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Volunteerism and Voluntary Work

Abstract

This summary seeks to clarify the concept of volunteering and to identify related social actions in Hungary. Social cooperation and solidarity have been key issues of recent years and decades, in which voluntary work and selfless individual or community activities have become more and more prominent.

More focus was put on volunteering in Hungary after the regime change, leading the NGO/non-profit sector to strengthen and expand and voluntary activities to grow in importance. Voluntary work has become a value and social achievement.

The study presents the development of the number of volunteers in Hungary, regional distribution of volunteers and territorial rates of volunteering, as well as the types of voluntary work and NGOs. Following the brief introduction to the history of volunteering in Hungary, the research carried out on volunteering in 2018 is described, including its key elements and highlighting future goals and expectations. The main aim of the study is to highlight what forms volunteering as a social value has taken in Hungary in the past 30 years.

MODERN APPROACH: PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Volunteering in its modern sense, as defined above, dates back to the regime change in Hungary. In tandem with the strengthening of the NGO sector, the number of volunteers helping organisations also increased in an exponential way in the 1990s. However, it was, and partly still is, difficult to break out of the interpretative framework that labels voluntary work as unpaid work. This wrong attitude has been inherited from the era of state socialism ('Communist Saturday' or 'social work').

'Volunteers act under their own free will, according to their own choices and motivations and do not seek financial gain. Volunteering is a journey of solidarity and a way for individuals and associations to identify and address human, social or environmental needs and concerns. Volunteering is often carried out in support of a non-profit organisation or community-based initiative' (Communication on EU Policies and Volunteering: Recognising and Promoting Cross-border Voluntary Activities in the EU 2011, as cited in Batta 2013).

THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF VOLUNTEERING

Volunteerism is a particularly important area both with regard to public and private/ecclesiastical initiatives. Although European societies, including the Hungarian society, have had opportunities for volunteering for a long time, voluntary work appears to be treated differently in the world of work and in social life. Volunteering can be regarded both as work and relaxation; the minimum common criteria that emerge from these approaches are that voluntary work is based on shared values and promotes integration.

'In comparison with the economic developments and the new forms of social organisation in Europe, the forms of voluntary assistance arrived relatively late in Hungary. Until the mid-19th century, they were almost exclusively limited to the charitable activities performed by the church. From 1867 the Hungarian state framed regulations for assisting the poor, continuing to rely greatly on the voluntary work carried out by the church, by civil organisations and by noble and generous citizens with material wealth. The systems of support — organised by the church — gradually introduced in the first decades of the 20th century played an important role in the history of the development of voluntary assistance in Hungary and in the expansion of its organised forms. In the inter-war period, the churches, civil organisations and private persons continued to fill the dominant role in carrying out work unselfishly and without payment, and in operating the system of social support. From 1945, the state began to take on an increasing number of social tasks, which pushed the activities of private persons, civilian charity organisations and churches into the background. During the decades of the socialist period, the state had exclusive responsibility for providing social security.'[1]

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[1] *National Volunteer Strategy 2012–2020.*

Volunteering and non-governmental organisations necessary for carrying out this kind of activity emerged in the 1990s. However only non-profit organisations emerged at that time, the Hungarian society started to regard volunteering as labour in the late 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000 decade. The programme called 'International Year of Volunteers 2001' was an important step in this process; the Health Ministry started organising the programme in September 2000 by holding a discussion forum. 'The forum was attended by 7 ministries and 70 non-governmental and church organisations, who discussed their ideas on opportunities for developing volunteerism in Hungary, and on the tasks to be done during the international year. (...) The most important outcome in the period following the International Year of Volunteers was the passing of Act LXXXVIII of 2005 on voluntary activities in the public interest, which institutionalised volunteerism, and had the objective of regulating and institutionalising voluntary activities in the public interest as a legal relation in the Hungarian legal system.'[2]

'There is no uniform and common definition of "volunteering". "Voluntary activity" can have different meanings in different countries, and its meaning is largely determined by the history and cultural traditions of a given state or area, as well as by cohabitation patterns.'[3]

In examining the multiple definitions of 'volunteering', a common element in these definitions is that volunteering is a form of human activity of a person's own choice that adds value to the community and strengthens solidarity.

The following conditions for voluntary activity are laid down in the UN Resolution adopted on the occasion of the proclamation of the year 2001 as the International Year of Volunteers:

'Volunteering refer to a wide range of activities, including traditional forms of mutual help and formal service delivery, carried out on an individual's own initiative and of his own free will, for the public good, for the benefit of others or the society, and for which the volunteer does not receive any remuneration.'[4]

Although the Hungarian volunteer law (Act LXXXVIII of 2005 on voluntary activities in the public interest) does not provide a specific definition, it provides clear criteria for voluntary work in the public interest. 'Voluntary activities on the part of individuals or communities which are based on the solidarity of members of society and which are carried out, for no consideration, for the benefit of others as an expression of the independent actions of citizens are recognised by the Parliament.'[5]

Work on the document entitled 'National Volunteer Strategy 2012–2020' had started in 2011, and the Parliament adopted the Strategy and its related action plan in 2012. The Strategy has three broad aims. It stresses that there is a necessity to develop a volunteer culture and to change attitudes in order to achieve a reduction in negative opinions about volunteering. Volunteering should therefore become a public talking point and part of the citizens' regular activities.

The involvement of special target groups, in particular of young people, the elderly, and mothers with young children, is essential for enhancing the relevance of voluntary work, and thereby the chances of the members belonging to these groups for social reintegration can also be increased.

[2] *National Volunteer Strategy 2012–2020.* 4–5.

[3] Batta 2013. 16.

[4] Batta 2013. 16.

[5] Farkas 2012. 62.

Volunteering strengthens social solidarity, reinforces social cohesion, contributes to the reintegration of the unemployed into the labour market, and strengthens volunteers' participation in society. It is particularly important to integrate disadvantaged people and to strengthen common values.

The National Volunteer Strategy[6] defines volunteering as 'an activity undertaken of a person's own free will, choice and motivation, and is without concern for financial gain, for the benefit of another person or other persons, or for the community at large. It comes together with its own particular set of values, which distinguishes it from paid work. Volunteering is a good and valuable thing in itself, which can make members of society capable of taking an active role, whether in a broader geographic sense or in more confined interest groups, and which is simultaneously beneficial to those in need of assistance and to voluntary workers themselves. Volunteerism is a tool for promoting equal opportunities, makes a contribution to the reduction of poverty and exclusion and to an increase in employment, and can help the unemployed re-enter the labour market, although it cannot replace paid labour.'[7]

Volunteering is therefore an activity carried out by a volunteer in the interest of the general good, for the benefit of those affected by the provision of assistance. Voluntary activity can be carried out individually (e.g. care of the elderly) or in groups (e.g. helping flood victims), and volunteering can mean undertaking only one task or a regular commitment. Voluntary work can be carried out with a governmental or non-governmental organisation, or with an organisation having an economic or commercial interest. However, it should be noted that volunteering is still a recognised activity in areas based on the solidarity principle.

An increasing number of Hungarian volunteers have undertaken voluntary work abroad in recent years and over the past decades, which can contribute to increasing our knowledge of problems that are not specific to Hungary.

'The meaning of volunteering has been completely reinterpreted, owing to constant economic and social changes, in Hungary in recent years and has got closer to the meaning of volunteering as interpreted in the United States or Western Europe today. However, regarding the motivation why people volunteer, Hungary is trailing other countries.'[8]

The diverse forms of voluntary activity include mutual help and self-help, as well as charity work, philanthropic activity, and assistance to others. Formerly, voluntary activities were mainly carried out under the auspices of the church and civil society organisations (foundations and associations).

Volunteers are frequently involved in matters of public interest; they participate in lobbying and society actions and are engaged in activities of interest representation. At the same, they are also involved in community life and society actions aiming at strengthening of the role of civil society.

Ferenc Péterfi (2002) gathered the main characteristics of voluntary work in one of his studies. According to this study, volunteering is an activity that has the following characteristics: 'it is undertaken of personal motivation, free will and choice, for the benefit of others, and is not motivated by material concerns; it facilitates for individuals and communities their involvement

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[6] *National Volunteer Strategy 2012–2020. 3.*

[7] *National Volunteer Strategy 2012–2020.* 3.

[8] Farkas 2012. 63.

in resolving their own problems, and it is of benefit both to persons in need of support and persons carrying out voluntary work'.[9]

'In the mostly international literature on volunteering, over the last decades there has been a wide debate about to what extent a volunteer's "own" choice, motives, and motivations — weighed against external circumstances, opportunities, and "invitation to participate" — affect the volunteer's reasons why (s)he volunteers in a given field of activity. "Patterns" of volunteering have changed over the last more than half century. There appears to be a decreasing tendency to "volunteer alone", and volunteers' organizational attachments are increasingly strong.'[10]

FIGURE 1.Number of voluntary assistants in Hungary (person)
(2015)
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office
(https://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xftp/stattukor/nonprofit/enonprofit15.pdf)

Data from the analysis of non-profit organisations of 2015 shows that the number of persons carrying out voluntary activity was 412,893, presenting a uniform spatial distribution, in 2015. As regards the capital city, county seats and other towns, one observes that voluntary work carried out in Budapest accounted for one-third of voluntary work carried out in the whole country.

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9   PÉTERFI 2002. 2.

10   *Az önkéntes motivációkról.*

Type of settlement	Average number of hours worked per capital	Number of persons employed as calculated volunteers	Estimated duration of work carried out by voluntary assistants during the year (number of hours)
Capital city	113	6192	12,880,860
County seats	117	6022	12,526,500
Other towns	112	5506	11,451,480
Villages	115	4992	10,382,820
Total	**114**	**22,712**	**47,241,660**

Table 1. Core indicators of voluntary assistants attached to non-profit organisations by type of settlement (2015)
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office
(https://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xftp/stattukor/nonprofit/enonprofit15.pdf)

'Voluntary work is one of the most appropriate methods of team building that is so popular nowadays. Voluntary work can actually teach us how to work together as a team, and we can experience the joy of working together. Companies often encourage their employees to volunteer, e.g. by organising a company volunteer day.'[11]

More than half (69.7%) of the voluntary assistants attached to non-profit organisations in Hungary worked with associations, and 24.9% of them worked with foundations. The number of volunteers working with church organisations cannot be seen from this statistical data, but it is well-known fact that the proportion of voluntary workers attached to church organisations is high, as volunteering is an activity closely linked to the regular routine of the members of the communities belonging to the church.

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[11] Farkas 2012. 63.

FIGURE 2. Core indicators of voluntary assistants attached to non-profit organisations by type of organisation (person per organisation) (2015)

Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office (https://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xftp/stattukor/nonprofit/enonprofit15.pdf)

Volunteers working with organisations in Hungary had links with 'classic' non-governmental organisations (95%), while a low number of them were attached to non-profit enterprises or advocacy organisations (2-3%). The reasons for this include the fact that these organisations have still carried out voluntary tasks based on traditional values.

FIGURE 3. **Core indicators of voluntary assistants attached to non-profit organisations by nature of organisation (2015)**
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office
(https://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xftp/stattukor/nonprofit/enonprofit15.pdf)

Persons who carry out voluntary activity can be separated into two basic groups. Volunteering is of particular importance to **young people**, as it plays a socially cohesive role and binds a community together. They also take part in the life of society through the specific solution of social problems, which increases their sensitivity to these problems. Voluntary work carried out by young people can be particularly beneficial to develop useful experience for working life and to increase their circle of friends and acquaintances.

Volunteering is of great value to **retired people** as well. Older people 'often find that they no longer feel "useful" to society. They can be active again which has a positive effect on their health and quality of life.'[12]

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[12]   FARKAS 2012. 63.

FIGURE 4. Volunteering population by demographic and other characteristics, and by formal or informal nature of work carried out - First quarter of 2014 (person)
(Young people aged 15-34, and young adults)

Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office (http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_evkozi/e_onkent9_03_02.html)

Demographic data of voluntary workers shows that 26.6% of the population aged 15-34 (i.e. 682,820 people) and 31.1% of the population aged 50-74 (i.e. 815,380 people) were active volunteers. They represented 58.5% of all volunteers.

FIGURE 5. Volunteering population by demographic and other characteristics, and by formal or informal nature of work carried out -First quarter of 2014 (person) (Adults aged 50-74)
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office
(http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_evkozi/e_onkent9_03_02.html)

Volunteering is a form of activity undertaken on the basis of a person's preference. In our modern-day societies, it is a tool for improving quality of life, while is still on the track to development in East European societies. Social structure, level of education, and social cohesion are factors which largely determine the commitment to a development pathway.

In addition, institutionalisation is another factor, furthermore, governmental, church and private organisations — an essential task of all of which is to establish cooperation and shape its nature — are also important actors. Volunteering is therefore a form of social responsibility which helps increase members' willingness to integrate others.

VOLUNTEERING IN HUNGARY – RESEARCH ON VOLUNTEERING (2018)

New research in 2018 was conducted on volunteering in Hungary, with the aim of determining to what extent the general social attitude towards volunteering changed and how successfully people (of all age-groups) were involved in voluntary activities.

Research objectives were defined as follows:

'The goal of the nationally representative survey covering the general adult population and involving 2000 persons is to describe the attitude of the population of Hungary towards volunteering, to determine the prevalence of engagement in voluntary work and the nature of voluntary activities, to identify the barriers to volunteering, and, last but not least, to gain a broad picture of social attitudes towards volunteering.'

The research found that a quarter (27.4%) of the adult population of Hungary, i.e. approximately 2,209,000 adults, volunteered in the 12 months preceding the conducting of the survey. The survey also asked the respondents, if they did not volunteer in the past year, whether they had previously performed voluntary work as defined herein. An additional 17.4% of the respondents answered the question in the affirmative, meaning that, combined, nearly half (44.8%) of Hungarian adults had volunteering experiences.

Figure 6. Distribution of respondents by volunteering experience in autumn - (%)
Source: Önkéntesség Magyarországon 2018 (Volunteering in Hungary 2018).

The majority of volunteers in Hungary were women in their mid-40s. A large part of Hungarian volunteers had a degree. 'In terms of settlement types, the residents of Budapest, the capital of Hungary, constituted only a tenth of volunteers, while the inhabitants of towns and villages were over-represented. The reason for this is partly reciprocity, since smaller towns and villages have a strong tradition of reciprocity and helping one another, and this kind of activity falls within the definition given above' (Önkéntesség Magyarországon 2018 [Volunteering in Hungary 2018]).

Between 2013 and 2018, the number of adult volunteers who volunteered regularly (at least once a month) increased to around one million people.

In terms of age groups, an above-average proportion of young people within the age range 18-29 seeking first-time employment and, particularly, of 50-59-year-olds nearing the end of their career volunteered regularly.

Those solely engaged in informal volunteering represented two-thirds of volunteers (18.1% of the total adult population). In contrast, a third (33.9%) of the volunteers surveyed performed formal voluntary work (that is, volunteering to an organisation or an institution), representing approximately 750,000 adults (9.3% of the total adult population). A total of 7.2% of the volunteers participated solely in formal volunteering, while an additional 26.7% of the volunteers carried out both formal and informal voluntary activities.

The number of students among formal volunteers was twice as high (17.5%) as among informal volunteers or in the mixed group. Furthermore, women were considerably over-represented among formal-only volunteers; they represented 71.8% in this group.

Volunteers said that they performed voluntary work by intrinsic motivation on the one hand and, on the other hand, were motivated by sympathy and solidarity. However, non-volunteers cited lack of time as one reason for not volunteering or stated that they never even thought about it or saw no need to volunteer.

'Act CXC of 2011 on national public education introduced school community service in national public education from the 2012/2013 school year in a phasing-in system. Community service means social and environmental protection activity carried out individually or in group for the advantage of the local community of the student, which is carried out within organised framework and is independent of financial interests. The National Volunteer Strategy 2012-2020 states that, although a distinction needs to be drawn between community service and voluntary work, community service can be regarded as the starting point, and the introductory step in the direction of carrying out true voluntary work, and the role it can play should not be underestimated' (Önkéntesség Magyarországon 2018 [Volunteering in Hungary 2018]).

Two-thirds of the adult respondents of the surveyed sample replied to the question whether the introduction of community service was a good idea in the affirmative, i.e. they thought it was a great idea for young people to be integrated in social life, while the members of the age group concerned, i.e. 18-29-year-olds, agreed less with the introduction of community service, but, overall, more members of the same age group were in favour of school community service than against. In light of the above, however, the proportion of respondents agreeing with the statement was much higher among those with higher education.

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Populism and religion in Central and Eastern Europe

Abstract

Populism is a re-emerging modern topic. Since 2015 it has been one of the most mentioned and analyzed issues in the political sciences, international relations, and sociological academic literature. Although populism is a worldwide phenomenon it is also highly regionalized. This research focuses on link between populism, nationalism, and religion in Central and Eastern Europe. Differences seen between this region, Western Europe, and United States are also examined. In this paper, we offer a novel understanding of populist phenomenon in Central and Eastern Europe based on decisive impacts of geopolitical and geo-cultural status of the region. This populist phenomenon can be traced back to "nurture itself" on the traumatized collective identity and a special kind of mindset, which is termed as wounded collective identity in this paper.

Keywords

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1. Regional understanding of populism and religion

Amount of scientific literature on populism is vast and can be judged comprehensively and also in contexts of different social, religious, and political climates of various regions of world. However, literature has remained silent in regard to some regions. Researchers typically examine populism in a specific area of the world, and then apply characteristics of populism regarding that region to other regions[1]. While researchers usually examine a region at a time, they generally try to make the claim that their work can extend to other regions, which is hardly justifiable.

To some extent this is not an accurate approximation. Every region has its own peculiar nature and attributes, so effects of populism could never be same between different regions. The study of populism is becoming a global disciplinary challenge for many researchers, including them from Eastern and Central Europe. According to Stavrakakis et al. (2017), populism is not a phenomenon limited to the government.[2] Populism is an insurgent force, which can be studied through various approaches involving other disciplines. It has been observed in current research that religious-based populism is becoming more popular in many regions of the world. Through this research paper we plan to contribute to this discussion.

Before 2015 the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) societies and political parties were described as populists[3] by the news. After the "migration crisis" in Europe began to dominate the general public discourse, populism was increasingly interpreted as a worldwide trend in public life. As far as populism is concerned, it is no longer possible to define a clear difference between Eastern and Western Europe. As Cas Mudde, a populism expert, stated in an interview (2018):

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[1]   Kaltwasser – Taggart – Espejo – Ostiguy 2017.

[2]   Stavrakakis 2004., Stavrakakis 2014.

[3]   Máté-Tóth 2019.

"there are many differences among the regions; Western and Eastern Europe". However, behind the rising tendencies of populism, we argue in this paper that there are differences in cultural and societal processes in addition to populist tendencies in the Eastern and Western parts of Europe. One of the differences often mentioned is that in the Eastern half of Europe people were socialized under communist ideology and circumstances.[4] This is a correct yet overly simplified statement. For an appropriate understanding of populism in the European region it is necessary to take the general geopolitical, geo-cultural, and cultural heritage of the region into account all at once when analyzing populist tendencies. Before this discussion can occur, the major cultural differences and characteristics of both regions need to be studied. Additionally, a clear understanding of the term "religion" in the context of populism is required.

2. Religion in the context of populism

The subject of religion in the context of the populism and political movements deserves attention. In the past two decades, Central and Eastern Europe has shown a greater tendency of religion and religious adherents leaning towards accepting populism[5]. In the populist rhetoric religion serves as a source of identification for "the people", the representatives of major religious organizations, and for the followers of these religions. Religion can be defined as being a method of personal contact to the Almighty, a set of values, and also the act of attending religious rituals. Populism and religion exist in many forms, and it is difficult to define them in simple terms. This makes creating links between the two challenging. The link between populism and religion as an identity factor is strong and general, but tensions between populism and religion arise due to private spiritual orientations and value-sets. One of the major differences is demonstrated by the statements of church representatives concerning populist xenophobia. Typical hate speech observed in Western and Eastern Europe involves the West making a critical comment typical, while in the East of Europe, a leader's critical comment often supports populist politics.

Religious populism is usually dichotomous. This can be illustrated by the historical concept of Manicheism; where light and darkness are clearly distinguished and are always in a struggle with each other. *Overtly* religious populism refers to when there is only a narrow sphere of possible interaction with the divine and Almighty, while *covertly* religious populism describes the sacralization of politics. These two subtypes are usually intertwined, making the study of religious populism an even greater challenge for researchers.[6]

3. Regional trends of populism

The characteristics of a region is important for both religion and populism. Until recently the definition of populism tended to be simplified in the literature. Simplification refers to the effort

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[4] Mudde – Kaltwasser 2017.

[5] Marzouki – McDonnell – Roy 2016.

[6] Salgado – Zúquete 2017.

to define populism using only some central elements and taking few variables into account. Mudde for instance stated in his publications that he used only two main variables to give a general, valid, and appropriate definition to the complicated phenomenon of populism[7]. According to him, the two basic characteristics of populism include while speaking in the name of the people and elite critics. Both are political tools used to divide society into two parts: the people (*us*) and the elite (*them*)[8]. In the words of Muddes, populism is defined as:

A thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite," and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people"[9]

Guth underlined the same simple approach, which analyzed the voting motivations and strategies after 2010 in Europe and in the USA.

Populists, first and foremost, are anti-establishment: they are intent on overthrowing a corrupt, insulated, privileged elite. Second, populists are anti-pluralists: they perceive the world in us–them terms, believing that they alone speak the mind of the people. And third, populists display authoritarian tendencies: they promise to simplify and make more efficient the exercise of power[10].

Going back to the question of the correlation between populism and religion, it is useful to recall the latest relevant international research. Marzouki described the important distinction between religion as a source of common identity and also as a value set. Through evaluation of several European societies Marzouki elaborated on this important distinction. The main theme of Marzouki is distinguishing the line between religion as an identity or a set of values. It has been suggested that the aim of populism is to motivate voters in an identity based religious approach. More specifically, a positive opinion on religion is created by the populist political entrepreneur with Christian roots. Cultural repercussions of religion promoted in this way could become dangerous, as little consideration is given in regards to the actual promotion of values of a religion[11].

