Narratives, Beliefs, Understanding

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A lap tanulmányokat, interjúkat, ismertetéseket és kritikákat közöl a történelem és a társadalomtudományok köréből. A közlésre benyújtott cikk még nem publikált és más folyóiratnál elbírálás alatt nem lévő, eredeti írásmű lehet. A benyújtott és a lap jellegének megfelelő írásokat két, a szerző számára ismeretlen szakmai lektor bírálja el. A két lektor véleményének figyelembevételével a szerkesztőség döntést hoz a megjelentetésről, melyet a szerzővel közöl.

A folyóirat megjelenik évente négy alkalommal: tavasszal, nyáron, ősszel és télen.

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REVIEW

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Context, Intention and Historical Understanding

Abstract

The aim of this article is to indicate how a version of intentionalist theory of linguistic communication can be adapted as a part of a contextualist methodology of the history of ideas. In other words, we attempt to clear up the way of harmonizing the theory that communication takes place when a hearer/reader grasps an utterer's intention with the methodological conception according to which a historian of ideas must concentrate his attention on the context in which in his past author was writing. This article argues that a plausible solution to this problem is suggested in some influential methodological essays by Quentin Skinner. Therefore we shall discuss, on the one hand, the place of an intentionalist model of communication in Skinner's methodology by providing a brief outline of the main theses of contextualism and intentionalism. On the other hand, we deal with some epistemological problems raised by the application of contextualist method. In particular, we consider the questions that can be raised about the manner in which a historian can grasp an author's intention.

Keywords

Quentin Skinner, intentionalist theory, linguistic communication, historical understanding

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INTRODUCTION

The term 'contextualism' refers to the method whereby a historian of ideas concentrates his attention on the context in which a past author was writing. The defining tenet of an intentionalist theory of communication is that communication takes place when a hearer or a reader grasps some sort of intentional state (intention, belief, desire etc.) that is distinct from the utterer's words expressing it. Now, one of the most important methodological questions of the contextualist theory of historical understanding is whether the contextualist method can be harmonized with an intentionalist conception of linguistic communication.

A possible answer to this question, we think, is suggested in some well-known methodological essays by Quentin Skinner, one of the founders of the 'Cambridge School' of the history of political thought.[1] Quentin Skinner is one of the world's most influential and philosophically sophisticated historians of ideas. His influence can be derived *inter alia* from the fact that he attempts to revise the major methodological tools with which the history of ideas has been tackled to now by formulating his contextualist conception in terms of an intentionalist analysis of linguistic communication that can place some traditional epistemological hypotheses about the historical understanding in a fresh and illuminating context. In short, what makes Skinner's contextualist methodology novel and influential, we think, is the adaptation of a special version of the intentionalist theory of linguistic communication. Thus, in our view, in order to understand the methodological issues of Skinner's historiography of ideas, we must consider the version of the intentionalist theory of communication which appears most strongly to have influenced his thinking. Now, the main task of our essay is to indicate how the topic of historical understanding might involve, or why should it involve, an analysis of intentional states expressed and grasped in communicative acts. Our investigation, therefore, include two stages. Firstly, we shall discuss the place of an analytical model of linguistic communication in Skinner's methodology by providing a brief outline of the main theses of contextualism and some important versions of the intentionalist theory of communication. Secondly, we shall deal with some epistemological problems that can be raised about the manner in which historian can infer a past author's intention from the author's words.

1. TOWARD A CONTEXTUALIST THEORY OF HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING

Let us begin by clearing up the methodological conception which Skinner refers to as 'contextualism'. What is usually thought to define the 'Cambridge School' of the history of political thought founded by Skinner, Pocock and others is a commitment to a form of linguistic contextualism: the thesis that historical texts can only be understood correctly by locating them within their intellectual context and, in turn, that this intellectual context can only be properly understood in terms of the language available to the individual past authors.[2] What Skinner regards as contextualism is the view that to understand what a past author meant by a text it is necessary to grasp what he was doing in writing it in a given historical context. In other words, contextualism, Skinner

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[1] For discussion of the epistemological background of Skinner's methodology see e.g. SKINNER 1969, 1978, 1983, 1988, 2002.

[2] For the discussion of historical contextualism of 'Cambridge School' of the history of political thought, see SKINNER 1969, 1978, 1983, 1988, 2002, POCOCK 1985, 2004, DUNN 1968, 1996.

claims, is the method whereby the historian concentrates his attention on the context in which his author was writing. This means, in Skinner's view, that to understand what a past author meant by a text, a historian must concentrate on the conventions of the type of society in which author lived, the kind of person he was, the people whom he was addressing and trying to persuade, and so on. As Skinner notes, we must be ready to read each of the classic text *"as though it were written by a contemporary"* (SKINNER 2002. 57). The relevance of such a contextualist method, for Skinner, can be pointed out especially in the cases where the reasons people had for holding their beliefs do not seem to be reasons for us, and where the beliefs themselves seem unintelligible. As Skinner claims, in such cases *"we discharge our tasks as interpreters if we can explain why say, Aquinas believed that God is at once three persons and an individual Being"* (SKINNER 1988. 256). *"We need not suppose"*, Skinner writes, that *"we have to able in addition to perform what may be the impossible feat for explaining what exactly it was that Aquinas believed"* (SKINNER 1988. 256).

So, in this view, to interpret a past author's text, we need to know something about the historical context in which text was written. If we attempt to surround a past author's text with its appropriate historical context, Skinner claims, we may able to create a more plausible conception of what the author was doing in writing the text in question. For to understand what questions a past author was addressing, and what he was doing with the concepts available to him in a special historical context, is equivalent to understand some of his basic intentions in writing his text. So, as Skinner writes, when *"we attempt in this way to locate a text within its appropriate context, we are not merely providing historical 'background' for our interpretation; we are already engaged in the act of interpretation itself"* (SKINNER 1978. xiv).

In arguing for this contextualist methodology of the history of ideas, Skinner offers his criticism of the view that concentration on the text is sufficient in itself for the understanding of the ideas contained in it. This so-called textualist view, Skinner points out, is wrong, since it assumes the existence of "timeless truths" which the historian hopes to distil from a past author's text. This erroneous assumption about "timeless truths", he argues, occasions that meanings which historians ascribe to the past authors might have very little or nothing to do with the authors' intentions. Some historians, for example, say of Machiavelli and Rousseau that by writing what they did, Machiavelli laid the foundation for Marx, and Rousseau provided the philosophical justification for the totalitarian as well as the democratic national state. Skinner argues, however, that description such as *"Machiavelli laid the foundation for Marx"* cannot be action descriptions, because they are not descriptions *"which the agent himself could at least in principle have applied to describe and classify what he was doing"* (SKINNER 1969. 29). For Skinner, the main problem with such descriptions is that they unapologetically avoid any reference to the intentions of the author in question; rather, they merely engage in philosophical criticism or moral judgment such that *"history becomes a pack of tricks we play on the dead"* (SKINNER 2002. 65). So those historians of ideas who to tend to form such descriptions simply assume that the same word employed by different authors indicates the same meaning and intention on the part of each. Ideas thus treated "historically", Skinner claims, are in fact abstracted from the past author's writing and, therefore, they cannot tell us anything about the role it originally had in the arguments and doctrines of the various authors concerned. The only way to settle the matter is to explore the dominant intellectual context of the time *"by paying as close attention as possible to the context of* [a particular] *utterance, we can hope gradually to refine our sense of the precise nature of this intervention constituted by the utterance itself"* (SKINNER 2002. 117).

So what leads Skinner to form his critical statements in the general assumption that the past authors were merely concerned with specific problems occurring in their own quite unique historical circumstances, and that they all conceptualized and expressed these problems by following the rules of a specific linguistic tradition. Thus, on Skinner's view, in interpreting a historical text, we must regard this text as a definite set of utterances formulated by a past author with the intention to communicate a certain meaning to a given group of the past hearers or readers. Consequently, according to Skinner, the main task of the historian's investigation is to ascertain the intention of the past author in writing his text. If that is so, a historian must presuppose, above all, a certain set of linguistic tools (words, expressions, phrases etc.) that alone makes it possible for a past author to express the intention which is ascribed to him by the historian. To understand a text, therefore, the historian must firstly determine the range of description available to the author of a text; and secondly he must elucidate, within these limits, what was the author's actual intention. In other words, clearing up what the past author could have intended, the historian then determines what the author must have intended to utterance; that is, the historical study of the texts and contexts relating to the past authors must be a study of intentions which the authors' words express.

Having said this, Skinner's argument on this score would certainly appear to us to be resting on an influential analytical conception of linguistic communication. However, in contrast to the generally accepted assumption, we believe that this conception cannot be regarded as a part of the theory of speech acts associated with the Oxford analytical philosopher, John L. Austin. Rather, we think, it is a special version of the intentionalist theory of communication. In other words, Skinner's contextualist conception of the interpretation of the past authors' text seems to be based on an intentionalist theory of the intentional structure and mental conditions of communicative acts. Thus, to clear up the basic assumptions of Skinner's methodology I turn now briefly to the main theses of the theory of communication that appears most strongly to have influenced Skinner's thinking.

2. Intention, communication and historical context

It is a familiar view, suggested by the commentators of Skinner's works, that Skinner has standardly formulated his methodological conceptions in terms of Austin's analysis of communicative acts.[3] Indeed, Skinner's admiration for Austin goes so far that he protests against those who write of his theory of speech acts as if there is scope for alternative theories. For Austin, Skinner claims, carried the attitude of disinterested curiosity about the workings of language farther than anybody in the analytical philosophy of language, and, therefore, he could provide *"a way of describing"* a fundamental aspect of understanding (Skinner 1988. 262).

The *"way of understanding"* that Skinner regards as Austin's most important contribution to a general theory of speech acts is the illocutionary description of communication that has been widely discussed and employed conception in the analytical philosophy of language in the years since Austin coined the term 'illocutionary act'. As it is well known, an illocutionary act on Austin's original account is an act which is performed in saying something. It is, in this view, to be distinguished

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[3] See e.g. Pocock 2004.

both from acts of saying something (the making of noises, or marks, belonging to a language), and from acts bringing something about as a consequence of saying something. In brief, illocutionary acts are to be distinguished from locutionary and perlocutionary acts. So in terms of Austin's model of illocutionary acts, the meaning of a word would appear as being inextricably tied down to specific activities in the context of which they enter into usage.

Now Skinner argues that a proper understanding of the concept of illocution gives us grounds for offering plausible accounts about the way of interpreting the texts of the past authors. For the main task of the interpretation of a past author's text, Skinner claims, is to illuminate the illocutionary force of the text. But how can the awareness of illocutionary force contribute to understanding of a past utterer's meaning? Although this question has been formulated by using Austinian terms, the answer suggested by Skinner is based on an intentionalist conception of communication rather than on Austin's original doctrine of speech acts. In answering the above question, Skinner emphasizes that to illuminate the illocutionary force of a past author's text, a historian must be determine the author's intention expressed by the author's words in a given historical context. So, in Skinner's view, in order to grasp the illocutionary force of a past author's text, a historian, having found out what the author could have intended in a given historical context, must determine what the author has intended to utter. This means, accordingly, that in illuminating the contribution of the awareness of the illocutionary force to our understanding of the historical texts, Skinner argues for a version of the intentionalist theory of linguistic communication. As we have seen, the defining tenet of an intentionalist conception is that communication takes place when a hearer/reader grasps some sort of intentional phenomenon that the utterer's words express.

In contextualist view, a plausible account about the context of a past author's text would enable us to understand some of his basic intentions in writing, and to elicit what he might have meant by what he uttered. To suppose this view on interpretation, however, an exponent of the contextualist-intentionalist methodology must explain the manner in which a historian can grasp an author's intention. Skinner suggests the following solution of this epistemological problem: in order to understand a past author's basic intention in writing, we must see, *inter alia,* what questions he was addressing and trying to answer, and how far he was accepting and endorsing, or questioning and repudiating, or perhaps even polemically ignoring, the prevailing assumptions and conventions of political debate. But what exactly does enable a historian to grasp an author's basic intentions by studying the ideological context of the author's text? How can a historian infer and individual mental state from the special features of the context of an author's text? And what exactly does a historian need to be aware of to grasp an author's message?

As far as we can see, Skinner does not offer plausible answers to these questions. Some versions of the intentionalist theory of communication, however, suggest possible solutions to these problems. As we have seen, for example, Davidson claims that a reader's grasp of an author's intention is mediated by the reader's knowledge of the truth-conditions of the reader's language (DAVIDSON 1980, 1984, 1990, 2001). That is, in Davidson's view, what enables an author to realize his basic intention in writing is the reader's knowledge of the truth-conditions of sentences in the reader's language. Other exponents of the intentionalist theory of communication, however, give other accounts of the manner in which a hearer/reader can grasp an utterer's intention. For instance, David Lewis emphasizes the essential role of two conventions in communication that he calls

conventions of "truthfulness" and "trust" in a language.[4] Jerry Fodor thinks of these conventions in communication as "recipes" for communicating specific messages.[5] Still other exponents of intentionalism stress the role of the so-called creative hypothesis formation. Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, for example, argue that a hearer/reader must infer an utterer's intention by inventing hypotheses concerning the utterer's possible intention and then selecting from these by means of a presumption that the utterer's sentences are *"optimally relevant"* (SPERBER–WILSON 1986. 163–171).

At this point, however, it is necessary to emphasize that, whether we accept Davidson's account of the common knowledge of the truth-conditions of utterer's language, or stress, for example, the role of the creative hypothesis formation in communicative acts, we must keep in view the radical epistemological difference between the manner of interpretation in the oral and literal forms of communication. Although Skinner, like others who intend to argue for a version of the intentionalist theory of communication, fails to consider this difference, it is important to highlight that intentionalism is one of the approaches to communication inviting to rethinking in terms of orality/literacy paradigm.[6] In other words, studying the various kinds of the calculations that hearers/readers use in order to grasp the intentional states which are expressed by the utterer's words, in our view, we must perceive that these kinds of calculation have quite different bearings in oral communication from those they have written. For we must perceive that while spoken linguistic material, as Bronislaw Malinowski notes, *"lives only in winged words, passing from man to man"*, the meanings of the words are *"inextricably mixed up with, and dependent upon, the course of activity in which the utterances are embedded"*, the statements contained in written documents *"are set down with the purpose of being self-contained and self-explanatory"* (MALINOWSKI 1923. 307, 311). Writing, in this view, intensifies the sense of self and foster more conscious interaction between individuals. In writing, Malinowski claims, *"language becomes a condensed piece of reflection"*, the reader *"reasons, reflects, remembers, imagines"* (MALINOWSKI 1923. 312). So this means, on the one hand, that the language from which a reader can infer the author's intention is more individualized and more interiorized than the language that is used in oral forms of communication, and, on the other hand, that the way of interpretation is more reflected in literal forms of communication than in oral communicative acts. In this case, accordingly, the manner in which the sentences of the written documents represent an ideological and social context is radically different from the way in which a given context is represented in an oral form of communication. Consequently, the manner in which a reader can infer the author's basic intention from the author's words representing the deeply interiorized context of writing is radically different from the way in which a hearer can grasp the utterer's meaning.

Applying these considerations to the epistemological problems of the history of ideas, we can note, on the one hand, that the historian, as a reader, can infer the past author's intention by reconstructing a "private" context-representation expressed by the author's words, and, on the other hand, that the epistemological background of the historian's inferences is actually constituted by an individual

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[4] For discussion of this conception see LEWIS 1983.

[5] See FODOR 1975, 1987.

[6] For discussion of the orality/literacy paradigm see ONG 1982, HAVELOCK 1986, GOODY 1987.

cognitive representation of the ideological and social context of the interpretation of the past author's text. So these considerations may urge the exponents of contextualism to rethink the methodological role of the context-descriptions in the history of ideas. For the orality-literacy paradigm may suggest them that the historian's account of the ideological and social context of the past author's text cannot be more plausible than his idea of the author's "private" thoughts. In other words, the historian's account of why a past author believed something cannot be more plausible than his hypothesis about what exactly it was that this author believed.

As far as we know, Skinner adapts the intentionalist conceptions without considering these epistemological problems. We think, however, that the adaption of a version of intentionalist theory can only help a historian of ideas to illuminate some of the connections between a past author's text and its ideological and social context, if he is aware of the basic differences between *"the ways of managing knowledge and verbalization in oral cultures"* and *"in cultures deeply affected by the use of writing"* (ONG 1982. 1). Such an epistemological distinction can enable an exponent of the contextualist methodology to create a plausible conception of the internal relation between an ideological context and its linguistic representation, and hence, in Skinner's words *"of how political thinking in all its various forms was in fact conducted in earlier periods"* (SKINNER 1978. xi). A detailed investigation of the methodological implications of this distinction, however, is altogether another enterprise.

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Family accounts, narratives, social values and history education

Abstract

Youth research in recent years has revealed that, with info-communication tools (smart phones, web 2.0) becoming a part of children's and youths' everyday life, screenager generations spend less and less time on face-to-face conversations both in the family and in their peer group. Influencers and virtual (online) communities are gradually taking over the role to form children's thinking played so far by traditional interpreting communities' (family, peer groups). Youths' exposure or, in other words, vulnerability to hoaxes and manipulative information spread via the Internet is increasing. The premise of our research is that the lack of family discourse on family history and historical events leads to *unrelatedness,* which results in collective memory fading away. At the same time, the social role of trans-historical values among members of young generations and their effect on guiding young people's behaviour is decreasing. These factors may transform the objectives and function of history as a school subject and history education (as a form of civic education realised in school). In the present study, we explore family discourse on historical events in students' families and issues of students' value orientations. Furthermore, we investigate opinions on social values that may be represented by history as a school subject and students' and teachers' views on the tasks of history education.

Keywords

social values, family, youth, history, history education

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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, factors suggesting that we are living in a world risk society (BECK 1997, 2007, BECK–GRANDE 2007) have been strengthening. Economic and political crises, increasing poverty, new migration flows, political populism gaining strength and technological changes (ICT, web 2.0), create new vulnerabilities for child and youth generations both in Europe (SORTHEIX–PARKER–LECHNER–SCHWARTZ 2017) and in Hungary, such as the crisis of freedom, solidarity, empathy, values of autonomy (crisis of universal humanistic values, crisis of European values), and exposure to manipulations of the post-truth era, the *"fear industry"* (BECK 2007).

The influencing effects of the mass media have become dominant in young people's thinking. Along with the appearance of web 2.0 and smart devices, time spent on talking in the family is decreasing, thus the impact of the family on young people's thinking and value orientations is also decreasing. The role of peer groups has acquired a new significance. In most recent years, real, face-to-face friendship communities have been taken over by virtual interpreting communities of youths and influencers guiding the individual.

As a consequence of all this, in Hungary, school-age children use the Internet and social media as a basic source of information, which thus become fertile grounds for hoaxes, misconceptions, manipulative grouping of information, and claiming false facts. This vulnerability is reinforced by the phenomenon of increasing isolation, seclusion, measured among Hungarian youths (GÁBOR 2012, JANCSÁK 2013), which means that children and young people leave behind the filter system of traditional interpreting communities (family, peer friendship communities) that would restrict the spread of misconceptions and manipulation.

The Hungarian educational system is not prepared to provide answers for this phenomenon. This applies for the school subject of History and Civic Education, which provides civic education within the frameworks of educational documents (National Core Curriculum), with its key task to educate students in grades 8 and 12 of public education (14- and 18-year-olds) into conscious, active citizens. Our earlier studies reveal that history education, due to its textbook-driven nature, performs its function of democratic education to a lesser extent, contents reflecting on civic education issues are absent from history teacher education, and teachers do not feel prepared for this task (JANCSÁK 2018). The National Core Curriculum specifies in detail those social competences and social values the formation of which, and in case of values the presentation/preservation of which, lies in the core of the task system of education. However, in everyday classroom practice, it is presenting and teaching the textbook material that is realized. Teachers are aware that the transmission of social values and the framework for civic education are created by non-formal and informal education, nevertheless, training-like sensitization, cooperative methods, project-based instruction, research-based teaching and inquiry-based learning receive no emphasis in Hungarian practices[1].

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[1] An objective of the Subject Teaching Methodology Program of MTA is to encourage innovation in the field. https://mta.hu/tantargy-pedagogiai-kutatasi-program.

1. Notes on methodology

Relying on the value theories and research findings of Inglehart (2000), Rezsohazy (2006), Rokeach (1968, 1973) and Schwartz (1992, 2006), in the value interval questionnaire, we specified the question group applied in Hungarian youth research by Gábor (2013). The democratic and civic competences to be developed by history teaching as prescribed in the Hungarian National Core Curriculum (NAT) were supplemented. We added a question block investigating democratic competences, critical thinking, historical thinking and values of active citizenship. It should be noted that our study does not depict the entire value field of modern societies in its complexity; this is a characteristic of value sociology studies (Váriné 1987. 158). When investigating value orientations, we listed those values that we had identified based on the NAT and included them in a question group as closed questions. Although other values may also appear in history classes, this long question group proved to be sufficient for analysis and for drawing conclusions.

The data that serve as the empirical basis for our research was obtained through paper and pencil questionnaires, which we administered among graduating secondary school students in 28 schools in the school year of 2016–2017 (N = 875) and 2018–2019 (N = 476) and among history teachers in 2017 (N = 171). In this research, discourse conducted in students' families, family accounts of historical events and issues of young people's value orientations were investigated. Furthermore, students' and teachers' opinions on role expectations towards history teaching and on social values that can be presented by history as a school subject and preserved as a result of value transfer processes between generations are also examined.

2. The lack of family stories and family narratives

Since the 1990s, several studies have been discussing the transformation of family as an institution, especially the transformation of its socializing function; the formation of families' inner structure and its negative impact on the socialization of children and youths are discussed through various approaches and in great detail in the Hungarian literature as well (Somlai 1997, 2013, Jancsák 2013, Kovács 2014). In today's age of instability (Szabó 2014), the age of rushing, changes in the world of work in case of parents, (longer working hours or more jobs) result in a reduced amount of time spent together actively on acts of speaking in the family. Our data show that families of graduating secondary school students engage in conversations for less than an hour a day, and conversations usually accompany or supplement traditional family rituals and daily fixed points in the schedule (waking up-having breakfast-leaving home, and then having dinner-preparing for bedtime). Consequently, instead of focused discussions, storytelling and accounts, it is rather casual chatting that takes place, leaving less room for discussing the life stories of closer or more distant ancestors or related historical events.

In our questionnaires, the historical events that we assumed could appear in the conversations of students' families were investigated within one question group. Our premise was that these events mark the historical milestones from the beginning of the 20th century which may function as important value-bearing symbols for the collective (national) memory.

FIGURE 1 *How much time do you spend on talking in the family on an avarage day (%)?*

Our research focus was to determine which historical events are talked about in the family circle, regardless of whether the family is personally affected by it or not. All the Hungarian historical turning points or events were included in our questionnaire from Hungary's accession to the European Union back to World War I. Our assumption was that there are only few families with none of their members being affected by any of the listed 20th-century historical events. We specified family member as "ancestor or even remote relative". Our research findings revealed that historical events and historical topics are not discussed in the family in case of nearly one third of the young people.

	2016/2017 N = 875	2018/2019 N = 482
Everyday life in the Horthy Era	30	24
World War II	71	63
Holocaust, persecution of Jews	62	49
Soviet occupation, deportation of prisoners of war	40	34
Recsk, internment, show trials	26	25
Collectivization	45	44
Persecution of kulaks	18	18
Everyday life in the Rákosi Era	32	49
1956 Revolution and War of Independence	62	48
Retaliation after the 1956 Revolution	41	34

TABLE 1 *We talked about it in the family in the past year... (%)*

Further analysing the data, we found no significant differences according to either gender or school type. When considering parents' educational level, we found that families where the father had the highest level of education, i.e. a higher education degree, engaged in conversations about historical events in a smaller proportion, while in the case of mothers, this proportion was more balanced. Conversations about historical events took place in 11% of families where the father had the highest level of education, while in the case of fathers with a secondary level education, this proportion was 18%.

	Father	Mother
Primary school (8 classes)	10	14
Vocational school	18	17
Secondary school graduation (matura exam)	18	15
College, university / Higher education	11	15

TABLE 2 *Fathers' / Mothers' level of education / do you talk about historical events? (YES, %)*

3. UNRELATED GENERATION (?)

In our research, we attempted to reveal how young people are related to our historical past through family history and life stories of close or distant relatives and what historical events they know to be related to their families. Our findings reveal that half of the students in their last year before secondary school graduation had no knowledge of their family being related to any historical event. In reflection of the above results (i.e. time spent on conversations in the family), it is hardly surprising, as family stories are typically preserved through discourse conducted between generations, and thus are part of our collective memory as well. The connection between ancestors' life stories and history is preserved in family narratives, which also supports the value transfer processes of trans-historical social values between generations, as in oral historical narratives, there is a marked presence of social value dimensions. We might say that, in this respect, our research findings depict an unrelated generation, whose members do not see historical milestones as value-bearing symbols but as teaching materials to be mastered in history classes. At the same time – based on our earlier discussion – it also means that historical events of our national past disappear from collective memory and become highlighted passages in textbooks to be learned in school, which young people only experience as distant academic knowledge.

	2016/2017 N = 875	2018/2019 N = 482
Everyday life in the Horthy Era	22	21
World War II	51	47
Holocaust, persecution of Jews	11	10
Soviet occupation, deportation of prisoners of war	27	23
Recsk, internment, show trials	9	5
Collectivization	41	39
Persecution of kulaks	13	10
Everyday life in the Rákosi Era	33	39
1956 Revolution and War of Independence	46	37
Retaliation after the 1956 Revolution	47	31

TABLE 3 *The family is involved in the event (%)*

4. HISTORICAL MEMORY AND THE INTRUSION OF GLOBALIZATION

The first round of our data collection was timed for the months after the 60th anniversary of the 1956 Revolution and War of Independence, as we intended to investigate the world that young people live in with respect to what historical events they discuss in the family and in their peer groups. We asked (in open questions) which historical events they talked about with their friends in the past month. We assumed that graduating secondary school students would talk most about this event in their communities in the time period after the special anniversary, as it is both close to young people's value orientation and it is also projected as "the revolution of youth" in the programs of national memory politics. It is to be emphasised that our respondents were in the last year of secondary school, and according to the framework curriculum for History and Civic Education, these value-saturated topics are to be covered in the final year in the month of October when commemorating historical events and discussing their event history and values serve as important supplements to civic education. Responses to the open question *"Which historical events did you talk about in the past month..."* are summarised in the table below. We found that young people conducted discussions about the events of 1956 in their families in the time period of the revolution's anniversary (and to some extent, its antecedents and the Kádár Era), however, apart from this, another "historical" event also appeared in family conversations (to a lesser extent) and in conversations with peers (markedly): the US presidential election. In October 2016, a higher proportion of young people talked about the US presidential election with their peers than about the 1956 Revolution. These findings do not only suggest that the world is a reference frame for young people, with what they experience, see, hear or read about pervading their lives, but also at what high level information globalization infiltrates young people's thinking and affects

their opinions and value orientation. This is exemplified by the fact that, among "historical" events, they list the US presidential election, which was the first to apply those media and media manipulation technologies and techniques which had rewritten the laws of earlier media communication on a global scale and thus became the overture to the era called post-truth.

FIGURE 2 *Which historical events did you talk about in the past month...?*

5. YOUTHS' VALUE ORIENTATION AND THE VALUES
OF HISTORY EDUCATION

According to value examinations conducted among youths in Hungary, there seem to emerge three eras based on the changes in young people's value orientations. (GÁBOR 2013) From the end of World War II to the mid-eighties, material values (e.g. flat, car, kitchen devices) ranked highest in value preference orders. Post-material values (freedom, solidarity, involvement in decision making, non-conformity, creativity) moved to the top of value preference lists in the following period (increasingly so in the nineties), until the mid-2000s. Then, with another transformation in value preferences, a certain value co-existence appeared with post-material values mixing with post-modern values (such as experimentation, relativity, spontaneity) and a new type of material values (info-communication tools, Internet) and being preferred together with trans-historical values as well (family, happiness, love, friendship, peace). All this demonstrates processes of value crisis/value change, when preferences for certain values, along with their power to determine decisions and actions, fade into the background and are replaced by another value (REZSOHAZY 2006).

In today's Euro-Atlantic civilisation, economic and political crises, increasing poverty, new waves of migration, strengthening political populism and technological changes (ICT, web 2.0, industry 4.0) work towards another value crisis in case of universal humanistic values (freedom, solidarity, altruism). In our research, we also intended to explore what value dimensions appear in the school subject History and Civic Education based on history teachers' opinions, and how they are related to students' value preferences. Our objective was to reveal how teachers describe the world of values of history education (the school subject History and Civic Education).

The teachers in our study were asked to mark on a scale of 1 to 5 how transferable they consider each value to students within the framework of the subject. The table below presents the value preference rank compiled from the mean scores of teachers' responses. It was concluded that the most important values carried by History as a school subject are freedom, democracy, patriotism, equality before the law, right to make decisions, the nation as a community, respect for traditions and tolerance. What makes these universal values trans-historical in nature is that they are handed down from generation to generation.

freedom	4,35		respect for professional expertise	3,65
democracy	4,35		role of science	3,64
patriotism	4,32		dignity of labour	3,62
equality before the law	4,24		relativity	3,4
right to make decisions	4,23		courage	3,39
nation as community	4,22		family	3,37
respect for traditions	4,16		creativity	3,34
tolerance	4,12		honesty	3,25
conscious citizenship	4,1		conscious consumption	3,23
responsibility	3,94		goodwill	3,14
development	3,89		security	3,13
solidarity	3,84		benevolence	3,09
ethics, morals	3,79		risk-taking	3,06
tolerance of religious beliefs	3,75		true friendship	2,95
peace	3,72		experimentation	2,68
truth	3,68		love and happiness	2,64
self-sacrifice	3,68		inner harmony	2,63
loyalty	3,67		politeness	2,6
sanctity of private property	3,65			

TABLE 4 *Values of history education. Which values can be transmitted to what extent in history classes? History teachers, mean scores, 1 to 5 scale (N = 171)*

So far, we have presented the power of value-transferring historical accounts in the family along with the consequences of their not taking place, which amplify the educational functions of institutions. This new role expectation from schools is mostly experienced by working groups of humanities teachers in the teaching community, and within that, especially history teachers. At the same time, when presenting trans-historical social values and performing civic education,

this subject can provide grounds for interdisciplinary concentration, project-based education and research-based education working together with other subjects. However, for this to be realised, there are two necessary conditions: expert-level professional understanding of the knowledge encompassed by the school subject and deep knowledge of subject teaching methodology (see also: BERLINER 2005, JAKAB 2006, KOJANITZ 2018). This is supported by the appearance of crystallised educational objectives with respect to the tasks of the school subject.

In our research, we intended to explore in depth how history teachers view the tasks of history education and how these views are related to students' opinions on the same issue. We concluded that the opinions of the two most important actors (teachers and students) in the educational scenario are the same regarding what they perceive to be the most important tasks of history education, which are its contribution to the preservation of collective memory, to orientation in space and time and to the formation of interpretational frameworks for historical concepts. However, their opinions differ on the interpretation of social processes (social studies) and on factors of individual knowledge management (collecting information), which students definitely consider a task of history education while teachers do so to a lesser extent. It also follows from this that this difference – to a lesser extent, but noticeably – also appears with respect to developing competences necessary for exploring and handling sources and applying source criticism, and also with respect to the introduction of civic competencies and constitutional knowledge, and the functioning of democratic institutions. In a reversed way, there is a considerable gap between opinions on critical thinking, which teachers mark as an important task, while students considered it less important. Through this, the demands of the young generation are manifested, which appear as new expectations from history education. It is to be noted that these factors reflect on the new vulnerabilities presented earlier (e.g. exposure to mass media manipulation), and support orientation in the present. The data also highlight which factors need a higher degree of integration into classroom processes (knowledge about the present) and more developed teaching methodology (individual information gathering and source management).

	Rank based on mean scores	
	History teachers	**Students**
Preserving collective local and national memory	*1*	*2*
Developing orientation in space and time	*2*	*1*
Developing critical thinking	3	16
Laying foundations for national identity	4	8
Developing correct usage of historical key terms	*5*	*3*
Developing historical conceptual thinking	*6*	*4*
Developing competences necessary for organising knowledge in a problem-centred way	7	13

TABLE 5 *Tasks of History Education*

	Rank based on mean scores	
	History teachers	**Students**
Introducing civic competencies and constitutional knowledge, and the functioning of democratic institutions	8	6
Transmitting democratic thinking and patterns of taking actions	9	11
Introducing other cultures and education for tolerance towards them	10	10
Developing competences of basic financial and economic concepts and processes	11	14
Developing competences for managing sources and applying source criticism	12	9
Developing competences for forming opinions and confronting them in connection with what was learnt	13	15
Analysing behaviour of historical actors and social groups, examining the operation of institutions	14	18
Analysing social-historical life situations	15	17
Analysing ethical problems	16	19
Developing students' knowledge about the present and social studies, developing their social orientation abilities	*17*	*5*
Raising awareness of values of social justice, equity and solidarity	18	13
Developing competences for individual information gathering and knowledge acquisition	*19*	*7*

SUMMARY

In our study, we presented how it affects family stories that there is a decreasing amount of time spent on conversations in the family, which is necessarily accompanied by the disappearance of value-transfer processes embedded in personal narratives and oral history within the family. As a result, conversations conducted on the milestones of collective memory and the narratives kept alive in this way disappear from young people's interpreting communities (family, peer groups). As the value-transferring effects of symbols carried by historical milestones are disappearing, young people's value orientations are changing and their exposure to new vulnerabilities having appeared in recent years is increasing.

The opinion forming of virtual reference people and interpreting social platforms, and the reception of manipulative media content all have an impact on students' value orientations and structure of value judgements. The phenomenon of value crisis/value change means the devaluation of universal values and the preference of a new type of material values and the preference of individual values.

Our findings show a divergence in the opinions of teachers, who are more sensitive concerning historical thinking, and new generations still in school, who are exposed to new information vulnerabilities. Our results also identified the new role expectations from history education, as they are defined by youths, concerning how civic education and individual knowledge acquisition are to be supported. At the same time, it was reinforced that history education's contribution to the preservation of collective memory and value transfer processes in case of trans-historical values is highly important. This extended role expectation entails that inter-generational value transfer through oral accounts of history, which is realized to an increasingly smaller degree within the family, should be taken over, to some extent, by history education.

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A Comparison of Ethnic Majority and Minority Students' Epistemological Beliefs about History[1]

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Abstract

The aim of the research is to compare ethnic majority and minority students' epistemological beliefs about history. A total of 732 (509 from Hungary and 223 from Vojvodina) grade 11 and grade 12 students were involved in the study. The students evaluated 26 closed, abstract statements of the adapted paper-and-pencil questionnaire (Stoel et al. 2017, translation by László Kojanitz) on a six-point Likert scale. The results showed that ethnic minority students tend to nurture both naïve and nuanced beliefs about history that are basically contradictory to each other. This may be related to their *"survival instinct"* (Peck 2018. 322): minority students do not question contradictory viewpoints or historical narratives but use them in parallel. The research draws attention to the impact of cultural factors (e.g. ethnic identity) on epistemological beliefs.

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GREENE and his colleagues (2016) argue that in our increasingly complex century epistemic cognition and epistemological beliefs play a crucial role as they continually help us to verify the authenticity of the huge amount of information and to draw sound conclusions. In the context of history education, Carla VAN BOXTEL and Jannet VAN DRIE (2018) emphasize that the significance of epistemological beliefs is widely recognized in the literature, but there is relatively little empirical evidence about how they do so in the case of history teaching and learning. This study is designed to contribute to the empirical research of this internationally important topic.

1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

1.1. Epistemological beliefs and history teaching

From a psychological point of view, epistemology refers to the knowledge and its origin of a person (HOFER–BENDIXEN 2012). Its interpretation as a belief system originates from SCHOMMER (1990. cit. HOFER–BENDIXEN 2012). In the context of history teaching, VAN BOXTEL and VAN DRIE (2018. 155) highlight that epistemological beliefs are "mental resources" that influence historical reasoning, which can be interpreted as the goal of learning history. According to the researchers, historical reasoning is an endeavour to *"reach justifiable conclusions about processes of continuity and change, causes and consequences, and/or differences and similarities between historical phenomena or periods".* (VAN BOXTEL – VAN DRIE 2018. 151).

In recent decades, several international studies have been conducted to investigate the role and impact of the epistemological beliefs in teaching and learning history (e.g. WANSINK et al. 2017, RETZ 2016, VOET – DE WEVER 2016, MCCRUM 2013, MAGGIONI 2010, MAGGIONI–VANSLEDRIGHT– ALEXANDER 2009, YILMAZ 2008). As the questionnaire from STOEL and his colleagues (2017) is used in this study, the theoretical framework is based on their understanding of epistemological beliefs. Summarizing the results of previous general and history-specific instances of research, in their multidimensional approach, they distinguished between (1) the content and (2) the development of epistemological beliefs. (1) Beliefs can relate to historical knowledge or historical knowing (how the knowledge is constructed) (HOFER–PINTRICH 1997. cit. STOEL et al. 2017). (2) Regarding the (2) development of these beliefs, they may be quite beginner (naïve) and much more advanced (nuanced). Naïve beliefs about historical knowledge refer to that there is a certain truth about the past, while nuanced beliefs mean that knowledge is subjective and therefore questionable. In the case of historical knowing, it is a naïve belief that external objectivities (e.g., from textbooks) allow us to learn the one and only truth about the past. At the same time, individuals with nuanced beliefs know that cognition is subjective because of the person, but appropriate methods can be used to ensure reliability (BUEHL–ALEXANDER 2001. cit. STOEL et al. 2017, KING–KITCHENER 1994. cit. STOEL et al. 2017, KUHN 1991. cit. STOEL et al. 2017).

With regard to the main context of the research, after the millennium, major changes have begun in the Hungarian history teaching and learning (e.g., JANCSÁK 2018, KAPOSI 2017, FISCHERNÉ DÁRDAI 2010). According to the *National Core Curriculum* (2012. 78), one of the most important aims of history teaching is to establish and develop a *"differentiated way of historical thinking"* by understanding the nature of history. In the draft version of the *National Core Curriculum* for 2019, it is stated that at least one topic has to be enlarged to develop historical thinking (*Nat tervezete* 2018). JANCSÁK (2019) stated that the new generations have to face with the increased danger of uncontrolled information. Therefore, history teaching has to take students' and teachers' values into consideration. It can be seen that there is a need to renew history teaching and to understand the nature of history. All this justifies that the number of empirical research about the nature of history has to be increased in Hungary.

1.2. New research directions: investigating the impact of ethnic identity on epistemological beliefs

According to HOFER and BENDIXEN (2012), studying the impact of cultural environment on epistemological beliefs has a great potential in future research. They justified this approach with the socially constructed nature of epistemological beliefs. In relation to history teaching, this notion is consistent with EPSTEIN's (2009. cit. SEGALL–TROFANENKO–SCHMITT 2018) view that students' identity and the cultural environment determine how they learn history. Based on a detailed review of the literature on the concept of ethnicity or ethnic identity, Carla PECK (2018. 315) identified three basic characteristics: (1) Ethnic identity is inherently *"fluid and plural"*, as it is strongly determined by the environment. (2) It can be interpreted both as *"a personal and a social process"*. (3) Common *"language, religion, appearance, ancestry, regionality, nonverbal behavior, values, beliefs, and cultural symbols and practices"* are defining elements of ethnic identity.

As an ethnic minority, Hungarian students from the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina were included in the research. Vojvodina is located in the northern region of the Republic of Serbia, with a population of approximately 2 million people and 26 different ethnicities, forming a diverse community (Autonomous Province of Vojvodina n. d.). According to the latest census (*Census* 2011), 251,136 Hungarians live mainly in the northern part of the province, and Hungarian is one of the six official languages of Vojvodina. Their cultural, political and economic relations are close and many-sided with Hungary. Since 2011, Hungarians living in ethnic minority in Vojvodina have the opportunity to apply for the simplified naturalization, and thus to the dual Hungarian–Serbian citizenship (*Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship* 2010). Regarding the elements defined by PECK (2018), it can be stated that the Hungarian community in Vojvodina has a strong ethnic identity, and almost all of the elements listed are identifiable in their case.

Taking the situation of the history teaching in Vojvodina into consideration, it is worth noting that the prestige of the subject is weaker than in Hungary (MÉSZÁROS 2019). Mészáros emphasized that history teaching in Hungarian language struggles with many difficulties. Among others, there is a lack of appropriate history textbooks, and the general aim of teaching history is not determined precisely (MÉSZÁROS 2019).

2. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

2.1. Aims and pedagogical relevance of the study

The purpose of the research is essentially twofold. On the one hand, I intend to compare ethnic majority and minority students based on their epistemological beliefs about history. On the other hand, it is important to underline that the development of the questionnaire is also in progress (see STOEL et al. 2017), and I endeavour to draw conclusions regarding the psychometric characteristics of the instrument. Based on these aims, the following research questions were identified:

1. What similarities or differences can be identified in the epistemological beliefs of ethnic majority and minority students on the basis of the questionnaire of STOEL and his colleagues (2017)?
2. What similarities can be identified in the related literature?

Because of Carla PECK's (2018) advice that the research on historical understanding and identity should avoid any generalizations, no hypotheses have been formulated at the beginning. Instead, I have used the strategy that in the light of the results, I searched for similar patterns in the literature.

The (pedagogical) relevance of the research can be determined from different perspectives. It is primarily the sociocultural environment that makes this study unique, which allows to join the international discourse. It is important to emphasize that a high number of Hungarian students from Vojvodina are studying at some Hungarian higher education institution, so the results can be useful in their learning and teaching process as well. In addition, based on my knowledge about the literature so far, the nature of the research is novel in the teaching of history in Hungary.

2.2. Instrument

I used the core questionnaire from Gerhard Stoel and colleagues, which was published in 2017. It contains 26 statements (short version 15 statements), which are categorized along two dimensions in a multidimensional approach as mentioned above. By combining the two dimensions, the authors defined 5 scales (STOEL et al. 2017. 126):

1. historical knowing: nuanced beliefs (6 statements), example: *15. A good historical account discusses multiple perspectives on the past,*
2. historical knowing: naïve beliefs (4 statements), example: *16. When eyewitnesses do not agree with each other, it is impossible to know what happened,*
3. historical knowledge: objective beliefs (5 statements), example: *9. Connections between causes and an historical event are fixed,*
4. historical knowledge: subjective beliefs (3 statements), example: *7. Historical accounts are mainly opinions,*
5. historical knowledge: nuanced beliefs (2 statements), example: *26. For many events, historians will continue to debate the causes.*

The exploratory factor analysis confirmed the existence of the first three scales, so in this research, I compare the students based on these.

The closed-end statements had to be evaluated on a six-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree). It is important to emphasize that the statements are abstract, independent from any historical topics.

Besides the 26 statements and the general demographic characteristics (age, gender, grade), the questionnaire included questions about the highest planned level of education, parents' and/or foster parents' education, grades from the previous year (history, Hungarian language and literature, mathematics) and the estimated number of books at home.

2.3. Data collection process

Gerhard Stoel was notified of the intention to use the questionnaire and approved the research. After the multi-stage translation work, the final Hungarian version, which was also used in this research, was prepared by László Kojanitz. The questionnaire, supplemented with general background questions, was also reviewed and approved by the Ethical Committee of the Doctoral School of Education at the University of Szeged.

The research was conducted between October and December 2018 in three grammar schools in the South Great Plain in Hungary and in four grammar schools in Vojvodina in Serbia. The grade 11 and 12 students were presented with the details of the research, and then they could decide if they wanted to complete the questionnaire, which was always voluntary and anonymous. Filling in the questionnaire took about 15 to 20 minutes. After the paper-based data collection, the data were coded and statistical analyses were performed using SPSS 25.0 software.

2.4. Sample

A total of 732 grade 11 and 12 students have been involved in the study. The Hungarian subsample (see *Table 1*) contained 509 students (M_{age} = 17.59, SD = 0.82) from three grammar schools, with the majority of girls (N_{girls} = 325, 64.2%). In grade 11, 263 students (M_{age} = 17.15, SD = 0.72) and in grade 12, 243 students (M_{age} = 18.06, SD = 0.63) joined the research.

Grade	N of students	Age		Gender		N of students per the city inolved (M_{age})		
		M	SD	Girls	Boys	City_1	City_2	City_3
11	263	17.15	0.72	164 (62.6%)	98 (37.4%)	127 (16.76)	72 (17.75)	64 (17.25)
12	243	18.06	0.63	160 (65.8%)	83 (34.2%)	111 (17.85)	42 (18.69)	92 (18.02)
Sum	*509*	*17.59*	*0.82*	*325 (64.2%)*	*182 (35.8%)*	*238 (17.27)*	*114 (18.10)*	*156 (17.71)*

TABLE 1 *Demographic characteristics of the subsample from Hungary* (Note: M = mean, ŰSD = standard deviation)

In the subsample of Vojvodina (see *Table 2*), there were 223 students, who conducted their secondary studies in Hungarian language in four different secondary schools. In grade 11, 104 students (M_{age} = 16.83, SD = 0.41) and in grade 12, 119 students (M_{age} = 17.89, SD = 0.37) answered the questions. In this case, too, girls constituted the majority of the subsample (N_{girls} = 145, 65.3%).

Grade	N of students	Age		Gender		N of students per the city inolved (M_{age})			
		M	SD	Girls	Boys	City_4	City_5	City_6	City_7
11	104	16.83	0.41	70 (67.3%)	34 (32.7%)	46 (16.83)	16 (16.94)	18 (16.78)	15 (16.80)
12	119	17.89	0.37	75 (63.6%)	43 (36.4%)	51 (17.90)	14 (17.86)	19 (17.74)	32 (17.97)
Sum	*223*	*18.40*	*0.66*	*145 (65.3%)*	*77 (34.7%)*	*97 (17.39)*	*42 (17.29)*	*37 (17.27)*	*47 (17.60)*

TABLE 2 *Demographic characteristics of the subsample from Vojvodina* (Note: *M* = mean, *SD* = standard deviation)

3. RESULTS

Regarding the general psychometric characteristics of the questionnaire, the reliability was acceptable in both subsamples (e.g. COHEN–SWERDICK 2010). The Cronbach's alpha values are .66 in the case of the subsample from Hungary (N = 458) sample and .73 in Vojvodina (N = 193).

3.1. Comparison of the ethnic majority and minority students

3.1.1. Independent samples t-test

The epistemological beliefs of ethnic majority and minority students were compared using independent samples t-test with regard to the three scales of the questionnaire (see *Table 3*). The analysis has shown that there is no significant difference between the two subsamples with regard to the epistemological beliefs about historical knowing. However, in the case of the naïve beliefs both about historical knowing and historical knowledge, there is a significant difference between ethnic majority and minority students. The results show that the nuanced beliefs of ethnic majority and minority students are at a similar developmental level. At the same time, the naïve statements are evaluated more positively by Hungarian students from Vojvodina living in an ethnic minority.

Scales	Hungary		Vojvodina		Levene test		Independent samples t test	
	M	SD	M	SD	F	p	?t?	p
Historical knowing: nuanced	4.60	0.62	4.62	0.65	1.414	n.s.	0.222	n.s.
Historical knowing: naïve	3.69	0.80	4.03	0.91	6.728	n.s.	4.895	.000
Historical knowledge: objective	3.06	0.74	3.34	0.82	3.514	n.s.	4.443	.000

TABLE 3 *Independent samples t-test between students from Hungary and Vojvodina* (Note: n.s. = non significant)

3.1.1. Correlations

Based on the correlations among the three scales and background variables, the two subsamples were compared in parallel (e.g. Cohen–Swerdick 2010). Regarding the research topic, I primarily focused on the correlations across the three scales of the questionnaire.

In the case of students from Hungary (see *Table 4*), there is a positive significant correlation between naïve beliefs about historical knowing and historical knowledge ($r = .200$, $p < .01$). Although there is no significant correlation with the nuanced beliefs about historical knowing, it is important to note that both naïve scales have negative relationships with the nuanced scale. From the background variables, history grade and the highest planned educational level correlate with the epistemological scales. The nuanced statements about historical knowing is positively related to the history grade ($r = .131$, $p < .01$) and to the highest planned level of education ($r = .158$, $p < .01$), too. In the case of the naïve scales, there are significant negative correlations between historical knowing and the highest planned level of education ($r = -.101$, $p < .05$), and historical knowledge and history grade ($r = -.133$, $p < .05$).

	N	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
1. Historical knowing: nuanced	509	1							
2. Historical knowing: naïve	509	−.034	1						
3. Historical knowledge: objective	509	−.012	*.200***	1					
4. History grade	509	*.131***	−.068	*−.133**	1				
5. Highest planned level of education	509	*.158***	*−.101**	−.052	.387**	1			
6. Mother's education	509	−.053	.014	−.040	*.201***	.186**	1		
7. Father's education	509	.001	.026	−.065	*.187***	.187**	.513**	1	
8. Books at home	509	−.026	−.026	−.050	*.148***	.188**	.350**	.337**	1

Table 4 *Correlations in the subsample from Hungary* (Note: *p < .05, **p < .01)

In the case of the students from Vojvodina (see *Table 5*), there are positive significant correlations among all the three epistemological scales. The nuanced beliefs about historical knowing show a positive significant correlation with the naïve beliefs about historical knowing ($r = .139$, $p < .05$) and historical knowledge ($r = .182$, $p < .01$). The two naïve scales also show significant positive relationship with each other ($r = .250$, $p < .01$). This means that in the case of the ethnic minority students, the naïve and nuanced beliefs are not separated. Other background variables in this subsample show no significant correlation with either epistemological scale.

	N	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
1. Historical knowing: nuanced	223	1							
2. Historical knowing: naïve	223	*.139**	1						
3. Historical knowledge: objective	223	*.182***	*.250***	1					
4. History grade	223	.122	−0.22	−0.22	1				
5. Highest planned level of education	223	.092	.035	−.013	*.256***	1			
6. Mother's education	223	−.041	.006	−.081	.034	−.008	1	−	
7. Father's education	223	−.020	.031	.047	−.003	.001	*.384***	1	
8. Books at home	223	.127	−.046	−.016	.082	*.221***	*.330***	*.339***	1

TABLE 5 *Correlations in the subsample from Vojvodina (Note: *p < .05, **p < .01)*

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the results, it can be said that there is a marked difference between the epistemological beliefs about history of ethnic majority and minority students. Nuanced beliefs about historical knowing were similarly positively evaluated by the two groups. At the same time, the students from Vojvodina evaluated significantly more positively naïve beliefs than their counterparts from Hungary. It means that ethnic minority students can accept both nuanced and naive beliefs. This is akin to what Carla PECK (2018. 322) called "survival instinct". She concluded the existence of this instinct based among others on PORAT's (2004) research conducted in Israel. Porat proved that students with strong ethnic identities are able to accept the narratives of their own ethnic community and the official (state-controlled) one, even if the two narratives present conflicting views and perspectives. The survival instinct manifests itself, firstly, in conforming to the official position and, secondly, in the intention that the intellectual heritage of its own, smaller community survives.

One of the very important features of the empirical research presented in this paper is that the existence of the *"survival instinct"* (PECK 2018. 322) is verified through abstract statements. Furthermore, it has been confirmed that the study of cultural factors that influence epistemological beliefs has a great potential.

LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER STEPS

It is worth noting that the nature and volume of the research do not allow me to formulate general conclusions. Moreover, the questionnaire is currently under development in Hungarian and international research, too.

During the academic year of 2019–2020, the geographical scope of the research will be expanded, as data will be collected in Croatia, Romania and Slovakia. This new research is supported by the *"ÚNKP-19- New National Excellence Program of the Ministry for Innovation and Technology."*

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Disorientation regarding axis supranationality / nationality in Europe

ABSTRACT

There have always been different definitions of the character of the European Union; it has been referred to as a "postmodern political form", a "*sui generis* structure", or as a "neo-medieval empire". Whatever the definition, supranationality is a necessary component of it. Supranationality has long been exposed to different interpretations, and the ongoing crisis is only increasing the heterogeneity in this regard. This paper is considering the ideational domain and it is an attempt to present conceptual differences regarding this subject by analyzing the relevant ideas. Our starting point is the role that Max Weber added to the ideas as such, which are the drivers of different interests. Without taking into account the organizational forms of supranationalism (we did not discuss the relationships between intergovermentalism and supranationalism), our aim here was to shed light on the existing situation regarding supranationalism by presenting a selection of confronted ideas. The paper consists of four parts. In the first part, we are questioning the possibility to subordinate supranationalism to depoliticized functionalism. The second part presents the ordo-neoliberal frameworks of European supranationalism. In the third part, we are investigating whether the notion of populism enables better understanding of supranationalism. Finally, in the fourth part, we are questioning the possibility of dichotomous interpretation of supranationalism.

KEYWORDS

supranationalism, crisis, ordo-neoliberalism, populism, communitarism against supranationalism

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1. Begriffsconfusion vis-à-vis supranationalism/ nationalism, or the impossibility of complete functionalization of supranationality

Fifty years ago, Friedrich Hayek diagnosed a tremendous confusion about political concepts (Hayek 1968) that put political sociology and other disciplines into a problematic situation. Yet, Hayek is not a guiding star in our thinking; he is only one of the representative participants in the ordoliberal-neoliberal context. Nevertheless, it should be noted that our research subject is far different from the orientation of this Nobel Prize winner, but his diagnosis can still be valid today.

In fact, the concepts/ideas that are supposed to lead us are nothing less confusing today than it was half a century ago. We are interested especially in the *disorientation regarding axis supranationality / nationality in Europe,* and more specifically the operationalization of these categories in the European Union.

At the same time, we keep in mind the approach of *Begriffsgeschichte* (Koselleck 1979) (conceptual history): here, the origin and genesis of the terms that simultaneously undergo certain regressions are taken into consideration. This is exactly what prompted us to choose the title of this chapter denoting a conceptual disorder that has become a dominant phenomenon.

The categorical couple supranationalism/nationalism could be understood as a "conceptual opposition", as suggested by Reinhard Koselleck (1995). Supranationalism generated in the EU is supposed to overcome the particularity and parochiality of national frameworks that undoubtedly posed serious problems for Europe's self-understanding throughout the centuries, especially in the XX century. In other words, there is the imperative of supranationalism to pacify the conflicts from the past that have been burdening European relations, as well as to enable something that Europe cares about, a free flow of goods and people within the world order. This imperative could be interpreted as an expression of *formal rationality* in the sense of Max Weber, and that it prevents programmatic competition within basic EU framework. In fact, regardless of our interpretation of the scope of supranationalism, it has to meet the following criterion: *"stabilization of social actors' expectations about the behavior in order to be resilient to disappointment, thus ensuring the structures"* (Luhmann 1969. 51).

Let us note that supranationalism itself and its interpretations pose a serious difficulty for the transparency of concepts. The elements of cohesion have long been sought in Europe. Can supranationalism emerge as a supranational construction of nation-states, implying peaceful rational cooperation between the nation-states? (Schmidt 2016, 2017) Is supranationality an analogous construction with respect to the nation-states?

In fact, it is uncertain in what sense supranationalism has a binding power. Namely, in the discipline that has been in real expansion in recent decades, European Studies often treat (functionally understood) supranationalism, and various theoretical orientations have emerged (Leal-Arcas 2007, Never 2012, Bickerton–Hodson–Puetter 2015). From the perspective of *functionalism,* supranationalism is often served as a neutral term that seeks to avoid complications with such (normative or descriptive) terms as "cosmopolitanism", "liberal internationalism" or "global interconnectedness" and to understand the tendencies in Europe from the perspective of functional organization of community (Spieker 2014, Hooghe–Marks 2008).

This would be the way to free the discourse about EU from the heavy debates on identity forms: such a debate would be continuously confronted with the dilemma of whether Europe can be treated at all from an identity perspective? Can "identity" be attributed to Europe at all, or is this doomed to failure? Is it possible to have a "common European identity" within a richly differentiated European environment, or is it necessary to include meta-identity projections here? (WHITE 2012). Supranationalism, which could be an effective basis for European integration, offers relief from such dilemmas. Thus, instead of complex political dilemmas, we might find ourselves on a much more neutral ground where the EU is represented in the light of "deliberative supranationalism" (JOERGES 2000) in order to operationalize the "market-building", or simply as a "spatial odyssey" of a cooperative European framework. Supranationalism might represent functional continuity, and it would not have to guarantee the identity.

Yet, as already proven by many examples, supranationalism can never be so functional or neutralized to avoid entailing of additional conceptual difficulties. Thus, supranationalism emerges as an instrument for ensuring that Europe becomes a relevant geo-economic and geopolitical factor. For example, liberal-minded politician Guy Verhofstadt, an ardent supporter of the European Federation, believes that supranationalism could destroy the relevance of nation-states and *pro-futuro* would unequivocally promote the EU as a factor in the "world order of empires". Here, the notion of supranationality clearly goes beyond the neutral frameworks and presents itself as the bearer of "programmatic" projection in terms of EU representation as a supra-national "empire" with increased decision-making capacity and extended maneuvering space. A loyal supporter of "old Europe" and discursive Europeanization, Jürgen Habermas, who was one of the most persuasive critics of functionalism in social theory, approaches functional supra-nationalism when he sees monetary homogenization as the common grounds, that is, he sees euro as a guarantee of communion with the common currency union and central bank. Moreover, his attack on *Kleinstaterei* associates him with the attitude of Angela Merkel, who also insists not only on the functional necessity of the euro, but also on its definition as the substrate of identity. Habermas uses this argument for his robust anti-nationalist attitude that he has long advocated.

The examples given above prove that the logic of supranationalism can never be depoliticized enough to lose its political edge. *We now claim that this recognized non-neutrality of such a term as supranationality is also related to the uncertain consequences of socio-economic changes in recent decades that relate to the state frameworks of a nation.* However, if we wish to grasp this, we need to search beyond the European Studies. Namely, other European Studies treat the substantive aspects of supranationalism in different social theories in a relatively more complex context. However, no interpretive pattern can avoid the consideration of profound changes of the position of the national state, as well as the nation as a collective framework of life ("hollowing out of national state", "global risk society", "shift from government to multilevel governance" with the multiplied actors such as NGOs, or subnational entities that take part in "joint decision making"), and this is where supranationality becomes part of a more complex picture. Thus, one can speak of rescaling of the nation-state powers upwards, downwards, or sideways (this scaling has been taken from geography) (JESSOP 2007), or that we are witnessing "uneven denationalization-renationalization". These discussions are indeed about uncertain outcomes, rather than a one-line projection of supranationalism, which can be seen in the assumptions about the possibility

of a "return of the nation state" (JESSOP 2010). Such attitudes would also represent political implications of the nation as a collective entity from different aspects in contrast to the supranational ideas about marketization of society.

Areas of common life are emerging in Europe as well, requiring the multiplication of governance, new forms of coordination and planning. Yet, the explicit rejection of the hypertrophied and simplified supranational thesis about the change in governance at European level which has made the nation state redundant (ARTS – LAGENDIJK – VAN HOUTUM 2010) suggests a tendency to devise a complex procedure which will not depend on a unilinear logic, but will take seriously new forms of complexity that imply perpetual interferences between the "post-national moments" of globalized European societies and national self-understanding.

Instead of certainty, uncertainty is projected here; instead of *teleology of supranationality,* the conflicts that are intersected by different socio-economic moments are prejudiced. The institutionalization of supranationalism is indisputable in the EU, but this by no means implies that all the relations condensed within it have been exhausted. Accordingly, instead of static, the dynamics of different levels is proposed here, which implicates the elements of supranationality and nationality into the vortex of different constellations. Thus, we can state that the EU emerged as a savior of the collapsed nation-states in World War II (MILLWARD 1992). Yet, other indications must not be disregarded: a nation as an identity framework can acquire a market-like form, that is, market traits: it happens when a nation is represented as a brand in a globalized market (KANEVA 2011, MADRA 2017), that is, when a nation form is reduced to a market category that is promoted in a volatile world market. This implies that the assumption of "conceptual opposition" between supranationality and nationality should also be reconsidered.

The contradictory imperatives of targeting in the EU unable easy finalization of argumentation and interpretation of the relationship between supranationalism and nationalism. Therefore, our (necessarily incomplete) argumentation points to different conceptual directions that shed light on the complexity of constellation and confrontational orientation.

2. ORDO-NEOLIBERALIZATION OF SUPRATIONALISM: EUROPEIZATION OF NEO-ORDOLIBERALISM

The EU cannot be understood without German ordoliberalism which *mutatis mutandis* is in the synthesis with neoliberalism of Austrian origin.

