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Controversies over a Notion

Power Relations
in Central Europe
1792–1797

National Patria versus
Patriotic Franck

Levente, the Man
and the Levente Movement

Document

Reviews

AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ · BUDAPEST

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GYÖRGY RÁNKI 1930-1988

Professor György Ránki, the founder of our journal, member of the editorial board, ordinary member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, president of its Section II, and director of the Academy's Institute of Historical Sciences died suddenly on February 19, 1988. He was born on August 4, 1930 in Budapest and studied at the Budapest University of Economics between 1949 and 1951. He had worked at the Institute of Historical Sciences since 1953, of which he became director in 1987. He had been corresponding member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences since 1976 and ordinary member since 1982. He began lecturing at Debrecen University in 1964 and later at Indiana University, Bloomington (USA). Beginning in 1955, he published books on economic and political history partly co-authored by Iván T. Berend, several of which were translated into foreign languages, mainly English. Among them were the books Magyarország gyáripara 1900-1914 (1955) (The manufacturing industry in Hungary, 1900-1914), Magyarország gyáripara 1933-1944 (1958) (The manufacturing industry in Hungary 1933-1944), Magyarország a fasiszta Németország életterében (1960) (Hungary in the Lebensraum of Nazi Germany), Magyarország gazdasága az első 3 éves terv időszakában (1963) (The economy of Hungary in the period of the first three-year plan), Magyarország gazdasága az első világháboru után 1919-1929 (1966) (Hungary's economy after World War I, 1919-1929), A kapitalista gazdaság fejlődése Kelet- és Délkelet-Európában (1973) (The development of capitalist economy in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe), A második világháboru története (1973) (History of World War II), Közgazdaság és történelem (1977) (Economics and history), Gazdaság és külpolitika (1981) (Economy and foreign policy), Mozgásterek, kényszerpályák (1983) (Range and constraint), and Európa gazdasága a 19. században (1987) (European economy in the 19th century).

The following passages on his work are from the obituary by his former professor Zsigmond Pál Pach.

Conscientiousness and achievement were his essence, his way of life. And how many things these qualities implied to him! He served as Director of the Institute of Historical Sciences and President of the Section of Philosophy and Historical Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, taught at the Hungarian Department of Bloomington University (USA) and in Hungary at Debrecen University and the University of Economics, controlled and organized dozens of scholarly projects, lectured all over the world at universities, institutes of history, conferences on economic history and at international congresses. But what was for him of paramount importance and the background of all these activities, was his research. He continually sought answers to more and more questions, and approached the writing of his innumerable articles, studies and books with unflagging intellectual readiness and scholarly excitement.

György Ránki was a historian of exceptional, even extraordinary talent, such as is rarely encountered. His generation grew to maturity at a time of horrors. While a secondary school student he was sent to the Auschwitz concentration camp. He and his peers grew to adulthood in an age of high hopes and great resolutions. After the liberation of Hungary, he went on to graduate from secondary school and to study at the University of Economics and the History Department of the Faculty of Arts of Eötvös Loránd University. A study of economics and history, plus Marxist economic history (which combined both disciplines) launched the untiring student on his scholarly career together with his best friend Iván T. Berend. Their co-operation was long, undisturbed and intellectually stimulating for both of them, resulting not only in fundamental scientific achievements, but also setting exemplary ethical standards. Incessant reading, investigation, thinking and a passionate exploration of the recent past made the young member of the Institute of Historical Sciences into an outstanding historian. His scholarly devotion helped him get through periods of waning hopes, great disappointments and shocks and absorb the experiences of another severe turn in Hungarian history.

Gyula Szekfü wrote in 1936 that 'the history of Hungarian capitalism is virtually unknown'. So Ránki and Berend were doing pioneer work when they began to investigate twentieth-century Hungarian economic history a decade and a half later. It is mainly because of their zeal and analytical skill during the subsequent fifteen years that we have been able to learn specifically about how capitalism developed in Hungary. Their work contributed not only to our understanding of

Hungarian economic history but also to our view of modern Hungarian national history in all its complexity. In contrast with the biased opinions of the past, they took a more realistic view of Hungary's role in the Dual Monarchy, of the intricacies of government policy during the Horthy Era (which had been approached with so little subtlety before) and the distressing effects of Trianon on Hungarian economic and political life (which they did long before stirring up this issue ceased to be a taboo).

György Ránki investigated the past without interruption, steadily broadening his scope. He wrote a pioneering monograph on the first years of Hungarian planned economy in the early sixties. Later he undertook the task of writing a history of the Second World War. Starting with a sharp-eyed review of the memoirs of prominent contemporary politicians, and continuing with a systematic study of the vast non-Hungarian source material and literature available by that time, he prepared an impressive and lasting synthesis that would have done credit to a team of experts. He wrote passionately but objectively about the underlying factors of the social and moral nadir of Hungary in 1944 and the Hungarian holocaust, all the while relating these issues to economic history. His starting points were always Hungarian problems, but he never stopped widening his scope to get an overview of the place of Hungary's economy in East-Central Europe and Europe as a whole. It has been only a few weeks since the publication of the co-authors' most recent outstanding study Európa gazdasága a 19. században 1780-1914 (European economy in the 19th century), an unparalleled enterprise in international scholarship. It is not just a collection of essays on certain countries' development or articles on various loosely connected problems, but is a homogeneous synthesis of nineteenth-century European economic development as a whole, its unity and the peculiarities and interconnections of its regions.

Historians outside Hungary began to take notice of Ránki's work as early as the early sixties. Foreign universities constantly invited him to lectures, lecture series and to serve residencies. He was successful everywhere as a scholar, a man of reliable knowledge and a master of several languages. At the World Congress of Historians in Stuttgart in 1985 he was elected First Vice-President of the International Committee of Historical Sciences. In the early eighties, while serving as the head of the Hungarian Department of Indiana University at Bloomington, with unprecedented energy he established what has become in effect one of the main foreign representations of Hungarian historical and social sciences and culture anywhere in the world. This department has become a scholarly and intellectual centre whose influence has radiated far and wide.

As time passed he remained what he had always been: a modest and amiable man, one without affectations, a husband and father who always took good care of his family, a true friend, colleague and professor. A consultation with a student or a younger colleague was just as important to him as a meeting with authorities of the historical profession or his own scholarly activity. He was a born democrat and puritan, who instinctively rejected all formalities.

Professor Ránki's untimely death means an enormous loss to the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, to the historical sciences in Hungary and abroad and to the whole of Hungarian intellectual life.

EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE: CONTROVERSIES OVER A NOTION

The question of whether there exists a unique region between Eastern and Western Europe is no longer much debated. Having close ties to both of its neighbours, this region possesses relatively distinct features, and is therefore to be regarded as deserving of scientific study as are Eastern and Western Europe. Beyond this, however, it is hard to make specific statements about East-Central Europe's character for which we could find a wide consensus. Even finding an appropriate term for this middle region has always been vexing. What characteristics social scientists have attributed to the region have always been highly influenced by the differences in the conceptual baggage and organizing principles of the various branches of science and by sometimes hardly concealed power policy aims. Inquiries in history, literature and art history tend to take different points of departure, and the historical experience of subsequent periods has often led to painful conclusions. Historians, for example, deem it justified to talk about a relatively homogeneous Eastern Europe which has its own inner structure. Among the apparently acceptable features of this region are economic backwardness, the delay of modernization, the existence of the multinational states and the creation of national states after their disintegration. Literary scholars, however, see different regional groupings when they look at the map. To them the literatures of certain Balkan peoples do not belong to the above-outlined vast region, just as they might well view the development of Russian literature, with its spasmodic rhythm, as different from that of Polish, Czech or Hungarian literature. Further debates might arise from the marking out of "spheres of interests" by the various branches of science, i.e. from the practice of imposing the special language and viewpoint of one discipline on another. Economists can usually fairly accurately define delay, i.e. how much backward territories lag behind advanced ones in, for example, the replacement of the wooden plough by the iron plough, or the medieval guilds by the more efficient factory system. This sort of evalua-

tion is then sometimes applied to literature, too, although it is hardly proper to judge the quality of a literature based e.g. on the date of the earliest appearance of romanticism in it. For example, romanticism in Germany preceded its appearance in France, but the French made up for this "delay" as early as the 1820s. Similarly, Slovenian romanticism, after virtually no preparatory period, produced a poet of European significance by the late 1820s. Power policy considerations compel scholars to step beyond the field of science not simply by using different concepts, but by displaying offensive or defensive attitudes. Slavonic studies began with the analysis of the Old Slav language and the linguistic affinities between its modern descendans. Beginning with the late 18th and the early 19th century, Slavonic studies developed into an important scientific discipline which, due to the ideas of the Slavic thinkers in the Habsburg monarchy who considered themselves oppressed, became gradually imbued with a consciousness of the community of Slav peoples. The theories of Schlözer and Herder were used to infer a glorious national character and the coming of a Slavic golden age following those of the Latin and German civilizations. The Pan-Slavic movements gained ground in the middle of the 19th century. On the other hand, the Hungarian Danube-region concept was accused of deriving its inspiration from the Hungarian power ambitions of the 1930s, viz. Hungarian social scientists used their research to support Hungarian policy, which was struggling to regain control of the former, historical area of Hungary and to acquire a leading role in Central-Europe. (Let us not discuss here to what extent this accusation is justified.)

All that can be established so far with certainty is that even within a national school we can find no consensus among social scientists with respect to the viewpoints, endeavours and political orientation of research. In the case of Slavonic studies, there are practically as many approaches as there are scholars. For example, there was an open dispute over the concept of 'Slav' between the Slovak Ľ. Štúr and his Czech contemporaries who felt Štúr's championing of Slovak as an independent literary language was a betrayal of the so-called biblical Czech language used by the Slovak evangelists. Likewise, the Polish and the Russian Slavicists also diverged, and not only over the question of Polish independence. Such debates have characterized Hungarian scholarship as well. During the 1930s, 'Danube region' (and even 'Danubianness') were commonly used terms, until historians replaced them by the notion of 'Eastern Europe'. Due to its vagueness, it also had to yield its place to another term, East-Central Europe, which we consider a more precise one from several points of view. While emphasizing the region's relative independence, this term reminds us both of its integration with Central Europe and its close cultural ties to Eastern Europe. Naturally

other names have been put forward to describe the region adequately, such as Zwischen-Europa, Zentral-Europa, etc.

It seems that the first task of the scholars of each individual discipline is to find a term on which the majority of them could agree. So far only two views have proved to be more or less generally acceptable. One of these is the traditional approach of Slavonic studies, while the other is the notion of a unified Eastern European region. The Slavistic approach is sustained by the power of tradition and has been adopted mainly by scholars whose professional interests lie primarily in the fields of Slavic history, ethnography, literature and art. According to them, the linguistic affinity of Slav peoples, their similar folklores, their locations on the map and the continued existence of an awareness of their reciprocal ties or 'vzájemnost' tend to prove that, in contrast to the Rumanian and German peoples, all Slavs are united in a distinct historical and literary region, with an internal geographical division into Southern Slavs, Eastern Slavs and Western Slavs.

The adherents of the Eastern Europe notion suppose the existence of a unified zone with definable features distinguishing it from Western Europe. This region extends from the Urals to the Aegean and the Adriatic Sea and, including Finland, the Baltic countries, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, to the present-day German-Polish border. This vast area indeed possesses common historical features which 'ultimately' render it justifiable to talk about it as a region, albeit in very generalized terms. Nevertheless, it is not only the flux in the position of borders and the existence of 'intermediate' zones that raise doubts as to the practical appropriateness of the Eastern Europe concept. It is also radically contradicted by the findings of literary scholarship. The histories of national literatures show great discontinuities within themselves or, more precisely, they cannot in all stylistic epochs accomplish the full richness of literary life, the primary reason being unfavourable external conditions. A literature formerly full of outstanding works may at times sink, even if not into total 'darkness', into a low creative level or silence. In different national literatures, this phenomenon happens at different times and for various reasons. Therefore, 'crisis' in a literature may last a century longer than in another. Certain intellectual trends and literary styles might fail to appear in some national literatures, or if they do appear, they are realized in a highly modified, incomplete form. For example, it is open to question - although we do not intend to discuss it here - whether classicism existed in Croatian literature as it did in the Polish and Hungarian literatures.

Those who argue for this large Eastern Europe, of course, take its internal

divisions into consideration, and sometimes they even seem ready to concede that these divisions, particularly if we focus on the features of culture and consciousness, imply important differences. However attractive it is to define universal features by making generalizations, it is hardly possible to give a thorough and subtle analysis of the Russian and the Czech, or the Bulgarian and the Hungarian 'developments' by lumping them together as belonging to the same region. This is especially true in the case of certain periods.

Until now we have not mentioned an argument often turned against both the approach based on Slavonic studies and the concept of Eastern Europe. Religion has in some ways remained a decisive factor into our day. It always influenced both individual attitudes and political organizations and may in a sense seem more important than a great number of other factors. The first and really decisive demarcation is the border between the Orthodox or Greek Eastern religion and the Roman Catholicism of the West. There is also a secondary division created by the Reformation. The structures within a religion, including its peculiar dogma and liturgy, are not only found in the church service, but also reflected in the relationship between church and state as, for instance, in the case of Byzantium and Russia. Suffice it to refer here to the awareness of Moscow's mission as the 'third Rome', crucial in the development of the Russian way of thinking, or to the hierarchical relationship between ruler and ecclesiastical authority, which exerted a powerful influence on the structure of the Russian state, i.e. on the character of Russian vassalage, which as a result became different from its western counterpart. Although the Orthodox religion also played a role in the life of other nations (Ukrainians, Rumanians, Serbs, Bulgarians), no autocracy similar to that of the Russian Tsar could develop among them, since they were not independent over much of their history. During important periods, these nations lived in enclaves among other peoples in multinational states. 'Internal division' has been a self-evident feature of their literatures. At one time Serbian literature in Hungary was much more important than it was in Serbia, which gained its independence step by step in a centuries-long struggle against the Turks; similarly, the opportunities for cultural development for a long time were more favourable for the Rumanians living in Transylvania than in Wallachia and Moldavia. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the 'unifying' activity of the Habsburg counter-reformation, intended to bridge the schism, proved successful in the case of the Rumanians and Ukrainians, and thus the 'Roman', i.e. western, ties of Rumanian and Ukrainian pastors were strengthened. When we think about the characteristics of the East-Central European region, we should not ignore the importance of religion. The religious autonomy granted to

the Serbs ensured independence for them in the area of Hungary; on the other hand the Catholic Church in Poland was able to become a 'national church' because of its opposition to the religion of the Russians and the Prussians. Thus it could harbour the national idea, which in Poland appeared embedded in religious consciousness.

Although some scholars draw the borders of Central-Europe at the meeting points of the western and Byzantine-eastern types of Christianity, the above-mentioned points make a cautious balancing necessary. Undoubtedly, there is an important difference between Orthodox and western Christian concepts of the individual, views with respect to the role of the state (i.e. the ruler's sphere of authority and jurisdiction) and the relationship between church and state. Naturally, these considerations must be supplemented by a study of the differences between the Orthodox and western Christian territories' political, institutional and economic history. Also, in the Orthodox territories the Reformation had very moderate, if any success, while elsewhere its impact was not only great with respect to religions habits, but it also decisively influenced mentalities, patterns of thought and the relationship between the state and subjects. At the same time, it should be noted that in places where national states were created at a relatively late date, these problems were coupled with the violent challenges of modernization. In the 19th century, these areas had to face the problems raised by liberalism, bourgeois development, world trade and competition between great and medium powers, as well as the requirements of their own internal progress. As a result, the stateless Czechs and to a lesser extent the Hungarians endeavoured to create their own independent states, or at least to attain statuses of maximum autonomy. Similarly, the South Slavs and the Rumanians, encouraged by the German and Italian unity movements, launched their struggle for a national state, one which would unify their peoples hitherto scattered across various states. This movement, which has been somewhat superficially termed merely 'nationalistic', relied on a different set of ideas, methods and aims when it appeared in the domestic and foreign policy of Tsarist Russia, just as it was not only with respect to tactics that the Czech and Hungarian political struggles differed from the above-mentioned ones. Their arguments and the underlying constitutional ideas were basically different, even if Serbs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Czechs, Poles and Rumanians were similar in making a cult from their histories, emphasizing those events which could be enshrined as legends and which served their respective political aspirations. To justify their territorial claims, they worked out theories about ancient history which were popularized in fiction, first in epic poetry, and later through historical novels, paintings and nationalistic

operas. When on the other hand we consider Russian history through its subsequent stages, we find a very different environment. Such differences are not significantly lessened by acknowledging the similarities between the enlightened despotism of the German-born Tsarina Catherine, Frederick II of Prussia and Joseph II of Austria. Any analysis of enlightened absolutism should, beyond the examples of Russia, Prussia and Austria, be willing to consider the cases of the Habsburg-related Toscana, Denmark, Sweden, Spain, Portugal and Naples, since the issue really is the political and economic modernization of underdeveloped territories. Of course, in many respects the cultural links of Russia and East-Central European countries with Western Europe show marked similarities. Russian-French, Polish-French and to a lesser extent Hungarian-French relations had much in common in the 18th century. Yet we ought to remember the numerous dissimilarities as well. For example, German-Russian cultural links over most of the 18th century basically differed in quality and intensity from those between Germany and Hungary.

In what follows we shall argue that during certain periods even the Balkans could not have been considered East-Central Europe. First, difficulties arise from the fact that we obviously think of Yugoslavia as a Balkan state today, although the Slovene-inhabited territories have never institutionally belonged to the Balkans. Next, as we have mentioned, many Serbs and Rumanians have lived in states outside the Balkans and maintained cultures that were, despite the similarities to the cultures of their Balkanian brothers, highly distinctive. We see a third difficulty in that the history of the Balkans shows the same contradictions that characterize Eastern Europe as a whole: religious differences do not necessarily separate ethnic groups; national 'awakenings' began at different times; and literary languages were standardized with different methods. In spite of all these complexities, we can find one important experience shared by the Balkans as a whole which gives the area a common character: namely, the Turkish rule, which lasted until the second half of the 19th century. Of course, each national independence movement in the Balkans demonstrates a unique history, as a comparative analysis of the struggles in Greece, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Albania will readily show. Nevertheless, these movements contained fundamental similarities, such as the armed struggle for national independence, the preservation of the Orthodox church and religion despite centuries of Ottoman rule, or the great number of Bosnians, Bulgarians and Albanians who became 'Turkified' or converted to Islam and also continued to practise this faith after their liberation was successfully completed. We should also remember that the occupants of the Greek, Bulgarian, Albanian and the unified Rumanian princi-

palities' thrones were supplied by the makers of European power politics and that the Balkans became an arena for sparring between Tsarist Russia and the Habsburg Monarchy. Western civilization spread first to the upper classes. The records of travellers to the Balkans in the second half of the 19th century and the first decade of the 20th century show the area as not only ethnographically interesting, but also as a 'terra incognita' hardly explored as yet by natural science. In Ivo Andrić's novel Bridge on the Drina we read about the tragic conflicts that ensued after Bosnia was taken over by the Habsburg Monarchy's army and bureaucracy. The new rulers felt they were bringing the benefits of civilization, but the local mentality was not receptive to Western ways. This book demonstrates a violent clash of cultures, habits and patterns of thought, including differing types of trade and production. It is quite clear that although both the Bosnians in Andrić's novel and the Czech bourgeoisie, which wanted to transform the Dual Monarchy into a trialism, felt annoyed by the labyrinth of the Austrian bureaucracy, these two feelings were basically different.

Still, when we emphasize the contrasts between the Balkans and the East-Central European region with its Polish-Czech-Hungarian centre, we do not deny their links as regards political and cultural history. Furthermore, although we doubt the applicability of the centre-periphery theory to cultural history, it should be remembered that from the perspective of the highest-ranking European powers the easternmost territories of the Balkans and the East-Central European region indeed existed on the periphery. Viewed from the cities of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Galicia and Bosnia seemed to be remote peripheries, but Transylvania, Serbia or Croatia received similar evaluations when the great European cities were the bases for comparison. Culturally, the resulting 'periphery-consciousness' could cause a defiant isolationism and an inferiority complex, but also a sense of uniqueness and a commitment to preserving the region's 'Eastern' character. There was a growing awareness of cultural regionalism and an emphasis on the values of uniqueness, although political parties and intellectuals were split over the question of whether to adopt western ways or to retain an introspective and idealized popular-communal orientation. It is certainly a biased view which sees culture and political thought as flowing unilinearly from the 'highlands' or 'mountains' of a vaguely defined Western Europe (usually France and, to a lesser extent, Britain and the Netherlands) towards areas of 'lowlands' or 'valleys'. It is true that from the second half of the 19th century Balkan and argueably East-Central European intellectuals and the movements led by them considered western parliamentary government and cultural institutions as models to emulate. However, there was a parallel aim of creating a new 'national exis-

tence' rooted in local tradition, with which the adopted patterns had to be made consistent. Characteristically, cultural adoption was confined to outward forms in the Balkan states in the second half of the 19th century. Through the ups and downs of local history, indigeneous attitudes had become fossilized, religious practices, relations between ethnic groups and social customs constituted patterns on which several rulers and industrial progress were imposed through violent outside coercion. Railroads and improved highways were meant to create closer ties between the Balkans and Europe, which, however, remained an alien world to the basically conservative natives for quite some time. This is again amply illustrated in literature, primarily in novels.

The conflict between the East-Central European and Balkan ways of thinking, manifest in Ivo Andrić's above-mentioned novel, was rendered obvious to the European powers by the emergence of the South Slav question. The strain in the Balkans was not only the result of great power rivalry, i.e. the fact that Tsarist Russia and Austria-Hungary clashed because they both wanted to fill the power vacuum created by the weakening of Turkey. Besides factors of power, the South Slav question had other elements, which were also clear for contemporaries. The conflict was not merely one between a conservative and backward peripheral region and technologically and economically more advanced colonizing powers. It was also a clash between two systems of values, world views and ways of life. More than a tension between Christian Europe and Moslem Balkans, or between Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy, the conflict of the Balkans and Europe was an inevitable antagonism of two regions which found it impossible to understand each other. (We should mention here that Tsarist Russia confronted Balkan-like situations in its newly acquired eastern territories.) Of course, none of these considerations diminish the importance of the tension in the conqueror-conquered relationship in the history of the Balkans.

To be sure, East-Central Europe should be separated from Russia, which can be termed Eastern Europe. The two regions differ greatly with respect to the nature of their political and cultural institutions and the social and moral responsibility of the bearers of culture. Neither should, for different reasons, East-Central Europe be grouped together with the Balkans, considering the peculiarities of state-formation and the cultural heritage in the latter region. Not only as regards topography, but also by its very nature, East-Central Europe is most closely linked to Central Europe. It became separated from that region because of a number of factors: first, the changes in world trade routes brought about by the discoveries in the 16th century and, secondly, the fall of national monarchies and the loss of national independence as a result of external pressure by

neighbouring great powers. Of course, the drawbacks that in the early modern period were made decisive by unfavourable historical conditions can be traced back to the earliest phases of state-formation in the region. In spite of such hindrances, the 'national' dynasties of Poland, Bohemia and Hungary created important kingdoms which, by virtue of their dynastic, religious and commercial links with other European states, became organic parts of the continent's state-structure in medieval times. In the Middle Ages the East-Central European societies, more than being passive receptors of external cultural stimuli, contributed to the shaping of European culture and laid the foundations of their own modern cultures. The loss of independent statehood (in Hungary in the 16th, in Bohemia in the 17th, in Poland in the 18th century) did not also mean the loss of the region's cultural productivity. It is remarkable how influential exiles from East-Central Europe were both politically and culturally and how extensively Hungarian, Czech, Polish cultural achievements were adopted in other national cultures. As examples taken at random, we may refer to Comenius, Ferenc Pulszky, or the great figures of Polish romanticism. Hungarian emigrations during the times of Rákóczi and Kossuth and the mid-19th century Parisian exile of Poles importantly affected European political life. (We shall not discuss here the undeserved mistreatment which these exiles received from the politicians of the great powers.) More important were, however, the close connections linking together the dynasties of East-Central European countries in the days of the Angevins, Jagiellons and King Matthias. Similar was in importance, although rarely applied in political practice, the idea of an East-Central European 'historical community of fate', which was espoused by a group of Hungarian intellectuals in the 1930s who in their search of answers to the region's contemporary problems looked to the lessons of its past. There is an entire network of close relationships which accentuates the parallel course of Polish, Czech and Hungarian history. The interconnectedness of these three cultures may be seen most clearly in their 19th century arts and literatures. The Poles and the Hungarians have sometimes been reproached as 'nations of nobles', also adding that the influence of their fossilized mentality and ideals continued to be felt even in the 20th century. Although the fate of the Czech nobility differed from that of their Polish and Hungarian counterparts after 1620, eventually the Czech national movement was also compelled to pursue a policy of 'venting grievances', which had been characteristic of the Polish and Hungarian nobility for such a long time. The centuries spent in the involuntary service of foreign power interest necessarily left their mark, as did the state of permanent alert which, as a result of their limited scope of action, characterized the Polish and the Hungarian nobility as

well as the leaders of the Czech national movement. On the one hand, they combined a proclivity towards titles grounded in history with a pretence of heroism, which on trial could indeed inspire patriotic self-sacrifice. On the other hand, some chose passive resistance and turning inwards as the only possible recourse in the face of the undoubtedly real threat of assimilation, which governments pursued alternately by enticement and by coercion. Those who unselfishly looked westwards ran up against the entrenched conservatism of those who proclaimed themselves to be representing national or 'native' values but were in fact often provincial. Often, however, occidentalists were superficial snobs incapable of understanding the goals of those who were not content merely to cherish the heroic past but wanted to emphasize contemporary social questions instead. An endemic national self-ignorance defied the attempts of some writers and thinkers to disseminate a more realistic view of the past; the academic establishment with its romantic stereotypes generally succeeded in suppressing those who exposed the hollowness of heroic illusions and the ostentatiousness of jingoism. The failure of the latter camp is perhaps a reason why even today it seems to be so hard to form a realistic view of the region's past and to get rid of the centuries-old prejudices.

Supporting these attitudes is an old body of sayings, clichés which have survived to the present day. These put the ideas relating to the peculiar mission of a nation or its role in European culture in a concise form, as e.g. 'Hungary was the bastion of Christianity which saved Europe from the Eastern peril'. Also relevant are some national myths. That is why the question about the historical place of the countries and the region in Europe normally receives an uneasy answer couched in terms of actual power policy considerations. Historians, when answering the question, are aware that the borders of the region have not remained constant through history. Important shifts of boundaries and changes in the composition of the population occurred as a result of such factors as forced migrations (e.g. the Serbs' exodus to Hungary to escape the Turks at the end of the 17th century), colonizations and peace treaties (e.g. after the First and the Second World War). As a consequence, 'national' historiographies have been written which have viewed the past from the perspective of the present, that is, they have reshaped the history of their peoples and nations in order to justify the new borders. This, however, makes it more, rather than less difficult to find satisfactory answers, all the more so because there is an atmosphere of nervous sensitiveness whenever the question of Eastern and Central Europe is raised. In the minds of some people, belonging to Eastern Europe is a stigma, even though classifications into regions should theoretically be based upon objective judgements.

At the same time, there has been an air of mystery around Central Europe, never clearly defined. As it is indicated by the term Zwischen-Europa, the region consists of barrier-states which have suffered heavily from war, e.g. the Thirty Years War, the Napoleonic wars, the many revolutions and uprisings, and the devastating Second World War. However, it is not true that there is only a practically undefinable area lying between East and West, but rather we find a region with unique features. Just as Germany, Austria, parts of Switzerland, and perhaps even Northern Italy can be considered the western part of Central Europe, so the lands lying directly to their east should be called East-Central Europe. This is not a game of words or a clever exercise in cartography. East-Central Europe is inseparably linked by history to its western neighbours to constitute Central Europe. In many ways East-Central Europe has served as a mediator between western Central and Eastern Europe. Threats from the east (the Mongols, Turks, Cumans) were indeed stopped here; at the same time, in spite of its complicated history of imposed alliances, each national culture of East-Central Europe has a definite Central and Western European orientation. The region has always adapted well to dialogues between its neighbours, not the least reason being the presence of Slav nations within it. Perhaps it is worth remindig ourselves that although Russian fiction was extremely influential throughout Europe during the 19th century, writers of East-Central Europe were most influenced by the novels of Turgenev, a liberal 'occidentalist', while Tolstoy and Dostoyevski remained often quoted authors, recognized and appreciated, but ones who were speaking about alien worlds.

We consider East-Central Europe a useful term because it simultaneously marks the region's Central-European character and its openness to the Eastern European region. However, it should also be emphasized that although the term is useful, it may not be of eternal value. It should be understood as a description of a dynamic process. This is a region only partly because of its geography; primarily it is the creation of the historical processes which formed its culture. This term has the advantage of not being based on preconceptions, but rather on the fact that over the course of centuries there has evolved a community of nations united by a common fate.

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ATTEMPTS AT CHANGING THE POWER RELATIONS OF CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN 1792-1797

The changing relations of power in 18th century Europe put a new marking out of spheres of interest on the agenda as early as the 1750s, and by the 1780s the repartitioning of the continent was obviously imminent. The victims were to be those countries which lagged behind the triumphantly ascending great powers in augmenting their economic and military potential and increasing the efficiency of their state machinery.

As is shown by the memoirs of Emperor Joseph II of Austria and the letters of Hugo Kołłątaj, one-time vice chancellor of Poland, this was no secret to keen observers. "The situation in Europe was precarious, fire was glowing everywhere under the ashes", the Emperor wrote, whereas Kołłątaj thought Poland was the first victim of a great power policy game which in the future would be directed against the German and Italian principalities and the Ottoman Empire.[1]

The outbreak of the French Revolution soon made Prussia, Austria and Russia conclude that from then on it was not only in Poland that a scene was set for them to expand their domains, but also in France, then collapsing into anarchy.[2] The revolutionary leaders, however, were not prepared to acquiesce to the loss of their achievements and to the partition of France, and were busily working on a new foreign policy scheme, which was designed to thwart the hegemonic endeavours of the great powers by creating a balance of power based on an alliance of small states. Even for its own sake, it is worth studying the transitions through which the diplomacy of the Revolution, compelled to defend itself against conquerors, was adjusted to the objectives and the phraseology of great power contest. However, it is at least as interesting to see how the peoples of East-Central Europe, which were dependent on the great powers and provided the bases of French diplomacy, responded to the calls of the French Revolution, and how late-18th century concepts were later incorporated into national traditions. In

what follows I wish to analyze the impact of the French Revolution from this viewpoint, and to deal with the problem of realism and survival of the various plans.

1.

When the Franco-Austrian and the Franco-Prussian wars broke out in the spring of 1792, the foreign affairs of the Revolution were managed by Charles-François du Périer Dumouriez, an experienced diplomat who, as a secret agent of Louis XV, had worked in Poland during 1770-1772, and had in the meantime also visited Hungary. He belonged to the traditional anti-Habsburg line in French diplomacy and, therefore, in the spring of 1792 he tried to secure the neutrality of Prussia by making concessions, while, to counter Austria, he tried to exploit the opportunities presented by the situation in Belgium. Following Brissot, he supported the concept of 'natural boundaries', urging defense of these boundaries where already secured, e.g., in Alsace, and offense where they were yet to be established, as on the Rhine and in the Alps. Thus, it was only in its phraseology that his concept differed from the foreign policy of the ancien régime. In practice, he also wanted to redraw the map of Europe in a high-handed fashion, and he was as unscrupulous in promising territories to potential allies as his predecessors had been.

On August 10, 1792, Pierre-Henri-Hélène-Marie Lebrun (Tondu[4]) succeeded Dumouriez, who, after his resignation on June 16, continued to play an important part in the foreign affairs of the revolution as a military commander. Lebrun was an old friend of Dumouriez, and thus the influence of the former foreign secretary on French diplomacy was unbroken until the autumn of 1792. Dumouriez initiated plans in the summer of 1792 for making an alliance with the Ottoman Empire and for fomenting revolts in the Habsburg Monarchy and among the Cossacks of Russia. This was in fact nothing other than a revival of the proposal to create an alliance of second-ranking states, worked out in the 1770s by Choiseul, foreign secretary to Louis XV. Only the formulation was novel: "a belt of allied republics protecting the body of France" was to be established.[5]

However, the plan of a Turkish alliance was thwarted, since the Porte refused to receive Sémonville, the newly appointed French ambassador. From then on, the leadership of the young republic made alternating efforts to obtain Prussian and Turkish support. An Outline of Instructions and Principles to be Observed in Negotiating with the King of Prussia, in which an unsuccessful attempt was

made to reconcile these two proposed alliances, was most probably one of the documents prepared for the negotiations subsequent to the victory of Valmy.[6] Despite continual failures, the French foreign secretary persisted in his adherence to Dumouriez's scheme sending two secret agents, Désportes and Déscorches, to Berlin and to Constantinople respectively, but neither mission enjoyed success.[7]

This dogged persistence in the face of repeated rejection, puzzling at first sight, is probably attributable to the influence of pro-Prussian circles (which included Dumouriez) among officers in the army, and to the fact that French cities were interested in trading with the Ottoman Empire. Marseille was playing a leading role in French-Turkish trade, and its magistrates regularly urged the foreign secretary and the secretary of war to settle the status of the French embassy in Constantinople.[8]

The scheme of the Outline of Instructions and Principles... was on the whole contradictory and unrealistic. For instance, a French expansion to natural boundaries would have automatically brought about a strong French influence on Belgium and Holland; this would have upset the benevolent neutrality of Britain, which was predicated upon strict non-interference with the independence of these two countries.[9] Nevertheless, in some respects the project was based on realistic assumptions. The Czech, Austrian and Hungarian republics, to be formed in the territories of the Habsburg Monarchy, and the creation of independent states in Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia could not only be harmonized with traditional French theories of the European balance of power, but was also supported by some social traditions and antecedents in constitutional law. Dumouriez, of course, had become well versed in these traditions during the time of his earlier secret mission, and, from the spring of 1792 on, he zealously urged the fomenting of sedition in Hungary and Russia.[10] French diplomacy was also not ignorant of the fact that the 1790-91 movement of the Estates in Hungary was considering the reinforcement of the confederation with Bohemia and other neighbouring countries, and that the Polish nobility of Galicia repeatedly demanded the unification of that province with Hungary, arguing that Maria Theresa had annexed Galicia to the Habsburg Empire in 1772 on the pretext that it was one of the lands of St Stephen's crown.[11] Thus, the creation of allied republics dependent upon France might not have seemed wholly impracticable.

While French diplomats were experimenting with reorchestrated varieties of the traditional foreign policy, there was a growing number of people in the National Convention who dreamed of the liberation of all oppressed peoples through world revolution. It was in this spirit that the Convention passed the

remarkable decree of November 19, 1792, in which support was promised to all subjugated nations.[12]

In practice, however, traditions proved to be more powerful than the revolutionary principles of observing the rights and liberties of other nations and the rejection of conquest, and the population of occupied Belgium became more and more justified in feeling itself subjugated. The tension between intentions and reality is apparent in the correspondence of the French foreign secretary: as early as November 24, 1792, Dumouriez protested against the activity of the French authorities and the profiteers who oppressed the Belgians and who, he thought, would compel him to resign.[13] Reporting from the theatre of war on the Rhine on December 23, Custine Jr. came to the conclusion that "the peoples need not and must not be deceived, but we either have to conquer the world, or we must temporarily endure the survival of those practices to which mankind has been accustomed".[14] In the course of several millennia, however, people had also become accustomed to resisting conquest. This explains the 'improvement' of the concepts of world revolution. Dreaming of the advent of the reign of liberty in Britain and Central Asia, the Abbé Grégoire, President of the Convention, thought in autumn 1792 that "all governments are our enemies and all peoples are our brothers; we shall either succumb, or all nations will be free"[15]; however, on April 26, 1793, Anarcharsis Clootz claimed no less than that "Nations are necessarily evil, but mankind is essentially good. Ergo, let us erect a world republic!"[16]

Between autumn 1792 and spring 1793, a mix of world revolution schemes and traditional foreign policy characterized French diplomacy, during which time the option of concluding a separate peace treaty with either Prussia or Austria was still pursued. On the other hand, Lebrun's letters make it quite clear that he expected that internal dissention would arise because of the influence of the revolutionary propaganda, "because of the hatred of governments towards French ideas", and because of the secret sympathy of peoples.[17]

Danton was the first to draw the inevitable conclusions from the growth of resistance in the occupied territories, from Dumouriez's treachery and from the complete isolation of French diplomacy. He realized that by espousing world revolution and by encouraging subversion, the French Revolution not only challenged the great powers, but also became abhorred by a large part of the population of the occupied territories. "The time has come for us to relieve liberty of all enthusiasm of this nature, in order better to preserve it", he said in the Convention on April 13, 1793, when he announced the policy of non-intervention. In accordance with the new foreign policy line, he promised that France

would abstain from interfering with the internal affairs of other countries, although she would not cease defending herself. This explains the renewal of the negotiations to establish a Franco-Swedish and a Franco-Turkish alliance, the ultimate purpose of which would have been to stab Russia and the Habsburg Monarchy in the back.[18] The confusion in the internal situation, however, also left its mark on the foreign affairs. Lebrun was first arrested, then temporarily restored to his office, while Choiseul-Gouffier, Sémonville and Déscorches were alternately considered for ambassador to Constantinople by the various political factions. One can understand that under these circumstances the Porte would not hear of an alliance or a close cooperation.[19] Danton was also gradually thrust into the background, and he could not prevent Lebrun from being again arrested and, in December 1793, executed.

In June 1793, Lebrun was succeeded by Desforgues, but the new line in foreign policy was announced by Robespierre on September 16. From then on, only the United States and Switzerland were regarded as allies of France, and she only intended to send chargés d'affaires to other countries. The management of French diplomacy was in fact taken over by the Committee of Public Safety.[20] In April 1794, Desforgues followed his predecessor into death, and the Jacobins appointed no one to succeed him. At the same time, they sent an increasing number of agents to incite dissention in Germany and in the Habsburg Monarchy.[21]

After the fall of the Mountain, which had abandoned actual diplomatic activity and the creation of a European alliance system, the traditional plans for Swedish and Turkish alliances and for supporting the Poles were again raised, although with an ever diminishing resolution. After Thermidor it was also clear that France had become one of the great powers aspiring to repartition the continent: in the minds of the members of the Committee of Public Safety and, later on, of the Directory, the formation of natural boundaries was closely intertwined with the partitioning of Belgium and Holland. Moreover, just as Prussia, Austria and Russia made Poland pay the costs of the war against the French, the revolutionaries cast the burden of the war on Italy. It is only understandable that the ideas of lending support to the Polish émigrés and of fomenting a revolt in Galicia, which were time and again put forward, usuallyfailed to evoke any echo. Concluding a separate peace with Prussia was more important for France than supporting unpredictable revolutionary movements. Foreign factions with French sympathies continued to be duped by promises for quite some time.[22] In the autumn of 1796 and in the spring of 1797, French diplomats seriously considered supporting a Hungarian-Polish rising to disrupt the Habsburg Monarchy,

but with the Leoben armistice of General Bonaparte events took an entirely different course.[23]

II.

The first signs of familiarity with the ideas of Dumouriez and Lebrun in the Habsburg Monarchy can be traced to October/November 1792. A leaflet, allegedly distributed in 2,000 copies, called upon the citizens of Pest to demonstrate for their rights and liberties on October 31.[24] Baron Riedel, the prospective leader of the Austrian Jacobins, appealed to the citizenry of the German territories through dozens of handwritten leaflets that they should assemble, with cockades in their hats and weapons in their hands, in the squares of their cities, and overthrow tyranny on November 1, 1792.[25] Czech literature has also preserved the memory of another handwritten appeal, no longer extant, which was sent to some respectable citizens, a copy of which was nailed up on Charles Bridge. The leaflet called upon the citizens to gather in Hibernska Square to launch a struggle for the recovery of liberty and for the expulsion of the Jews on November 3. It was also mentioned that General Dumouriez knew about the citizens' miserable condition, would not refuse to lend them support, and that he wanted to create free republics out of the poorly governed Monarchy.[26] The proximity of dates and the similarity of the appeals (this method was also used in the territories occupied in Belgium and along the Rhine) lead us to suspect the involvement of French emissaries in the above actions.[27]

It was, however, indisputably in Poland that the plans of Dumouriez and Lebrun evoked the liveliest response. The intensification of great power contest menaced the very existence of the Polish Republic, a traditional ally of France. In the summer of 1792, Polish reformers supportive of the constitution of May 3, 1791, were compelled to emigrate to Saxony by the Russian troops backing the conservatives. They were soon informed that Catherine II had concluded a secret agreement with Prussia on the second partition of Poland. These émigrés maintained close contacts with French diplomats through Marie Louis Daubry Déscorches de Sainte-Croix, formerly the French ambassador to Warsaw. Déscorches (who was later sent to Constantinople in place of Sémonville to negotiate the Franco-Turkish alliance) left his secretaries, K. La Roche and P. Bonneau, in Warsaw, and took into his service Pierre Parandier, Count Ignacy Potocki's former secretary, as the permanent French chargé d'affaires of the Polish exiles in Leipzig.[28] In November 1792, Parandier forwarded foreign secretary Lebrun's desire that the Poles should send an emissary to Paris. The

exiles' choice was Tadeusz Kościuszko, who in early February 1793 visited Dumouriez in the Belgian theatre of war with plans worked out by Hugo Kołłątaj and, later on, went to Paris to establish contacts with the most influential leaders of the Gironde and even with Lebrun.[29]

As we know from a letter of February 18, 1793, written by Kazimierz La Roche, Déscorches's former secretary (also banished from Poland in the meantime) to Hugo Kołłątaj, Kościuszko, with some modification, adopted the plan worked out by the French three months earlier, and submitted it in a memorandum to the French foreign secretary.[30] The memorandum proposed two large scale actions to occur in the near future, counting on the support of Franco-Swedish and Franco-Turkish alliances. The first was to be accomplished by the Swedes attacking Russia on the Baltic Sea, thus facilitating the transfer of French arms to Poland, while the second was to be launched by the Ottoman Empire against Russia and the Habsburg Monarchy, with the support of the French fleet on the Black Sea. As Kościuszko put it, the realization of the plan "should be started by fomenting disturbances and local risings in Hungary, Galicia, Bohemia, Silesia, Prussia and Russia. Of course, this would cost a large sum of money, but these moves would compel the enemy powers to withdraw some of their troops from the Rhine, which in its turn would significantly diminish the war expenses of France".[31]

Because of the confusion in internal affairs, Dumouriez's treason and the Jacobins' coming to the fore, Lebrun only made promises to Kościuszko, without really wanting to enter into an alliance with the Poles, lest he should weaken the chances of concluding a separate peace with Prussia or Austria. Thus, Kościuszko had to return to Leipzig empty-handed. The exiles in Saxony now adopted a policy of wait and see. They made the launching of a revolt for the recovery of the Polish constitution and Poland's integrity dependent on the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war, while they also revived one of the traditional strategems of Polish diplomacy: they offered the Polish crown to the Habsburgs.[32]

The exiles were, however, unable to prevent the internal discontent in Poland from culminating in a conspiracy. This began to take shape some time in the spring of 1793 among the officers whose condition was made precarious by projected cuts in the numbers of the army. Since they were quite ignorant of international power relations, they were confident of the French support that had earlier been promised to them. Their leaders, Count Ignacy Działyński and Andrzej Kápostás, a Warsaw banker born in Galgóc, also established contact with Poles living now under alien suzerainty.[32] Kápostás allegedly managed to establish links with the Hungarian malcontents, too.[34]

In summer, 1793, the Warsaw conspirators sent deputies to the Polish emigré leaders in Saxony and informed them that the army had elected Kościuszko dictator with plenary powers, and they only lacked a signal for starting a revolt. Since, however, the international situation seemed disadvantageous, the exiles did not want to take any rash steps. Kościuszko travelled to Galicia in September 1793 to examine the preparations on the spot, and his experiences were appalling. It was, for instance, revealed that Count Stanisław Sołtyk, who spent most of his time in Vienna and was unaware of the arrival of the commander-in-chief, had been elected leader of the revolt in Galicia. In addition to the fact that Kościuszko was only able to hold discussions with Sołtyk during his second journey to Galicia in October, he was also unfavourably impressed by the unpreparedness of the population, the lack of ammunition, and the verbal carelessness of the soldiers. At the Podgorze meeting, the commander-in-chief instructed the representatives of the Warsaw conspiracy to set up local committees in each voivodeship, to start preparing the peasantry for the struggle, and to collect money and arms.[35] Then he sent Count Wielhorski to Paris to ask the Committee of Public Safety for 12 million livres for the conspiracy in Poland and Galicia.[36] As for Kościuszko, he travelled to Italy, lest his presence should encourage the soldiers to act precipitously.[37]

Count Wielhorski arrived in Paris in late November. Soon afterwards, foreign secretary Desforgues called upon the Polish exiles through Parandier to send a deputy with plenary powers to Paris. Franciszek Barss, a Warsaw lawyer who was appointed to the task, arrived in Paris in February 1794. As is apparent from the memorandum submitted by Parandier and Barss in February, the exiles did not abandon their intention to incite revolts in Russia, Prussia and Galicia, and they also expected disturbances to spread to the Habsburg Monarchy. An explanation for this might be the fact that Kołłątaj and his circle deemed the international situation extremely unfavourable, and wanted to divide the forces of the great powers by attacking them on several fronts.[38]

There was, however, not much time left to make preparations. Discontent due to the projected cuts in the numbers of the army was at its peak in Poland, and an uprising spontaneously broke out on March 13. Thus facing a fait-accompli, the exiles decided to return home, since it was obvious that defeat would be tantamount to the complete partition of Poland. In this difficult situation they made abortive efforts to obtain Turkish[39] and French support. In spring, Barss repeatedly requested the Committee of Public Safety to grant aid of 30 million livres to the Poles, who in this event would also start a revolt in Galicia, but he was refused.[40]

In this situation Kościuszko decided that, despite the revolutionary inclination of the people, order had to be upheld in Galicia, and, to secure the neutrality of Austria, he again offered the Polish crown to Archduke Palatine Alexander Leopold.[41] With this, however, neither Count Ignacy Potocki, nor Count Stanisław Sołtyk could achieve any result.[42] Although the Viennese court showed itself ready to negotiate with Kościuszko's emissaries lest it should lose the sympathy of the population of Galicia, its gesture was insincere: the preparations to occupy Little-Poland had already been made in May, and the Poles in Vienna were carefully watched because of the rumours about the planned Galician revolt.[43]

III.