Mudde's previously mentioned approach can be used in generating fine-tuned insight regarding the particularity of populism in Central and Eastern Europe. Concentrating on the radical right-wing political formations, Mudde highlights the strong link between right-wing parties and the Catholic Church representatives in Poland, Slovakia and Croatia and other Central European societies with an Orthodox majority. These societies all have mainstream denominations, and many of them has an especially national character. In the case of the Orthodox Churches this is often taken for granted, because they are national churches. But while the Catholic Church has clear national character, it also defines itself as extending over multiple nations (as a reminder, the Greek word "καθολική" means universal).

In Eastern Europe the link between (Catholic and Orthodox) Christianity and the populist radical right has always been very strong. The link is strongest in the Polish LPR, which combines Polish nativism with orthodox Catholicism at the core of its ideology, but parties like the

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[7]   e.g. Mudde – Kaltwasser 2017.

[8]   Mudde 2009.

[9]   Mudde – Kaltwasser 2017. 6.

[10]   Guth – Nelsen 2019.

[11]   Marzouki – McDonnell – Roy 2016.

Slovak SNS or Croat HSP are also staunchly Catholic. In the Orthodox countries the synergy between religion and nation is even more complete, as most Orthodox churches are national churches.[12]

The national interest in these societies is promoted and defended by the public statements of Church representatives too. In contrast to Western Europe, bishops in Eastern Europe have seldom criticized right-wing politics. The following observation was made by Mudde:

"However, religion does not always act as a buffer against populist radical right voting; indeed, in countries like Croatia, Poland and Slovakia religion seems to strengthen it[13].

But Mudde's precise remark was that in CEE societies religion does not act as a buffer in front of radical right-wing arrogance and hate. Religion needs a deeper understanding of the region itself. This paper argues that a collective wounded identity of a region can explain why the main churches participate in comradeship with right-wing populism. This argument is constructed according to the self-understanding of the regional main actors and of the general population too. As social norms in this case, the critics of populist nationalism are generally viewed as betraying their country and also their church/religion.

Mudde's definition and description of the populism phenomenon is very important for international scholarly discourse. Regarding Central and Eastern Europe, we can ask what kind of special role is played by a nation in the regional populist mindset. It has been argued that the crucial impact comes from the promise of the establishment, or reestablishment, of the people of a nation in the region. For a deeper analysis of this idea of the nation, the theory presented by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe becomes relevant. In their theory the main target of the dynamics of societal discourse is the establishment of an equivalence chain among the different societal actors and entities characterized and motivated through very different aims and interests. This kind of unifying discourse process uses the term 'nation' as the main signifier. Populism as described in the approach used by Laclau and Mouffe can be equated to the foundation of the people, and in the case of Central and Eastern Europe, the nation. Because of the centuries-long lack of nation-state's autonomy, these societies have an especially high level of desire for sovereignty. A political rhetoric that highlights stability for the nation-state is especially popular. Successful politicians use populist rhetoric to appeal to this kind of desire.

4. Wounded Collective Identity

The necessary theoretical context needed for the examination of the region's collective identity is articulated in the transdisciplinary intersection of historical studies, social psychology, sociology, anthropology, religious studies, and political science. Additionally, closely related to studying identity is the topic of differing nationalisms.

It is widely recognized that it was Hans Kohn and John Plamenatz, following Friedrich Meinecke, who contextualized the concept of diverging developments. They argue that while the Western model is a voluntary construction based on citizenship, the Eastern one is the ethnocultural expression of a historical community. The inherent value judgements of these thoughts

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[12] Mudde 2005.

[13] Mudde 2005. 115.

incited criticism from various scholars. Although, it is also true that many social scientists have been arguing for differentiation when considering the actual historical and social context, and abandoning the value judgements[14].

These theoreticians base their ideas on the fact the formation of nations in Western Europe happened earlier than those in Eastern Europe, and under different circumstances. In the West, these processes occurred within the framework of the state, while in the East nations emerged before the state did. The different modes of nation formation have strong historical implications for the relation between the individual and the state. If a given individual who has the right to vote in addition to a number of other rights and obligations participates in this relation as a *citizen*, the focus is on political participation. However, if the individual participates as a *member of an ethnic group*, the focus shifts to language and ethnicity[15].

Many other academics also criticized these distinctive theories, claiming that these traditional forms of distinction are outdated, schematic, and inadequate in understanding contemporary society[16]. These critiques postulate a different interpretation: in their view, distinction shall not be between different types of nationalisms, but instead between the different components of the same concept of nationalism, and that the ethnic dimension is present, albeit more intricately, within Western national concepts.

Academic literature is divided concerning dichotomies, but there is relative agreement that the elements of national identity are anchored differently in Central and Eastern Europe. The reason for this difference can be traced to historical development, and most likely has social-psychological consequences.

The distinction between different forms of nationalism contributes to the thought that a region's countries being different is not the only factor affecting their development as states and nations. Additionally, the decades of Communism have also left their mark on post-Soviet countries. Reflecting on this phenomenon, the term "post-socialist vacuum" has emerged in recent decades. This helps explain the eroded moral values of the socialist system, and also denotes the process of incoming value plurality from the West replacing communist ideological structures[17].

This concept received criticism from several Eastern-European scholars. According to Péter Niedermüller our interest should shift from the approach based on this "vacuum" to the fact that the construction of democratic societies began without experience in democratic political structures.

The strengthening of national identity is one of the main consequences of this post-socialist vacuum. Niedermüller states that this is overly reductive, as the re-emergence of the concept of nation in the social/political sphere is not self-evident. For him, the locus of this re-emergence is the cultural representation of the past, induced by the context of the regime changes in the region as it was formerly distorted by socialist historiography. His concept of *national discourse* is founded upon the reclaiming of "silenced" national history, and its reproduction and recontextualization. There are three strategies that tend to be applied in this process: the restoration, reconfiguration, and nationalization of history.

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[14]   Kántor

[15]   Dunn 2015; Romsics 1998.

[16]   Nagy 2004; Neugart – Hanelt – Peitz 2002.

[17]   Beyme 1994, Niedermüller 1996.

Further reflections are offered by (Kriza 2004) who primarily discusses the shortcomings of Romanian national discourse. He distinguishes between three characteristics: the idealization of history, the dissemination of anti-Western *clichés*, and the disregarding of actual, prevalent problems[18].

Salecl presents new perspectives for the exploration of nationalism in former Yugoslavian countries, and Eastern-Europe in general[19]. The central claim of her study is that these nationalist movements capitalize on the supposed threats looming over the nation. Salecl explains this from a psychoanalytic viewpoint, exemplifying the relation between "us" and the "the enemy among us" through Slovenian cases. She also elaborates on Jacques-Alain Miller's theory, stating that the sense of being threatened is at its most intensive when the "other" enjoys his- or herself, and that the mere existence of the other is perceived to be a threat to the "ingroup".

These theories illuminate the fact that the ideas related to identity formation in the region are constructed in the conceptual triad of diverging historical development, the sense of being threatened, and collective history.

A similar perspective was offered much earlier by who argued for a historically situated regional sense of being threatened by external groups through his concepts of *communal hysteria* and *historical trajectory[20]*. The over-determination and social rootedness of the image of a threatening foreign power, and the consequent, trans-generational collective emotional patterns result in ambivalent, social-psychological consequences, such as unrealistic territorial attachment, the embedding of a permanent sense of insecurity, self-accusation, and self-aggrandizement.

The image of a threatening foreign imperial power, and the sense of historical loss, might justify the discussion of collective trauma and related psychological theories[21]. In these cases, major insights are related to transgenerational transfer, anchored and blocked states of identity, and permanent insecurity as the results of national hardships. The word "trauma" is more often used in connection with nationalism rather than with populism. Thus, theories of collective trauma allow us to describe the state of identity formation in the region through the metaphor of "woundedness", which we intentionally apply.

Wound 1: Lack of national state autonomy and sovereignty due to occupations by three big hegemonies. The in-between geopolitical and geocultural position of the entire region prohibited the building and/or rebuilding of sovereign national states for 100 to 400 years. Beginning with the historical period of the rise of modern nationalism among every bigger ethnicity, an irresistible desire for a sovereign national state arose, which was fulfilled in some cases only after 1991 (the Baltic states), 1994 (the Balkan states) and 2008 (Kosovo).

Wound 2: Prohibition of the exercising of human rights, especially of ethnic minorities. One of the main consequences of the lack of state sovereignty and of the loose overlap of the cultural/ethnic and nation state borders is the overall minority status of larger populations in the region. Because of the main logic of ethnicity based national states, the prohibition of the exercising of ethnic minority rights, and the public and official use of the ethnic language was a logical but negative consequence of the situation.

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[18] Kriza 2004.

[19] Salecl 1992.

[20] Bibó 1991.

[21] Erikson 1995.

Wound 3: Forced mobility: Under state forced mobility there were two kind of mobility took place in the 20th century. The first includes the mobility of ethnic minorities through ethnic cleansing and deportation[22]. The second includes the forced status mobility, such as a forced mobility between social strata and career paths according to the loyalty to a new regime. This second type of forced mobility includes deportations to labor camps as well.

Wound 4: Persecution of religion, churches and dissidents. In the period of state supported religion (mainly the Christian religion), non-Christian and small Christian denominations were not recognized and or were persecuted. This was not only due to the theological logic of the right religion, but also due to the strong connection between the state and the dominant religion and churches. In the long period of communist rule major religions and the dominant churches – especially the Roman Catholic Church, due to Vatican being a capitalist country – were considered enemies and were persecuted often in a brutal and violent way. Every perspective and institution that did not share the ideology and the goals of the communist rulers were seen as opposing powers and dissidents in the same way people of religious conviction were seen.

Wound 5: Genocides and other mass killings. Early in the 20th century the communist state was responsible for millions of deaths. Then the National Socialist dictatorship, and more recently the regular and irregular forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina were also responsible for mass killings. Totalitarian states are referred to by Rudolph J. Rummel as "mortacracies" and "megamurderers"[23]. Geographically, genocides and other mass killings occur with higher likelihood in Central and Eastern Europe than other regions in Europe.

A question for further discussion includes whether the nuclear disaster of Chernobyl should be included in the series of genocides, and whether it can be used as a metaphor for the wounds of the region. On 26 April 1986 a nuclear catastrophic accident labeled with INES 7 which is the highest level on the scale. Chernobyl is located 100 km north of Kiev close to the current border to Belarus, which at the time of the accident was part of communist USSR. The consequences of the catastrophe cannot be overstated. Not only because of the indirect health-related consequences but also because of the longtime effects seen in the entire region of Central and Eastern Europe, and some of Asia too. Millions of deaths and an ultimate change of the nature, society, and economy of the region can be attributed to the nuclear catastrophy. Although the disaster was an accident and is fundamentally different from the Great War to the Second World War in Europ in the 20th century, and from the genocides initiated by the Nazi regime or Soviets, it was also not independent from the communist politics of the Soviet Union (SU, USSR) and the cold war.

Wounded collective identity could also be defined according to Anthony Giddens' term *"ontological security"*. In his opinion ontological means something with fundamental and general stability in social order, and the feeling this stability imparts on the general population. Giddens concentrated his famous theory of structuration on the individual dimension of security, and how ordinary people maintain their system of trust and feeling of security.

"Ordinary day-to-day life (…) involves an ontological security expressing an autonomy of bodily control within predictable routines"[24]

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[22] Furedi 2017.

[23] Rummel 1992, Rummel 1996, Rummel 2018.

[24] Giddens 1986.

The personal or social security system is not taken for granted given the conditions in CEE, but people must manage with it currently, and possibly permanently, especially if the system is threatened as it is nowadays from many outside factors[25]. Giddens called the process of re-establishing security as "tact".

"Tact is a mechanism whereby agents are able to reproduce the conditions of 'trust' or ontological security within which more primal tensions can be canalized and managed."[26]

Giddens' theory has been most recently used in the studies of international relations, where the main agents are not individuals but social units such as states. The original term Giddens invented is in the relevant literature and scholars are now speaking more about in-security as about security.

In the region CEE insecurity of state existence has been a historical fact for at least 200 years as the process of building national states started. This is the wound with the highest impact on societal norms and values, and everyday life of people in the CEE region overall. Insecurity on the state level leads to instability of the state borders, then to the occupation of the state by other hegemonies from abroad, and finally the subjection to military or economic powers. States in CEE after the fall of the Berlin Wall received new freedom for self-assertion as autonomous national state unit. Some states of the region like Poland or Hungary, or the member-states of Yugoslavia enjoyed the period of relative autonomy during the presence of communism. Some other states like the Baltic triad – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – were included in SU and did not have any autonomy. Some others become autonomous state sovereignty for the first time such as Montenegro, Kosovo, and Moldova.

Insecurity on the state level has a strong effect on strengthening the state existence through ideologies, narratives and memory politics. Like the tact of individuals in handling or re-establishing ontological security, states living in a permanent insecure status are obligated to find and strengthen knowledge related to a purely autonomous existence. The choice to do this kind of collective mental work is not a real choice at all. It is an enforcement coming from the geopolitical given conditions. Therefore, all cultural sources who are capable of enforcing and stabilizing the general knowledge of state sovereignty and of the ontological security are especially welcome in the region of CEE determined by his in-between geopolitical status.

Subotic analyzed the post Yugoslav states in this direction by using the emotionally loaded notion of "dying".

When a state dies, all of the routine relationships a state has established and maintained with its significant others become immediately disrupted, and new ones need to be built from scratch. This external trauma provokes crippling anxiety in insecure successor states. Political memory of the old state no longer serves its legitimizing purpose; new histories need to be constructed to make sense to the new polity[27].

The deep and important mutual correlation between state insecurity – in the extreme case, the dying of the state – and the function of political memory in re-establishing a new state is a general characteristic of the states in CEE. Subotic analyzed the case of the post-Yugoslav states and her insights and arguments seem to be relevant for my argument as well as for the

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[25] Aging society, decreasing number of work force, political populism.

[26] GIDDENS 1986. 51.

[27] SUBOTIC 2019.

post-Czechoslovak states (Czeck and Slovakia), post-Soviet states (the three Baltic states), and in a broader sense for all states in the region. The terms "die" and "rebirth" should be understood partly as a rhetorical and symbolic characterization of the fundamental transformations of the state positions after the collapse of communism. However, the description of the correlations between the fundamental new political circumstances and the need for a new narrative are based on hard facts and affect the core dimension of the self-understanding of the societies in CEE.

5. Summary

Populism in its CEE trend is an ideology and a political strategy of interest for building and rebuilding national state autonomy and sovereignty. In Giddens' terms, a tact to re-establish the collective ontological security, or in Laclau's terms, to create the people. All collective mental sources, such as memory politics, framing of the history, national festivals and symbols have an important function in this securitizing work. The main religion and main churches belong to this ideological and symbolical arsenal as well for securing the new or the renewed state existence. The enforced intertwining of populist politics and religion has occurred in recent years after the refugee crisis created a new ideological and political coalition between nationalism and Christendom, as well as between the states and the main churches. To understand and to analyze this appropriately, it is very important to start by identifying the wounded collective identity markers of the region CEE. The way populism and religion are linked results from the realization of the created trauma. For a comparative sociological or political analysis on the European or intercontinental level, this special aspect of the region should be taken seriously.

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Value-saturated Education in Erzsébet Camps in Zánka, Hungary[1]

Aʙsᴛʀᴀᴄᴛ

The Erzsébet Camp in Zánka is located in the Balaton Highland, between Tihany and Badacsony. The Erzsébet Camps are one of the largest youth-project program in Hungary. Research data collection started in 2017, and it was carried out in three periods. The present study conducted analyses on a database compiled from findings of questionnaires administered to campers (2017, 2018 and 2019) and their chaperones (2018 and 2019). Data collection from the children and chaperones took place at the end of each camp shift and comprised of self-administered anonymous questionnaires with ten question blocks. The study conducts analyses of the database compiled from the main answers of more than 18,000 participants. Our research, exploratory in its nature, set out to compile the "value map" of the Erzsébet Camps. The main focus of our interest was the added value and developmental effects of the camps with respect to campers. The another research question was what social values are transmitted and the preservation of which social values is supported by the Erzsébet Camps.

Kᴇʏᴡᴏʀᴅs

children and youth, summer camp, leisure-time pedagogy, social values, social skills

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1. Introduction

The Erzsébet Camp in Zánka is located in the picturesque surroundings of the Balaton High-land, between Tihany and Badacsony, on an area of 100 hectares. The institution was named after the daughter of the Hungarian king Andrew II, Princess St. Elizabeth (1207–1231), who gave alms to those in need, founded institutions for orphans and built hospitals for the poor. With its enormous green area, the camp is adjacent to the shore of Balaton lake and has its own port, a railway station, several sports fields, an adventure park, concert venues and a cinema. The Erzsébet Camps are the largest camping program in Hungary, which is run by the Erzsébet Foundation for Children in the Carpathian Basin. The Foundation's documents and its website both declare that their most important mission to create a supportive environment, which is manifested through experiential pedagogy and recreational events, a methodologically sound development space and events that provide safe and high-quality services for children.

The methodological objectives of the camps (Baden-Powell 1908, 1992; *Sík 1992, Majzik 1997;* Bánhidi 2004; *Bodor 2006; Dorka é.n.; Heimann 2006; Nagy 2018; Solymosi 2020; Trencsényi 2018)* focus on active recreation and personality development, so sports activities, popular science programs, cultural heritage programs, decent entertainment and the representation of Christian social values play an important role in the educational program. The Erzsébet Camps consider it their mission to promote a healthy way of life, self-awareness, tolerance towards people living with disabilities, the development of trust in each other and sensitisation and education for the protection of our natural environment. The programs in the camp focus on gaining experiences. Disadvantaged children, children in residential care, children with special needs and children living with disabilities receive special attention in the camps. The six-day and five-night "sleepover" summer "Experience Camps", aiming at creating equal opportunities, have been realized by Hungarian budget support and EU funding since 2017. Due to the financial support, it is mostly children from the less developed regions of Hungary that can participate in the camping program. In the implementation of the programs, special attention is paid to disadvantaged and highly disadvantaged children, children supported by child welfare services and children with special needs. The present study presents our research findings on the Erzsébet Camps in Zánka, which provide camping opportunities for nearly 25,000 children.

2. Research Methodology

Data collection started in 2017, and it was carried out in three periods. Data collection from the children took place at the end of each camp shift and comprised of self-administered anonymous questionnaires with ten question blocks. This study conducts analyses of the database compiled from the main answers of more than 18,000 participants. The distribution of children participating in the survey in each year is presented in Table 1. This element of the research aimed at gaining a deeper understanding of the children's attitudes towards the camps, who are the direct target group of the Erzsébet Camps. The questionnaire examined the attitudes as they developed during the camping experience, as well as the evaluation of both the whole program and specific elements of the program. The distribution of participants by camp shifts is shown in the table below.

Turnusok	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	SUM
2017	178	277	371	425	391	450	344	409	263	346	-	3454
2018	289	222	285	180	297	358	297	312	349	333	255	3177
2019	962	1113	1208	1065	1399	1521	1310	1332	740	560	552	**11762**
2019 (%)	8.2	9.5	10.3	9.1	11.9	12.9	11.1	11.3	6.3	4.8	4.7	**100**

TABLE 1 *Number of participants*

55% of the participants were girls (60.6% in 2018 and 61% in 2017) and 45% were boys (39.4% in 2018 and 39% in 2017). Girls were slightly over-represented among the respondents in all the shifts.

As far as the age distribution of the participants is concerned, it is revealed that it was mostly children in their early puberty period, i.e. the 10 to 14 age group, that make up 82-84% of the campers in each year. (Figure 1).

FIGURE 1

When preparing the present study, two further analyses were conducted on the same database. Data collection from chaperons was also carried out at the end of each camp shift from 2017 onwards. The chaperones were asked to take part in anonymous self-administered questionnaires, consisting of 10 question blocks (Table 2). Based on our database containing 2,896 participants' responses, we examined what added value the camps represent in children's and teachers' lives according to the chaperones' opinions.

2017	2018	2019
503	935	1431

TABLE 2 *Chaperones participating in the survey (persons)*

In the winter of 2018, we conducted another survey focusing on the developmental effects of the camps as reflected by the chaperones' opinions. The online questionnaire was completed by 357 people, 329 of them being teachers. The aim of data collection was to investigate the chaperones' views (not so much their attitudes immediately after the camp but their more "settled" assessment on the practical value of the camps) on the more distant impact of the camps. The presupposition was that opportunities for educational and developmental effects of the camps could manifest themselves in the autumn among children and groups of children who had participated in a camp during the summer. This practical experience would shape and consolidate the chaperones' views on the camps. The average teaching experience of the respondents was 23 years, and most of them had spent 20 years in the teaching profession. The majority of respondents started their teaching career more than 10 years before, 9% had 5-10 years of teaching experience and 5% had less teaching experience than that.

