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CONTENTS

Autonomy in American higher education: the case of the land grant universities

László J. Kulcsár¹

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the autonomy framework and its practical aspects in higher education, using the example of American land grant universities. Autonomy is discussed from three distinct but interconnected perspectives: conceptual, financial, and internal governance. Each is crucial for public higher education to fulfill its mission, and all these are put at risk from both external actors the universities have to work with: the market economy and political forces. A careful balance between these actors ensures that universities are effective in delivering quality education while being flexible to address changing social and economic conditions. However, if corporatization gains the upper hand in promoting and enforcing a narrow supply and demand perspective or political forces see higher education as enemies of their ideology, the autonomy of universities will be at risk, resulting in the decline of the quality of education.

Keywords: autonomy, land-grant universities, self-governance, corporatization.

Autonomy and the landscape of American higher education

Higher education as a social institution has been the subject of many debates in the past and this is unlikely to change. In itself, there is nothing wrong with this: healthy debates are crucial to how institutions evolve. Some evoke more discussion than others though, and education is a good example of this. It is easy to see why it falls into this category. Virtually everybody was part of the educational system, including many through not only their own experiences but that of their children or grandchildren. As a result, people can relate to it and feel confident about offering their perspectives, with or without any ac-

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tual expertise. In addition, the way in which a society organizes education and determines what the next generation should be learning or remembering also impacts the grand narrative and identity of any nation. Finally, conceptualizing and building (or dismantling) the "knowledge economy" is a key element in the overall welfare of a society.

The issue of autonomy is at the core of the discourse on education. It cuts across all levels and institutions but is the most pronounced for higher education. This is no coincidence. In higher education, the emphasis is not only on delivering subject matter expertise, but also on educating and preparing citizens capable of critical and independent thinking. Autonomy in education is crucial for this latter task, which also explains the political pressure on universities to narrow higher education to simply teaching a skill and therefore raising an obedient working class. This debate focuses on how much autonomy seems to be needed: for those wanting universities to mostly engage in vocational education, the emphasis is on acquiring the relevant skills, which (and this is a powerful argument, because it is true) could be done in a simplified and cost-effective environment. Accordingly, the debate on university autonomy is really a debate on how a society would like its higher education to contribute to broader national goals. This article discusses this topic using the case of the land grant universities in the United States.

Before we go any further, it is important to note that the United States has an extremely diverse palette of higher education institutions. There are public and private institutions, 2-year and 4-year colleges in both categories, and unique universities such as land grants, religious schools, historically Black institutions, and tribal schools that cut across the public/private or 2-year/4-year categories. On top of this, the Tenth Amendment of the US Constitution delegates the authority of organizing public education to the states by not reserving this for the federal government.[2] Thus, the original variation is multiplied by the different ways the 50 states had set up their own systems. In this article, I will focus on the traditional 4-year public universities and the land grant schools as their special subset.[3] This group is reasonably similar in all states.

Stemming from the previous point, one can argue that there is no universal definition on what autonomy might mean for the variety of higher education institutions in the United States. In fact, as Rybkowski, in his historical overview of the subject (2009:76), noted, this was "an idea quite often questioned and challenged", creating an interesting battleground between the federal government, constituents in the states, and the universities themselves. However, before the Second World War, the establishment of the land grant university system was the only significant federal initiative in higher education (Richardson and Hurley, 2005).

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2   A good example for specific federal authority is managing immigration – the states cannot have their own rules about that.

3   American English uses the terms "university", "college", and "school" roughly as synonyms when it speaks about higher education, so in this article, these do mean the same.

The land grant university system is unique to the United States. It originated in the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862, as its language said, "to benefit the agricultural and mechanical arts." Up to that point, American universities, like others in the Western world, were elite institutions. Most of the general public were unable to pursue post-secondary educational opportunities that were reserved for those with significant wealth and class-based social networks.

Recognizing how this would hinder the development of the country and building on the new idea of mass higher education linking science to practical skills, the establishment of land grant universities was a novel and creative step. It is a little-known fact that one of the early proponents was Horace Greeley, the editor of *New Yorker*, who became famous for his call "Go West." Greeley believed that one solution to urban poverty was encouraging people to establish farms in the new territories. He soon realized though that most of these people have little if any relevant skills and started a campaign for professional and scientific agricultural education (including himself buying a farm, experimenting on it, and publishing the results in his magazine). As part of this campaign, he criticized the lack of higher education opportunities in agriculture (Cross, 2012).

At that time, the United States only had about six million urban residents to twenty-five million living in rural areas. In a remarkable way, the need for this new type of university did not come from the urban elite, but from rural constituents and their representatives to provide practical agricultural education.[4] Justin Morrill, the father of the bill and a representative from Vermont argued in Congress that "the monopoly of education is inconsistent with the welfare and complete prosperity of American institutions" (Campbell, 1995, p.17.). Land grant universities established the idea of participation in higher education based on merit and ability in the middle of the Civil War.[5] In addition, they set new values and goals for these institutions, emphasizing impact beyond knowledge discovery. One just needs to look at the chapter titles of Sternberg's edited volume (2014) discussing the value of these schools: economic development; fostering human capital and human potential; creativity, innovation, and entrepreneurship; role of the arts; and wisdom and ethics. The role of the land grants in advancing higher education significantly broadened the understanding of a university's impact on modern society.

The new universities needed funding of course. This was secured through granting land to states (hence the name "land grant"), mostly in the west including what the Homestead Act just opened for settlement in the same year. The states then would sell the land and use the revenue to establish and finance such universities, setting up these funds in perpetuum (Cross, 2012). States in the east, where there was little or

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4   The agricultural orientation of the new land grant universities was further supported by the Hatch Act of 1887 to set up experiment stations for the scientific study of agriculture and the Smith-Lever Act of 1914 to formalize cooperative extension. While eventually all land grant universities grew into comprehensive institutions, agricultural colleges are the oldest ones in most.

5   To be fair, the bill was introduced earlier, but President Buchanan vetoed it due to pressure from Southern and some Western states. When Lincoln was elected, the bill was finally signed into law – it did help that many of the opposing states seceded by then, thus had no representatives in Congress.

no land available, received land in the new territories so that they would not be dis-advantaged.[6] The universities established this way put the word "state" in their name and they still constitute the backbone of public higher education in the United States.[7] No other type of university has the concept of a "mission" so ingrained in their documents and collective consciousness. The land grant mission is about the betterment of society, building on the ideas of mass access to higher education and advancing knowledge from discovery to impact. And this is why the concept of autonomy is not merely a philosophical exercise here, but a discourse with clear practical implications.

Autonomy in Higher Education

To establish a framework for the study of autonomy in American higher education in this paper, the subject can be divided into three broad areas: (1) conceptual, or in other words academic, (2) resource and budgets, and (3) self-governance. I need to make a note on the first one: I will use the term "conceptual" to create an easier distinction for the reader between academic autonomy and academic *freedom*. Academic freedom is not simply about saying whatever a professor thinks without any consequences. It comes from the philosophical notion that knowledge and power are separable, rooted in the early 20th century organization of American academia (Scott, 2018).[8] In a pure form, this describes a theoretical world where universities are completely separated from governments, but not even the private universities can manage this entirely. As we have seen, the land grant system is not like this, in fact it cannot be like this, given the continuous feedback loops from knowledge generation to practical application for the benefit of the constituents. As it happens of course, governments are often keen to be at the center of determining what this benefit is.

Conceptual Autonomy

Conceptual autonomy is about letting a university define its mission and the best academic ways to achieve that. Legislators or other external actors may have broad aspirations about educating citizens, but how to set this up in practical terms should be a university decision. In this sense, autonomy is about trust in academia that they know how to do this the best. One could easily argue that this is similar to letting a carpenter decide how to build a roof frame based on acquired skills and experience.

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6   This was the reason why some Western states originally rejected the idea, fearing land speculations from East Coast actors.

7   Every state has a land grant university, but not all has the word "state" in its name though. There are also further additions to this group, most notably the historically Black colleges and universities in 1890 (since with all progressive thought, life was still racially segregated in the US at that time). Currently, there are well over a hundred land grants in the US.

8   Academic freedom is also connected to basic human rights: the freedom of expression, the right to learn, etc. For an overview from this perspective, see Roberts et al (2023). In 2012, the Council of Europe connected academic freedom to institutional autonomy, providing a conceptual recommendation to members states on this subject.

Carpentry, however, seldom evokes national discourse and most people are happy to admit that they have no knowledge about it. The aforementioned bias, though, with many commenting on education based on that they went to school is a more problematic issue, despite this being analogous to people wanting to influence fiscal policy simply because they have a bank account.

The debate on the extent to which academia should be allowed to establish and practice its conceptual autonomy is partially stemming from pressure by the economic sector with regards to workforce development. Workforce development is a supply issue, and it occurs in a balanced cooperation between government, the market, and academia. Governments determine economic policy and regulate the market environment, and if academia is out of sync with the needed workforce, market actors generate a demand (assuming that the missing skills have to be acquired in higher education). In a perfect world, this should create no issues, because even if market actors push workforce development to directions that mainly serve them and not society in general, governments counterbalance that by recognizing the need for and thus subsidizing education on subjects like arts and humanities. But if the government assumes a corporate stand on higher education, it may be tempted to remove this safety net and thus undermine broader academic considerations for short term economic gain. This is particularly problematic in countries where the government has dominant control over university resource allocations or personnel management. The recession triggered by the financial crisis of 2008 and then amplified by the pandemic has shaken the balance between the three actors and provided a stronger position to the market to encroach academia in the name of operational efficiency, which worked well for some governments that desperately wanted to save taxpayer money.

The direct conflict between academia and politics on conceptual autonomy, which is far more significant than the issue of workforce development, is purely conceptual. A government may have a strong position on what skills are valuable, what citizens should learn or how they should "imagine" their own nation. This happens when the government has its own agenda for whatever political reason and sees universities in absolute terms only: either allies to move that forward or agents posing a threat to that. Sometimes this is manifested in debates about specific subjects, such as critical race theory in the U.S. in recent years. More often though, this is represented in a more complex discourse on whether universities should allocate fewer resources to specific programs (typically those that encourage critical thinking) and focus more on vocational training so that students could have "good jobs."

It was noted that before the Second World War, the land grant system was the only major federal initiative impacting higher education. In the postwar era, the situation has become different. Several initiatives shaped the higher education landscape, including the G.I. Bill, the National Defense Education Act, the Higher Education Act, and federal funds appropriated for student loans or research and development purposes. These had a significant impact on the operations of uni-

versities, but federal legislation has always been careful not to encroach on the state level authority on organizing education itself.

One area, however, where the federal government was adamant to intervene was the issue of civil rights and the prohibition of discrimination against those who can study at a university. This was tested in 1980, when a small school, Grove City College, refused any federal assistance so that they could ignore all federal regulations (Rybkowski, 2009). The federal government responded by cutting federal aid to students who apply to the college, arguing that such aid is indirect support for the school. Since this resulted in a steep decline in applications and then enrollment undercutting school revenues, a predictable legal battle followed. The case went up to the Supreme Court and then back to Congress, and eventually in 1988, a new law stated that any indirect or direct federal aid means that the school must follow all federal regulations. This was seen by private schools as government overreach, and the fiercest battles have been fought around affirmative action ever since. This was particularly visible in the management of admissions (which was potentially the motivating factor for Grove City College to reject federal grants in the first place), culminating in the most recent striking down of affirmative action in college admissions by the Supreme Court. In an increasingly polarized world, it is likely that the debate on conceptual autonomy in higher education will stay with us for a long time, and at the time of writing this paper the incoming Trump administration is expected to intensify this conflict.

A unique aspect of conceptual autonomy revolves around the authority of expertise. Universities are often criticized for their faculty dismissing arguments coming from non-academic actors about academia. In reality, faculty are best qualified to judge each other's credentials and abilities as those relate to their subject area. A professor of astronomy would likely be the utmost authority on quasars as well as on the curriculum ensuring that students learn everything there is to know on the subject. But who is the authority on academic autonomy?

Tierney (2021) identified the crisis of autonomy as one of the three major challenges (with hegemony and legitimacy) for American higher education today, addressing this very question. It is often argued that since faculty are the arbiters of disciplinary knowledge, they are best positioned to run the institution itself, which is tasked to generate and transfer that very same knowledge and evaluate a student's preparedness. Since this is done by processes that take time and sometimes seem archaic, it is easy to see how this position can be challenged on the familiar grounds of efficiency. This challenge cleverly obscures the fundamental difference between efficiency in business operations and efficiency in the pursuit of academic knowledge. While there are connections between the two (after all the pursuit of knowledge also depends on a well-functioning academic bureaucracy), there is a temptation to strangle business operations that support undesirable academic fields in the name of administrative efficiency. This increasing corporatization of academia is one of the greatest challenges to autonomy today. More often than not this is playing out as a resource utilization conflict at universities.

RESOURCE AND BUDGETS

The conflict over conceptual autonomy might seem like an abstract discussion, however, it is often manifested in resource allocation and budget management, the second broad area in our autonomy framework. Private universities are largely shielded from external pressures challenging this. They may respond to market forces if those impact the success of university programs. They may also align their programs with whatever new trend they see valuable. However, they can withstand most political pressures on conceptual autonomy given their independent resource base, fully under their own control.[9]

Public universities in the United States do not have this luxury. Their budgets are partially dependent on state governments and important political and economic actors are also on their governing boards. For most universities, budgets typically come from four major sources: tuition, state allocation, external grants and contracts, and philanthropy. The latter two are largely independent from the first two, although the ability to create and maintain research capacity (labs, facilities etc. or top faculty) that determine the success of grants can be a function of revenues from tuition or state allocation.

In 2023, there were about 10 million students enrolled in public higher education in the United States (SHEF, 2024). The average annual tuition in 2024-25 in a four-year public university was $10,600 and a student could expect to pay just as much for room, board, and other expenses (Ma et al, 2024).[10] This covers a significant variation between $6,300 and $17,500 across the 50 states. It is also important to note that these are in-state tuition rates. Students attending a state university from a different state (or country for that matter) could expect to pay close to three times more.

State support for higher education adds up to approximately $11,000 per student, which again covers a huge variation across states (from $4,000 to $23,000). About 90% of this support is direct allocation to institutions and 10% is financial aid for students (the majority of student financial aid is provided by the federal government). This support just recently reached the level of what it was before the 2008 financial crisis, meaning that the Great Recession set state support back by 15 years. In addition, about half the states are still below what their support was in 2008, which means that they have likely cut higher education budgets permanently.[11]

With state support pulling back and university enrollment declining (due to predictable demographic trends), tuition burden on students has been increasing. In 1980, about 21% of public university revenues came from tuition, and today it is above 40% (SHEF, 2024). At the same time, direct state support to land grant

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9 The notable example was the congressional hearing of private university presidents about campus protests and antisemitism in the Spring of 2024. Presidents were put on the spot, and some of them were forced to resign after.

10 The average private four-year annual tuition is around $43,000.

11 Higher education is typically set as a discretionary item in state budgets, meaning that this could easily be cut when states face financial difficulties.

universities amounts to only 10-15% of their annual budget, and in some cases even less. It is important to note that while there is a market element in determining tuition rates, states often put caps on this, either by limiting the dollar amount a university can charge or limiting the percent increase from one year to another. This is done purely for political reasons: no elected official likes receiving calls from parents (their voters) about high tuition rates, which is unfortunate but understandable behavior, and some politicians are also happy to use the argument of affordability to pursue an agenda of putting constraints on conceptual autonomy. Regardless of the underlying rationale, state allocation and at least some control on tuition revenues provide powerful tools to political actors to influence, though not fully determine, the resource base of a land grant university.

The revenues mentioned above generate a fairly large budget for a typical traditional land grant university, usually several billion dollars a year. However, there are some restrictions in spending this money: funding from research grants and contracts can only be spent on the research activity the grant was written for, federal capacity funds (a special allocation to the original land grants, typically to colleges of agriculture) can only be spent on agricultural research and extension, philanthropy is commonly targeting a specific cause, sales revenues (such as athletics apparel) usually flow back to the original unit etc. These rules are fairly standard and seldom get caught up in any debate on resource autonomy.

Where autonomy comes into the picture is spending the money from tuition and state allocation.[12] There are overall expenses that serve the entire university and in the absence of designated revenues must be covered from this source to ensure basic operations: faculty and staff salaries and benefits, building maintenance, most student assistantships and tuition aid, transportation on campus, utilities etc. However, there is considerable autonomy for a university to set priorities within these necessary categories, especially when setting the number and compensation level of employees. These decisions are made in the context of self-governance of a university.

SELF-GOVERNANCE

A central question in any organization is conceptualizing and establishing the appropriate extent of self-governance on a scale between full control and full autonomy. Most organizations tend to be somewhere between these two extreme positions. It is easy to see how some do better with more control (the military for example), while others are more effective if self-governance is allowed to thrive. Higher education is an example of the latter.

Before we go into details, it is important to note that there are typical arrangements for the same type of institution across the globe.[13] However, the strength of democratic traditions and institutions, the understanding of what autonomy

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12   To give an example of the magnitude, my institution, Penn State University has a $10 billion annual operating budget for 2025, of which about $3 billion is tuition and state allocation.

13   Government bureaucracies for example never operate on self-governance principles, instead the rule of law is supposed to regulate effectiveness and ensure fairness.

means, as well as the often corresponding wealth of a nation, can result in a variation of self-governance practices for the same type of institutions. Taking the example of education, if autonomy is interwoven in the daily fabric of a society, reasonable institutional autonomy is a default setup.[14] But if a government suppresses autonomy and society is either complacent or feels powerless to do anything about it, institutional autonomy and self-governance quickly falls victim to political pressure.[15] This tends to happen in countries with weak democratic political traditions, especially if the state is captured and its institutions are exploited by a group of self-serving political actors.

American land grant universities enjoy a strong tradition of self-governance in higher education. Furthermore, public institutions can also be shielded by the relative similarity between land grants and top private universities. It is very difficult to put pressure on private universities with respect to self-governance, given their financial independence. Public schools then can point at the fact that deviating from the universal norm of academic self-governance will hurt them not only in the competition for top students and scientists but will also do a disservice to their home state by not being able to deliver quality education.

One central element of self-governance is the concept of tenure. Tenure is basically the lifelong employment of a faculty member after a provisional period, typically six years. If one is given tenure, the person is in a very safe position unless they commit a crime or decide to leave on their own. In most cases, tenured professors can expect a tenured position at another school when they switch jobs, so they only need to go through the provisional period once. Tenure is the fundamental tool for universities to protect faculty from any political pressure while ensuring academic freedom.

Tenure is embedded in a robust environment of self-governance around hiring and promoting faculty. Faculty hires in the United States are strictly bottom up processes where multiple levels of peers select and recommend the successful candidates. The final decision typically rests with the dean of the college who is responsible for determining the priority areas where faculty should be hired in the first place. For faculty hires, no approval is required from the top leadership of the university let alone anybody from outside academia.

Promotion decisions (including the one providing tenured status) are very similar. The only difference is that the dean is not the one making the final decision, as cases go up to the university promotion committee (all faculty, no administrators) for review, and the top leadership is making the final decision. That last step, however, is almost always a formality. The reason why hiring and promotion decisions are crucial for self-governance is that an empowered faculty with protected autonomy to do their job is at the heart of any higher education institution.

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14   An interesting chart can be found in Roberts et al (2023, p.5.): plotting liberal democracy index and institutional autonomy (as the authors defined each) resulted in a "moderately strong correlation".

15   A good overview of the Polish case written by Marta Bucholc can be found in Roberts et al (2023).

Hiring staff is done in a similar manner, with the deans being the executives determining the budget framework and college units making hiring decisions on their own. This system leaves one tool for university leadership to enforce control on operations, namely the budget allocation to the colleges. This certainly has an influence on how many faculty and staff can be employed. In resource poor times (such as during the Great Recession and the pandemic) university leadership may push agendas to "streamline" operations and establish "efficiencies" through budget cuts, using private sector consulting firms to encroach on downstream autonomy, triggering an internal conflict.

This internal conflict should be understood through a unique body for land grant universities: their governing board of trustees or regents. This board is typically established in the original university charter to bear overall responsibility for the operation of the school. The board then delegates the daily management responsibilities to the university president, keeping only the strategic ones, such as approving the budget or appointing top leadership. The board has a few appointed members by the state governor as well as ex officio members from the state, such as the secretary of education. Most members, however, are elected by various groups: alumni, industry groups, or faculty. The original purpose of the board was to create a governing body between the university and the state, ensuring that no direct political control can be exercised by the government and create a representation for state constituents. While this is done reasonably well, a recent complaint from university presidents is that board members increasingly see themselves in managerial roles and have limited understanding of the land grant mission itself (Gavazzi and Gee, 2018). This is not surprising since many board members come from industry and are likely more comfortable with practices resembling running companies than with philosophical musings about the land grant mission or the public good.

In recent decades, university operations have become increasingly complex and budget considerations have gained significance in comparison to the academic mission. In addition, there is a marked hostility from populist forces towards higher education, portraying universities as institutions of left-wing indoctrination. As a result, presidents often find themselves in a tricky situation, navigating the landscape of competing expectations of economic efficiency while protecting self-governance and academic autonomy from political attacks. This is a challenging task, given that concepts like autonomy are up for interpretation and are not operationalized in a uniform manner, while budget allocations look more straightforward and easier to be seen by the public as "savings" of taxpayer money. Top administrators typically fail this task if (often following the board's lead) they look at the university purely from a business perspective, moving the organization away from self-governance towards more control. This is particularly true if the university has a top-down leadership model, which puts little value on downward trust or the traditions of academic self-governance.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Let me start the concluding thoughts by stating that public higher education is a public good in any country. As a public good, the involvement of government is necessary, both in terms of providing resources and institutional autonomy. Everyday operations should include certain management practices based on business considerations, but a university cannot be treated as a corporation. Institutes of higher education are fundamentally different, and their multi-level operational autonomy with collaborative decision making is one of the signature differences.

Higher education is a fundamental institution in modern society, embedded into its social, economic, and cultural fabric in many ways. As such, it only changes at a certain pace. It can quickly adapt to new scientific discoveries or dynamic social conditions, but it is very traditional in operation, based on the underlying assumption that acquiring knowledge does not happen overnight and few corners can be cut in the process. Advanced degrees cannot be earned in a few months as they signify more than just a body of subject matter expertise, but also a certain attitude and practice of doing science, which takes time to develop. In addition, land grant universities are built on a partnership, which promises more than simply knowledge generation.

This partnership among many constituents in a state, known as the land grant mission, amplifies the collective spirit of these schools. In this spirit, the academic community expects engagement and respect for autonomy when large decisions need to be made in operations due to external factors. They are willing to accept the goal of improving efficiency, but only if they are at the table when it comes to programmatic decisions instead of having private consultants with limited understanding of academia prescribing the "best" business models, not to mention that the employment of consultants in the first place often signals to faculty that top administrators do not even trust the institutions they lead. The corporatization of higher education may improve business efficiency (though the results are mixed even in that) but it certainly poses a significant challenge to the mission itself.

This challenge is the most difficult to manage by the universities if a political agenda is dressed up as a quest for budget efficiency or when it piggybacks on otherwise needed operational changes. This is where autonomy and the supporting institutions are put under pressure. In a resource-poor environment, especially since this tends to correspond with shortsighted political regimes, autonomy is seen as an alien concept, only hindering operations, and higher education can easily crumble. But if these traditions and institutions are strong, the school can go through the necessary changes without the weakening of its autonomy and self-governance or losing core elements of its academic mission.

Knowledge generation needs an environment which fosters open communication, stimulates collaboration, and provides resources for experimentation. A lot of this can happen in a private laboratory, dedicated to the focused discovery of

a new vaccine or material. But universities are far more than that. Besides their objective to drive disciplinary discovery and create interdisciplinary spaces for collaboration, their mission is also to educate informed and contributing citizens. That cannot happen without an environment where institutional autonomy is valued, respected, and protected. About 160 years of experience in the land grant system, one of the most successful experiments in public higher education, has taught us that much by now.

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STATE AND CIVILITY LESSONS FROM HISTORICAL DESTINIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY AUTONOMOUS ERA

Imre Garaczi[1]

> " *War is the state in which
> is taken seriously in the pursuit of temporal wealth
> and things." (G. W. F. Hegel)*

> " *The armed prophets are all
> were victorious, and the unarmed
> have failed."* (N. Machiavelli)

ABSTRACT

Research in the philosophy of law and the philosophy of the state focuses on general questions that a knowledge of the individual legal systems cannot answer. The new millennium has seen an intensification of struggles – from academic levels of justification to popular street fights – about the role of the state, ranging from the minimal state that can be dismantled (see US election contest in 2020) to the world state that is regulated from above (see United States of Europe, China's super – centralized state). These processes cast a new light on the individual and social relations to autonomous time in the 21st century and on the authoritative right of civility, or citizenship, which has been rather eroded in our time. Mastering the basic principles of the philosophy of law will help us understand the State's functioning and criticize it rationally. What are the highest standards to which concrete laws can be reduced to be just? Is the fundamental norm part of positive law, or must we return to prepositional ideas? These two basic 'models' have alternated in modern European legal philosophy: legal positivism and the doctrine of natural law. To what extent has this authoritarianism prevailed in the theories of law and the state in different European eras and regions, whether they have been put into power or merely fictionalized?

Keywords: *civility, citizenship, authoritarianism, social contract, centralized power, minimal state, self-regulating systems, Axial civilizations.*

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1   Imre Garaczi President of the editorial board of the journal "Autonomy and Society".

The concept of civility was also used in medieval societies, although its significance was limited in scope. Exceptions include the 11th - 12th century city-states of northern Italy and the 14th - 15th century industrialized merchant cities of the Netherlands, where civility emerged and was considered a political factor in local governance. From the 17th century, political philosophies emerged, such as those of Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu, which re – emphasized the relationship between politics and civil life. The starting point was the articulation of the social contract principle, upon which laws governing political communities were built. It is also essential to mention the concept of the state of nature, which was closely linked to various forms of the idea of civility. According to Hobbes' famous formulation, the chief characteristic of the state of nature is "bellum omnium contra omnes"[2] (Hobbes 1970, 108). In contrast, the idea of the civil state is marked by the transition from a fear – filled, uncertain life to one of security guaranteed by institutions, following the social contract. During this period, the concept of a civil society was also closely tied to the Christian belief that people should be regarded as equals. A key characteristic of the history of civil society is that the management of public affairs was the domain of the autonomous and active male. Women, as autonomous political actors, predominantly appeared in the 19th century.