The problem of the Galician rising leads us now to events inside the Habsburg Monarchy. As was also well known among French diplomats, the Polish nobility of Galicia and the Hungarian nobility in Upper Hungary had established since the 1770s a close network of relations, based on Freemasons' lodges. During the reign of Joseph II, the Galician Estates demanded in a petition signed by 5,000 people that they should no longer be governed in the fashion of the hereditary provinces and that they should be brought under the authority of the Hungarian diet. The Prussians, taking advantage of the discontent among the Hungarian and Polish nobility, raised the idea of a joint anti-Habsburg rising in 1790. Leopold II, by issuing the Charta Leopoldina - in which he promised rights of autonomy to the Galician Estates - temporarily succeeded in appeasing their dissatisfaction[44], which, however, flared up again with renewed force after the emperor's death. In 1793, the Patriotic Society was founded in Lemberg. It counted about 150 members, had its own newspaper and extensive network in the country.[45] The society was divided into a moderate and a radical wing. The leaders of the former group were Duke Adam Kazimierz Czartoryski and Count Józef Ossolinski, aristocrats loyal to the Habsburgs. The Duke, through his close contacts with Hungarian bodyguards in Vienna, even learnt to speak Hungarian, and enlightened Hungarian aristocrats - such as Count József Haller, Count Imre Erdődy, the younger Count Csáky and József Ürményi - frequently enjoyed his hospitality in his country seat at Pulawy.[46] As revealed during the Cracow trial of 1798-99, Czartoryski had for years been consistently endeavouring to create an alliance of equals, an 'Eastern Switzerland' consisting of Austria, Bohemia, Hungary and Poland, led by the Habsburgs.[47] The Duke's loyalty notwithstanding, the Viennese court did not trust him, and had him watched by dozens of Austrian and Russian

spies. Through them, the court was informed that Czartoryski lent financial support to the Kościuszko insurrection and, later on, the radical wing of the Galician conspiracy.

Between 1793-97, the leaders of this radical wing were Count Sołtyk and Count Waleryan Dzieduszycki. Sołtyk, while officially negotiating on Kościuszko's behalf in Vienna in April 1794, gave the Viennese plotters money, so that they could send deputies to Barss in Paris[48] to ask for the support of the Committee of Public Safety.

Let us add that this was probably not the first occasion for negotiations between the Poles and the malcontents in the Monarchy. On June 15, 1793, Count Pergen's secret agents reported that Hungarians were staying in Töplitz and, some time earlier, the sojourning of Poles in Karlsbad was reported.[49] The court had the Poles in the Monarchy watched since as early as February 22, 1793,[50] and, after June, the names of visitors in bathing resorts also had to be reported. These measures,however, did not bring any result as yet. The local police did not know about either the Hungarians or the Poles, although Kołłątaj's correspondence makes it clear that in mid-June 1793 he was staying in Karlsbad with Count Alexander Batowski and, on July 1, they both went to Töplitz.[51]

We do not know whether, in June-July 1793, when the Polish exiles offered the crown to the Habsburgs, Polish-Hungarian negotiations were actually conducted; nevertheless, it is an established fact that Ignác Martinovics drafted a new Hungarian constitution in summer 1793. In this, he planned the creation of autonomous provinces for Hungary's nationalities, in which legislative and executive power would have been exercised jointly.[52] This idea of a federation to some extent seems to have been an improvement on the Polish-type confederacy (established to achieve one single objective), which had earlier been put forward by Lebrun, Kołłątaj and Kościuszko, on 'American lines', since in Martinovics's scheme the members of the federation would have been bound together by institutional links. Since Martinovics's 'Open Letter' makes it clear that he knew about the Polish exiles' offering the crown to the Habsburgs,[53] it was probably no accident that in his draft constitution and pamphlets of summer, 1793, there was no mention made as yet about the deposition of the House of Habsburg.

In December 1793, however, the Hungarian and Croatian malcontents queried Bacher, the French chargé d'affaires in Switzerland as to whether they could count on French support in the event of an insurrection, the purpose of which was to be the establishment of an independent republic.[54] Since this action came shortly after Count Wielhorski's mission to Paris, and since we also know that the Polish conspirators were then ready to start an uprising in Galicia,

it may not be too much to assume a connection between these events. A connection is made all the more likely by the fact that Count Sołtyk often visited Vienna at this time. In addition, the French foreign ministry received several reports via Switzerland on unrest in the Monarchy in late 1793, including a military plot, which, however, did not spread to other provinces, where the dissatisfaction of the population manifested itself in spontaneous local disturbances.[55]

The outbreak of the Kościusko insurrection strengthened the ties between the Poles and dissidents in the Monarchy. In May 1794, Jacobin tracts written by Martinovics, in which he frequently referred to the example of the Poles,[56] were distributed in Hungary. In Cracow, a Polish rendering of Alexius Nedeczky's ode Hungari ad Polonos was printed, which extolled Kościuszko.[57]

A statement made in 1795 by János Müller, a citizen of Sopron and a leader of the Styrian Jacobins, reveals that Baron Riedel, the leader of the conspirators in Austria, spent some time in Sopron in the spring of 1794. Here Cajetan Gilowski of Vienna visited him to discuss arrangements for publishing Franz Hebenstreit's poem Homo hominibus by a secret Hungarian printer. They also wanted to distribute the poem in Poland, to where Hebenstreit was planning a journey.[58]

Vienna was aware of the existence of malcontents in Hungary and Austria, but the 'Schusterkomplott' was considered harmless.[59] A letter of May, 1794, by Count Kollowrat, president of the Viennese Directory, to Count Ugarte, president of the Moravian gubernium, reveals that Vienna was much more worried about the spread of an outbreak in Galicia to the Monarchy.[60]

On June 5 and 8, the Prussian ambassador to Vienna intimated that Berlin had unambiguous proof that some Poles in the Monarchy under the influence of Paris were hatching a dangerous plot the purpose of which was to overthrow the Habsburg dynasty. The plotters, centered in Vienna, had connections with malcontents in the Monarchy as well as with other Poles staying in Bohemia.[61] Although doubtful about this report, the court took precautionary measures.[62] A confidential report by Count Zeidler of June 15 revealed that Polish foreign secretary Count Ignacy Potocki, his brothers and several others formerly exiled in Saxony were staying in Töplitz.[63] On June 28, Emperor Francis, referring to the case of the Prussian diplomats detained in Warsaw, ordered that the Poles, who had in the meantime moved to Karlsbad - Counts Jan and Stanisław Potocki, General Zabiello and Abbé Piattoli (formerly secretary of Stanisław August, King of Poland, now the tutor of Ignacy Potocki's daughter) - should be taken hostage, and that Count Alexander Batowski should be banished. All the papers and letters of the captives were to be thoroughly examined.[64]

In the execution of this order, however, there was some confusion. On June

30, the Kreishauptmann of Elbogen, on learning that Count Batowski had returned to Karlsbad, made a surprise search of his home. The Count had been wanted by the police since becoming Kościuszko's messenger to Barss. The local chief of police, unfamiliar as yet with the imperial order, found nothing of interest, but news of the raid had probably been leaked, for the military detachment arriving the next day found only Piattoli remaining in Karlsbad. Count St. Potocki and his son had left for Vienna early in the morning, as did, although taking a different route, General Zabiello. Before them, Jan Potocki had left for Lemberg.

After some confusion arising from the contradictory orders received by the local police and the chief constable of Prague, not without comic elements, Count Potocki, his son and Zabiello were at last arrested and handed over to the military authorities, while Count Batowski was banished.[66] Only Abbé Piattoli was found to possess noteworthy papers; these, however, were regarded as so subversive that only the president of the war council, the chief constable of Prague and the prisoner were allowed to inspect them, and thus it is difficult to form an idea about their content. In any event these documents revealed that General Wieniawski, who also had links with the malcontents in the Monarchy, was staying at a spa near Eger (Cheb) at the German border. He was then ordered to be arrested, too.[67]

Shortly afterwards, the Viennese court was informed that Count Sołtyk had been in regular contact with the French chargé d'affaires in Venice and later on, that he had financed the journey of the Viennese Jacobin deputies to Paris. The arrest of Sołtyk on July 15 was soon followed by that of Martinovics and the Vienna group of the Austrian conspirators. The court now already suspected that there was Hungarian-Austrian-Polish cooperation - this is obvious from the questions asked of the convicts -, and also that Ignác Martinovics, abbot of Szászvár, was the connecting link between the malcontents in the Monarchy.[69] This latter assumption was supported by the findings of the commission of inquiry in Vienna: as related in a letter of Count Saurau to the president of the Prague gubernium, the persons arrested in Vienna and Pest in summer 1794 were members of a joint plot, the purpose of which was to overthrow the constitution and start a revolution in Austria and Hungary under Martinovics's leadership.[70] It is well to mention here that according to Vilmos Fraknói, the Viennese Jacobins were condemned in February 1795 because of their participation in the 'Martinovics conspiracy'.[71]

The commission of inquiry, however, could not establish a Polish connection. Although the suspicion of the police was not dispelled (to wit, though Count Soltyk was released through a guarantee given by Duke Czartoryski and Count

Ossolinski, his wife and his children were kept hostage in the castle of Glogau),[72] the majority of the Poles soon recovered their freedom. Abbé Piattoli was an exception: his release was made contingent upon handing over information about the Kościuszko insurrection.[73]

Still, the existence of Polish connections is proven both by indirect contemporary data and by later direct sources. To draw upon only some of these, the secret information the Viennese court gathered from Switzerland, the reports of those denouncing the Hungarian Jacobins and the recollections of Polish exiles in Venice agree that the goal of the Hungarian plot and the malcontents in the Monarchy was to raise an armed force of 30,000.[75] The Polish exiles both in Venice and in Paris believed that with this force they could lend support to the Kościuszko insurrection, and because of this they were counting on Hungarian and Transylvanian support for later insurrections and for the erection of Dabrowski's legions.[76]

IV.

The collapse of the Martinovics conspiracy did not put an end to the attempts of various Central European peoples to cooperate with each other and to the illusions concerning French aid. With the deterioration of the position of the Kościuszko insurrection in autumn 1794, the idea of Polish-Hungarian-Austrian-Czech cooperation was again raised. Kościuszko addressed a manifesto to the soldiers in the armies of the three great powers, calling upon them to change sides and support the Poles.[77] After the commander-in-chief had been captured by the enemy, his successor T. Wawreczki unsuccessfully attempted to start an insurrection in Galicia.[78] The leaders now postponed the Galician action to the spring of 1795, which they planned to start jointly with the Hungarians. This is probably the background of a trip by Kołłątaj in early November to Galicia. He took the reserve money and the most important documents of the Kościuszko insurrection, and (according to information gathered by the councillor of governor general Mednyánszky) hid in Sáros county of Hungary, and then was arrested on returning to Galicia in early December. Then, however, neither money nor papers were found on him.[79]

From late 1794 on, the radical wing of the Polish emigrés (cooperating with Count Sołtyk's and Count Dzieduszycki's Centralization of Lemberg, the Polish refugees in Wallachia and French diplomats), struggled persistently to start a revolution, the purpose of which was to lay the foundations of democracy. In this, they also counted on the support of Hungarians and Transylvanians.[80]

One of these plans - with which the Viennese court, due to the activity of its Galician spies, to Prussian and Russian warnings and to the confidential reports of its ambassador in Constantinople, was not unfamiliar[81] - was forwarded to the French foreign ministry in December 1796. The opening lines of this plan substantiate information received from the Berlin court in early June 1794: "During the recent Polish revolution the leaders maintained extensive and intimate relations with malcontents in Hungary. They planned joint movements: the success of the plan that was to establish a new order in Poland would have encouraged similar ventures in Hungary. Thus the Poles, while fighting for themselves, were at the same time involved in another plot, which evoked a wide response in Hungary. This plot, however, was revealed even before the crushing of the Polish revolution. Many persons were arrested, and the leaders, Martinovics, Sigray, etc. were beheaded." The strikingly accurate spelling of names leads us to believe that the author of this document was a Hungarian who was in contact with the Centralization of Lemberg. This organization - unlike the moderate exiles in Paris, who at this time already supported the activity of Dabrowski's legions - wanted to rally the refugee soldiers in Turkish territory, and to invade Galicia with Hungarian and Transylvanian help from Moldavia. From Galicia, they intended to call for a general anti-Habsburg insurrection in the Monarchy.[83]

Further information about this plan comes from a report from Hungary, written in very poor French, a copy of which was made in the French foreign ministry on January 10, 1797. According to this document, Gergely Berzeviczy and István Illésházy in Hungary, and József Stadniczky of Dukla in Galicia, were to be in contact with the French commissary to ensure links with the local conspirators. For security's sake no more names were mentioned, the author of the report wrote, since they did not want to involve innocent people in trouble, adding that they did not trust Constantin Stammati, the French agent in Jassi, for he did not possess the discretion necessary in affairs like this.[84]

Duke Czartoryski and his circle probably were not thinking in terms of an insurrection, but they continued to support the reorganization of the Monarchy on federal lines. For this purpose, they invited Count Erdődy to represent the Hungarian Estates in semi-official negotiations to Pulawy in spring 1797.[85]

A series of arrests put an end to all these designs. The Viennese court managed to detain two Galician plotters, whom they found to possess proofs of the links with the exiles in Paris and with Duke Czartoryski's group. They also managed to detect the Gorzkowski-conspiracy, which aimed at liberating the peasantry. Despite a series of trials in Galicia in 1798-99, the Polish exiles

continued until 1809 to hope for Hungarian assistance in the event of an anti-Habsburg uprising.

The reason for the failure of the above projects ought to be sought for in a variety of factors, above all in the nature of objectives and the composition of the social strata which formulated them. Last but not least, the revolutionary plans were damaged by the Machiavellian, cynical nature of French diplomacy, which encouraged the movement by fair words and promises prior to the outbreak of the Kościuszko-insurrection and later defected the Polish cause. The heart of the problem lay in the objectives. A revolution to bring about a radical transformation of the existing political establishment under conditions of economic, social and cultural backwardness could only rely on a very narrow social base: a part of the nobility, groups of intellectuals and a thin layer of officers; in general, men of learning favourable to novel ideas, but who were generally political neophytes. Idealism and voluntarism characterized their endeavours, and they overestimated the values of ideas, symbols and slogans. The fact that they were not always able to rally followers is not only due to the others' conservatism, but also to the fact that these champions of revolution, while dreaming of democracy and the rights of man, often ignored the rights of those whose interests they were allegedly representing. It is no accident that in 1798 Kościuszko had to call on the Polish émigré leaders to warn them that raids of their troops would only cause unnecessary suffering for the population of Galicia and, thus, the people would be alienated from 'the cause', i.e. the recovery of the independence of Poland.[88]

Organizing irregular troops continued to be 'fashionable' throughout the 19th century. Plans of similar actions were put forward by the Hungarian and Polish émigrés in Italy as late as 1863. In the Balkan countries this method had its golden age in the second half of the 19th century.

It was, however, not only the idea of organizing irregulars that survived from the schemes of Dumouriez, Lebrun and the Polish exiles, but also the hope for confederation. This wish evoked a lively echo in all circles demanding social reform in the empires of East-Central Europe. Because of the region's extreme heterogeneity with respect to ethnicity and religion, it seemed that confederation was the only way to achieve democracy and guarantee the rights of nationality at the same time. It is not surprising that in 1797 the idea of a 'Balkan Confederation' was raised even among the Greeks of Wallachia, who were influenced by the Poles and French diplomacy.[89]

The idea of confederation has always been especially attractive for political progressives in Hungary. Suffice it to refer here to Lajos Kossuth's plans of a

Danubian Confederation, or to the designs of Oszkár Jászi to create an Eastern Switzerland. Such schemes also occupied bourgeois radical and intellectual circles, which were for a democratic renewal in the coalition period after the Second World War, since they conceived of this last fair message of rationalism as the only remedy to great power expansion. Confederation, they thought, would allow the peoples of the region, inextricably mixed up with each other, to rise above their petty disputes and live in harmony.

Therefore, I believe that the origins of these confederation plans are of interest not only to the professional historian but to all people whose lives are affected by problems of living within a multi-cultural society.

Abbreviations

A.E. = Archives des Affaires Etrangères (Paris)
C.P. = Correspondance Politique
AGAD = Archivum Główny Akt Dawnych (Central Archive of Old Papers, Warsaw)
Arch.Nat. = Archives Nationales (Paris)
Allg. Verwaltungsarchiv = Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv (Vienna)
Bibl. Czartoryska = Biblioteka Czartoryska (Czartoryski Library, Cracow)
Bibl. Nar. = Biblioteka Narodowa (National Library, Warsaw)
H.H.St.A. = Haus-Hof und Staatsarchiv (Vienna)
O.L. = Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archives, Budapest)
OSZK = Országos Széchényi Könyvtár (National Széchényi Library, Budapest)
kt. = kézirattár (manuscript collection)
PAN Bibl. w Krakowie = Biblioteka PAN-a w Krakowie (Library of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Cracow)
St.U.A. v Brně = Státni Ústředni Archiv v Brně (Central National Archive, Brno)
St.U.A.P.G. = Státni Ústředni Archiv. Prezidium Gubernia Českého Království (Central National Archive. Presidium of the Gubernium of the Bohemian Kingdom, Prague)

NOTES

1. Albert Sorel, La question d'Orient au XVIII^{e} siècle (Paris, 1878), p. 305.; PAN Bibl. w Krakowie Rkp. 200 (K). f.59-71. See also Frédéric Masson, Le département des affaires étrangères pendant la révolution 1787-1804 (Paris, 1877), pp. 2-3.
2. A. Sorel, L'Europe et la Révolution Française (Paris, 1889-1891), II, pp. 496-497, III, pp. 44-45.
3. Dictionnaire de Biographie Française (Paris, 1970), XII, pp. 259-261; Heinrich von Sybel, Geschichte der Revolutionszeit von 1789 bis 1795 (Düsseldorf, 1877), I, p. 373; Sorel, La question d'Orient, II, pp. 403-408.
4. Larousse, Grand Dictionnaire Universel du XIX^{e} siècle (Paris, 1914), X, p. 294.
5. A.E.C.P. Turquie I.184., 125., 156.; Jacques Godechot, La grande nation (Paris, 1956), I, pp. 80-84.; Sybel, Geschichte der Revolutionszeit, II, 22-23.; Sorel, La question d'Orient, III, p. 16.; Hans Kramer, Die Grossmächte und die Weltpolitik 1789 bis 1945 (Innsbruck, 1952), p. 37.
6. Projet d'instructions et Bases d'après lesquels il convient de négocier avec le Roi de Prusse. Arch.Nat. F.7. 4690. Papiers saisis chez Dumouriez. See the text among the documents, pp. 65-68 below.
7. Sorel, La question d'Orient, III, p. 21.; A.E.C.P. Turquie v.183. f.107., 233.; v.184. f.277.
8. Ibid. p. 360.
9. Sorel, La question d'Orient, III, pp. 18-20.
10. Sybel, Geschichte der Revolutionszeit, II, pp. 37-39. Vilmos Fraknói was also familiar with these designs, see Martinovics és társainak összeesküvése (The conspiracy of Martinovics and his collaborators), (Budapest, 1880), pp. 199-200; Julien Grossbart, "La Politique Polonaise de la Révolution Française jusqu'aux Traités de Bâle", Annales historiques de la Révolution Française, VI, (1929), No.2, p. 252.
11. Henrik Marczali, Az 1790/91-iki országgyülés (The diet of 1790-1791), (Budapest, 1907), II, p. 39; AGAD Zbiór Popiołów I.424.; József Hajnóczy, Ratio proponendarum in comitiis Hungariae legum, III, 2. X.9. and De comitiis regni Hungariae...^{x} In: Kálmán Benda (ed.), A magyar jakobinusok iratai (Papers of the Hungarian Jacobins, hereafter MJI), (Budapest, 1957), I, pp. 64, 84, 370; István Csapláros, Sprawy polskie w literaturze węgierskie epoki Oświecenia (Problems relating to Poland in the literature of the Hungarian enlightenment) (Warsaw, 1961), p. 51.
12. H.A.Goetz-Bernstein, La diplomatie de la Gironde. Jacques-Pierre Brissot (Paris, 1912), p. 326.
13. Sorel, La question d'Orient, III, p. 171.
14. Ibid. p. 166.
15. Sybel, Geschichte der Revolutionszeit, II, p. 36.
16. Sorel, La question d'Orient, III, pp. 388-389.
17. Ibid. pp. 164-165.; Masson, Le département des affaires étrangères, p. 264.
18. Sorel, La question d'Orient, III, pp. 387, 398-400; Arch.Nat.A.F. III.75. D.304. 10.; A.E.C.P. Pologne T.321. 320-322.
19. A.E.C.P. Turquie v.T.184. 323., 406., v.185. 153-155., 236-237.
20. Sorel, La question d'Orient, III, pp. 524, 534.
21. Ibid. IV, pp. 68-69.; A.E.C.P. Suisse T.432. 63-68.; Arch.Nat.F.7. 4691. Plaq.7-8.

22. The first decision of the Committee of Public Safety to support the Polish insurrection was repeated on March 22, 1796, and in September 1796. A.E.C.P. Pologne T.322. 351., 393., 395-406., 409-414.; Arch.Nat.A.F. III.74. D.301.; Nicolai Jorga, La Révolution Française et le Sud-Est de l'Europe (Bucharest, 1939), p. 18.; Marian Kukiel, Próby powstańcze po trzecim rozbiorze (1795-1797) (Insurrectionist attempts after the third partition) (Cracow-Warsaw, 1912), p. 89, 366-377.; Grossbart, "La politique Polonaise," 1930. No.1. 144.
23. A.M.Skałkowski (ed.), Archivum Wybickiego T.I. (1768-1801), (Gdańsk, 1948), pp. 233-234.; Szymon Askenazy, Napoleon a Polska (Napoleon and Poland) (Warsaw, 1918), II, pp. 197-201.; Pamiętniki Michała Ogińskiego o Polsce i o Polakach od r.1788 do końca r.1815 (Michał Ogiński's memoirs about Poland and the Poles. 1788-1815) (Poznań, 1870), II, pp. 197-200.
24. O.L.Kabinettsarchiv, Privatbibl. I.50. T.26. Nr.87. f.132-133. See the text among the documents, p. 69 below.
25. "Aufruf an alle Deutsche zu einem antiaristokratischen Gleichheitsbund", in: Fritz Valjavec, Die Entstehung der politischen Strömungen in Deutschland 1770-1815 (München, 1951), pp. 505-514.; Denis Silagi, Jakobiner in der Habsburger-Monarchie (Wien-München, 1962), pp. 162-163.
26. Justin-Václav Prášek, Panováni císaře a krále Frantiska I. Dějiny Čech a Moravy, nové doby (The rule of Emperor-King Francis I. History of Bohemia and Moravia. Modern Period) (Prague, 1905), X. p. 21.; Květa Mejdřická, Čechy a francouzská revoluce (Bohemia and the French Revolution) (Prague, 1959), p. 86.
27. Masson mentions Siccard, a French agent who was sent via Saxony and Bohemia to Poland in November 1792, but was arrested in Prague and later banished (Le département des affaires étrangères, p. 245.); according to Sybel, Lebrun had direct contacts with the malcontents in Austria and Hungary (Geschichte der Revolutionszeit, II, pp. 151-152.) In June 1793, a French emissary pretending to be a Belgian clergyman was detained in Galați. Gr. Pergen an den Grafen Lazansky. Wien den 19ten Juny 1793. St.U.A.P.G. 1791-1806. 15e. 252. 1793.907.; about the French secret agents see also A.E. Mémoires et documents. La France et divers Etats. 651. 49.
28. W.M. Kozlowski, "Le dernier projet d'alliance franco-polonaise (1792-1793)," Revue d'histoire diplomatique, 37 (1923), No.3-4, pp. 268-269.; Grossbart, "La Politique Polonaise", No. 2. p. 242.
29. Biblioteka Narodowa. BOZ 773. Mf.55691.; Askenazy, Napoleon a Polska, I, pp. 52-57.; Grossbart, "La Politique Polonaise", pp. 242-252.
30. Ibid.
31. Mémoires sur la Pologne présentés par Kościuszko au Ministre Lebrun. Arch. Nat.A.F. III.74. D.301. 22.; A.E.C.P. Pologne T.321. 320.; Kozlowski, "Le dernier projet", pp. 487-499.; Alexander Kraushar, Barss, palestrant warszawski (Warsaw lawyer Barss) (Warsaw, 1904), pp. 48-49.; Memoryał Kołłątaja o przygotowaniach do powstania r.1794 napisany dla Tomasza Wawrzeckiego (Kołłątaj's memorandum to Tomasz Wawrzecki about the preparations of the 1794 insurrection), in: Wacław Tokarz, Ostatnie lata Hugona Kołłątaja (Hugo Kołłątaj's last years) (Cracow, 1905), II, pp. 231-233.
32. Marian Kukiel, Wezwanie Austryi na tron Polski w roku 1794 (The offering of the Polish throne to Austria) (Biblioteka Warszawska, 1910), II, pp. 226-227.

33. Józef Zajączek, Historia Revolucji Polskiej w roku 1794 (History of the Polish Revolution in 1794) (Warsaw-Lwów, 1907), I, pp. 94-95.; Pamiętnik o przygotowaniach do insurekcji kościuszkowskiej (Memorandum about the preparations for the Kościuszko-insurrection), Józef Pawlikowski, Przegląd Polski, 1876, No. VII, pp. 77-78.; Wacław Tokarz, Warszawa przed wybuchem powstania 17. kwietnia 1794 roku (Warsaw before the outbreak of the April 17, 1794 revolution) (Warsaw, 1911), 12.; Stefan Kieniewicz, Ignacy Działyński. 1754-1797, (Kórnik, 1930), pp. 106-135.
34. Polski Slownik Biograficzny (Polish Dictionary of Biographies) (Oss. Wroclaw, 1966), XXI, 1-3. It is an established fact that Kápostás was wanted by the police in the Monarchy since spring, 1794, because, according to Galician Kreishauptmann von Baum, Kápostás first tried to stir up the population of Moravia and Silesia in the spring of 1793 and, when he failed, went to Hungary. PAN Bibl. w Krakowie. T.A. Hajdeckiego. 2171. T.7. 88.
35. Memoryał Kołłątaja, pp. 235-238.; Zajączek, Historia Revolucji Polskiej, pp. 94-95.; Pamiętnik o przygotowaniach, 85.; Kieniewicz, "Ignacy Działyński", 129-135.; Grossbart "La Politique Polonaise", 129.
36. A.E.C.P. Pologne T.321. 561., 619.; Sorel, La question d'Orient, III, p. 528.; Askenazy, Napoleon a Polska, I, p. 60.
37. A.E.C.P. Pologne T.322. 48.
38. In his letter to Barss on December 23, 1793, Kołłątaj explained that the French were obviously concentrating on the stabilization of their internal affairs, and that the coalition wanted to end the war as soon as possible. PAN Bibl. w Krakowie Rkp. 200/K/ 167. His observations are confirmed by the March 26, 1794 report of French chargé d'affaires Bacher, in which it was intimated that Prussia and Austria were inclined to make peace and would probably ask for the mediation of Switzerland. Sorel, La question d'Orient, IV, p. 33.
39. Jan Reychmann, "Z nieznaniej korespondencji Déscorchesa i La Rochéa z 1794/95" (From the unpublished correspondence of Déscorches and La Roche in 1794-1795), Przegląd Historyczny, 1956, No.1. 161-162.
40. Le Comissaire des Relations extérieurs aux Citoyens Représentans du peuple composans le Comité de Salut Public. Extrait de la lettre de Pierre Parandier au Comité de Salut Public. See both texts among the documents, pp. 70-71 below.
41. Zbiegniew Góralski, Austria a trzeci rozbiór Polski (Austria and the third partition of Poland) (Wrocław, 1979), pp. 96-97.; Sorel, La question d'Orient, IV, p. 55.
42. Sergei Solovyev, Istoria padenenia Polski (History of the fall of Poland) (Moscow, 1863), p. 339.; Marian Kukiel, Dzieje Polski prozbiorowe 1795-1921 (History of Poland after the partitions, 1795-1921) (2nd edn., London, 1963), p. 60.
43. PAN Bibl. w Krakowie T.A. Hajdeckiego 2171. T.7.passim. The news of the imminent outbreak of the insurrection in Galicia was also reported by Jan Jakub Patz, chargé d'affaires of Saxony in Warsaw, on March 19 and July 26, 1794. Z okien ambasady saskiej (From the window of the Saxon embassy) (Warsaw, 1969), pp. 48, 131.
44. Sybel, Geschichte der Revolutionszeit, I, pp. 162-163.; Sorel, La question d'Orient, I, p. 531. On the links between the lodges in Galicia and Upper Hungary, see Csapláros, Sprawy polskie, pp. 31-59.; Stanisław Śreniowski, "Rzeczypospolita i Galicja" (The Republic and Galicia), Przegląd Historyczny, 1952, No.1, pp. 96-98.
45. Jan Kosim, Okupacja pruska i konspiracje rewolucyjne w Warszawie 1796-1806 (The Prussian occupation and the revolutionary plot in Warsaw, 1796-1806) (Wrocław, 1976), pp. 168-169.

46. Jan Reychmann, Ze stosunków kulturalnych polsko-węgierskich w epoce Oświecenia (Hungarian-Polish cultural relations in the Age of Enlightenment) (Warsaw, 1960), pp. 7, 27, 53-54.
47. Askenazy, Napoleon a Polska, II, p. 195.; Jan Pachoński, Legiony polskie 1794-1807. Prawda i legenda (The Polish legions 1794-1807. Truth and myth) (Warsaw, 1969), I, p. 371.
48. Arch.Nat.F.7. 2395. D.3.; A.F.II.57. pl.415. piece 28.; Allg.Verwaltungsarchiv, Pergen Akten X/B.1. H.48.; Silagi, Jakobiner in der Habsburger-Monarchie, pp. 177-178.; Ernst Wangermann, From Joseph II to the Jacobin Trials (Oxford, 1959), 150.
49. St.U.A.P.G. 1791-1806. 15b. 1793. N.707., N.861.
50. Ibid. 15e. 253. 1793. N.253. In March 1793, hidden arms were found in Galicia: PAN Bibl. w Krakowie. T.A.H. 2171. T.7. 80.
51. Ibid. Rkp. 200/K/ 111., 136., 140.
52. MJI I, pp. 897-908.
53. Ibid. pp. 819-820.
54. Ibid. p. 962.
55. A.E.C.P. Suisse v.446. 320., v.440. 534.
56. MJI I, p. 1009.
57. PAN Bibl. w Kr. 1171.f.196.; OSZK Kt. Quart.Lat. 62. T.5. 28.; Csapláros, Sprawy polskie, 80-81. See the text among the documents, pp. 72-73 below.
58. H.H.St.A. Vertr.A. 2.K 307-308., 314-316., 751., K.3. 1113. Allg. Verwaltungsarchiv Alt. Polizeihofstelle II.2. H.48.
59. Wangermann, From Joseph II to the Jacobin Trials, pp. 146-147.
60. St.U.A. v Brně. B.95. sign.55. K.242. N.835.
61. Allg. Verwaltungsarchiv, Pergen Akten XVI. 7. H.1., 32., H.2. 314.
62. St.U.A.P.G. 1791-1806 15b. 223. 1794. 813., 841.
63. Kriegsarchiv 1794. Depart. Lit.G.Lib.27. paq. 5922/70.
64. St.U.A.P.G. 1791-1806. 15e. 253. 1794. f.931.
65. Ibid. f.932., 949., 1016.
66. Ibid. f.939., 947., 1016.
67. Ibid. f.947., 1263. T. Tokarz, Ostatnie lata I, p. 151.
68. Allg. Verwaltungsarchiv. Pergen Akten X/B.1. H.51. f.43.; X/B.1. H.48.
69. MJI II, p. 25.
70. St.U.A.P.G. 1791-1806. 20.6. 1794. f.1397. See the text among the documents, pp. 73-74 below. The contemporary public also thought that the investigation "threw light on the Austrian connections of the Martinovics-conspiracy". See Caroline Pichler, Denkwürdigkeiten aus meinem Leben. 1769 bis 1798 (Wien, 1844), I, p. 206.
71. Fraknói, Martinovics és társainak összeesküvése, pp. 203-204.
72. A.E.C.P. Pologne T.323. 22.; PAN Bibl. w Krakowie T.A.H. 2171. T.7. 92.
73. St.U.A.P.G. 1791-1806 15e. 253. 1794. 1065., 2191.
74. MJI II, pp. 24, 65-68.
75. Askenazy, Napoleon a Polska, I, pp. 225-226.
76. A.E.C.P. Pologne T.323. 321., 401., 407-408. Władysław Smoleński, "Emigracya polska w latach 1795-1797" (The Polish exiles between 1795-1797), Przegląd Historyczny, 1910, XI, 89.; Pachoński, Legiony polskie, I, p. 167.; General Jan Henryk Dąbrowski 1755-1818 (Warsaw, 1981), pp. 160-162.
77. Bibl. Czartoryska. Rkp. 967., 427., 433.
78. PAN Bibl. w Krakowie. T.A.H. 2171. T.4. 52.; Patz, Z okień ambasady, pp. 144, 198.
79. OL I.50. T.28. f.1-2.; Tokarz, Ostatnie lata, I, p. 136.
80. A.E.C.P. Venise 252., 364.; Pologne T.323. 248., 317., 320-323., 357., 401., 407-408.; Kukiel, Próby powstańcze 366-367.

81. PAN Bibl. w Krakowie T.A.H. 2171. T.6. passim; St.U.A. v Brně B.95. sign.55. K.243. N.627. 197.; Kukiel, Próby powstańcze, pp. 366-367.
82. Sándor Vadász, "Francia tervezet magyar-lengyel felkelésre 1796-ból" (French (plan of a Hungarian-Polish insurrection from 1796), Századok, 1970, No.1, pp. 70-75.; Pachoński, Dąbrowski pp. 140-142.
83. Askenazy, Napoleon a Polska, I, pp. 143-144.
84. A.E.C.P. Pologne T.323. 369-370. See the text among the documents, pp. 74-75 below.
85. Pachoński, Dąbrowski, I. p. 371.
86. PAN Bibl. w Krakowie T.A.H. 2171. T.6. 99-113.
87. A.M. Skałkowski (ed.), Archivum Wybickiego II, 1802-1822 (Gdańsk, 1950).p.415.
88. A.M. Skałkowski (ed.), Z korespondencji Kościuszki urzędowej i prywatnej 1790-1817 (From Kościuszko's official and private correspondence, 1790-1817) (Kórnik, 1946), pp. 42-43.
89. N.Jorga, La Révolution Française, p. 16.; Nikola Todorov, Filiki eterija i bălgarite (The Filiki eterija and the Bulgarians) (Sofia, 1965), pp. 29-31.

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NATIONAL PATRIA VERSUS PATRIOTIC FRANCK
THE "ERSATZ STRUGGLE" IN HUNGARY AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY

Talpra Magyar, your country calls!
the time for now or never falls!
'48er' liqueur, an excellent patriotic drink
Distilled by the First Alföld Cognac
Distillery Plant, Kecskemét.[x]

This advertisement and similar ones appeared in early 1906 in Hungary. There were numerous firms that found adopting political slogans more lucrative than mentioning product attributes traditionally more important to customers such as price, quality, etc. What had made the traditional scale of values change? The answer is to be sought in the changing political atmosphere of the country, which I wish to approach through advertisments, a hitherto unexploited body of sources.

To understand the entire problematique, we might begin the story with March 15, 1906, the 58th anniversary of the 1848 bourgeois revolution in Hungary. By the beginning of the 20th century, the 1848 Revolution and the War of Independence had become symbols of liberalism, of revolutionary ideas and, above all, of independence in Hungarian national and political consciousness. It was widely known that the poem by Sándor Petőfi, which evoked this theme and was quoted in the above advertisement, was first recited on March 15, 1848.

The attractiveness of this sort of symbolism was also reflected in the party system that was formed after the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise. Parties representing various political affiliations rallied either under the banner of 1867, the year when the Dual Monarchy was established, or under that of 1848. The appeal of the 1848 ideals was so great that several times even the '67ers stressed that it was they who truly preserved the heritage of 1848. In this context, 1848 was regarded as the rejection of the dualist structure of the Monarchy and the demand for an independent state. This state, as envisaged by contemporary politicians, was to be a nation state - in reality, a multinational state under Hungarian hegemony.

The 58th anniversary was commemorated under strange conditions. It was not only that official celebrations under the auspices of the state were out of the question: eight years earlier the legislature had made April 11, the day Royal assent was given to the laws of the March revolution, the public holiday, with the intent of taking away the revolutionary and anti-Habsburg edge of this symbol. It was the political situation, more and more critical during the previous one and a half year, that made the 1906 commemorations tenser than ever before.

The causes of the political crisis can be traced back to the '48 versus '67 division and the consequent impossibility of parliamentary rotation. The program of the '48er, or, 'independence' opposition threatened the existing structure of the Empire. The opposition had so far acquiesced in the fact that they could not take office. Apart from the governing party (called since 1875 Szabadelvü Párt [Liberal Party] none of the parties had nominated enough candidates at elections to secure a majority in Parliament, even in the case of a sweeping victory. The existing state of affairs, i.e. the way political differences between parties were onesidedly influenced by constitutional law, caused considerable frustration to the members of both political groups. This frustrating effect became even more pronounced around the turn of the century when the internal political situation, which had become tenser than ever before, came to a crisis. National minorities protested fiercer than ever against the limitations of their civil rights. Urban proletarization (both in terms of impoverishment and of growing political consciousness) and rural pauperization were on the increase. Within the ranks of the ruling classes it was primarily the 'agrarians', the representatives of the interests of large estate holders, who launched more and more aggressive and organized attacks against the 'mercantilist' tycoons who favoured the boosting of industrial production. In accordance with its formation and traditions, the parliamentary opposition channelled all discussions concerning these problems into the national question, i.e. the relationship between Austria and Hungary. They clashed with the government over the issue of 'the language and the coat of arms' of the k.u.k. (kaiserlich und königlich, i.e. imperial and royal) army. Since they were perpetually in minority, they often relied on filibustering. Having realized that they were unable to attain their goals, they tried to create a situation in which the government and the monarch would have no budget by paralyzing the legislature and thus, they hoped, they would be able to extort the acception of some of their important demands.

All the government's attempts to thwart filibuster either by attrition or by negotiations failed. Prime Minister Count István Tisza was the first to attempt

to restore order in Parliament by force. With a "coup de parlement", he had a provisional order of procedure passed that crippled filibuster.

The response of the opposition was a symbolic, though very effective display of strength: they destroyed the furniture of the House of Representatives. Emotions broke loose to an extent that new elections had to be held in January 1905. This time party groups in opposition, both 48ers and 67ers, formed a strong party coalition and defeated the Liberal Party that had by then been governing for 30 years.

The following 14 months witnessed an ever increasing emotional tension and bargaining between the parties. The program of the parties of independence in majority was unacceptable for the monarch. The Liberal Party, which was in minority, could not, and was not willing to rule under these circumstances and was replaced by an extra-parliamentary caretaker government. This intended to introduce universal manhood suffrage and refused to pay the personnel of municipal administrative bodies, who had supported the victorious opposition in an attempt to prevail on the newly elected parliamentary majority to adopt a more moderate program. Their main aim was to dissuade the coalition from the demand of the use of Hungarian language in the army. However, all their efforts were in vain.

The internal political crisis in Hungary also made its impact on the international situation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. International trade agreements that had been concluded in the meantime were to be ratified; it would, however, have been risky to convene the House of Representatives, with the opposition in majority. The government went to extremes by taking measures considered as 'horrible' by contemporaries. They dissolved the House of Representatives. They enacted the trade agreements by way of government decrees. In response to protests, they banned the sale of newspapers in the streets, had the most outspoken club of the opposition closed down and, finally, as it could be expected, the day after March 15 they 'disbanded' the executive committee of the opposition coalition.

Some opposition politicians got so scared as a result of these measures that they asked their parties that 'clandestine' meetings, regularly covered by the daily press, should no longer be held in their homes.

The political atmosphere was tense, everyone was trying to think of a way out and it was generally agreed that 'It can't go on like this.' More and more 'horrible news' were published in the papers. A ladies' committee wanted to lay a wreath on the memorial of the heroes of '48. The policeman on duty confiscated the wreath. To make matters worse he assaulted two Andrássy countesses,

granddaughters of a politician who had been executed in effigie in 1849 and who was appointed Prime Minister of Hungary in 1867 and Foreign Minister of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1871. At the same time, the two young ladies happened to be the nieces of one of the most distinguished figures of the 1906 opposition. Later the news turned out to be false but, obviously, it did not change the public sentiment at all.

It was also on 15 March - or, as suspected by some contemporaries, the aristocratic ladies might have dated their communiqué to this day because of the symbolism it implied - that opposition leaders' wives decided to "fry Austria in its own fat." They pledged that they would not buy anything made in the hereditary provinces and invited every patriotic man and woman to follow in their footsteps. According to the logic followed by the opposition, this might have brought Austria back to her senses, since everyone was confident that Austria was the obstacle of the monarch's approval of the use of Hungarian language in the military.

The 'buy-Hungarian movement' of the aristocratic ladies was launched on March 23 in the newspapers. It was called 'Tulip movement' after its emblem, regarded as a Hungarian folklore motif. The movement mobilized the opposition doomed to political impotence: If there is nothing else left for us to do, let us wear the tulip emblem, let us promenade with it on our jackets, let us found local organizations of the movement. By selling badges we could raise funds to support municipal clerks who lost their jobs because of their patriotism. Money was raised for newspaper boys, who were also deprived of their source of income. Opposition politicians and especially their wives took every opportunity to offer sacrifices at the altar of the fatherland and made their own smaller or larger contributions either in cash or in jewels (that were to be returned later on) to the 'national defence' campaign. In this way it was easy to draw a clear distinction: those who wore a tulip were oppressed patriots; those who failed to do so were clearly regarded as traitors who were on the payroll of the government and with whom all social contact was to be broken off. Within a couple of days, hundreds of articles were registered under trade marks with the tulip motif. Ladies and gentlemen could wear garments with the tulip motif all over their bodies: ladies' shoes with tulips were available as well as moustache trainers for gentlemen.

What happened next is easy to find out from certain really well-informed papers, or directly from the propagandists of the movement: the tulip was victorious, and in early April the opposition could take office. Nobody cared that all the issues they had been stressing hard so far were now dropped from their political program.

Thus, in April 1906, Hungarian society was carried away by emotions, particularly national sentiments, overwrought during the intense political struggles of the previous years. The actual issues - the use of the coat of arms and Hungarian language in the military - as well as the milestones - the smashing of furniture in the House of Representatives and the opposition in the counties - were of symbolic meaning. So was the victory gained: the opposition got the upper hand (quite a feat in itself), though not its political objectives. Moreover, there was the new-born symbol of opposition existence, the tulip movement which, however shortly, managed to survive the victory. The tulip used to be the symbol of fight; now it was tamed to be the symbol of peace. The emphasis was shifted from driving Austria on the verge of poverty to increasing the wealth of Hungary. The movement that supported industrial development in Hungary continued to exist and facilitated the gratification of national sentiments. By now, everyone had become a patriot; the only question that still riddled all true Hungarians was to decide who the greater patriot was. All I have been concerned with so far belonged to the world of politics. To what extent were other aspects of life, in particular, the production and consumption of industrial goods, influenced by the politically motivated pro-industry movement? Below, this issue will be highlighted by relying on an outstanding example.

As already mentioned, the beginning of the story can be set to March 15, 1906. On this day, the daily Független Magyarország (Independent Hungary) published a special several-hundred-page memorial issue that was available for weeks in several reprints. The publication of this special issue was partly enabled by the fact that it was full of "messages" that, in agreement with the title and profile of the paper and the political atmosphere of those days, extolled the virtues of Hungarian factories and products. One of the advertisements in the special issue gave a detailed description of a chicory-based ersatz coffee manufacturing plant called Pátria that was about to be opened in Nagykanizsa, a small provincial town in Zala county (South-Hungary). The name of the plant, registered as a trade mark on March 1, is also revealing of the atmosphere at the time.

The plant was built by one of the local wholesale companies that pursued an active marketing policy and invested a part of its capital in industrial plants. Schwarz and Tauber dealt primarily in spices and groceries and was the local representative of several Budapest firms.

As a matter of fact, the report on the newly built factory was tuned to the spirit of the day: 'We often, much too often come across advertisements in newspapers that offer the greatest variety of coffee substitutes. If we trace the origin of these products, much to our regret we are compelled to learn that

everyone of them, be it either chicory or fig-based, and even Franck's is of foreign origin.' 'In this country, there is only one plant that compares with the Nagykanizsa factory. It is in Kassa [north-east Hungary]. The big difference between the two plants is that while the latter uses German capital and employs German workers, the Nagykanizsa ersatz coffee manufacturing plant employes 250 to 300 Hungarians and it is quite plain even to-date that they are none the less capable. [In contemporary Hungarian usage German was often used for Austrians.] I believe the best way to conclude our report is to deliver an address to the patriotic women of Hungary and call them on to distinguish themselves by supporting the home industry. Since we are fully convinced that in practising culinary art they follow the instructions of Hungarian cook books and prepare specifically Hungarian dishes, much to the appreciation of their husbands and guests, we also take it that they will shun foreign products and use the tasty ersatz coffee from Nagykanizsa for their drinks. They will by no means regret their choice!'

Thus, a new chicory-based ersatz coffee manufacturing plant levelled an attack on its only important rival in its first advertisement ever made in a style attuned to the expectations of the day: questioning the Hungarian nationality of the other factory.

What about the company that came under the fierce attacks of a newly founded competitor? It was the Henrik Franck's Sons' Company, which had been in business in Ludwigsburg, near Stuttgart since 1828. Their first chicory-based ersatz coffee manufacturing plant in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was mounted in Linz in 1879. A second factory was built in Kassa, Hungary, in less than a decade. (Since the proportion of foreign capital accounted for 50% of all investments in the 1890s in Hungary, all this was in line with the current trends of the day.) In the early 1890s the Franck Company had its Kassa plant remodelled and modernized. At the same time, they had another factory built in Zagreb, Croatia, which belonged to the Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchy. By 1906, Franck's had 6 factories in the Habsburg Empire and, in addition, they installed a plant in Bucharest. The Kassa factory employed 57 workers in 1890, 216 in 1900, and at the time of the 1906 modernization of the plant they had more than 300 names on their payroll. In this part of Europe the Franck Company predominated the production of chicory-based ersatz coffee, as did the Kathreiner Company that of malt-coffee. Briefly, the Franck Company, although a private firm, was practically multinational and did not belong to any particular national economy. The question is how a multinational enterprise like Franck's

tried to adjust itself to the peculiar conditions in various countries and how it was able to protect itself against nationalistic accusations and attacks.

The Franck Company always adapted its factories to local conditions. In Kassa, their plant was one of the biggest factories in the town and supplied a number of local interests: it offered jobs, it contributed to communal investments, etc. The company also established contacts with national trade organizations: the Franck's joined the Gyáriparosok Országos Szövetsége [National Federation of Industrialists] and, in order to secure a steady supply of chicory, they applied for the support of the local agricultural organization, affiliated to the 'agrarians'.

Articles about the Kassa plant, published in various newspapers as advertisements between the late 1890s and the beginning of the First World War, show that the Franck Company regarded itself firmly established in the Hungarian market. These articles were modelled on the same internal structure, and thus were outstanding examples of what sort of image the company tried to build and maintain in Hungary.

First they described their own role in agricultural production, namely, the introduction of chicory farming in Hungary. The company published guides on chicory farming, at first in local newspapers, and later in pamphlets on the subject. It is obvious that while in their propaganda they claimed that they intended to develop agriculture in Hungary, securing a local supply of raw material was in fact a paramount interest of the company.

The second theme of the articles is that of dimensions: the area of the plant, the number of buildings on their sites, their own factory siding and the number of their employees. Enumerating all these features was meant to create in the reader a sense of stability and of the company's integration into the local economy.

