BELVEDERE MERIDIONALE
TÖRTÉNELEM ÉS TÁRSADALOMTUDOMÁNYOK XXVIII.ÉVFOLYAM,2.SZÁM

Patterns of

SOCIOREGIONS IN THE CARPATHIAN BASIN

Editor of the thematic issue: Pászka, Imre & Jancsák, Csaba

– MMXVI SUMMER –

BELVEDERE MERIDIONALE

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Kiadja a Belvedere Meridionale Kft.
ISSN 1419-0222 (print) ISSN 2064-5929 (online, pdf)

Tartalomjegyzék » Content

Tanulmányok » Studies

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Exploring University Students' Experiences of Double Academic Statuses in Romania Who? When? Why?

Abstract The paper offers insights into the views and experiences of DAS – double academic status – students at a Romanian university. This practice is discussed in the paper from the perspective of increased participation in higher education, when more and more people spend time and money not only on gaining qualifications, but also on boosting their credentials by participating in various extra-curricular activities with the hope of securing an advantage for their labour market entrance. The processes of who, when and why these students ended up in DAS will be explored along with reflecting on the local and national structural elements that allowed, and at times encouraged, such a practice.

Keywords extra-curricular activities; MSP – multiple status positions; DAS – double academic status; transitions; higher education; Romania; statistics; narrative analysis.

DOI 10.14232/belv.2016.2.1 http://dx.doi.org/10.14232/belv.2016.2.1

Cikkre való hivatkozás / How to cite this article: Plugor, Réka (2016): Exploring University Students' Experiences of Double Academic Statuses in Romania. Who? When? Why?. Belvedere Meridionale vol. 28. no. 2. 5–20. pp

ISSN 1419-0222 (print) ISSN 2064-5929 (online, pdf)

Introduction

One of the most significant trends impacting on the experiences of young people in recent years has been the increased participation in post-compulsory education (Furlong – Cartmel 1997, 2007; Nagel – Wallace 1997; Wyn – Dwyer 2000). From being a "minority pursuit for the privileged higher education became more and more a standardised part of the transitions process" (Nagel – Wallace 1997. 47.), and at the same time this lead to a differentiation within the higher education system (between institutions, courses, qualifications). While some authors (like Nagel – Wallace 1997) stated that the investment in higher education had good returns in the labour market, others (like Dwyer et.al. 2005) argued that "the relationship between education and employment was complex and could be extended and unpredictable". More recently, Brown and colleagues (2011) even more pessimistically claimed that "the opportunity bargain has not extended individual freedom but has led to an *opportunity trap* that forces people to spend more time, effort, and money on activities that may have little intrinsic purpose in an attempt to fulfil one's opportunities" (Brown – Lauder – Ashton 2011. 12.). From this perspective, participating in higher education has become a defensive action, education is a necessary investment to have any chance of fighting for a decent standard of living, but it will result in "handsome rewards" only for a few. Brown and colleagues (2011. 5.) argued that the belief that "education equals earnings" was unsustainable in a global economy because states failed to live up to their promise in the 'opportunity bargain'. The authors stated that the competitions for jobs shifted from within national borders to a 'global auction' open to everyone and the original opportunity bargain turned into an 'opportunity trap' because as more and more people spend time and money to gain qualifications, the value of the credentials in the job market is reduced and no one is able to secure any advantage - "If everyone stands on a tiptoe, nobody gets a better view. But if you don't stand on a tiptoe, there is no chance of seeing" (Brown – Lauder – Ashton 2011. 135.). From this starting point it is crucial to know the perceptions and strategies of higher education students. How do they view their studies and what role (if any) do extra-curricular activities have in their student lives and future plans? Are they engaging in different extra activities to boost their credentials and earn an edge in the labour market to avoid this *opportunity trap*? Which students opt for DAS and what role does DAS play in these students' lives? This article set out to answer these questions by looking at students' experiences and perceptions in a university in Romania. In the following I present a brief overview of the literature, followed by the methods applied in the research. The main part of the article comprises of the presentation and discussion of the findings from the analysis followed by concluding remarks.

Student experiences: MSP and DAS

Within the context of education to work transitions there are numerous studies on what happens to people after they graduate and enter working life. Length of time needed to secure a first job, returns to education after several years in employment, employability skills, graduate labour market characteristics, are all widely researched, especially in Western countries (see Shavit–Müller 1998; OECD 2000; Müller–Gangl 2003) but recently papers that include Eastern European countries (see Blossfeld et.al. 2008; Kogan–Gebel–Noelke 2008; Roberts 2009b; Blossfeld et.al. 2011; Kogan–Noelke–Gebel 2011; Robert–Saar 2012) are also appearing. These studies looked at the outcomes of transitions in a sequential manner: education,

then graduation, and then work. But several authors wrote about the non-sequential characteristic of education-work life-events, and as du Bois-Raymond (1998. 67.) specified, "what used to be arranged in series – learning and then work – is currently becoming a double field and a double life for adolescents and young adults: learning and work, work and learning alternately." She also pointed out that this started at an early age, for several people during school years because they wanted to supplement their pocket money. Wolbers (2003) and more recently Robert and Saar (2012) used the concept of 'double status positions' when talking about students who are engaged concomitantly in work and learning. Wolbers tried to determine whether being in a double status position was a step for young people towards stable employment or it was rather a kind of trap that placed young people in a persistent precarious working condition. He concluded that although double status positions were not a promise to secure, high-skilled jobs, they did act as a bridge between full-time initial education and stable employment for young people, especially regarded in the context of human capital investment that paid off later on (Wolbers 2003. 153.). In a recent study Roulin and Bangerter (2013. 34–35.) explored students' engagement in extra-curricular activities alongside their university studies and found that interest/passion, well-being, continuation of something started earlier in life, meeting other people, helping people, acquiring practical experience and the fact that it will look good on their résumé were all part of students' motives for engaging in extra-curricular activities. Although these studies drew attention to the important fact that students, while enrolled in full time university courses, participated in other types of events as well, they neglected to present the multifaceted and complex nature of all the activities students were engaged in. Elsewhere (Plugor 2016) I have argued that these is a need for academic studies and discussions to catch up with the realities of student life, as university students were not living in a dualistic world of studies and work or studies and extra-curricular activities, they were actually engaged in more than one or two extra activities alongside their studies and therefore multiple status positions (MSP) was a more appropriate term to describe their university status and experiences. In that paper I presented the different activities these students were engaged in and among those was the double academic status (DAS) which denoted students studying concurrently for two different degrees. In the literature various names and various definitions have been used to denote this status: joint degrees, double degrees, dual-degree programmes, combined degrees etc. Russell and colleagues (2008. 576.) defined double (dual, joint or combined) degrees as "undergraduate courses involving two bachelor degrees studied concomitantly over approximately five or six years" during which students receive "a 'discount' in terms of credit and time compared with the sum of two degrees". Or as Culver (2011. 42.) explained "dual-degree programs are undergraduate or graduate degrees in the same or similar subject area awarded by two or more institutions to students who have met the degree completion requirements for all participating institutions… their overarching objective has been to better prepare graduates to work in a global job market by imparting a more profound and extensive international awareness to them." See Knight (2011) for a full description about the various names and definitions used.

Research on student experiences of dual, joint, combined degrees proved to be surprisingly scarce even though there have been offerings of degree combinations for more than 30 years (Malone 1985; Wimshurst–Manning 2015). There has been considerably more attention on researching double and/or joint degrees in Australia (Russell–Dolnicar–Ayoub 2008; Hickey–Sumsion–Harrison 2010; Wimshurst–Manning 2015) than in other parts of the world, but even in that context the main focus was more on programme rationales, administrative

problems, structures, and the supposed career 'head start' that double degree graduates might have compared to their colleagues who graduated with single degrees (Wimshurst – Manning 2015. 2.) and not necessarily on the student experience itself (except Weissmann 2013).

In this paper DAS refers to those students who concomitantly are enrolled in two separate degree programmes. Also included in this category are those students who already completed a degree course and decided to enrol for a second same level degree; while those students who after completing an undergraduate degree decided to continue their studies within the same field at masters level were not included in DAS. The definition used in this paper for DAS is similar to how double degrees are also perceived in the literature. Nevertheless, while double degrees enjoyed some level of integration, institutional framework and structure, albeit it differed between institutions and even fields of study within the same institution, in DAS in the Romanian context there is no institutional framework or integration of the two programmes of study. To the best of my knowledge no previous research exists specifically about DAS students, especially not in the Romanian context and for this reason I use the experiences of double/joint degree students as comparisons.

Methodology

The field research was conducted in May-August 2011 and March-May 2012. In order to gain access to students and to collect some basic data about them and their university life I used an online questionnaire which was sent to final year BA and MA students (non-representative sample) via relevant gatekeepers (heads of career services, officials at the student services departments, lecturers and departmental managers and tutors at both universities). The online questionnaire included a series of questions relating to the students' age, ethnicity, gender, subjective social status, parents' and siblings' higher education experience, motivation for choice of university, subject studied, future plans, views on their university experience and engagement in extra-curricular activities. At the end of the questionnaire students were asked to provide their contact details if they wished to elaborate further their experiences in a face-to-face interview. A total of 181 (out of which 38 DAS) students responded to the online survey and the cases were analysed using IBM SPSS Statistics 22. Descriptive statistics were computed to gain insight into the frequency distributions of responses, and Chi-squares were used to determine whether there was a significant relationship between the independent variables (age, gender, subject studied, socio-economic status, home location, etc) and the dependent variable (DAS).

Similarly to Clandinin and Connelly (2000. 19.) I believed that "educational experience should be studied narratively" and I felt that prompting for narratives in life history interviews with students could add important layers to understanding their experiences, their motivations, feelings and plans and facilitated the exploration of the interplay between structure and agency as embedded in students' narratives. Through these narratives one could also gain a glimpse of how student experience as a phase of life was politically and socially constructed and we could describe their practices while preserving their voices. I gained narrative accounts from 29 (out of which 8 DAS) students, which were transcribed verbatim and then analysed in NVivo 10. For the qualitative analysis I combined two types of narrative analysis in order to present a holistic picture of the student experiences in the higher education contexts. Firstly, I carried out content analysis (Lieblich – Tuval-Mashiach – Zilber 1998), focusing on the events and

experiences recounted in the narrative, and I complemented it with structure or form analysis (Cortazzi 1993; Riessman 2008), looking at how the stories were put together. The purpose of the analysis was to gain a detailed understanding of student experiences and the context in which their experiences and their decision-making occurred (for a full account of methods used see Plugor 2013, 2015). In the following in the results section I present first the university to situate my study within an institutional and national context, then I focus on the results of the quantitative analysis of the survey data to indicate some of the significant factors in determining whether a student becomes DAS, and finally I present the experiences and perceptions of DAS students as it emerged from the qualitative analysis. With this analysis my ultimate aim was to gain answers for the following questions: who are those students who opt to become DAS?; when, why and how do they make this decision?; what are their experiences of being DAS?; and what role does DAS play (if any) in these students' planned future careers?

Results

The university context

Situated in the north-western part of Transylvania, the city where the chosen university was represented the most popular city for university studies after the country capital, attracting annually around 70,000 students (Statistical Yearbook – Romania 2007. 23.). The chosen University was one of the 56 state HE institutions including universities, academies, polytechnic universities and institutes that operated in Romania along with the 35 accredited private institutions and 21 provisionally approved HE institutions (Bologna Report – Romania 2012. 2.). This University was part of a small group of so-called 'Level 1' universities in Romania, which could be considered models for other institutions across the country (EUA 2001. 22.). The university was one of the six public universities in the city, it had a multicultural and multilingual character teaching courses in Romanian, Hungarian and other European languages.

While some universities discourage their students to take on extra activities which would use up a significant amount of their time, the Romanian University, according to its official policies and guidelines (Romanian University 2013. 3.), allowed students to be concomitantly registered for two degrees, as it was seen as one of the fundamental rights of being a student. According to the Romanian *Law of National Education* (2011. 33.), a student "can be admitted and enrolled concomitantly in a maximum of two degrees, independent of the institution". The university where I did my research offered four types of incentives for DAS students: 1. financially these students benefited from a significant reduction of their fees (between 25-100%) depending on which departments they opted for; 2. the student could transfer some of his/her module credits from one department to the other; 3. the student benefited from reduced attendance to seminars; 4. the students could work on an interdisciplinary dissertation having supervisors from both departments. While joint degrees were common within the Romanian higher education field, the potential for DAS, embedded in the university habitus was present only at this university. This Romanian context differed from the double or joint degrees present elsewhere as there was no institutional framework for DAS. The students applied, attended and completed one degree separate from the other. They were enrolled as full time students in two different departments and there was no communication at departmental level about the student. Essentially these students had two full time academic statuses, hence the term DAS to describe them.

Which students engage in DAS?

It is not known how many students at the Romanian university were engaged in double academic status, but in the online questionnaire that students completed (not representative of all the students enrolled at the university) 21.3% of the respondents stated that they were either enrolled in two degrees at that time or they already had a university degree and were studying for a second one. The majority of the students who filled in the online survey were females (69%), the mean age was 22.9 (s = 1.5). Hungarian students were in slight majority (58.2%) compared to Romanian students (41.8%) and most of the students (80.7%) came from other counties within Romania, only 19.3% were from the same county as the university. Around one in three students had a parent or sibling with higher education experience, while if we included their partners as well, then the number increased to two out of three having someone in their vicinity with HE experience. The students were asked to rank themselves on a socio-economic scale (from 1 to 10) compared to their fellow students and the mean score was 5.2 (s=1.3), while 75 percentile of the students placed themselves slightly above the middle, at position 6.

Seven out of ten students (70.9%) were studying an occupationally-oriented subject (business, sociology, politics, economics, computer sciences), two out of ten (20.6%) a discipline-based academic subject (geography, languages, history), while less than one out of ten (8.6%) were enrolled studying for a specialist vocational subject (law, engineering). Most of the students were enrolled at undergraduate level (75%) and correspondingly their highest educational qualification was the school leaving degree (60.1%), while the rest of them were in possession of an undergraduate degree (35.0%) or a masters degree (4.9%) already.

Table 1 below displays the socio-demographic characteristics of students either studying for one degree or being in a form of DAS. A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between the socio-demographic variables and students' engagement in DAS. The relationship between age and DAS was significant, χ^2 (2, N=181) = 26.02, p<0.001, older students were more likely to be engaged in DAS than their younger colleagues. Based on the odds ratio, the odds of older students of being in DAS was 5.66 times higher than if they were younger than 22 years of age. Similarly, the relationship between ethnicity and DAS was also significant, χ^2 (2, N=181) = 6.50, p<0.05, Hungarian students were more likely to be studying for a second degree or studying concomitantly for two degrees, while their Romanian colleagues were more likely to be enrolled for only one degree. If a student was of Hungarian ethnicity the odds of being in DAS was 2.69 times higher than if they were Romanians. The other socio-demographic variables (gender, parental HE experience, socio-economic status, home location) did not display a statistically significant relationship with DAS.