When considering the socio – cultural and social – historical aspects of the idea of civility, it is also crucial to acknowledge the close connection between political relations and economic and market transactions. Additionally, from antiquity to the present day, the moral sentiment of compassion has been closely associated with the concept of civility, with varying degrees of emphasis in different eras.

Modern authors attribute a pivotal role in the creation of civil society to the omnipotence of Reason. They base community norms and values on the requirements of Reason. In the writings of modern authors, basic laws related to Reason enable the development of universally valid principles, striving to ensure the principle of universality can be applied in any era or geographical location. The intellectual history behind this is that the function of the community's moral order was no longer envisioned in a transcendent world but rooted in the concrete social reality of everyday life. This shaped political philosophical thought in the 19th and 20th centuries.

From the second half of the 20th century, the concept of civil society became widespread in social terms, mainly due to the rise of the media society. Previously, this concept was primarily the domain of philosophers. Discourses on civil existence gained prominence as absolute and centralized forms of governance weakened, allowing for more courageous expression of differing opinions in society. It became clear that the phenomenon interpreted through the concept of civil society could serve as a counterbalance to rulers and the state. In contempo-

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2   "The war of everyone against everyone."

rary public discourse, this concept is primarily considered as a counterbalance to institutional and ideological monopolies. As Ernest Gellner said:

> „the set of diverse non – governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of society." (Gellner 2004, 11).

Gellner associates all of this with the idea that humanity's historical epochs were not solely under the rule of despotism and tyranny, but also included periods free from oppression. He points out that pre – modern political institutions rarely possessed the means to completely enslave an entire social system. Evidence of this is that even under despotic institutional rule, local communities could function autonomously.

Continuing Gellner's line of thought, these communities reinforced internal order and social roles through rituals stemming from various traditions. For example, kinship relationships, often intertwined with economic and sacred functions, provided a foundation for this. This process of forming hierarchies centered on the obligations within relationships; if someone failed to fulfill their commitments, their established networks were endangered. Numerous rule – following procedures also strengthened this system, imposing psychological burdens on society's members. Gellner concludes his argument by crystallizing three alternatives in the study of civil society systems: the caste – based, the relationship – and ritual – guided, and the type free from both communalism and centralized power.

Thomas Paine analyzes important questions regarding the mutual interrelations between the concept of civility and the ideal of the state. He emphasizes that various relationship systems among people do not primarily arise because of governmental power but stem from the principles accumulated in society based on traditions and the natural disposition of humans. Paine asserts that relationships among people exist and prevail independently of the government, characterized chiefly by mutual dependence and the networks of relationships formed along common interests.

According to Paine, the nature and amount of government needed in various societies are partly determined by society's character and the style of governance. One of humanity's primary characteristics is that, as a naturally created being, individuals must exist in a communal manner. This is significantly influenced by the fact that humans generally have broader needs than their available abilities can satisfy. In the long term, individuals cannot meet their real or unrealistic needs solely on their own; they inevitably rely on their family, relatives, and peers—on one or more networks of relationships. These relationships create gravitational forces within the cohesion of a community or society. To understand this, it is essential to examine the nature and character of the people forming the community and the types of mutual adaptation among them. We can observe the various skills and abilities that develop to preserve the benefits derived from society.

We find Paine's assertion somewhat exaggerated in the sense that he reduces the role of government merely solving issues where civilization is not sufficiently effective and suggests that society could perform its tasks based on mutual agreement without governmental assistance. Two historical facts contradict Paine's opinion: firstly, prehistoric societies established governments precisely to reduce feelings of fear and uncertainty in a chaotic world; secondly, the societies of ancient river valley civilizations could not have organized large communal projects—such as the construction of canal and dam systems—without establishing governmental authority. Paine also argues, supported by historical examples—that if formal governmental power is removed from the functioning of society, self – regulation can replace it. While this can be seen as a partial truth, long – term regional and geomorphological social interests could not have been harmonized and managed without crystallized governmental roles. Another partial truth in Paine's argument is that the dissolution of formal government does not necessarily lead to societal disintegration, as community bonds could theoretically strengthen. However, if we consider the collapse of great historical empires—such as the Roman Empire, the Carolingian state, or even the extinction of the Árpád dynasty—we see that these were followed by rather lengthy periods of anarchy. But this, of course, pertains to the pre-modern world.[3] Naturally, Paine is correct in asserting that.

> "The more perfect civilization becomes, the less it needs government, for it governs itself and regulates its own affairs. However, the old practices of governments are so contrary to logic that their expenses increase when they should decrease. Civilized life only requires a few general laws, which are so beneficial that whether enforced by government or not, the effect is nearly the same. By the time governments appear, the natural interactions within society have already addressed nearly everything."(Paine 1995, 135).

In the world of civil societies, the pursuit of statelessness is a realistic desire, as the state is one of the largest consumers of societal resources. However, this idea is regularly reconsidered when global problems arise that the civil sphere cannot manage. Civil society systems primarily operate in a self – regulating manner, exerting their influence autonomously overall. In contrast, the state primarily focuses overall and less on individual sectors or regional units.

Paine's logic traces back to the laws of nature, from which the laws of social functioning also originate. Figuratively speaking, the "interests" of natural functioning transfer to society. Contrary to Paine, it is also true that the state is created out of interest. A problem arises—according to Paine—when governmen-

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3 In the political philosophies of the Cartesian era, however, the question of the extent and scope of governmental power appears as a reality. Unlike the premodern era, in developed Western societies, the need for an all-encompassing, even total state power is no longer justified. The state, as an institutional system, should be as small and rational as possible, while the civil sphere should expand to manage its own affairs in a sovereign and autonomous manner. However, from the mid-20th century onwards, phenomena emerged that impacted the entire global order, once again necessitating the comprehensive competence of statism. Such processes include the global threat of the atomic age, the economic competition of multi- and international monopolies, and the increasingly alarming growth of international terrorism.

tal measures significantly diverge from the natural inclinations of society. Paine supports this assertion by citing various rebellions and disturbances throughout English history. He argues that the government often caused societal disruptions, contrasting this with the notion that the natural alliances and associations within local communities would not have caused rebellions and disturbances by themselves. This juxtaposition is rather forced, as Paine does not accept the fact that the state and communities organized on civil foundations are ultimately interdependent. This interdependence exists because the state, if it efficiently manages its assigned tasks, plays a functionally positive role out of necessity.[4] One of the most critical tests of this balance in various historical periods has been the issue of taxation. The government's sense of self – restraint and realism determines the extent of necessary tax revenues for the state's overall functioning. Where taxes have been excessive and unequal for long periods, civil society remains impoverished and dissatisfied, inevitably leading to a constant inclination toward disorder. Paine rightly perceives that if communities lack prospects for prosperity and happiness, the state must be prepared for continuous internal strife. This line of thought reveals that consensus between the state and civil society is only possible through mutually guaranteed and respected principles. According to Paine's example, when the United States was founded, formal precedents suggested that it would be the most tumultuous state in the world, as the immigrants belonged to various nations, spoke different languages, were familiar with different forms of government, had diverse temperaments, and practiced many religions. Yet, to the surprise of many, it established a unified legal system based on mutually crystallized principles and practices, functioning more modernly and smoothly compared to the Old World. However, this picture is not so simple, as the American example solved previous European issues like feudal oppression, burdensome court privileges, trade and industry restrictions, and high taxes, but it also produced new and significant contradictions in the New World. We agree with Paine's concluding thought that one of the great innovations of the American Revolution was establishing the governmental role of principles' validity, significantly limiting any government's potential for excessive power. This is supported by Alexander Hamilton's words as well.

> *"It is inherent in the nature of sovereign power to resist control, making its possessors averse to external attempts to limit or regulate their operations. This tendency explains why, in any political association based on the union of smaller sovereignties, there is a perpetual centrifugal force urging the lesser or inferior orbs to fly off from the common center. This tendency is rooted in the love of power."* (A. Hamilton 131, 1998).

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4   However, if the state itself becomes the focal point of power struggles and a hotspot for various interests, it negatively affects the functioning of society. A kind of balance principle is necessary between the two components: is the state, the government, capable of representing and managing the coherent goals and tasks of society, or is its sole aim to maintain its own power, thereby entirely restricting and subjugating civil society?

All these arguments support the Enlightenment era's struggle to transition from feudalism to a modern, bourgeois – type world and to establish a democratic form of government with modern ideas. Paine's assessment was straightforward in his own time, but as a goal to be achieved, it remains valid even today, on the threshold of the 21st century

> „*... government is nothing more than a national association based on the principles of society."(Paine 1995, 138)*

In examining the interconnections between civil society and various forms of government, the interpretation of the relationship types between reason (ratio) and the individual (individuum) has played a significant role since the Enlightenment era.[5] We have previously shown the importance of the synthesis of reason and revelation in the intellectual foundations of the United States' creation, serving as the backdrop for civil society. The principle of the social contract plays the most crucial role here. Its fundamental idea is that moral ideals are not derived from otherworldly entities but are rooted in the internal relational systems of communities comprising individuals. This closely ties to the fact that thinkers of the late Enlightenment era saw the new moral system surpass the earlier natural law principle. The turning point was marked by David Hume, who dramatically broke away from the previous moral – based natural law derived from a transcendent order. According to A. B. Seligman, the emergence of transcendent morality was closely linked to the development of the symbolic systems of axial civilizations.

> "*The emergence of Christianity as an axial civilization is of decisive importance for our inquiry. With this historical turn (marked by the appearance of major civilizations and historical religions), the conception of the relationship between the powers governing society and the cosmos was fundamentally transformed. The Axial Age separated the previously intertwined celestial and earthly orders, envisioning society as independent from, yet in tension with, the cosmic (thus transcendent) sphere." (Seligman 1997, 77).*

In this sense, the idea of unity between the earthly and heavenly realms became divided. Christianity places the source of moral authority in the transcendent sphere and derives moral imperatives from divine revelation. In contrast, in Eastern religions, moral commandments emerge from reconciliation with earthly existence. In Christian culture, human existence is vulnerable, and subordinate compared to transcendence. This principle was in effect for approximately fifteen hundred years, until the Enlightenment era. From the beginning of the modern age, the idea gradually gained ground in European intellectual history that the source of moral order

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5   We can adequately uncover the roots of all this by examining the important antecedents that created the public perception of the structure of society. This is desirable because it serves as an exemplary model in the development of modern civilization. The modern concepts of reason and the individual crystallize in the works of 17th and 18th-century English and French philosophers. The essence of this shift is the relocation of the sources of moral values from the medieval transcendental worldview to earthly, rational systems of thought.

is found on earth, in the everyday communities of autonomous individuals. Concurrently, the focus of faith shifted from the afterlife to human reason.[6]

This is important to highlight because the fundamental basis of individual and social existence lies in the relationship to the grace instilled within the soul.

> „*By denying the effectiveness of grace from external sources, Calvinism stripped priests of their mediatory role. In the language of sacramental theology, this desacralized the Eucharist, no longer viewing it as a means of grace. Calvinism, rejecting the salvific power of externally imposed norms, made voluntary obedience to divine laws the sole source of true Christian living.*"(Seligman 1997, 79)

Thus, the new ideas of Calvinism made a new type of Christian world organized on a communal basis a model to follow. It is essential to emphasize, when examining the components of civil society, the significant role of society members' relationships to religions. According to Calvinist soteriology, a new understanding of the sacrament of communion needed to be developed. The primary goal was no longer for community members to participate collectively in this sacrament, but for individuals to commit to representing God's will independently and autonomously.[7] This led to a process in which the nature of human relationships changed, no longer woven from pre – modern natural worldviews but emerging as metaphysical – based ideologies.[8]

Along with this came the transformation of the principles of authority influencing the relationships among community members. In everyday practice, this meant that the spiritual roots no longer stemmed from a transcendent milieu but from agreements among believers and the egalitarian relationships between community members —including pastors.

In this spiritual and intellectual revolution, the connection between religious life and secular vocations took on new meanings. The most crucial element was the recognition within Protestantism that practicing a chosen vocation could be one way to achieve salvation. (In this context, Cromwell also used the term "vocation".) According to Max Weber, one of the most critical components of the development of Protestant ethics was the changed economic order at the beginning of the modern era, the "spirit of capitalism". He emphasized that the new economic world played only a partial role in the emergence of the vocation concept. From this arose the new sense of morality and responsibility for modern man, which sought acceptance and perfection within the rational institutions of this world.

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6   Calvinism also plays an important role in this transition. The emergence of Protestant theology brought about a revolutionary change in the traditions of Catholicism in the sense that it transferred the previous doctrine of sacred grace from the transcendent milieu into the human personality, thereby making it attainable in this world.

7   In relation to civil society, another significant innovation of Calvinism is that it transformed the bonds of Christian society. The most prominent feature of this transformation is that it provided individuals with the opportunity to break away from the previous premodern kinship and residential communities and established new types of communal relationships based on a high degree of trust and contracts.

8   The most comprehensive models of this change were developed by the philosophy of religion during the Scottish Enlightenment.

The sacrament of grace no longer originated from transcendent precedents but from the impulses of earthly everyday life.

From the 17th century onward, the fulfillment of this idea was the principle that the connection between vocation and grace was not solely the monopoly of the religious elect but applicable to the entire society. This was realized most fully in the Anglo – Saxon – origin North American Puritanism. This process continued until the latter half of the 17th century, when, due to the general crisis of Puritanism, the relationships between grace and vocation had to be reinterpreted.

> „In the history of the development of civil society, the image of the modern man to be emulated strengthened by the 18th century, while still retaining its status of transcendence in relation to God. 'This inner division of the individual is related to the specific way ascetic Protestantism became institutionalized—in more everyday terms, how it became embedded in our spiritual traditions and morality. As we have previously seen, this division of personality became one of the most important sources of the idea of bourgeois society, anticipating not only the questions related to civil society but also the answers to these questions". (Seligman 1997, 90).

In the 19th – century history of the political philosophy of civil society, the focus of discussions shifted to individualism, freedom, and the right to self – determination. The writings of North American authors (R. W. Emerson, Garrison, Thoreau) significantly influenced the continental tradition. The interpretations expressed that democracy and human rights should be understood primarily as philosophical truths. In the American perspective, as reflected in the Jeffersonian Constitution, the source of the new type of governance is seen in the moral individual, endowed with sanctities. This has roots in the convergence of two traditions: firstly, the now – classical ideas of the Enlightenment, such as Rousseau's principle of the social contract, fundamental liberties, and the principle of limiting state power; and secondly, the still – remembered world of religious transcendence. These debates lay the groundwork for the possibility of a new civilization in modernity. Here, the idea of civility is expressed in the demands for equality, the attainment of universal suffrage, and the extension of civil status to the entire society. This indicates the projected importance of civil society in the 20th century. We have previously outlined the process in which the natural law philosophy of civil existence organically intertwined with religious tradition, and this fusion became the main argument for civil society in the 19th century. In the next phase of our discussion, we will weigh the universal questions of the relationship between society and the individual within the context of civil society and the state. It is in this context that J. S. Mill asks the question:

> "What, then, is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual over himself? Where does the authority of society begin? How much of human life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society? (Mill 1859. 166).

Mill's starting point is rather profane, as he simplistically asserts that both parties should benefit from life according to their real interests. He then dismisses various contract theories related to societies, arguing that those who retroactively derive the formation of human societies from such theories are mistaken. He attributes the end of the prehistoric era to the establishment of a sense of security among people, created to set limits on the fears arising from existential uncertainty. In this context, he places significant importance on virtues based on self-interest, which can be interpreted in harmony with social virtues. Mill pays special attention to the issue of education, which he considers crucial in developing positive social and individual virtues. His argument strongly relies on ethical sentiments. He envisions this within the specific spheres of individuality, where people's actions toward each other mature into rules that can guide the judgment of similar future actions. He then analyzes in detail the motivations behind the relationships of individuals within the community.

> *„I assert that, for a person's conduct and character that affects only himself, and does not impact the interests of others, he should not be subjected to any discomfort except those that inevitably arise from the unfavorable opinion of others."(Mill 1983, 169).*

A central element in Mill's argument is the examination of the dignity of the principle of authority, specifically whether someone loses their authority due to deficiencies in their intelligence or because they violate the rights of others. In this logic, it is also a dividing line whether the individual has harmed themselves or society. In the latter case, they deserve a stricter punishment. Mill refines the judgment of actions in cases where someone does not directly harm others; in such instances, it is necessary to restrict their behavior. Mill's utopian assumption is that things proven harmful to everyone from the beginning of history to the present must and can be prevented. This line of reasoning is based on not repeating the same mistakes that have been made many times in history and have proven to remain mistakes in the future. Mill's argument has a pedagogical nature, as it assigns the quality of the means and methods used for achieving goals to the community's responsibility. On the question of whether the community or society should intervene in purely private matters, Mill replies that there is a great danger that such intervention will occur at the wrong time and in the wrong way. This highlights the difficulty of confining interest – based relationships between society and the individual, and between society and communities, within strict rules, as the individual, the community, and society are all in constant flux. To illustrate this, Mill draws examples from European history over the three centuries preceding his own time, particularly showing the conflicts between adherents of different religions from the perspective of the individual and society. These conflicts range from the persecution of minority groups to debates over the introduction of a day of rest. Mill's thoughts can be weighed

from the perspective of the idea of civility, based on the universality and particularity of the individual. Historically, the universal individual was once part of the fate of the cosmos.[9]

This connection is nuanced by the circumstances surrounding the Christian civilization's development. According to Zoltán Balázs, all of this.

> „...meant that the radical decision, initially to join a community, became increasingly fictitious. Everyone was born a Christian, faith was ready – made, with all its existential and lifestyle consequences. Nevertheless, the image of man that was one of the defining features of the new religion proved stronger than historical circumstances and continued to shape them effectively. From the earliest centuries, alternative ways of continuing to embrace faith through radical choice and decision were sought. This has also proved to be a powerful community – building force." (Balázs 2003, 40)

The question of the particularity of individuality begins with an examination of acting autonomously. This can be considered on a par with individual action, in which the cognizing subject plays a decisive role. This question, like the universality and particularity of individuality, is resolved in the process of giving self – referential statements a prominent role in the field of the political, since we suspect cosmic roots in them. However, as a philosophical problem, this is of minor importance compared to the fact that in our time this is taking place in the context of mass society. In interpreting the sources of the history of ideas of civil society, we must draw attention to the relationship between politics and morality. From roughly the Renaissance onwards, the answering of political questions was closely linked to the moral factors involved. Machiavelli, in his major work, draws attention to the fact that the representation of moral ideals greatly reduces the effectiveness of politicians' decisions. He is the first to formulate, at the dawn of the new age, the application of virtue and vice to a given situation. For him, the interests of the community as a whole seem to be the most important.

> „A prince, therefore, must not mind incurring the charge of cruelty for the purpose of keeping his subjects united and confident; for, with a very few examples, he will be more merciful than those who, from excess of tenderness, allow disorders to arise, from whence spring murders and rapine; for these as a rule injure the whole community, while the executions carried out by the prince injure only one individual." (Machiavelli 1513, 121).

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9   The operation of the Greek polis was a terrestrial projection of a celestial model, with both striving for harmony. Christianity's eschatological inclination made faith a matter of personal choice, where individuals participate due to their own nature. With the spread of Christianity's legitimacy, the previous cosmic order, as an external world, completely shrank. The personal aspect of a Christian's faith is now expressed within the narrow confines of canonized liturgy. While in earlier times, the relationship with the cosmos could be based on empirical knowledge, the relationship with the Creator can now only be approached through the mystery of faith.

Compared to pre – modern thinking, the innovation here is that the relationship to morality is no longer of divine origin, at the mercy of some kind of fate, but that the autonomous man himself – like a prince – derives from his own will. At the beginning of the modern age, the relationship to morality, as a fundamental question of civil society, is closely linked to the interpretation of the concept of civilization. A form of community is considered civilised if it is linked to the pursuit of the 'good', creating happiness and wealth. The uncivilized form is that which is characterized by suffering, deprivation, and unhappiness in the long term. Later, this was one of the assumptions of Paine's time, and the reason for this is not that theories of civilization are lacking, but that there are obstacles to the operation of these theories. According to Paine, the European governments of his time, although they knew and believed in the principle of universal European civilization, were operating in the opposite direction. Their political decisions often led to barbaric and uncivilized situations.10 It is here that the role of revolutions, which are born with the aim of changing the moral state of government, becomes significant in Paine's thought. The need to change the moral state of affairs helps to create forms of civilized life. The political and economic consequences of this are that the tax burden is reduced, and the role of culture can be given greater importance. Peaceful trade, Paine argues, makes people friendly, presupposes mutual usefulness, and even makes nations useful to each other. Since trade expresses both the natural and the special interests of people, it is a significant opportunity to improve their state of being effectively. Paine's claim about trade may have seemed a realistic alternative in his day, but it has subsequently been shown to be an illusion. The modern and developed states and the multinational monopolies that have emerged alongside them have created a new situation, and wars are being waged under the control of governments to create uncivilized conditions, just as they were in Paine's time, because global commercial interests have a great deal of power to influence the workings of individual governments, based on their own interests. 11 Related to this, the next important issue in the history of modern civil society is the relationship between power and subject. In different human cultures, the typical systems of relationships between individuals who form a community give rise to the concept of the subject. In the 20th century, Michel Foucault's research gave rise to the study of this issue and a large literature has developed.

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10 Paine distinguishes between the civilizational needs and interests of citizens and the relationship of their governments to civilizational principles. While residents strive to civilize one another, governments are more inclined to wage war and squander the resources produced by civilized citizens on the uncivilized conditions created by wars. This is because the governments of Europe in the second half of the 18th century found it more materially profitable to maintain uncivilized conditions. Based on this, Paine differentiates between types of governments: a civil political order operates within a country according to its laws, whereas a court or cabinet government primarily pursues its objectives abroad, thereby reinforcing the primitive order of uncivilized life.

11 For example, in the post-World War II era, colonization continued in the same way as before, but with different means. Colonization can occur not only through military force but also by shaping market-consumer behavior, spreading cultural ideals, and even imposing lifestyle patterns.

The question is not a new one, since Freud, Jung and Lacan, among others, had already dealt with the problem in depth.

Foucault considers the possible relations between culture and the subject from three angles. The first is the objectification of the speaking subject with scientific status, which he analyses philologically and semantically. The second is the question of "the divisive social practice", according to which the subject is either divided within itself or separated from others. He cites as examples of this type the parallels between the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, and the criminal and the good guy. The third case is when people transform themselves into subjects. Foucault explores this type through the field of sexuality. The source of the problem is definitely the relationship between subject and power. According to Foucault, it is first of all necessary to shed light on the way in which concepts are created in relation to the object, since, in his view, the creation of concepts should not be based solely on the theory of the object, since the theory of the object cannot in itself be considered the basis for the creation of concepts. The understanding of the emergence of concepts must be examined in the light of their wider historical components. This is to be understood in the context of the excessive role of power that politically based rationality has ascribed to itself in the modern era. Foucault considers it dangerous to use the term rationalization in a uniform way. Rather, it is necessary to analyze individual rationalities and not the generalized one.

According to Foucault, we need to try to understand the prevalence of power relations in a different way than we have done so far: rather, we need to take the forms of resistance to power as a starting point. He analyses the following forms of resistance: the domination of men over women, of parents over children, of psychiatry over the insane, of medicine over the population and of bureaucracy over people's way of life. What common ground can be found in these types of defiance? Foucault's analysis distinguishes six forms:

1. The struggles of each of these types transcend political boundaries, are not country – specific, nor do they belong to a specific economic milieu.
2. They act against the influences of various power.
3. All of them have a direct impact, as they manifest themselves in the relationship closest to them and do not require a comprehensive solution.
4. What they all have in common is that they all question the status of the individual, and seek to make the individual truly individual, but in a way that does not disintegrate community life.
5. These oppositions pit knowledge and education against the competence of power by seeking to limit the privileges of knowledge that are associated with secrecy, distortion, and mystification.
6. The common premise of each of these types is the sense of their own autonomous identity. Thus, the main orientation of the orientation of these six types of struggles concerns the technique and form of power.

> *„This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize, and which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the word "subject": subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self – knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to. (Foucault 1987, 272 – 273)*

In this context, Foucault distinguishes three types of resistance: struggles against forms of domination; against forms of exploitation; and against forms of subjectivity and subordination. In history, these have been expressed in different ways, separately or even mixed. Today, the struggle against the subordination of subjectivity has taken centre stage. Its beginning, as Foucault understands it, is the age of the Reformation. There are, of course, countless arguments against Foucault's claim, for example that all these types are essentially derivative phenomena or the result of economic and socio – psychological tendencies, and can be traced back to the foundations of productive forces, class struggle and even ideological structures, but Foucault's truth stands in the sense that these types are complex and circular in relation to other forms in a given culture. The next element of his thought is the position of the concept of the state in relation to the subject. He emphasizes that the state thinks primarily in terms of the community, the whole, classes or groups, and adds that the power of the state is both individualizing and totalizing. The most important characteristic of these two types of process is that the modern state has integrated the techniques of power of the earlier, Christian world into a new political form. This is what Foucault calls pastoral power. Its character is oriented towards salvation. Of course, the modern state is a much more complex model of organization, and there are techniques for incorporating forms of individuality. Individualities need only to conform to desirable patterns. These patterns are expressed in various discourses in a given society or state power. The most important interface between the subject and power is the relationship to the discourses. This, in turn, is also a question of power, since discourses directed and controlled by power tend to be more powerful than those generated by subjects:

> *"I am supposing that is every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality. In a society such as our own we all know the rules of exclusion. The most obvious and familiar of these concerns what is prohibited. (Foucault 2 1970, 51).*

This idea is familiar to all of us, as even in the 20th century the central and self – censorship of the free use of discourse is common. So, we need to think carefully

about what, when, why and how we say it. History, in Foucault's reading, is itself represented in the power relations of different discourses and is an expression of the relationship between different systems of domination and the subject. It is not only in it, but also for it, that the struggle takes place. The interrelationship between the subject and power that we have just discussed sheds a great deal of light on the possible ways in which power can be exercised in civil society and on how power relates to civil society. In his reading of Foucault, the emphasis is on the means of exercising power, since he is looking for immediacy and points of contact in relations.[12] In general, strictly harmonized rules apply to closely organized institutions, while in other, civilian areas of life, the types of rules used are more flexible. An example of the former is the system of educational institutions, where a set of rules covering all areas of operation creates a system of checks and balances. In the latter case, for example, in a conversation between two friends, the most varied and free forms can prevail, limited only by self – censorship. This question clearly leads to an exploration of the specific nature of the power in question.

