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PREFACE

ANTAL ÖRKÉNY, GYÖRGY CSEPELI, FRANK T. ZSIGÓ

On September 25, 2018, the Sociological Doctoral School at the Eötvös Loránd University Faculty of Social Sciences, in conjunction with the ELTE Faculty of Law Political Science Doctoral School, organised an international conference with the participation of doctoral students conducting research in the fields of social science. The goal of the conference was to share key hypotheses and research results with each other in sections and with participating professors. The event was supported by EU project EFOP-3.6.3.-VEKOP-16-2017-00007 “Young researchers from talented students,” which supported the career path building activities of researchers in higher education.

At the end of the conference the editors of this volume asked the moderators of the given sections to choose those presentations which in their judgment were most successful. We have selected presentations for this volume which were recommended by section moderators and whose authors agreed to further develop into papers.

We eventually chose seven exciting and outstanding studies, which can be put into two wide thematic blocks.

The first thematic block contains articles concerning key questions on Europe’s past, present and future.

Éva Számely’s article studies the development of value systems that have in the long term determined day to day life in European societies. She uncovers the definitive effects on the mentality and attitudes of Europeans of the developmental regions of Europe described in the 1980s by Jenő Szűcs.

Géza Tokár writes about three local independence movements which threaten the unity of the European Union’s political structure. He demonstrates that the historical precedents and social support for the movements diverge significantly. He takes a position whereby the movements demanding actual or perceived independence in Catalonia, Scotland and Northern Italy are deemed a threat to the unity of the European Union when European decision makers neglect their causes.

Tibor Hargitai’s study deals with reconstructing the meme of EU-scepticism using the metaphor of the “epidemic”. The site of his study is contemporary Holland, where EU-scepticism and steps to oppose migration have been adopted by the majority of parties in parliament. At the same time the infection has not resulted in wide political breakthroughs.

Emese Kővágó’s case study on East-Central Europe looks at the post-1945 traumatic period of the history of Hungarians in Serbia. She uncovers the mutual effects of reciprocal Serbian-Hungarian atrocities. The strength

of the paper is its ability to show how the Serbian majority and Hungarian minority are able to move beyond the silencing grip of the trauma. The study shows the places and rituals of remembrance that do not separate but instead bring together the two ethnic communities.

The second part of the volume deals with topics of the sociology of families. In the post-modern age the place and role of families has changed radically.

Klára Tatár Kiss studies the differentiating effects of Protestant and Catholic value systems in motivations for female success. A unique strength in her paper is that she introduces the issue of the relation of women to religious value systems, which is of particular significance given the appearance of Islam across Europe.

Based on a national Hungarian representative quantitative database, Kitti Kutrovátz studies the relations between socio-economic status and the amount of time parents spend on their children. Concentrating on family time that aims to create well-being and enhance the child's cognitive skills, the paper confirms the importance of social status. The results demonstrate that there are diverse patterns of time parents spend with their teenage children according to families' socioeconomic status. Consequently, parents in upper classes spend more time with their children on activities that might be enriching for them, like helping with homework and eating together.

Polina Zhodkova examines one of the most important aspects of family life, namely the practice of power over the family budget between men and women. According to her study, agreement and the lack of agreement on the family budget is one of the most important predictors of long cohabitation or divorce. The probability of expected developments, however, are influenced by the family status of the couple: in the case of married couples the likelihood of financial arguments and possible splitting up is lower than it is for those living together unmarried.

A note to the reader: while the studies in this volume were selected at a relatively late stage in the doctoral studies of the authors, it is possible that results and conclusions will require further clarification and fine-tuning. We publish these studies in the hope it will help the authors complete their doctoral studies and inspire our other students to produce work of a similar high quality.

HOW DOES HISTORY EXPLAIN EUROPE'S CURRENT CULTURAL SETUP?

ÉVA SZÁMELY

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Abstract

Dutch social psychologist Geert Hofstede defines culture as the common mental programming that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another. The most fundamental element of culture, according to Hofstede, is values, which are passed on from generations to generations relatively unchanged. Hofstede, together with his team, has conducted a comprehensive research on how values in the workplace are influenced by national culture. As a result of the research, the so-called “six cultural dimension theory” has been developed based on an analysis over 100.000 respondents from over 70 countries. The theory claims that the actual value scores of the six dimensions give us the opportunity to measure and thus better comprehend the differences and similarities between national cultures.

At the same time, Hungarian historian Jenő Szűcs argues that the altering historic developments, rooted as far back as the Middle Ages, paved the way to the emergence of three clearly distinguishable cultural regions in Europe that can still be identified. These regions have developed certain “structures,” setting limitations and possibilities concerning how current social challenges can be met.

This paper seeks to investigate whether the values, as defined in the Hofstede model, in individual countries across Europe correspond with the pattern of Europe's historical regions as identified by Jenő Szűcs. The paper explores to what extent the historical internal borders of Europe can still be recognised on the contemporary cultural map that can be drawn from the rich value data collected by Hofstede's team. The paper finally concludes that although historical societal structural developments are indeed noticeable and play a decisive role, other factors which may be related to geography – such as climate, topography, access to sea, population density – also appear to play a forging role in today's value preferences. This gives us further directions for research.

Introduction

Dutch social psychologist Geert Hofstede points out that humankind is exposed to common problems, although people, groups and nations may feel differently about them. Since many of these problems do not stop at national borders, the solutions to them demand cooperation among the opinion leaders of different countries as well as support from broad groups of followers within countries in order to implement decisions. One of the key reasons why so many solutions do not seem to function or cannot be implemented is that *differences in thinking* among the partners have been overlooked (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 4).

During his research on multi-culturality, Hofstede revealed a common structure in the variety of differences in thinking and developed his famous six cultural dimension theory. His objective was to provide a framework which sufficiently deals with the differences in thinking, feeling and acting of people around the globe, which may serve as a basis for common understanding.

On the other hand, Hungarian historian, Jenő Szűcs claims that history has marked internal borders within Europe, creating three well distinguishable regions. These regions have developed markable different structures primarily concerning the relation between society, or people, and the state through socio, economic and political evolutions throughout the Middle Ages as well as Early Modern times, the effects of which are manifest even in our present day value choices. Szűcs names these regions i) Occident and ii) Eastern Europe, to demonstrate two opposing poles, and iii) East Central Europe as an intermediate region with an ambiguous mixture of characteristics of the other two typological structures. Occident's eastern borders correspond with the rivers Elbe and Leitha¹, while East Central Europe's eastern borders run across from the Adriatic Sea, through the lower-Danube region, the East Carpathian mountain ranges and then the forests dividing Polish and Russian lands, all the way to the Baltics.

The objective of this paper is to show, with the application of the Hofstede framework and data, to what extent history, or in particular, feudalism developments as explained by Szűcs, play a role in present-day value preferences. In other words, we explore whether the borders described above are still visible on the current value map of Europe.

This paper was inspired by the study of György Csepeli and Gergő Prazsák (2011) employing World Value Survey data. As such, this paper applies similar statistical methods for the clustering process. Hofstede's country scores in all six dimensions for 32 European countries, where data was available, were gathered. A K-Means cluster analysis was then applied to draft the Hofstede data cultural map of Europe. The resulting three European clusters are compared to the three historical regions of Jenő Szűcs on the one hand, and to the findings of Csepeli and Prazsák on the other.

¹ The river *Rhein* depicts the demarcation line between Western Europe and Central Europe, which share more characteristics concerning their structures, hence the name East Central Europe for the intermediate region.

Values as the core element of culture and their relationships with social structures

Hofstede defines culture as the collective mental programming that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another. In other words, it is the set of unwritten shared rules of how to be a good member of a society, group or category of people. People have the basic ability to deviate from it and react to situations in new and creative ways, and thus this mental programming only indicates what reactions are likely and understandable given one's past social environments (Hofstede et al., 2010, pp. 5-6).

In Hofstede's definition culture consists of two parts; values and practices. The core element, which is learnt from a very early age and therefore is the more unconscious part of culture, is values, which are tendencies—feelings—to prefer certain states of affairs over others, and which are passed on from generations to generations relatively unchanged. Practices are the visible parts of culture; they consist of symbols, heroes and rituals, which can be learnt throughout a lifetime and therefore are more conscious to those who hold them. Practices are the outer layers of culture; they may change relatively quickly and are more affected by technological changes. Hofstede et al have shown that cross cultural differences in basic value preferences remain relatively stable over time. Among these, the most basic values primarily affect the gender, the national, or in some cases the regional layers of culture. Layers of culture which are acquired later in life tend to be more changeable, e.g., organisational cultures (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 20). Since the more stable part of culture is values, a comparative study of culture should start with the measurement of values.

From the second half of the 20th century, with the availability of better data, more and more research has gone into values—universal and cross-cultural—with the aim, as the American psychologist, Milton Rokeach stated, of being able to “compare any one country's values to any other” (Rokeach, 1973, p. 89). Rokeach concluded culture, society and personality are the major antecedents of values and that attitudes and behaviour are the major consequents.

Further, as Israeli psychologist Shalom H. Schwartz has argued, that there has been widespread agreement in the social science literature regarding five features of the conceptual definition of values: “A value is a (1) belief (2) pertaining to desirable end states or modes of conduct, that (3) transcends specific situations, (4) guides selection or evaluation of behaviour, people, and events, and (5) is ordered by importance relative to other values to form a system of value priorities” (Schwartz, 1994, p. 20). Schwarz himself focused a great deal on classifying value content and thus modified the earlier definition of values as “desirable trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or of a social entity.”

Hungarian social psychologist Ibolya Váriné Szilágyi points out that values play a fundamental role in the forging of identity of both the individual and society. They are pragmatic for the individual in conducting human life and normative for the community (Váriné, 1987, p. 55). Csepli and Prazsák highlight that social systems

and individuals mutually define each other (Csepeli & Prazsák, 2011, p. 63) and values play a fundamental part in this process.

After a review of definitions of values, the development of Jenő Szűcs's three historical regions in Europe through their social structural evolution will be discussed.

The implications of feudalist evolution on social development and structures

Jenő Szűcs argues that current value choices in Europe are rooted deep in history, since specific structures emerged as a result of varying economic, societal and political developments, defining certain limitations as well as offering certain opportunities on related choices. Szűcs's argument dates back to the dissolution of the Roman Empire; particular important is how Feudalist evolution affected the development of freedoms of the various levels of society and thus framed the relationships between society and state. In Europe, according to Szűcs, there are two prototypes of structures that arose as a result of altering paths of Feudalist and later Early Modern Absolutist development.

The Occidental model geographically covers mainly the former Carolingian Empire and present day France, but later extended to the Benelux states, Switzerland, England, the Scandinavian countries, Spain, Portugal, West Germany, and to a lesser degree East Germany and Austria. Here, feudalist developments of the Middle Ages meant the complete integration of former Roman heritage and that of the barbarian Germanic tribes into an entirely new substance. Through the dynamic relationship between the powerful and the powerless, the mutual, in some places even contractual obligations within the unequal relations, with its symbolic rituals, the possibility of horizontal relations based on cooperation and competition, the emergence of middle strata and thus the possibility of some level of social mobility, all planted the seeds of liberties and the idea of society which exceeded the aggregation of the persons within the country. These are the very reasons why Early Modern Absolutism in these countries meant only a specific period in history throughout which the idea of social contract between society and state remained. Absolutism ended in this region with the demand of practical accountability of the state to its people and with the birth of nation states.

In contrast stands the East-European model, covering mainly current day Russia and the former Soviet states. Here, because of the later arrival of Slavonic tribes, the story starts a couple of centuries later. In this region the possibility of dynamic integration of the former Byzantine heritage and that of the Slavonic tribes ceased as a result of the Mongolian invasion. Rigid Byzantine institutions were accompanied by enslaved rural local populations. Here absolutism was real absolutism, all reforms introduced were top-down, with not even the faintest potential for freedom. On the contrary, this period was harshened by the second serfdom, with the deprivation of most basic rights, even the peasantry's right to movement. Overall rigidity and standstill best describe the essence of this model.

There is, however, an intermediate region that falls between the two models, which best corresponds with present day Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary and to some extent East Germany and Austria. This region had embarked on the Occidental path of Feudalist development in the Middle Ages, but, about a century and a half later. This meant that instead of autonomous work and discovery of solutions, entire patterns of structures were adopted and introduced mainly top-down. There was to some extent the idea of the birth of society, however, mostly only the nobility identified itself with such; an urban bourgeoisie was largely absent. Many elements of the Occidental model were in place, but in many aspects were distorted. In Hungary the case was worsened with the Ottoman occupation of the country during the first moments of Early Modern times. Due to such structural distortions this region was unable to follow the Occidental development path and was not able to completely avoid the second serfdom with its deprivation of the right of movement of the peasantry, among other rights. According to Szűcs this dual structure, i.e., the combination of the two prototype structures, gives this region a special third character.

In order to analyse to what extent Jenő Szűcs's three historical regions can be recognised on the current cultural map of Europe, Hofstede's six cultural dimensions theory will be explained in the following.

Hofstede's six cultural dimensions theory

Hofstede's six cultural dimensions theory is a breakthrough in social psychology in the sense that it provides a framework which enables the measurement and thus comparison of different cultures along so-called cultural dimensions.

Hofstede has joined the group of social scientists emerging from the first half of the 20th century who have substantially researched and concluded² that humankind shares the very same basic questions, with only the answers differing depending on culture (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 29). Intuitively these questions can be formulated as follows:

- How equal should we be?
- How dependent are we on our family?
- How should a man or a woman feel?
- How afraid are we?

² Such as that of the sociologist Alex Inkeles and the psychologist Daniel Levinson in 1945. They surveyed the English language literature on national culture. American anthropologists Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead played a role in popularizing this message.

- What should we focus on: past, present or future?
- May we have fun or is life a serious matter?

Each of these themes is covered by one of Hofstede’s cultural dimension (see Table 1). The dimensions have been derived by statistical factor analysis on the survey questions of statistically matched samples from altogether over 70 countries over the years. A cultural dimension can be defined as an aspect of a culture that can be measured relative to other cultures. With statistical standardisation, each dimension has been expressed on a scale that runs from 0 to 100. The two extreme poles signify the two opposing typologies of the dimensions; however, the majority of countries in reality lie somewhere in between.

Table 1: Hofstede’s six cultural dimensions

Questions		Dimensions of natural culture
How equal shold we be?	➡	Power distance
How dependent are we on our family?	➡	Individualism vs. Collectivism
How should a man or a woman?	➡	Masculinity vs. Femininity
How afraid are we?	➡	Uncertainty avoidance
Whath should we focus: on past, present or future?	➡	Long term vs. Short term orientation
May we have fun or is life a serious matter?	➡	Indulgence vs. Restrain

In the following each of the dimensions will be explained. The scores of the 32 European countries under inves-
tigation, and their relevance to Szűcs’s historical regions, will be presented.³

³ It should be noted that nations are not equal to societies. Societies are historically, organically developed forms of social organisa-
tions. Hofstede’s concept of common culture applies to societies and not to nations. In nations, which have existed for some time,
there are strong forces of integration of existing different groups or less integrated minorities. Usually there is a dominant national
language, common mass media, a national education system, a national army, a national political system, national representation in
sports, etc. At the same time there remains a tendency for ethnic, linguistic and religious groups to fight for recognition of their own
identity. Therefore, although nations are not homogeneous societies and thus research should be taken with care, they are often the
only feasible criterion for classification, and they can still serve as sources on the considerable amount of common mental program-
ming of their citizens. Where it is possible to separate results by regional, ethnic or linguistic group, it is recommended.

European country scores in the “power distance” dimension

The term power distance was derived from the emotional distance that separates subordinates from their superiors according to the research of Dutch experimental social psychologist Mauk Molder (1977). The power distance dimension is defined by Hofstede as “the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organisations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. Institutions are the basic elements of society, such as the family, the school, and the community; organisations are the places where people work” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 61). In the original questionnaires as well as in the replication surveys the power distance dimension contains questions which indicate how respondents perceive their daily work and, also, how they would prefer them. The fact that the two types of questions form part of the same cluster shows that there is a close relationship between the reality one perceives and the reality one desires.⁴




Figure 1: Power Distance Dimension Scores for Europe

Low power distance stands for the idea that inequality is somewhere wrong, and it should be reduced as much as possible. In small power distance societies hierarchies exist only for convenience, but roles can sometimes be changed. Power should be used legitimately, and everybody, regardless of their position on the level of hierarchy, is under the same rule of law. In children’s education the most important concept that a child can learn is inde-

⁴ The original IBM survey questions can be found in Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 56; the last Value Survey Module 2013 be accessed at <https://geerthofstede.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/VSM-2013-English-2013-08-25.pdf>

pendence. In organisations decentralisation is preferred. In the workplace subordinates expect to be consulted concerning their work.

On the opposite side, high power distance is associated with inequality as a normal part of society. In large power distance societies, superiors are considered also as superior beings. Power decides what is good or evil. In children's education the most important concept that a child can learn is respect. In organisations centralisation is preferred. In the workplace subordinates expect simply to be told what to do.

Figure 1 summarises the relative scores of the 32 European countries for this dimension. Higher scores correspond with higher power distance values. Interestingly, the graph does not only show a strong East-West divide but also a North-South divide, where all the Baltic states show lower power distance scores than the Latin countries. The East-West split remarkably confirms Jenő Szűcs's identification of the two opposing historical structures of the Occident and of Eastern Europe. The dual character intermediate region can also be recognised except for the two extremes, i.e. the low scores of Austria and high scores of Slovakia.

Hofstede validated the dimension scores against some hard data in societies, showing some interesting correlations. First, in large power distance societies there tend to be higher income inequalities than in smaller power distance countries. In high power distance countries, the size of the middle classes is smaller, and the lower classes are larger. In fact, in high power distance societies a larger part of the education budget is spent on university education, maintaining a polarisation between the elites and the undereducated. In smaller power distance countries, the biggest part of the education budget is spent on secondary level education, developing the middle strata of society. In domestic politics the use of violence is more common in large power distance societies, while in low power distance countries problems are more often resolved peacefully. The political system prevailing in high power distance societies is either dictatorship or oligarchy. When there is discontent with the political system in a high power distance society change will come about in the form of revolution. The problem with revolution is that only the faces in power change while the system itself remains unchanged. In lower power distance societies changes occur more slowly in the form of evolution, which means real change within the system (Hofstede et al., 2010, pp. 70, 83).

European country scores in the “individualism versus collectivism” dimension

In Hofstede's original IBM questionnaire there was a question on work goals, and the analysis of the possible answers of the 14 work goal items produced two underlying dimensions. One was the dimension of “individualism versus collectivism,” where the importance of personal time, freedom, and challenge stood for individualism, while the importance of training, physical conditions, and the use of skills (related to items that the company could provide) stood for collectivism. The other dimension came to be labelled “masculinity versus femininity” (see later). The individualism versus collectivism dimension is defined by Hofstede as follows: “Individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him- or

herself and his or her immediate family. Collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in which people from birth onward are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty" (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 92).

In collectivist societies people identify with *we* personalities, whereas in individualist societies they have an *I* identity. In collectivist societies the interest of the group prevails over the interest of the individual. Collectivist societies are exclusionist in the sense that they define in-groups and out-groups. The in-group is the major source of one's identity and the only source of protection one has against the hardships of life. Therefore, one owes life-long loyalty to one's in-group. All other people, or those in the out-group, are excluded by these societies. On the other hand, individualist societies are universalist in the sense that they regard others as individuals with their own unique characteristics (Hofstede et al., 2010, pp. 94-99).