Table 1. ❖ *Students' academic status by socio-demographic characteristics (N=181); % / (n)*

		One degree	DAS		All students within category
			One degree (but already in possession of a degree)	Two degrees	
Ethnicity*	Romanian	86.7% (65)	6.7% (5)	6.7% (5)	100% (75)
	Hungarian	70.8% (75)	12.3% (13)	17.0% (18)	100% (106)
Age***	22 or younger	90.5% (86)	0.0% (0)	9.5% (9)	100% (95)
	23 or older	62.8% (54)	20.9% (18)	16.3% (14)	100% (86)

		One degree	DAS		All students within category
			One degree (but already in possession of a degree)	Two degrees	
Gender	Female	80.8% (101)	8.8% (11)	10.4% (13)	100% (125)
	Male	69.6% (39)	12.5% (7)	17.9% (10)	100% (56)
Parental HE experience	Yes	73.9% (51)	11.6% (8)	14.5% (10)	100% (69)
	No	79.5% (89)	8.9% (10)	11.6% (13)	100% (112)
Sibling HE experience	Yes	71.2% (52)	13.7% (10)	15.1% (11)	100% (73)
	No	81.5% (88)	7.4% (8)	11.1% (12)	100% (108)
Partner HE experience	Yes	78.4% (58)	10.8% (8)	10.8% (8)	100% (74)
	No	76.6% (82)	9.3% (10)	14.0% (15)	100% (107)
Home	Same county	82.4% (28)	2.9% (1)	14.7% (5)	100% (34)
	Different county	75.9% (110)	11.7% (17)	12.4% (18)	100% (179)
Socio-economic status	Low	82.7% (43)	9.6% (5)	7.7% (4)	100% (52)
	Middle	81.8% (45)	10.9% (6)	7.3% (4)	100% (55)
	High	70.3% (52)	9.5% (7)	20.3% (15)	100% (74)
All students		77.3% (140)	9.9% (18)	12.7% (23)	100% (181)

Note: *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

Contrary to previous studies on similar topics (Russell – Dolnicar – Ayoub 2008) which displayed a predominance among female students for double degrees, in my sample (even though not statistically significant) males were present in higher numbers among those who were doing two degrees simultaneously as well as among those who were studying for a second degree, already having finished the first one. Controlling for age, I got the same results, male students were overrepresented in both the younger and the older student categories compared to their female colleagues.

Table 2 presents the characteristics related to students' educational background and students' engagement in DAS. The relationship between highest degree obtained by students and DAS was significant – χ^2 (4, N=181) = 37.032, p<0.001 – students who possessed MA degrees were more likely to be studying for a second degree or studying concomitantly for two degrees, while their colleagues who had a school leaving diploma were more likely to be enrolled for only one

degree. Based on the odds ratio, if a student had an UG or MA degree the odds of being in DAS was 2.71 times higher than if they had only a school leaving diploma; while if they already had an MA degree the odds of being in DAS was 4.72 times higher than if they had a lower degree.

While subject studied did not seem to display a significant relationship with DAS, whether students paid fees or not did seem to matter; χ^2 (2, N=179) = 9.19, p<0.01. Those students who paid fees were more likely to be studying for a second degree or studying concomitantly for two degrees, while their colleagues who enjoyed free university education were more likely to be enrolled for only one degree. Based on the odds ratio, if a student was paying fees the odds of being in DAS was 3.21 times higher than if they were in a state funded university place.

Table 2. ❖ *Students' academic status by educational characteristics (N=181); % / (n)*

			DAS		
		One degree	**One degree (but already in possession of a degree)**	**Two degrees**	**All students within category**
Highest degree (school)***	School leaving degree	84.4% (92)	0.9% (1)	14.7% (16)	100% (109)
	Higher (UG/MA) degree	66.7% (48)	23.6% (17)	9.7% (7)	100% (72)
Highest degree (MA)***	MA degree	44.4% (4)	55.6% (5)	0% (0)	100% (9)
	Lower degree	79.1% (136)	7.6% (13)	13.4% (23)	100% (172)
Fees**	Pays fees	58.3% (21)	16.7% (6)	25.0% (9)	100% (36)
	Does not pay fees	81.8% (117)	8.4% (12)	9.8% (14)	100 (143)
Subject	Discipline-based academic subject	77.8% (28)	8.3% (3)	13.9% (5)	100% (36)
	Occupationally-oriented route	76.4% (94)	9.8% (12)	13.8% (17)	100% (123)
	Specialist-vocational subject	100% (15)	0% (0)	0% (0)	100% (15)
All students		77.3% (140)	9.9% (18)	12.7% (23)	100% (181)

Note: *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

Although not statistically significant, it is probably worth mentioning that male students, with parents or siblings with HE experience seemed to be more keen to do another degree than their colleagues; and similarly students coming from outside the county to pursue their studies appeared to be staying on and enrolling for another degree in higher numbers than their colleagues; while opting to do two degrees concomitantly seemed to be higher among the higher

socio-economic status students, so these relationships could potentially be other significant indicators of DAS and would benefit from further analysis on representative samples. As the focus of the present paper is more on the experiences and views of students I will not present more in-depth analysis on the factors that determined DAS, but these are available if requested. In the following, using the qualitative data gathered in the study, I explore the reasons why students opted for DAS, their perceptions regarding this position and its role in their studies and future career plans.

When and why do students do DAS?

Additional knowledge and gaining specific skills, which would make them more employable were the main reasons given in previous studies for students opting for joint / double degrees (see Russell – Dolnicar – Ayoub 2008; Wimshurst – Manning 2015). In contrast in my study students spoke about being driven by intrinsic reasons like: interest, disappointment with previous course, needing to fill time wisely as well as taking advantage of a financial opportunity. Students displayed different reasons based on when they started their second activity. Previous studies rarely focused on timing of the joint / double status and understandably the reason could be because those students started their degrees at the same time. In my study, due to the fact that one course was independent from the other at my chosen university, the timing of students entering DAS was crucial and it was intertwined with their reasons for opting for DAS.

Two students opted to enrol in two courses at the same time in their first year (Székelyboy and Andreea) and their motivations were predominantly financial. Székelyboy[1] opted for the two courses before the admission process started, not as a result of it as was the case with Andreea. He thought he would not gain admittance to his first choice course and he accepted the scholarship offered by the Theology department: if a student was enrolled at their department and in parallel was a student on a different course, then the department would pay for that student's tuition fees. So in essence the student would benefit from attending two courses without paying tuition fees. Andreea[2] ended up in DAS as a result of the admission process as she did not secure a state funded place at her first choice course, while she did in her second choice. She knew that if she opted for both the university would give her a tuition fee discount, so she decided to take advantage of this opportunity.

Előd and SMRE started their second courses after the first year. Előd[3] was disappointed by the lack of practical experiences in his Politics course and he decided to study Law as it was an area he was interested in and he could see how he would be able combine the two fields together. He chose to study Law at a New University partly because he wanted to learn Romanian, but also because he wanted to be surrounded by people similar to him, with Hungarian mother language and studying in Romanian. For SMRE[4] his first course was Economics, while his second was Theology. He liked what he was learning in his Economics course and felt that lecturers were well-prepared and the theoretical aspects of the field were covered and also practical examples

[1] Székelyboy is male, Hungarian, age 21, no one with HE experience, position 3 on socio-economic scale, 2nd year studying occupationally-oriented subject & 2nd year studying discipline-based academic subject.

[2] Andreea is female, Romanian, age 23, parents & siblings with HE experience, position 8 on socio-economic scale, 3rd year studying occupationally-oriented subjects.

[3] Előd is male, Hungarian, age 23, parents & siblings with HE experience, position 8 on socio-economic scale, 3rd year studying occupationally-oriented subject & 1st year studying specialist vocational subject.

[4] SMRE is male, Hungarian, age 23, parents & siblings with HE experience, position 7 on socio-economic scale, 3rd year studying occupationally-oriented subject & 2nd year studying discipline-based academic subject.

mentioned. He also praised the extra-curricular activities organised by the department as he saw these as good skills-enhancing opportunities, but felt that these were not for everyone and consequently thought that there should be more practical focus in the curricula and not just in the extra activities. He explained opting for theology with his family background and the presence of a financial opportunity (the scholarship). His parents worked for the department so he has always been surrounded with theology-related topics, and additionally the scholarship which the department offered seemed a good option.

Eliza[5], Pacheco[6] and Blanka[7] all opted for the second degree while in the final year of the first one and Ercsi[8] after graduating from her first degree and while doing a Masters. All four opted for the second degree due to interest, but while for Pacheco this was the only reason, both Blanka and Eliza opted for the second degree because they were disappointed by their first choice and felt that it was not connected to their chosen career paths. Blanka felt that she would not be able to cope in the world of work with an International Relations European Studies degree so she decided to opt for something which was more practical and also interested her for a long time, Sociology. Similarly, Eliza also started her second degree because she was disappointed by her first choice, not feeling Economics was "her world" although she did appreciate the mentality and the worldview she got from her course. Pacheco decided to opt for Geography as his second course, on top of studying Tourism. His rationale was different, he was finally pursuing his interests and during the interview he kept emphasizing that it was not the same as studying for two different courses. Ercsi opted for the double status position after graduating from her Economics degree as she was starting her MA course because she knew she would have spare time and thought she could spend it better ({ne töltsem potyára itt az időt…}) by opting for a second degree. Her second option was Geography as it was an area she was interested in.

Overall, students who engaged in double academic status in their first year opted for the position either because of the financial advantages or because they were not prepared to opt for just one subject, one career option at that moment in time. Those students who opted for the second degree later, in their second or third years made a conscious choice of doing something different or something extra mainly because they realised that their first option was not entirely fulfilling. Students talked about the challenges of combining the two degrees both from a time management perspective and in terms of the curricula, but generally highlighted that they were able to fulfil both commitments.

What is students' experience of DAS?

As others have also noted (see Russell–Dolnicar–Ayoub 2008), students have mixed feelings when asked about their experiences and opinion about DAS. They highlight the various positive aspects (broader worldview, more knowledge, extra skills, more people) but also the

[5] Eliza is female, Hungarian, age 22, parents with HE experience, position 4 on socio-economic scale, 3rd year & 1st year studying occupationally-oriented subjects.

[6] Pacheco is male, Hungarian, age 25, no one with HE experience, position 7 on socio-economic scale, 3rd year BA studying discipline-based academic subject & 2nd year MA studying occupationally-oriented subject, already in possession of a BA degree in occupationally-oriented subject.

[7] Blanka is female, Hungarian, age 24, siblings with HE experience, position 7 on socio-economic scale, 3rd year BA & 2nd year MA studying occupationally-oriented subjects, already in possession of a BA degree in occupationally-oriented subject.

[8] Ercsi is female, Hungarian, age 24, no one with HE experience, position 5 on socio-economic scale, 3rd year studying discipline-based academic subject, already in possession of a BA & an MA degree in occupationally-oriented subjects.

considerable challenges they encountered (time constrains, workload, conflicting expectations, administrative difficulties).

Andreea found both courses useful and was able to use the knowledge gained in one course at the other, but her preference remained the Communication & PR and she was planning to continue studying for a Masters in that area. Juggling between the two courses and marrying the two timetables for her did not seem a difficult task. She was aware that the university requirement of lecture and seminar attendance was lower for students who were enrolled in two courses and she negotiated her course attendance with her lecturers. The busiest and most difficult periods were the exams for her, because during the three weeks she had to study and pass more than ten modules. She took advantage of an incentive which the university system 'gave' to students enrolled in two courses: students had the option to have their final grades from one department equated at the other department, they did not need to attend similar modules in the two courses, nor pass exams in those.

Pacheco also used this option and had several of his modules equated, so his workload was not as high as for students studying at different departments and the amount of support received from his lecturers was also greater because they already knew him and 'he belonged' to that department. As he stated: "They overlooked if I didn't go to classes, they overlooked if I didn't submit my assignments in time, they overlooked if I didn't take my exams when the others did and I could negotiate a different date. They were absolutely flexible in this respect." For him the difficulty was that he needed to write his undergraduate and his postgraduate dissertation at the same time and he had to juggle the deadlines his lecturers gave him. But he saw the two as complementary and he was planning to engage in PhD studies and in an academic career. From this perspective he was similar to the girls, Eliza and Blanka, as he used his second degree for future career reasons.

Eliza did not feel that combining the two courses was very difficult due to the nature of the field and the courses, she did however complain about the rigidity of some lecturers and how she was penalised when she was not able to prepare for a course. Ercsi mentioned that although lecturers understood her situation, they did comment that it was not beneficial for her to "ride two horses at the same time {két lovat egyszerre megnyergelni}…" and she mentioned that it was a very busy period and her grades were not very good but she managed to pass all her exams. Although there were university policies in place for double academic status students, much depended on the department and especially on individual lecturers how they treated students in these situations. In Ercsi and Eliza's case the departments they were attending were less keen on having double status students.

Other departments (like Theology) on top of the special arrangements for DAS students at university level, at departmental level they were supportive and understanding of students enrolled in two courses when designing the course timetable and with essay deadlines or exams. For Székelyboy attending courses and passing exams did not seem to be problematic, but he mentioned that he struggled with the different epistemological positions of the two fields. He was the only student to talk about this aspect, possibly not surprising as similarly to the Australian students in the Wimshurst and Manning (2015) study, the students I interviewed also regarded their two degrees separately. They spoke about them individually as disciplines that offer them a set of skills and knowledge, but there were no attempts from their part to consider achieving an epistemological balance between fields and/or worldviews. Both Andreea and Székelyboy talked about how they found the double aspects of their experiences interesting, how they were able

to use or not use the knowledge gained in one course to help them in the other. They both liked above all the practical experiences which they had and felt they learned the most from those. Apart from doing two courses at the same time they were also engaged in other activities at the student union which they found beneficial both for their studies and their futures.

Blanka and Előd drew the most comparisons between their two courses. Blanka felt that there was a disproportionate focus on history topics that lecturers were familiar with and the course structure lacked modules about international relations and European studies. She also felt that she was not able to see the connection between what she was studying and how she could use it in the world of work as there were hardly any practical experiences organised. The sociology course on the other hand was more practice-oriented, she enjoyed studying it more, felt the lecturers were more approachable and they focused on presenting the practical aspects of the subject too, consequently she could see the practical use of what she was doing, she was more engaged in extra-curricular activities as well and she was planning to continue to focus on this field in the future. She engaged in double academic status as she felt that she had the extra time to devote to something she was interested in and as she found where her interests lied she became more engaged in extra-curricular activities too. Előd enjoyed his experiences in the New University more as it was an environment similar to the Waldorf School in which he grew up. He had a deep sense of community feeling, the social aspects of his studies were equally important as the knowledge that he gained by studying. He described the New University as "colourful" compared to the "grey" Old University. He mentioned the several benefits of doing the two courses and he projected his future as continuing with both and focusing on aspects that "have a bit of both in them". Similarly to Előd, SMRE also highlighted that it was not difficult to combine his studies and that he enjoyed the different world-views the subjects offered. Wimshurst and Manning (2015) and Weissmann (2013) noted in their studies that although the students they interviewed were enrolled in double/joint degrees where they were supposed to receive an integrated experience of studying two different degrees, these students actually had to arrive at their own understanding of complementarity as it was not provided to them through the course.

