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PREFACE

This issue of Acta Linguistica contains a selection of the papers presented at the conference on Metapragmatic Terms held in Budapest, July 3 through 5,1990, and jointly organized by the Research Institute for Linguistic of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the International Pragmatics Association (IPrA), Antwerp. Metapragmatics is an empirical-conceptual approach to linguistic action. It is an attempt to come to grips with the varying ways in which linguistic behavior is conceptualized by those engaged in it, by way of scrutinizing empirically observable linguistic reflections of those conceptualizations (such as linguistic action verbials, i.e. the verbs and verb-like expressions used, in natural language, to talk about the conceptualized behavior in question). This metapragmatic approach to verbal communication is motivated by the assumption that the meaning of social practices can only be fully understood by gaining insight into the worlds of ideas with which the participants associate them, and in terms of which they interpret them. It ultimate goal, which can only be achieved after further scrutinizing the complex interactions between concepts and actual practices, is to shed light on cross-linguistic and cross-cultural communication problems which may result, in part, from differences in the mental communicative frames in terms of which interacting members of different linguistic, cultural or subcultural background, operate.

A useful starting point for the study of differences in the lexicalization and conceptualization of linguistic interaction, and of their behavioral correlates, may be the description of metapragmatic terms, i.e. linguistic entities which reflect directly the conceptualization of linguistic interaction. The present volume is devoted to this problem.

Fall 1992

Ferenc Kiefer *Jef Verschueren*

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METAPRAGMATICS IN LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM SPEECH AND GESTURE*

JUSTINE CASSEL

I. Introduction

In this paper, language acquisition data will be brought to bear on the question of what constitutes a metapragmatic term, and what relationship exists between metapragmatic terms and metanarrative discourse (a concept that I'll explain further below). In using the study of development to answer questions asked by linguists working on adult language I am assuming that data from acquisition is not just an earlier stage in or detour from studying adult speakers. One might ask: "Why kids? Aren't they just the ones who do it wrong?" But as Ochs–Schieffelin (1979) point out "Nowhere is the importance of an item more noticeable than in its absence. Child language is valuable to a study of pragmatics in part because it demonstrates gaps in competence". The nature of metapragmatics can here be elucidated by an examination of its absence.

First, however, a number of primary distinctions need to be drawn. Following Morris (1938) we distinguish between "relations which a given sign sustains and the signs used in talking about such relations" (1938, 7). The sign participates in three dyadic relations, broadly speaking, and these are syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, and each of these relations is subject to talk at a 'higher level of semiosis', that is to metalinguistic discourse. It is the last relation, pragmatics, defined by Morris as the relationship between a sign and its "interpreter" (here we may gloss that as 'user'), and its corresponding metalanguage that concerns us here.

Current discussions of pragmatics tend to fall into one of two camps: a) descriptions of pragmatic meanings in terms of propositional-like rules with structures that should parallel those of syntactic or semantic descriptions—pragmatics as a part of 'reference-and-predication' (Silverstein, 1987); or

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b) descriptions privileging the distinctions set forth by Peirce (1932) who took into account not only the sign and the user, but also the context of use (the **respect or capacity** in "something stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity"[1]). Into this latter camp falls, for example, Bates (1976) who, following Silverstein, defines pragmatics as the study of linguistic indices, which cannot be described without reference to the context of their use (1976, 3). This latter approach, often found under the rubric 'ethnography of speaking', allows an examination of the function of particular pragmatic forms—not only their socially understood purposive function, but also their function as indices at a higher level of the context of speaking in which they are uttered (Silverstein 1987).

It is the latter kind of pragmatics which allows, too, a metapragmatics, where this might be defined as kinds of implicit contextualization cues, or signs indexing the use of signs in context by users. Metalinguistic discourse, at least in the psycholinguistic literature, has often been conceived of in terms of explicit comments that indicate that the speaker is reflecting on language in some way. That is, metalinguistic awareness is commonly thought to be evidenced by self-corrections or repairs, questions about proper usage, comments about the speech of others, language play, judgements of linguistic structure and function, comments about languages and about language in general (Clark 1978). Metapragmatics can be both a subbranch of metalinguistics (note that some of the mentioned topics are actually metasemantic), and a special privileged domain in which to study it. If indexicals of various sorts comprise the object of study of pragmatics, then pragmatic usage contains metapragmatic usage, in some sense, since all indexicals, by definition, index their own use in context.[2]

Seen in this way, metapragmatics can be the study of terms that index the speaker's knowledge of and purposive functions for communicative situations, as well as indexing an entire cultural construction of the kind of interaction being engaged in ('metapragmatic function vs. metapragmatic discourse' Silverstein 1985, 1990).

[1] Cf.: Logic as semiotic: the teory of signs [from ms. c. 1897]. In: Buchler, J. (ed.) 1955. Philosophical Writings of Peirce, 99.

[2] Put otherwise, every metapragmatics has a pragmatics at a higher functional order.

II. Metapragmatics in narrative

(1) Adults

A. Speech

One domain where the use of metapragmatic terms to denote both the communicative functions of the speech situation, and the speaker's construction of the speech event, is particularly clear is narrative. When narrating a story adults often make clear where this narration fits into the interactive text—that is, into the larger speech event currently taking place (Polanyi 1989),[3] who the narration is aimed towards (Goodwin 1986), and what the speaker's relationship may be to the segment of events just then being narrated. This last feature can be captured by a set of distinctions grouped under the heading of **narrative, metanarrative,** and **paranarrative** kinds of events.

The narrator of the stories that I study (stories told to a friend about a cartoon or movie just seen) does not fill the role of narrator throughout the storytelling process. The 'narrator' is at first a viewer, face-to-face with a television screen on which is displayed a 'visual text'—the representation in images of a particular story about Tweetie Bird and Sylvester, (or a murderer loose in London). After serving as the (somewhat) passive recipient of a narration, the roles are reversed and the recipient then becomes provider of a narration, telling the story to someone who has never seen the cartoon or movie. Each role entails a situational frame, or participation framework which organizes spatial and temporal configurations of speakers and hearers, and experienceable durations understandable in terms of events. The sequence of events that comprises the story proper is only one of a number of sequences of events that comprise the narrative. The sort of storytelling that concerns us is composed of five 'event-lines', or 'stretches of time', that make up the three narrative levels. The speaker's reference to each of these event lines, then, is metapragmatic in that it denotes an aspect of the construction of the current speech event.

The five event lines that speakers have access to are (1) the event sequence of the **story** (the **emplotment** of characters across situations of [inter]actions); (2) the organization in the cartoon, or event of the **visual text**; (3) the duration or events of the **viewing**; (4) the **representation** of events that the future

[3] Actually, speakers more often make clear where the narration fits into the denotational text—that is the record of what is to be talked about: the topic—and less often do they explicitly fit the narration into the interactional text: into the network of social practices evoked by the speech event (Silverstein 1990, personal communication)

speaker has formed; and (5) the events of the **interpersonal narrative**, or event of the telling.[4] These are listed in Figure (I).



Figure (I) EVENT LINES IN NARRATIVE

These distinct event lines are important because all of them may equally well form the topic of the narrative that the listener hears. That is, not only the events of Sylvester chasing Tweetie Bird and then not catching him can be conveyed in a narrative, but also the event of watching the cartoon and then describing it may be described to the interlocutor. A distinction is drawn here between the happening of the events from their ordering in some narration. The event sequence of the story (1) comprises the **narrative** level of the discourse. The visual text (2), viewing (3), and representation (4) form the **metanarrative** level of the discourse: the part of the narrative that is about narrating. The interpersonal narrative (5) is what we are referring to as the

[4] I owe this conception of the structure of events in narrative to Michael Silverstein (personal communication).

paranarrative level of the discourse: the part of the story where the narrator steps out and changes footing (Goffman 1981), and speaks in his/her own voice to the listener. An example of each of these narrative levels is provided in Figure (II)—the example is taken from the beginning of a story told by an adult on the basis of a cartoon she had just seen.

B. Gesture

Adults make reference to all three levels, and all 5 event lines during a typical story. Their metanarrative speech functions metapragmatically to index the structure of the speech being produced. Adults also demonstrate a typical pattern of gesturing correlated with reference to these different kinds of events (McNeill–Levy 1982). **Iconic** gestures, that depict some feature of the action or event being described, occur most often with narrative speech. **Metaphoric** gestures, where the concept being depicted has no physical form, and **deictic** gestures accompany metanarrative speech. Paranarrative speech is characterized by few gestures other than occasional deictics indicating the listener. The move between narrative levels is also characterized by a pattern of gesture use. Specifically, clauses that effect a move from narrative to metanarrative, or metanarrative to paranarrative, are accompanied by a fourth kind of gesture, the **beat**. This association of gestures to narrative level is shown in Figure (III).

Beat gestures are small baton like movements that do not change in form with the content of the accompanying speech. An example is given below:

[Right], [okay this one] [actually wasn't] a B.B. cartoon
beat beat beat
(open right hand away from body sweeps out three times)

In this example the beats are indexing the co-construction of a shared narrative event: they are signs of the interactional text in progress. The semiotic value of a beat lies in the fact that it indexes the word or phrase it accompanies as being significant not purely for its semantic content but also for its discourse–pragmatic content. The beat is particularly sensitive to the momentary indexing of the larger discourse structure or narrative situation as a whole. Thus gesture can serve a metapragmatic function in conjunction with particular functions of the speech that accompanies it, and it can also serve the function of revealing metapragmatic work in progress. In Figure (IV) is the story beginning given earlier, but with the gestures noted as well. Figure (IV) also gives the beginning of a story narration in French, to illustrate that the phenomenon is not limited to English speakers.

1. um have you seen any of the uh Bugs Bunny cartoons?	[PARA]
{yeah like}	
2. right, ok this one actually wasn't a Bugs Bunny cartoon	[META]
3. it was one of the- the series	[META]
{oh, ok}	
4. and it had Tweetie Bird and Sylvester	[META]
{alright (laugh)}	
5. so so so you know	[PARA]
{the cat right?}	
6. right uh huh	
{ok}	
7. and uh the first scene you see is uh	[META]
8. this this window with birdwatcher's society underneath it	
9. and there's Sylvester peeking around the window	[NARR]

Figure (II) NARRATIVE LEVELS

(2) Children

The issue that concerns us here is the development of metanarrative speech. It has been noted that, in a number of respects, young children's storytelling often resembles a series of barely connected sentences. Children do not, until as late as age 10, introduce reference and maintain reference to discourse enti-

Speech	Gesture
Narrative	Iconic
Metanarrative	Metaphoric / Deictic
Paranarrative	(few gestures)
Metapragmatic	Beat

Figure (III) TYPES OF GESTURES

ties in the denotational text (in the **story** proper) an adult-like, cohesive way (Karmiloff-Smith 1985; Hickmann 1980). They use pronouns exophorically, as if the listener shares a common knowledge of the protagonists of the story. Likewise, there is evidence that in some contexts children do not use the metapragmatic markers of reported speech in an adult-like way until age ten or eleven (Hickmann 1985). Until that age they may not represent dialogue as speech; that is, they do not set it off by way of quotation frames or equivalents, consisting of verbs of saying. Finally, in thematic terms, young children may juxtapose a series of utterances that do describe the events of a story, but lack the organizational property of a single narrative unit (Karmiloff-Smith 1983) (that is, they narrate solely at the story or **narrative level**). Many of these processes show a U-shaped behavioral pattern. That is, young children produce linguistic output which is closer to the adult model than is their output later in development. Karmiloff-Smith (1985) argues that this temporary behavioral regression is indicative of progression at the underlying representational level, where children are re-evaluating the nature of the procedure being acquired, and constraining local production for reasons of more global concerns.

It will be argued here that the development of metanarrative skills too shows a U-shaped behavioral pattern which also indicates radical underlying restructuring of the representation of the act of narration, and commenting on narration.

In Figure (V) you see an excerpt from a child's narration, with gestures. The remainder of this paper will focus on the causes of the obvious differences between this transcript and the previous ones.

A. ENGLISH

2. [right], [ok this one] [actually wasn't] a Bugs Bunny cartoon [META]
beat beat beat

3. [it was one of the- the series] [META]
metaphoric

{oh, ok}

4. and it had [Tweetie Bird and Sylvester] [META]
beat

...

7. and uh [the first scene you see is uh] [META]
metaphoric

8. [this this window] [with birdwatcher's society underneath it]
iconic iconic

B. FRENCH

1. Okay, [alors] il s'agit de [plusieurs] [episodes] d'une même
beats

bande [dessinée] avec les [mêmes] [personnages]. [META]
beats

2. Tu as le [chat] le chat
beats

3. ce qu'on appelle le chat noir et blanc,

et le petit oiseau jaune canary [très] [très] [mignon] [META]
beats

4. et ils se font la guerre depuis depuis très très longtemps [META]
beats

5. on les connait bien [META]

Figure (IV) GESTURE & NARRATIVE LEVEL

You know what?	[PARA?]
The cat [tried to go up] iconic	[NARR]
[he climbed up] [the tube] iconic + descriptor	[NARR]
'n he went iconic	[NARR]
['n then um] [got the bird] beat + iconic	[NARR]
['n then] [Granny came] beat + prep for next gesture	[NARR]
[smacked him down] iconic	[NARR]

Figure (V) CHILD GESTURE & NARRATIVE LEVEL (AGE 5 YEARS)

A. Speech

Our initial question, then, was whether children differ from adults in any obvious way in their production of metanarrative speech. Do they talk as much about the act of narrating or the structure of the narrative? Does the metapragmatic function of narrative speech have any place in their stories?

The data reported here come from an examination of the stories told by two adults, and two children at each of three age groups. In order to have some consistency in the stories a 'natural-enough' narrative paradigm was used. Children and adults watched a Sylvester and Tweetie Bird cartoon and were asked to tell the story to a same-age listener who had not seen the cartoon. For children, the cartoon was split into three episodes so as not to overtax their memory. The resulting stories were transcribed and divided into clauses using the presence of a finite verb as a guide.

The first measure to be reported is a comparison in production of meta-narrative statements over development. The measure of production was the

percentage of the total number of clauses produced in a story that were metanarrative in nature. The results are listed in Figure (VI).



Figure (VI) METANARRATIVE CLAUSES

The trend is for a steady increase with age in the number of metanarrative clauses produced. At age 5 19% of a story is comprised of metanarrative clauses. This increases to close to 30% for adults.

B. Gesture

These results show that for the younger children there is little metanarrative speech produced. Why is this? It is hard to do further analyses on data that are not there. In this case, however, we may use gesture as a clue to the function of accompanying speech. Is the absence of metanarrative statements indicative of an inability to structure narrative at any global level? Are children simply stringing sentences together? In adults there is a clear link between the function of a clause and the kind of gesture that it cooccurs with. We can therefore ask about the pattern of gesture use in children, and use this pattern as a clue to the function of their non- metanarrative speech.

Given that so few metanarrative clauses are produced, one would expect little or no production of beats, those gestures that in adult narrative accompany metanarrative commentary.

The second question addressed, then, was do young children produce metanarrative gestures—that is, **beats**? The measure of production was the percentage of total clauses in the story that contained one or more beat gestures.



Figure (VII) BEAT GESTURES

Figure (VII) shows the percentage of total clauses accompanied by beats for each of the four age groups.

The production of beats shows a U-shaped curve of development. That is, 25% to 32% clauses of the total clauses produced by 5-year-olds **and** adults are accompanied by beats. Only 11% of the total clauses produced by 8-year olds and 11-year olds are accompanied by beats. It is striking that 5-year olds produce so many beats since Figure (VI) demonstrates that they do not produce the metanarrative speech that usually accompanies beat gestures.

The U-shaped pattern of production of beats leads us to question the function that beats serve at each level. It is unlikely that the function of beats undergo a radical shift from childhood to adulthood. This sort of radical

discontinuity between child and adult language is rarely found. More likely is that the function is similar or identical, pointing us to look at whether indeed something that might be metanarrative in nature is produced in the verbal channel. We thus examine the co-occurence of beats with metanarrative, and beats with other kinds of linguistic devices.

The third question asked, then, concerned the kind of speech accompanying the beat gestures produced by five year old children. We might hypothesize, on the basis of the development of other narrative subsystems, that children would acquire local marking of discourse before global. A local strategy to mark the structure of narrative might consist of temporal conjunctions to link clauses, as opposed to metanarrative speech linking talk about events. That is, perhaps children do not distinguish between event levels in the way that adults do. If this is the case, they may use local conjunctions to join levels of events. This then served as the third measure:



Figure (VIII) WHERE BEATS OCCUR

Figure (VIII) shows the percentage of beats that accompany metanarrative statements versus the percentage of beats that accompany temporal adverbial phrases and conjunctions for each of the four age groups.

At age 5 the majority of beats are produced in conjunction with time words. This phenomenon tapers off and is replaced by the adult strategy of producing beats in conjunction with metanarrative statements. The temporal conjunctions "then" and "and then" accounted for the majority of temporal phrases in the narrations produced by 5-year old children. Older children produced a wider variety of temporal terms.

I pointed out earlier that the beat is particularly sensitive to the momentary indexing of the larger discourse structure or narrative situation as a whole, and can therefore serve to reveal the metapragmatic function of the speech that accompanies it. If we consider the function of beats to remain constant over development, insofar as they index a reference to the discourse structure of the story, then we have evidence that temporal conjunctions have metanarrative function for children.

Why should we assume that beats remain constant in function over development? One might ask whether beats simply mark temporality in young children and metanarrativity in adults? Evidence against this hypothesis comes from the other kinds of speech with which beats cooccur. We said earlier that beats accompany different kinds of metapragmatic devices. In adults beats occur with metanarrative phrases, but also with word searches, *verba dicendi* and repairs. While beats produced by young children clearly do not accompany metanarrative phrases, it turns out that they do accompany repairs, and that this function remains constant over development. At age 5 one quarter of the total number of beats produced accompany repair clauses, and for adults this figure is not significantly different (27% of the total number of beats accompany repairs). Thus, the more general function of beat gestures, that is to signal some sort of metapragmatic device, does remain constant over development. This fact supports the use of beat gestures as a clue to how speech is functioning metanarratively.

We are claiming, then, that while adults speak of the act of narrating by making overt reference to the structure of the story being told, or to the structure of the narrating event, children speak of narrating in a less overt way. For adults temporal conjunctions are used to conjoin descriptions of events ("He went up the pipe **and then** Tweetie dropped a bowling ball down"). For children the act of conjoining events is not self-evident. They are not able to represent the events of level one in level five. They conjoin descriptions

of events with temporal conjunctions and then index this performance as a example of reference to the structure of the story by their use of beats.

A number of conclusions can be drawn from these results. First of all, 5-year-old children do appear to produce metanarrative speech, although of a different form than that produced by adults.

Secondly, although metanarrative speech does appear at age five, it is at a lower level of narrative structure than adult metanarrative speech. That is, rather than commenting on the structure of the story as a whole, or the narrating event as a whole ("This is a Bugs Bunny cartoon" or "It has three parts") children simply comment on the relationships of sequenciality that exist between events ("As if they were saying" and "First one thing happens, and then another does"). This earlier kind of metanarrative speech must undergo a rather important transformation before it looks adult-like, where the transformation concerns the size of the unit that is appropriate to comment on at a metanarrative level. Thus we are led to argue, with Karmiloff-Smith, that the temporary behavioral regression in the production of beats, is indicative of progression at the underlying representational level, where children are re-evaluating the nature of the procedure being acquired, and constraining local production for reasons of more global concerns. That is, as children begin to represent the story as a whole more important than the sum of its parts, they must re-evaluate where beats are to occur; it is during this process, I argue, that beat production diminishes.

Finally, to return to the issue of metapragmatics. We said that metapragmatics (in the sense of the **discipline** of metapragmatics) was the study of terms that index the speaker's knowledge of and purposive functions for communicative situations, as well as indexing an entire cultural construction of the kind of interaction being engaged in. For adults metanarrative and paranarrative statements have the metapragmatic function of indexing that language has a storytelling function, and indexing how that function is conceived. For children, we can now say, the semantic domain of temporal adverbial phrases (and especially temporal conjunctions) has this function. Thus, for children, temporal adverbials and conjunctions are metapragmatic markers.

This paper, then, has the dual function of determining, first, whether and how children speak of the culturally constructed act of narrating, but also of enlarging our vision of what might be metanarrative, and giving us a new view of the function of temporal adverbials and conjunctions in narrative speech.

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TYPES OF ENGLISH DISCOURSE MARKERS

BRUCE FRASER

Introduction

Levinson (1983) was one of the first to suggest in print that discourse markers might be considered as a group worth study:[1]

"...there are many words and phrases in English, and no doubt most languages, that indicate the relationship between an utterance and the prior discourse. Examples are utterance-initial usages of but, therefore, in conclusion, to the contrary, still, however, anyway, well, besides, actually, all in all, so, after all, and so on. It is generally conceded that such words have at least a component of meaning that resists truth-conditional treatment... what they seem to do is indicate, often in very complex ways, just how the utterance that contains them is a response to, or a continuation of, some portion of the prior discourse" (87–8).

He did not pursue discourse markers beyond these brief comments. Since then, several researchers have considered discourse markers in more detail. The first of these research efforts is reported in Schourup (1985), who uses the term "discourse particles" in focusing primarily on *like, well,* and *y'know* as they function in various sorts of written text and conversational data. He concludes that each particle signals previously undisclosed thinking on the part of the speaker and indicates that this thinking is now occurring or has just now occurred but that the particle does not completely specify its content.[2]

The second, and the most detailed effort, is reported in Schiffrin (1987). Based upon her analysis of *and, because, but, I mean, now, oh, or, so, then,*

[1] An earlier version of this paper was given at the Symposium on Metapragmatic Terms, Budapest, Hungary, July 1990.

[2] I will use the term *signal* in speaking of pragmatic markers (in contrast to *mean* in speaking of content material) to mean that the very presence of the form (lexical or sturctural) commits the speaker to a specific communicative intention. Just as the presence of a lighted green traffic signal signals authorization for the motorist to proceed, and the presence of the bailiff signals the immediate arrival of the judge, so the presence of *please* before an imperative form signals the speaker commitment to making a request.

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well, and *y'know* as they occur in unstructured interview conversations, she proposes that these markers typically serve three functions: i) they work as contextual coordinates for utterances by locating them on one or more planes of discourse; ii) they index adjacent utterances to the speaker, the hearer, or both; iii) they index the utterance to prior and/or subsequent discourse. She sees discourse markers as serving an integrative function in discourse, thus contributing to discourse coherence: they serve as a kind of ***discourse glue.***

The third is that found in Blakemore (1987), who discusses *and, after all, you see, but, moreover, furthermore* and *so* under the label of "discourse connectives." Working from the relevance framework proposed by Sperber–Wilson (1986), she proposes that these expressions are used to indicate how the relevance of one discourse segment is dependent on another: they are expressions which "impose constraints on relevance in virtue of the inferential connections they express" (141).

The fourth effort is that found in Fraser (1990), where I present an analysis of discourse markers as members of a pragmatic category. In this analysis, each marker has certain privileges of occurrence, similar to the elements in a syntactic category and each has a core meaning, signaling generally how the speaker intends the utterance of which it is a part is to relate to the prior discourse. The relationships signalled by discourse markers include a speaker commitment to topic change (*incidently*), parallelism (*similarly*), reorienting (*anyway*), dissonance (*well*), and consequence (*so*).

The purpose of the present paper is to examine the class of English discourse markers, looking specifically at what subclasses are motivated by the nature of the discourse relationship they signal. In the first section, I characterize the class of discourse markers, both indicating what they are, and how they are to be distinguished from close contenders for membership. In the second section, I propose a three-way class distinction and, within each of these, several sub-classes. In the final section, I suggest some areas in which further research might prove fruitful.

Characterizing discourse markers

Following Fraser (1987, 1990, 1991a) I assume that sentence meaning is analyzable into two distinct types of encoded information: content meaning and pragmatic meaning.

Content meaning captures that state of affairs about which the speaker is talking. Sometimes referred to as the "propositional content" of the sentence,

it is conveyed by lexical meaning in conjunction with the syntactic structures present, and serves as the basis for the message content when the sentence is used in direct, literal communication.

In contrast, pragmatic meaning provides signals of what messages the speaker intends to directly convey by way of the uttering of this particular linguistic expression. Pragmatic meaning is conveyed through structural pragmatic markers (e.g., the declarative structure, which signals speaker belief in the sentence content); lexical pragmatic markers (e.g., *please*, which signals a request that the hearer bring about the action described in the sentence content); and phonological pragmatic markers (e.g., the so-called "sarcastic intonation").[3]

Pragmatic markers fall into three major types: basic, which signal the speaker's basic communicative intention—the force of the sentence when used in direct literal communication; commentary, which signal an entire separate message consisting of a speaker comment on the basic message; and parallel, which signal a message separate from but concomitant with the basic message. In a sentence such as "Frankly, Sir, we are lost," the content consists of "we are lost," and there are several pragmatic markers: a basic marker, the declarative syntactic structure, signalling speaker belief in this state of affairs; a commentary marker, "frankly," signalling a comment to the effect that the speaker does not expect the hearer to welcome the sentence content; and a parallel marker, "Sir," signalling that the speaker intends to show deference to the hearer.

The relationship between these aspects of sentence meaning is shown in the following figure:



Within this framework, discourse markers are one type of commentary pragmatic marker. They are distinguished from other commentary markers in virtue of the fact that they, alone, signal a comment specifying the type of sequential discourse relationship that holds between the current utterance

[3] I leave unaddressed the issue of whether various phonological signals such as sarcastic intonation, emphatic stress, and the like are aspects of sentence meaning or utterance interpretation.

—the utterance of which the discourse marker is a part—and the prior discourse.[4]

Consider, for example, the following interchange:

(1) Attorney: What happened then?
Witness: ***Well***, we got into an argument, I sort of lost my cool, and called him a jerk. You know how sometimes you just can't keep your temper... haven't you had that happen to you? I'm sorry about that, but it just happened.
Attorney: ***Anyway, so*** you called him a jerk. ***And*** then what did you do?

There are four discourse markers (in bold italics) in the above interchange, each of which signals a speaker comment on the current utterance.

The first marker, *well,* signals some degree of reluctance on the part of the witness to recount the story.[5] The second, *anyway,* signals a reorientation of the discourse focus (here, back to the witness' story), while the *so* signals that the following assertion is grounded on the foregoing (indeed, the witness asserted it). The *and* beginning the final utterance signals that what follows is to be heard as parallel to some part of the foregoing discourse (here, the initial question.)[6]

Like other commentary markers, discourse markers are lexical adjuncts to and are independent of an already well-formed sentence. Hence, the absence of the discourse marker does not render a sentence ungrammatical and/or unintelligible. It does, however, remove a powerful clue about what commitment the speaker makes regarding the relationship between the current ut-

[4] Other commentary pragmatic markers signal other types of speaker comments on the current message, as illustrated in the following examples.
a) Frankly, we are lost [message has negative import]
b) Repeatedly, we are lost [basis for speaker belief]
c) Apparently, we are lost [degree of confidence in belief]
d) Regrettably, we are lost [attitude towards belief]
e) Mark my words, we are lost [attitude towards situation]
These issues are examined in detail in Fraser, 1991a.

[5] For the sake of exposition, I am assigning an interpretation to the discourse markers here and below. The points to be made should survive whether or not readers have slightly different readings.

[6] In some cases the discourse to which the marker signals a relationship may be in the distant past. For example,a student initiated a conversation with me not long ago with "*So,* when are you going to Italy?" The *so* in her utterance referenced our conversation of some two weeks earlier. For a detailed examination of *so* see Fraser 1991b.

terance and the prior discourse. This "privilege of absence" also distinguishes discourse markers from other commentary pragmatic markers, which do indeed contribute to utterance meaning. For example, the presence of *frankly* in "*Frankly,* you didn't do very well in the exam" signals a speaker comment, which cannot be inferred when frankly is not present.

At the general level the concept of discourse marker as a lexical marker signaling the relationship between parts of the discourse is relatively straightforward. However, there is unacceptable vagueness when one looks deeper.

First, because the notion of discourse marker is one which arose from examining how certain lexical formatives function on a discourse level, a complete understanding of what is meant by a "sequential discourse relationship," is not an *a priori* notion, and must evolve as researchers look more closely at the concept. For the moment, it must be left at a rather intuitive and unsatisfactory level: how the speaker intends the current basic message to be related to the discourse, either its structure or prior messages.

And second, although researchers generally agree (although not all explicitly state this), that there is some "core" meaning associated with each marker, what constitutes this "core" remains elusive. Consider the following examples.

(2) (a) Susan is married. So, she is no longer single. Damn!
(b) John was tired. So he left early.
(c) Attorney: And how long were you part of the crew?
Witness: Five years.
Attorney: So you were employed by G for roughly 5 years?
(d) Son: My clothes are still wet.
Mother: So put the drier on for 30 minutes more.
(e) Teenage son: The Celtics have an important game today.
Disinterested parent: So?
(f) [Grandmother to granddaughter] So tell me about this wonderful young man you're seeing.

These examples show that *so* as a discourse marker permits a wide range of interpretations, all of which arguably emerge from a core sense. Starting with this core meaning, the specific interpretation of the consequential relationship in a given instance is the result of enriching this general signal in light of the details of the particular discourse context. How this process proceeds, however, remains to be specified.[7]

[7] I see this process to be analogous to what occurs when one interprets *good* in "a good

Although not essential to their definition, there are several properties of discourse markers that are worth noting. First, discourse markers are drawn from a wide range of traditional grammatical categories: from verbs (*look, listen*); adverbs (*now, then*); literal phrases (*to repeat, as a result*); idioms (*by and large, still and all*); interjections (*well*); coordinate conjunctions (*and, or*); subordinate conjunctions (*however, so*); and *OK*, which falls into no traditional category.

In this regard, the core meaning of discourse markers, while always general, vary in the extent to which they are related to the meaning of the homophonous form when it functions in a traditional syntactic role. For example, the meaning of *continuing*, as a discourse marker (as in "*Continuing*, it would be futile for him to try"), is closely connected to its use as a present participle. On the other hand, the meaning of well in "*Well*, where were we?" is only distantly related, at best, to its meaning as a water source or the adverbial form of *good*.

Finally, although all discourse markers can occur in utterance-initial position, and are found there most often, only some are found in medial position, and even fewer are found in utterance-final position. The examples in (3) illustrate this, the "?" indicating an utterance of questionable acceptability.[8]

(3) (a) I am for it. ***However,*** the Dean won't agree
I am for it. The Dean, ***however,*** won't agree
I am for it. The Dean won't agree, ***however***

(b) ***In other words,*** you are refusing to do it
You are, ***in other words***, refusing to do it
?You are refusing to do it, ***in other words***

(c) ***Anyway,*** I want to get back to our initial topic
?I, ***anyway,*** want to get back to our initial topic
?I want to get back to our initial topic, ***anyway***

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meal" versus "a good movie" versus "a good boy," or when one interprets *just* in "just now" versus "just behind the barn" versus "just right."

[8] Aside from the obvious explanation that rests on the non-discourse marker grammatical status of the form (e.g., that *and* is a coordinate conjunction which occurs primarily in sentence-initial position), one potential explanation for the absence of discourse markers in sentence-medial/final position is the difficulty in distinguishing their function from the same formative functioning as a part of the sentence content. For example, whereas the potential ambiguity of "*Now* where were we?" can be reduced, if not resolved, by the presence a comma intonation, this is not possible for the alternative "Where were we now?", although the difference may be signalled by the utterance-final intonation. I am unaware of research which provides an account of these restrictions.

I now wish to turn to what discourse markers are not. First, in spite of their independence from the sentence proper, discourse markers are not single word sentences, even though some can be found standing alone to serve as a complete utterance. Two examples will illustrate:

(4) (a) Mother: There is no way you're going to watch TV.
Child: ***But...***
Mother: Sorry, that's the way it is.

(b) Faculty Member 1: I heard that there are to be more cutbacks next year
Faculty Member 2: ***So?***

In (4a), the non-falling intonation on the Child's utterance made it clear that she was not finished.[9] In (4b) the question intonation had the effect of imposing an interrogative gloss on the core meaning of "What follows is...", thereby creating the interpretation "What follows?"

In contrast, consider (5), which contains interjections: lexical formatives which stand alone and represent an entire message, usually reflecting the speaker's emotional state.

(5) (a) Son: The Celtics lost tonight
Father: ***Oh? Wow!***

(b) ***Ouch!***

(c) Teenager 1: I just talked to Madonna
Teenager 2: ***Far out***

In (5a) there are two interjections. The first, *oh*, has the basic interpretation of "What I understand you to be saying is new information to me." Of course this interjection, like others, has imposed upon it a marked intonation which, in itself, provides an additional parallel message. In this instance, it was a utterance-final rising intonation which signals surprise. *Wow*, also, stands for an entire message, "I am pleased at this information," *ouch* conveys "That hurts," and *far out* conveys "I'm pleased." Interjections differ significantly from discourse markers: they do not signal a comment on the current utterance. Indeed, they are not even pragmatic markers but are pragmatic idioms which may always stand alone.

Vocatives, nominals used to refer to the addressee (e.g., *Colonel, Waiter, Doctor, Everyone, Ahem, Sweetie*), must be distinguished from discourse markers. Like interjections, they encode an entire message, to the effect: "I

[9] The reader is referred to (Barton 1990) on the issue of elliptical sentences.

am addressing my remarks to ...." They seldom stand alone but are associated with an utterance and, as such, are one type of parallel pragmatic marker.

Because, also, must be excluded as a discourse marker. Consider the examples in (6).

(6) (a) Wife: Why do you want to go there?
Husband: **Because** I like the ice cream

(b) John must be at home, **because** his car is there

In (6a), *because* is functioning as a subordinate conjunction, albeit in an utterance in which the main clause of the sentence has been elided (I want to go because I like the ice cream). In (6b), *because* is functioning as a commentary pragmatic marker, but not as a discourse marker—it does not relate two messages, the one in the current utterance to some prior part of the discourse. Rather, like *inasmuch as, in view of the fact that, since, according to what I hear,* and *based on my observations* it signals the basis for which the speaker is expressing belief in the basic sentence proposition.[10]

Excluded also from the class of discourse markers is *Y'know*, a member of a class of parallel markers. Consider (7):

(7) (a) ***Y'know***, I really like eating raw pickles
(b) John is, ***y'know***, more of a friend than a lover

In (7), *Y'know*, not to be confused with its putative source *you know*, does not signal a comment on how the current utterance is related to the foregoing context. Rather, it signals a message requesting that the hearer appreciate and/or be in sympathy with the speaker's point of view. The expression *I mean* is also excluded from discourse marker membership for similar reasons.

Finally, excluded are pause markers, illustrated in (8).[11]

(8) (a) Coach: How many can you take in your car?
Parent: ***Well***...at least 6 if they squeeze

(b) There were***..oh***...maybe half a dozen left when I arrived

(c) ***Ah***...John...***uh***...could you come over here for a moment?

[10] There is also the utterance "Because!" in response to "Why aren't you cleaning up your room?" which appears to have become a fixed form, perhaps shortened from "beacuse I don't want to." In any event, it is not a discourse marker.

[11] Some of these pause markers appear to function as a kind of "start-up" form, signalling that the speaker is taking time to think about the answer or at least not responding too quickly, perhaps out of deference to the hearer.

While in some cases these pause markers are homophonous with discourse markers or other pragmatic markers, their interpretation in such examples makes it clear that they are not signalling a sequential discourse relationship. Rather, they signal a message that the speaker wishes to keep the "conversational floor," perhaps because of the need to think before answering. As such, these pause markers are member of yet another class of parallel pragmatic markers.

To summarize, discourse markers are lexical expressions which are syntacticly independent of the basic sentence structure, and which have a general core meaning which signals the relationship of the current utterance to the prior discourse. I now wish to examine the distinctions within this category.

Types of discourse markers

At the most general level, the class of discourse markers divides neatly into three primary subclasses: markers which signal aspects of topic change; markers which signal the current discourse activity (e.g., explaining or clarifying), and markers which signal how the current message relates to an earlier part of the discourse (e.g., that it is parallel to, or contrasts with). I will treat them in turn.[12]

Group 1: Topic markers

The first subclass contains two groups of markers: those which signal some sort of topic shift; and those which signal a refocusing on the current topic.

The notion of "topic" is, at best, problematic. Some researchers write of sentence topic, others of utterance topic, while still others explore the notion of discourse topic. (Some researchers wisely avoid the topic altogether.) For my purposes, I will consider only discourse topic—what the discourse participants are "talking about" at any given time, including various subtopics as they arise.

Although one might expect to find a discourse marker whose function is to signal an initial discourse topic, I have found none. When an initial topic is conveyed explicitly—and this isn't always the case—it appears to be as the result of an explicit suggestion (e.g., "I would like to talk to you today about your recent performance, Mr. Johnson"; "Let's begin with a discussion about

[12] On a larger scale, we might expect to find markers to signal how the speaker intends to frame the entire discourse segment, for example, "Did you hear the one about. . . " signalling that a joke is to following.

your recent performance"). There is, however, a sizeable group of markers which signal that the speaker wishes to change the topic, (if only temporarily), to continue with a present topic, or to return to a former topic. I have listed some of the topic change markers in (9):[13]

(9) *back to my original point, before I forget, by the way, continuing, in any case, in case you don't recall, incidently, just to update you, moving right along, on a different note, parenthetically, speaking of, that reminds me, to continue, to return to my original point, turning now to, while I think of it, while I have you, with regards to*

There is, in addition, a second group which signals a refocusing on a part of the topic at hand. These are listed in (10):

(10) *again, alright, but, here, hey, indeed, in fact, listen, look (here), now, OK, say, see, well, y'see*

We find these in examples such as the following:

(11) (a) ***Alright***, let's get this thing organized
(b) ***Indeed***, he is a good-looking guy
(c) ***Y'see***, we really don't have enough money at this time

Group 2: Discourse activity markers

The second subclass consists of discourse markers which signal the current discourse activity relative to some part of the foregoing discourse. These activities refer to types of discourse work such as explaining or summarizing, and not to the type of message (i.e., the type of illocutionary act) the speaker conveys through the utterance. I have identified 7 such activity types—surely not a complete list—and presented some representative examples in (12), with each type labeled by a term suggesting the discourse work being done.

(12) (a) **Clarifying:** *by way of clarification, to clarify*
(b) **Conceding:** *admittedly, after all, all in all, all the same, anyhow, anyway, at any rate, besides, for all that, in any case/event, of course, still and al*
(c) **Explaining:** *by way of explanation, if I may explain, to explain*

[13] The lists of discourse markers in the following discussion are intended to be illustrations, not exhaustions.

(d) **Interrupting:** *if I may interrupt, to interrupt, not to interrupt*

(e) **Repeating:** *at the risk of repeating myself, once again, to repeat*

(f) **Sequencing:** *finally, first, in the first place, lastly, next, on the one/other hand, second, to begin, to conclude, to continue, to start with*

(g) **Summarizing:** *in general, in summary, overall, so far, summarizing, summing up, thus far, to sum up, at this point*

Group 3: Message relationship markers

The third subclass of discourse markers are those which signal the relationship of the basic message being conveyed by the current utterance to some prior message. There are four groups: Parallel; Contrasting; Elaborative; and Inferential.

Parallel markers are the most general of these and signal that the current basic message is, in some way, parallel to some aspect of the prior discourse. I have list examples in (14).

(13) **Parallel discourse markers:** *also, alternatively, analogously, and, by the same token, correspondingly, equally, likewise, or, otherwise, similarly, too*

To see how these function, consider the examples in (15):

(14) (a) Oil ***and*** water don't mix

(b) Student 1: How was the party?
Student 2: Fantastic. Harold came. ***And*** who do you think he brought?

(c) A: John is sleeping in the den and I'm in the kitchen
B: ***And*** where am I sleeping?

In (14a), *and* functions as a coordinate conjunction and conjoins two nominals. In (14b), however, *and*, functioning as a discourse marker, signals that the second message is parallel to but separate from the first. The speaker has signalled that she is conveying two messages: the first, a claim that Harold came; and the second, a (rhetorical) question involving Harold's companion. Similarly, in (14c), the discourse marker *and*, uttered by the second speaker, signals a message parallel to the first two, in the sense here that this latter bit of information is needed.

Each of the other parallel discourse markers signals some qualification on nature of the parallel relationship. I can tentatively identify two subgroups. The first contains *alternatively,* or and *otherwise*, which signal an alternate to an earlier message. The second subgroup contains *also, analogously, by the same token, correspondingly, equally, likewise, similarly,* and *too,* which signal a message similar along some unspecified dimension, with *also* and *too* signaling an identity of a part of the current message to one preceding.

Contrastive markers, listed in (15), populate the second group.[14]

(15) **Contrastive discourse markers:** *all the same, but, contrariwise, conversely, despite, however, I may be wrong but, in spite of, in comparison, in contrast, instead, never/nonetheless, notwithstanding, on the one/other hand, on the contrary, rather, regardless, still, that said, though, well, yet*

Similar to the parallel markers, there seems to be a single, more basic contrastive marker: *but*. Just as *and* signals that there is some sort of parallelism at hand, *but* signals a sense of "dissonance." The examples in (14b) reflect some of the contexts in which the discourse marker *but* is found.

(16) (a) Son (whining): I can't do it
Father: ***But*** I know that you CAN do it

(b) Job Interviewer: The position has been filled. ***But*** do come in anyway and talk for a minute.

(c) Witness: I didn't think I should talk about it
Attorney: ***But*** what did you actually say?

There are several subgroups which specify a more detailed sense of contrast. Markers such as *contrariwise, conversely, in comparison, in contrast, on the contrary* and *on the one/other hand* signal explicitly that it is the content of the two messages that is in sharp contrast. Another subgroup contains the markers *all the same, despite, however, in spite of, instead, irrespective, nevertheless, nonetheless, notwithstanding, rather, regardless, still, though,* and *yet* which signal a contrast sharp but one generally unexpected. A third subgroup within this subclass of contrastive markers contains *I may be wrong but* and *that said*, which signal a contrast between a previous claim or like message (by either the speaker or another discourse participant) and the claim in the

[14] The expression *on the one hand* is the one exception I ahve found of a discourse marker which signals that the current message is related not to a prior one but one forthcoming.

current message. Finally, *well* appears to be the sole member of a fourth subgroup, signalling that the current message is contrary to that which the hearer is presumed to expect.

Elaborative markers populate the third group. These markers signal that the current utterance constitutes an elaboration of an earlier one. Included in this group are the following:

(17) **Elaborative discourse markers:** *above all, also, besides, better, for example, for instance, further(more), in addition, in fact, in other words, in particular, indeed, more accurately, more importantly, more precisely, more specifically, more to the point, moreover, namely, on top of it all, to cap it all off, what is more*

Of these, the markers *above all, indeed, in fact, on top of it all*, and *to top it all off* signal a more general sense of elaboration, (e.g., "He was fairly scared. Indeed, he was scared silly"), while a second subgroup containing *better, in particular, more accurately, more importantly, more precisely, more specifically, more to the point* has just the opposite effect, namely, to signal a more refined characterization of the sense of the foregoing. A third subgroup containing *also, besides, further(more), in addition, moreover, what is more* serves to signal one additional aspect to the current topic (e.g., "I don't think we should go due to the danger. Besides, I don't want to go.") A final subgroup signals the speaker's intention to have the current message serve as an illustration of an earlier point. Such markers include *for example, for instance, in other words, namely.*

The fourth and final group is **Inferential markers**, which signal that the current utterance conveys a message which is, in some sense, consequential to some aspect of the foregoing. Examples are presented in (18):

(18) **Inferential discourse markers:** *accordingly, as a consequence, as a result, consequently, hence, in this/that case, of course, so, then, therefore, thus*

Contrary to the other three groups, there is no obvious subgrouping, although there are subtle difference of use, for example:

(19) (a) John is remaining. ***So*** (?***in that case***) I am leaving.
(b) I don't want to talk with you. But I will. ***Thus*** (?***as a result***) sit down

Final remarks

The foregoing is intended to be a preliminary examination into distinctions within the class of English discourse marker. Based on my analysis, there appear to be some definite types: topic markers; discourse activity markers; and message relationship markers. Within these, there are various, more specific subdivisions, some clearly more problematic than others. Indeed, we may ultimately conclude that such an attempt at typing is not a useful way to understand discourse. Until then, however, I think it is an area worth pursuing.

I have, in addition, touched upon several areas where immediate future research is required. The notion of sequential discourse relationship requires clarification as do the details of the core meaning for individual discourse markers. One might consider whether or not discourse markers should be viewed as a pragmatic category, albeit a part of the grammar of a language, as I have proposed, or as part of a larger group of interactive markers, markers such as "Then there was the one about..." which introduces a joke, or "Let us pray," which introduces a moment of prayer.

Remaining, also, is an adequate account of the interrelationship between performative sentences and the presence of discourse markers. For example, we find "More to the point, I should have done it" conveying a speaker admission while "More to the point, I admit that I should have done it" and "I admit that more to the point, I should have done it" are highly questionable. Not unrelated to this problem is that of the sequencing of discourse markers—which can co-occur and in what order. For example, we find sentences such as "And so you agree" but not "So and you agree." And finally, there is the question of the occurrence of various discourse markers with syntactic structures. We do not find, for example, "By way of explanation, who are you?" I leave these problems for another time.

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VERBA SENTIENDI AS METAPRAGMATIC TERMS*

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1. Introduction

The focus of my interest is a certain type of verb whose function is to convey the subject referent's attitude to the event or situation described in the sentential complement of that verb. If, on a given occasion, I were to say (1),

(1) *John is sure (or convinced) that your signature is needed,*

then I would have expressed my opinion that John is committed to the belief that the proposition of the that-clause is true. I have attributed a propositional attitude to John. Since we do not have access to the workings of other people's minds, it is likely that it is John himself who has explicitly informed me of his conviction, though I may also have formed my belief about John without his having told me of his propositional attitude. And even if my evidence for saying (1) does stem from something that John has said, I am not thereby **referring** to any specific illocutionary act on the part of John.

On the other hand, if I were to use the past tense form ***was*** instead of present tense *is*, as in (2),

(2) *John was sure/convinced that your signature is needed,*

then I will be understood to refer to—to **report** on—one particular speech act performed by John. The predicate of propositional attitude is then seen to substitute for a verb of saying in an event of indirect speech.

Any verb of saying appearing in a report is indirectly a verb of propositional attitude. This is true because, normally, for someone to state that something is the case means she/he believes it to be the case.

An example like (2) shows that it is possible to refer to already performed linguistic actions without the help of an English verb of saying. You can instead

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use a main clause verb referring to what the reporting person assumes to have been the reported speaker's attitude to the proposition expressed in the complement clause. There are special predicates that are available to that end, namely the predicates of propositional attitude, or *verba sentiendi* (henceforth abbreviated VS), which in English include, among others, *believe, think, feel, assume, wish, hope, prefer, find* (as in *Beth found that the frozen berries were just as good as the fresh ones*), etc.

The reporting speaker's use of a particular VS may reflect the fact that that very verb was used in the speech act reported on. In such situations, the audience will normally assume that the reporter purports to provide a faithful rendition of what was said by the reported speaker (henceforth also referred to as the original speaker). We understand that the same VS would have been part of a direct- speech quotation of the original speech act.

In other situations, the reported speaker may have employed no VS at all, and yet the reporting speaker has for some reason chosen to avail herself[1] of a VS in her report. What happens in the latter type of situation is that the speaker is giving some extra information over and above what would be communicated if she had used direct speech and a verb of saying. By means of a VS, a reporting speaker can impart to her addressee what she considers to be certain accessible inferences based on her own interpretation of the reported speech act.

It is possible to combine a verb of saying and a VS in such a way that the latter appears in the complement of the former (*He said that he thought that...*), but this type of construction implicates that the VS in question was also employed by the original speaker.

Consider the following pairs of reported and reporting acts, where only the former report could have been felicitously replaced by *He said he believed that hot chilis are good for me.*

(3) Reported act: *I believe that hot chilis are good for you.*
Report: *He believed/believes that hot chilis are good for me.*

(4) Reported act: *Hot chilis are good for you.*
Report: *He believed/believes that hot chilis are good for me.*

Believe is a verb that can be placed on an epistemic scale ranging from total ignorance to absolute certainty, and it may receive either a one-sided (unilateral) or a two-sided (bilateral) scalar interpretation in a given communicative

[1] The reporting speaker (the reporter) will henceforth be referred to as "she", the reported speaker (the original speaker) as "he".

event (see Horn 1989). Under the one-sided understanding of *believe* in sentences starting with *I believe that.../He believed that...*, the verb is not felt to contrast with or be inconsistent with the epistemically stronger verb *know*. If you know that something is the case, then obviously you believe it to be the case. Conversely, you may well know that something is true without necessarily stating explicitly that you hold the kind of strong belief associated with the notion of knowing. For example, I may characterize the reported act of (4), which contains no epistemic verb of propositional attitude, by saying that the speaker *knows*. I would probably do so if my experience with the speaker is such that I consider him to be someone who can be trusted and who usually knows what he is talking about.

We do have a tendency, however, to give a two-sided scalar interpretation to *believe* in statements such as the formally identical reports of (3) and (4) above. By using the weaker epistemic verb, the reporting speaker conversationally implicates (Q-implicates in the sense of Horn, ibid., where the 'Q' relates to Grice's Maxim of Quantity, as expounded in Grice 1975) that the reporter assumes that the reported speaker just believes, and does not know for sure. That implicature is based on a two-sided understanding of *believe* as a scalar predicate. According to the reporter, the original speaker *at most believes* that hot chilis are beneficial.

It seems to be relatively speaking harder to avoid reading this Q-implicature into declarative sentences where the verb *believe* is in the past tense, and it is definitely easier to suppress this 'upper bound' implicature when the subject of the main clause is a 1st person pronoun and the VS is in the present tense, as in the reported act of (3). The speaker of that utterance may not have intended the recipient to infer that he holds a reduced degree of belief about the good effects of hot chilis, in other words, that he is not fully committed to the truth of the complement proposition. On the other hand, when that verb later reappears in a report on the original utterance, the Q-implicature is susceptible of being read into the report, and there is a distinct possibility that the recipient will even read the second-order implicature of "I believe otherwise" into the statement *He believed that hot chilis are good for me*. (Nonverbal cues can either strengthen or weaken that assumption.) As there is (supposed to be) no linguistic difference between the report of (3) and the report of (4), there is clearly also no difference between those two reports with regard to the implicatures they induce.

It is quite possible that the particular VS selected by the reporter adds information about the reporter's own interpretation of the reported event and its context, whether or not that interpretation is consistent with the original

speaker's intentions. When the main clause predicate is a verb that purportedly refers to the original speaker's mental state at the time of utterance, the reporter may succeed in building a richer, or more detailed context around the communicative act reported on than would be the case if direct speech had been used. Even a fanciful manner-of-speaking verb (like *giggle, stutter,* etc.) in an act of direct quoting (see Lehrer, this volume) cannot possibly convey as much in the way of extra assumptions (cf. Sperber–Wilson 1986) as a carefully selected VS.

A number of things can go wrong in a report on a past speech act. There is a risk that the reporter will present her audience with a highly inaccurate report. For instance, the report may be inaccurate because it misrepresents the illocutionary force (Austin 1962) that the original speaker intended the interlocutor to associate with his act, or because it adds one or more conversational implicata for which the original speaker is clearly not responsible.

To give you an example of the former type of situation, consider the following pair of reported and reporting acts.

(5) Reported speech act: *The deadline was yesterday, wasn't it?*
Report: *#He asked if the deadline was yesterday.*

This is not an accurate report, as it fails to convey the fact that the verbal act reported on was not an open question but an epistemically biased tag question construction whose first, declarative part reveals the speaker's own presumption, and whose second, interrogative part is a request for confirmation. The report in (5) captures the question dimension of the original speech act but fails to convey that the original speaker has at least weakly committed himself to the belief that the proposition of the declarative is true.

An example of a report that fails for a double reason is the one in (6).

(6) Reported speech act: *The deadline was yesterday, wasn't it?*
Report: *#He believed/thought that the deadline was yesterday.*

What is wrong with this report is that it both ignores the original speaker's request for confirmation and adds an unwarranted implicatum of the type discussed in connection with (3) and (4) above.

Occasionally you will fail to report adequately precisely because the words and the syntactic structure of the reported act are being copied slavishly in the reporting act. (7) provides a good English example of what I have in mind.

(7) Reported speech act: *I think we can all agree that the enterprise has been a failure.*
Report: *#He thought they could all agree that the enterprise had been a failure.*

My English informants tell me that the syntactic string *He thought they could all agree that the enterprise had been a failure* would scarcely make sense in any conceivable context. A faithful indirect speech report on the statement *I think we can all agree that the enterprise has been a failure* would have to depart from the actual structure of that modally modified declarative. *He felt very strongly that the enterprise had been a failure* would be a reasonable candidate.

A linguistic action verb used in a report on some previously performed act of speaking is one type of **metapragmatic** verb. The present paper is about the analoguous metapragmatic function of a different category of verbs: the VS. My principal language of investigation has been Norwegian. I will not attempt to delimit exactly the class of VS in Norwegian that can be argued to assume the role of a verb of saying in reports on previous speech acts. I am mainly interested in the use of four central Norwegian verbs of propositional attitude in reporting and reported acts, every one of which can be translated by the single multi-functional, or polysemous English verb *think*.

2. The *think* category of Norwegian verba sentiendi

The four Norwegian verbs referred to at the end of the introductory section are: 1) *tro,* meaning 'to think' in the sense of 'to believe' (including the religious faith context as well as a parenthetical hedging function); 2) *synes,* meaning 'to think', or 'to feel', with reference to strictly subjective evaluations based on personal taste, etc.; 3) *mene,* meaning 'to have an opinion (about something)'; 4) *tenke,* meaning 'to assume', or 'to suppose', in addition to its intransitive use as a predicate denoting the activity of thinking, or pondering.

We will first make a comparison between *tro* and *synes,* a lexical pair that is admirably suited to demonstrate the polysemous character of English *think*. In English it is possible to use a sentence like (8) not only if you feel you do not have sufficient knowledge to leave the statement of the complement clause unmodified, but also if you intend to express your personal subjective evaluation.

(8) *I think she's a good guitar player.*

The continuation of (9) implies the former reading, and that of (10) the latter.

(9) *I think she's a good guitar player, but I only know her as a percussionist.*

(10) *I think she's a good guitar player, but I admit that that's simply my own personal taste.*

If we substitute *believe* for *think* in the sentence structures of (9) and (10), we find that this other English VS, *believe*, is acceptable in (9') but not in (10').

(9') *I believe she's a good guitar player, but I only know her as a percussionist.*

(10') *I believe she's a good guitar player, #but I admit that that's simply my own personal taste.*

Norwegian *tro* (present tense *tror*) would be required in a translation of (9), while *synes* (present tense *syns* or *synes*) would be the right gloss for *think* in (10).

(11) *Jeg tror/??syns hun er en god gitarist, men jeg kjenner henne bare som perkusjonist.*

(12) *Jeg syns/??tror hun er en god gitarist, men jeg innrømmer at det rett og slett er min egen personlige smak.*

We have found that the same generalized conversational implicatures attach to the use of Norwegian *tro* and English *think - believe. Synes,* on the other hand, does not really belong to the same kind of epistemic scale as *tro* and its English counterparts, because it refers to a purely subjective judgement on the part of the subject referent. As the propositions of the complements of (13) are all such that you cannot form a purely subjective opinion about their truth or falsity, the *synes* alternative makes those sentence structures ungrammatical.

(13) (a) *Mons tror/*syns at han vinner i morgen.*
'Mons thinks (believes) that we will win tomorrow'

(b) *Jeg trodde/*syntes du kjente henne.*
'I thought (believed) you knew her'

(c) *Jeg tror/*syns Andersen hadde mistet lommeboka si.*
'I think (believe) Andersen had lost his wallet'

The subjective character of *synes* makes the indirect speech report of (14) an appropriate report on the statement of I) as well as on the unqualified statement of II).

(14) Reported speech act I): *Jeg syns hun er en god gitarist.*
'I think she is a good guitar player'
Reported speech act II): *Hun er en god gitarist.*
'She is a good guitar player'
Report: *Han syntes hun var en god gitarist.*
'He thought/felt she was a good guitar player'

The impartial character of this report stands in striking contrast to the biased alternative of (15) used as a report on I) or II) in (14).

(15) Report: *#Han trodde hun var en god gitarist.*
'He thought/believed she was a good guitar player'

Even Norwegian *synes* is a polysemous verb. I said that it refers to a different type of mental state than *tro*, but it does not necessarily involve reference to some personal evaluation, to a statement whose truth-value simply cannot be tested on empirical grounds. *Synes* is also appropriate when the speaker is trying to identify the nature of some sensory stimulus as she is speaking.

(16) *Jeg syns du har en flekk på frakken din.*
'I think you have a stain on your coat'
'It looks as if you have a stain on your coat', or
'You seem to have a stain on your coat'

(17) *Jeg syns det tordner.*
'I think it thunders'

This particular use of *synes* presupposes a 1st person subject. Curiously, it is not *think* but *believe* that seems to have an analogous function in English, a verb that does not correspond to Norwegian *synes,* apart from its use in sentences like (18) and (19):

(18) *I believe there's a stain on your coat.*

(19) *I believe there's thunder in the air.*

The English speaker's use of *believe* in (18)–(19) could conceivably represent a case of understatement; on the other hand, you will typically use (16)/(17) and (18)/(19) precisely because you have to see or hear more closely in order to form a definite idea.

The verb *synes*, which is otherwise quite acceptable in a metapragmatic reference to a previous statement involving that VS, is less natural in reports on statements of the type illustrated in (16)–(17):

(20) *?Han syntes jeg hadde en flekk på frakken min.*
'He thought I had a stain on my coat'
(21) *?Han syntes det tordnet.*
'He thought it thundered'

Synes can not modify statements that deal explicitly with the subject referent's preferences or (dis)likings. Hence (22) is well-formed, but (23) is not; (24) is well-formed, and (25) is not.

(22) *Jeg syns du er fantastisk.*
'I think you are marvellous'
(23) **Jeg syns jeg liker deg veldig godt.*
'I think I like you very much'
(24) *Jeg syns beaujolais er bedre.*
'I think beaujolais is better'
(25) **Jeg syns jeg foretrekker beaujolais.*
'I think I prefer beaujolais'

The constraint on complement and main clause verb relations that blocks Norwegian structures like (23) and (25) explains the absence of "reports" like (26) and (27).

(26) **Han syntes han likte meg.*
'He thought he liked me'
(27) **Han syntes han foretrakk beaujolais.*
'He thought he preferred beaujolais'

Notice that (25) would actually be quite acceptable if *tror* were substituted for *syns* (cf. the grammaticality of the English sentence *I think I prefer beaujolais*). It would simply weaken the speaker's commitment to the proposition of the complement clause.

