Spaces and Ideas

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A folyóirat megjelenik évente négy alkalommal: tavasszal, nyáron, ősszel és télen.

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The Transformation of Activity Structure and Consumption in the Hungarian Villages after Collectivization[1]

Abstract

After the Communist takeover the lifestyle, patterns of consumption, social relations and norms of behavior became homogenized in a *"negative way"* as a result of the process of proletarianization and downward leveling. From the late sixties, under changing circumstances, in accordance with the norms of a quasi-consumption society, the difference in lifestyle were reproduced at a higher average level. The history of the rural way of life in Hungary after 1944 can be divided into two periods. The first lasted until the second half of the 1960s and was dominated by the survival of traditions, modernization at a moderate pace, and a decisive degree of self-sufficiency. The second, which began towards the end of the 1960s, was marked by departure from traditions, a declining role for self-sufficiency, and an increasing orientation towards consumption. This study looks at the historical features of the first period of change, primarily in the household and activity structures, through an examination of housing, furnishings, dress and nutrition.

I. Introduction

The history of the rural way of life in Hungary after 1944 can be divided into two periods. The first lasted until the second half of the 1960s and was dominated by the survival of traditions, modernization at a moderate pace, and a decisive degree of self-sufficiency. The second, which began towards the end of the 1960s, was marked by departure from traditions, a declining role for self-sufficiency, and an increasing orientation towards consumption. This study looks at the historical features of the first period of change, primarily in the household and activity structures, through an examination of housing, furnishings, dress and nutrition. The characteristics of the traditional peasant way of life were already changing before collectivization, but the completion of the collectivization process accelerated the pace of change.

II. Changes in the rural way of life and activity structure

The structure of everyday activities in the villages changed cyclically for most people living in the villages, especially those employed in agriculture. During periods of less importance for agricultural production, family members who were not members of the agricultural cooperative spent a daily average of 2.8 hours on paid activity in the first half of the 1960s. With the housewives of agricultural-cooperative families, it was two hours. This relative freedom practically ceased in the spring and summer work rushes. Average daily working hours for cooperative members was more than eight hours–ten hours of communally executed work for men and five hours for women. The same increase in the work burden was observed among non-earning family members, who spent an average of three–four hours a day on agricultural work. (An average of three hours of this was taken with tasks associated with the family's private *'household plot'*.) Villagers working outside agriculture supplemented an average of 8.6 hours paid activity with 0.8 hours spent working on the family plot, irrespective of whether they were commuters or locally employed.

'Of course, the character of work and the conditions under which it is performed (e.g. the direct role of production and influences of the weather) differ in agriculture from those in other fields, and the consequences of this are reflected relatively less in the daily use of time. This daily employment of time is expressed mainly in three aspects of agricultural work. One is that the family work organization has remained, although it may have lessened in extent, so that there is not so sharp a division between earners and non-earners among the agricultural population as there is in non-agricultural sectors. The second factor fundamental to the daily use of time is the cyclical nature of agricultural production, producing an alternation of strenuous and less strenuous work rates and life rhythms. The third and final factor of importance is that although the agricultural and the rural population do not quite coincide, it remains true that most of the agricultural population lives under rural conditions – place of residence still decides way of life in many respects. (Of the earning cooperative members questioned, 90 per cent live in villages.) [2]

As the number of villagers not engaged in agriculture increased, the cyclical nature of the daily activity structure eased. Most employees worked fixed hours, and their lives became adjusted to these, not to the round of agricultural tasks.

For the agricultural population, the hour or hour-and-a-half of *'spare time'* that usually remained after the daily work of 10–12 hours was not usually spent on entertainment or recreation in the strict sense, but passed in sitting about and talking, or perhaps listening to the radio. The working day obviously

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[2] *A nap 24 órája. 12000 ember napi időbeosztása.* (1965)

began earlier in the agricultural season, usually at four or five in the morning. Despite the cyclical organization of work, it can be seen that the time spent on production work by men engaged in agriculture in the first half of the 1960s exceeded that of both manual workers and white-collar employees not employed in agriculture. The spread of female employment in the villages was somewhat slower than in the towns, the average time spent by women on earning activity in the 1960s was somewhat less than that spent by urban female workers or white-collar employees.

Adjusting to the new system of work on agricultural cooperatives meant that the daily employment of time by members also changed. The paid activity had a quite different significance for female cooperative members than for male members. Almost 70 per cent of the latter also worked collectively in the winter, while only half the women worked for the cooperative even in the summer. Behind this lay the fact that the vast majority of those filling the jobs offering continuous paid work all the year round (such as stockbreeding) and those in supervisory and managerial positions were men.

Use of time among those employed in agriculture varied with the weather and the cycle of agricultural work. In winter, earning cooperative members spent an average of 5.9 hours a day on the collective farm and another 1.5 hours on their household plot, so that the total time spent on production was an hour less than the average for urban workers. The time freed was usually spent on housework, while some would be added to the time spent on sleeping and relaxing. During this period of less agricultural importance, family members would also undertake substantially less productive work and associated responsibilities – an average of two hours a day. The time freed would be spent on tasks in and around the home.

The data from the various surveys show that 40 per cent of the time spent on agricultural production activity in the years after collectivization went on private work on the household plot. Here village women played a very significant part, due to the traditional family and social division of labour, irrespective of whether they were cooperative members or not, which also meant that no sharp dividing line could be drawn in the first half of the 1970s between earning and non-earning rural women. For those cultivating the family plot were also helping to generate and increase family income, although they were registered statistically as housewives or dependents.

'There were no working hours or performance requirements written down in the agricultural cooperative (and naturally, still less for those working independently). The amount of work contributed to the collective and the family farm depended primarily on how much each person was willing or able to do. In the agricultural cooperatives, the performance of women especially was influenced not only by personal inclinations, but by whether there was work to be done. Due to the characteristics of agricultural work and the absence of auxiliary production, work could not be ensured continually for everyone. This relative freedom (voluntary or involuntary) meant that female cooperative members to some extent subordinated their collective work to their household commitments, spending much more time on housework than women in manual or white-collar employment. (This was due partly to the absence of servicing and childcare institutions.) In winter, they hardly worked for the collective at all, and even in summer, they spent less time working for the collective than their counterparts in employment did.' [4]

The structure of daily activity, especially the use of time by women, was strongly influenced by the fact that the level of service provision for households in the early 1960s was much lower in the villages than in the towns (mains water, gas, accessibility of service companies etc.) So the time spent on activities round the home was greater. Throughout the 1960s, Sunday was still only the single day of rest in most cases.

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[3] Ibid. 11.

III. FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD AND CONSUMPTION

Big differences between country and town families and among social groups remained in the post-war decades in terms of household structure and the organization of family activities. The size and structure of families and households also changed significantly.[3] In both towns and villages, there was a fall in the number of households in which two or more family nuclei cohabited. The model of a multi-generation, permanently cohabiting family gave way in the villages to one of that of the nuclear family whose members started a career of their own. It gradually became common and accepted for the young couple to start life independently of the parents, in their own house. There was also an increasing tendency in Hungarian villages in the 1950s and 1960s towards heterogamy, with couples marrying despite strongly different social situations, so that the proportion of socially mixed families and households increased. In the mid-1970s, such socially mixed households accounted for almost half of those containing more than one earner.

The high proportion of time spent earning income showed a clear change in family strategies. By the mid-1960s, most families were engaged in side-activities earning them extra income. The other impetus behind household plots and auxiliary farming came from shortage. The country's commercial network remained undeveloped in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s and the low standard of service left people in villages reliant on their household plots for much of their daily food requirement. The extra income earned from the small surpluses produced played an important role in securing people's livelihoods and ensuring that the family prospered. Such earnings were usually translated into extra individual consumption.

An important difference between villages and towns could be seen in the transformation of the standards and norms for running a household. For the two-earner model became general somewhat faster and earlier in urban families than in rural ones. Income relations in the first half of the 1960s were uncertain, but they gradually stabilized in the second half of the decade. Income other than wages assumed increasing importance in the incomes of rural families, especially in the form of pension rights held by cooperative members. About half the family income increment in the second half of the 1970s came from rising wages, a third from the family gaining more than one earner, and a fifth from increases in social benefits and similar income other than wages.

Of course, the expenditure as well as the earnings in both groups increased, in a like proportion. The extra income of urban and rural households in 1965 went on different things. Worker and employee families spent almost half the extra on food, a third on manufactures and clothing, and a quarter on services. Hardly a third of the extra income of peasant and double-income families in villages went on food, almost half on manufactures (including building materials), and less than a fifth on services.[5]

Significant territorial differences in spending structure are also apparent. Villagers in the 1950s and 1960s spent much less on services and public transport than urban households did, while expenditure on private transport was greater.[6] A rural place of residence generally meant a lower level of equipment than an urban one. One factor behind this was the attention that rural households paid to obtaining the implements needed for their smallholding, rather than to domestic appliances. Only slowly and to a small extent did rural families in the 1960s and

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[4] TOMKA 2000.

[5] *Háztartásstatisztika* 1967.

[6] VÁGI 1993.

1970s reduce their consumption of home-produced food and to the same degree increase their purchases of food and consumption of foods outside the home.

The consumption and stocks held of various goods show a strong correlation with occupation and changes in occupation. In the period of private farming, the decisive majority of rural families constituted a production unit, so that their consumption preferences differed from those of cooperative members who had become wage-earners, officials, clerical employees or urban workers. In the operation of a family farm, *'stocks and reserves for personal and operational needs played a very big role in consumption... The central question in the economy of peasant households was to ensure adequate stocks until the next harvest.'*[7]

The income level of peasant society was generally lower than the average for other social strata. Within that, there were strong differences between the various groups, of course. This was reflected in consumption, for *'peasant families in the lowest income group cover a higher proportion of their consumption from their own production'*[8] than those in higher income groups. The proportion of income in kind from the agricultural cooperatives was generally highest in households where total per capita income was lowest. However, the families selling the most from their production were the once whose per capita income was highest and where the proportion of total income represented by produce in kind was lowest.

Self-sufficiency was at once a tradition and a necessity. The norms of earlier periods were still strongly present in peasant thinking and organization of life – the pantry should be full when the New Year begins – but this was reinforced by the backwardness of rural trade provision and the consequent need to be self-sufficient. *'Supplies of several basic foodstuffs to the villages was relegated into the background for a long period, up to the mid-1950s.'*[9]

Understandably, the proportion of self-produced goods in the consumption of peasant households at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s was still very high. This was the source of three-quarters of the peasantry's food consumption and half of its total consumption. The latter proportion in Hungarian society as a whole was 30 per cent. This obviously tied in with the uneven temporal distribution of peasant incomes. Most of the earnings came in the harvest period, which meant it was concentrated over a period of two or three months in the year, furthermore in a similar period to the one when production-related outlays were greatest. Not for a long time after the completion of collectivization did the period of regular monthly money payments arrive.

The changes in the consumption structure were strongly influenced also by the various socio-political changes. After the completion of collectivization, the proportion of farming-related acquisitions within the peasantry's demand for manufactures understandably decreased significantly, while after an interval, the consumption of goods related to personal needs began to climb quite fast. The priorities had clearly changed by the second half of the 1960s. Earlier, articles serving to further production had relegated those for personal consumption, but after collectivization, the latter became dominant. It seemed after the transformation that most peasant families had lost much of their farming role, tasks and character. Only later did it become apparent that this very complex transformation, which now seems to have demanded unnecessary sacrificese, had altered the system of farming by rural families and changed their agricultural role and tasks, but it had not caused that role to cease. Land ownership gave way to intensive utilization of labour. Under conditions of restrictions on property acquisition, income was

[7] Molnár 1962.

[8] Ibid. 9.

[9] Ibid. 11.

understandably diverted to consumption and improving living conditions. The stock of consumer durables increased, as did spending on housebuilding and housing modernization, all of which confirm this shift. There remained strong rural-urban differences in household structures and household activities in the decades after the Second World War, and differences between social groups. One common characteristic that remained was the approach to the roles and tasks of women. Irrespective of social position or settlement type, running the household remained a basically female activity.

IV. Clothing and dress[10]

The first decade of the Kádár period brought radical changes in the dress habits of people living in villages, especially in the period after collectivization was completed, when people began to forsake traditional dress on a mass scale. Dress was the area in which the changes in lifestyle and living habits were most conspicuous. According to a domestic-trade survey of rural dress habits compiled in 1962, *'Significant ground has been gained in the last few years by urban dress. Ready-made clothing, knitwear and garments of synthetic materials have increased their share of the turnover. Thereby, fashion as a force shaping demand has steadily spread to the rural population as well.'* It was also established that *'the clothing supply to the peasantry... is some 20–25 per cent lower than that of wage and salary-earners. The level of supply of bed linen is conspicuously low (150 sheets, 210 pillowcases, 150 quilt and eiderdown covers per 100 inhabitants, i.e. below the level required for a simple change of linen. The situation proved to be even worse in Szabolcs County.) The supply of outer garments is better, but not yet satisfactory. For every 100 men in all the families, there are on average 160 overcoats, 220 outer garments and 320 pairs of shoes (ankle boots, long boots). For women, the indices per 100 women were 180 overcoats, 660 dresses and 350 pairs of shoes. Families in Győr County are some 10–15 per cent better supplied than those in Szabolcs County.'*[11] The wardrobe changed more slowly than with worker families and especially compared with those in clerical or professional occupations – the peasantry were renewing their clothes only once in five to seven years.

One factor behind the acceleration in the shedding[12] of traditional costume was probably the anti-peasant policy pursued in the early 1950s. One defence by the peasantry was to try to change rapidly the outward appearance of peasant life. At the same time, the materials used for making traditional costume disappeared from the shops and domestic production of fabrics fell back. A further wave of shedding developed in the late 1950s and speeded up in the years after the completion of collectivization. Almost without exception, people under the age of 25 dressed in ready-made clothes and the girls had their hair done in ways that broke with custom. The example of the younger ones was soon followed by most of the middle-aged and some of the elderly. The traditional costume was retain fully or partly only by the elderly

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[10] The question is explored in more detail in Valuch 2002.

[11] Molnár 1962.

[12] *'Shedding'* is a widely used term in this context, although some recent works on society and ethnography prefer to call it *'changing dress'*. Márta Flórián, for instance, argues expressly for this. Essentially, this period marks the stage in the continual change in clothing in response to fashion at which villagers forsake the clothing, garments and dress habits that reflect a specific community or social group and follow urban dress patterns instead. Most ethnographers see the process itself, the transformation of dress habits and modernization of the wardrobe, as an inevitable consequence of the economic and social changes of the 20th century. For detail, see Flórián 2001. 11–15., 14–19.

who had been born before the First World War. At the turn of the 1960s and 1970s, it became acceptable in villages for women to wear trousers, and the number still wearing a kerchief declined.

The fashions in urban wear were followed after an interval in the dress of village women as well. *'The tendency was clearly, from the end of the 1950s, for the dress of the village population to integrate continually and by degrees with that of the urban population. During the first half of the process, there was integration among villages, as the inhabitants of »costume« villages shed. Then in the second stage, the people of the villages began to integrate into society as a whole.'*[13] Various phases can also be discerned in this process of adjustment and standardization, influenced by the succeeding fashions. There were significant differences in the abandonment of costume according to districts, sexes and age groups as well. The process of abandonment and changing of garments seen as peasant like by the outside world and the implantation of urban patterns would be protracted or differently initiated. The first thing to lose its validity was the subtle system of symbols conveyed by clothes, suggesting allegiance to age group, sex, social group and religious denomination. Perhaps it is not an exaggeration to add that the relatively rapid spread of town clothes and forms of dress was an outward manifestation of social mobility (or a semblance of it). Many people may have felt that if they dressed like townsfolk, any disadvantages attaching to a peasant background would ease, or if a poor peasant dressed his child as his old landlord did, the social difference between them would be reduced.

Everyday use of traditional folk costume had practically ceased by the final third of the 20th century, and ready-made clothing took over from home-made. Among the reasons were the changes in living and working conditions and the ambivalent policy towards the peasantry in that period. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, folk costume was almost wholly abandoned, above all because women were going out to work in large numbers. *'By that time, the disintegration of peasant culture could not be halted. It did not simply become desirable in the 1960s for the rural population to abandon the trappings of their peasant status. Masses of them deserted the peasantry altogether, accepting all the consequences of mobilization.'*[14] Forcible collectivization and forced industrialization made it impossible for the middle stratum of the peasantry, with its respect for tradition, to persist, and the traditional village community broke up, having lost its controlling function. It became incapable of assessing the innovations that were pouring down upon it and accepting or rejecting them accordingly.[15] The *'shedding'* was accelerated by the mass exodus from the villages, but for those who remained, the earlier isolation ceased, for the conclusion people increasingly drew from the failure of their bitter attempts at a new beginning in the 1950s was that they should not let their children become peasants. The obvious way to avoid this was education. Teenagers travelling in to urban secondary schools in the 1960s introduced new norms of behaviour and dress into the villages in many respects.

Typical items of female clothing in the villages after the *'shedding'* included tracksuit bottoms, a knitted blouse, a sleeveless housecoat and comfortable footwear. In many places, women retained the habit of covering their heads, regardless of the weather or of whether they had a traditional hairstyle or a modern cut by a hairdresser. One article retained was an apron. New, on the other hand, wear stockings, initially of cotton, which began to be replaced in the latter half of the 1960s by stockings made of a light synthetic material. Shoes only began to oust boots in the early 1950s. At the end of the 1960s, gymshoes (known as dorcó) became very popular everyday wear at home.

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[13] Szuhay 1996. 714.

[14] Fülemile 1991.

[15] Stefany 1986.

After traditional costume had been shed, elderly women continued to wear dark colours. New customs adopted included the use of make-up and lipstick, having one's hair done and going to a beautician for urban beauty treatment.[16]

With men, the new weekday apparel for home came to be worn blue overalls, no longer worn to work, with a cheap, soft shirt underneath, and among older men, often an apron as well. It became general to wear a suit on feast days, usually ready-made. Lighter or patterned materials were fashionable for younger men and plain colours for older ones. As an outer garment, they might wear a coat lined with foam or more rarely a leather or imitation leather overcoat. Shoes with pointed toes and a slight heel became fashionable. Typical wear for the younger generation consisted of flared trousers, a patterned shirt, and a coloured pullover in synthetic fibres. One garment popular for a long time was the shirt-pullover in synthetic fibres, usually for Sunday or festive wear, with a high polo neck instead of a shirt collar. Among the determining garments in different periods were leather coats, waterproof coats, clothes made of synthetic fibres, sleeveless women's dresses, usually of synthetic materials, housecoats and training suits.

Following the urban pattern became the predominant course, but not the exclusive one. Most people living in Hungarian villages dressed in the new style, but at that time, they still sought to adjust it to local norms and customs.

V. Diet and eating habits

The differences in income relations were more or less maintained in differences of eating habits. Those with lower incomes obviously spent less on food, and cheaper, high-calorie foods obtainable in large quantities were dominant in their diet. Higher-income households showed a greater propensity for innovation. However, almost irrespective of social status, the weekday diet in the 1940s and 1950s, and a decade or two later, typically consisted of Hungarian dishes that could be considered traditional. Rationality rather than variety prevailed, with the consistency and timing of daily and weekly meals strongly adjusted to the time of work done by the head of the family and to the seasons. This could be discerned most clearly in peasant families. The changes in lifestyle and eating habits were accelerated by the social changes and the way women were increasingly taking jobs. That reduced the time they could spend on housework, so that laborious and time-consuming household activities tended to be relegated. According to an analysis in the 1960s, *'the families still baking their own bread were almost exclusively those that received allowances of flour or grain in kind.'*[17] The cooking and eating habits of village families were still strongly marked by adherence to tradition. Regular cooking of a midday meal was most prevalent among them and the proportion of those preparing hot dishes at both main meals was high compared with urban households.[18]

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[16] The spread and acceptance of new customs were described in a 1962 report in the women's weekly *Nők Lapja*: *'She has on clothes in the new fashion, a buffon hairstyle and shoes with stiletto heels. She stops in the gateway for a moment, putting her head out nervously and then pulling it rapidly back in. She takes a handkerchief from her handbag and wipes the lipstick off the mouth, for there is an acquaintance coming down the other side of the street. All this happens in the large village of Kistelek, with over 10,000 inhabitants, before the house of the beautician Eszter Kiss. It is Friday, the weekly market day, when there are many acquaintances about and they tell you off for using cosmetics. Yet plenty of people come here, there's a row of bicycles in the courtyard'* (no. 8. 1962. 9–).

[17] Makay 1962.

[18] For more detail, see Makay: op. cit.

It was still common at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s for one dish to be eaten at each meal, but in ample quantities. A sizeable increase in the number of dishes prepared and consumed ensued at the end of the 1960s. As active religious observance declined and life became secularized, the dietary rules of various denominations lost importance, for instance the rules for fast days, although the erosion was slower in village peasant families than in the towns. Social and geographical differences in food consumption lessened, so that eating habits among urban and rural households became the same in many respects. One major change in the villages was the disappearance of the pre-war eating-habit distinctions between social strata. However, generation differences remained, with older people sticking to their traditional diet. The food served at family celebrations (largely irrespective of social situation) retained particular importance. Celebratory meals reflected the difference from other days, while among those with the lowest incomes, they generally served a prestige function. There were substantial changes in the menu at various festive occasions, especially weddings. Dishes previously reserved for weekends or celebrations began to appear in the weekday diet and appreciation of flavours came to the fore. The midday meal lost some of its importance as the main meal of the day, giving way to some extent to supper, when freshly cooked or previously prepared dishes would be served. The eating habits of village households were also changed gradually by the appearance of public kitchens, especially in larger communities.

VI. HOUSING CONDITIONS AND USAGE OF LIVING SPACE

Most of the rural housing stock, unlike the urban, was privately owned and remained so in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1949, 80 per cent of the country's dwellings were owner-occupied. The proportion increased to 82.2 per cent in 1960 and 87.7 per cent in 1970. The remaining fifth or sixth of the housing stock consisted of tenancies, co-tenancies or *'service'* dwellings (tied housing).

Year	1 room	2 rooms	3 or moore rooms	All
1949	73.1	24.2	2.7	100.0
1960	63.6	33.5	2.9	100.0
1970	44.5	47.4	8.1	100.0

TABLE 1 *Dwelling-size structure in villages, 1949–70, %* (Source: OROS 1994. 67.)

Table 1 shows clearly a strong increase in the number of rooms in village housing over the 1950s and 1960s. This was achieved partly by altering and extending existing dwellings, and partly because most new dwellings were built with two or more rooms. In terms of dwelling size, the change was faster in the villages than in the towns, despite the fact that the state housing programme in the period concentrated in the latter, where construction of large housing estates began in the 1970s.

The architectural appearance of most settlements also change considerably over the period. Village housing construction up to the mid-1960s followed the traditions developed in earlier decades and centuries. Village houses generally had an oblong plan and were set at right-angles to the street. They divided into three parts: room, kitchen and second room or store. Changes in the first half of the century meant that a kitchen with an open chimney was no longer characteristic after the Second World War. Houses were designed and built so that further rooms, stores or farm buildings could be added. Districts had their own building characteristics, although the internal

structure in Hungarian villages was practically the same everywhere. Traditional building methods became rarer in the second half of the 20th century and the materials used changed fundamentally. Walls of pounded clay or adobe blocks gave way to brick and rye or reed-thatched roofs to tiles. Up to the completion of collectivization, villages became dominated by rows of houses of different forms and in different styles. Then came a steadily increasing uniformity.

In 1961, the year collectivization was completed, 37,454 village dwellings were built. This number went steadily down to 24,461 in 1965. Then in the second half of the 1960s, it began to climb again slowly, so that by 1972, it had exceeded the 1961 level, with 38,263 new dwellings being built in the villages. More than nine-tenths of the new housing was built for owner-occupation.

However, the level of facilities in village houses changed relatively slowly in this period. In 1960, 3.1 per cent of rural dwellings had running water, 2.4 per cent a water closet, and 6 per cent a bathroom or shower. By 1970, 8.8 per cent of dwellings had running water, 5.5 per cent a water closet, and every tenth dwelling a public or local sewage-disposal system, while the proportion of dwellings with a bathroom had risen to 14 per cent.

The appearance of the village altered significantly in the 1960s. The earlier differences of landscape and architecture had been practically eliminated by the efforts to obtain architectural uniformity. Guided by the fashion for square houses with pavilion roofs (hipped equally on all four sides), people added a room beside the street end of the house and erected a pavilion roof over both. The other characteristic solution was to demolish the old house and replace it with a new, square house built with modern materials, using a standard design. Initially, these were built without farm buildings attached, but as the household plot and small-scale agricultural production became more important again, stores, barns and sheds for equipment and livestock would be added at the back. That steadily turned the square shape into an L. In the 1970s, the square houses were often built with the main rooms at a height of 10–12 steps and a sunken semi-basement below, where other rooms could be placed, for instance a pantry, workshop and kitchen. Very often there were lower (summer) and upper (winter) kitchens, in line with earlier patterns. These houses would have a floor area amounting to 150–170 square metres, of which 75–90 square metres would be the two or three rooms on the main residential floor. During the 1970s, multi-level building methods developed, bringing Alpine roofs and two-storey houses to Hungarian villages. (There were scarcely any examples of two-storey dwelling houses in Hungarian villages before the Second World War.)

While the outward appearance and ground plan of village houses were altering, the furniture, equipment and interior design were changing radically as well. Development of new customs often took a long time. *'The bathroom was often an untouched spectacle (for instance, because it could not be heated in winter). Next to the kitchen recess being built is the new dining area, but life goes on in the old kitchen or perhaps on the veranda. That is where they take guests or the children do their studying, or the sewing machine for the young outworker women is placed. The articles placed in the house would often be used for something other than their intended purpose, or be sold because of prestige consumption. So the new row of cupboards and the new living-room suite stand untouched.'*[19]

The kitchen equipment and furniture in today's sense became general in village households in the decades after the Second World War. While there was no separate bathroom, ablutions also went on in the kitchen, and this also affected the way it was equipped. Up to the turn

[19] Ibid. 335.

of the 1950s and 1960s, the most important item in the home of a well-to-do peasant was a set of furniture consisting of two cupboards, two night tables, a dressing table with mirror, two beds, chairs and a table, usually made by hand, arranged symmetrically or centrally. If the arrangement was symmetrical, the beds would be along the far walls, with the cupboards at the end of them and the table and chairs in the middle. In a central arrangement, the beds were placed side by side in the middle of the room, with the table and chairs at the end and the cupboards along the walls. At the beginning of the period, there was a third arrangement commonly found, known as the corner interior. This meant that the table and a corner bench were placed in the corner opposite the street side, opposite the fireplace or stove. Behind this was the cupboard, while the beds were lined along the opposite wall.

The change in housing usage was encouraged by efforts at modernization and by the fact that multi-generation households were becoming less frequent.

VII. INSTEAD OF A SUMMARY

After the Communist takeover the lifestyle, patterns of consumption, social relations and norms of behavior became homogenized in a *"negative way"* as a result of the process of proletarianization and downward leveling (to use the expression of András Kovács). From the late sixties, under changing circumstances, in accordance with the norms of a quasi consumption society, the difference in lifestyle were reproduced at a higher average level.

The question becomes unavoidable: how do the lifestyle and culture of the village and urban societies compare? Were they becoming more similar? Undoubtedly, as one result of the changes in social structure, tendencies to uniformity become observable yet, even at the end of the twentieth century, we cannot deny that differences remain. The tendency to innovation is greater in the city; one feature of village life remains the tendency to follow the example and to cling to its own traditions. *"In the life of the two types of settlements we observe innumerable similarities and a time lag. Because of its ecology, village lifestyle – deriving from its structure – i.e. the house, the plot of land, the courtyard and the garden – and because of close oversight by the community, continues to be different in more ways than it is similar to the city. It follows that village culture has not ceased to exist."*[20]

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"Hidden Resistance"

The Collectivization Process in Szeklerland[1]

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ABSTRACT

Collectivization was a characteristic phenomenon of the period of communism and its aim was the complete transformation of the rural society and of rural farming according to the Soviet model. During this process an aggressive liquidation of the private farms and the foundation of collective agricultural large-scale farms took place. The process of collectivization in Szeklerland lasted from 1947–48 until 1962. This long lasting period manifested itself in its complexity, generating fierce emotions, conflicts, but at the same time creating pretended agreement, silent opposition, uncertainty and anxiety. In this essay I will try to sketch – without the purpose of giving an allinclusive picture about this phenomenon – some important events of the epoch of collectivization, writing in detail about the hidden resistance and struggles of people against authority at that time in Szeklerland.

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[1] This text is a revised and reverse version of the *"Rejtette ellenállás".* A kollektivizálás Székelyföldön lezajlott folyamatáról. *Új Nézőpont* 2017. no. 1.

INTRODUCTION

In this essay I am going to write about the process of collectivization in Szeklerland, about the hidden resistance of people against the authority, on the one hand following the book entitled *Így kollektivizáltak minket*[2] [How we were collectivized] by JULIANNA BODÓ and on the other hand based on the essay *Küzdelem a túlélésért*[3] [The struggle for survival] by SÁNDOR OLÁH. Collectivization was a determining phenomenon of the epoch of socialism, meaning the total change of the rural society and farming on basis of the Soviet model. It was a complex process, the main goal of the communist agricultural policy being to form common-collective agricultural farms instead of individual ones.[4] During this process the forced liquidation of the private peasant farms took place and producer cooperatives (agricultural large-scale farms) were formed. The process of collectivization began in Szeklerland with the communist takeover (1947–1948) and it lasted until 1962. In this essay I will try to sketch – without the purpose of giving an allinclusive picture about this phenomenon – some important events of the epoch of collectivization, writing in detail about the hidden resistance and struggles of people against authority at that time in Szeklerland.

Until 1950 four counties, Marosszék, Háromszék, Udvarhelyszék and Csíkszék had been considered *"Szekler"* counties, which carried on even in their names the tradition of the old Szekler *"széks"* – seats (*"seats"* were typically Szekler administrative units). In the period of the collectivization, beside the constant new regulations regarding the reorganization of social life, rural farms and private property, restructuration of administration took place as well. Instead of the division county/district/commune, there were founded provinces after the Soviet model, consisting of rayons. The communal status of several villages was abolished, and they were subordinated to commune centers.[5]

The analyses and series of interviews presented in the above quoted volume of JULIANNA BODÓ were made in two villages of Szeklerland: in Korond (Udvarhelyszék) and in Menaság (Csíkszék) within the framework of the programme entitled *Transforming Property, Person and State: Collectivization in Romania, 1949–1962*.[6] The other author, SÁNDOR OLÁH writes in his essay *The struggle for survival* about a series of silent battles between the people of the villages along Homoród river (Udvarhelyszék) and the state authority during the period of collectivization.[7] He discusses in detail the hidden resistance of people against the authority during the years of collectivization. Although the analyses of the two authors based on a thorough fieldwork were carried out in not more than three or four Szekler villages, they can be generalized for the whole region. On occasion of an earlier work, I myself made life-interviews with some older villagers of Szépvíz (Csíkszék), who spoke about the period of the collectivization at length on that occasion, evoking their state of mind during that period. I worked up the biographical interviews based on the book entitled (2009) *Narratív történetformák* [Narrative story forms] written by IMRE PÁSZKA.

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[2] BODÓ 2004.

[3] OLÁH 2001.

[4] LÁSZLÓ 2010. 1.; LÁSZLÓ 2009. 57.

[5] Ibid. 10.

[6] BODÓ 2004.

[7] OLÁH 2001.

The substance of the autobiographical narratives is the perpetual discussion upon life, during which the personal issues of an individual is narrated. The individual experiences of this process *"neither can be observed nor be screened"* – it can be revealed through narration.[8]

The stories in the essays of the Julianna Bodó and Sándor Oláh resemble very much to the ones, which the people who I interviewed told me about the period of collectivization, so I am going to use some relevant details from my interviews as well.

In the process of collectivization the aim of the political executive was to transform rural society to abrogate private property, to introduce planned economy and to take away from people their income from agricultural activity through the complete transformation of rural society. The representatives of the authroity intended to form collective farms by rearranging ownership relations in order to take control of production and trading of goods in rural areas. Another goal of the political leaders was to liquidate the peasant farmers and kulaks (prosperous peasants) who were regarded as exploiters by the new communist system and to advance the landless and poor peasants.[9] On social level they intended to break the local authority's power and the cultural resistance, to reduce the influence of the clergy, to undermine the elite made up of the rich farmers (kulaks) and to bring up another elite from the poor, landless peasants, who would be faithful to the new political system.[10] Thus the ownership relations were transformed, the role of the peasantry changed and all this lead to the takeover of power by the communist party. *"In course of the execution of this plan the self-governed socio-economical institutions of the villages (headborough) were eliminated, others were transformed to propaganda-meeting events (the farmers' clubs), the other community properties (associations of forest holders, common ownerships, mountain communities) ceased to exist after their property had been collectivized. The elimination of such institutions meant at the same time the end of the rural civil society, of the variety, of different civil self-organization forms, and it prepared the process of the social homogenization."*[11]

In Szeklerland the local societies used a variety of resistance strategies and therefore the collectivization was not a coherent process in this region. In spite of this, although with time differences, the farmer cooperatives had been formed in most of the Szekler villages by the end of the fifties. Although the actual collectivization process did not take place right at the beginning of the fifties, the Szekler farmers felt in many respects, that their private property (their family lands) was in danger. In this period such local people got into leading positions, who did not possess any lands or agricultural goods at all, or they did not have any authority or prestige before their community. Related to this change, people considered, that the rate of the compulsory delivery of goods was unfair. The several restrictive measures imposed on the rural society in this period, restricted the right of people for free decisions and free actions almost completely. It was not allowed for them to sell their crops and animals, instead the burden of compulsory delivery was more and more heavier on their shoulders.

They did not dare to stand up openly against the mighty of the system, but they tried to withstand suppression and exploitation in tacit collaboration. They could not accept from the persons, who came into leading positions too easily, the humiliating behaviour and the manners of superiority. They considered, that the collecting of goods was arbitrary, abusive and unjust, especially with the leadership of those people, who were not respected by them, who did not own any land property and did not like to work either.[12]

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[8] Pászka 2009. 477.

[9] Bárdi – László 2008. 234.; László 2009. 57–58.

[10] László 2010. 1.

[11] Bárdi – László 2008. 234.

[12] Bodó 2004. 12–13.

"The great majority of these people were uneducated, lazy, worth of nothing. They could be easily influenced by some flattering promises and by the power, that they had got in their hands. After all, they did not have anything to lose, because they did not own anything. They had the power now in the village, they had become the leaders of the community. The roles had been changed. Servants became leaders and commanders, they stole anything and anywhere, where they had an occasion to do so."[13]

The financial burden was not the only reason of the resistance, the desperation felt because of the exploitation by the state was an aggravating factor as well. Fortunately the confidence of the people for each other played a big role in this period. Villagers helped each other, especially those mates, whose burdens imposed by the state were bigger, than they could cope with. Where the social strata were more outlined, the number of denunciations grew as well. Usually denunciations did not concern the people from their own environment but those, who had outstanding social positions – thus the kulaks were the most affected in these cases.

As I have already mentioned, an important goal of the political leaders in the period of collectivization was to make the life of the prosperous farmers (kulaks), belonging to the elite of the village harder and harder. In 1947 the communist takeover all over Romania took place. At first a huge press campaign began against the *"kulaks"* and then the decision was taken on the implementation of restricting measures against kulaks. There were imposed additional burdens on the kulaks in the whole country.

"The tension in the family was big, we were under great pressure, that resulted in a constant depressed mood. My parents were afraid, they did not know what to expect, and reigned by their daily fears, hopelessness and uncertainty they listened to the radio. They knew that they need to hold on because of the their four children, which they want to bring up and support. We were exposed to the system, our parents knew, that they would be among the first people, who would lose everything, who would be dragged around and imprisoned."[14]

At the beginning of the fifties the actions against the kulaks had started, and this was an another reason, why people felt, that their land properties and goods were in danger. Kulaks were considered all those wealthy villagers and their families, who possessed more hectars of land property and agricultural products and had a great prestige among the people of their community, moreover their lifestyle was a kind of model in the eyes of the villagers.[15]

"On the day my father signed the paper, all fellow villagers on the Gyímes street signed it, too. He had a great prestige in the village. People thought, if B.T. has nothing to lose, we do not have either. One of the organizers of the campaign told my father: – you should keep in mind, that this is the last deadline. Should you have refused to sign this paper, you would have ended with broken shankbones."[16]

The properties (the outbuildings) of the kulak farmers were confiscated for the head office of the collective farms and for the buildings of the farms. Their persecution and humiliation meant for their fellow villagers the destruction of the example, that they had followed before. At the same time this measure made the security of private property questionable. It is important to mention here, that in the Szekler villages, the agricultural cooperatives were established with time differences. We also have information about some villages, where these cooperatives were

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[13] Fekete Deák 2012.

[14] Fekete Deák 2013.

[15] László 2013. 15.

[16] Fekete Deák 2012.

not established at all. At the beginning of the fifties there were already some rumours about the coming collectivization, people knew, that in the places where these cooperatives existed, the lands, the agricultural equipments and the animals were taken away, this fact generated constant fear, anxiety and insecurity, which had in many ways a strong impact on the life of families. First of all people were afraid of what the fate of their family land properties will be. Some farmers sold their lands, taking into account that these would be taken from them anyway sooner or later. Though there were some families, who hoped, that collectivization will not take place and on the contrary they bought lands.

Insecurity and revulsion arouse from the fact, that *"goof-offs"* and *"people of no worth"* got into leading positions and their power became bigger and bigger. These were the people who went from house to house in the Szekler villages and using different methods – persuasion at first, then violence, too – they tried to force the farmers to join the collective farms. People had to give up as a result of the constant assaults a part of their property in favour of the cooperatives, and those who did not resign, faced serious threats. More specifically the foundation of cooperatives happened as follows: from the surrounding towns, where the administrative centres were established, agitators came into the village and they organized these cooperatives. At first only those farmers joined the cooperative, who agreed to the ideas of collectivization and who themselves collaborated in this organization work. In the initial phase it was enough to join with only one small piece of land and with one animal, for instance a sheep. But the wealthier landowners did not want to join even with a small piece of land either, because they knew, that this would finish with the confiscation of all their goods. The measures against the kulaks had already begun, but even so not less than half of the kulaks of the villages were not members of the cooperatives.[17]

In July 1950 under the pressure of the central authority the rhythm of collectivization speeded up, more aggressive methods were applied in order to force people to join the collective farms. If persuasion did not work, violence and harassment followed. (People were called to the Council, or to the Militia, some of them were beaten, others were executed or taken as hostages). In Maros county for example two farmers were killed in order to intimidate the villagers. As a reaction to the massive violence people organized demonstrations in some localities of Szeklerland. Such demonstrations took place on the territory of Háromszék county (in Kézdivásárhely and in the villages around the town Sepsiszentgyörgy) and in Marosszék (in the villages around Radnót).

The central authority was quick to respond and deported the farmers, which were considered to have been the leaders of these movements. In Háromszék county there were 34 families the members of which were disgraced. Some of these families were deported to Romanian counties, others were sentenced to prison.[18] The most severe clash took place in Sepsigidófalva on September 22, 1950. The villagers, who rose to defend the families which had received the order of deportation, clashed with the Militia commanded to the spot. Two local farmers were shot dead. By the end of the year 1950, forced collectivization had come to an end and in the upcoming period stress was laid on the organisation of the already founded collective farms. At the same time those farmers, who had already joined these collectives before, used different techniques (either avoided work or stole or concealed existing lands) to protect themselves and their property through hidden resistance against exploitation.[19]

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[17] BODÓ 2004. 15.

[18] LÁSZLÓ 2010. 1.

[19] Ibid. 1.

"HOPELESS FIGHT – THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL"

SÁNDOR OLÁH writes about the long series of silent battles in the period of collectivization between the people of the villages along Homoród river and the state authority. He discusses in detail the hidden resistance of the villagers against authority in the period of collectivization. We have got only little data about these attempts of hidden resistance, the author gathers credible information mainly from narrations, from personal encounters. The silent conflicts evoked in the essay were characteristic not only to the villages along the river Homoród, but also to other regions of the Szeklerland, where the process of collectivization took place in the same way. In the desperate, hopeless struggle people needed their entire ingenuity in order to face the monopolizers armoured with the shameful means of the political power, and to protect their property in some way.

We know from some reports written by tax collectors and functionaries to their superiors, that people tried to thwart the system with all means: sometimes they negated the extension of their territories or they tried to have profits by not declaring the whole volume of their crops and feedingstuffs in order to avoid in this way compulsory delivery or to diminish its extent.[20] They became aware, that they need to deliver less crops for the denied lands or for the lands which are owned by different members of the family, in this way the truth was revealed only when the inspecting commissions came to see various households.

Sometimes the inspecting person or the whole commission took decisions on the basis of ridiculous reasons: *"separate manure piles"* or *"crops put in different stacks"*. The tardy flow of existing data made maintanence of accurate records impossible, that is why in the case of some settlements the required data did not arrive on time or did not arrive at all to their destination. Thus neither the local nor the superior state organs could make reference to accurate information. Furthermore the farmers succeeded to get payments of advance from the state for crops, which they did not deliver later, on basis of fictitious agreements signed under false names.[21]

The control of identity of the involved persons became impossible, too. The fact, that people dictated false names of non-existent, false identity cards made the work of the inspecting authorities very difficult as well, because penalties imposed on false names could not be collected later. If farmers denied the number of animals, the extent of the crops owed in taxes decreased too and they needed to pay less taxes.

It appears from many documents, that there were founded commissions for the determination of the number of animals, especially of the sheep and these commissions carried out controls regularly. On the occasion of these inspections, the men of the authority often found twice more animals than the farmers had previously declared, as a result the superior organs demanded more severe controls and asked for supplementary compulsory deliveries. In many cases people pretended to be naive and uninformed or simply they lied to avoid the compulsory deliveries and the unfair taxation. They realized, that pretended lack of knowledge might be useful, because tax collectors could not do anything in that case. Tax collectors on their turn, seeing the effects of this pretended lack of knowledge, did the same thing in their reports to their superiors.[22]

One important momentum of the collective farming and of the inspections was threshing. On these occasions the inspectors could better control the quantity of the threshed grain and

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[20] OLÁH 2001. 208–210.

[21] Ibid.

[22] FEKETE DEÁK 2012.

could supervize the extent of the compulsorily delivered crops. Naturally there existed some outlying villages, where people avoided the common threshings not once with the help of the functionaries of the state. The violations of law which happened to come to light were followed by denunciations. Because of the problems of approaching the remote villages, in many cases the tax collectors and inspecting commissions could make inspections very rarely, and in some cases these inspections did not happen at all. There existed also some cases when foreign inspectors did not get any help at all from the local delegates, representatives.

The wealthier farmers would have liked to escape somehow from the obligations of the cooperative farming and it was pretty difficult to make them join the cooperative, moreover in some cases this turned out to be impossible. Pretending, that they understand the idea of collective farming, they tried with different pretexts to delay their joining the organization. At the meetings and on the occasion of different discussions almost everybody agreed to the ideas of the cooperative farming, but when the moment of signing of the entry declaration arrived, people found a lot of pretexts to avoid this. It was noticeable during the whole period the delaying of things, the non-payment of taxes, the non-declaration of the extent of animal stocks, crops, lands. Still the biggest problem for the farmers constituted the entry in the collective farm and the moment of the signing of the entry form. More and more commissions and organizations were founded, but they could not achieve big results in the convincing of people to enter the collective farms, moreover some of the members of the commissions themselves did not enter the farming cooperatives at all, or they joined only very late.

"Almost every day organizers came to us at undefined times, sometimes at night, sometimes very late in the evening looking for my father to get him sign the entry form. I was a little girl, and they asked me, where my father was. I showed in the direction, where I saw my father disappear, but fortunately when they got to the place, he was not there."[23]

Finally the delays, the avoiding of the meetings and gatherings lead to the result, that the collective farms were not founded at all or were founded only partially. Even the delegates or the elected commission members delayed the organization of these farms, invoking different reasons. In the year 1957 the authorities loosened their grip, the crop prices grew a little bit, many kulaks got exemptions. It was declared, that the delivery of crops was not compulsory any more, people should conclude contracts only for the quantities, which they did not need at their farms. Farmers often avoided the delivery of crops by saying they need the whole crop at their farms. As a result of the fact, that the system was less severe, people contracted less and less crops, and even those small quantities were not delivered either.