The third theme in their propaganda stressed that the company was concerned with the welfare of its employees, the majority of whom were women. Describing the high standard of hygiene, the decent wages the workers were entitled to, and the concurrence of the employers' and the employees' interests give the reader the impression of social tranquillity of a paternalistic kind.

The fourth feature they emphasized was technological modernization side by side with the company's long-standing and unique experiences in manufacturing. They simultaneously presented values derived from their own past and ones that were looking forward, in a way that they appeared to be features peculiar to the Franck Company, features which distinguished them from everybody else.

As a fifth subject in the descriptions of the factory, a social mission was ascribed to the company: the Franck coffee might facilitate the increase of milk

production in Hungary, since the humbler classes of society would prefer coffee with milk to brandy.

The recurring theme of the conclusion of the descriptions was the unquestionable superiority of their product and the inseparable unity of the factory and the nation. Since the style was emphatic, yet free from bombastic phrases, the claims put forward appeared to be realistic.

As in the factory descriptions, in other pre-1906 advertisements of the Kassa plant, too, there was a peculiar Hungarian character. The goods were shipped with labels in Hungarian. It was only the Kassa plant, instead of all the factories that appeared on the illustration on the boxes. In 1899 the company was entitled to use the Hungarian national coat of arms. This was in line with the advertising policies pursued prior to 1906: the national character was properly, though not conspicuously emphasized.

However, in 1906, when national sentiments ran high and the Hungarian character of the firm was challenged by competitors, this seems to have become insufficient. In March and in April, a new advertising campaign was launched by Franck in the Budapest and provincial dailies and in Fűszerkereskedők Lapja [Grocers' Journal]:

"Our distinguished housewives! We invite you to taste the real Franck substitute coffee, the best ersatz coffee ever made strictly from all-Hungarian material by Henrik Franck's Sons' Hungarian factory in Kassa."

On March 26, the factory launched 'Militia', a new brand of coffee on the market, probably expecting orders from the Hungarian units of the Army, the "honvéd"-troops. On these packets the letterings 'Home Industry' and 'Hungarian Agriculture' were already displayed, and the illustration showed the strictly Hungarian branch of the army, the Hussars. (The company did obtain orders from the army, although not for the brand called 'Militia'.)

The Franck Company, with its ample experience in marketing, did not confine itself to these steps. They realized how profitable under the specific conditions it was for their competitor to adopt the name 'Pátria' and were preparing for the imminent struggle in the market. They wanted to prevent their competitors from taking similar measures by having the words 'Tulip' and 'Turul' registered as their trade mark in early April.

The new graphic trade marks appeared towards the end of the year, in November and December. The standard Franck wrapping paper featured a view of Kassa and, separately, the Kassa Franck plant with the words 'Hungarian Industry' in capital letters beside them. Below, in minuscules, we find the inscription "Tulip trade mark, registered under No. 257 on April 6, 1906". That is practically

Franck's Hungarian trade mark

Franck's Czech trade mark

all that remained from the relationship of the tulip motif and the Franck Company. The above text appeared now and then in newspaper ads, and a bill form printed for Franck's featured the tulip motif in a corner. However, it had become quite obvious by then that although the flower motif did very well as a symbol of struggle for a couple of days' time, it was not effective in the long run. (The fact that it was debated even years later whether the Patent Office had been entitled at all to register the tulip, or the tulip was just a symbol for the place of origin, i.e. Hungary, and as such could not be registered as a trade mark, might have contributed to the decline of the tulip motif.)

On the other hand, 'Turul' was actually included in a graphic trade mark. However, it was a true manifestation of the market oriented approach of a good businessman, who sells his wares under all circumstances with the slogan that best boosts his sales, rather than a political statement.

Within the Monarchy, it was not only in Hungary at that time that a social movement to promote home industry could flourish. In Galicia, in Croatia and in Bohemia, 'home industry' became a catchphrase displayed everywhere. Linens, bars of soap, matches and other common consumer goods were named after distinguished figures of national history. Pamphlets were published that argued against buying products made in other parts of the Dual Monarchy. The Franck Company only adjusted its sales policy to this general attitude when they dropped the previously widespread German labels and replaced them with those written in the national language, and when the quality certificate attached to their products, which read 'Henrik Franck's Sons', was always made out in the local language. The same is shown by the two subjoined trade marks, obviously the products of a single designer. The lettering on one of them was written in Hungarian, and in Czech on the other; they have the same layout and the texts on both of them are almost identical: Agriculture, Chicory farming, Our Franck, Home Industry, Hungarian / Czech Labor, Hungarian / Czech Trade, Kassa/Pardubice. The fact that the lettering 'Nation and Fatherland' was only included in the Hungarian trade mark might be the reflection of the public sentiment at the time. The difference between the two illustrations also indicates the difference between the mentalities of the two countries. Whereas the Hungarian trade mark of Kassa bore the turul bird, widely used on Hungarian graphic trade marks, the Czech trade mark of Pardubice displayed chicory roots and a plough.

Both symbols were derived from the myths relating to the national dynasties of the two countries. While, however, the turul bird, regarded as the totem of the first Hungarian kings, was in fact a war banner that functioned as a symbol of a warlike and glorious past, the plough in the Czech trade mark obviously bore

a closer relationship to labour. As a matter of fact, it may be conceived as a national symbol - in ancient legends the Přemysls were invited to the throne of Bohemia from beside the plough and thus acquired the name "ploughman" -; however, the image of the plough could also directly refer to chicory farming. This assumption is substantiated by another Franck trade mark whose lettering was identical with that of the one mentioned above and in which the plough was displayed several times. It featured a peasant in the fields, the background being provided by the view of a factory, so characteristic of Franck advertisements.

In all these advertisements the emphasis on the Franck Company's Hungarian character became more pronounced than before, although still in line with the established advertising techniques of 1906. Obviously it was much to the dislike of their competitors, the Pátria. It seems that they deemed it impossible to challenge the Franck Company with its over-all reputation in any way other than by levelling a renewed attack against the latter under the national banner, for which they also found the political atmosphere ripe. There is no evidence for an initiative on the part of Pátria in the attacks on Franck's published by the papers in mid-December. However, it can be taken for granted that these articles, which made frequent references to Pátria and were meant to "protect" national and local industry, were not published independently of the Nagykanizsa company.

The campaign against Franck's began in one of the Zala county weeklies that criticized the pamphlet of the Franck factory and, simultaneously, sang the praise of Pátria. The article clearly regarded the Franck Company as Austrian by saying, "The Germans are irritated by everything that is Hungarian. They only want to take the money of this poor colony. When will we finally have had enough of Austrian supremacy? When will we finally show our Austrian brothers out? When will we finally kick them out of doors?" The attacks were not confined to the local level; they were also delivered in the Grocers' Journal. It is obvious that in this particular case it was not an expression of national outrage, but that of the struggle between two competitors in a unique form. The newly established firm, by stressing its own strictly Hungarian character, was trying to neutralize the advantages of a company with solid capital, with a well-functioning network of retail establishments, with more agents and with more sophisticated advertising techniques.

The advertising activities of the two companies attained an ever widening scope. The Franck Company continued publishing advertisements in letter form. Praising the quality of the product was gradually returning to the forefront. They stressed "how much stronger, richer in colour, more economical, cheaper and richer in aroma" Franck's coffee was than "certain miserably sweetish ersatz

coffees". Newer and newer merits of the coffee were discovered. Thus, "Franck's is not just the best coffee substitute, a generally acknowledged fact, but the best of all refreshments as well!" an advertisement entitled 'Excerpt from a Treatise on Agriculture' claimed. Besides, "Home industry", and "Made from raw materials produced by Hungarian agriculture" continued to be displayed on the product. In 1907, the Franck Company was entitled to use the full coat of arms of Hungary. Nevertheless, emphasizing the national character of their product was reduced to a secondary importance.

The genuine
PATRIA
ersatz coffee is the best!

Support home industry,
This is the slogan! Ask for
Genuine PATRIA,
The best of all ersatz coffees.

(Available in all groceries)

Pátria also stressed that its own products were "the best, the purest and the most perfect" and that their "colour, taste and flavour were superb". However, the lettering was always centered on their slogans "First class truly Hungarian product" and "The highest quality product of Hungarian industry". Both companies had the same scale of values. However, the reference to the Nagykanizsa factory's Hungarian, or, national character was much more pronounced than in the case of Franck's.

The two competitors' illustrations to their propaganda material not meant to be published in papers also differed slightly. (The lettering was similar to that of newspaper advertisements.)

On the bill leaflets and cards of the Franck factory, drinking their coffee substitute was set in a kind of a popular idyll. Young men and women, sometimes even children dressed in Magyar folk costumes encounter the Franck coffee substitute while at work or playing. Two techniques are employed to invite people drink Franck coffee: first, people in the pictures are always obviously enjoying the coffee and, secondly, there is always a packet of Franck coffee in the illustration. In the backgrounds of these bucolic idylls, or, genre-pictures meant to be traditional, the markedly contrasting view of the Kassa factory, a representative of modernity, invariably emerges. The message is that Franck's coffee is in fact a connecting link between what is traditional in Hungarian life and the modern world.

Pátria advertising materials that are at my disposal are not so homogeneous in design. A common thread is that there is no reference made in any of them to national themes. While the Franck Company made the peasant idyll their recurring theme, it was middle-class 'Gemütlichkeit' (conviviality and easiness) that characterized the bill leaflets and posters of Pátria. The Pátria advertisements might be set in a middle class home with children around, or in one of the typical scenes of middle class lifestyle, the coffee house. The modern world, omnipresent on the Franck advertisements, was depicted by the Nagykanizsa firm on a bill form in the shape of a freight train that transported Pátria consignments.

Differences in the way the two firms had their advertising materials illustrated, namely, that the Franck advertisement had a more pronounced Hungarian character, do not refer to any conscious attempt by this international company, well-established in the market, to lay an extraordinary emphasis on the political aspect. It was only that the two firms aimed at different groups of consumers. The Franck Company, while it wished to keep its middle class consumers, in an effort to gain new consumers aimed at new layers of the society, primarily the rural population. At the same time, Pátria, which wanted to break into the market focussed primarily on the middle classes, which had already been consumers of coffee substitutes before. Differences between the objectives of the two companies are reflected in the illustrations.

The next open encounter between Franck and Pátria took place in the summer of 1908. A complaint was lodged at the Sopron Chamber of Commerce and Industry (under whose sway the Nagykanizsa firm came) claiming that, with a view to advantages gained through lower rail tariff rates, the Franck Company had

not supplied western Hungary from its Hungarian (i.e Kassa) plant but from its Austrian (i.e Linz) factory. On the top of that all, they still claimed that their product was manufactured in Hungary, they used the Hungarian coat of arms and wanted in this way to drive Pátria out of the market.

The Zala county papers were roaring with outrage: "What is their Hungarian coffee substitute? Austrian goods under a Hungarian brand name." "There are two factories that produce coffee substitutes in Hungary: the Pátria in Nagykanizsa and a smallish (sic) plant of the Austrian Franck in Kassa. The Pátria is an all-Hungarian company. It belongs to Hungarians, it processes Hungarian produce with the labour of Hungarian workers. All this could be said of the Franck plant only with certain reservations..."

"Ever since the Nagykanizsa Pátria coffee substitute factory was founded, the Linz Heinrich Franck Söhne ersatz coffee manufacturing company has been trying to offset the efforts of the pure Hungarian Pátria by claiming that, by way of owning factories in Kassa and in Zagreb, the Franck Company also qualifies as a Hungarian firm that caters for Hungarian customers, employs Hungarian workers and processes Hungarian raw material on Hungarian soil." "...[such claims] put forward by an Austrian industrialist who has grown rich on Hungarian money infuriate everyone and are intolerable, since our most sacred ideals are sacrificed in cold blood for the sake of making profit."

The papers in the capital and the business press were not so rigorous. They regarded the presence of the Franck Company, and that of foreign capital in general, extremely important in Hungary. They acknowledged that it was wrong indeed to use the Hungarian coat of arms on goods that were produced in Linz. However, they found that it was regrettable if the firm in question was compelled to do so because it could take advantage of certain differences in the tariff system. The press in Budapest also suggested that attacks against the Franck Company should be brought to a halt. The press in Zala county claimed "The scope of the Sopron decision [which condemned the Franck Company] is much wider than the 'ersatz struggle'", and they were right. In fact, it was two approaches to industrial development in Hungary that clashed in this case. It was not just a matter of differences between local concepts and those taking the interests of the country as a whole into consideration. The people whose views were expressed in Sopron and Zala county would have kept everything foreign out of the country and would have exclusively relied on the accumulation of Hungarian capital. On the face of it, this approach was strictly Hungarian and, for practical reasons, very close to the views of the agrarians, who were afraid of 'forced' industrialization lest their own political power be diminished.

The other approach welcomed foreign capital, since it was quite obvious that Hungarian capital had still not reached an appropriate level and capital that had been accumulating in the agricultural sector was not directly channelled into industrial development.

In order to counter the attacks, the Franck Company intensified the patriotic accent in its publicity campaign. Nevertheless, what was at issue was clearly competition in the market, instead of a hurt national pride.

For Pátria, the attack might have been a last resort effort to stay in the market. In October, the Schwarz and Tauber Company was compelled to sell its paper-mill, which had been opened a mere one and a half year before, to a Vienna industrialist, and in the same month it was announced that the Nagykanizsa ersatz coffee plant would be reorganized into a joint stock company. Although no reasons were offered in the article, the projected list of share holders gives us a hint at the problems the factory is most likely to have faced: they wished to invite businessmen (marketing problems), agrarian circles (problems in the supply of raw material) and local banks (lack of capital) to buy shares. Local papers claimed that founding a joint stock company was in the interest of the town as a whole: after all, it was not a matter of indifference for Nagykanizsa whether a factory that employed 150 people existed or not.

The problem can also be ascribed to the fact that the market was overstocked: the home market could not absorb the amount of coffee substitute produced in Hungary. Even the Franck factory in Kassa complained that they could not fully exploit their capacity. (The same reasons must have rendered the Beck coffee substitute factory unprofitable from 1908 on. This factory in east-Hungary was somewhat smaller than Pátria, and was reorganized into a joint stock company in 1907, also with the purpose of making businessmen primarily interested in marketing its products.)

The reorganization of Pátria into a joint stock company took a long time. Since the first news in late October, five months had passed when the next notice, including a tentative list of the company's notabilities, appeared.

The list was characteristic of the period and of one of the above mentioned concepts of industrial development. It was headed by four agrarian Members of Parliament, two of them being secretaries of the business federation of large estate holders. One of the leaders of the agrarian network of cooperatives was also on the list. According to the original plans, representatives of local capitalists were also included. Local chicory farmers and grocers joined in, too. A few weeks later a local estate holder, an offspring of one of the most distinguished Hungarian aristocratic families, a Member of Parliament and a relative

of the head of the Tulip Association accepted the post of president of the joint stock company to be founded.

Eventually, the company was not founded. A few weeks after the date scheduled for the statutory meeting - which was in the end probably cancelled - the papers published sensational news: Pátria was affiliated to Henrik Franck's Sons. Pátria talked about their plans to enlarge the factory, to increase coffee production, to step up chicory production and to boost exports. According to the Franck headquarters in Linz, the two firms joined in an effort to curb trade and advertising costs and to increase profitability in this way. I am convinced that these are also the ends the Schwarz and Tauber Company wanted to attain.

As a result of negotiations between the two firms, the Franck Company fully incorporated Pátria on September 1, 1909. To reassure readers, and also to point out existing problems, the local paper wrote, "Naturally the factory will continue to operate, since it is stipulated in the contract signed with the municipal authorities".

In 1910, the new owners of the factory were trying to cut back production. The plant, which used to employ 150 workers, applied to the municipal council of Nagykanizsa for a permission to shut the plant temporarily, or to operate it with a personnel of only 20. (The previous contract stipulated 60 workers.) They explained that there had been an overproduction during the previous years, and that they had difficulties in marketing the enormous quantities of goods in stock. Although the local council granted the permission, certain newspapers accused the Franck Company of having bought Pátria only not to operate it.

Production was cut back and the plant was temporarily shut down. It was only in late 1910 that the advertisements of Pátria reappeared, claiming that after a period of reorganization the factory restarted operating at full capacity, and that the quality of all their products was improved. In the advertisement, Pátria is being promoted as a new brand. This was the first Pátria advertisement ever that failed to mention that it was a Hungarian product, and contained no adjectives like 'national' or 'home'.

A week later, the Zalai Közlöny [Zala County Journal] partly contradicted to the claims made in the advertisement laying an emphasis on continuity in the series "The factories of Nagykanizsa": "The plant was built during the period of patriotic enthusiasm and the 'Tulip' movement. The builders believed that the strong patriotic urge people demonstrated was not just an ephemeral burst of sentiments, but a lasting trait of patriotism that would support Hungarian industry and its products by a rightly understood community of interest, apart from emotions."

From then on, references to national character became less and less frequent in relation to coffee substitutes. The Franck Company ran the Pátria factory under the name of Schwarz and Tauber's Successors, being in this way entitled to use all the privileges obtained from the state by the previous owners. It was after the First World War that the Nagykanizsa factory was not only practically but also nominally taken over by the Franck Company.

And this merger marked the end of the 'ersatz struggle' in the market, with no brand threatening the hegemony of the Franck Company any more. By 1910, the fleeting, though intense emotions in favour of supporting home industry under the tulip banner had subsided. The advertisements of the Kassa factory no longer stressed the Hungarian character of their products, but were strictly concerned with their taste, colour, flavour and economicality. Advertisements on coffee substitutes returned to the scale of values usually applied to consumer goods. Perhaps it was only Iparvédelem [Protecting Home Industry], a periodical that might be regarded as a fossilized remnant from the period of movements protecting home industry, which kept on publishing the well known advertisement:

"Our distinguished housewives! We invite you to taste the real Franck coffee substitute, the best ersatz coffee ever made strictly from pure Hungarian material by Henrik Franck's Sons' Hungarian factory in Kassa."

However, it was in the "Letters to the Editor" section of the same periodical that in reply to a question of Dr.M.J. of Törökbálint ('Is the enclosed sample of coffee substitute of home production, or not?') the following answer was published: "It is a miserable foreign make. Please be so kind as to buy Franck coffee in the future. It is made in Kassa and bears the 'Coffee grinder' trade mark."

× Imitation of the opening lines of Sándor Petőfi's "National Song", written on the eve of the 1848 Revolution:

"Talpra Magyar, your country calls!
the time for now or never falls!
Are we to live as slaves or free?
Choose one! this is our destiny.
By the God of all the Magyars we swear
We swear never again the chains to bear."

(Petőfi. English and introduction by Anton W. Nyerges. Ed. Joseph M. Értavy-Baráth, Hungarian Cultural Foundation: Buffalo-New York, 1973, p. 253.)

D á n i e l S z a b ó
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LEVENTE, THE MAN AND THE LEVENTE MOVEMENT

In a book, which has remained controversial since its publication a few years ago, frequent reference is made to a work entitled No Mercy written by Csaba Dücső. The late György Száraz, when he wrote a polemical essay on the subject, could not ascertain the actual existence of Dücső's book. I will review this issue here in the light of new data. By doing so, I hope to put an end to this debate and at the same time make these findings available to the world at large.

In his essay Cuvînt despre Transilvania (1982), Ion Lăncrănjan reflects on the crimes and atrocities committed in North-Transylvania in the autumn in 1940 as follows: "... they worked with 'up-to-date' means, acting in the spirit of 'national ideology', which was accurately synthesized in a brochure entitled No Mercy. True, its author, named Csaba Dücső, was no extaordinary writer; this, however, makes no difference at all to the consequences of revisionist revenge, which the tract, championing a comprehensive genocidal policy, incited. In it, a certain Ievente Torday said:'I will not wait for revenge. I will not wait. I annihilate every Rumanian in my path. I will kill each of them. There will be no mercy. At night I will burn down the Rumanian villages. I will put all the inhabitants to the sword, I will poison the wells and I will even kill babies in their cradles. I will eradicate these good-for-nothing thieving people. There will be no mercy for anyone. Neither for the baby in the cradle, nor for the pregnant mother! I will annihilate every Rumanian, and then Transylvania will have only one nationality, the Hungarian, my people! I will nip their Horeas and Closcas in the bud. There will be no mercy...' It is true that these sentiments belong to the past, and it is imperative that they be completely put aside. But no final resolution can be achieved as long as the situation is permanently stirred up in a certain way by certain parties, without brutality, using 'up-to-date' rhetoric appropriate for the present age."

Lăncrănjan then tells us that the "No Mercy" camp did not arrive at its

above-enunciated position overnight. The first initiative came from journalists; later on historians and together with them - "if not before them" - politicians came, representing the most reactionary circles. Finally, after the division of Transylvania into two parts, the 'guards in rags' and the 'leventes'[x] rumbled onto the scene to shoot, stab and hang Rumanians and others. They set fire to Rumanian buildings and churches, scraped off inscriptions from graveyard crosses, bayonetted pregnant women and impaled babies on their bayonets; instead of cows they put people to the yoke, and they sliced off tongues and ears..."

To rebut Lăncrănjan's ill-willed 'ideology' György Száraz gave the following opinion about the No Mercy affair: "After that, he [Lăncrănjan] quotes a Hungarian 'genocidal brochure', the work of a certain Csaba Dücső entitled No Mercy. He does not tell the place and year of publication, nor the name of the publisher. It is not clarified what kind of work it is - a novel? a play? - we are to assume that it was meant as a doctrinal statement for the members of the levente organization some time in the Horthy-period. Lăncrănjan quotes 'levente Torday' - with a small 'l', consequently it is not a Christian name - who says: 'I will kill all Rumanians in my path. I will kill each of them... I will put to the sword all the inhabitants. I will poison the wells, there will be no mercy even for babies.'

"I have tried to find mention of Csaba Dücső, but have not been able to locate his name in any references, new or old. Lăncrănjan calls him an unextraordinary writer. But we must be careful - an unextraordinary writer is still a writer! Thus the Rumanian reader may justifiably assume that Csaba Dücső represents a consensus found in Hungarian literature. Do not misunderstand me: I do not doubt the existence of Csaba Dücső and his work. Certainly, his genre can be well documented. I have a large collection of Dücső-like writings by both Rumanian and Hungarian authors dating from before 1945, written in the very same tone. I could offer Lăncrănjan a pretty bunch of flowers from both groups, for the sake of balance. But for what purpose?"[1] Thus responded György Száraz.

In his report entitled În asteptare[2] - I abstain from remarking upon its tone - Lăncrănjan declares: "I have mentioned the work of Csaba Dücső (which was published by the Kiadóhivatal Rt in 1939, and naturally widely circulated), because his ideas were put into practice and sometimes his plans even attained 'over-fulfilment'. But they could not attain their main aim - the annihilation of every Rumanian in North-Transylvania..."

[x] A 'levente' - a member of a para-military Hungarian youth organization (between 1928-1944)

At this time I do not intend to discuss those atrocities that were indeed committed in North-Transylvania, or to pass judgement on the validity of Lăncrănjan's horrific data. Since he usually does not provide information as to place and time, we cannot easily judge the extent to which his generalized arguments are based in fact, and to what extent they are the products of his (or his sources') imaginations. Instead, I will begin by focusing on the career of Csaba Dücső's work before the time it acquired a key role in that of Lăncrănjan.

Csaba Dücső did exist, and the ominous work bearing his name was really published, as we are informed by an encyclopaedia of the history of literature.[3] The reason why György Száraz was unable to obtain the volume is very simple. The leaders of the democratic Hungarian state formed after the liberation of the country required all libraries and institutes to submit for pulping any works deemed antihumanist, nationalist, chauvinist, anti-Semitic, fascist, inciting, racist, etc. The aim of this decree was to prevent the poisoning of future generations. I would like to belive that not even Lăncrănjan considers this an attempt to destroy evidence. Thus Dücső's work almost disappeared sharing the fate of others of the same breed. However, a single original copy was found, and an idea can be formed about the character of the work.

The jacket shows an 'ancient Hungarian' (Scythian) holding a flag and blowing a horn from which emerges the caption: "Descendants of Atila [sic], Álmos, Árpád, forward to the new conquest!" Over the figure we find: "CSABA DÜCSŐ: No Mercy", while under it we read: 'Budapest, Spring, 1939'. On the back of the title-page we learn that the work was published by the Centrum Kiadóvállalat RT . The number of copies printed is <u>not</u> indicated.

Let us begin with the publisher. The Centrum Kiadóvállalat, a joint-stock company located in Budapest, Köztelek St. No. 1, was founded in 1922 by right-wing politicians. Among the founding share-holders was Géza Bornemissza, who had become estranged from the right by the second half of the 1930s, and Pál Teleki, who was no longer a member of the company at the time Dücső's work was published. The post of managing director was held for years,even as late as 1939, by Dr. Iván Nagy. The Company specialized in publishing material for university and high-school students. Dr. Nagy decided what kinds of works were to be published. He belonged to the extreme-right faction opposed to the rightist Hungarian political régime. The high point of his political career occurred when he became an undersecretary and press chief in the Ministry of Religion and Education in the fascist Szálasi-government. Nothing is known about his activities after that time.[4]

What can we say about this work of Csaba Dücső, whose publication we may

assume that Nagy approved? It is a slap-dash loathsome product of Hungarian chauvinism without peer. It espouses a nationalism carried to the inhuman fascistic extremes. Even by the standards of the time it was so execrable that most nationalists could not have read it without shuddering. It is devoutly to be wished that such books never be published again.

On the other hand, it should be noted that No Mercy is not a brochure, but a book of 188 pages. As to its genre, it is not a social programme, a political tract, nor a kind of school-book, but a disgusting novel without literary value. Of course this is hardly an excuse to its content, considering the transcendent poisonousness of the book. However, it is a novel and in view of what follows, this is by no means a negligible factor.

The book is a tale about an imaginary revolt of Hungarians living in Transylvania under Rumanian rule, organized and led to victory by a protagonist named Torday. Levente is Torday's given name, and it has nothing to do with the levente organization. He is in fact an officer of the Hungarian Royal Army, who sets out to organize a revolt in the Székely region (South-Central Transylvania) disguised as an innkeeper. Torday dreams of a great empire of 50 million Hungarians, living within the reestablished historical boundaries of Hungary. At the beginning - in spite of the disapproval of some of his comrades - he is forgiving of those who have committed offences against Hungarians. But when Rumanian troops launch a counteroffensive against the almost victorious revolt and (according to the fantasy of Csaba Dücső) hang 50 Hungarian hostages in the marketplace of the temporarily reoccupied city of Csikszereda (Miuercurea Ciuc), Torday changes his position. He considers merciless revenge the only adequate response, and from that time on the slogan in the title, "No mercy" is his only guide. After taking Csikszereda, for different reasons he orders the execution of first every tenth, then every fifth and finally every second of his Rumanian captives.

When Piroska, the girl he loves almost as much as his country, becomes frightened by his cruelties, Torday angrily tries to justify himself by uttering those terrible sentences quoted by Lăncrănjan. We quote them here so that the readers may compare them to Lăncrănjan's text:

"Hungarians have bled throughout history and Hungarian blood is being shed now again!... I will not wait for revenge! I will not wait! I will annihilate every Rumanian in my path! I will kill each of them! There will be no mercy! Just as there was no mercy for the Magyars at the time of Horea and Closca, and as no mercy is shown them today. The Rumanians will get no mercy! I promise this, Levente Torday! I will do what they did! At night I will burn down the Rumanian

villages! I will put all the inhabitants to the sword! I will poison the wells and I will kill their babies as the Horas hacked to death our young with scythes. I will eradicate this people of thieving rascals. There will be no mercy for anyone! Neither for the baby nor for the pregnant mother! There will be no mercy for them because they showed none to us. I will take revenge for all the Rumanian massacres in Hungarian history! Revenge! A cruel, merciless revenge!... I will make your nationality policy! It will be not the Hungarian who must bleed while the Rumanian can live in peace and breed like a cockroach! Certainly not! I will annihilate every Rumanian and then Transylvania will have only one nationality, the Hungarian, my people! My blood! My nation!... I will nip their Horas and Closcas in the bud! There will be no mercy!"[5]

There is no need to comment on Torday's fascist doctrine, a product of Horthy's day. But we have to point out that while the disgusting philosophy emerging from the quotation might be representative of its age and author, it by no means represents the attitude of the Hungarian people. The novel's wickedness is not mitigated by the fact that Torday does not succeed in the end.

It ought to be added that Dücső's pulp thriller offers a mixture of naiveté, ignorance, primitiveness and flagrant inconsistency. Even Dücső's contemporaries must have been skeptical of such Torday boasts as: "The Hungarian nation is the most beautiful sprout of the dominant Mongolian type, born for triumph! The blood of Attila, Árpád and Genghis Khan that courses within our veins impels us to victory!"[6] As schoolchildren Hungarians have been taught that the troops of Genghis Khan destroyed their country, yet here Torday embraces the notorious Mongol leader as an ancestor. Also incredible is the naiveté of Torday's plot to hide guns in wine-barrels in full sight of the Rumanian police. Contemporary Hungarian gentlemen must surely have looked askance at Torday's concept of word of honour. In the novel Torday swears to the Rumanian general defending Fogaras (Făgăraş) that he will commit suicide if the Rumanian troops give up the city without a battle. When they do so, Torday chooses an unusual way of fulfilling his promise: he takes off in an airplane to bomb Ploieşti, hoping he will be shot down. His scheme does not come off as planned: though he crashes, he does not lose his life, because his airplane's fall is broken by trees of the city park. And when the badly hurt prisoner Torday is exchanged for several hundred Rumanian captives, he quietly waits for recovery in a hospital bed in Brassó. It does not occur to him that he should fulfil his promise to commit suicide!

So much for Csaba Dücső and Torday. Let us return to Lăncrănjan, a citizen of today's socialist Rumania, and his treatment of Dücső's book to which he devotes two studies. At the beginning of this article we have shown how Torday's speech

was quoted by Lăncrănjan. If we compare this with its original, some important differences will become apparent at once. Of course, since Lăncrănjan's version is a translation, there are a number of unavoidable language-based differences. But in quoting Dücső's Torday continuously Lăncrănjan has led us to believe that nothing has been omitted from the original text. In reality, entire sentences important for our understanding of Torday's position have disappeared. Neglecting repetitions, these are as follows:

1. "There will be no mercy! Just as there was no mercy for the Magyars at the time of Hora and Closca, and as no mercy is shown them today! The Rumanians will get no mercy!"
2. "I will do what they did!"
3. "And I will kill their babies (so far the quotation is more or less accurate, unlike what follows) as the Horas hacked to death our young with scythes."
4. "I will take revenge for all the Rumanian massacres in Hungarian history," etc.

I do not intend here to give a history of the Horia-Cloşca revolt, still less to reflect on the fact that many Hungarians - and not only noblemen - became victims of this movement which began as a class-struggle.

I will also refrain from commenting on other historical references made by Torday. It may nevertheless be justifiably asked why Lăncrănjan, who himself uses a historical frame to express his views, ignores these historical references in Dücső's horrible work. Perhaps Lăncrănjan is afraid Rumanian readers will become aware of the bias in his approach.

Then, there is the levente question. In the original thriller, Torday bears Levente as a given name, quite a common one in the Horthy Era. This name is given no special meaning by Dücső. In the text of Lăncrănjan, Levente is written with a small 'l', thus becoming the carrier of a function and suggesting that Torday is a member of the levente organization, an official movement imposed on the whole youth in the Horthy Era. Lăncrănjan is now only a step away from saying that the leventes, along with the rag guards swarmed over North-Transylvania, torturing and killing Rumanians in the autumn of 1940. And he takes this step. The preposterousness of such a claim is transparent to all those survivors of the region who are old enough to remember the events of 1940. For the sake of everyone else, let the historical records show that just as Lăncrănjan's 'leventes' did not pillage North-Transylvania, neither did Dücső's Rumanian soldiers hang Hungarian hostages in Csikszereda.

In both Cuvînt despre Transilvania and În asteptare, Dücső's book is consistently defined by Lăncrănjan as a brochure,[7] whereas in reality - as we have

seen - it is a novel. Why is this necessary, i.e. the misclassification of genres? Could it be due to a functional difference between a novel and a brochure? A novel is obviously a less effective guide for implementing a political programme than a brochure. Nevertheless Lăncrănjan, let us quote him again, chooses to discuss the work of Csaba Dücső expressly because "his ideas were put into practice, and sometimes his plans even achieved 'over-fulfilment'". So Lăncrănjan makes a levente out of Dücső's 'hero', classifies the book as a brochure, and then he has the leventes invade North-Transylvania, their hellish deeds inspired by the prescriptions of the brochure.

The careful reader necessarily becomes suspicious of the way that Lăncrănjan chooses to present the repugnant philosophy of Dücső, i.e. the changes that cannot be explained purely by differences of attitude and interpretation. In Lăncrănjan's defense it may be supposed that Dücső's original text was not available to him and he had to work from indirect sources. Supporting this possibility is the fact that Lăncrănjan in his second article declares that Dücső's work was published by the Kiadóhivatal RT in 1939, and naturally widely circulated. His assumption of a large edition seems to have no support, as the number of copies printed is not indicated in the book itself. Nevertheless it is telling that, according to Lăncrănjan, the work was published by a company called Kiadóhivatal (which he writes in Hungarian). However, no publishing company called Kiadóhivatal ever existed: in Hungarian, kiadóhivatal means 'publishing office' and does not denote an independent publisher even as a common noun, but at most an organizational unit of an institution which oversees certain publications. In addition, on the backside of the original cover the publisher is clearly indicated: Centrum Kiadóvállalat RT. What is the reason for this mistake? It is not a mistranslation, because Lăncrănjan gives the text in Hungarian. In this case it is highly unlikely any distortion was intended - no consideration would have required one. Only Lăncrănjan himself can answer this question. Either he has to admit that his data on Dücső's book were received second hand and he did not see the original, or he has to confess that the mistake is his, i.e. admit his superficiality, in which case his other claims and conclusions are also vitiated.

For the moment, let us assume in Lăncrănjan's favour that he was led astray by inauthentic secondary sources. For Lăncrănjan was not the first to say that the leventes of Csaba Dücső's day pillaged North-Transylvania. We read in an 1940 issue of a Rumanian paper called Universul: "The terror in North-Transylvania is carried out by recently-armed gangs of Hungarian 'leventes'. They roam the Rumanian territories terrorizing the population. Without trial they shoot or hang Rumanians. The cruelty of these modern barbarians should not surprise us. Hun-

garians do not deny their Mongolian origin - their savagery is inherited. Moreover, these gangs are merely following orders, according to a programme defined in advance. Last year Csaba Dücső wrote a book for the Hungarian government-supported levente movement entitled No Mercy, and this book was approved by the Hungarian censors. In it, a levente-hero called Torday tells his girlfriend Piroska that the task of a levente is to annihilate the Transylvanian Rumanians, destroy their villages, poison their wells etc."[8]

Even the author of this article, a journalist of the pre-1944 Rumania, had no idea that the "leventes bayonetted pregnant women, impaled babies on their bayonets, instead of cows put people to the yoke and sliced off tongues and ears". Somebody else (in another newspaper? Lăncrănjan?) added these to the leventes' list of foul deeds. Dücső's work is clearly distorted by the writer quoted above. Gangs of recently armed leventes terrorize North-Transylvania. They carry out atrocities according to a "programme defined in advance". This programme it seems is nothing other than Dücső's work, written for the levente movement, which features its protagonist Torday in the role of a "levente-hero". The horrible vows of Torday are made out to be the duties of the leventes. Dücső's work appears as a programme sanctioned by the Hungarian government. And the conclusion: Hungarians "do not deny their Mongolian origin, their savagery is inherited".

Thus, in this article from Universul we find the same distortions made by Lăncrănjan concerning the work of Dücső. It is incidental that the author of the article turns the weapon of Torday's stupid boasting with the Mongolian origin of the Hungarians against Dücső. It is more important to point out (not to defend the Hungarian government of that time, but out of respect for the facts) that Dücső's book could not have been approved by the Hungarian censors, since censorship was only introduced on September 1, 1939, in the form of censorship after publication. However, No Mercy, as shown on its front cover, was published in the spring of 1939.

Accordingly, it is reasonable to suppose that Lăncrănjan got his information on Dücső from sources similar to the above mentioned article. In that case he is to be reproached "only" for pretending to be familiar with the original work, and for neglecting the criticism of his sources when he takes over their false data. However, these are unfortunately not the only elements of his method in search of truth.

Lăncrănjan's relevant works abound in discussions of atrocities and events occasionally culminating in massacres, in which, throughout history, but particularly after 1940, Hungarians have been the aggressors and Rumanians the vic-

tims. It is sad and painful to acknowledge that such events really occurred. But in 1940, similar ones occurred in North-Transylvania also before the Rumanian withdrawal from the territory, and later on in South-Transylvania as well, the only difference being that this time the victims were Hungarians. The Italian-German military board of inquiry, set up at the request of both parties, found ample evidence of mutually committed horrors in both regions of Transylvania. It is not my purpose here to sum these up.

"Historians appeared on the scene" - asserts Lăncrănjan when listing the groups which worked out the ideology of the brutal events in Transylvania, although he does not tell us who the historians were. Well, I certainly wish that today's historians appear on the scene. But let them be allowed to work free of political manipulation. We need those historians, from Hungary as well as Rumania who are morally devoted to serving the real interests of their nations' peoples, historians who want to put the authentic and objective exploration of the past to the service of humanity and the brotherhood of nations. Let them neutralize the poisoning effects of irresponsible pseudo-scholars and their politically motivated colleagues.

NOTES

1. György Száraz, 'Egy különös könyvről' (About a strange book), Valóság, 1982/10, p. 98.
2. See in Lăncrănjan, Vocaţia constructiva (A creative vocation), Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1983, pp. 191-192.
3. Pál Gulyás, Magyar írók élete és munkái (The lives and works of Hungarian writers), Budapest, 1944, vol. VI, p. 404.
4. I owe the data on Centrum Kiadóvállalat to Mrs Antal Sipos.
5. Dücső, No Mercy, p. 156. - The text is quoted without omitting any words or punctuation marks.
6. Ibid. p. 162.
7. "Some brochures of similar content were also published in Rumania at the time of the legionaries, but they were not put into practice as, sadly enough, were the principles of Csaba Dücső's brochure, in the Rumanian territory of North-Transylvania..." Lăncrănjan, Vocaţia constructiva, p. 191.
8. Universul, September 20, 1940. - Hungarian National Archives, Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office (K·67) No. 146.

J á n o s V a r g a

Hungarian National Archives

NEW DOCUMENTS FOR THE EVALUATION OF THE MARTINOVICS CONSPIRACY

Projet d'instructions et Bases d'après lesquelles il convient de négocier avec le Roi de Prusse[xx]

(Arch.Nat. F.7. 4690. Papiers saisis chez Dumouriez)

Si le Roi de Prusse s'obstine à vouloir faire une paix générale, il faut rompre toute négociation, La République Française ne voulant et pouvant dans aucun cas, ni aucun tems faire de Paix avec la Maison d'Autriche.

Les raisons qui semblent motiver l'Eloignement de la Prusse pour une Paix séparée ont paru faibles. Elles se réduisent à dire que l'Autriche et la Russie pour s'en venger, pourront tourner leurs armes contre le Roi; et comme ses troupes et ses trésors sont affaiblis par la malheureuse campagne qu'il vient de faire contre les Français, il craint de ne pouvoir résister à ces deux Puissances réunies.

La Russie ajoute-t-il n'a essuyé aucune perte. Elle a dans la Pologne une armée nombreuse qui peut à chaque instant entrer dans la Silésie Prussienne où la Prusse orientale.

L'Autriche désespérant pour le moment de rentrer dans ses Possessions aux Pays-Bas, voudra s'en dédommager aux dépens de la Prusse. Elle tournera exclusivement toutes ses forces contre cette Puissance à qui les Français dû leur éloignement et leurs affaires domestiques ne pourront donner qu' une faible assistance.

On répond que ces craintes ne sont pas fondées et que toutes les trames dangéreuses sont aucontraire pour la Russie et l'Autriche.

Les négociations avec la Prusse peuvent se faire secretement il ne sera pas

x These documents supplement Éva Ring's article, see above, pp. 18-38.
xx Cf. p. 19 above.

question d'alliance; mais l'on conviendra seulement de conditions de Paix très simples, qui ne devront avoir d'éffet et même n'être publiées et connues qu'au printemps prochain.

La saison rigoureuse qui s'avance et plus encore les progrès des armées Françaises le long du Rhin, sur la Mozelle et dans les Pays-Bas peuvent servir de prétexte au Roi de Prusse pour faire filer l'armée qu' il a actuellement sur les bords du Rhin et de la Lahn en partie dans la Hesse, en plus grande partie dans les Margraviats d'Auspach et de Bareith. On croira facilement que ces troupes n'y viennent que pour prendre des quartiers d'hyver et se refaire des fatigues et des maladies qu'elles ont éprouvées.

Cette armée pourra même y recevoir des renforts et ces renforts loin de donner de l'ombrage, inspireront aux Autrichiens plus de confiance en leur faisant espérer une nouvelle campagne combinée.

Les Prussiens pourront aussi faire des préparatifs en Silésie et dans les deux Prusses, toujours sous prétexte de renforcer au besoin les armées du Rhin.

On profiterait d'encore de l'hyver pour fomenter des insurrections dans la Hongrie, la Bohême et l'Autriche de même que pour réveiller le courage abbattu des Polonais et la vengeance implacable de l'Empire Ottoman contre la Russie et l'Autriche.

Si les agens Prussiens à Constantinople voulaient s'entendre avec ceux de la République française rien ne serait plus facile que d'engager le grand seigneur à renouveller la guerre au Printems prochain, contre les deux Cours impériales.

D'un autre côté la République française a quelque raison de compter sur le gouvernement actuel de la Suède et il lui serait facile d'opérer encore une diversion utile de ce côté tans sur mer dans la Baltique, que sur terre dans la Baltique, que sur terre dans la Finlande.

Enfin en faisant entendre à l'Electeur de Bavière que les secrets d'enemis de l'Autriche sont de se dédommager de ses pertes aux Pays-Bas par une invasion dans la Bavière dont elle convoite la Possession depuis longtems. On n'aurait point de peine à s'assurer quelques secours de ce Prince qui sait bien que ses continuelles indécisions ont irrité la Maison d'Autriche.

Ainsi au Printems prochain lorsque le moment d'ouvrir sa campagne serait arrivé et que l'Autriche confiante dans l'appui de la Prusse, aurait préparé de grands efforts pour attaquer les Français sur le Rhin, on publiérait subitement la conclusion de la paix séparée entre la Prusse et la France. L'armée Prussienne sortant de ses quartiers d'hyver en Franconie et jointe à 12.000 Hessois, tomberait à l'improviste sur la Bohême, par Tyra (?). Une autre armée Prussienne

ou entrerait dans la Silésie, ou combattrait les Russes dans la Pologne assistés des Patriotes Polonais dont le nombre et l'animosité augmentent tous les jours.

Les Turcs s'avanceraient également du côté de la Pologne ainsi que dans le Bannat de Temeswar et en Croatie en suivant le Plan de leur 1ère Campagne de 1788 et à l'aide des Valaques qu'il ne serait pas impossible de faire insurger.

Les Français feraient face à l'Armée autrichienne sur le Rhin et parviendraient bientôt à les chasser totalement de cette partie de l'Allemagne du Brisgaw, des villes frontières. Etc...

Dans le même tems nos armées du Midi les attaqueraient par le Piémont et les chasseraient de la Lombardie.

Notre Flotte de la Méditerranée entrerait dans la mer noire, et faciliterait un débarquement des Turcs dans la Crimée.

Ainsi les deux Cours Impériales Ennemies irréconciliables de la Prusse comme de la France, se trouveraient tout à la fois attaquées dans le Nord sur mer et sur terre par les Suédois, dans le Levant, sur mer et sur terre par les Turcs et les Français; sur le Rhin par les Français et les Bavarois; en Italie par les Français; en Bohême par les Prussiens et le Hessois, en Pologne et en Silésie par les Prussiens réunis aux Patriotes Polonais.

Ainsi la Prusse trouverait bientôt à se dédommager des pertes de la Campagne actuelle. Elle aurait abbattu sa rivale en Allemagne où elle deviendrait à son tour prépondérante. Elle aurait réparé envers la Pologne l'injuste abbandon qu'elle en a fait et il ne serait pas difficile de lui obtenir de cette République la possession de Thorn et de Dantzick, moyennant, qu'elle facilitat la réintegration des Polonais dans la Gallicie. La Prusse ajouterait à ses possessions le reste de la Silésie.

La Russie pourrait être punie et affaiblie par la perte de la Russie Blanche, celle de la Crimée et de toutes les Provinces et places qu'elle a prises en dernier l'an aux Polonais et aux Turcs.

Ceux-ci gagneraient quelques Districts dans la Croatie. La Principauté de Transilvanie pourrait devenir indépendante à l'instar de la Valachie et de la Moldavie.

On pourrait aussi s'assurer des vénitieux en leur promettant un arrondissement dans la Dalmatie et surtout la Possession du Littral autrichien. C'est à dire des Ports et Districts de Trieste, Fiume et Porto-Ré.

Les Suisses s'ils le voulaient pourraient concourir à l'Entreprises et en profiter: D'abord en faisant cesser les prétentions de la Maison d'Autriche sur la Valteline puis en ajoutant à la Confédération helvétique la partie du Tirol la plus voisine.

Je ne parle pas des moyens qu'on pourrait employer efficacement et avec la certitude morale du succès pour mettre en insurrection la Hongrie, la Bohême et l'Autriche et en faire trois Etats séparés dont l'un serait composé de la Hongrie et d'une partie de la Croatie, la second de l'Autriche proprement dite de la Stirie et de la Moravie, et la troisième de la Bohême.

Les Français ne prendraient rien pour eux et trouveraient la récompense suffisante de leurs travaux et de leurs dépenses dans la satisfaction d'avoir procuré aux Peuples qui bordent le Rhin, la Meuse et l'Escaut la liberté et l'indépendance et à l'Europe une Paix solide et durable, sans compter l'anéantissement de l'infâme Maison d'Autriche.

Ce projet répond à toutes les craintes du Roi de Prusse. Une paix générale, en supposant qu'elle fut possible de notre part, ne lui procurerait ni les mêmes avantages ni la même gloire à acquérir; il ne remporterait dans ses Etats, que la honte d'avoir inutilement dissipé des trésors et perdu une superbe armée.

Si ce Projet est du goût du Roi de Prusse, il sera facile d'y mettre bientôt la dernière main. Il suffira qu'il envoye ici un homme sur qui ait ses pleins pouvoirs et en qui nous puissions avoir confiance.

Il parait qu'on se propose d'envoyer le marquis de Lucchessiny mais on ne le croit pas ici l'homme, qu'il faut. Premièrement parce qu'on le croit susceptible de séduction; secondement parce qu'il a trompé indignement les Polonais, et que son nom seul suffirait pour éloigner ceux-ci d'un plan où ils pourraient jouer un grand rôle.

On desirerait que le choix du Roi de Prusse put (?) tomber de préference, sur le Ministre Stohm ou le général Kalckreuth auquel on adjoindrait l'aide de camp Mannstein.

Les Principes comme de ces personnages éloigneraient ici toute défiance de la part des Patriotes même outres.