When stating this, we do not want to fall into the trap of overestimating different ideas, that is, we do not want to represent any set of ideas as the sole determinant: it would be dubious idealism. The said assertion is only *minimalist;* it acknowledges that the rooting of certain ideas into a particular institutional reality is always mediated by multiple determinations.

Our starting point is the fact that these two ideological sources have been influencing the essential forms of the EU for a long time.

(1) Ordoliberalism is an idea that emerged as a response to the crisis tendencies in Germany during the 1930s, which certain jurists and economists viewed as a deep civilization regression (Franz Böhm, Hans Großmann Doerth, Walter Eucken, Alfred Müller-Armack, Leonhard Miksch, Alexander Rüstow, etc.). The ideas that were formulated for the purpose of salvation became

extraordinarily popular in the course of the post-World War II reconstruction when certain tendencies made suitable ground for the development of ordoliberal ideas (different terms such as "third way" appeared and they were related to certain representatives of the aforementioned direction, but we will continue to use the previously mentioned term), or the individual politicians (Ludwig Erhard, for example) acted as the promoters of ordoliberal ideas.

Ordoliberalism modeled as crisis therapeutics is, for us, primarily important in the European environment. Namely, when preparations for European unification began in the 1950s, ordoliberals played a significant role in the conception, so the *travaux préparatoires* carried a trace of ordo- liberal ideas. However, since the 1970s, when neoliberalism began to breakthrough, ordoliberalism was little mentioned and seemed to have become only part of a unique German history which attracted only those interested in relevant historical sequences. However, in recent decades, there has been a real expansion in practicing ordoliberalism in European and even American journals, and books on ordoliberal achievements are constantly being published (NEDERGAAR 2018, CERNY 2016. 78–91, ANCHUSTEGUI 2015. 139–174. MÜLLER 2019, FÈVRE 2017, HIEN–JOERGES 2017). Ordoliberalism is addressed to those who are responsible for the crisis management, and today it is especially interpreted as the conceptual framework for (rigid or rigorous) German attitudes to austerity during the crisis that erupted in 2007. The fact that top German politicians (Angela Merkel, Wolfgang Schauble) declaratively referred to ordoliberalism as an indispensable component of German politics within the EU (WEGMANN 2008. MAYER 2000) reinforced the belief that without ordoliberalism there would be no access to ideological turmoil within the EU.

What we are interested here is how ordoliberalism, which has normally transformed in the course of its existence, contributed to the paths of supranationalism. Ordoliberalism (otherwise derived from the Protestant-Lutheran tradition, MANOW 2001. 179–198, KRARUP 2019) can be, with some simplification, interpreted as an orientation that bears the mark of conservative-liberalism. Its association with conservatism is the tendency to have its ideas deep-seated in the order (we should remember here wide connotations of the *ordo* term throughout the history, BÖCKENFÖRDE 2017), as well as the doubts about the scopes of democratic organization of collective life. According to liberalism, there are bridges built with the basic intention: to rehabilitate the liberalism that weakened after World War I and II and to seek to reconceptualize classical liberalism which failed to understand society as a well-articulated whole and inadequately separated the economy from law and politics.

The key term with a remarkable career in terms of legally accomplished integration into the EU is "economic constitution" that representatively summarizes ordoliberal tendencies. The ordering of the market has affirmed as a civilizational principle which goes far beyond standard understanding of the market by allowing its legal framing. The point is to protect competition (which is again an expression of liberal affection) from all possible attacks (including oligopolies) because the competition is interpreted as a lever of order. Competition is not an expression of private law but a guarantee of good order. In other words, ordoliberals wish to affirm the embeddedness of market: unlike many liberals, they are convinced that the market is socially mediated, that there is a deep *social determinacy* of market competition.

The aforementioned term "economic constitution", which of course has been interpreted in numerous ways, has been a red thread in ordoliberal thinking about the emerging Europe. Constitutionalization through microeconomically postulated competition offered itself as a supranational core of the EU that was intersected by multiple divergences. The synergy between law and the economy

that is operationalized at European level should ensure the already mentioned problem of supra-national cohesion, which can be taken over by enlightened European bureaucracy and technocracy.

(2) Austrian theorists such as Friedrich von Hayek and Ludwig von Mises (and others) gave similar diagnosis as their German counterparts: it is a case of civilization crisis that calls for the rethematization of collective frames after World War I (DEKKER 2014). Undoubtedly, the said theorists follow special paths and they have become the representatives of neoliberalism, but we can also see clear parallels (to add, when Hayek returned from the USA, he ended his career with the ordoliberals, in Freiburg, SKIDELSKY 2006, and this is more than a mere biographical fact). Austrians also want to understand the market in terms of social integration: the market is not "self-referential" but a part of the social order and as such it must be framed by "external", "meta-economic" mechanisms or entities willing to mediate the same mechanisms. Neither the ordoliberals nor Hayek and others speak of the market *only* from an individualistic perspective: they certainly express the apotheosis of the market, but they are far from being ready to praise the market as an isolated set of different mechanisms. On the contrary, their intention is to emphasize the *meta*-individual aspects of communion, "commonwealth" through the market, as the market is entirely a "social institution" (this could even unexpectedly bring closer the theorists who are across the different fronts of the theory, such as Karl POLANYI and Hayek, SLOBODIAN 2018). The market seems to be just a dependent variable in this construction, it has no origin in itself. There are differences between Austrians and Germans regarding the meta-economic entities that play a driving role: the former tend to minimize state activities, and the latter are far more lenient and willing to allow the state a wider maneuvering space.

The Austrians in particular insist on the harmful erosion of post-World War I cosmopolitan content, and strongly criticize the cult of national self-determination promoted by the US president Wilson as detrimental to economic rationality. The post-war period exceeded the national momentum tolerance threshold. While this may seem like a huge surprise, Hayek and Mises persistently suggest that the logic of national self-determination with established territorial boundaries goes hand in hand with their opponents, that is, socialists of different kinds who see this as the realization of collective patterns of democracy. In any case, the Austrians advocate world governance, or to say this in ordo-liberal manner, the rise of the "economic constitution" to the global level, which implies a significant weakening of particular borders. Furthermore, this presupposes persistent "denationalization", the practice of effective supranationalism.

In doing so, the model of the Habsburg Monarchy's supranationalism (SLOBODIAN ibid.) is being invoked offering the starting points for the reconceptualization of the world cohesion, and later for Europe as well. Communion of different cultures, polyglotism with supranational economic communion, is presented as a historical matter for the normative projection of the constitution of the world and Europe. With heterogeneous interpretations of the monarchy (where some emphasize the combination of backwardness and irreconcilable national conflicts, JÁSZI 1964, and others point to positive cultural and political effects, JUDSON 2016, see, MEDVED 2018), Austrians belong to the group of interpreters who highly appreciate the historical importance of Habsburg Monarchy. Thus, Mises, who writes a book on the genesis and functioning of the nation, always keeps the afore-mentioned monarchy in mind as the ultimate referential point or as "benchmark" (MISES 1983, SALERNO 2019) for "denationalization" and deep deconstruction of national sovereignty.

The importance of disseminating post-World War II Austrian-neoliberal ideas should not be underestimated. The followers of Hayek and Mises occupied significant positions at international institutions, which is widely and sufficiently documented (see, Slobodian ibid.). Even if we try to be realistic about the impact of ideas on the most important tendencies of modernity, neoliberal penetration into different institutional spaces cannot be ignored. Hayek himself advocated interstate federalism (even before the outbreak of World War II), which is by many interpreted as an ideological legitimation of similar tendencies within the EU (Hayek 1948. 255, Bonefeld 2015). Finally, the powerful influence of Hayek and "his dream" (Worth 2017) and the concept of "denationalization of money" was also confirmed by Ottmar Issing ECB's first chief economist, as well as the research on the documents about EU emergence (James 2012. 6, Callinicos 2013).

Therefore, we have concluded that Austrian neoliberalism is one of the most significant sources of supranationalism.

3. "Populism" as the Negative of Supranationalism

Populism has become a subject of denunciation in recent decades. A large number of those active on academic and political scene do not spare critical arguments in relation to the said phenomenon: at times, it seems that populism has been the name for the concentration of all regressive moments. The engaged *anti*-populism is given a normative meaning, even a missionary-salvation role. So, one can read van Rompuy (former President of the European Council who merely continues the argument of such figures as Manuel Barroso) saying that populism is the greatest possible danger today (Jäger 2019a) and Guy Verhofstadt, who goes as far as to predict the "new world war" (Jäger 6/5/2019). Accordingly, the challenge of populism can only be answered by the crusade. Populism as pathological deformation of democracy is blamed to be the supreme culprit for the deterioration of the quality of liberal democracy (Krastev 2011), or treated as a malignant and embarrassing challenger of normatively understood liberal democracy (Pappas 2016, Mudde–Kaltwasser 2013). Populism as the embodied danger for the reproduction of liberal democracy is seen as an expression of intense decadence that can push modern (European) society into a total abyss. The poor immunity of liberal democracy is thus attributed to the mythological framework of populism, which is an instrument in the hands of certain politicians to hold voters under the delusion rather than to enlighten them.

However, those trying to discover the phenomenology of negative attitude towards populism will find themselves in a difficult situation, as they will face the opacity and contradiction of the arguments. At the very beginning of the paper, we mentioned the possible confusion of the concepts, and this is particularly evident with "populism": heterogeneity and contradiction of its application take away that little exactness that this quasi-concept has. Thus, it can be noted that by criticizing populism completely contradictory phenomena are addressed: the US President Donald Trump's politics is aimed at (referring to harmful protectionism and the ensuing trade war, especially with China), but various "anti-system movements" (Perry Anderson) are also criticized as they mobilized energy in the last decade against coercive austerity-politics or extensive deregulation practice. Different politicians like Tsipras, Le Pen, Corbyn and Orbán suddenly fall into the group of manipulative populists and they all started to share a common denominator and belong to the group of politicians who divert European liberal orientation from the right path.

Whoever identifies as the bearer of populism falls below enlightenment. The stigma of populism is inevitably placed on those criticizing euro, or on the supremacy of technocratic reasoning in the EU (despite of many economists who think that the euro was originally problematic and that it has contributed to discord). Then, populism is treated within the framework of "politics moralizing" with eclatant "antipluralism" that subverts individualism (MÜLLER 2016a, b, c, 2017): the same terms, however, offer little for the present day as they do not represent *differentia specifica* which can distinguish something like "populism". Populism is treated as an expression of emotional-affective endeavors where affective excess of reason slides towards the implication that populism is equal with anti-rationalism, which contains intensified hatred towards knowledge of experts and statisticians (DAVIES 2019). According to this, populism would fight against expertocracy by taking advantage of infirmity against the advanced knowledge-based governance that is wrapped in neutrality. Here, hope is no longer projected into the stockpile of knowledge, but rather anger or vengeance-like emotions are practiced. However, this can only be confirmed if we accept the strict dichotomy between "popular sentiment" and "expertise": for example, various technological innovations in history are precisely the work of "popular sentiments" (JÄGER 2019b). There is also a term that summarizes Margaret Thatcher's time in Britain as "authoritative populism" (GALLAS 2016). Political changes in recent years in Italy are treated as expressions of "digital" and "technological populism" (BICKERTON 2018). Moreover, there is also the notion of "market-populism" (FRANK 1992) by which "people" and "market" are equated (see the contextualization of the notion of market populism in the sociological analysis of "establishment" and "elite-research" with the reference to the anti-populists as "elite of anti-elitists" [DU GAY 2008]). We will not achieve much even if we raise the question of Euroscepticism as the basis of populism, since a non-random link between populism and Euroscepticism would have to be explained (CHOPIN 2016). Populism is criticized for assuming the homogeneity of the people against the corrupt elite, but it does nothing to help us: various politicians (P. Iglesias, for example) who are labeled as populism followers do not turn to the homogenization of the nations; on the contrary, they insist on internal differences of the term (TOSCANO 2015). Economists tend to emphasize crisis experiences as possible drivers of populism (hence the interpretation of the impact of Chinese import on Brexit; GUISO–HERRERA–MORELLI–SONNO 2017), but crises are always subject to interpretation. The crisis has always been open to the interpretation of political agency. That is, we could come to a valid conclusion, but only if we worked out the structural-agency-problem of populism as a response to crisis.

This is certainly not the end of the attacks on populism; we could continue but this is hopefully enough. It is a fact that populism has been subjected to negative criticism by both theorists and politicians. Nevertheless, the price of recognized inaccuracy and confusion over the promotion of populism, which is supposedly like the Damocles' sword over modern societies, is too high. This confusion, which pays tribute to daily actuality, cannot be resolved even if we turn to the logic of historization of democracy in Europe, putting populism in the context of the ongoing crisis of democracy in Europe (according to ROSANVALLON 2011). "Populism" as a term should have explanatory value but it simply brings more trouble than help; its analytical value is highly doubtful.

Yet, it is worth noting that the terms used in the academic-political context are not neutral; this is not just about cognitive confusion: "populism" has a performative power, therefore, it does not express the pre-existing reality, but rather creates a new reality. In other words, "populism" is not just an expression of a fact but, to use a paraphrase by Karl Mannheim (which was said while

defining conservatism), a special form of both opinion and experience. More specifically, it is *a way of conditioning and enframing* both experience and thinking and this produces various effects.

It is noteworthy that there are differences between Europe and America regarding the said concept: populism is a European narrative; only in Europe is it carrying a critical arsenal in relation to the projected dangers. Admittedly, the debates about populism originated in America, but the dimension we are discussing now becomes clearer in Europe. Namely, a US historian Richard Hofstadter, who launched the topic of populism on the academic stage, found it appropriate to say in 1968 at the London School of Economics that there is uncertainty about the definition of populism and that we are doomed to numerous definitions which do not illuminate our path to social phenomena (D'ERAMO 2013). Nevertheless, throughout his book, Hofstadter himself contributed to the confusion by adding various negative epithets to populism, but later he admitted that it was relevant, however, that many American subjects had gladly classified themselves as populists by the WWII (HOFSTADTER 1955. 12, POLLACK 1960). In any case, divergence persisted between the US and Europe: something considered as a medium of denunciation in Europe is almost unimaginable in the US in this form (although lately American authors have been engaged in the revival of "populism", EICHENGREEN 2018a, b, see sociological explanation regarding generation-clash, INGLEHART 2019).

Based on a scrupulous reconstruction of the genesis of anti-populism after World War II (partly in the context of the Cold War), Marco D'ERAMO (ibid.) makes a plausible hypothesis that the expansion of *anti*-populism is concurrent with the absence of use of the concept of people. Instead of attacking populism, the focus here is on the processes of the emergence of anti-populism. Populism has a conjunctural value, but mostly in Europe (as for Asia, there is the ironic example of Japan, TASKER 2017). However, the so far presented arguments about the concept of populism have received just about enough of our attention in this paper. The purpose of our argumentation was to consider whether the notion of populism as an anti-thesis of supranationalism could bring clarity to our concepts. The term in question can by no means offer a satisfactory explanation of the scope of supranationalism: if "populism" is the opposite of supranationalism, then our dilemmas only multiply. The counter-concept is justifiable if it contributes to the transparency of the concept, in this case the concept of supranationalism. Still, this cannot be achieved with an imprecise and ambiguous term such as populism.

4. RESISTANCE TO THE PRESENT FORMS OF SUPRANATIONALISM: NEW UNCERTAINTY

Much has been written about the involvement of EU in various forms of crisis (e.g. SCHMIDT ibid.), as well as its inertia in that respect. In other words, the crisis diagnosis has almost reached a consensus in EU articles. The same forms of crisis can be interpreted differently, and critical argumentation even mentions a possible EU collapse, that is, an antinomic space where disintegration emerges as a possibility (PATOMÄKI 2017) and the "end of Europe" is declaratively and ominously announced (DURAND 2013).

Most importantly, supranationality is necessarily involved, in one way or another, in all crisis narratives, and although Brexit narration is just one of the many relevant examples, it is also a paradigmatic example with its "taking back the control" slogan. Brexit can thus be viewed as an observation point to watch the resistance to "liberal-cosmopolitan capitalism", "economic

globalization", "borderless economy" "cosmopolitan positions", "global liberal economic order" and the opening of a new phase of capitalism in which "stronger rolls for the nation state" as well as the new "politics of scale" are possible (on these terms and about Brexit being merely an expression of convergent tendencies, NÖLKE 2017, JOHNSON 2017). *Based on presented argumentation, we would rather say that this is a resistance to the ordo-neoliberal economic constitution, which also includes centrifugal tendencies.*

In fact, this is a situation that plausibly demonstrates a confrontation with the *existing forms of supranationalism* in modern capitalism – our assessment differs from those who speak about "supranationalism" *in general:* it is not about resistance against supranationalism as much as it is against the *current* dominant forms that fuel the ordo/neoliberal globalization-tendencies.

Resistance to supranationalism stems from a complex political space that cannot be simplified to classical dichotomies (left/right cleavages). However, this does not mean that the same dichotomies should be unreservedly and immediately dismissed as unnecessary theoretical tools for analysis, as many interpreters are quick to claim (WHEATLY 2015); it is rather a *new complexity* where the interference of the aforementioned classical dichotomy and rebellious forms of communitarianism, as well as of "political cosmopolitanism", occur. The left/right division is complicated by the reconfiguration of "globalization-related risk and opportunities" (AZMANOVA 2011), but it does not eliminate the intelligibility of left / right dichotomy as the crisis narratives prove this (WHITE 2012).

Resistance from the communitarian perspective is referred to as the *Rousseau moment:* the famous French theorist strongly shaped the communitarian horizon as an indispensable moment in the eighteenth century. So, there is the left and right Rousseau argument (LÓPEZ YÁÑEZ 2005). This is exactly what we are following now, though without any intention to exhaust the arguments but to present certain tendencies in this field.

(1) *Left communitarianism* against European supranationalism raises the issue of weakened democracy. All countries have come under the pressure of globalization. In fact, it is emphasized that communitarian-national frameworks are genuine sources of democratic legitimacy, which entails certain forms of solidarity and egalitarianism. Supranationalism is now changing the situation after World War II, *"democratic national state is embedded in markets"* (STREECK 2014, 2016a, b, 2018a, b). Such left-wing communitarians are very active internationally, and those like German sociologist Streeck (who, precisely because of the articulation of national and international moment came into conflict with one of the doyens of European social thought, Habermas, who accused him of "small-state nostalgia", STREECK 2014b) only confirm Hayek's diagnosis but in a *negative* form: the post-war social-democratic regimes of the West also represented "national regimes" and established at least a fragile balance between the nation-state and democracy. Existing forms of supranationalism are in fact merely an attempt of "rational bypassing of democracy" (SOMEK 2001).

The arguments are political and sociological at the same time and they go back to structural transformations after the Second World War. Supranationalism, as well as the desocialization effects of advanced globalization, are said to relieve the EU of the pressure of democratic legitimation, which necessarily entails eroding of public power and oligarchic power-structure, as well as the deep division between globalized cities and the non-urban population of the countryside, affected by fear of "being economically abandoned", and borderless knowledge-economy. Let us counter this with some different ideas, that is, confront the leftist communitarianism with other ideas in relation to supranationality and democracy in Europe. The ideas that supranationalism

in Europe actually expands democratic capacities because it removes the constraints of national democracy have proven to be illusory (illusion related to MAJONE 1996) from the perspective of the above mentioned form of communitarianism. It is illusory to think that supranationalism is not striving for unity but rather a "new discipline of solidarity" (as WEILER thinks, 1996. 96). Finally, justice should not be against democracy under the excuse that a supranational Europe need not to be democratic (NEYER 2012). Alexander Somek once said "darling dogma of bourgeois Europeanists" inferring that national democracies are inherently defective so the concept of individualization can be used to play the mentioned democracies (SOMEK 2012, 2013 – the same author however seeks out sources of cosmopolitan citizenship in terms of protecting national democracy from unfettered competition in the world economy).

Powerless national democracy has become a victim of supranational efforts calling on existing states to open up to the European/world market. In other words, supranational globalization has sharpened the incompatibility between capitalism and democracy. Accordingly, as we have witnessed the paradigmatic situation with Brexit, here, the communitarian resistance against globalization is a pattern that occurs in Europe but globally as well. There are different forms of resistance; there is also subnational regionalism but "national nationalism" too, but it is merely a reaction to neoliberal-inspired supranationalism which ruins the chances for "democratic class compromise". Moreover, Streeck predicts that centrifugal forces will defeat centripetal tendencies by combating the forms of supranationality, that the European "superstate" is doomed to failure and it seeks "restored capacity for national political self-help". Furthermore, he confronts the supporters of Europeanized labor market saying that *"the only place where social obligations can be created and enforced is still the nation-state, calls for redistributive solidarity often come with appeals to national identity. It is above all at this point that globalist internationalization is confronted with a growing nationalist 'populism'"* (STREECK 2018b[1], see also GRIMM 2009). In other words, left communitarianism proposes the resocialization of capitalism by reconceptualizing the politics of scale toward a "more de-hierarchized European order", a "more nation-centered order".

It would be wrong to criticize left-wing communitarianism for uncritical support of the nation-state and the "primacy of nation" as the structuring principle (see discussion between Streeck and a historian Adam Tooze, TOOZE 2017). Repeatedly quoted here, Streeck makes the typical "path-dependent" argument against hypertrophied constructivism based on which the societies *"can evolve on the basis of what they have created themselves"* (STREECK 2017, see Streeck's criticism especially regarding his views on migration as well as the critique of his concept of open borders, VAN DYK – GRAEFE 2018). The projected new politics of scale seriously considers that democracy or rather "collective self-determination" can develop only within clearly set boundaries.

Supranationalism depoliticizes, and *re*-nationalization, which connects popular sovereignty and democracy, would create repoliticization. In this respect, there are significant left-communitarian impulses with the French theorists of *de*mondialisation (SAPIR 2010, LORDON 2011).

(2) The map of right-wing communitarianism is just as complex as the configuration of left communitarianism. We wish to emphasize here that right-wing communitarianism can contain both *moral* and *neoliberal* aspects (WHITE 2012). Communitarianism, irritated by the crisis that arose in 2007, raises a moral argument: consequently, supranational globalization and "transregresive forms"

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[1] When he uses the term "populism", Streeck always put it in quotes.

of economization (excessive greed, for example), behavior in Europe have resulted in erosion of moral engagement, in "demoralization". This way, "moral" capitalism is propagated, that is, capitalism in a moralized perspective that will overthrow earlier glorification of the motives such as "greed". In fact, uninstrumental national solidarity ("one-nation conservative") should be promoted over non-reflective supranationality. The immediate task is described as the reconstitution of synergies between markets and moral reflections, primarily at the communitarian-national level. To be more precise, remoralization is encouraged based on communitarian arguments. The nation as a moral framework of solidarity opposes the volatile dynamics of globalized suprationalism.

The right-wing communitarianism with neoliberal elements is not satisfied with the EU because it enables forms of intergovernmental agreement but excluding the market. Here, in fact, the aforementioned argument of Hayek's follower is renovated; according to him there is a surplus of "socialization" in the EU which burdens the smooth functioning of the market with non-market moments. The German AFD, which is a prototype for right-wing communitarianism in our classification, invokes ordoliberalism as a precursor that still inspires and orients (HAVERTZ 2018, see other examples, ibid.). National frameworks set against social (and environmental) European supranationalism are emerging as a horizon for market re-empowerment against over-coordinated European markets. Accordingly, *market* supranationalism is propagated and it would not restrict national interests or allow the corrupt elite to coordinate their actions at European level against "people" – here, the already quoted argument of "market populism" is mentioned again, that is, the concept of "people" equates with the logic of market, and endless competition as an expression of intrinsic characteristics of "people" is celebrated (this is the reason why Bebnowski has introduced the term of "competitive populism" in the study of sociology, as well as the paradoxical term of "populism of expertocracy", although it additionally complicates our conceptual possibilities; BEBNOWSKI 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016). The synthesis of economic liberalism and opposition compared to Euro-supranationalism (including the harsh criticism of euro as a cement of the European community, that is, the criticism of common currency) characterizes AFD as one of the paradigmatic examples of the right-wing communitarianism. Even though the withdrawal from the EU is not the aim that is systematically being insisted on, its frameworks seek to narrow back to restore national sovereignty (though, let us emphasize that there are neoliberal secessionists about the EU who, when asked whether neoliberal Hayek would be a brexiteer, say *"yes",* BOORNE 2016, SLOBODIAN–PLEHWE 2018). This type of right-wing communitarianism praises free trade of goods from national perspective but, in terms of people, it opposes migration and adopts anti-migrant attitude. Therefore, market supra-nationalism *does not* imply open borders concerning the circulation of migrants (AFD 2017). The fact that economic liberalism is in relation to restrictive migration is obvious and even different movements of libertarianism advocate different limits in migration processes (HOPPE 1998).

There are obvious differences between this type of left and right-wing communitarianism. The left-wing communitarianism protests against neo-ordoliberal supranationalism and projects national ordering for democracy. On the other hand, the right-wing communitarianism (the term "enlightened conservativism" has appeared in self-understanding of the actors in question, and the interpreters use the concept of "national liberalism", KELLERSOHN 2014, RAVETZ ibid.) of the mentioned type advocates for national ordoliberalism which connects national frameworks that are embedded in the cultural patterns with the strong state, that is, the maxim "strong state and free market" is repeated.

Conclusion

Supranationalism is embedded into self-understanding of the EU and it always implies a political interpretation based on structural-ageecy problem. We have claimed that the dominantform of supranationalism in the EU originated from neo-ordoliberalism; it is confirmed by the genesis and way of functioning of the EU. At the same time, the crisis, which resolution has been postponed, creatte supranationalism. However, since there is a lack of transparency of the mentioned term, we cannot put together an adequate picture of the European reality. Therefore, we have tried to classify the relevant communitarian arguments directed against the pres supranationalism. However, since there is a lack of transparency of the mentioned term, we cannot put together an adequate picture of the European reality. Therefore, we have tried to classify the relevant communitarian arguments directed against the present dominant forms of supranationalism in Europe by persisting in left/right cleavage. Heterogeneity of interpretation opens up new forms of complexity and uncertainty.

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Crowded Intersections

Transdisciplinary Tendencies in Social Sciences and the Humanities[1]

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we argue for the applicability of current transdisciplinary tendencies in social sciences and the humanities in the case of research topics in which two or more fields are involved. In the past decades, many texts have been produced that discuss the pursuit of scientific activities and scientific production while also highlighting the terminological and historical aspects related to these. Often, polemics emerge on whether the distinctive/distinguished terms truly denote different phenomena, or they are merely empty expressions in vogue now in scientific discourse. This latter approach is most often notable in the case of inter-, cross-, and transdisciplinarity.

An observer of these processes has to suffer from the multiplicity of interpretive frameworks behind these views, even though the given definitions, paradigm shifts, and processes seem quite obvious. In order to clarify the state of the field, we review historical approaches to disciplinarity, its modern and post-modern characteristics, while subsequently enumerating the necessary steps of transdisciplinary scientific production. The paper concludes with a case study of a research project, which exemplifies the distinct features of transdisciplinary research.

KEYWORDS

disciplinarity, transdisciplinary research, narrative psychology, religion, collective national identity

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In this paper, we argue for the applicability of current transdisciplinary tendencies in social sciences and the humanities in the case of research topics in which two or more fields are involved. In the past decades, many texts have been produced that discuss the pursuit of scientific activities and scientific production while also highlighting the terminological and historical aspects related to these. Often, polemics emerge on whether the distinctive/distinguished terms truly denote different phenomena, or they are merely empty expressions in vogue now in scientific discourse. This latter approach is most often notable in the case of inter-, cross-, and transdisciplinarity.

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1. Mode 1 and Mode 2

The introduction of the term "transdisciplinarity" is related to the conviction that science has transcended its former, disciplinary state, which may termed as Mode 1 of scientific production to its Mode 2 (Gibbons et al. 1994). Briefly, this means that although the division of different fields, rooted in the academic custom of the 19th century, was structured disciplinarily, meaning that the results of a given discipline were applied in a second step, Mode 2 *initially* requires the research project to have a practical goal and as such, practice and theory are not differentiated, the research always being goal-oriented. In many cases, this means that in a Mode 2 research project, there are a number of specialists who usually achieve results in intersections between disciplines. Thus, the age of the solitary scholar has come to an end: different sites of research are connected by communication networks, the organizational unit of a Mode 2 project is the team, and its main platform of communication is the Internet.

Although in Mode 1 there is a barrier between science and innovation, showcasing a powerful distinction between theory and practice, science and technology, in Mode 2, theory and applicability are continuously intertwined (Soós 2003), with scientific production becoming transdisciplinary. This is characterized by the application of joint methodologies and models in different fields, and the fact that questions and issues emerge outside disciplinary barriers and equally, the solutions are to be looked for outside these boundaries, too.

2. APPROACHES TO DISCIPLINARITY

VERES (2015) suggests that it is necessary to view the problem of disciplinarity both from modern and post-modern perspectives. In case of the former, disciplinarity appears as a historical category, denoting the differentiation of natural, social, economic, and political realities in the form of traditional branches of science that are shaped according to different epistemological specificities. As with the multiplication of interpretive frameworks there appeared a number of new methods and focuses of scientific research, so did the distinctive areas of expertise became more and more in-depth and – simultaneously – isolated. However, this was also the process through which boundaries became overtly narrow for the different disciplines, culminating in an increasing need and desire to cross disciplinary barriers and to initiate cooperation between academic fields. (VERES 2015, 3 Cf. KLEIN 2006.).

This process means both the incorporation of theories and methodological considerations, or actual cooperative research projects between professionals. In other words, as soon as the amount of knowledge accumulated overbore the disciplinary boundaries and methodological rigor of the different fields, various forms of transgressing these boundaries fractured their mono-chromatic nature. (BARRY et al. 2008)

Although the category of disciplinarity in itself suggests that it is a closed circuit, one-dimensional form of scientific production, if we look at this process from a historical perspective, it becomes clear that the dichotomy that claims disciplinarity to be homogenous and inter- and transdisciplinarity to be heterogeneous is fundamentally mistaken. There is, in fact, an inherent diversity within the given academic fields that allows transitions towards new approaches and methodologies, and on a chronological curve, these inherent developments create new connections between theories and methods, meaning that boundaries themselves are constantly shifting. (BARRY et al. 2008)

If we were to view this issue from a postmodern perspective, we must acknowledge that the attempt on behalf of the hard sciences to claim validity for their concept of science in all academic fields is increasingly under scrutiny, which resulted in the appearance of new perspectives and the reinterpretation of former aspects. The problems arising with hermeneutic interpretation and the subsequent conflicts over the definition of the "scientific" resulted in questioning the foundations of science instead of the illusion of being in possession of objective and empirical truth. In this tradition, the focus is no longer on the application of firm and prevalent theoretical and methodological structures, but instead on the horizons of dynamic changes, the options of possible perspectives, or the interpretive frameworks of "truth" as it is currently conceptualized, these being the new and cooperative concepts of scientific communities.

On the other hand, the reign of postmodernism brought about a newly found focus on particularity, applicability, and regional characteristics, which means an increasing demand of closing the gap between theory and practice. This assertion has led to the specificities of Mode 2 of scientific production, meaning that certain aspects of research transcend scientific boundaries due to the newly emergent demand on applicability. These assertions also mean that the context of transgressing these boundaries can be identified as a state of uncertainty, in which not only the questions and the range of possible answers, but the process of disciplinary reorganization are also uncertain. (VERES 2015)

In this process, the myth of rigorous and seemingly stable boundaries between disciplines also begin to erode, new attempts at paradigms and paradigm shifts emerge; research itself enters

center stage, and not the theoretical homogeneity behind these endeavors, while simultaneously new and formerly undiscovered phenomena appear in the scientific corpus. As an obvious end of this process, we may talk about a differentiation between disciplinary characteristics, while isolation of the bodies of knowledge claimed by the different disciplines becomes apparent. This results in the dissolution of said boundaries, urging the former, unidisciplinary paradigm to shift. (Nissani 1995)

3. Intra-, multi-, inter, cross, trans

While the uni/intradisciplinary approach offers a relatively straightforward model, if we are to compare inter/multidisciplinarity, it becomes apparent that these are not radically divergent approaches. The characteristics of the different models and the adjunct matrixes of research methods and approaches are skilfully summarized by Jensenius in his 2012 text (Jensenius 2012). The term "intradisciplinary" denotes a traditional approach to scientific production, in which research is focused on a single given discipline in which professionals rely on the terminology and methodological foundations of their own discipline. Essentially, this is what Gibbons describes, as mentioned above, as Mode 1 of scientific production.

In the case of multidisciplinarity, a multifaceted approach is needed due to the complexity of the problem under scrutiny, the consequence of which is that researches from multiple areas work on the same project. However, they remain in the comfort of their own fields and contribute the results of their own research to the final output. Participants do not transgress their own boundaries; multiple perspectives are present but neither the theories the participants rely on, nor their results are integrated.

Interdisciplinary projects differ from the formerly discussed ones, as the focus of research is primarily on issues that are in the intersection of different disciplines. Thus, researchers from more than one fields strive to unify their approaches and already established bodies of knowledge and try to internalize and amalgamate each concept and approach brought to the table in order to fulfill their research goals. While in the case of multidisciplinarity, respective fields coexist in a parallel way but without transgressions, interdisciplinarity results in an interaction between these fields in a way that enables the creation of new, unified theoretical and methodological approaches. Therefore, results are more likely to be coherent and integrated.

In many cases, the distinction between inter- and transdisciplinarity is far from self-explanatory; many argue that transdisciplinarity is nothing more but interdisciplinarity done right, so to say, while others claim that uni/intradisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity are two ends of the same spectrum, the latter being the most extreme form of interdisciplinarity.

Nowotny (2003) draws our attention to the fact that some view interdisciplinarity as a rhetorical tool of science politics, a mere empty signifier that emerged as a way of dissolving the antagonism between the isolation of fragmented disciplines and the idealized unity of science. Visvanathan (2002) and Sperber (2003) also argue that the implementation of true inter-disciplinarity is highly questionable, for it is impossible to integrate seemingly incomparable approaches within a single institutional context. In their view, cooperation is possible only on the platform of multidisciplinarity.

Regarding cross-disciplinarity, a given perspective or methodology of one field is being used for the purposes of another. This can mean the incorporation of a given theory or the application of a methodological framework, but without aiming to involve the totality of other disciplines. Compared to these, we may define transdisciplinarity as cooperation between paradigmatically different fields in a way that the questions a given project aims to provide answers for come from outside of the disciplines involved, or any disciplines at all. (Jensenius 2012)

First, transdisciplinarity was interpreted as a meta-theoretical perspective of interdisciplinarity, while today, it is a term that is mostly used for research projects that aim not only at creating interdisciplinary cooperation and interaction between respective fields, but at placing these connections in a completely new framework, unburdened by disciplinary boundaries. (Bernstein 2015) This model bears four different characteristic features: (1) it is mainly problem-oriented, but the solutions offered are not derived from the application of already prevalent knowledge, but from the issues arising directly through application and applicability. (2) This model is not disciplinary in nature, meaning that it can go towards multiple directions without the need to adhere to the theoretical or methodological constraints of a given discipline. (3) The results of such a transdisciplinary project is instantly communicated by its participants, and (4) it is considered to be a dynamic model, meaning that the direction the project may take due to the issues emerging is unforeseeable.

These features are directly related to the concept of Paul Feyerabend (1975) who claimed science to be in a state of permanent revolution without uneventful phases of stagnation. According to him, the undisturbed flourishing of theories guarantees the success of science; there are no generally agreed-upon standards of rationality, no universal methodological principles: *anything goes*. This way, the merit of a theory or scientific assertion, approach, and subsequent possible discovery is determined by its validity in light of validity and applicability. Many outstanding scientific discoveries would not have been made if those that made them had strictly adhered to the rules and standards of their age. Intertwined with these assertions, transdisciplinarity has much more scientific potential than other approaches, e.g. multidisciplinarity.

Some may perceive this approach to scientific production as something that is distant from actual scientific work, and closer to market-driven/policy-driven endeavors. Although it is certainly true that, as stressed before, one of the main features of transdisciplinary research is its insistence on being solution-driven and stressing applicability, this does not mean that it is to be seen as semi-scientific. This is why Wiesmann asserted more than a decade ago that one of the challenges lying ahead of transdisciplinarity is *"facing the scientific challenge"* (Wiesmann et al. 2008), meaning striving for proper acknowledgement on behalf of the different substrates of the scientific community. Although it is difficult to state it with certainty, there seems to be a marked increase in such research projects regarding a number of issues – albeit proving this assertion quantitatively with scientific metrics and other tools sadly exceeds the limitations of the present paper.

Knowledge produced by transdisciplinarity is transgressive, since its primary aim is the creation of a common platform, the direct consequence of which is its disregard for institutional boundaries. Its structure, however, is characterized also by the fact that it cannot be reduced to belong to any of its constituent disciplines. Moreover, the specificities of the given research project are determined not by already existing practices, but by consensus reached the participants, the result of which is that knowledge is produced in a network of multiple actors. (Nowotny 2003)

Related to this, we may also emphasize the role of transdisciplinarity in increasing the capacity building potential of scientific communities. As this approach not only enables, but also frankly requires greater cooperation between researchers, research groups, or networks, several actors of scientific production must adopt to these new circumstances. Due to the volume of such projects, funding opportunities need to be increased, which in turn can be viewed more favorably by the general public, as research in this sense focuses on "real-world applicability". On the other hand, these projects also have the potential to enhance technological development as well, because targeting newly emerging problems in an increasingly digital age and attempting to design solutions to them in a way that transgresses the boundaries of deeply rooted structures that seem to have little contemporary utility necessarily requires creating new technological solutions.

4. Mode 2 of Scientific Production

In Mode 2, the logic of scientific production changes primarily the nature of knowledge. While before, innovation was enhanced by new elements of knowledge, in this conceptualization, the novelty is to be understood as the regrouping of already established elements in a way that they supports the reorganization of problem-solving endeavors. Ultimately, transdisciplinarity is therefore to be understood as heterogeneous. This problem-oriented approach, as mentioned, bursts through disciplinary and institutional boundaries, and the ethos of closed scientific communities is replaced by networks of interchangeable and transdisciplinary research groups.

Before presenting a case study of a research project carried out by one of the authors of this paper, Réka Szilárdi, it is important at this point to detail to some extent how one might think of such a transdisciplinary research endeavor in practical terms. Whether we speak of a research group or a network of researchers, groups, we consider the following processes to be the agreed-upon, ideal-typical model for designing transdisciplinary research projects. As is the case – or should be – with all forms of research, the first step is designating a research question, a problem to be solved – fundamentally, the way our knowledge shall be extended. It is common to refer to this as *problem identification,* or as the *identification of the problem field,* to be followed by *problem analysis.* For this reason, we may distinguish three distinct, yet interconnected forms of research questions related to three separate forms of knowledge. (1) *Systems knowledge,* which raises questions about the origin and development opportunities for a given issue that comes from outside of the sphere of academia, with real-life stakes and implications. (2) *Target knowledge,* which raises questions that strive at narrowing down problems and justifying what is to be changed, what practices should be improved. (3) *Transformation knowledge,* in the case of which the related questions are targeted towards the practical ways of achieving change in their totality, including technical, social, legal, cultural and other possible means." (Pohl–Hadorn 2007) In reality, the actual, focused topic of research is the blend of these three aspects.

Simultaneously with designing of the research problem, the practical, organizational framework of the project should also be drawn up. The parties involved should designate different roles though this process, each according to their own capabilities and strengths, while also considering a decision-making structure that ideally is most beneficial for the aims of the research project and is in accordance with the requirements of the funding opportunities available. Subsequently, those involved parties with decision-making authority (the so-called *core team*) must decide

on how to undertake what is probably the single most crucial aspect of transdisciplinary research: *thematic synthesis.* (Hoffmann 2017) This process involves the development of a method of integration that is unique in all such projects, but nonetheless provides an opportunity for all involved parties to contribute, rendering the final product coherent and in accordance with the agreed upon set of milestones, aims, and final output.

After each party conducts their research activities, these shall be assessed and synthetized on a new, common platform, during which – as customary in the case of all scientific endeavors – results are required to be validated and the model of application should also be created with the involvement of all interested parties. (Hoffman 2017). This process of synthetizing is to be concluded with a common reflection on the results achieved and their subsequent dissemination. Such dissemination activities should include not only the achieved results with a focus on their implementable application, whether in the form of traditional and novel forms of academic publications, reports, policy suggestions, etc., but should also include a detailed description of how these results were achieved, e. g. the transdisciplinary structure in which it was done so. The purpose for this is two-fold: one the one hand, it presents a clearer image of the respective responsibilities of constituent researchers, networks, and their contribution, which is important both on the level of personal trajectories and for the nurturing of future opportunities for cooperation. On the other, such descriptions have the potential to encourage and instruct other researchers, groups, or networks to initiate and engage in similar transdisciplinary research schemes.

4.1. Case study

4.1.1. The construction of national identity within ethnic religious communities

In the turbulent years after the regime changes in 1989, many groups have emerged in Central and Eastern Europe, including Hungary that aimed at reconstructing their *original* ethnic religions (the pagan mythology in the case of Hungary). These communities represented a novelty not only from a religious perspective but also due to the fact that they centered their views around such concepts as innate distrust towards established academic considerations regarding the topic, ethnocentrism, the sense of being a threatened minority, and an array of nationalist ideologies.

There were a number of questions that arose regarding these groups:

1. Why do they have nationalist attitudes, while similar communities aiming to reconstruct ethnic religions in Western Europe and the English-speaking world are organized along principles that are diametrically opposed to theirs?
2. What is happening to collective identity in the region?
3. How can these phenomena be approached empirically?
4. What consequences can be drawn from these results, and how should this form of ethnocentric nationalism be handled?

It was quite obvious that to answer these questions, it was necessary to involve the theoretical context of a number of disciplines, while also creating a methodological framework in which it was possible to examine the totality of this highly complex topic.

4.1.2. Theories

The theoretical foundations needed for examining the identity of these religious groups and the national representations that were attached to them were to be found at the intersection of religious studies, social psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, and political science.

To maps these issues, many theories and results produced by religious studies scholars in the past decades regarding the interplay between society and religion were used. These included a reinterpretation of secularization theories and the religious changes that accompanied them, the sociology of new religious movements and the interpretation of religion as an economic phenomenon, and the approach of cultural and religious studies towards reconstructionist religions. Along these approaches, the specificities of these contemporary pagan groups, the basic differences within their ranks, their social stratification and their social function also became discernible and interpretable.

For this multifaceted analysis, the main interpretive framework was provided by the achievements of social psychology regarding (mainly social) identity constructions. This way, with the interpretation of social comparison theory and self-categorization models, it became possible to shed light on intergroup emotions and the mechanisms of self-evaluation. Moreover, theories of social constructivism provided further perspectives for interpreting self-evaluation within the context of the dynamics of interactions.

The paradigm of narrative identity illuminated the given group's collective memory, as well as the elements and mechanisms of the inherently present narrative structures in which they are embedded. Similarly, the characteristic features of social representation theory contributed largely to the understanding the structure and different types of collective representations. When examining the multifaceted sphere of Hungarian reconstructionist religious groups, theories of ingroups and outgroups tendencies and the patterns emerging in collective memory both proved immensely useful, while the contents reflecting on contemporary and prior history also helped in capturing the characteristics of competing representations.

The theory of collective national identity, being a great example for social identity, was the starting point for the research project. The examination of national identity and its many implications were embedded in the broader framework of social sciences. A number of considerations offered by social psychology, cultural studies, and anthropology were used to understand the conceptual horizon of many issues, while also including historical and political approaches to the theory of divergent concepts of nationalisms.

The topic of historical trauma implied the discussion of psychological theories of trauma states to some extent, whereas in order to understand the region's social changes, the social psychological consequences of Hungary's communist past also had to be considered.

4.1.2. Hypotheses

The basic hypothesis of the project was that Central-Eastern European ethnic religious movements differ from their Western European and English-speaking counterparts regarding their perception of national identity in the sense that national elements are present in faith dimensions, with a special emphasis on what academic literature sees as ethnic identity. Because the roots of these differences

are most likely to be found in specific features of regional (national) identity, the contextual, linguistic and content elements of these religious texts played a major role when creating the hypotheses. They provided a basic category for the characteristic identity patterns on the one hand, and on the other, if this identity substitute was to be rooted in a sense of threatened identity, it must have been found and validated on a linguistic level. Based on these assertions, 5 clusters of textual corpuses were created with 7 different hypotheses.

4.1.3. Sample

The sample was a textual corpus of 102.000 words that consisted of the religious narratives produced by the given groups and compiled with different considerations.

4.1.4. Methods

The preliminary phase of the research project included 4 years of fieldwork during which the public events of the given groups were observed. Naturally, this involved interviews with members and group leaders alike, appended with anthropological thick descriptions of each events.

Simultaneously, after uniting the large array of theoretical approaches and scientific results on a common platform, the next step was to commit to a methodological framework. Since the aim was to examine identity contents, qualitative methods were to be used, such as hermeneutic and field analysis, as well as network analysis.

The major part of the methodology, however, was a deeply rooted in transdisciplinary convictions. This was an automatized narrative content analysis tool, NarrCat, developed by the Narrative Psychology Research Group at the University of Pécs in the past 25 years. With this highly sophisticated tool, researchers are able to carry out empirical narrative analysis in a wide-ranging variety of fields.

Scientific narrative psychology[2] is a method centered on the conviction that individuals and groups create their own narratives along different principles of composition, which represent the observable psychological states of the given individuals and groups. This method pairs principles and categories of composition with psychological categories and analyzes them from statistical perspectives. The method is also capable of diagnosing and forecasting psychological states and processes of identification in case of individuals and groups.

During a narrative categorical analysis, automatized reduction of specified data occurs: the specified narrative units are transformed into categories that serve as bases for later analysis.

The development of NarrCat was the result of close cooperation between three different fields: psychology, linguistics, and information technology.[3] Its structure was preceded by two preconditions of linguistic technology: NooJ, the linguistic development environment software that serves currently as its main platform, and Hungarian national corpuses.

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[2] This term denotes a way of pursuing narrative psychological investigations that is distinct in a sense that it strictly adheres to the criteria of empirical research. This concept was developed by János László and his research group (LÁSZLÓ 2008, 2014).

[3] The method is the result of cooperation between the following institutions: Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience and Psychology, Research Center for Natural Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Institute of Psychology, University of Pécs; Research Institute for Linguistics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Institute of Informatics, University of Szeged; Morphologic Ltd.

The modularly structured systems is based on different lexicons; these were gained from corpuses representing general lexicon of the Hungarian language as well as specific texts of psychology.[4] The linguistically annotated lexicons served as input for local grammars.

Local grammars, in turn, served as input for two higher-order modules: the psycho-thematic and the relational modules (social references, negation, thematic roles). The flexibility of combining lexicons, local grammars, and modules also provide an opportunity for creating so-called Hypermodules.

NarrCat is an open and expandable system, and in its current form, it is capable of analyzing a wide variety of individual and group narratives, while allowing minor, project-specific applications, too. The system's core consists of modules (Emotion, Assessment, Agency, Cognition; Temporality and Spatiality, etc.), and each module has sub modules which consist of local grammars based on input lexicons. (EHMANN et al. 2014)

4.1.5. Research

Following the compilation of the textual corpus consisting of collective narratives, content analysis included first those explorative examinations that aimed at capturing the specific characteristics of the text in the form of thematic field analysis and hermeneutic analysis. Utilizing these, it turned out that the religious groups examined were bound to exaggerate the menacing image of a foreign power, a phenomenon that has deep social roots. Moreover, an intergenerational, heritable collective emotional pattern derives from these tendencies in which a number of ambivalent contents tend to appear, such as an unrealistic territorial insistence, a perpetual state of being threatened, the sense of self-accusation, and the over-exaggeration of the self. The data and the different theoretical considerations provided the base for further hypotheses about identity contents.

In order to discard or validate the hypotheses, the different modules of NarrCat were used. First, the corpus was analyzed using the pertaining modules of Nooj, after which the previously annotated text was revised manually with the Atlas.Ti 5.5 content analysis software. In order to eliminate false matches, actual matches were first labelled according to their positions within the relevant modules (agency, assessment, emotion). The qualitative data set was quantified, and the hypothesis were proven correct by statistical validation. The whole of this research project is accessible, as well as it's distinct parts. (SZILÁRDI 2006, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2017)

The whole of the research project was conducted in adherence to the model of interdisciplinarity, considering a number of aspects of said model:

1. First, it was not the disciplinary framework, but the topic itself and the problem field that prompted the involvement of different fields, theories, and approaches. During the project – although it was one of the authors of the present paper, Réka Szilárdi, who conducted the theoretical research by herself – a self-organizing research network was created with the involvement of researchers reflecting on the same problems in different countries in the region. (cf. AITAMUURO–SIMPSON 2013 and SZILÁRDI 2013).

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[4] These include in-depth interviews with populations with different psychological conditions (depression, borderline, substance dependence, crisis), intergenerational interviews with traumatized families, semi-structured interviews with normal populations (regarding issues related to performance, loss, interpersonal relationships), and historical, ethnic, and national corpuses.

2. Second, the methodology itself was layered and emerged as the result of cooperation between markedly different fields, such as narrative psychology, linguistics, and information technology.

3. Third, the practical applicability of the results transcends purely scientific boundaries, since it not only explores the divergent forms of identities, but also postulates propositions for possible and applicable solutions for handling patterns of threatened/victim identities – thus fulfilling the applicability requirement of transdisciplinary approaches.

CONCLUSION

As we have tried to demonstrate above, transdisciplinarity is different from other forms of scientific production. The range of issues examined are wide and the emerging problems transgress disciplinary boundaries – it is much more practical, and its output can be characterized as transdisciplinary knowledge value chains. In essence, transdisciplinary approaches tend to deal with problems outside of disciplinary boundaries and does so with methods that are to be found there, as well. It enhances cooperation between seemingly isolated fields of research instead of different disciplinary fortresses, secluded from and suspicious of each other. These knowledge value chains have to potential to connect the humanities, and the various branches of social and natural sciences for a common goal. Based on these observations, it is safe to state – without stretching credulity – that transdisciplinary research truly represents the way forward both for research endeavors in particular and scientific production in general.

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Coercion, Fear and Seeking for Amends in The Work's of Bibó's[1]

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ABSTRACT

István Bibó's works are focused on political hysteria. Political hysteria is characterised by fear caused by legitimacy crisis and the vicious cycle of coercion. Patterns of political culture and socialization dominated by hysteria are in lack of autonomy and self-responsibility. Instead, the cult of martyrdom, revenge and "escape from freedom" play a key role.

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Hungarian Democracy in Crisis, one of the most known essays of Bibó's, begins with the following sentences: *"Hungarian democracy is in crisis. It is in crisis because it is living in fear."*[2] The author's statement is quite strange, but not in the first sentence. There nothing unusual is claimed: in political publicity it is a common rhetoric element to pose the problems intended to unfold as crises to attract the reader's attention. The astounding and at the same time telling assertion can be found in the second sentence. It is in crisis *because* it is living in fear? Of course fear is an awful thing, but why does it cause crisis? As we have known so far, a deep crisis emerges when there is war, revolution, counter-revolution or starvation, mass disaster etc. *indeed.* However, when people are onl*y afraid* of these things but in fact no guns are shooting and no dead men are lying on the streets, why would we call this a crisis?

Well, at this point we can find a fundamental feature of Bibó's way of thinking. Bibó believes indeed that there is *nothing worse than fear* itself. If in a society, in public life people are afraid of something, then – even if the feared events don't happen –, fear itself implicates the nightmare scenario. Therefore good politics has to strive to create a world without fear.

But why is fear this important? Well, at the beginning of his lecture from 1971 titled *The meaning of European social development* Bibó claims: *man is the only being aware of his death.*[3] Thus fear is part of the human condition, and the worst one of all is to fear another person. That is to say to fear that *I, a subject can become a bare object in the hands of others more powerful than me* and this way I also lose my human dignity – after all, a person should not become the instrument of another.[4] However, fear is also generated by – as he exposes it in his lectures on Political Science held at the Faculty of Law at the University of Szeged – that power relations are constantly changing which causes such an uncertainty that finally many rather opt for calculable submission than eternal incalculability.[5]

Basically Bibó was a specialist of the Great Fears arising from system and imperium changes, revolutions and counter-revolutions. He was inspired by his teacher, Guglielmo Ferrero, the great Italian historian.[6] However, even before having read the works of Ferrero, in his dissertation on the philosophy of law *Coercion, Law, Freedom*[7] in 1935 he was dealing, with a psychological, empathic approach typical for him, with the experience of coercion, the state of mind under constraint – which is very similar to being terrified.

As according to Bibó coercion is a phenomenon of human psyche, we should get familiar with our author's concept of man. According to Bibó in the human world causality is an extraneous principle, as the main, own principle here is spontaneity,[8] personal determination[9] which he explains in his draft lecture in manuscript: *"the condition of man: a fragile, complicated, weaker but still stronger, personal being. In the rough physical environment that is surrounding us it takes much*

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[2] Bibó 1986. II. Vol. 1.

[3] *The Art of Peacemaking.* 374.

[4] Dénes 2004. 224.

[5] Op. cit. 136–137.

[6] Ferrero 1941, 1961, 1972.

[7] Bibó 1986. Op. cit. I. köt. 5–149.

[8] Op. cit. 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22.

[9] Op. cit. 58.

longer to create a living being (9 months) than to destroy it (a moment). This justifies fear. The nature of man: gentle, curious, creative, adventurous and risk taking".[10]

However, spontaneity still doesn't guarantee freedom, which Bibó defines as the victory of our own principle over the extraneous principle in our approaches. (If the choice doesn't even emerge, if there is no other way, there is no freedom at all).[11] It is possible that in our approaches and experiences causality (representing an alien law) triumphs over spontaneity (representing an own law).[12]

This is the phenomenon of coercion which means also viewing own and alien law together but in a reverse way compared to the case of freedom. In the case of coercion we experience in our view that we have been overcome, we recognize our weaknesses: namely that on the basis of our own principle, i. e. spontaneously we obey the extraneous will as if we were only physical beings without own subjectivity and ruled by the doctrine of causality.[13] This also means that coercion ends up in dehumanization: man is brought to lose control – but man, who learns reality through experience as a feeling and willing creature, who lives among risks can really live only as a person, as a free subject, not as an object or instrument.[14] In the latter case, due to vulnerability and being exposed to danger we can give up our freedom and be subservient to the forces opposed to our willing. *"Coactus tamen volui!"* (Constrained, nevertheless by my own will) – he cites the Latin phrase,[15] by which he underlines that under pressure and frightened we are able to convince ourselves of things and want things we originally didn't want to.

What does the idea of dehumanization consist of, what are the components of experiencing coercion? First of all it leads to trauma, as besides fear it causes harm as well, and we consider it as injustice when we are constrained on something against our will. Furthermore, we feel ourselves impotent: as if we reached an impasse. This means that one being constrained considers himself a victim. However, besides victimization there is another dimension of being constrained: the own responsibility of the one being constrained! This is a test of understanding Bibó, as we have to indicate in advance that what Bibó says might appear as blaming the victim at first sight.

An unavoidable component of being constrained is something similar to schizophrenia. Since at the beginning of suffering from coercion we don't want what others try to press on us, but if after being controlled by and surrendering to the pressure and *"identify ourselves with the aggressor"*. That is to say, finally we reconcile ourselves to the situation: *"that's it, you've got to get used to it"*.[16] Bibó illustrates it as following: *"The one being constrained surrenders to coercion not because it determines his action inevitably as causality, but because from the actor's spontaneity and the irrational or conscious reality of his own instincts, intentions and precepts it follows a surrendering standpoint towards coercion"*.[17] It is also recognizable in the following:

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[10] *Bibó István hagyatéka.* 1–71.

[11] Bibó 1986. Op. cit. I. köt. 46., 60.

[12] In his argumentation Bibó mainly relies on *Bergson* (Bergson 1911) and *Hartmann* (Hartmann 1926).

[13] Op. cit.. 45., 47.

[14] See Bibó's lecture: E*llentétpárok:* Bibó István op. cit., *MTAKK Ms* 5116/39–86. 1–71.

[15] Bibó 1986. Op. cit. I. köt. 18.

[16] Cp. the following concept from the lecture outline from the *Ellentétpárok: "Sense: able to think the opposite of itself. Fear: makes to do the opposite of itself!"* Bibó Op. cit , *MTAKK Ms* 5116/39–86. 1–71.

"According to common generalization the constrained action is the action of the one being constrained, however, it can be imputed to the coercing one. The true part of this is that the action of the forced one doesn't fully count towards him. The final move in every case of coercion is still made by the spontaneity of the actor. Even the strongest coercion can be imputed to the actor which is best illustrated by the fact that a standpoint taken under coercion can be regretted. And usually resistance towards the constraining tools held to be the most effective is evaluated morally the highest".[18] That is to say, the one being constrained is also responsible – however, compared to the constraining one only just a little – for finally willing to do what he rejected in the beginning and this, namely giving up his conviction, was decided by himself!

However, traumas, sufferings and becoming a victim can hinder taking this responsibility which in turn – as we could see above – is the indispensible condition of achieving freedom. According to Bibó that's how it can be realized: *"Much like a healthy individual.*[19] *a community capable of putting its abilities to good and safe use, however great or small, is strengthened when encountering catastrophe*[20] *because it makes a reasonable assessment of the causes of its troubles, draws lessons from them, bears what it deems elemental calamity, assumes the moral responsibility it recognizes as its own fault, finds redress for the injustices committed against it, resigns itself to what cannot be undone, renounces dreams impossible to attain, and defines and performs its duties. [...] A balanced community will finally solve its problems."*[21] Actually in this sentence Bibó sets out the criteria of resilience, the proactive, prosocial reaction to a crisis. These are the following: consideration of real power relations (no matter how strong or weak a political community is, it is realism that matters), revealing the real reasons for failure and drawing the lesson, taking moral responsibility for our own mistakes, gaining compensation for the injustice suffered, enduring the unchangeable and solving our problems.

Three elements should be underlined: taking responsibility for the mistakes, seeking for amends and enduring the unchangeable. Due to the existence of the own mistakes and the unchangeable it is obvious that the amends gained for the injustice can't be unlimited, even if the feeling of duty to have sympathy with the victim would at first make us believe so. Actually this is what brings us to the state of political hysteria. *"Political hysteria always starts out from a traumatic historical experience, in the life of a community, particularly one the members of the community believe to be intolerable and think the solution to the problems to which it gave rise is beyond the abilities of the community. As a result of such an exceedingly great trauma, political thinking, emotions, and intentions of a community become obdurate and paralyzed, the memory of the trauma, the lesson drawn from it for good or ill, and the desire that the community be fully guaranteed that the catastrophe will not be repeated predominate. Thoughts, feeling, and activity are thus*

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[17] Bibó 1986. I. 17.

[18] Op. cit. 31.

[19] Although Bibó draws a parallel between the individual and the community, he rejects the metaphysics of the community. He remonstrates: he is also aware that only the individual can have a soul, will and emotions. Consequently, in his interpretation "community" means relations based on the interactions of the individuals. (*The Art of Peacemaking.* 45.)

[20] Obviously this doesn't mean a natural disaster or personal tragedy (disease, loss of a relative) but political cataclysm, of which the source is/are another person/people and the constraining tools applied by him/them.