In several cases the members of the commissions themselves did not fulfill their obligations of delivery and so they lost their *"moral grounds"* to convince the farmers about the importance of contracting the crops. Collectivist leaders sent from foreign places criticised and blamed the local commissions more and more because of the frauds noticed at the compulsory deliveries of crops. Despite this many commission members began an information campaign against compulsory deliveries and against the conclusion of contracts.[24]

The payment of agistments went more and more slower, the farmers tried to justify the non-payment of taxes in different ways. They accumulated more and more debts and many farmers refused to meet almost all their obligations.

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[23] OLÁH 2001. 217–219.

[24] OLÁH 2001. 222–223.

The farmers invoked many reasons for the non-payment of taxes, one of these was *"bad weather"*. It appears from the records of seizures, that several times local tax collectors notified the indebted villagers to pay their debts. The notices were followed by direct visits to the indebted people. If the members of the commissions stated, that the farmer did not pay his taxes with bad intention, the enforcement followed directly. Records were drawn up about the enforcements, which in several cases remained stuck. Using this lack of consistence, many farmers chose to wait rather than deliver the compulsory crops. The commissions sought their superiors repeatedly to ask for the adjourning or for the abolition of the deadline of the compulsory delivery of crops. The goal of these requests was naturally to achieve, that the farmers should deliver less crops to the state or should not deliver any crops at all. Yet, the superior commissions did not agree to the requested reductions. The biggest arrears arose by the compulsory delivery of meat. The delays and the ignorance of the formal notices entailed in many cases emergency measures and seizures as defined in Act 131/1952 on Seizure.[25]

"Act 131/1952 on Seizure was in the whole period the most often mentioned »last« *coercive means of the collection campaigns. There always existed dissuasive examples of seizures or separately managed cases – the authority took care of this – but generally the local and raional apparatus postponed the imposing of the fines provided by law and the compulsory enforcements."*[26] People used every means in order to evade the duty of delivering their crops. The easiest and most uncontrollable way for this was shrugging off responsibilities. The person called to account, justified the non-delivery of the crops with some reasons, which could not be controlled by the commission. Such a reason was, that the machines did not operate properly or the field was not appropriate for sowing, etc.

The biggest problem was, as earlier, too, the signing of the definitive entry declaration in the collective farm, because people knew exactly, that those who choose to enter the cooperative, would sooner or later lose their lands, agricultural machines and animals. So farmers sought for more and more loopholes to avoid the definitive entry. On joining the collective farm, both husband and wife had to sign the entry form, sometimes the heads of the families invoked the fact, that they could not convince their wives about the entry yet. Therefore a separate propaganda was applied for the recruitment of women, the attempts to convince them having some well defined characteristics. Another problem constituted the involvement of the people in outlying villages and farms, because these people were their own masters all their lives and nobody forced them to do anything earlier.

The submission of lands to the collective farms was a difficult matter as well. The farmers and the members of the local cooperatives, who made the reports either about the submission of lands or about the compulsory delivery of crops, expected, that the person sent by the superior control body, does not know anything about farming or about animal husbandry. Therefore they mentioned sometimes incorrect or too obvious reasons in order to relieve or to avoid the compulsory delivery of crops or the submission of their lands. People wanted to protect with any possible means the objects belonging to their fortunes or their other movable or immovable property, which the state wanted to take from them against their will. The inventiveness of the farmers moved on a large scale, either they denied the amount of their properties, or they transferred these to their relatives, or they hid their crops and animals in order to protect their properties in some way. Finally by the end of the fifties, due to the persistent work and to the implementation of enforcement measures, in most villages of Szeklerland the collective farms had been founded.

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[25] OLÁH 2001. 222.

[26] OLÁH 2001. 235–237.

Yet despite the inciting propaganda oppositions increased, more and more commission members or people, who were considered leaders of the community and used to set an example for their mates, refused to collaborate with the local collective farms. Under the burdens it became more and more difficult to maintain order in the communities. The farmers did everything to prevent, that their lands would be assimilated and reparcelled. The matter of *"the exchange of lands"* was another measure of the new system, which created a lot of complications as well. In order to organize the cultivation of the lands properly, they needed to group the lands of the cooperative in big plots. Those farmers, who did not give in some of their lands into the cooperative, did not want to exchange their lands. Those who entered the cooperative, brought rather their poor-quality lands into the collective farm and let their good-quality lands outside. There existed cases, when instead of cultivating their own lands people ploughed the pasture of their neighbours and there they produced the amount of crops, which needed to be delivered. Sometimes they refused to meet the requests of delivery, invoking that the crop is not big enough.[27]

The inventiveness of the farmers was boundless. They realized, that they can conclude contracts on crops, which require much less work, as the amount and the type of crop people had to produce on a given land, was not regulated. So farmers produced a larger amount of those types of crops, which were not labour-intensive and less from the types of crops which needed more work. Thus the later complaints of the commissions were in vain, they could not do anything, as long as the contracted lands were covered completely and the crops were delivered, too. Guilty was the commission, which through carelessness concluded contracts over several years on such type of crops, which favoured the respective farmers.

People also realized, that it might be better for them to give their lands as presents to others or to sell them, to slaughter their animals contrary to the prohibition or to sell them on the black market, because in this way, they could avoid entering the collective farms. The commissions noticed these practices only when the moment of the compulsory delivery arrived, and some farmers did not have any properties any more or they had only very little lands to join the collective farms with. In these cases the imposed inspection did not find any animals or crops belonging to that farmer. Yet, because of the compulsory character of the delivery, the farmers tried to fill the gap of their material loss, by selling crops of poor-quality or which were unusable. The quality of crops as well as that of the products of animal origin was doubtful: the grain was of poor-quality, the milk contained water, the wool contained water as well or was sprinkled with sand, the delivered animals were slim.

Pursuant to Decision MT 676/1959 black slaughters were punished with prison.[28]

The people of the newly installed system did everything to prevent the farmers in their ambition to protect their property. The exploitation of the poor people and the negative effects of that epoch got to a level, where people were forced to damage the common property whenever there was an occasion to it. The grain disappeared from locked store rooms, the tools from the common penthouses, etc. The communist system tried to act against this vandalism by implementing a new jurisdiction and applying a new propaganda, which intended to appeal to the conscience of people. The tightenings brought instead of the denunciations silent consent and complicity even from the part of the commissions. Furthermore, the complete indifference regarding collective farming also damaged the common property. People had no interests in the proper keeping and feeding of the animals of the collective farms and in this way in many cases the animals died.

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[27] Oláh 2001. 237.

[28] Oláh 2001. 238–240.

Summarizing thoughts

Collectivization was a characteristic phenomenon of the period of communism and its aim was the complete transformation of the rural society and of rural farming according to the Soviet model. During this process an aggressive liquidation of the private farms and the foundation of collective agricultural large-scale farms took place. The process of collectivization in Szeklerland lasted from 1947–48 until 1962. This long lasting period manifested itself in its complexity, generating fierce emotions, conflicts, but at the same time creating pretended agreement, silent opposition, uncertainty and anxiety. The several restrictive measures impeded the free decision and free acting of people almost completely. In the desperate and hopeless struggle people needed all their ingenuity to stand up to the expropriators armoured with all repressive means of the power and to protect their properties in some way. The financial burdens and the desperation felt because of the exploitation of the state caused conflicts and resistance and also some hidden activities, which were considered illegal by the state. People in Szeklerland still have not got over the events of these aggressive pursuit of power, which had as a result private and collective traumas.

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Is the EU Accession
a Critical Juncture
for Romania's Language Policy?

Abstract

In the course of history, Romania's Transylvania was the home of a number of different ethno-linguistic groups, including Hungarians, Romanians, Germans, Jews and Roma among others. After the First World War, and particularly during the last decades of the communist regime, however, pressures to create a highly centralized, uniform, monolingual state with the Romanian language as its only official language have largely increased. This uniformizing French style Jacobin language policy became a key element of the Romanian state tradition, supported by the make-up of its institutions and legal provisions. As a consequence, the languages of Romania have been ordered hierarchically with the official Romanian language outranking the different minority languages, including Hungarian, German, Roma, Ukrainian, Slovakian, Serbian, Bulgarian, Ruthenian, Russian and so on. In this framework, the minority languages could be used at a local and regional level only. However, minority language use was restricted by language laws, thresholds and other hampering measures. The country's accession to the European Union (EU) in 2007 has been celebrated as a critical juncture challenging the canonical top-down Jacobin state tradition and its exclusive language policy with respect to the minority languages. The analysis presented in this paper will weigh the pro's and contra's of this claim. It will be concluded that although minority languages have received more recognition under the new EU order than under former Romanian nationalizing regimes, like the preceding post-communist and communist rules, the implementation of a permissive minority language policy still shows serious deficiencies. It will be concluded that the accession of Romania to the EU can hardly be referred to as a critical juncture concerning its language policy.

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INTRODUCTION

In this paper, I will address the question whether the accession of Romania in 2007 to the EU can be considered as a critical juncture for the country's language policy.[1] In order to answer this research hypothesis we will make an analysis of the Union's language regime and the language regime of Romania which has to coop with traditional ethno-linguistic diversity.[2] The question is important because it is argued that due to the architectural make-up of the EU cultural and linguistic diversity receive much more recognition than in the old system of the European nation states, i.e. the so-called Westphalian framework.[3] To make an insightful analysis that elaborates on the architectural structure of the EU to which Romania joined in 2007 it will be unavoidable to include historical-cultural aspects of the development of the modern Romanian state after the First World War.

In order to elaborate on a detailed analysis of the state traditions of Romania I will rely on the analytical tools which have been put forward in the volume *State Traditions and Language Regimes* (henceforth STLR) edited by Linda Cardinal and Selma Sonntag. In the introduction of their book they argue that in order to find an explanation for the nature and origin of language policy designed by the state the notion of *'state tradition'* defined as a conceptual framework for understanding language policy choices in a dynamic context, i.e. historical, institutional and normative ones, needs to be deconstructed.[4] Cardinal and Sonntag outline in their introduction to STLR two analytical tools in order to link state traditions to policy choices. These involve *'path dependency'* and *'critical junctures'*. The former focuses on the historical continuity

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[2] See the following references: Bárdi et al. 2011; Cadzow et al. 1983; Köpeczi 1994.

[3] See the following references for this claim Grabbe 2006; Jackson Preece 1997; Kymlicka 1996, 2008; Kymlicka – Opalski 2001; Marácz 2011; May 2012; Sasse 2005, 2008; Williams 2013.

[4] Compare Sonntag – Cardinal 2015. 4.

of state traditions. History is important in order to get insight into the *why?* and *how?* questions of language policies.[5] The concept of *'critical junctures'* homes in on pivotal points of interaction between tradition and policy. A political science approach towards language policy also allows us to redefine the outcome of the interplay of state traditions and language policies, i.e. the concept of *'language regime'* defined in STLR as *"language practices as well as conceptions of language and language use as projected through state policies and as acted upon by language users".*[6] It is true that according to modern sociolinguistics language regimes are *"socially constructed"* but languages regimes are connected, designed, promoted, and so on by the state in the first place. This observation demonstrates the merits of an interdisciplinary approach towards language policy. Both normatively and non-normatively driven analyses are relevant to understand the interface between state and society patterns.

The concept of *'path dependency'* is probably easier to grasp on the basis of a historical and legal analysis than the concept of *'critical juncture'* which implies a change in the state tradition that facilitates radical changes in a country's linguistic regime. It must be admitted that the concept of critical juncture is harder to operate with. It is easier to operate with what Capoccia and Kelemen call process tracing and other general forms of structured, theory-guided narratives which are relevant for the analysis of path dependency.[7] Critical junctures however are characterized by pivotal points of interaction between tradition and policy. According to the description of Sonntag and Cardinal, this can be a very wide array of what they call major historical shifts, like decolonization, war, redrawing of national borders, the dissolution of old states, and new patterns of governance – but ones never completely divorced from the old state of affairs.[8]

A major shift in the modern history of Europe was certainly the EU becoming a political union, when the Maastricht Treaty was concluded in 1992. Europeanization introduced innovative concepts of governance competing with the nation state, like multi-level governance, transparent borders, supranational rules and regulations, and so on.[9] Furthermore, it has been observed that the European architecture was advantageous for the recognition of multilingualism and linguistic diversity.[10] The Case studies in STLR demonstrate that not all European languages are affected in the same manner and degree by this major shift in history. Although it is clear that changing power constellations are involved in critical junctures it is not always clear that these power constellations are strong enough to bring the *'path dependency'* off course in all the relevant domains. In sum, although it seems well-motivated to analyze Europeanization in terms of a critical juncture the exploring analyses in STLR unambiguously demonstrate that language regimes might be affected otherwise in each single case. Hence, there seems to be a more subtle interplay between state traditions and major historical shifts than the editors point out in their introductory chapter of STLR.[11]

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[5] Compare Sonntag – Cardinal 2015. 4.

[6] Compare Sonntag – Cardinal 2015. 6.

[7] Compare Capoccia – Kelemen 2007. 355.

[8] Compare Sonntag – Cardinal 2015. 4–5.

[9] See Mccormick 2015; Lelieveldt – Princen 2014; Scholten – Penninx 2016.

[10] Compare Marácz – Rosello 2012; Vizi 2012.

[11] See Sonntag – Cardinal 2015. 3–26.

European Union

After the collapse of communism, the countries in the western part of the former orbit of the Soviet-Union have integrated into the EU. It is difficult to characterize the enlarged European Union as a political entity. It can be argued that it is a hybrid structure compromising institutional aspects of the traditional European system of nation states and institutional aspects of federalism, like the European Commission and other institutions of the EU.[12]

In order to understand the politics of multilingualism in the member states of the post-Soviet space it is necessary to investigate political and institutional aspects of both systems, i.e. the nation state system and the more recent supranational features of the EU. Seemingly, there is a conflict in this system. Traditional nineteenth century nation states are characterized by the concept of *'one state-one nation-one language'*, whereas the supranational aspects of the EU imply a different relation between the European citizen and the so-called European institutions. In the European framework, there is no one-to-one mapping between citizenship-institutions and language. Here comes in the issue of multilingualism and the politics of multilingualism, for the language regimes and the use of individual languages is dictated by power constellations.[13] Although a complete multilingual regime is guaranteed in the EU by language regulation 1/1958, this language regime has not *"percolated down"* to the member states of the Union. By large in the member states a restricted set of languages are official and might function as a lingua franca for the citizens that live in the territories where those languages are used. This traditional language situation, characterized by a so-called upgrading of national languages onto the level of the EU, does not hold factually in the EU. European language policy is further guided by an educational resolution that was adopted at the Barcelona European Council in 2002, the so-called 1 + 2 formula.[14] The Barcelona formula states that every citizen should be taught to master at least two foreign languages in addition to his or her mother tongue. A recent resolution on multilingualism adopted by the European Parliament on 24 March 2009 states that the Union *"Reiterates its political priority of the acquisition of language skills through the learning of other EU languages, one which should be the language of a neighboring country and other international '(...) »lingua franca« (...)' (compare article 36)"*.

The conflict consists in the fact that in the traditional model of nation states the matching between the official language of the nation state and the mother tongue of its citizens was taken for granted, although we know from a number of studies on linguistic diversity in the history of Europe, that this was not perfect in the nineteenth century's Westphalian system of nation states. In nineteenth century's Europe linguistic diversity was normally an inherent feature of the societies that were claimed to be monolingual. An eloquent example of this state of affairs where linguistic diversity was implemented in the language regime was the Austro–Hungarian Empire.[15] Although in the two parts of the Austro–Hungarian Empire, i.e. the Austrian parts and the Hungarian territories the language regimes were not completely identical, the languages of the different traditional ethnic minorities referred to in legal texts as *'nationalities'* had an official position in the public sphere and at the levels of regional and local governance.

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[12] See McCormick 2015; Lelieveldt – Princen 2014.

[13] See Marácz 2012.

[14] See Marácz 2012. 21.

[15] See Marácz 2012. 23–27.

In a similar fashion the language policy schemes of the EU leave more space for the detachment of mother tongue and official languages, as compared to the traditional nation states schemes. This detachment has been recognized by the Council of Europe, an organization monitoring the issue of human rights in the states of Europe and closely involved in the conditioned accession of candidate member states to the EU.[16] Two conventions of the Council of Europe guarantee the linguistic rights of traditional minorities in the states that are a partner to these legal treaties, i.e. the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM) signed on 1 February 1995 in Strassbourg and the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML) adopted on 5 November 1992 also in Strassbourg. Both charters have been included by the Union as one of the four accession – the so-called Copenhagen – criteria for EU membership. Especially the new EU-candidate countries from the post-Soviet space having traditional ethno-linguistic minorities on their territory had to fulfill the obligations of these charters before they could enter the Union. As a result of these supranational interventions concerning member state accession a supranational linguistic space in the EU has been developing.[17]

It has been argued that the apparent conflict sketched above between the classical nation state model inherited from the Westphalian system and the supranational features of the EU and its satellite organizations, like the Council of Europe can be resolved in a flexible framework of multi-level governance (MLG). MLG is able to absorb the characteristics of the national Westphalian system and the ones of federal systems, like the EU.[18] The idea is that policy is generated as an outcome of the interplay between different levels of governance, distinguishing different tiers that might operate autonomously but also in an interactive fashion, including the supranational Brussels, the national, regional and local tiers. This model incorporates enough flexibility to analyze seemingly antagonistic language regimes within one and the same analytic model. In order to demonstrate the working of the European system concerning Romania let us first discuss Romania's state tradition and language regime.

ROMANIAN LANGUAGE POLICY

The First World War can be interpreted as a *'critical juncture'*. Three traditional continental empires that had dominated the European history for centuries, at least in the Central and Eastern European space, i.e. the Habsburg Empire, Tsarist Russian, and the German Empire collapsed as a consequence of the Great War. In the aftermath of these collapses a new territorial state ordering of newly established or enlarged states, and a rearrangement of internal political power constellations took place. The guiding principles for these rearrangements were democratic ethnic self-determination in accordance with the Fourteen Points declared by US president Woodrow Wilson during the First World War. The national and democratic rearrangement of Central and Eastern Europe was implemented at the Versailles Peace Conference in a series of peace treaties under the responsibility of the victories powers, the so-called Allied Powers.[19]

The Austro–Hungarian Empire was dissolved by the Treaty of Saint-German (10 September 1919) which was concerned with the Austrian part of the empire and the Treaty of Trianon

[16] See the following references: Gál 2000; Skovgaard 2007; Schwellnuss 2005.

[17] Compare Brubaker 1996; Csergő – Goldgeier 2013; Marby et al. 2013; Marácz 2014a, 2015a, 2015b, 2016.

[18] See the papers in Scholten – Penninx 2016.

[19] Compare Chaszar 1982.

(4 June 1920) which regulated the partitioning of the Hungarian kingdom. Romania was one of the states that benefitted from these Peace Treaties. Due to these treaties Romania doubled its size. After the First World War in 1920, the country covered an area of 295 square kilometers and integrated the following areas next to the core Romanian state, the Romanian kingdom established in 1881, i.e. Bessarabia from Russia, Bukovina from Austria, Transylvania, and parts of East Hungary and the Bánát region from Hungary. Due to its heterogeneous territorial make-up Greater Romania was an ethno-linguistically diverse country. Of the approximately eighteen million inhabitants of Greater Romania 28.1 percent were ethno-linguistically non-Romanian.[20]

The country consisted of the following ethno-linguistic groups, including Romanians 12,981,000 (71.9 per cent), Hungarians 1,425,000 (7.8 per cent); Germans 745,000 (4.0 per cent); Ruthenians 582,000 (3.2 per cent); Russians 409,000 (3.2 per cent); Bulgarians 366,000 (2.1 per cent); Turks 154,000 (0.8 per cent), and others 990,000 (5.3 per cent).[21] The rights of these ethno-linguistic minorities were guaranteed by special treaties for minority protection, namely the Treaty *'Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Romania Concerning Minority Protection'*. This treaty was signed in Paris, December 9, 1991.[22] On behalf of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, the US, United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan signed the so-called Minority Treaty of Paris. Articles 2 and 8 of the Treaty were meant as fundamental laws being of a higher order than any potential Roman legal order (see article 1). These minority treaties annexing the First World War Peace Treaties were supposed to be monitored by the League of Nations, a supranational organization that was established as an outcome of the new European order established by the Paris Peace Conference (see article 12 of the minority treaty). Article 2 of the Treaty included a non-discriminative clause, i.e. *"no discrimination is allowed in Romania on the basis of birth, nationality, race, religion, or language"*. In article 8 there is a prohibition on the ban by the state on the use of the languages of the Romanian nationals of non-Romanian speech in private and public spheres and free speech of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts, independently of whatever the official language of Greater Romania would be, i.e. it was expected to be Romanian. Article 11 of the minority treaty guaranteed the communities of the German-speaking Saxons and Hungarian-speaking Szeklers in Transylvania local autonomy in regards to school and religious matters, subject to the control of the Romanian State. Both communities enjoyed an ethno-linguistic majority in their home territories, i.e. Szeklerland, roughly a territory consisting of contiguous traditional counties in the northeastern part of Transylvania and Saxon land bordering to west of Szeklerland.[23] The Minority Protection Treaty with Romania guaranteed the use of the German, and Hungarian language on the basis of the personality principle, although the Szekler and Saxon ethno-linguistic communities were in clear majorities in their own territories.[24] In practice, this implied that these ethno-linguistic communities could use the German, and the Hungarian language respectively in the domain of the school system, especially in institutions of primary and secondary education, and in the frameworks of their religious organizations, i.e. the Hungarians were members of the Reformed, Unitarian, and Roman Catholic Churches, while the Saxons were above all members of the Evangelical Church.

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[20] See NAGY 1994.

[21] See BÁRDI ET AL. 2011.

[22] See NAGY 1944. 212–221.

[23] Compare ELEKES 2011; KOCSIS 2013; LIPCSEY 1990.

[24] See for a discussion of the personality and territoriality principles MCRAE 1975; DEMBINSKA ET AL. 2014.

After the Romanian State had established itself in the newly acquired territories a new Romanian Constitution was adopted in 1923.[25] Article 126 declared the Romanian language to be the official language of the state. As the Minority Protection Treaty already anticipated to this future move of the Romanian State it had to guarantee the use of the other languages of non-Romanian speaking Romanian nationals. However, declaring the Romanian language the official language of the state for its whole territory without recognizing the traditional Saxon land, Szeklerland and large groups of ethno-linguistic Hungarians, Germans, Roma and other nationalities in Transylvania introduced a Jacobin state tradition in the domain of the Romanian language regime. Article 126 introduced a hierarchy of languages in Romania with the language of the ethno-linguistic Romanian majority ranking higher than the minority language even in territories in Transylvania where the minorities were in majority. The declaration of the Romanian language as an official language became an important tool in realizing another important Jacobin objective of the Romanian State declared in article 1 of the 1923 Constitution. This article declared Romania to be an indivisible, national unitary state. In the light of the ethno-linguistic diversity statistics presented above this led to the *'nationalizing state'* in the sense of Rogers Brubaker with assimilation strives targeting the non-Romanian speaking minorities of Romania.[26]

In the turbulent course of the twentieth century up to now the constitutional declaration of an indivisible, independent, sovereign and Romanian national unitary state has been the key concept of the Romanian State whatever its state form was. Between 1881–1947, Romania was a constitutional monarchy; between 1947–1989 it was a republic based on the communist regime; and from 1989 up to today Romania is a liberal democratic state which has been a member of the EU since 2007. The concept of Romanian national unitary is declared in the 1923/1, 1938/1, 1948/1, 1952/preambule, 1965/1, 1991/1, and 2003/1 constitutions. Next to the concept of the Romanian unitary state which is based on an ethno-linguistic Romanian majority Romanian as the official language of the state is explicitly declared in the Constitutions of the constitutional Romanian kingdom, i.e. 1923/126, 1938/94, and in the present liberal democratic Constitutions 1991/13, and 2003/13.

In the Constitutions of the communist period the official language of the Romanian national unitary state is not declared in a particular article but it is clear from the communist Constitutions that the languages of the minorities or *'cohabitating nationalities'* as they are referred to are of a lower order than the Romanian state language. Note that after the Second World War Romania got into the orbit of the Soviet Union and the arrangements of the First World War were no longer considered valid for the Central and Eastern European space. In the beginning of the socialist period the Romanian State did some concessions in the field of Hungarian language use in Szeklerland under pressure of the Soviet Union. In the Constitution of 1948 the language of the minorities can be used on the basis of the personality principle (see articles 24, and 68). The legal position of the Hungarian language even improved in the 1952 Constitution. Between 1952 and 1968 an administrative-territorial unit functioned with equal rights of the Hungarian language to the official Romanian language. The establishment of a Hungarian region followed the nationality practice of the Soviet Union.[27] Hence, Stefano Bottoni calls this form of *"autonomy"* a gift of Stalin to the Romanian Hungarians.[28]

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[25] See for the text of the Romanian Constitutions: http://www.rogoveanu.ro/constitutia.html, accessed at June 1, 2017.

[26] Compare Brubaker 1996.

[27] See Bottoni 2008, 2013; Bottoni – Novák 2011.

[28] Stefano Bottoni personal communication.

In the preambule of the 1952 Constitution the Hungarian language is declared to have an equal status to the Romanian language in an administrative-territorial unit, the so-called Hungarian Autonomous Region (HAR) which matched more or less the traditional Szeklerland and existed between 1952 and 1960. Here *'autonomous'* should be read between inverted comma's, for the HAR remained centrally controlled by the Romanian State (1952/20,21). Only on the territory of the HAR a compact majority of Hungarian-speaking Szeklers was allowed to use Hungarian as a language of public administration (see 1952/19) turning the public administration of the HAR into bilingual Hungarian and Romania.[29] The communication between the central organs of the HAR in Tîrgu Mures (Hun. Marosvásárhely) and the Romanian power centre in Bucharest took however place in the official language of the state, i.e. Romanian. Interestingly, the second popular language at the Hungarian primary and secondary schools in the HAR was Russian before the Romanian state language. This led to tensions with the Romanian central authorities.[30] The fact that Hungarian was an official language in the HAR weakened the position of the Hungarian language in other parts of Transylvania, excluding all other Hungarian communities in Transylvania from the use of the Hungarian language in public administration and the public spheres. In the fifties bilingual Romanian and Hungarian geographical signs were only allowed to be used on the territory of the HAR. In the rest of Transylvania even in places with a Hungarian majority this was ruled out.[31] In the second half of the sixties the Romanization drives of Transylvania also affected the *"autonomy"* of the HAR. The Romanization of the HAR intensified, when its territorial borders were changed with the goal to reduce the Hungarian majority in the HAR and to increase the number of the persons belonging to the Romanian minority in the region. The newly demographically engineered Hungarian region was referred to as the Mureș (Hun. Maros)-Hungarian Autonomous Region (MHAR). The Romanian constitution of 1965 guaranteed the free use of the languages of non-Romanian nationalities within special administrative-territorial units, like the MHAR. In practice however, the so-called Hungarian language administration was hampered by the increase of Romanian speaking persons. The newly created MHAR functioned between 1960 and 1968 before it was dissolved by the Ceaușescu regime.

In the post-Soviet period the new liberal democratic Constitution of 1991 and its modified version of 2003 both declare Romania a national unitary state (1999/1, 2003/1) and Romanian as the official language of the State (1991/13, 2003/13). Article 32 of the 1991 and 2003 Constitutions specify the language right of persons belonging to national minorities. These language rights are based on the personality principle.[32] Minority language speakers have the right to learn their mother tongue and receive education in their mother tongue (1991/23, 2003/32). The use of minority languages at regional and local levels is regulated by the second paragraph of article 120 of the Romanian Constitution (1991, 2003) guaranteeing the use of minority languages in administrative-territorial units and public services. This is further specified by government decision No. 1206, from 27 November 2001, regarding the Law on Local Public administration no. 215/2001, Paragraph 19, Article 2, stating:[33]

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[29] See Lipcsey 1990. 72.

[30] See Bottoni 2008. 120., 391.

[31] See Lipcsey 1990. 72.

[32] See Gal 2008; Csergő 2007; Nádor – Szarka 2003.

[33] Compare Horváth et al. 2010.

Authorities of public and local administrations, public institutions subordinated to them as well as decentralized public services, ensure the use of the mother tongue in their relationships with national minorities, in those administrative-territorial units in which the percentage of citizens belonging to national minorities are over 20 percent; all according to the Constitution, the present law and the international treaties to which Romania is a party.

Note that Hungarian language use is subject to asymmetries in Romania, even when it may be officially used. Firstly, its use is allowed in accordance with the personality principle but it is restricted by the threshold rule of twenty per cent. At least twenty per cent of the total inhabitants of an administrative-territorial unit must be minority language speakers in order to give the minority language an official status. Hence, this can be referred to as linguistic personality restricted by negative territoriality.[34] The second asymmetry which pops up is asymmetric bilingualism. Even when there is a large majority of Hungarian speakers in an administrative-territorial unit mother tongue speakers of Romanian are never required to learn or speak Hungarian but vice versa is not the case.[35]

ANALYSIS

Let us consider the research question of this paper again: Is EU accession a critical juncture for Romania's language policy? The First World War was a clear critical juncture affecting the make-up of states and their internal administration in the Central- and Eastern European space. The Romanian language became the official language of the enlarged Romanian state. As a consequence, the languages of the national and ethnic minorities, referred to as *'nationalities'* in the Interbellum, were outranked by the Romanian language. The use of Hungarian, German and other minority languages in Transylvania or in administrative-territorial units with a Hungarian majority, like in the counties of historic Szeklerland was a matter of the personality principle, and referred exclusively to the religious, educational and judicial domains. The use of Romania's minority languages was not authorized by the internal legal system but was guaranteed by an external legal provision, the Minority Protection Treaty concluded at the Paris Peace Conference and guarded by the League of Nations. In practice, however a forced language shift from the minority languages to the official Romanian language took place.[36]

An important consequence of the official status of the Romanian language and the application of the personality principle regulating the language use of the minority languages was asymmetric bilingualismy The latter is a second constant feature of the Romanian language regime. Since the First World War up to now members of the Hungarian ethno-linguistic minority always had to learn the official language of the state, i.e. Romanian but members of the Romanian majority were never obliged to learn or to speak the Hungarian language, not even when they were living in a territorially demarcated region with a Hungarian majority, like the HAR or its Romanized successor, the MHAR. Even in these so-called autonomous Hungarian regions under Romania's communist regime there was in fact a bilingual public administration operative based on the personality principle. The Romanian language was as the state language obligatory in the primary

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[34] Compare BRUBAKER ET AL. 2006; CSATA – MARÁCZ 2016.

[35] Compare HORVÁTH 2005; PÉNTEK 2006, 2013.

[36] See BOTTONI 2008. 120., 164–166.

and secondary curriculum for mother tongue speakers of Hungarian as well. On the other hand, Romanian mother tongue speakers could always use their own language for communication with the public authorities and in their own Romanian institutes for education. So, most of the ethnic Hungarian language speakers spoke Romanian but not vice versa. Although it must be said that especially in the first period of the HAR the quality of Romanian among ethnic Hungarians was low, even in the circles of the Hungarian communist cadre which was instructed by the central organs of the Romanian Communist Party to use the Romanian official language.

After the collapse of communism the Romanian language regime anchored in the 1991 Constitution is clearly path dependent on the historical state tradition. Its two constant characteristics, which might be referred to as *'diagnostics'* of the Romanian language regime can be clearly detected. The first diagnostic is the language hierarchy. This hierarchy is caused by the official status of the Romanian language in the Romanian Constitution outranking all other minority languages spoken on the territory of Romania, including Hungarian. The second diagnostic is asymmetric bilingualism. Successive Romanian Constitutions guarantee the language use of the other languages of Romania, including the minority languages only on the basis of the personality and not on the basis of the territoriality principle. Territoriality is relevant for the use of the Hungarian language and other minority languages but only as a negative condition restricting the personality principle by a demographic factor, i.e. the twenty per cent threshold rule per territorial-administrative unit.[37] This implies that Romanian mother tongue speakers do not need to learn or to speak Hungarian, even if they live in administrative-territorial units with a Hungarian majority, such as in specific regional areas of Transylvania, like the counties of historic Szeklerland but all Hungarian minority speakers have to learn and to speak Romanian. The latter but not the former is a requirement in the official primary and secondary school curriculum. However, research makes clear that asymmetric bilingualism is disadvantageous for the weaker language, in this case the Hungarian minority language as opposed to the Romanian state language.[38]

Although Romania's accession to the EU in 2007 is a clear critical juncture in the country's state tradition affecting many features of the political, socio-economic and institutional spheres both *'diagnostics'* of the traditional language regime can be observed in the societal context. The critical juncture of 2007 has not brought a fundamental change in the language policy of the country. There is no equality of the languages used on the territory of Romania, or in its Transylvanian parts where most of the minority languages are being spoken, nor is there symmetric bilingualism in Transylvanian administrative-territorial units with a Hungarian majority, like in the traditional counties in historic Szeklerland.[39] From the point of language policy and language regime the accession of Romania to the EU can hardly be called a critical juncture. It is true that the liberal regime in the post-Soviet space of which Romania is a part too has some positive side effects on the language use of the minority languages that are due to the liberal democratic and commercial market society empowering the use of minority languages in the public spheres. European transnational actors and structures have positively affected the language situation of minority languages after the accession of Romania to the EU.[40]

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[37] See MARÁCZ 2014b.

[38] See LAPONCE 1987; KISS 2015; CSATA 2016.

[39] Compare MARÁCZ 2017.

[40] Compare MARÁCZ 2014c, 2015c.

A supranational actor, like the Council of Europe guarantees the linguistic rights of traditional minorities in European states that are a partner in two of their legal treaties concerned, i.e. the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. Romania has ratified both treaties as well.[41] So, the position of the Hungarian minority language governed by the personality principle, especially in the domains of education and public administration, enjoys *"external"*, supranational protection from these treaties and from the transnational spaces that are created in Europe.[42] Due to the transnational spaces information and communication flows via Internet, social media and so on heavily intensifies the use of the Hungarian language both in the private and public sphere. Supranational market regulation will be favorable for the promotion of Hungarian–Transylvanian local and regional brands and other Hungarian–Transylvanian products and services. These commercial and business activities and products rely on the Hungarian language among the Hungarian ethno-linguistic community, like the use of Hungarian language labels for foodstuffs and other brands.[43] However, all these additional opportunities to boost the use of the Hungarian and other minority languages in Romania have not changed the path dependent institutional-legal position of these languages. Although these opportunities clearly empower the speakers of the Romanian minority languages one cannot classify them as counter-hegemony. Hence, the conclusion cannot be drawn that the accession of the Romania to the EU has been a critical juncture with respect to its language policy and regime.

CONCLUSION

It seems that we run into a paradoxical state of affairs, namely the EU accession of Romania in 2007 is a critical juncture resulting into institutional changes but not in the domain of language policy and regime. However, Capoccia and Kelemen point out that critical junctures need not have to affect all the policy-making domains: *"While relevant events happening at one of these levels of analysis may influence the others, analytically it is important to keep them separate and to identify the critical juncture clearly with respect to the development of a specific unit of analysis"*.[44] Hence, this is clearly the case with the Romanian language regime. How general this exception in the countries in the western part of the post-Soviet space is I will leave as a question for further research.

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[41] Compare MARÁCZ 2016. 31–32.

[42] Compare JANSSENS ET AL. 2013.

[43] Compare CSATA 2015.

[44] Compare CAPOCCIA – KELEMEN 2007. 350.

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Statistical Research on NEET (Not in Employment, Education or Training) in a Hungarian City

ABSTRACT

This work is based on one of my researches that was published in Hungarian language in 2016.[1]

Present study focuses on young people who are *NEET* (*N*ot in *E*mployment, *E*ducation or *T*raining) and it especially deals with the NEET population in a Hungarian city, called Szeged. This town is located in south-east Hungary, the third most populated city in the country.

In this study the author presents the number of the NEET group in Szeged, and also focuses on the qualification levels of the members of the NEET group. Both perspectives provide data and further inspiration for future studies in the country.

The research applied different statistical data sets from two informants; one of them is called Central Statistics Office (CSO), the other one is called Employment Department (ED). Both of them are located in Szeged as local organisations of their main Offices.

International data (EUROSTAT, OECD) show that the issue of NEET is a considerable problem in the European Union as well as in Hungary. Furthermore, the size of the NEET group in Hungary was higher in the research year than the average in the EU and the OECD.

The research points out that the size of the NEET group in Szeged is considerably high (7.31%), and the rate of man is higher (8.11%) than of women (6.57%). On the other hand, the overall qualification level is very low within the NEET which may entail integration difficulties into employment or education in the future.

Apart from the fact that the NEET rate is fairly high in the town, it needs to draw attention to a very challenging issue due to the different measurement procedures coming from the two informants. The local ED is able to measure those members of the NEET group who are registered by the ED and also agreed to cooperate with the competent office. However, the CSO works from a survey which was generally taken in the Hungarian population. This was a census taken in 2011. Therefore, its scope was wider than the ED's. The research has shown that the local ED, which registers the members of the local NEET group, is not able to see more than half of the whole NEET population (55.72%) in Szeged. Thus, apart from this statistical number, we do not know more information about the greater part of the NEET group in Szeged.

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[1] The paper was published in Hungary. SÁNTA 2016b.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Objective

This study explicitly does not introduce the concept of *NEET* (*N*ot in *E*mployment, *E*ducation or *T*raining) nor does it focus on the NEET group generally because several international and Hungarian literatures have dealt with this subject so far, and in a former paper the author also elaborated on that (SÁNTA 2016a; See also: SPIELHOFER ET AL. 2009; COLES ET AL. 2010; SISSIONS – JONES 2012).

In here it is sufficient to give a definition of NEET as a starting point for further studying of the focus group: *The NEET is a separate, clearly defined and statistically measurable cohort whose members are aged between 15–24 years, and who are unemployed, they are not in the education system or taking part in any training* (SÁNTA 2016a).

This study explicitly focuses on a question: *What is the size of the NEET group in Szeged within the total 15–24 year-olds age group?*

The paper also concentrates on the qualification levels achieved by the members of the NEET group. These data indicate the most vulnerable sub-groups in the main cohort.

The NEET issue has a huge challenge for Europe and as a member of the European Union, for Hungary as well in the 21th century (JANCSÁK 2011a; See also: KÁTAI 2006; JANCSÁK – KÁTAI 2013). *"Young people are one of the largest sources for Europe because they can embody everything what the future may hold"* (JANCSÁK 2011a. 135.). However, young people have serious challenges to step in the labour market as well as to take part in the education or training system. The situation is no better in Hungary wherein the NEET rate is considerably high as was mentioned in one of my former studies (SÁNTA 2016a).

Dealing with the NEET issue is reinforced by researches on young people who have a vulnerable situation in the labour market and the education system. Some youth sociologists in Hungary (JANCSÁK 2013; See also: JANCSÁK 2011b; NAGY 2008; BAUER – SZABÓ 2011; GÁBOR 2012) who dealt with the problem from a youth planning point of view emphasise that *"the youth*

on a shady side have been surrounded by a forest of unattainable and unrealizable opportunities" (Jancsák 2013. 15.). These valorise a deeper scientific understanding of the world of young people who are NEET.

However, publications which explicitly dealt with the numbers of the NEET group in towns or regions in Hungary have not been yet. This research from this approach is a pioneering work and hopefully gives inspiration for further studies in Hungary in the future.

1.2 Hypothesis and expected results

The research originates from a hypothesis that the rate of the NEET group in Hungary is high. This is based on the results of the EUROSTAT and the OECD (European Commission 2012, 2013, 2014; OECD 2013, 2014, 2015). In this study this hypothesis will be supported by data from the Centre Statistics Office (CSO) and also from the Csongrád County Government Office Employment Department (ED) in Hungary.

The methodological procedures of the two informants (CSO and ED) differ from each other. Therefore, it is presumable that the rate of the NEET group is higher than the rate of the officially registered NEET group. To prove this assumption Szeged was chosen, the third largest Hungarian city in terms of population (Local Equal Opportunity Programs in Szeged [LEOPiSZ] 2013). Therefore, the population of Szeged is able to provide an adequate multiplicity to define the rate of the NEET group, and possible changes in its numbers.

Presumably the expected result is that – the examined census data from 2011, and comparing this with the ED's data from the same year – the NEET group in Szeged is significant which at the same time adumbrates the situation of the NEET issue in Hungary. That means, I assume that the results of the research show that both participation in the labour market and the education and training situations are unsatisfactory for the young people, aged 15–24 living in Szeged. It may entail serious consequences from a Social Policy point of view.

1.3 Short description of the methodology

The research is basically quantitative. Two datasets were used: the CSO's census data from 2011 and also the ED's data from its database. The last one points out one of the limitations of this research: only those members of the target group were derivable from the ED's database who were registered in this competent office. That means, the data from the ED's database will not provide the whole number of the NEET group in Szeged from the examined year comparing this with the CSO's database which was more accurate. Thus the consequences from the ED's data will only serve as a benchmark. The next chapter discloses the database, and also presents the limitations of the research and the detailed methodology.

In the main chapter that includes the analysis of the data set created by the author, statistical tables and diagrams will show the data in order to get a more picturesque appearance. For this propose a table of the NEET database was constructed, and this is suitable for displaying data as well as comparing the data from the two informants.

2. Methodology

2.1 Why Szeged? – a topic delineation

Several issues were taken into account when I decided that the research within the NEET group would be limited for the city of Szeged. Introducing these criteria justify the methodological procedures.

It was mentioned earlier that the population of Szeged provided sufficient statistical multitude in order to begin the research within the subject. Being a local citizen also made the research for me more convenient.

However, the basic starting point was that I did not find a comprehensive research which would specifically address the NEET problem. The research material which would have worked up a certain area, region or even nation-wide database was not found. Thus the applied methodology is inductive, that is, the research is organised from the smaller units to the overall picture. After processing and evaluating the data in Szeged there will be a possibility of widening the picture of the research towards the entire NEET population in Hungary. My plan is to continue county-level research followed by processing data from neighbouring counties in this direction, which will be finalized by a regional research. This would be followed by the introduction of additional regions as well as a comparison of regions in the light of the NEET population data. The final plan is to prepare a nationwide NEET-map which specifically depicts the boundaries of the vulnerable and less vulnerable areas. So in this sense the present research is a pre-research into a deeper and more complex data processing.

A deductive method is, I think, not an appropriate starting point since nation-wide data do not reflect on different regions and it does not reflect on the unusual specificities of different counties even cities either. However if the aim is to terminate or at least to reduce the NEET problem with action plans, it is necessary to take into account the different features of the individual areas. Because what is the real goal? To reduce (or to terminate which would be the best) the size of the NEET group, to support each member of the group to be able to reintegrate into the world of the labour market and the education and/or training. This work can be successful if, after processing the data, the members of the NEET group are personally visited, and they are supported by complex, personalized programs (or action plans) in order for them to reach the final goal. This can be, I think, facilitated by detailed, inductive research series.

2.2 Description of the informants

The size of the NEET group in Szeged is derived from the data of the Centre Statistics Office (CSO) and also from the Employment Department of the Csongrád County Government Office (ED).

It would have been extremely beneficial to obtain the size of the NEET group from the census data in the period since the change of the political system; however, it was not doable. Although figures of three censuses were available but the processing of the first two, the census data from the 1990 as well as 2001 could not be taken into account. The reason is the following: when these two sets of data were taken there were no questions concerning the presentation of the portfolio of the NEET group. From the first and the second census I could only procure the data of the total 15–24 age group. However, this data set will be referred to in the next chapter. From the data

of the last census conducted in 2011 the size of the NEET group in Szeged can be derived, thus this is one of the reference points that enables me to compare the data.

The other data set has been compiled from the database of the ED. Those data also show the size of the NEET group in Szeged from 2011, of course with the difference that the database of the ED is able to present only those young people registered at the Department.

2.2.a Methodological differences between the two informants

The CSO as well as the ED keep count the unemployed in Szeged split them up also by age groups from which the NEET group can be analysed that is, not only those who are unemployed but those who at the same time do not take part in education and/or training. However, it needs to be noticed that they have a very different methodology to determine the data, which also affects the size of the NEET group in Szeged.

According to the CSO, unemployed who did not work during the given week (does not have a work status which (s)he was temporary absent from); (s)he was inseek of a job actively during the four weeks preceding the survey; (s)he is available that means (s)he can start to work within two weeks, if (s)he could find a suitable job (NFSZ).