Was DAS beneficial?

It was visible how the whole HE/university field in Romania was constructed and operated in a way to enable students to study for two degrees at the same time. Although the benefits for the university were not known specifically, it is possible that since a student was registered at two departments, the university counted them two times when reporting about the overall number of students registered at the university. In addition the student needed to pay a certain amount for the possibility to do two degrees at the same time, which although is a reduced rate, if there was no such opportunity then students would graduate only from one degree, so it would not be financially beneficial for the university. Students regard the possibility for DAS as a normal part of the HE system in Romania and were open about their positions. They told their lecturers and used the DAS to negotiate their levels of engagement with the course. Lecturers seemed supportive as they gave them absences or accepted delayed papers, although some might have been opinionated, like in Ercsi's case or inflexible, like in Eliza's case. DAS with all its implications was part of the university habitus.

All students highlighted the benefits of being in DAS. All of them spoke about the academic side, about what interested them and how DAS allowed them to build on those interests and

shape their future career plans, similarly to the students in Russell and colleagues' study (2008. 582.) who highlighted the benefits in "mixing subjects and the associated diversity of perspectives and range of teaching styles". The students in my study also spoke about the monetary benefits while others focused more on the emotional side and the sense of belonging and community which they experienced with DAS. The main disadvantages that students highlighted, similarly to Russell and colleagues' students (2008), were the increased workload particularly in the exams periods and clashes in timetables, but some of them spoke also about epistemological and theoretical differences between the subjects. Apart from the Theology department, which had a departmental policy to help DAS students, none of the other departments offered administrative or other kinds of support to the students so they were left to negotiate clashes in timetables and exams with individual lecturers and tutors. This was a problem mentioned in other studies as well (Russell – Dolnicar – Ayoub 2008).

Because these students were still studying and not in the labour market yet, the benefits of DAS for their future work was not possible to ascertain. Other studies, like Russell and colleagues (2008. 580.) found that only half of double degree alumni found their degrees beneficial in their jobs. In terms of career plans and awareness about their skills and how they could capitalize on them, Russell's students highlighted that they would have benefited from tailored guidance and focus on their employability skills. The students in my study, particularly those who opted for DAS later in their studies because they were dissatisfied with their previous choice, had clearer ideas about what future career plans they had and what role the second degree and DAS played in that. Blanka and Pacheco were planning to continue their studies building on their second choice subject, Előd, Ercsi and Székelyboy were planning to combine both degrees in their career plans and were hoping that DAS will represent an advantage when looking for jobs. Most of the students spoke about their two degrees as completely separate, only Székelyboy and Ercsi were planning to combine both in their future careers. This resonates with what Russell and colleagues (2008) also found, that most of their respondents experienced the two degrees separately, not 'fitting together'. These students highlighted that they would have benefitted from cross-disciplinary, trans-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary subjects to help them link the two, which also coincides with what Wimshurst and Manning (2015. 15.) proposed: "introducing (structured) integrative activities into combined degrees" so that students could understand and explore the conceptual connections.

Conclusion

In this paper my intention was to complement the existing literature on higher education student experiences by highlighting the existence of double academic statuses – DAS – using the example of a university in Romania. Although there were no official figures, based on the findings from an online survey (which was not representative of all the students enrolled at the university) it seemed that DAS was a practice that had an impact on a significant proportion of the students, 21.3% of the respondents stated that they were either enrolled in two degrees at that time or they already had a university degree and were studying for a second one. Further analysis exposed that Hungarian and older (23+) students seemed more likely to be involved in DAS, and similarly also students whose highest degree at the time of asking was a university degree, and those who were paying university fees for their studies were more likely to be in

DAS than their colleagues. The latter was not surprising given the fact that only one university place could be exempt from fees in the Romanian system, but the fact that the likelihood of DAS increased with the level of degree students reported having was an interesting finding. It would seem that for a significant proportion of students the practice was to gain multiple undergraduate and postgraduate degrees, a thought echoed by Blanka during her interview:

> *I graduated from my BA and then came the Masters and I enrolled to the same department because, a normal person… if they didn't like the BA then they wouldn't go to the MA… but I went because if I'm here in [name of the city] because of the sociology course then I of course continue doing the Masters because that's an extra paper, an extra qualification… so this was my thinking… because it's not very difficult, it's not much effort knowledge-wise and time-wise to finish the Masters, it looks good that I completed 2 cycles of the same…*

As we saw from the narrative analysis, this was largely due to the fact that students were dissatisfied and disillusioned with their first choice of subject and were looking for alternative career options. This practice was similar to the 'fishing for activities' mentioned by Brooks and Everett (2008. 383.) or the trendsetters of du Bois-Reymond's (2004), but these students were rather 'fishing' for one different activity within the formal education sphere and not various activities outside of the curriculum to engage in. These were the students who reported being dissatisfied with their studies and wanted to change and learn something different (Blanka, Előd, Pacheco and Eliza). From this perspective DAS became an escape route for students who realised that they made the wrong choice with their first degree. But also emerging from their narratives was a realisation that actually DAS was highly beneficial for their future careers as it was part of their *economy of experience (*Roulin – Bangerter 2013. 25*.)* that could be used as a tactic by students to distinguish themselves from their peers in the increased competition in the labour market (Brown – Hesketh 2004; Brown – Lauder – Ashton 2011). Overall, this strategy of 'fishing for' activities (Brooks – Everett 2008. 383.) or engaging in DAS and in MSP, seems to be on the raise and it could quickly become the contemporary student experience and mode of learning.

My study did not aim to specifically target students in DAS positions nor was this status the sole interest for the research, but it became an emerging topic shortly after beginning the field research. Conducting research on bigger and representative samples of students in Romania as well as more in-depth analysis specifically on DAS would provide more fruitful information both for academia and policy audiences. In this paper I did not have space to reflect more on the prevalence of students' 'sense of belonging', but this was apparent when students were selecting a subject and place of study, but also with regard to what activities they chose to be part of and which they disregarded or they gave up as it 'didn't feel right', and similarly with respect to where they could see themselves working and living in the future. Future research should explore students' attachment and detachment to places and communities. ✻

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Empowering Hungarian Ethno-Linguistic Minorities in Central- and Eastern Europe

Abstract The paper adopts the position that language is an intrinsic and largely non-negotiable part of individual culture and identity. The recognition of one's own language receives more and more support in international political and institutional frameworks. The promotion of linguistic diversity has become the official policy of the European Union. Due to such policies it is to be expected that languages will be and will remain in contact in the context of all sorts of levels of governance. In order to manage linguistic diversity in multilingual and multicultural areas the introduction of a global regime of language policies is unavoidable. These policies will need to satisfy transnational requirements and conditions, like universal human rights and Europeanization norms and standards set by the EU, OSCE, Council of Europe, and so on. However, because there are manifold connections between language and power, as we know from the work of the well-known political scientists, like Pierre Bourdieu, and sociolinguists. The latter claims that conflict has always a language element to it.[1] Hence, it is to be expected that language policies will be subject to power conflicts and hegemonic strives. In order to support my claim I will analyse the language policies of states with Hungarian language minorities in Central Europe, particularly Romania, Slovakia, Serbia (Vojvodina), and Ukraine (Trans-Carpathia). These policies can be studied in terms of concrete variables, like individual/collective rights, territorial or personal arrangements, thresholds, the Language Charter, multilingual education, the linguistic landscape, and so on. The range in which these variables are implemented is determined by local politics. Hence, this is subject to the politics of language policy. The ordering of these variables and vectors result into a typology of language policy representing a categorization of liberal language rights for minorites.

Keywords multilingualism, politics of diversity, typology of language policy, empowerment of Hungarian language minorities, Central Europe

DOI 10.14232/belv.2016.2.2 http://dx.doi.org/10.14232/belv.2016.2.2

Cikkre való hivatkozás / How to cite this article: Marácz, László (2016): Empowering Hungarian Ethno-Linguistic Minorities in Central- and Eastern Europe. Belvedere Meridionale vol. 28. no. 2. 21–37. pp

ISSN 1419-0222 (print) ISSN 2064-5929 (online, pdf)

www.belvedere-meridionale.hu

[1] Nelde 1995.

Hungarian Minority Languages

Hungarian in the Carpathian Macroregion

In 1867, the Hungarian kingdom became an autonomous entity within the Habsburg Empire. As a consequence, the Hungarian language became the official state language and functioned also as a language of regional communication. In the Hungarian parts of the Habsburg Empire, the Nationality Law XLIV (1868) resulted into a hierarchy of the regional languages of communication stipulating that Hungarian is the language of the state but it did allow the use of any other (regional) vernacular language as an official language at the local level, both in governmental administration, judiciary, church organizations, and in education.[2] This state of affairs lasted until the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the First World War.

Due to the peace treaties ending the First World War, including the Treaty of Trianon (1920)[3], the Hungarian language functioned as the state language in the truncated kingdom of Hungary, while it received a minority status in the newly established or enlarged states of Central and Eastern Europe, i.e. Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Austria. Due to the nationalist climate of the Interwar period the borders in Central Europe became closed. Hence, the Hungarian language remained in all areas outside Hungary a local vernacular language being formally granted a minority status.[4] However, even these minority language rights were hardly realized in practice. Because of the fact that Czechoslovakia seceded its easternmost parts to Soviet Ukraine a Hungarian ethnic minority came into existence in Ukraine as well after the Second World War. The situation characterized by isolation in the Interwar period remained more or less unchanged during the Cold War. Only at the end of the Soviet period cross-border traffic increased and the Hungarian language started to develop into a regional vernacular language.

Due to the collapse of communism and the new state formation in Central and Eastern Europe ethnic Hungarians have come to live in eight different countries in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Republic of Hungary (10,558,001), Romania (1,604,266), Serbia (339,491), Croatia (22,355), Slovenia (7,637), Austria (6,763), Slovakia (567,296) and Ukraine (155,711).[5] Compare the following table based on the census data of 1991:

1. ÁBRA ❖ *Ethnic Hungarians in the states of the Carpathian Macroregion*

	Carpathian Macroregion
Hungary	10,558,001
Slovakia	567,296
Ukraine	155,711
Romania	1,604,266
Serbia (Vojvodina)	339,491
Croatia	22,355
Slovenia	7,637
Austria	6,763
Total	13,261,520

Source: Kocsis – Kocsis-Hodosi (1995. 17)

[2] The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement no. 613344. See Bideleux – Jeffries 1998; Marácz 2010b. 55–96; and Gal 2011. 1–24.

[3] Compare Teleki 1923; Chaszar 1982. 479–491.; Hupchick – Cox 2001; Goldstein 2002. 31–33.; Bowman 1923.

[4] See Van Der Plank 2004.

[5] Marácz 1999. 69–91.; Van Der Plank 2004; Fenyvesi 2005; Gal 2008. 207–232.

Recall that ethnic Hungarians who live in all these states are autochthonous inhabitants of the region. In present days the former Hungarian parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire almost match with the so-called Carpathian Macroregion that is being surrounded by the Carpathian Mountains.[6] This region is defined by specific geographical, common socio-cultural, ecological and linguistic features.[7] It has been observed that there is a characteristic geo-ethno-linguistic distribution and diversity of the languages spoken in the Carpathian Macroregion. In table 2, the most important ethno-linguistic groups are listed based on the census data of 2001.[8]

Table 2 ❖ *Geo-ethno-linguistic distribution in the Carpathian Macroregion*

Group	Number	Percentage
Hungarians	11,706,000	39.7
Romanians	5,464,000	18.5
Slovaks	4,716,000	16.0
Croats	2,828,000	9.6
Serbs	1,497,000	5.1
Russians/Ukrainians	1,125,000	3.8
Roma	579,000	2.0
Germans	372,000	1.3
Slovenes	82,000	0.3
Czechs	60,000	0.2
Montenegrins	38,000	0.1
Russians	33,000	0.1
Bosnyaks	27,000	0.1
Others	105,000	0.4
Unknown	828,000	2.8

Source: Kocsis – Bottlik – Tátrai 2006. 28.

Table 2 demonstrates that the biggest ethno-linguistic group in the Carpathian Macroregion is the ethnic Hungarians, i.e. ethnic Hungarians have a relative majority of almost forty percent. It has been noted that there is a strong correlation between ethnicity and the mother-tongue or L1 spoken in this region.[9] The L1 of ethnic Hungarians in the Carpathian Macroregion is Hungarian; the L1 of ethnic Romanians is Romanian, and so forth. However, the reverse of this correlation does not have to be true. An L1-speaker of Hungarian can be a person of non-

[6] Teleki 1923; Marácz 2009. 117–118.

[7] The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) has arranged a special status for the region of the Carpathian Mountains which is a territory with a specific biodiversity in Central and Eastern Europe (see website: <http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/where_we_work/black_sea_basin/danube_carpathian/>, 9 June 2012). In 1998, the WWF has founded the Carpathian EcoRegion Initiative (CERI) that is an international coalition of NGOs and research institutes working towards a common vision and sustainable developments in the territory of the Carpathian Mountains. The CERI includes the Carpathian regions of seven different countries covering the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine (see website: <www.carpates.org>, 9 June 2012).

[8] Kocsis – Bottlik – Tátrai 2006. 28.

[9] Smith 1991; Brubaker – Feischmidt – Fox – Grancea 2006; Marácz 2009. 117–141; Marácz 2010a. 77–116.

Hungarian ethnicity, and so on. The following table based on the census data of 2001 presents the distribution of the ethnic Hungarians living in the Carpathian Macroregion in the eight different states. The corresponding percentages including ethnic Hungarian minority groups in eight different states are spelled out in table 3 as well:

Table 3 ❖ *Geo-ethno-linguistic distribution in the states of the Carpathian Macroregion*

Territory	Percentage of state nationality	Percentage of national minorities
Hungary	91.2	1.3
Slovakia	85.5	11.5
Sub-Carpathia (Ukraine)	80.5	18.3
Transylvania (Romania)	74.6	23.8
Vojvodina (Serbia)	65.0	26.7
Pannonian/ Slavonian Croatia	90.1	7.7
Mura region (Slovenia)	85.0	9.5
Burgenland (Austria)	87.4	12.5
Carpathian Macroregion	83.7	11.5

Source: Kocsis–Bottlik–Tátrai 2006. 29.

From table 3 it follows that most of the ethnic Hungarians live in the Republic of Hungary where they constitute more than ninety per cent of the population.[10] In all other seven countries ethnic Hungarians form numeric minorities which have legal minority rights. However, they do not enjoy equal rights to the majority nation. The use of the minority language is severely restricted compared to the majority vernaculars, i.e. the languages of the state in the official domains.[11] The Hungarian minority language is subject to language laws that specify the use of the Hungarian language in terms of a threshold in the public domain and in contact with local authorities. This will be discussed in more detail below.

Multilingual Regions with Hungarian Minorities

Ethno-linguistic Hungarian communities live mostly in compact territories bordering to the Hungarian kin-state.[12] In Slovakia, almost the entire ethno-linguistic Hungarian group lives in the southern parts of the country in a stroke of thirty kilometres along the border with Hungary that is 681 kilometres long.[13] Although the ethnic Hungarians form a substantial group in Slovakia, i.e. more than ten per cent of its inhabitants counting more than 560.000

[10] See Tóth 2005.