Figure 2: Individualism versus Collectivism Dimension Scores for Europe

Competition, in collectivist societies takes place between groups, or often tribes, while in individualist societies competition is between individuals. Carrying out a task together, in a collectivist society, relationships come first, and the task comes second. Meanwhile in individual societies it is more often the other way around. In terms of communication, in collectivist societies there is high context communication, which means that many things are obvious and taken for granted and therefore communication can be short. On the other end of the scale, in individualist societies there is low context communication; everything needs to be specified, which entails more extensive communication. Finally, a key concept in collectivist societies is harmony, which means there should be harmony in the in-group. Even if people disagree, they should maintain superficial harmony,

because otherwise the in-group would be weakened, or may fall apart. In individualist societies conflicts can do no harm and can sometimes be healthy.

Individualism scores for the 32 European countries under investigation are shown in Figure 2. The scores depict the relative positions of the countries, with higher scores representing more individualist societies. As can be seen, the most individualist countries are the Anglo, the Nordic, and the countries from the former Frankish Empire. The East European and Iberian countries show the most collectivist characteristics. Thus, the historical regions of Jenő Szűcs can be well recognised with some amendments. On the one hand, Hungary's very individualist position is striking, in part because individualism otherwise shows very strong correlations with national wealth. On the other hand, the Iberian countries exhibit a greater degree of collectivist affinity with the Byzantine and Ottoman heritage-bearing countries than with their Western European neighbours.

For a better understanding of this dimension, the scores have been matched against other hard data. As already mentioned, they show high correlations with national wealth, i.e., with GNI per capita.⁵ Richer countries are more individualist, poorer countries are more collectivist. Mobility between social classes from one generation to the next is also higher in individualist societies. Press freedom as well as the Human Rights Index, as defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, also strongly and positively correlate with individualism. It must be noted, however, that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was created by individualist countries. Concerning families, there is a higher divorce rate in individualist societies. In collectivist societies there is a larger age gap between spouses, with the husband being much older than the wife (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 130).

European country scores in the “masculinity versus femininity” dimension

As mentioned earlier, in Hofstede's original IBM questionnaire there was a question on work goals, and the analysis of the possible answers of the 14 work goal items produced two underlying dimensions. The first dimension of “individualism versus collectivism” was discussed earlier. The second dimension was “masculinity versus femininity”. Here, the importance of earnings, recognition, advancement and challenge stood for masculinity, while the importance of manager relationships, cooperation, living area and employment security stood for femininity. Hofstede's reason for labelling this dimension as masculinity versus femininity is that this dimension is the only one where men and women among the IBM employees scored systematically differently (except for countries at the extreme feminine pole as will be shown later).

⁵ The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the market value of all services and goods within the borders of a nation. The Gross National Income (GNI) is the total value that is produced within a country, which comprises of the GDP along with the income obtained from other countries such as dividends or interests. One of the main differences between the two, is that the GDP is based on location, while GNI is based on ownership. It can also be said that GDP is the value produced within a country's borders, whereas the GNI is the value produced by all the citizens. Source: <http://www.differencebetween.net/business/difference-between-gni-and-gdp/> accessed on 1st January 2017.

Hofstede defines a society masculine “when emotional gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success, whereas women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life.” At the other end of the pole, Hofstede calls a society feminine “when emotional gender roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 140).

In feminine societies people try to balance family and work, while in masculine societies work clearly prevails over the family and work is an acceptable excuse to neglect the family. Within the family in a masculine society fathers should deal with facts and mothers should deal with feelings, whereas in feminine societies both parents deal with facts and feelings. In terms of religion, in masculine societies the focus is on the Father, the almighty God, while in feminine societies the focus is on fellow human beings (Hofstede et al., 2010, pp. 175-180). A masculine society is a performance society that rewards the strong, while a feminine society is a welfare society that has solidarity with the weak. Masculine societies hold the view that immigrants should assimilate, i.e. should give up their own culture, while feminine societies defend integration, i.e. immigrants should adapt only those aspects of their culture and religion that conflict with their new country’s laws. Finally, in terms of sexual behaviour there is also a marked difference. In feminine societies sex is another way for couples to relate to each other, while in masculine societies sex is a way of performing, where men are the subjects and women are the objects and often feel exploited. Masculine societies consider homosexuality a threat to society, whereas feminine societies accept it as a fact of life (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 159).

Figure 3 shows the relative positions of the 32 European countries for the masculinity versus femininity dimension, where higher scores relate to higher masculinity. It shows that all Nordic countries, as well as the Baltic states and the Netherlands, are the most feminine scoring. With regard to the historical regions as explained by Jenő Szűcs, it is striking to see that the countries of the intermediate region of East Central Europe are the most masculine, followed by the Occidental region overtaking the countries forming the East European structure. Only the position of the Nordic states does not fit into the Szűcs’ historical picture.

Correlating masculinity scores with other hard core facts facilitates further understanding. Politicians translate dominant values into political priorities which can be reflected in the composition of the national budget. Holding wealth equal, in masculine countries the ratio of functional illiteracy is higher, and a higher ratio of people lives below the poverty line than in feminine countries. Feminine countries spend more of their budget on aid to poor countries and on protecting the environment than masculine countries. Finally, concerning employer-employee relations, feminine countries have a preference for free time over salary and they have more holidays per year than their masculine counterparts (Hofstede et al., 2010, pp. 170-175).




Figure 3: Masculinity versus Femininity Dimension Scores for Europe

European country scores in the “uncertainty avoidance” dimension

According to Hofstede, feelings of uncertainty, despite their subjective character, are acquired and learned. These feelings and ways of handling them, such as by means of technology for mitigating nature’s uncertainties, laws and regulations for controlling the ambiguities of other people’s behaviour and religion for alleviating anxiety concerning of the unknown personal future, all are parts of cultural heritage. They are transferred and reinforced by the basic institutions of society, such as the family, the school, or the state. Hofstede defines the dimension of uncertainty avoidance as “the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 191).

The two opposing extremities of this dimension are uncertainty avoidance versus uncertainty acceptance. In uncertainty avoiding countries uncertainty is a threat, thus it must be fought against, which means there is a belief in formulisation and a need for rules, even if they are not practical or not practiced. In uncertainty accepting countries, on the other hand, uncertainty is noble and life is accepted as it comes, thus there is a belief in deregulation, there are fewer rules and rules may even be broken when necessary. As a result, in uncertainty avoiding countries there is more stress and anxiety; aggression and emotions may sometimes be vented. In uncertainty accepting countries there is less stress or anxiety and the expression of aggression or emotions ought to be controlled.




Figure 4: Uncertainty Avoidance Dimension Scores for Europe

For uncertainty avoiding countries what is different is dangerous, and they tend to be xenophobic. For uncertainty accepting countries what is different is curious and they tend to be tolerant with strangers. Innovations are rather slowly and carefully adopted in uncertainty avoiding countries compared to their uncertainty accepting counterparts. In uncertainty avoiding countries it is more common to stay in a job as long as possible, while job mobility is much easier in uncertainty accepting countries.


Figure 4 shows the values for the uncertainty avoidance dimension for all 32 European countries. Higher scores correspond with stronger uncertainty avoidance. Overall, low scores can be found for the Anglo and Nordic countries, medium scores occur in the Baltic states and in the German-speaking countries, while scores are high for the Mediterranean, Latin and Central-East and East European countries. Although the picture seems more complex, Szűcs's historical regions can be identified. There is more fear in the East European region, less in the Occidental region, and the intermediate region is in between the two. The only modification here again is that the countries with most historical Islamic influence fear the most.

It is important to note that uncertainty avoidance does not mean risk avoidance. During the validation of uncertainty avoidance dimension scores with hard data in society it was found that in uncertainty avoiding societies people drive faster: in fact the speed limits on motorways tend to be higher than in uncertainty accepting countries. This highlights the fact that driving a car faster is a known risk and not an ambiguity, thus consciously taken by the uncertainty avoiding countries.

The rigor in rules and norms in stronger uncertainty avoiding cultures is also well reflected in language in the European countries. Cultures with higher scores more often use different modes of address for different persons; such as the almost indifferently used “you” in English, the differentiation between “du” and “Sie” in German and the even more subtle distinction between “Ön”, “maga”, (even “kegyed”) or “te” in Hungarian. Furthermore, uncertainty avoidance is visible in health care. First of all, in uncertainty avoiding countries the abuse of alcohol is higher. In these countries the ratio of doctors versus nurses is higher than in uncertainty accepting countries. In fact, the need for experts can be seen in the job ratios in organisations and even in advertisements; in uncertainty avoiding countries experts explain the goodness of a product while in uncertainty accepting countries, they use more humour. Interestingly, uncertainty avoidance also has a strong correlation with the perception of corruption as measured by the agency Transparency International (Hofstede et al., 2010, pp. 208, 293).

Finally, the varying rules on the domestic use of identity documents in Europe seems to be an astounding example of the present-day manifestation of the dimension described. National identity cards are issued to their citizens by all the listed 32 European countries except Denmark, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Norway. This corresponds with their low scores in the uncertainty avoidance dimension. Map 1 illustrates the striking correlation between the rigor of regulation on the domestic use of identity documents and the uncertainty avoidance scores identified by Hofstede.⁶

⁶ In Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Lithuania and Austria national identity cards are fully voluntary. In Greece, Portugal, Malta, Russia, Belgium, Poland, Serbia, Romania, Spain, Turkey, Bulgaria, Croatia, Luxembourg, Czech Republic and Estonia they are compulsory. For the rest of the countries some form of identity documentation is required. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_identity_cards_in_the_European_Economic_Area retrieved on 13 December 2018.



Map 1: Identity Documentation Requirements for Citizens in Europe

European country scores in the “long term versus short term orientation” dimension

The fifth dimension of long term versus short term orientation was added to Hofstede’s model later, when Chinese colleagues were invited to revisit Hofstede’s research. The Chinese researchers also found the importance of the first three dimensions, but did not detect the relevance of uncertainty avoidance, while the dimension on time orientation was missing for them. Hofstede and his team found a strong correlation with economic growth at the time, as well as with future economic growth of poor countries and this dimension. Thus, it was decided to include long term versus short term orientation dimension in the model.⁷

⁷ Since the original Chinese research only included 23 countries, thus Hofstede’s team searched items in the World Value Survey which were conceptually similar and statistically correlated significantly with the ones in the original questionnaire, in order to enhance the number of countries measured along this dimension.

Hofstede defines this dimension as follows. “Long term orientation stands for the fostering of pragmatic virtues oriented toward future rewards – in particular, perseverance, thrift and adapting to changing circumstances. Its opposite pole, the short-term orientation, stands for the fostering of virtues related to the past and present – in particular, national pride, respect for tradition, preservation of “face”, and fulfilling social obligations” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 239). Long term versus short term orientation relates to Confucianism, dealing with practical ethics and with Virtue, without religious content, leaving the question of Truth – which is focused on in the uncertainty avoidance dimension – open. While in Eastern thinking Virtue is key, in Western thinking Virtue is secondary to Truth, points out Hofstede.




Figure 5: Long Term Versus Short Term Orientation Dimension Scores for Europe

This secondary status in European thinking is clearly manifested in Figure 5, which depicts the dimension scores of the 32 European countries. The results seem more scattered than in the earlier dimensions. Overall, top positions are occupied by the Baltic states, Russia and by some of the German-speaking countries. Continental European countries occupied a medium to high range, while the Anglo, Nordic and Mediterranean countries scored on the short-term side. The historical regions of Jenő Szűcs can still be recognised. The East European structure seems most long-term oriented, while the Occidental structure the least, with the intermediate region in between. The North-South divide seems much less important in this Hofstede dimension than in the others.

There are, however, still important societal facts which correlate strongly with long term orientation. In long term oriented countries savings tend to be larger with funds readily available for investment. Investors prefer family businesses and real estate and companies focus on market share and long term profit. On the short term

orientation side countries usually have smaller savings, investors prefer shares or mutual funds and focus is on bottom line quarterly reports (Hofstede et al., 2010, pp. 262-267).

European country scores in the “indulgence versus restraint” dimension

The last dimension was derived from World Value Survey data from 1995 to 2008 (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 502) and is related to research on subjective well-being, or happiness, and having control over one’s own life. Hofstede et al proposed the following definition: “Indulgence stands for a tendency to allow relatively free gratification of basic and natural human desires related to enjoying life and having fun. Its opposite pole, restraint, reflects a conviction that such gratification needs to be curbed and regulated by strict social norms” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 281).

This dimension somewhat resembles the distinction in American anthropology between loose and tight societies, where in loose societies norms are expressed with a wide range of alternative channels, and deviant behaviour is easily tolerated; tight societies maintain strong values of group organisation, formality, permanence, durability and solidarity, resembling more indulgent versus more restrictive societies respectively.

In Figure 6 we see that the indulgence versus restraint dimension separates Eastern Europe from Western Europe. Interestingly, the Northern countries seem to possess the most extreme places at both ends. On the one hand the north-western European countries seem to be leading the indulgent camp, while their Eastern neighbours are the flagships of the most restrained group. Szűcs’s historical regions can be very clearly recognised. Those countries whose absolutist regimes were the shortest-lived seem to be the happiest.

Hofstede et al investigated how other research results corresponded with the indulgence versus restraint dimension in order to better understand and to validate. US social psychologist Michael Harris Bond, for example, studied social axioms and found that societal cynicism was strongest in Eastern Europe and in East Asia, while it was weakest in Norway and North America. In cynical societies he uncovered the view that powerful people are arrogant exploiters of less powerful individuals. Societal cynicism is significantly and negatively correlated with the indulgence versus restraint dimension. Thus, members of more restrained societies also tend to have a cynical outlook (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 289).




Figure 6: Indulgence versus Restraint Dimension Scores for Europe

Russian management professor Sergey Myasoedov has found a very simple example of this dimension in daily life. He remarked that American front-end personnel are required to smile at customers. When American companies brought over their strong company culture to Russia, they were quite surprised to find that while a smile was a friendly gesture in the generally indulgent USA, in the highly restrained Russian society the very same smile was greeted with suspicion (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 295). Moreover, in Russia, a stern face is a sign of being earnest. The presence of this can be well observed in the public images (from the very same public sources) of first line politicians as illustrated in Image 1.

Furthermore, indulgence is correlated with national norms of two of the five personality dimensions in the Big Five model of personality traits: positively with extraversion and negatively with neuroticism. This means that in indulgent societies there are more extroverted personalities, while in more restrained societies there are more neurotic personalities. Further, World Value Survey data suggest that there is also a high correlation between the perception of having good personal health and indulgence (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 289). Moreover, data from the World Health Organisation, 2008, proves that indulgence is also associated with lower rates of death from cardiovascular diseases, even after controlling for national differences of wealth (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 290). Finally, across wealthy countries indulgence versus restraint is the main significant predictor for birth-rates.⁸

⁸ 28 countries that had a GNI per capita more than 10,000 USD in 1999, see in Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 290.



Image 1: The role and significance of smile versus a stern face in different societies⁹

Societal restriction not only makes people less happy but also seems to foster various other forms of negativism. Cardiovascular disease is a complex phenomenon with multiple causes at the individual level, but it seems that unhappiness may be one of them. National governments of low-fertility countries are often concerned about raising birth-rates, although few tools have seemed functional so far. Although between 1998 and 2008 almost all countries in the European part of the former Soviet Union, as well as Bulgaria and Romania, doubled their GNI per capita, the dismally low happiness levels and the demographic crisis continue to the present day.

After the general presentation and analysis of the Hofstede cultural dimensions and their European country scores in relation to the historical regions of Jenő Szűcs, a K-Means cluster analysis will be presented in order to highlight the correlation between the cultural regions of Hofstede and those of Jenő Szűcs.


Hofstede's cultural map of Europe vis-à-vis Jenő Szűcs's historical regions

The six dimensions, as presented earlier, together form a framework of differences among national cultures. For the problem of categorising the 32 countries under investigation by using all six Hofstede cultural dimensions, the statistical algorithm of K-Means clustering has been used. The K-Means clustering algorithm seems ideal as the number of categories (clusters) can be predefined (to three) and the score results for all six cultural dimensions can be used for categorisation. The result of the K-Means clustering signifies that the countries in each of the categories have more similar scores to one another overall in the six cultural dimensions than to the other countries of the other clusters.

Map 2 shows the results of the K-Means cluster analysis where the colouring of countries represents their cluster category, while the white colour signifies a lack of data. The map shows that the Scandinavian countries and Finland, together with the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands belong together; the Baltic states, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the German speaking countries, Italy, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary form

⁹ Source: Wikipedia; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barack_Obama; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_W._Bush; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Presidents_of_Russia accessed on 23rd December 2018.

another cluster while Russia, Poland, all the states of South-Eastern Europe, the countries in the Iberian Peninsula and Malta constitute the third.



Map 2: Hofstede Cultural Cluster Map of Europe – the different colours represent the countries belonging to the different clusters

The overlap of the cultural clusters of Hofstede with the historical regions of Jenő Szűcs is only partial. On this Hofstede cultural map, the existence of the Occident centred around the former Frankish Empire is quite visible, with the borders coinciding reasonably. Also, Szűcs's East European structure together with the legacy of the former Byzantine Empire seem to be a prominent group. However, the third intermediate historical region is somewhat blurred, while the split of the Nordic countries together with the Netherlands and the countries of the British Isles from the rest of Europe appears to be much more salient.

Our analysis shows that while the historically developed East European versus Occidental structures hypothesis of Jenő Szűcs indeed applies, there are other factors which are equally important and mark the existence of yet another region which is concentrated in the northern part of Europe. From our analysis we also see that the Baltic countries seem to group together, somewhat diverging from their contiguous regions.

The cluster marked by red on Map 2 corresponds closest to the former Frankish Empire. However, intriguingly, the Baltic states seem culturally to more align with this cluster than with any of their neighbouring countries. Concerning this cluster's Hofstede power distance as well as uncertainty avoidance scores, they seem to take the middle position of the three. Their individualism as well as long term orientation scores vary between medium

to high, while they are leaders in the masculinity dimension. These countries score rather low on the indulgence index, with the Baltic states being the most restrained of all the countries of investigation. Overall one could say this cluster takes a middle position with a leading emphasis on masculine values, such as performance and toughness, and seems to be rather restrained.

The cluster marked with green on Map 2 seems to consist of the former Byzantine heritage and the East European structure as defined by Szűcs, although the Iberian countries seem to have joined them. This cluster scores the highest on power distance and uncertainty avoidance, coupled with the lowest levels of individualism and relatively low levels of indulgence, evoking the centuries-long dismal oppression of Eastern Europe as described by Jenő Szűcs.

The third cluster marked with yellow on Map 2 consists of all the countries of the North with the sea playing a dominant role throughout their history. They are the most egalitarian, least afraid, happiest and healthiest, most independent-minded welfare societies with significant concern for the environment, although they seem to respect tradition more.

It is important to note that power distance differences were found to be statistically related to geographic latitude, population and national wealth. The heirs of the Roman Empire all score on the strong uncertainty-avoidance side. The Roman Empire had developed a unique system of laws that in principle applied to all people with citizen status, regardless of origin, i.e., the idea of government by law. These facts may explain to some extent the North-South divide and the rise of the third cluster.

The conclusion that Csepeli and Prazsák made in their analysis of Europe from 2008 World Value Survey data seems to apply. Europe's key position, which was formerly taken by the Occidental region in Szűcs's analysis, appears to have been taken over by the Nordic and Anglo countries, including the Netherlands. The extended Frankish heritage, "core Europe" seems to have now taken on an intermediate role. Finally, Eastern Europe has been joined by the Iberian countries in their cultural development positioning.

