


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Social Positions and Social Statuses



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Social Positions and Social Statuses on a Shop Floor

An Empirical Illustration of the Theoretical Conception



ABSTRACT

In this paper, I illustrate the institutional (and relational) sociological conception of social position and social status by a brief description of a case study. I analyse the social positions and the social statuses of the workers, as well as the determinedness of social statuses by the given social positions on a machine industrial shop floor. First, I outline the interests and social powers of the workers. Next, I map the social positions of the workers, that is, I outline the social structure of the shop floor. Then I deal with the social statuses and the social determinedness of social statuses, and finally I briefly touch upon the performance orientations of the workers.

Keywords

social position, social status, types of social position, determinedness of social status, shop floor relations

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INTRODUCTION

In a theoretical article entitled *Social Position and Social Status: An Institutional and Relational Sociological Conception*, I deal with the concepts of social position and social status, the types of social position, as well as the determinedness of social statuses by the given positions (FARKAS 2020). In this paper, I will illustrate the conception of social position and social status as discussed in the mentioned article by a brief description of a case study. I will analyse the social positions and the social statuses of the workers, as well as the determinedness of social statuses by the given social positions on a machine industrial shop floor. I would like to point out that a satisfactory understanding of this paper requires knowledge of the theoretical article. In the following few paragraphs, I summarize very briefly the main concepts and connections discussed in it.

In the theoretical article, I introduced two different concepts, labelled as social position and social status. In my conception, *social position* means the position of the given individual (or group) in the system of social relations, which includes partly the position in the system of interest relations, partly the position in the system of social power relations. I defined the concept of social status in connection with the concept of the degree of interest realization. *Social status* is the degree of interest realization in the given social group or social sphere of life regarding all of the interests of the individual as compared to the degree of interest realization of others. I pointed out that the degree of interest realization and the social status are basically determined by the social position of the given individual or group, in other words by his/her or its positional social power given in his/her or its social position.

In real life, social positions can be rather complex, but by typifying social positions, we can point out their main features as well as certain regularities of how social relations work. Taking the authority position as a reference position, I typified the various social positions from the point of view of the two components of social positions: the power relations with those in the authority position and the interest relations with them (see Table 1). I distinguished authority position, exposed position, restricted position, patronized position, supported position, (strong, medial and weak) tolerated positions and rival position as the main types. I emphasized, that determined by the typical social positions, the individuals in a given social position realize their interests to a certain extent and achieve a better or worse social status.

Power relations with those in the authority position	Interest relations with those in the authority position			Neutral interest relation
	Interest identity or coincidence	Ambivalent interest relation	Interest contrary	
Balanced	<i>Authority position</i>	<i>Strong tolerated position</i>	<i>Rival position</i>	<i>Marginal positions</i>
Moderately unequal	<i>Supported position</i>	<i>Medial tolerated position</i>	<i>Restricted position</i>	
Largely unequal	<i>Patronized position</i>	<i>Weak tolerated position</i>	<i>Exposed position</i>	
Neutral power relation	<i>Parallel positions</i>			<i>Neutral position</i>

Table 1. The types of social position

Finally, I pointed out, that at the abstract level of a theory, we constitute ideal-typical concepts, and, by using such concepts, we formulate connections. Nevertheless, at the concessionary level of the theory and in empirical research into social positions, we can consider the complexity of real social relations to a more significant extent, especially (1) possibly the relative undeterminedness of the authority position, (2) possibly the existence of rival position, and (3) the social relations of the given individual or individuals in relation to those outside the authority position.

While discussing social positions and statuses, to a certain extent, I will also deal with the social structure and the stratification of the given shop floor. However, in the present paper I do not deal with the structure and stratification conception that is in close connection with the conception of social position and social status as discussed in the theoretical article (about this in short see: FARKAS 2019. 3–22.). Here, I only point out very briefly in what sense I will use the concepts of social class and social structure, and I will try to avoid the use of the concepts concerning social stratification. In my conception, *social class* is the aggregate of individuals in essentially similar social positions in the given social group. Thus, we classify the individuals on the basis of their essentially similar or different social positions into the same or into different social classes. *Social structure* is the specific whole of the social classes making up the given social group and the typical social relations between the given classes. In another paper I outlined the social structure of the capitalist society, which, in this way, can be regarded as another empirical illustration of social positions in my conception (about this in short see: FARKAS 2019. 11–15.).

The above-mentioned research was carried out in the Machining Shop Floor of the Pump Manufacturing Factory Unit of the Diósgyőr Machine Works (Miskolc, Hungary). I did the fieldwork long before the ‘regime change’ (in December 1983 and in January and February 1984), in the socialist era; the examined period was the year 1983. The factory unit produced pumps ranging from small-sized diving pumps to large-sized agricultural pumps. The cutting processes necessary for the production of the parts of pumps took place in the examined machining shop floor. The rough layout of the shop floor is included in Figure 1 in the appendix. It also shows that the machine park consisted of traditional cutting machines except for two numerical-control (NC) lathes. There were 80 machine operators working on the shop floor, and with the exception of five semi-skilled workers, all of them were skilled workers. Almost half of the workers were centre lathers, the other half were special lathers, revolver lathers, revolver lathe setters, NC lathers, horizontal lathers, millers, grinders, radial drillers and slotters. The shop floor management was composed of the head of shop floor and five foremen.¹

The theoretical conception concerning social positions and statuses discussed in the theoretical article started to evolve in the 1980s while I was doing some empirical sociological research on the shop floors. Although, at that time, I worked out the theory of institutional sociology, which this conception fits into, only in its main concepts and the main connections between these concepts, in the research in question I had already carried out the data collection and analysis on the basis of this conception. As the sociologist of the machine factory, I examined

¹ It is worth mentioning that Miklós Haraszti’s book entitled *A Worker in a Worker’s State* was based on the experience he gained on a similar shop floor in socialist Hungary (HARASZTI 1977). Besides, Michael Burawoy carried out some research between 1984 and 1987 in Hungary, and the machining shop floor in the ‘Bánki’ machine factory, where he did his research in 1984, was very similar to the shop floor I did my research in (BURAWOY – LUKÁCS 1992. 35–80.).

the given shop floor in various ways. I conducted a questionnaire-based interview with all the workers available (72 persons) while I completed the closed-ended questions with open-ended questions and a detailed discussion of certain issues. I also conducted in-depth interviews with some selected workers, accompanied some workers and foremen as a non-participant observer, and processed official documents and data. Next, I will very briefly analyse the social positions and statuses on the given shop floor. I base my analysis on the original data analysis (then still on a large computer with individual programs) using only a small part of the data available. By briefly presenting a part of the results of my research, I aim to illustrate the concepts and connections discussed in the theoretical article rather than review the given shop floor and the research methods I used. Therefore, I will not review the operationalization of the theoretical concepts, the concessions made in the course of the operationalization and the empirical research methods in detail.

Although it was several decades ago that I did the research, I will generally write about the shop floor in question in the present tense. First, I will outline the interests and social powers of the workers. Next, I will map the social positions of the workers, that is, I will outline the social structure of the shop floor. Then I will deal with the social statuses and the social determinedness of social statuses, and finally I will briefly touch upon the performance orientations of the workers.

INTERESTS AND SOCIAL POWERS ON THE SHOP FLOOR

Components of interests

As mentioned in the theoretical article, social position includes partly the position in the system of interest relations, partly the position in the system of social power relations. Thus, in order to survey the interest relations and social power relations on the shop floor, and to define the social positions, first we have to survey the interests and the social powers of the workers.

In my conception, from the point of view of motivation, the conduct of the workers on the shop floor is basically determined by their interests, that is, they are motivated by their realizable and known interests. If earnings refer to money earned from work on the shop floor, earnings constitute the main social goods that their interests are directed to. Thus, I will call the shop floor interests of the workers earnings interest. *Earnings interest* is the network of action possibilities created by institutions that may lead to the highest possible earnings available in the validity scope of the given institutions with an acceptable expenditure. In my conception, interests are factual environmental entities existing independently of the awareness of individuals and their conduct determined by the given interests. In another paper, I gave a very detailed analysis of the earnings interests of the workers on the given shop floor, and I also pointed out the social institutions and material-technical circumstances that create the components of the interests, that is, the action possibilities constituting the interests (FARKAS 2011). However, for reasons of space, here I only point out very briefly the main components of interests.

In the direct production shop floors of the Diósgyőr Machine Works, among the workers involved in direct production, payment by results was applied everywhere, while on the machining shop floors, individual payment by results was used. Thus, on the machining shop floor, the

subject of the research, the operators of cutting machines were also paid individually by results. According to the system of individual payment by results applied on the shop floor, the basic component of earnings is the (mathematical) product of the personal wage – specified for each worker as an individual, concerning one hour of norm time – and the performance of the worker measured in norm time.² The basic wage is supplemented by different allowances due to various titles, as well as by payment for non-working hours.

In Figure 2, I demonstrate that the components of earnings interests on the given shop floor can be interpreted at three levels from the point of view that the components at the same level are basically created or determined by the social institutions that can be assigned to the given level. The first level includes the general feature of the earnings interest that the earnings interest is made up of the action possibilities of optimizing the earnings and expenditures. At this level, the interests of the workers are determined by certain legal institutions and institutions or agreements within the families. The second level includes the components concerning wage factors that are mainly created by the institutions of the incentive system and the performance account of the firm. At this level, the earnings interests of the workers are mainly made up of the maximization of their personal wage, and the optimization of their performance percentage and their additional work. What earnings the workers earn at what expenditure of labour on the given shop floor depends mainly on what personal wage they have, what performance percentage they have achieved, and how much additional work they do. Consequently, these factors or rather the action possibilities that are in connection with them are also at the centre of the earnings interests of the workers.




Figure 2. Components of earnings interests

Personal wage is the wage for one hour of work according to the accomplished norm time, which, in this way, significantly affects the worker's earnings. When determining the personal wage of a worker, the managers take the qualifications and work experience of the worker into consideration, but also evaluate the worker's behaviour at work in a discretionary way.

² The norm time is the amount of time necessary to carry out a specific work or task according to the technological instructions.

Performance percentage shows how long it took the worker to complete the task compared to the period of time specified for the given task, the so-called norm time. Thus, as an example, if it takes a worker 50 minutes to do one hour's work according to the norm time, he or she achieves 120% performance; if, on the other hand, it takes him or her 80 minutes to do one hour's work, he or she will only achieve 75% performance. There are two forms of work outside the normal working hours, i.e., additional work on the given shop floor. One of them is the traditional overtime, which is a simple extension of working hours; but the wage earned on the basis of the performance during overtime is supplemented by an overtime allowance. The other is work in an internal subcontracting form, work done in the frame of the economic work partnership (GMK). There are six workers who are members of the economic work partnership established on the machining shop floor and they do additional work in the frame of this partnership.

The third level of the components of interests includes the components concerning means of work, work tasks and doing work, which are mostly created by the institutions of labour division, workplace supply, quality control and the institutions of the so-called 'quasi-ownership'. The main components of earnings interests at this level are as follows: optimization of the supply with means of work, optimization of work supply and, in connection with this, loosening of norm times; and in close connection with the former issues, the optimization of the number of shifts and the optimization of direct work.

Supply of the means of work includes supply of machine, on the one hand, and supply of tools and special devices, on the other. Supplying the worker with a machine usually marks out the regular workplace (workstation) of the worker for a longer period of time. The machine and the workplace that make it possible for the worker to achieve the highest possible earnings with a specified expenditure, or where the specified earnings require the least possible expenditure, correspond to the earnings interest. In the research in question, I tried to survey which characteristics of the machines on the shop floor were significant from the above-mentioned points of view, and to what extent the individual machines corresponded to the interests of the workers (FARKAS 2011. 24–28.). However, I only point out here that it is principally important for the workers that the machine should be in a good mechanical state and the norm time of the tasks belonging to the given machine or the tasks that can be performed on the given machine should be comparatively easy. At the same time, the machines that can be found on the shop floor are markedly different from each other from the point of view of these characteristics.

Besides the optimization of the supply of machine, within the interest component concerning means of work, the action possibilities making up the earnings interests are aimed at the optimization of the supply with tools and special devices. In general, we can say that the tools and special devices correspond to the interests of the workers if they are in a good state, can withstand a load larger than the load at the specified cutting speed and depth of cut, and are instantly available.

Regarding the supply of work, the higher the earnings that can be achieved with the required expenditures, or the less work expenditure the defined earnings require, the more the work tasks and workpieces correspond to the earnings interest. The most important issue of the optimization of work supply is differentiation between 'good jobs' and 'bad jobs' and obtaining the so-called 'good jobs'. The 'good' task and workpiece mean that the norm time of the given work is easy, while the norm time of the so-called 'bad job' is comparatively strict. In connection with

this, the action possibilities making up the interests of the workers are aimed at (1) work tasks with longer piece time, i.e., tasks that contain more cutting operations and long operation time, (2) pieces of less hard materials and (3) workpieces only recently given in production; (4) the longer these tasks and workpieces provide the worker with continuous work and (5) the more they are repeated, the more they correspond to the workers' interests. Relying on objective data, I have arrived at the conclusion that, concerning the 'goodness' of tasks, there can be up to three-to-fourfold differences between the different tasks and workpieces on a given shop floor.

The component of earnings interest concerning the optimization of the number of shifts and shift-rota is closely related to the components concerning the optimization of means of work and work supply. The Machining Shop Floor usually operates in two shifts, the morning and the afternoon shift, that is, the workers usually work in one or two shifts. Occasionally, however, the management may also order a three-shift system for certain machines or for certain workers. From the point of view of the optimization of the supply with work, workpieces and means of work, it is the one (morning) shift that corresponds most to the earnings interest. Nevertheless, if the worker is not able to achieve a favourable status regarding the supply of work, workpieces and means of work, the two-shift system, or, perhaps, the three-shift system may prove to be more favourable. The advantages of working in two or three shifts are that the workers are paid a bonus of 20 percent for the afternoon shift and a bonus of 40 percent for the night shift. According to the answers given to this question, 32 percent of the workers prefer the one-shift work, 54 percent the two-shift work and 14 percent the three-shift work.

As we could see above, the interests of the workers do not concern only the direct work. However, the action possibilities of optimizing the direct work are also important components of their interests. As for the intensity of work, it is mostly continuous work, without unintentional or intentional interruptions, with appropriate rest periods, done at a constant intensity that is, in the form of action possibilities, in the interest of the workers. Besides, they act according to their own interests also in the longer term if they produce workpieces machined of the appropriate quality. However, the careful use of machines, tools and devices constitutes their interest to a medium, rather than to a large extent. From the point of view of the extent to which it pays off to take fellow-workers into consideration, the workers' interests are made up of action possibilities that include considering the probable consequences of the actions, with respect to the workers with whom the given worker has social relationships, on the one hand, and those who have considerable social powers towards the given worker, on the other hand. In the paper referred to above, I pointed out that the components of the workers' interests that concern direct work are also significantly different from the action possibilities that can be inferred from the formal norms (FARKAS 2011. 34–36.).

The main interest components in question are of different weight, especially in connection with the fact that the degree of the realization of certain components largely determines the realizability of other components. The workers, however, not only know the individual components of their interests to a satisfactory degree, but, at the level of practical rationality, they also have a clear insight into the connections between the individual components. To support this statement, I point out how the workers give importance to the main components making up their earnings interests. In the questionnaire, I asked the workers to rank the individual components from the point of view of how important they think their realization is.




Figure 3. Rank order of the main components of earnings interests

Figure 3 shows that the workers regard the optimization of work supply, that is, the appropriate supply of work and workpieces, as well as the norm times that are favourable for them, as the most important. The next most important aspect for them is supply of the means of work, and, within this, they consider the optimization of the supply of machine more important than the supply of tools and special devices. These factors are followed by the components concerning the optimization of personal wage and performance percentage, then the component concerning the optimization of the work expenditure in the direct work. Finally, they regard the appropriate number of shifts and the possibility of additional work as the least noteworthy.

It is striking that the workers do not emphasize the importance of the interest components that I defined at the second level of earnings interests, the ones that are most closely related to earnings, but rather the components concerning tasks, workpieces and means of work, the effect of which on earnings and expenditures is far more indirect. In the present paper I do not deal with the mechanism of interest realization; I only remark here that, in the rank formed by the workers, it is crucially the actual determinedness between the individual interest components that are reflected. From the point of view of earnings interests, continuous supply with relatively 'good' works and the appropriate supply of the means of work are fundamental. These factors basically determine the realizability and efficiency of work expenditure and, in close connection with this, performance percentage and additional work. The components concerning personal wage and the number of shifts depend on other components to a lesser degree, but personal wage in itself is already an important determinant of earnings and expenditures.

In my research, I aimed to survey the expectations and attitudes of workers regarding the intensity of work, the quality of work, careful use of the means of work and consideration of fellow-workers. I tried to find the answer to the question of whether these expectations and attitudes reflect their interests or their personal and community values. I came to the conclusion that

personal and community values, as well as community moral norms do not restrict considerably the motivating effect of earnings interests.

Social powers

According to some conceptions, social power cannot be measured since this concept includes the aspects of social reality the quantitative expression of which is not possible. In some other conceptions, social power can be measured, and to measure the intensity of social power, typically, two methods are applied in sociological research: the reputational method and the event or effect method (BARNES 1988. 8–12.). The reputational method means assessing the power of certain actors by asking other actors who they believe to be most influential in the given area of social life (D'Antonio – Erickson 1962; FISCHER – SCIARINI 2015; MARGETTS 2011). This method is mainly used in the field of politics and in the research into the powers prevailing in political decision-making processes (e.g. HENRY 2011; KRIESI – ADAM – JOCHUM 2006). The representatives of the effect method regard the consequences attributed to the social power as the indicator of power. As an example, according to WHITMEYER (2001), the intensity of social power can be assessed by measuring the expected outcomes of the power. GOLDBERG (2006) examined power relations in political alliances by observing phenomena regarded as the consequences of the powers exercised, by what he called the ethnographic method.

In the given research, I considered it important to measure social powers independently of the social phenomena that we can partly regard as the consequences of the given powers. I measured the intensity of the social powers of workers towards the shop floor managers and towards all the workers on the shop floor by asking two questions. To measure the power towards the managers of the shop floor, I asked three out of six members of the management, the head of shop floor and two foremen, the following question: 'To what extent could the individual workers help or hinder the managers in their ambition to ensure that the shop floor meets the requirements of the factory unit management if this was their intention?' To answer this question, the respondents were expected to take the previous year (1983) as a basis, and, in the course of the analysis, I took the answers of the head of shop floor and of the two foremen with equal weight into consideration, and I calculated the social power towards the managers in this way. To measure the powers between the workers, I asked the given worker the following question: 'To what extent could you help or hinder your fellow-workers in their work to achieve higher earnings if you intended to and if you set aside the probable reaction of the other party?' With the person (manager or worker) interviewed I considered all the machine workers one by one, and he or she had to rank them on a scale ranging from one (to a small extent) to five (to a very large extent) when answering the above-mentioned question.

I determined the average powers of the workers towards their fellow-workers, and then I classified the workers according to their powers towards the managers on the one hand, and according to the intensity of their average powers towards their fellow-workers on two separate scales ranging from one to five (from small powers to large powers), which I do not present here. Based on the answers to the above-mentioned questions, we can say that the powers of all of the 80 workers towards their managers were known, but only 67 workers answered the question regarding their powers towards their fellow-workers, (however, their powers towards all their fellow-workers

were known). Nevertheless, from the point of view of determining social positions, it is an important variable; therefore, on the basis of some other information, I also assessed the average power of the workers who gave no answer to the question towards their fellow-workers.³

As I mentioned in the introduction of the theoretical article, social power is the degree of the social abilities of the given individual (or group) in which these abilities constitute the means or conditions of need satisfaction for another individual (or group) as an object. While preparing the research I assumed that the components of the social powers of the workers are mainly made up of the following social abilities: (1) scope of action at work, (2) expertise, (3) scope of action in the party or the trade union, (4) social relationship and (5) quasi-ownership on the shop floor.

The scope of action at work mostly includes the work tasks that the workers have to perform at the given workplace. Performing certain work tasks in time and of the proper quality may affect the interests of the managers to a larger extent than performing other work tasks. Consequently, the different scopes of action may constitute different degrees of power towards the managers of the shop floor. From the point of view of the fellow-workers, the scope of action may also constitute a significant social ability, especially depending on how and to what extent the scopes of action of the different workers are connected to each other in the technological process.

On shop floors where workers are paid individually by results, one of the most important social abilities is the expertise necessary for performing the work tasks falling into the scope of action of the worker. Besides expertise, the indicator I applied also includes the effort the worker makes during his or her normal working hours. Expertise can be regarded as ability and social ability; effort made at work relies on motives rather than abilities. Originally, I used the more complex indicator because I required it for another purpose (later I also measured expertise itself but in this context I still used the former indicator). I measured expertise and effort on the basis of the evaluation of two foremen; I asked the managers to evaluate the workers according to their expertise and the effort they put in during their normal working hours. Finally, I classified the workers into four categories: very good (18 men), relatively good (29 men), medium (20 men) and satisfactory (23 men) in respect of expertise and effort.

On the shop floor, 10 workers (12.5%) have relatively significant party or trade union (as well as youth organization, i.e. KISZ) scope of action, which means a formal entitlement to influence managerial decisions affecting the interests of workers. Eight out of the ten workers in question are trade union officers (shop stewards, members of the committee of the trade union), one is a party group officer and one the secretary of the youth organization (KISZ).

I measured social relationships with the number of the relationships (mutual choices) revealed by a network research method. As for relationships with workers and shop floor managers, 34 workers (43%) have no relationships at all, 29 workers (36%) have relationships with one or two people, and another 17 workers (21%) have social relationships with three, four or five people on the examined shop floor.⁴

³ Three workers evaded the question saying that they do not have considerable influence on their fellow-workers, therefore I classified them into the group of workers with small average power. I determined the average powers of the other workers who gave no answer towards their fellow-workers (10 people) considering partly their average power towards the management, and partly the social abilities most important from this aspect, namely, expertise (and effort) and the scope of action at work. These factors were known in the case of all the workers.