Let us now turn to the Norwegian VS *mene*. This verb has two distinct meanings. I am not sure whether there are actually two homonyms, or one polysemous lexeme. Certain criteria seem to point in the direction of homonymy, others do not (see the discussion in Fretheim 1990). One of the senses of *mene* is 'to have an opinion about something', the other sense is a purely metalinguistic one concerning the potential discrepancy and even opposition between what is being said and what is meant, or between how a speech act was interpreted the first time around and how it was intended to be interpreted by the sender. The sender may have to make another try with some sort of paraphrase of the first utterance. A sentence like *Jeg mener at jeg venter til det*

blir mørkt ('I mean that I'm waiting until it's dark') can only have the latter, metalinguistic meaning, i.e. "What I really mean to say is that I'm waiting until it's dark." In saying this I am definitely not expressing my opinion. As it is only the opinion sense that is interesting for the topic of this paper, *mene* is henceforth to be understood as the verb expressing the subject referent's opinion, and never as the formally identical verb used in self- or other-repair.

What are the lexical differences between *tro* and *mene*, and between *synes* and *mene*? First of all, *mene* resembles *synes*, in that it never induces a Q-implicature of the scalar epistemic sort. Consider the following two talk exchanges between A and B, where B's declaratives serve as metapragmatic acts of referring to something that the person named Astrid has said:

(28) A: *Var Astrid fornøyd med utstillingen?*
'Was Astrid satisfied with the exhibition?'
B: *Ja. Hun mente at det var den beste hun noensinne hadde sett.*
'Yes. She thought (= was of the opinion) that it was the best she had ever seen'

(29) A: *Var Astrid fornøyd med utstillingen?*
'Was Astrid satisfied with the exhibition?'
B: *Ja. (?)Hun trodde at det var den beste hun noensinne hadde sett.*
'Yes. She believed that it was the best she had ever seen'

In spite of past tense *trodde* and a 3rd person subject, B's answer in (29) does not generate a Q-implicature. In actual fact, some native speakers report that they feel the sentence structure is no longer entirely well-formed when you substitute *trodde* for the quite unproblematic VS *mente* of (28). The complement clause of B's answer contains a reported subjective evaluation on Astrid's part. It would indeed be presumptuous for someone to implicate that some other person's subjective evaluation has been based on an erroneous belief, so the Q-implicature generally does not go through in cases of this sort. However, one would not expect the VS *tro* to be at all appropriate when the reported speech act is a subjective evaluation, and in contradistinction to B's sentence in (29)—which is just very mildly deviant—the answer of (30), though structurally well-formed in isolation, actually turns out to be considerably worse, in the context of A's question, than the answer of (29).

(30) A: *Var Astrid fornøyd med utstillingen ?*
'Was Astrid satisfied with the exhibition?'
B: *Ja. #Hun trodde at den var fin.*
'Yes. #She believed that it was good'

There is a significant difference between B's reports in (29) and (30). You will not need to qualify your statement with a main clause VS like *tro* if you wish to express that some experience has had a positive effect on you. Using the hyperbolic expression that something is the best thing that ever happened to you, or the greatest piece of music you ever heard, is a very different matter. Even if we allow for the fact that Astrid's statement reported by person B in (29) may represent a standard type of hyperbole familiar from a large number of languages, it is understandable that a Norwegian speaker might prefer to qualify her use of a superlative like the one in (29) by adding the modal preamble of *Jeg tror at...* and placing the propositional content of her utterance in the *at*-complement. It is very likely that Astrid's original statement was something like this:

(31) Astrid: *Jeg tror at den utstillingen er den beste jeg noensinne har sett.*
'I believe that that exhibition is the best I have ever seen'

The report of (29) is then seen to render Astrid's own statement in a structurally most accurate way.

As for the report of (30), Astrid is not likely to have made the judgement of (32) about the exhibition unless she never saw it herself but had only been informed about it by someone who liked it:

(32) Astrid: *Jeg tror at den utstillingen er fin.*
'I believe that that exhibition is good'

While *Jeg tror at...* in (31) relates to the superlative *den beste* and nothing else, the same qualification in (32) relates to the *at*-complement predication. Both the statement of (32) and the report of (30) conversationally implicate that Astrid was personally unable to judge the quality of the exhibition. (English is apparently not much different from Norwegian on this point.)

Observe that even (33), which is identical to (30) except for the speaker's having selected *mene* instead of *tro*, would sound a little bit less natural than the flawless alternative of (34), where it is *synes* that occupies the VS position.

(33) A: *Var Astrid fornøyd med utstillingen?*
'Was Astrid satisfied with the exhibition?'
B: *Ja. (#)Hun mente at den var fin.*
'Yes. She regarded it as good'

(34) A: *Var Astrid fornøyd med utstillingen?*
'Was Astrid satisfied with the exhibition?'
B: *Ja. Hun syntes at den var fin.*
'Yes. She thought that it was good'

The VS *mene*, as it is being used by B in (33), pictures a situation where the experiencer has based her judgement on solid arguments more than on any impressions or spontaneous reactions that the exhibition might have caused in her. *Synes*, on the other hand, accomodates her spontaneous feelings about it.

Synes and *mene* have more conspicuously different functions in the reports of (35) and (36).

(35) *Han syntes det var godt å være i Lorvika.*
'He thought/felt it was good to be in Lorvika'

(36) *Han mente det var godt å være i Lorvika.*
'He was of the opinion that it was good to be in Lorvika'

Although both reports refer to personal judgements, (35) presupposes that the original speaker has been in Lorvika and really knows the place personally, and (36) does not. You can eliminate this condition pertaining to *Han syntes at...* of (35) by adding a subjunctive modal auxiliary in the complement clause, as shown in (37) where *syntes* and *mente* turn out to be interchangeable because the speaker of (37) does not relate her own experience.

(37) *Han syntes/mente det måtte være godt å være i Lorvika.*
'He thought it must be good to be in Lorvika'

We have seen that *Jeg mener...* and *Jeg syns...* can be prefixed to subjective judgements. That, I have said, is not true of *Jeg tror...* 'I believe...'. Nor is it true of *Jeg tenker...* 'I think/assume...'. Whereas an unmodified statement like (38) expresses a personal evaluation, (39) is a hedged statement of belief that can not be based on the speaker's own impressions. The speaker of (39) has not herself seen the necklace she is referring to, or she has at least not seen it in its present state, at the time of utterance.

(38) *Halsbåndet ser elegant ut.*
'The necklace looks elegant'

(39) *Jeg tenker at halsbåndet ser elegant ut.*
'I assume that the necklace looks elegant'

Even if Norwegian *tenke* and English *think* are cognates, *think* would be a misleading gloss in (39). We have to resort to some such English VS as 'assume'.

In fiction you may find a past tense statement like (40) referring to the subject referent's thoughts at the sight of the necklace. (40) conveys the same as the direct speech (or rather "direct thought") construction of (41), or the mixed "free indirect speech" construction of (42). 'Assume' would not be the right gloss in any of these.

(40) *Han tenkte at halsbåndet så elegant ut.*
'He thought that the necklace looked elegant'

(41) *Han tenkte: "Halsbåndet ser elegant ut."*
'He thought, "The necklace looks elegant"'

(42) *Halsbåndet så elegant ut, tenkte han.*
'The necklace looked elegant, he thought'

The communicative equivalence of (40) on the one hand and (41)/(42) on the other suggests that the VS *tenke* has a descriptive, and not a metapragmatic function in (40). It describes a thought process, not some linguistic action *resulting from* the kind of cerebral activity associated with the Norwegian verb *tenke*.

However, utterances like (41) or (42) are not restricted to that type of fiction where the narrator is omniscient and has the ability to "quote" other people's thoughts. (44) can be a report on (43), for example.

(43) *Jeg tenkte: "Dette er slutten."*
'I thought, "This is the end."'

(44) *Han tenkte: "Dette er slutten."*
'He thought, "This is the end."'

Though the utterance of (44) really looks as if it reports the thoughts of some person who is not the speaker of (44), that utterance is really a report on a communicative act, see (43), and not the result of a mind-reader's probings. The problem—if there is one—does not relate to (44), because (44) simply renders (43) in the straightest possible way; it is rather (43)—the original act—that presents us with a problem: are one's thoughts really translatable into a coherent linguistic form? I am not going to pursue that philosophical question. The point is that (43) is common usage. There is nothing bizarre about that Norwegian utterance or its English translation. We all know that people are constantly talking about their thought processes as if it were possible to quote thoughts.

Cresswell (1985, 41) notes that the direct speech report of (45) is true iff Lyell has uttered a token of the sentence Robins are red.

(45) *Lyell says 'Robins are red'.*

Hence a token of (45) cannot be used to report on a performed utterance of the sentence of (46), for example.

(46) *Lyell says that robins are red.*

On the other hand, the indirect speech construction of (46) would be an appropriate report, Cresswell reminds us, even if the original speaker had uttered a token of the English sentence (47), or, say, a token of the German sentence (48).

(47) *The robin is a red bird.*

(48) *Rotkehlchen sind rot.*

Indirect speech, as in (46), gives a speaker a certain latitude as to how the complement of the verb of saying may be structured. And the use of a VS in place of a *verbum dicendi* further increases this latitude. No one expects you to replicate the original speaker's wordings when you use a VS in a report. Conversely, you will not normally use a *verbum sentiendi* with a direct quotation. This, as we have seen, does not mean that indirect speech is the only possibility with such verbs. There is the free indirect style of (42), and there are constructions like (44). There are furthermore syntactic constructions with propositional attitude verbs in the postposed parenthetical clause position.

The Norwegian "direct thought" construction of (44) is confined to the use of one particular VS, namely *tenke*; in English it is confined to the verb *think*. I must confess that I have no idea why the parenthetical of (49) is perfect, while (50) is ungrammatical.

(49) *"Nå bedrer det seg," trodde han.*
'"Now things are improving," he thought/believed.'

(50) **Han trodde: "Nå bedrer det seg."*
'He thought/believed, "Now things are improving."'

The Norwegian VS *tenke* assumes a somewhat different character when it has the metapragmatic role of substitute for a verb of saying in a report of a speech act dealing with some future event, more precisely, a report of a statement about the subject referent's **intention** to act in a specific manner in the future. The talk exchange of (51) is perfectly acceptable. B is here reporting on Ola's verbal reaction to the fact that he had missed the train:

(51) A: *Hva sa Ola da han fikk høre at toget hans hadde gått?*
'What did Ola say when he got to know that his train had left?'
B: *Han tenkte han ville ta det neste toget isteden.*
'He thought he would take the next train instead'

Ola's actual utterance reported by B may or may not have included the VS *tenke*. That utterance could have been (52) for example, or (53).

(52) *Da tar jeg det neste toget.*
'Then I'll take the next train'

(53) *Da tenker jeg jeg tar det neste toget.*
'Then I think I'll take the next train'

The transitive VS *tenke* means 'to assume' or 'to suppose' when its object complement refers to an existing situation but it appears to have a different meaning when the complement refers to some future event, as in (53) and B's report in (51). There is actually some evidence that the transitive predicate *tenke* is ambiguous between an 'assume/suppose' reading and an 'intend' reading. A sentence like (54) can be interpreted in two different ways, either as a hedged statement of belief, or as an expression of what the speaker has planned to do. The present tense form *finner* ('find') refers to the future under either interpretation.

(54) *Jeg tenker jeg finner et billig hotell her i byen.*
(lit.: I think I find a cheap hotel here in town)
a. 'I suppose I'll find a cheap hotel in this town'
b. 'I intend to find a cheap hotel in this town'

Now, if someone were to report on my having uttered (54), then the 'assume' reading and the 'intend' reading would have to be differentiated syntactically. (55) and (56) are both possible reports on my original utterance, but on closer inspection (55) can only mean that I assumed I could find a suitable hotel, and in (56)—due to the added modal auxiliary *skulle* (lit.: should)—the reporter must have understood my utterance to be an expression of my intentions:

(55) *Han tenkte han fant et billig hotell.*
(lit.: He thought he found a cheap hotel)
'He assumed he would find a cheap hotel'

(56) *Han tenkte han skulle finne et billig hotell.*
(lit. : He thought he should find a cheap hotel)
'He intended to find a cheap hotel'

Why is ambiguity permitted in (54) but not in the reports of (55)–(56)? The following answer is the best I can do. When you report, you will ideally recreate at least part of the context of the reported speech act in order to reduce the addressee's processing efforts. The reporter's greater need to contextualize by means of her choice of linguistic form may account for the conventional use of distinct syntactic constructions for the 'assume' version of (55) and the 'intend' version of (56). In the original speech act of (54), the previous discourse itself would presumably give the addressee sufficient evidence to add the correct assumptions about what the speaker intended to convey.

The indirect speech/thought use of a modal auxiliary is not limited to the expression of an intention requiring coindexed main and complement clause subjects, but when intention is not involved, a different modal expression, like the one appearing in (58), replaces *skulle*:

(57) Reported act: *Jeg tenker du finner et billig hotell, Gerda.*
'I suppose you'll find a cheap hotel, Gerda'

(58) Report: *Han tenkte hun kom til å finne et billig hotell.*
'He thought she would (lit.: came to) find a cheap hotel'

Some Norwegian speakers claim to find an ambiguity similar to the one displayed in (54) even when they substitute *tror* for *tenker*; others do not perceive it so clearly with the VS *tro*. Personally I judge (59) to be subject to the same conditions of usage as (54), and I would like to add that you can eliminate the epistemically weakened alternative of 'I suppose I'll find a cheap hotel in this town' by keeping *tror* and using the reflexive verb *finne seg* ('to find oneself (something)') plus a right-dislocated copy of the subject pronoun. (60) is a disambiguated alternative to (59).[2]

(59) *Jeg tror jeg finner et billig hotell her i byen.*
'lit. : I believe I find a cheap hotel here in town'
a. 'I suppose I'll find a cheap hotel in this town'
b. 'I intend to find a cheap hotel in this town'

(60) *Jeg tror jeg finner meg et billig hotell her i byen, jeg.*
(lit.: I believe I find myself a cheap hotel here in town, I)
'I intend to find myself a cheap hotel in this town'

In reports, there is a clear difference between *tenke* and *tro*. While the choice between (55) and (56) as legitimate reports on (54) depends on the

[2] This observation is due to Randi Alice Nilsen.

reporter's conception of the meaning of (54), the report of (61)—unlike (56)—does not accomodate the intention reading that may be attributed to (59) in the right context:

(61) *Han trodde han skulle finne et billig hotell.*
(lit. : He believed he should find a cheap hotel)
'He thought he would find a cheap hotel'

In other words, (61) can not mean that the subject referent had made up his mind to find an inexpensive hotel. In addition we observe that the VS *tro* of (61) induces a scalar Q-implicature, as we would expect, while the VS *tenke* of (56) does not.

It now remains to contrast *tenke* and *mene*. A good example of differences in the contextualizing effects—or the relevance, if you like—of those two Norwegian verbs is provided by the following minimally different reports:

(62) *Da hun ikke kunne finne nøklene sine, tenkte hun at hun hadde glemt dem hjemme.*
'When she couldn't find her keys, she thought (= inferred, guessed, assumed) that she had left them at home'

(63) *Da hun ikke kunne finne nøklene sine, mente hun at hun hadde glemt dem hjemme.*
'When she couldn't find her keys, she expressed the opinion that she had left them at home'

These two reports do not give the recipient the same ideas of what the subject referent had said. (62) sounds like a report on a hedged statement. The reported speech act could have been something like *Jeg har sannsynligvis glemt nøklene hjemme* ('I have presumably left my keys at home'). The speaker's degree of commitment to the expressed proposition is probably fairly low here. It was no disaster that she did not have those keys, and therefore not terribly important for her, at the time, to be absolutely sure that she had left them at home.

In contradistinction to (62), the other report, (63), suggests that the subject referent had maintained, with a high degree of commitment, that the keys had been left at home. She may have performed a modally unqualified statement like *Jeg har glemt dem hjemme* ('I've left them at home').

3. Matching reported and reporting acts

The observations of the preceding section, on four central Norwegian *verba sentiendi* whose lexical content may be said to correspond to various aspects of the meaning of English *think*, were mainly based on native speaker introspection. I have in addition carried out a test in which Norwegian informants were asked to match a written set of reported acts and a written set of reporting acts containing one of those four VS.

Embedded under the VS in the **reporting** acts were certain modal modifications in the form of modal auxiliaries that the informants were asked to pay attention to. Those auxiliaries were assumed by the investigator to restrict the set of VS available in the main clause.

The **reported** acts were chosen so as to present the informants with nine syntactically and lexically distinct ways of expressing various modal qualifications of the same propositional content. The combination of modality markers (auxiliaries and modal particles) and embedded infinitival clause or *that*-clause found in most of the versions reveals that the original speaker is referring to something unfulfilled, some event or state to be completed, or terminated in the future. (64) presents the full set of reported acts used in the test. (The suggested English translations reflect my own views of what would be the contextually least marked meanings of my nine sentences. There are conceivably contexts requiring a different translation than the ones offered here. In a single case, no. 6, I found it necessary to be explicit about an ambiguity.)

(64) 1. *Det er nok best at jeg venter til det blir mørkt.*
'It's probably best for me to wait until it's dark'

2. *Jeg venter til det blir mørkt.*
'I'll wait until it's dark'

3. *Jeg skal vente til det blir mørkt.*
'I'm going to wait until it's dark'

4. *Jeg skal visst vente til det blir mørkt.*
'I'm supposed to wait until it's dark, apparently'

5. *Jeg tror jeg venter til det blir mørkt.*
'I think I'll wait until it's dark'

6. *Jeg tror jeg skal vente til det blir mørkt.*
'I think I'm supposed to wait until it's dark', or
'I think I'll wait until it's dark' (cf. no. 5)

7. *Jeg vil vente til det er mørkt.*
'I'm waiting until it's dark'

8. *Jeg har bestemt meg for a vente til det blir mørkt.*
   'I've decided to wait until it's dark'
9. *Det er meningen at jeg skal vente til det blir mørkt.*
   'The idea is for me to wait until it's dark'

The declaratives that were designed to serve as possible candidates for acceptable reports on the above set of acts 1–9 were divided into three subgroups, I, II, and III, that were structured differently in their main-clause direct object complements. There is a systematic difference in the choice of modal markers in the complement of the VS appearing in the main clause of the reporting utterances. Group I has a complement with the past-tense modal auxiliary *skulle* 'should' plus an infinitive, which shows that the subject referent is reported to have said that he would act in accordance with a certain plan or intention (possibly someone else's); group II contains the volitional modal auxiliary *ville* 'would' instead of *skulle*; group III contains the modal auxiliary *fikk* (lit.: got) plus an infinitive, and this is an auxiliary with a mildly deontic character, conveying the idea that the subject referent considered it appropriate to behave in the way reported by the speaker (in the present case, to wait until it gets dark).

These three modal auxiliaries seem to me to be very frequent in reports of speech acts whose performer is referring to some future nonverbal event. *Ville* and *fikk* definitely have a more subjective flavour than *skulle*. They can be relatively easily associated with the intentions, plans, or preferences of the subject referent of the VS, i.e. the speaker of the reported act. Unlike *ville* with its primary volition sense, both *skulle* and *fikk* suggest an element of obligation, but with *skulle* it is often an obligation that is outwardly imposed on the subject referent and with *fikk* it is an "inner" obligation, a feeling of having a duty to act in a specific manner, which does not arise from pressure from without but rather from a personally felt need to behave in the way described. Thus the sentence *Jeg skal vente her* (lit.: I shall wait here) means either 'I've made up my mind to wait here', or 'I'm supposed to wait here', whereas *Jeg får vente her* (lit.: I get wait here) means 'I'd better wait here', and never 'I'm supposed to (or 'expected to') wait here'.

(65) lists the set of reporting acts that my informants were requested to confront each one of the nine original acts of (64) with. (The glosses are strictly literal this time. Notice the e)-versions added for control. They do not contain a VS but instead the most neutral Norwegian verb of saying, *si* 'to say'):

(65) I (a) *Han tenkte han skulle vente til det ble mørkt.*
'He thought he should wait till it became dark'
(b) *Han syntes han skulle vente til det ble mørkt.*
'He thought/felt he should wait till it became dark'
(c) *Han trodde han skulle vente til det ble mørkt.*
'He believed he should wait till it became dark'
(d) *Han mente han skulle vente til det ble mørkt.*
'He meant he should wait till it became dark'
(e) *Han sa han skulle vente til det ble mørkt.*
'He said he should wait till it became dark'

II (a) *Han tenkte han ville vente til det ble mørkt.*
'He thought he would wait till it became dark'
(b) *Han syntes han ville vente til det ble mørkt.*
'He thought/felt he would wait till it became dark'
(c) *Han trodde han ville vente til det ble mørkt.*
'He believed he would wait till it became dark'
(d) *Han mente han ville vente til det ble mørkt.*
'He meant he would wait till it became dark'
(e) *Han sa han ville vente til det ble mørkt.*
'He said he would wait till it became dark'

III (a) *Han tenkte han fikk vente til det ble mørkt.*
'He thought he got [=had better] wait till it became dark'
(b) *Han syntes han fikk vente til det ble mørkt.*
'He thought/felt he got wait till it became dark'
(c) *Han trodde han fikk vente til det ble mørkt.*
'He believed he got wait till it became dark'
(d) *Han mente han fikk vente til det ble mørkt.*
'He meant he got wait till it became dark'
(e) *Han sa han fikk vente til det ble mørkt.*
'He said he got wait till it became dark'

The informants' task was to start with the reported speech act of (64/1) and run through the whole set of (65) I, II, III, checking on a form designed for the purpose which of those fifteen declaratives were acceptable reports on (64/1), and which ones were not. Then they would start all over again with (64/2), and so on, until the list was exhausted and a total of 15 × 9 pairs of reporting and reported acts had been evaluated. They were also asked whether they felt that main clause *han* and complement clause *han* referred to the same person. The number of Norwegian informants participating in this test was ten, which is quite modest. It was truly hard to recruit willing people,

though, as their job was extremely time-consuming and exacting, and quite tiresome after a while.

Both the three modal auxiliaries and the four nonauxiliary verbs of propositional attitude can be placed on a subjectivity—objectivity scale, with *tro*, the verb of all the c)-versions of the reporting acts, being definitely the most objective, and *synes*, the verb of the b)-versions, being definitely the most subjective VS in the set. Among the original speech acts of 1–9 there are four that have a typically subjective ring to them, namely nos. 2, 5, 7, and 8.

It may surprise some readers to learn that no. 5—*Jeg tror jeg venter til det blir mørkt*—belongs in that group, because *tro*, as I said, is the least subjective of the four VS. However, present tense *tror* after a 1st person subject can have a lexically bleached meaning; it can function like a hedge, or softener. 'I guess' would probably be the most suitable English gloss under such circumstances: 'I guess I'll wait until it gets dark' (cf. the data of (59)–(60) in the preceding section). The hedging function disappears once you replace the present tense and/or the 1st person subject with something else. Past tense *trodde* retains the full lexical meaning as a verb of propositional attitude. It is always a genuine VS when it is used as a metapragmatic substitute for a verb of saying in an act of referring to some speech act. And in a sentence like *Han trodde han ventet til det ble mørkt* you cannot help interpreting *han* in the main clause and *han* in the complement as non-coreferential terms, due to the objective character of the non-hedge use of the past tense form *trodde*.

Sentence no. 6—*Jeg tror jeg skal vente til det blir mørkt*—is ambiguous between a hedging and a non-hedging reading of the main clause verb. Why is the full lexical verb reading of *tro* so much more acceptable in sentence no. 6 than in sentence no. 5? The answer is presumably that Norwegian *jeg skal* ('I shall') opens for a situation where someone else—a person or an institution with authority—has decided that the speaker is to wait until it is dark. The ambiguity of no. 6 is a function of the lexical ambiguities of the verb forms *tror* and *skal*.

It turned out that the test subjects' opinions about what would be a good report on no. 5 and no. 6, respectively, were as a whole not very different, but there are at least a couple of striking differences between the data I got on 5 and on 6 that I find interesting. I have said that *skulle* is probably the least subjective of the three modal auxiliaries and that *tro* is the least subjective VS. The combination of those two items is what we find in the reporting act I (c): *Han trodde han skulle vente til det ble mørkt.* All ten informants found that this was an acceptable report on speech act no. 6, and that result was contrary to my expectations. Either they did not recognize the Q-implicature

and 'false belief' implicature that I have attributed to report structures starting with *Han trodde...* ('He believed...'), or they simply did not feel that those implicata interfered with their ideas of an acceptable report. In their unanimous acceptance of the pair of 6/I (c), the informants also disregarded the possible interpretation of 6 as a statement about the speaker's decision to wait, a pragmatic meaning that presupposes that you assign a hedge function rather than a VS function to *jeg tror....*

It also turned out that all ten informants considered II (b)—*Han syntes han ville vente til det ble mørkt*—to be a good report on no. 6, and the semantic differences between I (c) and II (b) are actually such that those two sentences simply cannot be used to report on the same statement. In version I (c) the reporter is talking about expectations and obligations, but in II (b) she is talking about a decision to act in the manner described. The former report implies that tror in no. 6 is being understood to be the VS meaning 'to believe', and the latter report implies an understanding of *tror* as a hedge, or parenthetical verb.

The fact that both pairs, 6/I (c) and 6/II (b), were assessed in the same way shows that the test subjects must have recognized the ambuigity of 6, but in their respective evaluations of 6/I (c) on the one hand and 6/II (b) on the other, they have evidently perceived one content at a time. All informants assigned the interpretation of 'I believe I'm supposed to wait until it's dark' to sentence no. 6 in the situation where it is matched with I (c), while they all assigned the interpretation of 'I guess I'll wait until it's dark' to the same sentence matched with the report of II (b).

The noted highly positive score for the pair of 6/I (c) was the same as for 4/I (c). Reported sentence no. 4—*Jeg skal visst vente til det blir mørkt*—contains a modal particle *visst*, which is hard to translate properly, but which is the least subjective of the most common Norwegian downtoner particles (Fretheim 1991); it often implies that the speaker is offering second-hand knowledge. No. 4 is a statement about the speaker's feeling of uncertainty about how he is expected to behave.

There were just two people out of ten who felt that I (c) could be used as a report on sentence no. 5 (*Jeg tror jeg venter...*). This means that the majority judged no. 5 to be a statement about the speaker's own decision to wait.

Most of the reporting versions with the modal auxiliary *fikk* in the complement (group III) showed high positive scores for no. 5 and no. 6 alike, though III (c)—*Han trodde han fikk vente til det ble mørkt*—was not considered a good report on sentence no. 5 by more than six people, against nine people

out of ten for the pair of 6/III (c). That discrepancy must be attributed to two factors, namely the non-subjective character of the verb *tro* when it cooccurs with the unequivocally deontic modal auxiliary *få*, and the fact that no. 5 can only be interpreted as a statement about the speaker's decision, while no. 6 can also function as as statement of belief.

None of the (a)-reports were ever associated with an obligation due to a decision made by someone other than the original speaker. All three combinations *tenkte... skulle, tenkte... ville,* and *tenkte... fikk* evoke a picture of a subject referent who has made up his mind to wait until it gets dark, though in my opinion the *tenkte... skulle* combination of I (a) does permit an interpretation of *skulle* as a deontic modal as well, just like III (a).

There is a striking difference between the informants' reactions to I (a) and their reactions to I (c), and a no less convincing difference between their reactions to II (a) and II (c). The responses suggest that everyone has considered *han... han* to be coreferential both in I (a) and in III (a), and that eight out of ten considered *han... han* to be coreferential in II (a). In contrast to those data, nobody considered the two occurrences of *han* in II (c)—involving the collocation of *trodde... ville*—to refer to the same individual. *Jeg tror jeg vil...* is an acceptable sequence due to the fact that the cooccurrence of a 1st person subject and the present tense of *tro* admits a parenthetical, or hedge interpretation, but the past tense form *trodde* of *Han trodde han ville...* in II (c) is not a hedge, it is a weak epistemic VS. Due to the noted scalar implicature attached to past tense *trodde*, the appearance of that form in II (c) means it is only with great difficulty that you construe the VS of II (c) as a verb modifying a statement containing the modal auxiliary *ville* of the volition type. Therefore the main clause *han* and the complement clause *han* of II (c) tend to be processed as non-coindexed pronouns.

Among the d)-reports starting with *Han mente...*, the *mente... ville* version of II (d) is apparently fraught with much the same 'problem' as II (c). When you have decided that you wish to act in a certain way, you will hardly describe your state of mind by saying that you 'have an opinion about' what you want to do, but that is exactly what a Norwegian speaker would do if she/he were to use (66) as a report.

(66) *??Jeg mener jeg vil vente til det blir mørkt.*
'I am of the opinion that I wish to wait till it is dark'

The deviance of (66) is consistent with the preponderance of assignments of non-coreference to *han... han* in II (d).

To the extent that (66) can be assigned a meaning, its meaning is significantly different from that of *Jeg* ***tror*** *jeg vil vente til det blir mørkt*. In such syntactic environments as these, the prefix *Jeg tror...* will automatically be understood to serve as a hedge, but the VS *mene* is never a hedge.

One might have believed that the (e)-versions, which contained no propositional attitude verb but instead the most neutral of all Norwegian verbs of saying would be acceptable throughout, but that was not the case. For example, III (e)—*Han sa han fikk vente til det ble mørkt*—got the best possible score as a report on sentence no. 1 and an almost equally good score with respect to nos. 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, but it got the very lousy score of two YES, eight NO as a report on sentence no. 4. The culprit here is the modal auxiliary *fikk*, not the verb form *sa* 'said'). *Fikk* suggests, as I said previously, some kind of personally felt obligation, whereas sentence no. 4 containing the modal particle *visst* may be said to minimize the importance of the speaker's own will or intention, and to describe the speaker as someone who is in this case simply acting upon some other person's presumably rather diffusely expressed request.

All in all, sentence no. 4 with its sequence *skal visst* proved to be the odd man out in the set of nine speech acts in (64). The report of I (c)—*Han trodde han skulle vente...*—got ten positive votes out of ten as a report on no. 4, but many of the other reporting acts shows very low scores with regard to sentence no. 4, including the other two sentences featuring *tro*, i.e. II (c)—*Han trodde han ville vente...* —and III (c)—*Han trodde han fikk vente....*

Judging from the informant responses, what generally happens in subgroup III of the reporting sentences is that the lexical differences between the four VS verbs of *tenke, synes, tro* and *mene* are somewhat blurred when the auxiliary *fikk* appears in the complement clause. As a rule the informant's reactions to the respective (a), (b), (c), and (d) versions of subgroups I and II differed systematically, but most informants discriminated to a much lesser extent between (a), (b), (c) and (d) in subgroup III. That is not surprising, since the modal auxiliary *få* suggests that the decision to act is the speaker's own. One consequence of that is that the presence of *fikk* in III (c) counteracts the Q-implicature normally adhering to past tense *trodde* with a 3rd person subject pronoun. *Fikk* favours a coreference understanding of *han... han*. With the exception of noncoreference judgements of *han... han* in III d) (*Han mente han fikk...*) from two informants, and from one informant in the case of III e) (*Han sa han fikk...*), the two pronominal subjects were uniformly considered to be coindexed in subgroup III of (65).

4. Conclusion

Assertives is the name that Searle (1979) gave to one of his five main categories of illocutionary acts. The assertives form quite a heterogeneous class, though Searle offers no explicit subcategorization. One thing common to all assertives, as Searle defines them, is the 'psychological state' that the performer of an assertive must be in, or its 'sincerity condition', to use his earlier terminology (Searle 1969).

The psychological state belonging to assertives is 'belief'; that is, a speaker who states, explains, claims, presumes or intimates that *p* is true is committed (in varying degrees) to the belief that *p* is true.

Bach–Harnish postulate four main categories of communicative illocutionary acts, which they label Constatives, Directives, Commissives, and Acknowledgements, respectively (Bach–Harnish 1979, 39f.). They propose very fine-grained subclassifications. Their Constatives, for example, are divided into fifteen classes, one of which is called Assertives. They claim that a feature common to all Constatives is "the expression of a belief, together with the expression of an intention that hearer form (or continue to hold) a like belief" (op.cit., 42).

With the proviso that the mentioned state of belief is given a definition wide enough to include judgements made on the basis of the speaker's personal taste (cf. Norwegian *synes*), 'belief' can indeed be postulated as the psychological state pertaining to the felicitous performance of Norwegian assertives. However, I very much doubt that those Norwegian declaratives that begin with *Jeg syns (at)...*, or the ones you can report on by saying *NN syntes (at)...*, would generally fit Bach and Harnish' description of Constatives as expressing the speaker's intention that the hearer form, or continue to hold, the speaker's belief. For *synes* it seems sufficient that the speaker informs the hearer about his own belief. If the speaker wishes to impose his belief on the hearer, he might have more success with a different VS than *synes*.

I have not undertaken a cross-linguistic examination that might tell us something about how wide-spread the metapragmatic use of VS is, and I do believe we should eschew any a priori assumptions as to the universality of this manner of reporting on past illocutionary acts. The conventionalized reference to the psychological state of belief observed in reports on assertives in the present paper might be culture-independent, but I am inclined to believe that it is culture-specific.

English is one language that makes extensive use of VS in reports on assertive, or constative communicative acts, and closely-related Norwegian is

another. One of my goals has been to contrast four central Norwegian VS in the lexical 'think'–'believe' area with their English counterparts.

Nothing has been said about non-assertive illocutionary acts, but our use of VS as metapragmatic devices is clearly not restricted to reports on declarative sentences used as assertives. Lyons (1977) contended that the state of mind of anyone asking or posing a question is lack of knowledge, puzzlement, or wonder about something, and that the most general function of questions is simply to give expression to one's state of wonder or uncertainty. He described interrogatives as sentences in which the state of doubt is "grammaticalized" (op.cit., 754). Be that as it may, it seems fairly accurate to say that the state of mind that one would normally attribute to a person performing an information-seeking question is a state of wondering (whether *p* is true). Both English and Norwegian have lexical verbs referring to this state of mind appropriate for anyone asking an information-seeking question. You can substitute English *NN wondered...* for *NN asked...*, and the equivalent Norwegian VS *lure på* 'wonder' of *NN lurte på...* for the verb *spørre* 'ask' of *NN spurte...* 'NN asked...'. Even this type of propositional attitude verb may have pragmatic implications beyond what would the case if a regular verb of asking were used instead. I have a particular type of situation in mind. Suppose the addressee of some reported question can be expected to know the correct answer to the original speaker's question. I imagine that in this sort of situation, the report of (67) can have a richer set of contextual implications than the report of (68).

(67) *Linda wondered whether you're related to Gregory Berry.*
(68) *Linda asked (me) whether you're related to Gregory Berry.*

If it is mutually known by speaker and addressee that the addressee of (67)/(68) does not know the answer, then the addressee would presumably interpret (67) as an indirectly conveyed question, more readily than (68). Using an explicit verb of asking is apparently one way of emphasizing that in uttering (68), the speaker is doing no more than reporting on Linda's original question. If you choose to be less explicit, in the manner of (67), you thereby also give a hint that you would not mind being enlightened yourself.

In my mind there is something to be gained from further exploratory studies of the sort presented in this paper. Cross-linguistic typological investi-

gations of the use of *verba sentiendi* as metapragmatic terms might be a useful complement to Verschueren's ongoing large-scale work on (Basic) Linguistic Action Verbs (Verschueren 1989, and this volume).

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MUþ, MOUTH(E), MOUTH DENOTING LINGUISTIC ACTION: ASPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RADIAL CATEGORY

LOUIS GOOSSENS

1. Introduction

A number of years ago, on the occasion of a BBC interview, John Searle was asked what he regarded as the essence of language. "Well, Searle replied after a moment's reflection, you open your mouth, and all that racket comes out". What Searle did, of course, besides leaving the sophisticated reporter speechless for a few seconds, was build on the knowledge that our mouths are crucially involved in the production of speech sounds and hence of linguistic action. That this is quite general knowledge about human language, is (also) reflected in the use of the lexical item *mouth* in Present-day English as it is recorded in a general usage dictionary like the *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English*. Indeed, in a data base collecting the figurative expressions for linguistic action from the LDCE (on which see Vanparys (in press)), it appears that with respect to the body parts which can be used to denote linguistic action (henceforth L.A.), *mouth* is the one that scores highest: 16 items in all, with *tongue* as a close second (14 items) and *lip* in third position with seven.

For me, this observation about the fequency of the items *mouth, tongue* and *lip* in the denotation of L.A. in Present-day English usage triggered the question whether for the corresponding items in Old English a comparable situation obtained as well. My findings are reported in a paper presented at the Ninth International Historical Linguistics Conference (New Brunswick, NJ, August 1989) (Goossens (forthcoming)) and are briefly summarized in section 2 of this contribution.

As a kind of follow-up I will try here to give a glimpse of the (diachronic) development in English of this use of the item *mouth* to denote L.A., working with three successive samplings, one for Old English, one for Middle English, and one for Early Modern English. As it happens, an analysis of these samples

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reveals a development with some interesting patterns, which I would like to report on here. The reason why in the title of this paper I speak of 'aspects of the development of a radial category', is that I want to think about it in a Cognitive Grammar vein (in line, for example, with Lakoff (1987)). The idea is that the meanings of the lexical item *mouth* and its ancestors are organized around a prototypical centre ('the opening on the face through which an animal or human being may take food into the body, and by which sounds are made', LDCE **mouth, n. 1**), which radiates out to other senses by metonymic and metaphorical mapping. Following Cognitive Grammar, I define **metonymy** as involving a mapping from one element onto another within the same domain, **metaphor** as involving a mapping between two different domains. Obviously, in this context we are concerned with just a part of the development of the radial category, viz. the metonymic and metaphorical mappings of *muþ, mouth(e), mouth* onto L.A.

As pointed out above, section **2** is concerned with the way in which the counterparts of Present-day English *mouth, tongue* and *lip* in Old English were used to denote L.A.; more particularly, with the way in which this meaning extension appears to have arisen. Section **3** briefly presents the data bases on which the main body of this paper is based. Sections **4**, **5** and **6** present my analyses of the Old English, the Middle English and the Early Modern English samples successively. A brief confrontation with the LDCE data follows in Section **7**, after which we round off with our final conclusions.

2. The rise of a new conceptualization pattern in Old English

In Goossens (forthcoming) I provide an account of the distribution of *muþ, tunge* and *weler/lippe* denoting L.A. in Old English texts (note that *weler* is the current item for *lip* in OE and that *lippe* is still somewhat marginal).

In outline, I found that for all these items the uses that denote L.A. occur with few exceptions in religious texts, and that within the religious corpus those L.A. uses predominantly come from the Psalms. In other words, there is ample evidence that the use of *muþ, tunge* and *weler/lippe* to denote L.A. is of biblical origin.

Among those items the most numerous one is again *muþ*, and, more importantly, it appears that for *muþ* (but not for the other items) we see the beginnings of an independent (i.e. independent of biblical sources) use in the denotation of L.A. In other words, the conceptualization of linguistic action in terms of the lexical item *muþ* is established in (late) Old English to the point

that it no longer requires direct biblical models. Obviously, from that point of view as well, *mouth* presents itself as the most promising item for the kind of diachronic investigation that I want to present here.

3. A data base for MUþ/MOUTH(E)/MOUTH

Although a lot can be learned from dictionaries, a study of the entries for *muþ, mouth(e)* and *mouth* in the Old English, Middle English and Oxford English Dictionaries will not do for our purposes, for a number of reasons. First, because for the Toronto Dictionary of Old English the entry *muþ* is not yet available. Secondly, because the material on which both the MED and the OED are based is extremely heterogeneous, and because neither of them gives an idea of the proportion in which a particular use comes. Moreover, the contextualizations in those dictionaries are (for obvious reasons) too restricted in a number of cases for independent interpretation.

Therefore, I decided to work with three comparatively homogeneous samples which present us with successive synchronic cuts. One for Late Old English around the millennium, for which I collected all the occurrences with *muþ* Ælfric's writings from the Toronto Concordance (Di Paolo Healey–Venezky (1980)), one for Middle English (second half of the fourteenth century) with all the uses of *mouth(e)* from Chaucer (where I made use of the Chaucer Concordance by Tatlock–Kennedy (1927) and Robinson's Chaucer edition (Robinson (1957)), and one for Early Modern English around the turn of the sixteenth to the seventeenth century with the uses of *mouth* in Shakespeare (based on Bartlett's Shakespeare Concordance (1962) and the Signet Classic edition (Barnet (1972)). In actual fact, there were about 170 instances in Ælfric, 160 in Shakespeare and only 70 items in Chaucer; so I decided to work with 100 random instances for Ælfirc and Shakespeare, whereas I took the complete sample for Chaucer. Under (1) I summarize this point about our data base, together with the distribution, in percentages, of the L.A. uses (both literal and non-literal ones) versus the contexts where no L.A. is denoted. Note that for the Chaucer sample 39% corresponds to 27 instances; for Ælfric and Shakespeare the percentage, of course, corresponds to the actual number of instantiations.

(1)	Ælfric (N: 100)	Chaucer (N: 70)	Shakespeare (N: 100)
L.A.	59%	39%	61%
Non-L.A.	41%	61%	39%

In what follows we concentrate on the L.A. uses only.

4. Patterns in the Ælfric data

In the analysis of the three samples the three main L.A. uses to be distinguished are the **literal**, the **metonymic** and the **metaphorical** ones.

The Ælfric data contain four L.A. instances where *muþ* can be interpreted in its prototypical or literal sense, as exemplified by (2) (the reference is that of the Toronto Concordance).

(2) (ÆGram 4.9)
Se muþ drifð ut þa clipunge and seo lyft byð geslagen
the mouth drives out the sound and the air is struck

mid þære clypunge and gewyrð to stemne
with that sound and becomes to voice

All the other instances are figurative. There are none, however, which are purely metaphorical, i.e. where *muþ* fits into a pattern that as a whole evokes a domain other than linguistic action and which in the context has to be mapped onto L.A. This means that as many as 55 (out of 59) have *muþ* in a metonymic sense. In other words, there is as a rule a mapping of the body part *mouth* onto some aspect of L.A., but this mapping occurs within the same domain, for which we can assume the presence of what Lakoff would call an Idealized Cognitive Model in which the mouth is conceived as instrumental in L.A. As it happens, we even have proof that Ælfric had an explicit awareness of the human mouth's instrumentality in linguistic action, given the (literal) instance from his 'Grammar' quoted under (2). Under (3) we give an example where *muþe* stands for what is said (*words, speech*).

(3) (ÆCHom II, 39 1 294, 231)
and cwæþ to ðam leasan mid gelærnedum muþe
and said to the wicked one with learned mouth

Our next step is to differentiate this category of metonymic uses. In (4) we give a survey of the subcategories adopted ((i)–(v)) together with the number of occurrences for each in our sample. We complete this survey with the figures for the literal and the metaphorical uses (which we have already given above). In addition, we have added under the metonymic cases an extra specification **metonymic in a metaphorical context**. What this indicates is that among the metonymic uses, there are some that fit into a metaphorical context, as metonymies. These are spread across subcategories (i)–(v); they therefore do not add up to the total.

(4) (Late Old English; Ælfric – 59 L.A. items)

A. Literal			4
B. Metonymic			55
(i)	muþ = what is said/words/speech	11	
(ii)	X's muþ = X's words = X as a speaker	24	
(iii)	muþ = speaker	3	
(iv)	muþ = speech faculty	6	
(v)	metonymic expressions with muþ	11	
(metonymic in a metaphorical context)		(16)	
C. Metaphorical			0

Let us next further illustrate and, if necessary, clarify, the distinctions made under the category **metonymic**.

(i) In (5) and (6) we give two more instances where *muþ = what is said/words/speech*. In (5) we can paraphrase *mid anum muþe* as *with the same words*, in (6) *of his muþe* means something like *with what he said*.

(5) (ÆCHom II, 2 17, 207)
ne magon we mid anum muþe bletsian and wyrian
not can we with one mouth bless and curse

(6) (ÆCHom II, 2 11, 93 42)
and he him of his muþe heofenlice lare forgeaf
and he him from his mouth in a heavenly way lore gave

heora sawle to bigleofan
their soul to nourishment

Note also that (6) is an instance of **metonymy within metaphor**. There is an overall context in which the domain of feeding is mapped onto that of L.A., but the metonymic interpretation of *his muþe* is still relevant. (For a fuller discussion of this intertwining of metaphor and metonymy see Goossens(1990)).

(ii) As indicated by the paraphrase in (4), our second subcategory is very much like the first, in that *muþ* permits the same paraphrase as in (i). But there is the additional possibility that we can equate the combination of the genitive and its headword *muþ* with the person(s) referred to by the genitive conceived as *speaker(s)*. We have included this as a separate subcategory because of its frequency. Indeed, it is more frequent than any of the other metonymies that we distinguish here. (7)–(10) provide examples.

(7) (ÆCHom I, 10 152.3)
godspelle þe we nu gehierdon of þæs diacones muþe
gospel which we now heard from the deacon's mouth

(8) (ÆLS (Vincent) 80)
seo ylce næddre spæc nu þurh þises arleasan muþ
the same adder spoke now through this wicked one's mouth

(9) (ÆLS (Ash W.) 241.)
forðan þe se leasa muþ ofslihð þæs mannes sawle
because the wicked mouth destroys the man's soul

(10) (ÆCHom I,4 74.32)
ðu settest on minum muþe þinre soðfæstnysse word
you put on my mouth of-your-truthfulness words

(9) and (10) are again instances of metonymies within metaphor.

(iii) There are also a few cases where there is a direct mapping of *muþ* onto *speaker*. In (11), for example, we get no genitive qualifying *muþ* and we cannot paraphrase it as *what is said/words/speech*.

(11) (ÆCHom I,10 160.8)
gewite seo sawul ut: ne mæig se muþ clypian
come the soul out not can the mouth cry out

(iv) As illustrated in (12) *muþ* can also be used to denote the *speech faculty*.

(12) (ÆCHom II 42 310.14)
ic soðlice sylle eow muþ and wisdom
I truly (will)give you mouth and wisdom

That the boundary lines are not always fully clear also for this category appears, for example, from (13), where *muþ* can be taken to refer to both the *speaker* and to his *speech faculty*.

(13) (ÆCHom I, 33 494.15)
he sprecð ðonne he mid godes herungum his muþ gebysgað
he speaks when he with God's praises his mouth occupies

(v) Finally, there are several instances where *muþ* is part of a larger expression which includes a verb and which is metonymic in its entirety. We illustrate this with (14)–(16).

(14) (ÆCHom I, 36 548.13)
he undyde his muþ and hi lærde þus cweðende
he opened his mouth and them taught thus saying

(15) (ÆLS (Sebastian) 94)
geopenige ðonne se ælmihtiga hælend ðises wifes muþ
(may)open then the almighty saviour this woman's mouth
þæt heo mæge sprecan
that she may speak

(16) (ÆCHom II, 25 352.4)
ða mid ðam gewrite wearð his muþ geopenod: and his
then with that writing became his mouth opened and his
tunge unbunden to rihtre spræce
tongue loosened to correct speech

With respect to (14), *opening one's mouth* is a necessary part of *speaking* and is therefore like a part–whole metonymy. Mutatis mutandis the same holds for (15) and (16).

Summing up this analysis, we find that in the Ælfric sample, there are only a few instances where L.A. is denoted literally, but a great many where there is metonymic mapping. The mapping is from *muþ* onto *what is said, the speech faculty* or the *speaker*, or from a complex NP (where *muþ* is the head and where there is a prehead genitive whose referent is the *speaker*) onto the *speaker*. There are also cases where the mapping is from a verbal combination (where *muþ* is an argument) onto L.A. as a whole. Purely metaphorical expressions in which *muþ* figures were absent, but among the metonymies quite a few were part of a broader metaphorical context, where, however, the metonymy remains interpretable as such.

5. Analysis of the Chaucer sample

The (sub)categories set up in analysing the Late Old English data are also relevant to the Chaucer sample, be it with some differences in the distribution (some of the categories, for example, are represented only sparingly). Mutatis mutandis, however, this presentation will be little more than a variation on the same theme. We first give a survey.

(17) (Middle English; Chaucer – 27 L.A. items)

A. Literal			1?
B. Metonymic			26
(i)	mouth = words, speech	14	
(ii)	mouth of X = X's words = X as a speaker	8	
(iii)	mouth = speaker	2	
(iv)	mouth = language faculty	1?	
(v)	metonymic expressions with mouth	1?	
(metonymic in a metaphorical context)		(6)	
C. Metaphorical			0

As can be observed, the predominance of the metonymic uses is even more overwhelming than in the Ælfric sample: again there are no purely metaphorical items (except perhaps for the instance which is now listed under subcategory (v)), and the single literal item (quoted here as (18)) is somewhat doubtful as regards its denotation of L.A.—The references are to Robinson's edition.

(18) (Canterbury Tales, Wife of Bath's T., 973)
She leyde hir mouth unto the water doun
she laid her mouth onto the water below

"..." quod she "..."
"..." said she "..."

The context in (18) is clearly one of L.A., but the first line in this quotation can also be interpreted without taking that context into account.

We now proceed to exemplification and clarification of the metonymic uses, in the same way as we did for the Late Old English sample.

(i) This is by far the best represented category, The emphasis here is on *spoken words/speech*, as appears from instances (19)–(21).

(19) (C.T., Parson, 1020 ff.)
Thou most eek shewe thy synne by thyn owene propre mouth
you must also reveal your sin by your own mouth

but thow be woxe downb and not by lettre
but you (should)be become dumb and not (too)detailed

(20) (C.T., Parson, 480 ff.)
Also the humilitee of mouth is in foure thynges: in
also the humility of mouth is in four things in

attempree speeche, and in humblenesse of speeche, ...
moderate speech and in humility of speech

(21) (C.T., Parson, 950 ff.)
Now for as muche as the seconde partie of Penitence stant
now in so far as the second part of penance consists

in Confession of mouth
in confession by mouth

In (19) *by thyn owene propre mouth* can be paraphrased as *in oral confession*, in (21) *Confession of mouth* means *oral confession*; *humilitee of mouth* in (20) can be equated with *humility in speaking*. Generally, there is a focus on either **oral** or **public** speech production.

(ii) The second type of metonymy, where we get *mouth* as the head noun of a complex noun phrase qualified by a genitive or an *of*-phrase which refers to the *speaker*, and in which *mouth* remains paraphrasable as *words*, whereas the complex NP as a whole refers to *X* (the person referred to in the *of*-phrase or genitive) *as speaker*, decreases in frequency as compared with the Old English sample, but is still well represented (eight instances in all). Illustrations are offered in (22)–(25).

(22) (C.T., Parson, 235–240)
Seith God by the mouth of Ezechiel
says God by the mouth of Ezechiel

(23) (House of Fame II, 758)
Loo, this sentence ys knowen kouth
look this saying is known

Of every philosophes mouth
from every philosopher's mouth

As Aristotle and daun Plato
such as Aristotle and Sir Plato

(24) (C.T., Prol., 1744)
This is a short conclusion
this is a brief decision

Your owene mouth, by youre confessioun
your own mouth by your confession

Hath dampned yow
has damned you

(25) (C.T., Melibee, 2690–2695)
Jhesu Crist ... for he dide nevere synne, ne nevere cam
Jesus Christ for he did never sin nor never came

ther a vileyns word out of his mouth
there a villainous word out of his mouth

Note that in (25) the metonymy fits into the context of the Conduit metaphor (cf. Reddy (1979)).

(iii) The two instances where *mouth* stands for *speaker* are quoted as (26) and (27).

(26) (C.T., Parson, 625–630)
but after the abundance of the herte speketh the mouth
but according to the abundance of the heart speaks the mouth

ful ofte
quite often

(27) (House of Fame III, 2076–2078)
Thus north and south
thus north and south

wente every tydyng fro mouth to mouth
went every news from mouth to mouth

and that encresing ever mo
and that encreasing ever more

(iv) The single instance where *mouth* can be taken to stand for the *language faculty*, (28), is somewhat doubtful again, to the extent that here *mouth* could also be mapped onto Homer's literary work, as Chaucer's own paraphrase suggests. In the second interpretation a further complexity arises, because Homer's work can be thought of as *writings* (even if we know that it was composed in an oral tradition); this would involve a double metonymy: from *mouth* onto *words/speech* (subcategory (i)), and then onto the written form.

(28) (Boece V, metrum 2,1)
Homer with the hony mouth(that is to seyn, Homer with the
Homer with the honey mouth that is to say Homer with the
swete ditees)
sweet compositions

(v) The expression with *mouth*, reproduced here as (29), is open to several interpretations. To begin with, we might take it to be a full metaphor in which *mouth* is reinterpreted as an animal (for example a horse) which has to be controlled. But the metonymic reading, whereby the speaker stops speaking while literally holding his mouth, should certainly not be ruled out either. Alternatively, we could say that we have a metaphor here from the earlier metonymy, in other words, what I have called a **metaphor from metonymy** in Goossens (1990).

(29) Now holde your mouth, par charitee
now hold your mouth for charity's sake

Summarizing here, we can say that overall pattern does not differ strikingly from the Old English one, except perhaps for the fact that the emphasis is more often on **oral** or **public** speech production in category (i). Note also that we have at least one instance, (29), which we might also have listed as a 'pure' metaphor.

6. The Shakespeare sample

Turning to the data from Shakespeare, we find that there is a striking shift in the general distribution. Not because we do not find any representatives of the category **literal** any more, for instantiations there were also rare in the Old English and in the Middle English sample, but because all of a sudden the **pure metaphors** have become frequent. The details are registered in (30).

(30) (Early Modern English; Shakespeare – 61 L.A. items)

A. Literal			0
B. Metonymic			37
(i)	mouth = words, speech	14	
(ii)	X's mouth = X's words = X as a speaker	8	
(iii)	mouth = speaker	5	
(iv)	mouth = language faculty	3	
(v)	metonymic expressions with mouth	7	
(metonymic in a metaphorical context)		(20?)	
C. Pure metaphors (occ. with demetonymization)			24

In our exemplification for the metonymic cases the great majority of our instances will have a metaphorical context. This reflects the fact most of the metonymies in Shakespeare are indeed of the metonymy–within–metaphor type. As the question mark in the table reveals, however, there are a number of instances where the difference between (frozen) metaphor and literal is not easy to make. The references are to the Signet Classic Shakespeare.
(i) The first subcategory, where *mouth* can be mapped onto *words* or *what is said* is again the most frequent type of metonymy. (31) illustrates a literal instance, (32) one which I think can be regarded as having a metaphorical context.

(31) (K. John iii 1 306)
O husband hear me! Ay alack how new is husband in my mouth

(32) (Richard II v 6 37)
From your own mouth, my lord, did I this deed

In (32) *what you said* can contextually be equated with *your order*. The reason for characterizing it as metaphorical hangs together with the fact that we are forced to conceive the speaker's (past) doing of the deed concerned as *proceeding from* this order; *from*, in other words, suggests movement from one location to another, which here is mapped onto a state of affairs in which a particular action (*this deed*) occurred as a result of somebody else's linguistic action. On the other hand, the metonymic mapping is still relevant; and the salience of the metaphor is, of course, restricted, since its only expression is the preposition *from*.
(ii) The second subcategory is exemplified in (33) and (34). Again it occurs with considerable frequency.

(33) (K. John i 1 21)
Then take my king's defiance from my mouth
The farthest limit of my embassy

(34) (Measure f. M. v 1 304)
The duke's unjust
Thus to retort your manifest appeal
And put your trial in the villain's mouth
Which here you come to accuse

From my mouth in (33) can be paraphrased both as *from what I'm saying* and as *from me (as speaker)*; *put your trial in the villain's mouth* in (34) amounts to *entrust your trial to what the villain is going to say* or *entrust your trial to the*

villain (as speaker). These metonymies occur both in a metaphorical context: *defiance* and *trial* have to be conceived as objects that can be manipulated in space (to be *taken* or *put* somewhere).
(iii) As can be inferred from the analysis of (33) and (34), the distinction between the first three subcategories in a metaphorical context is not always easy to make. (35) and (36), however, are best interpreted as requiring a direct mapping of *mouth(s)* onto *speaker(s)*.

(35) (Henry V iv 7 41)
It is not well done, mark you now, to take the tales out of my mouth, ere it is made and finished

(36) (Henry VIII i 2 61)
This makes bold mouths.
Tongues spit their duties out, and ...

(35) illustrates another point about the blurring of distinctions in metaphorical contexts. It might also be assigned to the fully metaphorical group, if we take the context to suggest a scene of a bakery, where the loaves are taken out of the oven before they are fully baked. Under that interpretation *mouth* is the *mouth of the oven*, which has to be mapped onto the *speaker's mouth*.
(iv) In (36) we get the metonymic mapping of Gargantua's *mouth* onto his *language faculty*. The pattern is (again) comparatively rare.

(36) (As you Like it iii 2 226)
You must borrow me Gargantua's mouth first; 'tis a word too great for any mouth of this age's size.

(v) Finally, we give a couple of instances where the expression as a whole has to be processed metonymically. A current pattern in the Shakespeare data is one in which *kissing* is viewed as a means to stop a person's speaking; (37) is an example in point.

(37) (Much Ado ii 1 299)
Speak, cousin; or (if you cannot) stop his mouth with a kiss and let him not speak either.

In (38) we can take it that, at the point where we get the dash in the text, there is some gesture on part of the character addressed such that it literally stops the speaker's mouth. In the context a kiss is not very likely; perhaps the addressee puts his finger on the other's mouth, which would give us the metonymic interpretation.

(38) (Two Gentleman of Verona ii 3 41)
P. Tut, man, I mean thou'lt lose the flood, and, in losing the flood, lose thy voyage, and, in losing thy voyage, lose thy master, and in losing thy master, lose thy service, and, in losing the service—Why dost thou stop my mouth?
L. For fear thou shouldst lose thy tongue.

As we have already pointed out, the most current pattern in Shakespeare is that of the full metaphors, i.e. instances where there is a mapping from a distinct domain onto that of linguistic action and where a metonymic mapping for *mouth* is no longer relevant. We illustrate this in (39) and (40).

(39) (Richard II v 3 29)
For ever may my knees grow to the earth
(Kneels)
My tongue cleave to my roof within my mouth
Unless a pardon ere I rise or speak

(40) (Richard II i 3 166)
Within my mouth you have enjailed my tongue,
Doubly portcullised with my teeth and lips,
And dull unfeeling barren ignorance
Is made my jailer to attend me.

In (39) the addition of *roof* can be taken to reinterpret the *mouth* as a building within which its inhabitant (*the tongue*) is immobilised. In (40) the metaphor is more explicit: here *the tongue* is viewed as emprisoned in a jail which is like a fortified castle (here *the mouth*).

Note that we can generalize over (39) and (40) as conceptualizing the mouth in terms of some sort of building. Another, even more frequent pattern has *eating* and *drinking* as a donor. We exemplify it in (41) and (42).

(41) (K. John iv 2 195)
I saw a smith stand with his hammer, thus,
The whilst his iron did on the anvil cool
With open mouth swallowing a tailor's news,
Who ...
Told of a many thousand warlike French,
...

(42) (As you Like it iii 2 203)
I prithee take the cork out of thy mouth, that I may drink thy tidings.

In (41) the mouth is instrumentally involved in *eating*, more particularly in *swallowing food*, which is mapped on *listening to* and *processing somebody's linguistic actions*. In (42) the donor scene is more specific; *removing a cork* is a preliminary to pouring out whatever is contained in the drinking vessel; the whole is mapped onto *beginning to speak/communicate* in a situation where the addressee is keen on hearing what the other one has to say (as is expressed in the added clause *that I may drink thy tidings*).

Among these metaphorical instances we also get a few which involve what can be referred to as **demetonymization inside a metaphor** (see Goossens 1990, 335). We illustrate this by (43) and (44).