3. ADDED VALUE OF THE CAMPS

3.1 Children's views on the programs and program elements.

A highly important element of recreational education services are those content elements that determine its microclimate: events with added values, enriching participants' personality by sensitising them with the help of experiential pedagogy. These events do not only provide recreational and flow experiences and develop competencies but also contribute to children "having a good time". The participants in the "sleepover" camps in Zánka in 2019 gave highly positive feedback on the related question. (Figure 2) Two thirds of the children had a very good time during the camp programs. A quarter of the campers were characterized by having a good time (rather good, 4 on the scale). Altogether, the two response categories (5 and 4 on the scale) were chosen by 89% of the respondents. 3.4% of the campers indicated that they did not have a good time during the programs in the camp. The data suggest that the greatest strength of the camps is the experience element of the programs. The mean scores of the responses on the 5-point scale in the three waves of data collection show that the campers were satisfied with the experiences in all three years of the study. (Table 3)

How good did you feel during the programs in the camp? (2019, %)

	not at all	rather not good	moderately	rather good	very good
	2	2	8	23	65

FIGURE 2

2017	2018	2019
4.4	4.6	4.5

TABLE 3 *How good did you feel during the programs in the camp?*
(mean scores on 5-point scale)

The study investigated which factors of each program element support and reinforce the mission of the camp. We investigated this issue with reference to fifteen factors. The mean values of realized program elements within each set of program elements were summarized. Table 4 reveals that it was program complexes in the field of social and community competences and healthy lifestyle and culture that received the highest mean scores based on children's responses.

	number of program elements (pcs)	mean score on 5-point scale
Organizing programs and meetings for children arriving from different places and environment, which aim at providing common experiences and facilitate understanding each other.	22	4.44
Programs aiming at community skills, self-acceptance, effective communication with peers and building trust.	22	4.38

Developing social competences through experiential learning in groups.	21	4.33
Encouraging children's initiative skills, creativity and resourcefulness.	18	4.44
Developing children's health conscious behaviour and physical activity, mastering first aid skills.	17	4.43
Learning community building for promoting cooperation in the community and reducing social disadvantages.	16	4.43
Strengthening social inclusion, increasing social activity and social cohesion.	14	4.4
Developing learners regularly supported by child welfare services, disadvantaged and highly disadvantaged learners and learners living with disabilities; increasing their motivation with recreational programs aiming at broadening their world view.	12	4.46
Preserving local values and the values of Hungarians, knowledge of nationality traditions.	11	4.41
Self-knowledge and knowing others, developing social skills and social relations.	9	4.39
Developing mental health and emotional intelligence.	5	4.48
Developing environmentally conscious behaviour.	4	4.44
The importance of social equality.	2	4.48
Career counselling sessions for upper-primary school students.	1	4.6
Alcohol and drug prevention.	1	4.27

TABLE 4 *Educational goals*

3.2 The birthplace of new friendships

One of the most important features of the camps is that they contribute to children's personality development by promoting the formation of new relationships and deepening old relationship. It is also a central element of the mission and undertaking of the Erzsébet Camps. Naturally, our research also addressed how the camps performed in this respect.

Based on three years of data collection, it is found that new social relationships and friendships are a prominent added value of the camps in Zánka. The vast majority of the children, nine out of ten campers, made new friendships during the time spent in Zánka. (Figure 3)

FIGURE 3

Among the 11,500 respondents participating in the research in 2019, girls made new friend-ships in a slightly higher proportion than boys.

	N	yes (%)	Sig.
boys	5131	86.47%	sig.<0.05
girls	6300	89.76%	

TABLE 5

In connection with the campers' evaluations, apart from questions measuring satisfaction and eliciting evaluative feedback, we also investigated commitment towards the Erzsébet Camps. We intended to find out how many campers would be happy to participate in the camp again. It is also a sign of satisfaction if the child would be happy to revisit an Erzsébet Camp in the following year (mostly those campers say that they would participate in the camp again who were more satisfied), and if they would recommend it to their friends to participate in an Erzsébet Camp.

Our findings reveal that nine out of ten campers would like to participate in an Erzsébet Camp again. This result was not surprising given the previous positive feedback. (Figure 4)

Figure 4

The campers' opinions and attitudes are not only valuable as they serve as feedback from the target audience of Erzsébet Camps but also because they may reveal what interpretations appear among peer communities about the Erzsébet Camps: its mission, the success of its undertakings in experiential education and its impact. The findings on the image of the camps being formed in indirect target groups such as peer groups are equally important for our research, as peer groups are further primary users and potential beneficiaries of this initiative. For that reason, the questionnaire contained an item on how positively or negatively the campers' experiences and opinions regarding the camps are transmitted to their peer group.

As it is revealed in the following figure (Figure 5), the campers reinforce and transmit their positive opinions concerning their "everyday" experiences in the camp to their friends, which means that they create a good reputation for the camps. This factor – due to the fact that groups formed by friendship relationships serve as an interpretative community – is important feedback, as apart from "customer satisfaction", it also refers to commitment towards the Erzsébet Camps. With reference to the item on sharing information in peer communities, girls indicated a somewhat more definite intention (Table 6), however, it is revealed that there are no significant chasms between respondents in terms of age groups (Table 7), which means that each age group would recommend the camp to their friends.

Figure 5

gender	Mean	Yes (%)	N	Sig.
boys	0.9	90%	5131	sig.<0,05
girls	0.94	94%	6289	
Total	0.92	92%	11420	

Table 6

Age groups 2019	Mean	Yes (%)	N
10 years and younger	.93	93.09%	2360
11 years	.92	92.31%	1937
12 years	.92	92.23%	2188
13 years	.93	92.74%	2121
14 years	.93	92.73%	1954
15 years and older	.89	89.14%	948
Total	.92	92.34%	11508

Table 7

3.3 The camps' added values to children's life

Our research focused not only on a deeper understanding of the campers' attitudes but also on the views of teachers, who constitute the other direct target group. During our data collection among the chaperones in the winter of 2018, we administered questionnaires which had a question block asking the chaperones' views on 31 factors, intending to explore if and to what extent they may have contributed to children's development. (Figure 6) Based on the responses given on a 5-point scale, the following factors can be identified as added values to children's development: establishing relationships, cooperation skills, thinking in terms of community, rule-governed behaviour, sports and recreational skills, helpfulness, empathy, self-discipline, social competences, self-confidence, patience, emotional intelligence, taking responsibility and trust in others. More than 90% of the respondents indicated that there was development regarding the above factors (scores 4 and 5 on a 5-point scale). It is also worth noting that the respondents also underlined the developmental effects of the camps in case of another seven factors (initiative, resourcefulness, managing conflict, courage, creativity, independent thinking and democratic competences). Two thirds of the respondents identified six further factors as having a positive effect. According to the chaperones, it is the usage of ICT tools that the camps had the least developing effect on (a quarter of the respondents believe that the camp did not develop it). It is an important finding that 80% of the chaperones regarded the developmental effect of the camps to be a five with regard to establishing relationships, cooperation skills and thinking in terms of community. More than two thirds saw a similarly high level developmental effect with reference to rule-governed behaviour, recreational skills, curiosity and helpfulness.

In your view, to what extent did the Camp and camping develop campers in the following factors?
(Chaperones, 2018, N=357)

■ 1 ■ 2 ■ 3 ■ 4 ■ 5

| Factor	1	2	3	4	5
Establishing relationships			20	78	
Cooperation skills			23	74	
Thinking in terms of community			25	70	
Rule-governed behaviour			27	69	
Sports and recreational skills			26	68	
Curiosity			30	64	
Helpfulness			29	64	
Empathy			34	59	
Self-discipline		8	33	58	
Social competence		9	35	56	
Self-confidence			37	56	
Patience		8	36	55	
Emotional intelligence		17	38	54	
Taking responsibility		8	37	54	
Self-knowledge		10	35	53	
Trust in others		9	41	49	
Initiative		11	38	49	
Resourcefulness		14	39	46	
Managing conflicts		12	43	43	
Courage		10	46	43	
Creativity		15	40	42	
Independent thinking		18	39	41	
Preservation of traditions		19	37	38	
Manual skills		19	41	36	
Democratic competences		14	49	35	
Aesthetic sense		22	45	31	
Logical thinking		24	41	30	
Aesthetic skills		29	39	26	
Active participation	7	30	43	19	
Oral and written text construction	12	36	34	15	
ICT usage	8	16	29	33	14

FIGURE 6

When examining the chaperones' views, we intended to find which social skills they believe to undergo value transmission processes within camping, and what deeper patterns of the world of values and transmitted value orientation in the camps can be revealed.

In accordance with the "educational credo" of the Erzsébet Camps, we selected sixteen social values and, based on their mean scores received on a 5-point scale, we established an order of value preferences. (Table 8) It was revealed that, apart from active recreation, it was humanistic values that received high mean scores as the main values transmitted by camping, such as helpfulness, security, tolerance, equality, true friendship, respect for others, being free from prejudices and solidarity. It is important to note that some of these belong among traditional social values (helpfulness, security, equality, true friendship, respect and solidarity), which are transmitted in a trans-historical way, i.e. over several eras, from one generation to another, and as a result, are part of our culture and manifest their effects over generations. Active recreation, tolerance and being free from prejudices are so-called post-material social values, which are part of the value orientations of the 21st century. Our data suggest that value transmission processes that take place in the course of realising educational programmes in the Erzsébet Camps support family socialisation effectively.

active recreation	4.73
helpfulness	4.62
security	4.59
tolerance	4.55
equality	4.54
true friendship	4.52
respect for others	4.52
being free from prejudices	4.49
solidarity	4.49
respecting community property	4.48
courage	4.45
physical and mental health	4.44
politeness	4.44
honesty	4.41
joy of a job completed	4.37
conscientiousness	4.30

TABLE 8: *In your view, to what extent did the Camp transmit the following social values towards campers? (2018 winter follow-up study, mean scores on 5-point scale, N=357)*

In the winter of 2018, we administered an online survey among the chaperones who had participated in summer camps before. We inquired about the developmental effect of the camps with respect to six overall factors that were crucially important from the perspective of the camps. Analysing our data (Table 9), we found that more than 80% of the 329 teachers working as chaperones gave a score of 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale with respect to all the six factors, which suggests that developing these factors was part of the educational goals realised in the camps.

Observing the mean scores, we can see that there is a difference of only .6 between the highest mean score (4.7) for the development of social competences and the lowest mean score (4.1) for developing independent thinking. It is to be highlighted that the opinions formed in the chaperones reflect that the Erzsébet Camps' undertaking to realise educational goals in its programme beyond just providing the traditional framework for a water summer camp holiday was successfully achieved. With respect to areas of non-formal educational, it is found that the chaperones evaluated community building (mean score: 4.8), and the realisation of sports and recreational activities (4.6) to be excellent, furthermore, preservation of traditions (4.1) and artistic education (3.9), seen as further missions of the camps, also received high scores. (Table 10)

	1	2	3	4	5
Developing social competences	0.2	0.6	3.5	18.6	77,2
Developing emotional intelligence		1.1	6.7	38.4	53,8
Developing conflict management	0.8	1.4	11.5	42.9	43,4
Developing independent thinking	0.6	2	17.9	38.7	40,9
Developing in terms of community	0.8	0.8	3.9	24.6	69,7
Developing self-knowledge	0.3	2	10.1	35	52,7

TABLE 9 *Chaperones' views on the developmental effects of Erzsébet Camps (2018 winter follow-up study, mean scores on 5-point scale, %)*

	1	2	3	4	5
Community and team building	0.2	0.6	2.4	12.9	83.9
Sports and recreation		0.3	6.2	26.1	67.5
Preserving traditions and values of the Hungarians	0.8	5	19.3	37.3	37.5
Artistic education	1.4	4.5	28.6	39.2	26.3

TABLE 10 *Chaperones' views on the developmental effects of Erzsébet Camps (2018 winter follow-up study, mean scores on 5-point scale, %)*

When surveying chaperones, we also intended to explore their self-reflections regarding their "take away" from the camps. In their evaluation, did the camps contribute to the foundations of their professional work and educational repertoire? 79% of the more than 1,400 respondents in the 2019 summer camps said that they had specific educational goals with participating in the camps. In this context, it is important feedback that nearly two thirds of the chaperones expressed that the camps provided help and support in performing their work more effectively outside the camps. (Figure 7) These responses reinforce our claim that the Camps can form chaperones' educational-methodological tools and professional skills considerably. The findings refer to long-term effects of the camps as well, especially because the vast majority of the chaperones' institutes had specific educational goals with the camps (74% gave this response) and chaperones themselves also had this "initial" goal (79%). The dissemination of experiences

planned by chaperones (Table 11) can create space for supporting the educational functions of institutes and family socialisation, but also for forming children's peer groups.

FIGURE 7

with institute heads	71
with colleagues	86
with parents	85
with children, students	81

TABLE 11 *Are you planning to share your camping experiences? (yes responses, %)*

Chaperons views, as presented above, which express appreciation for experiential knowledge that can be applied in their everyday practice, were shed even more light (Figure 8) on when the vast majority of respondents revealed in the relevant sections of the questionnaire that the camps had contributed to their relationships with children developing positively.

My relationship with children developed positively due to the camp
(a agreeing on a 5-point scale, breakdown in %, N=1431)

FIGURE 8

4. SUMMARY

Our research, exploratory in its nature, set out to compile the "value map" of the Erzsébet Camps. The main focus of our interest was the added value and developmental effects of the camps with respect to campers. Another research question was what social values are transmitted and the preservation of which social values is supported by the Erzsébet Camps. The present study conducted analyses on a database compiled from findings of questionnaires administered to campers (2017, 2018 and 2019) and their chaperones (2018 and 2019). Based on our results, the following conclusions can be drawn. The main developmental effects of the Erzsébet Camps are realised in the development of community and social competences, and in the area of emotional intelligence. Furthermore, the camps' undertaking to develop sports and recreational skills is also achieved effectively. Organizing events that are rooted in experiential pedagogy and coordinating educational goals and tools for achieving them support the systematic and conscious personality development goals of the camps. The world of values transmitted by the Erzsébet Camps constitute traditional humanistic social values, which are identical with the value orientations of the Judeo-Christian culture. The Erzsébet Camps represent a considerable added value to children's emotional, cognitive and ethical education, furthermore, they support the realisation of social functions. Based on the above, we can claim that the institution of Erzsébet Camps represents and realises value-saturated recreational education.

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Urban Noise Conflicts in Szeged

Abstract

Noise pollution is a serious and complex city problem. While there are objective, measurable parameters for noise mapping assessments, since the effects of noise are also subjectively perceived, it has been difficult to accurately evaluate the urban problems and conflicts arising from noise. Urban noise and its perception is related to the quality of life; thus its analysis is can provide useful insights for decision-makers. Therefore, through an analysis of online media content, the paper presents local the attitudes in Szeged towards urban noise. During the analysis different noise categories and the city's noise characteristics were determined. Even though the noise pollution in residential areas was found to be mainly concentrated in the city centre, it also affected more remote areas, and social problems and political discourses were also identified. Besides the noise of urban traffic, Szeged people appeared to be disturbed by noise related to leisure activities, such as urban (and university) programs and festival noise, which indicated that noise reduction efforts should be focus on more than just the reduction of traffic noise.

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Introduction

Noise pollution has been a growing urban environmental problem during the 20th century. As dynamic urban development and motorization have transformed cities (Mangalekar – Jadhav – Raut 2012), there has a been a rise in environmental problems: air pollution, water pollution, soil pollution, noise pollution and waste: which in turn have led to an increase in urban health problems (Thongyou et.al. 2014; Ozer et.al. 2009). Most of the previous researches focused on the pollution of air, soil or waters, while noise pollution and the conflicts related to it were often neglected. Despite noise abatement efforts, noise remains a complex urban problem for most people as it not only results in health risks (Fajersztajn et.al. 2019) but can also generate social conflicts that require local policy responses.

The main goal of this research was to analyse online media to identify the main sources of noise in Szeged, Hungary. Through an analysis of social discourses around the noise, break these sources down into specific noise categories to distinguish the noise sources that most disturbed locals. Therefore, the primary aim of this research was to highlight the main noise problems of the residents to identify the areas that need special policy attention. The identification of these problems contribute to the policies aiming the reduction city noise complaints, developing a more liveable, healthier, socially harmonious urban environment and increasing Szeged's environmental sustainability.

Noise pollution and the background to strategic noise mapping

Noise is any unwanted sound that causes a disturbance or is harmful (Smetana, 1975). Pure musical sounds can also be perceived as noise and unexpected sound effects can also be classified as noises. There are an irregular mix of sounds that have different vibrations and intensities

that are 'without musical quality' and can cause feelings of discomfort (Dési 2001). As people do not perceive noise in the same way, what counts as noise is subjective (Weinstein 1980), which makes it difficult to resolve many noise-related problems, that is, whether a certain sound qualifies as noise depends on the given situation, the frequency and intensity and the age and gender of the complainant (Simo – Cleary 2013; Nagymajtényi 2006).

Noise has been found to interfere with people's activities in various ways, with noise in everyday life being found to affect people in their homes (Zheng et.al. 1996), in their workplaces (Lamb – Kwok 2016), in nightclubs, on the street (Baros 2012).

When there is continuous noise, conflicts can arise between various social groups. The various noise sources have generally been defined under certain groupings. In general, noise pollution is the point source pollution that is associated with various industrial (Hatta 2000), agricultural and recreational facilities, can be a linear source (Ghotbi et.al. 2012), and can occur along busy roads (Arana – García 1998) near airports, or connected to traffic (Black et.al. 2007; Sadr 2014). Municipal noise exposure can be the sum of all the different noise sources (Omubo-Pepple – Briggs-Chamber – Ttamunobereton-Ari 2010): transport (Filho – Lenzi – Zannin 2004), services, industrial, construction and neighbourhood (Zentai – Schád 2001; Wang – Pereira – Hung 2004). These combinations form what is known as a unique 'noise character', which can be regulated by appropriate urban planning (Fodor 2001).

Several methods have been developed to directly reduce urban noise, such as noise protection facilities (Calixto – Diniz – Zannin 2003), reducing road surface noise, road network designs (Hatta 2000), or indirectly reducing urban noise, such as by designating protected areas (Bodnár – Fodor – Lehmann 2006). Developing noise maps is a useful tool for these interventions since the maps highlight the most noise-affected areas.

Noise maps are digital maps that illustrate various noise sources: roads, railways, airports and industrial facilities, with the noise extent being determined from annual data (*Szeged City Strategic Noise Map and Action plan* 2017). This noise mapping method (Fiedler – Zannin 2015) has been used to assess city noise mainly related to traffic (Figure 1), with agglomerations of more than 100,000 inhabitants (Jogtár 2004) being required to strictly follow the European Union noise map regulations (Berndt 2007).

Figure 1. Szeged 2017 strategic public road noise map (Lden) (August 27, 2020)
(Source: Vibrocomp Kft.)

Noise maps, however, are only developed periodically, since it is difficult to measure noise and compare it with traffic data and the maps only highlight the major problems and it is relatively expensive and time consuming to produce such maps. While these maps can help policymakers identify, understand and analyse urban noise, their aim is not to explore the whole noise characteristics, but only to highlight those areas that can be defined as noisy based on the measurable parameters. As the measured noise levels and the noisy areas on the maps may not be in line with the noise perceptions of the local residents, the social conflicts associated with these noise issues are not revealed.

Thus in most research, the presentation of noise exposure is mostly limited to only one segment of the phenomena itself. In our research, we put more emphasis on the presentation of noise pollution from a social point of view, as noise perception interpreted as a complex urban problem in the perception of the population. Therefore, as the consequences of subjective noise perception has been generally neglected in most noise pollution related research, this paper used a qualitative approach to illuminate the importance of urban noise pollution and its effects on social conflicts.

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH AREA

This research sought to identify the complex noise effects in areas in Szeged that had a heavy noise burden. In addition to traffic-based noise pollution, it was found that there were also noise load related to leisure activities.

To determine the specific public attitudes to the different types of noise exposure (ANTAL, 1976), articles closely related to the noise topic in online media and the related public opinions and discourses were analysed. The duration of the study ranged from March to May 2017, and the articles examined were selected from the period between 2000 and 2017. This is due to the increased emphasis on urban noise pollution and its reduction in the new millennium, as well as the lack of a comprehensive city-wide noise map and action plan in previous years. After a keyword search *(noise, pollution loud, decibel*), 85 relevant articles were collected, 71% of which came from the Szeged-related news portals; delmagyar.hu (32 articles) and Szegedma.hu (29 articles). The rest came from other online sources. Code categories based on the type of noise source in the articles unfolded during the study, with three main categories being identified: 1: recreational, 2: transport, 3: industrial and construction. When articles could not be classified because no clear noise type was described in the article or it discussed urban noise exposure in general but the topicality demanded its use in the research, they were placed in an 'other' category. The articles, broken down into noise categories, were further subdivided according to which news portal they belonged to, which was important to examine the differences between the media belonging to different political parties. Thus, the categories 'délmagyar.hu', 'szegedma.hu' and "other articles" were developed, and then they were analysed in response to the observation criteria.

Thirty-four observational aspects were introduced to analyse our chosen articles (see Table 1). As not all articles fully met these criteria, some aspects were not always adequately covered. Whether a given situation was classified as a conflict depended on many factors. The observational aspects sought to shed light on the nature of the article itself, the locations mentioned in the articles, possible political tone, the social age groups, the possible noise measurements, the causes of noise conflicts, and the subjectivity of noise perception.

1.	Which location was the article / post about?
2.	(If the article / comments revealed), in the case of which type of residential building was there a complaint?
3.	Has the noise been perceived as annoying locally or away from the noise source?
4.	Has there been a political reference in that article?
5.	In the comments (if any), after how long did the topic move to political direction?
6.	Based on the political comments, what was the mood of the discourse like?
7.	Which political parties appeared in the articles and comments?
8.	In which noise category were political comments most frequent?
9.	Have the author or commenters criticized the policy measures?
10.	Did noise appear as a real problem?
11.	What were the most common problems?
12.	From whom did the commenters expect the noise problem to be solved?
13.	Have the parties taken steps towards the authorities / municipality in relation to the case?

14.	Did noise emerge as an actual problem or other social conflict?
15.	What type of conflict is in the article (based on noise categories)?
16.	Has the same noise problem appeared in several articles?
17.	In relation to which article were the commenters annoyed about the noise problem?
18.	Has the author of the article taken a position on the topic or not?
19.	Who did the commenters blame for the conflict?
20.	Was there any prejudice in the articles / comments?
21.	From how many perspectives did the author of the article examine the given noise situation?
22.	Has the given sound source been compared with another noise source?
23.	What age group appeared in the articles as a sufferer of noise?
24.	What age group appeared in the articles as the cause of the noise?
25.	Did the author of the article approach the topic from a subjective or objective side?
26.	If the author of the article approached the topic from a subjective point of view, what was this tone?
27.	Was there any visual content of the article?
28.	Was there a comment on the picture?
29.	Was there a quote in the article?
30.	If so, from whom are they quoted?
31.	Were the comments rather positive or negative related to the given article?
32.	Has there been an official noise measurement in connection with the case?
33.	Has the noise source exceeded the allowed limit value in the case?
34.	In which dB category did the site appear on the urban noise map?