⁴ There were nine workers who did not take part in the network survey. I determined the probable number of their relationships on the basis of the unilateral choices where they were named.

Contrary to the official norms, the managers of the shop floor and the workers in advantageous positions have shaped what I call the institution of *quasi-ownership*, which means that, within certain limits, certain workers may take possession of some means of work, workpieces and work tasks. Of course, within their scope of action, the workers can mostly dispose of the means of work and workpieces; by quasi-ownership I mean disposal beyond this. Firstly, regarding the machines, it means that the worker, as the ‘owner’ of his or her machine, cannot be transferred to another machine against his or her will. Secondly, the owner-workers can develop their own sets of tools and devices, which they are relatively free to dispose of. Thirdly, some workers may also take possession of some workpieces or work tasks. In this way, the workers can obtain work tasks or workpieces that are in their quasi-ownership and that are, from the point of view of earnings interests, favourable for them, disregarding the individual decisions of foremen and dispatchers. The worker may request that these workpieces be directed to his or her machine, without it being transported first to the storeroom of the shop floor; and to start the work he or she does not need to ask for the approval of the foreman, either.

Social power	Social abilities				
	Scope of action at work	Expertise (end effort)	Scope of action in party or trade union	Social relationships	Quasi-ownership on shop floor
Power towards managers	0.45	0.80	0.43	0.61	0.83
Power towards workers	0.53	0.65	0.35	0.46	0.46

Table 2. Correlation of the intensity of social powers with the main social abilities

We may gain some impression about the importance of the above-mentioned social abilities if we have a look at the correlation coefficients between these factors and the intensity of social powers. Table 2 shows that the intensity of the powers towards managers is in very close connection with the quasi-ownership and expertise (and effort). Social relationships correlate with the powers towards the managers to a lesser degree, and the scope of action at work and in party or trade union comparatively the least. Expertise (and effort), then the scope of action at work are relatively in the closest connection with the intensity of the social powers towards the workers. Social relationships and quasi-ownership correlate less with the powers towards the workers, and scope of action in party or trade union the least.

As is well-known, simple correlation coefficients do not properly express how important the social abilities in question are by themselves, relatively independently of each other, as the components of social powers are. Therefore, I tried to demonstrate by path analysis to what extent these social abilities constitute the components of the powers of the workers towards the managers of the shop floor, on the one hand, and towards their fellow workers, on the other. In this respect, I deal with the powers towards the managers in more detail, because – as we will see below – these powers are more significant from the point of view of the extent to which the workers realize their interests, and what social status they achieve.




Figure 4. Representation of the components of powers towards the managers by path analysis

Figure 4 shows the connections between the social abilities under review, as well as between these abilities and the intensity of power towards the managers. The arrows represent pure (or direct) effects – with directions I as the researcher assumed in advance – in the form of path coefficients, except the simple correlation coefficient between the scope of action at work and expertise (and effort). According to the figure in question, it is mainly expertise (and effort) and the quasi-ownership within the shop floor, by themselves and independently of other social abilities, that constitute the social powers towards the managers. Compared with these abilities, directly, the scope of action at work has a much smaller significance, but, in the longer term, the scope of action at work also has an effect on other social abilities. Independently of other social abilities, scope of action in party or trade union and social relationships have a rather small significance. The social abilities in question constitute 81 percent of the social powers of the workers towards the managers.

I do not analyse the components of the powers towards the workers, I only note that, according to the data, the social abilities under review amount only to nearly 58 percent of the powers towards the workers. This less close connection can mainly be explained by the fact that the powers between the workers are considerably differentiated depending on whether the given workers work on similar or different kinds of machines and how these machines are connected to each other in the technological process, or whether they happen to work on the same machine. Consequently, some of the worker's social ability towards some of his or her fellow-workers may be significant, whereas towards others it may be irrelevant.

As mentioned above, I determined the powers of workers towards the managers and their average powers towards their fellow-workers. Taking the powers towards the managers and the average powers towards the workers with the same weight into consideration, I determined the general powers of the particular workers, and measured them on a scale ranging from one (small power) to five (large power). However, I will correct general powers below, from the point of view of mapping social positions, and outlining the social structure, attributing greater importance to the powers towards the managers.

So far, within the social power relations between the workers and the managers, I have only discussed the powers of the workers towards the managers. Regarding the power of the managers, we can assume that the head of the shop floor and the foremen have large powers towards the workers, and they have authority over the majority of the workers. Their social powers are decisively made up of their managerial scope of action, but partly, also, of their social relationships. The scope of the power of the managers includes employing workers, determining their scope of activities, job title and personal wage on the one hand, leading and controlling the everyday activity of the workers on the other.

SOCIAL POSITIONS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

As seen in the theoretical article, while highlighting the authority position as a reference position, we determine the typical social positions taking the social relations to those in the authority position into consideration. However, during the empirical survey of the social position of individuals, to a certain extent, we may also take their social relations to other individuals and groups with relatively significant powers into consideration. Although we are interested in workers, while determining the social positions of the workers and outlining the social structure of the shop floor, we have to keep in mind that the managers of the shop floor (the head of shop floor and the foremen) have considerable powers towards the workers, and they have authority over the majority of the workers. Therefore, in the research in question, I also aimed to survey the social relations of the workers to the managers.

As mentioned above, while taking the powers towards the managers and the average powers towards the workers with the same weight into consideration, I determined the general powers of the particular workers. However, I corrected the general powers from the point of view of mapping social positions, and outlining the social structure, attributing greater importance to the powers towards the managers. Finally, according to their corrected general powers, I placed the workers into three categories. By the correction of the general power I mean that I also took the powers towards the management into consideration separately when categorizing according to powers. Namely, according to the data, independently of the powers towards the managers, the powers towards the workers have no significant effect on the degree of interest realization and social (earnings) status. Regarding the connections between the three factors in question we can state that the correlation coefficient between the power towards the managers and the average power towards the workers is 0.53; the partial correlation coefficient between the power towards the managers and the social (earnings) status (to be discussed below) is 0.81; whereas the partial correlation coefficient between the average power towards the workers and the social (earnings) status is only 0.08.

According to the *corrected general powers*, the workers whose general power reaches or exceeds 3.35, and/or their power towards the managers reaches or exceeds 4.00 have large corrected general power. The workers whose general power falls between 2.61 and 3.34, and/or their power towards the managers falls between 3.50 and 3.99 have medium corrected power. The workers whose general power is less than 2.61 and their powers towards the managers is less than 3.50 have small corrected power. In this way, 20 workers (25%) have large corrected general power, 23 workers (29%) have medium power and 37 workers (46%) have small power. Thus, the categories according to the corrected general powers decisively express the power relations towards the managers of the shop floor, but partially they also express the power relations between the workers.⁵

In principle, the other aspect of typifying is constituted by the interest relations to those having authority, distinguishing, firstly, interest identity and interest coincidence, secondly, ambivalent interest relations and, thirdly, interest contrary. However, in the course of classification according to the interest relations, in the given research I not only took the interest relations to the members of the authority class into consideration, but also, the interest relations to the largely powerful workers in general and, in the case of the workers with small power, to the workers in the supported position (who have medium corrected power).

I defined the interest relations within the shop floor in the following three ways, regarding the managers on the one hand, and the fellow-workers on the other. Firstly, I surveyed the social relationships within the shop floor. I had assumed, namely, that social relationships indicate that the workers, as well as the workers and managers who are in relationship with each other conciliate their interests to a considerable extent, so their interests are largely identical. Secondly, I attempted to survey the interest relations between the workers and the managers partly with a question that I asked the head of shop floor and two foremen. I assumed that the interest relations between the workers and the managers are largely reflected by the extent to which the opinions of the managers and the opinions of the workers assumed by the managers are similar or different regarding the issues considerably affecting the interests of the workers (I measured the similarities or differences of opinions on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, where the full agreement is indicated by 5).⁶ Thirdly, I determined the interest relations between the workers partly by considering the interconnection or separation of means of work, work tasks and work accounts.

As we have seen in the theoretical article, the reference point of typifying social positions is, in principle, the individual or group who has authority and is in the authority position. Thus in the first place, we have to circumscribe the individuals in the authority position. If there are several individuals in the authority position, they are bound together by social relationships; these individuals form a social union or, considered at a concessionary level, a cohesive social network. Since – as I have mentioned above – it is probable that it is mainly the managers who

⁵ By excluding the effect of the other factor (powers towards the workers or the managers), the partial correlation coefficient between the powers towards the managers and the corrected general powers is 0.72, whereas the partial correlation coefficient between the average powers towards the workers and the corrected general powers is 0.24.

⁶ The question was as follows: ‘To what extent would you find it acceptable if things related to work and incentives on the shop floor would change as the individual workers would presumably like it?’ The manager questioned evaluated all the workers one by one with regard to the mentioned question.

are in the authority position, I surveyed the social relationships between the workers, and between the managers, as well as between the workers and managers.⁷

The social relationships (mutual choices) on the shop floor are shown by Figure 5 in the appendix, according to which four out of the six managers form a solid clique, which I call the core of the management. Of all the workers having large social power I classified those into the authority social class who are members of the cohesive social network (subgroup) which includes also the four managers of the shop floor and who, in the above-mentioned figure, can be found within the section of the authority class. Besides the fact that they have large social power, these workers are linked to the network of the workers having large power and the core of the management with at least two social relationships (mutual choices). Thus, I classified 7 workers, nearly 9% of the workers into the authority social class.⁸ I have to remark that, from the above-mentioned aspect, I classified two workers (worker 2 and worker 15) into the category in question with some concession. Namely, according to the network diagram, these two workers have no visible social relationships with the workers in the authority position and the core of the management. However, in fact, they presumably have some relationships, since four or five persons from this circle chose them unilaterally and some other information also proved the existence of these relationships.⁹

Within the circle of the workers with large (corrected general) power, I classified the workers who do not belong to the authority class, into the strong tolerated social class. According to the aspects of interest relations discussed in the paragraph below, two workers (worker 28 and worker 29) would be in a rival social position, thus these workers should have been classified into the rival social class. However, the rival class would only have consisted of these two workers, so – to avoid distinguishing such a small social class – I also classified them into the strong tolerated class.

Taking only the workers with medium or small power into consideration, I classified the workers into the different categories by interest relations according to the following aspects. I

⁷ The question to the workers to survey the relationships between them was as follows: 'If, under the present circumstances, you were to be entrusted with the task of assembling the worker staff of the shop floor, who would you most like to include as fellow workers in the staff? You may choose any number of persons from among the workers of the shop floor who receive a payment by results.' Apart from the managers of the shop floor, I also involved other managers of the factory unit in the survey of social relationships, but in the present paper I do not deal with managers outside the shop floor. The question to the workers to survey the relationships of workers with their managers was as follows: 'If there were some changes made in the management of the factory unit and the shop floor, under whose direction would you most like to work from among the current managers? You may name any number of persons ranging from the head of the factory unit to the foremen. The question to be answered by the head of the shop floor and the five foremen was aimed to survey the relationships of the workers with the managers and it was the same as the first question to be answered by the workers (without the words 'as fellow workers'). In order to survey the relationships between the managers, the following question was asked (however, this question is of any interest only from the point of view of the survey of the relationships between the managers of the shop floor): 'If there were some changes made in the management of the shop floor and the factory unit, who of the present managers would you most like to continue working with? You may name any number of persons from those in managerial positions at present, including group leaders, foremen, heads of department, heads of shop floor, technical managers and the head of the factory unit.'

⁸ Together with the managers constituting the core of the management, workers 1, 2, 3, 15, 19, 20 and 25 compose the authority social class.

⁹ Worker 2 did not take part in the network survey, but he was chosen by five people from the core of the management and the circle of the workers in authority position. Worker 15 took part in the network survey and he had no visible relationships with the core of the management and the workers in authority position, but he was chosen by four persons from this circle.

classified the workers who satisfy at least one of the following two requirements into the category of identity and/or coincidence interest relations. (1) From the point of view of the managers: the value of the assessment of agreement or disagreement is at least 3.75 and/or the worker has some social relationship with the core of the management. (2) From the point of view of the workers: joint work load and accounts with a worker having large power, or, in the case of a worker with small power, with a worker in supported position, and/or social relationship with a worker in authority position, or some close family relationship with a worker with large power (e.g. wife, child, son-in-law).¹⁰

I classified the workers who satisfy at least one of the following two requirements into the category of ambivalent interest relations. (1) From the point of view of the managers: the value of the assessment of agreement or disagreement falls between 3.01 and 3.74 and the worker has no social relationship with any member of the core of the management. (2) From the point of view of the workers: joint means of work and work tasks (the same machine, jointly used tools and special devices, and typically continuing the work started by the other worker in the previous shift), but no joint accounts with a worker having large power as a shift-mate (without a social or family relationship mentioned in the former category).

I classified the workers who satisfy both of the following two requirements into the category of contrary interest relations: (1) From the point of view of the managers: the value of the assessment of agreement or disagreement is not more than 3.00 and the worker has no social relationship with any member of the core of the management; (2) From the point of view of the workers: the worker works on his or her machine on his/her own or with a worker (as a shift-mate) with no large power and he or she has separate accounts (without a social or family relationship mentioned in the former categories).

Power relations with those in the authority position	Interest relations with those in the authority position		
	Interest identity or coincidence	Ambivalent interest relation	Interest contrary
	27 (33.8%)	32 (40.0%)	21 (26.2%)
Large power	<i>Authority</i>	<i>Strong tolerated</i>	<i>Rival</i>
20 (25.0%)	7 (8.8%)	13 (16.2%)	-
Medium power	<i>Supported</i>	<i>Medial tolerated</i>	<i>Restricted</i>
23 (28.8%)	8 (10.0%)	11 (13.8%)	4 (5.0%)
Small power	<i>Patronized</i>	<i>Weak tolerated</i>	<i>Exposed</i>
37 (46.2%)	12 (15.0%)	8 (10.0%)	17 (21.2%)

Table 3. Distribution of workers according to social positions or the social structure of the shop floor

¹⁰ To my knowledge, none of the workers had any close family relationship with the managers of the shop floor or the upper managers.

Thus, in line with the above-mentioned criteria, I classified the workers into the different social positions and the different social classes according to the social power relations and interest relations. As we can see in Table 3, 20 workers (25%) have large social power; among them 7 workers (nearly 9%) are in authority position, i.e. they constitute the authority class, along with the four managers composing the core of the management. 13 workers (nearly 16%) are in strong tolerated position and they constitute the strong tolerated class. 23 workers (nearly 29%) have medium social power; among them 8 workers (10%) are in supported position and in the supported class; 11 workers (nearly 14%) are in medial tolerated position and 4 workers (5%) are in restricted position and they constitute the medial tolerated class and the restricted class. 37 workers (nearly 46%) have small social power; among them 12 workers (15%) are in patronized position and they constitute the patronized class, 8 workers (10%) are in weak tolerated position and constitute the weak tolerated class, and 17 workers (nearly 21%) are in exposed position and constitute the exposed class. It would be worth analysing the composition of the social classes according to certain aspects (practical experience, social relationships, expertise and effort, scope of activity, party or trade union function, family-financial position, etc.), but, for reasons of space, I do not deal with this in the present paper.

As seen in the theoretical article, from the point of view of social inequalities, different social positions can also be similar, that is, from the aspect of what social statuses they make it feasibly possible to achieve, since the social status is basically determined by the inequality aspect of social position, that is, by the positional social power inherent in the social position of the given individual or group. By *social stratum position* I mean the inequality aspect of social position, that is, what degree of positional social power the given individual or group has. Thus, in principle, we can find more unambiguous inequalities between the different stratum positions than between certain social positions (and social classes). In the given research, from the above-mentioned aspect, I distinguished very advantageous (18 workers), relatively advantageous (21 workers), relatively disadvantageous (24 workers) and very disadvantageous (17 workers) positions. However, in the present paper, – for reasons of space – I do not deal with social stratum positions. I analyse the distribution of the degree of interest realization and social status according to the social position rather than the social stratum position, since, in this way, I can highlight the similarities and differences between the different social positions from the point of view of inequalities.

SOCIAL STATUSES AND PERFORMANCE ORIENTATIONS

Social determinedness of social (earnings) status

As mentioned above, the action possibilities constituting the earnings interest are aimed at the joint optimization of earnings and expenditures. It is not only the amount of earnings that is important for the workers, but also the efficiency of work expenditure, that is, how much they can earn through one unit of expenditure (HÉTHY – MAKÓ 1978. 117–118.; HILL 1986. 14.). The efficiency of work expenditure is expressed relatively well by earnings for one working hour, which I will call the hourly earnings. Figure 6 illustrates the distribution of the monthly average

earnings and hourly earnings of the individual workers. The analysis of the earnings and their components are based on the monthly (in the case of hourly earnings, the hourly) averages of the data for the whole of the year 1983 provided by the company's wage registration.

We can see that there is a very tight connection between earnings and hourly earnings and that the earnings are very differentiated; the difference between the lowest and the highest earnings is nearly tenfold. However, such great differences in earnings were not exceptional, they were rather usual in the period under review in the machining shop floors of the Diósgyőr Machine Works.




Figure 6. Earnings and hourly earnings on the shop floor

As seen in the theoretical article, by social status we mean the degree of interest realization in the given social group regarding all of the interests of the individual and compared to the

degree of interest realization of others. In the machining shop floor, the social status of the workers is reflected by the so-called earnings status. The concept of *earnings status* expresses how much an individual earns and through what amount of expenditure; the more the given individual earns with an expenditure still acceptable for him or her, the more favourable the earnings status is. In the research I classified the workers into five categories according to their earnings status, which is also shown in the above-mentioned figure.

According to the conception discussed in the theoretical article, the degree of interest realization and the social status are basically determined by the social position of the given individual or group. Table 4 shows the distribution of the workers in different social positions according to social (earnings) status; we could even say that this table shows the connection between social structure and social status stratification (see about this: FARKAS 2019. 18–20.). Figure 7, however, shows the average earnings statuses depending on social positions or the social structure. Accordingly, there is a rather tight connection between social position and social (earnings) status.

Social position	Social (earnings) status					Total
	Very good	Relatively good	Medium	Relatively bad	Very bad	
Authority position	6	1	-	-	-	7
Strong tolerated position	3	5	5	-	-	13
Supported position	2	4	2	-	-	8
Medial tolerated position	-	2	6	3	-	11
Patronized position	-	-	-	12	-	12
Restricted position	-	-	-	3	1	4
Weak tolerated position	-	-	1	4	3	8
Exposed position	-	-	-	3	14	17
Total	11	12	14	25	18	80

Table 4. Connection between social position and social status on the shop floor

With the exception of one worker, the workers in the authority position have achieved a very good earnings status, that is, they earn a lot of money with an acceptable amount of work. The earnings status of the workers in the authority position is 4.86 on average on a scale ranging from 0 to 5. The workers in the strong tolerated and supported positions have a relatively good average earnings status (3.85 and 4). According to their earnings statuses, these workers are relatively differentiated, and from a theoretical point of view it was slightly expectable that five

of them would be in a very good earnings status. However, we will see below that, among the workers in question, the workers who can compensate their lower personal wages (compared to the wages of those in the authority position) with a large volume of additional work in the economic work partnership typically gain a very good earnings status (four out of five men). The workers in the medial tolerated position have an average medium social status (2.91) and are mostly in medium status (6 men). However, such workers can also be found in relatively good and relatively bad earnings statuses (2 and 3 men). On the shop floor in question, all of the workers in the patronized position have a relatively bad (2) earnings status. This lags behind what we could generally conclude from the theoretical model, but is better than the status of the other workers having similar (corrected general) powers, especially compared to the status of those in the exposed position. The above-mentioned figure shows that the earnings status of the workers in the restricted position and of those in the weak tolerated position is equally 1.75 on average. Those in the restricted position are typically in a relatively bad status, the earnings status of those in the weak tolerated position is more differentiated; the latter workers are typically divided between the relatively bad and the very bad earnings statuses. The workers in the exposed position have a very bad earnings status, their status is 1.18 on average. Three out of 17 workers have a relatively bad, 14 workers have a very bad earnings status.




Figure 7. Connection between social position and social status on the shop floor

In the following few paragraphs, I try to find the answer to the question of to what extent social position (and social stratum position), as well as the two components of social position – positions according to power relations and interest relations – determine social (earnings) status. Table 5 shows the correlation coefficients between social status as a determined phenomenon and its determining factors.

Determined phenomenon	Determining factors			
	Social position	Social stratum position	Position by power relations	Position by interest relations
Social (earnings) status	0.91	0.91	(0.82) 0.72	(0.58) 0.46

Table 5. Correlation of social status with its determining factors

Although I otherwise do not deal with the social stratum position, here I also point out the correlation between stratum position and social status. The correlations of social position and social stratum position with the social (earnings) status are equally 0.91. As mentioned above, compared to social position, social stratum position should, in principle, explain social status to a larger extent. However, whereas, according to their social position, I classified the workers into eight social classes, I only distinguished four social stratum positions. Thus, it is probably the rougher classification by stratum position which explains that social position is in similarly close connection with social status than social stratum position.

As seen in the theoretical article, we make a distinction between two components of social position: the position according to social power relations and the position according to interest relations. When calculating the correlation, I considered the three categories distinguished above for each of these two factors and I ranked these categories according to inequalities. In the given cells of the above-mentioned table we can see the simple correlation coefficients in brackets, and below, the partial correlation coefficients.