Comparison of the Hofstede cultural map of Europe with the results of the Csepeli & Prazsák study

As mentioned earlier this paper was inspired by the study of Professors Csepeli and Prazsák on World Value Survey data from 2008. Map 3 presents the final results of the two analyses. The map on the left is already known from our exploration earlier. The map on the right depicts some of the research results of the Csepeli-Prazsák study, in which, with a multivariate analysis, the responses to the WVS questions have been classified into seven value categories: etatism; autonomy at the workplace; social trust; tolerance; altruism; individualism and conformity. Using these seven value categories the K-Means cluster analysis

was applied to form three clusters, which were named actors (doers), revolutionists and sufferers (passives). On Map 3 the ratios of actors are presented in each of the 25 European countries involved in the research.



Map 3: Comparison of the Hofstede Cultural Cluster Map of Europe with results of the Csepeli & Prazsák study¹⁰

The resemblance of the two maps and the resonating three clusters of Europe can be explained by the correspondence of the Csepeli-Prazsák value categories with the Hofstede cultural dimensions identified, although they employed different research data sources in the case of the first four Hofstede dimensions. The notion behind Csepeli-Prazsák's first value category of autonomy at the workplace resembles Hofstede's power distance dimension, where more autonomy and less dependence on what is instructed to be done corresponds with low power distance. The concept behind etatism echoes mostly the uncertainty avoidance dimension of Hofstede. The rank of countries shows the astounding correlation between the two. The value category of social trust may be approximated with the indulgence versus restraint dimension, in the sense, as mentioned earlier, that it negatively correlates with societal cynicism. Among others, in cynical societies there exists the view that powerful people are arrogant exploiters of less powerful individuals, suggesting a correlation with distrust. The fourth value category tolerance bears resemblance to two of the Hofstede dimensions, primarily to the individualism versus collectivism dimension and secondarily to the masculinity versus femininity dimension. Earlier we established that collectivist societies are exclusionists in how they define in-groups and out-groups, where the in-group is the major source of one's own identity and of protection. All others in the out-group are excluded by these societies, which may be an explanation of intolerance. On the other hand, masculine societies view homosexuality, as discussed before, as a threat to society, while feminine societies see it as a fact of life. Concerning immigrants, masculine societies tend to defend the view of assimilation, i.e., immigrants should give up their old culture, while feminine societies defend integration, i.e., immigrants should adapt only those aspects of their culture and religion that conflict with their new country's laws. The fifth value category altruism also seems to relate to two Hofstede dimensions, namely to masculinity versus femininity and to individualism versus col-

¹⁰ Source: Csepeli, Gy. & Prazsák, G., 2011, p. 76.

lectivism. Feminine societies are essentially, as mentioned above, welfare societies that have solidarity with the weak and also spend relatively more on protecting the environment. On the other hand, individualist as opposed to collectivist societies have more tolerance for others and accentuate the need of having close, intimate friends. The questions of the sixth Csepeli-Prazsák value category individualism may be matched with five out of the six Hofstede dimensions. Interestingly, the exception is the similarly named individualism versus collectivism dimension. There are three questions regarding having an adventurous life with emphasis on the discovery of novelties, which in fact is one of the main characteristics of an uncertainty accepting society. There are also two questions relating to subjective wellbeing; these may be matched with indulgence versus restraint. The question on performance relates to the masculinity versus femininity dimension while the question emphasising independence from others resembles the power distance dimension. If the question is interpreted more as having control over one's own life than it may well also be correlated to the indulgence index. Finally, conformism seems to correspond primarily with uncertainty avoidance and secondarily with the long term versus short term dimension with regard to leading a moderate life where traditions are important.

This comparison between the Csepeli-Prazsák value categories and the Hofstede cultural dimensions was made on the basis of their publications; for a clear statistical correlation analysis the actual respondents' data is needed, which may be a future direction for validation.

Further conclusions – to what extent is path dependency proven?

The broad concept of path dependency claims that “history matters”. Having concluded such contiguous clusters based on the Hofstede cultural dimensions actually correspond with the two typologies of European historical structures described by Szűcs, it is quite evident that history does matter in present day value preferences; the question is to what degree.

In a narrower sense, as the American philosopher, Daniel Little states, the idea of path dependency is also relevant in the evolution of large social structures. Little's claims that examples amount to structuring conditions that persist for a long time and further condition other historical developments corresponds entirely with Szűcs's analysis of the two European structures that developed over the centuries having a lasting effect on present day value preferences. The emergence of such structures is contingent, which means that although other directions were feasible in the early stage, once the structure is in place it creates its own conditions for persistence.¹¹

Path dependency also aligns with the Hofstede argument that the most basic element of culture, i.e., values, are passed on from generations to generations unconsciously, relatively unchanged over time, reinforcing value choices over and over.¹²

¹¹ <https://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2012/07/path-dependency-and-contingency.html>; accessed 4 December 2019.

¹² Although empirical studies and data go back only to the 19th century.

The current cultural cluster map of Europe based on the Hofstede research team's data show some other patterns important in the present-day value preferences that lie outside the structural-historical analysis of Hungarian historian Jenő Szűcs. Since the possible structures of Northern countries have fallen outside of this analysis in this context the reasons for these markable differences cannot entirely be unveiled. Historically developed societal structures surely matter, but perhaps geography – climate, topography, access to the sea, population density – itself might also play a forging role in value preferences. This gives us further directions for research.

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INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Abstract

The purpose of the study is to compare three independence-related movements and their interest-based strategies applied within the European Union, namely the Catalan, Scottish and Northern Italian initiatives. The ambitions and goals of the movements concern enhancing regional and territorial competences, and in more radical cases activities are directed at separation. These movements can be classified as interest-based movements, meaning they behave like classical interest and lobby groups by connecting and uniting political parties, NGOs and local movements on the basis of a common topic. The process tracing method was applied to identify various strategies applied in Brussels and expectations directed at European officials and institutions. As a result we can say that the three initiatives apply fundamentally different strategies. While Catalonia is connecting the political elite, lower regional units, social movements and cultural organizations, Scotland is relying mostly on political representation and the Scottish National Party. Furthermore, the Northern Italian “independence” movement radically differs from the previous two cases; the goals of local activists are not necessarily independence-based but rather serving domestic political ambitions. In addition, the European Union is unable to meet the expectations of the activists in the field of human rights and institutions. However, the EU provides limited benefits in the area of networking.

Keywords: European Union, national movements, territorial movements, assertion of interests

Introduction

A common perception about the European Union is that the organization is maintaining political and economic stability through its institutions and tools to moderate conflicts. However recently we have observed numerous issues which question this traditional role of the European Union, i.e., the strengthening of regional-separatist and nation-state building movements in various regions.

The aim of the study is to present the strategies of three recent movements which were visible in connection with the European Union. The three observed phenomena are the Catalan independence movement, activism toward Scottish independence and Northern Italian initiatives. In all three cases we can identify recent developments which have been reflected in the field of the European institutions. I will also address the dilemmas dealing with the methodology of measuring influence.

Identifying the similarities and differences between the advocacy strategies of the movements bears significance from the viewpoint of relevance. First of all, we can expect that the territorial movements should strengthen in the future due to the European Union's member states' local issues and difficulties and the disengagement provided as an answer. Second, the topic is undervalued, especially from a comparativist perspective. Last but not least, finding the answer to the question of whether the European Union can be exploited from the side of the independence movements can further affect long-term trust in Brussels and its institutions.

Hypotheses

As mentioned above, the assumptions connected to the conflict prevention role of the European Union do not necessarily reflect the developments of the last few years in numerous countries. However, the EU has certain methods to deal with similar demands coming from regional levels due to the fact that the European Union is a system of 'compounded representation' and, given its multi-level nature and plurality of actors, it constitutes a system of governance in which different forms of representation 'collide.' (Rittberger, 2009). Still, room to maneuver is extremely limited for the independence movements, considering they must communicate their needs against the interests of the member states.

Despite limitations, the structures of the European Union still provide certain opportunities. My preliminary assumption is that the independence movements are forming expectations toward the institution in three areas: human rights, institutional exploitation and mediation. These areas do not necessarily guarantee the success of the regional initiatives, but they have added benefits in the struggle toward independence. It is important to point out a common issue in the public perception of the "European Union" by the movements. The movements count on different forms of support from various bodies: from the European Council, the European Commission acting as a supranational institution, the European Parliament, and from its elected representatives.

- *Human rights-related expectations* are connected to expectations regarding the field activities of the independence movements activists. The representatives of the movements count on the vocal and political support of the representatives of the EU in cases connected to violations of the activists' human rights.
- *Institutional expectations* refer to the general attitude of EU officials and institutions concerning regional and territorial movements. The activists believe that the representatives support the cause of independence, which further encourages the local public and strengthens the dynamic of the process.
- *Expectations connected to mediation* describe the practical use of Brussels and Strasbourg facilities for the purpose of the independence movement. This means active lobbying in institutions, exploit-

ing networking opportunities, using public hearings and creating formal alliances within institutions and staffs.

Traditional approach and methodology

Past studies dealing with strategies of territorial-separatist movements focus mainly on three areas: the conflict of competences between the regions and the European Union, describing various forms of autonomy as a conflict-mitigating tool and analyzing paradiplomacy, i.e., examining the foreign policy aspects of regional representation.

From the institutional point of view the European Union is being seen as a body seeking to balance political and economic interests, based on representative democracy. The EU is built on the involvement of other political actors in the Member States (Rittberger, 2009). Others point out that Europeanisation has led to a complex strategy combining an intense process of nation-building with a pragmatic political approach aimed at reforming policy-making mechanisms at local and European levels (Roller & Sloat, 2002), which inspires similar movements. Still, the independence movements are more linked to the structures of the member states and their options in the field of advocacy are more limited. The European Union's minority protection policy and institutions are rather weak, and the EU criteria for minority protection are based on the Copenhagen criteria in the field of equal treatment and citizenship (Directorate General for International Policies, 2017).

The issue of autonomy plays an important role in the debate about independence movements. Autonomy is a tool to avoid nationality- and regionally motivated conflicts. Currently, autonomous structures are applied in at least twenty-one countries, while the competences of the autonomies differ widely. Each working autonomy has been created against a specific social, political, cultural, and ethnic background, based on unique historical and political genesis and aimed to accommodate the needs and interests of specific groups living in those areas and minority peoples within a state (Benedikter, 2008). Territorial autonomy can therefore be interpreted as an institution of established forms that were deemed successful in mitigating inherited tensions between states and their minorities (Smith, 2013). However, if central governments are unwilling to consider expanding regional powers and address the concerns of minority groups, they fuel separatist movements because independence (and the threat of it) becomes the only way to address regional concerns (Pfeiffer, 2015). From the legal viewpoint, in cases of independence movements we discuss the conflict between two great principles: the right of self-determination of peoples and the right to territorial integrity, which can contradict one another (Carley, 2015).

Studies focusing on paradiplomacy examine regional and lower-level representation units and state the fact that lower-level governments play an increased international role in the general globalization progresses. (Grydehoj, 2015) Regions, federal governments and provinces become more self-sufficient in both economic and political terms paired with limited competences in the field of diplomacy, which raises issues in international law. Regions also face a dilemma over whether they can interpret views on key issues differing from those of their home

country. Paradiplomacy in practice can become an important tool to strengthen the international acceptance of various regions.

Examining independence movements

During the course of my research, in addition to examining the three traditional approaches listed above I further studied a fourth aspect of activities of independence movements: perceiving the movements as interest groups trying to lobby within the European Union. Under the classic definition, interest groups include important groups of people and communities with an ambition to influence politics, but their specific goals are different from those of parties and do not seek to influence decisions through direct political participation. (Almond & Powell, 1966). However, independence movements are in many cases advocated by political parties and the political elite. Is it still possible to apply the methods of measuring the success of interest groups to similar movements?

While by definition territorial-separatist movements do not fulfill the criteria of interest groups, we can consider them as interest-based movements focused on a single topic. These movements share the same idea and point of view on a very specific topic, regardless of political or social status. Shaping a common voice regarding independence was evident in Catalonia, Scotland and Northern Italy as well. Strategies were formed and pursued along regional goals advocated by groups of activists, NGOs and political elites. Within the European Union's structures these groups act as a single entity.

If we want to measure the impact of these movements on the European Union's decision-making process, we face further dilemmas, as the outputs are rather difficult to measure due to the lack of visible progress and clear results. Using the process tracing method (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007) we can compare the empirical data available with the samples of our assumptions. The disadvantages of process tracing lie in generalization, a lack of clarity and small sample size, while it is heavily focused on interviews and additional desk research. Our ultimate goal is to compare the three movements. Based on their activities and preferences we are able to draw a comparison and thus identify similarities and differences in their strategies.

My analysis consists of two parts. During the phase of desk research I focused on gathering information on the strategies and history of national minority movements, relying on press reports and academic literature. The research was further supported with field study in Brussels, which took place from May 25 to 27, 2018, funded by the EFOP 3.6.3 project. During the study I was able to contact numerous representatives of the movement and visit the professional organizations focusing on minority politics, interest representation and lobbying.

Catalonia – multi-level activities

The Catalan independence movement is one of the most visible and active European territory-related movements. Since the establishment of the Estat Català (Catalan State) party in 1922, issues connected to enhancing the territorial rights of Catalonia have been part of the party agenda. In 1931 the province of Catalonia received partial autonomous competences. After the death of General Franco in 1975 the main goal of Catalan activists was to enhance various aspects of local autonomy.

The call for independence based on local mass-demand is a relatively new phenomenon, which strengthened in 2010 after the Spanish High Court of Justice's interference with Catalonia's constitution. The conflict culminated in symbolic local referendums and mass protests. As a result, in 2013 the Catalan Declaration of Sovereignty was adopted, which stated that the Catalan people have the right to decide on their own future.¹

In a self-determination referendum on November 9, 2014, the public voted in favor of Catalonia as an independent state. According to the official statistics, 42 percent of the population participated in the referendum and 81 percent of the respondents answered yes to both of the questions. This act was followed by a referendum in October 2017 linked directly to the proclamation of independence, with a 43 percent participation rate and 90 percent of the participants voting in favor of the decision. Several cases of police brutality were recorded in connection with the referendum. As a response, the Catalan parliament unilaterally declared independence, which further escalated conflicts with the Spanish state and resulted in the emigration of various leading Catalan politicians including president Carles Puigdemont, who settled for a short time in Brussels. The new elections held in Catalonia in December 2017 did not solve the fundamental conflict of interests between the Spanish and Catalan political elites.

The characteristic feature of the Catalan independence movement is that the political representation of the pro-independence movement is not unified. In the European Parliament three parties with fundamentally different agendas² represent the idea of independence: while they share a common position on this specific issue, otherwise their political ideologies range from far left to moderate right. This dispersion makes organizing joint actions in the field of the European Parliament increasingly difficult, while Spanish parties and pro-autonomy oriented Catalan political parties also act as a counter-balance.

Developments in Catalonia have triggered reactions in the field of the European Union. On December 12, 2013, former President of the European Council of Herman Van Rompuy, concerning the province, announced that the separation of one part of a Member State or the creation of a new State would not be neutral as regards the EU Treaties. Van Rompuy also expressed his confidence that Spain would remain united. Similar statements

¹ Catalan declaration of sovereignty (<https://www.parlament.cat/document/intrade/7176>).

² Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC), Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català (PDeCAT), Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC).

came from former Commission President José Manuel Barroso in January 2014 and Antonio Tajani, President of the European Parliament in February 2017. The comments of these leaders were met with dismay from the side of the Catalan public. The pro-Europe oriented Catalan public was discontent with the passivity of leading European politicians regarding police atrocities during the 2017 referendum. The representatives of the European Commission, nor the European Parliament, had not addressed the issue which caused nearly 800 injuries. Jean-Claude Juncker called the incident an internal affair of Spain and Margaritis Schinas, spokesperson of the European Commission, issued a general call for debate instead of confrontation and emphasized the need for Spanish prime minister Mariano Rajoy's intervention.

Catalan lobbying in the European Parliament is focused not only on official channels but on less formal tools as well. The Catalan communities are active in Brussels, relying on mass organizations, protests and partially the infrastructures of Catalan Houses (Casal Català), which act as cultural centers. Within the European Parliament a group of friends of Catalonia has been formed with the involvement of approximately fifty MEPs. The focus of the cooperation is organizing conferences and formulating resolutions. The Catalan government itself took a step toward institutionalization by forming the Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia (Diplocat) (Solé, 2014). Overall, the recent activity and lobbying is focused primarily on influencing public opinion and not the national governments.

Scotland – centralized interest representation

The issue of Scottish autonomy and independence has been a part of local political discourse for the last forty years. First seen as a controlled devolution, the process was heavily affected by foreign policy-related factors and the orientation of Great Britain. The issue of Scottish autonomy first emerged in connection with the Home Rule movement, which aspired to strengthen the competences of the local government. The first unsuccessful referendum on decentralization was held in 1979. However, the process was repeated in 1997 and 74 percent of voters supported the strengthening of competences. As a result the independent Scottish Parliament was formed in 1998.

The main political force behind the autonomist tendencies, the Scottish National Party (SNP) reformulated its policy in the beginning of the 21st century and became the leading political party campaigning for the Scottish independence. In its 2007 manifesto the party promised a referendum on the issue and won a majority in the Scottish parliament, resulting in a 2014 referendum. While 84,5 percent of the population participated, 55 percent of the voters declined the idea of Scottish independence, partially due to British guarantees to further enhance the autonomous status of the country. The independence movement gained a second wind in 2016 after the Brexit referendum, which pointed to the deep divide regarding attitudes toward the European Union in various parts of Great Britain. In Scotland, unlike in England, the supporters of EU membership were a majority. Since the Brexit process Nicola Sturgeon, the first minister of Scotland, spoke several times about organizing a second, repeated independence-related referendum.

The Scottish independence movement can be distinguished from the Catalan movement in several key aspects. The issue of independence is represented dominantly by one party, with a visible mass movement and civic background lacking, hence the representation of territorial interests is dominated by the representatives of the political elite.

While the Scottish independence movement can be characterized as highly euro-enthusiastic, it receives little endorsement within the Union itself. The dynamics of the independence movement were heavily affected by the remarks of leading EU officials. During the process several politicians commented on Scottish events, including José Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission, who in 2012 claimed it would be “extremely difficult, if not impossible” for an independent Scotland to join the European Union. A year later Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy openly admitted that Spain would veto the process.

The European Parliament had not faced a direct request regarding Scottish independence activities from the side of politicians. However, Brexit triggered another wave of debate about the future of Scotland. In February 2017, at the initiative of the EFA-Green party, nearly fifty politicians declared their support for Scottish independence, while 26 MEPs addressed an open letter to support Scottish EU membership.

Scottish paradiplomacy played a limited role in presenting the international interests of the region abroad. In 1999 an independent Scottish House was opened in Brussels, and Scotland undertook increased activity in the Conference of European Regions with Legislative Power (RegLeg). In 2002 Deputy First Minister Jim Wallace formulated his doctrine on Scottish foreign policy, which was based on protecting local interests at the European level, emphasis on contacts with the regions of the European Union, and creating a positive image of Scotland in Europe (Fabiani, 2014).

Northern Italy – Independence claim exploited by internal motives

Unlike Catalonia and Scotland, in the case of Northern Italian independence movements we cannot speak of a phenomenon which has historical roots. Instead of a historical movement the emergence and strengthening of an “artificial” sense of identity in Padania is a relatively new issue, paired with the demand of self-sustainability in the light of economic differences between the northern and southern regions of Italy.