TABLE 1: Observational aspects of the research

In Szeged, the Tisza River is a significant influencing factor due to its excellent sound-conducting properties that transmit unwanted sounds to different parts of the city. A high level of car traffic in the densely built-up city centre area due to the appropriate parking facilities could be defined as a local problem. However, the slow city rotation speed due to the frequent traffic congestion during peak periods was a city problem especially at roundabouts and on boulevards. Another problem was the scattered appearances of green surfaces. Erzsébet Park in Újszeged, Széchenyi Square in the city center, Kálvária Square along Kálvária Avenue and the forest strip along the Tisza are significant green areas in the city that serve to reduce urban noise pollution (*Szeged City Strategic Noise Map and Action plan* 2017).

Several cultural programs (which are sources of noise) are held in Szeged: the Szeged Youth Days (SZIN) in August, attracting thousands of young people; the concerts, theatre performances and especially the Szeged Open-Air Festival in Dóm Square that are also held in summer; and the various dormitory days, freshman camps and University Days on the Hattyas and the Bridge Fair. There are also several establishments: the Tisza DOKK, the JATE club, the Hungi Vigado and the Sing Sing Music Hall: that are the noisiest entertainment facilities in the city.

As it extremely important for local politicians to make Szeged as attractive as possible from a tourism point of view and to strengthen its image as a 'university city', they try to fill the city

with as many cultural programs and vibrant city life activities as possible. In recent decades, the shops on the city centre pedestrian streets have been replaced by restaurants with terraces, which provide recreation for young people and tourists; however, for those who live in this area, could be a reason of a new noise conflict (Boros 2009; Vedrédi – Boros 2012).

Results – Noise-induced social conflicts in Szeged

Among the code categories developed, the most prominent noise source was leisure noise, which was found to have widely variable territorial features, with noise-related public complaints coming from almost every part of the city. The SZIN, held in Szeged every August, was found to be a key problem in both the articles and the related comments, with the Szeged Partfürdő Camping (Coastal Bath Camping), in particular, being noted as being a noisy place. Other associated problems mentioned were the deterioration in the cityscape, the littering, the shattered glass and vandalism. Due to Szeged's geographical characteristics, the festival noises can be perceived in the immediate vicinity of the noise source and in more distant parts of the city.

The age group that suffered the most from the festival noise depended mostly on individual perceptions; however, retirees, families with small children and people who worked in the summer made the most noise related complaints, with the noisemakers at SZIN being identified as the young people and university students visiting the festival. If a particular age group was discussed in the articles or posts, in most cases a prejudiced social attitude was observed in the remainder of the posts. For SZIN, for example, a discourse developed that attributed the noise problems during the festival to certain groups of people. These debates were mostly fuelled by two groups: the first group that defended and supported the young people's entertainment opportunities, while the another blamed retirees for the noise conflicts that developed but also criticized the way and quality of young people's entertainment. Many commenters believed that these noises should be accepted by the people living in this area during the festival period from April to October (e.g. Szeged Wine Festival, Craft Beer Festival, Liget Festival, university freshman camps, Wine Square or Bridge Fair etc.).

When there was a political reference in either the article or comments, more heated debates unfolded. As large-scale urban events such as SZIN are often influenced by politics, most articles had at least by one political reference in the comment section. However, if the political remarks were made in the article itself, a more heated discourse evolved. Based on our research, most policy debates concerned community noise and most of these complaints were made by local opposition parties or their representatives. Therefore, the noise appeared as an 'excuse' to blame the city administration and was not focused on any one group

City noise were also found to be the result of entertainment opportunities that had been organized by the University of Szeged in the lower part of the city at the JUGYU club, which every year has been a recurring source of noise conflicts with the residents. Locals have complained about the noise and have previously signalled to their representative that the students are littering and using the area as a toilet. Social problems were also raised involving young people, with a majority of the commenters tracing the problems back to the deteriorating standard of education and 'today's youth is incapable of cultured entertainment'; therefore, there was also a

prejudiced blaming attitude. Many commenters articulated their opinion that this particular age group represented a plethora of general and mostly negative city-wide problems: deteriorating quality of education; deteriorating environment; and 'incompetence of political leadership'.

Other community and neighbourhood noise pollution was found to be caused by dormitories, sports centres, spaces designed for children and small shops and bakeries operating in the garages of panel houses.

Traffic noise was also mentioned in different parts of the city. Noise from roads, trains and planes all caused significant problems. Road traffic noise was mainly caused by motorists and truckers, with the latter causing noise burdens on József Attila boulevard, the roads leading into the city and Római boulevard. Adequate pavement quality is essential on these high-traffic road sections; however, there were several complaints about the noise from the protruding gutter covers a well as from the traffic dust, other pollutants, or vehicle-induced vibrations, which in most cases caused significant damage to buildings along the high-traffic roads. The changed traffic order in given areas also caused disagreements between the local residents and drivers. The transformation of the former, calm environment into a noisy one generated conflict, with a greater number of posts on these articles expressing annoyance.

The elements of the third category were identified as manifestations construction and industrial noise. Articles on construction sites in the city appeared periodically depending on where the renovation or construction was taking place. Identified problems were brownfield investments, new building construction, maintaining an existing building and overnight roadworks. In some cases, the local residents were seeking compensation for the dust and noise caused by the morning-to-evening work that had lasted for almost a year. They also complained that the outlook from their apartments had deteriorated after the construction which had resulted in a value decline in their properties. Therefore, the industrial noise load in Szeged was found to be negligible, with only a few complaints being received about the noise of the heavy industrial plant. In one case, the residents had visited the local representative and the plant owner, but no significant progress had been made in resolving the conflict.

Several articles were placed in the 'other' category due to their complexity. In a certain part of a city, several independent problems can cause conflict. An example is the complex noise problems of the people living in Tarján district, with complaints ranging from the 'noisy young people' to the eradication of green spaces on the roadsides. Another article in this category described the background to the 2017 Strategic Noise Map and its action plans. Some articles discussed urban noise in general and gave information about the dangers and measurement possibilities of noise pollution. Other articles drew the public attention to the other harmful effects of noise pollution and workplace noise exposure.

If a precise location was classified as noisy in the articles and comments, it was plotted on a map and its decibel values displayed on the strategic noise map of Szeged for comparability (Figures 2A, B). The noise sources were mostly leisure noise sources. Based on their territorial characteristics, the noise complaints were mainly limited to the city centre, 'Felsőváros', 'Alsóváros' (including the railway station and the university area), high-traffic roads and the Újszeged side of the Tisza river (Erzsébet Park, Odessa district). These areas also had high decibel values on the strategic noise map, with an average noise load of 60-65 dB.

Figure 2A. Areas considered noisy in Szeged in the examined articles (Source: own editing);
Figure 2B. Detail of the strategic noise map of downtown Szeged for 2017 on public roads
(Lden) (Source: own editing by Vibrocomp Kft.)

Conclusion

This noise pollution research explored the opinions of local residents in online media content and posts using a content analysis method to identify the social conflicts in the case city, Szeged, Hungary. Relevant online articles and the associated comments dealing with noise from 2000 to 2017 were analysed to determine the types of noise, the specific issues, and the specific characteristics, after which a strategic noise map was developed and compared.

Based on the results of the online media content analysis, the most significant problem in Szeged seems to be the noise pollution related to leisure activities, which due to the general geographic characteristics of the city were evident in the immediate vicinity of the noise source and also in different parts of the city, with both monotonous, long-lasting noise (e.g. traffic noise) and shorter and intense sound sources (e.g. festival noise) being complained about. In most cases, the noise exposure was a 'by-product' of some other social conflict, that is, people used the noise to complain about other social issues such as exclusion, prejudice, or politics. The focal noise conflict points in Szeged were also identified as downtown, the Alsóváros, the Felsőváros and the Odessa district of Újszeged.

As not all the opinions of the local residents in the immediate vicinity of a given noise source were included in the articles and associated comments, a future research could involve these opinions as well, using surveys and mental mapping.

Based on our results, the perception of urban noise pollution manifests itself beyond its measurable parameters in a much more complex way in the urban population, and its social perception is not limited to a mere problem. Thus, to ensure a more liveable urban environment for everyone in Szeged, noise abatement policies should not only deal with the traffic noise loads appearing on the strategic noise map but should also be based on the opinions of the local residents.

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Community resilience in post-socialist rural areas
The case of grape- and wine-producing communities in the Soltvadkert and Minis-Maderat areas

Abstract

Resilience thinking has become an increasingly popular topic in both academic and policy-making circles due to its normative interpretation, which assumes that resilience is the opposite of vulnerability. Vulnerable groups, communities, settlements, regions and nations have a greater likelihood of facing more serious consequences in the event of unpredictable, negative shocks. Based on this view, in general, rural communities and regions can be considered more vulnerable and hence less resilient to unknown, negative events, as the subsistence of these communities is more closely linked to their environments rather than to people living in urban areas. This is further exacerbated by the path dependence of having a post-socialist past: the 'legacy' of socialism that, in many cases, includes a relatively disadvantageous position, backwardness and intensification of peripheralisation processes. While there is no consensus on the concept of resilience itself, there are several approaches and perspectives related to possibly detecting signs of its existence in rural communities. Our aim to present how the notion of resilience can be operationalised at the farm level in post-socialist contexts based on three different perspectives in order to contribute resilience thinking related to post-socialist discourses. We illustrate how rural community resilience may be conceptualised based on the example of the grape- and wine-producing communities of Soltvadkert, Hungary and the Minis-Maderat wine region, Romania. Based on our qualitative methodological results, it can be stated that the resilience of a community or group, its properties reflecting resilience can be interpreted in several ways, which is partly location-dependent, partly path-dependent, however, it is highly dependent not

only on embedded structures but also on activities that are constantly reproduced by community members.

Keywords

resilience, farming, wine makers, wine region, Central-Eastern-Europe, ANT

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Introduction

The notion of resilience has gained large momentum in the multidisciplinary field of research and in policy-making circles in the past 20 years (Darnhofer et al. 2016, Wilson 2017). Due to its popularity and wide application, several authors claim that it is a fuzzy meaning catch-word (Székely 2015), while others argue that many research under-theorized, simplified or misused (Wilson 2017, Lendvay 2016). Based on the fruitful debate, which can be observed in the field, related to its views, approaches, types or definitions it is crucial to clear the answers for two fundamental questions when we analyze it - resilience to what, and resilience for whom – which are ultimately depend on disciplinary background, perspective and problem focus (Cutter 2016).

Beyond that, it is also important to mention that there are basically two approaches which distinguish between normative and neutral interpretations of resilience. The normative approach is based on the assumption that resilience–vulnerability are seen as oppositional terms and where resilience is a desirable outcome mostly from human action (Adger 2000). That is the reason why it is so popular in policymaking, because its application provides clear guidelines for decision-makers to find solutions to improve their environment, or its structures. An opposing view is that resilience is a neutral concept that can be either "good" or "bad". Usually this is illustrated by situations that seem "resilient" but could be perceive as negative for the long-term adaptive

capacity of a "system" or even a community, such as "resilient" lock-in processes associated with extreme income disparities, unequal power and governance structures (Wilson 2017).

As the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) makes almost 40 percent of the European Union (EU) budget (europarl.europa.eu 2020), and because family farms account for more than 90% of agricultural holdings (ec.europa.eu 2020), these businesses are of great importance not only from an economic, but also from a food safety point of view. Although individual and/or family farms in the Member States are eligible for relatively significant support, they cannot be treated in the same way, either in terms of the amount or form of support, as they face different challenges in terms of their geographical environment, economic, social and cultural environment and sector (Beke 2011). In most cases, bottom-up intervention can only take place in a limited way, however, top-down intervention is not necessarily possible, so it is essential to get to know and present place-specific case-studies as widely as possible in order to be able to plan and consciously respond to foreseeable and unforeseen threats (Martin – Sunley 2015).

At the same time, many authors draw attention to the unique semi-peripherical situation, political, economic, and cultural environment which can be observed in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) within which, resilience interpretation may be different from other parts of the world (Nagy – Timár 2017, Neugebauer – Kovács 2015). According to Lendvay (2016) the post-socialist transition, a process which has been lasting for 30 years includes many specific characteristics which contribute to the environment which, inter alia, justifies a reinterpretation of the application in the local context. These are the mixture of the images of the pre-socialist era, the legacies and memories of socialist past, the images that were created after the regime shift and during the accession to the EU with its accompanying processes, and the personal stories of the community members that determine how they relate to these (Lendvay 2016). This is one of the main reasons why resilience of the studied group, community, area, region cannot be analyzed without an interpretation of its historical past and wider geographical environment (Brown – Kulig 1996).

The literature on resilience has grown exponentially over the past 10 years, resulting not only in a number of theoretical innovations but also in a significant amount of practical application with a wide variety of sample areas and case studies (Tóth 2015, Ashkenazy et al. 2018). Due to the vast amount of literature, the present work does not aim to fully collect and summarize its results to date. Many authors have already tried to do this before us (Martin – Sunley 2015, Wilson 2017). Nor is it intended to call into question the usability of results that can be linked to theoretical discourses or different perspectives. The aim of our study is to show how the idea of resilience affecting rural communities can be interpreted mainly in the two selected rural sample areas and communities, within the post-socialist framework, thus contributing to the expansion of the literature on resilience and the number of available case studies.

Methodology

This study based on non-representational methods (Vannini 2015) believing that aspects of resilience may not be directly observable and measurable (Darnhofer et al. 2016). At the same time, we argue that a complex and multi-faceted concept like (community) resilience hard to be measured with aggregate quantitative analysis due to lack of systematically collected and

available data. Furthermore, a qualitative case study method could provide the opportunity for nuanced assessment of a locally-specific interpretation of resilience which can be used as a practice to other groups, stakeholders and decision-makers (Foster 2006).

Between December 2019 and April 2020, 20 semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted in the study areas with farmers, winemakers, traders, decision-makers, and other experts. Most of the interviews were conducted before the COVID-19 pandemic, therefore, we did not aim to investigate its effects. The reason for choosing these areas is that both situated in a "predominantly rural region" in 2011 (ec.europa.eu 2011), while based on the reformed typology of 2018 they became "intermediate regions" (ec.europa.eu 2018) which, in addition to the changing typology, partly reflects local urbanization processes and the relative decline in the economic weight of agriculture. Furthermore, both areas are strongly connected to grape and wine producing which can be traced back to a relatively long history and also it is still a dominant economic activity in the region (Figure 1).

However, many authors argue that when examining resilience, special emphasis should be placed on the analysis of various local and higher-level development documents, which indirectly or even directly, top-down affect the resilience of a community or region (Ashkenazy et al. 2018), which is not covered in our present work. This will be the subject of an other work, with the main emphasis on business and tourism development plans and concepts affecting the two regions and its grape- and wine makers, which provide the vision and potential envisaged by local decision-makers.


Figure 1. Study area (Source: Corine Land Cover 2018 data, edited by the author)

Theoretical background

In recent years, the term resilience has become important not only in the field of ecology or psychology, but in human geography, agriculture and rural development as well (see for example (Lin 2011, Herman 2015, Ashkenazy et al. 2018). Basically, most of the works connected to rural community resilience apply two different approaches, which are the social-ecological-systems (SES) and the community psychology (Lendvay 2016). Many authors argue that, however, actor-network-theory (ANT) offers allows for a more complex and comprehensive analysis related to resilience (Darnhofer et al. 2016, Dwiartama – Rosin 2014).

In the literature, resilience is often linked to the name of Holling (1973) in ecological science, who originally understood as an ability of a system to manage or cope with change. Based on his main idea and approach of SES Walker et al. (2004, p. 2) defined resilience as *"the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity and feedbacks"*. SES approach is based on the idea that human beings live in a complex, integrated, multilevel and multiscale interconnected system in which they should be considered as a part of nature (Berkes–Folke 1998).

On the other hand, there is an other approach, which derived from community psychology (Garmezy 1973, Lendvay 2016) focusing on the adaptive capacities of individuals and groups, and their ability to recover after a disaster or to follow a single development pathway (Scott 2013). Based on its main point of view and research focus (partly due to criticism of the unsatisfactory social theoretical system of SES), a community psychological stream examining different social groups, which can be found in the literature as community resilience or social resilience (Brown 2014, Keck–Sakdapolrak 2013). It examines a group of individuals, whose social structure, relationships, and internal dynamics determine how to act in a way that is built from a physical or social event that they perceive as negative. Brown–Kulig (1996, p. 1) defined resilience as *"a fundamental human potential which is both enabled and constrained by the social contexts people construct and within which they carry out their daily lives"*. Furthermore, it adds a crucial dimension to the analyses as it *"emphasizes identifying and developing community strengths, and building resilience through agency and self-organization, with attention to people-place connections, values and beliefs, knowledge and learning, social networks, collaborative governance, economic diversification, infrastructure, leadership, and outlook"* (Berkes–Ross 2013, p. 5).

As there is a perceptible gap between the two approaches, which resulting different kinds of shortcomings through multidisciplinary research, several authors have tried to apply a new "relational" approach to examine and understand rural resilience and its "components", which focusing on interactions rather than entities (Dwiartama – Rosin 2014, Darnhofer et al. 2016, Lendvay 2016). We agree with Lendvay (2016, p. 258) about that *"human geography should dissolve the theoretical dichotomy and treat both large scale structures and agency of individuals on the common ontological framework"*. ANT developed by Latour (2005) put emphasis on relationships in which "agents" participate, who are understood as inseparable from the spatial and temporal contexts within which they are embedded. Taking this perspective, we can see "farming" instead of farm and/or farmer, and "becoming" instead of "being" (see Deleuze – Parnet 1996), which refers to an on-going transformability of relationships between agents

and/or non-human actants (Chia 1999). This leads to that *"resilience is not a 'thing' that can be seized, held or measured, it is not an attribute or property of a farm or a farmer. Rather, resilience is the emergent result of ever-changing patterns of relations, relations that are material, social, cultural"* (Darnhofer et al. 2016. 118).

Aspects of Community Resilience

Grape- and wine production in Soltvadkert

Soltvadkert town has the largest vineyard area (~3000 hectares) within Hungary's largest wine region, the Kunsági Wine Region (~21000 hectares). Viticulture and wine production are based on old traditions in the area. Vines were planted in the region, mainly to bind quicksand, which dates to the 19th century. The devastating large phylloxera epidemic around the middle of the 19th century was avoided due to its high quartz content, sandy topsoil. In addition to the binding of quicksand, the livelihood was mostly forced to establish vineyards and orchards on gentler sand dunes, as their roots were able to penetrate deeper into the groundwater even where field cultivation and its success were uncertain (Molnár 2003). In the socialist period, unlike in a significant part of Hungary, mainly due to the average gold crown value of the lands, trade unions have been set up instead of producer cooperatives, which do not obliged participants to participate in joint work. The members were able to carry out individual farming for a certain fee. These trade unions participated in the domestic and export sales of the wines, integrating the producers, which meant mainly the production of large quantities of uniformly non-outstanding quality for the eastern market and which provided a substantially risk-free source of income. For this reason, it is perhaps no exaggeration to say that a significant number, if not all, of the families living here owned more or less vineyards, thanks to which they could gain economic benefits in one way or another. Initially, the area was called the "Golden Triangle" (GT) because it was this area where was best to make a living from agriculture (index 2019).

After the regime shift, from the early 1990s, circumstances changed significantly. The centralized state farms went bankrupt, a significant part of the trade unions disintegrated, the compensation process started and the majority of farmers, focusing on individual farming as far as possible. In a sense, many farmers benefited from the period of reparation, as they, thanks to the tacit knowledge (and not incidentally capital) accumulated from the greater "backyarding" during socialism, adapted more easily to the possibilities of a capitalist market economy. The problem stemmed from the accumulation of unsold inventories and the disintegration of previous markets. Thanks to the previous quantitative approach, there was a large amount of wine in the cellars, which, even if there was a demand, had to be delivered to the consumer. However, from the second half of the '90s, the area became famous for something else and the title GT was given a different interpretation. Due to the geographical features of the area and the ingenuity rooted in the past, the activity of counterfeiting oil began to develop and flourish, which often proved to be a motive for acts of violence. As this period subsided, a wave of "wine splashing" further strengthened the reputation of the GT, based mainly on the re-use of capital and technological conditions (barrels, tanks) accumulated from oil

bleaching. According to several interviewees, the perception and presentation of Great Plain wines in a negative light began to change, especially from that time, which is partly due to the great popularity and collective stigmatization in the national media. Although producers who previously carried out counterfeiting in large volumes have ceased to do so, thanks in part to official tightening, honest winemakers are still forced to suffer the disadvantages of this legacy (Schwarcz 2003).

An important milestone in the agriculture of the CEE countries is the accession to the EU, on which there are also divisive opinions among winegrowers and winemakers. Although, overall, the CAP has fundamentally brought predictability, transparency and many new opportunities for countries' agriculture, there have also been a number of difficulties with accession. It resulted in varying degrees of success among the countries that joined after 2004, but also within agricultural sectors, as, for example, in new markets, with more competitive Western competitors, domestic farmers had only limited ability to cope. Similarly, the mass emergence of multinational food processing and trading companies has led to new conditions, an increase in the proportion of products from abroad, and the introduction and adherence to often stricter EU standards has not necessarily benefited domestic producers. Of these, the situation of small farms with less financial resources and less international market relations, has become more difficult (Csáki – Jámbor 2012).

First, the changed market conditions and regulations associated with the regime shift, and later with the accession to the EU, require the change of the strategies of wine growers and the adaptation to them. However, not all farmers are able to adapt to this, and many, especially elderly winegrowers, have chosen to close, sell / lease their land, or cease their individual wine production. According to an interviewee, only in Soltvadkert, out of nearly 600 farmers who filtered their wine 30 years ago, a tenth of it continues this activity today. At the same time, the concentration of land and the transformation of the fragmented estate structure can be observed, as fewer and fewer people are dealing with this, but in larger and larger areas in order to be profitable. Most farmers who choose this path have abandoned the "fuss" of winemaking, preferring to remain "comfortable" in the cultivation of high-yielding varieties such as Bianca and, after harvest, sell their produce to larger wineries, which are mostly (not exclusively) sell in PET bottles as low quality table wine. For the most part, these 4-5 "multi-wineries" in the area set the maximum price per kilogram they are willing to pay for grapes produced by farmers, which creates a large-scale, relatively one-sided dependency. An excellent example of this was the 2019 grape price situation, which was criticized by several interviewees. Compared to the average prices of the last 7 years and measured in the interests of profitable operation, the farmers were able to sell their crops much lower, which on average accounted for half of their income. Events like these threaten smaller producers year after year, who are largely engaged in monoculture production and are vulnerable to buyers.