In my conception, the two above-mentioned components of social position determine the degree of interest realization and the social status in connection with each other. The correlation between the positions according to power relations and the positions according to interest relations is 0.25, (not shown in the table). The correlation coefficient between the positions according to social power relations and social (earnings) statuses is 0.82; between the positions according to interest relations and social (earnings) statuses it is 0.58. Independently of the effect of the other factor (positions according to power relations or interest relations), the partial correlation coefficient between the positions according to power relations and social (earnings) statuses is 0.72; the partial correlation coefficient between the positions according to interest relations and social (earnings) statuses is 0.46. Accordingly, social power relations determine the social (earnings) status to a more significant degree than interest relations, however, the effect of interest relations is also significant. In connection with each other, the two factors, that is, the social position determines the social (earnings) status in 83 percent, that is, how much the worker earns by what expenditure.

Distribution of the degree of interest realization

In the research in question, I analysed the distribution of the degree of interest realization regarding the different components of earnings interests in very detail. Accordingly, the social position of the worker basically determines to what extent he or she realizes his/her interests with special regard to (1) direct wage factors (personal wage, performance percentage and additional work), (2) supply of work tasks, workpieces and means of work, (3) shift number and shift rota, as well as (4) direct work. However, given the size constraints of this article, in the following I only point out to what extent the workers in different social positions realize their interests concerning earnings, performance percentages and the so-called performance possibilities.

We could see above that the earnings of the workers were very unequal; the difference between the lowest and the highest earnings is nearly tenfold and the difference between the earnings of the workers in very bad earnings status and in very good earnings status is nearly fivefold (1940 and 9410 HUF). However, the question may arise whether the interest of the workers really aims at achieving the highest possible earnings and hourly earnings up to a certain limit. I dealt with this issue relatively in detail elsewhere and I pointed out that the higher earnings statuses and the expenditures belonging to them usually correspond to the interests of the workers more than lower earnings statuses and the expenditures belonging to them (FARKAS 2011. 10–14.).




Figure 8. Claims concerning earnings and the actual earnings

In order to answer the question mentioned above, I also surveyed the claims of the workers concerning the interest components aiming at the wage factors. According to my assumption, namely, the claims largely reflect certain components of earnings interests. We have to see, however, that the claims usually reflect feasible interests, the part of the interests the worker is able to realize, rather than the whole of the interests. The individual takes into consideration to what extent he or she can realize his/her interests and formulates his/her minimum and maximum claims concerning the particular interest components (earnings, personal wage, performance percentage, etc.) mainly in proportion to this. Besides, the workers develop their ideas concerning a just or equitable payment, which, to a certain extent, also influences their claims.

To survey the claims concerning earnings and the components of earnings is, methodologically, not free of problems. It is especially the workers with a very good earnings status that conceal their actual earnings status and ambitions; therefore either they do not usually reveal their actual claims, or they try to obscure them with different ideologies, since they are afraid that the information they might give could serve as a basis for arrangements that could have an unfavourable effect on their interests or their possibilities of interest realization. In view of this, in the research I surveyed the claims regarding earnings and the components of earnings with several questions in an indirect way and I combined the answers with the data in the official wage registration (which I had already been familiar with when interviewing the workers).¹¹

In Figure 8 we can see the actual earnings and the minimum and maximum claims concerning earnings, in connection with social position. In accordance with the above-mentioned statements, the claims of workers are not usually aimed at achieving the highest earnings corresponding to earnings interests; the claims largely conform to the status available for the given worker, i.e. his or her feasible interests. According to the figure, the claims of the workers in the authority position, then the workers in strong tolerated and in the supported position are the highest, and the earnings they are paid (8480, 6830 and 6950 HUF/month) are in line with their claims. The claims of the workers in the medial tolerated and the patronized position, orienting to their feasible interests, are comparatively lower, and they usually also achieve the earnings

¹¹ As an example, I present the questions aimed to reveal the maximum and minimum claims concerning performance percentage. As mentioned before, the indirect questions below are necessary because most of the workers would not give a sincere answer to direct questions, although they have clear ideas about them.

1. How satisfied are you with the average performance percentage you have achieved this year (in 1983)? (Answers: on a scale from 1 to 5)
2. I am not asking the actual figure; the important thing about this question is how the workers value the average performance percentage they have achieved this year. Would you have claimed a higher average performance percentage than this if you had had more favorable opportunities to realize your efforts? (Two options: yes or no. If not, go on to question 6.)
3. If you would, by what percentage the maximum would you have liked to raise the performance percentage you have achieved? What is the highest percentage you would have claimed more? (Numerical answer expected.)
4. This year, have you achieved the lowest average performance percentage that you claimed by all means? (Two options: he or she has achieved, or he or she has not achieved it. If he or she has, go on to question 6.)
5. If you have not, approximately what percentage was missing on average for you to achieve the minimum performance percentage you claimed? (Numerical answer. Go on to the question after question 6.)
6. So, you have achieved the minimum performance percentage that you claimed by all means. By what percentage have you exceeded this minimum average percentage this year? (Numerical answer.)

In fact, the average performance percentage of the given worker is known from the wage registration, I already knew it at the time of the interview. From this, and from the answers he or she gave to the questions above, the maximum and minimum claims of the worker can be calculated.

(4970 and 3430 HUF/month) that correspond to their claims. The claims of the workers in restricted, weak tolerated and, especially, in the exposed positions are the lowest, but, typically, these workers cannot even achieve the earnings that correspond to their minimum claims (their actual earnings are 2960, 2810 and 2130 HUF/month).




Figure 9. Claims regarding performance percentage and the actual performance percentages

Figure 9 shows actual performance percentages and the minimum and maximum claims concerning performance percentages, in connection with social position. As pointed out elsewhere, higher performance percentages require more expenditure from the individual on the one hand, and, above a certain threshold, due to the norm cutting to be expected, they jeopardize the efficiency of the future expenditure of the worker, on the other (FARKAS 2011. 18–19.). Therefore, a specified performance percentage, which can be regarded as optimum according to the above aspects and from the point of view of the earnings, is in line with the interest of the workers. The surveyed claims mostly reflect the feasible interests concerning performance percentages as well, because they indicate the ambitions of the workers in their given social position. However, the claims clearly show that achieving the comparatively high performance

percentage, or increasing the lower performance percentage, up to a limit of nearly 140 percent (the highest), are in line with the interest of the workers in so far as we take as a basis, on the shop floor under review, the expenditures generally necessary for the workers to achieve the different performance percentages.

The minimum claims of the workers in the authority, strong tolerated and supported positions are around 120 percent; their maximum claims are between 131 and 138 percent. As for the averages, their actual performance percentages can be regarded as optimum for them: it is 128 percent in the authority position, 124 and 126 percent in the strong tolerated and supported positions. The workers in question on occasion could also achieve higher performance percentages but, in the case of the particular tasks, the more they approach 140 percent, the riskier they may think it is. It is the maximum claim of the workers in the supported position that approaches 140 percent the most. To exceed this value would already be very risky for the workers. The minimum and maximum claims of the workers in the medial tolerated position are relatively lower (104 and 124%), and their actual performance percentage (111%) exceeds their minimum claims significantly. Those in the patronized position claim minimum 106 and maximum 113 percent and their actual performance percentage (104%) is only a little lower than their minimum claims. The minimum claim of the workers in the restricted, weak tolerated and exposed positions is around 100 percent. The actual performance percentage of the workers in the restricted position is only a little lower than this (97%), but the percentage of those in the weak tolerated position (92%) lags considerably behind. The status of the workers in the exposed position is, from this point of view, especially bad; with their 77 percent performance on average, they lag behind the claimed minimum of 100 percent to a large extent.

As seen above, the most important components of interests are made up of the components regarding the supply of tasks, workpieces and means of work. Unsatisfactory supply may greatly hinder the worker in achieving the performance percentage appropriate to his or her expertise and effort, but in connection with this, also in doing the amount of additional work that corresponds to his or her interest. In the course of the research I surveyed the main problems and the inequalities of the degree of interest realization in this regard in detail, but here I will only point out the inequalities in question between the different social classes very briefly.

By *performance possibility status* I mean the status of the worker from the point of view of the extent to which he or she is supplied with work tasks, workpieces and means of work in line with his or her interest. I measured the performance possibility status of the workers on a scale from 1 (the worst) to 5 (the best), and I took into consideration to what extent the given worker is hindered in achieving the performance percentage in compliance with his or her expertise and effort (and in connection with this, doing the amount of additional work in line with his or her interest) by the following factors: (1) shortage of work and/or shortage of material, (2) tasks with short piece time and/or few pieces, tasks only enough for a short period of time, (3) work norms that are stricter than the average and more difficult to perform, (4) the bad state or malfunction of the machine and (5) lack or unsuitable quality of special device.




Figure 10. Connection between social position and performance possibility status

Figure 10 shows the average performance possibility status of the workers in different social positions. Accordingly, the workers in the authority position are all in a very good performance possibility status, their average status is 5. Next, those in the strong tolerated and supported positions are in relatively the best performance possibility status with an average status of 3.8. The status of the workers in the medial tolerated and patronized positions is, from this point of view, very similar; the status of the former is 3.3, that of the latter is 3.4. The average status of the workers in the restricted and weak tolerated positions is, equally, 2.3. The performance possibility status of the workers in the exposed position is the worst; they are in a status of an average 2.1. Accordingly, insufficient supply of work tasks, workpieces and means of work largely hinder the workers in restricted, weak tolerated and exposed social position in achieving the performance percentage appropriate to their expertise and effort and, in connection with this, in doing the amount of additional work in line with their interest.

Social position and performance orientations

Social position determines the social status of the given individual or group in connection with the determination of their social conduct. Below, I highlight the social conduct of the workers as well as the determinedness of their conduct by social position with regard to the so-called performance orientation.

Although, as mentioned above, I do not analyse the degree of interest realization concerning

additional work, here we take into consideration the differences in doing additional work from a certain point of view. Namely, it is advisable to analyse performance percentage and additional work in connection with each other, since, as a matter of fact, they jointly express in what period of time, how much recognized performance the workers achieve. Compared to the performance that can be achieved in normal working hours (that is, eight hours a day) and with a normal performance percentage (that is, of around 100 percent), the workers may increase their recognized performance by increasing their performance percentage, on the one hand, and by extending the working hours, i.e. by doing additional work, on the other. By *performance orientation* I mean the ambition to increase the recognized performances that means a choice from the point of view to what extent the worker seeks to increase his or her recognized performance by increasing his or her performance percentage and/or by extending the working hours.




Figure 11. Performance percentages and additional work hours of the workers

Figure 11 shows the distribution of the performance percentages and monthly additional work hours of the workers in the year 1983, based on the wage registration of the company. Assuming the above-mentioned orientation, I distinguish the following types of performance orientation in the given figure: (1) extra-fulfilment-oriented with GMK, 5 men; (2) overfulfilment- and additional-work-oriented, 10 men, (3) additional-work-oriented, 7 men; (4) overfulfilment-oriented, 10 men; (5) achieving standard performance, 28 men; (6) achieving low performance, 20 men.

In the above-mentioned paper, I pointed out that, in connection with personal wage, performance orientation directly determines the earnings status of the worker to a large extent (FARKAS 2011.16–17.). Nevertheless, I also emphasized that a similar earnings status can also be achieved partly by different orientations. As an example, the very good earnings status can also be achieved if the worker is overfulfilment- and additional-work-oriented, and, at the same time, has an outstanding personal wage, but the lack of outstanding personal wage can be made up for by extra fulfilment-orientation.

Table 6 shows the performance orientations more or less typical of the workers in different social positions. Accordingly, the workers in the authority position are typically overfulfilment- and additional-work-oriented (5 men), less typically overfulfilment-oriented (2 men). Besides, these workers have outstanding personal wage (27.6 HUF/hour), and in this way achieve a very good (6 men) or, possibly, a relatively good (1 man) earnings status. If they intended to, they could also join the economic work partnership within the shop floor or they could also set up another work partnership, within which they could do an outstanding amount of additional work, but, being paid high personal wage, they do not need to do so.

Social position	Performance orientation						Total
	Extra-fulfilment with GMK	Overfulfilment- and add. work	Overfulfilment	Additional work	Standard fulfilment	Under-fulfilment	
Authority position	-	5	2	-	-	-	7
Strong tolerated position	3	2	3	2	3	-	13
Supported position	2	1	3	2	-	-	8
Medial tolerated position	-	2	1	3	5	-	11
Patronized position	-	-	-	-	12	-	12
Restricted position	-	-	-	-	2	2	4
Weak tolerated position	-	-	-	-	4	4	8
Exposed position	-	-	1	-	2	14	17
Total	5	10	10	7	28	20	80

Table 6. Connection between social position and performance orientation

The performance orientation of the workers in the strong tolerated and supported positions is rather differentiated. A relatively good or medium social status is typical of the workers in question, and they have mostly achieved it by overfulfilment and/or additional work (7 men and 6 men). However, some of them (3 men), have only achieved standard performance. The members of the economic work partnership (6 men) emerge out of the workers in the strong tolerated and supported positions; 5 of them (3 men from the strong tolerated position and 2 men from the supported position) are oriented to extra-fulfilment, i.e. overfulfilment and an outstanding amount of additional work in the frame of the economic work partnership; one worker (from the strong tolerated position), however, is only oriented to a moderate amount of additional work. Thus, some of the workers in a less advantageous position than the authority position, seek to achieve a good social (earnings) status, similar to that of the workers in the authority position, by expanding their working hours considerably. As mentioned above, those of the workers in the strong tolerated and supported positions that can compensate their (compared to those in the authority position) lower personal wages (23.0 and 22.7 HUF/hour) by doing an outstanding amount of additional work in the economic work partnership can typically achieve a very good social (earnings) status.

The workers in the medial tolerated position mostly achieve standard performance (5 men), and some of them are able to increase their recognized performance with overtime (3 men), or with overtime and overfulfilment (2 men), rather than with only overfulfilment (1 man). All of the workers in the patronized position (12 men) achieve standard performance. The performance orientation of the members of the restricted social class and the weak tolerated class are proportionally similar; one half of the workers achieve standard performance, whereas relative underperformance is typical of the other half. In the above analysis of the degree of interest realization from the point of view of performance percentage, we could also see that, with their average 77 percent performance, the workers in the exposed position considerably lag behind the standard performance. The workers in question (14 out of 17 men) typically achieve low recognized performance.

SUMMARY

In this paper, I illustrated the institutional (and relational) sociological conception of social position and social status by a brief description of a case study. I analysed the social positions and the social statuses of the workers, as well as the determinedness of social statuses by the given social positions on a machine industrial shop floor.

First, I outlined the interests and social powers of the workers. Accordingly, the components of interests on the given shop floor can be interpreted at three levels. The first level includes the general feature of the earnings interest that the earnings interest is made up of the action possibilities of optimizing the earnings and expenditures. The second level includes the components concerning wage factors. At this level, the interests of the workers are mainly made up of the maximization of their personal wage, and the optimization of their performance percentage and their additional work. The third level of the components of interests includes the components concerning means of work, work tasks and doing work. The main components of interests at

this level are as follows: optimization of the supply with means of work, optimization of work supply and, in connection with this, loosening of norm times; and in close connection with the former issues, the optimization of the number of shifts and the optimization of direct work.

In the given research, I measured the intensity of the social powers of workers towards the shop floor managers and towards all the workers on the shop floor by asking two questions. I determined the average powers of the workers towards their fellow-workers, and then I classified the workers according to their powers towards the managers on the one hand, and according to the intensity of their average powers towards their fellow-workers on two separate scales ranging from one to five (from small powers to large powers).

The research results in part supported my hypothesis that the components of the social powers of the workers are mainly made up of the following social abilities: (1) scope of action at work, (2) expertise, (3) scope of action in the party or the trade union, (4) social relationship and (5) quasi-ownership on the shop floor. In this respect, I dealt with the powers towards the managers in more detail, because these powers are more significant from the point of view of the extent to which the workers realize their interests, and what social status they achieve.

It is mainly expertise (and effort) and the quasi-ownership within the shop floor, by themselves and independently of other social abilities, that constitute the social powers towards the managers. Compared with these abilities, directly, the scope of action at work has a much smaller significance, but, in the longer term, the scope of action at work also affects other social abilities. Independently of other social abilities, the scope of action in party or trade union and social relationships have a rather small significance. The social abilities in question constitute 81 percent of the social powers of the workers towards the managers. However, the social abilities under review amount only to nearly 58 percent of the powers towards the workers.

Then, I mapped the social positions of the workers, that is, I outlined the social structure of the shop floor. One aspect of typifying is, in principle, the social power relations with those in an authority position. However, during the empirical survey of the social position of workers, to a certain extent, I also took their power relations to other individuals with relatively significant powers into consideration. Taking the powers towards the managers and the average powers towards the workers with the same weight into consideration, I determined the general powers of the particular workers. However, I corrected the general powers from the point of view of mapping social positions, and outlining the social structure, attributing greater importance to the powers towards the managers. Finally, according to their corrected general powers, I placed the workers into three categories. In this way, 20 workers (25%) have large corrected general power, 23 workers (29%) have medium power and 37 workers (46%) have small power.

In principle, the other aspect of typifying is constituted by the interest relations to those having authority. However, during the empirical research, to a certain extent, I also took interest relations to other individuals with relatively significant powers into consideration. I defined the interest relations within the shop floor in the following three ways, regarding the managers on the one hand, and the fellow-workers on the other: (1) I surveyed the social relationships within the shop floor; (2) I attempted to survey the interest relations between the workers and the managers partly with a question that I asked the head of shop floor and two foremen; (3) I determined the interest relations between the workers partly by considering the interconnection or separation of means of work, work tasks and work accounts.

Thus, in line with the above-mentioned criteria, I classified the workers into the different social positions and the different social classes according to the social power relations and interest relations. Accordingly, 7 workers (nearly 9%) are in authority position, i.e. they constitute the authority class, along with four managers composing the core of the management. 13 workers (nearly 16%) are in strong tolerated position and they constitute the strong tolerated class. Among the workers with medium social power, 8 workers (10%) are in supported position and in the supported class; 11 workers (nearly 14%) are in medial tolerated position and 4 workers (5%) are in restricted position and they constitute the medial tolerated class and the restricted class. Among the workers with small social power, 12 workers (15%) are in patronized position and they constitute the patronized class, 8 workers (10%) are in weak tolerated position and constitute the weak tolerated class, and 17 workers (nearly 21%) are in exposed position and constitute the exposed class.

Then I dealt with the social statuses and the social determinedness of social statuses, and finally, I briefly touched upon the performance orientations of the workers. I pointed out that the social status of the workers is well reflected by the so-called earnings status. I intended to find the answer mainly to the question of to what extent social position, as well as the two components of social position – positions according to power relations and interest relations – determine social (earnings) status. According to the research results, there is a rather tight connection between social position and social (earnings) status. Social power relations determine the social (earnings) status to a more significant degree than interest relations, however, the effect of interest relations is also significant. In connection with each other, the two factors, that is, the social position determines the social (earnings) status in 83 percent, that is, how much the worker earns by what expenditure.

In the research in question, I analysed the distribution of the degree of interest realization regarding the different components of earnings interests in very detail. However, in this paper, I only pointed out to what extent the workers in different social positions realize their interests concerning earnings, performance percentages and the so-called performance possibilities. According to this, the social position of a worker basically determines the extent to which he or she realizes his or her interest in the mentioned aspects. Social position determines the social status of the given individual or group in connection with the determination of their social conduct. In this paper, I highlighted the social conduct of the workers as well as the determinedness of their conduct by social position with regard to the so-called performance orientation.

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APPENDIX




Figure 1. Rough layout of the Machining Shop Floor




Figure 5. Network diagram: Social relationships (mutual choices) on the Machining Shop Floor by social classes. (Notation: Au = Authority class, St = Strong tolerated class, Su = Supported class, Mt = Medial tolerated class, Pa = Patronized class, Re = Restricted class, Wt = Weak tolerated class, Ex = Exposed class)

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Innovation and territoriality. The changes of a district in Budapest nowadays



ABSTRACT

In our century, we encounter rapidly changing and uniquely functioning societies, each of which carries with it some excitement. The present study is written in this spirit, it essentially presents the territorial-social relations of a capital district.

On the one hand, the study provides a brief description of the history and situation of the district, in which the range of the most important data is embedded - such as the number and change of the population, the change of the housing stock, and the age distribution. In the course of the analysis and evaluation, we were interested in what changes the district has undergone in the last decade, with the constant transformation of territorial and social relations. Although the data can only present everything we examined from one side, we nevertheless believe that the lines of successful dynamic development have become visible.

KEYWORDS

downtown district, town and city development processes, dynamics, formation area

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INTRODUCTION

Our study undertakes to briefly present one of the most dynamically developing districts of Budapest during the past 10 years. A 9th district of Budapest is the district which eliminated the problematic flats and buildings, adopted the practice of rehabilitation used in Western Europe and gentrification as the primary target of housing privatization after the change of regime.¹ Each of these factors has also started innovative developments that have enriched the life of the district and also of Budapest in a spectacular way in the recent period.

THE BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DISTRICT

‘Ferencváros’ is the old and new name of the 9th district. The part of the city erected outside the city gates of Pest was named after King Francis I when he was crowned king in 1792. Among the districts of Budapest formed by the unification of Pest, Buda and Óbuda in 1879, the district identical to its present size even back then was given the serial number 9.’ (<http://ferencvaros.web0.vhost.hu/index3.php>)

We can consider Ferencváros, the 9th district as one of the most dynamically developing districts of the capital today. The district was developed during the second half of the 19th century at the same time as the large-scale industrialization. After the unification of Pest, Buda, Óbuda, the boundaries of the part of the city called 9th district were formed by two boulevards of the radial-ring urban structure of Budapest: Üllői út and Soroksári út (and the bank of the Danube River parallel to it). The housing development along the ring roads has resulted in units that are different, becoming less urban as we move further from the centre.’ (CSAPÓ – LENNERT 2015)

The first built-in area of the district was the Inner Ferencváros, where mainly 3-4-5 storey tenement houses were built. Mostly this area provided space for the network of cultural and public institutions. Central Ferencváros is the epitome of classicist architecture, and reminds us of the atmosphere of the old Ferencváros. The area of the Outer Ferencváros was mostly

¹ In 2020, on behalf of the Local Government of Ferencváros, the Homo Oecologicus Foundation conducted a research on the quality of social services in the district. This study uses the theoretical foundations of this research, in which the authors participated as researchers and analysts.

characterized by slums - the Mária-Valéria estate and the Kiserdő estate. These housing estates actually existed until the József Attila housing estate was constructed. The industrial activities and functions were also concentrated in this area.