Il faut qu'on ait réponse incessammant sur tous ces points pour diriger notre conduite ultérieure. On ne répondrait pas que la Négociation ne devint impossible, si l'on attendait que nos armes eussent fait de plus grands progrès.

L'affaire de la Hollande ne sera jamais un obstacle, si l'on veut agir de bonne foi, si le gouvernement Hollandais cesse de témoigner sa bienveillance à nos Ennemis, si surtout il condescend à la Libre Navigation de l'Escaut qui ne peut être considérée de notre part comme une violation des traités, mais qui est aucontraire une conséquence naturelle des principes de cette justice immuable antérieure à toutes les Conventions et contre la quelle aucune Convention n'a jamais pu prescrire.

János Mednyánszky, Councillor of the Governor-General, to the Emperor[x]
(Magyar Országos Levéltár [Hungarian National Archives] I. 50. Kabinettsarchiv Privatbibliothäk, T. 26. N. 87. f. 132-133.)

Ofen, den 27ten 9ber 1792.

"Ihre Majestät!
Das hier allerunterthänigst angeschlossene aufrührerische Blats (: welches man eigentlich behaupten will, dass es für die Preussischen Staaten verfasst seyn und in denselben circuliret habe :) soll der Sage nach in 2.000 abgedruckten Exemplaren in Pest unter dem Volk circuliren und man will noch dazu behaupten dass selbes in Kremnitz oder Schemnitz (: vermutlich in einer geheimen Buchdruckerey :) nachgedruckt worden seye..." (...)

Copia

Brave Bürger!
Ihr schlaffet und die Tyranney schwebet über eure Köpfe, Eure Schätze sind zerstreut, Eure Herren stritten, wider eure Freyheit, um euch in die Sklawerey desto gewisser zu werfen. Nach einem schimpflichen Krieg, wenn er schon einen glücklichen Ausgang nehmen sollte, werdet ihr genöthiget seyn drückend Auflagen zu bezahlen, neuen Schweis zu verschwenden um zu den Ausgaben der wohllüstigen Frauenzimmer eures Beherrschers beizutragen. Der Augenblick ist vorhanden, benutzet denselben, aber ohne Ausschweifung, ohne Laster. Euer Wille muss sich durch Gewalt offenbaren, durch Nachdruck, aber mit einer Gelassenheit Muth geben kann. Befehlet, dass dieser grausame, und ungerechte Krieg ein Ende nehme, dass die Ordnung in Euren Finanzen widerhergestellt werde, dass das Volk für den wahren Souverain anerkannt werde, dass der Unterschied der Stände aufhöre, welche uns herabwürdigen und dass der Mensch in seine ursprüngliche Würde wider zurückkehre, welche nur durch die Schwachheit des Volks, und durch die Tyranney zu sein aufgehöret hat. Dass diejenigen, welche das Vaterland, die Ehre und die Menschheit lieben, sich miteinander auf den 31ten 8bris erheben! Ehre sey der Freiheit, der Gleichheit, der Einigkeit, und der Tugend!"

x Cf. p. 23 above.

Le Commissaire des Relations extérieures aux Citoyens Représentants du peuple composants le Comité de Salut Public[x]

(Archives des Affaires Etrangères, Correspondance Politique, Pologne.T.322.48.)

Citoyens A Paris le 6. Messidor de l'an deux[xx]

L'Extrait ci joint de deux lettres communiquées à la Commission par le Polonais Barss, est digne de votre attention, parcequ'il renferme des probabilités pour une insurrection en Galicie, une des plus riches provinces de la Maison d'Autriche.

On conçoit aisément que la première impression que le succès de l'insurrection de Pologne a produite dans un païs qui jádis en faisait partie, a dû réveiller dans les nobles des mécontentemens mal éteints et dans toutes les classes le sentiment et le désir de la Liberté. On voit d'un autre coté les craintes du Tiran de l'Autriche dans la marche incertaine qu'il suit à l'égard des évênements de la Pologne, une insurrection en Galicie serait un des coups les plus funestes pour Vienne.

Cependant tans que la Pologne ne sera pas sûre de notre assistance, soit par le secours directs en argent qu'elle attend de nous, soit par la diversion que nous pourrions indirectement opérer en sa faveur du coté de Baltique, et de la Turquie, il est douteux que les chefs de l'insurrection osent faire des démarches qui forceraient l'Empereur de se joindre contre eux à la Prusse et à la Russie. C'est donc de nous que doit venir la première impulsion à donner aux mouvemens de la Galicie. C'est nous qui devons engager les Polonais à ne pas ménager un Despote qui ne les ménagera plus dèsqu'il pourra se joindre sans danger à leurs oppresseurs.

Mais il faut que nous ayons acquire le droit de leur donner des conseils et d'exiger qu'ils agissent conformément à nos vües.

Les doutes qu'il était permis d'avoir sur la nature de l'insurrection Polonaise l'ors de son commancement, n'existent plus. Si on n'en peut encore prévoir l'issüe, si tous les ressorts, tous les projets n'en sont pas encore connus, il est certain dumoins, qu'elle sert la cause de la République française, et qu'en toute hypothèse possible il ne peut être qu'avantageux pour nous de l'encourager et de la soutenir". (...)

J. Buchot

x Cf. p. 25 above.

xx June 25, 1794.

Passages from Pierre Parandier's letter to the Committee of Public Safety on July 10, 1794[x]
(Arch. Etr. C.P. Pologne T. 322. 251-252.)

§ VII. L'insurrection de la Pologne entraine celle des Provinces les plus importantes de la Prusse et de l'Autriche

Dans le mémoire sur la Pologne que j'ai présenté au gouvernement le 25 Pluviose dernier,[xx] j'ai dit: 'Sans doute la République Française pour hater la chute des Tyrans peut, par ses moyens, exciter des insurrections dans différens états de l'Europe, mais en Russie, en Prusse, en Gallicie, les Polonais sont les seuls qui peuvent le faire d'une maniere prompte et éfficace'.

L'insurrection de la Pologne doit s'étendre au de là même des provinces démembrées par le partage de 1772.

Il est très aisé aux Polonais de produire des soulevements dans les deux Silesies et au sein même de la Russie. Depuis longtemps ils s'y sont ménagés des moyens d'exécution, ont à cet égard des projets arrêtés et d'excellens instrumens.

Mais c'est surtout la Gallicie, cette province importante de la domination autrichienne qu'il est aisé de lui arracher par le moyen de la Pologne.

Les Galliciens se sont déja adressés au chef de la force armée de Pologne, pour opérer une levée de bouclier, et faire cause commune avec les Polonais.

Kociuszko (sic!) n'a pu adhérer a leurs propositions sans une réponse cathégorique à la demande des subsides faite au gouvernement Français par mon entremise et que j'ai annoncé dans ma dépeche du 6. Frimaire[xxx] N. 109.: la Pologne ne pouvant encore se donner un ennemi de plus sans être sure d'avoir un appui aussi puissant que la République Française. (...)

... La Maison d'Autriche a vainement employé toutes les ruses de sa politique astucieuse pour capter la bienveillance des habitans de la Gallicie. Elle redoute leur esprit insurrectionnel, elle en voulait faire des Allemands, mais ils sont restés Polonais... (...)

... L'insurrection de la Gallicie est pour la France d'un intéret majeur. Indépendamment de ce que vaut (?) cette Province qui fournit le plus à l'Autriche

x Cf. p. 25 above.
xx February 13, 1794
xxx November 27, 1793.

d'impôts et de recrues, elle ne peut qu'entrainer celle des autres peuples qui composent ses Etats, et qui sont tous portés à l'indépendance.

La Gallicie insurgée doit achever la ruine de la Maison d'Autriche..."

(Italics mine, É.R.)

Elegia ad Polonos[x]

(OSZK [National Széchényi Library] Kt. Quart. Lat. 62. T. 5. 28. A shorter and slightly different version entitled 'Hungari ad Polonos' is to be found in PAN Biblioteka w Krakowie [PAN Library, Cracow] 1171. f.196.)

Tres aquilae certare parant, certare cruente:
Nigrescunt binae, tertia lacte nitet.
Esto quidem verum est Nimium, ne crede colori:
Candori tamen haec laus, propria usque fuit.
Has nigras nigra facta docent, docuereque dudum,
Dum injuste vestrum diripuere solum.
Hae Libertatem, qua nihil pretiosus, uno
Ictu intendebant sternere, vosque simul.
Regina Alba Avium! justas consurgito in iras,
Qua pede, qua rostro pelle repelle scelus.
Sunt Tibi praestantes, novi, tua pignora cives;
Sunt generosa illis pectora, rumpe moras.
Rumpe morus, summe Arma, vola Polona Propago!
Pro Patria et Proprio sit tibi dulce mori.
Audior: en! quasi de coelo lapsus Kosciuszko
Gentis Totius nomina bella movet.
I.! Felix Kosciuszko! tibi Gratiosus amicam
Spondet opem: Lauris contege grande caput.
Fide Deo, Matrique Dei, neque Nomina temne
Seu Stanislae tuum, seu Casimire tuum.
Sis Kosciuszko tuis Gedeon, Samson Salomonque
Sint Philisthaei, quos petis ense, Viri.
Ejice de nidis, sibi, quos struxere, volneres,
Nigrae: trunca ungues, rostraque ad unca seca.

x Cf. p. 28 above.

Ut caussa, vincis, sic Armis vincere perge;
Et geminae titulum Laudis ab Hoste refer.
Et quam justa geris, tam sint quoque prospera bella:
Sentiat et Martem gens inimica tuum.
Sic erit ut toties referas aquila alba! triumphos;
Invicta, quoties sumseris Arma manu.
Ita vovet, praesagit, ac iamiam oculis usurpat.
Nobilissimae Polonae Gentis Cultor, et Amicus perpetuus.

Alexius Nedeczky de Nedecze,
Parochus Podvilkensis Inclyti Comitatus
Arvensis Tabulae iudiciariae Assessor.

Count Saurau, Deputy Home Secretary to Count Stampach, President of the Czech Gubernium[x]

(Štatni Ustředni Archiv, Prezidium Gubernia Českého Kralestvi [Central National Archives, Presidium of the Gubernium of the Bohemian Kingdom] 1791-1806. 20 G.1794.1397.)

"Wien, den 4ten September 794

"... Da von den in Wien arrestirten Personen verschiedene Listen circuliren, welche zum Theile ganz irrige Namen enthalten, wodurch also unbescholtene Personen im falschen Lichte erscheinen; so sehe ich mich veranlasst, Eurer Excellenz das Verzeichniss der wirklichen Gefangenen in der Anlage zu dem Ende mitzutheilen, damit dieselben davon zur Zerstreuung ungegründeter Gerüchte den dienlichen Gebrauch zu machen in Stand gesetzet werden.

Diese Personen haben wirklich die Absicht geheget, Theils in Oesterreich, Theils in Ungarn die Landesverfassung umzustossen, und eine Revoluzion zu bewirken; es sind aber zum Glück ihre gefährliche Anschläge noch in Zeiten entdeckt worden, und sie werden nach vollendeter Untersuchung der verdienten Strafe nicht entgehen.

Sollten Eure Excellenz etwa dortlandes im geheim Anzeigen erhalten, die auf obige Inquisiten Bezug hätten, so belieben dieselben mir solche ohne Verschub mitzutheilen..."

x Cf. p. 29 above.

... "Liste der zu Wien gefänglich erhaltenen Personen

1. Ignaz v. Martinovics, hungarischer Abbt
2. Baron Riedel, Hofpensionist
3. Riedel, dessen Bruder, k.k. Offizier
4. Hebenstreit, hiesigen Platz-Oberlieutenant
5. Gilovski, Feldkriegsaktuar
6. P. Frick, Pfarrer zu Falbach in N.O^{e}
7. Jutz, Hof und Gerichtsadvokat
8. Jellinek, gewesener Haus "Informator"
9. Prandstätter, wiener. Magistratsrath
10. Hackel, gewesener Handelsman
11. Wollstein, Professor der Thierarzneykunde
12. Hanke, Doktor der Arzneykunde
13. Troll, Polizeykommissär zu Lemberg
14. Billeck v. Billenberg, k.k. Hauptmann in dem Neustädter-Militär Akademie
15. dessen Bruder, Hofkriegsbuchhaltereybeamter
16. Graf Jacob Sigray, aus Ungarn (der junge)
17. Lascovics, gewesener k.k. Rittmeister
18. Hainoczi, k. ungarischer Sekretär
19. Szent-Mariay, Privat Sekretär
20. Alexander Szolarczek, ung. Edelmann

Plan of a Hungarian-Polish insurrection (January 10, 1797.)[x]

(A.E.C.P. Pologne v.323. 369-370.)

C^{en} Sargon Hongrie

copie de cette note fait le 21.nivose an 5.

"En faisant une revolution bien combinée, en Pologne et en Hongrie; on pourra mettre facilement sous les Armes 200.000 hommes.

On doit le répèter ici, que ce n'est points les hommes qui manquent, mais les moyen de les armer tous, et de les organiser de manière à pouvoir s'en servir est difficile, sans le secours de l'etranger dont on doit être assez puissante pour laisser le temps aux insurgens de se former. (sic!)

Cf. p. 31 above.

Le Bannât de Transilvanie fournira aisement 30.000 hommes, le centre d'Hongrie 20.000; la Galicie et les comités hongrois adjacens 50.000; l'Ukraine et la Podolie 60.000; le reste de la Pologne et la Lithuanie 60.000 hommes.(sic!)

Il ne s'agit que de combiner avec les chefs qui sont dispersés dans toutes les provinces, les principes, les mesures, et l'application des forces.

Pour mettre cette machine en mouvement, il faut intervention etrangère. Les Hongrois et les Polonais ne seront pas éloigné, d'entrer en conference et correspondance avec une personne qui possède la confiance du gouvernement français, qui soit muni de titres qui le constenti et dont les qualités personnelles inspirent de confience. Cette personne pourrait alors s'adresser, dans le comité de Cips, à M. Gregor Berzeviczy, dans le comité de Trenczyn au comte Etienne Illeschazy, ses deux personnes lui indiqueront des autres, et lui donneront les ouvertures nécessaire. En Galicie on peut s'adresser à M. Joseph Stadnicky demeurant à Doucla, qui donnera également tous les renseignements que l'on puisse désirer.

On doit observer ici, qu' il sera fort difficile d'entamer et de suivre une correspondance à moins que l'on ne se soit abouché pour convenir des Ynoÿcens, que pour assurer les personnes sur le danger, d'une telle correspondance. (sic!)

Il est également à remarquer, que ni les Hongrois, ni les Polonais auront de confiance dans la personne de Constantin Stamati qui réside pour le gouvernement français à Iassy; car on ne se fie pas à sa discretion, qui est si nécessaire dans une affaire si delicate. (sic!)

On n'a pas indiqué plus d'individûs, puisque les personnes nommés, peuvent de 2 lieues à 2 lieues adresser celui qui serait authorisé à une negociation de cette nature."

É v a R i n g

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EGYÜTTÉLÉS ÉS TÖBBNYELVŰSÉG AZ IRODALOMBAN

(Coexistence and multilingualism in literature). By László Sziklay (Budapest: Gondolat, 1987, 247 pp.)

It is lamentable that this collection of fine essays marks the end of a remarkable career. A few weeks after its publication, László Sziklay (1912-1987) unexpectedly died. He was born in the territory of present-day Slovakia, where he started his career as a teacher of Hungarian and French. In the highly prolific later decades of his life he became a well-respected scholar at the Institute of Literary Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Considering the environment of his early career, it is understandable that as a young scholar with an interest in literary studies, Sziklay at first began to inquire into the development of Slovak literature. He published articles on this subject in Hungarian journals from the mid-1930s on. His first synthetic treatment of the history of Slovak literature appeared in 1942, and in 1962 he published this work in a revised form, as a monumental monograph. He displayed great expertise and carefulness in this work as well as in several partial studies on Slovak literature. Sziklay was much more at home in the genre of essay than in writing lengthy books. Exactly ten years before the publication of the volume under review, his collected essays were published at Madách Kiadó, the Hungarian publishing house in Czechoslovakia.

Beyond the Slovak topics, however, László Sziklay's interest comprised the literatures of the other nationalities of historic Hungary; moreover, he gradually extended his research to Czech, Polish and Russian literature. His excellent command of several languages was a good qualification for this, and he was also able to encourage others to undertake similar inquiries. His linguistic versatility led him to comparative studies in literature at a relatively early stage in his career. For him, this did not merely imply a positivist approach, i.e. the philological study of influences, although he was a master in this field. Sziklay adopted a broader view of literature and explored similarities in development by reflecting on philologically kindred features. He had a great sensitivity towards

the problem of the aire culturelle created by historic Hungary, or, more generally, by the Habsburg Empire; towards the inevitable parallelisms and affinities among linguistic communities within the Empire which left their mark on the belles lettres. Sziklay was primarily interested in the problems of early and mid-19th-century literature, but - as is apparent in the book under review - he also inquired into earlier periods, such as the Renaissance and the baroque, as well as into the 20th century.

It was in fact also due to Sziklay's command of languages and his starting out from Czechoslovakia that two features of the development of historic Hungary seemed especially important to him. One of them, in the exploration of which he particularly distinguished himself, is "Hungarian-consciousness", i.e. the fact that people, including creative geniuses, who belonged to the various nations of Hungary and who spoke different languages, considered Hungary as their homeland and, irrespective of their linguistic and national affiliations, regarded themselves as Hungarians, i.e., persons belonging to the country. This phenomenon, which had for centuries been conspicuous, disappeared during the period studied by Sziklay, a period when modern national consciousness rendered such double commitments impossible.

The other feature in question, as indicated in the title of the volume, is multilingualism, i.e. the fact that in this aire culturelle it was quite natural for people to speak several languages, since they were compelled to do so by their everyday affairs. This feature was most prominent in cities, and among the upper classes and the intelligentsia. László Sziklay, who greatly contributed to the exploration of this phenomenon, was entirely justified when he evaluated it as a positive one and, therefore, presented it for his own contemporaries and disciples as an ideal to be followed.

The essays collected in this volume focus on these problems. The author grouped the writings into two parts, the first of them bearing the title "Coexistence". This contains the essays which can be classified into the sphere of typological comparation and which show what role was played by literature in the development of modern nations. (This is in fact the title of one of the essays.) As do several other papers along with the entire problematique outlined above, these essays range beyond the field of literary history, into more fundamental questions of historical development. The author's article on multilingual early-19th century Pest-Buda is also included in this part of the volume. During the last years of his life, Sziklay was working on a huge monograph, which would have shown the intellectual ferment that radiated from these two cities, whose population was in that period mainly German, but which were also the centres of

Hungarian as well as Serbian cultural and literary development. It was here that the Matica srpska (Serbian mother), the first Serbian cultural society, was founded. The Matica, which still survives today, has been the model of several subsequently established Slav literary societies. Numerous important figures of Rumanian and Slovak intellectual life were also working in these twin cities for a certain period of time, suffice it to refer here to Ján Kollár, the minister of the Slovak Lutheran church in Pest for three decades.

Essays which testify to the broadening of László Sziklay's academic interests are also to be found in the first part. These include, for instance, an article on the reception of Endre Ady's poetry among the neighbouring nations, and another one on the concern, apparent in all East-Central European countries in the interwar period, with the problems of the peasantry and the villages, a concern which gave rise, besides political movements and schools of sociology, to important tendencies in literature, too.

In the second part, entitled "Multilingualism", there is an illuminating essay on the memoirs of Count Imre Pongrácz, a member of an aristocratic family in early-19th century Upper Hungary, i.e. present-day Slovakia. Multilingualism is the most striking feature of the data about the family's history: the Hungarian notes of an 18th century ancestor are followed by lines written by his wife in Slovak and, as a matter of fact, entries in Latin and German are also abundant. Languages lived in a peaceful coexistence not only in the pages of the memoirs but in reality as well - this is the phenomenon that László Sziklay was so deeply concerned with.

The most interesting case is certainly that of Mihály Vitkovics, or Mihailo Vitković, the bilingual poet. The well-to-do Serbian lawyer was an active participant in the organization and the efflorescence of Hungarian literature in the first decades of the 19th century, an author of several Hungarian poems and, at the same time, an important figure in Serbian literature by virtue of his works in verse and prose written in Serbian. Histories of both languages' literatures acknowledge his role in their development, and there is no debate as to which of these literatures "owns" him - it is so self-evident that he belonged to both.

Naturally enough, only some of the essays contained in this volume have been referred to in this review. In the postscript, István Fried also emphasizes the peculiarities and the typological affinities in the development of East-Central European literatures. Fried does not discuss the merits of László Sziklay, who was still living at the time the postscript was written - nobody could have expected his lamentably early death. It is worth adding here a remark on the

series of Gondolat Kiadó, within which this volume was published. Quoting the title of a poem by Attila József, "Közös dolgaink" (Our common affairs), the series' intent is to familiarize its readers with the common past of the peoples of Eastern Europe.

László Sziklay was one of the most outstanding students of this common past, the fundamental issues of which are the subjects of this book. One essay in particular in this volume also shows him to be a genuine literary historian who, by carefully analyzing the prologue in a Hungarian, a Slovak and a Czech epic, written by a Hungarian author (Mihály Vörösmarty) and two Slovaks (Ján Holly and Ján Kollár), respectively, draws conclusions as to the poets' personalities, their places in the history of literature, and the determining role played by the Hungarian aire culturelle in their upbringing. This essay, like the entire volume, is a worthy summary of a remarkable scholarly career.

E m i l N i e d e r h a u s e r

Institute of Historical Sciences

ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURY HUNGARY (1526-1650)

By Vera Zimányi

Studia Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae. Budapest, 1987.

Vera Zimányi is an expert on agrarian history well known throughout Europe. Her book entitled Economy and Society in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Hungary (1526-1650) is a summary of her exploratory and analytical research over the past decades. The author originally wrote the chapters of this volume for the third volume of a ten-volumed synthesis entitled The History of Hungary 1526-1686, which will be published, happily, as a separate volume in English as well.

During the rule of Matthias Corvinus (1458-1490), Hungary was a leading state of the East-Central European region, an important force in international politics. After the disastrous defeat at the hands of the Turks at Mohács in 1526, this powerful medieval state fell apart: the western and northern regions acquiesced in Habsburg rule, while the native Hungarian king János Zápolya reigned in the other half of the country until his death. In 1541 the Turkish sultan occupied the central part of the country, so the process of tripartition was complete. Hungary's three parts - royal (i.e. Habsburg) Hungary, the territory under Turkish rule, and the Principality of Transylvania - developed along differing social and economic lines owing both to the political division and the differences in their geographical bases. Royal Hungary included the most fertile areas and the mining district in the North, while the territory under Turkish rule with the great Hungarian Plain and the mountainous, mineral-rich Principality of Transylvania had had different features for centuries.

The tripartition of Hungary and the insecurity of life resulting from permanent warfare made a grave impact on the size of the population. The contemporary local sources are much too incomplete to give a precise demographical cross-section of this era. The author relies on the scanty data available to reconstruct and evaluate the changes.

The Great Hungarian Plain started becoming water-logged and desolate as early as the 15th century. This process reached its apogee at the end of the 16th

century as a result of the colder and wetter climatic conditions of the "Little Ice Age". Therefore, the deterioration cannot be entirely blamed on the Turks. While there was a decrease in the number of peasant households, apparent from tax assessments, urbarial data testify to the overall growth of the population. Even in the less sheltered parts of the country we find a strong regenerative capacity. Until the Fifteen Years' War (1593-1606) the inhabitants, although fleeing their villages in times of war, either returned or resettled in better defended places once the danger was over. Analysing a great amount of local data the author presumes a small, 12% increase of Hungary's population during the period 1526-93. That means that the tendency towards demographic increase, which appeared all over Europe, was present in Hungary as well,although it was strongly restrained by the military and political conditions. However the "long war" had "such serious consequences that the population could not recover, indeed they affected 17th century development as well". It should be added that the devastations of the Turkish rule helped suppress population growth into the 18th century. If we look at the overall 16th century European data, the picture becomes clear: while in the developed countries of Europe in one century the population doubled, and in less developed regions also increased markedly, in Hungary it took 300 years to double the population, and this was only achieved because of a large continuing immigration of non-Hungarian nationalities. This great demographic influx resulted in Hungary's becoming a multi-national country.

Hungary played an important role in European economic life: the record shows that until the mid-16th century it was Europe's second largest producer of silver and an important exporter of gold and copper. This status was changed by the emergence of the world economy: the mining of precious and non-ferrous metals shrank to the level of local industries, while the agrarian boom and the price revolution favoured exporters of agricultural products in East-Central Europe like Hungary. The emerging economic division of labour - food produced in East-Central Europe and exported West, while Western Europe, struggling with its population explosion gobbled up the agricultural products coming from the East, paying for them with industrial exports produced by cheap labour - determined the economic development of the region, having an influence up to the present day.

Drawing upon her decades of research, the author has shown that prices in Hungary reflected Europe-wide fluctuations: the prices of cows and wine rose in multiples till the end of the 16th century. Although the country's grain exports were negligible, as a consequence of the great animal and wine export the price of grain also rose. That caused a basic change in the economy; while in the 15th century the agricultural structure was characterized by a clear dominance

by peasant farms, in the 16th century the seignioral manor run by a large landowner prospered. This change had a profound impact on social development as well. It is obvious that the manor, whose principal product was grain, could supply food for the family of the landowner, his dependents and soldiers (always numerous due to incessant warfare), but it is also evident that the formation of such monocultures widened the domestic market. Since the grain-producing manors continued to exist during the slump of the next century, they were probably supported by the home market. The Hungarian literature of recent decades has payed very little attention to this question, and this can be felt even in Zimányi's volume. Basic research is inhibited by the lack of adequate sources. There is a need for further research on the question of why the landowners, who were in a position to understand contemporary trade relations, preferred grain producing manors to all other products. They were not as involved in wine production and cow breeding as they were in the production of grain. Naturally enough, the geographical bases and the methods of production precluded the breaking of certain structures. We find considerable reference to landowners doing a large trade in cows and wine; these constituted the bulk of Hungarian agricultural exports. Later on, in the 17th century, they developed a near-monopoly over cow exports.

In Transylvania, the manorial development took place at a slower rate and remained less important than it was in Hungary. From this we may assume that this remote hilly region, less suitable for intensive agricultural production, was scarcely touched by the agricultural upswing.

The big agricultural boom had a retarding influence on the industrialization of the Hungarian towns. It strengthened and made irreversible the trade pattern which had exported agricultural and mining products and imported industrial products since the Middle Ages. The towns were mainly trading centres and their citizens were traders, not industrialists. They made good profit by maintaining an active balance of trade; if they had started competing with the inexpensive, mass-produced western industrial products, they would have fared poorly.

As more and more free cities came under Turkish rule, their roles were partly taken over by the oppida which were then forming. In these secondary towns we find a great concentration of population and wealth. Their citizens enjoyed incomparably more freedom than their compatriots who remained in the countryside, but their standard of living did not reach that of the inhabitants of the free cities. Although in some oppida there were more craftsmen than in the free cities, the character of these towns remained fundamentally agricultural. Often these craftsmen practised their crafts on a part-time basis and as a supplement to their primary work, which was agricultural production.

Both quantitatively and qualitatively, the 17th century depression made a grave impact on Hungarian foreign trade, which resulted in the decline of the domestic market and the stiffening of social hierarchy. In the struggle for markets the nobility, having great power and controlling the law, could make favourable trade arrangements for itself at the expense of the serfs. At the beginning of the slump the nobility mercilessly pushed its peasant competitors into the background, sometimes using non-economic pressure. The depression of the 17th century had an equally negative influence on the various spheres of the economy, the only exception being perhaps viticulture and wine-trade. The politically strong nobility tried to make the serfs absorb most of the losses caused by the downfall of the economy, thus strengthening the system of second serfdom.
serfdom.

In her carefully constructed and up-to-date work Vera Zimányi has described the economic and social relations of tripartite Hungary, which waged a life-and-death struggle against the Turks, from the beginning of the 16th century to the middle of the 17th century. The background of the picture is constituted by two important European economic changes, i.e. the continental division of labour caused by the agrarian and the price revolution and the subsequent regression. The author has shown through the analysis of a great number of data, although acknowledging that many gaps still need filling in, that Hungary robustly rose to Western Europe's great challenge, acting as an organic part of the European continent's economy.

Zsuzsanna J. Újváry

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HUNGARY IN THE REFORM ERA AS VIEWED BY THE WEST: TWO TRAVEL BOOKS

Jan Ackersdijck magyarországi utinaplója (A travel diary of Hungary by Jan Ackersdijck), introduction and notes by László Makkai, Budapest: Helikon, 1987, 85 pp.

John Paget, Magyarország és Erdély (Hungary and Transylvania), selected and edited by Sándor Maller, Budapest: Helikon, 1987, 348 pp.

The period known as the Reform Era - comprising the first twenty-five years of the formation of modern Hungary, i.e. the years prior to the Revolution of 1848 - has been traditionally popular with Hungarian historians as well as the reading public. This is the time when Hungary became part of the European mainstream, a process culminating in 1848-49, when the War of Independence aroused great sympathy all over Europe. More and more travellers visited the country. The number of travel books known at present from that period amounts to about 130. Informative, well-written examples of these are of interest not only to the general reader, but to the historian as well. Foreigners, especially those from the more developed countries, found a lot of things exotic which the natives took for granted, and are therefore unmentioned in contemporary Hungarian sources. Thus, the images of a country given by visitors are often more vivid and descriptive than those of the inhabitants. The travel books under review show Hungary at two times separated by a difference of twelve years, and by comparing the two accounts we can assess the progress of Hungary from the beginning of the Reform Era to its halfway point.

The manuscript of Jan Ackersdijck's travel diary, describing his more than two-week stay in Hungary in November 1823, was recently discovered by Professor László Makkai in the archive of Utrecht University. The travel diary is the only known travel book about Hungary from the first half of the 19th century written by a Dutch author. Ackersdijck was 33 years old at the time, a jurist, economist and statistician. Later he became a professor at the University of Liège and then at the University of Utrecht. He travelled a lot. The theme of his inaugural lecture at the university was how travels abroad helped historical and political studies. He set off to Hungary from Vienna. His main aim seems to have been to visit the quarterly fair in Pest. He probably consulted the best

available travel books in the Monarchy when making his itinerary, and he stuck to it. On his way he saw everything he could. He travelled exclusively by coach. From Pozsony (Pressburg, Bratislava) he made his way to the mining towns of Schemnitz and Kremnitz (Banska Štiavnica and Kremnica, today both belong to Czechoslovakia) where he visited precious metal mines, metal works and the Mining College; from there he went on to Pest and Buda, where he stayed for five days to see the places of interest of the two towns, among them the University and the National Museum; he also took a trip to Gödöllő to see the famous model farm on the Grassalkovich estate. Finally, he returned to Austria along the Danube, via Győr. Ackersdijck probably moulded the text of the diary in its presently published form later on, in Holland, after making use of the geographical and statistical materials he had obtained in Hungary. We do not know whether he intended to publish his brief, 55-page diary. He gave a lecture based on it in Utrecht, the text of which he published in 1849, influenced by the Hungarian War of Independence. The diary supplies a scrupuluos, day-by-day account of the author's experiences. Ackersdijck did not know any Hungarian, nor did he become acquainted with anybody except a university professor with whom he had a single conversation. He based his impressions exclusively on what he read and saw. This is how the son of the civilized Netherlands summarized his experiences: high culture and refined taste have not reached Hungary yet. Roads are unfit for traffic, even near the capital, the industry is rudimentary, Pest is the only city worthy of praise, the people are rude and uneducated. But of course most of the travellers of the time agree with these opinions. Where Ackersdijck differs from the others is in his tone, which is never scornful nor contemptuous. Ackersdijck is rather impersonal and dry, he makes only a few personal comments, and a lack of philosophizing characterizes the book. He becomes indignant at the nobility's unjust privileges. We cannot know how well he understood the causes of backwardness and how he thought things should be changed. The sober and thorough scientist in him was probably aware of the fact that his time in Hungary was too short and that he knew little about the country. The only person he spoke with strengthened his view that the educational system was backward and that Vienna had limited its intellectual contact with other countries. But at the time of his visit to Hungary even the greatest minds of the country had yet fully to recognize backwardness and to take steps towards modernizing the country.

Paget arrived in the country 12 years after Ackersdijck to find a quite different Hungary. His travel book, a great success in his time, has always been well known by historians. More than 1,000 pages long, the work was first publish-

ed in London in 1839 in two volumes. It was published in London again in 1850 and 1855, and in the USA in 1850 (and 1971). In the 1840s, there were two German editions, and it was primarily the German version that was read and appreciated in 19th century Hungary. Due to censorship, however, a Hungarian edition was absolutely impossible. Although incomplete, the present edition is the first in Hungarian. Besides describing Hungary and Transylvania (administered as an independent principality before 1848), Paget also dedicated extra chapters to the other nationalities of the multinational country, such as the Slovaks, Rumanians, Saxons and Germans, and to the regions where they lived. Sándor Maller selected one third of the book for publication, namely the chapters on the Magyars living in the territory of present-day Hungary and in the North and East of Transylvania.

Unlike Ackersdijck, Paget was not a pioneer: in London alone, eight travel books about Hungary were published in the second half of the 1830s. The country, which formerly had been thought of as an obscure province of the Habsburg Monarchy, was now discovered. The construction of railway lines, the development of steam-navigation and the regulation of the Danube in Austria and at the Iron Gate brought the formerly far-away country within easy reach. True, Hungary continued to be a rather exotic country in the eyes of the West, but it was no longer pointless to consider establishing commercial relations. There was another reason for the awakening interest in Hungary. The Habsburg Monarchy had increased in importance in terms of power relations. After Russia annexed the kingdom of Poland, autonomous before 1830, and for some years occupied the Rumanian principalities, which included the strategically important Danube Delta, Hungary acquired a special significance as the frontline territory of an empire providing a counterbalance to the Tsarist Empire.

In an age when modern tourism was beginning, more and more travel guides, similar to modern ones, were being published in England and the western part of the Continent. However, the suddenly increased demand for travel books about Hungary was mainly due to the above-mentioned reasons. Why, one is compelled to ask, has Paget's book been by far the most popular?

Most of the travellers spent very little time in Hungary and obtained very limited information. They were content with emphasizing the exotic features, repeating the stereotypy of a country rich in resources but backward. Many writers, even the more thorough ones, agreed with the viewpoint of Vienna, namely that Hungary was to be blamed for its own backwardness, and that Austrian government reforms would always fail because of hampering by an old-fashioned legislature and a narrow-minded nobility. During the period of en-

lightened despotism this reasoning was more or less justified. Like Julia Pardoe, the successful author of The City of the Magyars, another interesting work although not of comparable quality, Paget spent several months in Hungary. Most of the people they met were liberal minded and so they got to know the country from that perspective. They noticed what most travellers did not, i.e. that Vienna's reasoning was false, and that although the country was still backward, it was not the same one Ackersdijck had seen. After 1830 Hungarian liberals, playing an increasingly important part in public life, were the ones urging reforms, and it was Vienna that opposed them supported by the conservative aristocracy and the clergy. Influenced by their new friends, Paget and Julia Pardoe came to understand that the Hungarian liberals were the ones fighting for a constitutional system modeled on British lines, while Vienna, which had just filed illegal suits against a number of liberals, clung to autocracy and despotism. Thus, shortly after the birth of Hungarian liberalism, Paget and Pardoe arrived on the scene to write their sympathetic and authentic accounts. Paget's book was unmatched in detail and thoroughness. The best of all the travel books written during the Reform Era, in 1849 there was no book which could have better satisfied the curiosity of those readers who knew little about the country but sympathized with it.

An accidental encounter inspired Paget to take a trip to Hungary. He had a medical degree, but he lived off the fortune he had inherited, studying and travelling across Western Europe. In 1835, at the age of 27, he met in Rome the baroness Polyxéna Wesselényi, who was just divorcing her husband. They married two years later. That is how he got to Hungary, where he died in 1892. He went to Hungary at the request of the baroness, but the short trip he intended became a year and a half's stay, divided into two parts between 1835 and 1837. He was the first Englishman to travel all over the country, visiting certain places several times and meeting many people. From Vienna he first went to Pozsony where the Diet was in session. From there he took a steamboat to Pest (Ackersdijck still had to travel by coach), then he went down the Danube, as far as the Iron Gate, the Turkish border. He made a complete tour of Transylvania, went to the Banat and, along the River Vág, to the High Tatra, and he saw the Hungarian Plain, the Puszta and Lake Balaton. Paget has an excellent style, it is a literary pleasure to read his book. He was an intelligent and learned man and a keen observer who read extensively about Hungary. His descriptions of the way of life and everyday conversation provide important information both for the historian and the ethnographer. Being an English gentleman, he felt uncomfortable with the curiosity and insistent hospitality of good-willed but indiscreet strangers. He con-

sidered social manners unpolished, in particular the excessive pipe smoking. Coming from the most developed country of the contemporary world, his scale of values was much closer to ours than to that of those whom he met: quite understandably, he noted how different a notion people had of time in the underdeveloped country, their inability to make economic calculations and that they considered accumulating as the only way to preserve the value of property. However good an observer he was, he could not have drawn the conclusions which are the greatest value of his book, had he not got acquainted with the most outstanding personalities of contemporary Hungary like István Széchenyi (to whom he dedicates a whole chapter), Miklós Wesselényi, and others. He formulated his "remarks on their [i.e. the Hungarians'] social, political and economical conditions" (this is the subtitle of the book) by comparing his own observations with what he had heard from them. His diagnosis of the backwardness of Hungary is on the whole acceptable even today, as is his definition of the causes: bad laws and outdated privileges. He gave an excellent and accurate description of the situation of the peasantry, and he was right when he called the lot of the Transylvanian peasantry a "crying evil". But he also exaggerates. To counter the superficial statements of his compatriots, he tried to prove that the peasants were neither vassals nor serfs. He was carried away by the sincere though self-deceiving enthusiasm of his liberal informers. While in Transylvania he saw quite clearly how much the nobles feared a peasant uprising, which was their real motive for urging the emancipation of the peasantry. In spite of this he says it was the "spirit of self-sacrifice" that caused the nobility to seek the reforms. But in most cases his sympathy does not suppress his critical sense. However well he may have understood that Hungarians wanted to reinstate the Hungarian language and Hungarian culture into their rights, when writing about the Hungarian Academy he warned against getting isolated from the rest of Europe. He did not have a high opinion of the nostalgia with which former glory and national independence were spoken of and he considered the endeavour to secede from the Habsburg Monarchy to be unrealistic. It was clear for him that only "a very firm and consolidated centre" would be able to keep the multinational empire together, but the policy of Vienna, which some considered "a masterpiece of policy", only "increased the national hatreds and differences", and made the nationalities conscious of the injuries, rather than the benefits, that they derived from their "union".

Whereas Ackersdijck saw a motionless country, Paget found a Hungary which was already on its way to reforms; he witnessed, if only for a brief period, the birth of a modern nation, and fascinated by its zest, prophesied a glorious future

for Hungary. In view of the prospects for international free trade and technical development, he optimistically predicted strong future ties between Hungary and Britain. As outlined in the final part of the book, these were to involve more than trade relations: Hungary would become "a true and faithful ally" of Britain. Paget often met with sympathy for the British form of government. His acquaintances considered Britain a model to emulate, and this exerted a decisive influence on him. He came to the country to please Polyxéna Wesselényi and along the way began to write down his impressions, but his book came to surpass the limits of a traditional travel guide, almost to the extent of becoming a political treatise. He made efforts to forge links between his former and future homelands and tried to shape British public opinion favourably. Paget's book helped develop Englishmen's highly favourable opinion of the Hungarian cause in 1848-49. He achieved everything by his travel book that was possible. Unfortunately, he could do no more.

G á b o r P a j k o s s y

Institute of Historical Sciences

ISTVÁN TISZA. THE LIBERAL VISION AND CONSERVATIVE STATECRAFT OF A MAGYAR NATIONALIST

By Gabor Vermes. New York, 1985, East European Monographs. Distributed by Columbia University Press, IX, 627 pp.

István Tisza, who was twice Prime Minister of Hungary and was undoubtedly the most influential statesman of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy between 1913 and 1917, clearly deserved a reliable biography. Yet with the exception of some not too scholarly attempts in the inter-war period no such work existed even in Hungarian until quite recently. At last in 1985 Professor Ferenc Pölöskei of Eötvös University, Budapest, published a successful and well-received version,[1] but it is only a short piece written for a popular, illustrated paperback series (Magyar História), and could not provide an answer to all the issues concerning the complex personality of Tisza. So it was by no means superfluous that a few weeks after the appearance of the first biography of Tisza in Hungarian a massive volume appeared in English written by a Hungarian-born American professor of history from Rutgers University, Gabor Vermes.

No one would deny that Tisza was not only an important statesman but also a very controversial one. He had numerous devoted followers and admirers in Hungary and a few abroad, including two Emperors, Francis Joseph of Austria and William of Germany, but the majority of his contemporaries intensely disliked, even hated this symbol of the existing order, and the great contemporary poet Ady's epithets 'firebrand', 'the wild crazy man from Geszt' became firmly imprinted in the minds of generations of Hungarians. Was Tisza really an arch-conservative, a callous defender of an unjust system, a servant of Habsburg and Austrian interests, a warmonger personally responsible for the outbreak of the First World War and for the Hungarian participation in it, or was he rather a late representative of the liberal and patriotic Hungarian nobility, who made genuine efforts to come to terms with the non-Hungarian national minorities, who tried to save world peace in 1914, successfully maintained the rule of the civil authorities during the war, and opposed all annexationist plans? Finding an

answer to these and many other questions is especially important since the historical reputation of Tisza has been almost completely besmirched in the countries which fought against the Central Powers in the First World War.

The present biography is the result of many years of meticulous research and thinking, and is based on all available evidence provided by Hungarian and foreign archives (from the letters deposited with the Hungarian Calvinist Church to the foreign ministry documents in Vienna, Berlin, London and Washington, and to the Hoover Institute at Stanford) as well as on hundreds of published works and articles written over eighty years. Vermes has produced not only a very authoritative account of Tisza's life, but also a major revision of his portrait. The author proves beyond doubt that Tisza was no dictator, sincerely believed in the rule of the law and in the sovereignty of the elected Parliament, and was a liberal in most of his theoretical doctrines (e.g. the role to be played by churches, the observation of political, religious and cultural rights, and the strict observance of laissez faire). The book also makes it clear that many actions for which Tisza was directly or indirectly responsible were meant to maintain the political and social status quo, and were conservative in nature. Most of these conservative policies were the results of what the author calls the basic Hungarian dilemma: the nation, which had no linguistic relatives of any standing and only a few sympathizers in Europe, rightly perceived that its position was extremely precarious. Hungary had only a relative (about fifty per cent) majority over the Croats, Rumanians, Germans, Slovaks, Serbs and Ruthenes living within its political borders, and neighbouring it were a Slav great power, two German-speaking ones, and small nations like Serbia and Rumania, which were eager to increase their territory by acquiring parts of Hungary. The awareness of these threats might have made the creation of a centralized, even dictatorial state an almost logical answer, but the genuinely liberal traditions of Hungary (dating back to the Reform Era and the Laws of 1848) prohibited such a course. Yet completely liberal policies (inevitably leading towards full democracy) involved the danger of accepting the partition of Hungary's historic territory along ethnic lines. The solution was a unique 'liberal nationalism' or 'national liberalism', a determination to maintain the supremacy of the Magyar element without applying real repression, and this was best represented by father and son, Kálmán and István Tisza. Proving the liberal elements of the latter's policies as well as showing the shortcomings of this kind of liberalism is the major achievement of Vermes.

The most novel, and probably the most controversial chapter of the biography, 'The Clash of Ideas', shows how traditional liberalism (often called Old Liberalism, or conservative liberalism) represented mainly by the pro-Compromise ('67-er')

government party came into a collision course with the young, radical progressives of the journal Huszadik Század (Twentieth Century) and of the Society for the Social Sciences. This reviewer accepts Vermes' thesis that the two groups had far more in common than they - and posterity - realized: philosophically they had the same roots in enlightened rationalism, and they were equally in favour of capitalist progress, industrialization and urbanization. They differed about the pace and depth of social and political change, and the momentum and rhetoric of their conflict, augmented by a generation gap, led to an apparently irreparable and lifelong conflict between those who had a common interest in preserving freedom against irrational extremists both of the Right and the Left.

The other central theme of the book is Tisza's nationalism. Vermes is very convincing that István Tisza saw the internal and external dangers facing the Hungarians far more clearly than most of his contemporaries, but he thought that they could be successfully countered by maintaining the Austrian connection ('dualism') and showing national unity. When both were threatened by the Party of Independence, Tisza referred to Kossuth's arguments for a confederation of the Danubian nations as a proof that the Hungarians were too weak to preserve real independence if they stood completely alone. For the same reason, to prevent a German-Russian collusion, Tisza was a firm supporter of the Dual Alliance with Germany, although his political and cultural sympathies lay with the English. Tisza felt it was his mission to preserve the unity of the nation against factions which undermined it: narrow-minded chauvinists, radicals, socialists and the separatists among the Rumanians and the Serbs - but only by legal means, mainly in Parliament and in public debate. He was also ready to fight for the rights of the Hungarians promised by law, especially by the letter and the spirit of the Compromise of 1867, and worked for the expansion of these rights, so that Hungary could achieve real 'parity' with the Austrian half of the Monarchy. While he was always mindful of the prerogatives and the feelings of Emperor Francis Joseph, he was determined to oppose the absolutist ambitions of the military and of the Heir Apparent, Francis Ferdinand, who, in turn, considered him the most dangerous of all Hungarians.

Vermes pays due attention to what is little known, that Tisza was perhaps the most tolerant member of the Hungarian political establishment on the issue of national minorities. Not that he was ready to go as far as Mocsáry or Jászi in meeting the political demands of the non-Hungarian leaders, but he offered them substantial cultural and educational concessions. The most recent Hungarian collection of documents shows that these were quite far-reaching by contemporary standards, and the promises were matched by deeds like the introduction of mi-

nority languages into the state schools, and by admitting the principle that the minorities were entitled not only to equal rights but to some extra rights.[2] In 1913 and 1914 Tisza made repeated efforts to come to an understanding with the Rumanian National Party. Vermes suggests that the failure might have been due to the advice of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Recent research by Zoltán Szász has proved this beyond doubt.[3]

Well over half of Vermes' book deals with the last six years of Tisza's life. Some may find this proportion unwarranted, but if one considers the importance of the role the Hungarian Prime Minister played during this period both in Hungary and in Europe, or the amount of published and unpublished but relatively little used sources available, one is inclined to approve of such an extensive coverage. Vermes shows that Tisza used his constitutional right to influence foreign policy rather effectively. This role became crucial in the July 1914 crisis. Current-day Hungarian historians, notably professors Galántai, Diószegi and Pölöskei, have offered some interesting new answers to the old question: why did Tisza abandon his original opposition to the war?[4] Galántai lays the greatest stress on Tisza's concern for Transylvania, to the guarantees supplied by Germany that in the event of a broader conflict Rumania would stay neutral, and that Germany was ready to adopt Tisza's proposal about bringing Bulgaria into the Triple Alliance. Vermes, on the other hand, is more inclined to accept the conventional view, notably that although Tisza's volte face was not caused by direct German pressure, he realized that lack of action might endanger future German support in the Balkans (or even the alliance itself), and also his own reputation as the man on whom one could build a consistent policy. So he accepted the possibility of war, with a heavy heart, and not unaware of the high risks involved (pp. 217-235). (Diószegi's most recent explanation adds a more unorthodox and not unconvincing element. It was neither German pressure nor assurance that prevailed over Tisza's reluctance. The Hungarian Prime Minister had two internal factors to consider: the attitude of the Hungarian Parliament and that of the Monarch. Hungarian public opinion - as in other countries - was in favour of war in 1914. When Tisza, after repeated attempts, failed to alter Francis Joseph's conclusion that the only solution to the South Slav menace was war, Tisza had no choice but to resign or to place all his strength in the service of the war.)