[21] *The Art of Peacemaking.* 46.

morbidly attached to one interpretation of a single experience.[22] *In this petrified and lame state, pressing problems become irrelevant if in some way they have a bearing on the critical issue."*[23]

This is still the side-effect of victimization, the tragedies experienced. While looking for the justifiable amends one gets quite easily to the (mis)conclusion: the one who has been committed injustice against, is always right, therefore the whole world is in debt to the victim, (s)he just has a demand to everyone, but can't have any responsibility for anything. Otherwise, the deeds committed against him would gain confirmation and the offenders would be encouraged again. This in turn means a great and at the same time dead cert psychological gain which is equivalent to neither taking responsibility for the own mistakes nor tolerating the unchangeable or solving the problems. However, this way seemingly logical pseudo solutions come to the front which implicate the normalization of hysteria by generating the illusion of moral invulnerability: *"The worldview of hysteria is closed and perfect. Everything tallies with everything in it. There is only one thing amiss. Everything concurs in it not because it corresponds to genuine values and actual facts but because it systematizes the requirements of the false situation and says precisely what the one living in falsity wants to hear."*[24]

The false situation and the misleading experience generated by it appears and reproduces in habits, conventions, patterns and behaviour to such an extent that it becomes the norm.[25] It gets normalised, confirmed by everyday experiences, and behaviour contrary to this will be stigmatized as deviance and will be marginalized. This very kind of consolidation paralyses the managing of the most severe crisis and impasses, as the false situations and misleading experiences reproduced by forms and processes of interaction become evident and get infiltrated into inter-personal communication and the personality as well. Added to that is the loss of political instinct and judgement and the systematical making of wrong decisions in the most important situations: the members of the political class are not capable of *"instilling in people a sense of security in the face of the chimeras of fear, objective courage against actual danger".*[26]

Instead, seeking for amends spreads which becomes self-reproducing as a consequence of the gratification offered by the attitudes in relation with it on the one hand and the identity based on suffering on the other. Like this the seeking for recompense intensifies (!) after receiving amends because it enables to experience justification, apotheosis and the feeling of symbolic satisfaction over and over again: *"Should that environment decide to make amends, the hysteric will regard it as a justification of his own worldview, and he will lose restraint the moment the longed-for amends are offered. He will no longer be satisfied by any compensation, and his exceeding moral complacency and bullying will challenge his environment to fight. [...] As the pursuer runs amok, the factors that helped him until his cause had some genuine basis and justification or that he forced or imagined to side with him fall away."*[27] The former victim becomes Michael Kohlhaas whose

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[22] Cf. with the following: *"in the case of coercion instead of considering all the reasons, only one reason emerges which is regarded as the reason for coercion."* (Bɪʙó Op. cit.. 15.)

[23] *The Art of Peacemaking.* 47.

[24] *The Art of Peacemaking.* 47.

[25] See *The Art of Peacemaking.* 45.

[26] *The Art of Peacemaking.* 28.

[27] *The Art of Peacemaking* 48.

fate is an example for the following: *"nobody tends to commit injustice as much as the one who regards himself the innocent victim of injustice."*[28] Finally this process ends up in a disaster.[29] *"In the final count the individual or community that goes berserk runs his or its head against a wall of facts harder than any magic, spell, or illusion."*[30]

All this seems to be such an unstoppable vicious cycle that the question arises: is there any remedy, and if there is, what is it? Bibó first of all clarifies what we should not do. It isn't possible and it isn't worth to criticize or condemn the hysterical views, because this would cause another harm to the ones bearing hysteria, that is: we would give new impulses for them to go on playing their games – the analysis of hysteria is about self-responsibility and empowerment – and it makes no sense either to try to exclude the 'hysterical' from the political community.[31] So what to do then, what is it what we can do at all? Well, above all the most important aim is the achievement of autonomy, as the seeking for amends, which is focused on the image of the enemy and considers suffering, rather than decision making, a merit. However, these can't be worked out by self-contradicting messages as *"be free"*, *"be spontaneous"*, *"take the responsibility"* because this is nonsensical if based on duty. But it is already clear from *"Coercion, Law, Freedom"* that 'constrained freedom' is absurd.[32] Recognizing this, we can find the solution: on the basis of duty only *punishing others* is possible. However, virtue ethics[33] builds on public good, not on the obligations of man.

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[28]   Bibó 1990. 587.

[29]   *"Men commit their most gruesome hair-raising acts not when they give free reign to their natural beastly savagery. Savagery is quick to spend its fury, even the wildest bloodbath ending in physical nausea, and men have tame, not only wild, instincts. Men are most wicked when they believe they are threatened, morally justified, and exonerated, and particularly when they feel they are entitled and obliged to punish others. This is when they are capable of throwing off all vestiges of shame, of overcoming their physical nausea, and becoming massacrers, of being inveterate even when stones soften – not to mention men who give reign to beastly savagery."* The Art of Peacemaking. 194.

[30]   T*he Art of Peacemaking.* 48.

[31]   *"For those who shape the hysterical manifestations of that community, whether by direct political action, approval or mere acquiescence, taking a common political stand often engages only one area of their mental world; moreover, they themselves may personally be of sound mind and spirit, very appealing even, and whatever they do, profess or think in the name of their community, may seem perfectly reasonable, practical, or inevitable under the given circumstances.*
Naturally, community hysterias generate their blind, furious, and obtuse type of man, primarily prone to falling for and ranting their characteristic self-deceiving follies; their beneficiaries, who swim with the hysteric tide and profit by it; as well as their gangsters and henchmen. […] Plans seeking to cure hysteria by destroying, isolating or casting out its carriers grouped or whatever basis, will not help at all. Community hysteria is the condition of the community as a whole, and there is no use in eliminating the visible carriers of hysteria when its conditions and grounds remain untouched, its initial traumas are unrelieved, and the make-believe situation on which it is actually founded is unresolved. There is no use in eliminating all »evil men«: the delusions and false responses of hysteria will live on in peaceful patresfamilias; in mothers of six; in clean-headed persons who would not kill a fly; in noble, lofty, exalted minds; and the community will bring forth the madmen, the beneficiaries and thugs of hysteria in a generation." The Art of Peacemaking 45. The statement that hysteria is the status of the whole community is emphasized by the French interpreter of Bibó, Emmanuel Terray: Emmanuel Terray: *La question du voile: une hystérie politique.* http://reseau-ipam.org/article.php3?id_article=94. 2004. Last download: 1st January 2016.

[32]   Bibó 1986. Op.cit. I. 45.

[33]   Cf. Rácz 2014. 87–155.

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From Philosophy to Process Sociology

ABSTRACT

This paper traces the early influences that shaped Norbert Elias's thought during his formative years in Breslau. Norbert Elias, a major figure of twentieth-century European sociology, built a unique research tradition known today as process sociology after rejecting philosophy at the beginning of his career and polemicized with the dominant social scientific schools of his time throughout his long life. This paper, examining Elias's less known early writings and particularly his doctoral thesis in philosophy disputed by his supervisor, Richard Hönigswald, argues that to better understand, value and utilize Norbert Elias's unique processual approach to sociology one must better understand the relationship between the neo-Kantian movement, a today neglected, but once a highly influential continental philosophical movement of the second half of the long nineteenth century, and the thinking of Elias's rebel generation in interwar Germany. This paper also intends to search for a common ground between the philosophical and the sociological traditions.

KEYWORDS

Norbert Elias, Hönigswald, neo-Kantianism, process sociology, philosophy, Weimar

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Norbert Elias, who is best known in academic circles for his works related to historical sociology (*Die höfische Gesellschaft* 1969[1], *Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation* 1939[2]), was one of the most original figures of the twentieth-century sociological thought. The scope of his oeuvre extends far beyond what his popular image of a historian of manners and culture would suggest.

During his long career, Elias made a break with a number of common assumptions of the then-dominant schools of sociology, for example, that sociology is solely the study of advanced modern societies. Instead, he considered the study of long-term processes spanning through human history as one of the most important tasks of sociology. The goal for him was not merely a better understanding of modern societies but the better understanding of the human condition itself.[3] As he pointed out quite early in his career, *"if one wishes to understand man, if one wishes to understand oneself – every period of history is equally relevant to us"*.[4] He relentlessly criticized the structural-functionalist and the Marxist sociological theory of the second half of the twentieth century together with phenomenology and systems theory, just like other disciplines such as history or psychology. He considered their individualistic, rationalistic, ideological, economistic and over-analytic tendencies, their overly abstract and static nature and the narrowness of their scope a hindrance to synthesis and understanding.[5]

He reserved his harshest words for philosophy, however. As Richard Kilminster put it *"*[Elias's critique] *...was based on a scientific conviction that the entire tradition of philosophy is historically defunct and cognitively deficient. For him, it would be scientifically and intellectually dishonest to argue otherwise. Philosophy is revealed as a superseded and potentially disorienting form of human orientation related to theology and magical mythical thought."*[6] His rejection of philosophy was a deeply held conviction that formed the core of his thought, the core of process sociology as it is known today, thus one cannot properly understand process sociology and the task of sociology according to Elias without understanding his critique of philosophy.

For this reason, the goal of this paper is to make an attempt towards the reconstruction of the influences that formed Norbert Elias's thought since his youth and evoked his rather radical stance, regarding some of his peers and philosophy in particular. It aims to adopt a non-dogmatic approach, however. The intent is not to justify or refute the considerations behind Elias's position but to reach a better understanding of his highly critical approach while remaining open to the arguments of the other side as well. To reconstruct the arguments that form the basis of his life's work, while not throwing out the proverbial baby – in this case two and a half millennia of the western philosophical tradition – with the bathwater, and if it's possible, to bridge the perceived chasm between philosophy and process sociology.

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[1] English title: *The Court Society.*

[2] English title: *On the Process of Civilization.*

[3] KILMINSTER 2011. 91–92.

[4] ELIAS 2006a. 75.

[5] KILMINSTER 2011. 92.

[6] KILMINSTER 2011. 98.

In order to achieve these goals, on the following pages I intend to revisit Norbert Elias's formative years in Breslau and the intellectual climate in academic philosophy in interwar Germany (the reasons behind the demise of neo-Kantianism in particular) with the help of some of Elias's little known early writings (his doctoral thesis in philosophy entitled *Idee und Individuum: Eine kritische Untersuchung zum Begriff der Geschichte*[7] submitted in 1922 and its revised summary entitled *Idee und Individuum: Ein Beitrag zur Philosophie der Geschichte*[8] published in 1924), his autobiographical essay published in 1984 (*Notizen zum Lebenslauf*[9] 1984), a number of interviews he gave late in his life and a selection of secondary literature available in English on the philosophical and sociological trends of the era. I will only graze the subject of Elias's best-known works the aforementioned *Die höfische Gesellschaft*[10], his doctoral thesis in sociology under the supervision of Karl Mannheim and the *Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation*[11] because these texts were later heavily revised by Elias himself, therefore, they represent Elias's later thinking.

Although Elias wrote exclusively in German before the end of the Second World War, today's English-speaking readers are in the fortunate position that his entire oeuvre is available in authoritative English translation as well published by the University College Dublin Press. The translations were mostly approved by Elias himself. In the following, I am going to refer to the English editions of Elias's works.

1. INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES OF THE EARLY YEARS SPENT IN BRESLAU

Elias was born in Breslau, a German city in the eastern part of the German Empire, what is today the Polish city of Wrocław, on June 22, 1897, in a comfortably well-off German Jewish family.[12] According to Elias's recollections, he wished to become a university professor from a very young age despite the numerous obstacles barring this career path from young men with a Jewish background in Wilhelmine Germany, thus, he oriented towards an intellectual career quite early in his life.[13] He was first introduced to philosophy and to Kantian philosophy in particular, without which a proper philosophy education was unimaginable at that time, at the Johannes-Gymnasium in Breslau where he was taught by a distinguished staff (including Julius Stenzel who later became a professor of philosophy at the University of Kiel).[14] Elias's interest in philosophy, which developed during these early years, proved to be lasting as he enrolled into the Faculty of Philosophy alongside the Faculty of Medicine at the Schlesische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Breslau[15] after his demobilisation from the Signal Corps in 1918 at the end of the First World War. During his philosophical studies in Breslau Elias also visited lectures in other German universities

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[7] English title: *Idea and individual: a critical investigation of the concept of history.*

[8] English title: *Idea and individual: a contribution to the philosophy of history.*

[9] English title: *Notes on a Lifetime.*

[10] English title: *The Court Society.*

[11] English title: *On the Process of Civilization.*

[12] MENNELL 1998. 4.

[13] ELIAS 2013a. 80.

[14] ELIAS 2013b. 6.

[15] Silesian Friedrich-Wilhelm University of Breslau.

as it was customary among students at the time. In 1919 he attended the seminar of one of the leading neo-Kantian philosophers, Heinrich Rickert, in Heidelberg where he also got acquainted with and befriended the philosopher Karl Jaspers. Additionally, in 1920 Elias visited Freiburg where he attended the Goethe seminar of Edmund Husserl and probably got acquainted with Martin Heidegger who was Husserl's assistant between 1919 and 1923.[16]

The Schlesische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Breslau, similarly to other German universities at the beginning of the twentieth century was dominated by neo-Kantian philosophy, a now largely neglected but then wildly influential continental philosophical movement. Neo-Kantianism started out at the end of the eighteenth century as a response to the decline of Kant's influence and to the rise of German idealism. More specifically it was a reaction to Karl Leonhard Reinhold's, Johann Gottlieb Fichte's and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling's methods. The early neo-Kantians were aiming to rehabilitate Kantian philosophy after REINHOLD's *Elementarphilosophie* and FICHTE's *Wissenschaftslehre* had laid the groundwork for the rise of speculative idealism and gradually Kantian philosophy became obsolete in the eyes of the Romantic generation of young German philosophers. According to F. C. Beiser: *"The founding fathers of the movement were Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–1843), Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841) and Friedrich Eduard Beneke (1798–1854). All defined themselves as Kantians, and all called for a return to the spirit of Kant's teachings. They anticipated, and laid down the foundation for, defining doctrines of later neo-Kantianism: the importance of the Kantian dualisms between essence and existence, understanding and sensibility; the limitation of all knowledge to experience; the leading role of a critical and analytical method in philosophy; and the need for philosophy to follow rather than lead the natural sciences."*[17]

Their success and eventual rise to dominance by the second half of the nineteenth century can be attributed to several factors shaping German society, intellectual life and philosophy in particular of the time. Two of these, German nationalism and German historicism were broad intellectual currents with influence extending far beyond the world of philosophical circles. On the one hand, the unified German state did not become a political reality until 1871 and Immanuel Kant, the first philosopher of international stature since Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was a source of great pride for Germans and played a major role in shaping the German cultural identity during the first half of the nineteenth century. German historicism, on the other hand, was an intellectual current that encouraged self-awareness, the reflection on, and recollection of one's origins, historical roots. Kant as a major figure of eighteenth-century continental European philosophy was obviously an important part of the origins and historical roots of modern German philosophy, therefore, it was an unavoidable task to trace his influence and the development of his thought for anyone who wished to understand what shaped modern German philosophy, how it came to be.[18]

Beyond these general intellectual currents that created interest towards Kant, the strictly philosophical rationale of neo-Kantianism, which helped the movement to become dominant, was also twofold. On the one hand, speculative idealism, one of the main competitors of neo-Kantianism, collapsed during the middle of the nineteenth-century after Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's death in 1831 and the end of the Prussian Reform Movement in 1840, and also partly due to the increasingly

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[16] KILMINSTER 2006. xii–xiii.

[17] BEISER 2014. 3.

[18] BEISER 2014. 4–5.

ferocious attacks on Hegelian philosophy beginning in the 1820s. Three of Hegel's major critics worth being highlighted in this regard were Friedrich Adolf TRENDELENBURG who in his *Logische Untersuchungen* (1840) launched a powerful attack against Hegel's dialectic, Rudolf Hermann LOTZE who in his *Metaphysik* (1841) exposed the weaknesses of Hegel's logic and Ludwig Andreas VON FEUERBACH who with his *Das Wesen des Christentums* (1841) convinced non-Hegelians that Hegel's metaphysics is obsolete and they need to go beyond Hegel. This development was leaving neo-Kantianism as one of the main contenders with the chance of filling the vacuum left behind by the demise of speculative idealism in the German intellectual scene.[19] On the other hand, during the 1860s German intellectual circles were beginning to consider neo-Kantianism as one of the possible solutions to the major intellectual controversies of the time, namely, the so-called "identity crisis of philosophy" and the "materialism controversy".

The "materialism controversy" arose due to the increasing and all-conquering success of the empirical and particularly the natural sciences. The question was whether or not the success of the scientific enterprise is inevitably leading to the rejection of religion. It was an issue that was already present during the eighteenth-century and Kant's message, that a via media is possible between science and faith and one does not have to choose, still resonated strongly during the nineteenth century so much so that it helped the neo-Kantian movement to stall the materialist advance. The other major philosophical controversy of the time, the so-called "identity crisis of philosophy" also leads us back to the staggering success of the natural sciences and the already mentioned mid-nineteenth-century collapse of speculative idealism because these developments led many contemporaries to question the viability of philosophy itself. Their argument was that philosophy became obsolete and today it has nothing more to offer than, as Beiser puts it, "metaphysical hocus-pocus". Amidst these difficult times, the promise of the neo-Kantian movement was that through the examination of the methods, standards and presuppositions of the empirical sciences, philosophy can redefine itself as epistemology and exist independently from science but also benefit from its success.[20] Ironically, more than a hundred years later this seemingly successfully and strategically handled controversy that propelled neo-Kantianism into a dominant position within the German academia resurfaced and Elias questioned the status of philosophy due to its "emptiness" once again.

In reality, by the time Elias started his philosophical studies, neo-Kantianism was already in decline and the major cataclysmic events at the beginning of the twentieth century only hastened its fall until all remaining neo-Kantian philosophical circles were dissolved following Hitler's rise to power in 1933. The 1920s was a period of turbulent transition and generational conflict in Germany and also in Europe as a whole. It was a period of severe economic problems, social unrest and political strife following the devastation of the First World War, which provided very different social conditions for intellectual development and political socialization for Elias's generation than what had been experienced by earlier generations, including their parents' generation.[21] For Elias and his generation, it brought the feeling that the old world is gone forever and generated resentment towards the establishment of the pre-war period. In the case of philosophy, this meant

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[19] BEISER 2014. 5–6.
[20] BEISER 2014. 6.
[21] KILMINSTER 2007. 10.

a resentment towards neo-Kantian philosophers who were still dominating academic philosophy. The philosophers, sociologists, psychoanalysts of Elias's generation, including major intellectual figures like Karl Mannheim, Hannah Arendt, Theodor Adorno and Sigmund Henry Foulkes were addressing remarkably varied practical issues and theoretical dilemmas connected to all areas of economic, social, political and personal life while they were searching for new ways and polemicizing with the overlapping earlier generation of major thinkers as Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, Max and Alfred Weber, Georg Simmel, Thorstein Veblen and others.[22] Looking strictly at the philosophical developments of the period: *"... the 'new beginnings' of the time included, as well as existentialism and fundamental ontology, the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle and the philosophy of the early Wittgenstein. All of these in their different ways sought to make visible 'the hidden and stifling presuppositions' of Western thought as a way of trying to understand how traditional forms of thinking that seemed to have served people very well, no longer did so. A philosophical 'renewal of the West' was regarded as fundamental because 'the ancient Christian-religious foundations of life had been badly shaken'."*[23] Elias's generation found neo-Kantian philosophy to be way too idealistic, individualistic philosophy of consciousness which got lost in futile epistemological discussions and devalued the real problems of the real world. Refusing this, they searched for a philosophy that can find practical answers to real-life problems and if such philosophy cannot be found, they were willing to abandon the philosophical enterprise altogether and turning towards the seemingly greener pastures of other younger disciplines such as sociology.[24]

It's important to note this above described Zeitgeist because as it is evident from Elias's dispute with Richard Hönigswald (his Doktorvater[25]) or more precisely from how he presented the dispute in retrospective, he was a child of his time more than he liked to admit it. Elias stated numerous times during his career that this dispute was his point of departure on his road towards the rejection of neo-Kantianism and philosophy as a whole. The dispute according to Elias's recollections revolved around the neo-Kantian doctrines of a priori and timeless validity (Geltung).[26] A doctrine that asserted certain categories of thought, such as Newtonian, space, time, causality and some fundamental moral principles are not derived from experience, instead, they are inherent, eternal and universal to the human mind.[27] Elias thought this assertion to be untenable. As Richard Kilminster recalls Elias's position on the matter: *"Elias complained many times that the doctrine of the a priori was defeatist because it shackles human thinking forever to fixed categories and flies in the face of evidence of the advancing syntheses historically developed in the sciences in the light of new observations. In addition, that commitment to the principle of Geltung was inherently contradictory in a timebound world."*[28] Studies published since the 1990s,[29] however, showed that Elias somewhat

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[22] Kilminster 2007. 11.

[23] Kilminster 2007. 12.

[24] Kilminster 2011. 93–94.

[25] Richard Hönigswald (1875–1947) a Hungarian born major figure of the late neo-Kantian movement was the professor of philosophy at the Philosophy Faculty of the Schlesische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Breslau during Elias's years of studying there and he was the supervisor, called Doktorvater in German, of Norber Elias's doctoral thesis in philosophy.

[26] Elias 2013b. 13.

[27] Mennell 1998. 8.

[28] Kilminster 2007. 9.

[29] Kilminster 2007. 9.

exaggerated the rigidness of Richard Hönigswald's and the neo-Kantian's position in general. The neo-Kantians were actually quite aware of the fact that these categories and scientific concepts had social origins. None of them, including Hönigswald, ever claimed that the above-mentioned Kantian categories were timeless, eternal and unlearned as Elias alleged and they were perfectly ready to accept the contrary. Furthermore, both parties found the attainment of valid knowledge important, although, Elias went somewhat further and he was interested also in the issue of in what process concepts or knowledge acquire their validity.[30] In other words, in retrospect, it appears validity wasn't actually the main reason why Elias's path and the path of the neo-Kantians got separated, rather the personal conflict between Elias and Hönigswald which made it impossible for him to continue his university career in philosophy. Elias recalls in his autobiographical essay that after his dispute with Hönigswald, although, he eventually accepted Elias's doctoral dissertation, it seemed pointless to ask for further support.[31]

Contrary to his already intense interest in philosophy, his enrolment in the Faculty of Medicine was a choice made partly at his father's request. Although, he eventually abandoned his medical studies by the end of his pre-clinical semesters, his medical studies also had a profound influence on his intellectual development. Both in his autobiographical essay and his autobiographical interview, Elias recalls his memories of his anatomy lectures and his experiences in the dissecting room as sources of inspiration for questioning the neo-Kantian doctrines and eventually for the rejection of philosophy altogether, and also for developing the opposing concepts of the *homo clausus* and the *homo aperti*.[32] His knowledge of the human anatomy and his practical experience acquired through performing autopsies helped him realize that human beings are by nature social creatures attuned to living together with their own kind, as indicated for example by the unusually complex musculature of the human face compared to other members of the animal kingdom. These experiences also made him question if there is anything in the human brain and nervous system that supports the neo-Kantian image of humans. It seemed to him that nothing corresponds with the supposed division of the "external" and the "internal world of the mind", a notion that runs through the history of western philosophy since Plato and which brought about the preoccupation with the problem of how the single individual adult mind looking out from inside can acquire knowledge about the external world.[33] Stephen Mennell eloquently summarizes this problem of the homo clausus in his monography about Elias's life and work: *"It is the conception of the person (in the singular) as the 'subject' of knowledge; a single thinking mind inside a sealed container, from which each one looks out and struggles to fish for knowledge of the 'objects' outside in the 'external world'. Among those 'objects' are other minds, equally locked inside their own sealed containers, and one of the most difficult problems epistemologists (and sociologists influenced by them) pose for themselves is the question of how one thinking 'subject' inside its own container can ever know anything of what is being thought and what is known by those 'objects' – those of other 'subjects' – thinking away inside their own containers in turn."*[34]

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[30] KILMINSTER 2007. 9.

[31] ELIAS 2013b. 13–14.

[32] ELIAS 2013b. 8–11, 2013. 96.

[33] MENNELL 1998. 7.

[34] MENNELL 1998. 189.

In Elias's mind, the *homo clausus* is a form of process reduction in western thinking, spread by philosophy, which creates the illusion that one can discover eternal, unchanging conditions. In reality, however, it produces only highly arbitrary law-like generalizations reflecting only the given phase of the development of human knowledge. It's one of the main goals of sociology to leave behind the *homo clausus* mindset and to adopt a new processual way of thinking which he in his much later works called the *homo aperti.* As examples of the *homo clausus* mindset from the history of philosophy one can mention Plato's allegory of the cave in the *Republic,* the proposition of cogito ergo sum in Descartes's *Discourse on the Method,* the concept of the windowless monads in Leibniz's *The Monadology* and of course Kant's philosophy which was at the root of the conflict between him and Richard Hönigswald. A conflict that I will try to reconstruct in detail in the second part of the paper.

2. THE BREAK WITH HÖNIGSWALD AND NEO-KANTIANISM

Norbert Elias has submitted his doctoral thesis entitled *Idee und Individuum: Eine kritische Untersuchung zum Begriff der Geschichte* in 1922 which got accepted with much delay only in 1924 due to his personal financial difficulties caused by the post-war hyperinflation in Germany between 1920 and late 1923 (he had to accept a temporary job outside academia to support himself and his parents) and his conflict with his supervisor. Richard Hönigswald finally accepted an abbreviated version of his doctoral thesis from which the most disputed parts were removed and a new summary was published entitled *Idee und Individuum: Ein Beitrag zur Philosophie der Geschichte,* which due to the concessions made to Hönigswald, contradicts the dissertation itself on a number of points. Although Elias himself has never looked for it again, 54 pages of the originally 57 pages long typescript of the dissertation survived the tumultuous first half of the twentieth century, during which much of the otherwise impressive collection of the library of the Schlesische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Breslau was destroyed, and it was discovered fifty-six years later in the archives of the Uniwersytet Wrocławski. On the cover of the original typescript, it is indicated in Elias's handwriting that the pages 55–57 are missing. In all probability, these were the pages that had to be removed to meet Hönigswald's demands. The dissertation is written according to the academic customs of the era without direct quotations or citations from other authors in the form of an *"extended rigorous philosophical argument".*[35] It is a highly involved philosophical text, heavy with neo-Kantian philosophical jargon. Fortunately, Elias's reflections on the rediscovered dissertation are available from the 1980s to help the interpretation.[36]

The dissertation is concerned with the same problems that interested Elias during most of his life and especially in his two most famous works, *Die höfische Gesellschaft* which has its origins in his Habilitation thesis in sociology entitled *Der höfische Mensch: Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des Hofes, höfischen Gesellschaft und des absoluten Königtums*[37] written under Karl Mannheim's

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[35] KILMINSTER 2006. xii–xiv.

[36] ELIAS 2013c.

[37] The title in English: *The court person: a contribution to the sociology of the court, court society and the absolute monarchy.*

supervision and submitted in 1933 to the Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main[38] and the *Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation* his main work written in emigration in England, namely the structure of unplanned social processes and the relation between physical and social time from a philosophical point of view. In both of his main works, Elias tries to retrace the long-term historical processes behind the emergence of modern European states. Elias writes the following in his reflections: *"As early as my dissertation, therefore, I had been puzzling over what I later called 'as sequential order', the specific order within which a later event arises from a specific sequence of earlier events. At that time I was wondering about questions that are still of the utmost interest to me today – for example, the question of how a later form of a state emerges from an earlier one which in turn emerges from a yet earlier, a later form of knowledge from earlier ones and, more generally, how later forms of human social life emerge from earlier ones. Already present as well as the problem of the relation of physical to social time..."*[39]

In his philosophy doctoral dissertation, however, contrary to his later works in which his outlook is distinctly historical-sociological, Elias tries to conceptualise the stages of social development philosophically as a sequence of mental structures (which makes the original topic of his *Habilitation* thesis quite understandable) starting his argument with the problem of how a historian sifts through the abundance of material produced by humanity and how he selects and separates the facts that merit his work from those that he is leaving aside as something without significance. He claims that the criteria for selection cannot come from arbitrary pre-posited precepts but from the structure of the material itself and writes that: *"The object of historical investigation is not a structureless mass of events which it would be futile to attempt to grasp in retrospect, but a sequence of facts which are organised and linked together by a framework of a characteristic order."*[40] He states that even if the historian singles out a single historical fact, other facts that are close to it in space and time will emerge as other possibly relevant facts. Eventually, this will place the entire epoch in which the original historical fact belongs in a new light and *vice versa.* Meaning, the studying of a historical epoch will bring the historian's attention to individual facts as well. Elias calls this structure of the individual historical facts the 'idea' and sets out to examine the specific relationship between the individual facts and the underlying structure of the idea, or as he explains: *"Now, to make this selection it is important, above all, that the historian should know what it is to be understood by an 'idea'. This term, which has been bandied about too much in the course of history, has become so misunderstood that even its cautious use in the preceding discussion can signify nothing more than that there is, underlying history, a peculiar formation which is commonly called 'idea'. This idea and its relationship to the individual historical fact, to the 'individual' in the widest sense of the term, harbour a particular problem. From the solution to this problem historians may expect to gain clarity on the principle of historical selection and on the legitimacy of their*

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[38] One could also mention the original topic for his Habilitation thesis on which he embarked upon when, after he earned his doctorate in philosophy in Breslau, he moved to Heidelberg to pursue further studies in sociology under the supervision of Alfred Weber, that is the genesis of the modern natural sciences with a special focus on the Italian Renaissance. (Mennell 2006. xi.)

[39] Elias 2013c. 301–302.

[40] Elias 2006b. 23.

own procedure, while philosophers may hope to gain insight into the structure of history and proof of the claim to truth which historical judgment require."[41]

In his reflections he considers this above described inquiry as one of his early attempts to point out that a historical fact is a function of its position within the historical process, meaning that human experiences are not only events that came before and reasons for what comes after but at least in part they are also determining how the past is interpreted from the present, which facts we pick as reasons for interpreting present events. He cites the example of the relationship between the so-called modern age and the 'Middle Ages'. The 'Middle Ages' in our modern understanding is not simply an epoch that was before the modern age. Its image is also shaped by the fact that the modern age came after it and to understand it we need to look at what the 'Middle Ages' was like before the modern age came about. Elias, in order to explicate this in his dissertation, uses a Hegelian process model that was known to him at the time.[42]

The conflict with Hönigswald arose from the mode of how Elias attempted to surpass some of the fundamental doctrines of neo-Kantian philosophy and the comparison between the dissertation and the accompanying summary submitted two years after the submission of the dissertation is our best clue to reconstruct the nature of the conflict as Elias systematically backtracks on every major issue unacceptable to Hönigswald, thus creating contradictions between the dissertation and its summary. The most glaring examples are the three invariants mentioned in the summary as Elias explicitly contradicts statements made in the dissertation by endorsing them. The first of these invariants is time or the natural event which gives the historical fact its determinateness, the second is someone's experience or more precisely the relationship between the 'I' and the natural event, which makes the natural event historical and the third is validity, the conformity of meaning-structures to norms which belong to a system of history.[43] Elias also notes in his reflections the concessions made in his dissertation in order to finally receive Hönigswald's approval: *"It is also clear in this text how I tried to get around my research supervisor's categorical rejections of one of my central arguments with a compromise formula. In the last paragraph I pointed out that, as I had presented the matter, each single idea emerges as consequence from reasons, and 'can thus even be subject to the laws of the dialectical process'. But I added that 'the idea of validity as a principle of the dialectical process is not subject to its movement'. In this last sentence I made my bow to the philosophical fetish of the concept of validity..."*[44]

CONCLUSION

On the previous pages I made an attempt to trace the intellectual influences of Norbert Elias's formative years which he spent mostly in Breslau from the end of the long nineteenth century until the mid-1920s of interwar Germany and I tried to reconstruct Elias's dispute with Richard Hönigswald, the supervisor of his doctoral dissertation in philosophy which set Elias on the path of rejecting philosophy as a magical mythical mode of thinking and a thing of the past.

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[41] ELIAS 2006b. 24–25.

[42] ELIAS 2013c. 302.

[43] ELIAS 2006c. 55–56.

[44] ELIAS 2013c. 302–303.

In connection with the first issue, we have seen that the neo-Kantian movement, which started out as a counterreaction to the declining influence of Immanuel Kant during his final years at the end of the eighteenth-century and which rose to dominance at the middle of the nineteenth-century after the collapse of German speculative idealism, was already in decline when Elias began his studies at the Philosophy Faculty of the Schlesische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Breslau. We have also seen that during the 1920s a rebel generation of thinkers emerged in interwar Germany, Elias among them, who were deeply resentful towards the political and intellectual establishment which in the case of philosophy meant a resentment of the authority of the older neo-Kantian philosophers in German universities. Social strife and social change created an incredibly lively intellectual milieu in which the younger generation of philosophers, sociologists and psychoanalysts were actively searching for practical solutions for real-life problems in all areas of life while polemicizing with the previous generations and they were perfectly ready to stray from the known paths. Thus, although Elias's experiences as a medical student certainly served as catalysts for his rejection of philosophy and the formulation of his unique processual approach towards sociology, we cannot justifiably claim that Elias was a solitary genius alone with his criticism towards and rejection of philosophy. In fact, in many ways, he followed the example set by his peers. As Richard Kilminster writes: *"In common with many other younger philosophers at this time, Elias was rebelling against the neo-Kantians' idealism, individualism and neglect of concrete realities. The institutional prominence and mandarin authority of this philosophical establishment were substantial. Elias was part of a wider movement of intellectual opposition in the 1920s (which included the existentialists and fundamental ontologists such as Heidegger) to the rationalism of Kantianism. In that sense, Elias was riding a critical wave, not of his common making. But the particular character of Elias's approach to a critique of Kant in the dissertation became a serious problem for his relationship with Hönigswald."*[45]

In connection with the second issue, I have attempted to reconstruct Elias's argument set forth in his philosophy dissertation. We have seen that problems that interested Elias throughout his long life were already present in his dissertation, namely, the issue of the structure of unplanned social processes and the issue of the relationship between physical and social time. Thus, his dissertation is an important document if one wishes to better understand Elias's later thinking and the development of his ideas. Regarding his dispute with Hönigswald, very little is certain as the conclusion of his dissertation is missing. What seems to be certain, however, is that he did assume a position that was difficult to defend by choosing to criticise the fundamental doctrines of neo-Kantianism in his dissertation. At this point in my inquiry, however, I believe that his rejection of philosophy came more of as a necessity due to his dispute with Hönigswald than as an unavoidable conclusion of his critique of neo-Kantianism. In this paper, I did not make an attempt to reconstruct how Elias's early critique of philosophy developed in his later works but it seems to me that it is necessary to continue the inquiry in order to make a final judgment about the relations between philosophy and process sociology.

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[45] Kilminster 2006. xiii–xiv.

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At the border and beyond

Identification strategies of minorities[1]

ABSTRACT

Over the last half century, there has been an empirically perceptible rapid change and change of direction in social and linguistic processes. Our world has become more interactive, the flow of information has become faster, and communication technology is constantly evolving. The accelerated processes, evolution of history and culture of minority groups in families and mixed marriages result in the loss of language, which can lead to an identity crisis.

The purpose of the study is to present, through a process – from the 1960s to the present days – how one dimension, that is language, has formed the identity of couples living in mixed marriages in Vojvodina and also the members of Romani women's community in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county as well as what similarities and differences can be discovered in the lives of the two minority groups. Our research has concluded that opening up mobility channels significantly accelerates assimilation and language loss.

KEYWORDS

dual identity, minority, loss of language, assimilation, mixed marriage, Romanies, Vojvodina Hungarians

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INTRODUCTION

The study deals with the identity of couples living in a mixed marriage in Vojvodina and of Romani women living in a small settlement in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County. It presents the characteristics of the identity of the two minority groups along different life paths, trying to uncover the factors that help or destroy the identity of those living in a minority situation.

In today's information society, national and ethnic identities are undergoing constant changes. On the one hand, old, earlier versions of identity remain, while on the other, new types appear. Globalization and modernization are radically changing the way in which identity is preserved and developed. (SCHÖPFLIN 1998. 15–27) We have to deal with historical traumas, prejudices and stereotypes that are present in the minds of minority groups and also affect their adaptation to new opportunities (HÓDI 2006). Therefore, in the world of globalization and integration, it is very urgent to take into consideration the opportunities of these two minority groups – mixed couples from Vojvodina and Romani women – to conduct a situation assessment. The results of such studies can contribute to understanding the trends of change within minority identities and put us on the road to new tasks and course of actions.

The identity of most minority groups is linked to the mother tongue, so the focus of this study is on language as an identity-building dimension, as well as on attitudes towards the mother tongue, linguistic attitudes, and language loss. In the introductory part of the study, we present the purpose of the research and then proceed to a brief theoretical dimension, where, after briefly introducing the significance of identity, we introduce two alternative strategies, the concepts of dual identity and assimilation. In the next part of the thesis, the research method – the selection of settlements, research method, sample – will be presented, and the results of the interviews will be extracted. To conclude the study, we outline the identities and differences between the two minority groups and synthesize the changes within their linguistic dimension, taking into account the different historical, legal, and cultural backgrounds of the two countries.

1. PURPOSE OF STUDY

The main purpose of the research underlying this study is to explore the identity patterns of married mixed couples in Vojvodina and Romani women, as well as the identity strategies they represent in 3 eras. The Romanies and Hungarians of Vojvodina are the largest minorities in the particular country, therefore it is important to know how their identity is formed and how much they are assimilating. No such comparative study has been conducted so far.

The processes of modernization and globalization have not only transformed the majority society but have also affected the lives of members of minority groups. In a changed environment, traditions and values that define the daily life of the community also get a different meaning. The study seeks to find out how the newly opened mobility channels affect the lives of minorities. Women have a key role to play in passing on old and new values, as they enable the growing generation to integrate into society. However, it is not easy for Gypsy women to fulfil this function, while external environmental changes are fundamentally transforming the role of Gypsy women within the community. Examining the identity of Romani women is particularly important for social co-existence, as they are the ones who ensure the transmission of traditions to the next generation and, on the other hand, they play a central role in integrating into the majority society. For this, however, it is necessary to review the concepts related to identity.

2. THE FORMATION OF IDENTITY

We interpret ourselves and our belonging to others – to varying degrees, depending on the social context – through values, beliefs, and behaviours from the past. The process of identity formation can never start from scratch, it is always based on the set of pre-existing symbols that underlie identity. When defining identity, we can start from two theses. In one case, the term identity can be interpreted as answering questions like *"where I belong to and who am I?"*. Answers to these questions will also help to find the way around *"where I do not belong to and who am I not?"*. Another case is that the expression of identity not only defines the individual, but also has qualitative content, so that members of a given group can identify members with the same identity. It follows that identity consists of separate symbols, attributes defining identity, which also have a function of distinguishing identity (HOMISINOVÁ 2008).

Tajfel's theory of social identity, in the concept of the self, distinguishes between *individual identity,* which is self-definition and relation to others, as well as *social identity* in which the individual is a member of a group, community that has its own history and common destiny (TAJFEL 1981. 255).

The social identity is a mechanism, which is filled with content in intergroup relationships, discriminations, and comparisons (BREWER–PICKET 2006), so for this reason, because of the discrimination and feelings of inferiority among members of minority groups, the identity of the group members may be distorted and later these may be incorporated into their self-image and self-esteem (BREACKWELL 1993). It is difficult for members of a minority group to develop a secure identity, as they often encounter social rejection, which leaves a mark on their self-esteem. For this reason, it is important to get to know minority identity, because in the absence of a secure identity, their self-esteem will be lowered, and their coping strategies may be distorted. (CATANESE–TICE 2006, PICKET–GARDNER 2006)

3. DUAL IDENTITY

Identity construction is accomplished through intra-group and inter-group relationships and feedback. Acquiring ethnic and national identity is a cognitive learning process. Whether individuals are members of an ethnic or national community, positive evaluations, and participation in them are essential for the development of their identity. Through coexistence, shared experiences become accessible to all members of society. (BINDORFFER 2001)

The Hungarian nation, for example, has been offering the Gypsies positive patterns which can be followed for centuries, and they have had the opportunity to share some experiences too. Gypsies are both members of an ethnic group and of the Hungarian nation. Ethnic group membership gives them the opportunity to positively live and represent their own ethnic identity. The Hungarian national membership offers them further positive identification patterns. At the same time, ethnic and national identities intersect each other across multiple dimensions, resulting in a dual sense of identity. However, the construction of identity, which is the result of the intersection of ethnic and national dimensions, evolves over a given situation, space, and time. They are always situational in nature and will be arranged along the most favourable identification. The placement of the identity representation in the background or foreground is always determined by the given place and time. Dual identity involves both the search for common features and the direction of separation. Gypsies are trying to mix and separate at the same time, maintaining certain parts of their traditions, while adopting the values and behavioural patterns of the majority society at the same time. According to BINDORFFER (2001), the elements, spaces, and principles of ethnic and national identity are distinguished but they coexist and *"become operational in due course (...) depending on the response to a given situation"* (BELL 1975. 153).

Dual identity is therefore a personalized combination of identity elements from different sources, the essence of which is to complement, balance, and provide stability to adjacent identity constructs. Of course, the direction of movement towards each element is influenced by the determination of economic, social, political interests, or the place of individuals in the social division of labor and their education.

4. ASSIMILATION

The concept of assimilation is closely linked to national identity and identification because assimilation itself is a form of identification, a change in our identity. In identification, we define ourselves, which is a process of comparison with others, whom I resemble to and differ from. Assimilation works similarly: the individual abandons his/her previous identity or certain elements of it and identifies with another group (PARK 1955, GORDON 1964). In common language, assimilation is usually associated with the violent or non-violent merging of national minorities. This includes the content of the concept, but its overall meaning is more subtle. In the broadest sense, it refers to the integration into a group or structure, as well as the incorporation of the values and norms of the particular group (GORDON 1964).

There are basically two strategies for minority-majority relations: segregation and cultural adoption. The segregated minority is alienated from the majority society and is not part of the social structural system and is also territorially isolated (Van Kempen – Sule Özüekren 1998). From the point of view of national identity, cultural adoption can be interpreted as adopting the tradition of another nation. This process can be done by retaining one's own identity (integration) or by exchanging one's identity (assimilation). The most fundamental difference between assimilation and integration can be defined here. In the process of assimilation, a given nation integrates into the social structure system, but in return gives up its own language, customs, culture, and national identity as a whole (Gordon 1964). In contrast, in the process of integration, a given minority integrates into the social structure system while preserving its own national identity (Drachsler 1921). The segregated minority is isolated from the majority society and usually lives in much worse conditions than the majority nation. The assimilating minority assimilates into the majority nation and gradually ceases to exist. An integrated minority, on the other hand, does not merge into the majority society, but preserves its language and identity, and does not segregate, but is successfully integrated into the social structure system.

There are basically three possible approaches to the relationship between minority and majority: segregation, assimilation, and integration, and in the case of assimilation, we can talk about mixing and full adaptation.

Segregation		The minority is markedly separated from the majority society and is not part of the social structure. It is often accompanied by territorial segregation and marginalization.
Assimilation	**Full adaptation**	The minority is part of the social structure but loses its national identity and language. In the long run, the minority is completely merged into the majority and ceases to exist as an independent nation.
	Mixing	The minority is part of the social structure, partly losing its national identity and language. It takes over parts of the majority nation's identity, thus creating a new identity. It can create a new national identity, or it can be one of the stages of total assimilation, where a minority loses its identity by elements, eventually becoming completely identified with the majority.
Integration		The minority is part of the social structure, not marginalized, but retains its own national identity.

If we look for the simplest definition, then the assimilation of minorities is to give up some or all of their national identity and to take on another national identity. Assimilation, in this sense, is to leave the minority group and enter the majority group. We can talk about intrageneration assimilation, which is about the transition of a person to a nationality at some point in his/her life. Intergenerational or lineage assimilation, on the other hand, is not a change in the life path of an individual, but a process that goes through generations. This can happen in two generations, when the child(ren)'s nationality is different from that of their parents or, in the case of a mixed marriage, they choose the identity of one parent (usually the majority). However, it may be a multi-generational process as well, with each generation losing some of its ancestral national identity and the last generation having another national identity. So, each generation goes one step further by assimilation (Sandberg 1973).

By replacing the original identity, the minority can fully take over the identity of the majority nation, or only some of its elements, thus creating a mixed identity. In the event of full takeover, the minority is completely identified with the majority, loses, or voluntarily abandons its national identity and mother tongue, and instead adopts the identity of the majority nation (BRUBAKER 2002, TÓTH 2008). This can be interpreted both at individual and group level. At the individual level, the individual gives up his/her original identity and takes over the identity of majority nation. At the group level, we can talk about the full or partial assimilation of a minority. In the case of full assimilation, the given nationality gives up its identity and is completely absorbed into the majority nation, but in the case of partial assimilation it loses only certain parts of its identity. In this case, larger groups are formed and change their identity, often due to mixed marriages (MIRNICS 1994). Partial assimilation can still be reversed, but it can end with the complete incorporation of the minority.

In case of mixing, we can talk about merging groups. This is when two or more cultures merge, not minorities changing their identities. Here, the adaptation is incomplete, as both parties lose something of their previous national identity. The new national identity is created from the elements of the former one, taking over certain elements from each of them, thus creating a new national identity, which is different from the previous ones (YINGER 2002, TÓTH 2008). The best-known example is the American melting pot (PARK 1955). The theory is that many immigrants arriving in America will give up their original national identity and culture and merge into the American culture, which is the result of the merge of immigrant cultures. A similar process could be observed in the former Yugoslavia as well. The multinational country did not officially have a nation-state, but there was a significant demand for that from the leadership. To this end, Yugoslav nationality was created, which was a common Southern Slavic national identity, and its elements consisted of the identity of the Slavic nations living there (BAKIĆ-HAYDEN–HAYDEN 1992, LOSONCZ 1994). It was primarily couples living in mixed marriages and those born here, as well as members of minorities who adopted this national identity. In this case, we are talking about state-supported (and sometimes forced) national merge. However, after the country was disintegrated, state support ceased, and identity went into crisis.

5. ABOUT RESEARCH

Our research aims to compare the situation of the largest minority in Hungary and Serbia in terms of their assimilation and national identity. In the case of Serbia, we examined the situation of Hungarians in Vojvodina, and in the case of Hungary the situation of the Gypsies. There are many dimensions to analyse national and ethnic identity, but due to its narrow scope, this study examines language as one of the most important elements determining identity.

For the sake of comparability, our study looks at a process from the 1960s to the present, how the linguistic attachment and identity-forming power of the two minority groups has changed.

In our empirical research, it is important to mention the unfavourable regional location of the settlements and the composition of the inhabitants as they influence the formation of the identity. The survey was conducted in disadvantaged settlements where, according to the Central Statistical Office (KSH 2011), members of our chosen ethnic and national minority groups are overrepresented. These settlements were chosen because they are in the majority as minority groups, so the changing forms of identity can be better observed in this region. Thus, it is clear that both minority groups

live as the majority in the settlements, thereby they can use their own language not only at home or in their own "closed" communities, but also have much more opportunity to experience the linguistic dimension of national and ethnic identity. Thus, the regional location of the settlements as well as the ethnic and national composition of the settlements significantly influence the identity – not just the particular historical period – in the examined time period.

Looking over a longer period of time gives us the opportunity to observe how hereditary language patterns change, their role in preserving ethnic, national identity and the nature and usability of hereditary patterns.

The majority of respondents in the Vojvodina sample interviewed were women, as they are generally of Hungarian nationality in mixed marriages (RZS[2]). In the Romani sample, however, only female respondents were interviewed, as women play a key role in the continuation of traditions and language.

In the preparation of our interview draft, we also used previously prepared quantitative and qualitative data related to the topic – Census, nationality databases, Hungarian Youth Research database, Gypsy investigation database (KEMÉNY–JÁNKY–LENGYEL 2004), time series data tables of RZS. In our interview draft, we tried to make the wording clear, since it is important that they can easily understand the questions asked.

During our research in Vojvodina 30 interviews and with Romani women 44 interviews were recorded with a voice recorder. The transcript analysis of the audio material was conducted in communities where the change in language use was clearly observable during the period under review. We have deliberately placed these communities at the centre of our analysis, as changes in language use are more pronounced in this way. During the processing, interviews of national and ethnic groups are presented separately, as identity is a historical formation, a learned structure. At different times in different periods of history, different economic, political, and cultural influences have taken place and shaped the content of the identity of national and ethnic minorities. However, at the end of our study, we summarize the results of the interviews and look for connecting points in the linguistic dimension determining the identity of the two minority groups.

Besides the temporal validity of the research results, it is important to mention the spatial limitations. We cannot claim that the experience gained in the settlements we investigate can be generalized to all couples living in mixed marriages and to all Romani minorities. What is more, it is likely that the linguistic dimension and structure of national and ethnic identities may vary from one settlement to another, depending on geographical location, economic environment, mobility opportunities, historical background, and preserved cultural traditions.

6. The language of Hungarians in Vojvodina

"It is best if we find a scapegoat, and then the scapegoat is the guilty one, we hang it up, and the problem is solved. That is why things go wrong. Well, we usually know this from history, and from everyday practice, people are reluctant to look for the fault within themselves, but to look for a scapegoat. And it is the best to have a scapegoat and everything becomes resolved. And of course in a mixed marriage, well, if the marriage failed, it was not because I did not do something well or the woman did not do it well, but because she is of a different nationality, of a different religion, her skin is not as coloured as mine and the like."

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[2] Republicki Zavod za Statistiku – Serbian Statistical Office.

The Hungarian language plays a central role in the national identity of the Hungarians of Vojvodina and is one of its foundations. However, the Hungarian language version used in Vojvodina differs in part from the Hungarian language version, as it contains Serbian loanwords and some of its elements are more archaic (GÁBRITY 2013). Language can be seen as a semiotic tool which is capable of conveying our identity (BAILEY 2007). This is no different in the case of Hungarians in Vojvodina, who are the easiest to express their national identity by using their language. However, several versions of the Vojvodina Hungarian language can be observed. The Hungarian language spoken in the areas of mass Hungarians[3] is saturated with much less Serbian contact effect than Hungarian spoken sporadically. The language spoken sporadically shows a high degree of language deterioration: it is interspersed with Serbian words and sentence structures typical of Serbian are also common. This suggests the strong influence of Serbian language and national identity and the advanced state of assimilation of Hungarians.

Most Hungarians in Vojvodina are bilingual and younger generations are characterised by multilingualism.[4] The majority of Hungarians in Vojvodina speak Serbian besides Hungarian, and many of them also know a world language such as English, German, or Russian (GÁBRITY 2013). The phenomenon of code change is also common, as most Hungarians in Vojvodina speak Serbian at their workplaces and in the offices, but in the private sphere they communicate in Hungarian. However, mixed marriages are an exception, as home-based communication in these families happens mainly in Serbian.

The identity and language use of Hungarians in Vojvodina underwent significant changes in the socialist era. The legitimacy of Tito's system took place in the 1960s, and Yugoslavia was recognized internationally. In economic terms, it was a period of prosperity, as forced industrialization created many new jobs. Unlike the countries of the Eastern Bloc, the concept of unemployment was recognized, and the unemployed were not labelled as social parasites. However, the existence of large-scale unemployment was incompatible with the socialist ideology, thereby the significant number of jobseekers could not be ignored. The problem was solved by agreements with West Germany, which allowed many Yugoslav workers to work in Germany. The emigration solved the labor surplus in the country and remittances also helped the country's economy. Western goods brought in by migrant workers have also become established in Yugoslavia, and some of the symbols of "Western life" (own car, coffee machine, etc.) have become part of everyday life here (SZERBHORVÁTH 2016). At that time, Yugoslavia was a bridge between East and West, and Hungarians of Vojvodina played a key role in this. The relations of the Hungarians with the Hungarians in their native country became the channels of trade in goods, and during this period the Subotica Flea Market was established, the primary function of which was the delivery of Western goods to Hungary. As a result, Hungarians in the South had a higher status because they had relationships on the "other side" of the Iron Curtain as well.

"My husband and I have travelled to Hungary for a holiday several times. It was a much poorer place than Yugoslavia, which was visible on their clothes too, but the cleanliness was everywhere,

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[3] The majority of Hungarians in Vojvodina live in northern Bačka, where in several districts they form an absolute or relative majority. Hungarians living here make up the mass Hungarians.

[4] However, in the areas of mass Hungarians, especially in case of the members of the younger generations, they never learn Serbian. This is mainly due to the lack of Serbian language education at school and the fact that they do not need Serbian in everyday life or that they can cope with only its basic knowledge.

much better than ours. If we were near the border, we went to the public toilets on the Hungarian side, because the Yugoslav toilets looked like a pigsty, with discarded cigarettes and so on. Cleanliness was always taken care of the Hungarians. (...) My husband and I once went to a spa and walked in downtown. I noticed that he was acting a bit strange, as if he were nervous. He just turned to me and asked if something was wrong here. He didn't understand why there was such silence in the city. I laughed and told him that there was nothing wrong, only Hungarians do not like to shout on the streets." (Hungarian woman)

During the period of socialism, Hungarian was also an official language in the country and could be used in state institutions. Officially, Hungarian could be spoken anywhere, but the reality did not always coincide with the principles expressed in the media. The assimilation of the Hungarians was officially a taboo subject, but in practice it took place with great force. Knowledge of the Serbian language was a basic requirement in most workplaces, and Hungarians who were in a higher position were expected to marry or teach their children in Serbian (Mɪʀɴɪᴄs 1998). People living in mixed marriages usually communicated in Serbian, as the Serbian did not learn Hungarian.

"Well, we speak Serbian because my husband doesn't speak Hungarian very well. He understands some things, but he cannot speak the language." (Hungarian woman)

"We only spoke Serbian, unfortunately only Serbian. It was said that we could watch TV in both languages, but in the end, we always watched it in Serbian (...) He said he wanted to learn Hungarian but eventually he never learned it." (divorced Hungarian woman)

However, bilingualism was also present in the areas of mass Hungarians. In many places, it was a common practice for children to be taught in both languages, not just in Serbian.

"We talked to each other in Serbian, but I spoke Hungarian to the children, and he talked to them in Serbian, so the child knew both languages perfectly by the age of three (...) When I was alone or with the kid, I watched the TV in Hungarian, but when we were together then we watched it in Serbian. But if I found a series, or something that I wanted to watch, then we could watch it in Hungarian too, even if he was at home." (Hungarian woman)

"When the children were born, he spoke to them in Serbian, because I don't speak the Serbian so well, and he don't speak Hungarian clearly, so he only speaks Serbian ... they were little babies and many people said that why do we do it in this way, we will confuse the children. But I said this won't confuse them. They will get used to it that their father talks to them in Serbian and I will talk to them in Hungarian. When they were barely toddling and someone came, they could say hello anyway. Then children looked at that person and said Dobar dan. And the person asked me how they know what to say. But I think they didn't know it, but they somehow felt it, or I don't know, because surely that person said something to them previously, and then they knew what it was about. So, it was really good for us that the children spoke two languages." (Hungarian woman)

Thus, in the Yugoslav era, Hungarians had an acceptable status, not being a persecuted minority. However, assimilation pressure was present, and in mixed marriages communication mainly happened in Serbian. The use of the Hungarian language was hidden, but it was significantly restricted.

Mixed marriages were the benchmark for national cohabitation in the Yugoslav era. The Yugoslav government has promoted mixed marriages and presented to the international media that the proportion of heterogamous marriages is increasing in the country. With the outbreak of the Yugoslav wars, the situation changed and positions on mixed marriages took a full turn. Which until then was the most beautiful example of the celebrated "brotherhood unity", it became a collaboration with the enemy

during the war. Those living in heterogamous marriages have come under severe strain of identity. There were some who could not decide who they really were and henceforth which nation they belonged to. Others were able to make a decision and went to war as part of the free teams on either side (SEKELJ 1994). Although there was no war in Vojvodina, there was tension there too. And the deep economic crisis that followed the war only worsened the conditions that were already fierce.

After the war, the use of the Hungarian language was significantly restricted. Although it functioned as an official language, it was not used in offices. Many of them suffered from severe atrocities because they did not speak Serbian properly. According to the interviews, mixed marriages did not show any significant change in this area. In most cases, communication between couples has been in Serbian, and this has remained dominant during this period. However, statistics show that the number of mixed marriages has dropped significantly, as shown in the interviews: far fewer interviewees were found to be married during this period than during the Socialist or post-2010 period.

"We usually speak in Serbian. I think he understands a lot, you know, I taught him..." (Hungarian woman)

Since 2010, there have been significant changes compared to the post-war period. It is not possible to name a specific date, but the first step in the process may be the breakaway of Kosovo in 2008. It was at this time that statements sympathetic to the Hungarians began to appear in Serbian media, in many places the loss of Kosovo was referred to as the Serbian Trianon, and Kosovo was compared to Transylvania. The next milestone for Hungarians was the granting of dual citizenship. As a result, the status of Hungarians has increased significantly in the country, as Hungarian citizenship was also a passport of the European Union. Many non-Hungarian Serbs from mixed marriages began studying Hungarian. Some level of attachment to Hungary and their Hungarian ancestors has also developed, who have not considered themselves Hungarian at any level (HARPAZ 2016). There has also been a significant change in Serbian political life, with the replacement of the former rhetoric of government and the new leadership's efforts to establish friendly relations with Hungary. The communication between the spouses in this third phase is still mainly in Serbian, but in many places the Serbian side is opening up to the Hungarian language.

"Well, I don't know. All right, it might have been a bit strange at the beginning. I got used to that (before marriage) we always spoke Hungarian at home and then we switched to (Serbian), but you can get used to it soon." (Hungarian woman)

"Me and her usually speak Serbian, but we speak Hungarian with the children. Well, the girls speak Hungarian, while the little one speaks both the languages. Because I speak to him in Hungarian, while his mother speaks to him Serbian. Well, he understands everything, but he doesn't speak very well. He is uncomfortable because he feels that he does not know correctly and then he doesn't speak." (Hungarian man)

"Well, we speak Serbian because he is studying Hungarian now. But otherwise he knows Hungarian because he has learned a lot, he speaks very well, because when we met, I didn't really know Serbian. And he learned something from his mom too and because he works here in the village, you know, there are a lot of Hungarians, so he could learn many things because what I say to him once he remarks and calls it back. He speaks Hungarian with my friend because she speaks very bad Serbian. Yes, so I think he will learn the language within a couple of years, and he also speaks English, but I don't speak it, just Serbian. And sometimes in Hungarian, after all, because when I speak to him in Hungarian, then he answers back." (Hungarian woman)

As we have seen, the use of the Serbian language plays an important role in the identity of the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. Although the interviews were conducted with mixed marriages, the results can also be applied to the situation of the Hungarians. In the socialist era, Hungarians were not officially subordinate, yet the use of Serbian dominated both mixed marriages and work. The strongest assimilation can be supposed at this time as well, as mobility channels were opened to the Hungarians at this time (widespread mixed marriages, getting into better jobs). During the Southern Slavic wars as well as in the following period the dominance of the Serbian language can be observed. It is important to emphasize here that the speaker accepts the values of the culture in which he/she speaks (GÖNCZ 2004). Thus, Serbian speakers will primarily consider the identity of the Serbian nation, so the dominance of the Serbian language will lead to assimilation of the Hungarians. In recent years, the relationship between the two nations has improved, with Hungarians gaining more and more recognition in the country. As a result, we are seeing an increase in bilingualism. In many cases, the Serbian partner has learned or is learning the Hungarian language, which may reduce the degree of assimilation, since if both languages are equal, the assumption of a Hungarian identity and the emergence of a dual identity is possible. However, the assimilation of Hungarians has advanced significantly in the past decades and it is questionable whether current positive trends will be able to reverse this.

7. "LANGUAGE OR NOT, I AM A GYPSY"

The mother tongue has a key role to play in preserving ethnicity, identity, and cohesion, as the objective dimension of ethnicity is thus its main feature. According to FISHMAN (1975), language is not a conscious factor, except when it functions as a means of border keeping. By "unconsciousness" he means that in speech acts language is not valued, but it is merely a means of communication. During the period of nationalization, the survival of minority ethnic groups, the formation of their identity and self-determination meant the knowledge of their mother tongue. Thus, language was not only a means of communication, but also a conscious demarcation, a separator, protective, and defender function. The mother tongue appears as a central category in the self-definition of ethnic groups.

At the beginning of the period under study, in the 1960s, the representatives of the socialist ideology did not recognize Gypsyism as an independent culture, but only as a social group whose lifestyle was exclusively due to poverty. The state therefore pursued a strong assimilation policy against the Roma in order to address their social problems. However, this attitude met with opposition from the Gypsies because they did not want to give up their culture and language, so the violent attempt of socialist assimilation was unsuccessful.

During the research, it was noticeable that all Romani women born in the late 1960s named Gypsy as their mother tongue within the settlement. This most prominent variable is the most important sign of a sense of Romani identity and the preservation of group identity. Linguistic contacts are also influenced by economic relations, everyday forms of coexistence, and ideological views of the period in relation to Romani culture.

"We also listen to the mass in the temple in Gypsy, and I also pray in Gypsy at home, because I am a Gypsy and my prayer can only reach the Lord in Gypsy..." (1960s)

"In the family and in the village, I speak to everyone in the Gypsy language. In Hungarian, I don't always remember what I want to say..." (1960s)

The use of the Gypsy language among the Romani women living in the settlement born in the late 1960s is unconscious, mostly based on emotion. Often, even if they are not only surrounded by members of their own community, they will automatically speak Gypsy. In Gypsy, they are better able to express themselves and their feelings, as this was their primary language during their socialization. As far as language is concerned, the Gypsy language is still the primary one, although the Hungarian language appears in their daily lives for the sake of easier prosperity – e.g. during the interviews.