[11] Kontra – Hattyár 2002; Nádor – Szarka 2003.

[12] Schöpflin 1993; Tóth 2004. 14–25.; Kovács – Tóth 2009. 151–176; Batory 2010. 31–48.; Marácz 2009. 77–116.

[13] Szabomihály 2003. 95–110.

people their geographic distribution is rather complex. The ethnic Hungarians do not always have an absolute or relative majority in the areas they live in. In the Sub-Carpathian region (or Trans-Carpathian region seen from Ukraine), the ethnic Hungarian communities are located along the Ukrainian-Hungarian border.[14] In Romania, most of the ethnic Hungarians live in the north-western part of the country, i.e. Transylvania which is a traditional multi-ethnic, multilingual region.[15] In fact, the Hungarian minority in Transylvania lives in the northern part of the area stretching from the Hungarian-Romanian border to the Szeklerland at the feet of the Eastern Carpathians mountains deep into the centre of present-day Romania.[16] In Serbia, the Hungarians live in the northern part of the country, i.e. Vojvodina.[17] In Croatia, the ethnic Hungarian community lives in the Slavonian or Pannonian part of the country.[18] In Slovenia, the ethnic Hungarian community lives in the Mura region and in Austria the Hungarians live in Burgenland.[19] Due to the fact that in these ethnic areas outside Hungary the official language of the states involved, i.e. Slovak, Ukrainian, Romanian, Serbian, Croatian, Slovene, and German is used next to the Hungarian language these areas are multilingual. In fact, all Hungarian speakers are plurilingual speakers using the local Hungarian vernacular and the official language of the state they are citizens of.[20]

The most important factors governing multilingual and transnational communication in the regions with ethnic Hungarian minorities are historical and traditional customs, the role of borders and language policy. Let us discuss first the historical pattern of two types of multilingual and transnational communication.

These two types are opposing each other, including real multilingual or plurilingual communication and separate multilingualism. In the former type non L1-speakers share each other's language. This is illustrated by the communication traditions in the historic region of Vojvodina. This region in the southern part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire has received an autonomous status within the Austro-Hungarian Empire and later on during the twentieth century in the former Yugoslav republic. In Vojvodina, traditionally six languages are being spoken, including Serbian, Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian, Croatian and Ruthenian. Furthermore, there is a tradition for ethnic groups to speak each other's languages or to use a mode of communication like intercomprehension, when both interlocutors speak their L1 and at the same time are able to understand each other's languages.[21] The tradition of multilingual and transnational communication in the region of Transylvania differs from the one in Vojvodina, however. In Transylvania, traditionally three languages are spoken, i.e. Hungarian, Romanian and German. The German variant has been a Saxon dialect that was brought to Transylvania in the early Middle Ages by German settlers from the Mosel area. Here in this region multilingualism has traditionally been a case of "separate" or parallel monolingualism where the three

[14] See Beregszászi – Csernicskó 2003. 110–123.

[15] Cadzow – Ludanyi – Elteto 2005; Péntek – Benő 2003. 123–148; Péntek 2006. 267–273; and see the contribution of Csata, Zsombor in this issue.

[16] Schöpflin 1993.

[17] Korhecz 2009. 1313–1321.

[18] Lábadi 2003. 176–190.

[19] Szarka 2003. 15–37.; Kolláth 2003. 190–204; Szoták 2003. 204–219.

[20] Fenyvesi 2005.

[21] See Korshunova – Marácz 2012. 57–79.

language communities hardly spoke each other's languages.[22] With the exception of a civic and ecclesial regional elite, most of the inhabitants of Transylvania have displayed a monolingual attitude.[23] Separate multilingualism was further strengthened due to the hegemonic relations between the languages involved. Before the First World War Hungarian was the official language in the Hungarian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to which Transylvania also belonged. Standard German also enjoyed an important position because it functioned as the lingua franca in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.[24] Romanian did not receive an official status on the national level but only at the community or regional level.[25] A minimum number of twenty per cent of the speakers had to be speaker of a regional vernacular language in order for that language to be recognized as an official language in a fixed administrative-territorial domain. Although in the Habsburg Empire multilingualism was recognized as a positive value the monolingual attitude became the prevailing one supported by a nationalist language policy. In Transylvania, multilingualism came to be characterized by an asymmetry. L1-speakers of Hungarian mostly also speak Romanian but there are hardly any L1-speakers of Romanian that speak Hungarian.[26] The nation-states in the twentieth century manage their multilingual regions with language policies that are dominated by a monolingual attitude. The hegemonic language, i.e. the official language of the state is often promoted at the expense of so-called minority languages.[27] An exceptional case in the Carpathian Macroregion is the recent language policy of the Autonomous Province (AP) of Vojvodina that can be qualified as "multilingual".[28]

Hence, the Hungarian language in the states with Hungarian minorities has a limited distribution restricted to the areas where the ethnic Hungarians live. These regions, including southern Slovakia, Sub-Carpathia, Transylvania, Vojvodina, Pannonian/Slavonian Croatia, Mura region and Burgenland are traditionally mixed, multilingual areas where you find next to the language of the state, i.e. Slovak, Ukrainian/Ruthenian, Romanian, Serbian, Croatian, Slovene and German especially Hungarian and the languages of various smaller linguistic minorities.

Multilingual and Transnational Communication in Regions with Hungarian Minorities

The linguistic situation is not the same in all of these subregions in the Carpathian Macroregion discussed above. Different factors guide the multilingual and transnational communication in these regions. In this paper, we will adopt Vertovec's concept of "transnationalism". Transnationalism has been studied in detail in the context of globalization in the work of Vertovec.[29] According to Vertovec, transnationalism, or sustained cross-border relationships, are patterns of exchange, affiliations and social formations spanning nation-states.[30] When referring to sustained linkages and ongoing exchanges among non-state actors based across national borders – business, non-government-organizations, and individuals sharing the same interests – we can differentiate these as "transnational". In fact, transnational relations do not only appear in the case of spanning nation-states but they appear also in the case of national or social communities

[22] See Marácz 2010b. 55–96.
[23] See Gal 2011. 1–24.
[24] See Rindler Schjerve 2003.
[25] Marácz 2010b. 55–96.
[26] Brubaker–Feischmidt–Fox–Grancea 2006.
[27] Rindler Schjerve – Vetter 2012. 139.
[28] Hagan 2009.
[29] Vertovec 2010.
[30] Vertovec 2010.2.

speaking different languages.[31] Hence, the border between the communities does not need to be a concrete territorial border, it can also be a virtual one.

Janssens, Mamadouh and Marácz (2011) distinguish two vectors in order to classify languages of communication, i.e. firstly the scope of communication that can be local, regional or global and secondly the language abilities of the interlocutors participating in the communicative event, i.e. mother-tongue (L1) or foreign language speakers (L2). If only L2-speakers are involved in the communicative event and they share the same language, we refer to a regional lingua franca. This results into the following language constellation from the perspective of the Hungarian speakers in the Carpathian Macroregion. Hungarian is a 'transnational regional vernacular' in a wider region: L1-speakers in Hungary, Slovenia, Austria, Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, Serbia and Croatia. The Hungarian language is used by Hungarian minority speakers in order to communicate with Hungarian speakers from Hungary and with the other Hungarian minorities in Central and East European states. The official state language is however used by Hungarian minority speakers – being plurilingual speakers – with the authorities and L1-speakers of the Slovak, Romanian and other Central – and Eastern state languages. L1-speakers of the state languages display a monolingual attitude.[32] Note that this asymmetric relation is a source of conflict. The language of the majority speakers is more powerful than the one the minorities speak and in some countries their language is excluded from the official and public domain. On the other hand, there are a number of non-Hungarian L1-speakers who have developed a receptive competence of Hungarian in the Carpathian Macroregion. Hence, it is expected that the use of communication modes, such as 'intercomprehension' or 'code-switching' will be more frequent. As a consequence, the position of Hungarian as a regional vehicular language is becoming stronger in the Carpathian Macroregion resulting into increasing multilingualism.[33]

Language Policies in the Carpathian Macroregion

In the twentieth century, the language policies towards ethnic and national minorities depended on several different factors. The European nation-states pursued a policy of monolingualism in which the official language of the state enjoyed a stronger, i.e. hegemonic position, than other smaller "minority" languages.[34] This was also the case in all the states of the Carpathian Macroregion, maybe with the exception of former Yugoslavia's Vojvodina, although the position of the Serbo-Croatian lingua franca was clearly promoted across the board, especially in territories where a number of linguistic minorities lived together like in the historic region of Vojvodina.[35] In the period after the collapse of communism a further fragmentation of the system of states in the Carpathian Macroregion took place. As was pointed out above, the Hungarian minorities came to live in seven states, including Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine, Austria, Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia. The language policy with respect to the Hungarian minorities in these states was depending on different factors, like size, reciprocal minorities, the relation of the state with

[31] Vertovec 2010.3.
[32] Brubaker–Feischmidt–Fox–Grancea 2006.
[33] Smith 1991. 172; Vertovec 2010.
[34] Mintzel 1997; Maurais–Morris 2005.
[35] Ivanova 2012. 81–111.

the Hungarian minority and kin-state Hungary and so on.[36] There is a pattern that the larger the size of the Hungarian minority the more difficult it is for the minority to receive minority and language rights from the state these minorities live in. The Hungarians in Transylvania with around 1.5 million official speakers are certainly in a difficult position. The fact that they are the biggest minority group clearly plays a role in the discrimination of their language not being treated as equal to the Romanian state language. Another factor that affects the rights of minorities and minority languages is the fact whether there is a reciprocal minority of comparable size. This is the case between Hungary and Slovenia where on both sides of the border there is a small reciprocal language minority enjoying equal minority and language rights compared to the nationality of the state.[37] A third factor that plays an important role in granting minority rights to Hungarian minority speakers is governed by the relation of the kin-state Hungary and the host country of the Hungarian minority.[38] There is a structural tensed relation between Slovakia and Hungary causing pressure on the Hungarian minority in southern Slovakia.[39] The tensed situation in southern Slovakia affects the relations between Slovakia and Hungary in its turn.

In the grouping of the seven states discussed above two dividing lines appear. First of all, there is a nationalist versus a non-nationalist, multicultural language policy. Note that in the latter case the policy is "inclusive", if democratic rights and equality are granted to the speakers of minority languages as well. The only multicultural language policy in which the Hungarian language displays an equal position to all other languages, including the official state language is the one of Serbia's AP of Vojvodina. Hence, the position of the minority languages in the Carpathian Macroregion, including the Hungarian language is the best in Vojvodina. This traditional region has become an AP within Serbia.[40] The statute of the AP of Vojvodina has been agreed upon by the Serbian Parliament on November 30, 2009, afterwards it has been ratified in the Parliament of Vojvodina on December 14, 2009 and it has entered into force on January 1, 2010. This statute defines the AP of Vojvodina as a multi-ethnic, multilingual and multicultural community. The Hungarian minority has received the status of a national community as well being equal with the Serbian majority community (see article 25 of the Statute of the AP of Vojvodina). According to article 26 (see Official Journal of the AP no. 17/09) the AP of Vojvodina recognizes six official languages, including Serbian, Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian, Croatian, and Ruthenian. In this case, we can speak of a language policy of inclusion in a multicultural setting.

Within the domain of the nationalist language policies which is characterized by a hegemonic position of the state language there is a further division between states with nationalist language policies that are inclusive and states with nationalist languages policies that are exclusive. To the former group belong Austria, Slovenia and Croatia where a Hungarian language minority is living in specific regions, i.e. Burgenland, the Mura region and the Pannonian/Slavonian part of Croatia respectively. In these areas the Hungarian language enjoys equality next to the official state language, i.e. German in Austria, Slovenian in Slovenia and Croatian in Croatia.[41] In these countries, although the minority language is spoken in a country pursuing a nationalist language policy supporting the official language without restrictions, minority languages have an official status in the areas where the Hungarian minorities are present.[42]

[36] Sasse 2005. 13.

[37] Kolláth 2003. 190–204.

[38] Fowler 2002; Kántor–Majtényi–Ieda–Vizi–Halász 2004; Gal 2008. 207–232.; Deets 2010.

[39] Csergo 2007.

[40] Szilágyi 2009.

[41] Nádor–Szarka 2003.

[42] Szarka 2003. 15–37.

The situation is however substantially different in Slovakia, Romania, and Ukraine where the Hungarian language is not equal in legal terms to the official state languages, i.e. Slovak, Romanian, and Ukrainian respectively, not even in the territories where the ethnic Hungarians live and sometimes form a majority.[43] This means that in these countries the Hungarian language and culture face restrictions in the administrative, educational, judicial and public domains. These states follow a policy of 'exclusion' which is characterized by inequalities like hierarchies, subordination, asymmetries, additional provisions, anomalies, discrimination or language laws restricting the use of the minority languages or promoting the use of the official language discriminating at the expense of the Hungarian language in the official and public space.

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In sum, table 4 presents the languages policies of states with Hungarian minorities in the Carpathian Macroregion:

Table 4 ❖ *Language policies in the Carpathian Macroregion*

	Nationalist language policy	Multicultural Language Policy
Policy of Inclusion	Austria (Burgenland) Slovenia (Mura region) Croatia (Slavonia)	Serbia (Vojvodina),
Policy of Exclusion	Slovakia, Romania (Transylvania) Ukraine (Sub-Carpathia)	

Source: Marácz 2011a.

Although the patterns of language policies are more or less fixed along the lines of this scheme, the policies are clearly affected by the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. The process of Europeanization covers actually two separate processes that are connected.[44] First of all, there is the transfer of the European Union's acquis communautaire, i.e. the system of rules and regulations within the Union that is promoting democratic rights and the rule of law into the Central and Eastern European region.[45] The extension of the rule of law reaches also countries that are not members of the Union but are in the orbit of the Union, like the Balkans.[46] Other forums closely linked to the European Union, like the Council of Europe are also promoting human and minority rights protection in this area.[47] The second process induced by Europeanization is the widening of the European communicative space, that is borders becoming porous and in countries joining the European Union multilingual and transnational communication is getting more intensive. Let us consider in more detail how Europeanization has affected the position of the Hungarian minority languages in the Carpathian Macroregion.

[43] Péntek 2006. 267–273; Csergo 2007.
[44] Wiener – Diez 2009; Dinan 2010.
[45] Schwellnuss 2005. 51–71.
[46] Bache–George–Bulmer 2010.
[47] Skovgaard 2007. 12.; Grabbe 2006; Marácz 2011b. 155–185.

Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe

The European Union has acknowledged that linguistic diversity will remain an essential feature of European culture.[48] "Europe" will become increasing Babylonian due to urbanization, migration, globalization, and Europeanization itself.[49] For technical and political reasons the Union has not identified a unique language of communication. As the former commissioner for multilingualism, Leonard Orban (2009) puts it "In a Union where diversity is cherished, a *lingua franca* can never be enough to satisfy every communication need." In the resolution "Multilingualism: an asset for Europe and a shared commitment" the European Union declares that: "Europe's linguistic diversity constitutes a major cultural asset and that it would be wrong for the European Union to restrict itself to a single main language (see article 4)."[50]

In Volman (2012) it is argued that linguistic diversity is now anchored in the legal system of the EU. Policies of multilingualism will set through, even if they meet with strong resistance from the Member States.[51] According to him, article 3 of the consolidated Treaty on European Union, the so-called Lisbon Treaty describing its aims, stipulates amongst other things that the Union "shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity**,** and shall ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced." The provision mirrors article 22 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR), which states that: "The Union respects cultural, religious and linguistic diversity."[52] Volman stresses that these articles will also be referred to by those who want a system that is even more multilingual. According to him, the enhancing of minority and regional languages only just has begun. Any attempt to use the new linguistic provisions of the Lisbon Treaty to influence language policies in the Member States, for example those affecting linguistic minorities, both autochthonous minority and migrant communities, will be considered in this context.

Apart from the 24 official languages on the territory of the Union, around sixty indigenous regional or minority languages are spoken.[53] Indigenous minority languages are languages that are spoken by a minority community distinct from the majority constituting the state nation. Sometimes these minority languages can be official languages in the regions where they are spoken by the minority groups, as was discussed above in the case of nationalist, exclusive language policies. No special European Union convention protects minority languages, although the right to use one's mother tongue is recognized as a fundamental right in the EU.[54] The European Parliament has adopted several resolutions to protect minority rights, including language rights.[55] Article 24 of the recent resolution "Multilingualism: an asset for Europe and a shared commitment" states that the Union "Encourages and supports the introduction of

[48] See Extra – Gorter 2008. 3–63.

[49] Holton 2011; Marácz 2011c. 14–31.

[50] This resolution has been adopted by the European Parliament on 24 March 2009.

[51] See for this claim also the studies of Will Kymlicka, especially Kymlicka 1996; Kymlicka – Patten 2003; Kymlicka 2007.

[52] See article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union concluded in Nice on December 7, 2000 which states that the Union "shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity."

[53] See Extra – Gorter 2008.

[54] See Vizi 2003. 37–56.

[55] In 1981, 1983, 1987, 1994, 1996, 1997 and 1998; Jutila 2009; and Trifunovska 2001. 145–147.

mother tongue minority, local and foreign languages on a non-compulsory basis within school programs and/or in the context of extracurricular activities open to the community."[56] Article 26 from the same document states that the Union "Reiterates its longstanding commitment to the promotion of language learning, multilingualism and linguistic diversity in the European Union, including regional and minority languages, as these are cultural assets that must be safeguarded and nurtured; considers that multilingualism is essential for effective communication and represents a means of facilitating comprehension between individuals and hence acceptance of diversity and of minorities."[57]

Even more robust policies in support of indigenous minority languages have been adopted by the Council of Europe. Note that all the Member States of the European Union are members of the Council of Europe too. The Council of Europe has no sanctioning mechanism, if these resolutions are not met, however.[58] The Council of Europe has formulated the most clear legal treaties to protect national minority languages: the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM) signed on February 1, 1995 in Strasbourg and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) signed on November 5, 1992 also in Strasbourg.[59] The Framework Convention supports the positive discrimination of national minorities on the basis of human rights and general freedom rights, it recognizes the fact that minority rights are group rights and that cross-border cooperation is not only restricted to states but also local and regional authorities can take part in this. The Language Charter has been motivated by similar considerations. Languages are part of a common cultural heritage and the protection of languages is necessary to counterbalance assimilatory state policy and uniformization by modern civilization.[60] Note that all the Central and Eastern European states with Hungarian linguistic minorities have ratified these charters as well:

Table 5 ❖ *Framework Convention (FCPNM, CETS no. 157)*

States	Signature	Ratification	Entry into Force
Romania	01/02/1995	11/05/1995	01/02/1998
Serbia	11/05/2001	11/05/2001	01/09/2001
Slovakia	01/02/1995	14/09/1995	01/02/1998
Austria	01/02/1995	31/03/1998	01/07/1998
Croatia	06/11/1996	11/10/1997	01/02/1998
Slovenia	01/02/1995	25/03/1998	01/07/1998
Ukraine	15/09/1995	26/01/1998	01/05/1998
Hungary	01/02/1995	25/09/1995	01/02/1998

[56] See footnote 50.
[57] See footnote 50.
[58] Marácz 2011b. 155–185.
[59] Trifunovska 2001. 145–147.
[60] Consider Brubaker–Feischmidt–Fox–Grancea 2006; Marácz 2010a. 77–116; and Marácz 2010b. 55–96.

Table 6 ❖ *Language Charta (ECRML, CETS no. 148)*

States	Signature	Ratification	Entry into Force
Romania	17/07/1995	24/10/2007	01/05/2008
Serbia	22/03/2005	15/02/2006	01/06/2006
Slovakia	20/02/2001	05/09/2001	01/01/2002
Austria	05/11/1992	28/06/2001	01/10/2001
Croatia	05/11/1997	05/11/1997	01/03/1998
Slovenia	03/07/1997	04/10/2000	01/01/2001
Ukraine	02/05/1996	19/09/2005	01/01/2006
Hungary	05/11/1992	26/04/1995	01/03/1998

In principle, the Hungarian language communities all over the Carpathian Macroregion enjoy a modest legal protection due to these two conventions. These conventions provide protection for the speakers of Hungarian in the states where the Hungarian language is a minority language.[61] Note that the connection between territory and language in case of minority languages is not recognized by the Council of Europe these linguistic rights are framed in terms of the personality principle.[62] It should be possible to lift the norms and standards of minority rights protection, including language rights in the future. However, the legal implementation as a part of the language policy subject to European Union's leverage, local political measures can and have neutralized the implementation of these language policies.

Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania are confronted with hierarchies and asymmetries. International agreements, like the FCPNM and ECRML can be and are violated by national legislation and practice as the completion of the Slovak language law no. 270/1995 unambiguously demonstrates. This law promotes the language of the majority at the expense of the minority languages in Slovakia. Neither Slovakia nor Romania are urged to undertake special measures in order to promote the identity of their Hungarian minorities. Therefore, there is no effective policy against assimilation in Slovakia and Romania. The use of the Hungarian language in education and all areas of life is seen as a special right to be regulated by law. Language laws include special provisions in order to restrict the use of the Hungarian language, like a threshold of at least twenty per cent of ethnic Hungarians making up the population in an administrative-territorial unit.[63] Although the contact with other ethnic Hungarians from the Carpathian Macroregion is in principle unhindered, the Romanian and Slovak authorities often view these contacts as a threat to the state. The Slovak border police regularly control visitors from Hungary in the areas inhabited by the Hungarian minorities, although formally there should be no border control because both Hungary and Slovakia are members of the Schengen Agreement.

In sum, the legal situation created by the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe is favouring the position and the use of minority languages. Minority rights protection in the region although far from perfect has improved.[64] When improved it owes much to Union's leverage and conditionality but in some cases domestic politics drives the process and has worsened the situation.[65] This is true for the ethnic Hungarian communities as well. It is allowed to speak Hungarian, to open Hungarian schools, to use the Hungarian language, although conditioned

[61] Skovgaard 2007. 12.
[62] Dembinska – Marácz – Tonk 2014.
[63] Marácz 2014.
[64] Kántor – Majtényi – Ieda – Vizi – Halász 2004.
[65] Sasse 2005. 15–17; Grabbe 2006.

in public space as was pointed out above. Ethnic Hungarians are able to organize themselves and to form political parties and other societal interest groups and organizations to raise their voice to protect the Hungarian language and culture both in regional and national parliaments and in the European Parliament. The position of minority languages is strengthened due to the general climate within the European Union and support from other supranational forums, like the Council of Europe and the United Nations cooperating with the Union in this respect. As a result, the nationalist language policies that were discussed in table 4 are moderated by the Europeanization of the Central and Eastern European space. With the establishment of the Union the role of the monolingual state has been reduced, and multilingual regions have been given opportunities to develop.

Conclusions

In this paper, I have argued that the position of the Hungarian minority languages in the New Europe has improved due to universal human rights conventions and the norms and standards of Europeanization. However, it can still be hampered by the local politics of language policy. Hungarian is being spoken in the Carpathian Macroregion as a national, official language in Hungary and as a minority language in multilingual regions in the seven neighbouring states of Hungary, including Slovakia, Ukraine (Sub-Carpathian region), Romania (Transylvania), Serbia (Vojvodina), Croatia (Pannonian/Slavonian part), Slovenia (Mura region), and Austria (Burgenland). Within the European governance framework, it is to be expected that multilingual and transnational communication will intensify in the Carpathian Macroregion. Hungarian and other national languages will function as a transnational regional vernacular language. Different language repertoires and communication modes are being developed to make multilingual and transnational communication easier and more effective. In these strategies plurilingual speakers, like minority speakers are in a key position demonstrating that their Hungarian minority variant has become more important.

The Hungarian minorities in the states they live in have been confronted, especially in the twentieth century, with a nationalist language policy favouring the official language of the state, i.e. the majority language. The discrimination of minority languages in the Union is however not only a problem for the Hungarian minority speakers in the Carpathian Macroregion. Nationalist language policies are losing their strength, however. There are several reasons for this. Due to all sorts of globalization effects, like Europeanization, the role of the nation state becomes less prominent and borders become porous. The implementation and transfer of regimes of human and minority rights within the Union and to its periphery have strengthened the language rights of minority speakers. The Union is acting in concert in this field with other supranational organizations, like the Council of Europe and the United Nations. This has led to the implementation of minority rights protection conventions, like the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. With the help of the Europeanization drives, the implementation of a real multilingual language policy has recently been realized in Vojvodina and Kosovo that might set some benchmarking for other multilingual regions in Central and Eastern Europe.[66] Although the intervention of the European Union in the language policy of the individual Member States remains a sensitive issue – language issues are closely related to the identity of the Member States – the Union has now

[66] See Sarnyai – Pap 2011.

the legal tools to make the protection of minority language rights more effective.[67] However,at a local level, states still have the possibility to avoid the general implementation of universal conventions and norms and standards. Hence, language policies are very much depended on local political decisions that might take different variables into account. As a result, a heterogeneous pattern of language regimes arise. ❋

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[67] Compare Volman 2012. 37–56.; Vizi 2012. 155.

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The Role of Social Capital in the Process of Becoming an Entrepreneur and in Entrepreneurial Success

Abstract The network approach plays an important role in the sociological study of enterprises and of the process of becoming an entrepreneur. In our analysis we examine the role of social relations in the setup process of enterprises by the aid of a questionnaire survey of 3,021 respondents representative of the adult population of Transylvanian small towns, and the impact of networks on business success based on the results of a questionnaire survey of 1,005 companies representative of Transylvanian small and medium-sized enterprises. The conclusion of our study is that social network as a resource is much more important during the setting up of an enterprise, whereas in the case of already established, operating enterprises its contribution to entrepreneurial success is less significant.

Keywords social networks, entrepreneur, enterprise, enterprenurship

DOI 10.14232/belv.2016.2.3 http://dx.doi.org/10.14232/belv.2016.2.3

Cikkre való hivatkozás / How to cite this article: Kiss, Dénes (2016): The Role of Social Capital in the Process of Becoming an Entrepreneur and in Entrepreneurial Success. Belvedere Meridionale vol. 28. no. 2. 38–50. pp

ISSN 1419-0222 (print) ISSN 2064-5929 (online, pdf)

www.belvedere-meridionale.hu

The network approach plays an important role in the sociological study of enterprises and of the process of becoming an entrepreneur. According to the basic concepts of the paradigm associated primarily with Aldrich's name, entrepreneurs, too, are actors embedded in social micro-contexts, networks, whose endeavours to become entrepreneurs may be facilitated or hindered by these networks (Zimmer 1986. 14). The role of social capital in becoming an entrepreneur has been studied primarily with regard to small enterprises, since the innovative combination, the "bricolage" (the corresponding Hungarian term introduced by Tibor Kuczi being "kreácsolás", Kuczi 2011) of readily available resources and of others, which may be mobilized through contacts, is more emphatic in their case. The establishment of an enterprise is thus at the same time an inherent networking activity (Dubini – Aldrich 1991. 306).

The synergy effect of social networks on the establishment process of an enterprise, as well as their beneficial influence on the success of already operating, consolidated businesses is a much studied phenomenon. As regards the establishment process of enterprises, these studies have identified several kinds of helping mechanisms social capital can activate. To mention only the most important ones: contacts may serve as a source of information, that is, as additional resources to complete formal information sources, they may provide access to clients and suppliers, moreover, a proper social network, since it may provide an informal way to obtain loans, will possibly strengthen the financial basis of a business, too (Powell – Smith-Doerr 1994. 372). A family network may also present specific advantages by providing unpaid (family) work; this may be particularly useful in the initial phase of establishing a business, when it might mitigate the initial financial constraints; it may reduce the efforts spent on controlling the employees, as well as ensure emotional support (provided by the spouse especially) in the processing of the frustrations emerging due to failures in the entrepreneurial process (Sanders – Nee 1996).

One of the most detailed analyses of the impact of social networks on entrepreneurship has been carried out by Greve, who proposed to find out what are the most advantageous kinds of social networks in the different stages of the process of entrepreneurship. In order to examine this question, Greve distinguished among three stages in the process of founding a company. According to his model, the process starts with the ripening of a business idea, it continues with the organizational activity of setting up the business and finally, it ends with the initial stage of the operation of the newly created company. In the first phase thus, the individual becomes motivated on setting up the enterprise, and formulates some ideas in this regard, but does not take practical steps yet to achieve this goal (the motivation phase). In the second phase, the entrepreneur starts to plan the business in detail, to search funds, to set up arrangements, to look for a business establishment (the planning phase). Finally, the third phase of the process begins when the company starts the operating phase.

Since during these three phases the entrepreneur needs different resources, his/her contact network has to serve different purposes at every stage, and consequently this personal contact network undergoes a transformation during this process, its characteristics will be different in each phase. Using the sophisticated tools of network analysis, Greve has formulated several hypotheses regarding these changes in the social network:

In the course of the process of setting up an enterprise there is need for an ever growing web of contacts, and more and more work (*confirmed*)

The existence of a high-density social network is the most important in the planning phase. In the establishment phase a less dense contact network is preferable. (*not confirmed*)

The importance of indirect contacts increases in the establishment phase. (n*ot confirmed*)

In the establishment phase the importance of bridging social capital increases (*confirmed*)

In the establishment phase the importance of work relationships increases, at the expense of family ties and friendships (*not confirmed*)

In the establishment phase the importance of relations with persons active in different professions, especially the ties formed with managers, increases (*confirmed*)

In the light of Greve's results thus, the social networks of entrepreneurs in different phases of entrepreneurship differ in extension, in the number of available bridging ties, as well as in the professional composition of the group belonging to the network (especially as regards the percentage of managers). These characteristics show a tendency of growth in the course of the history of the enterprise (Greve 1995).