The story of Tisza's contribution to the war effort, as told by Vermes, is an impressive one. His sense of mission was stronger than ever. Tisza felt he had to deal with all major and minor issues himself, whether they concerned the alliance with Germany, negotiating with Italy and Rumania, wrangling with Austria over constitutional questions and the food supply, or looking after the

families of the soldiers on the front. Special Hungarian interests appeared to weigh on him more heavily than ever, but he continued to believe that their safeguarding also served the best interests of the Monarchy as a whole. That is why he was so rigidly against any constitutional changes that threatened the dualist structure, whether uniting the Poles under the Habsburgs, adopting the program of a Greater Croatia, or granting national autonomies. His major concern was to maintain internal stability and cohesion, and when that became increasingly difficult he could think of no other course than resistance to popular pressure. When at the end of the war the young Emperor-King Charles tried to save his throne by federalizing Austria, Tisza finally endorsed the platform of his parliamentary opponents, i.e. only a personal union with Austria, since he was unable to think in terms of more novel federal solutions, more in line with the new realities. Tisza's war-time foreign policy has been very little studied, and his sincere and serious efforts to restore peace must come as a surprise for most readers. In war aims he was the most moderate of all the leading politicians of the Central Powers - his critics would say he behaved moderately only to save historic Hungary. It was not only Tisza's personal tragedy that when the Allies were really ready to negotiate with Austria-Hungary, at the beginning of 1918, he was already out of office and could not realize this opportunity. On the other hand, he - unlike Károlyi, a man of faith and illusion[5] - was aware of the plans to carve up Hungary, and since he could not accept peace under such conditions he saw no alternative but to rest all his hope on the strength of the German army. Tisza was never good at accepting unpalatable facts. When he admitted that the war was lost, his whole utopian vision of a strong, stable and traditional Hungary collapsed, and the bullet of the unknown assassin killed a man who was already paralysed in spirit.

It is not surprising that in a work of long gestation, like the present one, one finds it hard to come by any factual mistakes. Naturally many questions can be raised about the proportions, some of the interpretations or epithets, the inclusion or omission of some details. A few examples: Vermes did not mention that the 1905 elections were exceptionally fair (which must have contributed to the defeat of the government), and that for Tisza it was a personal victory: he defeated his great rival, the younger Andrássy, in Deák's one-time Pest seat. It is unlikely that Jászi would have agreed to being called 'the Jewish sociologist' (p. 154), and Mihály Réz, highly respected by social scientists like Bódog Somló, was perhaps not a representative of 'the secular extreme Right' (p. 169). Vermes found (or ventured to say) very little about the human side of Tisza. This was perhaps unavoidable, given the reserved, almost shy nature of the man whose

private life has remained a secret. (But rumours about his visits to brothels are surely without foundation.) On the other hand, there is some evidence which runs counter to the widespread view about the supposed coldness and lack of human feelings of this Puritan: in close family and friendly circles his inner warmness penetrated his public shield.

Tisza was in many ways a tragic personality, mainly because he pursued unattainable and irreconcilable aims: he drew upon himself the wrath not only of the Heir Apparent, the Austro-German nationalists, the Socialists and most of the 'nationalities', but also that of many super-nationalist fellow countrymen. He wanted to see an industrialized, technologically advanced and prosperous Hungary, where social peace prevailed, where the rapidly growing working class, the agrarian masses, the nouveau riches and the non-Hungarian national minorities accepted their given position and limited perspectives. He was sincerely determined to uphold the liberal traditions of Hungary: political freedom and a constitutional, parliamentary government, while maintaining the political and economic hegemony of the traditional leading elements. For such aims it was essential to conserve the narrow franchise, the highly uneven distribution of land and wealth, and a system of government where the vast majority of citizens had little say in the decisions affecting them. But all that was not based on a conservative political philosophy, only on the realization of the probable consequences of political democratization. The subtitle of Vermes's work is thus a direct hit. In addition to the circumstances of Tisza's death, when the collapse of his world crushed him, his final tragedy was that despite his conviction that history would justify his policies, posterity has been very harsh to him. Gabor Vermes in this massive and convincing work did not acquit Tisza, but gave him justice.

NOTES

1. Ferenc Pölöskei, Tisza István, Budapest: Gondolat, 1985, 281 pp.
2. Gábor Kemény G. (coll. and ed.), Iratok a nemzetiségi kérdés történetéhez Magyarországon a dualizmus korában (Documents on the history of the nationality question in Hungary in the age of dualism) Vol. VI. 1913-1914, Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó, 1985, esp. documents 1 and 26.
3. Zoltán Szász (ed.), Erdély története. Harmadik kötet, 1830-tól napjainkig (History of Transylvania. Vol.3. From 1830 to our days), Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1986, pp. 1681-1687. Keith Hitchins did not draw this conclusion yet: "The nationality problem in Hungary: István Tisza and the Rumanian National Party", The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 53. (1981) No. 4, pp. 619-651.

4. István Diószegi, "Tisza István és a világháboru" (István Tisza and the First World War) in: A magyar külpolitika utjai (The road of Hungarian foreign policy), Budapest: Gondolat, 1984, pp. 284-287; József Galántai, A Habsburg monarchia alkonya. Osztrák-magyar dualizmus, 1867-1918 (The twilight of the Habsburg Monarchy. Austro-Hungarian dualism, 1867-1918), Budapest: Kossuth, 1985, pp. 289-294.
5. Károlyi's autobiography is entitled Hit, illúziók nélkül (Faith without illusions).

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UNITY AND VARIETY IN EASTERN EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT

"Reason! Thou shalt not grasp Russia,
Metres and ells won't measure her land:
There life takes a different course -
In Russia one needs to have faith!"

With these words Feodor Tutchev, the great Russian poet close to the Slavophils, expressed one of the great spiritual experiences of Russia in the last century, her digression from Europe and the setting frame of her peculiar historical fate. He was proud of it while other contemporaries tended to lament it, and soon Danhilevski would turn against Europe with an age-old Orthodox consciousness. On the other hand, the thinkers of the small Eastern European nations to the west of Russia have always emphasized their belonging to Europe, even if they were often angry with the old continent. At the same time, Europe looked upon the East with a unique mixture of aversion, contempt and fear. Eastern Europe - the concept itself is not yet two hundred years old, in the historical sense of course. There is a total lack of consensus as to its meaning, and the debates do not cause repercussions of excessive impact. In the second half of our century the term has acquired an increasingly political meaning, and fear seems to have become dominant in the abovementioned mixture of attitudes.

The number of interpretations of the term "Eastern Europe" is almost infinite; the history of the concept would require a wnole book. If one just looks through Hungarian historiography, one finds almost as many views as the number of scholars dealing with the problem, not to mention the other varieties originating here or arriving from elsewhere. To put it sarcastically, we could say that the neighbour to the east or south of "us" of course belongs there, in Eastern Europe until we get so far east, that Eastern Europe is no more mentioned.

Whether the interpretations set out from a global point of view or try only

to find the place of a single country, they end up arriving at a whole host of utterly different conclusions. Starting out from a single country is, of course, rather useful from the domestic point of view and even seems inevitable at times, but in my opinion it is bound to contain certain subjective elements as well, due to its starting-point. We may perhaps achieve better results if we try to conduct our inquiry detached from this or that individual country. Numerous subjective elements will, however, occur within any sort of investigation; they are almost impossible to do away with. In the time at my disposal therefore, I wish to approach the set of problems from two angles. The first is a consideration of the elements concealed within objective historical development, or, if this is too tall an order, those that can be unravelled from it, while the second is a subjective reflection of this probably objectively existent reality.

I.

With respect to the first approach it has first of all to be said that, from my point of view, Eastern Europe is a historical concept and, accordingly, its boundaries are changeable even if one takes the geographical determinants into consideration. This historical Eastern Europe is situated in the east of Europe and this in itself grants it a certain unity. For history does not only proceed in time, a fact historians have emphasized ever since the writing of history was born in the service of power, but in space too, something that Marxist historiography preferred to forget for some time lest it fall into the heresy of geographical determinism.

However, it is also beyond doubt that in our profession the time factor is the more relevant and, if we take a look at this, it will become quite apparent that Eastern Europe as a historical concept is actually not a very ancient phenomenon, compared to the totality of the development of the human race, for we cannot speak of it before the spectacular fall of ancient civilization. It therefore begins to emerge in the dark ages of European development.

This immediately yields the conclusion that the development of Eastern Europe contains a duality from the outset i.e. that in the one - smaller - part of its territory some form of Roman heritage has to be reckoned with, whilst this is lacking in the other - greater - part. Moreover, the limes of the Danube, which had divided the ancient duality of South and North in this area, cuts across the region in a manner different from the later units of development. Obviously, there is no need to emphasize the European significance of the Roman heritage.

We perceive the next factor of unity in the primary role played by the Slavs. The Slavic exodus from their original homeland, only tentatively localized even today, began in the early Middle Ages, reached, and what is more, transgressed the geographical boundaries of Eastern Europe, since when the majority population of the area has consisted of Slavic people. However great the differences separating the individual Slavic nations have become, however late and of partly artificial origin awareness of Slavic unity is, a sort of common consciousness can be discerned even in the early centuries. Besides, the majority status of the Slavs has strongly determined the development of this region for long centuries. No wonder, therefore, that the science of Slavonic studies, taken in the broader sense, often and in part rightly claims that the regularities it uncovers basically hold for the region as a whole, and that to speak of the Slavs is to speak of Eastern Europe as a whole.

At the same time, the spread of the Slavs is only one, though a numerically significant, symptom of the fact that in the early Middle Ages the original population of the Roman era changed, disappeared, was assimilated or migrated, while new ethnic groups arrived in the region from different parts. Similar processes took place in the Barbaricum, although they are less easy to trace than in the Roman area. The Finno-Ugric and Baltic ethnic units would also play some part in the development of Eastern Europe in the same manner as, mainly in the earlier periods, the Turkic or later the Tartar-Mongol groups did. In this context a few words must be said about the Avars, whose descendants, of course, usually fail to appear at international history conferences and are, therefore, liable to be forgotten. Yet Eastern Europe witnessed centuries when the Avars played a rather important role - and to the detriment of the majority Slavs, which, once again, is something not quite polite to remember. Moreover, if we were to go far back in discovering the antecedents, we should not leave unmentioned the part played by the Huns, the Goths and other Germanic tribes, though this, to a great extent, all belongs to ancient times.

Taken together, all this leads to another factor of Eastern European development which I consider rather significant, namely the ethnically mixed settlement of the region. True, for long centuries this cannot be regarded as an Eastern European peculiarity, but rather as an all-European phenomenon, for in the dark centuries ethnic mixing was rather characteristic of the whole of Europe. And it is precisely our own times, the second half of the 20th century, which show that the nation-state trend of Western European development has merely covered up this phenomenon: nowadays we encounter its widespread renaissance. Yet the

essential point is just this: while there ethnic mixing has for long remained invisible, in Eastern Europe it was very conspicuous and even gained strength, if we think of the events of the late Middle Ages or of the early Modern Age.

It is quite certain that in traditional society, to use this slightly heretical but comfortable term, ethnic differences are much less significant than social ones. Marxist historiography for a long time held this factor to be equally negligible in the case of the pre-bourgeois era and the period succeeding the bourgeois age, i.e. the socialist epoch. However, obstinate facts have forced researchers of recent decades to reconsider the question. We cannot leave it out of consideration whether we speak of ethnos of feudal clan, and as it has attained so important a role in Eastern European development during the last two centuries, and was not unknown before that, we must regard it as one of the basic factors of unity in the development of our region.

A feature recurring over and over again, but precisely because of its undeniability, one of truly great significance, is the backwardness of the Eastern European region compared to Western development. This has been repeated very often with respect to phenomena arising since the beginning of the Modern Age. Going back in time, it may also be discerned in the fact that the second phase of European feudalism was delayed in Eastern Europe and never quite became general. We shall return to this point in connection with the differences. Here we have to face a single problem: Byzantium. For Byzantium was,no doubt, an important component in the development of Eastern Europe and, with its traditions from the Roman Empire, a stronghold of civilization in the dark ages. How, then, is it possible to mention backwardness as a universal factor? I consider, nevertheless, that backwardness was such a factor, in the sense that despite all its undoubtable internal modifications, indeed, important alterations, Byzantium meant tradition much more than innovation, the ossified rather than the flexible, orthodoxy rather than change. And the Byzantine influence, which long outlasted the Empire itself, became a determining factor of backwardness.

If, then, we are to judge ethnic mixture as a phenomenon not peculiar to Eastern Europe, but, at least in the beginning as applicable to the whole of the continent, we ought also to mention a few other factors of pan-European significance. For to what extent could the often mentioned agrarian character of Eastern Europe distinguish it from any other territory of Europe which has for long centuries sunk back (or risen, perhaps) to the level of a subsistence economy? Is not the situation the same from Ireland to Sicily, from the Scandinavian Peninsula to the Iberian?

Or, related to this, from the beginnings of the Modern Age, the emergence of world economy as it is nowadays understood, the countries of Eastern Europe belonged to the periphery just as much as the abovementioned two peninsulas. This remains a determinant throughout the centuries of the Modern Age, but not only from the point of view of our region. The long survival of the periphery and the agrarian structure is not only an Eastern European peculiarity either. Of course if we give the adjective "long" its full meaning, we may, after all, find something specific in this.

We could actually continue the list of broader European phenomena relating to the periphery; to mention only one very significant one: enlightened absolutism. It is obvious that what we are facing here is a direct consequence of the periphery situation, an attempt to establish further development, to eliminate backwardness while preserving the essence of the system. Enlightened absolutism did not strive for bourgeois transformation, but merely for the strengthening of the state, or the system. It is only the historian, always wiser in retrospect, who clearly realizes that this attempt, despite all its weaknesses and inherent contradictions, after all did manage to promote bourgeois transformation, quite involuntarily of course. It is a universal symptom of the periphery; yet we may risk the hypothesis that in our region, despite sometimes spectacular failure (it goes without saying that we are alluding to Joseph II) enlightened absolutism managed to bequeath more positive achievements to bourgeois transformation than did its Southern European counterparts.

However, we have to return once again to the question of polyethnic settlement. It is undoubtable that the tendency of state-development we retrospectively look upon as normative was manifest, from the dark ages onwards, in the further development of a totally compartmentalized feudal society and the emergence of greater, but not empire-scale units, which later made possible their being interpreted as nation-states, with all the necessary reservations, of course. It is not principally the prematurity of the adjective "national" that we wish to allude to with this remark, but to the fact that even these relatively small units were not ethnically definite. Due to a number of historical accidents, however, this tendency, one which had evolved everywhere during the late Middle Ages, was discontinued in our region. Large empires took the place of nation-like states, empires which either recognised their polyethnic composition in some political, institutional form, or refused to acknowledge it at all. Objectively, however, the multinational composition prevailed. From the end of the 18th century contemporaries also noticed this, when during the fervour of bourgeois transformation it appeared to them as precisely one of the factors of backwardness con-

trasting with the situation in Western states developing according to the norm. This was an overemphasized generalization on the part of contemporaries; and historians did their bit in stressing it further. Yet, today it is mixed ethnic composition that appears more general. This, of course, can be understood to mean that here we are dealing with an even more general characteristic, not peculiar to Europe only, which makes the whole thing appear even less a specific Eastern European phenomenon.

However, in connection with this we also have to note that multinational composition gave rise to problems in an area in which we should expect the least sensitivity to national motives, namely, within the labour movement. That this evolved later than in the West is natural because of the general retardation. That in its early periods it borrowed the main stipulations of the Western movement is also understandable. Marx accepted the European norm of nation-state just as much as his fellow thinkers among the bourgeoisie did; it is well known that he considered it favourable from the labour movement's point of view. It was only at about the turn of the century that the Eastern European labour movement became aware of the importance of ethnic differences with offers of national sovereignty and cultural autonomy. The paths to the realization of these were rather divergent. However, it seems undoubtable that, by placing emphasis on the question, the Eastern European labour movement produced something quite special within the internationalist-minded labour movement generally.

After 1917 and 1945 it seemed that Eastern European peculiarities were beginning to vanish, a new phase of development having suppressed, if not solved, a whole host of old problems. The events of today seem to bear witness to the survival of the unity of Eastern European development, the survival of backwardness, and those economic difficulties that are the consequence of many centuries' evolution. To pass judgement on this, however, would fall outside the historian's competence.

If we stop and reflect for a moment upon what we have said about the uniform characteristics of Eastern European development, we discover that our findings are rather meagre. Weighed carefully, this little, too, can all be ascribed to the diverse ethnic composition. Is it perhaps the differences within the unity that provide us with some clue?

II.

For the differences almost appear to be more marked than the unity itself. We have already touched upon this. Let us begin with the geographical framework.

The northern and easternmost part of Eastern Europe is an extension of the Eurasian plains stretching towards Europe and extending from the Harz to the Urals with no natural boundaries except coastline. Even the rivers do not constitute these, for usually they unite rather than separate. Of course, the south-eastern part of the plain is different from the northern part, which is dominated by forests and which has a low average temperature; this southern part is the gate from Asia through which a succession of usually short-lived invaders arrived.

In contrast with the hopelessly monotonous plains is a middle zone, that of the Czech and Carpathian Basins, having easily defensible natural boundaries but nevertheless a sufficient amount of internal plain; the home, indeed, for a long time, of two relatively stable states. The Danube, once the limes dividing two worlds, tended rather to play the role of a connecting link in Eastern European development.

To the south of all this lies the over-rugged Balkan peninsula with its dishevelled mountain ranges and violent, much-branching rivers, in sharp contrast with the featureless plains of the North. While in the North the environment favoured the rise and fall of empires, and the shifting of boundaries to and fro, in the Balkan area it facilitated the emergence of units which were small even on the usual nation-state scale, and isolation. Whichever territory we mention, each was far from the main seas of the world, as the Mediterranean played this role in Ancient times only. The relation between this fact and economic backwardness is clear enough. Still, though climate, relief and natural resources undoubtedly resulted in great differences, fortunately we shall not have to fall back on geographical determinism, as these did not determine the variety of development but only modified it here and there.

Another duality, whose effects can be felt even today, proved a great deal more significant: that of the Western and Eastern Churches. So essential a difference is this that it often appeared to be the basic line of demarcation between Eastern and Western Europe. It is well known that the territorial division of the two Churches was uncertain for a long time. Only in the Roman era did the boundary between Greek and Latin liturgy coincide with the so-called Jiraček-line. Later it was modified; furthermore, this boundary was valid only within the territory of the Empire, which, as we have noted, included the smaller part of Eastern Europe. Which Church to belong to was a question which remained undecided in the emerging states for some time even after the final schism. The Serbian ruler, Stephan Nemanja, was first christened a Roman Catholic and became Orthodox Christian only later - even though this happened

as late as the end of the 12th century. By the late Middle Ages, however, a boundary more or less coinciding with state borders became final.

Obviously, it is not our task to give a thorough analysis of the differences between the two Churches, nor especially to discusss the disputed theological problems. In any case, these played no important role in historical development with the exception of the problem of papal primacy. We wish, rather, to allude to a number of motives relevant from the aspect of broader historical development.

Obviously, maintaining the purity of faith and doctrine was an essential question for both Churches. However, the Western Church proved more flexible in this respect, especially in the first centuries, than the Eastern one, which treated this issue with much more rigidity. It is a theological problem, but one of historical significance, that the Eastern Church rigorously dissociated itself from the heretical Latins of the West, while the Western Church regarded the Eastern as schismatic only, but not heretical. To our minds the difference may appear trifling, but in its own times it was important even in political history.

The Eastern Church's concept of "caesaropapism", i.e. the complete subordination of Church to state is well known. In contrast, exactly because of its close ties with the Papacy, the Western Church always managed to maintain some sort of independence from the state authorities in the long run. The expression "some sort of" is rather emphatic here, for a long line of cases could be cited in which secular power proved stronger, and, generally, the Western Church too always counted as a secure pillar of political power (again allowing for many incidental exceptions). Nevertheless, the basic difference existed, and this had far-reaching consequences.

Another important element is the Western Church's much more profound intellectualism. The Eastern Church never dared to surpass the Greek fathers in founding dogmas. If someone did so, he immediately became a heretic. In effect, the Western Church succeeded in its attempt to support theology with the concepts of philosophy. The scholastic adventure elaborated so precise a conceptual network that even today at times we are forced to revert to it for lack of other exact conceptual distinctions. The currency and greater role of literacy within the territory of the Western Church were only two manifestations of this deeper intellectualism.

Now all these differences, precisely because of their weaker state-ties and corresponding cosmopolitism, also prevailed in those areas of Eastern Europe where the Western Church remained dominant. Were it not mere word play, we

should actually call the territory we term Central-Eastern or East-Central Europe "Western Eastern Europe", for this would best express the gist of the problem. It is a pity that the oddity of the expression hardly makes this possible.

The differences between the two Churches had well-known consequences in Eastern Europe's cultural development. The Western Church held on to its rigidly preserved Latin while the Eastern Church, in the course of its missionary work, made essential allowances to the mother tongue or to Old Church Slavonic, which amounted to the same thing. This in turn led to the Western Church's being forced to use the national languages as well, while the Eastern managed to prolong the life of Old Church Slavonic as the literary language by a few centuries, thus to a great extent hindering the emergence of national literatures.

It is, of course, also relevant here that the spread of spiritual-cultural trends of Western origin - Humanism, the Renaissance and the Reformation, which brought about even deeper and more fundamental changes than the former two, were limited to Western Eastern Europe, too. The Eastern Church regarded this process as just another form of the Latin heresy and accordingly paid no attention to it.

There are two more phenomena confined to the territory of the Western Church, but which obviously cannot be explained in terms of the differences between the Churches. I am thinking of the second phase of feudalism and the system of Estates.

The second phase of feudalism, with its technical innovations and structural novelty, became widespread in Western Eastern Europe only, or more exactly, in that part of Eastern Europe the sovereign power of which belonged to this Western Eastern region. Here I am thinking of the Ukraine and Belorussia (with strong geographic generalization), i.e. the territories of the Lithuanian state originally belonging to Kievian Russia which remained within the Eastern Church, a fact the Church union ordered from above did not much alter. It is just this point that shows that in this case it is not a matter of the differences between the Churches, but much rather the fact that the achievements of the West, from the heavy plough to national poetry, reached Western Eastern Europe, an identical cultural environment, but went no further.

There is, by the way, a counter-example which should not be neglected: the Enlightenment. Its spread was already independent of the Church divisions, for general European dechristianization had by then reached the upper classes in the territories of the Orthodox Church as well. And only them - in Western Europe, too. Now this, if we wish, is further proof of the unity underlying the differences.

The system of Estates is even more problematic. We shall not include the phenomena of Russian development in the system of Estates for these lacked the basic characteristic of that system: independence from central power. Once again, this is something we only come across in Western Eastern Europe. It, too, can be explained by the easier penetration of Western institutions or be interpreted on the basis of the relationship between Church and state from the relative independence of these two powers. It seems almost certain that the organization of Estates started out along Church lines. The problem, however, as with so many of the others we have raised, needs further investigation.

A couple of decades ago we used to mention second serfdom and a seigneurial domestic economy as some of the most important arguments when speaking about Eastern European development. Recent research has somewhat ruffled this conception. It turned out that the phenomenon we have been dealing with appeared only late in Russian development, in the 18th century, so this, too, is essentially a characteristic of Western Eastern Europe. That the concept can be extended to territories east of this region is a proposition to be regarded cautiously. At any rate, this characteristic may be discerned from the Baltic countries to Croatia. Yet, we may only speak of a second serfdom where the second phase of feudalism had evolved with a serfdom free of forced labour and may not in places where slavery, in the early Middle Ages sense of the word, survived in the form of the holop until the beginning of the 18th century - and not as an insignificant, marginal institution.

Finally, there is a factor which we may, if we wish, deem to be exterior from the point of view of the philosophy of history, and this is the Ottoman Empire. By and large it covered the region of Eastern Europe that was once dominated by Byzantium, inheriting, actually, some features of the latter's institutional system. So, it was not unjustified to speak of the survival of Byzantium in some sense. However, it cannot be denied that the Ottoman Empire forced upon its conquered territories a social and economic structure and an agrarian system radically different from those which were there before. It may be disputed as to whether this was more favourable or harmful for the peasantry, but it was, beyond doubt, different. The social and state structure, understood in a broader sense, which evolved in the territory of the Eastern Church - to use this expression for lack of a better one - disappeared in the Balkans to give way to another one. This, of course, did not alter the region's agrarian character.

We could refer to a number of other peculiarities in which unity and difference are manifest, such as national revival, the liberation of the serfs or the

zonal development of capitalist economies. Yet, what has been said is perhaps sufficient to show that at a rather early stage three sub-regions began to evolve within Eastern Europe: one which we have playfully called Western Eastern Europe; a second one, whose better part was originally Byzantium and which, due to the Ottoman Empire became South-Eastern Europe; and a third one, which we could call Eastern Eastern Europe, to use an even stranger expression. The three sub-regions have individual features, as well as features that connect two and separate these from the third one - but which two these are varies. We have also mentioned the fact that the features indicating unity are of a more general, pan-European character, while the characteristics of difference are much more salient.

After all this, then, it would be perfectly justified to ask why, if the differences are so much more marked than the common elements, do we nevertheless speak of Eastern Europe's unity - among other things, at least? Simply because, due to the geographical position and neighbour relations, the three sub-regions form some sort of functional unity, with their interaction increasing ever since the early Middle Ages. It is, at the same time, also true that this unity which we have called "functional" for want of a better expression is reluctantly recognised in Eastern Europe. Thus, it is time to turn to the problem of the contemporary experiences of Eastern European development.

III.

In the beginning, when the succession of peoples living in Eastern Europe adopted some version of Christianity, awareness of a Christian unity was dominant - in practice, of course, in second place to the consciousness of state (or nation, in the sense not yet tied up with ethnic unit). This Christian unity, however, was originally polyglot, as opposed to the Latin unity of the West - polyglot as a matter of principle, the way it was realised by the linguistic reform inaugurated by Cyril and Methodius. Breaking the uniqueness of the three sacred tongues by introducing a new liturgic language may be regarded as the first manifestation of a polyethnic Eastern Europe.

The increasingly obvious duality, the opposition of the two Churches, however, soon began to erode the awareness of Christian unity. We have already pointed this out in connection with the objective factors, here it will suffice to emphasize how powerful this was in the consciousness of contemporaries. Certainly, the ever multiplying varieties of the Reformation would turn against the Western Church, and later each other, with the same violent hatred as the Eastern Church did. However, on the Protestant side, this hatred somehow

contained - and justly - the claim for innovation and progress, while on the Eastern side there was the ancient pride of the true faith opposing any innovative heresy. From this follows the isolation, also mentioned above, from anything that came from the West as something that must, by virtue of its origin be evil, immoral and false; the devil in some guise or other.

The emergence and the changing historical fate of states everywhere naturally produced a certain historical consciousness in the mentality of the ruling elite, an awareness of tradition, events, change and permanence that became objectified in the form of court almanacs and chronicles. As this was the consciousness of an elite which was actually governing, it produced a sort of historical tradition, consciousness which was close and in its elementary moments corresponding to historical reality, despite all distortions or falsifications committed for political reasons. The ruling elite would sooner or later attach itself to one of the poly-ethnic states' ethnic units, identify with it, and thus acquire a sort of "national" character. At this point, however, we must not forget that from among the many ethnic units of Eastern Europe this only occurred in the case of some of them, for there were from the start or there later evolved ethnic groups which were not active, but only passive participants in the states' development and whose members in the ruling class would inevitably assimilate with the elite of the leading ethnic group. Naturally no historical consciousness would develop within those ethnic groups not participating in the government of the state.

In this respect the Ottoman Empire became an especially important factor. By removing, eliminating or integrating within its own organization the earlier Balkan elites, it deprived the states, ethnic units and these elites of their historical tradition and consciousness. What remained was a mere negativity, the consciousness of being under the rule of the infidel Turks, a forced acknowledgement of the status quo. Only the Churches maintained a kind of continuity here, the consciousness of differring from the ruling ethnic group.

In the case of those ethnic units whose feudal elite was preserved because of the institutional system of Estates (even after these elites had been integrated within multinational empires) continuity of historical consciousness remained and with it continuity of information about the actual process of development, something that would gain increasing importance in later periods. All this also resulted in the fact that the number of states with some sort of independence remained greater than that of the empires and, accordingly, their state consciousness was preserved as well.

Summed up, all this also implies that by the Modern Age, after very great changes, the consciousness of national status was predominant in contemporary

mentality, even in the case of ethnic units possessing no states, and the knowledge of belonging to an empire appeared as only secondary compared to this, and emerged only in concrete political battles. Both, however, strengthened the idea of separation from others. Thus it would be senseless to ask whether we could encounter some sort of Eastern European consciousness anywhere in the region.

If awareness of some kind of broader unity can be registered at all, it can be detected, even in the early Modern Age in the issue of Christian unity, or the consciousness of belonging to Europe in the case of refined intellectuals, even the protection of this Europe against the Turkish power beyond it. That this Turkish power happened to be a factor not outside Europe, but essential to the whole of European history, is a question of the actual course of development. In people's minds it nevertheless remained alien. It may also be added that the motive of protecting Europe existed much rather in government manipulation than in the consciousness of the ruling elites, although it was not lacking there either.

From the point of view of the West the consciousness of a Christian community admitted even the single Orthodox country, Russia; what was more, the Russian ruling elite was also prepared to accept this in part, or, more exactly, the governing elite, which even undertook to co-operate in the war against the Turks, somehow overcoming its repulsion. The Turk, i.e. the Ottoman Empire was, at all events, different. Perhaps this was not unjustified if we believe - very faintly though and subordinated to other consciousnesses of status - to perceive the consciousness of the separation of the three sub-regions. It may also give rise to the notion that this is yet another proof of the three sub-regions' differences being stronger than the unity of the whole region.

It was due to the Enlightenment and the French Revolution that the situation altered radically, with consequences even today. By means of national rebirth, the awakening or renaissance of movements which started out in the wake of the Enlightenment, ethnic groups which had until then remained in the background also gained ground and even prevalence. Even if in its first moments - a few decades, that is - national renewal reached a narrow intellectual layer only, sooner or later it nonetheless became the affair of the broad masses excluded from historical consciousness until then. The consciousness of belonging to a nation, and, as a part of this, historical consciousness, became essential in these movements. As can be expected, in the case of elites with a national consciousness, it was their own historical consciousness, more or less corresponding to historical reality, which gained currency among the broader layers, mainly due to schooling, and became a primary means of national awakening in addition to

the language. In the case of the other ethnic units, the lost or originally missing historical consciousness had to be substituted for in some way or other. Enthusiastic and purposeful historians saw to this, of course. From this it naturally follows that the "national point of view" of history, as was ingeniously formulated in Hungarian national historiography, became dominant in the case of every ethnic unit or - we may now say - nation. As historians who propagate national fables or myths themselves sincerely confessed although historical truth is important, the cause of the nation comes first.

It is quite clear that in this altered situation consciousness of some sort of broader unity is inconceivable or at least very difficult to achieve. Earlier historical traditions as well as the forms of broader consciousness produced by the actual situation, as the natio polonica, the natio bohemica or the natio hungarica were now indeed related to a single actually existing nation, and the other nations that have counted, and counted themselves, as parts of these are excluded from this unity. In the case of Russia, the imperial consciousness could still be maintained from above by the simple expedient of not recognizing the other ethnic groups. In the case of the Habsburgs or the Sultan this was no longer feasible, whether they tried to propagate some sort of imperial consciousness as in the first case or simply relied on force, as in the second. The time for greater units was past.

In reality of course, there were numerous exceptions. The elites of feudal nationes, by now ethnically homogeneous, tried to maintain this old unity. In the modern bourgeois era, however, this has become impossible, even if its advocates were surprised. One - or one might say more than one - exception draws on the modern idea of a nation. The one is the consciousness of Slavic unity, which has never quite disappeared objectively either, as we have already mentioned. There was an attempt to realize this in a sublimated form, within the cultural sphere - this was the case of Kollár. There was also an attempt to draw its political consequences - Panslavism. Its influence was not to be neglected, but in reality this too was not viable because of concrete political antagonisms. A sub-species of this on a smaller scale was the South Slavic unity, with Croatian rule, in the form of Illyrism - that is under the leadership of the Croatian feudal elite in actual possession of a national and historical consciousness, or with Serbian rule, where the lack of historical consciousness was an asset in fact. In reality, however, this too was impracticable and would be realized only partially and after a very long time.

The contemporary mentality was willing to acknowledge the existence of two factors. One was Europe and the other the nation. Europe by now was indeed

the actually existing Europe, a group of smaller and greater nations, and the latter were the gaolers of nations fully entitled to, yet lacking, independence. Europe recognized this status quo and, what is more, forcefully maintained it by the usual authoritarian methods. So, Europe was generally or mostly a factor unfavourable to the nation: it declined to recognize it, was ungrateful, would not help - countless variations could be mentioned of the resentments the elite of national movements honestly felt and professed.

In contrast to the wicked or mostly wicked Europe there was a positive, absolutely good factor, and this, of course, was the nation. Everything had to be done, everything had to be sacrificed for the nation's benefit and glory and especially for its becoming an independent nation-state. This pathos of course contained a great deal of the sentimentality of the Romantic age with which the movements for national renewal were contemporaneous. By the second half of the 19th century the storm of sentiment had subsided and was replaced by bourgeois calculation, but the unique positivity of nation remained unchanged within the consciousness.

The priority of nation is also manifested in the fact that in certain cases the nation undertook some broader mission. Each, of course, had a certain national mission in the narrow sense: the unification of the nation as a whole in a state with precise geographical borders which would contain each member of the nation (and inevitably to the detriment of other nations, we may soberly add), and the total independence and autonomy of this state. If need be - and usually there was such a need - this had to be done against Europe, which was wicked anyway. This mission lasted until the claim was fulfilled - a rather long time, we may add again soberly or even maliciously.

There were, of course, more ambitious callings than these, especially at the time of national renewal, with romantic overtones, later subsiding or appearing in more cautious or up-to-date formulations. The Poles supported every national movement as by doing so they furthered their own nation's cause; Poland was the modern Christ or a martyr at least, crucified and offered at the altar of the cause of nations. The Czechs were the champions of liberty of conscience ever since the Hussite age and were the opponents of Germanic ambition besides. The Hungarians were to lead the peoples of multinational Hungary into the paradise of bourgeois civilization that solved all problems. The Russians would bring about the renewal of Man and teach it to the nations, and to all humanity. The opposition to Europe sometimes smuggled Asian, pagan, reminiscences into these national callings, though this would be more characteristic of the turn of

the century and the first half of the twentieth century. National callings address either the whole of humanity, or Europe or the nation on its own territory.

Only one thing finds no place within the narrower or broader national missions: a sense of unity drawing on objective factors. One could put it like this: the mission addresses humanity, Europe or the nation, but never the neighbours, unless these latter are willing to join the nation which will fulfil its mission at any cost.

A more thorough examination, though, can identify certain motives within the national ideologies, however national they may be, in which a certain duality of East and West is concealed and behind these, perhaps, the dualism of Eastern and Western Europe. In the case of the Poles it was the opposition of the Piast and the Jagiellon ideals, that is, the program of western or eastern expansion, which - at least as far as demands went - came up with great force after the restoration of the Polish state. Within the Serbs' historical thinking it was the duality of the medieval Zeta (Montenegro), and Raška-Rascia (old Serbia), which signified some sort of western or eastern orientation. But the all too well-known duality of '48 and '67 in Hungarian historical thought can also be mentioned here, which, although it lost its pertinence after 1918, has still not disappeared from our thinking as a difference of attitude.

Although the huge changes of 1917 and 1918 largely redrew the map of Eastern Europe, on the plane of consciousness they brought little change in the matters we are concerned with. The subjects of different perspectives, high and low, have changed according to whether this or that nation entered the ranks of the victors (the majority) or the vanquished (the minority). Roles were reversed, but the mechanisms of consciousness worked on, unchanged.

If we wish to be more exact, of course, the notion of some sort of unity did occur to a number of thinkers in the region that had not yet become socialist, and at times this had a broader resonance. The majority of multinational empires ceased to exist, fell or were overthrown (the different expressions reflect the different evaluations of the period), between Russia and Germany there remained the zone of small states, or, in their own opinion, nation-states, although the concepts of Zwischeneuropa or intermediate Europe, were neither born nor struck roots here. South-Eastern Europe, however, in the Balkans and Central Europe among those further north had already been conceived as a higher unity. Rarely, though, did these small states have any common interests even against the great powers. The attempted deceptions of publicism had, of course, no effect on politics, tended to provoke the resistance of the broader public too, and were at best used as slogans sometimes. It may, of course,

seem rather forced, but within these mental recognitions it is once again the difference of the three sub-regions that appears to come to the surface and the lack of unity is felt with increasing power.

After 1917, although setting out from a different ideological basis of course, isolation became once again complete in one of the sub-regions, meaning, in practice, a dissociation from the West. True, the West did not betray its age-old traditions of opposition either, even though no one took into account these historical traditions at that time. The further fundamental changes of 1944/45 in the other two sub-regions (or very nearly all of them) expanded this isolation from the West, and did so by pushing the boundaries of that hostile West a great deal further west than in the preceding interwar period. Once again this showed the relativity of the border between Eastern and Western Europe. For looking at it from Moscow, the West started no farther than Warsaw, from Sofia somewhere round Vienna and Budapest and probably somewhere near Paris from the viewpoint of Budapest. These perspectives existed not only in the period between the two World Wars. The common fate cropped up for a time as a political and publicist slogan only to fade again and give way to the lamentably traditional neglect of neighbours. Each state is perceived as belonging to the West, or at least to Central Europe, by its own citizens, while the other states do not, or are completely passed over. It is only those who are furthest to the East for whom there remains nothing else except - in different words, of course - a proud acceptance of Eastern Europeanism.

IV.

Before getting entangled once more in the problems of the present, however, it is time to sum up. We have tried to sketch a possible paradigm of Eastern European development, conscious of the fact that numerous other paradigms can be set up. Of course, it is, among other things, through the change of paradigms that science progresses. We have also tried retrospectively to formulate the summary of a lifetime's reflection. It is obvious even from this short sketch that our investigations had no claim to depth at any point. Most or almost all factors of the paradigm require scientific verification. It may, perhaps, be a task of such summaries, to call attention to new things to be done, new areas and, primarily, new angles of research. The investigation of the individual factors glimpsed above would each be worth a book, or more than one book perhaps. We hope that there will be some to undertake this task.

We mentioned the lack of depth a moment ago. In accordance with the by

now age-old traditions of the profession the breadth we strove for will not justify or excuse this lack of depth. Yet, perhaps we may permit some exceptions. For the nations of Eastern Europe may deserve so unusually broad a perspective since, as István Bibó once put it, they have suffered so much. Maybe comparative historiography, the necessity of which has so often been emphasized, will eventually be able, through the wise words of science, not only to uncover the cause of suffering but also find the modes of avoiding further torment. Credo, quia absurdum.

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E m i l N i e d e r h a u s e r

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KARL POLÁNYI IN HUNGARIAN POLITICS (1914-1964)[x]

This brief review is limited to Karl Polányi's role in Hungarian politics, at home and in exile, over the past 50 years. It is not my task to analyse Polányi's general political and ideological views or activities except in so far as the two are inseparable. Of course, there is a wider interrelation which should also be covered: the relation of science to politics in Karl Polányi's thinking and work and, within this, Polányi's general relationship to politics. This subject, however, merits a separate study; here it can only be touched upon.

Polányi belonged to a generation and an intellectual circle of the turn of the century, which thought in terms of universal concepts about the world, about society and about changing them. He himself, his brother Michael, and Oscar Jászi or Georg Lukács were fired by a common, unquenchable passion to improve the world which lasted into their old age, in spite of all their differences and conflicts. This passion, nourished by European ideas and Hungarian social realities of the turn of the century, charged them intellectually as well as emotionally. Anyone who ever met one of them, no matter how old the person was, could sense that they belonged to a vanishing race of men. "You and I reached manhood before the great change," wrote Karl Polányi to Oscar Jászi in October 1950. "Few such are left now: they embody the measure of the West, they are the platinum standards of the historical world of value. Those who came after us exaggerated or belittled, overstrained or discounted the values of the nineteenth century."

For them science and politics were not separate but parallel ways toward the realization of a universal purpose. At which of the two they would ultimately drop anchor was decided partly by personal inclinations, and partly by external, sometimes incidental circumstances. Their public personas usually exhibited an attitude of disdain, even contempt for the shallowness, details, and trivialities of day-to-day politics, and this was particularly so in Polányi's case. During most

of his life, Karl Polányi maintained a kind of symbolic conception of politics and a somewhat unwary and eccentric open-handedness, not always mindful of consequences. His relationship to politics was at all times ambiguous: besides the contempt, political ambition arose within him from time to time; besides the desire to be lifted above politics, he again and again realised the indispensability of politics.

His first turn towards politics came in 1913-1914. His starting point was probably the recognition of the pseudo-scientific nature of evolutionary determinism. In 1913 this was the theme of most of his speeches and writings. "Let us acknowledge," he wrote in Szabadgondolat (Free Thought), "that we cannot arrive at a more hopeless vicious circle than by taking our aims from social development and then entrusting social development to realise them!" "Our last ten years have been devoted to the exploration of Hungary and in doing this truly important work we have lost sight of the fact that we shall not find 'enthusiasm' marked on even the most accurate economic and social map of Hungary, yet without this term the map remains a useless piece of paper."

At the March, 1913 celebrations of the Galilei Circle he sounded the consequences in a dramatic tenor: in contrast to the youth of March, 1848 who "did their politics simply but well,... [we] did our politics scientifically but badly!... We have proved to the world that it has to change and yet it has still not changed. And we have not applied coercion, for every educated person knows that events cannot be forced, only precipitated..." He criticized this fatalist approach as mistaken and harmful: "[It] has turned politics into an occult science, scientia occulta as it was during the days of ancient theocracies."

The openly idealist and voluntarist Polányi (his views in this respect were somewhere between radicalism and the views of the young Georg Lukács), who renounced Marxist determinism and swore by setting targets and acting, was present at the birth of the National Bourgeois Radical Party in the early summer of 1914, as its secretary and one of its most agile organizers, together with Oscar Jászi, Pál Szende and Lajos Biró. With a little exaggeration, perhaps, he gave an enthusiastic account of his new role to his brother Michael: "My dear Misi, tomorrow I am going to Versec to prepare the Monday meeting...I have formed the party and now I am doing it... Of course, I have always approached everything from the executive side, and this is how I lead now, too, but this hurts many infantile adults. These days perhaps I am Jászi's closest confidant in the party. Everything is imputed to me. Not only in work, but in morals as well... The Galilei Circle has proved itself. It provided a whole host of workers

in the nick of time... Jászi works a lot. He has proved to be the best of our people... But perhaps I am the hero of the action."

Polányi was suited to a political career by virtue not only of his organizing but also his rhetorical talents, of which he himself was well aware. "Yesterday I spoke at the Law Candidates' society, on Saturday at some university meeting - everywhere with deserved success," he wrote in another letter. "The Sunday speech was prepared very carefully and all that was left for the actual performance was the pretence of improvisation...'A second Ottokár Prohászka,' they said in the conservative benches. My press reviews were surprisingly good. Jászi and the others were amazed. Károlyi and Bakonyi came over to me again and again to congratulate. Somebody embraced me. 'An orator at last!' and there was something in it."

But his role in the Radical Party was not limited to organization and publicity. His creative mind poured forth a flood of new recommendations - some brilliant, some absurd - mainly to advocate an even more radical direction in party policy and activity. "I repeat my last statement," he wrote to Jászi on July 16th, just a few days before the declaration of war, "that we have to make up our minds immediately in order to make a vigorous demonstration on the question of the ethnic minorities. The time for a courageous and forceful policy has come. One stormy week - and after that the fruit will just fall from the trees. We could never have made a step in a greater cause or at a more appropriate psychological moment."

The outbreak of the war suddenly ended the first phase of Polányi's political activities. The second phase began in the summer of 1918, at the end of the war, after three years of active service and a long illness. This second phase was a continuation, an attempt to realize the aims set in 1914, but also a new beginning, a searching for new ways, as indicated in "The Calling of our Generation" published in June, 1918 in Szabadgondolat. The article was characteristically Polányi, full of witty turns of phrase, suggesting much but spelling out little that was concrete. Its beginning was brilliant: "A generation is born into history when it becomes aware of its calling. And the worth of each generation is measured in terms of the extent to which it has been able to fulfil its mission... What is the calling of the present generation? Our fate has been to witness the most grievous calamity of mankind. For the contemporary individual this is a disaster which he suffers. But for a whole generation it is a mission to live for. This generation was made witness the greatest moral event since the Crusades and the Reformation."

He perceived accurately that the age of cataclysms had only begun with the

Great War; yet even in his Szeged speech of December 1, 1918, he held that the radical program remained essentially valid. He explained with deep conviction and great vigour that events had proved the correctness of the Radical Party, and its leader Oscar Jászi - in contrast to Hungary's traditional parties and the Social Democratic Party. At the same time he acknowledged that the difference between radicalism and socialism, while not an issue prior to the 1918 democratic revolution, had now become topical and significant. He declared, however, that "Radicalism must not stray from a democratic basis. Democracy for us is not a system of rule, but a society's ideal way of life. We shall never accept the dictatorship of the proletariat, just as we have refused the dictatorship of the ruling classes."

Polányi obviously regarded the Károlyi regime as his own, but he did not serve the government, nor did he assume any political role. The primary reason for this must have been his illness. Yet his inability to identify fully with the new government may also have been a contributing factor. To the end he remained the friendly but watchful and objective observer. He demanded "more determination... against every breath of the counter-revolution, a much faster pace for the economic construction of socialism, and primarily an immediate break with pseudo-socialist ethics and the morality the government has shown so far". He took an independent stand in the conflict between the revolutionary government and Budapest University, staunchly defending the university's autonomy.

His true interest, however, was in the future and he looked beyond the problems of democratic transformation. The most remarkable proof of his sensitivity as theoretician and politician was that in December, 1918, immediately after the appearance of the Hungarian communist movement, he was the first to initiate an objective debate of its programme in his journal. At his request, the first to air their views on the feasibility and desirability of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the communist goals were the three most respected leftist intellectuals, Oscar Jászi, Jenő Varga, and Georg Lukács. The "Bolshevism Special" contained an extract from a speech by Lenin, one of Gorky's writings and the views of several Galileist intellectuals, including those of Polányi. "The only serious representative of socialism today is Bolshevism," he wrote. "Any kind of socialism today which is not Bolshevism is nothing other than a surrender of the programme." At the same time, he did not believe in the success of the Bolshevist experiment because "the trouble lies not with Bolshevism, but with socialism itself."