(43) (Measure for M. ii 4 4)
When I would pray and think, I think and pray
To several subjects; heaven hath my empty words,
Whilst my invention, hearing not my tongue,
Anchors on Isabel; heaven in my mouth,
As if I did but only chew his name,
And in my heart the strong and swelling evil
Of my conception.

(44) (Tempest v 1 131)
For you, most wicked sir, whom to call brother
Would even infect my mouth, I do forgive
Thy rankest fault—all of them; ...

In (43) *heaven in my mouth* at first sight seems to contain a metonymy: we can map *my mouth* onto *what I'm saying*. The continuation (*as if I did but only chew his name*) forces us to reinterpret it in terms of the donor scene of *chewing food* in which the mouth has its own instrumentality. The whole is to be mapped, of course, onto *'empty' speaking* in which the speaker does not mean what he says. In (44) the potential metonym *mouth/speaker* has to be reinterpreted in terms of a scene where bad food infects the mouth, which then as a whole has to be mapped onto L.A. that has a negative (or even sickening) effect on the speaker.

As we have already observed at the beginning of this section, the most striking point about the Shakespeare data is the high degree of metaphorization, which results in a considerable number of pure metaphors, including instances where potential metonyms are 'demetonymized', as well as in a larger proportion of metonymies within a metaphorical context. It is unavoidable that this should occasionally blur the distinction between the (sub)categories adopted.

7. The LDCE data in the light of the diachronic development

Before moving on to our general conclusions, I would first like to consider the Present-day English sample of figurative expressions with *mouth* from the LDCE (referred to in section 1) in the light of the foregoing analyses. In spite of its restricted size (16 uses in all) this sample can be taken to be representative of everyday contemporary usage, especially in British English.

Making use of the classification adopted above, we find (a) that there are no literal uses among them (for obvious reasons, because the sample only contains figurative expressions), (b) that there are only five metonymies among them, and (c) that, therefore, the pure metaphors predominate (as many as 11 out of 16). To facilitate the discussion, we list this material under the (sub)categories adopted earlier; the paraphrases and the labels (*derog(atory), sl(ang)*, etc.) are from the LDCE.

Metonymic uses

(i) (45) *by word of mouth* 'by speaking and not by writing'

(iii) (46) *blabbermouth* derog sl 'a person who tells secrets by talking too much'

(47) *loudmouth* 'a person who talks too much and in an offensive manner'

(v) (48) *keep one's mouth shut* infml 'to avoid saying or speaking about something, esp. something secret; keep silent'

(49) *shut one's mouth* infml. a. usu. imper. 'to stop talking; be silent' b. *Well, shut my mouth!* Southern AmE (an expression of surprise)

Although this is not a complete inventory of metonymic expressions with *mouth* denoting L.A., the sample, as pointed out before, can be regarded as sufficiently representative to conclude that *mouth* has become decidedly less popular in the metonymic uses where it was most frequent in older stages of the language. The single instance where *mouth* is mapped onto *speech*, (45), has the emphasis on *speaking aloud*, a usage type that was quite frequent in the Chaucer sample; but otherwise a mapping of *mouth* onto *what is said* appears to have gone out of use. The use of *mouth* for *speaker*, on the other hand, is still current, especially when *mouth* receives an additional, pejorative qualification as in both (46) and (47). Subcategory (v) is probably preserved best, because one can think of other expressions, whose meaning is perhaps too

obvious to be listed in dictionaries (for example, *open one's mouth* for *begin to speak*), in addition to the ones included in the LDCE. Note also that the expression *keep one's mouth shut* (48) can be used in contexts where it is not metonymic: in the paraphrase 'avoid saying or speaking about something, esp. something secret' there is no idea that the speaker actually keeps his mouth shut, but rather that while talking, he does not give away a specific bit of information. In other words, we have in that use a **metaphor from metonymy** (cf. the discussion of instance (29) in the Chaucer sample). Similarly, the southern AmE use *Well, shut my mouth!* (49b), which is to be interpreted as involving an implicature, is best explained as building this implicature on a metaphor from metonymy.

Metaphorical uses

(50) *put the mouth on someone* BrE & AustrE sl 'to (seem to) make someone's actions or attempts unsuccessful by saying that he is doing very well'
(51) *stop somebody's mouth* fml 'to make someone keep silent'
(52) *Don't look a gift horse in mouth* 'don't complain about a gift'
(53) *put words into somebody's mouth* a. 'to tell someone what to say' b. derog 'to suggest or claim, falsely, that someone has said a particular thing'
(54) *to take the words out of someone's mouth* 'to say something that someone else was going to say, before he has had time or a chance to speak'
(55) *shoot one's mouth off* infml 'to talk foolishly about what one does not know about or should not talk about'
(56) *straight from the horse's mouth* infml '(of something) told to one directly, from the person concerned'
(57) *mouthful* infml, usu. humor 'a big long word that one finds difficulty in saying or pronouncing'; infml, often humor or derog 'a statement that is important, or that is long and tries to sound important'
(58) *mouthpiece* often derog 'a person, newspaper, etc. that expresses the opinion of others'
(59) *foul-mouthed* derog 'containing or having the habit of using foul language'
(60) *mealy-mouthed* 'of a type of person who tends to express things not freely or directly, using words which are not plain in meaning, esp. when something unpleasant must be said'

A first observation here is that some of these metaphorical expressions are derivable from metonymic ones. (50) reminds us of instances like (37) in the Shakespeare data; *putting one's mouth on somebody else's* is one way to stop him or her talking. Probably the expression is no longer transparent to most

speakers of Contemporary English, but this does not invalidate its metonymic origin. A similar point can be made for (51), which is comparable to (38); but, of course, in its Present-day English use there is no necessity any more to postulate an explicit gesture which has the effect of silencing another speaker. (52) can also be taken to have originated in a context where somebody made critical remarks about a horse that he received as a present. Moreove, we had already noted the possible shift from metonymy to metaphor in instances like (48) and (49b). In other words, metonymic expressions are not infrequent as a source for (these) everyday metaphors for aspects of L.A.

A second point is about donor domains. There is a variety of them, as is to be expected. But there is one that appears to be more important than the others, viz. that of eating and drinking, which can account for (53), (54), (57) and (59). A similar observation, it will be remembered, was made for the Shakespeare corpus. Obviously this hangs together with our general conception of linguistic communication in terms of the Conduit metaphor: the mouth is conceived as a container for (reified) words, which in the metaphors under discussion here can be taken to be fed into other people (as in (53)), or in some sense stolen from others (in (54)), or to be too voluminous to contain (57), or to have a soiling effect on it (in (59)).

8. Some conclusions

Having analysed three successive samples where *mouth* or its ancestor is used to denote linguistic action, and having confronted these analyses with the uses recorded in a contemporary corpus-based general usage dictionary, we would now like to highlight some patterns that emerge. Obviously, our sampling was too restricted to present this as the complete story of the development; on the other hand, we think that our findings have a reasonable degree of representativeness, and would at least be worth the confrontation with other, similar investigations into the way in which metonymic and metaphorical mappings can develop.

In our specific instance the mapping of *muþ* onto L.A. is of biblical (and hence non-native) origin, but it appears to have been firmly established already in the writings of Ælfric. Disregarding the (few) instances where it is used literally, we find that initially the mapping is only metonymic, but as such multi-faceted, as it was in the biblical tradition from which it was borrowed. The functionality of the mouth in the speech event allows it to be mapped onto *what is said*, and as such the combination *X's muþ* can denote *what X says* and

hence *X as speaker*. Less frequently onto the speaker directly, or onto the (more abstract) *speech faculty*. Besides, there are a number of verbials with *muþ* which are as such used metonymically. Some of these metonymies are fitted into metaphorical contexts, but such that the metonym is maintained, in other words we get metonymies within metaphor. This general pattern for metonymy is maintained with Chaucer, with as a special feature the added emphasis on **oral** or **public** production in most of the cases where *mouth* denotes *what it said*. This special point is not relevant for the Shakespeare sample, which, as far as metonymization is concerned, largely parallels the Ælfric one, except for the decrease in the type *mouth of X* or *X's mouth* and an increase of the metaphorical contexts in which the metonyms occur.

There is a striking difference between Shakespeare and the earlier samples, however, in that there are a considerable number of pure metaphors containing the item *mouth*, including some where we get demetonymization, i.e. instances in which a potential metonymic use of *mouth* loses its metonymic force because a literal interpretation is required with respect to the donor domain, which is mapped as a whole onto L.A. This sudden rise in metaphor is, of course, in line with the baroque, flowery character of Shakespeare's (and most Elizabethan) language.

As regards our restricted general usage sample from LDCE, we found that the metonymic applicability of *mouth* has diminished considerably; the metonymies that appear to survive best are those where *mouth*, with some further, pejorative, specification, is mapped onto the speaker, together with the metonymic expressions in which *mouth* is an argument in a verbal expression. On the other hand, the marked increase in pure metaphors we found in Shakespeare is also found here, though obviously there is no room for excessive flowery language in a general usage data base like the one used by the LDCE. As regards these metaphors, two categories stand out (even if the absolute numbers in our restricted sample are low): the metaphors from metonymy (i.e. those where the metaphor builds on an earlier usage which could be interpreted metonymically); and the metaphors where the donor domain is that of eating and drinking (which was already the major donor domain in the Shakespeare data).

Generalizing somewhat further, it would seem that the following dimensions in this development are worth emphasizing.

(i) In the metonymic mapping the complexity of L.A. makes for a multifaceted range of possibilities. *Mouth* and its forerunners are not just mapped on *what is said*, but also onto the speaker, the speech faculty, and in the case of more complex verbal expressions, on different aspects or stages of the linguistic

event. With respect to our oldest sample, however, we must stress again in this context that we owe this metonymic network to biblical sources.
(ii) Metonymic mappings can change over time in the sense that what used to be the major metonymy (here *mouth* onto *what is said* or *speech*) can become largely inoperative.
(iii) Extensive metonymic mapping can, as it were, pave the way for extensive metaphorical mapping. In our case, metonymies were found in metaphorical contexts from the start, but such that the metonymies remained interpretable as such. It was not until the Early Modern English sample that 'pure metaphors' with *mouth* were fully established. It would seem that this relates to the general promotion of baroque and figurative language with Shakespeare and in the Elizabethan period in general, but this will have to be confirmed by additional research of the type conducted here.
(iv) One clear instance where metonymy paves the way for metaphor is offered by the metaphors from metonymy, which were found in (proportionally) large frequency in our restricted Present-day English sample from the LDCE, but not earlier (though there is perhaps an isolated instance in the Chaucer data).
(v) With respect to specific donor domains for L.A. within which *mouth* figures (from the Shakespeare sample onwards, since we are concerned here with pure metaphors), the one that stands out is that of **eating and drinking**. It is worth pointing out that also here there is a conceptual foundation, in that our mouths are as it were equally instrumental, in speaking on the one hand, and in eating and drinking on the other, be it that the directionality of food and drink is the opposite of that of (egressive) speech production. Obviously, the connection through (partially) shared function is not of a diachronic nature, but experientially given.
(vi) Adding up the observations in (iii)–(v), the evidence here points to the priority of metonymy over metaphor in figurative mappings.

As I have already pointed out, these conclusions based on a single and somewhat restricted case study will have to be confronted with other investigations along similar lines.

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PERFORMATIVES ARE DEFAULT REFLEXIVE STANDARDIZED INDIRECT ACTS*

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Introduction

The problem of performatives

There are sentences which have the form of declaratives, but have been claimed not to have the usual constative force of declaratives—the so-called 'explicit performative sentences' or 'performatives'[1]:

(1) (a) I (hereby) order you to leave.
(b) I (hereby) promise to pay you five dollars.
(c) I (hereby) declare this meeting adjourned.

Performatives are still of interest to philosophers of language and linguists, because we have no consensual theory that explains two putative facts about performatives: the fact that performative sentences seem to be compositional (the meaning of the whole sentence is a function of the meaning of its constituents and their grammatical relations), and the fact that they seem to be used to perform the act named by the peformative verb (or noun etc.) that they contain.

The basic reason for the first putative fact is theoretical simplicity. A grammar or truth definition that can treat the contribution of e.g. 'order' in (1a) the same as 'order' in (1d)

(d) I ordered you to leave.

will have a leg up one one which has to provide a seperate clause for each use of each such verb in the language. Besides being theoretically untidy, such a treatment makes the prediction that each of these words and the sentences they occur in is ambiguous. And the theory must explain how the word or

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[1] I will use 'performative' as short for both 'performative sentence' and 'performative utterance' (of a performative sentence).

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sentence looses the (normal) compositional meaning it has in (1d) when it occurs in (1a).[2]

The basic reason for the second putative fact is introspection—there is a brute intuition that (1a–c) are used literally and directly to order, promise and adjourn respectively.[3]

These two properties of performative sentences can, of course, clash. The compositional meaning of a performative sentence is always one which generates a constative illocutionary act potential, but performative sentences may be used to perform non–constative acts, such as questioning, ordering, or commanding. So it seems to be the case both that the illocutionary act potential of a performative sentence is restricted by semantics to constatives, and that we intuit them as used to perform non–constative acts.

Conditions of adequacy

Any adequate account of how performatives work should meet at least four conditions: Performatives (i) are normal **declaratives** from the point of view of compositional semantics, (ii) they have an interpretation as a **non–constative** doing,[4] and (iii) they introspectively feel as if they mean just that non-constative doing. In addition, a theory of performatives must (iv) explain how they work communicatively—how speakers perform the acts they do, and how this is communicated to hearers. An adequate account of performatives must satisfy these conditions (or explain them away).[5]

How should we resolve this tension between semantics and pragmatics as well as conform to these conditions of adequacy? This is the problem of performatives. There is a spectrum of analyses of the communicative uses of performative sentences:

[2] See Heal (1974, 108–9), Récanati (1987, Part I).

[3] Gale (1970) argued that performatives do not have a truth value, and Schiffer (1972, 108–9) argued that performatives are not used to costate. See Sampson (1971) for a reply to Gale. We will return to Schiffer's proposal at the end of this section.

[4] Except when the utterance is also performatively a constative, as with 'I (hereby) state that p'.

[5] Searle (1989, section 3) offers eight conditions of adequacy, many of which are not neutral between theories. These are discussed in Bach–Harnish (in press).

Spectrum of analyses of performatives

1. Performatives are just used to do (illocutionary) things, (Austin 1961; Searle 1969).
2. Performatives are used to say (locutionary) one thing and to do (illocutionary) other things (Austin 1961).
3. Performatives are used to declare (illocutionary) things and to do (illocutionary) other things (Récanati 1987; Searle 1988).
4. Performatives are used to constate (illocutionary) one thing and do, by standardized indirection, something else (illocutionary) (Bach–Harnish 1979).
5. Performatives are used to constate one thing (illocutionary), and indirectly by implicature to do (illocutionary) another.
6. Performatives are ambiguous as between a performative and a non-performative reading.
7. Performatives are true or false, but are not used to constate anything (Schiffer 1972).
8. Performatives are true or false, and are used to constate one thing and to do that thing directly (Davidson 1979).

In this paper we will first look at Austin's introduction of the notion of a performative utterance and relate that to a notion of a performative sentence. We then elaborate the view in (4), and end with some comments on (2), and (6)–(8).[6]

A. Austin: What are performative utterances?

The thirty or so articles and books published on Austin's discussion of performatives gives testimony to the fact that his notion is not crystal clear. In part I of his paper "Performative Utterances" Austin introduces and motivates the notion of a performative utterance; in part II he tries to find criteria for distinguishing performatives from assertions statements and other 'constatives'. He fails and charts the demise of the distinction.

Austin (1961, 220) introduced "peformative" as a "new and ugly word" with the following explications:

"Now it is one such sort of use of language [non-reportive, non-descriptive] that I want to examine here. I want to discuss a kind of utterance which

[6] For a discussion of position 1 see Harnish (1991b). For comments on position 3 see Harnish (1991a, b), and Bach–Harnish (in press).

looks like a statement and grammatically, I suppose, would be classed as a statement, which is not nonsensical, and yet is not true or false ... They will be perfectly straightforward utterances, with ordinary verbs in the first person singular present indicative active, and yet we shall see at once that they couldn't possibly be true or false. Furthermore, if a person makes an utterance of this sort we would say that he is doing something rather than merely saying something ... When I say 'I do' (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife), I am not reporting on a marriage, I am indulging in it. Now these kinds of utterance are the ones that we call performative utterances" (1961, 222).

"These performative utterances are not true or false, then. But they do suffer from certain disabilities of their own. They can fail to come off in special ways, and that is what I want to consider next. The various ways in which a performative utterance may be unsatisfactory we call, for the sake of a name, the infelicities..." (ibid, 224).

"Furthermore, with these verbs [performative] that I have used there is a typical asymmetry between the use of this person and tense of the verb and the use of the same verb in other persons and other tenses, and this asymmetry is rather an important clue" (ibid, 228–9).

"...here is at least one other standard form...where the verb is in the passive voice and the second or third person, not the first: 'Passengers are warned to cross the line by the bridge only'." (ibid, 229), "You are hereby authorized to do so–and–so" (ibid, 229).

"Very typical of this kind of performative—especially liable to occur in written documents of course—is that the little word 'hereby' either actually occurs or might naturally be inserted" (ibid, 229–30).

"...any utterance which is performative could be reduced or expanded or analyzed into one of these two standard beginning 'I ...' so and so or begining 'You (or he) hereby ...' so and so" (ibid, 30).

From these quotations we can extract the following properties of prototypical performatives:

1. They are statements, grammatically;[7]
2. they are in the first person singular present indicative active;
3. they are not reports or descriptions;
4. they cannot be true or false;

[7] Austin probably meant that they are declaratives or indicatives, since statements are not kinds of sentences, but rather speech acts.

5. they are doings, not merely sayings;
6. they are subject to infelicities;[8]
7. they are asymmetrical between first person, present tense and other persons and tenses;
8. they naturally take 'hereby';
9. they take passive voice, and second and third person.

Non-prototypical performatives can take other forms, but are equivalent to prototypical performatives:

10. those in 9 can be reduced or expanded into the standard format of 2.

Defining performatives

Can we turn these into a more precise characterization of prototypical performatives? If we allow ourselves the notion of an illocutionary act, then we can say, as a first approximation:

(P-Perf) e is a prototypical performative iff
1. e is of the form: I (hereby) VP, or NP2/3rd are (hereby) VP-ed (VP is present tense or progressive aspect);
2. VP denotes an illocutionary act;[9]
3. If S utters e in the appropriate circumstances, then S VP-s.

(Perf) e is a performative iff e is equivalent (on a reading) to a prototypical performative.[10]

Lets try these out on some examples. First, (Perf) admits such non-prototypical examples as:

(2) (a) I will be there, and that is a promise
(b) I am promising to be there

But it rules out 'hedged performatives' such as,

(3) (a) I must order you to leave
(b) I would like to suggest a Merlot

This is because sentences such as (3a, b) are not equivalent to P-performatives, as can be seen by,

[8] Austin (1961, 226ff) notes that the list of infelicities is neither complete nor exhaustive.

[9] Austin (1961) of course propounded the notion of a performative before and independently of the notion of an illocutionary act, but he never succeeded in characterizing performatives to this satisfaction.

[10] By 'equivalent' we mean that they have the same illocutionary act potential.

(c) I must order you to leave, but you won't
(d) *I order you to leave, but you won't

Second, (P-Perf) rules out such examples as:

(4) (a) Come in [clause 1]
(b) I (hereby) move molecules [clause 2]
(c) I (hereby) utter an English sentence [clause 2]
(d) I promise to be there on Wednesdays (habitual) [clause 3]

Such performatives were contrasted with **constatives**, which are, prototypically, true or false, need not be first person singular present indicative active, don't naturally take 'hereby' etc. Notice that if we distinguish clearly performatives as sentences from performatives as utterances (actions), then some criteria go more naturally with the linguistic aspect, others go more naturally with the action. Qua sentence type, 1, 2, 7–10 are natural predicates of performatives, but qua action type 3–5 are more natural.[11] Both come together in **the production of the sentence token (utterance) under certain circumstances** and hence the title: Peformative Utterances. The production of the sentence token (utterance token) can be categorized according to properties of the sentence type tokened, or properties of the act of tokening it.[12]

In part II of the paper Austin argues that the distinction between constatives and performatives begins to break down at two important points:

1. Statements too can be felicitious or infeliciteous (1961, 235).
2. Performatives can be assessed along dimensions of "correspondence with fact" (1961, 237).

Austin concludes that,

"We need to go very much farther back, to consider all the ways and senses in which saying anything at all is doing this or that—because of course it is always doing a good many different things. And one thing that emerges when we do this is that, besides the question that has been very much studied in the past as to what a certain utterance *means*, there is a further question distinct from this as to what was the *force*, as we may call it, of the utterance ... What we need besides the old doctrine about meanings is a new doctrine

[11] Austin seems to have countenanced statements as actions which can be true or false; see Austin (1950), especially 86–8.

[12] Notice, by the way, that so far Austin has not mentioned what many regard as the most salient property of explicit performatives—they contain as main verb a description of the act being performed in their utterance.

about all the possible forces of utterances, towards the discovery of which our proposed list of explicit performative verbs would be a very great help" (1961, 238).

Thus, the old performative/constative distinction must give way to a doctrine of the forces of utterances, and in Austin's posthumously published lectures (1962) this new doctrine is worked out in some detail.

Récanati: saving Austin from Austin

Was Austin correct in rejecting the performative/constative distinction? According to Récanati (1987, 70ff), Austin was right to highlight the pragmatic dimensions of constatives, but he may have lost sight of the original idea behind the introduction of performatives. Although constatives, such as statements, may be infelicitous, they are still expected to conform to an independent reality the speaker aims to describe. A performative utterance, however, "represents itself as intended to bring about the state of affairs it represents" (ibid, 71–2). They have a world–to–act direction of fit (ibid, 155). For example, a serious utterance of "The earth is flat" constitutes a statement that the earth is flat, but what the sentence represents is the state of affairs of the earth being flat. An utterance of "The meeting is adjourned" on the other hand, presents itself as adjourning the meeting and is intended to bring about the state of affairs it represents. Does the distinction between direction of fit coincide with the performative/constative distinction? Not on two counts. First, performatives such as,

(5) I (hereby) state that Arizona is hot and dry

would, on Récanati's theory, have only a word to world direction of fit.

Second, Récanati also considers utterances of non-declaratives such as "Come here"? as performative because "My utterance represents your coming here, and it presents itself as, in a certain manner, 'causing' or intended to cause, this state of affairs to come to pass" (ibid, 71).[13] There is an important difference between these two examples that Récanati's reconstruction of Austin does not account for: an utterance of "The meeting is adjourned" successfully adjourns the meeting and makes true the content of the utterance, but an utterance of "Come here!" successfully directs the hearer to come here, and

[13] It is important to note that it is **utterances**, not sentences, that are supposed to have this property. The sentence itself, of course, can be used **with the same meaning** not only to order, but to request or beseech.

does not make true the content of the utterance—only compliance by the hearer would do that.

Adequacy

How does Austin's account fare with respect to our conditions of adequacy? Keeping in mind that we do not really have a theory here it is unclear whether performative utterances as characterized by Austin satisfy our first, second and fourth criteria of adequacy (see the section on Conditions of adequacy). As for (iv), Austin never proposed a theory of linguistic communication. As for (i) and (ii) the trick is dealing with property 5. If 'saying' here means just 'uttered' or 'produced something linguistic', then it would not satisfy the demands of compositionality. If, on the other hand, it means something stronger, such as the **locutionary** acts of his later lectures (Austin 1962), then they might. The picture would then be that what is said in a performative utterance is determined compositionally, but what is done is not. The mystery here is saying how what is done gets done in saying what is said (under the circumstances). If, on the other hand, 'say' is construed only as an utterance, then special conventions of use could attach to it such that their sincere and literal utterance counts as the performance of the indicated act.[14] In this case he would satisfy condition (ii), but not condition (i). Austin never worked out these ideas.

B. Bach and Harnish: performatives as default reflexive standardized indirect acts

Performatives as constatives

Bach and Harnish (1979, Chapter 10.1) agree with Austin's characterization of performatives except, notably, for his controversial theoretical doctrine about their truth valuability. As Bach and Harnish note, Austin does not really give any **argument** that performatives are not truth valuable. He intuits it and thinks it is obvious:

> "None of the utterances cited is either true or false: I assert this as obvious and do not argue for it" (1962, 6).

Austin apparantly thought it enough to point out that we wouldn't **normally say** that a performative utterance was true or false. But as we point out, there

[14] See Récanati (1987, part I) for an excellent detailed critical examination of this idea.

can be semantically irrelevant reasons for why we 'wouldn't say' something. For instance, we 'wouldn't say' some things because they are obscene or otherwise offensive. The only reason that is relevant in this discussion is that we wouldn't say it because it isn't **true**. But Austin did not show that it is **false** that we are not saying something or asserting something in uttering performatives. There is also some evidence that performative are true or false. For instance, we can say,

(1) S: I promise to be there.
H: Is that true? Do you?[15]
S: Yes, it is true; I promise that I'll be there.

(2) It is true that if I promise I will be there, then it will be true that I promised to be there.

(3) S: I gladly promise to be there.
H: That's false; you're not glad.

This last interchange is evidence because of the following (inductively arrived at) principle: if a sentence with "gladly" (or any other such adverb) modifying the main verb is true/false, then the sentence without "gladly" (or any other such adverb) is true/false.[16]

There are other arguments as well. Stampe (1975, section 36 ff) compares performatives to other oratio obliqua constructions; see also Davidson (1979). Harnish (1976, section B) argues that performatives, if not true or false, would fail general principles of substitutivity of identity, and hence compositionality. Harnish (1979), Davidson (1979), and Ginet (1979, 246) extend this to tense. Szabolcsi (1982, section 2) develops the idea that performatives are semantically declaratives (and so true or false) within a model theoretic semantics. Heal (1974, section III) presents an argument based on modification. She does not set the argument out explicitly, and she formulates it in terms of 'neustics' and 'phrastics'—a terminology I would like to avoid. Here is a reconstruction:

1. Consider sentences such as:

(4) (a) I promise with all my heart that ...
(b) I, being of sound mind and body, do bequeath ...

[15] It might be objected that H's contribution questions the content of the promise—being there—not the promise, but this does not seem to be so; to question that one should say "Is that true? **Will** you (be there)?"

[16] This elaborates an example from Heal (1974, 114). We still need an explanation, however, for why it is awkward to say of the unmodified sentence that it is true or false.

2. both (4a, b) are performatives;
3. 'promise' is modified by the adverbial in (4a), so it is a constituent used normally to predicate promising of the subject;
4. 'I' is modified by the adjectival in (4b), so it is a constituent used normally to refer to the speaker;
5. so 'I' and 'promise' are playing their normal roles in these performative sentences;
6. so performatives are true or false just as normal declaratives are.

Although steps 3, 4, and 5 need independent argument, it seems that the burden of proof is on the other side to give reason to suppose these sentences are not true or false in this case. However, our primary purpose here is not to argue that performatives are true or false, but assuming they are, to say how they work.

Illocutionary taxonomy

Bach and Harnish (1979, chapters 3, 6) proposed that what Austin (1962) called illocutionary acts covers two subclasses of acts: communicative and institutional (we called them 'conventional' acts). Communicative acts are successfully performed just in case their reflexive communicative intention is expressed and then recognized. For instance,

(REQ) S **requests** that H do A if S, in uttering e, expresses:
(a) the intention/desire that H do A,
(b) the intention that H intend to do A (at least partly) because of S's intention/desire.

We analyse **expressing** attitudes in terms of reflexively intending that H take the utterance as reason to think S has those attitudes.[17] For us, communicative intentions are reflexive intentions—they refer to themselves in the way that Searle (1983) and Harman (1986) have argued all intentions refer to themselves. But unlike most intentions, communicative intentions are fulfilled when they are recognized. For example, intending to convince you may, as these authors have argued, involve intending that this very intention be efficacious in convinving you, but your recognizing my intention to convince you

[17] The general form of communicative intentions is given by (EXP):
(EXP) S reflexively intends that H take the utterance of e as reason to think:
(a) S A-s that p,
(b) S intends H to A' that p.

does not constitute my convincing you. Telling you that p, on the other hand, succeeds when you recognize my intention to tell you.[18]

Most so called 'communicative acts' can of course be performed even though the intention to perform them is not (intended to be) recognized. So the terminology may be a bit misleading. However, such occasions are peripheral to the theory of speech acts and language use, and it may even be that they are in some sense parasitic on the communicative occasions.

Institutional acts, on the other hand, depend on nonlinguistic institutions (systems of mutual expectation) for their existence and are performed when the utterance satisfies the conditions of the institution.[19] 'Locution-specific' institutional acts require that certain forms of words be uttered inorder for the performance of the act.[20] There are two broad classes of institutional acts: **Effectives**, which cause changes in the institutional status of persons or things (for instance, a baby is baptized, a ship is christened, a meeting is adjourned), and **Verdictives**, which are judgments which by convention have official binding import in the context. For instance, a jury might find a defendent guilty or an umpire might call a runner out. Of course one can perform an institutional act without intending to communicate this fact. However, implementing the change in institutional status usually requires communicating this result to interested or affected parties.

The communicative role of the performative verb (or noun) in both types of act is to indicate what one is doing in uttering it by constating what one is doing. Thus we have options such as:

(5) Judge:
  (a) The defendent will spend ...
  (b) I (hereby) sentence the defendent to spend ...

(6) Chairman:
  (a) This meeting is adjourned.
  (b) I (hereby) declare this meeting adjourned.

[18] Recently the idea that communicative intentions are reflexive has come under criticism by Sperber and Wilson (1986) and Récanati (1987). Récanati rightly challenges Sperber and Wilson, then proposes his own modified criticism. That argument is challenged in Harnish (1991a, b).

[19] These are conventions, on one use of the term; see Lewis (1969), Schiffer (1972), Bach-Harnish (1979).

[20] See Bach-Harnish (1979, 110). One candidate example: saying the words "Harei at mekvdeshet li lefi dat moshe veisrael" while putting a ring on the bridge's finger in the presence of two appropriate witnesses constitutes marrying in some Israeli cultures.

Indirection

In some cases we communicate 'indirectly' in that one communicative intention (the one associated with the indirect act) is recognized (and expected to be recognized) by means of another communicative intention (the one associated with the direct act). The two acts are performed simultaneously, though the hearer typically will reason (and will be expected to reason) from the constative (direct) act to the other (usually nonconstative) indirect act. Thus, if I say

(7) "My car has a flat tire"

at a gas station I can expect to be taken as requesting a repair, whereas if said in an intersection to a policeman it will more likely be taken as an excuse. In both cases I am using the sentence to literally and directly assert that my car has a flat tire. Likewise, we can be communicating indirectly in performing an institutional act. As a constituent of communicative acts, (non locution-specific) institutional acts are also indirect in that the speaker is performing two illocutionary acts, and expects that the indirect act will be recognized by means of the direct act.

How performatives work

Applied to performatives, "I (hereby) order you to leave" is directly constative and indirectly an (standardized) order. According to Bach–Harnish (1979, 208) a hearer might reason (and be expected to reason) as follows:

1. S is saying "I (hereby) order you to leave."
2. S is stating that S is ordering me to leave. [mood and context]
3. If S's statement is true, then S must be ordering me to leave.
4. If S is ordering me to leave, it must be S's utterance that constitutes the order (what else could it be?).
5. Presumably, he is speaking the truth. [conversational presumption]
6. Therefore, in stating that S is ordering me to leave S is ordering me to leave.

On this account there is nothing semantically special about performatives.[21] In particular, it is not a part of the semantics of performatives that they refer to their own utterance. The speaker may be e.g. ordering by performing some

[21] Other than that the performative verb denotes an act performable, in the circumstances, by uttering that very sentence. But why call this a 'semantic' property of the verb? See Ginet (1979) for further discussion.

collateral act such as signing a paper (see step 4). In this sense performative utterances could be described as **default reflexive** in that they 'refer' to themselves (and are therefore reflexive) by default, when no collateral act could plausibly be being referred to as the vehicle of the performance of the order.[22] 'Hereby' makes explicit the fact that the utterance has the (indirect) force it has in virtue of what the speaker is now doing. It means something like,

Hereby = by this very act

where the act at issue could be, but need not be, the utterance itself. Notice that the vehicle of the performance of the indirect act is not a part of the communicative intention. Consider the following case.[23] I have authority to order you to face immanent death only in writing (to minimize misunderstandings). You do not know this, so when I say (while signing) "I order you to go" I intend the signing to be the vehicle of the order, but you understand the utterance to be the vehicle. There has been an infelicity, but communication has still been successful because for communication to occur, the hearer need only recognize my communicative intention to order—the hearer need not identify the intended vehicle, but only believe there is one. Hence step 4. would be typical, but not necessary. The generalized pattern of inference is:

1. S is saying that S F-s that P ("I (hereby) order you to leave.").
2. S is stating that S is F-ing that P (ordering me to leave).
3. If S's statement is true, then S must be F-ing that P (ordering me to leave).
4. Presumably, S is speaking the truth. [conversational presumption]
5. Therefore, S is F-ing that P (ordering me to leave).[24]

Furthermore, some forms of words, such as (8a) vs. (8b), become standardized for their indirect force in that H need not figure out what the indirect force of the utterance is, given that H knows the utterance has an indirect force.[25]

[22] Not to be confused with Récanati's notion with the same name (1987, 201). Scare quotes arround 'refer' and 'reflexive' indicate that there is nothing in the sentence that denotes, designates or refers to that utterance itself. The speaker intends it to be (taken to be) the vehicle.

[23] See also Sampson's (1971) Ruritania example.

[24] See Ginet (1979) for a discussion of the extension of performative verbs that helps legitimate steps 2 and 4.

[25] Bach–Harnish (1979, 195) characterize this notion as follows:

Illocutionary Standardization (IS): expression T is standardly used to F in group G if and only if:

(8) (a) Can/could/would you VP?
(b) Do you have the ability to VP?

The above inferences are a reconstruction of reasoning before standardization. After standardization the performative practice short–circuits the steps of this inference pattern, both as carried through by the hearer and as expected by the speaker:

1. S has uttered "I (hereby) order you to leave",
2. "I (hereby) order you ..." is standardly used to order,
3. It would be contextually inappropriate for S just to be contating that S is ordering,
4. So, S is ordering me to leave.

Compare this with ambiguity:

1. S has uttered "I will meet you at the bank",
2. "bank" means both 'river or lakeside' and 'finance house',
3. It would be contextually inappropriate for us to meet at some river or lakeside,
4. so S is saying that he will meet me at a certain finance house.

The interpretation of the utterance is thus introspectively indistinguishable from disambiguation, and so feels to the communicants like a 'reading' of the sentence.

Adequacy

It is easy to see that this theory satisfies the four conditions on performatives: (i) performative sentences are semantically ordinary declaratives, (ii) they have an interpretation that is non-Constative (the indirect act), and (iii) performative sentences feel as if they mean just the 'other' doing because this use has become standardized, and so introspectively approximates being a second 'reading' of the sentences. Finally (iv) our account of performatives is embedded in a general theory of speech acts and linguistic communication and thus we have an account of how a speaker can peform the act described in uttering that sentence, and how this can be communicated to a hearer.

(i) It is mutually believed in G that generally when a member of G utters T, his illocutionary intent is to F, and

(ii) Generally when a member of G utters T in a context in which it would violate the conversational presumptions to utter T with (merely) its literally determined force, his illocutionary intent is to F.

Open questions

The theory, as it stands, still faces prima facie difficulties and open questions.
1. One is the status of the general inference before standardization; did people really figure out performatives as they figure out paradigmatic cases of indirection?
2. And how did standardization come about—by precedent, by convention? Perhaps there was a natural evolution from collateral acts to utterance acts as the vehicle of the performance due both to the fact that natural languages contain the resources to talk about themselves, and that the utterance act is always available as the vehicle of the performance—freeing the speaker from having to perform the collateral act.[26]
3. Also notice that some forms have become standardized for indirect requests, but some have not. Performatives, on the other hand, all seem standardized—why?

(9) (a) I promise to VP
(b) I am promising to VP[27]
(c) I VP, and that's a promise[28]
(d) I VP, I promise[29]

4. Fourth, there is the lack of introspective evidence that we really are constating in communicating with explicit performatives. Perhaps one reason we

[26] See J. Burgess "Notes on Performatives", Monash University xerox, 1990.

[27] Why do performatives resist the present progressive if they are used to say what we are now doing? Notice that some forms are more natural than others, but most are no good with "hereby":
a) I am begging you ... *I am hereby begging you ...
b) I am asking you ... ?? I am hereby asking you ...
c) ??I am baptising ... *I am hereby baptizing you ...
Perhaps this has to do with the time structure of these various verbs and the fact that we are reporting on an act which aspect marks as 'in progress', but is actually performed at a point in time.

[28] Notice that "and that's a promise" cannot always be appended to an utterance used to make a promise:
S1: Do you promise to come?
S2: Yes, I will (come), and that's a promise
S3: *Is the Pope Catholic, and that's a promise
S4: *I promise, and that's a promise

[29] Direct quotation works differently, compare:
a) "I'll be there" he promised
b) *He promised "I'll be there"
c) "I'll be there" he said
d) He said "I'll be there"

do not normally introspect a constative force is not that it is not there, but because it usually is. I.e. since performatives are usually true, their truth is not their usual point and we don't notice what we take for granted. This explanation makes the prediction that when a performative is false, then its constative force should be (more) evident. However this does not seem to be so; if I say "You are fired", I clearly haven't done so, as conditions are not appropriate. Do we intuit this utterance as (more) clearly constative? It would seem not.
5. A corollary of this problem is why, if performatives are constatives, is it often so unnatural to say that they are true or false?
6. A sixth worry regards the function of performatives. Notice that some acts require performatives and some prohibit them.

Performative Required

(10) Priest:
  (a) I (hereby) pronounce you man and wife.
  (b) *You are man and wife.[30]
  (c) I (hereby) baptize you Samuel, in the name of ...
  (d) *You are (named) Samuel, in the name of ...

Performative Prohibited

(11) Umpire:
  (a) You're out!
  (b) *I (hereby) call you out.

(12) Boss:
  (a) You're fired.
  (b) *I (hereby) fire you.

(13) (a) I'll get you for that! (threat)[31]
  (b) *I (hereby) threaten that I will get you for that![32]

If the point of performatives is to make explicit an illocutionary intent, why don't we always have this option?

7. Why is (14a) a suggestion, but (14b) is not an adjournment?

[30] Notice that the following seems ok: "You are *now* man and wife".

[31] We also have forms such as: "I don't want to threaten you, but . . . ", and "I don't want this to sound like a threat, but . . . ".

[32] Included in this list are also "insinuate", "imply", "suggest" etc. and perhaps "brag", "boast" etc. See Strawson (1964), Vendler (1972) and Ginet (1979) for further discussion.

(14) (a) May I suggest a Merlot?
(b) May I adjourn this meeting?[33]

8. Finally, are performatives ambiguous? Suppose sentence S1 can be construed as C1, C2, and sentence S2 as C1 and C2. Then we will say that two construals of a conjunction 'S1 and S2' are uncrossed if the only possible construals are:

(UC) S1(C1) and S2(C1)
S1(C2) and S2(C2)

And we will call construals crossed if they include any others. Implicit in our earlier discussion was appeal to a principle such as:

(P) Since 'do so' proverbalizes under a meaning, if the first conjunct is construed as being used with a given meaning, then the second conjunct must be construed as having that same meaning.

In other words:

(CR1) The possibility of crossed construals (in conjunction reduction) is evidence for the indeterminacy of the unreduced clause.

(CR2) The impossibility of crossed construals (in conjunction reduction) is evidence for the ambiguity of the unreduced clause.

Consider the example:[34]

(15) (a) I saw her duck and so did he.
(b) I saw her fowl and so did he (fowl, *bow).
(c) I saw her bow down, and so did he (bow down, *fowl).
(d) I saw her (qua blond) duck and so did he (qua redhead).
(e) I saw her (qua redhead) duck and so hid he (qua blond).

The test correctly predicts that (15a) is ambiguous with respect to 'duck', but only indeterminate as between blonds and redheads.

Consider now the sentences:

(16) (a) I promise to come on Wednesdays and so does John.
(b) John promises to come on Wednesdays and so do I.
(c) I hereby promise to come on Wednesdays and so does John.
(d) John promises to come on Wednesdays and hereby so do I.

[33] See Fraser (1975), and Bach-Harnish (1979, chapter 10.2) for further discussion.

[34] See Zwicky-Sadock (1975), who also note problems with such tests.

These have the construals:

(17) (a) performative, report
report, report
*performative, performative

(b) report, report
report, performative
*performative, performative

(c) performative, report
*performative, performative
*reportive, reportive

(d) report, performative
report, report
*performative, performative

What does this say about (CR1) and (CR2) and ambiguity? Since they all allow crossed readings, (CR1) predicts the unreduced clause to be unambiguous. Notice that we are **forced** to cross readings, not just **allowed** to, as with normal applications of the test. But recall (P), the rationale for these principles. Why then can't we get reduction on the performative sense? The reason seems to be connected with the fact that most people do not get third person performative promises ("John promises to be there"), but those who do also get the above performative uncrossed readings. What does this show about the test? Is this an extraneous consideration—a filter on an independent test—or should it be constituitive of the test itself?

Consider an analogous case involving nonliterality:[35]

(18) Nerdsky is a (real) genius and so is Chomsky.

Here it seems we must take the reduced conjunt as ironic or not, depending on the construal of the first conjunct. By (CR2), this is evidence for the ambiguity of "Nerdsky is a genius" as between a literal and an ironic reading. Surely something has gone wrong if we apply the test in this way.[36]

Analogous points can be made for other forms of nonliterality, such as metaphors and proverbs:

(19) (a) The gambler is hot right now, and so is the weather,
(b) ?He who hesitates is lost, and so were Lewis and Clark,

[35] See Zwicky–Sadock (1975, 26ff.).

[36] Zwicky–Sadock (ibid) suggest a psychological set might be involved here.

(c) ?The early bird catches the worm, and so does the early fisherman,
(d) ?No man is an island, and neither is a peninsula.

As with irony, both clauses must be taken metaphorically or literally, no crossing is possible and again, ambiguity is predicted. With proverbs the situation is slightly different. Because the whole sentence constitutes the proverb there is no coherent way to proverbalize just part of it, and so it has no coherent interpretation as a whole.

Thus it would appear that there can be external filters on the output of these tests. In particular, we must be careful that the 'impossibility' mentioned in (CR2) is not due to some extraneous constraint on the interpretation of the sentence. But how do we tell when such a constraint is operative? This needs additional work.

Other ambiguity test yield similar results:

Contradiction

(20) (a) That kid (child) is not a kid (young goat). (ambiguous)
(b) *I promise to be there on Wednesdays and I don't. (univocal)

Substitution

(21) (a) He cooked (*baked) her goose. (ambiguous)
(b) I promise (am promising) to be there. (univocal)

Stylistic variation

(22) (a) They saw her duck (not= Her duck was seen by them). (ambiguous)
(b) I promise to be there on Wednesdays (= On Wednesdays I promise to be there) (univocal)

The overall upshot of these tests is that performatives are not ambiguous, though there are issues of interpretation regarding these test to be settled.

Alternatives

1. Maybe the answer to at least some of these worries is to take the second Austinian alternative mentioned earlier (section A) more seriously and propose that a speaker in uttering an explicit performative is saying that S is F-ing, but is not constating it. The problem with this solution, recall, is that we have no explanation of the connection between what is said and the illocutionary

force potential, and so do not satisfy condition 2. Until this connection can be spelled out in a way compatible with the other conditions of adequacy we cannot count this option as an advance on our theory.

2. Another, more radical, solution would be to deny the common assumption underlying most of these problems:

(T-C) If a sentence has a truth value, then it (i) has a constative illocutionary force potential (CIFP), and (ii) is uttered with that potential.

Perhaps performatives are sentences with a truth value, and so a compositional semantics, but they are not used constatively.

The problem with this solution is saying why performatives are not used constatively. We need to break the connection between having a truth value, having a CIFP, and being used constatively. Schiffer (1972, 108–9) argued ingeniously for one version of this solution. His view seems to be that performatives have the 'conventional force' of constatives (and so have a truth value), but they are not uttered with this full conventional force. Thus, he breaks the connection at T–C(ii). His argument is that to make the conventional force of e.g. "I order you to leave" explicit one would have to utter "I state that I order you to leave", and to make that force explicit one would have to utter "I state that I state that I order you to leave" ad infinitum. Many writers have found problems with this argument. Heal (1974, 117–8) denies the regress is vicious. Bach (1975, 232) denies that performatives make explicit the conventional force of an utternace. Heal challanges this also. Harnish (1976, section B) denies that the regress gets started.

How about trying to break the connection at (i)? This would be more natural in that this is a break between (on some accounts) a semantic property and a pragmatic one. Could a declarative sentence have a truth value without having CIFP? If having CIFP just means being able to constate with it, and constating is just uttering something as true or false, then it might prove difficult to drive a wedge between truth value and CIFP. If, however, we have a richer conception of CIFP involving the idea of expressing a belief or committment to truth, then it is possible for the performative to have a truth value, but not be used to express belief or truth committment.

Suppose we adopt the richer conception of CIPF for the sake of argument. Still we need an explanation of why they do not have such potential. And although this alternative would handle some of the above problems, it would still need to face others—such as why it is sometimes so unnatural to say that performatives are true or false. And what is the connection between uttering a truth valuable sentence (but not constating anything) and e.g. ordering?

How would we satisfy condition of adequacy (ii)? Until such questions can be answered we cannot count this option as an advance on our account.

3. Probably the most radical solution to the problem of performatives is Davidson (1979). He argues that performatives are indicatives, and so are true or false on occasions of utterance, and should fall under the purview of a truth definition. His proposal is that performatives (and other oblique constructions such as 'say that') are analyzed as follows:

(23) (a) I order that you go.
(b) I order that. You go.

Where the force of (23b) is given by:

(c) I am issuing an order whose content is given by my next utterance. You go.

By analysing performatives as paratactic constatives Davidson inherits all the problems of such theories.[37] There are two distinctive problems with this proposal. First, Davidson analyzes imperatives and interrogatives paratactically, and claims as a virtue of the analysis that it correctly predicts they are without truth value:

"Each of the two utterances has a truth value, but the combined utterance is not the utterance of a conjunction, and so does not have a truth value" (1979, 20).

The question then arises; why do performatives have a truth value, but nonindicative analyzed the same way do not? Furthermore, often a pair of sentences is equivalent to a conjunction, logically,[38] and each declarative sentence in the analyzing pair support a variety of inferences which the analyzed imperative and interrogative do not. Another distinctive problem with this proposal is the connection between performative sentences such as (23a) and their analysans (23b–c). How does the truth definition (semantics) treat these three sentences; are all three covered by its clauses, or only (23b)? What relates (23a) to (23b)? Davidson says the first sentence of (23b) "represents a transformation", but it is not clear in what sense; no transformational grammar would derive (23a) from (23b).[39] Furthermore, how would this proposal extend to such sentences as the following?

[37] See, for instance, Haack (1971), McFetridge (1975/6), Arnaud (1976), and Segal–Speas (1986).

[38] Think of &–Introduction, &–Elimination rules.

[39] See Bach–Harnish (1983, 389–492) for further critical discussion.

(24) (a) I order you to leave.
(b) ?I order you. To leave.

(25) (a) There is a phone call I promise to make.
(b) ?I promise to make that. There is a phone call.

None of this shows that Davidson's proposal is wrong, just that it needs more elaboration than Davidson has so far given to make it plausible.

Conclusion

In this paper we presented the problem of performatives as the problem of explaining how performative sentences can both have a (constative) compositional semantics and be used to perform a non-constative illocutionary act, and how a speaker can use performatives to communicate to a hearer. Further, we insisted that a theory of this be consistent with four conditions of adequacy. We saw that there is a spectrum of analyses of performatives in the literature, and before exploring our own theory we looked briefly at Austin's original characterization of performatives, his abandonement of the performative–constative distinction, and Récanati's resuscitation. We then turned to our own proposal that performative utterances are default reflexive standardized indirect speech acts, and we argued that this theory meets our four conditions of adequacy—though it faces a number of open questions. However, the alternatives seemed to face worse problems and we concluded that our theory is the best available theory of performatives.[40]

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[40] An earlier version of the Introduction occurs in Harnish (1991b). Various people have contributed to this paper. I would like to thank Kent Bach, John Burgess, Marcelo Dascal, Ray Elugardo, Lloyd Hunberstone, Jacob Mey, Francois Récanati, Barry Taylor, Aubrey Townsend, and audiences at Australian National University, Melbourne University, Monash University, and Southern Methodist University.

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MODAL PARTICLES AS DISCOURSE MARKERS IN QUESTIONS*

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1. The essence of modality consists in the relativization of the validity of sentence meanings to a set of possible worlds. In less technical terms one may characterize modality as 'envisaging several possible courses of events' or as 'considering the possibility of things being otherwise' (Kiefer 1987; 1992). The possibilities envisaged by yes-no questions are defined by the two alternatives: p and not-p. That is, the two possible courses of events considered in the case of the question "Is Bill at home?" are "Bill is at home" and "Bill is not at home". Roughly speaking, "p or not-p" is the propositional content of a yes-no question. In the case of wh-questions the propositional content has to be defined differently. To take the simplest example where the answer is categorially determined by the question word, the propositional content of the wh-question can be circumscribed in the following manner. The alternatives considered are defined by a set of propositions obtained by replacing the question word by categorially appropriate terms which are restricted by the universe of discourse. For example, the propositional content of the question "Who wants another piece of cake?" may be "Bill wants another piece of cake or Mary wants another piece of cake or John wants another piece of cake or Eve wants another piece of cake" where Bill, Mary, John and Eve are the only persons to whom the question may be put in the given universe of discourse. The presupposition that "Someone wants another piece of cake" may, but need not, be part of the propositional content. By asking a question the speaker wants to know which one(s) of the possible alternatives envisaged is (are) true. This is the **basic modal value of interrogativity**.

Modal particles in questions are used to modify the basic modal value of interrogativity. One characteristic feature of the basic modal value of interrogativity is that there is no preferred alternative, all alternatives considered are equally possible. By using a modal particle the speaker may wish to indicate that he has some evidence to believe that one of the alternatives is more likely to occur than the other one(s). Or a modal particle may be used to introduce a

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presupposition where no presupposition was present. Since in Hungarian most modifications of the basic modal value of interrogativity are brought about by means of modal particles, for our present purpose (in want of a more general definition) we may use this property as the defining property of modal particles in interrogative sentences: A linguistic expression is a modal particle in a question if it modifies the basic modal value of interrogativity.

Though not all discourse markers affect modality, all modal particles seem to have discourse functions. In the case of questions modal particles may have two main discourse functions: (i) they connect the question to the previous discourse, (ii) they signal the preferred or expected answer. This will become clear from the discussion which follows. The 'connective function' of modal particles cannot always be made explicit. On the other hand, the expected answer is, in general, derivable from the modal meaning of the particle.[1]

2. In Hungarian the following modal particles are used in questions: *csak* 'surely', *csakugyan* 'really', *egyáltalán* 'at all', *hát* 'so (after all)', *is* 'really', *még* 'still', *szóval* 'so', *talán* 'perhaps', *tehát* 'so', *ugyan* 'can/could', *tényleg* 'really', *valóban* 'really'.[2]

2.1. *Csak* 'surely'[3]

Compare the following sentences:

(1)(a) *Jár neked valamilyen újság?*
'Do you subscribe to a newspaper?'

(b) *Csak jár neked valamilyen újság?*
'But you surely subscribe to some newspaper?'

[1] From the vast literature on particles I refer here to Thurmair 1989 which is perhaps the most systematic account of particles in German. It also deals quite extensively with the role of particles in questions. For further references cf. the bibliography in Thurmair 1989. As to particles in Hungarian, the literature is rather scarce. Cf., however, Molnár 1968, Kocsány 1986, Fábricz 1987 and, in particular, Bende 1989.

[2] The list is perhaps complete. Recall that only particles which modify the basic modal value of interrogativity count as modal. It should also be made clear that the English equivalents are very approximate. As known, particles are notoriously difficult to translate. Furthermore the formulations of the speaker's attitudes proposed in the present paper are illustrations rather then serious semantic descriptions. For more precise formulations much further research is needed.

[3] In view of the scarcity of really reliable material the discussion of the particles here is by necessity very sketchy. A full-fledged account would have to cover modal particles in other sentence types as well. In particular, in a more complete description the behavior of modal particles in questions would have to be compared with their behavior in declaratives.

Question (1a) is indifferent with respect to the two alternatives. (1b), on the other hand, makes it clear—by means of the particle *csak*—that the speaker has some reason to believe that one of the alternatives—namely p—should be the case. At the same time, however, he is not quite sure whether p is really the case, where p = 'the addressee subscribes to a newspaper'. The same difference can also be observed between (2a) and (2b):

(2)(a) *Felkel Jancsi dél előtt?*
'Does Johnny get up before noon?'
(b) *Jancsi csak felkel dél előtt?*
'Johnny will surely get up before noon, (won't he)?'

(2a) is an uncommitted information question, (2b), on the other hand, makes the speaker's beliefs explicit who thinks that Johnny should get up before noon. The particle *csak* may be accompanied by the tag *nem?*, as in (3), but this need not be so.

(3) *Jancsi csak felkel dél előtt, nem?*

Csak seems to have a fixed position: it always occurs in the position immediately preceding the (prefixed) verb. This is one of the major differences between *csak* as a modal particle and *csak* as a logical operator meaning 'only'. On the latter interpretation *csak* occurs normally in front of a noun phrase.

In more general terms the speaker's attitude expressed by *csak* can be formulated in the following fashion: **The speaker thinks that p should be the case, but he has got some evidence which makes him believe that p may not be the case after all.**

Notice that the modal particle *csak* cannot occur in wh-questions for at least two reasons. First, *csak* expresses a strong belief toward one of the alternatives, which automatically excludes it from wh-questions. Second, the syntactic position of *csak* is taken by the question word in wh-questions, consequently there is no place for it in such questions.

As to the discourse function of *csak*, this can be derived from its modal meaning. Since the speaker indicates his preference, the preferred answer is the one which is in accordance with this preference. Therefore a positive answer to (1b) or (2b) meets the speaker's expectations whereas a negative answer does not. Furthermore, since very often it is not too polite to leave the speaker unsatisfied, a negative answer must in general be more elaborate.

Csak may be combined with the negative particle *nem* yielding *csak nem*:

(4)(a) *Nem akarsz elmenni hozzá?*
'Don't you want to go to him?'
(b) *Csak nem akarsz elmenni hozzá?*
'You surely don't want to go to him (,do you)?'

Question (4b) clearly indicates that the speaker thinks that p (= you go to him) should not be the case. In other words, the negative particle reverses the speaker's attitude expressed by *csak*. Question (4a) is indifferent with respect to this attitude.

2.2. *Csakugyan* 'really'

In contradistinction to *csak*, which has several uses of which most are not attitudinal, *csakugyan* is always an attitudinal marker in questions. Consider:

(5)(a) *Csakugyan ő az?*
'Is it really him'?
(b) *Csakugyan eljössz?*
'Will you really come?'
(6)(a) *Csakugyan nem ő az?*
'Is it really not him?'
(b) *Csakugyan nem jössz el?*
'Will you really not come?'

In (5a–b) the speaker's attitude expressed by *csakugyan* refers to a positive, in (6a–b), on the other hand, to a negative state-of-affairs. In other words, negation in (6a–b) is part of the propositional content. The relevant speaker's attitude can be paraphrased as follows: **The speaker is not quite sure about p, there is still a slight possibility for p not to be the case.**

Questions such as (5a–b) and (6a–b) are typically asked for confirmation. Once again, this discourse function can be derived from the modal meaning of the particle *csakugyan*: the belief that p is the case comes close to certainty, the other alternative is not seriously considered as a possibility, a negative answer is not expected. No wonder, it would be odd to answer the questions (5a) or (5b) by a plain 'no'.

As to wh-questions, consider:

(7)(a) *Csakugyan hol van a kutya?*
'Indeed, where is the dog?'
(b) *Csakugyan mi van vele?*
'Indeed, what is with him?'

The particle *csakugyan* in the above sentences is not modal, but it has a clear discourse function, which can be described as follows. When people start talking about the dog you realize that the dog has disappeared. This may prompt you to ask the question (7a). Similarly, in the course of a discourse mention is made of a certain person. At this moment you realize that you don't know anything about said person. In this case you may ask question (7b). More generally, the discourse particle *csakugyan* shows the speaker's involvement in the discourse topic as well as his ignorance with respect to the state-of-affairs at stake. Notice that the first part of this characterization is also valid for the use of *csakugyan* in yes-no questions and the second half of the characterization seems to be a general feature of wh-questions. It would thus be misguided to distinguish between the modal particle *csakugyan* and the discourse particle *csakugyan*. Since the modal meaning expresses a strong bias toward p (i.e. one of the alternatives), and a wh-question does not offer alternatives, the modal meaning is blocked in the latter case. This seems to be the case whenever a particle shows the preference of one alternative over the other. Recall that the modal particle *csak* behaves in a similar fashion. As to the discourse function, at least two things must be distinguished: (i) specification of the previous discourse, (ii) specification of the expected answer. (i) may be a common feature of yes-no and wh-questions, (ii), on the other hand, makes only sense in the case of yes-no questions. This seems to indicate that the particle *csakugyan* has a modal and discourse potential, the realization of which depends on the semantics of the question at hand.

It should also be noted that the particle *csakugyan* occurs in questions which are associated with a presupposition. Thus, question (7a) can only be meaningfully asked if the dog is somewhere, and (7b) can only be meaningfully asked if something can be said about the person in question. It is odd, however, to use the particle *csakugyan* with questions which do not have such presuppositions. E.g. +*Csakugyan kinek van egy cigarettája?* 'Indeed, who has got a cigarette?'.

2.3. *Egyáltalán* 'at all'

At first glance it would seem that the particle *egyáltalán*, too, has two different uses depending on whether it occurs in yes-no-questions or wh-questions. Consider

(8)(a) *Figyelsz egyáltalán?*
'Are you listening (at all)?'

(b) *Egyáltalán van hozzá bátorságod?*
'Do you have enough courage to do it?'

(9)(a) *Egyáltalán mit akar ez az ember?*
'What on earth does this man want?'
(b) *Egyáltalán hol tartod most a pénzedet?*
'As a matter of fact, where do you keep your money now?'

The particle *egyáltalán* occurs at the beginning or at the end of the sentence. The modal function of *egyáltalán* is quite apparent in yes-no questions. It can be paraphrased as follows: **The speaker has serious doubts about p, in fact, he believes that not-p is more probable than p**. As to its discourse functions, *egyáltalán* presupposes a previous discourse, of which questions such as (8a–b) can be a continuation. No identity of topic is required. The speaker expects an affirmative answer to his question, which is reinforced in the case of (8a) by politeness considerations. The addressee is expected to alleviate the speaker's misgivings.

