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**Liberation of Buda
and the Danubian Region**

**Freemasons
in the Danubian Region**

Second Vienna Award

Opening of the Iron Gate

Interview

Documents

Reviews

AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ · BUDAPEST

DANUBIAN HISTORICAL STUDIES

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F o r e w o r d

What purpose does the Institute of Historical Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences have as it launches its new series? Can a new series of this sort have any function nowadays; can it hope to find readers when bookshops and library shelves are crowded by more works on history and sociology than ever before? Can this often-compromised word "history" be expected to appear in a new light through our modest efforts? The answer can only be provided by the volumes that will appear. Let me nevertheless point out a few editorial guidelines which give form to our series in the future.

The essence of our programme is indicated partly by the title itself. "Danubian" has a double meaning here. On the one hand it has broadening and unifying function. Broadening, in that though most of our papers will deal with Hungarian history, our interest and subject will be the history of the whole Danube region. Unifying, because despite many failures and trials we are still led by the notion that the peoples of the Danube region are mutually dependent on each other, and it is in this light that our studies wish to search for historical truth. This will require patience and understanding, and a critical approach to guard against one-sided national prejudices, the embellishment or perhaps even falsification of history. At the same time "Danubian" also implies the limitation or circumscribing of our aims. The means at our disposal - for which we thank the Soros Foundation - do not enable us to discuss the many questions of universal history to the same depth. But apart from this practical reason it is worth paying particular attention to the Danube region also because it is a historical, social and ethnic unit even if we consider that its history has been formed as much by external as by internal forces. Yet as Hungarian history cannot be treated isolated from that of the rest of Europe without the danger of historical errors, neither can this broader historical and geographical unit.

We wish to summon history to testify in defence of the freedom of scientific research, against narrow-minded provincial and nationalistic historiography. We emphasize the importance of facts and rational intellectual conviction as opposed to distorting interests from whatever source they may originate: individual interests and errors, mass-instinct or the demands of dictatorship. History is worth little without addressing itself to historical problems. Just as a museum catalogue is not history, neither is historical chronology; it is, in Croce's words, only the "corpse of history". Our discussions, therefore, will extend beyond pure facts to the issues of "meaning" and "significance".

Paul Valéry regarded historiography as the most dreadful product of the human mind. In his view, history encourages dreaming, poisons the nation, creates false memories, exaggerates reactions, deprives nations of their peace and makes for megalomania and persecution complexes. Every issue in our series will attempt to refute this misconception.

We do not wish to assist either dreamers or "well-poisoners". Nor do we wish to tear open old wounds. We oppose every kind of megalomania, any leading role in the Danube region; nor do we want to reinforce anyone's sense of being persecuted. Our aims are modest, yet they might seem daring: we want to write accurate history.

G y ö r g y R á n k i

Director of the
Institute of Historical Sciences

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The Liberation of Buda and the Danube Region

It has been 300 years since the troops of the Holy League under the command of Prince Charles of Lorraine liberated Buda, capital of Hungary, from Turkish rule on September 2, 1686. After a professional and methodical siege of 2 1/2 months with river-borne cannons, they launched a decisive attack with three columns each from the South and the North, and managed to penetrate the fortress. In the course of a bitter, bloody fight, the commander of the defenders, the old Abdurrahman - 99th and last pasha of Buda - was killed, sword in hand, at the head of his remaining soldiers. The once busy and wealthy city had already been ruined during the bitter, 145-year-long Ottoman rule. It then had to endure the tribulations of war. The Italian Count Marsigli, learned staff engineer-general, tried in vain to find the remains of the famous Corvina Library in the smouldering ruins of the once-splendid 15th century Renaissance Palace of King Matthias. Thus began the period of a return to civilization and a gradual material and cultural advance.

The re-occupation of Buda caused a considerable international reaction. It was celebrated in numerous cities of Europe with illuminations and bonfires. Countless poems, odes, medals, carvings, sensational publications - not to mention the various reports, accounts and memoirs of the siege - were published.

The victory was won in the end by international collaboration in a joint European operation. The Holy League was established upon the initiation of Pope Innocent IX (1676-1689) in the Spring of 1684, with the participation of the Habsburg Empire (Emperor Leopold I), Venice and Poland (King John Sobiesky), with Russia joining them in 1686. All these countries had claims on the Ottoman Empire. But it was the Pope, as determined as he was frail, who really brought the League to action. He, with the help of Buonvisi, the papal legate in Vienna, and the Capuchin Marco d'Aviano, confessor to the Emperor, induced Leopold I

to continue the war. The pope supported him with enormous sums, although Leopold wanted to make peace with the Turks in the East, in order to concentrate his forces against the expansionist power of Louis XIV, King of France. The attack of Grand Vizier Kara Moustafa against Vienna in 1683 gave the first impetus to Leopold to apply to the Holy See, the Polish King and the Bavarian and Saxon Prince-Electors for assistance. Yet, even after the relief of Vienna, he still hesitated to exploit the favourable occasion to mount an offensive toward the East, which had not been ventured for a long time.

The Grand Vizier - just as his predecessors in the 16th century - was unable to capture Vienna. This, in itself, was not a serious blow to the Ottoman Empire. Buda, on the other hand, was the pillar of the Sultan's Empire in the middle basin of the Danube, in the territory of former Hungary. This was the first great central fortress - which the Sultan Suliman I captured in 1541, using it as a base, to extend and enlarge his power. Buda was a well-equipped fortification on the Danube that Christian armies tried in vain to take three times at the turn of the 17th century (1598, 1602, 1603). The first attempt in 1684 was also unsuccessful. It was, therefore, all the more important that in 1686 this pillar of Ottoman power be pulled down.

In the army of 75-80,000 men which brought this about under the leadership of Prince Charles - brother-in-law of the Emperor - many different forces came together. Its manifold character was represented by English, Scottish and Swedish volunteers and Italian and French officers. The great majority, however, was recruited from the Emperors' troops and the levies raised by the different Prince-Electors of the Holy Roman Empire - for considerable financial compensation, of course. Among the princes there were former friends of France, including Sobieski himself. Another was Maximilian Emmanuel, Elector of Bavaria, who soon became son-in-law to the Emperor. Frederick William, the Great-Elector of Brandenburg, drew back from Louis XIV not least because of the persecution of the Huguenots, and sent disciplined, excellent troops to Buda.

Louis XIV, under the pressure of European public opinion, also suspended his expansionist policy, and concluded a long armistice. Thus the traditional Franco-Habsburg rivalry, which consumed such enormous resources, was for a time put on hold. John George III, Saxon Prince-Elector and Margrave Charles of Baden-Durlach also sent soldiers; Frankish and Swabian units, and finally the light cavalry of 10-15,000, the Haiduks and infantry raised by exhausted, divided Hungary, made up the rest of the army. The latter were mainly deployed for raiding the countryside, and to march at the head of the attacking columns as cannon-fodder.

The liberation of Buda greatly affected the development not only of Hungary but of the Habsburg Monarchy as well as the whole Danube Region, and - as we have seen - Europe in general. The process, by which Ottoman rule was originally extended into the middle basin of the Danube from its base in Buda, was now reversed after 1686 and at a quicker pace. The recapture of Buda was not only important in itself, but it was also a turning point and principal event in the war of reconquest, during which the greater part of Hungary was liberated from Ottoman rule by 1699, and the whole country between 1716-1718. Moreover, it appeared for a time that in the South the liberation of the Balkan nations would shortly be accomplished.

The medieval Hungarian kingdom which succumbed to the superior forces of Suliman I in the Battle of Mohács on August 29, 1526, had been fighting for almost 150 years against the Ottoman expansion. In the beginning, it tried to defend its forward positions in the Balkans (beyond its frontiers), then after the conquest of Serbia and Bosnia, it fortified its own southern borders into a defence line. One of its important bastions was Belgrade, as a legacy from the Serbian state. In 1456, János Hunyadi succeeded in defeating the Turks at Belgrade. This kept them away for seven decades. Under the increasing Ottoman pressure more and more dynastic unions were established between Hungary, Bohemia, Poland and Austria. As Hungary was less and less able to bear the costs of defense, King Matthias Hunyadi (1458-1490) tried to establish some sort of unified monarchy under his own leadership by acquiring Bohemia and Austria. After his death, the Polish Jagiello dynasty took over and then, after King Louis II (1516-1526) fell at Mohács, the throne of Hungary and Bohemia came into the hands of Ferdinand of Habsburg, so that the House of Habsburg assumed direction of the new unified monarchy. At that time this made up only part of the great empire of Charles V, who, in rivalry with France, was not very willing effectively to defend his brother's Hungarian kingdom against the Turks.

In 1526, the Sultan occupied Buda only temporarily. Although the Turks sacked part of the country, and carried away tens of thousands of its population as slaves, they still believed that the country was too strong to be occupied immediately. After 15 years of intrigue, on August 29, 1541, they succeeded in occupying the capital through trickery. Thus, between 1543 and 1545, began the systematic occupation of the central and southern parts of the country, with the securing of the deployment road leading to Buda along the Danube, with the capture of a series of fortresses, and with the extension of the territory under Ottoman occupation eastward and westward alike between 1552 and 1556.

Yet, while the Habsburg Empire managed to defend the Western and Northern

perimeters, the enormous wedge of the Ottoman occupation detached the Eastern part of the country, Transylvania, which could preserve its own security only as a vassal of the Sultan and an independent principality. Its leaders vainly struggled several times (1551-1556, 1598-1603) to reunite Transylvania with the western part of the kingdom. The Porte did not allow it, for - on the basis of a declaration made in 1551 - Transylvania was "the discovery of Sultan Suliman" and his property. Thus the two great powers, from the East and from the West, shared Hungary, which continued its political existence in two small separate states, becoming a constant theater of war, while its population seriously diminished and its economy declined.

Toward the middle of the 17th century the Ottoman Empire showed signs of weakening. The most outstanding general and statesman of that period, Miklós Zrinyi (1620-1664) recognized that the Turks could be driven out of Hungary. In his view, a well-equipped Hungarian army could, on a suitable occasion, count on assistance from abroad - mainly from Germany - and the new, liberated Hungary could regain its rightful place within the Habsburg Monarchy. The attention and the forces of the Vienna Court were, however, preoccupied by the problem created by the French rivalry. When Ottoman military expansion was renewed, they were unable to avert the loss of important fortresses (Nagyvárad 1660, Érsekújvár 1663). Instead of taking advantage of the glorious victory of the imperial army commanded by Montecuccoli (Szentgotthárd 1664), they hastily concluded a humiliating peace.

In the second half of the 19th century, (after the collapse of the 1848-49 war of independence) the majority of Hungarian public opinion considered Austria to be the main adversary, whereas it regarded the Turkish empire as an in-offensive country, which harbored Kossuth and his fellow-refugees. Thus, more than one historian has judged the 17th century from this viewpoint. For them, it was quite understandable and even justifiable that certain Hungarian greater and lesser noble leaders, who had protected their feudal positions against absolutism, resorted to political conspiracy, the organization of insurrection, and pro-Turkish policy. They considered the Habsburg regime as neither capable of nor inclined to protect the remaining part of Hungary against the Turks. Against them the Vienna Court retaliated in the 1670's, oppressed them and instituted political and - against those Protestants charged with pro-Turkish feelings - religious persecution. The court suspended the Hungarian feudal constitution, and dispersed the Hungarian soldiers guarding the border castles as unreliable. The 19th century historians, mentioned above, considered it even more understandable (and justifiable) that a young nobleman, Imre Thököly, relying on the

Turkish power and hoping for French assistance, had started an armed uprising against the Habsburgs. He operated by the promise of protecting feudal-national rights and religious liberty for the Protestants. In 1682, he succeeded in having the Porte recognize him as an independent Prince.

We could only accept the position of these historians as fully correct if in politics - and later in historiography - indignation and emotions could be simply identified with the recognition of political realities. The hopeless dialectic of actions and counter-actions led an important line of Hungarian policy-makers down a false path. The vassal principality of Thököly, which divided Hungary into not three but four parts, was entirely dependent upon the Ottoman power. Thököly supported the Porte, and he had to go under with it. In 1683, Thököly's troops acted as auxiliary forces of the Turkish army marching toward Vienna and toward disaster. Thus, this unfortunate prince could find himself at the decisive moment on the wrong side. He was supporting the Ottoman conqueror who had been the original and greatest enemy of Hungary.

However, the great majority of Thököly's soldiers quickly went over to the liberating army, and at the price of no small effort and sacrifice, participated in the war of reconquest. But they were not considered the representatives of an independent military and political force, for which Zrinyi had once prepared.

The central significance of Buda was shown by the fact that after its recapture Ottoman rule in Hungary - built up over a long time - soon collapsed like a house of cards. The imperial troops under the command of Louis William, Margrave of Baden - called "Türkenlouis" - reconquered the Southern city of Pécs in the autumn of 1686. Another column reoccupied Szeged, in the territory between the rivers Danube and Tisza, after defeating Grand Vizier Suliman at Zenta. In the following year (in the summer of 1687) the army of Archduke Charles and Margrave Louis again inflicted such a crushing defeat on the Grand Vizier at Nagyharsány - near the former battlefield of Mohács - that a revolt broke out in Constantinople. The liquidation of the remaining pockets of Ottoman resistance in Hungary went on with the reconquest of Eger and, at the beginning of the following year, of Székesfehérvár. The capture of Belgrade on September 6, 1688, opened another chapter in Hungarian history. Thereafter the imperial troops moved on to the northern parts of Bosnia and Serbia and, in October, they conquered the castles of Sabac and Zvornik, which had last seen Christian Hungarian soldiers at the time of King Matthias. In the autumn of 1689, they defeated the Turks near Nis. The liberation of the Balkan countries, or perhaps more exactly their annexation to the Habsburg Empire, was stymied by the intervention of Louis XIV. Irritated by the success of his rival, he denounced

the armistice treaty in the autumn of 1688, and went on the offensive. Vienna, thus, hurriedly withdrew the bulk of the troops from the East. In any case, after the death of Pope Innocent IX, the Habsburgs could count on considerably less support from his successor Alexander VIII (1689-1691). Consequently, the re-organized Ottoman army was soon able to reconquer the lost Balkan territories, and even retake Belgrade (on September 8, 1690). Leopold I provided shelter and privileges in Hungary to the imperial troops as well as to large numbers of Southern Slav and Slav Orthodox Christians fleeing from the vengeance of the Turks. At the same time (in the summer of 1690) Thököly made a raid into Transylvania. However, after his first successes, the imperial forces drove him out in the course of the autumn. Transylvania, as a formally independent principality, came back under the "Hungarian crown", i.e. under the Habsburg monarch.

In the succeeding years the Porte made several attempts to reoccupy Hungary but these attempts remained unsuccessful. In the meantime, England and Holland had taken the side of the Habsburg Monarchy against France. Vienna, thus, could once again send more forces to the East. Louis William, Margrave of Baden, inflicted a decisive defeat on the Turkish army at Szalánkemén, on August 19, 1691, where the Grand Vizier, himself was killed. In the following years the battles continued with varying success. While the war in the West was nearing its end, the supreme command of the young Prince Eugene of Savoy brought about the resolution. Prince Eugene practically annihilated the Turkish army at Zenta, beside the river Tisza on September 11, 1697, and he even started again to invade the Balkans. At last, by the Treaty of Karlovitz (1699) Hungary was almost completely liberated from Ottoman rule, except for the Banate of Temes in the Southeast. The Treaty of Posarevatz (1718) left Belgrade and the Western part of Romanian Wallachia in the hands of the Habsburgs; however, these were lost again in 1738. The Southern border of Hungary was to become the dividing line between the two empires for a long time afterward.

In the 16th century the Ottoman Empire with its large, centrally-organized army definitely had the upper hand - at least quantitatively - against Hungary, and, in general, against the European states. This explained its success at Mohács, and that it could conquer Buda and a large part of Hungary. The disadvantage of the European states - including the Habsburg Monarchy, though not a Hungary reduced to ruins - was overcome in the second half of the 17th century. They also began to raise strong permanent armies. It was no longer necessary always to begin the organization of such armies anew, contingent upon the slow and doubtful approval of the estates. The achievements of military science, of

technology and of economic and social developments now swung the balance to the advantage of the European states. (It was typical that in the big battles of the war of liberation in Hungary the Turkish army's technical, trenching, and bridge-building tasks generally had to be carried out by French military engineers.)

It is interesting to observe that the Habsburg Monarchy, with its heterogeneous, complex ethnic and social structure, with a badly organized government that was often corrupt, was able to cope with the material and financial burdens of the long and successful war. Apart from the significant financial help granted mainly by the Pope, two more factors must be taken into consideration. One of them was the economic progress of the Bohemian and Austrian provinces of the Monarchy. The other was the fact that the population of the actual theater of war, Hungary, and primarily the peasantry, had to bear the burdens of supplying and billeting the troops. Considering the devastated condition of the country and its decimated population, this burden proved to be indeed great, all the more so as many arbitrary demands were made upon the people. In any case it can be said that Hungary participated in the war effort beyond her means. When the war moved on, the productive forces of the villages became overburdened. In consequence, Hungary was placed into an unfavorable, subordinate position within the Habsburg Monarchy. After the expulsion of the Ottomans, the country was often treated as a conquered province. The Hungarian nobility were shunted out of the way and their feudal and national rights were injured. The peasants, exasperated by heavy taxes and the abuses of the military oppression, soon joined the armed national struggle for independence led by Ferenc Rákóczi II between 1703 and 1711. Romantic historians often drew a parallel between the struggle for independence and the Thököly uprising. They maintained, quite mistakenly, that after the collapse of 1711 a period of decline and denationalization followed. In reality, the Rákóczi War of Independence was quite different. Unlike Thököly's revolt, it did not rely upon Turkish assistance, and did not aim at reestablishing Ottoman rule in Hungary. Essentially, it was aimed at winning a better, more equitable position for Hungary within the Habsburg Monarchy. Under the existing power relations, Rákóczi could not obtain full independence. However, the peace of Szatmár in 1711 was not followed by reprisals and further oppression but by a compromise. This restored the balance between the Vienna Court and the Hungarian estates, in a more favorable way than did the previous one. This made it possible for Hungary to be gradually rebuilt from the ruins during the long period of peace that followed, and to become stronger within the Habsburg Monarchy. After the liberation of Hungary, the Monarchy became a Danubian Empire. Consequently, modern Hungarian historiography considers

the beginning of the new era not from 1711, but from the years around 1686, the occupation of Buda, with which the entire process really commenced.

Domokos Kosáry

Institute of Historical Sciences

Freemasons in the Danubian Region before and after World War I

In the second half of the 19th century the social and political climate in Hungary created generally favourable conditions for freemasonry. Capitalist-bourgeois development started off dynamically; the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (1867) and united Germany (1871) came into existence. The bourgeoisie became stronger; there appeared groups of the intelligentsia who wanted a faster and wider range of bourgeois development and democratization. As a result of previous historical progress Jews were represented in these groups in a far higher proportion than their actual numbers among the population. Although freemasonry mainly attracted the new bourgeois strata, there was a considerable number of civil servants and employers among the lodge members. However, there were no workers or peasants. Jews were present in each of these groups.

In each European country freemasonry and its activity basically reflected the social and political conditions of that particular society. In Germany, the Prussian lodges were the most powerful and influential. They followed a Christian-conservative, nationalistic and often anti-semitic line which was alien to the fundamental theory of freemasonry. They were the most loyal to the government in the area. After the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian war the French and German lodges ceased to be in contact.

The Habsburg Empire, which ruled the Danube Basin, was characterized by a particular situation. Francis Joseph I upheld the 1795 decree of prohibition for Austria; the Hungarian Government, however, allowed the existence of lodges. Reorganization was started by outstanding personalities of the 1848-49 revolution and fight for freedom, after they had returned from exile. They had become freemasons in France, Italy and Switzerland. The first lodge was established in 1868, then the Scottish and Symbolic Rite lodges amalgamated in the Hungarian Symbolic Grand Lodge. Its first Grand Master was Ferenc Pulszky, archaeol-

ogist and academician. By the end of the 1910's there were 126 lodges, with approximately 13,000 members. Lodge-houses were built in Budapest as well as in the countryside.

Hungarian freemasonry had a particular role in the Danube region during the existence of the Monarchy. According to the Polish expert on freemasonry, Ludwik Hass, "for half a century the Hungarian Symbolic Grand Lodge was the only permanent and numerically strong freemasons' organization in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans (except Greece). Its activity not only encompassed Hungary, but also helped the creation of masonic organizations in the neighbouring countries." It admitted those who could not carry out a regular lodge activity, making it possible for Austrian freemasonry to survive the prohibition. In Pressburg (now Bratislava), which was part of Hungary, and in the West Transdanubian cities, for the sake of the Austrians, so-called border lodges came into being, which were regarded later as the "Mecca of Austrian freemasonry".

In the Czech and Moravian parts of the Monarchy freemasonry was permitted to operate freely. Their lodges were mostly under the supervision of German grand lodges, but they had good connections with the Hungarian Grand Lodge. The Czech and Moravian lodges had Austrian and Hungarian members as well.

There were also lodges in Romania, established mostly by members of the intelligentsia and bourgeoisie who had been educated in France, thus, strengthening their French orientation. In Serbia, in contrast, the foundation of a Grand Lodge was out of the question until 1918 mainly because of the weakness of the bourgeois development.

The other distinguishing feature of Hungarian freemasonry at the beginning of the 20th century was that the intellectual and artistic élite of the times joined the movement in great numbers. An independent lodge named after Martinovics, the leader of the Hungarian Jacobine movement, was established by a group of young intellectuals who gathered around the leading figure and theoretician of bourgeois radicalism, Oszkár Jászi. The program of the bourgeois-democratic transformation of Hungary and the Danubian basin was, in fact, drawn up at the meetings of the Martinovics lodge. Among the members of this lodge one could find Endre Ady, the greatest poet of the era and the symbol of all regeneration efforts; the bourgeois-radicals Pál Szende and Lajos Biró; and the then still social-democrat Eugene Varga who later became a world-famous economist in the Soviet Union.

Although most of the lodge members in Hungary did not profess progressive views, freemasonry was still interwoven with ideas of bourgeois progress. The Grand Lodge supported practically every claim that appeared in the program of

the bourgeois left. According to Jászi, freemasonry "was no longer merely a contemplative follower of philanthropic and philosophical ambitions, but also the brave champion of the fight for human progress". For them, this meant catching up with the Western bourgeois democracies.

The freemasons of the Danubian region became increasingly active, helped each other, and in contrast to the Germans, did not refuse to have contact with the French. The Hungarian Grand Lodge supported the initiative of the Grand Orient de France which aimed at creating an international organization of freemasons and its representatives were present at the preliminary meeting in Paris in 1900. (The office opened in Geneva in 1903.)

This encouraging process was frustrated by World War I. Masonic notions were subordinated to "national interests", the effect of nationalist views proved to be stronger. Freemasons followed the line drawn by the opposing powers during the war, and the formerly manifold international relations ceased to exist. An interesting situation emerged in the Danubian region: the leading country of the Central Powers was Germany, its ally was the Monarchy, joined by Bulgaria; whereas Serbia and Romania stood on the Allies' side. However, the attitude of the lodges was not homogeneous even within the Monarchy. From 1917 on the Hungarian Grand Lodge favoured the ending of the war more and more; it made contact with the lodges of the neutral countries; it approved of the democratization of the political system, while maintaining the borders of historical Hungary. The Czech, Croatian and Romanian freemasons identified with the military aims of the Allies.

Between the two wars

After World War I the map of the Danube Basin changed completely: the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy ceased to exist, historical Hungary broke up, and new states came into existence. All this had an immediate effect on freemasonry. In Hungary (as in other places) a bourgeois democratic system succeeded in the autumn of 1918. This, however, was followed by a proletarian dictatorship - unique in the Danube Basin. Its government banned all bourgeois parties and organizations, among them masonic lodges. The counterrevolutionary regime which followed the revolution stabilized this situation for a quarter century by a decree of the ministry of the interiors issued in May 1920, which abolished the lodges and confiscated their property. Two ill-famed counterrevolutionary organizations moved into the Budapest temple. The situation was worsened when several eminent freemasons (such as Jászi, Szende, and the painter Károly Kern-

stok) had to go into exile either permanently or for many years. As a result of the changes which drastically reduced the territory and population of the country, many Hungarian lodges found themselves in neighbouring countries. Finally, after 1920, some of the former lodge members no longer continued to belong to freemasonry.

The situation in Germany was in many respects similar to that in Hungary. Right wing circles demanded that lodges should be banned, just as they were in Hungary. The Prussian Grand Lodges seceded from the Association of German Grand Lodges in 1922 in order to emphasize conservative-nationalistic views. As a principle, Jews would not be accepted into their ranks. The liberal and tolerant lodges, which were in a minority, formed an independent Grand Lodge (Symbolische Grossloge von Deutschland) led by Leo Müffelmann, and took part in the activity of the international organizations. It did not make German freemasonry very popular that one of its leading figures was the Foreign Secretary, G. Stresemann.

In the rest of the Danubian countries masonic life became completely free after 1918. Its attraction was increased by the fact that the President of Czechoslovakia, T. Masaryk, the Foreign Secretary and later Prime Minister, E. Benes; the Yugoslav king, Alexander and other prominent people were high-ranking freemasons. A rapid development of the organization began everywhere.

In November, 1918, the Hungarian Grand Lodge "dismissed" the fourteen Austrian "border" lodges which then formed the Grand Lodge of Austria (the Grossloge von Wien) in the following month. Austrian freemasonry took up and even extended the role formerly played by the Hungarians. It not only gained a central position in the area, but also undertook an important mediatory function to ease the tension between universal and Danubian freemasonry.

In Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia the lodges which had existed before 1918 amalgamated in a Grand Lodge in 1920 (Lessing zu den drei Ringen). Then, in 1923, the Czechoslovak National Grand Lodge (Národní Veliká Loza Československa) was established following the initiative of E. Benes. The name indicated that lodge-life was influenced by national feelings in the Czechoslovak bourgeois democracy.

In Romania, the authorities hindered the activities of the Hungarian and Saxon lodges in Transylvania at the outset. The Grand Lodge of the old Romanian Kingdom was attempting to gain control over them. In the early 1920's the highly respected Ossian Lang from the New York Grand Lodge visited Romania several times and as a result of his negotiations the conflicts were eventually

settled. It became possible for the Transylvanian lodges to keep their independence and to set up a Grand Lodge in Kolozsvár (now Cluj-Napoca).

In Yugoslavia, freemasonry started off with a tabula rasa, because there had been no grand lodge in Serbia although many Hungarian and Croatian lodge members and lodges were to be found in the country as a result of the territorial accretion. Here, however, there were no problems similar to those in Romania: the activities of the Hungarian lodges remained undisturbed.

While the number of lodge members decreased in Hungary, it increased in other countries. More civil servants became lodge members than had previously been the case - except in Hungary - but doctors, lawyers, journalists, people of the so-called independent professions still dominated the lodges. Generally, freemasons came from social strata that had no bourgeois liberal views. Basic principles and restrictions made sure that no professed Catholics or people with extreme rightwing bias could become lodge members. On the whole, however, freemasons made up only a very small proportion of the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia.

Masonic life did not come to an end in Hungary despite the prohibition; the remaining members of particular lodges formed "table societies" and gathered in cafes and restaurants. Charities which had been established by the lodges and continued to be run by them served as cover organizations until they also were banned in 1938. Such social organizations as the Cobden Association, the Hungarian Fabian Society, the Feminist League, the Good Templar Order, etc. were also mostly the meeting places of the liberal opposition and the freemasons.

Hungarian freemasons were admitted partly by the Bratislava and other lodges in Slovakia. The paper of the Austrian Grand Lodge, the Wiener Freimaurer Zeitung, published the Hungarians' appeal for help. Two international organizations, the Allgemeine Freimaurer Liga (1920) and the Association Maconnique Internationale (AMI, 1921), which had been initiated at the beginning of the century, supported the Hungarian cause. AMI, which was under French influence, made several attempts in the 1920's to persuade the authorities to withdraw the decree of prohibition. Although these attempts failed, when the Horthy regime had been consolidated, from the mid-1920's, masonic activity was treated with far more tolerance by the government than before.

The Belgrade congress organized by AMI in 1926 brought about a significant and favourable change in international relations. For the first time since the war the freemasons of the former enemy countries could meet. Both organizers and participants realized that not only was the development of the French-German relationship important for Europe's peaceful future, but that the easing of ten-

sions between Hungary and the Little Entente countries was essential. They regarded it as their duty to promote peace, and co-operation, and to help reduce tension. Seeing the current problems very realistically, they urged the strengthening and extending of economic relations as opposed to the isolation and attempted self-sufficiency which prevailed after the war. There were delegates from nearly twenty countries, among them Austrians, Czechoslovakians, Romanians, Hungarians and, of course, Yugoslavs.

The notion of Pan-Europe, which occasionally arose at diplomatic and high-political levels over almost two decades, was drafted in masonic circles. Freemasons saw the future and special role of Europe being threatened from two sides: by the USA and the Soviet Union. The Pan-Europe movement gained new meaning as Hitler came into power and Italian Fascism fully developed. The vast majority of freemasons in the Danube region stood up against Nazi movements, racism and dictatorships. The antifascist attitude of freemasonry was also accompanied by the rejection of the Soviet system.

The proponents of extreme rightwing, fascist, and Nazi ideologies had always fiercely attacked freemasonry. One of the favourite propaganda phrases of these movements was the "international conspiracy" of "Jewish-plutocratic-masonic" forces. After 1933, however, freemasonry was not only threatened by propaganda, but by the very atmosphere that pervaded the European countries.

In 1933, it was decreed in Germany that lodge members should be dismissed from the civil service; the SA seized several temples for their own purposes; Leo Müffelmann, the Grand Master and other leaders of the Symbolische Grossloge von Deutschland were arrested, and, among other freemasons, he died in prison. In January, 1934, all the masonic lodges and organizations were banned; they were proclaimed to be anti-state, and were dealt with accordingly. Not even the Prussian lodges were spared. The predominantly Jewish German freemasonry re-established its Grand Lodge in Palestine.

All this profoundly shook European freemasonry, which made several efforts to help the persecuted against the dictatorships. For example, during the Spanish Civil War, at Christmas, 1936, they sent a petition to President Roosevelt and asked him to intervene in defence of the Spanish Republic and to restore peace. The petition was signed by the freemasons of 16 countries, among them the Czechoslovakian, Austrian and Yugoslavian Grand Masters; on behalf of the Hungarian freemasons Grand Master József Balassa was the signatory.

Except in Germany, masonic lodges were permitted to function freely until 1938-39. Their number increased in Hungary despite the 1920 prohibition. A Hungarian lodge called "In labore virtus" was established in Vienna alongside the

Viennese mother lodge "Labor"; and in 1936 a Hungarian masonic museum was opened in the headquarters of the Grossloge von Wien.

The Hungarians often visited both Prague and Bratislava. From the autumn of 1936 the Prague masonic paper, Svobodny Zednar had not only a German, but also a Hungarian supplement. The relationship between the Transylvanian lodges and those in the mother-country was kept up through various societies, organizations, and the Kolozsvár Grand Lodge. A similar contact was maintained with the Hungarian and Croatian lodges in Yugoslavia.

Freemasonry considered that the German annexation of Austria was inevitable already in 1936, and tried to prepare for it. The international organization dealt more and more with the situation of the Danubian countries. The question arose whether Budapest should take over the key role in the area from endangered Vienna, but the Hungarian government was not prepared to withdraw the 1920 prohibition decree. A delegation of distinguished international leaders of freemasonry visited each Danubian country, and eventually found Prague suitable for taking up Vienna's function. This indicates that they did not count on the dynamism of German expansion. The Grossloge von Wien moved to Prague well before the Anschluss, and the Hungarian lodge "In labore virtus" also carried on with this activity there and in Bratislava.

The German army occupied Austria on 12th March 1938. The Viennese Grand Lodge was closed; the same day its 78-years-old grand master was put in prison, where he died a few months later. The dissolution of Austrian freemasonry caused a great loss to the whole of the Danube Basin. This was crowned by the annexation of the Sudetenland (which had become part of Czechoslovakia in 1919) under the terms of the Munich Treaty, and later, in 1939, the occupation of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia; and the formation of a fascist puppet state in Slovakia. In the Prague government, which operated until the occupation, several masonic ministers helped brethren and Jews flee the country. The Nazis closed the lodges, and imprisoned most members or took them to concentration camps. The refugees reestablished the Grand Lodge in London.

In Hungary, freemasons already tried, before the Anschluss, to gather in Budapest their most important documents. Part of these were passed out to Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Nevertheless, many compromising data came into the hands of the occupiers in Austria and Czechoslovakia.

During and after World War II

Masonic life had been almost completely extinguished before World War II broke out. The German, Austrian and Czechoslovakian lodges were banned by the Nazis;

the Romanian ones were closed by their own government in 1937, and their members were prosecuted. The weak Bulgarian and stronger Yugoslav lodges were still operating, but not for long. The Yugoslav Grand Lodge, hoping that it could save its members from persecution "put masonic life to sleep" in August 1940. Hungarian freemasonry became completely isolated, and it was impossible to maintain regular masonic activity. Parallel to the enactment of the anti-Jewish law in Hungary in 1938, charities and humanitarian organizations that had been under masonic supervision were also banned.

Many freemasons from the Danubian countries left for Western and Northern Europe or for the USA and Palestine while it was still possible to emigrate. The task carried out by the Association Maconnique Internationale and by the Alliance des Maconneries Persécutées, which had been founded in June 1937, became more and more difficult; and finally France was also invaded by the Nazi army.

The victory of Nazism and Fascism caused very serious losses in Danubian freemasonry. Not only were the Jewish lodge members sent off to concentration camps, but others were similarly treated because most of them rejected the fascist Nazi regime. Many who managed to escape arrest joined anti-Nazi and anti-German sabotage actions, the armed resistance and propaganda work in the interest of the antifascist alliances. The freemasons in exile were present in various European resistance movements as well.

Conditions in Germany after the war were determined by the fact that although there were about 80,000 registered freemasons in 1933, by 1945, there were only 5,000. Losses were catastrophic in other countries as well. In addition, the replacement of members between the two wars proceeded in fits and starts in Hungary as elsewhere. (The younger generation was more attracted by the more radical, left-wing ideologies and movements than by masonic notions.) The ageing of lodge members also diminished the number of active members.

The reorganization of masonic life was greatly influenced by the general international atmosphere and the internal conditions of each country. Thus, although in the beginning the revival bore the same marks in the western, central and eastern parts of Europe, the differences soon became obvious.

The governments which came into power after the war everywhere withdrew prohibition decrees and made masonic life free. International relations were rapidly reestablished or developed since among the members of the allied supervising committees in every Danubian country there were freemasons. Freemasonry, however, was not able to regain its former significance and influence either in the Danube region or in other parts of Europe. As a consequence of the 1948-49 changes in authority in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Bul-

garia, freemasonry was banned by 1951 - or, not waiting for a decree, was "voluntarily" put to sleep. In Hungary, the decree of prohibition was promulgated on 12th June 1950.

In Austria, masonic life was free and vital. In 1954, the Austrian Grand Lodge became one of the founders of the organization which united the symbolic grand lodges of the continent. In Germany the history of freemasonry followed the changes that had taken place in the country: in the GDR lodges were banned, whereas in the FRG they were not.

In spite of the immense changes in economic and social life all over the world since World War II, many aspects of the masonic concepts remained valid. These included the struggle for freedom, equality, brotherhood, and human rights; the rejection of religious and racial discrimination. The generations which have grown up since then, however, are no longer interested in the realization of masonic ideals.

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Z s u z s a L. N a g y

Institute of Historical Sciences

The Second Vienna Award

At the end of June 1940, Romania satisfied the demands of the Soviet Government and handed over Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. The Hungarian Government now felt that the time had come to realize its demands for a territorial revision.

Germany's interests demanded that an armed conflict in the Balkans be avoided; Italy offered her help to Romania in the event of an attack by the Soviet Union; and the treaty guarantee between Romania, England and France was still in effect in February 1940. These were factors that induced the Prime Minister, Pál Teleki to draft the Hungarian position. This was published in "The Times" two weeks later, on February 23rd, 1940, in order to publicize the matter to the Western Powers and Germany. The memorandum stated: "Hungary, while by no means abandoning her territorial claims on Romania, will make no attempts to force a settlement of these claims during the war except in the case of two eventualities - (1) If Russia should attack Romania successfully and thus threaten to overrun the Balkans; and (2) if Romania should offer the Dobruja to Bulgaria. In the first instance, the Hungarian Army would immediately go through Transylvania to the Carpathians, there to stop the advance of the Russians; in the second, she would insist upon the justice of a similar settlement of the Transylvanian question and would do all in her power bring it about.

She would not, however, insist upon such a settlement in even of a peaceful cession of Bessarabia to Russia, for she considers Bessarabia none of her concern, and if the Romanians successfully resisted a Russian attack, she would not only refrain from making any more against Romania but would congratulate her upon her achievement. It may also quite safely be assumed that Hungary would remain inactive if the Allied Armies in the Near East came to Romania's aid.

Even if the event of a Hungarian dash to the Carpathians... the occupation

of Transylvania made necessary by this move would not be considered as a final settlement; the question would, at the end of the war, be submitted to the peace conference for a permanent decision."

The Hungarian Ambassadors in London and Paris were empowered to add the following to the written statement when presenting the memorandum: "The Hungarian Government:

- 1/ has no aggressive intentions towards anyone;
- 2/ is ready to defend, if need be by force of arms, the independence and honour of the country against any foreign aggression;
- 3/ will never, under no circumstances whatsoever, make common cause or undertake common action with the Government of the USSR."¹

On June 26th, 1940 Molotov presented the Russian ultimatum to the Romanian Ambassador in Moscow about the handing over of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. By that time, however, the international scene in Europe had changed drastically as a result of German military actions.

France's surrender had a cataclysmic effect on the Hungarian middle class, and brought about changes in the balance of power in Hungarian politics. The view that Germany was invincible and would finish the war rapidly became more and more widespread. This meant great pressure on the Hungarian Government, whose openly admitted position was to realize the Transylvanian revision before the existing conflict in Europe would come to an end.

In this situation, on June 27th, 1940 the Council of Ministers changed its previous resolution and decided not to accept any discrimination: If Romania fulfilled the demands of the Soviet Union, the Romanian Government should be forced to satisfy Hungary's territorial claims as well. The German Ambassador in Budapest then outlined his government's position, namely, that Germany would expect Hungary to stay completely calm.

After a discussion with the German and Italian Ambassadors the Supreme Defence Council assembled at Horthy's house and consented to the government's decision. It decided to mobilize and gradually move military formations to the Romanian-Hungarian border from June 29th on.

On the same day the Romanian Crown Council also met. They were under German and Italian pressure to avoid war with the Soviet Union, and thus to prevent a conflict in the Balkans. They realized that it would have been useless to rely on British intervention on the basis of the April 13th, 1939 treaty guarantee. Thus with a majority vote the Council accepted the transfer of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Before the actual transfer of these territories, Romania requested the German Government to try to restrain Hungary and Bulgaria and

promised to continue her oil export without interruption. King Charles sent a message to Hitler that he would also consider the conclusion of an alliance with Germany. A new Romanian Government quickly announcing its unconditional support for the Axis Powers, came into office. In his message on June 2nd, the king asked Hitler to guarantee the Romanian borders and to send a military mission to Romania. He had renounced the British guarantees the previous day.²

After the Russian-Romanian agreement the Hungarian Government also tried to gain permission from the Germans for its planned military action.

Although from the point of view of the planned Hungarian action the position of the Axis Powers, especially that of Germany, was decisive, the Hungarian Government tried to make inquiries in other directions as well. Above all it was interested in Moscow's opinion. Although it had had some previous information that, according to the Soviet Government's opinion, certain Hungarian territorial claims against Romania were well-founded,³ the Ambassador in Moscow was ordered to ask the Soviet Foreign Office what attitude they would take in the event of a Hungarian-Romanian conflict, and did they have plans in the event of a possible Romanian collapse. On June 4th, Molotov's reply was as follows: the Soviet Union had no claims against Hungary. He considered the Hungarian territorial demands well-founded, and said that he would legally support them at a possible future peace conference. "The Soviet Union will not intervene in the event of a Hungarian-Romanian conflict."⁴

Although the British answer to the Hungarian question was not so unambiguous, it was still remarkably more favourable than the government's former positions. In this Romania's act in renouncing the treaty guarantee with Britain no doubt played a significant role. The British Deputy Foreign Secretary - according to the Hungarian Ambassador's telegraph from London on July 2nd⁵ - expressed his hopes that "no armed conflict will take place between Hungary and Romania, and possible incidents causing such conflicts will not be used as a pretext by us. Otherwise, the British Government would only be happy to see a peaceful solution of the territorial claims."

However important all this was for the Hungarian Government, it could not be a substitute for German approval and support for the attack against Romania. The First Army, augmented with an increased number of troops moved to the Romanian frontier where several incidents occurred. On the basis of information reaching Berlin, on July 1st, Ribbentrop strongly protested in a note which said, among others, the following: "In principle, the Reich Government is politically disinterested in Balkan problems. It desires that in the interest of all, the Bal-

kans not become a theater of war, and it has therefore welcomed the peaceful accord between Russia and Romania. Germany has sympathy for Hungary's just revisionist demands. But Hungary must not expect Germany to resort to arms for the sake of these Hungarian demands. The Foreign Minister is unable to see what aims Hungary is pursuing with her mobilization measures, for even the Hungarian Government probably realizes that an attack by Romania on Hungary is entirely out of question. Should the Hungarian Government therefore attempt, contrary to expectations, to carry through its revision by force, it will do so entirely on its own responsibility." In concluding, he tempted the Hungarian Government with the bright prospect of revision by saying that: "at a more suitable time a revision can be effected without resort to armed force, and that the Reich Government would then support such revisionist demands."⁶

However, this warning did not achieve the appropriate effect, Ambassador Erdmannsdorff, summing up his impressions, reported to Berlin that the atmosphere in Hungary did not exclude the possibility of an attack against Romania. Therefore, Ribbentrop once more sent a severe note on July 4th to the Hungarian Government warning against a military attack. At the same time, however, he ordered Fabricius, the Ambassador to Romania to make the Romanian king understand that territorial concessions to Hungary and Bulgaria were unavoidable.⁷

After such antecedents, strong diplomatic actions occurred in all directions. A series of meetings took place in July between Hitler and the leaders of the Hungarian, Bulgarian and Romanian governments. On July 10th, in Munich, Hitler first met the Hungarians, Teleki, the Prime Minister and Csáky, the Foreign Minister, in the presence of Ribbentrop and the Italian Foreign Minister, Ciano. Hitler's aim was to dissuade the Hungarian Government from an attack against Romania. Using statistical figures he tried to prove that Hungary could not at all be sure of victory over the Romanian army, and emphasized that Germany's interest was in undisturbed production of Romanian oil. This position was strongly supported by Ciano.

Hitler, in accordance with his previous position, regarded direct negotiations between Hungary and Romania as the only possible solution. He said that the Romanian Foreign Minister had already informed the German Ambassador in Bucharest on July 6th, that Romania was ready to start negotiations, first with Hungary, then with Bulgaria, because the Hungarian question was more difficult to solve. At the same time, the Romanian Foreign Minister, Manoilescu, presented the king's answer to Hitler's message, in which King Charles announced that in agreement with his government he wished to deal with the territorial revision

through negotiations. At the same time, he expressed his hope that the solution of these problems would create the possibility of a close and extensive co-operation between Romania and Germany.⁸

Hitler told the Hungarians that the Romanian king had made efforts in order to achieve close political co-operation with Germany. He and Mussolini were therefore ready to insist on Romania's settling the territorial dispute with Hungary and Bulgaria. Hungary, however, had to give up her "all or nothing" position, and realize her claims step by step, because "which ever way the revision should go, one of the parties would always complain, and in the case of Transylvania, probably both."⁹

On July 15th, Hitler sent a letter to the Romanian king urging him to start the negotiations, announcing that Hungary did not aim at a full revision but would accept a reasonable compromise. If Romania were also inclined to accept such a solution, Germany might commit herself more towards Romania and form a closer relationship with her.

On July 20th, the new Romanian Prime Minister, Gigurtu, and the Foreign Minister, Manoilescu, visited Germany. Under strong pressure from Ribbentrop and Hitler, Gigurtu announced that Romania was ready for concessions as she was aware of her own position. When it came to concrete negotiations, however, it became apparent that there was an enormous gap between the voluntary Romanian concession and the Hungarian claim. Gigurtu talked about handing over 14,000 km². Ribbentrop, on the other hand, said that the Hungarians wanted to get back half of those territories which were detached by Romania in 1919. In fact, the Hungarian claim included a bigger area, 72,000 km² but the German Foreign Minister was aiming at a different solution. We want to point out that Romanian statistical data and maps of the Monarchy and Hungary presented during the negotiations were very efficient.

Hitler referred to these materials when he emphasised that "Transylvania had a population of 1/3 Hungarians and 2/3 Romanians. The problem became still more complicated by the fact that the Hungarians were settled in the east and the Romanians in the West of the country. For these reasons, the problem could be solved only by a reasonable division of territory combined with an exchange of populations."¹⁰

Hitler rejected the Romanian request for direct German participation in the bilateral negotiations just as he had in the discussions with the Hungarians. Moreover, this time the Germans even refused Manoilescu's idea of Germany being a possible arbiter in the matter. The minutes taken by the Germans

read as follows: "The Romanian Foreign Minister further inquired whether recourse to arbitration could be contemplated in case the negotiations with Hungary and Bulgaria reached an impasse. This idea, however, was rejected by the German side on the grounds of unsatisfactory experiences with the Vienna Award, especially with respect to Hungary."¹¹

After long delays the Hungarian-Romanian negotiations began in Turnu-Severin on August 16th, 1940. The Hungarian delegation was led by the former Ambassador in Warsaw, András Hory; Valer Pop headed the Romanian delegation. The negotiations reached a deadlock on the first day. The Hungarian proposal asked for the handing over of 69,000 km². The key point of this proposal was the area inhabited by the "Székelys". The Hungarian memorandum absolutely insisted on this area because - as Teleki said later - "inevitably this will bring back other considerable areas".¹²

On the first day of the negotiations the Romanians did not have a concrete counter-proposal. However, a few days before the discussions, the Hungarian military attaché in Berlin came to know about the proposal containing the proposed Romanian territorial concessions. According to this, the Romanian Government would have been willing to hand over an approximately 50 km wide zone along the Hungarian border. Three days later, on August 19th, when the negotiations continued and the head of the Romanian delegation gave his reply to the Hungarian memorandum, he did not mention this matter; he merely said that they were prepared to continue the talks if the Hungarian party accepted the principle of an exchange of population as a basis for the negotiations. Territorial concessions would come up only insofar as the exchange of population made them necessary.

The Hungarian delegation - following the orders of the government - did not accept this proposal even as a basis for negotiations. Both parties stuck rigidly to their respective positions, and after Valer Pop had read out a further declaration, the negotiations broke off once again. The Romanian declaration said: "The Romanian Government cannot withdraw anything from its former declarations or add anything to them. The position of the Hungarian Government is based on territorial demands, disregarding the ethnic situation. The Romanian Government, however, bases its position on the ethnic theory, which suggests that an exchange of population could be carried out, followed by logical territorial corrections. The Székely question could also be solved by an exchange of population. Therefore, it is up to the Hungarian Government if it accepted this as a basis for negotiations."¹³

After this, the situation between the two countries again became extremely

tense. Obviously, it was no longer possible to reach a bilateral agreement, even if the talks went on. As we can read in the German Ambassador's report, after the negotiations had broken down, Valer Pop explained the rigid Romanian attitude to Fabricius in the following way: "It had been the understanding of the Romanian statesman at the Obersalzberg that the Reich did not intend to compel them simply to cede Romanian territory. The Führer had talked about the ethnic element which could not in the long run be denied reunion with the adjacent homeland. From that the Romanian Government had drawn the conclusion that Germany would not require her to cede to Hungary territories with a purely Romanian population solely because they had once belonged to Hungary. He believed, as before, that a solution could be achieved only on the basis of transferring the Hungarians toward the border, and the Romanians interior."¹⁴

The Romanian Government was so convinced of having rightly interpreted its talks with Hitler, that, on July 26th, the day after the Turnu-Severin negotiations had broken down for the second time, it again asked Hitler, through its Ambassador in Berlin, to intervene and arbitrate. Since this step later played an important role in the events, it is worth quoting the notes of the Deputy Secretary of State, Woermann, in connection with this: "The Romanian Minister presented to me today a copy of an atlas just published in Bucharest, which contains a collection of reproductions of German, Italian, and Hungarian ethnic maps of Romania and especially Transylvania, dating from 1857 to 1930. In so doing he referred to the copy presented yesterday to the Reich Foreign Minister by the Chief of Protocol. He requested me to explain to the Reich Foreign Minister on the basis of these maps how unacceptable the demands now being made by Hungary are. Their acceptance would result in the cession of 2.4 million Romanians to Hungary, while only 180,000 Hungarians would remain on Romanian territory. In view of the Hungarian attitude the only possible course, after all, would be for the Führer to arbitrate.

I declined going into the details of Hungary's wishes and referred once more to our well-known position in the question of arbitration.

The Minister persisted in his view that the question could not be resolved without German intervention. The alternative to arbitration might be "advice", such as had been given Romania in respect to Bulgaria.

I persisted in my negative attitude toward suggestions of this sort.

M. Romalo took a very favorable view of the negotiations with Bulgaria, now that Romania has accepted all of Bulgaria's territorial demands."¹⁵

The Hungarian Government was much less optimistic about its own prospects than was the Romanian Government. When the Hungarian delegation arrived back

in Budapest from Turnu-Severin on August 20th, Prime Minister Teleki saw the situation as almost hopeless. He regarded the continuing of the talks as pointless, since according to the previous signs they would not raise any proposal that would even approach being acceptable for him. He saw only one solution, the military one, but against this there stood the definite German veto.

Although he realized that the Hungarian attack might bring about disastrous consequences, he nevertheless decided that if the Romanian Government did not accept the Hungarian demands at the reopening of the negotiations, he would dispatch the Hungarian army. He still hoped, however, that if Hungary attacked Romania, Hitler might intervene in order to prevent turmoil in the Balkans and would force the Romanian Government to accept a solution favourable to Hungary. Therefore, he made diplomatic efforts to convince the German Government that Romania was only manoeuvring and did not want a radical solution. Since, however, the situation was extremely tense, the attitude of the Romanian Government might lead to a conflict between the two countries at any moment, unless Hungary received effective help from the Axis Powers to solve the problem. His plans involved not asking the Axis Powers to arbitrate, but letting Romania do so. In this event the Hungarian Government would be able to emphasize that such a solution would only be acceptable for her if she received at least some preliminary assurance that the decision would be favourable for her. Thus Hungary would be able to keep up the appearance that she was not afraid of an armed reckoning, was convinced of her military strength, and therefore it is not she but Romania, who should make sacrifices.

The Hungarian-Romanian talks reopened on August 24th. They were unable to move the Transylvanian question away from the deadlock. With the repetition of the previous positions, the Turnu-Severin negotiations finally came to an end. This could not be altered even by the fact that before the Hungarian delegation left, Valer Pop had appeared on board of the ship "Zsófia", where the deliberations had been going on, and announced that the Romanian Government was prepared to make a concrete proposal in connection with the border. He said it would be based on the exchange of population principle and would cover all the Hungarian inhabitants of Transylvania, except the Székelys. However, they wished to make the proposed border-line absolutely dependent on the Hungarians' actual moving out of Transylvania.

The head of the Romanian delegation added unofficially that they would be willing to make a proposal in connection with the Székely question as well, which would consist of either wide-ranging autonomy within the bounds of Romanian

sovereignty or the inclusion of the whole Székely territory in the resettling project.¹⁶

On the day the negotiations broke up, the Hungarian Government took several measures aimed toward the military attack against Romania. Another three army corps which had not taken part in the preparations up to now, were mobilized as the 3rd Army. The troops stationed on the Hungarian-Romanian frontier were ordered to be ready to start by August 28th, unless Romania accepted the demands of the Hungarian Government.

As part of the diplomatic preparations, the Hungarian Ambassador in Belgrade, on instructions of his government asked the Yugoslav Government on August 23rd, if Hungary could rely on Yugoslavia's benevolent neutrality in the event of a military conflict between Hungary and Romania. The reply was that since Yugoslavia had friendly relations with both countries, her position would depend on the circumstances and the position of the great powers.¹⁷

On the same day József Kristóffy, the Hungarian Ambassador in Moscow, was instructed to speak to Molotov himself urgently and to tell him confidentially that the Hungarian-Romanian talks would probably break up because of Romania's attitude, and thus a military solution would be likely. He was also to ask if Hungary could rely on the friendly attitude of the Soviet Union in the event of a conflict. "Can we trust that the Soviet press will support the Hungarian demands", continued the instructions, "and that the Military Commissariat will not take measures which would enable Romania to withdraw further troops from Moldavia to the Transylvanian front?"

Emphasize that the Hungarian Government would be extraordinarily appreciative if the Soviet Union sold bombers and fighter planes to Hungary, and that urgently."¹⁸

In the evening of August 24th, 1940 the Hungarian Ambassador met Molotov, and his telegram about the conversation reached Budapest early next morning. In it we may read the following about Molotov's reply: "the position of the Soviet Government concerning the Hungarian-Romanian dispute is the same as it was previously: they think our claims are well-founded and the Soviet attitude will be favourable to Hungary in the course of events". Molotov could not say, however, what practical consequences this Soviet position would have. Thus he did not see any reason why the Soviet press should publish the Soviet Government's position in the Hungarian-Romanian dispute at this time, and he also could not make any statement about military movements. Because of the requirements of the Soviet army, the sale of airplanes to Hungary could not be considered.¹⁹

On August 26th, the Foreign Minister, Csáky invited the German Ambassador in Budapest to his office and told him that the Hungarian Government intended to ask the government of the Reich if it would manifest strict or benevolent neutrality in the event of a Hungarian-Romanian conflict. At the same time he told Erdmannsdorff confidentially that in his opinion "a message from the Führer to the Regent would surely still have the power of restraining him and the Army from taking any rash action".²⁰

On August 27th, Döme Sztójay presented the memorandum in Berlin. At 5 p.m. the same day the Romanian Ambassador in Berlin made the following statement on behalf of his government in the German Foreign Office: "The Romanian Government requested that no faits accomplis be created in the Hungarian-Romanian question. The Romanian Minister President and the Romanian Foreign Minister had already declared that they would accept an arbitration award of the Axis Powers, and were maintaining that position. They assumed, however, that both parties would be heard in such a case, so that the decision could be arrived at on the basis of a knowledge of all the facts in the case. To that end it would be desirable if the Romanian Foreign Minister were given the opportunity to present his case directly either to the Führer or to the Reich Foreign Minister. The aide-mémoire which Minister Fabricius was bringing with him contained only a brief summary of the Romanian viewpoint and was inadequate for that reason.

The Romanian Government was also willing to have a conference called between Hungary and Romania under the chairmanship of representatives of the Axis Powers.²¹

When the Hungarian and Romanian memoranda were presented in Wilhelmstrasse, Hitler had already given instructions for the rapid implementation of diplomatic and military measures to prepare and ensure German intervention. On August 26th, he ordered the Commander-in-Chief of the army to strengthen the formations stationed in Poland. Ten divisions were to be transported to the South-East of the Generalgouvernement and the formations arranged so that if they received an order they would be capable of quick intervention with the goal of occupying the Romanian oil producing regions. Ribbentrop put the diplomatic machinery into motion. On August 26th, he talked several times with Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, on the telephone about the possible solution to the Hungarian-Romanian relationship. At that time he did not suggest arbitration; he only proposed to invite the Romanian and Hungarian foreign ministers to Vienna and to advise them on how to find a peaceful solution to their problem. "Nat-

urally, all this should be followed by a threat, and whichever of them does not take the advice must bear the responsibility for the consequences",²² wrote Ciano in his diary about Ribbentrop's communication.

The German Foreign Minister ordered the German Ambassadors in Bucharest and Budapest home to report, and on August 27th, he asked the Romanian and Hungarian foreign ministers on the telephone to come to Vienna on the 29th and to bring a letter of authority with them. As an observer, Prime Minister Teleki was also invited to the Vienna negotiations. In the meantime, Ribbentrop listened to the reports and views of Fabricius and Erdmannsdorff at a hearing in Fuschl. After having consulted with them, he put forward two proposals to Hitler. One was based on Fabricius' ideas and it involved the areas inhabited by Hungarians outside Transylvania proper, to which Ribbentrop added Kolozsvár. The other included a relatively narrow strip of land in Northern Transylvania which widened into a funnel shape in the Székely territory, since Erdmannsdorff had convinced his Foreign Minister that the Hungarians would not accept any solution that did not contain the areas inhabited by the Székelys. Hitler combined the two proposals, thus determining the Northern Transylvanian area to be given to Hungary.

The German proposals to settle the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute were ready by August 28th. However, since it was difficult to tell how serious the Hungarian threats were, and whether the two parties would accept the German suggestions, Hitler made further military arrangements. On the 28th, completing the instructions which he had given two days before, he gave explicit orders for direct preparations for the immediate occupation of the Romanian oil producing region in case the renewed talks initiated by the Axis Powers were unsuccessful. The units in consideration had to be prepared for action by August 31st. According to the instructions, if the action should become necessary, Hungary was to be asked to agree that the German formations should pass through Hungary, and she should make the railway lines available for them. Hitler gave the 1st of September as the probable date for starting the action.²³

On August 28th, Hitler in Ribbentrop's presence informed the Italian Foreign Minister of his views. He told Ciano about the guarantee to be offered to Romania, emphasizing that before a Romanian-Hungarian agreement was concluded it should be mentioned to the Romanian Foreign Minister only, and that they should make certain that the Hungarian Government should not hear about it. As it was, if Hungary prematurely learned of the intentions of the Axis Powers, she might not accept the solution suggested by them. It was considered likely that

she would agree to a compromise at that moment only to raise further demands later on, in which the guarantee to be given to Romania would hinder her.²⁴

At this meeting the possibility of settling the dispute by arbitration did not come up. According to Ciano, this was decided in Vienna on August 29th. The entry in his diary on August 29th, 1940 reads as follows: "Ribbentrop and I have decided that we shall solve the problem by arbitration. If we immerse ourselves in a discussion now, we shall never be able to dig our way out of it."

In this spirit they conferred with the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Csáky and the Prime Minister, Teleki, who had arrived in Vienna that day. In order to ensure that the Hungarian delegation would accept binding arbitration unconditionally in advance, they employed various tools of threats and blackmail. Ribbentrop was unsparing in his reproach for the tensions that had surfaced in German-Hungarian relations in the previous years. He found Hungary's refusal of the German request to pass through the country during the attack against Poland in September 1939 particularly grievous. There was a sharp exchange of words between Teleki and the German Foreign Minister on this issue. Ribbentrop made it unmistakably clear that Germany would intervene with the most severe measures if Hungary decided to start military action against Romania, thus endangering the Romanian oil deliveries to Germany. Ciano also announced "that Italy would have to regard a conflict with Romania brought on by Hungary as a dangerous and inexplicable gesture on the part of Hungary".

Teleki did not want to commit himself in advance to unconditional acceptance of the arbitration award. He tried to make Csáky understand by shaking his head, and when it was his turn to speak he said..."and pointed out in particular that it was impossible for Hungary, for example, to agree to a solution that did not return the Székely region to Hungary". In the end the Hungarian delegation asked for time to think the situation over and for the possibility of contacting Budapest.²⁵

After the discussions Count Csáky immediately telephoned Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer, the Minister of Internal Affairs, who had been temporarily commissioned to act as Prime Minister, asking for the government's authorization. Csáky told him that Ribbentrop and Ciano had made clear that they were aware of Hungary's demands and that they would take them into consideration when making the decision. This was reinforced by two hints they had made about the Székely area during the conversation. The government assembled at once, and according to the minutes of the meeting the following resolution was passed: "The Council of Ministers has carefully assessed the situation from every point

of view and has unanimously resolved to accept the arbitration of Germany and Italy and Hungary submits herself unconditionally to their decision."²⁶

Early in the afternoon of August 29, 1940, Ribbentrop and Ciano also had talks with Manoilescu, the Romanian Foreign Minister. Ribbentrop was in charge of this meeting. Although, according to Ciano's note, he was less vehement than during the talks with the Hungarian ministers, he forced his will on the Romanian Foreign Minister in a harsh and inconsiderate manner. He declared "Romania had repeatedly requested the Axis Powers to make an arbitration award in the revision question. Now the Führer and Mussolini had decided after consultation to comply with this request and to make the award."²⁷ He also informed Manoilescu that after the award the Axis Powers would guarantee Romania's new borders.

In this cat-and-mouse game Ciano did his best to help his colleague to soften up the Romanian Foreign Minister. "I think he should pay a high price for our guaranteeing his borders" - he noted in his diary.²⁸

The Romanian Foreign Minister, who was not easily "softened up", would have liked an assurance that the decision would be based on the principle of the exchange of population. Ribbentrop, however, protested at once, saying that the Axis Powers could not be influenced in what concepts they should use in their decision. However, he added that within the bounds of possibility they would assert to the use of the ethnic theory. Eventually, after a long dispute, Manoilescu promised that he would obtain the Romanian Government's reply within 12 hours.²⁹

That same evening, the 29th, the foreign ministers of the Axis Powers received Valer Pop, member of the Romanian delegation, at Manoilescu's request. Pop asked again if the guarantee would extend to all the borders of Romania. In the German records we can read the following about this meeting: "His entire attitude was much more constructive than Manoilescu's and he said on leaving that he would urge his King to give the assurance that Romania would unconditionally accept the arbitration award which is to be made by Germany and Italy."³⁰

The Romanian Crown Council assembled on the night of 29th August. After a debate lasting into the early morning hours they eventually agreed, with 11 votes in favour and 9 against, to accept the award unconditionally. They acted on the grounds that the German-Italian guarantee was the only assurance against total collapse. The news of the decision of the Crown Council arrived in Vienna in the early hours of the morning on the thirtieth.³¹

The arbitration award was pronounced in the Belvedere Palace at 3 p.m. on 30th August. Under the terms of the award Hungary received 43,541 km²

territory. According to the 1941 Hungarian census, the distribution of population in this area was the following: 1,347,012 Hungarian, 1,066,353 Romanian, 163,926 German, Ruthenian and other nationalities. These figures differ from the data of the 1930 Romanian census. According to the latter, in the area in question there were 911,550 Hungarians, 1,176,433 Romanians and 307,164 persons of other nationalities, showing 183,144 inhabitants fewer. The difference was obviously due to the interpretation of the "other" category, as well as to the natural growth of population and to in- and out-migration after the award. Approximately 400,000 Hungarians remained in Romanian territory.

According to the arbitration award, the Romanian troops had to evacuate the area awarded to Hungary within two weeks. The award included measures concerning the rights of Romanians who found themselves in Hungary, and Hungarians who were left behind in Romanian territory. These could opt for citizenship in their new country. The award also included instructions on how the two governments should resolve the difficulties arising from the execution of the award, and when they could turn to the Axis Powers to settle their disputes.

Immediately after the award had been pronounced, Ribbentrop and Manoilescu exchanged the border-guarantee documents. They also signed the Hungarian - German and Romanian - German minority agreements.³²

In his diary Ciano described the moment of pronouncing and signing the award the following way: "The Hungarians cannot contain their happiness as they see the map. Then we hear a thud as Manoilescu falls on the table unconscious."³³

The reception of the Vienna Award in the outside world was, although not particularly hostile, not very favorable. The British press regarded the Vienna Award as a dictatorial decision imposed on Romania. Although they acknowledged that Hungary had justifiable territorial claims, the solution created by the Award was considered excessive.³⁴

The first official statements were issued on September 5th. Churchill and Lord Halifax assessed the settlement in their speeches in the House of Commons. Churchill said the following: "Personally I have never been happy about the way in which Hungary was treated after the last war. We have not at any time adapted, since this war broke out, the line that nothing could be changed in the territorial structure of various countries. On the other hand, we do not propose to recognise any territorial changes which take place during the war unless they take place with free consent and goodwill of the parties concerned." Lord Halifax' statement, on the other hand, sounded thus: "H. M. G. had never supported a policy based on rigid adherence to the status quo. On the contrary

we have lent our support to the principle that we should be favourable to a modification of the status quo, always provided that such modification is just and equitable in itself and is reached by means of free and peaceful negotiation and agreement between the interested parties without aggression or compulsion."³⁵

The Soviet Union maintained her previous position and generally acknowledged the justness of the Hungarian territorial demands until July 26th, 1941. However, the Second Vienna Award created a slight tension in German-Soviet relations, because the Soviet Government found it deleterious that in a question which affected the Soviet Union's security so closely, she was only informed after the facts, and that her opinion was not solicited about the solution of the Transylvanian problem.³⁶

The Second Vienna Award became a particularly decisive factor in both Hungary's and Romania's war history in general, and in their relations with Germany in particular. The solution did not satisfy either of them. On the other hand, the Award was a suitable means in Hitler's hands for enforcing his demands on both countries. The Award drew serious internal consequences both in Hungary and Romania and, at the same time, a race started for German favours for the sake of further territorial gains on the one hand and the revision of the arbitration, on the other.

Notes

1/ Hungarian State Archives. Foreign Ministry documents. Szent-Iványi manuscript 435-437. In: Gyula Juhász: A Teleki-kormány külpolitikája. 1939-1941. Budapest, 1964. p. 90.

2/ Documents on German Foreign Policy Series D.X. London, 1957. henceforth abbreviated DGFP Documents No 67, 68, 80.

3/ Idem document No 21.

4/ Diplomáciai iratok Magyarország külpolitikájához 1936-1945. (Diplomatic documents on Hungarian foreign policy, 1936-45) Budapest, 1982. Edited by Gyula Juhász (henceforth abbreviated: DIMK) Volume 5, documents No 155, 171., (also cf. DGFP, document No 119).

5/ DIMK document No 149.

6/ DGFP document No 76.

7/ Idem documents No 105, 104.

8/ Idem document No 146 (concerning the Munich negotiations).

9/ DIMK document No 186, p. 323.

10/ DGFP document No 245.

11/ Idem document No 234 pp. 315-316.

12/ Hungarian State Archives. Minutes of the Council of Ministers. August 31st, 1940.

13/ DIMK document No 304. p. 494.

14/ DGFP document No 396.

15/ Idem document No 376.

16/ DIMK document No 317. p. 518.

17/ Idem documents No 313, 319, pp. 508, 520.

- 18/ Idem document No 314.
- 19/ Idem document No 318.
- 20/ DGFP document No 393. p 544.
- 21/ Idem document No 399.
- 22/ Ciano naplója 1939-1943. Budapest, 1945.
- 23/ DGFP document No 407. and entry No 2.
- 24/ Idem
- 25/ Idem document No 410.
- 26/ Alianz Hitler-Horthy-Mussolini. Budapest, 1966. document No 92. p 282.
- 27/ DGFP document No 408. p 571.
- 28/ Ciano naplója 1939-1943. Entry on 29th August 1940.
- 29/ DGFP document No 408.
- 30/ Idem document No 409.
- 31/ Hillgruber, Andreas: Hitler, König Carol und Marschall Antonescu. Wiesbaden, 1954. 92.
- 32/ DGFP document No 413. and its appendix.
- 33/ Ciano naplója 1939-1943. Entry on 30th August 1940.
- 34/ Report of György Barcza, Hungarian Ambassador to London on 3rd September 1940. In: Gyula Juhász: A Teleki-kormány külpolitikája. p 208.
- 35/ Public Record Office. Foreign Office. 371. 26603/1033.
- 36/ DGFP document No 155.

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
Opening of the Iron Gate in 1896

More than six decades were to pass before the dream of István Széchenyi (1791-1860) (the "Greatest Hungarian") and his coworkers to make the Lower Danube navigable by 1896, the millenium of the Hungarian conquest, came true. Here, 1000 kms from the estuary, the Danube cuts the range of the Southern Carpathians for about 130 kms. In the process of regulating this gigantic river the organizing ability and creativity of Hungarian engineers played an important role. Common usage calls the whole stretch the Lower Danube, although the lower reaches of the Danube run from the Iron Gate to the Black Sea. The regulated reach is often considered the "Iron Gate" and this usage has gone over into other languages as well. In fact, the Iron Gate is really only the lowest 8 km of the Lower Danube, below Bazias. In this relatively short stretch navigation was impeded by cliffs reaching up from the bottom. Underwater rock banks made navigation practically impossible in times of low water. Below Bazias, the first considerable obstacle was the granite cliff called Stenka, its rock range projecting far into the river bed. River pilots had to guide the ships through this perilous reach all the way up to Turnu Severin. This obstacle was eliminated between September 1893 and October 1895 by building a 60 meters wide 2 meters deep new bed below zero water-level. Hardly 20 kms farther there followed a new obstacle, a rock bank called Kozla: after that came the one called Dojke, which dammed up the Danube. Therefore, at the Kozla-Dojke rapids, a 3,5 km long navigable canal was built between April 1891 and September 1896, in order to eliminate the section of waterfalls.

However, in the reach 10 km farther between Izlas-Tachtalia-Vlas the underground rocks and cliffs hampering navigation reappeared. The dredging of the new canal started in August 1893, and was completed in September 1897.

The rapids continued in a narrow reach between Greben and Milanovac. Here

The Area of the Regulations around 1896



Source: Tőry, K.: Az Al-Duna szabályozása (The Regulation of the Lower Danube). Budapest 1972.

a method of underwater blasting was necessary and a dike had to be built which reduced the river bed from a width of 2 km to 500 meters. The Greben rock-peak, jutting out into the bed, was removed, and in this narrowed channel a separate navigation canal was blasted. The dike was constructed to a length of 5.8 km; therefore the new navigation canal became 1200 meters long. According to the opinion of a contemporary, never before had a dike of such size been built in such a short time.

One km below Milanovac, the fearsome Juc falls set sailors a difficult task. At a low water level the water rushed down with terrible force. This was caused by a rock bank about 600-800 meters long extending for the full 1 km width of the river-bed downstream. The surveys needed for the work began in September, 1890, while the 1-km-long navigation canal was blasted out between May 1891, and April 1896. The accompanying 4-kms-long dike was built between March 1895 and July 1897. With this, the lower waters were narrowed down to about 400 m.

Below the Juc - already beyond the Kazan Pass - there followed some 10 km from Orsova the last and, at the same time, hardest reach impeding navigation: the Iron Gate. The headquarters of the technical management of the regulation of the Lower Danube was at Orsova. At this most dangerous stretch of white water, - on the border of Romania, Serbia and Hungary - an 8-km-long transverse underwater rock bank of Mount Allion impeded navigation. At the beginning of the Iron Gate starting 36 kms below the Juc falls, the rock bank did not protrude from the water, but its damming effect was already being felt. In the middle course of the Iron Gate, however, the cliffs and rocks of the 3-km-long Prigrada underwater limestone range projected, impeding navigation and the free flow of water. This reach below the Prigrada, full of whirlpools and eddies, tried the skill of sailors. Because of the high costs involved, the regulation of this course was solved technically by building a separate canal, the so-called Iron Gate Canal. This the speed and fall of the water tumbling over the rock bank.

The construction of the Iron Gate Canal started in August 1890, and it was opened on February 29, 1896. The festive inauguration took place on September 27. Since the construction work was done separately from the bed, on-shore, the original plans could be altered. Thus, the navigation canal at Orsova was constructed, instead of two meters under the zero water-level, an additional meter deeper. Thus, ships of 2 meters draft could pass through even in time of low water. At the time of the work on this 2.2 km-long canal undisturbed navigation on the Danube was insured. Below the Iron Gate, at the Lesser Iron Gate, more rocks were removed from under the water, and a 60 meters wide ship channel was blasted, with which unhampered navigation on this reach of

the Danube was ensured. From here on there were no more obstructions on the Lower Danube.

In this largest erosion valley of Europe, the designers and technicians surmounted the difficulties caused by four ranges. Out of the four only one, the Kazan Pass, did not require special technical competence.

At the time of the Roman Empire men recognised the importance of this border river, the Danube. On the critical reach of the Lower Danube - on the left bank - there ran a tow path. Its construction began at the time of Emperor Tiberius, but was completed only under the rule of Traian. Paul Vásárhelyi, an outstanding Hungarian engineer, saw this path himself when he was mapping the Lower Danube in 1832-34. Certain signs seem to indicate, that the Romans built a side-canal in order to avoid the obstacles obstructing navigation at the Iron Gate. The Roman military road was destroyed during time of the great migrations. After this time, nothing was done to develop navigation on the Lower Danube until the first third of the 19th century. Although the Posarevac Treaty concluded with the Turkish Empire in 1718 and later the 1815 Vienna Congress expounded the principle of freedom of navigation, this did not materialize under the prevailing political conditions.

Already under the influence of the Napoleonic Wars, when the grain export from Hungary flourished, the significance of a Danubian waterway suddenly increased. The Water Management and Construction Board of the Council of the Governor-General (supreme administrative organ of the country), therefore, ordered plotting of the Upper Danube and of its tributaries in 1816. The turn of the Lower Danube came in 1832-34. This was directed by István Széchenyi as royal commissioner. The works were supervised by Pál Vásárhelyi and his team of engineers, albeit an officer of the Serbian military frontier, Colonel Jan-kovich also made a general plan of this reach of the Danube in 1830. His plan, however, was made only from the point of view of navigation and did not have in mind the regulation of the river bed, as Vásárhelyi's did.

It is a great merit of Széchenyi to have recognized the importance of the Danube as an international waterway. He had minor rock blasts carried out at the Stenka, at Kozla-Dojke, and on the stretch of Greben, which succeeded in forming a navigable stretch of several hundreds of metres, even in time of low water. One year after these regulation works were performed in 1834, the plan for the control of the Lower Danube was carried out by Vásárhelyi, who had already proposed at that time the building of a lock canal on the Izlas-Tachtalia-Vlas, and at the Juc-falls. At the Iron Gate he wanted to equalize the different water levels by means of navigation locks. This grandiose plan aimed at assuring

safe navigation. Széchenyi and Vásárhelyi made a study trip to Western Europe and to England in 1833-34 - before drawing up the plan - to study underwater blasting techniques, to order dredgers and to purchase ships of shallow draft.

Yet, neither the government authorities, nor the First Danubian Steamship Company (DDSG) supported Széchenyi's concept, although he had been one of the principal organizers of this Company. Thus, instead of developing a navigable channel they had to be content with building a tow path on the left bank from Bazias to Orsova, which was later named the "Széchenyi Road". Even though his plans from the early 19th century did not materialize, the regulation works carried out made it possible for the Danubian Steamship Company's "Argo" to pass the Iron Gate, demonstrating that regular steamship navigation could start even at low water from Vienna to Galatz - if only by transshipment. Already in 1835, the steamship "Maria Dorothea" made its way on the Danube as far as Constantinople.

In 1856, the Paris Peace Treaty terminating the Crimean War declared anew the freedom of navigation on the Danube, now all the way to the estuary. The DDSG gradually recognized the importance of the Danube waterway, all the more so as they were granted exclusive transport rights on the Danube for a long period.

The high costs, however, still represented serious obstacles to the regulation work. This concern was relieved by the 1871 London Congress's stipulations according to which the littoral states were entitled to collect dues in order to cover the costs of regulation. The Turkish party of the mixed Hungarian-Austrian-Turkish Committee proposed regulation by locks. After some discussions, they adopted the concept of a 60 meters wide and 2 meters deep navigation canal with dikes. The Russo-Turkish war of 1878 postponed the regulation work. The 1878 Berlin Agreement revived the idea of regulation, and under the existing political conditions it left the right of implementation to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. However, there arose a lengthy dispute between the Austrian and Hungarian governments over who should actually carry out the work.

After the great flood of the river Tisza in 1879, experts from abroad came to Hungary to revise the flood-control designs in connection with the regulation of the Tisza. The Hungarian government took the opportunity of requesting their opinions on the plans for the control of the Lower Danube. These experts recommended the navigation lock solution in the case of the Juc falls and the Iron Gate. The majority opinion, however, was still for the establishment of open canals. The Technical Council of the Ministry for Public Works and Transportation accepted this solution in 1833-34, especially since the lock plan would

have cost twice as much. Another factor was that a system of locks was not desirable from a military-strategic point of view, for in case of war it might be blown up. Thus, Vásárhelyi's far-sighted concept of building a lock system disappeared from the agenda for a long time to come. The idea of regulation took on a new life after the intervention of Gábor Baross, later minister of transportation. This outstanding transportation and trade politician drafted a law in 1888 including (Art. 26) the general plan and projected expenses of regulation. He also obtained the consent of the Serbian government promising financial support for the regulation work. After inviting international tenders for the job, a joint Hungarian-German enterprise was established in 1890. This was the Regulation Company of the Lower-Danube-Iron Gate. Hugo Luther, a manufacturer from Braunschweig played a decisive role by assuring the financial support of the Berlin Disconto Gesellschaft. Luther carried out the financial side of the regulation work with such success that he was awarded the German Glashof Commemorative Medal. (This was the highest distinction given by any German association.) The Hungarian chief engineer of the Company, György Rupcsics, became the direct supervisor of the task. Work continued under state supervision and was completed by 1898, instead of in 1895.

Neither the Hungarian nor of the German companies could call on previous experience in meeting the enormous technical demands involved. Thus, for instance for the development of machinery French, English and American experiences with the regulation of the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal, and with the St. Lawrence River were applied or adapted. However, for the splitting of rocks, drilling ships of French manufacture used in the construction of the Panama Canal did not work, so Luther and Rupcsics developed them further. Thus, just as the competence of the Hungarian hydraulic engineers - beginning with Vásárhelyi - stood out, so did the engineering technique used. One technical innovation followed the other. For example, the Diósgyőr Iron Works produced better chisels than the Essen Krupp Works, and the Danubius-Schoenichen-Hartman United Shipyard and Machine Factory of Ujpest won the international tender for the building rights of the 600 HP "Iron Gate" steam-tug, outmatching a number of large foreign enterprises. This steam-tug was still towing the barges - against the current, heading upstream - coming through the rapid-current stretch beyond the regulated. How by means of a cable anchored at the upper end of the channel, until the end of the 1930s.²

The significance of the regulation is shown by the fact that, while between 1880-1890 ships with a draft of 12 hands (183 centimeters) could travel only 45 days out of the 275 working days from March 1 to November 30, after 1898,

this number increased to 258. Prior to the regulation, navigation had to be stopped at Orsova when the water level was 120 centimeters, while thereafter ships with 160 centimeters draft and 2500-2700 tons could operate even when the water level was 100 centimeters.

On the regulated reach of the Lower Danube towing costs were 12 times greater than on the quieter stretches of the river. Therefore, the solution with water barrage proposed by Vásárhelyi came up repeatedly, but this was solved only by the Iron Gate Barrage inaugurated in 1972. Since then, even ocean-going ships of 5000 tons can pass through the Iron Gate making superfluous the river pilot service established in the navigation canals that were built in the 1890's.

The regulation of the Lower Danube was, however, not free from diplomatic complications. The mutual support of the littoral states did not materialize. The 1878 Berlin Agreement maintained the resolutions of the 1871 London Congress. On this basis the regulation of water was legally a matter for the Monarchy. On the other hand, the littoral states were granted so-called land-cession rights. The Serbian Skupcina - Parliament - nevertheless passed a law in 1897 for the exploitation of the water power of the Lower Danube Rapids, and the Romanian king also made an attempt to obtain a say in the regulation works. He proposed that for the actual work a prior approval of the three affected parties be required. Another debate arose over the collection of navigation fees, etc. Neither the Monarchy nor the Hungarian government abjured their rights as stipulated in international agreements.³

Similarly the organization of the inaugural ceremony caused no small amount of trouble. The Hungarian Premier, Baron Dezső Bánffy, definitely objected to holding on-shore celebrations on Serbian territory and he suggested to his sovereign that Francis Joseph, with Charles, King of Romania and Alexander, King of Serbia, together inaugurate the canal from a ship. This conciliatory concept was, in the end, accepted. The inauguration of the Canal was integrated into the programme of the millenary celebrations of the Hungarians' entrance into the Danube basin.⁴ The task of overall organization was assigned to the ministry of trade; the minister of internal affairs was responsible for administrative and security measures, while Bánffy reserved for himself the political tasks, such as the prior censoring of addresses to be given in the presence of the king.⁵

Apparently, all went smoothly and with the greatest of pageantry. Contemporary papers wrote of the performance of miracles and titanic achievements, and they saw in it - deservedly - the materialization of Széchenyi's concept, which lent greater political weight to the nation. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine

Zeitung also called the inauguration of the Iron Gate Canal an event of historical importance demonstrating to the nations the spirit of progress and peace.

However, the opposition did not let the opportunity pass by without making political capital out of the celebrations. On October 1, 1896, Albert Apponyi, leader of the National Party questioned Bánffy in the Parliament about why the Hungarian national tricolor had not been hoisted on the royal ship. He was also dissatisfied with the inaugural speech of the king since this did not sufficiently emphasize according to him the role of Hungary in the regulation work. The extreme supporter of independence, Gábor Ugron called the events at the Iron Gate an Austrian celebration.⁶ The Hungarian national character was lost - in his view - in that the king did not deliver the inaugural speech in Hungarian.

Yet, these were not the real problems; the real issue arose over the covering of costs, especially the additional costs of the regulation work, which increased from 9 million florins to 19 million. It was a matter of concern that, because of the more than doubling of the original costs-estimates, the famous Berlin Disconto Gesellschaft that stood behind the Iron Gate Regulation Corporation and financed the enterprise, might present a new bill, since they performed extra work amounting to 2.5 million florins. This actually happened, but in the end the Disconto Bank was satisfied with 400,000 florins compensation. The Minister of Trade, Ernő Dániel reported in his submission to a meeting of the cabinet:

"The Berlin Disconto Bank is today one of the largest banking institutions not only of Germany but perhaps of the whole world. It would cause much greater damage if the loss suffered in the Iron Gate works were to become public - in consequence of the uncertainty arising therefrom - than the actual loss itself. The loss it has, no doubt, already recovered through its other enterprises. It was an immense stroke of luck for the Hungarian state and for the reputation of Hungarian engineers that such a world-famous bank sponsored the works, and could not afford to withdraw on account of its good reputation. It was an equally great stroke of luck that at the end of the work the bank did not dare to present to the world an account of its losses. Had the works been done by a Hungarian or a smaller foreign firm, it would probably still not have been completed, and no doubt would end with an enormous overpayment."⁷

The great technical enterprise had both a bright side and a dark side. However, we can still assess the importance of the regulation work best by noting that the regulated Iron Gate fulfilled its task of assuring safe and continuous navigation for three quarters of a century up to 1976.

Notes

- 1/ An excellent new survey of the regulation of the Lower Danube including sources and professional literature, can be found in the following work: Kálmán Tőry: Az Alduna szabályozása. (Regulation of the Lower Danube), Vizügyi Történeti Füzetek 5, Budapest, 1972. p. 81.
- 2/ Hungarian National Archives (in what follows: OL) K 228-1898-3-7294. On October 13, 1898 the Council of Ministers discussed the purchase of the new steam-tug under Item 16 of the agenda.
- 3/ OL-K 26-1898-VI-4337, and OL-K 255-1898-9-1097 and 1105. The exploitation of the water power of the rapids of the Lower Danube was discussed in the Council of Ministers on April 6, 1898, under item 9 of the agenda.
- 4/ OL-K 26-1896-141. Francis Joseph approved the program of the Iron Gate celebrations on June 30, 1896.
- 5/ OL-K 228-1896-3-15733.
- 6/ OL-K 26-1896-141, and OL-K 228-1896-3-15733.
- 7/ OL-K 26-1898-15584 and K 178-1898-3-15733. The Council of Ministers debated the matter of compensation under Item 12 of the agenda.

Á k o s K o r o k n a i

National Archives

Our article is published for the 250th anniversary of the death of Eugene, Prince of Savoy.

Eugene, Prince of Savoy, and Hungary

"Do you know why I esteem Hungarians so highly as soldiers? Because they have the unparalleled property that it costs them no effort to be whatever they want to be like; and what is the most remarkable about them is - which as it appears to me the Court does not appreciate fully - that the character of the nobleman and of the commoner is exactly the same."

We can read these lines in a letter by Prince Eugene written to Philip Ludwig, Count of Sinzendorf, on August 29, 1701. The military career of the Prince, which began and reached its climax with the war against the Turks, was closely connected with Hungary, whose crown was worn by the Habsburgs since 1526. It is possible that Eugene had heard of Hungary already while in France, but he really became acquainted with Hungary, the country, and its people only after 1683 as a soldier.

During Prince Eugene's activities, mutual mistrust poisoned the relations between the Vienna court and the Hungarian nation. The imperial policy-makers regarded the Hungarians as suspected, (or) perennial rebels who had to be kept in check with ruthless force. The Prince, however, tried to form his opinions without prejudices. As early as 1693, he declared: "I know by experience that I can always reckon with the courage and resolution of the Hungarians." He never changed this opinion. He was among the first to recognize the usefulness of the mobile Hungarian cavalry, and he pleaded for the establishment of Hungarian Hussar regiments in the imperial army. Later, when he gained some influence in politics, he often defended Hungary in the War Council and in the Ministers' Council, and he condemned policies intended to impose penalties on the country. He could not understand why the government mistrusted the Hungarians. "In my view" - he writes - "some people seek to defame this brave and good-natured people before the Emperor." As a member of the Cabinet, he ob-

jected to the increase of the tax imposed on Hungary, saying that the country had been impoverished by the permanent wars, and the peasantry could not bear the heavy burdens. He believed, and he gave voice to his conviction, that the constitutional complaints of Hungary should be examined, and if they were justified, they must be redressed. "I am only afraid" - he writes - "that if one has to wrest all their rights from the nation with sword in hand, in the end no mutual trust would be lost, and such a precious thing once lost can never be regained."

He did not agree with the aggressive measures of counter-reformation, or with the persecution of Protestants. He was of the opinion that "the activities of the Catholic clergy must be kept within bounds".

He condemned the activities of the Jesuits (the black-frocked), and he did not conceal his view that the ruthless recatholization by this order greatly contributed to the desperately low public morale in Hungary. He maintained that the Jesuits drove the people to despair, and "the desperate Hungarians could not keep their feelings under control". In 1723, he advised Emperor Charles VI (as Hungarian king Charles II): "Your Majesty should give the Augustinian and Helvetian confessions full liberty, and he who disturbs the religious peace should be brought to justice."

The great insurrection against Vienna under the command of Ferenc Rákóczi II worried him very much, and when he received the news of the Peace of Szatmár in 1711, he wrote with delirious joy to Count János Pálffy: "Ten times I kissed your letter... you saved it (the country) more through your intelligence than by your sword."

Would all that mean - as some people interpreted it - that Prince Eugene was the friend and advocate of Hungary? Would he have had a preference for the Hungarian people? It would be an error to attribute such emotions to him. In reality he was not particularly well-disposed toward the Hungarians, just as he was not toward any other people of the Monarchy. He declared himself French; he swore allegiance to the Emperor. He had in mind only and exclusively the consolidation of the dynasty, and he meant to extend the absolute imperial power. "Sire, the Monarchy relies on Your Majesty's army" - he said in 1703 to Emperor Leopold I - "without which Your Majesty would lie at the mercy of Turks, French, and perhaps one day, of Hungarians."

It was his conviction that the Habsburgs could only cope with the rivalry with the European great powers if there were peace in their lands. However, this peace could only be attained if no people or religion were preferred another,

and if the Emperor saw to it that the laws were strictly kept. Otherwise, "loyalty and attachment go nowhere", and internal troubles might break out. As to religious freedom, he was not guided by the idea of freedom of conscience, but only by reasons of state. As he wrote to the papal nuncio in 1714: "Religious disputes up to now have ruined many a country. We narrowly escaped having the dissolution of the Austrian Dynasty's rule in Hungary brought about by the Jesuits' persecution of the Protestants."

Therefore it follows that Prince Eugene refused to admit that any people had the right to self-determination, or to stand up against the monarch in defence of their rights. Whoever takes up arms against his monarch is a rebel, and should be forced into obedience, if needed, by armed might. He who raised his voice for the constitutional rights of Hungary was against entering into negotiations with the Hungarian rebels, or with Rákóczi.