However, some farmers have chosen a different path, in whole or in part, and have moved towards quality wine production. They try to establish their market presence and strengthen their position by replacing outdated technologies, selecting special varieties, selling them in bottles and participating in domestic and international wine competitions. Within this, we can separate a layer that, in addition to its production activities, partly promoting it, based on the strategies observed in the better-known foreign and domestic wine regions, tries to open up

to wine tourism. Various hospitality-related off-farm services (wine tasting, accommodation, meals, other events) are offered to interested tourists, with more or less success in order to being less vulnerable. By expanding their economic activity, they can earn a safer income, which, however, does not happen overnight (Ashkenazy et al. 2018). The majority of these grape and wine growers are farmers, who usually have neither hospitality nor particularly specific management knowledge, which greatly slows down the process.

In addition to economic challenges, as is generally the case in agriculture, a number of natural environmental challenges and 'non-human actors' also jeopardize farmers' activities and affect their success. The climate of the area is being examined by a number of studies which call attention to its high vulnerability to climate change, drought and desertification, which may have a strong impact on agricultural production in the area, including economy and society, in the future (Bajmócy et al. 2005). In addition, extreme weather events, lightning floods, hailstorms and various unprecedented or cyclical pests, which are becoming more frequent as a result of global climate change, are all constantly challenging and forcing farmers to adapt. Related to this it can be mentioned the efforts of some farmers to envisage their economic activity by abandoning viticulture and afforestation of land, which could pose new environmental and economic challenges to the community (Tölgyesi et al. 2020).

Grape- and wine production in Minis-Maderat Wine Region

Minis-Maderat Wine Region located in the South-Western part of Romania, 40 kilometers from the Romanian-Hungarian boundary, in Arad county. Of the 37 wine regions in the country, this is considered to be one of the oldest wine regions in the Carpathian Basin (Csávossy 2016). It forms an approximately 50 km long N-S strip between the Fehér-Körös and Maros rivers, on the western side of the Zarand Mountains. Its area approximately 3000 hectares, on which is dominated by red wines, of which Cabernet Sauvignon, Pinot Noir, Cadarca, Merlot and Burgund are the most popular, but it can find also Riesling Italian, Fetească regală and Muscat Ottonel (Mălăescu et al. 2014). Written memoirs from the 11th century mention vineyards in the landscape, which have undergone several ordeals over the centuries. As a result of the stormy times of the 17th century, they suffered enormous damage and were one of the wine regions almost completely destroyed by the great phylloxera disaster. He lived his heyday around the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century (Mód – Simon 2008). In the period following the events of 1947, the proportion of economic sectors to be nationalized in the country was constantly expanding, which resulted in the socialist-type transformation of agriculture and the radical transformation of rural land ownership. The established producer cooperatives and collective farms grew grapes within the framework of planned management, which were processed by the state cellar farms and sold mainly to the eastern markets (László 2013).

With the regime shift, the previously nationalized land was reprivatized, which, contrary to the Hungarian practice, was not solved with compensation certificates, but was returned to the previous owners by application. In practice, however, this has resulted in a fragmented estate structure and inefficient management. Based on the principle of economies of scale and taking

into account the previous quantitative point of view by the farmers, the aging social structure and the lack of knowledge of new market mechanisms, individual farming has become quite difficult. The three large local state-owned companies (VINALCOOL, VINEXPORT, Baracka Viticulture and Enology State Farm) have also been privatized, but less successfully than in other parts of the country, the equipment has been sold or simply lost track and a significant part of the land has fallen into foreign hands, or lying fallow.

Accession to the EU has also brought huge opportunities to this region. Various land-based and restructuring subsidies have improved the opportunities for many landowners. Ownership conditions also changed after accession, as previously the purchase of land ownership by foreign nationals was not allowed, thus generating even more foreign investors. The settlements were able to implement a number of infrastructural investments, with which they improved their accessibility and the living conditions of the inhabitants. Also, as the economic crisis of 2008-2009 coincided more or less with the period of EU accession, farmers were less affected. The Podgoria Minis-Maderat Local Action Group has been set up to try to coordinate the work of local actors and to assist in the mobilization and use of European Union funds.

However, in addition to the opportunities, it also brought some difficulties, which are related to the CAP, the forms of support and their use. EU regulations restrict the establishment of new vineyards and the renewal of old ones in all countries, especially in order to avoid overproduction. Romania does not differ from this either, as the extent to which the country's wine-growing area can be expanded or replanted is also regulated here. In the 2007–2013 programming period, Romania was able to draw on almost € 290 million for viticulture and oenology, more than 90% of which was used for vineyard reconstruction and conversion (Antoce – Calugaru 2017). This is particularly positive in that the old plantations, which are less suitable for market conditions, have been renewed and a more diverse variety portfolio has been developed, both nationally and often locally. However, there is also some criticism in this regard, as the vast majority of grants were available for this purpose, not for technological innovation or, for example, for expansion with various off-farm activities. Thus, a person who had a vineyard or land, applied for support without a longer-term purpose, which he used only partially for that purpose and, in a good case, left it fallow while waiting for the end of the maintenance period. In addition, a number of other, partly gray, speculative activities related to EU support for vineyards have been mentioned, which also hamper the efficient use and utilization of resources on the one hand and vineyards on the other.

The large influx of foreign direct investment observed after the regime shift into the western counties of the country, most notably the counties of Timisoara and Arad, resulted in a large-scale development, which did not leave the agricultural sector untouched either (Cretan et al. 2005). This trend has not diminished in the years of accession to the European Union (ceicdata 2020). Although a foreign citizen could not have exclusive land ownership until 2014, according to a 2015 report, nearly 40 percent of the country's agricultural land owned by foreign investors (Romania-insider 2017). This is due, among other things, to the land policy that is relatively liberal in Europe, the low land prices, as well as the opportunities or lack of opportunities for domestic farmers. The presence of foreign investors and/or owners in agriculture, viticulture and wine production can also be observed in the region. Many of the cellar owners are not local or Romanian native speakers, but are indirectly connected to the area, have started a business

here, or form an ownership share only as an investment.

Typically, operating companies with foreign interests are not satisfied only with viticulture, but also with their own quality winemaking, which is usually carried out in a smaller area, seeking to use modern technology. In terms of proportions, there are not many wineries, roughly 10-15, among whom 2-3 dominant players have more than 80 hectares of land. Other smaller wineries farm on an average of 15-40 hectares, as wineries usually make their wines partly from their own crops and partly from grapes bought from other winegrowing farmers. The set, which accounts for nearly 80 percent of producers, is made up entirely of winegrowing farmers, who are usually locally affiliated and sell their products to other local or non-local wineries. Based on the interviews, it can be said that the majority of producers consist of older farmers, accustomed to socialist conditions, less willing to innovate, with limited opportunities, who tend to take a quantitative rather than qualitative approach and who consider their own independence to be paramount. Perhaps they are the most vulnerable players here too, as their revenues depend on grape prices and some sell locally produced grapes, others sell in bulk their lower quality, lower value-added wines. In the neutral meaning of the term, it can be claimed that these growers are the most resilient players, but unfortunately on the bad way, as they locked-in the socialist circumstances with less adaptability and high level of rigidity.

In addition to economic and social factors, natural ones also play an important role in this area. Global climate change does not affect few places on Earth and its signs have already been seen in the study area. The wine region has an advantageous position in terms of grapes and wine production due to its topography and climatic conditions. Rising temperatures and falling rainfall due to climate change, extreme weather events, but also the emergence of various pests associated with them all put vines, and thus farmers' living conditions at risk (Sima et al. 2015).

Discussion

Resilience can be examined in a number of ways in the case of the two groups, which can be linked to agricultural activity. Considering the historical and current circumstances, as well as examining the geographical and structural environment within the groups and their wider context, the literature tries to interpret the concept of resilience based on two common perspectives. To bridge the differences between the structural and agency approaches, the ANT approach is being used in more and more work, which may provide a solution to the tensions arising from the dichotomy of the two approaches (Lendvay 2016).

We can examine the individual farms, lands, plantations that convey resilience in a given area. This is mainly due to their biophysical appearance, which depends on the size of the land, the relief conditions, or even the climate. It can also mean the agro-ecosystem of a plantation, which depends on soil quality, nutrient supply, the type of grapes produced, the type of cultivation, biodiversity, etc. Furthermore, different social structures (markets, different regulations) that determine the production on the land may play a role in this. If we look at it from this point of view, the focus should mostly be on the properties of the land, which can be influenced to some extent but cannot be changed. This is usually limited to the change between the quantity / quality of the crop and the cultivator of the land, its activity, which

presupposes atomized decision-making processes, often without the need for a broader social medium (Darnhofer et al. 2016). This can be examined in terms of the geographical and geological conditions of the two areas, which affect the possibilities, limitations and justifications for growing certain grape varieties, as well as the quantity and quality of the wines made from them. The studies related to that view also include what tenure conditions can be observed in the area, which ones can sustain themselves economically, safely and flexibly; the degree of diversity of each farm, the number of varieties of grapes grown and, in a broader sense, the type of cultivation.

Resilience manifests itself as a kind of flexible and prepared production and management activity that takes advantage of the given area (and structures) which tries to resist or adapt to as many types and degrees of negative disruption as possible (drought, ice damage, pests, changes in demand). As a concrete example, the Hungarian sample area was placed by winegrowers who abandoned their production activities in several waves, when with the change of market conditions it was no longer worthwhile to farm in a smaller area, which seems to have continued ever since. In contrast, however, a circle has emerged or is emerging that, although not with uniform strategies and goals, produces on a larger area of land. A similar process can be observed in the Romanian sample area. In both areas, there is also a search for a balance between typically local and more popular world varieties and the production of more laborious, more delicate and less demanding, more resistant grape varieties as a result of efforts to find safer sources of income.

From natural and/or "non-living" actants, we can shift the focus to social actors, to the agency that is related to each other within the given economic activity or geographical area and has an impact on the given community. The cornerstone of this approach is that the values, perspectives, perceptions, beliefs, and ideas of different actors fundamentally influence their own and others' economic activities. Instead of being passive sufferers of circumstances and environmental endowments, we see them as actors who actively shape their environment, activities, and opportunities, who receive constant impulses in a broader social context (Dwiartama – Rosin 2014). This perspective allows us to examine the differences between actors operating in nearly identical structures, the differences between more successful, more adaptable and less successful, more vulnerable firms, and their causes and motivations. From this point of view, we can also examine the production and sales strategies of farmers, their development, the learning and adaptation process that led to the current situation, and which may be important for the future. The role of networks also becomes important here, as in many cases different associations, collaborations and cooperatives offer opportunities not only to speed up learning processes, but also to overcome various threats and dangers (natural, economic, social) and to adapt to difficulties. This can be linked to the study of power inequalities and social justice, as the influence and advocacy capacity of different social and economic actors can be very different and variable (Darnhofer et al. 2016). Resilience here is related to the first interpretation, as farming strategies are partly forced to adapt to different structures, however, they do not fully determine farmers 'decisions. Farming is not only an ecologically but also a socially defined process, it is the given medium, community or person who organizes its activities by different influences. Thus, resilience here is closely linked to farmers' learning skills and abilities, as well as their situational awareness and adaptability, and last but not least, their willingness to cooperate and their embeddedness in different, overlapping social networks (Beilin et al. 2012).

In the context of the sample areas, this appears as differences due to differences in the thinking of wine growers and wine producers, which determine the possibilities of the person, the farm. Various social norms that can be considered the legacy of the post-socialist past appear here, which are responsible, for example, for the degree of vertical and horizontal general trust, the willingness to cooperate and the use of past experience in the present (Szabó 2004). Phenomena related to peripheralization processes also appear, such as the backwardness resulting from the rural situation, the economic activities related to rurality, and the one-way dependence relations resulting from the sale of a low value-added product (Nagy – Timár 2017). In addition, there is a degree of exclusion or stigma, which affects the quality of the wine region and the quality of the wines associated with the wine region. Also, the approach related to the peripheralization processes related to different communication discourses is explicitly connected to this, as on the one hand the image formed during political (local, regional, national, European) discourses, the image of the region itself, the farmers themselves and their responses they largely determine the vulnerability and potential resilience of farms (Meyer – Miggelbrink 2013, Lang 2012). A concrete example is the large-scale independence aspirations of the winegrowers in both regions, which prevent the creation of a more efficient producer and / or sales cooperative with greater advocacy capacity. Also, in both regions is the presence of a dominant personality (or brand) who was among the firsts to recognize and successfully exploit the new opportunities and which in many cases serves as an example for later entrants. These leading actors are usually more deeply embedded in the wider social and economic networks, defining, and shaping the opinion, image and development directions of the region.

The resilience of a region, its community, its actors and their economic activities can be examined from a slightly different perspective, which does not focus specifically on entities (ecological and social), but on their constantly evolving relationships. In order to be clearly interpretable, we need to examine the medium in which farmers operate, without forgetting the peculiarity of the viewpoint that processes are imagined open-ended. Because everything is related to everything, it assumes constant change and opportunities that do not examine practices or relationships from the then and now perspective (Darnhofer et al. 2016). Resilience is a trait that actors do not necessarily intentionally reproduce through their daily activities, which is thus embedded in the way people treat the material goods associated with their activities through different practices and in the symbolic meaning they associate with it (Lendvay 2016).

In the sample areas, this perspective connects producers (winegrowers, winemakers) with the crop (grapes), products (wine, various other services), consumers, traders, different decision-makers and the natural environment in which they live and operate. In both sample areas, the separability arising from the quantitative and qualitative approaches can be observed, the producer group that produces large quantities of relatively low quality grapes and wine, as opposed to those who try to move more towards quality production and diversify their economic activities. This can be observed in the exchange of knowledge related to activities related to production (on-farm - grape varieties, cultivation methods, harvesting, etc.) and beyond (off-farm - technology, wine varieties, packaging, sales, related services – eg. types of hospitality related to wine tourism, etc.), as well as in the joint or individual management of various social, economic and environmental changes. However, it is not necessarily possible to infer or directly state which of the strategies used by actors within a given community makes them more resilient,

since, as one actor put it: *"over time, it becomes clear how well a particular farmer is able to survive under given conditions"*. Yet, it is also necessary to see how these connections and their changes can flow smoothly and dynamically, as changes in their dynamics largely determine the possibilities of the connected actants.

CONCLUSIONS

Resilience thinking in multidisciplinary academic circles including geography has become exceptionally popular in western literature. While it has several coexisting, even conflicting meanings where resilience means an ability to change, and also an ability to remain in stable conditions, its meaning is determined by the disciplines, even its different approaches which altogether may obscure the concept. Resilience can be interpreted in many ways depending on who / what is placed in the study focus. Although there are many interpretations, with proper operationalization, although in many cases this is not the goal, some case studies may even allow comparative studies to be performed.

Based on the above, we can say that resilience is rooted in the structures of a system or a group, the elements of which determine how flexible it is. It can be resilient on the basis of the characteristics, properties and ideas of a group, the individuals that make it up, which, however, can make them both vulnerable and rigid if they are unable to adapt because of the structures they are embedded. The ANT enables the combined examination of structural and agency interpretation, which places the focus on the examination of the relations between the actors and their changes both in time and space. Based on these, it can be stated that basically the groups living in the post-socialist rural areas, which can be linked to various agricultural activities, are vulnerable, which, however, does not necessarily mean that they are not resilient in the neutral sense of the term, for it is precisely the structures that make them vulnerable, on the one hand that they insist to, and on the other hand, that they are involuntarily locked in. Through their activities, they become resilient in both positive and negative way, which they continually reproduce through their actions and relationships. Understanding these activities over time, i.e., rooted in their past, and in a broader geographical context, can predict the response to a potential negative event, i.e. the possible future path of the group, recognizing which we can take active action to prevent or prepare. However, this is not necessarily the task of the affected or examined groups, but also serves the interests of decision-makers, advocacy organizations and NGOs at different levels, which could provide an answer to the neoliberal critique of the concept.

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A Picture of the Social Situation – Institutionalisation in Hungary

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Abstract

The main purpose of the current study was to outline and assess a picture of the Hungarian and international welfare systems. The social care system is an essential institutional network for the society, be it a system of specific institutions or legislation. The European Union's approach mainly focuses on social responsibility and solidarity as its primary consideration. The European Union considers that social safety net and social protection systems cannot work without adopting this approach, and only the systems that offer true assistance to the members of the society can actually give assistance to the society. In addition to economic orientation, solidarity-based and socially inclusive attitude has a particularly important role to play, since it is much more than just funding to smooth out individual or social problems.

Keywords

solidarity, social system, social issues, community cooperation

Outlook for the European Union

'Article 151 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that, having in mind fundamental social rights such as those set out in the European Social Charter signed in 1961 and in the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, shall have as their objectives the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, and proper social protection.

Social, technological and economic developments, the continuous digitalisation and automation of the economy, and the significant restructuring of the labour market in recent decades have presented new challenges even for the European Union, which regards social rights and solidarity as its basic, shared values.'[1]

'The EU has 25 million unemployed people and 122 million people at risk of poverty or social exclusion. These figures call for more economic convergence to improve the lives of Europe's citizens. While inclusive and active labour market policies are crucial to move people into decent jobs, fair and efficient welfare systems are decisive in ensuring social protection for all and the social inclusion of those still excluded from society. Social affairs policy area covers decent jobs, social security, protection and inclusion, poverty reduction, gender equality, the needs of people with disabilities, children and families, young people, older people and minorities such as Roma, access to health, justice, education, culture and sport, volunteering and active citizenship. Its main focus, common to all subareas, is to put people on an equal footing at the centre of social policy and its main political instrument at the EU level is the European Pillar of Social Rights.'[2]

The aim of the European Pillar of Social Rights is to serve as a guide towards efficient employment and social outcomes, which are directly aimed at fulfilling people's essential needs.

'Delivering on the European Pillar of Social Rights is a shared commitment and responsibility between the Union, its Member States and the social partners. [...] At Member State level, the Pillar respects the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe, as well as the national identities of the Member States and the organisation of their public authorities at national, regional and local levels.'[3]

The social pillar expresses twenty principles structured around three main categories and aims to support fair and well-functioning labour markets and welfare systems.

The twenty principles defined in the European Pillar of Social Rights include education, training and life-long learning; gender equality; equal opportunities; active support to employment;

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[1]   Szociális jogok európai pillére. Infojegyzet (The European Pillar of Social Rights. Background Note)

[2]   Social Affairs

[3]   Proposal for an Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights

fair working conditions: secure and adaptable employment; wages; information about employment conditions and protection in case of dismissals; social dialogue and involvement of workers; work-life balance; healthy, safe and well-adapted work environment and data protection; childcare and support to children; social protection; unemployment benefits; minimum income; old-age income and pensions; health care; inclusion of people with disabilities; long-term care; housing and assistance for the homeless; and access to essential services.

'Western and northern European countries typically spend a larger share of their GDP on social benefits. 12% of benefits are means-tested on average in the European Union, but there are countries where it is much higher: 37% in Denmark, 28% in Ireland and 18% in the United Kingdom. 3.9% of benefits were means-tested in Hungary, which had been decreasing over the years, since it had been 5.1% in 2010. Of the Visegrad countries, this percentage was even lower (2.5%) than that of Hungary but was higher in Poland (4.7%) and Slovakia (4.0%)' (Magyarország 2018).


Figure 1
Social protection benefits in EU member states (2016)
(As a percentage of GDP)

Source: own edition, based on Magyarország 2018

Social Institutions of Hungary—Institutional Landscape

Funding source (state funded, non-governmental, private or market-oriented institutions) and the range of tasks arising from their social role allow a distinction to be drawn between the social institutions of Hungary.

Social services include basic social services and specialised social care. Basic social services are mainly services provided close to home and do not necessarily require access to services far from home.

Specialised social care includes more complex and mainly residential care services that require specific expertise.

These two forms of social services are limited to people and families without resources or with low income and conditional on the beneficiaries' social need or other situation (age or disadvantaged situation). A distinction can also be made between regular and provisional benefits in cash or in kind.

The system, benefits in cash and in kind, and social services providing personal care are covered in two chapters of Act III of 1993 on Social Governance and Social Benefits. The social services providing personal care consist of three sub-services: basic social services, specialised social care and developmental employment. The latter is further regulated in other laws and regulations and thus forms a separate category within social benefits.

Social services aim to provide effective assistance to the members of the society in need because of their living conditions or social status. An increasing number of the members of the Hungarian society have received the services provided by religious institutions in recent years and decades, certainly due to the fact that public institutions cannot provide support or satisfactory support to people in need of assistance. However, the public institutional system operates and supports basic and specialised social services.

If the social care system 'cannot provide basic services to people in need owing to their age, health status or social situation, specialised care appropriate to their condition and situation must be provided to them. Common characteristics of specialised social care services are that they are based on living services and must ensure resources in staff and equipment, as well as professional criteria, required for twenty-four-hour, continuous functioning and caregiving activities.'[4]

'The social and economic situation of the country has affected the population in different regions unequally. Problems related to demographic situation, employment, earning ability and health problems occur in the field of social policy, which fails to meet all social needs. Where social ills accumulate, there are growing needs for the local social care system. Since the disparities between the regions of the country are considerable, social policy developments should be focused as appropriate on the specific problems of the regions in the direst situation, and accordingly specific social development programmes must be established. The primary concern in improving the social care system must be to develop uniform-level, country-level and wide-ranging basic social services, which can tackle the problems of the needy near to where they live or within driving distance.

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4   Szociális szakosított ellátások (Specialised Social Care)

The social care system can be developed in two ways:

- creation of new services or expansion of existing services;
- modernisation and development of existing services.