The CSO in its concept distinguishes between unemployed and non-employed. Giving a definition at the latter one is the best if the employed is defined. According to the CSO, every person is employed who worked in the period under review at least one hour which provided an income, or (s)he was absent from work (because of annual leave, sick leave, etc.) temporarily (NFSZ). That means, non-employed are those who are not included in concept phrased above. This information is important to know because from this distinction I was able to determine the size of the NEET group in Szeged. This is *the rate of the non-learner and non-employed* within the population, that is, the NEET group. Within this, it is necessary to distinguish the group of *non-learner unemployed.* The result of the group's breakdowns is that there are two different groups between the NEET. One of them is those who are NEET but they are looking for jobs actively *(non-learner unemployed)*. On the other hand, there is a group whose members are also NEET but they are not in search of jobs at all *(non-learner non-employed)*. These two groups within the NEET can possibly be identified with those who were mentioned as *'open to learning'* and *'sustained'* NEET in the paper of SPIELHOFER ET AL. (2009).

The ED in its system uses registered job seekers instead of unemployed as I have already referred to it. Among these criteria the most important factor is that job seekers are those who are registered by the ED and they cooperate with the Department (NFSZ). That is, a member can only be part of the NEET group if (s)he is registered as a job seeker and cooperates with the ED.

It may follow that presumably the rate of the NEET group is higher than the officially registered NEET group by the ED in Szeged. This is due to the fact that there can be some young people who belong to the NEET group, however, for some certain reasons, they do not want to be registered by the ED. If the data show this, it is possible that some of those who are not registered get the necessary income from the grey and black economy to support their own existence. This can be a new area for further research from the point of view of either Social Policy or Social Psychology or of a combination of these two.

2.2.b Data of the CSO

The data of the CSO were collected from the Department of Szeged. The census data were from 1st of October, 2011. Three groups were from it. The first one is the total population of Szeged which can be compared with the same kind of data from previous censuses. It made it possible to reflect on trends. The second one is the total population of 15–24 age group and in here I was also able to provide some important findings. Finally, the third one is the rate of the NEET group in Szeged, and as mentioned earlier, only the latest census could be supported with available data. For all examined groups the gender breakdowns are nominated specifically.

The other database that comes from the CSO is the data on the educational achievement of the NEET group. There are four different subgroups in there: 1. Elementary school grade 8 or lower. 2. Secondary school without graduation but with professional diploma. 3. Secondary school graduation. 4. Degree of a higher education. These data also come from 2011.

2.2.c Data of the ED

The data of the ED were also collected from its Szeged branch. The statistics related to December of the current year. I examine the NEET group from two different aspects in this case. On one hand, the size of it was researched between 2011 and 2014. On the other hand, the educational achievement was examined within the NEET group from the period of 2011. The ED's data between the period of 2012 and 2014 are used only for indicative information.

2.3 Methodology of data comparison

A detailed comparison of the evaluated data will be introduced in five steps which indicate the direction of this research methodology as well.

In the first step, the census data of the CSO are processed. I describe the total population of Szeged and its reduction trend in table and bar chart, after that, the total population of 15–24 year-olds age group and its trend. I think the presentation of these data is necessary before I turn to introduce the size of the NEET group in Szeged. Within this data I mark the previously distinct sub-groups who are actively looking for jobs and those who are not doing so for some reasons.

In the second step, I present the data of the educational achievement coming from the census data of the CSO. Tables and bar charts are also used and the gender breakdowns are highlighted.

In the third phrase of presentation of data I introduce the data of the ED for the NEET group.

And in the fourth step, I present the data of the educational achievement coming from the ED's data. The information relating to these data are more detailed comparing with the similar data of the CSO thus a deeper view can be gained into the educational achievements of the target group.

In the final step, the data are compared with each other. I will show from this process the size of the NEET group in Szeged, its composition furthermore I will make statements about the educational achievements of the target group.

3. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

3.1 Analysis of NEET data based on the CSO

The presentation of the data begins with the population of Szeged. This city is the third largest one in terms of its population (LEOPiSZ, 2013). It can be called *'University town'* because the University of Szeged, with its several faculties and trainings, tends to attract young people from the whole country.

Table 1 shows the population of Szeged based on the last three censuses data. It also illustrates the numbers of men and women in the town.

Censuses	Men	Women	Total
01/Jan./1990.	81,791	93,510	175,301
01/Febr./2001.	77,496	90,777	168,273
01/Oct./2011.	**77,301**	**90,747**	**168,048**

TABLE 1 *The population of Szeged and its gender breakdown based on the censuses data (capita).* (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

The table shows that the population of Szeged was decreasing continuously during the 21 years when the censuses data were taken. Compared to the initial data, can be seen dramatic drop in the data collection in 2001. The population of the city decreased with 7,028 people compared with the data in 1990. However, the rate of decline has slowed down by 2011, and the decrease was only 225 people.

The rate of men, within the population of the city, was continuously reducing. Between the first and second census the men's population decreased from 81,791 to 77,496, which means the men's population declined all together with 4,475 capita. According to the last census data, the decrease of the men's population has slowed and their number settled in 77,301. For women, the process of decline can also be observed although this is not as rapid as for men. The initial data was 93,510 capita and for the next census the population of women declined with 2,733 capita. After, the next ten years the decrease of their population was only 30 thus the women's population settled in 90,747 capita in 2011.

Figure 1 [See next page.] presents these data. The bar chart distinguishes between men, women and the total, and uses different colours: men are represented with blue, women are with purple and the total is with white colour.

It can be observed from the diagram that the rate of men is significantly lower than the rate of women. Men who claimed themselves to be resident in Szeged in 2011 were 13,446 less than women in the same year. Furthermore the number of men decreased at a higher rate than the women. Although the number of men was continuously decreasing and the rate of them tendentiously lower than the women's rate nevertheless the men's population is much higher within the NEET group than the women's population, as it will be pointed out later.

Table 2 [See next page.] presents the whole population of 15–24 year olds in Szeged according to the CSO's data.

FIGURE 1 *The population of Szeged and its gender breakdown based on the censuses data (capita).* (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

Censuses	Men	Women	Total
01/Jan./1990.	14,345	15,684	30,029
01/Febr./2001.	14,572	16,431	31,003
01/Oct./2011.	**12,782**	**13,893**	**26,675**

TABLE 2 *The whole population of 15–24 year olds in Szeged based on the censuses data (capita).* (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

It can be observed from the numbers that between 1990 and 2011 the population of the 15–24 year-olds decreased with 3,354 young people. Thus, there is a significant reduction in the number of this population. Although, between 1990 and 2001, this population did not decrease; rather it increased. The growth was 974 people thus the total reduction was 4,328 people. In the examined year the whole 15–24 year old population in Szeged was 26,675 people.

In gender breakdown, the following can be observed. The men's population between 1990 and 2001 slightly increased, with 227 capita. By 2011, this population fell to 12,782 people altogether, so the total decrease was 1,790 young people. As for women a certain amount of increase was experienced between 1990 and 2001. From 15,684 to 16,431 which was 747 women increase. However, their population also decreased by 2011, and the value stayed well below the initial data; the total was: 13,893. In case of this gender the decrease is higher than the men's; the number of women aged 15–14 decreased with 2,538 capita between 2001 and 2011. Although the reduction of women's population was higher than the men's nevertheless the numbers of women stayed higher than of men, with 1,111 capita.

Figure 2 with reference to the table, shows the whole 15–24 year-olds population in Szeged. This, as with the previous, uses different colours for distinguishing the genders and the total population.

FIGURE 2 *The whole 15–24 age group compared with the total population of Szeged based on censuses data (capita).* (Source: Sánta 2016b)

In addition, each 15–24 age group from different census years stands beside the total population of Szeged from those particular census years. It can be observed that the number of total 15–24 age group slightly increased in 2001. However, the population reduced by 2011 below the rate of 1990.

If we compare the data of the two populations with each other it can be observed that the rate of the 15–24 year-olds population of the total Szeged population was 17.12% in 1990, this rate increased up to 18.42% by 2001. However, this trend somewhere between 2001 and 2011 stopped even the rate of the 15–24 population reduced below the rate of 1990 by the research period under the investigation. In 2011 the 15–24 year old age group was only 15.87% of the total population of Szeged.

As was mentioned earlier, different trends of the NEET group were not detectable from the censuses data because it was impossible to derive the size of the NEET group from the former two censuses data. However, an important conclusion can be made: the whole population of Szeged keeps decreasing just like the population of the 15–24 age group within the total Szeged population. The rate of this decrease is higher than within the total population. That means, in this study only one data will be presented about the NEET rate in Szeged. However, this may adumbrate a dark picture about the NEET situation. Even if we assume that the size of the NEET group in Szeged will be unchanged, that means, will not increase, the situation is still problematic because the total 15–24 age group keep reducing and the NEET group can be found within this population.

Closing this section the NEET rate in Szeged will be presented based on the census data from 2011.

Censuses	Men	Women	Total
01/Oct./2011.	1,037	914	1,951

TABLE 3 *The NEET population in Szeged and the gender breakdown based on the census data (capita).* (Source: Sánta 2016b)

The research year was October, 2011. The month needs to be stressed. This is due to the fact that later when the ED's data will be presented and compared with the CSO's data, it will be shown that the data come from the same year (2011). However, while the CSO presents data from October until than the ED's data come from December of the same year.

The table shows that according to the CSO's census data 1,951 young people aged between 15 and 24 were NEET in 2011. That means, these youngsters were not in employment, education or training.

Based on the gender breakdown it can be observed that the men's rate is higher than the women's. 1,037 young men were NEET in Szeged, in 2011 compared with 914 young women who were in the same vulnerable group.

Figure 3 shows the same rate in bar chart.

FIGURE 3 *The NEET population in Szeged and the gender breakdown based on the census data (capita).* (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

The chart graphically depicts that the rate of men is higher within the whole NEET population than the rate of women in Szeged. The size of men is 53.15% of the total NEET population while the size of women is 46.84%. So the men's group within the total NEET population is higher by 6.31% than the women's group despite the fact that the size of men within the whole population of Szeged and even in the total 15–24 population in the city is significantly less than that of the women.

The CSO's data of the NEET group in Szeged can be divided into further two groups. The study has already mentioned that within the NEET rate in Szeged two sub-groups can be distinguished: those who are NEET but actively looking for jobs, and those who are also NEET but for certain reason(s) they are not searching for jobs. The first sub-group can be called non-learner unemployed. The other sub-group can be called non-learner non-employed. For the sake of simplicity the study hereinafter calls the first sub-group *job-seekers* and the second sub-group *non-job-seekers*. The next table and diagram show the rate of these two NEET sub-groups.

Censuses	NEET job-seekers			NEET non-job-seekers		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
01/Oct./2011.	482	427	**909**	555	487	**1,042**

TABLE 3.A *Job-seekers and non-job-seekers NEET population in Szeged and their gender breakdown according to the census data (capita).* (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

It can be seen from the table that 909 young people who are NEET try to find jobs while the majority of young people (1,042) who are also NEET do not search for jobs. In addition, it stands out that in both groups there are more men than women, does not matter whether they are job-seekers or non-job-seekers. Furthermore, 555 young men are non-job-seekers and this rate is higher with 73 young men than the other group wherein the young men who are NEET believe that if they look for jobs then this search will be successful. This is true also for women in this sense; 487 women turned away from job search and their number are 60 more than those women who were job-seekers.

The associated diagram shows the two sub-groups (job-seekers and non-job-seekers) and the total NEET group in Szeged, and also their gender breakdown.

FIGURE 3.A *Job-seekers, non-job-seekers and the total NEET group in Szeged, and their gender breakdown according to the census data (capita).* (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

The charts show that the rate of non-job-seekers NEET is higher than the job-seekers NEET rate. Within the total NEET population 53.40% are those who are non-job-seekers NEET while the rate of young people who are job-seekers NEET is much less (46.59%). The men in all three groups are more than women. Within the job-seekers NEET group the men's rate is higher with 6.05% than the women's rate. Interestingly, within the non-job-seekers NEET group the men's rate is also higher than the women's rate with 6.53%.

What could be the reason that there are more young people are in the non-job-seekers NEET subgroup than are in the job-seekers NEET sub-group within the total NEET group in Szeged? One of a possible answer perhaps can be found in the eclipse of hope. Those young people are less in numbers who believe that their job-seeking action will be successful in the future.

In summary of this section, the total 15–24 age group in Szeged is compared with the total NEET group in the town. The aim of this study was to answer the question: *What is the size of the NEET group in Szeged within the total 15–24 year-olds age group?* The next table and diagram presents the answer of that question.

Censuses	Total 15–24 age group			Total NEET population		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
01/Oct./2011.	12,782	13,893	26,675	**1,037**	**914**	**1,951**

TABLE 4 *The total 15–24 age group in Szeged compared with the total NEET group in Szeged and their gender breakdown according to the census data (capita).* (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

Table 4 shows that the size of the total 15–24 age group in Szeged was 26,675 young people in 2011. Within this group almost two thousand young people were not in employment, education or training that is, they were NEET!

This is a further question why the size of men, compared with the size of women, is higher despite the fact that within the total 15–24 population, there are fewer men by 1,111 people than women in 2011.


FIGURE 4 *The total 15–24 age group in Szeged compared with the total NEET group in Szeged and their gender breakdown according to the census data (capita).* (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

From the diagram, it can be observed that in Szeged the NEET population is 7.31% of the total 15–24 age group in 2011. The NEET women's rate is 6.57% while the NEET men's rate is 8.11% in the total 15–24 population. So the men's rate was about one and half percent higher than the women's rate within the total 15–24 age group in the research year.

In possession of these data the question is answered. The size of the NEET group in Szeged was 1,951 capita in 2011 according to the census data. This is 7.31% of the total 15–24 population who lived in 2011 in the town. This percentage is very significant in a city that its population is the third largest in Hungary (LEOPiSZ 2013); many university faculties are available, and there are renowned education and training systems; therefore, it can be assumed that the number of available jobs is satisfactory.

In the next part the census data provided by the CSO will be examined further but the study focuses on the qualification levels achieved by young people who are NEET.

According to the CSO's data the education levels can be divided into four parts in Hungary. The first part is the primary education (grade 8) and in this category those can be found as well who have not even reached this level of education. The second part is the secondary education without school leaving examination but young people with this level of education have a professional diploma. The third category is the secondary graduation, and the last part is the higher education level. *Table 5* shows data concerning the number of NEET young people falling into the different categories in 2011.

	Primary and less		Secondary with professional diploma		Secondary graduation		Higher education		Total	
Censuses	**M**	**W**	**M**	**W**	**M**	**W**	**M**	**W**	**M**	**W**
01/Oct./2011.	342	231	216	133	418	437	61	113	1,037	914
Total	573		349		855		174		1,951	

TABLE 5 *The achieved qualification levels of the NEET group in Szeged and their gender breakdown according to the census data (capita). (M = men, W = women)* (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

The table shows the different education levels and the gender breakdowns in those different categories. Men's number can be seen on the left hand side while the women's number can be seen on the right hand side. In the last line the total number of the NEET group in different education levels appear.

The numbers of men in every category are higher than the women's except the last two categories. Those who have secondary graduation (this is called gymnasium) and those who have further education level deviate from this *'trend'*, and in these the women's rate are significantly higher than the men's rate. Nearly twice as many women are in the NEET group who have higher education level than men; 113 women are in proportion to 61 men.

It is also important to emphasize that the highest rate appears amongst those who have secondary graduation. 855 young NEET people have this type of qualification that approximates to the half of the total NEET group in Szeged. Those are positioned on the second place who have primary education or even less (573). This is also extremely high, and these two categories highlight the levels of vulnerability as well. It seems there are two really vulnerable groups in the total NEET group in Szeged. In one of them there are those who have a very low qualification level and in the other one are those youngsters who try to participate in the world of employment with secondary graduation.

FIGURE 5 *The achieved qualification levels of the NEET group in Szeged and their gender breakdown according to the census data (capita).* (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

On the diagram it can be seen more clearly that those have the lowest rate who have the highest educational level. This rate is 8.91% of the total NEET group. This relatively low rate may show that NEET young people, who have the highest education level, are more likely to be able to find a job than those who have lower qualification levels. This dataset seems to correlate with the similar British data in this breakdown (Audit Commission, 2010).

Those groups appear really vulnerable – as was already mentioned above – whose members have secondary graduation, and also those communities whose members have only primary education or less. Within the total NEET population in Szeged 43.82% have secondary graduation, and 29.36% have a very low qualification level.

Closing this section, a complex table *(Table 6)* will be presented for the different qualification levels however, in there the job-seekers and the non-job-seekers young people are also distinguished.

	Primary and less		Secondary with professional diploma		Secondary graduation		Higher education		Sum		Total
	M	**W**	**M**	**W**	**M**	**W**	**M**	**W**	**M**	**W**	
Job-seekers	116	69	**121**	57	200	213	**45**	**88**	482	427	**909**
Non-job-seekers	226	162	95	76	218	224	16	25	555	487	**1,042**
Sum	342	231	216	133	418	437	61	113	1,037	914	**1,951**
Total	573		349		855		174		**1,951**		

TABLE 6 *The qualification levels of the NEET group in Szeged distinguished in there the job-seekers and the non-job-seekers and their gender breakdown according to the census (Census 01/Oct./2011.) data (capita).* (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

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It can be observed in this more detailed breakdown that the number of men in most categories is higher than the number of women. This *'trend'* is changed in the category where the NEET young people have higher education, and this change is significant in this respect.

Furthermore, it can be seen that the number of non-job-seekers in total is higher than the number of job-seekers. However, it comes to light from the examination of the sub-groups that amongst those young men who have secondary education with professional diploma and those who have higher education try to find a job despite their NEET status. 121 young men who have secondary graduation with professional diploma look for a job while 95 young men who have the same qualification level are not in search of a job. However, conversely in this category 76 NEET women decided not to go for a work while 57 NEET women try to find it actively. This result is interesting when examining the data however, that is more understandable that within those, either NEET young men or women, who have higher education, there are more who would like to get a job than those who made an opposite decision. Perhaps, this highlights the fact that young men who has vocational education, and those who have the highest qualification, believe that they will have a job in the near future. However, those who have the lowest qualification or even do not have this one, and those who have secondary graduation are probably less confident that their job search will be successful.

The diagram which relates to *Table 6* shows these data in bar charts. Under the bar charts the plus (+) or the minus (–) indicates the job-seekers and non-job-seekers groups. Thus there are 11 bar charts all together. The last bar chart on the right hand side shows the rate of the total NEET group in Szeged.

FIGURE 6 *The qualification levels of the NEET group in Szeged distinguished in there the job-seekers and the non-job-seekers and their gender breakdown according to the census data (capita).* [Legend: 1. Primary or less (+), 2. Primary or less (–), 3. Secondary with professional diploma (+), 4. Secindary with professional diploma (–), 5. Secondary graduation (+), 6. Secondary graduation (–), 7. Higher education (+), 8. Higher education (–), 9. Sum (+), 10. Sum (–), 11. TOTAL] (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

There are two very vulnerable groups can be seen within the NEET group: one of them are those who have primary education or less, and the other one are those who have secondary graduation. In the group where the NEET young people have the lowest qualification level 66.08% of men and 70.12% of women belong to the non-job-seekers' group. The proportion of those who have only secondary graduation (which means have only a school leaving examination) somewhat less but more than half of both, men and women, (52.15%, 51.25%) do not look for job opportunities.

However, amongst those men who have secondary education with a professional diploma (but do not have school leaving examination) and the number of those (men and women) who have higher education is proportionally higher than the numbers of job seekers. In the first category, 56.01% of men look for job opportunities but in the case of women, this process is the opposite; 57.14% of women decided not to look for a work and only 42.86% of women are the rate of active job seekers. In the second category, who have higher education, the rate of both (men and women) is higher who are job seekers (73.77% men and 77.87% women) comparing with those who have the same level of qualifications but do not search for work.

Closing this part of the study, as a summary it can be said about the CSO's data from the 2011 census: The size of the NEET group in Szeged was 7.31% of the total 15–24 age group in the city in 2011. Within the NEET group, the men's rate is higher (8.11%) than the women's rate (6.57%) despite that the men's rate is much lower than the women's in the total 15–24 population.

It is also evident that within the NEET group the rate of non-job-seekers is higher (1,042–909; 53.40%–46.59%). This is a phenomenon that justifies a deeper social policy research in the future.

In a detailed examination of the qualification levels of the NEET group, it can be observed that there are two groups at considerable risk amongst the already vulnerable NEET group. One of them is those who have very low qualifications or even do not have any qualifications, and also those who have secondary graduation (in other words: who have school leaving examination without a professional diploma with it). In this segment it can also be observed that the rate of NEET men is higher than the NEET women's rate. Even, those men's rate is higher who do not look for jobs regardless of their already acquired qualifications (53.51%). There was only one group as an exception where the men's rate in the job seekers category was higher than the men's rate in the non-job-seekers category. They were those who do not have school leaving examination but have a professional diploma (secondary education with a professional diploma). In this group 56.01% of men were active NEET job-seekers. In this category there were more women who did not search for job opportunities (57.14%). As well as amongst those who have the highest qualification levels, both men and women, there were more active NEET job-seekers.

3.2 Analysis of NEET data based on the ED

Before the data analysis undertake it is important to mention the different data recording time and methodology of the Employment Department (ED) compared with the CSO which will appear in the figures.

The ED's data regarding to NEET group was taken in December 2011. If they compared with the CSO's data it can be observed some months differences between these two. That is, the research year is the same however the ED's data came from different month. Furthermore, the methodologies of the two informants also differ from each other as it was mentioned earlier. In here it is enough to be referred to this above mentioned analysis that the ED counts only those

young people who are officially registered as job seekers at the Department. They can be only part of this category (registered job seekers) if the young people officially registered and at the same time they are not participant in any education or training system; that means, they are NEET.

There is another important derogation needs to be highlighted. The ED in its data do not count with the total 15–24 age group rather the Department defines three different sub-groups within the NEET group: 1. 18 years of age and under; 2. 19 year-olds; 3. 20–24 age group. Compared these with the CSO's data it shows a considerable differences. Having a conversation with a colleague at the Employment Department, the above mentioned first sub-group (18 years of age and under) approximately includes the 17–18 year-olds young people. On the other hand, these sub-groups categories used by the ED provide further research opportunities in the future. Making close examinations on the different sub-groups may indicate those youngsters who are at a considerable risk within the vulnerable NEET group.

The above mentioned differences indicate that it needs to draw attention to the data recording time which was take in October 2011 by the CSO but, by the ED, was taken in December 2011. The NEET group is not a homogeneous group the members in there are continuously changing. Some changes might have been occurred between these two months in 2011; the exact data for that cannot be determined. On the other hand, the size of the NEET group in Szeged according to the ED's data is surely lower than the CSO's data. This one comes from their different methodology system, and also from the fact that the ED does not process the *whole* 15–24 age group.

The next the ED's NEET data will be analysed taking into account of these above mentioned differences between the two informants.

The first table in this section, which will be the seventh in the row, presents the size of the NEET group and its gender breakdown in Szeged according to the ED's data.

No. registrants in closing day	Men	Women	Total
December/2011.	462	402	864

TABLE 7 *NEET population in Szeged, and its gender breakdown according to the ED's data (capita).* (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

Table 7 shows that 864 young people were registered as job seekers in December 2011 in Szeged, that is, members of the NEET group. As has been also observed by the CSO's data, according to the ED's data as well the men's rate is higher than the women's rate with 60 young people within the NEET group. Therefore, it can be stated that the NEET men group in the city is at a considerably higher risk than the NEET women group in the research year. Because their size is higher within the NEET group although the number of men were less in the population of Szeged as well as in the total 15–24 age group comparing with the number of women, and the men's number reduction appears tendentious.

The *Figure 7*, relation to this table shows these data in bar charts according to the ED's data. Just as it was presented above, the diagram displays the gender breakdown of the NEET group as well.

The men's rate is 53.47% within the NEET group while the women's rate is 46.53%. So the Employment Department keeps count of fewer members in the NEET group in Szeged comparing with the CSO's data however, it can be said as well that the numbers of men are higher than the numbers of women.

FIGURE 7 *NEET population in Szeged, and its gender breakdown according to the ED's data (capita).* (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

The ED applies data recording annually and provides statements from them. Thus the data of the NEET groups in Szeged are not only available from 2011 but can be collected from the past periods till 2014. The next table and the adherent figures show those data.

No. registrants in closing day	Men	Women	Total
December/2011.	**462**	**402**	**864**
December/2012.	539	457	996
December/2013.	337	379	716
December/2014.	374	339	713

TABLE 8 *NEET population in Szeged, and its gender breakdown according to the ED's data (capita).* (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

As it can be seen the data came from December 2011, and the Department used the same months from the next three years as well. It can be observed that between the research year and 2012 the size of the NEET group increased significantly. 864 young people were NEET in 2011 but this number increased and by 2012 reached 996. This meant 132 capita growths.

After this year however, a significant decrease can be experienced in numbers, and this process although more moderate pace but also continued in 2014. By 2013 the size of the NEET group in Szeged reduced with 280 capita and altogether the size of the NEET group was 716. In 2014 this reduction process was continued, and the Department registered only 713 young people NEET from this year.

In the rate of men and women the same tendency can be observed, although it is interesting that the rate of men increased more than the rate of women in 2012. In this year the number of young men NEET increased by 77 while of young women NEET increased by 55. The next year, 2013,

is remarkable because investigating the data from the four years, as well as reflecting on the CSO's data this is the only year when the rate of men is lower than the rate of women. 337 men were NEET in 2013 compared with 379 women. However, the *'usual order'* once again returns in 2014; the number of men increase and their numbers exceed the numberof women and also exceed their own previous rate, and the men's group increased to 374. The number of women however decreased, thus a slight further reduction can be observed within the total NEET group in Szeged.

Figure 8 shows these changes in the usual way; men and women are represented with different colours as well as the total NEET population.


FIGURE 8 *NEET population in Szeged, and its gender breakdown according to the ED's data (capita).* (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

The bar charts show that comparing the baseline data with the data from 2012 the rate of the NEET group significantly increased. The growth was 13.26% in the total rate, and within this the men's rate increased by 14.29% while the women's rate increased by 12.04%. However, in 2013 a significant reduction can be observed within the total NEET rate. The total number in the NEET group decreased by 28.12% compared with the previous year. Furthermore, the men's rate in 2013 shows a significant decrease, and with this reduction at the first time the rate of women NEET exceeded the rate of men NEET. Within the total NEET rate the number of men shows 37.48% decrease, while the reduction in the number of women was only 17.07%. In the next year, 2014, the men's rate increased drastically again compared with the women's rate which rate, compared it with the previous year, decreased. In 2014 the men's rate increased with 9.9% while the women's rate decreased with 10.56%. Thus it emerged within the total number of a minimal 0.42% reduction.

Further researches can prove why a significant increase was in the number of the total NEET group in Szeged in 2012 according to the ED's data as well as further investigations are able to show the reasons of the following decreases too. In addition it would be worthwhile to examine in the future what happened in 2013 when the number of men, at the first time this year, and according to the recent research so far also the last time, was lower than the number of women. It will be referred to this train of thought in the conclusion.

Returning to the main purpose and to the research year, closing this section the data of educational achievements within the NEET group in Szeged will be presented according to the ED's data.

Educational achievements	Total/capita
Less than primary level	8
Primary education level	250
Trade school level	114
Professional school level	28
Vocational secondary school level	236
Technical school level	27
Grammar school level	156
College level	26
University level	19
Total	**864**

TABLE **9** *Educational achievements within the NEET group in Szeged according to the ED's data (capita).* (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

It is immediately apparent that the ED publishes the qualification levels in more detailed breakdown compared with the CSO's methodology; however the Department does not publish the gender breakdowns within these levels.

Nine categories are distinguished by the ED. The lowest levels are distinguished into two parts, one of them is the primary education level and to the other one those NEET people who do not even have this lowest level of qualification. In relation to all data it can be observed that the number of those who practically do not have adequate qualification level according to the Hungarian labour market conditions is significantly high. They are altogether 258 young people within the NEET group according to the ED's data.

The next category is the so-called secondary education which is divided by the ED into further five categories. The total number of these five categories is the highest, 561 young people, within the total NEET group. Within the secondary education category three sub-categories can be distinguished: 1. provides just a profession to the young people (trade school and professional school). 2. provides a profession with school leaving examination (vocational secondary school and technical school); 3. provides only school leaving examination (gymnasium) and this level of qualification predestines the young people to continue their study in further education. Thus 561 young people can be divided into the following proportions: 142 young NEET people have a profession but do not have school leaving examination with it. 263 young NEET people have both, a profession with school leaving examination. While 156 young NEET people have only school leaving examination which would be the highest level within the secondary education but only in the case of youngsters wanting to move further into college or university. (Interestingly in Hungary if young people decide not to engage in higher education with this qualification level, this third category becomes almost the lowest one compared with the other two or better to say not worth as much as the other two.)

The nine categories are closed with the higher education level. This sub-category is also divided into two parts. One of them is the college level with 26 young NEET people, and the other one is the university level with 19 young NEET people in the research year.

Interesting to see that amongst the data four extremely high numbers can be found, each of them are more than 100 people. While in the remaining five categories the number of registered young NEET people is infinitesimal. The most young NEET people in terms of their qualification level are in the primary education level, altogether 250 people. They are followed by the secondary school level (236), those who have a profession and also a school leaving examination. On the third place are those who have only school leaving examination (gymnasium), altogether 156 people. The line is closed by those who have trade school level, which means, they have a profession without school leaving examinations (114 people). These NEET people are altogether 756 capita from the total numbers while the number in the rest of the five categories is only 108 young people who were not in employment, education or training.

The figures show those categories within the young people at a considerable risk apart from the fact that the NEET group itself indicates a very vulnerable population in the society. These are those who have secondary education levels and those who have the lowest qualification level or do not even have that.

The next diagram shows the sizes of proportions selected those who are at a considerable risk whom should be given even more attention to.

FIGURE 9 *Educational achievements within the NEET group in Szeged according to the ED's data (capita).* [Legend: 1. Less than primary, 2. Primary school, 3. Trade school, 4. Professional school, 5. Vocational secondary school, 6. Technical school, 7. Gimnasium, 8. College, 9. University, 10. Total] (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

On the diagram it can be well observed the different categories, and that there are three, or even four groups whose members are at a considerable risk.

The highest value is constituted by those who have only primary education. This is 28.93% within the total NEET population. They are followed by those who have vocational secondary

education with 27.45%. The third place is for those who have grammar school education, altogether 18.05%. Finally, come those who have trade school education with 13.19%. These are altogether 756 young NEET people which was 87.5% of the total NEET group in Szeged in 2011.

It should be recalled in a brief comparison that according to the CSO's data those young NEET people are the most vulnerable who have the lowest qualification level (or even less) and those who have secondary graduation. That is, comparing the data from the two informants they correlate with each other emphasised the greatest risk factor group, those who have the lowest qualification. Furthermore, one of the secondary categories is defined by the CSO as secondary graduation. However this category is divided by the ED into two different categories distinguishing vocational secondary school and grammar school education (the technical school education does not play important role). Inasmuch the two categories (the vocational secondary school and grammar school education which categories provide school leaving examination) are added then those data exhibit a high degree of similarity with the CSO's related data.

3.3 Analysis of NEET data based on a comparison of data from the two informants

Finishing the main part of this study the statistical data on the size of the NEET group in Szeged will be compared based on the two informants, the Central Statistics Office's and the local Employment Department's database. This procedure will prove the hypothesis stated at the beginning of this paper: Because the methodological procedures of the two informants (CSO and ED) differ from each other therefore, it is presumable that the rate of the NEET group is higher than the rate of the officially registered NEET group. Data in two summary tables and the corresponding figures will underpin the method of proof.

The first table relating to this method *(Table 10)* confirms and presents the data of the NEET groups in Szeged in 2011 according to the CSO and the ED. Within the data, just as usual, the gender breakdowns are shown as well as the last column on the right hand side show the numbers of the total NEET groups according to the two informants' data.

Sampling dates	Men	Women	Total
October/2011. (CSO)	1,037	914	1,951
December/2011. (ED)	462	402	864
Non-Registered (capita)	**575**	**512**	**1,087**
Non-Registered (%)	**55.45%**	**56.02%**	**55.72%**

TABLE 10 *Summary table about the total NEET population in Szeged and their gender breakdowns according to the CSO's and ED's data (capita/%).* (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

As can be observed from *Table 10* the size of the NEET group in Szeged were 1,951 young people in 2011 according to the census' data. It is divided by gender that there were 1,037 men and fewer women in the group, they were 914.

In the same year 864 young people registered at the ED as NEET. The gender breakdown was as follows: 462 men and 402 women.

In the data of the gender breakdowns the same tendency can be observed: the number of NEET men is higher than the number of NEET women. Despite the fact that the number of men in the total population of Szeged and in the whole 15–24 age group as well is lower than the number of women.

In addition from the comparison of the NEET groups reveal that 1,087 young people lived in Szeged in 2011 who were not in employment, education or training, that is they were NEET but they did not register as job seekers at the ED. That means 1,087 young NEET people (575 men and 512 women) had not even been on the radar of the Employment Department in 2011!

Figure 10 shows these numbers in bar charts.

FIGURE 10 *Summary diagram about the total NEET population in Szeged and their gender breakdowns according to the CSO's and ED's data (capita).* (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

From the previous data expressed in percentage it can be seen that within the total NEET group in Szeged 55.72% of young NEET people did not register at the ED in 2011. That means in effect there is no information about more than half of the total NEET group! Distribution by gender 55.45% of men and 56.02% women are unknown.

In the last table a further breakdown could be applied by which the CSO's data gave the opportunity. As it was mentioned earlier that the total NEET group in Szeged derived from the CSO's census data was dividable into two groups: job-seekers and non-job-seekers. These data is compared with the data of the NEET group from the ED database as the last table shows.

Sampling dates	Job-seekers	Non-job-seekers	Total
October/2011. (CSO)	909	1,042	1,951
December/2011. (ED)			864

TABLE 11 *Summary table about the total NEET population in Szeged according to the CSO's and ED's data (capita).* (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

According to the data of the CSO, in 2011 there were 909 young people in NEET who actively looked for a job. However, more than this, 1,042 young people in NEET somehow decided not to exercise this option. It is very interesting to see that the number of those young NEET people who were job-seekers in the CSO's database is almost the same with the number of those NEET people who registered as a job seeker at the Employment Department. The difference in total is 45 people. That is, the assumption may have a probability that a significant proportion of those young NEET people who were identified as job-seekers according to the CSO's data registered at the Employment Department in order to facilitate their own situation. However, 1,042 young NEET people did not choose that way. This research is not able to provide an answer for this reason.

The last diagram *(Figure 11)* shows the above data in bar charts. The four diagrams present the gender breakdown as well.


FIGURE 11 *Summary diagram about the total NEET population in Szeged according to the CSO's and ED's data (capita).* (Source: SÁNTA 2016b)

The charts illustrate that the rate of job-seekers NEET is 46.59% within the total NEET group in Szeged while the rate of non-job-seekers is higher, 53.41%. In case if the registered NEET population by the ED is compared with the job-seekers NEET population according to the CSO the following can be said: 46.59% of the total NEET group was those who actively looked for a job based on the CSO's data while the rate of the registered young NEET people based on the ED's data compared with the total NEET population was 44.28%. The difference in total is 2.31%.

These data and the process, I believe, proved that the hypothesis was correct that the rate of the NEET group in Szeged was higher (even significantly higher) than the rate of the officially registered NEET group in 2011.

Description of the margin of errors and the conclusion of the research are presented in the last chapter.

4. CONCLUSION

The objective of the research was to determine the size of the NEET group in a Hungarian city, called Szeged based on two informants and their statistical data from 2011.

One of them was the Central Statistics Office (CSO). From this database the census data were derived. In summary it can be claimed that the size of the NEET group in Szeged compared with the total 15–24 age group is high; it was 7.31% of the total age group in 2011 in the city. Within the NEET group the rate of men is higher (8.11%) than the rate of women (6.57%) apart from the fact that the size of men is considerably lower than the size of women in the total age group.

Furthermore, it is eyecatching that within the NEET group the rate of the non-job-seekers is higher than the job-seekers (1,042–909; 53.40%–46.59%) which is definitely justify further social policy research that was mentioned above.

If the educational achievements are under detailed analysis it can be said that within the NEET group there are two sub-groups who are truly vulnerable apart from the fact that the young people in the whole NEET group are in a considerable danger. Solving the problem of young people who have very low qualifications or even who do not have any qualifications and of those who only have secondary graduation bears no delay. In this analysis it was also detectable that the rate of men in NEET is higher than of women even within men there are more who do not search for any jobs regardless of the obtained education level (53.51%). There was only one sub-group where in the rate of job-seekers men were higher than of non-job-seekers men. They were those who had professional diploma without school leaving examination. In this sub-group 56.01% of men were actively job-seekers in the NEET group. However, in this sub-group the rate of women were higher, those who decided for some reasons that they would not look for jobs (57.14%). On the other hand, within the group those members who have the highest qualification, they can be men or women, there are more who were actively searching for jobs.

The other informant was the Employment Department of the Csongrád County Government Office (ED). From the ED's data the following can be said relating to the NEET group in Szeged.

The ED's database held 864 registered young people who were NEET in 2011. The men's rate within the total NEET population was 53.47% while the women's rate was 46.53%. So the ED's database held proportionally less young NEET people in the city but like the CSO's data, here can be said as well that the number of men is higher than the number of women.

The ED's database provided an opportunity to follow the development of the NEET rate in the next years. Although these data are informative because only those population can be presented who were registered by the ED. Compared the baseline data with the data from 2012 it can be observed that the rate of the NEET group was grown. The men's rate within the total NEET population increased by 13.26% and the women's rate also increased but only by 12.04%. However, in the rate of the total NEET group a significant decrease was observable in 2013. The number of the total NEET group decreased by 28.12% compared it with the previous year and within this the men's rate showed a significant reduction, and in 2013 for the first time the women's rate was higher than the men's rate. Within the total NEET population the men's rate showed a 37.48% decrease while the decrease of the women's rate was only 17.07%. In 2014 the men's rate drastically increased again while the women's rate compared it with the previous year decreased. The men's rate increased in this year with 9.9% while the women's rate decreased with 10.56%. Thus the total number of NEET decreased with 0.42% in 2014.

The ED's database provided a more detailed breakdown as for the educational achievements. The research presented those categories wherein the young NEET people are at a considerable risk.

The most vulnerable are those who have the lowest qualification. They reached 28.93% within the total NEET population. They are followed by the group whose members have vocational secondary school level (27.45%). At the third place are those who have grammar school level which provide a school leaving examination but does not a profession (18.05%). Closing the line those stand who have trade school level (13.19%). They are altogether 756 young people that was 87.5% of the total NEET group in December 2011.

The hypothesis was that because the methodological procedures of the two informants (CSO and ED) differ from each other therefore, it is presumable that the rate of the NEET group is higher than the rate of the officially registered NEET group. This was justified by the comparison of the data of the two informants.

According to the census data in 2011 the size of the NEET population in Szeged was 1,951 young people aged between 15 and 24. The gender breakdown within the NEET group was: 1,037 men and 914 women.

In the same year only 864 young people registered at the ED as NEET; amongst them there were 462 young men and 402 young women.

Based on the gender breakdown the same tendency can be observed when the data of the two informants compared. That is, the rate of young NEET men is higher than the rate of young NEET women in the research year. Despite the fact that the number of men in the total population of Szeged and in the whole 15–24 age group as well is lower than the number of women.

It became clear during the research that 1,087 young people lived in Szeged in 2011 who were not in employment, education or training that is they were in NEET but they did not register as job seekers at the ED. That means 1,087 young NEET people (575 men and 512 women) had not even been on the radar of the Employment Department in 2011!

According to the data of the CSO, in 2011 there were 909 young NEET people who actively looked for a job. However, more than this, 1,042 young NEET people somehow decided not to exercise this option. It is very interesting to see that the number of those young NEET people who were job-seekers in the CSO's database is almost the same with the number of those who registered as a job seeker at the Employment Department. The difference in total is 45 people. In case if the registered NEET population by the ED is compared with the job-seekers NEET population according to the CSO the following can be said: 46.59% of the total NEET group was those who actively looked for a job based on the CSO's data while the rate of the registered NEET people based on the ED's data compared with the total NEET population was 44.28%. The difference in total is 2.31%. That is, the assumption may have a probability that a significant proportion of those young NEET people who were identified as job-seekers according to the CSO's data registered at the Employment Department in order to facilitate their own situation. However, 1,042 young NEET people did not choose that way!

It should be recalled in a brief comparison that according to the CSO's data those young NEET people are the most vulnerable who have the lowest qualification level (or even less) and those who have secondary graduation. That is, comparing the data from the two informants they correlate with each other emphasised the greatest risk factor group, those who have the lowest qualification. Furthermore, one of the secondary categories is defined by the CSO as secondary graduation. However this category is divided by the ED into two different categories distinguishing vocational secondary school and grammar school education (technical school education did not play important role). Inasmuch the two categories (the vocational secondary school and grammar school education which categories provide school leaving examination) are added then those data exhibit a high degree of similarity with the CSO's related data.

It can be said about both informants that their statistical data relating to the NEET group move between certain margin errors. That means the presented data in this paper are not exact data but in any case they are between the statistical margins of errors.

Furthermore, between the two surveys, as was mentioned earlier, a few months pasted, and during this time the data might have been changed. But this can be almost certain that the NEET population in Szeged did not decrease by 1,087 people between October and December in 2011. And this statement can be sustainable also together with the fact that the ED does not analyse the whole 15–24 age group however its data was given for the 17–24 population. Although the NEET group is not a homogeneous community, an everchanging company, whose members can be very vulnerable or not at risk at all (Coles et al. 2010), the data show that many are in the first category.

According to empirical experiences and many research documents demonstrate that to be part of the NEET group is not satisfying even this is a highly dangerous condition and will cause serious effect on our future. Therefore I find essentially important to continue researches on the NEET group.

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The Power of Public Works Programme in Peripheral Areas on the Example of a Dead-end Village

ABSTRACT

The most important aim of the public works programme, is to integrate or re-integrate the participants into the primary labour market through work-socialization. But its success or failure cannot be evaluated solely by the statistics, because the peripheral areas struggling with significant job shortage and in the absence of other options, some members of local governments give possibilities of the participation in public works programme as a privilege, thus they exploit the lack of information and labour market vulnerability of deprived people caused by their dependent positions in local power hierarchies. Consequently, the representatives consider their personal advantages and benefits more important than the the improvements of underprivileged people's interests and possibilities.

INTRODUCTION

The Hungarian government, after the amendment of social law, introduced the *"Road to world of work"* programme in 2009, which interprets the unemployed people as a homogeneous group. Its purpose to lead as many people back into the primary labour market as possible (SZABÓ 2013). The efficiency of the public works program is contradictory; one group of the researchers considers it successful, while others see it unsuccessful. The essence of the programme is that unemployed people can get a public works job, thus they get payment for performing the tasks organized by the state and the local government. Henceforward, these people are not entitled for social aid, thus the long-term aid recipients can be moved out from from their situation and they can be gradually introduced into the world of work. But this kind of job is rather degrading than useful for many people with professional qualification, because these works do not help them to get back into professional sector due to the nature of public works.

In practice, the situation of all of unemployed people are examined by the local government, who then will be classified based on defined criteria. These people will no longer receive social aid, but availability support (RÁT), which is 28,500 HUF (92 EUR). This is around the half of the amount of the maximum aid. But when they do work in the programme, they can get even 71,000 HUF (229 EUR) instead of the amount of maximum aid. It means that the wage of the public works programme is higher than the amount of the employment substitution support, so it can slightly reduce the poverty, but if somebody refuses the public work offer, they have to face consequences; for the first time, this person will not get any benefit for one month, but after the second refuse, they will not be entitled to get any support for two years. So the purpose of the public works programme is to help the adaptation to the world of work, however it hinders the return into the primary labour market, and some local governments of rural and peripheral areas operate the public works programme as a *"semi-feudal"* system due to the labour market vulnerability of the people living there.

1. THE AIMS, THE TARGET AREA AND THE METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

The research is based on a survey among the participants of public work programmes. The research focused on those rural and villager features of the public works programme, which could give opportunities of misuses for rural local governments as a result of the vulnerability of locals caused by labour shortages in countryside. Therefore, the survey was conducted in such a peripheral area; a dead-end village of 2000 people has been selected, which is situated in a disadvantaged subregion in Northern Great Plain Region in Hungary.

The survey focused on the entry processes of the public works programme, the nature and frequency of work, and the working conditions of the programme. Additionally, the research focused on experiences related to the programme, the satisfaction of working and the hypothetic distinctions and misuses. Besides the circumstances, the research has also investigated the personal and family effects of the public works programme and the possibilities for entry into primary labour market.

The quantitative research data were collected with standard structured questionnaire, which were supplemented by the qualitative information of unstructured interviews formed during the survey.