In the 1960s and 1970s, it was noticeable that Gypsy was the primary language among the ascendants of the then-born Romani generation. Thus, the origin coincided with their mother tongue, which is why these deep-seated roots are difficult to change for new patterns, and so old values were passed down to the next generation. The language, as the subjective and objective dimension of an ethnic group, completely overlapped during this period and further strengthened the Romani identity and adherence to the Gypsy language of the examined Romani women – despite that the state called for the merge and complete assimilation of Gypsies in accordance with the People's Resolution of 1961.

The forced industrialization[5] of the period and the changes in public education[6] – continuously since 1945 – also influenced the language usage of the Romani people. However, getting to school and workplace fundamentally changed the language usage of the Gypsies. As teachers, classmates, employers, and colleagues did not speak Gypsy, families often raised their children consciously in Hungarian.[7]

In the 1970s, the easing of state pressure and the recognition happened that full assimilation is not the solution to improve the situation of the Romani people, but rather the emphasis must be on their integration. The creation of Romani intellectuals and efforts to preserve culture came to the forefront – the first Romani World Congress in 1971, Romani language reform and fine arts. The party decision of 1979 recognized Gypsies as ethnicities – not nationalities.

However, during this period, the Romani women studied in the settlement show an intermediate state of bilingualism, with a gradual decline of the Gypsy language. Although language is still the most important element of their ethnic identity and reinforces their sense of belonging, it is the basis of their cultural autonomy. Knowledge of the Gypsy language is one of the most important components of their ethnic identity, essentially a sign of their belonging to their culture. Knowledge of the language and, most of all, its use within their community has an integrative role, but beyond the "walls" of the community, the language of the majority society comes in the foreground.

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[5] In the 1970s, there was no significant difference in the economic activity of Gypsy women, men, and non-Gypsies – 87.7% of the total population had some kind of employment, compared to 85.2% of Gypsies. For women, the proportion was 64% (total population) and 30% (Gypsies). (KEMÉNY–JÁNKY–LENGYEL 2004)

[6] The 8-grade school was registered into law and made compulsory for everyone. Successive governments have worked hard to achieve this. The proportion of Gypsy children not enrolled in school between '43 and '48 dropped to 37 percent, and later between '48 and '53 dropped to 27 percent. Between 1953 and 1957, the proportion of non-students was 13 percent and 9 percent for the next five years. (KEMÉNY–JÁNKY–LENGYEL 2004)

[7] In 1971, about the 71% of the Hungarian Romani population were Hungarian native speakers, 21.2% of them were Romani and 7.6% of them were Bayash native speakers, while according to the 2003 data, only 7.7% of them were Romani, 4.6% of them Bayash native speakers, while 86.9% of them were native Hungarian speakers. (KEMÉNY–JÁNKY–LENGYEL 2004. 39)

"To know the Gypsy language... well that's something ... we've always talked like this here ... (name of the settlement) ... I didn't even notice sometimes when I spoke Gypsy to Hungarians, as it came so... you know, it's just coming..." (1970s)

"I've always used Gypsy, but when I went in... (name of the settlement) then I only used the Hungarian... because the Hungarian postwoman did not understand Gypsy at all" (1970s)

"I talked to the kids in Gypsy at home... they don't ... but that's okay... well, a little ... but I understand" (1970s)

During this period, the presence and role of diglossian bilingualism can be observed in the language use of the respondents. This means that they use Gypsy in their closed community at home, but they use Hungarian at school, at work, and in official business. However, there is a functional difference between the two languages, and they are used in different situations. They express themselves in the Gypsy language in their closed family environment, where emotional and everyday matters are primarily discussed. At school, at the workplace, in the centre of the settlement, and even within their community, when it comes to official matters, they speak Hungarian, since the Hungarian language is "related" to this topic. The two languages work together to function as representing the mother tongue for monolinguals. However, the interviews also reveal that, although the loss of language is becoming more visible and the "clean" use of the Gypsy language is beginning to fall into the background, it is still an important identity-building dimension in the lives of Romani minority women in the settlement.

The use of the Gypsy language contributes greatly to the preservation of the identity of the Hungarian Romanies. Following the change of regime, the government made an increasing commitment to state funding for minorities.[8] It has become increasingly common in the primary schools to employ so-called pedagogical assistants from the Gypsy community, who have taught both teachers and students the knowledge of the Gypsy population and the Gypsy language. The state has supported initiatives aimed at preserving the Romani language and culture[9] – especially in higher education, teacher training, kindergarten training, colleges, universities – to provide education in the Gypsy language as well.

Following the change of regime, it was observed among Romani women living in the settlement that the increasing contact with members of the majority society also affects the use of the Romani language. It is now becoming increasingly rare for someone to use the Gypsy language every day, even within their own closed community. The interviews revealed that they know the Gypsy language, but they try to passively use it even in their own closed community. In the background of this, assimilation patterns can be discovered. Despite the passive use of the language, their Gypsy origin was not questioned in themselves.

"You can study Gypsy here at the university as well, and many people enrol, but not because language is so important to them... just because they need a language exam..." (after the regime change until today)

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[8] In 1991, central government subsidies increased to HUF 90 million from the previous 40 million. (Forray 2012)

[9] From sociological research (Forray 2012), we know that after the regime change, more and more (mainly) civic initiatives have developed in several parts of the country, mainly targeting school-aged Gypsy children, and strengthening their relationship with culture. In this process, we can also include higher education programs – first civil initiatives, church organizations for a few years, then state organizations (e.g. Romani special colleges) – which seek to support Romani young people in achieving their diploma as well as to make closer ties with their culture, thus trying to "revive" the Gypsy language.

"In the group, I am the only one Gypsy, no one would understand if I said something in Gypsy now, so I wouldn't use it anywhere" (after the regime change until today)

"Oh, I don't use it at home either ... you know it's better in this way..." (after the regime change until today)

The family, the closed community, seems to be losing its inheritance function. More frequent contact with the majority society, longer time spent in educational institutions, and appearance in the labor market all influence language usage patterns during this period. The interviews revealed that not only the "fear of discrimination", the limited use of language, but also the composition of a group of friends from outside of the community lead to the usage of the language of the majority society.

Language is considered to be the most important dimension of ethnicity, identity, and representation in the literature for the first generation. For second generation Gypsy women, clothing is less pronounced due to changed environmental conditions. However, the role of language in enhancing ethnic identity remained strong. Characteristics that define external identity are "easier" to leave, whereas language that is based on an internal, emotional basis is more difficult to leave. For members of the third generation, both clothing and language are no longer a crucial dimension of identity. After the regime change, it can be observed to this day that the majority of interviewees know the language, but it has a role in their life as passive and inactive knowledge. It can be observed in the settlement during the period examined that when forced assimilation attempts were made in the early '60s, the role of the Gypsy language in the construction of identity was strengthened. While from the regime change until today – where most Romani cultural and linguistic supportive initiatives have taken place – there has been a steady loss of language in the community.

According to Michael Stewart, isolation, separation from the majority society is an integral part of Romani culture. Therefore, the survival of culture and language is endangered if, for example, Romani girls' study time is postponed, increasing their chances of assimilation. They no longer spend their daily lives within a closed community, but in an accelerated world of globalization and modernization (FORRAY–HEGEDŰS 2003). External, structural factors influence the linguistic identity dimension of Gypsy women as well. Economic, political, and social processes have given different socialization patterns and strategies to Gypsy women in different decades. Sometimes they reinforce the Gypsy language in the female members of the community and have the role of pushing it aside and of applying it side by side, depending on the situation, to commit to constructing their identity.

SUMMARY

As we have seen, there are many similarities between the situation of Hungarians in Vojvodina and the situation of the Romani in Hungary, but there are also many differences. For the Hungarians of Vojvodina, Hungarian language is still one of the most important elements of identity formation, but for Romanies (especially among young people), it is no longer the most important factor. Hungarians undergo mixed assimilation and loss of language in mixed marriages with Serbians, while Romani language is marginalized regardless of mixed marriages.

In the socialist era, both Hungarians in Vojvodina and Gypsies in Hungary were under intense assimilation pressure, although in the Socialist Hungary, this was an explicit and open process, but in Vojvodina it was a hidden but powerful process. After the regime change, the situation

of Romanies improved a lot in Hungary, because the goal was not their assimilation, but rather their integration. In Serbia, however, from the 1990s onwards, the state regarded Hungarians as an internal enemy, trying to assimilate or eliminate them. Since 2010, however, there has been a significant easing and an increase in the status of Hungarians. The situation of the Romanies has also improved significantly in the last decade.

For both Romanies and Hungarians in Vojvodina, the strongest assimilation and loss of language occurs when they are offered the opportunity to integrate into the structure of the majority society and new channels of mobility are opened. In the case of Romanies, this phenomenon can be observed mainly in the years after the regime change, when the goal of the state was no longer assimilation but integration. However, their integration into the labor market has resulted in more contact with the majority society, which has led to the loss of their mother tongue. The Gypsy language was at a significant disadvantage compared to the Hungarian language.

In the case of Hungarians in Vojvodina, the strongest assimilation can be observed in the socialist era, also when they open their integration into the structural system of the majority society. The role of mixed marriages can be easily understood here, since Hungarians living in or coming from a heterogamous relationship cannot use only Hungarian in their official or private sphere. As a result, the Serbian language is gaining a significant advantage over the Hungarian, and this process accelerates the loss of language and the assimilation of the Hungarian people.

Assimilation tendencies are advanced for both minority groups and reversing them is a difficult process. However, the future question is whether this slow-moving, improving trend will be able to prevent total language loss and assimilation.

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Border Living and Identities
of the Hungarian–Serbian Borderlanders

Abstract

Diverse types of borders, like physical, social, personal or symbolic ones manifest themselves through a lot of different ways in political, social, cultural or economic discourses (Bauder 2011). There is no singular perspective neither a theory to approach the borders, because they are determined by different local factors (Paasi 2005, 2011, Newman 2006). However, there are some common phenomena which are present at all existing borders be it any type of them.

Borders created by insitutions or the society, impacts the lives of local residents, who are constantly reproducing these borders by making interactions with different actors and the border itself. Thus, borders shape the identity of local residents regularly (Houtum 1999, Newman 2006, Yndigegn 2006), thereby, the constant state borders have different meanings for different people (Balibar 2002). These narratives of the borders and their spatial extension have become more widespread, turning into more and more layered, and more and more identifiable in different areas and places of life, often separated from state borders (Balibar 2002, Rumford 2012). Bordering is an essential factor of defining self-identity, which is a Janus-faced phenomenon by constructing a community and at the same time by exclusion of the Others (Houtum–Naerssen 2002). Thus the exist of the borders inevitably build distance between the two side of it, enacting the stereotypes and then the behaviour of the borderlanders. However, the greatest effects of the border politics and the existence of borders have on those who are living close to them. Hence the research of them has great significance.

The most important questions of my paper are: What does it mean to live on one side of the border, and what on the other side? Along what kind of dimensions are the differences emphasized, and along which factors the similarities take shape. This paper shows the evolution and the narratives of the Hungarian–Serbian borderland and focuses on social and mental borders perceived by people living close to a state border, where different normative values meet.

The study area of the research is the Hungarian–Serbian border region. Two survey research in 2019 (N = 777) was conducted in some settlements of this borderland. This revealed that the most vigorous mental border derives from the different mindset, however the economic and the cultural differences were mentioned also. These outcomes show different pictures if we examine two of the sides of the border separately. From the Hungarian side smaller number of the respondents mentioned any perceived differences between them and those living on the other side. On the other hand, respondents from Serbia felt that different mentality is the strongest factor of their mental border towards the other side.

Keywords

borderland, mental borders, identity

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Introduction

The roles and the functions of state borders have changed throughout history, from time to time the dividing function coming to the fore, and other times the connecting role. Some periods and some boundaries characterized by physically invisible borders, while other boundaries are defined by walls and fences. The nature and role of state borders are constantly changing, even today. There are many economic, political, demographic, cultural and other factors that dynamically shape state boundaries.

The Serbian–Hungarian state border has also undergone many changes in recent decades. One of the most prominent historical point is the redefinition of the border defined by the Treaty of Trianon. Even today, this is often the subject of public debate on both sides of the border. Another important factor of the examined border region is that Hungarians live on both sides of it, creating a significant minority on the Serbian side. However, over the past decades, different socialization environments had taken place, and have made different life-worlds among the same nationalities on the opposing side of the boundary.

The starting point of the research and the main questions are linked to this key situation mentioned above. In this paper the following questions are going to be answered: What are the main differences and similarities related to the border situation of the two sides?; How the borderlanders are using the border itself?; What kind of attitude do they have towards their geographical location and whether they have a so called border consciousness or border identity? Following a brief theoretical review, the most important results of a 2019 Serbian–Hungarian cross-border survey would be presented.

1. METHODOLOGY

In spring of 2019, a questionnaire survey was conducted (N = 796) in the study area. The survey sample consisted of 10 settlements and 2 control settlements, 7 in Hungary and 5 in Serbia *(Figure 1)*. The reason for choosing this area is that both sides of the boundary are mostly lived by the same nationality, and it also has the most and the busiest border crossing points between Hungary and Serbia.

During the interpretation of the data, the units of analysis were made up of individuals, but because of the lack of a list of the population members (it is difficult and very expensive to get one from the statistical office), the sampling unit consisted of the dwellings. Systematic sampling was conducted with the help of an interviewer, every third residential building was selected, and only one person per building was eligible to fill in the questionnaire. The target number of questionnaires was the 5% of the residential buildings per settlement, however this was not achieved in all cases, some municipalities are somewhat overrepresented while others are underrepresented due to the differing response levels.

As part of the study, in the autumn of 2019, an online questionnaire survey (N = 200) was conducted among the Hungarian residents of Subotica (a city in the northern part of Subotica appx. 16 km from the Hungarian border). It included a number of open questions about the factors according to how the local residents are evaluating their position relating to the border, and how was changing that in different historical eras. The survey also functioned as a pilot, as the opinions raised in Subotica and the questions asked will be used later in the sample area described above.


FIGURE 1 *Study area in 2019* (KRISKA, O. 2019)

The data analysis was done primarily in the SPSS program, where I analysed different cross-tables, correlations. The main method analysis that is applied in this paper is the principal component analysis. All this made it possible for the different dimensions to be made up of several questions, thus better representing the attributions of that dimension and its different approaches.

2. Theoretical background

Diverse types of borders, like physical, social, personal or symbolic ones manifest themselves through a lot of different ways in political, social, cultural or economic discourses (Bauder 2011). There is no singular perspective neither a theory to approach the borders, because they are determined by different local factors (Paasi 2005, 2011, Newman 2006). However, there are some common phenomena which are present at all existing borders be it any type of them.

Borders created by institutions or the society, impacts the lives of local residents, who are constantly reproducing these borders by making interactions with different actors and the border itself. Thus, borders shape the identity of local residents regularly (Houtum 1999, Newman 2006, Yndigegn 2006), thereby, the constant state borders have different meanings for different people (Balibar 2002). These narratives of the borders and their spatial extension have become more widespread, turning into more and more layered, and more and more identifiable in different areas and places of life, often separated from state borders (Balibar 2002, Rumford 2012). Bordering is an essential factor of defining self-identity, which is a Janus-faced phenomenon by constructing a community and at the same time by exclusion of the Others (Houtum–Naerssen 2002). Thus the exist of the borders inevitably build distance between the two side of it, enacting the stereotypes and then the behaviour of the borderlanders. However, the greatest effects of the border politics and the existence of borders have on those who are living close to them.

People's basic need to belong to different groups and communities (Hogg et al. 2008) is most often requested with people whom they have some similarities. The use of "we-they", "here-there", "outside-inside" or other similar separations that create and form the identity is essential to the existence of these closed communities, be they related to spatial or social terms. In order to strenghtening the identities, reproducing the existing system, and legitimizing different group practices, these distinctions are often emphasized – whether they are real or just perceived (Houtum – van Naerssen 2002). Beyond the dual definition, however, it is important to determine the distance related to "us and others" separation, the mental distance and mental boundaries between them (Newman 2006, Meena 2014), even objectively, but even more on the basis of subjective perceptions (Yndigegn 2006).

The formation of a border identity requires several components and is influenced by the (state)-border. Historical background, economic, cultural and political distance, the degree of cooperation and institutionalization all influence individuals' attitudes towards the boundary (Payan 2014).

Identity could be defined as a discourse that people speak about themselves in order to interpret and give meanings of their own life-worlds (Brambilla 2007). At the same time, mental and state borders, especially when the two coincide, can transform all of this, since borders are meaning-breakers and meaning-makers concurrently. In each case, boundaries denote a different community, a different set of norms, and culture, thus during the crossing of a boundary the individual are forced to redefine themselves and their surroundings.

By "border consciousness", I mean a factor that is essentially part of an individual's identity, but weaker than that, and lies more "hidden", in the lower degrees of self-definition. For the development of border consciousness, there may be a sense of difference in two directions, a sense of difference towards the inner parts of the country, which is essential for its formation. If the border population feels significantly different from the border population of the neighbouring country, then the border consciousness is created also, but we do not speak of a single, integrative approach on both sides, but of different views in the two border zones. Of course, the sense of identity and the common qualities, the similarity of life and the subjective feeling can also occur, and in that case a truly common, cross-border consciousness could be achieved.

3. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE HUNGARIAN BORDER STUDIES

The renaissance of Hungarian frontier research began after the collapse of the socialist era, when the question of borders, cross-border cooperation and EU accession induced the birth of new research. In the previous era, under the auspices of socialism, political geography was neglected in the entire block thus the research of the borders was pushed into the background too (HARDI 2009).

One of the main features of Hungarian border research is that the focus is on the cross-border examination of various social phenomena and only recently launched the interest in topics where especially the boundary itself was emphasized in the research (KOVÁCS 2006). The interest of the studies on borders is mainly directed towards the defining the extent of the border zones and topics about peripherality, with numerous research on these subjects. An important starting point is the approach of Zoltán HAJDÚ (1988), who has applied the so called "line theory" and "zone theory" approach of the borders in Hungarian limology. He has already emphasized that borders both involve separation and cooperation, and that, overall, they can be seen as a zone of encounter, the possibilities of which are largely influenced by the formed image of (state) boundaries (HAJDÚ 1988).

According to the extent of the border zones, different methods have been used to define it. For example on the basis of the definition of urban catchment areas (KOVÁCS 1990), diverse transport geographic factors (PÁL 1996), or simply different zones were made relating to their distance from the border (HAJDÚ 1996, TINER 1994, HARDI 2008).

The issues about border closeness and socio-economic periphery related to that have also been accentual in the Hungarian border research, but the authors agree that border closeness may not necessarily involve the socio-economic peripherality. This largely depends on the boundary section and on the relationship with the neighbouring country furthermore, interventions of the government can also have a strong impact on the border life (BERÉNYI 1988, ERDŐSI 2002, TÓTH–CSATÁRI 2002, SZÓNOKYNÉ 2002, BAJMÓCY 2002). Of course, the existence of a border crossing pont is still scarce in order to increase the intensity of cross-border relations (KISS JÁNOS 1990), to build trust and to approximate social distances between the inhabitants of the two countries is needed to this.

In the international literature of border studies, a critical point of view on borders has become a crucial point of view for a few decades ago and today has been a decisive approach. However, in Hungary, only few studies are currently approaching mental boundaries and state boundaries as a social construct (TÍMÁR 2007, NAGY 2009, SIK–SURÁNYI 2015, PETE 2018).

4. RESULTS OF THE SURVEY – BORDER CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE HUNGARIAN–SERBIAN BORDERLAND

To present the results I grouped the questions around 4 main factors. These are the attitudes towards living close to the border; the patterns of using the border; the inward factors of the border consciousness; and the sense of difference towards the other side.

The principal component analysis of the *attitude towards living close to the border ('PC Location')* was made with two questions of the survey: 1) *"For me it is advantageous to live close to the border."* The statement was rated on a 1–5 Likert scale, while 2) *"How much do You love living close to the border?"* could be answered on a 1 to 4 scale. In the case of this principal component, a moderate correlation was found (t = –9.059; p = 0.000), Serbian respondents found their location near the border much more advantageous than Hungarian respondents.

Respondents from Mórahalom, Kelebia and Röszke (HU) rated the location of the settlement the most negatively, from Hungary only respondents from Tiszasziget were answering that living close to the border has more advantage. The situation of the two control settlements is interesting, because in the case of Csóka (SRB), neither the positive nor the negative attitude is not clearly present, while the value of Székkutas (HU) is the most striking in negative direction. Perhaps not surprisingly, the 'PC Location' relates to the question of whether it would be better to live in the interior territories of the country. In this question the difference between the two countries is also present (V = 0.362; p = 0.000), as 21% of Hungarians are agreeing with this, while only 5% agree with this on the other side of the boundary. Among those who consider the border location as a detriment, 54% of them would move away from their current settlement, if they could so, while only 24% of those who enjoy living close to the border would do so.

Turning now to border-using related questions, the first issue, which is very closely linked to the previous principal component, is the frequency of crossing the border. Namely, those who regard the border location as an advantage, crosses the border significantly more frequently from one side to the other (gamma = 0.305; p = 0.000). The difference between the two sides is even more remarkable (gamma = 0.623; p = 0.000), as Serbian respondents typically travel to Hungary more frequently. However, it should be noted, that 73% of respondents from Hungary and 34% of Serbia, chose the 'less than once per month' option. Among the settlements on the Hungarian side, the residents of Tiszasziget are those who use the border slightly more frequently than from other settlements. Regarding to the principal component of the location, this explains why was Tiszasziget' a bit different from other Hungarian towns.

Regarding the purpose of the crossing *(Figure 2),* I asked the respondents to name their 3 most common motivations for crossing the state border. In both countries, shopping and travelling are the most often mentioned by respondents. Visiting relatives is also important from both sides, but the Serbian side dominates in terms of entertainment, administration, commuting to work, studies and visiting health services. In terms of settlement level, the case of Tiszasziget is outstanding, as 60% of all mentions are related to shopping, further explaining that the respondents of the settlement move to the other side slightly more often and that they feel the advantage of the border location. Overall, as we can see from the figure below, respondents from Serbia have notably more diverse goals when they cross the Hungarian–Serbian border.

FIGURE 2 *Purposes of crossing the border in 2019* (KRISKA, O. 2019)

To further analyse the aspects of using the border, the so called *"patterns of using the border ('PC Using')"* principal component has been made which summarizes the responses to the following statements (all of the questions are related to the HU–SRB border):

	Component
	1
13. The border control takes too much time.	,714
38. The border makes my life harder.	,672
39. It would be better, if I could cross the border freely.	,756

TABLE 1 *Patterns of using the border ('PC Using')*

In the case of 'PC Using' we could assume that respondents from Serbia would be more sensitive regarding these 3 statements because of their frequency of border crossing. However, this alone does not justify their overall agreement with these statements compared to the Hungarian side. From Serbia, many more respondents feel that border control takes too much time, which is otherwise not correlated to the frequency of the crossing. At the same time, from Serbia more respondents said that the border makes their life harder (SRB: 36%, HU: 11%).

It seems somewhat contradictory that at the same time, the residents from the southern side of the border said to be an advantage living close to the border. The contradiction is only seeming,

as they have a higher level of awareness in the benefits of the border living, and the phrase *"makes my life harder"* specifically refers to the crossing of the boundary. If we look at the question *"How easy do you think it is to cross the border?"* We find that 48% of respondents in Hungary find it very easy to cross the border, compared to only 17% for respondents in Serbia, most of them chose the option of *"I can get through with little difficulties"* (65%).

All in all, from Serbia they are more likely to use the state border and because of the benefits it offers, they positively value their geographical location. On the other hand, crossing the border, is subjectively considered as a burden by the respondents of this site. Thus, there is a strong asymmetry between the two side regarding the experiencing and using of the border.

The previous statement is supported with that 37% of from Serbia have already had some unpleasant experiences at one of the border crossing points, while only 19% of the respondents from Hungary said so. Most often, 52% mentioned lengthy wait at the border, regardless of the respondent's place of residence. Several people emphasized that they live only a few minutes from the border, but they still have to wait in the queue for hours, even who are commuting to work from Serbia to Hungary. A further significant group of opinions consist of explicitly negative comments on the behaviour and attitudes of border guards and customs officers (SRB: 41, HU: 23 mentioned this). Ethnic Hungarian respondents from Serbia often complained that Hungarian officers were scornful with them at the border and they called them "Serbians". On the other hand, from the Hungarian side, although fewer people mentioned negative opinions about the border guards, in most cases they mentioned negative attitude of Serbian officers.

The next factor that may be present in the life of those living along the border is *inward border consciousness ('PC Inward')*. In the questionnaire, several questions were asked about whether border residents perceive border living different from living in the inner parts of the country, and whether residents differ from those living farther from the border. So, it is a kind of inward attitude (towards inner spaces of the country) and a sense of difference that is essential for the creation of a border consciousness, a border identity. The inward border consciousness principal component is composed of the following questionnaire questions:

	Component
	1
26. It is different to live along the border compared to the rest of the country.	,654
27. People living along the border are different from the rest of Serbia/Hungary.	,748
44. The interests of those living along the border are less important than those of other areas.	,696
54. The right to free movement is restricted to those living along the border.	,598

TABLE 2 *Inward border consciousness ('PC Inward')*

Analysing them separately, there is no difference between the two sides of the boundary in the first statement, but the responses are significantly scattered on a 5-point Likert scale between agreement and rejection. The other three statements, however, already show differences between Hungary and Serbia, with respondents from Serbia generally agreeing more than from Hungary.

In the case of the second statement, this can be explained – among other things –, by the fact that the majority of Hungarians in Vojvodina live near the border in the study area, while Serbians are in majority in the south and in the interior areas of the country. Attitudes towards minority political relations and related to the Serbian government and the majority Serbian territories may influence the third statement. In the case of the fourth statement, as previously described the difficulties of border crossing and hardships with it are more likely to occur on the Serbian side, at least in the subjective sense of the locals.

Looking at the components of 'PC Inward', it can be seen that in many cases other (indirectly border related) factors affect how people's identity and border consciousness develops. However, as it was mentioned, all this difference is needed to form some kind of border awareness, and the data suggests that Serbian respondents' border consciousness is stronger for these reasons *(Figure 3)*.

Examining control settlements is particularly important for this principal component, since, as we move away from the boundary line, the development of border consciousness is less perceptible, according to the hypothesis. On the Serbian side, this seems to be somewhat outlined, as Csóka has the lowest value, followed by Magyarkanizsa, which is inversely proportional to the distance of the settlements from the boundary. In Hungary the values of the principal component are much lower, Tiszasziget and Újszentiván have the lowest values, only to be followed by Székkutas, the control settlement.


FIGURE 3 *Values of PC inward border consiousness* (KRISKA, O. 2019)

Another important factor in the increase of border consciousness and identity is the *sense of difference from the other side ('PC Difference')* of the border, which can be examined from many aspects and also called as mental distance. From an economic point of view, the question asked in the questionnaire was that how the locals perceive the economic situation of their settlement comparing to the other side of the border and to their own country as well. When comparing with their own country, Serbia's residents felt to be in worse position, while Hungarians felt that their settlement is similar in economic terms to the rest of the country. The difference between the two sides is much more significant when they compared their settlement to the other side of the border. Respondents from the southern side clearly see their settlement in a worse economic situation, while from Hungary they find themself in a better position (V = 0.796; p = 0.000). 60% of respondents in Vojvodina agree with the statement that *"In general, those who live on the other side of the border are in a better position",* compared with only 11% on the other side.

Further investigating the differences, Hungarian and Serbian respondents did not agree with the statement that *"linguistic differences are a problem"* at all, with a relatively higher proportion of Hungarians than vice versa. This is probably because the answers given in Hungary focused on problems related to the Serbian language especially. There is no significant difference regarding the statement that *"norms and habits are too different",* there is a large majority of disagreeing on both sides.

60% of respondents from Serbia tend to agree with the statement that people have different mindset on the other side of the HU–SRB border, compared to the 43% of respondents agreeing with this from Hungary. By analysing the open question, it justifies the previous results. The most common response was the perceived differences are related to mentality, thinking, and behaviour from both sides. In addition, there were frequent responses concerning different language, culture, and economic and differences. However, there was no significant difference between the two sides of the border.

	Component
	1
43. We are different from the residents of Hungary / Serbia.	,609
47. Hungarians have a different way of thinking on the other side of the border.	,537
17. The people on both sides of the border do not trust each other.	,780

TABLE 3 *Sense of difference from the other side ('PC Difference')*

Based on the results of this principal component, it can be concluded that it is divisive on both side of the border *(Figure 4)*. Some inhabitants felt that there is some difference between people living on the other side, however some did not have such kind of feeling. All in all, there was no significant difference between the two sides in this factor.

FIGURE 4 *Sense of difference (outward) principal component values* (KRISKA, O. 2019)

5. ATTITUDES ABOUT THE BORDER IN THE CITY OF SUBOTICA

The results provided in this chapter should be treated with reservations due to the small number of cases, while at the same time they provide an appropriate guide to understand the overall picture and to mark additional targets.

The questionnaire included a question about what historical era is the most advantageous in terms of border proximity. 45% of all mentions were for the 90s, followed by the "nowadays" category by 20%. Then the period before the 90s, and finally the mentions "always" and "never" closed the line by 9 and 6% of all mentions. Of course, the situation may seem somewhat contradictory, since the 90s were the period of Yugoslav Wars and the war in Kosovo, but this period was the most favourable among the locals, according to the border situation. The question of why these periods were mentioned has received different responses by different historical ages.

In terms of the 90s, the grey and black economy, the petrol business has been one of the essential elements, since all this has been a source of revenue for many families at this time, when the economic embargo struck Yugoslavia. *"Black trade flourished between two countries".* As well as several people mentioned that the proximity of Hungary could make it easier to buy some essential products, which were in shortage in Serbia. *"Because we could go over and buy some food because the shops were empty here."*

Regarding the 80s, respondents mostly mentioned that they were free to travel to Hungary or anywhere else while for Hungarians from Hungary that was an entirely different situation. Their discreet income was higher in Serbia, and they were eligible to spend it freely in Hungary. *"In the 80s everything was cheaper there, in the 90s it was about survival..."*

For today, 91% of the respondents from Subotica like to live close to the border. Most of them mentioned the potential economic or touristic opportunities between the two countries as a positive one, but all in conditional mode, referring to the idle opportunities. As a negative, it has been most mentioned that the border has led to the increased number of migrants in the city, whether they stay for a short or for a longer time. Others have highlighted the negative effects of transport. *"The city's transit traffic is too high, which contributes to an increase in air pollution."* Another important group was the comments on government, since several people mentioned that the Serbian government does not pay sufficient attention to this area, neglects it much less than the more southern areas. Someone named Subotica as a "disgraced" city. *"Serbia does not invest as much as it does in the interior parts of the country."*

The results of this chapter provide a qualitative view of how the local population of Subotica approach to the border, however this is not necessarily true to the whole of the study area presented above, although it is a good guide for further qualitative examination of the area.

SUMMARY

Overall, the role of borders and border location in influencing identities depends on many factors. Hungarian respondents living on the Serbian side of the study area have more diverse border using practices than respondents from Hungary. Their sense of inward difference is stronger than that of the neighbouring country, however an important component of that is that they are nationally, linguistically and culturally different from the majority Serbian nation. At the same time, as we can see, in the case of the Serbian–Hungarian state border this is necessary for the formation of the border consciousness. The mental distance to the other side has similar characteristics on both sides, with slightly stronger differences perceived on the Serbian side. These differences are mainly limited to concepts like mindset, mentality and linguistic differences that may arise from the different social and socialization contexts mentioned in the introduction.

In the case of Subotica, we have seen that the perception of the border situation is very dependent on macroeconomic and other political factors related to the different historical era. The subjective opinion of the local population about the 90s was indicated as not in absolute terms as the most advantageous era for border-side. It provided a relatively safe place, and some economical possibilities as opposed to inner areas of the country.

According to the theoretical background, we can say that the polysemic attribution mentioned by BALIBAR (2002) is present in the Serbian–Hungarian border. The state border has different meanings for those living on the Serbian side and different meaning for those living in Hungary. Boundary perception and its usage are different for the two sides. At the same time, the sense of difference outward and inward are stronger on the Serbian side, which is essential part of border consciousness.

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Youngsters' Partnership Behaviour in the Carpathian Basin[1]

Abstract

This paper aims to present the social and demographic characteristics of partnership types among the group of youngsters beyond the borders of Hungary. We also analyze the relationship between partnership status and basic socio-demographic variables, to explore to what extent partnership status is determined by the aforementioned factors (cohort, region/location, social background, education, value orientation). The analysis is based on empirical survey data, collected in 2015. The target group of the research was ethnic Hungarian youth, aged between 15–29, who live beyond the borders of Hungary. As for methodology, descriptive statistics and multivariate analyses are used, more precisely logistic regressions in order to explain the effects of social determinants of partnership behavior. Explanatory models were usually carried out in three steps, including independent variables as the social-demographic ones, as well as education background of fathers and educational level of respondents. Factors measuring value orientation were introduced in the second step, and the final models incorporates variables such as parenting status and the parents' national identity referring to mixed or homogenous family background.

According to our analysis partnership status is strongly determined by domicile type, age, gender and value system. Subcarpathian youngsters tend to be the most traditional, while postmodern partnership formation trends are most adopted by youngsters from Southern Slovakia. Older cohorts and women are more likely to live in cohabitation or marriage. However, religiosity and having children significantly raises the chance of living in marriage, cohabitation is more likely determined by career oriented values and provenience from ethnically mixed families.[2]

Keywords

youngsters, partnership behaviour, cohabitation, values, Hungarian youth

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[2] Ethnically mixed union of parents.

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The pluralization of family forms and relationships gained special attention in demographic analyses and sociology of family in Western Europe from the 1970s, while in the Eastern European region mostly after the political transition. Behind the diversity of family and relationship forms are the socio-economic changes and social transformations of the past decades, which have influenced the family sphere and people's lifestyles in general. Changes in social and economic conditions have not left the family untouched, in fact, in late modern societies the family is the area where these effects are manifested (see Beck 2003).

The consequences of modern social realignment can be demonstrated in the changed functions and forms of the family; for instance, the role of the family in economic production has largely faded into the background (Andorka 2006, Utasi 2002). Extended families with shared property have been replaced by the nuclear family model and individual career strategies based on independent income. Norms and the (economic) interests of the family exercise less and less influence on individual desires and values, and the surfacing of these has enabled the burgeoning of 'new'[3] forms of living together.

Nowadays, the majority of young people in their twenties are still students, who has self-realization goals or simply founding their career. Relatively few of them are married, and they plan having their first child much later than the previous generations, so some of the important life events related to family are postponed to life stages beyond the classic period of youth (Makay–Domokos 2018).

1. Changes in partnership behaviour: The Rise of Cohabiters

A widespread view related to the theory of the second demographic transition is that changes in couple behavior are the imprints of dominant social values and their changes. According to Dirk van de Kaa's (1987) much-debated theory formed in the 1980s, the higher appreciation of individualization leads to the devaluation of marriage, replaced by the much more casual relationship form of cohabitation. This theory has mostly been criticized for its generalizations and North-Western-Europe-centrism, and indeed we can hardly state that in any countries of Central and Eastern Europe cohabitation would have replaced marriage. What could be observed is rather a slow rearrangement in family formation, the intensity of which may vary according to country,

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[3] Harcsa 2014. claims that this is not so much the spreading of new family forms but formerly peripheral models becoming more mainstream.

age group, gender and social strata (POTÂRCĂ–MILLS–LESNARD 2013). When examining couples' relationship formation, especially less widespread ones, it might be an interesting question which social groups are the primary 'rule models'. Young people play an important role here, as they are usually at the forefront of social changes. There are differences among European countries as to which social layers became the so-called models for the burgeoning of cohabitation. Experts have raised several hypotheses; one of these, mostly applicable to the Scandinavian region, is that cohabitation is most widespread among highly educated intellectuals and the middle-class, as well as among students (SPÉDER 2005, SOMLAI 2013). In Eastern Europe, specifically in Romania and Hungary, cohabitation was first present among the socially disadvantaged strata (SPÉDER 2005, MUREŞAN 2008). Hungarian studies of the late 1990s and early 2000s have demonstrated that while cohabitation as a relationship form is present in all layers of society, albeit to a differing extent, childbearing within cohabitation is mostly typical among those with lower education (S. MOLNÁR – PONGRÁCZ 1998, SPÉDER 2004). PONGRÁCZ–SPÉDER (2003) in their analysis of cohabiting couples, makes a difference between 'new type' and 'old type' cohabitation. The former is usually considered a prelude to marriage or an alternative to marriage (see HEUVELINE–TIMBERLAKE 2004), practiced mostly by unmarried people. Old type cohabitation refers to divorced or widowed people who cohabit after a marriage; formerly this was more common and socially more accepted. MURINKÓ–ROHR (2018) has also pointed out that, besides the growing number of cohabiting couples in Hungary, the social composition of people choosing this family form has also changed. The Hungarian microcensus of 2016 has demonstrated that the majority of cohabiters are officially single, aged between 30 and 40, who choose cohabitation as an alternative to marriage (MURINKÓ–ROHR 2018. 21). The result is remarkable, because in Hungary this relationship type has increased mostly among the youth in the 2000s (PONGRÁCZ–SPÉDER 2003).

2. DATA

In this study we rely on the secondary analysis of two data surveys. One is the first large-scale youth study[4] of ethnic Hungarians of the neighboring countries of Hungary, the database created in the MOZAIK 2001 research project. The second one is the GeneZYs 2015 youth sociology research, a data collection modeled on the earlier survey. In the MOZAIK 2001 research 6480, in GeneZYs 2015 2700 young people were surveyed in the four larger regions inhabited by Hungarians but falling outside the present borders of Hungary.[5] Both research projects[6] are representative of Hungarian minority youth aged 15–29 living in the neighboring countries of Hungary. In the frame of GeneZYs 2015 research personal interviews were made with 1000 young people in Transylvania (Romania), 700 in Southern Slovakia, and 500 in Vojvodina (Serbia) and Subcarpathia (Ukraine) each, on questions related to marital situation, social background and education, labor market situation, value system, religion, politics, civic attitudes, and migration willingness. Data collection took place at the same time and with the same methodology in the four regions.

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[4] On the past and present of youth studies and the results of the 2015 survey, see: PAPP Z. 2017.

[5] These were: Southern Slovakia, Subcarpathia/Ukraine, Vojvodina/Serbia and Transylvania/Romania.

[6] Youngsters were asked with a questionnaire based survey. The sample of respondents is representative within the individual regions in terms of area, type of settlement, age and gender.

3. RESULTS

In our study we mostly analyze partnership formation of youth aged 15–29, the sociological characteristics and values of those who are single and those who live in a relationship on the basis of questionnaire data from the GeneZYs 2015 youth study. In some cases, we also refer to the 2001 data for comparison. In the second part of this paper we try to explore to what extent can socio-demographic and value-related factors explain whether someone is in a relationship, and if so, what type have chosen: a relationship where partners are not living together, non-marital cohabitation or marriage.

Usually, the official marital status composition of a given society is divided to single/unmarried, married, divorced and widowed. For the past few years in several countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Hungary and Romania, it is possible to indicate on census data that the respondent lives in a cohabiting relationship. This methodological possibility exists independently of whether the given country legally recognizes cohabitation. The basic division is between two large parts of the population: those permanently without a partner, and those officially living with a partner. However, the categorization of marital status is far more complex than it first seems, as in practice the group of single people, that of divorced and of widowed people, and even that of officially married people all have very heterogeneous subgroups. Single people may live permanently alone, out of their own decision or as the result of circumstances, as widowed, may have a partner for a certain period of their lives in a cohabiting or LAT relationship[7] or as members of a patch-work family.[8] The category of married people can be further divided into those living with their spouse and those living apart from them.

Though it may seem an easy task to survey the marital status of the population, and censuses attempt to register data the same way in each country and cycle for the sake of comparability, this standard cannot always be enforced in the case of questionnaires. Based on the data collected during the MOZAIK 2001 and the GeneZYs 2015 youth studies, we have detailed information about the marital status of respondents, but the individual categories do not always match. For instance, during the 2001 survey there was no differentiation within the category 'single' between those who had a relationship and those who did not. During the 2015 survey those with a relationship were handled separately, who formed a rather numerous subgroup within the category 'single' (27.4%). If we consider young people in a relationship but living separately as 'single', there has hardly been any change within this category among Hungarians in neighboring countries in the past 14 years. With regard to the other categories of family status, the MOZAIK 2001 survey gives a more detailed insight into the reality of relationships, as both in the case of married and divorced respondents those living apart were registered separately. The most remarkable change is that the proportion of young married people has dropped by 7.1% in the past decade and a half, but the proportion of those in unmarried cohabitation has grown to about the same extent (7.4%).

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[7] Living Apart Together; couples who have a partner but they live in different households; see KAPITÁNY 2012.

[8] SOMLAI 2013. 160–162.

In 2001 the majority of people who were officially married but not living with their spouse were women (0.3%; N = 21). In 2001 it was registered whether divorced respondents had a new, permanent, cohabiting relationship. Due to the age characteristics of the sample this was true for very few people (0.2% of the whole sample). In 2001 the proportion of those who were divorced and lived apart was somewhat higher in the Carpathian Basin (1.1%, N = 68); in the 2015 sample the proportion of divorcees was 0.8%. In 2001 there is a gender imbalance among married people living apart, and also among divorcees. In all relationship types women are overrepresented, and the proportion of married and divorced women living apart from their (ex-)spouse – so technically single – is higher than that of men in a similar situation. Though the low numbers warrant caution, compared to earlier analyses about Hungary (Utasi 2002) we might presume that women who formerly wanted to marry live outside their married relationship by their 30s more often than men do. Remarkable gender differences can be detected in the 2015 survey of ethnic Hungarians in the neighborhoods in the categories of 'married' and 'single'. There are significantly more women among those married and living in a relationship, whereas there are 18.6% more men who are single, a considerable increase also in comparison with the 2001 data. According to Utasi (2002) gender differences in the structure of relationships derive from traditional gender expectations, which propel women to get married and start a family earlier than men, whereas the latter delay commitment to steady relationships even further than before.

Marital Status	2001 (Mozaik)			2015 (Genezys)			Change 2001–2015
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	
Unmarried (single), living alone	54,2	45,8	74,2	59,3	40,7	47,3	–
In relationship, living apart	–	–	–	44,3	55,7	27,4	–
Totally unmarried	–	–	74,2	–	–	74,7	0,5
Married, living together	35,7	64,3	21,8	38,5	61,5	14,7	–7,1
Married, living apart	14,3	85,7	0,3	–	–	–	–
Cohabited/not married living together	36,9	63,1	2,4	50,2	49,8	9,8	7,4
Divorced, living in cohabitation	28,6	71,4	0,2	–	–	–	–
Divorced, living not together	25	75	1,1	50	50	0,8	–0,3

TABLE 1 *Youngsters by marital status in 2001 and 2015 (%)* (Sources: MOZAIK 2001, Genezys 2015; calculations by the author)

Looking at Hungarian-inhabited regions outside Hungary as a whole, we can detect a dynamic regarding marital status and relationships: the most significant change is the 7.1% percent drop in the number of married people in the past decade and a half. The most common reason cited for the decrease in the proportion of marriages is the rise in the marrying age, which in the 2015 sample was 22.54 on the average, but changes in the value system (see: Van de Kaa 1987) and the weakening of the normative expectation to marry also play a role. While some decades ago both young and older people had little space to form cohabiting relationships outside marriage, nowadays public opinion is more permissive towards young people, especially concerning the first long-term relationship, which in some cases is no longer a marriage but a 'testing ground' before marriage, a cohabiting relationship preceding or even permanently substituting marriage. Similarly, single people of 25–30 years of age are no longer regarded as 'old lads' or 'spinsters', though over a century ago especially girls who had received no 'proposals' by the end of their 20s ended up permanently single (Utasi 2002). As we have mentioned in the introduction, as a conequence of socio-economic changes in the past decades, the function of family has changed, the emphasis has moved. While the productive role of the family has faded into the background, its emotional functions have been amplified, and thus the lifestyle of young people has changed considerably. The fact that many young people in their 20s are still studying or plan to study further (Székely 2016) also affects partnership formation. In an earlier analysis (Papp Z. – Vita 2018) we have pointed out that students tend to be less committed to forming partnerships, whether marriage or cohabitation, probably because of the difficulties regarding reconciliation of studies/career founding and family life. There are differences between the four analyzed countries, but we can hardly speak about family formation among the majority of those aged 15–29, as two-thirds of them are single.

In the following we shall overview changes in the proportions of single, married and cohabiting people according to regions. Examining the Hungarian-inhabited regions outside Hungary separately, we can draw three major conclusions. First, the proportion of unmarried single people has not changed considerably in the majority of these regions between the two surveys. The proportion of unmarried single people among the 15–29 age group is about two-thirds in Transylvania and Southern Slovakia, in the Subcarpathian region somewhat less (64%) and in Vojvodina somewhat more (82%), while this was the region with the highest number of single people during the previous survey too. The most radical drop in married relationships has taken place in Southern Slovakia (by more than 10%) in the past decade and a half. The decrease in the proportion of marriages is observable in all the regions of the Carpathian Basin, but this is not a unique phenomenon; there is a decreasing tendency of marrying in most European countries since the 1960s.[9] On the other hand, cohabiting relationships are on the increase, especially in Southern Slovakia and Transylvania. In the other regions the proportion of those cohabiting without marriage is below 10%. This is a remarkable change, considering that slightly over a decade ago only about 3% of young people lived together without marriage in Transylvania, Southern Slovakia and Vojvodina, and there were hardly any cohabiting couples in the Subcarpathian region. Based on the newest youth study, Subcarpathian youth demonstrate the most traditional relationship patterns, such as a high marrying rate, marrying young, and having children at a young age, while the least 'traditional' relationship behavior characterizes young people in Southern Slovakia (Papp Z. – Vita 2018).

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[9] See: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Crude_marriage_rate,_selected_years,_1960-2015_(per_1_000_persons).png.

FIGURE 1 *Marital status changing by regions, 2001–2015* (Sources: MOZAIK 2001, GENEZYS 2015; calculations by the author)

4. THE BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTNERSHIPS

One of the important aspects of the studies describing the changes of marital status along with social characteristics is the nature of gender and territorial/settlement type discrepancies as well as locality patterns regarding the marital status of a given population group (MURINKÓ–SPÉDER 2015, RÖVID 2018). For example, according to Szalma (In TANÁCS 2019. 194–195), there are big differences between unmarried men and women referred to as singles regarding residence and educational level. While a majority of unmarried women live in urban environment and are typically well-educated, a higher proportion of unmarried men live in villages and have low level of education, therefore the two groups can hardly find each other. We found it interesting to examine this analytic aspect in our study.

There is a strong correlation between the gender and the marital status of the young adult population in the full sample. 55 percent of young men are unmarried and live without a partner, on average, while this ratio is 39 percent among young women. Among individuals living with a partner an inverse tendency is observed, according to which, typically higher proportion of women live with a partner or are married than men. This general gender-related difference shows a similar pattern in every region, with the difference that there are regions where the gender-related differences are more striking: for example, the proportion of married women is approximately 10 percentage point higher than that of married men in the Subcarpathian region and Transylvania. The same pattern is observed in Transylvania regarding the population living with a partner, where the proportion of women living with a partner is significantly higher than that of men.[10]

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[10] In the whole sample, as well as in the case of Vojvodina and Transylvania, the significance level related to the chi-squared test was lower than 0.001, in the Subcarpathian subsample lower than 0.01. In Southern Slovakia we discover no significant connection between gender and family status (chi-squared test 0.072).

FIGURE 2 *Marital status of man and woman by regions in 2015* (Sources: GeneZYs 2015; calculations by the author)

In the Carpathian Basin the distribution of the unmarried population is roughly the same in urban and rural localities. The residence-related differences are higher among the population living with a partner, because the proportion of individuals living with a partner and that of cohabiting couples are less among the rural population. However, the number of married young people is somewhat higher in the rural areas. There is a significant correlation[11] between marital status and the type of residence in two regions (Southern Slovakia and Transylvania). In Southern Slovakia youngsters with rural residency are more likely to live a relationship (living apart) or be married. In this region urban residents prefer cohabitation much more than rural residents do. In comparison with this, on the one hand the proportion of individuals living without a partner among the young adult urban residents of Transylvania is slightly higher, on the other hand more significant residence-related difference exists only regarding married young people. In this case the proportion of married people is also higher among youth living in countryside than among young city dwellers. There is only a slight residence-related difference in the proportion of young adults living in a cohabitation. It is also true in the Subcarpathian region and in Vojvodina (Serbia).

On the basis of statistical analysis *(Table 2)* the residence-related differences in the distribution of the various forms of partnerships show that a higher percentage of rural young adults get married than urban young adults. This more traditional attitude towards partnership formation regarding rural and urban areas appears only in relation to marriages and, for example does not exist against non-marital cohabitation relationships – except for Southern Slovakia. It should be added that

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[11] In case of Southern Slovakia, the significance level related to the chi-squared test was lower, than 0.05, in Transylvania 0.001 and in the whole sample < 0.001. In Subcarpathia and Vojvodina there is no significant connection between the residency and marital status (Chi-square test 0.467respectively 0.218).

in the other regions the percentage of cohabitation relationships is below 10 percent among the young adults regardless of the type of settlement. On the one hand, this findings highlights that the willingness to marry is evidently unbroken in the rural communities, on the other hand the residence-related differences of people living in a cohabitation relationship among regions refer to the social background of these people and/or the societal acceptance of cohabiting relationships.

Regions		Marital Status			
		Unmarried	In relationship, living apart	Married	Cohabiting
Subcarpathia/ Ukraine	Rural	46,7	15,5	27,6	7,0
	Urban	47,1	20,0	23,9	7,7
	Total	46,8	16,9	26,4	7,2
Vojvodina/ Serbia	Rural	53,4	26,5	11,1	8,5
	Urban	48,0	35,3	8,4	8,4
	Total	50,2	31,7	9,5	8,4
Southern Slovakia	Rural	43,8	34,5	9,9	11,0
	Urban	43,5	29,8	5,6	20,5
	Total	43,7	33,3	8,8	13,3
Transylvania/ Romania	Rural	46,7	24,6	19,8	8,7
	Urban	50,1	28,5	10,6	9,8
	Total	48,4	26,5	15,2	9,3
Carpathian Basin	Rural	46,7	15,5	27,6	7,0
	Urban	47,1	20,0	23,9	7,7
	Total	46,8	16,9	26,4	7,2

TABLE 2 *Domicile type by marital status in 2015 (%)* (Source: GENEZYS 2015; calculations by the author)

When examining the sociological characteristics of individuals with different marital status, we should look also at the relation between the partnership formation and educational level, respectively the subjective material well-being. Educational level, marital status and the types of partnerships generally show strong correlation.[12] In the Carpathian Basin almost two-third of people who completed primary education do not live in a relationship, 18 percent of them

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[12] In case of Subcarpathia, Southern-Slovakia and Transylvania the significance level of Chi-square test is < 0.001, in case of Vojvodina < 0.01.

have a relationship without living together, while the proportion of married people is 10 percent and that of people living in a non-marital cohabitation is 9 percent. In comparison with them, much more of people who completed secondary education, be it vocational or high school graduates, live with a partner. Among university or college graduates' singles and people who have a partner (living in different households) are overrepresented. However, among university graduates – compared with the population having a school-leaving certificate – the proportion of married and cohabiting couples are higher too. When comparing regions, almost one-third of young adults completed primary education live in a relationship in Vojvodina and in Southern Slovakia, while this ratio is 13 percent in the Subcarpathian region and in Transylvania. However, the region of Vojvodina and Southern Slovakia have the lowest percentage of married young adults who completed primary education; in Vojvodina and Southern Slovakia this ratio is 1 and 4 percent, respectively, it is 19 percent in the Subcarpathian region and 11 percent in Transylvania. Similar pattern is observed regarding cohabitation relationships. In the Subcarpathian region and Transylvania the proportion of young adults with low level of education who live in a cohabitation is twice as that of young adults with similar level of education in Southern Slovakia or Vojvodina. In the Subcarpathian region, generally, among young adults with the lowest level of education have the highest percentage of non-marital cohabitation relationships, contrary to Vojvodina and Southern Slovakia, where the percentage of non-marital relationships is highest among young adults with the highest level of education. In Southern Slovakia, regardless of educational level, more young adults choose to live in a cohabitation relationship than marriage. A striking difference is observed, for example in the group of respondents with a school-leaving certificate, where the number of cohabiting couples is almost twice as that of the married couples and one in every five university or college graduates live with their cohabiting partners, too. Certain elements of the second demographic transition – growing number of cohabitations and decreasing number of marriages – appear mostly among the attitude towards relationships of young adults in Southern Slovakia. Research data indicate that the reason of this, in addition to the delay of marriages, might be that cohabitation is becoming an alternative for marriage more and more in this region. In the other regions, after one of the very important events of growing up – obtaining the first qualification or a degree – more individuals choose marriage than cohabitation. Based on this, we assume that postponement of marriages is mostly behind the trend in Vojvodina and Transylvania. However, the cohabitation relationships are mainly like trial marriages. In Transylvania the ratios of non-marital cohabitation vary between 10–14 percent in the case of young adults with both the lowest or the highest level of education. In this case the U curve is not really suitable for describing the correlation between educational level and partnership formation. It seems that the number of people living in a stable relationship is not growing steadily in parallel with the increase in the levels of education *(Table 3)*. Except for the Subcarpathian region, not university graduates are those who avoid partnership commitments the most; a decline is observed mainly among individuals who completed secondary education. One part of the individuals with school-leaving certificate continued their studies most probably. We may conclude that basically it is not the educational level but the continuation of studies that plays a significant role in the establishment of partnerships.

Finished education level		Marital Status			
		Unmarried	In relationship, living apart	Married	Cohabiting
Subcarpathia/ Ukraine	Elementary school	49,4	13,3	19,0	12,7
	Vocational school	75,0	25,0	0,0	0,0
	High school	45,7	16,8	31,6	4,3
	University	40,3	25,8	29,0	4,8
Vojvodina/ Serbia	Elementary school	67,4	27,0	1,1	4,5
	Vocational school	54,8	24,7	12,9	7,5
	High school	46,3	34,6	9,0	9,6
	University	35,5	36,6	16,1	11,8
Southern Slovakia	Elementary school	62,8	27,7	3,6	5,8
	Vocational school	40,5	29,8	14,0	15,7
	High school	43,0	36,3	6,8	12,7
	University	29,7	35,5	14,5	19,6
Transylvania/ Romania	Elementary school	66,6	12,5	10,5	10,5
	Vocational school	51,7	11,2	22,4	13,8
	High school	44,3	34,7	14,0	6,1
	University	32,2	38,0	18,8	10,2
Carpathian Basin	Elementary school	61,8	17,7	9,8	9,2
	Vocational school	49,1	21,9	16,3	12,4
	High school	44,7	30,6	15,8	7,8
	University	33,0	35,8	18,4	12,2

TABLE 3 *Education level by marital status in 2015 (%)* (Source: GENEZYS 2015; calculations by the author)

There is a close significant relationship between self-classification according to material well-being and marital status in the whole sample.[13] At the Carpathian Basin level, 18% of young people do not face financial problems, over half of whom (53.9%) are single and a significant proportion (27.4%) are not in a relationship. The proportion of people living in relative

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[13] The Chi-squared test significance levels are the following: in the whole sample, Transylvania, Subcarpathia, < 0.001, in case of Southern-Slovakia < 0.05, in case of Vojvodina Pearson Chi-Square 0.355.

wellbeing[14] decreases as we move from singles to those in a relationship and this applies to those who said they could just make ends meet out of their budgets. All in all, financially disadvantaged youth form a small group, with about 6% of people experiencing constant financial difficulties or want. Most of them live in a single or cohabiting relationship, and are followed by those in relationship, living apart. One-third of those who are materially deprived are single, and one quarter live in a cohabitation relationship. A similar pattern can be observed in Subcarpathia and Transylvania, in the context of material well-being and relationship formation. Financial stability is associated with a significantly[15] higher level of commitment to the relationship and a greater willingness to marry, while financial uncertainty is associated with a lack of commitment to the relationship. It is also true for young people in the Southern Slovakia that materially favored are more likely to have a relationship (without living together) than those struggling with financial problems. On the other hand, young people in a better financial situation do not necessarily choose marriage over cohabitation in this region. *(Table 4)*

In the last part of this study we will first examine the differences and similarities in the value system of individuals living in different relationship forms and taking the question whether there are regional differences in values between married and cohabiting partners. We will also compare this data with the value system of unmarried single respondents.

In three regions (Vojvodina, Southern Slovakia, Transylvania) single young people emphasized the importance of true friendships, family, love and happiness as the most important values.[16] In Subcarpathia, these three values are preceded by the desire for a peaceful, war and conflict-free world. Singles in Southern Slovakia ranked love and happiness (average value of 4.49) above the family (mean value of 4.46), but all three things were highly rated. Subcarpathian singles mentioned good relationships with people in fifth place, with a slightly lower score for cohabitants. Singles in different places ranked different things last, in the Subcarpathian region it was personal freedom and living independently, in Vojvodina an exciting life while success was rated lowest in Transylvania, yet these factors are also important, as they scored above four on a scale of one to five.

Cohabiting couples ranked love and happiness as very high factors, above 4.5 on average, but family and true friendship were also seen as important in every region. Compared to other regions, it is worth emphasizing that couples living in cohabitation in Transylvania ranked the family highest (4.71). One exception at the regional level that should be emphasized is that cohabiting young people in Subcarpathia put the importance of money on the first place (4.57). This positioning is peculiar in that money does not receive this level of priority, but it is also lower in terms of average values in other regions. Married couples in Southern Slovakia also mentioned the importance of money; it came in sixth place, with an average of 4.19. The order of value of the Subcarpathians is presumably connected with the crisis in Ukraine, the lack of money and the associated livelihood problems. At the same time, the result also highlights the fact that material factors

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[14] Those who said they had no financial problems or were getting by on a budget.

[15] The Chi-squared test significance levels are the following: in the whole sample, Transylvania, Subcarpathia, < 0.001, in case of Southern-Slovakia < 0.05, in case of Vojvodina Pearson Chi-Square 0.355.

[16] Respondents were asked to mark the importance in their lives of 26 pre-listed values on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not at all important and 5 is very important. For reasons of volume, the study only presents the first 14 most important values.

Subjective material well-being		Marital Status			
		Unmarried	**In relationship, living apart**	**Married**	**Cohabiting**
Subcarpathia/ Ukraine	living comfortably	55,6	13,9	25,0	5,6
	relative well, focusing on spending	46,9	17,7	28,6	4,3
	making ends meet	43,0	19,8	26,7	9,3
	having financial problems month by month	44,4	7,4	14,8	22,2
	live in material deprivation	37,5	0,0	0,0	50,0
Vojvodina/ Serbia	living comfortably	54,4	31,6	7,0	5,3
	relative well, focusing on spending	51,4	31,6	9,2	7,8
	making ends meet	42,0	34,6	11,1	12,3
	having financial problems month by month	56,5	26,1	13,0	4,3
	live in material deprivation	0,0	50,0	25,0	25,0
Southern Slovakia	living comfortably	50,0	32,9	6,8	10,3
	relative well, focusing on spending	39,8	36,8	10,4	12,8
	making ends meet	47,6	24,3	6,8	18,4
	having financial problems month by month	58,3	25,0	0,0	16,7
	live in material deprivation	33,3	33,3	33,3	0,0
Transylvania/ Romania	living comfortably	56,1	24,9	14,0	5,0
	relative well, focusing on spending	46,9	30,3	14,5	7,5
	making ends meet	37,6	21,2	22,4	17,6
	having financial problems month by month	45,9	8,1	16,2	28,4
	live in material deprivation	66,7	0,0	33,3	0,0
Carpathian Basin	living comfortably	53,9	27,4	11,7	6,7
	relative well, focusing on spending	46,1	9,5	15,4	8,1
	making ends meet	42,8	4,8	16,3	14,6
	having financial problems month by month	48,5	12,5	14,0	22,1
	live in material deprivation	38,1	14,3	19,0	23,8

TABLE 4 *Subjective material categories by marital status, 2015 (%)* (Source: GENEZYS 2015; calculations by the author)

are a very important to those living in cohabiting relationships facing commitment, especially in view of what was demonstrated earlier, i.e. that in Subcarpathia, cohabitation is a typical relationship form for those who are combating financial hardship. Another regional disparity in the value choices of cohabiting partners is among young people from Vojvodina, who ranked freedom (average score of 4.67) highest. We also note that among the Vojvodina cohabiting partners, the peaceful world, family and work follow after freedom, and precede self-realization. Personal freedom and living independently was among the first five factors in Transylvanian cohabiting relationships. The importance of work is prominent in the value structure of couples living together in almost all regions[17] this group considers work to be the most important.