As he wrote in his memoirs, at that time he was fighting "against the

terrible eruption of the Bolshevist world view" in a whole series of articles; at the Ady memorial he engaged Georg Lukács in debate and he recorded that he had been involved in two weeks of 'passionate polemics' with the Leninists in the dome hall of the university. But the arrest of Béla Kun and his fellow-revolutionaries prompted him to take the exact opposite position. This is what he wrote in the last issue of the Szabadgondolat: "Within hours, the violence done to the arrested communists has stirred the capital: not just the communists, everybody. Hundreds and thousands of people who have no political education and are otherwise enemies of communism have suddenly been shown the cause of communism in a new light. Obviously, there was something here which may have proved the communists' right. Truth had emerged only as a possibility, yet the masses were already shaken by it..."

This ambiguous relationship - sharp criticism of the communists coupled with a magnetic attraction to the movement (especially during crisis situations) - characterized Polányi throughout his life. In the days of the Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919 he was a non-Marxist revolutionary socialist, deeply sympathetic towards communism - sometimes fighting it, sometimes flirting with it - and so he remained during his long exile.

Yet, from the first years of exile in Vienna, a shift could be observed in his views in three directions: a movement away from political engagement, away from Hungarian politics, and away from the ideal of liberal democracy. Of course, all three processes were gradual and relative. None were followed to the end, but the tendency can be demonstrated in all cases. As a correspondent of the Bécsi Magyar Ujság (Vienna Hungarian News, a weekly published by Hungarian emigrés in Vienna), Polányi was a member of the community of exiled Hungarian democrats and a participant in the political activities of the group led by Károlyi and Jászi. The topics which he covered for the Bécsi Magyar Ujság included the world economy, international politics, and questions of science and ideology. He hardly ever addressed Hungarian problems (possibly because this was not his assigned area). He only became involved in the in-fighting among the Hungarian exiles because of an article, "The Chances of the New Russian Policy," which he published in the summer of 1921. The article, which discussed Lenin's N.E.P. (New Economic Policy), was attacked by Andor Gábor in a communist paper, the Proletár, as follows: "In the Bécsi Magyar Ujság, this rubbish-heap of the trashiest of all trash of the chaotic exile, Károly Polányi, the one-time president of the Galileists, drivels his long-eared jackassery." Gábor went on to claim that the exile of the democrats was pointless since they could be accommodated by the Hungarian counter-revolutionary regime at any time.

However, the target of this very vitriolic attack was not really Polányi but Jászi, who was particulary disliked by the communist intellectuals. Polányi himself still identified fully and even passionately with Jászi, as demonstrated by his letters to his mother and to his younger brother. In a letter of October 26, 1921, he wrote to his brother: "Politically, we are experiencing great times, you can imagine. Tomorrow Jászi is going to Prague; the events ... have proved our positions right in all respects."

A few years later, however, these very close political ties to Jászi began to gradually loosen, along with the ties of friendship. They maintained correspondence for thirty more years, up to the 1950's, but the dissonant chords of a deep disagreement disturbed their amiable harmony with increasing frequency. Of course, it is precisely these continual polemics (which ultimately destroyed their friendship) that make their correspondence so interesting and compelling for us even today. For this reason it would be worthwhile to publish their correspondence in full since it illustrates the diverse approaches to democracy and socialism taken by two individualistic social thinkers.[xx]

In an article published in a short-lived Hungarian left-wing periodical, Láthatár (Horizon) in 1927, Karl Polányi penned a sentence which might be regarded as the origin of their estrangement. "Such an abstract idea of democracy, which superciliously glossed over the realities of the stratification of society, the crisis and the war and its violence deserved to pass into history." Polányi was again some years ahead of his time: in the early 1930's a significant number of European left-wing intellectuals also began to question the traditional values of democracy, and the Jászis and Michael Polányis were driven into a minority position.

The years of the Second World War blunted the edge of the question or postponed it. As Thomas Mann put it,"Die waren moralisch gute Zeiten." After a long absence Polányi again became involved in the politics of the Hungarian emigrants, even if only indirectly, at Mihály Károlyi's side in London. It seems that his role was mainly to promote cooperation between Károlyi and the communists in the Hungarian Club of London, which resulted in the founding of the Hungarian Council in England. In 1944, both he and his wife, Ilona Duczynska, became members of the Council. After the war he followed the fate of Hungary and of the Danube region with concerned attention. He regarded the region's Russian orientation as natural, but only if a "window to the West" could be kept open. Yet, even in 1945-46 he feared a possible comeback of the Hungarian right, and was almost over-bearing in his insistence that Mihály Károlyi return to

Hungary immediately to support the Hungarian government, in deed as well as word, or else resign from politics altogether.

Yet, hardly a year later, the remnants of the Octobrist exiles were already divided over concerns, debates and anxious speculation of a quite different nature. As early as March, 1947, Jászi wrote to Polányi: "The rapid development of the Hungarian republic into a Soviet-style dictatorship ruins all your hopes as well as mine, unless you have been able to find a more reassuring compromise theory. I am quite incapable of this and fear that my Danubian journey, if it will take place at all, will be a moral ordeal."

The following decade, the terrible fifties, brought much ethical and intellectual anguish to leftist intellectuals of Polányi's kind living in the West. Ilona Duczynska once wrote: "It is given to the best of men to send down the roots of a sacred hatred somewhere in the course of their lives. This happened to Polányi in England - it has only increased in the later period, in the United States. His hatred was for the consumer society, for the dehumanizing effects of this society." But how could he have indulged in that hatred seeing the rage of Stalin's terror or Rákosi's atrocities?

There is no need to explain or give the details of his joy at the intellectual freedom fight of Hungarian writers and other intellectuals after the death of Stalin, and the hopes he pinned on the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, promising a new era. His enthusiasm did not diminish when the weapons of intellectual criticism were replaced by the criticism of the people rising in armed revolt. At the beginning of 1957 in an unpublished work entitled "A Hungarian Lesson", he attempted to show that the October revolution was caused primarily by economic problems. Two years later this is how he wrote to his brother: "1956 re-conquered me for Hungary. More than that, it gave me a mother country. I admire the fighters of October. I am proud of Miklós Gimes, son of my old Galileist friend. They have redeemed Hungary, a non-people, from Ady's 'szégyenkaloda', the stocks of history."

But that was not his final word on the matter. Ultimately the long-term tendencies took the upper hand in his thinking, and the roots of that "sacred hatred" proved to be the stronger. Like Sartre and many other leftist or neo-leftist Western intellectuals, his anti-capitalism and anti-Americanism led him, with full knowledge of all the problems, to an acceptance of "existing socialism". Obviously this was facilitated by the thaw in the political climate of the early sixties.

In November, 1960 he resigned from the organisation Magyar Irók Szövetsége

Külföldön (Association of Hungarian Writers Abroad), "in protest against the offensive nature of the presidential reports against the writers at home". This was an open break with the Hungarian exiles.

In the autumn of 1963, barely half a year before his death, he visited Hungary and met with many old and new friends, writers and economists. In December a short confession-like writing of his appeared in the magazine Kortárs (Contemporary) under the title "Hazánk kötelessége" (The Duty of our Country), in which he called upon the young writers and scholars of the socialist countries, including Hungary, to undertake an intellectual and scientific counter-offensive against capitalism.

This article and the visit itself were Karl Polányi's last gestures towards Hungarian politics.

x/ Paper read at the Karl Polányi Memorial Conference in Budapest, October 1986.

xx/ See a selection from the correspondence of Jászi and Polányi below, pp. 53-76.

G y ö r g y L i t v á n

Institute of Historical Sciences

DIALOGUE THROUGH CORRESPONDENCE

The correspondence of Thomas Mann and Károly Kerényi, which lasted for a period of more than twenty years, is an important part of the recent European intellectual tradition. The Hungarian academic world maintained a close and direct contact with European culture through this correspondence. This uniquely homogeneous written dialogue between the German writer and the Hungarian mythologist and classical scholar was important for both parties: they inspired the best in each other. For Thomas Mann, a writer who was attracted to universal human values and to the objectively-typical, who campaigned against the false application of myths and wanted to give them a new function, the scholar Kerényi provided continual stimulation and academic support. For Kerényi the intellectual friendship with Thomas Mann provided increasing support for his goal of studying mythology from the perspective of humanistic values. This friendship deepened his understanding of mythology and classical philology: namely, that academic research has an existential importance and should be addressed to the Present, instead of concerning itself with useless pursuits. The value of this correspondence is heightened by the fact that Thomas Mann, living in exile, wrote his most intimate thoughts to Kerényi about his works in progress (except for the period between 1941 and 1944 when their correspondence was involuntarily broken off).

Naturally, the question arises as to whether the study of this correspondence is anachronistic, i.e., that the value of this dialogue has not withstood the test of time. Doubtlessly, the first part of the correspondence (the letters written before 1945, published in German in 1946 and in Hungarian in 1947) fulfilled an important function during the period immediately after the Second World War. It was a reflection of the uninterrupted championing of humanistic values which was still a potent force at that time. "The level of this correspondence," as Thomas Mann put it in 1945, "of the interwoven details of the two autobiographies is

remarkably high; it is upright and humanistic, and it will certainly stand the test of times, just as it is acting today as a contribution to universal culture in a period most unfavourable to culture." The letters written after 1945 are worthy of contemporary interest, too. The entire correspondence, i.e., the complete collection of letters written before 1945 and between 1945 and 1955, was published by Kerényi in 1960 (after the death of the great novelist) in an entirely different era. This was a time when the intellectuals of Europe, having been brought to the brink of a crisis by German fascism, were to rediscover their real values; not only those brought to the surface by the struggle against fascism but also the ones which had been dominant before the fascist period - although sometimes presented in distorted form (e.g., by German scholars). These values, which dealt with the complicated sources of knowledge about man, were for some time almost considered as taboos.

The intellectual attraction of the two men was stimulated by favourable circumstances; intellectually speaking, they were both rooted in the tradition of German Lebensphilosophie and Geisteswissenschaft and were both opposed to intellectual conservatism "hiding its head under a cowl". From the thirties on they relied on each other for solving problems of religious history, mythology and the novel as a genre. Naturally, it should be pointed out that the intellectual territories of Mann and Kerényi were distant from one another. For Mann myths were not objects of academic research but raw materials to be used rather freely in his literary work. In Kerényi's view, myths were objects of strictly scholarly inquiry, although - holding the viewpoint that all myths, continually changing through time, have been passed down to us in the form of oral or written epics, i.e., of artistic representation - he saw no unbridgable gap between scholarly investigation and artistic interpretation of myths.

Their correspondence and writings show that Kerényi had a more important influence on Mann than vice versa. We could point not only to the well-known episodes found in the third volume of the Joseph tetralogy (e.g., the description of love spells and witchcraft by the desperate Mut-Em-Enet) but also to other, often hidden examples. In his essay - Voyage with Don Quixote, - Thomas Mann referred to Kerényi's 1927 treatise on Eastern and Greek novels, which helped Mann understand the place of Cervantes' work in the history of the European novel. When writing the last volume of the Joseph tetralogy, Mann relied on Kerényi's essay on feasts. The figure of the grown-up Joseph and especially that of the old Felix Krull might not have been created without Kerényi's studies on Hermes. However, these are only examples drawn at random; the most important

thing Kerényi's essays gave to Thomas Mann was the inspiration so often mentioned in the published volumes of Mann's journals.

The correspondence started at the beginning of 1934. It is an important date: by coincidence that was also the time when Kerényi was being pushed to the periphery of the official Hungarian intellectual world. The correspondence was initiated by Kerényi, most probably at the urging of his friends Antal Szerb and János Honti. This act by a Hungarian scholar, who was just getting ready to leave Budapest and go into "exile" in the provinces (namely, to the University of Pécs), was extraordinary for the time: after all, in him an "official" Hungarian university academic was making contact with a writer who had fought against German fascism, gone into exile and had earned the respect of leftist democrats. At that time, although the first volume of the Joseph tetralogy had already been published in Hungarian, it was the Magic Mountain that captured Kerényi's imagination. The correspondence began with a misunderstanding: Kerényi admired Thomas Mann above all as the creator of the figure of Settembrini. What Kerényi did not know, and at that time could not have possibly known, was that the novel was in fact originally intended to be a satyrical short story which in many ways reflected a viewpoint articulated in Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen (1918), namely a nationalist theory of the role of the German intellectual tradition. Through the character of Settembrini Mann parodied and criticized the superficial litterati with their enlightened-liberal belief in progress. He became a more positive hero only during the course of writing the novel, after the tragedy of the first World War. By all indications, Mann must have "corrected" the figure of Settembrini only later, i.e., after 1919 when he adopted a more democratic point of view. The real hero was naturally Hans Castorp, an unstable, vaguely Hermes-like, lyrical character.

By the way, the best example of the closeness of their collaboration is the figure of Hermes. Kerényi was awakened to the hidden possibilities of this character by Thomas Mann who felt this Greek divinity was particularly similar to his own personality. Later on Kerényi, having dealt with the figure of Hermes profoundly, claimed that one of his most original scholarly contributions was in establishing Hermes as the third great mythological principle after Nietzsche's Apollon and Dionysos. For Mann Hermes was a mediator between life and death in favour of the former between myth and pure humanity, between ancient and new real-life situations; he was fitness, flexibility and, last but not least, the symbol of non-majestic - and, for this reason, all the more moving - youthful beauty. This interpretation was acceptable to Kerényi as a possible modern adaptation of a myth. As a scholar, however, Kerényi concerned himself with

tracing the transformation of the Hermes cult from its pre-classical beginnings to its Classical Greek form (e.g., he showed how the phallic and orgiastic elements of the ancient cult had vanished or been reinterpreted by the Classical age).

It is interesting that at the inception of the correspondence Kerényi did not realize the importance of a most mythological detail of the Magic Mountain which is also the novel's intellectual highpoint. This is the dream of Hans Castorp which he saw in the snowstorm and then almost forgot. This dream as it appears to Castorp, is a very German synthesis of myth as belonging to both the barbarian, half-animal world and to its Classical-humanist "beautiful" opposite. We are to choose humanism, i.e., the philosophy formed harmonious by the spirit, but we shoud never forget about the anti-humanistic powers lying deep under the surface in the instinctive world of myths. This peculiar Classicism was opposed to the anti-humanistic trends in the "wrong" German interpretation of myths and looked forward to the victory of humanism over the new barbarism. Later Thomas Mann, to some extent drifting away from his German upbringing, abandoned this viewpoint. The Joseph novel as we know it is a humanized myth, the world of the Bible, as opposed to the dangerous myth or, according to Mann, to the senseless demonic idols of a rigid, monotonous world. It is a representation of human beings as "blest from deep below and from above as well"; it is an elevation of the soul, a symbol of the instinctive, as well as its reconciliation with and reassurance through the spirit.

Kerényi, 25 years Mann's junior, was raised in the same German Lebensphilosophie and Geisteswissenschaft as Thomas Mann had been a generation earlier. As a classical philologist and religious historian Kerényi was attached to German Romanticism and to the Romantic interpretation of Classicism as derived from Goethe and Hölderlin; it was this attachment that determined his occupation with Greek religion and mythology. Kerényi, along with the mainstream of German scholarship, considered Nietzsche's philosophy more productive for his scholarly work than the positivist historicism of Wilamowitz, even though he was aware of the fact that in the debate concerning the origin of tragedy Wilamowitz was right and Nietzsche was wrong, at least from a philological point of view. Kerényi, being chiefly influenced by the Nietzschean heritage as well as by the so-called Frankfurt school of religious historians and philologists, could never commit himself to German intellectual imperialism. The Frankfurt school (namely, W.F. Otto, K. Reinhardt and F. Altheim) never supported the idea of a German genius or calling. To be precise and not paint a false picture, in his youth and even into his early thirties Kerényi was not at all conscious about all this. He still

drew upon the ideas of the George-circle (which were rather outdated, or at least developed in a way very much open to question) in 1934 and 1935 when trying to provide intellectual support for the Hungarian reform movement. As he wrote in a letter to his brilliant student János Honti in Paris during the summer of 1934, "I highly recommend that you read Wolters' Stephan George und die Blätter für die Kunst and Kommerell's Der Dichter als Führer from the viewpoint of our common world (or island) to clarify our thoughts concerning people and poets. Moreover, it provides an excellent opportunity for a synthesis, better, for an organic extension and application." Without doubt it was Thomas Mann's influence that made Kerényi exclude these ideas from his later works. But it did not take place in the way assumed by some readers of their early correspondence, who stated that Mann sharply attacked Kerényi for his irrationalism and his close relationship with Klages. In one of his letters Kerényi denied this charge saying that his own attitude to Klages was firmly critical - which was certainly true if we exclusively consider the letters written to Thomas Mann. Anyway, we should point out that it is altogether improper to view their relationship from this perspective since Nietzsche and German Lebensphilosophie in general had an influence on Thomas Mann as well. He actually continued under these influences even when his Voltairean leanings began to hold ever greater sway over his thinking. These half-vanished, half-preserved thoughts helped Mann to survive the intellectual vicissitudes of his time. A good example of this is his evaluation of Nietzsche's - doubtlessly somewhat vague - contemporary, Bachofen. At a time when anti-intellectual forces were gaining strength, Mann condemned the Swiss scholar as an irrationalist, but in 1945 he wrote to Kerényi, who was studying Bachofen at that very time, that his in-progress Faustus book would regard Nietzsche as more important than Bachofen. "You probably perfectly understand," he added, "that my statements on Bachofen in the twenties were inspired by a political anxiety and by the way he had been purposely misinterpreted. After all, he certainly had a sense for the infernal, which humanism could hardly lack. Still, he was not at all conservative and his crowning achievement was his interpretation of the Zeus religion. I did not feel his timing and way of presentation were didactic enough, but I personally have never been afraid of this man from Basel and have studied him almost as carefully as I have Schopenhauer."

Kerényi went his own way but was influenced, perhaps not quite consciously, by Thomas Mann's thoughts. "Myth plus psychology", Mann wrote before 1945, "was the way to save myths from distortion." This conception was adopted by Kerényi in a rather original way. He never considered myth a phenomenon which

could serve anti-humanistic purposes; he rather concentrated on interpreting its humanistic character. Thus, in the second half of the thirties, he arrived at an ethnological approach to myth (at first he admired Frobenius as a philosopher of culture and only later as an ethnologist; this latter role was far more productive for Kerényi) and planned to compile a world mythology which was to be large yet not speculative. Pál Gulyás from Debrecen also contributed to this project by drawing Kerényi's attention to Finno-Ugrian mythology and to the ancient tradition of Rumanian folk tales.

All this coincided with a great change in American and European intellectual life. The fact that German Geisteswissenschaft was to a large extent ideologically compromised and the imposition of exile on a part of the German intellectual elite made academics hostile to fascism, like Kerényi, seek a new orientation. Kerényi's letters to Thomas Mann and others as well as his writings (especially his important essay Mi a mitológia [What is Mythology]) clearly reflect his intellectual metamorphosis and all his misgivings about belonging to the German intellectual world. At the end of the thirties he was proclaiming his ever increasing fascination with the results of English and American research into mythology and religious history. As early as 1938 he was thinking of emigrating to the United States and he tried to obtain Thomas Mann's aid by pleading his need for information on American Indians for a planned work on world mythology. He was even more open about his desires with his old friend Károly Tolnay, a Hungarian art historian who taught at Princeton from 1938 on. "I wish I could get out of the German cultural atmosphere," he wrote to him in a letter, "if only my Italian book could be published in English!" Besides, he was in despair about the ever worsening circumstances in Hungary. He was worried that Western intellectuals from the distance could not distinguish between fascist German (and Hungarian) scholars and humanistic ones, now a minority. As he wrote to Tolnay about his own work, "Will the Anglo-Saxon world understand that this attitude and these thoughts (although they aspire to be as noble as those of Goethe or Hölderlin) are not German but humanistic thoughts? And quite a few opponents of this attitude and thinking are already in America... Now that I have begun to make myself understood by the Dutch and Swedes, it seems that my destiny is to be published in German and now in Italian. It is not as if it were without pleasure to take part in the tragedy of the spirit to this extent. I have already given you the address of Thomas Mann... he is perhaps the only one who understands this tragic situation."

These worries did not make Kerényi abandon the stimulation he had derived from German scholarship. In addition to studying mythology with the approach of

religious history, theology and ethnology, he began drawing upon the methodologies of psychology, anthropology and philosophy. He wrote about this in 1943 from his new home in Switzerland to Lajos Fülep, whom he loved and respected. "The scholar of Greek culture and the religious man nakedly confronting the Absolute have the same task: to reach an understanding of man. As a science it is anthropology but it has nothing to do with what has been called anthropology heretofore: it is built on the plain ground of humanity. That is what all truly humanistic efforts should be aiming at... This is the goal I share with psychologists. That is how my 'philology' was able to become ethnology (Frobenius; anthropology' in English) and now psychology, which in the final analysis should be anthropology (Jung gives us only a start; Szondi is more important from an anthropological point of view; they both lack a philosophical basis and Jung's thoughts also lack coherence)." This quotation requires more detailed commentary.

Doubtlessly, Mann's influence contributed to Kerényi's turn to psychology. But, as always, Kerényi preserved his individuality. He never accepted the psychological interpretation of mythology, especially in its Freudian version, nor attempts to decipher myths by means of individual psychology. He also rejected the theory which considered pre-Classical and Classical Greek religion as a set of shared spiritual qualities, since according to this approach such a collective consciousness is based on individual neuroses or the drive for compensation. This is why Kerényi criticized Jung's thoughts on the archetype even though they proved to be productive for him for a while. He saw spiritual archetypes as still-surviving attitudinal and behavioural patterns and not as farfetched abstract spiritual forms (such as the archetypes of the circle, the square or the Deity) which Jung allegedly discovered in mental patients, cult symbols and mythology as well. As János György Szilágyi pointed out, these different points of view were already present in the first book co-authored by Jung and Kerényi entitled Das göttliche Kind in mythologischer und psychologischer Beleuchtung (1940). Later on Kerényi even more consciously distinguished himself from Jung and from purely psychological interpretation in general. Jung's goal, he wrote to Dénes Kövesdi, his best friend in Hungary in 1946, "is really Ganzheit. He is quite conscious about it; he consciously worked out a synthetic psychological method, as opposed to Freud's analytical one and he created komplexe Psychologie, but that is exactly what limits his Ganzheit, as well as that of all psychologists. They confront Nature, indeed culture as it is constituted in the outside world, i.e., not built up only in the Dreams of the Soul, in an astonishingly detached, strange way. They have no feeling for such things. Or, to be more precise, they are incredibly attracted to the 'systematic' quality of natural sciences, as Professor

Szondi would put it, and their great illusion is that of a perfect system. For Szondi this means some human Linnaeus, but for others astrology does just as well because it is 'systematic'. Soul and nature, man and the outside world are all made coherent by mythology, philosophy and all sorts of art and not by psychology - not by any one of the sciences by itself."

As we can see, and it can only partly be traced in his correspondence with Mann, Kerényi ceaselessly sought a firm theoretical basis for his interpretation of mythology. The culmination of this quest was reached with his study What is Mythology? (1939), which also reflects the influence of Thomas Mann. It met with Mann's complete approval. Kerényi never again reached this intellectual plateau in his later works. The sort of philosophical anthropology which was dominant in his works after 1945 was an approach to mythology (and to other wide-ranging fields of research already mentioned) perhaps most reminiscent of the natural philosophy of Goethe. As a matter of fact, it was not really a historical and structural analysis but, as was also pointed out by János György Szilágyi, a phenomenological description. However, these problems were not discussed in the Mann-Kerényi correspondence and therefore could scarcely have interfered with their relationship.

Another aspect of Kerényi's approach to myth helped make their relationship mutually beneficial, especially for Mann. Kerényi, as has been emphasized by his critics, less and less accepted the Classicist interpretation of myth - held mainly by W.F. Otto - since it viewed the Greek divinities in the never-changing, motionless form which they acquired during the Homeric period and deprived them of their "wolf-like harshness". The Classicist interpretation ignores the wild, orgiastic and magic characteristics these figures doubtlessly had in the pre-Classical period and which were always present throughout the history of Greek religion. Thomas Mann, in many ways a Classicist, paradoxically enough was most strongly influenced by Kerényi, drawing away from Classicism. His emphasis on the mythical figures' inner ambivalence helped Mann combine the half-rejected, half-preserved Nietzschean tradition with the theories of modern psychology in such a way that humanistic forces achieved victory by drawing upon the dramatic power of myths.

As a matter of fact it was the Nietzsche question which brought about the only conflict between them. Kerényi was aware that due to the experience of fascism the old ideas and ideals could not possibly remain unchanged. As is shown in a letter from 1945 critical of Goethe's "courtly humanism", he argued against ignoring the new circumstances and even changed his old views about the symbolic island. The humanist, he wrote, "is in despair when he is alone or isolated

from the intellectual community; he wants to be left alone by the authorities. Nor does he want to be doomed to 'helplessness'. He would like to be active... A new intellectual forum should be established outside of universities, ... an academic forum that Goethe might still have founded had there been no Weimar. And there is no Weimar any more..."

During and after the war Kerényi was apparently aware that both the world's and his own situation had changed. He was worried about the new Hungary and his place in it. He wrote to Thomas Mann that he doubted the need for a scholar like himself. And in fact he was soon being attacked in Hungary as an irrationalist. For a while - unfortunately only for a while - he was even defended by his students who were to become Marxists. At the beginning of 1947 he wrote to Béla Hamvas, "if I mention politics at all it would be to point out that wherever I have been so far has been on the political left. Not because I deliberately chose this to be in opposition to the political right, but simply because whether I wanted it or not, my opinion has always been revolutionary. I am not going to choose the other side just because I am now being attacked from the 'left'. Why should my convictions depend on my enemies'? They will not make me do that. Nor will I accept their view of what the political right is."

In the mid-40s he often stressed his attachment to humanism. Always claiming to be a hùmanist, he wanted to prove that he was a humanist in the traditional sense too. Still, he never saw humanism as being in opposition to the Nietzschean tradition or the more recent philosophical trends. The humanist's responsibilities, he emphasized, had increased since the time of Bachofen and Nietzsche: "the days of Zarathustra games are over". However, immediately after the war he strongly turned against anything which would have limited his scholarly work to the old positivist - historicist path of Wilamowitz. Kerényi felt it important to remind Thomas Mann of the discussion he had had in 1945 with the "pedant". A healthy scepticism towards science, Kerényi wrote to his critic, is essential if we want to do real scientific work; the so-called realism of historicism depended entirely upon speculation. It had an irrational basis, so to speak, and in Germany it also helped promote a sense of a historical calling and expansionist ambitions.

To this we can compare the correspondence exchanged in 1946 between Kerényi and Lajos Hatvany, who was still living in exile. Hatvany had harshly criticized the classical philology taught at the University of Berlin in his important book, A tudni nem érdemes dolgok tudománya (The Science of Things Not Worth Knowing), published in German in 1908. In a letter to Kerényi, Hatvany presented an almost hysterical criticism of a thin volume, Romandichtung und

Mythologie, which contained part of the correspondence (1936-45) between Mann and Kerényi. He criticized Mann's Joseph novel with especial harshness. "This novel," Hatvany wrote, "is four volumes of arteriosclerosis. I find it difficult to grasp the loftiness in the Mann-Kerényi correspondence. To be quite frank I do not understand it... The Briefwechsel is passed from hand to hand in Oxford - the emigré professors come knocking on my door, all feverishly reading it, although they do not recommend it to their students," Hatvany added. This letter was answered by Kerényi in the form of a brief historical overview. "To be quite precise, I would like to summarize my intellectual development in the following way: when I was a young philologist I assumed the satire you wrote about the University of Berlin in Wissenschaft des Nichtwissenswerten was more cruel than it deserved; when we first met [in the 30s] I thought it was rather fair; and measured by today's standards, don't think that criticism of the Golden Age of Wilamowitz was satisfactory enough. I do not know your opinion, but Wilamowitz has a fearful effect on me when I read in Hellenistische Dichtung his conclusion that in the Apollo-hymn of Kallimachos the poet of Kyrene propagated the Anschluss, that is, an Anschluss to Egypt. Where was the Anschluss of Hitler at that time?... Perhaps in the subconscious of German professors of history and philology... Intentionally, I do not cite examples in a similar vein from the conscious Wilamowitz, though it is not difficult to find a couple of them... I fear even emigrés criticize Thomas Mann's Briefwechsel because it celebrates a different kind of human value; namely, productivity as opposed to predation. Perhaps you do not acknowledge the existence of predatoriness or power-hunger, nor do you recognize productive, humanistic values. Perhaps that is why the Briefwechsel remains incomprehensible to you."

The letters written to Thomas Mann and the introductory notes of the volume show how anxiously Kerényi awaited the Nietzsche novel (i.e., Doktor Faustus) and how disappointed he was after having read it. How Mann could have so oversimplified the image of Nietzsche still astonished him fifteen years later. Their correspondence significantly decreased between 1947 and 1949. This was only natural. As Thomas Mann wrote to Kerényi in the autumn of 1948, "the Joseph novel is already far behind me and we are not the close companions we were when I was working on it." But one cause of their estrangement was the problem of Faustus and Nietzsche. It was an effort for Kerényi to squeeze out some words of praise for this book so dear to Mann and he did not give a clear answer when Mann urged him to write a review of it. He wrote in thinly veiled language to Mann that he expected another book from him which would

correct or balance Doktor Faustus. That was why Kerényi welcomed the new novel, The Chosen One, from which he had good reason to conclude that Mann had given up his one-sided interpretation of Nietzsche (which of course had been understandable during the time of the fascist threat) - and had rediscovered his former self.

From then until Thomas Mann's death their correspondence resumed its former intimacy. The Chosen One, Felix Krull and some other works of Mann's old age revived their relationship with regard to the study of myths. Not long before the death of the great novelist, in a letter written in 1954, Kerényi movingly summarized the fruits of their collaboration, emphasizing the benefits he had derived from the two-decade-long intellectual friendship. Whether or not we appreciate Kerényi's efforts in explicating myths and in defending his life's work, his words here carry a message valuable for us today. "The old-fashioned concept of material culture became morally untenable long ago because it has not shown itself in the least capable of resisting the totalitarian attacks of the half-educated and uneducated. What we aging Europeans can show the younger generation is the transformation of our purely material (and consequently limited) culture into one that is open to learning about and accepting the old and the new. At the time our correspondence was published I was constantly thinking of saying to the young people: Look, all of you! This is how we old people learn. We are neither dogmatic nor nihilistic and we value all the culture of the past in its every possible detail. How else could we still exist?"

M i k l ó s L a c k ó

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TRANSYLVANIA AND THE GREAT POWERS - 1945
(PETRU GROZA AND THE HUNGARIAN-RUMANIAN FRONTIER ISSUE)

On April 23, 1946, the Hungarian government debated the Hungarian peace aims and decided to send Pál Sebestyén[1] as extraordinary and plenipotentiary envoy to start negotiations with Rumanian Prime Minister Petru Groza and his deputy, Foreign Minister Tătărescu, with the intention of improving relations between the two countries and of settling the territorial and minority issues. The Foreign Ministry was instructed to prepare a territorial memorandum. It was the last minute for the hope that the two defeated states could find an acceptable solution to their historical discord instead of relying on the verdict of the victorious great powers, as had been the case with the peace treaty following the First World War.

The Hungarian-Rumanian frontier issue had been left open for decision by Article 19 of the armistice signed in Moscow on September 12, 1944: "Transylvania (or the greater part thereof)[2] should be returned to Rumania, subject to confirmation at the peace settlement."[3] A Council of Foreign Ministers for settling territorial issues and preparing peace treaties was formed in Potsdam. The Foreign Ministers of the three Great Powers (the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain) had the right to make decisions concerning the Rumanian-Hungarian frontier.

The Groza Government and Northern Transylvania

The government crisis which lasted for more than a week following the resignation of General Radescu ended on March 6, 1945. King Michael, having negotiated with the leaders of the political parties and with A.J. Vishinsky, Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs who was staying in Bucharest at the time, at last agreed that dr Petru Groza, president of the Ploughmen Front would form a cabinet consisting of representatives of the National Democratic Front and the liberal party of Tătărescu. The 'historical parties' which governed 'Great Ru-

mania' between the two wars went into opposition, because Iuliu Maniu and D. Brătianu did not accept the offers made to the National Peasant Party and to the National Liberal Party.

The coming to power of the Groza cabinet caused a clash between the Allies that lasted until the conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow at the end of December, 1945. The left-wing government was supported by the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Groza and Foreign Minister Tătărescu appealed directly by telegram to the Soviet Prime Minister on March 8, 1945 promising that "the Rumanian government will protect the rights of the minorities living in Transylvania and will work for equality, democracy and just relations for all its inhabitants."[4] As the new Rumanian government had taken the responsibility for guaranteeing peace and order and the rights of ethnic minorities in Transylvania, Stalin approved the introduction of Rumanian administration in Northern Transylvania.

The Groza cabinet considered the settling of the administration issue as resolving the frontier dispute as well.[5] On June 13, 1945 in his speech at Kolozsvár (Cluj), Minister of Justice L. Pătrăscanu confirmed the "final incorporation of Northern Transylvania within the borders of Rumania" and, as a member of the delegation sent to Moscow and also as president of the Rumanian armistice committee, he stated that "even if one or another article of the armistice was subject to debate (in Moscow), the one issue settled by the resolute and generous will of the Soviet government was the return of Northern Transylvania to Rumania."[6] A few weeks earlier, in a communiqué of March 12, 1945, US Secretary of State Stettinius had contradicted this perception: he declared that the reintroduction of Rumanian administration in Northern Transylvania did not alter the international status of the territory. The Soviet government, respecting the principle of common decisions made by the three great powers, did not settle the issue definitely. Soviet councillor Oshukin, deputy of Envoy Pushkin, referring to Article 19 of the Rumanian armistice, made it clear for Hungarian Foreign Minister János Gyöngyösi in Debrecen that "the entry of Rumanian administration in Northern Transylvania shall by no means prejudice the Peace Treaties."[7]

During the peace negotiations it was the Soviet position which proved to be decisive concerning the final Hungarian-Rumanian frontier. The relevant views of the Soviet government were formed before the turn of the war in Rumania, when the terms of the armistice with Rumania were worked out. In a letter addressed to the British Ambassador in Moscow on June 7, 1943, Molotov claimed the "he did not consider fully justifiable the so-called Award dictated by Germany in Vienna on August 30, 1940, which gave Northern Transylvania to Hungary (italics mine - M.F.)"[8]. The officials of the Foreign Office understood that this viewpoint

"would obviously give certain parts or the whole of Northern Transylvania to Rumania" but the Soviet principle imposing the return of all the occupied territories "would not oblige us to return the whole of Transylvania to Rumania".[9] The conditions of the Rumanian armistice prepared by the Soviet government were ready by April 12, 1944 and were handed over to Prince Barbu Stirbey, representative of the Rumanian opposition. The document declared the German-imposed Vienna Award unjust and called for coordinated Soviet-Rumanian military operations against the German and Hungarian troops with the object of "restoring to Rumania all of Transylvania or the major part thereof."[10] The latter formula was included at Churchill's request, since the original Soviet proposal was to "return the whole of Transylvania to Rumania".

On August 26, 1944, Molotov informed the Allies that he would still accept the conditions of the armistice prepared in April after the August 23 revolution in Rumania provided that the British addendum be omitted; in other words, Molotov proposed the reestablishment of the Trianon frontiers. The British Foreign Office did not find the concessions given to Rumania reasonable; on August 28 it again requested that the original proposed formula be accepted. The American State Department wanted to postpone settling the territorial issues until after the end of the war and therefore supported the British position.[11] The Soviet government, taking into consideration the points made by its allies, agreed to include the above-mentioned formula into Article 19 of the Rumanian armistice, which was finally signed in Moscow on September 12, 1944. A further consideration which led to the Soviet foreign policy of leaving the issue open for decision was the possibility of Hungary's withdrawal from the war. As we shall see, this was later referred to by the Soviet foreign minister at the peace negotiations in London.

In the spring of 1945, Petru Groza held that "it is by all means in our common interest that Rumania and Hungary come to an agreement before appearing at the peace conference". His idea was to create "a united block from the Leitha to the Black Sea", "the nucleus of which would be the Rumanian-Hungarian confederation where customs procedures at the frontiers would disappear and a common currency and total political cooperation would be introduced". This was opposed by Tătărescu on pragmatic policy grounds because he thought that such regional agreements would not be welcomed by the Soviet Union. The Rumanian foreign minister did not agree with Groza's plan to visit Hungary 'in a private capacity'; he held that Rumania could resume relations with Hungary only after 'settling certain issues first'.[12] While the points of view of Groza and Tătărescu differed concerning the reestablishment of the political relationship,

they coincided concerning the territorial issue. As it was put by an official of the Rumanian Foreign Ministry, "even Groza's pro-Hungarianism does not extend to the territorial issue since the political basis of his cabinet depends upon the facts that they got hold of Transylvania and that they will keep it in the possession of Rumania. Groza knows this very well and therefore insists on the western frontiers of Transylvania."[13]

Hungarian Foreign Minister János Gyöngyösi held that the basic principle of the new Hungarian foreign policy was that "the new democratic Hungary does not identify itself in any way with the previous reactionary, wartime governments" and "we have put an end to the idea of historic Hungary by signing the armistice."[14] An outline of the ideological basis of the peace negotiations was finished by the Peace Treaty Division of the Foreign Ministry by July 2 and was approved by the cabinet on July 25. Their starting point was that "the solution most in harmony with international justice, human progress and at the same time with the principles of democracy, socialism, and the agreements between the Allies would be to draw the Central European frontiers" in accordance with the Wilsonian right of peoples to self-determination and Lenin's ethnic principle. "There are many signs of the latter's being put into practice, therefore we feel it reasonable to demand this in the case of Hungary." Considered acceptable were exchanges of population combined with territorial compensation, plebiscites for Hungarian minorities living in contiguous blocks and population exchanges in cases of scattered minority groups. "However, if the Trianon or similar frontiers remain in force, international agreement will be required to resolve the consequent anomalies in the economic, transport, cultural and waterway issues. These are not exclusively the concerns of Hungary but also those of all the nations in the region"... "the new settlement should eliminate the significance of frontiers and evoke comfort, rather than despair, in people's souls."

The directives dealt separately with the neighbouring countries. It was stated that "in numerous ways the political situation of Hungary resembles that of Rumania. Moreover, in many respects Rumania's record is worse than ours (e.g., it participated in the war against Russia with larger forces, proved unreliable to the Western powers, to which it owes everything, it served the Third Reich faithfully and in the most important international and national issues it exhibited even less resistance to German pressure than Hungary), but these are not to be considered decisive elements in assessing the international political status of the two states. Perhaps more important is the fact that Rumania has a clash of interest with Russia rooted in political realism, whereas Hungary does not. Nevertheless, Rumanian foreign policy has given so many proofs of its fantastic

flexibility and adaptability, that it will probably also be able to adapt to this setback, as opposed to us who, out of inflexibility and delay, are not even able to make good use of our advantages. Rumania's withdrawal from the war is not comparable to ours and their achievements since joining the Allies show that the Rumanian political genius makes it a rival not to be underestimated." The Peace Treaty Division elaborated plans for the solution of the territorial issue, for the exchange of populations and for an independent or at least largely autonomous Transylvania to be put into the scales in the event of Rumanian territorial demands: "The armistice with Rumania surely raises hopes for the reannexation of at least a part of Northern Transylvania. Questions of what, when and how to take advantage of this opportunity depend upon political expediency and are decisively influenced by the relationship between the two states and with Russia." Finally, the Peace Treaty Division referred to the fact that "the conciliatory policy the Groza government exhibited towards Hungary and its people fully harmonizes with Rumania's territorial aspirations. It is probable that Groza and his small political group sincerely want to establish friendly cooperation with us Hungarians, but the experienced politicians who run Rumanian foreign policy support his position only because it is the most clever tactic they have at the moment. Indeed, if Groza only succeeds in improving the appearance of Hungarian-Rumanian relations, then Rumania will be able to proclaim that there is no Hungarian-Rumanian border issue, because, considering the improved relationship of the two nations, the borders do not play an important part any more. At the very least they will continue to do their best to establish a profound Hungarian-Rumanian friendship, but if the Hungarians still insist on a revision of the Trianon frontiers, then it will be regarded as only a recurrence of the revisionist 'kilometer-disease'."[15]

The Hungarian government presented its case regarding the peace negotiations before the three great powers after the Potsdam conference, on August 14, 1945. Their memorandum emphasized the role of the United Nations in protecting the rights of ethnic minorities and urged economic and cultural cooperation between the nations living along the Danube as well as "the application of the ethnic principle" in territorial issues wherever possible.[16]

The peace negotiations started at the first session of the conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, on September 11, 1945. The Allied Great Powers drafted the peace treaties without considering the wishes found in the nascent Hungarian peace-treaty proposal. The Rumanian-Hungarian frontier issue had become part of a major political clash and its resolution was subordinated to settling Rumania's political crisis.

The Rumanian Political Crisis and the "Transylvania-Debate" at the Council of Foreign Ministers in London

On August 19, 1945, King Michael of Rumania called upon Prime Minister Groza to resign, referring to the fact that the United States and Great Britain had failed to recognize his government and therefore Groza would not be able to represent Rumania properly at the peace treaty conferences. Groza responded to this by declaring that his government actually was "never stronger and had entire Soviet support", adding that "the question of American recognition of his government was of little significance and that the Soviet Union would eventually secure Anglo-American agreement to a peace treaty".[17] However, the king, expecting American support, turned to the representatives of the three great powers. He requested that they support the formation of a government that would be recognized by the United States and Great Britain. The American secretary of State, referring to the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, proposed a meeting between the three great powers. The Soviet government turned this down.

On August 31, 1945, the Rumanian foreign minister sent a request to the Soviets, asking them to receive a Rumanian delegation in Moscow in September, i.e. before Molotov went to London, to discuss the draft peace treaties. Tătărescu wanted the Soviet foreign minister to act as a 'spokesman of Rumanian interests' at the conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London and desired a "preliminary conclusion of peace between the Soviet Union and Rumania".[18] Prime Minister Petru Groza and Foreign Minister Gheorghe Tătărescu signed a number of Rumanian-Soviet agreements designed to improve Rumania's economic situation in Moscow between September 4 and 13, 1945. The Rumanian prime minister was guaranteed full support by the Soviet government, which stabilized his political position before the negotiations in London.

At the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London (September 11 - October 2, 1945) the Soviet delegation proposed that "Article 19 of the Armistice Agreement dealing with the frontiers of Hungary should be amplified to indicate that the whole of Transylvania will be restored to Rumania", "in view of the assistance rendered by Rumania to the cause of the Allies in the war against Germany". The American delegation urged that an examination be made of the claims of the two states. The British delegation, in reply to the Soviet proposal, stated that the question of whether the whole of Transylvania should be returned to Rumania cannot be decided only on the basis of Rumania's war record" and held the opinion that "it is very important to obtain a Hungarian-Rumanian frontier which is equitable in itself". The French Foreign Ministry, although not having the right to make decisions, outlined a "Rumanian annexation

of the Transylvanian highland and Bánát and a return of the Eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain to Hungary" but did not present this as an official motion.[19]

The reestablishment of the Trianon frontiers was supported by Molotov at the session of September 20, 1945, arguing that because of the close intermingling of the Rumanian majority and the Hungarian minority "it was impossible to draw a line that would not leave many Rumanians in Hungary and many Hungarians in Rumania" and that "it was common knowledge that the transfer of Transylvania to Rumania in 1919 had the approval of the United States, British and French governments" with only the Soviet Union not agreeing. Molotov announced that he was now "authorized to state that the Soviet Union agrees with awarding the territory of Transylvania to Rumania". "Hitler had disagreed with that decision and cancelled it. The Allies' duty was to reverse Hitler's decision and restore their own." The Soviet foreign minister, referring to Hungary's failure to join the Allies, made it clear: "The wording of Article 19 of the Rumanian Armistice terms had been carefully chosen so as not to tie their hands in case any new circumstances should arise. But nobody had suggested that new circumstances had arisen." He therefore recommended that the Trianon decision should be approved.

The French foreign minister, Bidault, urged that an ethnic principle be applied which had been established in the Yugoslavian-Italian-Istrian frontier issue with special provisions to protect national minorities, and proposed to confirm only those parts of the 1919-20 peace treaties which were "reasonable". The British foreign minister, Bevin, only wanted to "get a just and equitable frontier". In the opinion of the American foreign minister, Byrnes, by "a slight change in the Transylvanian frontier it would be possible to restore half a million Hungarians to Hungary". He was referring to a territory of 3,000 square miles (7680 square kilometres - M.F.), less than one-tenth of Transylvania, but did not strongly insist on his proposal: "if the modification (of the frontier) will prove to be impossible, the American delegation will not insist on it". Molotov did not object to considering the American proposal. The Council of the Foreign Ministers came to the decision that "the frontier with Hungary shall be, in general, the frontier existing in 1938; however, as regards Transylvania, the ethnic situation shall be examined with a view to determining whether the award of a small part to Hungary would materially reduce the number of persons to be subjected to alien rule".[20]

Taking all of this into account, it is not surprising that instead of carefully considering the issues, disputes between the defeated states were settled primarily on the basis of their respective statuses and the political considerations of the Allies. In addition, during the autumn of 1945 the Allies found the Bulgarian-

Rumanian issue far more important than the Hungarian one. That is why it was later possible to formulate the peace treaties based on the principles which were agreed to then by the three great powers in September, 1945, although the recognition of Hungary by the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain, as well as the elections held on November 4 made the Hungarian issue distinct from that of the recognition of the Rumanian and Bulgarian governments. On the other hand, the real conclusion to the peace negotiations was only possible after the struggle to recognize the Rumanian government had been successfully concluded, i.e., after several months' detour. On October 2, 1945 the London session was postponed with no joint communiqué having been issued.

The Effect of the London Conference in Rumania and in Hungary - The Moscow Conference

After the Soviet Union informed the Groza government about the Allies' viewpoints at the Council of Foreign Ministers regarding the Rumanian-Hungarian frontier issue, the news became widely known in the Rumanian world by the end of 1945.[21] The 'stubbornness' with which Molotov defended the 'democratic' character of the Groza-cabinet in London went further than Foreign Minister Tătărescu had ever expected and made it possible to maintain the Rumanian political status quo. On October 12, 1945, Tătărescu publicly stated that the Soviet Union was representing the best interests of the whole of Rumania, not just those of the Rumanian government, at the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers.[22]

On the other hand, the Hungarian government did not know the details of the peace treaties being worked out in London and was not informed about the debate over the frontier issue by the United States, Great Britain or France. As a matter of fact, the Americans regarded their proposal for the solution of the Rumanian-Hungarian territorial debate more a component of a larger political struggle than a gesture towards the Hungarians, and it was not coordinated in any way with the diplomacy of the Hungarian government.[23]

During the autumn of 1945, the formulation of Hungarian peace aims was hindered by both national and international conditions. The peace negotiations from beginning to end were conducted by the victorious powers; hearing the viewpoints of the five defeated states was out of the question until the middle of January, 1946. At a time when Hungary's political parties were devoting all their energies to an election campaign, the country was faced with one of its most serious post-war problems: the expulsion of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia and Germans from Hungary.