“The district is located on the left bank of the Danube River, with an area of 1,253 ha. It is part of the Pest Plain in terms of the nature landscape; it is separated from the Csepel Island by the Ráckeve-Soroksár-Danube branch in the southwest, and its western border is the main riverbed of the Danube. Administratively, it is the southern neighbour of the Downtown (at the Vámház körút (*ring road*) and Kálvin Square), of the 8th district along Üllői út (*road*) to Könyves Kálmán körút from the north-west and of Határ út, which is adjacent to the 10th district. The 19th and 20th districts are located southeast of Ferencváros.” (FERENCVÁROSI ITS 2015)

THE MODERN IMAGE OF FERENCVÁROS

The built-in area of Ferencváros is generally urban, especially the inner parts of Ferencváros, where there is a large vertical and horizontal division. The proportion of multi-storey residential buildings is high in the whole district (90.8%), which has increased significantly due to the large number of new residential buildings built in the inner unit of Ferencváros during the last decade. The proportion of multi-storey buildings is even higher (about 95%), as there are many multi-storey office buildings and various community buildings in the district.

Nearly half of the houses were built before 1946, these are 100-140 year-old tenement buildings, at the same time, most houses have been built in this district since 1990 (24,% - Source: CSAPÓ – LENNERT 2015)

Figure 1
Resident and permanent population in Ferencváros
(persons)² between 2010 and 2018




Source: City Directory, 2019.

² Resident population: the total number of persons with permanent residence in a given area and with no habitual residence anywhere else, and of the persons with habitual residence in the same area.

The number of the permanent residents of the district decreased by 5,069 (8.2%) between 2001 and 2011. Between 2011 and 2019, it increased by 2,743 persons (4.8%). Between 2010 and 2018, the number of the permanent residents did not decrease significantly, while the proportion of the resident population increased by 3,548 persons. “Due to the uncertainties connected to the data sources, it is difficult to take stock, in any case, it can be concluded that a significant proportion of the population living in the district only have a habitual residence here, i.e. are not permanent residents (which is supported by the high proportion of private rental flats) and that a larger number of the residents live in the district without a locally reported address. (ITS, 2015.)

Based on the available data, we can also see to what extent the birth and death rates of the district contributed to the change in the district’s population. The district data show that the number of births decreased to half during the period considered (from 3,235 to 1,628), while the mortality rate was only 9%.


Figure 2
Birth and death rates, person/year (between 2010 and 2019)



Source: Local Government of 9th District

Looking at the age pyramid of the , we can consider a current one, we will see the following facts.

Diagram 1
Age pyramid – Budapest, 9th district – based on the data in 2018




Source: KSH, 2018.

Overall, we can outline similar characteristics for the population of the district, connected to age and gender, as for the population of the country as a whole. Even in the case of the district, aging is a known process, women are over-represented among the 65+ age group, while the distribution is mostly balanced in the other age groups. The safe basis of the district's population is the 30-49 age group, they mean the potential future. In the case of the younger age group, there is a danger that they may not have decided yet whether or not they will stay in the district for certain. Their perspective is undergoing a kind of continuous change, so they may only partially play an important role in building a sense of local identity.

The other resident group of the district is the circle of tenants, the Hungarian and foreign residents, which does not necessarily appear here. In their case, we can see hesitation, as their housing is mostly temporary or long-term, but is not characterized by permanent stay. This does not mean a significant change in the number of the residents of the district, however, it means a change in the utilization and use of human services.


Figure 3
Age distribution - 2018 (person/age group)



Source: City Directory, 2019.

The district consists of four parts of the city, and each of them draws a specific line around itself. The Inner Ferencváros and the József Attila housing estates are the 'local' operating units of the district, Outer Ferencváros is an old industrial area with a small population, while Central Ferencváros is present in the everyday life as a dynamically and actively developing area of the city. The population of the parts of the city on 1st October, 2011, according to the administrative status on 1st January, 2019 was as follows.

Figure 4
The resident population as per the census (2011) – according to the administrative status
on 1st January, 2019



Source: City Directory, 2019.

The above chart shows that more than half of the inhabitants (54%) live in the constantly changing Central Ferencváros, and almost a quarter of them live in the József Attila housing estate (21%) and in the Inner Ferencváros (19%).

While the latter two territorial units are typically the places where the permanent, constant residents are living, Central Ferencváros is already much more heterogeneous in this respect.

As for the 9th district, similarly to the other districts of the capital, the active players of the local society are the non-Hungarian citizens.

On 1st January, 2019, the number of the residents in Ferencváros was 52,247 (100%), of which 48,330 (92.5%) had a valid permanent residence and 8,917 (17.06%) had a valid habitual residence. The number of the non-Hungarian citizens living in the district in the same year who belong to the category “immigrants, refugees, settled people and others” was 4,115 people. This represents 7.9% of the resident population. As for the number of the immigrants, there are fewer immigrants only in 9 districts than in Ferencváros, according to the relevant statistics of the CSO (Central Statistics Office). At the same time, with regard to non-Hungarian citizens registered in official refugee status, there are more immigrants only in 5 districts than in the 9th district. In terms of the number of non-Hungarian citizens with settled status, there are fewer immigrants in 13 districts than in Ferencváros, which is the subject of our research. In the comparison of the districts, Kőbánya, the 10th district is the most dominant among the people with immigrant status and settled status.

The data on the district also indicate that the presence of foreigners (immigrants, refugees, people with settled status) is not significant in Ferencváros. At the same time, the kindergartens and day cares can also admit children living outside the district into their institutions, therefore it may be assumed that the foreigners working in the district use the services of the district-maintained kindergartens and day cares for their children.


Studying the ethnic and religious distribution of the district, only data from 2011 are available to us. These data show that 80.7% of those living in the district declared themselves Hungarian, 2.1% as Gypsy, 1.8% as German, and 4.5% as other, non-Hungarian nationality. 18.2% of respondents did not wish to declare themselves or did not answer this question.

Housing situation in the 9th district

“Housing mobility is one of the most important issues in the urban and housing sociology. An efficient housing system assumes relatively high housing mobility, as the households are able to respond flexibly to changes in their demographic, income status and preferences under such circumstances. It is clear that if there are institutional and legal barriers to housing changes, the society should spend more on housing than would be optimal. Low housing mobility means that the families are not able to adapt flexibly to the changes in the housing needs and there will be households whose housing consumption is lower than the standard they could afford based on their income and preferences, and vice versa: due to the rigidity of the housing market, the households will strive to achieve a high level of housing consumption at an earlier stage in their lives, leading to permanent over-consumption.” (HEGEDŰS 2001)


Following the 1990s, one of the most intensive housing construction programs was launched, in several periods, in the district. In the period between 2010 and 2019, a drastic increase in the number of apartments (20,553 pieces) was experienced, which may be attributed to the changes in the economic life between 2010 and 2015, as well as the introduction of various family policy initiatives to the level of the society. Between 2010 and 2018, 70 detached houses, 11,770 apartments and 1,051 prefabricated buildings were handed over for use in the district.

Graph no. 1
Number of real properties between 2010 and 2018



Real estate database, apartment prices in Hungary, 2010-2018, CSO

Graph no. 2
Total number of apartments (pieces) (between 2010 and 2018)




Real estate database, apartment prices in Hungary, 2010-2018, CSO

The data on real estate construction shows the following facts at the district's level. During the period under review, the construction of residential housing was carried out at a rapid pace in the district. Between 2014 and 2017, and especially in 2015, the number of multi-apartment real properties and prefabricated flats can be considered particularly high. In parallel with the increase in the number of apartments, it can also be seen that the price per square meter of the apartments is also rising. In territorial distribution, the prices of the real estate in Central Ferencváros are clearly the highest. Between 2010 and 2018, the price per square meter of real estate in these areas was between HUF 300 and 585 thousand, while the price per square meter of real estate in the Inner Ferencváros was HUF 220 thousand in 2010, and reached an average price of HUF 350 thousand in 2015. In the case of the József Attila housing estate, the average prices per square meter were between HUF 195 and 260 thousand. In the outer unit of the district, in the Outer Ferencváros, which is more an industrial area, the prices per square meter were about HUF 188 to 220 thousand. Comparing the four territorial units, it is clear that the Central Ferencváros, mainly the newly built real properties, show a significant increase in prices per square meter between 2010 and 2018. At the same time, the area of Inner Ferencváros also seemed to catch up slowly, if not to such a drastic extent.


Graph 3 shows the average prices per square meter of apartment between 2010 and 2018 in the 9th district.

Graph no. 3
Average prices per square meter (thousand HUF) in the 9th district
(between 2010 and 2018)



Examining the prices per square meter of apartment, it can be stated that between 2010 and 2018, the price per square meter of apartments more than doubled. While in 2010 the average price per square meter was HUF 252 thousand, it rose to HUF 532 thousand in 2018. In the standard deviation, this exceptionally high amount characterises the newly built real properties of the Central Ferencváros and the civic-type apartments in certain areas of the Inner Ferencváros.


Figure 5
Change in the number of apartments between 2010 and 2019 (pieces) in Ferencváros



Source: City Directory, 2019.

In the detailed district-territorial units/parts of the city, the outstanding number of apartments in the Central Ferencváros and the high figure, proving the liveability of the József Attila housing estate, can clearly be seen.


Figure 6
Apartments in the territorial units of the district (pieces)
On 1st October, 2011, according to the administrative status on 1st January, 2019



Source: City Directory, 2019.

According to the reports of previous forums about the district: “In the 9th district of Budapest, as a result of the developments implemented during the recent decades, 1,200 apartments were renovated, and more than a thousand families were able to move into modern homes. Hundreds of billions of Forints were spent on projects initiated by the local government alone, partly from its own resources and partly using funds from tenders. The long-term project has also encouraged the private investors to build, and more than 150 residential real estate developments were undertaken by companies over the past two decades, and a total of 7,000 new apartments were built. A total of 76 thousand square meters of park and playground were built in the district. „Central Ferencváros is a part of the city on nearly 80 hectares and 44 blocks in the 9th district. At the time the complex development was started, the initially not really prestigious part of the city got into a rather dilapidated state. In 1990, Ferencváros remained significantly below the average of Budapest in almost all the indicators reflecting significant social conditions (employment, education, income status). Due to the success of the city renewal campaigns, the migration from the district was stopped by the mid-2000s, and even an intensive moving in process could be observed since then”. (http://www.ferencvaros.hu/index0.php?name=hir_160526_FIABCIdij)

Figure 7
Number of occupied real properties and number of inhabitants between 2010 and 2019
in Ferencváros




Source: Local Government of Ferencváros, Public Service Office, 2020.

Following the years of 2016, there was a 76.8% increase in the number of the handover of new real properties between 2016 and 2017, and a 44.3% increase between 2017 and 2018. At the same time, a large increase in the number of inhabitants can be noticed in connection with these real properties in 2017, which confirms the facts mentioned earlier. (For example, the result of the introduction of various allowances.)

Another factor influencing the increase in the population is the increase in the proportion of people aged 0-6, which has changed over the past nearly one decade as follows; a total of 90 children aged 0-6 have had a registered address in the new real properties between 2010 and 2019, which is considered to be negligible in the light of “all” the people moving into the new real properties. 4.1% of the 2,171 people (100%) who move in are children aged 0-6 (90 people). We could conclude from this that couples and families with small children have clearly moved into the newly built real properties.


Figure 8
Number of 0-6 year old persons in the population of the newly constructed buildings
(age/person)



Source: Local Government of Ferencváros, Public Service Office, 2020.

The figures of moving-ins and the migrations from the district also show changes during the past decade. While 2,430 people moved to the district in 2010, 3,668 people moved here in 2018, i.e. almost one and a half times more residents moved here. At the same time, the number of domestic migration also increased, 1,769 people moved out of the district in 2010, and this number rose to 3,222 in 2018, one and a half times more people left the district during the period under review.

Figure 9
Housing stock and number of apartment types (pieces)




Source: <http://statinfo.ksh.hu/Statinfo/haViewer.jsp>

According to the data of the Central Statistical Office, as per housing stock and apartment types, the one and two-room apartments (including the one-and-a-half-room apartments) are the most popular, as opposed to the four-room apartments (data registered by the CSO only from 2012). The intermediate place of the three-room apartments is presumably influenced by the number of children, i.e. those without children are primarily looking for smaller apartments, while those with one or two children prefer two-room real properties.

After the 1990s, the housing privatization, the sale of municipal real properties and apartments became the focus of thinking in every district.

The ownership structure has changed significantly over the past 30 years, and although the municipally owned real properties are still present, they do not operate under the same conditions as before the 1990s. The ownership structure in the district has changed as follows:

Figure 10
Local government-owned apartments in the district year/piece



Source: <http://statinfo.ksh.hu/Statinfo/haViewer.jsp>

“Studying the ownership structure of the domestic housing stock, the decisive question is whether the given person or family lives in their own apartment or in an apartment owned by others. In Hungary, a high proportion of the population (90 to 92%) lives in their own real property. Nearly 8 to 10% of the Hungarian population rents their apartment, which is either owned by the state, or by the local government, or by a private person or by a company. It is important to note that this ratio is somewhat uncertain, as the registration and statistical classification of rented privately owned apartments is unclear or unknown. From the point of view of ownership, the position of the local government as owner is negligible in addition to privately owned apartments, yet the role and responsibility of the local authorities connected to the conditions on the house market can be showed indirectly. As the vast majority of apartments satisfy their classic function as apartments, the local government has a demonstrable responsibility for the quality of life and housing conditions of the people living there, as well as for the development of the built environment.

Act LXXVIII of 1993 on Residential and Commercial Leases and on certain rules concerning their alienation stipulates that the local governments may decide on the amount of rentals on the basis of the above-mentioned 3 principles by a local government decree. The poor condition and low level of comfort of the municipally owned flats, mainly in bigger towns, is in the background of social-based renting. Among the already mentioned vacant apartments, there are ones that have been emptied specifically for the purpose of redevelopment, so their subsequent further use (renovation or demolition, and the construction of new houses in their places, followed by sale or rental, preferably at market prices) is among the possibilities.” (CSIDER 2015).

Thus, it is clear in the case of the 9th district that the number of municipally owned properties decreased by 64.2% between 2010 and 2018. The acquisition of the right to rent the apartments happens through market-based leasing, which is announced by the Local Government of 9th district Ferencváros of the Budapest Capital in the form of a public tender pursuant to the decision of the Economic Committee no. GB. 150/2015 (VI.17.).

SUMMARY

“Ferencváros is a district with outstanding and innovative economic strength, and it did not only maintain its previous significant role due to the traditional and developing industry and infrastructure within the capital, but also strengthened it by attracting knowledge-based developments and highly educated and active social strata. The district has traditional but still prosperous industrial premises, small business centres operating in brownfield areas, and new, modern greenfield industrial areas. The tradition of the local retail trade is extremely strong. Tourism, culture and the leisure industry are the driving forces of Ferencváros, which means significant economic potential for the future as well.” (Ferencváros ITS, 2015)

The prosperous nature of Ferencváros can be summarized along three indicators; firstly, we can say that although the number of people living in the district shows a decreasing trend, according to the statistical data, the newly built apartments and real properties have additional residents, who, in many cases, are not registered in the real estate, so their number cannot be traced. In many cases, they are present as tenants, and often as foreigners. The number of apartments in the district is gradually increasing, as is their quality and value, embedded in the territorial changes of the district. This clearly contributes to the transformation of the territorial and social values of the district, to the status changes of the population. The composition of the people living in the district is similar to other districts of Budapest - an aging society, and a low number of younger age-groups. The quality of life of the population living here is slightly higher than the average in Budapest; it is a popular place for young adults and families with higher earnings and higher status.

The vision of future can be achieved in the spirit of changes. The district will only be able to operate with an active and cohesive community built on solidarity. This is organically connected to the safe and adequate housing and living conditions, a sustainable future, and innovation and businesses engaged in services.

The territorial diversity of the district will be able to provide an opportunity for a quality and conscious life for everyone living there.

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DATA PROVIDED BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF FERENCVÁROS - electronically

REAL ESTATE DATABASE, APARTMENT PRICES IN HUNGARY, 2010-2018 (2019) Budapest, CSO

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Ordoliberalism in The Epoch of Pandemy



ABSTRACT

There are three parts to this paper. The first part presents a discussion on ordoliberalism as a discursive structure. In doing so, it also analyzes how a certain set of ideas acquires hegemony and the specific significance of the indication “ideas matter”. The second, central part of the paper emphasizes the contradiction relating to the application of ordoliberalism within the European Union. This contradiction is sharpened with the tension between “rules” and “discretion”-based government. At the same time, ordoliberalism, which is woven into the German tradition, is presented as an expression of this contradiction. This section also sheds light on the COVID 19 pandemic from the perspective of ordoliberalism and points to the continuity of the pandemic with pre-existing crises. In the third part, starting from the relationship between ordoliberalism and capitalism, we talk about the connection of this orientation with the German export strategy, which is a sign of strong continuity of German politics. Ordoliberalism is an expression of Germany’s position in the EU and the world, and similarly, if we can talk about „ordoliberalization“ of European capitalism, we can expect its presence on a European scale.

KEYWORDS

ordoliberalism, ordo, pandemic, crisis, market framing

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ORDOLIBERALISM AS A DISCURSIVE HORIZON

Frequent discussions and ritual invocations turned German ordoliberalism into the discursive horizon of the epoch. Interdisciplinary occurrence of this direction in the last decade transformed its position: from the former perspective of “German oddity” (BECK–KOTZ 2017), which was the subject of only some (historical, etc.) discussions, ordoliberalism has become an indispensable discursive element of those researchers who deal – indirectly or directly – with the problems of Europe and especially the European Union. Ordoliberalism has become a theoretical-practical pattern that has found its application in the expansive European studies, economic theories, and political sociology (SIEMS–SCHNYDER, 2014, DODD–KRIEGER, 2019). Its presence is indeed impressive.

Insistence on the “order” (*Ordo*) emphatically bears the traits of German tradition (BÖCK-ENFÖRDE 2017, BÖHM 1973). In Germany, there are “*ordnungstheorie*” and “*ordnungspolitik*”, “*ordnungsidee*” – but the same terms cannot be easily translated into other languages. Moreover, “*ordo*” is neither a “structure” nor a “system” – and in the case of ordoliberalism, its background with the already existing protestant religious impregnation (KRARUP 2019) indicates strong roots in the mentioned tradition. “*Ordo*” points to the long-term structure of economic behavior (as opposed to the Keynesian emphasis on short-term intervention measures), and it also views society as the “order of different orders.” To that extent, ordoliberalism is more than just a “research program” that offers only the foundations for research endeavors.

To avoid possible misunderstanding: the problematization of ordoliberalism spread from academic to non-academic domains, that is, it was even involved in the calibration of politics. Ordoliberalism developed a correction of classical liberalism and Keynesianism as well, after World War II, and it was a condition for ordoliberalism not to remain within the framework of one theoretical doctrine. After the mentioned war, it played a significant role in shaping (West) German politics, and at the same time, it influenced the genesis of the EU, which would have been impossible without it. Anyhow, ordoliberalism made its entrance on the political scene, too – to view it as a pure academic orientation that reflects only a perspective within the theoretical

“battle of ideas” would be the diminishing of all its roles and also myopia of the dynamics of European politics in the second decade of XXI century.

Alfred-Müller Armack, who was probably the one to launch an important term for ordoliberalism, social market economy, claimed that the said term did not hide the *Weltanschauung* („comprehensive world view”, see, ARMACK 1978. 329.). However, ordoliberalism is indeed comprehensive in its coverage of different areas of life. It is evident that, from the beginning of its emergence i.e. from the thirties of the XX century, ordoliberalism was aimed at becoming an *active agent* in terms of tailoring „ordo”, especially „framed” order: the intention to enlighten in order to ensure the transformation of the world and its stabilization was the *credo* of this orientation. The ordoliberal conception of modern rationality never aimed at remaining within the narrow confines of scientific institutions; its existence had *practical* ambitions. We can add biographical data that clearly prove that Armack, Alexander Rüstow, Walter Eucken, and others played a significant role in the political sphere and were publicly influential to such degree that they contributed to the formation of not only German but European politics as well (GOLDSCHMIDT–NILS ed. 2005).

Naturally, the estimations of ordoliberalism’s *influence* differ dichotomously. Discussions about ordoliberalism are so confronted that they can be easily divided.

On the one hand, critics believe that certain directions of European politics, especially some of its constituent parts such as austerity-biased politics („constitutional austerity” (Clancy), i.e. raising austerity to the constitutional level), deficit limits, and other rules serving to introduce discipline, can be unequivocally attributed, at least indirectly, to the influence of ordoliberalism and its integration, especially to the strategy of German politics. In other words, during the previous decade, there was *too much* ordoliberalism, which must be emphasized as a significant factor in shaping negative paths in the EU and its lagging behind other world powers. Ordoliberalism can be treated as a European „variant” of neoliberalism, or as a German relative of the dominant neoliberalism whose death has been predicted several times – unsuccessfully. The dogmatism of European politics, the advanced „ordoliberalization of Europe”, the negative form of path-dependent, or the inertia of the same policy could be attributed to the hegemony of ordoliberalism, which represents an ideological arsenal for German action within the EU.