Research and analysis has not managed to clearly demonstrate the impact of social capital on already consolidated enterprises. Certain studies show a contrary pattern. Bates (1994), for instance, concluded that a more intense use of network resources is characteristic of companies lacking in other assets, and therefore more prone to bankruptcy. However, this correlation called the „compensation hypothesis" has not been verified by Brüderl and Preisendörfer (1998), but the correlation termed „network success hypothesis," according to which extensive social networks based on strong bonds contribute to the success of newly established businesses, has been proven by them.

The role of personal relations in entrepreneurship was called even more radically into question by Curran and his colleagues, who concluded, on the basis of a qualitative research performed in the United Kingdom, that small-business owners/managers did not use the family contacts, kinship and friendship relations at their disposal for business purposes, not even in a tight situation. They were characterized instead by their preference to remain independent of these networks. This can be traced back primarily to their self-definition emphasizing independence, to the mentality according to which the enterprise may be conceived of as a kind of personal „fortress" (fortress-enterprise mentality), and the business is the entrepreneur's own, individual responsibility and duty.

Apart from the influence of this culture-specific (small) entrepreneurial identity, active participation in family and kinship-friendship networks was limited also because of the time consuming nature of networking. Forming contacts with experts and consultants was also unadvisable because of its expensiveness, since this latter type of relationships were money-costing service contacts (Curran et al 1993).

According to Donckels and Lambrecht (Donckels – Lambrecht 2005), too, family relationships have an obstructive influence on business success. These authors posit that the success of existing businesses is facilitated primarily by geographically extensive, business-related contact networks, but the positive impact of these contacts is limited/extinguished by the entrepreneur's strong embeddedness in family, kinship relationships. The results of the analysis ultimately did not verify this latter hypothesis. Instead, the researchers proved that although strong family bonds have an inhibiting effect on the development of international relations (by reducing the frequency of the entrepreneurs' participation in trade fairs/exhibitions, which promote the formation of this type of ties), they do not hinder the positive effects of already existing national and international relationships. It has been, however, clearly shown that geographically more extensive national and especially international social networks involving business people do bear a positive effect on the success of enterprises (Donckels – Lambrecht 2005).

The role of social networks in the process of entrepreneurship and in the entrepreneurial success of small entrepreneurs in Transylvania

In our analysis we have also chosen to examine the impact of the entrepreneur's ego-centered network of contacts on setting up and successfully running a business. Having in view the process of entrepreneurship we are going to differentiate the phases proposed by Greve, introducing yet another phase in the process model: the phase of lack of motivation prior to the motivation phase. Although the entrepreneurship process starts obviously with the formulation of the idea, when it comes to the impact of different relationships on this process, the role of the future entrepreneur's personal social network, its characteristics and differences compared to the networks of those who do not come up with a business idea, cannot be regarded as incidental in taking the first steps toward the articulation of the business idea.

We have examined the effects of networks on the success of already operating businesses using three variables. One of them is the lifetime of enterprises; we considered the long life of a company one aspect of successful operation. Having in view the life span of enterprises, we may distinguish two phases: businesses in the initial and in the established phase, classifying into this latter type, after Pete and his coathors, the businesses that have been operating for longer than three and a half years (Pete et al. 2010). Since the mere existence of enterprises evidently does not reveal much about their business success, we introduced an additional variable to measure it: the annual cash flow of businesses.

In the present study we are going to analyse the role of social relations in the setup process of enterprises by the aid of a questionnaire survey of 3,021 respondents representative of the adult population of Transylvanian small towns, and study the impact of relationships on business success based on the results of a questionnaire survey of 1,005 companies representative of Transylvanian small and medium-sized enterprises.[1]

In the analysis we are going to take under close examination the structural characteristics of the ego-centered networks of individuals being in different stages of the entrepreneurial process. This research strategy is based on the idea that if there are differences to be detected in the characteristics of the individuals' social network, the underlying cause is a selection mechanism, as a result of which those individuals whose social network bears the characteristics of a later entrepreneurial phase are more succesful in progressing to the next phase of entrepreneurship (Greve, 1995).

The studied types of relationships and their presumed effect on the different phases of becoming an entrepreneur and on entrepreneurial success

In the present analysis, we are going to examine the prevalence rate of three types of relations: non-economic, personal relationships, functional personal relationships necessary for starting

[1] The survey on population was conducted by way of questionnaires completed in the respondents' homes in May-June of 2011. The applied random sample was stratified by gender, age, nationality and county. Data collection on entrepreneurs was performed in the same period. This time the sample was stratified according to the size, activity area and the regional distribution of enterprises. For the survey on population the maximum margin of error was of +/- 1.8 %, at a 95 % confidence level, and in the case of the entrepreneurial survey +/- 3.1%. Both surveys were carried out as part of the research program entitled "Integrated Enterprise Development Model in the Small Towns of Three Development Regions" of the Research Center on Inter-Ethnic Relations from Cluj.

and running an enterprise, as well as institutional relationships formed with the institutional environment of the enterprise.

Independently of the setting up of an enterprise, the personal relationships existing prior to entrepreneurial intentions may facilitate the success of entrepreneurship in two respects. On the one hand, as we have shown above, they may be the means of mobilizing various resources necessary for starting the business. In this respect, the more extensive and denser the social network, the greater the potential benefits as several researches have confirmed (Greve 1995, etc). On the other hand, the personal relationship network acquires special importance, since it is well suited to convey direct information, know-how on entrepreneurship on „ entrepreneurial routine," if there are entrepreneurs, too, belonging to this network. In our research, we studied this function of personal social networks existing independently of the entrepreneurial intention, therefore, in the case of this network, we did not inquire about its structural characteristics (extent, density, etc.) but our questions pertained to whether the information concerning entrepreneurship is available through these relationships, that is, whether it is possible to reach other entrepreneurs through these ties. The effectiveness of this entrepreneurial knowledge transfer, however, may depend on the structural characteristics of the social network, its efficiency is subject to the nature of the relationship between the holder of entrepreneurial knowledge and the potential entrepreneur.

The importance of contacts with persons of different professions, relevant for the operation of the company, has been pointed out by several researchers, too (among others, the above discussed Greve). It is in any case inevitable for entrepreneurs to develop some of these types of relationships (for instance with an accountant). Besides these necessary connections, however, there is a wide variety of voluntary relationships developed on one's own initiative, which may help entrepreneurs to successfully found their business. Apart from conveying knowledge on „entrepreneurial routine," contacts with business leaders and entrepreneurs have other functions, too, since these persons are important members of the circle of suppliers and customers. There may be still further types of voluntary relationships, including some that seem to have so far escaped the attention of socio-economic researcher. We refer here to the relationships (possibly) connecting companies with the non-economic sector. Enterprises are embedded more or less also in the public sector through the orders they honour, and have tighter or looser relations with the state institution system through the bodies monitoring the activities of companies. These non-economic ties vary by country, and are likely to be stronger in countries with a socialist past. The role of controlling institutions is certainly influenced by the overall level of corruption (since these officials may easily obstruct the operation of an enterprise). For these reasons, we addressed in our research the issue of personal relations with those working in political-administrative institutions, as well as of the contacts formed with officials of institutions controlling the operation of enterprises.

Finally, we assessed the relations of enterprises with the institutional stakeholders of their economic environment. Here we intended to map those relationships of the enterprises that were not person-to-person relations, but contacts between the company and other institutions (organizations), irrespective of whether the connection was formal or informal. In this set of questions, on the one hand we inquired about relationships established with representative and consulting organizations (entrepreneur associations, cooperatives, business incubators, consulting firms), on the other hand, about relations with political and administrative institutions again. During processing, we considered these relationships also part of the ego-centered relationship network of the entrepreneur.

Based on the above, we formulated the following hypotheses on the impact of the entrepreneurs' social network on his/her success in founding an enterprise:

The entrepreneurial routine conveyed by the personal relationship network existing independently of entrepreneurial intentions plays a decisive role in the process of entrepreneurship. Accordingly, in the case of entrepreneurs in later stages of setting up their business will have more and more entrepreneurs in their originally non-economic personal contact network

B1. Necessary functional relationships will gain importance in the planning phase of the process of becoming an entrepreneur. Afterwards there is no reason for the proliferation of relationships of this type, therefore, the prevalence of such relationships in the social network will not grow in this later stage.

B2. he relationships formed with business leaders and independent entrepreneurs are of the utmost importance in all phases of the life span of the enterprise, therefore, the prevalence of these relations is expected to increase continuously. Since beginning from the establishment phase these relationships gain a new, additional function, too, the prevalence of these contacts is expected to grow considerably in the last phase of the process.

B3. Personal relationships with the political and administrative sector and controlling institutions will become important in the establishment phase.

C1. Institutional relationships established with representative and consulting organizations gain real importance in the establishment phase.

C2. Institutional relationships with the political-administrative institutions also become important in the establishment phase.

D. In the case of already existing enterprises all the above discussed types of relationships promote entrepreneurial success.

Analysis

In the analysis of the process of setting up an enterprise thus we distinguish among four stages of the process. Since we are using here the results of a population-based survey, the vast majority of respondents, understandably, has never even considered the question of founding an enterprise (81.5%). Those being in the motivational phase make up 11.1% of the respondents, those in the active phase 3.3%, and 4.2% of all respondents were entrepreneurs or self-employed – they may be considered to have arrived to the establishment phase. Although the persons being in an advanced stage of entrepreneurship form only a relatively small proportion of respondents, the database has proved useful for the present purpose, thanks to the size of the sample.

A) We inquired about the entrepreneurial model conceived not for economic purposes, that is, the one to be found in the social network independent from the firm, within the framework of the nuclear family relations and contacts with relatives, neighbours and friends. As regards prevalence in this framework, we expected – in accordance with our hypothesis A. – that in the more advanced stages of entrepreneurship we would find a growing proportion of entrepreneurs. As shown in Table 1, this assumption proved only partly true. As concerns family relationships, spouses and siblings with entrepreneurial experience gain increasing importance as the entrepreneurial process progresses. The importance of parents with entrepreneurial experience does not grow after the motivation phase, but still, it continues to be important.

The number of persons belonging to the network that covers more distant relations than family ties is probably larger, therefore, understandably, there is a higher percentage of entrepreneurs in these relations. Thus, the entrepreneurial model to be found in these relationships plays a greater role in the formation of motivation, but these relations fall back in importance during the operation of the established enterprise.

Table 1 ❖ *Were there entrepreneurs in your family, among your relatives and friends or their close relatives? ("YES" responses, in percentages)*

	Not potential entrepreneur	Motivation phase	Planning phase	Establishment phase
Spouse, partner	2.9	7.1	14.7	17.8
Parent	3.6	10.9	10.3	10.1
Sibling	3.1	7.6	9.3	13.4
Neighbour	10.1	20.2	25.8	13.8
Close friend	14.6	30.5	42.3	37.7
Relative	12.7	24.4	33.3	2.1

B) As regards the prevalence of relationships maintained with different occupational groups, our first hypothesis seems to prove true: the prevalence of relations with accountants, lawyers and notaries grows in the planning phase, but there is no significant growth in the establishment phase. The once established relationships, that are in most cases business-related, are maintained during the further existence of the enterprise, but the prevalence of this type of costly relationship will not exceed the necessary extent.

The situation is different as regards the prevalence of relations with business leaders and entrepreneurs, which continues to grow throughout the process of enterprise setup process. A specific dynamics of relationships with small entrepreneurs and self-employed persons may be observed, inasmuch as it changes twice dramatically throughout the business setup process. These relations are important conditions for stepping into the motivation phase, after which, during the transition to the planning phase, the prevalence of these relationships increases only slightly. Upon entering the establishment phase, however, the number of these relations shoots up.

Our hypothesis concerning political and administrative relations has not been confirmed. Although the prevalence of these relations shows a growing tendency up to the planning phase, in the establishment phase the prevalence of this relationship type decreases. This result indicates, therefore, that political and administrative relations have the greatest significance in the planning phase (providing consultancy services), and lose their importance in the case of already operating enterprises. The relations maintained with officials of the controlling institutions show a similar dynamics.

Table 2. ❖ *Do you have friends of the following professions? („Yes, we keep in touch regularly"-answers in percentages)*

	Not potential entrepreneur	Motivation phase	Planning phase	Establishment phase
Accountant	13.4	22.7	45.3	46.8
Lawyer	6.7	17.0	21.4	22.6
Notary	4.3	5.7	16.1	13.0

Manager of a large-scale enterprise	5.4	13.0	23.2	25.4
Small entrepreneur, manager	10.7	28.1	31.6	44.3
Self-employed, family entrepreneur	10.5	30.8	33.3	37.4
Local councilor, mayor	5.3	11.4	22.9	16.0
County councilor, municipal official	6.9	15.5	24.0	15.8
Local politician	3.8	8.9	15.6	9.1
County politician, national politician	2.4	4.8	10.8	9.8
Control bodies officials	2.8	7.7	13.7	13.1

C) Our hypothesis on the network of institutional relationships has also been confirmed only partially. The presumed dynamics of prevalence of relationships evolved in accordance with our expectations only as concerns the entrepreneurs' associations and other entrepreneurial organizations, showing a significant increase after reaching the establishment phase. The ties maintained with co-operatives show a steady growth during the entrepreneurial process, the services of consultant and proposal writing firms are employed to the greatest extent during the planning phase. The relations established with political-administrative institutions follow the above detailed dynamics of ties with politicians and public officials, that is, after entering the establishment phase these ties start to lose significance.

Table 3. ❖ *Do you have contact with the following types of institutions? („Personal relationship"–answers in percentages*

	Not potential entrepreneur	Motivation phase	Planning phase	Establishment phase
Entrepreneurs' Association, Chamber of Commerce	0.6	3.1	7.4	17.6
Other entrepreneurial organizations (eg. incubator)	0.4	2.5	3.2	7.6
Co-operative (credit, sales, producer)	1.0	4.1	7.4	10.9
Business consultant and proposal writing firm	1.3	5.3	8.4	8.2
Municipality or county council	9.3	11.6	21.1	20.2
Local or county party organization	1.9	6.3	8.5	6.8

Finally, we are going to perform the analysis of the examined types of social capital, using the linear regression model. Before applying the regression model, the variables that may be combined in one factor have been aggregated by principal component analysis according to relationship type. This data reduction procedure and its results are summarized in Table 4.

Table 4. ❖ *The summary of the data reduction procedure.*

Set of questions	Factors	Variables included in the factors
The presence of the entrepreneurial model in non-economic personal relationships	Family ties	Spouse
		Parent
		Sibling
	Relationships in the broader personal environment	Friend
		Neighbour
		Relative
Functional relationships	Factor of economic relations	Small entrepreneur / Small-enterprise manager
		Self-employed, family entrepreneur
		Accountant
		Large-scale entrepreneur / Manager
	Factor of personal-level political-administrative relations	Politician in the local party organization
		Politician in the county or national party organization
		Local or county municipality official
		Local or county councilor
		Supervisory official
Institutional network of relationships	Factor of institution-level economic relations	Business consulting company
		Co-operatives
		Entrepreneurial associations, incubators
		Entrepreneurial cluster
	Factor of institution-level political-administrative ties	Local or county municipality
		Local or county party organization

The impact of the resulting six factors has been tested step by step for each phase of becoming an entrepreneur. Table 5. summarizing the results also indicates the tendencies outlined above: the entrepreneurial model associated with the personal social network is more important in the motivation and planning phase, later its importance decreases. By contrast, the significance of the entrepreneurial model associated with the family social network grows in this latter phase. Personal economic ties become increasingly important during the progress of the process, as well as the ties formed with economic institutions. Relations established with the officials of political-administrative controlling institutions, though they initially bear a significant impact on the process of becoming an entrepreneur, later, in the establishment phase, they lose significance. Institutional ties formed with this sphere do not have a significant impact on any of the phases of becoming an entrepreneur.