The first visible North-Italian initiative creating ideology behind territory-related demands was the Padanese Movement which made itself visible in 1996 with Umberto Bossi’s Declaration of Independence. The Northern League political party, which supported the separatist movement, described Padania as a regional unit composed of fourteen “nations,” entailing the populations of each region.

The northern Italian independence process is connected to two specific referendums. The first referendum was technically an electronic public opinion poll organized through webpage plebiscito.eu in the Venetian region in

2014. According to the organizers, 63 percent of the population participated in the referendum, with majority favoring an independent Veneto, which would remain a member of NATO and the European Union. The legitimacy of the referendum was undermined by the lack of control of voter identity. Due to the initiative the Italian constitutional court examined the legal aspects of independence-related movements. According to the decision of the body the regions have the right to demand specific conditions on autonomy, but no legal basis exists on declaring independence.

The following referendum on independence, and later autonomy, was organized in October 2017 in Venice and Lombardy. The initiative first aimed at declaring full independence. However, the goals of the organizers were later modified in the light of political aims. The Northern League also gained a mandate to start negotiations between the Italian government and the regions to acquire wider autonomy. In Venice 58 percent of the local population participated, while 40 percent took part in Lombardia. Ninety-five percent of the voters supported the goals of the movement.

The characteristic feature of the northern Italian independence movement is that, unlike the Scottish and Catalan initiatives, the activists are nearly invisible in the field and institutions of the European Union. The lack of lobbying activity can be justified with the goals of the movement: the aspiration of the Northern League is not necessarily independence-related but rather focused on internal goals and strengthening the political powers of the party. From this perspective the northern Italian referendum is a political tool which united the local population and representatives, regardless of party affiliation, in the movement. As a result, Italian civil activism toward the European Union does not bear the mark of the identity of the Padanese, Venetian or Lombard, but has an economic impact. (Curelli, 2011)

Advocacy for the cause of Northern Italian independence is further hampered by the special status of the Northern League. The party is often associated with racism and considered to be part of the extreme right forces forming the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF). The main messages of the party alliance are focused on Euro-scepticism, anti-Europeanism and radicalism, with regional independence only a secondary goal of the initiative.

Conclusions – differences in approach

Comparing the practical activity and formulated needs of the three independence movements, we find that due to the differences in local demands the approaches and strategies also differ. The maneuvering space in the field of European institutions is by their nature limited. Activists can rely on formal consultations, the sympathy of EU delegates, or alternatively, if the paradiplomacy of the given region is active, on the help of their locally elected politicians. The Brussels network provides an opportunity to enhance personal relations with bureaucrats, sympathizers and representatives of other countries, however in certain cases—like in Northern Italy—the lack of enthusiasm for European institutions results in passivity in the given field. Due to the mostly negative comments from the representatives of the European Union the critical, eurosceptic attitude of otherwise

pro-European oriented independence movements may be strengthened in the future. The contrast is even more visible when taking into consideration more direct stances on other issues such as immigration or human rights.

For each movement we can identify several important differences. Regarding the use of the paradiplomacy, both Catalonia and Scotland are active, while in northern Italy the local, artificial identity is not reflected in communicating the interests of lower-level territorial units in Brussels. Catalonia is actively promoting the ideas of Catalan independence through its politicians, but the struggle for independence also involves NGOs, activists, experts and additional institutions. This kind of diversity in the field of territorial representation is absent in the case of Scotland and interpreting interests is completely situational for Northern Italy/Padania. Ironically, neither the Catalan nor the Scottish movement was able to achieve as visible an advancement in the field of enhancing competencies as the Northern Italian movement, which was rather passive at the European level and focused on creating domestic agreements.

Table 1: Similarities and differences between territorial movements

	Catalonia	Scotland	Northern Italy
Paradiplomacy	Active	Active	Not active in the EU
Approach	Bottom-up	Top-down	Ad-hoc
Level of Success	Partial (negative)	Partial (negative)	Positive

While drawing conclusions we can respond to our initial hypothesis: is it true that the expectations of territorial-separatist movements toward the European Union can be divided into three categories? According to our collected data and experiences the objectives of the North Italian initiative are not discussed in Brussels but in Rome instead. The European Union is incapable of fulfilling current Catalanian expectations in the field of human rights and institutional approach, while the movement for Scottish independence still can't generate positive responses. Both movements are, however, able to partially exploit the institutional background of the European Union for lobbying and targeting politicians and various institutions, which can be seen as part of a partially successful yet fragile long-term strategy to achieve a certain level of recognition in the international community.

Table 2: Expectations towards the EU and the reality

Expectation	Catalonia	Scotland	Northern Italy
Human Rights	Yes / not fulfilling	None	None
Institutional	Yes / not fulfilling	Yes / not fulfilling	None
Mediation	Yes / fulfilling	Yes / fulfilling	None

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DOES CONTAGION EXPLAIN CHANGES IN THE DOMESTIC EU POLICIES OF MEMBER STATES?

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Abstract

The influence of Eurosceptic parties on EU policy has largely remained a black box. One of the ways to explain the impact of party-based Euroscepticism on policy is to look at policy convergence of mainstream parties to the positions of Eurosceptic parties, also called the contagion effect. This short paper reviews three developments in Dutch party politics concerning policy positioning on EU matters. It finds that the criticism of the LPF on the EU has become mainstreamed among (new) parties in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the PVV has in 2010 to 2012, through its position as supporter of the government, shaped the policy of the Rutte I cabinet towards a more restrictive position, particularly on EU-related dimensions of migration policy.

Keywords: party-based Euroscepticism, contagion effect, Dutch politics, EU policy.

Introduction

In the Netherlands, as in other member states, political parties have become more Eurosceptic, particularly since the early 2000s (Harryvan & Hoekstra, 2013; Vollaard & Voerman, 2015). These years witnessed two countervailing developments concerning the relationship between the EU and the Netherlands; namely, a speeding up of integration at the EU level, while on the national level there was an increased sense of Euroscepticism (Harryvan & Van der Harst, 2013, pp. 207-208). The politician that changed the landscape and attitude of the Dutch parliament toward the EU was Pim Fortuyn and his party the LPF in the early 2000s.¹ Since 2005 Geert Wilders largely took over issue ownership² over Euroscepticism with a hard Eurosceptic agenda; which concretely meant the desire to get the Netherlands out of the European Union. The result of the 2005 referen-

¹ While the LPF was a strong critic of the EU, the party's leader Pim Fortuyn did not principally oppose the EU, but favoured a restructuring of cooperation in the EU. Pim Fortuyn's legacy long outlived him; he was assassinated on May 6, 2002.

² Issue ownership occurs when "certain issues may become associated with a particular party (e.g., the environment with parties from the left and opposition to immigration with parties from the right)" (Steenbergen & Scott, 2004: 167).

dum on the Constitutional Treaty in the Netherlands, with 61% of the respondents rejecting the Treaty, gave Euroscepticism in Dutch politics a boost.^{3,4}

After the referendum there was a “numbing silence” in Dutch politics on the EU (Harryvan & Van der Harst, 2013, p. 251), after which more parties came to hold more Eurosceptic positions (Harryvan & Hoekstra, 2013; Vollaard & Voerman, 2015; Hargitai, 2018). What are the reasons for this increasing Euroscepticism? Is the increased Euroscepticism amongst political parties a consequence of the strategic repositioning of these mainstream parties towards the policy positions of fringe parties? These questions will be addressed in this article.

Euroscepticism

While there has been an extensive debate about the nature and the definition of Euroscepticism, it is suffice to use the relatively simple classification of Szczerbiak and Taggart that distinguishes between soft and hard Euroscepticism; where soft Euroscepticism means “where there is NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that ‘national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU trajectory”. Hard Euroscepticism is “a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their counties should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived” (2008, pp. 7-8).

Contagion

The *contagion effect* refers to a strategic policy convergence through policy repositioning of one party to that of an electorally successful party. The point of departure of the contagion effect is party competition, and the motivations of political parties to seek voters and/or office and/or policy outcomes (Strøm, 1990). Most, if not all, studies on the contagion effect start with reference to Anthony Downs’s theory of electoral competition. According to this theory “not only the existence of ideologies, but also many of [parties’] characteristics, may be deduced from the premise that parties seek office solely for the income, power, and prestige that accompany it” (Downs, 1957, p. 141). Sitter argues that parties take a fourth element into consideration when developing their political strategy: “the weight of the party’s identity and ideology, the implications of its pursuit of core policy preferences, the incentives it faces in its pursuit of votes and the constraints of coalition politics” (Sitter, 2003,

³ With 127 in favour and 22 against, the Dutch parliament was overwhelmingly in favour of the ratification of the Treaty (Europa-Nu.nl).

⁴ Geert Wilders one day after the Dutch referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in 2005: “It was a wonderful day yesterday! The Dutch voter spoke out. A large majority said no. I am proud of the Dutch voter, because he said no to the European constitution of the elite in Brussels, who are light years away from the regular man and woman” (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2005).

p. 249). This would imply that the strategic recalculation of policy positions is within the realm of what parties might consider among their possibilities to maximise votes.

There are a number of recent studies that have looked at the contagion effect in different policy areas: Van Spanje (2010) conducted a large comparative study of immigration policy, Meguid (2008) and Ivaldi (2012) focused on immigration policy in France, while Meguid (2005 and 2008) and Abou-Chadi (2014) look at environmental policy, and Rooduijn et al (2014) look at the contagion of populist rhetoric of populist parties.

While in 2003 Sitter did not consider Euroscepticism becoming a strategic tactic for mainstream parties to increase voter share, Meijers (2017) finds support for the presence of Eurosceptic contagion, albeit with the condition of a high salience of the EU for these radical parties. For his analysis, Meijers conducts a quantitative analysis using Chapel Hill Expert Survey data. Other authors that conducted quantitative studies on the positioning of parties similarly use a scale that varies from 1-strong opposition- to 7-strong support (Ezrow et al., 2010; Somer-Topcu, 2009; Van Spanje, 2010; Whitefield & Rohrschneider, 2015), which are from either coded datasets of party manifestos or expert surveys. This approach, however, does not help understand the strategic considerations of parties towards such party convergence.

The contribution of Salo and Rydgren (2018) is a qualitative analysis of Eurosceptic contagion of the radical right Finn Party on the behavior of mainstream parties in Finland during the Eurozone crisis in 2010. They find that the Finn Party successfully polarised the political debate in Finland regarding Greek and Irish financial instability by not favouring support, in contrast to the mainstream parties. This led to a subsequent repositioning of mainstream parties toward the position of the Finn Party, which had a more anti-establishment solution to Greek and Irish financial difficulties in the EU context: “it was the strict constraints imposed on policymakers by the necessity of acting in a certain manner, lest the EMU and its constituent economies face an existential crisis, that brought on the punitive political climate where the national interest appeared as the guiding principle of all policymaking” (254).

Given the lack of understanding the effects of Eurosceptic parties on policy⁵ (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2013; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2018), the current research will follow George and Bennett’s (2005) focus on the usefulness of case study research for understanding causal mechanisms. Regarding the way that contagion affects factors like issue salience and issue ownership, Meguid (2008, pp. 27-30) finds that an “accommodative strategy” which “is typically employed by parties hoping to draw voters away from a threatening competitor” (Meguid, 2005, pp. 348), leads to a convergence of issue position (the contagion effect) and increased issue salience and transfers the issue ownership to the mainstream party (from the fringe parties) and thus decreases the electoral support of the niche party.

⁵ In the words of two of the most important scholars in the Euroscepticism literature, Taggart & Szczerbiak (2017, p. 45) : “[P]erhaps the biggest lacuna, particularly from the perspective of practitioners and policy makers, is the lack of research on the impact of Euroscepticism on European politics and policy. In other words, does Euroscepticism matter in terms of policy outcomes?”

Eurosceptic contagion in the Netherlands: trends since 2002

The aim of this section is to highlight a number of indicators that mark Eurosceptic contagion in the Netherlands. While there is a need for further research on the causal mechanisms behind the policy convergence of fringe parties and mainstream parties toward an increasingly Eurosceptic position, the following section will look at three particular developments in Dutch party politics concerning Euroscepticism: the success of Pim Fortuyn in polarising politics on the EU, the EU positions of new parties elected into the Tweede Kamer, and the contagion effect of the PVV on large mainstream parties like the VVD and CDA.

Pim Fortuyn

As the introduction already indicated, the ascent of Pim Fortuyn in national politics in the Netherlands appears to be the first step towards the real mainstreaming of Euroscepticism, where parties across the whole political spectrum have become increasingly Eurosceptical (or at least critical of the EU) (Leconte, 2015). Fortuyn wrote a book in 2002 that was published two months before the general elections in the Netherlands, and constitutes a programme to tackle the structural programmes the Netherlands was facing. On the part of the EU, Fortuyn lists the following 9 policy initiatives for the future of the EU:

1. Renegotiating the Dutch contributions to the EU, on the basis of population and GDP;
2. End to CAP and renationalisation of agriculture policy. EC maintains control over fair competition;
3. End to structural funds;
4. For new member states, a separate temporary structural fund to reach the EU economic level;
5. New member states temporarily not eligible to enter EMU;
6. Referendums over accession new member states;
7. Hold large subsidiary conference to evaluate all the rules and regulations and bring back competences to member states when needed;
8. End to the European Parliament, replacing it with a senate that houses national representatives of the member states;
9. Increased role of Dutch parliament in EU affairs, with more oversight over Dutch government representatives in EU. (Fortuyn, 2002, pp. 180-181)

Many political parties in the Netherlands share similar positions as those described by Pim Fortuyn on issues like the decrease in the Dutch contributions, a strict subsidiary test over legislation and an increased role of national parliaments (Schout et al., 2012, p. 417). However, while Fortuyn initially politicised⁶ the EU through his strong Eurosceptic position, other parties started to adopt similar positions, which contributed to policy convergence on a number of matters concerning the European Union.

The EU for new parties in the Dutch parliament

Of the six parties that were elected for the first time into the Dutch Parliament since the year 2002 - LPF, PvdD, PVV, 50+, DENK and FvD - only DENK can be convincingly said to be supportive of European integration. Starting with the position of the LPF, which was the first of these parties to enter parliament in 2002, there appears to have been a ripple effect. As mentioned above, Pim Fortuyn was not against the principle of the EU, but rather against the current form and shape of the EU, which he considered a bureaucratic bulwark, with its strong lack of democratic accountability. The party program of LPF in light of the 2004 EP elections closed with a quote from Fortuyn's 1997 book - *Soulless Europe*, "*I love Europe, I love its multitude of people, cultures, landscapes, weather conditions, languages and human beings. I sometimes hate the euro-elite [sic] in its arrogant negligence. In short, I want a Europe of the people, of the human scale. A Europe for you and me!*" (as quoted in Mudde, 2007). LPF was, in that sense, a soft Eurosceptic party, principally favouring the existence of a European Union, but strongly opposed to the current functioning of the EU, where the political elites and bureaucracy fail to serve the interests of the public.

In 2006, PVV and the Animal Party (PvdD) entered the Dutch parliament. The PVV⁷ was from its inception a hard Eurosceptic party, and was the first party to openly support a Dutch exit from the European Union. The Animal Party too rejects the current functioning of the EU, insisting on further democratisation and transparency, and is not in favour of further integration (Vollaard & Voerman, 2015, pp. 173-174). Party 50+ entered the Tweede Kamer in 2012 and is not in favour of deeper integration, but recognises the need for cooperation on the EU level on issues like migration, border protection, energy and economic affairs. In its 2017 party programme, 50+ is against the further enlargement of the EU. The last two parties to have entered the Dutch parliament for the first time are DENK and FvD in 2017. DENK is a party that supports European integration and enlargement, but states the need for democratisation and cutting red tape. Lastly, FvD is a hard-Eurosceptic party that favours a complete return of legislative sovereignty and demanding that the EU should limit itself to economic cooperation.

⁶ Politicisation, defined by De Wilde and Zürn in its simplest form, is "making a matter a subject of public regulation and/or a subject of public discussion" (2012, p. 139). Some authors add the factor "polarisation" as a necessary condition for politicisation to occur. Hutter and Grande define polarisation as "the intensity of conflict related to an issue among the different actors", which is maximised when two camps have completely opposing views on a matter (2014, p. 1004).

⁷ Geert Wilders left the VVD in 2004 because of major disagreements over the party's position regarding the accession negotiations with Turkey, which Wilders vehemently opposed. In the elections of 2007, Wilders' party became the PVV.

New parties in the Dutch political scene are more inclined to highlight the negative consequences of EU membership.

Contagion effect of the PVV

The policy effects of the PVV are particularly interesting to look at. While the focus will be on the effects of the PVV in terms of its Eurosceptic attitude, the multidimensionality of the EU and the inclination of parties to couple the EU to issue like migration and security (Akkerman & De Lange, 2012; Fennema, 1997), makes the delineation of where EU policy starts and ends less than obvious. An important example of how the PVV links immigration to the European Union is reflected in the following example: on March 1, 2012, the Central Planning Agency calculated that between 9 and 16 billion euro has to be cut from the government budget for 2013 in order to meet the European requirement of keeping government spending under the 3% mark. On March 5 the PVV was willing to negotiate budget cuts as long as some deals could be reached regarding immigration and asylum policy (Nieuwsuur broadcast on March 5, 2012). Wilders as such combines the salient issues of his party (immigration policy and the European Union).

Hurrelmann et al. also find that EU-related issues are frequently domesticated in discourse; in particular migration is considered a negative consequence of EU enlargement and open borders (2013, p. 13). The most salient and domesticated policy area is immigration policy. A significant part of this policy area relates to domestic issues, like the construction of shelters or legislation on family reunion, as contrasted to the European dimension where border controls and negotiations with third countries on the management of migration flows are recurring issues.

In general terms, previous research has already shown that the immigration policy of VVD and CDA was influenced first by the LPF (and less markedly by the populist CD which did not gain seats in 2002), which led toward a much more restrictive immigration policy than before (Van Heerden et al., 2014). “In the 2006 elections, when the PVV presented its first electoral manifesto, the CDA and VVD returned more or less to the positions they had held in 1998, but they did move in the direction of their latest anti-immigration competitor in 2010.” (p.132). In the election campaigns of 2012 and 2017 the VVD and CDA competed and continued in the same vein, and “rhetorically with the PVV by emphasizing national identity issues”; both parties “even proposed policies that were in tension with or, at times, in contravention of the Dutch constitution” (Akkerman, 2018, p. 14).

Besides the effect of the PVV on the policies of the VVD and CDA on immigration, the 2010 coalition agreement of the VVD-CDA(-PVV) cabinet was very restrictive. On the basis of the analysis of the positions of the three parties as according to their party manifestos in 2010 and the subsequent content of the coalition agreement, the negotiations on their topic appear to be mostly in line with the position of the VVD, but with the inclusion of a clause of the PVV.⁸

⁸ In negotiations the PVV demanded that people staying in the Netherlands illegally should be punishable.

There was a notable instance in the plenary debate following the fall of the Rutte I in April 2012 where CDA minister of immigration Gerd Leers emphasised that he was in favour of many of the policy proposals he had been negotiating since he became minister of the VVD-CDA(-PVV) coalition, despite the very restrictive nature of these policies.⁹ Whereas a number of MPs expressed their expectation of relief for Ministers Leers to no longer have to support the policies mostly in line with the PVV's agenda, Leers went on to say that the "content [of the proposals made by the Netherlands] were convincing, and that I still support it" (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2012, p. 19). At the same time, the minister and the government as a whole remained in favour of a Common Asylum Policy to control migration flows.