Family, love and happiness as well as true friendship were among the things that were most valued by married young people. As we can see, there is hardly any difference between the most important values stated by married and cohabiting couples. At the same time, the analysis shows that family has a higher value score on married couples' rating than on those cohabiting, with Transylvania being the one exception. A regional difference is that young people from Vojvodina, including married and cohabiting couples, have ranked freedom and the associated spontaneous life second in their lives. Differences, however, can be seen in the mean values: married young people from Vojvodina rated freedom 4.29, which was also very important for unmarried cohabiting couples.

In Subcarpathia and Southern Slovakia work is also ranked among the top five values among married people, with average scores of 4.45 and 4.35, respectively. It should be noted that faith in God is the sixth most important value for married Subcarpathian youth, immediately after work. However, faith is not so prominent in any region, even among married couples, who usually accord higher scores to traditional values. Young married people living in Transylvania mentioned appreciation as an important value in the top five. Subcarpathian married people also ranked appreciation quite prominently in ninth place, with a mean of 4.33, and preceded by more important things such as faith, good relations between people, and the Hungarian nationality background. In other regions, however, married people tended to rank appreciation more towards the middle.

Examining the structure of values, we see that there are no significant differences between the core values between married and unmarried people, the mean values demonstrate merely slight differences. There are regional differences and, accordingly, material and post-material elements appear in the value system of cohabiting couples. *(Table 5)*

Previous analyses that studied the connection between the form of the relationship and the value system, in particular religious practice, have shown that the type of relationship is not independent of the religion of the individual. PONGRÁCZ (2009), in her comparative work on the adult Hungarian population and minority Hungarians in Transylvania, found that Hungarians in Transylvania were more religious than those in Hungary. In Transylvania, people living in any kind of relationship[18] typically had stronger religious ties and she observed smaller discrepancies between Transylvanian married and cohabiting couples in the proportion of those who considered themselves to be non-religious, compared to the Hungarian subset (PONGRÁCZ 2009).

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[17] In Subcarpathia, on average married people gave the highest scores to work (4.45), followed by cohabitants (4.35), followed by singles (4.25).

[18] The study focused on comparing married and cohabiting couples.

	Unmarried		Cohabiting		Married	
	Subcarpathia/Ukraine					
1	peaceful world (free of wars and conflict)	4.63	money	4.57	family (starting and having a family)	4.92
2	family (starting and having a family)	4.56	love and happiness	4.50	love and happiness	4.83
3	true friendship	4.55	family	4.47	true friendship	4.49
4	love, happiness	4.51	peaceful world (free of wars and conflict)	4.38	peaceful world (free of wars and conflict)	4.71
5	good relation with other people	4.31	work	4.35	work	4.45
6	Hungarian background	4.30	accomplish the goals you had set	4.10	religion, faith in God	4.44
7	appreciation	4.25	personal freedom	4.10	good relation with other people	4.39
8	work	4.25	good relation with other people	4.08	Hungarian background	4.33
9	religion, faith in God	4.24	appreciation	4.07	appreciation	4.33
10	self-realization	4.20	being able to get and buy what you want	4.02	money	4.17
11	morality	4.19	religion, faith in God	3.99	morality	4.17
12	always reaches the set objectives/goals	4.18	help others	3.98	accomplish the goals you had set	4.12
13	help others	4.14	self-realization	3.82	moderateness	4.10
14	freedom, life without ties	4.13	right to lead and decide	3.80	respect for traditions	4.09
	Vojvodina/Serbia					
1	true friendship	4.66	love, happiness	4.87	family (starting and having a family)	4.82
2	family (starting and having a family)	4.49	personal freedom	4.67	love, happiness	4.81
3	love, happiness	4.44	true friendship	4.67	true friendship	4.62
4	personal freedom	4.39	peaceful world (without war and conflict)	4.65	peaceful world (without war and conflict)	4.50
5	self-realization	4.38	family (starting and having a family)	4.57	work	4.36
6	peaceful world (free of wars and conflict)	4.37	work	4.47	appreciation	4.35

TABLE 5 *Youngsters' value structure, 2015 (How important are the following things in your life? 1 – not important at all, 5 – very important; means)* (Source: GENEZYS 2015; calculations by the author)

	Unmarried		Cohabiting		Married	
	Vojvodina/Serbia					
7	work	4.36	work	4.45	freedom, life without ties	4.29
8	accomplish the goals you had set	4.29	accomplish the goals you had set	4.36	professional excellence	4.23
9	good relation with other people	4.23	professional excellence	4.28	self-realization	4.18
10	professional excellence	4.20	good relation with other people	4.20	accomplish the goals you had set	4.16
11	appreciation	4.17	success	4.17	professional excellence	4.07
12	success	4.17	beauties of life (nature, arts)	4.16	help others	4.05
13	help others	4.08	appreciation	4.14	success	3.82
14	exiting life	4.00	help others	4.14	beauties of life (nature, arts)	3.51
	Southern Slovakia					
1	true friendship	4.56	love, happiness	4.68	family	4.81
2	love, happiness	4.49	family (starting and having a family)	4.62	love, happiness	4.68
3	family (starting and having a family)	4.46	true friendship	4.43	true friendship	4.36
4	peaceful world (free of wars and conflict)	4.29	work	4.42	work	4.34
5	work	4.27	peaceful world (free of wars and conflict)	4.33	peaceful world (free of wars and conflict)	4.24
6	personal freedom	4.22	freedom, life without ties	4.22	money	4.19
7	accomplish the goals you had set	4.20	money	4.17	morality	4.10
8	self-realization	4.14	accomplish the goals you had set	4.10	good relation with other people	4.09
9	money	4.10	appreciation	4.07	freedom, life without ties	4.02
10	good relation with other people	4.09	success	4.05	accomplish the goals you had set	4.00
11	appreciation	4.07	professional excellence	4.03	success	3.99
12	professional excellence	4.04	self-realization	4.02	appreciation	3.98
13	success	4.00	morality	3.98	professional excellence	3.96
14	help others	3.89	help others	3.77	self-realization	3.94

TABLE 5 CONTINUED

	Unmarried		Cohabiting		Married	
	Transylvania/Romania					
1	true friendship	4.51	family (starting and having a family)	4.71	love, happiness	4.69
2	family (starting and having a family)	4.49	love, happiness	4.67	family	4.68
3	love, happiness	4.47	true friendship	4.49	true friendship	4.42
4	good relation with other people	4.34	work	4.48	peaceful world (free of wars and conflict)	4.37
5	personal freedom	4.34	personal freedom	4.42	appreciation	4.37
6	appreciation	4.32	self-realization	4.28	work	4.36
7	self-realization	4.30	good relation with other people	4.28	good relation with other people	4.31
8	peaceful world (free of wars and conflict)	4.30	money	4.28	morality	4.22
9	professional excellence	4.28	accomplish the goals you had set	4.28	self-realization	4.22
10	work	4.25	appreciation	4.26	accomplish the goals you had set	4.22
11	accomplish the goals you had set	4.24	peaceful world	4.25	helping others	4.20
12	success	4.20	helping others	4.24	moderateness	4.18
13	morality	4.17	professional excellence	4.22	religion, faith in God	4.17
14	helping others	4.13	success	4.21	money	4.17

TABLE 5 CONTINUED

In light of the results of this earlier study we presume that relationship types, and the relationship commitment at all, is influenced by value sets such as the individuals' attitudes toward religion and church. By analyzing to what extent and how religious the individuals were, below we try to explore if there is a difference in religiosity and marital status/the type of relationship, and whether there are patterns across regions. First, we examine the extent of religious practice and then the mode of religiosity among singles, married couples and cohabiters.

Generally speaking, regardless of the partnership type, about one third of young people attend church only on religious holidays. Following this, most them go to church weekly (21.2%), monthly and yearly (17.5% and 16.2%, respectively), while those who do not attend church (who never go) form the smallest group (11.5%). After single people, those in a relationship (not living together) and married couples exercise their religion more intensively (weekly, monthly). This type of more frequent religious practice is most typical of single people and least characteristic of those living in cohabitation. On average, the proportion of the latter among those who attend church services only on religious holidays is under 10% and even lower among those who go monthly

or weekly. In fact, as the frequency of church attendance decreases, there is a slight growth in the proportion of those in a relationship (not living together) and an even more spectacular growing in the proportion of couples living outside of marriage. Compared to this, institutional religious practice manifests itself differently in the lives of married couples and singles. The more intense[19] the religious practice, the greater the proportion of unmarried singles and married couples whose proportion gradually decreases as the church attendance intensity decreases.

In Transylvania and Vojvodina, the tendency is that most single people attend church services at least once a month and during major religious holidays, followed by people in a relationship, then married couples, with cohabiters attending church services the least. In Subcarpathia, married couples are more involved in frequent, institutional religious practice than those in a relationship (not living together), so they are the second "most religious" group in this regard. In Southern Slovakia, only among regularly churchgoers (on weekly bases) could be observed the predominance of singles; the differences between partnership types and religious attendance are evened out with the reduction of church attendance, e.g. among married couples and cohabiters who go to church monthly or holiday churchgoers who are single or in a relationship, suggesting that these groups demonstrate similar attitudes toward religion in Southern Slovakia. Another difference from region to region is which relationship types forms a majority among those who do not practice their religion institutionally: in Transylvania and Vojvodina, for example, people who are in a relationship, then singles, in Southern Slovakia and Subcarpathia, singles are followed immediately by those in cohabitation. Societal perception of cohabitation is also indicated by the fact that the lowest number of holiday churchgoers are the Subcarpathian cohabiters and the number of those who never attend church is highest among persons living out of wedlock here.

Taking into account the extent of institutionalized religious practice, overall, we find that a higher proportion of single or married young people experience religiousness at church services on a weekly or monthly level compared with cohabiters, and that a significant proportion of people in cohabiting relationships practically never does so. *(Figure 3)*

There is a tight connection between marital status of the young adults and how they live their religiousness. Religious bonds are affected by several socio-demographic factors like childhood socialization or age. Religious bonds get tighter when getting older. When starting a family, raising children religiosity plays an important role in the life of the parents and may strengthen their religious faith (Bahr 1970, cited by Rosta 2012). In this paper, however, we do not deal with the issue of family formation and having children, we focus specifically on the types of partnerships. The statement above is consistent with fact that among religious people the ratio of married, who typically belong to the older generation (above 25 years old) is generally higher than the ratio of other partnership types. The ratio of young people living in accordance with church rules is the lowest, 4.5 percent, among cohabiters The proportion of those living in accordance with religious teachings and having a partner is slightly lower (27,8%) than of those who are religious in their own way (26,6%), but it shows a slight increase in the number of non-religious young adults. In the Carpathian Basin we see a rising trend starting from religious to non-religious couples in the case of those who live in a partnership or live in cohabitation which shows that among

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[19] Intensity here refers to the frequency of attending church services.

young adults who live in accordance with the teachings of the church these two groups represent a smaller ratio than in the group of non-religious. The trend is just the opposite among singles and married people: while the ratio of religious singles following the teachings of the church decreased from 50% to 46%, we see that the ratio of religious married who follow the church teachings (17%) also declines in the group of non-religious married couples (10%).

In line with the earlier analysis made by Pongrácz (2009) we can confirm for the whole Hungarian minority youngsters, that cohabiters represent a relatively high ratio in the dimension of individual religiousness (religious in their own way) and in the group of non-religious, especially in Slovakia, Vojvodina and Transylvania.

Cohabiters in Transylvania and Slovakia are more committed to church than in the two other regions. In Vojvodina and Subcarpathia a significant part, above 80% of young adults living in cohabitation belong to the group of 'religious in their own way', while in Transylvania


FIGURE 3 *Religiosity by marital status, aggregated data, 2015* (Source: GeneZYs 2015; calculations by the author)

and in Southern Slovakia about three quarters of couples living outside a marriage say that they are religious in their own way. The regional differences in the religiousness of young cohabiters arise presumably from the acceptance of cohabitation within the regions. The stronger church's commitment among the young adults living outside of a marriage is probably due to the fact, that this kind of partnerships are less marginalized in the local societal context in Transylvania and Southern Slovakia, than in the Subscarpathian region. The high proportion of cohabiters among those religious in their own way in Subcarpathia might indicate this view. As it was stated by PONGRÁCZ (2009) earlier, the proportion of those 'religious in their own way' could be higher in the group of cohabiters – by contrast to married couples – because living outside of marriage is inconsistent with the church rules, but in a mostly religious societal context nor cohabiters can be list themselves in the group of non-religious.

In Subcarpathia, the two smallest groups of religious churchgoers are made up of cohabiters and those in a relationship, but not living together. As Subcarpathia is the most traditional community from the aspect of demographic behavior and values, the result indicates that in this region partnerships out of a marriage is the least consistent with religiousness, what the doctrines of the church order.

Religiosity		Marital Status			
		Unmarried	In relationship, living apart	Married	Cohabiting
Subcarpathia/ Ukraine	religious, in accordance with the church rules	49,0	13,7	33,3	2,0
	religious in their own way	44,9	17,4	26,2	8,7
	not religious	44,2	23,3	18,6	9,3
Vojvodina/ Serbia	religious, in accordance with the church rules	50,7	37,0	9,6	2,7
	religious in their own way	51,4	28,6	9,2	10,5
	not religious	47,1	36,8	10,3	5,7
Southern Slovakia	religious, in accordance with the church rules	52,1	35,0	6,8	5,1
	religious in their own way	40,5	34,1	9,6	14,9
	not religious	44,8	32,8	7,8	14,7
Transylvania/ Romania	religious, in accordance with the church rules	49,7	27,3	17,1	5,3
	religious in their own way	48,3	25,9	15,3	9,9
	not religious	46,4	29,8	9,5	13,1
Carpathian Basin	religious, in accordance with the church rules	50,3	27,8	16,9	4,2
	religious in their own way	46,5	26,6	15,0	10,9
	not religious	45,8	31,8	10,3	11,2

TABLE 7 *Types of religiosity by marital status, 2015 (%)* (Source: GENEZYS 2015; calculations by the author)

5. LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS

In the final section of the study, we use explanatory logistic regression models in order to point out what factors influence the most youths' relationship status. First of all, we try to answer that in case of ethnic Hungarian minority youngsters what kind of social, demographic and value related factors explains the type of relationship they are living in: in a relationship not living together, cohabitation, or marriage. Each relationship type is explained in separated models.

Thus, in the regression models, marital status categories (dummy) are the dependent variables, and the key independents are the socio-demographic ones described above, and the variables measuring values and religiosity. As a rule, regressions were made in three steps and only the best-fit models were included in the paper.

Independent variables used in logistic regression:

1. Gender (dummy: 0 – man; 1 – woman)

2. Age group (categorical: 15–19; 20–24; 25–29)

3. Country/region (categorical: Subcarpathia/Ukraine; Vojvidina/Serbia; Southern Slovakia; Transylvania/Romania)

4. Domicile (dummy: 0 – rural; 1 – urban)

5. Student status[20] (categorical: studying in vocational/technical school; studying in high school; studying at university)

6. Fathers' highest level of education (categorical: low; medium; high)

7. Type of religiosity[21] (categorical: religious, in accordance with the church rules ; religious in their own way; not religious)

8. Value system (set of values processed with factor analysis: faith and religiosity factor; altruist factor; success and career oriented factor)

9. Parents' ethnically mixed union/marriage (dummy: 0 – homogenous Hungarian; 1 – ethnically mixed)

10. Having a baby (dummy: 0 – not having a baby; 1 – having a baby)

From the aspect of relationship commitments, young people who have a relationship, but living in separate households make up the relative majority of the youth population in the sample. In the first two models, we tested the extent to which the socio-demographic and value factors described above are likely to influence this relationship type. In the first step, we only tested the effects of socio-demographic variables, and in the second step, we included variables related to religiosity and values. Based on these, the region of origin and the gender of the respondents seem to be very strong determinants of this relationship type, while student status, father's education level and the domicile, or religion do not play a significant role therein. Success and career-oriented attitudes, on the other hand has a positive influence, significantly increasing the likelihood of this type of relationship.

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[20] Those who had a student status (were studying) when they were interweaved.

[21] Independently of how often attend religious services what consider respondents about their own religiosity.

Independent Variables		In relationship, living apart			
		Model 1		Model 2	
		Exp. (B)	S.E.	Exp. (B)	S.E.
Gender (1, if woman)		1,894***	0,156	1,994***	0,162
Age group (ref.: 15–19 age)	20–24 age	1,212	0,239	1,260	0,245
	25–29 age	0,603	0,333	0,632	0,341
Region (ref.: Subcarpathia/Ukraine)	Vojvodina/Serbia	2,845***	0,327	2,334**	0,335
	Southern Slovakia	3,134***	0,319	3,032***	0,327
	Transylvania/Romania	2,224***	0,306	1,948*	0,311
Domicile type (1, if urban)		1,092	0,162	1,109	0,167
Student status (ref.: vocational/technical school)	high school	0,659	0,311	0,694	0,333
	university	1,630	0,340	1,681	0,364
Fathers' education level (ref.: low – 8 general at most)	middle	0,954	0,341	0,762	0,352
	high	0,954	0,368	0,825	0,379
Religiosity (ref.: religious, in accordance with the church rules)	religious in their own way			1,146	0,201
	not religious			1,473	0,293
Altruist (factor)				1,015	0,093
Success and carrier oriented (factor)				1,199**	0,092
Constant		0,114	0,522	0,000	0,558
Nagelkerke R²		0,125		0,139	
Exp. (B)		0,482		0,494	

TABLE 8 *Logistic Regression Model for explaining the 'in relationship, living apart unions' between 15–29 aged Hungarian minority youngsters, 2015. Dependent Variable: in a relationship, not living together (dummy; 1 – yes, 0 – all others; *p < 0,10, **p < 0,05, ***p < 0,01)* (Source: GENEZYS 2015; calculations by the author)

The socio-demographic variables most likely to influence cohabitation among young people such as older age, fathers' educational level and the region of origin seems to have a strong and significant effect in this case. Compared to the 15–19 age group, those in the 25–29 age group are most likely to have a partner, the children of the fathers completed primary education (maximum 8 classes) compared to fathers with secondary education, Hungarians living in Slovakia in the regional comparison, and those of urban origin are likely living in a cohabited partnership. With the completion

of education, the likelihood of cohabitation decreases: among young people, compared to those who had completed primary education (8 general classes), the graduates are less likely to have cohabitation. Success, individualization, desire for career, and desire for self-realization also increase the likelihood of cohabitation as a type of relationship, whereas religiousness significantly reduces this chance. In addition to control the above variables, two additional explanatory variables were included in the final model, one related to having a child and the other to parenting heterogeneity. The inclusion of these two variables slightly increased the explanatory power of the overall model, but at the same time reduced the effects of age, but they remained significant and the direction of the effect remained unchanged, meaning that those at a higher age have a greater chance of cohabitation. However, it is interesting that in the third model, the father's educational achievement already has a negative impact on this type of relationship, meaning that children of fathers either with secondary education or graduate are less likely to live in cohabitation than children of fathers completed primary education. This effect is reversed when we enter another independent variable, taking into consideration whether there is a child in the relationship. People with children are more likely to live in a cohabited partnership than people without children. Parents' marriages, depending on whether they are ethnically homogeneous marriage between Hungarians, or heterogamous, where one of the parties are not Hungarian, also influence the current relationship between the respondents, and those born in mixed marriages are more likely to live in a cohabited partnership than those, whose parents are of Hungarian nationality. *(Table 9)*

In the last model, we attempted to explore the sociological mechanisms likely to lead to marriage. In this respect, the two most explanatory variables are age and having a child, the 25–29 years old people far more likely to be married than those aged up to 19, and this strong effect, although somewhat reduced with the involvement of people having a child, but remains strong in all the models. Among the socio-demographic characteristics, gender significantly influence marriage, women more likely to be married than men. The direction of the effect of the regions is changing compared to the previous models. Here we continue to take the Subcarpathian region as the reference category, compared thereto in all other regions young people are less likely to marry. Regression analysis also reflects the fact that the probability of marriage is decreasing for young people from Southern Slovakia, then from Vojvodina and then from Transylvania. Otherwise, the decline in the institution of marriage is most pronounced among the youth of Southern Slovakia. Neither the level of education completed nor the qualification of the father significantly influence the formation of the marriages, however, regarding the direction of the effects, we have to note that, compared to those with primary education, graduates of vocational schools and graduates of secondary education have the greatest chance of marriage. In contrast, university education has a negative impact on married relationships. This situation will change if the model is controlled and take into consideration whether the interviewees already have children or not. Indeed, the chances of marriage are more likely among people with graduation and diploma, having a child (as opposed to those completed primary education, having no children). The ambition of success and career aspirations has a negative effect on marriage, while those who value religiosity and faith are more likely to marry. *(Table 10)*

Independent Variables		Cohabitation					
		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
		Exp. (B)	S.E.	Exp. (B)	S.E.	Exp. (B)	S.E.
Gender (1, if woman)		1,165	0,144	1,203	0,156	1,038	0,162
Age group (ref.: 15–19 age)	20–24 age	13,178***	0,361	14,559***	0,426	2,888*	0,487
	25–29 age	16,109***	0,361	20,031***	0,425	3,287*	0,491
Region (ref.: Subcarpathia/Ukraine)	Vojvodina/Serbia	1,376	0,275	1,058	0,312	1,450	0,324
	Southern Slovakia	2,890***	0,246	2,256**	0,282	2,639***	0,294
	Transylvania/ Romania	1,524	0,236	1,311	0,262	1,552	0,271
Domicile type (1, if urban)		1,581**	0,153	1,385	0,168	1,472*	0,172
Educational leve (ref.: general school)	trade/ vocational school	0,640	0,258	0,707	0,277	0,664	0,284
	high school (graduate)	0,450***	0,228	0,433***	0,252	0,453**	0,265
	university	0,495**	0,253	0,496**	0,275	0,568*	0,289
Fathers' education level (ref.: low – 8 general at most)	middle	2,964***	0,444	0,474***	0,220	0,531**	0,230
	high	1,015**	0,432	0,429**	0,289	0,469*	0,297
Success and carrier oriented (factor)				1,234*	0,088	1,251*	0,091
Faith and religiosity (factor)				0,728***	0,088	0,714***	0,090
Having children (1, if yes)						2,080***	0,204
Mixed marriage (1, if yes)						1,427*	0,184
Constant		0,016	0,405	0,015	0,475	0,051	0,569
Nagelkerke R²		0,144		0,159		0,117	
Exp. (B)		0,108		0,106		0,139	

TABLE 9 *Logistic Regression Model for explaining cohabitation based unions between 15–29 aged Hungarian minority youngsters, 2015. Dependent Variable: living in cohabitation (dummy; 1 – yes, 0 – all others; *p < 0,10, **p < 0,05, ***p < 0,01)* (Source: GENEZYS 2015; calculations by the author)

Independent Variables		Married					
		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
		Exp. (B)	S.E.	Exp. (B)	S.E.	Exp. (B)	S.E.
Gender (1, if woman)		2,477***	0,138	2,265***	0,146	1,386*	0,170
Age group (ref.: 15–19 age)	20–24 age	8,448***	0,424	,271***	0,429	2,557	0,603
	25–29 age	63,846***	0,410	62,447***	0,415	10,271***	0,597
Region (ref.: Subcarpathia/Ukraine)	Vojvodina/Serbia	0,236***	0,229	0,315***	0,259	0,488*	0,304
	Southern Slovakia	0,181***	0,215	0,241***	0,238	0,266***	0,280
	Transylvania/ Romania	0,448***	0,176	0,539***	0,187	0,759	0,220
Domicile type (1, if urban)		0,611***	0,147	0,702	0,156	0,713*	0,182
Educational leve (ref.: general school)	trade/ vocational school	1,417	0,271	1,275	0,286	1,656	0,344
	high school (graduate)	1,092	0,228	0,987	0,240	1,956*	0,300
	university	0,816	0,252	0,706	0,265	1,940*	0,330
Fathers' education level (ref.: low – 8 general at most)	middle	1,021	0,206	1,065	0,216	1,418	0,259
	high	1,053	0,252	1,169	0,266	1,458	0,315
Success and carrier oriented (factor)				0,843*	0,081	0,799*	0,094
Faith and religiosity (factor)				1,591***	0,097	1,471***	0,109
Having children (1, if yes)						15,496***	0,188
Mixed marriage (1, if yes)						0,941	0,219
Constant		0,014***	0,439	0,012***	0,455	0,010***	0,671
Nagelkerke R²		0,353		0,374		0,493	
Exp. (B)		0,167		0,172		0,229	

TABLE 10 *Logistic Regression Model for explaining marriage based unions between 15–29 aged Hungarian minority youngsters, 2015. Dependent Variable: married (dummy; 1 – yes, 0 – all others; *p < 0,10, **p < 0,05, ***p < 0,01)* (Source: GENEZYS 2015; calculations by the author)

CONCLUSIONS

In the past two decades the partnership behaviours and as a result the models of establishing a family have changed all over Europe. One of the most significant changes are related to the rearrangements of living together. Among the ethnic minority Hungarian youngsters living in a partnership and parallel to this the decrease of marriages indicate this theory. In the field of partnership behaviors we may state that the Hajnal-line (Hajnal 1965, quoted by Kiss 2010) is moving towards East.

Partnership formation is strongly influenced by social, economic as well as value factors; in this study we focused on the effects of this factors on marital status. More precisely we tried to the answer to what extent certain socio-economic variables and values determine partnership formation among Hungarian youth, in four regions of the Carpathian Basin. As for methodology there were used descriptive statistics and multivariate analyses. The results indicate that the long-term commitments in partnership decisions, like marriage is postponed of the classical young life stage. Though less people live in cohabited partnership than in marriage, the proportion of cohabitations has increased in every region in the past decades. We pointed out, that regionalism, the ethnically mixed life situation play a significant role in the forming of cohabited partnerships of the young generations. Though all the analyzed regions belong to the Central Eastern European area, there are different regional patterns in partnership behavior. Youth are more likely to live in cohabited unions in Slovakia and Transylvania, while youngsters in Subcarpathia show a higher willingness to marry than people in any other analyzed region. The traditional partnership value orientation of young girls could be also observed in all regions, which might be realized when examining that women endeavor to get married more significantly than men.

About the value system of youngsters, we might affirm that the value preferences of inner safety and the importance of private sphere (love, happiness, family, true friendship) were rated nearly at the maximum in case of every relationship type. However, the value system of cohabiters could be depicted with the desire for freedom and focusing on work, multivariate analyses showed that besides the career aspirations, the extent of religiosity, educational level and having children all have important impacts on youngsters' partnership formation.

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Preserving traditions and modernization

Identity patterns of three generations of Romani women[1]

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Abstract

The impact of globalization and modernization not only transforms Romani life at the individual level, but also changes the framework for the social integration of traditional communities, the way culture is transferred and socialized, while adding new content to the expression of Romani culture as well as identity and community values. In this transformation process, the dual role of Romani women in the development of new integration schemes is crucial for the minority group. As the guardians of habits and traditions in the socialization of the growing generations of the community, they ensure the continuation of traditions of identity, and at the same time – in response to environmental challenges – they are also the initiators of the changes needed to integrate into the majority society. The aim of the study was to explore the mechanism of this dual role – that is the preservation of tradition and the modernization for integration. In addition, within the framework of research, by examining three generations of Romani women belonging to the same family, we analysed the changing patterns of identity and looked at the extent to which the preservation or abandonment of traditions has contributed to the social integration and assimilation of Romani people over the past 20 years.

Keywords

Romani women, identity, additive and substitutive acculturation, tradition, modernization

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INTRODUCTION

The modernization process of recent decades has not only made a difference in the life of the majority society, but it has also had a significant impact on the life of the Romani society. In a changing environment, traditions are taking on new meaning, the way culture is transmitted, and the values that determine the day-to-day life of the community are also shaped. Of course, the process of change does not mean the permanent disappearance of Romani traditions, but rather the appearance of new values, behavioural patterns, and identity variants in many cases instead of existing ones or in addition to them.

In all societies – including Romani communities as well – women play a key role in the transmission of values and cultural patterns and in the integration of the growing generation into society. However, it is not easy to fulfil this role of socialization, when environmental changes over the decades have fundamentally transformed the role of Romani women in communities and the environment to which members of minority groups need to adapt in order to effectively integrate. There is no easy-to-learn recipe for the commitment of women responsible for socialization to the values and traditions that guarantee the preservation of ethnic identity in a rapidly changing environment and their commitment to the integration models promoting the fit into the majority society, which, however, weaken the bonds of belonging to an ethnic community.

Accordingly, research on the role of Romani women in cultural and value transfer is considered to be of key importance, since successful social integration of the minority group and the continuation of traditions that distinguish it from the majority society but reinforce belonging to the community primarily depends on how women of key importance in socialization can balance between tradition and the challenges of modernization. (KOCZÉ–POPA 2009)

In this study, we examine three generations of Romani women belonging to the same family, with the aim of understanding the role and importance of tradition and modernization within each generation, and of the changes in patterns of socialization within the family as well as the factors influencing transformation. In the first part of the study, we highlight some of the decisive elements of identity formation, in the second part we present the methodological tools of the research, and in the third chapter, we analyse the identity patterns and integration strategies of three generations of Romani women.

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF IDENTITY FORMATION: INTEGRATION, ASSIMILATION, MODERNIZATION, TRADITION

With the rise of globalization and modernization, the categories that define ethnic identity, both the schemes offered by the majority and minority communities, are transforming, as they are no longer as stable and unequivocal as they were decades ago. Changed frameworks lead to identity change, identity crisis, loss of tradition, or reinterpretation of tradition in particular communities.

In the fast-changing economic and social environment of the XXI. century, the statement that identity consists solely of ready-made elements in traditional communities and that there is no alternative for the individual to choose his/her identity or reshape the elements of his/her identity is no longer valid. (BERGER–LUCKMANN 1966, OGBU 1978, KRAPPMAN 1980) The idea of the changing elements of identity is, of course, not new, since Lewin pointed out in 1972 that personality development and, consequently, identity is a factor in the dynamic interaction of the individual and the environment; and with mobility and environmental change, the sense of identity of the group and its members changes as well. (LEWIN 1972)

In a multicultural society, with the completion of individualization, it is possible for an individual to be a member of several groups, and to develop his/her identity and its defining elements by himself/herself. (CSEPELI 1997) Consequently, the elements of personal and social identity are undergoing transformation. (PATAKI 1986) While the focus of personal identity is on individual life stories, when social identity is created, the individual shares some of his/her characteristics with others, but in a modernized society, he/she does so in a personalized way. (PATAKI 1998, BREWER–WEBER 1999, THOMPSON 1996) As a result, the growth of the individual space leads to new identity categories created by individual efforts rather than stable identity elements.

This change is seen in the development of ethnic identity among minority groups (BINDORFFER 2001, TURNER 1975), including Gypsy communities too. Everything that the Gypsies have received so far and taken for granted in their closed communities, the spaces and social groups reorganized in the course of modernization have made social relations insecure. The weakening of their previously naturalized culture and traditions forced the Gypsies to decide for themselves what is the value to them, what identity they would choose, and how they would organize their lives, using their own "knowledge and resources". (BECK–BECK 1996) Faced with new patterns that have been made more prestigious by the majority society – through modernization and globalization – the members of the minority group have gradually lost the traditionally held beliefs through socialization, which were maintained in their closed community.[2] This process has accelerated the change in the content and form of identity and may even result in assimilation.

However, the evolution of an individual's ethnic identity is the result of a process by which a person belonging to a minority group make oneself aware of belonging to a particular group. Ethnic identity assumed in different situations varies in many respects, depending on the advantages or disadvantages of belonging to a minority group in an individual's life. If majority society is associated with negative stereotypes against the minority group, individuals may choose to "end" their minority group membership by leaving the group and assimilating. (TÓTH 2008)

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[2] This change was facilitated, among other things, by the difficulty of incorporating Gypsy traditions into the norms expected and accepted by the majority society because of their "indefinability". The questioning of the credibility of traditions by members of the minority group also raises questions and leads to a loss of credit for previously held values and customs. (HEELAS 1996)

When we speak of assimilation as a completed process, we are talking about the merging of previously distinct socio-cultural groups. However, if we consider assimilation as a process, we follow the interaction from the first steps to the complete merging of the group in four key areas: cultural, social/structural, biological, and psychological. (MARGER 1991, YINGER 2002) Following the unification of the four areas, we can speak of a new ethnic group.

Our study focuses on the process of cultural assimilation *(acculturation),* during which members of the ethnic minority gradually adopt elements of the culture, clothing, language, religious, and behavioural patterns of the majority society. (MARGER 1991) Marger distinguishes between additive and substitutive acculturation as well. Additive acculturation is when more or less different cultures come into contact with one another and the culture of one group adds new elements. However, in the case of substitutive acculturation, new ones appear instead of the old cultural elements. (MARGER 1991) In this sense, acculturation is a process that does not always mean complete assimilation, as can be seen within the Romani group. Keeping one's own (separate) culture and reinforcing it with new elements can also be explained by the benefits of belonging to a separate community. For example, a sense of security stemming from belonging to a community, a more stable social network, high-prestige cultural elements (such as visuality, a sense of music) specific to the community, etc. In this case, members of the community are interested in preserving their distinctiveness in a certain degree and form. Separation and the development of positive elements of identity and inclusion in the culture of the majority are further enhanced by the fact that belonging to a minority group has features that can be easily distinguished by majority society and that group membership cannot be easily "denied". These can be for example dominant race characteristics (such as skin colour), language, hair style, clothing, as well as distinctive habits and patterns of behaviour. In this case, the members of the group try to introduce new, high-prestige identities into their own culture, instead of maintaining prejudices. This phenomenon has also been observed in three generations of Romani women. To avoid total assimilation, they ritualize some elements of the original culture, thus losing their old content and gaining new ones that can be more prestigious and serve as tools for individual self-identification.

2. THE RESEARCH SITES, APPLIED RESEARCH METHOD AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE

2.1. The research sites

The role of women in society can best be understood by examining their status in their micro-environment (BEBEL 1976).

For our empirical research, we chose a settlement in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county, which is one of the most densely populated micro-regions of the country inhabited by Gypsies, close to Mátészalka. Their population here was 3,380 people on 1 January 2015 (KSH 2015). In 2001, 14% of the inhabitants of the settlement declared themselves to be Gypsy in the census, and 24.63% in 2011 (KSH 2001, 2011). Today, these ratios have risen, but we need to wait a few more years for the next credible census, so we can only rely on estimates. According to social workers working in the settlement, 70% of the inhabitants consider themselves to be members of some Romani groups – Olah Gypsies or Romungro. Most of the settlements are inhabited by Olah Gypsies, who cherish their traditions the most among the Gypsy groups.

Among Olah Gypsies mostly living in closed groups, even the majority of the younger generation wears rose skirts, characteristic jewels, and braids, and they use Gypsy language more often than Hungarian in their daily communication. The focus of our analysis was deliberately on a closed Olah Gypsy community living in the settlement of Nyírség, as this resulted in a more marked breakdown between the generations as well as the majority and minority societies.

The living conditions of the families living here have undergone significant changes in recent decades. The "shabby houses" (putri) of Romani settlements were liquidated in the late 1980s and "Cs" type homes (reduced value) were built instead of them. The precondition for the construction of the "new" dwellings was at least one-year continuous employment, which for a time resulted in a steady employment of a significant number of men.

Due to the unfavourable regional location of the settlement, commuting was common – and it is still prevalent among men. Usually in the capital, but many works in other parts of the country. Romani women typically stay in the settlement with their children and take only occasional jobs to improve the family's financial situation. Thus, the standard of living of the family, the roles within the family and the division of labor – the pattern transferred to the next generation – were fundamentally influenced by the fact whether the Romani men were working and to what extent they were present in family life.

By the early 1990s, most of the available jobs had ceased, and the four-street "Cs" type new homes had become colonial nature again. Despite initiatives taken in recent decades to eliminate these settlements, the situation has not fundamentally changed.

An ecclesiastical denomination plays an important role in organizing the life of the settlement, which pays special attention to its task of promoting the integration of the Gypsy population. The role of the Church is not only limited to religious activities. Through numerous programs and events, it seeks to mobilize the resources of the Gypsy community and strengthen the identity of its members. The organizers would like to make Gypsy people value their culture and strengthen their Romani identity. Through their initiatives, they guide the local community towards social advancement and the preservation of local values. They create opportunities for sustaining bilingualism, bringing community traditions, customs, and generations closer together. Every effort is made to bring up a new generation of Gypsies in the settlement, who is bound to their own traditions and customs.

2.2. Applied research method and characteristics of the sample

In our case study, we would like to investigate the substitutive acculturation process of MARGER (1991) by analysing the cultural relations of three generations of Romani women. Through interviews and participatory observations with three generations of women from the same family, we examine the constraints and opportunities of old cultural elements in their case and how they give way to new ones. The chosen research methods also provided an opportunity to learn not only the observed phenomena but also the personal perceptions of the interviewees: how they evaluate and experience these changes. 35 interviews were conducted during the research, all of which were recorded with a Dictaphone. Interviewees were not disturbed by the presence of the Dictaphone but were more than happy to tell someone about their daily lives, their joys, and their troubles. The study included details of interviews conducted in a closed community, but we also used the experience gained during interviews in the surrounding area to expand on each dimension. (See *Annex 1* for additional features on the subjects of the referred interviews.)

The three generations included in the sample are currently of working age. The grandparent generation is in the late fifties, the parent generation is in the late thirties and in the early forties, while the grandchild generation is in the early twenties.

The framework of the study does not allow us to analyse all the relevant dimensions of the acculturation process revealed in the research, so we focus on three decisive dimensions in this paper. First, we examine the most striking area, the presence and appreciation of traditional clothing. Secondly, we analyse the role of Romani language in the transmission and use of the identity. Finally, we present the changes in gender roles within the family, focusing on two areas – the role expectations for work and parenting. The test dimensions are decomposed by generation, analysing the most important changes.

3. IDENTITY PATTERNS IN THREE GENERATIONS

3.1. The generation of grandmothers

The oldest generation – the grandmothers' generation that followed the tradition most closely – was born between 1958 and 1963. As the age at birth of the first child is significantly lower in this community than in the majority society, members of the grandparent generation are still of active job-seeking age and work in the community, mostly in supported public employment.

Grandmothers turned 20 years old in the mid-1970s, when, due to rural industrialization, the "dual-earner" family model was born in Hungary as a result of women's employment. Compared to 30% in 1971, the proportion of Romani women employed by the end of the seventies and early eighties reached or even exceeded 50%. (JANKY 2005)

However, this generation did not appear in the open labor market either then or in later years. Although in the seventies the gates were opened for the employment of Romani women, women did not take advantage of this opportunity in the studied settlement. The traditional female roles in their case have not changed. Their attitude to work and their roles within the family can be explained not only by the strength of traditions but also by the labor market situation of the examined settlement. The regional location and the isolation of the settlement as well as the distance between the open labor market jobs prevented Romani women from working. In addition, the high rate of Romani people in the settlement, and the tradition of being an Olah Gypsy, was the dominant framework of behaviour. Traditions in the settlement were more massive than in other settlements and within other Romani groups – precisely because of their isolation and homogeneous culture. Opening up and contact with other communities will be only seen in the second and third generations, when the internal interpretation of tradition and the relationship of women to tradition will also change.

3.1.1. "The skirt from which others can see that I am an Olah Gypsy woman..."

Appearance and clothing are a demonstrative part of identity, as well as they also determine its reproduction. Changing traditions are most noticeable by the outside observer in the field of clothing.

In the life of Gypsy women of the first generation, traditional clothing plays an important role. For generations of grandmothers, the headscarf, colourful, floral-patterned long skirt is a must-have for everyday life, both inside and outside the micro community. Their clothing is not just a holiday

appearance. They can often be seen in these well-known, typical Gypsy clothes during the weekdays. However, nowadays they wear their traditional clothes as mixed up with age-appropriate modern clothes, for example they wear t-shirts instead of blouses, and they are more permissive to the patterns when wearing a scarf. However, the under and upper wear are traditionally washed separately, and the special handling of garments is very important, because everything "below the waist is unclean."

"... oh, my mother wore it like this, she did this too... The last thing I should do to wash that laundry with my other clothes, because how others would look at me, I should throw it out then because it would be dirty..." (1st generation woman, 3rd interview)

Traditional clothing is a way of expressing their Gypsy ethnic group showing the strength of their identity and belonging to a group not just to those in their community, but also demonstrating their identity to the members of the majority society, by being Olah Gypsies.

"We are different" (1st generation woman, 3rd interview)

"You know the skirt is important, if I don't speak anything, they should still see that I am an Olah Gypsy woman based on my skirt. But I don't wear all kinds of skirts, because a non-Gypsy woman would wear them too, and then how would they say that I am an Olah Gypsy?" (1st generation woman, 7th interview)

"Well, XY doesn't insist so much anymore that I should always be in a skirt, but I do get used to it ... I don't feel comfortable in pants ... I respect our traditions, unlike many other Gypsy women, I'm proud of this ... wearing my skirt reminds me of my mother and my father ... it's like a heritage for me..." (1st generation woman, 11th interview)

"... Oh, if I went to the street in pants, do you know how much they would laugh at me? They would mock me. They would say, look at that old Gypsy woman, how does she look like, and not just Gypsies would say this, Hungarians even more so." (1st generation woman, 12th interview)

Jewellery and long hair are essential accessories for their outfit. Big gold ring earrings, gold chains, beautiful rings on their fingers, are all part of their outfit. Almost all first-generation Romani women wear these jewels as basic accessories. In addition to expressing their identity, jewels are a means of expressing their social status – as well as cultural affiliation with the community and the Gypsy ethnic identity. By wearing jewellery, they emphasize their financial position and indicate how much they have achieved in life.

"... I love my jewellery very much, aren't they beautiful? Even when I was a girl, when guests came to visit my father, I always had to wear them all or else he started swearing, shouting at me how do I look like, we are not broken gypsies... and now if my skirt doesn't look the way it should, then my husband yells at me." (1st generation woman, 11th interview)

Long hair is the ornament of Romani women, especially in the grandmother generation – because it still has *"a weight and meaning to wear"*. According to the older generation, if a Romani girl does not have long hair, it means a straight path to assimilation. Long hair appears as a kind of mystery and a means of identity in their case. Short hair is identified with shame, so it is common that if a Romani woman breaks a rule, her hair will be cut off.

"XY cheated on my son, and since we don't do that here, I cut off her hair ... there was no arguing, everyone knew it had to be that way..." (1st generation woman, 3rd interview)

The appearance of this generation, including clothing, jewellery, hairstyle, and related symbols, can be interpreted as a value, but also as a clear message to members of the community and to those outside the community, saying to them: I belong here. As the possibilities of the grandmother's

generation were limited – due to the unfavourable territorial definition of the settlement – even after the regime change, they did not enter the labor market and did not have to conform to the norms of the majority society. This situation has further strengthened their Gypsy identity and following traditional patterns. In their case, clothing is one of the main features of their local and ethnic identity, giving a symbolic expression of having an almost "uniformed" outfit. The exclusion, contempt, and rejection of the Gypsies by the majority society only further strengthened their identity, which was reflected in their clothing as well. Their often seemingly "artificial", over-traditional clothing, appearance, including their colourful skirts, buns, striking jewellery contribute to the strengthening of their Gypsy identity and becoming even more distinct from the majority society.

3.1.2. "... if I didn't speak Gypsy language, my family would be ashamed of me ..."

What makes someone a member of the community? Just by adapting his/her lifestyle and habits to the expectations of the community, or perhaps speaking the particular language or consider it as a native language? Nowadays, most of the Romani communities use only the Hungarian language. However, some of the Gypsies are bilingual, meaning that they also speak some version of the Gypsy language besides the Hungarian. We also discovered cultural and generational differences in language usage.

Knowledge and use of the Gypsy language by first-generation women is commonplace. The community of the studied settlement uses the Cerhar version of the Gypsy language. They speak Gypsy language more often than Hungarian within their family, on the street, among themselves, and sometimes even in shops in the centre of the settlement. The use of language is one of the strongest expressions of their ethnic identity, an important symbol of their belonging to the community. From those who do not speak the Gypsy language within their smaller family and friendly environment, they often keep some distance. In spite of the fact that the Gypsy language is in decline and used less and less in everyday communication – see 2nd and 3rd generations 2 – for these women, "being trapped" in the closed community and less contact with non-Gypsies made it possible to maintain and strengthen the Gypsy language. Language often strengthens Gypsy self-consciousness more than habits and lifestyles (CSEPELI–ÖRKÉNY–SZÉKELY 1999) – of course, these are still important to them. In their case, knowledge of the Gypsy language determines the strength of their integration into their community and the way they think.

Celebrations in the community create such communication situation – talking with their Gypsy-speaking relatives, neighbours, singing together, greetings – that further strengthens language use.

"... who doesn't speak Gypsy language isn't a true Gypsy then ... here is my grandchild for example, who understands everything, but doesn't want to speak the Gypsy language, only Hungarian ... apart from some Gypsy sayings, that's all..." (1st generation woman, 11th interview)

"Even in the shop, I sometimes say to the Hungarian woman 'me mangavmanro' – I ask for bread – but she's okay with this, because she knows that I speak the Gypsy language everywhere... if I didn't know the Gypsy language then everyone would wonder why, and my family would be ashamed of me... that's how I grew up, my mother and father talked to me like that and so did I talk to my children, my grandchild... but now you have to understand what I'm saying, right?" (1st generation woman, 7th interview).

"... It was XY's birthday lately, we celebrated it here in the house, singing and greeting in Gypsy language, do you know how good that was?" (1st generation woman, 12th interview)

Gypsy language is used unconsciously by the generations of grandmothers and is not conscious, but rather emotional. Often, if they are not only surrounded by members of their own community, they automatically speak in Gypsy language. Using this language, they are better able to express themselves and their feelings, as this was their primary language during their socialization. There are unwritten rules and expected behaviours regarding language use in this generation. For example, if they say hello to someone in Gypsy, they expect that person to answer in Gypsy language as well, or if they do not want the Gadjos to understand what they say, they should only speak in Gypsy. Many members of this generation can only chat with their own age group in Gypsy language. The use of language is intended to illustrate their attachment to the Gypsy lifestyle. For them, knowing Gypsy language is not a shameful knowledge, but rather a source of pride.

3.1.3. "... it is natural that my husband has the final word ..."

The old, traditional expectations and roles in the family model continue to exist in the generation of grandmothers, despite the fact that many of them have already entered the labor market and work within the framework of supported public employment in the settlement. Work does not mean fulfilment in their case; it does not add more to their lives. They work because, financially, not all of them can afford to have just one earner in the family. They continue to fulfil the roles of women within their families – serving husband, children – and this is considered to be decisive. They have also raised their children in such a way that girls and boys have separate roles and responsibilities within the family, in the household. Thinking about traditional female roles and their "evolution" has not been influenced by modernization – the word of grandmother and mother-in-law is sacred. According to the interviews, the roles of this generation in the family can be compared to the roles of women living in traditional peasant society. As their age and labor market status changed, the burden of work expected in the family remained unchanged, as their primary tasks included serving the husband and managing the household – then the care of their children, grandchildren. Even today, managing the household, washing, cooking, and cleaning are not the man's responsibilities. When managing money, or when it comes to making the most important decisions, man has the final word. If the husband dies (died), then his son "takes over" the father's place and status in the family. In the grandmother's generation, women do not pay bills to this day, they do not handle important matters, because in many cases this would result leaving the town and community, which men would not allow.

These roles, tasks in this generation, are taken for granted by women and the inheritance of tradition to the next generation is a natural process. This is how the next generation was educated as well. Their behaviour and thinking are deeply influenced by the system of norms of the traditional Gypsy community that they received from their parents during their socialization. To this day, if a Romani woman breaches a rule, she will be subject to an immediate sanction, and it is most typical of this age group to adhere to it. They consider judging important, so that men can listen the "guilty" person and make a decision about the case – even without the presence of the "accused" – in order to relieve tension in the life of the community and thus maintain a strong cohesion.

"When the girl was home, she always had to serve her brother, she had to wash, cook, help me at home, that was her job..." (1st generation woman, 3rd interview)

"Oh, such a question, of course my husband has the final word, I cannot go to another city to deal with a case because he won't let me... I have no problem with it, he's just jealous and that's all, that's his job." (1st generation woman, 11th interview)

The first generation of Romani women, despite being of working age, they have limited participation in the labor market and are financially dependent – men decide on the use of money. Although many live without husbands, their views on work, income, and social roles remain unchanged, while reality – often by necessity because they are left alone – goes beyond the traditional form of operation.

Demonstration of belonging to the community in all possible forms (clothing, language, habits) is characteristic of the generation of grandmothers – in the three areas examined, which are closed in geographical and social terms as well. Because of their generation status, they would have a leading role in the family – the word of grandmothers is sacred – but due to the changing environmental conditions – grandchildren move to other cities or settlements – they can no longer fulfil this role; thus, their role as cultural transmitters and identity makers is significantly limited, which mostly only reaches the next generation.

3.2. The generation of daughters

Economic and social development is uneven across time and space, which is why there are significant differences between regions – unemployment, investment, net income, etc. Following the change of regime, the social and economic transformation made the differences between the different regions of the country even more marked. (MARSELEK–PUMMER 2003) The settlement we examined is located in Northeast Hungary – as mentioned earlier – where the employment rate was one of the lowest in the country during the period under review (KSH 2018). Due to its regional location, second-generation Romani women in the late eighties and early nineties were thus less likely to enter the labor market than members of the previous generation or their peers with more favourable regional conditions.

Second generation members were born between 1970 and 1975. As they grew older, Roma employment rates gradually declined. Exclusion from the labor market intensified in the second half of the 1980s and peaked after the change of regime. As a result of the transformation crisis triggered by the transformation of the market economy, the Romani people have been squeezed out of the labor market in large numbers due to the collapse or significant narrowing of low-skilled sectors – construction, heavy, light industry, mining, and agriculture. The proportion of Romani women in employment – compared to 50% in the late 1970s – dropped to 16.3% (JANKY 1999) after the change of regime, even in regions where it used to be easier to work.

We did not encounter the "backflow" of second-generation women in the examined settlement in the mid-1990s, because they did not move to work in other settlements due to the regional disadvantages mentioned earlier. The employment rate of Romani men has also deteriorated significantly in these years, making it harder to keep a job and in many cases, they had to go far for work and income.

3.2.1. "Clothing is only part of the feast day culture..."

The relationship of second-generation Romani women to traditions and social roles was significantly influenced by the fact that men were away from the family for extended periods of time.[3] At first, this absence meant only commuting, and later on, we could see many leaving the family and community.[4]

The absence of men and women staying on their own created a specific situation: second-generation Romani women, despite the difficulties in the labor market in the 1990s, had to work to support their children and the household. Due to the absence of men, the Romani women were taken out of control of men and at the same time they were placed in the role of the father-husband supporting the family. This provided the ability (or meant a compulsion?) to cross the boundaries of their closed communities and to increase contact with members of the majority society. The forced change of role, frequent contact, and co-operation with members of the majority society also changed the generation's relationship to tradition. This first appeared in their clothing habits. In their case, they no longer wear headscarves or skirts, they prefer to wear pants for comfort and practicality, and because of external stereotypes, they can more easily "melt" into the majority society in this way. *"Life without a skirt, headscarf"* is not viewed well by the wider environment – especially the older generation – therefore, a kind of internal barrier was formed within this generation about what to wear when, where, and how to avoid conflict. Jewellery and the role of long hair are not as important as for them as for the older generation, and mobile phones are much more likely to be an expression of their social status. At community events where more Romanies meet – for example Romani cultural events and Gypsy fair in the settlement – they wear their skirts and jewels to signify the respect for the acceptance of expected habits and clothing. There is a sense of duality in respecting and abandoning traditions: inner community-bound values and norms begin to disintegrate under external pressure. The changes indicate a transitional phase in which the former norm systems are loosened, but the new values are not yet solidified. Because of this duality and insecurity, transition often involves tensions and conflicts: in this situation, it is not clear who is doing what is right or wrong.

"... yes, the Gypsy language is important as well as the skirt and others... but because I don't wear a skirt or I want my son to learn how to cook, I couldn't be an Olah Gypsy? That would be weird." (2nd generation, 8th interview)

"When we get together on bigger occasions and we go to XY, I usually wear those clothes, but wearing them on weekdays, I certainly wouldn't... Don't worry, my mother-in-law says her own arguments about this..." (5th interview)

"Ahh I no longer wear skirts, not even on occasions, I don't even have one... I don't need those, I'm currently attending a course, there are two Romanies there, but they are Romungros, neither of them wear these skirts, and now if I wore them everyone would know that I'm a Gypsy, but I'm not even that brown as you see (laughing out loud)..." (2nd generation woman, 10th interview)

"I wear pants as you see... if I go to XY, I don't want them to look me any further" (2nd generation woman, 2nd interview)

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[3] In 1971, about 85–90% of Gypsy males of working age, aged 15–59, were in active employment or in regular employment and 10–15% of them had casual or seasonal works. The regime change brought about a radical change as only 28.8% of Romani men remained employed. (CSOBA 2007)

[4] The husbands of the first-generation Gypsy women practiced traditional Gypsy professions, which mainly extended to the surrounding settlements, so they did not break away from their community and they had no contact with non-Gypsies as often as the second generation.

Traditional clothing is not as important for them as for the older generation. They are only visible at major community and church events. However, the lack of traditional clothing in the everyday life often provokes dislike in the older generation, which they often express.

The interviews revealed that in their case, the reasons behind leaving clothing include the integrate into the majority society, to avoid discrimination in the labor market, to find an easier position in the labor market and the rise of global fashion in traditional communities as well. We can say that the change in their clothing is the result of both internal and external decisions and constraints, which often cause internal conflicts, both within the community and within the individual's value system.

In the thinking of second-generation Romani women, clothing as an Olah Gypsy identity element is no longer as important as for the older generations. Their appearance on the labor market has also transformed their everyday clothing habits. The preference for practicality and comfort over old customs is a sign of their integration into the majority society. They only wear traditional clothing at common church events, less and less as a sign of identity based on inner conviction, but rather as a sign of respect for the older generation.

3.2.2. Language use as a latent pillar of identity and belonging together

The use and knowledge of the Gypsy language plays an important role in the life of every second-generation Romani woman – they use it daily – but only in their own closed community, within their families. They consider it important to teach their children how to use the Romani language, but they do not expect them to use it every day – either in the majority society or in their own closed community – compared to the older generation, who expected them to use it frequently, and they still expect this from third generation girls. By teaching the language, their purpose is not to further inherit and pass on traditions – and thus to transfer the Gypsy identity – but rather to facilitate communication with the older generation and to avoid the arguments with them.

Knowledge of the Gypsy language has a function other than communication for the second generation – it is often used to "exclude" those from the conversation, who do not understand the language. For them, language has an identity-forming power, strengthens a sense of belonging and provides a basis for their cultural autonomy.

"Knowing the Gypsy language is rare, and I'm proud of that, because it reminds me of my family..." (2nd generation woman, 2nd interview)

"It is important for me to be able to speak Gypsy, and we speak Gypsy with our neighbours and here in the house too... I also say things in Gypsy to my two kids at home, but I don't ask for it like my mother did in the past, when she asked me to speak only Gypsy or Hungarian..." (2nd generation woman, 6th interview).

"Do you speak the Gypsy language? Now you see, if I don't want you to understand something, I just switch quickly and now I can say whatever I want..." (2nd generation woman, 8th interview)

Knowledge of the Gypsy language is one of the most important components of their ethnic identity, essentially a sign of their belonging to their culture. Knowing the language and, most of all, its use within their community, has an integrative role, as it creates a sense of belonging to a group of Gypsies who speak the same language within their group. They prefer to use their own Gypsy language in their family circle and environment, which shows that they are not only rationally attached to their language, but also have a deep emotional connection with it. Language

is seen as a value by them, but it is no longer used as a primary language in the socialization of the growing generation – unlike in their childhood. This is due to the negative perception of the Gypsy language by the majority society, which is why they do not consider the use of Gypsy language as important, but they consider its knowledge as significant, because it is considered to be an expression of the Olah Gypsy identity. However, since they entered the labor market, they are aware of the value and usefulness of the spoken language in the labor market and therefore they do not account for the language deficiencies of their children in the use of the Romani language.

Despite all the changes, the language plays a very important role in the formation of identity in the examined settlement. Knowing and using it within a given group will result in a much stronger attachment to the community than clothing or appearance. Appearances change more rapidly, but intrinsic values, cultural and linguistic affinities are more strongly embedded and, as a result, they change more slowly.

3.2.3. Romani women in a dual role

Changes in family structure have also led to a shift in roles within the family within the closed Romani community.

The majority of second-generation Romani women were "divorced" and raised their children alone.

"... no, it's not that easy... he started to work in Pest, then on day he didn't come back... he isn't interested in our children, and he doesn't give money, but I wouldn't want it anyway..." (2nd generation, 6th interview)

The burden of financial security was also placed on women, which posed a major challenge to them.[5] Until the mid-nineties, they tried to organize their lives according to the old routines and replaced men's lost income with social benefits. However, following the gradual decline in the value of their social benefits, they began to work more and more frequently from the second half of the 1990s. Often, even at the price of being aware of it, working can lead to moving away from their community.

The role of second-generation Gypsy women living in the settlement is no longer confined to previously adopted child-rearing and household management. In order for the family to survive, they had to enter the labor market, because this was the only way they could raise and educate their children. With the undertaking of man/father roles, women also re-evaluated roles within the family. Their children are no longer raised according to the traditional family model. Serving a son is no longer an unquestionable duty for a woman, though traditions are still a daily routine.

"When there are events here in the house, we women cook, then serve the food for men, and we don't sit down at the table until everyone has food in front of them... but I don't see why we have to do this... there are things we leave and there are some that we don't, and I don't really understand why this can't be left out." (2nd generation, 10th interview)

With the change in the status of boys/men within the family – no longer the sole breadwinners of the family – their role in managing the household has also changed. Mothers find it essential that boys should play their part in managing and arranging the household, just as girls do. However,

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[5] For the older generation, there was no precedent for women to raise their children alone. They lived in modest circumstances, but the financials were created only by men, so that family-related tasks were the only responsibilities of women.

they also attach great importance to the education and employment of their daughters, since for a Gypsy woman, taking their own lives as an example, work and income provide a stable basis.

"I also teach my girl so that she doesn't have to do everything, and if she'll have her own family, she should know that even a man has to participate in household chores because she won't be able to do it alone beside working ... but I'll teach her how to cook and everything which my mother taught me, but that's not what life is all about." (2nd generation woman, 10th interview)

"The older boy can already make pancakes, and even if I were sick, he would do everything helping his sister because he knows that her sister has to learn a lot at school. It's true that these are not big things yet, like making pancakes, washing dishes, but these mean small steps ahead." (2nd generation, 2nd interview)

"I'm the only one who manages all the bills, I manage the money ... now no man should tell me what to do, because I have the last word..." (2nd generation woman, 6th interview)

The power of the homogeneous community in which they live can no longer exert its influence as strongly as in the first generation. More frequent encounters with members of the majority society have a greater influence, which does not mean giving up or abandoning Romani traditions and culture, but rather reinterpreting it, and adjusting to the *"more accepted by the majority"*. The reason for the change – compared to the older generation's identity – may be the weakening of the Gypsy traditions beyond the normal generation gap. Community pressure is no longer as strong as that of the grandparents' generation, indicating a weakening of the integrative power of the community. In addition to the pressure from their families, expectations and values in the majority society also affect their lives. Among the second generation of Romani women, the amount of time spent outside the family has increased and the main stage of their lives has become the space created by the majority society.

Among the three identity-forming elements examined – language, clothing, roles –, one of them stands out, which determines their belonging to the Olah Romani community even within the life of the second generation: language. Based on their knowledge of the language and their use within their micro community, they identify themselves as Olah Romani women, and they identify with it internally as well. Clothing and family roles, behaviour patterns in the Romani community (e.g., male predominance) work under the influence of external pressures, if they work at all, and they no longer play a decisive role in shaping their identity. The second generation of Romani women is characterized by the "no longer, not yet" condition. The two dominant elements of ethnic identity are no longer considered indispensable for identity formation, but the significance of and identity with the language has not been questioned among them, either in the feast day or in everyday culture.