When in Italy he received the news of peace negotiations with the Hungarians, he could hardly hide his indignation. "Since when should a sovereign make peace with his own subjects, let alone with rebels? Has a rebel then a right to wage war? Which law binds the monarch to carry on peace talks with insurrectionists?... to accord them a right to war and peace tacitly by untimely and inappropriate compliance, or even by negotiating with them -, neither the law of nations, nor even less the constitution of Hungary, calls for that."

When after seven years of war he was forced to realize that it was not an easy task to repress the Hungarian insurrection, he was inclined to reconciliation as a last resort. He advised Emperor Charles I: "Une corde ou un cordon a Rákóczi." Which means, if there is no way to hang Rákóczi, he must conclude an agreement with him. That is the reason of state. But he never recognized the right of the Hungarian nation to a sovereign state nor to an autonomous government.

The Turks surrendered the castle of Temesvár to the Prince in October 1716, and Mehmed Pasha also requested free withdrawal for the one-time Hungarian insurgents staying in the castle. Eugene wrote in the draft agreement with his own hand: "La canaille puo andare dove vuole." (The mob may go where it wants.)

Nevertheless the fact remains: Hungary owes it to the strategic genius of Eugene Prince of Savoy that, after 150 years of occupation, the Osman power was driven out of the country. The battle of Nagyharsány in 1687, the victory at Zenta in 1697, the capture of Temesvár in 1716 made it possible to re-establish the territorial integrity of the Hungarian kingdom, and to begin the process of rebuilding the country. The equestrian statue of Eugene in front of

the one-time royal castle in Buda represents the tribute of thanks of Hungary to this great general and statesman.

Here follows the English version of some letters by Eugene Prince of Savoy to Marshall János Pálffy. The German originals can be found in the following documents: Sammlung der hinterlassenen politischen Schriften des Prinzen Eugens von Savoyen in sieben Abteilungen. Herausgegeben von J. Edler von Sartori, Tübingen 1811-1821.

K á l m á n B e n d a

Institute of Historical Sciences

Eugene, Prince of Savoy to Count John Pálffy.
Vienna, 12. II. 1703.

The extraordinary measures to be taken against the malcontents in Hungary give me much work and worry. While formerly the Camisards' offensive compelled the French to divide their armies, this year the malcontents occupy our forces. I share the opinion of your Excellency that not only to Ragotzy (Francis Rákóczi II.) and Bercenj (Nicholas Bercsényi) organize the rebellion in our rear, but many others, too, busy themselves to stir up the rebellion in Hungary. Princess Ragotzy (I willingly render her this title) herself declared here in many places - and I have letters, too, of this tenor - that the strongest camp of the Hungarian rebellion was in Vienna, among the black-frocked ones. Cardinal Grimani, who is usually well-informed, told me as early as this spring that this year we would have much trouble with Hungary, and that the authorities had now to make a decision. There is nothing left but to take a strong line with those rebels, and to shatter their hopes of foreign assistance. I am very pleased that the Danish troops have been contacted; shortly a considerable Prussian army, too, will reach our borders. Thereafter I will go personally to Pressburg to lead the operations.

The Duke of Baden agrees with you perfectly that we should strike the malcontents at their most tender point. I share this view, if only General Montecuculi could have supported his so well-started maneuvers by a reinforcement for Transylvania. The situation now requires that we cover Pressburg with a strong observation corps, to which General Heister has greatly contributed by his forced march. The English and Dutch ministers have used every effort to bring the malcontents to an agreement, even the Archbishop of Colloza (Kalocsa) appeared decidedly to come around to this view. You may rest assured that I in my place have done all in my power: Yet, so long as the malcontents still have the hope of relying on the support of their brothers and so long as they still see that not all roads to new operations can be closed to them no intervention whatever can be of use.

Next month I will go again to Hungary myself, and - so far as my powers permit - will try my own hand at putting out the fire. God grant that I do not burn my fingers in so doing. Colonel Caroli (Alexander Károlyi) also went over to the malcontents with a troop of hussars. You can consider this step as a dereliction of duty which took place against my will.

Eugene, Prince of Savoy to Count John Pálffy.
Caravaggio, 7. 9. 1705.

With all the inconveniences I could imagine taking place in Hungary, I would never have thought that the Jesuits in Transylvania could have the audacity to erect a triumphal arch for Ragotzy - elected among great tumult Prince of Transylvania - the inscriptions of which Your Excellency had the kindness to forward to me. I have long been aware that the Jesuits in Hungary have secretly declared for the French-Spanish party; yet, I would never have believed that they should be openly unmindful of the respect, or at least the loyalty and allegiance they owe to the royal dynasty. Steps of this kind indicate that their rule has lasted too long, as the noble Sarpi overtly said. The art of changing colours has often proved a failure, at least such a mean partisanship can never last long. I will wager that they would be the first to have to clear out after the repression of the rebels, as they well deserve.

The inscription LIBERTAS AUREA startled me most: how can it be brought in accord with the vow of obedience and of poverty? As to the one reading: PIETAS AD OMNIA UTILIS, it seems to me that it probably means sheer hy-

pocrisy. How could such ghastly doings stay hidden so long under the black frocks?

Things are getting worse and worse; in as much as the clergy does not even refrain from perjury in their endeavours to mislead the people. In this case strength should come before benevolence. So long as we are unable to subdue the rebels by superior force, a peaceful settlement of the conflict is not conceivable. It appears to me that it would be no particular trouble for Ragotzy to bring the Swedes and most easily the Poles, over to his side, for among the latter priests, Jews and women are almost the most important thing.

Eugene, Prince of Savoy to Count John Pálffy.
Caravaggio, II. 9. 1705.

The Duke of Marlborough gave me a copy of the letter of his Queen adressed to our Sovereign concerning the unrest in Hungary. It appears to be the counterpart of the one written by the King of France to Ragotzy encouraging him to pursue the rebellion. The Earl of Sunderland and Lord Stepney will get no advantage from this. Ragotzy is whole-heartedly attached to France, as the King promised him protection and asylum in France in case his cause might fail. The Queen expresses the wish that the Emperor may offer propitious terms of peace for his Hungarian subjects.

In the diplomatic sense this request appears to me very paradoxical. Since when should a sovereign make peace with his own subjects, let alone with rebels? Has a rebel then a right to wage war? Which law binds the monarch to carry on peace talks with in surrectionists? The Emperor is ready any time to accept the proposals of the nation for the redressing of their grievances; he is ready to invite the nation to make such proposals; what more, he is disposed to do away with those grievances according to their wish and request - but to compromise with rebellion, which the nation itself did not ask for, to enter into peace negotiations with the adherents of a foreign power, to accord them a right to war and peace tacitly by untimely and inappropriate compliance, or even by negotiating with them -, neither the law of nations, nor even less the constitution of Hungary, calls for that.

I submit my so often repeated views for your kind consideration. Your sound reasoning, and your virtuous patriotism is a model for me; you and the honourable Estates of Hungary should decide about my opinion; reprove me if wrong, since you have never yet been unmindful of the respect to your monarch, and

then I will myself acknowledge my mistake to your king. But should you find my reasoning worthy of your attention and approval, then further put your trust in me to keep nothing back, that the nation wishes, but rather to declare it freely. With rebels we will certainly not reach our goal, and in order to remedy the grievances of the nation, our norm will and must be the constitution of your country. The rebels, however, have no part in this.

Eugene, Prince of Savoy to Count John Pálffy.
Ryssel, 23. 9. 1708.

The great victory the eminent General Heister won at Trentschin, August 3, over the Hungarian rebels comforted me only in the respect that the trouble-mongers will, in this year at least, not be in the position to gain ground. But I do not expect much good from the Diet of Pressburg since the Estates do not exhibit most willing compliance regarding the succession rights of the Austrian House. It appears to me that this opposition very much deforms the character of the gratitude which, considering what the Royal House has done for them, has until now so outstandingly been their wont. I am only afraid that if one has to wrest all their rights from the nation with sword in hand, in the end mutual trust would be lost, and such a precious thing once lost can never be regained; for the national character is not changed, even by great misery.

The nations would in this case observe the rule of the wise Scipion, who would no longer give either his trust or his heart to someone who had once deceived him. The protesting Estates by their submissiveness in politicis, put to shame a large part of the Catholics. It is only to be regretted that the Catholic side fails to use this readiness - following the advice of your Excellency - to the true benefit of the common cause. Who knows how many foreign agents of Rome, France and Poland are in Vienna, in order to mislead the nations through constant tension, and constantly to provide new nourishment for mistrust, which in any case is very easily fed?

Eugene, Prince of Savoy to Count John Pálffy.
Mainz, 20. 6. 1711.

As far as I can remember, I have had no happier day then yesterday in my life. Ten times I kissed your letter of the 6th of this month in which you informed me by the enclosed reports, of the favourable ending of the affair

of Hungarian malcontents. Last month I had a similar report from Vienna which seemed to be reliable; I could not believe it, however, until I heard the truth from you yourself.

Thanks be given to Providence from me and all good people for choosing my best Count as its instrument, and at the same time for the pacification of the country. The Monarchy owes this lucky event to your demonstrated fearlessness, your perseverance and your perspicacity. Oh, had our late monarch experienced at least this joy, which now comes doubly to his in any case very heart-stricken princess! I can hardly wait for the moment when I can warmly embrace you, my dear Count, on account of my sincere joy. I saw in you from the very beginning a second Count Michael Teleky. He saved the country, and you have preserved it more through your intelligence than by your sword.

If only I could imagine, after this confluence of the most vexatious circumstances, such a joyful and beautiful day on which I could write you in return such a result (the true gift of the Divinity), that peace has been concluded with France! But my days are too short to be able truly to send you those few precious words: My Fatherland is at peace. This war sows the seeds of new wars in Europe for an entire century: I doubt that I shall come to see that the sword be sheathed; consider my words. May the Providence help you with word and deed that at least in Hungary internal strife should not flare up again. For there, too, bad seed has been sown, which has a nofarious effect so long as the three escaped leaders have not lost their entire influence on the matters of the country.

I have just received news from Vienna of the conquest of Montgatsch (Munkács). This very day I will copy the reports forwarded to me and send them to our dear Starhemberg. Maybe it would be his first and perhaps only comfort in his present circumstances.

Action of Margit Slachta to Rescue Slovakian Jews

The Slovakian state created in March 1939 only granted full civic rights to inhabitants belonging to the "Slovakian ethnic group". From the first month of the existence of the new state anti-Jewish legislation restricted the legal situation of Slovakian Jewry, which made up some 4 % of the population.¹

The Slovakian Jews earlier played an important role in economic and civil life. In certain intellectual professions, e.g. physicians, their proportion exceeded 50 %. This stratum rose into bourgeois civilisation at a higher rate than Slovak nationals, and their mother tongue and culture was almost entirely Hungarian. All this only increased the antisemitism of the Slovak intelligentsia which was fighting for national determination. The representatives of the Catholic Church were everywhere to be found in the leadership of the new Slovak state and many leaders of the intellectual class were under their influence.

The disenfranchisement of Jews was initiated by the Slovakian state itself. The "Codex Judaicum" issued on September 10, 1941, reflecting the spirit of the Nuremberg Laws put Slovakian Jewry outside the law. Their special designation, segregation and deportation started in 1942. The news of the deportations reached Hungary, and in these years about 6-8000 Slovakian Jews found refuge in Hungary.²

The action launched by Margit Slachta (1884 Kassa - 1974 Buffalo) to rescue the Slovakian Jews is less known. Margit Slachta was a well-known personality of Hungarian public life between the two world wars. As early as 1919 she organized the Catholic Women's Party, as candidate of which she was elected member of Parliament - the first woman MP in Hungary - for 1920-22. In 1923 she established the Society of Social Sisters³ which worked for the protection of children, women and families. She was a conservative, legitimist politician, sensitive to social questions. As a committed Christian, she defied the spirit of the age, and faithful to the ideas of charity and fraternity rebelled against racism and inhumanity. Between 1945-48 she was elected MP again. Yet, she did not conform to the demands of the new era. She became gradually isolated, she was ousted from public life that was becoming more and more impatient, until finally she was driven to emigration.

The news concerning the deportations in Slovakia prompted her to immediate action. At Easter 1942 she went to Pozsony (Bratislava) to see for herself if the news were true, and how she could help. Returning home, she bombarded the Church authorities and all influential personalities with letters and petitions.

She urged a united, determined position of the episcopacy in support of the persecutees. Unfortunately, her efforts remained without success. In the Spring of 1942, 58,000 Slovakian Jews were hauled away to extermination camps. In the Spring of 1943 it came to the deportation of the remaining 25,000 Jews, mostly of Christian religion. Slachta again tried to help. This time, she turned to the Pope, Pius XII, himself.

It came to her knowledge that Francis Spellman, Cardinal Archbishop of New York, whom Slachta had known from the US, was going to spend a few days in Rome early March. The well-informed knew well that Spellman belonged to the narrow circle of the Pope's confidants, Slachta therefore wished to gain access to the Pope through him. At the cost of many difficulties - through the intermediation of Regent Horthy's wife - she managed to obtain a passport, and flew to Rome. Archbishop Spellman received her at once, and obtained a papal audience for her. Slachta informed Spellman, and later the Pope, of the Slovakian events orally and in writing as well.

It was perhaps owing to this intervention that Pope Pius XII then instructed the seven Slovakian bishops to proceed personally at President Tiso, Prime Minister Tuka, and Mach, Minister of Home Affairs, to protest against the deportation of the remaining Jews. He also ordered that in all churches in Slovakia a pastoral letter signed by the seven bishops be read, expounding why deportation was incompatible with Christianity.

The deportation planned for 1943 did not take place. The above mentioned action by Margit Slachta must have played a role in the respite given to Slovakian Jewry. At the same time the changed situation of the war also had an effect in the same direction, perplexing the "zealous" leaders. We must refer also to the 50,000 dollar "ransom" which the Bratislava Rescue Committee, acting as a self-defence organization for Slovakian Jewry, paid to the SS, in the person of Dieter von Wisliczeny, in exchange for the suspension of the deportations.⁴ This amount - two dollars per person - reached Slovakia through international Jewish organizations.

The remaining Slovakian Jewry which had won a breathing space, in the end met its fate in the Autumn of 1944. After the defeat of the Slovakian uprising deportations started again in retaliation. More than 10,000 persons were transported to Auschwitz and other death camps.⁵

At that time, Slachta could no longer intervene on their behalf. When in Autumn 1944, all hell broke loose in Hungary also she tried again to help those in trouble. The social sisters under her direction turned over their houses and documents to the persecutees. They hid and rescued more than 1000 people.

Slachta, following Christian teachings, took a stand against the barbarities. She belonged to the few about whom we could say they did their best to help their fellow human beings.

The documents published here were written by Slachta in English. The first letter was written in Budapest, and the rest in Rome after the meeting with Spellman. The documents were put at our disposal through the courtesy of a social sister, Ilona Móna.

Notes

1/ The decree of April 18, 1938, defined the term "Jew". On this basis Jews were considered to be those of Jewish religion, plus those converts who converted to some Christian confession after October 30, 1918. This Slovakian decree defined the notion of "Jew" in a similar fashion with the first Hungarian anti-Jewish law.

2/ Vaadat Ezrah Vö-Hazalah Bö-Budapest. Der Bericht des Jüdischen Rettungskomitees aus Budapest. Submitted by Dr. Rezső Kasztner. 12.

3/ Society of Social Sisters (1923-1948). Its clerical president was Bishop Count János Mikes, its president Margit Slachta. The Society established itself in five countries, and by the end of the thirties, had about 200 members. Their primary task was to provide committed and qualified social workers for the protection of children, women and families.

4/ Baron Dieter von Wisliczeny was a member of the Department RSHA IV B 4, dealing with Jewish matters. In the period under examination, he was the leader of the SS Sonderkommando in Pozsony (Bratislava). He was executed after the war in Czechoslovakia on account of the role he played in the deportation of Slovakian and Hungarian Jewry.

5/ Some 8,000 persons were transported to Auschwitz, the rest to Theresienstadt and Bergen-Belsen. About 2,000 Jews remained illegally in Pozsony (Bratislava).

M á r i a S c h m i d t

His Excellency

Francis SPELLMAN D.D.

Archbishop of New York

R O M A

Your Excellency;

First of all may I express my heartfelt gratitude for the granted audience inspite of the tiresome day. And please accept the expression of a double thank for your fatherly extreem kindness in sending us home on your own car. God bless your Excellency in return.

In answering your Excellency's question as to the deportation of the Slovak Jews, I take the liberty to mention a few possibilitis, which could be useful at the solution of the problem.

- 1/ In case Slovakia shall carry out this devlish plan of deportation, the U.S.A. will withdraw for 20,000 german subjects the permission to stay in the United States. /Does our moral law allow such kind of retorsion?/
- 2/ It is known the cruel fait of German soldiers as Russian warprisonners. Should Slovakia give up the plan of deportation, the U.S.A. will intervene by Russia in the interest of German warprisonners.
- 3/ The Slovak "government" efforded 150,000 Switzer francs monthly, should she allow the Jews to remain. The Jews, - deprived from everything they had, are not able to secure this amount.
The U.S.A. could offer this amount to Slovakia in dollars.
- 4/ Spain has representativ in Slovakia. Foloowing the offer of the U.S.A., Spain should be the protector of jewish interests in Slovakia. In case Spain is willing to do this, and should assure a certain financial help to both countries.
- 5/ Spain should grant quick permits to Jews, temporary immigrants in Spain and the U.S.A. should declaire their willingness to grant them permanent stay in the U.S.A. after the war.

I ask to be excused for my poor English and this hurried letter. I would be extreemly happy if something could be done and if peoples hope in your person Excellency could be answered by some arrangement in their behalf. Oh remembered them, they suffer extreemly.

Whishing your Excellency a wuiet trip and the chisest blessings of the Lord,

I remain,

your greatful and humble daughter in Christ

Roma, the 23rd March 1943.
Via Giulia 1.
Sister Margaret Slachta
C/O Monsgr Francis Luttor

His Excellency
Francis SPELLMAN D.D.
Archbishop of New York
NEW YORK

Your Excellency;

With the permission received here in Roma, I take the liberty to enclose the letter presented here in the Vatican to Monsgr D. Meglio, who is in charge of the Slovak cause.

There is but little hope that the Italian gouvernement will consent and allow to Slovakien refugees to enter Italie. But even in this case to obtain the letter of the New York Bank, would mean much for the Italian Jewish charity organization, as they are helping the Croitien refugees who with the permission of the gouvernement are already here.

The president of the Italian organization is:

Mr. Lelio Vittorio Valobra
Genova, Piazza Vittoria 4.

He could not tell me the name of the New York bank, where the money is in deposit. But he assured me, that the Joint Distribution Committee is well known.

In connection of point 5. of my letter, I ask your Excellency to graciously procure for Mr Valobra this bankletter.

I suppose that the Joint Distribution C. has a deposit for other countries too. Oh it would be such a blessing if the Hungarian and Slovakian organization could have such letter of assurance too. If this is possible, please to intervene for the other countries too.

To say a word of the Slovakian case: the Holy See made the utmost in their interest. The plan of deportation is postponed until middle of April. May the merciful God allow that it would be cancelled definitely.

I would be exceedingly grateful for one word from your Excellency wheather such a bankletter is possible or not.

Hoping that your Excellency's trip in the two other continents was satisfactory I ask your blessing, and remain Your humble daughter in Christ

Enclosure I.

The destructions of the Jews forms one of the darkest passages in the history of the young Slovakian state, not only on account of its methods, but also because the Slovakian themselves are more the passive spectators rather than the active performers of these unheard-of events, except the leaders, with Mach and Tuka at their head who, however, are also only the means of a mightier power than they themselves.

The data regarding the deportation cannot give even an approximative picture of its real meaning to a non-participant. It is necessary to complete the dull facts with some details.

That high degree of hatred which is necessary for the execution of such a plan or for even looking-on passively, was excited beforehand by a systematic propaganda.

During a long period, the newspapers published a series of pictures and articles, apt to raise the greatest hatred. No means were too low in the service of instigating hatred, also by big placards.

Day after day new decrees were issued, the basis of which was not formed by real necessity, but rather with the aim to humiliate and torment the Jewish population: such as the large yellow star marking them; the curfew to be inside by six o'clock; the compulsion to leave their lodgings and crowd into ghettos; later on the forbidding to move from one town to another; Christians were forbidden to enter the homes of Jewish families and vice-versa; in shops, and restaurants inscriptions were placed excluding them; decrees were issued forbidding intervention in Jewish affairs; they were excluded from legal rights, they were deprived from all possibilities of earning their livelihood etc.

It can be understood that after such a systematic preparation the mob could attack with sticks and iron rods the Jews, that they broke in to their shops and robbed them, even dragged defenseless people from their houses and were allowed to beat them half-dead, and later on could even deport and kill them.

During the deportations a transport of 3,000 girls was gathered in the Patronka in Bratislava, where all their articles of value, keepsakes, provisions and clothes were taken away from them, and in order to prevent any communication with their relatives, the windows of the camp were boarded. They had to sign papers to renounce their articles of value. For two days they were left without food and if anyone committed suicide the others were made responsible for it.

There is evidence that, as with the Croatian and Polish women, these girls were also carried to entertainment places behind the front of they were found

"fit" for this purpose and placed at the disposal of the soldiers. In Poland there existed young girls, even among the rich, who got into such camps from which they could often only escape by obtaining a certificate from the physician, proving that they were syphilitic.

It is feared that, after the Slovakian Jewish girls and women, it will be the turn of the Christians, for their excessive waste in men and women not only behind the front, but also in the work camps is known. This supposition is rendered still more plausible by the fact that after last year's deportation in accordance with an official decree, all household employees had to submit to a medical examination. Sanitation in Slovakia is not on such a high level as to permit the supposition that under the present difficult circumstances the Slovakian government should have ordered it from a sanitarian point of view.

Very reliable witnesses state that these girls carried to entertainment places at the front served whole companies, and after having become "useless" they were shot in groups. On examining these unfortunate corpses a physician stated that wild beasts could not, have handled them worse than the soldiers entertaining themselves. This physician - according to his statement - felt sick himself from the sight.

He says that these unfortunate girls not only waited apathetically for their turn of the execution, but even asked for it.

After the girls and the young men had been taken off separately, they took the remaining people along, regardless of their age, condition of health, culture. Healthy people, sick, old and dying people, new born babies, pregnant women were all separated from each other and placed in camps then loaded on to waggons. Their documents were taken away, and they were marked by numbers. The waggons were sealed. Eye witnesses saw the inhumane, even diabolical way of transportation. From these sealed waggons, sobbing and cries for help could be heard which accompanied the rattling of the wheels was ghostly. They were not allowed to take with them any victuals, medicines, or even the most necessary things for personal daily use. The strings of their only luggage, tied to their back, were out on entering the waggon.

The ground of the waggon was filled with lime, which in want of the most primitive sanitary accommodation was slaked and the poisonous gas killed them, so that daily 10-15 corpses were thrown out of the waggons, by the attendants.

One of the most heart-breaking transports was that of 5-17 years old children who lamenting, sobbing and crying together faced an unknown future.

Beyond the border the deported people had to walk 20-30-40 kms and those unable to walk were shot.

Trustworthy eye-witnesses tell us about the mass executions, where the people marched in columns of eight, among them mothers with babies, old men supported each others towards the trenches, where machine-guns fire put an end to their misery. They were buried in masses, some of them still alive. News arrived of every kind of massacre: of people being slain, shot or gassed, etc. No humanitarian society, nit even the Red Cross was able to procure any news about them.

The remainder tried to hide in woods and bushes, or escaped towards the Hungarian frontier.

Those who had hoped that after these bloody and cruel days their life would be spared, were overcome by a new wave of terror following the speech of minister Mach on February 8. 1943. His cry: "Away with all Jews" spread like fire all over this formally free, but in reality subjugated little state; in the months of March and April all of them must be deported, which practically means their murder in various ways.

On February 12th 1943. the internments in Bratislava began anew. Indiscribable panic broke out among the miserable people, numbering over 20.000, among them more than 10.000 Christians. The internments are not made by the police this time, but by members of the Klinka guard, who execute their commands with the greatest possible brutality.

According to information some 500 children are roaming about in Slovakia, alone, destitute without parents or guardians. The misery of hiding and all the risks of escape towards the Hungarian frontier are beginning over again. According to Mach's plan, two months hence no Jew may live in Slovakia.

Without difference of religion all people fearing God must join in preventing the realisation of this devilish plan if we dont want the wrath of God to avenge with manifold punishment the destruction of many thousands of human beings incapable of self defence.

Enclosure 2.

In March 1942, the Slovakian government decreed the deportation of the whole Jewish population of the State which - according to the legal definition of the Jews - amounted to approximately 80-90.000 people.

An agreement was concluded between the Slovakian and the German State, according to which Slovakia pays Germany 500 RM for each deported person, while all movable and immovable property of the deported Jews passes over to the Slovakian State.

Who were deported?

In principle the deportation extended to every person of Jewish origin, if a special decree did not provide for their exemption.

Who were exempted?

- a./ Those who work for the state, such as e.g. physicians, veterinary surgeons, chemists, engineers, the leaders of agricultural undertakings etc.
- b./ Such persons as receive a personal exemption from the President of the State.
- c./ Persons married to Christians, if married before September 10, 1941 and their descendants.
- d./ Persons who were baptized before March 14, 1939.
- e./ Jews of Hungarian and American citizenship.
- f./ Employees of the Jewish central office (Ustredna Zidov:).
- g./ Two rabbis.

Besides these legal exceptions there was no other escape: infants, old people, pregnant women, sick people, cripples, invalids, imbeciles, all were obliged to leave Slovakia.

The course of the deportations.

The interments began on March 24, 1942. At first women between 17 and 35 years, some days later men from 16 to 50, and thereafter - with a few short intervals - all other categories were taken, from March 26. 1942 to the end of October 1942, one transport following the other, 65-70.000 people having been deported.

From the notes of an eye-witness we find the following details:

"March 24. Women from 17 to 35 taken and interned.

March 25. Men from 17 to 45 interned. The internment of women continues too. People are being enclosed in different camps in Slovakia.

March 26. 30 waggons crowded with young girls were sent towards the borders. At the frontier-station of Zvard the transport was handed over to the

SS. At present it is impossible to state the destination of the transport. (Galicia? Silesia?)

March 27. 50 waggons filled with men have started towards Zilina, probably with Lublin as destination. On the same day 1000 young girls were deported to unknown destination.

April 4. 8.000 people transported beyond the borders and 4.000 interned in Sered, Bratislava, Zilina, Poprad, Novaky. The interned people suffer from hunger, their provisions are being taken away.

April 8. The city of Trnava is surrounded, all Jews up to 60 were taken away."

The deportations ceased from the end of October till present date.

The places where the deported Jews were settled.

At the Slovakian border the deported people were usually taken over by German SS-divisions or soldiers. The Slovakian Jews were settled in Galicia, Poland, East Upper Silesia, and the Ukraine: those able to work were employed partly in factories and military factories, the rest were placed in closed reservations, ghettos.

The execution of the deportation.

Families were separated, first young girls, later on young men and afterwards old people were also deported. Without previous warning people were taken away from their offices, their homes, sometimes from the street. Their internment took place under terrible circumstances; they were enclosed in camps where no communication with the outer world was possible and from where they were transported towards the frontiers without any food or drink.

The documents and identity papers were taken away from the deported persons, they were not allowed to use their name, and were only numbered.

Since all their articles of value had already been previously seized, they were only allowed to take with them most necessary objects for every day use, except medicines, up to a limit of 50 kilos. However, in most cases not even this luggage arrived.

The situation of the deported Jews.

According to reports, the major part of the 65-70.000 deported people are no longer alive. Most of them died as a result of physical privations, or through acts of violence. Out of the 65-70.000 there are only 3-4.000 whose identity number or address is known. Hardly any correspondence is possible with them and news from them arrive only very exceptionally.

Notes of an intelligent Slovakian woman who, after many months of persecutions, unbelievable adversities and misery, succeeded to escape from deportation.

The cruelties started in March 1942 when quite suddenly at night the young girls and childless women from 16 to 45 were taken away from their homes. They were carried off almost from the school-desks and from the warm home of their parents. They were allowed to take with them only a small bundle, some warm clothes, a little food, with which their parents were able to provide them in the middle of the night. In fact, even these few things, such as a cover and warm sweater, as well as the wrist watch or ring which some of them possessed, were all taken away from them. It did occur not only in a single case that Slovakian policemen in the Bratislava camp of Patronka declined service, saying that they had children themselves and that the weeping of the parents broke their heart, and that childless policemen should be sent there.

No news have ever come about the first transports. In summer there came some open cards from the Ukraine to the Stavebne Drzstvo, where intelligent Jewish advocates, learned merchants and other people possessing a university degree did the hard work of masons. In these cards they wrote that all of them were no more than shadows through famine, that their clothes were completely in rags, and they entreated some food and old clothing. No eye remained dry on reading these lines. One post-card was more sad than the other.

One transport started after the other: now already whole families were deported. However, on the frontier they were separated.

The poorest and most religious people were the greatest heroes. They led their small children and no tears were in their eyes, but prayers on their lips. Some of the Christian housemasters or of their Christian neighbours ran after them and wanted to give them something, but they were threatened. No human feeling was tolerated.

An old lady teacher of 78, an 80 years old merchant, sick people unable to walk, blind and invalid people were lifted into the waggons. Many of them died already en route. 40 people were crowded together in one nearly hermetically closed cattle waggon.

In the concentration camp of Zilina, which had room for 1200 people, at times there were crowded together 2500 persons.

The furniture was all taken away from the lodgings and sold at quite low prices in the destroyed synagogue which had been transformed into an auction hall. Those who were allowed to remain there at the beginning, first with yellow, then with white legitimations, were also driven out of their homes and

permitted to live either in the ghettos or wretched housings outside the borders of the cities.

Nearly every day it accoured that persons were taken to the concentrations camps though they possessed a legitimation. If they paid high bribery amounts, 50-100.000 Ks. they were set free again, but this procedure could be repeated whenever.

The Finance Ministry employed 78 lawyers, with a salary of 900 Ks., but 10 days later all of them were arrested together with their family.

The Jews had to wear yellow stars (Mogen David) of a diametre of 12 cms. From 6 p.m. to 8 a.m. no Jew was allowed to show in the streets. In innumerable cases Jews were cruelly beaten in the streets.

According to the law those who had converted to Christianity "on time" at least maintained their human liberty, though their property was also seized. They received a legitimation that they could not be put into a transport. However, also here there was found a possibility to disregard the legal decree, by saying that the person was not "politically trustworthy".

Towards the end of summer two waggons with insane people were sent off.

Before the beginning of the deportations (in winter 1941) at a temperature of 30 centigrades below zero, the Jews were compelled to hand over even the smallest piece of fur they possessed and commissions visited every house, searching all presses and taking along everything they could. There were places where they emptied the whole house.

The houses were expropriated. Every house was entrusted to an administrator a German or a Slovakian, who acted as he pleased. E.g. a housemaster who had been satisfied with his lodgings during 40 years, kicked out the house-owner, an advocate, together with all his documents and other belongings.

The administrators compelled the owners to sign a declaration that they had handed over their houses of their own accord.

The Jews there suffered unspeakable pains and torments.

The 20.000 people of Jewish origin, still living in Slovakia, a considerable part of whom are Christians, are also actually menaced by deportation and thus with complete destruction.

Sanyo Mach, Minister of the Interior, deputy Prime Minister, and Commander-in chief of the so-called Hlinka guard, in a speech held at a meeting of the Hlinka Guard on February 8, 1943, announced that the 20.000 Jews still living in Slovakia would also be deported now, without any regard to whether they are baptized or not or possess any legal document whatsoever.

In its number of February 9, 1943, the "Grenzbote" quotes the following

part of the above-mentioned speech of Sanyo Mach, who also read Adolph Hitler's letter of greeting to the Hlinka Guard.

"Alle Juden müssen weg!

Was das Judentum bedeutet, war uns immer klar und wird uns heute noch viel klarer. Eins unserer ersten Pflichten wird es daher sein, wenn wir 80 v.H. des Judentums beseitigt haben, auch mit den übrigen fertig zu werden. Wir alle sehen, was diese 20.000 Juden, die wir noch hier haben, bedeuten. Mögen sie nun getauft oder ungetauft sein, eine solche oder jene Legitimation haben, alle verfolgen das gleiche Ziel. Aber es wird der März kommen und der April und es werden wieder Transporte gehen. Wir werden mit den Juden so verfahren, wie mit ihnen seinerzeit Stur oder Vajausky, Hlinka oder Rázus verfahren."

Since any resistance to the brutal terror of the Hlinka Guard is impossible, the situation of the 20.000 people, if no help arrives at the last moment, is desperate and hopeless.

Already when the first 65-70.000 people were deported, a great many people committed suicide, killed their own families and terrible tragedies took place. Whoever could, tried to flee, but only very few succeeded, since the frontiers were strongly guarded and those who were caught were immediately deported. Now the same atrocities are beginning: on February 19th the internments started again, and the unfortunate people were caught and imprisoned in order to deport them.

The flight towards the Hungarian border started again and happy are those who succeed in getting to Hungary. At present there are also arriving great numbers of small destituted children who do not know what happened to their parents. It is reported that approximately 500 small children are roaming about in Slovakia, without their parents, alone, forsaken.

If help does not arrive without delay, another 20.000 people, Jews and Christians will perish!

His Excellency
Spellman, D.D.
Archbishop of New York

New York

Your Excellency;

Fully appreciating that most important duties are making excessive demands on your time and in spite of my own unimportance, I am begging your interest in behalf of multitudes of people, subjects of great tragedies that have begun last year and are continuing at present.

This terrible tragedy is disguised under the name of Slovakian Deportation. Last year 60.000 people perished, as its victims and 20.000 are awaiting the same fate now.

In vain did the Church lift up her voice to save them, before the Germain powers moral rights have no waight. Therefore I am begging your Excellency to bring this S.O.S. cry to the notion of persons in authority in the United States earnestly pressing them to intervene with their influence and to rescue these unfortunate people from humiliations, tortures, slow or quick violent death.

In reality not only the 20.000 are affected by these happenings, but also who are instumental in the carrying cut of the borders. The unbelievable brutality and cruelty, that surpasses all imagination, kills their souls. They die a spiritual death.

Large numbers of Catholics are also lost because they are scandalized seeing that these things may happen under the leadership of the Catholic Primeminister Tuka, a daily communicant, and President Tisso, a clergyman, without their being excommunicated. The churches are depopulated for the inhabitants of many villages abandon such religion and deny their faith.

The events in conquered Slovakia makes our heart and soul ache because Slovakia had been the integral part of Hungary for a thousand years. We are worried lest the devastating movement might spread over the border into our country. Tho' Hungary could not remain entirely immune from the damaging influence, nevertheless she withstands with estonishing moral strength, like a living devine miracle, the spiritual and intellectual storm that comes raging and devastating correct this from East to West.

The Peace Treaty terminating the First World War divided the territory of Hungary among six countries. Major territories fell to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania; some villages in the counties Árva and Szepes which became part of Poland, and Fiume with its negligible population which was attached to Italy, but these are not taken into account in the examination of the data. After the Second World War we must include in our statistical series the data of the Soviet Union to which went (from Czechoslovakia) the area inhabited by Ruthenians (Transcarpathian Ukrainians).

The first population census was taken everywhere immediately after the establishment of the countries affected (generally in 1920) and since then, censuses have been taken at ten-year intervals, at much the same time as in Hungary. (Rumania is an exception, where lately censuses have fallen in the middle of two decades: 1956, 1966, 1976.) At the beginning similarly to Hungarian usage, the data were compiled according to communities. In Czechoslovakia, however, since 1949, in the Soviet Union throughout, and in Romania since 1966 only the figures for larger territorial units have been reported. Only Yugoslavia kept the system of publication according to communities. (There, on the other hand, settlements were grouped into larger units.)

The analysis of figures according to countries is facilitated by the fact that the territories annexed to the new states generally form a separate territorial unit even now.¹ The detailed data by country between 1920 and 1970 are contained in Table 1, the summary data for the former territory of Hungary for the period 1851-1970 in Table 2.²

According to the data of the official censuses performed in the different countries the proportion of those whose mother tongue is Hungarian, in the Carpathian Basin, within the borders of former Hungary, rose from 51.4 % in 1900 to 52 % by 1970.

It appeared to be appropriate to supplement this value by an estimate which gives a closer approximation to the actual situation, for we cannot accept the census data as 100 per cent accurate. Rejecting exaggerated estimates, but with a slight increase in the number of Germans, the realistic value for Hungarophones in present-day Hungary may be set at 10.1 million.

^xThe term "historical Hungary" refers to the pre-Trianon geographic boundaries of Hungary.

The data of the Czechoslovak census are not completely accurate either. The number of Hungarians reached bottom in 1949: in total 368,000 persons declared themselves of Hungarian nationality. With the democratization of the situation by 1960 their number increased to 534,000, but even today adequate data on their proportions do not manifest themselves, especially in the cities or in wholly Slovakized communities. In Czechoslovakia we have to reckon with the highest number of bilingual communities, where the change of state power has always greatly influenced the declaration of one's nationality. This has exerted its influence especially in the villages in the territory of Galánta (Galanta), Léva (Levice) and Kassa (Kosice). It must not be left out of consideration that among the various groups of Hungarian, the highest natural rate of population growth in the last two decades is to be found in the Csallóköz (the territory between Bratislava and Komarno). Taking into account a considerable decrease due to resettlements and exchange of population, and keeping in mind that of the one million Hungarians shown in 1910 in the territory attached to Czechoslovakia close to 200,000 now live in the Soviet Union, it can be stated that the 573,000 of Hungarian nationality (with 618,000 having Hungarian mother tongue) shown in 1970 is a close approximate to the realistic value, which, at the maximum, may be put at 700,000.³

The Romanian data are more problematic. The number of Hungarians shown for 1956 shows a stagnation to 1966, although the Hungarians living there can be assumed to have taken part in the natural population growth in this period in proportion to their numbers. Relying on the data of 1956, it can be taken for certain that in 1970 the number of Hungarians in Romania reached 1.8 million.

The reduction in the number of Hungarians in Yugoslavia in the last decade can be accounted for by multiple circumstances. The final settlement of guest workers in Western countries, the absorption of scattered Hungarians in Croatia, and the low rate of population growth brought down further a number which had hardly changed for decades. Census data from Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union must be considered as realistic with a slight rounding up. In Austria the number of Hungarians has always been of insignificant magnitude.

These are in rough outline the general statements which must unfailingly be added to the statistical practice and the accuracy of data of the neighbouring countries. In general, therefore, the official census figures are reliable, only insignificant adjustments need to be carried out. According to the result of our estimates, the number of those of Hungarian mother tongue living on the territory of one-time Hungary reached 13.3 million (53.6%) by 1970. Leaving out of con-

sideration the distortions favoring Hungarians in the 1910 census, this is the highest proportion reached so far.

In the appearance of this surprising result primarily the growth of the number of Hungarians living in Hungary plays the decisive role. Although their natural population growth is lower than in the neighbouring countries, the number of people of Hungarian mother tongue living in present-day Hungary increased to 10.1 million, as compared to 5.9 million in 1900, in consequence of the resettlements after the First and Second World Wars, and of the Magyarization of the nationalities living there.⁴

At the same time that the low natural population growth is barely enough to maintain the number of population; the growth rate of those living in other countries in greater or smaller measure augments the number of the peoples who constitute the state. This is shown by the fact that the number of Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries grew between 1900 and 1970 from the 2.8 million altogether to only 3.2 million, even with adjustments to the census data. The accelerating urbanization of our century, the unavoidable bilingualism in the workplace and in education, the increasing number of mixed marriages following the loosening of the ties of religion, society, and nationality have initiated the same process in all countries.

Notes

1/ The territory of Burgenland - territory annexed to Austria; Slovakia, which belongs to Czechoslovakia; and Transcarpathian Ukraine has remained practically the same, even the borders of the one-time Hungarian counties and of Transylvania in Romania have hardly changed. In Yugoslavia alone do we have to deduct the Hungarian population of Syrmia (Croatia), from those of the Voivodeship, and to add the data for the villages of the former counties of Vas and Zala which figure in Croatia and Slovenia, to those of the Voivodeship.

2/ The figures of both tables originate from the census volumes of the individual countries. Census figures of some countries could not be found, or a census was not prepared in the period under examination. In both cases the series are completed by estimates, which are reported in brackets.

3/ According to the estimate of Kálmán Janics their number can be put at 720-740,000. Uj Szó, 1968, April 12.

4/ In the displacement of figures especially the gradual absorption of Germans living in the territory of former Hungary, and their deportation after the Second World War played an important role: their number fell back to third of the peak

reached at the turn of the century. It is interesting that the proportion of Slovaks reached the level established in 1851 only in 1970, and that of the Romanians has even diminished. The proportion of Ruthenes and Southern Slavs, is, in spite of their significant numerical increase, not significant, whereas the slow diminishing of those listed under the heading "other" is primarily the consequence of the integration of the minor Southern Slav groups.

Z o l t á n D á v i d

Central Statistical Office

Table 1

Breakdown of the population in the territory of historical Hungary by nationalities 1920-1970

	Total	Hungarian	German	Slovak	Romanian	Ruthenian	Serb	Croatian	Other	
<u>1920</u>										
Hungary	7990	7157	552	142	23	-	17	37	62	
Austria	295	25	221	-	-	-	-	45	4	
Czechoslovakia	3558	739	150	2034	-	459	-	-	176	1921
Yugoslavia	1488	391	319	49	70	11	550	-	98	1921
Romania	5139	1322	555	-	2923	-	-	-	339	
Sum total	18470	9634	1797	2225	3016	470	649	-	679	
<u>1930</u>										
Hungary	8689	8001	479	105	16	1	7	28	52	
Austria	299	18	(251)	-	-	-	-	30	-	
Czechoslovakia	4065	708	169	2408	-	546	-	-	234	
Yugoslavia	1552	(400)	(300)	(70)	(50)	(20)	(650)	-	(62)	1931
Romania	5548	1353	544	-	3208	-	-	-	443	
Sum total	20153	10480	1743	2583	3274	567	715	-	791	
<u>1950</u>										
Hungary	9205	9076	22	26	15	-	5	10	51	1949
Austria	276	5	240	-	-	-	-	31	-	1951
Czechoslovakia	(4000)	355	-	(3565)	-	(30)	-	-	(50)	1949
Yugoslavia	1745	449	36	72	59	22	763	197	147	1948
Romania	5761	1482	332	-	3752	-	-	-	195	
Soviet Union	(800)	(140)	-	(10)	(16)	(574)	-	-	(60)	
Sum total	21787	11507	630	3673	3842	626	768	238	503	

Table 1 (continued)

	Total	Hungarian	German	Slovak	Romanian	Ruthenian	Serb	Croatian	Other	
<u>1960</u>										
Hungary	9963	9786	51	31	16	-	5	25	49	
Austria	271	6	238	-	-	-	-	25	2	1961
Czechoslovakia	4168	518	6	3559	-	35	-	-	50	1961
Yugoslavia	1847	459	-	61	58	(25)	833	246	165	1961
Romania	6232	1559	368	-	4052	-	-	-	253	1956
Soviet Union	920	146	-	12	18	686	-	-	58	1959
Sum total	23401	12474	663	3663	4144	746	838	296	577	
<u>1970</u>										
Hungary	10322	10166	36	21	13	-	12	18	56	
Austria	272	(7)	(240)	-	-	-	-	(25)	-	1971
Czechoslovakia	4542	554	5	3884	-	42	-	-	57	
Yugoslavia	1930	439	7	60	53	22	890	246	213	1971
Romania	6720	1597	372	-	4559	-	-	-	192	1966
Soviet Union	1057	152	-	10	23	808	-	-	64	
Sum total	24843	12915	660	3975	4648	872	902	289	582	
<u>1970 (estimated)</u>										
Hungary	10300	10100								
Austria	300	-								
Czechoslovakia	4500	700								
Yugoslavia	1900	500								
Romania	6700	1800								
Soviet Union	1100	200								
Sum total	24800	13300	700	3800	4400	900	900	300	500	

Table 2

Breakdown of the population in the territory of historical Hungary by nationalities 1851-1970

	Total	Hungarian	German	Slovak	Romanian	Ruthenian	Serb	Croatian	Other
1851	11120	4527	1367	1690	2163	355	361	85	572
1869	13219	6207	1816	1826	2322	448	287	208	105
1880	13749	6404	1871	1855	2403	353		640	223
1890	15163	7358	1990	1897	2589	380	495	194	260
1900	16838	8652	1999	2002	2799	425	438	191	332
1910	18264	9944	1903	1946	2948	464	462	195	402
1920	18470	9634	1797	2225	3016	460		649	679
1930	20153	10480	1724	2583	3274	567		715	789
1950	21787	11507	630	3673	3842	626	768	238	503
1960	23401	12474	663	2663	4144	746	838	296	577
1970	24843	12915	660	3975	4648	872	902	289	582
1970(estimated)	24.8	13.3	0.7	3.8	4.4	0.9	0.9	0.3	0.5

Percent

1851	40.7	12.3	15.2	19.5	3.2	3.2		0.8	5.1
1869	46.9	13.7	13.8	17.6	3.4	2.2		1.6	0.8
1880	46.6	13.6	13.5	17.5	2.6			4.6	1.6
1890	48.5	13.1	12.5	17.1	2.5	3.3		1.3	1.7
1900	51.4	11.9	11.9	16.6	2.5	2.6		1.1	2.0
1910	54.5	10.4	10.7	16.1	2.5	2.5		1.1	2.2
1920	52.2	9.7	12.0	16.3	2.5			3.5	3.7
1930	52.0	8.6	12.9	16.2	2.8			3.5	3.9
1950	52.8	2.8	16.9	17.6	2.9	3.5		1.1	2.3
1960	53.3	2.8	15.6	17.7	3.2	3.6		1.3	2.5
1970	52.0	2.7	16.0	18.7	3.5	3.6		1.1	2.4
1970(estimated)	53.6	2.8	15.3	17.7	3.6	3.6		1.2	2.2

Table 2 (continued)

	Total	Hungarian	German	Slovak	Romanian	Ruthenian	Serb	Croatian	Other
<u>Growth or decline</u>									
(1851 = 100)									
1851 - 1970	223	294	51	225	203	253	249	353	87
1900 - 1970	147	154	35	190	157	212	205	157	151
1920 - 1970	134	138	39	171	146	196		185	74
1950 - 1970	114	116	111	103	115	144	117	126	99
1950 - 1970	114	112	105	108	121	139	117	121	116

Zoltán Szász on Erdély története (History of Transylvania) Volumes I-III.
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1986. Executive editor: Béla Köpeczi. Editors:
László Makkai, András Mócsy, Zoltán Szász.

Danubian Historical Studies: The ten-volume History of Hungary, a large scale synthetic study goes into great detail in its analysis of two thousand years of Transylvania. What was the point in publishing a separate three-volume HISTORY OF TRANSYLVANIA before finishing the whole series of ten volumes?

Zoltán Szász: The great synthetic Hungarian history series deals with the development of the Carpathian Basin as a whole. The history of Transylvania is presented only among so many other themes within a larger framework. It was only during certain periods between the middle of the 16th century and the end of the 17th century that Transylvania played a key role in preserving the continuity of Hungarian statehood, in the enrichment of culture and the intellectual life and in the consolidation of the Reformation. Therefore, these periods are covered in great detail. Obviously, a large synthetic study like this can only take into account those periods of lesser importance in Transylvanian history in short, scattered in various chapters throughout the whole series.

Transylvania was the only part of historical Hungary besides Croatia, which was regarded both in constitutional law and in public sentiment as a separate province, having distinctive regional features, like, for example, Savoy and Lorraine in France. Right from the beginnings of Hungarian statehood, the Hungarian Kingdom was recognized in the West as a unified state and it was only these two regions that could have been regarded as separate provinces.

It must also be mentioned that Transylvania has always been a prominent issue in the national consciousness of both past and contemporary Hungarian society. The historical reasons for this can be discussed here only in brief.

After the Ottoman victory in the Battle of Mohács in 1526, which marked the end of independent medieval Hungarian statehood and the capture of Buda

in 1541, Transylvania retained the largest part of its former independence in the tri-partite Hungary. In sharp contrast to the plight of the peoples of the Balkans, Transylvania's dependence on the Ottoman power was rather formal. Anti-Habsburg movements and wars of independence launched from Transylvania had a decisive role, in that "Royal Hungary", i.e., the northern part of the country under Habsburg control during the years of the Ottoman occupation, and subsequently the whole territory of the country that had been liberated from under Ottoman rule and which consequently had come under Habsburg influence after 1686, did not share the lot of the Czech provinces. They were able to retain their legally and formally independent statehood. Thus, in the national consciousness of all Hungarians, Transylvania became a symbol of the preservation of independent Hungarian statehood and of the fight for national independence.

As for modern Hungarians, the majority of Hungarians living outside the present borders of this country about 2 million people live in Transylvania (forming also the largest ethnic minority group in Europe). The notion of cultural and national cohesion is an organic part of Hungarian national consciousness.

A synthesis of the history of Transylvania is not only necessary for historians as they try to unravel certain fascinating and complex professional questions but it is also necessary because people in general know very little of this subject and mistaken ideas concerning Transylvania are very common. Transylvania has been part of Romania - with the exception of short intervals - for nearly seventy years. Historiography may facilitate the acquisition of a thorough scientific knowledge of the present-day situation and the fight against age-old prejudices. In an indirect way, historiography may have a part in the formation of a more realistic and healthier national consciousness.

Danubian Historical Studies: Two different views of Transylvania exist side by side in the Hungarian national consciousness. One view is of old, medieval Transylvania, and the other a more common contemporary view of Transylvania as a region ceded to Romania by the Trianon Treaty in 1920 including the territories west of the Királyhágó (now Piatra Craiului) a mountain pass in the Carpathians. This region also includes parts of Szatmár, Bihar and Arad counties and the Bánság region. In such a synthetic study the authors' choice between these two views is from the professional point of view very significant.

Zoltán Szász: Their choice is really of tremendous significance. The term "Erdély" or "Ardeal", or "Siebenbürgen" had been used only until quite recently in Hungarian, Romanian and Transylvanian Saxon political terminology to mean

simply Transylvania in the historical and geographical sense, i.e., the 57,000 square kilometer region east of Királyhágó. The region between the present-day Hungarian border and the Királyhágó was not included in those statements about Transylvania, partly because this area does not even have a proper geographical name.

Only this old Transylvania had a distinctive, historical development. There was nothing specific about the agricultural development of the eastern fringe area of the Great Hungarian Plain. Likewise, the urban development of, say, Szatmár, Várad, Arad and Temesvár are not particularly distinctive either. To analyze the historical development of the 100,000 square kilometer area as a whole, would mar delicate regional features and obscure regional differences. Our study focuses on Transylvania in the historical sense although it also takes into consideration that in the 16th and 17th centuries Transylvania expanded its frontier westwards and only the border along the ranges of the Carpathians that remained stationary. In our analysis of the economy and the society in 1848-49 and during the period beginning in 1867 (when Transylvania finally lost its status as an independent province) we focused our attention on Transylvania in the historical sense. However, in the political history we dealt with Transylvania in the broader sense. Thus, we can see that the regional aspects of political history as well as economic and social history can be analyzed from various points of view which do not necessarily coincide. Obviously, this is not the case with the history of this region after 1920. Transylvania in the broad geographical sense was ceded to Romania and, from then on, the development of the region took quite a different course. Unraveling the events of this era will be the task of future generations of historians.

Danubian Historical Studies: Previous publications concerning the history of Transylvania have depicted it as either a part of Hungarian history or as a chapter in Romanian history. How did the authors of this study get over this difficulty?

Zoltán Szász: In our study we took the specific features of the history of Transylvania and her unique geographical position into consideration. Furthermore, we also had to consider the consequences of her location as a fringe area throughout history, namely, as a border province of the Roman empire, as the easternmost bastion of Latin Christianity and later of Reformation. Finally, it came to be a province on the fringe of the Habsburg empire. As a result, developments in Transylvania had their consequences both in the development of central and south-east Europe. Regarding its political ties and the

economic history Transylvanian history belongs in addition to the history of Hungary, to the histories of the Habsburg empire, the Romanian principalities, the Ottoman empire and Poland. The cultural-ideological achievements of Transylvania can be judged against an even broader European background.

Danubian Historical Studies: A number of hotly debated and unresolved issues have for a long time hindered the formation of a relatively comprehensive view of the history of Transylvania. What sort of an approach does the new study take towards these issues?

Zoltán Szász: The history of Transylvania has been the subject of serious debates. (Publications concerning these questions could fill a library.) Such issues are for example the possibility of the survival and Romanization of the Dac population in the 2nd and the 3rd centuries A.D., i.e. the issue of the Daco-Roman continuity; the way of life and the level of civilization of the Goths, the Huns, the Gepides and the Avars, migrating peoples that either crossed Transylvania or settled there; and the question of when the Magyars settled and when the Romanians arrived, i.e. the question of the identity of the native dwellers in this land. To this list can be added the evaluation of the period of the dual monarchy from the national point of view.

Debates about these extremely difficult technical issues may have escalated to such great extent because since the time they were first raised in the 18th and 19th centuries these problems have always been continually tied to political and ideological struggles.

Opposite views, like for example the theory of continuity vs. the theory of immigration have retained their political volatility. We could not take it upon ourselves to settle the differences between conflicting views by compromise. Neither do we aspire to become judges who would pronounce a final judgement in these cases. The authors did not write a polemical treatise; they wanted to share their scientific achievements with their readers. At the same time they frequently refer to the particular subject under debate in the detailed bibliography.

Danubian Historical Studies: Upon the publication of a synthetic study of this kind the question is bound to arise as to whether it contains new and previously unpublished scholarly findings or not.

Zoltán Szász: I think it certainly does contain new findings. However, a detailed list of these new results would require a critical review. I would like to point out just a few of the more important themes of the study.

From the methodological point of view I would like to emphasize the complex approach to the comparative analysis of economic, social and political history.

An ethnologic description of the way of life taking into account the various layers of common culture tie in with the above mentioned methodology. Carrying out both a joint and a separate analysis of the history of the three peoples of Transylvania, the Romanians, the Magyars and the Saxons is, in my opinion, an entirely novel approach. I may say without exaggeration that the pictures and illustrations are also quite unique. They are not just illustrations to the text, in fact they are a pictorial supplement to the book, presenting the various ethnic groups of the region, the area's unique economic and cultural features and the coexistence of a high level of development with a state of underdevelopment.

To shed some light on the contents of our study, we give an account of the structure of the Dac kingdom, and its society; we point out the unique characteristics of Dacia during the Roman Period that differentiated it from other provinces at that time and the temporary set-up of the first period. A careful analysis of archeological findings substantiates the claim that Transylvania was a home for a number of peoples during the period of the great migrations and that even the Gepides and the Saxons engaged in agriculture on a continuous basis. At the same time, the study proceeds with the description of subsequent stages in the development of archeological research. I find the description of the transformation of the society of the Romanians, who started settling down from the 12th and the 13th centuries onwards a unique achievement. Of note is the detailed account of the Romanian leading classes' infiltration into the county organization while becoming noblemen themselves and the forcing of their subjects to the rank of serfs, and changes in the plight of the Romanians situated on royal estates. The authors have succeeded in presenting a clear view of the medieval history of the three major ethnic groups, the Magyars, the Saxons and the Romanians, and of the three feudal nations, the Magyars, the Szeklers and the Saxons.

Jumping ahead in time, we can find another noteworthy example of a new finding. Beginning with the heyday of the independent principality in the 17th century the book gives a detailed account of folk culture and the level of education among the common people.

In this volume, we analyzed those wars of independence originating from Transylvania not primarily from the point of view of the Hungarian kingdom as a whole but rather from the specific point of view of Transylvania itself. We succeeded in forming a much more comprehensive view of the 18th century Habsburg version of Enlightened Absolutism. It appears from our latest findings that at certain times the Imperial Court in Vienna either pursued a discriminatory economic policy or their economic policy was inadequate because of their

erroneous judgement of the economic situation. Certain economic reforms of the Transylvanian estates preceded the reform plans of the Vienna Court. The description of the 19th century Reform Era is unique in that it is the first synthetic study of the society, culture, politics and economy of this period depicted in such detail. By relying on their firm background knowledge of social history, the authors have succeeded in evaluating every detail of the events of 1848 and 1849 in Transylvania, which were spirited with ardent hopes in the beginning, but which declined into clashes with a tragic end. In this way, the writers managed to keep clear of commonplace expressions in their evaluation and did not become bogged down by such adjectives as revolutionary or counter-revolutionary.

From the era of early capitalism I should like to point out the thorough description of the society and the economy and the detailed account of the vast modernization which took place in Transylvania between 1850 and 1914, which was achieved in the face of a multitude of serious problems. The chapter on political development after 1867 is also unique. As is widely known, Transylvania had lost even the last remainder of its independence by this time and we cannot speak of any independent political life there per se. Our study concentrates on the biggest problem of that age, namely, the issue of nationalities. Here, we evaluated the extent of integration of the Saxons, and tried to find out what sort of tendencies the Romanians had towards integration and segregation as well as what changes occurred in the Hungarian policy on nationalities. This chapter ends with the description of the 1918 bourgeois democratic revolution and the account of one of the most important points in the history of Transylvania, its cession to Romania.

Needless to say, enumerating the new achievements of the study is not the task of the authors and the editors: it is the responsibility of the critics. Since there is no final judgement historiographically speaking, it will be up to the critics to prepare a thorough evaluation.

We did not aim at renewing old debates but, rather, resolved to prepare a new synthetic study on the basis of the latest scholarly findings. We sincerely hope that our work will also pave the way to joint studies in this field.

We are quite sure, however, that no book of this size and complexity has been written on the history of Transylvania so far.

Jenő Szűcs: Vázlat Európa három történeti régiójáról. Magvető Kiadó, Budapest, 1983. 137 pp.; French version: Les trois Europes. Préface: Fernand Braudel. Paris, Ed.: L'Harmatta, 1985.; English version: The Three Historical Regions of Europe. in Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungariae, No. 29. 1983. 131-184 pp.

The author - a leading scholar in Hungarian medieval studies - calls this monumental historical essay an "outline". Recording and synthesizing all the important historical events and interrelations of over a millenium, he examines the development of Europe in the historical-structural sense; where and when its internal borders were formed, what fundamental structural features characterized the regions taking shape within these borders, and finally, what constraints determined and what possibilities were offered to the development of the peoples living in the region by these regional historical structures.

The essay of Jenő Szűcs differs from writings of the past decades on similar themes. He does not project the situation that developed and confirmed after 1945 back to the historical past. Instead, he tries to dig out the actual historical roots of the formation of the regions, and follows the development of regional structures from the beginnings to the 19th century. He was induced to compose this study by studying the works of the most significant Hungarian political scientist of the 20th century, István Bibó (see the review article of this issue). Bibó's essays explain the historical traditions of the Hungarians as originating from the historical-regional situation of Hungary.

Chapter I briefly outlines Europe's historical-structural development. He shows the boundary lines running North and South as they were shaped in the Middle Ages, dividing the two regions which were developing their own peculiar structures. The first internal boundary line - already in existence around 800 - extended along the rivers Elbe and Saale, then, taking a slight turn towards the Southeast and running along the full length of the Western border of Pannonia, reached the Adriatic Sea; it is thus in essence identical with the Eastern border of the Carolingian Empire. The other dividing line was formed some 3-400 years later, during the 11th-12th centuries, parallel to and East of the former one, and stretches from the Baltic countries along the Eastern borders of Poland and Hungary to the Lower Danube. Behind the first boundary line there developed in the early Middle Ages what we call Christian-feudal society and Western civilization. The second, however, marks the border up to which the

elements of the Western European structure were spreading, naturally advancing from West to East, with decreasing density and intensity. To the East of the second boundary line the contours of a peculiar structure took shape, fundamentally differing from the Western one. Between these two boundary lines is situated the part of Europe called, according to the most generally accepted current terminology East-Central Europe. Beginning with the 11th-12th century this area articulated as an independent region between the earlier-formed Western Europe and the contemporaneously-forming Eastern Europe. Still it obtained its particular aspect only after 1500, at the beginning of the New Age. This is the most original insight and most important scientific result of the momentous "outline" by Jenő Szűcs: he followed the historical way of East-Central Europe and demonstrated its place within this continent, defined its typical structural features, and, last but not least, showed the development of its relations to the two neighbouring regions of Western and Eastern Europe.

This intermediate region has shown, during 1000 years of its history, a peculiar oscillation between Western and Eastern Europe. Its initial development points to a contribution to the development of an autochthonous Eastern European feudalism. From the 12th-13th century on, however, it draws nearer to Western Europe, Western elements multiply in its structure; and it very nearly appears to become a part of Western Europe, at least in a sense its Eastern periphery. After 1500, however, it turns in the opposite direction, and develops a structure typical of Eastern Europe. But it keeps its own separate regional identity - indeed, it now becomes ever more striking - for the "turn to the East" did not entirely wipe out the Western elements of its social and political structure. In the 19th-20th century new attempts were made to return to the Western-type line of development. Thus East-Central Europe is really an "intermediate" region, in whose structure elements characteristic of Western and Eastern Europe mingle or exist side by side in a particular way and in different proportions, often calling forth tragic contradictions.

Such a complex regional historical structure can be analyzed from many points of view. Jenő Szűcs points out the dimension which István Bibó also emphasized: the historical conditions of the democratic social organization, the formation of the relations between state and society. Viewed from this angle the most important structural feature of medieval Western Europe was that it established a new type of relation between state and society unknown anywhere else. After the full political and social disintegration of the early Middle Ages, the integration of the West, advancing from below, took place within the

bounds of the feudal structure. The "freedoms" guaranteed to the different autonomous social groups by custom or written contract constitute the internal organizing principle of this structure. The "contract-like" character of the social and political relations made it possible to preserve human dignity even in relationships based on inequality and subordination. The functions of the dissolved state and the elements of political sovereignty were dispersed in the feudal society, and within the framework of the system of estates, the sharing of power and sovereignty between the monarch and the developing political society (societas civilis) soon came up.

This kind of relationship between state and society could not develop in Eastern Europe. The preponderance of the sovereign power prevailed in every sphere over a still amorphous society, and even the Church remained subordinated to the political power. East of the second boundary line this structure became more rigid, but in the intermediate region, beginning with the 12th century, the elements and institutions of the Western structure were gradually spreading. But while in the West vassalage and the manorial estates followed each other, and they were shaped by an organic and spontaneous process of development over almost half a millennium, in East-Central Europe some sort of congested, accelerated, non-organic development, mostly initiated and guided from above, brought into being "Western"-type structural elements and models in a crude, deformed or truncated form.

In this region the political society was represented almost exclusively by a nobility which was far more numerous than that in the West, but in whose members the educating and character-forming influence of chivalrous culture was missing. The less numerous, weaker urban middle class (*bourgeoisie*) was not able to join forces with them.

The Modern Times, the unfolding of the crisis of feudalism, brought a change in the relationship of the large European regions. The different regions of Europe responded to this crisis in different ways, and recovered from it through different means. Serfdom ceased in the West, and through the unfolding of world economy a new expansion became possible. Development proceeded in the direction of national absolutism, and led to the formation of modern national societies. Absolutism proved to be an important integrating factor, but only a transitional historical episode, for in the end society brought the state under its control. Local autonomies or "freedoms" continued to exist under state control. However, they were eventually integrated into a general notion of liberty extending to all citizens. In Eastern Europe - which in the Modern Times has been gradually identifying itself with the Russian Empire -

the state definitely obtained the upper hand over society, all but "nationalizing" society and extinguishing the margins of individual autonomy. Here, absolutism rigidified into a 400 year old way of life; in Jenő Szűcs's apt statement: "Here, absolutism is itself the structure".

After 1500, the social development of East-Central Europe again takes an "eastern" turn: the burden of the crisis is shifted onto the peasantry and second serfdom comes into being. This "turn to the East" deforms the social-political structure even more, but its Western elements, the organizing principles of law and freedom, do not vanish entirely. This region in itself produces several development variants, which the essay appropriately characterizes by stressing essential features. In Hungary, the repeatedly renewed compromise between absolutism and the estates in the 17th-18th centuries represents the "Western" element, the existence of a Western-European - although in character already anachronistic - type of corpus politicum. But exactly from the peculiar mingling and coexistence of Western and Eastern elements, it follows that neither the Western nor the Eastern choice could be eliminated from the lasting crisis of feudalism. Unsuccessful attempts to return to the Western way or join up with revolutions that finally collapsed, or revolts initiated and terminated from above, mark the culs-de-sac of the modern historical development of this intermediate region, and within it, of Hungary.

Within the scope of this short review, we could only point out the most important pillars of the "outline" of Jenő Szűcs. But every line, every statement in this study, which condenses and synthesizes a vast amount of historical material, inspires further reflections, sometimes maybe even stimulates debates and contradictions. It is in any case certainly an essential contribution to the formation of a more nuanced, more complete historical image of Europe, and to the fixing of the place of the East-Central European region within it.

L á s z l ó K a t u s

Institute of Historical Sciences

István Bibó: Válogatott tanulmányok (Selected Studies) I-III. Budapest, 1986.

Magvető Kiadó 735 pp; 923 pp; and 654 pp.

The author of these studies, who would now be 75 years old represented an exceptional and, especially in Hungary, a rare phenomenon. Despite his upper middle-class origins he was a consistent democrat, a patriot with a European horizon; an independent social and political thinker. After his brief post-war public role, he was forced into silence throughout the whole Rákosi-era; then, due to his even shorter political appearance in 1956, he was imprisoned for years. After his release he lived in complete seclusion conducting his activities quietly for fifteen years. Following his death in 1979, he grew into a virtually mystical figure in Hungarian intellectual circles. His publications, buried in old periodicals, were dug out; lectures and commemorative events were held, and even a book was published in his memory. His posthumous writings issued in various journals were snapped up like hot cakes. Thus, despite or perhaps because of his gentle and tolerant personality, which had lacked all demagoguery, and his explicitly rational intellect - Bibó was endowed with a role as a sort of national prophet after his death. His moral and intellectual reputation in almost every circle of the Hungarian intelligentsia is beyond dispute, and it has grown enormously.

A certain liberalism of the official cultural policy is indicated by the self-criticism implicit in that it has made possible, since 1979, the publication of some of Bibó's writings. Recently, a representative selection of his works has come out. Since the sensation of easy access has now passed, the works must hold their ground by their intrinsic quality. In my opinion, they will be able to do so.

Until now, complete collections of Bibó's works have only been published abroad: first in 1960 in London, under the title "Harmadik út" (Third Way) then his "Összegyűjtött munkái" (Collected Works) in four volumes published by the European Protestant Hungarian Free University in Berne between 1981 and 1984. These publications contain Bibó's appeals and memoranda from 1956-57; his late work, "The Paralysis of International Institutions and their Remedies" (London, 1976, Harvester Press) as well as a few of his minor writings which are missing from our selection. The latter, on the other hand, goes beyond the previous editions by inclusion of some writings found among the author's posthumous papers, particularly by the reconstructed text of the several hundred page manuscript "Az európai egyensulról és békéről" (On the European Balance

and Peace). Previously, only one chapter "A német politikai hisztéria okai és története" (The Reasons for and History of the German Political Hysteria) had been known. It has now become apparent that the numerous fundamental themes of his "classic" studies written between 1945-48 had already been shaped in this "ancient opus". They are also indicative of his well-balanced and crystal-clear method of analysis and approach, worthy of the sensation they caused.

A bonus of our publication, however, is the thorough commentary (written by István Vida and Endre Nagy) which gives important assistance in explaining the historical, political and personal references of the academic sources in the texts. Furthermore, it includes Tibor Huszár's monumental essay giving a thorough and correct Marxist analysis of the ideological sources and contents of the oeuvre of the thinker and politician István Bibó.

The structure of the book follows a chronological order, and is clearly comprehensible. The first volume contains the young Bibó's essays written between 1935 and 1944, partly about his special branch of learning (mostly the philosophical and sociological aspects of the law), and partly on the deepening crisis of the social and political system of Hungary and of the conditions in Central Europe.

Among these studies the most distinguished apart from the large manuscript mentioned above are the "Kényszer, jog, szabadság" (Coercion, Law, Freedom) written in 1935, when Bibó was 24 years old and the brilliant little essay discussing the real function and the symptoms of the crisis of the social elite. Yet, I would rather select a minor writing of his from 1936 "A mai külföld szemlélete a magyarságról" (The Current Foreign View about Hungarians) in which the realistic and rational views so characteristic of Bibó become manifest.

He states that the Hungarians "live in a political dream-world"; they are determined to prove their Europeanism while in the eyes of Western-Europe only their exotic features are interesting. The great figures of Hungarian culture who are known to the world are not part of cultural life at home. His conclusion is that in order to give the notion of being Hungarian a comprehensive meaning, the present potential and underlying "primitive forces" must be first turned into culture at home.

In the second volume (1945-49) his capacity to give a historical and political analysis of such highly up-to-date and delicate questions which no one else dared to touch, or only cautiously talked round, became apparent in the highest degree. He always wrote honestly and with disarming outspokenness, lacking any ulterior motives. For instance he started his first 1945 article "A magyar demokrá-

cia válsága" (The Crisis of Hungarian Democracy), this way: "Hungarian democracy is in a crisis. It is in a crisis, because it lives in fear. It is tortured by two kinds of fear: fear of proletarian dictatorship and fear of reaction." His famous public debate with Georg Lukács took place after the publication of this article. Then Lukács, answering Bibó's article and worries, reassured him and the Hungarian democratic public he represented by saying that the Communist Party was not aiming at a proletarian dictatorship.

With similar honesty, Bibó discussed the internal effects of what was from Hungary's point of view a severely unfavourable peace treaty, its implications for democracy, and, as the title of a series of articles has it "the misery of Eastern-European small states". He wrote his essay on "The Jewish-question in Hungary after 1944" in the same spirit, which is probably the best article that has ever been written on the subject. He summed up the causes and antecedents of the horrors which culminated in the 1944 deportations and persecutions; the responsibility of the entire Hungarian society and its leaders, and the visible and invisible consequences. He showed the possible ways out both with the deep sense of responsibility of a contemporary witness and yet with the objectivity of an ideal judge.

Finally, the third volume (1971-79) includes the major works written after his six years in prison. In some of the studies Hungarian historical and domestic aspects dominate, but there are some which have universal character and significance. In 1971-72 Bibó, who was already ill, taped the essay "Az európai társadalomfejlődés értelme" (The Meaning of European Social Development). In this, he eventually put his personal convictions into words: he acknowledged his Christian approach to history (this had previously provided only the background); his views on the great European revolutions, and the revolutionary spirit in general, on Marxism and its theory of the state, and on the struggle between the professional revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries after the French Revolution. The meaning of European social development, according to Bibó, is the humanization of power, the gradual abandonment of coercion by the state. In his declining years he believed that this process could and must be encouraged. He was a scholar who considered the world objectively, but he was not a fatalist. He thought that at every historical moment it must be considered not only through the prism of reality but also through the potential of its situation. The realization of such a potential is not inevitable but it is the outcome of effort and goodwill.

G y ö r g y L i t v á n
Institute of Historical Sciences

Oszkár Jászi: A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés. (The Formation of National States and the Nationality Question) Selection, ed. by György Litván, Gondolat, Budapest, 1986. 315 pp.

Oszkár Jászi (1875-1957), the well-known figure of Hungarian bourgeois radicalism and modern Hungarian sociology published his major work on the history of nationalities in 1912. The present selections, meticulously edited by György Litván, contains the most lasting pieces of Jászi's writings. In his introductory essay "Egy régi könyv időszerűsége" (The Timeliness of an Old Book) Litván analyzes the circumstances in which the book was written, published and received; the values and the faults of Jászi's work; and how his predictions and prophecies were modified in many aspects by the passage of the time since the first edition.

In the title of his work Jászi suggested the principle which became a basic moving force of the nationality question in the 19th and 20th centuries: namely, the national aspect of state and society. Although his definition of nation is based mostly on a statistical approach (according to him, the nation is "the dominant nationality which creates a state containing one or more other nationalities"), and he does not see it as possible for every nationality to become a nation. Neither does he regard the national state as the (exclusive) domain of the ruling nationality.

He rejects the English historian, E. A. Freeman's, ideal of a unilingual nation-state, but shares the views of the German sociologist, G. Jellinek, on the criteria of the modern national state. These are, according to Jászi a constitutional division within the state as well as the legal self-restraint of the state against the individual.

In Jászi's time, progressive public opinion in Hungary generally looked up to Western European democracies and Western scientific achievements for guidance. In conformity with this general trend, Jászi based his sociological and political system on the latest accomplishments of contemporary German, French and English social science. Oppenheimer's "Der Staat", E. Renan's orientalist works, and the historical studies of W. Cunningham and T. Mommsen had particularly strong effects on Jászi's ideas. Jászi surveyed the European "nation-nationality" problem in Britain, Germany, Belgium, Austria and the Balkans. On this basis, he came to the conclusion that the current state of national transformation may be measured by the degree of progress in assimilation. According to Jászi, at the turn of the century in Europe "the assimilation is almost complete in the

West, is partially completed in Central and Eastern Europe, and is minimal in the Balkans".

Consequently, he called this latter region Europe's "unfinished" part, and considered the relationship of the nationalities in the Balkans as a type of racial conflict. Of particular interest in his survey of Western Europe is that when he studied the French question in Alsace-Lorraine, the Polish problem in Posen and the Danish one in Schleswig, he based his investigations on field work. He regarded these instances as "clinical cases of the nationality question" and built the results of his research into his book in the form of sociological descriptions.

György Litván's present selections leave out the greater part of these studies: the core of the book is made up of Jászi's analyses of the Hungarian situation. Understandably, the nationality problem in the Austrian part of the Dual Monarchy receives major emphasis in these studies. He was actually arguing against the Gross-Österreich plan put forward by the Austrian Social Democrats (Renner and Bauer), and against the idea of cultural autonomy.

Analyzing the European and American parallels in the situation resulting from the contemporary Hungarian government's nationality policy, Jászi came to the following conclusions: the major elements of oppressive policy which gave particular affront to the nationalities were the discrimination against the use of a nationality's mother tongue, and against other cultural manifestations. Accordingly, he proclaimed the creation a so-called "minimal" nationality program as his goal. "To achieve peace between nationalities has two sine qua nons: one of them is good education, good public administration and good jurisdiction in the people's language, the other is the acceptance of the nationality's right to practice its language and culture freely." (p. 245) The press and the party leaders of the Romanian, Slovak and Serb nationalities in Hungary, almost without exception received Jászi's program positively. They were convinced that Jászi intended it to be the beginning of reconciliation.

In his introduction, György Litván points out that the errors of the book (Jászi overestimated the possibilities of natural assimilation; and underestimated the centrifugal tendencies of the nationality movements; and anticipated an automatic solution as a result of industrialization and democratization, etc.) are basically due to Jászi's "rational evolutionism". Judging by the development of nationalities (Irish, Scottish, Welsh, Breton, etc.) on the peripheries of the big Western-European countries, he believed that it is the prime interest of every nationality not to become isolated but rather to attach themselves more and more closely to the centre. For him, this meant that the nationality

movements "should, in the final analysis, develop in the direction of an organic economic and cultural unity". This process, however, can only reach its goal through the help of the culture of the native languages, because - and perhaps this is the most universal and enduring perception of the book - "mankind is so constituted that the way to internationalism leads through nationalism, and the way to this latter is through the mother tongue of the masses". (p. 276)

At the time he wrote his studies, he planned a German edition of his book with which certainly - at least in the circles of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy - a productive debate concerning the possibilities of a democratic solution to the nationalities' problem could have developed. The endeavours of Hungarian bourgeois radicalism in this direction could have become more widely recognized in European public opinion. However, Jászi became better known in the European press only at the end of 1918, when he was appointed minister "for the preparation of national self-determination in Hungary" in the revolutionary government. In a completely changed situation he had no chance whatsoever to arrive at an agreement with the Romanian and Slovak politicians.

L á s z l ó S z a r k a

Institute of Historical Sciences

David F. Good: Uneven Development in the Nineteenth Century; A Comparison of the Habsburg Empire and the United States. The Journal of Economic History, Volume XLVI. Number 1. March 1986. 137-151.

The author is Associate Professor of Economics at Temple University in Philadelphia. In his analysis of uneven development he emphasizes the importance of the comparative approach. He believes that by using a comparative method, our knowledge will be more complex and historically more adequate than by creating some "ideal type" model. In his present study, contrary to the previous uneven development models, he compares regions, not countries.

The subject of his investigation is the 19th century development of the Habsburg Empire and the United States. He believes that the 19th century was the period during which disparities between the two emerged and developed. He analyzes two features which he considers to be the cause of the "delayed diffusion of growth".

One of them is economic integration, as a characteristic of a national market. In both countries, the development of the national market was determined by geographical factors: in the Habsburg Empire the East-West line, in the United States the North-South line dominated. Good thinks that, although the integration had already started in both countries around 1800, it was not completed until World War I. At the same time, he emphasizes that there was a difference between the rate of integration in the backward areas of the Habsburg Empire and in the US South.

The latter was more dependent on foreign than on home trade. Good is convinced that, even with a perfect integration of the product and factory markets, development would still have been uneven because of the more rigid institutional structure of the Habsburg Empire.

The author analyzes the effects of the institution of serfdom in the Habsburg Empire and of slavery in the United States. He concludes that the decisive developments took place before the Emancipation and the Civil War, respectively.

Within the Habsburg Empire, a faster, more effective and more integrated development was possible in those regions where the institution of serfdom had started to decline before 1848 and the Emancipation put an end to an already crumbling system.

He sees a similar situation in the USA. After the Civil War, the South could not imitate the development of the ante-bellum North. The development of the South is a much debated question, but it is generally agreed that the

institutions of tenancy, share-cropping, and debt peonage restricted the flexibility of the economy in the South, paralyzed the use of resources and hindered technological changes.

In his summary the author says that usually two models are used for uneven development: one emphasizes external, the other, internal features. Good is convinced that the unevenness between the development of the regions was due to internal reasons, and although the external determinants were not negligible, their role was secondary.

D á n i e l S z a b ó

Institute of Historical Sciences

Der Donauraum

After four years of silence, DER DONAURAUM, a periodical of the Forschungsinstitut für den Donauraum was published in the form of a year-book this year, on the 30th anniversary of its launching. Publisher Felix Ermacora pointed out in the preface of DER DONAURAUM that he still regards the analysis of this region, which has been troubled with a number of extremely complex problems throughout its past and recent history, as his prime area of consideration. His intention is to publish articles of the highest standards based on the most recent findings of scientific research. Furthermore, he wants to present the interwoven history of the peoples of the area and the multicolour ethnic, economic, social and political heritage which has been preserved until now.

The editors' claims that they would provide publicity to the many-sided analyses of the Danube region were substantiated by Rudolf Kirchschräger, Karl Halbmayer, and Georg G. Rundel's contributions about Austrian subjects, Johann Wolfgang Brügel and Karin Schmid's articles about Czech and Slovak issues, Othmar Nikola Haberl and Vladislav Marjanovic's writings on south Slavic subjects, and the contributions of Jenő Bango and László Kővágó about Hungarian issues. Although these articles concentrate on the historical or up-to-date issues of one or another nation they treat their subjects as those concerning more than just one state, nation, or ethnicity.

In order to facilitate the flow of information in international scholarly circles, the periodical also carries book reviews on publications about the history of this region, reports on related conferences and a selected bibliography of studies in the field of social sciences published in various countries.

Having found DER DONAURAUM a high-quality paper also on historical sciences and a valuable source of information, we welcome the reappearance and the publication of the periodical.

G y ö r g y G y a r m a t i

Institute of Historical Sciences



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DANUBIAN HISTORICAL STUDIES

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**Language and Nation
American Diplomacy
and the Hungarian Minority
in Czechoslovakia
(1945–1947)**

**Danubian Federation Plans
and Hungary, 1945–1948**

**Official Anti-Semitism
and Professional
Associations
in Interwar Hungary**

Danubian River Navigation

Document – Reviews

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LANGUAGE AND NATION

From the standpoint of language and ethnicity the Danubian Basin presents quite a mosaic. A different language was spoken in towns than in the country; the landowner spoke a different language from the serf. Often within a single settlement it was not uncommon to find two or even more languages being spoken. Nevertheless, under the conditions of traditional society there was no communication problem as people were to a certain extent able to understand one another's language. However, in administrative or commercial activity conducted over greater distances, several *lingua francas* were used which could be understood by the diverse population, primarily by the upper layers of society. Within the Habsburg Empire this language was, of course, German, although in higher circles Italian or French might also be spoken. In certain areas (Hungary and the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom) Latin was the official language. In the Balkans, Greek was the universal language.

By the middle of the 18th century, the situation had begun to change. The influence of the Industrial Revolution in England began to be felt and sooner or later the Danubian Basin would have to respond to the coming challenge with a bourgeois transformation of its own. This emerging new world introduced innumerable new ideas and knowledge which soon became indispensable, especially in urban areas. Even the *lingua francas* were only able to keep up with these accelerating changes with difficulty.

The second challenge appeared at the end of the century, namely, the political change which arrived with the spreading influence of the French Revolution. One cannot disregard one of its essential precedents, the Enlightenment, which came to the area primarily by way of Germany. For the majority of the population, this meant an introduction to the basic tenets of agricultural reform.

The Enlightenment and political revolution brought about national awakening, those movements which were also referred to as national rebirth or renewal. The essence of thinking at that time was that the nation, which had existed since ancient times, was now dormant and its members unaware of their true, national identity. Therefore, they needed to be awakened and made conscious of their national identity. Once this has come about, the reborn nation could begin to express its political demands, the final goal of which would be an autonomous nation-state. In the wake of the French Revolution it was impossible to imagine anything different in Europe.

Within any national awakening, the most important role was clearly played by language. Would be members of a nation had to be addressed in their mother tongue, in order to be instilled with national consciousness. Aside from political and cultural tasks, the previously mentioned modernization phase gave the mother tongue even greater importance as the most significant and useful tool in the propagation of new ideas.

Language became the key criterion in determining national affiliation. Czechs, Poles, etc. pondered their fates in their own language, conscious of their national status. At this point, however, a certain difficulty arose. Czechs, Poles or Hungarians can be listed separately since they all had some sort of generally accepted language and linguistic norm. For centuries, each of these languages had had its own literature. However, in the case of a number of other nations, no such linguistic norm had existed. Instead, there were merely a smattering of dialects which were in some cases quite different from one another. Outside of the use of a lingua franca, the ideas of certain ethnic groups could only be expressed in various other (i.e., foreign) languages or in the writer's own local dialect. What is more, one dialect could not always be understood by the speakers of another.

In such cases the most important task for the nation was the creation of a usable literary language, i.e., the elevation of one of the dialects to that level. The fundamental nature of this issue is indicated by the fact that only those ethnic groups became nations (in the modern sense of the word) which were able to successfully create such a literary language.

Two examples are particularly enlightening: the Slovaks and the Slovenes. A part of the Slovaks belonged to the Lutheran Church and used medieval Czech for their worship services and as a literary language. Following unsuccessful attempts at the end of the 18th century, in 1843, Ľudovít Štúr and his associates were able to canonize the Middle Slovak dialect - a form distinctly different from both Czech and Polish - into a literary language which became

accepted in a few decades. Slovene dialects, however, were close to the so-called "kaj" dialect of Croatian which had a respectable literary tradition dating back to the Middle Ages. Had this dialect become the basis of the Croatian literary language, then in all probability the Slovenes would have adopted it as well and would have been assimilated into the Croatian nation, just as the Slovaks, had it not been for the reforms of Stúr, would have become members of the Czech nation. The Croatian Ljudevit Gaj, however, after initial attempts of a slightly different nature, took up the Croatian "što" dialect and began to publish newspapers in it. This very same dialect became the basis for the Serb literary language through the reforms of the Serb Vuk Karadžić. The Croats adopted this language with only minor dialectical differences. A permanent agreement on the language was reached in Vienna in 1850. The only difference between the two variants of the language remained in the script, with the Serbs preferring the Cyrillic alphabet and the Croats opting for the Latin. The connection between language and nation is shown by such individual cases as the ethnically Slovene poet Stanko Vraz who, under the influence of the Illyrian, i.e., south Slav national unity, joined Gaj's reform movement and in the process became a Croatian poet.

The question of the written form of the language was usually connected with the question of the alphabet although there were exceptions. The Romanians still used the Cyrillic alphabet even when Old Slavic began to be replaced by Romanian as the official language. In Transylvania, however, the Uniate clergy, having recognized the Latin origins of the Romanian language in the course of their studies in Rome and Vienna, wanted to express this in the mode of writing. The first Romanian book using the Latin alphabet appeared in Vienna in 1777. (The Danubian Principalities only took up their example in the mid-19th century).

One of the first and without a doubt most fundamental steps in the canonization of the literary language was the formalization of its structure, the editing of a grammar. There had been attempts at this at a relatively early stage when, for example, in 1768, Marko Pohlin devised a grammar of the Carniolian (Slovene) language. It is worth noting here that the ethnic name "Slovene" was still not used. The separation of the Slovenes as a distinct nation from out of the overall unity of Slavs took place only gradually and in a way which was similar to that of the Slovaks. (Both group's ethnic names are derived from the name "Slav"). The first Romanian grammar was written in 1788 by Ioan Piuaru-Molnár. The turn of the century was the period of the canonization of languages and their grammars, generally accepted up to date. The first scholarly Hungarian grammar, the so-called "Debreceni Grammatika" (named after the town where it

was published) appeared in 1795. This was followed almost fifty years later by "The System of the Hungarian Language", a normative grammar published by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The Slovene philologist Bartolomej (Jernej) Kopitar wrote a Slovene grammar in 1808 and the outstanding Czech linguist, Josef Dobrovský, brought out a Czech grammar in 1809. Both the difficulties of creating a literary language as well as the role played by the lingua franca are shown by the fact that these last two works were both published in German. In addition, the afore-mentioned Vuk Karadžić, well-known throughout Europe as a collector of Serb folk songs, also published a Serb grammar and dictionary.

The comprehensive collection of the canonized vocabulary in single or multi-language dictionaries represented the next step toward the creation of a unified literary language. This had begun to take place by the first half of the 19th century. Samuel Bogumil Linde published a six-volume dictionary of Polish between 1806 and 1814. One of the propagators of the Romanian language's Latin roots, Petru Maior, published a multi-language dictionary in 1825, the "Lexicon Budense". The most prominent member of the younger generation of those involved in the Czech "awakening", Josef Jungmann, published a German-Czech dictionary from 1834 to 1839 and Gergely Czuczor and János Fogarasi published a six-volume Hungarian dictionary from 1862 to 1871.

The connection between language and nation caused problems not only for the Slovenes and the Slovaks but for the Slavs in general. In the 1830's the poet Ján Kollár expounded the theory of "Slav mutuality", i.e., that in fact there was only one Slavic language, split into four dialects: Russian, Polish, Czechoslovak and South Slavic. If there was only one language then there was only one nation. Kollár was of Slovak origin and was for decades a priest in the Slovak Lutheran church in Pest. Naturally, he wrote in Czech and vehemently opposed Stúr's moves toward a separate Slovak language. He believed that every cultured Slav should at least be able to read all four dialects. For him, South Slavic meant Serbo-Croatian, as little was known at that time of the existence of the Bulgarians. Even so, the recognition of the separate standing of the four dialects virtually implied four languages, which is to say, four Slavic nations.

A further stage in the development of the language was its adaptation to the conditions of modernization, i.e., the use of new words to express new ideas. In many places - particularly among the Czechs, Hungarians and Romanians - spectacular "linguistic revivals" were taking place. Words were borrowed from other related languages (from Italian and French in the case of Romanian, for example). Another form of the revival was the raising of words from the folk language into the literary language, and the creation of new words. (Hungarian

e.g., at this time became full of newly invented words). The enrichment of the language by newer and newer words was naturally a tendency never to be finished and one which has continued to this day. From the point of view of the creation of modern nations, the most important stage in their development - that of the formation of a literary language - can for the most part be considered to have been concluded by the middle of the 19th century.

However, the task of creating a modern nation did not end with the establishment of a national literary language. According to the thinking of the period, language alone was merely a tool to be used to establish national consciousness. The building of this consciousness, however, was to be the responsibility of the schools, taking note of the fact that in this region in the middle of the century the ability to read and write had become an important issue. It is true that it was several decades before literacy became widespread and that there were various other ways of promoting the spread of national identity. Around the middle of the century, schools could accept only a small part of the population although it should be added that middle- and upper-level instruction was far better established than lower-level education. At the same time, the presence of the lingua franca (German and Latin) was still strong at the higher levels. However, elementary education, where it existed at all, was usually conducted in the students' native tongue. This was due to the fact that a large part of the instruction going on at lower levels was being carried out by the various religious denominations.