In wh-questions the particle *egyáltalán* has no modal function. Once again, since the modal meaning has to do with the choice of one of the alternatives, it is excluded from wh-questions. On the other hand, *egyáltalán* indicates that there was a previous discourse and questions such as (9a–b) fit into this discourse, i.e. they can be considered as natural continuations of the discourse. Also the presupposition of the question must be fulfilled. Consequently, it would be queer to use *egyáltalán* with questions where this presupposition is not satisfied, e.g. +*Kinek van egyáltalán egy cigarettája?* 'As a matter of fact, who has got a cigarette?'.

Since the presupposition of the question is taken for granted, it is utterly uncooperative to refute the question. Thus, for example, in contrast with a question such as *Mit akar ez az ember?* 'What does this man want?', the question (9a) cannot be answered adequately by *Nem akar semmit* 'He doesn't want anything'.

The speaker expects a satisfactory answer to his question. From the above discussion it should be clear that the discourse function of *egyáltalán* in yes-no-questions and wh-questions is not radically different. It has two main features: (i) it presupposes a previous discourse and (ii) it shows the speaker's involvement (his bias in the case of yes-no questions and his acceptance of the presupposition of the question in the case of wh-questions).

2.4. *Hát* 'so, after all, and'

The particle *hát* raises a number of problems. Notice, first of all, that it can be used to introduce questions as in (10a–b).

(10)(a) *Hát én?*
'And me?' / 'And what about me?'
(b) *Hát aztán?*
'What next?' / 'And what then/next?'

In both cases the particle *hát* can be replaced by the conjunction *és* 'and', which is also indicated by the English equivalents. There is yet another thing which can be gathered from the English translations. Questions (10a) and (10b) are not genuine yes-no questions. In spite of the fact that no question word appears in them, they are wh-questions of a special type often referred to as open-questions. That is, the answer of the question is not categorially defined. The situation is similar with (11a–b).

(11)(a) *Hát mi újság nálatok?*
'And what is the news with you?'
(b) *Hát merre jártál?*
'And which places did you see?'

The answer to (11a) is not categorially defined by the question word *mi?* 'what?'. Everything which counts as a new event is an appropriate answer to the question. At first glance, question (11b) does not seem to fit into this picture. Wouldn't it be possible to answer this question by, say, *Londonban* 'in London'? Though such an answer would be quite satisfactory if the question *Merre jártál?* 'Where did you be?' had been asked. In the case of (11b) however, a more elaborate answer is required. In fact, the speaker wants to hear a story, a description of the places which the addressee visited during his tourist trip. In other words, (11b) is an open question, whereas the question *Merre jártál?* is not.

However it would be wrong to believe that the particle *hát* in the function of *és* 'and' can only occur in open questions. As testified by (12a–b), *hát* may have this function in any wh-question independently of whether the question is categorial or open.

(12)(a) *Hát hol a te barátod?*
'And where is your friend?'
(b) *Hát mit láttál Londonban?*
'And what did you see in London?'

The fact that the particle *hát* is equivalent to *és* 'and' in (10a–b) and (11a–b) shows clearly the discourse function of this particle: it indicates that the question is a continuation of the previous discourse. The particle *hát* with

this discourse function only occurs with wh-questions and it can always be replaced by *és* 'and'.

Consider next:

(13)(a) *Hát megjöttél?*
'So you are here?'
(b) *Hát meg akarsz teljesen őrjíteni?*
'So you want to drive me completely crazy?'

In these questions the particle *hát* cannot be replaced by *és* 'and'. Notice that (13a–b) are rhetorical questions, rather than genuine yes-no questions. They need not be answered. However, the rhetoricity of these questions is not brought about by the particle *hát*, the questions without this particle are already rhetorical. The only contribution of *hát* to these questions seems to be emotional.

In the following questions, however, the particle *hát* has a modal function.

(14)(a) *Hát megölték?*
'So he was killed after all?'
(b) *Hát találkoztatok már?*
'So you have met before?'

(15)(a) *Hát nem ölték meg?*
'So he wasn't killed after all?'
(b) *Hát még nem találkoztatok?*
'So you have not met before?'

In these questions the particle *hát* modifies the propositional content. (14a) is not identical with *Megölték?* 'Was he killed?' and (14b) is not identical with *Találkoztatok már?* 'Have you met before?'. The speaker's attitude indicated by *hát* can be paraphrased as follows: **The speaker held the belief that not-p, but he got some evidence to believe that p is the case.**

The discourse function of *hát* can be derived from its modal function: the speaker believes that p is the case and he asks for confirmation. In addition, since the speaker's beliefs underwent radical changes, he expresses his astonishment at the state-of-affairs that caused these changes.

Notice that the above description works equally well in the case when p is a negated statement, as in (15a–b).

In some cases modal interpretation of *hát* is also possible with wh-questions. Consider:

(16)(a) *Hát mikor ment el Jancsi?*
'When did Johnny leave?'
(b) *Hát hová tűnt el a pénzem?*
'Where did my money go?'

On one interpretation the particle *hát* can be replaced by the conjunction *és* 'and' and no modal interpretation is possible. There is, however, another possibility. The speaker expresses his belief—by using *hát*—that the state-of-affairs at stake should not have been taken place: Johnny should not have left and the money should not have disappeared. This interpretation is pretty much in line with the interpretation of *hát* in genuine yes-no-questions: the speaker held the belief that not-p is the case, but then he had to realize that p is the case after all. It is far from being clear, however, in which cases this interpretation becomes possible with wh-questions.

2.5. *Is* 'really'

The particle *is* functions as a modal particle if it is syntactically connected with the verb phrase. If it takes scope over a noun phrase, it is a logical operator. In this respect it shows a behavior which is paralell to that of the particle *csak*. The modal use of *is* is exemplified by (17a–b).

(17)(a) *El is ment hozzá?*
'Did he really go to him?'
(b) *Meg is oldotta a problémát?*
'Did he really solve the problem?'

It would correspond to the normal course of events that 'he went to him' and 'he solved the problem' hold. In a way the events expressed by the propositional contents of (17a) and (17b), respectively, are consequences of events which had occurred before. They would correspond to the arrangements, plans, activities, etc. of the persons involved. Let us denote the relevant plans, intentions, arrangements by q. Under normal circumstances there is a practical inference, which leads from q to p. And this very inference is questioned in (16a–b). The speaker's attitude can thus be circumscribed in the following fashion: **The speaker admits that p should normally be the case, but he has got some reasons to believe that p may not be the case after all.**

As to the discourse function of *is*, it must first be noted that the speaker wants the addressee to dissipate his doubts, consequently the expected answer to (17a) and (17b) must be affirmative. In addition the particle *is* has a connective function: it must be possible to infer p from the previous discourse.

The particle *is* contributes in a different way to the meaning of wh-questions. Consider:

(18)(a) *Hol is nyaraltál?*
'Where did you spend your summer holidays?' (I should know it.)
(b) *Mit is mondott?*
'What did he say?' (I should know it.)

The meaning of *is* is almost untranslatable. But the difference between the questions in (18a–b) and the corresponding questions without the particle *is* is this. By uttering the question (18b) the speaker indicates that he is quite aware of the fact that he should know what the person referred to by the pronoun *he* said, but he simply cannot remember it. The relevant information was either mentioned earlier in the conversation or it may have come from other sources. By uttering questions such as (18a–b) the speaker wants to refresh his memory. Such questions necessarily induce a presupposition: it is taken for granted that the addressee spent his summer holidays somewhere and that the person referred to by the pronoun *he* said something. The corresponding questions without the particle *is* are just plain wh-questions: the speaker need not presuppose that the addressee had summer holidays or that the person referred to by the pronoun *he* said something. Moreover, in that case the speaker has no idea about the possible answers to his questions. In sum, then, questions such as (18a–b) exhibit the following speaker's attitudes. *The speaker admits that he knew the answer, but he cannot recall it.*

Questions such as (18a–b) may occur in various contexts. They need not presuppose a previous discourse, as already pointed out. Since, however, they refer to an earlier 'mental state', they do have a connective function. In addition, the particle *is* contains a politeness factor. Admitting one's forgetfulness is more polite than asking the same question twice.

The two modal uses of *is* do not seem to have anything in common. Therefore we will assume that we have to do with two particles which will be referred to as is_1 and is_2, respectively.

2.6. *Még* 'still'

The particle *még* is not necessarily modal though it is normally mentioned among the modal particles. Compare:

(19)(a) *Te még beszélsz?*
'Are you still talking?
(b) *Még te beszélsz?*
'And you complain?'

Még functions as a temporal adverbial in (19a), in (19b), on the other hand, we have to do with a rhetorical question. The question without the particle *még* may, but need not, be interpreted as being rhetorical. This means that *még* contributes to the rhetoricity of the question, it disambiguates the question. The prepositional content of (19b) depicts a state-of-affairs which is at variance with what the speaker would expect. The same holds true for (20):

(20) *Még van kedved tréfálni?*
'And you are still in the humour to joke?'

In (19b) it is taken for granted that the addressee is complaining and in (20) that he is joking. No answer is expected. The speaker doesn't ask a question but expresses his indignation about the respective states–of–affairs. The particle *még* has a similar function in wh-questions as well.

(21)(a) *Hol van még ilyen nyugalom?*
'Where can one find such a quiet?'
(b) *Kivel lehet még így játszani?*
'With whom can one play in such a way?'

Once again, the questions without the particle *még*, too, can be interpreted rhetorically, the only contribution of *még* seems to be to reinforce rhetoricity.

This means that *még* is not changing the propositional content of the question: it is a rhetoricity particle rather than a modal particle.

2.7. *Szóval* 'so'

Consider:

(22)(a) *Szóval elmész?*
'So you are leaving?'
(b) *Szóval megint pihensz?*
'So you are taking a rest again?'

(23)(a) *Szóval ki járt itt?*
'Tell me now who was here?'
(b) *Szóval mi történt?*
'Tell me now what happened?'

(24)(a) *Szóval maga a bűnös?*
'So you are the culprit?'
(b) *Szóval maga írta ezt a levelet?*
'So you wrote this letter?'

What is common in these questions is that the speaker indicates by using the particle *szóval* that he has some evidence to believe that p is the case for yes-no questions and that he has some evidence to believe that the presupposition of the question is true for wh-questions. Notice that *szóval* can only occur at the beginning of the sentence. The type of evidence depends to some extent on the propositional content of the question. Thus, for example, in (21a–b) we have to do with direct (perceptual) evidence. In (24a–b), on the other hand, though direct evidence is not excluded, the first thing which comes to one's mind is linguistic (e.g. hearsay) evidence. In (23a–b) the presupposition of the question is taken for granted: 'someone was here', 'something happened'. The corresponding questions without the particle *szóval* need not have these presuppositions. It would seem that the evidence which the speaker has got for the truth of these presuppositions is indirect rather than direct or linguistic.

For yes-no questions the modal meaning of *szóval* can be paraphrased as follows: **The speaker has some direct or linguistic evidence to believe that p is true.** In the case of direct evidence no previous linguistic context is needed. Linguistic evidence, on the other hand, does presuppose such a context. Furthermore, since the speaker is biased toward p, the question is used for confirmation.

As to wh-questions, the contribution of the particle *szóval* to the meaning of the question can be formulated in the following fashion: **The speaker has some (indirect) evidence to believe that the presupposition of the question is true.** Such questions are not used to introduce a conversation, however. They are prompted by the fact that the addressee seems to be reluctant to satisfy the curiosity of the speaker. Questions such as (23a–b) require a clear and unambigous answer. (22a) asks for identification and (23b) for specification. Both questions presuppose a previous linguistic context.

2.8. *Tehát* 'so'

The function of the particle *tehát* comes very close to that of *szóval*. In fact, in wh-questions *szóval* can be replaced by *tehát* without thereby affecting the meaning of the questions. That is, (25a–b) are synonymous with (24a–b).

(25)(a) *Tehát maga a bűnös?*
'So you are the culprit?'

(b) *Tehát maga írta ezt a levelet?*
'So you wrote this letter?'

In the case of wh-questions, however, *tehát* seems to be different from *szóval*. Consider:

(26)(a) *Tehát ki járt itt?*
'So who was here?'
(b) *Tehát mi történt?*
'So what happened?'

The particle *tehát* is in a way stronger than the particle *szóval*: the speaker insists that the addressee draw the conclusion and he wants him to speak up. By now the speaker does not only know that 'someone was here' and that 'something happened', but he has also some hunch about who was here and what happened. The presuppositions of the questions are taken for granted.

Another difference between *szóval* and *tehát* may be that in the case of the latter the type of evidence on the basis of which the speaker draws his conclusions seems to be less clear. By and large, however, the two particles seems to have identical functions.

2.9. *Talán* 'perhaps'

The particle *talán* occurs in yes-no questions only and has a number of uses, some of which are illustrated in (27a–b) through (28a–b).

(27)(a) *Meghalt talán?*
'He is perhaps dead?'
(b) *Talán beteg volt?*
'He was perhaps ill?'

(28)(a) *Beteg talán?*
'He is not ill, is he?'
(b) *Meg vagy talán elégedve az életeddel?*
'You are not happy with your life, are you?'

(29)(a) *Talán a tudománynak éljek?*
'Should I perhaps dedicate my life to science?
(b) *Talán én vállaljam a kockázatot?*
'Should perhaps I bear the risk?'

The analysis of sentences (27a–b) is quite straightforward. The particle *talán* expresses possibility. The speaker does not have any evidence in favor of any of the alternatives. The possibility of p being the case just occurred to him. By asking the question he puts forward a hypothesis. The speaker's attitude can thus be formulated as follows: **The speaker considers p to be possible.**

Since the speaker is not biased toward any of the alternatives, there is no preferred answer. Questions such as (27a–b) cannot be used to initiate a discourse.

The questions in (28a–b) are rhetorical. Rhetoricity is brought about by the particle *talán* together with the intonation which is characteristic of rhetorical questions. The states–of–affairs at hand are not qualified by the speaker: he knows that p is not the case. He uses his questions in order to express indignation, surprise or annoyance.

Questions (29a–b), too, are rhetorical. In the case, however, the questions without the particle *talán* may already be interpreted rhetorically, but they may also function as genuine questions. In other words, *talán* contributes to the rhetoricity of the question, and it is not a modal particle in this case.

2.10. *Ugyan* 'can, could'

The uses of the particle *ugyan* are exemplified in (28a–b) and (29a–b).

(28)(a) *Ugyan mi történhet?*
'What can happen?'

(b) *Ugyan ki ad nekem kölcsön pénzt?*
'Who is willing to lend me money?'

(29)(a) *Ugyan mi bosszantotta fel ennyire?*
'What did upset him so much'

(b) *Ugyan hová ment ez a gyerek?*
'Where could the kid have gone?'

In (27a–b) the particle *ugyan* indicates that the speaker believes that 'nothing can happen' and 'nobody is willing to lend him money', respectively, are likely to be true statements. Nevertheless, due to the uncertainity of the underlying assumptions, these questions can still function as genuine questions. Notice that (28a–b) are not associated with presuppositions.

The speaker's attitude indicated by *ugyan* can be expressed in the following way: **The speaker does not believe that the presupposition of the question holds.** The addressee may refute this assumption. Typically, questions such as (27a–b) are used to counter the addressee's hypothesis as to the validity of the presupposition.

The questions in (29a–b) are different. Normally they are associated with presuppositions and the particle *ugyan* does not modify the propositional content of the questions. The particle is simply used to emphasize the fact that the speaker has no idea as to the answer to the question. This means that in this case it cannot be considered to be a modal particle.

The particle *ugyan* precedes immediately the question word. It cannot be used in yes-no questions.

2.11. *Valóban/tényleg* 'really'

The functions of these two particles are undistinguishable and they can be used interchangeably. Both occur in yes-no questions only. Consider:

(30)(a) *Valóban/tényleg beteg Éva?*
'Is Eve really ill?'

(b) *Valóban/tényleg elutazott Jancsi?*
'Has Johnny really left?'

(31)(a) *Valóban/tényleg nem beteg Éva?*
'Is Eve really not sick?'

(b) *Valóban/tényleg nem utazott el Jancsi?*
'Has Johnny really not left?'

By asking (30a) the speaker indicates his doubt about Eve's being ill and by asking (30b) he expresses his doubt about Johnny's having left. In (31a–b) the speaker's attitude refers to the negated statements. The speaker's attitude indicated by *valóban/tényleg* can thus be formulated in the following fashion: **The speaker expresses his doubts about p.**

Questions containing the particle *valóban/tényleg* are asked for confirmation. Furthermore the state-of-affairs expressed by p must have been mentioned in the previous discourse, or at least it must be deduceable from it.

2.12. Tags

Section **2.12** concludes our discussion of the particles which occur in questions and which are modal. Nothing was said so far about particles which function as tags. The wide variety of tags in Hungarian is demonstrated by (32a–g).

(32)(a) *Elment a vonat, ugye?*
'The train has left, hasn't it?'

(b) *Szerettek iskolába járni, nem?*
'You like going to school, don't you?'

(c) *Jó lenne, mi?*
'This would be fine, isn't it true?'

(d) *Nemsokára elutazunk, nem igaz?*
'Soon we will leaving, isn't it true?'

(e) *Jót mulattunk, igaz?*
'We have really enjoyed ourselves, didn't we?'

(f) *A ház mögött nagy kert is van, nemde?*
'There is also a big garden behind the house, isn't it?'

(g) *Hozok neked valami ennivalót, jó?*
'I'll bring you something to eat, OK?'

In these sentences we encounter the tags *ugye* 'isn't it, hasn't it, is it, has it', *nem* 'not', *mi* 'what', *nem igaz* 'not true', *nemde* 'isn't it, hasn't it' and *jó* 'good, OK'. It is not at all clear to what extent the analysis of these tags would fall under the scope of the present paper. For the time being we have to relegate their examination to a later study.

3. Let's now summarize the results of our discussion. Table 1 shows the distribution of the modal particles discussed in the present paper. The first column indicates whether the particle can occur in yes-no questions, the second column whether it appears in wh-questions, the third column whether it also shows up as a modal particle in declaratives, finally the fourth column indicates whether the particle may also have other functions (whether it can also be an adverbial or a conjunction). Only genuine questions are considered, i.e. the occurrence of particles in rhetorical questions is not indicated in the table.

Table 1

particle	yes-no qu.	wh-qu.	decl.	other f.
csak	+	−	+	+
csakugyan	+	−	+	−
egyáltalán	+	−	+	−
hát	+	+	+	+
is$_1$	+	−	+	+
is$_2$	−	+	−	+
szóval	+	+	+	−
talán	+	−	+	−
tehát	+	+	+	+
ugyan	−	+	+	−
valóban/tényleg	+	−	+	−

From Table 1 it can be gathered that the only modal particle which occurs in questions but not in declaratives is *is*$_2$. Within questions, however, far more particles may occur in yes-no questions than in wh-questions. Only the former admit *csak, csakugyan, egyáltalán, is*$_2$, *talán, valóban/tényleg. Ugyan* is the only modal particle which occurs in wh-questions but not in yes-no questions.

Table 2 considers the particles from the point of view of their functions in questions, i.e. whether they are always modal or whether they can assume other functions as well. "+" means that the particle in question is always modal, "–" means that it is never modal, "±" means that it can be both modal and nonmodal, and "blank" indicates that it does not occur in that position.

Table 2

particle	yes-no question	wh-question
csak	±	
csakugyan	+	–
egyáltalán	+	–
hát	±	±
is$_1$	±	
is$_2$		+
szóval	+	+
talán	+	
tehát	+	+
ugyan		+
valóban/tényleg	+	

4. By way of conclusion, let's summarize the main claims and findings of the present paper.

(i) Some of the modal particles may also have other functions. The two functions, however, can be kept apart by means of syntactic criteria.

(ii) Each modal particle has a core meaning. The difference in the modalizing effect in yes-no questions and wh-questions is attributable to the difference in the semantics of the two types of questions. Only the particle *is* shows different meanings in yes-no questions and in wh-questions, which are not traceable back to a common core meaning. Consequently, we have to assume that we have to do with two different particles. (*is*$_1$ and *is*$_2$, respectively)

(iii) All modal particles in questions are at the same time discourse markers. Most particles—in addition to their modalizing effect—connect the question to the previous discourse, i.e. questions containing such particles presuppose an appropriate linguistic context. Also, some emotional reactions may be predictable. For example, if the speaker held the belief that p and then new

evidence makes him believe that not-p, he tends to express his astonishment at not-p. This boils down to the claim that quite a few discourse functions of modal particles can directly be derived from their semantics.

(iv) The meaning of modal particles may involve various things. A particle may express the strength of belief, the change of beliefs brought about by new evidence, doubt and uncertainty, the existence of evidence and perhaps also the type of evidence.

(v) In the case of yes-no questions the modal particle also seems to indicate the speaker's bias toward p or toward not-p, consequently it determines the preferred answer. For example, strong bias toward p entails that the question with the propositional content p is asked for confirmation. In the case of wh-questions, on the other hand, modal particles tend to reinforce the presupposition of the question.

(vi) The modal meaning of a particle is, in general, not radically different in yes-no-questions and wh-questions. It may happen, however, that the modal meaning is "blocked" in the case of one question type which, however, does not affect the discourse function of the particle. In other words, the modal meaning may be effective in the case of one question type only whereas the discourse function appears in all question types. The "blocking effect" of a question type should, of course, be deducible from the semantics of the modal particle and that of the question type.

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SPEECH ACT TERMS AND MOOD INDICATORS (IN KOREAN)*

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0. This paper is concerned with the distinction between speech act verbs and non-speech act verbs, special adverbial constructions with performative function, some types of illocutionary acts, and the relation between mood indicators and speech act verbs, particularly in Korean.

1. Illocutionary acts as acts are positive. First, I argue that all the illocutionary acts are positive, or constitute doing something (in saying something), and, therefore, the negation of a performative does not constitute a performative.[1] For instance (1), below, is a performative but not (2) (cf. Lee 1973).

(1) I *promise* (not) to finish my paper in time.

(2) I don't promise to finish my paper in time.

For most negation-implying performatives, negation is semantically associated with the complement of each corresponding positive performative verb, not the other way around, as in (3) and (4), below:

(3)(a) I *forbid* you to use my car.
(b) I *order* you not to use my car.

(4)(a) I *deny* it.
(b) I *declare* it is not true.

In (3) and (4), (a) is equivalent to (b).

Let us now observe how the illocutionary act of forbidding is realized in Korean as a case in point. Typically, it is realized as negative imperative, as is expected cross-linguistically. Consider:

(5) ka-ci mal -ara !
go Comp Neg+DO Imp
'Don't go.'

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[1] Austin (1962, 79–80) has such tests as 'Does he *really*?', 'I *deliberately* approved his action', and 'I *am willing* to apologize', even though he doesn't say anything about the negation of a performative explicitly.

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Korean has two forms of negation and the negative imperative essentially takes the longer form. Observe:

(6)(a) an ka -as' -ta (without DO as in German and French)
not go Past Dec
'(Someone) didn't go.
(b) ka -ci an + h -as' -ta (with DO as in English)
go Comp not do Past Dec
'(Someone) didn't go.'

(6b) is the longer form just as (5) is. However, Neg+DO is obligatorily lexicalized as *mal-* in the imperative context (cf. Lee 1978), as the impossibility of (8) below shows. The short form negative imperative as in (7) appears only in some children's acquisition data but never in adults. Take a look:

(7) an ka ! (as in "Geh nicht") (never in adults)
not go
'Don't go.'

(8) *ka-ci an + h -ara !
goComp not do Imp
Intended: 'Don't go.'

The illocutionary act of order involves the addressee's volition to do something, and the negative imperative (4) can be paraphrased as:

(9) I do the saying act of causing you not to activate your volition to go.

Therefore, universally, a negative imperative is impossible with a non-volitional state predicate, as shown in (10), whereas it is better with a state-change (process) predicate (when the change is assumed controllable) and it is perfect with action predicate.

(10)(a) ?* changpaek-ha -ci mal -ara !
pale Comp Neg+DO Imp
Intended: 'Don't be pale.'
(b) (?) changpaek-hae -ci -ci mal -ara !
pale get Comp Neg+DO Imp
'Don't get pale.'

On the other hand, *mal-* can be used even in a situation where the speaker's wish or hope of the addressee's not doing the act concerned is expressed in a declarative sentence, as follows:

(11) na -nin [ne -ka ka -ci mal/an+h -ki -ril] para -n -ta
I Top you Nom go Comp NOT+DO Nomlz Acc hope Prs Dec
'I hope you won't/do not go.' (-ki=Nominalizer)

With *mal*, the sentence becomes more volition-sensitive increasing its forbidding force. With *an+h* 'not+do', it remains more neutral or objective. The verb *kim-ha-/kimci-ha-*'forbid' of Sino-Korean origin can be used as a performative verb as shown in (12), but its corresponding pure Korean verb *malli* 'cause not to do; stop', as an action verb, cannot. Observe:

(12) na -nin [ne -ka ka -nin kOs -il] kim -ha -n -ta
I Top you Nom go Prs N Acc forbid Prs Dec
'I forbid you to go.' (kOs=to, that, thing; O=)

In the embedded complement, an action verb is possible but not a state predicate such as *be pale*, which is analogous to the negative imperative.

2. Speech act verbs vs. non-speech act verbs. In connection with this, let us turn to the classification of verbs. The group of non-speech act verbs as opposed to speech act verbs can be divided into two: one is the group of action//motion/process verbs and the other is the group of psych-predicates. Action verbs are either transitive (e.g. John *killed* a rabbit; taking Agent and Theme, and other possible argument roles) or intransitive (e.g. Mary *walked*; taking Agent only). Motion/process verbs involve Theme but not Agent (e.g. Bill *rolled* down the hill unconsciously; Joe *grew* up).

The group of psych-predicates, on the other hand, can be divided into cognitive verbs and emotive/sensational predicates. Cognitive verbs, particularly mental activity verbs, can occasionally be used as semi-performative (or even performative) verbs with the first person subject in present tense (e.g. *believe, know*; *presume, assume, suppose*; ⟨classified by Austin as performatives⟩ *conjecture, recognize, understand, don't mind, resent, am determined to, intend*). Such attitude predicates as *regret*, *resent*, *strange* might be called cognitive-emotive predicates.

Emotive predicates again can be divided into active ones such as *fear* and its corresponding Korean verb *musOwO-ha-* and passive ones such as *be surprised* and its corresponding Korean intransitive verb *nola-* or Korean psych-adjective series corresponding to *lonely*, *painful*, *sad*, *(home-)sick*, *have a (head-)ache*, *hatable*, etc. Those psych-adjectives usually take Experiencer as Topic/subject and Nom(inative)-marked Theme (or Stimulus). But they cannot take the third or second person Experiencer in present tense. Look at the following:

(13)(a) na -nin ki yOnghwa -ka silphi -ta
I Top the movie Nom sad Dec
'To me, the movie is sad.'

(b) John -in ki yOnghwa -ka silphi -Os' -ta
Past
'To John, the movie was sad.'

(c) ??John -inki yOnghwa -ka silphi -ta
'To John, the movie is sad.'

(13c) is normally unacceptable because of a pragmatic factor; the speaker has no way of knowing the other's psychological state at speech time. The speaker alone knows his own psych-state at speech time and hence (13a). However, it is not an act nor a performative; it is simply a description of the speaker's own psych-state. In past tense, any person as Experiencer is all right; the speaker could already get access to informational evidence regarding someone else's psych-state to justify his utterance by the time of utterance, as in (13b).

3. Performative disjuncts. Korean has a special adverbial adjunct or rather a disjunct construction of 'V-stem + kOntae', which functions just like (semi-) performatives.

(14)(a) phantan-ha 'judge', cimcak-ha- 'presume', sangsang- ha- 'imagine', saengkak-ha- 'think', tor-a po- 'look back', hwaksin-ha- 'firmly believe', wOn-ha- 'wish', himang-ha- 'hope', para- 'want', chOng-ha- 'ask, request'

(b) yo(khOntae) 'summarising, in brief'
ye(khOntae)[2] 'taking an example'

It is interesting to see the above natural class of verbs take the performative-like adverbial construction in Modern Korean, but in Middle Korean, far more types of verbs could take the same construction. The verbs of (14a) are transitive verbs that take complement clauses but they can take neither any object complement clause nor the subject in the adverbial construction in question. The following S either serves as an underlying object or is a consequence of the act of the preceding construction. The unrealized understood subject of the adverbial construction is necessarily the first person speaker.

[2] Phonologically, *-ha-kOntae* becomes *-khOntae* obligatorily (vowel /a/ deletes and aspiration of /k/ occurs) in these two examples. Furthermore, the verb forms *yo-ha-*, *ye-ha-* do not exist in Modern Korean. In (a), the phonological process of contraction (with aspiration) is preferable but not obligatory.

The disjunct formative *-kOntae* should be a (subordinate) conjunctive marker originally, even though underlyingly the construction constitutes a higher S of the following S, as its matrix performative (cf. Lee 1973). It resembles the present participial construction of English or other Indo-European but it does not always function as a performative (though it does in *Frankly speaking,* —', etc.) and typically its unrealized subject is same as that of the following S. The disjunct may be more like the parentheticals of English such as *I imagine*, *I suppose*, *I assume*, *I gather*, *I think*, etc. or such a performative adverbial as *presumably*. Even in English, those constructions are limited to mental activity verbs that can function as (semi-)performatives. The *-kOntae* construction is followed by a normal sentence in Korean. It is used in a formal, grave style, as in a judge's decision document.

Another such construction is the 'Vstem + *noni*' construction. This requires a full performative like *iri-* 'tell', *mut-* 'ask', and *myOng-ha-* 'order'. This construction is syntactically different from the above in that it can take all other elements (subject, indirect object) of a performative sentence except its complement clause. The original complement which now follows the disjunct construction surfaces as a main clause. Look at (15):

(15) nae -ka nO -eke iri-noni, chOnkuk-i kak'aw-Os'-ninira
I Nom you to tell Disj heaven Nom near Past Dec(grand)
'I tell you that Heaven is at hand.'

This disjunct is not a subordinate but a superordinate clause in spirit. It is used in a grand(ious), imposing style as in the Bible.

Differently from disjuncts, a copular construction functions like a performative, sometimes, as in (16) below. Its null subject cataphorically refers to the following utterance of a sentence.

(16)(a) myOngnyOng -i -ta. na -ka -ra!
order Cop Dec out go Imp
'This is an order. Go out.'

(b) macimak chungko -i -ta. t'Ona-ci mal -ara.
last advice Cop Dec leave Comp Neg+DO Imp
'This is my last advice. Don't leave.'

(c) tow -a cu -kes' -ta. yaksok -i -ta
help give will Dec promise Cop Dec
'I will help you. It is a promise.

In (16c), the copular construction follows the utterance expressing intention. There must be correspondance between the construction of 'the name of an illocutionary act + Copula + Dec' and the following or preceding sentence: if an order, an imperative S; if a promise, an intention expression, and so on.

As we have observed, various syntactic constructions other than a regular performative sentence are employed for the purpose of performative function in Korean.

4. Illocutionary act types and sentential types. Let us consider now some aspects of the relation between different types of illocutionary acts and sentential types. One sentential type can serve different illocutionary acts and one type of illocutionary act can take different sentential types (cf. Lee 1973). As argued in Lee (1973), permission is not an assertion type, differently from Heringer's (1972) claim, even though it takes the declarative S form like *You may leave*, or *ka-to coh-a* 'It is all right even if you leave' in Korean. Heringer claims that it is an assertion type just as *You are able to leave* is. However, we can respond to the latter with *That is true* but not to the permission type, just as we cannot say "yes" or "no" to the explicit performative of permission like *I permit you to leave*,[3] Harnish (in the same conference) may not agree (see section **6**).

Deontically, obligation and permission are inter-related in the sense that the negation of one is equivalent to the other and both acts involve authority on the part of the Agent. So the permission-seeking modal expression can be used in (17a) but not in (17b) below.

(17)(a) May I *suggest* that you run for the Presidency
(b) ?? May I *permit* you to run for the Presidency
(c) ?? May I *order* you to run for the Presidency

The Agent of *suggest* does not need the pragmatic presupposition of his authority but the Agent of *permit* does. In (17a), the modal expression shows the speaker's politeness to the hearer, giving the impression of leaving the option to the addressee and enabling the sentence to function as performative. In (17b, c), however, there occurs a conflict of presuppositions on authority in the speaker; s/he presupposes that s/he has the authority of the act of permission or order but, at the same time, s/he presupposes, by means of the modal expression, that the addressee has the authority of giving permission

[3] Austin (1962, 154) states that an excercitive such as *permit* is 'the giving of a decision in favor of or against a certain course of action, or advocasy of it'. He further states 'it is a decision that something is to be so, as distinct from a judgment that it is so: it is advocasy that it should be so, as opposed to an estimate that it is so. . .'.

for that (cf. Lee 1975). But authority is one-way or asymmetric in a single act of authority-requiring illocutionary act. Therefore, (17b) and (17c) cannot constitute a permission and an order, respectively, while (17a) does constitute a suggestion. The modal expression of (17a) already lost its independent force of permission-seeking or question except its presupposition involved because of the force of the embedded performative.

There are various expressions of promise in Korean and one form originating from intention (or futurity) expression came to serve as a promise marker, as in (18).

(18)(a) t'o o -l k'O-ya
again come will
'(I) will come again.'
(b) t'o o -l-k'e
Promise Marker
'I promise to come again.'

(18b) is a promise in the sense that it is used only in a promise context. The futurity/intention marker is longer than the promise marker, which comes from the former by contraction historically. The shorter the form of futurity/intention expression becomes, the more intensely does the speaker's intention get expressed, so as to be bound as a promise (in (18), (b) may be accompanied by crossing baby-fingers as promise gesture but not (a), among children in Korea). It should be a reflection of iconicity in language. It is witnessed in any language (see the deontic reading of (27) in English later). The most immediate, peremptory illocutionary act of order is expressed by a single verb (and possibly a minimal element) in any language. *Go!* in English, *ka* (from *ka-a*, Vstem + S ending) in Korean, and *Geh* (Vstem) in German.

Threatening, though involving intention, is different from promising in that the speaker believes that the hearer does not want, rather fears, the speaker's future act and that the speaker's performing a threat does not obligate him to do the future act. It cannot be an act of contract. Threatening is not used as an explicit performative except in an embedded clause in a round-about way of performing the act, as in *I wish I wouldn't have to* ***threaten*** *you* ... Illocutionary acts adverse to the addressee are typically represented with the expression of inevitability of the act concerned on the part of the speaker, with such modal expressions as *I must...*, *I have to...*, followed by an adverse performative. In Korean, a round-about implicature may be mobilized for a threatening act, as, for example, in *wihyOp-iro til-li-l-ci morici-man...* 'This may sound like a threat, but...'. However, a straightforward expression,

such as one corresponding to *I will kill you (completely)*, is frequently used. Threatening can constitute a perlocutionary act, on the other hand. It is not an institutionally well accepted formal illocutionary act and does not give a pleasant impression, even though it may not necessarily constitute a criminal act.[4] It is something you want to avoid as an explicit matrix S performative expression, even when you are performing it.

Typologically speaking, performatives as main clauses do not abound in Korean, probably not in any language, as already painted out on the first day of the conference. It occurs in an emphatic, bureaucratic, or fictional (as in a drama) situation. Instead of performatives, major mood indicators that show illocutionary forces regularly occur toward the end (verbal part) of a sentence in this SOV language. And even when those are reported, they regularly appear in the embedded complement sentences, as shown below:

(19) Sue -nin [[Joe- ka ka-as' **-ta**] -ko] mal-ha -yOs' -ta
Top Nom go Past Dec Comp say Past Dec
'Sue said that Joe went.'

(20) Sue -nin [[Joe -ka ka -as' **-ninya**]- ko] mul -Os' -ta
Top Nom go Past 0 Comp ask Past Dec
'Sua asked whether Joe had gone.'

(21) Sue -nin Joe -eke [[ka **-ra**] -ko] myOngnyOng-ha -yOs' -ta
Top to go Imp Comp order Past Dec
'Sua ordered Joe to go.'

(22) Sue -nin Joe -eke [[ka **-ca**] -ko] ceeuy -ha -yOs' -ta
Top to go Prpst Comp propose Past Dec
'Sue suggested to Joe they go.'

Typically, those declarative, interrogative, imperative and propositive mood markers show their corresponding illocutionary acts and they also appear in complement sentences when reported. And the reporting verbs correspond to the names of the illocutionary acts or performative verbs. Because the sentences from (19)–(22) are reported sentences, they are statements and end in the Dec(larative) mood marker.

All the speech act verbs that can occur as reporting verbs can be replaced by the verb *mal-ha* 'say', and this possibility suggest that all the speech acts verbs can be covered by the same term *mal-ha* 'say' in Korean at least in reporting. As a matter of fact all the illocutionary act verbs must have originated

[4] Mey in the conference rightly indicated that 'criminal' varies from society to society.

as reporting or quotation verbs. Because of the mood markers in embedding we can tell which illocutionary act is reported, even if we simply put the reporting verb *mal-ha* 'say' in the matrix S. In other words, we can replace the matrix V *mul-* 'ask' by *mal-ha-* 'say' in (20) above and so forth.[5] This is not so tidy in Indo-European languages, though we can frequently tell from different syntactic forms (mainly complementizers). Consider:

(23) John told Mary to go. (Imperative force)

(24) *John said whether Mary had gone.

Thus, in Korean, mood indicators and speech act verbs are closely interrelated, and important functional elements are placed toward the end of a sentence, differently from SOV languages like English. For instance, S-ending mood indicators together with speech-level addressee honorification show the speaker's illocutionary intent and different degrees of interpersonal honorification in a straightforward way. However, in English, as in any other Indo-European language, there is no linguistic way of independent addressee honorification and that is why indirect speech act forms develop in Indo-European languages to show the speaker's attitude toward the addressee. Those forms are interrogative forms or speaker-based modal expressions such as hypothetical subjunctive mood, to take the form of giving an option or soften coercive or other illocutionary force involved.

Even in Korean, change is taking place; speech levels are getting simplified—the pair of polite and familiar levels becoming far more predominant than the formal pair of deferential and plain levels. Then, what happened is that the new predominant pair of levels came to develop various modality expressing variant forms. Thus, the basic *-O(-yo)* level expresses a categorical judgement (in Kuroda's sense) of the speaker, and the S ender *-ne*, as an evidential, shows the speaker's unexpected immediate finding. So *ka-as'-O* '(he) went, is gone' can mean that the speaker found the fact earlier in the past, but *ka-as'-ne* 'I find right now that he's gone' means that the fact is found immediately at the time of speech, and the exclamatory S ender *-kun(-a)* usually shows expected or expectable finding. The quotative S endings *-tae, -ninyae, -rae, -cae*, coming from complex S's of embedding, express the speaker's report of someone else's statement (*-ta* Dec), question (*-ninya*), order (*-ra*), and

[5] However, the verb *mal-ha-* 'say' does not properly function as performative even if it is used in the 1st person in present tense, when applied to question, order, proposal, promise, etc., which are not statement, because it lacks its respective illocutionary intent, though it represents the part of saying in the illocutionary act involved.

proposal (*-ca*), respectively. Cliticization occurs in each case (*-tae* from *-ta -ko hae* '(someone) says that ... Dec', and so forth).

In English, the modal verb *must* is ambiguous between the deontic meaning and the epistemic meaning, as in (25), but in Korean, two different constructions for the different meanings are employed, as in (26) below:

(25) John must be at home.

(26)(a) John -i thillim-Opsi cip-e is'-il-k'O-ya (epistemic)
(b) John -in cip-e is' -Oya(-man) ha-n -ta (deontic)

(27) John mustn't be at home. (deontic only)

In (26a), the epistemic meaning is expressed by the Conjectural modal construction plus an adverbial showing certainty. In (26b), the deontic meaning is expressed by the deontic modal construction consisting of the compositional meaning of 'all right only if...'. The deontic modal construction with its binding force, is shorter than the epistemic one at least in negation in its contracted form as in (27). The meaning of deontic binding is more urgent to the speaker and its form is shorter, reflecting iconicity as mentioned earlier. On the other hand, the epistemic meaning of *may* is translated into Korean like (24) below:

(28) John -i o -l -ci -to mori -n -ta
Nom come Fut Dubitat Concessive not know Pres Dec
'John may come.'

The modal part of sentence (28) comes from Dubitative plus a main V ('not know') undergoing reanalysis in this case as a light predicate or an auxiliary. So it cannot take its own original subject, i.e., the 1st person, and it is almost limited to the present tense.

5. Factivity. In English, modal inflection has developed well as modal auxiliaries but instead factivity distinctions in complement sentences are rather poor. In contrast, observe the fine factivity distinctions in Korean shown in (29)–(33).

(29) Sue- nin [[Joe -ka t'Ona -n kOs] -il] kaethan-haes' -ta
Top Nom leave Past Nmlzr Acc regretted Dec
'Sue regretted that Joe had left.'

(30) Sue- nin [[Joe -ka t'Ona -s' -ta -nin kOs-il] ic -Os' -ta
Top Nom leave Past Dec Pren N Acc forgot Dec
'Sue forgot that Joe had left.'

(31) Sue- nin [[Joe -ka t'Ona -n kOs] -iro] al -n -ta
Top Nom leave Past N Dir know Pres Dec
'Sue believes Joe to have left.'

(32) Sue- nin [[Joe -ka t'Ona -s' -ta]] -ko saengkak -ha-n -ta
Top Nom leave Past Dec Quot think Pres Dec'
'Sue thinks that Joe had left.'

True inner factivity is marked in (29), as is the case with the higher cognitive-emotive verb like *regret*; external factivity for publically known fact is marked in the complement with such cognitive verbs as *forget*, *know*, as in (30); the Korean V *al-* 'know' is ambiguous between factive and non-factive, depending on whether the embedded complement takes Acc or the oblique case of direction, and (31) shows the latter non-factive case. If the verb *al-* 'know' is factive, it can be either of inner factivity or external factivity, depending on whether its complement clause takes a prenominal tense form before the Nominalizer *kOs* followed by Acc or a finite full clause form + *-nin-* (←*-ko ha-nin-* 'say that') *kOs* followed by Acc as in (30), respectively. Thus factivity shows different degrees from strong to weak down to none, and all the differences are grammatically marked in Korean as shown. This feature of factivity presupposition is not well appreciated by the GB framework because it sticks to syntactic principles.

An interesting phenomenon regarding the cognitive verbs *al-* 'know' and *mori-* 'not know', its negative form, is that the former can be ambiguous between factive and non-factive as mentioned, and ambiguity can further be shown by the following dependent Nominal. Observe:

(33)(a) na- nin [ai -ka t'Ona -n cul- il] al -as' -ta
I Top child Nom leave Past way Acc know Past Dec
'I knew that the child had left.'

(b) na- nin [ai -ka t'Ona -n cul- lo] al -as' -ta
Dir
'I thought that the child had left.'

This ambiguity is in parallel with (31), between *kOs-il* (Acc) and *kOs-iro* (Dir). However, in (31), when Acc replaces Dir and makes factive presupposition possible, even if the Acc marker is deleted, still factivity remains, and it cannot be taken as delation of Dir. Dir must be marked to be interpreted as non-factive. However, in (33), if there is no marker after the dependent Nominal *cul*, there occurs an ambiguity between factive and non-factive. However, there is a disambiguating phonological cue: if there is no pause between the dependent

Comp N and the matrix V *al-* 'know' and a slight stress on the complement V, then the S is non-factive. On the contrary, if there is some pause between the dependent Comp N and the matrix V 'know' and a slight stress on the matrix V, then the S is factive. In the former, the complement V is focused, whereas in the latter, the matrix V 'know' is. But the negative V form *mori-* 'not know' cannot take the non-factive creating Direction marker *-(i)lo*, as follows:

(34) *Sue- nin [[Joe -ka t'Ona -n cul/kOs] -iro] mol -as'-ta
Top Nom leave P N Dir not know P Dec
'Sue didn't believe (*know*) Joe to have left.'

The V *mori-* 'not know ' can only take Acc in the complement as a pure factive verb, whereas *al-ci mot-ha-* ' not able to know' (V+Neg) can take Dir, gaining the sense of weak factive presupposition this time. Because of the presupposition of *mot-ha-* 'unable to' *cul/kOs-iro al-ci mot-ha* comes to gain factive presupposition even with the Dir marker, meaning 'unable to reach the state of knowing ..., (thinking some other way)'. (If the ability Neg *mot-ha-* is replaced by the neutral Neg *an-ha-*, the gained factivity disappears.) If Dir is replaced by Acc in this context, the construction comes to be purely factive, meaning 'unable to know the fact that...'. Factive presupposition is primarily due to the matrix verb and is marked in the complement by case (Acc), but the same cognitive verb can be non-factive by taking an oblique Dir case in the complement. The lexical negative ability cognitive verb behaves only as factive but the syntactic version with Dir also behaves so.

Even in English, only non-factive predicates allow the matrix Acc plus infinitive construction as follows (cf. Kiparsky–Kiparsky 1971):

(35)(a) I believe Mary to be the one who did it.
(b) *I resent Mary to be the one who did it.

In (35a), *to* originally meant direction and it implies not reaching or touching the goal in the mind, whereas factive presupposition requires some fact's touching the mind. That is why the *to*-infinitive cannot be used for cognitive-emotive factive verbs such as *resent*, *regret*, etc. (*know* is slightly weaker in factivity, allowing a *to*-infinitive, as in *I knew him to be a fool.*). We can conclude from the above discussion that surface syntactic phenomena are semantically and pragmatically motivated.

6. Residual discussion. As already argued, illocutionary acts are acts and they are positive. Potentially negative illocutionary acts tend to have negation in their complements. Otherwise, negation is lexicalized and the verb can behave

like a positive action verb as a performative (e.g., *disagree*, so *I don't disagree* is not a performative, and neither is *I don't object*). These lexicalized verbs are not subject to negative polarity phenomenon (for instance, **I disagree at all* but *I also disagree.*) differently from syntactic negative constructions (cf. *I don't agree either.*). *I agree* is used as a performative when the issue in question is specific and the response is counted as voting or something like that as an instantaneous act. Therefore, its negation *I don't agree* is exceptionally felt by many people as at least an 'implicit' performative (in Austin's sense when he calls an imperative S an 'implicit performative' of the illocutionary act of order) in that kind of particular context, as if it were a positive act of disagreement or objection.[6] The reaction must be just like "yes" or "no", so *I don't agree* is felt to be the contradiction rather than any contrariness of its affirmative counterpart, as indicated also by Fretheim in the conference. As a matter of fact, *I don't agree* in the sense concerned corresponds to a denial of agreement, and, according to Barwise–Etchemendy (1987), a 'denial', differently from 'negation', 'rejects some claim that has already been raised'. In the case of *I agree* or *I don't agree*, the issue should not be broad or general so as to be cumulative (like *I (don't) agree on any points whatsoever*), habitual (like *I agree all the time*, or futuristic, to be interpreted as a performative or an implicit performative,[7] otherwise it becomes the (objective) description of the mental state of the speaker (for instance, as an answer to *Do you agree with what the President said on television?*[8]). Likewise *I don't agree* in the performative sense if any is equivalent to *I do the instantaneous act of causing you to see that I have a different opinion.* In that sense, illocutionary acts as acts can be said to be positive, in any case.

As for the thesis proposed by Harnish in the conference that 'performatives are also constatives', he is raising a very important and old philosophical issue but he is not distinguishing between performative acts as acts performed instantaneously, i.e., synchronously with saying the performatives or "immediately" (in Récanati's sense) on one hand and constatives as representations (descriptions or reports) of states of affairs independent of the utterances on the other.

[6] Some non-typical performative forms are witnessed such as passive performatives like *You are dismissed*, and *All passengers are requested to proceed to gate ten*, or embedded performatives as already exemplified.

[7] If performativity is defined too broadly, as seemingly done by Pocheptsov in the conference, then it can hardly be distinguished from illocution.

[8] As Hadland suggested in personal communication.

Performative verbs are uttered in present tense, but not in the habitual or progressive aspects of the tense. As soon as performative verbs are interpreted in those aspects, they become constative verbs. So, if someone says "Are you really (or truly) promising?" he is constating a (progressive) state of performing a promise, exploiting the momentary performative act as if it had some duration. Also, when I say "I promise to be there", if the hearer can say "Is that true?" and I say "That's true", then *that* should refer to the finished promising utterance. Bach–Harnish (1979) crucially exploit the progressive aspect of the performative verb for their argument for applying 'truth' to performatives, but the progressive aspect is for constatives from the beginning and their reasoning process makes a false start. Furthermore, as admitted by everyone, performative or illocutionary acts involve social, institutional or presuppositional appropriateness conditions, not truth conditions. Those appropriateness conditions are not necessarily part of the performative expressions concerned, whereas *Snow is white* is true iff snow is white. If *I order you to leave* as performative and *Leave!* as imperative have the same illocutionary force, and if the former can be true as a constative because it is an utterance associated with ordering, then the imperative sentence can also be true as a constative because it is an utterance associated with the addressee's leaving. If this reasoning could be correct, then all the varieties of truth-conditional semantics and logic could have treated all the types of sentences such as imperative, interrogative and propositive plus performatives from the beginning. But we could try any kind of truly justifiable innovation, and one can be easily tempted to make generalizations between performatives and constatives on the basis of their common declarative sentence form and common verb form.

Lastly, Verschueren (1989, also in the conference) argues that question (asking) is more basic than request cross-linguistically. It is an interesting point of view, but I view request as a subtype of the illocutionary act of IMPEREing (imposition). Its another subtype is order or command. Therefore, a request can be realized even in English in a polite imperative form such as *Please come to me.* And in Korean, request and order are distinguished merely by honorific speech level sentence ending differences (Deferential/Polite vs. Non-deferential/Non-polite). Another dimension of difference is the pragmatic presupposition of 'authority'; an order needs it but not a request. Furthermore, a request by means of an interrogative sentence type is an indirect speech act.

Even in acquisition, a one-word imperative (N or V) comes far earlier than an interrogative type. The latter is more information-related, whereas the former more action-related. The whole issue might turn out to be a basic matter of how to use the term 'basic'.

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CHECKLIST FOR VERBS OF SPEAKING*

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Preliminaries remarks

My long-term goal is to compare lexical systems in natural languages, basing my hypotheses on many long-held assumptions, as well as a few recent ones: (1) Languages have equivalent expressive powers, but (2) they may lexicalize concepts somewhat differently. A single word in one language may be expressible as a phrase in another. (3) However, there are universal patterns of lexicalization across languages—the kinds of parameters and semantic notions that get lexicalized do not vary wildly across languages. On the last point, the works of Berlin and Kay on basic terms, Rosch on prototypes, and others following them have been influential. Earlier work that I did on cooking terminology applied these assumptions to a relatively small and manageable domain, and this paper applies these notions to a much larger and more complex semantic domain. Verbs of speaking constitute an interesting set, because the number of lexemes varies so enormously across languages. Whereas English and other Indo-European languages have hundreds of verbs, other languages, such as Navajo and O'odham, are reported to have only a few. However, the languages are probably comparable in expressive power, since the information which is incorporated into English lexemes can be stated syntagmatically in these languages. For example, the Navajo word for *whisper* can be translated as

(1) *Bijeeyi'ji' dah díńíish' ánii'* "....." *bidíńiid*
his-ears-into I-put-my-head I-told-him
t'aa hazhó'ógo
very softly
'Putting my head to his ear I told him very softly "..."'

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My study is also influenced by Talmy's work on verbs of motion (1985), in which he compares different languages with respect to the *patterns* of information that get incorporated into lexical items. For example, English frequently incorporates manner of motion, Spanish typically incorporates paths, and Atsugewi, an Amerindian language, incorporates themes. Talmy stresses the fact that it is necessary to examine characteristic **patterns** of lexemes to arrive at a satisfactory typology; therefore, one must examine a large number of items, not just a few, in order to find the significant generalizations.

The beginning of my study is for English verbs, although the current work can be looked at more as a wishlist of things to investigate; hence, the results below are very preliminary. In recent years many significant studies have appeared, and I have drawn freely from these. Different investigators have been interested in different aspects of such verbs, and one of my goals is to try to pull together various threads of this research. Some of the studies have been concerned mainly with syntax, and not necessarily the syntax of *verba dicendi* (hereafter, VD). What I have wanted to do is collect data on various syntactic and semantic properties of VD and see which properties correlate with and predict other properties.

One reason for looking carefully at the syntax, even though my ultimate goal is lexical meaning, is that it is a good working hypothesis to suppose that syntax and semantics are correlated and that syntactic frames provide clues to lexical meaning. (See Wierzbicka 1988; Pinker 1989). Of course, one must be careful to avoid circularity—of arguing that the semantics must be such and such since the distribution is as it is. In other words, there must be some independent semantic evidence in addition to syntactic evidence. Even if syntactic and semantic correlations can be found, the direction of influence is open to theoretical decision. Does syntax determine semantics? Does semantic determine syntax? Are they mutually influential? Are both reflections of something else? Do different verbs and/or classes of verbs require different explanations?

Another reason for looking carefully at the syntax and semantics involves learnability considerations. Each verb involves many semantic and syntactic facts. For the language learner to acquire all these facts for several hundred verbs is a formidable task. If verbs fall into classes that share clusters of semantic and syntactic properties, then knowing a few things about a verb will enable the learner to predict the rest. Moreover, it begins to explain how and why speakers have judgments about novel uses. (See Pinker 1989, for an extensive discussion on this point.)

My data base is around 400 VD in English, and it includes related items, such as verbs of thinking, verbs that are primarily derived from other semantic

domains but which are metaphorically used as VD, and a few verbs which are not really VD at all but which are used in direct speech, such as *blush*, in *"Please don't", she blushed.*

One of the methodological problems is that the judgments of acceptability are very subtle, and intuitions are not to be trusted. Since each word has multiple senses, a different sense may be involved in each person's judgment or in one's judgment at different times. In some cases it may be possible to use large corpora to supplement intuitions, a task that future work will address.

The checklist

The checklist consists of semantic and syntactic properties of verbs of speaking, and the goal is to look for those properties which are correlated with each other—to see which properties are predictors of other properties, and to see what the clusters of properties might be. What are there semantic properties that predict syntactic properties (or vice versa)? Included in the checklist are the following: Does the verb introduce direct or indirect discourse? Is the verb intransitive, transitive, or ditransitive? What kinds of prepositional complements and adjuncts occur? What kinds of clausal complements are possible? Are there the differences if the matrix clause is negative? What illocutionary speech act does the verb express? Are there asymmetries in the verbal paradigm? Is the verb factive? Is it performative? In addition, a few other syntactic properties have been examined that are not confined to VD, such as extraction from subject position. However, these verbs provide a corpus for testing various hypotheses that syntactic theories have made. Given the large number of possibilities, correlations were sought only where there was some reason to suspect a connection. In some cases, a correlation was hypothesized but not found, and these will not be discussed.

English verbs of speaking

Verbs that introduce direct speech[1]

One of the intriguing puzzles is what semantic factors might determine whether a verbs can take a direct speech complement. Since most verbs allow direct

[1] As recently as Aronoff (1985, 50) wrote, "one construction . . . which has received little attention from modern syntax is direct discourse. I do not know why so little attention has been paid to this construction, since it is so common. . . ". Banfield (1973) is mentioned as an exception. This situation has changed radically, as can be seen from the references.

speech complements, it may be more profitable to look at those verbs that do not appear in direct speech. Some verbs, e.g., *deny* and *dissuade*, incorporate a negative element which means 'say not', and there is therefore a semantic clash. For example, consider (2):

(2) *"I am not a crook," denied Nixon.

Deny reverses the polarity of the proposition, not the utterrance expressing it. Notice that (2) does not improve if the *not* is omitted, since then the sentence violates the requirement that a direct quote reflect what was (or could have been) said.

In general, verbs that incorporate a negative resist direct speech complements (*cancel, veto, acquit, renounce, forbid, decline, reject*), but syntax may play a role (see below).

Verbs that name conventional (in the sense of Bach-Harnish 1979) or institutional illocutionary acts do not fit well into direct speech pattern:

(3) *"You are Mary Louise," baptized (christened) the minister.

(4) *"The defendant is innocent," acquitted the jury.

(5) *"The meeting is over," adjourned the chairman.

For these performatives, one can appeal to the argument structure of the verbs by saying they do not permit clausal direct objects, but that only pushes the question back further. A speculation here is that words spoken are formulaic or routine and therefore there is no need to present them in direct speech. This is even clearer in cases where the verb simply repeats the formula, resulting in redundancy.

(6) *"Congratulations," she congratulated (him).

(7) *"I forgive you," he forgave (her).

Another class of verbs that resist being used to introduce direct speech are those that refer to interactional speech activities, e.g., *debate, consult, chat, conspire, discuss, contract, negotiate, gossip, converse.* These focus on participation in an activity rather than on content. For these verbs, argument structure provides a more plausible explanation, since many of them are intransitive, and it is reasonable to treat the theme (the quotation) as the direct object.[2] If the verb is transitive but the theme is not the direct object, direct speech is awkward at best.

[2] Though this view is plausible, it is not uncontroversial. See Monroe (1982).

(8) ?*"Ladies and Gentlemen," he addressed the audience.

(9) ?*"You're so beautiful," he flattered (her).

One interesting problem has to do with the verbs that are not VD at all but which are used, at least in literature, to mark direct speech, such as *blush, laugh, pout,* as illustrated in (10) and (11):

(10) "You're too kind," she blushed.

(11) "I hate you," he pouted.

One might suppose that such verbs can be used for actions or responses that can accompany speaking, but surely this is not correct. One can speak while eating, reading, watching, etc., but such verbs cannot mark direct speech:

(12) *"Look at that bird!" she watched.

(13) *"I like this bread," he ate.

Some of the allowable verbs can be treated as manner of speaking verbs, such as *laugh* and *giggle*; others, meaning 'speak while blushing' or 'speak while pouting' suggest that the response itself is communicative (although not necessarily intentionally so).

Moreover, the possibility of non-VD being pushed into the category of VD is open and depends on finding a plausible context. Consider the following dialogue between a husband and wife over breakfast.

(14) "Good morning," she says happily.
He grunts, picks up the newspaper, and takes a bite from his toast.
"Did you sleep well?" she asks cheerfully.
He continues chewing on his toast.
"What's the matter? Are you angry with me?" she queries.
He remains silent and continues chewing on his toast.
"Please say something!" she pleads.
"Shut up!" he chews.

In this example, *chew* can be viewed as a communicative act. Although some may find it marginal, it is possible in a literary text, since such texts frequently use innovative expressions.

Bare fact correlations: 1) Manner of speaking verbs (*whisper, shout, lisp*) all permit direct speech complements. 2) In general, verbs that permit exclamatory complements are found with direct speech.

(15) (a) He stressed what a fool John is.
(b) "What a fool John is," he stressed.

There are differences between sentences in which the VD precede the quotation and those in which it follows. This remains to be investigated. (See Reinhart 1975.)

Verbs that introduce indirect speech

Turning now to indirect speech, the first problem is to specify what to include (and exclude). The traditional narrow definition is that indirect speech in English is introduced by the complementizer *that* (which can sometimes be omitted), and furthermore, in indirect speech there are deictic shifts of person, tense, and time and place adverbials. Since indirect speech has been narrowly defined as requiring a possible *that* complementizer, any verb that does not fit into the frame is necessarily out, for example directives, which tend to require different kinds of complement constructions. Traditionally, indirect speech is thought of as a fairly mechanical transformation (this term is not intended technically), where (16) might be reported by (17):

(16) Bill says to Mary: "I like reading novels."