Two of the three historically largest mainstream parties in the Netherlands have moved their positions on migration towards the position of the PVV, a far-right party which has advocated leaving the EU and a complete stop of non-European migrants.

Conclusion

This paper has reviewed some of the developments in Dutch party politics concerning policy positioning on EU matters. Firstly, Pim Fortuyn successfully put Euroscepticism on the agenda, and issues that he advocated in the late 1990s and early 2000s are now part of many parties' criticisms of the European Union. While the negative outcome of the 2005 referendum on the Constitutional Treaty and other external developments, like the Eurocrisis and the migration crisis encouraged critical reflection for parties regarding European integration, the electoral breakthrough of the LPF and PVV and their Eurosceptic discourse is likely to have accelerated the increased Eurosceptic discourse of mainstream parties, similar to the effects of those parties in the immigration and integration debate, as argued by Van Heerden et al. (2014, p. 134).

Secondly, of the six new political parties that entered Dutch politics since the early 2000s, only one (DENK) of had a clearly favourable position toward the EU, while of the other five parties two (PVV and FvD) were hard Eurosceptics, two were clearly soft Eurosceptics (LPF and PvdD) and the 50+ party takes on a position of pragmatic cooperation (Hargitai, 2017). This also indicated the increased Euroscepticism that the paper began with.

⁹ Shortly after taking office, in December 2010, Minister of Immigration and Asylum Leers presented a Roadmap for migration and asylum policy that the Dutch government was going to work toward at the EU level, focusing specifically on a number of issues. Firstly, the amendment of Council Directive 2004/83/EC and the amending Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 (the Dublin Convention), whereupon immediate (re)negotiation is possible. Secondly, Council Directive 2003/86/EC on family reunification and Council Directive 2003/109/EC on the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, where negotiations are pending and cooperation was being sought with other member states. Thirdly, there were three directives where at the time no adjustments were expected where the Netherlands were going to bargain: Council Directive 2004/38/EC on the rights of EU citizens to move freely within the EU, Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, and the Association Agreement with Turkey. (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2010)

Thirdly, there has been a contagion effect of the migration policies of the LPF and the PVV, particularly on two of the three historically most important mainstream parties, the Christian Democrats (CDA) and the Liberals (VVD). Migration policy is often coupled to issues like European integration, and for that reason was included in the analysis.

A note for future research: case studies that use process tracing to understand the causal mechanisms behind the contagion effect would be highly relevant contributions that would help to understand the influence of Eurosceptic parties on policy, an area of research that has so far been neglected (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2013; 2017).

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COMMEMORATIVE PRACTICES – THE 1944 MASSACRES IN VOJVODINA

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Abstract

During the last three decades the collective memory of the massacres of local Hungarians carried out by Tito's administration in 1944 in Vojvodina started to transform into cultural memory in the circle of local Hungarians. Given that societal forces behind the memory-construction were effective, the collective memory of the event serves as a basis for rites in present. In fall 2017 I examined local rites that attempt to preserve the collective memory of the 1944 massacres, which also serve as a basis for the creation and re-formation of local cultural meanings and values. Moreover, by observing and analysing the characteristics of the examined rites my aim was to detect the societal forces that influence the formation of local meanings and shape the frames of processing the past. Through the observed rites, as concluded, the collective memory of the event is energized through and forms the past via "nationality". However, as observed, an explicit common "border-line" has been developed through local inter-ethnic interactions, an attitude that regulates commemorative practices, structures public narratives as neutral as possible, and aims to serve local peacefulness. These features, however, lead us to the question of whether the memory of the event locking itself into a rigid and formal "tricolour-ness" is able to serve reconciliation in a society that lacks relevant fundamental societal discourses and past-processing exercises in general, and where the majority of the local population hesitates to participate in the commemorative exercises.

The research context

This paper concentrates on the collective memory of Vojvodinian Hungarians with a special focus on massacres committed against them. In 1944/45 Hungarian residents of Tito's Yugoslavia, along with Vojvodinian Germans, were identified as "enemies of the people" and became victims of massacres, high-handed executions, mass deportation or forced encampment. Beside ethnic minorities, groups of royalist Serbs were also executed. The memory of the 1944 massacres of native Hungarians in Vojvodina, occasionally defined by Hungarians as genocide, was excluded from Yugoslav official politics of remembrance and was *a taboo* for almost 50 years. Nevertheless, memories remained vivid as losses occurred within family circles. After the political transformation in Hungary and Yugoslavia in 1989/90 public commemorations started to spread. By bringing these memories to light, the amount of publications covering the topic started to gradually increase. Thirty years later a bilateral committee of historians from the Hungarian and Serbian Academies of Science was assigned in 2009 to conduct fact-based historical and documentation analyses. Political representatives of both ethnic groups argued for these analyses by claiming the need to dissolve mutual distrust and promote reconciliation.

The memory of the massacres gradually infiltrated into political discourses and became a central element of ruling narratives, while collective memory of the events simultaneously started to transform from communicative into cultural remembrance. The escalating number of memorials and monuments appear to prove this change in accordance with the growing degree of commemorations and rites. Due to the work of the bilateral academic committee, publications on the history of the massacres have been published, while sociological analyses are still lacking. In order to fill this gap I started to examine the collective memory of the 1944 massacres in 2017. My analysis is structured through a research question asking which societal factors contribute to present representations of the massacres committed by Tito's early administration in Vojvodinian Hungarian and Serbian communities (modes and meanings), and form the framework for processing the past in these communities (interethnic relations). My research project, arguably, will be conducted in a way that considers historical embeddedness as well.

The legitimacy of the question is rooted in the "Never again!" imperative aiming for coexistence and social solidarity among various communities (Alexander, 2011). In the history of the memory of the Holocaust, a common belief stating that *anybody* can be a target of human suffering stemming from discrimination became determinant; thereafter, repetition of past events *must be* obstructed. Aspirations for and practices of comprehending and processing the past serve as distinctive instruments of prevention, by which remembrance functions as a basis for peaceful coexistence in the long term. In accordance with the introduced framework, this paper focuses on the aspect of *how* the local Hungarian community remembers the 1944 massacres, or more specifically, what characteristics related commemorations entail. In order to understand these features, I used the method of participant observations. Before enlisting the examined elements and presenting the findings, key concepts will be clarified.

Clarification of key concepts

This paper perceives *communities*, including nations, as being constructed or "imagined" to use Benedict Anderson's (1991) words; their members do not know each other but still live with the imago of a community, which generates the feeling of belonging and group conscience. Rogers Brubaker pointed out "nations are understood as real entities, as communities, as substantial, enduring collectivities," though this should be questioned since groups, such as nations, are not collective subjects with individual will or characteristics (1996). "Ethnopolitical entrepreneurs" as described by Brubaker (1996) are actors who frame events and present themselves as national-ethnic. *Framing*, or *cultural representation* in other words, is the process by which we perceive groups or nations as enduring collectivities though they are constantly in motion. By perceiving a nation as a cultural representation, we may examine the modes of representation, characteristics of relations, authorities and actors re-producing representations, or the role representational exercises play (Zombory, 2011, p. 67). Similarly, identity cannot be understood as a stable and essentially framed entity, thus, following Zygmunt Bauman's thoughts, we prefer the term *identification* as "a never-ending, always incomplete, unfinished and open-ended activity in which we all, by necessity or by choice, are engaged" (Bauman, 2001).

When using the term *collective memory*,¹ Maurice Halbwachs (1925) claimed that memory operates only within a collective context as being “embedded” in social frames: memory is a social phenomenon. “Past comes into being insofar as we refer to it” and is always reconstructed within a referential framework or our own present, claims Jan Assmann’s interpretation (Assmann, 2011, p. 17). We remember only those past events that are given meaning and significance in the present; thereafter, remembering is semiotisation, a process of producing these meanings. Constructed meanings might congeal into various spatial or written cultural carriers such as the book, curriculum, or the monument. These features are the main characteristics of *cultural memory*, while *communicative memory* comprises memories related to the recent past: this is what the individual shares with his/her contemporaries, argues Assmann (2011, p. 36). By various meaning-giving practices, communities may transform communicative memory into cultural memory – or just fade away. *Cultural rituals* may serve this process since through their performative, formalised language encoded in postures, gestures and movements they play an essential role in forming and congealing collective memories that are passed on over time, argued Paul Connerton (1989). Rites also serve as a basis for creation and formation of local cultural meanings and group identities (Assmann, 2011, p. 72). This paper aims to capture the characteristic of described processes as follows.

Methodology for observation

In order to answer the introduced question, the method of participant observation was applied. Aspects of analysis were as follows: goal of remembrance, locations, central spaces and actors, timing, applied symbols, choreography, participants and absentees, interethnic relations, degree of trans-nationality, portrayal of victims and perpetrators, communicated meanings. This way I expect findings that reveal the key meanings attached to the memory of the 1944 massacres and the key actors shaping these contents. In addition, I wish to understand how memories that subsided into silence for decades are able to connect in the present and if collective memory has already become homogeneous. I assume that despite an increasing number of local commemorative practices we will find a mosaic-like, immature collective memory of 1944 massacres still in formation, assumedly due to long-lasting tabooing, imperfect fact-based knowledge and poor degree of communicative memory. In order to verify my statement, I collected data at four Vojvodinian locations in 2017: Csúrog/Čurug, Szabadka/Subotica, Zenta/Senta and Bajmok. Due to the lack of space here, I will introduce the main characteristics of these ceremonies, depict similarities and differences, and draw conclusions.

¹ For more about the sociological theory of memory, see Kovács (2012).

Fieldwork

By selecting distant and dissimilar *locations*, my aim was to collect data that would enable capture of similarities besides unique local characteristics. Csúrog is a Serbian village, as all local Hungarians were forced out of their homes in 1945 and punished by collective guilt. Due to political discourses, it transformed into an interlocal space where monuments were erected and key Hungarian (and occasionally Serbian) politicians and family members pay their respects. Bajmok is a small town with Serbian and Hungarian inhabitants where Germans were executed along with Hungarians in 1944. It serves as a basis for bi-ethnic commemorations at the present time. Szabadka, the largest city in northern Vojvodina and inhabited by a few ethnic groups, is an interlocal space again where a monument was raised in 1994 for the victims of 1944. Finally, Zenta is a Hungarian-majority town with two memorials, one in the cemetery raised in 1994, and the other erected in 2007 at the river bank, where executions took place. As the majority of victims of massacres were shot into *mass graves outside built-up areas*, next-of-kin generally visited these areas on the Day of the Dead, first secretly, later openly. In some cases commemorations take place in cemeteries where memorials were created. Csúrog, Szabadka and Bajmok belong to the first group of locations, Zenta to the other, as concerning the Day of the Dead ceremony as, remarkably, they organise a ceremony by the river few days later. As noted, initiated by Hungarians, monuments stand in all places. Besides monuments plaques with engraved (mostly Hungarian) names are also present in all locations, except Csúrog. We see that the selected locations and local population differ, but the *timing* of ceremonies, presence of mass graves, or the existence of memorials created by Hungarians show us clear similarities.

The *choreography* of rites turns out to be another similarity. Ritualistically, the notes of the Hungarian anthem stimulate Hungarian attendants to open their psyche to the realm of "nationality". As no other anthem is sung, it appears that Hungarians host the event and provide opportunity for "others" to join. The ceremony is generally opened in Hungarian but translated into Serbian and German, a gesture reinforcing the act of hosting. Christian priests always present are in charge of transforming the event from the profane to the sacred: they commence rituals by blessing the memorials and praying for the salvation of innocent victims and for forgiveness. Sermons, held in Hungarian, are occasionally followed by diverse speeches by Hungarian politicians hardening the *national-sacral dominance*. Gestures, however, are generally present (except in Zenta) as some speeches are translated (in short and sometimes even with poor pronunciation) into other local languages; moreover, in Szabadka Jewish words break the homogeneity of the presented ethnic-Christian sphere. Nowhere do family members of the victims have a chance speak as was the case in the early era of commemorations. Currently, Hungarian ethnopoliticians *play the key role* in forming the meanings and values related to the memory of 1944 at the *central spaces* of the rituals, which are the monuments. This is verified again by the procedure of laying wreaths: generally they place their wreaths first, into most visible places, while family members are asked to lay down their flowers and light the candles of remembrance only after. Bajmok was the only exception, performing the rite in the opposite way. Moreover, following the ceremony, a local family member grabbed the microphone and said:

“I’d suggest you come here by night. The sight, peacefulness... or... by night you feel here the whole, when darkness falls on dead.” (P₁)

By this act, he managed to include the testimony of a victim into the ceremony. Since the rite became more formalised, voices of family members have disappeared; however, seemingly not in an irreversible way. They still have much to say.

Symbols, again, reinforce the supremacy of the national-sacral frame. The anthem, the cross, clothes (“bocskai,” valiant gown) wore by some, tricolour wreaths composed of flowers and ribbons, the dominant spoken language, selection of artistic pieces – all these jointly seem to govern the mental frame within which meanings are re-produced and enable separate family losses to intertwine in the present. Nevertheless, *space is open for representation of losses of other local ethnic groups*, too, and Germans, Croatians and even the very small Jewish community use their chance. With the exception of the Jewish representative, however, all the ethnic groups present articulate their message within the frame of their “own” nationality – again. The Serbian party did the same when their official political representatives joined the ceremony.² Only few symbols such as a neutrally coloured ribbon show us sporadically that some are ready to leave the national sphere and move toward an ethnically neutral realm.

Concerning the *participants*, four aspects are worth highlighting. First, Hungarian commemorators show heterogeneity concerning the *name* of the ethnic group: some are Vojvodinian, others “southern” (“délvidéki”), another just “Hungarians”. These names, importantly, mean different strategic visions in minority politics, too. Second, as noted above, Hungarians constitute the majority in all places, accompanied by local “others” depending on the characteristics of the local population and their interethnic relations, as well as on the interlocal nature of the ceremony. Third, what seems similar in all places is that more middle-aged or elderly people than young people attend the event. Beside local scouts, no school-age people join, or some come with their families, which challenges the success of the intergenerational transmission of the constructed meanings. Finally, though ethnopolitical actors and family members are present, the majority of locals are absent. This challenges the existence of a broader “community of remembrance” just as well as the success of the infiltration into the micro level of meanings generated by political discourses (Nora, 1989). These *absences* need further analysis.

Communicated contents, *meanings* and values vary not just place to place but also speaker to speaker. As noted above, national belonging dominates the ceremony, but within this framework both open and closed narratives are present. As an example of a closed national narrative, we heard a priest praying:

“May God bless not just their memory but our future as well, on a soil you gave to the Hungarian nation.” (P₂ Csúrog)

² The only case of Serbians being not present officially was Csúrog where Serbian members of the group caring for the memory of 1942 Razzia (when Hungarian military troops executed local Serb people) joined the commemoration.

However, narratives more open to universal values were also present:

“Executing people without legal proceedings and judicial decision or identifying them as war criminals in a retrofitting way are only few pieces of evidence that prove that the major human right, the right for life, was not respected and protected.” (P₃ Bajmok, politician)

This refers to a fragmented character of the collective memory of 1944 and the presence of an ongoing semiotisation, which is an essential characteristic of all collective memories, as Assmann pointed out, but here we witness a genuine situation where meanings are under re-construction due to the long period of tabooing and updated historical findings. Some perceptions are already accepted, such as the meaningful image of victims who are all generally understood to be “innocent”. Paradoxically, in these narratives, they became active heroes sacrificing their lives for the nation instead of being powerless, systematically executed victims of the early Yugoslav communist regime, as current historical research show. Interestingly, victims are always portrayed as being active decision-making martyrs, while commemorators as passive actors. This without appealing for individual responsibility or the potential to act, in the passive-patterned present:

“In Csúrog we remember our martyrs and obey the will of God. (...) We may justly doubt if we could forgive, so we must ask for the help of God.” (P₁ Csúrog, priest)

“Let’s hope that in future, just like in present, adequate legal instruments will be guaranteed for the protection [of human rights]. (P₃ Bajmok, politician)

Perpetrators remain undefined in almost all cases: if some identify a group, then it is “Tito’s partisans”. Seemingly, they avoid pointing to any group; thus, Serbs are never mentioned. Perpetrators are left out of the narrative in accordance with the communicated wish of focusing on the innocent victims – as neutrally as possible – as a collective duty, which is the articulated goal and function of remembrance.

The aspect of transnationality consisting of the “triangle” of national minorities, nationalising states and external national homelands must also be discussed (Brubaker, 1995). The justification for this approach serves the observation that besides members of the local minority and majority groups, guests from Hungary also join the commemoration. Their participation is rather formal as appointed diplomats accompany the events, who seem to respect the interethnic frames local groups developed during their long coexistence. This appears significant because, as portrayed, characteristics of the ceremonies revealed an implicit desire for a certain “neutrality” as regards the interethnic dimension: they definitely avoid mentioning ethnic characteristics of the perpetrators, do not ask openly why the local “other” is absent, or shun any term that might sound provocative.

“God should be asked the question of how these people can and could deal with their conscience. We are not obliged to judge.” (P₃ Szabadka, politician).

One might ask, why does it happen this way? Richard Papp conducted anthropological studies among Vojvodina Hungarians in the mid-2000's and concluded that a "cultural-ethnic revival" was observable, openly represented by some, while restrained by the majority. For the majority normative set of rules developed and solidified through interethnic practices over many decades were determinative. Manifestations of ethnic belonging in the public were realised only within commonly developed "limits" for many members, which served as an ethnic shield, he argued. Cultural contents were always present but within the "internal" or "hidden" realm of culture and personality that became characteristic of cultural tradition originating from distrust of the ethnic majority. As from the 2000's channels of performing cultural contents became more open, a minority within the minority started to use new ways of self-representation, while others preferred using the safer ethnic shield – thus causing an internal gap (Papp, 2003). Despite the above, space for representation is continuously expanding and the members of the ritual are continuously broadening the limits within which symbolic expression of ethnic belonging is possible, I argue that local Hungarians are still stretching this "border-line" by paying attention to the existing "limits" and to the local "other".

The pursued neutrality noticed at commemorations of 1944 harmonizes with Papp's observations, and once somebody crosses this mental "border-line" an immediate response follows. In Bajmok, a Hungarian governing party-member joined the 1944 commemoration and started to inflame local Hungarians against an unknown "other" – the "migrant" – by willingly drawing an analogy between 1944 and the present migration crisis. A local Catholic priest, visibly spontaneously, *immediately* responded as *the "line" was crossed*.

"We should preserve the feeling on how terrible [the past] was, that all the innocent victims should be protected, not just ours. All the victims must be protected. By this we understood what it means to remember our beloved ones: to protect the "other" too, regardless of his religion or nationality. Innocents must be stood by." (P₄ Bajmok)

The message clearly communicated the very simple logic that the "other" cannot be mistreated only because of being "other," which is exactly what "we" as victims experienced in 1944 and what "we" learned from 1944 (and "you" did not). At this point, although an orientation toward pan-Hungarian culture is present, local cultural-ethnic meanings and interethnic conventions were highlighted and dominated the space, showing an aspiration to remembrance and representing 1944 in a way that recognizes present local interethnic characteristics. All observations made on commemorations are suggested to be interpreted through this lens.