On the other hand, the followers and today’s proponents claim the exact opposite: in the last two decades, there has been *too little* affirmation of ordoliberalism. Neither the EU nor German (economic) politics sufficiently reflected ordoliberal maxims; it was the lack of recognition of ordoliberalism that led Europe to falter. When the critics of this direction comment on *excessive* ordoliberalism, it is only the case of forced pragmatism of German approach and positioning in the context of interstate relations for the purpose of strategic rationality. To accuse ordoliberalism of certain European failures implies simplification and „ideological abuse” (FELD–KÖHLER–NIENTIEDT 2015, DOLD–KRIEGER 2021).

If we take the viewpoint of the mentioned critics, then how is the influence of ordoliberalism manifested?

The approaches presenting forms of ordoliberalism simplify ideological impacts and skip various transmission mechanisms that enable the rooting of ideas. How certain ideas become ideologies that offer rationalization for particular politics needs to be carefully analyzed, starting from its structure to the conjunctural moments. Furthermore, the hegemony of an idea or

its parts should be viewed only as embedded in various economic and political constellations. Namely, the strong association of austerity with ordoliberalism is not new; in fact, Italian fascists had already developed a combination of technocratic management and politics of austerity (MATTEI 2017). Thus, we will not broaden our understanding of ordoliberal tone regarding austerity in Europe unless we consider economic and political determinations. The phrase „ideas matter” does not imply that ordoliberalism develops its influence vertically, from above, and linearly. That is, dynamizing the impact of a single set of ideas is not self-evident; originally scientific ideas formulated within academic communities a priori have no causal significance in terms of shaping political practice. Science cannot pave the way for social practice by reflecting on its social position.

Accordingly, ordoliberalism and its presence in Europe cannot be reduced to monolithic and linear influence, but it needs to be regarded as part of a complex configuration. Ordoliberalism, as well as neoliberalism, must have its „interlocutors” (JAMES 2020. 486.) who, based on „spillovers”, disseminate axioms and statements of a given scientific concept. Academic subjects can be „initiators of discursive practices” (Foucault) with analyses, diagnoses, and forecasts based on the requirements of different clients; yet, their concepts can be viewed as directing only *in potentia*.

Considering the present situation and relevant research, it is evident that only in Germany, there are broad „advocacy coalitions” (SABATIER–JENKINS–SMITH 1993) just like dense „networks” (ÖTSCH–PÜHRINGER–HIRTE 2017) of various NGOs, foundations, consultancy firms that systematically promote ordoliberalism or its parts for the purpose of political effectiveness. The position of ordoliberalism must be assessed from that standpoint – after all, we can see this in other countries as well; namely, the channeling of influence takes place in a complex institutional environment where contradictory tendencies intersect. Even the emergence of ordoliberalism does not take place in a neutral, but in a grooved context with asymmetrical influences of various power configurations, with selective coercion to frame the existing ideological constellation (for general problems, LATOUR 1994).

We know that ordoliberalism was a legitimate matrix for German politics whose representatives have many times referred to ordoliberalism as an ideological framework that justifies the rigor of market criteria (PÜHRINGER 2015). Namely, ordoliberalism had its political representation, but even that will not save us the effort to analyze the influence of ideas.

Not to lose ourselves in a detailed discussion of this issue, we would only note that, in this constellation, the conceptualization of „ideological influence” must take into account processes that can be modeled based on Robert Merton’s thinking, who designed „unintended consequences” as the general dimension of “purposeful actions” (see NEDERGAARD 2015. 1095., MERTON 1936). Even those who intentionally operationalize given ideas can produce unintended consequences, that is, results over which they do not have control.

To summarize: there does not have to be a *direct* match between ideas and their realization to talk about the guiding influence of certain ideas in the „battle of ideas”. After World War II, ordoliberalism did indeed gain significant positions in the apparatus of economic politics, but it had to earn its status where there were significant strongholds of Catholic corporatism. It is often claimed that the idea of a central bank enjoying strong independence from the state is an expression of ordoliberal projections – but we must not forget the major roles of the way the German

mark was introduced and the allies' intention to prevent money printing from being reused for „rearmament“ (SCHARPF 2015, SOLTY 2016). The operationalization of ideas always happens in conjunctural situations. Ideas are not univocal; they allow for different interpretations, at least within appropriate discursive boundaries.

Consequently, ordoliberalism was and has remained exposed to conflicting interpretations. Of course, we could first list the proponents of the state, but we must not forget the fact that a strengthened rival, the Alternative für Deutschland (AFD), has also acted with the intention of promoting ordoliberalism over the past decade. Unlike state managers and politicians, it *expressis verbis* aims at „radicalization“ (HAVERTZ 2018) of ordoliberalism, including an attack on the EU, as well as a fierce criticism of all its institutions. If Angela Merkel's country sees „framed market“ in Europe as „the arbiter of all things“, that is not enough for the pro-market calibrated AFD: we need to go much further.

Now, as we can see, ordoliberalism is a guarantee for the survival of the EU on the one hand, but on the other (which disrupts the mentioned „consensus“), ordoliberalism is a conceptual framework against an insufficiently market-oriented EU. Thus, there is the same conceptual framework, homologous points of reference, but almost heterogeneous interpretations.

It is, therefore, a context of *defined* hegemony of ordoliberalism. The contradictory claims about a surplus and a shortage of ordoliberalism are the organic necessity of interpretations of orientations such as ordoliberalism. We do not claim that this hegemony is not divided, disturbed, and combined with other orientations. On the European scene, orientations are forming ideological confrontations, primarily Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism. It is necessary to state clearly that neither today's ideological turmoil nor the dynamics of European politics can be understood without considering ordoliberal discourse.

Finally, if we intend to present the forms of influence of ordoliberalism, then we must go beyond European parochialism. Namely, there are such representatives, „interlocutors“, „second dealers“ of ordoliberalism who did leave the European level and addressed certain issues at a global level. This is what the notion of „ordoglobalism“ evokes (in terms of a detailed description of this notion, SLOBODIAN 2018): various networks and associations of influence have appeared at key points of world (economic) politics and in the leading international institutions (World Trade Organisation, for example). The same influences have been dynamized indirectly (locally: Geneva as a source of dissemination), through loyal students, supporters and actors who operationalized ordoliberal concepts, but on a global scale.

Thus, ordoliberalism is far from limited to European perspective only; its traces can be found everywhere with its „interlocutors“ promoting it on a cosmopolitan level, too. Ordoliberalism should be considered on a global level. In fact, we could say that ordoliberalism influenced the shaping of globalization in the twentieth century; some famous ordoliberals found it convenient to make projections about the emerging globalization, which gradually developed in the last third of the twentieth century. We are not implying here that this influence is of the same intensity at the European and world level; we do not want to equate different levels, but the fact that ordoliberalism remained a constitutive ideological lever of European self-understanding before the pandemic is relevant.

ORDOLIBERALISM BETWEEN „RULES“ AND „DISCRETION“

1. Ordoliberalism is much more than a baby brother/sister of neoliberalism, which is typically associated with the top-down performance of certain Anglo-Saxon countries. Careful weighing of different political and economic tendencies in the XX and XXI century warns us that Germany has contributed to the ideological repertoire much more than the metaphor of kinship with neoliberalism describes. To be clear: despite the lost war in the middle of the XX century, German politics managed to ensure continuity of its export orientation, to adjust successfully its policy of creating manufactured products that were and have remained part of the export strategy, to lower labor costs and establish a standard deflationary policy (“deflationary ordoliberalism”). Therefore, it became and survived as an active *creator* of the international political economy. The statement about its role of the „architect” (GERMANN 2020) is not exaggerated at all, which means that in terms of „neoliberalization” it did not have just a mimetic role, which is often assumed (note active role of Germany in case of Ukraine, for example, SONNE 2014, CAFRUNY 2015).

Finally, the significance of ordoliberalism derives from the above said. German export policy has become increasingly globalized, penetrating far beyond Europe (2015, the United States became the most important destination for German exports). As we all know, China is a significant destination for the strongest German companies and Germany’s regional position in South Europe is also well known (STEINBERG–VERMEIREN 2016, GERMANN 2017). Furthermore, „ordoliberal export strategy” is discussed quite thoroughly (CAFRUNY–TALANI 2019, 8.): the extraordinary historical weight of a well-thought-out export strategy as a *par excellence* of German orientation leads us directly to the affirmation of „ordoglobalism”. Moreover, even Ludwig Erhard emphasized the strategic priority of Germany’s export strategy (ASH 1994. 244.) – “ordoglobalism”, that is, an export strategy based on ordoprinciples can offer legitimacy for such priorities.

Furthermore, Germany is in the European milieu where the logic of „soft power” prevails, and the EU promised exactly that: the domestication of power and coercion, i.e. the transformation of „hard power” into a „soft” version with self-limiting and multiplied actors who can reach a consensus in one complex infrastructure. Still, Germany’s position in this constellation is constantly debated, given Germany’s actual power in the geopolitical economy. Consequently, it is regarded as being “posthegemonic” or “semihegemonic” with the politics of “benign leadership” (GERMANN 2017. 5.). It could be even viewed as “subimperialist” (FOUSKAS 2018). Its position is strong enough to be *primus inter pares*, but it does not have such strength as to lead Europe unilaterally. Germany (we paraphrase here certain indications of Karl Mannheim, although not regarding Germany) cannot dictate decisions, but it can make way for its „defensively offensive” politics to *condition* the making of relevant decisions. Thus, it can be assumed that ordoliberalism actually provides a higher degree of authoritarianism compared to the “more relaxed” Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism (FOUSKAS–GÖKAY 2018. 123.).

2. If we analyze the attitude of Germany and its geo-politico-economic position, we will find numerous contradictions. Heiner Flassbeck, former Chief of Macroeconomics and Development of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva,

and one of the fiercest critics of today's Germany and German mercantilism has pointed out that Germany would like to be hyperloyal to Europe or to EU and "the best European at the same time" (FLASSBECK 2019). Another important critic of German politics, Wolfgang Streeck, argues that the "Germany's European empire" was (unintentionally) created by Germany emerging from an inferior position in the first decade of the XXI century when it had established itself as a "neoliberal rationalization machine" (STREECK 2018) and "enforcer" of monetary discipline for Europe.

We should not presume that there is some inherent love of Germany towards Europe: it is a strategic-rational decision of a country that was "too big to be loved and too small to be feared" (STREECK 2015). Of course, we should also mention some fragilities of "ordoliberalism". Germany's export strategy that led it towards global, non-European paths was interpreted by some as the cause of certain elements of fragility in its "geopower" policy (KUNDNANI 2015).

Yet, we are here also interested in the ideological situation of ordoliberalism with respect to the German constellation. The mentioned orientation presents the so-called *laissez-faire* doctrine of market criticism because the market cannot take care of itself enough. Hence the programmatic ordoliberal effort of "market framing" which backbone is "competition" or "competition order". As commented by many, this is the case of shifting the focus from "exchange" to "competition". "Exchange" is an abstract, main idea of classical liberalism, while "competition" is a phenomenon that can be deduced from the "framed" order. "Framing" as a targeted activity enables an active state that is much more productive here compared to any form of the "*laissez-faire*" doctrine.

Ordoliberals originally called this "frame" the *Wirtschaftsverfassung* (economic constitution). Armack, whom we have already mentioned here, was the one to use the said term in his book on capitalism when he was trying to define the "laws of the development of capitalism" (ARMACK 1932. 12.). The economy will develop into a "whole", Armack continues, so it must ask itself whether the order is to be understood. Such orientation requires a special cooperation between legal and economic discourse: we will not be mistaken if we say that ordoliberal conceptions generally depend on the success of this union.

Certain German specifics, or a kind of *metaphysics*, must be pointed out here. Namely, we cannot avoid elucidating the German calibration of politics, that is, to shed light on the context where the ordoliberal interpretation of politics arises.

Ordoliberalism has retained much of what can be called "*metaphysics of law*" (TORNHILL, 2007) within the German tradition. Politics is thus seen as a stepping stone to "metaphysical truth" (AUER 2019), that is, to higher-order truth (*Vernunftwahrheit*, VOLLRATH, 2003. 42.) which is purified from "political contestation," that is, from the contingent political outcomes. This is why German politics is always burdened with a "surplus of consensus" (DAHL 1965. 19.; AUER *ibid.*, 3.) because "contestations" are viewed only as a transitory instance towards the truth which seems to be an imperative in terms of mental insight. Order is understood as *Wesensordnung*, order of substance.

It is of considerable importance here that law, as a metaphysical instance, can overcome the mentioned political conflicts: *law as a neutralized medium overpowers political disputes*. In his de-essentialized theory of law, Niklas Luhmann argues that law implies "counterfactual expectations" because "uncertain expectations" are much more unbearable than "disappointments and

surprises” (LUHMANN, 1993). When ordoliberalism constitutes an order, then it aims to stabilize the said expectations, but also to set a higher medium of regulation and coordination in relation to parliamentary democracy.

Therefore, ordoliberalism draws from the “metaphysics of law”, that is, the metaphysical aspect of the law, which enables the position of economic discourse in the context of the “whole”. Those commenting on the overload of EU politics with the law and complaining about the deficit of “democratic accountability” should know that Germany, with ordoliberalism, has devoted a great deal of effort in immunizing European infrastructure from democratic contingents. Ordoliberalism is harnessed to the truth of “order”, that is, to the higher-order truth. The universally present defense of “democratic accountability” that has become especially intense in the EU can be explained with the fundamental ambition of ordoliberalism.

3. However, things get complicated. Let’s turn to Luhmann again: it is important to build “resistance to disappointments”. Yet, crises combine both surprises and disappointments. Ordoliberalism was originally a stabilization body for (West) German capitalism, first in the 1930s and then after World War II. The crisis has always played a key role in the ordoliberal imaginary anyway (ARMACK *ibid.* 34). It was born out of crisis and lives for the sake of crisis management. It can even be said that gaining stability based on the revitalization of the “order” is one of the most important goals of the ordoliberals.

However, it is important to note that this direction became accepted after the 2007 crisis, which was a “surprise and disappointment” for many. In fact, ordoliberalism is widely perceived as a “crisis science” that can explain the EU’s commitment to the politics of austerity and generally persistent “rule-followed strategy” which assertive variant was recognized in the relationship towards Greece in 2015. Of course, the same practice of resolving the crisis has been often exposed to criticism that emphasized the unfruitfulness of the European performance that buried Europe in a subordinate position in the multilateral world. At the same time, ordoliberalism was regarded as the culprit in terms of: a) prolonging crisis incentives in Europe, b) further decline of democratic capacities on the old continent, c) affirmation of technocracy and bureaucracy against the democratic expression of political will (majoritarian democracy), d) slipping into permanent authoritarianism.

Criticism of ordoliberalism was directed to the wrong approach of the EU to a crisis, that is, it was accused of causing the decline of EU authority. This can be explained by the fact that ordoliberalism got trapped by a complex, antinomic relationship between “rules” and “discretion” (a different aspect of this by WHITE 2015). *The aim is to govern apolitically based on neutral rules, but it ends up in discretionary politics.* The governance is planned to be depoliticized, but the result is repoliticization through technocratic discretionism. Thus, ordoliberalism secretly merges with the elements of Machiavelli’s theory.

We seem to be confronted with a general problem: Roberto Esposito noticed this in the case of neoliberalism. He emphasized the “immanence of the market” and its relation to human existence in order to perform broad depoliticization, but his approach resulted in a strong repoliticization, that is, in reconfiguration of power relations between different social subjects (ESPOSITO 2005; OKSALA 2017; NEDERGARD 2020).

Anyhow, the earlier mentioned trap emerged to the surface and became constantly present with the ongoing crisis. “Rules” represent the operationalization of the process of neutralizing political struggles for the purpose of metaphysical truths conducted by the European enlightened technocracy. They rely on the “meta-rules” that enframe the mentioned economic constitution. Critically speaking, contemporary debates on the continuity of “emerging politics” in Europe with the *eternal surplus of European technocracy and bureaucracy* (SCICLUNA – AUER, 2019) testify to the oscillation between “rules” and “discretion”, i.e. between neutral management and strongly non-neutral management of crisis.

Since 2007, Europe has been constantly oscillating between rules and discretionary government: if rules are there to strengthen the intact stability, then the stability of expectations of social actors and discretionary crisis management is the case for transgressive interventions based on the familiar *logic necessitas non habet legem*. For example, apolitical behavior regarding the migration crisis in 2015 had to become involved in inconsistent repoliticization (STRECK 2018). One researcher (VAN MIDDELAAR 2016. 496.) claims that the Ukrainian problem retrospectively affirmed that the EU was never apolitical, because then it had to see the “uncomfortable truth”, more precisely the necessity of a “pre-eminence of non-rule based decisions.“ We have argued here that this is not a contingent outcome, but an inherent problem of the ordoliberal conception of the European constitution. *According to “ordoliberal utopia”* (W. Münchau), *European politics can be realized on the basis of rules that guarantee metaphysical neutrality*. The operationalization of rules always implies a discretionary interpretation of the situation in accordance with the opportunistic engagements.

As we have said, ordoliberalism is to be blamed for European problems, but it was caused by the crisis. Too much technocracy caused by the tensions between the discretionary regime and „rules” has shaken the EU’s ordoliberal legitimacy. In other words, ordoliberalism is itself a victim of cumulated crisis tendencies. It was also affected by the elements of crisis which eruption could not be prevented. From ordoliberal perspective, the fact that such an important institution as the European Central Bank (ECB) must exceed its limits (TESHKE 2019; LOKDAM 2020) to maintain the monetary „ordo” of Europe also challenges the basic concepts of ordoliberalism. The ECB’s acts during crisis management have proved to be great material for studying the contradiction between „rules” and „discretion”. Some interpreters (SYMS – SCHNYDER 2014) believe that the position and agenda of the ECB, which always expands its maneuvering performance (targeting of interest rate, etc.), cannot be reconciled with the ordoliberal notion of neutrality as it leaves free space for discretionary management that cannot be justified. „Central Bank independence” also does not coincide with ordoliberal ideas. This is unequivocally true (if we at least consider the claims of different ordoliberals), but it still does not make ordoliberalism irrelevant. Discretionary management is indeed criticized by ordoliberalism, but the way in which ordoliberalism is involved in the EU and the technocratic approach embody the contradiction in the application of ordoliberalism.

4. Now, the next thesis is as follows: pandemic management represents *continuity* in terms of the intriguing relationship between rules and discretionary management. Crisis management has never been just dealing with one extraordinary object, that is, it is never just „management of crisis”, but also „management by crisis”. There is no political instance that would not engage

in the processes of „management by crisis” and provide itself with „output legitimation” on that basis. No crisis process is neutral so as not to encourage an effort to take advantage of the situation with regard to the affirmation of the mentioned output legitimation. We can say that management during a pandemic can be understood in this way: at present times, we are not only confronted with „management of pandemic” but with the „management by pandemic”, as well. This means that no crisis is just a *restitutio in integrum*, but a rearticulation of an existing constellation.

COVID 19 has undoubtedly shed light on certain problems, especially regarding public health and climate/ecological bias of capitalism. Therefore, its far-reaching consequences are unquestionable: the phenomenology of corresponding regressive tendencies in the short and long run proves this. Numerous articles present alarming arguments that intensify the idea that neoliberalization of health policy has reduced resilience to pandemics, and there are increasingly more of those articles giving statistics on privatized health institutions and the decline of public health (POHL 2020). Besides, there must be an explanation why the pandemic came as a surprise despite earlier regular WHO warnings.

Furthermore, some studies apocalyptically announce climate changes: the report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has caused somewhat more attention this year than before, although its warnings were strong in previous years as well. Finally, there are books on proximate and ultimate causal mechanisms of a pandemic, which reflect the importance of zoonosis in relation to the eruption and expansion of COVID-19, to confirm this (WALLACE 2020; MALM 2020). Those books also critically indicate the impact of capital-directed agrocomplex on soil erosion and degradation of biodiversity, which consequently promotes zoonosis –this is a well-known phenomenon, but it become immensely significant during the pandemic.

We do not deny the idiosyncrasy and severity of the ongoing pandemic. Neither do we equalize the pandemic with other crisis processes. We qualify the pandemic, by standard definition, as a „major crisis” involving all important trends of the social structure. However, the COVID 19 pandemic cannot be seen as an *isolated* crisis. Finally, we have already experienced everything we have listed so far. There are differences only in terms of *gradation* and in a sharper hermeneutic perspective during a pandemic. Of course, the EU will now focus its huge financial resources on the Green New Deal (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2020) or it will be a financier to pump its huge funds into socio-economic spheres. Still, regardless of the amount of funds, we must be aware that the „climate emergency program”, treating climate dynamics in the perspective of „securitization” is not new but a mere continuation of articulation of the already existing crisis constellations (we will now leave aside the different meanings of securitization of climate change, DUPONT 2017).

THE PANDEMIC ONLY GIVES A NEW PERSPECTIVE AND OPENS A NEW FIELD FOR THE „THICKENING” OF VARIOUS CRISIS TENDENCIES

Despite the depth of COVID 19 that affects life in late capitalism, it does not represent radically new tendencies as much as a continuation of something that had already existed. It would be

enough just to briefly list some cumulated crisis tendencies to show the presence of continuity (for example, a cumulation of the debt: in 2007, the „average eurozone debt to GDP ratio was 65 percent”, in 2021 it was 84 percent, see, LANCY 2021, etc.). Moreover, Europe was the one marked as a continent that did not overcome the systematic problems that persistently remained even after the crisis management (FLASSBECK 2016). To be more precise, long before the pandemic, harsh diagnoses had already been made about the upcoming crisis, and it was not written only by the radical pens (PLENDER 2020).