(17) Mary reports to someone else: "Bill says that he likes reading novels."

However, reported speech can also consist of a paraphrase, with the reporter's views added as well, and if we broaden our conception of indirect speech to include sentences that take complementizers other than *that*, a much wider range of possibilities exists, as shown in (18) and (19):

(18) (a) Bill says to Mary: "Bring me my slippers."
(b) Mary reports to someone else: "Bill told me to bring him his slippers."

(19) (a) A to B: "What are you going to do?"
(b) B reports: "A asked me what I was going to do."

A criterion which permits any kind of paraphrase is probably too broad, since it allows (21) to count as an indirect speech report of (20).

(20) Priest: "I baptize you Mary Louise."

(21) The priest baptized the baby.

Sentence (20) could be ruled out as a base for indirect speech on other grounds, however. Indirect speech verbs require, as Banfield (1973) pointed out in her seminal article, that the message be a proposition, so that (22) would be ungrammatical:

(22) *He said that ugh!

Therefore, the criterion for indirect speech should be expanded to include at least clauses introduced by *whether* and probably clauses introduced by *for-to* and *to* as well. This characterization permits (18b) to be included. The syntax and semantics of indirect discourse awaits further study. However, some trends concerning the correlation of complementizer types and illocutionary acts and the interaction of complementizers and negation are discussed below.

Complementizers, illocutionary acts, and negation

There is a rough correlation between the complement construction of the embedded clause and the kind of illocutionary act denoted by the VD (Searle 1976; Kiparsky–Kiparsky 1970; Wierzbicka 1988; and others.)

In general, *that* clauses are associated with knowledge and assertions, *to* correlates with directives, and *for-to* constructions are found with "weak directives", like *plead*.[3] Finally, some verbs, for example, those denoting manner of speaking, means of communicating, and a few others, embed several or all complement types.

That clauses are indeed highly correlated with assertions, and conversely, most verbs of assertion allow *that* complements. A small class of assertives that disallow *that* complements are judgmental verbs, such as *denounce, acclaim, admonish,* and *credit,* which presuppose a fact or event and assert a judgment.

Another syntactic property to look at involves the distribution of complementizers in the sentences with and without negative main verbs. Traditional accounts of verb complements and complementizers assume that there should be no difference. In the case of verbs taking *that, to,* and *for-to,* such is the case. Any verb that permits *that* in main clauses without a negative, also permits *that* when negated:

(23) (a) I told him that I was happy.
(b) I didn't tell him that I was happy.

Similar pairs of sentences can be constructed for *to* and *for-to* complements.

[3] Gerundive complements will be discussed in future work.

Such is not the case with *whether.* Radford (1988) noticed that some verbs allow *whether* to appear when the main clause verb is negated, but not otherwise, as in

(24) (a) He didn't assert whether he would leave.
(b) *He asserted whether he would leave.

(25) (a) She did not admit whether she stole the money.
(b) *She admitted whether she stole the money.

To better understand what is going on, we must look at the meaning of *whether.* Since *whether* introduces alternatives, the meaning of the matrix verb should involve some sort of choice. This explains the use of *whether* in embedded *yes-no* questions, as in (26):

(26) He asked whether it would snow.

This observation also explains the selection of *whether* complements with interactional verbs like *debate* and *discuss*:

(27) We debated whether we should buy a new car.

(28) We disputed (about) whether we should go.

The semantics here is fairly clear, in that alternatives are being considered.

In (27) and (28), one can intuitively see how the negative sentences provide alternatives. (25a) can be paraphrased as 'either she stole the money or she did not, but she did not say which of these alternatives is true.' In (25b), however, only one proposition is being entertained—'that she stole the money'. It seems that the primary verbs that behave this way are assertives; however, not all assertives allow *whether* when the VD are negatives, as in (29):

(29) (a) *He didn't concede whether he lost the race.
(b) *She didn't claim whether the argument was convincing.

This topic clearly needs more work along the lines of a finely-grained semantic analysis.

The syntax of *to* and *for-to* constructions interacts with control. In *to* constructions, (which are not to be interpreted as 'in order to', the implicit subject (PRO in GB) is coreferential with the object of the matrix verb if there is one, with a few marked exceptions, like *promise.* In (30), it is *Sally* which is the understood subject of *move.*

(30) Bill ordered Sally to move over.

If there is no direct object, the understood subject is generally coreferential with the matrix subject, as in (31) although cases of "arbitrary" control can be found, as in (32).

(31) Norman begged to leave. (Norman is the leaver.)

(32) Norman said to leave. (Leaver(s) unspecified.)

In the case of *for-to* constructions the subject of the embedded clause is specified and is usually different from either the subject or object[4] in the matrix clauses, possibly for pragmatic reasons.

(33) (a) ?I nagged John for John to go.
(b) ?I nagged (John) for me/myself to go.

As for the correlation of illocutionary act and complement type, *to* correlates highly with directives. This is to be expected, as Wierzbicka's analysis of *to* would predict, since to is associated with wanting—and a directive is an expression in which the speaker want the addressee to do something. A small class of directives that disallow *to* incorporate a negative: *forbid, prohibit, dissuade,* and, *cancel.*

For-to constructions among the VD are rather limited, and they cluster around 1) requests—directives in which the speaker is in a weak position, and 2) business deals. Examples are *beg, nag, plead, intercede, appeal, apply, bid, negotiate, contract,* and *advertise.*

At least two VD classes plus assorted other individual verbs select *that*, and either *to* or *for-to* complements, (and sometimes both). The two classes are manner of speaking verbs (*scream, shout,*) and means verbs (*cable, telephone*). Among the others are *suggest, hint, advertise, plead, argue, decide, propose,* and *say.*

(34) (a) He screamed/telephoned that the house was on fire.
(b) He screamed/telephoned for someone to help him.

Although one could propose double or triple lexical items, it is more efficient to establish a single verb meaning and let the syntactic construction itself supply the relevant illocutionary force. (See Wierzbicka 1988; Ruhl 1989.)

[4] Very few verbs that allow or require internal dative objects are found with the *for-to* construction.

Truth properties and presuppositions

Two items on the checklist are truth properties and presuppositions. To test for whether the VD is one in which truth is relevant, a frame with the adverbs *correctly* or *accurately* was used.[5] The prediction is that these adverbs should only be acceptable with assertions or with VD that can be used as statements, like *broadcast*. Syntactically, the VD that allow truth modifiers should also allow *that* complementizers, a correlation that holds up very well. However, one interesting class of exceptions emerged. Manner of speaking verbs sound rather bizarre with *accurately*, even when they are statements.

(35) (a) ?He babbled accurately that the sun is very hot.
(b) ?He lisped correctly that 3 + 3 = 6.

Apparently, the kind of information that manner of speaking verbs incorporate is somewhat incompatible with truth properties. Verbs either incorporate a manner or an illocutionary force. It is probably not the case that incorporating both constitutes a cognitive overload or that the two semantically clash. The explanation may be pragmatic—that a speaker focuses on only one of these notions. It is analogous to the fact English syntax only allows a speaker to topicalize one constituent. (See Pinker 1989, 204.)

A class of verbs, *lie, fib*, and their synonyms and hyponyms entail the falsity of the statements.

Some of the classic work on presupposition and factivity has predicted that VD should not pass any of the tests for factivity; or in Kartunnen's terminology (1971), VD should be presuppositional plugs and not allow presuppositions to remain. Although most VD behave this way, a major class of exceptions are verbs of judging,(*excuse, apologize, blame, forgive, criticize*), which, according to Fillmore's analysis (1971), can be decomposed into two parts: components that are asserted and components that are presupposed.

(36) I didn't apologize to him for kicking him

presupposes that I kicked him.

A small number of other verbs also act like factives: *divulge*, *disclose*, *reveal*, *prove*, *verify*, and *attack*, plus a few marginal cases like *add, acknowledge, remember, recollect*, and *emphasize. Divulge, disclose*, and *reveal* involve knowledge on the speaker's part, and like other verbs of knowledge, e.g. *know,*

[5] *Correctly* can also be used with judgmental verbs, such as *advise*, but the meaning is that the advice is good, rather than true. With interactional verbs, like *apologize*, the adverbs show that the act meets expected social standards. These uses are ignored.

comprehend, and *prove* (which are not VD), they exhibit factive properties. For these verbs, adding *accurately* or *correctly* sounds redundant. *Remember, recollect, point out, notice, observe,* and possibly others are not necessarily VD, but they are commonly used in direct and free indirect speech. *Attack* is a verb of judging and can be handled with the other such verbs as analyzed by Fillmore (1971). Finally, *refute* and *inform* carry a strong presumption of factivity: *refute* strongly implies that the refuted statement is false, and *inform* strongly implies that the information presented is correct.

Prepositional complements and adjuncts and transitivity

Drawing the line between complements and adjuncts is harder than one might suppose, as Jackendoff (1990) points out. However, for the purposes at hand, it may not be important, since the concern is with what can or cannot co-occur with the VD. The possible complements and adjuncts are intimately tied up with issues of transitivity. The analyst, however, has the option of deciding whether transitivity is a given which can be used to explain other phenomena or whether the transitivity of a verb is itself something to be accounted for.

Among the VD are verbs that are always intransitive (*consent*), those that may be intransitive or transitive (*lament*), and those that are optionally ditransitive (*tell*). Among the transitive and ditransitive verbs, either the goal (the addressee) or the theme (the message) is designated as the direct object, where the other theta role is expressed as a prepositional phrase. *To* expresses the goal and *about* or *of* express the theme. (Dative alternations are discussed below).

About. One might expect most VD to permit *about* phrases, since people talk about things.[6] However, less than half the VD take *about*. Among those that do are intransitives and optional transitives; some of the relevant semantic classes so far identified are manner of speaking verbs: *babble about, boast about, whisper about*; and group interaction verbs, such as *chat about, argue about, converse about, conspire about*. One observation suggesting that the semantic class may determine the syntax is that I have heard speakers use the expression "discuss about", even though *discuss* is standardly transitive, but it denotes group interaction.

With. Of the many meanings of *with*, the one I am concerned with is that of interaction—doing something interactive with other people. This is quite a small class and includes *chat, discuss, converse, argue, agree, conspire, debate,*

[6] The *about* phrase under discussion is a verb adjunct, not a post-nominal modifier. In *I gave the news about John to the press,* the *about* phrase is a nominal adjunct.

and a few others. Other VD can be forced to accept *with* by imposing a group interpretation on verbs that normally denote individual actions:

(37) ?He complained with me to the management.

It is interesting to note that any intransitive verb that permits a *with* phrase also permits an *about* phrase (but not necessarily the converse.)

Charge, threaten, and possibly *intercede* allow another sense of *with*, which may be a reflex of an earlier meaning, 'against':

(38) The court charged the defendant with theft.

For. The benefactive *for* can occur with about half of the verbs, although I find my judgments here quite unreliable. Since *for* phrases are adjuncts, they should appear freely wherever their meaning is compatible with that of the verbs, as in (39) and (40).

(39) I beseech you for the sake of my family not to reveal my secret.

(40) Let me explain it again for you.

Datives: internal datives, *to*, and alternations

Dative constructions and dative alternations have been much studied (by Green 1974; Oehrle 1975; Wierzbicka 1986; Pinker 1989; Jackendoff 1990; and many others). The problem is to try to find an explanation or a set of predictors or at least anything better than just a list that will predict the distribution. Some verbs permit only internal datives (*convince, forbid, challenge*), others permit only to datives (*explain, assert, advertise*), while other allow both constructions (*tell, cable, convey*). Wierzbicka (1986) claims that the syntactic distribution can be accounted for by the meanings. However, there is a problem of circularity, since it seems to be the distribution which provides the clues to the meaning.

In general, when looking at internal and external datives, it seems necessary to divide verbs into various subclasses, a practice followed by Green (1974), who argues that communication verbs exhibit great syntactic diversity, and also Wierzbicka (1985), who in fact argues for an abstract unity as well. There is psycholinguistic evidence in acquisition studies for a number of subclasses in that children apparently do not treat all verbs that take double objects as a uniform class but rather subdivide them into narrow semantic classes (Gropen *et al.* 1989; Pinker 1989). Pinker's hypothesis is that

syntactic alternation patterns affect narrow classes of items. Narrow classes can be determined by phonological, morphological, or semantic criteria or by an combination of these.

Morphological constraints can be seen among the VD. In general, Latinate words with prefixes where the stress does not fall on the first syllable do not allow internal datives (Oehrle 1975; Pinker 1989).[7]

(41) (a) He reported/explained the facts to me.
(b) *He reported/explained me the facts.

In the cases where the both the internal dative and the prepositional dative are permitted, the double object carries with it the connotation of success (Green 1974; Oehrle 1975; Wierzbicka 1986).

(42) (a) He cabled me the news.
(b) He cabled the news to me.

(43) (a) He told me the story about Joe's accident.
(b) He told the story about Joe's accident to me.

The (a) sentences are more likely to suggest success than the (b) sentences.

The most apparent narrow classes among the VD are the means verbs (*telephone, cable, radio*) which permit both syntactic forms and manner of speaker verbs which resist internal datives, with some items being worse than others.

(44) (a) He shouted/whispered/yelled the message to me.
(b) *He shouted/whispered/yelled me the message.

Another narrow class identified by Pinker is verbs in which a future commitment is made: *offer*, *guarantee*, *pledge*, *grant*, *promise* among the VD as well as other verbs, many of which violate the morphological rule stated above: *refer*, *allot*, *assign*, *advance*, *award*, *grant.*

In general, directives (requests, orders, advice, suggestions) allow or require an internal dative and do not permit *to*+NP, e.g. *caution, direct, counsel, beseech, ask,* etc.

(45) (a) I cautioned (directed, entreated) him to pay me.
(b) *I cautioned (advised) (the warning) to him.

[7] There are some exceptions, however, pointed out by Dick Oehrle, such as *assign*.

Pinker's hypothesis (1989) of narrow classes is very promising and a cursory study of the VD seems to be compatible with it. However, careful semantic sorting needs to be done independently of the syntactic distribution. Circularity is a difficult problem to avoid, and even some of very best analysts occasionally slip into it.

Asymmetries in the person paradigm

There are three small classes of VD in which there are subtle differences between the first person and other persons in the person paradigm. One class consists of *claim*, *allege*, and in some cases *say* (especially if stressed). Compare (46) and (47).

(46) He claims that X's theory is the best one.

(47) I claim that X's theory is the best one.

In (46) there is an implicature that the speaker is withholding approval of the proposition, which is not the case in (47). However, the asymmetry may be only apparent, and Wierzbicka's account (1987) explains why. The verb *claim* puts forth some controversial issue, something that others might be expected to challenge. In the case of first person sentences, e.g., (47), the speaker admits that the proposition is controversial; in third person sentences, the speaker is implying his or her own challenge.

A second class of asymmetries include manner of speaking verbs which denote a negatively evaluated manner: *growl, grumble, babble, chatter,* etc.[8]

(48) He chattered/babbled about the war.

(49) ?I chattered/babbled about the war.

The explanation in these cases is strictly pragmatic. Speakers are not likely to describe their speech acts negatively. The phenomena are exactly analogous to those of *lurk*, discussed in the 1960s and 1970s transformational literature (see Harnish 1975).

The third class involves those VD that can serve a performatives, such as *bet*, *guess*, *advise*, *declare*, *recommend*, etc. as in (50):

(50) I recommend that you invest in the stock market

[8] A few other *verba dicendi* that carry a negative evaluation can be included here, for example, *conspire*.

where the sentence can count as a recommendation. With a different person (or a different tense), (50) would simply be a statement.[9] Extensive accounts of the syntax and semantics of such constructions can be found in Austin (1962), Searle (1969), and Fraser (1971). A wide variety of illocutionary act types can be used as performatives, including a large number that are involved in formal procedures and institutional practices: *summon, authorize, certify, adjourn, resign, sentence, baptize, nominate, second,* and many more.

Other properties of verba dicendi

Some of the syntactic distributions that are included in my checklist are not particular to VD, since they occur with other kinds of verbs as well. However, the VD may serve as a useful corpus for testing the predictions made. For example, Erteschik-Shir–Lappin (1979) have predicted that extraction from subject position is possible for verbs that are semantically 'light', or 'non-dominant'. Therefore, (51) is grammatical but (52) and (53) are not.

(51) Who did Bill say left?

(52) *Who did Bill whisper left?

(53) *Who did Bill broadcast left?

Stowell, however, argues that the explanation lies in case assigning properties postulated as a part of GB theory. If *that* cannot be deleted, then the following subject cannot be extracted. Therefore, Stowell predicts that extraction from subject and deletion of *that* should apply to exactly the same verbs. In my sample, there is some overlap in the two classes, but they are by no means co-extensive.

Unfortunately, the judgments of acceptability are so subtle that I do not consider introspective reports to be reliable enough. Therefore, the property of *that* omission must await investigation until the data can be checked with corpora.[10]

Erteschik-Shir–Lappin argue that the lie test also applies to 'semantically light' or 'non-dominant' verbs. Consider the following dialogues:

(54) (a) John said that Bill stole the money.
(b) That's a lie!

[9] I am grateful to Paul Meyer for this observation.

[10] Longman's Dictionary of Contemporary English, based on a corpus of 25 million words of text, provides information on the acceptability of omitting *that*.

(55) (a) John bet that George stole the money.
(b) That's a lie!

For (54) a possible interpretation is that Bill stole the money as well as the interpretation that John did not utter the complement. However, in (55) the only interpretation is that John did not bet that George stole the money. Thus Erteschik-Shir–Lappin predict that the same verbs should behave alike with respect to the extraction and *lie* tests. In my sample the number of verbs for which the *lie* test yields ambiguous sentences overlaps with but is not exactly coextensive with the extraction tests.

Broad semantic classes and illocutionary force

One important aspect of the study of VD, the one that relates to Talmy's approach to lexical typology (1985), is a frequency count of the different semantic classes. Since categories overlap, more than simple counting is involved. In general, illocutionary force constitutes the most important semantic dimension, particularly for assertives (statements) and directives. Very few verbs are used to ask questions: *ask*, *inquire*,*query*, *interrogate*, *question.* As mentioned above, statements and directives correlate with complement selection.

A second set incorporates manner of speaking components. Syntactically, these verbs occur as intransitives, as transitives, and with almost any complement; it is the complement type which determines the illocutionary force. Example (56a) is a statement and (56b) a directive.

(56) (a) I whispered that X.
(b) I whispered (to him) to X.

Means verbs such as *telephone, cable,* etc. behave the same way.

Another set of VD lexicalizes kinds of group activities: *chat, dispute, talk, gossip, debate, converse.* These are typically intransitive but allow further specification by means of *with* and *about* adjunct phrases. The meaning of the verb focusses on the nature of the activity—whether serious, friendly, argumentative, etc.

Another small but important class includes textual verbs, that is, verbs used most frequently as responses to the speech of another, such as *add, agree, reply, contradict, decline, disagree.* Some of these lexicalize the speaker's attitudes or intentions. Although some, like *reply* can involve any illocutionary force, others are limited to assertions. Thus we see that the semantic classification of VD is different from taxonomies of illocutionary acts, although illocution plays a big roll in the lexical semantics.

Summary

This paper has surveyed broadly the various syntactic and semantic aspects of *verba dicendi* in English. The syntax is varied, but Pinker's hypothesis that narrow semantic classes of verbs will predict syntactic properties is a promising one. Semantically, illocutionary force is an important aspect of constructing semantic classes, but manner of speaking, means of communicating, conversational interactional, and textual sequencing are also important semantic notions are incorporated into verbs. I hope that this study can serve as a basis for comparing the verbs of speaking in other languages in order to compare the lexicalization of concepts from a truly universal semantic domain.

Appendix

The morphology and syntax of indirect speech

In comparing the grammatical properties of reported speech across languages, Coulmas (1985) stresses the arbitrariness and variability. Some languages, such as German, use a special mood for indirect speech, others, such as English and Italian, shift tense, others use special complementizers or adverbs or quotative particles. However, before giving up on the possibility of finding universals, it is necessary to investigate this matter more abstractly. Following the work of Victor Friedman (1980, 1981), it is necessary to look, not only at the forms used for reported speech but look also at the other meanings and uses of that form and then look at the paradigmatic contrasts in the language. For example, in looking at tense shifts from present to past, we need to see what other functions past tenses have and what they contrast with; similarly we need to see what other things the subjunctive mood signals in German and what contrasts are made with other moods. Perhaps at a more abstract level we can find greater similarities—perhaps not. But since labels like 'subjunctive mood' and 'past tense' are often applied loosely, a scholar of universals and typology must be wary in interpreting them without looking at how they are used in each language.

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THE ITALIAN MORPHEMES *NO* AND *NIENTE* AS CONVERSATIONAL MARKERS

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This paper on some pragmatic uses of the negative morphemes *no* (literally "non" in French and "no" in English) and *niente* (literally "rien" in French and "nothing"/ "not ... anything" in English) in Italian everyday conversation, is part of a broader research in progress, which was started a few years ago (1987) at the University of Bologna, within an interdisciplinary project (Istituto di Comunicazione, Dipartimento di Psicologia, Dipartimento di Lingue e Letterature Straniere Moderne).

The main aim of our overall project is an analysis, both qualitative and quantitative, of the specific functioning of various conversational markers which characterise spoken Italian language (e.g., : *ecco, allora, anzi, appunto, insomma, comunque, magari*). Given the high frequency and the functional complexity of this category of linguistic items (in Italian as in other languages), we believe that intra- and interlinguistic micro-analysis in this field could help to add a few elements to the description of the overall mechanisms of the regulation of conversation. Although we will not deal here with the quantitative aspects, we can observe a fragment, taken from a conversation over dinner (5 participants; Kiki is a female dog), where out of a total of 96 words, 31 (32%) are conversational markers. The part immediately preceding this fragment concerns a plan to buy and perhaps restore a country house. Given the circumscribed aim of the present paper, transcription conventions are limited to suspension points to indicate pauses, upper case to indicate raised voices, colon to indicate a lengthened syllable. Markers are in bold type.

132. A: **e poi** mettere la luce ...
133. D: **sì no ma** la luce ci sarebbe ma ... tutte le pratiche ... ma ... il telefono anche ...
134. A: **no no sì d'accordo** ...
135. D: **comunque** ...
136. A: **no capito ma** ti ...
137. D: **cioè** quello che volevo dire ... mi rendo conto ...
138. A: **cioè** se uno invece desiderava ...
139. B: **appunto ma** ...

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140. A: **cioè comunque** i tempi sono sempre ... **almeno** per quello che ho potuto vedere
141. D: **certo** ...
142. A: **anzi** aumentano sempre anche quando ... **voglio dire** anche nelle ... colle migliori **ecco** ... pre ... **cioè** condizioni **diciamo** ...
143. B: **ma infatti appunto** ... alla fine ti ...
144. A: **mhh** be:ella ... ha fame anche la Kiki **vedi** ... che non mangia niente ...
145. B: **eh sì**
146. A: be:ella lei

(English transposition)
132. A: **and then** putting in the electricity
133. D: **yes well but** the electricity's already been installed but ... there's all the business but ... the telephone too ...
134. A: **oh well yes of course** ...
135. D: **anyway** ...
136. A: **O.K. but** ...
137. D: **well** ... what I wanted to say was ... **I mean** ...
138. A: **well** ... **but** if you wanted ...
139. B: **exactly but** ...
140. A: **well anyway** it always takes longer ... at any rate from what I've seen
141. D: **of course**
142. A: **in fact** it always takes longer even when ... **I mean** even in the ... under the best so ... **I mean** ... **I mean** conditions you could say ...
143. B: **mh** ... **right of course** ... in the end you ...
144. A: [to dog] oh sweetie ... [to B] Kiki's hungry too ... **you see** ... she usually doesn't eat much ...
145. B: **I know**
146. A: sweetie ...

(French transposition)
132. A: **et puis** faire installer l'électricité ...
133. D: **oui ben bon** l'électricité elle y est mais tout le reste ... les démarches et puis le téléphone ...
134. A: **ça oui oui d'accord** ...
135. D: **enfin** ...
136. A: **non tu vois mais** tu ...
137. D: c'est que je voulais dire ... je comprends ...
138. A: c'est que si au lieu on voulait ...

139. B: **justement mais** ...
140. A: **enfin** c'est que les temps sont toujours ... du moins pour ce que j'ai pu voir ...
141. D: **bien sûr** ...
142. A: **et puis** c'est toujours plus long ... même quand ... je crois même dans les ... avec les meilleurs **voilà** ... pré ... comment dirais-je ... conditions **disons** ...
143. B: **mais c'est ça justement** ... **et puis** tu ...
144. A: **ah** que t'es belle ... Kiki aussi a faim **tu vois** ... elle qui mange rien
145. B: **eh oui** ...
146. A: t'es belle toi

As for theoretical definitions of "discourse markers", found in the many studies in this field, we will at least mention those of van Dijk (1979), Ducrot (1980), Ducrot–Anscombre (1983), Schiffrin (1987), Moeschler (1989), and Fraser (1990). However, these and other studies provide a range of trends which cannot be examined here directly.

Besides, we have to recall that pragmatic and psycholinguistic aspects of denial have already been stressed in psychological studies and in psycholinguistics (Wason 1965; Antinucci–Volterra 1978). Although we do not intend to deal here with the eminently semantic problems of denial, one of the points we would like to make is that the pragmatic uses of the Italian morphemes *no* and *niente* do maintain a relation with their negative referential meanings (and these meanings themselves contribute to their pragmatic functions). However, their communicative functions seem to go beyond their meaning content. Moreover, as Schiffrin points out, the communicative strength of these discourse markers also depends upon where they co-occur within discourse.

We will therefore try to see if and how the various functional aspects emphasised by the literature on discourse markers are contained in the pragmatic uses of *no* and *niente*. A preliminary examination of our data showed that, curiously enough, *no* and *niente*, in their pragmatic use, often do not seem to convey pure denial nor pure disagreement. This pragmatic use does not apply to question–answer pairs, where the holophrastic use is found as a second pair–part; i.e. after yes–no questions, as in *Hai visto Claudia? No (non l'ho vista)* (Did you see Claudia? No, I didn't); or in question–answer pairs, as in *Hai ricevuto posta? Niente* (Did you get any mail? Nothing).

Used as pragmatic markers, *no* and *niente* tend to convey confirmation and agreement, contrary to their referential content, and quite paradoxically. Most of the time, these conversational devices (especially when they are used in

the turn-opening position) reveal the coexistence of assent and dissent, in different ways and degrees, through a move aimed at attenuating and minimising agreement and/or disagreement. They then function as signals of cooperation and acquire a metacommunicative dimension which allows us to classify them as conversational markers.

Before focusing on these and other aspects in our proposal of analysis of examples selected from our corpus of conversation, let us start by granting that extra- and paralinguistic aspects are crucial in conversational analysis. And for *no* and *niente*, as for all conversational markers, prosodic contours are essential. Though prosodic components definitely helped us in identifying referential uses from pragmatic ones, we did not study them for themselves in our proposal of description.

Now, since some readers may not be familiar with Italian, let us briefly step back in order to make a few considerations about some very common uses of *no* and *niente*. In spoken Italian, *no* by itself, as a negative imperative form linked to contextual elements, functions as a prohibition (an order not to do something), e.g., to a child: *no!* = don't (= don't throw the spoon out of the window). In formal written Italian, prohibitions that are not deictically marked (as in *no smoking, no parking*) are formulated without a *no* form: *vietato fumare, divieto di sosta.* See also, the doctors prohibition *niente fumo.*

No as a second pair-part of an adjacency pair is often difficult even for native speakers to understand when the first pair-part is put in a negative form, e.g., *Non è stata sincera. No* (She wasn't sincere). Does this naked *no* mean agreement with the content of the utterance or denial of the first speaker's evaluation? In fact, in cases like this one in Italian daily conversation, we often hear the first speaker asking the second one what was really meant by *no*, in order to check the correctness of the interpretation. In similar structures, French provides an alternative to the polarity of the yes-no answers: the French morpheme *si* has precisely the function of clearing up such ambiguities.

The indefinite pronoun *niente* also has an adverbial function, as in *non è niente/ per niente/ nient'affatto piacevole* (it is *not at all* pleasant; ce n'est *pas du tout* agréable).

As a conventional reply in politeness routine sequences, *niente* functions as a minimising device after thanks and apologies: *Grazie. Niente; Scusa. (Di) Niente.* (Not at all/ You are welcome/ Don't mention it; Ce n'est rien/ De rien/ Je vous en prie/ Pas de quoi).

Similarly, we find some standardised combined uses of *no*, e.g., *no* following *perché* (why) or *come* (how) in politeness replies which show some degree of kind attention towards the first speaker's request or appreciation of his/her

proposal: *come no?* (= certainly; mais bien sûr); *perché no?* (= why not?; pourquoi pas?)

Data

Our study is based on a corpus of recorded and transcribed spontaneous conversations (2 h 26') taken from a larger corpus (a total of approximately 12 h). The situations of exchange concern a) dinner-table conversations (**relation oriented,** 1 h 6'); b) discussions which are more focused on specific themes (**topic oriented,** 1 h 20'). In both cases, the exchange, which is not characterised by a clear disparity of roles, is rather informal. Participants (from 2 to 9 per conversation) are native speakers of Italian, living in Bologna, from various social backgrounds; ages range from 20 to 65.

Examples

Ellipsis, sudden changes of topic, and overlapping of different levels of discourse tend to make transcribed utterances of everyday conversation syntactically and semantically unclear. For this reason (and for economy), the examples are limited to five very short fragments of conversations which seem to be quite clear even without a more extensive conversational context. The examples are followed by a proposed rough translation in French and in English. Of course, the question of translation "equivalence" is linked to the problem we are examining.

(1)
A: comunque però per forza ... ho dovuto PER FORZA: fare così ...
B: **no sì** hai fatto bene ... mh::solo che magari è stato tutto un po' affrettato **no**?

(English transposition)
A: anyway but I had to ... I HAD to do it ...
B: O.K ... well ... you did right ... er ... except maybe it was all a bit too soon)

(French transposition)
A: mais de toute façon il fallait ... j'ai dû ... je n'avais pas le choix ... faire comme ça
B: non mais tu as bien fait ... mh ... sauf que ... voilà ... il a fallu décider un peu trop vite ... tu ne crois pas?)

The act with which A expresses his position is marked by self–justification (*comunque, ho dovuto, per forza*). The *no* which opens B's reply does not express disagreement with the content of A's act, but metacommunicates on this act precisely as regards the aspect of self–justification, with the double function of recognising and containing it (= I recognise your justification, so there is no need for further justification). The *no* therefore concerns the relational level, building solidarity or politeness, by which B relates more closely to A. The *sì* which follows expresses agreement as to the content of A's act, an agreement which can then be reduced *(solo che magari)* by the relational move (getting closer).

(2)
A: ... perché così non è corretto ...
B: **sì no ma** che gli dico

(English transposition)
A: ... 'cause that isn't really right ...
B: well yes ... but what should I tell him

(French transposition)
A: ... et ça c'est pas correct ...
B: oui bon d'accord mais qu'est-ce que je vais lui dire

In B's reply introduced by *sì no ma*, B at the same time steps closer to and farther away from A's position. The morpheme *no* signals a disagreement which does not concern the evaluation expressed by A (on which agreement is assumed to have already been reached) but reinforces the distancing move displayed by *ma*, on the more restricted level of what consequent concrete behaviour to adopt.

(3)
A: e poi non ti ho detto ... quell'altra volta anche ... che hanno avuto la pretesa ... ancora ... ma sono matti ... proprio ... che fosse D a ...
B: **no no ma** hai ragione

(English transposition)
A: and then I didn't tell you ... the other time too ... when they wanted to ... again ... they must be mad ... really ... that D should ...
B: I know I know you 're right

(French transposition)
A: et puis je ne t'ai pas dit ... la fois où ... en plus ... ils prétendaient ... mais ils sont fous ... que c'était à D de ...
B: non mais tu as parfaitement raison

Paradoxically and in a conclusive way, the redundancy of the negative morpheme *no* here signals reinforcement of agreement with A, implicitly meta-communicating to the hearer that he does not need to add anything in order to mantain his position.

(4)
A: be' forse è vero ... come tutti ... perché comunque tutti siamo stanchi ... più che altro ha bisogno di riposo ... di riposarsi ...
B: **no perché** anche l'altro giorno fa ... dice ... non riesco neanche più a dormire ... mi dispiace perché

(English transposition)
A: well perhaps that's true ... like everyone ... because anyway we're all tired ... above all he needs to rest up ... to rest ...
B: I know because the other day too he said ... he said I can't even sleep any more ... I'm sorry because ...

(French transposition)
A: ça se peut ... remarque ... comme tout le monde ... c'est qu'on est tous fatigués ... il a surtout besoin de repos ... de se reposer ...
B: non c'est comme quand l'autre jour ... quand il a dit qu'il n'arrivait plus à dormir ... ça m'ennuie tu vois ...

Here B's reply, introduced by *no* immediately followed by the explicative morpheme *perché*, does not reject the interpretation proposed by A. Rather, the negative morpheme signals a shift from the general (shared) level to a more specific one. Agreement with A's statement is made possible precisely thanks to the preceding change of level.

(5)
A: e come si fa allora ... dillo tu
B: **niente** ... prima fai la sottrazione poi ... se ti dà ... come si dice ... poi hai trovato l'altro lato ... e così ... a questo punto ... mh ... **niente** ... dopo fai tutto come nel problema di prima ...

(English transposition)
A: and how d'you do it then ... you tell me
B: look ... first you do the subtraction then ... if you get ... what do you call it ... then you've found the other side ... and so ... at that point ... mh ... O.K. ... then you do it like the problem above ...

(French transposition)
A: et comment on fait alors ... vas-y je t'écoute

B: bon écoute voilà ... d'abord tu fais ta soustraction puis ... si tu trouves ... comment est-ce qu'on dit ... alors tu as trouvé l'autre côté ... et puis là ... mh ... ben bon voilà ... ensuite tu continues comme pour le problème d'avant ...

Within this context (explanation), the morpheme *niente* occurs both in the initial position and within the utterance, with a double function: self/heteroregulation. In the first case, *niente* functions as a minimising device, mainly used to facilitate starting and to help discourse planning. In the second case, the minimisation tends to signal to the hearer (metacommunication) the speaker's willingness to adapt his own discourse to a simpler level: a level of shared or presupposed knowledge which would be more accessible to the hearer. Depending upon the case, this self–regulating aspect could take on different pragmatic functions ranging from polite to impolite, e.g. bridging distance (simplifying the issues for the hearer) or, at the opposite pole, adding and emphasizing distance (showing impatience).

Remarks on quantitative aspects

Table 1
Co-occurrences of *no* as conversational marker

	tot.	init.	inner	fin.
no+sì	5	5		
no+mark of agreement	19	14	3	2
no+sì+mark of agreement	4	2		2
no+mark of agreement.+ma/peró	10	10		
no+sì+ma/peró	4	4		
no+commentary marker	22	19	2	1
no+ perché	12	9	3	
no/ah no	44	7	24	
sì+no/be'/mh+sì+no	16	16		
sì+no+ma/peró	4	4		
ma+no	3	3		
come+no/oh+come+no	5	5		
	148	98	32	18

agreement markers: *d'accordo*, *certo*, *è vero*, *infatti*, *appunto*.
commentary markers: *volevo dire*, *cioè*, *capito*, *dipende*.

Table 1 shows occurrences and co-occurrences of *no* as a conversational marker. Semantic uses were omitted, as well as ambiguous cases (those in which the borderline between semantic use and conversational use did not seem clear enough out of context).

The frequency of *niente* is very low (9 occurrences) compared to the frequency of *no*. It is of course true that the corpus lacks the types of exchanges where *niente* is most likely to occur (explanations, routine transactions, thanks and apologies).

Of the 148 instances of co-occurrent *no* (*no* occurring with another marker), 98 (66.2%) occur in turn-initial positions, while 32 (21.6%) occur in internal positions and 18 (12.2%) in turn-final positions.

Space does not allow us to explore the aspects of at least three very common uses of non-turn-initial *no*:

a) *no* in an internal position = *non è vero? (you see/you know what I mean?; tu vois/vous voyez);*

b) *no* in closing position = *non è vero?* (tag questions; *n'est-ce pas*);

c) *noo!* expressing a mixture of surprise and approbation (holophrastic) = *incredibile! (really?; how amazing!; c'est pas vrai!).*

In turn openings, *no* occurs mainly combined with other markers. Co-occurrences are much less frequent when *no* occurs in internal and closing positions.

Combinations with *sì* and/or markers of agreement (e.g., *d'accordo, infatti, appunto*) and with commentary markers (e.g., *volevo dire, capito, cioè*) are very frequent.

As for the order of co-occurrence, in openings *no* precedes *sì* or an agreement marker in 35 cases, while *sì* precedes *no* in 20 cases.

These figures are interesting if compared with the use of the French *non*. Vicher and Sankoff (1989) found no use of *non oui* in turn-openings, while they found *ben oui, ben non* and, more seldom, *non ben.*

These data might suggest that everyday conversation between Italians is strongly polemical and uncooperative. As a matter of fact, out of a total of 994 markers occurring in turn openings, our corpus contains 214 cases of *sì* and 185 of *no* (both conversational and semantic). This prevalence of the use of *sì* can comfort us about Italians' willingness at least to cooperate, if not always to agree.

The high frequency of *no* combined with *sì* or with other markers of agreement (preceding or following *no*) seems significant to us since, beyond the surface structure of the negative device, it reflects a specific attention to and an awareness of the relational plane of discourse.

Our data are limited in space and time to the Bologna area and the late 1980s. *No* and *niente* as conversational markers can indeed be influenced by regional, generational or individual peculiarities and idiosyncratic styles. For this and for other reasons, they are often seen as pure hesitation marks, i.e., as having a weak function. However, the way these markers function actually goes far beyond these factors. *No* and *niente* not only seem to belong fully to present standard spoken Italian, but they also to some extent seem to reflect the overall mechanisms of the regulation of conversation. This is precisely what we try to underline in our conclusions.

Conclusions

Our data support the following tentative conclusions regarding spoken Italian:
– *No* and *niente* have specific conversational uses which cannot be fully assimilated to the use of semantic denial.
– Like many other conversational markers, they have favored locations: they tend to occur in turn-initial position, but also (with different functions and less frequently) in internal and turn-final positions.
– It is interesting to note that this type of *no* can occur in the initial position of an utterance without belonging to the second pair-part of a yes-no question. Similarly, *niente* can occur in an initial position without being the negative answer to a question-answer pair.
– Compared to the common uses of semantic denial, pragmatic uses of *no* and *niente* allow combinations and co-occurrences which could not occur if these negative morphemes were simply viewed as grammatical units. Thus, although the reference of *no* contradicts that of *sì*, in their pragmatic uses they not only coexist but even strongly tend to be combined. The same applies to *no + d'accordo d'accordo* (two occurrences), or *no + certo è vero.*

Some authors (Schiffrin 1987; Fraser 1990) claim that although markers are syntactically detachable, removing them from an utterance would cause considerable loss on the functional level. Our data analysis allows us to observe that, in spite of their semantic "detachability", *no* and *niente* (like many other Italian conversational markers) tend to occur by themselves, not only in holophrastic uses, but also elliptically.

At any rate, *no* and *niente* certainly have more than one function:
– They can be used by a speaker to convey a personal orientation toward a particular state of affairs. In that sense, we can speak of both a relational and an indexical function: the specific speaker's orientation in relation to the deictic center contributes to define the space of discourse which includes both participants (relation level) and utterance (textual level).

– By pointing out what the speaker is doing, backward or forward within the discourse, or both (anaphora and/or cataphora), or referring to a shared presupposition, *no* and *niente* have a metacommunicative function. Thus they are able to operate on different planes of discourse.
– So, *no* and *niente* not only enhance coherence, marking connections which are inferred by producers and interpreters of the discourse (énoncé), but they also provide coherence linking the different components of talk at one and the same time: at the very level where speakers' relations with each other are involved in what is being said, meant and done (énonciation).
– By contributing to coherence between utterances, *no* and *niente* as conversational markers can also be read in terms of cooperation strategies since, along with other linguistic items, they signal, add or even create relevance between turns in conversation.

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BETWEEN RULES AND PRINCIPLES: SOME THOUGHTS ON THE NOTION OF 'METAPRAGMATIC CONSTRAINT'

JACOB L. MEY

A pragmatic universe is not predictable in the sense that a morphological or syntactic universe (considered abstractly) is: no strict conditions can be set up for a pragmatic universe, neither can any stringent hypotheses be formulated and tested that would create the illusion of a well-formed world.

A pragmatic approach to language cannot, therefore, be captured by the 'exact' methods of sciences such as mathematics or physics; pragmatics views the world as a world of users, and tries to capture the general conditions under which the users of a language have to work. Rather than speculating on what the user possibly could (or could want to) say, pragmatics investigates what the user actually can, and normally will be expected to say. In other words, we constrain the world of use in accordance with our (explicit or implicit) knowledge of the users, and with the expectations that follow from that knowledge.

Efforts at computer modeling of human language behavior have made us aware of the importance of user goals, embodied in devices such as **scripts** (cf., e.g., Schank–Abelson 1977). Scripts are, in fact, realizations of certain general constraints obeying which we arrive at the most general realization of our goal (the 'default', as it is often called). If we want to deviate from the 'normal' case, we have to qualify these constraining conditions, while staying within the general set of expectations; alternatively, we must create a wholly new set of constraints, embodied in another script. Goals and expectations, as represented by such constraints, are essential to a pragmatic understanding of human activity, and much more so than are correctness of sentence construction and obedience of the rules of grammar.

As Carberry remarks, in another context,

"[this] strategy utilizes pragmatic knowledge, such as a model of the information-seeker's inferred task-related plan and expected discourse goals. The power of this approach is its reliance on knowledge gleaned from the dialog, including discourse content and conversational goals, rather than on precise representations of the preceding utterances alone" (1989, 76).

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Thus, what we are looking for in metapragmatics is still, in Caffi's (1984a, 1984b) words, those "units of action which are constitutive of a given interaction" (1984b, 464). However, it is not necessarily and always given that those actions can be captured by rules for the use of certain distinguished, 'canonical' speech acts— on the contrary, in order *to state* something, I usually avoid using the 'speech act verb' to state, as Caffi perceptively remarks (ibid., 456). And indeed: the linguistic actors rely on what is implicit in the scenario (the 'script'), as well as on what is explicitly stated (in the dialog): that is, the whole framework of discourse is invoked, both on the general level (a story, an argument, a report, etc.) and on the individual level of **this** particular story, argument, report, etc., with the parameters indicated by the agreed-on conventions and limitations between, respectively of, the interactants.

The problem with available models of discourse, as pointed out by Borutti (1984), is that they tend to be "deterministic and idealistic" (1984, 445); when we are dealing with a script, the common defaults are those that are least interesting from a pragmatic point of view. We are not really and always interested in people following the normal route, just as, in Nietzsche's famous words, an elegant error can be much more interesting than a plain truth; all depends on our goals.

This is not to say that viewing metapragmatics as subject to the constraints of (idiosyncratic) human discourse is an uncomplicated and problem-free affair; "in order to understand discourse", as Borutti reminds us (ibid.), "the procedures of making meaning normal and constant are very important", and "[t]o obtain a correct representation of the subject's discourse, we must consider the linguistic strategies of the speaker, the effects he or she is planning, the anticipation of the hearer'[s] mental reactions, his or her pre-existing context of speaking, etc." (1984, 445).

When looking around for a model which, at the same time, embodies the notion of pragmatic constraint as the expression of human potential, and the constance which is necessary for a consistent and metapragmatically well-functioning mechanism of discourse, we may find it worth our while to consider what goes on in the particular, 'artificial' (but not necessarily machine-created) environment of the world of art, more specifically that of the literary work. One could say that the essence of participating (mostly as a reader or writer) in a literary universe is, for both 'consumers' and 'producers', the acceptance of a set of constraints governing the use of that world, in particular those relating the universe to language and vice versa.[1]

[1] Cf. the speech act vs. utterance dichotomy, as described by Levinson (1983).

The ways literary universes are introduced and established vary greatly from period to period, from culture to culture. As an instance, compare the detailed, descriptive statements of time, space, geography, actors, characters, physiognomy, apparel, etc. that were customary in the Romantic period (good examples can be found in the *Waverly* series of novels by Walter Scott) to the extremely frugal and indirect lighting of the literary scene by modern novelists such as Alain Robbe-Grillet or Jorge Luís Borges. The problem of 'making up' a world, that is, of establishing a script, is akin to that of setting up conditions for the proper use of language, say, in a conversational environment: in both cases, the constraints cannot be universal, but have to respect the individual actors' idiosyncrasies; yet, as an author or conversationalist, I have to keep those constraints constant as well as consistent throughout my work (be it literary or conversational), on the penalty of becoming unintelligible and/or being rejected by my collaborators in the literary effort, my readers or my interlocutors.

It has been said that the reader, on opening a book, delivers him-/herself, wholesale, into the hands of the author. Evidently, this is only partly true: the true part being the voluntary acceptance of the author's world and of the constraints that are imposed by him/her. Notice also that in order to be effective, the constraints are never explicitly stated: they are inferred from what we notice about the actors as described, comparing their behavior with our own, familiar, and expected way of being, and by applying the inference schemas that we use in our own daily lives.

The main advantage of a 'constraint' over a 'rule' approach as a metapragmatic explanatory device is borne out by the ease with which literary constraints are manipulated by (and vice versa, manipulate) the users, in this case the readers, as compared to the clumsy use of rules. Pragmatics is the science of the unsaid; the literary work in particular balances on the ridge between 'everything else being the same' and 'nothing else being the same': *ceteris paribus, nullis paribus.*

What is the same, and what not, however, is never explicitly stated; neither is how to handle the samenesses and differences, that is, how to interpret the constraints. Reading one of the Waverly novels, say, in 1989, is quite a different cup of tea than doing the same some 150 years ago, when they first saw the light of day; and in to-day's literature (as an example, take recent work by John Fowles, e.g., *A Maggot*), no amount of elegant and skillful pastiching can obscure the fact that the author's and the reader's work with the text, and

hence the way the textual and dialogical constraints are manipulated, depend entirely on the contemporary conditions against which constraints are defined and accepted by authors and readers, respectively, and then re-defined and reaccepted by every new generation.

This point of view has consequences for our handling of pragmatics in our daily lives and our usual surroundings as well. Much of what has been going on in linguistic pragmatics has been characterized by a certain 'idealism' (both in its vanilla variety and in the strict, philosophical sense). The feeling that we 'accept' or 'reject' the constraints in a literary work, and in general, decide on our own goals and expectations by incorporating them in a script, respectively extracting them from what some consider to be the dark underbrush of conscience, reflects also on our dealings with language on a day-to-day base. Just like the playwright 'sets the stage', in the literal sense of the word, that is, words the plot on the stage by manipulating dialog and stage directions (the 'constraints'), so we are able to model and change the world of our lives using the words that are at our disposal when dealing with that world.

The problem has a double aspect: that of **matching** and that of **changing**. As to the first aspect, the extreme case, of course, is the idea that one can match the human speaker's native competence by means of abstract, grammatical rules. In a pragmatic surrounding, the ideal of matching comes up when we start to realize that a certain use of language reflects the actual world situation rather poorly. This can be either because the words belong to another, earlier period (this we can normally live with: nobody thinks of 'sailing' as an unorthodox activity, even when mentioned in connection with such definitely sail-less contraptions as atomic submarines), or because they reflect an altered consciousness of the world; if we feel constrained by such a state of affairs, it usually means that the constraints aren't right, and hence we have to change them: which is the other aspect of the problem.

Consider one such constraint (or 'meta-rule' as one could call it) concerning the 'generic' use of the personal pronoun third person masculine in English: *he*. The mismatch is that half the world's population is female; so how can we refer to them by the masculine?, people say. A solution ('change') is to introduce the hybrid form *s/he*; alternatively, one could declare the feminine to be the proper generic form, and uniquely use *she*, also when males are around.

In the latter case, the change concerns not the real state of the world (which remains the same all the time), but the **constraints** we place on our

use of language in describing that state. But notice that what we do here is to change the scenario, a limited discourse, more or less like we did with the literary universe that I referred to above. We don't change the world (at least not directly) by using the generic *she*; at best, we may change (or 'raise', as it used to be called) our consciousness about the problem. And nothing wrong with that, of course, as I have argued elsewhere (Mey 1985, 365–68).

By contrast, a naïve belief in the 'magic' of the meta-level in pragmatics may lead to such absurdities as the proposed use of the 'generic' feminine in universes where the majority or even 100% of the population are masculine (e.g. the military or the Catholic priesthood).[2] The function of a feminine form, under the constraints that operate in our actual world, is first of all to denote a female being: to change that, we would have to use other means than (however meaningful) pragmatic insights. The world in which more or less one half of the inhabitants are female, one half male, exists; but likewise, we are dealing with a world in which the societal power is not at all distributed in accordance with the more or less equitable division of the sexes. The metapragmatic conditions for language use in such a world reflect, not the **actual** state of world affairs, but the **societal** state of human meanings, as expressed in the **metapragmatic** constraints on language telling us how to use, and how not to use, the words that go with that world.

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[2] It certainly is no valid argument for such a 'solution' that the masculine has been used in a pseudo-generic fashion for centuries in many languages.

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METAPRAGMATIC AWARENESS AS A FEATURE OF TECHNICAL DISCOURSE

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This article is a spin-off from ongoing research on the structure of technical texts in general and abstracts in particular. For reasons of space, it concentrates on **verbs** that are put to metapragmatic uses in academic texts. There is a large variety of such verbs, some of them metapragmatic, some not, and they are used in a characteristic variety of ways in academic discourse. Some of these uses would presumably be called metapragmatic, whereas others would not. To investigate the problem on a sounder empirical basis, 30 verbs were selected which I had found in a pilot study with a small corpus of social science texts. These verbs seemed to be common enough to yield interesting results and at the same time representative of certain typical metapragmatic functions that verbs can have in technical texts. By means of COCOA, and with the friendly assistance of some colleagues,[1] concordances were produced of all their occurrences in the 'J' section[2] of the LOB corpus of English texts. I wish to start from the assumption that metapragmatic terms do not only play a central role in the structure of technical texts, but signal one aspect of text structure (Meyer 1987a) that is both typical of and common to all technical discourse (Lüdtke 1981; 1983) and that is manifested in a wide variety of expressions (Meyer 1987b). Furthermore, it is called into question if and how a class of metapragmatic terms can be defined and delimited.

To start with, a few general preliminaries concerning the theoretical background of the study seem appropriate.

[1] In particular, I wish to express my gratitude to prof. Dieter Mindt and Felicitas Tesch for their friendly assistance in making access to the corpus possible, and Dietrich Lange and Hans Peters for the many hours they spent to provide me with their patient technical help in details of the handling of COCOA and the operating system and for their invaluable psychological support. Neither could have been dispensed with in the making of this paper.

[2] This section is labelled 'Learned and scientific English'.

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1. A theoretical point

One question to be clarified is what exactly we mean by **'text structure'** here. This notion is explicable in terms of two basic kinds of question which are by no means trivial (there has been considerable confusion about these particular questions in text linguistics):

(a) What are the linguistic elements that are regarded as forming a text structure: are they morphemes, words, phrases, sentences, paragraphs, or all of them?

(b) What are the relations between the elements that turn the jumble of words, sentences etc. into a text structure: are they syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic? Are they syntagmatic or paradigmatic?

For the purposes of this paper, it will be argued, with its view to identifying the role of metapragmatic expressions, it is **syntagmatic functional or pragmatic relations between clauses and larger text chunks** that are the relevant items of analysis. It is functions or relations of this type that are the major object of metapragmatic awareness in technical discourse.

The most recent and best known approach to text structure based on relations of this kind is Mann–Thompson's (1987) 'rhetorical structure theory', but many similar approaches have been around for at least twenty years (cf. Meyer 1975, and 1983 for an overview). The exact linguistic status of these relations is not sufficiently clear yet, but for the time being I will assume that ultimately they can be accounted for in terms of speech act theory, e.g. as relations between linguistic acts that form hierarchies of complex illocutionary acts.

2. Uses of metapragmatic expressions

For the purpose of devising an appropriate pragmatic theory of academic discourse it might be useful to take a close look at the uses to which verbs commonly called metapragmatic can be put in technical texts and then to ask if these functions can possibly be fulfilled by other expressions as well. In this way, we find out how writers in the academic world decribe their own linguistic acts, and what linguistic acts they ascribe to others.

2.1. Performatives

First of all, as Austin has shown, metapragmatic verbs can be used to **perform** linguistic acts. The ways in which this is actually done, however, differ widely from each other, and from the philosophical ideal of an explicit performative formula. We just don't have formulations like

(1) *I hereby claim that metapragmatics is bunk

or

(2) *We hereby condemn prototype semantics as a dangerous aberration and heresy.

In real academic discourse, performatives are hedged, either by modals (emphases mine, P.G.M.):

(3) **I would also suggest** that it is a common view in Britain that ...

or by modalized passives:

(4) **It must be admitted** that Einstein's special theory of relativity is simpler than Robb's alternative.

Typically, additional modifying material is used to hedge the illocutionary act:

(5) **It can be convincingly argued** that this development has been influenced by ground-water.

Some of these formulae, taken in their verbatim meaning, are just illocutionarily self-defeating: if S utters that s/he 'would suggest' that p, s/he has in fact suggested that p.[3] So the only inference that makes sense of such an utterance is that S wanted to suggest and in fact has suggested that p.

Other formulae of this kind usually thematize appropriateness conditions or similar prerequisites for academic speech acts: if 'it must be admitted' that p, then any rational person will in fact admit that p when asked to do so, and if 'it can be convincingly argued' that p, this may provide reason good enough for academic persons to argue that p.

What is more, there are performative formulae which do not use a 'performative' at all:

[3] This case bears a certain resemblance to real self-defeaters like *I'm not going to tell you that p*, where mentioning p in the complement clause defeats the intention proclaimed in the matrix clause. It is only the conventional character of such 'polite' uses of *would* that makes such formulations acceptable.

(6) **It is difficult to see** how there could be desire without endeavour.

(7) **We shall suppose** that the two time constants are the same.

Expressions like in (6) and (7) are widely used in academic texts. (6) is not a statement on anybody's difficulties in seeing something nor is (7) an announcement of a future mental state of the author. The expressions are simply conventionalized means of performing certain linguistic acts typical of academic discourse: expressing doubt and stating a working hypothesis. So why not analyse them as performative formulae?

2.2. Metatextual reference

Metapragmatic verbs can also be used to **refer** to one's own linguistic acts. This is also done by a large variety of expressions. For want of a better term, let me call these expressions metatextual expressions. It may be worth noting that there is an implication relation between classical performative and metatextual verbal expressions. As a rule, performative expressions can also be used to perform metatextual reference if transformed into an appropriate grammatical person, modality, and tense. We could thus transform examples (3) and (4) into metatextual formulae

(3)' **I have also suggested** that it is a common view in Britain that ...

or

(4)' **It has been admitted above** that Einstein's special theory of relativity is simpler than Robb's alternative.

But this does not hold vice versa. We cannot just take a metatextual expression and use it in a felicitous performative formula, see examples (8) and (8)':

(8) We shall now briefly review the various methods which have been used.

(8)' *I hereby briefly review the various methods which have been used.

Somebody using the verb *admit* in the first person singular has to be very careful to avoid admitting whatever is spelled out in the complement clause. But no one is able to review anything just by using the verb *review* (which is a pity as it would make academic life so much easier!). Example (8) can thus only be understood as an announcement, not as a performative formula. Announcements are a common device of signalling the topic organization of a text ((9), (10)).

(9) There are a host of further points to be sorted out. Let me try to **list** these.

(10) We shall **consider** in a little more detail the effects of ...

But they are not the only way to refer metatextually. Anaphoric references to former linguistic acts performed in the same text are just as common.

(11) We **referred** to this issue in the introduction to this chapter when we **discussed** the application of the ... systems as redundancies.

And again, it is not metapragmatic terms alone that are used in these functions:

(12) This table is **analysed** in detail in section B of this chapter.

analyse most frequently occurs in a meaning where it describes a mental or physical activity performed by scientists. But sometimes it also functions like a metatextual verb. There is a number of activity verbs that are ambiguous between a physical, mental, and verbal reading. Among the ones studied by me for the present paper are *hold*, *compare*, *show*, *concentrate*, *consider*, *examine*, *illustrate*, *introduce*, *investigate*, *provide*, and *see*.

2.3. Intertextuality

So far I have drawn examples from the **metatextual** text layer. The **intertextual**[4] layer also provides ample material for a study of metapragmatic expressions. The terms that are used for intertextual reference are largely identical to the metatextual ones, but there are some further problems of analysis. Intertextuality in technical discourse is neither mysterious nor can it be reduced to the simple question of quotations. Let us look at a typical example (emphases mine, P.G.M.):

(13) The **Robbins Report**, whatever its many **merits**, did one great **disservice** to the development of higher education in Britain. That was the **establishment** of the 'Robbins **principle**' that places should be provided in higher education for all those qualified for and seeking them. It is this

[4] The term **intertextual** has become a buzzword in recent years, especially in literary studies, and sometimes my impression has been that much of the discussion of this term has led to obscuring questions rather than clarifying them. The present paper is not concerned with the discussion among literary scholars. Neither will I attempt to give a fireproof definition of **intertextuality**. I will use the term as a convenient label covering all cases where one text relates or refers to another.

principle which has **determined** that much **discussion** of the future of higher education has been demography-led, especially in official **publications**. Thus, a peaking of the 18-year-old age group in the early 1980s, followed by a decline in the late 1980s and early 1990s, **suggests** a series of alternative strategies (...). It is significant that whatever may have been **said** on the sidelines, the attraction of new client groups was not **proposed** by Government as an end in itself ...

If we look at the expressions that are in bold type in the above text sample, the complexity of the task of determining and delimiting the intertextual side of metapragmatic awareness in technical discourse becomes apparent. *Robbins Report* is a proper name for a text, so references to it are certainly intertextual. *merits*, *disservice* and *establishment* are short characterizations of or allusions to perlocutionary effects of the Robbins Report. Perlocution belongs to the domain of pragmatics. Does this mean these expressions are metapragmatic?

On the other hand, a term such as *suggest* would immediately be identified as metapragmatic by most linguists. In our example, however, it is not used metapragmatically. It rather describes a relation between a state of affairs and certain possible actions (represented by (...) in the above text). I will come back to this issue in section **2.5.**

Another difficulty is illustrated by the use of *said* and *proposed* in (13). They are speech act verbs, in some way referring to third party utterances here. But it is not made clear what texts or utterances exactly are referred to. The verbs are used here to allude vaguely to a general background of discussion on the Robbins Report.[5]

To make the notion of intertextuality more suitable for a pragmatics of technical discourse, I would suggest to distinguish at least three types of intertextual expression. Look at examples (14) to (16):

(14) Cavagnari and Jenkins thereupon returned to Jamrud and **reported** their failure to Chamberlain.

(15) Many informants **reported** that two or more methods had been used.

(16) For example in the case of ... ferrites it has been **reported** that the use of nitrates gives rise to better microwave properties.

All the instances of *report* in the three examples above can without doubt be called intertextual, but they differ in pragmatically important respects.