The most important factor of the compilation of research sampling was that its cumulative characteristics look closely to the features of the whole population of the village. Therefore, in order to ensure the representativity of questionnaire data collection, a probability sampling

has been worked out, with which applied method every household had the same chance to get into the research sample. Thus, the survey used a probability, territorially proportionate, systematic sampling, prepared based on the layout of the village. Every fourth element of the settlement's housing stock – instead of the previously planned every sixth real estate, owing to the formed *coverage error*[1] which was a result of consideration of the reported data of térképem.hu website – has been chosen into the sample.

Thus, the *sampling interval*[2] has been 4, and the *selection rate*[3] of the sample shown 1/4. The respondents have been chosen from people of members in active age of the achieved households, where one person answered the questions per household.

In order to the appropriate territorial distribution, the sampling was prepared for every street of the village. The research used supplementary sample elements to keep the originally specified sample size, which were applied in case of the loss of main sample elements. The supplementary elements were mostly used because of no existing addresses caused by coverage error, in fewer cases due to refusals of response, when the neighbouring household – next to the main address, in ascending numeric order – has inquired.

103 underprivileged households were included in the research sample. Bearing in mind the measure of relevance of gotten information, the research sought to query a member in working age in every included household, who provided information about the rest of household members. Therefore, the data collecting was conducting after the end of working hours from 4.30 PM in weekdays, and from 2 PM in weekends, generally in Sundays. Thus, the survey gained data about labour market situation of 576 villagers.

2. Theoretical background of the research

According to Zsuzsa Ferge, the poverty, as deficiency means multiple deprivation, because it does not only affect to material, earnings and wealth goods, so possessions which connected to economic capital, but it has an impact on the knowledge, skills and abilities and the accessibility to the educational opportunities. Besides these, the poverty effects on the culture, the entertainment, the human services and the suitable school, so it touches the goods, which are connected to the cultural capital. Additionally, the poverty means the lack of rights, relationships and social maintainer forces, so the lack of goods connected to the social capital (FERGE ET AL. 2006).

Because the social integration of people living in poverty indicates a lower level of it, therefore these people do not have the adequate amounts of relationship with the middle class

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[1] Coverage error: in case of mark of the sample elements such an address has been picked into the sample, which does not exist (Hunyadi 2001).

The research primarily took into account the 634 houses indicated by térképem.hu, but during the first field work has already seemed that the database used by térképem.hu is obsolete, because so many houses have been demolished or they became uninhabitable because of the flood. Therefore, in order to reach the sufficient number of sample sizes the sampling interval reduced from 6 to 4.

So a significant part of the houses displayed by térképem.hu does not exist. Its primary cause is the flood in 2000, which significantly reduced the number of housing stock of the village, but simultaneously many of houses have been destroyed by their owners regardless of the flood, but referring to it, because the state gave subsidy to rebuild the demolished houses (NAGY – BOROS 2012, 2015). Many of villagers moved away from there and they bought or built new houses in the surrounding cities or the county town from the state aid for flood damage.

[2] Sampling rate: item number of the population/item number of sample (BABBIE 2003).

[3] Selection rate: item number of sample/item number of population (BABBIE 2003).

segment of the society. According to Castel, the poor groups' exclusion from the society happens in two dimensions: on the one hand, the lack of financial resources pushes these people into dependency situation, on the other hand, besides the decrease of financial resources, insofar these people's network connections (family relationships, work connections, personal relationships) reduce as well, they will be increasingly excluded from the society. So Castel says, that primarily those groups will be excluded, which besides that they became poor, even their network connections weaken too. So the poverty is a result of decline of relationships (CASTEL 1993).

3. LABOUR MARKET SITUATION AND OPPORTUNITIES OF PERIPHERAL RURAL VILLAGES

The size of settlements shows significant correlation with job opportunities, unemployment and indicators of poverty. These inequalities are easily noticeable in the context of livelihood opportunities, income level and access to services in territorial and settlement differences (VIRÁG 2009).

The poverty rate is the biggest in small settlements and the extent of public work programme also the highest here (26%); almost half of the people living in the most disadvantaged subregions (46,6%) have less income than 60% of the median income.

7,6% of the total population of Hungary live in settlements with less than 1000 inhabitants and 20% of the people living in the most disadvantaged subregions dwell in small settlements or tiny villages with 100–500 inhabitants.

About 60% of those people who maintained themselves from regular social assistance before the public works programme live in disadvantaged circumstances, 60,5% of registered unemployed people living in most disadvantaged subregions have not found job for more than one year, 47% of them for more than two years, but 15% of them never had a job (BASS 2010). According to the results of László Bass, 10,4% of the people who live in villages with 1–2000 inhabitants in disadvantaged subregions have been unemployed for more than three wears, 17,6% of them live in relative poverty, so they maintain themselves from less than 60% of the median income (OECD1) and the poverty rate grows in parallel with the number of children of families. In Hungary, 7,6% of the total population live in villages with less than 1000 dwellers, while 20% of the people living in most disadvantaged subregions dwell in small settlements, tiny villages (BASS 2010a). The employment indicators of families with children are extremely low, because just every third people in active age have labour income, consequently the unemployment rate exceeds the national average.

The degree of impoverishment and segregation is huge in rural areas (KOÓS 2015). The results of common spatial effect of the poverty and exclusion are such of rules, norms and practices which are totally different from the values of majority society (VIRÁG 2009).

Because the settlements in disadvantaged subregions are the most affected with lack of jobs, most people living this kind of areas sustain themselves and their families from social supports and different *transfer incomes*[4], which allow them a living standards below the poverty line. According to the opinion of some researchers, the participation in public works programme cannot improve significantly on financial situation of these families, moreover, it hinders them to the return to the primary labour market (BASS 2010).

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[4] During the original income distribution, a part of the proceeds is given for others because of different reasons. The public power takes one part of it and give it for others or for the same group, but with different title. These incomes – earned during the secondary distribution – are named transfer incomes (ZOMBORI 1997).

The livelihood strategies of permanently unemployed people who living in poverty are occluded, in which played an important role, that the unemployment management became the task of local governments (VÁRADI 2010). Besides the casual works and opportunities provided by local governments, people can get extra money from collecting crops of plants, which can be supplemented by casual works in distant towns and proceeds from collecting wood and iron (SOLT 2009).

According to the researches of households of families with children in disadvantaged subregions based on representative sample leaded by László Bass, 51% of the families living in most disadvantaged subregions get their income from primary labour market, which could be supplemented with maternity benefit (GYES), pension and occasionally with aid. They form the *"market type"*. The people belong to the *"alternative type"* (24%) excluded from the primary labour market, but taking advantage of the opportunities casual work and black labour, supplement their income with social benefits and elements of family support system, thus they can take care of their families. The people of *"aided type"* (13%) can not get income from the primary labour market, neither the alternative labour market. Besides these groups, there is the type of people *"standing on two legs"*, who supplement their income from primary labour market with proceeds from legal work or black labour, but in lower proportion they also participate in the public works programme or they could receive social benefits or transfer incomes as well (BASS 2010b).

Because the underprivileged families cannot sustain themselves from social benefits and transfer incomes, they get money from the secondary labour market, where beside the casual work and black labour, it appears the opportunity of the public works programme (BASS 2010a).

4. THE ACCESS TO THE PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME AND ITS EFFECTS IN PERIPHERAL AREAS

The poverty became the own problem of communities and individuals owing to the decentralization of state support, because the distribution of social benefits and public works programme's opportunities belongs to the decision of local governments and mayors. Thus, most mayors use the withdrawal of social benefits or postponing its payment as a kind of *'educational'* tool. The aim of supported secondary labour market – which is a part of the public works programme – the reduction of social tensions and providing of everyday living (BASS 2010b).

The public works programme became an alternative of the primary labour market instead of its role of labour market reintegration (VÁRADI 2016a). The local governments try to organize the public works programme adjusted with local needs and because too many people would like to get into the programme, but its sources are scarce, thus in order to employ as many people as possible, the decision makers *'rotate'* the applicants. As a result, a labourer can work generally at most four or five months a year in daily six hours' part time job, which reduce their wage.

Public works programme base salary (gross)	79,155 HUF
Skilled public worker guaranteed wage (gross)	101,450 HUF
Work leader's salary in public works programme (gross)	87,090 HUF
Work leader's guaranteed salary in public works programme (gross)	111,660 HUF

TABLE 1 *Salaries of the public works programme in case of full time job, without family benefits, 2016* (Source: *Hungarian Journal* 2014. No.189.)

So the rotation principle increases the numbers of involved people, but decrease the size of payment. This works in real, so that if someone works just three months a year, daily six hours with at most primary education, their monthly income increases from the amount of 28,500 HUF (92 EUR) of availability support (RÁT) to monthly 32,000 HUF (103 EUR) of salary (Bass 2010 b).

The public works programme mostly offers opportunities for people with worst labour market characteristics, which contributes to conservation their situation (Szabó 2013; Messing 2012; Firle – Szabó 2007). According to the research leaded by László Bass, the chances for get in or return to the primary labour market are much higher for groups with more favourable labour market skills, because while 4–5% of undereducated-, gypsy- or long-term unemployed poor people have gotten permanent job, the employment chances for better educated, not gypsy and not poor people show the value of 20%.

Between 2007 and 2010, exactly 10% of the people working in public works programme have gotten job in the primary labour market, but in the same period, 24% of those unemployed who did not participate in public works programme have gotten permanent job. Among the employees of public works programme are in higher proportion the long-term unemployed people, but based on the period of unemployment, they have returned to the primary labour market more difficulty.

Interestingly, according to the results of some research, the people who work casually or do black labour, they have higher chance to get a job in primary labour market, then the people who participate the public works programme (Bass 2010b; Firle et al., 2007). Of course, its reason could be that a priori just those people take a public works job, who see just a little chance to get a job in the open labour market.

The local governments struggling with lack of resources, which were forced to downsize their institutional headcount, they often replace their personnel needs by public works programme employees, often with their former public services labourer: In the current operation conditions, it is more profitable to employ a worker as a participant of public works programme than take them into the institutional personnel. In small towns the mayors take part in the distribution of working tasks and the supervision of employees as well, which shows, besides the public works programme is an appropriate tool for reduce the social tensions, it stabilizes and strengthens the current power relations (Virág 2009).

The EU programmes, which were intended to lead back the unskilled, long-term unemployed people to the primary labour market, were not successful, because the majority of the unemployed live in those areas, where the labour market can not employ significant size of labour and the most of trainings offered by these EU programmes gave professions which provide opportunities in just a few segments of primary labour market. So because of the lack of local and regional labour market possibilities or the accessibility of workplaces and the under-qualification of long-term unemployed people and as a result of their low level of working ability, after the end of programmes, many of the training participants became social aided again, or they utilize their acquired qualification in the secondary labour market, e.g. in the public works programme (Virág 2009).

Naturally, the trainings for at most few months are not suitable to replace the knowledge and competences, which are missing due to the unfinished primary or secondary education and these cause labour market drawbacks (Váradi 2004). Therefore, the task of employment of people with no job left to the local governments, thus they employ them in the public works programme, hence the local governments became the biggest employers of the settlement or even the area.

According to some researches, the participation in the public works programme reduces the chance to get a job in primary labour market; its reason that the tasks of the public works can be simply and easily solved, thus these do not improve the competences of employees.

The employment centre (government office) generally transmits to the public works programme those people, whose chances for employment considered low by the centre. It is known by the employers as well, therefore they are less willing to give job for people who participate in the public works programme, because they link to them lower productivity (SCHARLE 2012).

So the public works programme can not realize its re-integrational aim, because it does not develop the employment opportunities of the participants (KÖLLŐ – SCHARLE 2011; FAZEKAS – SCHARLE 2012), but the participation reduces the time for job search and decreases the job search willingness too, because alternately with the social benefits, it provides a low level, but predictable income (SCHARLE 2012).

The system which devolved the employment of long-term unemployed people to the local governments, closes the most disadvantaged people into the trap of social aid and unemployment (VÁRADI 2010), because the public works programme conserves the situation of unemployed people and the lifestyles based on social benefits and casual works (HAN 2014). According to the research of the HAN[5], 62% of the public workers live under the poverty line and 91% of them live below the subsistence level, and in case of the families with children these proportions are 15% and 37%. Despite that 40% of the public workers said, it is getting harder to get in the programme, one fifth of the families can not provide the necessary conditions of appropriate childcare and healthcare for their children, one third of the respondents did not experience any change in their life, but one fifth of them felt positive, one tenth of them perceived negative changes due to the programme (HAN 2014).

As I mentioned earlier, the local governments probably for cost saving reasons, have some kind of tasks done with public workers, what formerly were done by the employees of local governments as public servant (MESSING 2012; CSOBA – NAGY – SZABÓ 2012). According to the research, 20% of them do the same work with no qualification needed as public worker for less money, what they did as public servant. Thusly the local governments, thanks to the 90–95% state support, can solve the obligatory local governmental tasks with significant cost reduction (HAN 2014). Of course, it does not pass the legal framework, but it reduces the prestige of concerned professions, thus these jobs gradually devaluate from social viewpoint, moreover because of the less income, the motivation level for working will be lower as well, therefore it implies the decrease of quality of work.

Consequently, the public works programmes may have a harmful effect, since the public workers squeeze out the underqualified workforce from the primary labour market. The respondents of the research mentioned as disadvantages of the programme that it is a short-term job with poor working conditions. Of course, the public workers are more satisfied that the unemployed people, but less than the people working in primary labour market. Most of the public workers live below the subsistence level, which hinder the reproduction of ability to work, caused by the health of public workers getting worse in short term, because they can not pay the needed medicines (HAN 2014).

The aim of the public works programme that leads the participants back to the primary labour market is remains an illusion, not just because in the disadvantaged subregions the capacities of the primary labour market are in low rate (VÁRADI 2016a, VÁRADI 2016b), but the public works programmes does not incite for efficient performance, thusly it does not motivate the public workers for *'real'* work, therefore it is not prepare them for the circumstances of primary labour market (VÁRADI 2010).

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[5] Hungarian Anti-Poverty Network

5. THE RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH

5.1. Demography of the participants of the public works programme

The labour market situation of the villagers and the disadvantaged employees'[6] opportunities in the primary labour market are well illustrated by the data, which shows that just 43.2% of the people of working age (between 15 and 64 years of age) living in the village worked in the public works programme at the time of the research (N = 354). However, according to the regulation of programme, youth under 25 years of age can participate in with permission of the local government[7]; therefore if we examine exclusively just the age, which is conventionally considered by the public works programme, this proportion is already 60.4% (N = 212).

The average age of the participants is 35.4 years, while the youngest public worker – despite the regulation – is 17 years old, the oldest public worker in the village is 62 years old. The proportion of men and women working in the public works programme is balanced in gender perspective, the proportion of women (52.3%) only slightly exceeds the proportion of men (47.7%) in the village.

The education level of the public workers is very low, while 19% of them did not finished the elementary school, most of them (69%) obtained primary educational certificate, and just 12% of the public workers have professional qualification, of which 8% obtained certificate of skilled workers training school, 2% of them vocational school certificate, and 1-1% of them acquired graduation certificate and vocational qualification based on graduation *(Figure 1)*.

5.2. The entry possibilities of the public works programme

Naturally, considering the whole process, there are no – and it can not be – differentiation among the application and employment methods of seekers, so every public worker has gotten into the public works programme through the subregional employment centre, but significant differences can be experienced with its frequency and duration in the village. Many of villagers work in the public works programme since the municipal election in 2014, but there are dwellers who can participate continuously for four to five years, while others have to wait six to seven months for a workplace in public works programme. According to a general view of the villagers, a good acquaintanceship

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[6] The Committee of European Communities specifies the disadvantaged situation in case of an employee:
– he or she did not have a regularly paid job in the last six months;
– he or she did not obtain a secondary level qualification or professional qualification (ISCED 3);
– he or she is over 50 years of age;
– he or she is a person living alone with one or two dependents;
– he or she work in a branch or profession of a member state, in which the gender imbalance is more than 25% bigger, than the average of imbalance of the total economic branches of this member state, and he or she belongs one of these underrepresented gender groups;
– he or she belongs to an ethnical minority of a member state and who needs strengthen his/her professional or linguistic qualification or strengthen his/her professional experiences to improve his/her chances to getting a job at a certain workplace. (EUR-Lex 2008)
     According to the decree of Committee of European Communities, in case of disadvantaged employees, one of these criteria must met.

[7] Youth under 25 years of age only in justified cases – because of family –, social situation, or regional labour shortage – can be involved into the public works programme, which regulation's purpose is the involvement of youth into the Youth Guarantee System.

FIGURE 1 *Educational level of public works programme's participants (N = 150)*

is needed to someone can participate and stay in permanently in the public employment programme, as one of the interviewees said: *"Since this mayor is, I constantly work. I have applied and I have been chosen."*

More respondents mentioned that the size of the family is an important aspect of the selection, so the social criteria prevail between the local conditions, like the following quote illustrates: *"The mayor takes into consideration who is poor, especially if he sees, there are a lot of children in the family." "If there is hiring time, the mayor sees it and helps, particularly where are a lot of children."*

For those who have no opportunities for constant work, they can get back into the public employment generally after one to three months break, but sometimes they must wait five to six months for return.

The unstructured interviews revealed that the mayor gives preferences at the entry into the public works programme to those people who voted on him at the time of municipal elections. In order to bridge the *"contra voting"* and get a job in public works programme, people have to buy significant quantity of meat from the enterprise of the mayor or a member of the local government on credit, which provides the possibility of work in the public works programme[8]. The repayment of credit is guaranteed for the *"seller"* by the monthly deduction from the wage. Those public workers who did no vote on the mayor and did not buy from the mayor's enterprise, when they take their holiday, in their cases the administrators book absentee day instead of holiday days, which after these days reach the limit, it consequences the exclusion from the public works programme.

The refusal of application in public works programme is not perceived as discriminatory measure, because during the application, just 17,7% of the public workers (N = 62) have already realized distinctions, but more than every fourth applicants have experienced rejection during the recruitment process (26,2%, N = 65), which was justified with the reason of fully exhaustion of employment places.

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[8] For entry into the public works programme, the people have to purchase at least 20 kilograms of meat (in average 1000 HUF/kilogram, 3,3 EUR/kilogram) from one of local government members who deals with cattle breeding and its cost is deducted from the wage of public works. The real price is depending on quantity.

But there were people who did not get any explanation, according to others, the primary cause was the vote on the other mayor candidate at the time of municipal elections: *"They did not justify it, but later they even took the aid as well"*

Naturally, the application of employees sent by the employment centre (governmental office) can not be refused from the part of local government and they do not do that officially. Therefore, when a *"contra voter"* applies for work, they employ him/her formally, but they indicate, that *"the number of workplaces is full"*, then they administrate absenteeism for his/her name for five days, which causes that they can terminate the employment relationship of the applicant in the public works programme. Because of that, these unemployed people will not receive social aid later, while they do not know, that they have participated in the public works programme. Thus, the political standpoints contribute to the exclusion from labour market and causes further marginalization.

The villagers, who could get a job in the public works programme for one year before the research, they worked in average for 8.5 months. Just 11.3% of the participants worked for 1 to 3 months' period and 21.6% of them could work for 4 to 6 months. 13.3% of the public employees worked for 7 to 9 months' period, while 53.3% of them were employed for 10 to 12 months. It seems that most of the public workers living in the village are employed continuously or just with short interruptions, because there are permanent colleagues of the local government in the highest proportion (40%)[9] *(Figure 2)*.


FIGURE 2 *How many months could the participants work in the public works programme in the one year (in the last 12 months)? (N = 60)*

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[9] Among those who do not work officially – so they do casual work or black labour – or get regular social assistance or entitled for assistance of working age, so they do not participate in the public works programme, 67% of formerly have already worked in the programme formerly. This group worked for one and a half year, so for 18 months in average in the public works programme, but they do not participate in it for averagely 21 months. They do no work because of childbearing or the types of available works of the public works programme do not match with their concepts, but the *"inadequate vote"* also causes inactivity in the village.

In the examined settlement, all of public workers are employed in daily 8 hours in the public works programme, so they do not try to enlarge the number of participants with part-time jobs.

The participant villagers' work attitude is shown well by the data; 71,7% of them love their job and just 13,3% of them indicated their dissatisfaction with the activity in the programme *(Figure 3)*.


FIGURE 3 *Do you like your job in the public works programme? (N = 60)*

There are six different kind of type of work in the public works programme in the village:

1. Administrative work

2. Value-creating work

3. Trained work

4. Unskilled work

5. Participation in training

6. Brigade leadership tasks

Not more than 7% of the public workers do administrative activities, they manage the documentation of the participants, book the absenteeism and prepare the work schedule. The role of value-creating public work is significant (28%) in the village, during witch the participants deal with plant cultivation in plastic tunnel, wire spinning and adobe brick making. A part of the public workers grows paprika and tomato in plastic tunnels owned by the local government, and one part of the harvested vegetables is given to the school kitchen and another part of them is distributed among the workers. At the time of the research, the productions of the wire spinners and adobe brick makers were used for the archives which the local government had it built. The jobs of trained workers (8%) could be various; one part of them do earthworks at the edge of the village, others mow the lawn and some of them perform maintenance tasks, but the abovementioned archive is built by masons working in the public work programme, moreover, they renew the flagstones as well *(Figure 4)*.

FIGURE 4 *What kind of job do you work in the public works programme? (N = 60)*

The fourth group of the public workers is formed by those unskilled workers (39%) who beside the spud, scythe and rake for plant trees, they deal with garbage collection and keep the streets clean.

It is possible to get qualifications within the framework of the programme, for witch the 15% of the public workers in the village have the opportunity. During the research, there were possible to participate in conveyor-, basket weaver and crop farmer trainings for public workers. Just 3% of public worker form the group of brigade leaders who do their job for higher wage. The adjudication of this job is diverse among other public workers; the brigade leaders are selected from close acquaintances of the mayor; therefore, these people's leadership attitude is different to those who voted on the current mayor of the village than to those who gave their vote to the other candidate.

Besides the traditional alignment – but in context with it – by type occupation, there is an other kind of grouping of public workers based on the relationship with the mayor. The first group is formed by the relatives of the mayor and local government representatives and those sure voters who exempt from some rules, inter alia from the rule of absences' observance. However, the vote on the leader of the village does not mean sure public works position, usually, the members of this group work inside the village performing leadership tasks or administrative jobs at the mayor's office.

The other group is created by those who are called – referring to the current asylum problem – *"migrants"*, because these people work at the edge of the village doing harder works then the first group or they got job in the farm of one of relative of the mayor.

Those villagers who do casual work or sustain themselves from black labour or possibly live from benefits (regular social assistance or support for people for active age), 67% of them have already worked in the public works programme. This group in average was employed for a 1.5-year

period by the local government and worked 21 months ago in the programme for the last time. They generally do not participate in the programme, because of childbearing, or the nature of available jobs – *"I do not want to make adobe bricks, like in the '60s"* – but there are people who are excluded from the public employment due to the *"improper"* vote.

Accurately 64% of the public workers are not satisfied with the salary of the programme *(Figure 5)*, in line with that, 36% of them find it adequate, but almost all of the public workers (85.7%) experienced improvement in the financial situation of their household as the result of the participation of public works programme. Besides that, 12.7% of them did not perceived any change and 1.6% of them felt decline in their financial situation during the programme.


FIGURE 5 *How satisfied are/were you with the payment in the public works programme? (N = 61)*


FIGURE 6 *How changed the financial situation of your family or household due to the participation in the public works programme? (N = 63)*

5.3. Experiences gained during the public works programme

The respondents have highlighted – in line with the positive experiences about the public works programme – that the opportunity provided by it improves the situation of families. Moreover, they can work among acquaintances and friends in good community and many people can work locally, and they can generate revenue for the village during the value-creating work, thus the settlement can develop.

Both the work and the participation in the trainings are experienced by the people as recreation and they do not have to work a lot during the work, furthermore in the trainings, the attendees can acquire nationwide recognized (National Qualification Register, OKJ) qualification.

The people evaluated as a counterpoint the low level of wage and the short-term employment due to the periodical hiring, but they mentioned the ignorance of the weather conditions too – *"if there is very hot, even so we have to go"* – which in case of the works inside the plastic tunnels can be particularly difficult.

People indicated that some villagers' chances for entry are very narrows, so *"just those can get into the public works programme, who buy meat from the representative"* and the rules are not equally valid for everyone: *"They take exception, because they allow someone to go away from work, even for up to two weeks. Others get letter of H*[10]*, if they go home earlier",* but the different management – depend on the voting side – with workers appears in the speaking style and the place of work as well: *"That person goes to spud, who voted against the mayor."; "They make us beast, if we do not spud, it comes the letter of H and deduct 4000 from the payment or fire us."*

Nonetheless, although according to one third of the workers, the participants have to work a lot, most of them (58.7%) feel, that the volume of the work is just right *(Figure 7)*. The workmates come out well with each other, because they indicated in prominent proportions (85.2%), that there is no problem and debate among the colleagues.


FIGURE 7 *How much do/did you feel overloaded yourself in the public works programme? (N = 60)*

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[10] *"H"* is the letter for indicate the absenteeism in the report.

According to the own opinion of the majority of the public workers (71.4%), their superiors are satisfied with the quality of work done by them, however some of them (14.3%) say, that the brigade leader do not care about that *(Figure 8)*.

Exactly 76.6% of the participants of the public works programme in the village mentioned as expectations the accurate arrival, only 39.1% of them said the precise work and 29.7% of them indicated as a requirement the compliance with the deadlines during the work. Beside these, they have mentioned the compliance with house rule and instructions, the cleanliness, and the alcohol-free appearance.


FIGURE 8 *How your superior evaluate/evaluated your work in public works programme? (N = 63)*

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

In case of the local government's workers it is often, that exploiting their low level of labour market opportunities, the local government fire them and hire them back through the frame of the public works programme. So the local government – in order to reduce their expenditures – employ their former public servants back, which means, that the workers do the same job, what they did before the public works programme, but for less money with unpredictable contract and in several cases without protective clothes required by their work or without sufficient amount of water.

The current system incites the local government to give jobs for people with availability support (RÁT), because in case of unemployed people, the local government has to pay 10% of the amount of benefit and 20% of the sum of availability support, but in that case if they employ them in the public works programme, the state defrays the 95% of amount of the public works' wage, which includes the availability support as well.

Besides that, the legal regulation of the public works programme means another advantage for the local government – because the public workers have just 20 days off – which does not take in account the rest of regulations of the supplementary leave's amount in employment legal relationships. So it does not depend on the workers' age and the numbers of children. This may result that the public workers supersede the low-educated workforces from the primary labour market.

In spite all of these, because of the lack of available jobs in peripheral areas, there is continuous demand to participate in the public works programme, moreover, according to the experiences of public workers, it is getting harder to get into the programme. Therefore, there are misuses experienced from the part of the local government, which are evolved due to the strong dependency relationships, exploiting the uniformedness and labour market vulnerability of underprivileged layers, some of village leaders give jobs in public works programme as privilege or employ their relatives in public works jobs with higher payment category than the rules allow it. These leaders also give preferences for those who voted them during the elections or intend to give public works job for those people who pay a part of their wage back to the representatives, or they have some works made by the applicants in order to get into the programme.

After the entry into the public works programme, the local government can take immediate redundancy in cases if the worker regularly drunk; if he or she neglects the work tools; if the labourer commonly does not do his/her daily work; if he or she endanger the safety of colleagues or he/she unjustifiably absent from work several times. The public worker can take immediate resignation, if the employer creates unworthy circumstances; does not provide appropriate equipment; the work safety is incomplete; the rest period is short; so in cases if he/she is humiliated, bullied or discriminated. Notwithstanding the misuses, the public workers living in peripheral areas do not dare to indicate, because on one hand they do not know their opportunities, which lead them to the direction of labour inspectorate, on the other hand, in case of any kind of complain, the representatives not just fire him/her, but all of him/her relatives will be dismissed, thus he or she in the absence of other job opportunities – according to the law – remains without any aid.

As Zsuzsa Ferge and her colleagues mention, besides the low level of financial possibilities, inter alia the poverty means the lack of access to knowledge and rights as well (FERGE et al. 2006). Therefore, the vast majority of the people in the village – in absence of the knowledge of their rights – do not aware of the infringements to their detriment, for which reason the only one employer in the settlement, that is the local government secures its misuse strategy taking advantage of its peripheral features and monopoly position.

Not incidentally, it is worth to note, that the public works programme did not reach its originally set of purposes, because just 1,6% of the locals (N = 64) got a job in the primary labour market thanks to their works in the public works programme, but in spite of the current operational problems, it is essential for the maintenance of the villagers' everyday life. However, in such a joblessness area, the primary aim of the public works programme is not the labour market integration, but the reduction of the social tensions and the mitigation of the subsistence difficulties.

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eTIME or the Networking of Leisure Time

Generational Culture Consumption in the Digital Age

Abstract

The aims of my research are to reveal the effect of ICT tools on lifestyle, the typical patterns of cultural interests and cultural consumption in digital and mediated environment, the attributes of free time activities of different generations in the light of the findings of the last two timescale analyses. Additionally, an explanatory model which may assist us in revealing some special features of e-time will also be shown.

Hungarian and international research about this topics shows that internet use is detrimental to social relations – especially at the early stages of the penetration period: it reduces the time spent with friends and family, weakens communication among family members, and also influences the use of different media. Traditional social and cultural activities are *"in competition"* with the internet, as the amount of free time has practically been constant for decades (an average of 4.5 hours per day for adults). Researchers have compared the activity structures of users and non-users, and their finding is that internet users are significantly more likely to read a book, use media actively also for various artistic content, visit art events, and participate in various leisure activities (sports, cinema etc.), while they watch less television.

Keywords

culture, information society, cultural consumption and participation, internet use, generations

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INTRODUCTION

Time, which made Saint Augustine frightened and confused, misled Newton, inspired Einstein and made Heidegger obsessed, is the wonderful invention of eternity. Culture is everything that cannot be perpetuated genetically, it even includes Voltaire and vodka advertisements. However, *"in Bosnia and Belfast, culture is not only something that we put in a CD-player but it is also something which we need to kill for".*[1] Information society[2], which revolutionises everything, establishes a novel social and economical formation, ignores the rules and the millennia-old rigid structures and destroys the frames of time and culture, is the new millennium. As free time became the *"product"* of industrial society, information society has also produced a specific form of time, namely *"e-time"* or the time of information society, which has evolved in a period which can be described by information and communications technologies. E-time can speed up the rhythm of everyday life much better than anything before.

It induces essential changes in several segments of economy, work and society. *"Multi-time"*, which means doing diverse activities simultaneously, comes into existence. The rhythm of work and gaming changes, the new time of the novel paradigm overrides historically and socially accepted system of workweeks and weekends.[3] The consequences of the accelerated and reversible time are the blurred boundaries of human life cycles, the appearance of flexible age and the change of public opinion as well. Time becomes a classifying marker in the new social formation. Hence, age and belonging to a generation can have a much more intensive impact on chances of the labour market, social and cultural capital, the position in systems of inequalities. Age also forms the structure of free time activities and preferences for cultural consumption. Technological development affects free time as well, and it also influences the amount of leisure time, the expansion and polarisation of opportunities. Its modifying impact on the nature of spare time activities became significant in a short period of time.

METHODS

I use a quantitative method, secondary data analysis to answer the research questions. The empirical part of my paper is based on the voluntary activity data of the time balance sheet surveys from 1999/2000 and 2009/2010[4], and I also use Generation Z datasets of the *Magyar Ifjúság* survey 2012. My paper uses the term of leisure time as conceptualised in international time balance sheet research, i.e. *free* time excludes all time spent with work and the satisfaction of physiological needs, and also all activities done in order to deliver home or family chores. In order to map out the patterns of leisure time and culture consumption, I have split this main

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[1] EAGLETON 2001.

[2] Z. KARVALICS 2002.

[3] LEE – WHITLEY 1999, 2000; ROPOLYI 2006.

[4] The reason why I chose this method is that the most common sociological methodology for time related research is the time balance sheet survey focussing on the individual. Time balance sheet surveys focus on how members of any society use their time, which also reflects on how much economic, cultural and social capital they have. Categorisation in Hungary splits daily activities into three large basic units: the first block contains socially mandatory activities,

block into two parts, based on the classification introduced by FALUSSY[5]. Activities are grouped as follows, according to their location, method and type:

I. Leisure time spent away from the screen:

– visiting cultural institutions (theatre, cinema, museum, exhibition, concert, opera);

– social leisure time (friends, family time, social programs);

– cultural leisure time spent at home, within the home (reading, listening to radio or music, pursuing a hobby);

– *"open air"* activities (motion, sports, excursion, fishing, gardening);

– other leisure activities (voluntary help, working with political and civil sector organisations, religious exercise, mending pets).

II. Leisure time in front of the screen:

– watching television or videos, watching movies on DVD;

– computer use, internet use.

Using the narrow interpretation of culture consumption during analysis, I included activities in my analysis that entail the reception of some product of high or mass culture, and I concentrate on active leisure activities that are related to spending social time, i.e. which require active participation, physical and/or mental activity and the leaving of the personal living space.

When talking about generations in my paper, I use an interpretation based on MCCRINDLE[6] a generation is the group of individuals defined by the same age, life stage, identical technologies, events and experiences. The generational categories used on this basis are as follows:

– above 60 years of age: Builders (1925–1946),

– between 45 and 60 years of age: Baby Boomers (1946–1964),

– between 30 and 44 years of age: X generation (1965–1979),

– between 15 and 29 years of age: Y generation (1980–1994),

– 0 to 14 years of age: Z generation (1995–2009).

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i.e. types of activities where there is no real free choice between whether one carries them out or not (wage earning work, study, family care, transport). The second block contains the satisfaction of physical needs, which is also mandatory activities that are carried out by the majority of society as part of a daily routine and mainly serve physical regeneration (sleep, eating, bodily hygiene). The third block contains voluntary activities where the individual is relatively free to choose from alternatives of mental, psychological, physical recreational activities. The following indices were used for the analysis: *"A" index:* daily average time use in minutes, which is the average time calculated for the entire population (or groups of population) for all activities examined, with a total of 1440 minutes, i.e. 24 hours a day. *"B" index:* percentage rate of the people carrying out the given activity. *"C" index:* average time spent with the given activity in minutes (SZALAI 1978; KSH 2012).

[5] FALUSSY 2004.

[6] MCCRINDLE 2009.

RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH

I have made the following statements for the main questions raised in the course of my research.

Leisure time spent away from the screen

The forms of spending leisure time with a focus on cost efficiency and cost savings became characteristic by 2010. There was a major drop in programs involving financial spending, leaving the home, or travel as compared to the year of the millennium. Forms of spending leisure time at home became dominant in this period, and the popularity of various social form of leisure time (free time spent with friends or family members, visiting each other) increased, while the amount spent with reading continued to drop, especially with young generations. Cooperation in church, civil or political organisations, volunteer work show the lower participation rates as activity forms: the rate of participants in these is minimal in all generations.


FIGURE 1 *Leisure time spent away from the screen, 1999/2000*[7]

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[7] N = 10,997.

There is a significantly smaller difference among generations in the area of *culture in the narrow sense* in 2010 as compared to ten years before: participation is balanced on a low level. The least popular activity form for the two young generations are attending opera performances and concerts; they choose all other events that fall into the category of culture in the classical sense over classical music. Similarly, members of the two older generations prefer going to the theatre, museum or exhibition or even a movie over classical music programs.

When looking at the leisure time activity patterns of generations, we can see that a *"generational shift"* has become visible in many areas, which is characteristic for younger generations primarily, and it indicates changes that happened over the decade analysed here. Members of younger generations (Y, X) show levels of participation in various leisure venues (e.g. cinema, theatre, museum, entertainment venues) as the next older generation did ten years earlier.

Considering all leisure activties, *generation Y* is seen as *the most active:* They spend their free time actively, diversely and interestingly, they spend a lot of time with other people, they make excursions and do sports, entertain themselves, and a part of them even visits cultural institutions – although this rate is much lower than at the turn of millennium. Their leisure time habits make them similar to generation X of the turn of millennium.


FIGURE 2 *Leisure time spent away from the screen, 2009/2010*[8]

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[8] N = 8,391.

The *"out"* programs of *generation X* halved over the decade, while there was only a slight drop in similar activities of the *Baby Boomers*, which involve leaving the home. Next to the youngest generation, it is the oldest where the biggest changes happened. In comparison to the turn of millennium, many more members of the *Builders generation* said that they went at least once to the theatre, cinema, visit friends, do sports, to a sports event as spectator, to eat out at a place, played board games, or took their grandchildren to the puppet theatre or the circus.

One typical characteristic of *generation Z*, i.e. *"digital natives"*[9] or the *Internet generation* is that they use the internet continuously. Data from the 2012 survey show that digital natives feel comfortable in digitalized-mediatized homes, or in in the vicinity of the internet, computers, i.e. devices[10], and also in the company of their friends. Online communality, continuous online activity and presence have grown to the extreme and peaked in comparison to earlier generations. The Internet generation no longer organises its free time around the television screen; the computer monitor has become the main rival[11]. For generation Z, the Holy Trinity of free time is the internet, television, and spending time with friends; this generation is characterised by a rather monotonous pattern of free time use concentrating around the home and telecommunication devices.

The majority of generation Z members are not striving to use their free time in a quality way, they spend most of their time, which is free from obligations, in front of various screens; any inspirational leisure time activity[12] pursuing or commitment to hobbies, visiting cultural institutions are rare

**FIGURE 3** *Free time use averages of Z Generation (minutes)*[13]

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[9] PRENSKY 2001.

[10] 82% of the generation have a computer at home, 76% also have internet access.

[11] They spend 140 and 195 minutes on average with watching television on weekdays and weekends respectively, and the same amount of time in front of the television.

[12] VITÁNYI 1997.

[13] *Magyar Ifjúság* 2012. N = 1,319.

activities that appear with but a few of them. Only one-third of this generation engages in high cultural events, one-fifth does sports in their free time, and one quarter spends time with reading books. This little time spent with reading newspapers and books[14] reflects the content consumption preferences of the Internet generation: the most important medium and main source of news for them is the internet[15], and they consider newspapers[16] the least important source of information, even television[17] ranks higher.

Leisure time in front of the screen

Spending free time at home has become an increasingly attractive option through the development of info-communication tools, entertainment electronics and the media industry. Various audio-visual devices have appeared in homes over the past decade, which have all enabled culture consumption at home to become an *"experience"*, thus reducing further the need to visit cultural institutions.

The fundamental structural split of leisure time between time in front of the television, and all other activities has been happening since the 1980's[18]. As a result, as much as 58% of free time was spent with watching television by the year 2000, while in 2010, members of society spend more than half of the time free from obligations (57%) in front of some sort of screens. We can observe extensive and intensive reduction between the periods of the two time balance sheet surveys: all generations have reduced the average time they spend with watching television by more than 20 minutes[19], however, television still remained the main leisure time activity with the most time spent with it *(Table 1)*. The oldest generation spends the most time in front of the TV set:

	1999/2000			2009/2010		
	"A" index (min)	"B" index (%)	"C" index (min)	"A" index (min)	"B" index (%)	"C" index (min)
Generation Y	136	81.2	167	101	71.8	140
Generation X	142	86.9	164	115	82.3	139
Baby Boomers	173	90.7	190	150	88.3	170
Builders	212	93.5	226	191	94	203
Total	165	88.0	187	139	84.6	163

TABLE 1 *Watching television broken down to generations 1999/2000–2009/2010*

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[14] Members of generation Z spend 7 and 44 minutes with reading a newspaper and a book on weekdays, and 16 and 59 minutes with reading the same on weekends.

[15] Average 4.14 points from 5.

[16] 2.76 ponints.

[17] 3.61 points.

[18] ANDORKA – FALUSSY – HARCSA 1990.

[19] The biggest drop can be seen with generation Y: They watch half an hour (35 minutes) less television on daily average than in 2010. Generation X, Baby Boomers, and Builders spend 27 minutes, 23 minutes and 21 minutes less in front of the television than at the turn of millennium.

they spend 58% of their free time with watching television programs in 2010-ben (191 minutes). The younger generation spends the least time with television in 2010, and the rate is identical to the figures of a decade before – although it is 30 minutes less – at an average of 101 minutes, which corresponds to almost one third of their free time.

I applied a regression model[20] to look at the factors that influence the *amount of time spent with watching television (Table 2)*. This has shown that economic status and age, belonging to a certain generation exert the most important effect, and the amount of time spent with watching television increases by 16 minutes on average with the increase of age. Improvement in financial status reduces television time by 5 minutes on average, and the same reduction in television time is 7 minutes with improved availability of cultural capital. Internet use reduces the time spent with watching television by almost 30 minutes, on average, pupils spend 43 minutes less in front of the TV than the ones who are graduating from their studies, while active earners have 40 minutes less for this type of entertainment than non-actives.

	B	Standard error	Beta	t	p
Constant	135.747	5.847		23.217	0.000
Economic capital	–5.172	1.447	–0.45	–3.573	0.000
Cultural capital	–7.660	1.486	–0.63	–5.154	0.000
Generations	16.362	1.569	0.142	10.426	0.000
Internet use (1 = yes)	–27.187	3.262	–0.119	–8.528	0.000
Economic activity (1 = yes)	–39.950	3.070	–1.72	–13.014	0.000
Student status (1 = yes)	–43.229	5.091	–0.119	–8.491	0.000
Settlement	3.699	2.753	0.015	1.344	0.179

TABLE 2 *Explanatory model for time spent watching television*

After the turn of millennium, the *emergence of computers and the internet in households* had started adding nuance to the television centred, monotonous leisure time structure. According to the time balance sheet survey of 1999/2000, 11 percent of the respondents reported having a computer, 9 percent said they didn't have any but wanted one. Seventy-six percent of the households in that sample said their household didn't have a computer, and they also didn't want to own one. The attitudes to owning, or purchasing in the future, a computer is significantly determined by the age of the head of the household, i.e. the belonging to a generation[21], education and

[20] This model is significant, F = 164,348; p = 0.000. The explanatory power of this model is low, explained variance is 13.6%. The following variables were included in the model: I have created the index for cultural capital by using the next variables: the rate of school education *(institutional cultural capital)* and time spent with reading books *(incorporated cultural capital)* generates the index. I constructed *economic capital* along three dimensions, by using a main component: household's net monthly income, availability of durable consumer goods in the household, and savings generate the index. Further explanatory variables include the settlement type where the *respondent lives*, and *internet use*.

[21] Almost one-fifth of heads of household (18%) are in generation X, 38% of them are Baby Boomers, while 44% are Builders.

economic status. Low level of education, older age, and dropping from the labour market (for whatever reason) result in negative attitudes and dislike against IT and related devices.

Material and cognitive barriers[23] that keep people away from information society had mainly collapsed over the decade concerned, so that more than half of the participants (53%) in the time balance sheet survey of 2009/2010 were using a computer, and 62% of households actually owned one.

	Do you use a computer?		Total
	Yes	No	
Generation Y	10	90	100
Generation X	25	75	100
Baby Boomers	50	50	100
Builders	72	28	100

TABLE 3 *Computer use broken down to generations 2009/2010[22] (%)*

Data from the time balance sheet support the hypothesis that age is the primary explanatory factor for digital inequality[24], computer use by older and younger generations indicates the existence of a *generation gap*. Internet use shows the same pattern as computer use: generation Y members are the most active (86% use the internet), followed by generation X where only one-third doesn't use the internet in their free time; while more than half of the Baby Boomer generation (54%) stays away from information society, and the members of the Builders generation are the least *"entangled"* in the web: 75% are no internet users.

We can observe significant differences in the *internet use of generations (Figure 4)*. There are generational and socio-cultural differences behind the interest and the satisfaction of needs; however, we must not ignore inequalities in use, or the differences in *"useful use"*. Accessing information and communication rank first in the internet practice of all generations, and then there is a stepwise drop in learning and self-education as we move back in the row of generations. There are pregnant differences in the use of online games, the internet varieties of entertainment electronics, and the downloading of movies, music and different software. As we move towards older generations, the rate of people who play reduces, and there is a clear difference in the net use patterns of generations when it comes to exchanging files: This is the area where there is a deep divide between younger and older generations as this activity needs more established user knowledge, which is less characteristic for older generations. Online news consumption, reading newspapers, magazines and news portals is the area where the two older generations are stronger than the two younger ones, while primarily members of generation X use the internet for the purposes of e-commerce.

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[22] DESSEWFFY – RÉT 2004.

[23] N = 8,245. The Pearson coefficient of generations is 0.389, i.e. there is a positive (linear) relation of medium strength across the variables.

[24] CSEPELI – PRAZSÁK 2010b.