This issue had its political side as well which was naturally taken up by the burgeoning national movements: the use of the mother tongue with the authorities and within administrative and judicial spheres. In practice, this did not present a problem as the patriarchal-paternal administration would perform the administration of justice in the language of its subject people. However, the question remained principally unresolved and in higher political forums this led to conflicts. Such was the case in the Hungarian Diet when in 1844 Hungarian became the official language, replacing Latin. The Croatian delegates continued to speak in Latin, (which remained the official language in Croatia until 1847). This issue appears all the stranger from a modern perspective since the Croatian delegates all spoke Hungarian but continued to speak Latin simply on principle. The oneness of language and nation here led to further aggressive behaviour on both sides, examples of which could fill many pages.

The 1848 Revolution in the Habsburg Empire ended with the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise. In the Balkans the period of the formation of nation-states ended in 1878. The issue of language in this period (which lasted until

the end of the First World War) was raised in a different manner than previously. First, as has already been noted, the canonization of the national languages had already taken place and there were already nations which had been established on the basis of ethnicity (even if every virtual member did not yet know it). Throughout these decades the work of the preceding period was continued, i.e., the establishment of the literary language in all spheres of life, the most important of which were the schools. The introduction of universal, mandatory education eventually became the standard everywhere and by the turn of the century it had become the rule rather than the exception. The question then became how much the schools were to be used to spread the language (and with it a national consciousness).

In the new Balkan countries (Romania, Serbia and Bulgaria), which regarded themselves as nation-states, there was, of course, no problem. The school-network was only built slowly but to such an extent that eventually high-level institutions, academies and, before long, even universities were founded in these countries. These countries were truly nation-states in the sense that the substantial majority of the members of each nation lived within the borders of the respective country. At the same time, there were national minorities within the territory of almost every state but these made up only a small percentage of the total population and did not affect the character of the nation-state. Usually, these linguistic national minorities did not make any linguistic claims. The state was in accord with the European norm which regarded nation and state as identical. Thus, even the question of the official language was not a problem as everyone regarded it as natural both inside and outside Serbia, for example, that the official language of that country should be Serbian.

Naturally, the situation was different after 1867 within the state referred to semi-officially as the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which was composed of some fourteen different ethnic groups (or, by this point, nations). Close to half of these lived entirely within this state while the remaining nations were only partly contained within the Monarchy with a part (usually the majority) of its members living outside the borders, mostly in their own states. The two ruling nations, the Austro-German and the Hungarian, together did not constitute even half of the total population of the Monarchy. Under these circumstances, the question of which language was to be used became extremely important in terms of national development.

First though, the place of these nations needs to be examined briefly. In the Austrian Empire called Cisleithania the constitution of December 1867 (as the culmination of constitutions established repeatedly since 1848) declared the

status of equal rights for the nations (Volksstamm according to the German text) which implied an opportunity for their cultural, linguistic and educational development as well. Hungary did not have a constitution laid out point by point but only a number of laws which together provided a sort of constitutional framework. Among these laws was Article 44 of 1868 regarding the nationalities (the official term for non-Hungarian nations being nemzetiség). This law, looking to the example of the European nation-states (and particularly to France), regarded the entire population of Hungary from a political point of view as members of a single political nation without regard to nationality, i.e., the differences in ethnicity and language. It was thus possible to interpret this law, in light of the situation in Cisleithania, as guaranteeing the equality of the nationalities with Hungarian being regarded as merely one of the nationalities. In practice, however, this law represented the position of Hungarian as the state language for all of Hungary (with the exception of the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia).

Croatia-Slavonia composed a separate region within the Hungarian kingdom and Croatian was its official language. This recalls the situation of Galicia within the Austrian Empire where Polish was the official language of administration even though half the population was made up of Ukrainians. In the other Austrian provinces German was the official language, although local, national languages could be also used.

Within the Cisleithanian part of the Empire, education the most important area from the standpoint of language, was largely determined by linguistic composition. For example, in 1882 there were 16,915 elementary and secondary schools in operation. Of these, 6,710 conducted instruction in German, 3,962 in Czech, 1,596 in Ukrainian and 1,316 in Polish. In secondary education the proportion of schools teaching in German increased. Of the 164 gymnasia, 96 taught in German, 33 in Czech and 21 in Polish; of the 80 so-called "real-schools", 61 taught in German, 10 in Czech and 6 in Polish. In higher education, by far the greatest number of schools taught in German although the universities of Cracow and Lemberg (now Lvov) taught in Polish. There had also been a Czech university in Prague since the division of the university there in 1882. Therefore, only the nations making up smaller percentages of the population (Ukrainians, Slovenes and Italians) did not participate in higher education. Even so, these nations were at least represented by departments of their language and literature at several universities, for example, the Slovene Department at the University of Graz. Teacher training was also guaranteed for the most part for the instructors of each nation's elementary schools.

Within Hungary, as was previously noted, Croatian was the official language of the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia. This was also true for education as well although there were naturally elementary schools which taught in Serbian. In 1874, the University of Zagreb was opened with instruction in Croatian. Within Hungary itself, the situation became decidedly unfavorable for the non-Hungarian nations. A look at the figures from two different periods reveals the extent of this change for the worse. In 1880, 7,342 Hungarian and 6,093 non-Hungarian elementary schools were in operation: 2,756 Romanian, 1,716 Slovak, 867 German and 313 Serbo-Croatian. As some of these schools were a mixture of Hungarian and non-Hungarian - some subjects were taught in Hungarian and some in the local language - the actual number of schools teaching either partly or entirely in a language other than Hungarian was 8,482. By 1913 the situation had changed significantly: compared to 13,608 Hungarian-language elementary schools, there was a total of 3,321 non-Hungarian schools of which 2,170 were Romanian, 449 German, 365 Slovak and 265 Serbo-Croatian (excluding those schools in Croatia itself). This large-scale change was for the most part the result of the new educational laws enacted in 1907. These laws increased the number of state schools primarily at the expense of the various ecclesiastical schools and demanded that every school teach in the state language, i.e., Hungarian. (Prior to this law, 75.7% of all elementary schools belonged to the Church.)

It is clear that instruction, even if continuing in the local language, had, as one of its primary objectives, the instilling of patriotism toward the state, according to the earlier formulations of educational law. Accordingly, from the standpoint of the establishment of national consciousness, only the fact that instruction took place in the native language should be taken into consideration. In Cisleithania, surely, instruction loyal to the state was demanded as one sort of Austrian patriotism. Because of its different ethnic structure, the Cisleithanian part of the Empire did not oppose the use of national languages to the same extent as the Hungarians.

Naturally, it should not be forgotten that, especially within Cisleithania, in addition to instruction in the native language, various and often very high-level forms of cultivation of the literary language were present. In addition to the Austrian and Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Czech, Polish and Croat (called Yugoslav) academies were also established. Over and above this there were a large number of cultural institutions (within Hungary as well) which were not only forums for the manifestation of the national languages but for their cultivation and development as well. The liberal political system - within the

given constraints of the social order - likewise allowed national language newspapers, books and theater. That which could not be achieved in connection with language and nation through instruction was made possible by these forums and organizations, though to differing degrees in different nations.

The political dimension of the question of language use in the Cisleithanian part of the Empire caused a major problem, mainly in connection with the Czechs. The state language, German, was not formally legislated by constitutional law but used in practice even in the communication between Galicia and the central government. In practice in this part of the Austrian Empire the local spoken languages were used in judicial proceedings and civil administration as well as for street signs and in shop windows. Within the Bohemian provinces both German and Czech were used with German remaining the language used in public administration in spite of Czech demands for change. As the turn of the century approached, the strengthening of the Czech national movement again brought this question to the fore. Prime Minister Badeni's language decree of 1897 introduced bilingualism and with it the regulation that every state official be able to speak both languages within four years. This gave an advantage to the Czechs, most of whom already knew German. As a result, German representatives of the Bohemian provinces began an unprecedented series of obstructionist tactics in the Reichsrat and the Bohemian Landtags. When the decrees were finally revoked, the Czechs promptly began an obstructionist campaign of their own. In Moravia a compromise plan for the territory was reached by 1911 which was satisfactory to both sides. So great was the "nations' struggle for the state" (as Karl Renner, one of the leaders of the Austrian Social Democrats, put it in the title of one of his books) and so powerful the shock waves it sent rippling through the society that a general solution began to appear increasingly unattainable. The solution proposed by some Social Democrats - cultural autonomy independent of territory - was not even accepted by the party's own leading forum. Thus, the question in effect remained unresolved until 1918.

An issue which needs to be still raised is that of assimilation, i.e., the question of the exchange of one language for another. In Cisleithania, minority German elements did not try to Germanize those around them; instead, assimilation usually worked in the opposite direction. For example, in the early 19th century Prague was still a predominantly German city, but by the end of the century the Czech element had become greater (due in part, of course, to Czech migration). In Hungary (not including the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia) there were repeated attempts at magyarization, especially involving the intelligentsia. These attempts, however, more often than not, had exactly the op-

posite effect from the one desired. By far greater losses were caused to non-Hungarian nations by natural assimilation, the horizontal mobility which accompanied capitalist development wherein workers flocked to Budapest, the biggest industrial center. In the mid-19th century, Buda and Pest were German cities with considerable numbers of Hungarians, Serbs and various other less well represented language groups. By the eve of the First World War the overwhelming majority of the population of Budapest considered Hungarian its mother tongue.

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy officially declared itself composed of many nations (i.e., languages) even through the smallest of details: it printed the value on its banknotes - used throughout the Monarchy - in each national language.

In 1918, there came the great change as new states came into existence out of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (and out of other territories as well). In practice, these states either included linguistic minorities or officially recognized their multinational status (e.g., Czechoslovakia and the Serbian-Croatian-Slavone Kingdom which only in 1929 became Yugoslavia). It is clear that this large scale rearrangement touching the Balkans, too, essentially reduced the pre-war number of linguistic minorities living under the authority of another state throughout the whole of Eastern Europe by about half, to approximately one-quarter of the total population of the region, i.e., about thirty million people. National censuses listed the national minorities at around 20.1% of the total population; unofficial estimates tended to put the number higher, at 29.2%. Compared to the previous state of affairs, this essential difference arose, on the one hand, from a linguistic point of view, from the general spread of education which had taken place over the previous decades and, on the other hand, from the point of view of national consciousness, in that nations or parts of nations which had grown in their national consciousness now came under the authority of another nation-state. While the spread of national consciousness in the 19th century occurred primarily through the language, the new states had now to reckon with established national consciousness, established by the way of the language.

The question of state language was included in the newly established or modified constitutions and demanded its knowledge from all citizens. In a significant gesture to national minorities, the victorious powers concluded relevant treaties with each state separately, though in similarly worded texts. In these the language rights of minorities, too, were guaranteed and with them the opportunity for elementary and secondary-level education in their native languages. Only the text of the treaty with Romania specified only elementary

education in minority languages. The question of higher education was not covered in the treaties. The treaties were, by separate agreements put under the auspices of the League of Nations which assured that, should the need arise, the minorities could turn to that organization for assistance.

Apart from the treaties, different organizations - primarily Churches - were able to keep their schools and within this sphere education in the national languages may be said to be universally guaranteed. Naturally, in those communities, where a minority group lived in small numbers, such rights could not be guaranteed.

In civil administration and judicial proceedings, the right to use one's native language was guaranteed by the minority treaties, even though internal affairs were carried out in the state language. It is worth noting here that in Czechoslovakia - in the spirit of the fiction of a single Czechoslovak nation - the constitutionally determined state language was Czechoslovak. In practice, however, it turned out that Czech was used in the Bohemian territories and Slovak in Slovakia. The language of local administration was determined by the language of the local population with precedence of the state language. In Czechoslovakia, there was even the possibility that in villages of a single nationality with a population of less than 3,000 official announcements and local administration would be carried out only in the local language. Street signs could be in two or more languages. The language of the minority had to be displayed if that group made up at least 20% of the population.

These same treaties guaranteed the free use of the mother tongue in the private sphere as well. This could be interpreted quite broadly to include total freedom of language use in companies, associations and organizations. In addition, there were political parties in each country set up by the minority nations (often even several for one minority), which, of course, used their mother tongue. In newspaper and book publishing language use was basically free. Many cultural associations operated in the same native language to promote the use and cultivation of that language.

In connection with assimilation it is enough to say that undoubtedly it continued to be not an unknown phenomenon. Now it moved in the opposite direction, but extended to much smaller groups in the society.

The most important part in this was the above-mentioned fact that the new national minorities with their more developed national consciousness were in an entirely different situation. Their high culture had generally been long established and their national culture already spread through the schools. Ac-

cordingly, the mother tongue, freely used in schools, in public administration, at the bar, even in street-names, had a more powerful impact upon members of the minorities in conserving national consciousness than in the period before 1918.

After the end of World War II most of the pre-1939 borders were re-established. The proportion of national minorities again dropped. The largest part in this change was played by the forced resettlement of the Germans (apparently understandable at the time though later criticized). Other voluntary or less voluntary resettlements and population exchanges also contributed to this numerical decrease in national minorities. In the absence of precise data, this change can only be estimated. One may put the decrease in the number of national minorities as high as one-half that of the pre-war figure, or even more. Today, only Hungarians and Albanians remain in relatively large numbers outside the borders of their own nation-states under the authority of one or more foreign states.

It is common knowledge that after World War II the international sanctioning of collective minority rights did not come to pass for a number of reasons, mostly because it appeared as if the guarantee of individual human rights had already solved the problem. In this region, therefore, there was never any sort of internationally binding treaty on the issue.

The constitution of each country (all socialist, with the exception of Austria) stresses that the rights of their citizens, regardless of any differences (national or otherwise), are equal. They guaranteed the right of instruction in one's own native language (in practice, at the elementary and secondary levels), the use of that language in official communication, just as had been permitted by the laws and regulations which existed between the wars. "In those administrative areas in which populations of nationalities other than Romanians live, every governmental organ and institution shall use the written and spoken language of that nationality and shall appoint officials from among this population or from among other citizens who are familiar with the language and lifestyle of the local population", states Article 22 of the constitution of the Socialist Republic of Romania, for example. In the press and in book publishing the minority languages survive.

The question of a state language has been avoided by these constitutions; it is not included among the points mentioned in the texts. Yet, undoubtedly, there is a state language in each country and that is the first language of the state. In contrast to the previous century with the broadening and intensifying of education, the state language now plays the role of *lingua franca*, in each country. This naturally even more increases its importance in everyday life. Perhaps it is even more important that in the mass media - television and radio

in particular - the broadcasts in the languages of the nationalities pale in comparison to the broadcasts in the state language which carry all the latest news and most important information. On the other hand, the increased value of special knowledge or skills has brought with it the importance of specialized schools. This, however, inevitably leads to a movement away from instruction in minority languages. Since this special knowledge or skill will inevitably be used within the mainstream culture (and in the state language) instruction will almost always be in the state language. In any case, it would be impossible to maintain a school in every minority language for every separate specialized skill.

Taken together, all this has moved the mother tongue back into the private sphere. A considerably widened public life has allowed few places for its use. This means that still, more than ever, language is the most important criterion of national identity and an essential tool in the preservation of national consciousness.

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E m i l N i e d e r h a u s e r

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AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA (1945-1947)

In the initial phase of the Second World War, the ideas of Eduard Beneš and of the Czechoslovak bourgeois emigrés concerning the reestablishment of the republic, the creation of a unitary nation-state, and the removal of the Hungarian national minority were already well known in Washington. At the time of Beneš' visit in May and June of 1943 Roosevelt accepted in principle the idea of the resettlement of minorities from Czechoslovakia, but gave a definite promise only that the United States would support the resettlement of the Germans living in the Sudetenland;¹ this did not extend to the removal of the Hungarians in Slovakia. Nevertheless, the State Department raised several objections at the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945 to the Czechoslovak government in exile against their notions relating to the practical details of the eviction of the Sudeten Germans. In response to the Czechoslovak government's memorandum of November 23, 1944 concerning the question of the German minority, the American government put on record in January, 1945, that in the resettlement it was necessary not only to take into consideration the demands of Czechoslovakia, but also the future peace and security of Europe; neither could the sorts of difficulties which would soon face the Allied forces occupying Nazi Germany be dismissed. The transfer must take place on the basis of an appropriate international agreement, under international auspices, in a gradual and orderly manner, and with consideration for those affected. They emphatically declared that so long as there were no such international agreements, unilateral transfers of large groups could not come to pass.²

The American government made no mention of the resettlement of the Hungarian minority, though such would have been expected by the Czechoslovak side. Similarly, it took a position at the three-power talks on the Hungarian armistice agreement in Moscow and did not support the Czechoslovak proposal

that a provision be included in the agreement to the effect that Hungary would be required to take on the obligation of receiving the Hungarian population evicted from Czechoslovakia.³ It became obvious to Washington, from the accounts of Benes' Moscow discussions of March 1945 and from the declarations of the Kassa Program of the Czechoslovak National Front government,⁴ that the Czechoslovaks considered the removal of the Hungarian population as important as that of the ethnic Germans. The Czechoslovakian anti-Hungarian measures, the news arriving about unilateral, arbitrary expulsions, and an inquiry by the Hungarian government made it unavoidable that the American government take a definite stand in the matter of the Hungarian population of Slovakia.

The decision came relatively quickly. On June 4, 1945, Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Grew informed the American chargé d'affaires in Budapest, Arthur Schoenfeld, that the State Department considered its position with respect to the resettlement of the Germans in Czechoslovakia valid and applicable in the case of the "Hungarian-speaking" minority as well. It recognized that the Czechoslovak state had the right to hold to account those citizens of Hungarian nationality who had committed crimes against it, but it also declared that Washington would consider the laying of collective responsibility on the entire Hungarian population and evictions based on ethnicity to be unjustified. It referred to Jan Masaryk's speech of May 21, 1945 in San Francisco at the founding of the United Nations, in which the Czechoslovak foreign minister reported that only those Hungarians would be called to account who had "plotted against Czechoslovakia" or who had fought on the side of Nazi Germany, but those who had supported the Czech cause could keep their citizenship and live freely. He sought to give the impression that the Hungarian government's anxiety concerning possible excesses was probably groundless. Grew authorized Schoenfeld to inform the Provisional National Government of the above.⁵

Schoenfeld sought out Foreign Minister János Gyöngyösi of the Provisional National Government on June 12, 1945, and informed him both verbally and in writing of the position of the American government. The Hungarian politician, who was otherwise a member of the Independent Smallholders' Party, acknowledged the statement with "great satisfaction". Concerning the report of Schoenfeld that on American initiative consultation had begun among the Allied Powers on the matter of the expulsion of the Hungarians from Czechoslovakia, he voiced the hope that a possible joint action of the Great Powers would prevent the undifferentiated eviction of Hungarians. Stretching the truth somewhat, Gyöngyösi told the American diplomat that since the liberation of Czechoslovakia, i.e.,

in scarcely three months' time, 20,000 persons had been expelled without any humanitarian provisions at all, and that approximately 10,000 were being kept in an internment camp in Pozsony (Bratislava) under very bad hygienic conditions.⁶

The American government actually did attempt to take diplomatic steps in the matter of settling the situation of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia. On June 4, 1945, along with the instructions sent to Schoenfeld, the American government informed the British Foreign Ministry that according to its information numerous Hungarians had been expelled, and it asked whether the English government would agree to jointly addressing the Czechoslovak and the Yugoslav governments. Referring to the fact that the Czechoslovak government already knew the preliminary American position regarding the resettlement of the German minority, it suggested that the following be brought to the attention of the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav governments: 1) the Czechoslovak (or Yugoslav) government should take no unilateral steps toward the complete or partial removal of the "Hungarian-speaking" minority; 2) ethnic groups should be transferred only on the basis of international arrangements; 3) in the interest of facilitating the orderly displacement of the affected persons, the transfer should be effected gradually; 4) in any solution of the minority question, not merely the requirements of Czechoslovakia (and Yugoslavia) should be taken into account, but also those general considerations which are interrelated with the future security and peace of Europe. Besides this, in the transfer they must take into consideration all those problems which the occupying powers in Hungary face. The State Department's note put on record that the American side considers as "unjustified any attempt to treat all members of an ethnic group as subject to expulsion on grounds of war responsibility." Washington further recommended that the British government instruct the British mission to the Allied Control Commission that the international body monitoring the implementation of the Romanian armistice should prevent the unilateral expulsion of Hungarians from Romania; on the other hand, that it request the Allied Control Commission in Hungary to take the appropriate measures for the control of the Hungarian frontier. Rudolf Schoenfeld, the American chargé accredited to the Czechoslovak emigré government, was instructed to inform Prague of the American initiative.⁷

At the same time, the British government hardly dealt at all in detail with the question of the German and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia. This was not only because it did not at the time feel itself directly affected, but also because its opinion was that putting the question on the agenda should

be postponed until the war came to an end and a comprehensive resolution of the German question had been agreed on by the Allied Powers; and further that German resettlement had to occur within the framework of a general organizational plan on the basis of an international agreement. Churchill and Eden had been aggrieved by Beneš, because before his departure he did not discuss with them that he would raise this question in Moscow, and this was not mindful of the British position. They did not approve of making the Czechoslovakian government's resettlement plans public. They were also afraid that the precipitous and drastic action of the Czechoslovak authorities would produce an unfavorable effect in Germany and make more complicated the resolution of the German question.⁸ Beneš' speech on May 9 in Bratislava as well as the arbitrary measures against the Hungarians prove that the President of the Republic and the Czechoslovak coalition government led by Zdenek Fierlinger took no further account of British opinion.

London therefore remained noncommittal. Sir Orme Sargent, a leading official of the British Foreign Office, reported on June 7 to John Winant, the American ambassador in London, that whereas they approved of the American position in connection with the resettlement of the Hungarian minority, they did not consider it likely that anything could be accomplished through the collaboration of the Romanian and Hungarian ACC.⁹ In its reply to the State Department the Foreign Office therefore did not even touch on it, and merely proposed that Britain and the United States - before the Potsdam summit - should separately discuss the "entire question of the transfer of European ethnic minorities".¹⁰ The American government rejected this, however, arguing that the two countries' positions were clear and that it was to be expected anyway that these problems would be discussed at Potsdam.¹¹

Beneš and the Czechoslovak government officially requested on July 3, 1945 that at the approaching Potsdam conference the heads of state and government put the matter of the resettlement of the German and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia on the agenda and discuss it. Referring to the fact that in principle the Allied Powers did not raise any particular objection to the expulsion of minorities, they reported that the Czechoslovak government had begun working out the plans for the arrangement of an "organized and orderly settlement". They informed them that the transfers would affect 2-2.5 million Germans and some 400,000 Hungarians. They recommended - for the first time - that this could take place, in the case of the Hungarians, in the form of an "exchange of peoples". "... The Czech and Slovak nations consider unanimously the transfer of Germans and Hungarians an essential necessity for the future of

the Czechoslovak State and for the preservation of peace in Central Europe. It is, therefore, obvious that the attention of the entire Czechoslovak public opinion is drawn to this question, which is undoubtedly the most burning of all problems, the solution of which the Czechoslovak Government is endeavouring to attain. Any postponement of its settlement cannot but considerably disquiet all Czech and Slovak population. As long as this elemental problem is not solved, all administrative, economic and social reconstruction and consolidation of the State is being hampered and delayed."¹²

The desires of the Beneš group were partly realized. The representatives of the Allied Powers did actually discuss the question of the resettlement of the Germans, and passed a resolution that all or a part of the German population remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary must be resettled in Germany, and "any sort of transfer which actually comes about must take place in an organized and humane manner".¹³ They officially informed the Polish and Czechoslovak¹⁴ governments of the resolution, as well as the Allied Control Commission for Hungary - this because the Allied Powers did not have diplomatic relations with Hungary. There was no mention of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, neither at the meeting of the heads of state and government, nor at the discussions of the foreign ministers, nor in the resolution.

The Prague government, even though it had reservations, was basically pleased with the Potsdam decision concerning the Germans, but it was sorely touched that it did not receive international endorsement for the removal of the Hungarians from Slovakia, not even in the form of an exchange of peoples. Therefore, Deputy Foreign Minister Clementis once again turned to the Allied Powers with a note, including the United States. Referring to the Potsdam decision concerning the resettlement of Germans, he assumed that the Powers presumably agreed with the exchange of the Hungarian population in Czechoslovakia and the Slovak population in Hungary, and, therefore, he requested in the name of the government that the Allied Control Commission in Hungary authorize the arranging of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian population exchange, exactly in the same way as the Allied Control Commission in Germany had done. He offered that Prague was ready to send a committee of experts to Budapest.¹⁵ The Allied Powers, however, left this initiative without an answer for more than two months.

The Hungarian Provisional National Government was also to experience a similar attitude. Learning of the diplomatic action of the Czechoslovak government and of the deprivation of citizenship rights of the Hungarian population

in Slovakia, János Gyöngyösi turned to England, the United States, and the Soviet Union on September 12, 1945, and requested that the Council of Foreign Ministers, which was preparing to sit in London, hear the Hungarian government on the question of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. He proposed that until some decision was taken, they set up, with the participation of the delegates of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, an international commission which would examine all aspects of the divergence of views of the Hungarian and Czechoslovak governments in connection with the situation of the Hungarian minority.¹⁶ The Hungarian government, too, received no answer for weeks.

All this was fundamentally connected with the international situation. The antifascist Powers were bound by the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which, because of a divergence of views concerning the preparation for the peace treaties to be concluded with Nazi Germany's former European allies and the questions of Eastern Europe (chiefly Romania and Bulgaria), ended unexpectedly without result. Soviet-American relations, but in essence the entire international atmosphere, became more tense. American foreign-policy difficulties were increased in that American-Hungarian and American-Czechoslovak relations began to develop in opposite directions.

On September 22, 1945, Washington - although at Potsdam it had still opposed it - offered as a concession to the Soviet Union the diplomatic recognition of Hungary, with the condition that the Provisional National Government assure the organization of free democratic elections. In the Budapest municipal elections on October 7, 1945, the Independent Smallholders' Party - the political representative of the peasant and bourgeois forces - won; on November 2, 1945, the United States officially took up diplomatic relations with Hungary; the November 4 parliamentary elections ended with an easy victory (57%) for the Smallholders' Party. After that the assessment of Hungary in Washington changed significantly, and Hungarian-American relations improved step by step.

In contrast, because of the large-scale nationalizations in October 1945 - which also affected American capitalist interests - the United States was offended by the Fierlinger government; after the earlier harmonious period, relations between the two countries began to deteriorate. All this influenced the American government's attitude toward Czechoslovak-Hungarian relations and the question of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. It complicated the situation that in the American diplomatic corps, the Czechoslovak government's nationality policy was judged in ways which sharply differed from each other, chiefly by the ambassadors Steinhardt in Prague and Schoenfeld in Budapest.

Arthur Schoenfeld, who was an experienced, liberal-minded diplomat, an adherent, in the Rooseveltian spirit, of Soviet-American cooperation since the beginning of the war, understood the serious political and economic difficulties of the new Hungarian democracy; he sought to inform the State Department correctly of the Hungarian position and supported the Provisional Government and later the Tildy cabinet's normalization of Czechoslovak-Hungarian relations and the endeavors aimed at improving the lot of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. On August 31, 1945, he sent to Washington those 17 protest notes which Gyöngyösi handed to the ACC in Hungary on account of the Czechoslovakian treatment of the Hungarians. "Hungarian Government states" wrote Schoenfeld in his telegram, "their nationals live under reign of terror and are oppressed on nationalistic grounds, a fact which is deeply resented by every Hungarian citizen. Hungarian Government requests Control Commission to impress on Czechoslovak Government that democratic principles should be applied to Czechoslovak Hungarians and that the inhumane persecution and despoliation of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia on nationalistic grounds should be terminated. According to information received by this Mission and previously reported to Department it is apparent that the Hungarian Government has some justification in its protest regarding continuance of deportations and terroristic oppression of Hungarians especially in Slovakia and that these acts are continuing in spite of representations previously made by government. Chairman of Allied Control Commission here has not indicated any action which may have been taken in behalf of Commission to correct this situation."¹⁷

In contrast, Steinhardt, who was of strongly conservative opinion, filled with great-power haughtiness and enmity for the Soviets, and who was closely attached to Beneš, Jan Masaryk, and other representatives of the Czechoslovak haute bourgeoisie, supported without reservation the Czechoslovak government's nationality policy, which could hardly be called democratic or humane. Steinhardt reacted with conspicuous exasperation to his Budapest colleague's telegram of August 31, which he had also received. "All of the officials with whom I have talked", he reported to Secretary of State Byrnes after consultation carried out with the Czechoslovak government and members of the Slovak National Council, "deny the existence of a 'reign of terror', 'inhumane persecution', or 'terroristic oppression'. They do not deny that what they describe as 'a few Hungarians' have been expelled from Slovakia to Hungary 'where they will presumably have no further cause for complaint' and that the property of 'a limited number' has been seized. ... They assert that as only a few of the ring leaders have thus far been arrested or expelled most of the

loudest complaints of alleged ill treatment are coming from individuals who are known in their local communities to have been active Nazis who either took part in or encouraged the inhumane treatment to which the Slovaks were subjected by the Hungarians during the Nazi occupation. The Slovak authorities state that they are prepared to prove that individuals who have recently complained to the Hungarian Government of alleged persecution and of the existence of a reign of terror are the same individuals who were directly or indirectly responsible for the deaths of thousands of Slovak citizens including most of the Jewish population of Slovakia. They describe the protests now being made by the Hungarian Government on behalf of Hungarian Nazis residing in Slovakia as 'hypocritical, disingenuous and as a device to influence public opinion in the United States and Great Britain and to gain sympathy for defeated Hungary'. They argue that it stands to reason that Hungary desires to keep its fifth column in Czechoslovakia in the hope of some day avenging its defeat. In my opinion, the repeated protests by the Hungarian Government (which I do not believe has as yet been recognized by the Czechoslovak Government) are merely serving to increase the determination of the Czechoslovak Government, and particularly of the Slovak National Council, to rid themselves of the greater part of the Hungarian and German minorities as well as to fan their indignation at what they describe as the audacity of Hungary and Germany enemy States defeated only a few weeks ago in criticizing the internal affairs of one of the members of the United Nations after what the world knows of the sufferings of the Czechs and Slovaks at the hands of the Germans and Hungarians when they were in the saddle."¹⁸

In his confidential letter of October 20 to F. Williamson, Assistant Chief of the State Department's Central European Division, Steinhardt touched in particular on the question of the Hungarian population in Slovakia. In it - accepting the Czechoslovak argument - he once again sharply objected that Hungary, a losing state, barely a few weeks after its military defeat should carry on a press campaign against a winning state in the matter of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. He openly wrote that "I am strongly sympathetic to the desire of the Czechs and Slovaks to rid themselves of the Germans and Hungarians". According to him, the Hungarian complaints and objections were much rather directed toward the revision of the frontier than toward the prevention of expulsions. He recommended that the State Department call to Hungary's attention who won the war, because in this way American foreign policy could be freed from many "headaches". He tried to shift the responsibility for Hungary's attitude onto the Soviet Union, stating that if the

Czechoslovak-Hungarian antagonisms became permanent, the Red Army, by using this could remain longer in Czechoslovakia. He called the Hungarian government a "stooge" which could not criticize its neighboring country without the concurrence of the Soviet Union. "It is my considered judgment", he summarized, "that to achieve permanent tranquillity and prosperity in Central Europe it is essential that those Germans and Hungarians the Czechs and Slovaks do not trust should be expelled and that the Czech part of Tesin should be returned to Czechoslovakia, more for economic than for political reasons. I do not fear mass expulsions of the Germans and Hungarians. If the Czechoslovak Government were authorized today to expel as many Hungarians and Germans as they choose to, I doubt that more than 1,000,000 Germans and 150,000 Hungarians would be expelled. Some of my friends in the Czechoslovak Government agree with this view."¹⁹

With regard to the increasingly tense international situation and Soviet-American relations, to the divergent development of the relationships with Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to internal debates, the State Department found it best not to change its position in connection with the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. On October 19, 1945, Secretary of State Byrnes simultaneously instructed Steinhardt and Schoenfeld to inform Prague and Budapest that the Potsdam resolution concerning the Germans did not apply to the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, and that the assumption formulated in the Czechoslovak note of August 16, 1945, according to which the United States would agree to a possible Czechoslovak-Hungarian exchange of populations, lacked all foundation. Byrnes put on record that the American position had not changed in relation to its earlier one, and the Czechoslovak government should take no further unilateral action to resettle the Hungarian minority; that was to be carried out under international supervision and according to appropriate international arrangements. The American Secretary of State indicated delicately that Washington would welcome it if the two governments involved would mutually work out plans for the settlement of the minority question, and he would put them before the Allies for approval.²⁰

Since it had not succeeded in obtaining international approval, the Czechoslovak government took new diplomatic initiatives. Dalibov Krno, Czechoslovakias representative to the ACC in Hungary, proposed in writing and orally in October of 1945 that the two governments begin negotiations toward an agreement on the exchange of populations, and invited Gyöngyösi to Prague. Similar proposals were sent from the Czech side to the leaders of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party, who were in Prague at this time. Gyöngyösi accepted the in-

vation in principle, but requested a postponement until after the November 4 parliamentary elections were over and a new government formed.²¹

Soviet diplomacy up to this point had not really taken a position on the Slovakian minority question. It is known - at least according to Benes' account - that at the time of his visits in December 1943 and March 1945, Stalin gave a definite promise of support for the Czechoslovak head of government's resettlement plans. It turns out from the book by Taborsky, Benes' former personal secretary, that at the time of the negotiations for the establishment of the Czechoslovak government, Molotov was far from committing himself, even in the matter of the Germans.²² Light is cast on the Soviet guardedness in Potsdam as well, but that also manifests itself in that although Marshal Voroshilov, the ACC's Soviet chairman, received the Hungarian objections, he immediately passed these on to Czechoslovakia's representative in Hungary. The ACC took no steps of any kind.²³ For their part, the Soviets also officially denied the alarming rumors according to which the Soviet Union would support Czechoslovakia's anti-Hungarian provisions and the arbitrary expulsions.²⁴ The interest in Soviet foreign policy therefore became obviously livelier, because after Potsdam the lot of the Hungarians in Slovakia turned substantially for the worse and the two countries became completely estranged from each other. The first sign of change in the Soviet attitude was that on October 20 Marshal Voroshilov passed on to Prime Minister Béla Miklós Dálnoki the letter of the Czechoslovak delegate Dalibov Krno initiating bilateral negotiations.²⁵

Barely a week after the formation of the Tildy government, János Gyöngyösi reported at a press conference on November 23, 1945 that he was traveling to Prague on December 2 to begin negotiations for a settlement of the situation of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia and for an agreement on a population exchange.²⁶ Although the government and the democratic parties were agreed that Gyöngyösi should go, they had no confidence at all that under the prevailing circumstances it was possible to carry on any fruitful negotiations. On November 28, the head of Hungarian government, Zoltán Tildy, addressed a letter to Krno, the Czechoslovak delegate in Hungary, in which - recounting the anti-Hungarian measures enacted in October and November - he voiced the anxiety that in these circumstances the negotiations could not lead to any result, and thereby tried to shift the responsibility in advance onto the Czechoslovak side. Referring to the fact that the Allied Powers were urging the bilateral negotiations, the Hungarian government, despite its previous experience, "was ready to seek the possibility of an agreement with the Czechoslovak Re-

public". He tried, however, to establish preliminary conditions for the negotiations; he demanded that the Czechoslovak government put an end to the persecution of Hungarians in Slovakia, suspend the implementation of the previous anti-Hungarian presidential decrees and orders, and refrain from renewed acquiescence in resolutions of this sort. Tildy sent his letter to Marshal Voroshilov, chairman of the ACC, and to the Budapest ambassadors of the Allied Powers.²⁷ On November 30, the Hungarian government renewed the proposal made in mid-September, which had remained unanswered, that the Allied Powers establish a commission for the investigation of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian disagreements concerning the situation of the Hungarian minority, and until this commission sat, to put the area of Slovakia inhabited by Hungarians under international supervision.²⁸

On December 7, 1945, the State Department turned to the British, and three days later, to the Soviet governments. It emphasized that the United States felt it "particularly desirable" that Czechoslovakia and Hungary conclude a realistic agreement respecting the Hungarian minority situation in Slovakia and the exchange of populations. In connection with the Hungarian proposals it repeated that the United States rejected the setting up of an international commission and international supervision of Southern Slovakia and considered the bilateral negotiations an effective means of resolving the disputed questions. It voiced the hope that the British and Soviet governments would agree with the American position, and that they would use their good offices in a similar spirit in Prague (and in Budapest).²⁹

The international consultations, however, were again broke off because the Council of Foreign Ministers met in Moscow in the middle of December. That meeting - in contrast to the one in London - ended on December 26 with significant results. The representatives of the Allied Powers agreed that it was necessary to call a conference to work out peace treaties to be concluded with Nazi Germany's former allies, and they came to a compromise on the restructuring of the Romanian and Bulgarian governments. That Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union could come to an understanding with each other on important international questions naturally also influenced the judgment and the handling of the problems connected with the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia. On January 2, 1946 the British Foreign Office notified the American ambassador in London by letter that the British government shared Washington's view that the Czechoslovak-Hungarian disagreements must be resolved by bilateral negotiations. Similarly, the Soviet government also took a position in mid-January about which it also informed its Prague and Budapest

diplomatic representations. After this, it was not difficult for the State Department to decide what answer it should give to the Hungarian proposals. On February 9 Schoenfeld categorically informed Gyöngyösi: 1/ Under the present circumstances, the government of the United States considered impossible the setting up of an international commission for the investigation of the Hungarian-Czechoslovak minority question and the examination of a population exchange; 2/ it did not support the proposal that those districts of Slovakia inhabited by Hungarians be brought under international supervision; 3/ it would recognize and support any such humane solution on which Hungary and Czechoslovakia agree.³⁰

Before the final international rejection, the Tildy government had already made a proposal at the beginning of January for a renewal of the bilateral negotiations. At the end of 1945 - after the discussions in Prague - the situation of the Hungarians in Slovakia had somewhat improved,³¹ and this made the atmosphere more favorable. At Czechoslovak invitation³² (because of the illness of Clementis), the negotiations continued in Prague between February 6 and 10, and then concluded in Budapest. On the 27th an agreement for the exchange of populations between the two countries was signed.³³

The population exchange agreement was also the result of the diplomatic efforts of the Allied Powers, especially of the United States. But the ink was not yet dry before new proposals came from the Czech side. Deputy Foreign Minister Vlado Clementis, first orally to the members of the Hungarian government and leaders of the democratic party and later also in writing in a letter of February 27 addressed to János Gyöngyösi, raised the issue that Hungary should accept a further 200,000 Hungarians from Slovakia over and above the agreement on population exchange.³⁴ From the Hungarian side this was declared unacceptable.³⁵ The Czechoslovak government again tried to exert international pressure on the Hungarian government. At the beginning of March 1946, Clementis brought up before L. Steinhardt that with the good offices of the three Allied Powers it might be possible to persuade Budapest to agree to the transfer of 200,000 Hungarians.³⁶ Steinhardt supported this plan, and even the State Department was inclined toward acceptance; Schoenfeld, however, definitely opposed it. The State Department was forced to accept his argument that it was precisely the United States that had fought for the idea that there should be no outside interference in the dispute between the two countries. Thus was born the decision that the Czechoslovak demand should be discussed at the peace conference in connection with the Hungarian peace treaty.³⁷

As is well known, in September 1946 the Czechoslovak peace delegation at the Paris peace conference put forward a modified amendment to the draft of the Hungarian peace treaty, which in case of acceptance would have empowered Czechoslovakia to expel arbitrarily 200,000 Hungarians, and would have obligated Hungary to accept them. After lengthy dispute the Czechoslovak proposal for unilateral removal was dismissed and on October 12, 1946, a compromise was accepted which prescribed that in bilateral negotiations the two countries settle the issue of those who were not transferred to Hungary in accordance with the population exchange treaty signed on February 27, 1946. Czechoslovakia received the right to be able to turn to the Council of Foreign Ministers in the interest of final resolution of the question if no agreement was reached within six months.³⁸

The United States, and some others, supported the Hungarian position on the question connected with the peace treaty because from October 1945, beginning with the nationalizations, it watched with ever-increasing dissatisfaction the leftward slide of Czechoslovak domestic policy, and after the Communist Party's May victory in the elections, its distrust increased. Czechoslovak - American relations further deteriorated.³⁹ In contrast, Washington considered Hungary's political structure and power relationships more acceptable from the American point of view, and even strove to extend its East European base here. In the course of 1946 the United States made numerous gestures. It gave a 15 million dollar loan for the purchase of American Army equipment which had remained in Europe; it returned to the National Bank the gold appropriated by the Germans; it supported UNRRA's sending of relief shipments.⁴⁰ Besides liberal principles and humane viewpoints, in the rejection of the modified Czechoslovak amendment a political consideration also played a role in that they could thus help the Smallholders' Party and the moderate elements, and increase American political influence in Hungary.

After the Paris peace conference, János Gyöngyösi sought out Ambassador Schoenfeld on October 23 and in the name of the Hungarian government expressed his gratitude for the understanding and support which Hungary had received from the American representatives at the Hungarian peace treaty negotiations. He declared that the helpful attitude of the USA "would never be forgotten in Hungary".

The Hungarian government kept its promise, and at the end of October - that is, months before the signing and the coming into force of the Hungarian peace treaty - it presented a motion that representatives of the two countries begin negotiations in Budapest. Beneš and Czechoslovak government circles

were, however, dissatisfied with the Paris decision and offended by the Western Powers, and did not hasten to reply. Gyöngyösi received an oral response that on the Czechoslovak side they would await the signing of the peace treaty, which came to pass on February 10, 1947.⁴¹ Furthermore, sharp disputes had broken out around the interpretation and implementation of the population exchange agreement of February 27, 1946, which were settled in May of 1947,⁴² but until then renewed bilateral negotiations could not be considered. Meanwhile, domestic Hungarian political developments attracted the attention of American diplomacy and completely pushed the question of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia into the background. These included the struggles surrounding the liquidation of the anti-republic conspiracy of the racist secret society called the Hungarian Brotherhood; the arrest of Béla Kovács, the General Secretary of the Smallholders' Party (February 25, 1947); the forced resignation of Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy (June 1, 1947); and the formation of the new government and the proclamation of new parliamentary elections.

As conditions in Hungary were consolidating, the turn to the left was completed in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. Beneš and the Czechoslovak haute bourgeoisie withdrew from power. In the Summer of 1948 the building of socialism began in both countries, and the entire nationality problem came into a new light. Beginning with the Summer of 1947 American diplomacy no longer dealt with the question of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia.

Notes

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2. Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1945. Vol. II, General Political and Economic Matters (hereafter FRUS, 1945. II), memorandum of Ambassador H. Ripka, Nov. 23, 1944, pp. 1227 - 1237; telegram of J. Byrnes, American Secretary of State, to Rudolf Schoenfeld, US chargé accredited to the Czechoslovak government in exile, January 16, 1945, pp. 1246 - 1247.
3. Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1944. Vol. III, The British Commonwealth and Europe (Washington, 1965), telegram of J. Grew, Assistant Secretary of State, to A. Harriman, American ambassador in Moscow, January 15, 1945, pp. 975 - 976; telegram of A. Harriman to the Secretary of State, January 15, 1945, pp. 976 - 978.
4. FRUS, 1945. II, H. Ripka's note to R. Schoenfeld, April 20, 1945, pp. 1250 - 1252.
5. Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1945. Vol. IV, Europe (Washington, 1968; hereafter FRUS, 1945. IV), telegram of J. Grew to A. Schoenfeld, June 4, 1945, pp. 928 - 929.
6. FRUS, 1945. IV, telegram of A. Schoenfeld to the Secretary of State, June 12, 1945, pp. 931 - 932. Schoenfeld's note may be found in: Hungary at the Conference of Paris. Vol. II. Hungary's International Relations Before the Conference of Paris (Budapest, 1947), pp. 4 - 5.

7. FRUS, 1945. IV, telegram of J. Grew to J. Winant, US ambassador in London, June 4, 1945, pp. 929 - 930.
8. FRUS, 1945. II, telegram of G. F. Kennan to the Secretary of State, April 18, 1945, pp. 1249 - 1250.
9. FRUS, 1945. IV, telegram of J. Winant to the Secretary of State, June 7, 1945, pp. 930 - 931.
10. Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. The Conference of Berlin. Vol. I (Washington, 1960; hereafter FRUS, 1945. The Conference of Berlin), memorandum of the British Embassy in Washington, June 28, 1945, pp. 644 - 645.
11. FRUS, 1945. The Conference of Berlin, note of the State Department to the British Embassy in Washington, July 11, 1945, pp. 647 - 649.
12. FRUS, 1945. The Conference of Berlin. I, letter of A. W. Klieforth, American chargé in Czechoslovakia, to the Secretary of State, Prague, July 5, 1945, p. 225, and memorandum of Deputy Foreign Minister V. Clementis to chargé A. W. Klieforth, Prague, July 3, 1945, pp. 646 - 647.
13. Teheran, Jalta, Potsdam. Dokumentumgyűjtemény (Collection of Documents) (Budapest, Kossuth, 1969) p. 400.
14. FRUS, 1945. IV, telegram of L. Steinhardt, American ambassador in Prague to the Secretary of State, August 3, 1945, p. 1267.
15. FRUS, 1945. II, V. Clementis' note to L. Steinhardt, August 16, 1945, pp. 1269 - 1270.
16. Hungary at the Conference of Paris. II, János Gyöngyösi's note to F. Gascoigne, British ambassador; A. Schoenfeld, American ambassador; and G. M. Pushkin, Soviet ambassador; September 12, 1945, pp. 1269 - 1270.
17. FRUS, 1945. IV, telegram of A. Schoenfeld to the Secretary of State, August 31, 1945, pp. 932 - 933.
18. FRUS, 1945. IV, telegram of L. Steinhardt to the Secretary of State, September 10, 1945, pp. 933 - 935.
19. The Library of Congress. Collection of L. Steinhardt. Box 83. Letterbooks, Official Letterbook, July 19, 1945 - December 31, 1945.
20. FRUS, 1945. IV, telegram of J. Byrnes to L. Steinhardt and A. Schoenfeld, October 19, 1945, pp. 937 - 938.
21. FRUS, 1945. IV, telegram of A. Schoenfeld to the Secretary of State, October 29, 1945, pp. 938 - 939; Hungary at the Conference of Paris II, Zoltán Tildy's letter to D. Krno, November 28, 1945, pp. 30 - 34.
22. Taborsky, op. cit., p. 204.
23. FRUS, 1945. IV, telegram of A. Schoenfeld to the Secretary of State, August 31, 1945, pp. 932 - 933; telegram of A. Schoenfeld to the Secretary of State, September 26, 1945, pp. 935 - 936.
24. FRUS, 1945. IV, telegram of A. Schoenfeld to the Secretary of State, October 29, 1945, p. 938.
25. Hungary at the Conference of Paris II, Zoltán Tildy's letter to D. Krno, November 28, 1945, pp. 30 - 34.
26. National Archives of the United States. General Record of the Department of State. R. G. 29. Main Confidential File 760 F. 64/II-246, telegram of A. Schoenfeld to the Secretary of State, November 24, 1945. I herewith express my thanks to Péter Sipos, who put the documents from the American National Archives at my disposal.
27. Hungary at the Conference of Paris II, Zoltán Tildy's letter to D. Krno, November 28, 1945, pp. 30 - 34.
28. FRUS, 1945. IV, telegram of A. Schoenfeld to the Secretary of State, November 30, 1945, pp. 941 - 942; Hungary at the Conference of Paris II, memorandum of J. Gyöngyösi, November 20, 1945, pp. 15 - 17.
29. FRUS, 1945. IV, telegram of J. Byrnes to Winant, December 7, 1945, pp. 943 - 944.

30. Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1946. Vol. VI, Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union (Washington, 1969; hereafter FRUS, 1946. VI, telegram of J. Byrnes to A. Schoenfeld, February 4, 1946, pp. 361 - 363; Hungary at the Conference of Paris II, A. Schoenfeld's note to J. Gyöngyösi, February 9, 1946, pp. 53 - 54.
31. Hungary at the Conference of Paris II, János Gyöngyösi's letter to D. Krno, January 5, 1946, pp. 56 - 57.
32. Hungary at the Conference of Paris II, D. Krno's letter to János Gyöngyösi, January 14, 1946, pp. 58 - 59.
33. See further Sándor Balogh, A népi demokratikus Magyarország külpolitikája 1945 - 1947 (Foreign Policy of the Hungarian People's Democracy, 1945 - 1947) (Budapest, Kossuth, 1982), pp. 112ff.
34. Hungary at the Conference of Paris II, V. Clementis' letter to János Gyöngyösi, February 27, 1946, pp. 80 - 90.
35. FRUS, 1946. VI, telegram of A. Schoenfeld to the Secretary of State, March 27, 1946, pp. 366 - 377; Hungary at the Conference of Paris II, János Gyöngyösi's letter to V. Clementis, April 24, 1946, pp. 90 - 92.
36. FRUS, 1946. VI, telegram of L. Steinhardt to the Secretary of State, March 7, 1946, pp. 364 - 365.
37. FRUS, 1946. VI, telegram of J. Byrnes to L. Steinhardt, March 21, 1946, pp. 365 - 366; telegram of A. Schoenfeld to the Secretary of State, March 27, 1946, pp. 366 - 367.
38. See further S. Balogh, op. cit., pp. 220 - 257.
39. See further Geir Lundestad, The American Non-Policy Toward Eastern Europe 1943 - 1947 (Oslo, 1978), pp. 159 - 167.
40. See Péter Várkonyi, Magyar-amerikai kapcsolatok, 1945 - 1948 (Hungarian-American Relations, 1945 - 1948) (Budapest, Kossuth, 1971), pp. 171 - 212.
41. FRUS, 1946. VI, telegram of A. Schoenfeld to the Secretary of State, December 3, 1946, pp. 372 - 373.
42. See S. Balogh, op. cit., pp. 127ff.

I s t v á n V i d a

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DANUBIAN FEDERATION PLANS AND HUNGARY, 1945-1948

For a century the idea of the federation of the small nations situated in the Danubian Basin had been a recurrent issue of varying intensity in the political thinking of the region. We can trace this idea to works by Balcescu after the European revolutions of 1848, as well as to the programs of Kossuth, who had been forced into exile following the collapse of the Hungarian War of Independence. Oszkár Jászi,^{1/} a leading figure of the progressive bourgeoisie that was about to become a distinctive political force in the early 1900s, recommended a similar solution for the coexistence of the newly forming small nations. However, these concepts hardly influenced contemporary politics, although they did have an impact on the political consciousness of the time. Despite the fact that the issue of forming a confederate state of the small nations in the region was always raised during times of international crises, the advocates of the confederate idea failed to win the support of influential politicians in their own countries, nor did they succeed in gaining the backing of great powers that had political influence in the region.

The status quo created after World War I did not facilitate political reconciliation in the region as far as the ethnic and state boundaries were concerned. Furthermore, it could barely serve the economic strengthening of the new states. This situation could turn the nationalism of a region which had been a buffer zone between the great powers, into hostile political force and could be manipulated to the point of conflict between both the nationalities of one country or the peoples of neighbouring countries. It was also the logical outcome of hostilities that were in effect approved by policies pursued by the great powers, the dash of the big powers during World War II was accompanied by the sideshow battles of these small states.

Having glanced over the historical background, we may have a better understanding of why it was such a remarkable achievement in the years after World

War II that the issue of a confederate state was raised again in this particular region of Europe - this time in an entirely new context. While in previous times the opposition federation plans were part of the political program of marginal or political forces, now the most remarkable new feature was that in several small countries the idea formed an integral part of government policy and was backed by such prominent figures as Tito in Yugoslavia, Dimitrov in Bulgaria and Groza in Romania. The above list also indicates the willingness of both sides, victors and defeated, to establish contact. Furthermore, it is also worthwhile to register that in this period the idea of federation seemed to express much more popular feeling than ever before. At the same time, this means that there must have been a further motivating force besides expectations for economic consolidation and increased political influence in the region owing to the integration. Based on the contemporary public statements, we can conclude that regional integration in this form of Pax Danubiana was a consensus creating alternative for all those who were familiar with the historical facts of the cohabitation of the peoples of this region and it could have served besides the de jure peace, the de facto reconciliation of the nations.

The present study deals with plans dated between 1945 and 1948 that envisaged the cooperation of Central and South-East European states in the framework of a federate state with special regard to contemporary Hungarian approaches. This is because the results of historical research on this issue^{2/} now enable us to complement the data on the Hungarian role in this question. These aspects will be broadened only when the events mentioned concern the area as a whole, or when the Hungarian bearing of the topic differs significantly from developments in other countries in the region.

Obviously, the countries of this region embarked on their new initiatives for integration differently in time and form, and not without difficulty. The first initiative came from Yugoslavia in April 1944, while still engaged in battle, to create a Balkan federation with Bulgaria and Albania. In the last months of the same year and in January 1945 Bulgarian-Yugoslavian official talks took place on this issue. The two parties reached an agreement in principle on the federation and on the required preliminary steps. However, Bulgaria was not a sovereign state as her foreign policy was subject to approval by the Allied Control Committee. As a result, the treaty of alliance and mutual assistance that was signed did not even contain references to the federation of the two countries.^{3/}

The British government's opposition to the idea of an alliance even in this form also tied in with the fact that the distribution of power between the major powers was gradually changing in the region. The 1942 January agreement between

the Czech and Polish governments in exile, and between the Greek and Yugoslavian governments in exile on a confederate state in the Balkans were reached with British aid not negligibly in order to maintain its influence in the region. However, these initiatives, like Churchill's other ideas concerning the Central European region, were rejected by the Soviet Union at the 1943 Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Allied Powers. The Soviets reasoned that "some plans for establishing confederate states remind the Soviet people of the 'cordon sanitaire' policy that had been clearly directed against the Soviet Union".^{4/} In the light of the above developments, both the British veto of January 26, 1945, "which set an abrupt end to the process of South-East European federation",^{5/} and the official position taken at the subsequent talks between the two Balkan states and the Soviet Union, namely, that it was premature to raise such issues at open discussions,^{6/} were worthy of attention not only because they shed some light on certain modifications in the positions taken by the major powers, but also revealed much about the relationship among the Allies who were still at war with Germany. In October 1944, during his Moscow negotiations with Stalin, among other issues Winston Churchill also objected that new government bodies in the liberated territories, like, for instance, the Bulgarian Patriotic Front, assumed an "exceedingly" left-wing attitude,^{7/} and thus were in violation of the agreement of the Grand Alliance concerning the need for an even representation of all democratic forces in each country. If Bulgaria, which was viewed by the British from the above-mentioned point of view, had formed a confederate state with Tito's Yugoslavia, which followed the most radical leftist course in the region, it would have further increased political tensions between the members of the anti-fascist coalition.

The outcome of the Bulgarian-Yugoslavian initiatives illustrates the fact that while military cooperation between the Allies on the European front was vital in order to win the war, toleration of the allied partners' point of view characterized diplomatic relationships. The small nations, which had been liberated from German domination, had to take new developments on the international political scene in Central and South-East Europe into consideration in the process of their political reorganization. The political scene had undergone drastic changes as a result of World War II, and the new status quo also influenced the manner in which these nations restored ties among themselves. Even in the reorganization of Poland, by the antifascist powers, which was the first country to be recognized as an ally, the influence exerted by the great powers was proportionate to the importance they attributed to Poland on the basis of their own interests, their ambitions and their political power. Accordingly, small nations that had fought on

the German side and had been defeated were even more compelled to recognize the Allied Control Committee, which supervised their domestic and foreign policies. By also supervising the payment of war reparations, the Committees also had direct control over the process of economic reconstruction in these countries.

Obviously, the restoration of ties between Hungary and Romania was also influenced by the above-mentioned factors, all the more since both had been defeated in the war. Yet attempts at cooperation between these two countries, which also included certain elements of integration, seemed to have enjoyed a more favourable reception by Allies right from the beginning. Two weeks after Petru Groza had been appointed Prime Minister on March 6, 1945, a Hungarian delegation was sent to Romania. The delegation was empowered by the Provisional National Government of Hungary to carry on preliminary talks about the restoration of ties between the two nations. At the same time, the Romanian Prime Minister made a proposal for cooperation that was far greater in scope than what the Hungarian delegation had had in mind. As recorded in the official account of the diplomatic mission, which was prepared for the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Groza envisaged a unified block stretching from the River Leit to the Black Sea. When it was pointed out that joint economic and political bodies would have to be organized to prepare the way for such cooperation and these would require the approval of the Allied Control Committee, Groza informed the representatives of the Hungarian government that "he had already had talks with Mr. Vishinsky, the Soviet Commissar in charge of Foreign Affairs and Colonel-General Suseykov, and both senior Soviet officials expressed their willingness to welcome the beginning of direct Hungarian-Romanian negotiations before long".^{8/}

Further favourable news from abroad also contributed to the growing readiness on the Hungarian side for discussions on the bilateral level. When the Hungarian government prepared a paper on this subject at the request of the Allied Control Committee, it cautiously gave economic reasons, with some historical background to substantiate the claim that close cooperation was necessary among the neighbouring countries. The paper was written in the middle of September 1945, and was meant to be used during the preparatory phase of talks on a peace treaty.

On September 23, 1945, ten days after this memorandum of the Hungarian government, the Hungarian Communist Party published its manifesto for the upcoming elections. The Communist Party's program was much wider in scope and went beyond the above-mentioned reasons, saying that "the utmost aim of Hungarian foreign policy is to safeguard the peace and the consensus of the

peoples of the Danubian Basin and to pave the way to Kossuth's idea, that is, to a confederate state of the Danubian nations. In an effort to achieve this aim, trade between these countries must be intensified and steps must be taken to form a joint Hungarian-Romanian-Yugoslavian customs union."^{9/} In the light of what has been said about the first reactions to the efforts of the Yugoslavians and Bulgarians, and the initiatives that Groza had taken, the declaration of such a political program presupposed prior discussion by the countries concerned and that the party manifesto had been approved by the Allied Control Committee in advance. Such an approval was vital since Hungary, like Bulgaria and Romania, was not a sovereign state.

From the beginning of 1946 on, official statements on the foreign policy pursued by Hungary became somewhat more restrained. Stressing the importance of good neighbourly relations and close friendly cooperation were still at the top of the list of tasks. However, the two main issues, the customs union and a confederate state, were not mentioned any more and things were described in a more roundabout way. Although the institutionalized purges against Hungarian nationals in Czechoslovakia modified the objectives, changes in the foreign policy could not be ascribed to the above reasons, all the less since Czechoslovakia was not even considered as a partner by any of the parties concerned. In 1946, the major issue in Hungarian foreign policy was the upcoming Paris peace conference. Since both the issue of minorities and the stipulation of the final state boundaries were on the agenda of the Paris conference, a wait-and-see attitude on the customs union and the confederate state was adopted in Hungarian diplomatic circles.

However, ideas concerning various alternatives of the integration of nations were given more and more publicity in the press. It was the Köztársaság, (Republic), a weekly paper, that took the leading role in discussing various aspects of the subject. As the mouthpiece of the "Dunai Munkaközösség" (Danubian Workshop) it was primarily meant to popularize the idea of confederation. Michael Károlyi, the president of the 1918 bourgeois democratic revolution, who had returned home after 25 years spent in emigration, wrote an introductory article entitled "Kossuth the Seer". He expressed his political program and envisaged the reconciliation of the Danubian nations taking place within the framework of a confederate state. He thought that the next step after a customs union was to found a confederate state, the significance of which he viewed as being a factor in European politics. "Once we succeed in founding a union of fifty to eighty million inhabitants, we would be in a very good bargaining position and in this case we could be a bridge between East and West",^{10/} he wrote.

Two weeks after Károlyi's article was published, György Bölöni, editor-in-chief of Köztársaság suggested that an "Office of Danubian Affairs" be established. It would be responsible for "setting up a customs union with a view to founding a confederate state".^{11/} Bölöni's article was meant to leak information on the content of Károlyi's letter a few days before, addressed to Árpád Szakasits, first secretary of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party, and to Mátyás Rákosi, first secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, both members of the Cabinet at that time. Károlyi stipulated that he would accept responsibility to carry out his tasks at whatever post was found for him if such an office were set up. Despite Károlyi's left-wing affiliation, the Hungarian political leaders were reluctant to appoint him to a serious position that would benefit a statesman of such calibre and record. "The Office of Danubian Affairs would be subject to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, I would be in charge of it and it would be charged with taking preparatory steps to establish ties with neighbouring states."^{12/}

Another article in the same issue of the periodical quotes Árpád Szakasits as saying that the Social Democratic Party was about to convene a conference on the economy. The conference would be attended by representatives of the social democratic parties of the Central European countries in an effort to facilitate the cooperation of the countries concerned through multilateral negotiations.^{13/}

A multitude of plans, interviews and proclamations were published in Köztársaság over the following weeks. The subsequent articles were published under the title "Danubian Federal Republic". A lengthy interview with writer Pavel Rucinsky concerning the speech he had delivered at the joint meeting of the Hungarian-Yugoslavian and the Hungarian-Romanian Societies was the first article to be published on the subject. On the one hand, Rucinsky firmly distanced himself from the German "Grossraum" principle that was plainly regarded as an expression of expansive great-power politics. On the other hand, he pointed out that this was no time for nursing grudges over the past. He focused on likely areas of cooperation and pointed out that in this respect Yugoslavia had considerably more freedom of movement. "In the whole Danubian region it is only Yugoslavia that can be regarded a victorious nation. Thus we must wait until the belligerent nations have concluded a peace treaty. If the rest of the Danubian countries declare that pooling their efforts and pursuing a policy of close co-operation with Yugoslavia is in their own interest, peace negotiations may take place in a more favourable atmosphere." In his opinion, the time was getting ripe for gradual synchronization in the sphere of the economy (currency reform; uniform monetary system; the standardization of tariffs and the gradual abolition of customs borders; the introduction and coordination of a planned economy in

the member states of the confederation/. In the meantime, preparatory work on the "political program" would go on: progressive democratic political forces should be united in each country to carry out tasks of mutual interest; the problems of minority groups of foreign nationals should be settled; public administration should be rationalized and should be reorganized according to popular interests; and, finally, "political unity should be gradually attained through agreement of mutual friendship". In conclusion, he offered the following alternative to founding a confederate state: "We may envisage a solution to the problem that Hungary and Romania first set up a joint customs territory. At the same time, Bulgaria would conclude a treaty of alliance with confederate Yugoslavia and finally the two alliances - in other words, the right and left banks of the Danube - would establish a customs and political union."^{14/}

In each of the subsequent issues, outstanding economists and well-known personalities were invited to comment on the ideas that had been outlined by Rucinsky. All of these distinguished persons considered Rucinsky's plans worthy of support and warmly welcomed his ideas. However, they failed to go into a detailed analysis. Furthermore, it is also striking that there were neither higher ranking statesmen nor senior party officials among the above-mentioned persons. The fact that no political and party leaders would comment on the proposals can be put down to the time of the campaign. For this same reason the manifesto concluding the campaign in Köztársaság had no response. The reason why the politicians kept a low profile was that attention was focused on the Paris peace negotiations where the "Hungarian question" was being discussed during those weeks. Without knowing what decisions the great powers would bring, no one was willing to take sides on an issue that concerned the future of the whole region.

Although the decisions passed at the peace talks caused a temporary political depression and broad disappointment in Hungary, statements that reckoned with reality started to dominate the political scene. Professor István Bibó, who gave the most complex analysis of the historical trends of his time almost simultaneously with the events, pointed out in his publications after the Paris Peace Conference that "no matter how harsh the terms of the peace treaty, this country must not give up pursuing a policy that follows European humanism and the highest standards of democracy and aims at understanding its neighbours and becoming integrated into the political and cultural community of East-European peoples".^{15/} This attitude was soon adopted by the most influential periodicals of the age, which began to analyse the ideas of federation and customs union supportively. The claim that it was not just the daydreaming of an intellectual

elite which let its voice be heard in some outstanding journals seems substantiated by two further aspects. Although official statements were palpably reserved from time to time, we may state that until the middle of 1947 cooperation with the neighbouring countries (which may include found customs union and confederation) was among the few issues of Hungarian strife-ridden domestic politics on which all of the government parties agreed. As early as 1946 the Communist Party had a major influence in the formation of foreign policy. Its September 1946 congress, held after the Paris conference, officially declared that "we consider a democratic Danubian confederation not only attainable but also necessary".^{16/} Another question which is bound to arise here is, besides statements made by government and party officials and those published in the press, how the idea of the proposed customs union and the confederation of these nations was received by the public. In the years after World War II public opinion polls were carried out several times in Hungary on the issue of cooperation among the Danubian countries. The results which were published revealed only the proportion of those who favored close cooperation among the countries in the Danube region. They were as follows: in December 1945, 14%, in February 1946, 24% supported the idea; and 40% were supportive for economic reasons; 89% on political grounds by December 1946. According to the poll taken in May 1946, 84% of those asked were for the proposed Hungarian-Romanian customs union, 12% against and 4% abstained.^{17/}

Since Hungary and Romania were not sovereign states in 1946, they were able to ponder the issue of the customs union and a confederate state only as a plan that might materialize once the peace treaty is signed. However, countries that were free of such restrictions could, or actually had taken the first steps towards integration. The issue of Albania's adherence to the proposed alliance between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had also been raised during the talks in 1944. In the beginning of this paper we have already mentioned that negotiations concerning the Bulgarian-Yugoslavian alliance were broken off, the reasons for which we have already mentioned. The Albanian-Yugoslavian friendship and mutual assistance pact, signed in July 1946, and the agreement of the same countries on economic matters, such as negotiated uniform rates for their national currencies, the founding of joint ventures, the coordination of economic planning in both countries and the setting up of a customs union, which was concluded in November 1946, were the first institutional steps towards integration.

After the Paris Peace Treaty had been signed, diplomatic activities increased in 1947 as a result of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria pursuing a more active foreign policy. The sudden increase in diplomatic activity was as much motivated by the efforts of the states in this region to place their relationship on a firm

basis, as by the deterioration of relations between the great powers, the first signs of the coming Cold War and that these all had an impact on the Central and South-East European region as well. Since the above developments had far-reaching consequences for issues that are the subject of our analysis, we are compelled to refer to these events briefly. These events are as follows: the declaration of the Truman Doctrine; open support for anti-communist forces; the expulsion of communists from the governments of France and Italy in May 1947. At the same time, political developments in Central and South-East Europe followed rapidly, with outstanding representatives of bourgeois-democratic political forces, like Hungarian Prime Minister Nagy, the Leader of the Bulgarian Peasants' Association, Petkov, the Leader of the Romanian Peasants' Party, Maniu, and Polish Deputy Prime Minister Mikolajczyk being either forced to emigrate or getting arrested. At the same time, the above-mentioned states and Czechoslovakia refused to participate in the Marshall Plan, which was also known as the European Recovery Program. Another major international development was the organization of Cominform, the Communist Information Bureau, in September 1947. The first resolution passed by the organization declared the division of the world. For each communist party the Cominform set the task of grabbing political power in their countries. Furthermore, the organization called for closer ties between communist countries and coordination in the field of foreign policy.

The transformation of international relations placed the ideas of integration among these countries in quite a different context. The first signs of change may be traced to the ambivalency reflected in the Hungarian press coverage of the visit of the Romanian government delegation headed by Petru Groza in May 1947. In spite of the willingness of both parties, which had been repeatedly declared during the previous two years at various political forums, the public announcement of measures to be taken in the interest of the customs union was finally not made. This hesitation is well expressed by the example of Közgazdaság (Economy), a weekly magazine that had treated the issue of a customs union several times. The cover headline reads as follows: "We welcome Petru Groza, a statesman who was the first in Romania to stress the significance of the Hungarian-Romanian customs union and hasn't ceased to do so."^{18/} The analysis on an inside page of the same issue, however, emphasized the many obstacles in the way of setting up a customs union. The message of the article was that "we must not expect quick results. We should and must choose to advance step by step".^{19/} In the next issue of the weekly, György Markos, a communist economist, applied the same approach to the issue. However, he added that

"only if we work hard and strengthen our economic system gradually, secure economic and political independence for ourselves and strengthen democracy both in the economic and political sense, will we be able to talk about Hungarian-Romanian or any other customs union, or even about a confederate state of the nations in the Danubian Basin... In conclusion, a Hungarian-Romanian customs union is too much to ask today, but it will not be enough to aspire for tomorrow."^{20/} The interview that Hungarian Social Democratic Party leader Árpád Szakasits gave after the Budapest conference of Central European Social Democratic Parties, where economic issues were also discussed, tied in with Markos's opinion. According to Szakasits to propose a customs union was still premature.^{21/}

Although opinions on the issue became more diverse, these forms of integration had not been discarded as future objectives, only the timing had changed. However, the tone and content of an article written by Vasil Luca in Romania seemed to be diametrically opposed to articles published in Hungary at the same time. Luca, who had risen to the post of one of the secretaries of the Romanian Communist Party by that time and was also Groza's Minister of Finance, regarded the endeavors of the small Danubian nations for cooperation with a view to integration as the modified version of confederate state plans that had been urged by Winston Churchill during World War II. Furthermore, Luca regarded these nations' efforts at integration as the continuation of the past ambitions of imperialist politicians.^{22/} Luca's article created a stir not only because the writer had failed to take changes in the balance of power among the great powers into consideration, but also because it discredited Petru Groza's speeches and intentions, given that it was just a few days after the Romanian Prime Minister had returned from negotiations in Hungary.

However, the halt in the integration process did not seem to be general for the whole region. After the peace treaty had been signed, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia resumed their talks on integration that had been discontinued due to outside pressure. The official report published after the Bled negotiations in July and August 1947, contained a detailed list of measures to be taken in order to coordinate the economic development of the two countries. The objective of the measures was to follow a step-by-step process towards a customs union.^{23/} Talking about the agreement, Georgi Dimitrov mentioned that the Soviet government suggested that the expiry data of the agreement to be signed should be stipulated as twenty years.^{24/} The friendship and mutual assistance pact signed by the representatives of the two countries in Evxinograd, Bulgaria, included the provisions of the Bled official report. As it turned out from the official communiqué and speeches made by Tito and Dimitrov at a mass rally in Varna following

the signing of the agreement, the customs union was regarded as a minimum program to be gradually realized in the near future; confederation was considered the long-run objective.^{25/} The Albanian-Yugoslavian-Bulgarian agreement of December 1947 was an effort to go beyond the bilateral level of cooperation among these countries.^{26/}

After the low-keyed statements of the summer of 1947, the issue of integration in Hungary repeatedly entered the forefront of public attention. It acquired new elements and obvious political significance. Having returned from his talks in Czechoslovakia, the President of the National Planning Board, Imre Vajda, said that the plan was to establish a complex economic system of the East-European peoples' democracies including Czechoslovakia and Poland that would be based on economic agreements. This view, which stressed the economic aspects of building a system of countries, was far surpassed by another article published ten days later, during the talks of the Yugoslavian delegation headed by Tito in Hungary. The article, entitled "A New Great Power", said that "the new great power... would stretch from the East Sea to the Black Sea and to the Adriatic and it would consist of the new democracies that were being built in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania". In these countries "two or three years after their liberation, it is not only their coming closer to one another that is on the agenda, but something much bigger is brewing".^{27/} In the first part, the article states that integration is to be extended to a wider region that previously envisaged. However, the rest of the article urged that the countries in question enter into a political-military alliance and it quoted Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk as saying that "Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania are more than likely to sign a free (sic!) defence treaty". According to the article, the underlying reason for "forming such a united front" is the "American threat that is about to take the form of armed aggression on the southern borderline of the peoples' democracies, in Greece ... One of the first occasions where the strengthening cooperation and the united action of the peoples' democracies will be put to the test will be whether they understand the extent of the threat Greece is exposed to and what steps they shall take to counter it."^{28/} As a result of profound changes in the international political atmosphere in 1947, a militant style became characteristic of the speeches delivered at subsequent ceremonies where agreements between the countries concerned were signed. As far as the whole Danubian region was concerned, the changes were reflected in that the previous seeking of consensus among themselves according to the motto "co-operation in peace for the benefit of the whole Danubian Basin"^{29/} was replaced

by a marked demonstration of unity towards the outside world, which was best expressed by the following quotation: "No force can break the unity of the peace-loving peoples of the Danubian Basin."^{30/} Reading late 1947 communiqués, one may conclude that the establishment of Pax Danubiana in federational form definitely ceased to be on the agenda, or rather, the efforts for cooperation were put on a different basis. That was why Dimitrov's press conference, after the signing of the Bulgarian-Romanian agreement on January 18, 1948, attracted such international attention. Greece - which had already been referred to in another context - was also listed among the proposed states of the confederation. When the time is ripe for federation, and it will surely happen, our peoples, the countries of the peoples' democracies, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Greece - take note, Greece, too - will carry out their plan. It is up to them whether they form a federation or a confederation, when and how their plans will materialize. We can assert our belief that our peoples' present work will facilitate the solution of this problem in the future."^{31/}

However, instead of the escalation of the idea envisaged above, it faded away rapidly. As for the reasons, the viewpoints differ widely, but they agree on one point, namely, that the initiatives of the small countries in the Central and South-East European region were definitely pushed into the background after the publication of a statement in Pravda in late January 1948. Pravda asserted that "the main problem of these countries is not the federation or confederation they have dreamt up, but the safeguarding and strengthening of their independence and sovereignty by means of organizing and mobilizing their own popular democratic forces."^{32/} The tone of the statement reflected the requirements of co-operation in the "Cominform-style", in line with Stalin's expectations. These requirements were to become widespread in the years ahead and failed to tolerate the independent-minded initiatives of even such politicians like Tito and Dimitrov, who were highly esteemed in the international communist movement. The issue of Greece - going back to the tensions of World War II - was a problem elevated to the sphere of the superpowers as it was considered to lay "outside" of the political competence of the small states of the region.

Thus the various interpretations of the idea of integration soon disappeared from Hungarian political forums as well. However, in the spring of 1948 one of the publications, which was issued on the centennial of the 1848 bourgeois revolution, claimed that "the Hungarian Peoples' Democracy can call itself a direct descendant of the 1848-1849 War of Independence with very good reason, since the foreign policy pursued by this country, the agreements signed with

Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Poland, were the first step towards realizing the ideas of Kossuth". The program that is reflected in the title of this publication, "The Alliance of Danubian Nations. Contemporary Hungarian Foreign Policy as the Realization of the Ideas of Kossuth",^{33/} fell into the pattern of the years 1945 and 1946, namely, in that contemporary political objectives were presented in a historicizing context. Nevertheless, it performed no other role but that of the swan-song of integrational attempts.

Notes

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- 2/ Joachim Kühl, *Föderationspläne im Donaauraum und in Ostmitteleuropa.* München, 1958; Rudolf Wierer, *Der Föderalismus im Donaauraum.* Graz-Köln, 1960; Francois Fejtő, *Die Geschichte der Volksdemokratien. Band I. Die Ara Stalin, 1945-1953.* Graz-Wien-Köln, 1972; Krisztov Lazo, *A délkelet-európai népi demokratikus országok együttműködéséről, 1944-1948.* (About Cooperation among the South-East European Peoples' Democracies, 1944-1948) Budapest, 1972.
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- 4/ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Vol. I. 762; György Ránki, *Geschichtsliterarische Fragen Ostmitteleuropas im Zweiten Weltkrieg.* In: *Ostmitteleuropa im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, ed. Ferenc Glatz. Budapest, 1979, 33.
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- 7/ W. S. Churchill, *The Second World War. Vol. VI. Triumph and Tragedy.* London, 1954, 60 - 64.
- 8/ Attila Sipos (ed), *Groza Péter emlékére* (In Memoriam Péter Groza) Budapest, 1984, 72 - 74.
- 9/ *Szabad Nép* (Free People), September 23, 1945.
- 10/ *Köztársaság* (Republic), June 13, 1946.
- 11/ *Köztársaság*, June 27, 1946.
- 12/ In: János Jemnitz, *A magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt külpolitikai irányvonalának alakulásához, 1945-1948.* (To the Development of the Foreign Policy of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party, 1945-1948) *Történelmi Szemle*, Vol. 2-3. (1965) 163; Tibor Hajdu, Károlyi Mihály. Budapest, 1978, 503.
- 13/ Sándor Szalai, *A magyar béke és a világbéke.* (Hungarian Peace and World Peace) *Köztársaság*, June 27, 1946.
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- 26/ Krisztov Lazo, op. cit., 76.
- 27/ Miklós Gimes, Új nagyhatalom (A New Great Power) Szabad Nép, December 7, 1947.
- 28/ Ibid.
- 29/ Petru Groza's speech delivered at the Hungarian Writers' Association during his visit in Budapest in May 1947, Szabad Nép, May 4, 1947.
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G y ö r g y G y a r m a t i

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OFFICIAL ANTI-SEMITISM AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS IN INTERWAR HUNGARY

This paper is a short summary of my research on the political behavior of the two largest and most important professional groups in interwar Hungary: the lawyers and the physicians. My research is based primarily on the archives of professional associations, such as the Archives of the Hungarian Chamber of Law and the Hungarian Chamber of Physicians. In addition to the records of associational life, the Archives of the Chamber of Law contains the personal files of an estimated 10,000 lawyers, that is a file on every single lawyer who practiced his profession in Budapest between 1867 and 1968. Most probably because its location was unknown to historians, this enormous material has never been used for historical research, and still awaits a thorough socio-historical investigation. My research in the Archives was primarily focused on the reconstruction of articulate economic, political and social conflicts among professional groups, with special emphasis on the influence of right-wing ideologies among professionals in the interwar years.

In the last few years, extensive research has been conducted on the Nazi-fication of the legal and the medical profession in Nazi Germany, by, among others, Michael Kater in Canada and, Konrad Jarausch in the United States.^{1/} These historians have pointed to the remarkable speed at which, after 1933, the German doctors and lawyers, these foremost representatives of the German Bürgertum, submitted to the political demands of the totalitarian National Socialist regime. What is more, Kater and Jarausch have demonstrated that the German doctors and lawyers were in fact overeager to employ the most stringent racial discrimination against their Jewish colleagues, and to join the National Socialist movement.

To give only one example, the German National Socialist Lawyers' League, which, in 1928, numbered only 250 members, by 1934, boasted of 13,000 mem-

bers.^{2/} This political activism made the lawyers and the doctors almost unique among the major German professional groups.

In contrast to Germany, where anti-Semitic legislation was the direct result of Hitler's assumption of total power in 1933, in Hungary, the first anti-Semitic measure predated the German by over a decade. Anti-Semitic legislation in Hungary was introduced in an authoritarian counterrevolutionary state in 1920. Paradoxically enough, this counterrevolutionary system, far from becoming totalitarian, managed gradually to restore the fundamental liberal institutions of the prewar regime, among them, the parliament, the multi-party system, and the freedom of the press. Therefore, while, on the one hand, Hungarian official anti-Semitism encouraged the early development of organized anti-Semitism, it is also true that the political system within which this legislation was put into effect, allowed for incomparably more political and social freedom than did the political system of Nazi Germany.

Consequently, in Hungary, all social groups - Jewish and non-Jewish alike - were freer than in Germany to develop their diverse strategies in adjusting to the spread of political anti-Semitism. It is in this light that I shall try to analyze the striking political diversity of the two major professions, the legal and the medical, with one profession outdoing official anti-Semitism by an ever widening margin and the other resisting official anti-Semitism to an astonishing degree.

When, in the year 1920, the anti-Semitic Numerus Clausus Law limited the proportion of Jews to approximately 6 percent of the total university student body, 51 percent of all private lawyers, and 46 percent of all practicing doctors were of the Jewish faith and an additional 5 to 10 percent consisted of Jews who had only recently converted to Christianity. Uniquely among the Central European States, in Hungary, the legal profession was dominated, even in absolute terms, by Jews, and the situation was not much different in the medical profession. This at a time, when in Germany the proportion of Jews among lawyers did not surpass 16 percent and their proportion among doctors was less than 15 percent.^{3/}

No wonder then that in Hungary's postwar economic and political crisis, the gentile educated classes - who were suddenly deprived of their former secure careers in the immense Austro-Hungarian army and bureaucracy, and who were swamped by the arrival of refugees from dismembered Transylvania and Slovakia - found the most aggressive outlet for their frustrations in fighting the conspicuous concentration of Jews in the professions. From that time on, the practice of law, medicine and engineering became the ultimate refuge for those holding, or aspiring to a university degree. The search for this refuge now became intimately tied with Judeophobia, the fight to expel Jews from the professions.

Among all the professionals, the medical doctors were the first to adopt a violent anti-Semitic posture. As early as August, 1919, still under the revolutionary Bolshevik government, a clandestine right-wing association was formed by military doctors and highly placed professors of medicine, with the aim of expelling Jewish doctors from all institutions of public health and the army. As the Bolshevik government collapsed, the new association, called the National Union of Hungarian Doctors, immediately engaged in an anti-Semitic purge among state-employed doctors and medical students accused of having supported the revolution.

Quickly gaining in support and power, the Union prevailed upon the government to enact the anti-Semitic Numerus Clausus Law which, in its original draft, as of early 1920, had not yet contained any discriminatory measures against the Jews. At first, this law was not even directed against the Jews, but against women, by proposing to restrict severely the number of female university students. Only under the pressure of the medical profession and the mechanical engineers did the Numerus Clausus Bill end up as an anti-Jewish measure.

Preventing young Jews from entering the medical profession was not the only anti-Semitic measure the Medical Union demanded from the government. It also demanded the exclusion of Jews from state medical services, especially from the 1920's on, when the government, along the lines of the etatist political philosophy of Hungary's resourceful conservative prime minister Count István Bethlen embarked, on a grand scale, in the development of centralized medical insurance for the industrial population. Within less than a decade, the proportion of industrial workers benefitting from insurance plans grew from a prewar 30 percent to 80 percent by 1927. This in turn, created an unprecedented boom on the medical job market.

The Racist Medical Union successfully utilized the boom on the job market to ensure that only gentile doctors would have access to the new salaried positions offered by the expanding welfare system. The immense success of the racist medical union can be measured by the fact that, within a decade, racial segregation within the medical profession became close to complete. By 1930, 70 percent of all gentile medical doctors were salaried employees of a centralized insurance organization, whereas close to 80% of all Jewish doctors were left to earn their livelihood on the competitive market.^{4/}

The sweeping success of the racist Union in securing employment for its members quickly turned the Union into the single greatest and most aggressive right-wing professional organization in Hungary. By 1930, approximately 4,000

out of the 5,000 gentile physicians, that is, an astonishing 80 percent belonged to the Racist Medical Union.

It was at the height of its success that the racist union suffered its first reversal under the impact of the great depression of the 1930's. With the national financial system on the verge of collapse, the very first cuts in the state budget affected the state employees, among them the gentile doctors. The government was now using all its powers to preserve the relatively high level of centralized health care in the cities, even if the price to be paid was to antagonize the doctors by freezing the price of medical services.

But, for the racist doctors, the greatest psychological shock was only to come in the next few years when it became clear that private doctors, by now mostly Jewish, had recovered economically much faster and more successfully than those left at the mercy of a bankrupt state. By the mid-1930's, it also became evident that the quick recovery of private doctors was a direct consequence of the splitting of the medical profession into private and public sectors, with the private sector covering the needs of the affluent, and the public sector obliged to take care of the more or less deprived.

The bitter lesson of the great depression created a remarkable ideological confusion within the ranks of the racist medical union. Entrapped in a centralized medical system for which the racist doctors themselves had been fighting over many years, they now began to look upon private practice as the main avenue of escape from government control or, in other words, as a way to re-establish their economic independence. But for this, they now had to stage a fight on two fronts: one against the government and another, against the 4,000-strong group of Jewish doctors holding on to their long established positions in the medical free market. This dual confrontation is what explains the extreme radicalism of the racist medical union in the late 1930's and during the war. The ever growing anti-Semitism of the racist doctors became closely tied to their rejection of governmental interference in medical care. Thus, while, on the one hand, the racist doctors expected from the government the full implementation of totalitarian methods against the Jews, on the other hand, their economic ideology became increasingly anti-etatist, or, in other words, free-market oriented.

Their newly found economic liberalism did not, however, prevent the leadership of the racist union from joining forces with pro-Nazi elements in, and to the right of the Hungarian Government Party, and from establishing warm relations with the German National Socialist Medical Association. Nor were the racist doctors discouraged from their pro-Nazi sympathies by their full awareness of the fact that their German counterparts, obsessed with the theory of the

superiority of the German race, relegated the Magyars into the category of inferior, non-Aryan peoples. Aryan racist theories notwithstanding, the superior attraction for the Hungarian right-wing doctors was the radical anti-Semitism of the German Nazis.

The National Socialist triumph in Germany encouraged the Hungarian racist medical union to act as the most outspoken pressure group for the enactment of anti-Semitic legislation. It was partly through the efforts of the Medical Union that the anti-Jewish laws of 1938 and 1939 eventually banned Jews from entering the professions. By now, the racist medical union totally disregarded the efforts of the government to preserve social medicine and it demanded the withdrawal of the license of every Jewish doctor in Hungary.

After Hungary had entered the war in 1941 on the side of Germany, the Union leaders spoke up in Parliament for sending all Jewish doctors to forced labor on the Russian front. Moreover, the Union presented the army with an all-inclusive list of Jewish doctors to be sent away to Russia. The process was repeated following the German occupation of Hungary in March, 1944, when S. S. Lieutenant Colonel Adolf Eichmann and his Hungarian collaborators were given new lists of Jewish doctors. As a result, an estimated 78 percent of the Hungarian Jewish doctors were dead or missing at the end of the war. This was in excess of the losses suffered by Hungarian Jewry in general, and it far exceeded the proportion of Jewish losses in the other professions.

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In the light of the success of violent organized anti-Semitism among medical doctors, one is astonished to find how unsuccessful organized anti-Semitism proved to be within the Hungarian legal profession. In contrast to the doctors, whose racist union was formed secretly under the Bolshevik regime in 1919, anti-Semitic lawyers were able to create their own organization only in 1927. Again, in contrast to the gentile doctors, 80 percent of whom had quickly joined the racist union, the racist National Union of Hungarian Lawyers could never, throughout the entire interwar period, rally more than 650 members; that is, a pitiful 8 percent of the legal profession.

In 1920, when the Numerus Clausus Law was enacted, the President of the Budapest Chamber of Law declared publicly that - to quote his words - "We, the leaders of the Chamber of Hungarian Lawyers declare the Numerus Clausus Law to be in grave violation of the principle of equality before the law. Therefore, we are fully determined to fight the letter and the spirit of this legislation with all the power at our disposal."^{5/} A statement of this nature by a jurist carried

much more weight and was conducive to greater retaliation than a similar statement by the leader of any profession.

Despite all pressure by right-wing forces and the Ministry of Justice, the leadership of the Chamber of Lawyers never withdrew its promise to fight for equality before the law, not even in the period of the anti-Jewish laws of 1938-1939, or during World War Two. After the second anti-Jewish Law of 1929 had made Jewish lawyers defenseless against government discrimination, the gentile elite of the legal profession formed a new, liberal organization, consisting only of Christian lawyers, the sole aim of which was to defend their Jewish colleagues and to prevent the Racist National Lawyers Union from gaining the upper hand in the Chamber of Lawyers. For more than three years after 1939, this Christian liberal association succeeded in preventing an extreme-rightist takeover in the Chamber. The Chamber officially condemned incitement against the Jews, and successfully mitigated the effect of governmental discrimination by, among others, gaining exemptions from the Jewish Laws, by intervening on behalf of Jewish lawyers called up for labor service, and, last, but not least, by falsifying records and statistics. As a result, hundreds of Jewish lawyers were registered by the Chamber of Law as non-Jews.

Contemporary observers never ceased to express their puzzlement over the failure of the anti-Semitic political movements to create a deep split within the 6,000 strong group of Hungarian lawyers on a confessional or racial basis. In my view, one of the factors blocking racial segregation was the exceptionally high level of social integration of lawyers, based on a complex system of cooperation of the Jews with their gentile colleagues. Jewish and non-Jewish lawyers not only had many joint offices, but, they together created several liberal political parties, and they sat together in county and city councils, prestigious casinos and clubs, not to speak of the Freemasonic Lodges. Inter-marriage between Jewish and non-Jewish families of lawyers was much more frequent than in other social groups.