> *„The exercise of power is not simply a relationship between partners, individual or collective; it is a way in which certain actions modify others. Which is to say, of course, that something called Power, with or without a capital letter, which is assumed to exist universally in a concentrated or diffused form, does not exist. Power exists only when it is put into action, even if, of course, it is integrated into a disparate field of possibilities brought to bear upon permanent structures. This also means that power is not a function of consent. In itself it is not a renunciation of freedom, a transference of rights, the power of each and all delegated to a few (which does not prevent the possibility that consent may be a condition for the existence or the maintenance of power); the relationship of power can be the result of a prior or permanent consent, but it is not by nature the manifestation of a consensus."* (Foucault 1982, 283).

Foucault seeks the root of this process in violence and asks whether violence is the sole and ultimate source of any power. It is always primarily coercive towards some specific subject, and has two preconditions, first, that the subject of violence is assumed to be an agent, and second, that violence in most cases produces a counter – reaction, i.e. responses, reactions and reflexes. The use of coercion is a complex matter, since it can be used by its sheer brute force, or by the threat of its sensation; and often it is not even necessary to use it to obtain consent, it is enough to refer to it, and it can even be funny. Foucault confronts the power relation with freedom, for the exercise of power gradually eliminates freedom, since power can only be exercised where there is some degree of freedom. Of course, this interpretation applies to the relations of power and freedom

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12   The toolbox of power is necessarily linked to capabilities, and this can be understood in the communicative relations woven into discourses. The mediating medium itself is also important, the use of language, the sign system, cryptic codes and symbolic forms. Power relations and forms of communication are always situational.

in the modern age. However, its claim is contradicted by the fact that modern civil constitutions require the authorities to maintain the dominions of freedom, i.e. the state must guarantee – optimally – the rights of freedom. One can approximate Foucault's view to 20th century Western European practice in that power and freedom are two sides of a complex political corpus and the degree of freedom in a given society depends on a coherent balance between the two. Foucault often links the study of different types of power to institutions. He interprets this concept broadly to mean not only forms of power and organization, such as public administration, hospitals, prisons, but also nexuses between individuals and social groups, such as friends, sexual relations, family relations. For institutions, the most fundamental expectation is that their survival is a primary concern. Foucault finds the correlations of power that are manifested in institutions in the mechanisms that exist outside them. He points out that they are rooted mainly in social techniques. This logic leads us to the conclusion that society cannot exist without power relations. In support of this, we can argue that the interests of the individuals, groups and communities that make up society necessarily produce power, the maintenance of which is in turn guaranteed primarily by institutions that function well or badly. One cannot exist without the other. It is as foolish to assume a society without power as a society without power. Here we can come to the same conclusion as in the relationship between freedom and power: the relationship between power as an institution and society should be such that power expresses society in an adequate way and, at the same time, society is responsive to power.

Of course, this conclusion can only be so crystal clear in its conceptualization, because in everyday life – especially in the world of globalization – the regional and intercontinental interconnections of economic, social, political, and cultural phenomena have become so complex that we can be happy to see that the powers and institutions concerned can even approximate to a coherent functioning that meets the requirements of the times. The most attractive manipulative tool of all, however, is cognitive influence. Here, it is not primarily the emotions that are tried to be influenced, but the intellect. This technique relies mainly on simple and unquestionable logic. A specific tool of influence is the mediatized global manipulation that has become widespread in the last decade. This type of manipulation combines a wide range of tools and techniques and is a comprehensive way of inciting people to follow fashions or lifestyles. How to defend against manipulation? One key to the solution lies in culture. An important part of this is rhetoric, but this has been almost unknown in the last half century, in the context of mass society (This is perhaps no coincidence!). Knowledge of the world of rhetoric would be important because it would make it easier for the individual to see through lying and misleading manipulations. The teaching of rhetoric in secondary schools and universities today is very limited, because the techniques of persuasion operate primarily outside the world of culture, and this is another reason why members of mass society are not prepared to apply ethical reflection.

Manipulation techniques are also ethically objectionable because individuals in society are seen as almost programmable automatons, systems, machines, operating on an input – output basis. In arguing against manipulation, P. Breton highlights as the main harm of manipulation:

> „....manipulation is a threat to democracy. Its very existence undermines the foundations of democracy and deprives this political system of its most essential element, freedom of expression. Its operation serves best those who see neither democracy nor the opportunities it offers to win public opinion as a means to its destruction. There is a clear link between the use of methods aimed against freedom of thought and anti – freedom values." (Breton 2000, 13).

This is also important because when manipulative solutions become predominant in mass societies, this can seriously violate human dignity, make individuals vulnerable and, finally, negatively affect freedom of speech. As individuals in society, we can successfully escape from the maze of manipulation if we are able to interpret the messages that come our way on a cultural basis and maintain our openness to other members of society without being influenced. This requires standards that we can apply autonomously in any situation. Taking stock of some of the possibilities in the modern history of civil society and the state, we must conclude that the idea of civilities has had a very adventurous (?!) journey in the last four hundred years of rationalism. The seeds sown in the time of Descartes and Hobbes have taken root in extremely capricious economic and political times. Many branches of the tree of civility have withered, but new ones have grown in their place. The hope remains for the 21st century that the fruits of this tree will really come to fruition, because autonomous civic will and action, if not squeezed by political and economic interests, can always provide a beacon of light.

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THE VANISHING NATION: BUNJEVCI

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Bunjevac sam rođen čovik
Bunjevac sam odhranjen
Bunjevac ću ostat uvik
Dok ne budem sahranjen![3]

Ej, bunjevci, na severu Bačke.
sačuvajte pisme bunjevačke.
pivajte ih još puno godina,
vaša j' grana mala al' je fina.
(Zvonko Bogdan)[4]

ABSTRACT

The study demonstrates that Hungary's Bunyevac (Bunjevci) movement to achieve independent nationality status is not an initiative to disrupt Croatian unity. It is not an unpleasant or suspicious assertion of the interests of a newly born nationality but an effort to reconstruct the historical situation of the Bunyevac people. There has not yet been an analysis of this process from a historical, political science, or sociological perspective. In our opinion, what is at stake here is the reconstruction of cultural autonomy with geopolitical contexts, alongside the struggles of ethnic groups to assert their interests. In most cases, the efforts of the Bunyevacs to reassert their national-cultural autonomy have only generated marginal interest on the part of the majority nation. In such cases, the state typically accepts the position of groups promising less conflict, even if that group relies on historically and morally questionable measures.

Keywords: *minority politics, Bunyevac (Bunjevci), historical-cultural analysis, political interests, Hungary*

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3   I was born a Bunyevac, growing up a Bunyevac, I will always be a Bunyevac, Till I am buried! (Bunyevac folk song, unofficial translation)

4   Hey, Bunyevac people of North Bácska, preserve the Bunyevac songs. Sing them for many years; your national and cultural roots are rich and beautiful (Zvonko Bogdan, a songwriter and folk singer of Bunyevac-Serbian origin from the village of Gara (HU). Unofficial translation.)

INTRODUCTION

The official abolition of an autonomous *ethnic group* with its history, culture, and folk customs, which fought both winning and losing battles in the Middle Ages, and which was predominantly described in contemporary writings in overwhelmingly positive terms, but most importantly, as *a recognized ethnic group*, would seem to be a complex task. The truth is, however, that the state representatives of the dominant political interests of Hungary have accomplished this task quite easily in the 20th century, and the institutions under their jurisdiction have shaped the law accordingly, although illogically and without regard for history.

We are talking about the Bunyevacs, who do not exist as an independent nationality under current Hungarian law. However, they are found in large numbers in Hungary and elsewhere. Their communities and civil institutions have a rich history. Today, they can survive without state support, thanks to the efforts of some local governments and individuals, albeit with incredible difficulty. If the Hungarian state recognized the Bunyevac communities as an independent nationality, just like in the Republic of Serbia, this would be a significant advantage for them regarding their cultural autonomy and institutions. At the same time, it cannot be denied that it would also be a disadvantage for others, such as Croats, or so they think, and it may be so in reality. The National Croatian Self-Government (NCSG) reacted to the Bunyevacs' aspirations for independence in 2006[5] and 2010, and later, with nervousness and irritation (Origó 2010). For example, they published a statement[6] declaring that the Bunyevacs are inseparable from the Croatian nationality. In this case, there is a profound misunderstanding as to the authority of the NCSG since such a statement by an NGO has no historical, cultural, or legal significance. The wording of the statement itself is reminiscent of similar statements made during the socialist era, saying that the Bunyevacs wanted to break up the unity of the Croats. This, of course, ignores the 1945 Tito model of Yugoslav ‚Croatianisation,' whereby members of the Bunyevac, Sokac, Bosnian, and Rac ethnic groups *were to be* registered as Croats (see later for details). This is how ‚unity' was created in the interests of Tito, who was of Croatian origin. This is the ‚unity' that the Bunyevacs want to break up, according to the NCSG. Such statements continue to this day, even by the Croatian President. The Croatian President Zoran Milanovic's statement that the Bunyevac people in Serbia are Croats[7] was officially protested by the National Council of the Bunyevac Minority in a statement of 30 September 2021.[8]

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5   Minutes of the Hungarian Parliament's Human Rights Committee meeting, 28 November 2006.

6   https://horvatok.hu/index.php/hu/aktualitasok/rendezvenyek/625-bunyevacz-hu

7   Since the previously described NCSG statement on the website does not contain a date, we cannot judge whether the NCSG statement followed the Croatian President's statement or vice versa. The President's statement is irrelevant, and so is the NCSG's statement.

8   https://bunjevci.org.rs/?view=article&id=95:saopstenje-nacionalnog-saveta-bunjevacke-nacionalne-manjine-povodom-izjave-zorana-milanovica-pridsidnika-republike-hrvats

The decision of the Hungarian government to adopt the Tito method and „good practice" (see later) meant favorable financial and advocacy conditions for the Croats, which they believe are threatened by the Bunyevac's aspirations for independence. Behind this ideological concern, it is more than likely that economic and political considerations may be at work. In other words, Croats need the Bunyevacs, Sokacs, etc., to maintain their positions on the ethno-political level. One can feel this way, especially if one considers the data of Kocsis (2021, 70), which shows that the number of Croats in Hungary decreased from 26774 in 2011 (Hungarian Statistical Office) to 18483 in 2016. One can assume that if the Bunyevacs were listed as a separate nationality, as in 1930[9], or 1949[10], this number (18483) would decrease substantially further. Similar reasoning behind including the Bunyevacs among the Croats may also underlie other opinions. For example, Vuković (2020), a researcher at the University of Zagreb, divides the Bunyevacs of Bačka, arguing that the modern-minded Bunyevacs identify as Croats. „They build their identity on modern currents from their heritage, but they also pay much attention to folk culture. They place themselves firmly within Croatian culture, which they see as the modern successor of pre-modern cultures and with which their own culture is most closely linked."[11] In other words, the „Croatian-Bunyevacs" are the „good guys," the ones that are worth belonging to; the others are the unfortunate Bunyevacs, backward, outdated, lacking modern ideas, and waiting for help from the Serbs. Our study is an attempt to analyze this contradiction. Our analysis is primarily historical and secondarily cultural anthropological, with some political „spice." Our fundamental aim is to contradict the statement in the title and to prove the autonomy of the Bunyevac people and the reality of their centuries-old history. As a starting point, we agree with the opinion of Tihamér Vujicic (1978): ‚The Southern Slavs living in our country are not a single nation: they are a group of people who have been living here since different times or who have migrated here, and who are quite isolated from each other.' Accordingly, we must speak of the Bunyevacs as a separate ethnic group.

We do not intend to make the past and present situation of the Bunyevac people the subject of a specialist historical analysis. The sources cited are merely used to create a well-founded argument for their existence as a distinct ethnic group and to shed light on the fact that their legal ‚disappearance,' or rather ‚disappearance by ethnic motives,' was the result of political interests and the will that this implied, accompanied by a high degree of indifference on the part of today's political elite.

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9   In the 1930 census, 9016 persons in Bács-Bodrog county declared Bunyevac or Sokac language as their mother tongue. The number of persons with Croatian mother tongue was 31. In Baranya County, 5241 persons with Bunyevác or Sokac as their mother tongue were enumerated.

10   According to the 1949 census, 5,701 persons with Bunyevác or Sokac mother tongues lived in Bács-Kiskun county alone. There were 213 Croats and 369 Serbs.

11   Online edition, no page number.

THE ORIGIN

Who are the Bunyevacs, and where did they come from? These questions point to their origins and are still not fully understood. There are several theories on the origin of the Bunyevacs. Some believe that the name Bunyevac is based on the name of the river Buna (Bosnia); others believe it is a nickname. Still others derive it from the name of the huts (bunja) that were common in the Bosnian mountains. The Bunyevacs have been called Dalmatians, Illyrians, Catholic Racs, Catholic Serbs, and Vlachs. However, they appear in literature as Croats only in the 19th century, then only in connection with creating the Bunyevac literary language[12] (Lakatos 2019; Antunovich 2021). Todosijević (2002) presents seven theories, including the Norman origin of the Bunyevacs. Why are they not simply called Croats? The origin of the Bunyevacs seems uncertain; the only thing that seems inevitable is that they are not Croats. Of course, some of the Bunyevacs also lived in the territory of the Kingdom of Croatia, which was established in the 9th century with no permanent borders, but this did not mean that they were Croats[13]. The name Croatian itself first appears in a document dated 852 AD (Szeberényi 2011). The territory of the Kingdom of Croatia and its vassals have often changed throughout history, except for the origin legend, according to which they were led to their new home by a leader called Hrvt[14]. This leader could, of course, only have done so with the permission of the Avars since, at that time, the Slavic tribes invading the Balkans from the northeast were subordinates to the Avars. The struggles of Byzantine, Frankish, Venetian, Hungarian, and Turkish rule redefined the borders and, at times, even challenged the very existence of the Croatian Principality/Kingdom. The Frankish-Byzantine Treaty (812 Aachen) even divided Dalmatia into two parts, with the Croats living in the northern territories under Frankish rule. Szeberényi also draws attention to the uncertainties of historical sources since some of the written documents at that time could not be verified and were based on oral information. This circumstance leaves a lot of room for the retroactive legitimization of political ambitions.

Several authors have dealt with the migration of the Bunyevacs to the central southern areas of the Kingdom of Hungary, but very few with how they came to the area between the Svilaja and Dinari mountains. However, this is the key to the question of origin. Ostrogorsky (2003), who analyses the history of the Byzantine Empire, places the Balkan invasion of the Avars and Croatian and Serbian tribes from the north-northeast in the turbulent period of the 6th and 7th centuries AD. After the conquest, most of the Avars retreated, but most of the Slavs settled down, occupying a significant part of modern Greece. Even after this, the

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12 For a thorough summary of the development of Bunyevac literature, see Mándics 1987.

13 On this basis, Slovaks living in Hungary today should be regarded as Hungarian. The territorial principle is not relevant in such cases.

14 The Byzantine emperor Constantine, "Born in the Purple" (905-959), was born in Byzantium and identified 'White Croatia' beyond the Carpathians as the Croats' ancestral homeland.

movement of Slavic tribes did not cease, as Byzantium integrated a large part of them into the empire, made them taxpayers, obliged them to perform military service, and relocated some of them to other parts of the empire to the ‚thermas,' for military and economic reasons. The Croatian tribes settled in the north-western Balkans, the Serbs in the eastern Balkans, and in what is now Greek territory. The Bunyevac population, on the other hand, presumably either arrived to the south-western Balkans from the south-east during a mass migration or was pushed to the Dalmatian and Bosnian territories because of pressure from the rising Bulgarian empire (Unyi 1947). During the ecclesiastical schism, the Croats and the Bunyevacs were Catholicized by their position, while the Serbs and those living in the Greek territories remained under the jurisdiction of Byzantium (Orthodox Christianity). The truth is that, according to the uncertainties of the time, the Croats were at one time to be found in the Eastern Church, as were the Serbs under Latin influence. However, Unyi (1947) repeatedly refers to the fact that the Bunyevacs were „trapped" between the territories of the two leading Slavic tribes (Serbs and Croats), which also means that they did not belong to either of them.

Our study deals with the origins of the Bunyevac population only in so far as it seeks to point out the presumably different routes of arrival in the Balkans, one of which (south-east) was used by the Bunyevac and the other (north-north-east) by the Croatian-Serb tribes at different times of migration. It cannot be excluded that the population that later became Bunyevac had already been living in the south-western Balkans. The period of the emergence of the Slavic tribes in the Balkans, as mentioned above, was characterized by the constant shifting of borders, the precarious alliances of interests between the various powers, and the struggles of the Byzantine state (the Eastern Roman Empire) on several fronts at the same time. Uncertainty in the region did not decrease after the fall of Byzantium (1453) and the expansion of the Turkish Empire in the Balkans. The loosening, fluidity, and frequent changes in political and ethnic borders called into question the region's stability and gave a new incentive to migration.

THE HISTORY

István Iványi's (1896) study in the Yearbook of the Bács-Bodrog County Historical Society[15] described the formation and the situation of the Bunyevac nobility at that time. He emphasized that the Bunyevac nobility (no mention of the Croats) received the noble title for their military merits in the war against the Turks. The Bunyevac settlers arrived in the Kingdom of Hungary in several waves (Mándics 1987). Margalits (1918) mentions that from 1687 onwards, the Bunyevac surnames proliferated in the church registers of Szabadka (recently Subotica). Margalits also emphasizes that the center of the Bunyevac population was Szabadka and its surroundings, while that of the Sokacs was Mohacs, Pécs and its surroundings. Referring to a book on

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15 Iványi was previously attacked in Ethnográphia for his incorrect linguistic and ethnographic statements concerning the Bunyevacs. Regardless of the legitimacy of the attack, the controversy also confirms that at the end of the 19th century, the Bunyevacs were still treated as a separate ethnic group (Popovich 1893).

the history of Szabadka, Iványi says that one of the waves of Bunyevacs was brought to Bácska by Domonkos Markovics (Dujo Marković) and György Vidákovics (Juro Vidaković), who had been ennobled for their military service. Under the leadership of Vidákovics, about 5,000 Bunyevac families settled in this region[16]. According to Margalits (1918), the first Bunyevac settlers appeared in Bácska under the leadership of Lukács Sucic, born in Bosnia. Iványi mentions the following in connection with the guarding of the Tisza and Danube border region against the Turks: ‚[Markovics and Vidákovics] organized the Tisza and Danube military border region with the Serbian and Bunyevac militia who had fled from foreign lands' (Iványi 1896, 16). This is also the opinion of Szárics (1842), who emphasizes the valor of the Bunyevac army as those who engaged the enemy ‚in the front line' during the Turkish invasions. The number of Bunyevacs and, to a lesser extent, Serbs, who settled in several waves, is known only by estimation. According to Heka (2000), this number exceeded 20,000. At the time of the 1720 census, about 85% of the population of Baja (Hungary) was made up of Bunyevac. The Franciscan monks, who organized this migration and continued their work with the support of the Roman Church leaders in Vatican, played an important role in the settlement in the Kingdom of Hungary. Their activities in Bácska were not suspended. They organized ‚public education' in the ‚Illyrian' language and produced an Illyrian-Hungarian-German textbook.[17] Todosijevic (2002) refers to the work of Sekulić (1991), who argues that the picture of the migration of the Bunyevacs is too simplistic. According to Sekulič, in addition to the Bunyevac leaders and the Franciscans, the Turks also played a significant role in settling the area with the Bunyevacs. Some of them converted to Islam and then re-Catholicized after the Turkish withdrawal. It was in the interest of the Turkish regional government to reestablish cultivation in the depopulated areas. Margalits (1918), for example, mentions that Bunyevacs leased the wastelands surrounding Szabadka (Subotica) from the Turkish authorities in the city. This indirectly confirms Sekulić's statement.

Where were the Croats, one might ask. The answer can be found in the works of Sarosácz (1973) and Konczér (1997), among others. The mass migration of Croats from the North-West Balkans to the Transdanubia region, especially to the western border area, was also a consequence of the Turkish threat (Pálosfalvi 2011). The spatial separation between the migration and settlement of the Bunyevacs and the Croats cannot be coincident. Both South Slavic ethnic groups, as indicated earlier, had different territorial locations but not rigid boundaries, just as in the case of the Serbs. The Croats were resettled in Hungarian territory mainly at the instigation of the Zrinyi, Frangepan, Nádasdi, Erdődies, etc., families who owned large estates in the south and western Balkans. These places also received a small number of Bunyevac settlers, and churches were even built for them, mainly for economic and military reasons. The assimilation of the Bunyevacs here in the Croatian environment could otherwise have been very successful.

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16   Their daily life revolved around fighting and farming, as the following saying illustrates: ‚Bunjevci su svoj život vodili izmedu motike i puške' (the Bunyevác have a hoe in one hand and a rifle in the other).

17   The name „illyr" means bunyevác.

According to Érdujhelyi (1896), the settlement of Sokac and Bunyevac into the Kingdom of Hungary from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina took place in the 1680s. The same opinion is expressed by Bálint (1944), who points out the isolation of the Bunyevac people in the south-western part of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the southern part of Dalmatia and explains the deficiencies of the Bunyevac literary language, for example, by this isolation. However, he notes that the natural development of the Bunyevac language was also hindered by political considerations, which may also explain the influence of the Croatian literary language. These circumstances, however, do not indicate that the two ethnic groups are identical. Bálint also details the cultural anthropological characteristics that confirm the autonomy of the Bunyevac ethnic group. Dudás (1896) mentions Bácska, Zombor, and Szabadka as areas inhabited by Sokac and Bunyevac. The existence of an independent Bunyevac ethnic group is also mentioned later in official documents. In 1918, the Serbian National Council in Novi Sad declared its independence from Austria-Hungary and elected its representatives. Sajti (2011) has pointed out that the composition of this National Assembly did not reflect the actual demographic situation, as Hungarians and Germans were hardly represented. More essential for us to know, however, that, despite the Serbian dominance (576 representatives), the Bunyevacs had 84 representatives and the Croats only 2. The composition was indeed very unequal, but the point is that the *Bunyevacs were a separate people.*

In more recent literature, for example, Konczér uncritically adopts Sarosácz's somewhat confused typology, which includes the Bunyevacs, Bosnians, and Sokacs among the Croats. Sarosácz is clear: the Bunyevacs are Croats. The same view is shared by Soksevits (2003), who considers the Bunyevacs to be the ‚Csángó' (emigrant people) of the Croats. It is unclear in what sense he uses this metaphor, which would only be valid if the Bunyevacs had broken off from the group of Croats, as the Csángos did from the Szekler group from Transylvania to Moldva region (on the other side of the Carpathian Mountains, not Moldavia). In his study, Soksevits writes, „the Bunyevacs…. are now a group of people who are mostly integrated into Croatian society…" (p. 67). If this is the case, there must have been a period when this integration had not yet taken place so that we can speak of an independent ethnic group. According to him, some Bunyevac groups have not been integrated, and this statement further erodes the credibility of his argument. It is a relatively common feature of the literature about the Bunyevacs that they do not clarify the ethnic relationship with the Croats, which we can discover in the uncertainty of the authors as well as the compulsion of perceived or real conformity. Nor do they clarify concepts such as ‚integration.' Whether one reads the writings of Sarosácz, Soksevits, or others, one is struck by the erroneous interchange of concepts, as if the authors themselves were not sure of the correct relationship between the terms Croat and Bunyevac, Sokac, Bosnian, etc.

For centuries, the Balkan region was the scene of the rivalry and struggle between the two Christian churches, the Roman and the Byzantine, for the „conquest of souls." In 866, for example, the Bulgarian Tsar Boris I regularly ‚competed' between the two churches. He sent a lengthy questionnaire to each of them and decided based on the answers he received. The questions concerned mainly the use of the local language and the recognition of ‚paganish' customs. Many of the questions can be found in Johnson (2005). The Byzantines eventually won the competition, although at first, under Frankish influence, it seemed that Rome would be the winner. The aftermath of this struggle can still be felt today. The Croatian ethnographic „occupation of space" supported by the Roman Catholic institutions stopped at the mental border of the religious views of the Bulgarians and Serbs under Byzantine influence, even though many cultural affinities can be demonstrated between the Serbs and the Bunyevacs. Nevertheless, the Serbian ethnic influence among the Bunyevacs was not nearly as strong as among the Croats, even recently. Consequently, the Croats' ‚political expansion' and aspirations were greatly facilitated by the dominance of a common religion – Roman Catholicism – in the Western Balkans. Understandably, Serbia has no interest in the presence of a unified Croatian ethnic group, including Bunyevacs, Sokacs, etc., which would favor the cultural autonomy of the Bunyevacs. However, unity would be in the fundamental interest of the Croats. In many cases, geopolitical and political motives drive the decisions of different states, and this is the case here.

THE BUNYEVACS AND THE ETHNOPOLITICAL ASPECT

As mentioned earlier, Bálint (1944) noted that political aspects also hindered the natural development of the Bunyevac language. Tüskés (2001, 101) also mentions that „the Bunyevacs were constant targets of efforts to erase their national identity." He indicates that these efforts affected not only the Bunyevacs but mainly them. However, he does not explain why or give details about who ‚fired shots' at these targets.