FIGURE 4 *Internet use of generations 2009/2010*[25]

Members of the youngest generation show the most even use of all the listed possibilities offered by the internet: their internet use is diverse and colourful. The net use practice of the two older generations is very similar: it includes mostly practical preferences for the oral and written forms of communication and a reduced focus on entertainment, which do not necessarily require established, diverse user skills.

Internet use, culture consumption and time use

Empirical research into the relationship of i*nternet use and culture consumption* has shown that behaviour related to culture are mainly prevalent in people who use the internet, however, internet use in itself does not help any person to become a consumer of culture without any precedence. The world wide web can only help by augmenting pre-existing cultural interests[26]. There is a defining difference between net users and non-users as regards visiting high cultural institutions: internet users go to the opera, museum, exhibitions and theatre three to four times more often than non-users do. People keeping a distance from the IT world prefer leisure activities that are less dependent on technological devices and more focussed on the home, and they are much more active in these activity forms (playing with children, grandchildren, gardening, taking care of pets) and in practicing religion than internet users. They are characterised by the simplest, cheapest and least *"tiresome"* use of free time. Age plays a significant role in all of this; the decisive majority of non-internet users come from the two oldest generations who basically lead less active lives that are concentrated around the home and determined also by physical conditions; however, it would be a mistake to disregard the rate of generation Y and generation X members (one-third and one-tenth respectively) who also belong to this group. The culture consumption behaviour of the non-internet using group can be described as a *"cultural desert"*, and we can state that the presence or lack of internet use shows significant correlation with the choice or non-choice of various activity types that are related to culture.

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[25] N = 4,201.

[26] Csepeli – Prazsák 2010a.

When constructing and explanatory model for classical culture consumption,[27] I examined whether visiting the venues of classical culture is defined by the variables included in the model, or whether there are other factors behind the emergence of preferences *(Table 4)*. Including, in the model, generations as a categorical variable and using the oldest generation, i.e. the Builders as the reference category, I came to the result that the teenager and twenty-something members of generation Y are not significantly different from the oldest generation when we look at the chances to consume classical culture, and if controlling for all other variables. So, comparing the culture consumption and cultural interest of the young with the oldest, the relationship is non-linear but shows a U-curve: members of generation Y and Builders show similarly intensive interest for classical culture, and they also show equally high frequency of participation, provided that they are internet users.

	B	Standard error	Wald	p	Exp(B)
Economic capital	0.416	0.032	165,315	0.000	1.516
Cultural capital	0.504	0.033	231,492	0.000	1.655
Internet use (1 = yes, 0 = no)	1.421	0.080	316,320	0.000	4.141
Urban (1 = yes, 0 = no)	0.665	0.068	96,572	0.000	1.945
Generation			47,792	0.000	
Generation (Y)	−0.118	0.105	1,266	0.261	0.889
Generation (X)	−0.522	0.096	29,635	0.000	0.593
Baby Boomers	−0.417	0.091	21,123	0.000	0.659
Constant	−2.153	0.091	563,729	0.000	0.116

TABLE 4 *Explanatory model of classical culture consumption*

Internet use exerts the strongest effect on participation in culture in the narrow sense: there is a more than fourfold chance of finding high culture audiences among computer and internet users than among those who stay away from these for whatever reason. Possessing economic and cultural capital increases interest for and participation in classical culture by 1.5 times, while urban residence doubles it. Results of this analysis show that the technology of the information age has deepened pre-existing cultural differences, and status crystallisation is further strengthened by inequalities in internet access and internet use.

Exclusion from information society drastically reduces the chances to get involved in cultural life. People in older generations, living in rural areas, with low education, in less good economic situation, not using a computer or the internet will choose culture related leisure activities at the lowest proportion. Young people that use ITC technology are in a somewhat better position especially if they live and

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[27] Logistical regression, all variables included in the model have autonomous, significant effects, the model's explanatory power can be described as good: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test p = 0.000, Chi-square = 49,317, Nagelkerke R square = 0.24, i.e. the combination of explanatory variables explain 24% of the dependent variable variance. Variables included in the model: generation membership, cultural capital, economic capital, settlement type, and internet use.

study in an urban environment. Looking at cultural participation, continued school education has a positive effect, but this typically ends when school education ends. Internet using, oldest Builders and younger generation Y members that live in the capital and possess more than the average of economic and cultural capital typically show the highest rate of classical culture related activity.

Variance analysis *(Table 5)* done to examine the time use differences between those who do and who don't use the internet does not support theories, primarily from the early stages of internet spreading, which looked at the social dimension of it and assumed loneliness, isolation, reduced social capital and narrowed social connections for internet users.

On average, internet users spend 9 minutes more with socialising than those who stay away from information society. They spend more time with various forms of social entertainment such as card play, board games, and they also make more excursions, spend more time walking in the open, and also do more sports. In case of visiting each other, there is a minimal difference between the two groups, and this also applies to reading books (8 and 7 minutes respectively). On average, they spend 30 minutes more with learning and self-education, and they watch television more than an hour less than non-users.

	Internet users (minutes)	Internetet non-users (minutes)	F-stat.
I. Socially bound activities	479	389	42.089
II. Physiologically bound activities	696	757	14.862
III. Free activities	271	299	6.661
Watching television	114	183	194.715
Reading a book	8	7	9.16
Socialising	91	82	50.978
Reading a newspaper or magazine	11	16	106.538
Visiting each other	6	7	13.456
Learning, self-education	46	15	721.024
Sports, walking, hiking	17	13	51.300
Social entertainment (card game, board games etc.)	6	3	88.025
How many books have you read over the last one year?	7.91*	7.4*	

TABLE 5 *Time use averages of internet users and non-users, 2009/2010 (N = 8,391)*

Looking at the three main activity categories, we can observe substantial difference between the two groups in 2009/2010: internet users spend one and a half hours more on socially binding activities, i.e. income earning, learning, taking care of the family, which is primarily associated with their age and their belonging to a certain generation, and their position in the distribution of work across society. Internet users spend one hour less on sleeping, eating, the satisfaction of their hygienic needs, and they can also spend 30 minutes less with leisure activities than their peers who stay away from the internet, however, they use this time much more consciously, more actively and in an experience oriented way.

Conclusion

Computer and internet use in the examined period until 2010 has brought about a change in the free time structure of younger generations (Z, Y, X). The younger the given generation, the deeper and more profound the change. I assume that the time balance sheet survey in 2020 will indicate the impact that also covers older generations, thus the entire society, which bring about substantial change, and also causes defining transformation in leisure time use that will have a long-term cascading effect.

Cultural participation of people using information technology and those untouched by the digital world is significantly different, the audience of classical culture is significantly more likely to appear in the group of internet users. Online leisure activities of younger generations are key, however, a part of them is versed in navigating the world of offline culture, especially members of generation Y.[28] Their activity in the classical scenes of culture has unfortunately dropped in the period examined, while a certain proportion of the Builders' generation has gone the opposite way – they are typically the ones who use the internet. Watching television is the most important leisure activity for the oldest generation, however, it is no longer the dominant activity for younger generations. Internet use reduces the time spent watching television by almost 30 minutes on average, while it has no negative impact on the amount of time spent with social activities, friends, family members.

In summary, we can state that economic, cultural and social capital possessed by the individual has a significant effect on the use of social time; and further the social status of, and the system of activities carried out by the individual in modern information society are stronger than ever defined by the individual's age and the technology *"controlled"*, owned and competently used by the individual. Not unlike the interpretations in antiquity and the Renaissance, free time is the privilege of free individuals in our society. This means that persons who are released from or escaped the boundaries of work have *the largest amount of free time* (economically inactive, pensioners, unemployed). However, the time of antique ideals is over, and the findings of this empirical research show that free time is less and less the space where virtues and ideals unfold, or individuals develop. It is much more weightless entertainment, filling time with something, anything really, that becomes dominant; the simplest, handiest and least costly solutions are preferred, which often means binge television watching.

The establishment of information society, technological changes will not leave free time unaffected either – just like in preceding periods. As a result of a flexible concept of time, the status of free time changes and – much like in traditional societies – there is no clear, sharp distinction between working time, and time out of work, i.e. leisure time. As opposed to earlier societies, the individual in information society has an increased freedom in deciding when the want to enter the world of labour, when they start or end a work process, and when to spend time with entertainment, resting, or minding their social relations. In the sphere of netCulture, consumer habits are entangled with production habits, and this is increasingly and emphatically true for generations Z and Y. They, the younger generations are early adopters of info-communication technologies and in the forefront of creating user media contents. Their individual abilities, skills, technical

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[28] It would be a mistake, however, to forget the app. two-thirds of the generation who never participate in any cultural event.

prowess and experience in the online media space, and their generational attitudes make them particularly fit for the innovative use of new production possibilities.[29]

The choice of leisure time activities shows not only characteristics defined by economic and cultural capital but also generational features. The majority of generation Z – similarly to the oldest generation of Builders – are characterised by passive, monotone, often purposeless leisure time activities, which actually corresponds to their generational definition: they are the *quiet generation* who feel alright within the safe walls of their homes. While free time choices of the oldest generation are often determined by coercive factors (health issues, lack of company etc.), and then they are narrowed down to the television, the choice of the screen/monitor for generation Z is always based on free choice, based on an order of preferences.

Free time use of *generation Y* is intensive; this generation is characterised by an experience-focussed leisure pattern that is after visual stimuli. This diversity in leisure activities is also a consequence of their generational character (openness to technology, preference for communality, high levels of energy). The cultural interest of this generation is wide and refined, which is matched by IT and technological prowess. Generation Y members were born at the time of national and ethnical chauvinism, the community, wealth, the possession of assets are important to them, but they are very interested in and open to the world.[30] This digital generation was confronted with an unprecedented array of choices, they learn and like to choose, try new things, they gain experience and knowledge that are global and extend to the whole world.

Generation X has the least time for leisure activities, which they try to spend in a meaningful way, mainly with their families and friends. The frequency of *"out"* programs of this generation halved over the decade examined, they watch almost 30 minutes less television in 2010 than they did at the turn of the century, three quarters of them are computer and internet users. Members of generation X were born at the time of cultural renewal, the invasion of new ideas, the oppose the existing institutional order, honour, freedom and survival are important values to them. Deep commitment to these two values, and the affinity for new ideas are reflected by how this generation refuses to grow middle-aged and old, to fit into the clichés defined by age; they prefer rewriting societal rules and generate an *"anti-age"* movement of sorts, the waves of which are then happily ridden by cosmetics and fashion corporations, the movie and advertising industries. Generation X is not trapped by its age, their generational character is that of knowledge, high professional demand, which spur them to look for new solutions.

There was only a slight drop in the *"outdoor"* activities of the *Baby Boomer* generation in the years from one time balance sheet survey to the next, their leisure time activity structure is similar to that of the Builders. Members of this generation were born after the war and the great crisis, a vision for the future, professional knowledge and diversity are important to them. Their attitude of seeking new solutions, which is also their generational feature, is supported by the fact that half of this generation is part of the internet universe.

As an outcome of my research we can state that the *availability of financial assets* remains the defining factor of cultural participation, while *economic capital and the geographical slope*

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[29] Glózer 2014.

[30] Howe – Strauss 1991.

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continue to have a strong influence. Next to *cultural capital*[31] that fundamentally affects the quality of life, *IT capital* has an increasing effect, i.e. knowledge about the use of information technology, the possession of devices, and their skilful and diverse use. Individuals who are culturally active will also do other leisure and recreational activities more often than others, they do more sports, hike more, spend more time with social activities, sometimes they also create and pursue various artistic activities. Bad financial status, the low rate of owned institutional and incorporated cultural capital, rural habitat, and exclusion from information society resulted in narrower choices for leisure activities with an absence from the events of symbolic culture by 2010, and they also strongly limit the number of preferred leisure activities, and the time expended on them.

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[31] BOURDIEU 2004.

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The Religious Patterns of Young Roma People in Hungary

Abstract

The Hungarian youth's religious patterns and beliefs can be analysed with the help of the database of *Hungarian Youth Research*. According to Rosta (2013) it seems to be clear that the earlier phenomena and categories (for example *"religious in their own way"* etc.) do not fit into the current religious transfornations anymore. The main reasons for this change are the development of mixed religious patterns (mixed with esoteric or oriental elements) and the process of secularisation.

The aim of this analysis is to map the young roma people's religious patterns relying on the database *Hungarian Youth Research 2012*[1]. The roma subsample was separated from the database (N = 625). Quantitative techniques were used (crosstabs analysis, means, ANOVA-test, factor analysis and linear regression).

Our first empirical findings refer to the fact the rate of the *"traditional religious"* people are higher in the roma subsample. The acceptances of religious dogmas are more typical in the roma subsample but these items refer not only to the traditional contents but also to esoteric elements as well (e.g. horoscope). This relationship is verified by the ANOVA test (two factors were identified, the traditional and the esoteric-mixed factors). A linear regression modell was configured in the last step of our analysis and the sociocultural variables (type of settlement, gender etc.), the categories of religious self-identification and the fact of the religious education are involved as well. Our aim was to reveal the effect of the ethnic identity. The effect of the roma ethnic identity is significant in the case of the traditional religiosity but this relationship does not move together with the rejection of the mixed-esoteric patterns. Moreover with the help of the database the effects of the secularization have been revealed as well.

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[1] Thank for the database for Kutatópont (http://kutatopont.hu/).

INTRODUCTION

If we would like to deal with the religious life of roma people a number of research are available abroad and in Hungary as well. Mostly they tend to focus on the local communities, the features of the local networks and practices and it is frequent that they deliver qualitative data (Vekerdi 1982; Tesfay 2009; Gog 2008). We have to lay down that this can be a very important viewpoint from the aspect of sociology or anthropolgy of religion but the macrostatistical data can give us such an empirical findings which reflect the changes of the whole roma society (Gyetvai – Désfalvi 2016; Bartl 2014; Gyetvai 2014). With the help of this viewpoint the first signs of social transformations are more detectable than analyzing the practices and life of a closed or local communities are analysed.[2]

This explains for the fact that sometimes we have the feeling that the quantitative and qualitative research into roma people' religious life deliver us different emphasis and different trends. It is clear-cut that the Hungarian roma population has been transforming – for example the number of the roma people has increased, their educational level as well and the rate of those people which live in towns has also risen. Accordingly we have to focus on the macrostatistical data because the local analysis cannot be cover the whole roma population. If we go through the special literature from these two aspects we have got such a feeling that there are various features in the field of roma people's religious life. Various trends can be found: secularization on the one hand and strong traditional patterns or a religious revival on the other. Moreover if we analyse the religious patterns and practices the wider social contexts and transformations seem to be a very important starting points. In the case of research which focus on the youth this last sentence is more relevant.

In this study this macrostatistical viewpoint will be dominant. The database which were used (*Hungarian Youth Research 2012*) is representative for gender, age and the type of the settlement so the separated roma subsample does not refer to specific group of the Hungarian roma people or specific geographic area. We know that Hungarian roma population is varied and in these different groups and communities the religion get different features and practices but – as we have mentioned – the changes in the whole roma ethnic group can be followed with this method more succesfully.

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[2] The sociology of education focuses rather on the relationship between the religiosity and the school achievement (Pusztai 2004). Past the last decade some analysis refer to the institution of roma colleges for advanced studies (sponsored mainly by churches) (Jancsák 2015; Jenei – Kerülő 2016).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

Religious patterns in Hungary

In this paper the phenomenon of secularisation was not analyed – several publications in the field of social sciences had done it (e.g. ROSTA 2004; MÁTHÉ-TÓTH 2011). Moreover some parts of this process are evident (the rise of people outside denominations, the fall of the religions's social elements, the individualisation etc.). It is an important fact that the relationship between the modernisation process and the secularisation is detectable. However the secularisation process does not seem to be a linear and irreversible change (ROSTA 2004; TOMKA 1996; HAMILTON 1995).

The socialist system did not prefer the religious practices in Hungary and tried to restrict it but the first elements of secularisation had started in an earlier period. The restrictions of the religious practices were less effective in isolated villages. Besides the religion has got several other functions in the communities which refer to the everyday life, the rhythm of the work, the holidays, the whole cultural system, the normes and the rules of the social behaviour. And this is why the above restrictions did not function effectively in local communities. This duality according to the types of the settlements has still been working and the main features and patterns of religiosity are different in villages and towns. After the regime changed these restrictions have disappeared. But the secularization and the changes in the field of religious life are rooted in not only the political context (FÖLDVÁRI 2009). Moreover the religiosity has not withdrawn only in the small villages – despite the fact it could be expected due to secularisation. For example in the larger towns a part of the youth can be typified with religious mindset.

If we analyse the members of the denominations according to the data of census 2001 and 2010 we can detect a significant transformation. (Moreover it is to be noted that this section of the survey was not obligatory and the phrasing of the question was different in the two census. The phrasing of the survey from 2011 focuses on the feeling that *"I am belonging to the denomination"* and not on the simple membership.) In 2011 the total of the *"no answer"* and *"without denomination"* is about 46%. In the case of the established churches the number of the membership was decreasing – despite the fact that the restrictions of the socialist system have not been in force for one or two decades *(Diagram 1)*.


DIAGRAM 1 *The Hungarian society's division according to denominations* (Source: KSH, own diagram)

But this change does not unequivocally effect the decrease in the religious practices and mindset because this diagram displays only the institutional approach of religiosity. The individual forms of the religiosity have become more widespread – and this process refers to the dissolution of the traditional communities and the preference of indiviual values. The category of *"I am religious in my own way"* according to TOMKA (1999) links inherently to this transformation. But this type of religiosity can not be measured by means of questions which the survey of the census contains. According to TOMKA (2009) the rate of this category was less than 50% percent of the adult population. The relationship between the religious self identification and the denomination was analysed by ROSTA (2011) in Hungary.

During the socialist system's last decade an other important religious phenomenon was observable. At first we can detect the dynamic progress of the free churches (Methodists, Adventists, Jehowah's witnesses etc.). This change significantly transformed the religious spectrum of the Hungarian denominations. Other important shift was the evolving of the New Age's elements is this term – the eastern religions became more significant and some esoteric notions and phenomena have become popular. To sum up this chapter sweeping changes have formed the religious life in Hungary in the Millenium.

THE RELIGIOUS PATTERNS OF THE YOUTH

Naturally the religious patterns of the youth have got a special features. This notion can be due to causes which refer to the age (e.g. INGLEHART 2008). The age can form the thinking and the values and this change forms the attitude toward the religion as well. Other important factor is the life situation of the younger cohorts. INGLEHART (2008) calls to our attention to the symptom that the thinking and values were formed by the effects of the period in which people grew up. And the childhood of the young cohorts came to an end during the socialist system or after the regime changed – which represents a watershed from the aspect of religion. Moreover if we analyse the religious life of small villages in Hungary we have to be aware of the fact that the young people are underrepresented in this type of settlement.

Another very important external context is the process of individualisation. Naturally this notion refers not only to the religion but rather to every segment of life. This transformation evolved in the Middle Ages according to MACFARLANE (1978). This change has made less the personal networks less tight and the personal religious networks as well. So every fact mentioned earlier tend to shape the religious patterns of young people in less traditional way.

If we analyse the recent features of young people's religious life with the help of the *Hungarian Youth Research 2012* interesting patterns can be detected. The survey contains six optional responses (no answer, uncertain, I am not religious, I have got definitely another conviction, I am not religious, I am religious in my own way, I am religious and I am following the rules of my church).

We have to be aware of the fact that religious self identification contains more categories and this attitude can not be described with a simple *"no"* or *"yes"* option. In 2012 the most typical category was the *"I am not religious"* answer and the second was the *"I am religious in my own way"*. The traditional form of religiosity has got only 7 percents (ROSTA 2013). *(Table 1)*.

In 2016 less significant but important transformation is perceptible. The rate of the traditional religiosity has decreased to 6%. The most dominant category was the *"I am religious in my own way"* (43%) and the second is the *"I am not religious"* (41%). (SZÉKELY – SZABÓ 2016)

Optional answers	Percents
No answer	7
Uncertain	8
I am not religious I have got definitely another conviction	7
I am not religious	40
I am religious in my own way	31
I am religious and I am following the rules of my church	7

TABLE 1 *The proportion of the religious self identification according to the Hungarian Youth Research 2012 (N = 8000, per cents)* (Source: my own table)

The questionnaire from 2012 contains a very important question which refers to the different religious dogmas. But these items are linked not only to the *"traditional"* religiosity (Hell, Satan, God, Trinity, Saints etc.) but the items of the *"New Age"* and other eastern religions (reincarnation, horoscope, talisman, UFO etc.). The main lesson of the analysis of Rosta (2013) is that we have to use this complex approach of the religiosity because the confessed dogmas are rooted not only in traditional ground. Some *"esoteric"* or *"eastern"* items were more popular than the traditional items. In this analysis this new approach has been applied to young roma people.

ROMA PEOPLE AND RELIGIOSITY

The religiosity of roma people show us a diverse picture in the different European and non European countries but the most typical notion is that this ethnic group is conformed to the religion of the majority. Moreover this was a long process with full of conflicts and the roma people were frequently viewed as heretic in the late Middle Ages.

Over the past two decades the established denomantions and the free churches have turned to roma people more intensively. Free churces have been more successful according to the data of census. The membership of these denominations has increased intensively in case the adult population (Gyetvai 2014). But the young people's religious patterns are not identical with the adult population.

Moreover the data of census show us a change with opposite direction according to Bartl (2014). She said that the roma people's religious patterns have started to assimilate to the non roma population's features. In 2011 22% of the roma people was not belonging to any denomination and 11% did give not answer this question *(Diagram 2* [See next page.]). But these data are linked only to the religious self identification and not to the contents of the religious dogmas. We can suppose that these contents have changed as well.

Nevertheless it would be a mistake if we assume that the contents of the religious dogmas are equivalent in the roma and in the non-roma ethnic group even if they say *"I am belonging to Catholic church and I am religious"* (or other established denominations) so their religious self identification are similar. The roma people's religiosity was analyzed in the 60's by Mészáros

DIAGRAM 2 *The non-roma and roma population's religious division according the census 2011 (per cents)* (Source: BARTL [2014], my own diagram)


DIAGRAM 3 *The change of the denominations' proportion according to the roma population from 2001 to 2011 (percents)* (Source: BARTL [2014], my own diagram)

and the empirical findings have showed that for example the religious events (e.g. christianing or funeral) were adapted but the ground of their religious feeling is different from the Christian dogmas. There is a different relationship between God and the indiviual and some dogmas are not known (e.g. penitence) whilst the elements of the magic are perceptible. (VEKERDI 1982) But these findings come from the Kádár era but we suppose that this dichotomy has been observable yet and these elements are still detectable. At the same time the denominations' recourse to the gypsy population may have transformed the system of religious dogmas.

If we would like to compare the contemporary young roma people's religiosity with the non-roma young population we have to be aware of the fact that the closed comunities and the strong traditions can preserve the *"original"* forms of the religiosity. Based on the data of census we expect the effects of the secularisation too. *(Diagram 3)*

METHODOLOGY

As we have mentioned the database of *Hungarian Youth Research* was used this analysis from 2012 and the roma and non-roma subsample were separated. The question which refers to the ethnic identity was self categorization. This approach is embedded in the external context (politics, prejudices etc.) but the rate of gypsy population in the database (7.8%) was similar to estimates of the demographers. (Moreover we have to be aware of the fact that this method can generate some degree of bias.) The database was representative for gender, age, the type of the settlement between 15 and 29.

The categories of the religiosity (e.g. I am not religious, I am religious and I follow the rules of my church etc.), proportions of denominations and religious dogmas (miracles, heaven, God, horoscope etc) were analysed in this study and the roma and non-roma population's patterns were compared with different statistical methods (per cents, frequencies, ANOVA-test, cross tabulation, factor analysis, linear regression). Our hypotheses are as follows:

– We can reveal the effect of the ethnic identity in a linear regression modell according to the different types of the religiosity (factors will be identified with the contents of the religious dogmas). The variables of the social background will be involved in these models but we suppose that ethnic identity has their own effect.

– According to VEKERDI (1982) we suppose if factors were created from the contents of religious dogmas in the roma and non roma subsample the patterns will be different.

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

Our first step was to reveal the differences between roma an non-roma young people regarding religious self identification. There were seven optional answers connected with this question. The differences between the two subsamples are presented in *Diagram 4*. The most dominant answer in the non-roma subsample is the *"I am not religious"* and in the roma subsample is *"I am religious in my own way"*. The traditional religiosity is less typical but the proportion is larger among roma people. About 30% of the roma subsample said that *"I am not religious"*. The religious thinking is more typical in the roma subsample but the total of the two definitely *"religious"* answer is about 50%.

DIAGRAM 4 *Religious Self identification (N = 625 and N = 7375, cross tabulation, p < 0.05, sig.: 0.000. Hungarian Youth Research 2012)*


DIAGRAM 5 *The church of the christening and the church which I am belonging at the moment (N = 625, per head. Hungarian Youth Research 2012)*

The survey consists of two questions connected with denomination. The respondents had to name the denomination of the christening and this question focuses rather on the religious tradition of the family. In some free churces (Adventists, Methodists or Jehowas's wittnesses etc.) the christening of the children is not possible so this data refers less to the traditions of the families but rather it can be an effect of a adult conversion. In the second question the respondents had to name the denominition which he/she was belonging to at the moment. If we compare the results of these questions we can identify 54 roma persons (this is about the 9% of the subsample) which named a church in first question but did not in the second. The loss is the more apparent in the case of Roman Catholic church but the Calvinist and Greek Catholic denominations have a less significant decrease. The membership of the free churches is lower in this database – we suppose this is more typical among adult roma citizens (the rate of the membership is about 4.5% according the BARTL (2014) in the roma population). Those shifts which were shown in the earlier chapter according to the non roma population seem to be similar in the roma subsample *(Diagram 5)*.

If we separate those 54 young roma people which left their earlier denomination this subsample is typified with specific social features. (Although the number of the subsample is very low so our findings can not be regarded as valid.) Their paternal education level is higher *(Diagram 6)*, they have finished the vocational school in higher proportion and they are underrepresented in the villages and in the county seats. (Young roma people from the smaller towns tend to leave their denomination.)

The next step of our analysis is to reveal religious dogmas. This block of survey contains 16 items and these items were measured with a five grade scale. The means of the items were used and the means of the roma and non-roma subsamples were compared. 12 significant differences were identified with ANOVA-test ($p < 0.05$, *Diagram 7* [See next page.]). (In the case of talisman, horoscope, reincarnation and UFO there were no significant relationships.)


DIAGRAM 6 *Proportion of young roma people who left their denomination according to completed education level (per cents, N = 625 and N = 54. Hungarian Youth Research 2012)*

BEL VEDERE

Diagram 7 *Religious dogmas in the roma and non-roma subsample (significant differences with ANOVA-test, means with five grade scale, N = 7315 and N = 625, sig. = 0.000: ***, sig. between 0.001 and 0.01, = **, sig. between 0.01 and 0.05 = *. Hungarian Youth Research 2012)*

Roma subsample		Non-roma subsample	
3.22	God	2.70	God
2.78	Heaven	2.31	Heaven
2.54	miracles	2.30	miracles
2.54	**Trinity**	2.29	**telepathy**
2.54	Saints	2.22	**horoscope**
2.49	after-life	2.21	after-life
2.46	**resurrection**	2.20	Saints
2.43	**Hell**	2.18	**Trinity**
2.39	**Satan**	2.09	**UFO**
2.38	horoscope	2.09	**resurrection**
2.18	reincarnation	2.08	reincarnation
2.16	**telepathy**	2.04	talismans
2.10	immaculate conception	1.99	**Hell**
2.08	talismans	1.94	**Satan**
2.02	**UFO**	1.86	immaculate conception
1.90	magic	1.82	magic

Table 2 *The positions of the religious dogmas in the roma and non-roma subsample (N = 625 and N = 7375. Hungarian Youth Research 2012. means with five grade scale)*

As we can see the acceptence of the religious dogmas is stronger in the roma subsample but this not a definite traditional pattern (see the means of the horoscope below). The most significant difference refers to God, Heaven, Satan and Hell and the distances of some items are less remarkable (e.g. miracles, immaculate concepcion). This patterns seems to be linked to the empirical findings of VEKERDI (e.g. the varied acceptance of the relgious dogmas – but every traditional religious dogma has a higher mean in the roma subsample). The acceptance of the telepathy is higher in the non-roma subsample.

The framework of the religious dogmas can be rather decoded with the positions of the items *(Table 2)*. According to this pattern the elements of the New Age seem to be more essential part of the non-roma subsample's thinking (e.g. telepathy, horoscope, UFO) and some *"traditional"* dogmas are less significant (e.g. Hell and Satan). The distance between the item of God and the other *"traditional"* items alludes to the individual religious interpretations and the lower means in the non-roma subsample refer to the stronger effect of secularisaton. The telephaty and horoscope have a higher position than after-life or Saints.

After this stage of our analysis factors were identified with the help of these variables. Maximum likelihood method and varimax rotation were used (saved information: 66.7%, KMO: 0.956) We could save 15 items (every item except *"miracles"*). The patterns of the religious dogmas seem to be clear-cut because those two types of the religious elements can be revealed which was introduced in the theoretical part of this study (traditional elements and the elements of New Age). The traditional factor includes dogmas which are related to established churches (e.g. Heaven, God etc. – at the same time some variables are accepted not in all established churches, e.g. Saints) and the second factor contains the horoscope, talisman, reincarnation, telepathy, magic and UFO.

	Traditional	Esoteric-mixed
resurrection	0.819	0.299
after-life	0.638	0.497
horoscope	0.237	0.677
God	0.771	0.233
talisman	0.247	0.741
reincarnation	0.425	0.673
Heaven	0.865	0.277
Satan	0.761	0.348
Hell	0.787	0.326
Saints	0.859	0.280
Trinity	0.867	0.256
immaculate conception	0.746	0.289
telepathy	0.296	0.722
magic	0.301	0.743
UFO	0.135	0.635

TABLE 3 *The patterns of the factors according to religious dogmas (N = 8000. Hungarian Youth Research 2012)*

The name of this factor is *"esoteric-mixed"* and some parts come from eastern religions (e.g. reincarnation) and other parts are linked to the esotericism (horoscope, UFO etc.). The patterns are shown in *Table 3*.

If we use an ANOVA test ($p < 0.05$) signicant difference is detectable between the roma and non-roma subsample in the case of traditional factor (the mean of the factor score is 0.381 in the roma subsample and –0.02 in the non-roma subsample, sig.: 0.000). During the analysis of esoteric-mixed no significant difference can be shown.

As we have seen the religiosity is embedded in social background as well. Thus it is a very important research question that these factors have been shaped by ethnic identity or sociocultural background. A linear regression model was applied in which the dependent variables were the factors identified previously. Beyond the sociocultural variables other variables which refer the religiosity were involved the model. The first was the religious education in the family and the second is the type of the religious self identification. Every model has got four steps.[3] (The *Table 1 of Appendix* contains the types of the variables.) In the case of traditional factor the ethnic identity preserves their positive effect after the involvement of the sociocultural and religious variables *(Table 4)*. Gender, the type of the settlement (the county seat) and religious variables have formed too this factor. Positive effect is linked to the roma ethnic identity and the category of woman. Young people

	1. step	2. step	3. step	4. step
ethnic identity (0 = non-roma, 1 = roma)	0.90***	0.101***	0.102***	0.055**
gender (0 = man, 1 = woman)		0.106***	0.102***	0.057***
county seat		–0.147**	–0.148**	–0.058***
village		–	–	–
economic capital		0.051**	0.048**	–
own educational level			0,050**	–
the educational level of the mother			–	–
the educational level of the father			–	–
religious education (0 = non-typical, 1 = typical)				0.243***
uncertain				–0,217***
religious in their own way				–0.309***
non-religious				–0.643***
R²	0.90	0.207	0.214	0.631

TABLE 4 *The linear regression model of the "Traditional factor" (Hungarian Youth Reserach 2012. N = 8000)*

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[3] 1. step: ethnic identity, 2. step: gender, type of the settlement, subjective economic capital, 3. step: parental educational level, own educational level, 4. step: religious education and religious self identification.

from the county seats do not tend to assume the traditional religiosity. The religious education refers this to attitude. It is very important fact that the *"religious in my own way"* identification removes the respondents from the traditional religiosity. But the most important relationship for us in the table is the positive effect of roma ethnic identity.

Table 5 represents the linear regression model of the *"esoteric-mixed"* factor. It is evident that the ethnic identity does not have any effect in this case – but the other relationships are very interesting because those variables are shown which move people toward the esoteric religious dogmas. The most significant effect refers to the category of woman. In the case of the settlement we can see an opposite influence and the religious education does not have any impact either. The *"uncertain"* religious self identification strenghtens disposition of the positive attitude toward esoteric elements contrary to the *"I am religious in my own way"* – whilst reading the special literature we may have the feeling that this type of identification refers to this religious disposition.

Our second hypothesis has focused on the system of the religious dogmas in the roma subsample. We expect a different pattern in which the traditional and esoteric elements show us a special framework. In the case of the whole database the two centers of the religious dogmas (traditional and esoteric-mixed) can be defined. If we conduct a factor analysis in the roma subsample the outcome was similar to the pattern of the whole database, because these two centers were identified *(Table 6* [See next page.]*)*. Less significant differences are detectable by the esoteric-mixed factor – e.g this one does not include the item of reincarnation (This variable refers to every factor with similar weight). The essential frameworks of the religious dogmas are parallel in the roma and non-roma subsample.

	1. step	**2. step**	**3. step**	**4. step**
ethnic identity (0 = non-roma, 1 = roma)	–	–	–	–
gender (0 = man, 1 = woman)		0.127***	0.127***	0.122***
county seat		0.074***	0.074***	0.086***
village		–0.053**	–0.054**	–0.057**
economic capital		–	–	–
own educational level			–	–
the educational level of the mother			–	–
the educational level of the father			–	–
religious education (0 = non-typical, 1 = typical)				–
uncertain				0.077***
religious in their own way				–
non-religious				–0.095**
R^2	0.05	0.169	0.170	0.218

TABLE 5 *The linear regression model of the esoteric-mixed factor. (N = 8000. Hungarian Youth Research 2012)*

	Traditional	Esoteric-mixed
resurrection	0.776	0.345
after-life	0.675	0.435
horoscope	0.351	0.593
God	0.772	0.211
talisman	0.243	0.703
Heaven	0.852	0.230
Satan	0.715	0.409
Hell	0.772	0.358
Saints	0.878	0.238
Trinity	0.846	0.247
immaculate conception	0.648	0.412
telepathy	0.378	0.693
magic	0.210	0.749
UFO	0.160	0.650

TABLE 6 *The religious dogmas' factor in the roma subsample (N = 625, Maximum likelhood method and varimax rotation were used, saved information: 64.9%, KMO: 0.933. Hungarian Youth Research 2012)*

SUMMARY

The aim of this study was to compare the roma and non-roma young people's religious patterns with quantitative method and representative database. We suppose that with the help of this approach we may refine the picture which generally has linked with the roma people's religiosity according to the special literature.

Our starting point was the study of BARTL (2014) and ROSTA (2013). Bartl used quantitive data as well and her empirical findings focus on the religious changes inside the roma population. Rosta has drawn attention to the transformations of the religious dogmas inside the young cohort.

Special literature has highlighted that the roma people's religiosity has specific features whose elements have got historical and cultural rootes (e.g. roma cultural and religious traditions). But some elements can be the effects of recent transformations. Due to these facts two hypotheses were formulated. According to the first hypothesis we assume that the roma ethnic identity has its own effect is the linear regression model – this preconception was verified in the case of traditional religiosity. The empirical findings show that the roma ethnic identity is connected with this type of religious thinking. The membership of the denominations and the categories of self-identification allude to fact that the religious thinking is more significant in this ethnic

group and this is not the effect of the sociocultural background. This quantitative and nationwide result can validate those qualitative or local findings which highlight the central role of religiosity in the local roma communities' life.

But our empirical findings are linked to the outcome of BARTL (2014) – as we have revealed the proportion of those young roma people which said *"I am not religious"* is about 30% and we can separate the group of those young people which left their churches (their rate is about 9%). Moreover the stronger acceptance of the traditional religious elements does not result in the refusal of esoteric items (there was not any significant difference between the roma and the non-roma subsample in the case of this factor). However the traditional items compose the ground of their religious dogmas (as we have seen in *Table 2*). Approaching the roma people's religious life only with the *"traditional"* aspect will not result in an elaborate overview.

Our second hypothesis has relied on the study of VEKERDI (1982). To verify our presumption we have used a factor analysis only in the roma subsample and the patterns of the factors were compared. This hypothesis has not been verified because the frameworks of the religious dogmas seem to be similar and we can model them with two centres: first with a traditional and second with an esoteric center.

To sum up our empirical findings we can identify some specific elements of the young roma people's religious life and these results reinforce the fact that this issue needs further reserach with different aspects and methods. That is also evident that we should use the new results of other research in the field of sociology of religion because the system of the accepted dogmas and the features of the religious life have been persistently altering. Furthermore attention has to be paid to the external context (political, institutional etc.) since the religious patterns are embedded in these phenomena as well.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 1 *Types of the independent variables in the regression modell* (By the using of categorical variables we follow the instructions of MOKSONY 2006.)

Variable	Type	Values
ethnic identity	dichotom	0 = non-roma identity 1 = roma identity
gender	dichotom	0 = man, 1 = woman
type of the settlement	cateogorical	(the reference point was the smaller town) county seats and villages were involved
educational level (own, mother's, father's)	dichotom	0 = without degree 1 = with degree
subjective economic capital (measured with five grade scale)	dichotom	0 = less favourable (1 or 2 with the help of fivegrade scale) 1 = favourable (4 or 5 with the help of a fivegrade scale)
religious education	dichotom	0 = it was not typical 1 = it was typical
religious self identification	cateogorical	the reference point was *"I am religious and I follow the rules of my church."* uncertain, non religious, *"I am religious in my own way."c*were involved

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Abstract

In our rapidly changing world, it is becoming more and more complex and complicated for young people to plan their future, which is perceived as a problem by all who are involved. Issues such as one's relation to democracy, their desire to have children, their intentions to pursue further studies, whether they plan their future in their place of residence or abroad or the risk of deviant behavior are not only important from the point of view of the individual but also for society, as the future of a given region is also influenced by the above indicators of future vision. Research methods traditionally applied in youth research, which focus on socio-demographic characteristic features (i.e. objective life situation indicators), are less and less capable of providing adequate answers to these questions. In my hypothesis, to identify the underlying connections, the research tools of psychology and sociopsychology are also necessary to be applied apart from traditional sociological methods.

Therefore, in my study, by the secondary analysis of the most recent, 2014 data of the European Social Survey, I intend to demonstrate the significance of the underlying motivations as future vision creating factors behind the decisions Hungarian young people make.

INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, one of the most significant problems of Hungarian society is the high migration potential of young people. Apart from the classical domestic migration from east to west and from rural areas to cities (BÁLINT 2012), by today, outward migration has reached such a degree that certain areas of the country and certain industries may face an acute labor force shortage in the near future. Therefore, it is essential to explore how young people view their current situation and what they think about their future.

The European Union regards the youth as a resource, as active, independent, responsible, discrimination-free, tolerant, innovative citizens, the holders of European values, real citoyens (*White Paper* 2001; *An EU Strategy for Youth* 2009; JANCSÁK 2011). As in case of all resources, their distribution is uneven both territorially and in terms of quality. Thus, it is of no insignificance what tendencies can be observed within a given administrative unit concerning the following indicators (which influence the future of the region):

– their relation towards democracy (what political public life is like);

– their desire to have children (demographic indicators, the sustainability of social security);

– their intentions to pursue further studies (the economic performance of the country, productivity, unemployment, the structure of economy);

– whether they plan their future at home or abroad (demographic and economic consequences again);

– their tolerance levels (the situation of minorities);

– the risk of deviant behavior (public safety and public health) (among others: *Magyar Ifjúság 2012* [The Hungarian Youth 2012]).

Therefore, in my research, I intend to investigate which factors determine the future vision of young people the most and what relationship can be found between young people's perceived life situations and how they create their vision for the future. Youth research in Hungary in the past decade has shown that socio-demographic factors, especially the type of settlement young people live in and their parents' educational attainment, have a significant influence (among others CZIBERE 2014; DOMOKOS 2013; FEKETE – PRAZSÁK 2014; MAKAY 2013; JANCSÁK – KRÉMER 2016). György Csepeli's recent work paints a gloomy picture in connection with the Hungarian youth's vision for the future. Regarding the possible careers of generation Z, he warns against the dangers of a forming caste system among the youth, where the above mentioned hard variables also play an important role (CSEPELI 2016).

Is it possible that in our rapidly changing, globalized world it is still these objective life situation indicators that determine the future prospects of our young people? A notable group of contemporary sociologists have been arguing that it is not social structures that should be in the focus of investigations but rather the person, the individual. The reason for this paradigm shift is that it is not social classes and institutions any more that determine the behavior of a person but individual experiences (MARTUCVELLI 2012). In my study, based on this assumption, I intend to establish a starting point for this.

GLOBALIZATION, SOCIAL CHANGES AND THE CHANGE OF AN ERA FOR THE YOUTH

In the study mentioned in the introduction, György Csepeli created the vision of the introduced social structure based on the challenges of globalization and the digital revolution. I also find it indispensable to briefly introduce these when discussing the topic.

Globalization is a phenomenon that does not only form economic, but also political, cultural and social processes (INOTAI 2001; BECK 2005; GÁBOR 2012). In the economic dimension, regarded as the primary dimension for a long time, there were three factors that played a special role in the organization of the worldwide, cross-continental activities of transnational societies: the liberalization of capital movements and the deregulation of financial services, opening markets further towards commerce and investment, thus promoting international competition, and an advancement of information and communication technologies in economy (OECD 2005). As a result of that, however, a homogenizing process can be witnessed: the same products are available in the stores of multinational commercial chains, the same economic and cultural patterns are spread due to the advancement of multinational media concerns, and thus consumption habits become similar, the lifestyle of consumer society becomes dominant everywhere to the disadvantage of local traditions and other methods of production; furthermore, the political systems of states also show convergence (GIDDENS 2008; BECK 2005).

In the modern era of labor force market, it is income obtained from work that has become the basis of satisfying needs in a consumer society (EHRENBERG – SMITH 2003). The employment structure has undergone significant changes in the past few decades: while at the beginning of the 20th century industrial workplaces dominated the labor market, from the 1950s on, the service sector has become the largest employer. A major reason behind this is the automatization of work processes – which spans from technological development through Taylorism to the appearance of informational technology – in the course of which the work of humans is taken over by machines, especially in case of physical work (GIDDENS 2008; BECK 2009). In case of corporations that live under the spell of growth and efficiency, this is a rational decision, as taxes and other contributions that are added to labor expenses with the spread of welfare systems have been on the increase. In the more developed regions of the world, this process is further strengthened by the opportunities that globalization has created, as it has become simpler to relocate production to other (less developed) regions where labor costs are lower. As a result of the info-communicational revolution, automatization has reached the tertiary sector as well: self-service checkouts, automated food, online ticketing systems or web shops are all on the rise.

The increase in supply, according to market rules, will result in a stronger competition in the labor market as well. This process leads to the erosion of workplace security at the same time. Instead of indefinite work contracts, employers offer employment opportunities for definite (shorter and shorter) periods (CASTEL 1998). This tendency is further strengthened by the fact that, due to the rapidly changing environment, a major part of investments is realized in the form of projects (CZIBERE – KOVÁCH 2013). The repercussion of projects – namely, their nature of being realized in a definite time span – will be experienced in the labor market as well.

Further consequences of project-based work are the strengthening of networking between organizations and institutes, the dominance of management know-how over academic knowledge, the appearance of the so-called culture economy, and the restructuring of previous power relations. Project-based functioning changes the work of the government as well; in the redistribution processes the role of the local level becomes stronger, which in turn restructures the model of the welfare state and public services (CZIBERE – KOVÁCH 2013).

Another important change is the effect of the ICT revolution, the advances of creative industries. The new tools open up the opportunity for new, more complex application areas; in response to this, there are more and more entertainment electronics, content provider and communication technology companies and start-ups appearing in the market. The latter demonstrate an exponential growth potential with the help of a wide range of marketing tools, however, due to their rapid obsolescence, they are exposed to high risks as well.