Table 5. ❖ *The effect of the social network on the entrepreneurship process, divided into phases.*

	Motivation phase		Planning phase		Establishment phase	
	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.
Entrepreneurs in the larger personal social network	0.055	0.012	0.081	0.000	x	x

Entrepreneurs in the family social network	0.065	0.002	0.062	0.002	0.120	0.000
Economic relations	0.137	0.000	0.176	0.000	0.222	0.000
Personal-level political-administrative ties	0.053	0.016	0.094	0.000	0.057	0.006
The factor of economic institutions	0.111	0.000	0.116	0.000	0.149	0.000
Political-administrative institutions	x	x	x	x	x	x

D) The analysis of the relation between social networks and entrepreneurial success, is performed, unlike the above, not based on a survey on population, but on the basis of the results of a survey on enterprises. Due to the larger sample size, this entrepreneurial database allows for a more reliable analysis, though it presents a significant disadvantage, too, inasmuch as the respondents in most cases are the managers of the enterprises, and not the actual entrepreneurs themselves, as it has been mentioned in the methodological presentation of the research. Thus, the results may be regarded as to confirm or refute our hypothesis only inasmuch as the analysed social networks may be considered to be the company's social network, and not the personal social network of the entrepreneur or manager.

We have studied the influence of relations on the successful operation of an enterprise, applying the research strategy used so far. We have grouped enterprises, according to the time elapsed since their foundation, into two categories: enterprises in the initial and in a later phase of their operation, drawing the boundary between these two categories at four years from the beginning of their operation. We have examined the correlation between the different types of relations and the two categories of enterprises, by the aid of contingency tables. The results are presented in Table 6.

As shown in Table 6, there are very few significant relationships between the time elapsed since the founding of the enterprise and the different features of the social network. The existing personal relationships with entrepreneurs that constituted an important factor in the process of founding the enterprise, ceased to influence its successful operation after the founding stage. Similarly, there is no significant difference between the initial phase and the later phases of operation as regards the prevalence of institutional relations either. Significant differences between the two categories of enterprises have been found only in the case of some functional relationships with the officials of political-administrative institutions, as well as controlling bodies.

Table 6. ❖ *The impact of contact types on the successful operation of enterprises*

	The enterprise has been operating for		
	Less than four years	**More than four years**	**Sign.**
There is an entrepreneur among the following persons			
Spouse, partner	16.7	19.7	x
Father	6.4	7.5	x
Mother	5.5	3.9	x
Siblings	8.3	10.1	x

Neighbour	16.0	16.0	x
Relative	25.5	25.3	x
Close friends	42.6	38.5	x
There is a member of one of the following professions among acquaintances			
Small-enterprise manager	89.2	89.2	x
Manager of a large-scale enterprise	70.9	72.2	x
Accountant	92.0	94.5	x
Notary	68.8	72.3	x
Self-employed, family entrepreneur	78.4	84.8	0.059
Lawyer	69.6	77.0	0.057
Politician in the county or national party organization	30.4	37.8	0.075
Mayor, local or county councilor	58.9	68.7	0.026
Politician in the local party organization	41.4	52.6	0.017
Municipal or county council official	58.9	71.0	0.007
Control bodies official	33.3	46.5	0.005
Direct relations with the following institutions			
Consulting company	8.2	11.9	x
Co-operative	5.4	4.9	x
Business associations, chambers of commerce	9.0	13.3	x
Entrepreneurial network, cluster	3.0	6.5	x
Municipality, county council	20.5	20.3	X
Local and county party organization	6.4	5.4	X

We used the business turnover as another operationalization possibility of entrepreneurial success. We did not distinguish between categories according to the size of the turnover. instead, we compared the average turnover according to relation types. With this method we haven't found any significant correlations between turnover and functional relationships, therefore we left out these correlations from Table 7., which summarizes the results. Ties to / Relations with the entrepreneurs belonging to the personal social network do not exert a significant effect on entrepreneurial success, although the presence of a entrepreneur spouse or parent increases turnover almost significantly. In contrast with personal and functional relations, however, we have found a significant correlation between institutional ties and turnover. These ties increased the turnover of the enterprise in all cases.

Table 7. ❖ *The averages of company turnover according to the types of business relationships*

	Yes	No	Sign.
There is an entrepreneur among the following persons			
Spouse, partner	593 876 175	170 437 916	0.076
Father	792 101 141	189 833 926	0.056

Mother	4 522 774	258 041 126	x
Siblings	206 407 126	251 746 043	x
Neighbour	102 617 063	286 531 591	x
Relative	459 339 364	204 371 461	x
Close friend	248 368 176	258 301 017	x
Direct relations with the following institutions			
Consulting company	721 870 699	107 593 885	0.007
Co-operative	858 658 915	145 010 357	0.020
Business associations, chambers of commerce	690 222 548	116 605 112	0.012
Entrepreneurial network, cluster	929 489 810	141 533 423	0.007
Municipality, county council	496 809 996	115 640 340	0.053
Local and county party organization	834 247 679	161 821 488	0.031

To study the joint impact of the different types of relationship on entrepreneurial success, we aggregated these relationships by principal component analysis. As a result, the personal contacts with entrepreneurs before becoming one of them settled into three factors (the friends-neighbours-relatives factor, the parents' factor and the spouse-sibling factor); functional relationships settled also into three factors (the factors of political–administrative–bureaucratic relations, of those established with small entrepreneurs-self-employed–accountants, as well as the factors of ties formed with notaries–lawyers–big entrepreneurs), whereas institutional relationships combined into a single factor Examining by means of the regression model the relationship between these factors and the number of years elapsed since the founding of the enterprise, as well as the company's cash flow – as it was expected in view of the results above – we could not find any association. Az regards also the correlation between the two variables of individual factors and success, we could find a weak correlation in the case of one single factor: between the factor of institutional relations and the company's cash flow.

Table 8. ❖ *The correlation between factors formed of types of relationships and entrepreneurial success (correlation coefficients)*

	The time elapsed since the founding of the enterprise		**The company's turnover**	
	Pearson coefficient	Sig.	Pearson coefficient	Sig.
Entrepreneur among friends, neighbours, relatives	0.026	0.457	0.006	0.915
Entrepreneur parent Vállalkozó a szülök között	-0.053	0.124	-0.057	0.284
Entrepreneur spouse or sibling	-0.002	0.948	-0.052	0.323
Political-administrative-bureaucratic ties	-0.046	0.164	0.028	0.584
Relations with small and self-employed entrepreneurs, accountants	0.027	0.419	0.057	0.253
Relations with notaries, lawyers, large-scale entrepreneurs	-0.032	0.330	-0.044	0.383
Institutional relations	0.014	0.669	-0.117*	0.018

Conclusions

Our results thus indicate that the nature of the social network is changing during the process of entrepreneurship, that is, the entrepreneur will utilize different types of social relations as a resource in the different successive stages of setting up the enterprise. Thus, the entrepreneurial models offered by the personal network of contacts, the presence of other entrepreneurs in these close personal relationships, are important factors in becoming an entrepreneur, and they become increasingly important as the process progresses, losing some of their significance only after the establishment of the enterprise. But even in this case, it may have a relatively important positive impact on the company's turnover if the entrepreneur's spouse or parent is also an entrepreneur. Similarly, functional relationships also play an increasingly important role in the process of entrepreneurship, in the established operational phase, however, these relations are no longer the conditions for further business success, their prevalence does not increase further. This applies primarily to economic, service-related ties. Political-administrative relations retain their importance during operation, thus contributing to entrepreneurial success.

Institutional relations gain importance progressively in the course of the life of the enterprise. In the initial stages of business setup (the motivation and planning phase) only the contacts formed with economic institutions are important, at this stage the political-administrative relations do not contribute to the consolidation of the business. In the later phase of the life span of the enterprise, however, these relations are the ones that contribute the most to entrepreneurial success. On the basis of these results, the overall conclusion is that the social network as a resource is much more important during the setting up of an enterprise, whereas in the case of already established, operating enterprises its contribution to entrepreneurial success is less significant than expected. ❋

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Reflections on the economic aspects of multilingualism in Transylvania

Abstract Using an economic perspective, the study deals with fairness problems associated with language use in multi-ethnic Transylvania. It showcases empirical findings to demonstrate that asymmetric bilingualism in its current state creates economic disadvantages for linguistic minorities. Among the theoretical solutions offered by the economics of language, it examines the possibility of the introduction of the English, as a lingua franca and some of the institutional conditions for a symmetric bilingualism. It argues that these scenarios are highly improbable to be accepted by the linguistic majority especially if they are backed by confrontational ethical arguments used so far. As an alternative it analyses the promotion of multilingualism through the economy with reference to the extra revenues and aggregate welfare benefits ethno-linguistic diversity can have for the society as a whole.

Keywords economics of language, ethno-linguistic diversity, linguistic justice, Hungarians in Transylvania

DOI 10.14232/belv.2016.2.4 http://dx.doi.org/10.14232/belv.2016.2.4

Cikkre való hivatkozás / How to cite this article: Csata, Zsombor (2016): Reflections on the economic aspects of multilingualism in Transylvania. Belvedere Meridionale vol. 28. no. 2. 51–65. pp

ISSN 1419-0222 (print) ISSN 2064-5929 (online, pdf)

www.belvedere-meridionale.hu

The starting idea of our study is that in societies with ethno-linguistic diversity the establishment of social integration has significant additional costs compared to monolingual societies. Under the term integration here we understand a predictable, efficient functioning of the institutions, and their capability for development. A prerequisite of integration is that people can understand and efficiently communicate with each other.

So it is with the integration of the economy as well, regardless of the institutional mechanism it is embedded in: the market (through exchange) or hierarchies, firms (through command). If the economic actors do not understand each other, the exchange does not take place, or only with significantly higher transaction costs (translation, authentication, additional bargaining and risk costs etc.); in firms the management will be more expensive – the employees could misunderstand the instructions, which increases the chances of making errors, and their correction could be costly.

1 Asymmetric bilingualism and chance inequalities

The main thesis of our analysis is that within this institutionalist perspective, in Transylvania, a greater part of the costs of economic integration is borne by the minorities, as they learn the language of the majority. If the efficient functioning of the economic institutions and its coordination mechanisms are considered public goods, the members of the majority are free-riders, since they have to invest less in order to participate in the economic communication.[1]

Due to this asymmetry, members of the linguistic majority, the Romanians, have advantages, because (Grin 2004):

– *They save the learning costs of Romanian.* According to the experts of the economics of language (Piron 1994), for a near-native language proficiency, a total of 12,000 hours of learning, education and exposure is required.[2] The costs are influenced by many factors, beginning from individual competencies (e.g. talent for languages), through the degree of difficulty of the language and the level of exposure, to the effectiveness of teaching methods. On the latter, most of the experts regret that in Romanian public education not functional, everyday Romanian is taught, but Romanian literature and grammar (Szilágyi 1998). Although in the last five-ten years substantial changes have taken place in this respect (e.g. the introduction of manuals and curricula specially designed for minority pupils), the methods that are used are still outdated, because they usually neglect a communicative-interactive approach, but build on deductive logic used in the education of classical languages, so they are over-concerned with grammar and text-centred knowledge of literature, and offer little room for practising the language (Benő 2012). This means that the learning of the language of the majority requires additional effort and investment, which is not covered by public funds. Thus, the catching-up process is financed by the individuals themselves. This generates further inequality because it puts a disproportionately higher burden especially on the shoulders of those parents who live in majority Hungarian

[1] The same is true for the global economy, the English as a lingua franca is used by more and more people worldwide. The US alone is saving 16 billion dollars annually since they do not have to teach any other languages for their pupils in the elementary and primary school. (Grin 2004: 200). We have no similar estimates for our case in Romania.

[2] It is important to note here that not everyone needs to know Romanian at a near-native level, in order to succeed in life in this country. But there is a much higher probability for a member of a minority language group to get confronted with disadvantageous consequences arising from his/her language difficulties.

areas, have lower education and more modest financial conditions to finance the realignment of their children.

– *They do not have to count on the alternative costs of learning Romanian.* Instead of learning Romanian, they can spend more time to learn other foreign languages, get a deeper knowledge in other domains or simply just give more time for recreation etc. The same applies to those who assist in language learning. This aspect is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.

– *They can save on communication costs.* These costs are present in all the formal, institutional interactions where people with different mother tongues get in contact with each other, as the messages should be translated to the dominant, official language, which often has to be paid for.

– *They have a legitimacy and rhetorical advantage.* The speakers of the dominant language have an advantage in reasoning and bargaining, because the conversation takes place in their own language.

This phenomenon is further reinforced by the fact that in Romania the official, "titular", default language is Romanian, and minority languages are of a lower, "marked" status (Brubaker et al. 2006). The latter also implies that the lack of adequate Romanian language skills leads to worse labour market opportunities. Worse positions, in their turn, may cause income disadvantages.

Several studies have already drawn attention to the inequalities of employment and income between the Transylvanian Hungarians and Romanians. According to these, Hungarians are under-represented in higher-status occupations (Veres 2015), and their income level is lower than the Transylvanian average (Kiss 2014).

Using the international Labour Force Survey data we can follow the ethnic differences of income conditions and their evolution over time (Table 1). The earning statistics confined exclusively to employees show that in 2012 only 9 percent of Hungarians belonged to those who are in the highest earning one-fifth of the population in Transylvania, while almost 32 percent of the Hungarians belong to the lowest-paid one-fifth. The results also show that between 2008 and 2013 the proportion of Hungarians significantly increased in the bottom quintile, while fewer and fewer people are earning as much as the upper one-fifth of the employees. This reflects a surprisingly clear and rapid deterioration of the income situation of Hungarians in Romania.

Table 1 ❖ *The proportion of Hungarian employees among the income quintiles of the national data set (LFS 2008–2012)*

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
lower quintile	27.4	27.5	28	30.3	31.9
lower-middle quintile	25	25.1	26.6	23	24.1
middle quintile	21.9	21.7	17.8	20.4	20
upper-middle quintile	15	15.6	16.1	16.7	14.8
upper quintile	10.8	10.1	11.6	9.7	9

Source: own calculations based on LFS 2008–2012 data

These income differences are of course present for a variety of reasons, so it is important to examine whether the differences in Romanian language skills significantly contribute, and if so, to what extent, to the formation and subsistence of this inequality. Unfortunately, it is difficult to answer this question in an ethnic breakdown, because it is not possible to separate the factor reflecting the differences of Romanian language skills from other attributions that specifically characterize the Romanian and the Hungarian population. The results of the available studies

do not provide an opportunity for this. It is possible, however, to examine whether incomplete Romanian language skills cause earning disadvantages among the Hungarians. A descriptive analysis on a 2009 survey[3] reveals that those Hungarians who speak good Romanian earn 34 percent more compared to those who do not speak well or do not speak at all. A greater part of the difference, however, is not explained by the disparity of language skills, but rather by the factors that correlated with the latter: the respondents' gender, level of education and place of residence (urban or rural, inside or outside Szeklerland). In order to see more clearly, we included these variables in a joint linear regression model (Table 2). The result shows that the lack of Romanian language skills has a significant influence on the income, even if we control for these factors. All other things being equal, the lack of language skills or insufficient knowledge of Romanian negatively affects the incomes of native Hungarians. Moreover, this effect among the highly educated is not valid, it causes income differences, however, among those who have baccalaureate at the most. So the lack of appropriate Romanian language skills causes income loss among the less educated, further deteriorating the situation of the most disadvantaged groups.