Summary

According to the analysis we may summarise by stating the contents of 1944 commemorations (communicated and transmitted meanings, knowledge, values) are relatively fragmented, but the form, choreography, timing, location, participants and (a passive-like, national-sacral) framework of the rites show a more homogeneous picture, as does the representation of the victims and perpetrators. Following a long silence, individual traumatic

experiences and memories of 1944 construct a collective memory through and by “nationality” in examined ceremonies. Various national-sacral symbols galvanising the feeling of belonging to a group became widespread, while tools enabling identification even with in-group witnesses were missing, except in Szabadka where at least few names were read. I learned that though openness is provided by local Hungarians as initiators of 1944 commemorations for other ethnic communities suffering in 1944 to join, but all groups prefer to focus on their “own” members; thus, chances for *a common* commemoration seem to be low at the moment.

Since the “national” element governs the rite, deepening the national component of identity, collective memory of the event is vitalised through and forms the past via the “nationality” but strictly *within the boundaries* that were developed commonly by the local “other.” This line was visible during the observed rites. The aspiration to “neutral” representations, regardless of the experiences of ethnic-faceted conflicts in everyday life, might be understood this way.

As observation showed, the determinant feature of rites is the national “tricolour” within a “line” serving interethnic peace. Commemorative space is entered only by the political elite and family members, meaning that the majority of in-group and out-group members are absent. In the recent past, local Hungarians commenced bringing “to life” the memory of 1944 primarily through ritual ceremonies. However, its success might be questioned as its level of institutionalisation is weak, it does not manifest in various forms, and does not attract the majority of population. Cultural memory is not alive yet, while practices able to serve the solidification of memory of 1944 events are still lacking. Moreover, a wide range related societal discourses and past processing practices are generally missing. According to the imperative of “Never again!” practices, processing the past is the adequate tool for prevention, in which remembrance functions as a basis for peaceful coexistence. Thus, if local Hungarians do not establish these past processing practices but instead maintain only memory of unprocessed traumatic event to linger within the wider community, the opportunity for reconciliation could be lost. One could ask whether the memory of the event locking itself into “tricolour-ness” is able to serve as reconciliation in a society that lacks relevant fundamental societal discourses and past-processing exercises in general but remembers a traumatic event without the majority of its group members.

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WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP: THE POTENTIAL CORRELATION BETWEEN PROTESTANT OR CATHOLIC RELIGION AND GENDER EQUALITY IN EUROPE

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Abstract

The main objectives of this paper is to explore how the Protestant and Catholic religions can influence gender equality, while applying the methodology of comparative analysis. The Catholic cluster consists of Austria, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal - these countries have high gender gaps. Denmark, Finland, the United Kingdom, Norway and Sweden represent the Protestant cluster, which consistently stands out in the World Economic Forum's annual Global Gender Gap Report. In terms of the employment of women the paper covers the period from 1990 to 2019 and concludes that in the early years the employment of women was significantly lower in the Catholic countries; however, the rapid growth of employment led to the current, close to parity status quo. Closing the employment gap is a multi-faceted phenomenon and the Protestant religion in itself does not appear to be the only driver, therefore the various levels of EU legislations need to be considered. In education attainment religion does not seem to be a differentiating factor. Political empowerment is an area with a gap between the Protestant and the Catholic clusters. The ratio of women in parliament and in ministerial roles shows that the Protestant countries are close to achieving gender equality while the Catholic countries lag behind. To what extent this is due to religious difference will require further research, especially given that the outcome of the research correlates well with Gosta Esping-Andersen's typology of welfare capitalism in a way where the Protestant countries feature social democratic regimes, while the Catholic cluster is ruled by conservative regimes.

Key words:: religion, gender equality, female leadership, political presence, EU policy, secularization, welfare capitalism

Introduction

Gender equality and female leadership is one of the most salient topics in today's world. The World Economic Forum started to measure the Global Gender Gap index in 2006 and the 2017 report paints a mixed picture:

- “...in 2017, the average progress on closing the global gender gap stands at 68.0%— meaning an average gap of 32.0% remains to be closed worldwide across the four Index dimensions in order to achieve universal gender parity, compared to an average gap of 31.7% last year,
- on average, the 144 countries covered in the Report have closed 96% of the gap in health outcomes between women and men, unchanged since last year,
- more than 95% of the gap in educational attainment, a slight decrease compared to last year,
- the gaps between women and men on economic participation and political empowerment remain wide: only 58% of the economic participation gap has been closed—a second consecutive year of reversed progress and the lowest value measured by the Index since 2008—and about 23% of the political gap, unchanged since last year against a long-term trend of slow but steady improvement.

On current trends, the overall global gender gap can be closed in exactly 100 years across the 106 countries covered since the inception of the Report, compared to 83 years last year” (World Economic Forum 2017).

The European Union also conducts its own research and the 2017 results echo those quoted above by stating: “We are moving forward at a snail’s pace. We are still a long way off from reaching a gender-equal society and all countries in the European Union have room to improve. In some areas, the gaps are even bigger than ten years ago” (European Institute for Gender Equality, 2017).

As part of my doctoral studies I have chosen to explore the potential role of religion for women at the workplace and, in particular, for women in political and leadership roles in Europe. I must state that this is small scale research, which is part of my development, therefore this paper will have limitations.

Catholic and Protestant women’s roles

“Durkheim describes religion with the ethereal statement that it consists of “things that surpass the limits of our knowledge” (Little, 2016). Durkheim went on to elaborate: religion is “a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say set apart and forbidden, beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community, called a church, all those who adhere to them” (Little, 2016, p. 431).

Historically, women have had a special caretaker role, which originates from the concept of Mary the “nurturing mother” of Christ. Marian devotions are at the heart of the Catholic religion and for women motherhood and family are the sacred priorities in life. “Conflicting images of women go far back in church tradition. While Mary has been revered as the mother of Jesus, the 13th century Catholic philosopher, Thomas Aquinas, summed up a persistent negative view when he described woman as “an occasional and incomplete being, a misbegotten

male” (Hart,1985). The Catholic religion made it clear that for a woman to achieve salvation she needs to fulfill her familial duties, she must love her husband and she must love her home and household, as the Apostle commands: “Let women be subject to their husbands as to the Lord, because the husband is the head of the wife, and Christ is the head of the Church.” (Carota, 2015) It was not until the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) that relations between the Catholic church and the changing modern world were addressed. “The Second Vatican Council’s reflections on the female condition came at a time when the role of the woman was still eclipsed by that of the man — the father, the brother, the husband... the Magisterium of John Paul II can surely take the credit in recognizing the existence of a feminine question, and to move from the mere recognition of the dignity of the woman to her involvement in civil and social life. ... In *Gaudium et Spes*, Pope Paul VI recognized ... that “women now work in almost all spheres” (Dossier, 2008).

In 16th century Europe the Protestant Reformation was initiated by Martin Luther. The Reformation was a protest against the corrupt Catholic Church. It was also a “media revolution,” as literacy was seen as something essential for human to achieve salvation through the way they lived their lives. Religion has fundamentally changed as the means to achieve salvation; the Word of God has become a tool, which meant that people had to be able to read the Bible and educate their children. This also changed the role of women in society, as Luther writes about the marriage and family in Protestantism: “Martin Luther became a family man, and he wanted everyone else to be situated similarly” (Karant-Nunn & Wiesner-Hanks, 2003, p. 88). These fundamental changes have shaped the economy and society in several different ways. In the 20th century Max Weber argued for the importance of the Protestant religion in capitalist culture: “...at least one thing was unquestionably new: the valuation of the fulfillment of duty in worldly affairs as the highest form which the moral activity of the individual could assume” (Christian, 2008).

The notion of change is evident, and the key question is to what extent—if any—the Catholic and Protestant religions, their beliefs and female representation exist in today’s modern world.

My hypotheses are as follows:

1. Within the European Union, in Protestant countries female representation in the labor market is higher than in Catholic countries.
2. Within the European Union, in Protestant countries women have higher participation in education than in Catholic countries.
3. Within the European Union, in Protestant countries women have more active roles in society and their participation in leadership and political roles is higher than in Catholic countries.

Methodology

The research is narrowed to ten countries of the European Union, dividing those into two religious clusters. The Protestant cluster contains five predominantly Protestant countries: Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway and the United Kingdom, while the Catholic cluster consists of the five primary Catholic countries: Austria, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal (Five Centuries..., 2017). The research methodology is quantitative comparative analysis, including longitudinal trend analysis of the two clusters and the individual countries. The applied data sources are the Eurostat, EU and World Bank databases.

Results

Female employment analytics

The main strategic objective of the European Union is to increase the employment rate of the 20-64 year old population to 75% by 2020. There is a significant difference among the EU members: the smallest gap (2.1%) appears in Protestant Finland while one of the biggest gaps—significantly above the EU28 average—is in Catholic Italy (20%).

In terms of longitudinal trend lines the gender employment gap improvement within the EU28 countries is of interest. While the gap was 15.7% in 2006, it had been reduced to 11.6% by 2016. The analysis shows that men's employment is stagnating, which suggests that the improving gender employment gap tendency is due to women's higher labor force participation. (Appendix 1)

The trend line covers nearly three decades and shows that in 1990 the level of female employment was significantly lower in the Catholic cluster (39.4%) compared to the Protestant countries (45.8%). Over the decades progress was made and recent figures show that the Protestant (47.3%) and Catholic countries (46.1%) are close to parity in terms of female participation in the labor market.

Taking into consideration historical growth rates and developing a 10-year prognosis, it can be expected that by 2021 there will not be any employment gap for women employment based on the predominance of Protestantism or Catholicism, in line with the EU's 2020 75% strategy.

The individual country level analysis further clears the picture of female labor force participation trends. In 1990 Italy (36.2%) and Spain (34.8%) have the lowest female employment rates even compared to the Catholic countries: both are below the 39.4% cluster average. These two countries started at similar levels but the progress is achieved is of a very different shape and form. Initially growth was parallel but after 2000 the countries seem to embark on different paths: Spain achieved a 46.3% female labor force participation rate (for comparison Protestant United Kingdom's rate is 46.5%). As such, the progress is remarkable. In Italy the trend first slowed and

then since 2010 has stagnated. Among the Protestant countries growth is moderate as the starting point was at a much higher level and suggests that this might be close to the maximum level of gender employment equality attainable.

The Global Gender Gap Index measures the ratio of female labor force participation over the male value based on the International Labor Organization database, which paints a very similar picture, indicating a minor gap (0.043) between the two clusters.

Analyzing multiple data sources in the we can conclude that while in the 1990s there was a more significant gap between Protestant and Catholic countries in Europe in terms of the female labor market participation, by now this has almost disappeared. In this research project the dependency of relationships and religion has proven to be true only during the 1990s. Several scientists researched this correlation in the 1990s and all verified a positive correlations for both Catholicism and Protestantism.

There are only a few previous empirical studies on the labor market effects of Protestantism. All of them focus on a single aspect: the effect on female labor supply. Schmidt (1993) finds that female labor force participation increased more slowly in Catholic countries than in Protestant ones. Lesthaeghe (1995) reaches a similar result. Similarly, positive correlations are reported between Protestant religion and “female work desirability” (Siaroff 1994) and between percent Protestant and egalitarian attitudes toward women’s employment (Haller and Hoellinger 1994). None of these studies covers a large group of countries. Nor do they control for the impact of most other important institutions that have been found to affect the performance of the labor market. (Feldmann, 2007)

In the next decade something changed and by now this significant gap has been reduced. With this, the first hypothesis was proven false in 2018, with the comment that this is a relatively new change given the fact that in the 1990s the correlation was evident. This finding of the paper is also in line with those of some other researchers such as Bayanpourtehrani and Sylwester, who conclude: “Countries where Protestantism is prevalent or where no religion is practised have higher female labor force participation. Finally, we find some evidence that the association between female labor force participation and religion is weakening over time” (Bayanpourtehrani & Sylwester, 2013).

Female enrolment in tertiary education

Education is often viewed as the catalyst for social change. Enrolment in tertiary education in the Global Gender Gap is defined by the ratio of female gross tertiary enrolment ratio over the male value. The comparative analysis highlights that the Catholic and Protestant religion has no correlation with the tertiary education of women. Furthermore, gender equality of tertiary education has been achieved or even over achieved in all of the ten researched European countries. These findings have also been confirmed by Euromonitor research, stating “Women now account for the majority of tertiary education students worldwide: almost 52% of students were

women in 2016, up from just under 51% in 2011” (Euromonitor Research, 2018). This finding is in line with other research, such as Breen et al, who conclude: “We find that, as expected, over the 20th century, inequalities between men and women in their educational attainment declined markedly” (Breen et al., 2010). The European Union also reports similar results: “In 2012, women outnumbered men in most academic fields, representing 77 % of graduates in education and training, 73 % in health and welfare and 65 % in the humanities” (EIGE, 2017). Furthermore, Eurostat reports (2017) also confirm these trends: “Almost 5 million tertiary education students graduated in the European Union (EU) in 2015: 58% were women and 42% men” (Eurostat, 2017). It is important to recognize the presence of gender based segregation in education, which led to the current status whereby some educational faculties are predominantly regarded as feminine while others as masculine, but this phenomenon is beyond of the scope of this paper. Overall, the analysis indicates that the second hypothesis is proven false.

Female participation in leadership, parliamentary and ministerial roles

The analysis of Gender Gap report was applied to researching the third hypothesis, i.e., women as professional and technical workers; women as legislators, senior officers and managers; women in parliament; and women in ministerial positions.

The cluster-based analysis shows that in terms of the level of women as professional and technical workers, there is no difference between the Catholic and the Protestant countries. The difference starts to emerge when we examine women as legislators, senior officers and managers. In the Protestant cluster female participation in such leadership roles is higher than in the Catholic countries. Female representation in legislative bodies and the number of women in ministerial roles even further confirms the religion-based difference, with the conclusion that Protestant countries have more female representation in the political domain than do Catholic countries.

In terms of technical and professional workers, Protestant Norway, Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Catholic Portugal and France have the most favorable values. Catholic Italy (0.832) is the most unequal for technical and professional workers. The gender gap increases for senior, legislator and manager roles and here the gap between Catholic and Protestant countries emerges. All countries perform worse in terms of gender equality for managerial and leadership roles, and even the Protestant countries are not close to gender equality. The gap continues to widen for the two religious clusters in terms of the roles women take in parliament and becomes worst when measuring the number of women holding ministerial positions. In terms of women in legislatures Sweden has the best gender gap ratio, followed by Norway. Catholic Italy and Austria are the least equal in terms of women in parliament. Protestant Sweden and Catholic France have already achieved full gender equality in ministerial roles. Catholic Portugal, Italy and Austria provide the fewest opportunities for women in parliament, while Spain appears to be outperforming its counterparts with is 0.625 value. (Appendix 2.)

Since 2013 the European Union has been measuring progress in gender equality as an integral part of effective policymaking, using the Gender Equality Index. The conclusion is very similar. With this, I conclude that the

third hypothesis holds true for managerial and political roles with a disclaimer that France and Spain do not represent their true cluster values.

Discussion

The role of religion and secularism in defining European identity

The European Value Study concludes that Europe has become a secularized continent and shows that in the researched countries—with the exception of Italy and Portugal—the importance of God is at the lower end of the scale. In the western part of the world religious institutions are deteriorating, citizens attend church less, and people increasingly turn away from institutionalized religion. Many European citizens believe “There is a personal God”: the vast majority of people consider themselves religious in this respect, “believing without belonging,” or what sociologist often call “church-free-spirituality” (Sison & Cunado, 2011). The EVS concludes that Europeans remained religious—except France with its 15% atheists—but institutionalized churches are on the decline. This in fact shows that Europe has become increasingly “unchurched” but not necessarily secular.

Researchers discuss the change in religion in Europe: “Heelas and Woodhead (2005) have argued that in modern culture there is a subjective turn from life-as forms of the sacred to subjective-life forms of the sacred. This spiritual revolution shifts the emphasis from transcendent to inner sources of significance and authority, empowering the individual. According to Inglehart and Welzel, in post-industrial societies, with the loss of authority, traditional religions weaken in favour of spiritual and individualised ways of personal expression. Thus, individualisation is mainly applied to Protestant and Catholic countries” (Coutinho, 2016). Secularization is an ongoing process in Europe: “Secularization means the decline of traditional religion both at the societal and the individual levels. Traditional religion is transforming into new, often hybrid forms of religiosity and spirituality. While every European nation followed its own secularization path, there was a general trend of declining traditional religion in the sense of belonging, practice and belief, although the decline of belief was less strong. That decline was partially compensated by an increase in post-Christian spirituality. Secularization was stronger in Protestant than Catholic and Orthodox countries” (Knippenberg, 2015).

Although belief in God continues to be an important value for Europeans, modernization, secularization, deteriorating Christian church institutions are evidence that religion is going through a change process in European society, which can have a potential impact on gender equality. This finding further confirms that the correlation of gender equality and religion is a complex phenomena, and establishing a direct causal relationship would not be valid.

European Union gender equality and gender mainstreaming

“The European Union is considered one of the world’s most advanced political systems with regard to the promotion of gender equality, with its policies aiming to combat gender inequality often being considered “exceptional”” (Jacquot, 2017). The first initial steps toward gender equality go back to 1957, when the implementation of a Single Market was introduced. “In 2009... the Lisbon Treaty... clearly reiterates the obligation of ensuring gender equality for both the Union and the Member States” (European Commission, 2013). The concept of gender mainstreaming was introduced in 1995 in the Platform for Action of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing and ensured that the gender perspective would be included as part of policy making. Recently Hubert et al conducted a critical analysis of the twenty years of EU Gender Mainstreaming and concluded: “we argue that even though gender mainstreaming has been hindered by a political context dominated by enlargement and the economic crisis, on a back drop of definitional problems, administrative reforms and budgetary restrictions, the dual approach—an EU policy characteristic—remains a firmly embedded, well documented strategy for advancing gender equality in relevant policy domains... As the main EU actor, the European Commission still possesses the exclusive right of initiative according to the Treaties, and thus remains the main driver” (Hubert & Stratigaki, 2016).

The country level analysis highlights that the countries have a very different approaches in addressing the gender equality objectives: it is common in all countries that European legislation to some extent impacted the gender equality agenda, but in it itself this does not seem to be enough (e.g., Italy). Local policy making, gender mainstreaming and gender budgeting seem to be more critical to success. Notably, the achievements are very fragile, as in Spain the 2008 economic crisis and austerity policies dismantled previous successes. With this, the correlation between religion and gender equality is weakened, as we cannot exclude the impact of the EU legislation.

Welfare capitalism

In interpreting the results, there is another possible relationship impacting equal gender rights in these European countries.

In the three worlds of welfare capitalism (1990), Esping-Andersen presents a typology of 18 Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development welfare states based upon three principles: decommodification (the extent to which an individual’s welfare is reliant upon the market, particularly in terms of pensions, unemployment benefit and sickness insurance), social stratification (the role of welfare states in maintaining or breaking down social stratification) and the private–public mix (the relative roles of the state, the family, the voluntary sector and the market in welfare provision). The operationalisation of these principles, largely using decommodification indexes, leads to the division of welfare states into three ideal regime types: Liberal, Conservative and Social Democratic. (Bambra, 2007)

Sweden (the Scandinavian model) is the example of the social democratic typology.

...mainly characterized by a high de-commodification and strong universalism, the latter means there is a strong sense of social rights and a strong sense of been able to get your livelihood without relying on the market, the former means that most class are in the welfare state. The ideal is not to maximize dependence on the family, but capacity for individual independence. The state opts to take direct responsibility of caring for children, the aged, and the helpless. It is committed to allow women to choose work rather than the household. (Ndunda, 2016)

Italy represents a “conservative-familialist” society, where although change has started, conservative values and the role of women in family care are significant and core values in society even today. Welfare policies in Italy correlate with the Esping Andersen’s conservative typology; in “the Conservative type, the main feature is the presence of a degree of class alliances—due to the preservation of status differentials but de-commodification is comparatively modest. This type features social insurance more than social assistance, means-tested benefits. Most of the benefits for unemployment or sickness are entitlements based on insurance contributions previously made and the benefits received vary according to the income of the individual” (Ndunda, 2016).