Economic reasons were also responsible for preventing segregation among lawyers. Anti-Semitic politicians themselves argued that their failure to win over the gentile lawyers was due to the lawyers being "in the pay of Jewish capital". This did, indeed, contain an element of truth. In the 1920s, according to a contemporary estimate, 40 percent of all gentile lawyers in Budapest represented Jewish-owned enterprises.^{6/} Considering the important role private lawyers played in business-management, the significance of the collaboration between Jewish and non-Jewish lawyers in banks, and other business enterprises cannot be overestimated.

This, however, still fails to account for the tolerant attitude of the remaining 60 percent of gentile lawyers towards their Jewish colleagues. Another important factor in shaping their behavior was the strong liberal political tradition which characterized the collective associational life of Hungarian lawyers. As opposed to most professional groups, the political and social associations of lawyers were mostly formed back in the 19th century, in the age of liberalism. Note that the first political associations of the other professional groups such as the doctors or the engineers were created only after the First World War as a reaction to the disintegration of the liberal political system. Lacking a serious political tradition, these professions reacted to the tremendous political crisis of 1918-1919 by forming typical mass organizations, such as the one which rallied the physicians into a single right-wing block. Among the lawyers the hegemony of traditional liberal associations stood in the way of the rise of new political forces. Anti-liberal, or totalitarian ideologies failed to exercise an attraction on the liberal lawyers who thus managed to resist collectively the growing interventionism of the state.

The prolonged survival of the liberal tradition among lawyers was in part due to the fact that in opposition to the physicians or the engineers, the post-liberal age brought no fundamental change in the professional life of the lawyers. The lawyers did not become integrated into the great corporations or into the state apparatus. Even such lawyers who worked for the great banks or the big industrial enterprises preserved consciously their operational independence. Rather than becoming salaried employees, the lawyers chose to keep their own law offices and worked for business or for the government on a contractual basis.

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The final test of the political liberalism and religious tolerance of the gentile lawyers came in March, 1944, with the German occupation. In those days when the racist doctors were busy submitting complete lists of Jewish doctors to the Nazi occupying forces, the Quisling government of Hungary was unable to obtain the cooperation of most gentile lawyers, in liquidating the offices of Jewish lawyers.

The end of the war brought to a close the threat of racial discrimination for the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust. One would logically expect that the gentile doctors, with their sense of total political defeat, found the adjustment to the new, left-wing coalition government extremely difficult, whereas, the liberal lawyers, uncompromised in right-wing, racist policies, would adjust to the new system rather successfully. But this was not to be the case. With the medical system in shambles, and with 57 percent of all Hungarian doctors lost in the war,

by 1947, 90 percent of all gentile physicians had passed the denazification procedures, and, by the same year, 45 percent of them had joined the communist, or the social democratic party.^{7/} On the other hand, the majority of lawyers, Jews, and non-Jews alike, found it increasingly difficult to adjust to the new political order. True to their tradition, the lawyers attempted to reconstruct their chamber in a liberal framework. Although for them the denazification procedures represented no danger, their attempt at the restoration of the liberal chamber of law was, by 1948, completely frustrated, as the country was undergoing a transformation into a one-party system. By 1950, 60 percent of all Hungarian private lawyers had lost their licenses, which left the country with no more than 2,000 out of its original 6,000 lawyers. If already back in the 1920's the survival of liberalism among lawyers was primarily made possible by the strength of their professional, economic and social traditions, now, following the Second World War, this tradition was irresistibly overridden by stronger forces, and the conflicts between Jewish and non-Jewish professionals were transposed into a different political context. The new, Stalinist state had no use for liberal lawyers. As for medical doctors; they had definitely lost their taste for politics, or interest representation, but, because they were needed, they have easily found their place in the new society.

Notes

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COOPERATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF THE DANUBIAN BASIN IN RIVER NAVIGATION

Few waterways compare with the Danube in terms of its linking so many nations and peoples. Millions of people and billions of tons of goods have been shipped via the Danube since ancient times, from the rafts and dugouts of prehistoric men, to barges, barks and the freighters of more recent times, while galleys and warships sailed it in wartime.

Ties between these peoples date back thousands of years. However, the nature of their relationships varied widely. Peace brought prosperity and happiness for the peoples and nations along the banks of the Danube, but frequent wars decimated the population and often ravaged these countries to such an extent that their development was arrested for a long time.

The Paris Peace Treaty of 1856 declared the Danube an international waterway and founded the European Danube Commission (Commission Européenne du Danube). Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey were represented in the Commission. This Commission can be regarded as the first international organization for navigation on the Danube, the sphere of authority of which, however, was limited to the length of the river between its Black Sea delta and Isaccea. The Paris Peace Treaty also provided for the establishment of a so-called River Commission. However, this organization was short-lived, since the document concerning navigation on the river, drawn up by the commission, was rejected.

The 1858 Second Paris Congress and the 1866 Third Paris Congress extended the assignment of the European Danube Commission in several successive steps. At the 1878 Berlin Congress the major European Powers commissioned the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to make the Lower Danube navigable, including the "Iron Gate" (Vaskapu). The Hungarian government shouldered sole responsibility and all expenses for executing the entire work. The "Vaskapu-csatorna", later called Sip

Canal, was opened for river navigation on September 27, 1896. (See Danubian Historical Studies, Vol. 1. Number 1.) The Sip Canal made the transshipment of goods a thing of the past. Although authorization was granted by the Berlin Congress, the Hungarian government did not charge for the passage, irrespective of what flag the ships sailed under. The point was to promote navigation on the Danube.

The 1883 London Conference extended the licence of the European Danube Commission for another 21 years. According to the provisions of the agreement, the assignment of the Commission was to be further extended by three-year terms on the expiration of the first 21-year licence, if no member notified the other nations represented on the commission one year prior to the expiration of the three-year extension, deeming it necessary to either change the composition of the commission or review its assignment. Uniform navigational rules and rules concerning river survey for the region of the Danube between the Iron Gate and Braila were also adopted by the Conference.

The International Danube Commission (Commission Internationale du Danube), with the participation of Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania and two German states along the upper stretch of the Danube was founded at the 1921 Paris Conference, which was convened in accord with the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty of 1919. An Administration of the Iron Gate, which was to be in charge of the region of the Danube Rapids, was established from among the representatives of Romania and Yugoslavia and with the participation of the International Danube Commission.

A multilateral trade and navigation agreement was concluded, and the so-called Betriebsgemeinschaft was founded by Hungarian, Austrian and German shipping companies on October 1, 1926 with a view to reducing operating expenses, increasing turnover and making navigation on the Danube more economical by joint action in handling freight.

The opening of the Hungarian Royal Duty-Free Port in Budapest in 1928 was a major event in the development of navigational infrastructure. The beginning of fluvio-maritime navigation on the Danube, i.e., without transshipment at the mouth of the Danube - significantly increased the importance of the port. The first such voyage was accomplished in 1933 by a Dutch vessel, the "Appolinaris III". The first Hungarian ship designed and built specifically for both Danube and maritime navigation, the "Budapest", was launched in 1934. New opportunities for international cooperation between nations along the Danube and the peoples of the Middle East opened up in this way.

France, Great Britain and Romania concluded the Sinai Agreement in August,

1938. Germany and Italy adhered to the agreement on March 1, 1939, in the Bucharest Treaty. The above-mentioned events and legal documents changed the legal background to navigation on the Danube. The European Danube Commission lost its control over navigational issues. From then on the Commission was only entitled to ratify navigational tariffs, work out recommendations for river pilots, and oversee hydraulic construction. However, the Commission was not empowered to modify plans. At the same time, Germany joined the European Danube Commission.

Soon after this, Germany convened a conference in Vienna. The representatives of Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia and Yugoslavia decided to annul the 1921 Treaty of Paris and to dissolve the International Danube Commission. A new administrative body, the River Council, was founded to replace the Commission. The Administration of the Iron Gate and Rapids, in which Germany had become represented besides Yugoslavia and Romania, was subordinated to the River Council.

Entirely new recommendations were worked out and submitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers at the 1946 Paris Peace Conference. The recommendations were debated and the Council of Foreign Ministers accepted the following passage, which was to be included in the Peace Treaties:

"Navigation on the Danube shall be free and open for the nationals, vessels of commerce and goods of all states, on a footing of equality in regard to port and navigation charges and conditions for merchant shipping. The foregoing shall not apply to traffic between ports of the same state."

It was also decided at the Paris Peace Conference that six months after the peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania come into force, a conference with the participation of the representatives of the Foreign Ministerial Council of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Romania, the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, the U.S.A. and Yugoslavia must be convened to work out a new navigational agreement. As one of the Danubian countries, Austria was entitled to join the Convention on the Regime of Navigation on the Danube after signing a separate peace treaty.

The Danube Conference started on July 30, 1948 in Belgrade. The above-mentioned convention was signed after lengthy debate on August 18, which came to be known as the Danube Convention or the Belgrade Agreement. As opposed to the earlier convention of 1921, the Belgrade Convention concerns shipping only on the Danube from Ulm to the Black Sea, through the Sulina arm, with the outlet to the sea through the Sulina channel. (The 1921 Convention declared the whole of the Danube and its tributaries an international waterway.)

The two former commissions were replaced by only one international commission, the Danube Commission, which had administrative, advisory and coordinative functions. The signatories of the convention were Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, and Yugoslavia.

The new agreement opened new possibilities for developing shipping and international relations. The signatories to the agreement declared in the preamble that the signing of the Convention is motivated by their desire to enhance economic and cultural ties among the Danubian nations themselves and with other nations.

The Danube Commission, founded by the Convention, was first headquartered in Galac, Romania, and then moved to Budapest in 1954. Austria joined the Convention on January 7, 1960. The Federal Republic of Germany is being represented on the Commission by the experts of the Ministry of Transportation in an observer capacity since 1957.

The existence of the Danube Commission is a good example of the cooperation between the nations of the Danube Valley. By maintaining relations with a number of international organizations, the Commission performs manifold functions. The Commission has close ties with many international organizations, the relationship having been established either by separate agreements or by correspondence. There is regular cooperation between the Danube Commission and the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), in which the Danube Commission holds the status of an international organization; the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA); the World Health Organization (WHO); the World Meteorological Organization (WMO); the International Telecommunication Union (ITU); the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT); the Central Commission for Rhine Navigation (CCNR); the Oder Commission (OR); the International Maritime Organization (IMO); the Danube Research Team of the International Limnological Association (SIL); the Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses (PIANC); the Bratislava Conference of the Directors of Shipping Companies, etc. These organizations are either directly or indirectly concerned with the major issues of river and/or maritime navigation. Cooperation between the Danube Commission and the above-mentioned organizations has been mutually beneficial for all parties concerned. International cooperation between a much broader circle of nations goes on within the framework of these organizations, since it is not only the nations of the Danube Valley but also the members of the UNECE and the CMEA that are involved. The exchange of experiences and documents, participation in the work of these organizations and

the participation of the representatives of these organizations in the work of the Danube Commission in the capacity of observers provide ever newer opportunities for broadening the circle of already manifold activities to further the cause of navigation on the Danube.

Navigation on the Danube revived soon after World War II, and by 1955 the coordination of the commercial and administrative issues of international shipping were an obvious necessity. The Directors of Danubian Shipping Companies signed the "Bratislava Agreements" in 1955. The Conference of the Directors of Shipping Companies bears a close resemblance to maritime shipping conferences. The original parties to the Conference were the shipping companies of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and the Soviet Union. The Austrian, West German and Yugoslav shipping companies joined the Conference only later. The Conference is an international but not an inter-governmental organization, in which all shipping companies on the Danube are represented in order to coordinate their interests and to achieve a higher level of utilization of the Danube fleet, ports and the waterway itself.

Having reviewed the major issues in this era of the history of shipping on the Danube, the following events that had facilitated the development of navigation on the Danube on the international level are worth mentioning.

The Austrian Donau-Dampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft (DDSG) acted on the initiative of Count István Széchenyi when it founded the Óbuda Shipyard on Óbuda Island in 1835. (Today it is called the "Óbuda Shipyard of GANZ-DANUBIUS Hungarian Ship- and Crane-Building Company".) Most of the steamships of DDSG had been built here before the Korneuburg Shipyard was opened.

We have already mentioned the canalization of the Danube gorges at the Iron Gate, a giant project also inspired by the Hungarian Count Széchenyi. The regulation of the river opened up the whole Danube to river transportation, although the transshipment of goods was still necessary. Passage along the entire length of the river was navigable for all vessels free of charge.

Another section of the upper stretch of the river was regulated by the locks at Jochenstein that had been started as a joint venture of Germany and Austria and was finished after the end of World War II. The Iron Gate Hydroenergy and Navigation System, built by Romania and Yugoslavia, was inaugurated in 1972. Shipping bypasses the huge dam in a pair of locks so that even fully loaded ships can sail regardless of the water level. The countries situated along the banks of the Danube contributed a total of US \$ 55.5 million to the construction costs of this complex navigational facility.

The construction of the joint Czechoslovak-Hungarian hydroelectric power plant and navigational system at Gabčíkovo and Nagymaros was started recently. After finishing the project, the shallows that have made navigation on the Danube at times difficult, will disappear and the entire length of the river will be deep enough for safe navigation as stipulated in the Recommendations of the Danube Commission. There are several other joint construction projects planned or under way.

The following data must be taken into consideration when evaluating the state navigation on the Danube (1982):

The Danube fleet

number of ships	4,910
total engine power of the fleet	726,340 kW
tonnage	4,049,380 tons
total amount of goods shipped via the Danube	74,890,000 tons
total amount of goods handled by Danube ports	132,336,800 tons

Passenger traffic on the Danube

number of passenger ships	154
total seating capacity of the fleet	33,852
the number of local passenger ship lines	
between ports in the same country	40
the total length of the local lines	3,286 km
the number of passenger ship lines between	
two or more countries	9
the total length of international lines	4,536 km
total number of passengers	6,285,800
total length of voyages in passenger traffic	
(in passenger kilometers)	294,443,500

These figures speak for themselves and prove that the eight nations of the Danube Valley command a significant commercial fleet.

Traffic on the Danube increased 8.2 times between 1950 and 1982, cabotage shipping grew 9.6-fold, the exports of the countries of the Danube Valley shipped via the Danube increased 5.4 times and shipping between two or more countries grew 6.3-fold. In the period stated above, 1,480,361,500 tons of goods were shipped via the Danube, 585.2 million tons of which were shipped from one country to another, and 895.2 million tons were in cabotage shipping.

The quantity of goods shipped in international transportation amounts to an average of 17.73 million tons per year during the above mentioned period. Taking shipments from other countries also into consideration, each of the eight countries along the Danube handled an average of 2.22 million tons of goods a year.

It is worth considering, whether the ever-increasing foreign-trade relations call for an increased utilization of the Danube as a means of transport of goods in foreign trade. It may be surprising, but not a single ton of goods was transported in 1982 on Soviet ships to Romania, on Romanian ships to Bulgaria, on Romanian ships to Hungary, on Bulgarian ships to Yugoslavia, on Austrian ships to Yugoslavia, to Hungary or to Czechoslovakia, on ships of the German Federal Republic to Czechoslovakia. The amount of goods shipped via the Danube on Bulgarian ships to Hungary, on Yugoslavian ships to Hungary, on Yugoslavian ships to Romania and on Austrian ships to Romania was about 1,000 tons each. Romanian ships transported 6,000 tons of goods to the Soviet Union, and 5,000 tons to Yugoslavia. Bulgarian ships took 9,000 tons to the Soviet Union and 3,000 tons to Romania. Since it is common knowledge that inland navigation is the best means of transporting large quantities of bulk commodities at long distances, it is hard to understand why the countries of the Danube Valley fail to take advantage of the excellent opportunities. The construction of inland waterways rated of international interest in accord with the resolution of the UNECE, such as the Danube-Main-Rhine canal (under construction), the Rhine-Rhone waterway and the Danube-Oder-Elbe canal (planned) will be finished one day. Gradually, a network of connecting inland waterways in Europe is being constructed which will link fourteen countries on the European continent. All the issues that call for immediate action in order to ensure that navigation on these future international waterways will be undisturbed, must be tackled at once. Already in 1957 I pointed out the main problems of international cooperation to be solved. Furthermore, I compiled a list of recommended measures in 1978 (see Közlekedéstudományi Szemle, May 1957 and October 1978).

I have also recommended repeatedly that a Water Transport Executive Committee be founded. The committee would operate within the framework of the UN Economic Commission for Europe and would be convened once a year in Geneva. The Water Transport Executive Committee would discuss and formulate the main principles that could serve as guidelines to be carried out by international navigational organizations in charge of the area in question and by the member country involved. In lack of an international organization of this kind,

carrying out a recommendation would be the sole responsibility of the government bodies of the country involved. The Executive Committee would consist of international navigational organizations (like the Danube Commission, the Central Commission for Rhine Navigation and Commissions to be founded later would be welcome to join, and the representatives of the countries touching on the rivers in question. The Executive Committee would, at the same time, co-ordinate the differing legal and law-enforcement systems of the member countries. The existence of such an organization would perfectly match the recommendations of the Helsinki Final Act. At the same time, it would be doubly advantageous in that the resolutions (or recommendations) adopted by the Executive Committee would be carried out by the Water Transport Executive Committee and the international navigational organizations on a multilateral basis, and by the Executive Committee and the countries concerned on a bilateral basis.

Having reviewed the past and pointed out some of the issues of river navigation and foreign trade, we may also gain an insight into the future of inland navigation.

If the plans are realized, we may come closer to carrying out the principles expressed in the Charter of the United Nations. "We, the peoples of the United Nations determined... to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,... to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours,... to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples, have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims."

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G y ö r g y F e k e t e

Transport Committee of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences

BEUST'S SUBMISSION ADDRESSED TO THE EMPEROR REQUESTING
HIS GETTING APPOINTED REICHSKANZLER, DATED JUNE 11, 1867¹

If we may focus our attention on one particular case and concentrate on one aspect of the development of history, we might do this with the submission of Friedrich Ferdinand Beust, Minister of Imperial House and of Foreign Affairs (Minister des kaiserlichen Hauses und des Äusseren). Not because this is more legible or comprehensible than other documents of this type, but because its filing coincides with a significant historic moment which makes the thorough analysis and commentary of the "alleruntertänigster Vortrag" worthwhile.

Emperor Franz Josef was crowned King of Hungary in Buda on June 8, 1867. After having been crowned, he ratified the laws concerning the compromise. Friedrich Ferdinand Beust accompanied the monarch to the Hungarian capital. It was during his stay in Buda that Beust applied for the position of Chancellor of the Empire, which is in itself unique.

The submission seems to have been written as a result of the pressure during the summer of that year.

The Magyar Compromise was reached in the spring of 1867. In February, Emperor Franz Josef had appointed the Hungarian government, but it took several months for the Austrian parliament to ratify the law concerning the Compromise. In the meantime the Austrian majority of the Imperial Parliament formed an Austrian Parliament.² Until then the administration of the Empire and kingdoms and countries (Cisleithania) represented within the Imperial Council had not been separated. It is easy to understand that this transitional state in itself was problematic from the parliamentary procedure aspect. Beust, Minister of Imperial House and of Foreign Affairs was appointed Prime Minister on February 7, 1867. As such he was in charge of the administration of Cisleithania, and, in addition to being Prime Minister, he was also Minister of Culture and Education. The Austrian liberals who were neither capable of nor willing to oppose the new dualist system withdrew from government affairs until its ratification by Parliament.

Herbst, a senior liberal politician, justified his refusal of a ministerial portfolio as follows:

"Dasselbe ist aus dem Reichsministerium hervorgegangen und fungiert noch als Reichsministerium...Da jedoch das Reichsministerium zugleich das Landesministerium für die diesseitigen Länder bildete, so musste die leidige Folge eintreten, dass das Interesse des Reiches wesentlich als mit dem der diesseitigen Länder zusammenfallend und jenem Ungarns entgegengesetzt und jede von Ungarn dem Reiche gemachte Konzession eigentlich als eine Konzession für die Erbländer erschien und noch heute diesseits wie jenseits vielfach so aufgefasst wird. Darüber wurde das, was allein wahr ist, vollständig verdunkelt, nämlich dass das Interesse der Erbländer am Reiche kein anderes ist, und sie zu keinen relativ grösseren Opfer nötigt, als das, welches Ungarn am Reiche nimmt und in seinem eigenen wohlverstandenen Interesse nehmen muss."³

Beust could afford to reject Herbst's important conclusions. According to Herbst there are three opposing interests within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It might have been only a pretext on the part of Beust that while applying to the Emperor for the post of Chancellor of the Empire, he explained his application in part with Herbst having failed to accept the ministerial post. This reference to Herbst's failure to accept the offered post was not just a pretext. Herbst's letter to which many had reacted (and which had been published in newspapers) certainly had contributed to the realization by the political leaders in the monarchy that there are three opposing interests within the Empire. As a result of the letter they also arrived at the conclusion that of the three opposing interests that of the Empire should predominate.

Beust wanted to apply the new dualist system in everyday government affairs by preserving as much as possible the institutions of the Gesamtmonarchie. We can read in Beust's Vortrag that the reorganization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must take place in such a way that "issues concerning the Ministry of Commerce should be retained to the greatest possible degree within the sphere of authority in charge of mutual affairs". And the main reason why he made the submission requesting the post of Imperial Chancellor was that in essence it meant the creation of the position of Prime Minister of the Empire.

The Hungarian conception of dual monarchy did not acknowledge the existence of a Gesamtmonarchie; it thus follows that they did not accept a common government as a governing body, but only ministers in charge of joint affairs ("A common ministry must be established to be in charge of issues of mutual interest").⁴ The Hungarian politicians who were signatories to the Compromise wanted the common Minister of Foreign Affairs not to be the head

of the common government but only to chair the joint council of ministers. Consequently, Beust's submission ran counter to the Hungarian understanding of dualism. By that time, however, he had won the support of the Hungarians and was primarily concerned with strengthening his position with the Austrians. His appointment as Reichskanzler in Austria would have "underlined the existence of a new state of affairs" and, furthermore, that "dualism is not to be degraded into a personal union". Beust's appointment as Chancellor was meant to win the support of the Austrians and all those who were afraid of the Gesamtmonarchie becoming a dualist state.

It is noteworthy that Beust wanted Taaffe as his deputy, and not only because Herbst had declined the ministerial post.⁵ "Taaffe has no party affiliation" wrote Beust to the Emperor; Taaffe was later called an Imperial Minister. We might say that he represented continuity between neo-absolutism and dualism not in terms of constitutionality but in that of the Reichs concept. And it was also Taaffe who represented the interests of the Empire in the Cisleithanian government (when it finally came into existence in December 1867). It was not just a mere coincidence that in 1868 it was only Taaffe from among all the members of the Austrian government, who was frequently invited to participate in the joint council of ministers.⁶

Beust's alleruntertänigster Vortrag was unique in its form. It appeared that he had not received the permission of the monarch in advance to write the Vortrag as it would have been customary. In the event of having acquired the monarch's permission he would have made an expressis verbis reference to this.⁷ That explains the frequent occurrence of extensive excuses in Beust's text, his too lengthy introduction and his failure to enclose in accordance with the custom of the day the plan of the allerhöchste Entschliessung. ("Die Fassung der allerhöchste Entschliessung die ich erst denn formulieren würde, wenn die Gedanke die allerhöchste Genehmigung fände..."). The Vortrag was preserved among the documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only in draft form, and we also cannot know when it was forwarded to the emperor. However, twelve days later Beust was appointed Chancellor of the Empire which was the fulfillment of his desires.⁸ Count Taaffe was appointed Deputy Prime Minister on June 27.⁹

Emperor Franz Josef accepted Beust's ideas: "Welche Gestaltung der Monarchie immer gegeben werden mag, Eines erscheint dabei unentbehrlich; ich meine, dass die sämtliche Aufgaben höherer Politik konzentriert und unter der unmittelbaren Aufsicht Euerer Majestät von einer mit dem Allerhöchsten Vertrauen beglückten Persönlichkeit geleitet werden. Die Justiz und Administration mag geteilt sein, nach Anerkennung des ungarischen Rechtes... über die Nützlichkeit

eines mehr oder weniger der autonomschen Befugnisse der einzelnen Königreiche und Länder in dieser Richtung kann eine Verschiedenheit der Ansichten ohne Gefährdung des höchsten Staatsinteresses bis zur einer gewissen Grenzlinie Platz greifen, aber das politische System /sic!/ muss im ganzen Umfange des Staates ein einheitliches sein und kann nur einen verantwortlichen Träger haben."¹⁰

Beust's appointment in June 1867 as Chancellor of the Empire was in keeping with the same idea. No single decree of the monarch in itself could have influenced the position of Foreign Minister in the years to come during the era of dualism, nor to what extent the joint Foreign Minister was able to function as Prime Minister of the Empire.

Allergnädigster Herr!

Indem ich das bereits mündlich angemeldete Promemoria des Abgeordneten Dr. Herbst im Anschlusse au. vorlege, gestatte ich mir einige denselben Gegenstand betreffende ehrerbietige Bemerkungen.¹¹

Das Promemoria entspricht im wesentlichen den mündlichen Äusserungen des Professors Herbst, nur verschweigt dasselbe die von ihm mit einem entschiedenen "Nein" beantwortete Frage, ob er vielleicht der Meinung sei, der Eintritt eines Minoritätsministeriums sei durch eine vollständige Neubildung, also gewissermassen durch eine vorausgehende Tabula rasa bedingt. Dagegen ist die Ausführung hinzugekommen, dass das jetzige Ministerium als Reichsministerium eine in den Verhältnissen liegende, den Interessen der zisleithanischen Hälfte ungünstige Stellung einnehme, welche ein neu eintretender Minister sich nicht aneignen möge, während aber jene Stellung des Ministeriums im allgemeinen bis zum endlichen Austrag des Ausgleiches eine Notwendigkeit bleibe. Mehr scharfsinnig als wahr ist dabei die Einstreuung, dass das jetzige Ministerium aus eben diesem Grunde das zisleithanische Interesse ungenügend vertrete, indem es die von Ungarn dem Reiche gemachten Zugeständnisse als solche hinstelle, die den zisleithanischen Ländern gemacht seien; denn offenbar fällt hier das Interesse des Reiches mit dem der zisleithanischen Länder zusammen.

Ich lasse dahingestellt, ob Professor Herbst seine und seiner Gesinnungs-genossen Gedanken vollständig ausgesprochen hat, oder ob ihm nicht unbewusst mehr noch die Idee vorschwebt, dass das jetzige Ministerium sich abnützen und ihm einen besseren Platz aufheben werde. In dieser Beziehung hat sich allerdings die Situation nach den Adressdebatten etwas geändert.¹² Dr. Herbst war übrigens selbst der Meinung, dass einige hervorragende Mitglieder der Majorität sehr gut schon jetzt in das Ministerium eintreten könnten, und es ist wohl möglich, dass sie sich jetzt, nämlich nach der Adressdebatte an meiner Seite sicherer fühlen würden als bisher.

Nichtsdestoweniger kann ich nach wiederholter und reiflicher Erwägung nicht unterlassen, Euer Majestät gnädigem und weisem Ermessen einige Betrachtungen anheimzugeben, die teils persönlicher, teils sachlicher Natur sind.

Es ist vielleicht als eine nicht nur meiner persönlichen Befriedigung, sondern auch dem Regierungsinteresse förderlich gewesene Genugtuung anzusehen, dass die wiederholten Schwierigkeiten in der Komplettierung des Ministeriums mich in die Lage gebracht haben, den Kampf mit den aufgelösten Landtagen und den ersten Waffengang mit dem Reichsrat ziemlich allein aufzunehmen. Die bisherige Annulierung hat aber ganz abgesehen von der Frage der Zulänglichkeit meiner physischen und intellektuellen Kräfte auf die Dauer entschiedene Nachteile, welche auch damit nicht beseitigt wären, wenn das Ministerium des Cultus und Unterrichts endlich einen Chef erhält. Selbst die Besorgung der Präsidialgeschäfte, die aktenmässig wohl von geringem Belange sind, mich aber fortwährend in die Notwendigkeit versetzen, über jeden Zwischenfall mit den Ministern sowohl als mit Mitgliedern des Reichsrates abgesondert zu verhandeln, zieht mich auf die Länge von den Geschäften des Ministeriums des Äussern in empfindlicher Weise ab. Letzteres ist aber in doppelter Beziehung unerwünscht. Einesteils verdient die allgemeine politische Lage volle Aufmerksamkeit, andererseits ist es jetzt Aufgabe, das Ministerium des Äussern durch eine gut organisierte und mit den geeigneten Persönlichkeiten ausgerüstete Handelssektion zu verstärken, um so viel als möglich von den Geschäften des Handelsministeriums für die gemeinsamen Angelegenheiten zu retten. Dahin gehört auch namentlich eine durchgreifende Revision des Konsulatswesens, insbesondere im Orient.

Es kommt hiezu die bevorstehende Reise nach Paris, welche ich mit ruhigem Gewissen unmöglich antreten könnte, müsste ich mein gegenwärtiges Geschäftspensum wenn auch mehreren Stellvertretern plötzlich überlassen.

Soll in diesen Beziehungen ein sowohl mir persönlich als auch den Geschäften notwendiges Gleichgewicht hergestellt werden, so halte ich es allerdings für geboten, dass ich schon jetzt in die Stellung des definitiven Reichsministers, die mit meinem Amte als Minister des Äussern verbunden sein wird, eintrete, die mir gnädigst anvertraute Führung des Präsidiums des Ministerrates in dem einstweilen fortbestehenden gemischten Ministerium¹³ dagegen bis zur definitiven Organisation des Reiches nach Massgabe des Ausgleiches provisorisch, aber mit der Ermächtigung fortzuführen habe, einen Stellvertreter für diese provisorische Funktionen Euer Majestät alleruntertänigst in Vorschlag zu bringen. Auszunehmen wären hierbei die Staatspolizei und die Presseleitung.

Selbstverständlich würde ich, falls Euer Majestät eine entsprechende Entschliessung zu fassen geruhen sollten, allen auf der Tagesordnung befindlichen

Fragen gleiche Aufmerksamkeit zuwenden wie bisher, nur mit dem Unterschiede, dass diese meine Aufmerksamkeit eine viel konzentriertere und darum auch meine Au. Vortragserstattung eine viel präzisere sein würde.

Um indessen meinen Gedanken vollständig auszusprechen, muss ich noch etwas hinzufügen, dem es mir unendlich schwer wird, Ausdruck zu geben, womit ich aber nicht zurückhalten kann, weil es meiner innigsten Überzeugung nach mit zur Sache gehört. Ich erbitte mir deshalb im voraus die allergnädigste Nachsicht, indem ich die Beteuerung hinzufüge, dass falls Euer Majestät eine entsprechende Entschliessung zu fassen, nicht für angemessen befinden sollten, ich diese Ah. Entscheidung gleichmässig vom rein sachlichen Standpunkt aus entgegennehmen würde.

Um die Geduld Euer Majestät nicht durch lange Einleitung zu ermüden, nenne ich zunächst die Sache, die ich im Auge habe. Es ist die Beilegung eines Charakters, welcher späterhin ohnedies für den Minister des kaiserlichen Hauses und des Äussern notwendig werden dürfte, da, wenn die Bestimmungen des Elaborates zur Ausführung kommen, der Präsident des Reichsministeriums - und dies wird den bestehenden Rangverhältnissen zufolge der Minister des kaiserlichen Hauses immer sein müssen - nicht zugleich Präsident des zisleithanischen Ministerrates sein kann,¹⁴ zwei Ministerpräsidenten aber nicht wohl nebeneinander bestehen können. Dem Charakter der Stellung dürfte aber wohl der Name des Reichskanzlers am besten entsprechen.

Ich bin nun der Meinung, dass eine solche Ah. Bestimmung, wenn sie jetzt erfolgte, manche Vorteile darbieten würde, ohne von wesentlichen Nachteilen begleitet zu sein. Es dürfte damit einestheils die Durchführung der neuen Ordnung der Dinge in entschiedener Weise betont und damit manchen Zweifeln ein Ende gemacht werden. Dies gilt insbesondere dem zisleithanischen Teile. Nach der ungarischen Seite hin aber würde andernteils der ernste Wille bekundet, den Dualismus nicht zur Personalunion ausarten zu lassen, sondern eine gewisse Zentralleitung in verkörperter Gestalt hinzustellen. Das - ich darf sagen - grosse Vertrauen, das mir gegenwärtig auf beiden Seiten entgegengebracht wird, dürfte ein solches Vorgehen möglich machen; es dürfte aber auch der gegenwärtige Moment, wenn es überhaupt den Ah. Absichten entsprechen sollte, nicht ungenützt zu lassen sein. Wenn ich meinem Vorschlage gemäss provisorisch mit der Führung des zisleithanischen Ministerrates oder vielmehr des gemischten Ministeriums und also auch mit der entsprechenden Verantwortung betraut bleibe, so wird in keiner Weise weder nach der einen, noch nach der anderen Seite hin verstossen. Diese Funktion würde aufhören, sobald der Ausgleich vollständig zur Ausführung kommt; ich würde aber tatsächlich das Präsidium nicht in andere

Hände legen, ohne gewissermassen herabzusteigen, worauf ich allerdings einigen Wert legen muss. Die Fassung der Ah. Entschliessung, die ich erst dann formulieren würde, wenn der Gedanke die Ah. Genehmigung fände, würde übrigens so einzurichten sein, dass sie die Gestalt einer Prädizierung, nicht einer Organisation erhielte.

Dass ich darin zugleich den höchsten Beweis Euer Majestät Huld und Gnade mit dem tiefsten Danke annehmen würde, bedarf nicht der Erwähnung. Wie sehr dadurch meine Stellung im In- und Auslande gehoben werden würde, ist ein Vorteil, den ich, wie ich aufrichtig versichern darf, nur im Interesse der mir obliegenden Aufgaben ins Auge fasse.

Wohin immer die Ah. Entschliessung ausfallen möge, glaube ich jedenfalls in bezug auf meine Stellvertretung im Präsidium des Ministerrates mich dahin aussprechen zu sollen, dass Graf Taaffe hiezu die geeignete Persönlichkeit sei, wobei freilich ich voraussetze, dass ihm mit der ihm zugedachten Ehre auch die Verpflichtung auferlegt werde, das Ministerium des Cultus und Unterrichts zu übernehmen.

Dass ich in meiner Eigenschaft als Protestant der Vertretung dieses Departements nach der Anregung der Konkordatsfrage¹⁵ enthoben werde, ist eine dringende Notwendigkeit. Eben dieses Umstandes willen wird aber ein Mitglied des Reichsrates aus der Majorität ohne die weitgehendsten Anforderungen in dieses Ministerium nicht eintreten wollen, Hasner¹⁶ am allerwenigsten, und ebensowenig eine hervorragende Persönlichkeit ausserhalb des Reichsrates, die überdies noch gefunden werden müsste. Graf Taaffe hat keine Parteiantecedentien, gilt für aufgeklärt und doch nicht für antiklerikal. Er wird den korrekten Standpunkt mit Geschick vertreten, zugleich aber auch das, was zu tun möglich und nötig ist, mit richtigem Blicke erkennen. Diese kirchliche Frage ist auch ein Grund mehr, dass ich in die Lage gebracht werde, an den Beratungen des Reichsrates nur fakultativ und nicht obligatorisch teilzunehmen, denn meine Eigenschaft als Protestant wird mich stets in die missliche Alternative versetzen, dass mir entweder von klerikaler Seite ein unberufenes Eingreifen oder von liberaler Seite eine gezwungene Passivität vorgeworfen wird.

Ofen, den 11. Juni 1867.

Notes

1/ Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna (HHStA) Administrative Registratur, F4, K399.

- 2/ Gerald Stourzh, Die österreichische Dezemberverfassung von 1867, in: Österreich in: Österreich in Geschichte und Literatur 12/1968/ pp. 1-16.
- Éva Somogyi, Vom Zentralismus zum Dualismus. Der Weg der deutsch-österreichischen Liberalen zum Ausgleich von 1867, Budapest-Wiesbaden, 1983, pp. 94-104.
- 3/ Eduard Herbst's (1820-1892) letter to Beust dated June 5, 1867. It cannot be found as an appendix to Beust's submission, but see HHStA Politisches Archiv (PA) I.K. 558. The letter was also published in the July 28th issue of the Neue Freie Presse, cf. József Zachar, The Austrian-German liberal Constitution Party and Political Power 1861-1881, Budapest, 1981, p. 302.
- 4/ 1867: law XII., paragraph 27
- 5/ Count Eduard Taaffe (1833-1895)
- 6/ Gemeinsame Ministerratsprotokolle, 1868 HHStA, PA. XL. K.283.
- 7/ HHStA, Nachlass Erb, K. 1.
- 8/ HHStA, Kabinetsarchive, Geheimakten K. 40
- 9/ HHStA, Kabinetsarchive, Geheimakten K. 41
- 10/ Beust's Vortrag about the organization of Reichkanzlei dated December 12, 1867. HHStA. Administrative Registratur, F4, K.399, ad 40/R.K.
- 11/ See reference 3.
- 12/ The Vortrag was debated during the end of May, and the beginning of June, 1867 in the Austrian Parliament. Cf. Somogyi, op.cit., p. 99.
- 13/ Gemischtes Ministerium obviously means the ministry in which the joint affairs and those concerning Cisleithania had not been separated.
- 14/ The ministry in question (i.e. the joint ministry) is not entitled to manage the parliamentary affairs of neither part of the Empire, nor can it exert any influence but on joint affairs." Law 12, 1867, paragraph 27.
- 15/ Emperor Franz Josef signed an agreement on August 18, 1855 with the Vatican. The agreement guaranteed that the Catholic Church would have extensive rights in public education and marital affairs. Josephinite bureaucracy and the liberal bourgeoisie in Austria took a joint stand against the agreement of 1855. The development of a new religious policy became a priority, and the main achievement of the liberal legislation after the Compromise of 1867.
- 16/ Leopold Hasner Artha (1818-1891), liberal member of the Reichsrat.

É v a S o m o g y i

Institute of Historical Sciences

DIE KONFERENZEN DER SOZIALISTISCHEN PARTEIEN ZENTRAL- UND OSTEUROPAS IN PRAG UND BUDAPEST, 1946 UND 1947

Stuttgart, 1985

by Peter Heumos

It would be a mistake to reduce the issues of the Post-World War II years, which happened to be a period full of hopes for the future, to a choice between the capitalist or socialist paths of development. The war was still raging when perspectives of the future of East-Central Europe were first evaluated in light of the lessons of the inter-war period. The destructive impact and role of petty nationalism in the inter-war period in disrupting of building up a common front against the expansion of the Hitlerite Germany cannot be doubted even though the Nazi aggression made the safeguarding of the national independence of the small countries of the region especially timely. It was the low level of development, or in certain cases, the stagnation of the economies of the small nations during the inter-war period that resulted in the weakness and vulnerability of these countries. Thus, it was no coincidence that a number of different political forces ranging from English liberals to certain governments-in-exile regarded some sort of confederation of nations as the solution to this problem. Forming a confederation seemed an acceptable solution to the social-democratic parties as well.

The social-democratic parties, which operated within the national framework of the Post-World War I successor states, followed the traditions of the Bruno program of the Austrian Social Democrats, who had envisaged the democratic transformation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the 20th century into a federation of states. The social-democratic parties were opposed to nationalism, the ruling idea of the age, and saw the victory of democracy only within the framework of some sort of cooperation among the nations of the Danubian Basin.

However, it became quite clear during World War II that the idea of a confederacy of smaller nations were not likely to win the support of the Soviet Union, which was about to become the leading regional power. The Soviet Union figured that such confederate states would not only try to offset the negative aspects of being small nations but would also become potential players in an anti-Soviet bloc. Furthermore, Soviet policy makers also realized that a confederate system of nations had its own potential internal contradictions, such as the possibility of feuds between nations and the restriction of national

independence in a period when the regaining of national sovereignty proved to be the most effective driving force in the struggle against Hitlerite Germany. As far as international politics are concerned, the Post-World War II years spent on restoring the structure that had existed before the war. Although leftist political forces had the upper hand over right-wing parties on the political scene, the settling of old accounts and new hatreds which were the legacy of the war characterized political developments in the countries of the region.

Heumos points out that social democrats who had returned from exile or reentered the political scene after time spent in the underground had to adjust to the new conditions. It seemed that in the midst of the struggle against right-wing forces, the post-war reconstruction and fighting economic hardships, the social democrats could not focus on the ideas outlined at the international conference of socialists in London in March 1945.

This document was drafted in the belief that the anti-fascist coalition will continue to hold and envisaged large-scale regional cooperation between nations as the economic basis of international relations in the future. As the Czechoslovak Economics Minister, a social democrat, put it: "The most favourable regional economic and political solution would be the formation of a confederacy of nations from the Baltic states to the Adriatic..., which, of course, would be based on maintaining friendship with the Soviet Union." A year after the war the idea of a confederacy seemed to have been forgotten. However, when contact - especially those between the Czech and the Hungarian social democrats, which had been severed during the war - was restored, the idea of a confederacy of nations in the Danubian Basin, or their close economic cooperation, was raised again. An agreement in principle was reached at the international socialist conference in May 1945 that a conference of the East-Central European socialists be convened as soon as possible. Besides using press reports of the period and memoirs published later, Peter Heumos's account is primarily based on the documents of the British Foreign Office. The book contains a rich collection of documents on the preparations for the Prague and Budapest conferences and the protocols of both meetings are also included. The British Labour Party, which was in power at the time, harbored illusions that there was a third alternative between the U.S.A. and the communist Soviet Union, that is, between the bourgeois parties supported by the former and communist forces backed by the latter. The Labour Party assumed responsibility for supporting the social-democratic alternative. This explains why the British embassies in the countries concerned paid close attention to the efforts of the

social democratic parties to establish cooperation between the nations of the Danubian Basin.

Responsibility for the preparations was assumed by the two strongest social-democratic parties in the Danubian Basin, namely, the Czechoslovak and the Hungarian parties. This period was marked by rivalry and even by feuds between the two countries due to the expulsion of Hungarian nationals from Czechoslovakia. While the need for cooperation was felt even more with the passage of time, the escalation of the Cold War raised new obstacles.

The Soviet Union's role in the cooperation of the nations in the Danube Basin had to be clarified and as it became clear in the course of the conference, there was no way of avoiding the issue of cooperation with the communists either. In no time it was evident that the cooperation of the Danubian Basin nations was subject to big power politics.

The Prague conference was conducted in an optimistic atmosphere and past experiences and the possible German threat were prominent on the agenda. By the time of the Budapest conference, the Cold War had escalated. It had become understood that lasting and harmonious cooperation between East and West was not likely to be achieved. In France and in Italy, the communists lost their government portfolios. The political struggle became more pronounced also in Hungary, a good example of which was the forced resignation of Premier Ferenc Nagy. Fearing right-wing attempts at restoration, some social democrats supported such harsh measures. The rest of the social democrats, however, did not agree with the communists' methods. Szakasits wished to establish cooperation between the nations situated in the Danubian Basin under the auspices of the Soviet Union. A number of his comrades, however, regarded this as a deviation from the original concept and insisted on keeping an equal distance from "the hammer of the Russians and the anvil of American imperialism".

The inherent weaknesses of the ideas themselves were also revealed during the debates of the two conferences. It would be a mistake to place blame solely on the international situation for the failure. The Hungarian social democrats' recommendations concerning the intensification of cooperation seemed to be only a list of requests rather than a well thought-out strategy. There was little evidence of their having a clear view of economic issues. While Bulgaria and Romania had already developed strong economic ties with the Soviet Union (with about 50% of their foreign trade being with the USSR), only an insignificant percentage of Czechoslovak foreign trade was with the Soviet Union and no more than 15% in the case of Hungary. What the plans of each country had in common was that they went as far as envisaging economic

cooperation between the countries in the Danubian Basin even at the level of making joint plans. While the Czechs wished to use the cooperation to make their country the workshop of Eastern Europe, the industrialization of agricultural countries was the main aim. At the conference held in the summer of 1947 the Hungarian Social Democratic Party argued in favor of merging the economies of the countries of the Danubian Basin. Some thought that the Hungarian social democrats set too fast a pace for progress in this field. Plans submitted by social-democratic economists cautiously emphasized industrialization but regarded the role of agriculture equally important.

No final resolution was passed at the conference. However, the participants left in the belief that the questions raised could be clarified in the course of further meetings. In the fall of 1947, after the Cominform had taken a tough line against social democrats, there were only tentative efforts made to distance the social democratic parties of Eastern Europe from those in West-European countries. This effort did not meet with much success in the parties torn between East and West. In one year's time there no longer were any independent social democratic parties in Eastern Europe and the idea of the economic integration of the countries of the Danubian Basin also vanished.

It is not so much the rather low-key introductory study but the documents published in Peter Heumos's book that make it outstanding. It is the protocols of the Prague and Budapest conferences that we hold especially valuable. In Prague, the delegates provided information on the situation of their respective countries and parties. Three members of the Hungarian delegation, Anna Kéthly, Ödön Kisházy and Zoltán Horváth spoke at the talks. Since Kéthly played a key role in the party, her address should be considered the most important. First, she talked about the oppression social democrats suffered during the Horthy era. Then, she pointed out the importance of cooperation between the leftist parties but added that they were not willing to set up joint organizations with the communists. She criticized the National Peasant Party, which had a strong anti-bourgeoisie and anti-Semitic bias and consequently kept weaving between Left and Right tendencies. She attributed the election defeat of the leftist parties to the behavior of the Red Army and accused the communists of opportunism on the issues of nationalism and religion. As to foreign policy, she favored friendship with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, she voiced concern over the division of the world between East and West. Finally, she criticized the Czech government's policy of persecuting the Hungarian minority.

The Budapest conference devoted much more attention to the questions of economic cooperation among the nations of the Danubian Basin. The economic

experts of the Hungarian social-democratic party prepared a number of recommendations. Cooperation would have included reconstruction, social issues and working conditions. A separate memorandum was prepared for joint action in tackling financial problems, including the establishment of a multilateral clearing system that would have been complemented by bilateral trade agreements. Since all of the speeches are published in the book, we can conclude on the basis of the protocols that there was less interest in general questions than in Prague. The opening address delivered by Árpád Szakasits reflected this approach when he emphasized that they did not wish to form any kind of a bloc. Almost no political issues were mentioned by Anna Kéthly this time. Her address primarily concerned economic issues and cultural cooperation. Most of István Ries' speech dealt with the period between the two world wars, concluding that cooperation between the two workers' parties was necessary. Another legacy of the past was the need for economic cooperation among the Central and East European countries. He expressed the hope that the support of the Soviet Union could be won for this programme. The representative of the British Labour Party attending the conference in an observer status thought that the results of the conference fell far short of expectations due partly to differences in the power relationship and partly to the rather general way recommendations for cooperation were formulated. There was a great deal of uncertainty, especially in the Hungarian and Romanian parties, about the position of the Soviet Union. Finally, the conference only succeeded in setting up some special committees charged with formulating a joint economic plan. The final chapter of the report is about the situation of the social democratic parties, which was summed up by the Labour Party representative. The political situation in Hungary was described as follows.

The Russians want to safeguard their political influence in Hungary. To achieve their desired end, they wish to take advantage of the plot, the importance of which is vastly exaggerated in order to help the Leftist Bloc assume power and to subject the social democrats to the influence of the communists. In the sphere of the economy, they are mainly urging a drive against the banks.

It is not merely the documents published in Heumos's book but also its biographical appendix that make this volume valuable in understanding the political situation between 1945 and 1947 in East-Central Europe.

G y ö r g y R á n k i
Institute of Historical Sciences

F. SMAHEL: LA REVOLUTION HUSSITE, UNE ANOMALIE HISTORIQUE

(Collège de France, Essais et conférences) Paris: PUF 1985, p. 131

Researching the activities of John Hus and the events of the Hussite revolution have been regarded by Czech medievalists as their main task for more than one hundred years. This can be explained by the role of John Hus in the process of the formation of the nation. Historians often consider Hus a forerunner of the later developments in Czech history, and they often viewed the Hussite events as the first appearance of contemporary problems. Historians viewing the hostilities between the Czechs and the Germans as the most important factor in Czech history, or the religious wars or the ideological issues were only trying to substantiate their a priori ideas in this way.

Hussitism remained an important issue for Marxist historiography after World War II. However, studies were focused on one particular aspect, namely, the role of the class struggle in the Hussite Wars. It soon became a widely accepted thesis that in the course of the crisis of feudalism the conditions of the urban and rural poor had deteriorated to such an extent that it inevitably precipitated in the outbreak of the Hussite revolution.

Smahel began to study the history of the Hussites as a young scholar. He published a book about the life and career of Jerome of Prague (Jeronym Pražský, Praha) in 1966. However, his career came to an abrupt halt in the summer of 1968. Smahel was forced to give up his job as a historian for five years.

At the end of the 1970s, he was allowed to work as a research fellow at the museum in Tabor (Muzeum husitského revolučního hnutí). He is extremely enthusiastic about his research and has written twelve studies since 1979, some of which are still in print. Although his topics range from the history of the city of Tabor between 1432 and 1452 to the age of the legendary Jan Zizka, all his subjects are in some way related to the history of the Hussite movement. As the top expert on the period, he was commissioned to write his now standard study entitled The Czech Provinces at the Time of the Hussites. However, there is another important aspect to Smahel's activity. He seems to have succeeded in forming a small scholarly circle around himself, the members of which tackle particular issues requiring clarification.

His work was also recognized on the international level in 1983. The Collège de France invited him as the foremost expert on Hussitism. The resulting book contains Smahel's lectures delivered in the spring of 1983 in Paris.

The four lectures are, in fact, four chapters of his study on the Hussite revolution. The aim is to discuss "the interaction between the economic, social and political conditions of long duration, on the one hand, and the revolutionary events on the other" (p. 16.). It describes the crisis of the ancien régime, Bohemian society, Hussite doctrines and the dual religion and nation after the revolution. The book is concluded by a chapter entitled 'Revolution Prior to the Revolution' and by a summary of the results.

Of all the tenets of the Annales school it was longue durée that seems to have had the greatest influence on Smahel. He hoped that in this way he would be able to differentiate between the slow but lasting changes in the course of general social and economic development and the unexpected events of a revolution. Otherwise, he remained guided by Marxist principles. It must be pointed out that Smahel's point of view was far removed from the vulgar Marxist concept of history which was directly influenced by daily politics and so characteristic of the early 1950s. He has no a priori conceptions. His is a solid synthesis or rather an outline of the most important issues which draw conclusions strictly on the basis of historic documents and other publications, including sometimes his own. It is the little bit strange and thought-provoking title of the book that reveals the impact of his stay in Paris in 1983.

Lasting changes in the economy and society cannot be described without adequate quantification. Consequently, the book contains a number of tables and graphs. The application of a statistical approach is, of course, not all that simple even in Bohemia, which enjoyed a relatively high level of culture under Charles IV. One encounters the usual problems: the lack of data concerning the whole country, or facts of great importance, or the uncomparable records. Smahel, nevertheless, managed to make brilliant use of the scant information he had. With this in mind, his most remarkable achievement was his study of clerical relations. He not only reveals the contradiction between the fact that far more clergymen were ordained in the Diocese of Prague than the number of available benefices but he also pointed out that the affluence of ecclesiastical bodies was only illusory, since a large portion of their income was claimed by the Pope and the King of Bohemia for their own purposes.

The fact that there were 1,000 clergymen and 1,200 clerical university students in Prague means that every twentieth inhabitant of the town held an ecclesiastical title, many of whom were poor. Thus, we can assume that the number of disaffected intellectuals was very high. From the point of view of later secularization, Church property was not only attractive as something easily attainable but, having been freed from taxation by the Church and the

secular authorities, it could also be regarded as a source of personal profit. These two examples give a clear idea of Smahel's approach. He does not concern himself with statistical calculations as such. He does not process his statistical data any further (some of his data is certainly unfit for any further calculations). Instead, he uses his data to see certain tendencies.

The final conclusion of his analysis is that, in a paradoxical way, it was the nobility which came out victorious at the end of the revolution. They not only excluded the Church from power but they also deprived the monarch of his authority, and by secularizing 80% of all Church property, the nobility significantly increased its own financial influence. As a result all royal estates disappeared by the end of the revolution.

Smahel's book provokes in Hungarian historians a long and strange line of thought. The natural resources of Bohemia and those of Hungary seem identical. Both countries are situated in a landlocked basin. Both are primarily agricultural regions. At the same time in the Middle Ages both countries were among the biggest and at certain times the sole suppliers of precious metals in high demand. Both countries could be divided into regions of different levels of development in terms of agriculture and urbanization. The density of the population in both countries had been below the West-European average before the 12th century. During their massive development period both countries received an influx of immigrants: people came to Hungary from every direction, while most of the immigrants who arrived in Bohemia were of German descent. Due to the predominance of agriculture, towns were small and the bourgeoisie unable to play a role in politics. The overwhelming majority of town dwellers had German ancestry but the ravages of the plague diminished the influx of people from German territories. Consequently, towns were forced to attract people from neighboring villages, thus causing the rearrangement of the ethnic composition of the provinces.

The male line of the ruling house of both countries had died out around the end of the 13th century. However, kings from related families on the female line, that is the House of Luxemburg in the case of Bohemia and the House of Anjou in the case of Hungary, ascended the thrones of these countries, strengthening central royal power again. Bohemian social structure resembled the West-European model more closely. The Hungarian one retained many of its characteristics from the previous era of royal despotism. Bohemian aristocracy practiced its powers in a more regulated way. Bohemian towns were larger; Prague had 40,000 inhabitants while the combined population of Buda and Pest was less than 15,000. The achievements of Charles IV made Bohemia culturally superior.

The above-mentioned facts might have caused Hungarian historians to believe that the outbreak of the Hussite revolution had made all similarities between the development of the two countries disappear forever.

However, Smahel's results are surprising in that he notes that both the Bohemian and the Hungarian nobility gained the upper hand over their monarchs. After the death of Charles IV of Bohemia and Louis the Great of Hungary the once loyal nobility in both countries formed leagues and claimed and subsequently took the lion's share of the power. The Bohemian aristocracy's ascension to power was facilitated by the Hussite movements, while the opportunity presented itself to the Hungarian nobility when Louis the Great died without a male heir to the throne of Hungary. It is not a mere coincidence that Wenceslaus was imprisoned by the aristocracy in 1394, and Sigismund was taken captive in 1401. Although the aristocracy had had vast estates in both countries, it was only the second half of the 14th century that their holdings surpassed royal estates in size. The nobility held 59% of all castles in Bohemia in 1350, while only 33% of the castles in Hungary belonged to aristocrats. The reason for the success of the nobility to change the power structure cannot be attributed merely to the weaknesses of Wenceslaus and Sigismund.

The similarities between subsequent developments can also be attributed to the fact that the other layers of both societies shared the same lot. Both the Bohemian and Hungarian lesser nobility reached a crisis period and were only able to increase their income by offering their military services in the defensive struggles fought in Bohemia against the Catholics who were trying to crush Hussitism, and in Hungary against the Ottoman Empire. The bourgeoisie were not able to maintain their prosperity and tried to improve their situation by purchasing estates.

If we follow Smahel's line of thought, we must conclude that temporary changes in the course of the Hussite revolution such as instituting a new form of freedom of religion and improving the lot of the peasants had little effect on development in the long run. Only in Hungary did a peasant revolt break out in the early 16th century.

The question must be raised here as to whether there is a chance of starting a joint study which could serve the mutual interests of both parties concerned. Should there be any joint project launched, it would be Smahel's greatest achievement not only from the point of view of the development of Hungary but also from that of the whole East-Central European region.

E r i k F ü g e d i

FIRST SYMPOSIUM OF HUNGARIAN HISTORIANS

Budapest, August 28-30, 1986

The number of those who claim to be of Hungarian origin but live outside the present borders of Hungary is cautiously estimated to be as high as 30% of all Hungarians, which means between 4 and 4.5 million people. Their cultural and historical background, and in certain cases their common mother tongue are their most important links with the Hungarian nation. The Symposium of Hungarian Historians, held between August 28 and 30, 1986 in Budapest, was attended by Hungarian historians living in Hungary, in the neighboring countries, in Western Europe, and overseas. The two and a half-day long symposium was jointly organized by Hungarian Forum, The Institute of Historical Science of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, The Association of Hungarian Historians and the Budapest Eötvös Loránd University. Twenty-five Hungarian historians from abroad and sixty from Hungary exchanged views on the central issue of the meeting, namely, the development of Buda, Pest and that of Budapest in the Middle Ages and in modern times and the role this development played in the history of Hungary.

The opening speeches were delivered by Zoltán Havasi, President of Hungarian Forum, a supervising body responsible for the organization of the meetings of Hungarian intellectuals and by Péter Hanák, president of the Organizing Committee. Both speakers pointed out that the symposium was an excellent opportunity to discuss a wide range of topics and they also emphasized the need for an exchange of views. The ultimate aim of the symposium was to make this meeting of historians a forum for the exchange of different ideas and for the discussion of various approaches to the history of Hungary and the Hungarian people.

György Székely spoke about recent research findings and the problematic issues concerning the urban development of Buda in the Middle Ages. In his presentation, András Kubinyi tackled the central issues of the development of Buda in the 15th and 16th centuries. The subsequent debate was even livelier than expected. It was primarily the historians from abroad who asked for the floor. In response to the contributions of Szabolcs Vajay, István Hunyadi, Zsigmond Zalabai, György Nagyrévi Neppel, György Bárány and László Fogarasi, the two speakers - Székely and Kubinyi - had excellent opportunities to supplement the texts of their original papers with further details concerning their subjects.

The symposium was held on the 300th anniversary of the liberation of Buda from Ottoman rule. Imre Weller gave a detailed account of the historic events

during the siege of Buda. Ferenc Szakály held the view that the long Ottoman rule in Hungary also had long-range negative effects in that it foreshadowed the tragic fate of Hungary and the Hungarian people. Géza Perjés reviewed the events of the campaign to liberate the country and Kálmán Benda talked about the ties between Prince Eugene of Savoy and the peoples living along the Danube, with special regard to his relationship with the Hungarians. In the subsequent debate, Béla Köpeczi, member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, pointed out the close relationship between national independence and freedom from foreign rule in the movements of the feudal classes and in the struggles against Habsburg and Turkish influences. Ágnes R. Várkonyi's paper on the historic background to the thinking at that time, characterized well by the statement about the plight of the Hungarians 'bleeding between two heathens for one country', tied in with Péter Püspöki Nagy's presentation on the issues of the Turkish alternative. Beside those mentioned above, the following foreign scholars also participated in the debate: Imre Boba, József Matúz, Márton L. Kovács, Sándor Varga, Adalbert Tóth and Zoltán Szénássy.

The two papers read during the closing session were also of great interest to everyone. Károly Vörös's paper was entitled 'From Pest-Buda to Budapest'. He reviewed the 19th-century development of Pest and Buda into a major cultural, political, economic and transportation center and their subsequent unification under the name of Budapest. Péter Hanák dealt with the history of the same age and talked about the background of the central role of Budapest in the economic life of the whole country, the bourgeois development which accompanied urbanization and the modernization of Budapest. The two fine presentations on developments in the 19th century invited those familiar with this era to comment. Both László Péter and István Deák pointed out that the development of Budapest as the capital city can be assessed in an unbiased way only in terms of the needs of the whole country and the analysis of the role performed by the capital city.

Kálmán Benda, chairman of the half-day closing session, concluded that the papers read and the contributions made lived up to the high expectations of the symposium. He emphasized that every historian inside and outside Hungary was welcome to make a contribution to Hungarian historical studies as long as they conduct their research activities in an unbiased manner.

On the third day the participants of the symposium were briefed on the state of the art of historiography today in Hungary in the headquarters of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences by Ferenc Glatz, deputy director of the Institute of Historical Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. He pointed out that

Hungarian historiography has been having an increasingly favorable reception both in Hungary and abroad. Nevertheless, he was mainly concerned with the problems still awaiting solution. Among a number of topics he also mentioned his views on the excessively close ties between the science of history, an obviously ideology-related discipline, and the expectations of the political leadership in the past and the impact of this, for example, on historical research conducted into certain periods. Then Gyula Juhász, member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, curator of the National Széchényi Library and head of the Library's Department of Hungarian Studies, spoke about the background and state of Hungarian Studies and plans for the future. Finally, László Makkai briefed the visitors on the aims and principles related to publishing our Danubian Historical Studies magazine.

The open atmosphere of the talks and the nature of the questions raised prompted a number of visitors to comment. Foreign visitors gave an account of the workshops conducting Hungarian historical studies, their attainments and their future prospects. Imre Boba and István Deák talked about the work going on at U.S. universities, the meager supply of young scholars and the availability of scholarships. László Péter talked about the problems of Hungarian historical studies conducted at British universities, with special regard to those at London University. Iréneusz Galambos reported on the activities of Hungarians in Burgenland, Austria, in studying the history of Hungary. János Dobos talked about the high level of organization and the active role of the Yugoslavian government in the training of young historians and in conducting Hungarian historical studies. Sándor Varga introduced the most recent publications of Hungarian historians in Slovakia, István Hunyadi talked about workshops conducting Hungarian studies in France. József Matúz gave an account of his own work. János Csonka talked about the need for as well as the potential for Hungarian studies in Sweden.

Péter Hanák, chairman of the debate, declared the symposium a success in his closing speech. He expressed the hope that the second symposium of Hungarian historians scattered throughout the countries of the world, and those in Hungary may be held in a couple of years' time. A booklet containing transcripts of the papers read during the session of the First Symposium and the participants' contributions to the debate is being compiled, and is available to participants and those interested in a limited quantity. Please write to Magyar Fórum (Magyar Értelmiségi Találkozók Védnöksége, Budapest, Benczur u.15. H-1068) for your copy.

L á s z l ó S z a r k a
Institute of Historical Sciences

LANDMARKS IN THE BUILDING OF EUROPEAN NATIONAL STATES IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

by Dino C. Giurescu

East-European Quarterly, 1986, 1

The main theme of the study can be summarized as follows: on the basis of the principles of conservative legitimacy the awards of the 1815 Vienna peace settlement concerning territorial issues restored the balance of power among the great powers in Europe, which had seriously deteriorated. However, this also meant that the interests of the bourgeoisie and peasantry were challenged. Furthermore, and this is even more important from the point of view of this paper, the awards of the Vienna peace conference also ran counter to the aspirations of European nations to establish legitimate countries. What conflicts, what changes in the international political situation and what developments in the distribution of power facilitated the changes that had profoundly transformed the map of Europe by 1914 and facilitated the establishment of several nation states in spite of the fact that the principles of conservative legitimacy still held valid?

Answering the above question in detail is an even more difficult task than raising the issue and it concerns only the period until 1849, as stated in the title. The author briefly reviews the early Serbian, Greek and Romanian movements, the events in Belgium and Poland in 1830 and the Italian, German, Hungarian, Czech, Slovak and Romanian revolutions in 1848 and 1849. The author draws certain conclusions of universal validity from the cases of limited success and more often from those of defeat, which was much more often the case in these uprisings.

These conclusions are as follows:

1. Each of the revolutions evolved from the people's aspirations for a nation-state of their own. At a certain point in time these aspirations were expressed by a mass movement and consequently, in the majority of cases, in armed revolt followed by a war of independence.

2. This war of independence was allowed to succeed only if it did not run counter to the main interests of the great powers and if it did not seek to upset the balance of power. These preconditions set extremely narrow limits in the geographic sense to an area where national movements in the 19th century had a chance of victory. It directly follows from the above facts that such a movement was not allowed to disturb the territorial integrity of the great powers

(this could have happened only in Italy, which was regarded as a province of only secondary importance from the point of view of the Austrian Empire). Furthermore, national movements were also not supposed to change Russo-Austrian, Russo-German, Austro-German and Franco-German borders that are attributed primary importance by the author. Consequently, national movements had a chance to operate successfully outside of the great power blocks, in Belgium, in Italy and in the territories of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans.

3. Despite so many negative factors and the deep-rooted social attitude of conservative legitimacy, which sprang into action even if a national movement was far from violating the interests of any of the great powers, the success of a national movement largely depended on the support of one or several great powers.

All these three requirements were only rarely satisfied simultaneously before 1849, since either the support of a great power was lacking, as in the case of the Italians, Germans or Romanians, or the objectives of the national movement, if realized, clearly would have upset the territorial integrity and structure of a great power, as in the case of the Hungarians, Czechs or Slovaks, and partially in the case of the Germans and Italians, too. With the exception of Serbia, Greece and Belgium, where these factors were combined and brought success, the lack of the coincidence of these favorable factors resulted in armed intervention and the subsequent defeat of the revolution.

The final conclusion drawn by the author is that the legacy of 1848 was the realization of these necessary prerequisites. The leading forces that strived to found nation-states abandoned their earlier tactics, and having accommodated to the totally new conditions created by the Congress of Vienna, they attempted to attain their main objectives through a somewhat modified course of action. This new policy resulted in profound changes in certain countries, but it also meant that nations which had failed to match these conditions had a chance to establish their nation-states only in a different historical situation, after having lost the First World War and in the wake of revolutions.

G é z a V á r a d y

Institute of Historical Sciences

UNE ENQUETE LINGUISTIQUE ET FOLKLORIQUE CHEZ LES ROUMAINS DE TRANSYLVANIE DU NORD 1942-1943

by Béla Köpeczi

Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1985

The author, who has become an outstanding scholar of neo-Latin languages and a university professor of French, carried out linguistic and folklore research on the Romanian population of two northern Transylvanian villages in 1942 and 1943. His main objective was to research bilingualism. The locality where he carried out his research had a mixed population, but it was predominantly Romanian. This region is lodged between two great Hungarian-speaking population groups in Transylvania, namely the people of Kalotaszeg in the Kolozsvár region and that of east Székely land. Since the Hungarians share each village with Romanians - in some rare instances they outnumber their Romanian neighbors, while in most cases it is the Romanians who have an overwhelming majority - bilingualism can be studied in depth. Since the author studied neo-Latin languages under several outstanding scholars at the Budapest university and, having come from Transylvania, Romanian was his second language, his research had very sound foundations both in terms of his knowledge of the target languages and his solid training in methodology. However, he was not only spurred by the professional curiosity of a linguist. Bilingualism was - and has remained until recently - one of the key issues in Hungarian-Romanian relations.

Irrespective of the frequent political changes and the successive periods of Hungarian and Romanian domination, and in spite of the mutual efforts of both countries to assimilate the people of the other nation, statistics prove that the distribution of various nationalities in the population of Transylvania has remained unchanged since the mid-1800s; namely, 57% of the population are Romanian, 27% Hungarian and 9% German, whose number shrank by half as a result of the forced relocation and the voluntary emigration of masses of Germans after 1945. It follows from the above-mentioned facts that the prerequisite of the peaceful coexistence of the various nationalities is bilingualism, perhaps even trilingualism. Linguistic plurality, especially in the case of mixed marriages, may result and has, in fact, often resulted in linguistic assimilation. However, in the light of the above figures we may conclude that major shifts in the distribution of the Hungarian and the Romanian populations has not taken place and cannot be ex-

pected to occur in the near future. Consequently, bilingualism should not be regarded as a negative feature that facilitates assimilation. To the contrary, it must be viewed as a welcome characteristic of these nationality groups and facilitates understanding between them. In this sense statistics compiled more than four decades ago have a lot to say concerning the present.

The author visited two adjacent villages. Their history is a good example of developments in ethnic and religious relations in Transylvania in the past. One of the two villages, Szészárma (Sasarm in Romanian) has been known since the Middle Ages as a village with a Hungarian name and a mixed Hungarian and German population that had a Roman Catholic (i.e., not Romanian) church. The people of the village embraced Calvinism during the reformation. As a result of the ravages of the war between 1601 and 1603 the village had lost its population and its Calvinist Reformed church had been ruined by 1644. It happened around the same period that Romanians who had emigrated from Moldavia settled here. The regional dialect that has been preserved by these Romanians is still a vivid reminder of their place of origin. In 1941, the village was populated by 917 Romanians and 57 Hungarians. All the Hungarians were bilingual and a Hungarian woman called Róza Kerekes knew the richest variety of Romanian folklore and acted as interpreter.

The other village, Magyarneemegye (Nimigea ungureasca in Romanian) was also a mixed Hungarian and German village in the Middle Ages. The common religion facilitated the early Magyarization of the German segment of the population. Similarly to Szészárma, the village adopted the Calvinist trend of the Reformation. In 1941, 1,172 Hungarian Calvinists formed the majority as compared to 375 Greek Catholic Romanians. The Hungarians were more affluent, but had fewer children. The relatively poorer Romanian families often had five or six children. The Hungarians of this village were also bilingual, which can be attributed to the fact that nearby villages were predominantly Romanian. Although Hungarians were compelled to seek brides in faraway villages in this predominantly Romanian region, mixed marriages were relatively rare, not so much for linguistic reasons but much more due to differences in religion. It is also worth mentioning that Romanians in Magyarneemegye spoke a different dialect from that of the Romanians of nearby Szészárma. The Romanian population of Magyarneemegye did not come from outside Transylvania, namely, from Moldavia, but had migrated from Romanian villages in north-east Transylvania and, consequently, they settled down and mixed with the original Hungarian inhabitants.

In his research, the author primarily focused on linguistic questions. Nevertheless, the material he has collected has folkloric aspects as well. Humorous

and sad folk songs, ballads, folk tales are compiled into a fine sample of each prominent genre of Romanian folk poetry. Although they are described in the preface, they merit a much more detailed analysis by a folklore expert. We deem it important to mention that the items the author compiled in the volume reveal a lot about both the unique features of Romanian folk poetry and the integration of themes and motifs that had been adopted from neighboring peoples, mainly from Hungarian fellow villagers. A uniquely Romanian motif that happens to be the core of the classic Romanian ballad 'Miszita' is the bequest of a shepherd boy who has a premonition of his upcoming death and contains where he wishes to be buried, that he leaves his ring to his mother, etc. All this takes place in the consoling sense of oneness with all embracing Mother Nature. However, common European themes that are well-known in the folklore of almost every people and are generally the themes of different ballads are combined into uniquely novel work of art here. Such widely-known themes are, for instance, that of the unfaithful wife who abandons her husband and children for the sake of her lover, but, having come to regret her deed, returns to her family, or, for example, the story of the husband who seeks to avenge the unfaithfulness of his wife and wraps her in linen and tar and sets her afire. Both the ballads and the folk tales are not only pearls of Hungarian and Romanian folklore but they are the shared literary heritage of almost all European nations, their regionally different forms notwithstanding. The message of the volume underlines the importance of the peaceful coexistence of different peoples, which is a pressing issue to this day.

L á s z l ó M a k k a i

Institute of Historical Sciences

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN HUNGARY
BETWEEN 1954 AND 1978
RESEARCH ON THE MECHANISM OF THE SOCIALIST ECONOMY

Selected and edited by László Szamuely

Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1986

There is a rather paradoxical situation in Hungary today. While everyone talks about economic reforms, so far the reform movement seems to have failed to gain momentum and it still lacks a firm social base. On the one hand, the reform became an issue of primary importance, indeed, a political dividing line. On the other hand, the lay public is incapable of following the different reform ideas and making the necessary distinctions among the various political and economic approaches. The broad-ranging literature on the subject is also baffling to most lay readers.

These problems call for a historical survey and a systematic study of the reform movement and reform concepts. This work began in Hungary in recent years and several outstanding studies have been published on the subject. László Szamuely's new book is a good representative of these publications.

The book starts with a detailed introduction that provides ample information especially on the political debates of the 1950s and their political and economic background. The book contains a number of articles and documents, several of which have not been published before. Among the latter are two excerpts from Tibor Liska's hitherto unpublished "Ökonosztát", some documents of the debates conducted in 1957 by the Economic Committee, which was headed by István Varga, and manuscripts from 1963 and 1964 by János Hont, Ferenc Erdei and József Bognár, who had participated in the preparations for the New Economic Mechanism which was launched in 1968. Although the articles published in the book have a shared message, they reflect a variety of views.

György Péter's article on the rationalization of the central planning system, Márton Tardos's idea of a socialist holding company, Tibor Liska's theory of entrepreneurial socialism and János Kornai's first important empirical writing, dated September 1956, all appear in the volume. Some key figures of the new generation of economists of the 1970s, such as, Tamás Bauer and Károly Attila Soós, who took a sociological approach to economics and who had entirely new and important things to say about the driving forces of the socialist economy, are also represented in the final chapters of the book.

There is an excellent introduction which helps orientate readers both in the Hungarian technical literature on economics and also in the publications of the other socialist countries. For quite a long time politicians and economists in the socialist countries had similar reactions to the problems they had encountered right from the start. In the 1950s, the problems were immediately blamed on the machinations of both domestic and foreign enemies. Later, the blame was shifted to organizational shortcomings and the personal faults of the workers. This approach persists to this day in East-European countries. "The time will come when the analysis of problems in the functioning of the socialist economy is conducted on a scientific basis when instead of concentrating on individuals and individual institutions, the analysis will focus on the economic management system itself, the methods of economic management, and the real situation and the interests of the companies, the bodies of economic management, producers and buyers, i.e., all of the parties involved in the economy."¹

This book is a collection of both entirely new and previously published materials that can be used in the currently ongoing debate on reform in Hungary. Even from the aspect of the legitimization of the reform, one of the key issues in the debate is to whom and to what date we assign the launching of the reform movement and how we assess changes in the economy and the economic management system over the past 30 to 35 years.

One view is that the reform began in 1957 and has been underway ever since. Béla Csikós-Nagy² is of the opinion that this has been a steady progression while Iván T. Berend³ sees certain halts and regressions in what nevertheless fundamentally has been an even process.

The views of László Szamuely⁴ and András Bródy⁵ on the cyclic nature of the reform process and on the ideas concerning the reform are diametrically opposed to those of Csikós-Nagy and Berend. Szamuely and Bródy trace the beginnings of the reform to the meeting of the Central Leadership of the Hungarian Working People's Party in June 1953, when Imre Nagy was Prime Minister for the first time. The process of reforming the economic management system and debates about the kind of system the economic management should apply have undergone three cycles so far. The work of the Economic Committee marked the peak of the first phase in the process around the turn of 1956 and 1957. None of the reforms were realized at the time and the issue itself was shelved for a long time. The idea was revived in 1963-64 and it culminated in the New Economic Mechanism introduced on 1 January 1968. A plainly anti-reform trend became politically dominant by the mid-1970s. The third cycle of

the reform and the debates about the reform started in the late 1970s and is still with us today.

László Lengyel⁶ also supports the cycle theory. However, he draws a sharper line of distinction between phases in terms of the enforcement of the reform and cycles in terms of the development of theories on the reform. He holds the view that we can differentiate between two cycles in terms of the implementation of the reform; one took place in the second half of the 1960s and the other started in the late 1970s. However, he distinguishes four consecutive cycles in terms of ideas on the reform. We have already mentioned three phases of the development of the ideas on the reform, i.e., 1953-1957; 1963-1968; and from the late 1970s on. Lengyel holds that these three phases were preceded by the period between 1945-1948, when contributions by Eugene Varga, a Marxist, Pál Justus, a social-democrat, and István Varga, a disciple of Joseph A. Schumpeter⁷ further added to the plurality of ideas in the literature on economics published in the period under consideration. Lengyel regards the critical approach to economics as the core of the reform idea and this is the reason why those who had been seeking new forms of economic management and those who became critics of the central planning system come under the same umbrella.

Szamuely's book is worthy of the memory of an outstanding achievement in the history of critical economic thought. This has meant a challenge against naturalist view on economies, the drive against constructive ideas and the supremacy of the bureaucratic and hierarchical direct economic management system that had already had its firm basis in Hungary between the two world wars. It was replaced by a market-oriented approach and the preference of autonomous decision making in economic matters.

Given the loss of illusions concerning the omnipotence of the state and the recognition that in the absence of any other social force that could be mobilized for this task⁸ it is only an enlightened, self-regulating central power that can execute social and economic reforms is a paradox that still awaits solution. It is hoped that this volume edited by László Szamuely will contribute to a better understanding of the problems being faced.

Notes

1. László Szamuely, *A magyar közgazdasági gondolat fejlődése 1954-1978.* (The Development of Economic Thought in Hungary, 1954-1978) Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó (KJK) 1968. 11-12.

2. Béla Csikós-Nagy, Az 1957 évi gazdaságpolitikai fordulat - Varga István szerepe. In: Változások, váltások és válságok a gazdaságban. Tanulmányok Varga István emlékezetére. (The 1957 Turning Point in the Economic Policy - The Role of István Varga. In: Changes, Turning Points and Crises in the Economy. Studies in Memory of István Varga), ed. Ádám Schmidt and Egon Kemenes, Budapest, KJK, 1982. 21-31.
3. Iván T. Berend, Gazdasági útkeresés, 1956-1965. (Way out for the Economy) Budapest, Magvető, 1983.
4. László Szamuely, op.cit.; and, A mechanizmusvita első hulláma Magyarországon, 1954-1957. (The First Phase in the Debate on the Economic Mechanism in Hungary), Valóság, 1982/7.
5. András Bródy, A gazdasági mechanizmus bírálatának három hulláma (Three Phases in the Criticism of the Economic Mechanism) Közgazdasági Szemle, 1983/7-8,
6. see the book review by László Lengyel in Valóság, 1982/5 and Valóság 1984/4.
7. László Lengyel book review on Tamás Bauer, Planned Economy, Investment, Cycles, Valóság, 1982/5.
8. Tamás Kolosi, Strukturális csoportok és reform (Structural Groups and the Reform), Valóság, 1986/7.

Á g n e s P o g á n y

Institute of Historical Sciences

THE PARTICIPATION OF HORTHY'S HUNGARY IN THE INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF YUGOSLAVIA, 1941-1945

Zrinyi, Budapest, 1986

This book was published jointly by the Institute of Military History of the Yugoslavian People's Army, and the Institute and Museum of Military History of the Hungarian People's Army. It is a collection of 220 documents published simultaneously in Belgrade and Budapest and bears the subtitle "On the history of the war of liberation fought by the people of Yugoslavia".

The preface to the volume was written by the two chief editors, Lieutenant-General Fabijan Trgo of Yugoslavia and Major-General Ervin Liptay of Hungary. Detailed notes complement all of the documents in the book. Furthermore, there is a chronology and a biographical and geographic index, too. The material was selected by Colonel Ágnes Godó, who co-edited the volume with Lieutenant-Colonel Anton Miletić.

Although according to the title, this is a compilation of documents from 1941 onwards, the volume also includes the text of the 'Eternal Friendship Pact, between the Hungarian Monarchy and the Yugoslav Kingdom, signed in Belgrade on December 12, 1940, and Hungarian Minister to Berlin Döme Sztójay's report of December 19, 1940 on the press and diplomatic coverage of the pact.

These two documents, which can be regarded as an introduction, are followed by several other documents beginning with Miklós Horthy's letter of March 28, 1941 to Hitler and ends with a directive issued by Colonel-General Károly Beregfy, the Arrow-Cross Minister of Defense, dated February 14, 1945 on the "Prevention of Hungarian nationals deported to Germany from returning arbitrarily to Hungary".

The distribution of documents over each year shows an interesting picture. The editors included 119 documents from 1941; 44 from 1942; 55 from 1943; 42 from 1944; and 4 documents from 1945. Obviously, the nature of these documents varies widely: Premier Pál Teleki's suicide note, documents concerning events in Ujvidék (Novi Sad) in January 1942 are among the documents, together with a report on the re-opening of the Nagykanizsa internment camp in February 1945.

The Hungarian Royal "Honvéd" Army invaded Yugoslavia on April 11, 1941. The same day General of Infantry Henrik Werth, chief of the Hungarian general

staff introduced military administration in the "occupied territories of southern Hungary" (document 14). The Hungarian Minister of the Interior issued a directive on the internment of people who might be suspected of being politically involved in the Serb issue already on April 15 (document 19). Military tribunals were set up on April 18 (document 26); on May 21, the commander in chief of the 3rd Hungarian Army decreed that internment camps should be set up (document 27); on May 26, chief of staff Werth decreed that all inhabitants of the territory under military administration who had settled there after October 31, 1918 should be registered (document 41).

The participation of Hungary or, more properly, of the Hungarian armed forces in the occupation of Yugoslavia makes most people think of events in Ujvidék. It is not by accident. According to the geographic index, Ujvidék appears 108 times in the book beginning with the mop up actions (document 23), which claimed the lives of 500 civilians and which were ordered by the commander of the 10th Hungarian Infantry Brigade. The name of Ujvidék is often mentioned in documents pertaining to the events of January 1942, and finally in the directive of October 4, 1944 issued by the Szeged 5th Army District Command on the evacuation of its operational area (document 210).

Most documents referring to the Ujvidék events can be found in the chapter on 1942. The Ujvidék Detachment of the Szeged 5th Gendarme District Command had made arrangements as early as December 22, 1941 for enforcing martial law in the case of those who assisted 'communist gangs'. Furthermore, it was decreed that if the inhabitants of a farmstead were involved in such activities, they would be interned and their property confiscated (document 75). On January 3, 1942 gendarme investigators set out in the evening to encounter partisans in the Zsablya area. On the next day they engaged the enemy in several locations and in the ensuing battle both sides suffered casualties. Colonel-General Ferenc Szombathelyi, chief of Hungarian general staff decreed that from January 5th on, the command of detachments of armed forces should be assigned to the 5th Army Corps Headquarters (document 80).

Subsequent documents furnish detailed information on the extension of the scope of the roundup, on the ensuing bloodshed and casualties. On February 4, Budapest Deputy Chief of Police József Sombor-Schweinitzer reported to the Minister of the Interior that "about 3,000 people, including children and women, had been executed" in the Bácska region (document 86).

The book contains several documents on the issue of the participation of Hungarian troops in the occupation of Serbia, which was repeatedly demanded

by the Germans. Since the Hungarian Government refused to yield to the German demands, Hungary did not take part in the attack on Serbia (documents 123, 126 etc.).

However, the Nedić Government's request for arms so that Mihailović could "fight partisans and bolsheviks" was received favorably by Hungarian authorities. In Ágnes Godó's note related to this document, she refers to "a great number of receipts and consignment notes concerning war materiel, communications facilities and hospital equipment that high ranking Hungarian officials in the Ministry of the Interior and in the Army shipped to the Chetniks". It is regrettable that these documents which were used in the Mihailović trial were not included in the present selection of documents.

Furthermore, we must point out that despite the fact that the files of the Oberbefehlshaber Südost, like all German military records in the Freiburg Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv of the German Federal Republic pertaining to World War II, had been declassified and made available to Hungarian researchers, quotations from these documents were not furnished from the original sources, but from Yugoslavian archives and publications. The telephone conversation between Major-General von Geitner and Major-General Winter on July 3, 1944 on the issue of arms shipments to the Chetniks is quoted from a Yugoslavian source (document 204, note 4). But the facts were more complicated: According to the War Register of Oberbefehlshaber Südost, Winter took the following decision in the conversation at 18.45: "The commander of the South-East has a free hand concerning the supplying the Chetniks with ammunition, but the general ammunition stock should also be taken into consideration and it is to be ensured that the Chetniks will not stockpile the ammunition for themselves."

Likewise, it was in the telephone conversations of July 3, 1944 that the Germans requested that Hungarian troops be deployed against the partisans in the Hungarian-Croatian border region, in the area of Virovitica and Barcs. The German Army Command requested and was duly given the consent of the Hungarian headquarters.

The detailed body of notes, the chronology and the indices of biographical and geographical names further add to the high quality of this book. However, it is not quite clear according to what principles biographical notes on certain figures were included and those on others excluded. It is confusing that several names are spelled differently in the notes and in the index. Names are misspelled in several cases.

Furthermore, there are mistakes such as attributing the rank of Colonel-

General to Field Marshal Keitel (document 181, note 8), or attributing the rank of 'SS Admiral' to Wilhelm Bürker (document 126, note 3), the granting of the title 'von' to the name of Friedrich Paulus and the failure to use the same title in Hans Greiffenberg's case.

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LEVANTINE TRADE ROUTES TO THE DANUBIAN REGION IN THE MIDDLE AGES

The subject to be considered in this paper has long been discussed by historians. As a matter of fact, for two centuries now scholars have been debating the issue of whether or not the Levantine trade routes crossed mediaeval Hungary, particularly along the Danube.

1.

The decline of the Ottoman Empire revived interest in commercial expansion towards the East in the "Danubian Monarchy" of the Habsburgs. Endeavours to participate in the Levantine trade were especially intensified after the peace of Kutchuk Kainardji (1774), when the "Eastern Question" came into the limelight of world politics. Earlier projects of this kind were adapted to the specific conditions of the Napoleonic era by G. Berzeviczy, a Hungarian economist, who presented them as integral to world trade. In a work written in 1808 (and in a number of his later writings) he proposed an overland route for the long distance trade between Asia and Europe. He also gave historical support to his proposal, claiming that in the Middle Ages, before the circumnavigation of Africa world trade had mostly been carried on overland, and oriental goods had reached the West from the Black Sea area via Transylvania and Hungary. Contemporary events seemed to justify Berzeviczy's thesis: Napoleon's Continental System (1806) did, in fact, temporarily compel oriental trade to find an overland route and the route did indeed cross Hungary.

At about the same time, a similar view was being voiced by German historians. Among them, there had already long been a debate on how Indian spices and other Far Eastern goods had got from the Levant to the south German towns before Venice and Genoa established their hegemony in Levantine trade during the second part of the 13th century. J. G. Meusel (1780) held that the trade

route went through Italy even in this early period; C. F. Gemeiner (1800) traced the path of the oriental wares from Constantinople through Kiev to Germany; J. Ch. Fischer (1785), however, claimed the trade route ran from Kiev via Novgorod to the Baltic Sea. Quite different - and a departure from the opinions they themselves had formerly subscribed to - was the view put forward by Prof. A. L. Heeren of Göttingen in a paper presented to the Institut de France, and by his younger colleague, K. D. Hüllmann in a paper submitted for a competition held by the Societät der Wissenschaften of Göttingen. They asserted that the main route of Levantine trade from the 8th to the 13th centuries had led from Constantinople through Hungary, along or on the Danube, to the Austrian and south German towns. Both prize-winning works appeared in 1808. It was exactly Napoleon's plan for establishing an overland route to the East to compete with the British-dominated sea route - a plan that was very much in the air between 1806 and 1808 - that served for them as the contemporary parallel, and largely inspired both Heeren and Hüllmann to work out their theory of a mediaeval overland trade route to the East (Cf. F. Bastian, 1929).

There was another alternative theory - one whose contemporary relevance was quite different - which was also raised in the intellectual workshop at Göttingen slightly earlier, namely, that during the 14th and 15th centuries, Levantine trade passed through the "Saxon" (German) towns of Transylvania. This thesis was first formulated by A. L. Schlözer, a historian of European renown, in a book written to lend historical support to the Transylvanian Saxons' claims of preserving their self-government against the absolutist royal power. His book appeared in 1795-97. It was this theory that was taken over and developed by J. C. Engel, a German-speaking Hungarian historian between 1807 and 1813.

The thesis of an early mediaeval Danubian trade route to the Levant and the idea of its mediation by Transylvanian Saxon towns during the late Middle Ages (the 14th and 15th centuries) were later combined by the Hungarian M. Horváth in a book submitted for a competition held by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1835, and by F. Hann, a Transylvanian Saxon, whose dissertation appeared in 1848. As to their authorities, both historians referred mainly to Heeren and Hüllmann for the period up to the 13th century, and to Schlözer and Engel for the 14th and 15th centuries. In addition, they quoted G. Gülich and J. Hormayr, who, however, had also used Hüllmann as their main authority.