[5] These observations are not meant as a criticism of the quoted text, but as an indication of the broad variety of intertextual phenomena in technical discourse.

In example (14), a simple historical event is narrated which happens to include a linguistic act. Accordingly, a metapragmatic verb (*report*) is used. But this verb has no specific status in this particular discourse qua academic discourse. The linguistic act of reporting that is reported here is simply part of the text's subject matter. We might call this use of the verb *report* the **narrative** use. As far as the pragmatics of academic discourse is concerned, *report* in this use is in no way different from other verbs.

Example (15) comes from a study of birth control practices where informants were questioned as part of the research done for the paper. The reporting that is reported here is thus occasioned by a professional activity, which in turn is reported in the paper. The linguistic acts described here thus have a more significant status in the discourse, as they are part of a scientific practice. They do not just happen to be linguistic acts, they are elicited as such and used as evidence. A distinction should be made between trivial instances of reported speech acts (example (14)) and reports of speech acts which are data in a scientific inquiry.

To discuss example (16), another item of theoretical background is to be introduced here: the notion of **autonomous, planned discourse** (Ochs 1979; Meyer 1983), i.e. discourse that is not bound to a specific immediate situation, that is addressed to people not in a private, but in a public role (Akinnaso 1985). The overwhelming majority of technical discourse available for analysis obviously falls in this category. I cannot go into all the intricacies of the 'oral–literate' debate here (see, among many others, Tannen 1980 and Bibe 1986). But I do want to argue that despite all the necessary autonomy of technical discourse, technical communication creates its own specific 'context of situation': a fictitious 'situation' between an author, an anonymous reader, and other authors that are being discussed in the intertextual layer of the text and that form a background for it. This reference to other texts is all that planned, autonomous texts have for a context of situation.

It is this context that is, along with the text itself, the second major source and object of metapragmatic awareness. It means that each technical or academic text is part of a larger discourse to which it relates and in which the academic community, so to speak, takes part. This discourse basically consists of written texts, and it is not easily delimited. Potentially, it includes all texts that could be regarded as bearing on a certain topic.

While the reporting referred to in example (15) was part of a discourse that was used as a research strategy, but not part of an academic communication situation, the sentence in example (16) relates to the academic discourse background just described. It seems obvious that examples of type (16) are

the most relevant for a pragmatics and metapragmatics of academic discourse. Only this type of intertextual reference is to be called metapragmatic in the full sense: the linguistic acts referred to are the ones that constitute academic discourse proper; they are the equivalent of turn-taking and responding to other participants in a face-to-face situation. Thus this use of intertextual expressions serves to create a new communication situation which brings together different texts.

2.4. 'Metatheoretical' use of verbs

The metapragmatic uses of verbs are by no means exhausted by the functions described so far. In fact, it was not quite easy to find clear-cut sentences from the corpus that could be used as good examples of performative, metatextual, and intertextual uses. There are many ways to discuss academic speech acts, and use verbs in this discussion. Look at examples (17)–(19):

(17) ... the former are useful when **discussing** problems associated with a definite point in the crystal.

(18) Three instances of well attested phenomena which this theory is unable to **explain** will be quoted.

(19) It is quite another matter to **suppose** that there ought to be one technique or one set of rules.

These examples show that metapragmatic expressions are not only used to perform or discuss real linguistic acts, but also to discuss hypothetical ones, or to refuse specific acts, or to discuss certain properties of possible academic speech acts without being committed to them or to the claim that somebody else actually performed them. It is not so much real arguments that are discussed in this way, but possible arguments in hypothetical discussions. This use of metapragmatic expressions is neither meta- nor intertextual, it may perhaps be labelled 'metatheoretical'.

2.5. 'Evidential' use of verbs

There is yet another use of verbs in academic discourse, evincing considerable overlap with metapragmatic expressions, and playing a significant role in the process of technical communication. Look at examples (20)–(23):

(20) The origin of pure modern abstract painting is fully **exemplified** in the work of Mondrian.

(21) For example, the recent investigations by ... have **indicated** that ...

(22) The foregoing analysis **indicates** that restrictive amendments to the present act are not likely ...

(23) The causes of this change have aroused great controversy, controversy which **illustrates** how difficult it is to interpret ...

These examples are typical of a group of verbs which are used equally freely in a performative, metatextual, and in a third function. In my corpus, this group consists of *suggest*, *exemplify*, *indicate*, *illustrate*, and *show*. *See* is also related, but behaves differently in some respects. What is striking about these verbs is that they can either have an animate subject, in which case they usually signify speech acts, or their subject refers to facts which are usually called 'data' in science, or to scientific activities (research etc.). In the two latter cases these verbs indicate that the data or research mentioned constitute or have produced evidence of something. This is why I propose the term 'evidential' for this use of these verbs.

The meanings of this group of verbs seem to constitute a chain of metonymic substitutions from facts via scientific activities to linguistic action and in some of the examples it is not possible to determine the boundaries. It is not at all clear, however, in what direction these substitutions have proceeded, and if there has been historical development at all. It seems that facts, research, and description can sometimes be viewed as one and the same thing, and it does not seem to matter which aspect is highlighted in an argument.

It seems that in language usage, the distinction between non-verbal events and speech acts is not always clear-cut. Events may be represented as speaking subjects, texts as agents, speech acts as physical actions. And it is not always easy to tell which usage is literal and which is metaphorical.

3. Domains of text coherence and metatextuality

In previous research (Meyer 1983), I have identified five conceptual-functional domains from which the relevant coherence-creating text-internal relations may be motivated, at least in common-sense texts: **Topic**, **Clarification**, **Time**, **Causality**, and **Persuasion**. Seen from this angle technical texts are among the most interesting text types as they form a prototypical kind of coherent text and provide a fuller range of functional text-internal relations than most text types.

The categories of Topic, Time, and Causality correspond to relations in the 'real', i.e. text-external world. Topic development in technical texts is

largely based on real connections between real objects. Temporal and causal relations between clauses reflect temporal and causal relations between real events. Clarification and Persuasion, on the other hand, are purely communicative categories. The relations that they define seem strictly text-internal.

In the following it will be shown how the specific conditions of technical discourse lead to specific forms of metapragmatic awareness concerning the five different conceptual domains.

3.1. The very complexity of the inter-objective relations that a text may describe calls for more explicitness and transparency on the **topical** text level. As a rule, technical texts do not just slide from one topic to another tacitly. They often mark their topic structure by subheadings and various other devices, and, what is more interesting in our present discussion, often comment on, give overviews of, and take stock of the topics covered and the way these have been dealt with. Take the following paragraph from the introduction section of a social science text as a typical example:

(24) In the **following**, we will **concentrate** on those political debates and changes which primarily concern the past and future course of higher education in the Federal Republic, although occasional **references** will be made to the secondary sector. Before we can **take a closer look** at the most recent developments, we must, however, **summarise** the major structural features of the system of tertiary education as it evolved in the FRG over the past 25 years. Only in a larger time perspective, will it be possible to **assess** the significance of the issues involved in present-day debates on higher education.

There is a large variety of terms used to refer to sections of the current text or to mention speech acts. Most of the terms emphasized in the above section would not usually be regarded as metapragmatic (*concentrate, look, assess.*) But undoubtedly they are used in a metapragmatic, or, to be more specific, meta-topical function here in that their direct objects are topics and their semantic value boils down to a metaphorical description of a certain way of dealing with a topic.

3.2. In the **time** layer of the text meta**pragmatic** awareness seems to be restricted to the occurrence of a few speech act verbs that make the narrative function of certain text chunks explicit. Sometimes, the linear character of a

text is referred to in terms of a text-internal temporal structure (***before*** *we can take a closer look*), but spatial metaphors are more prevalent here (*above, below*, etc.).

3.3. In view of the central role of **causality** in technical texts, text-internal pragmatic functions derived from causal relations abound. A causal relation between real-world states of affairs provides the basis for various kinds of speech acts or relations between speech acts. What counts for text structure, however, is not the objective real-world causal relations but their reflection in the hierarchy of text-internal speech acts, as well as purely text-internal causal relations between speech acts. Metapragmatic terms such as *explain, justify, deduction, consequence* are used to make these functions explicit.

3.4. The speech act verbs (and nouns) that exist to describe **clarification** and **argumentation** strategies occur as explicit markers of such functions in texts (e.g. *summarize, exemplify, characterize, admit, hold, argue, emphasize* etc.). A certain reluctance, however, seems to prevail, where the explicitness of some types of argument is concerned. *criticize*, e.g. is never used explicitly in the corpora studied by me, not even hedged, and not even when reporting other people's linguistic acts.

4. Summary and conclusions

To conclude, let me try to summarize the main results of this investigation in a few theses:

4.1. As far as academic language is concerned, there is no such thing as a class of metapragmatic terms. There is a whole lot of expressions that can be used in a metapragmatic or a similar way. But there is hardly one expression that is exclusively used in one way or the other.

4.2. What is more, postulating a class of metapragmatic terms tends to blur distinctions that have to be made for an adequate pragmatic account of academic communication.

4.3. It is potentially fallacious to draw conclusions for pragmatics from the terms people use to describe their own linguistic acts, or from the terms they use to attribute linguistic acts to other people, i.e. one should be careful when inferring pragmatic categories on a metapragmatic basis.

4.4. It is not always possible to separate metaphorical, metonymic, and verbatim uses of verbs describing verbal, mental, and scientific activities. It seems that scientific activities and discourse have not only made the world speak to people, but have also considerably widened the range of things that people can do with words.

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THE BASIC *VERBA DICENDI* AND THEIR COHESIVE ROLE IN SPOKEN CONVERSATIONAL LANGUAGE

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The aim of this study is to show some characteristics of the *verba dicendi* and their use in everyday conversational language, not only on the morphological and syntactic level, but also on the macro and micro level of preserving logico-semantic textual cohesion in conversation. A conversation is taken here as a complete entity, i.e. as a unit of speech event. The cohesive function of the basic *verba dicendi* is also studied in the context of the interaction between interlocutors. Though most of the study deals with the *verba dicendi* in Serbocroatian, the findings have been checked on examples in other languages, Russian, English and French, and based on the textual analysis of cohesion done on the material from these four languages. The corpus consisted of transcribed recordings of authentic, spontaneous, informal conversations between friends, relatives and colleagues conversing at parties, visits to one another and at informal situations at work, in offices. The duration of each recorded conversation was never less than half an hour.[1]

Some features of the textual structure in conversational language

The textual analysis of the conversations is based on the unit of paragraph, considered here as a thematic, content-coherent whole, and smaller units, corresponding to what in literature is sometimes called "moves",[2] but in our

[1] Polovina, V. (1987): Razgovorni jezik (Tekstovi) [Conversational language (Texts)]. 220 pp. unpublished transcribed conversations; Savić, S.–Polovina, V. (1989): Razgovorni srpskohrvatski jezik [Conversational Serbocroatian language], 75–220. Institut za južnoslovenske jezike, Novi Sad; Zemskaja, O. (1987): Russkaja razgovornaja rec' (Teksty) [Conversational Russian language]. 220 pp. Nauka, Moskva; Svartvik, J.–Quirk, R. (1980): A Corpus of English Conversations. Studies in English 56 (a part of 250 pp.). Gleerup–Liber, Lund; Laroche–Bouvy: Conversation, jeux et rituels. Unpublished doctoral thesis. Sorbonne, Paris; Kundaković, M.: Prilog proučavanju dijaloga u savremenom francuskom jeziku (Contribution à l'étude du dialogue en français contemporain). A part of unpublished transcribed authentic conversations. Beograd.

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terminology "subtopical units" within the paragraph. This paragraph-based analysis provided a framework for further description of the semantic and pragmatic characteristics of conversational coherence. The length of the paragraph and the type of the cohesive ties between them, both in a continuant conversation and when a conversation gets occasionally interrupted by verbal digressions or some situational factor, depend on a number of exophoric and interpersonal factors.

An important pragmatic finding based on this analysis concerns the average length of a paragraph with a single topic, ranging from 7 conversational turns, plus or minus 2 turns, suggesting cognitive, psychological constraints on the paragraph length. More surprisingly, this average length applies not only to the paragraphs of the continuant conversation but also to the "digressive" paragraphs.

The study of the cohesion between these basic communicative units—conversational paragraphs—shows an interesting phenomenon, namely, the cohesive ties are stronger between two to three paragraphs, either on logical, psychological or some other, situational grounds, so that dyadic and tryadic cohesive forms, as we called this phenomenon, turn out to be important characteristics of the authentic spoken conversational language.

No less important are the tendencies for the choice of topics in the conversations of our corpus. This has not been discussed much in literature, as it is felt that somehow such investigations would fall well beyond language study. But our corpus shows that, even though the flexibility in changing topics is great, there is nevertheless a number of them that occur universally in conversations. Such common topics in the corpuses in all four languages are given here in the order reflecting their frequency of occurrence: a third person (usually not present in the situation of conversation), then work, then leasure activities, and much less than these first three, yet characteristic enough: immediate physical situation, weather, language. These are, of course, tendencies, but very strong tendencies, and explicable by their importance for the interlocutors. Apart from these, in a sense universal themes, many specific, culture-based topics appear relating speakers to their relevant speech communities and country situations.

Verba dicendi in Serbocroatian conversations

The basic *verba dicendi* in Serbocroatian are given here according to the frequency of their occurrence[3] in our corpus: *kazati* – 'say, tell', *reći* – 'say, tell', *pričati* – 'tell', *govoriti* – 'speak', *zvati se* – 'be called, name', *zvati* – 'call', *pitati* – 'ask'. These are the basic forms, but it should be mentioned that Serbocroatian has a rich derivational system of affixation that either changes the meaning of the verb altogether, or its aspectual meaning. This can be shown on the example of the two most frequent verbs *kazati* and *reći*. Thus *kazati* by means of prefixation becomes *dokazati* – 'to prove', *otkazati* – 'to cancel', *prokazati* – 'tell on somebody', etc. By means of infixation these verbs, which are perfective, can become imperfective: *kazivati*, *dokazivati*, *otkazivati*, *prokazivati*, now denoting continuant, iterative actions. Beside these derivational possibilities, the verb *kazati*, even in its perfective form, can have imperfective meaning in the present tense form, in certain contexts. For example *Ja vam kažem* can be translated as "I am telling/speaking to you". On the other hand, the verb *reći*, while it can give other verbs, *proreći* – 'foretell', for example, cannot be imperfectivized.

The categories of tense and aspect are linked in a complex manner in Serbocroatian, so that the present tense of the perfective verbs, for example, is normally used in restricted contexts (conditional and intentional sentences). This is certainly one of the reasons why the tenses of the two most frequent verbs of speaking are distributed in our corpus in a complementary way (the numbers in brackets refer to the number of their occurrences): *kazati* occurred in the present tense form (248), in perfect tense (15), future (3), and imperative (7), whereas *reći* occurred mostly in perfect tense (55), aorist (24), imperative (9), and conditional (3).

It is also interesting to see the use of the grammatical category of person. The dominant forms for both *kazati* and *reći* are the first and third person, which results from the high frequency of the "third person" topic in our conversations, since the common role of these verbs is to introduce the direct speech of a third person, less often as an introduction to the indirect speech and very rarely to introduce free indirect speech.

The two verbs *kazati* and *reći* are in our corpus usually followed by direct and indirect object, declarative or intentional sentences.

[3] For the purpose of our study this is considered to be the most significant criterion, but the decision upon the overall status of these verbs is according to Verschueren, J. (1989). Language on Language: Toward Metapragmatic Universals. Papers in Pragmatics. Vol. 3., No. 2.

The high frequency of *kazati* and *reći* can, therefore, be explained by several factors: firstly, they serve to introduce other persons' speech, secondly, they are used not only in their primary meaning but also as synonyms of 'to confirm', 'to suggest', 'to assert', etc., thirdly they sometimes function as pause fillers or hesitations, and lastly they have a cohesive role in conversation.

As to the other, less frequent verbs in the corpus, the situation is as follows: The verb *pričati* – 'tell', has not been used often, which is not unexpected, since it demands a "story-type" object ("story" in Serbocroatian is *priča*. The conversations of the type that we analysed do not stand long stories and monologues, and shorter conversational turns are preferable in such situations in which the general tendency toward solidarity in assigning equal conversational roles is dominant.

The verb *govoriti* – 'to speak' which denotes the action of speech as the general human ablitity, is usually followed by a noun or adverbial phrase that 'qualifies' that ability: *govoriti gluposti* – 'speak nonsense', *govoriti glasno* – 'speak loudly'.

The reflexive *zvati se* – 'be called, name' occurred mostly to refer to the third person that is being talked about, whereas the non-reflexive *zvati* – 'call' was used in syntagms such as *zvati telefonom* – 'call by phone' or *zvati glasno* – 'call aloud'. The relatively high frequency of the reflexive *zvati se* (31) as compared to *zvati* (9) or the other less frequent verbs can be explained by the fact that people often discuss the names or nicknames of other persons and objects.

The verb *pitati* in Serbocroation is seldom used in the sense of 'request' and in fact, it does not occur as such in our corpus. It introduces direct and indirect questions.

The cohesive role of verba dicendi

It can be shown that the distribution of the basic *verba dicendi* in spoken conversational language, their linguistic and pragmatic context, and cohesive function is very similar in all the four languages that we examined.

In order to preserve the continuity throughout a conversation, as a whole speech event, a wide variety of lexical expressions and syntactic devices can be used. The continuity may be maintained through the same topic, or several connected topics, but as the oft-mentioned features of this type of conversation, between friends and acquaintances, spontaneous, casual, are the discontinuity

and susceptability to all sorts of interruptions or the flexibility in topic introducing, the devices for the continuation of a whole conversation are varied, depending on the kind and length of the interruption. If verbally expressed, the interruptions are most often the length of a paragraph, whereas longer interruptions are rare. More precisely, if an interruption occurs after a topic has been pursued for some time and consists of a shorter paragraph (two to four shorter turns) fewer linguistic devices will be needed to restore the original theme. As the length of the interruption increases more linguistic devices will be used.

The most common linguistic devices used in such cases are: particles, proper names as appelatives, *verba dicendi*, and repetition of key lexical items that denote the main topic. For example:

I dobro, kažeš niste uspeli ... ("And O.K., you are saying you didn't manage ...").

The interruption was relatively long due to the negotiation about how the coffee would be served, and it would be impossible without using such cohesive items as particle *i* plus affirmative adjective *dobro* (good, OK) to signal that the successful agreement about the coffee has been completed, and the verb *kazati* to give the explicit invitation to one of the interlocutors to continue what he was saying, to restore the previous theme. Mere repetition of the last or key words of the preceding topic would be odd because there is always a possibility that the interlocutors might try to interpret them in connection with the immediately preceding turns (e.g. in the example above "You did not manage to take coffee").

Or in this example from the English corpus, one of the four participants in conversation has not been actively participating in it, but reading a letter by himself, and one of his friends invites him to get involved:

Tell us, Gordon, will you come out of that letter / tell us ...

Of course, *verba dicendi* are not the only linguistic expressions in such situations, and we find various other ways to realize cohesive ties in conversations. In the same English conversation with the four participants we find this example:

Gordon where / a simple question / where ...

in which the expression *a simple question* can be expanded into "I want to ask you something". In many such cases, it seems that an explicit metapragmatic

expression is the easiest and shortest way of restoring continuity after interruptions. In dyadic and tryadic cohesion, i.e. between two or three paragraphs, *verba dicendi*, or explicit metalinguistic and metapragmatic along with other cohesive expressions are often used to establish continuity, especially in those cases when the new topics are not so close to the preceding ones, or there is some other danger that the interlocutor will have difficulties in grasping that the speaker's intention is to change the topic. It should be noticed that such use of *verba dicendi* is not an idiolectal feature of some speakers, but one of the linguistic devices that must be used if the conversational flow is to be preserved in the same "solidarity" manner.

The following examples show the situation in which *verba dicendi* are used to perform the cohesive role in a continuant conversation, without interruptions. In a conversation of four friends meeting after the holiday trips to various places, which is the prevailing topic throughout the conversation, one begins with:

Čekaj da ti pričam o starom društvu ... ("Wait that I tell you about old friends ...")

and as the conversation goes on new topics are connected to the preceding ones by:

Kaži kako ste provodili dane... ("Tell us how you spent the days")

the preceding theme being "how they spent the evenings", or

A mogu ti reći, mi smo jeli ..., ("And I can tell you, we ate ...")

after the other two participants have informed about their "food" experiences.

In another conversation between two elderly friends who have not seen each other for a long time, the general topic of the whole conversation is "what has happened in their lives in the meantime", but one of them puts more questions than the other. In order to diminish the effect of an interviewer, when the more inquisitive of the two friends wants to introduce a new topic, she often begins with:

Kaži, Vera, jeste li zamenili stan? ..., ("Tell me, Vera, have you changed your flat? ...")

A reći mi, kako ti je sestra? ..., ("Tell me, how is your sister? ...")

It would be very odd indeed, almost impolite if these appelatives and verbs of speaking were eliminated, and questions simply uttered without such cohesive metapragmatic devices.

The *verba dicendi* may also have an important role in preserving the cohesion within a paragraph. The most characteristic use is exemplified with the following words from the already quoted "holiday" conversation:

Sve u svemu, kažem, lepo smo se proveli ..., ("All in all, I say, we had a nice time")

where the verb *kazati* is used to signalize a generalization, common when a speaker thinks that a topic has been exhausted.

That this cohesive role of *verba dicendi* in conversational language is more textual and metapragmatic in nature than we can find in their other uses is supported by the fact that in many instances they can be substituted by other cohesive verbs such as verbs of perception (*listen*, *hear*, ...) or verbs of cognition (*know*, *understand*, ...). The following examples will illustrate this:

Al da čuješ ovaj finale ..., ("But that you hear you the finale" in a rather literal translation, meaning "you should hear the end of the whole thing ...").

In this utterance the verb *čuti* – "to hear" could be substituted by *kazati* or *ispričati* (followed by the obligatory pronoun as the indirect object). Similarly in:

Advokata još nisam uzela [...] ali sad gledaj, ja odlučim da .., ("The lawyer I haven't yet hired one [...] but now look, I decided to ...")

Instead of the phatic verb of perception *gledati* we could substitute it with yet another verb of perception such as *slušati* – "listen", or equally with the verb of speaking, *kazati* for example. The same applies to the next example:

Ej, znaš šta, idemo sutra ..., ("Hey, you know what, tomorrow we are going...")

in which the verb of cognition *znati* can be substituted with a verb of speaking with the same effect.

The verbs of perception and cognition in all these examples signalize the continuation of a topic after a certain interruption, verbal or non-verbal, or that the speaker is continuing the same thread of conversation and at the same time warning the listener that a new topic or subtopic is being introduced.

These verbs of cognition and perception have the same cohesive role as the *verba dicendi*, and they can be relatively easily substituted for one another in these contexts without any particular change in meaning.

They all characteristically occur at the beginning of a turn that introduces a new theme, and at the beginning of a turn of new interlocutor. But

in comparison with other cohesive devices *verba dicendi* show certain specific distribution. While appelatives occur at distant parts of conversations, and particles can function to connect two successive turns, the verba dicendi in their cohesive role clearly signalize the introduction of a generalization, explanation, more precise description, i.e. to connect subtopical or paragraph units. Thus, they serve to bridge possible metaconversational misunderstandings between the interlocutors, signalizing explicitly the metapragmatic action in the conversation.

This analysis of the way the basic *verba dicendi* are used in Serbocroatian and other languages clearly shows that they have a major role in preserving cohesion in spoken conversational language by fulfilling their metapragmatic functions.

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METAPRAGMATIC TERMS OR THE EXPRESSION OF PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE: THE CASE OF CAUSAL CONJUNCTIONS

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In English some causal conjunctions introduce an adverbial clause in which the idea expressed (or propositional content) is not causally linked to the idea expressed (or propositional content) in the main clause. Examples of such non-propositional adverbial clauses are the following:

(1) (a) "Percy is in Washington, ***for*** *he phoned me from there.*" (Quirk *et al.* 1985, 1104).

(2) (a) Considerable help will be provided to retain experienced teachers who are urgently needed ***because*** *there will be a financial incentive for them to stay.* (POA.4F. 1131)

(3) (a) All we are saying in our report is that ***as*** *circumstances have now changed,* ***as*** *reprocessing is responsible for 75% or more of the volume of radioactive waste and we have no satisfactory means of disposing of radioactive waste in this country as yet*, should we not reconsider our whole philosophy in this particular area? (VI. 7)

(4) (a) ***Since*** *some of the oil companies have threatened to get out of North Sea*, will my right hon. Friend say whether they have indicated where else they could go on less tough terms than the Government are now suggesting? (POA.20J. 1007)

(5) (a) ***Now that*** *the Treasury has at last yielded the principle of indexation by indexing savings bonds—which I welcome*—is it not high time to extend indexation to taxation? (POA.30J. 602)

(6) (a) That is why in Brussels at the present moment, eh, we are discussing, eh, labelling of animal feed—on mixed feeds and compound feeds ***so that*** *the farmer knows when he looks at a cattle feed bag exactly what's in it.* (PI. 96)

(7) (a) It was the very strong feeling of [...] that meeting that we should support the, eh, situation ***such that*** *the ambulance service should be treated as a special case within the health service.* (VI. 104)

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In example (1a), for instance, it is not the case that Percy's phonecall from Washington is the reason for him being there. At least, our judgement that it is not the case that Percy's phonecall from Washington is the reason for him being there is made and will be accepted on the basis of a set of assumptions an individual has gathered about the world which is individual, temporal and culture-specific and which I will call an individual's 'knowledge of the universe'. This knowledge of the universe does not allow us to relate somebody's phonecall from a place to him being there in a causal relation. Neither does this knowledge of the universe allow us to accept that it is because I checked my bank account this morning, that there's no longer anything in it, as in example (1b) below.

Among these non-propositional adverbial clauses, two types can, in fact, be distinguished semantically. In one type (examples (1a) to (7a) above) the **cause** is a sufficient condition for the **consequence**, i.e. the **cause** entails the **consequence**. In examples (1a)–(5a) this **cause** is expressed by the subclause, whereas in examples (6a) and (7a), the **cause** is expressed by the main clause.

In the other type the **cause** is not a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the **consequence**. This type is exemplified in utterances (1b)–(6b) below:

(1) (b) I have nothing in my bank account ***for*** *I checked this morning.*
(2) (b) "I have nothing in my bank account, ***because*** *I checked this morning.*" (Quirk *et al.* 1985, 1072)
(3) (b) "***As*** *you're in charge*, where are the files on the new project?" (ibid., 1104)
(4) (b) "What does this word mean, ***since*** *you're so clever* ?" (ibid., 1072)
(5) (b) ***Now that*** *the White Paper on Public Expenditure has shown that the government no longer believe that that is possible*, when will the right hon. Gentleman be meeting the TUC leaders to tell them? (POA. 4F. 1141)
(6) (b) I very much share the view which has been expressed by the Director of Fair Trading. I think the grounds for reference for these takeover bids should be changed, ***so that*** *instead of the Director of Fair Trading having to establish that a bid is against the public interest, it should be up to those proposing the merger to prove that it's in the public interest.* (PI. 29)

Syntactically and phonetically, however, all 'non-propositional' adverbial clauses (1a)–(7a) and (1b)–(6b) share the same specific features in contrast with the 'propositional' adverbial clauses (as in, for instance, *He called from Washington cos he was worried*), as has been pointed out in the literature

by Rutherford (1970), Williams (1975), Haegeman (1985), Quirk *et al.* (1985, 1070ff) and Haegeman (1987, 2–3) (intonation, cleft-sentence construction, etc.).

In order to explain this type of non-propositional clause, it has been claimed that, instead of linking the two propositional forms of the subclause and the main clause, these conjunctions link the adverbial subclause to an implicit clause like *I claim this ...* or *I say this ...* (see for example Quirk *et al.* (1985, 884) and also the—explicit or implicit—proponents of Ross's (1970) performative hypothesis: Rutherford (1970, 96 and 98ff), Sadock (1974, 38), Henschelmann (1977, 178) and Coppieters (1984–5, 55ff and 64)). In other words, these conjunctions and their clauses are also linked to what have been called performative verbs or illocutionary acts:

> "Les adverbiaux de relation causale [...] peuvent aussi se situer à un niveau plus abstrait et concerner l'énonciation ou l'acte illocutoire." (Korzen 1985, ch. II)

This means that these adverbial clauses refer to the speaker's awareness of her communicative activities, just like the other explicit metapragmatic expressions do: performative verbs, speech act verbs, or adverbials like *personally speaking* in example (8):

(8) Personally speaking, I didn't really like the course.

The labels assigned to them by Quirk *et al.* (1985, 618 and 1072)—'comment disjunct' and 'style disjunct'—also suggest that they can be classified with the other types of indicators of metacommunicative awareness.

However, causal adverbial clauses do not share the same characteristics with adverbials like *personally speaking*. The latter could be considered as 'direct' metapragmatic terms: there is some explicit reference to the act of speaking or communicating. The causal adverbial clauses, on the other hand, do not contain this explicit reference and could therefore be called 'indirect' metapragmatic indicators: they do not explicitly express in any form whatsoever the activity of speaking. That there is a difference between the 'direct' and 'indirect' types of adverbials is further reflected in some distinct linguistic characteristics. Only the 'indirect' causal adverbials can be linked to imperatives, the 'direct' comment disjuncts cannot (Quirk *et al.* 1985, 828). Consider the examples below:

(9) Give me the answer, since you're so clever.
(10) ? Give me the answer, personally speaking.

The 'indirect' adverbial can occur as the answer to a WH-question containing the activity of speaking, the 'direct' one cannot, as examples (11) and (12) illustrate:

(11) A. Why did you say you have nothing in your bank account?
B. Because I checked this morning.
(12) A. Why / How did you say you didn't like the course?
B. ? Speaking personally.

Apart from the performative explanation of causal adverbial clauses, other accounts have been presented. These, too, include reference to a link between the causal adverbial clause and an implicit clause. This time, however, the clause does not contain a performative verb but rather a cognitive one like *I think this, I believe this, I judge(d)* or *and I know, and I am sure of it*, and *and I am convinced of it*. On this account, a sentence like (2b) is not related to sentence (13).

(13) I tell you that I have nothing in my bank account because I checked this morning.

but to sentence (14):

(14) I know that I have nothing in my bank account because I checked this morning.

In other words, the adverbial clause need not reflect a ***meta*communicative** awareness in the strict sense: it can also reflect a kind of meta**cognitive**[1] awareness. Hence, adverbial causal clauses need not express a reason for **uttering** a sentence: instead, they can contain an argument for just having a specific **thought or belief**, or to use a more precise term derived from philosophy which has already been used in pragmatics, for example, by Sperber–Wilson (1986, 73), the propositional attitude that the speaker has (consciously or not) when she expresses the utterance. It denotes the way in which the speaker entertains an idea, whether, for instance, she believes it to be a true state of affairs, or whether she wishes it to be a true state of affairs.

Does this then mean that there are several types of meta**pragmatic** awareness to be distinguished? The expression of these types could then be

[1] The term **metacognitive** is only valid as a notion in a theory in which cognitive representations of language are assumed, and in which one can therefore find the concept *I think that I think*.

summarized as follows. In sentence (15) no metapragmatic awareness is expressed, while sentences (16) and (17) are both examples in which metapragmatic awareness is communicated. Sentence (16) expresses metacommunicative awareness and sentence (17) metacognitive awareness:

(15) *This is X.*
(16) *I tell you this is X.*
(17) *I believe this is X.*

But if it is the case that there are several types of metapragmatic awareness, how do we distinguish between them? This question reminds us, in fact, of one of the main controversies surrounding the performative hypothesis: what is the exact wording of the implicit clause and on what should this formulation be based?

One of the problems is, indeed, that both types of metapragmatic causal adverbials—i.e. both metacommunicative and metacognitive causal adverbials—share the same characteristics. It is often not easy to identify even within a context whether a causal adverbial is intended as metacommunicative or as metacognitive. Is a sentence like (2b) intended to express (13) or is it intended to express (14)?

Consequently, as far as causal conjunctions are concerned, the language system does not seem to provide a distinction between a speaker referring to her cognitive activities (beliefs or propositional attitudes) and a speaker referring to her communicative activities. Hence, linguistically, there does not seem to be a reason to make the distinction. Yet, epistemologically, it is possible to draw a distinction between a propositional attitude (belief or wish) on the one hand and a communicative act on the other. Consider, for instance, the following sentences:

(18) "X because Y"
(expression of a propositional form)
(19) "I tell/ask/command X because Y"[2]
(expression of the act of expressing a propositional form)

[2] The causal clauses (*because Y*) link Y to the complete sequence preceding the clause:
(I tell/ask/command X) because Y
(I believe X) because Y.
They cannot be used as metapragmatic terms to link Y to X only:
I tell/ask/command (X because Y)
I believe (X because Y).

(20) "I believe X because Y"
(expression of the propositional form and the attitude towards that propositional form)

In sentence (18) a propositional form (X because Y) is expressed, in sentence (19) it is a communicative act containing the propositional form X because Y, and in sentence (20), finally, the speaker not only expresses a propositional form (X because Y) but also her attitude towards that propositional form. One solution to this difficulty is to assume that underlying each communicative act there is always a propositional attitude (whether the speaker is conscious of it or not).[3] Hence, each basic communicative act can be retraced to one specific type of propositional attitude. A statement could then be paraphrased as follows:

(19) (a) When I tell you (X because Y), I also want you to believe that[4] I believe (X because Y).

And the following paraphrases can be suggested for the acts of asking (sentence (19b)) and commanding (sentence (19c)) respectively:

(19) (b) When I ask you X—i.e. when I want to get this piece of information—I want you to tell me X.
(19) (c) When I command you X—i.e. when I ask you to do X—I want you to do X.
(cf. also Sperber–Wilson 1986).

In other words, the basic speech acts all seem to go back to the propositional attitude of *wishing*. In fact, this underlying propositional attitude is probably a pragmatic universal. Put differently, each utterance expresses or refers to the speaker's intentions. When the speaker uses a metapragmatic term (and in particular a causal adverbial clause), what she does is either to refer to the propositional attitude of belief (*telling, believing*) or to refer to the propositional attitude of wish (*asking, commanding*). If the speaker construes a metapragmatic causal clause, she gives a reason for the propositional attitude that has remained implicit (19d–g):

[3] Note that the reverse need not be the case, i.e. each propositional attitude need not be accompanied by a communicative act.

[4] One might argue that a statement could also be paraphrased as follows:
When I tell you (X because Y) I believe (X because Y).
I have added the phrase *I want you to believe that* in order to account for those cases in which the speaker is insincere.

(19) (d) When (I tell you X) because Y, I also want you to believe that [(I believe X) because Y].

(19) (e) When (I ask you X) because Y, I also want you (to tell me X) because Y.

(19) (f) When (I command you X) because Y, I also want you (to do X) because Y.

(19) (g) When (I believe X) because Y, I may (tell you X) because Y, i.e. I may also want you to believe that [(I believe X) because Y].

If we assume that this is the case, i.e. that metapragmatic terms indirectly refer to attitudes, and if we assume that, at least in Western culture and in formal language, one should not express personal things, and hence not one's attitudes either, we might expect informal speech to contain more references to the speaker's propositional attitudes (whether in the form of direct or indirect metapragmatic terms) than more formal speech.

The results of an investigation into a corpus of causal adverbial clauses only (and not any of the other metapragmatic terms) contradict, however, these expectations. In this study I have tried to classify each example out of a total of 1500 cases in which two causally related states of affairs are expressed, either as propositional or as metapragmatic. For some utterances (about 5% of all utterances investigated), it was impossible to make a straightforward decision, in which case the example has not been classified.

The following registers were included in the corpus: Radio 4 news interviews with politicians (PI), Radio 4 news interviews with other people (VI), parliamentary oral answers (POA), and conversations (S).[5] From each register, a total of 375 instances of causal clauses was collected.

Three of the four registers investigated seem to use about the same number of metapragmatic causal clauses: both types of interviews and the conversations. In these registers the conjunctions initiating a **consequence** introduce 1.5 to 2 times as many metapragmatic clauses as the conjunctions initiating a **cause**. Consider the figures in the table below:

[5] The corpus consists of the following parts:

S: S.1.10, S.1.12, S.2.6, S.2.7, S.2.8, S.2.9, S.2.12, S.2.13 and S.3.4 from *A Corpus of English Conversation* (Svartvik–Quirk 1980).

VI: 130 interviews with various people recorded from BBC Radio 4 news interviews broadcast between 3rd December 1985 and 10th February 1990.

PI: 150 interviews with politicians recorded from BBC Radio 4 news interviews broadcast between 3rd December 1985 and 10th February 1990.

POA: 15 sections from The Parliamentary Debates–Official Report–House of Commons–Oral answers to Questions between 13th January 1975 and 5th February 1975.

	propositional		metapragmatic	
	causal	consecutive	causal	consecutive
PI	149	128	10	21
VI	145	129	12	17
POA	143	74	73	63
S	126	171	12	21
Total	563	502	107	122

It is only the parliamentary oral answers (POA) that show remarkable figures. These can, however, be easily explained: one of the rules governing that part of the Parliamentary Debates in Westminster is the requirement that Members are only allowed to ask questions, and that they must not hold a monologue. Since Members do want to present arguments for their views, they integrate them within their questions and present them as reasons for asking their questions.

Other results form the investigation are the following. It seems that one out of ten to fifteen clauses introduced by a causal or consecutive conjunction is metapragmatic. We must conclude from this that expressing one's propositional attitude is a fairly frequent phenomenon. As far as the frequency of each separate conjunction in a metapragmatic clause is concerned, the following order (going from the most frequent conjunction to the least frequent conjunction) can be set up: *so that, because, as,* and *since*. The conjunctions *now that, that's why* and *such that* occur only rarely in metapragmatic clauses.

For a further analysis of the conjunctions introducing metapragmatic causal adverbials, however, it is insufficient to rely on propositional attitudes only: each metapragmatic causal adverbial itself carries with it the same propositional attitude of belief (or wish that the addressee believes that the speaker believes). Instead, the conjunctions differ from each other, for instance, in the degree of manifestness (Sperber–Wilson 1986) of the state of affairs expressed by the clause. *Since*, for example, suggests that the speaker thinks that the causal relation expressed in the sentence is already regarded by the listener as a manifest state of affairs:

(21) "***Since*** *it was Saturday*, he stayed in bed an extra hour" (Collins 1987).

This could be visualized by a gradient representing the degree of manifestness of a state of affairs (cf. Vandepitte 1990–1991). It means that the same kind of difference between conjunctions used propositionally can also be found if these conjunctions occur in metapragmatic use.

Summarizing, this article presents some evidence for the existence of so-called 'indirect' metapragmatic terms. It illustrates this for one particular type, that of causal adverbial clauses. Further investigation is now needed into other 'indirect' metapragmatic indicators, such as the causal adverbial conjuncts like *thus* and *therefore*, and the reformulatory conjuncts like *rather* (Quirk *et al.* 1985, 618). Secondly, the article introduces a cognitive basis—i.e. a propositional attitude—to which these indirect metapragmatic adverbials can be related. We need, of course, more research before we can conclude whether propositional attitudes constitute the basis for other metapragmatic adverbials and for the metapragmatic terms in general, and whether more instruments are required for an investigation into their distinctive characteristics.

The cognitive basis suggested, however, broadens the field of investigation of metapragmatic terms. Not only speech act verbs or performative verbs should be included but also the so-called cognitive verbs, especially when used in the first person present tense indicative.

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THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE ON LANGUAGE: METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS*

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1. Introduction: The research

The definite article in the title of this paper should be interpreted with care. It is not intended to cover the entire category of investigations which could bear the label 'the study of language on language'. Nor does it refer to the example par excellence. Thus we are not concerned with historical or philosophical approaches to language on language; nor do we touch upon indicators of linguistic awareness other than verbs. Yet replacing the definite by an indefinite article would also have been problematic: Though the methodological problems to be discussed are characteristic of one particular study of language on language, especially the theoretical implications are much wider, as we hope to demonstrate.

1.1. Background

The specific study under discussion is to be situated within an empirical-conceptual approach to linguistic action (LA),[1] interpretable as a form of ethnography of communication. The approach in question is an attempt to come to grips with the varying ways in which linguistic behavior is conceptualized by those engaged in it, by way of scrutinizing empirically observable linguistic reflections of those conceptualizations (such as linguistic action verbials—LAVs for short—i.e. the verbs and verb-like expressions used, in

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[1] The approach was originally defined in those terms in Verschueren (1979, 1985) and further exemplified in Verschueren (ed.) (1987). However, it is related to a much older and wider tradition; references are to be found in the publications mentioned.

natural language, to talk about the conceptualized behavior). This form of **metapragmatics** is motivated by the assumption that the meaning of social practices can only be fully understood by gaining insight into the worlds of ideas with which the participants associate them, and in terms of which they interpret them. Its ultimate goal, which can only be achieved after further scrutiny of the complex interactions between concepts and actual practices, is to shed light on cross-linguistic and cross-cultural communication problems which may result, in part, from differences in the mental frames in terms of which interacting members of different linguistic, cultural, or subcultural backgrounds, operate communicatively.

Inseparable from the search for those differences, is a desire to locate similarities. Not only is there a logical connection between the two enterprises, but especially in an imponderable area such as the lexicalization of concepts of linguistic action, there is a strong temptation to regard the identification of similarities as a logically first step— though this step itself requires careful attention to mostly divergent data from a wide range of languages. In addition, an interest in the problem we have defined, detached from the potential quest for its solution, would be merely frivolous if not irresponsible. The belief that solutions to cross-cultural communication problems may exist, is tenable only on the assumption that people can learn foreign languages and can acquire the skills needed to function 'properly' in a foreign culture's communicative style. This assumption, for which human experience provides ample evidence, can presumably be explained only on the basis of a **universal core** inherent in all languages and cultures. The discovery of aspects of this universal core would be an invaluable step towards understanding the differences and, therefore, towards solving the problems resulting from them.

Especially—but by no means only—in the domain of linguistic (inter)action or verbal behavior, the only safe starting point in this quest is an assumption of minimal universality: nothing should be considered a universal until conclusive evidence stemming from wide-ranging comparative research has been obtained. Given the large number of languages to be investigated in order to avoid genetic, areal, typological, and cultural biases, and given the large number of LAVs in most languages, the search for **metapragmatic universals** within a lexical version of the empirical-conceptual approach to linguistic action (focusing on lexicalizations of linguistic action as reflections of underlying conceptual patterns) may run into serious problems on account of this attitude.

For this reason, an attempt should be made to identify more restricted, conceptually basic, sets of LAVs which are small enough to make the topic

of investigation manageable across a wide range of languages. This search for **basic linguistic action verbs** (BLAVs) cannot be carried out successfully unless the LAV lexicons of natural languages show a hierarchical structure of some sort. As Wierzbicka (1988) points out in her comments on the project, the existence of such a hierarchy cannot be taken for granted:

> "The idea [...] is attractive, but I believe that it is based on a dubious assumption. There is no reason to suppose, a priori, that the lexicon of speech act verbs will have a kind of hierarchical structure similar to the folk-taxonomies of animals or plants, or to the sets of color terms. The problem is empirical and has to be solved on the basis of a detailed semantic analysis of a large number of speech act verbs" (111–2).[2]

The issue is indeed empirical. But since the aim is to identify those sets of LAVs which occupy a basic level in language-specific lexicalizations of linguistic action concepts (in view of cross-linguistic and cross-cultural differences in conceptualization), the issue can only be approached in terms of the relationships which speakers themselves can observe between the LAVs of their own individual languages, and not in terms of relationships which emerge from a uniform application of anything comparable to the 'semantic primitives' analysis proposed by Wierzbicka (1972, 1980, 1985)—though the latter has already been applied with great skill and patience to speech act verbs (see Wierzbicka 1987). A language-internal identification of a set of BLAVs can be carried out only on the basis of a number of operational criteria which can be reasonably assumed to reflect, with a sufficient degree of accuracy, language-specific conceptual basicness within the LAV lexicon.

Our research goal in the work commented upon here (and reported extensively in Verschueren 1989) was to discover sets of LAVs which are conceptually 'basic' in a representative sample of the world's languages, by applying a number of operational criteria to define sets of BLAVs in a uniform, and hence cross-linguistically and cross-culturally comparable way. Further, a comparison of the operationally defined sets of BLAVs (if the investigation shows that they can indeed be isolated) was intended to lead to the discovery and formulation of universal tendencies in the lexicalization of linguistic action, or,

[2] Similarly, Herb Clark (personal communication) has remarked, quite correctly, that the existence of a strict parallelism between the hierarchical structure of biological folk taxonomies and the conceptual relationships between verbs cannot be simply postulated.

in language on language. The original idea was to look for synchronic implicational universals comparable to those found for color terms (see Berlin–Kay 1969) and plant and animal names (see Brown 1977, 1979, 1984).

1.2. Methodology

Two categories of operational criteria were used to identify the sets of basic linguistic action verbs in each individual language investigated. A number of preliminary screening criteria were used to exclude certain types of LAVs from the set of BLAVs. They basically served to reduce the amount of data as much as possible, as efficiently as possible, as soon as possible, without betraying the research goal, i.e. without being obliged to take unwarranted shortcuts by simply ignoring LAVs which one would not intuitively (that is, on the basis of the researcher's intuition) be inclined to regard as conceptually basic in the domain of linguistic action. Passing all the preliminary screening criteria does not automatically qualify a LAV as a member of the set of BLAVs. A positive assessment of membership has to follow from data obtained through elicitation procedures based on the basic conceptual criterion.

The following preliminary screening criteria are formulated in terms of questions a negative answer to which will normally exclude a verb from the set of BLAVs for the language concerned. Note the adverb 'normally,' which points at the necessity to apply the criteria in a flexible manner—not to be confused with arbitrariness. Flexibility is needed, first, because due attention has to be paid to some typological characteristics or idiosyncracies of individual languages. Second, most of the criteria bear on gradable notions so that a mechanical form of decision-making is in principle out. Third, not all of the criteria are equally important in view of the research goal; hence decisions in terms of one criterion may sometimes overrule decisions based on another criterion. For a complete explanation of the criteria, and the way in which they were applied, the reader is referred to Verschueren (1989). The criteria:

PSC1: Is the LAV monolexemic?
PSC2: Is the LAV monomorphemic? And if not, is its meaning semantically non-transparent?
PSC3: Is the LAV formally unmarked?
PSC4: Is the LAV semantically unmarked? Can it be applied to a wide range of arguments? Is its degree of semantic specificity lower (or at least not higher) than that of other available terms with related meanings?

PSC5: Is the LAV pragmatically unmarked? Can its meaning be adequately accounted for in terms of characteristics of the act it describes (without reference to the describing act in which it is used)?
PSC6:Is the only meaning of the LAV a linguistic action meaning? If not, is its linguistic action meaning the primary meaning?
PSC7: Is the LAV psychologically salient for native speakers?

Positive assessment of membership in the set of BLAVs for any given language is a judgment about the conceptual basicness of a LAV. Using definitional relationships as indicators for conceptual basicness (just as we used the parameters presented in the form of the preliminary screening criteria as indicators of conceptual non-basicness) enables us to formulate a semantic operational criterion which is similar to one used by Berlin–Kay (1969, 6) for basic color terms (viz. "Its signification is not included in that of any other color term"), and which is also related to Dixon's (1971) notion of 'nuclear verbs'. The most elementary form of the basic conceptual criterion is as follows:

BCC: A BLAV cannot be defined in terms of another LAV.

This criterion, however, requires various modifications, for which, again, we have to refer the reader to the more complete report in Verschueren (1989).

Verbs which are not excluded from further consideration by one or more of the preliminary screening criteria, and which pass the test of the basic conceptual criterion (taking into account numerous caveats), belong to the set of BLAVs for the language under investigation. It should be clear that the BCC makes the verbs satisfying it by excluding each other in paraphrases **conceptually basic** because speakers of the language in question do not (habitually) regard the acts they refer to as subtypes of other types of linguistic action.

An elaborate questionnaire (Verschueren 1984) was developed for the research reflected on in this text. It did not only contain guidelines for applying the operational criteria, but also a standardized set of speech events. This set of speech events was intended to serve two purposes. First, it was meant to be used for eliciting LAVs for languages for which no reliable lexicographical sources were available. Only in a few cases was the questionnaire actually used for that purpose. Second, it was designed to allow us to study the distribution of the meaning of the BLAVs singled out on the basis of the operational criteria, across the spectrum of speech events, in a sufficiently uniform manner to make decent cross-linguistic comparisons of such distribution possible. So

far, this task was performed for only about a dozen languages—not enough to draw serious conclusions at this time.

Except for those languages for which the entire procedure outlined in the questionnaire was followed, some shortcuts were taken towards achieving the goal of identifying the sets of BLAVs. The first step was lexicographical consultation. On the basis of the information found in the available lexicographical sources, language-specific ordered sets of questions were constructed, aimed at an efficient application of the operational criteria to all LAVs remaining after excluding those which could already be unambiguously rejected because of the lexicographical information. Those questions were used to elicit the missing information either by directly working with informants, or by presenting them to experts with access to informants. In most of the cases where mediating experts were involved, further follow-up questions were required.

1.3. Research findings

The structure of the sets of BLAVs

The BLAVs discovered for the 81 languages of our sample on the basis of the operational criteria do not form undifferentiated sets.[3] At least six clearly distinguishable types can be observed.

(i) Base

There are BLAVs such as *to say* and *to speak* which can be used to describe any type of linguistic action. In their most general sense they mean 'to use language', 'to express linguistically'. This does not preclude their having more specific senses as well, as is the case with *to say* in the sense of 'to state'. However, any other LAV can be defined in terms of at least one of them. Because of this property, and because of the semantic generality of which it is a consequence, we regard them as **base items**.

All languages in our sample have at least one base item. Most languages (43 from our sample, or 53%) have two base items; there are 16 with one (Fore, Gbeya, Grebo, Hausa, Kalam, Kera, Kewa, Kiowa, Lingala, Ngizim, Nukuoro, Polish, Russian, Sranan Tongo, Warlpiri, Wolof), 13 with three (Blackfoot, Bobo Fing, Ch'ol, Hanunoo, Kamchadal, Khmer, Kwanyama, Maidu, Sotho,

[3] Remember that also Berlin–Kay's (1969) sets of basic color terms do not form fully continuous sets of contrasts. The only contrast lexicalized in all languages (*black* vs. *white*) is mainly a contrast in terms of brightness (dark vs. light), whereas most additional basic color terms (*red*, *green*, *yellow*, etc.) are differentiated along the parameter of hue.

Yimas, Yoruba, Yup'ik, Zulu), and 9 with four (Emai, Hawaiian, Kilivila, Maori, Nisenan, Nubian, Ojibwa, Xhosa, Yurok).

(ii) Core

The base items are not the only members of what could be called the **conceptual core** of the LAV lexicon. The label is motivated by the fact that these so-called 'core items' have a disproportionately wider range of linguistic action tokens within their scope than any of the other BLAVs.

The distinction between base and non-base core items is a gradual one. Closest to the base, for English, is *to talk*. It differs from *to speak* in that, though it can sometimes be used in the general sense of 'using language', it is generally restricted to contexts in which there is a clear implication of reciprocity; its basic meaning seems to be something like 'to converse'.

Similarly, *to tell* is very close to *to say*. It is further removed from the base, however, since it cannot be used in the general sense of 'using language' and always carries the more specific meanings of 'informing' (i.e. 'stating' with a clearly present addressee), 'narrating', or—derivatively—'ordering'.

It is not always easy to decide whether equivalents of *to talk* and *to tell* should be treated as base items or as non-base core items. Especially in cases where more than two items were placed in the base (see the lists under (i)) it is quite possible that further research will show that one or more of them belong to the core outside of the base. Given the difference in distance from the base, this possibility is stronger for items which might have to take up the 'talk' slot (which is filled in only 13 cases now); the risk of misjudgment in the case of 'tell' BLAVs (49 cases listed now) is lower because of the larger distance from the core.

A further core item is *to ask*. Of the 81 sample languages, only 8 do not have an 'asking' term with BLAV status. Of those who do, 24 have a BLAV equivalent to English *to ask* in that it incorporates both 'question' and 'request' senses (one of these, Dongolese Nubian, has two BLAVs with both meanings: *ídd(i)* and *síkk(i)*; three of them, Tunica, Ngizim, and Shuswap, have an additional 'asking' term: Ngizim *jàayu* 'to ask [question]', Tunica *wíra* 'to ask [question]', and Shuswap *q°ex-m* 'to ask for [object]'). Kabyle Berber, Hopi, Nukuoro, Persian, Cuzco Quechua, and Wolof only have 'asking' terms with a 'question' meaning (Persian has two, as a result of some special properties of the Persian lexicon pointed out before; the others only one). Languages with only a 'requesting' BLAV do not occur in our sample at all. 41 languages have two terms distinguishing 'to ask (question)' (e.g. German *fragen*) from 'to ask (request)' (e.g. German *bitten*); but in many of these, the 'question'

BLAV seems to be extendable to the description of 'requesting' acts, whereas we have not been able to observe the reverse. Exceptionally, languages make a three-fold 'asking' distinction:

1. asking a question;
2. asking for some object;
3. asking someone to do something.

In our sample, only Kamchadal fully fits this paradigm: *linʃ* (1), *anst* (2), *nest* (3). A few other languages, however, make use of the possibilities of this three-fold distinction. We have already noted Shuswap *q°ex-m* (2), occurring in addition to a verb with both 'question' and 'request' senses.

(iii) Periphery

There is a special category of BLAVs which we call **peripheral** because their acceptance as BLAVs seemingly violates PSC4: its English members are *to name* and *to count*. These verbs, indeed, refer to rather restricted kinds of activities. This fact is counterbalanced, however, by the following observations:

- They occur very frequently.
- The constraints are not of an institutional kind.

The second observation does not count for *to name* in the sense of 'giving a name', an activity which is usually surrounded by a more or less strong institutional context. Hence 'naming' verbs which exclusively mean 'to give a name' were eliminated. As soon as they allow additional modes of usage related to 'mentioning by name' or 'referring to' (as in "Name the capital of the United States" or "Name something, and I'll get it for you"), 'enumerating' (as in "Name the fifty states"), or even 'calling by name', they are accepted as BLAVs unless one or more of the other criteria blocks this possibility. It should be clear from this that there are different shades of BLAV-ness among 'naming' verbs; thus French *nommer* may be a more dubious case than English *to name*. The case for including 'naming' verbs is strengthened, however, not only by their intuitive importance and their irreducibility to other LAVs, but also by their occasional identity with base items (interpretable as a specialized meaning of the 'unique beginner' on a lower level of the lexical hierarchy), as in Blackfoot, Maidu, Nisenan, and Dongolese Nubian.

For the BLAV status of irreducible 'counting' verbs, there are even stronger indications, in spite of the fact that counting may arguably also be a mental activity (an assumption supported by the fact that the verbs in question often also mean 'to reckon, estimate, etc.'; consider, for instance, also

Wintu *λ'a·mah* to count, figure, reckon' which is related to *λ'am* 'to think'). First, their occurrence is nearly universal (67 cases from our sample, or 83%). Second, from a diachronic point of view, they are often the basis for other LAVs, some of which are even BLAVs. Thus a diversity of languages seems to testify to a conceptual link between 'counting' and 'telling/narrating': Spanish *contar* realizes both meanings fully; English *to tell* itself used to have a 'counting' meaning which still surfaces in some contexts; English *to count* vs. *to recount*; French *compter* vs. *raconter*; Dutch *tellen* vs. *vertellen*; German *zählen* vs. *erzählen*; Yana *dau* 'to count' vs. *daumai* 'to recount, retell'. Similarly, the meaning of Limba *kondi* 'to count' is extendable to 'to relate, narrate; notify, say, tell; acknowledge'. Tunica *wíra* means both 'to count' and 'to ask (question)'. And Greek *légō* used to mean, in Homeric times, 'to pick out, select; collect, enumerate, recount'; it then became the usual word for 'to speak' and 'to say', and it further specialized its meaning to the Modern Greek 'to say'. A third observation underscores both its conceptual importance and its peripheral position: in a very wide range of languages, 'counting' verbs are the basis for or extend their meaning to 'reading' (e.g. Emai, Fore, Gbeya, German, Hungarian, Lenakel, Miwok, Nukuoro, Ojibwa, Venda, Yup'ik, and many more).[4]

Both 'naming' and 'counting' BLAVs were found in 32 languages; a 'naming' verb only in 5 languages; a 'counting' verb only in 34 languages; and one language, Lingala, has one verb, *-tánga*, for both 'counting' and 'naming'.

(iv) Interaction

Most types of linguistic action involve interaction. The BLAV types considered so far, however, do not explicitly focus on the interactive aspects of verbal behavior. These aspects remain implicit, except in the case of *to talk* and its equivalents, which tend to require reciprocity ('conversing') in most instances of use. About 50% of our sample languages (41 out of 81) also have a BLAV which focuses explicitly on interaction by describing a conversational move which necessarily follows speech by someone else: *to answer* and its equivalents.

[4] In spite of the decision to keep counting verbs in the set of BLAVs, and in spite of all the arguments we can think of to justify that decision, the case for *to count* as a BLAV is no doubt the weakest one. Independent evidence for this comes from a tentative explanation of performativity (see Verschueren n.d.) according to which passing PSC5 would entail the possibility of explicit performative use for the verb in question. Whereas this entailment seems to match linguistic facts for all other BLAVs (except, of course, the non-action BLAVs), it does not do so in the case of *to count*.

The reason why an 'answering' BLAV is to be found in only 50% of the sample, is that the concept lends itself to semantically transparent compounding and derivation (forming items to be excluded on the basis of PSC2) and to semantic extensions of 'returning' verbs (to be excluded on the basis of PSC6).

'Answering' BLAVs never coincide with any other BLAVs, except for one case where (not surprisingly, since both involve interaction though one more explicitly than the other) it is the same verb as the 'talking (conversing)' BLAV: Osage *u-ki'-e*. The same relationship emerges from quite a number of non-basic LAVs in the investigated languages. Just two examples:

Hanunóo	*magsaragtán*	'to talk, answer back and forth to each other, as of a group of people on the trail' (cf. the noun *sagút* 'answer')
Hausa	*tanka/tamka*	'to converse, to talk much' but also 'to reply'

(v) Social routine

A fifth category of BLAVs covers a domain of verbal behavior which can be labeled social routines. Its only members are *to greet* and *to thank* and their equivalents. Though the behavior in question usually manifests itself in formulaic expressions (which restricts the scope of applicability) and though at least 'greeting' can usually be non-verbal as well as verbal, there are good reasons to accept the BLAV status of the corresponding LAVs.

The potential counterarguments tentatively adduced in the foregoing sentence are not based on properties which could give us something to go by in an attempt to exclude the verbs on the basis of our operational criteria. The restricted scope (reminding us of PSC4) has nothing to do with a high degree of specialization or institutional constraints, only with the forms of expression. In this respect, *to greet* and *to thank* contrast sharply with the much more specialized *to apologize* and *to congratulate* (for which direct equivalents are to be found in only a small minority of the world's languages); acts of 'greeting' and 'thanking'—in that order—are extremely pervasive in human interaction. As to the non-verbal nature of many acts of 'greeting', this does not help us to apply PSC6 since in most cases native speakers cannot decide whether the verbal or the non-verbal action meaning is primary. There are, of course, some noteworthy exceptions, such as the following:

Ojibwa *namkawaad* 'to greet someone'

anam	+ ik	+ aw	+ aa	+ d
[greet]	[*use the body*]	[abstract final]	[3-object]	[3-subject]

Similarly, one other quite common type of specificity rules out the BLAV-ness of a number of 'greeting' verbs. An example:

Luiseño *namóka-* 'to greet visitors, receive guests'

(Many 'greeting' verbs acceptable as BLAVs incorporate this 'welcoming' meaning.)