The purpose of the analysis of the ethnopolitical dimension in our case is to clarify the position of the Bunyevacs as an independent ethnic group on the political palette of Hungarian society. It should be emphasized that by politics, we do not mean "party politics" but socio-political relations, which imply relations, cooperation, and competition between different social groups. We know these relations are often ‚contaminated' by party-political relations, but we will ignore them for now. The ethnopolitical situation of the Bunyevacs is examined in the following dimensions: (1) the linguistic dimension, (2) cultural and civil organization, and (3) the legal aspect of the aspirations for self-government. Of course, these dimensions are strongly interlinked so that one piece of information can be interpreted in multiple dimensions. With this in mind, we will continue our analysis.

THE LANGUAGE

The Bunyevacs have made enormous efforts to maintain and deepen their national identity and cultural autonomy from the Middle Ages to today. Mándics (1987), for example, lists the secular and religious figures who have done much to preserve and disseminate the Bunyevac language and culture. Thus, he mentions the work of Mihaljo Rađnič, Lovro Bračuljevič, Antun Bačić, Antun Josip Knežević, Petar Lipošević, Petar Milošević, Ivan Ambrozović, Luka Karagić, Luka Čilić, Mirko Pavić, Grga Pestalić, Grga Čevapović and, last but not least, Bishop Ivan (János) Antunovich.[18] Antunovich (2011), in his work published in 1882, six years before his death, called on the Bunyevacs to resist assimilation and maintain their separate and unique identity among the South Slavs. The National Croatian Self-government's opinion that the bishop is of Croatian origin, „the spiritual leader of all Croats along the Danube," and „the initiator of the Croatian awakening to self-awareness" is untrue.[19] An excerpt from the Archbishop of Kalocsa's Circular Letter of 20 December 1924 on the existence of the Bunyevac language:

> „I draw the attention of the pastors of the Bunyevac and Sokac-speaking parishes to the fact that Dr. Arch. „Novi Vinac Andjeoski molitva i pisama molitvenik za kršćansko Katolički puk", published by the Holy See's chairman Jakab Wildinger, parish priest of Hercegszánto, which is recommended not only for its usual prayer and song content in Bunyevác parish churches but also for its neat and manageable form." Signed: Bishop Gyula Zichy, Apostolic Governor.

The circular indicates not only the existence of an independent Bunyevac language but also that it is predominant in the everyday use of the Bunyevac population; otherwise, the language of mass and hymns would only be a mechanically repetitive text, but one whose content could not be understood. Incidentally, this was also the problem with the Latin mass. Education in Bunyevac also resumed in some places after the Second World War. For example, MTI (Hungarian News Agency 13 October 1947) reported an event entitled „Bunyevac public school opens in Baja". The school then began teaching in Hungarian and Bunyevac.

Later on, education in the Bunyevac language was discontinued due to the „Croatianization" or the generalization of the concept of „the Serb-Croat." At present, a few publications, websites, and Facebook groups are trying to cultivate and maintain the Bunyevác language, including the recently established

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18 Bishop of Kalocsa, Hungary, Antunovich was of Bunyevac nationality from the Bunyevac family of Kunbaja (Hungarian village). The Pallas lexicon wrongly identifies him as Croatian. The symbolic occupation of the Croatian space is also indicated by the fact that the statue of Antunovich (2021) in Baja is a gift from Croatia to the city. The statue is meant to symbolize the reconciliation of the two nationalities (Bunyevac and Croat), although the Bunyevac and Croatian people have different ideas of reconciliation.

19 https://horvatok.hu/index.php/hu/oho/palyazatok/2021-emmi

Bunyevác Cultural Institute in Baja[20], the Bunyevác bibliography edited by Ildikó Balázs, the bilingual Bunyevác folktales published by the Bunyevác Cultural Institute. The use of the Bunyevac language is also supported by contacts with Bunyevac organizations in Serbia and the Bunyevac-language school textbooks they provide.

The struggle to recognize the Bunyevac language continues today, particularly against the Croatian language, which is „in the offensive," as the following Croatian measure shows. In autumn 2021, the Bunyevac language (registration number Z-7471) was included in the list of national treasures in Croatia. This measure, however, only recognizes the Bunyevac language as a dialect of the Croatian language, thus confirming the view that the Bunyevac people are Croats.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS

In the second half of the 19th century, the organization and activity of the Bunyevac „civil society" was solid and diverse. Numerous civic organizations: reading, drama, orchestras, and choirs clubs were formed and operated in the ‚Bunyevac' towns of Szabadka (Subotica), Baja, Zombor, and Bács and the villages. The existence of a Bunyevac identity was also indicated at this time, for example, by the fact that in 1899, the Bunyevac people of Szentistván (now Bajaszentistván) organized a collection for the design and sewing of a ‚Veliki Bunyevacki Barjak' (Big Bunyevac flag) for the church. The revival of the ancient Bunyevac poetry and songs, known as „groktalice," strengthened Bunyevac identity and national consciousness. Kujundžić-Ostojić's (2016) analysis showed that although the origins of groktalice songs date back to the Bunyevac times in Dalmatia and Bosnia, and the people, events, and customs they recite are not directly related to the Bunyevac of today, but they were and are essential elements in maintaining national consciousness and identity. Before the Second World War in Hungary, the Szent István Society published several textbooks in Bunyevac and Sokac, marking the beginning of Bunyevac-language schooling. Some examples:

Bunjevačka i šokačka čitanka za I., II. ik III. razred osnovnih škola. Reading book I, II and III for grades I-II-III of bunyevác and sokác public schools. Szent István Society, Budapest, 1939. 116.

Bunjevačka i šokačka čitanka za IV., V. i VI. razred osnovnih škola bunjevčakog i šokačkog nastavnog jezika. Reading book for the bunyevác and sokác public schools IV, V en VI class. Szent István Society Budapest, 1943.

Čitanka ze treči razred narodnih škola bunjevčakog i sokačkog nastavnog jezika. Reading book for the third class of the Bunyevac and Socač national schools.

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20 István Ikotity, director of the Bunyevac Cultural Institute, in an interview with the „Azonnali" internet portal on 20.07.2020, disapproved of the initiatives taken to recognize the Bunyevac as an independent nationality. The reason behind this opinion was presumably the desire to secure resources, which are predominantly under Croatian influence.

Hungarian Minority Public School Textbooks Series. Budapest, 1944. 122.

Publications, books, and websites are not only a way of preserving and maintaining the language, building community, and spreading and keeping culture. This latter function is not only performed by language but also by the conscious construction of identity. Identity itself presupposes several shared cultural contexts and their acceptance. Identity also means belonging to a community. People with the same identity do not need to be close to each other in space, although it is undoubtedly an advantage. The common identity also creates its institutions. These institutions, like reading clubs, inns, meeting places, choirs, orchestras, alumni communities, etc., maintain this construct of consciousness. A common language is one means of doing this, but it is not the only means. In other words, for those who no longer speak the language, Bunyevac identity is a sense of community and belonging, and even a few expressions, names of joint activities, names of everyday or festive customs, and functions symbolize belonging.

It is very likely that a significant proportion of the German nationality in Hungary no longer speaks German, and it is the same for Croats, Slovaks, and others. What binds them together is nothing other than the internalization of a guiding relationship to culture, nationality, place of residence, occupation or leisure activity, common sports, a group in a common educational institution, and identity. Identity can be maintained and strengthened through various symbolic representations. To continue with the earlier example, when the Bunyevacs collect money for a flag, for the creation and maintenance of an institution, when they take work, when they place their symbols, for example, their flag, on the building of the municipality, they not only represent their existence and identity, but also symbolically consider the space (not the building) as their own, and formulate a demand that they, as Bunyevacs, should be able to do something for it. Language and social organization, including the conscious construction of identity, create the basis for their institutions to be placed in a legal framework that points to the recognition of their national and cultural autonomy.

A RUGGED ROAD TO AN INDEPENDENT NATIONALITY

In the previous parts of our study, we repeatedly pointed out that the Bunyevacs were an independent ethnic group throughout history, without interruption, until the middle of the 20th century. In the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary, they had an independent nationality status, and the state recognized this. Of course, they were not spared of the efforts of Hungarianization, but the Hungarian state did not declare the Bunyevacs to be Hungarians.

At the end of the Second World War, Josip Broz Tito, of Croatian origin, following his power aspirations, achieved that the Department of Internal Affairs of the

Subotica District National Committee stated in the declaration of May 14, 1945: *„Since the Bunyevác and Sokac nationalities do not exist,* you are ordered that all Bunyevács and Sokac should be treated exclusively as Croats, regardless of their declarations."[21] -The decree also contained further instructions, namely that *all documents containing the names of Bunyevacs and Socac should be destroyed and replaced by Croatian documents* without any objection as to the implementation of the decree. The author of the decree graciously adds that the costs incurred cannot be passed on to the persons concerned. The document concludes with the appeal, „Death to fascism – Freedom for the people!" It seems that the Bunyevacs and the Sokacs were not part of the people. Thus, almost immediately after the end of the Second World War, in the middle of the 20th century, the first political intervention was made, which is still in force today, and which placed the Bunyevac people among the Croats, together with the Sokacs and other ethnic groups.

So, unity was achieved, but one could say that this is their business; what has Hungary got to do with it? The question is legitimate, but let us see what happened. On 5 April 1995, the agreement between Hungarian Foreign Minister László Kovács and Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granić included the old Yugoslav „good practice," which was born in 1945 and also applied within Hungary. On 26 September 1995, in Zagreb, Csaba Tabajdi and Jakša Muljačić, Hungarian and Croatian secretaries of state, gave the agreement the legal wording it needed. After this, in Hungary, the National Croatian Self-Government requested that the persons who called themselves Bunyevac, Sokác, Rác, Bosniak, and Dalmatian during the census *be declared Croats when the data were aggregated*[22]. The Hungarian government granted the request, and the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO) acted accordingly. It means that even if we wanted to, we could not tell how many people identified as Bunyevacs, Sokacs, etc., in the censuses. In the first decade of the 21st century, the Bunyevacs responded to this measure, which violates the Hungarian constitution and, incidentally, the EU recommendations on minorities[23].

ROUND I

Mihály Muity and Ferenc Iharos launched a People's initiative to extend minority legislation to the Bunyevac minority. The National Electoral Committee (NEC) validated the signatures and asked the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) for its opinion. Despite the uncertainties of the expert opinion, President E. Vizi did not support the proposal. One of the arguments was that the statistics did not show any Bunyevacs scattered here and there but Croats. Indeed,

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21 Official translation. Csaba Botka, a court translator in Hungarian, did the official translation. 2020.10.26. File number 7/20.

22 The 5th meeting of the Croatian-Hungarian Minority Joint Committee was held in Eszek on 25-26 January 2001. The Croatian delegation was headed by Dr. Nenad Prelog, State Secretary of the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Hungarian delegation was headed by Tibor Szabó, President of the Office of Hungarians Beyond Borders. The reference is from the minutes of the meeting.

23 See Dr. Andrea Varga Damm's speech after the Parliament's agenda on 21.02.2022.

it would have been a great surprise if many Bunyevacs had been found since all of them had previously been registered as Croats at the request of the NCSG. During the Committee hearing and debate in the Hungarian Parliament, most Members of Parliament were utterly uninformed on the issue, with only György Wiener (Hungarian Socialist Party) taking the trouble to inform himself thoroughly. The Committee postponed the decision, but the lobbying power of the NCSG finally prevailed in the vote (18 in favor, 334 against, seven abstentions 12/12/2006).

ROUND 2

On 11 January 2010, the NEC validated the signature collection sheet of a People's initiative that attempted for the second time to bring the Bunyevac minority within the scope of minority legislation. The NCSG was alert and had already challenged the petition before the Constitutional Court, but to no avail. According to the NEC, the signatures were in order, but the Hungarian Parliament gave a negative answer again (21 in favor, 258 against, and 41 abstentions on 16.05.2011). Despite the new HAS resolution, which József Pálinkás signed as President, it was more permissive than before and considered a favorable decision conceivable. If we compare the two negative resolutions, we can see that there has been a striking increase in the number of abstaining Members and a minimal increase in the number of supporting Members.

SUMMARY

This study has shown that the Bunyevac movement in Hungary's effort to achieve independent nationality status is not an initiative to disrupt Croatian unity. It is not an unpleasant or suspicious assertion of the interests of a newly born nationality but an effort to achieve a reconstruction of the historical situation of the Bunyevacs. There has not been a thorough historical, political science, or sociological analysis of this process. In our opinion, what is at stake here is the reconstruction of cultural autonomy with geopolitical contexts, in addition to the struggles of ethnic groups to assert their interests. In most cases, the efforts of the Bunyevacs to reassert their national autonomy have only generated marginal interest on the part of the majority nation. In such cases, the state typically accepts the position of groups promising less tension, even if that group relies on historically and morally highly questionable measures, such as the 1945 Tito decree or its Hungarian counterpart.

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SPECIAL RESPONSE TO AN EXCEPTIONAL SITUATION:

THE FRENCH STATE (1940-1944)

Krisztián Bene[1]

ABSTRACT

The French State, established under Marshal Philippe Pétain following France's defeat by Germany in 1940, sought to overhaul the country's political, social, and economic systems through the National Revolution. Centered around the slogan „Labour, Family, Fatherland," the regime aimed to create a new order based on right-wing, authoritarian, corporatist, and anti-Semitic ideologies. Despite its alignment with Nazi Germany and its efforts to consolidate power in the hands of Pétain, the regime's domestic policies were designed to address long-standing societal issues, including economic instability, political fragmentation, and the perceived decline of traditional values. Although the regime failed due to military defeat and foreign pressures, many policies persisted, influencing France's post-war modernization. This study explores the French State's rise, brief existence, and lasting legacy on French society. It reveals how a regime built on radical ideals provided pragmatic solutions that endured beyond collapse.

Keywords: *French State, National Revolution, Philippe Pétain, authoritarianism, political legacy*

INTRODUCTION

In May and June 1940, the French army suffered an unexpectedly devastating defeat at the hands of the German forces on the offensive across the Ardennes. The result was the signing of a humiliating armistice and the birth of a new government and political system under the leadership of the First World War hero, Marshal Philippe Pétain. The German invasion forced the French government to move to Vichy, where the two houses of the legislature voted overwhelmingly in

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favour of proposals the Head of Government put forward, giving him the power to draft a new constitution and absolute power for its duration. Contrary to expectations, Pétain used the power delegated to him to collaborate with the Germans in foreign policy and to carry out the so-called National Revolution in domestic policy. In the latter context, he sought to create a new political, economic, and social system in France by proclaiming the motto of „Labour, Family, Fatherland."

In this study, we attempt to review the birth, operation, fall, and legacy of the French State (also called Vichy France or Vichy regime) on French society within the limits of space.

THE BIRTH AND FIRST STEPS OF THE FRENCH STATE

It was only in March 1939 that France, like Britain, realized that war with Germany was inevitable and was not ready to fight a successful war against an aggressive superpower. Nevertheless, on 3 September 1939, the French and British governments declared war on Germany, which, ignoring the Allies' ultimatum, did not abandon its attack on Poland launched on 1 September (Azéma – Bédarida 1993a, 42-43).

France was alone on the mainland, apart from a small British expeditionary force, to face a German army of comparable numbers. This would not have doomed the French army to fail, but it suffered several shortcomings. The lack of adequate industrial production capacity meant that the latest modern armaments were delivered to the troops late and in small quantities (Muracciole 2002, p. 30), and the sub-units equipped with them were deployed in isolation, in small detachments and not organized into larger units capable of carrying out independent operations. This was a particular disadvantage for armored divisions, which were not recognized until too late, so in May 1940, only three mechanized and three armored divisions were organized within the French army, while the Germans had deployed ten armored and six mechanized divisions in their offensive in the West (Keegan 2008, 116).

In addition to this, the lack of a unified command structure and coordination between the military and political leadership was at least as serious a problem as the flawed defense strategy, which took for granted the impenetrability of the Maginot Line, built based on the trench warfare experience of the First World War. In addition, most of the French, having experienced the terrible losses of the First World War, received the outbreak of war without enthusiasm, and this also affected the morale of the troops, which only deteriorated during the eight months they spent in defensive positions. (Cointet 1996, 57-73) This period, known as the „Phoney War," favored the German side, gathering strength for the offensive to the west. At the same time, the morale of the Allied troops was undermined by the monotony and boredom of idle waiting (Azéma – Bédarida 1993a, 62).

The subsequent German offensive launched on 10 May 1940 took the Franco-British command by surprise, and the German attack through the Ardennes,

which was considered impenetrable, broke through the weakly defended front line and trapped the Allied troops in a pocket. (Azéma – Wieviorka 2004, 18) Although many Allied troops trapped in Belgium were rescued from the ring by sea (Azéma – Bédarida 1993a, 79), the German advance could not be stopped. On 7 June, German troops broke through the French defenses on the Somme; on the 10th Paris was declared an open city (on the 14th the French capital fell), and the government fled south, while on the same day, Italy entered the war against France (although the latter's attack was stopped by French troops relying on the Alps) (Cointet 1996, 81-85).

The question was then whether France would continue the fight based on its colonies and navy or call for an armistice (Paxton 1973, 18-19), as there were many supporters of both positions within the French leadership. (Azéma – Wieviorka 2004, 32-34) In the end, the latter position prevailed, as in a few weeks, France suffered one of the most significant and most devastating defeats in its history: it lost its capital, and its army virtually ceased to exist (60,000 dead, 200,000 wounded, 1.6 million prisoners of war). (Azéma – Bédarida 1993a, 81) Consequently, on 17 June, the new government that replaced the Reynaud government, headed by the First World War hero Marshal Pétain, formally and publicly announced an armistice with the Germans[2] (and two days later with the Italians, who had not achieved any military success). The armistice agreement was signed on 22 June at Rethondes railway station in the forest of Compiègne. A similar agreement was signed with the Italians on 24 June (Jackson 2004 158-161).

The terms of the 24-article armistice treaty were tough but also surprisingly fair compared to the terms imposed on the other defeated countries. The French mainland was divided into two parts: the so-called northern zone with 24 million inhabitants (the northern territories and the Atlantic coast) was occupied by German troops. At the same time, the government of Pétain administered the southern part, which had 14 million inhabitants. The French had to bear the cost of the occupying army (400 million francs a day). Nevertheless, in principle, the French government exercised administrative authority over France. The French army was limited to 100,000 men, but this did not apply to the colonial forces stationed outside the mainland (several hundred thousand men), which could thus guarantee the defense of the colonies, which remained under French authority, against any external attack. The French fleet did not have to surrender to the Germans or disarmed, but the fleet units had to return to their stations in France and refrain from fighting German ships. The French prisoners of war had to remain in German prisoner of war camps until the conclusion of the peace treaty that ended the war. (Muracciole 2002, 65-67) Therefore, the armistice agreement was theoretically only a temporary one, to be replaced by a peace treaty shortly after the end of the conflict (Paxton 2004, 81), but this did not take place within the short time hoped for due to the development of the war.

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2   The call had a disastrous effect on the troops still fighting, who then surrendered en masse to the Germans, believing that the armistice had been concluded. This, of course, further weakened the position of the French government.

The new French government chose Vichy as its seat, as the small spa town with its hotels to accommodate incoming government employees seemed an ideal choice. (Cointet 1996, 104-105) The Head of the Government, Marshal Pétain, and one of his close associates, Pierre Laval, set a new course of action by proposing to reform the entire existing political system by drafting a new constitution. The two houses of the legislature adopted the proposal for a new constitution on 10 July by an overwhelming majority of 569 votes to 80, with 20 abstentions (Muracciole 2002, 71), and placed the legislative, executive, judicial, and administrative powers under the authority of a government headed by Marshal Pétain until the constitution was drawn up. (Azéma – Wieviorka 2004, 44-46) The members of the legislature hoped to reform the institutions and functioning of the spectacularly failed Third Republic. However, in doing so they promoted the creation of an authoritarian system that was intended to be temporary but in reality lasted four years without any legal counterweights (Jackson 2004, 167-170).

In the new system, which took the name of the French State, Pétain became the Head of State with executive and legislative powers, while Laval was initially given the post of Head of Government. In domestic politics, the new government worked to establish an undemocratic, authoritarian political system in the framework of the so-called National Revolution (*Révolution nationale*), which sought to exercise total control over the whole of society, on the model of the fascist states (Aron 1954, 217-247).

In foreign policy, the Laval line dominated the first months of the new regime. The Prime Minister was convinced that the war would end with Germany's victory in the short term and that thereafter, preparations would have to be made for political and economic cooperation in a German-led Europe. It was in this spirit that it was decided that relations between the two countries should be deepened, which would lead to a ‚relaxation' of the terms of the armistice and the conclusion of a more advantageous peace treaty (Cointet 1996, 115).

Since calm and, above all, time was needed to carry out the National Revolution, Marshal Pétain wanted to keep France out of the war, but he needed an agreement and a certain amount of support from the German side (Muracciole 2002, 171-172).This led, among other things, to the negotiations on 22 and 24 October 1940 in Montoire, where first Laval and then Pétain met Hitler. (Lambauer 2001, 205-209) During the negotiations, the Marshal committed to closer cooperation with Germany but refused to provide military support for the German war effort (Ormos-Majoros 1998, pp. 426-431).

The lack of at least a gesture of compensation disappointed the leading French political circles, which expected concrete concessions in return (Lambauer, 2001, pp. 265-270). The public mood was only somewhat soothed by the release and arrest of Laval on 13 December 1940, who became quite unpopular with the French population in a short time. His release was only secured through the intervention of the German authorities, who then transferred him to Paris, from where he did not return to Vichy until April 1942 (Muracciole 2002, 211-212).

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The arrival of Admiral Darlan marked the beginning of a new era in Franco-German relations. The military officer, who had previously held the post of Minister of the Navy, was appointed Head of Government on 9 February 1941 and soon afterward Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Interior. He succeeded Pierre-Étienne Flandin, who had held the post of Head of Government for a short period from 14 December 1940 to 9 February 1941. However, as the Germans refused to cooperate with him, a more suitable replacement had to be found for the politician who had recognized the situation and voluntarily resigned. By this move, the Marshal effectively put the management of French foreign policy and Franco-German relations in Darlan's hands (Azéma – Bédarida 1993a, 93).

Darlan was also convinced that Germany would soon win the war. At the same time, he believed that the French fleet, the second largest in Europe after the British (Paxton 1973, 112), and the colonial empire were trump cards in this game that France could play to secure its future status as a great power, possibly in place of the British, in post-war Europe (Cointet 1996, 186-187). The Germans welcomed the economic aspects of this (goods shipments to Germany were increasing rapidly). However, the preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union made them disinterested in French military cooperation, so French concessions were not followed by any concrete reciprocation from the German side for some time (Muracciole 2002, 216).

Negotiations continued, and Pétain met Göring on December 1. The French demands (facilitation of the crossing of the demarcation line, incorporation of the prohibited coastal zones into the free zone, release of prisoners of war, substantial reduction of the occupation costs, curbing of the activities of the collaborationist parties in Paris) were almost completely ignored, and a protocol was signed on 17 December 1941. In return, the French agreed to supply Rommel's troops through the territories under their control and, if they retreated as far as Tunisia, to take up arms to support them (Paxton 2004, 274). German interests thus triumphed once again, as the French could not improve their political or military positions meaningfully despite their growing commitment to the Axis powers.

At the beginning of 1942, Darlan was much less convinced of Germany's victory than he had been before due to the events of the war (German defeat outside Moscow, US entry into the war). Therefore, he emphasized waiting in his relations with the Germans. However, this did not please either the Germans or Marshal Pétain, and he was replaced on 18 April 1942 with Pierre Laval taking up the post of Head of Government again. The return to power of the former leader was preceded by serious diplomatic and domestic negotiations, during which the Germans made it clear that they wished to cooperate with Laval in the future (Jackson 2004, 259).

RETURN OF LAVALAND THE OPEN COLLABORATION

Even in 1942, Laval was convinced that Germany would emerge from the war as the master of the situation in Europe in the worst-case scenario, and he continued to do everything he could to deepen Franco-German relations. In his view, cooperation with the Germans was the best means of fighting communism and France's post-war recovery (Muracciole 2002, 182).

As the war dragged on longer than expected and the losses on the fronts increased, the Germans became increasingly interested in French labour, which, like the workers of the other subjugated states, was needed to maintain German industrial production. The Third Reich had been accepting French volunteers since 1941, luring them into German factories with the promise of higher wages than at home. By early 1942, however, it was clear that more than a few tens of thousands of people were needed, and negotiations began to intensify the use of French labor. The French side wanted to obtain the release of prisoners of war in exchange for the workers. However, the Germans were already employing them in agricultural and industrial production (Azéma – Wieviorka 2004, 252) and so only agreed to an exchange of one prisoner of war for three skilled workers (Azéma – Bédarida 1993b, 310). After several months of negotiations, on 4 September 1942, the Germans once again won a complete victory: the French government introduced the Service de travail obligatoire (compulsory work service), under which all adult men and women (the latter only near their place of residence) were obliged to perform work of a type and duration determined by the higher authorities (Crowdy 2007, 5).[3] In practice, this meant the transfer of young and skilled French men to the German war industry, which resulted in the number of Frenchmen working in Germany rising to over 300,000 by the beginning of 1943 and then steadily increasing in line with German needs (Azéma – Bédarida 1993b, 311-312) in addition to prisoners of war, a total of 650,000 French workers were employed by the German war industry. According to some estimates, in 1943, more than 8 percent of German GDP was produced by French citizens (Azéma – Wieviorka 2004, 99).

The Allied invasion of North Africa on 8 November 1942 fundamentally changed the situation in France. The most important event was the redeployment of the French army in North Africa, which resulted in the Germans crossing the demarcation line on 11 November and occupying the free zone. On 27 November, they disarmed the armistice army and attempted to seize the French flotilla stationed in Toulon, which, instead of resisting or disembarking, self-submerged (Jackson 2004, 270).

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3   Many fled compulsory work service and joined the Resistance rather than work in Germany, so this decision contributed greatly to the growth of the French Resistance movement.