Hormayr, Hann and Horváth all believed that after the imminent dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Asian-European world trade would again be carried on overland rather than by sea - just as it had been the case in the Middle Ages, prior to the fall of Constantinople and the discovery of the Cape route

to India. They wanted to give historical backing to the claims and aspirations of the German, Transylvanian Saxon and Hungarian sides respectively, to play the greatest role possible in this world trade. Their scholarly argumentation, however, was based on little convincing documentary evidence. Hüllmann primarily referred to the customs tariffs of the late 12th and early 13th centuries of the Lower Austrian town Stein, which did, in fact, register pepper and other Eastern produce among the goods transported on the Danube.¹ These customs tariffs, however, said nothing of the direction from which the oriental goods entered Stein. For further evidence, Hüllmann referred to the customs tariffs of 1260 of the town Győr in Western Hungary,² which "listed pepper among the commodities going up the Danube". It was only cattle, however, that the document in question specifies as being taken out of the country (superius deferunt) by Germans and Hungarians; the context of the passage referring to pepper (currus hospitum latinorum) suggests that it was rather being brought in by Italian merchants. We might add that the other references adduced by Hüllmann, Horváth and later writers - for instance, the fact that Frederick Barbarossa's Crusade went along, and partly on the Danube, down to Belgrade, and that there were some Hungarian traders in Constantinople and German ships in Alexandria around 1170, according to Benjamin of Tudela - permit one at best to conclude that Levantine goods reached Hungary from Constantinople now and then. This scanty data, however, far from justifies the theory of an "old supply line from the Levant through the Danube" and the attributing to it of a "prominent" role "in world economy" right to the late 13th century (a thesis that was to become almost generally accepted by historians after another of Hüllmann's works was published in 1826), nor even to the late 12th century (as we still find in Vol. II of The Cambridge Economic History of Europe. See the interesting chapter written by R. S. Lopez, 1952).

2.

W. Heyd's great monograph Geschichte des Levantehandels im Mittelalter (published in 1879) however, brought about a marked turning-point of the historiographic "destiny" of the thesis in question. Most historians now rejected the idea both of a Danubian route and of Transylvanian mediation. The view that henceforth came to prevail was that of Levantine goods having reached mediaeval Hungary and Southern Germany exclusively through Italy or through Dalmatia. (D. Csánki, K. W. Nitzsch, W. Götz, K. Th. Inama-Sternegg, O. Meltzl: 1880-1892; etc.)

This turn in historiography again had something to do with factors unrelated

to scholarly research. The hopes that had been entertained concerning the re-nascent preponderance of an overland trade route given the decline of the Ottoman Empire appeared, in the decades after the opening of the Suez Canal (1869) to have been exaggerated. When the German economist J. Jastrow gave expression to this (in 1887), he simultaneously declared that the Danube route had been just a byway, even in the long distance trade of the Middle Ages.

Sure enough, several attempts were made in the first decades of the 20th century to "rehabilitate" the mediaeval Danube route thesis. The grandiose aspirations of Germany's policy-makers of the day - the "Berlin-Baghdad Railway", etc. - found an echo in a number of historical writings, too, which revived the idea of a Constantinople-Danube route in mediaeval world trade. (H. Zimmerer, C. V. Suppan, H. Wendt, etc.: 1914-18). However, these views were rendered irrelevant by subsequent political developments and discredited by the Hungarian historian S. Domanovszky (1918) and the German medievalist F. Bastian (1929), who convincingly rounded off Heyd's argumentation. And when, in the 1920s, H. Pirenne put forward his famous thesis of Islamic expansion having put an end to sea-borne trade on the Mediterranean between the Orient and the Occident from the 8th to the 11th century, he also alluded to the weakness of the "Danube-thesis", in obvious agreement with Heyd.

On the other hand, Heyd was also the authority referred to by those historians who rejected the idea of a Transylvanian mediation. In fact, the German scholar had repudiated - and for good reason - the idea of an early mediaeval Danubian trade route, but he had said nothing at all about the late mediaeval Transylvanian trade route. Therefore, the historians who took his critique to apply also to the latter claimed that there was no reliable documentary evidence to confirm the role of Transylvanian towns in supplying Levantine goods from the Black Sea region in the Middle Ages. They preferred to draw on the patents of the Hungarian King Louis of Anjou, patents which encouraged the Saxon merchants of the Transylvanian towns Nagyszeben (Hermannstadt, Sibiu) and Brassó (Kronstadt, Braşov) to make trips to Dalmatia, notably to Zara (Jadra, Zadar), for the following reason: "ideo, ut regnum Hungariae rebus et bonis maritimis locupletetur."³ (1367, 1370) These documents, they argued, proved that Hungary obtained oriental commodities not from the Black Sea region through Transylvania, but from the Adriatic through Dalmatia, and also exported some of the rich store of "maritime goods" coming from Dalmatia to other Eastern European countries. (A. Pleidell, A. Fekete Nagy: 1925; etc.)

Closer examination, however, does not support this conclusion, even for the half century following the Treaty of Zara (1358), when Venice was re-

placed by the Hungarian Crown as sovereign of the Dalmatian towns. The sources especially those edited by Fejér, Wenzel, Zimmermann-Werner, Ljubić, Tkalčić indicate that far from there already existing a Zara line from where Hungary got her "plenitude of maritime goods", Louis of Anjou was merely urging the opening up of a hitherto unfrequented trade route when he tried to encourage the Transylvanian and Hungarian merchants - and even the Genoese, his allies against Venice - to make regular trips to Zara (quod iidem in ipsa via Jadrensi procedere assuescant).⁴ Moreover, it had always been a chief element of Venice's Dalmatian policy to achieve that Levantine goods "non possint deferri Jadram vel districtum aliunde quam de Venetiis",⁵ and to make sure of this Venice used her maritime power to put stringent regulations into effect even after 1358. King Louis' attempt to initiate Hungarian-Dalmatian trade relations independently and in defiance of Venice was a far-sighted, but short-lived experiment, one that lost its significance even before the Dalmatian coast passed back into Venetian hands. The charters of King Louis which favoured the Zara trips of Transylvanian Saxon burghers were renewed by King Sigismund of Luxemburg in 1395 and 1406 but never again.

3.

Mediaeval Hungary did indeed get a great many of her Levantine goods via the Adriatic but these came overwhelmingly from Venice instead of Dalmatia. Two "direct" routes led from there to Hungary; the Senj - Zagreb, and the Gorizia - Ljubljana - Ptuj lines, but the spices imported from Venice usually reached the country less directly, through the famous Venezianerstrasse: Tarvisio - Judenburg - Semmering - Vienna. From Vienna, most of the goods went to Pozsony (Pressburg, Bratislava), Western Hungary's trade center and chief customs post. It was from there that they continued their way to Buda, the capital of Hungary. Characteristically enough, at the same time that Louis of Anjou issued his patents encouraging trade with Dalmatia, he also promulgated decrees forbidding the Hungarian toll collectors on the Danube to confiscate from the Viennese merchants "de eorum rebus et mercibus diversa munera, piper scilicet"⁶ (1366, 1380-81). Between Vienna and Buda, then, pepper was shipped not upstream, as Hüllmann had thought, but downstream. The sources also disprove Hüllmann on the point that the pepper bought in 1438 in Buda by some Breslau (Wroclaw) traders "came without a doubt from Constantinople". The customs tariffs of Buda from the year 1436 make it probable that a part of the pepper

imports came there from Venice;⁷ while the customs book ("thirtieth book") of Pozsony for the fiscal year 1457-58 indicates that many Buda merchants bought their pepper in Pozsony.⁸

The Pozsony customs book provides also information on the quantity of spices imported. For the 1457-58 fiscal year - when Western-Hungary's foreign trade was booming - we find that the chief item of the spices coming in through Pozsony was pepper, $166\frac{2}{3}$ centners by volume, and valued at roughly 5,000 florins. The centner in question was probably equal to 58,8 kg. Therefore, the pepper that entered Hungary along her chief "Adriatic" pepper trade route in the above-mentioned year amounted to 98 metric quintals.⁹

4.

Let us now turn from the Adriatic to look at the Black Sea. We ought to do so all the more as - the adherents of the "Dalmatian thesis" notwithstanding - there is no doubt at all of there having been a Transylvanian supply route for oriental goods, and an important one at that. (For the documents, see mainly the sources edited by Fejér, Teleki, Hurmuzaki, Bogdan, Gündisch, Mályusz; for a recent study, see R. Manolescu.)

It was in 1358 that Louis of Anjou, and in 1368 that Vladislav, Voivode of Wallachia, gave the burghers of Brassó special privileges to carry on the "Trans-alpine" (i.e. Transcarpathian) trade. Patents issued by Stibor, Voivode of Transylvania, in 1412, and by Mircea cel Bătrîn, Prince of Wallachia, in 1413 (the latter are extant in Slavo-Rumanian and Latin) indicate that the Transylvanian merchants exported mainly broadcloth originating from Flanders, Italy, Cologne and Silesia, as well as ironware. Beside Wallachian agricultural products (such as fish, cattle, hides, wax and honey), they imported commodities from farther afield: pepper, saffron, ginger, cloves, goat's wool, camelhair, cotton, and "other goods which come from the sea", and which "per Sarracenos asportantur" to the coast.¹⁰ The patent issued in 1368 obliged these merchants to pay the tributum toll at Cîmpulung on all goods sold and bought in Wallachia. However, if they crossed Wallachia on their way to another country, they also had to pay the tricesima - one "thirtieth" if they went via Braila, and two "thirtieths" if they went some other way: first on their way out at Cîmpulung, and again on their way back at the Danube. The regulations of 1412-13 obliged the Transylvanian traders to pay taxes at Rucar (near Cîmpulung), at Dîmbovița, Tîrgusor and at Brăila in Wallachia itself. If they went beyond Wallachia, they had to pay the thirtieth tax on crossing the Danube, and "on their way back from the

coastal areas or the areas across the Danube" (venientes de marinis partibus seu trans Danubium).¹¹ Later Wallachian charters (Radul Praznaglava: 1421-22; Dan II: 1424, 1431; Vlad Dracul: 1437, 1444; etc.) also stipulated that the Transylvanian Saxon merchants using the "Brassó route to Brăila", and then going "up to the sea", "to the great sea", had to pay the thirtieth tax on "pepper, saffron, cotton, camelhair, goat's wool and other goods which came from the sea".¹² Once they had got beyond Brăila, their nearest access to the Black Sea was Chilia, which lay in the Danube Delta (near what had formerly been Licostomo). Here, Genoese colonists were to be found from as early as the 1360s. They established lively contacts with their other Pontic settlements like Moncastro (Maurocastro, Cetatea Albă, Akkerman, Belgorod Dniestrovski), a settlement founded at about the same time at the mouth of the Dniester. Primarily, however, their links were with Caffa (Thedosia, Feodosia), that great emporium of Levantine trade and the most important Genoese colony on the Black Sea, which had existed on the Crimean Peninsula for around a century. (See W. Heyd, N. Iorga, G. I. Brătianu, etc.) The spices and other "maritime goods" which the Transylvanian traders bought in Wallachia and Moldavia must have got there mainly through this supply route. It was this route - "a regione Cathan (Cathay) in Caffam et ad portum Kylliae et demum ab illinc versus partes istas (=Hungariam)"¹³ - that King Sigismund of Luxemburg had in mind when he allied with the Genoese to try to break Venetian hegemony over Levantine trade, not only, as Louis of Anjou had attempted to do, in the Adriatic area, but primarily in the Black Sea region (1412, 1418). It was also along this route that Vladislav II, Voivode of Wallachia, tried to have arms brought from Brassó "ad curiam nostram in Tergovistia, ab hinc ad Brailam, ab hinc vero usque Kyllie"¹⁴ (1453-54).

It must, however, also be noted that many Wallachian charters, as mentioned above, stipulated that if the Brassó merchants continued their journey not through Brăila but along some other way, and notably if they "crossed the Danube with their wares at Dîrstor or Giurgiu or Nikopol", they would be obliged to pay two "thirtieths" in tax.¹⁵ This indicates that Transylvanian Saxon burghers also carried on trade in the area south of the Danube, i.e. in Bulgarian territories. Some of their "maritime goods" might well have come from here, among others from Calliacra (on the Black Sea coast, north of Varna), a place mentioned in one of Sigismund's charters of 1402 in this very context;¹⁶ it also had connections with the other Pontic settlements of the Genoese. Finally, we must take into consideration the direct routes leading from the Black Sea coast through Moldavia to Transylvania. It was March, 1475, a few months before Caffa was captured

by the Turks, that the Genoese government had demanded that the Transylvanian town Beszterce (Nösen, Bistrița) pay compensation to a merchant from Caffa, who "servas quatuordecim ad usum nostrorum civium conducebat" and had been robbed in the mountains around Beszterce on his way to Genoa.¹⁷

5.

There is evidence for a continued supply of spices from Wallachia to Transylvania in the second half of the 15th century, i.e. not only after the fall of Constantinople (1453), but also of Caffa (1475), Chilia (1484) and Cetatea Albă (also 1484). This tends to support the view that the expansion of the Ottoman Turks did not cut off the traditional Levantine trade routes. (Cf. A. H. Lybyer, E. Ashtor, H. Inalcik). The change which afterwards became really apparent affected not the existence of trade routes or the continuity of commerce but the mediating persons, the individuals acting as middlemen. As a matter of fact, the traders of Wallachia played an increasing role in negotiating the transit trade in spices into Transylvania. While earlier documents mentioned almost only merchants from Brassó journeying to Wallachia, the charters issued from the middle of the century onwards repeatedly refer to Wallachian traders making the trip to Transylvania. This latter group soon began to compete with the Transylvanian Saxon merchants and received considerable support from the Wallachian princes. Around 1458, Vlad Țepeș passed a number of economic regulations ("skala" "borderland fairs"), as well as violent measures to restrict the trade activities of the Brassó merchants in Wallachia.¹⁸ Radul cel Frumos wanted to make permission for them to trade there dependent on the condition that the Wallachians should also be able "to go freely anywhere in the country of the royal lord (=the King of Hungary) even as far as Várad (Oradea)"¹⁹ (1470). (We find similar stipulations by Basarab Laiotă in 1474: Bogdan; or by Neagoe Basarab in 1517: Manoilescu). The Brassó merchants endeavoured to retain their active role in the trade beyond the Carpathians; the Wallachians, in their turn, were eager to take this into their own hands, and even to get into the Transylvanian market.

The situation that had developed by the turn of the century is well illustrated by the Brassó customs book ("twentieth diary") of 1503.²⁰ We find that traders from Transylvania and from the Rumanian Principalities were taking roughly equal shares in the export trade going from Brassó to Wallachia. The Saxon traders still carried on most of the import trade in agricultural products going from Wallachia to Transylvania; but they had already been compelled to give up the bulk of their most lucrative import business, the spice trade. Only

one group of Brassó wholesale traders, namely the societas magna, continued to be active in this field: their main line was the export of broadcloth and knives, and the import of spices. The latter, however, accounted for only 14.1% of all the spices imported to Brassó; 82.1% was carried on by Wallachians, the rest by Moldavians. On the other hand, the Wallachians were still unable to corner any of the Transylvanian market, and continued to be debarred from trading their goods beyond Brassó.

Other sources available for the late 15th and the early 16th centuries certainly enable us to trace the route taken by the spice traders beyond this point, too. The documents of the toll litigations of Várad, from the 1470s to the early 1490s,²¹ as well as the register of the toll stations of County Bihar compiled in 1520 for the purpose of putting an end to abuses that "were of long standing",²² indicate that beyond the border towns of southern Transylvania, it was Saxon merchants who conveyed the valuable shipments of spices to the interiors of Transylvania and Hungary: through Kolozsvár (Cluj) or Arad and mainly to the famous fairs of Nagyvárad. Here, and partly at Debrecen, the goods again changed hands, to continue their way farther north to Kassa (Kaschau, Košice) - as one can see from the documents of 1502-3 of the Handelsgesellschaft of Kassa.²³ This society of Kassa traders - somewhat similarly to the societas magna of Brassó - bought broadcloth in Cracow (sometimes exporting wine in return), selling most of it in Várad and in Debrecen to merchants from Brassó and other Transylvanian towns, from whom they bought pepper in return. We find the names of a number of Brassó burghers doing business in Várad and Debrecen - merchants who at times paid the price of the broadcloth they bought from the Kassa traders in pepper - among those of the pepper importers listed by name in the Brassó customs book of 1503.

All this goes to show that the spice consignments coming from the Black Sea region to the southern border towns of Transylvania usually continued their journey to Nagyvárad, the important market-town east of the river Tisza and from there to Kassa, the centre of Upper Hungary (Eastern Slovakia). Wallachian merchants played no part in the trade at this stage of the journey: the valuable spices were conveyed as far as Nagyvárad mostly by Transylvanian traders, and afterwards by the merchants of Kassa.

The route leading from the Black Sea region through Wallachia into Transylvania and Hungary may be paralleled to the route leading from the Black Sea coast through Moldavia into Poland. (Cf. St. Kutrzeba, P. Panaitescu, M. Matłowski). Hungary, like Poland, had an overland trade route leading to the Levant

in the late Middle Ages; she received her spice imports not only from a westerly but also from an easterly direction.

6.

But how much of the spice imported was negotiated from each of these directions? In the case of Hungary, we can give some approximate answers to this question.

As mentioned above, the customs book of Pozsony for the fiscal year 1457-58 gives us an idea of the volume of spices that entered the country at this chief customs post for imports from the West. (98 metric quintals of pepper.) The customs books ("twentieth diaries") of Nagyszeben for 1500,²⁴ and of Brassó for 1503 provide the basis on which we can calculate the volume of spices that entered the country at the main eastern customs posts.

The statistical analysis of the entries of these twentieth diaries²⁵ shows that in 1500, $105\frac{3}{4}$ kanthners of pepper were imported through Nagyszeben, at a customs value of $4,120\frac{1}{2}$ florins. This quantity, however, seems insignificant compared to pepper imports coming through Brassó, which amounted to a total $719\frac{1}{4}$ kanthners in 1503, at a customs value of $32,084\frac{4}{5}$ florins. Considering that neither the quantity nor the composition of the customs duties collected in Nagyszeben and in Brassó changed much during the years in question, we are entitled to collate the two data. The quantity of pepper entering Transylvania from Wallachia through these two customs stations at the very beginning of the 16th century came, then, to 825 kanthners altogether, at a customs value of more than 36,200 florins. Since the kanthner in use here was probably the equivalent of 56.2 - 56.7 kg (its kilogram equivalent is considered by some scholars slightly higher and by others a bit lower than that), the annual pepper imports of Brassó and Nagyszeben at the very beginning of the 16th century, taken together, came to about 463-468 metric quintals. Accordingly, the volume of pepper imported from the direction of the Black Sea - more precisely, the annual quantity that entered Transylvania through the major eastern customs stations in the early 16th century - was four and a half times as much as the yearly volume imported from the direction of the Adriatic - more exactly four and a half times as much as came into Hungary in the mid-15th century at the chief western customs station of Pozsony. In this sense, then, there was "a lot" of spice coming from the Black Sea region, and the part it played in supplying the Transylvanian and Hungarian market was significant indeed.

But how did this spice trade compare to that carried on through the chief route of Levantine trade; i.e. to the maritime spice imports of Venice? F. C. Lane, F. Braudel, E. Ashtor and C. H. Wake estimate that at the turn of the 15th to 16th century - before the Portuguese opened the direct sea route to India, or, more precisely, before this had a perceptible effect on the international spice trade - Venetian galleys had brought home 1,150,000 English lbs (i.e. 5125.25 metric quintals) of pepper per year from Alexandria, their main supply port in the Levant. South Transylvanian imports were therefore 8.9-9% of the imports coming into Venice from Alexandria. If, beside Alexandria, Beirut, Venice's other important spice supply market is also included, the above-mentioned authors find the average annual Venetian import of pepper at the time in question to have amounted to between 1,400,000 and 1,750,000 English lbs, i.e. a volume of between 6349 and 7936 metric quintals. With this as the basis of comparison for the overland trade route we have been dealing with, we arrive at a figure of between only 5.84 and 7.38%. In this sense, then, - at a time when Venice already and as yet practically monopolized the trade in oriental spices going to Western and West-Central Europe - the pepper coming through Brassó and Nagyszeben was merely a "small" quantity. More precisely, it was a quantity that well reflected the place and role of the Transylvanian route in the entire system of Levantine trade routes of late mediaeval Europe.

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Z s i g m o n d P á l P a c h

Institute of Historical Sciences

OSZKÁR JÁSZI'S VIENNA YEARS AND HIS ATTEMPTS TO BUILD CONTACTS WITH THE DEMOCRATIC LEFT IN THE SUCCESSOR STATES

Oszkár Jászi's Vienna years form something of an intermission between the two main phases of his life, the Hungarian and the American ones. At the same time, these years represent a kind of transitional period between the two phases, and witnessed the gradual transformation of a Hungarian scholar and politician with an international outlook into a future American professor preoccupied with Hungary. These years slowly changed Jászi's former existence, his old family, professional and political ties, and prepared him for a second life in a new world, a new marriage, a new career, and a new approach to old problems.

"Since our last meeting in Budapest, a whole world collapsed", Jászi wrote to R.W. Seton-Watson in his first letter after the war.¹ When he left Hungary for Vienna on the festive May Day organized by the Soviet Republic, he could not yet realize that his old world had vanished forever. Six years later, when he left Vienna for Oberlin in 1925, he was already well aware of the fact.

Jászi's Vienna years were the most tormented ones in his long life. He spent them in a feverish state of constant inner crisis and mental anguish, both public and private, and he was unable to find relief until he arrived in America.

Even so, the amount of work Jászi did during this time was extraordinary. He wrote an account of the Hungarian revolution and counter-revolution of 1918/19 in Hungarian, German and English.² He also attempted to outline his social and economic views in several lengthy manuscripts, such as *Ad Naturrecht*, *Imperialism and Pacifism*, *Marxism versus Liberalism*.³ He edited the daily newspaper *Bécsi Magyar Ujság* for three years and wrote hundreds of articles for Hungarian, German and other journals published in the successor states as well as several dozens for the Western press. Although living in Vienna, Jászi made frequent and long trips to meet Mihály Károlyi in Czechoslovakia, Italy and Yugoslavia, and to visit his own family in Slovakia and his friends in

Transylvania. In 1923/24 he spent six months on a lecture tour of the United States. Throughout the whole time, he conducted an enormous correspondence which held together the first political emigration from Central Europe this century. In addition, he kept a diary which remains an indispensable source for the history of all the post-1918 emigrés, from the Liberals to the Communists, and of their political and diplomatic efforts unmentioned in printed sources.

As leaders of the democratic group, in the first months of 1920 Károlyi and Jászi were aiming at uniting most of the reliably anti-Horthy exiles into a common front. There was, however, a single, but important difference in the approaches of the two men: Károlyi wanted to involve the Communists, whereas Jászi wished to keep them in neutrality. All efforts at unification were frustrated by various disagreements, especially in regard to international orientation.

The Communists - and Károlyi - looked towards Soviet Russia.

The Social Democrats hoped for assistance from the Socialist International and from socialist and liberal public opinion in the West.

Some of the Liberals among the emigrés were legitimists, while others counted on disapproval by Western governments of the white terror in Hungary.

Jászi was deeply disappointed by the attitude shown by the Allies and their peace-moves in relation to East-Central Europe. "I see horrified how wrong, shortsighted policy the Entente makes in Hungary", he wrote to Seton-Watson in the same letter. Though he never lost faith in the values of Western democracy and the helpfulness of its liberal and socialist forces, he nevertheless did seek a more urgent and more effective type of support. He thought he could find it in the successor states, the countries of the future Little Entente that he called "the Allies of Hungarian Democracy".

It seemed to be in the vital interests of the governments and the democratic forces in the neighbouring countries to bring down the revanchist Horthy régime which was preparing war against them and which was fomenting unrest among their Hungarian minority populations.

It was, therefore, only logical to build contacts in these countries. Jászi, however, conceived of the alliance thus created not just as a merely tactical one, needed only to defeat the Horthy régime, but as a long-term necessity on the road leading to rapprochement with the successor states, to the integration of Hungary in her new international environment and, as a final step, to the establishment of a Danubian Confederation.

He considered the work of contact-building not only to be one of the most important tasks of the exiles but also as his own personal mission, because he

felt himself to be the right person for the task. Indeed, his past and his entire political record qualified him to negotiate with the political and intellectual leaders of the Danubian states and to attempt to persuade them to assume a tough attitude towards the Hungarian regime but a friendly one towards the Hungarian people - in Hungary and in their own countries.

As a matter of fact, this was the very same plan which Jászi had been unable to realize in 1918 as Hungarian minister of nationalities. Now he tried to launch it from the other side, so to speak, hoping to cooperate with his former adversaries, the Czech and Romanian leaders.

In the meantime, Jászi shunned all kinds of Magyar nationalism and was ready to accept the basic condition for any co-operation with the successor states: the acknowledgement of the status quo and the renunciation of any attempt to revise the Trianon treaty by force. The Károlyi-Jászi group was the first and, for a long time, the only Hungarian political faction which saw a lasting reality in East-Central Europe's post-1920 order.

In doing so, the group challenged the overwhelming majority of their compatriots and its members were branded as traitors and "Masaryk's agents" by Hungarian officialdom and the entire right-wing press. Jászi defiantly maintained this stand for 25 years, without ever abandoning his patriotic feelings and his loyalty to Hungary's true national interests.

In a memorial talk on Thomas G. Masaryk, given here before the Assembly of Oberlin College in 1937, Jászi related that he had once asked the President: "If you were a Hungarian statesman, what would you do now?" Masaryk had answered: "Well, in this hypothetical case I would try to do two things: First, I would fight for an honest carrying out of national autonomy for the Hungarians. In the second place, I would advocate the return to Hungary of those territories in the frontier regions where the Magyars constitute a solid, homogenous majority".⁴

Undoubtedly, Jászi quoted these words as the supreme justification of his own position. They aptly expressed the reservations in his friendship and moral support for the successor states. He revealed one of these in an editorial about the possible alliances of the democratic exiles. Hungarian democracy, he wrote, may renounce revanchism, but can never cease to demand the same rights for its separated Hungarian kinsmen as it had claimed before the war for the oppressed nationalities of old Hungary.⁵ Jászi found it unpolitic to voice publicly his second reservation, a peaceful revision of the Trianon frontiers in favour of a democratic Hungary - especially by Czechoslovakia - but he did express it during his talks with Czech statesmen.

These confidential talks started as early as October 1919 when Jászi visited Masaryk, Beneš and Tušar in Prague for the first time. He visited that city regularly during the next years. Czechoslovakia as the first democracy in Central Europe was the most important country in Jászi's international connections.

On March 30, 1920, together with Mihály Károlyi and Pál Szende, Jászi had a long and decisive conversation in Prague with Eduard Beneš. According to Jászi's diary,⁶ the Hungarians put the following questions to the foreign minister

- 1/ Did he see any sense in an organized political emigration, even without the participation of the Communists?
- 2/ Was Czechoslovakia willing to redress the injustices of the Peace Treaty?
- 3/ Was he ready to acknowledge the emigration in a semi-official way?

Beneš answered all the three questions in the affirmative. He stated that the existing Hungarian régime was impossible and intolerable, because "this feudal island cannot maintain itself in the midst of the democratic successor states". He reassured his visitors by saying that their position was the only one suitable for building the establishment of a new equilibrium in Europe. The most important thing was, he emphasized, to bring about an honest and sincere communication between the democratic forces of their two respective nations.

This was exactly what Jászi wanted not only to hear but also to put into practice. During the following months he greatly extended the range of his activities. In November 1920 he made his first tour of the Balkans, visiting Belgrade, Bucharest, and Zagreb to meet both the governmental and the opposition leaders of Yugoslavia and Rumania.

"I had for some time felt the necessity" he said in a statement,⁷ "of informing Southern Slav and Rumanian political circles about the true situation of Hungary, and about the views of the Hungarian democrats. At the same time, I felt the need to establish direct contact with the democratic and progressive wings of these circles. Besides I had also received invitations from my old Yugoslav and Rumanian friends to renew connections which were interrupted by the war and the revolutions. Of course, I spoke everywhere in my own name, but I am sufficiently familiar with all shades of Hungarian emigré opinion to be entitled to speak in the name of others, too, except for the Communists who continue their policy of world-revolution disaster."

"My conception," Jászi continued, "which I presented to the South Slav and Rumanian democratic public opinion, was roughly as follows: The Hungarian problem closely concerns the Little Entente. Without its proper solution it is impossible to create those conditions which would permit the development of

Central Europe. Hungary is the Archimedean point of a fatally sick Central European world. This must be the starting point for either a regeneration or a final dissolution... The collapse of the Horthy régime is therefore in the vital interest of the Little Entente."

However, Jászi warned against a military intervention. Instead, he proposed political pressure, insistence on demobilization, and delay of the Yugoslav evacuation of Baranya county and the Southern town of Pécs. At the same time he advocated economic and commercial links and the genuine solution of the problem of the Hungarian minorities, whose situation he described as depressing.

The poor refugee, based in a Vienna bed and breakfast and travelling day and night by slow train, was received as a statesman and a true friend by Pašić, Pribićević, Drašković and others in Belgrade, and by Averescu, Take Ionescu, Gareflid, Duca, Octavian Goga, Iuliu Maniu, Bratianu, Iorga, Mihalache, Gusti and others in Bucharest. Some even wanted to introduce him to the King. However, Jászi was better received than were his proposals.

"I received much encouragement but no definite promises", he wrote to Károlyi. "The leftist parties and the young people greeted my ideas enthusiastically, while the right-wing parties and the older people did not understand me. Averescu or Take Ionescu would more easily communicate with an agent from Horthy. In spite of their great politeness, their old diplomatist and militaristic brains cannot accept the idea that there are Hungarians who oppose revanche sincerely and as a matter of principle."⁸

Very soon, however, Jászi also encountered a similar attitude on the part of the modern and progressive elements in the successor states.

In March 1921, just a few days after the expulsion of the Károlyi family from Italy and the prevention in Naples of Jászi's and the Rev. János Hock's embarkation for the United States, Eduard Beneš met Gusztáv Gratz, the Hungarian foreign minister at that time. The successor states had already begun to accommodate themselves to the Horthy régime, which they actually preferred to a strong and democratic Hungary, which might have seemed attractive to both the Magyar minorities and the landless peasants of their own states. Accordingly, their relations with the emigrés became looser and more businesslike. They regarded them as political tools rather, than as allies and partners for the future.

Jászi also began to differentiate more keenly between the governments and the genuinely democratic forces in the successor states. He trusted the former less and less and tried to base progress towards a Danubian rapprochement and federation on the latter. In late 1921 he presented a detailed plan for a Da-

nubian Cultural League to be formed from the democratic elements and the intellectual elite of these countries. The tasks of this multinational organization would have been to make the nations of the region familiar with each other's history and culture, to analyze their social and economic problems, to popularize their cultural achievements, to publish a review, to organize conferences and - last but not least - to combat chauvinism and defend the national and human rights of the minorities in each country. A remarkable plan indeed, even for today!

The problem was, however, the weakness of such independent elements and forces in East-Central Europe. The greatest interest for Jászi's plan and conception was shown in Rumania, both among Rumanian intellectuals in Bucharest and Hungarians in Transylvania. The left-wing Bucharest review Revista Vremii published a series of programmatical articles by Jászi on Danubian problems and on the proposed Cultural League.⁹

In May 1923 Jászi spent three weeks in Bucharest and six Transylvanian towns. Again, he received a warm welcome from the authorities and scholars in the capital. In Transylvania, however, he was confronted with the daily implementation of the nationality policy and by the realities of minority life. He could not help but realize that his benevolent urging of an active and loyal civic attitude was, in the eyes of the Hungarians, tantamount to national submission. During this dramatic trip he came to appreciate more clearly than ever before that the policy of the Little Entente, which was tolerant towards the Hungarian régime and intolerant towards the Hungarian minorities, was ruining and compromising his whole conception and activity.

At the end of his journey, like some deus ex machina, R.W. Seton-Watson appeared in Kolozsvár (Cluj) and Jászi, according to his diary, confided to him his serious doubts as to whether it was permissible to continue his political activity and to maintain his one-sided alliance with Prague, Bucharest, and Belgrade. Seton-Watson, as Jászi noted, "understood the dilemma and promised to tell Beneš that he must decide whether he would cooperate with the exiles or not".¹⁰

Beneš, however, as Jászi himself knew and wrote to Károlyi, had very much changed his attitude since 1920. He thought that "the exiles, once they get home, would pursue the same nationalist policy of territorial integrity (as Horthy does). In any case, they are not suitable partners because they have passed the limit which no emigré should vis-a-vis his country's public opinion".¹¹ In this cynical view, Beneš was unfortunately right. Still, Jászi was unable and un-

willing to change his mind on the future of Danubia and on the necessity of an understanding with the successor states. Since he was prevented from promoting this idea in all honesty on the political level and on the spot, he had no other possibility but to withdraw from politics to theory and from Danubia to America.

As an independent American scholar in the 1930s, Jászi criticized more sharply the internal structures and the national policies of the successor states, even those of Czechoslovakia.¹² Nevertheless, he consistently maintained his solidarity towards this endangered democracy, especially in the dark months of 1938-39.

For this solidarity, Oszkár Jászi had to pay a high price in his relations with Hungary and with most of his compatriots.

Even so, he was ready to do this in the hope that the Czech leaders had learned their lesson from the quick disintegration of their multinational state, and that they would promote, as Beneš personally promised him during the war (in Cleveland), Danubian understanding and federation in the future.

When, in 1945, Jászi witnessed the opposite happening, he exclaimed in a private letter: "Mea maxima culpa, I overestimated our Czechs!",¹³ and tried to do everything possible to stop the evacuation of the Hungarian minorities from Slovakia by force. In a long letter written jointly with Professor Rusztem Vámbéry, Jászi warned President Beneš that "any indiscriminating collective responsibility seems to be contrary to the democratic principles of which Czechoslovakia was the outstanding champion in Central Europe".¹⁴

When this discreet intervention proved to be ineffective, Jászi also asked for the good offices of Harold J. Laski and Wickham Steed. "The new Czechoslovak policy against the Hungarian minority was one of the worst episodes of my life which has shaken my belief in the intelligence and the morality of men," he wrote to them "I beg you to do all that you can to convince the Czech leaders who have always shown deep esteem and admiration for you, that the road taken by them will lead to disaster and create an unbearable atmosphere in the whole Danubian Basin."¹⁵

Finally, Jászi did not hesitate to denounce this dangerous nationalistic policy publicly, in The New York Times. In a joint statement, together with Antony Balasy, John Biró, the Reverend Ambro Czakó, Ferenc Göndör, and others, he pointed out that "The new Czechoslovak attitude no doubt is due to the belief that the minorities helped the Nazi oppressors. But it is not true that there was a general plot of the minorities against the Czechoslovak state... It seems that the new "realistic statesmen" of Europe, fighting Fascism but

infected by its very principles, have returned to the "chattels and pawns theory" of international relations... A Hungarian minority rightly treated would become for the Czechoslovak state not a danger spot but an asset".¹⁶ At the sight of the expanding process of re-slovakization and expulsion of minorities, Jászi repeated his protest and warning before the American and international public a year later.¹⁷ And after his last visit in 1947 in the Danubian countries, he summed up his bitter experiences in a superb essay "Danubia: Old and New".¹⁸

However, Jászi never regretted his efforts at establishing friendly contacts with the democrats of the neighbouring countries.

We must say, with regret, that in these efforts Jászi failed to enlist many supporters. Since the 1920s nobody has seriously attempted to establish even a Danubian Cultural League.

NOTES

- x/ Paper read at the Oszkár Jászi Memorial Conference in Oberlin, Ohio, on November 9, 1985.
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G y ö r g y L i t v á n

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THE SLOVAK SEPARATION IN 1918: AN INDIRECT FORM OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The disintegration of multinational, pre-1918 Hungary was a complex process. The following essay outlines the arguments in favour of Slovak separation. Our basis of systematization is the distinctive character and evolution of these arguments, since what was at issue was not simply separation itself but the possible alternatives open to Slovak politicians, including the option of remaining within the Hungarian state, all the time present in Slovak political thinking.

Although the factual investigation of the issue to be discussed can still be regarded as incomplete in some respects, we shall adhere to the sequence of events reconstructible on the basis of previous studies.¹ The decisive period of Slovak breakaway - the autumn of 1918 - can be divided into three phases:

- The first phase, which lasted from the beginning of August until the end of October, saw the declaration and general acceptance of the idea of Czechoslovakian state unity.
- The second phase, in November, was a temporary equilibrium established by the short-lived diplomatic achievements of the revolutionary government of Count Mihály Károlyi and by Beneš's diplomatic counter-offensive in Paris. The Slovak National Council at Martin (Turócszentmárton)^x, set up on October 30, negotiated simultaneously with the Budapest and Prague governments and tried to arrive at solutions which favoured Slovak national interests.
- The third phase lasted from the demarcation by Paris of Slovakia's southern frontier until the military invasion and incorporation of Slovakia. This was directed by Šrobár's Slovakian ministry, which arrived in Žilina (Zsolna) on December 12.²

We shall try to convey the dynamism and inherent contradictions of the views of the most important Slovak political groups in Martin, Ružomberok (Rózsahegy), Budapest, Prague and Vienna, and some leading politicians (e.g. Milan Hodža, Matúš Dula, Vavro Šrobár).

During the autumn of 1918, the greatest problem in East-Central Europe was the approaching conclusion of peace and the national rearrangement of the region. As a consequence of accelerated and aggressive political activity, radical proposals were put forward that promoted inevitable national separation. But at the same time, this deliberately speeded-up process became one of the reasons why the otherwise attractive democratic slogan of self-determination became more and more questionable as a practical possibility.

In the contemporary Slovak press, beside the theoretically unexplained worship of self-determination, we also find publications that make surprisingly clear distinctions between the multifaceted and problematic question of self-determination and that of "doing justice", considered more realizable within the scope of peace talks. The Narodnie Noviny published in Martin, cautiously balanced opinion and official censure: "The nationality problem has ceased to be an internal affair, it has become a foreign political, even a world affair. The most remarkable novelty is that the solution of the nationality problem is in the hands of the "world as a whole" and not in the hands of the nationalities concerned. Therefore, the outcome depends not on the will of the nationalities, either ruling or oppressed, but on the decision of the entire embattled world... Today nationalities are no longer initiating or demanding: they are waiting."² Although the Martin group apparently considered the settlement of the nationality problem to be the duty of the peace conference, the rapidly changing internal and foreign political situation in October, the constant internal debates over passivity, the rapprochement policy of the Hungarian Wekerle and Károlyi cabinets and the promptings not only of Masaryk and his emigré associates but also the demands of the Czech politicians in Prague forced each group to take sides. Thus, a certain mechanism for expressing opinions and for identification of views became a kind of substitute for self-determination itself. This mechanism brought the national-political demands of the Slovaks to the surface.

For the Slovak national leaders, reliance on the peace conference was the only possible strategy that guaranteed both national separation and self-determination. This fact was not evident at the time. The fragmentation of forces and almost total ignorance concerning the activity of the Czechoslovak emigration at the beginning of 1919 had resulted in a situation in which Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Point peace programme was dismissed by the central Slovakian daily as nothing but an ordinary means of propaganda, similar to the proposals of Czernin, the Austrian Foreign Minister. This was unparalleled, even among the non-dominant nations of the Monarchy.³

On the other hand, we should not forget that already from 1916 onwards

several voices were heard propagating with firm conviction the necessity of post-war changes in East-Central Europe. But in Slovak political ideology such views were based on the traditional belief of an imminent "outside interference". By the time of the Balkan Wars, the belief evolved that the solution of the Slovak question lay in a "universal apocalypse", involving the liberation of Slavs living in the Habsburg Monarchy, as a result of Russian military intervention against the latter.

In his reply on the national question sent to the Peace Conference and published in the Hungarian review Huszadik Század, Samuel Zoch, a Lutheran clergyman in Modra (Modor), expressed opinions concerning the consequences of the war for national policy which were similar to Masaryk's. According to him small nations had defended their rights to existence; what's more, each small nation was likely to be given a certain measure of independence. However, Zoch deemed compromise advisable: "The opposition of nations can lead these small nations of the region to the fate of litigant peasants who lose their entire holdings in the legal battle for a few furrows."⁴

Two possibilities for attaining self-determination were recognized by Slovak politicians during the first period preceding the separation in the autumn of 1918: the peace conference of the great powers acting as a kind of court of arbitration and the possibility of a compromise arrangement between neighbouring nations. It was also clear to them that in both cases the expression of Slovak national purposes which rendered a sort of autonomy possible could be important as well.

Let us examine the chances for autonomy and the possibilities it could have suggested to the political representatives of the Slovak nation.

The aims of the 1861 program for Slovak autonomy had already lost some of their attractiveness owing to the failure of the pre-war non-Hungarian federation attempts in Hungary: the idea of Slovak autonomy realized within the Hungarian state had no sympathizers at all among the Hungarians themselves. This is why the idea of a Czechoslovakian union became generally accepted at the time of the Slovak separation. How independent Slovak statehood as an intermediate solution became lost can be very well seen in Hodža's radical pamphlet written in September, 1918: "So we Slovaks should separate ourselves from the Hungarian state. And that's Gospel truth, you either take it or leave it! But if we break with the Hungarians, what happens then? We could exist by ourselves, independently. We could have our own Slovak country, our own Slovak king, our own Slovak army, our own Slovak state. We could, if we wanted to! The only question is whether there are enough of us for an autonomous Slovak state!" Later in the same pamphlet, Hodža quotes the Rumanian and Serbian attempts at union as

examples and urges the abandonment of dreams about a great-Moravian statehood: "Or have we forgotten that we Slovaks had a country of our own? We had a beautiful, great and glorious Slovak country together with those Slovaks living in Moravia and Bohemia!"⁵ From May 1917, when the Czech representatives in the Austrian Reichsrat raised their demands for the Slovak territories, a desperate struggle broke out to win the favour of Slovak political groups. The claim for a union put forward first by the Czech emigration and later by the Czech representatives brought about a fundamental change. The Czech-Hungarian conflict became really pronounced in September 1918 when the news arrived that the Czechoslovak National Council had been officially recognized as an allied government by France and Great Britain.

The intensifying struggles during the late summer of 1918 offered four options from the point of view of the Slovak groups: Slovak autonomy within Hungary, Slovak autonomy within a new Czecho-Slovak state, a united Czechoslovakia involving Czech supremacy and, finally, an independent Slovak state. These were the alternatives. It follows from the nature of politics that the Slovak groups, following their instincts, were most afraid of a fifth possibility, i.e., that the territorial integrity of the Hungarian state should be preserved. They tried to prevent this eventuality with all their might. The rejection of autonomy was also motivated by their fears on this score.

Let us examine the development of Hungarian relations with the Slovaks, which was undoubtedly a decisive factor in each of the Slovak standpoints. "Spontaneous" Slovak attempts at a compromise initiated by Prime Minister István Tisza could line up no significant Slovak forces either in 1915 or in 1917. Ján Mudroň, son of an earlier SNP chairman, the Slovak leader of the actions organized by the Hungarian royal frontier police and government commissioner Kürthy, accepted the SNC majority's opinion in November 1918 and withdrew his own idea of a compromise. But in his reasoning Mudroň maintained his doubts concerning the rights offered to Slovaks by a Czechoslovak state. "We were afraid that our Slovak language would be in greater danger if we lived with our Czech brothers than if we lived among Hungarians! As well as the linguistic relationship, we were also worried about the Czechs being intellectually and financially richer than us. Therefore, together with others, I would rather have stayed in the land of St. Stephen's crown, after obtaining full national autonomy, than join with the Czechs."⁶

In the last days of August, 1918, rumours spread that Károlyi was seeking to establish relations with politicians of the nationalities. Károlyi's deputy first visited Milan Hodža, then, in the first days of October, he had talks with Dula,

Stodola, representative of the Budapest group, and Vladimír Makovický, spokesman of the Ružomberok group. According to Károlyi's Memoires, the negotiations about Slovak autonomy to be granted within Hungary proved successful, and Károlyi writes that Dula made a formal and final compromise that merely depended on his own appointment as Prime Minister.⁷

The appearance of the compromise solution as a possibility in August naturally provoked fiercest resistance in Prague. Responding to the Hungarian government's nearly simultaneous rapprochement policy F. Staněk, Czech representative in the Austrian Reichsrat raised the cry: "Don't negotiate!" Doubting the frankness of government initiatives he could only imagine negotiations about the Czechoslovakian problem in the form of talks conducted with both governments simultaneously. Josef Rotnágl, organiser of the pre-war Czech-Slovak movement for union, considered the rejection of Hungarian rapprochement attempts to be the most important Slovak national interest. He said that the Hungarian promises of, among other things, Slovak schools, Slovak university departments, Slovak public administration, autonomy and a Swiss-type canton system, could not be taken seriously.⁸

The correspondence of the Slovak political groups shows that Dula's talks with Károlyi served only one purpose. This was articulated in a letter written by Hodža on September 27: "It is necessary to put the bridle on Károlyi and his group because at the moment they are exploiting every opportunity available. Let them feel happy about this for a short while and then paralyse them for ever!" Dula and his associates entered into talks in this spirit, and on October 11 they reported about them to Prague. They received strict commands to break off talks with the Hungarians.⁹

While Dula still had not decided when and how the Slovak Separation should be proclaimed, on October 18 the Slovenský Týždenník, Hodža's political daily in Budapest, emphatically advocated Slovak self-determination: "We are aware that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy offered peace on the basis of self-determination. Therefore, we demand this right for our nation as well... We do not ask for more nor will we accept less."¹⁰

The following day in parliament, Ferdiš Juriga, on behalf of the Slovak National Council which was not yet even formed followed the example of the Rumanian national committee and brought his plea into harmony with those of the Rumanian representatives when he ignored Dula's admonitions and came down in favour of Slovak national self-determination.¹¹ At the same time, both Dula, and the leader of the Social Democrats, Emanuel Lehocký, thought that the

only possible policy was to wait. In Lehocký's opinion, the liberty offered by Jászi and Károlyi was, like the ersatz coffee used during the war, a poor substitute for the real thing. Only a body with international political authority could give Slovakia real freedom and real autonomy.¹²

Therefore, in the second half of October Juriga, Hodža, Dula and Štefánek (from the Prague-group) all considered the continuation of talks with the Hungarians to be harmful, since they judged the conciliatory position of the Károlyi group to be not only the result of pressure but also to be lacking in any kind of sincerity and guarantees. In vain did Károlyi arrange the ending of Šrobár's banishment to Cegléd - the condition for continuing the talks - as Dula was not prepared to sit down to the conference table. Šrobár arrived in Prague on 26th October.¹³

What other factors influenced the shaping of Slovak arguments and opinions? Undoubtedly, from September 1918 information concerning the activity of the Czechoslovak political emigration lead by Masaryk, Beneš and Štefánik became more and more important. No direct links existed with the chief organ of the emigration, the Czechoslovak National Committee in Paris, but news was transmitted more or less regularly via Prague and Vienna. The complex and incidental relations between the emigration and the Slovak politicians made it rather difficult to reconcile Slovakian and Prague conceptions concerning Czech-Slovak affairs with the ideas of the emigration. It was not easy to make the world accept a programme of Czechoslovakian national unity without the help of Slovak politicians, who up to that time had hardly given any signs of their existence.

It was not surprising that in such circumstances Matúš Dula judged the only rational policy to be one of wait and see, in spite of pressure from the Prague and Slovak groups. He found an irrefutable argument against those who urged the proclamation by referring to the need to respect the Czechoslovak government in Paris: "President Wilson does not need our declarations", the chairman of the SNC announced on October 24.¹⁴ Therefore, as expected, there was an almost total uncertainty concerning the actual results achieved by the emigration. Kramář sent instructions to Martin before going to Geneva to negotiate with Beneš; he advised moderation in the event of a possible Slovak declaration on the question of a unified Czechoslovak state.

The comprehensive literature on the Declaration Conference of the SNC in Martin gives various evaluation of the two modifications Milan Hodža made in the text ratified by the plenary meeting. Hodža arrived from Vienna late on the night of October 30. We can hardly verify the commonly-accepted claim that, among the participants of the meeting, nobody had known about the events

of two days before - the proclamation of the Czechoslovak Republic. It is customary to account for this ignorance by referring to the phrasing of the document, the lack of a concrete declaration concerning Czech-Slovak union, and the dream of a common Czechoslovak language. At the same time, there is no doubt that Hodža had precise information about those events. But Hodža, in accordance with the instructions of the politicians who left for Geneva, thought it wise to be cautious. Meanwhile, influenced by the events of October 28, he deleted the fourth article of the Slovak Declaration from the first copy of the Národné Noviny of October 31 with the knowledge and approval of a few Martin politicians.

This ominous fourth article could have become the most authentic legal source of Slovak autonomy within the Czechoslovak state. "We expect the solution of the Slovak problem by the peace-conference, which is going to decide the fate of our nation. Therefore, we demand that the part of our nation living in Hungary is represented at the forthcoming peace-conference" - said the famous fourth article.¹⁵

Matúš Dula subsequently condemned Hodža's actions and tried to relieve the SNC from responsibility. He said: "After all, our Council had not the slightest intention of placing the fate of our nation at anyone's mercy or whim."

There is no doubt that during the October 30 declaration session, and even more during the following day's conferences, controversies emerged about the question of Slovak self-government and autonomy within the Czechoslovak state. Dula, Zoch, Dérer, Hodža and the majority considered the immediate raising of the unconditional autonomy to be unnecessary. According to Ivan Dérer, the problem should have been discussed "in private", in order to keep the confidence of the allies. Because of the Slovak autonomy offered by the Károlyi government, Dula did not consider the immediate proclamation of separation to be expedient.

In the meantime, on October 31, Emil Stodola, Hlinka and Juriga protested in Martin against the rejection of the legal guarantees of Slovak national autonomy, and they consented to the Czech-Slovak union only on the condition of an urgent legal arrangement concerning Czech-Slovak relations for the next ten years. Juriga's group was also aware that the Slovak acceptance of the idea of a Czechoslovak national unity was a significant political condition in the formation of a new state. Nevertheless, the majority of Slovak politicians expected the solution to come as a result of a favourable political climate. They kept a cautious eye on Károlyi's diplomatic efforts and they were also afraid of the possibility of a plebiscite to decide on the fate of the national status quo.

The Slovak politicians received accurate information only after the return of

the Geneva delegation on November 4. The facts announced by Beneš seemed to justify all previous hesitation, vagueness and passivity. Instead of ethnic frontiers, geographic frontiers became possible. The Czechoslovakian emigration had proved to be an influence on the allies in matters of East-Central European politics.

"They don't take the Hungarians into consideration, theirs will be a small state, and if they keep on bullying everybody they won't be able to evade even more severe retribution", said Beneš's message.¹⁶ Of the two ways of achieving self-determination (separation from Hungary by agreement and joining a Czecho-Slovak state; a great power decision sanctioning the ideas of the Czech emigrés) only one now remained, namely the Paris decision urged by Beneš, and this fact was heartily accepted by Slovak politicians earlier and more easily than by the Hungarians. No wonder: they were fascinated by the prospect of ample territories beyond their wildest dreams. After all, compromise with the Hungarians had always been the result of compulsion. The failure to achieve autonomy was compensated for by the restoration of "Rastislav and Svatopluk's state" as the Hodža pamphlet put it. After a short while, however, it became clear that the disregard for an independent national program and the passive policy of wait and see had serious consequences.

The Budapest talks of Hodža, deputy of the Czecho-Slovak government in Prague, formed the most dramatic episode in the Slovak separation. As grounds for the negotiations, the Ministry of Nationalities in the Hungarian Károlyi cabinet, headed by Oszkár Jászi, drew up a project for the temporary settlement of the relationship between Hungary and Slovakia until a decision had been reached by the peace conference. This would have placed the "Slovak Imperium", to be formed from the territories of the 67 districts with Slovak majority in Northern Hungary, under the governance of the Slovak National Council. The national budget and administration would have remained within the competence of the government in Budapest. The SNC would have immediately gained control over education, and, in stages, over civil, criminal and administrative jurisdiction. Contentious issues would have been settled by an eleven-member joint committee.

In his counter-proposal, Hodža claimed for the SNC absolute national, governmental and military sovereignty over the territories north of the Hungarian-Slovak linguistic boundary. Although the talks were expected to bring about a spectacular agreement, and Károlyi and Jászi were quite confident about the acceptance of the extensive autonomy offered by them, Hodža's goal was from the outset to ensure the conditions for complete separation. Above all, time was needed to annul the clauses concerning Slovakia in the Belgrade military

convention concluded with the Hungarian government; second, the implementation of Hungarian mobilization and the projected plebiscite in the Slovak-inhabited territories had to be prevented. Finally, in order to facilitate the recruitment of the initially meagre Czecho-Slovak military force, it was imperative to determine the temporary demarcation line between Hungary and Slovakia. Hodža carried out all these tasks completely.

As is clear from an analysis of the Hungarian-Slovak talks, Hodža, exceeding the instructions of the Prague government, made an attempt to enhance the prestige of the eclipsed Slovak National Council in Martin, and this was probably what prompted the Czecho-Slovak government's disavowal of its deputy's stand in Budapest. A reduction in the significance of the Budapest talks was also the purpose of the declaration of the SNC deputies on December 1, which showed that no agreement had been reached towards even a temporary settlement of Hungarian-Slovak relations.¹⁷

"Hungarophobia", the eternal excuse for Slovak political passivity, can hardly account for the neglect of an independent Slovak national programme. There were much more important factors, above all a longstanding disadvantage with regard to the Czechs, one which was compounded by eccentricities of a Czechoslovak emigration that ignored the emancipation pursuits of the growing Czechoslovak movement for union and finally the "Czechoslovakism" of Šrobár, who refused to support the national demands of the SNC and thereby destroyed the possibility of reciprocal agreements guaranteeing equal rights for Slovaks.

In December and January, Czechoslovak troops returned from Italy and, in response to pressure from Beneš, occupied Slovakia within the geographical frontiers that had been delineated. They met with no significant resistance. Šrobár arrived in Žilina on December 12 and supervised the occupation, and as the authorized minister of Slovakia he dissolved the SNC.

The formation of the Czechoslovak state urged by the Czechoslovak emigration and the Czechoslovak government in Paris can only in a limited sense be considered as an organic continuation of previous nationality relationships in the region. This is obvious from the fact that the alternative possibilities for the accomplishment of imminent Slovak separation lost their importance. The compromise possibilities in Slovak-Hungarian relations came to be excluded.

Therefore, the Slovak separation from Hungary and the union with the Czechs reflected the realities of Slovak power politics and facilitated only an indirect form of self-determination in line with the Czech conception and the decisions of the great powers.

NOTES

- x/ According to a law of 1898, pre-1919 Hungary officially used Hungarian place names, although the non-Hungarian press could certainly freely use non-Hungarian alternatives. In this article, we have adopted the Slovak names, in current use today, with the Hungarian equivalents in brackets on first appearance.
1. The most recent treatments of the question are: Jozef Butvin, "Domáci národno-oslobodzovací boj Slovákov za prvej svetovej vojny" (The resistance struggles of the Slovaks during World War I), Historický časopis, XXXII (1984), pp. 864-904; Josef Kalvoda, "The Czechoslovak-Hungarian Dispute", War and Society in East Central Europe, Vol. VI. Essays on World War I. Total War and Peacemaking. A Case Study on Trianon. Ed. by Bela K. Király, Peter Pastor and Ivan Sanders (New York, 1982), pp. 275-295.
 2. "Význam svetovej vojny" (The Significance of the World War), Národné noviny, September 24, 1918.
 3. "Wilson a Czernin" (Wilson and Czernin), Národné noviny, January 29, 1918.
 4. A nemzetiségi kérdés a társadalmi és egyéni fejlődés szempontjából (The Issue of the Nationalities with a View to Social and Individual Development. Inquiry of the periodical Huszadik Század, prefaced by Oszkár Jászi) (Budapest, 1919) pp. 99-101.
 5. Milan Hodža, "Slováci, pozor" (Slovaks, be vigilant! - pamphlet), Literárny archiv Matice slovenskej, LA MS/Martin 64 L6
 6. Ján Mudroň, "Slováci sú jednotný" (The Slovaks are unified), Národné noviny, November 26, 1918. The change in Mudroň's position is extensively discussed by Ladislav Tajták, "Úsilie maďarských vládncich tried o udržanie Slovenska v rámci Maďarska v roku 1918" (The efforts of Hungarian ruling circles to keep Slovakia in Hungary in 1918), Historický časopis, XIV (1966), pp. 578-579.
 7. Károlyi Mihály, Egy egész világ ellen (Against the Entire World) (Budapest, 1965), pp. 301-302.
 8. Josef Rotnagl, Česi a Slováci, Vzpomínky a úvahy nad dopisy a zápisky z let 1907-1918 (Czechs and Slovaks. Reflections and Recollections on Letters and Notices from 1907-1918) (Praha, 1945), p. 231.
 9. LA MS 42 C 49, Hodža's letter to A. Stefánek; Matúš Dula, "Moja odpoveď na novšie a staršie otázky", (My reply to new and old questions. Manuscript, Turčiansky Svätý Martin, February 28, 1924), LA MS C 53
 10. Slovenský týždenník, October 18, 1918.
 11. Juriga's speech, Journal of the House of Representatives, 1918, XLI, p. 350.
 12. Robotnícke noviny, October 19, 1918.
 13. Vavro Srobár was the most radical Slovak adherent of Czech-Slovak union. The speech he delivered on May 1st, 1918, was the first important sign of intensified Slovak activity and, as a consequence, he was banished in the summer of 1918.
 14. Dula's arguments are quoted from a letter to R. Markovič (Státny ústredný archív SSR, Bratislava I. SNR 1918) by Marian Hronský, Slovensko na rázcestí, Slovenské národné rady a gardy v roku 1918 (Slovakia at the Crossroads. Slovak National Councils and Guards in 1918) (Košice, 1976), p. 35.
 15. Matúš Dula, Moja odpoveď... On the confusion relating to the Declaration, see J. Butvin, "Domáci národno-oslobodzovací boj", pp. 898-903.
 16. Confidential circular of the Slovak Committee of the Prague National Committee on November 5, 1918, Fond Makovický Vladimír, ŠÚA SSR, II/2a

17. There is a rich selection from the material of the Hungarian-Slovak talks in Slovenský rozchod s Maďarmi roku 1918 (The Separation of the Slovaks from the Hungarians in 1918) (Bratislava, 1929), pp. 35-52.

L á s z l ó S z a r k a

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THE ROLE OF SHAMANISM IN HUNGARIAN ETHNIC IDENTITY

The national identity consciousness of the peoples in the Danubian region is deeply rooted in their folk cultures and in pagan traditions preserved by the peasantry under the cover of Christianity, which were later discovered and incorporated into high culture by scholars and poets in the era of national awakening. The best-known Hungarian example is pentatonic music, which was handed down in popular tradition for centuries before being discovered and included in written music by Bartók and Kodály after 1900.

Recently, there has been a similar interest in the beliefs current in ancient Hungarian religion, which have shown close kinship with Finno-Ugrian, Mongolian, Old Turkish, Chinese and Japanese shamanism, and which also attracted the attention of Mircea Eliade, the lately-deceased eminent scholar in the field of religious history (Le chamanisme et les techniques archaïques de l'extase, 1951). These beliefs have not only become the focal subject of research in Hungarian religious history, but also a major source of inspiration for modern Hungarian poetry and psychotherapeutic practice.

Shamanism, dating from before the Hungarians' migration from their original home and preserved in popular beliefs, sorcery practices and tales, as it were, to our own days, received its earliest detailed account to come down to us in 1648. It was written by Marco Bandini, an Italian bishop who visited Hungarians living in the Rumanian principality of Moldavia, east of the Carpathians. He observed that: "Sorcerers are as highly esteemed by them (the Hungarians) as discerning and pious scholarly men are in Italy. The practice and study of magic and quackery are honourable and open to everybody. Oh, how many prayers I offered up to God! How many opportunities I had to exercise tolerance when hearing and often seeing the practice of this loathsome quackery! What can be read of ancient oracles in the fabulous stories of Antiquity can be personally experienced here. Whenever a sorcerer wishes to learn about the future, he will

mark out a certain place where he stands for a while muttering, with his head twisted, his eyes rolling, his mouth awry, his forehead and cheeks puckered up, his countenance distorted, his arms and legs flailing around and his entire body shaking. Then he throws himself down and remains there seemingly lifeless for three or four hours. When he finally regains consciousness, he is a horrible sight for onlookers: first, he slowly revives with trembling limbs, then, as if possessed by infernal spirits, he stretches out all his limbs, fingers and toes so much so that one expects no bone to remain in its socket. Eventually, as though emerging from a dream, he relates this as the future. When somebody falls sick, or loses something, he will turn to the magician. If somebody sees his friend's or benefactor's spirit turning away from him, he will try to win it back by magic. And if they have some enemy, magic is regarded as the best way of taking revenge. The practices of various magicians, quacksalvers, soothsayers and charlatans could not be related in a single volume."¹

This detailed description is rarely referred to, although it undoubtedly provides an accurate account of a trance technique, which was still employed at the time, and also serves as evidence for the fact that divining the future and magic, as based on ecstasy, were established and everyday practices among the Hungarian people.

Interest in pagan Hungarian beliefs and in the discovery of the heritage of shamanism has not diminished in the centuries that have passed since Bandini's relation. The subject had been approached in hundreds of articles and papers, until Vilmos Diószegi, having studied an enormous amount of comparative material, established the Siberian (Uralian and Altaic) connections of some elements of Hungarian popular belief. In the first place, Diószegi found the shamanistic analogue of the Hungarian shaman, the "táltos", among Altaic peoples. As a result of his research, he claimed that many aspects of the beliefs associated with the táltos can be proved to date back to the time of the settlement of the Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin. For instance: "The selection of the táltos candidate by sickness, by long sleep, or by the disjuncting of his body, that is, his acquisition of knowledge through the search for superfluous bones and his initiation through climbing a sky-high tree, in its entirety as well as in its details, represents the Hungarian settlers' beliefs about the táltos candidate. A single headed drum in his hand, being his vehicle at the same time, an owl-feathered or antlered headdress, a grooved or ladder-like "táltos-tree" with representations of the Sun and the Moon - these are the paraphernalia of the Hungarian settlers' táltos. His time-honoured activities, on the other hand, are trances and fights in animal form when in a trance, or his conjuring of spirits by means of incantations."²

Diószegi's method was systematic comparison between Hungarian popular beliefs relating to the táltos and similar beliefs among the neighbouring peoples (e.g. the South Slav kresnik and nestinar), and he only compared those elements of the former to the respective shamanistic beliefs of kindred peoples living further to the East that were exclusively Hungarian. For example: "The selection of the Hungarian shaman was a process similar to that used by the Voguls, Ostyaks, Lapps, or the Altaic Turks, Yakuts, etc. This is to say that the candidate's calling was of superior ordination. ... He will receive his being chosen as a heavy burden, as an unavoidable destiny ... initially he wants to renounce it but finally he is compelled by the "shaman-sickness" to accept the vocation ordained for him."³ This socially-enforced and institutionalized method of role-taking was later considered an important feature of North-Eurasian shamanism by other scholars, too.⁴ The innovation in Diószegi's method was the comparison and analysis of not just single elements but entire belief systems, and the consequent ability to prove that these phenomena were not isolated. He also showed that Hungarian folk culture has got an ancient stratum, that is, shamanism, which had already been a part of the settling Hungarian tribes' spiritual culture.

After the untimely and unexpected death of the eminent scholar in 1972, Hungarian research on shamanism briefly came to a standstill, only to be taken up later on by a new generation of scholars. A volume of essays on Siberian shamanism collected by Diószegi was published, although unfortunately he could no longer take part in the editorial work.⁵ Some years later, an international conference was held in Hungary, the participants of which presented papers on their latest research in commemoration of Diószegi.⁶ Some of the papers complemented Diószegi's achievements, since they addressed themselves to subjects not covered by him. Tekla Dömötör, for instance, was the first to deal with Hungarian female shamans,⁷ while the present writer discussed some aspects of shamanism today, the chances of its survival, and also gave an account of his conversations with the last Hungarian táltos, or, more exactly, the last "tudós pásztor" (knowledgeable herdsman) who could still remember the method of healing with a leather-covered sieve which substituted for the drum.⁸ A paper on the "delusions" and neuroses recalling the memory of shamanism, delivered by a psychiatrist who based his discussion on the accounts of numerous patients encountered in the course of his medical practice,⁹ aroused a lively interest at the symposium.

There is a little known article published after Diószegi's death, by Lóránd Czigány, an eminent Hungarian literary historian living in Canada, on Amanita Muscaria, that is, on a certain species of toadstools.¹⁰ As is well known, this

species was widely used as a hallucinogen by shamans all over the world,¹¹ and particularly in Siberia. We also have some data on its use (especially in the case of love charms) from Hungarian popular belief, though the nature of the phenomenon - it was a strict secret since the poison could be lethal - will certainly prevent much more information coming to light. Czigány, however, found an interesting piece of indirect evidence for the use of the mushroom. According to Hungarian táltos beliefs, a "tudós pásztor" or táltos would only ask for milk when dropping in at a house in his shabby apparel. According to villagers, this humble request was the sure sign of his being a táltos. Let us quote from some recently collected material, which Czigány could not have been familiar with:

"They were born with teeth and they had to be looked after very carefully until the age of seven. Because when the sky became clouded they were stolen, they were taken away and they could not be looked after carefully enough, they were taken away. The child was taken away.

These are the táltoses who were born with teeth to govern the clouds when the sky becomes cloudy. And once they came down to the earth, and they went to the people and asked for something to eat. They went into a woman's house and told her that they wanted some milk to drink. The woman told them she had no milk while she did have some. They knew that she had some milk but she did not want to give them any. They said, 'Well, if you have not got any milk, you will have water.

And they poured such a rain upon the earth that water was flowing over the threshold and window-sill."¹²

This motif was considered irrelevant and was totally neglected by scholars, although modern pharmaceutical research has shown that milk could be an effective detoxicant in cases of mushroom poisoning.

Due to the accumulation of material during the last decades, newer and newer dimensions of the táltos are revealed in the analyses. The following features can be important for comparative religious history research: the táltos is born with teeth; at the age of seven he disappears (wandering about in the surrounding fields or in the reeds - notice the special role and frequency of the number seven in táltos beliefs); if he does not disappear, he falls sick, has convulsions and, finally, falls into a long and deep sleep. For this deathlike sleep there used to be a peculiar word elrejtezik (to hide), whose root is identical with that of the verb révül (to become entranced).¹³ As is known, elrejtezés or révülés (hiding and becoming entranced respectively, here both are implied in the meaning of the latter) are essentially symbolic expressions for one of the

most important elements in becoming a shaman, the trip to the other world, during the course of which the candidate comes into the possession of knowledge. In Hungarian popular belief, the trip to the other world has been particularly well preserved in beliefs associated with the necromancer.¹⁴

Another important feature of táltos beliefs is the above-mentioned motif of asking for milk and the táltos's capacity to raise a storm or to send rain on houses or villages if no milk is provided. He is, therefore, clearly in possession of supernatural powers. His next characteristic is especially important for mythological comparison, namely, his ability to change shape: he could turn into a bull, so that he could fight against his enemy in animal form. It is particularly in stories of the herdsmen of the Great Plain where lively descriptions of fights between bulls of different colours (black and white, red and blue) abound. These fights can be compared - as was done by Diószegi - to those of the shamans of reindeer keeping peoples, where the shaman's assistant spirits appear in the shapes of reindeer bulls. The shamans among horse keeping peoples on the steppe however, fought in the form of stallions or bulls of divine origin.¹⁵

Research has shown that shamanistic beliefs can be considered the backbone of the ancient Hungarian pagan belief system. And it was not futile, even on the part of the earlier generation of scholars, to search for the survival of shamanism not only in mythology, but also in folk tales.¹⁶ The sky-high tree is well known in Hungarian tales and the figure of the young swineherd climbing it has been identified with the protagonist of the shamanistic ritual of initiation (climbing the shaman tree or ladder was a symbol of entrancement). Climbing the tree in fact means the trip to the other world, where the shaman gets into contact with the gods, so that he could play the role of a mediator.

It should not be concealed that there are some critical approaches to Hungarian shamanism in our folklore - approaches which question, if not deny, its existence.¹⁷

Undoubtedly, one hardly negligible problem is posed by the lack of an unambiguous terminology. As early as 1967, a thought-provoking article by Jenő Fazekas drew attention to the fact that in Hungarian folk belief there are four different figures (the táltos; the tudó or tudós [someone in possession of knowledge]; the garabonciás [~wizard: someone disguised as a travelling student, capable of raising storms]; and the regös [~a bard who brings about fertility with his magic songs performed around Christmas]) - all of which are comparable to that of the shaman. On the basis of their characteristic features inferred from Far Eastern analogues,¹⁸ Fazekas believed that they could be traced back to an ancient personality with a complex social function. In search for the etymology of

the word táltos, he listed the possible parallels that had been suggested before, among others the Finnish taita (to know), the Mongolian dalda (secret, miracle) and the Turkish taltys (to grow weak).¹⁹ In his monumental Linguistic Remains of the Ancient Hungarian Religion, the linguist Dezső Pais devoted a separate and elaborate chapter to the description of the Turkish word family tal, associated with the root of the word táltos and having in its semantic field the meanings "to grow weak", "to faint" and "to get tired", which can be indirectly related to the meaning of the Hungarian word táltos.

Although the direct analogues of popular Hungarian shamanistic beliefs have been found among kindred peoples, this is not reflected in similarities of terminology. The old words for the Lapp magus were noita and noiade (adopted by Finnish, too), etymologically identical with the Vogul word najt (shaman). Analogies like that might refer to the common origin of shamanism. The Votyak animal sacrificer was called tuno, while the name of the same person among their Cheremis neighbours was kart. In early Hungarian mythological literature, the Hungarian sacrificer is identified with the táltos, who offered the horse sacrifice. In this case, the only identical practice is that of offering sacrifices, while there is no reference to a common origin in Finno-Ugrian nomenclature. According to a recent etymology, the Hungarian word táltos may be of Ugrian origin (cf. Vogul tült, Ostyak tolť, "magic power").²⁰

There is no unambiguous indication of the place of shamanism in the ideology of the Hungarians settlers though we have been reminded that the reduction of ancient Hungarian religion to shamanism is untenable.²¹ It was suggested by Vilmos Voigt as early as 1965 that even if the Hungarians had adopted shamanism before the settlement, it could not be their most highly developed "religious system".²² In a nomadic pastoral society, which had adopted highly developed military techniques and certain elements of agriculture, shamanism could only be a part of the system. In his article "The social role of shamans in nomadic states", István Dienes suggested the revision of earlier views on the basis of Menander, Rasid ad-Din, Plano Carpini and other sources. He wrote: "Obviously enough, it was the shaman aristocracy at the court that created and popularized the religion-like belief system of a religious conviction more advanced than shamanism. States based on personal dependences were not only bound together by the arms of the prince's retainers, but equally by intellectual factors sanctioned by the court shamans."²³

The archaeologist Gyula László's doubts and "dissent" concerning the ancient Hungarian religion is even more clearly articulated: "Both the shaman and the táltos are men of the powers above and, consequently, the true religious stratum

- be it either monotheistic or a world of spirits - must transcend them. The same can be inferred from the mythology of the related peoples; the world is everywhere ruled by a wise and divine creator (Numi Torem, Tengri)..."²⁴

Research up to now seems to prove unambiguously that the settling Hungarians no longer exclusively adhered to shamanism. Like other Eurasian peoples, they were living within the reach of great world religions: on the steppes surrounding the Black Sea they became acquainted with Nestorian Christianity, Judaism and Islam, and still earlier with the activity of Sogdian Manichean missionaries in Southern Siberia.²⁵ The latter influence must have been particularly important in the formation of the Hungarians' spiritual outlook (mythology).

Furthermore, although it is a historical fact that Hungarians have been Christians since the end of the 10th century,²⁶ traces of the shamanistic tradition can still be found in narrations and tales collected in the last decades. Táltoses, memories of whom have remained quite vivid, were characteristic figures of villages and regions, almost each village having its own tudó, táltos, or tudós pásztor.²⁷ Recently, people could still remember their deeds as well as the use of the riddle or sieve, reminiscent of the one-time drum, for these ordinary utensils had often been used for magic, like fortune-telling or medication. In other words, it was the practice of everyday beliefs that a one-time shamanism governed. That is, shamanism - as Diószegi has pointed out²⁸ - rather than being a religion, was a stock of everyday beliefs that helped people to regulate their relationships with nature and supernatural powers. There is still one more aspect to be mentioned, that is, the general function of all ideological systems to regulate the relationship between the individual and his social environment; by providing the members of the community with advice and prohibitions, such a tradition supplies patterns of behaviour and shapes morality.

Tradition has the same social role today, and therefore it is no wonder that writers and poets, who have always played an important part in Hungarian culture, found their roots in shamanistic tradition. Remember Endre Ady's prophetic role and his references to his táltos ancestors:

"I am the servant of the sun
who ministers the midnight wake and feast...

I am a priest - a pagan, pagan priest ...
I am a martyr of the East ...
a scion of cursed sorcerers ..."

(A Parisian Dawn)²⁹

Among the contemporaries, we could mention Ferenc Juhász's visionary poetry and the experiment that the young poet conducted on himself in 1957, in order to experience the entrancement of a shaman under the influence of hallucinogens. He writes: "I died, it flashed through my mind, I became so scared. The man cut my head off, slashed my body into tiny pieces and dropped them into the cauldron ... when all my bones seemed to have been severed from the flesh, the smith said, 'All your bones have now turned into rivers,' and indeed, I saw a river in the room, with my bones drifting in it ... he began pulling them out of the river with his pliers. When he had pulled all the bones to the bank, the smith assembled them and covered them with flesh, so that my body regained its former appearance."³⁰ The poet's vision is much the same as the belief in the shaman's or táltos's dismemberment, followed by a feeling of being reborn on the part of the initiated.

Since folklore and literature are parts of culture with the social function of preserving - or tending - the identity of the community, it is no accident that such motifs appear in literary works. In the dramas of recent years especially, there are some very interesting examples of the shaman or táltos appearing among the dramatis personae, by the side of Prince Géza (10th century), for instance, in Magda Szabó's Az a szép, fényes nap (That Lovely Bright Day); or as King St Stephen's (997-1038) friend, the tutor of his untimely deceased son, Prince Imre, in József Ratkó's Segítsd a királyt! (Help the King!).³¹ In both cases, the shaman or táltos is a historical figure symbolizing the preservation of traditions. The conflict between the adherent of old beliefs and the followers of the new ideology consists not so much in whether the new is necessary at all, but whether the introduction of a new ideology should necessarily be accompanied by the demolition of ancient traditions. The conflict is particularly sharp in the very successful Hungarian rock-opera István, a király (Stephen, the King), for here the táltos is found on the side of the chieftain Koppány, who is in revolt against King Stephen, a Christian. His songs are always in the old style of folk music. The above examples show that beliefs exalted into symbols - among them the shaman mythology - can become important elements of popular identity.

It has been proved by the events of contemporary world politics that ethnic consciousness may appear in many different forms from the revival of old religiosity to new messianic movements, or even to the therapeutic renewal of shamanistic practice.

NOTES

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4. L. Honko, "Role-taking of the shaman", Temenos IV (1969), pp. 26-55; A. L. Siikala, The Rite Technique of the Siberian Shaman (Helsinki, 1978), FFC No. 220.
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9. A. Kelemen, "Medicine, man, personality and shamanistic worldview", Hoppál (ed.), Shamanism, I, pp. 184-192.
10. L. Czigány, "The use of hallucinogens and the shamanistic tradition of the Finno-Ugric people", The Slavonic and East European Review, LVIII (1980), pp. 212-217.
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12. B. Csorba, "Temerini hiedelemmondák" (Legends of Temerin), Hungarológiai Közlemények, XII (1980), pp. 111-141. The passage quoted is on p. 131.
13. J. Balázs, "The entrancement of the Hungarian shaman", V. Diószegi (ed.), Popular Beliefs and Folklore Traditions in Siberia (Budapest, 1967), pp. 53-75.
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15. Diószegi, A sámánhit emlékei, pp. 342-355.
16. S. Solymosy, "Magyar ősvallási elemek népmeséinkben" (Elements of the ancient Hungarian religion in our folk tales), Ethnographia, XL (1929), pp. 133-152.
17. V. Voigt, Glaube und Inhalt. Drei Studien zur Volksüberlieferung (Budapest, 1976).
18. J. Fazekas, "Hungarian Shamanism", C. M. Edsman (ed.), Studies in Shamanism (Stockholm, 1967), pp. 97-119.
19. Ibid. p. 106.
20. M. Hoppál, "Az uráli népek hiedelemvilága és a sámánizmus" (The belief system of Uralian peoples and shamanism), P. Hajdu (ed.), Urali népek (Uralian peoples) (Budapest, 1975), p. 230.
21. Cf. Gy. Király, A magyar ősköltészet (Ancient Hungarian Poetry) (Budapest, 1921), p. 52.
22. V. Voigt, "A samanizmus, mint etnológiai kutatási probléma" (Shamanism as a problem of research in ethnology), Nyelvtudományi Közlemények, LXVII (1969), pp. 379-390.
23. I. Dienes, "A sámánok társadalmi szerepe a nomád államokban" (The social role of shamans in nomadic states), Világosság, XXIII (1982), pp. 296-299. The quotation is from the end of the article.
24. Gy. László, "Különvélemény ősvallásunkról" (A dissent concerning ancient Hungarian religion), Új Írás, XVI (1976), p. 68.
25. M. Hoppál, "Az 'égigérő fa' gyökerei - Berze Nagy János mitológiai tanulmányai" (The roots of the 'sky-high tree': the mythological studies of János Berze Nagy), Janus Pannonius Muzeum Évkönyve (Yearbook of the Janus Pannonius Museum), XXV (1981), pp. 267-273.

26. Hence the special value of works that attest to this influence in Hungarian popular beliefs. See S. Bálint, Karácsony, husvét, pünkösöd. - A nagyünnepek a hazai és közép-európai hagyományvilágban (Christmas, Easter and Whitsuntide. Important Holidays in Hungarian and Central European Traditions) (Budapest, 1973); Zs. Erdélyi, Hegyet hágék, lőtöt lépék... (Archaic popular prayers) (Kaposvár, 1974).
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29. Poems of Endre Ady. Introduction and translation by Anton N. Nyerges (Buffalo, New York, 1969), p. 80.
30. F. Juhász, Mit tehet a költő? (What can the poet do?) (Budapest, 1967), pp. 135-140. Quoted by Gy. László, "Különvélemény".
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M i h á l y H o p p á l

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THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON CALVIN RESEARCH IN DEBRECEN

In 1974, ecclesiastical historians and theologians researching into Calvin's activities as a reformer and coming from Switzerland, France, the Netherlands, Scotland, Germany and Hungary set up a committee whose task, among others things, is to organize an international congress of Calvin research every four years. The six-member presidium, whose secretary is Professor W. Neuser, Münster, has been supplemented by a seventh member from North America. The first two congresses, in Amsterdam (1978) and in Geneva (1982), reflecting the peculiar spirituality of the Presbyterian Churches acting as the hosts, treated Calvin as a theologian and as a minister, respectively. The third congress was held in Debrecen, the ancient centre of the Hungarian Presbyterian (Reformed) Church, which has three million members. This last conference was held between 25th and 28th August, 1986, with the participation of around one hundred Calvin scholars from Europe, North America, South Africa, Japan and Korea.

Unlike in the Netherlands and in Switzerland, Calvinism never became an established religion in Hungary. After its birth in 1567, it was a denomination either suppressed or openly persecuted for three centuries, during the rule of Habsburg kings who promoted the cause of the Counter-Reformation by the force of arms. Calvinists, along with other denominations, only enjoyed freedom of worship in the Hungarian Principality of Transylvania between 1567 and 1687, and in the period of liberalism, in other words, after 1867. Calvinism was not reinforced by religious coercion imposed by the state, but by the internal conviction of its adherents, and it was therefore characterized, like East European Protestantism in general, by ethical requirements manifested in seriously-taken church discipline and not theological speculation, and by toleration inducing peaceful coexistence with others and not denominational clericalism. Self-disciplining ethics and openness towards the other branches of the Reformation were also important features of Calvin's reforming activities and therefore it was only nat-

ral that these aspects came to the fore during the Debrecen Congress. The frequent reappearance in historiography of Max Weber's well-known tenet of the close relationship between the Calvinist Reformation and modern bourgeois development, accompanied by arguments both in support and at variance with it, also justified the presentation of the relevant findings at the Debrecen Congress. The tone was set by the introductory paper read by Professor Elemér Kocsis (Debrecen), who, searching for the exposition of the theological notion of "sanctification" in Calvin, claimed that Calvin, in place of this notion, but fully in line with it, talks about Christian life. As a consequence, Calvin's theology is of ethical structure and therefore he points beyond his master, Luther, from the outset. Aiming at more than a mere historical retrospect, Professor Kocsis also emphasized the timeliness of Calvin's doctrine, not only for the Churches that follow him, but also for contemporary human society as a whole. This is a theology imbued by the hope that the Gospel will, even outside the Church (*extra ecclesiam*), be capable of reforming and regenerating the life of humanity, provided it is ready to accept the Ten Commandments in the broad interpretation of them given by Calvin, that is, the sanctification of life by showing respect towards the sanctity of life. In this respect, Calvin's *Institutio* is "the Magna Carta of fundamental ethical values, despising which no human community can long survive".

The other papers dealt with Calvin's relationship with other reformers, with his French contemporaries (B. Roussel), with Bucer (W. van't Spijker), with Luther (J. Rogge), with Bullinger (F. Büsser) and with humanism (C. Augustijn). Also examined were the influences on Calvin, with similarities and dissimilarities. In conclusion, they pointed to the ethically structured nature of Calvin's theology as its most original feature. Although much discussion centred around the fields in which Calvin is a disciple and those in which he is independent, and whether he can be regarded a humanist or the negator of the anthropological optimism of humanism, the papers and discussions of the Congress culminated in the realization that research in Calvin's intellectual legacy is not just the preserve of theologians and ecclesiastical historians but a scholarly activity indispensable for becoming familiar with the emergence of the modern world, and therefore for the self-knowledge of humanity.

It has been decided that the next congress will be held in Grand Rapids, USA, in 1990.

J ó z s e f B a r c z a

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INTERNATIONAL HISTORICAL CONFERENCE ON THE TERCENTENARY OF THE REOCCUPATION OF BUDA

An international historical conference entitled "Buda 1686", organized by the Buda Castle Memorial Committee, was held at the Hungarian Academy of Science between September 1st and 4th, 1986. Historians from fifteen countries participated at the event, which fitted into the series of programmes commemorating the successful siege of the Turkish-held town three hundred years ago - not only a turning point in the history of Hungary but also a feat that affected the history of Europe as a whole.

The papers presented at the conference centred around four main themes. The first of these was economic and political conditions and power relations in Christian Europe and the Ottoman Empire during the two centuries of the Turkish presence in Hungary, but particularly during the second half of the 17th century. The second major theme covered the internal situation in Hungary before and during the wars of liberation. Here the contributors analyzed the internal status quo and the external relations of the country divided into three, later into four parts, in the context of the ties linking her both to the Habsburg and to the Turkish Empires. Questions of military history, events and strategical problems of the siege of Buda and the wars of liberation, as well as foreign policy aspects ; of the campaigns, constituted the third main subject of the conference. Within this context, papers centred round the subthemes of internal events, the participation of the members of the Holy League, and the European response to the great victory. This was the field that commanded the widest interest both on the part of Hungarian experts and foreign scholars. The closing subject of the conference dealt with the effects of Ottoman rule.

After opening the conference, with his paper entitled "From Mohács to the reoccupation of Buda: the international background to Hungarian history" Zsigmond Pál Pach, Academician and chairman of the Buda Castle Memorial Committee, presented a detailed analysis of the European situation.

In contrast to earlier evaluations, Pach stressed the importance of the discovery of new lands, as well as of overseas enterprises and colonizing activity. These, together with the emerging modern world economy exerted an influence not only on those countries where feudalism had already reached an over-mature state but on the countries of East-Central Europe as well. Moreover, the latter were drawn even closer to the West than before, when the industrial-agrarian division of labour became more pronounced. In its first phase, the process had a positive effect: as a result of the agrarian and price revolutions, economic life and commerce prospered in East-Central European countries. In the long run, however, it contributed to the rise of the so-called second serfdom, since it failed to trigger an internal structural change in the economy.

Paradoxically enough, while Hungary became part of the nascent world market and enjoyed the benefits of the price revolution and agrarian prosperity, throughout the 16th century, a time of considerable economic activity, the country served as a theatre of war in which the Habsburg and Ottoman forces regularly clashed. The persistent fighting reduced the increase of her population, and changes in her ethnic composition "presaged the sinister events of the distant future". "The most important task of the 16th-17th centuries, oscillating between bad and worse and abounding in dramatic turns, was survival and the preservation of the Hungarian ethnic group, Hungarian culture and Hungarian statehood."

It was only towards the end of the 17th century that, as a consequence of pressure to turn towards new markets, including the Levant which was then under Turkish occupation, that the European situation became favourable for the reunification of the country. The Turks were driven out after a campaign lasting 15 years. The campaign was conducted by European forces of the Vienna-Venice-Warsaw axis, organized by the Papacy, and involving enormous sacrifices on the part of Hungary both in terms of lives and money. The retaking of the capital was a decisive event in this campaign, and already indicated the dawn of a new era.

In his paper entitled "European power relations and interests at the time of the wars of liberation", Béla Köpeczi, member of the Academy, divided the 17th century into three phases with respect to European hegemony: up to the end of the Thirty Years War the Habsburgs dominated the continent; France became the leading European power after the Peace of Westphalia (1648), only to yield this position to England after 1697. This division also indicates the key political themes of the latter part of the century: the rise of modern great powers, the question of hegemony and the crystallization of alliance systems.

The change in European power relations and alliance systems had important

consequences for Hungary: after 1648, French expansionism and the loss of most of their influence in the German states compelled the Habsburgs to expand toward Eastern Europe. This, however, was bound to generate a conflict with the Ottoman Empire. The decision was difficult and took a long time to make: in spite of their victory at Szentgotthárd (Western Hungary, 1664), the Habsburgs abandoned the idea of liberating Hungary, partly because a Western-oriented policy was still more lucrative for them, and partly because they rightly feared French expansionism. The problem was solved by the creation of the coalition of European Christian states in 1683-1684, a coalition which supported the Habsburgs' policy in the East.

Béla Köpeczi also gave a detailed analysis of the political mentality of the period and of European opinion concerning the campaign against the Turks, the participants of the war and Imre Thököly.

The survey of international economic conditions and the inquiry into European - to be more exact, Western and East Central European - power relations and interests was followed by the paper of Gyula Káldy Nagy ("The Ottoman Empire and its vassal states in the 1680s"), which dealt with the Turkish Empire and the economic and political conditions and external relations of its vassal states. In his paper, he gave a summary of the latest research. As early as the 16th century, there were indications of decline in the Ottoman Empire, a decline that became obvious during the 17th century. Janissary revolts, the non-payment of mercenaries and the appointment of seven Grand Viziers within two years (1595-96) "were in the 17th century the symptoms of stagnation rather than of decline", but other phenomena, such as corruption in the financial administration, were already clear indicators of decline itself.

The only European ally of the Ottoman Empire was powerful France, which, however, refrained from armed intervention. Among the vassal states of the Empire, only Ragusa, Wallachia, Moldavia, Transylvania, the Khanate of Crimea and Thököly's Upper Hungary were more or less allies as well, although their reliability was quite dubious. Not even the Tartar Khanate, which was exempted from paying any tribute, was an exception to this rule.

Finally, the contributor touched on a relatively little known fact: during the siege of Vienna, the population of Lower Austria suffered losses running into several tens of thousands. The memory of this horrible devastation and flight of terrified refugees was a much weightier reason for Emperor Leopold to retake Buda than the Ottoman defeat at Vienna.

György Hazai, Academician, spoke about the history of the relations between the Ottomans and Christian Europe (The Ottomans and Europe: images of each

other"). The most important and most persistent element in the image of the Turks during the three hundred years between the Battle of Nikopol (1396) and the reoccupation of Buda (1686) was fear, which was enhanced by the lack of adequate information on the one hand and conscious manipulation and exaggeration of the "pagan" enemy's disrepute on the other. The fear of the Turks was an organic part of the official policies of the state and the Church, for the Turkish threat was always a good pretext for filling up the exchequer. Luther and his followers had an image of the Turks quite different from this official view.

Parallel with this distorted propaganda, European states made efforts to obtain useful and exact information about the enemy's life and social conditions. At the same time, the situation was just the contrary on the Turkish side: they only had sparse and inadequate information about Europe, and the old myth of the Turks' invincibility was suddenly and unexpectedly destroyed by their defeat in the siege of Vienna in 1683.

In his contribution to the first theme entitled "Europe and the Ottoman Empire", Gilles Veinstein (France) analyzed the situation after the Battle of Mohács (1526) on the basis of the correspondence between Sultan Suleiman and his Grand Vizier. The long hesitation and the ultimate decision in favour of Hungary's vassal status both prove that, at this time, Vienna was already the Turkish ruler's principal objective.