Social routine BLAVs occur in 44 languages (i.e. 54% of our sample). Of these, 20 languages have two terms corresponding more or less to English *to greet* and *to thank*; 19 have only a 'greeting' term, 3 only a 'thanking' term, and 2 have a term covering both meanings.

The conceptual unity of the social routine category (justifying its setting apart as a category) does not only appear from the polyvalent BLAVs in two languages from the sample:

Hausa *gaida*: 'to greet, salute, bid farewell' and 'to thank'
(Consider also the noun *barka* 'thanking, blessing, congratulation')

Hungarian *köszön* 'to greet' and 'to thank'

It also emerges from large numbers of LAVs in this domain which had to be excluded from the set of BLAVs for a variety of reasons. The unifying meaning seems to be the expression of positive feelings towards the addressee, the expression of goodwill, the acknowledgment of the existence of a social relationship worth maintaining. This is why 'greeting' verbs are more crucial members of the set than 'thanking' verbs, a fact supported by the figures (of the 22 languages with only one social routine BLAV, there are 19 with a 'greeting' verb and only 3 with a 'thanking' verb) and by the close relationship between 'greeting' and 'talking to, addressing'. Some examples from which the conceptual unity of social routines, as lexicalized in the world's languages (though not always in the form of verbs), and as defined above, may appear:

Kabyle Berber	*eḥmed*	'to praise, celebrate, thank'
Blackfoot	***ksimmatsim-***	'to greet' (cf. *ksimmatsitaki-* 'to be happy' and *ksimmatsin-* 'to be happy to see a person')
	[happy]	
Gbeya	*mba-á*	'to greet' but also 'to congratulate'
Hanunoo	*báti'*	(n.) 'greeting' or 'feeling, emotion'
Hawaiian	*aloha*	'to love, regard with affection; have pity, compassion upon; show mercy; salute at meeting or parting; give thanks (as an act of worship)'
Krio	*eku*	a greeting word, used especially by the Muslim Krios of Freetown < Yoruba *kí* 'to greet' > *ekuabɔ* 'welcome home' *eku fɔ* 'I compliment you on'
Sebei	*ngerekyi*	'to greet visitors, welcome' and 'to please'

(vi) Non-action

A relatively low number of languages (13 from our sample) have specialized verbs describing linguistic non-action. The majority of languages, however, fills this slot in the pattern by negating a base item.

The pattern resulting from the occurrence of these six types of BLAVs is 'broken' only by a few lexical items which occur with more than one BLAV meaning:

Kabyle Berber	*ini*	both 'to say' and 'to ask (question)'
Blackfoot	*ani-*	both 'to say, tell' and 'to name'

Maidu	*'a..'*	both 'to say' and 'to name'
Nisenan	*ha*	both 'to say' and 'to name'
Dongolese Nubian	*ɛ̈-*	both 'to say, tell' and 'to name'
	wɛ́	both 'to say, tell' and 'to name'
Osage	*u-ki'-e*	both 'to talk (converse)' and 'to answer'
Spanish	*contar*	both 'to tell (story)' and 'to count'
Tunica	*wíra*	both 'to ask (question)' and 'to count'
Warlpiri	*ngarri-rni*	both 'to tell (story)' and 'to name'
Yurok	*tɹgɹwɹm-*	both 'to speak, talk to' and 'to greet'

Since the total number of distinct BLAV forms presented for our sample languages is 572, the stability of the pattern cannot be doubted on the basis of 11 items which occupy slots in more than one BLAV category (i.e. a 1.5% exception rate). Some of them (as in the case of Yurok) are easy to explain. Others are surface expressions of more commonly observed relationships (as in the case of Spanish). And some recurrent ambiguities (as in the case of the five forms meaning both 'saying' and 'naming') may point at other common relationships; the recurrent identity with a base item may lend further support to the decision to treat 'naming' verbs, if the criteria are satisfied, as BLAVs in spite of their seemingly restricted scope.

The overall distribution of BLAVs across the six categories in our 81-language sample is as follows

	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)
Number:	81	77	72	41	43	13
Percent:	100	95	89	50	53	16

The (roughly) descending numbers from left to right give further support to the centrality of the core items. Furthermore, the relevance of all BLAV categories is underscored by their occurrence in at least 50% of the sample languages (except for the non-action category, the marginality of which is clear).

The number of BLAVs

The number of BLAVs varies from 1 to 12, with languages having 4 to 11 BLAVs representing 92.5% of the sample (75 cases). Overview:

BLAVs		Languages
1	2	Kalam, Kewa
2	None	
3	2	Kera, Kiowa
4	6	Amharic, Fore, Wappo, Warlpiri, Yana, Yimas
5	10	Cuicatec, Gbeya, Hanunóo, Hausa, Hindi, Luiseño, Lake Miwok, Nukuoro, Eastern Ojibwa, Sranan Tongo
6	12	Blackfoot, Ch'ol, Diegueño, Grebo, Hopi, Krio, Ayacucho Quechua, Cuzco Quechua, Tarma Quechua, Shuswap, Wintu, Wolof
7	16	Achumawi, Mzab Berber, Guaraní, Khmer, Kilivila, Lenakel, Limba, Lingala, Maidu, Bodega Miwok, Mon, Mong Njua, Ngizim, Tunica, Venda, Central Yup'ik
8	8	Kabyle Berber, Hungarian, Indonesian, Kamchadal, Nisenan, Persian, Sebei, Zulu
9	7	Abuan, Bobo Fing, Emai, Hawaiian, Maori, Tiruray, Yoruba
10	10	English, French, North Frisian, Dongolese Nubian, Osage, Northern Sotho, Spanish, Swahili, Southern Tuvaluan, Welsh
11	6	Dutch, Greek, Kwanyama, Polish, Russian, Yurok
12	2	German, Xhosa

The order of development

The data make the formulation of synchronic implicational universals (potentially revealing an order of development, as discovered for color terms and plant and animal taxonomies), completely impossible. The only BLAV category which is always represented is the base. From there onwards, any direction of development seems possible, though statistically there is a higher likelihood

that the core and the periphery will be developed than the interaction and social routine components, and though the development of a non-action BLAV is exceptional.

Universality

The form of universality emerging from the data may be much stronger than if a neat developmental pattern had been discovered. A highly stable core of lexicalized conceptualizations of linguistic action can be observed.

First of all, there is never a correlation between the differences in the sets of BLAVs and geographical or cultural parameters. Thus higher numbers of BLAVs are not reserved for languages spoken in highly industrialized western societies: Xhosa shares the privilege of having 12 BLAVs with German; Kwanyama and Yurok both have 11, just like Dutch or Polish; Osage and Northern Sotho share the number 10 with English and French; on the other hand, the Hungarian BLAV set is restricted to 8 items. Similarly, none of the BLAV categories is restricted to areas or culture types; even the slightly marginal non-action BLAVs occur in Berber, Kwanyama, Mon, and Northern Sotho alongside Dutch, French, Greek, Russian, etc.

Second, the mechanisms by which the BLAV status of verbials in certain categories (in particular non-action, but also interaction and social routine) are 'blocked' are well-understood. It is predictable that such blocking will occur for a significant number of languages, which means that the lexicalization processes are quite universal.

Third, further differences between languages are usually to be explained on the basis of additional properties of those languages. Thus the extreme cases of Kalam and Kewa (with only one BLAV) derive their status unambiguously from the special characteristics of their restricted verb root sets.[5]

The findings clearly lend support to the view that all human languages represent the same overall level of evolution. The lexicalized reflection of conceptualizations of linguistic action points at a truly universal linguistic action core. Any assumptions about verbal behavior which go beyond what is directly derivable from the existence of this universal core should be subject to careful scrutiny, from an explicitly intercultural perspective, before generalizing them.

On the basis of the foregoing observations, we can formulate a number of universal tendencies (UT) in relation to the LAV lexicon of natural languages.

[5] Kalam, for instance, contains only about 95 verb stems, only 25 of which are 'generic verbs' which speakers of the language rely on heavily. All action and state meanings have to be expressible with those restricted means. Hence, a restricted set of BLAVs is virtually predictable.

UT 1: For all human languages it is possible to identify a set of conceptually basic LAVs
(Note that the validity of this generalization implies the hierarchical structuring of at least a significant part of the LAV lexicon of human languages.)

UT 2: The number of BLAVs varies from 1 to 12, but almost all languages have from 4 to 11 BLAVs

UT 3: All BLAVs can be placed in a pattern of six categories (base, core, periphery, interaction, social routine, non-action) which is highly stable across the languages of the world.

UT 4: If a language has only one BLAV, it is always a base item

UT 5: Amost all languages have, in addition to a base item or base items, core and periphery BLAVs.

UT 6: Almost all languages have one or more 'asking' verbs in their non-base core; of the threefold distinction 'ask (question)', 'ask for (an object)' and 'ask to do something', only the first one is always realized in languages with 'asking' BLAVs.

UT 7: Almost all languages with periphery items have a 'counting' BLAV.

UT 8: Almost all languages with social routine items have a 'greeting' BLAV.

2. Methodological problems

Before trying to spell out the theoretical implications of those research results, a number of methodological caveats have to be formulated which put them in the proper perspective.

It may be useful, as a starting point, to consider to what extent criticisms which have been levelled against anthropological linguistic studies of the Berlin–Kay type (which functioned at least partly as my source of inspiration) are applicable to the BLAV research as well. Take Hickerson's (1971) critique. Her main points are the following:

(i) The study used an urban sample of bilinguals as informants.
(ii) The language sample was biased.
(iii) Imperfect sources were used.
(iv) The evolutionary claims are not tenable.
(v) The observed cultural correlates are dubious.

As to (i), our research procedure was considerably different. Though some informants (especially for European languages) were definitely urban bilinguals directly accessible to us, many provided information through linguists in the field. To (ii) we must plead guilty: the sample overrepresents European languages, and completely underrepresents Asia. Hence, many more languages have to be investigated to support the generalizability of our research findings. Similarly, (iii) is applicable: of the lexicographical sources consulted, many are outdated and some contain quite biasing glosses. However, though lexicographical sources were usually the starting point, they were never relied upon as conclusive evidence. Points (iv) and (v) are not applicable: the BLAV findings themselves undermine any aspirations in the direction of evolutionary claims (except that all languages investigated seem to represent a very similar evolutionary stage) or the observation of cultural correlates.

So far, the study may not score too badly. The situation gets worse, however, once it is approached from the point of view of theories of the lexicon.[6]

For instance, more clarity is needed on how the project relates or does not relate to cognitive notions of and tests for basicness (or even to the idea of 'basic vocabulary' as handled in lexicostatistics).

The BLAV study, as presented above, only addresses the question of differential total lexicalization in some controllable perceptual/conceptual domain. It is far from clear how total or maximal lexicalization can be operationalized. However sophisticated one makes the operational criteria, there is still the danger that the task one performs is essentially a recoding of dictionary entries to fit a template of intuitions characteristic of a speaker of one of the maximalizing languages. Though the existence of such danger cannot be denied, the best defence against this crucial form of criticism is to point out that none of the research findings were predicted and that only one (the one reflected in UT 4) was at all predictable. Thus the six different types of BLAVs were not at all postulated in advance; actually the hypotheses we started out with were quite different. Moreover, as will be shown in the discussion of the theoretical implications, the results completely undermine expectations one might have on the basis of theories of verbal behavior (in particular speech act theory). This does not mean, though, that what 'emerged' from the data can be said to be unrelated to our own habits of thinking about verbal communication. Therefore, corroborating evidence deriving from further detailed analyses and especially from complementary types of investigation, is needed.

[6] Many of the following remarks were made, quite correctly, by an anonymous referee for the IPrA Papers in Pragmatics, in which the original research report appeared.

The main weakness of the BLAV-approach to lexical semantics remains the fact that it was essentially agrammatical and context-free. It ignores aspects of discursive styles and genres in the institutional contexts in which verbs of saying are characteristic in many languages (as in narratives, formal ritual occasions in which explicit performatives are used, etc.). It also ignores the grammatical structures in which verbs of speaking are used. Thus it may be necessary to investigate the possibility of language-specific bias in the fact that all the verbs considered seem to focus on the utterer as topical subject. Furthermore, the approach ignores the relationships between metapragmatic verbs and other indicators of metapragmatic awareness.

Though there is a practical excuse for the agrammatical and context-free approach (viz. the need to cover too many languages for the sake of the comparative validity of the research), there is no justification. Hence we must conclude that to the extent that the results of the investigation can be deemed relevant, they can be regarded only as a stepping stone to more sophisticated metapragmatic studies more akin to the tradition established by Silverstein (see, e.g. Silverstein 1985; Gumperz n.d.) which concentrates on actual usage patterns—rather than a survey of decontextualized lexical items—of a much wider range of indicators of metapragmatic awareness (including adverbs, discourse markers, and the like).

3. Theoretical implications

Taking these methodological caveats into account, the BLAV-investigation carries numerous theoretical implications which deserve to be formulated tentatively while awaiting more definitive research results based on (i) a wider language sample, (ii) further detailed analyses, and (iii) complementary research providing corroborating evidence. The following remarks will be restricted to four domains: speech act theory, the study of sentence types, the semantic analysis of LAVs, and the study of problems of crosscultural communication.

3.1. Speech act theory

The results of this investigation cast doubt on the universal validity of the 'orthodox' theoretical classification of speech acts (cf. Searle 1976).[7] We shall restrict our observations to commissives and directives, two of the five main classes proposed.

[7] For earlier criticisms, which are largely supported and further substantiated by the BLAV-investigation, see Verschueren (1983a, 1983b)

The most striking fact is that commissives (one instance of which, the act of promising, was for a long time treated as a prototypical example to illustrate the tenets of speech act theory) are not represented in the set of BLAVs of any language. 'Promising' verbs, if they occur at all, are definable in terms of 'saying that one will do something' in a clear statement sense. This relationship is underscored by 'promising' verbials and nouns which do occur in a variety of languages. Some examples:

Amharic	*qal sättä* 'to promise'	
	[word, statement (in court)] [give, grant, provide]	
Maori	*kii taurangi*	'to promise' (literally 'to say something that has not yet been fulfilled')
	[to say, tell, speak] [unsettled, changeable, incomplete, unsatisfied, unfulfilled]	
Lake Miwok	*lílaw-* < *liláwpo*	'to say, tell' (semelfactive, reflexive, transitive) 1. 'to say something about oneself', 2. 'to claim to be', 3. 'to promise'

The obligation involved in 'committing oneself to do something' seems to derive exclusively from general (and culture-specific) norms of interaction and verbal behavior, operating in this case on statements about certain types of future activities.

Similarly, the obligation resulting from acts of 'ordering' derives completely from an institutional context of authority. There are no 'ordering' BLAVs in any language of the sample. If the meaning is present more or less prominently in the usage of any BLAV, such a BLAV will always have a basically assertive meaning, as in the case of English *to tell*. Some other basic and non-basic LAVs showing the same relationship:

Limba	*cepi*	'to acquaint, tell, affirm, allege, assert, bid, command, declare, fix (price), inform, invite, mention, narrate, notify, proclaim, profess, quote, relate, say, show, speak'
Nubian	*án*	1. 'to say', 2. 'to say to, tell, bid', 3. 'to let, allow'

Venda *-laya* 'to advise, admonish, impart wisdom, teach' but also 'to order, command'

Another typical case is where 'ordering' verbs basically mean 'to rule, govern' (e.g. Diegueño *uuchutt* 'to rule, send, order', Mong Njua *căŋ* 'to rule, govern, manage, order'). The only 'directing' BLAVs are 'requesting' verbs.

If such lexical findings can be correlated with ethnographic observations, as is the case for commissives if Rosaldo's (1982) observations concerning the negligible role of this category in Ilongot verbal interaction are valid, they should be considered seriously for evaluating theories of verbal behavior.

3.2. The study of sentence types

Not only are the only 'directing' BLAVs 'requesting' verbs, but (as appears from the observations concerning asking and requesting in **1.3**), 'requesting' is strongly associated with 'asking questions'. In many languages both meanings are incorporated in the same verb (as in English *to ask*). Moreover, the asking of questions seems to take priority in the lexicalization of linguistic action concepts (cf. UT6). Adding to this that the canonical form for expressing a request is an interrogative sentence (a direct question about a future action, such as "Will you do this for me?", or an example of an indirect speech act or 'pre-request') and that—as observed above—other directives do not occupy a central position in the conceptualization of linguistic action as reflected in its lexicalization, it may be justified to call the supposed correspondence of the three basic sentence types (declarative, interrogative, imperative) with three basic illocutionary force types into question.

In much of the linguistic literature, the following form-function correlations are taken for granted:

declarative – assertion
interrogative – question
imperative – order/request

Though our data do not make it possible to make grammatical claims (since, for one thing, the approach was itself basically agrammatical) they do allow us to ask questions and to formulate hypotheses to be tested by completely different methods. With regard to typical correlations between sentence types and utterance functions, at least the following hypothesis can be suggested:

declarative – assertion
interrogative – (i) question, (ii) request
imperative – ?

Thus only the declarative sentence type would have one clear functional correlate; the interrogative would have two; and the imperative would be a vague or multifunctional category.

3.3. The semantic analysis of LAVs

As to implications concerning the semantic analysis of LAVs, there is at least one directly related to the foregoing observations concerning questions and requests. Rudzka-Ostyn (1989) argues, for instance, that *to ask* covers two distinct meaning prototypes: one for asking questions, and one for making requests. Though she accepts interrelationships, her analysis emphasizes the distinctness. Some of her own observations, however, are not easily explained in this way:

- the conceptual connection which emerges in examples such as "He asked whether I would join him";
- the direction of historical development in the meaning of *to ask* in English (which goes from question to request);
- the frequency of occurrence in the investigated corpus (1276 instances of asking a question vs. 747 instances of requesting).

Our data fully support the conceptual connection, and the conceptual priority of questioning over requesting. Such additional evidence should at least warrant an attempt to describe the meaning of *to ask* in terms of one basic prototype.

Further, the data obviously challenge the conclusions Wierzbicka (1988) draws from her own investigation of speech act verbs:

> "[...] there is only one 'basic speech act verb' in English: say; and that as 'say' is probably a lexical universal, and a universal semantic primitive, the word for 'say' may well be the only basic speech act verb in any language. Above the level of say there are no hyponyms and hyperonyms. Detailed semantic analysis shows that apart from say, there are no speech act verbs in English which would be related to one another in the way sparrow is related to bird [...]."

Something must be wrong with a semantic analysis which shows that only *to say* is hierarchically related to other English speech act verbs if

- at least 8 English verbs (all base, core, interaction, and social routine BLAVs) are actually used by speakers of English to define other linguistic action concepts felt to be 'subtypes';

- more than one English verb (*to speak* as well as *to say*) occupies a top position in the hierarchy.

The data confirm that the occurrence of at least one base item (such as English *to say*) is universal. But accepting 'say' as a semantic primitive disregards the fact that

- many languages (not just English) have more than one base item;
- in many languages the 'saying' verb is not strictly separable from more general action meanings.

Once a semantic primitive approach is adopted, however, it is hard to avoid this kind of problem. Since the approach may also tend to make wrong predictions and could thus prevent the discovery of the type of universality found in this study, it should always be seen as just one of a variety of collectively necessary approaches.

3.4. Problems of intercultural communication

The universal tendencies observed in this investigation provide us with a tentative empirical basis to start from in the search for intercultural differences in the conceptualization of linguistic action which may be partly responsible for intercultural and international communication problems.

Needless to say that all the work still has to be done. Though the search for the relevant differences can start as soon as a reliable research strategy has been developed, the empirically identified universal basis itself needs to be further investigated. One necessary way of doing this will be by mapping the comparative distribution of BLAVs across the spectrum of speech events. Also, as explained in section **2**, grammatical considerations have to be reintroduced in the lexical semantic methodology, and data from other types of metapragmatic research have to be adduced.[8]

[8] For a quite interesting attempt on the part of a third party to justify the metapragmatic approach taken in our BLAV investigations, the reader is referred to Kertész (n.d.).

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A RELEVANCE-THEORETIC APPROACH TO COMMENTARY PRAGMATIC MARKERS: THE CASE OF *ACTUALLY, REALLY* AND *BASICALLY*

RICHARD J. WATTS

1. Introduction

My principal argument in this paper will be that a relevance-theoretic approach[1] to what Fraser (1990) calls "commentary pragmatic markers" offers a possible way out of a terminological and analytic impasse into which both European particle research and Anglo-American discourse marker research appear to be moving. The almost total lack of cross-fertilization or even of any kind of healthy competition between these two research traditions is both alarming and lamentable. The study of particles/discourse markers does after all cover a large area of the field of metapragmatics, which I take to be analysis of the linguistic, paralinguistic and extralinguistic means by which interlocutors attempt to guide the processes of interpretation and social involvement in verbal interaction.

In section **2** I shall sketch out the work being done within these two research traditions. I shall suggest that the different theoretical orientations with respect to the way they approach the study of language are largely responsible for many of the terminological problems confronting this area of metapragmatics. I shall thus attempt to gain a little clarity here before moving on to section **3**, in which, while agreeing in general with Fraser's (1990) analysis of discourse markers, I shall argue that we cannot and should not divorce ourselves entirely from considering how metapragmatic elements might be accounted for in syntactic terms. The discussion in section **2** will show that at least for German and Dutch syntactic considerations are unavoidable.

In section **4** I shall tackle questions of meaning. Here I shall agree in principle with the "minimalist" tradition (cf. e.g. Schourup 1985; Fraser 1987, and 1990; Schiffrin 1987; Watts 1987; Blakemore 1987; Foolen 1991; König and

[1] The application of Sperber–Wilson's (1986) theory of relevance to the analysis of discourse markers is best illustrated in Blakemore (1987) and Blass (1988).

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Requardt 1991), but I shall argue that Fraser (1990) is wrong in assuming that the pragmatic core meaning of the discourse markers he considers (*well, so, now,* etc.) need not be related to their content meaning. In order to show how a core meaning can be used either metapragmatically or semantically, I shall undertake a relevance-theoretic analysis of the three English lexemes *actually*, *really* and *basically* in section 5. The type of analysis I propose will also offer a way of coordinating syntactic and pragmatic approaches to particles/discourse markers and thereby bridging the gap between the continental European and Anglo-American research traditions.

2. Particle or marker, discourse or other

2.1. The status of particles

In recent years there has been a veritable upsurge of interest within German linguistics in the status of lexemes that are generally referred to as "particles", which almost leads one to feel that we are dealing here with a research tradition. Some of the standard works within this tradition are Weydt (1969, 1979, 1983, 1989), Altmann (1976), Helbig (1977), Helbig–Kötz (1985), Weydt–Harden–Hentschel–Rösler (1983) and Weydt–Ehlers (1987). In addition a number of doctoral and post-doctoral theses have been published, which either deal directly with particles in German (e.g. Hentschel 1986; Jacobs 1986; Gornik-Gerhardt 1987; Thurmair 1989) or devote significant sections of the text to an analysis of particles (e.g. Franck 1980; Doherty 1985; Wegener 1985). Articles have appeared in numerous journals and collections, and conferences have been devoted to the subject of particles.[2] In addition particle research has spread to the analysis of a wide variety of languages other than German, notably Dutch (cf. e.g. Foolen 1984; van der Auwera–Vandenweghe 1984; Westheide 1985, 1986b, 1986c, 1991; De Vriendt–van der Craen–Vandeweghe 1991), Norwegian (cf. e.g. Fretheim 1989 and 1991; Askedal 1989), Polish (cf. e.g. Tabakowska 1989; Katny 1980; Grochowski 1986). There is little point in continuing this list, but readers are referred to the particle index (Partikelregister) in Weydt (1989) in which references to particles in no fewer than 36 languages are listed.

[2] E.g. the particle conference in West Berlin in 1988, the proceedings of which have been published in Weydt (1989) and the Groningen symposium on discourse particles in 1989, the proceedings of which appeared in February 1991 as a special double issue of the journal Multilingua under the guest editorship of Werner Abraham.

The fundamental problem with the majority of this research, however, is that it starts out from a consideration of particles within one or another theory of grammar.[3] Particles are taken to be a word class, hence a syntactic category, and as such require to be distinguished from other word classes. Once this has been achieved—and my main argument is that it has not been achieved, for reasons that I will outline shortly—it should then be possible to subcategorize, a process which requires a stringent set of syntactic constraints on distribution. Given an adequate subcategorization of the syntactic category "particle", it is then important to consider what its grammatical and semantic functions might be within the sentence, and finally to establish what it contributes towards pragmatic interpretation and discourse structure.

The first and thorniest problem is the fundamental question of whether there are any grounds at all to positing a syntactic category "particle". The term has been used in the traditional grammars of several European languages, including English, to account for a veritable ragbag of elements that could not be fitted into any of the traditional parts of speech.[4] In fact, since in English prepositions, conjunctions and interjections were generally left over after the grammarian had accounted for the other parts of speech and since they were considered to function only as cohesive syntactic elements, they were often lumped together as particles. In reading English grammars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, one quickly gains the impression that, true to the Western grammar tradition, such leftovers as these were not considered worthy of much attention and were easily disposed of with a few choice examples.[5]

In the case of German, however, things were somewhat different. Traditional grammars of German tended to focus their attention on those parts of speech which could be inflected, i.e. on verbs, nouns, pronouns, adjectives and articles. Those syntactic elements which could not be inflected tended to be lumped together as particles. The 1984 edition of the Duden, for example, classifies adverbs, prepositions and conjunctions as particles, and further subcategorizes the adverbs into "Adverbien", "Pronominaladverbien", "Modalwörter", "Abtönungspartikeln", "Gradpartikeln" and "Intensivpartikeln" (cf. Hentschel–Weydt 1989, 4). Other grammars of German

[3] A number of particle studies do not presuppose a specific theory of grammar, e.g. Blass (1988), Fretheim (1991), Tobin (1989, 1991), König (1991).

[4] Watts (1990) indicates the kinds of word class commonly focussed on in traditional grammars of the 17th and 18th centuries.

[5] Cf. the comments on particles in Bishop Lowth's grammar of English (Lowth 1762).

either restrict particles to the scalar (or degree) particles ("Gradpartikeln") or extend them to cover interjections as well.

Hentschel–Weydt (1989) make an attempt to bring some order into the picture by positing three groups of word classes, those that are traditionally considered to be the "major" word classes on the basis of the fact that they have lexical meaning (i.e. verbs, nouns and adjectives), those with a deictic function (e.g. the deictics and all pro-forms), and those that have neither a lexical meaning nor a deictic function but "ihre Semantik nur im Zusammenhang mit anderen Wortarten entfalten". This third group includes particles, prepositions and conjunctions. They then narrow down the category of particles to "Gradpartikeln" (scalar or degree particles), which they proceed to further subcategorize into "Intensivpartikeln" (intensifying particles) and "Fokuspartikeln" (focus particles), "Modalwörter" (modal words), "Abtönungspartikeln" (downtoning particles) and "Antwort- und Negationspartikeln" (answer and negation particles).

Despite their valiant effort to bring some order into a confused area of grammar, however, the reader is left with a distinctly uncomfortable feeling that this kind of categorization just does not work. The principal reason concerns Hentschel–Weydt's theoretical approach and their terminology. Although it is quite correct to question the idea that all non-inflected words in German should be lumped together and called particles, no reason is given for wishing to hold on to the term "particle" at all.

The question as to whether "particle" is a clearly definable syntactic category in relation to other categories can, of course, only be answered within a theoretical model of grammar. We may first question Hentschel–Weydt's word class grouping. Within generative grammar a clear distinction is made between major categories, i.e. those which do or do not enter into syntactic configurations with the logical function of a predicate (symbolized by the feature [V]) or with the logical function of an argument (symbolized by the feature [N]), and minor categories, i.e. those which fulfil other grammatical functions such as modification and specification. Modern generative grammar recognizes four major categories, N [+N,–V], V [–N,+V], A [+N,+V] and P [–N,–V]. The category A also covers those lexemes whose scope of modification ranges over members of the V category as well as those of the N category. Hence, in German adjectives may also occur as adverbs without any inflection, i.e. they would still be counted as members of the major category A; some add the morpheme *-weise* (e.g. *glücklich – glücklicherweise*).

A few of these lexemes, however, are listed by Hentschel–Weydt as being modal words, i.e. as being a type of particle (e.g. *wahrscheinlich, eventuell,*

sicherlich, möglicherweise). Prepositions (and by extension many conjunctions) are put into the same category type as particles. In generative grammar, however, they are members of a major category P. Scalar particles are better placed in a minor category ADV (adverb), whose grammatical function is that of specification. The type of specification can then be defined, like that of the category of determiners (DET) and numerals (NUM), in logico–semantic terms. This then leaves us with the downtoning particles and the answer and negation particles. Interestingly enough, two of this latter group, *ja* and *doch*, also occur as downtoners. The other members of the downtoning group also belong to the minor category ADV.

We therefore return to the crucial question: Do we need a category "particle" at all if most if not all of the members of that category can be accounted for in terms of other categories? There are four main reasons why positing such a category is so compelling for German (and also for Dutch). First, if one tries to order the categories of traditional grammar without resorting to an entirely new theoretical framework, one needs, at least for German and Dutch, to find good reasons for retaining the term "particle". Since retaining the term appears to be a relatively straightforward move—much more so than it is for English—there seems to be no reason for shifting to another framework. Second, the very fact that many elements classified as particles appear to lead a double life as some other part of speech and as particles, has created the need to account syntactically for the "other" (particle) use. Third, particles occur syntactically in what Abraham has called the middle field. That is, if we take German and Dutch to be SOV verb final languages (and that is still very much an open question!), particles always occur somewhere between the subject and the verb. This is of course only apparent on the surface in subordinate clause structure and in main clauses containing an auxiliary verb in which the main verb occupies the final position. In other words, they occur within sentence structure in well defined positions and never sentence externally. Fourth, they can occur in clusters in a well-defined order (cf. Thurmair 1991 for German and De Vriendt–van der Craen–Vandenweghe 1991 for Dutch), which has even led to the suggestion made by those of a generative bent that there may be such a thing as a "particle phrase". Fifth, they appear to occur between the sentence theme and the sentence rheme (cf. Hentschel–Weydt 1989; Krivonosov 1989), although Thurmair (1991) has some very convincing counter arguments to this hypothesis.

The main argument against continuing to accommodate a category "particle" for the grammatical description of German (and, by extension, Dutch) is that the Hentschel–Weydt division into three basic category types rests on

semantic rather than syntactic criteria. The third type, to which particles are said to belong, rests on the criteria that this type of element has neither a lexical nor a deictic meaning and that it is semantically definable only in relation to its combination with members from other word class types. In addition, Hentschel–Weydt derive their subcategorization into particle types not from syntactic distributional constraints, but from semantic–pragmatic considerations. Focus particles are said to have "die semantische Funktion, Beziehungen zu anderen Propositionen als zu denen, in denen sie selbst stehen, herzustellen." Furthermore they imply "Alternativen zu ihrem Beziehungselement und schliessen sie als mögliche Werte in einem grösseren Zusammenhang ein oder aus" (Hentschel–Weydt 1989, 12). Modal words are particles "die dazu dienen, den Wahrheitsgrad einer Äusserung zu bezeichnen" (ibid., 12), whereas downtoning particles do not function on the level of the sentence in which they occur, but "sie kommentieren ihn als Gesamtäusserung von einer Metaebene aus und verankern ihn so im Redekontext" (ibid: 14).

In general I am not in disagreement with their interpretation of how such linguistic elements function within discourse, but this surely cannot form the basis upon which syntactic categories and subcategories are set up. The double life of particles is no different from that of similar elements in other languages, e.g. English *well, now, then*, etc., but that double life concerns the use to which the members of syntactic categories are put, not the distinction between different syntactic categories. I would wish to say that whatever category we might assign, for example, English *well* or German *eben* to, it remains a member of that category even though it might be put to different uses in discourse.

The third and fourth arguments for positing a syntactic category "particle" are equally unconvincing, but they do raise an interesting syntactic problem. Whether they are interpreted as contributing content meaning or metapragmatic meaning to the utterance in which they stand, they do occupy a sentence internal position from the point of view of theoretical syntax, and thus demand a grammatical description on that level. This is less clearly the case for equivalent lexemes in English, which often stand outside sentence structure in either a sentence prefacing, sentence coda or parenthentical position (cf. section 5). The fifth argument assumes that we can unequivocally analyze sentence structure into theme and rheme. The immediate criticism here is that the status of the two terms theme and rheme is still under debate, and that even if we were able to find adequate criteria for making such a distinction, those criteria would rely crucially on discourse structure and mutually shared knowledge rather than model-theoretic syntactic constraints.

We can conclude from the foregoing discussion that there is little if any need to posit a minor syntactic category of "particle". It is perfectly possible to account for particles categorially in other ways. What does remain unsolved, however, is the crucial link between their syntactic regularity of occurrence in sentences and the metapragmatic functions they fulfil when such sentences are used as utterances in real discourse. As we shall see in the next subsection, it is their metapragmatic function in discourse which has interested Anglo-Saxon researchers more than their syntactic description.

2.2. Discourse marker research

American and British discourse marker research is firmly anchored in the study of pragmatics and also sociolinguistics. Fraser (1990) suggests that the study of discourse markers as a field of enquiry in pragmatics can be traced back to the early 1980s. Concern with the pragmatic, as opposed to grammatical, functions of certain sentence connectives such as *and, but, if*, etc. can be traced back at least as far as Robin Lakoff's seminal article "If's, and's and but's about conjunction" (1971). In Bernstein (1971) we find a useful suggestion on how *you know* might be understood as a sociolinguistic marker in discourse. Fraser quotes work by Schourup (1985), Schiffrin (1987) and Blakemore (1987) as being perhaps the most significant lengthier contributions to the pragmatic study of discourse markers, but several other contributions might also have been mentioned, e.g. Owen (1983), Lakoff (1973), Svartvik (1980), Östman (1981), Watts (1987), Stenström (1984a, 1986).

In all of this work the central concern has been on the contributions to utterance meaning that certain elements which have come to be called "discourse markers" make in ongoing discourse. This has meant that a number of approaches to the study of those contributions have been made. On the one hand, they may be looked at as lying on the borderline between semantics and pragmatics, such that the study of discourse markers may be used to investigate where content meaning ends and pragmatic meaning takes over. On the other hand, they may be approached from various models of discourse analysis (cf. Schiffrin's 1987 model of discourse or the approach taken by Svartvik and Stenström from within the tradition of British systemic analysis), or from the point of view of conversation analysis (cf. Owen 1983; Watts 1987). They may also be considered from the point of view of contextualization cues in the Gumperz tradition of interactional sociolinguistics (cf. here Watts 1989), or, as I wish to do in this paper, as elements which help to evaluate the relevance of one or more utterances in a discourse with respect to others (cf. Blakemore 1987; Blass 1988; Watts 1991).

The problem with the majority of this research is, however, that there is no clear definition of what is understood by the term "discourse marker". Fraser (1990) makes some very valuable suggestions, which I shall deal with in more detail in section **3.** It should be clear, however, that the model theoretical status of the term is radically different from that of "particle". Whereas particle research has attempted to show (or has more often simply assumed) that there is a syntactic category "particle" which needs to be fitted somehow into models of syntax, discourse marker research has made no such assumptions. Discourse markers are in any case a very heterogeneous set of expressions ranging from non-lexical segments like *oh* and *mm* through lexical elements like *well* and *now* to phrases like *all right, of course*, sentence fragments like *you know, I mean, you see*, and whole clauses like *what I wanted to say was, while I have you* (cf. Fraser 1990), *to get back to what I was saying*, etc. It would make very little sense indeed to pretend that discourse markers were members of a syntactic category. However, in a later section I shall argue that it may be possible to ascribe the same grammatical function to them and thus to account for them in an extended model of syntax.

How, then, should we understand the term "discourse marker" if not syntactically? Since the analytic approach to these expressions is so different from that which is usual in the particle research tradition, it is clear that terminologically "particle" and "discourse marker" must be understood in two fundamentally distinct ways. Taken literally, "discourse marker" refers to any expression which marks off one segment of the overall discourse with reference to some other segment(s). As we shall see, Fraser (1990), with very good reason, narrows this down considerably. The term cannot therefore be understood as one pertaining to a grammatical model; it derives its value from a theory of discourse structure and function, and is thus metapragmatic.

Given that this is so, however, we need to consider whether it would not also be a more appropriate way of analyzing German and Dutch particles. As we saw, continual recourse is made in the particle literature to the terminology of language usage and pragmatics in order to subcategorize what is erroneously taken to be a syntactic category. There are even examples in which the correlative German pronoun *es* (Richter 1989) and the German ethical dative (Wegener 1989) are analyzed as particles on the basis of the similar metapragmatic functions which they can be shown to fulfil. König–Requardt (1991) show quite convincingly that it is indeed possible to analyze such expressions as *doch* and *mal* as discourse markers whose metapragmatic function is to help the addressee assess the degree of relevance of the utterance in which they occur with that of preceding utterances or potential future utterances.

My argument in this paper is that this is the type of bridge we should now be concerned to build between the two research traditions outlined in this section. In the following section, however, I shall discuss Fraser's suggestions concerning the analysis of discourse markers and suggest some ways in which syntactic considerations may be dovetailed into a pragmatic analysis.

3. The syntax of discourse markers

Fraser (1990) makes a clear distinction between linguistic expressions that encode content meaning and those that encode pragmatic meaning. Those that encode content meaning form part of the propositional structure of the speaker's utterances, whereas those that encode pragmatic meaning are "signals of the speaker's communicative intentions" (1990, 386).

The pragmatic meaning of an utterance can, he maintains, be subdivided into "basic pragmatic markers", which indicate what illocutionary force the utterance is intended to have (e.g. *please*, performative expressions such as *I suggest, I acknowledge*, etc., or even sentence mood indicators such as the interrogative or the imperative), "commentary pragmatic markers", with which the speaker indicates how s/he stands with reference to what is said and/or how the addressee is intended to take the utterance, and "parallel pragmatic markers", which encode a message in addition to that which is encoded in the utterance itself. This latter class includes forms of address, but also modifying adjectives which indicate what the speaker feels about what s/he is referring to rather than modifying some expression in the proposition. The example that Fraser gives is "Take your damn shoes off the table", in which the adjective *damn* does not really modify the noun *shoes* but rather expresses what the speaker feels about the state of affairs encoded by the proposition.

It is within the group of commentary pragmatic markers that Fraser locates discourse markers. He defines these as being "a class of expressions, each of which signals how the speaker intends the basic message that follows to relate to the prior discourse" (1990, 387). In general one can agree with this basic taxonomy, but there are a number of reservations that have to be made. At one point he maintains that discourse markers are not simply adverbs masquerading as discourse markers, but that they are a very heterogeneous set of expressions (cf. the point made in section **2**). Discourse markers are "not susceptible to analysis as a single traditional grammatical category such as Sentence, Noun or Preposition", but he contradicts himself by stating at an earlier point in the paper that commentary markers, which include discourse

markers as a subset, "are not just a random group of expressions but are members of a separate syntactic category with several sub-categories, albeit a category whose members carry pragmatic rather than content meaning" (1990, 388). How are we to understand these two statements?

He also maintains that discourse markers indicate how the utterance to follow is to be interpreted in terms of previous utterances. As I have shown elsewhere, however, some of the expressions which Fraser lists as discourse markers can only occur in an utterance prefacing position as what I have called, following Schiffrin (1987), lefthand discourse brackets (e.g. *now*, *look*, *listen*, etc.), others only occur as righthand discourse brackets in an utterance coda position (e.g. *though*), while others may occur either in the prefacing position and the coda position and still others may occur parenthetically. My own research has shown quite clearly that native speakers have a tendency not to perceive those that occur as lefthand discourse brackets, but are sensitive to those that occur as righthand discourse brackets, so much so that they can use discourse markers occurring in these positions as socially stigmatizing features of an individual's speech style.

We may resolve the apparent contradiction as to whether or not discourse markers constitute an independent category with a number of subcategories encoding pragmatic rather than content meaning by interpreting Fraser's term "separate syntactic category" to mean a syntactic category not forming part of the propositional structure of the utterance, and indeed Fraser also suggests that while there is a central pragmatic core meaning to the discourse markers, this meaning is not necessarily cognate with the semantic contributions they would make to propositional meaning if they were within the scope of the sentential syntactic structure. It is on this point that I disagree with Fraser, and I shall elaborate on questions of meaning in the following section.

One argument against viewing discourse and other commentary markers as constituting "separate" syntactic categories can be derived from the particle research discussed in section **2.1.** As we saw, in their efforts to set up particles as a syntactic category, particle researchers almost invariably have recourse to pragmatic rather than semantico–syntactic arguments in subcategorizing what they take to be particles. At the same time I argued that not only do many "particles" in German not merely masquerade as adverbs, but are obviously most logically defined as adverbs, but also that they are usually to be found within the scope of sentence structure, in the so-called middlefield. As König–Requardt (1991) convincingly show for *doch*, however, they fulfil the same kind of pragmatic discourse function in German as the discourse markers in English. It therefore seems reasonable to suggest that discourse markers are

also members of well-defined syntactic categories, but that in English there is a tendency for them to occur outside the syntactic sentential structure of the proposition, either as righthand discourse brackets, lefthand discourse brackets or parenthetical insertions. As we shall see in our discussion of *really*, *actually* and *basically*, however, non-parenthetical sentence-internal positions are also possible.

Sentence initial, sentence final and parenthetical occurrences of discourse and other commentary markers can be shown to lie outside the CP (the complementizer phrase, which in current government-binding models is the highest level of sentence structure) (cf. Watts 1991 for lexemes such as *well, so* and *cos*). The argument is derived from a paper by Haegeman (1990), who attempts to account for subjectless sentences in English for two types of discourse, diaries and recipes, within the framework of a government-binding model. The parametric setting in the core grammar of English with respect to root sentence subjects can be relaxed under certain conditions by positing that an empty category in the subject NP position can be bound to a non-overt topic NP in the sentence specifier position, which is also the position to which *wh*–elements and other topicalized elements can be moved just as long as they are maximal projections.

What is interesting about Haegeman's analysis for our present purposes is that with respect to one of her examples she suggests that certain linguistic elements may occur to the left of a non-overt topic in the specifier position. These are typically connectives such as *and, but, so* and *because (cos)*, and adverbs like *well, anyway, now*, etc., all of which Schiffrin and Fraser analyze as discourse markers. In Watts (1991) I have carried this argument further to show that the specifier position could not possibly be occupied by these elements, since they may also occur in subjectless sentences. It follows from this argument that there must be a syntactic position lying to the left of the CP available for metapragmatic terms like commentary markers. In this initial position, all commentary markers identified by Fraser, whether attitudinal like *frankly*, modal like *certainly*, those which signal the source of information (e.g. *according to her*, cf. Fraser 1990, 390f.), those which mitigate unpleasant responses or minimize upcoming impositions, or the more narrow set that Fraser has termed discourse markers (i.e. those that signal a discourse relationship), modify the discourse in one way or another. They serve to guide the addressee's reaction to what is about to be said.

By the same token, it follows that there must also be a syntactic position available for such elements to the right of the CP. The metapragmatic

terms occupying this position instruct the hearer to focus on the last assumption made and to process it in specific ways with old assumptions. In Watts (1989c) I have suggested, following Schiffrin's analysis (1987), that metapragmatic terms occurring as lefthand brackets are processed automatically, but that speakers are very aware of the occurrence of righthand brackets. The evidence suggests that the sentence final position is perceptually far more salient than the sentence initial position. The parenthetical position is available for a speaker to interrupt the structure s/he is currently developing and to focus specifically on the part of the overall structure to follow. Discourse markers in this position, in other words, function rather like lefthand discourse brackets instructing the hearer to focus specifically on the upcoming part of the overall structure.

But why is it necessary to provide a syntactic explanation for commentary markers? Is it not sufficient simply to recognize the fact that in English at least they lie outside the scope of current syntactic theories and to concentrate one's efforts on defining their metapragmatic functions? There are five reasons why I consider it necessary to give a syntactic account of commentary markers. First, it is clear that they differ from the set of interjections, which Fraser takes to be "not part of a sentence, but [...] an entirely separate 'sentence', an expression (usually but not always a single word) which encodes an entire basic message typically involving the speaker's emotional state" (1990, 391). Thus commentary markers do not encode a message independent of other utterances prior to them or following them in the discourse, and an adequate linguistic account of them must take into consideration the ways in which they are linked to propositional structure. Second, they display regularities of occurrence in relation to utterances with a propositional structure which indicate that they form part of the speaker's linguistic competence, regardless of the fact that they encode pragmatic rather than content meaning. Third, equivalent expressions in languages like German and Dutch generally occur sentence-internally.[6] Fourth, and as a corollary to the third point, a refusal to consider how they might be integrated into some form of syntactic description of the language concerned is not only tantamount to a rejection of the need to account somehow for the native speaker's linguistic competence, but it also merely exacerbates the widening gap between particle research and discourse marker research which it is the major purpose of this paper to stress and to narrow. Fifth, insistence on a purely pragmatic consideration of commentary

[6] This is of course not always the case. They can sometimes occur in utterance prefacing positions or be generated as tone units in their own right—as in English.

markers is likely to lead to an insistence that whatever is posited as the core meaning of a commentary marker does not necessarily have anything in common with that expression's content meaning when it appears in propositional structure.

I shall deal with questions of meaning in the following section. One further comment is in order here, however. An attempt to account for pragmatic markers syntactically does not necessarily imply that this is done within one theoretical framework only. I have chosen to consider them from the point of view of a government-binding model of syntax, but I am equally convinced that more intensive work along these lines, at least for English, will eventually lead to a radically different approach to syntax from that common to this model. That particular discussion, however, lies outside the scope of the present paper.

4. Content meaning and pragmatic meaning

Fraser (1990) makes a clear distinction between content meaning, i.e. "a more or less explicit representation of some state of the world that the speaker intends to bring to the hearer's attention by way of the literal interpretation of the sentence" (1990, 385), and pragmatic meaning, i.e. what the speaker intends to communicate beyond that which is interpretable from content meaning. Pragmatic meaning, however, is always inferable within the context of language usage. Sentences only have pragmatic meaning as utterances, or at least as potential utterances.

In a sentence like *John shut the door* the meaning of every individual lexeme and phrase is underdetermined. The proper name *John* indexes a potential individual, but whether that individual is human or animal (it is after all possible to train chimpanzees and other animals to shut doors) or whether that individual is male or female (I remind readers of a Johnny Cash song entitled "A boy named Sue") does not belong to the content meaning of *John*. The past tense verb form *shut* indexes a particular kind of activity which has been completed, i.e. is temporally distant from discourse time, but the fact of its being temporally distant is not immediately indexed by the "past tense" form itself despite our use of the term "past", nor is the activity indexed to a specific point in past time. In the NP *the door* the determiner *the* specifies the referent indexed by the noun *door* to be in some sense within the mutually shared knowledge of the speaker and the hearer. In this sense it only really has meaning by virtue of being used in an utterance context. It would be very difficult indeed to argue that it has any real content meaning.

The underdeterminedness of content meaning is a characteristic of human language, such that in the process of verbal communication the addressee is continually involved in deriving from the propositional structure of language input possible inferences which will allow her/him to derive a maximally relevant interpretation of the speaker's communicative intentions. As Blakemore (1987) suggests, language input is structured in such a way as to allow the addressee to derive from it, as well as from other systems of perceptual input, a logical proposition which can be enriched into a full cognitive representation by applying logical processes of inference to it in the context of already present cognitive representations. The less the effort needed to derive cognitive representations which significantly enrich the addressee's knowledge within the context of the ongoing discourse, the more relevant the utterance may be said to be (cf. Sperber–Wilson 1986).

Looked at from the perspective of cognition and communication, therefore, it is not at all sure that a real distinction can be made between content meaning and pragmatic meaning. It follows that the claim that discourse markers have a core pragmatic meaning which does not necessarily have anything in common with their content meaning when used as members of syntactic categories within sentence structure becomes rather tenuous. But it also follows that if expressions are used as a preface to or a coda of propositions (i.e. as lefthand and righthand discourse brackets) as they most frequently are in English, they are automatically interpreted pragmatically. Through their use the addressee is given explicit clues as to how s/he should interpret the language input in order to form cognitive representations. There is, however, no reason why such expressions should not come as an integral part of propositional structure, as they most frequently do in German and Dutch.

To illustrate that the principle of underdeterminedness of meaning may allow us to discover a minimal content core meaning which can serve to guide the process of pragmatic interpretation, let us briefly consider the case of *well*, which has been the object of several researchers' attention. *Well* can occur as an adjective, as in (1), an adverb, as in (2) and (3), and a discourse marker (although, I maintain, still as a member of the syntactic category "adverb"), as in (4):

(1) You're looking well.

(2) John drives well.

(3) I can well understand why you don't want to come.

(4) (a) Well, I understand why you don't want to come.
(b) I understand, well, why you don't want to come.

In each case I shall maintain that *well* is a member of the major category A[+N,+V], although it can never be used to modify the head of a noun phrase. Thus a sentence like (5) is not possible:

(5) *John is a well man.

The interpretation of *well* in (1) as meaning "healthy" is a clear case of underdetermined meaning. Since the only place where *well* may occur adjectivally is as the predicate of a copula verb, it is evident that some core content meaning has been conventionally extended to index the same state of affairs as "healthy" or "fit". It is after all also possible to have a sentence like (6):

(6) You're looking good.

in which the meaning of the adjective *good* is similarly underdetermined. Since *good* cannot function to modify predicates, its place is conveniently taken by *well*. Hence the minimal content meaning of both lexemes must be very similar (cf. example (2)).

In (3) *well* modifies either the whole VP *understand why you don't want to come* or merely the verb *understand*. With verbs of cognition like *understand, know, believe, appreciate*, etc. *well* is conventionally interpreted to mean something like "easily", from which the addressee can infer the speaker's empathy or solidarity. Once again, this meaning is inferable from a minimal core meaning of *well/good*.

Fraser suggests that *well* in (4a) is used as a discourse marker to signal upcoming dissonance, whereas it is simply a pause marker in (4b). Several other suggestions have been made with respect to the function of *well* as a discourse marker.[7] Since *well* never occurs as a righthand discourse bracket, it seems more reasonable to suggest that when it occurs outside the propositional structure, either in the initial position as in (4a) or in a parenthetical position as in (4b), it has as its pragmatic scope the upcoming proposition or part of the upcoming proposition. The interpretation of *well* as a pause marker does not make much sense if we consider either that a parenthetical insertion invariably causes an intonational break which often cooccurs with a pause or that the

[7] Watts (1987) discusses three approaches and suggests an alternative analysis which may also be understood as a relevance-theoretic approach.

pause is made deliberately in order to insert the lexeme *well*. Interpreting *well* as a pause marker reduces it to the level of a non-lexical phonetic segment like *er*, i.e. empties it entirely of meaning.

I shall argue that the minimal core meaning of both *well* and *good* can be glossed as something like "the speaker expresses a positive assessment of x". The degree to which and the way in which x is positively assessed will rely entirely on how the addressee can enrich the proposition by means of inferential processes to derive a maximally relevant cognitive representation.

In the case of the discourse marker use of *well* I suggest that the proposition within its scope is interpretable as being positively assessed, but that the nature of that assessment relies on the ability of the addressee to enrich the proposition inferentially to reach a maximally relevant cognitive representation. The implication here is that the speaker is certainly making an utterance to which s/he can adopt a positive stance but that the full relevance of that utterance will not be derivable from the content meaning of the utterance alone. I shall therefore suggest that the minimal core meaning of a lexeme such as *well* on the level of content meaning is still present, in however opaque a form, on the level of pragmatic meaning. In the following section I shall illustrate this with an analysis of the lexemes *actually*, *basically* and *really*, which in accordance with Fraser's taxonomy of commentary markers can be considered as pragmatic markers indicating the degree to which both speaker and addressee can have "confidence in the accuracy of the following content message", i.e. as modal markers.

5. An analysis of *actually*, *really* and *basically*

In this section I shall focus on the three English lexemes *actually*, *really* and *basically*. The data on which my analysis is based are taken from approximately ten hours of verbal interaction recorded during social activities which I have described elsewhere (Watts 1989c) as family gatherings. The participants are all members of my extended family and, apart from ninety minutes of the overall total, I was a participant observer. All the recordings were made using a Sony walkman with a built-in microphone with a recording range of roughly three metres. The instances of *actually*, *really* and *basically* to be discussed were taken from a forty-five minute stretch of interaction, which I consider typical of the family discourse that I have collected from the British side of my family.

Actually, *really* and *basically* appear to be fairly similar in meaning and by virtue of their morphological derivation from the adjectives *actual, real* and *basic* may be assigned to the major category A[+N,+V]. They may occupy four different syntactic positions in an ongoing utterance, sentence internal (generally as a modifier in the auxiliary complex, which in the government–binding model of generative syntax is taken to be part of the INFL component and considered to be the head of the sentence), sentence initial as lefthand discourse brackets (to the left of the sentence specifier position, so that utterances such as *Really can't say* and *Actually don't remember what he said* are possible, although rare in the present data), sentence final as righthand discourse brackets (to the right of the core sentence in what might also be called an adjunct position, e.g. *It's too late now basically* or *I can't understand them really*) and parenthetically (in certain sentence positions, but separated in oral discourse from the syntactic constituents to the left and right by clear intonational breaks, e.g. *And they did, basically, a circle*). In addition they may also occur as tone units in their own right, i.e. as isolated elements with rather specific intonation contours (e.g. *Really?* or *Basically, yes.*).

In sentence initial or sentence final position they may also occur as tone units, i.e. there may be a distinct intonational break between them and the rest of the sentence (e.g. *Actually, I find it difficult to see how the British could/ I/ the tourists can get into Gibraltar* or *He'd go in as an ordinary seaman, basically*). I shall argue that from a syntactic point of there is no difference between their occurrence as sentence initial and sentence final elements with no clear prosodic break from the rest of the sentence and their occurrence as preceding or following tone units (i.e. as lefthand and righthand discourse brackets) or as parenthetical elements.

However, despite the fact that from the point of view of content meaning their lexical contribution to the utterance is probably greater in the sentence internal position, I shall argue that in all positions their pragmatic meaning as commentary markers is derivable from and more important than their semantic core meaning.

All three lexemes relate what the speaker is contributing to the topic, the assumptions s/he is making, to previous or already held assumptions and thus help to guide the further development of the topic. Topic development displays the degree to which an individual group member is able to maintain, enhance or perhaps even damage her/his standing (or status) in the emergent network of interpersonal relationships that is being enacted through the ongoing discourse. They are thus key elements not only in creating topical cohesion in the

discourse, but also in allowing the participants in the discourse to structure the interaction socially.

Consider first the following short extract from the data. Immediately prior to the speaker's turn, the participants in the verbal interaction have been discussing why fish and chip shops are not usually found in Europe outside the British Isles. The speaker then says that when he was serving in the navy in Gibraltar, he noted that there were no fish and chip shops there, which evinces general surprise and leads him to continue as follows:

(7) Well, that- that's what all the troops were complaining about, you see. Which made it/(0.8) somebody over here have the idea (0.6) that- that/ you know, they were looking/ you know, a gold mine (0.7) basically.

Extract (7) contains five examples of what Schiffrin (1987) and Fraser (1990) would call discourse (or pragmatic) markers, one occurrence each of *well, you see* and *basically* and two of *you know*. In addition there are three unfilled pauses of 0.8 secs., 0.7 secs. and 0.6. secs. duration. The speaker self corrects once, changing the pronoun *it* to the NP *somebody over here*, breaks off a syntactic structure twice (*which made somebody over here have the idea that/ and they were looking/*), repeats himself twice on the demonstrative *that* and finally gives the NP *a gold mine* in place of a full sentence.

Nevertheless, despite the apparent dysfluency of the turn, communication is achieved, and I shall argue that it is achieved largely through the discourse markers. The data of oral performance contain metapragmatic terms which permit the hearer(s) to process information in specific ways and to infer assumptions which add significantly to those already held and/or to strengthen the value of one or several of those assumptions. Oral interaction involves instantaneous cognitive processing, and most of this is below the level of consciousness. Thus, it is crucially important as an addressee to receive instructions about what to focus on, what to ignore, what to hold in and what to erase from short-term memory. The discourse markers in (7) function in this way, although the instructions they encode are different and apart from those encoded by *actually*, *really* and *basically* will not concern us further here.

Let us begin the discussion of *actually*, *really* and *basically* by considering their syntactic status. Apart from standing alone, they may occupy four different syntactic positions, sentence initial, sentence final, sentence internal and parenthetical. A range of examples is given below:

Sentence initial (with or without a prosodic break)

(8) And they said, "Well, *really*, you- you- you- you *really* ought not to go in."

(9) *Actually*, I find it difficult to see how the (0.7) British could/(0.8) I/ the tourists can get into Gibraltar.

(10) I mean they had one episode there where/ with the :er(.): *basically* all about the doings of the vicar, on board a ship.

In (8) the marker *well* functions to signal that the upcoming assumption should be processed by the hearer as a direct quote of what the person said but that its full relevance is to be gained by enriching the proposition by processes of inference into a full cognitive representation (cf. section 4). Thus *really* is in effect the first element to the left of the following sentence structure. In (10) the speaker tries twice to complete a syntactic structure but without success, so that *basically* prefaces the phrasal structure to its right.

Sentence final (with or without a prosodic break)

(11) It's too late now *basically*.

(12) I can't understand them *really*.

(13) The chips were quite nice *actually*.

Sentence internal

(14) I said, "You say it again, what you *actually* said."

(15) Because I think P will *basically* turn round and say, "Well (0.9) if you don't move (0.6) I'm not taking you."

(16) I don't see/(0.9) *really* see any difference in the "Nationwide".

Parenthetical (the forty-five minute corpus does not contain any examples of *really* or *actually* in this position, although there are occurrences in the overall ten-hour corpus)

(17) And if, *basically*, they didn't send you to sea, they (0.7) did jobs/ they did/ you- you did jobs at :er(.): barracks.

Consider the following examples from the data:

(18) Eighty pound the cot was. Yeah. And they *actually* got one for forty-nine.

(19) Course all the- all the- the *really* good British comedies are all finished *really*, aren't they?

(20 = 15) Because I think P will *basically* turn round and say, "Well (0.9) (0.9) if you don't move (0.6) I'm not taking you."