Conclusion

There seems to be a rather limited correlation in terms of the role women play in society based on religion. Protestant countries show somewhat some more favorable ratios of women in politics and managerial roles compared to Catholic societies. Other factors such as the level of secularization in today’s Europe, the role of the legislative mandates and frameworks of the European Union, the concept of gender mainstreaming and gender budgeting, as well as the type of the social welfare state, also appear to be impacting the gender equality agendas in the researched countries. This highlights a complex, multi-faceted, multi-dimensional phenomenon and the impact of Catholic and Protestant religion on female labor force participation, tertiary education and leadership, political roles seem to be indirect and not straightforward.


The academic research literature also supports the above conclusion: in modernization theories, Inglehart and Baker argue “given religious traditions have historically shaped the national culture of given societies, but that today their impact is transmitted mainly through nationwide institutions, to the population of that society as a whole—even to those who have little or no contact with religious institutions. ... The fact that a society was historically shaped by Protestantism or Confucianism or Islam leaves a cultural heritage with enduring effects that influence subsequent developments” (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Other researchers focus more on the different types of welfare states, concluding “there are some works that analyze the effects religions produces on women’s decision to enter in the labor market. Esping-Andersen analyses how religious denominations are likely to influence the employment patterns... His conclusion is that conservative-corporatism promotes the male breadwinner conception by implementing welfare and family rights detrimental to women labor market participation. However, Gosta Esping-Andersen does not provide quantitative evidence” (Pastore & Tenaglia, 2013). Others argue and research the policy and regulatory role of the European Union, such as the Treaty of Maastricht

(1992) or the European Employment Strategy that recognizes that gender equality and gender mainstreaming are essential for progress in terms of achieving gender equality.

To dive deeper dive into causal relationships and develop valid and reliable research some more work is required, potentially analyzing a larger sample of countries or including different variables, e.g., Christianity and Islam.

Appendix 1


2017 in the Catholic and Protestant clusters – Female labour force participation rate between 1990



Source: Author's analysis based on World Bank online database

Appendix 2

Female education participation and role distribution within the Protestant and Catholic clusters



Source: Author's analysis based on Global Gender Gap online database

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THE INEQUALITY OF PARENTAL TIME – THE ROLE OF SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS

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Abstract

This study investigates the diverse patterns of parental time according to the family's socioeconomic status in order to explore one neglected aspects of inequalities between children. The current discourse about parenting underlines that the cultural views of parenting are dominated by the quality of parent-child relationships, and time has become one of the most important components of that relationship. Besides, the significant impact of parental time on children's cognitive and social outcomes and wellbeing is well documented in the literature, however, the public and academic debate focus on young children and neglect teenagers. Besides, the social position might influence the amount and characteristics of parental time. However, several researchers argue that not the total amount of time differ, rather the way they spend time with their children. Often, parents at the bottom end do not have the knowledge and resources to live up the cultural expectations of modern parenting. Consequently, this paper focuses on parental time perceptions of parents and their teenage children. We intend to integrate the perspective of children in the debate of family dynamics. Furthermore, we intend to explore the role of socioeconomic status in determining the amount and the nature of time parents and children spend together. This study analyses quantitative data of a representative parent-child linked survey consisting data of subjective estimations, preferences and evaluation of parental time that enables to grasp some qualitative aspects of time and to explore the impacts of socioeconomic status. We argue that investigating the perceptions of family members broadens the debate of the quantity aspects of parental time that might contribute to comprehend its complexity. Furthermore, exploring the effects of socioeconomic factors enables to reveal the diverse patterns of parenting. In conclusion, this paper, by examining parental time, sheds some light on how parenting might raise inequalities through the different attitudes and practices in shared activities with children

Introduction¹

This study aims to explore values and beliefs related to parenting, investigating patterns of time parents and their teenage children spend together. We focus on the effects of the family's socioeconomic status (SES).

Cultural expectations about parenting has changed significantly in the last couple of decades. The model of intensive parenting has emerged, and accordingly this parenting style is seen as a guarantee for children's emotional, social and educational success (Faircloth, 2014). The ideal was introduced and described by Sharon Hays' concept of intensive mothering (1996). Further, a new ideal of fatherhood has also evolved, one that requires a more active and more involved commitment but also a caring task (LaRossa, 1988; Spéder, 2011). Consequently, parents utilize their various resources for their children's wellbeing and success.

Furthermore, the concept of quality time – as one of the parental resources – has become an important aspect of this ideal. Quality time underlines the importance of spending time together and also highlight its qualitative aspects (Snyder, 2007; StGeorge & Fletcher 2012). Besides, in this parenting culture the cognitive enhancement of children is of crucial significance; this is reflected in the appreciation of many activities which are seen as interactive and enriching for the children (Dermott & Pomati, 2016; Milkie et al., 2015; Kalil et al., 2016).

Empirical findings confirm the importance of the family's social status that might determine the child's various outcomes. The difference in outcomes appears in early childhood and might shape life paths (Kalil & Meyer, 2016). Some scholars argue that social position might also influence the attitudes toward and behaviours of child rearing and thereby determines the nature of time parents and children spend together (Lareau, 2011; Hsin & Felfe, 2014). Therefore, investigating parental time investment might be crucial in understanding rising inequalities (Esping-Andersen, 2009).

This paper reviews some recent Hungarian quantitative results about the perceptions of parental time with teenagers. We will focus on the role of socioeconomic factors related to time perception and some qualitative aspects of time in order to explore the diverse patterns of time parents and children spend together. The data are from a representative survey conducted with teenage children and one of their parents about their subjective perceptions of parental time.

The paper is structured as follows: first, connected to the idea of intensive parenting, we elaborate time as a form of social capital and introduce different time concepts. The following section reviews earlier empirical findings about parental time perception and influential factors. Subsequently, the purpose of the study, research methods

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and initial results are described. The paper concludes with a discussion of results and the implications for future research.

Background

In this section we elaborate the theoretical framework, previous empirical findings and the purpose of the current study. First, parental time is discussed in the framework of the theory of social capital, and related to this, concepts of parental time are demonstrated. The following section reviews some previous empirical findings on parental time. Finally, we present the aim of the paper.

Parental time as social capital

Coleman (1988) argues that social capital is crucial for children to facilitate the creation of social outcomes, and relationships among and between individuals encompass this capital. Therefore, he suggests that the social and cultural resources of parents can be utilized only through interactions that will enhance a child's cognitive development. Accordingly, social capital in the family refers to that time parents and children spend together when parents pay attention to the child. Related to the current discourse about parenting, the quality of the parent-child relationship dominates the cultural views of parenting, and time has become one of the most important determinants of that relationship, especially concerning mothers (Roxburgh, 2012; Milkie et al., 2015). Consequently, focused parental time is considered a kind of social capital.

The quality aspects of parental time are expressed by diverse approaches to concepts in the literature. There is a broad concept of family time that aims to promote family well-being. Family time reflects the importance of spending special time with family and children by focusing on traditional family values. Therefore, family time refers to family rituals, traditions and family events, but also refers to routines and spontaneous activities that enable the experience of togetherness (Ashbourne & Daly 2012), like eating together or time spent together watching movies and playing games. Family time thus underlines the importance of quality itself.

The concept of 'quality time' emerges in the frame of family time and has become a significant element of cultural discourse about parenting (Snyder, 2007). Quality time highlights the importance of the nature of interaction and not the amount of time families spend together. Accordingly, this time concept includes values and beliefs about how individuals should efficiently use their time. Consequently, this also works as a cultural model of parenting: it includes beliefs about how parents should spend time with their children to promote close parent-child relationships, well-being and the children's cognitive enhancement (Snyder, 2007, StGeorge & Fletcher, 2012).

In parenting culture, ensuring the cognitive enhancement of children is of crucial significance. There are several activities which are deemed indicators of good parenting, because these address children's cultural development, such as reading with children, helping with homework, organising cultural programs (Dermott & Pomati, 2016)

or organising extra-curricular activities (Lareau, 2003). In line with these, quality time in the literature has been defined as the amount of time spent on these kind of activities, which are seen as interactive or enriching for children (Milkie et al., 2015; Kalil et al., 2016). However, there is a recent 'parenting package' concept that intends to broaden the notion of quality time. Therefore, this concept emphasizes the context of parent-child interactions, including parental styles and strategies (Fomby & Musick, 2018).

Empirical findings

The last Hungarian time-use data from 2010 show that the time spent on childrearing activities almost doubled in the past three decades (Harcza, 2014). This is consistent with the trend in Western societies (Hofäcker, 2007; Lam et al., 2012). In spite of this fact, there is a intensifying tendency of parental anxiety concerning spending enough and sufficient time with children (Roxburgh, 2008).

Furthermore, the Hungarian data demonstrate that the structure of parental time has changed significantly. For example, time for reading and playing was four times greater in 2010 than at the end of the 1980s, while time spent on caring tasks decreased during this period (Harcza, 2014). These data highlight the changing cultural norms of parenting.

However, it is important to note there is a decreasing tendency in parental time spent with school-aged children (Harcza, 2014; Craig et al., 2014). This finding might reveal the over-scheduled life of school-aged children (Harcza, 2014). Galinsky (1999) investigated parents and children using large-sample representative research and conducted interviews in the US in the 1990s. She found it is older children who report spending too little time with their parents.

The literature on the impact of parental time is dominated by studies focusing on children's educational success and well-being. Particularly, public and academic debates focuses most on young children and neglect the treatment of teenagers, but several scholars have argued that adolescence may be a more stressful period than early childhood, and as such spending time with parents during this phase might be especially beneficial for children (Milkie et al., 2015). In a recent study Milkie et al (2015) found that parental time – if both parents were present – had a positive impact on several indicators of adolescents' well-being. Moreover, maternal time appeared to be significant only for teenagers and not for younger children. These findings underline the relevance of research on adolescents.

Concerning children outcomes, in the literature the importance of family background is also accentuated. There is persistent evidence showing gaps in children's outcomes according to the family's social status. A growing body of literature demonstrates that the style of parenting might differ between various social classes (Lareau, 2011; Kalil, 2014; Hsin & Felfe, 2014). Furthermore, increasing evidence supports the notion that highly educated parents spend more time with their children than do less-educated parents (Sayer, 2004; Kalil, 2014). Moreover, highly educated parents spend parental time differently: for example they spend more time in enriching activi-

ties (Kalil, 2014; Hsin & Felfe, 2014), but often mothers at the bottom end of the socioeconomic ladder do not have the knowledge and resources to live up to the cultural expectations of modern parenting (Nomaguchi et al., 2016). In line with this, Esping-Andersen (2009) argues that although children at the bottom end may receive more parental time due to lower labour supply among their parents, number of siblings and quality of parental time investment put them in a worse position. Lareau (2011) investigated parenting by focusing on behaviour and also reported that the family's social class position shapes the cultural logic of child rearing, which is responsible for transmitting parents' advantages to their children. In addition, family structure might also be relevant, primarily concerning the disadvantageous position of single mothers (Kalil et al., 2014).

Consequently, social position might influence the amount and characteristics of time parents and children spend together (Kalil, 2014; Hsin & Felfe, 2014). These results confirm the importance of differences in parental time by SES.

Purpose of the study

This study is part of a broader research project that investigates how the family members, parents and children define, evaluate and perceive the time they spend together. Despite there being available time use datasets, these do not capture subjective experiences and can only provide limited explanations of how parent-child interactions affect family life. Therefore, in order to gain insight into this complex issue we apply mixed methods. The empirical investigation consists of a representative parent-child linked survey conducted in 2017 and of semi-structured interviews with 30 families. The survey includes data on subjective estimations, preferences and evaluations of parental time that enables us to grasp some qualitative aspects of time. The qualitative part is prioritized because the main research question refers to the mechanism of family dynamics, whereas with the survey our aim is to provide contextual information.

This current paper elaborates the initial quantitative findings and contributes to our comprehension of the social context. The aim of the first analyses is to identify the main patterns of the evaluation of parental time. We focused on the role of sociodemographic factors: especially on the significance of social position. In the following section I present the research method.

Research method

Data collection was restricted to families with children aged 12 and 16 in Hungary. The representative survey was carried out in 1000 families in 2017. Parents and children were interviewed separately. The survey included questions related to parental time spent with everyday practices and routines, investigating both quantitative and qualitative aspects. Furthermore, alongside other topics, the questionnaire addressed the adolescents' well-being and academic performance.

Concerning parental time perception, in the current paper we show three aspects of time that were measured in the survey: (1) the subjective evaluation of the amount of parental time, (2) aspects of family time that aim to enhance well-being and (3) aspects of quality time that aim to enrich the children's cognitive skills.

In order to measure perceived parental time respondents were asked "On a typical school day, do you think you spend about the right amount of time with your child/parent, too much time or too little time"? Family time was measured by two variables. Respondents were asked how much they agree or disagree with the following statements: first, "In general our family eat dinner together"; second, "We have family rituals and traditions". Both variables were measured with a 5-point Likert scale. Last, to capture activities that aim at cognitive enhancement two variables were applied: the subjective estimation of parents about the amount of time spent on school work on an average school day (in minutes) and a question asking "How often do you attend cultural program with your child/parent together?" (This latter question included 6 response categories from 'daily' to 'never').

We focused on several important sociodemographic factors that influence parental time, such as age of children, gender, family structure, household size and SES (Craig et al., 2014; Kalil et al., 2014; England & Strivastava, 2013). The SES of families was measured with various variables. In the present paper we elaborate differences by the educational level of the parents and the subjective economic welfare of the families. In order to explore the main patterns that feature parental time perception, descriptive statistics and bivariate analyses such as correlations, cross-tabs and analysis of variance (ANOVA) were conducted.

In the following section we discuss the first quantitative results on subjective perceptions of time parents and children spend together.

Results

In this section the three aspects of parental time, presented above, are described.

In general, looking at data on parental time we can conclude that the perspectives of parents and children were very similar to each other on almost all the issues, like shared activities or parenting. Furthermore, surprisingly, overall satisfaction was typical. Finally, consistent with international findings, gender, age of children, household size and family structure showed significant relations in some cases, but the significance of the socioeconomic status of the parents was more remarkable. Particularly, subjective welfare and educational level showed significant relations with most aspects of parental time. Therefore, we focus on these differences.

Perceived parental time

The subjective evaluation of the amount of time parents and children spend together was the only factor related to time that showed remarkable difference between the perspectives of parents and children. The majority of parents are satisfied with the amount of time they spend together with their child on an average school day (58%), but there is a notable proportion of parents who report time deficits with children (41%). However, the children are much more satisfied with the amount of time compared to parents; 19% report time deficits and almost 80% of them report that they spend the right amount of time together. Both parties’ reports are linked significantly to the structure of families and to subjective economic welfare.

Figure 1 shows that families with worse financial situations are more dissatisfied with the amount of time they spend together.




Figure 1: Perception of time with children on a typical school day by subjective economic welfare (%)

Family time

In order to measure family time two variables were assessed. Eating dinner together might capture the routines of family, whereas the other refers to the rituals and traditions.

Concerning the agreement with the statement “Generally, our family eat dinner together” we conclude that eating dinner together is typical in the investigated families.

There is almost no difference between the parents’ and children’s answers: around 80% of the respondents agree or totally agree with this statement, while around 12% responded with a neutral answer and around 9% disagree or totally disagree with this statement. The responses of parents showed significant differences by type of settlement and subjective economic welfare, whereas the children’s responses are linked to their age. Parents in smaller settlements or with better financial situations agree more with this statement, e.g., almost 67% of those who live without any concerns totally agree. However, this rate for those who have financial problems is only around 39%. Concerning the children’s responses, younger children agree with the statement more.

The tendency of responses about family rituals and traditions is very similar: there is only a moderate difference between children and parents, and the vast majority (around 75%) agree or totally agree that they have family traditions and rituals. Around 6% of children and parents disagree with this. Both have significant relations with some components of socioeconomic status, such as subjective economic welfare and parents’ educational level.

Figure 2 shows the ratio of children who disagree with the statement “We have family rituals and traditions,” which increases as the level of parental education decreases.




Figure 2: “We have family rituals and traditions” by parent’s educational level – Children’s responses (%)

Quality time for cognitive enhancement

In order to assess quality time that aims to enhance the child’s cognitive outcomes, we first measured the frequency of cultural program participation. Accordingly, around 12% participated at least weekly, 21-23% several times a month, around 50% monthly or less frequently, and 17,7-16,5% never attend a cultural program together. In both cases the variable showed a significant relation to the educational level of parents and to subjective economic welfare. The frequency of participation at cultural programs was higher at the upper level of educational

level and subjective economic welfare; e.g., with at least BA degree 49,5% of parents reported attending cultural programs at least several times a month compared to the result of 27,3% of parents with vocational education.

Furthermore, the estimated amount of time parents and children spend together on school work on an average school day also showed significant differences by social position. Accordingly, on average a parent spends half an hour a day on school work with their child (mean=35,6 and 36,7min).

Figure 3 and 4 demonstrate how the amount of time increases with the upper level of parental education and with better economic situation according to parents' responses.




Figure 3: Time spent together on school work on an average school day (minutes) by parent's educational level– Parents' responses




Figure 4: Time spent together on school work on an average school day (minutes) by parent's subjective economic welfare level – Parents' responses

Age of children and gender are further factors: parents spend more time on school work with younger children and with girls.

Discussion

Subjective perceptions and estimations of parental time were measured, and the cross-sectional data do not capture the changes in time. As such, we can conclude that our results are consistent with patterns of previous international findings. Accordingly, age of children, gender, household size, family structure and SES of families had significant relations with parental time. Since the cognitive enhancement of children and promotion of their well-being are important elements of modern parenting culture, we focused on the relevance of the social position of families.

The significant ratio of parents reporting time deficits with children reflects the growing anxiety of parents that has evolved with the emergence of a cultural model of parenting. However, it is important to note that there is a remarkable difference between parents by social status, and parents with worse financial situations are more dissatisfied. In spite of this, some scholars argue that the rise of a new normative standard of child rearing is influenced by the norms of the middle class (Dermott & Seymour, 2011). Hays (1996), investigating attitudes toward child rearing, also found that the pattern of intensive mothering appeared among both the middle-class and working-class mothers.

Furthermore, generally teenage children are satisfied with the amount of time they spend with their parents; this differs from the results of Galinsky (1999). On one hand, this might reflect the importance of the nature of time. On the other hand, the specific age group of teenagers might explain that children do not really care about parental time.

Concentrating on family time and quality time that aims to create well-being and enhance the child's cognitive skills, our data confirms the importance of SES. The results demonstrate that there are diverse patterns of time parents spend with their teenage children according to families' socioeconomic status. Consequently, parents in upper classes spend more time with their children on activities that might be enriching for them, like helping with homework, eating together, etc.

Future research should address the question of whether the nature of time itself can explain the inequality of children according to their outcomes. Further we might investigate whether the quality of time mediates or strengthens the effects of the social status of family. Qualitative investigations can contribute to comprehending the role of time in parenting, the mechanisms of time and its impact on the children's various outcomes. Understanding the differences in parent-child interactions by SES can inform state intervention to support parents in a way that allows them to better invest in their children.