Jean Béranger (France) spoke about the ambivalent character of French foreign policy. Louis XIV's only consideration was the political and economic interest of his own country, and he was therefore ready to support any anti-Habsburg movement. However, as France's Turkish alliance was somewhat unseemly, he did not openly adopt a pro-Turkish policy.

Jean Nouzille (France) considered the Austrian-Ottoman conflict from a European aspect on the basis of the reports from French ambassadors at the Porte. He showed that Louis XIV always had objective and detailed information at his disposal about the situation in Central Europe, and that he could therefore choose the best moments for implementing his expansionist policy vis à vis the Habsburg Empire without jeopardizing the advantage newly gained by Christian Europe over the Turks.

Klára Hegyi opened the series of contributions on the second main subject, the internal situation of divided Hungary. In her paper entitled "The Hungarian province in the Ottoman Empire" she examined the special status of Hungary in the European part of the Turkish Empire. The characteristic Turkish land system and jurisdiction districts were introduced in Hungary as well, but the links binding her civil and economic administration to the Empire were much looser than

those of the Balkan states - so much so that conditions in Hungary during the mid-17th century already hardly resembled those in the Balkans. The greatest difference lay in the extent of military occupation, for the Kingdom of Hungary though mutilated, continued to exist, as did the Principality of Transylvania. Local laws, local customs and local administration survived under the extensive system of Hungarian-Turkish dual rule, but a price had to be paid for this: not even that part of the population living under Turkish occupation could feel itself to be secure. The middle part of the country had to serve primarily military purposes: it shielded the inner territories of the Empire and was a base for further expansion.

In his paper "The Habsburg Empire and Hungary in the last decades of the 17th century", Kálmán Benda sketched the history of the western part of Hungary from the viewpoint of Habsburg dominance in East-Central Europe. After the rule of the Jagiellons had collapsed into anarchy, only one dynasty remained on the political scene in the region, the Habsburgs, who initially had the smallest chance of so doing. With the coronation of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria as King of Hungary, Austria, Bohemia and Hungary were united under Habsburg rule. Therefore, when the monarchy was created, divided Hungary could not become its power centre. Benda emphasized the responsibility of the dynasty, the members of which tended to regard themselves primarily as Holy Roman Emperors and who did not identify themselves with the interests of the peoples of the monarchy. The steady increase in tensions and a whole series of risings in Hungary were direct consequences of their policy. The introduction of Emperor Leopold's absolutism, the suspension of the Hungarian constitution, the violation of laws and the need to preserve peace with the Turks at all costs left the country only one option: the creation of a national principality, organized on the Transylvanian model and paying tribute to the Turks. Had the Turks been victorious at Vienna - as was expected all over Europe -, this alone would have offered a chance for the survival of Hungary.

In his paper "Imre Thököly and the Upper Hungarian Principality", László Benczédi examined the formation of the region that broke away from Habsburg Hungary. Benczédi approached the subject from two aspects: what was it that caused Thököly and a large part of the Hungarian nobility to side with the Turks when the long-awaited hour for their expulsion from the country had finally come, and what were the considerations which favoured a pro-Turkish policy in Hungary? After the Peace of Vasvár (1664) the general opinion concerning the Turks was that they were so powerful that "even in their times of misfortune the victorious party will court their favour" (Thököly). To this tendency to think

in terms of the "Universum Ottomanicum" were added the fears of sharing the fate of either the Balkan peoples or the Czechs. The Hungarian ruling classes felt themselves to be under pressure and, being familiar with the more peaceful conditions obtaining in Transylvania, they saw a way out in the adoption of a Turkish orientation. In the event, the fate of Thököly and the Upper Hungarian Principality was decided at a European level. The victory at Kahlenberg in 1683 put a sudden end to the old status quo and after this it was the success of the imperial army that protected Hungary from sharing the lot of the Balkan peoples. Thököly had to pay a high price for his miscalculation; nevertheless, with his efforts to overthrow the established order, which was unbearable after 1664, he contributed to the decisive change.

Katalin Péter, in her paper "The Principality of Transylvania during the wars of liberation", presented an original analysis of the changes in the constitutional status of the eastern part of Hungary, Transylvania and Habsburg Hungary. For a long time, Hungarian policy had been animated by the idea of the unification of the country, with the underlying conception of a "common homeland" and of the parts of the divided country belonging together. Bocskai's political testament and the first Treaty of Nagyszombat (1615), concluded between Gábor Bethlen and King Matthias II, were both conceived in this spirit. After the middle of the 17th century, however, the idea of a "common homeland" was suddenly abandoned; contemporaries began to talk of "one nation living in two homelands". Katalin Péter traced the roots of this conception to opinions concerning the country's structure during King Matthias Corvinus's reign. At the time of the wars of liberation, the supremacy of the Hungarian Kingdom, secured by and unquestioned since the Speyer agreement (1570) was no longer recognized. The Prince of Transylvania concluded a treaty with the Habsburgs in 1686 (this was reformulated in 1688) according to which Transylvania was attached "to His Majesty's countries and provinces" instead of to Hungary. The treaty meant the abandonment of the century-old policy aimed at the country's reunification. Prince Apafi's serious mistake was due not just to the Transylvanians' fears of the power of the lords in the Kingdom but also sprang from the long-standing 'de facto' independence of the Principality and the fact that Transylvania had profited nothing from the anti-Habsburg campaigns.

Szabolcs Vajay (Switzerland) added some remarks on social conditions in Habsburg Hungary. He raised the question of the origins of the relatively large Hungarian nobility and answered it on the basis of data to be found in the Regal Books of between 1430 and 1753. With the ennoblement of King Sigismund's court dentist in 1430 for services rendered, the formerly inflexible social framework

underwent a change. Constant wars against the Turks and the struggles of the rulers of the two parts of the country against each other meant that fighting men were always needed. Ennoblement became a new means of recruiting soldiers: those favoured had to go to war at their own expense, and received no payment. After 1711, new settlers could acquire noble status as a reward for hard work. With the economic and military consolidation of the country completed, Maria Theresa put an end to this long process in 1753.

Vojtech Kopčan (Czechoslovakia) spoke of the increasing burden of heavy taxes imposed on the peasantry of the Upper Hungarian counties, which complemented the devastation caused by the armies moving through the region.

Jaroslav Macek (Czechoslovakia) analyzed the foreign relations of Habsburg Hungary with the Czech lands under Habsburg rule. He emphasized that, although Habsburg rule had to face - besides several local conspiracies - considerable passive resistance in Bohemia, the sovereign, with the help of foreign nobles, could keep the Czech Estates under such effective control that his absolutist efforts could be directed towards Hungary and the Balkans. A separate treatment was given by Macek to the Czech and Silesian contacts of the son of the executed Péter Zrínyi.

On the third main subject of the conference, the one most directly connected with the actual events of 1686, a detailed paper entitled "The reoccupation of Buda" was read by Imre Wellmann. After Buda had been captured by the Turks in 1541, it was generally recognized in Europe that the Ottomans already constituted a direct threat to Central Europe as a whole. In the following year, an attempt to retake Buda was made by a German imperial army. After the failure of this force, however, a new attitude was quickly adopted: as there was no hope of recapturing the Hungarian capital, a defence line to contain Ottoman expansionism had to be built in Hungary. Therefore, Europe remained unmoved until the unexpected and surprising victory of Kahlenberg. Although the failure of the siege of Buda in 1684 was a bitter experience, it by no means deterred the war party from making renewed efforts. In 1686, it was a much larger, better equipped and better supplied army that set out to conduct the carefully planned operations. Success was to a great extent due to the good logistics of the imperial army. More than two-thirds of the heavy burden of the war was imposed on what had remained of Hungary, to take the pressure off the hereditary provinces.

In his paper "Strategy and logistics in the war of liberation", Géza Perjés analyzed the background of the victory. Recent research has shown that army supply is dependent on the given economic and social conditions. As a result, generals can hardly be blamed for the poor supply of their armies, as organizing

proper supplies is impossible below a certain population density. In the 16th century, the supply system of the Turkish Empire, which was much richer and endowed with greater resources, was far more effective than that of the Habsburgs. This held true even during the first half of the 17th century, and the situation only changed to the advantage of the Habsburgs after about 1650. After the re-occupation of Buda, the imperial army supply withstood even the test of the Draava operations in 1687. The recapture of Belgrade, however, raised new problems: the imperial army had reached the limits of its operational range, while the Turkish military leadership adopted new tactics and strategy.

István Czigány's contribution - "Hungarian participation in the war of liberation" - was closely connected with the two preceding papers. He analyzed two aspects of the armed forces: the numbers and the quality, or, fighting efficiency of soldiers. Relying on exact numerical data, Czigány showed that, taking into account population size, Hungary provided almost the maximum possible number of soldiers, given the territorial, political and religious divisions of the country, as well as her internal conflicts and relative exhaustion. With the soldiers levied and with the mobilization of her last remaining financial resources Hungary contributed appropriately to the European accomplishment of the expulsion of the Turks. However, Hungarian light cavalry no longer met the requirements of modern war the principles of which had been formulated during the so-called revolution of warfare in the 16th-17th centuries. This was the reason why Hungarian soldiers were employed by the imperial military leadership as secondary forces although ones entrusted with many important tasks. Thus, the roots of the aversion to Hungarian soldiers, well documented in source material, are not to be found in the underrating of their fighting efficiency but in political considerations: Hungarian "ropedancing policy" was disapproved by the Habsburgs, though, from the country's point of view, this was the only means for national survival.

Ernesto Piacentini (Italy) recalled many positive and negative details of the long siege on the basis of a diary, discovered in the library of Viterbo Cathedral a few years ago. In his records running into several hundred pages, Lieutenant-General Michele D'Asti, who took part in operations and who was mortally wounded in the final attack, did not conceal his respect for the enemy's resolution and steadfastness.

Pavel Balcarek (Czechoslovakia) contributed interesting data on the financial background of the siege, drawn from Prince Dietrichstein's extensive correspondence. Mention was made of the inequitable distribution of various subsidies, the exaction of payments from the Hungarian peasantry and the difficulties of recruiting.

Walter Hummelberger (Austria) spoke about the soldiers' equipment and everyday life. Equipment was undergoing a change and, although no uniforms were worn as yet, protective clothing was already available. Hummelberger quoted astonishing data from the diary of Johann Dietz, Saxon court physician, about the misery of the wounded, lying on the ground in filthy and overcrowded camps. Doctors were few and, in addition to enemy action, epidemics took a heavy toll among the soldiers.

Helmut Schnitter (East Germany) added some remarks on laying siege which was developed into a veritable science during the 16th century. The lessons of the siege of Buda contributed substantially to the theory of military science.

Olga Zirojević (Yugoslavia) surveyed water and land routes on and along the Danube and Drava rivers - from the enemy's point of view. She showed that the good state of these greatly helped the advance and supply of the Turkish army.

The contribution of Othmar Pickl (Austria) was connected with Géza Perjés's paper on strategy and logistics. Pickl spoke of the great difficulties in supplying the army corps advancing along the Drava with materiel and provisions, because that river was hardly navigable.

Peter Broucek (Austria) read a paper entitled "Austria the leading power of the Holy League in the Turkish war". This dealt with the circumstances of the creation of the League and also examined the roles played by its various members. After the securing of the western defensive line, German principalities joined the League one after the other. In spring, 1686, the unified army advanced along both sides of the Danube in two corps. The lessons of the unsuccessful siege of 1684 had been learnt, the timing of the operation was better and, due to the better supply and good coordination of the movements of the two corps, their efforts were this time crowned with success.

In his paper "The war of the Holy Roman Empire and the Holy League", Karl Othmar von Aretin (West Germany) spoke about the decisive role played by Turkish expansionism and of that Empire's struggle against it. This was manifested both in the Empire's internal structure and in the triumph of the Reformation. Von Aretin emphasized the mutual dependence of the Emperor and the imperial princes.

Zygmunt Abrahamowicz (Poland) analyzed the role of Poland in the wars against the Turks between 1683 and 1699. King John Sobieski, with a series of victories behind him, had already envisaged the recapture of Constantinople when the battles in Moldavia made him realize that his country was no longer powerful enough to fight successfully against the Turks, who could, despite their losses, still retain some of their military efficiency. King John's successor made a renewed attempt to realize the great king's plans; in the peace of 1699, however,

he had to acquiesce in the fact that Poland could not expand at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.

The contribution of Michal Klimacki (Poland) was closely connected with that of Abrahamowicz; Klimacki added remarks on the great Polish hero's anti-Turkish wars and his plans concerning the Rumanian principalities.

Under the title "Russia and the Turkish war", Svetlana Oreshkova (Soviet Union) presented a detailed historiographical survey, examining most of the historical works that have been published on the subject.

Erba Odescalchi (Sweden) spoke about Pope Innocent XI, an exceptional figure. After succeeding to the papal throne, he made every effort to create a grand European anti-Turkish coalition, utilizing all of his extraordinary talent, indefatigable ardour and also financial resources.

Manfred Kehrig (West Germany) sketched a portrait of the Margrave Louis William of Baden, based on his heroic deeds for which he was given the name "Louis the Turk". In the liberation of Buda, too, Louis played a great part - much greater than that played by Eugene of Savoy, to whose honour a statue was erected by the grateful Hungarians.

Cvetana Pavlovska (Bulgaria) depicted the hard lot of the Bulgarian people and their never-ending hidden resistance. The expedition against Buda made the situation of the Bulgarians easier as it forced the greater part of the Turkish army to march northwards. Also, Bulgarian uprisings contributed to the war effort of the Holy League by constantly disrupting the enemy's operations.

Matti Lappalainen (Finland) spoke about the relations between the Swedish-Finnish Kingdom, the Ottoman Empire and Europe as a whole. The common point with the Turks, that is, anti-Russian sentiment, did not prevent Charles XI from sending troops to participate in the last battles against the Ottomans. After pointing out the similarities between the kingdom in the North and the great power in the South, Lappalainen analyzed the military organization of the two.

Two young scholars from Spain, Maria Elena Sanches Ortega and Miguel de Bunes, examined the distinctly anti-Turkish and anti-French orientation of Spanish court diplomacy and the participation of the Holy League in the fighting in Hungary.

Josef Matuz (West Germany) sketched the life of Abdurahman Pasha, the enemy leader whose heroism was amply demonstrated in the fighting itself. The son of an Albanian peasant, he had a spectacular career. He became governor-general of Buda as a result of his talent, his organizing ability and his capacity to deal with people.

As proved by contemporary responses to the event, people at the time were

well aware of the significance of the recapture of Buda. The first contributor on this subject, Ágnes R. Várkonyi raised novel thoughts in her paper "The reoccupation of Buda in contemporaneous public opinion and political thought". She challenged the traditional view, according to which it was only the official world that celebrated, while Hungary as a whole remained silent. She first considered what people were discussing all over the country at the time of the siege of Buda, and then she turned to the process in the course of which the great event was transformed into history in the minds of those who lived through it. In the years between 1645 and 1664, many remarkable pamphlets on politics and the theory of the state as well as outstanding works of art and literature, were inspired by an awareness of the historical significance of the recapture of Buda. The siege of 1686 became absorbed in this traditional Hungarian material, instead of the official propaganda, which praised Emperor Leopold as the sole victor.

In their joint contribution, Herbert Langer (East Germany) and János Dudás treated the European responses to the war against the Turks as reflected in the "Theatrum Europaeum". The journal depicted a glossy, laudatory and often one-sided image of the deeds of the imperial army.

Pere Molas (Spain) spoke about the positive responses in Spain to the liberation of Buda on the basis of a number of publications in Barcelona.

Vaselin Traikov (Bulgaria) made some remarks on the Bulgarian risings after 1686, as influenced by the great victory, the news of which reached even the remote monasteries in Bulgaria.

Marcus Köhbach (Austria) considered the significance of the reoccupation of Buda from the enemy's point of view on the basis of a Turkish funeral song unknown up to now.

The closing theme of the conference - the impact of Turkish rule on Hungary - was summed up by Ferenc Szakály in his paper "The balance of Turkish rule in Hungary". Processes that began in the 16th century and which became irreversible during the 17th century, and which were disadvantageous to the development of the country, were manifested in population numbers, in the distribution of settlements, in ethnic composition and in economic, social and political changes in Hungary. It was the Fifteen Years' War (1593-1606) that proved to be disastrous to the original population of Hungary; shorter wars or local skirmishes, as all over Europe, could be compensated for by the spontaneous regeneration of the population. But the unrestrained barbarities of the Tartars passing the winters of the war years in Hungary brought a several decades' tendency to its culmination. Hungary's population, 4 millions at the time of King Matthias, did not increase during the next two-hundred years in spite of immigra-

tion. This is to say that, in the period of Ottoman rule, not only did the growth of population come to a halt, but also a part of the original Hungarian stock was lost. The medieval structure of settlements also disintegrated. The Turkish occupation undermined the hierarchic network of Hungarian towns, and after the Fifteen Years' War, commerce was held back for centuries. The Turkish and Tartar armies mostly advanced across the fertile plains and along the river valleys inhabited by Hungarians, and thus it was the Hungarian ethnic group that suffered. The ultimate reasons for Trianon can also be traced as far back as this. The contributor emphasized that it was mainly the Turks and not the foreign mercenaries who were responsible for the devastation of the country. "Turkish occupation was the disease, with western and Hungarian soldiers acting as the fever struggling against it. Fever is necessary to overcome disease, though at the same time it puts the sick body to an extra test, so much so that the fever itself might become a cause of the body's ruin." As to Hungarian culture, despite the superficial impact made by the Turks, it remained within the European orbit, and continued to expect and obtain stimulating impulses from the West. Summing up the effects of Turkish rule in Hungary, Ferenc Szakály found that the positive aspects are by far outweighed by the negative ones: "Hungary paid a cruelly high price" for the few curiosities gained as a result of Ottoman rule.

Closely related to the observations of Ferenc Szakály was the paper read on demographic change by Géza Dávid, who calculated the population of the country in an even more cautious, that is, pessimistic way. In the late 16th century, the population did not exceed 3.5 million, the same figure as in King Matthias's time. The unfavourable trend continued during the 17th century, at the end of which only half of the 4 million inhabitants of the country were ethnic Hungarians.

In his paper, Tamás Hofer surveyed Ottoman influences on Hungarian peasant culture. Since in the ethnic stratification that developed in the occupied territories, society was bound together by force and regulations, instead of by common interests and objectives, there could be no peaceful ethnic and cultural symbiosis. Ethnic groups tenaciously clung to their own customs, and it was this that eventually resulted in their survival as nations. The Hungarians did not become Turkish in their clothing, nor in their everyday utensils and the decorative motifs on these, nor even in their economic culture. As a matter of fact, there were influences, but these remained superficial.

The concluding address of the conference was delivered by Domokos Kosáry, member of the Academy. The many papers of the conference which dealt with numerous different topics invariably suggested the conclusion that the recapture of Buda cannot be regarded as an event of just local significance, since it dis-

rupted the whole framework of the Ottoman Empire. It is very important that the event be presented not only in a Hungarian but also in a broadly international context. This purpose was excellently served at the conference by the papers and contributions both from Hungarian and foreign scholars.

Domokos Kosáry first reflected on the questions relating to population, ethnicity and social and economic conditions. The size of the population of the country was estimated quite differently in the various papers. László Makkai's position in the most recent synthesis (Magyarország története [The History of Hungary] 1526-1686) is diametrically opposed to the views expressed in earlier literature. There is still no ultimate solution to the problem, but it may reasonably be claimed that Turkish rule cannot be absolved of the responsibility for the devastation.

In the evaluation of political relations, the struggle between absolutism and the Estates ought to be considered in the light of the impact each made on the other.

Domokos Kosáry paid special attention to the problematic situation of small states. Since Hungary by herself was powerless in the face of the Turks, there was no alternative for her but to do what she eventually chose to do, namely to incorporate herself in the Habsburg Empire as a separate state. Thököly's rising was only justified when taken on its own; his fall was rendered inevitable by his being a vassal of the Turks. It was not as a continuation of the Thököly tradition that Ferenc Rákóczi launched on his own anti-Habsburg struggle (1703-1711), but as a challenge to the internal structure of the Habsburg Monarchy.

We might conclude that the reoccupation of Buda facilitated economic, social and national development in Hungary. Three hundred years after the event, "we pay homage to the memories of the 50,000 Christian victims and one-time enemies in the spirit of peace and reconciliation".

Z s u z s a n n a J . U j v á r y

Institute of Historical Sciences

CONFERENCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN 1918-1938

Budapest, March 16th-20th, 1987

The Committee for the History of Science and Technology of the Organization of Hungarian Scientific Associations and the Complex Committee for the History of Science and Technology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences have for years been engaged in organizing conferences concerned with the scientific and technological development of the Central European region. This one was the third, but perhaps not the last, in the series. The preceding conferences that dealt with the second half of the 19th century and the period between 1900 and the First World War, respectively, were on the whole successful. Nevertheless, they were not devoid of the many disturbing symptoms of fragmentation characteristic of the field. This time, topics were better linked up with each other, and there were several attempts to cover wider subjects. In none of the branches, however, were any efforts made to deal with the period as a whole, not even with regard to the most important developments.

True, at the opening session, Ferenc Szabadváry, in his presidential address, referred to the important role of Central Europe in the technological development during the period and to the fact that many of the technical achievements in the region were accomplished outside Germany. He also pointed out that the main features of the present day structure were shaped at that time. However, there was nobody to provide a sketch of, for example, the history of quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity, which lay the foundations of modern science, or a study of the influence of decisive political developments, such as the emergence of Nazism or the establishment of the Soviet system, on science and technology. Whatever the reason for this, the fact was that discussions were not focused on the main issues of the scientific and technological history of the period, but on subjects slightly more remote from them but nevertheless influenced by them.

A somewhat comprehensive paper was presented by Elisabeth Crawford, of Swedish origin, who arrived from Paris and surveyed her remarkable field of re-

search from the viewpoint of the relation between centre and peripheries. She studied the efficiency of the region through Nobel prizes not only on the basis of prizes actually awarded, but also through nominees and nominators. This time she concentrated on the scientific periphery, mainly on Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the Central European region. Wolfgang Kunzer's paper on the interaction of mathematics and technical sciences in the period also held out promises of a general approach. In the event, dealing as it did with the evolution of applied mathematics, Kunzer's contribution turned out to be a treatment almost exclusively concerned with German developments. It is, of course, true that it was in Germany, particularly in Göttingen, that this branch of science struck root after its Dutch and French beginnings.

E. Hiebert, a Harvard professor, spoke about the research in nuclear physics and nuclear chemistry in Austria. He concentrated on the achievements of the Institut für Radiumforschung and the department of theoretical physics at the University of Vienna. Hiebert touched on the activity of such personalities as Stefan Meyer, Schrödinger, Lise Meitner, Pauli and Weiskopf. Austrian research was very close to the German centre not only geographically, but also in terms of linguistic, institutional and personal contacts. J. Hurwic, who lives in France, dealt with the history of the radiological laboratory in Warsaw which, unlike that in Vienna, was in regular touch with the Paris institute headed by the Curies. This promising laboratory was closed down during the German occupation.

The author of this report presented a paper on the Hungarian connections of Philipp Lenard, a leading Nazi physicist and a Nobel prize winner. Horst Kant, GDR, spoke about the founding development and the leading scientists of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, the most important German physics research centre. His countryman A. Vogt used abundant data to demonstrate how lively Soviet and German scientific relations were up to the Second World War, in spite of political differences. The Rumanian L. Sofonea and his three colleagues (Tibor Toro among them) spoke about the adoption of the main ideas of the theory of relativity by the scientific establishment in their own country and how Rumanian scientists, in their turn, contributed to the development of that theory.

The latter paper was one of those which surveyed the respective fields country by country. These provided a comprehensive and sometimes homogeneous picture concerning the spread of some important intellectual trends in the region. One could hear about the history of medicine in Yugoslavia in the given period (B. Belicza); about chemical science and technology in the same country (I. Čupović); about the beginnings of physical chemistry in Bulgaria (M. Igov) and its

sociological aspects (V. Misheva); about the achievements of geology in the Soviet Union (V. V. Tikhomirov) and in Hungary (B. Csath, G. Csiky, I. Dobos); and about the reception of Darwinism in Yugoslavia. (The list is far from complete.)

The two papers on the research laboratory of the Egyesült Izzó, the biggest Hungarian light bulb manufacturing factory (by L. Szöllőssy and I. P. Valkó) provoked a lively discussion. The efficiency, high intellectual level and, last but not least, financial success of the laboratory were surprising not only for the foreign participants but for some of the Hungarians, too. The contribution of the laboratory to the history of science in the strict sense would deserve a separate analysis, which could also provide an opportunity for interesting comparisons. This, at least, could be inferred from the paper of L. Novy, Prague, who, speaking about the scientific development of his country in general terms, demonstrated its efficiency using the example of the Skoda Works. We must conclude that a comparative study of the countries in the region is highly desirable.

Among the papers on the history of professional training, the one by László Szögi covered the international connections of Budapest's Technical University, while Zénó Terplán (together with A. Debreceni) discussed the training of mechanical engineers through the development of the department of machine construction and the water machine laboratory at the same university.

The history of technology, again, embraced a wide variety of subjects and showed a variegated picture. Subjects ranged from the tool industry in Dresden (P. Bartsch, GDR) through the Hungarian leather industry (B. Tóth, Hungary), hydraulic construction (I. Szerényi), the production of explosives in Czechoslovakia (J. Markwart) and the history of the Kodak factory in Vác, Hungary (P. Kiss) to the achievements of Austrian construction engineering (H. Janatschek, Vienna) or Hungarian industry as represented at the Budapest industrial fairs (É. Vámos). Interrelationships, however, were again rather inadequately pointed out.

To mention all the papers would be impossible here, even all the good ones. I have tried only to indicate the related subjects and I share the hope of many specialists that the proceedings of the conference will soon be available, in spite of financial difficulties. In general we can say that the conference took place in a very pleasant atmosphere and that the work done by 34 foreign and 26 Hungarian participants was surprisingly intensive. This was largely due to effective organization on the part of the Organization of Hungarian Scientific Associations.

G á b o r P a l l ó

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TWO BOOKS - TWO DIFFERENT VIEWS ON THE HYPOTHESIS OF DACO-ROMAN CONTINUITY IN TRANSYLVANIA

It was exactly fifty years ago that the French historian Ferdinand Lot published a book entitled Les invasion barbares (Paris, 1937), in which he termed the Rumanian people a 'historical enigma and miracle' (une énigme et un miracle historique). He argued that after Roman troops had been withdrawn from Dacia in 271 A.D. and the Roman population had been evacuated from that province (which had been under Roman occupation since 106 A.D. and which forms today's Transylvania), for the next 1,000 years or so, or, up to the 13th century no reliable and authentic written, toponymical or archeological traces could be found in Transylvania relating to the existence of a people that spoke a neo-Latin language, i.e. the Rumanian people. The lack of information in historical sources was regarded by Lot as "impressive". On the basis of certain features of the Rumanian language identical with other Balkan tongues and from the underlying unity of the Macedo-Rumanian and the Transylvanian Rumanian languages, he concluded that the Rumanian people was shaped in a Balkan environment and that a part of it migrated to the region north of the River Danube after the 10th century. The 'enigma' concerns the dates and duration of this migration, while the 'miracle' is constituted by the fact that a population group retaining its neo-Latin language could survive the vicissitudes of the Great Migration of peoples.

This twofold question was not raised until the publication of Robert Roesler's book entitled Romaenische Studien in 1871. In this, Roesler questioned the generally accepted theory of 15th century Italian and Hungarian humanists, namely that the Rumanians of Transylvania were the true descendants of the Roman or Romanized Dacian (i.e. Daco-Roman) population of the former province of Dacia, a population which had inhabited the same region ever since Roman times and which had an unbroken, i.e. continuous, line of Dacian or Daco-Roman heritage. While the majority of Hungarian, German, Bulgarian,

Serbian, Czech and Russian historians accepted Roesler's reasoning, several Rumanian linguists, unable to dismiss it as false, came up with the idea of 'admigration'. According to them, a small core of the future nation was joined in Transylvania by a much larger group from the Balkans. Rumanian historiography has violently rejected Roesler's theory of the Balkan origin of the Rumanian people.

The works written on this subject by Hungarian and Rumanian authors over the past hundred years would fill a whole library. We must admit that in some instances books had a passionate or even a sarcastic tone. This is quite understandable, since Transylvania is the homeland of both peoples, neither of which is willing to be excluded from the region's common past. Prior to 1920, it was mainly the grievances of three million Rumanians there which caused tension, while since 1920, the grievances of two million Hungarians have created a similar problem. This tension has been apparent even in historiography. Nevertheless, the debate on the hypothesis of Daco-Roman continuity cannot be regarded - in spite of the opinion of many - a nationalistic quarrel between Hungarians and Rumanians. In fact, conscious attempts are being made to explain the 'enigmas' and 'miracles' to which, motivated by their scholarly interest in the subject, scholars from almost every European country have contributed. The fact that, despite the enormous efforts, no final and conclusive solution to the problem has yet been found can be ascribed primarily to the ethnically non-definable character of the archaeological finds sought with utmost zeal by Rumanian scholars, and to the methodological differences in the toponymical application of research in linguistics. In addition, no new written sources have been discovered recently.

Below, an attempt is made to present the current state of the results achieved in unravelling the complexities of this subject on the basis of two recently published books, one of which puts the Rumanian viewpoint, and the other the Hungarian one.

A History of Transylvania. By Ștefan Pascu (Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1982, 318 pp.)

The author wrote a book on the history of Transylvania as early as 1944, arguing the case for Daco-Roman continuity and in support of the theory that Rumanians have formed the ethnic majority in Transylvania throughout history. In this more recent book, Pascu remains faithful to his old convictions. As Huntingdon College's P. E. Michelson put it in his preface to the book: "Rumanian ... scholarly writing was the vehicle for the expression of national

awareness (if not for the emergence of that sentiment itself); it is noteworthy that it continues to be so into the twentieth century... Founded concurrently with the Rumanian University of Cluj after World War I, the institute at Cluj... was conspicuous in the forefront of this development... Rumanian historical scholarship underwent a drastic "conversion" to the Marxist-Leninist model, first under Stalinist-Zhdanov conceptions, then (after 1956) under an increasingly Romanianized version of Marxist orthodoxy. Stefan Pascu was both a spokesman for the Cluj tradition and a leading member of the new Cluj school... Professor Pascu's book is primarily a work of historical interpretation and synthesis and must be approached as such. However, it is also a product of a society in which public expression must be consonant with public policy, so that here we may detect trends in contemporary Rumanian foreign policy, policy toward national minorities, and the political and social mobilization that the Rumanian Communist Party is trying to carry out under increasingly difficult circumstances." (pp.XII-XIV.)

Considering the above, we can assume that the passages in Mr. Pascu's book relating to the hypothesis of Daco-Roman continuity must be regarded as the 'official' Rumanian view on the issue, and not only as the author's conclusions based on his own research in this field. This assumption is further substantiated by the fact that the author is neither an archeologist nor a linguist. He does not claim expertise in these areas, since none of his 26 entries in the select bibliography given with the book relates to either of the two disciplines. Nevertheless, Mr. Pascu endeavours to substantiate his claims by quoting secondhand archeological and linguistic arguments, such as:

"The withdrawal of the Roman army and administration from the province of Dacia did not mean that Daco-Romans abandoned their lands. That Daco-Roman civilization north of the Danube survived the so-called Age of Migration, the vast movement of nomadic tribesmen that occurred during the fourth to seventh centuries A.D., is indisputable..." (p. 28)

"Red pottery of Roman style continued to be manufactured at various locations in central Transylvania; these have been dated by metal objects and coins from the third and fourth centuries. Daco-Roman rural settlements have been discovered at Bratei and Brîncovenesti, and at sites further north, among Cluj-Mănăştur and Suatu. In other areas, the Daco-Romans, forced by the migrating tribes to abandon their earlier fortified settlements, rebuilt in more mountainous areas, as, for example, those discovered at Proştea Mică and Cetatea da Baltă in central and eastern Transylvania..." (p. 29)

"As archeological research continues, new proofs of the nature of Daco-Roman civilization come to light. Roman coins of the fourth and fifth centuries, the great majority of bronze and a few of silver, have been discovered throughout the area. Bronze money reflects the humble socioeconomic status of its Daco-Roman users; the migrating peoples used only gold and silver coins. A more significant proof is furnished by the hoards of coins discovered at several Transylvanian sites: at Sarmizegetusa; in the Banat at Orșova and Răcăjdia; at Hunedoara; near Tîrgu Mureș; in the northeast near Dej, and in other places. The coins in these treasure troves are from the third and fourth centuries. These discoveries are complemented by others from the fourth and fifth centuries, which confirm that Latin was the language of the Daco-Roman population, both at home and in public life. On a silver ring discovered at Vețel, we find the inscription 'Quartine vivas' ('Long life to you, Quartinus'); on the devotional cross found at Biertan is inscribed 'Ego Zenovius votum posui' ('I, Zenovius, brought this offering'); still other Latin inscriptions were found on a brick unearthed at Gornea in the Banat and on the bottom of a vessel at Porolissum.' (p.32)

"... The material and cultural remains of the population that inhabited Dacian territory form a coherent whole, known as the Bratei Culture. Finds include ceramics, brooches, combs, and small food mills characterized by elements of indigenous Romance style, as well as ceramics, metal objects, and coins that are marked by Byzantine influence. The Bratei Culture, the creation of the Daco-Roman people, is known from finds all over Rumania: at Bratei, Ciumști, and Morești in Transylvania; at Costișa and Monoaia in Moldavia; and at Ipotești and Stolnicești in Oltenia and Muntenia. The fact that the culture shows only insignificant regional variations implies that the entire Rumanian territory was occupied by the same Daco-Roman stock. Furthermore, the great number of sites from the third through the sixth centuries in which the material culture continues the Roman provincial tradition - about one hundred such sites have been identified so far in Transylvania alone - testifies to the wide dissemination of their way of life.

The Bratei Culture was succeeded - both chronologically and taxonomically - by another known as the Ipotești-Cîndești-Ciurelu Culture. This society, which flourished in the seventh and eighth centuries, was sedentary, rural, and evidenced some social differentiation... The characteristics of this society confirm its evolutionary connection to the preceding Dacian and Roman provincial cultures. It, too, was the creation of a Romance population and represents the continuation of the Roman tradition with Byzantine influences.

The indigenous society influenced the culture that was brought or established

by the Slavic peoples who settled in the Danube-Carpathian region beginning in the sixth century, that known as the Sărata-Monteoru-Balta Verde Culture. The resultant mingling of Romance and Slavic elements is seen almost everywhere in which remains of this culture are found: at Suceava-Șipot in Moldavia; at Ipotești and Cîndești in Muntenia; and in the Tîrnave-Someș region in Transylvania. In certain cases we may speak of a mixed culture, but the proportion is heavily weighted toward the indigenous Romanized element, especially in ceramics..." (p.38-39)

"Taking into account all the linguistic evidence - grammar (including morphology and syntax) and lexicon (including archaisms and foreign, especially Slavic, influence) - contemporary scholars have concluded that the Rumanian people and language evolved in the strongly Romanized regions along the Lower Danube (where there were about forty Romanized, Latin-speaking towns) and in Dacia north of the Danube, where Latin was likewise spoken in towns, military camps, mining centers, and craftsmen's collegiae. Summarizing the formation of the Rumanian people and their language, one may say that the process proper began with the Romanization of the population north of the Danube in the second to fourth centuries; at the heart of it were the two main ethnic elements, Dacian and Roman. Various migrating peoples who settled in the area added some minor features, as also was true in the case of the other neo-Latin peoples and languages. Beginning in the sixth century, the evolving Rumanian culture north of the Danube was stronger than that of the Slavic population, and therefore the latter was assimilated." (p.40-41)

Since no historian can be equally well-versed in each phase of a more than one thousand-year long historical process, using secondhand arguments in a synthetic study is not to be objected to. Nevertheless, it is only fair to expect the author of such a work to be consistent and free from contradictions in processing and evaluating secondhand data. Unfortunately, Mr. Pascu frequently contradicts himself in the passages quoted above. The presence of a Daco-Roman population is supposedly proven by bronze coins, regarded as a characteristic feature of a poor people. But, if this is the case, how do treasure troves containing silver and gold, tacitly attributed to the autochthonous inhabitants of the land, prove the presence of the same? Besides, even the author must be aware of the fact that the inscription on a vessel unearthed at Porolissum, which is mentioned among artifacts with a Latin Christian inscription that might as well be attributed to Goths who settled in Transylvania after the Romans had withdrawn, is a primitive forgery made in recent times. Nevertheless, Mr. Pascu insists on using this as evidence. Furthermore, when evaluating the late-Roman

burial site at Bratei-Baráthely, Mr. Pascu fails to acknowledge his compatriot Kurt Horedt's claim that the documentation of the findings cannot be scientifically checked (Die spät-römischen Bestattungen aus Siebenbürgen. Studii si comunicări 21. Sibiu 1981). The author even assumes that the continuation of this unique culture can be proven by findings of an entirely different kind and dating from a later period (e.g. Moreşti-Malomfalva, Ipotesti, etc.) although a few lines later he correctly refers to the latter findings as Slavic in origin. Of the linguistic arguments, he fails to mention the marked Albanian influence on each and every regional dialect of the Rumanian language, which testifies to the impact of a Balkan environment. He also fails to refer to the large Rumanian population living in the Balkan Peninsula, a population frequently appearing in Byzantine and Serbian sources from between the 10th and 15th centuries, which gradually migrated north of the Danube. In addition, he omits to mention the Macedonians, the last of these migrants, who settled in Rumania in the 20th century. Speaking of a continuity of successive cultures along the Lower Danube might at best be regarded as an obscure hint at the presence of a Rumanian population in the Balkans, and this can, in the event, only be substantiated for the northern bank of the river. However, it is plainly misleading to claim that the use of the Latin language in Dacian (i.e. Transylvanian) towns, military camps and craftsmen's collegiae continued after 271 A.D. In fact no towns, camps, nor collegiae existed in the province after the Romans withdrew.

However, it is not only contradictions and vague wording which cause problems for the reader but also the author's failure to quote arguments both in support of and at variance with his hypotheses.

Data is evaluated exclusively by the author with a view to substantiating his own claims. This is all the more noteworthy as in a synthetic study, co-authored by Mr. Pascu (Histoire de la Roumanie, ed. Horváth, 1970), another scholar offered a much more thorough treatment of the hypothesis of Daco-Roman continuity and enumerated counter-arguments as well.

"As has also been proven by certain archeological discoveries, the second half of the 5th century witnessed the beginning of a period of grave difficulties ...each settlement, large and small, that are known to have been inhabited up to then by Daco-Romans, appears to have been abandoned..." (p. 84)

"Since there are striking analogies, with other regions, we may reasonably assume that both the abandonment of old settlements that happened to be in the way of the intruders and the withdrawal of the Daco-Romans to distant valleys, hills and mountains were temporary phenomena confined to that specific period.

The autochthonous population led the life of nomadic shepherds and were

involved in animal husbandry (ancient activities in these regions), and this facilitated a mobile life style opposed to that of a minority of peasants. This might have been the underlying reason for the fact that the original names of towns and settlements that had been abandoned by the native population were forgotten and that these towns and settlements were given new names on the arrival of the Slavs... The native inhabitants of the land only returned after a certain period of time. This, however, cannot have been very long... (p. 85)

"From the 8th century onwards, returning to the land that had been occupied by Slavic peoples, the natives adopted the toponymy of the foreign newcomers (Slavs, Hungarians etc.)." (p. 87)

Although one cannot find any reference to the fact, which even Rumanian linguists have acknowledged, that the resemblance between the Latin and Rumanian names of great Transylvanian rivers (Alutus-Olt, Maris-Mures, Samus-Somes, Crisius-Cris, Tibiscus-Timis, p.87.), which is assumed by many to testify to 'the continuity of the autochthonous population', can be put down to linguistic transfer through Slavic and Hungarian mediation - itself a weighty argument against the idea of continuity of the Rumanian population there - we must admit that the mere mentioning of yet unresolved problems in Histoire de la Roumanie offers a much better starting point for a dialogue over debated points than Stefan Pascu's apodictic statements. These pronouncements are exactly what they were termed in the preface of his book, namely the products 'of a society in which public expression must be consonant with public policy'.

Although this is no excuse for the author's prejudice, it makes it clear why he displays such a biased approach.

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Erdély története (The History of Transylvania). Editor in chief Béla Köpeczi (3 vols, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1986, 1945 pp.)

This representative achievement of Hungarian historiography was reviewed in the first issue of our periodical. Unlike to Stefan Pascu's book discussed above, the Hungarian study is the joint result of the efforts of several authors and does not reflect any 'official' view. Each contributor takes full responsibility for what he writes, and in some cases co-authors disagree with one another. It would require a lengthy analysis to cover the whole work. This time we will confine our presentation to only two passages from Volume One relating to the hypothesis of Daco-Roman continuity. The first of these, written by István Bóna, will illustrate

how fallible the methods designed to identify archeological finds are, and how tentative the proofs they can furnish. For the second passage we will quote László Makkai to point out the possibility of using the admigration hypothesis, a middling position between the opposing Hungarian and Rumanian standpoints, and thus a potential basis of a dialogue that might result in the bridging of the gap between them, provided that an open and strictly scholarly approach is adopted.

"Ever since 270 A.D, the population of the province of Dacia in Transylvania has not been mentioned in any written source. The names of former Roman towns, settlements, fortresses were forgotten and no language or early medieval record preserved them for posterity. All that was left was merely a heritage of unknown linguistic origin from pre-historic times: the names of some major rivers, such as the Temes, the Maros, the Kőrös, the Szamos and the Olt. River names like Ampelus - Ompoly and Tierna - Cserna were also passed down from the pre-Roman period.

According to recent data, it was the coins of the Emperors Philippus Arabs and Decius that mark the end of normal monetary life (that is, a regular payment of soldiers) in fortresses along the north-western, northern and east-Dacian limes, and coins of the Emperor Valerianus (260 A.D) in Micea (Vecel), a castrum guarding the western outpost of the province along the River Maros. Dacian coins with the inscription 'PROV/INCIA/DACIA' were issued for 11 years from 246 A.D. onwards. Soldiers were paid in coins from this mint until 256/257 A.D. However, even around 268 A.D. there were quite a few people in the interior of the province who buried their money in the hope of recovering it in more peaceful days (the treasure troves of 1902 and 1963 found in Apulum and the Galacs coins unearthed in Krassó-Szörény). Their prudence went unrewarded, and this mistake must have cost them their lives.

There has been hardly any systematic archeological excavation in the cemeteries of Roman castra in Transylvania, and thus the date when they were last used cannot currently be ascertained. Nevertheless, we can conclude that the Goths did not know what to do with the border fortresses, which they had no practical use for them; consequently, in most cases no traces of occupation and settlement can be found in them. Although we are know of some Roman and Roman-native Dac cremation cemeteries in the interior of the province, and which date from the 3rd century A.D., these do not contain any artifacts that can be dated later than 270 A.D. An urn grave in Radnót, where a coin of Severina Augusta was uncovered, is the most recent one, and not even this site can be supposed to date from a period later than 269-271 A.D.

As to municipal cemeteries, the parts of the Potaissa (Torda) cemetery that have been uncovered up to now date from the time of Gordianus III, or prior to that era. The site of the demolished 'Principia' (headquarters of the military command) in the castrum of the Roman legion stationed there was used in the 5th century by eastern barbaric peoples as a burial site. 'Late-Roman' sarcophagi of eastern and Hellenistic origin, tombs made of slabs of stone and tegula coffin (made of roof tiles), with no artifacts in the latter, were very common in the cemeteries of Napoca (i.e. in Kolozsvár, Petőfi street) as early as the 3rd century. Some of them might date from the period after 270 A.D. The most remarkable burial sites were unearthed in Apulum (Gyulafehérvár), where graves made of earth-bricks and of stone, and ordinary tombs of the 'imperial' style dating from the 2nd and the 3rd centuries but not later than 270 A.D., have been found in three separate cemeteries. No trace of the new 'burial culture' that was introduced during the era of the Tetrarchy from Scythia Minor (Dobruja) through the limes along the River Danube and the River Rhine to Britain can be found in Transylvania and on that bank of the River Danube inhabited by barbaric peoples. The main features of this 'burial culture' are as follows: the tombs were orientated, i.e. they were facing either west or east; there were belts and onion-shaped fibulas, which denoted various kinds of obligatory state service in the graves of men, and there was jewellery made in the specific provincial style in the tombs of well-to-do women.

It was compulsory to wear the onion-shaped fibulas, prescribed and given to subjects as symbols of power by the late Roman state. The only 'classical' onion-shaped fibula unearthed in Transylvania to date from the 4th century was found on the bank of the Székás creek that flows into the Küküllő river at Obraja. This was discovered in a rural settlement that can, on the basis of a coin of Crispus, be dated as being after 317 A.D. Some fibulas of this kind must have found their way to barbaric peoples in those days: fibulas have been unearthed in Gepid, Sarmat and Quad settlements and graves, although they can hardly be regarded as anything more than spoils of war. This is substantiated by the fact that no late-Roman tombs dating from the '4th century' (i.e. after the beginning of the Tetrarchy) can be found in the Obraja village cemetery of the 2nd and the 3rd centuries.

Apulum is the only Transylvanian town where real late-Roman finds of jewellery worn by women and few coins (Constantin the Great and Constantinopolis) have been discovered. Allegedly, these artifacts were unearthed in a grave during the excavation of the palace of the legate. Since both the jewellery and the way

used to be worn (several bracelets worn together) follow the distinctive trans-anubian provincial style, the unearthed graves must have been the burial sites of women carried off by the Goths.

The only village cemetery that was still in use in the 4th century - and it was the study under review which emphasized it - is the cemetery No. 1 in Aráthely (Bratei). The cremation graves bear the unmistakable features of a Roman province - the latest Pannonian graves of this kind, in which some coins of Probus (276 - 282) were found, date from the late 290s A.D. The chronology of this cemetery of about 350 graves is extremely uncertain. The majority of the graves are located north by south, and in some cases graves are situated on top of one another: we may therefore assume that the cemetery was first used in Roman times. In a later period another people, also accustomed to cremation burials, buried its dead on top of the earlier burial site in a makeshift (i.e. barbaric) manner. Even if the three coins used to date the cemetery had really been found in local graves, the lower, original layer of the cemetery was last used around 353 (the coin of Constantinus II.), while the upper layer was first used around 338 (the coin of Emperor Constantinus II) and last in 373 A.D. (the coin of Valens). The people that buried its dead here was extremely poor: apart from some iron and bronze fibulas, no artifacts were found in the graves. There were a few houses and pits located in a haphazard manner on the burial site, and artifacts characteristic of the Goths, such as crook-backed horn combs, buckles, fibulas and gardening tools hidden in the ground, namely spade-heads, sickles and carriage fittings. The majority of tiles found in the graves (?), in the houses (?) or on the ground (?) were the products of the Gothic Maroszentanna culture; other pieces date from the 4th century and were made on the southern bank of the River Danube in the provincial style that was common in practically all the settlements and cemeteries of the Maroszentanna-Csernyahov culture. No find sheds light on the material civilization of the local population in the 4th century. If the local population that buried their dead here was still around in the second half of the 4th century, it must have been an isolated rural community whose members clung to their pagan traditions. (The clues suggestive of this are the cremation of their dead, the presence of a multitude of animal bones and the remnants of sacrificial food in the graves).

Two hundred years of archeological research in Transylvania has been unable to come up with unambiguous evidence for the continuous survival of a 'Roman' population in Dacia. Regardless of whether archeological finds of Roman origin unearthed in Dacia originate from a native people or from settlers, they date from between 107 and 270, and in this way the settlements and cemeteries where

they were found can also be more or less precisely dated. No authentic proof of a 'late-Roman' culture, which started to develop from the era of the Tetrarchy on, has been found that would testify to the existence of a closed, local community in Transylvania. Some municipal cemeteries were still in use for some time after the evacuation of the province. In some rare instances the ruins of devastated towns might have been inhabited by the captives of barbaric tribes - a consequence of Gothic rule. It was only in Baráthely on the southern bank of the River Nagy Küküllő that traces of the continuous survival of the pre-270 population can be found for some unspecified period. It was a fairly comfortless existence: a people pushed to the verge of enslavement and exploited by the Goths lived and died there after 270 A.D. Their villages disappeared without trace and they gave up their cemeteries during the rule of the Goths in Dacia." (p. 111-113)

"Speaking of the 'blaks', the supposedly Rumanian population of the Bulgarian Rumanian Empire, whose home was located by Anonymus in Northern Transylvania mention has been made of some documents of the Hungarian and the papal Chancellery that referred to a 'land' or a 'forest' (silva) in the Southern Carpathians as 'terra Blacorum' and was inhabited by Rumanians in the first three decades of the 13th century. Since these are the earliest known documents relating to this region, we have no written record pertaining to the beginnings of the history of the Rumanians in Transylvania.

We do not wish to involve ourselves in the issue of Daco-Roman continuity, i.e. the continuous survival of a Romanized population in Transylvania from ancient times onwards. Nevertheless, we must repeatedly emphasize that neither historical, nor archeological nor toponymical proof of the existence of a Rumanian population in Transylvania prior to the early 1200s has been furnished so far. However, Rumanians as transhumant and nomadic herdsmen and Rumanian soldiers enlisted in the Byzantine army have been mentioned in written records from Thessaly to the Balkan Mountains since 976 A.D. Cuman warriors who invaded Byzantine territories in 1094 through the mountain passes of the Balkans were guided by Vlachs, i.e. Rumanians. Rumanians who herded their livestock in the mountains between the Rivers Drina and Morava are referred to in several documents dating from the end of the 12th century. A great number of geographical names given by, or testifying to, the presence of a Rumanian population in the Middle Ages have been preserved both in this region and in the southern mountainous region of Bulgaria, where Rumanians no longer live. All this does not necessarily imply a migration of the Rumanian people from South to North and into the Carpathians. However, we can conclude that they presumably led a life

that favoured constant migration - the life of nomadic and mainly semi-nomadic herdsmen who spent the summers in the mountains and the winters in lowland pastures along the banks of major rivers or near the coast. Transhumation as a main occupation does not exclude, but rather presupposes, some kind of agricultural activity in certain high mountain terraces, an assumption confirmed by the fact that such terraces can still be seen in the Transylvanian mountains. The memories of such a life style have been preserved in the vocabularies of the Albanian and Rumanian languages, which developed from a supposedly common proto-language.

However, transhumation was only possible in sunny mountain pastures facing South or East. Consequently, the interior of Transylvania cannot be regarded as the ancient territory of Rumanian transhumation. P. P. Panaitecu, a Rumanian historian was right in saying that: "the transhumation of sheep from the southern bank of the River Danube and from the Carpathian mountains into Transylvania has never been mentioned. It would have run counter to the laws of nature, since Transylvania, situated on the northern and western slopes of high mountains, has no rich pastures. No sensible herdsmen in the South would have wished to drive his flock into Transylvania, a land poor in pastures." (P. P. Panaitecu, Introducere la istoria culturii românești, București, 1969, p. 146) However, Rumanian herdsmen, who used to drive their livestock to lowland pastures along the River Danube, may have lived on the southern slopes of the Southern Carpathians at any time in history since the birth of the Rumanian people, especially after 800 A.D., when the Bulgarians, who had occupied southern Transylvania, expanded their control over the region between the Carpathians and the Danube, a region known as Wallachia today. In this way the transhumation of large herds, i.e. the transfer of animals from the mountains to the Danube and vice versa became safer. When Bulgaria came under Byzantine rule around the year 1000, Wallachia became the border province and a pasture land of the Pechenegs, who were later replaced by the Cumans. Border fortresses retained by the Byzantine Empire along the lower reaches of the Danube and in the Danube Delta were not capable of ensuring the security of the transhumant Rumanian herdsmen who drove their livestock from the Southern Carpathians to the Lower Danube and that of the Slav people who inhabited the lowland forest areas. Consequently, they had to find the ways and means of coexistence with the nomadic intruders. To safeguard their mutual security, the Pechenegs, and later the Cumans established good and enduring contacts with the Rumanian herdsmen, certain relations of dependence whose details, due to the lack of

records, are vague, but which was in the event transformed into a firm alliance during the time of the Bulgarian-Rumanian Empire, founded in 1185 with Cuman military assistance. Having obtained military experience during their service in the Byzantine army, the leaders and judges of the Rumanian herdsmen in Wallachia started to form alliances that kept increasing in size and importance. Groups of smaller settlements of herdsmen (called 'katun') were united into larger public and military administration bodies (kenézség), headed by leaders who originally had been in charge of controlling livestock raising but gradually became the members of a professional military aristocracy. Rumanian border guards who were settled next to the Székelys and the Pechenegs in the Transylvanian border region must have come from this body which was not quite a feudal ruling class, but rather a group of high-ranking barbaric tribal chieftains." (pp. 301-202)

Having studied and compared the above two texts with Histoire de la Roumanie (1970), we can draw the conclusion that even though there seems to be no chance of finding an ultimate solution to the 'enigma' and the 'miracle' of the origins of the Rumanian people in the short run, we may hope that arbitrary assumptions will disappear in the near future through the coordinated work of Hungarian and Rumanian historians. It would only require a positive approach on the part of both sides.

L á s z l ó M a k k a i

Institute of Historical Sciences

TURKS, HUNGARIANS AND KIPCHAKS. A FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF TIBOR HALASI-KUN

Guest editor Pierre Oberling, assistant editor Geraldina Cecilia Butash. *Journal of Turkish Studies* (Türklük Bilgisi Arastirmaları), VIII (1984), 303 pp.

All over the world, Tibor Halasi-Kun is regarded as the doyen of turcologists, a man whose personality and scholarly activity inspire affection and respect everywhere. On the occasion of his 70th birthday, his American disciples published a Festschrift: the eighth volume of the Journal of Turkish Studies was dedicated to him. Twenty-one of his former pupils - many of them senior scholars already - not only paid homage to their professor, but also acknowledged the motivation he had given them during their time at Columbia University, New York.

Tibor Halasi-Kun belongs to that great generation of scholars whose ambition it was to embrace the whole field of turcology, and who were equally at home in the study of the languages and cultures of the Central Asian Turkic peoples and in Ottoman studies. It is to Gyula Németh, his professor at the University of Budapest between 1931-1936, that Halasi-Kun owes this ambition and, as a matter of fact, much more besides. In Hungary, turcology is not merely one of many disciplines but a national field of study, since it is essential to an understanding of Hungarian history and, especially, Hungarian ethnogenesis. Since the turn of the century, Hungarian turcology has indeed attempted to contribute in this area. In this spirit, during the decade prior to the Second World War, a generation of scholars was trained under Gyula Németh's instruction and solicitude, the existence and thorough grounding of which provided the basis for new findings in the study of ancient Hungarian history. Gyula Németh's disciples became well known scholars in Budapest as well as at several great universities of the world. Tibor Halasi-Kun belongs to this great generation of scholars and has, throughout his career, considered it important to add to his intellectual inheritance and introduce his own pupils into the labyrinthine study of ancient Hungarian history. He is one of those wide-ranging scholars searching, in a broad East European and Central Asian perspective, for the reasons of the Hungarians' migration through

the steppes. The Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi, founded by him in 1975, display the same attitude, and the journal has by now become indispensable to any study of migrations in the steppes, to ancient Hungarian history, or to the medieval history of Eastern and East-Central Europe as well as that of Central Asia.

In Tibor Halasi-Kun's ever increasing oeuvre, however, the widest scope is given to Ottoman studies, the initial incentive for which he had received from Lajos Fekete at the University of Budapest. As director of the Hungarian Institute in Ankara and during his years at Ankara University (1943-1951), Halasi-Kun was able to gain ample insight into the most important Ottoman manuscripts. Under Lajos Fekete's influence, his interest was attracted by Ottoman censuses or Domesday Books, that is, various *defters* beside narrative sources. It is mainly owing to him that these sources have also been "discovered" by Turkish scholarship. Halasi-Kun has laid a particular emphasis on the publication of the *defters* concerning the parts of historic Hungary under Ottoman rule, and this is not only essential to an understanding of the demography and economy of the occupied territories, but also to comprehensive work on Hungarian historical geography.

Halasi-Kun is one of those rare scholars in the field of Ottoman studies who are equally expert in the history of the Ottoman language and in Ottoman linguistics, literature and history. His extensive knowledge played no small part in the fact that the Archivum Ottomanicum - which was founded in 1969 and edited by him - has become one of the best known and most highly esteemed publications in the field.

A distinct part of Halasi-Kun's works is dedicated to Cuman-Kipchak language and history. The Cumans, who also settled in Hungary, played an important role in Mamluk Egypt. Cuman slave-soldiers, having settled along the Nile, assumed power in 1250 and made their own language one of the official languages of the Mamluk empire; their literary records are the prime sources for the history of Kipchak language. In his papers on the Kipchaks, Halasi-Kun traces the almost incredible linguistic and cultural connections established between 12th-15th century Eastern and East-Central Europe and the East Mediterranean from the Don to the Danube and from the Sea of Azov to the Red Sea.

This threefold interest is reflected in the carefully compiled Festschrift; it is by no means accidental that it has been entitled Turks, Hungarians and Kipchaks. Halasi-Kun has not only conducted research in these three fields, but has also trained disciples in each of them. In this way, the volume also serves to show the disciples' coming to terms with their master's legacy.

Halasi-Kun, however, not only imparted scholarly knowledge to his pupils in the United States, but also the peculiar scholarly and intellectual approach he

brought with him from his native country when he arrived at Columbia in 1952. His work is imbued with the vox humana of the Carpathian Basin, that is, a respect for other peoples and ethnic groups. He belonged to the generation brought up in the intellectual traditions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, influenced by them from childhood and preserving them even when many people had either forgotten this honourable part of the Monarchy's legacy, or wanted to have it forgotten. The evolution of the ethnic diversity of the Danubian Basin and the co-existence of different ethnic groups there are recurring themes in his essays. His papers on the history of the Banat, which was ethnically the most colourful region of historic Hungary, if not of the whole of Europe, have supplied a particularly great need.

In most of the papers of the Festschrift, some period of Ottoman culture and history is examined. At the same time, the papers address debated or not fully explored problems of Ottoman studies.

In her paper, Margaret L. Venzke inquired into the 16th century decline of corn cultivation in Eastern Anatolia and Syria by comparing the corn tithes (1536-37, 1551-52, 1570-71) of the Jabal Sim'an nahije, near Aleppo. In the defters analyzed, both the quantity and the money equivalent of the tithes are entered, and they clearly show that rising prices were accompanied by a fall of production. The exhaustion of the soil, brought about by the increase of production resulting from population growth during the previous decades is indicated by the author as the reason for the phenomenon.

The only Hungarian scholar represented in the volume, Gusztáv Bayerle (Indiana University, Bloomington), analyzed Evlia Çelebi's travels in Hungary, and raised the question of the famous traveller's familiarity with Hungarian history. Çelebi can hardly be regarded a historian in the original sense of the word. He did not have the slightest inclination to trace sources, nor was he sufficiently versed in Ottoman chronicles. Rather, he only had rather vague ideas, based on secondhand information, about Hungarian history. Therefore, it is not treatment of the past that constitutes the most valuable part of his travelogues, but his reports on the military expeditions in which he personally participated and his notes on Hungarian towns and castles. These show him to be a keen observer, although occasionally given to exaggeration.

One of the most valuable contributions to the volume has been written by Arsenio P. Martinez on the financial conditions of the empire of the Ilhanides. On the basis of gold and silver dirhem findings, Martinez succeeded in estimating the coin output of the respective mints. Archaeological findings have also revealed the high volume of trade between various regions. Ilhanide rulers had to

keep a sharp eye on the finances of the empire, for a large-scale hoarding of gold coins threatened it with crisis, as did large-scale silver imports from Europe which could alter the exchange rate between gold and silver.

In his paper, Peter B. Golden wrote about Turkish semantic borrowings in the Russian language from the time of the Russian principality of Kiev to that of the Mongol invasion. Polovci, the name of the Cuman people, is one of these semantic borrowings. The meaning of the word jazik (language) shows a Turkish influence. The Russian expressions čelom bit (to ask humbly), rotu pit (to swear) požalovat (to grant) are all evidence for the powerful linguistic influence exerted by the Turkish peoples of the Golden Horde.

Uli Schamiloglu commented on a very important problem of Pecheneg history and, therefore, of ancient Hungarian history. The Pechenegs are mentioned in a 10th century work by Ibn Ḥayyān, an Arab historian from Spain but, as opposed to the form bādžānāk (bāčānāk), current in other Arabian sources, he uses the form bāšānāk, which is close to their Hungarian name. Since this cannot be attributed to a Spanish orthographic influence, it would be worthwhile to trace the source of Ibn Ḥayyan's information on the Pechenegs where, similarly to Hungarian borrowing, the common Turkish č had been replaced by š by the middle of the 10th century.

Marian Lăzărescu-Zobian's paper was concerned with Cuman-Rumanian relations in the Middle Ages. The eastern and southern approaches of the Carpathians fell under Cuman rule and, accordingly, the region was called Cumania in contemporary sources. The history of Moldavia and Wallachia is inseparable from that of the Cumans, who not only ruled over these territories for two centuries, but who also exerted a very important cultural and linguistic influence on the formation of the Rumanian people. It is also remarkable that numerous Moldavian boyar families had Cuman names, and were aware of their Cuman origin as late as the 16th-17th century.

Though it has been edited in the United States and most of the papers have no direct connection with Hungarian history, the volume certainly belongs to Hungarian historiography. In the eyes of the contributors to the volume, Halasi-Kun has not only been a professor at Columbia University, but also a great figure of Hungarian turcology and Ottoman studies. His American disciples are invariably, to an extent at least, experts on the Hungarian past as well; several of them have become familiar with the Hungarian language and with Hungarian culture.

Halasi-Kun is one among those Hungarian scholars living abroad who enhance

the reputation of Hungarian scholarship. It was a great pleasure for all his admirers and friends when he was elected honorary member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1986.

J á n o s H ó v á r i

Institute of Historical Sciences

HUNGARIA ELIBERATA - BUDAVÁR VISSZAVÉTELE ÉS MAGYARORSZÁG FELSZABADÍTÁSA A TÖRÖK URALOM ALÓL 1683-1718

Hungaria Eliberata - The Reoccupation of Buda Castle and the Liberation of Hungary from Turkish Rule 1683-1718. By Ferenc Szakály (Budapest: Corvina Kiadó, 1986, 186 pp.)

Hungarian historians had for years been preparing for the celebrations to mark the tercentenary of the recapture of Buda Castle, an event of decisive importance from the point of view of bringing about an end to Turkish rule in Hungary. Having explored a large part of the relevant archive material both in Hungary and abroad, scholars have published a number of monographs and reference books since 1983. The following list is a selection of these publications. István Sugár, Lehanyatlik a török félhold (The Decline of the Turkish Crescent), (Budapest, 1983); Ágnes R. Várkonyi, Buda visszavívása (The Siege and Reoccupation of Buda), (Budapest, 1984); János Barta jr., Budavár visszavétele (The Reoccupation of Buda Castle), (Budapest, 1986); János J. Varga, A fogyó félhold árnyékában (In the Shadow of the Waning Crescent), (Budapest, 1986); Lotharingiai Károly hadinaplója Buda visszafoglalásáról 1686 (The Diary of Charles of Lorraine on the Recapture of Buda), (Budapest, 1986); Bél Mátyás Buda visszavívásáról (Mátyás Bél's Account of the Retaking of Buda), (Budapest, 1986); Buda visszavívásának emlékezete 1686 (Memories of the Reoccupation of Buda, 1686), edited by Ferenc Szakály (Budapest, 1986), a book giving a rich selection of sources; Buda ostroma 1686 (The Siege of Buda 1686 - selected correspondence of contemporary figures), edited by Katalin Péter (Budapest, 1986); Buda Expugnata 1686 - Europa et Hungaria 1683 - 1718, edited by István Bariska, György Haraszti and János J. Varga (Budapest, 1986); a guide to records relating to the subject in European archives.

Ferenc Szakály's latest book, published by Corvina Kiadó, Budapest, forms an integral part of the above list of publications. The book, which was written for a broad spectrum of readers but which also satisfies the highest scholarly standards, is a worthy achievement of Hungarian historiography. Besides the topicality of the book in the tercentennial year, it is high professional standards and reliance on a large body of contemporary sources, as well as on 19th and

20th century secondary literature that make Ferenc Szakály's study one of the best books on the subject. The book is, however, more than a synthetic summary, since the author wished to avoid simplification. Although he did not take it upon himself to deal with the events leading up to the siege of Buda in 1686, in other words the 150 years of Ottoman rule in Hungary, nevertheless, by outlining the major military, political, economic and demographic issues, as well as settlement patterns and cultural history between 1520 and 1682 and by describing the specific circumstances under which Hungary was torn into three parts, Szakály provides his readers with sufficient background information for an understanding of events between 1683 and 1718, on which the book is focused. Readers can also form a clear view of the significance of the military campaign to liberate Hungary and of the impact of the war on Hungary's history in the decades which followed.

The author gives a detailed account of the diplomatic activity carried on by the European powers in the early 1680s, activity directed towards their participation in the defence of Vienna. He describes how the siege of the imperial capital was lifted and how the war continued on Hungarian soil. He tells of the victory of the allied forces at Párkány, as well as of the reoccupation of Esztergom, Visegrád, Vác and Érsekújvár between 1683 and 1685. Also described is the unsuccessful siege of Buda in 1684. At the same time, we learn about the foreign policies conducted by various leaders of tripartite Hungary (the country was further divided into four parts in 1682). Special attention is paid to Imre Thököly's unsuccessful pro-Turkish policy and to the policy of Mihály Apafi, Prince of Transylvania, who oscillated between Vienna and Constantinople.

Mr. Szakály deals with the crucial events of 1686 in a separate chapter. He draws an excellent picture of Leopold I, Holy Roman Emperor and King of Hungary, whose preferences were for peace and the fine arts, and who could only be persuaded (by Pope Innocent XI) to launch another campaign against the Ottoman Empire with the greatest difficulty. At the same time, a detailed account is given of the policies of the elector princes - the Duke of Bavaria, the Duke of Saxony and the Margrave of Brandenburg - who all assisted the Emperor in his efforts. He describes the deployment of the troops that were to besiege Buda Castle, the defence preparations of Abdurrahman Pasha and the major events of the siege itself.

While recalling the events of the war years 1686-1699, the author portrays the imperial generals - Charles of Lorraine, Maximilian Emmanuel, Louis of Baden and Eugene of Savoy - whose military feats included the recapture of Simontornya, Pécs, Kaposvár and Szeged in the fall of 1686, the victory at Nagyharsány in 1687, the reoccupation of Belgrade in 1686, the victorious Bal-

kan campaign of 1689, and the victory at Szalánkemén in 1691, (which has passed into history as the bloodiest battle of the 17th century) as well as the success at Zenta in 1697. These great victories compelled the Ottoman Empire, which was also troubled by internal problems, to make peace, which it did by concluding the Treaty of Karlóca on January 26th, 1699.

Besides the imperial generals, the author also portrays the grand viziers, who followed one another in quick succession in the wake of the repeated Turkish defeats. He also gives an account of the mutiny which followed the Battle of Nagyharsány and which eventually led to the fall of Sultan Mehmet IV. Also examined are the Turkish successes during the 1690s: the occupation of Belgrade in 1690, the defeat of the imperial troops at Zernyest in 1690 and at Lugos in 1695. Having analyzed the causes of the defeats suffered by the Christian powers at the hands of the Turks, Mr. Szakály concludes that the Turkish victories and the prolongation of the fighting cannot be ascribed solely to the temporary overcoming of difficulties by the Turkish military leadership, but must also be seen in the light of the machinations of Louis XIV of France. The French king, jealous of Leopold I's expansionism in the east, began the War of the Grand Alliance (1688-1697), and in doing so disrupted supplies of food, arms and ammunition to the troops in the east and tied down a great number of soldiers who would otherwise have fought the Turks. It was also Louis XIV's intervention that prevented imperial troops from liberating Bosnia and Serbia from Turkish rule.

As a result of the fall of Belgrade, the Turks invaded Hungary on successive occasions. Nevertheless, the imperial troops gained a foothold along the lower reaches of the Danube and increased the domains of Leopold I by another 150,000 square kilometers. "It was a remarkable achievement and a great victory," the author concludes, "even in spite of the fact that better fortune could have increased the newly gained territories even further and that the last seven years of the warfare were spent defending what had been gained earlier instead of enlarging the reoccupied territory."

Mr. Szakály raises the question as to what the causes of the Habsburg victory were and why the imperial army was able to gain the upper hand over the Turkish troops, who had been justly feared in East-Central Europe for a century and a half. The author concludes that the Habsburg victory can be explained mainly by social and economic reasons, which also resulted in the supremacy of Western Europe in terms of military power. In the course of the massive development of

Western Europe, the relative and temporary advantages of the Turkish model, interwoven as it was with nomadic features, had been cancelled out by the late 1600s. "The factories that were common all over Europe proved to be a more reliable source of supplies for the army than the guild industry and the state-owned arms factories of the Turks, so much so that the Turks themselves purchased their more up-to-date armaments in Western Europe. Furthermore, European peasant farmers, who were interested in developing their lands were more reliable suppliers of food for the army than Turkish peasants, who were exploited to the maximum and who led lives of the utmost precariousness. Finally, the nascent capitalist credit system that had developed within the framework of feudal economic conditions was clearly a more flexible source of finance than the over-centralized Turkish financial management system. When in the end the abovementioned achievements facilitated the emergence of large standing armies in Europe, and these, in turn, served as the means for the further boosting of capitalist development, the former military advantages of the despotic Turkish structure disappeared forever. Such far-reaching changes could not have been compensated for, not even by the enormous size of the Ottoman Empire."

The war that lasted for 16 years was waged mainly on Hungarian soil and for the domination of Hungary. In the spirit of Miklós Zrínyi's endeavours, Palatine Pál Esterházy also did his best to increase the participation of Hungarians in the liberation of the country. In this way he managed to avoid the shame of Hungary's liberty being achieved by foreigners only. From 1684 on, 15,000 to 20,000 Hungarian soldiers were regularly engaged in the war against the Turks, and this figure was in accordance with Hungary's military potential. In addition, Hungary took upon herself the enormous financial burden of provisioning the troops stationed in the country. According to Palatine Esterházy, Hungary spent 30 million forints on maintaining the Imperial army between 1683 and 1690. Mr. Szakály is correct in pointing out that no such military victories could have been won without the Habsburg Crown Prince, the financial support of the Czech provinces and the pope in Rome, and the financial and military assistance given by the German principalities, since it needed a standing army of between 50,000 and 60,000 and an annual 10 million to 12 million forints to fight and eventually overthrow Turkish rule. Hungary, with its 4 million inhabitants, trailing behind most European nations in terms of social and economic development and divided in both the geographic and the political sense of the word, would have been incapable of achieving this on her own. Foreign assistance, however, had to be paid for and the consequences of it lasted for centuries. The

Hungarians were compelled to forgo their right to elect their own kings (this as early as 1687) and the country came under Habsburg rule. From then on, contemporaneously with the advance of the imperial troops institutions controlled by the military and the treasury in Vienna replaced the ancient system of public administration operated by the nobility in each county. In southern Hungary, from the Adriatic Sea to Transylvania, the Habsburg government established a Serbian military border region which was separated from Hungary and established as an autonomous territory.

Nevertheless, an agreement with the Hungarians was sought by the successors of Leopold I. Joseph I and particularly Charles III were forced to fight a war on two fronts: in the west against Louis XIV, their traditional enemy, for their succession to the Spanish throne, and in the east against Prince Ferenc Rákóczi II, who began his anti-Habsburg war. In this favorable atmosphere a constitutional compromise was achieved by the Hungarian diet at Pozsony, which met between April 3rd, 1712 and June 1st, 1715. Although the Germanization of Hungary was successfully avoided in this way, this compromise between the Viennese court and the Hungarian nobility resulted in the fossilization of the prevailing social and economic system in Hungary.

The author then focuses his attention on the resumption of Habsburg-Turkish warfare that ended with Austrian victory: since Temesvár and Belgrade were retaken, the Temesköz region, which had remained in Turkish hands after 1699 by virtue of the Treaty of Karlóca, came under the authority of the Emperor in 1718.

In the final chapter of the book entitled "Conclusion" Ferenc Szakály raises the question that is still debated by Hungarian historians, namely, whether the war, the course, circumstances and results of which the book is concerned with, should be regarded as an instance of the resurrection or the failure of the Hungarian nation. One school of Hungarian historiography has claimed that the war only replaced one evil with another, that is, it substituted Habsburg rule for Ottoman domination, and therefore that the victory of the imperial armies gives no cause for celebration. Opposing this view, the author insists that the liberation war should receive a more reasonable evaluation, "even if the only reason for this is that the war brought lasting peace to a country and a nation that primarily needed peace to recover her strength and return to the way of development after a hundred and fifty, or rather two hundred and fifty years of incessant warfare and pointless devastation." The negative results of Habsburg absolutism on the development of Hungary were far less severe than those caused by Turkish rule and the fighting which attended it. The assets that had been

destroyed in that period "would have secured for Hungary a much better starting position in the great rearrangements during subsequent centuries."

Mr. Ferenc Szakály's book is made even more enjoyable and useful by the inclusion of a large number of illustrations, a chronological table, a glossary of military terms, a list of literary works relating to the subject and detailed indices of biographical and geographical names. We recommend this work to all those who are interested in the great turning points in our national past.

J á n o s J . V a r g a

Institute of Historical Sciences

DIE HABSBURGERMONARCHIE 1848-1918. BAND IV. DIE KONFESSIONEN

Edited by Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1985, XVI, 864 pp.)

Before reviewing the fourth and latest volume of this important series of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, it is worth while casting a glance at the antecedents of the enterprise, which form an interesting chapter in the international history of our profession. The initiative came not from strictly professional circle but from the political sphere. In 1952, the Rockefeller Foundation suggested that an international scientific organization be created, which - with a view to the projects of federation between European states then on the agenda - would inquire into the nature and functioning of supranational political formations. The Habsburg Monarchy seemed to offer a useful historical model for these inquiries. In the course of its realization, the plan became detached from political objectives and was transformed into a distinct venture of historical scholarship, but with its international character kept intact. The organizational framework of the research was developed in the late 1950s. In 1957, historians working in the United States established a committee for the advancement of the studies of the Habsburg Monarchy. Hans Kohn, the doyen of historical research into nationalism became the committee's chairman, the secretary being John Rath, who has been editing the periodical Austrian History Newsletter since 1960 (the title was changed to Austrian History Yearbook in 1965) to publish articles and documents relating to the history of the Habsburg Monarchy. In 1958, three Austrian historians (Johann Christoph Allmayer-Beck, Fritz Fellner and Gerald Stourzh) wrote a detailed memorandum entitled The Habsburg Monarchy and the Problem of the Supranational State, which provided the underlying principles for further planning. In 1959, a committee was formed at the Austrian Academy of Sciences for research into the history of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The first chairman of the committee was Professor Hugo Hantsch, who, after his death in 1972, was replaced by Professor Adam Wandruszka. In 1960, Hantsch submitted a research project for a synthetic study of the history of the Austro-Hungarian

Monarchy. His proposal was also discussed at the International Congress of Historical Sciences in Stockholm. Initially, scholars from Western Europe and America took part in the research alongside the Austrian historians, but in the course of the 1960s specialists from the socialist successor states also gradually became involved, and this facilitated a many-sided treatment of the controversial historical problems of the one-time Monarchy, a treatment that would take all viewpoints into consideration. These problems were discussed at a series of international conferences in the 1960s: in Budapest and Vienna (1964), in Bloomington (1966), in Bratislava (1967) and in Vienna again (1968), and the volumes containing the materials of these conferences have become indispensable reference books for students of the Monarchy. The committee of the Austrian Academy started a series entitled Studien zur Geschichte der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie, in which more than 20 monographs have already been published.

In 1968, the writing and publishing of the synthetic series was clearly placed on the agenda - according to the original plans, in eight volumes and with the contributions of about seventy specialists. At present, a series of ten thematic volumes is projected to deal with the history of the Habsburg Monarchy between 1848-1918. The topics for each of the volumes are as follows: Economic Development. - Administration and Justice. - The Peoples of the Empire. - The Religious Denominations. - Foreign Policy. - The Military. - The Development of Constitutional Life. - Political Parties and Movements. - Social Structures. - Cultural Life. It is also obvious that the number of contributors will in the meantime be increased, for the first four volumes were written by 50 historians from 11 countries (29 Austrians, 5 Americans and 12 from the successor states, with 4 Hungarians among them). The character of the venture is therefore really international, aptly reflecting the ethnic colourfulness of the former Monarchy.

The volumes of the series already published have treated economic development (Bd. I. Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, 1973), administration and justice (Bd. II. Verwaltung und Rechtswesen, 1975) and the history of the peoples in the Empire (Bd. III. Die Völker des Reiches, 1983). The latest volume is devoted to the religions of the Monarchy, that is, the denominations recognized by the law; there is no discussion of the so-called "sects", i.e. the "free" Churches, or religious communities not yet legally recognized at that time. Like the previous volumes, it contains the work of several authors, the only difference being that while the staff that wrote Volumes I-III was of an international composition, and historians of the successor states were also represented, 8 of the 9 authors of Volume IV are Austrians and only one chapter was written by a foreign (West German) scholar.

In his brief introduction, Professor Adam Wandruszka (Vienna), editor-in-chief of the series, refers to the contradiction between the Catholic ruling house and the Empire of many denominations. The Habsburgs have always felt and declared themselves to be a distinctly Catholic dynasty, and they wished to envisage their empire a Catholic Great Power, whose task it was to protect and promote the Catholic faith. Unity of faith, however, could not be realized, all the efforts and spectacular successes of the Counter-Reformation and baroque periods notwithstanding. In 1910, only two-thirds of the population of the Monarchy were Roman Catholics, and the proportion of Catholics did not exceed 78% even if the Eastern Uniates or Greek Catholics were included. In addition to 39 million Catholics, 10 million people of other denominations lived within the frontiers of the Empire, and there were five religious communities apart from the Roman Catholic one with a membership of over one million. The Habsburg Monarchy was the most colourful and mixed country in the whole of Europe not only from an ethnic but also from a religious point of view. This fact was symbolized by the occasion of swearing allegiance in a Vienna barracks a couple of years prior to the First World War, when the recruits of the common army took the oath in ten languages in the presence of army chaplains belonging to seven denominations.

More than half of the volume is devoted to the Roman Catholics - quite understandably, since in 1910 they formed 79% of the population in Austria and 52% of it in the lands of the Hungarian crown. The chapters on the Roman Catholic Church in Austria were written by Peter Leisching (Innsbruck), those on Croatian Catholics by Ivan Vitezić (Vienna), while the summary treatment of the history of the Catholic Church in Hungary was undertaken by Moritz Csáky (Vienna-Graz), who earlier published an excellent monograph on the Kulturkampf in Hungary. A comparison between the parts dealing with the history of Catholicism in Austria and Hungary respectively, and the rich bibliographic material quoted in them, amply demonstrates the differences between the two countries' Church historiographies as regards the attitude to problems as well as the basic tendencies and findings of research. The Hungarian chapter is chiefly concerned with matters of Church policy: the relation between Church and state; legislation relating to Church policy; the power status and financial conditions of the Church; the issues of Catholic schools and foundations (where the author, in my opinion, slightly underrates the professional standards and educational achievements of Catholic secondary schools) and the development of so-called political Catholicism. Beyond this, only a limited scope is given to the internal life of the Church and the non-political aspects of the Catholic revival at the turn of the century, primarily through description of the activities of Sándor Giesswein and Ottokár Prohászka.

The study on Austria, three times as long as the one on Hungary, beside its thorough treatment of the problems of Church policy, is further divided into chapters which give a detailed account of Church organization and the social stratification of the clergy, which show the relation of various social classes and strata to religion and to the Church, and which analyze the peculiar features and forms of their religious lives. A separate chapter is devoted to the intellectual and cultural trends within Catholicism, the scientific, artistic and cultural activities of Catholics, the intensification and revival of religious life at the turn of the century. Scholarly research has provided much deeper insights into the internal development of the Church in the 19th and early 20th centuries in Austria than in Hungary, and this facilitates a more subtle and multifaceted description of the seminal change in the public functions, social status and relations of the Catholic Church, brought about by bourgeois development and modernization. In the late 19th century, Austrian Catholicism was undoubtedly much less burdened with the historical legacy of feudalism than was its counterpart in Hungary. The Kulturkampf had already taken place in the 1860s and 1870s, the heritage of the Josephist state Church and the Concordat had been wound up, the separation of Church and state was more advanced than in Hungary, and therefore it was possible for the Church from the 1870s onwards to expend its resources on internal organization, reform and regeneration. Austrian Catholicism, with a broad social basis in the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie, was perceptibly democratized by the turn of the century and, with considerable involvement on the part of laymen, launched an influential mass movement whose endeavours at social reform were, despite their conservative nature, unquestionable. The Hungarian Catholic revival occurred after a certain time-lag and was unable to evolve into a mass movement of comparable size and social ambition: political Catholicism, after promising beginnings, was soon lost in the dead-end of constitutional struggles, while the Christian Social movement always remained modest. In Austria, the development towards 20th century European Christian Democracy can be traced back to the turn of the century. Both studies underline the role played by Catholicism in the lives of the national minorities: the Catholic Church and clergy, as well as the encouragement and initiatives from Catholic institutions and associations, were important agents in national development, in the organization of national cultural and political movements among the Czechs, Poles, Slovenes and Italians in Austria and among the Slovaks, Germans and Croats in Hungary.

This latter function of Catholicism, that is, the part it played in national development, is focused on in the study on the Croat Catholic Church. The Croats were politically fragmented in the various countries of the Monarchy, the

connecting link between them being primarily provided, apart from language, by the Catholic religion and the Catholic Church. In this respect it was a fact of outstanding importance that, the bishopric of Zagreb having been raised to the status of an archbishopric in 1852, the Croats became fully independent of Hungary as regards Church organization. After describing Croat Church organization, Vitezić presents the significant aspects of the history of the Croat Catholic Church - above all its place in national culture and politics - primarily by examining these in the context of the careers of some prominent bishops (Haulik, Mihačević, Dobrila, Mahnić, Stadler, Strossmayer). Among the issues of Church policy two peculiarly South Slav problems are discussed in detail: the campaigns for the general applicability of the ancient Slav glagolitic liturgy, and the issue of the reorganization of the San Girolamo de' Schiavoni Institute, which had existed in Rome since 1453, for the postgraduate training of priests. In both cases, the endeavours to accentuate the national character of the South Slav Church were thwarted by the protests from the Budapest government and by the intervention of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy.

The Orthodox and Uniate, or to use their contemporary official names, "Eastern Orthodox" and "Greek Catholic" religious communities, were Church organizations of the Monarchy's ethnic minorities and had a distinctly national character. Their history was written by the renowned expert of the subject, Emanuel Turczynsky (Munich). In 1910, there were 5.4 million Greek Catholics (3.4 million in Austria and 2 million in Hungary) and 3.7 million Orthodox believers (0.7 million in Austria and 3 million in Hungary) in the Monarchy, but the 800,000 Orthodox inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina can also be included. Taken together, the adherents of Eastern Catholicism came to 18% of the population (14% in Austria and 24% in Hungary). The Serbs were Orthodox, the Ruthenes of Galicia and Hungary were Greek Catholic, while the Rumanians were distributed between the two Churches of the Eastern rite. Turczynski claims that these Churches enjoyed more liberty and had more favourable opportunities to set up institutions of a national character in the Habsburg Monarchy than they did either in the Balkans or in Russia. As a result, in the case of Serbs, Ruthenes and Rumanians alike, religion and the Church played a prominent role in the maintenance of ethnic identity and in the process by which these peoples became modern nations, the first phase of which the author calls that of "denominational nationalities" (Konfessions-Nationalitäten). Going back in time at least as far as the 17th century in both cases - in the case of the Greek Catholics, to the time of the union - the study supplies a detailed account of the gradual development of the organization of the Eastern Churches in the course of the 18th and 19th centuries; and describes the

main institutions (schools, cultural organizations, training of clergymen) of each of the religious communities (the Ruthens of Galicia and Hungary, the Rumanians of the Banat and Bukovina, the Serbs of Croatia and Dalmatia), as well as the role played by these institutions in religious and national life. Particular attention is paid to the development of Serb-Rumanian conflicts within the Orthodox Church and the gradual separation of the independent Greek Catholic Church of the Rumanians.

A separate chapter written by Wolddieter Bihl briefly discusses the Uniate and non-Uniate Eastern rite Armenian Churches, both of which had only a few thousand adherents.

Protestantism was particularly strong in the Hungarian part of the Empire; in Austria, it had been quite effectively suppressed by the Counter-Reformation. In 1910, 2.6 million Calvinists, 1.3 million Lutherans and 70,000 Unitarians taken together formed 19% of the population of Hungary, whereas in Austria the number of Protestants was a mere 600,000 (2.1%). The history of the Protestant communities in the Monarchy was written by Professor Friedrich Gottas (Salzburg). He deals with the Hungarian and the Cisleithenian Protestant Churches in separate chapters. In Hungary, Calvinism was a distinctly Hungarian religion, Unitarianism similarly. The Lutheran Church, however, played an important role in the cultural and national development of the Germans (primarily the Saxons of Transylvania who even had an independent national Church) and of the Slovaks. In Austria, Protestantism was strongly entrenched among the economic and intellectual élite (industrial entrepreneurs, university professors). The study first focuses on the efforts made at a uniform organization of the Protestant Churches in the period of neo-absolutism and on the failure of these efforts. This is followed by a description of the organization of each Church and a quite detailed discussion of the problems of inner religious life, the movements of internal missions and religious awakening, trends in theology, foreign relations and schools, with an emphasis on the importance of the Protestant Churches in cultural life.

There are two short chapters on the peculiar products of Austrian religious development, on the so-called German Catholic movement (by Wolfgang Häusler) and the Old Catholic Church (by Hans Hoyer). The former was the Austrian afterlife of the bourgeois democratic clerical opposition in the German Vormärz and "revolutionary theology", based on rational and liberal religious criticism, and flourished in Vienna, Graz and other big cities at the time of the 1848 Revolution. However, the movement - whose fundamental internal contradiction it was that it wanted to create a community of a religious nature without a religious faith - rapidly declined. Its adherents later reappeared in the so-called freethinking

movement, of which they were the ideological and organizational antecedents. The Old Catholics, led by Döllinger, the renowned German scholar of Church history, broke away from the Catholic Church in 1870, at the time of the first Vatican Council, because they rejected the dogma of Papal infallibility in questions of faith. The Old Catholic Church, recognized by the law in 1877, later adopted other reforms, too. It rejected the hearing of confessions and obligatory celibacy for priests, gave the Church a conciliar organization with an important role of laymen and introduced the use of the vernacular in the liturgy.

In 1910, more than 2 million Jews lived in the Habsburg Monarchy (4.5% of the population). In the lives of the Jewish communities a radical change was brought about by the recognition of the Jewish religion and the civil emancipation of the Jews after the bourgeois revolution. The history of Jewry in the Empire was summarized by Wolfgang Häusler (Vienna) in a chapter which is relatively short but extremely rich in material, its very title pointing to the fundamental problem: "Austrian Jewry between inertia and progress". Equality before the law, emancipation and the integration into bourgeois society disrupted the formerly strict boundaries of Jewish communal existence that had embraced and regulated human life as a whole, in all of its aspects, and "Jewishness" was transformed from a peculiar lifestyle into a denomination, one of the religions open to all equal citizens. How far Jews should become assimilated and become integrated into their social environment, what they should preserve of their ancient Jewish traditions, of their peculiar kind of existence, of the elements of cult and rite and what they should abandon - these were the great questions to which answers were sought by Jewish communities living everywhere within the territories of the Monarchy. The study presents the quarrels between liberal reformist and Orthodox Jews, as well as the mediating positions, in a multifaceted way. In Austria - particularly in Vienna - a compromise could be arrived at which moderated and balanced the conflicts, but in Hungary a sharp confrontation evolved between Orthodoxy, especially powerful in the western and northern towns of the country, and the reformist neologians, who were concentrated in Pest. After the 1868-69 Israelite Congress, this conflict resulted in a breach between the Jewish communities in Hungary. A highly interesting chapter in Häusler's study is the description and evaluation of Chassidism, a movement of religious revival that had evolved among Galician Jewry since the 18th century and which was accompanied by charismatic and ecstatic phenomena (like the ritual dance) of a popular character. The influence of Chassidism can also be evidenced in Hungary, and it played an important part in the development of Jewish popular narrative art and of Jewish humour. The author also draws attention to the limits of the assimila-

tion and bourgeois development of the Jews - above all those in the East - and ascribes the emergence and relatively great impact of Jewish national ideologies and Zionism at the turn of the century primarily to the failures of assimilation and the partial lack of integration into the society of the Monarchy. Concluding his survey, Häusler contends that a peculiar synthesis of the frequently conflicting trends that had developed among the Jewry of the Monarchy was accomplished in the oeuvre of Martin Buber, an outstanding Jewish thinker of the 20th century.