It seems reasonable to suggest that in (18), (19) and (20) *actually*, *really* and *basically* are generated within the VP (in the case of *actually* and *basically* in (18) and (20)) or in the adjective phrase (in the case of *really* in (19)) and that they function as modifiers. Thus the scope of modification for *actually* in (18) must be *got one for forty-nine*, for *really* in (19) *good*, and for *basically* in (20) *turn round and say...*

Two questions may be asked at this point. What is the semantic contribution of each of these elements in the modifying functions they perform sentence internally, i.e. what is their core content meaning, and is there any difference between these contributions and those that they make as metapragmatic terms sentence externally? The meanings of all three lexemes are fairly close, denoting something like genuineness, honesty, fundamentality or even truth. However, it is in the sentence internal position that subtle differences can be discerned. If we insert *really* in place of *actually* in (18), we convey the impression that some other price was given for the cot that was purchased than forty-nine pounds. If we insert *basically*, we convey the impression that the price may in fact have been a little more or less than forty-nine pounds. *Actually*, on the other hand, guarantees that the genuine price that they paid on the occasion of buying the cot was forty-nine pounds rather than the price of eighty pounds that the purchasers had seen for another cot.

Thus, although the fundamental meaning of all three lexemes appears to be something like "genuine, real, basic", the logical information found at each lexical address is that further assumptions should be inferred, and that these will be different for each lexeme. For *actually* we may posit that the assumption within its scope, e.g. in (18) the fact that the cot was bought for forty-nine pounds, was true at one particular point in past time (which the speaker does not further specify) but not necessarily at any other point in time. For *really* we may posit that the assumption within its scope, e.g. in (19) that the assessment *good* may be made of British comedies, does not always hold. The inference in (19) is that some British comedies are classified as good that do not deserve that assessment. In the case of *really* there is thus always an alternative assumption, which accounts for its occurrence as a tone unit in its own right used to query the validity of a prior assumption, as in (21):

(21) S These were taken through the windows of the coach.
B *Really*?

Neither *actually* nor *basically* could substitute for *really* in (21).

For *basically* we may posit that the assumption within its scope is more or less valid, but that the hearer should allow for a certain amount of variability. Hence in (20) *actually* and *really* could substitute for *basically*. If we were to insert *actually* in place of *basically*, the speaker would then guarantee the truth of the assumption at some point in the future and not leave room for any other assumption. If we inserted *really*, the speaker would then indicate to the addressee that there is another alternative, which is being excluded by the use of *basically*.

The subtle differences just suggested between the three lexemes *actually*, *really* and *basically* are not part of the core content meaning, but they concern rather the types of inference permissible on the basis of that core meaning by the addressee on the assumption(s) within the scope of the lexemes. They indicate that certain types of assumption may be derived from parts of the linguistic input and they thus guide the hearer in assessing the way in which s/he should process the new information. In this sense they are metapragmatic markers guiding the search for relevance. Whether they occur sentence internally or as lefthand or righthand discourse brackets, the propositional structure immediately following them or immediately prior to them will contain the assumption that should be processed not only in accordance with a core content meaning, but also and more importantly in terms of pragmatic meaning, i.e. in terms of the logical operations to which that assumption should be submitted.

I therefore maintain that the function of this type of commentary marker will always be to modify some propositional structure or part of it. The structure itself may be internal to a CP, a whole CP or some other phrasal or clausal structure standing not in a CP but on its own. The purpose of the modification, however, is to indicate to the addressee(s) how the process of pragmatic interpretation should proceed. A grammar of English—and by extension the argument must carry over to the grammars of languages like German and Dutch with respect to the so-called particles—need only allow for syntactic positions beyond the structure of the CP and with respect to those elements which may occur in those positions for well defined positions inside the CP, either parenthetically or not. The syntactic description of German and Dutch positively requires that most of these elements be accounted for within a theoretical syntactic framework. The fact that both languages, being

essentially verb-final, contain a so-called "middle field" which will allow for the generation of metapragmatic elements sentence internally merely stresses the need to extend the syntax of English beyond its present limitations, and no amount of pretending that the "well"s, "you know"s, "anyway"s, "really"s etc. of oral performance data are not within the scope of a sentence grammar will do. The three elements presented here may occur sentence internally and will therefore require the syntactician to provide an adequate explanation for their occurrence anyway.

6. Conclusion

I have suggested that some form of sensible fusion between syntax and pragmatics can be achieved if we resort to a theory of relevance, as I have implicitly done throughout this paper. If we consider utterances to constitute linguistic input to the central processing component of the brain, that input must be structured in accordance with the grammar of the language concerned even though it may be incomplete and contain a number of false starts. In general we are very good at filtering the "noise" out of the data, precisely because, as Sperber–Wilson (1987) and Blakemore (1987) suggest, we need to convert that input, like all other perceptually structured input, into propositional structure to make it available for processes of inferencing on the basis of old information. To make the conversion into propositional structure possible we need to access all the encyclopaedic and logical information derivable from the input. Part of that information will be metapragmatic, i.e. instructions on how to process the assumptions derived from the input. In this paper I have dealt with three adverbs in English—and I see no reason why we should not continue to classify them as such from the point of view of syntactic categories—and have shown how they may function both inside and outside canonical sentence structure in English to focus attention on syntactic structures from which assumptions may be derived. I have argued that in focussing the hearer's attention on those structures, they also guide the ways in which the hearer may assess degrees of relevance. I have given an informal account of their syntax and of the metapragmatic functions they fulfil. A more detailed formal account is of course necessary, but cannot be given within the framework of one short paper. There remains no doubt in my mind, however, that it can be given.

I should nevertheless prefer to end this paper on a note of warning. It would be a mistake to conceptualize metapragmatics as a level of linguistic

description beyond pragmatics. There are two reasons for making this claim. First, it is not possible to conceive of an utterance in real time and in a real discourse context as totally neutral, i.e. as not in some way containing an indication of the utterer's involvement with what s/he says and as not being directed at some interlocutor within some form of social interaction. The only linguistic objects that are purportedly neutral in this way are not utterances but sentences or sentence fragments, and these exist, if at all, only in the clinically sterile abstraction of linguistic theory. All language, if we conceive of it as something learnt and used by human beings, is dialogic. Every utterance, as Sperber–Wilson (1986) argue, comes with its own guarantee of relevance and requires interpretation of some kind. If this is so, it must have some metapragmatic import.

Second, even if we were to try to locate metapragmatics in some form of extended linguistic model, the very fact that those elements may occur, for example, as the choice of one grammatical structure or linguistic expression over another, as grammaticalized honorific forms, as sentence internal adverbs, as sentence connectives, parenthetical phrases, indirect speech acts, as pragmatic markers of various kinds, as pre-sentential verbal structures or tag questions, as intonation and rhythmic patterning, tempo, volume and silence, as co-occurrent kinesic signals, to name but a number of subsets of possible elements, would simply make a mockery of the attempt.

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LEXICAL HEDGES AND NON-COMMITTAL TERMS

YAEL ZIV

1. Introduction

Languages provide a variety of means of expressing non-commitment with respect to the content of a given message. In this paper I will investigate a lexical hedge in Colloquial Israeli Hebrew (CIH) which is functional in expressing lack of commitment and in modifying speech acts and manifests metacommunicative awareness. The account proposed utilizes some non-ad-hoc version of the Gricean maxims and constitutes an attempt at a principled explanation of the relevant linguistic phenomena.[1]

CIH has recently witnessed the introduction in the speech of many youngsters of certain lexical hedges sharing a common non-committal force. Lexical items which otherwise function as a subordinating conjunction "as if" (*ke'ilu*), an adjective or an intensifier "like this" (*kaze*) and an adverbial "in this manner" (*kaxa*), as in the following sentences, respectively,

(1) hu hitnaheg ke'ilu hu lo makir oti
he behaved as if he (does) not know me

(2) (a) hu gar bebayit kaze
he lives in a house like this

(2) (b) hu kaze xaxam
he so/such/like this smart

(3) kaxa ani oved
this way I work

display different distributional constraints and significantly distinct semantic and pragmatic characteristics in their recent "hedgy" usages. In these latter uses, the items under consideration function as adverbials and show properties which, presumably, have evolved from their more conventional uses. The following sentences may constitute examples of their special adverbial use.

[1] I should like to thank my student Ayelet Sackstein, whose seminar paper on the minimizing *kaze* helped crystalize my conception of the topic, and my colleague Joe Taglicht for his helpful comments on some of the issues raised here.

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(4) ani yaxol ke'ilu lalexet matay sheani roce
I can as if/sort of to go whenever I want

(5) hitragashti kaze velo yaxolti lazuz
I got excited like this/kind of and not I could move
(=and I could not move)

(6) az ani roce kaxa lalexet vehu matxil ledaber
so I want this way/sort of to go and he starts to talk

As might be expected, the distributions of the different adverbials are not identical; still, they all indicate lack of commitment. The commitment in question may be pertinent to the truth, accuracy or appropriateness of the utterance or a relevant part of it. In sentences such as those in (4)–(6) their use has the effect of signalling to the addressee that the propositional content of the sentence need not be taken literally, and the most insightful approximation of their meaning would be akin to "sort of".

In this paper I will restrict my attention to one of these items *kaze* ('such', 'kind of'), in an attempt to shed light on its special meta-communicative characteristics and on the over-all treatment within our pragmatic theory of such lexical hedges.[2]

2. *kaze* – syntactic and semantic properties

2.1. Syntactic characterization

As an adjective *kaze* displays the characteristic agreement with the noun which it modifies and may either precede or follow it as in the examples below:

(7) (a) bayit kaze
house(M) like this (M)

(7) (a') kaze bayit
such (M.SG) house

[2] The American English colloquial use of *like*, the Norwegian use of *lisom* and the use of *kao* in Serbo-Croatian appear to display some of the pragmatic characteristics which our instances of *kaze* exhibit.

The semantic similarity between the various items and the apparent pragmatic correspondence in their extensions is indicative of a natural tendency for such developments, under the reasonable assumption that these are independent linguistic phenomena. (I am indebted to Th. Fretheim and to V. Polovina for the data on Norwegian and Serbo-Croatian, respectively.) In Japanese, a related extension is evident with the use of *tyotto* 'a little' as a similar lexical hedge (cf. Matsumoto 1990).

(7) (b) agada kazot
legend(F) like this (F)
(7) (c) batim kaele / kaelu
houses(M.PL) like these(PL)
(7) (d) agadot kaele / kaelu
legends(F.PL) like these

In its newly acquired use as an adverbial *kaze* naturally ceases to manifest the various morphological realizations in the feminine and in the plural and occurs invariably as *kaze*.

The two instances of *kaze* differ also in their potential for accentuation. Only the adjectival, the so-called "original", *kaze* can be accented, the new adverbial item cannot be accented.

Syntactically, the adverbial in question shows distributional properties that place it under what Quirk *et al.* (1985) refer to as 'subjunct', namely, an adverbial which, like a disjunct, cannot be the focus of a cleft construction, an alternative interrogative, or a restricting subjunct like 'only'.[3]
It pre or post modifies whole VP's as in:
[ ] indicates material in the scope of *kaze*

(8) bahatxala ze [hevix oti] kaze (*taatuon* p. 15)
at the beginning it [embarrassed me] sort of/like this
(9) (a) ani tamid kaze [carix sheyidxafu oti kcat] (*taatuon* p. 36)
I always sort of [need that will push (PL) me a little]
(9) (b) im mishehu holex kaze [liftoax xanut mircono] (*taatuon* p. 13)
if anybody goes sort of [to open a store out of will]

It may occur between the main verb and its non-pronominal direct object post-modifying the main verb as in:

(10) sheanaxnu yexolim [lehafxid] kaze et habecim shelahem
that we can [to frighten] like ACC the balls their
(*taatuon* p. 12)

When the direct object is a pronoun *kaze* follows it, as in:

(11) [lakxu oto] kaze al alunka mishama (*taatuon* p. 62)
took(PL) him like on a stretcher from there

[3] The impossibility of the occurrence of *kaze* in these positions is clearly predicted by its non-accentuation.

Where the main verb occurs with some other complements or adjuncts *kaze* precedes the complements or adjuncts as in:

(12) (a) ma, caak ecyon, mitparec kaze [baalicut] ladvarim shelo
what shouted Ezion bursting like [gayly] to the words his
(*taatuon* p. 56)

(12) (b) mipney [sheze lo histader] kaze im hadmut shelo (*taatuon* p. 56)
because [it not work out] like with his image

It may modify certain descriptive adverbials or adjectives functioning predicatively as in:

(13) haknisa elav[mugefet] kaze besorgey barzel (*taatuon* p. 43)
the entrance to it [closed] like with iron bars[4]

These distributional properties of *kaze*, thus, strongly suggest that it is functional in modifying the predicative entities. The fact that it cannot occur sentence initially seems to corroborate this hypothesis, under the assumption that it must be an immediate neighbour of the entities within its scope.[5]

2.2. Semantic properties

Semantically, the adjectival *kaze* means 'like this', 'such', while its adverbial use acquired the meaning 'kind of', 'roughly speaking', 'approximately'. As such, it serves to modify the meaning of the items within its scope: the immediately preceding or immediately following entity. The conceptual content added by *kaze* to the sentence is, clearly, truth conditionally relevant, for the

[4] An interesting distributional characteristics is its potential double occurrence, once preceding and the other time following a given entity, as in:

(i) and Ezion turned to him kaze muxan lehakot kaze (*taatuon* p. 34)
sort of ready to hit kind of

The two instances of *kaze* differ in scope, such that one of them is properly included in the scope of the other.

[5] The only apparent exceptions occur in sentences or clauses with elliptical subjects, thereby, again, modifying the predicative part of the sentence. Consider:

(i) ima hayta kazoti tmima. kaze heemina, ana aref,
mother was such naive. like believed, I know,
bacad hatov shel haarvim
in the side the good of the Arabs

propositional content of the sentence in question is affected by the hedging effect of the adverbial under consideration.[6]

Consider its uses in the following examples:

(14) and the American... can feel great.. shehu megane kaze
that he reproaches sort of
et hamakim vetomex bamukim (*taatuon* p. 39)
ACC the beaters and supports the beaten

(15) and I see the face of the stabber .... merutashot kaze
smashed sort of (*taatuon* p. 36)

(16) ..shoxev al haarec uvoxe kaze (*taatuon* p. 38)
lying on the ground and crying like

In these instances the speaker provides a description of an activity or an attribute of some object and chooses to present his characterizations using hedged terminology. The natural expectation in such cases would, presumably, be that terms of a scalar nature would be thus characterizable, so that the item in question would be modified in terms of the relative position which it occupies on the relevant scale.
Instances like:

(17) we are talking bekol ram kaze (*taatuon* p. 11)
in a voice loud sort of

(18) hu yafe kaze
he handsome sort of

where *kaze* seems to function as a diminisher of a nonexact type, indeed, occur, but the use of *kaze* does not require that the entities which it modifies be scalar, rather, it seems to impose a hedged sense on the items in question. Thus, examples like (14) and (16) above and (19) following

(19) (a) loxacim yadayim kaze (*taatuon* p. 39)
pressing hands like

(19) (b) vekonfino nisa lenaer oto kaze (*taatuon* p. 41)
and Konfino tried to shake him sort of

abound. Presumably, the type of hedged description evident in such non-scalar cases serves an important communicative need—the speaker's option

[6] I will not elaborate here on the semantic properties and status of hedges, but, presumably, some version of fuzzy logic of the type proposed in Lakoff (1972) will have to be adopted to account for the meaning of such lexical items.

not to have to commit himself to any definite, precise characterization, if he so wishes.[7]

The Gricean maxim of Quality dictates that the speaker should not say that which he believes to be false and that for which he lacks adequate evidence. Making imprecise, and under substantiated statements, thus, constitutes a blatant violation of the Cooperative Principle. Using an explicit hedge is, therefore a very useful conversational tool to avoid violating the CP. It is not the case, then, that the speaker cannot attempt to venture an opinion on or to provide an assessment of a given topic tentatively, it is only the case that such tentativeness in expressing his opinion ought to be explicitly indicated. Diminishers such as *kaze* function in expressing this tentativeness.[8,9]

[7] This semantic characterization predicts the ill-formedness of such sentences as:

(i) exad veod exad hem shnayim * kaze
one plus one are two sort of

The hedgy *kaze* cannot co-occur with such well-known, non-controvertial truths. It seems that there is no relevant sense in which the speaker could be hedging in such cases, under normal assumptions. Not surprisingly, Matsumoto (1990) notes independently that the Japanese counterpart of (i) with *tyotto* 'little' as the lexical hedge is just as infelicitous. However, she points out an interesting context where such sentences may become felicitous. This is the case where the speaker is correcting the addresse's mistake in the addition operation and is attempting to mitigate the effect of his utterance by presenting it in a "softened" apologetic manner, akin to "if I may say so". Note that here it is not the propositional content that is being modified but, rather, the speech act itself.

[8] At this point it may be interesting to speculate about the nature of the semantic alternatives designating tentativeness. Expressions such as "I'm not sure", "maybe", "probably" and the like are not as versatile in terms of distribution and wear the tentativeness on their sleeves. *Kaze* is a lot looser and its distributional properties make it considerably more functional in CIH.

[9] The lack of commitment evident in the use of *kaze* is, sometimes, utilized to avoid specification in a particular context, for reasons of ignorance, irrelevance or even in order to conceal some information. The following example shows this use:

(i) halaxti barxov kaze
I walked in the street sort of (=with no particular specification of the activity)

The sentence in (i) seems to convey a meaning similar to that of

(ii) stam halaxti barxov
just I walked in the street (with no particular reason or purpose)

3. Pragmatic characterization

The semantic–pragmatic characterization adopted here presupposes a well-defined function which is non-arbitrarily assigned to *kaze*. The straw-man proposal that *kaze* is a discourse entity whose sole function is "gaining time" as a kind of hesitation marker, is easily counterevidenced by its disributional constraints, on the one hand, and its non substitutability, on the other. Thus,the idea that *kaze* is a mere hesitation marker that is utilized as a filler in instances where the speaker is still undecided as to what it is that he wants to say would make the wrong predictions that it ought to be possible to insert it in any position that would be available for hesitation phenomena markers. Such is not the case. (Cf. Maclay–Osgood (1959) where the distributions of a variety of hesitation phenomena markers e.g. pauses—filled and unfilled—repeats and false starts are discussed.) The fact that *kaze* can occur as a post-modifier in sentence final position indicates that it is not a "filler" in these cases. If we assume that some other instances of *kaze* could fulfil the filler role, then we would have to explain their non-substitutability with other hesitation phenomena markers. Thus, there must be something unique about the occurrence of *kaze* and the only sound assumption consistent with these facts is that it contributes semantic content to the sentence.[10]

In what follows I will show that in addition to its semantic "hedginess" *kaze* is functional in the modification of speech acts as well. It is used as a mitigating device. This pragmatic function will be examined in some detail and an attempt will be made to show that the meta-communicative properties associated with *kaze* follow from its semantic characteristics. The claim about such extensions of meanings will be corroborated by parallel developments both in the case of related lexical items in Hebrew and in instances of the counterpart or related lexical entities in other languages (cf. fn. 2).

The occurrence of *kaze*–like lexical items in sentences such as :

(20) at muxana kaze / ke'ilu laazor li?
you ready sort of / as if to help me

[10] It is interesting to note in this context that even the lexical item *well* which shows up in a variety of positions in the discourse in the guise of a filler, is not, in fact, a mere filler. It turns out that there are two distinct items *well* and that they differ in their discourse function. One of them displays properties that are associated with a predictable semantic content which is not in free variation with other hesitation phenomena markers (cf. Schiffrin (1985) and Gluckman (n.d.)).

is to be accounted for in terms other than the speaker's commitment to the truth or lack thereof of the propositional content of the sentence. Such sentences function as requests[11] and any account based on their truth would of course be inapplicable, in principle. Rather, the occurrence of *kaze* in such sentences is to be explained in terms of their illocutionary force. Thus, *kaze* can occur in sentences expressing requests as an indicator of the speaker's lack of commitment to the appropriateness of the request. The request could be judged inappropriate in terms of politeness, for example. The speaker could be assumed to have taken the liberty of requesting something he should normally not have asked for, potentially from someone who it is presumptuous of him to assume would comply with his request. The same is true in the case of questions, where the appropriateness status of the question at hand may call for a softener. Thus, if the question under consideration is in some sense in violation of normal assumptions about appropriateness in a given context, then the subjunct *kaze* would indicate tentativeness, which would function as a mitigating device.[12] The prediction that we would make concerning the co-occurrence of *kaze* with questions is the following: only questions which could count as impositions would seem to allow the occurrence of *kaze*; sincere questions which do not seem to cause any embarrassment would disallow *kaze* in their domain. Thus compare:

(21) * matay hu magia kaze
when he arrives (=When does he arrive *kaze*?)

(22) at yexola kaze lehagid li lama lo bat?
you can to tell me why not came (2FM)
(Can you tell me *kaze* why you did not come?)

In (22) the speaker is making explicit his awareness of the potential embarassment in his question, no such embarrassment or inappropriateness is evident in (21), which constitutes a genuine request for information of a non-emotive type.

[11] I will make no claim here about the syntactic status of such sentences in CIH, whether they are to be analyzed as interrogatives differing from their counterpart declaratives solely by rising intonation or whether they are to be regarded as declaratives. Crucial in the present context is the range of potential illocutionary functions that they display, which, not surprisingly, is co-extensive with that shown by interrogative sentences in English, for example.

Incidentally, the literary Hebrew version of interrogatives with the particle *haim* is incompatible with the colloquial use of *kaze*

[12] In this context cf. Mittwoch (1979), where final parentheticals with questions are shown to have a modifying or correcting function with respect to the speech act performed.

The characterization of the pragmatic function of *kaze* as a mitigating device allows us to make the following prediction with respect to its distribution: *kaze* will not co-occur with orders. This prediction is indeed borne out, as is evident from the ill-formedness of sentences like

(23) * shev besheket kaze (* indicates infelicity)
sit still

The decisive and authoritarian nature of orders is incompatible with the attempt to mitigate them via some indications of inappropriatenss. Sentences with the explicit performative *mecave* 'order' such as

(24) ani mecave alexa lashevet besheket *kaze
I order (on) you to sit still

indicate this incompatibility even better.[13]

In trying to account for the various uses of *kaze* it becomes patently obvious that in addition to its semantic content, *kaze* exhibits pragmatic extensions of its originally conceptual content. The common denominator is an overt indication of the speaker's lack of commitment to the accuracy of the relevant description in or whole propositional content of the sentence in question or to the appropriateness of some aspect of the illocutionary force of the utterance under consideration. The over-all effect is, then, one of absolving the speaker of the responsibility for the absolute truth or appropriateness of his statement and as such it can function as a mitigation device.

A satisfactory account of the natural extension of the meaning of *kaze*, would consider its original sense. Thus *kaze* 'like this' expresses similarity. Similarity, as is well-known, is not an exact concept. It is clearly relativistic; similar in some respect (cf. Tversky–Gati 1978). Hence, it is close to the adjunct 'approximately'. The pragmatics of its non-committal use follows automatically from this semantic characterization. It is thus not surprising to find parallel developments in several unrelated languages (cf. fn. 2). In concluding, I would like to point out that the semantic minimization characteristic of *kaze* constitutes evidence for its meta-communicative nature. Any attempt by the speaker to qualify his description in terms of the appropriate linguistic expression is by definition evidence for meta-communicative awareness.

[13] Note that if the performative verb is modified e.g. 'I sort of order you to X' we may have a felicitous utterance, but we are certainly not dealing with a performative, but rather with a hedged performative.

4. Theoretical implications

The account I propose of such lexical hedges within our pragmatic theory utilizes a version of the Gricean maxims. Any such attempt at an over-all treatment will have to provide a non-ad-hoc explanation of the particular utilization of the pertinent super-maxim (Be Cooperative) with its corollary sub-maxims. A case can easily be made that the maxims of Quantity, Quality or Manner properly defined and extended can be adduced to account for the interpretation of the lexical hedge *kaze* in the case at hand. Thus, the maxim of Quantity with its subspecification whereby the speaker has to make his contribution as informative as but not more informative than is required could easily be shown to account for the relevant use of *kaze*. *Kaze* makes sure that the lack of specification evident in the context where it is used be acknowledged and as such would not constitute an instance of violation of the relevant maxim of informativeness of the Cooperative Principle (CP). In considering the Gricean maxim of Quality which dictates that the speaker's contribution ought to be true and be supported by adequate evidence it is clear that *kaze* is utilized in an attempt not to violate that maxim: using *kaze* the speaker explicitly indicates that he indeed lacks the appropriate type of evidence and that his contribution may not necessarily be accurate. The explicit indication is supposed to absolve him from the responsibility to abide by these criteria. The use of *kaze* is thus accounted for also by the maxim of quality.

As for the maxim of manner, here we seem to need a more liberal interpretation for the account to follow through. To start with, it is evident that this maxim is considerably vaguer than the others. So it is not surprising that we need to work harder to find a way to put it to use in explaining the properties of *kaze*. As a matter of fact, it is easier to show that the use of *kaze* stands in a blatant violation of this maxim. Thus, *kaze* introduces "obscurity of expression" due to its nonexact nature, which is missing from the sentence once it is not used. On the other hand, two other sub-maxims making up this maxim 'be brief' and 'be orderly' may be appealed to in our attempt to explain the pragmatics of *kaze*. Both sub-maxims could be shown to be operative when in place of suggesting at relative length that the speaker is providing his description tentatively, we simply use the lexical marker *kaze* (cf. fn. 8). Needless to say that a more sophisticated argument could be constructed with sufficient ingenuity, that would derive the properties of *kaze* from the maxim of manner. I do not wish to attempt such an account at this point, but I believe that my little excercise in this direction proved the ad-hoc nature of any such attempt

to account for the pragmatics of *kaze* on the basis of the various Gricean maxims. I thus hope to have established the need for a much tighter pragmatic framework within which such linguistic phenomena could be handled, in a principled manner.

Various theoretical alternatives to the Gricean maxims exist. The serious contenders in the context under examination are the Hornian (Horn 1972, 1985) and the Levensonian (Levenson 1987) versions which attempt to come up with an accurate and all-encompassing system of inferences. Thus, several specific hearer / speaker inferential principles are assumed to be operative in interpreting utterances. Still, adopting any of their proposed alternative apparatuses leaves us with the challenge of a non-ad-hoc assignment of the relevant principles. Such an assignment is not a trivial procedure and it requires independent motivation which is, apparently, still unavailable. This alternative therefore does not fair better as an explanation in the case at hand than the Gricean maxims.

Sperber–Wilson's (1986) Relevance Theory constitutes an alternative to the Gricean CP with its sub-maxims. The Relevance Principle, from which all the other Gricean Maxims are supposed to follow, measures informativity in terms of cognitive effort. Despite its attractiveness, it seems to be insufficient in cases where social considerations such as politeness are concerned. Since it only allows for cognitive factors to be involved in the determination of informativity, this theory will necessarily attribute an improbable cognitive content to otherwise purely social, interactional factors. The use of *kaze* as a mitigating device is just such an example. This lexical hedge expresses lack of commitment with respect to the appropriateness of the utterance in question in terms of politeness, inter alia. Such properties cannot be accounted for by any exclusively cognitively oriented approach, such as the Relevance Principle (cf. Ziv (1988) for an extensive discussion of this issue).

Kasher's (1976, 1982, 1987a, 1987b) Rationality Principle is another attempt to reduce the Gricean maxims to a single principle from which all the other maxims would follow. The principle of Rationality reads as follows: "Where there is no reason to assume the contrary, take the speaker to be a rational agent. His end and beliefs, in a context of utterance, should be assumed to supply a complete justification of his behaviour, unless there is evidence to the contrary." (1982, 33) This principle, which clearly takes social factors into account, can be shown to make the right kind of predictions with respect to the properties of *kaze* as evident in the current paper. Under the reasonable assumption (which underlies Kasher's proposal) that the

various Gricean Maxims follow from the Rationality principle,[14] it is easy to predict the characteristics of *kaze*. Just as we could predict its properties on the basis of the Gricean maxims of Quality and Quantity (see above) so it is possible to come up with an account in terms of the Rationality Principle. Here, though, we would not have a duplication in terms of explanatory principles, since the overriding principle of Rationality will be invoked. The only problem worth clarifying at this point is the apparent contradiction between the non-commitment evident in the use of *kaze* and the informativity requirement which is at the heart of any theory of inference, Kasher's Rationality theory constituting no exception.[15] Thus, the use of the hedgy, non-committal *kaze* would appear to counter the basic communicative need to convey a high degree of informativity. This conflict can be resolved if we assume that violations of the informativity requirement are less costly in social terms than are corresponding violations of truth and accountability, in the relevant social environment. And indeed, the extensive use of lexical hedges like *kaze* seems to corroborate the suggestion that we do in fact consider violations of truth and unsubstantiated statements worse socially than corresponding violations of fullfledged informativity. Given this state of affairs, there seems to be no contradiction between the rationality principle underlying human interaction and the general communicative principle of informativity. Accordingly, one need only be as informative as is possible under reasonable assumptions, without making any "irrational" social move, where by "irrational" is meant violating the Rationality Principle.[16] In other words, the socially oriented Rationality principle would seem to make the correct predictions even with respect to apparent violations of the basic informativity requirement.

We have thus shown that lexical hedges such as CIH *kaze* the function of which is to mitigate the speech act or to constitute markers of tentativeness can be accounted for insightfully by invoking a version of the Gricean maxims which makes use of an overall Rationality Principle.

[14] In Ziv (1988) I argue that Relevance cannot follow from Kasher's Rationality Principle.

[15] Note that whether Relevance is derived from Rationality a' la Kasher, or whether it has to be established as an independent principle alongside Rationality (as I claim in Ziv (1988)), is immaterial with respect to the issue at hand. In both cases it is clear that informativity (which underlies Relevance) is a primary requirement in any theory of human inference.

[16] In this context cf. Kasher (1988) where apparent violations of the requirement on informativity quoted by Keenan (1976) are resolved in a similar fashion.

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ASPECT ET PERFORMATIVITÉ EN SLOVÈNE. PLAIDOYER POUR UNE HYPOTHÈSE DELOCUTIVE

IGOR Ž. ŽAGAR

Presque tous les verbes en slovène connaissent deux formes aspectuellement distinctes[1] dont la distinction est même morphologiquement marquée: une forme perfective et une forme imperfective. Par conséquent, on peut dire, par exemple, *Je promets*, de deux façons différentes:

Obljubljam (forme imperfective que je désignerai par$_{FI}$)

et

Obljubim (forme perfective que je désignerai par$_{FP}$),

mais seulement la première, la forme imperfective, est utilisée par les Slovènes dans le sens performatif, tandis que la forme perfective, fait curieux, ne peut signifier que *je suis prêt à promettre, je vais promettre* — la simultanéité d'une promesse, accomplie par le fait-même de l'énonciation, étant absente.

Mais, en fait, qu'est-ce qu'on a dit si on a employé la forme «authentique», c'est-à-dire la forme imperfective? Avant tout, qu'on n'a toujours pas promis (ou juré, etc.), qu'on est, peut-être, en train de promettre, mais que, **justement à cause du choix de la forme imperfective**, la promesse n'a toujours pas été et n'a pas pû être donnée. Aussi longtemps que je promets$_{FI}$, je n'ai rien promis, et si je ne fais que promettre$_{FI}$, je ne peux pas présenter quelque chose comme promis.

Cependant, le fait reste que les Slovènes, quand ils veulent vraiment promettre, c'est-à-dire quand ils ne veulent pas seulement **exprimer leur volonté de promettre**, choisissent toujours la forme imperfective. La question qui s'impose — peut-être pas pour un linguiste, mais sûrement pour un philosophe — est bien sûr: comment promettre ou, plus précisément, comment donner une promesse? Même plus: peut-on jamais promettre en slovène, peut-on jamais présenter quelque chose comme promis? Cette antinomie était

[1] «Presque», dans ce cas, n'est pas restrictif. Il veut dire seulement que certains verbes ne connaissent qu'une seule forme, mais qui, elle aussi, connaît deux emplois aspectuellement distincts, par exemple: *roditi* 'donner naissance', *krstiti* 'baptiser', *ubogati* 'obéir', *darovati* 'faire cadeau', *žrtvovati* 'sacrifier', etc.

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déjà présente et actuelle à la fin du XIX. siècle; à vrai dire, c'était justement cette antinomie qui a — un peu par mégarde — engendré les fondements de la théorie de la performativité en slovène, **et cela, un demi-siècle avant Austin.**

Dans le présent article, j'essaierai de dépoussiérer une partie de la controverse qui a opposée pendant trente ans les différents savants slovènes.[2]

En 1892, à la couverture[3] d'un journal, d'ailleurs consacré entièrement aux problèmes religieux, *Cvetje z vertov sv. Frančiška* [Les Fleurs du Jardin de Saint-François], un frère franciscain, Stanislav Škrabec (1844–1918), a commencé une polémique sur la différence d'emploi entre le présent perfectif et le présent imperfectif en slovène. L'enjeu de la controverse était le suivant: est-il légitime d'employer le présent perfectif (par exemple *obljubim* 'je promets') à la place du futur perfectif ou pas, vu que dans certaines régions limitrophes, surtout près des frontières italienne et hongroise, la population utilisait le présent perfectif à la place du futur perfectif?

La première chose, un peu inhabituelle pour l'époque, que Škrabec a faite, était sa répartition des verbes slovènes: il ne les a pas répartis d'après les temps, comme c'était d'usage, mais d'après les deux aspects. En slovène on a donc, avant tout:

a) des verbes perfectifs (*obljubiti* 'promettre')
b) des verbes imperfectifs (*obljubljati* 'promettre'),

et c'est les aspects qui gouvernent l'emploi des temps, nullement le contraire.

Les verbes imperfectifs connaissent ainsi trois temps:

– praesens (*obljubljam* 'je promets$_{FI}$'),
– imperfectum (*obljubljal sem* 'je promettais'),
– futurum (*obljubljal bom* 'je promettrai$_{FI}$')

et les verbes perfectifs quatre temps:

– perfectum (*obljubil sem* 'j'ai promis'),
– plusquamperfectum (*obljubil sem bil* 'j'avais promis'),
– futurum exactum (*obljubil bom* 'je promettrai$_{FP}$'),
– aorist (*obljubim* 'je promets$_{FP}$').

[2] Je serai, bien sûr, obligé d'abréger, mais je discute ce débat en détail dans mon livre Zagatnost performativnosti ali kako obljubiti [Les impasses de la performativité ou comment promettre]. DZS, Ljubljana 1989.

[3] «A la couverture» veut dire littéralement à la couverture, parce que c'était le seul espace dont il pouvait profiter pour publier ses écrits linguistiques.

Une chose est claire pour Škrabec (1887: VII/2), c'est que d'après cette classification, la forme aoristique *obljubim* (utilisée dans certaines régions à la place du futur perfectif) ne peut pas dénoter un acte au présent parce qu'elle n'est «praesens» **que de par sa forme, et non de par son contenu.** Le vrai «praesens» ne peut dénoter que ce qui se déroule, ce qui est en train de se dérouler au moment de la parole, bien que l'aoriste annonce seulement **l'accomplissement** de l'acte mentionné, **quelque soit le temps**, il est donc aoriste dans le vrai sens du terme qui veut dire «illimité», c'est-à-dire n'indiquant pas une datation précise. Et puisque qu'il s'agit d'un temps illimité, l'aoriste peut être employé soit pour un acte qui est/a été **déjà accompli**, soit pour un acte **qui ne sera accompli qu'à l'avenir** — si le sens de l'énoncé est suffisamment expliqué par le contexte. Si ce n'est pas le cas, il faut employer les formes plus définies dont dispose la langue slovène, c'est-à-dire soit le perfectum (*obljubil sem*) pour le passé, soit le futurum exactum (*obljubil bom*) pour le futur.

Son collègue Luka Pintar (1857–1915), linguiste et historien de la littérature, a été beaucoup plus précis et restrictif dans ses définitions. Avec des verbes perfectifs, dit-il, on ne dénote qu'un fait, c'est-à-dire l'accomplissement d'un fait, tandis qu'avec des verbes imperfectifs, on dénote **sa durée**. C'est pourquoi il pense injustifié la division entre un vrai présent, qui dénotera le **déroulement** d'un fait dans le présent, et un présent illimité, un aoriste, qui ne dénotera que l'**accomplissement** d'un acte.

Le vrai présent, dit-il, est celui qui dénote ce qui est réellement présent, et non pas ce qui a été — en raison d'une narration plus vive — seulement transposé au présent. Et ce qui est réellement présent, ce n'est pas seulement ce qui se déroule au présent ou ce qui est en train de se passer, mais aussi ce qui — au moment où je le constate — s'accomplit. *Je donne$_{FI}$, je prête$_{FI}$, je remets$_{FI}$*, sont des vrais présents (ils dénotent que je suis en train de donner, prêter ou remettre), mais *je donne$_{FP}$, je prête$_{FP}$, je remets$_{FP}$*, sont des vrais présents aussi si — en les énoncant — j'accompagne l'accomplissement d'un acte, c'est-à-dire si je constate l'accomplissement aussi verbalement (Pintar 1890, 686).

D'après Pintar donc — et contrairement à Škrabec —, «le vrai présent» se divise en présent au sens duratif, pour lequel on emploie des verbes imperfectifs, et en présent au sens factuel, pour lequel on emploie des verbes perfectifs. Mais qu'est-ce-que le sens «factuel»?

D'après Pintar, on a affaire au sens factuel d'un verbe quand on conçoit une action en soi-même, indivisée en commencement, déroulement et accomplissement, quand on la conçoit dans «une seule pensée indivisible», sans tenir

compte de la durée et du résultat de cette action, bref, quand on constate un fait.

Ce qui est tellement important dans cette délimitation entre le présent duratif et le présent factuel, c'est le changement de niveau que commet Pintar quand il donne des exemples pour son «présent factuel». Le présent factuel, dit-il, c'est le présent avec lequel je **constate** un fait, quand j'accompagne l'accomplissement d'un fait (par exemple, quand je donne quelque chose à quelqu'un) aussi verbalement. L'exemple qu'il présente en détail est l'emploi du verbe *se recommander*.

Je me recommande$_{FI}$, dit-il, quand je cite à la personne à laquelle je me recommande mes références, mes avantages et mes capacités (facultés), mais, par contre, quand je fais mes adieux, quand je prends congé, et quand je constate mon désir que la personne en question se souvienne de moi, alors *je me recommande*$_{FP}$.

Ce qui a échappé à Pintar, c'est un fait extraordinaire, à savoir que le verbe *se recommander* (ou *avouer*, qu'il évoque également) se comporte différemment que les verbes *donner, prêter* ou *remettre*, verbes qu'il avait cités à l'appui de son présent factuel. C'est-à-dire que, avec le verbe *se recommander*, on ne peut pas accompagner ou constater un fait qui soit accompli indépendemment de la profération de ce verbe, comme par exemple dans le cas de *donner* (ou *prêter* ou *remettre*). Le verbe *se recommander* ne peut constater que soi-même, son propre emploi et énonciation, il est donc son propre fait, son propre acte: on ne peut se recommander qu'en disant *je me recommande*!

C'était en 1890. Il lui faudra 20 ans de polémique pour s'apercevoir de cette distinction. Mais suivons d'abord les échos polémiques qu'a déclenchés sa définition du présent factuel.

Son plus sévère critique était Viktor Bežek (1860–1920), pédagogue et linguiste. Pour lui, le présent n'est rien d'autre qu'une limite qui se déplace toujours entre le passé et le présent, sans dimension, comme un point mathématique qui fuit incessamment. Essayer de arrêter ou fixer cette limite est impossible, parce que dans l'instant même où on ouvre la bouche pour la constater, elle est déjà passée. Constater le présent, dit-il, ce serait la même chose que'arrêter le temps (Bežek 1891, 632).

En 1892, Škrabec est toujours d'accord avec Bežek sur le concept du présent et l'impossibilité de l'emploi du présent perfectif au présent, bien que ce qui l'interesse, c'est l'impossibilité de l'emploi du présent perfectif au futur:

Le présent perfectif annonce, sans que le temps concret soit pris en considération, le commencement d'une action. Mais nous ne pouvons pas concevoir

de commencement ni dans le passé ni dans quelque autre temps, à moins que ce ne soit évident à partir des autres expressions de l'énoncé. Nous ne pouvons pas concevoir de commencement comme comprenant tout le temps du discours non plus, parce que un discours, si bref soit-il, est quand même quelque chose de durable; un commencement, par contre, n'est qu'un instant qui est soit déjà passé avant même qu'on l'annonce, soit qu'on n'attend que pendant le discours, et qui se situe donc dans le futur, si proche soit-il (Škrabec 1892: XI/2).

C'est vrai que le présent perfectif en slovène fait penser au futur, dit Škrabec, mais ce n'est pas la même chose quand on dit:

To kravo ***prodam*** (Je vends$_{FP}$ cette vache).

ou

To kravo ***bom prodal*** (Je vendrai$_{FP}$ cette vache).

Avec la première phrase je n'annonce que la volonté de vendre, **s'il y aura des acheteurs**, avec la deuxième, la certitude que le marché aura lieu.

Néanmoins, il ressent déjà l'impasse d'une telle définition de l'emploi du présent perfectif, et cela justement au sujet des performatifs:

Faire un éloge en disant «*Je te loue*$_{FP}$», ce n'est pas slovène; chez nous, on loue en disant «*bien, tu as bien fait, tu es sage*», etc. Dire «*Je me recommande*$_{FP}$, *je m'incline*$_{FP}$», c'est un barbarisme. Et «*Je me recommande*$_{FI}$, *je m'incline*$_{FI}$», pas beaucoup moins. Si quelqu'un s'incline, le Slovène le voit, s'il n'est pas aveugle, pourquoi le raconter donc? S'il dit qu'il se recommande, mais ne dit rien qui pourrait servir comme recommandation, je crois que c'est comme si quelqu'un disait «Je travaille», mais en même temps, il demeurait les mains croisées à l'ombre et sommeillait. — Dans ce groupe se situent aussi les expressions: *je promets*$_{FP}$, *je remercie*$_{FP}$, *je garantis*$_{FP}$, *je commande*$_{FP}$, *je dément*$_{FP}$, *j'ordonne*$_{FP}$, *je conclus*$_{FP}$, *je m'engage*$_{FP}$, *je conjure*$_{FP}$, *je renonce*$_{FP}$, *je confesse*$_{FP}$, etc. Par rapport au vrai présent, ce sont des germanismes et des latinismes. Mais on ne peut pas employer des verbes imperfectifs à leur place non plus, **parce que l'accomplissement d'une action doit être exprimé** (Škrabec 1892: XI/3).

Et c'est là tout le problème qui, comme dans un cercle vicieux, continuera à se reposer pendant dix ans: comment accomplir une action qui ne peut être accomplie que par l'énonciation du verbe mentionnant cette action, vu que:

1) le présent perfectif ne peut pas dénoter des actions qui s'accomplissent au présent;

2) le présent imperfectif ne peut dénoter que des actions qui se déroulent et pas celles qui s'accomplissent au présent?

Ce n'est qu'en 1910 que Luka Pintar trouvera une réponse «logique» à ces questions:

Est-ce qu'on peut toujours appeler illimité ce qui est exclu du présent? Parce que l'exclusion du présent est aussi une limitation. Et si quelque chose est vraiment illimité — **comme était supposé l'être le présent perfectif ou aoristique** —, il doit être réalisable non seulement au passe ou au futur, mais aussi au présent (Pintar 1910, 500).

A partir de cette définition, Pintar revient à son exemple d'il y a vingt ans, quand il a attribué aux verbes comme *je donne, je prête, je remets*, la possibilité d'accomplir l'action qu'ils mentionnaient, et introduit une distinction entre ce qu'il appelle le **praesens effectivum** et le **praesens instans**:

Je donne est de par la modalité (un) potentiel, de par le temps (un) présent, mais si ce n'est pas un présent factuel ou praesens effectivum, on pourrait l'appeler **praesens instans** (présent imminent)... On appelle un présent imminent ce qui peut s'accomplir à chaque instant, ce qui va s'accomplir dans un futur très proche, ce qui est en train de s'accomplir, même ce qui vient de s'accomplir (Pintar 1910, 502).

Avec cette distinction entre **praesens effectivum** et **praesens instans**, Pintar a produit une distinction très importante à **l'intérieur** de la catégorie du présent perfectif, corroborée par deux distinctions **extérieures** (extérieures en tant qu'elles délimitent le présent perfectif par rapport au présent imperfectif):

1) **modale** (le présent perfectif étant «problématique» et «potentiel», le présent imperfectif (par contre) «assertoire» et «indicatif»);
2) **généalogico-taxonomique** (le présent perfectif étant «particulier», le présent imperfectif (par contre) «général»).

On emploie des verbes perfectifs pour exprimer des jugements problématiques, c'est-à-dire de par leur modalité potentiels et subjectifs, et des verbes imperfectifs pour exprimer des jugements assertoires, immédiatement valables, de par leur modalité donc indicatifs.

La différence entre le présent perfectif et le présent imperfectif est donc — d'après Pintar — dans la possibilité de montrer l'attitude de celui qui pense, juge ou énonce quoi que ce soit, **à l'egard de la pensée ou jugement énoncé**. Le

présent perfectif serait ainsi **une instantiation du présent imperfectif**, une particularisation de la forme générale, en tant que tel subordonné à la généralité, mais, justement à cause de sa particularité, **parce qu'un énonciateur particulier exprime de par cette forme particulière (et particularisée) son attitude (particulière) par rapport au contenu propositionel général, impossible à ramener à la forme générale.**

C'est justement par cette particularité énonciative que Pintar motive la nécessité d'emploi de la 1. personne du présent pour l'accomplissement d'une action qui ne peut s'accomplir que par la seule profération du verbe qui la mentionne:

On peut facilement trouver une raison pour cette limitation à la 1. personne du singulier. C'est que pour moi-même, je suis en position de savoir ce que je viens de conclure, déterminer etc. Quant aux autres, je ne possède pas un tel savoir, et si je ne le possède pas, je ne peux pas l'exprimer non plus (Pintar 1910, 567).

Škrabec, lui, a essayé de réconcilier la théorie et l'empirie par une autre voie, par la délimitation entre l'emploi du présent perfectif et l'emploi du futur perfectif.

On pourrait résumer ses points de vue d'alors en deux thèses:

1. Dans le présent perfectif, les Slaves du Sud — et surtout les Slovènes — ne voient pas et n'ont jamais vu un futur;
2. On emploie le présent perfectif pour dénoter l'accomplissement d'un acte dans un temps indéfini, c'est-à-dire comme présent historique ou aoriste gnomique.

Mais jusqu'à la polémique entre Bežek et Pintar dans les années 1890–91, Škrabec n'a défini le présent perfectif que par rapport au futur, négligeant ainsi le deuxième chaînon du dispositif perfectif/imperfectif. Cette polémique lui offre la possibilité de le délimiter aussi par rapport au présent imperfectif.

Pour une action inaccomplie, en 1897, il s'accorde avec Bežek: on ne peut pas employer un verbe perfectif, mais, ce qui est évident, seulement un verbe imperfectif. Le présent d'un verbe imperfectif indique seulement la durée, qui peut comprendre aussi le moment d'un véritable présent, **mais pas nécessairement** (ce «pas nécessairement» sera épistémologiquement très troublant dans les discussions ultérieures de la performativité en slovène). Qu'est-ce que cela veut dire, «pas nécessairement»?

Le présent, argumente Škrabec (1897: XVI/8), n'est au fond qu'un instant entre le passé et le futur. L'accomplissement d'un acte, lui aussi, n'est qu'un

instant. Et si l'acte s'accomplit par l'énonciation même du verbe qui dénote cet acte, alors on doit s'accorder que les deux tombent dans un seul instant, puisque l'accomplissement et l'annonce de l'acte font un.

Bref, s'il y a des actions qui s'accomplissent par l'énonciation même des verbes qui les dénotent — une option qu'il refusait à l'époque — les verbes en question doivent être énoncés en forme perfective, **parce que l'aspect imperfectif donne une trop vive impression que l'action dénotée n'a pas été accomplie.**

Cette théorisation de Škrabec a subi de sévères critiques. Même l'action accomplie par un seul mot, affirme le professeur Rajko Perušek (1854–1917), le plus virulant critique de Škrabec, dure au moins autant de temps qu'il en faut pour que ce mot soit énoncé; cette action commence par le commencement et s'accomplit par la fin du mot, et même le mot le plus bref dure un certain temps.

En fait, au cours de son argumentation, il s'avère que la controverse performative (en tant que déjà formée comme telle) **ne porte pas sur le concept du langage, mais sur le concept de la réalité.** Perušek écrit que dans la vie quotidienne, on ne peut pas concevoir le présent comme un point sans dimension qui séparerait le passé et le futur, mais comme **une série, tantôt plus longue tantôt plus courte, des moments temporels qui se succèdent.** Le présent ne peut donc pas être représenté par un point dans lequel coïncideraient le commencement et la fin, c'est même logiquement impossible:

> Chaque discours dure au moins quelques instants et un tel discours dépasserait aussitôt ce point sans dimension; ce point serait ainsi pour le locuteur passé. Ou bien il devrait se dépecher en parlant, jusqu'à ce que ce moment n'arrive; ce point serait ainsi pour le locuteur dans le futur (Perušek 1910, 15–16).

La conclusion qu'il en tire: puisque le présent s'étend aussi un peu au passé et un peu au futur, même les actions qui s'accomplissent par l'énonciation même des verbes qui les dénotent, doivent emprunter le présent imperfectif.

Malheureusement pour lui et heureusement pour la théorie performative, Perušek avait mal choisi son exemple, *se confesser*, et son commentaire a été encore moins pertinent: le salut de l'âme, se demande-t-il, dépend-il des quelques caractères de plus qu'a la forme imperfective *izpovedujem se* 'je me confesse$_{FI}$' par rapport à la forme perfective *izpovem se* 'je me confesse$_{FP}$'?

Škrabec, qui était un saint homme, a violemment — mais théoriquement très productivement — répondu à ce «blasphème»:

L'accomplissement d'un acte de confession, écrit-il, ne dépend pas seulement de la juste forme du verbe, mais de **l'intention du confesseur autorisé** (Škrabec 1911: XXVIII/5).

En 1911, l'accomplissement d'une action ne dépend plus — ou pas seulement — de la juste forme du verbe, c'est-à-dire de la forme qui **exprime** l'accomplissement d'une action, comme il a exigé à l'époque. Au contraire, Škrabec y ajoute deux conditions supplémentaires:

1. une intention (déterminée)
et
2. une personne autorisée.

Il connaît déjà la sui-référentialité (qui, à vrai dire, n'a été postulée explicitement que par Benveniste), maintenant il pose encore deux conditions de la performativité réussie:

1. condition qui exige que l'énonciateur du verbe performatif donné ait vraiment l'intention d'accomplir l'action dénotée par le verbe);
2. condition qui exige que l'action dénotée par le verbe (performatif) ne peut être accomplie que par une personne autorisée, dans les circonstances déterminées.

Ce qui lui manque encore, c'est la condition qui exige que le verbe performatif soit proféré à la 1. personne du présent, condition qui a été théoriquement déjà postulée par Pintar. Deux mois plus tard il écrit:

Et parce que l'acte est accompli par celui qui profère le mot, le verbe doit se trouver à la première personne du présent, d'habitude au singulier, seulement dans les chansons, quand il y a plusieurs personnes qui chantent à l'ésprit unique, au pluriel. La troisième personne peut seulement exceptionnellement remplacer la première (Škrabec 1911: XXVIII/7).

Škrabec a donc formulé presque toutes les conditions de la performativité réussie,[4] exigées par Austin presque un demi siècle plus tard. Mais si Austin a formulé sa théorie dans le passage du champ philosophique au champ linguistique, Škrabec, lui, est resté et a bricolé dans le champ linguistique même. Cependant, sa théorie performative est un produit accessoire et fortuit, issu d'une controverse purement grammaticale, mais dès que le concept de la performativité a commencé à prendre forme — si imparfaite fût-elle à l'époque

[4] A l'exception de la condition exigant l'accomplissement correct et complet d'un acte performatif par tous les participants.

—, **c'est lui, le concept de la performativité encore naissant, qui maîtrise le débat, même au niveau grammatical dont il est issu!**[5] C'est-à-dire, que les concepts de la théorie de départ, de la théorie des aspects, sont construits et reconstruits, définis et redéfinis, dans le but de la complétude et du meilleur fonctionnement de la (méta)théorie performative, et pas dans le but de leur propre meilleur fonctionnement. On est donc confronté à une situation paradoxale: on a affaire à deux théories, une théorie de base (théorie des aspects) et une métathéorie (théorie de la performativité), cette dernière engendrée, un peu par hasard, par la discussion concernant les problèmes de la théorie de base (emploi des différents aspects).

Mais une fois tracée, la métathéorie accessoire devient tellement puissante que c'est elle qui oriente le débat concernant les problèmes de la théorie de base. En revanche, c'est justement leur solution (la solution des problèmes de la théorie de base) qui la rend (la théorie de la performativité) inopérante. A savoir, on a d'un côté la théorie, exigeant que les verbes, dont l'énonciation même accomplit les actes qu'ils dénotent, doivent être énoncés en forme perfective, parce que des verbes imperfectifs — malgré l'intention du locuteur — donnent une trop vive impression que l'acte dénoté n'a pas été accompli, et de l'autre la réalité qui la contredit, n'utilisant pour l'accomplissement des actes performatifs que des formes imperfectives.

Si on prend en considération tous ces faits — et *contra factum non datur logica*, affirme Škrabec — on serait obligé de conclure qu'en slovène on ne peut promettre ou jurer ou accomplir un quelconque acte performatif... que par mégarde. Peut-on éviter une telle conclusion?

On trouve une ébauche de solution de ce problème, malheureusement non développée, dans une dérive de la pensé de Škrabec. En 1897, une des raisons par lesquelles il justifie l'emploi, en slovène, des verbes dont l'énonciation même accomplit des actes qu'ils dénotent, a été le fait historique que les Slovènes n'accomplissaient pas depuis toujours les dits actes par l'énonciation des verbes qui les dénotaient. Il situe la coupure après l'acceptation du christianisme, plus précisément, après la traduction de la bible et des écrits liturgiques en slovène, parce que **ce n'était que des écrits liturgiques qui avaient présenté des formules — pour l'accomplissement des actes qui ne peuvent être accomplis que par l'énonciation des verbes qui les dénotent — que l'usage séculier a pu prendre pour modèle.**

[5] J'essaie de montrer dans le chapitre II/A de mon livre (voir note 2) et dans un article inédit «The Obligation to Keep a Promise» (1987), que même la «découverte» de la performativité par Austin a été en quelque sorte accessoire et fortuite, issue d'un changement de champ conceptuel.

A un certain moment donc, une formule conversationnelle *obljubljam*$_{FI}$ apparaît, qui est employée pour que le locuteur, de par le fait de dire *obljubljam*$_{FI}$, promette quelque chose à son allocutaire. Il est probable, dit Škrabec, que pendant un certain temps, deux formes concurrentes coexistaient, *obljubim*$_{FP}$ et *obljubljam*$_{FI}$. Mais **puisque certains dialectes slovènes ont déjà adopté la forme perfective pour exprimer le futur (perfective), la forme imperfective a commencé de servir pour exprimer le praesens effectivum!**

Ce qu'il propose, implicitement, est donc une hypothèse délocutive de la performativité en slovène. Quand je parle d'une hypothèse délocutive de la performativité, je ne me réfère pas à la délocutivité benvenistienne, mais à la délocutivité généralisée, développée par J. C. Anscombre.[6] De ses propres mots:

Il s'agit d'un processus destiné à rendre compte de cas où une formule F_1 de valeur sémantique S_1 peut donner naissance à un morphème F_2 dont la valeur sémantique S_2 fait intervenir la valeur en énonciation de F_1 (Anscombre 1980, 115).

Anscombre propose un schéma à cinq étapes que je vais, pour conclure, essayer d'appliquer au cas de *je promets*$_{FI}$ slovène, pour corroborer ainsi l'idée de Škrabec. Il s'agit, bien sûr, d'un essai schématique.

1. A une certaine époque, le slovène possède le morphème *obljuba* 'promesse', avec le sens «engagement de (faire) quelque chose». Dans le premier dictionnaire de la langue littéraire slovène (Glonar 1936, 247), on trouve effectivement sous *obljuba*, «obljubo dati$^+$: obljubiti» 'donner une promesse$^+$: promettre', la petite croix marquant que l'expression à gauche des deux points est hors d'usage, l'expression à droite étant celle qui l'a remplacée. Ce qui montre qu'à une certaine époque, pour accomplir un acte de promesse, par exemple, les Slovènes n'employaient pas encore de verbe qui, de par sa propre énonciation, accomplissait l'acte qu'il mentionnait, mais plutôt une forme périphrastique.

2. Apparition d'une formule F1 = *obljubljam*$_1$ (je promets$_{FI}$), par laquelle le locuteur s'engage à (faire) quelque chose à travers une loi de discours comme: «Si X dit à Y qu'il lui *promet*$_{FI}$ de faire quelque chose, c'est qu'il s'engage à faire quelque chose». D'après Škrabec, une telle formule apparaît après l'acceptation du christianisme.

3. Pendant un certain temps, deux formes concurrentes coexistent, *obljubim*$_{FP}$ et *obljubljam*$_{FI}$. Mais puisque la forme perfective a déjà été adoptée

[6] Voir surtout Anscombre 1979a, 1979b et 1980.

pour exprimer le futur (perfective), un nouveau morphème F_2 = *obljubljam*$_2$, est fabriqué, dont la valeur sémantique S_2 = «faire l'acte qu'on fait en disant *obljubljam*$_1$», contient une allusion à l'emploi de F_1 du stade 2.

4. Puisque F_1 et F_2 sont formellement identiques, les emplois de F_1 du stade 2 sont (à une certaine époque) relus en donnant à F_1 la valeur sémantique S_2. *Obljubljam*$_1$ est donc relu comme *obljubljam*$_2$, ce qui veut dire que je fais quelque chose parce que je **dis** le faire.

5. S'il y a identité formelle entre F_1 et F_2, les emplois de F_1 du stade 3 peuvent (à une certaine époque) également être relus en donnant à F_1 la valeur sémantique S_2, ce qui donne: *obljubljam*$_2$ = «faire l'acte que l'on fait en disant *obljubljam*$_2$».

Cette dérivation montre que l'accomplissement de l'acte de promesse (et, en principe, de tous les actes performatifs en slovène; le cas de *promettre* n'a été pris que comme modèle pour des verbes de dire en général) ne dépend ni de l'intention du locuteur, ni de la juste forme du verbe (prétendument performatif), mais simplement d'un fait banal qu'en slovène, il est (devenu) d'usage de promettre (et, de par ce fait, accomplir un acte de promesse) en disant *obljubljam*$_{FI}$, et pas *obljubim*$_{FP}$.

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For marking subsections decimal notation should be applied. Do not use more than four digits if possible.

Examples within the text should be marked in italics. Meanings are to be rendered between inverted commas (' '). If glosses are given morpheme by morpheme, the initial letter of the gloss should be placed exactly below that of the example. Grammatical morphemes can be abbreviated in small case letters connected to the stem or the other morphemes by a hyphen. No period should be applied in such abbreviation. For example:

(1) (a) A sólymaid elszálltak
the falcon-gen-pl-2sg away-flew-3pl
'Your falcons have flown away.'

Examples can be referred to in the text as (1a), (1a–d), etc.

One proof will be sent to the author. Please read it carefully and return it by air mail to the editor within one week: Acta Linguistica Hungarica, MTA Nyelvtudományi Intézet, H-1250 Budapest, P.O. Box 19.