THE FALL OF THE SYSTEM

France thus effectively lost the special status it had previously enjoyed among the countries occupied by the German army. With the complete occupation of the country, what remained of its sovereignty was lost. With the fleet's sinking and the colonial army's transfer, its former room for manoeuvre ceased to exist. From the end of 1942, France had also become just one of the annexed states of the German Empire, which had to carry out orders from Berlin (Cointet 1996, 274). If it did not comply with German demands, the German leadership was always ready to replace government members. This was also the case at the end of 1943, when more radical politicians, more open to meeting German demands, helped to bring to power the Vichy government (Giolitto 2002, 306-307). This system, however, was still under the control of Marshal Pétain, who could exert some influence on the members of the government but was not in a position to change the main political course (Broche – Muracciole 2017, 416-419).

At the same time, the loyalty of the French population to the government was shaken, which undermined the legitimacy of the political leadership. This was also felt by the German authorities, who increasingly involved extremist French political forces in government, whose leading members were ready to take over the country at any time. This possibility hovered over the French government like the sword of Damocles until the very last moment, even when, at the end of August 1944, they were transported to Sigmaringen Castle in Germany together with Marshal Pétain, who had to be forcibly transported to Germany, where he considered himself a prisoner (Azéma – Bédarida 1993b, 53). Here, on 6 September, the so-called *Délégation gouvernementale française pour la défense des intérêtes français* (French governmental delegation for the defense of French interests) was set up, which included several members of the extremist movements (Marcel Déat, Joseph Darnand) (Rousso 1984, 23, 112)

In France, after the Allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944, the number of attacks against the Germans and the French collaborators multiplied. As the liberation of the country's territory progressed, so did the number of these actions. The attacks, initially attributed to various resistance groups, were followed by various spontaneous mass movements, mainly against the French, who had compromised by collaborating with the German occupation authorities (Delperrié 1969, 552). The situation was made worse by the Communist Party's call for revenge, which led a section of society to join the armed reprisals. The executions often had little to do with politics. However, they were simply a means of avenging past grievances, plundering the local wealthier classes, or removing senior officials to promote hoped-for social advancement (Novick 1985, 127 and Venner 1975, 34-36). The exact number of victims of the purges that took place during the popular uprisings that co-

incided with the country's liberation is unknown. Even if the extreme figures suggested by political bias are discounted (which vary between 10 and 105 thousand), authoritative estimates put the number of victims of these excesses at around 11 thousand throughout France (Amouroux 1991, 104-105).

The provisional government's first meeting in Paris was held on 2 September 1944, so until then, it could only exercise strictly theoretical authority over France. What changed during this transitional period was that the local authorities, aware of the government's presence, were more careful to maintain a semblance of legality. So, by government decree of 26 June, military tribunals were set up to investigate collaborators so that at least a semblance of legality was introduced into the purge (Novick 1985, 143-144).

In Algeria, the French government has already begun legal proceedings against the political and military leaders of the Vichy regime, which it considers illegitimate, who have fallen into its hands. The first such case was brought on 4 March 1944 against former Interior Minister Pierre Pucheau, who was in Algeria because he wanted to join the new French army being formed as a reserve officer and participate in France's liberation (Novick 1985, 96-98). The situation was made even stranger by the fact that he had been working throughout his government to remove the Germans from the country. Not only did he have written evidence of this, but he was personally in contact with several people who were already senior members of the émigré government and army and could attest to this. None of this mattered, however, as Pucheau was considered guilty not for his actions but for his involvement in government affairs that was considered illegitimate. As a result, at the end of the trial, which proceeded very quickly, Pucheau was sentenced to total confiscation of his assets and the death penalty, which was carried out on 20 March (two weeks after the trial began). The trial, which was a conceptual one, sent a threatening message to the government in France. However, it had the opposite effect since, without a peaceful alternative, it only pushed the Vichy government even further toward collaboration with the Germans (Aron 1975, 6-12).

Two months later, the trial of the first senior military leader, Admiral Edmond Derrien, began. The admiral was the deputy to Admiral Jean-Pierre Esteva, the commander-in-chief of the French troops in Tunisia. He was accused of *not disobeying orders*.[4] The prosecution argued that the patriotic soldier should have known which orders to disobey and when in the spirit of the revolutionary tradition. The admiral, who had carried out orders to the letter, was sentenced to life imprisonment while acknowledging his previous merits (Régie 1975, 13-14). This was a direct continuation of the trial against Admiral Esteva, which was only carried out after the liberation of the motherland, as the admiral was sent home by the Germans by plane to France when the situation of the Axis troops in North Africa was beyond repair. The

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4   Author's emphasis.

charge against him was the same as that against his subordinate, which was paradoxical because the admiral's anti-German views, which he had widely expressed, were well known. Despite this, he was sentenced to life imprisonment, with confiscation of property and loss of civil rights, from which he was released only six years later, shortly before his death (Novick 1985, 271-272).

The trial of Marshal Pétain began on 23 July 1945. The 89-year-old Head of State decided to return to France on his initiative after learning that his trial was to be held in absentia. The Marshal arrived in France on 26 April, leaving his chateau in Germany and traveling to France via Switzerland. Two charges were brought against him: conspiracy to undermine national security and collusion with Germany as an enemy country. The elderly statesman offered no explanations or excuses, speaking only twice during the trial. At the very beginning, he explained that he was accountable only to heaven and posterity, and at the very end, he said:

"My life and my liberty are in your hands, gentlemen of the jury, but I leave my honor to my country. Judge me according to your conscience; mine is clear, for I declare, after a long life on the brink of death, that my only aim has been to serve France." (Michel 1972, 59)

Laval and Darnand were heard as witnesses during the trial, and a large amount of documentary evidence was used in the evidentiary proceedings. However, this did little to sway the jury, who were already convinced of Pétain's guilt before the trial, and no amount of testimony, even if favorable to the accused, would change their conviction. Consequently, no one was surprised that the Marshal was sentenced to death on 15 August, deprived of his civil rights, and his property confiscated (Azéma – Wieviorka 2004, 335) Although the Marshal did not ask for a pardon, the execution was not carried out because of his age, as De Gaulle, the Head of the Provisional Government, had pardoned him and reduced his sentence to life imprisonment, and the former Head of State was therefore kept in custody until he died in 1951 (Meyer 1975, 69-77).

The trial of Laval, who fled to Spain to escape prosecution, was then handed over to the French authorities, who were determined to convict one of the embodiments of the Vichy regime. In the run-up to the legislative elections, they wanted to conclude the trial quickly, so after a short investigation period, it was resumed between 4 and 9 October. There was no actual trial, Laval had no opportunity to produce witnesses or documents to prove his case, and on 9 September, he was sentenced to death, deprivation of his civil rights, and confiscation of his property. The execution took place on 15 October under the peculiar circumstances that the former Head of Government had taken poison on the morning of the execution. However, the dying man was nevertheless brought before a firing squad and executed (Brissaud 1975, 81-86).

Vichy's legacy

By its very nature, the new political order prioritized efficiency, which was also highly valued by the thinkers of the 1930s, so one of the most important issues was how to achieve it. The corporative system was a natural way of achieving this, replacing the trade unions with ‚natural' economic units that would make it possible to build a new, viable third way alongside liberalism and socialism. However, initially, there were several possible parallel implementation methods. The first was based on workers' participation in management, the second on the hegemony of employers, and the third on direct control by the state. Initially, it seemed that workers would emerge as the winners of the changes and that in the newly formed professional corporations, not only would their interests be protected, but they would also have the opportunity to participate in management. However, they were quickly disappointed when control remained in the hands of employers' representatives, while they were even deprived of the right to strike. However, the employers were not to rejoice in this success for long either, as the government took over the management of the corporations under the banner of efficiency to meet the ever-increasing industrial orders (mainly from the German occupation authorities), and the great experiment ended in disappointing failure. Instead of capitalist big business, the workers were exploited by an authoritarian government. In truth, the minimum wage was introduced to protect workers. Social insurance foundations were laid, which helped improve workers' financial situation, and these progressive measures were maintained after the war (Paxton 1973, 204-213).

Equally important was the social innovation of the old-age pension introduced in 1941, for which there had long been a strong demand from workers. The political leadership made many promises to introduce it, but it was the French State that finally did so. Its importance and popularity are illustrated by the fact that, after the end of the conflict, social security adopted it in its entirety (Paxton 1973, 324).

The political leadership also placed great emphasis on the education of the youth, with morality, physical work, and physical exercise as the declared main guidelines. In connection with this, among other measures, great emphasis was placed on promoting sporting activities for young people so that physical education, both in and out of school, played a major role in education. In this spirit, physical education was included in the school-leaving certificate and has been ever since. Although this move served the nationalist and militant aims of the system, it also played an important role in keeping young people healthy and improving their sporting performance. It was not removed from the school-leaving examination (Terfous 2010, 136-147).

The government, which had centralized executive power, also put policing on a new footing when it decided to merge the previously decentralized police organization into a single organization, the Police Nationale (National Police), in

August 1941. Under the authority of the Secretary General of the Police, it was responsible for the protection of national interests and the maintenance of order in cooperation with the gendarmerie. The structural reform, although inseparable from the political nature of the regime, led to greater efficiency, which the new post-war political regime also demanded, thus preserving the new police organization, which, with minor changes, still exists in France today (Cointet 1996, 212).

The identity card was introduced in October 1940 in connection with these centralization efforts. The innovation was not the identification document, which had already existed, but the fact that it became compulsory for all citizens over the age of 16 to obtain and use it in the identification procedure with the authorities. From 1942, the card also included a reference to Jewish origin, which made it very easy to forge the document to conceal those who wished to avoid the attention of the authorities (Jews, conscripts, resistance fighters). The identity card remained in use after the war, but from 1955 onwards, it was no longer compulsory but optional for French citizens (Desprairies 2012, 16-18).

The list of reforms that have stood the test of time and survived political regime changes could go on and on, listing less significant measures, but will be omitted to respect space constraints. However, the laws presented here give a good idea of the fact that the French State, which operated in a remarkable period and whose activities are generally rejected by French posterity as a whole because of their nature, implemented many reforms that proved useful and so forward-looking that they survived the fall of the regime and are still in force today, contributing to the emergence and long-term functioning of the France we know today.

SUMMARY

The Vichy regime wanted to create a new political, social, and economic order in the framework of the National Revolution, based on essentially right-wing ideologies, authoritarian, anti-democratic, corporatist, anti-Semitic, regionalist, reliant on the countryside as opposed to the cities, and based on the personal cult of the Marshal. The situation created by the defeat of the war acted as a catalyst for the promotion of these solutions, together with several measures (personality cult, anti-Semitism, etc.) which were not felt by a large part of French society but which it was only able to express its opposition to a limited extent.

This large-scale attempt at political-social transformation ultimately failed due to the foreign policy situation. However, many emerging results survived (and in part still live on today) in France. One of the primary explanations for this may be that the system, which used radical methods, in most cases, sought and offered answers to long-standing problems that various political and economic groups had worked on for a long time. As a result, these measures, whatever the nature of the system, provided real solutions to many problems and, therefore, survived in France after the fall of the French State and contributed to the modernization of the country's political, economic, and social structures.

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LANGUAGES OF AUTOCHTONOUS MINORITIES IN FRANCE IN THE SHADOW OF POWER

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Dialect is nothing else but a defeated language,
language is the dialect which proved to be the winner in politics.

(Louis-Jean Calvet)[2]

Abstract

The present study gives a short historical overview of the fate of French autochthonic minority languages parallel to the spreading, but in fact in the shadows, of French, the exclusive language of the French nation-state. By highlighting and briefly analysing some important historical crossroads the study aims at giving a comprehensive and clear picture of the minority language policy of one of the founding member states of the European Union. French language policy, just like the language policy of the other European states, has always been subject to power games of different political authorities. The example of minorities, living in the shadows of power and fighting for their survival, can also be instructive to Middle East Europe, primarily because even in Hungary only very few have a deep knowledge of this language ideology and practice.

Keywords: *minority languages, language rights, language laws, assimilation, diglossia*

INTRODUCTION

Almost Every country in Europe is characterized by linguistic and ethnical diversity. Despite this most of modern European nation-states recognize solely one language, that of the dominant ethnical group, as the official language and – apart from few exceptions – considers itself a monolingual state. The goal of every nation-state is the development of a common political identity, which assumes priority over the individual's ethnical identity, in order that this individual

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should primarily identify itself as a citizen of the nation-state and only secondly as a member of an ethnical, minority community.

Thinking of France today, very few will think of concepts such as „multilingual" or „minority". No wonder as the history of this country is a showcase of the consistent fight over centuries for a strong, homogeneous, and firm political national identity. The notion of nation-state itself, as a legal category is of French origin (Renan 1995,172). Still, at the beginning of the 20th century most of the French were bilingual: they spoke some regional, minority language (usually as the first language) and French. This diglossia, bilingual state was preceded by monolingualism, that is, most of the population spoke only the regional language, and they got socialized in this language. How did this monolingual French society become a French monolingual language community by the end of the 20th century?

LANGUAGE OF THE KING

It was the Renaissance king, Francis I. (1515-1547) who took the first step on the way to raising the French language to the position of „state language". French used to be just one of the dialects in the 16th century. However, it could not have become the common language, if the kings had not come from the Capeting-house between 987 and 1328, who were princes in and around Paris. As French was the regional language in this area, and monarchs of the dynasty tried to expand their power across the whole empire, the prestige of the king's language exceeded that of the others'.

The language of administration and jurisdiction had been Latin for centuries. However, Francis I. soon noticed that in order to be able to exercise power a language was needed, that everybody could understand and speak, which was worth learning as a token of social advancement. For this, French, the language of the king would be most suitable. Latin proved to be a serious competitor, but the values of humanism, the increase of the role of national languages in everyday life aided the king with his language political aspirations. In August 1539 with the cooperation of Chancellor Guillaume Poyet a decree of 192 acts came into existence with the goal of reforming church law. Act 111 of the decree prescribed the *compulsory usage of French in the field of law and administration*:

> *And as similar things (misunderstandings) often occur in connection with the interpretation of Latin words in decrees, from now on we want all decrees or proceedings from the Supreme Court or from courts of first instance, whether a memorandum, report of investigation, contract, letter of credence, legal transaction and notification or anything connected to these, to be uttered, written down or delivered to the interested parties in French mother tongue and in no other way.* Bárdosi V. – Karakai, I. 1996, 423.

The royal decree did not only intend to put an end to the autocracy of Latin but also to that of regional languages, primarily that of Provençale, which was considered the main rival of French. Nobles of Provance objected to this, of course, but in vain. Although not from one day to the other, this decree started a process, because of which French succeeded the other regional languages. First it became the language of only the elite, the nobles, the chosen few, then gradually that of all subjects, although this process took much longer than expected.

ONE NATION – ONE LANGUAGE

The language policy of the French Revolution can be divided into three vastly different periods. The period between 1789 and 1792 can be characterized by a relatively tolerant language policy that accepted or endured the language usage of the minority. The second period, between 1792-1794, was famed for its radical decrees of the Jacobin dictatorship, aiming at the exclusiveness of the French language, while the last period, between 1795-1806, was the language policy of the era after the fall of the Jacobins and Napoleon's time. (Brunot 1927)

The Revolution brought a decisive change in the lives of regional languages. The king's language, French, became the language of the Revolution, Freedom, the Declaration of Human and Civil Rights, that is, the language of the Republic. The nation, organized around democratic and republican principles, developed a new notion of the native country, which needed new words and expressions. The flame of the Republic started from Paris, but it swept across the whole of France, and what would it have become without the enthusiastic patriots of the country, who marched towards the capital singing the Marseillaise?

Right from the beginning, there had been a debate among the delegates in the National Assembly about the language of the "unified and undivided" Republic and the respect for regional languages. After the outbreak of the Revolution the spreading of the current ideas was crucial in the country. Before the Jacobin dictatorship leaders of the Revolution strived to familiarize people with the revolutionary ideas all over the country. The language policy of the Revolution was Liberal and tolerant in the beginning, the Constituent National Assembly, the Convent ordered the decrees to be translated into all the regional languages in June 1790. However, the Revolution did not have enough skilled translators, and even for the few experts, it caused enormous problems in translating the laws formulated in literary French into the regional languages, as they lacked the most important expressions of modern life. Not to mention that civil servants openly or secretly tried to sabotage this work. As a result of this, some changes were made. In 1791, the first attack started, aimed at primary education.

At the outbreak of the Revolution, French, as a native language, was still only spoken by one in ten citizens, and there was still a high number of people around the country who did not speak this language at all. While the first decrees made it possible for the regional languages to be involved in the political events, even in these times there were serious opponents to the endurance of minority languages, like Talleyrand, who wanted to ban these languages from schools:

Primary schools are going to end this peculiar inequality: the language of the Constitution and the laws is going to be taught in them to everybody, the mass of decayed dialects, constituting the last remnants of feudalism is doomed to disappear demanded by the coercive power of matters. Walter 1988, 116.

The situation became more serious with the external and internal threats to the Revolution, the Jacobins modified their language policy: emphasis was no longer on everybody reading the decrees in their own language, but on that everybody should be able to speak the language of the Revolution. In several sources cases are mentioned, when Jacobin functionaries complained in their reports that they did not know the local language, did not understand the habits of the people, so they were not able to work with the proper efficiency. From the point of view of dialects, the final blow came with the Vendée-uprising in 1793, as the royalist attack against the Jacobin regime started in Bretagne, where the Breton language was still quite a living one. Following this Paris placed an equality sign between speakers of the dialect and counter-revolutionaries, that is, enemies of the Revolution speak regional languages. Barère best elaborated on the standpoint of the Jacobins. In the Convent he summarized in a long speech why it was necessary for the languages of the people in France to disappear and why everybody should speak exclusively French. This is the most beautiful language of Europe. Human and civil rights were first born in this language throughout the entire world, and ideas of freedom spread in this language, but it is still not the language of the entire public. In France, several nations live within one nation and the individual languages constitute barriers among them. The most important task of education, therefore, is to instruct people French. Ignorance is the seedbed of counter-revolution. Thus, Barère argued in the National Assembly:

Federalism and superstition speak Breton, emigration and hatred against revolution German, counter-revolution Italian and fanaticism Bask.

Then he added:

Let us destroy these tools of fault and damage (…). The language of a free nation is the same for everybody. De Certeau et al. 1975, 294.

In the meanwhile, *Abbe Grégoire,* bishop of Blois had been conducting his survey for four years, having started his enormous work in August 1790, doing a questionnaire survey throughout the whole country about dialects in France (patois). He presented the results of his work on 16 June 1794 to the Convent. The report had the meaningful title: *Report about the necessity to destroy dialects and tools of this and about rendering the usage of French universal.*

The report is an accurate diagnosis of the linguistic diversity of the age, which must be discontinued because the only language worth surviving is French. The situation is serious and urgent, as of the twenty-five million strong French population at least 6 million, predominantly country "citizens" do not speak French at all. Dialects are poor, they resist translation, pulling back the work of the local functionaries of the Revolution. They also make the development of agriculture impossible, as not even farmers understand each other.

Abbe Grégoire lengthily discusses the disadvantages of using dialects and as a conclusion he says:

> *Of all that we have said it is to be concluded that in order to exterminate prejudices, to help develop all kinds of truths, talents and virtues and so that every citizen should become one in the huge mass of the nation and that the political mechanism should become simpler and the operation of the political machinery easier, all should speak the one and only language.* De Certeau et al. 1975, 300.

Because of the report the usage of French was strengthened in more decrees, functionaries using dialects, as an example, could be sentenced to 6 months in prison by the power of laws passed in July 1794.

After the fall of the Jacobins some concessions were made regarding the use of minority languages. But regional languages continued to remain tools of informal language usage. The Corsican born Napoleon, who had never perfectly spoken French, his second language, which he learnt to obtain power, did not prove to be a supporter of minority languages. Although he was not a sworn enemy of regional languages, his wars proved to be melting pots in the creation of national unity. The language of the Napoleonic army became French, even if there were separate corps, where soldiers were allowed to use their native language, like Alsatians, who, though they spoke Alsatian, fought for Napoleon in French.

LANGUAGES OF THE BOURGEOIS FRANCE

Following the Revolution, nationalities in bourgeois France would have had great difficulties, even if they had had leadership imbued with a national-nationality consciousness. In the melting pot of industrial development, Breton, Basque, Catalan, and Occitan country youths melted into the French nation through as-

similation, thus taking over the French language and customs. This natural assimilation was helped by nationalist propaganda. Modern bourgeois nationalism could first win great masses in the army, an organization most efficiently helping assimilation.

As regards education in bourgeois France, schoolbooks were written in French, and authorities did all they could to make nationalities in the country French in their language. Regional languages did not develop in this period. Unfortunately, leading personalities of regional language speakers migrated, moved to bigger cities and capitals, and separated from their languages, the culture, and the customs of their regions.

By the middle of the 20th century, illiteracy had ended in Bretagne, but this was combined with the Breton language being forced into the background, French being the language of education.

Typically for the age, even during the break, schoolchildren were allowed to speak only French, and the ones using dialects were severely punished; this was the plaque or symbol. This meant that when a child said something in his mother tongue instead of French, he got a shoe hung around his neck or was given a pebble or a stick, which he could only get rid of if another child gave himself away. Then, the object was transferred to this child. At the end of the school day, the child who had the object usually had to do some cleaning chores.

In Bretagne, notices were posted on the walls of schools: Spitting on the floor and speaking Breton are forbidden! (Bárdosi V. – Karakai, I. 1996, 109).

As parents clearly saw the strong connections between social advancement and eliminating regional languages, they supported the teachers.

However, even in these times there were people who realized that the destruction of regional languages meant the impoverishment of a common national heritage, so they tried to do something against it. Among them was a certain *Charles de Gaulle,* uncle of the general president. He and some well-intentioned linguists worked out a plan to save regional languages.

The plan of the linguists dealt with six regional languages, Provencal, Basque, Breton, Flemish, Alsatian and Corsican. They proposed that teachers in primary education should be allowed to use local languages while they were teaching French, and they also suggested that books in the listed languages should be published as well as to make it possible for pupils to learn how to read and write correctly in their mother tongue. They wanted these languages to be taught in secondary schools and to be included among school-leaving examination subjects. They urged for departments to be set up at universities, where the literature, history and language of the nationalities could be researched and taught. The proposal of De Gaulle and his companions never even got an answer from the competent authorities.

One significant language political measure stood out in the 19th century, the one connected to the educational secretary, *Jules Ferry,* who introduced free,

compulsory, and secular education between 1880 and 1886. Equal opportunities were in view everywhere, and uniform curricula and programs were developed in the common language, French, of course. The French language central school system led the way to social advancement.

At the beginning of the 20th century, World War I. dealt a serious blow to minority languages. At the beginning of the war, novices were organized into regiments of soldiers recruited from one region where they could speak their native language. Towards the end of the war, however, these regiments were reorganized, and the soldiers were transferred into separate regiments, so they were forced to speak French to each other, and by and by, they got out of the habit of using their native language.

Typically, during World War I. 240 000 Bretons were killed, twice as many as recruits from other historical areas of France. In the beginning recruiting posters were printed in Breton as well, but later, during the war some officials and military courts of the French army forgot that not all Bretons could speak French and several Breton soldiers were executed, whose primary offence was that they did not understand commands.

CENTRALIZATION VERSUS REGIONS

After World War II the fight for supporting minority languages awakened. What was this interest in minority languages and cultures to be thanked for after such a long silence? The reason for this obviously lies in the strengthening of aspirations for regionalization. Although the referendum about regionalism called by President De Gaulle in 1969 brought the fall of the movement, the government was concerned about the dissatisfaction of the regions and was forced to make concessions in favour of the regions.

After these laws rendering the education of minority languages feasible were passed one by one, association schools were established, where education could be pursued in minority languages, but all this came too late. France today is one of the European countries that did not ratify the *Regional and Minority Chart of the European Commission,* which for newly joining member countries was a compulsory condition. This country is a classic example of a tight connection between language and power. For centuries, France did everything in its power to bring the hegemony of the French language into existence, and it cannot be stated that it would have strived to select among tools to reach it. The principle of one nation – one language has been deeply rooted in French society's different strata ever since the Revolution. Unfortunately, the fact that, nowadays, Europe is marching towards multiculturalism and multilingualism has not changed this principle. Although there are still people in France who speak minority languages, the triumphal procession of the French national language has been completed by now; its hegemony is unquestionable.

INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION

On 19 June 2008, the daily paper *Libération* was published with the headline: "The Senate refused the addition of regional languages in the Constitution."[3] Have debates over still existing minority languages fighting for their survival flamed up again nine years after the failed ratification of the Chart? No, of course, it is about something different. That social debate slowly cooled off, and although within the European Union, some criticism of France was to be heard about its attitude towards the ratification of the Chart, at the beginning of the 21st century, this issue did not seem that significant anymore. There would have been no trouble had a group of members of parliament not put forward a bill in the House of Representatives *(Assemblée nationale)* in May 2008, the core of which was to extend clause two of the Constitution in the following way:

> *The language of the Republic is French, with respect to regional languages, which constitute part of our heritage.* [4]

In the justification of the bill the representatives referred to languages and cultures being threatened and they emphasized the importance of preserving languages, which is a common goal in Europe. In the justification, of course, the importance of ratifying the European Chart is mentioned, as well, to which there would be no more constitutional barriers after the acceptance of the bill, and nine years after signing it, at last, this document could be sanctioned in France, too. After a long debate, the House of Representatives finally passed the bill, with the consent and backing of most representatives from both the right and left. After so many years, the ice seemed to break. Rachida Dati, Minister of Justice in the new right-wing government, whose debate about the reform of judicature involved this issue, agreed that after the approval of the Senate the Constitution should be modified in line with these ideas. The press was full of articles about the *found prestige of regional languages,* minority representatives were glad, and everybody was satisfied.