As a result of the changes briefly demonstrated so far, long-term strategies and career models have been taken over by activities aiming at reaching goals and results that have been broken down to shorter cycles and are more tangible. Consequently, the uncertainty of the plannability of the future is increasing. Owing to this, a significant transformation can be observed in young people's life stage, as these uncertainties have their impact on the processes of becoming independent as well. The most conspicuous characteristic of this phenomenon is the extension of this phase: when young people leave the educational subsystem, they do not leave their families and do not establish their own households, but rather continue their earlier way of living and lifestyle. As a consequence, the prolonged life stage of youth is transformed from being a limited and transitory youth age of the industrial society – the main function of which was to obtain some qualification – to being a professional youth status, which is legitimized by the increasingly vivid interest of society and economy. This appreciation leads to a situation where young people transform into model providers from model followers (ZINNECKER 2006; GÁBOR 2012; JANCSÁK 2013). This process is called youth paradigm shift.

One of the most typical manifestations of this process is the transformation of the former linear career model. One of its characteristic features was that basic life stages built upon each other. These used to have well-defined functions: the school years were about preparation, adulthood was about independence, self-support, responsibility, work and reproduction, and old age was about handing down knowledge to the next generation. These life stages and functions fitted together closely, and there was no movement between them. This has largely changed due to the fact the life-long learning and the possibility to work in student jobs have been created: periods of preparation and work change each other periodically (SOMLAI 2004). The linear walk of life has been exchanged for a walk of life of options (GÁBOR 2004). As a consequence of a series of decision situations, walks of life become individualized, with determinisms disappearing.

The youth paradigm shift holds both advantages and disadvantages in itself for young people. Pursuing studies in higher education requires more and more financial investment, competition for obtaining social positions is increasing, psychological pressure caused by risks and constant decision situations is growing, and young people are more and more endangered. The extension of education does not automatically mean that they can find a job that matches their degree, what is more, sometimes even unemployment cannot be avoided (SOMLAI 2007). Another factor increasing young people's endangered status is that they have become one of the most important target group of telemarketing. As studies examining consumer behavior have revealed, young generations are generally brand dependent, which leads to international brands trying more and more to tie them to themselves. Due to lack of experience and uncontrollability resulting from quantity dumping, negative consumer behavior is formed easily (GÁBOR 2004).

All in all, as a consequence of the youth paradigm shift, the youth life stage is no longer determined by finding employment, marriage and starting a family with establishing one's own household, but by competent participation in the cultural, political and consumption sphere (ZINNECKER 2006).

THREE IMPORTANT NOTES

The ever more profound changes that appear progressively more often and in more and more areas generate such unpredictable effects that will lead to a paradigm shift in future research as well: future is interpreted in a new way, not as the mechanical consequence of past and present but as a set of possible versions for the future. The degrees of likelihood are determined by the stability of processes going on in the present and by the values and the degree of future orientedness of individuals and institutions (NOVÁKY 2001). The situation is similar at the micro level as well. There are several alternative scripts available for the individual to form their own future vision, and when making a choice, it becomes important whether their orientation is individualistic or they are community-oriented and how positive their prospects for the future are (NOVÁKY 2008).

The rejection of the formation of future as a mechanic consequence is reinforced by Bourdieu's theory on the reconversion of the forms of capital. As a critique of Marx's theory, which placed economic capital at the center of social stratification and inequalities, many dealt with the possibility of identifying new forms of capital in the second half of the 20th century (among others BOURDIEU 1999; COLEMAN 1994; FUKUYAMA 2007; PUTNAM 2004). There are some differences in the theories as for the names of the forms of capital and the descriptions of their characteristics, but they all have the common feature that knowledge and social networks appear as capital generating factors. Bourdieu calls the three forms of capital economic, cultural and social capital, and he demonstrates that these forms of capital are mutually convertible to each other (BOURDIEU 1999). That is, disadvantages at birth can be compensated or changed, thus providing an opportunity to mitigate social inequalities. Although he proved the correlation of the various forms of capital in his empirical studies (BOURDIEU 1978), in recent decades the expansion of education and the appearance of community networks have probably weakened this.

Finally, I would like to draw upon the main findings of the recently published book by Ágnes Kapitány and Gábor Kapitány. In their study, they interviewed 200 subjects who were born into different life situations but were all considered to be successful by others, and their common characteristic was that they did not follow mainstream values and life strategies in their lives. Their main finding was that the alternatives and rebels do not form a unified subculture: they claim different values, and their common denominator is that they are all inner controlled (KAPITÁNY – KAPITÁNY 2014). In their analysis, they emphasize that what we regard as mainstream is also constantly changing, so it is conceivable that a life strategy that is considered alternative today will become general in the future.

RESEARCH DESIGN

In connection with the youth paradigm shift, the individualization of walks of life and, in relation to that, the responsibility of making decisions have been mentioned. When discussing the risk of the abundance of choices, Beck emphasizes the fact that individuals, when choosing a strategy corresponding to an actual situation, become members of *"situation and topic specific coalitions"* (BECK 1997) Reformulating the original research question, I placed the focus of the investigation on what the guiding principle can be that can provide some rule in our world that is based on the uniqueness of micro situations.

A special case of action theory, namely rational choice theory may provide help here: when there are several options to choose from in our actions, out of all the possibilities, we tend to choose the one that promises the most optimal results for us. That is, the explanation of social phenomena lies in the rationality of individuals acting without being coerced. Jon Elster, however, points out that actors of society usually cannot act totally at their discretion. Decisions are essentially influenced by the size of the set of optional possibilities. The number of available alternatives is determined by external and internal factors alike:

– *Preliminary commitment:* the individual reduces the number of optional alternatives as a consequence of culture, norms and rule systems. (The opposite process is when an alternative becomes attractive due to its being prohibited, a phenomenon Elster calls adaptive preference formation.)

– *Manipulation:* certain actors, media or even social institutes may have some interest in making us choose from the alternatives that they prefer, and in order to realize that, they are keen on affecting the individual either directly or less conspicuously.

– *Change in preferences due to conducting studies:* the set of rejected alternatives is modified as a result of new information or knowledge.

– *Change in preferences depending on a state:* the possibility of certain alternatives is eliminated as a result of a previous choice.

– *Rationalizing:* the number of alternatives is reduced in order to make decision-making more effective.

– *Changing the quality weight in an anticipatory or retrospective way:* changes are realized in order to avoid the psychological disadvantages that would accompany the decision.

– *Dependency:* an individual may be in a situation where they cannot fully control their decisions.

Finally, an individual may decide on their own to reject certain alternatives. A special case of this is adaptive preference change, when an alternative that is believed to be unreachable is excluded. Another case is personality planning, when an individual (self-)consciously decides about the preference weight of certain alternatives.

In summary, the formation and change of preferences can be attributed to two factors: first, taking into account the physical, economic, social, legal and psychological restricting conditions, the set of possible alternatives is narrowed down to the available alternatives, then a decision is made about which of these to choose. Upon further examining the restricting conditions, we arrive at motivations seen as forces in the background of human behavior that urge the individual to act. According to their source, they can be inner (intrinsic) or outer (extrinsic) compulsions; in case of the former, the activity is perceived as attractive, and in case of the latter, the individual acts upon the influence of some coercion or incentive. Motivated behavior can spring from needs (e.g. hunger, recreation), but also from some habit. Thus, motivation is the driving force of a behavior formed as a result of needs (OLÁH 2006).

These driving forces are classified as primary (related to self-preservation and reproduction) and secondary (learned, conditioned) drives. Primary drives appear intermittently and may manifest as very strong inner compulsions. Secondary drives are accompanied by positive emotions, and they contribute to personality development (KEMÉNYNÉ 1989).

Out of the various motivations, I underline those that may play a role in forming future visions:

– *curiosity motive:* human need for information, which can be regarded as constant; the behavior it triggers is usually playful;

– *competence motive:* human endeavor to attain mastery or realize effectiveness in handling our material and social environment;

– *autonomy motive:* human endeavor to always have alternatives in initiating and regulating our activity, and that these are not determined by external factors;

– *performance motive:* overcoming obstacles, realizing tasks faster and more efficiently, exercising power over others (Oláh 2006).

An important indicator of performance is the goal, which is influenced by two factors: hoping for success and fearing failure. Those with the first motive being stronger (success orientation) usually set moderately difficult tasks to realize, which are still reachable, while those with the second motive (failure avoidance) tend to choose either very easy tasks (there is a very small likelihood that they cannot solve them) or unrealistically difficult (it does not constitute failure if they cannot accomplish them) (Keményné 1989). Success orientation and failure avoidance become characteristic features of the personality in the long run.

In my analysis of Hungarian young people's motivations, I used the database of the European Social Survey Round 7 conducted in 2014. Upon the initiative of the European Commission, every two years there is an empirical data collection using random selection as a statistical method; the selected sample includes 1,500–2,000 people per country. The survey was coordinated by TÁRKI [Institute for Research in Social Sciences] and MTA TK [Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences]. (The database is available on http://ess.tk.mta.hu/.) Out of the 1,698 people in the sample, 309 were young (under 30).

In one of the modules, subjects were asked how similar they think they were to a person described with certain given characteristics. In the course of the secondary analysis, I found four variables that refer to humanistic motives. In relation to curiosity, getting to know new things and new people, exciting life and creativity; in relation to autonomy, freedom of decisions; in relation to competence, demonstrating abilities and being recognized; while in relation to performance motive, success, material goods and exercising power over others as preferred variables[1].

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[1] The original variables were the following:

– Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him/her. He/She likes to do things in his/her own original way.

– It is important to him/her to be rich. He/She wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.

– It's important to him/her to show his/her abilities. He/She wants people to admire what he/she does.

– He/She likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He/She thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life.

– It is important to him/her to listen to people who are different from him/her. Even when he/she disagrees with them, he/she still wants to understand them.

– It is important to him/her to make his/her own decisions about what he/she does. He/She likes to be free and not depend on others.

– Being very successful is important to him/her. He/She hopes people will recognise his/her achievements.

– He/She looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He/She wants to have an exciting life.

– It is important to him/her to get respect from others. He/She wants people to do what he/she says.

RESULTS

First, I was interested in the order of motivations. The respondents had to mark their answers on a scale of 1 o 6, where 1 was the strongest value. *Table 1* presents that a kind of pecking order was established with autonomy being the strongest and performance motivation being the weakest.

Motivation	Variable	Mean
Autonomy	Free decisions	2.08
Curiosity	Inventing new things Experiencing new things Getting to know others Seeking adventure	2.13 2.39 2.50 2.94
Competence	Showing abilities	2.30
Competence	Being successful Power Material goods	2.45 2.86 2.95

TABLE 1 *Values of each motivation* (Source: Compiled by the author, 2017)

According to the obtained results, the preference order of motivations shows a certain dissonance, as autonomy can be reached through consistently satisfying the performance and competence motives. On the other hand, Hungarian young people are typically characterized by failure avoidance, rather than success orientation. This is in line with the results of a survey conducted among young people in Hajdú-Bihar County, in Hungary, where the order of respondents' value preferences was friendship, security, freedom, love, trust, peace and experiences, while material goods, admiration and power were less preferred. This reflects a defensive future strategy that prioritizes the psychological security of the individual, which leads to lower risk-taking and mobilizing only a lower level of resources for goal-oriented future-building (HAMVAS – SZŐCS 2016).

In the next step, I am investigating the links with socio-demographic characteristics, which is summarized in *Table 2*. With reference to gender and parents' educational attainment, I found no significant connections; however, in case of type of settlement, educational attainment and activity in the labor market, there was a strong correlation. This result is especially interesting as youth research in the past decades found that parents' educational attainment has a significant impact on young people's lives. In the 2012 large sample survey, 46 percent of young respondents declared that they fully, while 36 percent said they partly accept their parents' value system (SZÉKELY 2014). The parents' – especially the father's – educational attainment influences the child's educational attainment: in case of people with completed primary education, the highest qualification of 68 percent of the fathers is skilled worker, while in the case of people with a degree, 69 percent of the fathers have a secondary school leaving final exam; and the other way round: the children of 73 percent of fathers with a degree have a secondary school leaving final exam, while 85 percent of fathers with completed primary education have children whose highest qualification is skilled worker (*Magyar Ifjúság 2012* [Hungarian Youth 2012]), intention to marry: 13 percent of the 15–19 year-old children of fathers with completed primary education, while only 3 percent of the adolescent

children of fathers with a secondary school leaving final exam live in a partnership relationship; in the age group 20–24, 34 percent of children in unqualified families live in a partnership relationship, while in families with a secondary school leaving final exam, only 12 percent (Domokos 2013), ideas about the timing of childbearing: 79 percent of the fathers of those who already have children do not have a secondary school leaving final exam, while this figure among those without children is only 57 percent (Makay 2013), political socialization: young people with at least one parent having a secondary school leaving final exam are less likely to cherish nostalgic feelings towards the political system before 1990 (*Magyar Ifjúság 2012* [Hungarian Youth 2012]).

Motivation	Variable	Socio-demographic characteristics
Autonomy	Free decisions	Settlement type[2], educational attainment[3]
Curiosity	Inventing new things Experiencing new things Getting to know others Seeking adventure	Settlement type[4], educational attainment[5], activity[6] Settlement type[7], educational attainment[8], activity[9] Activity[10] Settlement type[11], activity[12]
Competence	Showing abilities	–
Competence	Being successful Power Material goods	Settlement type[13], activity[14] – –

Table 2 *Significant connections between each motivation and socio-demographic characteristics* (Source: Compiled by the author, 2017)

It demonstrates the significance of knowledge capital that motivations are the strongest in case of students and are weakest in case of the unemployed. Among those with low educational attainment (with completed primary education or less) it has been found that the curiosity motive (experiencing new things, getting to know other people) is significantly higher, while competence and performance motives (being successful, showing abilities) and creativity and seeking adventures are significantly weaker.

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[2] (sig < 0.028)

[3] (sig < 0.002)

[4] (sig < 0.001)

[5] (sig < 0.001)

[6] (sig < 0.007)

[7] (sig < 0.004)

[8] (sig < 0.004)

[9] (sig < 0.017)

[10] (sig < 0.028)

[11] (sig < 0.001)

[12] (sig < 0.019)

[13] (sig < 0.001)

[14] (sig < 0.021)

Conclusions

Due to the expanding arena of possibilities for alternatives which is the consequence of accelerating social changes, young people's socio-demographic characteristic features demonstrate a weakening correlation with optional future alternatives. Their explanatory power is also reduced by this. When answering the research question put forward in the introduction (What factors determine young people's future vision?), it is worth paying more attention to the investigation of such soft variables as motivations, values and future orientedness. One way of doing this may be through the analysis of socializing agents, as they transmit those behavior patterns that are expected in certain social roles and the norms and values that serve as their basis, and they assist young people in acquiring knowledge, skills and competences that will enable them to successfully participate in the life of society (Goslin 1976).

In my hypothesis, there will only be a deterministic relationship between young people's life situation and future vision (they will only get stuck in the caste system described by György Csepeli) if in a given situation each of the socializing agents (family, school, local communities, peer groups and the media) is weak. The relative strength of any of the agents (i.e. a moderate or high level of accessibility to the necessary knowledge and information) will provide an opportunity for the young to change their situation, i.e. to rebel against the circumstances. This is why it is essential that social institutes should lay more emphasis on transmitting the value of competence and performance in the process of socialization.

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Descriptive Life Stories of Hungarian Scientologists

Abstract

In this article we explore the religious life of Hungarian Scientologists. The research includes various interviews and some historical background that are needed to understand as to how the Church of Scientology has operated in Hungary and as to how church members recount their history with the Church. Among the interviewees are active members, high-ranking members and ex-Scientologists as well. A key element of sociology of religion is to try and understand individuals, institutions and of course social connections among these actors. Our aim is to reveal the complexities of Scientology and most importantly to provide a better understanding of church members as individuals.

INTRODUCTION

In this study, we have collected more than 20 special interviews partly with the leading members of Scientology from Hungary, and partly with members who left the organization previously being highly committed to it. The president of the Hungarian Church of Scientology helped us in the selection procedure of the interview subjects. We made interviews with most of the Scientology organization leaders operating in Hungary, and with leading members of the Hungarian Church of Scientology she recommended. In regard to the members, we interviewed 14 men and 7 women, the average age being 42.5, regarding education 15 subjects were postgraduates, 4 had vocational schools, and one of them had a high school degree. The majority of the interviewees lived in Budapest, half of them were born in the countryside, half of them in the capital. Their marital statuses mostly were divorced. They lived in their own apartment, were active workers, 40% of them were middle income individuals, the other 40% were in the high income group, and 20% lived on minimum wage.

The 40–60 minutes long semi-structured interviews – as the profession calls it – allowed us to recognize the human side of the organization that we have known previously from the books, articles, and statistical data.

On the other hand we managed to understand what it means for a person to be connected to Scientology, and what are the expectations and promises that keep attracting these people further to Scientology after the first encounter. Through the interviews we developed an understanding of the *"secret"* of Scientology, the language,[1] the operating principle, and practice which expressly characterizes the organization.

The researchers of Scientology generally accept that the ideology of the organization is strict and dogmatic which has no toleration for individual interpretations, and does not guarantee the right for the members to further develop its doctrines. On the contrary, even minimal difference from the teachings is considered as a learning mistake, that needs to be corrected with the appropriate method.

Based on the interviews we can declare that we encountered many instances among the interviewee's statements, that could be the signs of internalized doctrines and principles. However this acquired logical and theoretical value structure had not stopped them from assessing their own life in a much more sophisticated way. Dorthe Refslund Christensen made the same recognition while she examined the representation of Scientologists. She found that an organization with rigid soteriology does not automatically lead to a uniformized interpretation, even among the deeply connected members.[2]

These conversations were not created to serve as a basis of some kind of statistical distribution, but to highlight the dimensions and options that can characterize the community. Our interviewees were chosen from the most influential members of the Hungarian Church of Scientology. Due to this, it is obvious that the organization, and its principles mean a lot to them. It is also natural that

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[1] The subject how Hubbard developed the organization's inner communication system for total standardization would deserve an own research. The founder transferred the basic language of the organization from English, to a special language which connects special meaning to ordinary words, on the other hand it applies a wide range of acronyms and abbreviations. That is a further research question, how the members acquire the doctrines that could be only understand in this unique Scientologist language, and what are the consequences of this own language for the internal, and external relations of the members. The linguistic analysis of this issue in connection with the Hungarian language would be extremely interesting.

[2] CHRISTENSEN 2009. 103.

among those who are not committed to the organization at this high level, we could encounter these views in a much less intensive way and coherence. The aim of this chapter is to frame the many point of views, along a wide range, and complexity of this community based on the reports or statements from the insiders. The variety of benefits, the members acquired during their everyday lives while they were connected to the organization.[3]

Our conversation partners, or interview partners were selected by two different methods. The representatives of the Hungarian Scientology were selected based on our parameters by the Church of Scientology. We wanted to meet those, who were nominated by the Scientology Church as the most important members in their aspect. Our aim was to interview those who were in charge of the different Scientologist projects, and those who played the most relevant role in the history and present of the Hungarian organization. The members of those who quitted the organization were selected by the well-known and often applied sociological method called the snowball method. We met the first former member by accident, then each one we met, suggested another.

Henceforth we will make a portrayal of what we got from the interviews, without focusing on individual interviews. We executed a deep analyses of the interviews and interpreted the data relying on existing theories. The summary of this can be found in the assessment section of the paper. We of course promised the interviewed respondents absolute discretion, that we intend to keep. We will not publish the names, and the recorded statements about to be listed – even if they contradict each other –, and we will not expose anyone's identity. These interviews can primarily be described as life stories, authenticated by the speakers themselves. The quoted statements are individual stories and opinions and as such we do not intend to address or label them.

METHODOLOGY

In the qualitative research we applied semi-structured narrative interviews among the core members of the Hungarian Scientology. In the editing process of the interviews applied the theory of faith development (FDT) and its research methods. Afterwards we applied qualitative material analysis of the recorded interviews using explorative method.

The qualitative material analysis allows us to systematically examine the original interview texts. In the process we determine the basic unit of the analysis – in this case the answers to our previously asked questions. We rephrased the original answers to a unified form, which is appropriate for analysis. We summarize each answer's key elements. Then we decrypt the text created by the method by the original interview text.[4]

In 1995, James Fowler published his monograph called The stages of Faith. In his work he created the main stages of the development of personal faith considering the theory of personality development. These stages are the following: Intuitive-Protective, Mythic-Literal, Synthetic-Conventional, Individual-Reflective, Conjunctive, Universalizing. These phases are not following each other by a strict order, and they are not clearly separated from each.[5]

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[3] Let us refer to a methodological note from William James, which stated that the main attributes of religion, can be identified the best at the level of *"religious geniuses"* and not in the level of the insane. (JAMES 2004; MÁTÉ-TÓTH 2010)

[4] MAYRING – BRUNNER 2009.

[5] FOWLER 1995.

To examine the stages of faith, Keller and others developed a standardized interview guideline based on Fowler's work. We applied this method in our research along with our advanced knowledge of Scientology. The main subjects: Retrospective glance to the most important stages of life, its positive and negative events, most relevant relationships, values and commitments, religion and ideology.[6] We created our hypotheses according to these subjects, based on the Scientologist literature.

HYPOTHESES

Stark and Bainbridge proved that in the recruitment of religious communities, personal connections, personal networks play an important role. This connection applies not only in the cases of cult communities and sects but in the traditional denominations of the world as well. On the other hand qualitative and quantitative researches proved that in cases of some religious community's members the role of this personal and network component is significantly smaller during the process of the integration into the community.[7]

In his early work Roy Wallis had pointed out, that in the members of new religious communities (cults and sects) two epistemologies decisively determine what characterizes the bond to the community. The firs one is the acquiring of the ideology offered by the community (epistemological individualism), the second one is the almost unconditional acceptance of the community leader's authority (epistemological authoritarianism). Wallis proves the process of these two epistemologies, through the example of Scientology, as the transfer from healing cult to religious cult.[8]

John A. Saliba published his first monograph in 1995, about the understanding of new religious communities, which was revised in some points and republished in 2003. However the author wrote his book as a Christian to Christians, firmly standing up against the attitude of the anti-cult movements.

He didn't think that cults would be inherently dangerous, on the other hand he evaluated the psychological gains and losses of belonging to a cult from several aspects. He refers to Aldridge, stating the four benefits of belonging to a mainstream religious or non-religious community are: (a) legal protection, (b) tax returns, (c) stabile connection to an ethical community, (d) recognition. On the other hand in the cases of non-mainstream communities we can identify these disadvantages: legal attacks, contempt of the main religious communities, being labelled as a cult. Specifically in the case of Scientology, he shows that belonging to the community can be advantageous, against the ordinary psycho-therapeutic procedures, and by handling the possible threats well, this could mean personal stability, balanced ideology, and temporary network for these, and similar community's members.[9]

According to Christensen[10] L. Ron Hubbard coordinated and defined the Dianetics, which was founded by him, and Scientology as well. Until his death in 1986, he was the unquestionable religious leader, mentor, and coordinator of the organization. *"And he is till nowadays"* – says the author.[11] The religious leader position of Hubbard is the fundamental, legitimate basis

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[6] KELLER – KLEIN – STREIB 2013.

[7] BAINBRIDGE – STARK 1980.

[8] WALLIS 1975.

[9] SALIBA 2003. 130–133.

[10] CHRISTENSEN 2005.

[11] CHRISTENSEN 2005. 227.

of the organization teaching, and its inner process. Christensen highlights in her work the efforts of the organization which is not only maintains the living memory of Hubbard, but consider him as a living, and creating person. This hagiographic effort, and the presence of Hubbard in the organization daily basis can be identified in other religions as well. The organization worked out Hubbard's exceptional life story, putting him in the role of an extraordinary Scientist, a *"saviour"*. It deepens the application of the technology created by him, and requires its practice. For the organization Hubbard is an ordinary person and a superhuman at once, with special, above average skills. The only guarantee of *"salvation"*.[12]

According to these we focused in the following topics in our semi-structured interviews: the most important stages of life, the most relevant persons, – the incentives, and motivations of joining Scientology, – the meaning of Scientology in a person's life, – the most important values of the Scientology for the individual, and for the society, and at last, but not least, – the personal connection to Hubbard.

INTERVIEW FINDINGS

Encounter with Scientology

Two main options as to how one encountered Scientology were recounted by our interview partners. The first one is the participation in some kind of presentation where the auditor spoke in a very convincing way about topics that caught the attention of the members participating the audition. The second important moment of the process is reading the book Dianetics, which means a great deal to people who enjoy thinking about how the brain works, the background of decisions, or the elements of self-knowledge.

Scientology first started to appear in Hungary during the '90-s, along with other spiritual-movements that perceived man, society, and culture in an alternative way than the ideology of the previous era. There were powerful civic and social activities in those days around the country, especially in bigger cities. It was a fashionable thing to go to meetings, sessions, and the young intellectuals were roaming in the open market of views and spiritualties as the first tourists in the streets of Vienna's and London's shopping districts for the first time they got a chance to go West.

"A lot of things had come from the West before, which was not like the socialist man ideal should be this or that, and he should be a member of the KISZ (Association of Young Communists), or be a militiaman, or whatever, but it was when the structure started to soften and a lot of thing were allowed or weren't prohibited. These were the times back then. This wasn't out of the blue for us, it had a prelude along with double nominations, and recalls in '85 which was a new thing. A bunch of new things started then, and we looked at it as intellectuals, so there were a lot of things we could have got, but we didn't know it. But now if it is already in the shop- window, we should take a look at it."

The previously half-legally operating groups started to gain attention among great Christian churches. Plenty Buddhist spiritual schools or some other Oriental spiritual groups widened the civic society religious options. Meanwhile artistic, philosophical, and political groups invited the youth into movements, initiatives, and conversations in massive numbers. The fundamental

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[12] CHRISTENSEN 2005. 227–258.

phenomenon of these meetings, and ideological gatherings were their daydreams: something much more different than what they were told before.

"Something is not the way as they told us, something here is different, and then I started reading about how things are. And I was a young kid back then interested in, aeroplanes, spaceships, are there aliens, or are there not. It started to spread back then, this are there UFO-s or aren't. These things started to interest me, right."

The exploration of new ideologies enthused this social movement, that had no general organizations, showing the same patterns during their operations. Someone stood out from the unknown, and started to speak honestly about new things, then slowly those who were interested seriously, started to be sorted out from the wider audition, the movement started to operate in a low level, and if an international bigger organization was in the background, the new cell joined its circulation. If we look back from 20 years later, we can't see this early '90-s bustle, but many of the members who have joined to the organizations they found suiting themselves back then, many are now in key positions – in our case in Scientology.

Another typical aspect of the encounter with Scientology was the reading of Dianetics and its influence to the reader. Especially for those who have never read a book about the brain, the mind, the spirit, and other non-material stuff, this work opened a new world. As in the cases of other similar books to different people in differing life situations the book had not just granted serious spiritual experience but offered the solution of the most important questions in life.

"I'd bought the book, Dianetics, I went home and started it immediately. I loved reading, a book like this was no big deal for me, I can start anytime, no problem. I was reading it for five hours that day, did not finish it, but I read quite a significant amount, and in the meantime I figured out many things about my life, and it was super good. I want this! I've told my parents about it, called my boyfriend I've lived together with back then. . »Listen I've found something that is going to change our lives, and then I went back and said this is a great book, what else is there.«"

About the personal importance of the book many emphasized the fact that there were not just abstract theories in there, that were hard to obtain first and required continuous effort to understand, but theories that actually proved to be useful right from the moment they applied it. Meaning they had real exact solution to a given problem they encountered during their lives. For example it could help them understand inner processes and surpass serious traumas.

"I had been recovered from my trauma maybe because of this thing. I've never read these kinds of books before so I didn't really believe that Dianetics is about passing. I didn't know what to expect. However it explained a lot of questions I had in me, that what chased these things that I sat in my office working and all of a sudden I had to get up, or go out, or cry, or I had a diarrhoea. It was so irrational, and wasn't concrete, or explainable that why in one moment I am ok, and in the other I am not. What happened in one minute? And then you got an answer from Dianetics, about what triggered. The first two chapters of Dianetics was about what state one could be in if one clears his mind. So, to put it this way be clear, a clean state of mind. I don't know what to do for this but I want it. So If someone would say I should jump on one leg, and it is going to take for a half year, then I would have started it. It was so attractive for me, the state itself, and they wrote down, and then I had this advantage that I've never heard about Hubbard or Dianetics before. I had absolutely no false information, and I'm pretty sure that I had luck when I met with the people who could give the book to me in my reality, that I should just read it, and then I said ok, what is the next step."

The intensity and depth of applying the approach and the practice could be so strong that even the word *'conversion'* wouldn't be an exaggeration. The conversion is a sudden or gradual turn, that significantly affects the person's self-evaluation, and helps the critical reinterpretation of life events that has happened so far. It is a radical set of connections of the events that had happened before, and those that were about to come to pass – also present in the case of selecting values and social networks. Our interview subjects reported the same radical turn of events, however they did not call it conversion. We publish two examples of this below.

"It is definitely a change, but it is not like bang, it's a change while you go in your way. In a fortunate way someone knows where is he heading, know his way, and where he wants to be. I say in a fortunate way because I've been working with people for a long time, and eight out of ten have absolutely no idea where is he going. So I've always felt that I have a role, and its going somewhere.

My friend their took me to a lecture, held by a doctor who read from Hubbard's works. And the first lecture I've visited was exactly about the social and antisocial person's behaviour. Hubbard had a lecture about this, and he read that. He read in English, and read one sentence and then he translated it to Hungarian. And when he read about the antisocial behaviour I've recognized myself so much. And I was broken, practically my whole body shaken, and I said , Oh my God, It can't be, I can't. That someone could saw into my soul this much, and he saw what I've taught, and this can't be, I am awful and terrible and an enemy of the world, and this is not good. And then a chapter fallows explaining that every person has these patterns, the question is that if it's continuous or just occasionally happening. If someone is behaving antisocially because of a bad experience it doesn't have to be permanent. But if you recognized yourself while you have reading this, I can assure you, you are not antisocial, cause self-criticism is a luxury for the true antisocial which he cannot afford. I've had a feeling that if someone could broke me into pieces and rebuilt me in 15 minutes, then that man must know something."

The science of Dianetics could be defined as an applied philosophy. Scientology applies personally customized practice through the method of audition. The functionality of Dianetics, or its efficiency were experienced by many, through the results of the auditions. This positive experience justifies the theory written in the paper, and in addition encourages people to apply these practices more and explore the depths of Scientological knowledge and practices.

"After a regular sitting, I was scared that that's how it works, oh my God. And the person had a profit from it for a lifetime. His problem was, you know, he sat there in a room, and felt bad, you know it was always like this. And there in an audition the person had so great success that, he stopped crying and it dried off, and he said I've never felt so good in my life. And this touched me so much, that this how it works. I finished the course, and this is a good thing, I apply it every day since."

So the first encounter strengthens the group feeling to a degree, and to a degree brings closer to knowing Dianetics and experiencing its effects. These experiences motivated further immersion. For those who require these services, and become high-ranking members in the organization, human relationships, and acquired knowledge becomes more and more important and becomes an integral part of their way of thinking.

As to the experiences they had in the organization, they kept in touch more likely with someone who also lived through these experiences, and knew these appropriately and communicated with them in an individual interpretation of Hubbard, and with an individual logic and vocabulary.

Important Norms

During our conversations with leading Scientologist members, it became clear to us what benefits they recieved in the organization, and what are those things that could significantly contribute to further cooperation, taking responsibilities creating and enlisting services from it. According to the theory of social exchange, fittin into a certain community can be divided in four steps. The first one is the examination of costs and rewards, the second one is the deal about their rate, the third one is commitment, when we accept the cost-reward rate, and we more likely concentrate on the community itself, the last one is the institutional acceptance of the connection, where we officially accept the community's norms and declare them mandatory for ourselves.[13] After the interviews with leading Scientologists, we could clearly identify the areas, where the commitment realized for them.

When the members got into the organization, they found themselves in the middle of a serious learning and self-knowing process. During this they will acquire a coherent view in a way that surpass everything before it, which has an explanation for every aspect of their personal and social lives. Their self-knowledge will enrich as a result. In the cases of audition, their hidden memories and their deep injuries are revealed, and they recognize what drives them, and what helps them achieve a balanced behaviour and what had obstructed it from them. This continuously deepening self-knowledge is the fundamental basis of the conscious lifestyle. The trainings were called assistances and technologies. Their practices were typical problem solving techniques with the members and participants. These techniques first strengthen the consciousness, so they could fight the small, and bigger obstacles of life, and at the same time they strengthen the value of the organization, as they learn these skills and knowledge from there.

"Thinking of myself that I was before 1993, I didn't consider myself as blunt or a person with any less abilities, however, at those times I could float in life so much easier than today. There were less handhold in life and today I can in full thank for the kind of stability, power, elemental stability, if you say so, that I believe I've got today to Scientology. It gave me a very stable point in life and very important useful religious tools to live accordingly. Based on common sense, based on rationality. But possibly many people think the same way as I did long time ago that religion and common sense only have a bowing acquaintance."

People who have already required a numbers of services, and even have been committed members of the organization for many years, can appreciate the community the more they get involved in it, where they can find the previously mentioned values, that provides them partially with preservative setting, partially a place satisfying their social needs. Most of the time during these processes the previous network undergoes a transformation in its entirety or to a high degree into a network of the members of this organization, into a kind of strong buzzing community and unity. This cohesion is only strengthened by any negative discussion about the organization that can also be handled by adequate methods that are major parts of the trainings.

The advantages of the membership are apparent not just in private life, but also in the workplace. Development, marketing, management, communication are training areas of high priority. Technologies used in corporate governance provide companies employing them with more conscious leadership skills, more sophisticated labour sharing methods, more structured accountability. The novelty greatly affects those who have not yet met or started to utilize more modern organizational developmental technics. They can experience in a unique way as to how Hubbard methods affect

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[13] Thibaut – Kelley 1959.

the companies positively. Not to mention the above-the-average trust Scientologist companies have towards each other that brings many serious advantages in the competitive market economy.

"We started to use this administrative technology, as it is called officially. At that point the consultant promised to me, if I started using it, the work schedule of 12–14–16 hours would stop and we might get the job done within 8 hours. Well, this is totally impossible, but if it went down by 2 hours, that would be already worth it! We started doing it and in fact, after half a year we got to that point that one day I went home already at 8 in the evening. My wife said father, let's try to keep you home. So we started using that type of responsible technology, job description and organizational sheet. And then again we started using it, and I went to work at 8 in the morning and I was back home at 5 in the afternoon."

Partially, parallelly to the involvement's depth the extent of accountability also grows in regard to the organization. The members undertake different functions: from the function of a voluntary colleague for a few hours to a colleague living their complete lives within the organization. To many of them helping is kind of a natural thing that they want to offer and make accessible to others.

Our interviewees also reported exceptional stories beyond the usual increments of the regular self-reflection and more conscious lifestyle, other religions refer to as miracles. Recovery takes place, even from sickness diagnosed as incurable. Some get rid of severe psychiatric pressure; some solve family conflicts beyond hope or experience balance.

The theories, practices and community of the organization offer and ensure opportunities and fulfillment of a more thorough life according to the asked key Scientologist figures. They appreciate it even as much as they say: *"Scientology is my life"*.

"For me Scientology is, we can say that it means to me my life, everything. But it doesn't mean it, of course, because then we could think that I live for church. It's not like that, I've got a family, I haven't become a Sea Org member, it's good like this for me, I like it this way that I live out there in the world..."

Based on the above it's obvious that after the initial interest and first positive experience the stage of commitment and involvement follows while it's beneficial for the members, in other words it's worth taking and fulfilling responsibilities and paying the price of membership and services related to it. It is typical of Scientology auditing practices and control techniques that they occur parallelly at all levels with trainings and the acquiring of technologies, in other word the degree of the personal interest's fulfillment is directly proportional to the degree of acceptance of organizational interest.

Ron

L. Ron Hubbard referred to as *'LRH'* or simply Ron or even more intimately *"the old one"* among Scientologists has been the founder, a regularly mentioned and celebrated and the most important person of the organization. The author and introducer of fundamental writings used in Scientology, an emblematic figure of the organization whose picture can be seen in every Scientology church. A speaker thanking for some of his success to Hubbard, showing his picture or even turning to him, and then the members joining the speaker to express their gratefulness by standing up and clapping enthusiastically is a regularly repeated ritual on every Scientologist ceremony. Each organization maintains an office for him, as if he was present and still working there even today. We asked our interviewees what Hubbard personally means to them.

The Scientologists universally consider Hubbard as a renaissance man, a greatly knowledgeable brilliant person who created something unique and unsurpassable in an innovative exploration of the mind's functioning as well as in establishing pragmatic methods. They talk about his writings being diversified and embracing many fields of knowledge like a magical spell, they look up to him as a real Scientist. *"To Scientology he is what Albert Einstein is to physics"* – a Scientologist says. Hubbard created something everlasting by collecting the content, overviewing, systemizing and enhancing the most important cultures of the world. Besides his knowledge and philosophical work he created a functional system that is able to introduce and transmit this knowledge. We need to stick fully to Hubbard's doctrines and techniques because only that way can we ensure their effectiveness positively regardless of character types and cultures. Guarding the doctrines and controlling their fair use are duties of the main Scientology organization, the Religious Technology Center (RTC) that strives to be institutionally represented in every country. For the interviewees Hubbard's person, his doctrines, his elaborated organization and their mutual and universal impact frame a kind of an inseparable unit where the person is in focus.

Hubbard has not gotten any titles in the organization, he is considered to be the founder of the Scientology, but at the same time also many other titles are in use when he is mentioned. *"He is a philosopher, a Scientist, a religion constituter for me who observed regularities that move our everyday, our life as perfectly as his composition is trustworthy. However, I'm saying it again that I've experienced some more times again and again that he gives trustworthy presentment about life's regularities"* – a medical Scientist says. Being a philosopher and Scientist – explorer, writer, photographer, composer, shipping expert, organization developer – is joined by the description of *'religion founder'* who introduces us to a new dimension. The religion founders are the gods themselves in large religions of the world, or at least more than a mere mortal. For Scientologists Hubbard is not a god, but a highly respected great person to whom they are personally thankful for the gifts that stem from – and can be attributed to – him, and who also means a great treasure in the Scientologists' lives and even beyond these in regards to the world's salvation.

"He dedicated his entire life, in my opinion even a lot more to drive people or rather mental beings to a better direction. And in his entire life he has been sleeping 3–4 hours a day in order for him to write enough and provide us with the methods and opportunities that I'm not saying he explored, but observed. I haven't seen this degree of self-devotion ever before, maybe not even self-devotion that I think of, I can't find the right word. This is not human for me, this is a kind of attitude to mankind that I really feel I personally will owe him forever. Well, it's difficult to return, it's also a little burden that we can't return it, but how could we.

Shortly put, I would again say that he has been a stable point. While I think it's not as much different from other religions since also there the religion constituter likely plays an important role in the believers' lives. From this respect there is more likely no difference. For me he is a person that I think of with tremendous gratitude. And again just from practical point of view for that I was given something that is very difficult to return, very difficult to accept for me."

Hubbard is an outstanding person, an ideal and recognizer of the world's problems and a savior of sort. None of the interviewees considered him to be godlike though, however, he does represent a prophet of sort. In Scientology human-beings have eternal life, humans are just clothes of the immortal substance in his actual appearance. Scientologists don't think of Hubbard's presence up to date in this regard though, but as an effective reminder.

„Well, what should I say, I think of him with the type of love as a family member. As much as I love my parents my heart encompassed Hubbard. I could say that he is my best friend, but unfortunately, I have never met him, so it's just the respect for him that keeps on going."

Hubbard's work which many of the interviewees benefited from, is the source of love and respect. Depending on the interviewees' characters there were some that took Ron's closeness rather emotionally, some were like under a spell because of his knowledge, and again some others were appalled even at the sight of the verification of his theories again and again. While his writings are regularly used beyond official trainings as a handbook or instruction manual for life, for many people the author is pretty much alive within the texts.

„Usually we say that he is the best friend of mankind. For me Ron is my best friend personally. Of course, not literally meant. Knowing his work one can simply imagine how he would have solved certain situations, what he would do. He is a mentor, a fatherly good friend. When I open a writing of him, I always will get a guidance for sure, but it is not the type of guidance as a parable in the bible."

Based on our experience the interviewees' view of Hubbard's were coherent in their nature. This picture is also sorrounded by the respect for his selfless helpfulness, next to mentioning his unsurpassable abilities. In the decade following the Second World War Hubbard established the main ideas of his writings that which he offered to numerous significant American organizations which did not appreciate this offer, tried to abuse it, or straight up recognised it as a risk to themselves and therefore they became enemies. Hubbard kept on trying, couldn't be broken, and with a new approach by creating an organization, he tried to find supporters of his writings and findings, successfully. Hubbard not sparing himself lived his enduring and selfless life. He deeply respected people, trusted them and he was interested in nothing else but letting everybody find their own internal energy sources, get rid of any difficulties that limit their personalities. He is not considered a Saviour because the Saviour accomplishes salvation without the people's cooperation, however Ron has helped people by examples and developments regarding one's self-saving abilities. *"And Hubbard asked on a congress, – even though I always read his writings that he wrote himself, – why were you accepting what I say. And well, because you are saying them. Don't accept them just because I'm saying them. Accept them because you have checked and they are right for you."* – one of our interviewees said.

This knowledge, this portrayal is the Scientologists' LRH-picture, and this shows how there is an unfailing harmony between them.

The most important value

We can also call Scientology a life philosophy. In the centre of it there is a well confinable and – on every day's basis – a simply worded substance that has been analysed in details by Hubbard in many of his assessments and that can be acquired during trainings and practices. Those who have been members of the organization for a long time or even take a major role in there have adapted the central thesis of Hubbard's life philosophy. It might not be an exaggeration that their own thinking is driven even more and more by this thesis, they think according to its principles, use its idioms, deal with its internal and external trading.

We asked our interviewees what is the most important suggestion that they would like to phrase as a spiritual heritage for their loved ones. They should mention something – we asked them, – that they would like the ones they love never to forget. We were hoping to gain very personal statetments to this question. We purposefully didn't ask this question on a theoretical basis. We did not ask it this way: *"what do you consider to be the most important thesis of Scientology's life philosophy"* or this way either: *"what do you consider to be the central value of Scientology's*

philosophy". Through these type of questions the conversation is taken to a rather theoretical, impersonal level. But on the contrary, we were interested to know what core tenets have they internalized.

The majority of the respondents really talked in a very unique way about this topic. Some of them got surprised at first. *"Good question"*, *"I've never thought of that"*, – that's how they started to tell what they think the most important thing to be. Only a few did not mention a concrete value, but talked in general: *"read the Dianetics"* or *"become a Scientologist"*. These answers show that people who reply like these primarily trust in the organization and in its conceptual system. The general power of theory and organization is what provides them with discovery and fulfillment of values.

„There are people who will have to go a long way to figure out the truth. And I'm saying, yes, Scientology is the only one functioning that will help people find the truth."

The majority of people mentioned self-understanding, loyalty to ourselves as central values. *"Be yourself!"* – they said many times. Keep your identity, personal integrity and stick to them even if numerous difficulties occurred along the way. The be-loyal-to-yourself is a well known expression from Eric Knight, it means a basic strive to become identical with yourself through maintaining certain theories consistently even if conflicting power might have an effect on one. According to Hubbard's philosophy one can survive – this is what we tried to imply with this question – destructive powers and burdens. So understanding of freedom is that one should keep in mind and decide independently, not listening to anybody else, and make the choices and be loyal to that decision up to the bitter end. The *"be yourself"* expression can also mean live and let live. In this regard it does not only mean self-centeredness, but also turning towards as per *"let them be themselves"*. These respondents in the latter category would also leave behind the safe-keeping of mental integrity to their descendants as their heritage. What does this integrity mean? To have power to hold on to one's set goals regardless of defeat or without opportunism. Not to allow others to distract him following his set ways, not to give up his dreams, to be purposeful. So in this regard, mental integrity means tendentiousness and persistence.

Besides self-understanding and loyalty towards ourselves altruism was also present in the answers, the area of solidary that is. Show good examples, and in many areas of life be demanding to yourself, be a good example to your family and community. Community is an enterprise in this case, the community that one works for. Over and above: *"show some responsibilities for other people"*.

„I regularly tell to my daughter that she can allow herself everything that she could stand, if we did it to her, and she should not allow anything to herself that she couldn't bear, if we did it to her."

In this response we hear the golden rule that may be familiar from the noble religious tradition. This golden rule is used in *"The way to happiness"* by Hubbard. In the replies the dimension of furtherance comes up which in Scientology is the guiding principle of relationships to each other. One of the respondents quoted a slogan from the voluntary pastors: *"something can always be done"*. Furtherance seems to be a consequence, the consequence of self-understanding and loyalty to ourselves. It is clearly outlined in the replies that you can reach proper self-understanding through auditing and trainings. In this learning process you can get to know the functioning of the human mind as well as the extensive world interpretation unique to this organization.