The EU has been criticized many times during the pandemic. For example, its actions based on the „economic emergency” perspective were criticized precisely because they expressed ordoliberalism, like in case of rejection of crisis management by corona bonds (MONACO, 2020). European labor market policy was praised as Europe did not lose as many jobs as the USA. The ECB’s actions, which delayed the „sovereign-debt crisis” were applauded as well, but despite all that, the EU suffered a recession and its fall was more intense than that of the USA (TOOZE 2021). The pessimistic diagnosis predicts even long-term crisis tendencies (ARTUS 2021) in Europe only to be manifested later. The well-known ordoliberal strategy of „rule-biased” austerity was criticized retrospectively as it had assertively ordered a reduction in public health funding during 2011-2018, and the EU’s weaknesses to opportunistic behavior were criticized concerning the influences of Big Pharm (LANCY 2021).

This, again, emphasizes the continuity of the pandemic with the previous situation. The EU has experienced various crises over the past decade and this has prompted some researchers to simply claim that it is a “permanent crisis” (TALANI 2016). It is also difficult not to see the mark of ordoliberalism on the process that has led to the crisis, but also on the management of/by crisis. The affirmation of ordoliberalism is both an input and a desired output during all crises in the second decade of the XX century. The same stands for COVID 19, which implies management of crisis by ordoliberalism.

The pandemic was also interpreted as a „Hamiltonian moment for the EU” (KALETSKY 2020; criticism on that, WEEKS, 2020, see the further explanation of ISSING, „first chief economist of the European Central Bank”, too, 2020). In short, Alexander Hamilton, the first finance minister of the Union to address the accumulated debt in the war for independence, is invoked here in the sense that a pandemic can create an opportunity for the reconstitution of Europe turning it again into a federal EU. As the old expression says, „never let a crisis go to waste.” The EU is doomed to constantly transform itself anyway, so the pandemic is then a great opportunity to put the issue of failed federalization of Europe back on the agenda: *hic rhodus hic salta*. Ordoliberalism could also contribute to this projection.

The promotion of the former finance minister of the USA is of course completely contrary to those speculations about pandemic possibly ending the excess of neoliberalization in Europe (KILIÇ, 2020). It remains unclear what exactly that would mean. Crisis management from the perspective of ordoliberalism was criticized in Europe because it encouraged unevenness and deepened geoeconomic differences between North and South on the old continent. Would „Hamiltonian moment” in the (so far only fictitious) post-pandemic EU imply efforts to overcome the mentioned unevenness?

During the pandemic, numerous principles important to ordoliberalism were certainly challenged, *at least indirectly*. The monetary ordo of the ECB with a technocratic approach that

realizes rational neutrality for some researchers (TOOZE 2020) became unlikely hypothesis; namely, the mentioned neutrality disappears with the ECB entering a sphere that exceeds its set limits. A politicized monetary instance that makes systematic interventions replaces technocratic neutrality.

One might assume that the hypothesis of neutrality has always been just a mask for politicization. Anyhow, it is a fact that the degradation of the ideological neutrality of money management affects the idea of ordoliberal technocratic neutrality.

Constant questioning of ECB's competencies is related to its aforementioned non-neutral role. So, immediately after the peak of the pandemic, the German Constitutional Court ruled on the „public sector purchase program” which was launched in 2015 by the EU. Without discussing the merits of the said decision (the Federal Constitutional Court for the first time claimed the Union act as „*ultra vires*”, MEINEL 2020), it is symptomatic that the decision of the German court caused the discussion to flare up with completely opposite opinions. The decision was interpreted by some as the last nail hit in the coffin of the federal EU, while the others saw it as a chance to rehabilitate federalization, especially after the Brexit situation (WOLF 2020; VITERBO 2020). Brexit, of course, added fuel to the fire, further intensifying the problems of the meaning of (post) sovereignty, supranationalism of EU, and finally breaking the „teleology” of European integration by which the EU would expand in time based on the logic of enlightened rationality.

What is important here is that the evocation of the Hamiltonian moment and constant discussions about the „mutualization of debt” as a lever for consolidating the post-Brexit situation show that the constellation is fragile. Instead of unambiguity, ambiguity and complexity have spread. Ordoliberalism must also be weighed against the same dilemmas.

CONSIDERATIONS OF ORDOLIBERALIZATION OF CAPITALISM

The thunderous announcement of „recovery programs” in the USA and the EU („Next generation program” and „asset-purchase program”) is, for many interpreters, a sign of a possible milestone. There are even some ideas that management by pandemic could also break the ties with the dominant austerity model that which has led Europe to a problematic path.

How to resituate ordoliberalism now in the midst of these measures? Can we, with the desired transformation of neoliberalism into post-neoliberalism (MORGAN 2021), speak analogously about *post*-ordoliberalism? Is that the future of Europe?

The criticism of classical liberalism by ordoliberalism has prompted some thinkers to argue that there is criticism of capitalism hidden in ordoliberalism (NEDERGAARD 2020). According to that, the conservative-liberal support of the social-market economy carried polemical charge towards capitalism. This would raise the assumption that capitalism is being criticized here from a liberal point of view, thus affirming the presence of some tensions between liberalism and capitalism.

It is a historical fact that ordoliberalism encouraged „social market economy”. Ludwig Erhard (ERHARD 1947) categorically equated „politics of order” with „social politics”. Armack spoke of „constructive Social Economy” (ARMACK 1978). There are undoubtedly certain components of ordoliberalism that represent an expression of divergence in relation to the Anglo-Saxon variant

of neoliberalism. Namely, not only does it promote the notion of „social” (which is almost excommunicated by certain neoliberal theorists), but also requires certain measures of social policy. Ordoliberals attacked the welfare state because they thought that their ordo-politics was more adequate in terms of achieving certain ethical principles, in other words, they thought that ordoliberalism was superior to the paradigm hidden in the welfare state. If there is Keynesian inspiration for the welfare state, it will only deceive the workers. The market is not the final criterion of truth. Armack will say that the market is just a system of instruments used for the affirmation of ordo. Rüstow, who has been widely quoted as the father of the „third way” between „capitalism and communism” (1949), although the primacy should be attributed to Franz Oppenheimer, truly criticizes „vulgar liberalism”, „boundless liberalism” and he suggests to colleagues “frame” as a restriction of the “free market” (ASSLÄNDER – ULRICH 2009).

Rüstow might be of some relevance to today’s theorists who are interested in the ethics of the economic sphere. His engagement in religious and ethical issues is just an example of the ordoliberal view that the economic domain must always be weighed from the aspect of non-economic criteria. The market is not self-regulatory and accordingly, the social aspect as a corrective in relation to the unbalanced market should present a „constitutional order”. Ordoliberals are always against the reductive understanding of the economic domain anyway; for them, economic issues (which are otherwise analyzed in detail, but without quantitative techniques) are at the same time a stepping stone for some anthropological and ontological questions. They think that they have built an observatory from which they can comprehensively and interdisciplinary reconsider the dynamics of modern life. And if we add the phrases „strong state” and „ordering power”, then we can see a range of different moments that separate ordoliberalism from the mentioned, much more familiar forms of neoliberalism.

However, we should not think that this gave birth to a kind of criticism of capitalism: ordoliberalism changed its direction by recognizing the necessity of the transformation of liberalism, which emphasized the importance of the revelation of natural order. And we are far from getting a devastating criticism of capitalism from ordoliberalism that seeks to nail liberalism to the ordo. Truth be told, the situation with capitalism is not simple. Armack, as we have already quoted, wrote an extensive book on capitalism and its laws opposing different notions of capitalism in sociology and economics. Eucken, who died in the middle of the XX century, distinguished capitalism from the „free market”. He already nominalistically expressed doubts about the idea of capitalism, which seemed too abstract to him, as a personified general notion (*personifizierten Allgemeinbegriff*, see, EUCKEN 1959. 63.) and which hinders „real research of reality” (*die echte Untersuchung der Wirklichkeit*). Emphasizing the programmatic importance of „economic humanism”, he underlined that capitalism necessarily implies monopolies, oligopolies and asymmetric market power in general, which undermines the pillars of the market. This is then opposed by a decentralized market structure that keeps the „open economy” alive.

Of course, it is unquestionable that such attitudes cause certain ordoliberal attitudes to be in opposition to the existing tendencies which imply multiplication of different forms of the mentioned asymmetric market power. We could also add that different reports during the pandemic confirm additional impulses regarding the strengthening of capital concentration in the form of market power. But what we can most benefit from ordoliberalism is the „spiritualization of capitalism.” It is no coincidence that Armack, when once addressed these issues (1978, *ibid.*),

firmly rejected „mixed systems of economic policy” and advocated „pure order” and „delicately synchronized” economic policy with the social dimensions from spiritual perspective. Yet, there is nowhere any indication of the alternative to the existing order.

After all, ordoliberalism as an „enforcer” of market-financial discipline, as a medium of discipline during the previous decade, and finally as a liberal orientation with state support could not exist if it were not congruent with the export strategy of German mercantilism, i.e. export interests of German capital. In this regard, we agree with the decisive opinion that ordoliberalism is necessary to explain the trends in the last decade, but it is not enough at the same time (CAFRUNY – TALANI 2019). Still, that should come as no surprise: the structure, as we have already said, is expressed in conjunctural tendencies. Eucken’s nominalism, which Sombart, Weber, Schumpeter, Mannheim question, calls into question the notion of capitalism as a general indication. *Therefore, we do not want to overestimate the „ideological influence” of ordoliberalism, but at the same time, we do not consider that frequent relating of German actors to ordoliberal constructions is pure manipulation.*

The German interpretation of the 2007 crisis was and remains moralizing („frugality of the North” and „propensity of the moral hazard of the South”). The significance of this is reflected in the fact that public discourse depended on the narrative of the mentioned crisis. Ordoliberalism as the „great narrative” of the crisis, and as the „idea of the powerful” (PARSONS 2015; MATTHIJS 2015. 5.) that limits the power of „weaks” made it possible. One comment states:

„Ordoliberalism is what Angela Merkel wants for the Eurozone as a whole: rigid rules and legal frameworks beyond the reach of democratic decision-making... She is interested in power, not in ideology. And power means domestic power — she would never risk anything for broader European objectives in the way Kohl did... Germany, it seems, is becoming more German... What is much less likely, however, is that they will ever abandon ordoliberalism“ (MÜLLER 2012; cited by CALLISON. 2018. 68.)

We agree with this comment, but the only thing that seems as an exaggeration to us is the claim that „she is interested in power, not in ideology”. Ordoliberalism could have been a discursive horizon in the first and second decades of the twentieth century because it made it possible to *seek a balance between ideology and applied power.*

To conclude: ordoliberalism was determined by the pandemic as well as the previous crises. His representants should now think about the socio-ecological order, the „pure order” but which is strongly mediated by ecological criteria. It is true that today’s Europe is very different in relation to the historical situations in which the founders-ordoliberals began their journey. However, ordoliberalism is so strongly embedded in the institutional infrastructure of the EU that we will have to look at ordoliberalism in the near future. Its core, namely, the legalistic, rule-mediated government that is immune to democratic „pressures“, remains in force – even though at the time of writing this, the last days of the German Chancellor’s rule are coming to an end.

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The Birth of the Myth of the Unaffiliated Sociologist.

Was Dimitrie Gusti (just) a technician in the peasantist
government?



ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to focus on Professor Dimitrie Gusti's position within the Peasantist government at the beginning of 1930s. The author tries to gather necessary arguments against the belief which emerged in the fifties under the communist regime, and still valid until present days, that Gusti was promoted in the government of the National Peasantry Party because he was a good specialist, and not because of his political affiliation to this party. Besides the significant antecedents which prove the permanent and powerful connection with the elite of the National Peasantry Party since the beginning of the 1920s, he also had an interest in studying and modernizing the rural areas. The Professor's political behavior during his term might be described as loyalty and dedication towards fulfilling the governing programme of the party. More than that, even in 1934, when the National Peasantry Party was in opposition, Dimitrie Gusti, defended the accuracy of this party's political programme and participated in the conception of its new programme. The clarification of the professor's position within the Peasantry Party government is suitable especially for analyzing his ideological stance, which is a subject that still arises perfectly justifiable in current debates. This analysis is legitimate not only for clearing the Professor's position, but also for shedding light on the activity of the National Peasantry Party.

KEYWORDS:

Dimitrie Gusti, monographic sociology, National Peasantry Party, political behavior, the rehabilitation of sociology

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It is not only recently that the sociologist's political commitment has come into question, but the manner and the seriousness of the commitment knew very different degrees of intensity over time. Leaving aside the ethical debate regarding the participation of contemporary sociologists in political and military processes (as it does not make the object of this study), we focus on some endeavours related to the political commitment of some sociologists of the interwar period. According to our research, these endeavours reflect to a significant degree the political values imposed upon or assumed by the historians of sociology. Obviously, no researcher can "escape" the culture and ideology in which they became investigators of sociology's past, but we believe that understanding *sine ira et studio* the context and history of the interwar sociologists' political commitment would sensibly reduce the risk of their image being distorted.

It is not only recently that the sociologist's political commitment has come into question, but the manner and the seriousness of the commitment knew very different degrees of intensity over time. Leaving aside the ethical debate regarding the participation of contemporary sociologists in political and military processes (as it does not make the object of this study), we focus on some endeavours related to the political commitment of some sociologists of the interwar period. According to our research, these endeavours reflect to a significant degree the political values imposed upon or assumed by the historians of sociology. Obviously, no researcher can "escape" the culture and ideology in which they became investigators of sociology's past, but we believe that understanding *sine ira et studio* the context and history of the interwar sociologists' political commitment would sensibly reduce the risk of their image being distorted.

AN EXEMPLARY MINISTER

In the history of Romanian sociology there is no shortage of sociologists with major political commitments during the interwar period. (We mention only between brackets that professor Petre Andrei (1891-1940) in Iași and professor Traian Brăileanu (1882-1947) were also ministers of education.) But the case of professor Dimitrie Gusti (1880-1955), the founder of the Romanian Social Institute and of the Bucharest Sociological School, definitely became the most controversial. This is why, in this study, we try to bring light on a matter related to the Professor's political commitment during the 1932-33 period, when he served as a minister. As we know, after King Carol II (1893-1953) dismissed (after only one year in office) the government of "technicians" led by the great historian Nicolae Iorga (1871-1940) in June 1932, the National Peasants' Party, a centre-left party that had been born and grown strong after World War I, was called to govern. After Iorga's flawed governing, the first task of the new government was to prepare parliamentary elections, so that the country be led by a legitimate cabinet. All the more so because only such a government could implement the anti-crisis measures so greatly needed also in Romania.

Within the cabinet formed by Alexandru Vaida Voievod (1872-1950), the professor was invited to head the Ministry of Education, Religious Affairs and Arts. As opposed to his colleagues, Gusti had never held any ministry office before. The professor kept his ministry office within all the Peasantist governments – after several reshuffles, including after the alternance of prime-ministers – from June 1932 until November 1933. During this period, the professor was a full member of the government, in the sense that he did not isolate himself in his projects related to his ministry, but he participated in the activity of the entire government. He supported several government proposals in entirely different fields than those of culture or education. We found neither that he was criticised by the old Peasantists regarding his activity, nor that his removal was proposed, not taking into account the rumour of his being replaced by professor Petre Andrei in the summer of 1932¹. But the years of the world economic crisis were accompanied by political crisis. Consequently, the Peasantist governing was also extremely turbulent.

Despite his undisputed ministerial record within a Peasantist government, starting from the 1960's, during the period when sociology was being restored², a belief started to prevail that Gusti had not been a Peasantist, because he did not have a PNT membership card, and that he had been an independent expert, a technocrat. Some might consider that clarifying this matter is as a mere technicality, but in our opinion, understanding the history of his political commitment brings us closer to understanding the political context in which the founder of the sociological school had to perform.

In order to shed some light on this matter, we will focus primarily on the period of the Peasantist governing, namely the 1932-1934 period, and the effects it had on Gusti's career. In our opinion, Gusti's behaviour can be explained only by analysing his actual and symbolic actions during that period, and not by analysing his later statements and the interpretations of those statements. (Obviously, these statements are important, but not for the beginning of the '30s. They are important for the privative context of the '50s, and this should make the object of

¹ GOLOPENȚIA 2010. 63.

² ROSTĂS 2018.

another study.) Therefore, in this paper we will present Gusti's activity after pledging allegiance to King Carol II.

It is true that Gusti did not become a minister as any regular Peasantist, by climbing the party hierarchy, by participating in election campaigns, by fighting the National Liberal Party, General Averescu's People's Party or Iorga's Democratic Nationalist Party etc. Yet, Gusti's actions during his first days in office were visibly very useful to the party. He initiated a series of talks with professional federations whose members had been affected by the economic crisis, he participated in the meeting of the Inter-University Council and had a meeting with the writers who had been awarded the national prize, in an attempt to relaunch this initiative that had been abandoned for several years, and, most of all, he started to visit the schools in Bucharest. Further on, he visited the country – he inspected schools, he participated in training courses for school inspectors in Pitești and for primary school teachers in Brașov.

But this activity of gathering information and *ad hoc* counselling did not have the sole purpose of obtaining data or of solving problems. His visits and meetings *were prepared, announced and in many occasions covered by the daily press*. This strategy of promoting his activity had a clear political objective: to illustrate the fact that schools of any level and the intellectuals, from primary school teachers to the great art or science authors, were going to find an effective and competent support under the new Peasantist government. After the general disappointment brought by Iorga's government of technicians, it was necessary to wake up the electorate of state employees in the education field from their lethargy. This is why Gusti, in the middle of summer and of the students' vacation, was visiting schools and pointing out in the press that this field that had suffered during the Iorga government needed reforms. This is a less known side of the sociology professor's activity, namely using the press to launch initiatives. Let us not forget that during his last years of studies in Berlin, between 1906 and 1908, Gusti was a very keen observer of the nature and purpose of the press.

It is well-known that Gusti did everything he could to promote his sociological school and his reform projects, including those related to the ministry. But precisely in order to accomplish these plans, he participated directly in the party election campaign in the summer of 1932, contributing to its victory. Therefore, Dimitrie Gusti was in no way neutral, but he entered the electoral battle in the Ilfov county alongside powerful Peasantist leaders such as Ion Mihalache (1882-1963) and Virgil Madgearu (1887-1940) who were running for the Chamber, while he himself was running for the Senate³. In this capacity, besides the publicity for the activity of the ministry, he followed the same path as the other candidates. He delivered electoral speeches, he participated in street gatherings. One event in which Gusti participated is worth mentioning exactly because it is characteristic of the interwar era.

It was an ordinary electoral PNȚ meeting which took place at the Eforie Hall in Bucharest. The opening speech was delivered by Gusti, who focused on the problems of his department under the circumstances of the crisis, pointing out that “a lot is being said about a finance and banking reform but so little about a school policy.” And this brought about the school crisis. Even though “education is compulsory, illiteracy soars to such an extent that yearly there are 300,000 children who do not go to school.” He went on and also named other vulnerabilities of the cultural activity in the country (“even though they have cooperatives and libraries, they

³ See the daily newspaper *Universul*, no. 183, July 6, 1932, 7.

don't know what to do with them"), or the problem of intellectual unemployment as a result of the university crisis. As Gusti did not use to attack anybody, there were no incidents during his speech. But Virgil Madgearu, the secretary general of the party, "attacked the liberal party accusing it of favouring the development of the big industry to the disadvantage of the little industry" and this generated an unpredicted event. During the speech of the secretary general, at some point somebody shouted "Fire!", "Out!" People got into a great panic and started to run scared towards the exit. Peace was restored with difficulty. Some of the citizens did not return to the hall. After the meeting, leaving the Eforie Hall, the National Peasantists protested in front of the offices of the *Adevărul* and *Dimineața* newspapers"⁴, reported the Bucharest daily *Universul*.

Even from the analysis of this electoral campaign we can point out Gusti's commitment to the Peasantist policy. What we can also point out is the fact that in this new capacity he did not alter his actions or the discourse that he used to employ at the cross-party meetings of the Romanian Social Institute. We add here a detail which has to do with the political and electoral logic: after the failure of a technocrat government, after the press had chastised this type of governing, Gusti's biggest mistake would have been to engage in electoral battle as an unaffiliated technician.

As we know, the National Peasants' Party won the elections in the summer of 1932, and Gusti took a seat in the Senate of the Peasantist power, besides his minister position. His activism did not wane after the end of the elections campaign, on the contrary.

Throughout his entire period in office, he was concerned with the situation of those members of the teaching staff who had been wronged previously. As a university professor and a dean from 1929 and until he was appointed a minister, he knew first-hand the students' and graduates' life during the economic depression and he worked towards improving their situation. Given that his ministry also included the departments of religious affairs and arts, Gusti did not hesitate to enter into dialogues with the members of the church and with the members of the world of literature and arts. He did not leave these fields to be managed exclusively by the general directors of the respective departments. To determine Gusti's efficiency as a minister judging by the number of dialogues and meetings with the representatives of these fields would be exaggerate. Nevertheless, what the press noted is significant: 70 meetings with associations of primary school teachers, secondary school teachers and graduates, almost 30 meetings on university- and student-related matters, over 20 meetings with representatives of several churches in Romania, almost 50 meetings with representatives of cultural associations, of visual artists and of musical institutions and, of course, with writers and playwrights. Under the circumstances of the world economic crisis, which impacted also upon Romania, and of the austerity measures, Gusti managed to improve the situation of the underprivileged in his system and even to prevent the closing down of some cultural institutions, and he managed to set up new ones. It is enough to mention the setting up of the prizes for young writers or the Book Month. But Gusti's commitment does not end with the tasks of his ministry. He participated in almost 50 more protocol meetings, time-consuming solemnities, stressful parliamentary debates than the other members of the government. We should also recall his foreign mission to Italy, for the inauguration of the Romanian School in Rome. On this occasion, Gusti met not only with his counterpart, Francesco Ercole, the Minister of National Education, but also with Prime-Minister Benitto Mussolini,

⁴ *Universul*, July 12, 1932, 12.

with King Victor Emanuel the 3rd and with Pope Pius the 11th. A separate study is needed to cover this almost two-week visit to Italy of minister Gusti.