Bosnia-Herzegovina, occupied in 1878 and annexed in 1908 by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, added still further to the religious diversity of the Habsburg Empire, since one-third of the population in this region were Moslems, beside the Orthodox believers (43%) and the Catholics (23%). The condition of the Moslems in Bosnia is described by Professor Ferdinand Hauptmann (Graz), who points to the fact that the Moslem question was also a social one: in Bosnia the landlords (beys and aghas) as well as the overwhelming part of the free peasantry were Moslems, whereas the majority of Christian peasants were kmets living in feudal dependence.

The latest volume of the history of the Habsburg Monarchy, the chapters of which - rich in content and conveying a great deal of new information - have been reviewed here, will not only serve as an important contribution to what is strictly religious and Church history. It will also be an indispensable reference book for students of the ethnic and national problems of the multinational Monarchy on the one hand, and for those of the various branches of cultural history on the other. Almost all the denominations played a prominent role in national development and in the preservation and advancement of ethnic features and national identity in the case of one or several peoples of the Monarchy. Some religious communities fulfilled the roles of distinctly national Churches, which in the initial phase of the national movement - though in certain cases also later - compensated for the lack, or the underdevelopment of political and cultural institutions.

The volume is supplemented by a bibliography of 80 pages, containing some 1600 entries (the works referred to in the notes to the studies, presented in alphabetical order). An important part of the appendices is a coloured map, designed by Peter Urbanitsch, which, similarly to the nationality map in Volume III, represents the religious division of the population broken down according to districts, with circular diagrams proportionate to the number of inhabitants.

L á s z l ó K a t u s
Institute of Historical Sciences

TÖRTÉNELEM ÉS NEMZETTUDAT

(History and National Consciousness). By Zsigmond Pál Pach (Budapest: Kossuth Kiadó, 1987, 174 pp.)

This time it is not some problem of his familiar field, i.e. 16th-18th Hungarian and world economic history that is in the focus of Zsigmond Pál Pach's inquiry, but the almost unexpected, albeit elementally emerging contemporaneous question of nations and nationalities, those new forms of national identity that are not confined to specific social formations or geographical regions.

Employing the conceptual and methodological tools of historiography that have resulted in surprising successes in the past few decades, the author draws several conclusions that cannot in the future be ignored by experts, writers, politicians and sociologists dealing with this complex problem. Professor Pach takes as his starting point the obvious fact that national consciousness is only a part, or a segment, of community consciousness. It does not have a separate existence but is embedded in a rich environment, moulded by different occupations deriving from the social division of labour; by family, religious and generational relations; as well as by old and new factors shaping behaviour and consciousness. Though national consciousness itself keeps changing within this system of interrelationships, its specific role and unique influence cannot be replaced by any other form of community historically evolved or evolving in our days.

The reader cannot help being impressed when Pach outlines the historical phases of patriotism and national consciousness. He is strikingly at home among the centuries-old images that have featured prominently in our national consciousness; he makes us feel the pulse of the veins of history connecting past to present when dealing with the defeat at Mohács, the tragedies of the country divided into three parts, the recapture of Buda from the Turks, and the shadows cast by the centralizing efforts of the Habsburg Monarchy: "The 160 years of Hungarian history from the Mohács disaster to the reoccupation of Buda, abundant in dramatic changes and tragic reversals of fortune, was wavering-fluctuating-simmering among different endeavours at, and varieties of, survival: the preserva-

ion of Hungarian statehood, the struggle against and negotiation with, or opposition to and manoeuvring between, the two Great Powers that is, among the conceptions of independent and less independent, good and less, or rather, bad and worse, policies."

We can also read about the struggles for independence, which bore the marks of class antagonisms but which were nevertheless progressive in their general orientation. Already in the period of late feudalism, different notions of the fatherland were discernible: the narrowminded idea of the fatherland adhered to by the nobility, the idea of a fatherland common to all, ignoring class interests, and, finally, the popular-plebeian patriotic conception. It was during the first part of the 19th century and, of course, as a result of the emergence of capitalism, that the modern, bourgeois, content of the national idea and national consciousness could become a determinant ideology, a dominant idea of the Reform Era, the ideological motive force behind social and political movements and hereby the vehicle of historical progress and a means for getting rid of feudal remnants. Even at that time, it encompassed several trends: that of the capitalizing landowners and the liberal nobility, and the democratic popular one. These trends were themselves further divided into several sub-trends.

In chronological order, the third phase analyzed by the author is the bourgeois era in Hungary. While nationalism and progressive national consciousness, though burdened with considerable social antagonisms, had been running parallel with each other before, now diverged. A gap opened between the negative historical legacy and recent produce of nationalism on the one hand, and the democratic heritage of patriotism on the other. The former became uppermost in the Horthy era, when it was manifested in antisemitism, chauvinism and revisionism. We can also add that the administrative and educational systems were successfully recruited into its service. However, the democratic and socialist forces of patriotism also did not become as insignificant as presented by vulgar Marxist historiography. It is not only the revolutions of 1918-1919 that ought to be mentioned in this context, but also the democratic and socialist trends in the 1930s with their ever more striking anti-fascist features. In view of all these things, it can be claimed that under the given circumstances the potentialities of the anti-fascist national struggle for independence were much greater than was realized. In late 1944 to early 1945, it was not only the fascist Szálasi and his ever diminishing army that characterized the country, but also the existence of the Hungarian National Front for Independence and later, in the end of December 1944, the convening of the Provisional National Assembly in Debrecen and the formation of the Provisional Government there, in other words, the birth of a new and democratic Hungary.

Finally, the analysis of contemporary national and nationality relations of our region by a historian is quite unusual. What is peculiar here is again the polemic indulged in by the author, in some cases agreeing and in others disagreeing with such excellent writers as Gyula Illyés and Sándor Csoóri, both personally deeply committed to the national question. As far as its content is concerned, the conception of the historian often comes close to that of the writers; it is rather in the emphases, in the approach to the things yet to be done and in the vision of the future that the differences are striking. While several thinkers of renown, confronted with the serious problems of the present, envisage the threat of national disaster, Zsigmond Pál Pach preserves his firm belief in the prospect of a positive solution.

Pach does this on the grounds that no national grievances that threaten the existence of Hungarian minorities, no matter how severe they are, can jeopardize the survival of these. This is all the more so because a steady reinforcement of their existence is derived from the inexhaustible sources of their past, their historical and cultural traditions, their language and, last but not least, their proximity to Hungary. Therefore, when we talk of the necessity of a national revival in economic, political and moral terms and also act to bring it about, we will exert an influence on the forms of behaviour of the Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring countries. A considerable number of writers, artists and scholars judge the present state of our country to be much graver than do the political leaders, and they urge more effective action for the improvement in the conditions of Hungarians living in those countries. Naturally enough, the claim to the right of action on the part of intellect and scholarship cannot be contested. Nevertheless, we persist in our agreement with Petru Groza that the revision of boundaries is, as a matter of course, unsuitable for the solution of the national and nationality problems of the East-Central European region. Historians trust in wise consideration and in the recognition of the necessity for cooperation among the various nations, for it is in this that the promise of general prosperity for the neighbouring countries is to be found.

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
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EMIGRATION FROM THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY TO THE UNITED STATES (1870-1914)

Migration is a standard feature of human history, but the hundred years prior to the First World War might be regarded as the 'Age of Modern Migration'. Never before had so many Europeans set out for such distant places in such a short time and at such low financial cost. During these one hundred years, about 55 million people crossed the oceans, 35 millions of whom went to the United States.

Emigration to faraway lands overseas evoked a mixed response in each of the European countries affected by it. Books attempting to put the case for or against emigration would fill libraries. However, public interest in emigration almost immediately subsided once its major waves had come to an end.

Interest in emigration revived after the mid-1960s, when growing ethnic consciousness among the peoples of the United States and Canada, together with the problems of guest workers in Europe again focused public and scholarly attention on the issues of 'Modern Migration'. Interest in this theme was further encouraged both overseas and in Europe by détente.

Studies were started in various branches of the social sciences. However, on the basis of first results gained in outlining the main trends in emigration, it was soon recognized that this complex social phenomenon cannot be explained just by using traditional historical sources and traditional methods. New concepts call for a reinterpretation of documents as well as the exploration of hitherto neglected sources and, above all, for the adoption of new methodological approach. For example, historians were compelled to acknowledge that they needed to study the methods and concepts developed and the conclusions drawn in this field by other branches of social sciences, especially by sociology and anthropology, as well as to consider the possibilities of adapting these to the purposes of historical studies. The characteristic features of new approaches

formulated in this way are an inter-disciplinary attitude and widespread utilization of comparative analytical methods.

The object of the present study is to give, by using these new techniques, a concise account of the overseas emigration of the peoples of the Danubian Basin.

The consecutive phases of the process

The first wave of emigration took place in the 1830s, 1840s and 1850s and affected the peoples of the British Isles. It was primarily masses of German and Scandinavian origin who made up the second wave between the 1850s and 1870s. Although there were indications of emigration from the Danubian Basin as early as the 1870s, large numbers of people only began to leave the region in the early 1880s. In the next two decades, emigration assumed such large proportions that in the first decade of this century the records of American immigration authorities show people from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to be the largest single group among new arrivals. By this time they accounted for 24% of the total.

In American historiography, the 100 years of 'Modern Migration' are divided into two distinct periods. The first one, between the 1830s and the 1880s was characterized by the arrival of immigrants from Western and Northern Europe, the so-called 'old immigrants'. The second period began in the 1880s and lasted, through the First World War, until 1924. In these decades, the so-called 'new immigrants' from East-Central and South-Eastern Europe set foot on American soil. Such periodization was not always devoid of prejudice, with racist overtones.

Recent historiography regards the 1880s a time marking the end of one era and the beginning of another, but for different reasons. It lays great emphasis on changes in the nature of immigration, in other words, from this period onwards 'settlement-migration' was replaced by 'labour or proletarian migration'. These distinctive changes were characteristic of all new arrivals after the 1880s, and from all countries of Europe, including western and northern countries as well.

Mass migration was conditioned by demographic, economic and social developments both in the immigrant's home country and in the country that took him in. These factors encouraged people to leave regions which were overpopulated, affected by unemployment and lacking in capital, and to go to lands where labour was in greater demand and where wages were higher.

The peoples of Europe entered the international labour market, which emerged as a corollary of capitalist development, both according to general rules and

in their own particular ways. The emigrants from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy who set out overseas almost invariably joined the process of 'proletarian mass migration'. Economic and social developments in that region of Europe during the 1880s and 1890s produced conditions which created a large number of potential emigrants. This is a period of an accelerated population growth, of the commencement of industrialization and, as a result of a shift in the structure of machinery, of shortened productive processes in agriculture. All these changes precipitated an abrupt increase in the available labour force. Preserving traditional life styles became increasingly difficult. On the other hand, the introduction of modern means of transportation (for example, railway construction) and a rise in the level of elementary education (with the introduction of compulsory schooling) broadened the outlook of the rural population and furnished them with a growing stock of information about the opportunities for leading a different kind of life.

The 1880s marked the beginning of a new phase in the development of American industry. Its extraordinarily rapid expansion not only increased the demand for labour in general, but especially the demand for cheap and unskilled labour. As a result, job opportunities and higher wages in America began to attract the segment of the population in the Danubian Basin that had failed to find employment either in agriculture or in industry in their home countries.

The process of large-scale emigration from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to America started with a period of slowly increasing emigration rate. This was followed by a period in which the number of emigrants sharply rose and, finally, by a period of emigration in full swing. The chronology of emigration differed from one ethnic group to the next and from region to region. (The number of Czech emigrants was already ebbing when Rumanian emigration was about to gain momentum.) Thus, the stages of emigration from the Danubian basin can only be dated approximately, as follows. There was the initial stage as above, until the 1890s; the second period, one of sharply increased emigration until about 1907; and finally the period of mass emigration in the years just prior to the outbreak of the First World War.

The fourth phase, that is, the slowing down of emigration from the Central European region followed a different pattern from that affecting western and northern countries. In the Danubian Basin it was not local industrial development and absorption of the labour force that gradually reduced the impetus for overseas emigration. Instead, it was the restrictive immigration policy pursued by the United States that put a sudden end to it. A quota law passed in 1924 set a limit to the total number of immigrants per year and barred large numbers of

people of Central and Eastern European origin who were now regarded as 'undesirable immigrants'. Emigration to Canada, Argentina, Brazil, France and Belgium remained more or less free until the beginning of the 1929 economic crisis. After 1924 the majority of people who left the Danubian Basin chose one of these countries as their destination. However, the number of these emigrants was considerably smaller than the number of emigrants before 1914.

How many people left?

As far as numbers are concerned, there are many different assessments of the total figure of emigrants from the Danubian Basin. The same source often quotes different data according to the varying ways in which it was classified. Prior to 1899, immigrants to the United States were classified according to their country of origin. It was only from 1899 onwards that the authorities began to query immigrants about their ethnic background.

Realistic estimates concerning the number of emigrants - especially in terms of a given ethnic group - are hard to obtain, since the abovementioned objective difficulties are coupled with subjective ones. Constantly struggling for their very existence, the small nations of the Danubian Basin have always reacted to losses of population in an extremely sensitive manner. As a result, contemporaries in each country tended to exaggerate the scale of the emigration that was taking place. Newly settled immigrants themselves were in their new homes bound to exaggerate the size of their own groups in order to boost their sense of security and importance. Nor does 'contribution history', a kind of a competition fueled by the ethnic revival and aimed at deciding which nationality group contributed most to the greatness of the United States, help to correct exaggerated data and allow us to arrive at realistic estimates.

3,765,381 immigrants from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were registered by the US Immigration Office between 1861 and 1913, with the majority (2,260,113) arriving after 1899. The embarkation of 2,038,383 Hungarian passengers was recorded by European port authorities between 1871 and 1913. In the same period, 1,815,117 Hungarians immigrated to the United States. Since the repeated passage and, thus, the multiple registration of the same person was by no means uncommon, the above figures may be misleading because of 'accumulated' data. For example, 23% of Hungarians who immigrated to the United States in 1904 had already been there before. Their repeated round trips earned them such notoriety that they were dubbed 'birds of passage' by the US authorities. Thus, the actual number of immigrants could possibly have been at

least 25% less than the numbers going through the immigration process. Therefore 'gross migration' from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy before the First World War can be put at three million, an estimated one and a half million people out of whom were Hungarian.

Statistics on the number of emigrants compared with the total number of the population in various countries show that emigration was much greater not only in Ireland, but also in Norway, Sweden and even in Finland than in Hungary. However, before 1914, no large-scale emigration had taken place from any country to the east or south of Hungary, except for the massive exodus of Jews from western Russia to America.

Statistics on 'gross migration' do not directly indicate the final loss of population resulting from migration, since the migratory process involved the movement of people in two directions: both to and from foreign lands. Data on the latter were entered in American immigration statistics from 1908 onwards. Between 1908 and 1924, 63% of all Hungarian immigrants to the US, 55.6% of the Slovaks, 50.7% of the Croats and Slovenes and 66.0% of the Rumanians returned to their respective homelands.

Statistics on re-emigration in official Hungarian files are also of great interest: between 1899 and 1913, 30.9% of all emigrants are shown to have eventually returned. In reality, this figure must have been larger, since even those who were in charge of compiling data on returnees admitted that their files on re-emigration were incomplete. When one also considers the data in American censuses on that segment of American population born in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy or in Hungary itself, the number of those who re-emigrated to Hungary can be cautiously estimated to be as many as 30 - 40%.

A characteristic feature of 'new immigrants', with the exception of Jews from Russia, was that a relatively large proportion of them returned to their home countries. Scholars have only recently begun to inquire into this aspect of labour migration, and this phenomenon has not yet attracted as much interest as deserves. The subjective motives that resulted in the exaggeration of the dimensions of emigration were responsible for the neglect of re-emigration and for the underestimation of its importance.

The joint analysis of emigration and re-emigration is the sine qua non of a better understanding of the nature of emigration from the Danubian Basin to overseas countries. We have to realize that people in general did not set out on a voyage to America in order to abandon their original environment for ever, and with the objective of starting a better and completely new life there. Instead, they aspired to improve their financial position in their original countries.

Temporary employment - lasting for 2 to 5 years - in a new society was intended to offset a trend towards downward mobility in their homelands. They were willing to bear the burdens of a temporary descent into the ranks of the North American proletariat so as to avoid a permanent descent into the proletariat of their home countries.

These hopes and plans for returning to their homes were gradually undermined and rendered unrealistic by the impact of the new environment or by the immigrants' failure to achieve their initial aims. Nevertheless, the decision finally to settle in America was usually not made before departure for the New World, even in the case of those who actually did settle. In several cases, emigrants returned to their original homes once again before settling down in America on a permanent basis, since it was the conflicts that accompanied the process of re-settlement in their own environment that made them resolve to leave their motherland behind for ever.

Who emigrated?

The one hundred years before the First World War might as well be named the age of the 'peasant exodus'. Although there were considerable differences **between** peoples and periods, it was peasants and agricultural labourers who constituted the mass of emigrants from Europe as a whole.

The majority of emigrants from Western Europe for several decades prior to 1880 came either from the ranks of smallholders or were craftsmen from the provinces. In the successive era of labour migration, it was primarily impoverished landless villagers and industrial labourers who left for overseas countries.

The pioneer emigrants to America from the Danubian Basin were also craftsmen, tradesmen and village artisans. However, it was the agrarian population that launched the mass exodus. There were few independent, landowning peasants among them; the majority were day laborers. Such a high proportion of emigrants from this social stratum was unprecedented both in the history of Western and Northern Europe and in the history of the Russian Empire. Unlike that from any other region in Europe, mass emigration from the Danubian Basin to overseas had a distinctive agrarian-proletarian character.

However, it would be a mistake to overemphasize social homogeneity, since the structure of emigration described above differed between the various ethnic groups of the Danubian Basin. For example, the majority of landowning peasants who emigrated from Hungary came from Croatia, and there were more of them among Slovak emigrants than among the Magyars. On the other hand, craftsmen,

tradesmen and skilled workers comprised a larger proportion of Hungarian emigrants, than was the case among the national minorities.

As far as basic education is concerned, emigrants as a general rule tended to be more literate than their compatriots who remained at home, although there were significant differences between individual ethnic groups. In the years between 1899 and 1910 the American immigration authorities judged 88.6% of the Hungarians, 76.0% of the Slovaks, 65.3% of the Rumanians, 63.9% of the Slovenes, 63.8% of the Croats and 46.6% of the Ruthenes over the age of 14 to be familiar with the arts of reading and writing.

This sort of migration can be conceived of as a movement of the younger generation. One of the distinctive features of settlement migration and especially of labour migration was that it involved the most productive age groups of the population. For example, 61.6% of those who set out from Hungary for an overseas destination between 1905 and 1907 belonged to the 20 to 40 age group. The percentage of teenagers, i.e. those younger than 20 years of age was also relatively high (23.2%). American statistics show that the number of children, i.e. those under 14 was small.

The most striking difference between the demographic structure of settlement and labour migration was that the former tended to be characterized by the keeping together of nuclear families in the course of the migratory process: families either emigrated together, or family members were reunited in their new environment before too long.

In the period before the era of mass migration there were almost as many women as men among those who left the Danubian Basin. For example, in the years 1878 - 1879 the proportion of women was 40%. However, after the migratory process had gained momentum, it was primarily men who were swept along. In 1907, the year that marked the peak of emigration, women accounted for only 28% of those who left. However, the proportion of women afterwards gradually increased: by 1913, their number surpassed that of the male emigrants and their percentage was as high as 53.8%. Still, we should not interpret these figures to indicate either desire for final settlement or as part of the process of family re-unification. The emigration of women was further encouraged, especially from the 1910s onwards, by the demand for female labour in American industry, primarily in tobacco and cigar factories.

The era of labour migration was not characterized by the emigration of families as a whole, but by the emigration of individuals. In some isolated cases married couples set out having left their children behind. They entrusted their children to the care of grandparents in their native villages so that they could

make money in America (for their own purposes) burdened with the least responsibility possible. Married men who had emigrated would rather return to their homes than take their wives and children to America. It was single men and women who married local people there and established families in their new environment.

The migratory process was characterized by a specific kind of division of labour. Emigrants to America pooled their efforts with members of their families who had stayed in their native village in order to reach their common goals. Research has just begun to pay attention to the specific role played in modernization by traditional forms and the corresponding family-based system of the division of labour in the period of emigration to America. Research has also focused on the concerted efforts and peculiar lifestyle required not only from nuclear families but from extended ones too, families which had for years to contend with separation from loved ones.

The ethnic background

One of the most striking features of emigration from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was that the ethnic backgrounds of emigrants from this region were more varied than in the case of emigrants from any other European country. The ethnic distribution of these people based on data compiled by the US Immigration Office in the period 1899-1913, is as follows:

Almost one fifth (18.7%) of all emigrants from the Monarchy were Poles. The second largest group was made up of Slovaks (15.4%). Croats-Slovenes ranked third (14.2%) and were followed by Hungarians (14%). Germans trailed behind with 11.4%. These six ethnic groups comprised 73.7% of all emigrants from the region. Two other large groups of emigrants were the Jews (7.5%), who were registered by American authorities at that time as a distinct ethnic group, and the Ruthenes (7.2%). The numbers of Czech and Moravian emigrants were much smaller, the percentage of these being 4.4% in the period in question. This figure must have been higher in earlier years, since Czechs and Moravians had been the pioneers of emigration from the Monarchy and the number leaving had by this time subsided. The low proportion of Rumanians (3.1%) is explained by their belated joining of the migratory process.

As far as emigration from the territory of Hungary is concerned, the main feature of the emigrants' ethnic distribution is that two-thirds of them belonged to the national minorities and only one-third came from the dominant Magyar group. Numerically speaking, Slovaks and Hungarians were the largest groups: these groups contributed 402,680 and 387,391 emigrants, respectively, as registered by American authorities between the turn of the century and 1913. However, profound changes took place in the course of the migratory process

in terms of the proportions of the various ethnic groups within the total number of emigrants from the Monarchy. These changing proportions also indicate how differing the dates of involvement in migration by the individual ethnic groups actually were. In 1899, Slovaks accounted for 25% of all immigrants to the USA while Hungarians comprised only 9%. By 1913, the proportion of Slovaks had fallen back to 10.4% and that of Hungarians had increased to 11.7%.

The fact that emigrants from a multinational empire had different ethnic backgrounds is not surprising in itself; what is remarkable is the fact that the percentage of national minorities among the emigrants greatly exceeded that in the society from which they originated. Researchers both in Europe and in America are intrigued by this feature of overseas emigration from the Monarchy. Considerable differences in the degree of emigration from among the various ethnic groups naturally lead to the conclusion that these must have been caused by nationality problems, i.e. emigrants must have left because of political reasons. This view is often expressed in works on emigration published throughout the world. The importance of political motivation is extremely difficult to assess. Political factors were obviously the reason for the emigration in the case of some intellectuals, who had become active leaders of nationality movements and who afterwards emigrated to America urged by their political tenets. However, there are several factors that militate against the attribution of too great an importance to political motivation in explaining the unique pattern of emigration among the nationalities. If political motivation is overemphasized, then we are unable to explain why many people returned to their original environment where nothing had changed in the political sense. We should find a higher correlation between individual ethnic groups' willingness to migrate and the degree to which they were discriminated against, and it would be hard to understand why ethnic Germans in Hungary were more prone to emigrate than Rumanians. Furthermore, it would also be difficult to understand why Slovaks from regions where the nationality movement was relatively strong, such as Western Slovakia, failed to emigrate in larger numbers than their compatriots in other regions.

We can find a better explanation of the peculiar multinational composition of the emigrant population, and we may encounter fewer contradictions if we set out to analyse the successive centres of emigration and the internal mechanisms of it.

Centres of emigration

While a propensity to emigrate was general in certain regions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, from others emigration seldom, if ever, occurred. The major

regions producing emigrants in the Austrian part of the empire were Galicia and Bukovina in the east, and Dalmatia and Krain in the south. As far as Galicia and Bukovina are concerned, it was primarily Poles, Jews and Ruthenes who left for America, whereas the majority of emigrants from Dalmatia and Krain were Croats and Slovenes. A major emigration centre developed in north-east Hungary on the right bank of the River Tisza, i.e. in Sáros, Zemplén, Abaúj, Szatmár, Szabolcs and Borsod counties. 29.2% of all emigrants between 1899 and 1913 originated from this region. There were other, less important regions of emigration in Transdanubia, primarily in the Veszprém region, in southern Hungary (in Bács-Bodrog county) and in Transylvania (in Brassó county).

In Hungary, it was with the emigration of the Slovaks that the most important emigration centre in the north-east of the country was formed, but it is also worth noting that 69.3% of all Hungarian-speaking emigrants set out from this area, too. Slovaks and Germans seem to have been the first to emigrate from each major region of departure. Hungarians and other ethnic groups followed in their footsteps.

In order to understand why the centres of emigration were mostly situated in regions mainly populated by national minorities, we must analyse various European emigration patterns. In each European country concerned - in those with an ethnically more or less homogeneous population, too - emigration became widespread through the formation of so-called emigration centres or regions of emigration. A distinctive feature of each of these regions was their peripheral status, i.e. they were situated beyond the orbit of the industrial centres of the given country. These were mainly hilly regions or areas where the economic conditions were worse, or natural resources less abundant, than in the country as a whole. As a result of the above factors, auxiliary activities (like, for instance, domestic industry and handicrafts) and seasonal agricultural labour undertaken in other regions traditionally played a key role in the lives of peasant families in these regions, in addition to the cultivation of the land. However, the formation of emigration centres also underlines the fact that although the possibilities and the limitations for individuals are conditioned by the general economic and social relations under which people live, their intentions and activities are strongly influenced by their immediate environment. Actual cases of emigration from a certain region cannot be deduced from the macro-structure. Pressure exerted by the environment does not make people leave their homes behind on their own initiative and in large numbers. Also required are attractions, promises of a change for the better, and a combination of factors that compel people to emigrate and ones that encourage them to do so. Communica-

tion channels are required that provide people with information on where it is worth emigrating to and why. In this particular case the information channel was created through feed-back supplied by those who had emigrated earlier. The most important feature of the inner mechanism of emigration was that it became widespread through communication between individuals, a communication network consisting of relatives and friends. As a result, emigration had a certain self-generating effect and it became so widespread and common in certain regions that it cannot simply be correlated with the economic or social features of the area in question.

Ethnic groups with migratory traditions were more likely to emigrate to America. Had the Slovaks not had centuries-old habits of seasonal migration, they would not have been so responsive to news about the great opportunities in America. Had Germans in Hungary not been used to wandering from place to place through their traditions of peddling, it would be even harder for us to explain the high proportion of them among emigrants.

The topography of emigration reveals the sort of ties that existed between regions and ethnic groups in which emigration was already common and those in which it had just started. Since the practice of emigration was spreading from the north towards the south-east, the first groups of emigrants from Hungary were Slovaks and Germans, who resided along the northern border of the country.

The geographical location of major areas of departure in the Danubian Basin and, consequently, the peculiar multinational composition of the emigrants, can be better understood by consideration of inner mechanisms of how emigration became widespread than by looking at the status of each of the nationality groups, or by relying on the hypothesis that automatically associates emigration with the most backward and the poorest areas and holds this to be sufficient explanation of regional differences.

The lands across the ocean

The settlement areas and the job opportunities of the newly arrived immigrants were strongly determined by the demand for unskilled and cheap labour force in America. In their new environment even peasants and members of the agrarian proletariat (fragments disregarded) found employment in industry. There were job openings for these people mainly in the industrialized states of the East Coast: in the mines of West Virginia and Pennsylvania, and in the steel mills of Ohio, Illinois and Connecticut. In New York, it was craftsmen and skilled workers whose ambitions were more likely to be realized, especially in the tex-

tile industry and in service industries. Therefore, the points of destination of immigrants from the Monarchy, who were extremely mixed from an ethnic point of view, were basically the same in the USA.

As a general rule, relatives, and people from the same village or from the same region tried to stay together in their new country overseas. However, their objectives, as well as their opportunities to find employment and make money, compelled them to lead a migratory life on American soil as well. As a result of this, relatives and people from the same village or from the same region often became separated from each other. In their settlement patterns, both concentration and dispersion are readily discernible. The largest groups of Hungarians lived in Cleveland, Ohio, and in New York City (in the latter, primarily Hungarian Jews) and there was a large concentration of Slovak immigrants in Pittsburgh. Chicago had a large Polish population. Besides these large centres, groups of immigrants of all sizes settled down in thousands of localities and in obscure mining places, apart from towns. However, the ethnic enclaves of immigrants from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were not formed in strict separation from one another, as is generally assumed. The real dividing line was between the settlements of 'new immigrants' and settlements of native Americans.

Wages that were regarded as lucrative when compared with those available in the home country were in fact the lowest wages paid in America, often for doing dangerous jobs with extremely high accident rates. The immigrants' intention to stay in America on a temporary basis and the migratory nature of their existence resulted in a peculiar way of life. Since they wished to save money at all costs, they reduced their living standards to a subsistence level. Native Americans were perplexed and horrified by what they regarded as this lack of ambition, and they explained differences between their own culture and values and those of the immigrants from Eastern Europe in racial terms. They nicknamed them 'Hunkies' and tried to become socially separate from them as much as possible.

Immigrants who settled down on a permanent basis were assimilated into the American working class population, while preserving their distinctive ethnic cultures. This process took some time and was not without certain conflicts. Most immigrants who settled started to climb the economic ladder from the very bottom and did not rise very much in the following 50 years. The only exceptions were those peasant immigrants who managed to establish an independent livelihood. The first generation of immigrants laid the foundations for their social and communal activities by developing their ethnic communities and organizations (their churches and associations).

Those who re-emigrated resumed their original occupations in their homeland, that is, the majority of them became peasants again. The economic gains of years of hard work in American industry enabled them to build houses, buy plots of land or pay their debts. Some of them succeeded in ascending socially, too, and by purchasing 40 to 70 acres of land they assumed the status of well-to-do peasants. Emigration might have improved the lot of individuals, but it failed to bring about changes in the social structure of the peasantry proportionate to the large number of people involved.

The response of the sending societies

Even the first news about emigration caused extreme anxiety among owners of large estates, who were concerned about the loss of their cheap labour force. This was especially the case in Hungary, a country deeply involved in agricultural production. Conservative action groups made up of large landowners began to demand, from the early 1880s onwards, that the government should control or even ban emigration. The fact that the emigration issue became a problem of such magnitude in this part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy can also be attributed to the rising tide of increasingly aggressive Hungarian nationalism, with its illusory belief in building a Hungarian national state of 30 million inhabitants, a scheme that called for retaining the available workforce within the borders of the country.

However, the population of Hungary, which consisted of several ethnic groups, had by this time become charged with tension between nationalities. The major emigration centres were situated in fringe areas inhabited by the nationalities. From the point of view of the Hungarian national state, the advantages of emigration were pointed out in confidential government documents, especially before emigration started to affect the Magyar ethnic group (for example in the report of July 29, 1902 prepared by state secretary Kunó Klebelsberg and addressed to Prime Minister Kálmán Széll).

However, it was always the negative effects of emigration that propaganda and politicians emphasized. Although hard currency savings returned to Hungary contributed 200 million crowns to the national income in 1913, not even economic advantages could offset the enormous loss of manpower with which contemporaries identified emigration. One of the reasons why emigration was considered detrimental must have been the hypersensitivity of small peoples constantly fighting a battle for national survival. However, there is more to it than this. Analysis of the issues of emigration, its extent, its causes and its impact proved to be an extremely effective tool in the hands of the most diverse interest groups,

used in their political power struggles. This complex social phenomenon could be associated with all the economic, social and political issues of the era. The aristocracy, the haute bourgeoisie, dependence on Austria, discrimination against nationalities and unsuccessful governmental policies were equally liable to be blamed for emigration. Data pertaining to the loss of population and the mass exodus of people could be turned to demonstrate the imperilled state of the nation or of individual ethnic groups, and could be used to express all sorts of political sentiments.

Thus, for public opinion in Hungary, it was the social problems of the Hungarian nation that were raised by emigration from the country: the departure of both Magyars and members of the nationalities were regarded as 'a loss to the Hungarian people'. 'Our population is decreasing day by day and the number of newly-born babies fails to make up for that of emigrants. If emigration continues at this rate, Hungary will bleed to death in ten years', it was pointed out in one parliamentary address. The same concern over emigration was voiced by outstanding progressively-minded Hungarian poets.

We must look back on the political opinions and ideologies which prevailed in Hungarian society of the time in order to understand how the emigration of one and a half million people from Hungary came to be interpreted even by the progressively-minded public as the emigration of one and a half million Hungarians: we must recall the concept of a unified Hungarian nation, according to which the citizens of this country "comprise in a political sense one nation, the unified Hungarian nation" (Law 44 in the Code of 1868). For Hungarians, this concept was incompatible with an evaluation of emigration that conceived of the various nationality groups as political communities.

On the other hand, emigration appeared in the political sentiment of the national minorities as an omen of the demise of their own ethnic groups: "If the mass exodus continues, the very existence of the Croat people will be at stake", it was pointed out as early as in 1903 in the 'Sabor', the Croat parliament. Nationality leaders blamed the repressive nationality policies pursued by Vienna and Budapest for the emigration of huge numbers of people. Emigration became a symbol of the sad plight of ethnic minorities in Hungary. This opinion was voiced by the publications the emigrants brought out in America.

At the same time, immigrants from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the 'suppressed Slavs', were regarded as "new immigrants" and were viewed with growing contempt in their new environment in the United States. Hungary, their original home, was more and more frequently blamed by the American public for the influx of large numbers of these people.

The massive emigration from the Danubian Basin became part of the historical consciousness of the peoples in that region. Its memory has been preserved up to the present day and has been interpreted from several different perspectives. Hungarians regard it as a loss of one and a half million people of Hungarian stock. Emigration overseas reminds neighbouring peoples of the policy pursued by the Hungarian ruling classes, a policy designed to suppress ethnic minorities. It also reminds them of the many deprivations they used to suffer.

Diametrically opposite views and contradictory evaluations are so deeply ingrained that not even recent historiography dealing with the history of emigration can easily free itself from them.

It is only a comparative approach that can give rise to the hope that Central European peoples will come to regard the emigration of large numbers of people not just as a tragic chapter in their own national histories, but to consider it for what it actually was: a part of a general movement all across Europe.

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WOODROW WILSON AND THE SUCCESSOR STATES*

The literature dealing with the life and political activity of Woodrow Wilson, 28th President of the United States, could fill libraries. However, we know very little about his views, plans and actions which had a direct impact on Hungarian history, and on the history of the Danube Basin as a whole. Our knowledge of these is scant and often erroneous. This became clear to me during the course of my research at the Wilson Center.¹ While examining Wilson's policy towards the successor states, I discovered evidence at variance both with views widely held by professional historians and by the general public. Two diametrically opposed views of Wilson's achievement have become established. The first greatly exaggerates the American president's role in shaping the successor states; the other belittles his contribution. During the interwar period, the first approach was the one adopted by historians and public opinion both in the successor states and the defeated states. However, among the victors Wilson became idealized as a great liberator, whereas in the defeated countries the American president's rather exaggerated role was seen in a wholly negative light. The former countries attributed their liberation and successful unification to President Wilson. The latter blamed him for their defeat, for the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for the establishment of borders that failed to follow the ethnic principle. As we shall see, neither evaluation corresponds with the reality. The successor states ignored the fact that up until May 1918 President Wilson had declined to support their national movements and had refused to receive their lobbyists in Washington. Not even Masaryk was received at the White House before June 1918. Even after this, the president's policy concerning their national programmes continued to be characterized by a certain degree of ambiguity. For the defeated nations, the sole standpoint for judging Wilson's role was the outcome of the Paris Peace Conference, and, as a result, they failed to take a number of facts into account. Firstly, President Wilson pursued a policy of

friendship towards the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy even after the United States had entered the First World War: he did not immediately declare war on Austria-Hungary. (He only did so in December, 1917, as a result of severe internal and external pressure.) Secondly, Wilson wished to preserve the economic and political unity of the Habsburg Monarchy and intended to federalize it within its existing boundaries. Austria and especially Hungary would have been assigned leading roles within the federation he envisaged. It was not Wilson's fault that these plans failed to materialize. Thirdly, even if President Wilson did give up the idea of observing the ethnic principle during the period under consideration, he did not do so at Hungary's expense. On the contrary, he intended to favour Hungary, since according to his original ideas, Slovakia would have been a part of the Hungarian state belonging to the federation. Lastly, Wilson played no role whatsoever in the Paris Peace talks at the time when Austrian and especially the Hungarian affairs were discussed (the reasons for this will be analyzed below). After President Wilson's departure for home, the American delegation attempted to oppose the exaggerated territorial demands of the victorious successor states, which were supported by Clemenceau. In a few cases - as for example the case of the proposed Yugoslav-Czechoslovak Corridor - the Americans' endeavors were crowned with success.

A third kind of approach was adopted by Marxist historiography. In the 1950s, historians in the successor states went to the other extreme in oversimplifying Wilson's contribution, questioning his role in the creation of the successor states and attributing the establishment of these states exclusively to the activities of local revolutionary movements. In fact, it is certain that when the internationally esteemed president was compelled to give up his plans for a federal state designed to preserve the unity of the Monarchy and when he adopted, however ambiguously, the programmes of the national movements, he lent substantial support to these. It was not by chance that the leaders of the national movements took pains to win Wilson to their cause. Besides, the United States, under President Wilson's leadership, had played an important part in the Allied victory and, as a result, in the establishment of these independent states.

As is obvious, the historiography of the successor states underwent a sharp turn after the Second World War. Differences between formerly victorious and defeated nations were erased. All with the partial exception of Yugoslavia, now viewed President Wilson in a negative light. This did not mean a change in the case of Hungary, apart from the fact that from then on it was not the Trianon Peace Treaty which President Wilson was blamed for.

How has Western historiography dealt with these issues?

In general, little attention has been paid to them.² Studies on the history of the First World War, on the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, on the Paris Peace Conference, on President Wilson's life and on his policies towards Central Europe have attached only marginal importance to these issues. Beside many objective, moderate and justified views, false and mistaken claims have also been made on several occasions. A number of questions of great importance have remained unanswered. For example, no explanation has yet been given as to why President Wilson supported only the Polish independence movement up to the end of May 1918 and why he failed to do so in the case of the Czechoslovak, South Slav, Rumanian and Italian movements. Nor has it been elucidated why Wilson remained doubtful and undecided as regards their programmes even after May (and, as far as Rumania was concerned, up to the very end of the war).

Why did the president not involve Secretary of State Lansing in the affairs concerning the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy? Except on the Rumanian and the Italian issues, the latter did not share the president's views. He considered the dismemberment of the Monarchy and the establishment of an independent Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia to be important. (On the other hand, Lansing also refused to support the Rumanian bid to annex Transylvania up to the end of the war.) Why did President Wilson recognize the Czechoslovak National Committee only as late as September 1918 and the Yugoslav Committee only in December 1918? Questions such as these are still in need of clarification. It is, for instance, not sufficient to say, as O'Grady does in his study,³ that the reason why President Wilson supported the Polish independence movement was that its leader, Paderewski was on friendly terms with Colonel House, Wilson's closest advisor. This explanation is just as unacceptable as a claim made in another study, that the reason why President Wilson failed to pay any attention to the demands of the Hungarian emigrés was that they had no outstanding leader.⁴ The Czechoslovak and the South Slav national movements did have prominent leaders if Masaryk and Štefanik can be regarded as such; nevertheless, President Wilson declined to receive Štefanik at all, and he only met Masaryk in June 1918 after his plan to preserve the unity of the Monarchy and to reorganize it on federal lines had become unrealistic. Nor was the president willing to receive representatives of the Yugoslav Committee, which had such outstanding figures among its members as Pribičević. The answer lies elsewhere, and becomes clear when the above facts are considered in the light of Wilson's plan to preserve the unity of the Monarchy. The American president supported those endeavours that did not run counter to his Central European policy: in other words, his attempt to maintain the economic and political unity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Polish as-

pirations did not necessarily conflict with this policy. An independent Poland could come into existence without infringing the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary and Wilson refused to support Polish designs on Bukovina and Galicia. In fact, an independent Poland would have lent strong support to the Monarchy with a view to the latter's role of a counterpoise against both Germany and Russia. This was not the case with Czechoslovakia and the South Slav State. The recognition of their independence would have been tantamount to the partitioning of the Monarchy, not to mention that of Hungary.

However, President Wilson had no intention of breaking up the Monarchy. The reason for this was not only that he wanted to end the alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary, but also because - and this was his prime reason - he regarded the establishment of a number of small countries to be unwise from an economic and political point of view. He feared that the economies of small nations would be unable to prosper on their own and to substitute for the Monarchy in offsetting the German threat. History proved Wilson right and Lansing wrong. The Secretary of State held that, in order to limit German influence in the region, the Monarchy should be dismembered and a belt of small national states should be created. It would be rather farfetched to quote the Anschluss in support of Lansing's concept, as has been done, for example, by Mamatey.⁵ Indeed, the fate of Austria in 1938 would substantiate Wilson's contention. The reason why Hitler was able to accomplish the Anschluss so easily was that he was dealing with a small, politically isolated country with an ailing economy. The other countries of the region were in a similar position. They, too, were incapable of withstanding German pressure, and sooner or later lost their independence.

What would have happened had Wilson's plan actually materialized? It is highly probable that, in this event, Germany would have had no chance to pursue an expansionist policy.

President Wilson had clearly expounded his views on the preservation and federalization of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy one month before the United States joined the war. Soon after the United States declared war, the president appointed a Committee of Inquiry, which was given the task of working out a policy and making plans for the restructuring of the world after the end of hostilities. These plans, when implemented, were supposed to secure peace in the long run. The committee was headed by Colonel House, President Wilson's closest advisor and friend, a man who shared the president's views on European issues and on the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. During the preparation of the plans, it was the president's concept that prevailed. Wilson, who was not particularly well informed on European affairs, kept in close touch with the Com-

mittee of Inquiry and with the individual specialists who served on it. He coordinated his views with theirs and sought their comments. Wilson prepared his famous Fourteen Points in association with the Committee of Inquiry, dispensing the service of the State Department. The president's concept is faithfully reflected in a plan for the federalization of Austria-Hungary set forth by Charles Seymour, member of the Committee of Inquiry and subsequently a member of the American peace delegation. The explanatory text attached to the map was signed by Charles Seymour on May 25, 1918, five months before the end of the war in Central Europe.

As it is shown on the map, the plan proposed the establishment of a federation of six member states in the territory of the Monarchy. Before discussing the reasons why the plan was dropped soon after its completion, I must deal with President Wilson's policies towards the independence movements and towards endeavors for national unification. These policies formed an integral part of the above-mentioned plan and strongly depended on its success.

As has already been said, President Wilson supported the movement for Polish independence. However, while recognizing the Polish Committee, as we have seen, he refused to do the same for the Czechoslovak, South Slav and Rumanian independence movements as well as the ambitions of these nations to be territorially unified. The national leaders did their best in order to be received in the White House, but their hopes were thwarted, as in the case of Štefanik, Vice President of the Czechoslovak Committee. Štefanik travelled to Washington in August 1917 to persuade the American government to recognize the Czechoslovak Committee set up in Paris. In addition, he wanted to recruit volunteers from among Czech and Slovak emigrants into an independent Czechoslovak Legion that would have been attached not to the US Army but to French. Unable to meet either Wilson or Lansing, Štefanik was received only by Polk, Lansing's deputy, who intimated to him that neither of his plans was supported by the political and military leadership in America. Štefanik left the United States with bitter impressions. He hated Wilson from the bottom of his heart, referred to him as "satan" and in his life never changed his opinion of the president. Štefanik's dislike only increased when he learned that in the summer of 1918 President Wilson was at last beginning to support the Czech independence movement. However, President Wilson had no intention of attaching Slovakia to the new Czech state, but wished to leave the latter within the borders of Hungary, albeit with a large measure of autonomy.

The case of the South Slav movement was similar. Although requested by Pašić, Wilson refused to receive the Yugoslav Committee during its visit to the United States. The president was not prepared to conduct negotiations with a

committee whose members were citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and whose primary objective was to obtain his support for Serbia's annexation of the Monarchy's South Slav territories.

Even so, the committee did travel to the United States, although its members, Hinković and Vosnjak, carried on their activities as private citizens. They tried to recruit supporters and volunteers in South Slav communities, but with little success. One of the reasons for their failure was that the South Slav movement in America, like that in the Monarchy itself, was strongly divided. Some influential immigrant circles did not want the Monarchy should cede its South Slav territories to Serbia. Another important reason why the committee failed was that President Wilson, who did not recognize promises made to Serbia by the Entente powers during the war concerning the annexation of territories, attempted to curtail Yugoslav propaganda. It was characteristic of the president's approach that he refused to recognize the Pact of Corfu signed in 1917 by Serbian Prime Minister Pašić and Trumbić, the president of the London Yugoslav Committee. The Corfu Declaration looked forward to the establishment of a Yugoslav state under the leadership of the Karageorgević Dynasty (i.e. the annexation by Serbia of South Slav territories within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy). As soon as the Corfu Declaration had been signed, its text was delivered to Lansing, and then to President Wilson who, however, did not approve of it and did not pass it on to the press. There was silence over the declaration for some considerable time. Circumspection with regard to it was also required because the declaration ran counter to Italian aspirations in the Adriatic region. (These aspirations in fact constituted the main purpose of the collaboration between Trumbić and Pašić.)

President Wilson, who refused to recognize any secret agreement concluded during the war and who endeavoured to maintain the unity of the Monarchy, declined to support either the Yugoslav or the Italian views. However, Lansing preferred the Yugoslav plans.

It is only understandable that new developments in Yugoslav-American relations were followed with keen interest in Rome. Sonnino failed to win the American president over to Italy's side and could not persuade him to recognize the secret Treaty of London. Naturally enough, the Serbian military delegation's visit to Washington created considerable anxiety in the Italian capital. Fears were even increased by the fact that Milenko Vesnić, the head of the delegation, was received by President Wilson in person. (The members of this delegation were not citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy but those of Serbia.) The original plan of the delegation was to present the Corfu programme to the president and

to the American administration. Finally, however, Vesnić gave up this idea. Assessing the situation, he realized that President Wilson did not favour the secession of South Slavs from the Monarchy and that he disagreed with their acquisition by Serbia. Vesnić therefore deemed it wise not to raise this issue at all.

Rumania's efforts were similarly unsuccessful. The Rumanian government and the royal court did almost everything in their power to secure President Wilson's support for their endeavours to unify all Rumanian-inhabited territories in a single Rumanian state. They had accurate information concerning the American president's refusal to recognize the secret Treaty of Bucharest and Rumania's territorial claims against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In this particular respect there was perfect agreement between President Wilson and Lansing. Washington regarded Rumanian claims to Transylvania to be unfounded. American chargé d'affaires Andrew, who cannot be suspected of being sympathetic towards the Monarchy at all, might have contributed to the president's resolution to some extent, when he recorded in his confidential reports that the Rumanian government's endeavors to annex territories lacked proper foundations, since only sixty to sixty-five percent of the population of Transylvania were Rumanians, and only a small portion of the Transylvanians welcomed the Rumanian invasion in 1916.

Bratianu and the royal court attributed great importance to changing the attitudes displayed both in official American circles and among Rumanian Americans, especially those who came from Transylvania. They wanted to win them over to the cause of Rumania's annexation of Transylvania. They were aware that this task would be difficult, since President Wilson and Lansing were openly against it, and the majority of Rumanian-Americans were also not in favour of the detaching of Transylvania from the Monarchy. Queen Marie, an ambitious lady, decided to travel to the United States in person, in order to place the fate of the Rumanian people in the hands of the American government and people. Since President Wilson and Lansing did not agree to her plan she was compelled to cancel her intended American trip. It was after this that, without any previous announcement, a Rumanian delegation arrived in the United States on 27 June, 1917. This development caught Washington by surprise. The members of the delegation were Rev. Lucacin, Ion Mota, and Lt. Vasil Stoica (all of them emigrants from Transylvania). Beginning their journey in Jassy, they arrived in the United States after an adventurous journey via Siberia and Japan. Their task was to be a twofold one. Firstly, they were to conduct a propaganda exercise

among Rumanian-Americans to persuade them to espouse the cause of the unification of Rumania and Transylvania. Their second aim was to recruit volunteers for a Rumanian Legion that was to fight, under American command, on the western front. It was not easy to animate Rumanian Americans, since, as we have seen, the majority of them were unenthusiastic about Rumania's annexation of Transylvania. The members of the Rumanian delegation were not dispirited by this response and, unlike Štefanik, remained in the country and continued their work. Although they never had an opportunity to meet President Wilson, the members of the delegation were received by Lansing and Secretary of War Newton D. Baker. Nevertheless, they failed to gain support for the annexation of Transylvania by Rumania and for the establishment of a Rumanian Legion.

President Wilson's attitude caused extreme desperation and disappointment in the leaders of the independence and unification movements. They were aware that the reason for the continual rebuffs they suffered was not, in fact, the one given by the Americans, namely, that the United States was formally not at war with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Nevertheless, they had very high expectations from America's declaration of war on the Monarchy in December 1917.

However, before long, the leaders of the national movements experienced yet another setback for their hopes: soon after the United States had declared war on the Monarchy, President Wilson presented his Fourteen Points to the Congress on January 8, 1918. An examination of point 10 is highly relevant to the problem under consideration. Why did President Wilson include it? What was the essence of this much debated and diversely interpreted point? Why did it provoke such an anxiety in Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Rumanian circles, making efforts for the independence of their nations and why did it cause such satisfaction in Vienna and Budapest?

The Entente had not given up its plan to break up the alliance between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Germany and to conclude a separate peace with the former. It was no coincidence that as long as there was some hope of achieving this, the Entente powers did not recognize the independence movements and the endeavours for the territorial unification of small nations, the success of which would have been tantamount to the dismemberment of the Monarchy. All the Entente powers - at this time even France, but especially the United States and Britain - wanted to preserve the territorial integrity of the Monarchy. We may assume that London and Washington coordinated their views. Lloyd George accepted President Wilson's principles for the settlement of territorial disputes. The British prime minister stated in a speech on January 5, 1918 that he shared President Wilson's views in that the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary

was not among the Entente's war aims. He pointed out that the nations of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which had long aspired to it should be given the right of self-determination based on democratic principles. However, unlike President Wilson, Lloyd George wished to observe the terms of the secret treaties of London and Bucharest, i.e. he wanted to allow Italy and Rumania to annex the territories that had been promised to them. However, he made no mention of the annexation by Serbia of the Monarchy's South Slav territories.

On the same day, President Wilson and House, both as yet unfamiliar with Lloyd George's speech, set out to formulate the Fourteen Points. The Fourteen Points were based on the material that had been prepared by the Committee of Inquiry. Point 10 proposed to endow the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy with autonomy, or self-government. Wilson's principle of self-determination, when applied to the Monarchy, did not mean secession.

Wilson had briefed Lansing about his Fourteen Points on the day before he made them public. The Secretary of State acquiesced into them, although he disagreed with point 10 concerning the inviolability of the Dual Monarchy's borders. He made this quite clear in an entry in his diary.

President Wilson's Fourteen Points and Lloyd George's speech caused extreme disappointment in Italian, Rumanian and Serbian government circles and embittered the leaders of the independence movements. Beneš noted that "There was no doubt left that President Wilson was not in favour of breaking up the Monarchy and that his plan for the liberation of the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy did not call for the establishment of independent states but for the introduction of self-government and the creation of some sort of a confederation".⁶ All these leaders launched concerted attacks on President Wilson's policy. In order to achieve their aims they redoubled their efforts. (It is worth mentioning that the independence movements within the Monarchy were at this time experiencing slight setbacks.)

The Italian Government's request that President Wilson should amend point 9 concerning Italy was rejected in Washington. It took Wilson a long time to change his views on Italian aspirations.

It was in Rumania that the Fourteen Points caused the greatest alarm. Vopicka sent a telegram to Washington on January 12, 1918 saying that the president's peace programme made the situation critical. The Rumanian government took the view that if Transylvania was not ceded to Rumania, there would be no point in continuing the fight, and immediate peace with Germany was demanded by all sides. France and Great Britain did their utmost to prevent Rumania from carrying out its threat and concluding a separate peace treaty

with the Central Powers. Paris and London assured Bratianu that if his country continued the war on the side of the Allies and did not pull out of the fighting, Rumania would be entitled to annex Transylvania after the final victory. However this kind of a guarantee did not satisfy the Rumanians, since America, which was playing an increasingly important role in the war effort, adopted a different stance, refusing to recognize the Treaty of Bucharest and opposing the annexation of Transylvania by Rumania.

France, Britain and Italy did not abandon the Rumanian cause and sent a joint telegram to Washington on February 12, 1918, in which they reminded the American Government that Rumania would conclude a separate peace treaty if they did not immediately send the Rumanian king a declaration, assuring him that the Allied Powers would abide by all their promises to Rumania. As pointed out in the telegram, it was imperative that the United States should accept such a declaration, since this was the only way of preventing the Rumanian government from concluding a separate peace with the Central Powers.

Lansing, who was willing to accept the proposal, discussed the matter with Wilson on February 17. However, the American president flatly refused the request of the Allied Powers. He did not change his policy towards Rumania and continued to reject Rumanian claims concerning Transylvania.

On February 25, 1918 Lansing sent a telegram to Vopicka, in which he empowered him to inform the Rumanian government that the United States was ready to assist Rumania in the latter's attempts to preserve her territorial integrity. This declaration, however, failed to make the Rumanians change their minds, since Wilson still stuck to his earlier position concerning Transylvania, a position he had also made clear to the Rumanian king.

On March 7, 1918 Rumania carried out her threat and signed a provisional peace treaty. "Bratianu and his successor General Averescu ... both argued that there was no use for Roumania to keep on fighting because according to the speeches of the President and Lloyd George even if the Allies win, Roumania is not to get additional territory"⁷, said the cable of the American chargé d'affaires. In fact, Rumania was experiencing extreme military and economic problems that might have made the government consider a cease-fire. However, it is not enough to explain the Rumanian decision solely on these grounds, as is done by some historians. Rumania did indeed have an alternative, in other words, she could have withdrawn her troops via Russia, as had been done with the Czechoslovak and the Yugoslav forces. Upon French and British urgings, the Rumanian king was ready to consider this option. Bratianu, however, failed to do so and, hoping for a favourable peace treaty, the Rumanian government pulled

out of the fighting so that before the end of the war it could throw in its lot with the side that would be most likely to emerge victorious.

After this, Rumania ceased to devise plans and take action to annex Transylvania. However, Rumanian emigrés did not give up their activities. Take Ionescu in France and Stoica in the United States continued their struggle for Transylvania, but Wilson still took no notice of them. He also disregarded the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities which convened in Rome to discuss the ways and means of gaining independence for the minorities in the Monarchy. France and Britain were also represented at the Congress, which was given great press coverage in both countries. This was not the case in the United States.

However, in late May 1918 President Wilson was compelled to modify his views on this issue and he had to give up the idea of creating a federal state in Central Europe. What were the events that made him change his mind, and how did this change of heart show itself?

In May 1918 Clemenceau published the letters of Emperor Charles of Austria, addressed to Prince Sixtus, and as a result it was revealed that the Emperor was prepared to conclude a separate peace with the Allied Powers. Accordingly, secret negotiations that had been conducted with the participation of the United States reached deadlock. There was no longer any hope whatsoever of severing Austria from Germany. President Wilson was outraged to learn of the French prime minister's unreasonable act. All this created an entirely new situation. The sharp turn was favourable for those who disagreed with President Wilson's policy of safeguarding the unity of the Monarchy. As we have already mentioned, Lansing was one such person. The Secretary of State considered the time to be ripe for asserting his own line in foreign policy. "I hesitate to include the question of independence for the nationalities within Austria-Hungary, such as the Czechs, Ruthenians and Southern Slavs, because the President, excepting in the case of Poland which is mostly outside the empire, had indicated a purpose to preserve the Dual Monarchy intact. I do not believe it is wise to do this. I think that the President will have to abandon this idea and favor the creation of new states out of the imperial territory and require the separation of Austro-Hungary. This is the only certain means of ending German power in Europe"⁸, Lansing wrote.

On May 10th, Lansing asked Wilson to give a clear and straightforward answer on whether he was determined to continue to safeguard the unity of the Monarchy or he was now prepared to support the right to self-determination of various nations even to the point of their total secession. Republicans in the United States, led by Theodor Roosevelt, Wilson's main political opponent, launched a campaign aimed at splitting up the Monarchy. So did Britain and

France. Soon after this both powers recognized the Czechoslovak and the Yugoslav committees. In this way, the final verdict on the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was brought.

In this situation President Wilson's plan for the establishment of a federation became unrealistic. Step by step, he began to stray from his political tenets, although he did not altogether abandon his policy. Wilson continued to distinguish between the Polish and the other independence movements. Whereas he promised support to the Poles, the others had to be content with mere sympathy. This sort of a discrimination worried the leaders of the Czechoslovak and the South Slav independence movements, and with good reason, especially as the president still refused to acknowledge the committees for quite some time, and even Masaryk's efforts failed to produce any effect in this. The president of the Czechoslovak Committee admitted that he had had no influence whatsoever on Wilson and therefore, instead of the establishment of an independent state, the main item on the agenda for the talks of June 1918 was the creation of a Czechoslovak Legion.

Wilson's reluctant attitude is hinted at in Lansing's circular telegram of May 29, which was sent to all American embassies. The Secretary of State informed US representatives that the Government of the United States had followed with interest the Rome Congress of the Oppressed Nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and that it sympathized with Czechoslovak and South Slav national aspirations. (The Rome Congress of April 1918 had up to then been ignored.) The wording of this cable revealed that the turn that had begun in US foreign policy was not yet complete. Czechoslovak and Yugoslav national aspirations had not been given the same treatment as the Polish ones. The first two were 'sympathized with' while the latter was 'supported'. This is also substantiated by the fact that not even during his June meeting with President Wilson had Masaryk been able to make him recognize the Czechoslovak Committee. Moreover, President Wilson's letter to Vienna dated October 18, 1918 was, in a way, also ambiguous. Not even at that time did the president side with the nations fighting for their independence, since he still hoped that Emperor Charles might be able to reach an agreement with their leaders and establish the kind of federation that he himself was aiming at. However, this solution, which earlier would have delighted the nationalities, was now impossible. They were separated from Vienna by an ever-widening gulf. Having realized this, Wilson now began to support Masaryk's plan for a Central European Democratic Union. According to this, the newly established independent states would be re-united on a democratic basis. The developments of the post-war era proved these ideas to be

unrealistic. Small nations newly independent and experiencing their heyday of nationalism could not be brought together again. They strongly opposed any attempt at integration.

We shall deal with President Wilson's activities in Paris only in a concise way. During his brief sojourn in the French capital, he focused his attention primarily on the creation of the League of Nations and the German issue, paying little attention to the problems of successor states. Wilson had left France by the time the Trianon peace talks began. In Paris, the American president made big concessions, deviating from his original views in general and therefore from those concerning the Monarchy as well. Nobody, not even he, considered federalization to be an option. In the majority of cases he acquiesced into the fait accompli created by the victorious successor states. President Wilson even reconciled himself to the fact that Clemenceau exploited the idea of self-determination, which had been set forth by him, to further the interests of French power policy. Why did the American President make these concessions in Paris? This is a complex issue, and one which I shall attempt to analyse in my forthcoming book. Here I allude to a few factors only. President Wilson was in an extremely difficult position at the Paris Peace Conference. When he arrived there, he did not enjoy a solid political support in the United States. As a result of the Congressional elections in November 1918, Republicans won a majority of the seats in the Senate and they strongly attacked his foreign policy. His plan to travel to Paris was also subject to fierce criticism. Furthermore, Wilson found himself up against both Clemenceau and Lloyd George, two intransigent politicians each with a strong political background in their respective countries. President Wilson was an academic with little knowledge of European affairs. As a result of this, he was often defeated in debates in which he did not happen to be a very skilled performer. Wilson did not always receive assistance from members of the American Peace delegation when he attempted to form a clear view of what was an extremely complex situation. Not even they were sufficiently familiar with Central European affairs, and in addition, their views tended to differ from those of the president.

President Wilson has often been criticized for the underlying idealism of his approach and for the alleged irrationality of his plans. There is quite a lot of truth in such criticism. However, I think this was not the case with Wilson's Central European plan; on the contrary, I believe that the plan was both reasonable and realistic. It was only towards the end of the war that the plan proved to be impracticable by virtue of new developments in the international and military situations.

NOTES

- *This article is supplemented by a document, see below, pp. 50-56.
1. The clarification of these issues was in the focus of my research in the Wilson Center. I inquired, apart from the literature on the subject, into the papers of Woodrow Wilson and Robert Lansing (Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress), into the material of the State Department, and into the documents of the Inquiry and the Paris Peace Conference (National Archives, Washington D.C.). Here I wish to express my gratitude to the Wilson Center for facilitating my work by providing the most excellent conditions.
 2. An exception is Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe 1914-1918 (Port Washington - New York - London, 1956.) However, I disagree with several of the author's claims and conclusions.
 3. Joseph P. O'Grady (ed.), The Immigrants' Influence on Wilson's Peace Policies (University of Kentucky Press, 1967.), pp. 8, 28. This position is shared by Victor S. Mamatey, quoted in *ibid.* p. 10.
 4. Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe, pp. 11, 166.
 5. *Ibid.* p. 95.
 6. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1917, 2. Suppl. vol. I. (Washington, 1933.), p. 757.
 7. Edouard Beneš, Souvenir de Guerre et de revolution 1914-1918 (Paris, 1928), p. 549.
 8. War Memoirs of Robert Lansing Secretary of State (Indianapolis, 1935.), p. 261.

M a g d a Á d á m

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THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE POLICY TOWARD NATIONAL MINORITIES AND THE GERMAN ETHNIC GROUP POLICY IN HUNGARY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Between the autumn of 1938 and the spring of 1941, Hungarian governments were able, on four separate occasions, to extend the northern, eastern and southern borders of the country, regaining territories that had been granted to Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia by the Trianon Peace Treaty in 1920, territories with high percentages of non-Hungarians, besides a considerable Hungarian element.¹ The proportion of non-Hungarians in the population was greatly increased. Whereas after Trianon Hungary had a population of 9,319,992 of whom 662,820 (i.e. 7.1%, or every eleventh person) were non-Hungarian-speaking, by the end of 1941, 3,318,493 out of the new total of 14,683,323 (i.e. every fourth or fifth person) came under this category.² It is not surprising, therefore, that the relationship between territorial revisionism and the policy toward national minorities during this period has been subject to thorough historical analysis.³ Obviously, the years when Hungary, now once again multinational, was directly involved in the Second World War also deserve attention from the point of view of the history of the nationalities.⁴

In this paper, however, instead of the history of Hungary's national minorities during these years, or the actual changes in Hungarian policy toward them, we shall consider the various conceptions of the nationality problem current in Hungary at that time, and the different trends in policy towards the nationalities during the Second World War. These years brought about a particularly acute conflict between the traditional Hungarian (political) conception of the nation and nationality policy on the one hand, and the popular German (völkisch) conception of the nation, ethnic group theory (Volksgruppentheorie) and efforts for the settlement of nationality issues on the basis of ethnic group rights (Volksgruppenrecht) - all actuated by the influence of the German Reich - on the other.⁵

Among the German minorities in the Danubian Basin - including the German minority in Hungary - the idea of German ethnic community (Volksgemeinschaft)

gained considerable ground during the period of the Weimar Republic in the late 1920s and early 1930s.⁶ Rooted in the Pan-Germanism of the last decades of the 19th century, this concept flourished after the First World War and became a widely propagated means of German influence on behalf of German minorities living outside Germany, a means which, in reality, served hidden foreign policy goals. Initially, those ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche) in Hungary who supported national socialism after 1933 conceived of this ethnic community as primarily one of blood (Blutgemeinschaft), i.e. a community of the German race. In their minds, the importance of coexisting with the Hungarian people was eclipsed by the fact that they belonged to a vast German ethnic community that embraced all Germans in the world. In line with the national socialist conception, they no longer regarded themselves as a national minority (nationale Minderheit) but as a part of the all-German community (Gesamtdeutschtum). In this sense they regarded themselves as an ethnic group (Volksgruppe), for the members of which belonging to the German people (deutsche Volkszugehörigkeit, "Volksbürgerschaft") was more important than their Hungarian citizenship (Staatsbürgerschaft). Resistance to efforts at assimilation was replaced by a complete rejection of assimilation, including natural assimilation. In addition, they set as an objective the re-Germanization of those of German descent (Deutschblütige) who had been long and durably Magyarized. In all fields of life they strove for a far-reaching ethnic separation (völkische Aussonderung) of Germans, that is, for an ethnic autonomy (Volkgruppenautonomie) which would allow for only nominal state control, but which would guarantee the Reich an institutionalized influence in the life of the "ethnic group". In 1935, under the leadership of Franz Basch, a national socialist fraction called the Volksdeutsche Kameradschaft was separated from the Society for German Popular Education in Hungary (Ungarländisch-Deutscher Volksbildungsverein). Supported by the Reich, this group, newly named the Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn, was legally recognized by the Hungarian government in 1938 and began its struggle for the status of a corporate body under public law (Rechtspersönlichkeit). In so doing the association aimed to become the sole acknowledged representative body of the German "ethnic group" in Hungary and, as "required" by ethnic law, strove to establish its own German "ethnic organization" (Volksorganisation), separate in every respect from Hungarian organizations.⁷

The idea of a German "ethnic community" and German "ethnic group" theory was considered by Hungarian ruling classes to be prejudicial to an independent Hungarian policy toward the nationalities. However, they were not without interest from the point of view of organizing, under Hungarian influence, those Hungarians constituting minorities in the neighbouring countries. The situation of

the Hungarian population living in relatively solid blocks in the border regions contiguous to Hungary was regarded as similar to that of those Germans who in German ethnic literature (Volkstumsliteratur) were called "frontier Germanity" (Grenzlanddeutschtum) and who were deemed recoverable through simple annexation.⁸ Actually, it was on these grounds that the Hungarian Revisionist League, founded in 1927, launched a broad social movement at home and a massive propaganda campaign abroad for the recovery of the areas inhabited by "frontier Hungarians". At the same time, Hungarian policy did not abandon its long term objective of a complete and integral revision; it promised autonomy to the non-Hungarian population of the territories to be annexed in the event of their return to Hungary. This conception of "New Hungary", formulated with a view to the restoration of Historic Hungary with the support and spiritual guidance of Count István Bethlen and Count Pál Teleki and made public in the autumn of 1928, held out the prospect of several varieties and degrees of autonomy for the nationalities. These ranged from administrative to territorial autonomy, according to the level of national consciousness of the given nationality, the proximity of the area it inhabited and its partial or complete return under Hungarian rule. Territorial autonomy was promised to Slovakia, Ruthenia and Transylvania in the event of a complete return.⁹

The project met with an unfavourable reception on the part of all those who opposed national autonomy in general and territorial autonomy in particular; they thought it resembled Oszkár Jászi's "Eastern Switzerland" idea of 1918 and doubted its constructiveness. However, it made a definite impact on one variant of Hungarian national socialism that evolved during the mid-1930s: Ferenc Szálasi's "Hungarism" was partly rooted in the "New Hungary" conception. In his project for a "Hungarian Federation of United Lands", made public in 1935, he conceived the future Hungarian empire as a federation of territorially autonomous units, albeit under national socialist rule.¹⁰

As a result of the First Vienna Award, the Hungarian government annexed Hungarian-populated areas of Southern Slovakia in the autumn of 1938, after the German acquisition of the Sudetenland. The following year brought the complete break up of Czechoslovakia but Hungary's recovery of the rest of Slovakia was prevented by the establishment there of a separate republic - a puppet state in fact - with German support. Nevertheless, Hungary was able to annex the whole of Ruthenia, and this was the first territory to be acquired in which the majority of the population was non-Hungarian. The problem of fulfilling the promise of territorial autonomy in that region now presented itself. The Teleki government did indeed work out a detailed plan for the autonomy of the area and tabled a

bill in Parliament to put it into effect. The bill was, however, removed from the agenda without having been debated, partly because the Hungarian population in Ruthenia protested against its own minority status under the projected Ruthene administration in the autonomous territory, and partly because Hungarian military leaders objected to autonomy for security reasons.¹¹

The problems involved in the autonomy of Ruthenia provoked the leaders of the Arrow-Cross Party to abandon the original conception of its leader Szálasi, who had been imprisoned in 1938, and to replace territorial autonomy with ethnic autonomy as the structural basis of a national socialist Greater Hungary, or "Hungarist Empire", to come. Their argument was as follows: ethnic group autonomy was of a "personal" nature, and pertained to individual members of an ethnic group even when that ethnic group was in a minority in any particular region. The power-hungry Arrow-Cross Party hoped to gain the support of the Reich by the presentation to Parliament, in June 1940, of a bill proposing the settlement of the nationality problem in Hungary on the basis of the ethnic group principle. Although the Hungarian government considered a wide range of different types of autonomy at least in public, it refused to countenance ethnic group autonomy in the country. Still, the latter was the very end the Volksbund, relying on German support, struggled to attain after the example of the German ethnic group in Slovakia, which was led by Karmasin. The bill submitted by Arrow-Cross representatives Hubay and Vágó proposed a registration of the country's population and their classification into seven ethnic groups - Hungarians would have been one of them.

The Germans considered it useful and tactically advantageous from the viewpoint of the Volksbund's aspirations that the proposal was based on the ethnic group principle. Germany, however, was interested only in the autonomy of the German ethnic group, for which she wished to secure exceptional status within the Hungarian state by means of ethnic group autonomy; the investing of other nationalities with similarly extensive autonomous rights was considered harmful to Hungary's economic and other potential, which was crucial for Germany. For this reason the efforts of Slovak leaders to organize the Slovak minority in Hungary as a separate ethnic group under the influence of the new Slovak state received no support from the Germans, and Franz Basch refused all close co-operation with the Slovak "ethnic group leaders" in Hungary (Obtulovič and, later, Böhm). The Arrow-Cross bill was found all the more unsatisfactory because it afforded no sufficient opportunity either for the re-Germanization of those who had become Magyarized or for the separation of ethnic Germans in

the Levente organization, a paramilitary Hungarian youth association, and in the army - not to mention other organizations. Besides, the German assessment of the bill was much influenced by the fact that the idea of a Hungarian empire was incompatible with the interests of the Reich itself. This remained the case regardless of whether the idea was presented in a Nazi guise, as "Hungarism" or as the re-establishment of "St Stephen's state", which was envisioned by the Bethlen-Teleki line. Germany was willing to support Hungary in the latter's policy of territorial acquisition, but suggestions hinting at the restoration of historic Hungary only concealed Germany's true interest - the atomization of the Carpathian-Danubian region (Karpauthen-Donau-Raum) into small ethnic states.

Thus, the reception of the bill fell short of its presenters' expectations, and there was nothing to prevent Teleki from launching a political campaign denouncing Huby and Vágó as traitors and depriving them of their seats in parliament. The Arrow-Cross bill was also rejected by other Hungarian national socialist parties, which organized themselves under the same banner. In the nationwide protest campaign, which for foreign policy reasons concealed the main issue, that is, the Arrow-Cross men's approaches to Germany, and which presented the two MPs solely as shapers of a harmful theory of nationality policy, advocates of intolerance towards the nationalities assumed such prominence that Teleki deemed it necessary to define his principles and presented the official, moderate line in a booklet entitled "Hungarian Policy toward the Nationalities", which was also published in the languages of the nationalities themselves. The booklet, however, not only reveals a distinct opposition to the Nazi policy towards nationalities but in the expositions on the Hungarian nation, described as traditionally generous toward her nationalities, there is an apparent lack of a capacity to adopt a reasonable approach to the vital problem of nationality policy in modern times.¹²

Hungarian statesmen taking part in the negotiations which led to the Second Vienna Award at the end of August 1940 were blackmailed: in return for permitting Hungarian territorial acquisitions in Northern and Eastern Transylvania, the Germans made them sign an agreement of a foreign policy nature. This agreement concerned the settlement of the German minority question, a purely domestic affair until then, in accordance with the requirements of ethnic law that they had previously been unable to assert in Hungary.¹³ Because of Teleki's amendments, however, the agreement was, in its final form, obscure enough to allow for different interpretations and, to a certain extent, evasion on the part of the Hungarian government. Contrary to German expectations, the agreement was never sanctioned by act of parliament: Teleki only passed it as a decree, without an enacting clause.¹⁴ On the initiative of the Volksbund, infuriated by the sabo-

tage of the agreement, the Germans now set about preparing a new, more carefully worded, "more perfect" and "ineludible" agreement after Teleki's death. The draft of the agreement has survived and gives a clear indication of how far the Germans were prepared to go with regard to ethnic separation (völkische Ause-sonderung): what they strove for in fact amounted to establishing a state within the state.¹⁵ Although from the autumn of 1940 onwards, the special position of the Germans in Hungary was recognized and repeatedly confirmed by the Hungarian government, the Volksbund had great difficulty in pressing each of its demands and in most cases had to be satisfied with compromises. After the fall of the Bárdossy government, regarded as relatively compliant, it proved to be impossible to push through a new ethnic group agreement that would raise the status of the German ethnic group in Hungary to that already attained by Germans in the neighbouring countries.¹⁶

The abortive struggle of the Teleki government against the "wild Hungarians" - i.e. the advocates of an intolerant nationality policy who accused the government, naturally without any foundation, of appeasing the nationalities - was carried on by the Bárdossy government. Campaigns aiming at the intimidation or mass expulsion of Slovaks or Rumanians, provoked by or themselves giving rise to similar moves against Hungarians in Slovakia and Rumania, introduced the spirit of "measure for measure" on both sides of the frontier.¹⁷ In Northern Transylvania and later in Bácska, which was occupied by force of arms in spring 1941 after German and Hungarian troops attacked Yugoslavia, Lieutenant-General Fekete-halmy-Czeydner, the army's self-appointed nationality policy expert, propagated the necessity of anti-Rumanian and anti-Serbian co-operation between the Hungarian and the German peoples.¹⁸ To make up for the wrongs Hungarians had suffered, the Hungarian nationalist parties in newly-annexed territories adopted a repressive policy toward the nationalities which came to obscure the democratic traditions of peaceful and fruitful coexistence with non-Hungarian peoples not long before, such as the Sickel Movement in Slovakia (the old Upper Hungary) between 1928-1934, or the Marosvásárhely meeting in Transylvania in 1937. After joining in the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, leading Hungarian military circles, advocating an aggressive policy toward the nationalities, planned the deportation of the entire Ukrainian population of Ruthenia to territories occupied in the Soviet Ukraine.¹⁹ Bárdossy prevented this by dismissing chief of staff Werth; however, in Bácska, which was under Fekete-halmy-Czeydner's command, atrocities against the Serbs by army and gendarmic forces stained Hungarian nationality policy.²⁰

From the outset, but particularly after the crushing defeats, in early 1943

of the German and the Hungarian armies at Stalingrad and Voronezh, respectively, Miklós Kállay's government made efforts to rectify nationality policy. The government decided to take steps to improve the condition of the nationalities, irrespective of the treatment received by the Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries. Such a policy was regarded as essential if Hungary was to retain her territorial acquisitions after the war. The measures of the government, however, were not determined enough. Indeed, in most cases, they were not even implemented because of resistance, or sometimes contrary actions, on the part of local authorities.²¹

During the Second World War, Hungarian policy towards the nationalities was considerably influenced by Hitler's programme, announced after the defeat of Poland in October 1939, for the repatriation of those Germans who were living in an "alien" environment beyond the borders of the Reich and who were exposed to assimilation with the local population. In fact, these groups were intended to be employed as means of Germanizing Polish territories under German occupation.²² After this, certain Hungarian chauvinist circles brought pressure to bear on the government to take the opportunity offered and conclude an agreement with the German government on the resettlement elsewhere of those Germans in Hungary who were unwilling to Magyarize.²³ Regent Horthy supported the idea and in a letter of early November 1939 proposed it to Hitler for consideration.²⁴ Horthy's initiative brought no response, for Hitler's resettlement policy encountered powerful opposition in the Reich, and even in the Nazi Party and in leading circles of the SS. The SS objected to the sacrificing of German positions which would result from the evacuation of German "ethnic groups" from South-Eastern Europe, or from the abandonment of those that insisted on staying there.²⁵ The ethnic group leaders (Volksgruppenführung) in the "Südostraum" also invariably adopted a stand against resettlement, and, joining forces with the internal opposition to Hitler's plans in Germany, worked out counterprojects, all of them based on the idea that the "historical calling" of German ethnic groups was to be fulfilled in the "Südostraum". One of these projects was for the establishment of a separate Transylvania under German patronage and Saxon hegemony.²⁶ As a result of the Second Vienna Award, which divided the territory of Transylvania, as well as the German population living there, and which thrust new viewpoints to the foreground, this project was dropped in the autumn of 1940 and was replaced by one aiming at the unification of the Saxons of Transylvania and the Swabians of the Rumanian Banat in a "Volksstaat Donauland".²⁷ At the same time, the organization of the German-inhabited territories of Bácska and the Serbian Banat as "Prinz-Eugen-Land" was also an objective, reviving the memory of the one-

time military frontier district of the Habsburg Monarchy.²⁸ The leaders of the Volksbund in Hungary drew upon these plans by laying a strong emphasis on the role of the German ethnic group in Hungary as a bridge between the Austrian province of the Reich (the "Ostmark") and the major German settlement areas in the "Südostraum". On the one hand, they hinted at the possibility of Germanizing Transdanubia to such an extent that it could be absorbed into the Austrian territories (by concentrating the German ethnic group in Hungary there completely and by re-Germanizing those Germans who had already become Magyarized). On the other hand, they stressed the importance of the existence of the German ethnic group with a view to influencing Hungary in accordance with the interests of German power policy. Obviously enough, this way of vindicating the right to a homeland ("Heimatsrecht") in opposition to Hitler's resettlement plans and to the chauvinist strand in Hungarian nationality policy cannot be regarded as an assertion of the German ethnic group leaders' loyalty to the Hungarian homeland. Basch and his adherents wanted to avoid the evacuation of Germans from Hungary and their resettlement in the "Warthegau", the Polish territories occupied by Germany. They thought that the "ethnic struggle" (Volkstumskampf), was to be waged in Hungary, with the aim of attaining German hegemony over the Hungarian and other peoples living in the country.²⁹

The idea of a massive resettlement of Germans was not adopted by the official, moderate strand in Hungarian nationality policy which, instead, proposed a limited population exchange. Supporters of this moderate line wished to see the repatriation, on a voluntary basis, of Hungarians in the Burgenland who, as a result of the Anschluss, had fallen under Nazi German rule in March 1938, and of the Hungarians in Pozsonyligetfalu (Petržalka, Engerau), ceded to Germany by Czechoslovakia in October 1938 - about 16,000 people in all. In return, the government hoped to get rid of a similar number of German extremists from the Volksbund.³⁰ An agreement on these lines was, however, thwarted by Himmler, who regarded the handful of Hungarians in the Reich as hostages, wishing to use them to influence the Hungarian policy toward the German "ethnic group".³¹ At the same time, the German government realized that Hungarian nationality policy was very keen to rid itself of Volksbundist propaganda, which was particularly influential among less well-to-do "ethnic German" youth, and since, after the invasion of Russia, the Waffen-SS had an ever increasing need for manpower, an agreement for the recruitment of SS volunteers among the German population of Hungary was concluded between Germany and the Bárdossy government in early 1942. Those who, "hearing the call of German blood", preferred joining the German army to joining the Hungarian one, were deprived of their

Hungarian citizenship, and the German government was urged to evacuate the families of these men to Germany. This request, however, was cancelled, because Hitler repeatedly declared that after the war he would resettle the entire German population of South-Eastern Europe, and therefore the German population of Hungary also, inside the borders of the Reich.³²

In the course of the first and the second recruiting campaigns in 1942 and 1944 respectively, as many as 40,000 Germans in Hungary - most of them Volksbundists - joined the SS. Hungarian moderates were at pains to disabuse the Germans of Hungary of their adoration of Hitler, and to steer them away from the Volksbund and the SS by constantly reminding them of Hitler's resettlement plans, while the slogan of the extremists was "let them go". By the beginning of 1944, one-third of the Germans in Hungary were members of the Volksbund, another third were directly influenced by it - i.e. by Nazi Germans in Hungary - and the rest were passive. It was only a few tens of thousands who were - with the concealed and rather inadequate support of the Kállay government - ready to show their commitment to the Hungarian homeland actively in the so-called Loyalty Movement (Treuebewegung). After the Germans occupied Hungary, this movement was disbanded by Sztójay's puppet government, which concluded an agreement with the German government for a third SS recruiting campaign in Hungary, formally retaining the voluntary principle, but in fact facilitating forced enlistment. As a result, at least another 60,000 (certain German sources put the figure as high as 80,000) ethnic Germans were recruited in summer 1944. According to the agreement, these men did not lose their Hungarian citizenship by joining the SS, and those SS volunteers who had earlier lost it, now had it restored to them.³³

After Horthy, who was already seeking a way out of the war, and the Lakatos government appointed by him failed in their attempts to conclude an armistice, Ferenc Szálasi came to power. When he was released from prison in the autumn of 1940, Szálasi, who had quite thoroughly inquired into the questions of nationality policy, gave his approval to the bill put forward by Hubay and Vágó, and set about working out his own plans relating to nationality policy. Szálasi began creating different nationality sections in the Arrow-Cross Party, and insignia were designed for each of them which combined the party emblem with their separate nationality colours. He also singled out Slovaks, Ruthenes and others on whom he would be able to rely, after his seizure of power, in establishing the community of peoples in the "Hungarist Empire".³⁴ Szálasi was a great admirer of Hitler, whose ideology and political activity he considered to be tremendously important for the German people and also regarded them as a primary source of instruction

for national socialism in Hungary - although this, in his own view, was a product of conditions peculiar to Hungary and was destined to solve problems similarly peculiar to Hungary. A national socialist Hungary would become, in theory, an equal party with Germany in the National Socialist community of Europe. However, Szálasi did not recognize the Germans in Hungary to be part of the German people or German nation. Instead, he considered them to belong to the Hungarian nation and thought that - while respect should be shown for their "ethnic personality" (Volkspersönlichkeit) - they ought to be integrated with the other peoples of the country into a strict state unity, under Hungarian hegemony. In Szálasi's ideology, expulsion was a sanction: those nations, or parts of nations, that were unable or unwilling to integrate themselves into the "Hungarist Empire", were to be removed - Slav peoples being sent to the Volga region, Rumanians to the territory between the Dniester and the Bug, Germans to the Reich itself. Szálasi also refused to acknowledge the Volksbund's exclusive right to organize Germans in Hungary. He was jealous of the Volksbund's close relationship with Germany, which he wanted to appropriate for himself.³⁵

The friction between Szálasi and the Volksbund as well as his insistence on the imperial idea of a Hungarist Greater Hungary aroused German antipathy towards him. In nationality policy affairs the Germans were much more in agreement with Count Fidél Pálffy's Hungarian National Socialist Party, which seceded from the Arrow-Cross Union, created at Szálasi's prompting in autumn 1940. The Hungarian National Socialist Party was content to confine its organizing activity to those of the "Magyar race" (Rassenmadjaren), to acquiesce in German efforts at disassimilation and re-Germanization, to apply the principle of separation on grounds of ethnicity to military service as well, and to limit membership of the Hungarian state to those of the Magyar ethnic group. This ideology was set forth, in opposition to Szálasi's Hungarism, by Ödön Málnási (Metzler).³⁶ Former Prime Minister Béla Imrédy's extreme right-wing Hungarian Revival Party, which formed the National Socialist Party Alliance with Pálffy's National Socialist Party, was not so immoderate in its approach to nationality policy. Imrédy demanded particular attentiveness toward the claims of the German "ethnic group", but did not conceal the fact that he saw "excesses" which he found disturbing.³⁷

Although it was with Pálffy's party that the Volksbund had its most intimate relationship, the latter also preserved its links with the Arrow-Cross Party, constant disagreements notwithstanding.³⁸ These links were transformed into an increasingly close community of interest, when in the summer of 1943, they both observed the intensified activity of the Independent Smallholders' Party and the

Social Democratic Party, allied with each other, in the field of internal and nationality policy. In 1943, these two parties set about regaining their support among the German population, which had earlier been quite considerable, but which had been weakened as a result of the growing influence of the Volksbund and the Arrow-Cross Party since the late 1930s. They also extended their activity to the nationalities, the size and significance of which had greatly increased due to the territorial gains. These two parties wished to find a way out of the war, and sought to lay a foundation in nationality policy which would help them achieve this objective.³⁹

A leading role was played in developing the approach of the Smallholders' Party to nationality policy by Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, an advocate of an equitable and generous policy toward the nationalities "on St Stephen's lines", i.e. by making amends for the wrongs suffered and by facilitating autonomy for the nationalities.⁴⁰ This policy received ample expression in the party's memorandum of summer 1943.⁴¹ At the same time, Bajcsy-Zsilinszky's conception of nationality policy strongly depended on the restoration of Greater Hungary. After the German occupation of Hungary, when imprisoned by the Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei: SiPo), Bajcsy-Zsilinszky drafted his plan for a federated Greater Hungary.⁴²

Activity among the nationalities was one of the remarkable traditions of the Social Democratic Party, which considered the struggle for minority rights to be an organic part of the fight for democratic liberties. In opposition both to the government's nationality policy and to the German nationalists' movement, the Social Democrats stressed from the outset that the solution of the nationality problem was conceivable only in a democratized Hungary. During the Second World War, when Basch's Volksbund became a pawn in Nazi Germany's power policy game and a source of recruits for the German war machine, the Social Democratic Party continued bravely to defy the Volksbund, but successive Hungarian governments preferred to bargain with the latter. The Social Democrats recognized the increased significance of the nationality problem in the country, which now had a large number of Ruthenes, Rumanians and South Slavs as a result of the annexations, and the party extended its activity to these groups by reorganizing its previous Committee for Germans into a Committee for the Nationalities. Their achievements in the nationality regions of the country, especially in Northern Transylvania, were quite remarkable. The Social Democrats' alliance with the Smallholders put an end to the isolation of the party and greatly contributed to its obtaining growing support among the nationalities. The German occupation of the country, however, resulted in the banning of both parties.⁴³

Szálasi's struggle for power was characterized by his endeavour to appear to the general public as an intransigent Hungarian. In the spring and summer of 1944 for instance, he fiercely criticized the Sztójay cabinet, claiming that the latter, by agreeing to a third SS recruiting campaign in Hungary, had caused disarray in the Hungarian army and had "sold the country in spoils" (sic) to the Germans. For his part, Szálasi in the meantime offered to sell the Germans the country as a whole for employing it in a total war (Kriegseinsatz), if they helped him to power. Indeed, Szálasi did this after Horthy's attempt at an armistice had failed, enabling the Arrow-Cross leader to seize power on October 15th, 1944. The government of Szálasi, who was both "leader of the nation" and prime minister, reflected the restoration of unity between the Arrow-Cross and the Hungarian National Socialists, as well as their alliance with the extreme rightist forces in the former governing party. Franz Basch, leader of the Volksbund, regularly attended the meetings of the "Crown Council"; all other nationality leaders were members of the Peoples' Community Council, presided over by the Hungarian Sándor Csia, but only had the right to express their opinions. The nationality department in the prime minister's office was replaced by the "Peoples' Community Office of the Leader of the Hungarian Nation". This office analyzed the reports on the conditions of the nationalities and on the events relating to them in Szálasi's "empire", confined first to Transdanubia and later only to areas north and west of the Lake Balaton. These reports recorded the resistance of the Slovaks and the South Slavs, and the conduct of the Germans, who were deemed reliable from the viewpoint of the Hungarian Nazi regime. Working in co-operation with the SS detachments, the Volksbund made considerable efforts to evacuate the German population from Hungary. Their own military units which as the Heimatschutz replaced the rather poorly organized and equipped terrorist groups called the Deutsche Mannschaft after August-September 1944, attempted to track down ethnic Germans who had deserted the SS. This continued until the advance of the Soviet army compelled these forces, together with the Volksbund's leaders, to leave the country in late March-early April, 1945.⁴⁴

During the Second World War the underground Communist Party, which was known as the Peace Party between June 1943 and September 1944, carried on its activity under extraordinarily difficult circumstances. Despite this it made strenuous efforts to counter the influence exercised over the nationalities by their own Nazi organizations and to win them over to the independence movement. Lajos Muck and others began organizing the democratic freedom movement of Germans in Hungary (Demokratische Freiheitsbewegung der Volksdeutschen in

Ungarn), and in the mining districts, the Swabian Anti-fascist Alliance was founded. Influenced in most cases by Slovak, Rumanian and South Slav Communists, anti-fascist groups were formed in various organizations of the nationalities in Hungary, groups which, however, adjusted themselves to the national objectives of Slovak, Rumanian and Yugoslav progressives. The Communist Party of Hungary did not adopt the idea of Greater Hungary; it thought that the fate of the territories annexed to Hungary would depend on the intensity of the anti-fascist struggle fought in Hungary itself.⁴⁵ While Hungarians resident there played an active part in the anti-fascist rising in Slovakia and in the guerilla fighting in Croatia, no guerilla movement or armed resistance on a comparable scale could evolve in the territories drawn under Hungarian rule.⁴⁶

In the immediate aftermath of the war, the German ethnic and power policy, as well as the revisionist and nationality policy of the counter-revolutionary regime in Hungary pursued in the war years, had grievous repercussions in the countries of the Danubian Basin,⁴⁷ where the 1937 frontiers were to all intents and purposes restored. The Germans were evacuated from Hungary under the terms of the Potsdam Agreement, which had the force of international law - not, as Hitler had imagined, to Germanize the territories conquered in the East by the victorious Reich but to populate the territories of a defeated Germany west of the Oder-Neisse line.⁴⁸ The place of the evacuated Germans was mostly taken by Hungarians forced to leave the territories regained by Czechoslovakia, and by Székely Magyars (Csángós), who had been moved from Bukovina to Bácska in 1941 and who now had to leave the southern region restored to Yugoslavia.⁴⁹ As a result of fundamental social and political changes, the following years passed in Hungary and in the neighbouring countries without an automatic consolidation of nationality policy or the assertion of a definite course in it. To achieve these persistent efforts, attentiveness, tact and expertness continue to be required, along with the co-operation of all the countries involved.⁵⁰

NOTES

1. Linguistic division of population (per thousand) in the territories annexed to Hungary between 1938 and 1941 (data from 1941):

	Total population	Hungarian speaking	%	Non-Hungarian speaking	%	Of these	%
In the territories acquired from Czechoslovakia in 1938	1,062	883	84.1	179	15.9	Slovak 116	10.9
In Ruthenia, acquired in 1939 after the liquidation of Czechoslovakia	694	70	10.1	624	89.9	Ruthene 501	72.2
In the territories annexed from Rumania in 1940	2,577	1,344	52.1	1,233	47.9	Rumanian 1,069	41.5
In the territories annexed from Yugoslavia in 1941	1,030	402	39.0	628	61.0	South Slav 327	31.8
Total	5,363	2,699	50.5	2,664	49.5		

2. Division of the population of post-annexation Hungary according to language and nationality at the end of 1941:

	Mother tongue	%	Nationality	%
Hungarian	11,364,830	77.5	11,884,917	80.9
German	720,291	4.9	532,868	3.7
Slovak	270,467	1.8	173,514	1.2
Rumanian	1,100,290	7.5	1,052,067	7.2
Ruthene	563,910	3.8	547,177	3.7
Croat	207,734	1.4	68,162	0.5
Serbian	164,755	1.1	159,346	1.1
Wend, Slovene	70,315	0.5	20,343	0.1
Gipsy	57,776	0.4	76,738	0.5
Yiddish, Hebrew/Jewish	132,325	0.9	139,455	0.9
Others and unknown	30,621	0.2	28,776	0.2
Non-Hungarian total	3,318,493	22.5	2,798,406	19.1
Total population	14,683,323	100.0	14,683,323	100.0

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
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L o r á n t T i l k o v s z k y

Institute of Historical Sciences

Map showing the plan of federalizing the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, May 1918*



Since the map is published in black and white, the different colours that mark the dividing lines in the original map and text are substituted for by numbers:

- | | | |
|------------|---|--------------------|
| 1 = green | } | in Hungary |
| 2 = purple | | |
| 3 = red | | |
| 4 = red | } | in Austria |
| 5 = green | | |
| 6 = red | - | in Bohemia |
| 7 = red | - | in Poland-Ruthenia |

(The borderlines nos. 1 and 7 are not visible on the copy of the map.)