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DETERMINANTS OF FINANCIAL DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN SPOUSES IN RUSSIA: THE GENDER DIMENSION

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Abstract

Many researchers highlighted the financial arguments between spouses as the key predictor of family disruption and divorce. However, the question of what are the determinants of the financial disagreements emergence remains as a blank spot in a vast body of research devoted to marital conflicts and financial management. This study is an attempt to fill this gap and answer questions about what may lead to their occurrence. Literature review showed that the grounds for power construction in a household affect the occurrence of a financial conflict. At the theoretical level, it was suggested that there are 5 aspects influencing financial disagreements: financial management in the family, the distribution of power and household responsibilities, the contribution of the spouses to the family budget, their employment and the financial difficulties in the family.

The empirical study was based on the Survey of Consumer Finance data of the 2013 Russian wave (the sample included 2430 families) and three methods of analysis (classification trees, logistic regression and log-linear analysis). The data shows that the main determinants of frequent disagreements about money in families are gendered: in order to decrease financial arguments frequency husband has to be a tightwad and to have traditionalist attitudes. Women in turn contribute to financial disagreements decrease if they have the same level of satisfaction with making financial decisions in comparison with a man. The formal indicators of family life such as possession of resources and income ratio seem to have no influence on family conflicts about money.

Introduction

Financial conflicts are most prominent in family life, beyond conflicts concerning leisure, parenting and intimate relationships, since financial conflicts are difficult to resolve, presuppose a fairly long and painful conflict between spouses and affect topics related to basic values (Dew, Dakin, 2011; Dew, Britt & Huston, 2012). The subject of money in modern society, moreover, is generally considered one of the most sensitive—some authors even equate it to the last taboo in communication between individuals (Atwood, 2012; Dew, Britt & Huston, 2012; Romo, 2011). V. Zelizer also considered money as a sensitive area of family relationships but argued that scientists know very little about it (Zelizer, 2002). At the same time, there is lack of attempts to construct an explanatory model of the emergence of financial conflicts (the only valid example of such a study is Britt, Huston & Durband, 2010). Studies that are focused on financial management in the family usually scrutinize the methods

of management, the decision-making process, the distribution of responsibilities and so on, leaving research of financial disagreements relatively undiscovered.

The definition of a conflict suggests that it arises from the struggle for any kind of resources. Financial conflict in this paper is understood as the existence of spouses' different points of view for any topics related to money. These different positions are discussed if there is a reason and desire (in the presence of a conflict situation), sometimes with the emotional involvement of the spouses, and lead to certain results in such dispute.

Marital relations mainly represent a clash of two opposite genders (in this study only heterosexual couples are considered) who have their views on finances, their perceptions and their view of the present and future of the family. This thesis could be confirmed by J. Zagorsky's study that revealed that men and women perceive financial issues differently and have different orientations in managing their own and family money (Zagorsky, 2003). In this case, spouses act in the conditions of social norms, which, consequently, impose additional difficulties. That is why the basic assumption of the following research is that the gender matters when it comes to analyzing the determinants of financial disagreements. Thus, there is a need to understand whether the distribution of financial power, the spouses' perception of their gender roles and other aspects of family life are the determinants of the emergence of financial conflicts.

Theoretical determinants of financial disagreements

One of the key studies on household duties and their distribution is by J. Brines, who found that despite the labor market revolution (the mass entry of married women into the labor market), there is no significant redistribution of responsibilities within the family. At the same time, the developing gender load sometimes serves as a compensatory mechanism, leveling the ratio of partners in market distribution through household duties. For example, a man in modern society can earn less than a woman, but in order not to break his perception of himself as a man, a woman delegates more power to him in the household, without loading him with more homework, and thus takes it upon herself (Brines, 2002; Ibragimova, 2016). As T. Dadaeva found, when a wife earns significantly more than her husband, there is no redistribution to bring the family close to the egalitarian type. Moreover, in the bulk of such families (60%) it is the wives who most often perform household duties. In this case the wife has to be a breadwinner and do household chores (Dadaeva, 2005). Another research project conducted in 2004 found that 92% of women were employed in the labor market, but at the same time the average woman worked one month more than her husband when taking housework into account. This situation can lead to a situation where a woman is unsatisfied with her position, so the authors conclude that gender discrepancies and family stability are influenced by gender ideologies, economic resources and time resources of each of the spouses. This influence can be either direct or mediated by the domestic distribution of responsibilities (Cubbins & Vannoy, 2004).

The opposite may also happen: a husband earning less is more actively involved in the everyday life of the family and the upbringing of children (Deutsch, Roksa & Meeske, 2003). This correlates with the “masculinity crisis” in society, i.e., the weakening of the structure of gender roles. Generally, gender division in the household plays a central role in the construction of gender inequality: this happens directly through the distribution of responsibilities, and indirectly through participation in the labor market. In this case, emerging inequality is supported by cultural attitudes and the distribution of material resources (Ridgeway, 2011).

Considering financial management, it is often the woman who is more aware of the financial situation of the family and it is she who spends most of the money on household chores (Lytkina, 2004, pp. 86-87). A study by T. Dadaeva showed that 10.9% of women and 1.8% of men are completely dissatisfied with the division of duties in the home; another 43.5% of women and 27.8% of men are partially satisfied. 70.4% of men are fully satisfied with the existing distribution of household chores, but the figure among women is 45.6%. The reasons for women’s (dis)satisfaction, in the opinion of researchers, can be explained on the one hand by the manifestation of traditional culture, and on the other by economic circumstances (Dadaeva, 2005). It is important to note that everyday interaction with money and planning of everyday purchases may be considered additional household tasks, while control over money and adoption of key decisions bears witness to power distribution in the family. In conditions when not only the time spent, but also the incomes of the spouses are approximately equal, the situation is aggravated, since each side has certain claims to power and a word in decision-making (Kandel, Davies & Raveis, 1985).

The first two hypotheses arise here:

H1.1: In families where both spouses spend about the same amount of time on work, conflicts over finances occur more often.

H1.2: In families in which spouses bring approximately the same income to the household, financial disagreements occur more often than among couples with different income levels.

Thus, gender division in families may contribute to increasing inequality and provoke a situation of spousal dissatisfaction and a struggle for power in the family, which, in turn, is fraught with conflict. Conflicts can also be caused by different spousal perceptions of wealth and family assets: if the husband believes that everything is fine in the family and insists on a large purchases, and the woman overestimates debts and underestimates well-being, a controversial situation may arise.

According to some authors, the family and the power in it are the main sources of inequality reproduction (Addo & Sassler, 2010; Ibragimova, 2016; McLanahan & Percheski, 2008; Pahl, 1983). Inequality in the incomes of men and women is found to be in line with different attitudes to income: women’s income is often perceived as “money for pins” (Zelizer, 2002). Changes in the structure of the modern family contribute to the reproduction of inequality in two ways (McLanahan & Percheski 2008):

- Parenthood affects the employment and earnings of women much more than that of men, because it is women who bear the primary responsibility for the children's upbringing. This is superimposed by the fact that before the child's birth women earn less than men, and after maternity leave the gap in their incomes may be insurmountable;
- The mother, should she become single, usually incurs an incommensurable financial and time load in comparison to the former partner.

At the same time, despite the growing number of women in the labor market, men are still more likely to take a lot of power resources (Dew & Dakin, 2011). According to A. Komter, a significant lack of gender equality arises from gender norms, concepts of masculinity and femininity and rules of interaction between men and women that are not always expressed orally (Komter, 1989). The issue of gender attitudes is very important, but it deserves a separate detailed consideration.

These theses lead the empirical research that follows toward the second hypothesis:

H2: The presence of a sense of injustice in the distribution of household responsibilities or decision-making positively affects the frequency of financial disagreements' emerging.

Considering other types of theoretical predictors of financial disagreements, financial difficulties positively influence the relations of the spouses, rallying them together and leading to an increase in the number of common discussions and decisions (Dew, Britt & Huston, 2012). This can also be explained by the decrease in the number of resources around which a conflict can arise (reducing the pressure of power mechanisms in the family). That is why the next hypothesis of the following research is:

H3: Financial difficulties do not affect the frequency of financial disagreements.

Research (Batalova & Cohen, 2002; van der Lippe, Voorpostel & Hewitt, 2014) also shows that gender roles in cohabitations are less structured (fixed), which increases the dissatisfaction of partners with the ratio of work in the labor market and the amount of housework done. The comparison of unmarried and married women shows that the former are much more likely to note the existence of financial disagreements in the couple (Ruppaner, 2010). In addition, partners in cohabitation appreciate personal freedom more and show less commitment to the relationship, which can increase the number of conflicts. Here it may be assumed that:

H4: Financial disagreements arise more often among cohabiting unions than among officially married couples.

One of the main conclusions from the literature is that the presence of children leads to an increase in the frequency of conflicts in families (e.g., McGonagle, Kessler & Schilling, 1992), and the bulk of conflicts lurk in the first years of the child's life. This period is considered one of the most difficult transitions in the family cycle and

the life of parents: one more member of the family joins the married dyad, who becomes the center of attention. This reduces interaction and intimacy between partners, increasing the likelihood of conflict situations (Crohan, 1996; Kluwer & Johnson, 2007). In the case of financial relations the new family member causes several new responsibilities and purchases and forces spouses to reconsider their priorities. That is why the last hypothesis of the following empirical research is:

H5: Having no children under the age of 18 reduces the frequency of financial disagreements between spouses.

Methodology

Data Collection and Sample

The empirical study was conducted by employing the Survey of Consumer Finance. In Russia 6.103 households and 12.650 individuals participated in 2013. Personal interviews were conducted using a true address sample with the condition of triple visits of every household in order to contact and interview their members.

Having selected married couples (partners who are in an official marriage or living together and consider themselves husband and wife) who answered the question of the frequency of financial disagreements in the family, a sample of 3.554 observations was obtained. Whole couples became the unit of analysis instead of considering spouses individually. By excluding families in which the opinion on the frequency of financial disagreements was different, and after removing responses with a large number of missing values, 2.480 families were included in the final sample and subjected to analysis.

Dependent Variable

The question used in the survey was: “How often do you face disagreements connected to any financial topics in your family?” The distribution of the two variables reflecting the answers of each of the spouses showed was biased toward a complete absence of conflict (the answer “Never”): 39% of men and 37.7% of women answered this way. The presence of permanent conflicts was reported among 3.5% of men and 5.5% of women.

Husbands and wives basically note the same frequency of financial disagreements in their households. However, there are some deviations which show that women tend to slightly overestimate this indicator compared to men. At the same time, in 70% of married couples the answers to the question about the frequency of financial disagreements completely coincided: in 30% of responses there are differences of 1-2 points. That is why the following analysis was based only on those cases where the answers were the same.

Independent Variables

The independent variables were:

- age of spouses and age difference;
- education of spouses and education differences (most often the same level of education is found (54.7% of families), but if the level of education of the spouses is different, then the level of education of the wife is much higher than that of the husband (31% of families against 14,2% of families in which the husband is more educated than his wife);
- children and their age (up to 18 or older);
- financial difficulties (in the form of delays of payments, delays in wages);
- attitudes towards money (with the help of cluster analysis the spouses were divided into tightwads and spendthrifts);
- type of financial management (the most prevalent is the joint pool including 43% of families, in most families the idea of a family budget is completely identical);
- attitudes towards gender distribution of labor and power (with the help of factor analysis two types were identified: “traditionalist attitudes” and “egalitarian attitudes”);
- the distribution of power (measured through the final word in decision-making);
- a sense of injustice (in half of families the level of satisfaction with decision-making is the same, in the rest the men are on the average more satisfied than women with making decisions in the family);
- the difference in income and time spent on work (both spouses work in the bulk of families and spend about the same amount of time working; on average, husbands earn more than wives).

Main results

The first exploratory stage of identifying the determinants of financial disagreements was classification tree construction. According to the classification tree the difference in the spouses' satisfaction with decision-making in the household (the sense of injustice in our measurement) is most related to the frequency of financial disagreements and, accordingly, becomes the primary predictive variable. We can conclude that the following characteristics of the spouses lead to an increase in the frequency of financial disagreements:

- the woman is less satisfied with decision-making in the household compared to the man;
- the man referred to as a spendthrift;
- residence in a village;
- independent financial management in the family;
- unregistered relationships (cohabitation).

Disagreements are positively influenced by (i.e., are reduced in their frequency) by a large relationships duration, equal satisfaction with decision making or when the woman is more satisfied, men referred to as tightwads and financial management through a common pool system.

In this case these variables are considered not as individual, but as a combination of a number of characteristics. Analysis results are close to confirming the second hypothesis: indeed, a sense of injustice in decision-making (that is, difference in the satisfaction of the spouses) explains the frequency of financial disagreements. Moreover, the classification tree showed that the satisfaction of a woman is very important, since it is the sense of injustice associated with other significant characteristics that increases the frequency of conflicts, which corresponds to the conclusions formulated in a number of articles (see, for example, Cubbins & Vannoy, 2004; Kander, Davies & Raveis, 1985). A preliminary confirmation can be given to the fourth hypothesis: in cohabiting not officially married unions in combination with the man being a spendthrift and a slightly higher satisfaction for the woman, financial disagreements arise more often in comparison to unions with the same characteristics, but in which relations are officially registered.

The confirmatory method of the analysis is carried out with logistic regression. As was supposed in Hypothesis 5 of this research, having no children under the age of 18 reduces the likelihood of frequent financial disagreements among spouses. Taking other characteristics of the family into account, living in the city reduces the likelihood of frequent financial disagreements (as was seen in the classification trees results). Unfortunately, in comparison with classification trees, logistic regression gives us a one-dimensional result, which in this case is difficult to interpret without reference to other patterns of the family. Remarriage increases the likelihood of frequent financial disagreements. These results, by the way, contradict the results of some studies (Ruppanner, 2010) in which it is asserted that the conflict situation in remarriages is much lower due to the fact that the spouses already have experience in building relationships and do not want to “go the same road again”. The category of “unregistered relations” is not significant, perhaps because of the low degree of completeness of the category after determining the final list of analyzed observations or the fact that only those couples in which the answers to the frequency of financial disagreements coincide are analyzed.

All other found determinants bear the gender load. The lack of traditionalist attitudes in men increases the likelihood of the family falling into the categories of rare and frequent financial disagreements compared to those who have no financial disagreements at all. The lack of traditionalist attitudes in women increases the probability of infrequent financial disagreements among spouses, but this predictor is not significant for the greatest frequency. A man being a spendthrift raises the probability of increasing the frequency of financial disagreements (the effect for frequent disagreements is twice as high as for the category “rarely”). Equal satisfaction of spouses in decision making reduces the likelihood of increasing the frequency of financial disagreements, therefore, it can be finally concluded that different satisfaction ratings can lead to an increase in the frequency of financial disagreements. The absence of delays in making loan payments (according to the wife’s assessment) reduces the likelihood of frequent financial disagreements. This result can be correlated with the findings of D. Zagorsky (2003) that state women assess the welfare of the family through the lack of loans, debts and financial problems. It can be assumed that women who feel stable and adequate family well-being are less likely to provoke a financial conflict.

The above predictors individually affect the frequency of financial disagreements rather weakly, while the intersection of several signs in the family can allow more accurate predictions of problems in the area of money. These results can be confirmed not only by the classification trees prediction of likelihood, but also by log-linear analysis. For example, the union of two spendthrifts leads to frequent disagreements about money. To the same frequency of financial disagreements results from a combination of the man being a spendthrift, the same education of the spouses and the lack of the man’s traditionalist attitudes. The interaction of having children under the age of 18, the spendthrift man and the absence of traditionalist attitudes of one of the spouses is also interrelated with frequent financial disagreements in the family.

Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is confirmed: in cohabitations financial disagreements occur more often. Based on the results obtained with classification trees and indirect assumptions from logistic regression, the hypothesis of the importance of injustice in making financial decisions is confirmed: differences in satisfaction with financial decisions (especially in cases where the woman is less satisfied) are one of the key predictors of the increase in frequency of financial disagreements. The hypothesis that financial difficulties reduce the frequency of financial disagreements can be accepted according to the results of logistic regression: the results demonstrated that a lack of financial difficulties favorably affects family relations and reduces the likelihood of frequent financial disagreements. Hypothesis number 1 on the involvement of spouses in the labor market can be rejected: all three methods ignored this factor in relation to the frequency of financial disagreements.

Conclusion

This research shows that the frequency of financial disagreements is influenced by a variety of factors. These can be divided into two groups according to their meanings. The first group includes basic characteristics of the family: cohabitations and remarriages are at risk, while spouses in the first official marriage who do not have children under the age of 18 have a greater chance of life without conflicts over money. The second group of determinants represents the importance of studying the gender dimension when considering the spousal relationship regarding money. Thus, a significant factor is the values and attitudes of the spouses: men and women who do not want to focus on their incomes and expenses, do not have vast horizons of planning and do not learn from their own financial mistakes, i.e., fall into the spendthrift cluster, are likely to have frequent financial disagreements. The man's traditionalist attitudes are of the same importance: husbands who have a traditional vision of the family reduce the likelihood of frequent financial disagreements in families, while egalitarian attitudes may lead to the opposite result. This is explained in this study by the erosion of responsibility and the absence of labor specification from partners: if the spouses have clearly assigned responsibilities and there is a complete understanding of the cash flows within the family (who contributes, who spends on what and how everything should be accounted for), there are fewer disagreements in comparison to cases of building relationships based on constant discussions, attempts to form equality, etc. That is, by the way, similar to the findings of American researchers (Schaninger & Buss, 1985) that demonstrated that the happiness of the marriage is dependent on the labor specification within the family. We can also conclude that a common pool reduces the frequency of financial disagreements, which is associated with blurring the boundaries between spouses and eliminating inequalities. Equally important is satisfaction with financial decision-making: a woman whose satisfaction level is lower than her spouse's will be more likely to express dissatisfaction. Therefore, the frequency of financial disagreements in such a family will increase. This is confirmed by a number of Western studies on the time and employment budgets of women at home and in the labor market (see, for example, Kluwer & Johnson, 2007).

It is particularly important to emphasize that most of the features that have turned out to be significant and which affect the frequency of financial disagreements should not be considered separately, but through their interactions. It is the systems of family characteristics that are more likely to predict the appearance or absence of financial disagreements in the family. It can be concluded that most of the supposed theoretical level aspects of family life do contribute to the presence or absence of financial disagreements between spouses: the joint pool reduces their number, dissatisfaction with decision-making (one of the dimensions of power) increases their frequency, and a lack of traditionalist attitudes leads to frequent conflicts. Nevertheless, not all hypotheses have been confirmed in this study: for example, financial difficulties, difference in income and workday were not significant factors (which may be related to the measurement of these variables in the database), although they are present in the results of Western studies (Dew, Britt & Huston, 2012; Dew & Dakin, 2011).

Considering the limitations of this study, it should be noted that I was not engaged in the qualitative elaboration and conceptualization of financial disagreements: the analysis was based on a ready-made database without measurement of the concepts of interest. In this regard, the impossibility of giving an exact answer to the ques-

tion of what financial disagreement is in the family and what exactly people understand by it, and what is hidden behind the category of “frequent” financial disagreements, cannot be denied. One more serious limitation is the causality problem. Can it be always said that the distribution of power or the financial management mechanism, or the distribution of household duties, affects the frequency of conflicts? Could it be the other way around? On the one hand, it is possible to know, but on the other hand, if there is a reverse situation, it should definitely lead to the destruction of the marriage, since the family’s affairs to a certain extent are strongly dependent on the emotional state of the spouses. Therefore, the experience of marriage became the best controlling variable, since there are clear doubts that this situation occurs in established families.

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