Our respondents often used, of course, special Scientology technical terms. One of these key terms is *"dynamics"*.

"Considering the different dynamics and pushing them all forward. And in my opinion if everyone did this, then we would live in a whole different world, so then not in a caduceus, mostly materialistic world, but a much more intellectual, much more constructive world. I would rather give this everyone in my will."

Hubbard's work differentiates eight dynamics altogether, and we can notice four of them in the responses. According to the Scientology aspect the dynamics are incentives for survival towards ourselves, our family, our team and humanity.[14] Life's *"optimal solving equation"* exists – according to Dianetics – if the solution could prevail in all four areas at a maximum level. Otherwise, anybody could achieve success in life, if she concentrated on her own benefits. In the above response one of the most important target of Scientology is identified. In another formulation we will find the same first four dynamics: *"we are safe, if the neighbours are safe too, our parents are safe too, our colleagues are safe too, and the neighbour countries are fine too"*.

All the respondents replied, with or without direct references, by referring to some of Hubbard's writings, and that mostly quoted the *"Dianetics"*, respectively *"The way to happiness"*. In some responses there were only some of Hubbard's surface theses that were barely traceable, the majority of people rather quoted literally from the above mentioned books. We can take it self-explanatory that for the majority of insider Scientologists the wordings are the most important lessons of the life philosophy ingrained in to their way of thinking as far as they are able to quote the chain of their thoughts and even key sentences without any difficulties. The most important objective value in this thesis becomes the most important personal value in the members' life in the course of years.

Religion, religiosity

Usually kids of religious parents are more religious than the ones of non-religious parents. Per terminology, the first stage of religious socialization occurs in the family. Kids experience their parents' religiosity through family's customs, manner of speech, subjects, short stories. Merely the parents' religious affiliation, whether they are baptised or registered in to any religious community, is of no interest in regard to their kids' religious education. In the more traditional societies the religious affiliation walked hand in hand along with practicing religion that, beyond fulfilment of religious responsibilities, also meant a religious interpretation in many areas of life. Regular participation during religious ceremonies (i.e.: Sundays or Saturdays) doesn't purely mean fulfilment of responsibilities, but also meant acquiring and transmitting certain aspects. In modern life religious affiliation and religious conviction and practice broke apart. *"Belonging without believing"*[15] – with this expression described Grace Davie, one of the most remarkable contemporary sociologist in the book *"Religion in Britain after 1945"*. This characteristic sign is noticeable also in other European countries, so is it in Hungary. In addition to the Hungarian situation, in the decades after 1950 the political danger of any relationships to officially functioning religious communities[16] as well as the church's contribution (Compare: [17, 18]) had a great influence on the socialization of the believers. In general this kind of *"unreligious religiosity"* characterises the parents of the questioned Scientologists. The consequence of this was that kids raised in such families could not pick up the religious aspects, religious practice in any influential way. Therefore, their religious socialization could only remain at a low level.

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[14] Hubbard 2007. 43.

[15] Davie 1994.

[16] Tomka 1997.

[17] Kamarás 1992.

[18] Máté-Tóth 1996.

The lack of socialization in regard to religion has got two consequences in general in any case: one is the lack of understanding and proper handling of community and culture in regard to religious dimensions, and the second, *"the first ingeniousness"* is shaping an own religious conviction at the starting time of adulthood.[19] People who couldn't experience the objective knowledge and especially the aspects of the parents which would ensure the understanding of religious dimension, are partially left behind in the community uncomprehendingly when they first bump into religion and religiosity, and partially with a kind of naivety that could compare the new experiences with the previously learned ones.

„My parents have been baptised at that time officially, but they are no Christians. They are Catholics, but they have never practiced any religion. [Have you been baptised?] No, I haven't. I've always said that I'm an infidel. I only had an eponymy celebration, so I haven't gotten any religion."

"I've received my baptism certificate from my mom to my 50th birthday, that's how I learnt that I was baptised as a Lutheran. I my childhood I had to call two childless aunts Godmother, but they did not take me to church either."

The religious background of the interviewed people is not as obvious of course, the previously quoted text is an example for complete irreliogisity. There are families where the parents as well as the children got baptised, they even practiced religion some time, especially in the form of church visit on large holidays, but the family wasn't at all convinced about religion and religious aspects. And finally we can also find those who practiced religion in their childhood and also those who were impressed by the church's *"blessed"* spot.

"I can remember that with my grandma at her house at nights we prayed and also went to church. She regularly took us to church. I loved it, I still love it till today. There are beautiful paintings."

The characteristic of the parents' religiosity is connected with the basic supposition related to the religious nature of Scientology. In our interview we purposefully have not asked, if they considered Scientology a religion. This question would focus on the official status of the organization, especially to those who have been members for a long time, and therefore are also embedded. Those who found this important however, covered this subject. If someone had been specifically raised as an atheist, it would be irritating for them to hear that Scientology is considered a religion, for the first time. If someone had been raised in a family that had gotten some level of religious conviction, they felt an *"ideological"* stress between Scientology as religion and the family's religion.

Many of the interviewees mentioned the political persecution of religion during the Kadar-era in regard to questions about their parents' religiosity. They mentioned the difference between the existence of religiosity and the lack of religious practice in this political era. Many of the parents were members of the Hungarian Socialistic Labour Party, the only party at that time. The concord of Marxism, the party's ideological basics did not really motivate the members, rather it was membership, which was an indispensable criteria to fill up certain jobs or manager positions at even lower levels.

"My dad was a medium level manager in […] city and […] factory. In his heyday of course it was all about the socialism, the party government. Well, he is not as much religious, not sure, if I can say that he was of average interest. His parents baptised him and at Easter they went to church or also at Christmas when they thought of that. However, they have not been going to church on a regular basis, maybe that's how I should say this. So my parents were not religious, my dad – I'm rather saying it this way – was a member of the party out of interest, but in my opinion it was a little more than that because he also went to give talks. Deep in his heart he didn't like

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[19] RICŒUR 1967.

it though. I can remember that too. So they were not religious as much. When Scientology reached families, that's of course a very prickly topic."

In this interview the previously mentioned dimensions are clearly visible. The relation of politics and religion, the connection between party membership and position-taking, the complex personal area of interest and personal conviction, the level of religious conviction and the arrival of Scientology in such a multifunctional family.

Considering the religious socialization where we might see certain cases of continuous drops per generation which doesn't show as a clear picture as the statistic indicators. The grandparents of our interviewees grew up in a social era when religiosity was self-explanatory, at least on the level of formal religious practice. They baptised their children – meaning the parents of our conversational partners of Scientology – but their youth and adulthood were characterised by strong atheism or at a later stage agnosticism. Many of them were even forced to join the party willingly or inadvertently. Even though some of them still baptised their children or the grandparents did it for them, they have not practiced religion in the family, many of them turned even secularists or atheists based on the Scientific ideology. The parents are usually baptised, but the families don't practice any religion. People can get involved with Scientology because the influence of the family's religion doesn't hold him/her back. Regardless of their children's beliefs, their parents still keep in touch with them.

We can explain this process with a metaphor of a boat representing the person's religiosity, which is tied down by many anchors on the culture's sea, beneath them the anchor of formal bonding and the spirituality. In the grandparents' generation these anchors are still left down. In the parents' generation they anchor up already spiritually and the children's even formally. The boat gets loose and might be floated to alternative spirituality. The acquiescence of Scientology's religious nature doesn't belong to any initial evidences for the members recognising the organization's ideology more and more. On the contrary, initially there is no relation between studying lectures and books and religions and religiosity. Many of them mentioned that when the first time they heard about Scientology being a religion, they found the information shocking and displeasing. They needed to contemplate about it, time to understand what religion is and what it would mean in the case of Scientology as a religion.

"So that was it, and when it was about Dianetics and it was about Scientology, I was wondering what they were, and for a long time I handled it with some distance and this led me to accept this is a religion and through this I became religious. Indeed, I needed to understand what religion was, what it can give one and where and which role it has got and where it is placed in one's life. And what is the practical use of it, maybe that's the most important part."

However, out of the responses no clear, profound or concrete portrayal was received about what Scientology's live thesis was about religion and in what sense does it consider itself a religion. But there are also the individual aspects and interpretations of the members about certain technologies and practices.

Half of our interviewees list Scientology in to the category of religion. An important positive argument for them that religions consider human beings with spiritual nature. Religions are somewhere facing the materialistic world, more properly, they propagate independent dimensions and are ideological and institutional systems teaching this. They are able to give a handhold to people and able to motivate them to help and be selfless, therefore, we need to look up also to their representatives with respect.

Scientologists don't consider Dianetics writings of religious nature because it takes up the topic of mind. It has hugely influenced many people because they learnt it as a Scientific theory written with engineering and medical precision. Scientology constantly underlines based on Hubbard's

writings that its thesis, dialectics and technics should not be approached from the religious point of view, and either based on some trust on human respect, but it has to be given credit based on its usefulness and conviction about its functionality. In this position rationality and religious aspects are rather confronting to each other.

The influence of atheist-communist era can be seen in certain aspects. This aspect did not only confront science and religion, but also considered the spirituality and religion meaningless and damaging, and it withheld practicing religion. Though the interviewee's father was a KISZ member, he still baptised his son. The grandparents from mother's side took him to church where he was touched by the majesty of that sacred place. At the same time he describes his relationship to materialism at that time this way: *"I believed in materialism"*.

In Scientology there is no god like in other belief based religions, and there is no Messiah either, but many other religions lack such figures as well. Even though many people consider the founder the religion's founder, but they certainly do not consider the founder a Messiah or a god. In this regard an interviewee pointed to Buddhism, to similarities between Scientology and Buddhist aspects. Scientology is a practical religion, it's not built on god or on belief in a god, but knowledge.

According to Hubbard's message nobody has to leave his/her own religion in order to become a Scientologist. Scientology is a *"full confessional religion"* that can also be joined by people who are not religious at all – a member pointed out. At the same time – he claimed – it's the very last one of the dynamics, the eighth one is its endless dynamic where also God originates from. Religions start at this point while it's the end point for Scientology, and this end point is only understandable, if the first two dynamics had been already understood.

It is clear of the above that Scientologists belong to a wide range of belief systems in Hungary or even got into some loose institutional kind of relationship to certain large Christian sects, but generally they don't practice their religion, it's message doesn't have any influence on their thinking and behaviour. To the committed insider Scientologists Christianity or belonging to church doesn't mean – even if relevant – as much as it meant to their parents. In its traditional meaning Scientology is not considered a religion, it is often compared to Buddhism. It is the spiritual portrayal of humanity that they consider to be the religious dimension of Scientology. In this regard there are some who found Scientology through an active spiritual search considering its religious messages.

Our research did not aim to delve into the health or mental health of the leading key Scientologists. We have not used any special questions in this regard and our professional competence would have not qualified us for this type of inquiry. We still would like note in all fairness that all of our conversational partners conveyed the impression of a well-balanced, self-conscious, well-situated person striving values.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on our interviews, we can verify the notion of Wallis presented in the hypotheses section of our paper. We found that Hungarian Scientologists are extremely committed to the teachings of the Church of Scientology, they aimed to for the best, and it covers diverse areas of their lives. We also found, that L. Ron Hubbard is a subject of partly religious, partly secular reverence among them. His authority remains unquestioned. As the most interviewed members are first generation Scientologists, their joining to the organization happened in diverse settings, Stark's and Bainbridge's idea about the importance of personal networks is less important in the case of key figures of Hungarian Scientology.

In conclusion, we will sum up with a quote what we also experienced during the interviews and what we've partially referred to already above. Christensen concludes his experiences based on many conventional and informal mutual activities the following way:

"Scientologists are, of course, Scientologists, but they are, more important, people in the community, in society, in the world: citizens, lovers, parents, friends, employees and so on. Second, their representations do not follow a simple pattern of deduction from, for example, the writings of Hubbard (the systemic or theological level of Scientology) to their own lives. Not all the teachings of Hubbard are actual factors in the individual lives of these people. Third, the ideas produced by these individuals seem to be produced to meet the overall cultural challenges of Western, modern culture. And, fourth, even though these people represent things differently, it is possible to point certain key representations that are – implicitly or explicitly – present in their ideas with regard to the being Scientologists."[20]

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Medieval Female Mysticism and Weber's Charismatic Authority

ABSTRACT

What is all the fuss about the female power in the Middle Ages, whether it be personal, social or political? In the following paper I try to investigate its striking socio-political aspects using Max Weber's theory on charismatic authority and Grace Jantzen's model on the political power of medieval female mysticism. Moreover, the paper presents *clara et distincta* what the female mysticism is, pointing out its legacy and future as well. The conclusion reflects on the fundamental correlation between medieval mysticism and Weber's understanding of charismatic authority as alternative to constructive rationality and social power.

INTRODUCTION

The current paper is dedicated to present the medieval female mysticism as a charismatic authority in a Max Weberian sense, introducing a new socio-scientific approach in the flourishing field of interpretations. Until fairly recently scholarship has focused on mysticism especially as an individual experience with the ultimate reality neglecting its social dimension. In this work, I would like to underline the necessity of a socio-dimensional model of mysticism pointing out the phenomenon of medieval female mysticism. In the last three decades' scholarship, has seen an emerging multidisciplinary interest to female mysticism. Undoubtedly it is also a leading topic in feminist scholarship. The aim of this presentation is to show a new way toward the sociology of mystical experience using Max Weber's model concerning charismatic authority.

THE WEBERIAN APPROACH

Inspired by the social theory of Max Weber, I am trying to ask in what senses was medieval female mysticism a charismatic authority. The principle inspiration for this recent study is Weber's opus magnum *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* which is structured synchronically and analytically rather than diachronically as a grand narrative. Economy and Society is a kind of Summa of ideal types for the study of world history: they are meant to be corrected against the complexities of past societies. (D'AVRAY 2010) In this work Weber distinguishes four kinds of rationality. *Value* (alias conviction) rationality, *instrumental* rationality together with the concepts of *formal* and *substantive* rationality. Besides these four kind of rationalities, in this section I am oriented towards what we might call the dynamics of stability: powerful forces interacting in ways that reproduced existing structures, while incorporating new elements of strength. For Max Weber, new social structures can emerge under the influence of charismatic leaders, or rather of their followers, for his ideal-type is quite different from the modern usage of the word to mean *'magnetism'*. (D'AVRAY 2010)

Weber defines *"»charisma« as a quality, deemed to be extraordinary (...) of a personality, on account of which this person is judged to be endowed with supernatural or superhuman or at least specifically extraordinary powers or properties, which are not accessible to everyone else, or as sent by God, or as an outstanding model and consequently a »*Leader*«"* (WEBER 1922. 140.)

In the light of another definition *"charisma is the great revolutionary power in epochs that are in the grip of tradition. By contrast with the no less revolutionary power of ratio (...) charisma can be a transformation from the inside, which, born of necessity or enthusiasm, means a fundamental change in the direction of central convictions and actions with a completely new orientation of all attitudes to all specific forms of life and »to the World« generally."* (WEBER 1922. 658.)

The Power of Charisma – specifically creative revolutionary force and will

In the case of Weber society is influenced by two big forces: a charismatic and a rational one. Meanwhile charisma revolutionize from the inside, the ratio does it from without. Charisma is a revolutionary force and will which impacts can change the attitude to the world and the acting directions in societies. This revolutionary power from within creates a central *metanoia* in the followers attitude. Charisma is a disrupting force in history, it breaks the power of rational and traditional rules and above all *"overturns all notions of sanctity"*. Charisma does not know any kind of respect to the longstanding creations of the society. That is why Weber argues charisma

as a *"specifically creative revolutionary force of the history"*. Charisma and all of its transformations are highly intense social powers which can always change the status quo. (WEBER 2013. 1116–1117.)

The medieval period is not short of examples of movements started by *'charismatic'* individuals, though they did not necessarily survive very long. (Aldebert, Valdes, Saint Francis of Assisi) *"In the case of Francis we meet a charismatic person, but he seems to expect to be obeyed even though he holds no office. Statements about »charisma« in Weber are statements about the image of the leader in the minds of the followers."* (D'AVRAY 2010. 106.) On the one hand I am exactly arguing for the very strong interaction of charisma as one individual quality based on the particular experience with God or Jesus Christ, but on the other hand this private spiritual interaction becomes« social through the strong effect among the direct followers and further in form of different institutionalizations. That simply means: charisma is authority.

The Pure Types of Domination and the Extraordinary Quality of Charisma

Weber distinguishes between three *'pure'* types of legitimate authority: The validity of claims to legitimacy may be based on: 1. Rational grounds – resting on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal-rational authority). 2. Traditional grounds – resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority); or finally, 3. Charismatic grounds – resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic authority) (WEBER 1922).

Weber's term *"charisma"* was differently interpreted and conceived during the last century. As Martin Riesebrodt argues in his study on *Charisma in Max Weber's Sociology of Religion*, Weber's charisma has received diverse and contradictory interpretations. Riesebrodt's essay argues that this diversity is caused less by the inadequate readings of Weber than by inconsistencies in Weber's own conceptualization. Weber introduced his concept of charisma in two different contexts (political sociology and sociology of religion). In his political sociology he formulates the ideal type of charismatic authority informed by Rudolf Sohm's Canon Law. (SOHM 1892) *"Here we are interested above all in the second of the three types: rule by virtue of devotion to the purely personal »charisma« of the »Leader« on the part of those who obey him. For this is where the idea of vocation (Beruf) in its highest form has its roots. Devotion to the charisma of the prophet or the war-lord or the exceptional demagogue in the ekklesia or in parliament means that the leader is personally regarded as someone who is inwardly »called« to the task of leading men, and that the led submit to him, not because of custom or statute, but because they believe in him."* (WEBER 1994. 312.)

Meanwhile, Weber connects it in his sociology of religion with the anthropological debate of the turn of the century on magic and religion, especially the debate on pre-animism initiated by R. R. Marett, and uses it as an alternative for concepts such as *mana* or *orenda*. (RIESEBRODT 1999) *"For example, not every stone can serve as a fetish, a source of magical power. Nor does every person have the capacity to achieve the ecstatic states which are viewed, accordance to rules of experience, as the preconditions for producing certain effects in meteorology, healing, divination, and telepathy. It is primarily, though not exclusively, these extraordinary powers that have been designated by such special terms as »Mana«, »Orenda«, and the Iranian »Maga« (the term from which our word »magic« is derived). We shall henceforth employ the term »charisma« for such extraordinary powers."* (WEBER 1993. 2)

"Both conceptualizations of charisma are located on quite different levels of abstraction, which Weber has not sufficiently clarified and systematized. This leads to inconsistencies, contradictions, and overgeneralizations. His claim of a supposedly anti-traditionalist or even revolutionary character of charisma is especially problematic. The article argues that while this claim may apply to certain types of charisma under specific conditions, many types of charisma actually seem to be integral parts of institutionalized and traditionalized social orders." (RIESEBRODT 1999) If we are now turning to the core question of mysticism, we should keep in mind the aforementioned different understandings of Weber's famous term CHARISMA.

THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF MYSTICISM

In this specific context, I mean by mysticism what Jean de Gerson thought. The fifteenth-century chancellor of Sorbonne described it as an *"experimental knowledge of God through the embrace of unity love"* (The definition was also used by SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS (2015), SAINT BONEVANTURE (1987) and it reappears in the operosity of the outstanding German historian, KURT RUH (1990).

The social dimension of mysticism covers both the institutional embodiment of mysticism in groups and movements and the influence of mysticism upon the wider society and vice versa. Moreover, there are not just social but also political aspects to mysticism. *"The connection of questions of power to questions of mysticism is obvious as soon as one stops to consider that a person who was acknowledged to have direct access to God would be in a position to challenge any form of authority, whether doctrinal or political, which she saw as incompatible with the divine will. If defining mysticism is a way of defining power, then the question of who counts as a mystic is of immediate political importance."* (JANTZEN 1994)

As it can be seen according to Grace Jantzen, mysticism is always political and interconnected with questions of power. Jantzen argues that mysticism has undergone a series of social constructions, which were never free of gendered struggles of power. The main research question is the following: what is mysticism? Is it an individual/private/subjective direct experience with God or does it have political and social implications as well? According to Jantzen mysticism is always a question of defining and delimiting authority. Mysticism is a great agenda of power. In Christianity struggles for authority have always been significant, especially in the medieval period where struggles increased and mysticism was an overwhelming phenomenon. Is it possible to say that in epochs where struggles for authority are dominant, mysticism is an often-presented phenomenon? Jantzen gives a brief sketch on some ways whereas mysticism has been socially constructed in the Christian West. In her investigation, she uses Foucault as initial standpoint, then she builds a historical background of mysticism based on Bouyer and McGinn and creates a philosophical background with the help of Swinburne and Alston. Jantzen affirms that who is considered as a mystic changes time by time.

Mystics have played prominent roles in the doctrinal development of their traditions, in reform, in renewal, and protest, and sometimes in secretarian, messianic, and millenarian movements. (JONES 2005) Visions have given authority and power to women and at the same time have made these women insiders of the Church too. With the help of visions, women have become able to change the world, build convents, found hospitals, preach and their visions made them role models for other women with a deeper self-development. Saints and mystics are rule breakers. Unconventional and unpredictable people. (PETROFF 1978) In summary, it can be observed that mysticism showed itself not only as a special kind of rationality but as one special kind of social power as well.

This very important correlation between mysticism and charismatic authority was suddenly reflected by many gender inspired authors in the 1980s, (PETROFF 1978; JANTZEN 1995; BYNUM 1987) Therefore I ought to focus on this feminist approach. *"In the high and late Middle Ages, numerous women visionaries across the European continent, including among many others the famous Gertrude the Great and Mechthild of Helfta, Mechtild of Magdeburg, Hadewijch of Antwerp, Bridget of Sweden, Catherine of Siena, Julian of Norwich, and Teresa of Avila claimed authority for themselves as spiritual teachers and based that claim at least in part on the visions they had received. The construction of mysticism could no longer exclude women."* (BYNUM 1987. 13–30). This affirmation is also valid to Saint Angela of Foligno who is the leading figure of my scholarly interest.

Issues of gender have become prominent in the study of mysticism since the 1980s. This is only partly a reflection of the attention to such issues within the study of religion as a whole. More significantly it is because, within many mystical traditions, women are better represented and have made more distinctive contributions than in other religious contexts. Leaving aside the unbidden nature of mystical experience, environments and ways of life associated with mysticism (such as asceticism, monasticism, and writing) have also favoured women. Even in patriarchal societies these contexts have been less subject to restrictive customs of ordinary society. Acknowledging the presence and contributions of women mystics is only part of the story, however. There are also specifically feminist critiques of how the lives, writings, and influence of women mystics continue to be evaluated in ways that fail to do justice to their distinctive contributions. A number of French women thinkers have taken particular interest in how some women mystics have been able to work beyond the restricting oppositions dogging so much of Western culture (male–female, body–soul, reason–emotion etc.) Simply to say, in the context of emerging feminist critics, alternative forms and approaches to rationality and power were expected and found in the reflections on medieval mysticism. (JONES 2005)

The legacy and future of mysticism

Scholars as well as practitioners have recognized mysticism not just as a constant motif within religions but as a key to what is most important in religion. As such, mysticism tends to figure prominently in revisionist global theologies, metaphysical system building, New Age thought, debates about the relationship between world religions, and interdisciplinary approaches to art, language, society and human consciousness. (JONES 2005)

CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK

I think we could have two main benefits through the reflections on the fundamental correlation between medieval mysticism and Weber's understanding of charismatic authority as alternative to constructive rationality and social power. The first benefit I call as diachronic, which means the new approach to medieval mysticism with the sociological tools of Weber's theory. In this way we will be able to deliberate medieval female mysticism from the carcer of modern individualism and open up new spaces for understanding medieval societies as well. However, for a social scientist the second benefit would be more interesting. In the time after the fall of communism and after the new political and cultural matrix in entire Europe, one can observe insecurity concerning modern rationality and democratic power – not only in Central and Eastern Europe at all. Social sciences could have a chance to contribute to original approaches and visions in searching for new ways of thinking and using power.

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Divergence Instead of Convergence or Whoever Stays Out is Left Behind[1]

ABSTRACT

Topic: Development potentials of small and medium-sized towns in Hungary's spatial structure, with an outlook to the Carpathian Basin.

Objective: To introduce and evaluate the spatial planning objectives of OTK 2005 (National Settlement Development Concept) and OFTK 2014 (National Development and Territorial Development Concept), and the actual territorial development practice compared to that, as well as to introduce the tendencies, perspectives and potentials.

Method: Comparative analysis, charts, thematic maps

Outline of contents: Outline the failure of OTK. Criticism and abandonment of the Pole Programme, the *"Paris and the Sea"* syndrome (or the *"Modern Cities Programme"*). New findings about the OFTK spatial structure. (Extended) interpretations of the terms *"Centre"* and *"Peripherals"*. European central areas and (semi-)peripheral areas (blue banana, blue star, red octopus). The appearance of the *"octopus"* in Hungary. Why is it a problem? Well-known statements by well-known people. How does it happen in broad strokes: spatial distribution of infrastructure developments, in the past and present. Attempt to expand the delimitation of the *"octopus"*, the real causes of the unwanted trend. Old/new urban planning perspectives. Perspectives beyond urban planning.

Conclusions: Territorial development objectives that have been declared for decades have not been implemented in Hungary. The alleviation of the central spatial structure cannot be seen, quite to the contrary, in fact. This tendency can be expected both on short and medium term. The small and medium-sized towns located in the semi-peripheral, peripheral areas have to face this perspective. This process should be evaluated in conjunction with the development and the spatial structure position of the Hungarian cities that are now across the border. In order to stop the trend of divergence it is not sufficient to issues declarations in each cycle; scientifically based radical solutions should be proposed.

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INTRODUCTION: PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM

Theorem Statement

The role and future positioning of small and medium-sized towns can be assessed in the light of the development of the spatial structure being comprised of a basically distorted structure (cf. hydrocephalus phenomenon); which hidden/not generally known factors the spatial structure development depends/depended on should be examined, as well as what the possible perspectives are based on this knowledge.

Decree No. 97/2005 (XII. 25.) of the Hungarian Parliament on the National Spatial Development Concept

The planning document and the Hungarian Parliament's very important decree on this subject – in line with the European integration process – include the territorial policy principles as clearly identified objectives. Among other things, they identify the objectives of alleviating the monocentricity of Hungary, decentralisation and regionalisation (with regards to this also offering alternatives):

'Decentralisation and Regionalism: *A considerable part of development policy and implementation decisions as well as of the development funds should be* decentralised. *To this end, it is important to strengthen the developmental role played by the regions and the competences required for this (...)'*

'Territorial Cohesion: *Mitigating the most serious, significant spatially underdeveloped areas which are detrimental to societal equal opportunities and which limit the effective functioning of the economy: a) creating social and economic cohesion of areas permanently lagging with regard to their development,* the dynamisation of external and internal peripherals; *b) ensuring fundamental life chances in every settlement of Hungary; c)* alleviating the excessively monocentral spatial structure.'

It is important to note that even the former territorial plans defined similar objectives with regard to spatial structure that spans of decades. Thus the recognition and handling of Hungarian territorial processes (i.e. not only involving studies, but also plans and interventions on a national scale) have been present on the stage of large-scale politics. The first comprehensive planning material, *the Regional Planning and the Hungarian Settlement System* (PERCZEL – GERLE 1966), was of significant importance in the history of Hungarian urban planning despite the fact that it lacked political legitimacy, because not only did it establish the monocentricity of the country and its components, but it also included a professional proposal package to alleviate this distorted, monocentric spatial structure. The National Settlement Development Concept (Országos Településhálózat-fejlesztési Koncepció, OTK) was prepared and approved based on this in 1970, then in its revised versions, all of which were later evaluated as having been *"implemented"* one-sidedly or without success (PERCZEL 1989). This is indicated very clearly by the quoted statements of the OTK issued 35 years on, in 2005. That means that the territorial structural anomalies recorded by Károly Perczel and his colleagues continue to exist, thus the objectives always remain the same. Based on this it might seem that although the prevailing policy declared certain important objectives, it is as if they did not take it too seriously. However, after a decade's time there was an important change in direction when the planning document was revised. Namely, if the territorial objectives are not met, there must be a problem with the objectives.

OFTK: Decree No. 1/2014. (I.3.) of the Hungarian Parliament on the National Development and Territorial Development Concept

In the planning document made ten years after Hungary's accession to the EU and subsequently to the closing of the first EU budgeting cycle it was established that the territorial policy objectives set forth in the OTK of 2005 had failed: *'the competitiveness of the areas have not improved, cohesion has come to a standstill, the extent of territorial cohesion has not been sufficient and the social disparities have become larger'*. This statement is especially serious since it all happened despite the EU aid aimed at territorial policy goals (ERFA, Cohesion Funds, Structural Funds).

However, the assessment did not reveal the real causes of the failing convergence, and as a result the design document was characteristically supplemented with territorial objectives written in subdued language and with new points of emphasis (almost as a criticism of the OTK): *'Area-specific Objectives: (among others) an urban network ensuring a multicentred spatial structure (...), reducing territorial disparities, regional cohesion and promoting economic recovery'.*

It can be established that there was a clear setback compared to the former territorial policy objectives. Since the planning document of 2014 replacing the OTK document of 2005 no longer included the need for *the alleviation of the monocentered nature of Hungary, the decentralisation, or the regionalisation.* Which means that this is a much more half-hearted planning document defining more restrained directions and making unfortunate compromises. It seems that large-scale politics and the underlying policy decision-making preparation put up a white flag about the failure of the European convergence programme, settled for the principle of mitigating territorial disparities and discarded the former territorial policy objectives by qualifying them as being *"utopian"*. It has to be assessed in conjunction with the fact that – according to Eurostat data and Hungarian surveys – it is especially true for Hungary that the phenomenon of *"divergence instead of convergence"* is an existing problem (NAGY 2007). That is to say regional disparities have become more pronounced and the migration from the underdeveloped regions to the more developed ones

and/or abroad is a seemingly unmanageable social phenomenon which is also recognised by large-scale politics. Is it the failure of the EU convergence programme? Do we have to discard the need for cohesion? Such questions are justified, since there have been a large number of studies on this topic also in international literature about the so-called new economic geography, agglomeration, cluster and trade-off theories. (KRUGMAN 1990; PORTER 1998; FRATESI 2005; HALMAI 2009; KERTÉSZ 2006, 2013). This could even serve as a kind of consolation for Hungary. Saying, for example, that without the convergence programme the situation would be much worse as regards the balanced territorial development. In any case, the Hungarian convergence programme aimed at the cohesion of less developed European regions (and the *"implementation"* of the programme) continues in the budgeting period between 2014 and 2020, with an emphasis on innovation, research and economic development. Nevertheless, its success is strongly questionable (if we disregard the self-justifying statements of the large-scale politicians). The root of the problem – the abnormally distorted spatial structure – will certainly persist. What substantive findings can be expected in a new National Development and Territorial Development Concept after 2020?

On the one hand, a sobering assessment can be expected about the failure of convergence, i.e. about further divergence as regards the less developed Hungarian and European regions (this is also confirmed by the latest publications). At a national level, the best case scenario is a statement that if there had not been territorial development aid, the territorial discrepancies would have increased at a higher rate. In turn, even more subdued plans will be drawn up based on these research assessments, followed by the Sisyphean tasks of divergence research, then publication and replanning which repeat themselves from cycle to cycle. Might it happen that convergence programme (as a need) would disappears altogether? This would also be tantamount to choosing a second-degree Europe. In this case, will the term *"divergence"* be generally accepted and will we have to live with the divergence in Hungary instead of denying it? Meaning: *lagging* will be the accepted state, the *"normal"* one, and not only in public discourse. The very role of *spatial planning* may become questionable. Obviously *research* would remain. The territorial and social discrepancies in Hungary already have a huge amount of literature, the development of territorial processes will definitely provide work to be done for the researchers, even in the future.

Quotes to be Quoted

The development in Hungarian territorial discrepancies can be described as a process of *centralisation.* In the well-known, vulgar phrasing, it is the so-called *"hydrocephalus phenomenon"*. Nevertheless, there is no literature (I could not find any – I.N.) that would describe the process itself, within the framework of a comprehensive analysis. Could it be a taboo? Since our topic is closely linked to the value system of the prevailing public authority – although it is difficult to seek out – and to its role as an anointed intervening, correcting, money-giving actor, it is nothing to be surprised about. One thing is for sure, along the lines of interests, concealment is strong and there is no discussion about this topic in public discourse. No wonder that certain radical-sounding statements by a few well-known and established researchers drew public attention (and naturally were *"forgotten about"* afterwards, see National Development and Territorial Development Concept). This *"selection"* here is provided because the statements based on these studies provided an expressive description about the *various dimensions of centralisation*, it is worth a brief examination to assess to what extent they are currently relevant:

Public authority dimension

'This state is utterly over-centralised...', said Dr. Ilona Kovács Pálné, a constitutional law expert researching the potentials of municipal administration, when interviewed publicly in the news programme of the public television broadcasting company back in 1993. After 15 years the situation is the same: *"Due to the lack of a strong mid-level the central administration is overloaded with operational tasks....The Hungarian State is a centralised state where not even the advantages of centralisation are present"* (Pálné 2007). The survival of the *"hourglass model"* characteristic of Hungarian state organisation familiar from public administration research – which features extreme mid-level weakness – is to be expected, the only change being that by now the *"foot"* of the hourglass is also leaner. The central public authority level has become extremely strong (with clearly autocratic characteristics) and it has taken possession of the mid and district levels with its government offices. The regional administration level seems to vanishing; the functions of the county-level local governments have been limited to exclusively performing regional planning (this is, however, a one-sided/hypocritical role, since development funds are allocated by the ministries), the public authority functions of the local governments of settlements have been limited (e.g. school maintenance, certain public authority tasks) and their relevant sources of revenue have been reduced. (See in more detail: Why Did We Let It Happen? (Pálné 2013)

Dimension of revenue creation and allocation

The well-known Hungarian geographer Dr. Bálint Csatári, a researcher of sub-regions, predicted in an interview published in *Népszabadság* in 1995 that *'a fearsome indolence will characterise our country if the local-interest communities do not manage to make their role against the very strong money-allocating centre official'*. This latter forecast unfortunately has become a reality. They did not manage the task; what is more, during the period since then the fund-allocating county and regional development councils have been closed. The EU application criteria are set by the government bodies. The Centre and the Central Authority reigning in the Centre thus have become even more oversized. Due to the redistribution of internal resources a certain *"autocratic redistribution"* – for lack of a better word let us call it such – emerged, almost as a logical outcome.

Urban planning – political science dimension

'Budapest will reach out its octopus arms far out towards Tatabánya, Vác and Gödöllő; these settlements will fuse together, forming a megapolis', predicted Dr. László Lengyel in 1993 as the invited lecturer at the Savaria Urban Planning Summer University. Then, responding to a debate article: *'Of course it is the fault of the prevailing government... of course it is acting contrary to the spatial plans... thus chaos is formed, and chaos becomes a system... chaos itself will become the system'*. The debate article responding by I. N. to the lecture (*"Who Feeds the Octopus?"*) was published in the journal *Urbanisztika* (Urban Planning); the material statement of the article underpinned with facts is that the prevailing government actively participates in the creation of the disparities between the centre and the peripherals. Where does this process stand at present? On the one hand, it can be said that the truth of the prediction is indicated by the prioritisation of suburban public transportation being extended to a radius of 100 km, which is considered to be a primary concern; by now the majority of the settlements in the agglomeration around Budapest have become urbanised small towns and Érd has become a municipality of 100,000 inhabitants; these *'sleeper'* settlements can be regarded almost as the outer districts of Budapest. On the other hand – and several researchers agree –

the distribution system has become chaotic, and this means a higher number of institutionalised cases of corruption or suspected corruption among other things. It can be said that the anomalies that surfaced in the media (e.g. uncontrolled surplus spending, delays in announcing/evaluating applications) are a result of the proliferation of the centre positions/functions; and this is (almost) a logical outcome.

Urban planning – economic geography dimension

The observations made by Dr. Gyula Horváth (Director of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Regional Studies) can almost be taken as a summary of the above statements and forecasts, who declared the above characterised centralisation phenomenon as a basic economic problem: *'In Central Europe it is a unique and centuries-long trend that the central regions, Budapest and its agglomeration have an unshakable position. Changing this trend is the key to Hungarian modernisation, as well as the determinant cause of its failures so far.'* He called attention to the key problem of the centralisation process in series of studies and lectures, virtually with no success. Perhaps because *"...there is resistance against the bottom-up initiatives where (e.g. in Hungary) the central area has dominant, even strengthening positions in production factors which improve competitiveness"* (HORVÁTH 1998). Arbitrarily naming this trend, it could be called an (almost) ever strengthening, unstoppable *"permanent centralisation"*. Taking this as a starting point the position and future of Hungarian small and medium-sized towns can only be realistically evaluated by examining it in conjunction with the effects of the large city. Failing this, only false statements can be made from a professional point of view. My material statement is that the Hungarian centralisation is a series of deliberate public authority *"deus ex machina"* activities, and it can be characterised by the above four dimensions. These dimensions are strongly interconnected and the (group interest based) activities within them strengthened each other during the years of contemporary history of Hungary's centralisation. (NAGY 2001)

Important findings of well-known and renowned Hungarian researchers have been forgotten by now, leaving no echoes, *their prophecies remained Cassandra prophecies.* The taboo of the monocentred spatial structure remained with us and researchers still owe us a comprehensive analysis. There have been marginally related analyses and studies; however, they stayed within professional bounds, not reaching the response threshold of policy/decision-makers.

ANALYSING THE PROBLEM, WITH NEGATIVE FORECASTS

Why is it important to analyse the problem? In other words, why would the discontinuance of the trend be the key to modernisation? There are several aspects to this.

Economical aspect

It is an axiom of the regional economics that in a well-delimited geographical space social cohesion mobilises the local resources (1). Its logical outcomes are *competitiveness and economic activity.*

From this follows the inverted statement that in the case of lacking social and economic cohesion, the local resources are unexploited and inactive (2). Not only formal logic, but also practical experiences prove that this results in *competitive disadvantage and economic stagnation* (3).

It can be observed that the phenomenon under (1) is characteristic of the regionalised or decentralised systems (having partial or full autonomy), while that under (2) is characteristic mainly of centralised systems (4).

Hungary is an *extremely centralised country* (5). Thus, statements (3), (4) and (5) jointly mean a permanent competitive disadvantage and permanent divergence – at the national economy level (6).

Concentration of population as an accompaniment/component of centralisation

After the Middle Ages, at the dawn of the new era the Hungarian *"large cities"* of that time were at about the same level; the dynamic population movements towards the central area started in the Hungarian Reform Era, and is still continuing as a result of the deliberate territorial policy across regimes and political systems. It is well-known that the growth of population across the borders is not only a spontaneous urban planning/economic geography process, but also a deliberate territorial policy, as a result of which the population of e.g. Temesvár and Kolozsvár were boosted compared to that of the Hungarian *"large cities"*.

FIGURE 1 *Centralisation and population concentration: changes in the population of the "largest cities" of the Carpathian Basin* (Source: KSH [Hungarian Central Statistical Office], own drafting)

Beginning from the eighties up to now, there seems to be break in the process of centralisation: the population of Budapest started to decrease. However, in reality it is due to the phenomenon of suburbanisation, being nothing else than a territorial expansion (i.e. the expansion and territorial growth of the city). The total population number increased: the population of the more liveable agglomeration region increased through internal and external migration: the population of Budapest and the agglomeration jointly accounts for one-fourth of Hungary's population. Nowadays, it can be stated with a slight exaggeration that Szentendre, Dunakeszi, Gödöllő, Vecsés, Érd, Százhalombatta, etc. can be considered as outer districts of Budapest. The only difference is that the settlements are not merged (yet).

According to the recent statistics a *"reflow"* to Budapest has started, based on the balance of inward and outward moves. The development of new, more liveable quarters and/or decentres attracts people, while the disadvantages of daily mobilisation is unattractive, thus garden suburbs are becoming more and more dense. It can be forecast that as a result of the joint action of agglomeration-based and external migration the outward migration will not decrease anymore. If this tendency continues, agglomeration will grow, also in terms of area (not only in population number). At the moment, being at *"halfway"* point, we have a population of 2.5 million, and by 2030 there will be a metropolitan zone of 3 million residents.

Comparative analysis

Single-pole central field of force with local government of settlements not having real functions

It is based on a hierarchic, single-centred resource collection and allocation with an insignificant amount of locally created / locally allocated resources and with a lack of territorial competences. Characteristics resulting from the essence of the model: There is no effective regional centre, maybe up to the quasi-mid-level. Large cities, medium-sized cities, small towns and small settlements are basically handled as belonging to the same category. The lack of cohesion is *"natural"*, there nothing other than formal relationships. The *'divide and conquer'* principle prevails, it is also a *"natural"* element of the model. There is no communication between the regions. There is no cohesion, not even within the regions; and this is contrary to the regional territorial policy of the EU, in which the creation of cohesion is of a primary importance.

Polycentric urban network based on regionality

Its essence is the decentralised collection and allocation of resources, with a significant amount of resources remaining in place. In this model (sample country: USA) the individual/entrepreneur pays taxes to the settlement, the settlement pay taxes to the county, the county pays taxes to the state and the state pays taxes to the federal government. Characteristics resulting from the essence of the model: The regional centres organise the economics of the region (based on interests). Regional autonomy is natural, with the internal division of tasks between the cooperating large cities, medium-sized cities, small towns and small settlements. As a result of the model, cohesion is natural.

Comparing the two models, if we are counting on an intensification of centralisation, this will also mean that we can give up on the *"dream model"* and the resulting advantages for the national economy.

FIGURE 2 *Central spatial structure model /pattern of the current Hungarian urban network/*
(Source: own drafting)

FIGURE 3 *Decentralised spatial structure model (dream) / idealised urban structure model*
(Source: own drafting)

Approach based on the centre/peripheral spatial structures (it is worth it to review this approach and try to imagine Hungary in this context):

The earlier know centre delimitations are the *"blue banana and sunshine belt"*, where the spatial delimitation has been made based on GDP (1989, by French geographers).

The *"blue star"* central area delimitation became *"well-known"* when the importance of transport corridors was recognised (DOMERGUES 1992.). The *"red monkey"* or *"red octopus"*: the new element is the role of transport corridors; then, the recognition of the organising role of large cities in economic development. Later, together with the transport corridors, the role of *urban networks* appeared in the public awareness of researchers, and as a visual equivalent the *grape motif* appeared. (VAN DE MEER 1998; LEVER 1999)

Here, the so-called *"suction cups"* are the large cities in the axes of cities formed by the transport corridors, as well as the dynamic large cities on the tentacles (Copenhagen, Berlin, Warsaw, Vienna, Budapest, Rome, Barcelona, Madrid). It is important that the model is based on the system of relationships based on real economic interests of the *"functional"* information-transport channels (and their narrow areas) between these cities.

FIGURE 4 *The "blue grape" and "red octopus" centre zone delimitations, indicated jointly, are the most similar to the convergence maps according to the Eurostat report* (Source: own drafting)

FIGURE 5 *Reducing European territorial disparities: convergence programme* (Source: EUROSTAT)

These well-known research delimitations, by now possessing a symbolic meaning – i.e. the development of the EU convergence programme – are confirmed by the EUROSTAT reports on thematic region maps in the form of official reports and they also provide an evaluation, informing the citizens of Member States in each language, as well as serving as an important basis for regional researchers. The position of small and medium-sized towns should be interpreted in the light of this.

The effects of the EU policy aimed at reducing regional disparities have been recorded in studies. It has been established, among other things, that certain *"convergence clubs"* have formed (regardless of the aid provided) and the developed areas progress together, as do as the less developed ones. Even the effectiveness of the EU territorial policy was questioned, but analysts chose to approach the matter with the opinion that *without the support system the divergence would be larger.* The material findings of the researches: *Apart from the phenomenon of convergence, divergence is also present. Convergence may happen only over the longer term.* (BARRY 2000)

According to the present trend, Budapest and its area belongs to the elite convergence club, like an island. The Western regions of Hungary remain at a stable level, while the others are lagging behind relatively speaking; all this is applicable to small and medium-sized towns. From among the regions with a Hungarian population, this is increasingly true of those located in Romania; there, too, the centre settlements are the dominant ones. This confirms the research findings of the National Development and Territorial Development Concept evaluating the territorial processes.