* This document is a supplement to Magda Ádám's article, see above, pp. 19-32.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY FEDERALIZED WITHIN EXISTING BOUNDARIES

Explanatory text to map.

By Charles Seymour, May 25, 1918

Introductory

The adjoined map shows Austria-Hungary divided, within her present boundaries, into six federal states. The division is based upon existing administrative or political boundaries, most of which possess an historical character. Each of the six federal states would possess a definite ethnic complexion, although they would each of them also include racial minorities of which some would be of numerical importance. Hungary, the largest of the federal states would be chiefly Magyar, with Slav, German, and Rumanian minorities. Austria would be predominantly German with Italian and Slovene minorities. Jugo-Slavia would be almost pure racially, if we assume the Croats, Serbs, and Mussulmans of Bosnia to be of the same ethnic character. Transylvania would be chiefly Rumanian, with a strong German (Saxon) and Magyar (Szekeler) minority. Bohemia would be Czech, but with a German minority of about thirty per cent and a slight Polish minority. Poland-Ruthenia would be mixed, but almost entirely Slav: the majority of the inhabitants would be Poles, about forty per cent Ruthenes, while there would be slight but fairly compact German and Rumanian groups.

The division can hardly be called one which would satisfy the different ethnic and political groups of the Dual Monarchy. The Magyars and the Germans are opposed to any sort of federalization which would destroy their domination over the Slavs. The limit of the von Seydler proposals is national autonomy within existing provincial boundaries. Nor would the Czechs and the Jugoslavs consider that the division indicated on the map answered their claims, and even should it be granted and accepted they would hardly consider it final.

It is, however, the division which has the practical advantage of combining existing administrative units without cutting boundaries, and which provides federal states based to some extent on history, each of which has a definite if not a pure racial character.

Hungary

The new federal state of Hungary would be the most important of the federation in point of size, both in area and population, corresponding to the present Hungary, shorn of Croatia-Slavonia and Transylvania. In area this Hungary would be reduced from 109,216 square miles as at present constituted to 86,898 square miles. It would include a population of about 16,000,000 persons instead of 20,885,000 (Census of 1910, disregarding the natural increase of the population since 1910 as well as the partially counterbalancing losses incurred because of the war). It would take in the Central Alföld and the little Alföld, as well as the industrial Slovak districts to the north, and would lose nothing of an essentially Hungarian character.

Its racial character would be Magyar and that race would form 65 per cent of the entire population; the only really compact group of Magyars living outside its borders would be the Szeklers [sic] in southeastern Transylvania. It would include in the north the great body of Slovaks, numbering about 1,800,000 and in the northwest about 400,000 Ruthenians. To the southeast there would be a fringe of counties where Rumanians predominate and to the south the Banat and the Backa where Slavs, Magyars, Rumanians, and Germans are mixed.

The dotted green line shows the probable effect of subtracting the Slovak districts which are claimed by the Czechs; and the dotted purple line indicates the Ruthenian districts which might be added to Poland-Ruthenia. If the ethnic basis of division were established the dotted red line shows the districts which might be given to Transylvania because of their predominantly Rumanian character.

From the economic point of view Hungary would lose the Transylvanian mining districts. But she would retain the industrial districts of the north and practically all the valuable agricultural land.

Austria

According to the map, Austria would lose Galicia, Bukovina, Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and Dalmatia, and would be reduced in size from an area of 115,831 square miles to one of 45,917 square miles, and in population from about 28,000,000 to approximately 8,500,000 (Census of 1910). She would gain the advantage, however, of a far more homogeneous population. Including the German provinces of the Austrias, Salzburg and Vorarlberg, the Tyrol, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and the Coastland, she would have a population in which the Germans would form about seventy-five per cent instead of about thirty-five per cent as in the existing state.

The new boundaries would leave some three and a half million Germans outside. They would also include the million or more Slovenes in Carniola, Carinthia, about 750,000 Italians in the Tyrol and Coastland, 170,000 Serbo-Croats in Istria, and more than 125,000 Czechs (official figures) chiefly in Lower Austria. The dotted red line indicates the effect of subtracting the Slovene and Serbo-Croat districts from Austria and adding them to Jugo-Slavia according to the demands of the Jugo-Slavs. The dotted green line indicates the Italian districts which might be ceded to Italy if an ethnic basis were established.

According to this map Austria would retain her seaport at Triest and the, mining districts of Styria and Carniola. She would, however, lose the most important industrial districts of the present Dual Monarchy, which are in Bohemia.

Jugo-Slavia

This new federal state would not answer completely the demands of the Jugo-Slavs as enunciated in the declaration of their deputies on May 30, 1917, for it does not include the Slovenes of Carniola, Styria, and Carinthia, nor the Serbo-Croats of Istria. Nevertheless it goes far towards meeting the desire for Jugo-Slavic union within Habsburg territories, as expressed by the more moderate south Slavs. Previous to the war it would have been received with enthusiasm. It would be a state built up to some extent upon an historical basis, including the old Trium Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In area this state would cover 41,096 square miles, and would include a population of about 5,215,000 (Census of 1910).

Ethnically such a Jugo-Slavic state would be almost homogeneous, with ninety-four per cent of its population belonging to the southern Slav race. The Croats, the Serbs, and the Mussulmans of Bosnia are cousins, if not brothers. It is true that some of the former dread incorporation with Serbia proper, from fear of losing their individuality and in the belief that Serbia would play the part of a Prussia rather than of a Piedmont in a complete Jugo-Slavic union; but they do not object to union with the Serbs of Slavonia and of Bosnia. The minority races would include some 160,000 Germans, 110,000 Italians, and 107,000 Magyars. In religion Jugo-Slavia would not be a unit: rather more than half of the population (2,870,000) would be Roman Catholics; about a third (1,580,000) would belong to the Orthodox Church; rather more than 600,000 would be Mussulmans.

This state would be the most backward of the federation. The population is uneducated, routes of transportation are poor, industry is nowhere far developed. But it would possess valuable natural resources, both mineral and agricultural, a long coastline, and unrivalled harbors.

Bohemia

The new federal state of Bohemia as shown upon the map would be the second of the federation in population, including about 10,000,000. In area it would be comparatively small, covering 30,622 square miles. It would rest upon an historical basis, as it would be formed from the lands of the old Bohemian Crown - Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. While it would thus answer the demands of the Czechs who have indicated that they would be satisfied with securing "historic rights" for Bohemia, it would not fulfil the expectations of the extremists who insist that to this "historic rights" Bohemia should be added the Slovak districts of Hungary, which are ethnically part of the Czech territory. Nor would it satisfy the Germans, who form a powerful minority in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia and refuse to be incorporated in a Bohemian state under Czech control.

The new Bohemia would be, perhaps, the least satisfactory of the federal states from the racial point of view. The majority of the inhabitants would be Czechs (about 6,200,000), who would form sixty-two per cent of the population. The Germans with 3,500,000 would form a minority of thirty-five per cent, and the Poles with 250,000 about two and one half per cent. By concluding the Grand Duchy of Teschen from Bohemia and adding it to Poland-Ruthenia, the Polish minority would disappear and form part of the Polish state. The effects of such a change are indicated by the dotted red line.

Bohemia would be the most advanced of all the federal states. Its people would show the least percentage of illiteracy and the highest development of industrialization. Both as a transit state and because of its natural resources it would in all probability be the most prosperous.

Poland-Ruthenia

Poland-Ruthenia, including Galicia and Bukovina, would be the fourth state of the federation in point of size and the third in population. It would cover 34,338 square miles, thus slightly exceeding Bohemia, and would include 8,775,406 inhabitants, or rather more than Austria. The historical basis of this state would not be ideal although it would not be totally lacking. Galicia is an ancient historical entity, but has never been joined to Bukovina, which previous to 1777 was a part of Moldavia and thus tributary to the Porte. On historical lines Bukovina should naturally be attached to Rumania.

Ethnically, Poland-Ruthenia would be divided between the two races, the Poles inhabiting chiefly the western and the Ruthenes the eastern portion. The former are more numerous (4,700,000 as against 3,500,000). There is a Rumanian

Area, population and ethnic characteristics

	Area in square miles	Population	Ethnic characteristics %
Austria	45,917	8,494,354	75 German 14 Slovene 9 Italian
Hungary	86,898	16,086,166	62 Magyar 12 German 11 Slovak 9 Rumanian 2 Ruthenian 2 Serb
Jugo-Slavia	41,083	5,215,470	94 Serbo-Croat 3 German 2 Italian 1 Magyar
Bohemia	30,622	10,059,257	62 Czech 35 German 2 Pole
Poland-Ruthenia	34,338	8,775,406	53 Pole 40 Ruthenian 4 Rumanian 3 German
Transylvania	22,318	2,678,367	55 Rumanian 34 Magyar 8 German

[The differences between the data in the text and those in the table are original.]

minority of 273,000 living in southern Bukovina which, if a racial basis were established should be joined to Transylvania. The effect of such a change is indicated by the dotted red line. There is also a group of 250,000 Germans, the greater part of whom are in Bukovina. From the racial point of view Poland-Ruthenia would not be satisfactory since it is not an ethnic unit and also because the two dominant races are but portions of the greater masses of Poles and Ruthenians living without the existing boundaries of Austria-Hungary.

The state would also be divided in religion, the Poles belonging to the Roman Catholic Church while the Ruthenians are Uniates, who acknowledge the authority of the Pope but preserve the rites and languages of the Eastern Church.

Poland-Ruthenia would be essentially agricultural in character, with comparatively few industries, but with prospect of increasing importance as a transit state.

Transylvania

Transylvania would be the smallest of the federal states both in area and population. It would cover 22,318 square miles, about a quarter of Hungary and half of the new federal Austria. Its population would number approximately 2,600,000, about half of Jugo-Slavia as constituted on this map. The historical claim of Transylvania to separate existence is strong. It maintained independence from Hungary for one hundred and seventy-five years after the Habsburgs were elected Kings of Hungary and received autonomy as an Austrian Crownland during a brief period in the middle nineteenth century. Since 1876 it has formed one of the seven administrative divisions of Hungary.

Its ethnic claims to becoming a federal state are not so strong. The most numerous race is the Rumanian which forms about sixty per cent of the total population. But there is a strong and compact minority of Magyars (Szekelers) in eastern Transylvania who compose about thirty-three per cent of the population and whose rights would have to be provided for. In addition a group of more than 250,000 Germans (Saxons or Swabians) form a minority of eight per cent. Three counties of Hungary (Krasso, Arad, Szilagy) in which the Rumanians form the majority are indicated on the map by the dotted red line.

Transylvania contains natural resources of value, particularly in its minerals. At present it is essentially an agricultural state.

M a g d a Á d á m

Institute of Historical Sciences

AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SIGISMUND OF LUXEMBURG IN BUDAPEST

This year is the 600th anniversary of Sigismund's accession to the throne of Hungary and also the 550th of his death, as Holy Roman Emperor and King of Hungary and Bohemia. To commemorate these events, scholars from Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Hungary assembled for a four days' conference in July 1987 in the castle of Buda, as guests of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Museum for the History of Budapest to discuss recent research on Sigismundus rex et imperator and to have a new look at the image and the assessment of that half century on which this Luxemburgian king left his mark.

It is fair to state that Sigismund never had a "good press." German historians kept blaming him for not having solved the crisis of the Empire and Hungarians for having left the country in the hands of power-hungry barons. The Hungarians resented his many absences on imperial business, and the Germans the years he spent in Hungary. In Czech tradition he counted, of course, as enemy number one, "traitor" to Jan Hus and leader of several crusades against the Hussites and the Bohemian estates. Authors with noble sympathies saw in Sigismund a friend of the cities, while bourgeois historians charged him with abandoning urban development in favour of the aristocracy. Pro-conciliarists found him wanting in his support for Basel, papalists as wavering in his loyalty to Rome. Remarkably, neither the Marxist-Leninist orientation of many historians after 1948, nor the post-war "realistic" schools of historical research in West Germany changed essentially these opinions. The national and nationalistic points of view remained overtly or covertly prevalent. Even though some work was done especially on the sources of the period, the overall lack of interest was not conducive to new assessments.

It is worth noting that the initial call for an anniversary exhibition and conference about the age of Sigismund some four or five years ago met with little international response. Probably, the many events that had surrounded the sex-

centennial in 1978 of his father, Charles IV, billed as "an emperor in Europe", have exhausted public interest in the Luxemburgian dynasty. Still, it was at least surprising that this time, in contrast to the internationally organized exhibitions dedicated to Charles IV, some museums altogether ignored the call from Budapest to send objects. That the reactions to our call for papers were rather slim until the last year or so was certainly also a late reflection of Sigismund's "bad press" in the countries of which he was a ruler half a millennium ago. However, many of the participants of the conference expressed the hope that the splendid exhibition in the Museum of the History of Budapest and the international scholarly meeting, even if not changing all this by one strike, marked a definite turn towards a more balanced and matter-of-fact analysis of the age of Sigismund, an age that was instrumental like few others in the birth of what we now call East-Central Europe.

The papers were grouped around four major themes: From Nicopolis to Taus (Domažlice): Sigismund and the Crisis of European Powers; From Constance to Basle; Sigismund and the Crisis of Christendom; Cities, Princes and Barons: Sigismund as Reformer of a New Statehood; and a special section devoted to the cultural history of the period. The opening session bore the title: The Image of Sigismund in Historiography - a topic that was in fact the red thread throughout the proceedings. Altogether some three dozen papers were presented and discussed by an impressive group of speakers and participants. From the octagenarian doyen of Sigismundian studies, Elemér Mályusz, to recently graduated young historians, and from internationally acclaimed authorities to researchers who presented their findings for the first time, a wide spectrum of academic generations were represented. This fact, together with the points of view from the different countries and the diverse theoretical approaches made the meeting a true reflection of that unity in variety which characterized East-Central Europe in both the past and the present.

Since there are plans to publish the proceedings in a German-Hungarian co-production, it is not necessary to attempt a detailed report at this junction. It is, however, worth recording that in spite of the many different points of departure in age, experience, methodology, theory, topographical and topical focus, a certain consensus was established from the outset, namely, that it is imperative to revise the essentially negative image of Sigismund and that it is possible to do so by systematically studying hitherto unexplored sources and by leaving aside national prejudices and a priori evaluations. This truly Central European - one might say Danubian - task has to start with work on the sources, as Prof. Mályusz emphasized in his opening statement. His great calendar of Sigismund's records

needs to be continued. Considering that its earlier parts were produced some time ago and under less than ideal conditions, they may need revision and updating. Several other speakers pointed to records that may yield new insights and demonstrated their value, for example, for urban history (F. Kubu, R. Marsina and others) or for the international context of Sigismund's Bohemian and Hungarian policies (F. Kavka, J. Macek).

A revised image of Sigismund began to emerge already in the opening session in which the speakers (F. Seibt, P. Moraw, H. Koller, J. Macek) agreed that there is no basis for a radical upgrading of his achievements, or for a major "rehabilitation" that usually accompanies such anniversaries. Clearly, Sigismund was not a great ruler, nor a particularly impressive personality; he was an unsuccessful general, a poor guardian of his treasures, and a rather inconsistent and half-hearted reformer. Still, he did acquire posthumously the fame of a man who could solve the ills of the age; witness the apocryphal ascription of the Reformatio Sigismundi to his name. In spite of his failure to resolve the Hussite issue in Constance and his useless and wasteful wars against the Bohemian Estates, it was in fact Sigismund who found a road to an actual compromise between the intransigent Catholic and the radical Hussite exponents of violence. At the end of his life he brought about what may be called a religious co-existence in conflict-torn Central Europe. While the defeat at Nicopolis did in fact mark the last attempt at a general offensive against the Ottomans, Sigismund was able to learn the lesson by decreeing military reforms in Hungary and by finding the right men and the means (e.g., in the reform of the salt monopoly, as explained by I. Draskóczy) to strengthen the defense system on the southern borders of the kingdom (Gy. Rázsó).

Several speakers (A. Kubinyi, P. Engel, M. Polivka, B. Žilinsky, M. Tischler and others) pointed out that in his oft-emphasized and even more often criticized urban policies the king and emperor was able to make some important steps, albeit within possibilities fairly limited by economic, fiscal, and political parameters. A fine example of the Emperor's flexibility was given in the study of Sigismund's policies vis-à-vis the city state of Eger (now Cheb, Czechoslovakia): he was able to use that independent polity not only as an ally, but, when he realized that some kind of *modus vivendi* had to be found in Bohemia, also as a "listening post" and a bridge to the Hussite towns and nobles (F. Kubu). That Sigismund cast such a wide net in international affairs, in economic policies regarding Levantine trade (Zs.P. Pach), in his attempt at a continental blockade (W. von Stromer), in the feelers trying to reach the mid-eastern enemies of his Ottoman enemies, suggests that he was an innovative politician, prepared to

explore all avenues to solve his many problems, even if many of these moves proved to be less than happy. The papers on Sigismund's attitudes to learning (Gy. Székely), the arts and architecture (E. Nagy, I. Feld, E. Marosi, M.V. Schwarz, T. Wehli, A. Kéri and others) described something similar in the field of culture. He was certainly not the magnanimous and knowledgeable patron that his father had been, but he did his best to found a university in Óbuda, he ordered impressive building works in Buda, Pozsony, and Tata, and in fact was the sponsor (whatever the exact dating we accept for them) of the splendid group of stone sculptures recently unearthed in Budapest. Actually the debate about the dating and ascription of these statues, the greatest single group of monuments representing the controversial weichen Stil around 1400 in Europe, was one of the liveliest discussions of the conference.

"An honourable preservation of the status quo" or "a respectable marking of time" were the formulas found most suitable to describe the achievements of Sigismund's fifty years of rule. Even if not all conflicts were resolved, the crises did not become more embittered and avenues for solution remained open. Circumspect arrangements for the acceptance of his designated successor, Albert, were also signs of far-sighted action (D.H. Heimann); that Albert had too little time to continue his father-in-law's policies, was an unforeseen tragedy. One might perhaps go even one step further in the assessment of this "mediocre" ruler. True, he was not an exceptional statesman, but, as I pointed out in my summary, he faced exceptional problems; in order fully to resolve even one of them he would have needed larger than life stature. Few other Christian rulers had to face the existence of two or even three popes, with a considerable history behind both obediences, and certainly none in a context complicated by the rise of conciliar thought and nascent nationalism. The Ottoman advance towards Central Europe was a military threat totally different from earlier feudal conflicts within Europe and had no parallel since the Barbarian invasions: a ruthlessly expansive military power with an entirely alien social and religious background was about to overrun the weak underbelly of the West. The Hussite revolution, this "historical anomaly" (F. Šmahel), was the most advanced and elaborate challenge of the medieval order before the Reformation. Sigismund did manage to call a council, resolve the schism, and support the reforming efforts for quite some time. Had he succeeded in solving the reformatio ecclesiae in caput et membra, he would have been a true novus Constantinus. He did manage to contain Ottoman advance at the line of the Danube; to stop the Turkish expansion into Europe, would have required a new Charles Martel. Last but not least, he was instrumental in achieving a viable solution in Bohemia, one that put an

end to fratricidal bloodshed and lasted for several generations. Hence, one can risk saying that Sigismund, a man of average abilities and with perhaps a too pragmatic/realistic vision, when faced with such extraordinary challenges, did not do too badly.

J á n o s M. B a k

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SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON THE ENLIGHTENMENT

Budapest, 25th July - 2nd August, 1987

The Congress was organized under the auspices of the International Society for Eighteenth Century Studies (ISECS) by the Institute of Historical Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, in cooperation with Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest. The organizers aimed to bring together a congress of a truly interdisciplinary character and a "world congress" in the literal sense of the term; their success in so doing was demonstrated by the range of subjects discussed in six sections and nine round tables by nearly 900 scholars from all continents. It would be vain to attempt to give a precise account of what happened in each of the sections. What follows is a condensed version of the concluding reports on the work of the sections presented at the plenary closing session, and a series of interviews with some distinguished participants of the Congress.

Jean Meyer (France) summarized the activity of section I ("Enlightenment and Economy"), itself divided into four subsections ("Economic policy: tendencies and aspirations"; "Rise of agriculture and the Industrial Revolution"; "Commerce, transport, infrastructure"; "The universities and the shaping of discourses of political economy and economic government"). Professor Meyer laid particular emphasis on the discussions in the fourth of these subsections, since it was through the training of able professionals that links between society and ideology could be forged and theory thereby put into practice, a chief concern of the Enlightenment itself, and a process whose success or failure was an object of close scrutiny in each of the four subsections. In this respect, the Congress was a kind of milestone in the history of congresses on the Enlightenment: it was the first time that an entire section, with its various ramifications, was devoted to the study of economic life. This endeavour has been welcomed as an indication of an interest in the Enlightenment not merely as a purely intellectual movement, but in its penetration into society as well.

"Enlightenment and the Society in Change" was the title of section II, reviewed

at the closing session by Derek Beales (United Kingdom). This section conducted its work in three subsections ("Social forces and enlightened policies"; "The American Revolution and its repercussions"; "The French Revolution and its repercussions"). Professor Beales was the first among the reviewers to apply the word "fragmentation" to the Congress, both in relation to the conclusions drawn and to the work done. He found the synthesizing effect of the Enlightenment to have been questioned by the fact that Enlightenment and Revolution were not "brought together", while - as pointed out by John Pocock in his introduction to section II/2 - the American Revolution should be understood as a result of processes' distinct from the European Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Secondly, he found the papers read too diverse and specialized, although their conclusions could in several cases be generalized (e.g. the view that the group among the nobility seriously affected by the Enlightenment was a minority in every country, as against a considerable conservative majority). One exception was the introduction of Michel Vovelle, who gathered evidence from all over Europe on the echo of the French Revolution. Several of the papers were, however, concerned with one particular country and perhaps made too much of the translations of works by Enlightened authors into a particular language. After all, the *élite* culture of educated people - traditionally a chief concern when studying the dissemination of the Enlightenment - was of a cosmopolitan character, and this reduces the significance of translations. Another critical remark made by Professor Beales was the absence of any account of the effect of French invasion during the revolutionary wars, although this is a case in which the "repercussions of the French Revolution" could quite readily be grasped.

Section III ("Enlightenment: Ideas and their Propagation") was divided into four subsections, two of them ("The church in change"; "Philosophy: its expansion into society") being reported by Norman Hampson (United Kingdom). As to section III/1, Professor Hampson welcomed the complication of the picture drawn of the 18th century, being now at last viewed as something more than "a simple boxing match" between the Enlightenment and established religion. Talking about section III/2, he expressed his agreement with Ulrich Ricken, who, in his introductory paper, had referred to the absence of the link between ideas themselves and their diffusion in society. In Professor Hampson's view, this congress did not go very far in establishing such links: although we heard much penetrating analysis of Hume, Montesquieu, Kant and others, the subject projected in the second phrase of the section's title only received treatment in a minority of the papers. Professor Hampson also remarked that - again, with significant exceptions - the study of the Enlightenment sometimes seemed a "pious commemora-

tion", an object in and for itself, instead of a contribution to a better understanding of our own world. Finally, he also mentioned with some regret the fragmentation of the congress's work into various delimited subjects by many of the participants - something the philosophes of the Enlightenment would probably themselves not have liked very much.

What Professor Hampson found wanting in relation to the penetration of ideas into society was the precise object of study in the two subsections reviewed by Jean Sgard (France) ("Books and the press: vehicles of ideas"; "Schools: traditions and modernization"). Of especially high value were the inquiries into the process of the spreading of literacy and the development of libraries in some of the less advanced regions of Europe (Italy, Greece, Spain, Hungary, the South Slav territories). Research in the field of the history of the printing presses and publishers has provided much new evidence as to the relationship of these with their readers, while journals have been accorded a distinct role in the integration of society. Many of the papers in section III/4 focused on the consequences of the expulsion of the Jesuits and emphasized the importance of the fact that the educational system under their direction was everywhere gradually being replaced by institutions under state management.

Alexander Gieysztor (Poland) presented the report on section IV ("Enlightenment and Scientific Progress"). He particularly stressed the immense diversity of the topics discussed in the four subsections ("Convergence of theory and practice: mathematics, physics, technology"; "The human body and nature - new ideas and new treatments"; "The new political science"; "Clio and her new methods"). Papers were submitted on the popularization of Newtonian physics as well as the relationship of Newtonian physics to deism; on the position of scientists vis à vis their milieu; on the problems of medicine and public health in various regions of Europe (Saxony, Northern Italy, Hungary, Dalmatia) as well as the aesthetics of the human body and the problem of sexuality in the light of 18th century scientific research. Some of the papers in section IV/3 were preoccupied with the development of the republican tradition during the period of the Enlightenment, others with the varieties of the social contract theory (one paper inquired into the influence of Rousseau in Japan). The relationship between reason and sentiment in historical writing was one of the recurrent themes in section IV/4, and the emergence of national historiographies in various parts of Europe (England, Ireland, Portugal) also attracted close scrutiny.

Section V was devoted to the study of "Enlightenment and the Arts". The first subsection, focusing on literature, was further divided into three groups discussing literature and aesthetics, the status of the writer, and finally, lite-

rary genres and trends. "Fragmentation can be fully applied to this section, too," said Haydn Mason (United Kingdom) in his report, though he added that this fact probably sprang from the very nature of literary studies. He therefore praised all the more the synthesizing efforts made in the introductory papers by Jacques Chouillet and Siegfried Jüttner in sections V/1/a and V/1/b respectively. The former pointed to the clear development of aesthetics in the 18th century and the advance beyond classical perceptions, as well as to the necessity of introducing more sophistication and a neater periodization in 18th century literary studies, as a means of avoiding the reduction of the Enlightenment to simplistic forms like "the Age of Reason" etc. In the second introduction, the writer's emergence into someone of independent status as a general phenomenon of the 18th century was questioned, and, in this, the importance of three factors was emphasized: the book market, the writer's relationship with his environment and his own conception of himself. This basic insecurity of 18th and early 19th century writers was also the subject of papers read in the section dealing with Goethe, Schiller, Hamann and others. A striking feature of the work of the section was the interest shown in the position of women writers. Professor Mason also mentioned that much has been learnt about the distribution, although relatively little about the consumption, of books in the period of the Enlightenment. As to section V/1/c, the lack of an introduction resulted in the fact that there was "no structuring influence"; among the trends amply discussed during the sessions were the concern with autobiography shown throughout the period, and the emergence of criticism as an independent literary genre.

There was no summary report on section V/2 ("Music, theatre and their audience"). Reporting on sections V/3-4 ("Architects and art patronage" and "From painting to decorative arts"), David Irwin (United Kingdom) laid a special emphasis on the very last of these topics. It was through the decorative arts that artistic achievement established everyday contact with the various strata of society, a fact the significance of which was well reflected in the extensive treatment the subject received at the Congress. It was also in this field that the Enlightenment ideal "better design - greater trade - greater national prosperity" became especially relevant. Several of the papers dealing with the visual arts, however, also concentrated on the social aspects of artistic activity: the functional aspects of buildings, the mechanisms of patronage, and the relationship between city planning and the holders of power.

The last of the sections - "Enlightenment and National Evolution" - was reported by Béla Köpeczi (Hungary). He again emphasized the significance of the introductory papers, especially that of Ernst Wangermann on the conditions of

national consciousness and that of Yuri Lotman on the role of language in national development. As Professor Köpeczi pointed out, the very conception of the nation is still one of the central subjects of research, no single notion of it being universally applicable in Europe as a whole. The same applies to the content of national consciousness, the object of study in the first of the four subsections. Professor Köpeczi mentioned with some regret that, due to the failure of representatives from Central European countries to appear in the section, the chance of a comparison between the lands of this region, highly interesting with regard to national evolution, had been lost. Section VI/2 was preoccupied with "National language: a unifying and centrifugal factor" and discussed problems like the creation of a literary language or the choice of a regional dialect for that purpose. In that process, of course, a paramount role was played by the development of national literatures that were themselves the focus of interest in section VI/3. Largely theoretical issues were the topics in section VI/4 - "The nation: different meanings of an old term". What Professor Köpeczi especially stressed was the fact that potentially delicate questions of nation, nationality and nationalism were discussed in a truly scholarly manner, without the slightest tinge of national pride or jealousy in any of the sections.

At the end of the closing session, the nine round tables - whose topics ranged from the history of the family in the 18th century through a bicentennial treatment of the American Constitution to the history of the colonial world during the period - heard a summary evaluation by Roland Mortier (Belgium), who has presided the ISECS for the last four years. He also expressed his appreciation to the authors of all the papers read at the Congress, more than 520 in number. Abstracts of these, as well as the full texts of the plenary sessions and the concluding reports will be published by the Voltaire Foundation (Oxford) as the Transactions of the Congress in the series "Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century" in the course of 1987-1988.

The first volume of the Transactions, containing the introductory papers for each theme, was one of several books to appear on the occasion of the Congress. Other publications include Domokos Kosáry's Culture and Society in Eighteenth Century Hungary; Lettre à M. de Voltaire ou plainte d'un Hongrois, edited by Imre Vörös; Projet pour un théâtre national hongrois (1779); Les Lumières en Hongrie et en Pologne, edited by F. Biró, Z. Sinkó and L. Hopp; Les Lumières en Hongrie, en Europe centrale et orientale, the transactions of the 1984 conference on the Enlightenment at Mátrafüred (East-Hungary), edited by Ilona Kovács; and, finally, Sous le signe des Lumières, a collection of articles on the Enlightenment written by young historians of the Eötvös Loránd University and

edited by Éva H. Balázs. To make the Congress an all-round cultural event, it was accompanied by various exhibitions, with "Treasures of 18th Century Literature in the Collections of the National Széchényi Library" and "Culture and Society in 18th Century Hungary" (Ethnographical Museum) being only the most spectacular among them.

As mentioned above, Danubian Historical Studies has asked some eminent scholars about their own impressions concerning the work of the Congress. Domokos Kosáry (Institute of Historical Sciences, Budapest) was Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the Congress. Our first question related to problems of organization and the significance of Budapest's having been chosen as the venue of the Congress.

D.K.: It was at the sixth Congress in Brussels, in 1983, that the question of where to organize the next meeting was discussed, and among the three contenders - the USA, West Germany and Hungary - Hungary, quite unexpectedly, gained the majority of the votes. We understand this partly as a mark of appreciation for the state of the historical profession in Hungary, but, even more importantly, as an indication of an interest in Hungary, for this was the first time that the Congress had been organized in an East European country. Lastly, I would mention that Hungary has at the present time the reputation of being a place where the dialogue between those holding different opinions is generally considered feasible. A great many scholars did indeed come, and the number of participants exceeded that of the Brussels congress. It was my impression that all of them left satisfied with what they had seen and done. It was also the first occasion that the East European countries were represented at the congress to any significant degree. In Brussels, there were four Hungarians and one Pole; in Budapest there was, for instance, a 32 member delegation from the USSR, but specialists from Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany also actively took part in the work of the Congress.

We also wanted to widen the scope of the Congress from the point of view of topics dealt with. True, the International Society has carried on research into a vast number of topics, but literature and the history of ideas have always been paramount among these. We have tried to understand the 18th century as a period in which economics, society and politics also had their own special importance. This emphasis on interdisciplinarity is reflected in an innovation of a technical character, namely, the grouping of papers into six sections and several sub-

sections. These began their work after the plenary opening session, each of them introduced by a paper that somehow determined the course of discussions. At the end, results were summarized at a "summing-up" session, to create a sense in the participants of work having been finished.

A further ambition on our part was to increase familiarity with Hungary's place in Europe, without unduly thrusting ourselves into the foreground. This was the purpose served by my own introductory lecture, while some of the evidence could be viewed at the exhibition at the Ethnographical Museum, a central exhibition put together with the cooperation of other institutions as well. At one of the round tables, specialists from various countries discussed the future of the Enlightenment conferences regularly held at Mátrafüred, and we have decided that they will be needed as one of several workshops operating as links between individual research and large congresses.

DHS: Which of the discussions would you consider to have been especially exciting or important?

D.K.: The work done in the section dealing with the history of agriculture, with the introduction given by Joseph Goy, seemed highly fruitful to me. The discussions in the section on the teaching of economic theories, dominated by scholars from Göttingen's Max Planck Institute, were very lively and informative too. The history of science was also interesting; here Roger Hahn in his introduction challenged the tenet of the "Newtonian revolution" and embedded Newton in a longer process of the development of natural science. Others, however, argued that if one speaks of the Enlightenment conceived as the application of scientific achievement to economics and politics, then it was certainly Newton who had "publicity" throughout the 18th century. When we look for the beginnings of the Enlightenment in Hungary, we find it at the point where Newton was already believed.

DHS: What insights has the Congress provided into the role of Hungary and the East-Central European region in the period?

D.K.: This is one of the questions in which, although they were not the subjects of any separate discussions, we have taken a great step forward. Historians in Western Europe have not paid much attention to the East since the Second World War. For instance, the French *Clio* series, i.e. the university textbooks, formerly displayed an all-European scope, while the *Nouvelle Clio* is overwhelmingly concerned with the history of Western Europe. On the other hand, to take Hungary as an example, the focus of interest has been the relation between the country and the Habsburg Monarchy, or, more precisely - and even more restrictedly - the government in Vienna. This has created various divergences. It was demon-

strated by French historians long ago that Europe as a whole showed an upward trend throughout the 18th century. By contrast, in Hungarian historiography there used to be a lot of romantic-nationalist nonsense, namely that the 18th century was a period of decline, misery, colonial status, etc., and one was unable to see how an enlightened literature and the antifeudal national programme of Hajnóczy could develop. Now, the efforts made on both sides may have coordinated these two images, and East-Central Europe could be allocated its right place in the all-European model. We are a peripheral zone, but peripheries are also parts of the general pattern. This means that people in Hungary, who had still insisted on the old concepts, have been compelled to realize that Hungary could not adopt a course different from that of the European model, while people from the West have been made to discover the richness of the heritage of the Enlightenment here.

At the Congress, J.G.A. Pocock (Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore) read the introductory paper in section II/2 on the American Revolution.

DHS: In some of your earlier writings you made the case for a distinct subject called "British" history. Now, in your introduction you have related this to the idea of the plurality of "Enlightenments", arguing "there was no petit troupeau des philosophes promoting Enlightenment in England; neither the deists at the outset of the siècle des lumières, nor the Benthamite philosophic radicals at its close, quite fill that role". Is this meant to challenge M.C. Jacob's thesis of a "radical Enlightenment", with the deists featuring prominently in it, and what is, then, your own assessment of the "plurality of Enlightenments"?

J.G.A.P.: There was indeed a rationalism with illuminist and radical possibilities, looking back in some ways to the English republicanism of the seventeenth century, and in some ways displaying affinities with Freemasonry. Without quarrelling over points of detail, I agree with the broad outlines of what Margaret Jacob has written. But on the other hand, you have what seems to me an Enlightenment, in the sense that it represents religion as civil, reasonable, comprehensive and supportive of the established order in Church and state, and this is the Newtonian Enlightenment, which Jacob sometimes calls the magisterial Enlightenment, as opposed to the radical. In the second place, though Englishmen like John Toland, who are figures of her radical Enlightenment, were unorthodox rationalists in point of religion, their rationalism is illuminist and shows affinities with Renaissance Neoplatonism - figures like Bruno - and with some aspects of radical Protestant spirituality, like e.g. Jakob Böhme. So, it is easy to have both a conservative and a radical Enlightenment. In English thought, particularly, you see this reflected in, or rather, related to, the fight of the Church of England on two fronts. The Church of England had, on the one hand, to struggle against

papistry, against what is called superstition, against in fact the embodiment of religious authority in visible symbols. Since my coming to this part of the world, I think of this very much as a struggle against the baroque. This is one side of the story. But on the other hand, Anglicans always had to defend themselves against the radical claims of the sects, which they called enthusiasm, and they tended to see the rationalism of Toland, Spinoza and figures of that kind as directly descended from the radicalism and enthusiasm of the sects. I find this going on in English thought throughout the eighteenth century, at the end of which it is reflected in the head-on collision between Edward Gibbon and Joseph Priestley. Both Gibbon's history of Christianity and Priestley's emphasize the Platonist and Neoplatonist component as responsible for all superstition, for all the debate over heresy, and in many ways for all enthusiasm as well. Yet, from identical histories of Christianity, Gibbon draws conclusions which are conservative and anti-enthusiastic, and Priestley conclusions which are radical and which seemed enthusiastic both to Gibbon and to Edmund Burke. Now, when it comes to a plurality of Enlightenments, I want to deduce the Enlightenment of Gibbon, and that of Hume and the Scottish moderates very much from this position. And there is no way that I know of in which to relate this controversy to the kind of thing conducted by the philosophes.

The next Congress on the Enlightenment will be organized in Bristol. We asked Haydn Mason (Bristol University) about the experiences gained and the lessons learned in Budapest.

H.M.: I think there are several things about this conference that one can look at. There was the disciplinary spread of papers and the spread of different fields of interest, which was extremely useful, and in which a great deal of work was done by a very large number of specialists. This is in itself an ideal, an aim we must try to adopt in Bristol. The International Society is interdisciplinary, and this has been a very interdisciplinary conference. The Budapest conference was not the first to have achieved this - Brussels and Pisa were already very rich in this respect - but the diversity has been considerably greater here. The second point is of a different order, and concerns the efficiency of the Congress. People on the organizing staff have made sure that participants knew what was going on. It is very easy to lose touch if you are trying to go from one section to another, and I think that, in many many ways, orientation was made much easier. On the practical level, having secretaries in each section is certainly something that we shall do in Bristol, because we want to be sure that people have a sense of what is actually going on at the conference. Thirdly, a very important part must be given to history in the future conferences. I myself am

by specialist training much more of a littéraire, a historian of ideas, but not a historian in the proper sense of the term, but I am very anxious that the historical aspect should be maintained and that it should be of great importance. And there is a last point. It is too early yet, of course, to say exactly what we are going to be doing - ideas are just developing - but I am very anxious that we should not lose the sense of cosmopolitanism that Budapest has been so very good at providing, because Hungary, geographically speaking, is ideal for this. It is marvelous for East and West to come together. It will be harder for us in Bristol, but we shall do our very best to maintain that sort of ambience, and I hope very much that people from Eastern Europe will be able to attend in large numbers, as they did here.

Robert Darnton (Princeton University), newly elected president of the ISECS, spoke of his ambitions as follows.

R.D.: The chief objective I wish to pursue is the forwarding of the tendency that has been apparent at the last congresses, an endeavour also pursued by my distinguished predecessor Roland Mortier. The Eighteenth Century Society is international - as was the "republic of letters" of the Enlightenment philosophes - and we must maintain and increase its international character, and to facilitate dialogue between as many scholars and views as possible. The eighteenth century ought not to be solely a period of study for its own sake; it should rather serve as a means of bringing people interested in the same subject closer to each other. Study of the Enlightenment, with its ideological diversity and tolerant attitude, is an excellent vehicle for such an exchange of ideas. It is vital that scholars from Eastern Europe, as well as those from the West, should participate in this activity, and here I wish to add that I am deeply impressed by the enormous talent I have found here in Hungary for such a dialogue. We have plans for an "East - West seminar". Young students of the Enlightenment from both Eastern and Western countries could come together in Paris - the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme has offered its hospitality - and there they could attend lectures, hold discussions and freely make use of libraries and archives. Later, the seminar could be moved to somewhere in Eastern Europe - Budapest, for instance.

DHS: At the Congress, you chaired a round-table discussion entitled "Publishing the Enlightenment" which dealt with problems related to what you call "the social history of ideas". How has this subject gained as a result of the Congress?

R.D.: "The social history of ideas" is, of course, a slogan. The research I am doing and which other people are doing is an attempt to understand a set of related questions: the question of the role of the intellectual in society; the ideological preparation of the French Revolution in particular and the revolution-

nary era in general; and the way ideas circulate through the social order, something which could be applied to any period in history. It is, at least the way I envisage it, a total circuit of communication that goes from writers to publishers and printers, to booksellers, and finally to customers, libraries, and the people who are making sense of books. Every stage should be studied. I do not think, in other words, that you can any longer distinguish between the study of the content of ideas on the one hand and their diffusion on the other. The final stage in this communication circuit is reading itself and the formation of public opinion. How did readers read in the past? We do not really know, but I think we can assume that they did not read exactly as we do today. The contents of a text itself no longer seems self-evident, and what we need to do is recreate the mental framework in which readers operated and to think of the text as something that touches off an active intellectual cognitive process of making sense of things. It seems the greatest danger in something like Enlightenment studies is anachronism. By this I mean simply saying, "What a good thing the Enlightenment was!" I happen to agree with this opinion, but it is not adequate as a methodology. I am convinced that something like anthropology gives us a much more valid approach: anthropology in the very general sense of the word, that is, an attempt to understand the symbolic systems within which people operated. You find this emphasis everywhere in a certain kind of cultural history; you find it even in the work of, for example, John Pocock who is talking about political history and who attempts to recreate political language as he calls it. You cannot simply read texts, you have to get at the idiom which flows through, from one text to another, and this is part of the way people understood the political world. Those of us working in the field of diffusion studies are, I think, concerned with the same problems, and the old-fashioned "pure" history of ideas looks inadequate to us. I sense, especially among younger historians, an excitement about understanding intellectual life and cultural systems as something much more complex. We have a new set of methods and assumptions, and a new sense of the problématique that make for a renewal of Enlightenment studies. So I think what seems at first to be a rather esoteric subject in which one counts books in libraries, for example, is in fact a subject which moves in many different directions and which has a bearing on many different kinds of history, and also on many classic questions, such as the connection between the Enlightenment and the French Revolution.

DHS: You mentioned France and the French Revolution several times, but in your round table the question of the generalization of results relating to France was also raised. What are the prospects for the extension of your branch of research to other regions of Europe?

R.D.: It is true that most of the work in this area has been concerned with France. After all, France was the main home of the Enlightenment and it was in France that the Revolution broke out. It is natural that the work should have a French bias. Research, however, has not been concerned solely with France. Some speakers at the round table pointed out, for example, that not all of our results are generally applicable in Europe: for instance, the ideological commitment of publishers and booksellers to the works they disseminated was much more pronounced in England and Germany than it was in France. These questions, it seems to me, are also urgent and important for people studying the Danubian Basin. Certainly I think that these methods can be applied to any country during the 18th century, and to Hungary in particular. You find people doing sociological studies of reading habits (as Dr. Tóth of Hungary has done), people trying to look at the composition of libraries (Professor Vidan has read a paper on libraries in Yugoslavia), and others following the flow of books through the book trade, or attempting to understand the composition of the intelligentsia. I think these studies would employ the same techniques that I have been using and which Roger Chartier, Henri-Jean Martin and others have been using in France, the only difference being that these techniques are now applied to a different geographical region. A lot of this work, of course, is connected with an older kind of social history of ideas, which was simply quantitative and which was very important. But many of us are now connecting this quantitative type of study to a more anthropological sense of how it was that culture operated.

Roger Chartier spoke about some of the actual results gained by the methods explained by Robert Darnton. The interview with Roger Chartier was conducted by István György Tóth, secretary of the Organizing Committee, for Hungarian Television.

R.C.: As to the style of reading, we have tried to show that the 18th century, or the Enlightenment, was a period of transition between two types of reading. The old style can be termed intensive reading, that is, reading which is linked to a small number of available books. These were books with very long lives, usually of religious character, and which were re-read several times, learnt by heart and recited. Reading was therefore related to a sacral activity: the religious element is all the time discernible in it. The 18th century seems to have brought about, for more and more layers, a break with this old style of reading, and the appearance of a new type, extensive reading. This was pursued with several books being read more or less simultaneously, with printed material being more closely linked with current events. The religious nature of reading material was diminished, while new genres, such as the journal and the novel, made their

appearance. Reading became more fluent and was no more confined to the repeated deciphering of a few texts. The reader freely switched from one text to another, and became able to traverse the new and ever widening world of publications.

I.Gy.T.: You mentioned that reading spread down the social scale during the 18th century. What do we know about the reading habits of the lower strata?

R.C.: Two things must be mentioned when talking about the reading habits of the masses, both the peasantry and the urban poor. The first is their relationship with written culture, including the relationship of those unable to read. Surprising though it may be, it is an established fact that the written word was accessible to illiterates; it only required that someone read the texts aloud. Reading aloud for the benefit of others was a quite widespread practice in many regions, especially in towns, where not only the various kinds of writing to be seen on walls - posters, notices, announcements, etc. - but also books and journals on display at booksellers were read aloud to the illiterate. Undoubtedly, there existed a certain illiterate reading culture, about which I have already written quite extensively. The second thing we ought not to forget is that 18th century publications which aimed at the lowest strata contained illustrations as well as texts. On notices and posters, as well as in the most popular books, illustrations played an extremely important part in facilitating the understanding of the text. By relying on the assistance of others and by looking the pictures one could comprehend the almanacs, even if one was completely unable to read.

I.Gy.T.: How about the institutional background to the development of reading culture?

R.C.: In the 18th century, public libraries made their appearance in England, France, Germany and elsewhere. To say that these libraries could be used freely would certainly be an exaggeration. Nevertheless, great ecclesiastical collections, royal libraries, and libraries of scientific and jurists' societies were opened to the public, the conditions naturally differing considerably over time and from place to place. The 18th century witnessed a rapid increase in the number of reading societies in England and Lesegesellschaften in Germany, i.e. societies where one could enrol by paying a certain amount of money. The sum was not very high, but was high enough to exclude the lowest strata, even if they wished to join these societies. In return for the subscriptions, members had access to the books purchased by the society and could read them in the reading rooms. Among the publications obtained by the reading societies, journals were very important, as these continued to be expensive and few people could afford to subscribe to every issue of every journal. The new genres, such as novels, were also of great im-

portance. Clubs, coffeehouses and literary societies were relevant too. The promotion of reading was not their primary function, but buying journals, reading in common and the discussion of what had been read was important here, too. I think it was this institutional network - library, reading society, club, coffee-house, literary society - that formed the backbone of the new political and social milieu where readers became disputants and critics, subjecting both the state and religion to close scrutiny. A new social environment - in which the written word played a great role, especially with the spread of newspapers - gradually evolved first in England, then in France and later in other countries, such as Germany and the countries of Central Europe. This is the setting in which the conditions were created in some countries for the preparation of a revolution, for instance in France in 1789.

Rudolf Vierhaus (Max Planck Institute, Göttingen) chaired a round table discussion, entitled "Enlightenment and Reforms".

DHS: "Reform" is a word often mentioned here and there in various contexts today. What insights has the Congress offered into its meaning during the period of the Enlightenment?

R.V.: The crucial problem of the Enlightenment is the difference between programme and reality, or, theory and practice. The Enlightenment was not only an intellectual movement of historic significance, but one with the aim of changing reality. The papers read at our round table were case studies, that is, contributions on this general question, which is, I think, a problem we still have to face today. The Enlightenment was the first movement to construct programmes which said that men should live and think in a specific way and that specific ideas should be accepted, for instance that man has rights by birth and there should be constitutional government. But the implementation of programmes proved to be a problem. Most thinkers of the early Enlightenment believed that their goals could be attained in a very short time. Later they had to learn that this was a long-term process. Furthermore, people were confident, not only in France, but everywhere in Europe, that enlightened ideas would be realized by peaceful reform, and then different trends came into conflict with each other, resulting in a revolution that nobody wanted. It ended in terror, and therefore, ever since the experience people had with the French Revolution, you always had to say when you wanted reforms that you did not want a revolution because that might end in a despotic system of government - a military dictatorship. The general scheme also applies to specific fields of development. I think one of the most important ideas of the Enlightenment was that there should be general education, because educated people could think and act in a better way.

But to implement this, to have a generally accepted and centrally financed school system, was also a long process. You could say that the programme of the Enlightenment has not been completely realized even now. On the other hand, you can, of course, maintain that the representatives of the Enlightenment were not aware of the resistance of old traditions and of the fact that people want to live and act not only in accordance with rational ideas but that they also want to follow their emotions freely. I think these are really important questions. All governments and political movements today, and those individuals who want to reform even such things as school systems, always have to ask themselves first what their aims are, whether it is a long process to arrive at these aims and to what degree the masses are able to realize what it means to act in a rational way.

DHS: You mentioned that the resistance stemming from tradition might vitiate the chances of reform. Considering the differences in traditions in the various parts of Europe, how far do you regard the Enlightenment a uniform intellectual current, and how much should diversity be taken into account?

R.V.: I think one cannot arrive at a final answer to this question. Frenchmen have always believed that the Enlightenment was in substance a French movement. It is understood now that the Enlightenment was a general intellectual movement, although it took specific forms in different countries because of its combination with different trends, conditions and traditions. In Germany, for instance, one finds a difference between the Catholic Enlightenment and the Protestant Enlightenment, there is the influence from the combination of Pietism and the Enlightenment, etc. Here, in Hungary, the specific situation was that while the Viennese Enlightenment undoubtedly made its own impact, there were other direct influences from Paris, Göttingen and other places in Germany. And therefore you cannot speak of, for example, an "Enlightenment in the Habsburg Empire", because people here thought differently from the way people in Vienna did. One should not forget that the Enlightenment gave rise to a new understanding of national differences. For when one invites people not only to think in a rational way, but also to become conscious of themselves, then they come to ask what they are and what their traditions are. And if they go on to think in rational ways, they also come to ask how they can combine the experience of their own society with the experiences of others and what they have to do to organize and reform society. There is an older theory of Gerschenkron that societies coming later than others may have the chance to make their way to reforms faster because they already see what has happened in other societies. The danger is that they then try to reform too quickly and "overorganize" change. One can, of course, organize change, but only up to a certain point, or else one underestimates the resis-

tance of tradition. It is a highly interesting question, and I think we should discuss much more what it is that we still have to do to achieve a better understanding of the Enlightenment as a combination of general structures and specific - national, confessional, etc. - manifestations.

Éva H. Balázs (Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest) was the deputy chairman of the Organizing Committee and chaired a round table that presented the state of research pursued by former students of the University.

DHS: How would you assess the performance of Hungarian participants at the Congress?

É.H.B.: From a Hungarian point of view, I think the Congress brought clear successes in certain fields, for example, in the history of political thought, with Gábor Pajkossy talking about Hungarian constitutional reform projects in the 1790s and Éva Ring speaking on Central European confederation plans during the same period. But I could also mention the paper on religious art by Géza Galavics in the section on art history, or the paper on cameralism by Aladár Madarász in the section on the teaching of economic theories. The list is far from complete. Foreign participants - Robert Darnton, Derek Beales and Rudolf Vierhaus among others - spoke of a "Hungarian breakthrough" at the congress, for which, I am delighted to say, much of the credit must go to the younger generation. It is widely known that leading Hungarian scholars have for several decades enhanced the reputation of Hungarian historiography in various international forums. Now our younger specialists also had an opportunity to demonstrate their professional grounding and versatility. The round table I chaired drew on the research done by some former pupils of our University's Department of Medieval and Early Modern World History and who are now junior scholars. Their contributions provoked a lively interest and received a highly positive response. I am confident that this will continue, and I believe that the attitude of Robert Darnton, the new president, justifies my optimism. He considers the participation of young people to be very important. Lastly, the Congress has also been encouraging in that it reflected a widening of the interdisciplinary character of Enlightenment studies - an endeavour that has for a long time been paramount in the research done at our Department.

DHS: How has the Congress contributed to your understanding of the place of Hungary and Central Europe in the Enlightenment?

É.H.B.: This has for long been a controversial issue among Hungarian historians. For my part, I constantly find myself asking whether we are justified in labelling ourselves as "peripheral" or "marginal", and whether the indicators of underdevelopment, well established in economic history, can or should in all circumstances

and in all periods be applied to the Danubian region. In particular, there has as yet been no serious analysis as to how reliable these economic categories are in cultural history. I think that the politically tinged approach, which lumps Central Europe and Eastern Europe together and which mixes up social and cultural history with economic facts without any qualification, is too simplistic and is incompatible with a proper historical approach. For instance, the antecedents of the Enlightenment included the dissemination of the Reformation, and the degree to which the Reformation was adopted in various countries is highly relevant. The significance of the fact that in Hungary Protestantism could provide a political justification for the resistance of the Estates to the Habsburgs ought not to be exaggerated. We should, instead, focus on the enormous encouragement given to vernacular languages and literatures everywhere by both the Lutheran and the Calvinist Reformations. In Hungary, this was especially the case, the results being most readily observable in Transylvanian literature, which unfortunately has been quite neglected in research. This is, of course, by no accident: due to the present unavailability of archive material, no new treatments of this literature based on primary sources can be expected to appear in the near future.

Anyway, one very important question, and one that has always dominated my own research, is how the adoption or refashioning of the "intellectual treasures" arriving in Hungary from all over Europe (in other words, their adjustment to our own potentialities) was actually carried out. Again, it is a simplification to claim that Hungary was merely a receptor. For more than a decade, I have cherished the idea of applying the triangle theory of economic history to the field of cultural history, and I raised this again in the introduction to our round table. The idea was received with remarkable interest, especially on the part of German scholars. Rudolf Vierhaus, for instance, said that the theory could be fully applied to Germany, since - apart from the Kantian school - Germany is also often assigned the role of a "receptor", despite the existence of an early German Enlightenment comparable to the English one both in its content and in its weight. And indeed, just as there were totally underdeveloped - if you like, "marginal" - zones in "central" areas like France or the Netherlands, the intellectual yield of Germany, despite her political fragmentation, was striking. German universities were far ahead of the French ones, and that Frenchmen were aware of this is reflected in the fact that throughout the period of the Enlightenment they flocked to German universities. It was there that they could obtain the most up-to-date training in economics, statistics and natural science. The English also quite often attended the German universities, particularly Göttingen, with the dynastic links between Britain and Hanover probably only one among

several factors. Now, just as German universities enjoyed a good reputation, there was, by the late 18th century, a centre of agricultural training and research at Keszthely, Hungary. Known as the Georgicon, this was invariably mentioned in journals circulating widely in Europe, its name occurring alongside those of the most renowned Western educational institutions.

I came to know about Göttingen with its international milieu quite well through my research into the career of Gergely Berzeviczy, who studied there in the 1780s, along with several of his compatriots. Their activity compelled me to raise another point. Some of my distinguished colleagues consider the French Revolution to be a landmark in the history of the Hungarian Enlightenment as well. This is a position that seems extremely dubious to me. I am convinced that future research will vindicate my opinion, and the opinion of all those who reject the theory that Hungarian society "turned reactionary" and "retreated into the arms of Vienna" as a consequence of the shock of the French Revolution. People who were born in the 1760s and who lived up to the Reform Era could not have changed their minds completely during these decades. In my view, the call of the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on tolerance and equity, provoked a lively response in Hungarian society, and the fact and manner of the renewal of the reform activities in the 1820s demonstrates that the projects devised by these very up-to-date minds were, by the time of the Reform Era, considered to be worth undertaking, developing and codifying. Berzeviczy is sometimes singled out as an exceptional figure, but his correspondence furnishes ample evidence for the existence of similarly minded collaborators. I refer not only to people like Hajnóczy, who has already received much publicity, but also to others such as József Dessewffy, Ferenc Széchenyi, Czindery, the Vay brothers, etc. These figures have not yet attracted the attention they deserve and are sometimes even characterized as stubborn conservatives. I also expect the inquiries into the activities of these men to produce a new and more positive evaluation of the nobility, even the aristocracy, which, in the event, honestly undertook the tasks of political leadership, in other words, the settlement of the constitutional status of the country and the voicing of the reform demands raised by the Enlightenment. Their activity is the best example of reconciling moderate behaviour, and in some cases a profound piety, with a commitment to the principles of the Enlightenment. It is a recurring error in Enlightenment studies that only possible materialists and those who were very radical can be regarded as its consistent adherents. The mainstream of the Enlightenment was not radical but rather humanitarian. It involved very important positions from liberty of conscience to social criticism, but it did not aim at a radical trans-

formation of society. This last was the "privilege" of the French Revolution, which, let me stress once more, did not automatically put an end to the Enlightenment, the survival of which depended on specific structures. The Revolution terminated the ancien régime, but not the Habsburg Monarchy, nor the Prussian state. Here society remained within its traditional framework, and the forms of thought related to that framework were only affected to a limited extent. Unlike many other scholars, I regard the conservative trend in the Enlightenment to be as respectable as the radical. In any event, the Hungarian intellectual élite, overwhelmingly recruited from the nobility, favoured this position, and - even if it did so because it was "incapable" of absorbing more "advanced" ideas - we should nevertheless honour it, since it was in the spirit of these conservative, or rather, moderately progressive, views that the Reform Era eventually came to fruition.

L á s z l ó - K o n t l e r

Institute of Historical Sciences

EROBERER UND EINGESESSENE. GEOGRAPHISCHE LEHNAMEN
ALS ZEUGEN DER GESCHICHTE SÜDOSTEUROPAS IM ERSTEN
JAHRTAUSEND n. Chr.

By Gottfried Schramm (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1981, 468 pp.)

The author of the book is a linguist, or as he himself says, "a philologist-turned-historian", who applies his expertise in linguistics to the solution of historical problems. He touches no lesser an issue than the development of ethnic relations in the Carpathian Basin and the Northern Balkans, usually called South-Eastern Europe, in the 1st millennium A. D., as reflected in the historico-linguistical changes of the ancient toponymy adopted by Roman, and, later on, Slavic conquerors. His studies are based on a large corpus of names, which, nevertheless, has not been analysed with equal thoroughness in the countries of this area, and, with the exception of Austria, Slovenia, and Hungary, has not been examined from a historical point of view. From this material, Schramm selects approximately 200 names for analysis. It is the history of river denominations that has proved to be the most illuminating, for chronologically-speaking, these are the earliest names and were more likely to survive than the names of settlements, which were themselves often prone to destruction.

During the first half of the 1st millennium A. D., the linguistic form of these river names underwent a peculiar change as regards their end sounds. This is to say that if the forms preserved in early Greek or Latin sources ended in -os, -on, or -us, -is, -um, respectively, i. e. if their inflections used to be masculine or neuter, in the first centuries A. D. they adopted the end sound -a (cf. Tissos - Tisa, Savus - Sáva, Colapis - Kupa, Strymon - Struma, Ragusium - Ragusa). This end vowel -a, which, owing to lack of sources, can seldom be observed before the year 600, not only appears in river names, but also in settlement names, and even in common nouns (e. g. plant names of Dacian origin). This therefore seems to be a general tendency in the history of local languages, one that in most cases can only be evidenced in Slavic languages, although it is not of Slavic origin itself. This latter fact seems to be obvious if we consider that the transformation of the original masculine ending into the

end vowel -a had certainly started before the Slavs arrived in this area, and in the 3rd and 4th centuries A. D. it was already widespread. Further evidence is provided by the fact that in the area previously inhabited by the Slavs, river names (Seret, Prut, Dniestr, Dniepr, Don) do not end in -a. As early as 1932, the prominent Hungarian linguist János Melich proved that the river names Sava and Drava were borrowed by the Slavs from a language which used the end vowel -a, and in general, the Slavic river names ending in -a were not created on the analogy of rěka or voda ('river', 'water'). Agreeing with the above, Schramm also rejects the explanation that the end vowel -a is in a way the result of an internal development within the Greek or the Latin language, river names being masculine in these languages for the simple reason that the Greeks and the Romans had male river deities. So there remains only one way to find a solution: to trace the origin of the end vowel -a to the barbaric languages of the region of the Danube and the Balkan peninsula.

Recent research has called into doubt the earlier hypothesis that in the Danubian region and in the Northern Balkans there existed an Eastern Thracian as well as a Western Illyrian language, and instead, several, definitely Indo-European, related languages are assumed. Schramm, therefore, usually speaks of a "regional-barbaric" language or languages, and attributes the emergence of the end sound -a to a local barbaric language in which the last syllable underwent a weakening of articulation, becoming a single faintly articulated vowel (known as shwa). During the period in which place names were borrowed, up to 800 A. D., this sound was absent from Greek, Latin, Germanic and Slavic languages, and was substituted for by -a. For this reason, Schramm uses the term "secondary -a" and traces the origin of this sound back to linguistic influence by North Iranian Sarmatian (Yazig, Roxolanic) peoples who migrated towards the South from the Hungarian Plain (the Alföld) and the Lower Danube, since in their languages all end sounds became weakened into shwa. This hypothesis is supported by the geographical distribution of place names ending in "secondary -a" in a large area which comprises present-day Hungary as well as the regions adjoining the rivers Drava, Sava, and the Lower Danube, the plains between the Balkan and the Rhodope mountains, and the Adriatic coastal region from Istria down to Epirus. However, it does not include the Carpathian and the Balkan mountains, and therefore it seems to be a phenomenon peculiar to plains (map no.1). The North Iranian peoples were Nomads with horses who, therefore, occupied the plains; thus it was indeed they who might have influenced the language of the local barbarians.

Still, it requires some consideration whether the Slavs, who arrived there

after the year 600, did really borrow place names from a population which spoke neither Latin nor Greek, but which had its own barbaric language; Schramm's map no. 4 shows Latin-speaking inhabitants in areas which on map no. 1 belong to the range of "secondary -a", namely, the region between the rivers Drava and Sava, the banks of the Lower Danube, and the Dalmatian shore. In these areas, the names may have come from a Romanized population rather than from local barbaric people, although the Hungarian archaeologist András Mócsy sees sufficient evidence for the existence of the latter to suppose even a "Thracian-Illyrian koine" in Moesia Superior (Eastern Bulgaria) in Gesellschaft und Romanisation in der römischen Provinz Moesia Superior (Amsterdam, 1970, p. 249). Schramm's hypothesis is, however, not one of linguistic amalgamation of barbaric peoples under Roman rule, but one of Sarmatian linguistic influence on various languages, which, in any case, indicates "ties over large distances, which created a new type of community among barbarians. Nevertheless, the linguistic community defined by "secondary -a" included only peoples on the plains, as we have seen; not only in the abovementioned areas, Romanized till 600, but also in the valleys of the rivers Maritsa and Tundža, in the south, as shown in Schramm's map no. 1. This fact can be explained by the settlement of a Danubian Romanized population, fleeing the Slavic invaders; it seems to be evident in Macedonia and Thessaly, but we might as well suppose that it also took place west of these regions. One of the most convincing and most interesting things to be found in Schramm's book is the demonstration of a massive north-south migration of a Latin-speaking Danubian population to the Greek linguistic area; these people have survived as Macedo-Rumanians up to this day, but the migration is also reflected in place names ending in "secondary -a".

The high occurrence of such linguistic forms among Romanized populations can be explained in terms of an influence of local barbaric populations only if we suppose the existence of a Latin-barbaric bilingualism widespread in the Danubian areas and in the Northern Balkans - an idea which is, however, absent from Schramm's book. Instead, we can find traces of the concept expounded by the Rumanian archeologist Constantin Daicoviciu. It is argued by the latter that, as in the Dalmatian coastal areas, in the Lower Danubian region "an amazing degree of Romanization took place during the course of six centuries", while "Romanization did not pervade the central Balkans to such a degree (...) it only slightly affected the mountainous area in the west, where relatively few Latin inscriptions have been found, this region being inhabited continuously by non-Romanized Thracians and Illyrians, who were ancestors of the Albanians and - after having become Slavonized - of the Serbs and Croats" (Istoria României

[The History of Rumania], vol. I, București 1960, p. 794). Thus, place names ending in "secondary -a" cannot be found in these mountains, where the local barbaric population preserved the masculine and neuter endings in river names; this means they remained outside the communicative unity of the Roman Empire.

Schramm successfully proves the sharp separation of plains and mountains by showing that the changing of end sounds in river names into a "secondary -a" was only effected in the lowland reaches of rivers, but not in mountainous areas. Quite an illuminating example is the duality which can be observed in the classical names for rivers which flow from Transylvania to the Hungarian and Rumanian plains. In Jordanes's mid-6th century history of the Goths the forms Tisia, Grisia, Marisia, Tibisia and Aluta appear, corresponding to the fact that the Goths dwelled in the plains. Meanwhile, the Transylvanian mountainous areas not only preserved the names Körös, Maros, Temes, and Olt but also passed them down to present-day Hungarian (an exception is the river name that used to be Tissos, but, as a result of its typical lowland course, became Tisza in Hungarian and Tisa in Rumanian and Serbian). These names, as Schramm mentions, were borrowed by the Rumanians in the forms Cris, Mureș, Timis and Olt from the Hungarian language, that is after the settlement of the Hungarians in Transylvania, which took place around 900; and the Hungarians borrowed them from the Slavs. Consequently, as the plains became depopulated, the river names ending in "secondary -a" were no longer used, and were preserved only in mountainous areas, which, however, did not belong to the Roman communicative unity. Nor did these areas have ties with the area between the Danube and the Tisza, a region which never belonged to the Roman Empire, but which was exposed to Sarmatian linguistic influence, and thus, was involved in the linguistic development which produced "secondary -a".

These findings lead us to important conclusions about the much-debated issue of Daco-Roman continuity, i. e. the continuous survival of the Rumanian people in the territory of ancient Dacia, or more exactly, in present-day Transylvania, from the 2nd century A. D. to this day. Schramm duly draws the conclusion in the matter of both Albanian and Rumanian continuity. "Albania and Rumania are similar in that neither Albanian, nor Rumanian scholars have analyzed thoroughly enough the highly important corpus of evidence provided by old borrowed names, although this heritage is readily accessible and the material is easy to survey. In a more or less apodictical fashion, they claim that the ancient heritage of names proves the unbroken continuity of these two peoples in their present-day homelands since antiquity, or at least it does not contradict the theorem of continuity. The serious objections, which have been brought forward by scholars of other nations,

are never refuted by the defenders of this theory in a careful, considered way. Instead, they usually ignore or abruptly rule out such considerations" (pp. 31, 32.) After locating the ancient Albanian homeland in the region of present-day Stip instead of in today's Albania, Schramm enters upon the analysis of the ancient names of rivers and streams still extant in the Rumanian language, including the five names mentioned above, plus Szamos - Someș, Ompoly - Ampoi, Argyas - Argeș, Berzava - Birzava, Cserna - Cerna, Prut, Szeret - Siret, Duna - Dunăre, Küküllő - Tîrnava, Zsil - Jiu Vedeia and Bodza - Buză, as well as Abrud (the name of a settlement) and Bihar - Bihor (a mountain name). His results generally agree with the findings of Hungarian linguist István Knieszsa, namely, that in the case of the abovementioned names, their present-day Rumanian versions cannot be derived from the documented or hypothetical ancient forms if we suppose that they have undergone only such changes that are permitted by the laws of Rumanian phonology; so there must have been a Slavic or Hungarian mediation. In the case of the names Küküllő and Bihar, Schramm's views are original, although debatable; but it seems to be a quite ingenious hypothesis that the Wallacho-Rumanians coming from the south might have borrowed the names Argeș and Buză directly from a non-Romanized population living in what is present-day Muntenia. As for Dacia, i. e. present-day Transylvania, he definitely asserts that it was a "non-Romanized area" (pp. 128, 129). The Wallacho-Rumanian language, in Schramm's view, is "a continuation of the language of the Roman refugees in the Central Balkans", already separated from the coastal Dalmatian language, which implies that the Wallacho-Rumanian language was a creation of the Romanized population which fled from the region of the Sava and the Danube to Thessaly and Macedonia. Schramm finds it totally impossible that this population should have had such close ties over such a large distance with the Roman people who had allegedly remained in Transylvania, that they, instead of developing two distinct languages, spoke two dialects of the same language (incidentally, with identical traces of an Albanian impact in both), therefore he considers the theory of Wallacho-Rumanian continuity to be untenable.

Schramm's great merit lies in the fact that, instead of limiting research to smaller areas or to a single country, his book covers the whole of South-Eastern Europe, and he is able to demonstrate general trends in linguistic development in this large area. Whether he has found a definitive explanation for the origin of these trends, has yet to be answered by further research, research which he, with this book, wishes to encourage. With endearing modesty, he writes in the Introduction: "What I propose here is nothing but an imperfect attempt, to be

perfected with the help of colleagues. My book belongs to the class which can be good - if ever - only in its second edition". A proper sign of appreciation would be to say that we eagerly look forward to this second edition.

L á s z l ó M a k k a i

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SIEBENBÜRGEN IM FRÜHMITTELALTER

Antiquitas Reihe 3, Bd. 28, by Kurt Horedt (Bonn: Habelt, 1986, 212 pp., illustrations, 12 tables)

Kurt Horedt, a former professor of Kolozsvár (Cluj) University, is considered to be the greatest expert on the prehistory and protohistory of Transylvania. His activity has covered a major part of the prehistoric age as well; however, his main field has been the period of the Great Migrations and the early Middle Ages, which he has studied making use of his mastery of the Hungarian, German and Rumanian literature on the subject. Horedt's most recent book, a sequel to his Siebenbürgen in spätrömischer Zeit, can be regarded as a reference work. It was written in its present form in Munich, the city to which the author retired, and, as Horedt himself says, this change of residence made it possible for him to give "a dispassionate and unprejudiced" opinion on the basic problems of the period. In his view the relevant issues are the role played by Germanic peoples, Slavic influence and the continuity of Roman groups. This is reflected in the contents of the book, in which the main headings are "The Germanic period", "The Slav period" and "The Hungarian period", and there is a short chapter on the problem of continuity. One might compare these to the titles of the chapters relating to the same period in a recent Rumanian study: "Danubian Romanism after Aurelian's withdrawal"; "Eastern Romanism up to the foundation of the first Rumanian political formations" (L. Bârză, Continuitatea creației materiale și spirituale a poporului român pe teritoriul fostei Dacii [Continuity of the material and spiritual achievement of the Rumanian people in the territory of former Dacia], Bucharest, 1979). There is no need to explain the differences further - they are obvious from a comparison of the chapter headings alone. On the other hand, anyone who examines the contents of Erdély története (A History of Transylvania), (Budapest, 1986) will see a striking similarity between the titles of its chapters relating to the period and the corresponding titles in Horedt's book.

In the Introduction to his book, the author summarizes the conclusions of his previous work, published in Bucharest in 1982. Essentially, his reasoning in this earlier book was that, after Dacia had been given up by the Romans around 270 A.D., there was sporadic continuity of life in Roman towns - although under altered conditions - while in rural settlements it was the Dacians, reinforced by the settling Karps and "Western Dacians", who were gaining more and more prominence. The groups of stock-raising Goths of the Marosszentanna (Sîntana de Mureş) - Černjakhov culture only arrived in the territories of the former Roman province at a later date. To discuss these questions would require a separate review. In the present writer's opinion, the evidence is insufficient for the construction of a picture such as this, and the author may have been unduly influenced by the views he expressed in his previous book.

According to Horedt, the Germanic period lasted from the 5th century to the mid-7th century. During this time, Visigoths, Ostrogoths and Gepids succeeded each other in Transylvania. The period began with the Marosszentanna culture, and is divided into four sub-periods. This periodization had already been proposed by Horedt in an earlier work (the present book being for the most part a summary of his previous research). For the sake of clarity it must be said here that the successive epochs are the Hun period, the early Gepid (according to Horedt, the Ostrogoth) period, the golden age of the Gepid kingdom and, lastly, the "Merovingian culture" of the Avar period. Horedt gives a careful description of objects, especially of pottery, although he relies on the reader's familiarity with partial studies. Even if doubts might be raised on some issues, it has to be admitted that the chronological ordering of finds is correct - as the author himself makes clear, they are not forced into a kind of "historical Procrustean bed". Still, it should be pointed out that the Mariersdorf site (p. 23.) has been corrected to Magyarvalkó (Văleni) by István Bóna (Erdély története, I, p. 143.); that, based on Jordanes's description, the River Flutausis is the Prut, and not the Olt; and that the Kutrigurs are hardly worth discussing after the end of the 6th century, merely because on one occasion they are mentioned by Agathias.

The mid-7th to the mid-10th centuries, according to Horedt, constitute the Slav period, in which he distinguishes between the following groups: Mediasch (Medgyes), Gîmbas (Marosgombás), Nuşfalău (Szilágynagyfalu), Blandiana (Maros-karna), Ciumbud (Csombord) and Klausenburg (Kolozsvár). The nature of this classification is slightly prehistorical, and it conceals the historical relationships which can be defined with certainty. As a matter of fact, the Gîmbas group consists of Avar relics, the Klausenburg group comprises those of the Hungarian settlers in Transylvania, whereas Blandiana B is identical with the

Bijelo Brdo culture, i.e. burial sites of the Hungarian common folk. The Ciumbrud group is only represented by one site, and Horedt presumes that the relics found there derive from Moravian settlers. However, it is in Bulgaria that parallels of the Csombord finds can be observed, dating from the late 9th century at the earliest. Therefore, neither Horedt's opinion, nor that of some Hungarian archaeologists is justified. These specialists claim that the Csombord finds point to the presence of Bulgarian settlers during the 9th century. In the 10th century at the earliest, however, this may not be the case, the more so because 9th century Bulgarians are also indicated by other stocks of relics. The Blandiana A group is one such stock, but several sites of the Mediasch group, the cemetery of Baráthely (Bratei, Pretai) among them, belong to this period, too. At the same time, the age differences of the finds of the Mediasch group are considerable, Mediasch itself being no earlier than the 10th century and the site at Nagyke-mező (Tîrnava), with its Pécs-Keszthely type buckle, dating from the mid-7th century. Another problem is raised by settlements. In south-east Transylvania, where one would expect Slav cemeteries to be abundant, they are completely lacking; on the other hand, it is in this region that the typical, early Avar finds are denser. Considering the characteristic types of building and objects at Cege (Țaga), this settlement, defined by Horedt as Slav, is undoubtedly Avar. The Nusfalău group is, however, a demonstrably Slav stock of relics, but these people, who buried their dead under tumuli, did not migrate there from eastern Slovakia, as the author believes, but from Eastern Europe (H. Zoll-Adamikowa, G. Vékony), and were therefore undoubtedly Eastern Slavs. Horedt considers the place names Bălgrad and Țeligrad to be Bulgarian Slav and associates them with the Blandiana group (as is done in Erdély története). Neither of these judgements is acceptable, unless both names came into the Rumanian language from the Hungarian. In any event, from an ethnic point of view the Blandiana group was probably Bulgarian-Turkish and, consequently no Slav place names should be expected to occur among them.

Despite these criticisms - and even more could be made - the chapter on the Slavs is highly informative, and its data are in most cases also chronologically correct. At the end of the chapter, there are two short passages entitled "Written sources" and "Linguistic conclusions". These convey well-known data, on the basis of which the author concludes that during the 7th century the earlier Germanic, Roman and non-Romanized Dacian population of Transylvania disappeared, and the province became completely Slavonized. It was only in the 9th century that, under Bulgarian dominion, Rumanian shepherds migrated to the area. The claim that Rumanian immigration began only in the 9th century, under

Bulgarian rule, is by no means new, but the theory of survival until the 7th century, which Horedt had attempted to prove in his earlier book, is. Unfortunately, written documents as well as linguistic evidence to support these claims are lacking. Names like Bălgrad etc. have already been mentioned, but it should also be added that in the territory of Transylvania there are no Rumanian place names derived either from Bulgarian Slav or from Bulgarian Turkish. Among written sources, the chronicles of Simon Kézai and Anonymus are cited as providing proof of a 9th century migration. Anonymus can be disregarded in this respect, since, as has been proved by J. Deér, he drew the ethnic map of the Carpathian Basin during the period of the Hungarian settlement by reference to peoples living outside the borders of Hungary during his own time (i.e. the 13th, rather than the 12th century). The reference to Kézai is novel and quite complex in its origin. Briefly, the Székelys were descended from the Onogurs, who had settled in Transylvania in the 7th century and who had been familiar with the runic characters of the Turks; the 7th century treasure trove of Nagyszentmiklós can be associated with them, and the Székelys' runic alphabet derived from runic writing found in the Carpathian Basin. According to Kézai, at the time when the Hungarians were still in Russia, the Székelys were staying (wohnten) together with the Wallachs and began using the latter's writing. For in Székely runic writing there are indeed traces of the Cyrillic script, used by the Rumanians, too... Kézai, however, wrote that the Székelys settled in Transylvania after the Hungarians had arrived (*Scriptores Rerum Hungaricarum* I. 162-3., Horedt quotes the index of the volume). Therefore, we still do not possess evidence supporting the Rumanians' 9th century migration; moreover, the linguistic evidence we do have is against it. Nevertheless, we must agree with the author when he states that the history of Transylvania between the 7th and the 9th centuries provides no basis for the theory of continuity of earlier ethnic groups. (I consider that such a theory is precluded by Germanic presence in the region from as early as the 4th century.) This remains true even when one calls the period Avar and Bulgarian, instead of Slav - which is not, of course, meant to ignore Slavs in the history of the region.

The author gives a detailed and thorough analysis of the earliest period of Hungarian statehood, which he calls "Hungarian period". The chapter is based on Horedt's earlier research, and for the most part puts the views expressed in his earlier works. Still, there are some new inclusions such as the subsections on castles and churches, with much new evidence and correct dates (as e.g. in the case of Doboka, dated too early in Rumanian scholarship). Horedt, correctly, regards the Bijelo Brdo culture as the archaeological culture of Hungarian state-

hood. This is an opinion shared by several Hungarian specialists, the present reviewer among them. It is therefore surprising that Horedt uses the name Ciugud to designate the settlement heritage of the period. Highly important is the information on the building of Gyulafehérvár (Alba Julia) Cathedral, information which has so far been accessible only to those who understand Rumanian. Although not without alterations, Horedt maintains his theory on the gradual expansion of the Hungarian state in Transylvania.

There is a short chapter dealing with the problem of continuity. In this, the author discusses some of the relevant theories and reiterates the conclusions of the Slav chapter (survival in Dacia, the theory on the origin of the Székelys, etc.); in line with his earlier views he regards the immigration of the Rumanians as having occurred in the 9th century. Even if certain of the author's more minor contentions are open to debate, we have to agree with Horedt's general conclusion, which is supported by the available evidence: "Each of the ethnic groups inhabiting Transylvania today immigrated at different dates and none of them are autochthonous or primary settlers" ("Alle gegenwärtig in Siebenbürgen lebenden Volksteile sind... zu verschiedenen Zeitpunkten eingewandert und nicht autochthon oder uransässig", p. 172.); "at the present state of research, no ethnic continuity going back in time before the Slav period can be evidenced in Transylvania" ("gemäß dem gegenwärtigen Forschungsstand in Siebenbürgen keine ethnische Kontinuität nachzuweisen ist, die über die Slawen zurückreicht", p. 177.).

In conclusion, I might say that even if on certain issues - issues more important than mere minor details - I disagree with the author, his facts are correct, his work was indeed written without "passion and prejudice", and is therefore a reference book in the real sense of the term. Differences of opinion can be discussed - we all endeavour to achieve no more than a better understanding of our past.

G á b o r V é k o n y

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SREDNA EVROPA I ZEMITE PO DOLNIJA DUNAV PREZ XVIII-XIX. v.
(SOCIALNO-IKONOMICHESKI ASPEKTI)

(Central Europe and the Lower Danubian Countries in the 18th and 19th Centuries. Socio-economic aspects)

By Virginia Paskaleva (Sofia: Izd. na BAN, 1986, 317 pp.)

Virginia Paskaleva, an established historian in her native Bulgaria, is well-known to Hungarian scholars. Her research up to now has concentrated on the social and economic development of Bulgaria and other Bulgarian-populated territories and their relationship with the rest of Europe, and especially with the Habsburg Monarchy during the period of the Bulgarian nation's rebirth. The intention of the author was to summarize her previous investigations and to consider European history from the perspective of the Lower Danube region, a perspective that can be misleading since the Monarchy, nearer to that region, seems to be larger than the European centre further off.

It is apparent from the huge bibliography that the author has surveyed the literature of the problem. She has also done research not only in the Viennese archives but in Leipzig as well, since the fair in that city was one of the centres for Balkan trade.

The book begins with an introduction, which outlines the scope of the work and which provides a critical analysis of both the sources and the existing literature. This is followed by four chapters. The first of these focuses on development during the 18th century and also looks back on the war of liberation at the end of the 17th century. The first half of the 19th century is discussed in Chapter II. Chapter III examines the next period, up to the Congress of Berlin in 1878, and the fourth one deals with the "Eastern Question" between the Congress of Paris (1856) and 1878.

As indicated in the introduction, the author intended not only to investigate the commercial links between Central and South-East European (Balkan) countries, but to make comparisons between them as well. The first chapter contains a good analysis of the economic policy pursued during the period of Enlightened Absolutism and of the positive effects of this. However, relying on Hungarian historical literature the author does not neglect to mention the negative effect

absolutism exerted on Hungarian economy by impeding industrial development. At that time trade between the Balkans and the Monarchy was dominated by Balkan merchants, who exchanged Balkan raw materials for the industrial products of the Monarchy. The balance of trade was negative for the Balkan peoples and it had to be supplemented with extra money. Nevertheless, these trade links were rather useful for the Balkan countries, since thus they were enabled to join the mainstream of European development, and in the emergence of capitalism.

The first trading company was founded in 1719 in the Monarchy, where, later, additional attempts were made to dominate trade, attempts which succeeded in eliminating the monopoly of the Balkan merchants during the first half of the 19th century. The foundation and operation of the Imperial and Royal Danube Steamship Navigation Company played an important part in this process. Unfortunately the German term k.u.k. is always mistranslated only as royal. It is in this chapter that the author's most important conclusions, as well as a number of highly informative tables and diagrams on the development of the trade in commodities and of passenger traffic from the 1830s onwards, are to be found (p. 139 and pp. 147-155). These tables and diagrams show a steady rise in both, allowing for the natural declines during periods of war and other such disruptions. The positive effect of the regulation of the Danube at the Iron Gate is also presented. It is interesting that by the time the commercial companies and firms of the Monarchy achieved their dominance the balance of trade between the Balkan region and the Monarchy for the latter became negative. At the same time, the turnover of the ports on the Lower Danube also showed a negative balance for the Monarchy. Paskaleva indicates that beside the Danubian routes, the continental routes through Transylvania and the Trieste-Constantinople-Galați route were also important.

The author rightly emphasizes the part played by the 1848 revolution in transforming the Monarchy into a predominantly capitalist society, as a result of which Central Europe (that is, the Monarchy) could preserve its preponderance over the Balkan countries. The underdevelopment of the Balkans is demonstrated by thoughtful analyses of the annual reports compiled by the Danube Steamship Navigation Company on its business (pp. 209-220). This backwardness is also shown by the survival of folk costume in the period. The chapter concludes with a survey of the work of the Danube Commission and the relevant clauses of the Treaty of Berlin.

In the last chapter, Paskaleva repeatedly emphasizes the fact that the exchange of goods provided an opportunity for different ethnic groups to meet and to build political and cultural relations; for instance, one third of Bulgarian

books published in the last century were printed in Central Europe. As the author herself admits, only a rather sketchy outline of these cultural relations occurs in the book and then just in the context of Bulgaria; little attention is paid to the Rumanians, still less to the Serbs. Hopefully, the author will in the future attempt to deal with this question in a similarly long monograph.

The book is full of illustrations, including a contemporary Széchenyi portrait, which unfortunately are poorly printed.

For Hungarian readers, the significance of Paskaleva's book lies in the fact that from a Lower Danubian perspective, economic development in Hungary, in spite of the Austrian discrimination, seemed much more rapid than that in the Balkans during that period. This has been already proved by some distinguished Hungarian scholars, but hopefully this view will now become more widely accepted when supported by the different perspective of a Bulgarian historian.

The impact made on South-East European societies by Central Europe, exporting industrial goods to the Balkans and importing agricultural produce from there, has been much discussed in the literature and has so far received an almost unambiguously negative evaluation. Paskaleva's book with its fresh and balanced approach and its precise data, is an important contribution to this topic.

E m i l N i e d e r h a u s e r

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