The debate of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London disquieted Groza

as well. On November 1, 1945, Groza told the delegation of the Hungarian Committee upon their arrival in Bucharest that the most important feature of the Hungarian-Rumanian relationship was the maintenance and building of friendship and that raising the frontier issue would only 'revive chauvinism and revisionism'. He said that changing the frontiers by one or two counties was insignificant and that there would be an "inflow of chauvinism and revisionism through a leak of 20 metres' correction of the frontier and, instead of mollifying the situation, discord between the two nations will reoccur". Groza, referring to his negotiations in Moscow in September, 1945, added that the plan of establishing a customs union and the reassumption of diplomatic relationship with Hungary "met (Stalin's) the utmost approval". Groza said he knew very well that some political circles would prefer that the Rumanian-Hungarian issue be decided by the Allies rather than by the two concerned parties. "It was bad enough when two great powers made decisions for us in Vienna. This time we do not need three great powers deciding for us (italics in the original - M.F.)." "Those favouring a decision by the great powers are chauvinists and fascists." As a farewell, Groza said that "if Hungary were to demand changes in the existing frontiers, then Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia would probably make claims on Hungarian territory and thus a final reconciliation and resolution would never come to pass."[24]

Several times during the autumn of 1945, Petru Groza made public his thoughts on 'Hungarian-Rumanian friendship': "Solution of the frontier issue is of secondary importance to our two peoples. Our primary task is to promote democracy and peaceful cooperation between the peoples living in the Danube plain. Our nations have reached adulthood. Leave us alone and I am convinced that we shall build one of the happiest communities in the world here in the Danube region sooner than we might expect. The first step on this road is the customs union." Groza also stated that he was "definitely against any exchange of populations. The heart cannot be torn from the body. Peoples cannot be made rootless. Everywhere in the world there is only one way: provide peoples with equal rights, abandon all forms of racial and national discrimination, and support fraternity and peace".[25]

At the December 15 - 27, 1945 session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, the peace treaties were the first item on the agenda. The Soviet, British and American foreign ministers agreed that the terms of the peace treaties would be decided by four Allied powers in the case of Italy, two in the case of Finland, and three in the cases of Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary (the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain). On the basis of understanding reached at the first plenary session of the Council of Foreign Ministers

in London, the foreign ministers' deputies were to start work immediately in London, finishing the drafting by May 1, 1946, at the latest. The Council would then convoke a conference with the purpose of considering the five peace treaties with the participation of the five members of the Council and the 16 member states of the UNO which actively waged war with substantial military force against European enemy states. After these discussions, the states signatory to the armistice terms would draw up the final texts of the peace treaties.

On December 23, the three great powers asked France to organize the conference. Byrnes, on behalf of the three governments, promised the French foreign minister that the Council of Foreign Ministers would have the final authority in decisions concerning the peace treaties, but all the Allies involved would be allowed to participate in broad and thorough discussions at the conference. He also guaranteed that the views of the states affected by the treaties would be taken into account. "As was permitted in the earlier meetings in London, full opportunities will be given these states to discuss the peace treaties and to present their views both in the formulation of the draft at the May conference."[26] On January 17, 1946 the French government accepted the peace treaty process as it had been formulated in Moscow. The decision on the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier issue was made by the great powers during the spring of 1946. However, during these crucial months the Hungarian and the Rumanian governments were not consulted.

After a meeting between Stalin and Byrnes on December 23, 1945, the three foreign ministers agreed that the three great powers would advise the Rumanian king that one member of the National Peasant Party and one member of the Liberal Party should be included in the government. When this was done, the Rumanian government was partially recognized by the American and the British governments in February, 1946. The Hungarian advantages, namely the 1945 autumn elections and the recognition of the Hungarian government, disappeared. The pendulum had again swung in favour of Rumania.

NOTES

1. Dr. Pál Sebestyén (1893-1973) was head of the Department of International Law of the Foreign Ministry between 1937 and 1941, and the minister's head of department between 1941 and 1944. During the time of the Provisional National Government he took part in the democratization of the foreign service and on August 1, 1945 he became the executive head or "general secretary" of the Foreign Ministry.
2. Here and below the term Transylvania designates the territories annexed to Rumania by the Trianon Peace Treaty of 1920.

3. See St. Lache - Gh. Tutui, România si Conferința de pace de la Paris din 1946 (Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference of 1946), Cluj-Napoca, 1978, p. 318.
4. Dániel Csatári, Forgószélben (In a whirlwind), Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1969, pp. 461-462.
5. On March 24, 1945 Groza declared for the delegates of the Hungarian government that "the problem causing discord between our governments and nations can be considered no longer existing". See Ildikó Lipcsey, "Réczei László feljegyzései 1945 márciusi romániai megbeszéléseiről" (László Réczei's records of his March, 1945 talks in Rumania), Történelmi Szemle 1984/4, pp. 96-117, and New Hungarian Central Archive, Foreign Ministry, Peace Treaty Division (hereafter NHCA-FM PTD), 40024/Bé/1945.
6. Universul, June 17, 1945.
7. Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1945. vol. V. pp. 527-528. NHCA-FM PTD 146/Bé.res/ 1945.
8. Magyar-brit titkos tárgyalások 1943-ban (Hungarian-British secret negotiations in 1943), collected and edited by Gyula Juhász, Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1978, p. 159.
9. Ibid. pp. 160-161.
10. FRUS, 1944, vol. IV. pp. 170-172; Public Record Office, Foreign Office (hereafter FO/37140732). Lord Moyne's telegram no. 948 from Cairo, April 18, 1944.
11. FO 37140732; FRUS 1944.vol. IV. 200.1.
12. Ildikó Lipcsey, "Réczei László feljegyzései"; Népszava, May 20,1945. (Sándor Szalai's interview with Prime Minister Petru Groza on the common problems of Rumania and Hungary).
13. December 4, 1945,record of counsellor István Gyöngyössy, "Talk with a 'Hungarian expert' of the Rumanian foreign ministry on the possibility of the settlement of the Transylvanian question". NHCA-FM PTD 27/Bé-1946.
14. Új Magyarország, July 3, 1945. (Foreign Minister János Gyöngyösi's press conference on April 19, 1945.)
15. NHCA-PM PTD 14/Bé.res. István Kertész's record no. 1945 of July 2, 1945. Reviewed in Sándor Balogh, A népi demokratikus Magyarország külpolitikája 1945-1947 (The foreign policy of popular democratic Hungary 1945-1947), Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1982. p. 147.
16. La Hongrie et la Conférence de Paris, Budapest, 1947, vol.I. pp.7-14. Quoted in Stephen D. Kertész, Diplomacy in a Whirlpool, Notre Dame University Press, Indiana, 1953, pp. 262-266.
17. Paul D. Quinlan, Clash over Romania. British and American Policies toward Romania 1938-1947, Los Angeles, 1977, pp. 142-143; FRUS 1945, vol. V. p. 579.
18. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Archives et Documentation (hereafter MAE A.D) Série Z. Europe 1944-1949. Roumanie vol.8. Jean Paul-Boncour's telegram no. 122 of September 22, 1945.
19. FRUS 1945. vol. II. pp. 147-149.; MAE.A.D. Série Y Internationale vol.135; PRO, Cabinet Papers, 133.
20. FO 371.48319; MAE.A.D. Série Z. Europe, Roumanie vol.2.; FRUS 1945. vol. II. pp. 279-282.
21. MAE A.D. Série Z. Europe, 1944-1949, Roumanie vol.8. Jean Paul-Boncour's telegrams nos. 177-178 of October 18, 1945 and no. 42 of March 27, 1946 on Foreign Minister Tătărescu's statements; NHCA-FM PTD 41065/Bé/1945, record on p.5. Talk of Prime Minister dr. Petru Groza with the members of the Hungarian Committee for Refugees on November 1, 1945.
22. MAE A.D. Série Z. Europe 1944-1949. Roumanie vol. 8. J. Paul-Boncour's telegrams nos. 177-178 of October 18, 1945.

23. L.A. Squires, secretary at the American embassy in Budapest, mentioned the Transylvania debate to a Hungarian foreign ministry official in November, 1945. (I owe this information to Aladár Szegedy-Maszák.)
24. NHCA-FM PTD 41065/Bé - 1945, record quoted above.
25. Szabad Nép, December 20, 1945. (Miklós Vásárhelyi's interview with Petru Groza.) For the Rumanian statements on the conclusion of the frontier issue see also Népszava, May 20, 1945 and the August 23, 1945 speeches of Groza and Tătărescu.
26. MAE A.D. Série Y. Internationale 1944-1949. June /5.2.5./ vol. 127.

M i h á l y F ü l ö p

Hungarian Institute of International Relations

DOCUMENTS

FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF OSCAR JÁSZI AND KARL POLÁNYI

Oscar Jászi and Karl Polányi belonged to a group of great social scientists, including Georg Lukács, Karl Mannheim, Michael Polányi, Arnold Hauser and others, whose thought was rooted in the fertile intellectual atmosphere of fin-de-siècle Hungary, and whose activities later contributed to the growth of social science and culture throughout the world.

The parallelisms in the careers of Jászi and Polányi are particularly remarkable. Both of them started out from the intellectual and political movement for a democratic Hungary, and both of them were American professors when their long lives ended. They first met as early as the 1890s, probably at one of the meetings of left-wing intellectuals regularly held by Cecile Polacsek, Polányi's mother. Polányi later became a contributor of Huszadik Század (Twentieth Century), the first periodical of Hungarian sociology, edited by Jászi, while Jászi lent his patronage to the Galileo Circle, headed by Polányi. There were two periods of their close cooperation. First, in the mid-1910s, they led the National Bourgeois Radical Party as president and secretary. Second, in the early 1920s, now both exiles in Vienna, they developed very intense intellectual ties and collaboration. Their relationship became less intimate in the 1930s; however, the attachment between the two men was strengthened again in the anti-fascist movement during the Second World War. In their after-war correspondence their fundamental differences of opinion relating to the Soviet Union and the communist movement increasingly gained prevalence. Differences in approach thus made Jászi and Polányi's "quarrel-friendship" of several decades end as a rather strained relationship.

Most of the correspondence of Jászi and Polányi, which was started during the First World War, has been preserved among their papers (those of Jászi at Columbia University, Butler Library; those of Polányi at Pickering and, a part of it - owing to the activity of Erzsébet Vezér - in the National Széchényi Library,

Budapest). What follows is a selection of this rich material, primarily focussing on the period of the Second World War and its aftermath, when these two outstanding theorists and keen observers were preoccupied by the problems of the national and social reorganization of East-Central Europe. No completeness has been aimed at; letters of minor importance have been omitted, while only the fragments of some other letters are extant. The annotation is also confined on the most important persons and references.

J á n o s G y u r g y á k - G y ö r g y L i t v á n

Institute of Historical Sciences

Jan. 11th, 1943

My dear Oszkár,

I was very glad to read your articles and letters in the Harc and in the N.Y.T.[1] I fully agreed with everything.

Harper's have recently asked me for an article on the State Department's Russian policy, which they consider to be definitely negative.

My article has been accepted, as I hear.[2] My thesis is that Russia shouldn't be forced to follow a world revolutionary line, towards which she is becoming less and less inclined, although Russia could decide to follow it under the pressure of circumstances (i.e. the Hitler-Stalin agreement, and her extremely moderate Spanish policy at the time of the Popular Front, etc.). I supported my thesis with the argument that Russia could be a constructive element in Eastern Europe (nationality question, agrarian question, economic integration). In this respect my article certainly restricts itself only to allusions; political analysis is not in Harper's line. I list all Eastern European countries - from Finland to Albania - as being in the Russian sphere of interest conceived of in a broader sense, and in this connection I explicitly mention Hungary. The article is frankly unfriendly to the Communist Party and is definitely and pointedly independent of the interests of Russian policy. My criticism on the State Department is merciless.

I'm sorry that Grandpa[3] is the victim of a confused conservatism.

The most important personal news is that Ilona[4] and I are returning home.[5] She's going in spring and I in summer, after finishing my book.[6] Ilona resigned

her job here and refused a very flattering offer from the Reusselaer Polyt. Inst. in order to be able to present herself for voluntary service at home.

Lots of love
to you and Recha,

Your Karli

Dearest Recha and Oscar,

This is to send you my love, and lots of it.

Ilona

Jan. 18th, 1943

My dear Oszkár,

I've applied for a scholarship from the Guggenheim Foundation with a plan of work which is actually an extension of my present work. The subject is the Russian revolution as part of the world cataclysm of the year 1930.

I am pleased to find that I can easily cope with the Russian language; my memories from my childhood (and a command of the Polish language) help a lot.

The Foundation will probably require very good character references in the first place. For this reason I've given the names of all those who can give a reference on the basis of personal knowledge of me (Studebaker; Duggan; Federn; Lewis Jones - the Bennington president; D. Lindsay, Master of Balliol, who was my boss in England and who is now staying here). In this respect I have given your name as well.

The plan itself applies economic methods, and here I referred to J.Marschak, J.B.Condliffe and - for credit policy - to Drucker.

Before he invited me to present my competition paper I let the General Secretary of the Foundation know that it is not my intention to settle here.

I think the Russian revolution should be evaluated by a contemporary who has a real inner independence towards the subject. Soon we will run out of contemporaries. There have been few among them who would even put in a claim for such independence (not to speak of the authority of such a claim).

I am convinced that it is you more than anybody who can testify to my inaccessibility (not just in the trivial sense of the word), and in this case your word will carry more weight than anyone else's.

Affectionately, Your Karli

Oberlin
January 25th, 1943

My dear Karli,

I prefer to write in Hungarian, perhaps we'll understand each other better. Last time I wrote in English to answer your official letter written in English.[7] This letter of yours caused not my "unfriendliness" but my irritation. It made me feel that the letter was looking for an alibi and for this reason it was sermonizing on how an Anglo-Saxon gentleman should behave.

You accuse me of impatience. As you know I am an old liberal in this respect and I respect every honest conviction. Therefore I respect yours also, and I have always been convinced of the sincerity of it. But it is not the question of conviction, but of private and political honesty, that in the disguise of liberalism we shouldn't let scoundrels move freely. For years I have witnessed with great disappointment how Danubian emigrants try to preserve here the habits and value judgements of the Pest and Vienna cafés.

I understood your outburst against 'disclosures and personal remarks', in this way, too. Let's be fond of each other and be polite even to scoundrels. Such morals would completely poison the atmosphere. Of course I have always hated disclosures and personal remarks the way they occurred at home: they did it for fun, they were rude and they spat at each other without any reason. I have repeatedly written in Harc that this tone was detestable and was to be avoided. But this doesn't mean that we must tolerate the ravages of the delegates of the usury capitalism of Pest. We must make these figures harmless, if we can. It is purely a question of evidence. We do harm to the Hungarian people if we let these characters mislead America. Such good manners are much worse than beating up somebody honestly.

Those who complained to you of my certainly senile (this is how the teachers of the new policy morals call it) intransigency forgot to tell that there were no theoretical conflicts between us. However, we did have some disagreements over certain moral questions, such as: may we ally ourselves with the former leader of the Awakening Magyars?; is it right to extend our front in the direction of Békessy?[8]; can we forgive Göndör's[9] political immoralities on account of his 'good heart'?; should we throw a great combatant like Fényes[10] on the mercy of his enemies in order to avoid an unpleasant polemic; can we simply deny that the socialist leadership - with one or two exceptions - took part in the government of the dictatorship of the proletariat?

These were the discrepancies between us, not political or ideological differences. I was, I am and I shall be intransigent in questions such as these. But I

have always felt respect for heterodox people and I have always hated dogmatism. That's the reason why I feel closer to Kolnai than to several radical or socialist friends of mine, who 'follow' me.

When I reminded you of your Christian and Communist past I didn't mean to deprecate these respectable categories but instead intended to emphasize that it is not enough to speak about great theories and to spare dishonest politicians or let them escape at the same time. Such an attitude can lead neither to Christianity nor to Communism.

But I didn't mean to hurt you with the epithet 'Christian Communist'. really did believe that this term expressed best the direction of your intellectual development. And if have-been Marxists are deeply hurt if one calls them 'Communists' it never occurred to me this could hurt your sensibility also, since you always find a theoretical standing-point, while those 'Marxists' were pursuing a very practical policy and are now offended with Károlyi when he tells how the socialists and the bolsheviks made pacts behind his back.

I thought that Christian Communist properties expressed best your faith, because I knew that 1/ you refuse to sacrifice moral values for economic gain; that 2/ not long ago you were close to the Christian Communist MacMurray and you worked on the manifesto of revolutionary Christianity together with him; that 3/ with the results in Moscow you consider the economic side of the social question resolved; that 4/ you believe in a 100 per cent planned economy; and that 5/ you didn't share my concern about the Soviet economic system, namely that it can't be put into effect without sacrificing the freedoms of the individual.

I still believe that such an attitude can be best called Christian Communism, and I understand very well the beauty of this faith if one can believe that the absolute planned economy is compatible with a Bill of Rights.[11] And as I don't believe in human omniscience (least of all in my own), I have never claimed that I can't be wrong or that I don't know my own limitations.

If you think over our controversy from these perspectives, you will understand that not for a moment have I doubted your sincerity or your moral integrity. The best proof of this is that parallel with our controversy and a few days before receiving your last letter I emphasized, with great affection, these qualities of yours at the Guggenheims.

Believe me that the memory of our common past still survives in my heart and although our ways don't always follow the same direction I still believe that we serve the very same ideals. That's why your opinion (not well expressed as see) in the Mannheim - Bátor case hurt me so much. (You, too, call my answer to the lawyer 'entirely sufficient'.)

Both I and Recha send our love to you and Ilonka with the hope that after this letter no bitterness remains in your heart.

Your old comrade,

(Oszkár)

Bennington College
Bennington
Vermont
March 1st, 1943

My dear Oszkár,

Your kind lines made me very glad. I forgot all my complaints straight away. As my sense of humour inclines to excess I felt the most joy on reading your lines in which you suspect me of cultivating the New York café tradition of being bosom friends with scoundrels, and, ignoring several undoubted faults of mine, you accuse me of just this.

What really made me recognize you for what you were was the fact that you made the same complaint against Harc! as I did and you even told them, although in the given case you had a different point of view (for which I can think of many serious reasons).

I don't believe in a totally planned economy. My first paper[12] about a socialist economy, some twenty years ago, was built upon this, Mises[13] attacked me saying that I cherished illusions if I thought that there existed a middle course between a laissez-faire and a totally planned economy.

Today we know what happened to Mises and this point of view of his. In reality today we can see nothing but a middle course.

The real alternative is between a laissez-faire and a regulated economy. The first believes in automatic market organization (Max Weber's Selbststeuerung der Wirtschaft), the second doesn't believe in it, and accordingly it undertakes the task of regulating the market.

The question of property has no priority any more. The public company form is perfectly imaginable. A bill of rights would continue to be the basis of the rights of individuals, under the protection of the courts. State property is certainly not the only possibility, the most important question is whether we want to protect the individual's right to work or not? Why not oblige firms to employ workers whatever their points of view are? There is no reason at all for

not protecting the individual's rights against the trade unions or even against the public companies. Those who have studied the Anglo-Saxon common law institutions won't doubt that the courts, if they can rely on a closed and convinced public opinion, are able to protect the individual's rights against all constitutional factors. At least this is what the American experience shows.

I believe in a New Deal[14] which relies on a clear conception instead of opportunistic, unresolved, confused and unprincipled intervention in everything. would set up my formula like this: since today neither money, nor land, nor labour are under the laws of the market any more, the best thing would be openly to take the three out of the market. 1/ Money: today there is nothing but managed currency. Gold currency is a relic of the 19th century. 2/ The TVA[15] and the excellent conserving administration of the New Deal show that land can't be surrendered to the market. 3/ The present trade-union situation plus social policy has taken the labour organization out of the market (the present situation is characterized by the trade unions' abuse of their authority). think that land, money and labour shouldn't be left to the market.

Apart from this the free operation of the market should be left intact. The experience of all countries shows that there is no difficulty in this once the automatization of the market in the question of money and credit organization is put aside. The market is noli me tangere[16] only as long as state credit is the stock exchange, that is, as long as it depends on the operation of the money market. The new "functional finance" has put an end to this. There has been no fundamental innovation since the Poor Law Reform in 1834 created the free labour market.

The new situation is going to have far-reaching consequences in foreign policy. The 19th century thesis of "the world cannot be half slave, half free" doesn't fit into a world in which the economy is "mixed", i.e. "partly planned". The only type of state to be exterminated is the one which wishes to solve the problem of international division of labour by extending its power over the world. All the other systems are cooperative in a foreign policy sense, their internal systems are unimportant to the others when economic structure is concerned (in the 19th century it was quite different: the financial powers intervened in the internal affairs of every state, because in the era of the gold standard cooperation was only possible if their internal systems were similar). The new situation has some very important practical advantages: there is no need to force all states of the world into the procrustean bed of federation, because now it is enough for their governments to cooperate freely. The main point is

that the 19th century didn't know about government cooperation in economic questions.

I admit that this letter is only a rough outline of what I intend to say, so I apologize. But perhaps you will be able to make the message aut with a bit of good will. x/

The British authorities have made it possible for us to sail together in the summer.

Affectionately,

Karli

x/ I hope that the appendix is clearer.

Bennington College
Bennington
Vermont
March 4th, 1943

My dear Oszkár,

I was very glad to see that after so many years our opinions concerning the alternatives for the Russian role in Central Europe are very similar. Of course, we can speak only of hopes. This is why the dogmatism of some friends of mine, who ab ovo don't allow any other possibility than either a Hitler-Gau or a Soviet-Gau in Central Europe is so harmful. This lack of imagination attaching to the past is becoming more and more dangerous.

It is the Bolsheviks' German journal, published in Mexico, from which one can extract, from a distance, the most information concerning Russian plans. The title is "Freies Deutschland", it's a monthly. Its latest number gives 10 exact domestic programs for the (future) German government, and these reinforce my expectations.

When I was working on my article,[17] the symptoms of what I described in it as constructive Russian policy[18] hadn't yet appeared. Today, when we face up to the Russians' initiatives concerning Czechoslovakia, Germany and Yugoslavia, what I wrote in November is almost a common-place.

The Duggens invited me to undertake a lecture tour for them in the first term of 43/44. I had to say no, because in summer I very much want to go home with Ilona. (I am sorry if I mentioned this to you in my letter the other day.)

I met Dawson at the Oxford Anglo-Catholics' summer school. He was the

most outstanding representative of Catholic fascism. I've read his main work on our civilization, I haven't seen his latest books. At that time he was fanatically reactionary in the political sense. His brilliant mind was morally unfruitful.

I am curious to know your opinion about my essay on international politics, in the centre of which is the new tolerance: political tolerance which the 19th century state did not know with regard to the internal organization of foreign states but which was the characteristic value of every former civilization.

Our daughter[19] spent even Christmas Eve in the munitions factory; we affectionately inform Recha that she can be proud of her goddaughter.

With great affection,

Your Karli

Oberlin
August 18, 1943

My dear Karli,

Thank you for your kind letter. On the threshold of a new period of your life I think of you a lot and I wish from the bottom of my heart that your work will continue to be useful and fruitful and that you will continue to derive a lot of happiness from your excellent daughter. I think it will be easier to follow the great historic turning point from London than from New York; there will be more opportunity for individual initiatives from there, and perhaps it will be easier to do something against the subversive work of the Hungarian reactionaries.

Thank you for your fine Rousseau essay.[20] I, too, have always defended this great man against the charges of romanticism and sentimentalism, on similar grounds to yours. Perhaps I placed more stress on some dangers of the interpretation of the doctrine, dangers which even Rousseau himself couldn't avoid. Besides, I feel that the interpretation of the natural rights is too relative in your formulation. I'm glad that your book is going to be published soon,[21] and that you've even been commissioned to continue it.

In England, apart from your wonderful brother,[22] I am in continual contact only with Károlyi. But I also correspond with Dániel.[23] I would like you to visit both of them. The address of K.M. is Flat 29, 99, Haverstock Hill, London, N.W.3. Daniel's is 1, Millington Road, Cambridge.

I think it would be important if you discussed the situation with K.[24] and tried to bring him closer to reality.

From the letters, which I have confidently enclosed and which I would like to have back, you will see the main point of our disagreement. If he got back to Hungary, he would fail again, I fear. He himself feels the weak points of his position and would like me to go to England on the pretext of a lecture-tour (which he could prepare) and reinforce our platform. But I think that for the State Department to let me out is out of the question, and as long as I don't know his present way of thinking I am afraid of identifying with him. Because the final problem is not (as you wrote) whether Hungary will belong to the Soviet sphere (which we can hardly doubt) but whether it is possible for Hungary to maintain - even within this sphere of interest - its Western character and the humanist mentality of its outstanding personalities. And I'm afraid K. can't see this problem.

As for us, I shall soon take to the road also and Recha and her mother will follow me a few months afterwards. I know the risk implicit in the decision, but my pension needs rounding off and - what is much more important - a pensioner's life in a small town is not for me. Without permanent work and struggle I would become rusty sooner or later. In September I'll be at the University of Kansas City as a visiting professor, and then I shall settle down in New York, where I'll have a chance to work on a topic that is very close to me. At the same time I will look for an editor for my book 'Tyrannicide' (which John D. Lewis and I wrote together).[25] I feel that soon a new situation will come about, one in which I may be able to have an influence on the course of Hungarian affairs.

So once again my best wishes to you. At my age and in the present international situation I can't know whether we will meet again in this state of being. Although we have had some disagreements on certain points, you may always be sure that our friendship has always been among the great treasures of my life.

God bless you,
Affectionately,
Your old friend,
Oszkár

49A Hornsey Lane Gardens, N.6.
July 13th, 1944

My dear Oszkár,

I would like to describe in a few lines the situation here concerning Hun-

garian matters, as far as I can form a notion of it. We haven't heard of you for a long time; unfortunately you couldn't make up your mind to run the risk of the journey - not to speak of the insurmountable obstacles you might have encountered had you carried out your plan.

The Council,[26] which can hardly be said to have worked even for one day, is experiencing crises which are becoming more and more acute. The nationalists are waiting for an alternative focus in order to break with us, in the meantime in the Council they are dictating their revisionist vindications into minutes, the formula of which they made us enter in our programme at that time.[27] The only thing we've been able to prevent is that it is not Révai[28] who represents them in the press and publicity committee.

The Londoners[29] - under the slogan 'everything for unity' have been acting with the nationalists in a formless cartel. But at present the situation is that the Londoners don't strictly follow Révai, but support the more moderate line of Buday and Sztankovich.[30]

Neither can we claim that the Károlyists have wished to support the Council with all their hearts, something which is understandable if we consider that they have been a minority on it from the very beginning. Their strict collaboration with the Londoners proved to be an illusion, as they were tied to the line of Badoglioism[31] in the spirit of 'unity'.

With the help of this brief guide perhaps you will understand the following more easily.

1/ My own situation. I accepted Council membership, which I was offered unanimously, only after consulting with my English friends. Among them - apart from some of my oldest friends - are persons who work in the field of foreign policy, and Seton-Watson as well. There are many people in this country who, like me, think that Great Britain should collaborate closely with Russia in connection with Danubian issues and that she shouldn't build counter-positions there. Insofar as we can speak of regionalism, let's consider the Danube a Russian region. Besides, the interests of Hungary and Europe generally need closer Hungarian-Czechoslovak collaboration. Hungary and Czechoslovakia need a similar foreign policy - both the Czechoslovaks and the Hungarians need to follow a Russian orientation, but at the same time both must put the utmost stress on having a window open to the West both from the economic and the cultural point of view. The way to reconcile these two aims is not to follow the power-balance method, as it is called, but on the contrary, to accept an unconditional Russian orientation in military and foreign affairs, which is absolutely reconcilable with keeping the window to the West open. The first way implies a conflict

of interests between Russia and the West and would be impracticable because the Russians would ab ovo suspect. The second way is the only practicable way, because the economic and cultural independence of the Czechoslovaks and the Hungarians would be a Russian interest also. Ilona went one step further and was willing to enter the Károlyi movement, which I haven't done. (I mention here that I have given several lectures to the 'Friends of the New Democratic Hungary Club' led by Mrs. Károlyi, but didn't accept the committee membership I was offered the other day because I can't approve of the anti-Stalinism which receives strong stress there and which culminates in the conspicuous absence of Russian officials. (As you know the Károlyis conduct their affairs themselves, which makes my situation much more simple.)

In the Council I am a co-opted member. I am not a Károlyi delegate. Károlyi informed me that he would like to see me there as a member of the committee of the DMASZ.[32] I wrote to him that the only way I could do this was with your approval, but I'm told that you haven't given this. But DMASZ representation would have complicated my position, which is the result of unanimous election.

But against both the Londoners' bureaucratic viewpoint and the nationalist-conservative sabotage, I naturally represent Károlyi's and your own line, as it accords with my own convictions, too. So far I have been able to serve the cause of British-Russian collaboration, which - as I have already said - is the preferred option for me.

2/ The period before the formation of the Council. When I got in touch with Károlyi through your message to him he was completely alone. He had only four followers in this country, including his wife, who - as I have already said - is emotionally affected and whom one can't consider an absolute Károlyist. We two were there among the four, and Zoltán Kellermann, a former communist, who is a personal follower of Károlyi. The reason for Károlyi's isolation at that time was the Londoners' rigid policy of unity; they refused to form a council without the nationalists, while the latter, for theoretical reasons, were unwilling to accept Károlyi as president. The situation at the front produced a change. As I myself am not a member of the Károlyi movement I followed all this from the sidelines here. I know that within the Károlyi group Ilona and Kellermann insisted on the agreement with the Londoners, which the Károlyis hardly trusted as they obviously knew that the Londoners would insist on cooperation with the nationalists (which actually happened). They didn't share Ilona's illusions concerning the formation of a Károlyi-London bloc. I myself strongly supported an agreement.

3/ The formation of the Council. Since March 23rd, with the participation of the Londoners, the Council considered itself formed. But the point in the programme which referred to the peace conditions - at the request of the nationalists and after long and exciting talks (in which I didn't take part) - suffered modification. Later they could have said with good reason that the Council - taking its stand on the basis of this programme - came into being only after their participation, at the public meeting on April 23rd (the agreement was on April 22nd). Together with the normal formation of the Council officers should have been elected, but this and above all the election of a secretary didn't occur, because no one had sufficient confidence in the Council to hold such an important post. The bloc of the nationalists plus the Londoners probably wanted to give this post to the Londoners, in return for which Révai would have been vice-president (?) or something like that. The weak point of the situation was the compromise which was born between Károlyi and Iványi[33] over the issue of the revisionist formula. Apparently the Londoners were against the agreement but later it turned out that they had no objection to it; the Czechs considered it harmless as a tactical move provided that Károlyi could keep his hands free in the Council. The present crisis is due to the fact that this condition is not ensured and the whole situation is going to turn round. It's true that the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Information have entered into communication with us officially and that in this respect the situation of the Council is normalized. But it doesn't mean that either the BBC or other official mediums are at our disposal, except for occasional messages over the air. If we are satisfied with this modest result and that we have hampered a possible formation by Ulain[34], then the formation of the Council was not quite futile. But the big question is whether the price of it was not too high, as the Council has tied Károlyi's hands after all.

Yours affectionately,

Karli

49A, Hornsey Lane Gardens, London N.6.
May 15th, 1946

My dear Oszkár,

I was very glad to receive your letter, with which you enclosed your brilliant article about Hungary.[35]

I feel just as you do: I shall by all means visit Hungary, if I am given a chance. Who knows, one may prove to be useful.

Two years ago I gave an account of the situation regarding Károlyi, an account which unfortunately - because of the censorship - was not clear enough. By 'Londoners' I meant the Communists (i.e. the Hungarian Club in London), while you as it appears from your answer thought I meant the British government! No wonder my letter looked confused.

When I met Károlyi in the autumn of 1943 he refused to collaborate with the Social Democrats or the nationalists. I didn't understand the first stance but approved the second. The Communists, on the other hand, insisted on collaboration with the nationalists, which made left-wing co-operation impossible.

Later the Council was formed but it never worked effectively. In it the nationalists tried to save Horthy for the future and sabotaged Károlyi's line, to which Károlyi replied by sabotaging the Council. The Communists, like good bureaucrats, were satisfied with the Council's formal existence.

My line was to activate the Council by involving the Social Democrats (Böhm -Prager).[36-37] This was hampered by the nationalists, with the help of the Communists.

Károlyi's own line and action were much more important than the Council itself. The enclosed copy of the letter[38] (dated from April 16th, 1946) gives an idea about it. Until December 1944 Károlyi had been independent of his wife in his policy. Then both of them isolated themselves from every organized or personal connection. My close connection with Károlyi lasted from the 1944 January S.O.S. until his speech on January 2nd, 1945. During this year my point of view as expressed in the Harper's article prevailed in many respects. The enclosed letter I sent to Károlyi before our last talk about the other matters. He answered orally, saying that the Russians are to be blamed for everything and that they flatly refused to take him into their confidence concerning their intentions. On the other hand it is a fact that on September 15th, 1945 the Russian Embassy here called Károlyi and gave him the facilities to return home but he refused to take the opportunity.

Ilona, by contrast with me, participated in the Károlyi movement, and stood 'left' of me. But she, and I also, would have disapproved had Károlyi depended on the Communists (something the Communists themselves understood). It was in this that her standpoint differed from that of the absolutely honest Endre Havas,[39] who naively thought that 'Károlyi had to go along with the Communists'. That's why Ilona opposed his being drawn into the Council.

In the critical times of January 1945 - after his ominous New Year speech - Ilona and I acted together. I 'countersigned' her letter to Károlyi (January 17th, 1945) in which she reminded him of the inevitability of making a decision: either forwards or backwards. Later on I repeated this, as I said in my enclosed letter. On this Károlyi distanced himself from me also. I alone, in contrast to all the members of the Council (Ilona had been excluded by then) called Károlyi to acknowledge publicly the agrarian reform which was already being carried out. This he was unwilling to do, saying 'we don't know anything definite about it').

Before leaving he asked me to go to see him and was very grateful for my services to the cause over the previous days (see his declaration in the Manchester Guardian on May 7th, 1946, which I put in and translated into English).

I think I owed you this brief account. Please keep the enclosed letter among your papers. I don't want my own role in the Károlyi tragedy to remain unclear.

Affectionately,

Your Karli

P.S. I hope you received the offprint of my article published in the 'Slavonic Review'[40], which I sent to your Oberlin address.
These last two and a half years with Károlyi was a series of long and painful struggles and bitter decisions. My way was honest and straight.
There is nothing why to reproach me. Poor Hungary!

Cold Spring, N.Y.
July 22nd, 1946

Dear Karli,

This is a very belated answer to your kind letter of May 15th. I will keep both the letter and the enclosure to Károlyi among my papers. They will probably go to the Harvard archive, where they collect emigration documents, and on Hungarian affairs they asked for my collaboration as well.[41]

I can tell you that I am still unable to reconstruct the situation in which these letters originated and am unable to understand why you thought that Hungary was in danger because of these controversies. I think they were typical examples of word problems which in the meantime have been resolved and settled by History. In a similar way History has dashed our hopes that the Soviets wanted democracy in Central Europe. They persist in the madness of

their dialectics and will suppress every real democratic attempt. I am afraid that soon Hungary will experience the fate of 'liberated Poland'. Since my article in Foreign Affairs[42] every day that has passed has provided evidence of this.

In spite of this or just because of this I stick to my Danube trip, although I know that I couldn't exert a serious influence on the shaping of affairs. But I would like to see the battlefield of my youth and I long to shake hands with friends who remained true to the real conception of democracy before I leave this earthly existence. But for the time being I can't go. Dr.Hollós[43] doesn't allow it before spring and I also have political and financial difficulties. I don't understand why Károlyi hasn't written to me since he left Hungary. It would be important for me to get to know his real impressions and his evaluations.

For the time being I am doing nothing in the summer home of Andris, my son, on the bank of the Hudson. Although it's sometimes very humid, which is difficult to tolerate, the best treatment is the love and kindness of the young. The day before yesterday Gyuri[44] and Helen stopped over here en route to the seaside. Máli[45] also made a trip here and after such a long time the family were therefore together again for two days.

In early August I will be in Oberlin again at the old home. Recha is very busy at preparing for my return. My plans for the future are uncertain. There is only one thing I don't hesitate about: I won't take on more teaching. I feel the need to concentrate on my own problems. And when one is getting on for 72 it is difficult to bear the paraphernalia of academic work.

I hope that you, Ilona and Karla are all well and can put up with these "heroic" times of happy murder, and that you can discover logos in the madness.

With the old affection,

Your friend,

Oszkár

P.S. We are looking forward to Mihály's autumn visit very much.
I enjoyed your good K. article.[46]

423 W 120 St. Apt. 76.
November 12th, 1948

Dear Oszi,

Chance so ordained that I came across two works of Bódog Somló[47] and I feel that it is my duty to express my homage to this lonely mind, at least within our narrow friendly circle.

I first came across Güterverkehr in der Urgesellschaft (1909)[48] after a reference in the notes of Mauss,[49] a French sociologist. It's true that the title itself refers to ancient society which science now considers as a hypothetic structure. But behind the out-of-date title we can discover not only a bold and deep criticism of the then dominant utilitarian psychology, but a number of pioneering reflections and intuitions which have since been vindicated. What Malinowski[50] and Thurnwald[51] discovered in the 1920s filled Somló's assumptions with substance. Another book[52] of his was pointed out to me by an American friend (of German origin) a few weeks ago and he had a very high opinion of it. Last night Mauzi[53] sent over the Hungarian original. The "Preface" says - he wrote it 46 years ago and you won't remember it - that "the period of European civilization in which we live and which - as everything shows - is the dawn of an illimitably profound change of human society has begun new practice concerning the problem of state activity". The basic idea is that the liberalism of the 19th century was only a transition towards a much more integrated and, at the same time, freer society. He disputes the mental and structural sameness of religion and science (p.34.). This opposition to Marxist, Spencerian and Piklerist one-sidedness necessarily isolated him. It's true that here also just as in his Urgesellschaft, one can feel the survival of these examples of one-sidedness.

But the balance falls on the side of the new deep thoughts. Somló preceded his contemporaries by one decade in understanding the economy of primitive peoples. The State Intervention and Individualism also formulated several predictive syntheses.

To my everlasting shame I took my doctor's degree with him, in 1908,[54] without having any knowledge of his works.

Affectionately, as always,

Karli

R.R.3, Pickering, Ont.
October 27th, 1950

Dear Oszi,

Forgive me for the pink paper - here in the hospital it's the only one they've got.

I am at the age when the past gains new life and sense: memories of old friendships revive and from the distance I can see more clearly the beautiful outlines of life.

You and I came into man's estate before the great transformation. There are few such men: they represent the standard of the West and are a kind of platinum units of historical worth. Those who came after us exaggerated or disclaimed, overstressed or discounted, the values of the 19th century.

I indeed had a very special mission: into my Central-European mentality there entered - very early - Russian elements and - not too late - Anglo-Saxon ones. On the one hand I had Tolstoy and Dostoyevski (as elements of the Russian revolution, though) and since my childhood on the part of my father (who had very strong ties to the West) my English education, which, finally, took me to England in 1931 and 1933. It is from this trinity that the broadness of my intellectual foundations derives and to which my all-pervasive ataraxia is due. It was not only Goethe who taught me tolerance but Dostoyevski and John Stuart Mill as well, although with emphases that apparently excluded each other. I have not been interested in Marxism since the age of 22. I fell under decisive religious influence at the age of 32 (you were the only one who noticed - something that I perceive and understand only now - that the tranquility of my state of mind was due to a certain mysticism). The blessing on my life - my marriage against which you warned me with the sobriety of a true friend - is due to this, too. But who knows the hidden ways of life? I am still moved when I think of your moral courage.

Old age had something much more surprising for me. In the 1909 jubilee supplement of Huszadik Század I published some theses[55] (emerging from the Marxist egg) which, looking at them after 30 years, besides the mistakes, showed the outlines of the main direction of the development of the history of ideas. (It was only Ervin,[56] as far as I know, who noticed what they were warning against. I don't know what you thought of them, but you did publish them. To the rest of the world they meant nothing.) Today I know that ever since I have been waiting for the prophecy to come true. This is the simple, sad but complete explanation of my unrealism during the middle part of my life, which both

theoretically and practically was condemned as unproductive. From 1909 to 1935 I did nothing. I did my best in a direction which led nowhere: mine was a one-sided idealism which vanished in the vacuum.

This is how the balance of the Galileo Circle became negative. In the moral field it was creative success; for the first time perhaps since 1848 very many students became acquainted with the experience of moral commitment and this they transplanted into their private lives. But my failure in the political field was irremediable. Your ideas concerning the decisive significance of the agrarian and nationality questions could have been realized by the Galileo Circle - at least by way of initiatives. The failure of the Galileo Circle was that in 1918 it wasn't at the disposal of the generation which had - during serious, long struggles - united with the peasants or the nationalities.

This is one reason why your October mission couldn't come to anything.

Who is responsible for this? I am. I led the circle in an anti-political direction. I didn't make any attempt to form a unity of action either with the workers, or with the peasants, or with the nationalities, I didn't even try. It was narrow-minded to think that a mainly Jewish intelligentsia couldn't have done it. (Szabó's fatal mistake.) The Russian peasantry was more afraid of the Russian aristocracy, and the Hungarian peasantry more afraid of the Bolsheviks, but the really self-sacrificing, convinced, long-term, clear-sighted political work (for which the moral strength of the Galileists would obviously qualify them) would always be able to overcome obstacles like these. The T.T. and later the radical party couldn't do anything without the youth. And I have never been a politician; I had no gift for that, nor any interest. And the Galileo Circle wouldn't have meant less than the Russian student movements of the 1880s, but would have had both a leadership and political experience. Szabó, unfortunately, believed only in discussion groups. Therefore nobody saw the revolutionary possibilities of the Galileo Circle. This was one hidden cause of the failure of October. I can't put the blame on anybody else.

I was 50 years old when in England circumstances led me towards the studies of economic history. I earned my living as a teacher of this subject. I didn't even think at that time that I could have another job, for which I was then actually preparing.

Some 3 years later, apparently under the pressure of circumstances, I wrote a book, attempting a historical approach to the age again, on the basis of 1909. But this time I also gave an economic history perspective to my essay. It was 10 years ago, in 1940.

The surprise came in the last 4 years, between November 1946 and Novem-

ber 1950. These 4 years passed like one long uninterrupted and busy workday. The result, whether I finish my new book or not, is an interpretation of the economies of early societies, especially the phenomena of commerce, money and the market, and lays the basis for a comparative history of economics. Herbert Spencer's descriptive sociology (one part of it) had the same aim; Max Weber's posthumous work would have achieved it if it hadn't used types which were too complicated. But fundamentally neither in Spencer's nor in Weber's time could the limits of the market economy which predominated in the 20s and 30s be seen. Now it is very easy to see that Grote, Mommsen, Eduard, Meyer and Rostovtzeff[57] used the example of the market as a historical norm.

I would be delighted to tell you a few things about the results of the research. Only one example: the business methods of the early Assyrian merchant colony (the so-called Cappadocian finds) reveal that the secret of the enormous economic development of the early state some 3,000 B.C. is as follows: within a tribal society, there is no economic transaction (to trade in food is a crime). The motive is to save tribal solidarity against attitudes which destroy unity, such as speculation... The famous equivalents - carved into stone - of the Babylonian theocratic kings removed the stigma of profit from the simple but significant transactions, because it is just to exchange what is 'equivalent', and the action itself is justified. The just equivalent made the exchange, the rent, etc. Thus barrier to economic development is removed by the exclusion of speculation from the relations. St. Thomas Aquinas and the doctrine of justum pretium is based on the same theory. Justitia regnorum fundamentum.

Old affection finds a way for itself in this unwarrantably long letter, my dear Oszi. I am writing it in bed lying on my back, that's why my handwriting is so bad.[x]

God bless you, and if you happen to come to New York, don't forget that I long to see you again.

I send my love to Recha[58] and to you

Karli

[x] It was too bad in fact, I send you the typed text instead.

Oberlin
November 5, 1950

Dear Karli,

Your letter dated 27th October would have made me very happy, had it not contained news of your illness. (Referring to this I ask for immediate information, if only in two lines.)

I feel that your letter was the product of a telepathic contact. (I do believe in things like this.) I have been doing an abominable job in the last weeks, which I usually call 'preparation for my burial'. I have packed up a great part of my documents, notes, letters and diaries and have handed them over to the College so that after my death at a certain time and with a certain amount of care - they will be available for those who are interested in them. Although I haven't read any of them again, this process has worn me down very much; for this reason my present answer can only be short. Among the "dusty documents" I came across one of your letters, dated 12th November, 1948. It must have got mixed up with other papers and therefore wasn't answered. (You wrote about Bódog Somló in that letter and I will come back to it, because you put this interesting and worthy character in a perspective which is not quite correct.)

As to the telepathic contact, I was digging up the past at a time when you were also wrestling with it. Of course, it would be very good to talk over this common part of our lives. As a matter of fact one of the reasons for my long silence was that I wasn't able to form a clear idea of your way, and especially of your present theoretical standpoint concerning the principal problems. These problems can't be research curiosities any more, here everybody must profess his views clearly in the name of moral commitment (as you call it). Words and cautious formulas have no use, because this concerns our children, and whether they will be slaves or free men and women.

Concerning the details I think you overestimate the role of the Galileo Circle both in the negative and in the positive direction. The Galileo Circle suffered from the same illness as Hungarian society. It was a society with slogans far from real life, and later it fell - for the most part - for the ideologies of Kun and Rákosi. It therefore joined the forces which later made October and an Octobrist synthesis impossible.

Otherwise I feel that our ways move on different levels. You stand for historicism; I can imagine neither a fruitful nor an honest political life without the restitution of natural rights. Of course, historical research has its significance in a comprehensive and dynamic historical-scientific picture. But I don't

think that one moment in Assyrian economic history could give us any guidance as to the solution of our present economic and moral problems.

So that you can clearly see the sharp line which divides us (not in our endeavours but in our conceptions) I enclose a paper of mine[59] about the problem of peace. I meant it as a memorandum, not as a lecture, and it contains the thinking and teaching of many years. (Of course time and space were too insufficient to defend all my theses.)

My dear Karli, get well as soon as possible and continue your work with results and success. Fate was kind to you when it made the last period of your life's work creative and guided it into the milieu most suited to you.

At the end of summer Mihály[60] spent a week-end with us and it was a great satisfaction for me to see that on the most important points our ways are parallel.