French democracy, however, works in a two-chamber system, that is, all bills have to be submitted to the Senate and voted for, so the final decision lies in the hands of senators. Senators, though, voted 216 against 103 for this amendment to have no place in the Constitution. Protocols of the debate in the Senate can be read on the homepage, and even recordings prove that the debate was not free of personal remarks and there was a lot of resistance. The amendment was not only voted against by the right-wing but by radicals and communists, as well. Several people argued that the purity of the French should be protected rather than bringing back the shadows of the past. In vain did Rashida Dati ar-

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3   https://www.liberation.fr/france/2008/06/19/langues-regionales-le-senat-est-un-frein-a-la-moderni-te_21376/

4   https://www.senat.fr/seances/s200805/s20080513/s20080513001.html

gue for the acceptance of the bill, in vain did they have the backing of socialists. The French Academy also immediately asked to speak and called attention to the fact that this amendment would be an attack on national identity. The circle closed again.

Unfortunately, in 2011 the situation is still where it was decades ago, Claude Allègre's fear from disrupting the national unity in any way, is so deeply rooted in the French society that it gives serious worries about the survival of regional languages and cultures.

Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, in his campaign speech on 9 March 2007 announced:

> *If I am elected President of the Republic, I will not support the signing of the Chart of Regional Languages.* [5]

No positive shift can be expected in the current political situation, either.
The language and political slogan of France is still unchanged:

> *Come brother, your dissimilarity enriches me, but also for you it would be better, if you became like me, as soon as possible!* Étienne 1999, 43.

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5   https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/165843-declaration-de-m-nicolas-sarkozy-ministre-de-linter-ieur-et-de-lamena

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San Marino: Independence, Autonomy, Nationalidentity

Klára Siposné Kecskeméthy[1]

ABSTRACT

San Marino is the oldest republic in the world. The ministate has maintained its independence and national identity for more than 1,700 years. The parliamentary republic can trace its history back to the time of Emperor Diocletian. Throughout its long history, there have been countless attempts to suppress its independence and territorial integrity, but each time it has defended its autonomy in the complex balance of power between the city-states of Italy. It has safeguarded its autonomy, national character, traditions, and identity despite European integration efforts beyond nation-states. In a diverse Europe, San Marino occupies a special position because it serves as an example of the road to European integration for all those heading for the future of Europe.

Keywords: autonomy, independence, parliamentary republic, Great and General Council, European integration

INTRODUCTION

In a very diverse Europe, mini-states occupy a special place because of their size, their specific relations with neighboring countries, and their feudal, medieval political character; we might think that they are a kind of relic. However, perceptions are deceiving because in these small countries, both in international political life and in their economic relations, modern 21st-century conditions prevail. Andorra, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, San Marino, and the Vatican have preserved their independence over the centuries.

San Marino is the oldest republic in the world, still existing today, and the only surviving Italian city-state, is a small „island" in the heart of Italy. It is the third-smallest country in Europe after Vatican City and Monaco, and it is the

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fifth-smallest country in the world. San Marino (Serenissima Repubblica di San Marino) is the world's second-smallest republic after Nauru. San Marino is a land-locked country located in central Italy, on the eastern slopes of the Apennines. This independent republic is surrounded by Italy and has a 7 km border. Its capital is San Marino. San Marino has a perfectly protected strategic location, which is why it is also known as a country nestled on a rocky hilltop. The 61 km² country is dominated by the central limestone massif of Monte Titano, each of the three peaks guarded by a medieval tower. The three towers are enshrined in the state's coat of arms, a classic symbol of the ancient state. La Rocca, La Cesta, and Il Montale are the three towers; citadels were built in the second half of the 14th century for defensive purposes. The historic center of San Marino and 739-meter high Mount Titano was a designated World Heritage Site in 2008, covering an area of 7 km². According to the justification, San Marino is one of the oldest republics in the world and the only remaining Italian city-state. It represents an important stage in the development of democratic models in Europe and worldwide.[2] Its long continuity is due to its strategic location at Mount Titano's top and its legal and institutional functions. San Marino has a widely recognized iconic status as a symbol of a free city-state.

San Marino has a population of 35 095 (2024 July) and a population density of 1699 inhabitants per km². The population has one of the highest life expectancies in Europe (85 years). The working-age population is high, with 14% under 15 and 21.5% over 65. 98% of the population live in cities. Almost the entire population is Roman Catholic (95%). The official language is Italian.

History of San Marino

The history of the small republic dates to the time of Emperor Diocletian. According to tradition, San Marino was founded in 301. Legend says that the country's founder was a mason named Marino, who fled Dalmatia to find refuge on Mount Titano to escape Christian persecution. The community gradually grew and eventually became a self-governing territory. The republic is named San Marino in memory of its founder. The earliest authentic source refers to it as a mountain castle in an 8th-century text. The first authentic historical reference to San Marino is found in the bull of Pope Honorius II of 1126, which mentions the parish and castle of San Marino.

San Marino sided with the Ghibellines in the great medieval struggles between the Popes and the German-Roman emperors, for which Pope Innocent IV cursed it with an ecclesiastical curse in 1247. By this time, San Marino was a republic, and its authority and power were gradually growing, so the other peninsula states sought to allay themselves with it (Kmety 1928). Numerous attempts have been made to curtail the ministate's independence, but each time its autonomy has

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2   San Marino Historic Centre and Mount Titano, https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1245/. Downloaded 11. 11. 2024.

been defended/preserved in the complex power relations between the Italian city-states. San Marino was in the crosshairs of the papacy's territorial expansion for centuries. It has constantly fought for its independence against the conquering ambitions of the surrounding lords and the Papal States. Only in 1739 did the Legate Alberoni succeed in capturing San Marino in the name of the Pope, but the rebellion that broke out after the invasion led Pope Clement XII to declare the ministate independence again in 1740.

In 1797, during his victorious campaign in Italy, Napoleon offered his „friendship" and promised the extension of the country's territory (Rimini, Pesaro and the whole of Romagna), but the ministate refused it. San Marino did not want to be bigger than it was in its second millennium. We were small, and we will remain small, was San Marino's response (Vásárhelyi 1930). Napoleon finally recognized the independence of the small republic. After the fall of Napoleon, Metternich respected the independence of the small state, and the Congress of Vienna in 1815 confirmed and formally recognized the autonomy, independence, and neutrality of San Marino (Rózsa 1957).

In 1849, during the Italian War of Independence, the revolutionaries led by Garibaldi broke out of the siege and fled to San Marino. On 22 March 1862, San Marino signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Kingdom of Italy, which was renewed several times over the years. This treaty guaranteed that the Italian army would come to San Marino's aid in the event of an external threat.

In May 1915, San Marino joined Italy in declaring war on the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany, Bulgaria, and Turkey. The tiny republic participated in the Great War, with the 15-strong San Marino „expeditionary force" fighting on the Italian side. At the end of the war, when the peace negotiations began, San Marino also sent delegates to Versailles and Trianon, so San Marino signed the peace treaties.

The mini-state had two primary sources of income: tourism and stamps. The country issued (and still issues) a series of stamps yearly, and the sale of these stamps worldwide sustained the state budget.[3] In 1920, however, neither tourism nor the stamp business was doing well, and the state treasury could not raise the funds needed for the trip to Sévres. The delegates' trip to France was canceled, and San Marino did not sign the Turkish peace treaty. Two decades later, it was discovered that the two countries were still at war because no one had thought of ending the otherwise insignificant situation (Paál 1938).

During the Second World War, San Marino experienced a short period of heavy fighting. On 21 September 1944, nine days after the German invasion of the country, San Marino declared war on Germany. The next day, British forces liberated the country's capital. During the war, tens of thousands of refugees were sheltered, many Sanmarinese fought on the side of the Italian partisans, the Allied air force bombed the San Marino railway station. It destroyed the only railway line between San Marino and Rimini, which linked the city to Italy. [4]

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3   Divisione Filatelica Numismatica San Marino, https://www.ufn.sm/en. Downloaded 18. 11. 2024.

4   Miért üzent hadat San Marino a tengelyhatalmaknak? 1944, Magyarság, 25. évf. 223. szám, 11.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE POLITICALSYSTEM

San Marino is a parliamentary republic with one of the oldest constitutions in the world. The Constitution of San Marino was adopted on 8 October 1600 by the Grand and General Council (Consiglio Grande e Generale), which codified the first written constitution of the Republic, dating back to 1295. The bodies created at that time are still in operation today, such as the Arengo, the Great and General Council, the Capitans Regent (i Capitani Reggenti), the Council of Twelve (Consiglio dei XII) and the Syndicates of Government (Sindaci di Governo).

The backbone of San Marino's constitution has been the Arengo for centuries. Arengo – the assembly of heads of families – was the name of the assembly that governed San Marino from the 5th century until 1243. It was composed of the heads of the great families of San Marino. The Arengo had no leader or permanent assembly. This made San Marino unique in its era: it was a state without a head of state. The Arengo was paralyzed by feuds between the great families, and by the early 13th century it was dysfunctional. So, the citizens of San Marino decided to elect their assembly, which they called the Great and General Council. In 1243, the Pope, nominally the ruler of San Marino, made the Great and General Council the supreme body of San Marino.

In the early 1600s, the Council, while recognizing the Arengo's prerogatives on paper, stripped it of its activities, and did not convene for some three centuries. Convened on 25 March 1906, the Arengo resumed its former prerogatives. The citizens were asked whether the system of lifetime appointments of councilors to the Great and General Councils should be continued. The proposal was rejected by 90.65% of voters. Another question asked was whether the councils' size should be proportional to the population of the communities they represent. This was supported by 94.89% of citizens. The country's first democratic elections were held on 10 June 1906, resulting in the first directly elected parliament in history. [5] To commemorate this remarkable event, San Marino celebrates the „Arengo" on 25 March each year.

The Great and General Council, which functions as unicameral parliament, is the legislative body of the mini-state, and its members are elected every five years. Its powers include issuing laws and regulations, ratifying treaties and conventions, and appointing diplomatic representatives and consuls. The Council also exercises the power of pardon, amnesty, and rehabilitation and appoints public officials and judges. Among its members it elects the two Captains Regent, the State Congress, the Council of Twelve, the Mayor and members of the Budget Committee. The Parliament appoints two of its own members as Governors Regent, elected for six-month terms, who are the heads of state. The Captains Re-

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[5]   Anniversary of the 'Arengo' in San Marino in 2023, https://www.officeholidays.com/holidays/san-marino/anniversary-of-the-arengo. Downloaded 21. 11. 2024.

gent can only be re-elected after three years. The two Captains Regent take office in a ceremonial act on 1 April and 1 October (Kmety 1928, Vásárhelyi 1930). They share a throne, on which is inscribed "Animus in consulted libero"; the soul is free in deliberation. They preside over the Grand and General Councils, the Council of the Twelve and the Congress of States, propose bills and represent San Marino in its foreign relations. They act corporately, making decisions unanimously. Two Secretaries of States (foreign affairs and the interior) and secretaries in charge of other ministries assist them. Traditionally, the minister of foreign affairs held the post of prime minister. The Captains Regent and the cabinet form the backbone of the executive. The members of the Great and General Council elect the Council of the Twelve, which performs civil, judicial, and administrative functions. In the Parliament building (Palazzo Pubblico di San Marino) Captains Regent hold monthly hearings. Since 1960, all adult citizens, including women, have had the right to vote. Since 1973, women have also been able to hold public office (Bird 1993). A peculiarity is that the ministate was governed by a left-wing coalition led by the Communist Party of San Marino between 1945 and 1957. The repercussions of the 1956 events in Hungary damaged the Communist Party's reputation. In September-October 1957, a constitutional crisis was triggered when the Socialist Party dissolved the governing coalition (Paár 2021).

San Marino is divided into nine districts (castelli), also cities. These are Acquaviva, Borgo Maggiore, Chiesanuova, Domagnano, Faetano, Fiorentino, Montegiardino, San Marino (Città di San Marino), Serravalle. All these towns are neighboring Italy. The two most populous cities are Serravalle and the capital San Marino.

Education is compulsory up to the age of 14. The Università degli Studi di San Marino was founded in 1985. Another important institution of higher education is the International Academy of San Marino (Akademio Internacia de la Sciencoj San Marino, Italian: Accademia Internazionale delle Scienze San Marino), whose official language is Esperanto. Free medical care is available to citizens. There is one main road (SS72) in the country, branching off the Italian motorway E55 from Tarvisio to Brindisi, and there are several smaller minor roads. San Marino has one of the shortest railway lines in the world, its length is only 800 meters. Another notable feature of the country is the 300-meter-long cable car that connects the capital with Borgo Maggiore.

Almost half of the citizens live abroad, but many Italians live in San Marino, where taxes are lower than in Italy, and many companies have moved their headquarters to San Marino. Traditionally, most of the population worked in agriculture and quarrying, but today, tourism is at the heart of the economy. San Marino stamps are in great demand among stamp collectors worldwide (Siposné-Kecskeméthy, Nagy 1997). The bulk of the government's revenue came from the sale of postage stamps, worldwide sales, and the annual budget subsidy paid by the Italian state under its 1862 treaty with the Kingdom of Italy. San Marino received budget support for the Italian state monopoly on salt and tobacco. The ministate

also agreed not to print its currency, not to open a radio or television broadcasting station and gambling facilities (Bird 1993). Despite the vast expected profits, San Marino has never allowed casinos to operate on its territory. San Marino has a small merchant fleet based in the Italian port of Rimini.

San Marino maintains diplomatic relations (it had an envoy in Rome as early as 1609). It has consular relations with a number of countries, including the United States of America. Diplomatic relations were established 163 years ago, in 1861. On 7 May 1861, President Abraham Lincoln wrote a letter to the Captains Regent accepting the offer of honorary citizenship. The republic maintains permanent observer representation at the United Nations Permanent Mission in Geneva, the European Intergovernmental Committee on Migration, and the International Labour Organisation. San Marino has signed the Outer Space Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is a member of UNESCO, the World Health Organisation, the International Court of Justice, the International Red Cross, the Universal Postal Union, the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations, the International Union of Official Tourism Organizations, and the International Relief and Works Agency, among others.

San Marino has had a knighthood since 1859; the so-called Order of the Knights of San Marino and the Order of the Republic of San Marino (Ordine Equestre Civile e Militare di San Marino) were founded on 13 August 1859. Many heads of state and government have received this honor (Hieronymussen 1967). [6]

San Marino has been a member of the Council of Europe since 1988 and of the United Nations since 1992. San Marino signed a Customs Union and Cooperation Agreement with the European Commission on 4 July 1991, after which it formally joined the European Community Customs Union on 16 December. The ministate is also part of the EU's Economic Union. The Republic of San Marino has used the euro as its national currency since 1 January 2002 under a monetary agreement with the European Union. Among the euro coins issued in San Marino, until 2016 the Statue of Liberty (La Statua della Libertà) also appeared on the two-cent euro coins. Since 2017, the city gate has been shown on the new coin. Before introducing the euro, San Marino used the lira as its national currency under a monetary agreement with Italy.[7] The special feature of the San Marino lira is the low number of coins issued, which makes it attractive to coin collectors.

The ministate significantly developed tourism in the second half of the 20th century. Thanks to this and favorable taxation, it became one of the wealthiest states in Europe. San Marino is much more developed and richer than its Italian neighboring territories. Strong tourism accounts for more than 50% of the country's GDP, with more than 3 million tourists visiting the country annually.

6   San Marino: Order of San Marino, https://www.medals.org.uk/san-marino/san-marino001.htm. Downloaded 25. 11. 2024.

7   San Marino and the euro, https://www.bcsm.sm/site/en/home/international-relations/san-marino-towards-europe/san-marino-and-the-euro.html. Downloaded 25. 11. 2024.

San Marino has no regular armed forces, its defence is provided by Italy. Military service is compulsory for all men between the ages of 16 and 51, but teachers and students are exempt. The Guard of the Castle (Guarda di Rocca) performs ceremonial duties alongside the Captains Regent, which is great entertainment for tourists. Public order is maintained by the Gendarmerie.

SUMMARY

The existence and survival of the autonomous statehood of European mini-states (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, San Marino and Vatican City) have been determined by different geographical factors, societal and state-building geographic forces.

Specific political formations were created: Andorra is a parliamentary co-princedom, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Monaco are constitutional monarchies, San Marino and Malta are parliamentary republics, and the Vatican is a sovereign bishopric and electorate. We can ask whether mini-states have the right to exist in a unifying Europe.

European political and economic integration does not/cannot mean uniformity, merging into European „greyness", giving up national identity. On the unifying continent, everyone can preserve their traditions and national and cultural characteristics, which are determined by their geographical location and the peculiarities/specificities of their centuries-old history. The Republic of San Marino is an example of how to represent sovereignty in a globalized world without giving up our cultural heritage, traditions, and historical memory. In San Marino, patriotism, freedom, and independence go hand in hand with real politics that considers regional and global conditions and adapts to the international space, relations, and conditions. Still, it is also linked to neighboring Italy and the European Union through its economic ties.

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FROM THE PANDEMIC TO QUANTUM, AT THE DAWN OF A PARADIGM SHIFT

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ABSTRACT

The term "pandemic" in the title is merely a milestone of an era, a symbolic starting point of a possible paradigm shift; therefore, the study does not directly undertake an analysis of the COVID world. The study focuses on potential future(s) based on the proposition that humanity faces an unprecedented political, economic, ethical, and spiritual challenge. The author believes that two paradigm shifts will occur in the history of humankind in rapid succession and humanity can only prepare for these changes if they understand the prospective future(s) that await us. The author proposes a meme paradigm shift and addresses super-artificial intelligence as one of the possible future actors.

Keywords: *quantum, AI, paradigm shift, ethics, politics*

INTRODUCTION[2]

The term "pandemic" in the title reflects only a "milestone," the symbolic starting point of a possible paradigm shift. We can assess the emotional power of the custody change envisioned in Covid 19, the work of Schwab-Malleret (2020) Covid 19, which not only sparked the most influential and provocative socio-political debates but generated a very strong emotional response in the world outside of academia. It is important to note that the conference's purpose was to present the research and processes related to economic, political, ethnic, and cultural autonomy both in Hungary and internationally, and to allow space for relevant related scientific ideas as well. The term "quantum" in the title is not without precedent in Hungarian

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social science, after Elemér Hankiss (1928-2015) opened the door wide, figuratively speaking, for the terminus techniques. Humanity's self-destruction due to its fascination with technology has been a permanent part of the scientific and social discourse, even if only tangentially since the 19th century. Notable thinkers (Baudelaire, Nietzsche, T.S. Eliot, Camus, Hobsbawm, Lorenz) consider the new challenges facing humanity terrifying. Hankiss (2018) agrees, but he identifies a glimmer of hope, a new framework of interpretation, which he linked to the world of quantum. In Miszlivetz's (2018) interpretation, Hankiss, based on the results of quantum sciences, saw the possibility of a new dialogue and tried to find a new framework of interpretation in the age of disillusionment in Western civilization that left humanity searching without answers.

The study's purpose is to examine humanity's possible future(s). Based on careful analysis of the past and present, the author hypothesizes that humanity is faced with unprecedented political, economic, ethical, and spiritual challenges that could greatly affect the issue of autonomy.

The author employs different methodologies in his analysis. He relies on the historical (genetic) critical method. Although many people consider this form of mapping outdated, Beyme (1992) points out its existing advantages. In addition, he employs the institutionalist methodology recommended by both Lowndes (2002) and Beyme, as well as the interpretive method (Bevir, Rhodes 2002). The three methodologies strengthen and complement each other, allowing the topic to be fully explored and developed.

TECHNOLOGY – HISTORY – SOCIETY

The history of humanity can be described as permanent technological progress, and this history reaches its climax when man loses his ability to advance further. The author accepts as an axiom that the main engine and goal of technological development is to improve the quality of human life, at least to improve the quality of life of certain elite groups, which, according to more optimistic interpretations, may spill over to the broader social groups and then to the whole of humanity. Kaku (2006), a theoretical physicist, identifies the exponential growth of humanity's knowledge and energy as a characteristic of human civilization, which he proves by the fact that the depth of our scientific knowledge has doubled every 10-20 years since World War II. Human history can also be interpreted as a chronology of paradigms and paradigm shifts. Technological periods or eras and paradigm shifts often go hand in hand. The scope of this study does not allow us to analyze each technological era in depth. However, we can persuasively show that each technological era is becoming shorter and shorter. Remember how long it took to get from the ancient inventions of Ctesibius to 1624, the first patent law, Isaac Newton's law describing gravity, and then to the first machine of the Industrial Revolution, James Watt's steam-powered machine, which he patented in 1769. It is significant that Beck (2019, 21) calls the people of the era the first 'clueless generation".

The permanent development of the second industrial revolution culminated in the understanding of the electromagnetic interaction described by Maxwell and the development of assembly line work, followed by the harvesting of nuclear power and then the third industrial revolution with the world of computers and Internet-based IT systems and the emergence of mass production.

Schwab (2016), a prominent theorist of the World Economic Forum, emphasizes the role of intelligence instead of body strength during the Fourth Industrial Revolution and focuses on a future where artificial intelligence takes over human intelligence. According to Schwab (2016), Kuosmanen–Tero (2021), and Csepeli (2020), the boundary between physical, biological, and digital-virtual reality is already blurred here, where the Internet of Things (IOT), cyber-physical systems, and artificial intelligence will be the determining factor, where the data-driven industry will easily facilitate not only mass production but the production of unique product as well.

It is worth noting that no consensus has been reached in the academic debate yet about where one phase of the industrial revolution begins or ends. Schwab (2016) dates the First Industrial Revolution between 1760-1840, the Second from the end of the 19th century to the early 20th century, the Third from the beginning of the 1960s, and the Fourth from the turn of the 21st century onwards. Beck (2019) puts the start of the Third Industrial Revolution as 1995 but emphasizes that some people find it in 1969, while he seriously debates the start year of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. He argues that the 1990s, 2008, 2010, and 2014 are equally good options and emphasizes that some doubt it has even begun.

Schwab (2016) links the emergence of the terminus technicus "Industry 4.0" to the Hanover Fair 2001, and the German government adopted this concept into its policy making in 2014. Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) call this period the Second Machine Age in the title of their book, determining the period of the Fourth Industrial Revolution because the world is at an inflection point where digital technologies will facilitate the creation of incredible until now believed to be unfeasible, products. Beck (2019 33) divides the Fourth Industrial Revolution into two eras: the first will last until 2030, and the second will last until 2045. Beck (2019, 210) places the robot and the robot-human connection at the origin of the Fifth Industrial Revolution: cobot, from "collaborative robot" while envisioning the disappearance of mass production in Industry 6.0. Business Finland, edited by Kuosmanen–Tero (2021 38), captures the main attributes of this new phase in ubiquitous, customer-centric, virtualized and fragility-free manufacturing.

In this phase, we focus on the present and future of this technological development to answer in subsequent chapters of this study whether humanity is on the verge of a paradigm shift or is perhaps already in the midst of one and how this shift affects society's roles and autonomy.

Based on the work of researchers and managers involved in mapping our future, we will arbitrarily select the innovations and developments from the 4.0

Industrial Revolution taking place today that can be indicators of the following technological eras and paradigm shifts. The study's author calls the next industrial revolution, which is numerically the fourth and is no longer purely industrial, the Era of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Robots.

Approaching AI from a social science perspective, we should refer to Prakash's (2020) interpretation, who proposes a three-prong (narrow, general, strong) way of interpretation. He considers the beginning point of AI a system/software that can function similarly to human intelligence in many ways already, while the result would be a structure that exceeds human intelligence, thereby generating many social and ethical questions. Daniel C. Dennet (Beck 2019, 36) classifies AI into 3 groups based on its development: the oracle AI, which can analyze all available knowledge per the given parameters; the genie AI, which is capable of autonomous action, can control military instruments or even surgical robots; the ruling AI, that has complex cognitive abilities and can control machines and people.

Let's review exhaustively yet arbitrarily where the current technology is, predominantly with the help of the following futurists: Prakash (2018, 2020), Harari (2018, 2020), Beck (2019), Kurzweil (1999, 2013, 2022), and Csepeli (2020).

- Brain-computer interface: the convergence of biology and technology that allows humans and certain animals to control objects with their brains, thanks to converting neurological signals emitted by the brain into electronic instructions by micro-computers. Bionic life has existed since the early days of the 21st century, but it is expensive and accessible only to the very few.
- Facial recognition: biometric software that can identify a person by scanning and analyzing their face.
- Image and sound recognition: artificial vision and hearing; the software can identify a sound, an image or objects in an image. Voice recognition software can interpret human speech (Siri, Xiao Ai Xiaomi) and detect (admittedly poorly for the time being) emotions from the voice.
- Big Data: includes the amount of stored data, the total amount of (scientific) data at the given moment, which is beyond human capacity already because the age of the Renaissance man has passed. Cloud services make it possible to store "infinite" amounts of data cheaply. Big Data also makes it possible to map and analyze the habits, behaviors, ideological views, and health data of the population without any statistical surveys.
- Generated realities, i.e., virtual (Virtual Reality, VR) and augmented (Augmented Reality, AR) reality. VR is a three-dimensional programmed environment where we are present while isolated from our physical environment, and our perceptions are produced digitally. AR complements physical reality with programmed reality. VR and AR will revolutionize education, certain areas of psychotherapy, and maintenance work; they can be used to teach how to drive vehicles or perform medical procedures, among other things.