3.3. The generation of grandchildren

The third generation can be called the children of the nineties. When this generation was born, the employment rates of parents were very poor compared to the majority society: the number of unemployed and inactive (people living on benefits, disability pensions) was high. For many families, the only source of livelihood was child support. In spite of all this, the life of young people born in the 1990s was greatly influenced by the expansion of education at the end of the period,

as well as the emergence and expansion of various educational and scholarships to support Romani people. A study by István Kemény in 2003 also shows that from this generation, more and more Romani young people have completed primary school and appeared in institutions providing graduation and profession. (JANKY 2005) Moreover, Romani girls are present in institutions providing graduation at a higher rate, which means that traditional family patterns are being pushed aside and modernization is on the rise. (KEMÉNY–JANKY–LENGYEL 2004) As a result, the approach, mindset, and interpretation of the third generation we investigate is completely different from that of the first- and second-generation Gypsy women. They interpret the notions of traditional symbolic systems, morality, language, and traditions in a different way.

Members of the third generation enjoy greater freedom and opportunities in many areas of life than members of the previous generation. However, there is a price to expanding freedom and choice: their identity and belonging to the Olah Gypsies are at stake. There is a daily (re-)interpretation of the traditions among them that define belonging to a community, and the boundaries of identity are becoming uncertain.

As second-generation Gypsy women considered it important to educate their daughters, members of the third generation were in contact with members of the majority society – from early kindergarten age – for a long time. Adapting to the norms and values of the majority society in the course of institutional socialization, primarily within the school system, led to the weakening of the norm system of the traditional Romani community, resulting in a generation gap between the second and third generations.

3.3.1. The sometimes-appearing Gypsy roses

The deviation from tradition affected first and foremost the traditional Olah Gypsy clothing. This is the most striking difference between particular generations. In the grandmothers' generation, this clothing is a must. Clothing expresses a sense of belonging together and has a strong integrative role even today. Third generation Olah Gypsy girls no longer see the importance of wearing Gypsy clothes, headscarves, or having a long hair. Even traditional dresses for festive occasions are worn only to avoid confrontation with the older generation. Their dresses no longer follow the traditional Gypsy clothing and they usually wear ready-to-wear outfits. Yet, in the form of a piece of clothing – t-shirts with roses, floral jeans – or pairing it, traditions are back again, sometimes subtly indicating their ethnicity. For members of the majority society, these signs do not appear, but for the older Olah Gypsy generation, these colours, patterns, clothing pieces have a meaning and they alleviate conflicts between generations. In the grandchildren's generation, these symbols are used to express a rediscovered/undertaken identity.

For third generation women, the jewellery that their grandparents wore as an expression of their social status no longer appears. The status symbols used are much more typical of members of the majority society: nails, mobile phones, clothing, and shoes brands.

"I love rosy, floral dresses, but as much as I'm wearing them now, more roses are already too Gypsy..." (3rd generation woman, 4th interview)

"I've little jewellery, I don't wear much, it doesn't mean anything to me... it says more about me if I've Adidas or Nike shoes..." (3rd generation woman, 1st interview)

Abandoning traditional clothing is primarily due to a change in the values prevailing among the younger generations. The outward expectation of "assimilation" that is imposed on them by the majority society and the fear of prejudice further exacerbates their abandonment of traditional clothing and identity symbols. According to the interviews, in most cases this does not involve any internal conflict, but rather a result of a conscious decision that may facilitate their social integration or, where appropriate, their assimilation. The sign of advanced integration is the symbolic conscious wearing of Gypsy motifs, which also indicates a decrease in fear of prejudice and a stability in their status.

3.3.2. "... if I spoke in Gypsy, they would shut out me..."

Not only traditional Gypsy clothing is affected by the frequency of contact with the majority society, but also the use of Gypsy language. While the generation of grandmothers used Gypsy as their primary language, everyday language users are rare among the members of the third generation: Gypsy language is not present as an active means of communication for them but rather as a passive knowledge/skill. Although they know and understand their language, they are unable to use it or are reluctant to speak it, even within their close environment. In many cases, assimilation patterns can be discovered in the background of lack of language skills or its presence as a passive skill. Because they are often in contact with members of the majority society, they fear that if they would accidentally and routinely speak Gypsy in their non-Gypsy environment, that would result in their rejection.

The interviews revealed that they consciously do not use the language within their own community and that they also choose their vocabulary in the company of Hungarians in order not to "reveal" themselves.

"I don't use language at home, I understand everything, but if I spoke it at home, I might not notice myself at school and I would accidentally speak in Gypsy, and then everyone would look at me weird and they would shout out me... so I just simply don't use it anywhere" (3rd generation woman, 9th interview)

Third generation girls would love to blend in with majority society. They are the ones who are the most aware of the difference between the two ethnic groups, and therefore, because of their acceptance and integration into the majority society, they tend to be more aligned with the majority society.

3.3.3. Dual identity with new character features

The coexistence of older and younger generations in a community allows third generation Olah Gypsy girls to clearly distinguish between past and present patterns of life, culture, traditions in their community. Attitudes towards change, continuous learning, career development, self-actualization, a changed attitude towards community leaders, and signs of modernization are the most spectacular in this generation.

The transformation of roles within the family had already begun with the second generation of women, but the third generation Gypsy girls had grown up in the pattern that it is not only the woman who is responsible for housekeeping and raising children. Through the example of second-generation women, they see that women can play more roles within the family, which affects their perception of traditional family relationships and division of labor. The division of labor within their families does not develop in the traditional way; there is hardly any difference between male and female tasks. Their brothers cook the same way as they do when needed. Serving their mate and future husband, and raising their child is not considered to be their sole task, but rather a shared one. The members of third generation already manifest this role change at community events as well, and they do not serve male members.

"If I have a husband in the future, I won't serve him, because he has both hands and legs, he can serve himself if he wants something, right? And if I go home from work and I'm tired, somebody can put food in front of me too." (3rd generation, 4th interview)

"I told my mom that XY can do the same dishwashing as I do, because it's not engraved in stone, that we girls have to do it..." (3rd generation woman, 1st interview)

By breaking away from their traditional community and continuing their studies in cities, their self-definition is dependent on the socio-cultural context of the local environment.

Despite turning against or re-interpreting the values and traditions of the community, the third generation of Gypsy girls consider themselves as Olah Gypsies when it comes to identity. However, their identity is defined by other categories expressed by different symbols. For them, the recognizance of an Olah Gypsy girl is her eyes, her saturated emotional expressions, her characteristic gestures, her knowledge of dance, and her musicality. Members of the third-generation associate identities with the above-mentioned and not with language, clothing, or traditional roles/habits. The identity-building traits they mentioned are not as prominent as clothing or language usage, yet they are able to discover, identify, and represent values that they feel are more common alongside symbols and hidden dimensions of the Gypsy community, which makes them feel a little more compared to the daughters of the majority society.

"... you see, I'm not dark-skinned, and even I have to go solarium to be tan... you don't tell who the Gypsies are by colour. We Gypsies know who a Gypsy is, I'll tell you if I look into her eyes whether she's a Gypsy or not..." (3rd generation woman, 9th interview)

The contrast between the majority and minority societies, the strength of social prejudices, has an impact on ethnic identity consciousness. In many cases, third-generation girls are only able to "get rid" of the subjugation of the community and at the same time preserve their Romani identity, which adds value to them, by redefining their identity-forming dimensions and elevating themselves out of the affirmative dimensions of prejudice in majority society, while placing it in an identity relationship that is invisible to the majority, but decisive for them. The identity definition of this generation – as opposed to that of the older generation – comes not only from parents, grandparents, and the community, but also, the identity dimension system developed for members of the generation under the pressure of the majority society – in many cases, prevailing latent – is also decisive at least to that extent.

Summary

In our study, we examined three generations of Olah Gypsy women to show how changes in Gypsy traditions affect identity change and integration into mainstream society. During the analysis, we analysed three identity dimensions: clothing and attire, language use, and changes in women's roles in the labor market and within the family.

Integration has already appeared in the life of this closed community, preserving certain traditions, and abandoning others of their original culture.

External, structural factors – as we have seen – have greatly influenced the identity dimensions of the Romani people and the changes in their roles within the three generations. The economic, political, and social processes of different decades gave different chances, socialization patterns and strategies for Romani women. Sometimes they reinforced Romani traditions, sometimes they were being pushed into the background. In case of the first generation, we saw a clear *"identity picture of the Olah Gypsy",* with only a few signs of the acculturation process (e.g. forced female labor in 2010)

The second generation is in transition. Their linguistic attachment is weakened, their lifestyle is transformed and their relationship to culture is affected. The precarious situation created by the regime change and the multitude of options offered by modernization have shaken up their seemingly stable social and cultural environment and pushed them for transformation. The majority of Gypsy women living in the settlement have to raise their children alone, as men have disappeared from their family. This situation necessitated the acquisition of new patterns of adaptation and had to re-interpret their ethnic identity, their relationship to culture and traditions, as earlier patterns were no longer applicable in the changed circumstances. For this generation, we are witnessing a clear additive acculturation process where members of the generation are forced to adopt the values and behaviours of the majority society in order to survive. Continuous abandonment of identity elements associated with minority culture and a dynamic process of assimilation are typical of them.

In the case of the third generation, we are already experiencing a highly advanced assimilation process, which is uniquely coloured by some elements of substitute acculturation. The majority of the interviewees identify themselves as Olah Gypsies. However, they associate different symbols with Romani identity compared to the female members of previous generations. New identity-building traits are hardly identifiable for the majority of society, they are not as prominent as clothing, habits, or language. With the hidden dimensions of identity, they identify themselves as belonging to the group, and along these lines of identity, which they regard as highly prestigious, they would like to represent values that make them feel slightly more as Romani girls than girls in majority society.

Preserving the identity of the Gypsy minority is still subject to a number of internal and external tensions, especially when members of the majority society express strong prejudices against the traditional identity elements of minority society (clothing, language, roles). We have also experienced this in the Olah Gypsy community, where members of the third generation – in order to avoid conflicts and exclusion – have identified alternative dimensions of identity that are difficult to identify for the majority society. However, an ethnic group can only survive if they clearly state and represent their own values, identity elements, because if they do not know or dare to name their values anymore, if they are hesitant to represent identity dimensions for self-identification, then it is only a matter of time when they will bid farewell to their "ethnic identity".

Interview number	Generation	Number of children	Educational attainment	Marital status	Current employment	Previous employment
1st	3rd	0	university	single	student	student
2nd	2nd	3	primary school	married	worker	worked
3rd	1st	4	3 classes	married	worker	housewife
4th	3rd	0	university	single	student	student
5th	2nd	3	graduation + OKJ	divorced	worker	worked
6th	2nd	1	graduation + OKJ	divorced	worker	worked
7th	1st	2	4 classes	married	worker	housewife
8th	1st	3	graduation	married	worker	worked
9th	1st	0	university	single	student	student
10th	2nd	3	skilled worker	married	worker	worked
11th	1st	2	primary school	married	worker	housewife
12th	1st	3	primary school	married	worker	housewife

ANNEX 1 *Socio-demographic characteristics of interviewees referred to in the study*

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Dimensions of Digital Inequality Based on Pisa 2015 Data for Hungary

A Study

ABSTRACT

In the past ten years, use of ICT tools has become an integral part of everyday life among young people. Using these tools is second nature to these digital natives. It represents an organic part of their socialization. They make use of the Internet in countless areas and enjoy its benefits, just as they suffer the consequences of an online presence. ICT use among young people and its attendant effects on them can be studied in a number of areas. This study investigates features of dimensions of digital inequality developed by DiMaggio and Hargittai in the Hungarian subsample of the PISA 2015 international student assessment, which includes students' ICT use. The paper thus focuses on available ICT equipment, which is a particular aspect of autonomous use, knowledge of ICT use, social support for ICT use and patterns of purpose of use among 15-year-old students. The study first reviews the literature and research on modes of ICT use and digital inequality. It then outlines the data and methodology used in an analysis and provides a detailed report on the distribution of variables which can be interpreted as dimensions of digital inequality in the PISA survey.

KEYWORDS

Digital inequality, PISA, dimensions of ICT use

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Introduction

The study of the effects of ICT use on society has become increasingly urgent within sociology with the emergence of ICT tools and the growth of the ICT sector. To be able to approach certain social links to ICT use, it is necessary to know the patterns based on which further studies can be conducted. This study thus aims to identify dimensions of digital inequality and investigate the distribution of those dimensions among 15-year-old students in detail.

1. CONCEPTS OF THE DIGITAL DIVIDE AND THE DIGITAL INEQUALITY

At the time when info-communication technologies began to spread two approaches emerged regarding its effects on social inequalities. According to the normalization hypothesis the use of ICT will contribute to the shrinking of social inequalities by offering equal chance to access information, knowledge and possibilities. Contrary to this the stratification model points out that the access to ICT won't diminish inequalities but will even strengthen and deepen them, which leads to a new form of social inequality: the digital divide or digital gap. (PINTÉR 2007, DiMAGGIO 2001). Although both hypotheses rely on theoretical concepts, empirical data support the stratification model as researchers face that ICT is unequally distributed in society and generates new forms of inequalities.

This new form of inequality can be studied at different levels. On the one hand it can be explored globally, between societies and on the other hand within a society between the different social groups (BOGNÁR–GALÁCZ 2004).

The focus of the researches on the social contributions of ICT applied different focuses depending on the extent of penetration. In the beginning, when penetration was low, studies concerning the social implications of ICT pointed their attention to the digital gap. This approach makes a dichotomous distinction between those who have access to ICT and those who don't and those who use these devices and who don't. NORRIS (2001) made an extensive analysis on the digital gap, the factors contributing to it within the American society. The study revealed that this type of inequality is mainly influenced by the traditional social inequality dimensions as income level, occupation, educational attainment, age, ethnicity and residence (NORRIS 2001).

However when the penetration level of ICT began to rise and ICT became accessible for the most part of society, the focus of research needed to be shifted from the dichotomous distinction between users and non-users to the differences among ICT users. This approach concentrates on the so called digital inequality or second-level digital divide (DiMAGGIO–HARGITTAI 2001, HARGITTAI 2012). The digital inequality can be explored through five dimensions. The first one refers to the technical equipment. The type of device, the hardware and software used as well as the type of internet connection have a strong effect on the quality of internet use. The technical equipment can enhance or limit some kinds of use. The second dimension of digital inequality deals with the autonomy of use. This dimension comprises on the one hand the place of use: is it a public or non-public place, how far is it, how much time does it take to get there, and on the other hand the limitations and control of use – which is related to the place of use. In the third dimension we find the skills that strongly influence the quality of internet use. When exploring digital inequality the social support of the user needs also to be taken into account. Is the close social environment supportive regarding ICT use? Can the user rely on a family member to ask

for informal help when facing problems while using the internet? These factors also influence the modes of ICT use. Finally maybe the most important dimension concerns the purpose of use. The activities on the internet are very diverse, some contribute to enhancing social, economic or cultural capital, others don't. Therefore the purpose of use indicates huge differences among users regarding their social status. (DiMaggio–Hargittai 2001).

2. DATA AND METHODS

The analysis of this paper is based on the Hungarian subsample from 2015 of the huge, extensive international survey of the OECD on student assessment (PISA) organised every three years. Students in the survey are tested mainly in three fields: mathematics, reading and science. Respondents are also asked to fill out complementary questionnaires as for example the ICT questionnaire which intends to measure different dimensions of ICT use and ICT competencies of the students. Our broader research aims to reveal the relationships between ICT use and school performance[1], in this paper though – as a starting point – we present descriptive results about the different dimensions of digital inequality among Hungarian 15-year old students.[2] The dimensions of digital inequalities are based on the model of Dimaggio and Hargittai explained in the previous section. The five dimensions have been explored by the questions and variables of the PISA database demonstrated in the table *(Table 1)*.

Dimension	Variables in the PISA 2015 database	
1. Technical apparatus	Are any of these devices available for you to use at home? *Desktop computer, Portable laptop or notebook, tablet computer, Internet connection, mobile phone with Internet access*	
2. Autonomy of use	During a typical weekday/ weekend day, for how long do you use the Internet outside of school?	
3. Knowledge and skills	Comfortable Internet use	Autonomous Internet use
	I feel comfortable when using my digital devices at home. *When I come across problems with digital devices, I think I can solve them.* *I feel comfortable using digital devices I am less familiar with.* *If my friends and relatives have a problem with digital devices, I can help them.* *If my friends and relatives want to buy new digital devices or applications, I can give advice.*	*If I need new software, I install it by myself* *I read information about digital devices to be independent* *I use digital devices as I want to use them.* *If I have a problem with digital devices I start to solve it on my own.* *If I need a new application, I choose it by myself.*

TABLE 1 *Dimensions of digital inequality based on PISA 2015 database* (Source: PISA 2015, own construction)

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[1] Vincze 2018a, b, 2016.

[2] The effects of these dimensions on school performance are going to be presented in a further paper.

Dimension	Variables in the PISA 2015 database	
4. Social support	*To learn something new about digital devices, I like to talk about them with my friends. I like to share information about digital devices with my friends.*	
5. Purpose of use	Use for general activities	Use for school related activities and learning
	Playing one-player games. Playing collaborative online games. Using email. <Chatting online> (e.g. <MSN®>). Participating in social networks (e.g. <Facebook>, <MySpace>). Playing online games via social networks (e.g. <Farmville®>, <The Sims Social>). Browsing the Internet for fun (such as watching videos, e.g. <YouTube™>). Reading news on the Internet (e.g. current affairs). Obtaining practical information from the Internet (e.g. locations, dates of events). Downloading music, films, games or software from the internet. Uploading your own created contents for sharing (e.g. music, poetry, videos, computer programs). Downloading new apps on a mobile device.	*Browsing the Internet for schoolwork (e.g. for preparing an essay or presentation). Browsing the Internet to follow up lessons, e.g. for finding explanations. Using email for communication with other students about schoolwork. Using email for communication with teachers and submission of homework or other schoolwork. Using social networks for communication with other students about schoolwork (e.g. <Facebook>, <MySpace>). Using social networks for communication with teachers (e.g. <Facebook>, <MySpace>). Downloading, uploading or browsing material from my school's website (e.g. timetable or course materials). Checking the school's website for announcements, e.g. absence of teachers. Doing homework on a computer Doing homework on a mobile device. Downloading learning apps on a mobile device. Downloading science learning apps on a mobile device.*

TABLE 1 CONTINUED

The dimension of available ICT equipment was examined through the presence and use of ICT tools at home. Use was investigated through autonomy of use and duration of Internet use. Indeed, the amount of time a student spends online outside of school reflects the degree to which they enjoy free and unrestricted access to the Internet. Students' ICT knowledge was surveyed based on the extent to which respondents said they are able to use digital devices independently and to solve problems that may have arisen during use. Social support for ICT use was examined on the basis of the degree to which respondents discuss ICT with their friends and share related information with one another. Finally, purposes and modes of Internet use were surveyed among 15-year-old students. Home Internet activity was analysed in general as well as modes of use, which aid in studying, doing homework and progressing with their studies.

3. FINDINGS

3.1. Technical apparatus: Available ICT equipment at home

The 2015 PISA survey asked about home access to and use of the following ICT tools: desktops, laptops/notebooks, tablets and smartphones. It especially examined the presence of Internet access and use at home. A total of 96% of the Hungarian respondents enjo home Internet access, which they also use (independently of which device they use to access the Internet). There is a similarly high percentage (89%) of 15-year-old Hungarian students who have the kind of mobile phone that enables them to access the web (a smartphone). At 73%, the proportion of those who have a desktop at home and use it was lower. The percentage of students who have a desktop at home but do not use it was relatively high (16%). However, 11% of the respondents have no desktop at home. A little more than three-quarters (78%) of the 15-year-old Hungarian students surveyed have a laptop or notebook, but around two-thirds of them use it as well. The tablet is the least widespread of the ICT tools, although two-thirds of the students surveyed have one in their home. However, fewer than half of the respondents (48%) use their tablet at home. This device shows the highest proportion of respondents who have one at home but do not use it (18%).

FIGURE 1 *Available for you to us at home: ...?* (Source: PISA 2015, own calculation)

3.2. Autonomy of ICT use: Time spent on the Internet outside of school on an average weekday and weekend day

Internet use differs somewhat during the week or weekend. A very small portion of respondents, 2% in all, spend no time on the Internet on weekdays or weekends, nor is it common for them to spend only a short period of time, an hour or less, on the Internet, either during the week or at the weekend. A total of 5% spend no more than half an hour on the web on an average weekday, while 8% are on it then for 31–60 minutes. Over the weekend, even fewer of them, 4% of respondents,

go online for less than half an hour, while 6% do so for between 30 minutes and one hour. During the week, more of them – a bit over one-fifth (22%) – are on the Internet for one to two hours than there are over the weekend (14%). Dedicating relatively long periods of time on the web is most characteristic of the weekend, with 21% of students spending four to six hours on it then and 29% doing so for over six hours. Using the Internet between two and four hours is popular in about the same proportion on weekdays (27%) and the weekend (24%).

FIGURE 2 *For how long do you use the Internet outside of school on a typical...?* (Source: PISA 2015, own calculation)

The link between time spent on the Internet during the week and over the weekend is very strong, with a Pearson correlation value of 0.722.

The students typically use the Internet as much at the weekend as during the week or fall into the next category of Internet use. The exception is young people who do not go online outside of school weekdays. The largest proportion of them, 37 per cent, are not on the web at the weekend either. However, 40% in all spend some time there over the weekend – between half an hour and two hours. A comparison of Internet use on weekdays vs the weekend leads us to conclude that the time the students spend online is somewhat restricted. This control may be external, e.g. parents' regulating their children's use, which is more permissive at the weekend than during the week – but even then not without boundaries. Students' timetables, extra lessons during the week and weekend events, which determine the amount of free time they have for the Internet, may represent another external restriction. However, in the light of the correlations found, this assumption suggests that the majority of students' time is used similarly during the week and at the weekend, since most spend the same amount of time at the weekend or one to two hours more online than they do during the week. Another external restriction may be the device they use, as a device fixed to a particular place (e.g. a desktop) offers different options in terms of time than a portable device (e.g. a smartphone). This is because it is presumably easier to access the web occasionally with a portable device than with one that is tied to a given location.

Contrary to expectations, however, there seems to be little difference in time spent on the Internet between users of particular devices.[3] Desktop users spend their time on the Internet similarly to those who use portable devices. Even smartphone users are not typically online longer than those who use other devices.

Autonomous use of the Internet in terms of time does not therefore appear to be influenced by the device the students use to go online.

Among the controlling factors for time spent on the Internet, neither free time nor device used provides a satisfactory explanation, according to my study. Parental control may presumably be decisive in the population under examination; however, the database available provides no option to study this factor. In addition to external factors, however, a kind of internal control and motivation can be assumed, which influences time spent on the Internet. Indeed, if we consider time spent on the Internet during the week as being largely the result of some external (parental) control, then there would be a larger proportion of those who spend far more time on the Internet than the results show. Presumably, intrinsic motivation (the purpose of Internet use and attitudes toward the Internet) also significantly influences the amount of time someone may/can/would like to spend on the web.

3.3. Knowledge of ICT use and digital competence

The next dimension of digital inequality involves knowledge and skills tied to ICT and Internet use. The more at home one is on the web and knows what to do, the more content one can access and the greater the experience using the Internet is. ICT competence was measured with nine items on the PISA survey. Of those items, some refer to a moderate level of understanding, while others measure a deeper interest and knowledge.


FIGURE 3 *Skills and knowledge for a comfortable Internet usage* (Source: PISA 2015, own calculation)

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[3] This correlation obtains for time spent on the Internet both during the week and at the weekend.

Over 90% of the respondents feel comfortable using ICT at home. A total of 80% of the 15-year-olds believe that they can remedy problems that may arise in using ICT. Almost the same percentage reported that it is no problem for them to use an ICT tool which they do not know well. About three-quarters of the sample can provide assistance to their friends and relatives in resolving problems that may arise in ICT use. Compared to the rest of the data, the smallest proportion, 70% of the respondents, feel competent offering advice to friends or relatives with regard to shopping for a digital device or app. The largest proportion of 15-year-olds (70–90%), therefore, are comfortable and experienced with regard to their ICT knowledge and skills.

Another few items on ICT knowledge and skills in the PISA study measured the extent to which respondents are capable of autonomous use without any assistance. The majority of the young people, a bit more than 80 per cent, are able to choose apps they find necessary and are beginning to resolve problems that arise in using ICT. A total of 77% of the respondents are able to use ICT tools as they like and keep their use in check. Two items significantly reduce the proportion of competent users. Only about 60% of the sample know how to install the necessary software on their device, and only around half of the respondents demonstrate a deeper interest in ICT tools. They do additional reading to learn about their ICT tools to be able to use them as autonomously as possible.

FIGURE 4 *Skills and knowledge for an autonomosuly Internet usage* (Source: PISA 2015, own calculation)

As regards skills and knowledge, it is clear that the majority of the Hungarian 15-year-old students are digital natives who use ICT tools autonomously, comfortably and knowledgeably.

3.4. Social support for ICT use

Social support is distinct as an influencing factor among the dimensions of digital inequality developed by DiMaggio and Hargittai. This dimension refers to the fact that the extent and quality of individual use are influenced by the degree to which the social environment is supportive of the individual as regards ICT use and whether the individual knows how to ask for informal help if necessary. In this study, this dimension manifests itself in the extent to which the respondent likes to talk to their classmates and friends about digital devices and to exchange information about them. Presumably, those for whom ICT use is more embedded in their relationships with their friends enjoy a greater quality of use and can thus perform better in school.

FIGURE 5 *Social support for ICT use* (Source: PISA 2015, own calculation)

A total of 60% of the respondents like to talk to their friends about digital devices to gather new information about their own. A bit more than half of the sample (52%) like to share information with their friends about ICT tools. This is how the ICT use of the majority seems to be embedded in their social environment.

3.5. The purpose of ICT use

The purpose of ICT use forms the most decisive dimension in the model of digital inequality developed by DiMaggio and Hargittai. They believe that the quality of use and its effect on social status is influenced by what the user does when they are on the Internet. Are they using their ICT tools for recreation or to increase their resources? The purpose of home ICT use was also examined in two areas in the PISA 2015 wave: general Internet use and use with the express purpose of studying and completing school assignments. The analysis in this study examines general Internet use and study modes.

3.5.1. General modes of Internet use

Placing individual activities in descending order according to everyday use, the study found that 15-year-old students most commonly use social media platforms. A total of 61% of the respondents use Facebook or other social media daily, while around 20% use them almost every day. The second most frequent activity among young people is searching for and watching entertaining videos on video-sharing platforms (e.g. YouTube), with 52% of them doing so daily and 27% of them doing so almost every day. Of all the activities listed, those who never do this represent the smallest percentage. Watching entertaining videos seems therefore to be one of the most widespread activities among young people. Among everyday Internet activities, chatting occupies third place. A total of 47.5% of the respondents use some chat app every day. However, compared to the previous data, those who never chat daily represent a relatively small proportion, 14% of the sample. Downloading music, films and games from the Internet is more widespread. Although only 32% of the respondents do this every day, a total of 94% download some kind of content from the Internet with some frequency. The frequency of the following two activities is distributed very similarly: reading the news and gleaning practical information from the Internet. The distribution of the respondents is relatively even within individual categories. Young people engage in these two Internet activities in the greatest proportion once or twice a week, with 30% of the sample obtaining practical information and 25% reading the news. Playing games is the least popular Internet activity among young people, whether it is done with others online or alone. A total of 61% of the sample never play online games on social media (e.g. Farmville), 42% never play multi-player online games, and 33% play no role-playing games. Similarly, it is infrequent for them to upload or share content that they have created, with 39% never having done so. Those who usually upload


FIGURE 6 *General modes of Internet use outside of school* (Source: PISA 2015, own calculation)

or share content typically do so once or twice a month or week. One activity that is typically done once or twice a month or week is downloading new apps to a mobile device, with 57% of respondents doing so with this frequency. Young people also seldom use their email accounts, with 30% of them doing so once or twice a month and 23% using them once or twice a week.

The most frequent Internet activities among 15-year-old Hungarian students, therefore, are using social media, searching for entertaining videos and chatting. The least common online activities include playing games, mainly online games available on social media and multi-player online games, as well as sharing self-made content.

Based on how often someone engages in the activities listed, the study has attempted to separate the profiles to which the principal component method was applied. It was possible to distinguish between three types of use in forming the principal components with regard to general use: (1) use for communication and entertainment; (2) use for play; and (3) use for gathering information.[4]

A total of three-quarters of the information from the original variables are included in the three principal components. The cumulative explained variance is 75 per cent.

While the first and second principal components rather reflect Internet use for entertainment, relaxation and recreation, the third one points to use for resource growth.

	Communication and entertainment	Use for play	Use for gathering information
social networks (e.g. <Facebook>, <MySpace>)	0,852		
Chatting online (e.g. <MSN®>)	0,766		
browsing the Internet for fun videos, e.g. <YouTube>)	0,725		
playing collaborative online games		0,902	
playing one-player games		0,894	
reading news on the Internet (e.g. current affairs)			0,885
obtaining practical information from the Internet			0,876

TABLE 2 *General modes of Internet use – Rotated component matrix* (Source: PISA 2015, own calculation)

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[4] As the principal components were being formed, certain items which had low communality or which were tied to more than one principal component were removed with an eye to the highest explained variance and ease of interpretability.

3.5.2. Internet use for learning

In the 2015 PISA survey, researchers included a question about the frequency with which students engage in Internet activity tied to study and school assignments outside of school. Of the choices offered, students most frequently communicate with each other about school assignments on social media, with 29% doing so every day and another 26% doing so almost every day. There were relatively few (8.9%) who never talk to their classmates about school assignments on social media. In contrast, it is less common for students to discuss school assignments with each other by email, with nearly 40% never doing so. A total of 43% email classmates about school assignments once a month or once a week. A total of 17% of the sample exchange emails every day or nearly every day.

Social media represent the main channel of communication between students about school assignments. They use social media platforms to maintain contact with teachers less often, with one-fifth of the students using them to communicate with their teachers every day or nearly every day. However, 34.9% of the respondents never use them to keep in touch with their teachers. However, email, another way to communicate with teachers online, is even less popular, with only 13.9% of respondents using it every day or almost every day. Six per cent more students never email their teachers (41%) than those who never contact them by social media. Students typically engage in some communication with their teachers online once or twice a month, with 30% doing so by email and 22.3% using social media for this purpose.

A total of 34.4% typically surf the Internet to complete school assignments, for example, essays and presentations, once or twice a week, with 29.3% doing so once or twice a month. Similarly, 63% of the sample use the Internet to look up information that they hear in lessons on a weekly or monthly basis, while 58% of them do their homework on the computer. Less frequently, they will use some mobile device to do homework, with 44.5% of the students reporting that they have never done school assignments that way. A total of 21% of the sample use a mobile device to do their homework once or twice a month, while 18.3% will do so once or twice a week. The proportion of those who use their mobile device to do homework every day or nearly every day amounts to 16.2 per cent.

A total of 21.9% of the students use the school website nearly every day for downloads, uploads and surfing. The same percentage do so weekly (21.7%), and a slightly higher portion do so monthly (27.2%). Nearly 30% of the respondents, however, never use the school website for downloads or uploads. Even fewer use the school website for information on news and bulletins pertinent to the school, teachers or students. A total of 37% of the respondents never use the school website for information. Around one-fifth of the students access the school webpage once a month, and the same proportion do so once a week. The percentage of those who check the latest information on the school website every day or nearly every day is a bit more than 20% altogether.

The least common kind of Internet activity of all those related to study and school assignments is that of downloading study aid apps to a mobile device. A total of 52.7% of the sample never download study aid apps for science, and 48.6% never download any other kind of study aid app. In both cases, 20% of them download these apps to their mobile devices monthly, 14–15% do so weekly, and 14% do so every day or nearly every day.

In sum, among the Internet activities tied to study and school assignments, the most frequent activity, i.e. done every day, is communication between students on social media. With a frequency of once a month or week, students typically surf the Internet to complete their school assignments, look up information that they have heard in lessons there and do their homework on the computer. Among the least common activities, i.e. indicated by respondents as something they never or almost never do, is downloading learning-related apps onto their mobile device and doing homework on their mobile device.

FIGURE 7 *Internet use for learning and school related activities* (Source: PISA 2015, own calculation)

A principal component analysis was similarly conducted of modes of Internet use tied to study and homework to ascertain patterns of use in this area. Based on this analysis, two principal components can be distinguished within the set of variables. One principal component involves activities that more specifically involve use of ICT tools for studying or learning, such as collecting information on the Internet to complete school assignments or to understand learning material as well as communicating with classmates about school assignments on social media platforms. The other principal component involves all the other activities from this set of variables, including downloading apps that aid learning, using ICT to do homework and keeping up-to-date on the school website. These modes of ICT use were summarized as activities that are facilitative of one's studies, but not strictly tied to doing schoolwork.

	ICT use for studies	ICT use for learning
Downloading science learning apps on a mobile device.	0,883	
Downloading learning apps on a mobile device.	0,882	
Doing homework on a mobile device.	0,815	
Using email for communication with teacher\submit of homework or other schoolwork.	0,739	
Doing homework on a computer.	0,724	
Checking the schools website for announcements, e.g. absence of teachers.	0,674	
Using email for communication with other students about schoolwork.	0,658	
Download\upload\browsing from school website (e.g. time table or course materials.	0,654	
Using Social Networks for communication with teachers.	0,531	
Using Social Networks for communication with other students about schoolwork.		0,81
Browsing the Internet for schoolwork (e.g. for preparing an essay or presentation.		0,758
Browsing the Internet to follow up lessons, e.g. for finding explanations.		0,695

TABLE 3 *Internet use for learning and school related activities – Rotated component matrix* (Source: PISA 2015, own calculation)

CONCLUSION

The study focused on the five dimensions of digital inequality developed by DiMaggio and Hargittai and examined the Hungarian subsample based on the PISA 2015 data. As regards available equipment, the research found that penetration and use of ICT tools at home is considerably high. Almost every student has Internet access at home, and nine out of ten have a smartphone with Internet access. Autonomy of use was examined through time spent on the Internet. About two-thirds of the students spend over two hours on the web during the week, and about three-quarters of them spend that much time online at the weekend. It was concluded from a deeper analysis of time spent on the Internet that this factor is influenced by intrinsic motivation rather than by external circumstances, e.g. the portability of the device. Presumably, parental control also plays an important role in limiting time spent on the Internet; however, the PISA data offer no option to analyse this factor. The 15-year-old Hungarian students mostly evaluated their ICT knowledge and competences as good, thus clearly suggesting that they are digital natives. In the dimension of social support, this kind of embeddedness of ICT use in social support was found among a bit over half of the respondents. Finally, the pattern of modes of Internet use was examined. As regards general Internet use,

three user modes became clear: one involves using the Internet primarily for communication and entertainment; another concentrates on playing games; and a third is aimed mainly at gathering information. Based on the responses, as regards Internet use tied to studying and completing school assignments, there is a distinct mode of use aimed primarily at doing schoolwork and one that is rather facilitative of one's studies.

Exploring and better understanding the dimensions of digital inequality among 15-year-old Hungarian students may represent a starting point for further studies, which may direct us to differentiating factors in the dimensions, e.g. the role of gender and socio-economic background, and which may examine the links of these dimensions to other areas, e.g. the relation to learning and school performance.

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The emergence of peer-to-peer accommodations

The case of the Airbnb

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ABSTRACT

Due to the development of information and communication technologies (ICTs), the so-called sharing economy spread rapidly to new sectors. The principle of sharing economy is that users can share their idle resources with each other. One of the most well-known manifestation of sharing economy is Airbnb, which is an online platform for short-term rentals. Nowadays, Airbnb offers more accommodation than some of the largest "traditional" hotel chains, and its estimated market value is 38 billion dollars. Airbnb gained a significant share within tourism accommodation services and has influence on urban property and rental markets, thus its diffusion led to conflicts between various actors. Our aim to present the characteristics of Airbnb; how does it work and what kinds of dilemmas and conflicts emerge in relation to the proliferation of short-term rentals? Furthermore, we aim to understand, to what extent could Airbnb interpreted as a part of sharing economy; is it genuinely sharing of idle resources, or is it a new form of capitalist enterprise? In addition, we also briefly present the spatiality of Airbnb in Hungary.

KEYWORDS

sharing economy, Airbnb, Budapest, Balaton, tourism, peer-to-peer accommodation

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INTRODUCTION

The development of information and communication technologies (ICT) transforms the economy in various ways – from the organisation of companies to the relations between companies and consumers or between consumers and consumers. These processes influence consumption patterns as well. One of the most important manifestations of these changes is the so-called sharing economy, which affects consumption patterns, prices, and poses important challenges towards the more traditional actors of the markets. These actors often cannot react to the rise of new competitors. Furthermore, the existing regulations do not provide adequate policy framework to manage the effects created by the emergence of the sharing economy. One of the most well-known examples of the sharing economy is Airbnb, which is an online platform for sharing rooms, apartments, and houses (OSKAM–BOSWIJK 2016). Just like other representatives of sharing economy (see the example of Uber in Hungary and in other countries), Airbnb also generates fierce conflicts between economic, political actors or between social groups.

Our aim is to review some conceptual aspects of the sharing economy and to present Airbnb; what kinds of problems and dilemmas can emerge in relation to peer-to-peer accommodations. In addition, we also present briefly the characteristics of Airbnb supply in Hungary. The paper is based on the analysis of relevant literature and on our researches; we collected data through web-scraping technologies to describe the spatiality and other characteristics of Airbnb in Budapest, in the Balaton region and in the largest Hungarian cities.

1. SHARING ECONOMY: CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS

The sharing of goods, services, and various types of idle capacities is not a completely new phenomenon; but due to the possibilities offered by the new information and communication technologies sharing became a more widespread process.

Sharing economy has various interpretations and it is mentioned under different terms; for example, collaborative economy, collaborative consumption, BOTSMAN–ROGERS 2011, BRIGHENTI 2016, GUTIÉRREZ et al. 2016, HAMARI et al. 2016, KALÓZ 2015, MALHOTRA–ALSTYNE 2014, PIZAM 2014).

However, the most of the definitions highlight that there is a new way of serving the needs of consumers. It has a different internal logic compared to the "ordinary" logic of capitalism – for example, it has a community content as well, thus profit is not the only aim of the activities. Using the framework of GIBSON-GRAHAM (2002), sharing economy could be described as an alternate capitalist enterprise, where the organizational framework is different compared to the capitalist enterprises and income can stem from self-employment or other sources.

Within the sharing economy, the users share their idle capacities with each other in various sectors from transport (Uber, Lyft), finance (Kickstarter), accommodation (Airbnb, Couchsurfing). Arguably, the sharing economy had the most significant influence on travel and accommodation services. Couchsurfing, Homeaway, and Airbnb offers accommodations, Vayable and CanaryHop provides guided tours, while through Eatwith it is possible to get meals (ERT et al. 2016).

As we mentioned above, the development of ICTs have a crucial role in the emergence of sharing economy; they enable a direct and immediate connection between service providers and users (BÁLINT–TRÓCSÁNYI 2016, EINAV et al. 2016, MELEO et al. 2016). In addition, these technologies enhance the community experience as well, thus motivating users to participate in sharing economy. Through sharing, consuming, and providing feedbacks, users and service providers can manifest and strengthen their belonging to certain identities, communities, or can join or create new communities (BOTSMAN–ROGERS 2011). Last, but not least, the new communication technologies enable on-demand service provision. The service providers can answer rapidly and effectively to the emerging demands through the new communication channels.

Within sharing economy trust is an extremely important issue; in contrast to the traditional services, there are no reliable brand names. Trust can be achieved through other ways: through the feedbacks of other users. After the transaction the user can rate the provider (and in most cases, the provider can rate the user as well) – this is a significant element of the community building aspect of the sharing economy (IKKALA–LAMPINEN 2014).

Since the sharing economy transforms consumption patterns radically, traditional service providers often lose their market positions. This leads to conflicts between the old and new actors of the market. Maybe the best example of these conflicts is the case of Uber: the company provided a platform for car sharing, creating competition for taxi companies. As a consequence of the conflicts, the regulation regarding taxi services has been changed. Due to the changes in regulation framework, Uber cancelled their operations in Hungary (INDEX 2016).

According to FRENKEN and SCHOR (2017), the key features of the sharing economy are the following:

– temporary access to resources;

– better use of resources, i.e. the use of idle capacities;

– direct connection between consumer and consumer;

– extensive use of online platforms (mobile phone applications, homepages etc.)

Thus, non-profit orientation is not a necessary feature of sharing economy – on the contrary, profit-oriented and non-profit activities can be interpreted as elements of sharing economy.

2. THE AIRBNB

Airbnb was founded in San Francisco in 2008 – at the time the name of the company was Airbed & Breakfast. The basic idea was to create a platform to enable owners to rent out their unused properties. Despite this starting idea, not only individuals, but traditional Bed&Breakfast providers can also offer accommodations on the Airbnb platform. The rapid rise of Airbnb has started in 2012, and nowadays the company is one of the most important players in the accommodation market with more than 150 million users. The market value of Airbnb is higher than some of the most well-known hotel chains; in 2019 Airbnb worthed more than 38 billion dollars – this exceeds the market value of Hilton and Hyatt. The revenue of Airbnb grew faster in the last years than those of the traditional hotel chains and become one of the key players in the global tourism market (GUTTENTAG 2015, OSKAM 2016, OSKAM–BOSWIJK 2016, SAMAAN 2015, SLEE 2016). Most of the accommodations offered through Airbnb is located in Europe and North America *(Table 1)*.

The company offers listings in 191 countries, 81,000 cities and the number of hosts is over 650,000. The number of guest arrivals between 2008 and 2018 exceeds 400 million.

Country	Number of listings
United States	660,000
France	485,000
Italy	340,000
Spain	245,000
United Kingdom	175,000

TABLE 1 *Countries with the most Airbnb listings, 2019* (Source: ipropertymanagement.com)

The company defines itself as a "reliable marketplace for people to advertise, find and look interesting and unique accommodations all over the world" (AIRBNB 2017). The platform enables hosts to rent out houses, apartments, private and shared rooms. The structure of the supply depends on the tourism demand, commercial accommodation offers, and price level. The platform works like other online booking systems; the user inputs their preferences (time, duration, destination, etc.) regarding the travel, then filters the results using further options. Only registered users can book and the whole transaction happens within the Airbnb platform – this ensures that the company would not be left out from the transaction and will get the commission after the successful booking. The earning for Airbnb come from the commission to be paid by the host and from the service fee paid by the guest (AIRBNB 2016).

As we mentioned above, trust is a crucial issue in sharing economy. The host's profile includes a photo and a brief introduction, but the most important element is the feedback from previous users. The feedback provides opportunity to get information on the host, the accommodation, the services, etc.

This can help to decide between the available accommodations. Some of the earlier researches point out that the photos and usernames make racial discrimination possible. For example, minority hosts often receive lower ratings from their guests (KAKAR et al. 2016). The reliability of the ratings can also be an issue since it is not possible to check, whether the feedback is based on real experiences or prejudices (ERT et al. 2016, IKKALA–LAMPINEN 2014, TEUBNER et al. 2017, ZERVAS et al. 2015).

There are several possible positive aspects of Airbnb. Some of the analyses emphasise its sustainability, claiming that the platform makes available idle resources – thus there is no need to create new capacities (RANCHORDÁS et al. 2016). Furthermore, in North American cities Airbnb contributes to the spatial deconcentration of tourism; while the majority of hotels are located in the city centre, peer-to-peer accommodations tend to be located towards the more peripheral areas (GUTTENTAG 2015). Authenticity is often highlighted as well; the guest stays where locals live, thus they have a higher chance to get familiar with local culture, can interact with locals thus moving away from the "tourist bubble". They also use more localised services instead of the standardised ones at the hotels.

In addition, several researches found that Airbnb guests stay longer and spend more than average tourists (*Budapest Business Journal* 2015). Peer-to-peer accommodations are also sources of income for deprived people. With the earnings from short-term renting they can pay for utilities and rent, thus they can avoid eviction. Last, but not least, Airbnb and other sharing economy accommodation platforms can contribute to the strengthening tourism sector of new destinations through the affordable, expanding and more diverse local accommodation supply Tussyadiah–Pesonen 2016).

Airbnb is usually a typical urban phenomenon, but in some cases, tourist regions with villages and smaller towns can be affected as well – like the Balaton region in Hungary. Large cities have the required quantity of properties, they are often key tourist destinations and provide necessary services for tourists. In other words, the supply, the demand, and the services are all available in these cities.

3. PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES IN RELATION TO AIRBNB

Various kinds of problems have emerged in relation to short-term rentals. The existing regulations are not appropriate to manage the new market processes, and new regulations cannot be adopted quickly. The regulations, which apply for the traditional accommodation services, do not apply for peer-to-peer accommodations – thus from a legal point of view, many of the Airbnb rentals operate within a "grey zone". One of the most often highlighted problems is that many of the Airbnb hosts do not register their activity – which means that they do not pay taxes either. It creates a competitive advantage over hotels and other registered accommodation services (SCHNEIDERMAN 2014, STREITFELD 2014). Furthermore, it is a socially unjust situation as well, and can be considered as an example for the privatisation of profits, and socialisation of losses situation; the costs and disadvantages are spread over within the local community, while the (financial) gains remain at the hosts and the guest. The marketability of rentals is strongly related to public developments, community services – but Airbnb rentals do not contribute to their financing (RANCHORDÁS et al. 2016). There is a common problem, which is a feature of online services; the profit loses its territoriality and is independent from the place of the actual service (i.e. the rental) and the profit is earned at the headquarters of the online companies.

In addition to the above, peer-to-peer accommodations has a negative effect on local communities as well. Due to the increasing market opportunities, landlords often decide to place their apartments on the short-term rental market, withdrawing them from the traditional rental markets. It results in increasing property and rental prices. According to several researches, Airbnb fosters neighbourhood change and gentrification, too (COX–SLEE 2016, DELGADO-MEDRANO–LYON 2016, SAMAAN 2015, SCHNEIDERMAN 2014, WATERS–BACH 2016). Airbnb increases the rent gap, thus makes neighbourhoods more appealing to investors. According to earlier researches (COX–SLEE 2016, DELGADO-MEDRANO–LYON 2016, SAMAAN 2015, SCHNEIDERMAN 2014, WATERS–BACH 2016), the growing interest of investors accelerates the displacement of residents and weakens social cohesion through the increasing real estate prices and changing the owner and tenant mix. The growth of tourism changes local service patterns as well. The service providers orient their services and prices towards the more solvent consumers – i.e. the tourists. This could result in the disappearance of traditional enterprises. The racial and ethnic characteristics of hosts and residents are often different; while the majority of locals belong to minorities, the hosts usually belong to white middle and upper classes (DUDÁS et al. 2017b).

The different lifestyles, attitudes between locals and tourist can be sources of conflicts too. While locals live their everyday lives in the neighbourhood, tourists want to have fun and party (SANTOLLI 2017) and it disturbs the everyday activities of locals – it is certainly the case in cities that attract large number of budget tourists. As a consequence, some condominiums decided to limit short-term rentals (*Index* 2017, *Portfolio* 2016).

Because of the above-discussed problems, several cities have introduced restrictions to manage the effects of Airbnb. For example, Amsterdam and Paris only allow short-term rentals for a limited number of days per year. In other cities (e.g. San Francisco or Berlin) special permits or licenses are required for short-term rentals (SLEE 2016).

4. AIRBNB IN HUNGARY

Due to the characteristics of peer-to-peer accommodations, analysing Airbnb is a difficult task; the publicly available data has its limitations, while the host themselves are not motivated to provide information. As a result, most of the researches are built on datasets put together by the researchers themselves – usually through web-scraping techniques (GUTIÉRREZ et al. 2016, INSIDE AIRBNB 2017, KE 2017).

Several researches analysed the emergence and effects of Airbnb accommodations in Hungary. JANCSIK et al. (2018) analysed the Airbnb offer in Budapest in comparison to the international trends. DUDÁS et al. (2017a) used 3-band raster representation techniques to reveal the price determinant factors of Airbnb listings. DUDÁS et al. (2018) evaluated the listings on the lower level of urban hierarchy, highlighting that four towns have outstanding role in Airbnb offers outside Budapest: Pécs, Szeged, Eger, and Debrecen. However, their number of listings are far less compared to Budapest. Those towns which have larger hotel accommodation capacity, also have significant Airbnb offer while population number has no significant effect on Airbnb supply. SMITH et al. (2018) focused on the regulatory framework, presenting the challenges of Airbnb or urban development and tourism policy. BOROS et al. (2018) compared hotel prices and Airbnb prices in Budapest, revealing that peer-to-peer accommodations can be compared to the four-star hotels in this regard.

According to Google Trends, the interest towards Airbnb grew from 2015: from that year the number of internet searches to the term Airbnb is high. The number of hosts grew as well – according to our previous research (Boros–Dudás 2017) the number of host registrations is usually decreases during winter. At the same time, the conflicts related to short-term rentals became more visible as well; growing rent prices, conflicts between tourists and locals, etc.

According to our results, the Airbnb offer in Budapest is concentrated in the central districts of the city; most of the listings are located in the 5th, 6th and 7th districts *(Figure 1)* – this is the spatial pattern of hotels as well (Dudás–Boros–Pál 2016). The prices are independent from accessibility or the services available in the vicinity of property. The cause of this is most probably the compact character of the city centre and the density of services. At the same time, the facilities and the size of property both have a significant role in shaping Airbnb prices (Dudás–Boros–Pál 2016, Dudás et al. 2017a).

FIGURE 1 *The spatial distribution of Airbnb listings in Budapest (01. 06. 2018)* (Source: based on www.airbnb.com data, edited by the authors)

The case of District 8 highlights the relevance of urban regeneration processes (Czirfusz et al. 2015) since the density of Airbnb rentals is higher in the renewed areas of the district. On the one hand, it is due to the enhanced service offer and renewed real estate stock. On the other hand, those who live in more deprived parts of the district have no sufficient funds or information to utilise their properties in the short-term rental market. Their apartments are in bad condition,

they have no funds for renovation and/or have no idle capacities (free rooms, empty apartments). In many cases hosts manage multiple apartments – their activity cannot be interpreted as a part of the sharing economy since they do not utilise their idle capacities and the connection is more like a business-to-costumer type than consumer-to-consumer one.

Regarding the price conditions, the Airbnb rentals of Budapest mainly compete with the four-star hotels (DUDÁS–BOROS–PÁL 2016) – in other cities the main competition category is that of the three-star hotels. Most of the listings offer whole apartments – which is a bit different from the global Airbnb trends.

Although Airbnb is mainly an urban phenomenon, in some cases traditional tourist regions have significant Airbnb offers as well. That is the case in the Balaton region as well – but the background is different here. The Balaton region is the second most important tourism destination within Hungary. This area has a long tradition for alternative accommodations; in the decades of communism the so-called "zimmer frei" supplemented the official accommodation offer. This has meant that families rented out their rooms or apartments, mainly for international tourists. After the change of regime this practice survived, and when Airbnb has emerged, the zimmer frei offers were advertised on the platform of Airbnb as well. The majority (85%) of the region's offer consist of whole apartments – just like in the case of Budapest.

There are significant spatial differences within the offer in the region; there are more Airbnb listings along the Southern shore of the lake and the spatial pattern is more scattered along the Northern shore *(Figure 2)*. The number of listings is higher in the vicinity of the lake, while accessibility has a weaker effect on the number of Airbnb listings. Based on the registration dates of hosts, the first listings appeared in the traditional centres of tourism (Siófok, Balatonfüred, Hévíz, Balatonboglár).


FIGURE 2 *Spatial distribution of Airbnb listings (01. 06. 2018)* (Source: based on www.airbnb.com data, edited by the authors)

In contrast to the reports from Budapest, in the Balaton region, the number of conflicts in relation to Airbnb is fewer. This is due to the character of the local economy: the traditional importance of tourism. The locals are more accustomed to the tourist behaviour than in Budapest. Furthermore, short-term rental activities utilise properties which were used in tourism before, but under a different platform – while in Budapest Airbnb transformed the local rental and real estate market.

Conclusions

As we discussed above, it is not unequivocal that Airbnb is genuinely a part of the sharing economy. In many cases, Airbnb hostings seem to be more like a capitalist enterprise than sharing activities. The host rents out mainly whole apartments, houses and not only rooms or beds – which would be more appropriate examples for idle capacities. Furthermore, many hosts manage more than one listings and employ staff for welcoming guests or cleaning the apartments. Thus the character of the connection is more business-to-customer (B2C) than customer-to-customer (C2C).

This leads us to the question; is a "real" sharing economy possible in our globalised economy and society? The lessons learnt from the previous researches show that Airbnb has moved from the alternative capitalist organisation and alternative market transactions towards a traditional capitalist market logic. Thus the suspected positive effects, like contributing to the payment of deprived people, or enhancing their quality of life cannot be confirmed. It can appear at the beginning, but the logic of capitalism transforms peer-to-peer accommodations soon. As a result, poorer tenants will be pushed out from the neighbourhoods affected by Airbnb. The property and rental prices will grow and local communities will be quickly transformed. Furthermore, Airbnb has a price advantage over hotels and other commercial accommodation services, since the tax avoidance of hosts.

In our opinion, the often claimed role of Airbnb in the growth of tourism flows is debatable as well. The growth rates of tourism in Budapest and other regions are quite similar – while the majority of Hungarian Airbnb offer is located in Budapest. If the claims about the positive effect of Airbnb would be true, the growth rates should be different. This leads us to the conclusion that peer-to-peer accommodation benefits from the growing market.

Airbnb has a significant market share in Budapest and in the Balaton region – in the two most important tourist destinations of Hungary. Whole apartments give the majority of listings in both areas – in a slight contrast to the global processes. While in Budapest the location of the property has a weak effect on prices, in the Balaton region the vicinity of the lake influences the price.

Analyses in the future should focus on dependencies on various levels; who, where and how profits from Airbnb? As we mentioned above, one of the key issues with Airbnb is the privatisation of profits and socialisation of losses and costs. A special attention should be paid to the relation between Airbnb and gentrification. Several analyses have shown that Airbnb accelerates neighbourhoods change, contributes to population change. Thus short-term rentals can cause problems in relation to segregation, spatial exclusion, urban property and rental markets, or the sustainability of local communities.

To sum up the above, we can conclude that short-term rentals are one of the most significant challenges of the contemporary urban policy which requires a complex management from policy

makers, national and local leaders. While the positive effects (e.g. diversification of accommodation offers) of Airbnb and other peer-to-peer accommodation platforms cannot be neglected, we cannot trust its management to the market. some kind of community control and regulation is needed to defend public interests.

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Location of Industry in Small Settlements in the light of Industrial Towns

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ABSTRACT

Location of industry is already following Western European trends in the 21st century, and priority is given to social factors, e.g. educational attainment, social mobility and cheap labour, in decisions on setting up new industrial establishments and on developing investments. Firms, due to globalisation, prefer moving to sites that ensure greater profits, the focus is thus on profit. Geographical location, mineral resources, water supply, the state and quality of the environment, and the climate are the main natural factors relating to location of industry. The size and qualifications of labour force, national legal system, political stability, infrastructure and local tradition are the main social factors relating to location of industry. Thinking about the nature of our settlements in this respect, it is considered that although villages and towns can be based on common principles, they themselves develop and create their characters and values.

KEYWORDS

industrial cities, developing, economy system, industrial settlements

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INTRODUCTION

Industrial role became predominant in the development of settlements in Hungary in the first half of the 19th century. Various branches of industry affected differently the development of settlements. *"The industry relied on the already existing network of villages in the regions of mine sites: its workforce lived or moved there (in the valley of the Sajó River, areas along the Zagyva River, etc.). Larger settlements and towns (such as Putnok and Salgótarján) were subsequently developed. The development of the processing industry resulted in the restructuring of the settlement patterns of the regions concerned. As a result, larger settlement groups and agglomerating areas emerged by the merging of cities, towns and villages in their vicinity".*[1]

Budapest, Hungary's capital city, is a great example of that as its rapid development was clearly induced by the industry. As from the mid-20th century, industrialisation had a significant impact on the country as a whole, including social, economic, political and territorial development. Industrial settlements with industrial and/or residential functions sprang up, involved in activities of an industrial character. It has provided a basis for the settlements which up till now still has an effect on their development, despite the fact that some of these settlements have not or scarcely been involved in industrial activities for years, if not for decades.

Therefore, after the 1990s, the role of the industry has been downplayed in the development of settlements, the focus of the ambitions placed in settlements has gradually shifted towards the tertiary sector from that date – at the expense of traditional industrial developments. The development paths of settlements have no longer been exclusively determined by the industry but by a complex set of activities involving inter alia service and/or agricultural activities.

When discussing industrial villages or industrial towns, it is important to make clear that most of older industrial villages were granted town status after the year of 1990, and even if industrial function is of decisive importance in these settlements today, they are rather rural in nature, in terms of demographic characteristics and institutions, in spite of their town status. Focusing solely on dominant industrial functions and factors relating to location of industry in relation to settlements with village status is problematic, on the one hand because there are very few, only a minimum number of industrial settlements with village status, so-called 'industrial villages', today, such limitation of the interpretative framework would thus substantially curtail the framework of the content of the present study. Therefore, in addition to industrial villages, classic industrial towns given town status back in the era of state socialism and all settlements that were granted town status after 1990 despite their rural character and whose economies are or were dominated by the industry are also covered in the study.

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[1] KŐSZEGFALVI 2004.

1. INDUSTRIAL SETTLEMENT – INDUSTRIAL VILLAGE – INDUSTRIAL TOWN

After the regime change in 1989–1990, among the changes in the society and economy, economic transformation has had the strongest impact. Changes have resulted in the differentiation of settlements, increasing gaps between towns and towns, towns and villages, villages and villages, and varying development paths. Small settlements with industry-oriented economies, emerged in the first or second half of the 20th century, hit rock bottom in the 1990s, as specific activities had ceased in these settlements, whereby they lost their self-sustainable capacity, which had a direct impact on their local societies and social composition. Industrial villages thus started seeking new roles either by building on their past or by locating new activities.

The result of the regime change is the increasingly distinct notions of 'town' as a functional concept and as a legal concept. In the era of the Hungarian Soviet Republic (literally the 'Republic of Councils in Hungary'), infrastructural eligibility criteria for town status were stringent under Government Decree 11/1971 (March 31) and Joint Instruction 8/1971 (Ép. Ért.) of the Minister for Building and Urban Development and the President of the Council Office of the Council of Ministers (e.g. a 300-person community centre and increase of the population of the urban area by more than 1% annually). Act LXV of 1990 on local governments entered into force in 1990 repealed the former detailed legislation on the conferment of town status and introduced a more lax regulation and procedure (Act LXV of 1990 on local governments in force between 1990 and 1999, then Act XLI of 1999 on the procedure of town and country planning in force between 1999 and 2015), which allowed relevant political decision-makers a wide margin of discretion. Consequently, the number of towns elevated to town status greatly increased over the period 1990–2015. While the number of settlements with town status had only been 166 in Hungary in the year of the regime change, their number increased to 346 (Budapest, 23 towns with county rights, and 322 towns) by 2014. Some of the towns that had recently gained town status had only a few thousand inhabitants and were characterised by rural infrastructural circumstances and poor public utility services. The new and more stringent regulations for the conferment of town status were introduced in two stages in the 2010s; Government Decree 321/2012 (November 16) on the procedure of town and country planning was first adopted, which allows a greater margin of discretion with regard to the conferment of town status, but the real turning point was the amendment of the Government Decree in 2015. The amendment to the Decree lays down demographic (e.g. at least 10,000 inhabitants at the date of application and continued population growth during the last five years), infrastructural (e.g. 90% of urban roads need to be paved) and institutional (e.g. healthcare institution, training pool or multi-functional sport complex) requirements, as well as special fiscal conditions. Particularly remarkable is the fiscal condition: only settlements where at least 20% of total income derives from local business tax in the year of application can apply for town status. The condition requires the existence of a significant local private business sector, which constitutes a new and significant constraint when compared with the legislation and practice on the conferment of town status between 1990 and 2015.[2] As a result of the stricter legislation, none of the towns has received town status since 2015 in Hungary, but a high number of village-like settlements were granted town status in previous years due to the lax regulation.