Besides the task of doing away with the problems brought about by the previous government, Gusti initiated a series of innovating actions, beyond the meticulously documented legislative proposals, beyond the research on the education system included in the volume of documents⁵ edited one year after the completion of his term. This feverish reforming activity occasioned by his position as a minister had only one unforeseen (although predictable) consequence: the monographists, the members of the Bucharest Sociological School, those with whom he had been exploring the Romanian rural reality for seven years, starting as early as 1925, felt abandoned, lacking the Professor's direct guidance. Gusti did not forget his first and foremost commitment to researching the reality with the help of the young people he trained. He helped the monographists with scholarships abroad, by financing the Făgăraș summer camp (called "writing camp"), which also offered additional field research opportunities in Drăguș.⁶ But Gusti's absence from amidst the young monographists generated a sentiment of crisis, something which his most important assistant, Henri H. Stahl (1901-1991) later on called "the monography crisis".⁷

Naturally, this situation partially illustrated the well-known conflict between his calling as a scientist and his calling as a politician, but Gusti was convinced, as any East-European intellectual, that thorough reforms, science must help society escape underdevelopment. For this reason, he thought that politics offered him the chance to try to accomplish as many of his reform ideals as possible. And, because generally his ideas coincided with the ideas of the National Peasants' Party (which at that time was considered a centre-left party), and because the party supported him, he also supported this government until it forwarded its resignation to the king in 1933.

A PEASANTIST WITHOUT AN OFFICE

After the November 1933 elections, when Gusti lost the ministry office, one could believe that he distanced himself from the PNT, especially because on 1 December 1933 King Carol II appointed him at the lead of the "Prince Carol" Royal Cultural Foundation. But Gusti's gesture to gather and publish, in 1934, the documents of his term as a minister in the great volume "A year at the Ministry of Education, Religious Affairs and Arts" shows his belief that his work in that government had not been in vain, even if only for this collection of documents, useful to anyone who would follow him at the Ministry of Education.

In the introduction to this volume, which includes the doctrine and legislative work of his ministry, Gusti clearly states his commitment to the peasantist values, and for this reason we will quote this entire part:

"In the «Program Manifesto» of the National Peasants' Party of 27 June 1932, the chapter regarding school reads as follows: «Citizens, the National Peasants' Party will strive

⁵ GUSTI 1934.

⁶ ROSTÁS 2013.

⁷ STAHL 1981. 195-272.

and make all sacrifice in order to set up a school suitable to the current needs of the country. The primary education will be strengthened and will have a practical nature, being closely connected to the local life, so that it prepares the children for the life requirements and the environment in which they live. The decrease of the number of illiterates shall be pursued through all possible means. Higher peasant schools will be created to train the natural leaders of the villages and to improve village life. The secondary education will be regulated and improved so that its graduates can be useful to society right away and so that not all of them seek to go to Universities. The vocational education will be developed and focused on meeting the requirements of the social and economic life. The development of private education under the control of the state will be encouraged. Universities will have a greater creation capacity and also a greater impact on society. Besides school, the National Peasants' Party will oversee through all means the development of the people's education through the cooperation of all the state services with the great cultural societies of the country.

The National Peasants' Party will do its best to restore to the Church its great role of comforting the soul and of guiding the believers on the right path, while giving its servants the respect and holiness they should enjoy in order to set the national life on pillars of trust and healthy traditions».⁸

It is of great significance that in 1934, while in opposition, Gusti participated in the debates of this party's elite – within the framework of the National Peasants' Party Circle of Studies. We find him in a volume of projects elaborated by 20 PNT personalities, such as Mihail Ralea (1896-1964), Armand Călinescu (1893-1939), Virgil Madgearu (1887-1940), Ioan Răducanu (1884-1964), Petre Andrei (1891-1940), D. R. Ioanițescu (1885-1970), Grigore Gafencu (1892-1957) and others, each approaching a field in which they had already risen to prominence. Professor Gusti wrote about the prospects and the necessity of organizing the culture, carrying on the ideas he promoted while he was a minister and included in the above-mentioned volume. To conclude, during the above-mentioned years, Gusti's behaviour transpired not only ideological consistency, but also an organizational involvement with the party.⁹

THE PEASANTIST PAST OF AN INDEPENDENT SOCIOLOGIST

One can question if this PNT affiliation had any roots in the past. Formally, it had none. We have not seen any document so far that would confirm his membership to the National Peasants' Party. But if the membership card is not of real consequence, and if we follow Gusti's (more or less discreet) involvement in politics, we learn, from Keith Hitchins' *Rumania 1866-1947*, in chapter *Parties*, that the National Peasants' Party, whose initial leaders had been bank officers and cooperative workers, started to become popular with the intellectuals, as early as the beginning of the '20s, thanks to its commitment to "political democracy and social reform": "Among them there were notably Dimitrie Gusti, the well-known social anthropologist, and the members

⁸ GUSTI 1934. VI-VII.

⁹ *Rapoarte*, 1934.

of the Romanian Social Institute that he had set up in Bucharest in 1921; Virgil Madgearu, an economist who would become one of the lead theoreticians of peasantism[...].¹⁰ If during this period Gusti's peasantist activity had not been visible, as a founder, in 1918, of the *Association for Science and Social Reform*, which later became the *Romanian Social Institute*, his notoriety rose very quickly within the capital city's intellectual and political milieu, precisely because of the cross-party atmosphere he imposed at the debates of this institution. Also notorious is the fact that Virgil Madgearu, an old friend since the time they studied together in Germany, was Gusti's second in command in setting up all these institutions. It is clear that the two shared an identical interest in the village and in the rural matter, but while Gusti, by his nature and calling, tended towards promoting scientific thinking in politics, towards researching the rural realities, the economics professor Virgil Madgearu chose the political organization and action. Therefore, it is not by chance that when the Peasantists came to power, in December 1928, Gusti was invited as a president in the boards of the Autonomous House of State Monopolies, of the National Office of Cooperatives, of the Radio Broadcasting Company and, finally, to hold a minister position.

From this point of view, Mihail Manoilescu (1891-1950)'s memoirs, written in 1944 are a more than interesting document. A renowned engineer and economist, an ideologist of Romanian corporatism with a difficult political career in the interwar period (from fervently supporting King Carol II to contesting him and then to becoming his foreign secretary), Mihail Manoilescu (1891-1950) recalls with admiration Gusti's activity at the Romanian Social Institute.

„As any important institution – Manoilescu wrote – our Institute also had at its origin *one man*.

Gusti was an animator; a dynamic and likeable animator. This is why he did not launch a trend but he set up a beautiful intellectual display where, with his captivating delicacy, he managed to gather together those that would become, at the end of the war, the most important intellectual personalities of the country.

The malicious used to say about Gusti that he has the gift of discovering and attracting the future ministers to the Institute! But this joke was actually an homage; because encouraging *at the right time* the people who carry great hidden virtues within them is no small merit.

I started to work there in 1919 and I stayed there forever active and full of initiative, during the *heroic era* of the institute which ended once Gusti joined the National Peasants' Party.

Gusti could not have made a greater mistake than that of joining a party, *be that any party*. His great virtue and all his charm lied in his *neutrality*, this is why, precisely the day when – according to the well-known phrase – he “*got his political colours*”, he lost his own colours and his uniqueness which made him fulfil a true *national function*.”¹¹

Yet, from the nostalgic description of Gusti's period of neutrality one can clearly understand Manoilescu's antipathy towards Madgearu and the party he represented:

¹⁰ HITCHINS 2013. 428.

¹¹ MANOILESCU 1993. 49-50.

“What made the beauty of the committee meetings is that, exactly as with Junimea, they were held orderly, at each of the members’ houses, in an intimate atmosphere where only Madgearu’s outbursts would spoil the general mood.

But it is fair to admit that at the Institute, even impetuous Madgearu left aside politics for quite a while, until the fatal day when he attracted Gusti into his party and in doing so he ruined the house where we all felt so well...”¹²

It is clear, and Manoiilescu’s memoirs prove it, that Madgearu’s influence and confidence were a factor in Gusti’s accepting political dignities before entering the government. But equally clear is the fact that Manoiilescu did not realize that Gusti’s neutrality was closely connected to the rural themes. In other words: Gusti hoped that his reform ideas would be accomplished by entering a government which agreed with him.

Therefore, even though he knew he needed to preserve the Romanian Social Institute as a cross-party scientific forum, Gusti was at the same time contributing to clarifying the party ideology as a supporter, without getting involved in the actual party life. On the other hand, the RSI actually was a cross-party institution given the activity of its departments and the series of conferences which were very renowned within the intellectual and political milieu of interwar Bucharest.

What is certain is that within the history of the National Peasants’ Party we have not found so far any documents regarding Dimitrie Gusti’s party activity, while his activity as an organizer of the Romanian Social Institute’s conference and of the monographic sociology research was abundantly recorded. Furthermore, Dimitrie Gusti’s style of maintaining good relations with the representatives of all the important parties was well known and recognized even by his opponents.

This style, as well as his proved managerial capability qualified him for the positions he occupied after the appointment of the PNȚ government, besides, of course, the guarantee of his loyalty as a supporter of the Peasantist movement.

It is worth pointing out that Gusti never used offensive words regarding his opponents, be they persons or parties, neither when he was a minister, nor even during the electoral campaign. Moreover, he even organized a consultation meeting with those who preceded him at the lead of the Ministry of Education.

And yet, it is inexplicable that at some point there was this almost general consensus that Gusti had been only a technocrat, a technician in the National Peasants’ Party government during 1932-33. After reading the studies on Gusti’s activity published after the end of his term, nobody stated or suggested that he was incongruous with the PNȚ Government, whether he was a member or not. 25 years after starting his university career, there appeared consistent studies regarding his multilateral activity signed by people with whom he worked closely such as Mircea Vulcănescu (1904-1952), Henri H. Stahl (1901-1991), Octavian Neamțu (1910-1976), Ion Zamfirescu (1907-2001), Traian Herseni (1907-1980), Gheorghe Vlădescu-Răcoasa (1885-1989) and a series of politicians, but nobody disputed the nature of the professor’s participation in the Peasantist government.¹³

¹² MANOILESCU 1993. 50.

¹³ *Omagiu* 1936.

After World War II, while sociology was struggling to survive, neither Gusti nor others mentioned the period in which he was a minister¹⁴. The professor only mentioned publicly and positively the monographic sociology research, the Law of Social Welfare and the importance and benefits of the International Congress of Sociology (even though it did not take place, because of the outbreak of the war).

THE (EXPLICABLE) DWINDLING MEMORY OF THE PEASANTIST COMMITMENT

After 1948, that is after sociology was banished from the university and from among the social sciences, after the Academy of Romania became the Academy of the Popular Republic of Romania, where Gusti was no longer allowed, for almost ten years, Gusti was mentioned only as a representative of the bourgeoisie-enslaved sociology, as a Peasantist minister and other epithets of the time.

Gusti's public activity actually started to be re-evaluated within the wider context of revalorizing the cultural heritage initiated by the cultural authorities of the communist party at the beginning of the '60s. The studies meant to rehabilitate Gusti and his school also take into consideration the matter of introducing his political activity. Within this context, there appears for the first time the idea that Gusti would have become a member of the Peasantist governments because of his scientific prestige, while he was not even a member of the PNȚ. Those familiar with the respective period realize that the authors, Ovidiu Bădina, a young researcher who had studied in Moscow and Octavian Neamțu, a faithful co-worker of professor Gusti's since 1934, in order to have their book published, they were forced to „gloss over” the past and offer an image that the ideological authorities and the censorship could accept. This implied an acceptable interpretation of some facts from the past, capable to determine the censors to allow the problematic fragment. Thus, for a comparison with the above-sketched reasons for appointing Gusti to the three public offices, please find below the authors' interpretation:

“The tasks that Gusti received during the period 1929-1930 – the Radio Broadcasting Company, the Autonomous House of Monopolies, the National Office of Cooperatives – corresponded to his sociological, statistical and legal training achieved during his studies and developed creatively through the constructive activity he had been carrying out for a decade in the country. The radio stations were, in the culture policy program elaborated by Gusti, one of the most efficient instruments of dissemination for the national culture. He contributes to building a national broadcasting program and comes up with the idea of the Radio University.”¹⁵

The glossing over intensifies when it comes to explaining why he entered the Peasantist government. It is suggested that he was not convinced of the necessity of this step and that this brought him only trouble in the long run:

„He did not accept to become a minister for vain ambition, but because he had a reform program for the public education to accomplish. The circumstances in which he accepted

¹⁴ Rostás 2021.

¹⁵ Bădina & NEAMȚU 1967. 89-90.

to enter the National Peasantist government led by Al. Vaida-Voievod and the part N. Titulescu played in his decision are known from G. Vlădescu-Răcoasa's accounts. Gusti hesitated a lot. The document entitled «Should I run for office», in which his brother Anastase is showing him the reasons that would justify him to enter the government, that is to implement his own views in the field of culture policy, reflects the numerous considerations that Dimitrie had raised in his dialogues with his brother. In one year and four months, during that governing period, he was part of four governments, which hindered his activity very much. Moreover, the government crisis found him every time away from Bucharest, sometimes away from the country, in Rome or in Germany, on official missions...¹⁶

After thus setting the atmosphere for approaching the issue of the ministry position, the authors quote Gusti's own testimony, without specifying the date it was written:

“Gusti writes about this later on: ‘I received the proposal to take part in a Peasantist government, even though I was not a member of the Peasants’ Party, being offered first the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then, after I refused, the Ministry of Education, Religious Affairs and Arts. My hesitation lasted for a few days’; ‘...The one who determined me to abandon my two-day hesitation to enter the government was N. Titulescu, with whom I was in a friendly relationship. He encouraged me to accept the proposal especially because, being in the government, I could help him in his policy to bring Romania closer to the Soviet Union, a policy which, as we know, was considered very bold at that time.’¹⁷

This argument was obviously a manoeuvre to make Gusti's commitment to a Peasantist government acceptable to the cultural authorities of the time.

We quoted these paragraphs not in order to blame or expose the authors of the volume, but in order to show the reasons why they presented Gusti's time in office in this way. First of all, we should point out that in the end any history, even those considered scientific, are intellectual constructions. Furthermore, within the context of the ideological domination exerted by the Romanian Workers' Party (after 1965 – the Romanian Communist Party), only naïve intellectuals understood the “reclaiming of the cultural legacy” at the beginning of the ‘60s as an act of justice. This decision was actually a manoeuvre to find new legitimacy for the single party. And this widening of the legitimacy base did not also imply an objective study of the interwar political system or of the historical parties, and therefore neither the study of their governments. Even a neutral description of the political parties, of the role of personalities, of the international context - not to mention of the National-Peasantists, who were chastised more than the National-Liberals - was unthinkable. It is understandable why the authors needed a distorted (not to say hilarious) presentation of Gusti's involvement in the PNTȚ Government. A minor moment with Nicolae Titulescu (1882-1941) was blown out of proportions expressly because the renowned foreign officer supported the revival of the relations with the Soviet Union, hence his memory was revered.

One wonders what was the source that supported the assertion that Gusti was rather a specialist, a technician in a government of politicians. The source was Gusti himself. But at the same time one should also wonder when and in what context did he deny his membership to

¹⁶ BĂDINA & NEAMȚU 1967. 90-91.

¹⁷ Bădina & NEAMȚU. 1967. 91.

the National Peasants' Party. The answer is revealing for those who know what the weight of a non-communist political past was for an intellectual after World War II. In volume VII of his *WORKS* edited in 1993, after the change of regime, Ovidiu Bădina gathers, in a chapter suggestively called "Texts removed from D. Gusti, *WORKS*, Vol. VI", the memorandums Gusti sent the central party and state authorities between 1946 and 1954. In a period when the entire intellectual elite was more or less blamed – many being arrested and sentenced – for cooperating with the regime from before 23 August 1944, it was natural that each would look for "mitigating circumstances" in their past. Therefore, it is understandable why Gusti insisted on this detail, that he was not a formal member of the PNT. It is worth quoting here these fragments from the memorandums written after 1948 also in order to exemplify the self-defence discourse of the intellectual whose freedom was threatened:

"I was not a member of the club of liberal, conservative or peasantist parties, because fortunately, on the one hand I had no ambition what so ever to raise to prominence and on the other hand, because, as an observer of the Romanian public life, I realized their true value. Yet, in 1932, I received the proposal to take part in a Peasantist government, even though I was not a member of the Peasants' Party, being offered first the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then, after I refused, the Ministry of Education, Religious Affairs and Arts"¹⁸

Further to the recommendation of prime-minister Dr. Petru Groza (1884-1958), Gusti elaborates more on the previous memorandum, and regarding the matter of his participation in the Peasantist government, he does not change the essence, but adds a few more sentences:

"In one year and four months I participated in four governments – the ministerial crisis always found me away from Bucharest – which, naturally, hindered a lot my activity. Nevertheless, I managed to leave behind enough studies and legislative proposals to make up a 1562-page volume, published in 1934."¹⁹

In 1950, after not having received his pension for four months and after having been evacuated from his own house, Gusti sends a shorter memorandum to the Minister of Internal Affairs, Teohari Georgescu (1908-1976), in which, to the known content, he adds:

"I was part of the 1932-33 governments as a *specialist*, as a *technician*, not as a politician..."²⁰

In a later version, undated, he brings a nuance meant to also set himself apart from the Peasantist politics:

"In 1932 I received a proposal to be part of an election government in my sole capacity as a scientist and technician, not as a member of the party who formed the government, and of which I was not a member."²¹

The last letter – sent in September 1954, this time to his former student, Miron Constantinescu (1917-1974), an important leader of the Communist Party – published by Bădina – does not bring any new phrasing regarding his status in the above-mentioned governments, but recalls his actions after 23 August 1944, which demonstrated a deep understanding of the newly created

¹⁸ GUSTI 1993. 80.

¹⁹ GUSTI 1993. 87.

²⁰ GUSTI 1993. 97.

²¹ GUSTI 1993. 99.

situation. After all, this last letter is the desperate cry of an elderly professor, marginalised and ill, who continued to be followed and threatened, even after Stalin's death:

"...I insistently and with all my heart ask you, in your official capacity as a vice-president of the Council of Ministers and as a member of the C.C. of the PMR, to energetically intervene in order for me to be left in peace to carry my illnesses unbothered – please show that you knew me from when you obtained your BA, and then when you prepared your PhD and from when you carried out your activity in villages, through papers and studies at the height of the dictatorial regime, at the University and in the field.

Please take into consideration my old age, my illnesses, especially my heart and my nerves, under all their shapes, and tell everybody interested in my humble person, tell them, please, the Truth.

Let me be removed *once and for all* from the list of those prosecuted for faults; eight years of continuous errors and of troubled and tormented life are enough. Thank you!
D. Gusti"²²

Under such political circumstances anyone would try to diminish the importance of the role for which they were prosecuted, especially if their arguments formally had a cover.

The same strategy was used also by the authors quoted above, Ovidiu Bădina (1932-1999) and Octavian Neamțu, in order to avoid the danger of having the censorship refuse the presentation on Dimitrie Gusti's sociological work and his school. As the communist regime remained firm in accusing the interwar governments, the idea that Gusti did not agree with the PNTȚ ideology and that he had been rather a technocrat in the 1932-1933 government was perpetuated.

Some might consider that this perpetuation is of no great consequence. Yet, we are of the opinion that not the formal enrolment but the commitment to a governmental program and the solidarity with the government are the ones matter. Gusti was not the only one in government structures who was not a party member, neither before nor after World War II. Much more important are the ideological consequences of Gusti's participation in this government of 1932-33. But the research regarding the matter of which "-ism" can apply to minister Gusti's activity is not yet satisfactorily concluded, and it does not fall upon this study to bring ideological clarifications. Also, we cannot approach the real consequences the ministry position had on the Bucharest Sociological School. Nevertheless, as we previously mentioned, the hypothesis regarding the "crisis of the monography" needs further clarifications.

CONCLUSION

This paper gathered the arguments necessary for demonstrating that the belief which started in the 1950s and was perpetuated until the present day is unfounded. According to this belief, Dimitrie Gusti was promoted within the National Peasants' Party thanks to his prestige as a specialist, as a technician and in no way because he was a Peasantist. The history preceding this government demonstrates the strong and permanent ties the professor had with the elite of this party starting as early as the '20s, to which the scientific interest for the rural world is to be added. But the clearest proof of his political views lies in his political behaviour during the

²² GUSTI 1993. 103.

Peasantist governing, which can be described as loyal and dedicated to carrying out the program of the party. Moreover, even in 1934, when the PNTJ fought in opposition, Dimitrie Gusti invoked the justness of its government program and participated in the drawing up of its new program. Clarifying the Professor's status within the Peasantist government is useful especially for the analysis of his ideological views, which continue to raise justified controversies. These investigations are worth carrying on because not only Dimitrie Gusti's views, but neither the National Peasants' Party's views have been adequately explained.