- Natural language processing (NLP): the ability of AI systems to decode the semantic distinctions and depths of natural language. Graves (2022, 57) emphasizes the importance of NPL, which is highly relevant to our topic, particularly regarding significant religious and moral texts. This is how AI can learn human morality and spiritualism and thereby understand significant human dimensions such as suffering and fulfillment.
- Satellite data analysis: This process can help analyze a company's efficiency or a country's economic well-being more precisely. The SMI (Satellite Manufacturing Index) uses algorithms to analyze data from billions of satellite observations. The BMI (PMI) index, which shows the state of a particular industry in an economy, will thus provide a much more realistic picture.
- Internet of Things (IoT): a network in which physical objects are connected to the Internet. The objects have a unique identifier so that they can communicate with each other; thus, the objects can also be monitored. Cyber-physical systems represent a fusion of physical and digital reality. The critical attribute of this fusion is that cyberspace is timeless, everything happens in the now. This is how 5G or 5th generation mobile internet becomes available, which increases the speed of data downloads. This is not particularly important for everyday Internet use. Still, it forms the foundation of m2m (machine-to-machine) and machine-to-human communication, which takes place in real-time and is already present in the era of self-driving vehicles.
- 3D printing and multifunctional new, programmable organic and inorganic materials (metal foams, superplastic materials) used for the technology: Beck (2019) emphasizes that the paradigm shifts can also be described in terms of materials science. One of the new super-materials is graphene and the production process was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics in 2010.
- Quantum information science: its mysterious tool is the quantum computer, which is not a more advanced form of the traditional binary computer. Its advantage lies in its problem-solving capabilities which it can perform sui generis since it can work on all possible solutions simultaneously. This method of working is more like intuition and probability than logic and causality. Kroó (2018) draws our attention to this as a very serious challenge, decoherence, that must be solved. Progress in the field can be clearly seen in the increase in the performance of quantum computers measured in qubits: while Google's machine had 53 qubits in 2019, the device jointly developed by Harvard and MIT has 256 qubits. A related field is the quantum internet, an unbreakable network in principle, and also a chance to exceed 5G many times over, as well as quantum cryptography, which is the algorithmic side of encryption.
- Nanotechnology: the scale of one-millionth of a millimeter, where Newton's laws are in many cases unintelligible. Instead, the quantum world comes to the fore. This also means the age of nanorobots.

- Automation of health care: On the one hand, it means the complex organization and management of the health care system with the inclusion of AI; on the other hand, it means a specific medical function, such as analysis, diagnosis, prevention, or a specific surgical procedure. AI doctors and medical robots such as Watson or ROSA are well-known today.
- Body modification and human enhancement, as we have entered the era of permanent medical implants and bionic prosthetics.
- Downloadable knowledge: quickly download skills by getting the brain in the right state. This could mean transmitting electrical signals from one human brain to another. Advanced research is carried out by DARPA (TNT project, Targeted Neuroplasticity Training), the Californian research company HRL Laboratories or the Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation program among others. A radical transformation of human learning processes is expected, making long-term schooling unnecessary.
- Blockchain technology: this method ensures transparency for all transactions and is the key to the widespread use of cryptocurrencies. Cash is slowly losing ground. Kurzweil (25.2022) estimates the amount of dollars in circulation to be only 30 times that of cryptocurrency. In 2018, Venezuela introduced the world's first state-backed digital currency, the Petro.
- Digital state and public administration: all official administrative business is taking place digitally, Estonia being a prime example.
- Vertical agriculture: This innovation has revolutionized food production. Kurzweil (2022) highlights the absence of chemicals among its many advantages and the non-negligible fact that vertical cultivation accounts for only 1% of the area required for horizontal farming. Food production is much cheaper because of the deflation rate.
- The era of driver support systems and self-driving smart vehicles is coming in both passenger and freight transport. Self-driving, autonomous taxis are being tested in many countries and have received the highest score of 5 in the rating system created by the Society of Automotive Engineers International for self-driving vehicles. In transportation, self-driving big rigs and the platooning method were already tested in Hungary in 2017 (Beck 2019, 122), which means that only the first car in the convoy is driven by a human, all the other vehicles are driven by a robot pilot.

The scope of this study does not allow us to examine every technological innovation of the beginning of the 21st century in detail, but we can take a moment to look into the future. Perhaps the following example can convey, in a unique way, that we are truly in the middle of a real paradigm shift now, in the beginning of the 21st century. As of 2018, India is working to create a "cyber twin" for everyone (Cyber Twin; Prakash 2020, 60). These digital avatars will live on after the natural death of the real person, with unique thoughts and a complete personality.

Summarizing the ideas of Prakash (2018, 2020), Harari (2018, 2020), Beck (2019), Kurzweil (1999, 2013, 2022), and Csepeli (2020), we can conclude that the Fourth Industrial Revolution can be described as a cyber-physical system, where the physical and the digital worlds merge. Its indispensable tools are a constant and mobile internet, ever smaller but more efficient sensors, and artificial intelligence that can transform societies and economies.

Let's focus on AI for a moment that has the capacity to draw a conclusion and make independent decisions. This capacity is made possible by the neural system design created using the pattern of the neural network of the human brain. Neural networks are capable of complex operations autonomously, without a human presence. Moreover, AI is not plagued by the weaknesses and inefficiencies resulting from the moral dilemma after being expelled from Paradise. According to Prakash (2020 20), AI is more like a living organism than a technology, it evolves and reproduces.

THE ROBOT IS A TANGIBLE FUTURE

Based on the first chapter, let's ask: is the future facing humanity, the new era of paradigm shifts, terrifying? The relationship between technology and man as well as the problems this relationship presents to man's autonomy have been heavily examined in the works of many authors in recent decades: Bergyajev (2004), Heidegger (2004), Jonas (2004), Ellul(2004), Garaczi (2012), Lorenz (2022), Douglas (2020), Harari (2020), Beck (2019), Barabási (2018), Csepeli (2020) and Schwab (2016). Ellul (2004 7), the technology historian points out that the merging of man and machine already gave rise to several distinct alternatives in the 20th century. While one of the alternatives hopes for a harmonious, cooperative relationship between man and machine, the other alternative is a vision of the diminution and, eventually, the extinction of humankind. Whichever version becomes (or not) a reality in the future, it will certainly significantly transform our understanding of time because automation and robots can restore our time. Ellul (2004), Garaczi (2012), and Beck (2019) point to the increased appreciation of free time, which provides an opportunity to renew interpersonal relationships. Beck (2019, 23) captures this process by saying: "There is no need for a man as a robot, but as a human being," as a creative being, a thinking, feeling, unique, and singular human entity with a personality.

The idea of robots was already present in the ancient world. In Greek mythical literature, golden robots were made to serve the inhabitants of Olympus. In China, we can find records of dancing robots that dazzled the emperor. However, the technology was not available to build robots, so man himself became the robot who worked, entertained, and fought. After a few thousand years, the situation changed radically. The robot vied for since ancient times, was born, and the invention of Windows 95 made computing and the Internet accessible to the masses.

However, automation and the Fourth Industrial Revolution are not without consequences, and many professions will disappear or shrink. Prakash (2020 56.) predicts the disappearance of jobs as we know them today on a grand scale. The question is whether we can treat this risk analysis as an axiom. Beck (2019) and Molhoek (2022) describe the requirements of the new jobs as those with a high level of expertise or the need to be able to work on one's own, while people without marketable skills will be pushed to the periphery and will work in state-maintained, economically unprofitable sectors just to occupy their time. We will closely examine some examples Prakash (2020) raised that somewhat contradict this view. In 2018, a Swiss bank (UBS) presented an AI clone of one of its chief economists that has a digital body, moves, communicates, and provides economic advice like its "original." The role of a politician cannot be considered mainstream either. While a high level of intellectual performance is not expected, an AI named Macuda Micsihito came third in the mayoral election in Tokyo's Tama district in 2018. Earlier in 2017, Romania presented an AI ambassador named ROMBOT who was responsible for the country's image, which can be considered one of the world's first virtual ambassadors.

Beck (2019, 82) calculates the disappearance of 24-40% of jobs in Hungary in the next 10 years, which will affect at least 1 million people, but this does not apply to jobs in which human presence is essential. Beck (2019 99) optimistically mentions that while 800,000 jobs were lost in England between 2001-15, 3.5 million new jobs were created. In his opinion, general unemployment is not approaching, but the labor market restructuring is imminent. However, these data can also create a false sense of peace since the Fourth Industrial Revolution is only in its initial phase. In addition, the conclusions were based on data from a country with an advanced educational system. Beck (2019) recommends prevention: since Industry 4.0 addresses an economic interest, the consequences of it will not be a financial crisis, but a social one. Prakash (2020 61) focuses on the UN's risk analysis, which states that more than 50% of workers in Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines could lose their jobs in the next 20 years. The McKinsey Global Institute (2017) predicted that 800 million jobs will be lost by 2030. According to the authors of the Oxford Martin School (2016), automation can threaten up to 85% of jobs in developing countries; this risk is the highest in Ethiopia, 77% in China, and 69% in India. In Ethiopia, we can't be surprised because, under the leadership of Nobel laureate Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali, the country follows an unorthodox development model when it invests heavily in AI and drones. In this case, backwardness is an advantage in a certain sense because many developmental steps can be skipped, although success is contingent on the adaptation to the work culture. Let's look at specific data to see the emerging situation more clearly. Beck (2019, 69) notes that in 2007 a thousand people had to be employed to produce five hundred thousand tons of steel a year, a decade later 14 people, while in the factory of

the Chinese company Tianyan Garments Company, 1.2 million T-shirts are sewn daily by SoftWear Automation robots without any human labor. Despite all this, Kurzweil (2022 25.) remains optimistic and points out that in the USA, during the last 115 years, 24 million jobs have turned into 142 million, while the number of working hours has decreased from 3000 to 1800 hours per year. He does not expect high unemployment in developed countries and considers work a means of self-expression, a significant part of a person's identity. However, the author of this study would like to emphasize that work interpreted as self-realization requires high levels of intellectual foundations. Especially considering how Kaku (2006, 281) illustrates the development of technology: the muscle power of prehistoric man was equal to 1/8 horsepower, then thanks to tools, this changed to 1/4 horsepower until man and horse reached parity with each other at the end of the Ice Age. A man could generate more energy than the animals around them only during 0.01% of man's existence. Only the discovery of nuclear power in the last decades allows for an increase in man's ability to use energy sixfold.

AI and robots are the new workers of the future; machines will make up the largest share of the workforce, and both societies and individuals will become dependent on them in almost every field. AI is poised to take control of everything from emergency services to tax collection and is poised to eliminate the frustrations of bureaucracy and corruption. According to Kurzweil (2022), people will be able to live at a higher standard and quality within 10 years thanks to the evolution of technology, which will include universal basic income. Contemplating work in this new world, humanity will need to answer the following questions in the short term: How many new jobs can or should be created for people? Can we still talk about rent-for-hire in the classical sense? Do we need a basic income? How many hours should a working week consist of? Will the level of crime increase in the so-called period of anomaly? Can the fight against crime reduce the autonomy of individuals? Will Luddism have a renaissance? Can AI assistants be hacked?

Let's return to our introduction and Hankiss' horror. Boda (2018 1547.) finds the driving force behind Hankiss' thinking in the term "fear" which the noosphere is meant to keep under control- this concept is synonymous with civilization, only a more narrowly interpreted category of it. The noosphere may be able to provide an interpretive framework for humanity, but the interpretive framework of the civilized West is shattered. A new paradigm requires a new noosphere, but its content spans through the ages, namely the world of ethics and morals. The relevance of ethics may become truly essential for the first time. For thousands of years, ethics as an applied philosophy has been searching for the answer to one simple question: What is good and what is bad? Ethics is universal, while morality is culture-driven. This can be clearly seen when looking for solutions to Hardin's (2005) lifeboat problem or Prakash's (2020 32) "csille" dilemma. This is well illustrated by the German Code of Conduct for

self-driving cars, published in 2017 and adopted by the German government (Prakash 2020, 39), which prioritizes human life and prohibits discrimination based on differences between people.

Throughout the history of mankind, ethical decisions have always been in the hands of humans (or God/s). However, in the 21st century, these decisions may be directly or indirectly transferred to AI in part. AI must understand ethics precisely since "ethics" will drive its decision-making. The question is which culture's or company's morality will prevail in the AI's decision-making. Indeed, most technical developments aim to develop and program "ethics" that allow AI to adapt to cultural norms. This may lead to AI explaining events in different ways due to its programmed "ethics" and thus further dividing the world, but it is also possible that Kant's (1985) dream of world peace is finally in reach.

Let's attempt to illustrate the age of ethics, medicine, politics, autonomy, and paradigm shift as fusion! Caligiuri (2022) sees the primary goal of medical sciences as saving and prolonging life and reducing pain and suffering while artificially improving the human body goes beyond these goals. Medical treatment never transcends the bias toward people. However, man wants to escape his mortality. The COVID world generated improvement since vaccines are not part of our natural human structure but give a kind of extra boost compared to the original state, thus making the vaccinated person transhuman. Hrynkow (2022 13.) recommends that we interpret transhuman as a person who has been perfected to some degree, whose abilities fall between unperfected humans (homo sapiens) and fully perfected posthuman beings. Based on the work of Don Simborg, Dabrowsky and Haynor (2022 30) call the posthuman entity Homo Nouveau, who represents a new human race after Homo Sapiens and is virtually immortal. Relying on evolution, the ultimate goal of transhumanism's (political) philosophy is a human perfected with the help of science. The author duo Dabrowsky-Haynor (2022) highlights the atheistic-humanist bias of transhumanism, the main goal of which is to achieve paradise on earth for humans with the help of the ethical use of technology. Kurzweil (2022 23.), who is considered the Edison of the 21st century, sees the extension of human life as his scientific drive and, based on our attitude towards the latest modern technology, GNR (genetics, nanotechnology, robotics), identifies three separate groups: those who rejoice, those who are terrified, and those who are ambivalent, who consider it their moral duty to continue development since the continuous suffering of humanity can only be alleviated by technological development. Kurzweil (2022) accepts the Janus-faced nature of technology and, therefore, considers it important to treat the issue ethically and recommends the use of the Asilomar ethical guidelines for biotechnology. Undoubtedly, merging humans and AI raises new questions for human autonomy and ethics. However, within the (political) philosophy of transhumanism, Dabrowsky-Haynor (2022 39.) finds the role of human auton-

omy essential, where the category of "proactive freedom" means that it gives a person the opportunity to decide what attributes he wants to live by. They also believe that, thanks to the "spillover" effect, technological innovations will be available to ordinary people as well as the privileged few. Beck (2019) calls this process the evolution of access to technology and goes through the following stations: the privileged, followed by the business sector, then anyone who can afford it, and then the technology becomes mainstream, and it is possibly replaced by something new, or it serves as the basis for a larger business. Boss (2022 171.), however, is not optimistic at all and uses the term small cyborg in situations where we can pinpoint and identify the socio-economic dependency between live tissue and manufactured products. The humanlike bionic prosthetics will only be available for the privileged few in the foreseeable future. Boss also recommends we differentiate between the vulnerable little cyborgs and the real cyborg because while the little cyborg is vulnerable to the energy-, information- and capital structures under the control of others, the real cyborg is independent from all these systems. This means a new kind of dependency on those who provide the cybernetic components. It is worth noting that Boss (2022) categorizes smartphone users and people with prostheses as small cyborgs.

Harari (2018, 445) points out that all research is influenced by the "Gilgamesh project" searching for immortality, the creation of a divine being, and this project justifies everything that science does – or we could say that it justifies all that the financial supporters of the science do. In his ethical typology of the concept of normality, Caligiuri (2022 145) reconsiders the classic normal and abnormal value duality and, looking to the future proposes that the category of abnormality should be interpreted not only as a downward deviation from normality but also as an upward deviation, since the abilities of transhuman far exceed those of the natural men. Dabrowsky-Haynor (2022) and Kurzweil (2013) consider the emergence of singular intelligence the tipping point when the merging of natural and artificial intelligence is created by genetic engineering, cyber technology, and nanotechnology (nanorobots). Due to the exponential growth of technology, it is predicted that by 2045, we will be able to download our individual and unique consciousness into non-biological carriers. Dimitrij Itskov started managing this so-called Avatar project in 2011. Let us note: the project's success can also mean that a dictator will have a chance to stay in power forever, or we may not need to replace our psychologist, not to mention that a life sentence can become self-fulfilling.

Prakash (2020 15) says the following about the era of the new paradigm and the AI-driven world of the near future: "Today's development will be compared to the art of cavemen of thousands of years ago." We can expand on this statement, include the scientific explosion expected by quantum computers, and understand just how accurate his statement is. Kurzweil (1999; 2022 20.) identifies the most important spiritual quality as consciousness, expects the

awakening of AI to consciousness by 2029, and notes the asymmetric aspect of the encounter since AI will be much more intelligent than us. Stroda (2022) considers the tipping point when an AI with an independent sense of humor emerges. In this case, Dabrowsky-Haynor (2022 34.) recommends the label artificial superintelligence, which also means the A(S)I is becoming a person that/who (and this is not an accidental duplication) will be able to modify its own software.

From that moment on, AI can be a more effective influencer than any human propaganda or religion. It would be hazardous for human communities and autonomies if AI were racist or prejudiced or if human life came under too much control. Dabrowsky-Haynor (2022) considers it dangerous that the political-economic elite can influence society through AI and master algorithms. AI, Big Data, and IoT can be very harmful to human autonomy as their (private) life becomes an open book. We will not be able to decode this superintelligent AI (which currently does not exist yet), and Kurzweil (2013) marks that as the beginning of a new era that will be characterized by technological singularity, galactic space travel, and immortality.

Let us not forget that the group that considers superintelligent AI a threat to humanity includes names such as Hawking (Dabrowsky-Haynor 2022), Bostrom (2015), and the exalted genius Elon Musk (Beck 2019). Chinese billionaire Jack Ma (Prakash2020 143) resigns to the idea that AI will lead to the next world war, as every industrial revolution has led to a world war so far, even though humans have ultimately benefited from such wars.

Let us remember that any future risk analysis is uncertain and unpredictable. We cannot know whether we are facing a dystopia or a utopia, but Kaku (2006) believes that futurology, the scientific prognosis of the future, is an increasingly important science.

EPILOGUE

The author believes that the pandemic is merely a symptom of a new era of uncertainty that highlighted man's mental and social fragility and the vulnerability of the autonomy of individuals and communities. A relevant consequence of the pandemic is that people look at themselves and their world differently, questioning previously self-evident truths. As a result of the pandemic, technology increased in value, which also means that rethinking the relationship between humans and technology is a must, mainly because transhuman and posthuman entities are gaining more and more space. Harari (2018) sees the next period of history as special in that man himself will be at the center of interpretation, and human consciousness and identity will fundamentally change. He directly projects the last days of Homo Sapiens with the "Frankenstein myth".

Is the situation really that hopeless?

Szathmáry (2018 1543.) examined the cultural evolution of humanity from the point of view of game theory, in which man appears as a cooperative being, although mostly in the form of "parochial altruism." This approach is problematic because the most critical challenges facing humanity in the 21st century can only be conquered with cooperative solutions. Harari (2018) also finds the ability to cooperate as essential, the result of which is technical civilization, with the end product being man, the unhappy master of creation. However, mankind must not forget its "predator" nature (as revealed by human's forward-looking eyes and historical cataclysms), as well as the torment of the "Peter Pan complex" which in Kaku's (2006, 293) interpretation means that one simply does not want to grow up and take responsibility for one's actions. However, the time has come to pay the piper since several of the deadly sins listed by Lorenz (2022) may be able to destroy humanity, most certainly the irresponsible use of nuclear energy. Kaku (2006, 298) sees the greatest threat to humanity in uncoordinated global politics fueled by the selfishness of nation-states. However, the author would hold both the super-rich and the average person responsible as well. In any case, the convergence of societies and cultures would be essential to deal with the threats. The ethics of transhumanism, as Dabrowsky-Haynor (2022) interprets it, makes man responsible for evolution, even suggesting that man initiates evolution.

All human cooperation requires a fiction, a cohesive material. This fiction is the myth for Harari (2018) and Wilson (2004), while for Hankiss it is the noosphere. This is the collective knowledge of humanity, but Harari suggests that a new agenda is needed for the person who has become God. At the same time, Hankiss tried to find an answer in quantum research, but unfortunately, he ran out of time as his life was cut short. Hankiss (2018 1581.) considered the "bubble of modernity" as an explanatory principle for civilization, as a paradigm ready to burst, and he thought that particularly terrifying because most of humanity has not been able to digest the Copernican turn of centuries past yet. How can homo sapiens face and process the mental-spiritual shock of the quantum universe? Some of the people are stuck in the Ptolemaic trap, while some have not even reached that level of consciousness yet, and they have deified the two-dimensional world of the ancient Egyptians. Still, others have fallen into religious fervor and founded a new church or a spiritual movement (AI-church, blockchain religion). Hawking (2022) linked the understanding of the ontology of man and the Universe to deciphering the theory of the universe.

As we are approaching the end of the study, we must introduce an old-new discourse because, in this context, the issue of determinism and indeterminism, fatalism, and free will is crucial. Boda's (2018) dilemma about whether human creativity has a role in the development of culture or it is merely an evolutionary process where the "divinity" of man disintegrates is also formulated based on this discourse. If it is merely an evolutionary process, humanity can sit back in its imaginary armchair and calmly await its destiny, which, in all likelihood, will

also mean the end of man's reign on earth. This will happen when the permanent dominance of memes related to ancient instincts continues dominating the life of societies. The basic instinctual world dominates life through these memes, summarized as 4F (Food, Fear, Fight, Find a mate). Boda (2018) is not optimistic about the future, as he considers the rule of memes related to the 4Fs to be the Achilles' heel of mass democracies, which make governance based on long-term strategies impossible. The author also considers the influence of memes problematic in the case of dictatorships and authoritarian systems. Regarding evolution, Wilson (2004) emphasizes rational thinking on the one hand while suspending rationality on the other if defending the integrity of the political community through mythology or religious beliefs becomes a priority. Dawkins' (1986) work on memes, i.e., new replicators, is not too promising for people who desire autonomous, free decisions. In the world of meme and network research, the studies of Barabási (2022) and Blackmore (1999) further confirm all this: human action is a predictable act, and the human world is deterministic. Einstein pondered whether God really had a choice at all when creating the universe. However, Polkinghorne (2008), who was both an accomplished, influential physicist and an Anglican priest, questions this kind of mechanistic world and allows for the dimension of indeterminism. Székely (2011), on the other hand, points to the difficulties of proving the dilemma from the perspective of the applied sciences.

This is where we need to introduce the quantum world, where classical laws are contingent, where commutative algebra is useless, and where many quantum events take place in the biology of animals and humans. The indeterminate, random events of the subnuclear (and cosmic) world offer opportunities for human free will. Kroó (2018) raises the social aspect of the quantum behavior of the human brain and highlights the super positional nature of the human brain, which gives space to irrationality and unpredictability while generating connectivity between people in their intellectual and emotional fields. Kaku (2006, p. 131) emphasizes that, based on quantum theory, there is (also) a calculable probability that "impossible" events can occur, and this statement does not only apply to the world of quarks and neutrinos, which is tinier than small, but to quantum cosmology as well. Kaku (2006, 261) points out that Schrödinger's probability wave-function can also be assigned to humans. Openness shows up even in the field of theology: the 14th Dalai Lama (2021) feels a closeness between the quantum universe and Buddhist philosophy, while Davies (2000) tries to find answers through the confusing paths of the applied sciences and mysticism in his book The Thoughts of God. Boda (2018) does not see individuals as puppets and allows a role greater than zero for human mysticism, just as in the case of Hankiss (2018) and Harari (2020) the creation of man is also present, while Kaku (2006) emphasizes the Heisenberg-type indeterminacy relation, so it highlights the effect of quantum mechanics. The great mystics of Eastern and Western culture, such as Dzecün Milarepa, St. Pio of Pietrelcina, or Srinivasa Ra-

manujan, who derived his scientific achievements from the transcendent world, the goddess Namakkal, would strongly question the rule of genes.

The author believes another paradigm shift of humanity is under way. The technical and tool repertoire of the Fourth Industrial Revolution is unfolding before our eyes, and a paradigm shift with a significant impact can already be detected. This could also be called the Fifth Industrial Revolution, but the author recommends using the terminus technicus Quantum Revolution, which omits the "industrial" qualifier. This does not rule out the validity of technological advancement but rather emphasizes that this will be the first revolution that will rely on the unprecedented performance of the synergies of various intelligences (the plural is intentional). However, the relevance of the Quantum Paradigm Shift will not mean merely technological advancement but a radical change, almost a revelation, of the human worldview, the magnetic presence of the universal-cosmic focus, the painful loss of the Earth-centered and heliocentric worldview, and the marked reinterpretation of the 4-dimensional world. Humanity would need a reverse quantum leap in order to find good answers to the irreversible challenges of the future in the present. The author, therefore, strives to bring a possible world of the Quantum Revolution in sync with the present, which is the purpose of this study. What changes are necessary for mankind to find security and to feel that his life has meaning and significance? – as Hankiss (2018 1590.) put it. The goal of the following study, but not of this one, is to demonstrate the need for a change of attitude in politics, public and higher education, research, economics, fiscal and monetary policy, healthcare, and social-mental health. We need reforms to successfully deal with the psychological and somatic challenges of the paradigm shift in society and the individual, as presented by Molhoek (2022). However, we must learn to walk through a symbolic prison wall. Harari (2018) describes it as a failure of humanity that our psyche (soul), unlike our body, has resisted improvement. It would be difficult to dispute this statement in the light of permanent wars. Is there any hope for humanity? Is "all human knowledge" enough to walk through the prison wall? After all, technological advancements make almost all the knowledge of all the cultures in the world available. Can we learn from this? Wilber's (2008 17.) integral method and model claims to be on this path and can promote human evolution (it is true that the Islamic world is still unexplored for them). He considers the spiritual development of man and humanity possible, which is quantum-like (Wilber 2008 32) and is based on the harmony of the holy trinity of consciousness levels of I-WE-US, which reaches from an egocentric perspective through the culture-centric stage to universal community commitment. Gilligan (2003) describes the levels as hierarchical since each level means an increasing degree of empathy and tolerance. He emphasizes the differentiated world of women and men at the same time, which are only able to dissolve into each other at the final, i.e., the fourth, so-called integral level, as autonomy and relationship, as well

as the system of rights and responsibilities. Wilber (2008, 115) distinguishes between two types of hierarchy, the "oppressive/ruling hierarchy" is based on the ranking and oppression of people, while the "realization/growth hierarchy" avoids all of these. In the comparative world of the second type, the organic structure of nature (quark, atom, molecule, cell, organism) appears as a positive model, where the dependency growth hierarchies are clearly visible, each higher level surpasses and integrates the previous ones, but the higher levels do not suppress the lower ones, only surround them.