Priority must be given to the quality assurance of basic social services in accordance with the legislation, and, secondly, social services must be provided in accordance with legal requirements. Emphasis must be placed subsequently on meeting development demands stemming from local needs and on achieving a quality of services equivalent to that of the services provided in more developed regions.'[5]

Residential long-term care facilities (see Table) provide non-stop, all-around care and, if necessary, rehabilitation for the elderly, people with disabilities, psychiatric patients, addicts and homeless people. 'The number of clients/residents has persistently been above 70,000 since the mid-2000s, and the utilisation of social services has exceeded 96%. The number of clients/residents has similarly increased in social institutions providing temporary home: approximately 13,000 people used their services in 2017, and the utilisation of this type of social services was above 90%.

61% of clients/residents of social institutions providing long-term or temporary home were elderly, 17% of them were people with disabilities, 11% were homeless people, 9.4% were psychiatric patients and 2.2% were addicts in 2017. The numbers of addicts (72%), homeless people (61%) and the elderly (37%) increased the most compared to 2000' (Magyarország 2018).


Figure 2. Distribution of clients/residents of social institutions providing residential long-term and temporary home by funding source (thousands of persons)
Source: own edition, based on Magyarország 2018

5   Szociális ellátórendszer (Social Care System

Figure 4. Institutional residential long-term care for the elderly (religious institutions)
Budapest
Source: own edition, based on http://statinfo.ksh.hu/Statinfo/haViewer.jsp

1. Main elements of the social care system

For the understanding of the social care system, it is essential to overview the social situation. The following summary[6] outlines the most important elements of the social care system.

1) Functioning of the social market economy

'The liberal market economy leads to large social disparities and inequalities, the state must therefore, to some extent, play a redistributive role. The purpose of the redistributive role is to provide assistance to the poorer and/or more vulnerable strata of the population. An important means for achieving this objective is social policy, and its main elements include progressive taxation (the state imposes a greater percentage of taxation on higher income) and social expenditure. Social expenditure includes the pension scheme, health care (including pharmaceutical subsidies), sickness benefit, unemployment benefit, jobseeker's benefit, social assistance (child home care allowance, child care benefit and family allowance), educational scholarships and consumer price subsidies (passes for students and pensioners). Social solidarity has a crucial role to play in narrowing social disparities, which is facilitated by the activities of charitable and non-governmental organisations, charity events and charitable contributions.

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6   Source: A szociális ellátórendszer fő elemei (Main Elements of the Social Care System)

2) Pillars of the social care system

The main elements of the social care system are social insurance, employment policy, family allowances, social services and social assistance.

3) Social insurance

National compulsory health insurance and pension insurance schemes were established at the same time. Pensions and health services are classified as social insurance. Health insurance is designed to help maintain the health of insured people, restore their health in case of health detriment and provide income support in case of incapacity for work. This type of income support is sickness benefit. The qualifying condition for health insurance is social insurance coverage, and the entitlement to benefits depends on the payment of health insurance contributions. The state pays health insurance contributions for the unemployed, pensioners and children. The health insurance contributions paid to the health insurance scheme cover healthcare costs (general practitioners, out-patient care centres and hospitals) and pharmaceutical subsidies. Pension insurance is designed to provide payment necessary to ensure the livelihood of people of retirement age (old-age pension) or of people temporarily or permanently incapable of work (disability pension). It is not possible to know the lifespan of people in advance, beneficiaries thus share risks. Workers pay pension insurance contributions as a proportion of their income to the pension insurance scheme. The qualifying condition for public pension is the payment of pension insurance contributions. In Hungary, compulsory pension system was started in 1928. Pension contributions were invested in real estate and shares, and the pensions of retired people were paid from the assets thus accrued. This is called funded pension system. After the Second World War, a significant part of the national assets was destroyed, and the stock was devalued. Since 1947, pensions have been covered by contributions paid to the pension system in a given year, which is called "pay-as-you-go" scheme. The main problem with the pay-as-you-go scheme is that the number of contributors is falling and the number of pensioners is increasing. Owing to the problem of the ageing population, pension reform was implemented in 1997. As a result of the reform, elderly workers stayed in the public pension scheme. Accordingly, young workers only paid 1.5% into the pension fund and 8% into private pension funds operating on a funded basis, to their own pension accounts. The pension assets accumulated in the pension accounts would have been converted into life annuities on retirement, which were intended to supplement their reduced pensions. The pension reform would have reduced the expenditure of the pension fund in the long term, and since pension receipts decreased in the short term, pensions were covered by other public expenditure and loans. The government restored the pay-as-you-go scheme in 2010, while a large part of private pension fund assets was used for the reduction of public debt. Accident insurance is designed to provide sufficient means of subsistence temporarily or permanently for workers injured at work to cover their living expenses.

4) Social services and assistance

Social services are intended to help disadvantaged people or people in crisis by providing formal care services. Institutions specialising in care for the elderly and addicts, family support services or services for the homeless carry out their activities in a formal way. Social assistance means financial assistance. Social assistance includes housing benefit, care allowance, funeral support, public health care, funeral at public expense, housing allowance and regular social assistance.

5) Employment policy

Unemployment is a corollary of the market economy. Unemployment is the temporary state of being jobless. Unemployment is either voluntary, temporary (when an unemployed person could find employment but does not take the job for some reason, e.g. for health reasons, due to their educational attainment or the salary offered) or long-term. Long-term unemployment is when workers are jobless for one year or more. Finding a new job is exceedingly difficult, since employers have less confidence in the unemployed and workers are also out of practice. The task of employment policy is to tackle unemployment. Employment policy has active and passive types of means. Passive means and measures ensure and provide unemployment benefits. Passive means include unemployment benefit (for three months) and jobseekers' benefit (maximum entitlement is ninety days). Active means facilitate maintaining existing jobs and provide support to jobseekers in finding jobs. Means on the workers' side, e.g. job search allowance, mobility allowance, housing benefit, public work scheme, assistance for self-employment and retraining for the unemployed are financed in whole or in part by job centres. Retraining is a means for facilitating job search and job retention. Those who are under the age of 25, or under the age of 30 for those holding a university or college degree, did not gain eligibility for unemployment benefits upon graduating from school; are involved in community service work and undertake to participate in retraining, and are disability pensioners can receive retraining. The following expenses can be reimbursed within the limits of the training assistance: training costs and examination fees, repayment of travel expenses between the locale of training and home, the reimbursement of the costs for accommodation and meals. Reimbursement of travel costs: jobseekers participating in training with aid are entitled to an unlimited number of regional transport tickets with, on average, 90% price reduction between home (residence) and the locale of training.

Means on the employers' side: assistance to employers for increasing employment and creating new jobs, state assistance for the employment of unemployed entrants, and assistance for community service work.

6) Family benefits

Family assistance is designed to encourage childbearing and to provide financial assistance to help raising children. Child-raising income replacement benefits paid to parents who stop

working: infant care allowance, child care benefit, child home care allowance, family allowance (qualifying condition: regular school attendance) and family housing allowance.'

Summary

However, irrespective of how the standards of public services change, our shared interest is to heighten general awareness of our interdependence, to strengthen the value of responsibility for others, and to promote modern ways and techniques of selfless assistance to members of society. It is no coincidence that community service is already inherent in the culture of citizenship. This means that average middle-class citizens could not imagine life without taking advantage of some of their free time to help others and the community. A great example is the case of a Dutch student who benefited from the Erasmus programme, came to Hungary to study, and the very first thing he did the day after his arrival was to find a place where he could carry out social work for six months he would spend as an Erasmus student in Hungary. Another example could be the story of a young Hungarian employee who worked for a company in the USA, where the corporate culture encouraged him to take active part in the sound system of social solidarity, solely because all of his co-workers carried out unpaid work in their areas of expertise for the community.

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SOURCE OF DATA

http://statinfo.ksh.hu/Statinfo/haViewer.jsp

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Digital inequalities by gender and socio-economic status among Hungarian students based on PISA 2015

❦

Abstract

Our paper focuses on the socio-demographic segmentation of dimensions of digital inequalities introduced by DiMaggio and Hargittai (2001). These dimensions include technical apparatus, autonomy of use, ICT skills, social support and purpose of use. We conducted our investigation on the Hungarian subsample of the PISA 2015 dataset, from which we applied variables on ICT use to reveal differences between boys and girls, and by socio-economic and cultural status of students in these dimensions. According to our analysis there are gendered differences as well as differences by socio-economic status regarding dimensions of digital inequalities. Our results can contribute to further research to better understand the relationship between digital inequalities and other dimensions.

Keywords

digital inequalities, socio-economic status, gender, PISA

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1. Introduction

The use of info-communication technologies is an organic and indispensable part of life for youngsters nowadays. The generation of children who grew up among ICT devices are called by different names like 'Digital Natives' (Prensky 2001), 'Millenials' (Oblinger 2003) or 'Screenagers' (Rushkof 2006). Scientists dedicated to these generations agree that technology and the digital world has fundamentally changed the lives of these children who have been exposed to ICT actually from their births on. Digital technology affects their personality development, social relationships, values, the way of learning, working and loving. Besides enjoying the benefits of the Internet more and more children and youngsters suffer from its disadvantages and risks. Children and youngsters, who associate the Internet mainly with social media, are often exposed to negative psychological and social effects. These vary from influencing their personality development to being threatened by cyber-crime (Aiken 2020). To map these effects among young people it is important to reveal the characteristics of their ICT use as well as the main factors of segmentation of their usage. In this paper we intend to describe patterns and inequalities of ICT usage along social-demographic characteristics based on the data of the PISA 2015 study.

The use of ICT devices has widely spread and has become a common activity among youngsters in the 21st century. At the beginning, when ICT was new in the society, sociologists focused on the differences between users and non-users. This was the so called digital divide/digital gap concept (Norris 2001). However after a rise in the penetration of ICT in society, the focus had to be shifted from the digital gap concept to the digital inequality concept which concentrates on the differences among users (DiMaggio et al. 2001, Hargittai 2002, 2010). In a previous study (Vincze 2019) we investigated dimensions of digital inequalities among Hungarian students based on the PISA 2015 database. There we applied the dimensions of digital inequalities introduced by DiMaggio and Hargittai (2001), who distinguished between five aspects to reveal the inequalities among ICT users. These were the following: (1) technical apparatus, (2) autonomy of use, (3) skills and knowledge, (4) social support and (5) purpose of use. We have applied these dimensions to our further analysis.

2. DATA AND METHODS

The analysis of our paper is based on the Hungarian subsample of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) conducted every three years among 15-years old students arranged by the OECD. Besides measuring the competencies of the students all over the world in the field of mathematics, reading and science, the data are supplemented by information on the ICT use of students at home and at school as well. From the beginning on in the year 2000 researchers aimed to catch up with the rising importance of ICT in students' lives. Therefore an additional ICT questionnaire had been developed to reveal patterns of ICT use, and to measure its impact on learning and school performance. The last time this questionnaire was available for the participating countries was in 2015, therefore the analysis is based on these data. We followed the five dimensions of digital inequalities introduced by DiMaggio-Hargittai during our analysis. We adopted some related variables as measures of the dimensions. We examine the dimension of technical apparatus through the access and use of different ICT devices at home. As for the autonomy of use the time spent using the Internet will be investigated. Since the amount of time a student spends on the Internet outside of school reflects to some extent how free or limited the access and the use of the Internet for him or her is. The digital skills can be approached in two ways according to the PISA questions. We can distinguish between skills for a comfortable usage and skills for an independent or proficient usage. To measure both types of skills students had to express to what extent they agree or disagree with ten statements on a four-level scale[1]. As for the dimension of social support we applied variables from the database which showed how typical it is for students to talk about info-communication technologies and to share information about ICT with their friends[2]. Thus social support reflects the level of integration of ICT in the social networks. Finally we revealed the purposes and modes of Internet use among 15-year old student in Hungary. On the one hand general Internet activities and on the other hand modes of Internet use which include school related tasks or support learning have been investigated.

In this paper we aim to reveal the segmentation of dimensions of digital inequalities by socio-demographic factors. We analyse the differences of the dimensions of digital inequalities from two aspects: gender and social background. We examine the variances in ICT use between boys and girls as well as the correspondences between socio-economic background of the students and their ICT use. Socio-economic background is included in the analysis by the ESCS[3] index. This index consists of three components: (1) the highest level of education of parents, (2) the occupational status of the parents, and (3) the cultural resources at home (number of books), and other educational resources. The ESCS index is a standardized index, which has been computed to have a mean of 0 for all OECD countries and a standard deviation of 1 (OECD 2017). In Hungary the mean of the ESCS index is -0.177 which is lower than the OECD average and a standard deviation of 0.94 which is very close to the standard deviation of the OECD countries.

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[1]   1=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Agree, 4=Strongly agree

[2]   Like in case of the previous variable, respondents were able to express the extent of agreement or disagreement on a four-level scale.

[3]   Economic-Social-cultural Status.

N	5570
Mean	-0.177
Std. deviation	0.943751
Minimum	-6.7872
Maximum	3.0072

1. TABLE: Descriptive statistics on the ESCS index in the Hungarian subsample. Source: PISA 2015, own calculation.

3. FINDINGS

3.1. Technical apparatus: The use of ICT by gender

There are some differences between boys and girls in the use of ICT devices at home. The use of a desktop computer is by 20% higher among boys than girls[4]. Tablets are also more frequently used by boys than girls, the difference however is just 5% between the two groups[5]. Among girls the rate of laptop or notebook users (by 5 %)[6] and the rate of cell phone users with Internet connection (by 2.6%)[7], is somewhat higher than among boys. However there is no difference between boys and girls in the use of the Internet, they both use it at a high rate[8].

Source: PISA 2015, own calculation

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[4]   Pearson's Chi-square statistic =219.761; p=0.00

[5]   Pearson's Chi-square statistic =1.935; p=0.00

[6]   Pearson's Chi-square statistic =25.201; p=0.00

[7]   Pearson's Chi-square statistic =9.285; p=0.01

[8]   Pearson's Chi-square statistic =1.929; p=0.381

Still relating to the technical apparatus we investigated the difference between boys and girls in the non-use of the available ICT devices in their homes. We found that gender plays a significant role in the non-use of two devices: the desktop computer and the portable laptop/notebook. One-fifth of the girls don't use the desktop computer although it is available for them in their homes, the same rate of non-users is only 10% among boys. In the case of laptop we found the opposite relationship: the rate of non-users who have a laptop at home is somewhat higher among boys (15.8%) than among girls (11.6%).

Source: PISA 2015, own calculation

The mean of the number of devices used at home slightly varies between boys and girls. Boys use on average 3.6 devices at home and girls use 3.5[9].

So to sum up, the technical apparatus as a dimension of digital inequalities shows gendered differences. It is more typical for boys to use a desktop computer than for girls. The use of a tablet is also more characteristic for boys, however the difference is not remarkable. More girls use laptops than boys, but the difference is quite low. The data shows no difference between boys and girls regarding the access and use of the Internet and smartphones.

3.2 Technical apparatus: The use of ICT by ESCS index

The relationship between the use of different ICT devices and the ESCS index is basically positive. Thus those who have access to ICT devices in their home and use them, have a more favourable social-economic and cultural background than those who don't use ICT devices in their home may it be because they don't have any or for other reasons[10]. Only in case of desktop

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[9]   The independent samples T-test is statistically significant: t= -3,485; p=0,000

[10]   All one-way ANOVA tests are statistically significant.

computer use do we see a different correlation. The mean of ESCS index is somewhat lower for those who dispose of a desktop computer and use it than for those who have one in their home but don't use it.

Regarding the different categories of usage the biggest difference between them outlines in case of the Internet. The ESCS index of those who don't have Internet access at home as well as of those who have access but don't use the Internet is much lower than of those who have access and use the Internet.

Source: PISA 2015, own calculation

The index to measure the social background showed a positive relationship with the number of ICT devices used at home, the Pearson's correlation coefficient is: 0.211. Thus the more advantageous the socio-economic background of a student is, the more typical is it for him/her to use more ICT devices at home. According to the linear regression model, when the number of ICT devices used at home increases by one, then the ESCS index rises by 0.273[11].

3.3. The autonomy of use: The time spent on the Internet by gender

The PISA data shows no gender differences in the daily time spent online outside of school neither on week days[12] nor on weekend days[13].

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[11]   The variance explained by the model is 44%. The regression model is statistically significant: p=0,000

[12]   Pearson's Chi-square statistic = 9.654; p=0.14

[13]   Pearson's Chi-square statistic = 10.228; p=0.115

3.4. The autonomy of use: The time spent on the Internet by ESCS

The correlation between the time spent on the Internet and the social status is the shape of an inverted U-curve. It means that both the ones who spend little time online daily and those who use the Internet for more than 6 hours a day have a more disadvantageous social background than those who use the Internet moderately. The ESCS index is the lowest in the case of those students who don't use the Internet at all, neither on week days nor on weekend days outside of school. Among Hungarian students the socio-economic background is the most favourable for those who spend moderate time (i.e. 1-2 hours a day on week days, 2-4 hours on weekend days) online outside of school.

ESCS index by the time spent on the Internet a day

Source: PISA 2015, own calculation

3.5. ICT skills and knowledge by gender

In case of both types of ICT skills the analysis reveals that boys feel themselves more confident in the use of ICT. The differences between the self-perceived ICT skills are smaller between boys and girls for general ICT use[14]. However in case of skills for an independent or autonomous use the variation is bigger between boys and girls. Especially when it comes to the installation of new software or the reading about digital devices to be independent the self-perceived skills are much lower for girls than for boys.

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[14] A higher mean refers to higher level of agreement.

Skills and knowledge for a comfortable ICT usage by gender

■ Male ■ Female

	I feel comfortable using digital devices that I am less familiar with.	If my friends and relatives want to buy new digital devices or applications, I can give them advice.	When I come across problems with digital devices, I think I can solve them.	If my friends and relatives have a problem with digital devices, I can help them.
Male	2,96	2,96	3,09	3,04
Female	2,86	2,7	2,91	2,81

Source: PISA 2015, own calculation

Skills and knowledge for an independent Internet usage by gender

■ Male ■ Female

	If I need new software, I install it by myself.	I read information about digital devices to be independent.	I use digital devices as I want to use them.	If I have a problem with digital devices I start to solve it on my own.	If I need a new application, I choose it by myself.
Male	3,05	2,74	3,09	3,14	3,2
Female	2,32	2,2	2,78	2,87	2,92

Source: PISA 2015, own calculation

3.6. ICT skills and knowledge by ESCS index

The socio-economic background is in connection with the level of self-perceived ICT skills. For both types of skills it reveals that better skills are related to a more favourable socio-economic status.

The ESCS index is lowest for those students who totally disagree with the statements about ICT skills and knowledge, i.e. whose self-perceived ICT skills are the lowest. We found the lowest ESCS indexes for those students who don't feel comfortable using digital devices they are less familiar with and for those who can't give advice to friends and relatives when they want to buy new devices or applications.

Source: PISA 2015, own calculation

Source: PISA 2015, own calculation

3.7. Social support of ICT use by gender

The use of ICT is rather embedded in the social networks of boys than of girls. The proportion of students agreeing[15] with the statement that they like to talk about digital devices with their friends is significantly higher among boys (71%). Furthermore it is also more typical for boys to share information with their friends about digital devices (66%).

Source: PISA 2015, own calculation

The gendered differences of social support of ICT use might be explained by the distinct interests of girls and boys of that age.

3.8. Social support of ICT use by ESCS index

The social support of ICT use measured by the integration of this issue in the social networks, has not revealed a clear tendency for socio-economic status. It seems that social background doesn't influence whether students like to share information about digital devices with friends or whether they like to talk about ICT with them or not.

3.9. The purpose of ICT use by gender

The purpose of ICT use has been investigated in the PISA additional ICT questionnaire in two categories. The first one refers to general activities on the Internet – including communication,

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15   The categories „Stongly agree" and „Agree" altogether.

BELVEDERE
MERIDIONALE

entertainment and looking for information - and the other covers activities related to learning and the studies[16]. We are going to analyse both of these categories separately.

The analysis outlines differences between boys and girls in the frequency of general modes of Internet use. Almost all activities listed are more typical for boys than for girls except for using social networks. In case of two activities we have found almost no differences between boys and girls. These are chatting online[17] and browsing the Internet for fun videos[18]. The biggest differences in the frequency of use have been found in the case of playing. Boys play one-player games, collaborative games as well as online games on social networks much more frequently than girls[19].

Source: PISA 2015, own calculation[20].

According to the PISA data it is mostly boys who do activities related to learning and school more often than girls. The difference between boys and girls is the largest in case of downloading learning apps on a mobile device, using e-mail for communication with teacher and downloading/uploading from school's website. There is just one activity that girls do more

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[16] For all items the frequency of use has been asked on a five-level scale: 1='Never, or hardly ever', 2='Once or twice a month', 3='Once or twice a week', 4='Almost every day', 5='Every day'. A higher mean indicates a higher level of frequency of use.

[17] p=0.06

[18] p=0.533

[19] The mean of the categories of use for females in case of: playing collaborative games online=1.66; and of playing one-player games= 1.22.

[20] Items are listed in descending order of the difference (as absolute value) between boys and girls. For items marked with * the difference is not statistically significant p> 0.05.

frequently than boys related to school, namely the use of social networks to communicate with other students about schoolwork. We have found no significant relationship between gender and browsing the Internet for schoolwork[21].

Internet for learning and school related activities by gender

■ Male ■ Female

(Activities listed top to bottom:)
- Downloading science learning apps on a mobile device.
- Downloading learning apps on a mobile device.
- Using email for communication with teacher\submit of…
- Download\upload\browsing from school website (e.g. time…
- Using Social Networks for communication with other…
- Checking the schools website for announcements, e.g.…
- Using email for communication with other students about…
- Doing homework on a computer.
- Using Social Networks for communication with teachers.
- Doing homework on a mobile device.
- Browsing the Internet to follow up lessons, e.g. for finding…
- Browsing the Internet for schoolwork (e.g. for preparing an…

mean of the categories of the frequency of use

Source: PISA 2015, own calculation

3.10. The purpose of ICT use by ESCS index

To analyse the relationship between general modes of Internet use and the socio-economic background we applied principal components based on the Internet activities. Three principal components have been separated[22]. The first (FUN) refers to a frequent use of entertainment and communication activities on the Internet except for playing games. The second one (PLAY) stands for a frequent use of playing games. Finally the third principal component (INFO) shows the frequent use of ICT for obtaining information on the Internet by reading news or searching for practical information. The linear regression analysis revealed a positive effect of the ESCS index on the FUN and INFO principal components. This means that a more favourable socio-economic and cultural status contributes to a more frequent use of the Internet for entertainment and communication, as well as for obtaining information[23]. However the frequent use of the Internet for playing games is not influenced by the ESCS index, the regression model isn't statistically significant.