The Hungarian *"octopus"* i.e. the European and regional transport corridors and the *"suction cups"* which have an advantage of position, i.e. the medium-sized and small towns located along this axis and which have a development potential. This model provides a more nuanced picture of the convergence/divergence spatial structure provided by Eurostat. We can interpret this together as the dynamically growing *"octopus"* starting from the centre, named so by László Lengyel in his urban planning analysis in which he states that this process is a natural one. (Explanation: black tone: dynamically growing *central area;* dark grey tone: transport communication axes


FIGURE 6 *The Hungarian projection of the "red octopus/blue grape" central area delimitation* (Source: own drafting)

strengthening the central area – in my view, these are semi-peripheral. The areas not indicated are – also depending on the secondary bypasses – semi-peripheral or peripheral areas).

If the current trend continues, the *"black octopus"* will gain further ground, the settlements in this area will (actually) merge, the *"tentacles"* and the *"cup"* will be lagging only relatively; however, the peripheral areas – if all goes according to the trend – will have no chance to rise. Seeing as – as if forced, autonomously – everything is focused in the centre. The implementation of East-West bound elements of the network is delayed (in this the counter-interest of the *Centre* for an area of position is presented). Although the Danube bridges of both Dunaújváros and Szekszárd have been ready for years now.

Comparing this to the European tendencies, the need for regional competitiveness and economic-social cohesion with the promise of an economic recovery should be placed and evaluated in this dynamically changing central spatial structure.

WHY IS IT GOING THE WAY IT IS GOING? WHAT MAKES THIS THE TREND?

Network of Hungarian airports

The size of the symbols indicate the rate of traffic at the civil airports. The Ferihegy Airport of Budapest has implemented several megaprojects; however, since the 1960s, decision-makers have not considered it to be a public responsibility to develop the airports outside Budapest: the development of regional airports are dismissed as being a *"regional issue"* (but we know that there are no regions, just EU statistics on regional level). As the Association of Provincial Airports indicated in its announcement: *'Maintenance of the operation of provincial airports is a primary national interest, since these airports significantly improve the competitiveness and the ability to attract investments in the surrounding regions. The Association mentions that while in countries of a similar territory the market share of regional airports is around 35–55 percent beside the central airports, in Hungary this figure is less than 1 percent.'* (Source: Magyar Távirati Iroda, MTI.)

Railway, public roads networks

Railway, public roads networks all roads lead to Budapest. The radial railway and public roads networks built at the end of the 1800s concentrated the traffic – and through that the working capital – deliberately to help create/strengthen a national capital; and the spatial structure has not changed significantly.

Internal population movement

The distorted central spatial structure resulted in an attracting/repelling impact, as well as migration characterised by a population concentration process since several decades and the quitting of peripheral areas which resulted in turn from that; the prevailing attraction is the more favourable living standards/subsistence. This grew and strengthened the Centre continuously. In recent history, even the population movements arriving from across borders is primarily attracted by the Central settlement (45% in 2015, source: KSH)

FIGURE 7 *Overview of the main components, characteristics of the central spatial structure*
(Source: own drafting, VÁTI and KSH)

Proportion of higher education graduates

The increase in the capital weight of the Central settlement is at the same time a result and a cause, characterised by the proportion of higher education graduates. This also indicates the competitive disadvantage of the peripheral areas, and ultimately represents an adverse effect on the national economy. (In the case of any other economy-related thematic map the same distorted picture would be indicated).

FIGURE 8 *Territorial allocation of priority projects, milliard HUF, 2007–2009* (Source: own drafting and NFÜ [National Development Agency])

EU developments strengthening the Centre

When combining the investment values of supported priority projects – (source: website of the National Development Agency; own adaptation) – it can be observed that the majority of these are aimed at the Central region of Hungary (and within this, naturally the larger part is aimed at the metropolitan area)... This is interesting, to say the least, considering that the EU does not support the crowded, over-developed metropolitan areas.

During the period of 2004–2013, in the territorial allocation of the Transport Development Operational Programme (KÖZOP) the investments strengthening the Central area were dominant. The problems is not that such projects are present (naturally they are needed), but that they are dominant, and the intention to alleviate the central spatial structure – included in the National Spatial Development Concept – cannot be felt.

For the implementation of the Integrated Transport Development Operational Programme a government resolution named the transport development (large) projects for the 2014–2020 programming period. Indicated on the map it can be clearly seen that network developments pointing toward the direction of the Centre, thus further strengthening its role and position, are dominant; the development of East-West relations did not take place.

FIGURE 9 *The Transport Development Operational Programme (KÖZOP) strengthening the Centre* (Source: own drafting and NFÜ)


FIGURE 10 *The Integrated Transport Development Operational Programme (IKOP) strengthening the Centre* (Sourse: own drafting and Hungarian Official Gazette ([Magyar Közlöny])

Brief introduction of brakes, traps, contradictions acting against the reduction of territorial discrepancies

There is a Decree of the Hungarian Parliament on the transport development policy of Hungary: this act declares that the network development should follow the traffic needs. / According to the contract concluded with the operator of the Budapest Airport, the Hungarian State cannot develop an airport within 200 km. / The original proposal in the Decree of the Hungarian Parliament of 2005 on the designation of *"pole cities"* – in theory anti-poles – was adopted with an amendment: Budapest is a pole-city as well. / In the current budgeting period the *"Pole Programme"* aimed at alleviating the spatial structure was replaced by the *"Modern Cities Programme"* – including all larger cities, all county seats. Thus recovering the *"Budapest and the Sea"* syndrome, the term originating from the French decentralisation, at the time of designating the anti-poles, to overcome the *"Paris and the Sea"* spatial structure in the 1970s; based on the growth pole theory by Boudeville. / Beside the declared objective of reducing the territorial discrepancies, it is contradictory that there is an objective to develop the capital into a metropolis. / The tender documents of the Regional Operational Programmes (ROPs) are sometimes contradictory to the declared territorial development objectives (e.g. the requirement of economic return when establishing the basic infrastructure of a technological industrial park within the framework of the Szeged Biopolis Pole Programme). / In the light of the *'divide and conquer'* principle, at the beginning of the political transformation in the 1990s there was a deliberate distribution of public authority tasks in the form of increasing the number of municipal cities; since then the citizens of such cities, including also the county seats (!) still do not have local government representation in the given county (from an economic geography and urban planning aspect this is an irrational, *"hole in the cheese"* syndrome). / In the light of the *'divide and conquer'* principle, beginning from 1990 the mid-level local government competences have been deliberately reduced to meaninglessness. / For the Central Hungary Region a special status has been obtained from the EU (regardless of the fact that here the GDP per capita is above the 75% of the EU average, regional developments can still be supported for certain objectives, although to a limited degree: this has been funded by reallocating a part of the EU funds for the less developed Hungarian regions). / For the regions, where EU support cannot be provided, funds from the state budget can be made available based on a Government resolution. / Surplus State investments from the budget, being contrary to the territorial development objectives, and the spatial policy of the European Union (e.g. in connection with the EXPO Budapest or the Olympic Games in Budapest) / There have been/are serious cover-ups in connection with EU assistances, the public opinion was informed through the media that certain investments can be supported by EU funds, however, they are contrary to the territorial policy principles of the EU. There is no real public awareness in this area, it is hard to connect the dots with such low levels of information provided.

In the face of all this, as a self-contradictory situation, the capital...is suffocating

The radial highway development based on traffic needs further strengthen the single-pole spatial structure. The concentration of Hungarian and foreign capital and the strengthening of the centre role further increases the *"professional traffic"* targeted here. The intense suburbanisation also strengthens this process, together they *"route in"* the target traffic. The M0 ring road does not help at all, since it serves only for routing the transit traffic. All this increases traffic congestion, the adverse effects of urbanisation and the potential and actual environmental damages that have to be treated, naturally from public resources and state subsidies. Among

other things, this is the reason why this city is not really liveable, why public transportation is problematic and why main roads are regularly jammed. These problems force newer and newer urban developments. The modern environment results in people moving in, new investments, jobs, higher standards of living; the city further expands; the traffic further increases, etc...

QUO VADIS? (OLD/NEW THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS, PERSPECTIVES, SCENARIOS)

Zero solution (nothing is done...)

The divergence process in Hungary continues > Hungarian GDP is concentrated here > the concentration of the investment capital and of the population continues > an extremely distorted spatial structure is formed, where one-third of the population of the country lives in the central zone. A metropolis capital of 3 million inhabitants expanded in size becomes the objective and although it is a *"European"* city, it is in strong contradiction with the settlements that are permanently in a semi-peripheral or peripheral situation. The small and medium-sized towns that are outside of the development axes will be left behind... It has to be taken into consideration that the country could be *"torn into two parts"*, especially if we do not care about it or support these processes for selfish reasons. Even the form of this is questionable, even as a hypocritical professional debate agenda: a central conurbation with a city ring(?) or a regional city(?) should be created or another urban form should be created(?) And: the central territorial structure may result in the further strengthening of the central public authority surviving (!) in a political rotation, making it encased, as a natural consequence (since the two process is connected, they strengthen each other).

Actively deciding to reverse the trend, urban planning dimension

Organic scenario

Connecting the traffic networks included in the national plans is a priority; slowly but consistently the East-West direction network elements are implemented > the former cross-border traffic relations are rebuilt at a higher service provision level > a *"net-like"*, more balanced spatial structure is created, based on Western European (Dutch) examples > the potential for polycentric urban development is ensured in the Carpathian Basin. It is an important question to know what all of this means if the public authority, institutional and international central functions continue to be concentrated in the Centre, but it may become a reality when the reviving local economy forces regional autonomy out.

Radical scenario

Adoption of the National Spatial Development Plan (unified concept and territorial development) by the legislation > reincarnation of the abandoned Pole Programme, declaring the formed pole cities as anti-poles > radically promoting the innovation-based development of provincial university cities > subsidised construction of scientific-technological parks > developing regional airports into international airports with support from the State > connecting Pole Cities with the Southern highway ring, being a *"civilian"* initiative, formerly supported by the counties, but discarded by the government, completed with East-West/North-South network connections > promoting the connecting into the network of small towns and small settlements, and promoting their regional economy organisations > establishment of a regional autonomy.

FIGURE 11 *The spatial structure scheme of the Hungarian Pole Programme* (Source: VÁTI, OTK 2005)

Actively deciding to reverse the trend, state organisation/political dimension

Organic solutions in the light of a cooperative state organisation, in the name of a wise "Good Governance"

Deconcentration version

Well thought-out decision about the relocation of centre-making public authority functions > *"Version A"*: relocating the ministries and other government offices in pole cities, or in other small cities suitable for this purpose (there have been such attempts, without success, perhaps not by chance, to have the Constitutional Court in Esztergom and the State Secretariat for Rural Development in Kecskemét) > *"Version B"*: selecting and planning a new capital > (there was an unsuccessful attempt for this in Hungary (Dunaújváros); there are well-known examples in Europe and on other continents (e.g. German government offices in Bonn, or Holland parlament and governement offices in Hága) > relocating government offices > relocating other public institutes > the capital will be exempt from a part of the traffic resulting from professional reasons > etc.

Decentralisation version

Adopting a decentralisation law based on a European example > distribution of public authority on a territorial basis > moving certain authorities down to the mid-level, overlapping the tasks of county government offices > establishing strong mid-level local governments > establishing autonomous regions > regional local governments > Regional Development Plans (unifying the concept and the territorial development plan) at the mid-level etc.

Radical scenario (forcing out regional autonomy)

"Waking up" of the local economy, promotion of interests, social initiatives > Action by the programme party *"For Decentralisation"* > determinant role in the public authority > avoiding the brakes and traps through legislation > self-reduction of the public authority to a territorial level, creating regional autonomy > the above detailed potential urban planning solutions, initiated from below, based on regional decisions.

Conclusion

Territorial development objectives that have been declared for decades have not been implemented in Hungary. The alleviation of the central spatial structure cannot be seen, quite to the contrary, in fact. This tendency can be expected both on short and medium term. The small and medium-sized towns located in the semi-peripheral, peripheral areas have to face this perspective. This process should be evaluated in conjunction with the development and the spatial structure position of the Hungarian cities that are now across the border. In order to stop the trend of divergence it is not sufficient to issues declarations in each cycle; scientifically based radical solutions should be proposed.

Territorial development??? There is no such thing. Or to put it more precisely, there is a characteristic Hungarian territorial interest mechanism instead of it. The result of which is a self-contained, self-inducing process across political systems and ideologies, having been and being strengthening by the central spatial structure, and harming the competitiveness of the regions in peripheral positions. Hungary's capability for convergence depends also on the Hungarian spatial development (balanced/sustainable spatial development or permanent divergence). If the large-scale politics fail to recognise this and the prevailing (!) political actions contradict the territorial policy of the European Union promising convergence, then the only possibility is to go through a negative scenario.

The Pole Programme was abandoned, forgotten, as if it had been completed... And it was replaced by the developmental and territorial development concept including only moderate objectives. Knowing the interest mechanisms it is to be feared that the decisions set forth in it – being favourable for the national economy – will not be met. If we could get to a point when one of the scenarios are considered, or the Pole Programme is reloaded – interpreted even as anti-poles – it could all take place. Just a closing thought for this. The pole / anti-pole dichotomy is not a special enemy vision; there are mutual advantages to be found. This served as a helping power as regards Vienna and Buda-Pest when the need to establish a national capital surfaced in the 19th century. Another analogy would be the relation between positive and negative electrons, or Yin and Yang in Eastern philosophies: *"The basic law of life is the constant interaction of anti-poles. This interaction is the source of all experiences, all developments."*

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Esztergom

A City Centre Between Historic Sites[1]

Abstract

The following short paper discuses the reconstruction of the City Centre of Esztergom in the second half of the 20th Century. The *"New City Centre"* in the area between the two historic zones of the town was planned as a completely new construction. The paper shows how this centre reflects a compact version of the ideology of city reconstruction of the time, how the architecture concepts chanced with the time. The plans of a radical intervention were rejected. Most of the buildings were built in an even more *"historicising"*, almost post-modern style. But the townscape could not integrate this style. Thus, after 1990 came up the task of *"reconstructing the reconstruction"*.

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"If there is any place in the land that is defined by its architecture – with a single building that colours the entire cityscape and shapes the city's sights – then Esztergom is that place."[2] Thanks to its size and its location on top the castle hill, the basilica is clearly visible at a distance of more than ten kilometres, while the historic cityscape is rather modest, at least in comparison to the twelve cities in which areas were first listed as historic sites in 1961.[3] Esztergom was the only city in which two historic zones were listed: one near the basilica (archbishopric town or Watertown) and one in the former royal part of the city around Széchényi-Park.[4]

The area between the two zones would also have qualified as worthy of protection, but a new modern city centre had been in planning here since the 1940's. The *"New City Centre"* in the area between the two historic zones was planned as a completely new construction during the four decades of Socialism which ended in 1989. Although this area is very small, it has a decisive effect on the cityscape. Esztergom city centre more or less offsets the basilica, as it represents, with only one centrally located building, modern (in the lingo of the time, *"Socialist"*) Esztergom.

The following short paper focusses on the time when the city centre was being built, between 1960 and 1990. It shows how this centre reflects a compact version of the ideology of city reconstruction of the time, immediately adjacent to the historic zones.[5] Besides contemporary professional books and studies on city remodelling also planning documents of the Hungarian National Archives (Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár) served as sources for this paper.

The Overdue City Centre

Until 1895, Esztergom was made up of four individual settlements: the Royal City of Esztergom, Watertown, St. George's Field (Szentgyörgymező) and the Parish of St. Thomas (Szenttamás)[6]. The former square, where the city centre (Rákóczi-tér) would later be built, was located exactly where the Royal City, Watertown and the village-like Parish of St. Thomas met (only St. George's Field was located slightly further off). This area gained importance also because, as of 1885, it provided the fastest access to the bridge to Párkány (today Štúrovo). No less than seven streets led to Rákóczi Square, where all together they formed a small, open square. Even the nationally significant paved federal highway along the Danube (B11) went by there. And at that time and precisely in that place the idea for the erection of a city centre was born. Rákóczi Square and its surroundings preserved their character into the middle of the twentieth century with the former suburban type of building characteristics: low houses, full of nooks and crannies between. Only the so-called Lőrinc Street towards Párkány[7] was given a more impressive outer aspect.

So it is no coincidence that, a good half-century after the once independent cities had been united, a prestigious new design for Rákóczi Square was the main objective of the architectural competition held in 1943.[8] The plans submitted to the competition have to this day only partially been unearthed.

[2] Cf. Granasztói 1978. 81. Quotation translated by Zita Horányi.

[3] Buda (Budapest), Eger, Esztergom, Győr, Kőszeg, Pápa, Pécs, Sárospatak, Sopron, Székesfehérvár, Szombathely, Vác, Veszprém (Pozsonyi 1973. 99.; Gerő 1971. 186–188.).

[4] Gerő 1971. 187.

[5] Román 2004. 228–229. Cf. also Jankó 2011.

[6] Pifkó – Zachar 2000. 75.

[7] Štúrovo/Párkány until 1920 Hungary, 1920–38 Czechoslovakia, 1938–1945 Hungary,1945–92 Czechoslovakia, since 1993 Slovakia.

[8] Kun 1981. 29.

But even those that do exist show that the architects did not deal with the given historic features very respectfully. After examination by the Historic Monuments Protection Authority of the 1950's (1953, carried out by Kálmán Szelle), the plans had to be revised[9]. A few years later, Széchenyi Square (centre of the historical Royal City of Esztergom) and its surroundings were listed as historic sites while on Rákóczi Square only two buildings were listed.[10] One might wonder why the Historic Monuments Authority was not more persistent and why it did not do more to preserve the historic buildings in the area between the two historic sites, i.e. between Castle Hill and Széchenyi Square. The answer may lie in the particular local situation (which would require further investigations), but it is an established fact that Esztergom was not an isolated case: *"Political pressure was put on the Historic Monuments Protection Authority (...) to list protected areas sparingly, with respect to size as well as number"*.[11]

So, the price for listing a historic site in Esztergom seems to have been the *"approval of the authorities"* for the reconstruction of the city centre. The plans for the city centre had already been completed in the 1950's.[12] The open spaces in the city were to be enlarged by increasing the building line setbacks in order to achieve an imposing regularly shaped square. János Sedlmayer was the planner in charge, who was considered to be one of the foremost professionals in that field in Hungary at the time.[13] Even if the scale of his designs was too monumental – reflecting the appearance of the second Russian capital, St. Petersburg – they show a basic tendency towards humility with respect to the old city, especially concerning the open visual axis to the basilica.

In the fifties, however, such a plan was considered unrealistic in Esztergom for political reasons. Blue collar and mining towns such as Tatabánya, Oroszlány and Dorog were given absolute priority as far as investment by the state was concerned. During the toughest years of communist dictatorship, the Catholic church centre Esztergom was considered a *"sinful city"* that was not worthy of receiving support from the system of the *"working class"*[14].

BUILDING THE NEW CITY CENTRE

In the sixties, Esztergom lost its isolated position. Although the city did not regain its original leading position within the county, as *"residential city of the Dorog industrial area "*, it stood a good chance in the fight for the financial resources of Socialist planned economy.[15] The design of the new city centre could in the sixties be ranked as a concern of regional, partially also of national significance.[16] For this, four requirements needed to be fulfilled: 1) Increase the number of inhabitants; 2) Create important services also for the agglomeration: retail stores, schools; 3) Modernisation of the transportation system and an overpass for B11 and 4) Promotion of tourism. Because the country gave the latter item highest priority redevelopment of the city centre began with reconstruction of Spa City.

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[9] Source No. 1.

[10] Source No. 1. 1953.

[11] ROMÁN 2004. 229. Quotation translated by Zita Horányi.

[12] Source No. 2. 1956.

[13] KUBINSZKY 2005.

[14] BÁNLAKY 1992. 56–66.

[15] Cf. LETTRICH 1964.

[16] Source No. 3. 1969.

Until the middle of the 19th century, maps showed a sea surrounded by marshland at the place where today's so-called Spa City is situated. After it was drained, a restaurant was built there, and swimming baths were created in which thermal spring water was collected. Later, a sports pool was added outdoors for swimming in the open air and smaller additions such as changing rooms were made.[17] The plans of the 1960's for the spa called for the demolition of nearly all the annex buildings with the exception of the restaurant and the swimming pool. Even adjacent streets were to be razed to make room for hotels, among other things.[18]

It is characteristic for that time that an expertise on the project refers to first and second class tourism. Just two decades after the revolution that was to put an end to class society this is an indication of the fact that *"Socialist society"* accepted the difference in income and even cemented it architecturally: *"Demands regarding accommodation vary. Some of the guests, who arrive in groups or singly, are more demanding, and request more comfortable, cultivated accommodation; the others are looking for simpler lodgings."*[19] Therefore a little further away from the pools, a modest tourist hotel was built with cramped rooms and minimal technical equipment.

For the more demanding, i.e. wealthier guests, a hotel was built immediately adjacent to the listed historical building, with all conveniences available at the time. An auditor's report of the planning institute comments on the difference between the hotel designed by Dezső Tóth and the listed historic swimming baths: *"The new hotel which is designed according to modern trends does not disturb the overall architectural concept in spite of its divergent appearance"*.[20] The spa hotel includes almost all the elements of modern architecture: the wings on stilts that jut out over the sidewalk, the street façade consisting of nothing but clear glass, the pure form of the grid-like reinforced concrete construction and the rhythm of the terraces allowing one to intuit the arrangement of the rooms inside which were consistently laid out according to a standard scheme.

The development of the spa complex in Watertown was, however, never completely finished, because in 1965 planning of the city centre took priority. Two to three hundred apartments, several dozen businesses and department stores were to be erected in the city centre, and also B11 was to be enlarged.[21] It was clear from the beginning that it was not a question of repairs, but that the planning of the city centre was going to be an entirely new project.

The first building plans that were made between 1962 and 1969 intended a still more radical intervention, but the designs of the local architect's office (planner: Ferenc Schneider) renounced all historical types of buildings and, where the streets had been, placed a huge building mass in the centre of the plot. The monumentality of the seven-storey buildings with ribbon windows and the *"no walls"* look of its strongly subdivided construction would indeed not have shown to advantage, considering the narrowness of the streets, if the building had not been placed in the middle of the building plot. At ground level along the frontage a row of stores, and a glass superstructure was projected, partially covered by shed roofs. On the spot where one hundred razed apartments had stood, almost three hundred apartments were to be created; the area available for commercial enterprises was to be enlarged from ca. 800 square meters to more than five times as much. This city centre wanted to be a counterpart to the old city of Esztergom.

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[17] Pifkó 1997.

[18] Source No. 4. 1963.

[19] Source No. 4. 1963. Expert's opinion on the plan: László Szabó Sóki. Quotation translated by Zita Ragoncza.

[20] Unknown author, source No. 5. 1964.

[21] Source No. 3. 1969.

While preparations for the investments were being made, the city council held a nation-wide competition for plans for the city centre that included not only designs for the centre itself but also for the entire area between the two listed historic sites, all the way to St. Thomas Mountain. The planners dreamed of a modern city centre with bypasses, fly-overs, a cultural centre reminiscent of an amphitheatre and an elevated pedestrian zone for the envisaged agglomeration (130,000 inhabitants).[22] The call for tenders involving apartments housing 130,000 persons was in itself unrealistic and it is therefore not surprising that of the numerous ideas only individual elements were accepted for the actual city centre, and that happened only because one of the contestants was the already mentioned Ferenc Schneider. He and his colleagues (above all Kálmán Homor, Director of the Architectural Office of Esztergom) were responsible for the entire project.

In 1971, reconstruction work on the houses began, but not according to the original plans.[23] Work on these new plans began before the tender of 1971 which shows that this project was undertaken independently of the tender. The new concept threw out the seven-storey *"sky scraper"*, the stores were integrated into the lower stories of the three-storey, steep-roofed residential buildings.

The group of buildings on the Little Danube was completed first. The atmosphere resembled the extension of the spa which had, after all, been conceived architecturally as a historicising extension of the apartment building between the two world wars. On the one hand, the group of buildings closes off the courtyard of the apartment building from the future city centre, and on the other hand it creates a new U-shaped square towards the Little Danube. The connection between the projected city centre and the riverbank was solved by placing the central axis of the group of buildings on stilts. Thanks to the smaller scale of the building complex and the interplay of the façades, a solution preserving the atmosphere of the historic city could be found.

The second building phase concerned the buildings along Lőrinc Street. This group of buildings was built in an even more *"historicising"*, almost post-modern style. The one- to three-storey buildings with high roofs seek to reflect the vertical scale of the former street and the piecemeal structure of the building plot. This is significant because in this way the planners gave the impression that modern architecture shows understanding in its treatment of the historical aspect of the city. So the southern façade was arranged along a zigzag line to provide shade and loosen up the appearance of the block.

The last building phase did not take place until the end of the seventies. When Rákóczi Square, which since the forties and still at that time was considered to be the starting point for the development of the city, was renovated, a delay occurred, primarily due to the unsolved traffic situation. While still no solution was in sight, the investment for the city centre, the purchase of the department store (enlarged by additional residential blocks), could be postponed no longer.[24] The *"Bastion department store"* (Bástya Áruház 1977–80) is proof of the robustness of the seventies and creates a city in the city with its own elevated sidewalk level that leads to an independent *"network of streets"*. The elevated sidewalk of the building complex offers a view of the multi-storied town houses on Rákóczi Square.

The contemporary elements of the ground floor (stores, traffic) are barely perceptible, creating an almost painterly static (and historical) appearance. To an even greater extent the same is true of the exit of the sidewalk towards the thermal spring. As much as the Bastion department store attempts to profit from the surrounding historic cityscape, it still manages to suppress the latter.

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[22] Source No. 6. 1971.

[23] Source No. 7. 1970–72.

[24] Source No. 8. 1977.

To correct this, at the end of the eighties, as part of traffic regulation, a proposal was made for a grass strip in front of the building to cover its front side.[25]

During the last phase of the city centre project and in the last minute before the fall of communism, the party building (house of culture) was erected in continuation of the Bastion department store. It is grotesque that the building with the greatest ideologic role in the socialist cityscape was built so late. Today the building is known simply as the *"green house"* and eases the robustness of the Bastion department store in that it intentionally imitates the rhythm of the oldest building in the city centre, the classicistic spa and restaurant.[26] The development of the city centre began to falter, however, in 1989, and has not been continued to this day.

The half-finished city centre deteriorated rapidly after the start of the new millennium. The bathing area in the inner city was neglected in favour of planning and erection of the new water park (located on the island just off shore from the city). The listed historic building has been preserved but the luxury hotel of the 60's was torn down. The demolition of the party headquarters is scheduled for 2017, but also the demolition of the Bastion department store that has degenerated from the former Socialist *"luxury department store"* to a collection of small stores specializing in cheap mass-produced items is on the agenda. The idea for remodelling the building into a market came up, but never got off the ground. On the spot where a multi-storey car park was projected in the 1980's, a huge parking lot opened in autumn 2016. The city centre has thereby been converted into a specific park+ride area, from whence people continue on their way not by means of public transport, but set off on foot to the nearby points of interest in the inner city.

POSTSCRIPT

Even before completion, the new city centre drew fierce criticism. In 1981, the architect János Kun wrote: *"[...] no architectural transition is being created between the preserved historical buildings of the city centre and those that are to be built".*[27] Criticism was also aimed at the city centre because in the author's opinion far too many apartments were built and thereby too little room remained for stores and services. Today, however, it is evident that the small retail stores on the ground level and the erected apartments are the only buildings that have continued to form an architectural ensemble over 30 to 40 years. The business complexes with single functions did not survive the decades after the fall of communism, above all because of bankruptcy of the city treasury of Esztergom.[28]

Finally, one can ask oneself whether it was primarily a faulty architectural concept that led to the rapid and visible degradation of the city centre or whether precipitous social change is indeed responsible for it.[29] The question is of course much too complex to answer here. It would, however, be rewarding to consider this before undertaking the apparently inescapable task of *"reconstructing the reconstruction"*, i.e. before the city begins to rebuild the city centre or begins to renovate the existing buildings.

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[25] Source No. 9. 1984.

[26] Source No. 10. 1984.

[27] KUN 1981. 19., quotation translated by Zita Ragoncza.

[28] Esztergom is not the only Hungarian City that went bankrupt on account of the housing market crash in 2008 or other financing problems. It is unquestionable, however, that the media presented Esztergom as a textbook example of a bankrupt city treasury.

[29] See also: LOCSMÁNDI 2016.

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
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FIGURES

FIGURE 1 *Protected historical sites in Esztergom* (Source: GERŐ 1971. 187.)


FIGURE 2 *Plan for the Centrum* (Source: Archive document Nr. 2.)

(1960.)

FIGURE 3–4 *View of Centrum about 1960 and today* (Source: Archive picture from the book "Esztergom képekben" by V. JUHÁSZ KATALIN [2000], p. 14., the actual photo made by the author)

**FIGURE 5** *Hotel Volán for "for simpler lodgings"* (Source: Fortepan Nr. 15937 [1972], Photograph: Urbán Tamás)

FIGURE 6 *Regulation plan for the Centrum* (Source: Archive document Nr. 7: 1970–72)

FIGURE 7–8 *The street "Hévízköz" before the reconstruction and the today character of the Centrum* (Source: Archive document Nr. 2., the actual photo made by the author)

FIGURE 9 *Model of first Version of the Reconstruction* (Source: Archive document Nr. 3. 1969.)

FIGURE 10 *The final Version of the Reconstruction* (Source: Archive document Nr. 7: 1970–72.)

FIGURE 11 *The elevated sidewalk of the department store with view of old town* (Source: Photo made by the author)

FIGURE 12 *Degradation of the city centre* (Source: Photo made by the author)

MEGJELENT! KAPHATÓ A KIADÓNÁL.

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The Face of German Democracy

Parliament and Government Buildings in Berlin

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CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND THEIR SPATIAL REPRESENTATION

Since the German re-unification 1990, there arose the question, where to locate the main parliament and government functions of the Federal Republic of Germany? Before coming to more details, we should have a glance to the constitutional system of Germany, giving the basis for the planning and construction needs of the constitutional bodies.

First of all, as the main body of the legislative branch of public powers there is the Bundestag (the House of Representatives, Chapter III of the Basic Law [in German: Grundgesetz]). *"Sittings of the Bundestag shall be public"* (Article 42 paragraph 1 of the Basic Law), consequently a representative assembly hall including seats for the public – separated from the Members of Parliament – is needed. Furthermore, the Bundestag needs a lot of committee rooms. The committees are mirroring the federal ministries, e.g. the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Defence (Article 45a), which are denominated explicitly in the Basic Law. They also perform additional duties, e.g. Committees of inquiry (Article 44), the Committee on the European Union (Article 45), the Petitions Committee (Article 45c), and the Parliamentary Control Panel *"to scrutinise the intelligence activities of the Federation"* (Article 45d).

Second, there is the Bundesrat (Chapter IV of the Basic Law). The Bundesrat is the representation of the Länder governments in the federal legislative and not-comparable neither with the U.S. Senate, nor with the House of Lords in the United Kingdom. *"The Länder shall participate through the Bundesrat in the legislation and administration of the Federation and in matters concerning the European Union"* (Article 50). *"The Bundesrat shall consist of members of the Land governments, which appoint and recall them. Other members of those governments may serve as alternates. Each Land shall have at least three votes; Länder with more than two million inhabitants shall have four, Länder with more than six million inhabitants five, and Länder with more than seven million inhabitants six votes. Each Land may appoint as many members as it has votes. The votes of each Land may be cast only as a unit and only by Members present or their alternates"* (Article 51). Lawyers call those constitutional provisions as a *"modified one chamber system"* according to the fact that the members of Bundesrat are not elected directly (but execute their powers on the basis of powers vested to them by Länder parliaments) in contrary to the members of Bundestag elected in direct and general elections, but in fact there is a dual chamber system.

Third, there is the executive branch of public powers. The head of state is the the Federal President (in German: Bundespräsident, Chapter V of the Basic Law). His duties are chiefly – except specific cases of dissolution of Bundestag – of representative nature. The head of the Federal Government (in German: Bundesregierung, Chapter VI of the Basic Law) is the Federal Chancellor (in German: Bundeskanzler), who *"shall determine and be responsible for the general guidelines of policy"* (Article 65). As a junction point of all federal ministries, the Federal Chancellor's Office is obviously the most important site of the executive powers.

In 1991, the Bundestag took the basic political decision to move from Bonn to Berlin. The Bundesrat and the Federal Government followed. However, parts of the ministries still have their offices in Bonn, the provisional (West) German capital since 1949. The first presidential elections after the reunification were held in 1994 in the former Reichstag building, which became the new seat of the Bundestag.

FIGURE 1 *The Reichstag building* (Source: Photo made by the author)

ACTION TAKEN AFTER THE BUNDESTAG DECISION 1991

Subsequently, a large-scale development program for the premises of the constitutional bodies and the ministries started. To implement the program, the Parliament passed a specific legislation.

Section 247 of the Federal Building Code provides for *"Special Provisions for Berlin as the Capital of the Federal Republic of Germany"*. For better understanding, I will quote here the full text:

"(1) In the process of preparing and adopting urban land-use plans and other statutes under the provisions of this Code, special attention shall be given to giving due consideration to matters arising from the development of Berlin as the capital of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the requirements of the Federation's constitutional bodies for the proper discharge of their duties.

(2) The matters and requirements referred to in para. 1 shall be explored in a Joint Committee with representation from the Federation and from Berlin.

(3) In the event of the Joint Committee failing to reach agreement, the Federation's constitutional bodies may determine their requirements independently; in doing so they shall have regard for the orderly urban development of Berlin. Urban land-use plans and other statutes adopted under the provisions of this Code shall be adjusted accordingly to make allowance for the requirements as determined.

(4) Where the Federation's constitutional organs have determined their requirements pursuant to para. 3 sentence 1 and implementation of these requirements calls for the preparation and adoption of an urban land-use plan or other statute provided in this Code, the urban land-use plan or statute shall be prepared and adopted.

(5) Development of the parliamentary and governmental precincts of Berlin shall satisfy the aims and purposes of an urban development measure as stated in Section 165 para. 2.

(6) Where decisions within permission, consent or other procedures relating to the development projects of the Federation's constitutional organs call for the exercise of discretion, or where personal assessments or the weighing of interests are involved, the requirements determined by the Federation's constitutional organs pursuant to para. 3 shall be considered with the due weight allotted to them under the Basic Law. Para. 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis."

On this basis, an international urban design competition was organised. One of the main issues of the competition, held after the basic political decisions, was that parliament and government buildings should perform in a symbolic manner the values of the German democracy and of the German reunification. The Bundestag and the Bundeskanzleramt (the Federal Chancellor's Office) should be located close together, to symbolise the co-operation between two main branches of public power, the legislative and the executive power. Another main issue was the character of Bundestag as a *"working parliament"*, needing a lot of adequate rooms for fractions, committees, and the staff of the MP's, too.

FIGURE 2 *The Federal Chancellor's Office* (Source: Photo made by the author)

THE "TIE OF THE FEDERATION"

The winners of the urban design competition 1992/1993 were the architects Axel Schultes and Charlotte Frank. Their main idea was the *"tie of the federation" ("Band des Bundes")*, symbolising the reunification by locating the Federal Chancellor's Office (the building as such also designed by Axel Schultes and Charlotte Frank) and the Bundestag functional buildings in a broad band on both sides of the Spree river (the *"Paul-Löbe-Haus"* in former West Berlin and the *"Marie-Elisabeth-Lüders-Haus"* in former East Berlin, both designed by Stephan Braunfels), connected by pedestrian bridges (EYINK – KLUY – SIEGEL 2000).

FIGURE 3 *Pedestrian bridges on Spree River between "Paul-Löbe-Haus" and "Marie-Elisabeth-Lüders-Haus"* (Source: Photo made by the author)

Of course, the Parliament and government area should not be isolated. The area is located within the context of main traffic lines, especially the north-to-south street tunnel and the new Central Station, providing for local, regional and international railway connections as a main railway cross.

THE REICHSTAG BUILDING AS THE IDEAL AND ARCHITECTURAL CENTRE OF THE ENSEMBLE

A look back to history

The Reichstag building was designed by Paul Wallot and erected between 1884 and 1894. In anecdotic terms, it is remarkable that the dome was subject to disputes with the emperor, who didn't want to see such a dominant symbol of parliamentary powers. However, it should be taken into account, that the parliament of the Second Empire (1870/71–1918) was elected on the basis of a general right to vote of all adult male citizens, which was not common at that time in Europe. In 1933, probably by Nazi criminal actions, it was heavily damaged by fire, and also in 1945 during the Berlin battle (CULLEN 2014).

After World War II, in the 1960s the building has been reconstructed in a simplified manner and without the spectacular dome. The architect was Paul Baumgarten (CULLEN 2014).

FIGURE 4 *Reichstag Building, interior of one of the side domes* (Source: Photo made by the author)

The reconstruction of the Reichstag building as the seat of the Bundestag

In 1993, an architectural competition with three winners took place. Subsequently, in 1995 the design proposals had been revised and Sir Norman Foster was the final winner. The construction works started in 1996 and had been finished in 1999 (CULLEN 2014).

The plenary sessions' hall is the core of German democracy. The eagle at the front wall shows the same proportions as the *"predecessor"* in the former Bundeshaus building in Bonn.

The surrounding of the Reichstag

The City of Berlin provided for a good quality public space around the Reichstag, and for good public transport connections. In a wider context, the urban space around Reichstag, additional parliamentary buildings and the Main Station is still under development. As a highlight of former railway infrastructure, the former *"Hamburger Bahnhof"* (Hamburg Railway Station), is now used as museum of contemporary art.

Outside the "tie of the federation"

The seat of the Federal President is Bellevue Castle, not forming a part of the *"tie of the federation"*. The administrative tasks of the Federal President's Office are being performed in an additional building close to the Castle, having an oval ground plan – if you like, the German Oval Office.

The Bundesrat is located in the building of the former Prussian *"Herrenhaus"* at the Leipziger Strasse, the *"House of Lords"* of the Prussian legislation. The second chamber of legislative is in so far in a historic tradition of the formerly predominating German Land.

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FIGURE 5 *The Reichstag, seen from the entrance of the underground station* (Source: Photo made by the author)

FIGURE 6 *The former "Hamburger Bahnhof"* (Hamburg Railway Station), now museum of contemporary art (Source: Photo made by the author)

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The Historical Sociology
of Climate Change

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Pászka, Imre (2016): A társas világ környezetei. Történet- és tudásszociológiai tanulmányok. [Environments of Social Life. Studies on Historical and Knowledge Sociology.] Szeged, Belvedere Meridionale. 262 p.

Imre Pászka's book entitled *Environments of the Social Life. Studies on Historical and Knowledge Sociology* was published last year (2016) in Hungarian. The book comprises 4 parts, respectively 7 chapters, the first four of which forming one, thematically contiguous unit.

The first chapter entitled *Inter-relations between Anthropogenic and Natural Factors* (pp. 9–29) introduces the methodological background. One of the newest concerns that sociological research has directed its focus upon is the social effects of factors that are external to society, such as climate change. The importance and the relevance of Pászka's endeavor is obvious, the current rate of climate change is there to render it significant.

The second chapter is entitled *Climate: Warming Up / Cooling Down* (pp. 30–42). In this part, the author relies on the new science of environmental history to present the slow, natural and cyclical changes the climate undergoes. During the last two thousand years, Europe has seen four distinct climatic periods, the so-called Little Ice Age between the 14th century and the second half of the 19th century being the most commonly known. Pászka's interest is directed towards

the warming period preceding this Ice Age between the 9th and the 13th centuries. The period is referred to under several names, some call it the Medieval Climate Optimum, the Medieval Warm Period and it is sometimes called the Medieval Climatic Anomaly and there is no consensus among scientists regarding the exact duration of the period either. What is known, though, is that temperatures during the period rose by 1–2 degrees Celsius above normal mean temperatures, moreover, the temperature in Northern Europe is thought to have been 4 degrees higher (p. 35). According to some sources, Europe during that period was warmer than it is today. As Pászka emphasizes, *"(Medieval) Warming up is only a dominant tendency, the weather of the seasons is not free from some extremities, even in the periods of warming up, neither is their fluctuation identical in different regions. ...The beginning and the end of the warming up both warn us about regional differences and diversities which are further refined by regional microclimates."* (p. 239). One of the defining features of climate change today is that the warming is much more accentuated in the Antarctic region than in more moderate climate zones and there are significant regional differences as well – e.g. the warming is higher in the Carpathian Basin than it is outside of it.

There is one aspect that Pászka does not address, but is worth noting, namely that climate sceptics often reach out and use the Medieval Optimum in their arguments, pointing out the natural factors that led to its appearance. Consequently, they argue, the dominance of natural factors cannot be excluded when addressing the global warming process as we experience it today, therefore it is unnecessary to limit CO_2 emissions and to reduce the combustion of fossil fuels such as coal, oil and gas.

The third chapter bears the title *Climate Optimum of the Middle Ages: Warming up / Upswing* (pp. 43–148). This long part is dedicated to the discussion of the relationship between climate warming and socio-economic prosperity. The author provides separate accounts of the effects of the warming on the population, on the environment, on technology, on the markets and of the city as well as on starvation and on diseases. In his argument Pászka relies on a trend that is commonly accepted in professional literature: *"Namely, literature includes a trend which assumes correlation between the emergence of cultures and civilization and warming up, as well as between cooling down and the decline of cultures".* (p. 239)

Climate cooling in Medieval Europe was undoubtedly accompanied by economic and social decline, while periods of warming came with economic growth and social boom. *"It is a fact that ... the flourishing three hundred years of the Middle Ages were included in this period of warming up."* (p. 238). However, what Pászka also emphasizes is that *"as for the time periods, the optimum of the Middle Ages does not cover the period of the boom, the boom occupied a shorter period, and shall not even be considered as something general throughout the European Continent, as it has a kind of insular and isolated nature".* (p. 146) The author states the following: *"The demographical starting framework conditions for the boom were defined as the repression*

of an external (invasions) and an internal (vendetta) factor. ... (W)e highlighted the multifunctional role of the Church (as the dominant institution of the age), which was able to create the conditions for the beginning and the progression of the boom". (p. 239) *"A slowdown of the prosperous years could be sensed as early as before the period of warming up (the turn of the 13–14th centuries)."* (p. 240) As we are currently unable to determine exactly the point in time when the Medieval Climate Optimum came to an end and such a point is most probably impossible to identify, the later statement seems debatable. I consider climate change to be a huge stressor that society must accommodate to with the help of coping methods such as the development of new farming tools and technologies. This also means that Medieval society had to accommodate to the warming that characterized the climate of the time, therefore the argument that social boom lagged climate warming does not necessarily indicate the absence of causality.

"However, the believed/real stimuli of climatic/weather factors could be sensed throughout the continent during the period of warming up, and above-average and outstanding development and growth was accomplished by some regions only: Northern Italy, and Northwestern Europe." (p. 147) *"Processed data imply that institutional factors play a determining role in booms, and climate as well as its concrete manifestation, the weather played a rather associated and partial role, while balanced climatic periods had a somewhat stabilizing effect"* (p. 146). I fully agree that the beneficial effects of Medieval warming were not direct and automatic, but were channeled through a stable social structure that had the Church at its center in the period. I also agree that this institutional system had its limitations that could halt social development even if climate conditions were otherwise favorable. However, I find it difficult to consider the social impact of climate change as being *"rather associated and partial"*. The way I perceive the world, in my paradigm, if you like, a significant change in climate produces significant social change in an a priori, that is, in an inevitable and invariable manner, but I admit that this is a difference in philosophical approach between the author and me.

The fourth chapter, that is at the same time the last chapter in the first part of the book, is titled *Structures of the Market System* (pp. 149–175). It provides the reader a thorough scientific account of the development of the market system, but unfortunately, it is only vaguely related to the previous part, with very little consideration for aspects related to climate history.

The next three parts, respectively chapters have the following titles: *The Possibility of a "Text-Based" Social Science* (pp. 176–205), *Dialogic Situations: "Me-You" Relations* (pp. 206–217) and *The Knowledge Milieu of a Sociologist* (pp. 218–237). The papers in these parts of the book are aimed at understanding and interpreting the social positions of individuals, being trapped in everyday situations and in the events of the social world. The second through the fourth part of the book are different from the first part not only in terms of length, but also in terms of the methodology used. The author tries to provide a common interpretation framework for these papers that show significant diversity in terms of the topics addressed as well as in the methods employed. I do not consider the attempt to be unsuccessful, but I think the entire book could have been much more reader-friendly, had the author focused only on the first part, that is, on the socio-historical aspects of climate change.

In its entirety, Pászka's book explores a very exciting topic that belongs to the forefront of modern socio-historical research: the relationship between climate change and social transformation in Medieval Europe and it provides exciting insight into this interesting borderline area of science not only for experts, but for the average reader as well.

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