Wilber (2008) considers the first phase of the 21st century as the threshold of a paradigm shift, where the transition from the postmodern to the integral level takes place, which is extraordinarily spiritual in essence. Solzhenitsyn (1978) believes humanity's only chance for the future lies in spiritual development. Transcendent keywords appear in the encyclical Laudato Si' by Pope Francis (2015), in which he proclaims a need for comprehensive ecology. He calls on every one of us to engage in a joint discourse through the sense of common origin and shared earthly community in the hope to create socio-ecological justice. Csíkszentmihályi (2009) considers reaching the state of flow an important step because it can lead to the dissolution of the pathological individual Ego and become part of the shared life experience as one. To capture the flow experience, Trothen (2022) recommends harmonious cooperation and meditation exercises for awareness and group discussions. The door to spiritual development can eventually open thanks to the reclaimed time and free time. Finally, humanity could overcome its spiritual limitations. The author believes the first step would be to transform the mental stigma of "everyone is replaceable" into the meme "everyone is irreplaceable, unique, and special."

If the topic and message of the study (4th Industrial Revolution, Quantum Revolution) has remained unclear to someone, perhaps the short story of today's bestselling author, Jo Nesbo (2022), will help their understanding. In closing, the author sincerely hopes that the tunnel effect of quantum systems will allow humanity to escape from its prison where they are trapped by their own dogmas in the foreseeable future, without external help. If this does not fully occur, the author would like to ask large cyborgs (transhumans), self-aware A(S) Is, and posthumans to strive for contact with humans in the spirit and tolerance of I-WE-US.

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THE VIRTUE OF NATIONALISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Miklós Bakk[1]

In 2018, Israeli political scientist and director of the Herzl Institute Yoram Hazony (who the Hungarian audience could get to know as a participant of this year's NatCon conference in Brussels as a discussion partner of Viktor Orbán) published a book in the United States, the title of which – *The Virtue of Nationalism* – is already highly provocative, and which formulates a clear and strong position on one of the biggest questions of our time within political philosophy: the opposition between sovereigns and globalism. Published in New York by Basic Books, it was named the 2019 Conservative Book of the Year in the United States. The Hungarian translation of this book was published in 2019 by Századvég Publishing House. Hazony's basic thesis can be formulated as follows: in the international community of states, there are two „types of state": the „empire" and the „nation-state." However, these two types are not to be understood as types that can be deduced from the origins and internal structure of states (i.e., they are not classical types of states, as discussed in the works of, for example, Péter Takács). The two ‚types' are a distinction between two ‚world orders,' and the difference between nation-state and empire is a distinction according to the role of states in the ‚world order' and their role in shaping the ‚world order.' The nation-state order is a system of independent and free states, each struggling for the common good according to its tradition and interpretation', and the imperial order, in contrast, is a system of people united under a single jurisdiction, created and maintained by a single supranational authority. Hazony cites Israel, Japan, Norway, South Korea, and Switzerland as examples of the first vision as independent, free states, and the second as the European Union as established by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, and the post-World War II United States, which, in its competition with the Soviet Union as a consequence of the Cold War, departed from the model of national independence and turned to the imperialist

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path of imposing global legal regulation. Hazony traces this dichotomy back to the beginning of human political history. Israel is one of the archetypes of the ‚nation-state': in the Hebrew Bible, the prophets of Israel described imperial Egypt as a ‚house of bondage', with an army to secure its peace, and in contrast, the Mosaic law of the Jewish state offered a constitution which, in today's terms, could best be described as a ‚nation-state' law. The king of such a state writes Hazony (who is also a biblical scholar), is chosen by the citizens ‚from among their brethren', as are the priests, whose duty it is to guard the traditional laws of the nation and to teach them to the king, so that he ‚may not exalt his thoughts above his brethren'.

Contrary to the Mosaic model, the ancient empires – Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, Persia, and later the Roman Empire – sought to secure a universal peace over all mankind (of course, as ‚mankind' was then conceived) – by conquest. The goal and the idea of *universal peace* through conquest have accompanied the history of empires almost throughout their history. The idea of Roman universality was articulated in the *Pax Romana:* the idea of ‚rule without borders' (imperium sine fine). This idea is constantly reiterated in the creeds of later empires, right up to the *Pax Americana* or the *Pax Sovietica.* Hazony's point is clear: the ‚nation-state order' is much more just than the ‚imperial order.' This is the book's central thesis, but for the Hungarian reader, there are other fascinating ideas in the author's reasoning. One is to show how nationalism was ideologically quarantined in the post-World War II order. Although political science still sees it as proven today that the realizations of the modern world, such as democracy and human rights, can only survive and function on the institutional foundations of modern nation-states, a misconception that nationalism was the cause of both world wars gained ground among the leaders of the victorious democratic states after the Second World War. Understandable antipathy to the Holocaust, Hazony writes, led the educated elite to see any particularism of kinship, nationality, or religion as the beginning of Nazism and racism. But this reading of history was a colossal misreading: the identification of Nazism as a nationalist ideology. In reality, Hitler was a fierce enemy of national sovereignty, leading a regime that, following imperial logic, sought to end once and for all the self-determination of peoples. This misidentification gave rise to the post-World War II anti-nationalist sentiment in the West, which in turn gave rise to anti-nationalist ‚liberal imperialism.' After the Cold War, it was this ideology that made the creation of an American ‚world order' a universal cause. Another tenet of Hazony emerges from his Israeli patriotism: he is proud that his country „acts as a nation-state of a certain people", while also developing free institutions that allow other minority national and tribal groups to practice their religion as they see fit and to educate their children in their own language and cultural heritage. This example of Israeli patriotism points to a question that Hungarian public opinion is wrestling with:

how can Hungarians affirm their nation-state? In contrast, is the flourishing nation-state in their neighborhood an obstacle to the collective rights of the Hungarian community beyond the border? Hazony finds the answer in balancing two principles that cannot be absolutized. Nations are entitled to the principle of national self-determination. Still, from the perspective of a stable order of states and the consolidation of mutual respect, this principle *guarantees political independence only to those nations that are cohesive and strong enough to defend it.* That is to say, if the principle of national self-determination could be asserted without any internal constraints, the proliferation of its expression would result in a proliferation of political communities at a rate where conflicting communal claims would result in perpetual fields of conflict; thus, the self-determining nation must be strong enough to defend and stabilize its self-determination against neighboring self-determinants. Hence, the principle of self-determination has an inward component: the nation-state must, over time, acquire sufficient military and economic strength to be recognized as an independent nation by other states, and ‚sufficient strength' implies sufficient socio-cultural homogenization performance, a continuous demonstration of the strength of the community. In other words, the nation-state must prove – on the one hand – that it is sufficiently stable and solid in its internal relations, that it can be present as an ‚equal' (not a negligible) member of the system of nation-states, and thus that it can ensure that others do not interfere in *its internal affairs*. On the other hand, precisely because each minority nation has interests and aspirations – arising from its identity – which are not those of the majority nation and thus run counter to the homogenizing aspirations of the common state, the nation-state must also take account of the situation in which the state-strengthening homogenizing policies of the majority nation call into question the very interests of internal stability and thus, writes Hazony, the ‚ nation-state... creates a zone of anarchy within its borders and thus undermines the whole order of the nation-state". Hence, the defense of minority nations is placed in a fertile field of tension if maintaining the order of independent nation-states is seen as the primary objective. The defense of self-determination and independence transfers the main decision-making competence to the nation-state as to how it wishes to act towards its minority nations. At the same time, the maintenance of the nation-state order also requires that the anarchy from within does not become so strong as to open the way for a transformation towards an imperial order, *nor does it override the principle of non-interference,* which is no more an absolute principle than *the principle of self-determination.* It is necessary to strike a balance between the two principles, which is always practical in nature but, because it also has a moral dimension, generates a constant effort to find a normative yardstick to help strike a balance. This normative balance is reflected in international minority law. Still, the limitations on the enforceability of this right in the con-

flict between *the principle of self-determination* and the principle of non-interference illustrate the irresolvable tension between the two principles. The internal peace of a free and stable (nation) state is guaranteed by the rule of a single cohesive nationality (the hegemony of the majority nation), held together by a tried and tested bond of mutual loyalty. But it is precisely the strength of the cultural domination of the majority nation (against which, in principle, there is no chance of any opposition) that raises the integrity of the state to a level where the majority nation – usually the one with the name – that possesses it does not regard the presence of a smaller community as a threat and grants it rights and freedoms. In the triad of nation-state – majority nation – national minority, achieving this balance is the only basis for lasting community rights. A significant achievement of Hazony's book is that it moves from the historical dimension of empire to formulate a theoretical context for a contemporary issue that also determines our region.

TRANSYLVANIAN MIGRATION TO FOREIGN UNIVERSITIES IN THE MIDDLE AGES

(Sándor Tonk: Erdélyiek egyetemjárása a középkorban.
Kriterion, Kolozsvár – Bucharest. 1979. 397.p)

Reviewed by

László Kulcsár[1]

First, perhaps, we should discuss what justifies the presentation of a book published forty-five years ago and draw the attention of the interested public to it. We could also say: how long has this East-West trend in international migration been present since we are still experiencing it today? The attraction of Western European universities is excellent. Moreover, the European Union's Erasmus program prevents this process from becoming financially tricky. The phenomenon is, therefore, as topical as it has been in past centuries. Another reason is that Sándor Tonk's study sheds new light on the historical context of European inequalities. This may encourage today's researchers of convergence processes to take a more realistic view. If we want to paint a more pessimistic picture, we can draw attention to the phenomenon of ‚*path-dependence*,' which hindered the unfolding of the promising modernization process in medieval Transylvania described in the book. It is, therefore, rare to find a study that can provide ammunition for several social science approaches today, even if it was written several decades ago.

In the modern sense, the world's first university was founded in Fez, Morocco, in 859, if we exclude the Indian center of learning (Takshila) that existed more than a thousand years before the founding of the University of Fez. The migration of people seeking to learn can be traced back thousands of years. At every

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age, there have been centers of knowledge that have preserved, developed, and transmitted the knowledge needed by society, the state, and politics, including the economy and the military. Attending foreign universities, which were also prestigious, was also a ‚chic,‘ a sign of social status, and membership of a closed club offered additional benefits. In specific periods of the Roman Empire, for example, elite youths' visits and study trips to Greek ‚centers of knowledge' were also proof of this status. In the Middle Ages, as today, years spent at prestigious foreign universities were often a prerequisite for social promotion, for a good job or a position.

On the other hand, the intellectual centers represented by universities have been in constant flux throughout history, even if they have often seemed immobile. They move simultaneously in time and space as the complex relations between the center and periphery change. The book gives several examples, whether in Western or Eastern Europe. However, one thing seems to remain constant: *migration and movement towards scientific, cultural, and artistic centers.*

The book by Sándor Tonk[2] (1947-2003) sheds light on a very important dimension of this process (a factor of great importance for the development of humanity, yet to be analyzed in global history) in the development of Europe by examining the medieval development of the ‚p*eregrinatio academica'* from Transylvania. His scholarly work on this subject did not cease with the publication of this book, as he continued to examine the question in his doctoral thesis on the period between 1520 and 1700, published in 1994. In this review, we mention only the latter thesis to show the continuation of this enormous research work, which we must refrain from evaluating in detail for lack of information.

Before referring to the book's structure, we will turn to Tonk's approach, the approach he takes to the subject of his research. In any case, if we were to identify the discipline whose conceptual set and methods he uses, we would have to say that Sándor Tonk's work, in our opinion, belongs essentially to the field of sociology of history. The reviewer sees this as a very positive point. The results of his enormous research work are placed not only in a historical context but also in a social and sociological one. Among other things, this is demonstrated by the fact that the role, position, and behavior of certain groups and structure of contemporary Transylvanian society are linked to the changing characteristics of the ‚university life' and the development of the ecclesiastical and administrative bureaucracy in the field of urban self-government. It shows how differentiated this group of university-goers is and how different their social and cultural affiliations are. A socio-historical approach also enables it to interpret the characteristics of the geographic and ethnic situation of the group under study. It pays great attention to these factors, as is shown by Map 1. in the book. Because of its importance, this map is included in the presentation (although, unfortunately, not of the best quality).

2   Historian Sándor Tonk played a prominent role in the establishment of the Hungarian University of Transylvania (Sapientia) and was its first founding rector until his untimely death in 2003.

In the book's first chapter, Tonk outlines the history of the medieval universities, but this is not a simple chronology either. He analyses the history, performance, and outlook of the universities by placing them in the context of the often-triple squeeze of the three major interest groups of the time: the Catholic Church, especially the Pope (since the bishops' views and the Pope's views and interests often clashed in the functioning of the universities), the empires and the urban bourgeoisie and municipalities. The book illustrates the conflicts and the often-precarious alliances of interests of the three ‚principal authorities' created for universities and students. In many cases, regulations issued by the Pope limited the influence of the city, or the city, supported by imperial interests, was strained against the ambitions of the Church. If the Pope had defended the privileges of the university against the city, of course, this ‚freedom' would not have come ‚for free.' The students strengthened the structure of the Church, and the university had to comply with the papal wishes regarding education and the knowledge taught. Establishing universities, especially theological faculties, required papal authorization among other reasons. It is also true, however, that, as Tonk shows, especially in the early Middle Ages, the ecclesiastical system offered graduates various employment opportunities and could not have fulfilled its role without them. Ecclesiastical dominance persisted, with some breaks, for several centuries and coexisted with the differentiation of European universities in several dimensions. This process was marked not only by differences in the ecclesiastical and secular character of the universities but also by differences in the quality of teaching and the transfer of knowledge. In his book, Tonk analyses the history and programs of Bologna, Italy, and Paris universities. These universities taught very different standards, with very different habits and histories. The presence of an eminent professor made the university flourish, but their departure meant they were in danger of disappearing. The University of Montaigu was derided in Paris as the „Mother of Theology's arsehole" by its students. Erasmus of Rotterdam, the illegitimate son of a laundress and a priest who also attended the university, hated it because of its old, outdated concept. Still, interestingly, Ignatius of Loyola and John Calvin, who also attended, admired it for its rigor and simplicity (Johnson 1979). The picture was not uniform, and likely, there were also significant differences between Italian universities in the Middle Ages.

The book also deals with the successes and failures of university formation in Central and Eastern Europe. Despite their historical differences, the Universities of Prague and Cracow are presented as success stories. The Hungarian experiments are mainly examples of failures. The ephemeral life of University of Pécs, thanks to the lack of interest of the King (Louis I ‚the Great'), the failure of the University of Óbuda (part of Budapest today), founded twice (1395, 1410) by King Sigismund, to changes in domestic politics, and the fate of King Matthias' initiative to found a university in Buda was sealed by the death of the king.

In the book's second chapter, the author has carried out a very careful statistical analysis of the university movement in Transylvania. Information is provided on nearly 2 500 ‚university students' from Transylvania who went to universities abroad. The socio-historical nature of the analysis is demonstrated by the fact that it typifies the ‚university-goers' according to several important territorial, social, and economic characteristics, such as settlement type, settlement size, social stratification, and income status. It also examines the evolution of this process over time. He does not simply draw graphs but analyses the dynamics of the process by linking these dynamics to longer-term trends in Transylvanian society and economy and changes in the foreign policy and power situation.

Map 1. Distribution of Transylvanian students enrolled in universities abroad by municipality

I would like to give a few examples to support the above ideas. Very interesting is Tonk's thought and analysis of the process of social „rapprochement" and „penetration" of the ecclesiastical and secular intelligentsia into each other's territory. In this process, the dominance of university-educated ecclesiastics has steadily declined, and the influence of secular intelligentsia has grown, which has meant, among other things, an increase in the expertise of municipal officials and a strengthening of the municipal character of some cities. This process also brought with it a dynamic civic transformation. In addition to the cities with a traditionally strong bourgeoisie (Kolozsvár – Cluj-Napoca, Brassó –

Brasov, Segesvár – Sighisoara, Nagyszeben – Sibiu, Temesvár – Timisoara), the rural towns benefited from the rise to intellectual positions of the young middle classes, the craftsmen of the various industries. In addition to the bourgeoisie and the nobility, there were also ‚university-goers' from the free peasantry, although in more limited numbers.

The spatial and regional inequalities in civilization and economic and cultural development can also be seen in the ‚university-going' population. Indeed, we would venture to suggest that the pattern of regional inequalities today is very similar. Tonk's map (Map 1) of the spatial distribution of students in Transylvania shows essentially the same. One such pattern is the ‚semicircle' of Szatmár (Satu Mare), Bihar (Bihor), and Kolozsvár (Cluj) counties. The other is the much denser but not so continuous pattern of Fejér county, Medgyes, Nagyszeben, and Brassó. The study then describes the life of the students at the universities abroad, the education system, the textbook-collecting activities of the students, and their crucial role in reforming the Transylvanian school system and raising its standards.

Sándor Tonk has compiled a vast amount of literature in his book. His source works number more than two thousand and include hundreds of books, studies, diplomas, and documents. By his own admission, it took him more than five years to study, organize, and evaluate them. His scholarly output is also outstanding in that it provides considerable thought for other researchers, including the author of this paper.

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        Szabó, I. és Szabó, T. 2001 'Tanulmány cím' *Folyóirat cím*, Vol. 1. 2. pp. 1-21.

Szerkezeti ajánlások

1. Cím, kiegészítve a szerző(k) nevével (neveivel), fogadó intézménye(i)vel és tudományos beosztásával (beosztásaival), valamint a levelező szerző e-mail címével (lábjegyzetben) a levelező szerzővel való további kommunikáció érdekében.
2. Legfeljebb 250 szavas absztrakt. *Az absztrakt tartalmazza a dolgozat céljait, módszereit, főbb eredményeit és következtetéseit.* Az angol absztrakt tartalmazza a tanulmány címét és a magyar absztrakt nyelvileg helyes angol fordítását.
3. A téma és a vonatkozó szakirodalom ismertetése.
4. Módszertan, adatforrások (ha releváns).
5. Leírás, megállapítások.
6. Összefoglalás/következtetések.
7. A szerkesztő fenntartja a jogot, hogy a tanulmány szerkezetét megváltoztassa az érthetőség és a jelzett követelményeknek való megfelelés érdekében.

A folyóirat a következő rovatokat tartalmazza

1. Tanulmányok
2. Műhelymunkák
3. Gondolatok könyvekről

A cikk elfogadására vonatkozó döntéshozatali folyamat

1. A szerző benyújtja a kéziratot (lásd fent).
2. A folyóirat szerkesztője(i) átnézik a kéziratot
3. elutasítja vagy
4. továbbítja a bírálóknak.
5. A kézirat lektorálási típusa: dupla, anonim jellegű.
6. Szakmai bírálati folyamat
   a. Az anonim, kettős szakértői lektorálás a következőket jelenti: A bírálók személyazonossága nem ismert a szerző számára, a szerző személyazonossága nem ismert a bírálók számára, a bíráló, és a szerző személyazonossága ismert a (döntéshozó) szerkesztő számára.
7. A folyóirat szerkesztője/szerkesztőbizottsága a módosítások alapján dönt a publikálásról.
8. A folyóirat szerkesztője vagy szerkesztőbizottsága mérlegeli a bírálók visszajelzéseit, és döntésre jut a következők szerint.
   a. Módosítások nélkül elfogadja (elfogadás): a folyóirat a tanulmányt eredeti formájában teszi közzé.
   b. A folyóirat publikálja a tanulmányt, de felkéri a szerzőt, hogy végezzen kisebb javításokat (*elfogadás*).

c. Elfogadja publikálásra a tanulmányt nagyobb módosítások után (*feltételes elfogadás*): a folyóirat publikálja a tanulmányt, amennyiben a szerző(k) elvégzi(k) a bírálók és/vagy a szerkesztők által javasolt nagyobb változtatásokat.

d. Átdolgozás és újbóli benyújtás (*feltételes elutasítás*): a folyóirat hajlandó a szerzők nagyobb változtatásai után egy újabb döntéshozatali fordulóban újra megvizsgálni a tanulmányt.

e. Elutasítja a tanulmányt (*teljes elutasítás*): a folyóirat akkor sem publikálja, illetve nem vizsgálja újra a tanulmányt, ha a szerzők jelentős módosításokat hajtanak végre.

A döntéshozatali folyamathoz kapcsolódó információk

1. Egy tanulmány döntéshozatali mérföldkövei a következőképpen kerülnek publikálásra:
   a. A benyújtás dátuma
   b. Az elfogadás dátuma
   c. A közzététel dátuma

A szerkesztői érdekeltségi nyilatkozat

Az *„Autonómia és Társadalom"* arra kéri a szerkesztőbizottság tagjait, hogy sorolják fel esetleges összeférhetetlenségeikkel kapcsolatos információkat. A lista tartalmazza a szerkesztőbizottsági tag egyéb kötelezettségvállalásait és szerepeit, amelyek folyóiratokat, könyveket és kiadványokat készítő társaságokat érintenek.

A szerző összeférhetetlenségi nyilatkozata

A szerzők nyilatkoznak, miszerint összeférhetetlenség nem áll fenn.

Finanszírozási nyilatkozat

A kutatás/tanulmány valamennyi finanszírozási forrását be kell jelenteni. Be kell jelenteni a finanszírozó szerv szerepét a vizsgálat megtervezésében, az adatok gyűjtésében, elemzésében és értelmezésében, valamint a kézirat megírásában.

Nyilatkozat a szerző(k) hozzájárulásának mértékéről és jellegéről a publikált tanulmányt érintően.

1. A levelező szerző felelős azért, hogy minden szerzői hozzájárulás pontos és az illető társszerző által elfogadott legyen.
2. Az összes szerző szerepét (szerepeit) fel kell tüntetni.
3. A szerzők több szerepben is közreműködhettek.
4. Nincs olyan szerző, aki nem járult hozzá a tanulmány elkészítéséhez

Az adatok és anyagok elérhetőségére vonatkozó nyilatkozat

Ha releváns: minden szerzőnek be kell illesztenie a kéziratba az „Adatok és anyagok elérhetősége" c. nyilatkozatot, amelyben részletezi, hogy az eredményeket alátámasztó adatok hol találhatók meg. Azoknak a szerzőknek, akik nem kívánják megosztani adataikat, jelezniük kell, hogy nem osztják meg azokat, és meg kell indokolniuk, hogy miért.

A rövidítések jegyzéke

Ha a szövegben rövidítéseket használnak, azokat a szövegben az első használatukkor meg kell határozni, és a rövidítések jegyzékét is meg kell adni.

Köszönetnyilvánítás

Kérjük, tüntessen fel mindenkit, aki hozzájárult a tanulmányhoz, de nem felel meg a szerzőség kritériumainak, beleértve azokat is, akik szakmai írói szolgáltatásokat vagy anyagokat nyújtottak.

A szerzőknek engedélyt kell kérniük a köszönetnyilvánítás szakaszban említett valamennyi személytől.

ETIKAI NORMÁK

A diszkrimináció tilalma

Az *„Autonómia és Társadalom"* c. folyóirat nem alkalmaz megkülönböztetést életkor, nem, faj, etnikai hovatartozás, nemzeti származás, vallás, identitás, fogyatékosság, egészségi állapot, családi vagy szülői státusz, illetve bármely más, a törvény által tiltott alapon.

A hatásköri visszaélés tilalma

Az *„Autonómia és Társadalom"* c. folyóirat szerkesztőbizottságának tagjai – akár személyes, gazdasági vagy szakmai előnyszerzés céljából – nem érvényesítik befolyásukat azokkal a potenciális szerzőkkel vagy recenzensekkel kapcsolatban, akik felett közvetlen vagy közvetett felügyeleti, értékelési vagy egyéb hatáskörrel rendelkeznek.

Az *„Autonómia és Társadalom"* c. folyóirat szerkesztőbizottságának tagjai nem rendelkeznek közvetlen felügyeleti vagy értékelői jogkörrel senki vonatkozásában, akivel főnök-beosztotti, rokonsági vagy szexuális kapcsolatban állnak.

Összeférhetetlenség

Az *„Autonómia és Társadalom„* szerkesztőbizottságának tagjai a szerkesztői munkájuk során minden befolyástól mentesen végzik munkájukat, és kerülik az összeférhetetlenség látszatát. Összeférhetetlenség akkor merül fel, ha a szerkesztőbizottság tagjainak személyes vagy pénzügyi érdekei megakadályozzák őket szerkesztői munkájuk elfogulatlan végzésében.

Érdekösszeütközések

Az érdekkonfliktusok lehetnek pénzügyi vagy nem pénzügyi jellegűek. Érdek-konfliktus akkor áll fenn, ha a szerzők adatértelmezését vagy az információk bemutatását befolyásolhatják a más személyekkel vagy szervezetekkel fennálló személyes vagy pénzügyi kapcsolataik.

Az *„Autonómia és Társadalom"* c. folyóirat szerzőinek nyilvánossá kell tenniük minden olyan pénzügyi és nem pénzügyi érdekeltséget, amely kínos helyzetbe hozhatja őket, ha a kézirat közzététele után nyilvánosságra kerül.

Plágium

Az *„Autonómia és Társadalom"* c. folyóirat tanulmányainak kifejezetten azo-nosítaniuk kell a szerzőt, és hivatkozniuk kell rá, ha adatokat vagy anyagot vesznek át szó szerint más személy írásos munkájából, legyen az publikált, publikálatlan vagy elektronikusan elérhető. A szerzők publikációikban elisme-rik és hivatkoznak mások munkájának felhasználására, beleértve a koncepcio-nális megközelítéseket, modelleket, módszereket, tartalmi vonatkozásokat és egyéb kutatási eszközöket, még akkor is, ha a munkát nem szó szerint idézik. Nem mutatják be mások munkáját sajátjukként, függetlenül attól, hogy az publikált, nem publikált vagy elektronikusan elérhető.

Közzététel utáni vita és javítások

Az *„Autonómia és Társadalom"* c. folyóirat a tartalom közzététele után a szak-irodalom javítására szolgáló módszerekkel rendelkezik és kész azok alkalmazá-sára. A publikálás utáni kommentárok vagy viták megjelenését lehetővé teszi, ha a közzétett adatok alternatív értelmezései kerülnek napvilágra. Ebben az esetben kérjük, vegye fel a kapcsolatot a szerkesztővel.

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