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[21] p=0.85

[22] The three principal components maintain 75% of information of all variables.

[23] FUN: B= 0.114 p=0.00; INFO: B=0.127 p=0.00; PLAY: B= -0.005 p=0.731.

The correlations are more obvious if we compare the means of ESCS index by the different categories of the frequency of use for the items of each principal component. All three items for the FUN principal component show the same tendency: the negative means of ESCS index decrease gradually as the frequency increases. Thus those students, who rarely use social networks, chat online and browse for fun videos on the Internet, have a more disadvantageous socio-economic status then those who engage in these activities on a daily basis.

Source: PISA 2015, own calculation

In regard of the items for the INFO principal component we found the same correlation with the socio-economic status but the tendency is not as gradual as in the case of the items of the FUN principal component. Students who never or hardly ever read news on the Internet or obtain practical information have a more disadvantageous social status than those who engage in these activities at least once in a month or a week.

## ESCS index by Internet activites for obtaining information

Source: PISA 2015, own calculation

Playing games on the Internet is not related to the socio-economic status, neither are the activities which were excluded from the principal components[24].

The modes of Internet use linked to learning and school show mixed relationship with the socio-economic and cultural status. For some activities, like doing homework on a mobile device and using social networks to communicate with teachers, the ESCS index is the most favourable for those who never or hardly ever do these activities. An advancing tendency in social status outlines for a lower frequency of some activities, i.e. downloading learning apps, doing homework on a computer or downloading/uploading from school website, however the tendency stops for the less frequent category of use. The mean of ESCS index is remarkably low for those students who never, or hardly ever engage in these activities. Other modes of Internet use for learning however show a different pattern of correlation with socio-economic status. The more frequent a student browses the Internet for schoolwork or to follow up lessons the better his/her socio-economic status is. The tendency is the same for using social networks to communicate with other students about schoolwork. In case of the above activities and doing homework on a computer, the ESCS index of those, who never engage in these activities, is outstandingly low. The socio-economic status according to the frequency of using e-mail for communication with teachers is mixed.

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[24] Because of low communalities.

Source: PISA 2015, own calculation

CONCLUSION

In our paper we intended to present how different dimensions of digital inequalities are segmented by gender and socio-economic status among Hungarian students. The analysis applied the five digital inequality dimensions defined by DiMaggio and Hargittai. These dimensions cover inequalities among ICT users in regard of the technical apparatus, the autonomy of use, the ICT skills and knowledge, the social support for ICT use and the purpose of use. Our aim was to explore the differences between boys and girls and the variation related to socio-economic and cultural status in these dimensions. The analysis was based on the Hungarian subsample of the PISA 2015 dataset which contains data about many aspects of ICT use of 15-year old students.

In regard to gender we found differences in most dimensions of digital inequalities. In the dimension of technical apparatus it turned out that the use of desktop computer and tablet is more typical for boys, but a higher proportion of girls tend to use a laptop in their homes. The Internet and a cell-phone with Internet access is equally used by boys and girls. As a measure of

the autonomy of use the daily time spent on the Internet has been investigated. However no gendered differences have been found in this dimension. The social support of ICT use which has been explored by the communication about ICT devices with friends is more typical for boys. So are self-perceived ICT skills, boys feel themselves more confident in using digital devices. In regard of the purpose of ICT use outstandingly differences have been discovered in case of playing computer games online or offline. This activity is most popular among boys. Girls are more engaged in using social networks. For learning and schoolwork the Internet is most frequently used by boys except for using social networks to communicate with other students about schoolwork, this activity is more common among girls.

The socio-economic and cultural background of the students which was measured by the ESCS index, also shows correspondences with the dimensions of digital inequality. In the dimension of technical apparatus, the tendency is quite clear: the access to and the use of any ICT device at home is linked to a favourable socio-economic status. Regarding the time spent on the Internet as a measure of the autonomy of use it reveals that both little time and lot of time spent online daily correlates with a disadvantageous socio-economic background, while a moderate use of 1-2 hours a day on week days and 2-4 hours on weekend days goes together with a favourable socio-economic status. ICT skills outline a clear tendency with ESCS index, the better the self-perceived ICT skills, the higher the means of ESCS index. The dimension of social support doesn't show any clear interpretable correlation with socio-economic status. Finally in the dimension of the purpose of use we distinguished between general modes of use, and the use for learning. As for general Internet use we found that frequent engagement in activities related to communication and entertainment, as well as obtaining information show a positive relationship with socio-economic status. No correlation was found with playing computer games online or offline. In case of Internet use for learning the relationship with socio-economic status is mixed. For most items the socio-economic status is enhanced by less frequent use, i.e. once a month or once a week.

When interpreting results of our analysis it should be kept in mind that tendencies for ICT use change rapidly especially among youngsters. Although the analysis was based on PISA data from 2015, yet it is important to reveal correspondences between dimension of ICT use and socio-demographic factors on these data to provide a benchmark for further analysis. As a further direction of research we aim to continue our investigation by revealing the relationship between digital inequalities and educational inequalities using data on educational performance from the same PISA dataset we conducted the analysis on for this paper.

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The Importance of Diplomacy: A Case Study of Taiwan

Abstract

After the de facto separation of China in 1949, the international community was divided on the issue which government represents the Chinese nation as a whole. Until the 1970s the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan maintained its seat in the UN, and formal ties to a significant number of countries. However, by the end of this decade, in 1980, Taipei government was left with merely 22 diplomatic allies.[1] Our article focuses on the position of Taiwan after this shift, examining the regime's perception of the effects of recognition and derecognition. As the Taipei government has put significant efforts into the preservation (and expansion) of diplomatic relations with states that are not considered globally influential, we examined what possible effects and consequences these ties can have on the international legal status of the entity. It has to be noted that for this purpose, only the official relations, and diplomatic allies of the ROC were considered. After describing the diplomatic activities of Taiwan, and the shifts in the number of its diplomatic allies (between 1988–2020), we found three main areas which are positively affected by these ties. They provide basis for the regime's claim to sovereignty and statehood, and they enhance Taiwanese presence in international institutions (and indicate the unresolved nature of the entity's international legal status). Most importantly, they help to maintain the international nature of the cross-strait conflict and contribute to preserve the status quo.

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[1]   Tubilewicz 2007. 7.

1 Introduction

The island of Taiwan is situated in East Asia, between the South China Sea and the East China Sea. It is separated from continental Asia by the Taiwan Strait, which lies between the island and the east coast of China.[2] The Taiwan Strait, however, is not the only factor separating Taiwan from Mainland China. The Chinese Civil War between the forces of the Kuomintang (KMT), led by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), led by Mao Zedong, resulted in the de facto division of China in 1949.[3] The government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) exercises authority over the Mainland territory. Taiwan (along with the islands of Peng-hu, Kinmen, and Matsu) remained under the de facto control of the Republic of China (ROC).[4]

Today the Beijing government represents 'China' in most bilateral relations, and multilateral forums (such as the United Nations) as well. The Taipei government has merely 15 official dip-lomatic partner states (as of November 2020),[5] and no seat in the United Nations (UN).[6] Even though the number of states who recognize the ROC is low (and declining), sustaining these formal relations are of utmost importance for Taiwan.[7] We wondered whether these relations have meaningful effects on the entity's global position, therefore, we asked the question; do the remaining diplomatic ties of Taiwan enhance its international legal status? If yes, in what ways?

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[2]   Salter 2004. 8–10.

[3]   Maggiorelli 2019. 183–184.

[4]   Kan – Morrison 2014. 12.

[5]   Diplomatic Allies. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China (Taiwan).*

[6]   Huang 2003. 81–82.

[7]   Maggiorelli 2019. 181–182.

2 THE ONE-CHINA PRINCIPLE

In order to find the reason behind the low international recognition of the Taiwanese regime, we have to consider the 'one-China principle'. In spite of the de facto separation of the state, the legal unity of 'China' was upheld by both parties. They considered Taiwan to be part of the one Chinese state, this is the one-China principle.[8] Their judgement only diverged in terms of who the legitimate government of the whole of 'China' was.[9] This understanding implies that foreign states (who wished to conduct official diplomatic relations with China) had to choose their representative for the Chinese nation, exclusively either the Beijing or the Taipei government.[10]

Until the 1970s the ROC enjoyed the recognition of the US and most 'Western powers'.[11] In addition, the ROC had been one of the founding nations of the United Nations (UN), it also held a seat in the Security Council (UNSC), as a permanent member.[12] In 1971 the representatives of the ROC were expelled from the UN, and their seats were assigned to the PRC.[13] This decision was shortly followed by many states switching their recognition from the Taipei to the Beijing government, most notably, the by the United States.[14]

It is important to acknowledge the fact that Taiwan had made attempts to achieve dual recognition, like in 1989, which failed due to the counteractions of Beijing.[15] Therefore, it can be argued that the ROC in the past decades have been known for trying to 'stretch' the one-China principle, and interpreting it in a quite flexible way.[16] However, abandoning the doctrine is not possible without retaliation from Mainland China.[17] Thus, overall, we would like to point out that officially the one-China principle still continues to dominate international affairs.[18]

3 COUNTERING DERECOGNITION – TAIWAN'S DIPLOMATIC STRUGGLE

Ever since the simultaneous existence of the PRC and the ROC regimes started, there have been a competition between the two governments to acquire recognition from the other states.[19] Generally we can notice that connecting recognition to economic gains is not a novel phenomenon.[20]

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[8] CHEN 2017. 30.

[9] CRAWFORD 2007. 5.

[10] BJÖRN 2008a. para. 5.

[11] ALBERT 2016. 2.

[12] HUANG 2003. 78–81.

[13] HUANG 2003. 82.

[14] HSIEH 2007. 774.

[15] HUGHES 2003. 54–55.

[16] HUGHES 2003. 49; 130.

[17] JACOBS 2012. 121.; Anti-Secession Law (Full Text) (03/15/05). *Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America*.

[18] HICKSON 2003. 5.

[19] MAGGIORELLI 2019. 180.

[20] RICH 2009. 171.

Therefore, it is not surprising, that the ROC government has long been using economic tools to further its diplomatic interests. The regime started providing assistance to Africa, and to Latin America and the Caribbean in the early 1960s with the concrete aim of gaining recognition.[21]

3.1 'Checkbook diplomacy'

The role of these foreign aid instruments tremendously increased when, by 1979, Taiwan was left without a seat in the UN, without recognition by the US, and with the alliance of only 22 countries. This is especially true for the period that started after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo, as in 1988 Lee Teng-hui, the new president started to implement his new foreign policy approach.[22] He called his strategy 'flexible' or 'pragmatic' diplomacy and identified the main objective as Taiwan's emergence from international isolation.[23] As a means of achieving this goal, Taiwan did not abstain from using 'checkbook diplomacy'.[24]

Nevertheless, what exactly do we mean by 'checkbook diplomacy'? In simple terms, it is 'purchasing' recognition. In the case of Taiwan, the regime provides various forms of economic benefits (such as loans, donations, and investments) to a state,[25] and in return it expects either the creation or the maintenance of formal relations. For instance, Niger decided to recognize the Taipei government in 1992, shortly after receiving a loan of US$50 million from the regime.[26] Ending diplomatic ties have inverse effects, for example El Salvador decided to switch recognition to the PRC in 2018,[27] and as a result the ROC decided to relocate "six of its aid programs"[28] from El Salvador.

Utilizing economic instruments in order to gain recognition is not an alien concept to the PRC either, the Beijing government managed to seize many diplomatic allies from Taiwan by using such tactics.[29] For instance, in the above-mentioned case of El Salvador, the PRC promised to provide funding for a project in the Central American country (which project was previously deemed excessively pricey and unethical by the ROC government).[30] Additionally, it must be noted that 'checkbook diplomacy' is not an official name for the foreign policy strategy of the competing governments, they mutually condemn such practices by the other side of the Taiwan Strait.[31]

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[21] Tubilewicz 2007. 6–7.

[22] Nemeskéri 1998. 11.

[23] Tubilewicz 2007. 7–9.

[24] Michelon 1997. 45.

[25] Michelon 1997. 47.

[26] Rich 2009. 172.

[27] Shattuck 2020. 350.

[28] Maggiorelli, 2019. 195.

[29] Shattuck 2020. 335.

[30] Shattuck 2020. 346-347.

[31] Rich 2009. 182.

In this 'interest-based' diplomatic contest, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean became the most important battlegrounds,[32] as well as island countries on the South Pacific[33] (although, during the 1990s, Taiwan made significant efforts to develop relations with post-communist Central and Eastern European states).[34] It is very much apparent that by using economic aid instruments, mostly "smaller countries which are more in need of development assistance"[35] can be targeted. Therefore, the centers of the 'checkbook diplomacy' of the PRC and the ROC are states that generally do not play significant roles internationally.[36]

3.2 Evaluating the diplomatic contest

In this section, we will look at whether Taiwan's allocation of resources and provision of assistance to preserve and enhance international recognition[37] achieved its goal. We decided to divide the period between 1988 (the beginning of flexible diplomacy)[38] and 2020 into three different periods to examine. The first period consists of the administrations of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian (1988–2000 and 2000–2008, respectively), the second only includes the presidency of Ma Ying-jeou (2008–2016)[39], and the third follows the presidency of Tsai Ing-wen from 2016 until 2020.[40] After individually considering these three periods, we will present a comprehensive picture of the achievements.

Between 1988 and 2008, the ROC was very focused on establishing new diplomatic relations, and 'checkbook diplomacy' was regarded as an essential instrument of this policy.[41] Generally, it can be argued that purely in terms of the number of allies, the beginning of the 1990s was a positive development for the ROC.[42] In 1988, the Taipei government was recognized by merely 22 states, by 1995 this number rose to 30. The number of official diplomatic partners had not been this high since 1974. However, it appears that 30 was the peak, because after 1996 this number of allies was never reached again.[43]

During the 2000s, the ROC could establish formal ties with only 3 states, the last of which happened in 2007, when Saint Lucia switched recognition from the Beijing to the Taipei government.[44] As a result of these modest gains, and the greater advances of the PRC, by the start of Ma Ying-jeou's presidency, the regime only had 23 partners.[45] President Ma decided to

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[32] Rich – Banerjee 2015. 145.

[33] Tubilewicz 2007. 15.

[34] Tubilewicz 2007. 46-50.

[35] Maggiorelli 2019. 199.

[36] Shattuck 2020. 339.

[37] Rich 2009. 184.

[38] Tubilewicz 2007. 7-9.

[39] Presidents & vice presidents since 1947. *Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan).*

[40] President & vice president. *Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan).*

[41] Michelon 1997. 50.

[42] Maggiorelli 2019. 181.

[43] Tubilewicz 2007. 7-11.

[44] Tubilewicz 2007. 11.

[45] Wang – Lee – Yu 2011. 253.

establish a so-called 'diplomatic truce' with Mainland China, which put an end to 'checkbook diplomacy'.[46] The rival governments agreed to refrain from poaching "the other's diplomatic allies"[47]. Due to this agreement, there was no significant change in the number of Taiwanese diplomatic partners. Nevertheless, the diplomatic truce did not seem to concern Gambia, as the African state decided to derecognize the ROC in 2013.[48]

The start of the first presidential term of Tsai Ing-wen made cross-strait relations 'cooler'[49], which also meant the termination of the diplomatic truce by Beijing. On the other hand, President Tsai affirmed that her administration would not relaunch 'checkbook diplomacy'.[50] However, it is apparent that the preservation of allies continues to be regarded essential.[51]

Since 2016 Taiwan has already lost 7 diplomatic allies,[52] therefore the regime (as of November 2020) maintains official ties with solely 15 states. Geographically, the majority of these states are located in Latin America and the Caribbean (9 countries), or in East Asia and the Pacific (4 states). Additionally, the Taipei government has one ally in Europe (the Holy See), as well as in Africa (Eswatini).[53]

3.3 The shortcomings of 'checkbook diplomacy'

Overall, "the delivery of development aid constitutes an effective instrument of public diplomacy"[54], however, excessive reliance on this method does not usually bring the expected or hoped results.[55] This experience can be noticed in the case of Taiwan as well. The first period of 'checkbook diplomacy', could be regarded as quite successful, as it increased the number of the allies of the ROC. However, it proved to be rather difficult and (in most instances) unsuccessful to keep these new ties, as already by the start of the 2000s, the number of official partners started to decline yet again.[56]

The instability of 'checkbook diplomacy' is due to some of the factors that make this foreign policy practice possible, namely that it is very easy to switch recognition, and that states try to maximize their economic benefits.[57] "Whenever better conditions"[58] are being offered by one of the two governments, 'opportunistic' states can choose the more 'generous' option.[59] For

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[46] Wang – Lee – Yu 2011. 254.

[47] Shattuck 2020. 355.

[48] Shattuck 2020. 337.

[49] Chen 2017. 4.

[50] Shattuck 2020. 335.

[51] Maggiorelli 2019. 196–201.

[52] Shattuck 2020. 335–336.

[53] Diplomatic Allies. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China (Taiwan).*

[54] Maggiorelli 2019. 181.

[55] Maggiorelli 2019. 198.

[56] Tubilewicz 2007. 7–11.

[57] Rich 2009. 183.

[58] Tudoroiu 2017. 205.

[59] Tudoroiu 2017. 205.

instance, the state of Nauru switched recognition twice within the period of 2003-2005,[60] and Papua New Guinea managed to change alliances twice within the year of 1999.[61]

Moreover, it is obvious, that "on a dollar for dollar base"[62] Taiwan does not have the means to compete with Mainland China, the second largest economy of the world.[63] Additionally to direct financial contributions to a country, states switching to recognize the PRC also benefit from enhanced trade relations therewith.[64] Also, it must be kept in mind that apart from creating economic incentives, the Beijing government can also exert pressure on states to make this switch.[65] Therefore, as Thomas J. Shattuck put it, "overall, Taiwan, on its own, is not well positioned to counter China's tactics"[66].

4. Enhancing the international legal status of Taiwan?

In the previous sections we illustrated the attempts of Taiwan to maintain (and to form) diplomatic relations in order to combat international isolation, as well as the importance and success of said efforts. It can be concluded that the results of the foreign policy of Taipei are mixed at best.[67] However, the process to achieve these humble outcomes is very costly[68] and sometimes has negative implications on the regime's international reputation.[69] Why is this foreign policy still worth pursuing? What possible effects can the remaining formal diplomatic relations have on Taiwan's international legal status?

4.1 Supporting the international presence of Taiwan

Diplomatic allies in a way enable the Taipei government to continue to appear in international organizations, as they raise and support the issue of Taiwanese application to these forums.[70] For instance, in 1993 seven Latin American partners of the ROC advocated for adding the question of the representation of Taiwan to the agenda of the year's UN General Assembly (UNGA) session. This attempt was unsuccessful, the issue was only discussed by a committee.[71] However, from 1993 until 2008 each year,[72] there was a UN Petition endorsed by (some)

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60 Rich 2009. 173.

61 Tubilewicz 2007. 11.

62 Maggiorelli 2019. 203.

63 GDP (current US$). *The World Bank*.

64 Maggiorelli 2019. 189.

65 Shattuck 2020. 335.

66 Shattuck 2020. 348.

67 Maggiorelli 2019. 203.

68 Rich 2009. 184.

69 Tudoroiu 2017. 205.

70 Rich 2009. 181.

71 Klintworth 1994. 283–284.

72 Wang – Lee – Yu 2011. 260.

ROC diplomatic partners.[73] None of these were successful, nevertheless, they reminded the international community "that the issue of Taiwan is not resolved."[74]

On the other hand, it is important to note, that these functions are not exclusive to official allies, since non-official partners of the ROC regime are also capable and willing to do these supporting activities in international forums (except for the UNGA). Major states (e.g. the US, Canada) endorse Taiwanese participation, with the same, futile results.[75]

4.2 Status quo maintenance

Evidently, the division of China has been 'internationalized' since 1950, when the US decided to protect the ROC on Taiwan from the forces of Mao Zedong.[76] This international nature was also reflected in the fact that both governments of 'China' has had their own diplomatic allies throughout their coexistence.

Undoubtedly, there is a marked imbalance between the number of states who recognize the PRC, and the states who recognize the ROC (180 and 15, respectively).[77] Still, official ties with this handful of states assist the Taiwan regime in its efforts to maintain the international aspect of the cross-strait conflict.[78] The significance of 'internationalization' is that it serves as protection or "buffer against the use of force."[79]

Timothy S. Rich summarizes this rationale excellently as "Recognition is crucial to Taiwan's national security, not only to prevent further isolation but to deny the PRC the ability to swallow Taiwan without international objection, while making forced reunification more difficult."[80] Nonetheless, it should be considered that Taiwan as a de facto regime, with or without recognition by other states, would still be protected by the UN Charter "against the threat or use of force by the PRC government."[81]

Additionally, preserving some degree of recognition is deemed as essential (by the Taipei government) to be able to continue upholding its "claim to sovereignty"[82] and legitimacy.[83] On the whole, it can be argued that the remaining diplomatic ties, on one hand, help the ROC to avoid increasing international isolation, and on the other, extend the current status quo,[84] in which Taiwan functions as a de facto independent entity.[85]

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[73] RICH 2009. 181.

[74] RICH 2009. 182.

[75] SHATTUCK 2020. 343.

[76] HUGHES 2003. 16.

[77] SHATTUCK 2020. 335.

[78] MICHELON 1994. 49.; TUBILEWICZ 2007. 23.

[79] HICKSON 2003. 6.

[80] RICH 2009. 180.

[81] BJÖRN 2008b. para. 22.

[82] TUBILEWICZ 2007. 14.

[83] HARWIT 2000. 465.

[84] MAGGIORELLI 2019. 202–203.

[85] RICH – BANERJEE 2015. 146.