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[2] SZABÓ 2015.

1.1 Industrial villages and village-like industrial towns

"The lives of settlements of, on average, 3000–4000 inhabitants have been determined in recent decades by the presence of industries of national importance, employment structure of an industrial nature, the relatively long history of the manufacturing industry with significant effects on society and settlement" (ENYEDI–HORVÁTH 2002). Industrial settlements are scattered throughout the country and are centred in certain industrial areas, and their lives are determined by their industrial function, even though it may no longer be their main function today. The notion of 'industrial village' is not sufficiently explicit in this regard and is incorrect for the simple reason that a significant number of these settlements have meanwhile received town status.

Hungarian industrial villages include, inter alia, Almásfüzitő situated on the bank of the Danube River (in the industrial region of Komárom) where inhabitants were involved in the processing of alumina and oil. The alumina plant in the settlement that still has village status was the largest plant of its kind in Hungary and Central Europe between 1950 and 1997. The village is currently trying to find its way, while its inhabitants have to face less working opportunities. Its population has been on a stable downward trend for nearly 30 years as industrial activities have been ceased in the village, which has thus lost its population retaining ability.

Similarly, Bélapátfalva is also fumbling its way; the settlement in Heves County was a village until 2004 and was elevated to town status in the same year. The industry of the industrial settlement involved in cement production has provided employment for its inhabitants since the early 1990s, not continuously, but for long years. Cement production ceased in the settlement whose economic life was based on cement production in 2000, and subsequently the plant was permanently closed down. The local government created an industrial park to replace the cement plant. It has successfully maintained its role as an industrial village by replacing the plant with an industrial park, and it functions as the centre of the sub-region where workers are no longer employed in a monolithic structure.

Sajóbábony that was granted town status only in 2009 could be considered for a long time as a classic example of an industrial village. The settlement is situated in the Bükk Mountains, at the junction of the Tardona Hills and Sajó River Basin. *"The settlement is divided into two distinct parts: an old village (in the core) and an urban-style housing estate. The industrial development of the settlement has formed the settlement structure."* The predecessor to the North Hungarian Chemical Works (Hungarian short form: ÉVM), the company '1040', was set up in the settlement in the early 1950s, which was originally a defence plant. The TNT factory of ÉVM was destroyed by an industrial accident in 1979. Subsequent chemical production also gave a living to several hundreds of people. The site of the former chemical plant functions as an industrial area today, just like in Bélapátfalva. It can involve various activities in both cases, as well as in the cases of other settlements: services, industrial and, in some cases, agricultural-industrial functions. The industrial park gives prospects not only for Sajóbábony but also for other nearby industrial villages and towns regarding development and social and labour market stability.

Rudabánya can no longer be considered as an industrial village in the strict sense of the word, as its previously decisive industrial function has practically ceased, and the settlement was awarded town status in 2008: *"It is located in the Northern Hungarian Region, in the north west of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County, at the edges of the microregions of the Putnok Hills and*

Rudabánya Mountains. It is at a distance of 220 km from the capital city and of 40 km from Miskolc, the regional centre and county seat. Its population is below 3000 inhabitants, which means it belongs to the group of smallest towns in Hungary."

Ércbányászati Nemzeti Vállalat (National Ore Mining Company) was established during the nationalisation period, in 1949, and the mine of Rudabánya later became its largest mining plant with a long-standing tradition and great potential. *"The iron ore mine in Rudabánya operated as a separate company between 1952 and 1964. It ceased operating as such in 1964, when Országos Érc- és Ásványbányászati Vállalat (National Ore and Mineral Mining Company) was set up. The development of iron ore mining was completed by 1968, however the switching to state-of-the-art and modern technologies did not delivered the expected results."* It was predictable in the early 1980s that the mining company would be wound up due to its loss-making activity, but it has not been replaced by a new industrial activity. The remaining population is involved in agricultural and commercial activities, the level of industrial activity is very low.

Lábatlan elevated to town status in 2004 was known for its cement factory founded in 1868, where portland cement manufacture began, using minerals of the marl mine in the Berzsek Mountain. *"The manufacture of construction materials and cement was developed in close connection with this culture that exists to this day, which made the settlement one of the main centres of the industry in Hungary in the 20th century."* The asbestos-cement paper factory was set up in 1908. The plant was modernised in 1965. The construction of the Fine Paper Factory of Lábatlan began with an investment of HUF 2 million. This factory was one of the largest and most modern factories in Central Europe until 2009. The industrial role of the village is granted by Lábatlani Vasbetonipari Zrt. (Reinforced Concrete Industrial of Lábatlan), which has been manufacturing concrete, reinforced concrete and prestressed concrete parts. Tourism and industrial functions are given priority in the ambitions of the settlement today. Izsófalva with large village status is in a specific situation compared to other industrial villages. The settlement is located in the Northern Hungarian Region, in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County, at the eastern edge of Borsod (former Putnok) Hills, at a distance of 9 km from Kazincbarcika, in the valley of the Ormos Stream. A high number of members of the working class had been moving to the settlement from the 1960s, which resulted in a large increase in its population and the emergence of two mining villages (sites), Ormospuszta and Rudolftelep. Mining was an essential activity in Izsófalva – which was given large village status in 1971 – in the 1960s, which ensured its inhabitants relative prosperity. However, large-scale coal mining was discontinued in 1977. It has led to substantial emigration since the 1980s, which has been aggravated by the secession of Ormosbánya in January 1993 and of Rudolftelep in December 1994, which has made Izsófalva an ageing settlement, and the number of its population has dropped to less than a third.

Some other industrial settlements – including Múcsony and Sárisáp with village status, and Borsodnádasd granted town status in 2001 – have been in a similar situation after the 1990s. Losing their industrial role has led to a change in the situation of the settlements, and their prominent role played in the settlement network has been downplayed. Settlements that have lost their previous role and are searching for new ways include the settlements previously involved in industries in Hungary.

Local societies have been constantly transforming in industrial villages and small industrial towns since the 1990s, the population of such settlements has been steadily decreasing, which force

the settlements to find a new role for themselves and to closely cooperate with the surrounding settlements. Industrial functions, which determined the nature of these settlements, are no longer 'building blocks' of the villages and towns, they have thus set themselves the primary objective of defining their particular characters. The number of remaining industrial settlements with village status (industrial village) is limited to a small number of settlements due to the extensive practice of the elevation to town status in the period from 1990 to 2015, and in particular therefore the scope of examination should not be limited to the settlements with village status. Some of the examined industrial settlements were characterised by constantly shrinking population numbers between 1991 and 2018.

FIGURE 1 *Number of inhabitants of industrial villages in 1991 and in 2018* (Source: Based on data of *Gazetteer of Hungary* [as at 1 January 2018])

Small settlements whose economies were industry-oriented before therefore has been lagging increasingly behind other settlements in Hungary since the 1980s. When considering the value of the former industrial settlements, their attractiveness has been directly related to a long-term vision, and not to employment and living areas.

1.2 Industrial towns

'Socialist settlements' classified in the category of classic industrial towns – which were awarded town status in the era of state socialism between 1947 and 1990 – shared some general features prior to the regime change, namely the predominance of industrial functions, a high level of employment in the industry, the insignificance of town traditions, and social composition (a high proportion of young and middle-aged people with technical knowledge). The same industrial towns are today characterised by severe loss of prestige, lack of investments, sometimes forced immigration, outmigration, high unemployment rates, and are located in regions experiencing crisis.

Taking Pál Beluszky's approach, industrial towns of Hungary can be divided into three main categories: the first category is the so-called socialist industrial towns (e.g. Ajka, Dunaújváros, etc.); industrial towns, such as Paks and Nyerges, belong to the second category; and the third category covers towns with industrial and residential functions (e.g. Dorog and Százhalombatta). The towns have taken on widely differing characters since their emergence, the examination of their industrial function therefore shows a mixed picture of the settlements.

The main aim of the present study is to examine industrial villages and so-called socialist industrial towns and industrial settlements in the light of current trends and recent changes.

The term 'industrial town' has a double meaning in the literature of Hungary: it means, on the one hand, a town artificially created during socialist industrialisation and, on the other hand, a town with new investment(s) and whose economy heavily relies on a large factory (e.g. car manufacturer in Győr or in Kecskemét) that provides employment for the inhabitants of the town and of its surrounding settlements.

A high number of towns, so-called socialist towns, were built in the 1950s to satisfy the demand of industrial investments for workers.[3] Most of the industrial investments were targeted the middle-mountain areas with mining resources, along the axis of energetics and heavy industry, comprising of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County (Ózd, Kazincbarcika and Miskolc), Budapest, and Veszprém County (Várpalota and Ajka) (ENYEDI–HORVÁTH 2002).

The first wave of newly established 'socialist towns' includes Dunaújváros, Kazincbarcika, Komló, Oroszlány and Ajka. Power plants were built in the settlements (in Oroszlány, Komló, Ajka, Várpalota, Berente and Gyöngyösvisonta) and near new oil reserves (in Százhalombatta). The bases for iron and steel industry were expanded with large-scale reconstruction (in Diósgyőr and Ózd), and new roads were built in Dunaújváros. There were lignite mining and a thermal power plant generating electricity in Oroszlány; coal mining, alumina production and energy production in Ajka; coal and lignite mining, electricity generation and aluminium smelting in Várpalota; coal mining, electricity generation and chemical industry in Kazincbarcika; a thermal power plant generating electricity and chemical industry in Tiszaújváros; and a power plant based on iron and steel industry, production of building materials, and light industry in Dunaújváros.[4] The settlements were established as means to implement the objectives set out in accordance with political principles in the era of socialism. The 'inventors' did not take into account any historical roots, focusing solely on industrial past, if there was such. The new towns were synonyms for 'modernity' from the moment of their emergence.[5]

The settlements can also be categorised according to the nature of industrial development. Accordingly, they can be grouped into the following categories: The first group of industrial towns covers Ajka, Tatabánya, Ózd and Várpalota where an already existing industrial activity were expanded, and Komló, a mining town, also belongs to this group. The second group covers settlements that had had no industrial past and were created as a result of a political decision, e.g. Dunaújváros, Paks, Tiszaújváros and Százhalombatta.

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[3] BELUSZKY 2003.

[4] DRAGONICS 1975.

[5] GERMUSKA 2004.

The building of Dunaújváros (Danube Ironworks) and Tiszaújváros (Tisza Chemical Plant) was initially a greenfield investment in nature (a project on a completely new site) in the vicinity of two smaller villages (which were later integrated into the new settlements). Moreover, industry was established as linked to Százhalombatta (Danube Refinery) and Paks (Paks Nuclear Power Plant), but not built seamlessly next to them, with some delay after the aforementioned two towns, in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[6]

Post-war socio-economic and political processes played a fundamental role in the establishment of the towns. It led to new forms of dependence and new social, economic and political grounds, which fundamentally altered certain segments in Hungary.

The first accepted categorisation of Hungarian towns is outlined in György MARKOS' book *Magyarország gazdasági földrajza* (Economic Geography of Hungary). He emphasises in his work that account should be taken not only of new functions but also of those inherited from the past in determining the character of a town.[7] Socialist industrial towns had therefore been artificially created in a top-down political system, and their populations had been very low before their economies became industry-oriented.

2. SITUATION OF INDUSTRIAL SETTLEMENTS AND INDUSTRIAL TOWNS TODAY

Industrial settlements, including industrial towns, have lost their dominant position after the regime change, with the exception of two settlements: Százhalombatta given town status in 1970 and Paks elevated to town status in 1978. The economies of the two settlements are still based on industrial functions, and their local residential populations mainly work in industry. The present-day situation of Hungarian industrial towns is actually determined by their role played in the past. What does all this mean? While all or part of their industrial activities have ceased in most of industrial villages and small settlements, the majority of the towns ensure their prosperity by providing jobs in new industries related to industrial functions.

Towns emerged in the 1940s and 1950s include Tatabánya (1947), Ózd (1949), Várpalota (1951), Komló (1951), Dunaújváros (1951), Kazincbarcika (1954) Oroszlány (1954) and Ajka (1959). Tiszaújváros (1966), Százhalombatta (1970) and Paks (1978) were awarded town status in the 1960s and 1970s.

The town of Martfű is interesting to note, which is described in the Integrated Urban Development Strategy of the Town of Martfű as follows: *"According to the classification of settlements by complex town type, Martfű includes among socialist industrial towns, it is therefore necessary to be aware of the distinctive characteristics of this type of towns in order to outline development tendencies of the town. No difficulty arises as to the definition of the notion 'industrial town': it simply is a settlement whose main functions relate to industry and the majority of its population work in industry."*

Martfű had been constantly changed in the era of socialism, as, in addition to the shoe factory started before the war, a vegetable oil factory and a brewery were established in the village. *"The structure of its economy is considered to be relatively multi-faceted. Although its population*

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[6] CSIZMADY 2013.

[7] MARKOS 1952.

increased fivefold (from 1500 to 7400 inhabitants) between 1949 and 1990, the settlement has lacked development due to the weaker bargaining power of light industry and to the proximity of Szolnok and Tiszaföldvár. Town status was eventually awarded to Martfű in 1989, it had thus been excluded from most of the benefits from redistributive policies." Although Martfű, as discussed by historian Pál Germuska, only partially meets the criteria of the category 'socialist industrial town', it can be affirmed in respect of the present study that it has the same role and functions as the other 11 socialist industrial villages and towns.

FIGURE 2 *Year of conferment of town status on socialist industrial towns* (Source: Based on data of *Gazetteer of Hungary* [as at 1 January 2018])

The economies of the settlements that were the first of industrial towns to receive town status (Tatabánya and Ózd) relied heavily on heavy industry. Tatabánya was seeking a new role after the regime change, building in particular on its location, existing pool of skilled labour, and the working knowledge of its inhabitants. Consequently, innovative industries requiring creativity and economic cooperation have moved to the town. In the case of Tatabánya, its municipal area and the functioning of the principle of reciprocal effects are particularly important. After some initial difficulties, by the early 2000s, the town has embarked on the so-called Western type development path, which has been further supported by the location of the town and its economic interest closely related to Budapest and the western border. Its industrial park, higher educational institution and firms operating in various sectors provide increasingly favourable conditions for the attracting and retaining of new highly skilled inhabitants.

The various activities, e.g. agricultural or service functions, located in the villages and towns in the agglomeration of Tatabánya have deeply been interconnected, and the dependency of the neighbouring settlements on Tatabánya is not solely economic and related to industrial functions. Not even in the case of the town of Oroszlány, which, as a mining settlement, had a large population due to a high degree of autonomy and high prestige but is also looking for a new role and is posing

new challenges to its inhabitants. Ózd's future built on the foundation of the past is less positive. *"Ózd is the centre of a region with serious social and economic problems in Hungary, where accumulation of disadvantages has been the result of multiple factors."* The economic role of the town and its surroundings has progressively decreased since the 1990s due to the closing of heavy industry, which has further exacerbated the situation of the disadvantaged local residential population with a low level of educational achievement. The region has been characterised by high unemployment and resultant low incomes in the last 30 years. There are no firms that would provide good economic bases in the town, which makes the development of the settlement impossible. Ózd has a specific urban periphery. One of the reasons for its diminishing role may be that the town of Eger has proved to be a stronger player both in terms of labour market and of activation of its society.

Várpalota and Komló given town status in 1951 fall under a particular type of industrial towns. *"The historical evolution of Várpalota had been sound until the Second World War, from Roman settlement and rich medieval village to mining town from the end of the 19th century. The programme »Várpalota, Inota and Pét: One Town« marked the beginning of a new era in 1951. Rapid industrialisation and the expansion of the villages of Inota and the already seceded Pétfürdő have fundamentally changed the way of life and the structure of the town. The industrial recession has placed Várpalota as an industrial centre in a particularly difficult situation after the regime change."* However, industrial change has brought about the restructurisation of the industrialised local society. Disadvantaged groups of society with lower levels of education live in the settlement, which has a major influence on the innovativeness and long-term development of the town.

The town of Komló was a mining settlement, had developed rapidly and provided occupation for its inhabitants before the regime change in Hungary. *"The past of the former mining town inevitably has an impact on its economy. After closing its mines, newly established local firms are still unable to provide employment for the unemployed people. The skill levels in the workforce are low. Komló and its region still could not fully recover from the major social crisis following the closure of the mine despite the increasing number of local businesses."*

Residents of the town, just as in Ózd and Várpalota, have low levels of education. The number of movers from Komló has been higher than the number of people moving to the town due to its urban transport and access. High unemployment rates and the disadvantaged situation of the town further hamper its development, as Komló faces enormous investment needs to revive the town as a whole and its economy. A particularly important point in this context is the fact that Komló was not created at the time of socialist industrialisation, as it already was a traditional mining settlement at that time, which just continued to develop. However, its long past did not confer any advantage on the town after the closure of its mine in terms of privileges or new prospects.

The town of Oroszlány, which is a dead-end settlement, was given town status in 1954. The town prospered from coal mining and had an outstanding role in the 19th and 20th centuries. The power plant and its related Márkushegy Mine had been the largest employer in the town and the region for decades. The economy of Oroszlány has been restructured profoundly after the regime change, which later has led to the relocation of modern industrial plants and service suppliers in the former mining town. *"The coal mining industry was restructured in the 1990s, whereby mines deemed uneconomical were closed. All remaining mines in the basins around Oroszlány and Tatabánya, along with the power plants served by them, were again reunited in one company by integrating the mines and power plants in 1994."* An industrial park was set up after the 1990s to ensure the continuation of industrial activity, to some extent, in the town.

FIGURE 3 *Changes in the number of inhabitants of Hungarian industrial towns between 1990 and 2018*
(Source: Based on data of *Gazetteer of Hungary* [as at 1 January 2018])

"The closure of the mine exposed the town to a major challenge, which was successfully overcome. Its economy is today independent from the mining industry and is on sound ground."

The composition of the local residential population is also specific in the town, since, as a result of its previous industrial activity in mining, the proportion of inhabitants with lower or intermediate levels of education is higher than the national average, but the number of the population having completed tertiary education is significantly lower. However, account should also be taken of the fact that the attainment levels of the population do not meet local labour market demands due to the previous industrial role of the town, which means that institutions and firms operating in the town are not able to find qualified personnel.

Dunaújváros has been an important industrial town. Significant outward migration from the industrial town was the prevailing trend between 1990 and 2018 – 14,338 people moved from the town over the 27-year period – due to the setback suffered by the former Danube Ironworks that was the largest employer before the regime change, unemployment, monolithic expertise, and the inapplicability of the expertise of the local labour force. The town was emerged as a new industrial town in the 1950s, after the construction of the steel plant and its related housing estate. The socialist political leaders wanted to make the town a model socialist industrial town. Its former name was Sztálinváros (Stalin Town) between 1951 and 1961, and, after its renaming, 1961, Dunaújváros provided employment and a livelihood for thousands of workers and engineers. The development of the town ground to a halt in the 1990s due to the changing role and restructuring

of heavy industry, just like of the other industrial towns. Both the town and its inhabitants went through a difficult time in subsequent years, and this 20-year period was characterised by insecurity and a struggle of the town to find a new role. The settlement has gained a new position by building on its old industrial activities and locating new activities (ISD Dunaferr Zrt., Hankook Tire Magyarország Kft., etc.) following the millennium. Dunaújváros has been in a special situation as a settlement near to Budapest and due to its beneficial role played in the cultural life and education of the region.

"Kazincbarcika was created with the unification of three settlements, Barcika, Sajókazinc and Berente, in 1954. The town is located in the Sajó Valley, to the north of Miskolc. The town was created to provide housing for workers of the newly built Borsod Chemical Plant and the nearby mine, and the town as a planned town was mainly characterised by a large housing estate and incomplete institutional structure."

The institutional system serving the residents was of appropriate quality and provided full range of services due to the vigorous growth of the town between the 1960s and the 1980s, after the development of the Borsod Chemical Plant. The town also had to face a severe crisis at the end of the 1980s, which actually lasted until the end of the 1990s. The former Borsod Chemical Plant has been replaced by BorsodChem Rt., which, although being the largest employer in the region, is not able to absorb all groups of former employees of the plant. Changes in the industry and the population of the town have had an enormous impact on the life of the settlement. The population of the town declined by more than 10,000 people between 1990 and 2018. The population decline was constant over the period concerned, partly because people with a higher educational attainment formerly employed by the industry moved to other parts of the country, while low-skilled labour force with lower educational levels did not move out of the region.

Ajka was awarded town status in the late 1950s. The town created by the unification of several villages already was an industrial town in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. The economy of the town had been dominated by agriculture, the mining sector and the aluminium sector for decades, but the processing industry has gained increasing importance after the regime change. Ajka could also not avoid the crisis that affected industrial towns after the 1990s. The town and its region have sought to locate new activities, to find a new role, and to develop new functions. Many people formerly employed in the industry have become unemployed, and many people have moved to other parts of Hungary. The number of inhabitants of the town decreased by more than 5000 people between 1990 and 2018. Most of its inhabitants are medium-qualified people and people with specialised skills, and the number of tertiary-educated inhabitants is low.

Three new socialist industrial towns were created in the last wave of industrialisation in the 1960s and 1970s. Tiszaújváros (1966) used the name Tiszaszederkény until 1970, when the name of the socialist industrial town was changed to Leninváros (Lenin Town). The construction of the Tisza Chemical Plant began in the mid-1950s, then an oil refinery was built in the early 1970s, and the Tisza Thermal Power Plant was constructed at the end of the 1970s. The town, like the other industrial towns, was adversely affected by the industrial and social transformations caused by the regime change. The settlement reached absolute rock bottom in the 1990s, and local workers were just as severely affected by the industrial reconversion as in other Hungarian towns. The situation was further exacerbated by the outmigration of people with higher educational levels and medium- or highly skilled people to build a new life elsewhere. The emigration of thousands of people from the town has been continuous in the last 30 years. Százhalombatta and Paks have been among the last industrial towns to receive town status. The economy of the former town was dominated

FIGURE 4 *Population of working age (in April 2019) in total population, compared with total population* (Source: <www.nfsz.munka.hu> and data based on data of *Gazetteer of Hungary* [as at 1 January 2018])

by the oil industry, and the latter town is home of a nuclear power plant. The modern-day industrial activity in Százhalombatta has been based on the companies of the Danube Riverside Power Plant and the Danube Refinery (now MOL Zrt.) from the outset. Industrial investments initiated in the 1960s provided a sound basis for the employment of the old and new inhabitants of the town by the end of the 1970s. Százhalombatta has been growing constantly since the 1960s, and its population has been also increasing since 1960. The regime change did not cause either economic or social crisis in the town. Of the Hungarian industrial towns, only Százhalombatta could and can retain and increase its population. Its close proximity to Budapest (its role as agglomeration), labour force with highly specialised (monolithic) knowledge and skills (employed by MOL Zrt.), MOL Zrt. and smaller businesses attracted by MOL Zrt. to the town have provided an advantage to the town. The majority of the population of the town have lower or intermediate levels of education, and the proportion of graduates is lower than the national average, just like in other industrial towns. The example of the town of Paks offers quite a contrast. The economy of the town based on the nuclear power plant has followed a different path than that of the previously established industrial towns. The town, whose economy is based on highly specialised knowledge and industry, was developed from an already existing village, taking advantage of its location next to the Danube River. The town was developed into an industrial town according to a government decree implemented in 1967, which determined the construction of the first nuclear power plant

of Hungary in the area between the Danube River and the Csámpa Plain. The construction work of the industrial plant (earth moving, construction of panel housing estates, and grounbreaking ceremony) commenced in 1969. *"The housing estate for the workers of the nuclear power plant was built according to the urban planning principles of the 1970s. It is now integral part of the town. Its »Tulip Houses« triggered a progressive architectural debate. The buildings and public areas of the town are still liveable but in need of renewal."* In the meantime, the population of Paks has been steadily increasing, which was boosted by the conferment of town status on the settlement in 1979 and the commencement of electricity generation of the first block in 1982. The power plant completed in 1987 has been ensuring the economic prosperity of the town and a good quality of life for its inhabitants.

SUMMARY

The diverse industrial settlements integrated within the fabric of settlements is trying to find their ways and roles in Hungary. Village status causes constraints for settlements, as villages have to face restricted opportunities, decreasing populations, and the challenges posed by the profound transformation of the economy and industry.

The new roles of small settlements are extended to new functions such as locating new industrial activities, which radically alter and transform the type of villages and the lives of the communities (see Gyöngyöshalász). However, such settlements cannot be compared to the settlements built on already existing industries (see Almásfüzítő).

The settlements with new town status rely less and less solely on industrial activities, since they have relocated their previous activities to their newly built industrial parks or ceased their previous activities and commenced new ones. However, these changes have not been positive for the settlements, as their populations have to commute daily for work or are forced to move for living difficulties. The settlements seem to have serious difficulties meeting their strategies and visions for defining their new roles. The term 'industrial village' has no precise and unequivocal definition, it would thus be more accurate to say that there are settlements involved in, inter alia, industrial activities in certain areas of Hungary, but these towns are not covered by the previously applicable definitions.

Industrial towns and industrial settlements have fallen into similar roles, as they have been forced to continuously adapt to changes since 1990. The oldest towns still bear the hallmark of their industrial past, which largely determines their modern-day roles and economies. However, only a few of the 11 towns could retain a part or whole of their local residential populations, thanks to their specific industrial activities and newly defined character (Paks, Százhalombatta, Tiszaújváros, Tatabánya and, in recent years, Dunaújváros). In the context of these towns, the question may arise whether the time of their emergence, their locations, their roles and their special industrial functions or policy decisions relating thereto have determined their statuses that can be considered relatively stable. The question also arises as to what extent they will be exposed to changes generated by policy areas, or whether they will be able to find their own place among other Hungarian towns. Why socialist industrial towns created in the 1940s and 1950s and involved in heavy industries are not included in the list? Can Komló, Ózd and Kazincbarcika ever locate new activities to stabilise the situation of their local residential populations, secure them a proper living and provide prospects for a better life?

The populations of the towns are chiefly made up of members of the working class and people with secondary education with low proportions of people with higher education (only in a few towns, mainly due to their higher education institutions), but the majority of inhabitants in older industrial towns generally have lower levels of education than those of the towns emerged in the 1970s.

Of the 11 industrial towns in Hungary, only one could increase its population in recent years and decades. Százhalombatta has managed to safeguard urban liveability, while continuing to be one of the traditional industrial towns, of which the best proof is the fact that MOL Zrt. that is not in municipal hands still employs more than 50% of people living in the town.

The same only partially holds true for the other towns, the impossibility of the almost full employment of the local residential population in industries thus shed further doubts on the statement that there are so-called traditional industrial settlements in Hungary, which are involved in industries that enable people living in the settlements and their neighbouring areas to earn a living.

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Theories of the voting behaviour in the context of electoral and urban geography

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Abstract

Electoral geography – the analysing of spatial patterns in voting – intends to explore the spatial-specific factors that influence voter decisions, while the theories of voter behaviour generally seek to explain the electoral results in the individual level. In many cases, the disciplines of the electoral geography and voting behaviour analysis are connected due to their research objectives. The two sub-disciplines overlap in many ways, because voter's behaviour is largely influenced by their social environment and daily interactions. This statement is especially true in a highly heterogeneous environment such as metropolitan area, where the population is vulnerable to many different influences.

Based on the above, the aim of this paper is to briefly overview the literature on electoral geography and voting behaviour, and explore its connections with spatial sciences, especially urban geography. Therefore, the first major question of the study is how electoral geography literature has developed, what topics it has focused on, and how these have evolved into voting behaviour theories. The second major question is how different theories are embedded in certain social stratifications, spatial scales and spaces, with special reference to urban areas.

Keywords

Electoral geography, electoral behaviour, urban geography, urban socio-spatial processes

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INTRODUCTION: ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

Electoral geography is a sub-discipline within political geography which integrates scientific results from a wide range of fields (law, political science, history, mathematics, statistics, game theory, public opinion survey, sociology, marketing, social psychology, economics) (HAJDÚ 2006). Its importance increased in at least two waves, first in 1945 and then in 1990, in both cases as a result of the democratization of the world and the extension of universal suffrage and electoral rights (BÉKÉSI 2004).

Its location within political geography is justified by its main objective: the spatiality of voting mechanisms. In the current democracies, the important actors who determine the geopolitical processes in their home country are chosen by the citizen of a given nation (BLACKSELL 2006). Therefore, it is important to examine the mechanism that places these actors in the geopolitical space. Furthermore, the psephology (analysis of elections) and its spatial part is intended to map the relationship between voters and politicians, through analysing public discourse. Consequently, electoral geography can provide information for various disciplines about the spatial factors that explain the decision-making mechanisms of individuals or social groups.

Based on the above, the aim of this paper is to briefly overview the literature on electoral geography and electoral behaviour, and explore its connections with spatial sciences, especially urban geography. The analysis also focuses on the origins, development, and current research direction of electoral geography, keeping focus on spatial explanations of electoral behaviour. As a conclusion of our research, we join the proposition that studying the spatiality of voter behaviour can provide primary information for the study of many other geographical phenomena.

1. DEVELOPMENT AND PARADIGMS OF THE ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY

Electoral geography has existed not only as a sub-disciplinary of science but also as a method of influencing the translation of votes into seats since Governor Elbridge Gerry in 1812, who sought to secure his power with a salamander-shaped constituency (MARTIS 2008). As a result, the most well-known term in electoral geography, gerrymandering, has been created to refer to the result-oriented bounding of constituencies. Nevertheless, the first electoral geography work had to wait for more than 100 years, when André Siegried published his work about West France in 1913, in which he discovered spatial patterns in the election results, which were associated with certain other economic, social, demographic, religious and historical spatial patterns (MEZŐ 2003).

The first electoral works were published in England (KREHBIEL 1916), US (SAUER 1918) and Sweden (TINGSTEN 1937). While the first is a work on spatial patterns and explores their natural, economic, and social causes, the second introduced the concept of gerrymandering into the literature and discusses the manipulated constituency system of the states of Missouri, Kentucky, and Tennessee, preferring to compare electoral boundaries with ethnic maps, the third suggested the importance of the later notion "neighbourhood effect", but this work does not explicitly appear. Compared to the technical and methodological possibilities of these electoral work between 1910 and 1930, when it took weeks or months to work on an electoral map, mapping electoral results with regionalist descriptions and comparing them with already known economic or social characteristics were the maximum performance for electoral geographers of that time.

Subsequently, by the end of the 1940s, electoral geography was a positivist, descriptive and – in the spirit of the time quantitative – initially with French (not separated from electoral sociology) and later Anglo-Saxon dominance (DAVIS 1958, HAJDÚ 1992). This was further escalated in the 1950s as a result of the quantitative revolution, where social geography moved closer to traditional science. However, this was not necessarily true for the political geography. In a book review BERRY (1969) describes the political geography as a moribund backwater, because of forcing the geopolitical perception of the 1930s. In many cases, political geography has not been able to break the old, regionalist view of space as an independent container. Moreover, between the 1950s and the mid-1970s, the electoral geography did not respond most rapidly to the trends of the quantitative revolution too (BURTON 1963). This may be due to that electoral geography was already highly quantitative, so its researchers did not feel the need to improve the methodological and theoretical framework of the quantitative revolution. In addition, apart from geography, other frontier sciences have been criticized for partial discipline. According to ROWLEY's (1969) critique from behavioural science and various social theories, electoral geography in many cases does not use these existing theories in its work (citing to COX's [1968] work).

In response to the critiques, electoral geography has been the leader of reforming political geography since the mid-1970s (JOHNSTON 2001). Peter Taylor contributed to this with the issue of the difference between votes' and seats' ratios (GUDGIN–TAYLOR 1979) and defined the district bounding as a modifiable areal unit problem and proposed this into electoral geographical discourse (TAYLOR–OPENSHAW 1979). He introduced the role of the boundaries in the translation of votes into seats by breaking the container theory of the 1930s by analysing and demonstrating the effects of the boundaries themselves (TAYLOR 1973). Due to the majority electoral system of the Anglo-Saxon world, American and British electoral geographic work in largely focuses on the redistricting (as shown in the three examples above).

However, besides analysing constituencies, many other subjects were covered by electoral geography. According to AGNEW (1990), during the aforementioned recovery period, between 1960 and 1987, electoral geography research focused on four objectives: geography of – (1) electoral behaviour, (2) interpersonal information flow and voting behaviour, (3) electoral systems and (4) political parties. This literature review focuses on publications and research findings of the first two objectives. The last two are difficult to distinguish but their interdependencies are unquestionable. By way of the example, numerous works have already demonstrated how spatiality of voting behaviour influences the bias of the electoral systems and thus the election results (TAYLOR 1973, JOHNSTON 2002).

The scale of the examination of voting behaviour has been constantly changing during this period. The focus was first on the state level then it crawled to the examination of everyday life in four stages. Firstly, from 1965 to 1972, Cox (1969) introduced "neighbourhood effect" into the scientific discourse, which refers to influencing the voter by his/her local social networks (Johnston 1986). Because in this period there is a state controlled and "containerized" modernization view in the political geographic literature, Cox described it as electoral behaviour within national frameworks. Secondly, in the early 1970s, social problems and conflicts also came within the scope of electoral geographers (because of the disintegration of the welfare state), so they wanted to describe and relate electoral behaviour to access to public services (Cox 1973). In the third period, mid1970s, the effect of neo-marxist uneven development was also observed in, for example, Archer–Taylor (1981), which attempts to explain the different electoral spatial patterns in the United States using Wallerstein's World-system theory (voting of the core and peripheral areas in different ways). The last period up to the completion of the 1990 major paper (Johnston et al. 1990), micro-sociological spaces, places played an important role in Agnew's (1985) work, emphasizing the role of the social context in the Scottish National Party support.

Due to the disintegration of the eastern bloc, electoral geography analysis in the 1990s also expanded spatially. The developed world began to be interested in the electoral process within the democracies that emerge from state-socialist systems. For example, a number of electoral geography publications from Hungary appeared in more prestigious English-language journals. Initially, only the electoral results were mapped with minimal interpretation of the spatial processes conducted (Martis et al. 1992, Kovács 1993), and later the Hungarian spatial model of electoral behaviour was created by Kovács–Dingsdale (1998), based on the Lipset–Rokkan (1967) cleavage theory (this will be elaborated in the next section). After the 2000s, the works were published based on the Hungarian election results on constituency-scale (Mészáros et al. 2007) and criticizing the redistricting at 2011 (Kovács–Vida 2015).

One of the current three major trends in electoral geography (Shin 2015) is still an understanding of what and how are votes influenced and whether this is at the local (neighbourhood effect) or at the higher level. This includes research on places that influence electoral outcomes, embedded contexts and scale (Agnew 1996). The other two major trends, the mapping of election results and the geographic dimensions of the translations of votes into seats, appear in current electoral geographic work, partly separate, partly connected.

The recent electoral literature (psephology) has paramount importance where the history does not end in the state of liberal democracy, contrary to Fukuyama (1992), but is under constant attack by autocratic states like Russia and China.[1] Although Gvosdev (2019) believes that this Russian attack – which underlie liberal democracies – is much more a geopolitical rather than an ideological interference, nonetheless, spatiality of recent electoral behaviour research should consider not only localities but also this global context. In addition, the Cambridge Analytica scandal has proven to the general public and researchers that social media is one of the most effective tools for influencing election results from abroad (Reed 2015, Laterza 2018, Terán–Mancera 2019).

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[1] Ignatieff, Michael (2014): *Are the authoritarians winning?* – New York Review of Books July 10. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jul/10/are-authoritarians-winning/ (downloaded: 2019. 06. 09.).

According to Manuel Castells, cyberspace is a corridor between real spaces (MÉSZÁROS 2009). As part of this, social media platforms provide a unique virtual space to connect and provide information to millions or even billions of people. These platforms play an important role in examining the spatiality of voting behaviour, because they provide unprecedented data about social relationships, the evolution of public discourse, and the spread of political information. The cyberspace is a place where everything is digitally documented and stored. However, it is important to note that we get a non-representative picture of the influence of voting behaviour by analysing social media, because not all activities take place on these platforms. Despite this, in most communities and certain age groups, these platforms have become the primary source of information about political events (69% of Americans use social media and 30% of voters actively use Twitter [GROVER et al. 2018]).

A phenomenon of electoral geography and voting behaviour, polarization and its spatial projection has also been demonstrated using information from cyberspace. Polarization occurs when different party voters are ideologically alienated, and the number of centrists decreases (KINSELLA et al. 2015). Geographic polarization is the spatial dimension of this, when like-minded people move into a community, increasing segregation between neighbourhoods (BISHOP–CUSHING 2008). The spatial concept describes a phenomenon similar to the classic neighbourhood effect (JOHNSTON et al. 2000) but extends it somehow. The polarization of political discourse during the 2016 US presidential election was examined on Twitter (GROVER et al. 2018) and the Brexit referendum on Facebook (DEL VICARIO et al. 2017). Both studies found two separate and completely non-communicating echo chambers in social media, belonging to two different political sides and interpreting the same news in a completely different way. Using cyberspace data, CHEN–ROHLA (2018) has shown that after the 2016 presidential election, political polarization has become very high that those family members whose voting for different presidential candidates spent significantly less time on the post-election family event (Thanksgiving). For the geographic polarization, KINSELLA et al. (2019) discovered clear spatial divide between the locations of partisan voters and the policy issue voters in several major cities of US on microscale. The interesting thing about their research is that it compares the spatial results of a referendum on a cultural war issue (same-sex marriage) with party support, and there was a strong relationship between the partisan and policy issue voters. However, one of the limitations of this relationship is that there were some localities where certain voters were more likely to vote differently from partisan expectations.

Electoral geography has recently become more closely related to the connecting disciplines, which describe spatial or social phenomena, draws on quantitative spatial analysis, political economy, and postmodern space theories thus increasing the methodological and theoretical embeddedness of this sub-discipline (LEIB–QUINTON 2011). Electoral geography will never be able to detach itself from the quantitative analysis of results from its objective (election results) (LEWIS 1965), because elections provide abundant data and material on many aspects of society. However, due to the fast processing of data and the reduction of the necessary time, from the examination of social discourse, beyond the production of existing economic, cultural, and social spaces, we can observe the impact on society of the dominance of power and flexible accumulation of the capital. In doing so, electoral geography goes beyond its scope of examining voting as a manifestation of social opinion, but also analysing the discourse that it creates and the reflections on it (NICLEY 2011).

2. THEORIES OF THE VOTING BEHAVIOUR

Beyond the historical and thematic overview of electoral geography, it is necessary to mention the historical changes and major paradigms of voting behaviour that are not necessarily spatial. According to the sociological theory, also called Berelson and Lazarsfeld's model (BERELSON et al. 1954), voters' decision is determined by the voter's social background, ethnicity, religion, family traditions, personality, and attitude to certain issues. Intergroup differences were also discovered based on voter behaviour between those born before and after the Great Depression. Additionally, the importance of family relationships was emphasized when a child assumed the same social status as his or her parents.

After the theory of sociology, an economic-based voting behaviour theory was born that focused on rational human choice (DOWNS 1957). According to this theory, voters have specific goals and they seek them most effectively through the act of voting (or not voting), so it influences them in making their decision. The relationship between the cost of voting and the likelihood of voting benefits is considered. Several critics of the theory have come to light recently, starting with the fact that if voters were to manage the benefits of voting at an individual level, nobody would vote (WILLIAMS 2011). It has also been criticized that a rational decision requires the collection of sufficient information (which is a burden on the time cost of voting), but it is not collected by those who ultimately vote, so their vote becomes irrational (POPKIN 1991).

The interdisciplinary nature of voting behaviour research is supported by the fact that after the sociology and economic theory, a psychological voting behaviour theory of party identification, came from CAMPBELL et al. (1960). Combining the aforementioned two theories, they considered the voters' attitudes to be the basis for various political organizations (because the book is American, it defines specific attitudes toward Democratic and Republican candidates, parties, foreign policy, domestic politics, and so forth.) (WILLIAMS 2011). As a critic for the party identification model, LIPSET–ROKKAN (1967) formulated their own theory, emphasizing the importance of social cleavages. According to them, the positive or negative attitudes described in the party identification model are largely determined by the socio-economic cleavages found in the population of a certain nation. According to this, contradictions such as the place of residence (urban-rural) or the economic class one belongs to (capitalist-worker) are the greatest estimates for the voting behaviour.

In addition, according to many researchers, the mass media influences voting behaviour. The direct effect of mass media is concretized by the two step-flow hypotheses (LAZARSFELD et al. 1948). The theory is that the mass media does not send information directly to voters, but through opinion leaders. ROBINSON (1976) further elaborates on this through the impact of interpersonal networks and the introduction of a level of political awareness. His research in the 1968 presidential election in the USA showed that the more informed a voter is, the less he or she will be influenced by the mass media. If this level reaches a critically low point, the voter will receive information only from the mass media, while in other cases (which means a large majority of voters), information and ideologies will flow continuously from the more informed to the less informed voters. ZALLER (1992) joins this separation by saying that a person who actively participate in political discourses is less likely to be influenced through mass media due to their coherent basic value system. However, the superficial voter has less knowledge and thus cannot reject new information because of inconsistent value system. Thus, not only the mechanism

of interpersonal communication but also the interpretation processes within voters have been mapped within the voting behavioural literature.

In this context, numerous studies point to links between voting behaviour and social capital (PUTNAM 1995, ALESINA – LA FERRARA 2000, 2002). Although social capital was firstly mentioned by Pierre Bourdieu, who appended to his conflict and structuralist class theory beside his cultural and economic capital, in parallel Robert D. Putnam developed his own social capital, specifically derived from an analysis of the American democracy and organized around trust (SIISIÄINEN 2003, FÜZÉR 2016). PUTNAM (1995) sought to explain social capital within voting behaviour, one of its components, participation. According to him, social capital is a common knowledge created through the interaction of those within society, with the existence of it strengthening the cohesion of the society. This leads to a high voter turnout on common issues (and not only in elections). According to his surveys, social interactions and therefore social capital are decreasing, which ultimately, reduces voter participation (PUTNAM 1995, WILLIAMS 2011). This declining component can be linked to the aforementioned higher polarization level of the society.

3. VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN THE URBAN CONTEXT

Electoral geography analyses embedded in different spaces can be a special focus. This is especially true for metropolitan areas where, due to complex spatial processes, there is an extremely diverse inner structure. Therefore, if we accept any of the aforementioned theory of electoral geography or voting behaviour, the explanation of metropolitan votes is a particularly complex issue. Moreover, these spaces are most often characterized by rapid transformation in time and in physical space (such as gentrification) (BOROS et al. 2016), which also has far-reaching consequences for electoral spatial patterns. In our opinion, it is worth examining urban and electoral geographic spatial processes together in such pilot areas. Therefore, in this section we first review the literature on urban spatial structure, and then after the related electoral geography works.

The Chicago School was the first to focus on the spatial structure of the city in the 1920s under the name of urban ecology through developing three models: concentric zone (Burgess and Park) (PARK et al. 1967), sector (Hoyt) (ADAMS 2005) and the multiple nuclei (Harris and Ullman) (HARRIS–ULLMANN 1945). These models have been criticized from the very moment they were introduced due to their schematic and overly simplistic nature. The concept was that spatial structure of social processes was modelled on the tools and rules of ecology and evolution. The researchers of the Chicago School were mistaken to see the city as a spatial construct with free competition between social groups for jobs, opportunities and land, whereas these processes control the inner social spatial structure of cities (KUHLKE 2006).

Closely related (and mathematically supported) to the urban ecological models is the Alonso model of land rent, an improved version that was described by WHEATON (1974), with which the model of urban economics was created. The model predicts the population density, land cost and function at each point of the city. This prediction is calculated from the intersections of the profit and land loss curves. However, this model of mere utility and efficiency of site selection also oversimplifies the spatial structure of the city and does not address possible interests within the city and human factors. The aforesaid models are based on the organic development of society and the self-regulating system of free market processes, so the electoral geographical analysis

based on this perception can be defined as the product of this, based on the existing conditions. Thus, the model of rational choice defined by Downs (1957) is most closely connected to this.

In contrast, Marxist-based political economy and critical geography have deduced a theoretical model of the inner structure of the city from class conflict situations based on the contradictions of capitalism (Gyimesi 2013). The critical theory explaining many spatial structures can be grouped around two major theories: class conflict and capital accumulation. According to the class conflict theory, urban spaces are designed to serve the interests of profit maximization as efficiently as possible. In this sense, the active actors are the capitalists, while the passive "sufferers" of this process are the working class. This changed when workers were able to organize themselves with the labour union, thus suppressing the intention to profit maximize of capital. Due to this, capital left the inner neighbourhoods and urban sprawl began (Kuhlke 2006). Here comes the second theoretical framework, the theory of capital accumulation, which defines the urban structure by flowing the surplus production of capital through the primary, secondary and tertiary circles to maximize profits (Harvey 1978), inter alia with the growth coalitions (Boros 2018). This explains several urbanization phenomena, such as the development of gentrification, suburbanisation and the appearance of gated communities.

The initial studies of urban voting behaviour are located around the spatial phenomenon of suburbanization, both in the westernized country and in Hungary (Jankó–Komornoki 2008, Vasárus–Vida 2014). Research has also been carried out in Great Britain, Canada and the US on the political identity of suburban citizens (Cox 1968, Walks 2005, 2006). On this basis, while inner-cities perform better in left-wing or social-democratic parties or candidates, traditionally right-wing parties have a higher voter support in suburban areas Walks (2006), in his study of the Toronto metropolitan area, concluded that of the many explanations given to this polarization, the two most powerful are the effects of self-selection mechanisms and social interactions. The first one explains segregation by lifestyle choices. Based on this, there is a lifestyle closely related to the suburbs, which is much more typical of the Republicans, and there is a characteristic of inner-city neighbourhoods, which is much more typical of Democratic voters. The author states that the party identification model of Campbell et al. (1960) refers in relation to the identity of voters, because the voter spontaneously chooses a place of residence appropriate to voter's own internal identity (Bishop–Cushing 2008). The second explanation is based on social interactions as it is strongly based on the concept of neighbourhood effect, in which it confirms the escalation of the segregation process.

The next urban phenomenon that may influence voting behaviour is gentrification. Its evolution has been studied from multiple angles, which can take on a variety of approaches from urban renewal to political economy. Starting from the uneven development, Smith (1982) first described the theoretical model of gentrification, in which the most important phenomena were the rent-gap and value-gap which means the gap between the actual capitalized ground rent or value (with the present using) and the potential rent or value (with a higher or better using) (Smith 1987). Renewed neighbourhoods are bringing new and higher-status citizens to the area, and old citizens, who are largely under-educated and economically vulnerable, are often displaced. The effect of this process on voting behaviour was examined by the authors of Knotts–Haspel (2006). In their theoretical review, they argue that some people with a low level of education who live next to a highly educated person (and are in active social interaction with them) are more likely to vote with their neighbour.

However, the claims in the literature are unclear. One theory emphasizes mobilization among old tenants, who as a result of new movers, become closer and therefore more involved in public

debate, as well as become more active participants in political events (OLIVER 1999). However, not everyone agrees as there are those who argue that the insecurity and frustration stemming from gentrification are precisely what diminishes the confidence of voters in democratic institutions and hence their political activity. For example, research in Atlanta has shown that gentrification reduces voter turnout among both newcomers and old residents (KNOTTS–HASPEL 2006).

The appearance of gated communities also has many effects on people living in and around it (KOVÁCS–HEGEDŰS 2014). The effect of gated communities on voting behaviour has also been studied by WALKS (2010). The existence of self-governing communities at some level is also a matter of political and settlement geography, but the voting manifestation of this is worth exploring in electoral geography. The main question was whether people living in a gated community behave differently from others and if they are, is it caused by people from certain social groups or the context of the place itself. To determine this, polling districts with the same demographics, real estate prices and social composition as in the gated community were used as control areas. The study concludes that people in the gated community voted more for the conservative side than for the left. At the same time, the willingness to participate was not significantly lower, but was significantly lower than that of the residents around them. This shows that self-government and partial self-administration turn off people's eyes on larger political issues (WALKS 2010).

To conclude the connection between electoral and urban geography, we would like to present articulated thoughts in a Tel Aviv case study (CHARNEY–MALKINSON 2015). With regard to the Israeli capital, the authors expressed the hope that by mapping the election results (at least every four years, but in some cases more frequently) and by understanding the underlying processes, the city geography itself can provide a good resolution and even the processes of internal transformation. Not only can electoral geography deal with the mapping of voices, but it can serve as a basis and background for urban studies that otherwise have access only to larger-scale, scaled-up information, or to highly detailed, but not representative, qualitative information.

CONCLUSIONS

In many cases, the two sub-disciplines of psephology literature, geography-based electoral geography and behavioural studies-based voting behaviour analyses, are interconnected. This is particularly true in those analyses which are embedded in different spaces and their contexts. Numerous theories have been developed to explain the spatiality and voting behaviour, which at first glance contradict each other. However, in the literature review, we have seen that some theories give stronger, and some give weaker explanations in different scales and spaces. Of course, in theories with non-space, this is true for different social groups, but it is also increasingly spatial because of the geographic polarization.

Thus, the aim of spatiality of voting behaviour analysis is dual, on the one hand, it has to explore the reasons behind the vote as a manifest political expression, and on the other hand, it may provide additional information to the various peer disciplines (urban geography, behavioural studies). By its objective of analysis, elections are the best full-sample polls, which provide information on the entire population at least every four years (even for those who did not vote, as this is a decision). However, with the advancement of cyberspace and exploration exploiting it, electoral information may seem redundant, but these information is perfectly good for validating these highly biased (non-representative) analyses.

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A survey research among employees at a Chinese Company

A Case Study of Incentive Effectiveness on Employee Performance at Suning Corporation

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ABSTRACT

Incentives form an indispensable part in the operations of a company regardless its social and cultural context. In this article I have reviewed different types of incentive schemes. I have conducted a case study with secondary analysis of data about Suning corporation, which is a Chinese retail store network. The research observed that coming up with an executive incentive framework increases the loyalty of the staff at the workplace. The methodology for researching on Suning gives a rational base of the whole incentive process. The description is also dependent on the scientific basis and interpretations based on the logical concepts identified. The principles are related to the tools used in the research as well as the techniques that could be applied in the study. The research reports on the most critical or appropriate methods of study that have been selected to carry out the research.

INTRODUCTION

Suning was incorporated in 1990 of which it grew to become a leader in China's retail sector. The company has a wide range of commodities including consumer electronics, household goods, virtual products, books, daily necessities, and general merchandise. The company was then listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange in July 2007 after being accredited by the stock market due to its performance. The management attached much significance to the company's after sales department as a leading retailer. The firm presently has close to 5000 professionals working as service personnel what have so far contributed to business success. When compared with other multinational firms like Wal-Mart and Tesco, the company's aftersales department is found to have a big room for improvement still. Incentives form an indispensable part in the operations of Suning regardless of the marketplace. In this literature review, we have secured different sections of incentive schemes. The research observed that coming up with an executive incentive framework increases the loyalty of the staff at the workplace.

1. BACKGROUND

A company has several elements giving it opportunities to improve its working environment. Among the features include creating the right name as a company that values its workers. With Suning Commerce as the major research project, the paper analyses the incentive plan for the commerce together with the effects of implementation. The paper analyses the causes of failure of the incentive plan within suning among them being fixed executive price which is not to be adjusted based on the changes of the stock price, high assessment criterion within the strategy transition period and the correlation between the stock price as well as the incentive plan an how it needs to be implemented. Workers being part of the stakeholders also need to be dealt with effectively. The satisfaction of the workers is dependent on the level of motivation which the company needs to consider a priority. In case it happens that the workers are satisfied and highly motivated, the company stands to gain from the outcome. The close connection of the incentive items in based on the company's performance indicates that there is a consistent interest between the management and the company which helps in reducing the stock performance. The relationship helps sunings to reduce the supervision cost, agent risk and to a given extent, retain the talents. The incentive theory states that the higher the incentive level, the more productive the management will be in improving the work presentation thereby leading to a high level of workforce satisfaction. The company through the introduction of talent show and management can help in coming up with a better incentive scheme. However, in such systems, the company has to consider the relevance of the talent and management criteria to the business (RICHARD 2001). The objective of the study is therefore to identify the importance of the incentive scheme, to assess the ideal system of Suning Holdings, Understanding the effectiveness of the incentive system and to provide various recommendations on how to improve the methods for an incentive for the company. The research questions used in the study therefore include:

1. What is the ideal system for an incentive?

2. How effective is the incentive scheme for Sunning?

3. What is the importance of the incentive system?

4. What are the main methods of planning and assessing the incentive process?

2. PROBLEM

Suning in 2010 issued a stock option incentive plan to its workers of which there were 248 backbones who benefited including the company president, vice president, core managers, chain store keepers and other workers. The director and the store keepers however received more of the stock options. The rule of the motivation system needs to be planned in a manner that the business never feels that it is overburdened. The incentive system in Suning is meant to ascertain that there is an actual cost increase to the market if it is not designed expertly. There is a need for maintenance cost by the time the company plans for an incentive system. Suning's management had to allocate adequate funds within the incentive system. The funds were to help in the corroborating and also supporting the incentive requirements within the company. Sunings incentive system was to enable the company create a positive working atmosphere which allows the business to share its wealth with the workers as well as influencing their mindset which creates a confident psycho-somatic level. The motivational theories have earlier recommended that same outcomes and perspectives for the bonus system. The business needs to provide a proper remuneration system supported by the management which also has to include the incentive framework. The presence of competition within the private sector has made Suning incentive system to remain popular among most business entities. Suning commerce provides incentives to the workers through a variety of ways. Among the methods is where the company decides to fix particular amounts after the sales level has been attained. A sound incentive system needs to justify the efforts made by the employee in production. The system was earlier used to attract the workers and also inspire them to endure improving their presentation. Suning has also dedicated a provision of incentives to their workers as they continue to understand the actual company values. In the current business environment, provision of proper incentives has become part of company ethics based on how it is practiced. The company may, however, face different problems as it tries to formulate an ideal and valuable design for the incentives that will ensure that there are mutual benefits to both the company and the workers. The employee's performance assessment acts as one of the significant factors used to determine the incentive system in Sunings. The formulation of the incentive system could, therefore, face challenges based on how it is manipulated on the performance criteria (FUNK 2012). The incentive criteria could give rise to corruption in the company due to the unethical practices by the managers not fulfilling their responsibilities and take advantage of the system to reward their loyal subjects. The principle of the incentive system, however, suggests that the function of each is diverse towards the making of the incentive system and in ensuring that it remains efficient. Within the report, much priority has been to understand the convenience and the different dimensions used for the incentive systems. Much deliberation has also been allocated to planning the paramount motivation system that will enable the business to fulfill the worker's expectations.

The primary significance of the research is that it is intended to deliver an effective outcome concerning improving the systems for incentives within the related corporations. From the research report, the best reward system can be identified in regards to the retail market in which Suning operates. Further, the limitations that may be faced while trying to decide on the best scheme within the customer service department can be resolved thereby making the research more significant in a different section.

The methodology for researching on Suning gives a rational base of the whole incentive process. The description is also dependent on the scientific basis and interpretations based on the logical

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concepts identified. The principles are related to the tools used in the research as well as the techniques that could be applied in the study. The research reports on the most critical or appropriate methods of study that have been selected to carry out the research.

The perspective for the research shows that the study on Suning incentive aims towards the subject matter which is the incentive scheme. The research also offers different scopes of knowledge to help the understanding the topic better. In regards to the current study, two types of philosophies can be applied. The views include interpretive research philosophy whereas the other is positivism research philosophy. Within the positivism viewpoint, the study emphases on the general facts and figures which remain constant globally regardless of the economic conditions (WALLIMAN 2017). There is no possibility of changing into the opinion and viewpoint irrespective of the changing conditions. To get different beliefs, the study can be dependent on the interpretive philosophy. Indulgent in the educational research is therefore essential since it gives the reader a wide range of awareness and intellect in getting deeper into the subject matter. Interpretation of Suning incentives enables the reader to understand and analyze the different possibilities available in the surrounding environment. The most relevant research philosophy for the study is mixed research since the private corporations operate in a vibrant setting of which there is a significant focus on evaluating the changing climate. There also exist more requirements to help in focusing and assessing an appropriate motivation plan that is dependent on diverse situations. The thoughts of different personalities could be evaluated to make a better incentive plan. Therefore, educational research is applied to facilitate the success of the study. The study will stresses on the point of knowledge on incentives in Suning's that needs to be developed based on the empirical facts of observation as well as revealing the actual summary of the research based on the fundamental principles.

The approach used in analysing Suning incentive involves techniques that have been carefully selected and planned. The method is building on the analysis of the secondary information that had earlier been collected. The strategies that can be applied within the study include deductive and inductive research (WALLIMAN 2017). The inductive method of analysis is one in which the researcher gets first-hand information on the event which helps in concluding. The inductive approach facilitates the basis for proposing a new concept. Deductive criteria are one in which the person performing the study is committed to checking the relevance of the situation, concept of the statement. In a deductive approach, the researcher is confined to specific limitations of researching within a given area. The total focus needs to be diverted to the inductive approach to enable the research team to come up with an efficient incentive plan that can be adopted by Suning holdings. With the assistance of inductive criteria, it is possible to spot the best internal working setting having a background incentive plan.

The methodologies that were considered in the study are two types of research techniques; they comprise of qualitative and quantitative methods. The two ways are important in improving the reported value. The nature of the data from the qualitative report indicates that there is no application of the statistical tools in performing the analysis. The qualitative data subjective and the information it depends on is always lengthy. The quantitative research, on the other hand, is related to the adaptation of the statistical tools such there is the use of different soft wares to measure the information collected (PATTEN–NEWHART 2017). The nature of the study, however, calls for a quantitative approach where the information used is objective, and the analytical tools need to be applied in the most appropriate manner.

Through the use of a questionnaire's secondary analysis, a survey involving the collection of data on the incentive system for Suning Company via paper questionnaire and email was used. The number of respondents for the study based on the intended population was 400. However, from the data sampled, there was only 300 valid feedback from the respondents who were finished within the designated timeline. There were no survey data intended to be released to the third parties to help in protecting the privacy of the whole research process (Patten–Newhart 2017).

The data collected was from both primary and secondary sources for materials related to Suning. The primary sources included the use of questionnaire (secondary analysis) whereas the secondary sources included the published material. Based on the literature review, it is evident that six dimensions affect the satisfaction of employees. The aspects can be illustrated as shown in the figure below:

Figure 1 *Illustrating the model for six dimensions*

The design for the questionnaire was originally based on the six hypothetical models of incentive. The first part of performing an empirical analysis is to carry out scientific, statistical analysis to help in understanding the distribution of data based on analysis of Suning. After getting to know the distribution, what followed was understanding the validity of the questionnaire used in data collection in Suning. Conducting a regression analysis on the survey helps in finding out the factors that affect the worker's satisfaction.

The analysis design attracts the questionnaire for operative fulfilment which is extremely embattled due to the reliability and validity. The information is combined with the expansion prominence together with the features of the system adopted by Suning's customer service sector.

The regression analysis performed helps in working out the key issues that influence the customer and employee satisfaction level from the customer service department within Suning Holdings.

To ensure that the study is reliable and valid, collection of data was dependent on the methods as well as the procedure used while sampling the data. The sample size of 400 used is enough to get the relevant information based on the given feedback. The data collected enabled the study to attain the expected conclusion. To ensure that the results gathered are reliable, it is essential to verify that the information collected is from Suning's workforce.

To carry out a valid and authentic report, there is need to have an ethically compliant team that aligns to the requirements of the research. The major ethical issue related to the study of Suning's incentive is having to plagiarize from the secondary data instead of carrying out original research and probably make a comparison. The resources for gathering the data were cited which the online sources used were proved to be having trusted information as noted by the researchers. The data gathered also had to be entered the way it was received to avoid manipulation of the information. The research also tried to be eco-friendly by distributing the questionnaires through email thereby reducing the hustle in data collection.

The research found out that an increase in the wage in Suning has the highest mean whereas the workload possessed the lowest mean. The other variables like the wage income, cultural atmosphere and the nature of the job that one does, bonus, job challenges, interpersonal relationships all play an essential role in determining the satisfaction of a worker. The salary income is significantly correlated with the satisfaction followed by the environment that one is exposed to in Suning.