Recha and I send our greetings, as always,

Oszkár[61]

NOTES

1. Probably the following articles are referred to: "What can and what will American Citizens of Hungarian Origin do for their Unhappy Native Land in this Extreme Peril?", Harc, December 25th, 1941; "Manifesto of the American Federation of Democratic Hungarians", Harc, 1941.
2. "Why Make Russia Run Amok?", Harper's Magazine, 1943. March, pp.404-410. In Hungarian: Fasizmus, demokrácia, ipari társadalom. Társadalomfilozófiai írások. (Fascism,democracy, industrial society. Essays on social philosophy), Budapest: Gondolat, 1986, pp. 148-164.
3. The hint 'Grandpa' probably refers to American foreign policy or to President Roosevelt.
4. Duczynska, Ilona (1897-1978), wife of Karl Polányi.
5. 'Home' refers to England where Polányi lived from 1933 to 1947, with interruptions.
6. The Great Transformation, New York, 1944.
7. The antecedents of this letter - an 'official' exchange of letters which contains most important controversies - are incomplete. It burst out over the policy of the Hungarian émigrés in America and over the problems of collaboration with the conservative group led by Tibor Eckhardt (the Mannheim-Viktor Bátor case). In his letter of January 21st written in English, he speaks of the difference in mentality between the two of them and himself and he decribes his relation towards Communism and towards the Soviet Union: 'I have never called myself a 'Christian Communist' and I am quite convinced that you can't say of anybody who is not a Communist that he is one. It has never occurred to me to be a Communist and even less to be a 'fellow traveller'. I have always been against this mentality and philosophy. I have never done anything to deserve the Communists' approval and I have never feared their disapproval. It's true that except for the darkest times, when I began to doubt seriously, I have always hoped that Russia will provide one of the real solutions of the problem of industrial civilization. And I still hope for this. People think of something different when they call somebody a Communist.

When in my latest letter I referred to those who don't believe in a constructive Russian policy I wasn't referring to your point of view. On the contrary. Your latest letter, however, gave rise to serious doubts in my mind as to whether your point of view according to which 'the good relations between Russia and the democracies depend mainly on Russia and not on us' is fruitful. This point of view wouldn't help matters even if it were true.

8. Imre Békessy (1887-1951?), publicist and editor.
9. Ferenc Göndör (1885-1950), journalist. Editor of the weekly Az Ember (Man), Budapest, Vienna and later New York.
10. László Fényes (1871-1944), before 1918 a well-known pro-independence publicist. Later a socialist publicist. Lived in France and later up to his death in America.
11. The English Bill of Rights passed in 1689.
12. Sozialistische Rechnungslegung. Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, Bd. 49, 1922, pp. 377-420.
13. Ludwig Mises, Neue Beiträge zum Problem der sozialistischen Wirtschaftsrechnung, Ibid. 1923/24. pp. 488-500.
14. Social policy introduced during F.D. Roosevelt's first term as president (1933-37).
15. See Polányi's articles in Der Österreichische Volkswirt: TVA. Ein amerikanisches Wirtschaftsexperiment, I-II. 1936, nos. 21-23.
16. Don't touch me! Here: untouchable.
17. See 2.
18. Namely, the Russians can be a 'constructive factor' in Eastern Europe.
19. Karl Polányi Levitt, a professor of economics, lives in Canada.
20. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, avagy lehet-e egy társadalom szabad (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, or can a society be free), In Fasizmus, pp. 244-258.
21. He refers to the book 'The Great Transformation'.
22. Michael Polányi.
23. Arnold Dániel (1878-1968), writer and economist. World-famous expert on the agrarian question, agrarian socialism and agrarian economics.
24. With Károlyi.
25. Oscar Jászi-John D.Lewis, Against the Tyrant. The Tradition and Theory of Tyrannicide (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), p. 288.
26. The Hungarian Council in England: a group which came into being in 1944 led by Mihály Károlyi, with the participation of Károlyist, nationalist and communist émigrés.
27. The 'nationalists': the union of the Free Hungarians in London which was led by Antal Zsilinszky until his suicide, and András Révai was also a member.
28. András Révai (1903-1973), journalist and political scientist.
29. The London Hungarian Club, the organization of the communist émigrés.
30. György Budai, graphic artist and engraver. Formerly a member of the Szeged Youth group.
    Viktor Sztankovics, publicist and correspondent of the Pester Lloyd, then of the BBC.
31. Marshal Badoglio, Italian prime minister after the anti-fascist coup d'état in 1943, which overthrew Mussolini.
32. American Association of Democratic Hungarians, its leader was Jászi.
33. Béla Iványi-Grünwald (1902-1965), historian. Between 1941 and 44 the director of the Hungarian service of the BBC.
34. Ferenc Ulain (1881-?) lawyer and right-wing politician.
35. Oscar Jászi, "Choices in Hungary", Foreign Affairs, April 1946.
36. Vilmos Böhm (1880-1949), social democratic politician.
37. Jenő Prager (1894-1967), editor in Pozsony (Bratislava), then in London.
38. Letter of Karl Polányi to Mihály Károlyi, April 15th, 1946.

39. Endre Havas (1909-1953), communist writer and translator. Secretary of Károlyi, fell victim of illegality.
40. "Count Michael Karolyi", Slavonic Review, January 1946. pp. 92-97.
41. Jászi's papers were eventually deposited with Columbia University's Butler Library.
42. A reference to the article "Choices in Hungary".
43. Gyula Holló (1890-1973), Jászi's doctor.
44. György Jászi and his wife.
45. Anna Lesznai.
46. See 21.
47. Bódog Somló (1873-1920), lawyer and sociologist, professor at the University of Kolozsvár (Cluj).
48. Der Güterverkehr in der Urgesellschaft, Bruxelles-Leipzig-Paris, 1909.
49. Marcel Mauss (1872-1950), French sociologist.
50. Bronislaw Kaspar Malinowski (1884-1942), English social anthropologist of Polish origin.
51. Richard Thurnwald (1869-1954), sociologist and anthropologist. Born in Vienna.
52. Bódog Somló, "Állami beavatkozás és individualizmus (State intervention and individualism), Budapest, 1903.
53. Mrs. Sándor Striker, Laura Polányi.
54. Polányi took his doctor's degree at the University of Kolozsvár, which was more liberal than Budapest University.
55. "Nézeteink válsága" (The crisis in our points of view), Huszadik Század, XI, 1910, nos. 1-2, pp. 125-127.
56. Ervin Szabó (1877-1918), sociologist, librarian and socialist politician.
57. Eduard Meyer (1855-1930), German historian of Antiquity; Theodor Mommsen (1817-1903), German historian; Michael Rostovtzeff (1870-1952), American archaeologist and historian of Antiquity. Rostovtzeff was of Ukrainian origin.
58. Recha Rundt (1885-1970), second wife of Oscar Jászi
59. We don't know which article he refers to, perhaps to the one published in Látóhatár (Horizon), in May, 1952 entitled "Hogyan készül a béke" (How peace is made)
60. Michael Polányi
61. We know Polányi's reply (November 7th, 1950) only in parts.

My dear Oszi,

Thank you for your clear lines which are full of mental and moral strength. My health doesn't seem to be in big trouble. We are simply getting old... I'm trying to ...

I don't negotiate with the new Russian islam. And I don't negotiate with their unrestrained critics who come from the ranks of semi or total bolsheviks. I am nursing with strong faith the plants of common sense which have remained.

Yours affectionately,

Karli

P.S. As to the opinion over the early Assyrian finds, we should never forget the legends of science - the description of certain butterflies in the Canary Islands for instance, which was published in 1859 by a well-known English author (not without revealing the historical perspective of the age).

Izvoare si mărturii referitoare la evreii din România (Sources and testimonies concerning the Jews in Rumania), vol.I. Ed. by Victor Eskenazy, Bucureşti: Federatia Comunităţilor Evreieşti, 1986, 162 pp.

"If we insist on duties, we must grant rights, as well."
D.G. Costa-Foru, 1864

The present volume of documents consisting of nine written sources from the Dacia Romana period and 184 from the 12th to the 17th centuries was born not only out of an ambition to preserve the past of the Jews in Rumania but also out of an intention to show that during the period of Rumanian Jewish co-existence there occurred mutual influence. As Victor Eskenazy emphasizes in his introduction, these documents are part of the Rumanian heritage as well, and can provide important information concerning Rumanian history - and, additionally, information concerning other co-existing nations and denominations. If we think of the scattered archeological finds (e.g. Hebrew coins) or of the diary of the travels of Rabbi Benjamin, writes Dr.Moses Rosen, Chief Rabbi of Rumania, in the foreword to the book, we can see that the Jewish presence in Rumania goes back several centuries. "These sources tell us about our co-existence with the hospitable Rumanian people, whose happiness and suffering we shared. We borrowed some of their culture, we created our mother tongue out of the sweet Rumanian language, and we made their songs and desires our own. We worked hard and, out of conviction, we did our best to promote the development of the country. In commerce as well as in science, culture and literature, in physical work as well as in intellectual pursuits, the Jews contributed to the progress of this country on the road to civilization," Dr. Rosen adds.

Besides the sources concerning the history of the Jews in Rumania published in works containing the sources of Rumanian history in general, this book continues the enormous task earlier undertaken by the Societatea istorică Iuliu Barasch (the Iuliu Barasch Historical Society) in its periodicals, namely in Anuarul pentru israeliţii (Jewish Yearbook); in Analele sociatatii istorice Iuliu Barasch (Iuliu Barasch Social History Review) from 1886 onwards; by the Sinaia Societatea de studii judaice (the Society for Jewish Studies); in the two-volume Călători şi scriitori străini despre evreii din Principatele româneşti (Foreign travellers and

writers on the Jews living in the two Rumanian principalities), by Scarlat Callimachi - S. Sriscristian, 1935; and in Documente si note privitoare la istoria evreilor din Ţările Române (Documents and records relating to the history of the Jews in Rumania), by Lazăr Rosenbaum, 1947.

The present volume contains the most important types of sources concerning the Jews of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania. These are 1/ travel diaries (e.g. the description of the Jews of Mangalia by Evlia Çelebi in 1652); 2/ records of rabbinical councils concerning the religious life and legal relations of the Jews (e.g. the text of an oath from the 15th century); 3/ Chancellery documents with statutes concerning the Jews (the document from 1662 of Prince Wallachia Grigore Chica on the lease of certain salt mines); 4/ letters (the letter from the 17th century of the Rabbi of Vilnius to the Rabbi of Iaşi); 5/ documents concerning foreign relations and reports of ambassadors (the instructions of Petru Rares to Ambassador Avram din Bănila); 6/ documents concerning the activities of Jewish doctors of medicine in the three principalities (about the physicians who attended István Bocskai, Gábor Bethlen, Vasile Lupu and Ştefan cel Mare); 7/ demographical records from Transylvania, the significance of which, regarding the Jewish population, is stressed by Eskenazy. (The registration of the Transylvanian Jews was ordered by Samuel Bruckenthal - in 1750, not including those in Gyulafehérvár, there were 229 families residing in Transylvania.)

What is even less complete than the publication of the sources are the writings which deal with the history of the Jews of Transylvania. The studies in this field of Nicolae Iorga, G.Bogdan-Duică, J.B.Brociner and Verax were made in the beginning of this century, and besides these, the writings of Ernő Marton and Mátyás Eisler can also be considered significant. Matatias Carp gave a documented history of the Holocaust in the three lengthy volumes of his work entitled Cartea Neagră, published in 1946-47. These cruel events claimed 400,000 victims: 256,000 people died because of Rumanian fascism and 144,000 because of Hungarian fascism. Izo Schapira's study entitled Lapok a román zsidóság történetéből (Pages from the history of the Jews of Rumania), published in the yearbook of the magazine A Hét (The Week), is a short review of the 500 year-old cultural heritage of the Jews of Rumania. Schapira's thesis is that in Moldavia the Yiddish and Rumanian cultures were dominant, whereas in Transylvania Hungarian culture prevailed and in the Banat and Bukovina German culture was supreme. Consequently, the histories of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania were influenced by different factors. The historical development of Moldavia was basically Eastern European, that of Wallachia Balkanian and that of Transylvania

Western European. The past of the Jewish population in each region was determined by different circumstances.

Jews in Transylvania

As Mátyás Eisler, Ernő Marton and Moses Camilly-Weinberger all conclude, until the 17th century we can only speak of a scattered Jewish population, even if the presence of Jews in Hungarian commerce, the economic administration and in the chancellery of the principality is proved by a number of sources in the present volume, actually by one-third of the 184 documents. According to Eisler the béth-din (the Jewish political forum or sedes Judaica) founded in Gyulafehérvár (Alba Iulia) in 1591 constituted the oldest (Spanish) Jewish community in Transylvania. For a long period Jews were allowed to settle only there. Until the emancipation this community was autonomous as far as its internal affairs were concerned, and the president of the religious community was the leader of the whole Jewish minority. On October 26, 1578 the Transylvanian diet authorized many Jewish merchants to enter the markets, to lay out their goods, as the diet put it. The Armenian, Serbian and Greek merchants of the towns, because of the rivalry, opposed the granting of the right of free trade to Jewish merchants. A law passed in 1654 forbade the Jews to act as retail traders in the cattle business. On the other hand, in 1623 Prince of Transylvania Gábor Bethlen, with the aim of improving the economy of his country, allowed the Jews to settle and abandoned the legislation discriminating against them, which was next reintroduced in 1650. The wars of religion during the 17th century and the military actions which were far too great for the country put an extraordinary burden on all the inhabitants of Transylvania. This was particularly so in the case of the Jews, even if - and this is emphasized in the present volume - pogroms such as those in Eastern Europe were unknown in any of the three regions. (As Solomonovici wrote in 1916, other sects were also persecuted in Transylvania. He is supported by Brociner, quoting the Polish chronicler Bielski, who met Sabbatarian Christians persecuted by the Catholic authorities in Moldavia. See Kronika Polska, 1597.) In 1680 Prince of Transylvania Apafi defended the Jews. In 1694 Pál Esterházy, palatine of Hungary, gave the salt monopoly in Transylvania to Samuel Oppenheimer, and the latter, together with a financier called Wertheim, regularly attended those meetings of the Chancellery which dealt with economic affairs. Prince of Transylvania György Rákóczi II authorized free trade and this was confirmed by Joseph II. In the 18th century - to some extent due to immigration from Galicia to Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania - the influence of the Jews, who served

as ambassadors, doctors of medicine and army contractors, increased more and more. The emancipation of the Jews of Transylvania can be traced in the laws and decrees of Hungary before 1918.

The National League of Transylvanian Jews founded on 20th December, 1918 declared that "the Jews of Transylvania are part of a scattered, but racially and religiously homogeneous, Jewish nation". Following the ratification of the Trianon Peace Treaty a powerful Zionist movement came into being alongside the already established Orthodox, Neolog and Sephardic religious groups. Although the Jews were treated as a minority, i.e. as an ethnic group, in Transylvania 75% of them were culturally Hungarian and they played an important role in Hungarian cultural and political life. Between 1922 and 1940 the function of the Erdély-Bánát Országos Zsidó Iroda (Transylvania-Banat National Jewish Bureau) was to monitor those legal orders which were important from the Jewish point of view. In 1920 the Ministry of Culture authorized Jewish secondary schools in which the language of the education was to be Rumanian. In connection with this Moses C. Weinberger wrote that "the purpose of the Rumanian government was to deprive the Transylvanian Jews of their mother tongue and culture and to separate them from the Hungarians by means of this provision". In 1927 the government closed the Jewish grammar school at Kolozsvár (Cluj) on account of irredentism, and some 1,000 students could only continue their studies in Hungarian between 1940 and 1944 (when Kolozsvár was again under Hungarian administration) under its then headmaster, Márk Antal.

Jews in the Rumanian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia

Iorga was convinced that "in the ample source material of the 15th century there is no reference to the Jews" and, together with Bogdan-Diucă, stated that the scattering of the Jews from Spain and the growth of the Jewish religious community in Constantinople (as well as the appearance of the Jews in the Balkans and at the customs offices on the Danube) took place in the 16th century. As in Transylvania here they had a significant role in diplomacy and in the economy. On the basis of sources (both finds and documents) we can speak of their presence, and even of their settlement, in the period from the 15th to the 17th centuries. According to a contemporary source, Solomon del Medigo, a physician and theologian, stayed with Solomon ben Arayo, a well-known cabbalist in Iasi, between 1618 and 1629. The latter, together with the Rabbi of Iaşi, Nathan Hanover, actually developed connections between Rumanian culture and science and those of the rest of the Continent through their personal Western

European contacts. Many Jews found refuge in Moldavia from the pogroms of Hmelnitsky, and in the 17th century the princes authorized a land leasing system, even though Jews were allowed to buy land only from the 18th century onwards. The 18th century also marks the beginning of Jewish immigration from the East. This was, to some extent, regulated by a 1786 law which required would-be Jewish settlers to have 250 forints of capital to qualify for residence permission. According to Raichevici, a traveller from Ragusa, in 1788 there were not only Greek Orthodox and Lutheran churches in Bucharest but also a Jewish synagogue.

Although the Organizational Regulations issued in 1829 treated the Jews as aliens and although the government authorized their settlement only if it could be regarded as promoting the country's interests, the economic policy of the principalities accelerated the process of immigration and emancipation. The Organizational Regulations guaranteed the exercise of political rights only for those belonging to Orthodox Christianity. Accordingly in 1833 the Jewish religious community of Iaşi handed in a petition to the Provisional Government, requesting that those who had been born in Rumanian territory or had been resident there for a long time be treated differently from the new immigrants. Various studies of the issue all agree that international pressure played an important role in the emancipation of the Jews; their final achievement of equality in terms of political rights and citizenship, in spite of the fact that some 200 laws were passed concerning these between 1829 and 1916, was a long process.

In 1859 the Treaty of Paris, after the unification of Moldavia and Wallachia, declared that the extension of political rights to those belonging to other religions would be guaranteed by a law to be prepared in the future. The Civil Code in 1862 authorized individual naturalization which, after ten years residence, could be gained from Council of State on the basis of an application to the sovereign, Iorga writes. A law of 1864, confirmed by a law of 1874, required one of the following qualifications for the exercise of municipal rights: 1/ commissioned rank in the Rumanian Army; 2/ secondary and higher education at Rumanian schools; 3/ a university degree gained abroad; and 4/ the establishment of a factory in Rumania employing at least 50 workers. Prince Ion Alexandru Cuza, who had an important role in starting the country's capitalist development, in a speech delivered in December 1865, promised to extend Jewish emancipation in line with the attempt made during the 1848 revolution in the Rumanian principalities and in Transylvania. However, the implementation of this was hindered by a coup at the beginning of the following year by boyars dissatisfied with Cuza's reforms. In 1878 at the Congress of Berlin the first condition for the acknowledgement of an independent Rumania was the emancipa-

tion of the Jews. The new constitution of 1879 nullified the provision in the constitution of 1866 concerning religious inequality. In 1918 the Rumanian Jewish issue entered international politics again: the Treaty of Bucharest signed on 7th May, 1918 stated that "the privileges of the Rumanian Orthodox Church as well as its legal and administrative guarantees shall be shared by Roman Catholics, Uniates (Greek Catholics), Protestants and Jews". Naturally the Jews, regarded until then as aliens, now gained Rumanian citizenship.

The volume of documents emphasizes the sacrifices made by Rumanian Jews during the revolution of 1848, during the war of independence of 1877-78, and during the First World War, in which about 22,000 Jews served as soldiers, many of them being decorated for bravery. The editors of Izvoare si marturii referitoare la evreii din Romania deliberately omitted to recall all the grievances by the Jews at the hands of the extreme right and the Iron Guard between the two World Wars and did not enumerate the legal measures resulting in discrimination. This branch of Eastern European Jewry, now greatly reduced in size because of the Holocaust and because of emigration since 1945, attempted to provide information about itself in order to preserve the past, a turbulent past during which in the territory of present-day Rumania - Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia - it was much more helpless and defenceless than the rest of the population. Up to 1948, when the Church-operated schools were nationalized, the Jews of Rumania cherished their almost 1,000 year old traditions, religion and culture in their Yiddish secondary schools and at the former rabbinical college at Arad. Now they do this in the Jewish State Theatre at Bucharest; through the 2-3 books published every year in Yiddish by the Kriterion Publishing House; through the several magazines issued by the Federation of Jewish Communities and in more than 100 synagogues, Torah schools and libraries which together house 70,000 volumes. At the same time they are getting assimilated and identified with the community in which they have lived and worked for several hundred years, as are the other ethnic minorities of Rumania.

Changes in the Jewish population as reflected in the censuses

Moldavia		Wallachia		Transylvania	
1803	2,527 families			1750	229 families[x]
1820	3,553 "	1821	3,316 families	1782	332 "
	14,212 persons				
1831	36,946 "	1838	5,960	1845	3,000 "
1859	118,944 "	1860	9,234	1850	15,559 persons
1899	196,752 "	1890	68,852	1870	24,842 " xx
1899	266,652 " (4.5% of the population of Moldavia, Wallachia, Muntenia, Dobruja			1910	170,943 "

Rumania

	by religion	%	ethnically	%
1930	759,930	4.2	728,115	4.0
1940	329,841	2.8	313,058	2.6
to the Soviet Union by the annexation of Bessarabia	277,949	8.2[xxx]	275,329	8.1
transferred to Hungary after the Second Vienna award	148,294	6.2	138,921	5.8
to Bulgaria by the annexation of South Dobruja	848	0.2	807	0.2
1941	314,859			
1942	275,068			
1948	139,169			
1956	146,264			
1966	42,888			
1977	25,686 (45,000)[xxxx]			

x/ with the exception of Gyulafehérvár (Alba Iulia)
xx/ in certain towns: Kolozsvár (Cluj) 3,008; Gyulafehérvár (Alba Iulia) 1,221; Marosvásárhely (Tîrgu Mureş) 663; Fogaras (Făgăraş) 276; Beszterce (Bistriţa) 229
xxx/ of all Rumanian citizens transferred
xxxx/ According to the data of Minority Rights Group, 1975.

I l d i k ó L i p c s e y

Institute of Historical Sciences

Each of the documents in Izvoare şi mărturii, published in Rumanian, is followed by an English summary. The volume has two appendices, the second of which contains photographed extracts from certain documents, a glossary, different indices and a list of works consulted.

Quoting the numbers of the documents from the volume we would like to draw attention to the following:

N° 2. King Andrew II of Hungary includes provisions concerning the Jews of the Hungarian Kingdom and Transylvania in his famous Golden Bull of 1222.

N° 3. Andrew II undertakes to fulfil his promise in connection with the Jews in the presence of Jacob, bishop of Premeste.

N° 5. The famous privilege given to the Jews by King Béla IV of Hungary.

N° 10. King Louis I of Hungary, expels from the country (c. 1350) those Jews who refuse to convert to Christianity. (I should like to remark that both documents 5 and 10 have been published in several studies dealing with Hungarian

Jews. The reason for their present publication is their significance concerning the pasts both of Rumanian and Hungarian Jews.)

N° 11. The regulation of King Sigismund of Hungary regarding offices which could be held by Jews.

N° 13. The regulation of King László I of Hungary concerning taxes to be paid by the Jews.

N° 17. The instruction of King László II of Hungary to the city council of Nagyszeben (Sibiu) in connection with the assessment of Jewish-Christian credit deals.

N° 20. King László II of Hungary gives instructions to the Voivode of Transylvania, among others, in connection with the case involving the city of Nagyszeben and a Polish merchant named Izrael.

N° 22. A Jewish oath formula found in the library of the Hungarian aristocratic Batthyány family at Gyulafehérvár (Alba Iulia). [This subject has an interesting background in Hungarian Jewish historical studies. It is summarized by Ernő Winkler in his Adalékok a zsidó eskü történelméhez (Data on the history of the Jewish oath), (Budapest, 1917) and in his studies in the Magyar Zsidó Szemle.]

N° 23. A Jewish codex from the 15th century found in the abovementioned library.

N° 25. A reference from 1504 to István Nagy, physician to the Voivode of Moldavia, previously physician to the Tartar khan.

N° 62. A reference made at the Transylvanian diet at Kolozsvár (Cluj) in 1578 to a fair at which a number of Jewish merchants were present.

N° 92. A description from 1600 of the persecution of Rumanians, Serbs, Greeks and Jews.

N° 119. Prince of Transylvania Gábor Bethlen bestows privileges on his Jewish subjects.

N° 124. Bethlen fixes the maximum price of certain articles sold by Turkish, Greek and Jewish merchants.

N° 130. Prince of Transylvania György Rákóczi I invites to his court a Jewish physician who had previously worked at the court of Prince of Moldavia Vasile Lupu.

N° 158. The contribution of a Jew named Samuel to the ransoming from the Turks of prisoner of war András Comaroni and his family.

N° 159. Prince of Transylvania Mihály Apafi I confirms the privileges of the Jews.

N° 172. Army contractor Oppenheimer sells weapons to the Habsburg Empire to be used against the Turks. An excellent study of Oppenheimer, especially on his

activities in connection with Hungary, was written by Ferenc Szakály in vol.XIV of Monumenta Historica Judaica.

We look forward to the forthcoming volumes of the series.

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Bécs és Pest-Buda a régi századvégen (Vienna and Pest-Buda in the late 1700s). By Éva H. Balázs, Magvető Kiadó: Budapest, 1987, 342 pp.

Historians have often produced their most outstanding achievements when summing up the results of long years of research in related or overlapping fields. This is the case with Professor Éva H. Balázs's comprehensive historical essay. As we learn at the end of the book, her present work is based on studies she made in the 1950s to write university textbooks and on the research she did in the 1970s on 18th century Hungary (which was the basis for the chapters she contributed to Magyarország története [The History of Hungary], a joint effort of Hungarian historians organized by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences). Obviously her present study has also been enriched by her extensive research experience with certain favourite themes; namely, the history of Freemasonry in the Habsburg Empire and the achievements of Gergely Berzeviczy, an outstanding economist who began his career as a Josephist.

The study reviewed here covers the years 1765-90; i.e., the time of Maria Theresa and her son Joseph's joint rule, and after the former's death, Joseph's reign. As its title suggests, the book deals with an Empire divided into two halves, i.e., the relationship between the hereditary lands of the Habsburgs (plus the Low Countries) and, across the River Lajta (Leitha), the Hungarian Kingdom. However, some tension is also involved in the title, since in the period under consideration, the cities of Vienna and Pest-Buda were not really comparable. Vienna was a metropolis, the centre of the hereditary lands of the Habsburgs and the capital of the whole Empire. By contrast, it was only in the second part of Joseph II's reign (as a result of his policies) that Pest-Buda

embarked on the road that led to its becoming the political centre of Hungary. It would take another fifty years and an extended period of economic prosperity before Pest-Buda truly became Hungary's centre.

The above is not meant to imply that the book is only concerned with problems arising between the Empire's disparate halves. As is stressed in the introduction, the author also analyzes enlightened absolutism, the period of the "ancien régime's last governmental experiment". The activities of Maria Theresa and Joseph II are viewed from continental and international perspectives. In the author's opinion the two monarchs wanted to raise the Monarchy to a level "at which negotiations with the most developed countries could be conducted as equals". To do this, they tried to implement the economic and social ideals of the Age of Reason. In addition, they based their foreign policy upon a goal of transforming the traditional system of alliances. Their economic policies were influenced by mercantilism and physiocracy. Nevertheless, Vienna, insisting on the "cameralist" views that had been developed in the previous century, continued to regard Hungary chiefly as an agricultural territory and supported industrial development elsewhere in the Empire. With regard to the impact of foreign experience, Professor H.Balázs points out that the achievements in the Habsburg-dominated Italian lands, especially Florence and Milan, had a stimulating effect on Austrian economy.

Having viewed the subject of the book from a broad international perspective, the author sets out to evaluate the personnel of Austrian enlightened absolutism. First of all, she praises the indefatigable Maria Theresa, who became ruler of a consolidated Empire following her husband's death in 1765. The monarch chose her counselors wisely. H.Balázs stresses the importance of Chancellor Kaunitz, who organized the State Council and directed foreign policy. Historians have long acknowledged Kaunitz' prominence, but his role merits a much deeper analysis in our age. From the Hungarian perspective, Kaunitz' role is of special importance because of his great influence over events affecting Hungary. In several cases, his actions were decisive in bringing about change, e.g., his twelve-point memorandum on Hungarian affairs of 1761 (which the author analyzes in detail). This memorandum and his scheme to introduce the teaching of German in the Belgian and Lombard territories were to form the basis of his future Hungarian policy. The author points out that the political role of Kaunitz' widely travelled protegé Karl Zinzendorf is, especially from the Hungarian perspective, practically unknown, in spite of the fact that his invaluable 57-volume diary spanning six decades in itself justifies granting him a prominent place in history. He was an

important figure in the Empire, an expert on European affairs who once served as governor of Trieste. In this capacity he preferred free trade to mercantilism. He understood and sympathized with the economic plight of the Hungarian Kingdom and Transylvania. Professor H. Balázs gives due praise to the achievements of Sonnenfels, a jurist who came from a well-to-do middle class Jewish family. His ideas had a great impact on the legal and political thinking of his age. As head of the department of political and economic sciences at the University of Vienna he educated generations of future civil servants in the art of administering an enlightened absolutist state. He believed the nation would prosper if individual interests were recognized.

The second part of the book is devoted to the reign of Joseph II. As an introduction to this theme, there is a chapter in Part I on Joseph's earlier life, i.e., his education, developing personality and the relationship between him and his mother Maria Theresa in the period when they jointly ruled the Empire. This background helps the reader to understand the tensions between the widowed empress and her co-regent son as well as why Maria Theresa changed her mind about abdicating. Young Joseph is shown to have been strong-willed. The author deems it unlikely that Joseph regarded as his role model Frederick the Great, who truncated the Empire. Dreams written in 1761 and Memorandum, addressed to his mother in 1765, reveal a lot about the prince's thoughts during the period when he was preparing to assume power. Memorandum was the product not only of Joseph's studies, but of his extensive practical experience as well; it testifies to the young co-regent's restless desire to bring about change in conditions he did not like. Because of his mother's resistance to his ideas and the overall personal rift between them, Joseph went travelling throughout the Empire and beyond. "His travels were a means of both gaining experience and running away from home."

Although the book is concerned with the era of Maria Theresa in Austria-Hungary as a whole, particular attention is paid to the social structure of the Empire's Hungarian half: the author reviews the conclusions historians have drawn and adds her own contributions to the literature. In addition to outlining the roles of the old and new aristocracies in administering the Empire, this study sheds light on the conscious efforts of the enlightened government to find a solid social basis. At the same time, it is pointed out that unquestioned loyality is bound to disappear as the first generation dies out and sons and grandsons become unafraid to criticize the old ways freely, according to their own temperament. The author empasizes the important role of the numerous

gentry class, which was in close contact with strata both above and below it. The ranks of the gentry were continuously being augmented from groups of people hardly better-off than peasants, while the discretion of the monarch kept on increasing the group of loyal aristocrats by granting titles as baron and count to gentry families. The large number of gentry who ascended to higher rank testifies to the great possibility for upward mobility. Another group that benefited was that of the new intellectual class, drawn from the commoners. These were to play a significant role during Joseph's reign. The impetus for change was first generated by members of the educated gentry who supported Joseph's enlightened absolutism, provided he took their interests into consideration and was willing to change his economic policy.

Professor H. Balázs points out that although the imperial court supported the development of chartered towns, this policy was not successful in Hungary. Most chartered towns were insignificant settlements and it was only in oppida that development on a large scale took place. The business climate of Hungarian towns was not conducive to the growth of manufactories. The bourgeoisie did not invest its capital in industry but in transacting loans. Privileged towns, populated predominantly by ethnic Germans, failed to support either the development of Hungary or the Monarchy as a whole. In contrast to all other European countries, urban population did not increase in Hungary during this period. The only exception to this was the future capital city, Pest-Buda, which experienced growth from the 1770s onwards. The capital of the country and the seat of the diet was Pozsony, a great city, but virtually without any industry. Pest-Buda itself had no industry before 1776, when the state established the first textile manufactory.

Part I, entitled "New Government Policies - New Practices", deals with the last fifteen years of Maria Theresa's reign. This part is primarily a discussion about enlightened absolutism, its proponents, its theoretical background and its practice. Part I serves mainly as an introduction to Part II, the decade of Joseph II's reign. The title of Part II, "The Drama of the 1780s", provides the key to the whole book. By this the author points up the tumultuous nature of the era that confronted Joseph II. Although the sovereign had spent fifteen years gathering experience needed to implement his programmes, he assumed power at a time when Western Europe was on the verge of a crisis, when events were being guided by hitherto unknown forces. The failure of Josephism cannot be attributed to the fact that the Empire was a collection of diverse nationalities nor was it caused by the contradictions in the development of modern nations in its territories. Momentum towards change was generated by

longstanding problems of European society, with the result that "dynastic government, even if it had enlightened features, was no longer viable". Professor H. Balázs does not subscribe to the widely held view that whereas the mother's main concern was the preservation of the dynasty, the son's was to serve the state. An explanation for the failure of his policies must be sought in the changes in the international political climate. At first these only affected territories outside the Empire, but because of the close ties between European powers the new trends spread throughout the continent.

Joseph II wanted to implement domestic and foreign policy reforms along the lines of his own and Kaunitz' earlier proposals. In the author's opinion a close connection can be shown between the policies of Kaunitz, who had been chancellor for twenty years, Joseph's earlier views, and his actions as emperor from late 1780 on when he inherited the throne. The chancellor and his monarch did not always see eye to eye, but they shared each other's views regarding the clergy, the peasantry and civil rights reforms. They also agreed upon basic foreign policy issues: the necessity of an alliance with France (which they, however, always looked upon with suspicion) and the practicality of cooperating with the rising Russian power. In Joseph II's opinion the Habsburg Empire's power in Europe would be ensured by a modernized army ready to conquer new lands. Kaunitz, however, was against war, which he regarded as disruptive to the status quo. This difference arose, it is explained, from Joseph's background: "Maria Theresa was compelled to wage war; Joseph II grew up in wartime".

The international situation was not conducive to foreign policy initiatives: the domestic situation, however, called for immediate attention. The problematic relationship with the Church assumed special importance. The main stages in settling ecclesiastical affairs were the renewal of the Placetum Regium, the separation of monastic orders from their foreign headquarters, the removing of censorship from the control of the clerical hierarchy, the reorganization of the training of priests and, finally, the issuing of the seminal Toleration Act. Support for these measures was not unanimous: it encountered resistance from Roman Catholics. Protests were voiced in Hungary in the Council of the Governor General, and even in the Imperial Chancellery. However, Joseph II was not in the least perturbed by the opposition. What's more, it prompted him to attack certain bishops for their wealth. In spite of the fact that some imperial measures were directed against individuals, Professor H. Balázs considers them justified, although remarks: "My sympathy with these endeavours is only vitiated by the fact that the monarch overestimated his and the state's

power to control church affairs and often meddled into ceremonies and matters of religious life without the necessary tact and good sense."

From the beginning, Joseph II's reign was characterized by his drive for centralization and personal rule. With regard to Hungary, the sovereign declined to have himself crowned King of Hungary. In Professor H. Balázs's opinion, his reluctance to take the Hungarian crown and with it the coronation oath was due to his reluctance to have limits imposed upon his freedom to act. In spite of this provocative gesture and his orders to the Chancellery and the Council of the Governor General (both of which he treated with impatience and sometimes suspicion), the Hungarian authorities initially endeavoured to mollify the monarch and to maintain the normal usages in administration. In spite of a marked deterioration in their relationship with Joseph, the Hungarians did not openly oppose him. Drawing upon the findings of the most recent published research on the subject, the author claims that the turning point occurred in 1784, due to a culmination of events beginning with the removal of the Royal Crown from Hungary. While this measure provoked only politically conscious people, its sequel, the monarch's decree making German the official language stirred nationwide outrage. Finally, the decree mandating a national census, whose aim was to make universal military registration realizable, forced the Hungarian counties into open opposition. As strange as it may seem from the perspective of 200 years later, the noblemen who ruled the counties were afraid that they would lose their privileges if their residences received street numbers. This sort of behaviour demonstrated the Hungarian aristocracy's total lack of faith in the emperor's reforms.

The year 1784 was not only notable for the confrontation between the monarch and the Hungarian aristocracy. The tragic Horia-Closca peasant revolt in Transylvania, which would have far-reaching consequences, took place in the fall of the same year. As a result of this and other peasant uprisings, laws were enacted protecting serfs and methods of law enforcement were overhauled. The civil code of 1786 proclaimed universal equality before the law and the right of all citizens to own property. Making these concessions in the spirit of modernization, the monarch was even attempting to reform the counties, which had for centuries safeguarded the interests of the Hungarian nobility. Joseph's clear aim was to destroy the counties' autonomy. In 1785 he ordered the grouping of the counties into ten districts and appointed reliable royal commissioners to head them. These district commissioners were outstanding figures whose reports provide valuable information about Hungary's economy, legal system and overall

cultural environment at that time. These figures would continue to play important roles in government, especially in the diet, after the period of Josephism.

For a long time, internal problems diverted attention from foreign policy difficulties. Joseph's first failure in that sphere occurred as early as 1785 when he made an unsuccessful attempt at opening the River Schelde to foreign shipping which had been barred by international treaties. He also failed to realize his longstanding ambition of exchanging the Austrian Low Countries for Bavaria. Even more damaging was the uprising in 1787 by Belgian nationalists, who wanted independence from the Empire. Owing to a war with Turkey, their revolt succeeded and in 1789 the Low countries freed themselves from Habsburg rule. In 1788 Joseph formed an alliance with Russia and entered the Empire into a disastrous war with Turkey. The emperor chose to lead the campaign personally. The war emptied the treasury and created a food shortage. Joseph II died in February 1790 as a result of an illness he caught during his campaign.

When drawing the balance of Joseph's reign, the author chooses to emphasize the emperor's personal traits and to evaluate Josephism in general, rather than specific policies. She regards the emperor as a great historical figure whose objectives were much too ambitious. "Realization of his domestic and foreign policy goals would have taken decades", the author claims. Both Joseph II's temporary and lasting achievements were strongly dependent on his own abilities, since even those who initially supported him, eventually backed away from him. His quick temper and belief in his own infallibility distanced his friends and supporters. However, the author does not see these as the main reasons for his failure. She claims that the time was not propitious for the emperor's programmes, Europe being hit by its first wave of revolutions. In addition, due to the army's fiasco in fighting the Turks, the government was unable to take a stand against the Belgian rebels. We might add that if Joseph had used brute force in Hungary, success would not have been likely. Anyway, the monarch, whose "salus populi" policy managed to alienate almost every segment of society, even lacked the moral authority for doing so.

One important group which turned against Joseph was that of the Freemasons. Since Professor H. Balázs is an internationally recognized expert on this group, frequent reference is made to Freemasonry throughout the book. In the introductory chapters, we learn from a survey of Hungarian lodges that 75% of Freemasons came from the gentry and that the majority of them were protestants (a group barred from the more important government posts before Joseph II's Toleration Act). "This explains their keen interest in the Empire's economy, their sophisticated political sense and their attraction to enlightened absolutism."

A chapter is devoted to the effect of Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws on political thinking in Hungary and the plans of the "generation that was ready to take action". This reform-minded group of Freemasons came together during the reign of Maria Theresa and had championed Josephism even before Joseph II launched his reform programme.

Thus Hungarian Freemasons "were prepared and active" before Joseph's accession to the throne. In the beginning they saw the emperor as their champion, a confidence that was bolstered by Joseph's words and deeds. Joseph II appointed several Protestants to high office. The author claims that during the first four years of Joseph's reign "the term Freemason was synonymous with Josephist". Yet the monarch's Freemason supporters were alienated not only by the same policies which were unpopular with the people at large; they were also put off by his attempt to unite and regulate freemasonic lodges. What most provoked their outrage was the Patent on Freemasons issued at the end of 1785. This stipulated that Freemasons register with the police and that they inform the authorities in advance of their meetings. Furthermore, the patent banned meeting in private homes. These regulations caused universal disappointment among the Freemasons, especially those in the rebellious Low Countries, Hungary and Transylvania. The result in Hungary was rampant dissatisfaction leading to the alienation of Joseph's last supporters. Thus, we can understand why Hungarian Freemasons went over to the camp of the moderate aristocracy and joined the Jacobin Society of Reformers. The imperial court's harsh measures, the 1795 trials and executions, the French wars and the subsequent wheat boom were followed by a standstill. Later the Hungarian Josephist reformers, their sons and disciples would embark upon a path that led to the Reform Era and the 1848 Revolution. "The generation of the Reform Era", Professor H. Balázs points out, "were the intellectual heirs of Josephism, the tenets of which they updated and Hungarianized."

The above claim points to the need for a separate monograph which would help us better understand the ideas and society of the first half of the 19th century. Can we have asked for more from this outstanding study which not only achieves its objectives but also outlines the course of future studies?

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A szlovák társadalom és polgári nemzeti mozgalom a századfordulón 1895-1905 (Slovak Society and Middle Class National Movement at the Turn of the Century 1895-1905), by Imre Polányi, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1987. 239.p.

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy contained two million Slovaks, 85% of whom were living in a homogeneous block, although under diverse economic and social conditions in what is now Slovakia. They occupied a unique position among the ethnic and political groups of the Hungary of the Dual Monarchy. In a new book, Professor Imre Polányi of Janus Pannonius University, Pécs, Hungary, examines the structure, development and economic organization of Slovak society, and inquires into the internal dynamics and alternatives in Slovak middle class and (in one chapter) social democratic politics.

Although the history of national minorities has traditionally constituted an important subdiscipline within Hungarian historical studies before, Polányi's is the most comprehensive account of Slovaks living in pre-1918 Hungary to appear in seventy-five years. From among the numerous reasons for this hiatus it will suffice here to mention the methodological problems presented by the uncertain borders of pre-1918 Slovakia, i.e., the lack of historic borders, the heterogeneity of the statistical data and the diverse approaches which have been employed by Czechoslovak and Hungarian researchers. Imre Polányi endeavours to present a true picture of this Slovak society, focussing on ethnicity rather than its earlier incorporation in Hungary and today in Czechoslovakia. Thus, geographically, he treats the ten "whole" and seven "divided" counties of the territory of Hungary which became part of Czechoslovakia after 1918, concentrating on the region's Slovak inhabitants.

In determining the temporal limits for this study, the author has been confronted with serious problems. First, it is difficult to precisely date politically active and passive periods (which we believe the author has solved by stressing the transitional character of the 1895-1905 period). In addition, although the data from the censuses of 1880-1910 can be used to form many reliable conclusions, they are almost totally inappropriate for making comparisons by ethnic groups. It is well known that the statistical tables of the censuses of 1880 and 1890 did not include data broken down according to ethnic groups and the data of the 1900 census are rather inconclusive. The ample ethnic data collected for the 1910 census can just present us with a snapshot of the region for that year only. Not to pass beyond the ten-year period in the course of which the Slovaks became politically active, Imre Polányi has made a survey of the 1900 census

data and several contemporary industrial and agrarian statistics in order to get an understanding of the social structure of Upper Hungary at the turn of the century.

Let us now mention a few notable conclusions. After Budapest, the most important mining and industrial region of Hungary was composed of the counties of Zólyom, Gömör, Szepes, Liptó and Nógrád. In all of Upper Hungary's 10 "whole" and 7 "part" counties, there were 495 companies in 1900 which employed twenty or more workers (then considered the minimum size for a large concern). This comprised 22 per cent of the large companies of the entire country. Over fifty factories operated in the counties of Szepes and Gömör and the city of Pozsony. At the same time, 45 of the country's 96 factories employing more than 500 workers were found in the territory which is now Slovakia.

This and other recent studies have proved false the hypothesis (held by Hungarians at the turn of the century and recently by Slovaks) that the industrialization of this region caused a massive process of Magyarization among Slovak factory workers. Polányi persuasively argues that Magyarization occurred because of the internal migration of skilled Hungarian workers, and the Magyarization within the central, Hungarian region of the country. Another point, one that has not often been mentioned, is that only 6,346 unionized workers had Slovak as their native language, according to a contemporary Slovak survey. The Slovak Social Democratic Party's organisation had no presence in the large factories of Szepes and Gömör. Thus, outside the counties of Pozsony, Trencsén, Turóc and Liptó and the cities of Budapest and Vienna, Slovaks did not participate in the labour movement which arose during this period. This was one of the factors that hampered the internal cohesion of the Slovak national region, one of the goals of the Slovak Social Democrats.

Serious difficulties arose because of the small size and relatively impoverished condition of the Slovak middle class and landowning populations. Polányi correctly notes that even the most successful Slovak bankers and industrialists may be viewed as having belonged more to the middle class than to the plutocracy (p. 35). The number of Slovak-owned large factories was a mere 7 in 1905. These played an insignificant role in the country's and even in Upper Hungary's economic life with their basic capital of 2,7 million crowns. Lacking adequate data on Hungary's national minorities, the author relied on estimates based on the relative size of ethnic groups and on the data relating to the voting population to determine the number of Slovak workers (90,000-100,000), landowning peasantry (170,000-180,000), manor servants (51,500) and the agrarian proletariat

(116,000). In the closing section of the first part of his book, which deals with social and economic history, the author briefly surveys the causes and effects of the two most important Slovak population movements: their resettling to other parts of Hungary and their emigration, for the most part to the United States.

The second part of the book describes the reactivization during this period of Slovak middle class and social democratic political movements. The Slovak National Party, which in effect was identical with the Slovak national movement, is discussed with separate chapters devoted to its conservative, Calvinist and people's party-like Catholic factions. Further chapters treat the bourgeois democratic opposition within the party (whose aim was Czechoslovak unity), the activities of Slovak-Americans and the efforts by Slovak Social Democrats to obtain independence.

Naturally, a foreign author is at a disadvantage when dealing with complex questions that have long been studied by Slovak historians. Such problems include, for example, mapping the Slovak National Party's political base or determining the significance of the Catholic political movement, which varied by region and village. Polányi skillfully analyzes the latest Slovak research, concentrating on sensitive questions to which Slovak historians, due to their traditionally ideological approach, have often given ready-made answers.

Thus, for example, in a sub-chapter on the Slovak National Party's conservative leadership, there is a remarkable analysis of the isolationism arising from the inadequate understanding of the process of assimilation, which affected Slovak society. Polányi offers insights on how, on the one hand, Magyarization hindered the political, cultural and economic development of the Slovak nation, and how, on the other hand, the party refused to deal with Hungarian progressives and abused in a merciless ideological struggle those who had become assimilated.

An important contribution of the book is that it provides a many-sided analysis of the decade's blossoming Czech-Slovak relationship, a subject heretofore given scant attention by Hungarian and even Slovak historians. Polányi does not merely note the activities of the Czech-Slavic Association and the Slovakophil movement (traditionally supported by Czech intellectuals), or T.G.Masaryk's influence (which especially after 1918, was magnified and said to have been important even in the earliest period); he also details the intellectual background of Czech-Slovak union, the constraints imposed by the backwardness of Slovak society and the serious consequences of Magyarization. It is a pity that the economic side of the Czech-Slovak relationship (which, of course had only

become really important in the years immediately prior to the First World War) gets no attention from Polányi when he discusses this cooperation, which became decisive for the development of the Slovak nation after the war.

In the final chapters, which deal with Slovak-Americans and the elections of 1901-1905 the reader becomes aware of an issue which has been neglected, or perhaps deliberately ignored: the Hungarian government's "Upper Hungary policy" of bringing the development of Slovak society and the Slovak national movement under control. Though this omission allowed more space for discussing Slovak society and its politics, the book's second part, with its exclusive focus on events inside Upper Hungary, lacks the universality of its first, economic-historical part.

Even so, this work (along with the forthcoming bilingual historical yearbook "Common Route - Spoločná cesta", edited by Imre Polányi) is an exceptional achievement of Hungarian Slavonic history studies. It provides a useful framework for the future cooperative exploration of such problems with Slovak historians.

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