5. Conclusion

Our set of research questions; 'Do the remaining diplomatic ties of Taiwan enhance its international legal status? If yes, in what ways?' focused on the regime's place in the international arena. We began dealing with this issue by examining the group of states that continued to maintain diplomatic ties with the Taiwanese regime. It is apparent that by the middle of the 1990s, the Taipei government lost all of its formal relations with internationally influential states.[86] However, this was also the time period when the regime very actively tried to find new diplomatic allies,[87] and in course of achieving this purpose, it did not refrain from using 'checkbook diplomacy'.[88] It was also discussed that 'checkbook diplomacy' methods are appealing to states that are "poor, heavily indebted"[89] and do not play prominent roles in international politics.[90]

Afterward, we followed the results of Taiwanese efforts to form and maintain official relations. Regarding this aim, only modest results were detected,[91] but for high costs.[92] Even though this finding did not provide immediate answers to the questions, it still demonstrated that the existence of formal ties are regarded to be paramount by the leadership of the regime,[93] which indicates that diplomatic relations are perceived to have effects on the global position of Taiwan.[94]

Consequently, we presented three factors that are either positively affected or assisted by the presence of diplomatic allies. These factors are rather linked to each other. Firstly, diplomatic relations have a quite 'symbolic' impact,[95] as they provide some basis for the ROC government to keep claiming sovereignty and statehood.[96] Furthermore, official allies facilitate the indirect presence of Taiwan in international organizations (most notably the UN), as they advocate for the admission of the regime to the forum.[97] This advocacy is rarely successful, however, it serves as a reminder for states that the question of Taiwan has not been resolved yet.[98]

This leads us to the final argument, which is that the fact that both governments are recognized by a number of states, 'internationalizes' the conflict and cross-strait relations as well to a certain extent[99] (even though both entities formally belong to 'China'[100]). This international nature serves as a safeguard against the use of force[101] or a unilateral act of reunification.[102]

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[86] Copper 1992. 211.

[87] Tubilewicz 2007. 7-9.

[88] Michelon 1997. 47.

[89] Tudoroiu 2017. 202.

[90] Shattuck 2020. 339.

[91] Maggiorelli 2019. 203.

[92] Rich 2009. 184.

[93] Maggiorelli 2019. 180-182.

[94] Michelon 1997. 49.

[95] Michelon 1997. 49.

[96] Tubilewicz 2007. 14.

[97] Rich 2009. 181.

[98] Rich 2009. 182.

[99] Michelon 1997. 49.; Tubilewicz 2007. 23.

[100] Crawford 2007. 18–20.

[101] Hickson 2003. 6.

[102] Rich 2009. 180.

Therefore, our answer to the asked questions is that the maintenance of formal relations with seemingly nonsignificant nations does enhance the international legal status of Taiwan. Taking into account the above-listed three factors leads to the conclusion, that the remaining diplomatic ties on the one hand are meaningful to avoid an even higher degree of diplomatic isolation, and on the other, they assist to the preservation of the status quo.[103]

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The effects of World War I on marriages between 1914 and 1918 in Hungary

ABSTRACT

The 20th century has entered the history of Europe as a constant era of wars, crises and dictatorships. This century also marked a series of trials for Hungary. The imprint and long-term effects of the historical events of the period can be well traced with the help of statistical data, therefore the aim of our study is to show how serious and difficult to remedy social, economic and demographic problems can be when people attack people, either with weapons or by another method. In the present study, we analyze the effects of World War I on marriages between 1914 and 1918.

KEYWORDS

war, marriages, demography

The nature of wars in the light of statistics

When it comes to statistics of war loss lists, the focus is on soldiers who have fallen, disappeared, possibly captured or wounded during combat operations, as well as civilian casualties in areas affected by various military operations. The indirect effects of wartime periods, which appear only later, after the events of war, in population, its composition, state of health, and other characteristics, often receive less attention. Knowledge of the statistics of military casualties is essential for both the military leadership and the political power to emerge victorious from an armed conflict.

In historical Hungary (excluding Croatian-Slavonian countries), before the outbreak of World War I, the number of marriages per thousand inhabitants was so high that it occupied a prominent place in the ranking of European states. However, during the war, the number of covenants dropped significantly.

The effect of the war on marriage can be seen as early as the first five months of the war of 1914. The decline was greatest in 1915, after which, by 1918, marriage was slowly recurring.

A volume of studies (Bodart) published in 1916 uses statistical data to show how the wars and armed conflicts between Austria and Hungary between 1618 and 1913 developed, what changes can be observed in terms of the length of wars and the characteristics of acts of war. The statistics published by the study show that during the 300 years analyzed, the number of wars waged by Austria-Hungary increased, the number of years spent in wars decreased, and the average duration of wars decreased from 6 to 1 year. The increase in the number of wars and the decrease in the average duration together claimed more casualties. After the Napoleonic Wars, armed conflicts became more and more violent. (Bodart 1916)

The length of periods of war has the same effect on the losses suffered during military operations as it does on demographic processes that can be perceived later. In war-torn countries, the number of births is greatly reduced due to the retreat of men to war and the protracted nature of hostilities.

In some of the countries involved in World War I, the birth rate fell to half normal, which means that the actual loss of life in the dead in the Great War was not as much as the loss due to missed births.

Postponed marriages

In historical Hungary (excluding Croatian-Slavonian countries), before the outbreak of World War I, the number of marriages per thousand inhabitants was so high that it occupied a prominent place in the ranking of European states. However, during the war, the number of covenants dropped significantly.

The effect of the war on marriage can be seen as early as the first five months of the war of 1914. The decline was greatest in 1915, after which, by 1918, marriage was slowly recurring. The number of marriages fluctuated between 1870 and 1913. The number of marriages per thousand inhabitants - in the period under study - was the highest in 1873, which could not be surpassed in the following years.(KSH 2008) While the difference in the number of marriages observed during the peacetime can be attributed mainly to economic and social phenomena such as changes in agricultural yields, it can no longer be directly related to these factors during the war. (KSH 1924)

In 1913, the number of covenants even exceeded 170,000, which is even higher than usual in peacetime. This was followed by a major setback, which had its effects as early as the five war months of 1914. Nothing indicates war losses better than the fact that from August 1, 1914, to October 31, 1918, only 47 percent of the average of the previous peaceful years was tied up.

TABLE 1.

Marriages

Year	Number of marriages	Increase (+) decrease (-) compared to the previous year	Per thousand inhabitants
1913	172 050	+10 945	9.2
1914	136 337	-35 713	7,2
1915	60 948	-75 389	3,2
1916	62 866	+1 918	3,4
1917	75 745	+12 879	4,1
1918[a]	126 894	+51 149	6,9

[a]Data from October 1918 are incomplete.
Source: *A Magyar Szent Korona Országainak 1913–1918. évi népmozgalma*. 3.

The number of marriages was the lowest between 1915 and 1916, when half as many covenants were born compared to the average of the pre-World War years. A decree, which came into force on December 1, 1916, to increase the desire to marry, allowed prisoners of war, hostages, and wounded away from their homes to marry their chosen ones by proxy.

Although a year later, in 1917, 20 percent more people chose the institution of marriage than the year before, the real breakthrough came in 1918, when men returned home from the front. (HEINZ 2000) Of the approximately 140,000 marriages postponed between 1914 and 1918, 90,000 were eventually concluded later. After a few years, the remarriage of the widows resulted in a marriage surplus. (CSERNÁK 1996)

In addition to the decline in the desire to marry, the men enlisted as soldiers, blood loss and the unfavorable economic situation, among other things, also contributed to the drastic decrease in the number of marriages.

Act XXXI of 1894, in force from 1895 to 1953, in addition to introducing the institution of compulsory civil marriage, the law also contained a number of regulations and obstacles

to marriage, which presumably no longer had a significant effect on the number of marriages during the war. Until the announcement of the public decree signed on January 20, 1913, the recruits could not marry before the age of 24, which delayed the formation of the family. Members of the armed bodies were subject to stricter rules. The right to marry, subject to a royal license and covering only a certain percentage of the regiment's officers, and the deposit of a marriage deposit all made it hard the prospects of officers wishing to marry.

"The Austro-Hungarian officers - including the officers of the Hungarian Royal Army and the Austrian Landwehr - could only marry with strict obligations and permission. Failure to obtain a permit threatened to lead to job losses. Crewed non-commissioned officers were also allowed to marry only with permission, and conscripts were prohibited from marrying before reaching the conscription age. The roots of the regulation go back to the reign of Maria Theresa. An ordinance issued in 1750 entrusted the approval of the marriage of officers with the permission of the colonel commander as well as the regimental commander and the assembly of officers. It also made the deposit of a marriage deposit mandatory. This deposit initially provided an income for the retired officers and also provided a further support for the widowed wife. In general, the higher the rank of the officer intending to marry, the smaller the amount he had to deposit. Of course there were always exceptions, because with the permission of the ruler it was possible to marry even without a deposit. Although at that time the widow was not paid any kind of pension. However, the amount of the deposit continued to rise. For example, a lieutenant had to deposit 60,000 crowns, thirty times his annual income. Until 1913, only the Minister of Defense could authorize the marriage of those facing actual military service. For marriage before the conscription age was generally forbidden. In practice, this prevented marriage before the age of 24. This is because the majority of young people have already completed their compulsory military service by the age of 24 and have moved from the actual service to the reserve. Thus, family life could no longer make it more difficult to perform active service. The ban was finally lifted by a circular decree signed on January 20, 1913, by the Minister of Defense Hazai Samu." (Deák 1990)

The war significantly rearranged the time course of marriages, which was customary in peacetime and was repeated almost year after year. The distribution of the covenants between the months since August 1914 has been less associated with the feasts and traditions of the peaceful years. Prior to World War I, the fewest covenants were made in July, among others, due to agricultural work, and the peak time was in November. While the carnival period was most conducive to those preparing to get married among the church holidays, it was less common in Advent and December for couples to appear in front of the registrar. Although before August 1914 Hungary was still one of the countries with the highest number of marriages per thousand inhabitants, it lost its leading position significantly during the war. (KSH 1924)

In Hungary, in 1913, there were still 9.2 covenants per thousand inhabitants, thus placing it at the forefront among both the later warriors and the later neutrals. In the following years, the number of marriages in historical Hungary dropped significantly. The year 1915 was particularly unfavorable, as the number of marriages per thousand inhabitants was the lowest during the war at that time. After that, until 1918, there was a gradual rise. In the last year of the war, Hungary was leading amongst many of the countries, both neutrals and countries in war.

TABLE 2

Number of marriages per thousand inhabitants in some European countries*

Counrty	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918
War countries						
England	7,8	8,0	9,8	7,5	6,9	7,7
Scotland	7,1	7,4	7,6	6,5	6,3	7,1
Ireland	5,1	5,4	5,6	5,2	4,9	5,2
Italy[a]	7,5	7,0	5,1	2,9	2,7	3,0
France[b]	7,5	5,1	2,2	3,2	4,8	5,4
Portugal[c]	6,6	6,9	6,3	5,9	5,5	–
Finland	5,9	5,7	5,4	5,8	6,0	4,5
Romania	9,2	8,5	7,2	–	–	8,0
Belgium[d]	8,1	5,5	3,4	4,2	4,5	6,0
Germany[e]	7,7	6,8	4,1	4,1	4,7	5,4
Austria[f]	6,7	7,2	4,5	4,4	4,8	6,6
Hungary[g]	9,2	7,2	3,2	3,4	4,1	6,9
Neutrals						
Sweden	5,9	5,5	5,8	6,2	6,2	6,7
Norway	6,3	6,5	6,5	6,9	7,2	7,8
Switzerland	6,9	5,7	5,1	5,8	6,0	6,7
Denmark	7,2	6,9	6,5	7,2	7,0	7,7
Netherlands	7,8	6,8	6,7	7,2	7,4	7,3
Spain	6,8	6,5	6,2	6,6	6,8	6,7

a) Numbers of northern Italian villages not included:. 234 in 1917 and 268 in 1918. b) Only 77 dep. c) Together with the Azores and Madeira. d) Between 1914-1918, excluding 60 villages in West Flanders. e) 1917 és 1918 excluding Alsace-Lorraine. f) 1914-1918the border laid down in the Treaty of Saint-Germain is Austria. g) Data for 1918 are incomplete as of October.

Source: *A Magyar Szent Korona Országainak 1913–1918. évi népmozgalma*. 4.

The war did not significantly change the territorial distribution of marriages per thousand inhabitants. As in previous peaceful years, the lowest proportions can still be found on the right and left banks of the Danube, where during our participation in the war there were 3.0 and 3.4 marriages per thousand inhabitants. Most covenants were concluded between the Danube and the Tisza (5.8) and in the city of Rijeka (5.2), where the average of the previous peacetime period was also the highest. (KSH 1924)

In the peaceful years, there were nearly as many marriages per thousand inhabitants in the cities as in the countryside. During the war, the number of covenants made in the countryside fell well way below that of the cities, and it could close up only again in the last year of the war.

Characteristics of marriages by age group

The war across Europe has affected the average age of grooms to marry their chosen ones. Although the proportion of grooms between the ages of 20 and 24 remained the highest after the outbreak of World War I, their number decreased by 25 to 40 percent compared to 1913. Compared to the previous peaceful year, the proportion of 25-29 year olds increased slightly in the first year of the war, decreased in 1915, and then began to increase slowly again. The proportion of those over 30 rose sharply between 1915 and 1916, which, in addition to remarriages, may have been due to the fact that military service affected those under 30 to a greater extent. (KSH 1924)

Table 3
Age distribution of grooms
(percentage)

Year	Under 20 years	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	Over 60 years
1913	7,1	41,0	30,8	12,7	4,4	2,6	1,4
1914	6,0	37,1	32,1	15,4	5,1	2,2	1,5
1915	5,8	26,0	25,1	22,1	12,0	6,0	3,5
1916	4,8	28,5	26,0	17,4	11,5	7,4	4,4
1917	6,2	31,2	28,7	16,3	7,6	6,1	3,0
1918	5,6	33,9	32,4	15,8	5,8	4,0	2,5

Source: *A Magyar Szent Korona Országainak 1913–1918. évi népmozgalma*. 5.

The impact of war (through the mechanisms of getting widowed, remarriages, and postponement) is also reflected in the evolution of the age distribution of brides. While the proportion of those under 20 decreased compared to 1913, that of those over 30 increased.

Terminated marriages

As in peacetime, during the war years, marriages were terminated mostly due to the death of the spouse. Between 1914 and 1918, battlefield deaths, results of unfavorable public health and economic conditions - except in 1916 - increased, and while the number of marriages terminated due to deaths increased, while the number of divorces decreased. Judicial divorce is granted by Act XXXI of 1894. defined by law. according to which a divorce is possible only "… if the marriage is so broken up that the further cohabitation has become unbearable for one or both parties". The law also mentions the institution of so-called "separation from bed and table," which may be a solution for those who, for religious reasons, cannot choose a judicial divorce. (Heinz 2000)

While in 1913 there were 649 per thousand new marriages, in 1915, when the number of marriages fell the most, there were more than three times as many marriages terminated by death. (Íszádeczky-Kardoss 1924)

TABLE 4

Number of marriages terminated

Year	Marriages terminated by death		Marriages terminated by divorce	
	nubmer	per thousand new marriages	number	per thousand new marriage
1913	111 655	649	7 842	46
1914	115 295	846	6 906	51
1915	122 926	2 017	2 625	43
1916	111 323	1 770	2 323	37
1917	113 606	1 499	2 739	36
1918[a]	149 685	1 180	–	–

a)The 1918 data is not processed.

Source: ÍSZÁDECZKY-KARDOSS 1924. 7.

The number of marriages abolished by divorce fell sharply during the war years, as in several warring countries. In historical Hungary, in the first year of the war, in 1914, there were 51 divorces per thousand new marriages, but in 1917 there were only 36.

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Dimensions of Granularity

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Heidemann, Frank – Zehmisch, Philipp (Eds.) (2016): *Manifestations of History. Time, Space, and Community in the Andaman Islands.* Delhi, Primus Books. 187 p.

It has always been a worrying challenge of research program leaders and book editors to initiate and find common *leitmotifs*, when they specify the conceptual and methodological framework of a cooperation, and later, when try to extract and reveal common patterns from the completed contributions. How to order the colorful, heterogenous, distinct pieces into one-directional, convergent, cohesive, unitary set of papers as chapters, under the sun of bigger theoretical horizons?

Even the longtime Andaman researchers can learn a lot and refresh their views about this extraordinary (spatial, ethnic, linguistic, and religious) assemblage, thanks to this selection of well-written, partly synoptic papers: outcomes of a Munich, 2013 conference.

We can zoom to the penal settlement aspects, following the 1858 way of a solidarity-creating Muslim scholar into the Cellular Jail, which has culturally reconfigured as the "Indian Bastille" in the fight against colonial oppression (Jamal Malik). Clare Anderson opens out

the Warneford family archive, reconstructing the (material and spiritual) presence of a British family in the colonization period, while Claire WINTLE interconnects the (contested) interpretations and display of material objects with identity shaping, from a museum anthropology perspective. Satadru SEN confronts us with the calamities and traps of indigenous Andamanese (Jarawa, Onge, Great Andamanese, Sentinelese) becoming citizens of a modern postcolonial nation. *'Primitives in the national zoo'.* Although the ill-informed and mostly illiterate Sri Lankan repatriates became citizens of India and got work and a piece of tribal land, it cannot be converted into settler land, and they had to find their own voice against the state machinery to improve their life (Frank HEIDEMANN). In the meantime, the forest clearing, contract labourer Ranchis, *"the* (infrastructure) *builders of modern Andaman"* since 1918 are working and living in a marginalized transitory zone 'between civilization and wilderness' (Philipp ZEHMISCH). No surprise, that the identity formation and territorial differentiation of Pre-42 communities resulted dissimilarities in their world views (Kanchan MUKHOPADHYAY). In contrary, as Manish CHANDI illustrates fascinatingly, Nicobarese folktales and legends can serve as common 'rationale', regulating the methods of 'resource use, conservation and partitioning' – norms and practices.

This multiplicity and multitudinousness should have provide enough possibility to find common insights far beyond the indicated narratives. Now, I think that the *'space versus time'* (the priority of spatial basis of perception over against the temporal ones) is an overwrought, nearly useless methodological straitjacket. There is no need to fight *'against monopolist, Euro-American, time-centered history'*, or *'hegemonic Western frameworks, dominated by science, post-Enlightement rationalism and reason'*. It is more, than obvious, that contemporary Andamans *'laid more emphasis on places, locations, regions, territories, and other spatial dimensions'* than others, since their multi-territorial background and current geographical discursiveness, as an inheritance of 'colonially-incubated modernity' (SEN). No intentions from a non-existing 'other side' of history making to ignore the spatial aspects or overwrite them with temporal ones (while *'decolonizing the hegemonic episteme of elite history'* is a never-falling, valid narrative).

Anyway, this artificial opposition is mainly based and feasible at all because of inconsistent usage of 'History' itself. Let me to provide an ad hoc list of strongly different meanings and aspects of 'history', collected from the book. A *'discipline of historical science'* (of which '*historiography'* is only a subdisciplipne) made by professionals is unopposable against the *'conceptualization of the past'*, *'construction of the past'*, *'referring to the past'* by different groups and individuals. *'Oral history'*, *'life history'*, *'community-oriented history'* and *'cultural memory'* refers only to the selected investigation modes and domains, as parts and components of '*historical consciousness'*. *'Periodization of history'* and the *'conceptualizations of understanding and writing history'* require disciplinary abstraction from the observer-researchers, while the *'contemplation of the past (imaginative anamnesis)'* is very personal – and not equal with *'telling one's own history'*. Even they are very close to each other, the *'complex process of self-canonization'* is not equal with *'identity making by history'*, and the *'historicization'* of things in a given context has different function, than the *'usage of past to understand the present'*. It is too easy to find *'manifestations'* in every enumerated aspects.

Interestingly, we can identify consonant approaches after all. The authors recurrently highlight the forms of simultaneities: the *'multistory view'* or *'multiple view of history'*, the role of *'coexisting perceptions'*, *'shared tradition'* and *'creative mutuality'*. Moreover, it is a part of the

entangled nature of the field: as *'identities are fragmented and fractured'*, they are constantly overlapping with not only the three structuring patterns (time, space, and community), but the local combinations of religious and linguistic perspectives and practices. Even the *'objects…are polysemic and can contain several and incongruent meanings as they come into contact with the agendas of different audiences'* as Claire Wintle reminds us. It is not enough to unravel the four kinds of migration: there are disparate differences between settlers and local borns, between generations of local borns, between families of the same ethnic group, and even between members of the same family (just check the story of the Perumals). As Kanchan Mukhopadhyay recognizes: *'identity issues are manipulated by different sections of a group's members'*. He formulates the hidden micropattern: *'the combination of attributes makes one niche distinguishable from another, even though they share similar ecological characters'*.

So, the ultimate question is: which kind of *granularity* we need – if granularity means the adequate level of detail, considered in a model or a (causal) reconstruction process. The greater the granularity*,* the deeper the level of detail. From a granular point of view, anthropologists must retrace and jigsaw every difference-constituting element of selected events, structures, and actors, aiming to identify the decisive *'factors beyond the actors control'* as well. In this puzzle game, getting the swing of *'the rhythms of everyday'*, grains are not simply facts of the past, but contextual relations, too, buckled by the serendipitous cobweb of affordances. In this epistemological space the recognition is always a *'construction work with potential meanings'*, including the *'iconic representations'*, which '*Andamans have been pregnant with'* (Jamal Malik). So, the constructions of the pasts (!) are *reiterations*, while historical reflections (with Jörn Rüsen's worlds) are '*interpretive recollections'*.

We are there. *'Ethnographic subjects allow us to return to the places where thought is born'* - sums up Sita Venkateswar in the Afterword, citing Joao Biehl. To sense the granular nature of these places, where history is also created, open out the large, supplementary map, and contemplate, playing upon the spatial patterns, standing out from the distribution of different communities on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. And return scores of time, when pick an insight in this outstanding collection, anywhere.

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EGYÜTTHATÁS – REPREZENTÁCIÓK II.

A KÁRPÁT-MEDENCE A TERMÉSZET ÉS A TÖRTÉNELEM MŰHELYÉBEN

(KIS JÉGKORSZAK – JÁRVÁNYOK)

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