Colleagues Care And Support		Care from the superiors	Interpersonal Relationship	Member leader relationship	Cultural Atmosphere	Mutual respect among colleagues	Atmosphere for learning
Pearson Correlation	Job Content	−0.02	0.05	0.04	0.16	−0.27	0.03
	Satisfaction	−0.06	−0.07	−0.02	0.05	0.52	0.01
	Job Duties	0.00	0.08	0.07	−0.04	−0.06	−0.04
	Job Competency	−0.02	−0.03	0.03	−0.01	−0.11	−0.11
	Job Identification	−0.01	0.00	−0.04	−0.02	−0.03	−0.08
	Job Challenge	−0.02	−0.06	0.03	−0.23	0.28	−0.06
	Workload	0.00	−0.15	−0.03	−0.21	0.35	−0.10
	Personality Fit	−0.09	0.03	−0.05	0.02	−0.01	−0.07
	Confidence In Work	0.00	−0.04	0.08	−0.02	−0.08	0.08
	Job Autonomy	0.04	−0.07	0.03	−0.02	−0.04	−0.03
	Exert Ones Advantages	0.03	−0.02	0.00	0.07	−0.02	0.07

TABLE 1 *Showing cross correlation*

3. DISCUSSION

In Suning, the incentive feature has gained much prominence in the current past as an aspect of human resource administration as well as in making the workers satisfied and happy. According to MARSCHKE and HEINRICH (2010), the system can be defined as that which motivates the workers to improve their performance on some set of actions and also to enable them to complete the different functions that will allow them to accomplish the company set targets and goals. The human resources act as one of the most valuable company assets that the company can possess since they provide precedence on the steps taken to satisfy the needs to the required extent. The incentive system, therefore, has a vital role to play within the company. The business needs to pay reasonable amounts of incentives to the workers to increase the motivation level and also increase their performance which will increase the personal loyalty and commitment to the organization. It thus implies that in case the company wants to sustain its market for a prolonged duration, and also fulfil the corporate goals, then the best method to use it the incentive system. The system is, therefore, a success factor in the company which can be relied upon. Employees feel more motivated when they are appreciated in monetary terms of which when they are provided with incentives, then they feel like they are part of the company. Therefore, the human resources department needs to develop a proper incentive system to help it in addressing the required skills and attributes needed for the production sector. In this context, the incentive system can be regarded as a procedure used to recognize the workers' efforts to help in fulfilling the company goals as well as the set mission and vision. Whenever a company is not in a position to develop a better remuneration package in terms of incentive, then it will not be in a position to sustain its place in the market for a prolonged period.

The system could also be defined as an approach based on the workers' performance that needs proper assessment. It is therefore through the incentives as noted by MARTIMORT (2009) that the Suning's human resource department can motivate the workers thereby ensuring that the performance is maintained as the organization desires. When the set goals are achieved, then the company will be in a position to ease comfort thereby allowing it to motivate the workers. They further suggest that the incentive system is not an element of production thereby making it possible for the company to survive without the arrangement. In other aspects, the incentive system can be in non-monetary terms. Companies, therefore, need to come up with a scheme that identifies the workers who can be motivated in monetary terms and those who need the non-monetary benefits like through promotions. Need for the incentives systems in the company: In incentive scheme is an essential form of the company's business operations since, in essence, it has a significant influence on business operations. The incentive scheme also plays a role in business existence. The significance of the inventory systems has over time grown by more significant margins thereby doing businesses regardless of the operating market segment to pay attention towards the system. The business success is also dependent on the level of the employee motivation thereby making incentive an effective way of ensuring business success. The system is thus the best method of encouraging the workforce thereby increasing the level of loyalty to the company. The scheme also motivates the workers to push and provide themselves with a challenge which in turn results in higher productivity which in the long run translates to increased earnings to the business. The employees work while having in mind that the better the performance, the more the pay which drives them to continue working and giving quality output for a given period (LI 2016).

The significance of incentives can also be improved by promoting working as a team among the employees. Teamwork is essential for the company's success since it is mostly dependent on the level of collaboration. Through the incorporation of different employee incentive programs, the company management is in a position to give the workers motivation to work in other teams and also make a contribution to attaining the organizational goals and objectives. Provision of group incentives can also help in motivating presentation and nurturing the organization within the company. It also implies that the workers will have to provide their task inputs at hand thereby creating a group founded setting within the workplace. Mason and Watts (2010) observe that teamwork helps the business to increase effective performance thus maintaining the brand image of the firm. In other instances, peer pressure can act as a motivation for excellent individual performance. Teamwork makes the process of operating in the market much more straightforward and also more effective since the company mission, vision, goals, and objectives are achieved in the required time.

Incentives also act as a morale booster to the workers thereby increasing the workers' job satisfaction level. The business needs to take steps necessary to help it in boosting the workers' morale thus ensuring that they remain committed to the increasing production and attaining the company goals. There is a straight and constructive correlation between the employees work efforts and the organizations' revenue. Whenever there is high morale among the workers, the company's turnover is reduced which also will have an impact on the business market performance, operations, and its existence (Lewis–Smoke 2017). The cost of signing and that of drilling the new workers is also reduced immensely which in turn may help the business to function better due to the reduction of the expenses and in the long run, attain the intended objectives.

The programs are also of importance to the company since they immensely affect the business delivery system and the service quality. When the workers are given the right incentive system, they are in a position to corporate at work thereby increasing the quality of products and service as well as the delivery services. The situation necessitates the need to offer the workers a better compensation scheme which will motivate then work towards the attainment of the business goals.

An ideal incentive system: The company needs to have a proper incentive plan that will help in improving the general employee performance within the workplace. Several motivation systems and methods have been established by different corporations to assist in achieving employee satisfaction level. Among the schemes include group incentive schemes or special incentives. The business, therefore, needs to compare functions with the available incentives then select the one that best suits its performance. The opportunities will help the company to emphasize the features thereby extending its existence by a significant margin. The incentive plan that can be recommended in such a scenario is the individual scheme which has differential piece rate plans, Gantt Task, and Bonus Plan; Emerson Efficiency Plan, Rowan Premium Plan; and Halsey Premium Plan (Degerstrom 2018). The piece rate plan is the best out of all the projects since it has an effective incentive scheme. Piece rate plan was developed by F. W. Taylor who was the father of scientific administration which is still applicable to the present organisation operations. Piece rate plan is beneficial to the occupational initiatives mainly since it mostly emphases on the employees' output. Within the system, the business has to follow the notion of two-piece work rates whereby one is has a higher price for determining the employee wage rate for the workforce attaining the company standards whereas the other is for the ones who are not in a position to achieve the set benchmark. It makes it possible to draw a clear distinction between the workers who have contributed towards the company goals and those who could not manage to attain the standards.

The differentiation among the workers can help in motivating the workers who do not reach the set goals and benchmarks to identify the areas and sections of improvement that will enable them to catch up with the rest. The approach is, but it eventually helps the organization in enhancing the employees' performance. When the system is applied in the right manner, it may help the business to attain positive results in return apart from prolonging its market existence. The company may also be in a position to achieve the set goals and objectives since the production methods have been made simpler. It is however not easy for the corporations in the service business to advance the work morals then put them into practice within the place of work since system becomes difficult to use after most of the workers attain the set standards which makes it unsustainable to the firm. The situation may make it difficult for the firm to survive in the market for a considerable period thereby making goal fulfillment a challenge. There are also no specific guidelines measuring the working standards in the firm making it challenging to the company to apply the incentive system. Other studies according to PEKKANEN et al. (2006) contrasts by suggesting that regardless of the sector one or industry may be operating in, determination of the standards is always an easy assignment. Pekkanen et al. support the research by providing examples that within the service industry like the hotels and restaurants, the rules of service is evident based on the time taken by a worker on a particular customer's table. Better performance in such a scenario, therefore, can be awarded to the employees who are in a position to deliver faster service to the customers whereas those who are slow are regarded to be performing poorly. Within the manufacturing environment, the companies' set benchmarks depending on the manufactured machinery parts within a given time frame. In case a workers productivity is high, then he is considered to be performing well and in a position to meet the company set standards. The employees conduct therefore needs to be measured and also evaluated through keeping in mind the different facets like the equipment's, raw materials available or the consumed time during production. An individual's performance, therefore, needs proper assessment in a holistic manner that would take into account the factors like to market forces.

In the group incentive system, the worker's performance is evaluated based on how effective they work as a team. Teamwork is one of the best methods of enhancing performance thereby helping the employees attain the organizational goals as they collaborate in the assignments given. However, according to BALLWIESER and et al. (2012), in a teamwork setting it becomes challenging to monitor and also assess the performances based on the individuals since there is no set manner to determine the individual performance. In such a way, it becomes challenging to reward group work to particular persons. The management may face difficulties in trying to assess the incentive scheme to be given to the workers based on such group work assignment.

There also exist other types of incentive systems like the co-partnership, profit sharing among others of which in profit sharing, the business shares the gains with the workers in the form of incentives. The method is significant since it encourages the workers to be loyal to the market and also at the workplace. Loyal staff always work towards attaining the company set objectives. According to BALLWIESER and et al. (2012), if the Suning distributes the gains earned over a given duration, it may eventually have decreased earnings. Stock option for the incetive started in 1950s but was adopted in China in 1980s. Such a scenario may influence the business flow of work within the operating environment since the company will have reduced financial resources thereby impacting the long term goals and objectives. However, profit share remains the best way to motivate the staff which increases their loyalty and determination at the workplace. The approach encourages the workers to give their best in terms of performance which in the long run benefits the company through more earnings and profits.

Limitation of the study

The major limitation as collected from the research is secondary analysis of already existing data. Another limitation that the research could not take into account the knowledge on the interview situations to approach the employees and retrieving information from them (HANCOCK–ALGOZZINE 2017). The employees in Suning were not willing to share the data with the team thereby limiting data collection. Getting people with respect and conduct during the research was also a problem. The study was carried during Suning working hours thus making it a challenge to get the respondents since most of them were busy with the assigned responsibilities at work. Most of the respondents were from the company thereby making it a challenge to survey during the regular working hours.

CONCLUSION

The company's primary aim is to operate for the benefit of the stakeholders' including the employees. The workers play a significant role in handling and propelling the company operations. Therefore, satisfying the needs of the customers' needs to remain a primary goal of the business and it needs to be treated as an issue of priority. The incentive scheme is one of the significant motivation channels that the company has to factor. The incentive can be treated like a new figure that the company has to share with its workers. The bonus system helps in creating a positive relationship between the workers and the management. Therefore, the creation of a constructive and outstanding remuneration structure can help the company in delivering the performance from the workers thereby increasing the net returns. According to the theory of Herzberg, incentive theory needs to be one that provides proper remuneration to the employees.

There are specific issues that could be looked at by the organizations while detailing a perfect and gainful impetus plan. The evaluation of the performance of representatives is one of the significant issues that could be treated as a test to the motivator framework. The development of a motivating force framework could also face challenges related to controlling within the performance framework. It could likewise bring forth debasement and dishonest exercises if the chiefs are not satisfying their duties. In this manner, the standards of a motivation theory propose that the job of every single individual is massive in making the motivator framework viable and proficient. Incentives, therefore, have a role to play in the business progress thereby promoting the company to design a better method to help in boosting the system When a company intends to sustain its position within the market for a more extended period as it meets the corporate goals, then it needs not to look further than the incentives.

The incentive scheme is a good motivator for the employees that enables them to give themselves targets and goals related to productivity. The system acts as a morale booster whenever the production levels go down thereby justifying the need for having the scheme. When the morale is increased, then it is possible to have the employee's satisfaction level also increasing thereby increasing productivity. The system also serves as a way of ensuring that the company retains its productive employees. The workers will not have to search for employment elsewhere if the company rewards their efforts handsomely. Thorough applying interpretive research in the study, the company is in apposition of adopting the empirical thoughts realized from the fieldwork to help

it in improving the working relations with the staff. The team concentrates more on the inductive method to assist in getting a viable solution for Suning Holdings. The approach makes it easier to observe the best way to operate in the external environment while having in mind the context of a bonus plan. The research was conducted in a quantitative approach where the study incorporated a piece of objective information. The collected data was both from secondary sources and primary sources thereby making it easy to analyse the outcome. The variables that were used for the study consisted of the wage income, wage increase, the content of the job, cultural atmosphere, the bonus, the challenges faced in the working environment, interpersonal relationship influence and the level of praise all of which play a part in guaranteeing that the staff gets motivated and also satisfied. It thus implies that motivation is not only through monetary benefit since there are also aspects of the non-monetary factor playing a part in the influence. The outcome of the study, therefore, aligns with Maslow's hierarchy theory. The theory suggests that it is not possible to motivate human beings from similar vigour since people have dissimilar desires. The incentive program to be designed in Suning holdings, therefore, should appear in a way that demonstrates both the fiscal and non-monetary aspects.

Findings

1. Suning Holdings needs to select from different incentive schemes highlighted like the company incentive plan, individual or even group incentive plan based on the set objectives.

2. The company should come up with a performance matrix tool that has to incorporate it in the remuneration scheme for the employee incentive structure. The project can be relevant to the company in avoiding conflicts in the reward system.

3. The incentive system should not be biased. It needs to be both monetary and non-monetary for all the staff to increase the level of morale.

4. Suning should also divert more of attention on the praise and commendation, cultural atmosphere, wage income, challenges experienced at the workplace, salary increase, and interpersonal relationship as it tries to come up with a new design for incentive.

5. The scheme needs to be purely dependent on work performance and not on the employee's position.

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Jihadist war
or a challenge of disintegration?[1]

Empirical contributions to the understanding
of the effective European export of terrorism by ISIS

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
ABSTRACT

In this paper we introduce some relevant research results about the role of social embeddedness and social resources in the sphere of social conflicts and violence. In accordance with the actual state of the investigation process the outcomes presented in this analysis are focusing on the activities of the so called 'Islamic State' or ISIS – considered to be a rather effective terrorism exporter recently. After briefly outlining the broader – global – context of terrorist organizations, the particular characteristics of the activities of ISIS and some elements of the conceptual frame, the study highlights empirically two potential explaining factors of the success of the terrorist organization. On the one hand the influencing network – primarily linked to the cyber sphere – of the Islamic State is explored, demonstrating a notable focus on the developed countries of Europe. On the other hand the paper summarizes the main conclusions from a case study on the recruitment base of the militants in Brussels of the terrorist organization investigating the relationship between the territorial distribution of the ISIS foreign fighters in city and the extent of segregation of the Islamic population in the different districts, including also certain socio-demographic factors to shed light on the significance of the broader – unfavourable – social context.

KEYWORDS

social embeddedness, terrorism, marginalisation, disintegration, segregation

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INTRODUCTION[2]

By now it is perhaps no exaggeration that the Islamic State has revolutionized the operation of the global terrorism market[3]. It is not necessarily the case that it has simply introduced new processes[4] in using this kind of violence; however, a remarkable part of its activities has received significant, widespread public attention, and the operations which it has carried out or which have been linked to it have been highly visible indeed. The paper briefly outlines the main findings of research on a global cooperation network among terrorist organisations and the related results on Islamic State activities. It also covers preliminary results from a new phase of ongoing research, based on the foregoing, in which – potential – factors behind the exceptional success of ISIS are examined more closely. Focus is placed on the operation of two mechanisms in particular: (1) the – considered to be – key element of *influence,* or propaganda, in which the organisation engages consciously, as well as a *personal network,* which facilitates the process of persuasion and plays an *intermediary* role between the Islamic State and its sympathisers, actually its potential "soldiers", who tend to be distant geographically; and (2) the significance of *marginalisation* stemming from the deprived socio-economic conditions in *segregated communities* and the role of the processes of *disintegration* behind the effective mobilizing potential of ISIS. The paper closes with a review and interpretation of findings from the analysis and a suggestion of possible further directions in the research.

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[2] This paper is a written, extended version of conference contributions presented recently at numerous scientific events. I am grateful for the comments and critical remarks of several conference participants.

[3] See TÁLAS (2006. 8) and BENMELECH–KLOR (2016. 2–3) on terrorism interpreted as a global market operating on the basis of a type of principle of *demand* and *supply* with its own actors.

[4] See BESENYŐ 2015.

1. The Islamic State's hybrid cooperation network

In an earlier phase of our research – which primarily examined cooperation networks between terrorist organisations[5] – our attention was drawn to the outstanding position of the Islamic State. With attacks carried out through cooperation between terrorist groups within a developing global network, ISIS has occupied a leading position, particularly in the light of the fact that as a new organisation it has not been on the terrorism market for long *(Graph 1):* indeed, it falls within the elite group with the highest number of ties to other terrorist groups. Based on the data, from among the 14 terrorist groups in this top category, the Islamic State occupies the end of the mid-range, surpassing al-Qaida, for example, and following close behind Hamas *(Figure 1).* In the light of this, in the next part of the analysis, we focussed on ISIS activity with particular interest and drew new empirical conclusions on the features of operations conducted by the organisation[6].

Regarding the extraordinarily widespread and diverse activities – which have occurred in the most visible form in Western European attacks[7] – we argue that a *unique organisational pattern* may lie behind these activities, although the pattern is not entirely new. In terms of the social dimension, we interpret this phenomenon as a terrorist operation built on a kind of *tertiary group membership* (Balogh 2017a. 61–62); the point of which is to be capable of indirectly winning over and

Graph 1 *Islamic State within the global operative cooperation network of terrorist organisations* (Source: Balogh 2017a. 57)

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[5] For more details, see Balogh 2017b.

[6] For more details, see Balogh 2017a.

[7] However, this is by no means the only region in which this presents a significant problem (Marone 2018).

FIGURE 1 *Islamic State and other cooperative terrorist organisations with high number of ties* (Source: BALOGH 2017b. 651)

mobilizing particular perpetrators in a manner characteristic of the operation of tertiary groups[8] – typically through the perception of symbolic solidarity or ties, not through the development of actual, direct social embeddedness.

Another development of the research is that the Islamic State has used the means discussed above to develop or expand its cooperation network with extraordinary success, thus forming a unique and considerably complex pattern *(Graph 2)*. The network structure taking shape around ISIS might be considered uniquely *complex* in the sense that it is tied to numerous other terrorist groups with which it has conducted joint operations. These ties have been multiple in more than one case; that is, they have led to repeated joint operations. Further, we interpret the ISIS cooperation network as *mixed* or *hybrid,* since it involves formal organisations, terrorist groups and individual perpetrators as well as informal players and other individuals outside any official terrorist group (BALOGH 2019).

Based on the results from calculations conducted as part of the data analysis, it is clear that this particular cooperative form of carrying out terrorist operations, i.e. this particular organisational pattern, lends the Islamic State extraordinary efficacy – a relatively high rate of success and a relatively high average number of casualties in attacks (BALOGH 2017a. 63–64).

In the continuation of the research, we aim to ascertain – empirically, to the extent possible – the factors behind the export of terrorism on the part of ISIS, which has proved to be so extraordinarily effective. In what follows, we outline the preliminary results of this new phase of the research.

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[8] See PUTNAM (2000. 156.).

GRAPH 2 *Hybrid cooperation network of the Islamic State* (Source: BALOGH 2017a. 63)

We focus on two mechanisms which might be assumed to play a decisive role: (1) the conscious and targeted influence on the part of the Islamic State, more specifically, the diffuse network of supportive individuals, which is related and – to a significant extent – complementary; and (2) the broader social background to the ISIS recruitment of foreign fighters with its clear large-scale mobilizing capacity. This broader social background is investigated as a particular consequence of *social exclusion* and *disintegration,* or territorial *segregation.*

2. DATA ANALYSES

2.1. "Developed Europe" in the crossfire of radicalization – influence and propaganda

Radicalization can be seen as the central element behind the European activities effectively undertaken by the Islamic State. A number of analyses are in relative agreement that with the conscious (combined) use of its many channels of communication and persuasion, the organisation is capable of producing and transmitting propaganda[9] suited to spreading its ideological influence – solely by virtual means as well[10] – to areas not under direct ISIS control.

This analysis shows that radicalization is likewise a key element. We assume that from among the factors behind the "success" of ISIS, the strong *social embeddedness*[11] – which conveys

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[9] See WEISS–HASSAN 2015. 202–207, BESENYŐ–PRANTNER–SPEIDL–VOGEL 2016. 156–169, and PRANTNER 2016. 104–107.

[10] One research finding represents an excellent illustration of the problem: an overwhelming majority of those convicted or suspected of criminal activity in the United States who can be tied to the Islamic State watch ISIS propaganda videos ('THE EGLYPH' 2018. 2).

[11] See GRANOVETTER 1991, 2006 on the matter of social embeddedness.

the aims and world view represented by the organisation to interested parties and potentially the means by which they may be achieved – is of particular significance. We would add that this process of persuasion and mobilization does not only take place exclusively – or perhaps even primarily – in virtual space, although the options provided by the Internet may doubtless have proved to be an outstandingly effective tool. However, it is important to stress the *human factor* – the intermediaries – behind these processes that *create* a live *connection* – in the strict sense of the word as well – between the extremist groups physically operating in distant locations and the terrorist organisations or their sympathisers. The brief analysis below[12] aims, among other things, to illustrate the Islamic State's capacity to influence and – in a broader sense – that of the related world of ideas organised around a Muslim religious background[13] within the context of developed European countries.

GRAPH 3 *European network of extremist Islamist communicators* (Source: Author's compilation)[14]

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[12] We have gleaned the data for the analysis presented in this paper from the dataset collected and made available on the Counter Extremism Project website (https://www.counterextremism.com/), and we have organised them within a unified database. In developing the database, we took into account individuals engaged in activities in Western Europe. Further, we did not restrict the selection to individuals tied to the Islamic State. Therefore, the database covers seven countries and a total of 22 propagandists, recruiters, instigators and influencers (reflecting the state of affairs on 31 October 2018).

[13] More precisely, the world of ideas that features – often selectively – a Muslim religious background primarily in line with the ideological aims of a particular organisation (BESENYŐ–PRANTNER–SPEIDL–VOGEL 2016. 99–108, 120–133).

[14] The propagandists, recruiters, instigators and influencers tied directly to ISIS are marked with red nodes.

Based on the data collected, a picture begins to form of a group of extremists basically in the Western region of Europe *(Graph 3)*. We found a total of seven countries in Europe which were affected by this form of persuasion; that is, at least one person was identified whose activities were somehow tied to expressions of this world of extreme ideas. Based on the data, most of the propagandists, recruiters, instigators and influencers (a total of 13) were located in the United Kingdom, where the number of extremists not tied to the Islamic State is relatively high *(Table 1)*. Considerably fewer could be found in Belgium and France, countries geographically close to the United Kingdom, and in Austria: a total of two people each in the records for the research project; in those places, the role of the Islamic State is nearly an exclusive one. The Scandinavian nations are among the least affected countries, with the presence of no more than one individual identified as facilitating radicalization each; here all three extremists operate under ISIS authority.

	number of extremist communicators (p.)	number of ISIS-linked extremist communicators (p.)
United Kingdom	13	7
Belgium	2	1
Austria	2	2
France	2	2
Norway	1	1
Sweden	1	1
Denmark	1	1
Total	22	15

TABLE 1 *Number of extremist Islamist communicators by country and their ISIS ties* (Source: Author's compilation)

2.2. Jihadist nests in Brussels: segregation and marginalization

We conducted a secondary analysis using the data on ISIS foreign fighters broken down by Brussels districts to carry out an empirical study of the role of the presumed factors of segregation and disintegration behind the effective mobilizing capacity on the part of the Islamic State.

In analysing the differences between districts in the recruitment base for ISIS foreign fighters the original statistical values[15] were converted to percentages so that like units would make the demonstrated results easier to interpret. Regarding the basic distribution of the data obtained in this manner *(Table 2),* the highest rate of volunteers travelling to Islamic State-controlled regions is 23%, and there are naturally districts in which there is not even one foreign fighter on record. The average rate of foreign fighters in all 19 districts is 5.3%, and the differences

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[15] The data analysed here is derived partly from sources published in other studies (VLIERDEN 2016. 60, KIS-BENEDEK 2017. 109), which were supplemented with own data collection using official Brussels statistics (http://statistics.brussels/en?set_language=en).

in the values are considerably large – the second largest among the factors under examination – reflected by a standard deviation of 7.5. The differences are less marked for each district as regards the proportion of the Muslim population, which might be seen as the primary explanatory factor for ISIS fighters from Brussels. This is clear in the standard deviation (6.05) for the average, which is 5.3 per cent as well. However, it is also important to note that the lowest proportion of Muslims stands around 0.36% and that the district with the largest Muslim population fails to reach a value of one-fifth (19.26%).

Indicators	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Distribution of ISIS foreign fighters (%)	5,263	7,554	0,00	23,86
Estimated proportion of Muslims (%)	5,263	6,051	0,36	19,26
Rate of registered unemployment (%)	5,263	4,391	1,34	16,04
Share of higher education graduates (%)	36,200	11,224	20,07	55,86
Number of districts (N =)	19	19	19	19

TABLE 2 *Main indicators for districts under examination calculated on basis of relative values* (Source: Author's calculations and compilation)

In terms of the aims of the analysis, a particularly important indicator of the composition of the city's population is the rate of job seekers in individual districts. The average value is also in agreement with those for the previous two variables. However, importantly, the smallest difference for this key labour market indicator has been observed in the area under examination: the rate of registered job seekers is 1.34% in the district with the most favourable conditions, but it is 16% in the district characterised by the highest rate of job seekers. This is clearly expressed in the low value for the standard deviation (4.39). Another type of data on the composition of the city's population which we will deal with is the rate of higher education (university) graduates. In terms of the fundamental indicators obtained, there is a considerable difference: an average of somewhat more than a third (36.2%; SD = 11.22) of the entire city population is university-educated. Even in the district in which the rate of university graduates is the lowest, it is one-fifth of the population (20.07%), while there is also a district where the majority of the population (55.86%) has graduated from university.

In what follows, we use the data above to ascertain (1) the extent to which we find empirical confirmation for the assumption that the territorial distribution of foreign fighters follows that of the Muslim population and (2) the role played by the socio-economic context in the spatial pattern of the recruitment base. With regard to the first aim here, a clearly marked pattern emerges: a correlation between the proportions of fighters from Brussels travelling to Islamic State-controlled regions and the estimated proportions of the Muslim population in the city *(Figure 2)*. The connection is positive; that is, in terms of the pattern, the higher the estimated proportion of the Muslim population in a particular district, the higher the proportion of ISIS foreign fighters. However,

it should be stressed that in the majority of the districts the proportion of foreign fighters and the estimated proportion of Muslims are typically low – both being below 5 per cent[16] – with only a few areas with higher values for both factors. This pattern may suggest the presence of a sort of *segregation process.* All in all, with a correlational coefficient of 0.936, it is clear that there is a strong, positive, even statistically significant connection (p = 0.000) between the distribution of ISIS fighters from Brussels and the areas of residence of the Muslim population within that city *(Table 3).*


FIGURE 2 *Positive connection between estimated proportion of Muslims and proportion of ISIS foreign fighters* (Source: Author's compilation)

However, another correlation that must be stressed is one that – by its very nature – points to the presence of the pattern of segregation. It is the connection between the proportion by district of Brussels residents travelling to Islamic State-controlled regions and territorial features of the labour market *(Figure 3):* based on the data, it seems that the less favourable the employment situation in a particular district, the higher the proportion of fighters for the terrorist organisation. The connection is statistically significant in this case as well; with a value of 0.901, it is characterised by a significant correlational coefficient (p = 0.000) *(Table 3).*

A connection similar to the previous one points to the decisive role of the broader socio-economic composition with regard to the rate of university graduates *(Figure 4).* Based on the data, it appears that the presence of ISIS foreign fighters is smaller in districts characterised by relatively favourable educational attainment. Specifically, there are certain districts in which the low rate of university graduates is associated with a high proportion of foreign fighters; however, almost as many districts

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[16] However, a positive correlation between the two variables appears to be taking shape in this segment of the observation units as well.

Correlation coefficients (c.c.)		Estimated proportion of Muslims (%)	Rate of registered unemployed (%)	Share of higher education graduates (%)
Share of ISIS foreign fighters (%)	c.c.	0,936	0,901	−0,492
	p	0,000	0,000	0,032
	N	19	19	19
Estimated proportion of Muslims (%)	c.c.		0,975	−0,491
	p		0,000	0,033
	N		19	19
Rate of registered unemployed (%)	c.c.			−0,393
	p			0,096
	N			19

TABLE 3 *Correlational coefficients between distribution of Islamic State foreign fighters and other socio-economic indicators on basis of data on Brussels districts* (Source: Author's calculations and compilation)


FIGURE 3 *Positive correlation between the rate of registered unemployed and the proportion of ISIS foreign fighters* (Source: Author's compilation)

can be pointed to in which the values of both variables are low. This less marked, less clear pattern is also manifested inasmuch as the present indicator for educational attainment shows a much lower statistical connection to the proportion of Belgian fighters travelling to Islamic State-controlled regions: the value of the correlational coefficient between the variables under examination is –0.492, which is far lower than in the case of the previous two factors. However, it might be considered an inverse connection insofar as the link is statistically significant (p = 0.032) in this case as well *(Table 3)*.


FIGURE 4 *Negative correlation between rate of university graduates and proportion of ISIS foreign fighters* (Source: Author's compilation)

Based on the results from data on the districts of Brussels, the proportion of ISIS foreign fighters shows a strong, positive correlation with the estimated proportion of Muslims and the relative frequency of registered unemployment. Further, a significant negative connection exists with the rate of university graduates. In other words, we see the clear emergence of a basic relation involving areas populated in high proportions by Muslims proving to be relatively significant recruitment bases for foreign fighters for the Islamic State. At the same time, results obtained with regard to indicators on the socio-economic environment point to the fact that socio-economic background should not be considered negligible either: areas characterised by more favourable labour market options and educational attainment are less likely to produce foreign fighters. This means that behind the differences between areas in terms of proportions of residents headed for Islamic State-controlled regions lie additional, significant factors tied to broader dimensions of the social context and certain segregation processes along with Muslim ancestry; thus the phenomenon is not exclusively – and perhaps not even primarily – a matter of ancestry. It is in light

of this that we examine the relation between the presence of a Muslim population and a deprived socio-economic environment, that is, the phenomenon of areal marginalization and segregation.

An extraordinarily strong relationship can be demonstrated between the estimated proportion of the Muslim population and features of the labour market, which can be characterised as follows: the higher the proportion of registered job seekers, the higher the share of residents of Muslim ancestry in a particular district *(Figure 5)*. There is a positive correlation of 0.975 between the variables, which is statistically significant as well (p = 0.000). In the light of this, it seems therefore that unfavourable labour market trends tied to the presence of a higher proportion of Muslims in the population are present.

A similar situation becomes clear in educational attainment insofar as university graduates are less common in districts where the estimated proportion of Muslims is relatively high *(Figure 5)*. In other words, the higher the proportion of Muslims in the population of a particular district, the smaller the layer of university-educated people there. The direction of the relation of these variables is therefore negative; however, the strength of the relation is less than that for the previous indicator: the correlational coefficient is –0.491, indicating a statistically significant (p = 0.033) linear relationship *(Table 3)*. This also means that the relationship between this dimension of the socio-economic background and the ancestry group is not incidental or random: the lack of high educational attainment is characteristic of the high proportion of Muslims among the population[17].


FIGURE 5 *Correlation between estimated proportion of Muslim population and other socio-economic indicators* (Source: Author's compilation)

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[17] It might be added here that a connection appears in the trend between the criteria for the socio-economic dimensions (with a correlational coefficient of –0.393); however, this negative trend cannot be seen as significant (p = 0.096) in the present analysis – or in statistical analyses in sociology generally – taking into account the decision-making level applied (α = 0.05).

It therefore seems that socio-economic conditions are tied to the composition of the districts by ancestry and that a picture emerges that suggests a link between deprived socio-economic conditions and the presence of a Muslim population. The question then arises whether the high proportion of foreign ISIS fighters produced stems exclusively from the proportion of the Muslim population within that of particular districts or whether the phenomenon can be traced back to a broader, more complex combination of factors: the presence of segregated communities whose members' ancestry and deprived socio-economic status emerge jointly.

In what follows, we apply two approaches to investigate this assumption statistically. First, we make further use of the correlation calculation method to investigate how the originally strong link between the proportion of those leaving the city for Islamic State-controlled regions and the estimated share of the Muslim population changes with the inclusion of variables that arise from the broader social context. Beyond a study of the partial correlational coefficients as part of the other approach based on the values of socio-economic variables, we separate those districts which are collectively characterised by deprived socio-economic conditions and thus we use this grouping – of actual segregated districts[18] – to conduct an examination, district by district, of the original correlation between the capacity to produce foreign fighters and the estimated proportion of the Muslim population.

The strong, positive and statistically significant correlation coefficient (= 0.936; p = 0.000) between estimates for the proportion of Muslims in the population calculated at the level of the Brussels districts and the distribution of foreign ISIS fighters decreases significantly once data for registered unemployment is included as a controlled variable in the relation. The partial correlational coefficient – i.e. that which is also considered as playing the role of controlled variable in the connection and essentially eliminates it – continues to be positive (0.594) and statistically significant (p = 0.009), although low in value *(Table 4)*. In other words, it seems that if we take into account the labour market differences between the districts, the correlation between the proportion of the Muslim population and that of foreign fighters travelling to Islamic State-controlled regions is demonstrably less marked: the strength of the relation between the two criteria drops by over 0.3. This dimension of the deprived socio-economic environment therefore causes the result for the original calculation on ancestry to drop by that much – it does not place it in brackets and it does not eliminate the correlation between the estimated proportion of Muslims and the proportion of outbound ISIS fighters. However, it reflects the likely role of this unique phenomenon of the socio-economic background.

Educational attainment plays less of a marked role: it does not alter the original correlation substantially as a controlled variable in any respect. Only a slight reduction can be measured in the case of the partial correlational coefficient (0.916), and the significance of this estimate (p = 0.000) produces no change *(Table 4)*. The differences shown in educational attainment

[18] Segregated districts were determined by separating the districts with below- or above-average values both with regard to registered unemployment and rate of university graduates. Of those districts, we considered areas marked by the least favourable values for both variables – above-average registered unemployment and below-average rate of university graduates. Then we applied this categorization, which involved a total of four districts distinguished on the basis of the criteria above, to the data in the form of binary variables.

by city district therefore do not prove decisive as a background factor; the correlation between the distribution of the Muslim population and the capacity to produce ISIS foreign fighters does not alter this dimension of the social context.

If we consider both socio-economic factors as factors in the totality of the broader social context of the phenomenon under examination and do the calculations accordingly, we arrive at a fundamentally similar result. The statistical correlation between the estimated proportion of Muslims within each district and the proportion of the population successfully mobilized by the Islamic State is still demonstrable ($p = 0.034$). However, it shows a considerably weaker relationship, with a partial correlational coefficient of 0.516, if the marked link between composition by ancestry and proportion of foreign fighters is reduced by 0.42 within the totality of factors tied to social composition and the labour market environment *(Table 4)*.

(Partial) correlation coefficients ([p.]c.c.)		Estimated proportion of Muslims (%)	Estimated proportion of Muslims (%)	Estimated proportion of Muslims (%)
Share of ISIS foreign fighters (%)	c.c.	0,936	0,936	0,936
	p	0,000	0,000	0,000
	N	19	19	19
Share of ISIS foreign fighters (%)	p.c.c.	0,594	0,916	0,516
	p	0,000	0,000	0,034
	N	19	19	19
Control variables				
Rate of registered unemployed (%)		+	−	+
Share of higher education graduates (%)		−	+	+

TABLE 4 *Control variable calculation of connection between estimated proportion of Muslims and proportion of foreign ISIS fighters* (Source: Author's calculations)

The findings here therefore at least partly appear to support the assumption that deprived socio-economic conditions play a likewise significant role in the developing pattern of fighter recruitment. That is, the proportion of the Muslim population as an explanatory factor behind that of foreign ISIS fighters per district proves to be less decisive if we consider the potential socio-economic difficulties characteristic of a particular district, i.e. a segregated locality. These difficulties clearly contribute to the development of the proportion of foreign fighters under examination inasmuch as they reduce the demonstrable relationship with the composition by ancestry.

We can assume from the foregoing that districts characterised by deprived socio-economic conditions serve as bases for targeted recruitment of ISIS foreign fighters. Based on the concurrent

presence of deprived conditions in the segregated districts[19], a particular link indeed forms in the distribution between Muslims and residents who travel to Islamic State-controlled regions *(Table 5)*. While the correlation coefficient reflects an extraordinarily strong, positive and statistically significant relationship based on the entire database for all the Brussels districts, as has become clear from a number of perspectives, no correlation can be measured between the composition of the population within the internal islands under the most disadvantageous conditions and the distribution of foreign ISIS fighters. The correlational coefficient essentially drops by half with regard to the segregated communities (= 0.446), and this can no longer be considered significant even statistically (p = 0.554). In other words, if we examine the mobilizing potential of the Islamic State at the level of the most deprived districts, we find no substantial link to a composition based on ancestry among the residents there[20].

Correlation coefficients (c.c.)		Estimated proportion of Muslims (%)	Estimated proportion of Muslims (%)
Share of ISIS foreign fighters (%)	c.c.	0,936	0,446
	p	0,000	0,554
	N	19	4
basis of calculation		all districts	segregated districts

TABLE 5 *Correlation between estimated proportion of Muslims and proportion of ISIS foreign fighters in segregated districts* (Source: Author's calculations)

CLOSING REMARKS

This empirical study of certain factors which might play a significant role in Islamic State activity at the export of terrorism and recruitment of foreign fighters, which have clearly proved effective, particularly in Europe. In continuing our investigation with the goal of identifying a pattern of operative cooperation manifested in jointly implemented operations among terrorist organisations, we have placed two potential mechanisms at the centre of the analysis: we have broadly illustrated a personal network which plays an *intermediary* role, a network whose members are tied to one

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[19] These segregated localities can truly be characterised as extremely deprived districts inasmuch as registered unemployment is significantly higher (t = –8.813; p = 0.000) (12.76% on average compared to 3.26% in non-segregated communities) and the rate of university graduates is significantly lower (t = 2.370; p = 0.030) (25.66% compared to 39.01% in other districts). Obviously, this can be explained by the exclusion experienced in these districts; however, it is important to bear in mind that the estimated proportion of Muslims and the proportion of foreign fighters are also significantly higher (t = –7.883; p = 0.003 and t = –4.745; p = 0.017, respectively) (at 16.06% and 2.38%, respectively, compared to 18.27% and 1.79%, respectively). In other words, districts identified and delimited as segregated communities are indeed characterised by the most deprived socio-economic context and by the highest divisions based on ancestry as well as the proportion of foreign ISIS fighters.

[20] It should be stressed that the estimated proportion of the Muslim population is typically high in each of these districts distinguished as segregated localities and that the number of cases is extraordinarily low, thus making the results uncertain.

another by ISIS and its potential sympathisers, who are formed by targeted influence operations and disseminated propaganda. We believe that in this case we are seeing a unique case of *social embeddedness* in the meeting of Islamic State objectives – that is, in its extraordinarily conscious, multi-layered and purposefully developed efforts. This social embeddedness is of central importance with respect to the actual, successful mobilization of members of society who have the potential for radicalization. The other issue under examination was approached through results tied to *marginalization* and *challenges of integration* and with greater coverage than the foregoing. Using data on the Brussels districts, we have illustrated the extent of the role of deprived socio-economic conditions in the relation between the proportion of the Muslim population and the distribution of foreign fighters for the Islamic State. Based on the data analysis, it is clear that deprived socio-economic conditions show a positive correlation with the territorial proportion of foreign ISIS fighters. This appears to confirm the assertion – which can be said to be conventional[21] – that social inequality is of outstanding importance in the operation of this unique form of violence. At the same time, this contradicts the – considerably persuasive and empirically strong – argument as regards the Islamic State of there actually being a greater capacity to recruit foreign fighters in the case of a high level of socio-economic development and relatively insignificant inequality (Benmelech–Klor 2016). In our view, however, this is only a seeming contradiction, with both patterns offering an explanation for the process of radicalization. All in all, a distinction could be made with the fact that empirical research on a deep level of social processes will provide a clear picture. By collecting, ordering and systematically examining country data, the analysis conducted by the researchers noted previously (Benmelech–Klor 2016. 3–4) argues that the recruitment base and output rates of Islamic State foreign fighters are higher in societies characterised by greater prosperity. In other words, in this case, on the macro level of society, the relations observed can be considered valid with respect to countries. The empirical observations of the analytical part of this research focus on society at a lower organisational level: deprived socio-economic conditions relate to both the estimated proportion of Muslims and the distribution of foreign fighters by district. In fact, the positive statistical relationship between the proportions of the Muslim population and the presence of foreign ISIS fighters in districts with small populations, or *segregated districts,* which are characterised by unfavourable socio-economic indicators also disappears. This can thus be interpreted as a kind of *dual pattern* of the radicalization processes analysed here: the same factors show a relationship in a direction which is different from – or opposite – the mobilization process of potential extremists depending on whether we consider the phenomenon on a large scale within relatively broad frameworks of society or within a local, narrower social context, in which the processes of marginalization and segregation and the challenges of integration are more visible.

In the light of this, a possible next step in the research might be to conduct a more thorough study of the unique duality of the radicalization process. With supplementary data collection and an expansion to other research areas involving case studies, it may be worthwhile and necessary to examine whether the findings here can be considered valid, particularly considering the fact that the calculations made for this analysis apply to a single well-defined context with a small sample.

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[21] See Benmelech–Klor 2016. 6.

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All-time sparkles of social innovation

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Jancsák, Csaba (2019):
Fejezetek a magyarországi hallgatói mozgalmak történetéből.
[Chapters from the History of Hungarian Youth Movements]
Belvedere Meridionale, Szeged

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www.belvedere-meridionale.hu

Csaba Jancsák has been dealing with the history of youth movements for nearly two decades. In the early 2000s, as the head of the Student Union at the University of Szeged and a historian, he was naturally attracted to the history of the Szeged events of the 1956 Revolution.[1] Although in the academic community he is mostly known as a sociologist and youth researcher, in his scholarly work, he returns to the history of student movements from time to time, approaching it from the perspective of the sociology of education. He edited volumes in the topic back in 2002 and 2011[2],

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[1] Döbör András – Jancsák Csaba (2000): "Ötvenhatnak az a megismételhetetlen hangulata": Beszélgetés Kiss Tamás szegedi diákvezérrel. ["The Unrepeatable Atmosphere of 1956": Conversations with Tamás Kiss, a Szeged Student Leader] Oral History. *Belvedere Meridionale* 12. évf. 5–6. sz. 52–65.

[2] Kiss Tamás – Jancsák Csaba (2002) (eds.): *Magyar Egyetemisták és Főiskolások Szövetsége: 1956 – Szeged.* [Association of Hungarian University and College Students: 1956 – Szeged.] Szeged, Belvedere Meridionale.; Jancsák Csaba (2011) (ed.): *A szegedi szikra: MEFESZ, 1956.* [The Sparkle in Szeged: MEFESZ, 1956.] Szeged, Belvedere Meridionale.

and in 2016, he compiled a monograph[3] on the role played by MEFESZ (Association of Hungarian University and College Students) in the events of 1956. In the same year, his volume[4] of life interviews with participants of the Szeged events in 1956 was also published.

As Jancsák puts it, *"When reading this volume, we take a time travel trip to the world of contemporary university students. This world of life can also be called the stage of campus-existence, the phase of university life, during which university students practically »live« on campus. We analyzed the issue of self-determination through the history of organizations and the role and effect of the scenario's actors."*

The book is divided into five chapters. The first chapter, introducing the context on a theoretical level, discusses what conditions come together when student movements emerge, how their world of values forms and changes and what effect they exert on the social and political system. It covers the significance of forming youths' active citizenship, as their participation in the life of society may be an indicator of how democracy works. The role university student movements play in innovation is also essential, as they are not only formed within the framework of institutional microclimate but also form it in a reflective way, expanding its frameworks in the meantime.

The second part of the volume explores the circumstances of the foundation of the first university student unit, the *Szegedi Egyetemi Ifjúság* (SZEI) [Szeged University Youth] under the rectorship of Albert Szent-Györgyi (1940–41). After the university had moved back home to Kolozsvár (Cluj Napoca), and with the foundation of a university in Szeged on its own right, student organizations were established on new grounds; as the rector puts is: the university is to educate humans, individuals and intellectuals, and not masses that are easy to manipulate. As an advocate of Anglo-Saxon liberalism, Szent-Györgyi founded the first university clubs, as he believed that demanding intellectual work also needs to be accompanied by leisure activities in appropriate settings. Introducing the structure of an organization similar to today's student unions, the author discusses the issues of higher education autonomy and students' democratic activities.

The third part of Jancsák's book is devoted to the student organizations of teacher training colleges. He mentions the first student organization, *Segélyegylet* [Aid Association] founded in 1875, then *Ifjúsági Kör* [Youth Circle] in 1901, which was the predecessor of *Polágriskolai Tanárjelöltek Köre* [Circle of Student Teachers]. The *Botond Bajtársi Egyesület* [Botond Camaraderie Association] took over the role of the *Ifjúsági Kör,* and they soon started to publish a student paper, with the title *Botond.* From 1928, after the college had become co-educational, female students could also join the association. Alongside the *Botond Egyesület,* another organization involving Catholic students, named *Foederatio Emericana Integra Corporatio,* was also born, which later contributed to the foundation of KALOT [Catholic Agrarian Young Men's National Council] and KALOSZ [National Association of Catholic Young Ladies]. From 1939, there was a scout troop at the college, and in 1941, the *Ifjúsági Hivatásszervezet* [Youth Professional Organization] of the teacher training college started its operations with its main function of safeguarding interests. The author emphasises that the listed student organizations *"worked as real communities,*

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[3] Jancsák Csaba (2016): *Az 1956-os forradalom indítószikrája. A szegedi MEFESZ.* [The Sparkle of the 1956 Revolution. MEFESZ in Szeged] Szeged, Belvedere Meridionale.

[4] Jancsák Csaba (2016): *A Magyar Egyetemisták és Főiskolások Szövetsége (1956): Életútinterjúk tükrében.* [Association of Hungarian University and College Students (1956): In the Reflection of Life Interviews.] Szeged, Belvedere Meridionale.

and apart from uniting their members and offering valuable experiences for college students, they also functioned as scenes of informal education, preparing their members to become central figures in the local teaching community after their graduation and finding employment."

Chapter four, after introducing the social environment of Hungarian higher education in the 1950s, depicts the first steps, objectives and later demands of MEFESZ, which later played a significant role in the 1956 events, through in-depth interviews with MEFESZ founding members and leaders, analysing contemporary documents, documents from the time of retaliations and printed and electronic press coverage of the events. The activities of MEFESZ gained significance as they dealt with social issues and problems, and the responses to these, in a given historical moment, and as a result, they functioned as a catalyst of the 1956 events, becoming the most impressive student attempt at democracy in the 20th century.

The last chapter in the book covers the period of student union movements from 1988 until today. As a consequence of nationwide student movements in the 1980s, student activism became a factor, and it formed into a structured unity by the early '90s. The 1993 Act on Higher Education meant that the institution of the student movement came of age, as its operations were now ensured within a legal framework. At the same time, it also meant that the roles of student activism became somewhat empty. In spite of this, student unions strengthened by the turn of the century and became decisive, indispensable actors on the stage of higher educational politics. It is a question now whether new types of student groups, being formed these days, will serve as an alternative for the present form of student unions or turn into its renewal in the end.

The student movements discussed in the volume can be interpreted as a trendsetting, valueforming phenomenon. The causes of the emergence of such movements – irrespective of historical eras – are socio-political problems or crises from the representatives of which young people dissociate themselves, and this opposition becomes a major component of the force that keeps the community together. As for the movements discussed in the volume, it was the dissociation of SZEI from the *Turul Szövetség* [Turul Association], MEFESZ from the *Dolgozó Ifjúság Szövetség* [Union of Working Youth], and the student union from the *Magyar Kommunista Ifjúsági Szövetség* [Association of Hungarian Young Communist League]. Student activism has become an official organisation, and although earlier movements dissolved in history, their effect is noticeably present in the world of values of later organizations.

At the back of the book, an index of names helps to navigate in the work.

Jancsák's book, richly illustrated with original documents and photographs, is a niche piece of work as the examination of youth movements does not only contribute to a deeper understanding of the given era but can also be interpreted as a reflection of social and political changes.

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We can only say, "Oh, for Dudar"

The Memory of the Hungarian Village Research of the Institute of Sociology

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Lencsés, Gyula (2019):
Angolok a Bakonyban. Az Institute of Sociology
1937-es dudari falukutatásának története és dokumentumai.
[English Researchers in the Bakony Wald. The History and Documentation
of the Field Work of the Institute of Sociology in Dudar, Hungary]
Gondolat Kiadó – A Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Veszprém Megyei Levéltára,
Budapest–Veszprém

—⟨✦⟩—

"... [it] will always remain as an almost unreal experience"[1] wrote Gwendolyn Shand in a letter to her mother. *"...it was a whole experience for us, that includes everything, unforgettable, nice moments, hateful things, lessons in a positive and negative way, amusements and excitements, pleasant and unpleasant people, stupid and clever things /.../ it had some kind of European atmosphere and those Hungarian excitements that we know well were missing."*[2] Béla Reitzer summarized his experience to Ferenc Erdei. *"We can never thank you enough for providing such a wonderful experience for us /.../ If I had known how good it was going to be, I might have been ill with excitement before coming out, but now we can only say, »Oh, for Dudar.«"*[3] wrote Dorothea Farquharson enthusiastically. These quotes from 1937 are all about the same series of events.

What kind of experience connects the Canadian social worker, the Hungarian expert of social policy and the English sociologist?

They all participated in a common scientific enterprise of the Institute of Sociology and the College of Arts of Szeged Youth in the international village research project that was carried out in Dudar, Hungary in 1937. Gyula Lencsés' book published in 2019 titled *English Researchers in the Bakony Wald. The History and Documentation of the Field Work of the Institute of Sociology in Dudar, Hungary* is a well-documented introduction to this cooperation.

At first sight his cooperation seems surprising but actually fits well in the practice of the Institute of Sociology and its win organisation Le Play House. They organised about 90 field researches in almost 20 countries between 1921 and 1951. In the Eastern European region, besides Hungary, they conducted research in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland as well. The efficiency of these usually two-week long field works that involved about 20-30 people changed according to the person in lead and the (often random) composition of the participants. Some of them had significant scientific results, while others were rather educational trips where the members of the research group could gain insight to the methodology used by Le Play House.

Holistic approach was the basis of the research activity of the Regional Survey Movement, as it is presented in details by Lencsés. Thus, according to the theory of Patrick Geddes and Victor Branford the results in concerning the observed community should be should be interpreted in their mutual interconnections. The research was divided into three main fields: the place (for example geological endowments, climate, botany and zoology), the work (meaning economical life, for example: share of goods, consumption and finances), and the folk (meaning the life of people, for example: demographic data, human relations, organisations, psychological factors, traditions and history), and it implies a development of a further detailed system of criteria.

In the 1920's and 30's besides the Francis Galton's eugenic and the Leonard T. Hobhouse' ethical school, the regional and civic approach by Patrick Geddes was significant in British sociology. In the 1930's the Institute of Sociology was closely cooperated with the Sociological Review and one of whose editors, Alexander Farquharson was also the general secretary of the Institute.

The idea of the Hungarian field work can be linked to the 3rd International Conference on Social Work held in 1936 in London organised by the Institute of Sociology. Farquharson

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[1] Lencsés 2019. 592.

[2] Translated by Norbert Szűcs.

[3] Lencsés 2019. 600.

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and his colleagues travelled to Budapest in 1935 to discuss the details of the conference with the authorities of the Hungarian social work. The Hungarians took seriously the possibility of an international exchange of knowledge. They created a committee for the preparations with the leadership of Sarolta Lukács, the vice president of the Hungarian Red Cross, organised a five-day pre-conference and delegated about twenty experts to London. Many members of the College of Arts of Szeged Youth were already involved in this preparatory work. They became key figures of the Hungarian field work.

The College of Arts of Szeged was founded in 1932. Its members with different specialization were connected by their mutual theme, the intention to get to know the peasantry and by their village survey activity. Many of them became later definitive scientific or political figures of this field which indicates their significance. (They also reached significant cultural achievements. For example the poet Miklós Radnóti, the stage director Ferenc Hont, who was one of the founders of the Szeged Open-air Festival or György Buday the graphic artist and woodcutter.) Taking part in the Dudar field work was at the same time the last significant achievements of the College of Arts. Besides the dynamics of their operation, the different route of the members' carriers, the political situation and later the 2nd World War effected the breakup of the group.

The researchers of the Institute of Sociology and the members of the College of Arts participating in the research as well, would have demanded the presence and greater involvement of György Buday, the leader of the Szeged group. But he did not interrupt his scholarship in Rome, thus it was Viola Tomori who was responsible for the welcoming of the English researchers. She was the one who chose the settlement, organised the travel and accommodation for the researchers, and provided the interpreters. She coordinated the involvement of the Hungarian participants, some of them also participated in the field work, while others only sent studies related to different parts of the research. As the member of the College of Arts of Szeged Youth Béla Reitzer and Zoltán Gáspár deserve to be highlighted as participants, but the Dudar collection of the ethnomusicologist Sándor Veress is also a significant result of the field work. Among the members of the College of Arts Gyula Ortutay and György Buday wrote lectures related to the research. Their English translations were read out in the absence of their authors. It tells us a lot about Tomori's organisational skills that via Sándor Veress even Béla Bartók sent a text to the participants, as well as Károly Viski, one of the most significant ethnographers of that time, sent a study.

Although the field works of the Institute of Sociology were often organised for the enthusiastic but at the same time amateur social researchers, or university students without deep theoretical and methodological knowledge, the group of the Dudar survey – may be due to its small number (7) – was more qualified than usual. Alexander Farquharson, the leader of the Institution of Sociology took part in the field work. His wife, Dorothea Farquharson played an important role in the communication with Viola Tomori. She was the organiser of the trip on the English side. Gwendolyn Shand, a Canadian social worker closed her studies at the London School of Economics with this field trip. Willy Gierlichs was a sociologist at the University of Köln. For the invitation of Tomori, Richard Thurnwald ethnologist professor from Berlin and his wife and colleague, Hilde Thurnwald also joined the group. The field work took place between the 7th and 17th of September in 1937.

Historians of Hungarian social science did not forget this research project,[4] moreover for its 60th anniversary lectures by the Hungarian experts were published in Hungarian and English as well.[5] Gyula Lencsés, assistant professor of the Department of Sociology at the University of Szeged put this topic to a new dimension by discovering that among the documents of the Le Play House and the Institute of Sociology at Keele University's Special Collections and Archives, there are almost one and a half thousand pages long forgotten records kept about the Dudar survey. The book titled *English Researchers in the Bakony Wald* was written in order to share this discovery.

Part I of the book, in 100 pages, shows the process of the Dudar village survey, its scientific context and actors. It places Le Play House and the Institute of Sociology as well as their theoreticians in the history of British sociology, introduces the methodical drafts of the regional surveys, their practices in connection with foreign field work. Among the members of College of Arts of Szeged Youth it focuses on the introduction of Viola Tomori, then outlines the process of the research implementation starting from the preparation till the afterlife of the research. In these chapters he introduces the participants, reveals their relations, and their schedule of work. Lencsés commemorates not only the further life of the research material but also of the researchers and in some cases their close, tragic death caused by the war. He also reports on the elaboration of the Dudar survey in social history.

At the end of Part I he tells us the logic along which he reconstructs the volume from the manuscripts that he found at the Keele University's Archives into a possible volume in Part II. He used the table of contents of Dorothea Farquharson's manuscripts as a main guideline. According to her logic the material of the English researchers, mixed with the lectures and collections of the Hungarian colleagues, form a whole in a planned but not finalized volume. Some remaining texts that do not occur in Farquharson's table of contents were fit into the studies by Lencsés along this logic.

In Part II on almost 400 pages the reader gets acquainted with the reconstructed Dudar-volume through 40 texts. The book in a book effect was reduced only by a short introduction at the beginning of each writings, in which Lencsés shares information with the reader about the theme of the writing, its actors, authors, its previous publications as well as his editing and formatting decisions. These additions increase the value of the text and help its interpretation. He supplemented the writings with layouts of buildings and households, photos, maps and music sheets.

Most of the writings belong to Béla Reitzer and Theodora Bremner. This is partly due to the fact that Miss Bremner stayed in Budapest in order to work together with Reitzer on finalizing the writings even after her fellow researchers travelled home. Some of their texts were interviews. The original editor of the manuscript, Dorothea Farquharson also has several texts in the book. Besides her five writings, Lencsés included her reminiscences and lectures about the Dudar survey in the Appendix.

In Lencsés' opinion – with which we agree – Gwendolyn Shand's research results are the most valuable amongst the guests. The talented young Canadian lady made exciting family studies. Her study on emigration is especially valuable as well as her other notes on emigration. Their uniqueness derives from the fact that she was engaged with the theme in the United States as well.

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[4] Csaplár 1971, Lengyel 1985, Lengyel–Simon 1986, Boross–Márkusné 2000, Lencsés –Feleky 2013.

[5] Trencsényi 1997.

It was as important reference point for her that she had a common knowledge of Pittsburgh with a man from Dudar. The photos she took during the field work remained in her legacy in the Canadian Nova Scotia Museum, thus Lencsés could use them when he compiled this volume.

In Part III we find the participants' correspondence related to the field work in chronological order. The letters from the Keele University Special Collections and Archives are presented in their full length. In case of the other letters only parts are published as they contain private information as well.

The first letter was written by Viola Tomori and György Buday to Alexander Farquharson on the 3rd of September 1936 as a contact letter. Out of the 128 letters 61 were written before the field work. From 1940 onwards the letters resulted from the communication between the Farquharsons and Buday. They consulted not only about professional matters but as it was war at the time they discussed the fate of the research participants as well. Within this topic the letters between the Farquharsons and their hosts, the Jakab family are particularly interesting. These letters were translated by György Buday. After 1947 there is one letter from 1956 and three letters from 1970 in the collection.

Most of the letters – almost half of them – remained from the exchange of letters between Dorothea Farquharson, György Buday and Viola Tomori. The examination of this fact is that prior to the research Tomori was intensively communicating about the preparatory work both with Buday and Farquharson. The two ladies stopped their exchange of letters after 1937. But between Buday and Farquharson the communication became more intensive from that time. Buday soon after the Dudar survey still in 1937 moved to the United Kingdom. Dorothea Farquharson asked his help several times in professional control and translation.

The book includes a digital supplement organised in three folders. Folder I contains the manuscripts of the texts of the reconstructed volume on the Dudar field work. In Folder II we find the collection of the participants' correspondence related to the research. Folder III contains the documentation of the folk music collected by Sándor Veress in Dudar.

Gyula Lencsés, the author of the book made his job with outstanding thoroughness and humility. His 1109 notes provide the reader with tremendous amount of information. The notes also make it obvious that he fully understands and knows the one and a half thousand pages long manuscript rediscovered by him, the literature belonging to the theme, the private and professional career of the research participants, the dynamics of their relationships and their broader network. Lencsés works with a critical approach, he reveals several mistakes and imprecisions. We have the feeling that he knows the research material better than the researchers themselves. But the huge number of notes are useful not only for refinement but they unfold interesting life stories between the lines.

Lencsés illustrated the book with 160 photos, drawings and reproductions of manuscripts. These help the reader get closer not only to the results of the field work but to the research method and the personalities of the researchers as well. The book could definitely be a valuable reading for those who are interested in ethnography, sociology, history, history of arts and history of social science. Especially for those who study the work of the Institute of Sociology, Le Play House and the College of Arts of Szeged Youth, as well as the village research movements.

The high standard of the book manifests in its typographic appearance as well. On the first flyleaves of the book there is coloured version of György Buday's woodcut that he made as the design of the researchers' folder. The drawing represents Dudar with a hand marked with a stigma

of Christ above the village as the glittering sun. Such presentation of Buday's woodcut is also the symbol of the book. This is an aesthetical solution that remembers the participants of the Dudar survey with respect, evokes one of the attributes of the research (the folder) and represents one of the participants' artwork. Besides it informs the reader about the structure of the village. For the initiated it refers to the correspondence between Viola Tomori and György Buday about their preparatory work, about the organisational difficulties and about their dreams and doubts about the research and their lives. In one of the last peaceful years before World War II that changed everything drastically, they did not know that not only their scientific plans, but their whole lives would change radically.

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MEGJELENT!
KAPHATÓ A KIADÓNÁL.

Pászka Imre

EGYÜTTHATÁS
– REPREZENTÁCIÓK
I.

A KÁRPÁT-MEDENCE A TERMÉSZET
ÉS A TÖRTÉNELEM MŰHELYÉBEN

(KIS JÉGKORSZAK)

Belvedere
Szeged 2019