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Civilization Critical Investigation on the „Clockwork Condition” described by Anthony Burgess



ABSTRACT

The negative effects of the civilized lifestyle are widely discussed by many authors (for example Marx, Wells, or Max Nordau) in the nineteenth century, showing that industrial society and its mechanic requirements make a hard mental and physical impact on people who build and constantly change the modern world. In the twentieth century, many authors also dealt with the problem of adaptation to technology – a process that deeply changes people – that pushes them to a direction that leads towards an obedient, man-machine condition of life. Taylorism and its heritage, plus the culture, sport, sex, etc. industries and above all politics with its satellite media determine people how to live their lives. This makes a lifelong discomfort for those who want some autonomy but gives redemption for others who flee from constant decision-making. Burgess’s „clockwork condition” is a great depiction of the (post)modern man whose actions are mostly mere responses to a mechanic milieu created by „the state” that uses people as tools. Even democracy can turn into a spiritless, alienated sequence impregnated with boring or obviously mad plans of a governing minority if citizens forget how to be conscious, creative, and responsible when they make decisions. Beyond the topic of the novel *A Clockwork Orange* the problem is general: do we choose the „forced marriage of an organism to a mechanism” and follow the given patterns, let the conditioning happen, or insist on being imperfect, but capable of making decisions, even if many of them are bad.

KEYWORDS

Anthony Burgess, Clockwork Condition, problem of adaptation, Taylorism

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When Anthony Burgess describes the „clockwork condition” in one of his writings after more than ten years of the appearance of his novel *A Clockwork Orange* and a short time after Stanley Kubrick’s movie adaptation (it came out in 1972 in Britain) he states a very important thought about freedom and work. As he says „There is a bigger and more abiding consolation — the fact that I am free to write what I wish, that I have to follow no clock, that I need call no man “sir” and defer to him through fear. But such freedom breeds its own compunctions: I feel guilty if I do not work; I am my own tyrant. ... I recognize that I am better off than most, but I do not regard myself as having opted out of the agony and anxiety that plague men and women who are slaves to lives they did not choose and denizens of communities they hate.”¹

In the life of the writer work and freedom could be luckily paired in a content and steady way. These are brilliant sentences from a free man who is capable of free choice, accomplishing the art of living without lies, tactics, and other squalid actions. Burgess reveals the essence of the free intellectual mood of life as a writer and he knows how lucky he is. Success and contentment are very rare parts of the life of the majority of people of civilized countries. Alienation, hurry, deadlines, propaganda, professional wish makers with scientific-based advertisements, politics with its language that is not only reduced to a moron’s level but it does not even say the truth, and last but not least the caste system in institutions, workplaces, etc. These things in democracies make life – or there is a good chance these phenomena do – miserable on many levels for almost everyone. Burgess had to fight for this „winning” condition he describes in 1973. He had many tyrants when he was a soldier or a public servant, there were rules, clocks, and sirs whom he needed to obey, but finally he won and swapped his tyrants. He for himself as a tyrant is much better than a – most times – less intelligent, less educated one who surpasses the subjugates in things like aggression or careerism.

Of course, the circumstances of workers, or more precisely wage-workers have changed a lot. The sequence of positive results can be traced back well from the beginning, that is (let’s say) Marx’s essay of alienated labor until the mid-20th century’s evolving welfare states, where

¹ BURGESS 2012.

– thanks to the Bernsteinist social democratic thinking and actions² – the world of labor slowly was cottoned with measures and laws that defended workers (regardless of the color of the collar) from many dimensions. Despite the better salary, greater appreciation of workers, more safety and possibility of reaching a more convenient and plannable life and future some kind of spleen remained in the air and is still with us.

The phenomenon that Burgess called „clockwork condition” was well scrutinized much earlier by Max Nordau, a Hungarian born Jewish writer, journalist, and physician (and later Zionist leader) who in 1882 wrote his famous (or for many readers infamous) work titled *Degeneration*, and found many facts in his medical office in Paris that the new lifestyle – that had new characteristics such as the rule of the clock on people and a new kind of discipline conducted by the pace of the machine production makes people ill both physically and psychically. His more than five hundred pages diagnosis targets mainly the *fin de siècle* cultural milieu as a degenerative factor in art, literature, and philosophy, in order to show those tendencies that make degenerated leaders and cultural elite and through them degenerated future planning. There is a part in this book where Nordau as a doctor overstocks his readers with plenty of (well documented Prussian) statistics about many illnesses: how much the number of patients with mental problems, cardiac disease, alcoholism, or drug addiction increased in a decade. He points out the growing rate of felonies or suicides but also observes that the newer generations sooner meet hair or skin problems, teeth problems, and need to wear glasses because their vision capacities begin to decline earlier.

As Nordau notes „all the symptoms enumerated are the consequences of fatigue and exhaustion, and these, again, are the effect of contemporary civilization, of the vertigo and whirl of our frenzied life, the vastly increased number of sense impressions and organic reactions, and therefore of perceptions, judgments, and motor impulses, which at present are forced into a given unity of time”³. This cocktail of tasks, speed, and compulsory decisions consists the greater part of the life of those unlucky ones who also had to throw their personal life into this vertigo and whirl and have no choice to turn themselves into their own tyrant. It is not surprising that they drink more alcohol, take more drugs or choose more often to commit suicide, or do crimes and mad things. Nordau warns his readers that the future can be much worse if the evident (at least for him) degenerative tendencies will follow, then be intensified and dominate the 20th century.

Interesting that Nordau partly envisioned the Karova Milkbar and the Ludovico treatment too, and was capable to super enhance the dystopic picture of the future ruled by degeneration: „... In the place of the present taverns houses would be found devoted to the service of consumers of ether, chloral, naphtha, and hashish. ... Sexual psychopathy of every nature has become so general and so imperious that manners and laws have adapted themselves accordingly. Modesty and restraint are dead superstitions of the past, and appear only as atavism and among the inhabitants of remote villages. The lust of murder is confronted as a disease, and treated by surgical intervention, etc”⁴.

² Against the classical Marxism, for example Karl Kautsky, who forced class struggle and world revolution the Bernsteinist way was of the reforms and the gradual improvement of the life of workers.

³ NORDAU 1895. 42.

⁴ Ibid 471-472.

Modesty and restraint are strict basic constitutions of civilization and civilized behavior that need a system in the background which coerces people to learn it and also to apply it. Being a civilized human has a price, a great part of the autonomy of a person remains dumb because the state acts instead of the citizen in many cases, such as protecting him or giving him possibilities for living a decent life with many rules to keep. As Burgess says „fear of the whip drove the slave to work; fear of dismissal still drives the wage-slave to work”⁵. Civilization – which partially consists of some culture (but this ingredient is not really necessary) – is based on discipline, limited knowledge, a dose of fear, and a relatively narrow intellectual horizon for almost everyone. Long ago the closest mate of people became the machine, machinery has been the alignment point. As Herbert Marcuse notes life in industrial societies has lost its spontaneity or its adventure likeness. „Individual distinctions in the aptitude, insight, and knowledge are transformed into different quanta of skill and training, to be coordinated at any time within the common framework of standardized performances”.⁶ The result is fatigue, but not the muscles are tired, rather the mind.

As Burgess points out problems of ends and means of society became apparent soon for the elite and it begins to think about solutions. These solutions of course do not concern the elite as the focus of the problems but the people, also known as voters. People behave strange, follow destructive rules, cheat, steal, nothing is enough for them, etc. Who does understand this? The elite raises the question, and the programs for correction quickly begin to appear also by politicians and scientists. Changing voters and keeping the votes at the same time however is almost mission impossible. B. F. Skinner made a solution for this challenge that made Burgess angry, and that is why we can write, read, dispute about the masterpiece called *A Clockwork Orange* for more than a half-century.

As Skinner states „the so-called 'democratic philosophy' of human behavior to which it also gave rise is increasingly in conflict with the application of the methods of science to human affairs. Unless this conflict is somehow resolved, the ultimate goals of democracy may be long deferred”.⁷ Skinner gives a plan – a description about the conflict, and a cure for the symptoms, but not for the basic problem. His cure changes behavior, as if man were a circus animal, says Burgess. Conditioning – he notes – only ensure self discipline, as a built in patrol against autonomy of the self. Without identifying the problem, namely the clockwork condition, alienation, malaise the cure will be ineffective. Skinner identifies only misbehave, that must be cured scientifically and effectively.

Heidegger revealed the problem well in one of his writing about Nietzsche. As he points out in *The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead'*, quoting from *The Gay Science* by Nietzsche » „We have killed him-you and I. All of us are his murderers,” he allows the madman to as: „But how have we done this?” Nietzsche elucidates the question as he repeats it, spelling out what is asked in three image: „How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do when we unchained this earth from its sun?”⁸ Without transcendency, without the belief of God mankind lost his sun in the past three decades. What

⁵ BURGESS 2012.

⁶ MARCUSE 2004. 44.

⁷ SKINNER 1961. 3.

⁸ HEIDEGGER 1977. 107.

remained is science, which is for almost all is reduced to narrow-minded materialism, even scientists are blind to those disciplines that differ from the one they are dealing with. Capitalism bundled in materialism is the torch with which people regard the earth. Their goals and actions accord no more with transcendency, there have been no value system given by God anymore, humans' task is to correspond earthly wishes with earthly law. No more redemption and the wishes, plans, and self-restraint depends on the individual's intellect, social background, and other profane factors.

Everyone is at the market: producing and consuming are tangled in the same person. At the same time, many kinds of industries strive to plant the abundance of wishes and goals in the subjects' minds, make them want to possess and discard endless sequences of products and buy everything every time at every age. Besides turning off the transcendent light or sun which helped them to see their goals man also „drink up the sea”, all that archaic unity that lay under the sun – all that remained has been raw material: coal, wood, oil, water, stone, meat, etc. And if someone nowadays is „green” enough, sun, water, wind, or the heat of the soil at first place are renewable energy sources for him or her. Without the sea and the sun, the well-known horizon also vanished, and the familiar world soon became a memory, or rather a fairytale. Today everything is changing on the facade, everyone is rushing, even learning is lifelong, but rules, clocks, and „sirs” are the stable points in „the vertigo and whirl of our frenzied life”.

In his 1977 Spiegel interview which has a telling title – Only a God Can Save Us – Heidegger exposes his worries for what is so sinister about the 20th century. „Everything is functioning. This is exactly what is so uncanny, that everything is functioning and that the functioning drives us more and more to even further functioning, and that technology tears men loose from the earth and uproots them.”⁹

Focusing on the world of Alex we can see a kind of result of vertigo and whirl of millions' frenzied life in an imaginary Britain where anomie is a basic part of life. As Burgess told in many forums the theme of the novel is free will, which is very important to him as a writer with a catholic background. In an interview he tells something very serious: „...choice, choice is all that matters and to impose the good is evil, to act evil is better than to have good imposed”.¹⁰ Again, we can see that autonomy is competing with heteronomy, the possibility of originality versus artificial or opportunist, also known as civilized actions. Blocking honest actions of humans for requiring the awaited behavior pattern for making a machine-like well doer scientifically is lower class than an honest act even it is bad - that is what Burgess tries to tell. The absolute denial of choice and free will make this kind of technological and medical method a dead-end, for it turns society into an orchestra that plays only its actual conductor's music, with no possibility of improvisation.

Burgess was rightly worried about the fact that this conception would be a real alternative for politicians. Skinner handled conditioning and chemical treatment as a good and reliable solution for the repair of social problems of democratic countries and if he had found supporters, the plan would have been realized.

But even without this direct freedom reducing scientific intervention, choice is still often missing from the lives of people who live in a modern state among non-dystopic circumstances.

⁹ Only a God Can Save Us: Der Spiegel's Interview. 37.

¹⁰ INGERSOLL – INGERSOLL 2008. 8.

„For the moment, I have to record that I have been derided and rebuked for expressing my fears of the power of the modern state—whether it be Russia, China, or what we may term Anglo-America—to reduce the freedom of the individual”¹¹ says Burgess. It is not accidental that he uses the expression wage-slave depicting people who are not so successful and lucky as he himself is. The majority has been thrown into a situation of surviving and not choosing a job but finds one, and seldom is happy with it. „The maintenance of a complex society depends increasingly on routine work, work with no zest or creativity. The things we eat, clothes we wear, places where we live become increasingly standardized because standardization is the price we pay for the prices we are able to pay. Life ticks along for most of us like a Woolworth’s alarm clock. We grow used to the rhythm imposed on us by our need to subsist: soon we get to like our bondage.”¹²

Liking the bondages is often a reaction by people to the facts of modern reality and its dysfunctions. Modernity needs these dysfunctions to be able to function. In democracies, there is liberty and equality, but for example at workplaces – where people spend more than half of their wakefulness – we do not find it often: instead of equality we can see caste systems with rules, clocks, and „sirs” to the extent that we, who maintain these societies deserve. A typical example for this environment, as Burgess tells it, is the army where drill and commands determine the actions of the soldier and to do so transforms the individual into a tiny particle of the collective. „At first I resented the discipline, the removal of even minimal liberty ... Soon my reduction to a piece of clockwork began to please me, soothe me. One of a squad, obeying orders with the whole squad, forbidden to ask questions or to question orders—I was, after four years of rigorous academic life, having a delicious vacation from the need to be /choosing/ all the time. I can, after six years of that, sympathize with the civilian who is unhappy about making his own decisions—where to eat, whom to vote for, what to wear.”¹³ Conformity is indeed a soft pillow for hundreds of millions on which they can sleepwalk their entire life without doing anything original or interesting or valuable that exceeds satisfactory „functioning”. They are, we are human resource, ordered to do something (anything) humanly possible, or as Heidegger calls this, being in the state of the „standing reserve”.

Such is capitalism, we could say, and all of us saw that the experiments to reform or supersede capitalism became nightmares in the 20th century. As Burgess admits „a man has to conform to a pattern of work in order to feed himself and his family; a man may find it pleasurable or natural or convenient to conform in his social tastes”.¹⁴ Then he continues with a warning: „but when patterns of conformity are imposed by the state, then one has a right to be frightened.”¹⁵ The remote, impersonal governing machine can turn into an inhuman minority group, mainly in big countries or federations. Democracy is not enough strong to hinder the formation of such a government, thus conformity is dangerous if it becomes too widespread. That is why a dose of fear from politicians and the state is really useful as keeping distance from conformity, plus one useful thing: reading dystopias – these are the advice of Burgess for all who want to understand something about the „clockwork condition”.

¹¹ BURGESS 2012.

¹² Ibid

¹³ Ibid

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Ibid; Rorty 1995.

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Review of the book “The philosophy of the labor market, employer power and social responsibility” by Gábor Dániel Nagy



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The labor market philosophy attempts to understand the fundamentals of the labor market as a phenomenon (NAGY 2021). There are two primary participants in the market: employees who provide stock and employers who provide claims. The book focuses on the relationships between employers and employees and their relationship at the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels.

The labor market comprises several components. The labor force participation rate is the number of people willing to work in the labor market. The population of applicants refers to

those who apply for a particular job and match their requirements. The candidate pool refers to the people who expressed interest in applying for a position by applying for it. The individuals chosen refer to the people who passed the screening process and were therefore employed. From a macroeconomic perspective, wages are determined by the relationship between labor supply and demand. When supply exceeds demand, wages grow at a slower rate compared to productivity. From a microeconomics perspective, the author points out that individuals supply labor as long as their wages exceed the opportunity of not doing so. Labor demand is determined by the relationship between the marginal cost of production and the marginal revenue of output. Labor market constraints reduce the incentive for firms to hire, as the costs and risks of hiring are high. Trade unions, employee training and qualifications, minimum wage laws, and job-related data all affect the flexibility of the labor market (KNELL 2014).

The text highlights that employers are responsible for compensating employees with reasonable wages commensurate with the services they provide. They are engaged in hiring, managing, supervising, and controlling employees, training and development, and ensuring a safe workplace. Providing health insurance is a great incentive for potential employees. They are more likely to work when they are not concerned with the costs of attending to possible health issues. Employers who offer health benefits have more power than those who do not. Further, offering employees opportunities for growth is likely to retain them. Employees also look for job security—an employer who guarantees job security enhances their power in the market by attracting quality personnel (KNELL 2014). Employers also increase their power if they engage in social responsibility, ensure a workplace free from discrimination and harassment, disburse compensation on time, enhance safety by providing employees with the necessary protective equipment and emergency services, act in good faith, provide employees with a system that supports a healthy work-life balance, and protects the privacy of employees.

Nagy (2021) points out that the multifaceted nature of the labor market has resulted in a lack of consensus regarding its structure. A review of the literature on the subject highlights a basic understanding of the market as the meeting point of demand and supply to set the price for the labor provided. The market is a means of communication in which buyers and sellers communicate their needs and intentions. The labor market definition is sometimes constrained by geography and time, although it is considered a vital element of a market economy. The market may also be viewed as a social institution in which the human element plays a role in determining social dynamics, such as poverty. From a structural perspective, work security may be inversely proportional to firm size. When making job-changing decisions, workers must balance security, seniority, and compensation. The labor market is unique, given that workers have control over where they direct their productivity. They can also control productivity based on wages. Further, individual workers seeking employment are in a position of information deficiency that employers can exploit in a prisoner's dilemma approach (LIOTTI 2020).

Further, ILM has been suggested to have evolved from on-job training, customs, and enterprise-specific abilities. ILMs are preferable for managers seeking to retain competitiveness in both the labor and product markets. ILM structures are shaped by workers' need for security and management's need for efficiency. Employees with the same qualities may be treated differently in various areas of the labor market. Job structure, employment conditions, training, career structure, workforce mobility, and recruitment regulations are affected by current technology,

market conditions, and industrial structure (LIOTTI 2020). Even with labor market liberalization, demand differentials across genders remain. Policies regarding formal and informal economies also impact the labor market. Workers in the informal economy have less job security and, therefore, face more uncertainty than their counterparts in the formal economy. A firm may rely on an internal strategy of hiring workers or an external strategy involving subcontracting to meet its labor needs.

Employees are the most valuable asset in the production process. As such, they wield significant power and required effective management to harness it. The relationship between an employee and their manager should be grounded in shared values, conflict resolution, mutual trust, communication, motivation, and participative leadership. Employee relationship management is essential for effectively coordinating inanimate resources to develop a firm's competitive advantage. Employee retention is a precursor to customer retention, and a firm excelling in human relationship management meets the needs of its employees and customers, creating a fertile ground for long-term relationships. The author highlights the research methodologies employed in studies on the relationship between employee relationships and performance. Employee relations are affected by legal systems, socio-ethnic heritage, technology, and financial factors. Employee engagement allows employees to attain a sense of ownership. Employees may also be attracted to a company's culture. Corporate culture can fall into four categories: social, dependable, enterprising, and hierarchical.

The text dives into the McKinsey 7S model, which is an internal control tool for corporate entities. According to this model, seven elements were used to determine success. Three are hard elements, namely structure, strategy, and systems, and four are soft elements, namely skills, staff, shared values, and style (MARCOTTE 2011). Maintaining an effective balance between the seven elements is essential. Altering one element results in a chain reaction that necessitates altering the others to maintain a desired balance. Communication is an essential component of employee relationship management. The text highlights that communication promotes trust and group activities in the workplace. Another vital component of relationship management is participative leadership. This is essential in demonstrating the shared objectives and values between the administration and subordinates. It is also crucial to develop mutual trust to increase confidence depending on others. Motivation is driven by leadership, reward, working conditions, empowerment, creative thinking, growth and development, and meaningful work. Managing conflicts in the workplace reduces the negative friction caused by poorly managed conflicts. The author also outlines the benefits of employee relationship management on performance and employee results.

Corporate social responsibility comes with the benefits of strengthening relationships with customers and communities. CSR endeavors allow a firm to return to society, benefiting from the community in which it operates. The author examines the CSR activities of various scholars. The CSR approach depends on, among others, the nationality and the industry of focus of the scholar. CSR perspectives oscillate between economic and social models. From an economic perspective, CSR is a way of sharing the value derived from a firm's activities to its communities. Social perspectives are more concerned with changing social situations, such as alleviating poverty (BOTSIAN 2019). Environmental aspects of CSR may be concerned with intrinsic concern for the environment or influenced by the need to internalize a firm's negative externalities.

Society's expectations of corporate behavior have changed. As a result, companies are expected to engage in CSR more often (BOTSIAN 2019).

The author elucidates several limitations of the labor market. Lack of training makes it difficult for employees to enhance their productivity. Lack of permanent contracts reduces job security. A mismatch between the work done and working conditions, as well as compensation, raises well-being issues (see NAGY 2016). An increase in inequality and a lack of business ambition are other issues in the labor market. Employer empowerment may result in the abuse of this power, which deteriorates interpersonal relations. Security and credentials risk, arrogance, high training costs, and little knowledge and understanding are all adverse effects of increased employer power. The author criticizes CSR by pointing out that it is a source of increased costs. CSR also affects the company's profit and may impact professionalism, increase internal conflicts, waste time, and receive negative attention from stockholders and creditors.

The book concludes with future implications for the labor market. Organizations are likely to be decentralized with more personalized employer-employee relationships, and will likely make it easier for women, the elderly, and individuals with disabilities to participate in the labor force, retraining and lifetime learning will receive more attention, and growing wages will reduce the link between fringe benefits and employment (BRATSBERG et al. 2018). The future of CSR emphasizes this concept. Legal pressure to enforce CSR may undo progress, since firms engage in CSR as an obligation for compliance. For employer power, the future is likely to involve more scheduled production. The firm can earn higher profits from a more organized production process. Increased employer power may reduce security concerns by enhancing employee training on security, effective management of confidential information, strong access controls, data encryption, mobile device security, and verification of third-party security controls.

Employee training was the focus of this study. Trainers need to stay current on new approaches to handle changes in the labor force. Training should also align with the organizational goals. Employee competencies should also be evaluated based on the training objectives. Training programs should be efficient in terms of financial and human resource utilization to achieve the set objectives. Training reduces employee turnover by allowing employees to be better at what they do. Training is also likely to result in lower utilities, such as electricity costs. Labor costs will also be lower because of the increased productivity and efficiency of employees.

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**EGYÜTTHATÁS
— REPREZENTÁCIÓK
II.**

**A KÁRPÁT-MEDENCE A TERMÉSZET
ÉS A TÖRTÉNELEM MŰHELYÉBEN**

(KIS JÉGKORSZAK – JÁRVÁNYOK)

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