Table 2 ❖ *OLS regression model for income – Hungarians in Transylvania (standardized regression coefficients, TL survey, 2010, N=1651)*

	Transylvania	Szeklerland	other regions in Transylvania
Male	0.199***	0.115**	0.268***
upper secondary education (compared to primary and lower secondary)	0.105**	0.084*	0.119**
higher education (compared to primary and lower secondary)	0.300***	0.244***	0.333***
urban residence	0.102**	0.093*	0.107**
residence in Szeklerland	-0.076**	-	-
good command of Romanian	0.085**	0.067*	0.108**
Coefficient of determination (R2)	0.169	0.091	0.215

*Note: * 0.05>p>0.01. ** 0.01>p>0.001. *** p<0.001. Only significant effects presented.*
Source: own calculations based on "The Turning Points of our Life Course 2./Életünk Fordulópontjai 2." survey

In the explanation of the differences in employment statistics perhaps it is even more difficult to determine the impact of the Romanian language skills. However, earlier qualitative studies show that Hungarian youngsters are more prone to "under-plan" their career tracks: Hungarian university graduates get hired in the competitive private sector at a lower rate (Csata – Dániel–Pop 2006) and in their career narratives an increased cautiousness related to some perceived shortcomings regarding their Romanian language skills often appears (Csata et al. 2009).[4]

At the end of this section it should be mentioned that, obviously, the invested effort of the Hungarians to learn Romanian, sooner or later could pay and they could gain a comparative advantage from the fact that they know one more language. Our data is not suited to confirm

[3] "The Turning Points of our Life Course 2./Életünk Fordulópontjai 2." survey was carried out in 2008-2009 by the Hungarian Demographic Research Institute (Budapest) in cooperation with the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities (Cluj Napoca/Kolozsvár) and the Max Weber Centre for Social Research (Cluj Napoca/Kolozsvár). The stratified, multistage random sample was representative for the Hungarians living in Transylvania by gender, age groups and territorial distribution. A total of 4017 persons was interviewed, and the margin of error was +/-1,5% with a confidence level of 95%. We used this not-so-recent survey data because of a higher number of cases and higher reliability.

[4] Thus, it would be a simplistic and superficial reasoning to explain the occupational inequalities with an (intended or unintended) institutionalized discrimination of the minorities.

this hypothesis and there is a need for a more nuanced further analysis. The results only show that: **1.** the income and occupational situation of the Hungarians is less favourable compared to the Romanians', **2.** among the Hungarians the higher income is partially explained by a better knowledge of the Romanian language. These two observations, however, seem to be enough to conclude that those Hungarians who have less exposure to the Romanian language and have more modest conditions to learn it, are disadvantaged beyond their control, compared to the members of the majority society.

2 Alternatives for the elimination of chance inequalities

The asymmetry of the status of languages thus generates chance inequalities between the linguistic minority and majority. The economics of language literature suggests that there are two real solutions for this equity problem:

– the use of a third language, a "*lingua franca*" – different from the language of the minority and majority – both in formal and informal communication

– *symmetric multilingualism*: when the languages used in the region are given equal status in all interactions.[5]

There is a need for any other alternative program that decreases the aforementioned chance disadvantages (e.g. more efficient teaching of the Romanian language, bearing the costs of the realignment as a common charge, introducing bilingualism in public institutions etc.), they could improve the equity, but they do not fully solve the problem. So let us examine these two options above in the case of the Hungarian minority in Romania.

The use of a *third language in communication* (e.g. English) is quite costly; and a series of professional arguments warn us that it could endanger the organic development or even the survival of local and regional languages (Skutnabb – Kangas 1999, Phillipson 2010). In spite of this, it is a rapidly spreading practice in Transylvania as well, especially at multinational companies and in intellectual professions. The fact that more and more people are getting familiar with the everyday use of English can further accelerate this process and it can show up in other areas as well[6].

However, the introduction of the English as a lingua franca – along with the exclusivity of the Romanian as the sole official language in the country – does not necessarily solve the chance inequality problem mentioned above. For example, if in addition to English, the Hungarian children must continue to learn Romanian as well in order to succeed in life, the asymmetrical relation will persist, since the Hungarian children will still need to learn one more language compared to the Romanians. Even if we assume that after learning a second language it is easier to learn a third one, the aggregate efforts of Hungarians to get along with inter-ethnic communication will be higher than those of the Romanians'. In other words: if the Hungarian and Romanian children spend the same amount of time to learn other languages than their mother tongue, the Romanian children will probably speak better English, because in the case of Hungarians part of this time should be spent learning Romanian. This is one of the alternative costs which we referred to in the previous chapter.

[5] An obvious prerequisite for this is that the majority could learn the language of minorities under the same conditions as the minority learns the language of the majority.

[6] For a recent analysis of the worldwide consolidation of English as a lingua franca, the injustices that this process has given rise to and a normative framework for a linguistic justice, see Van Parijs 2011.

Studies on foreign language skills among youth in Romania support this hypothesis: Hungarian-Romanian bilingual high school students under-perform in English tests compared to monolingual Romanians (Iatcu 2005, Molnár 2008). In relation to this, however, a number of alternative explanations must be taken into account. One is that it is easier for a Romanian pupil to learn English because Romanian closely resembles English. But both studies revealed that Romanian children even knew significantly more English words that do not resemble their Romanian equivalents (non-cognate words). A further alternative explanation is that in Romanian schools/classes the quality of foreign language education could be higher. Finally, slight differences in the exposure to English could exist.[7] These latter two hypotheses therefore need to be verified. Nevertheless, in all of these assumptions the initial one appears to be the strongest, that the English language skills of Hungarian students are worse than the Romanians', because they have to learn two foreign languages instead of one, and they spend time learning Romanian at the expense of English. Their disadvantage could only be partially compensated by the fact that due to the early compulsory learning of Romanian, their meta-linguistic competencies could be more developed, thanks to which it might be easier to learn a third language (in this case English).

Further analysis shows that this disadvantage does not even out after studies either. According to the Mozaik 2001 survey data, among those Hungarian youngsters who live in central and western Transylvania and who started to work, only 21.8 percent declared that they spoke English, compared to 26.1 per cent registered among the Transylvanian Romanians. Among the Hungarians in Eastern Transylvania – Szeklerland – this ratio was even less, only 7 percent.

According to the 2009 Etnobarometer survey on an adult sample, 36 percent of the Romanians and only 22 percent of the Hungarians considered that their English was good enough to participate in a conversation.[8] As a conclusion, we can state that as long as the Romanian language will continue to be compulsory subject to learn for the minorities, the introduction of English as a lingua franca probably would not solve the fairness problem caused by the asymmetrical bilingualism, since it seems that the Hungarians accumulate a further disadvantage compared to the Romanians, regarding their foreign language skills. The situation would radically change, however, if Romanian would be permitted to be completely replaced by English in inter-ethnic communication. This option – although it might sound absurd – is already in practice in some countries and brings us closer to linguistic equality.[9]

The institutionalization of *symmetrical multilingualism* in contemporary Romania seems just as unrealistic as the official introduction of English as a lingua franca. But this is not only due to the fact that the political context is unfavourable and the majority of Romanians in Transylvania are reluctant to learn the language of the minorities. The following factors have also a great influence:

– *The institutional costs of multilingual education for the dominant language group are usually*

[7] For the exposure, we should consider an important example given by Van Parijs (2011). He argues that it is much easier to learn English if instead of dubbing, movies are featured in their original language and they are subtitled in the language of the country/region. In Romania the subtitles, in Hungary the dubbing is the common practice, and for a Hungarian native speaker in Romania it is obviously more comfortable to choose the Hungarian dubbing instead of the original sound and Romanian subtitles, which are both more difficult to understand.

[8] The estimated level of proficiency was higher among Romanians in all other foreign languages as well. The only exception was the German, where the differences were not significant (10 percent of the population declared that they could make themselves understood in German).

[9] Related to this solution, the positive example of Singapore is cited frequently, where the Chinese, Malay and Indian populations are communicating with each other in English. For the details, see: Liu 2015.

overestimated. Yet, depending on the region's characteristics, these represent only 5-10 per cent of the budget for education (Grin 2004) [10]. So making the education multilingual is primarily not a question of money.

– At various levels of political and public life, representatives of minorities formulate almost exclusively *confrontational ethical arguments* based on some kind of perceived historical legitimacy (e.g. "Romanians promised autonomy for the minorities after Trianon and they should keep their word"), or existing international practices based on progressive perceptions of democracy (Catalonia, South-Tyrol etc.). Economic arguments – referring to cooperation instead of interest struggles and destructive competition, focusing on the chance disadvantages of linguistic minorities mentioned above and the possible benefits of ethno-linguistic diversity listed below – occur significantly less frequently in these debates. Instead, the "us" and "them" dichotomy, the obsession of the zero-sum game where the minority can only win at the expense of the majority and vice versa, continues to be symptomatic.

– In the Hungarian public space in Romania there is a strong expectation that *these problems should be solved by political representatives primarily through legislation*. Yet it is obvious that favourable laws alone cannot solve the problem without local will: for example the law about multilingual administration beyond the 20 percent threshold is impossible to be fully respected if resources for its implementation are not assigned (e.g. to increase the number of local government employees who speak Hungarian)[11].

– These expectations are usually system-wide, *they expect solutions from macro-level reforms*. Less attention is paid to those successful local, grass-roots civic and individual initiatives that could become possible models for a wider diffusion.

3 The economy as a ground for multilingualism

3.1 The demand side

A "grateful" terrain for these bottom-up, grass-roots attempts, articulated along these pragmatic arguments, could be the consumer market. Here buyers could efficiently (and since they have the money: with impunity and without risks) signal if an important element of their identity – in this case the linguistic aspect – is not endorsed properly in business policy. These kinds of consumer actions could start with addressing the seller in minority language, through expressing dissatisfaction if there is no multilingual information, customer service etc., to the point that they choose other products or services that meet their expectations in this regard.[12] Although this practice seems fairly simple, they occur very rarely and sporadically.[13] Behind the lack this proactive attitude, the "no action", we could identify three main reasons:

– Some of the customers belonging to a minority language group do not call for multilingualism, it is not important for them. They might get along in Romanian, and it is often the case that the use of Romanian is taken for granted, seems natural, and most importantly, it is thought as legitimate. This produces linguistic hegemony on the market.

– They are afraid that their action (e.g. asking for a product in Hungarian in a Romanian

[10] In Canada the full multi-language "operation" of the Quebec region costs less than 0.5 per cent of the federal budget. (*Canadian Heritage Languages Institute Act* 1991).

[11] For a review of the practical application of the administrative language policy, see Horváth 2009.

[12] In the economics, this practice is also called ethical consumption (Shimp 1984).

[13] For further details, see: Szilágyi 2014.

shop) will have unpleasant consequences. The same may apply to the provider, who may fear that if he/she addresses the consumers in Hungarian as well, he/she will lose Romanian customers. It is an important task for upcoming research in economic sociology and economic psychology to estimate the probability of the occurrence of these cases in different regions and socio-demographic groups in Transylvania.

– These actions have opportunity costs: it is time-consuming to wait for a seller who speaks Hungarian, to write a complaint, to post on a forum, to look for another shop/provider, etc. These alternative costs are heavily dependent on 1) the proportion of minority language speakers in a given town/region, 2) how well the minority groups speak the language of the majority.

It is also important to know that at a given number of service providers, the marginal cost of these additional efforts decreases rapidly. The introduction of multilingualism in the economy could be perceived as an innovation and in every business innovation there are significant expenses/efforts in the initial stages, until their diffusion as good practices do not accelerate. During the stages of innovation and early adoption (Rogers 2003) the individual alternative costs could be effectively reduced with a community campaign, which would draw the attention on the benefits of multilingualism in the economy, both on the provider and consumer side. Such a campaign would probably succeed, because at least at the level of dispositions it is clearly palpable an economic ethnocentrism among the Hungarians in Transylvania: if it is possible to choose, they are rather willing to buy products and services manufactured and/or commercialized by "Hungarian" firms (Csata – Deák 2010).

Compared to the relative indifference of the customers on the "demand" side, on the "supply" side a number of successful initiatives have appeared in recent years. Using a rather utilitarian logic, these initiatives promote multilingualism in the economy because they either expect extra revenues (firms) or they recognized the aggregate welfare benefits associated with linguistic diversity (NGO-s). In the rest of the paper we will display a few of these initiatives, will highlight the antecedents of their appearance, and we will present their underlying narratives. Following the above mentioned logic, these initiatives will be considered social innovations, and if they prove to be successful, chances are good that others will copy them. Their significance therefore goes beyond whether they are viable as business models or not: as a "latent effect" or a "positive externality" they succeed to introduce multilingualism in the economy through the "back door".

3.2 The supply side: good practices in the promotion of multilingualism through the market

The appearance of new transnational regulations in the last decade set the ground for new institutional conditions, "opportunity structures" for ethnic Hungarians in Romania, to use the economic institutions and cooperation as efficient means for promoting multilingualism in Transylvania. It seems that the supranational control over market regulations apparently offers more room for the articulation of ethno-specific needs in the economy including a more frequent use of minority languages in marketing communication, consumer service, the linguistic landscape of trade etc.

In the promotion of minority languages through the economy we distinguished two distinct narratives. According to the first, multiculturalism and ethno-linguistic diversity could be a comparative advantage for the economy, its professional management, exploitation and marketing can contribute to the improvement of the aggregate welfare of the whole society. The other approach is built on the conviction that the collective experience of living in a minority could have economically convertible advantages. These perspectives lie on different theoretical grounds, therefore we will start with their presentation, and then we will turn to those economic and civic initiatives which – consciously or spontaneously – are using these tools in their activities.

3.2.1. Multiculturalism and aggregate welfare

The social science research of the relationship between ethno-linguistic diversity and economic development has begun to make dynamic developments in recent decades. Among the scholars there is a convincing consensus that developed democracies and economies are able to productively "handle" ethnic and linguistic diversity, and reduce or even nullify its negative effects (Collier 2000). Or, as Page (2008: 14) put it simply: "We find that in advanced economies, ethnic diversity proves beneficial. In poorer countries, it causes problems." This positive relationship has been confirmed at lower levels of analysis as well: in major cities (Ottaviano – Peri 2006, Putnam 2007, Bellini et al. 2013), markets (Levine et al. 2014) and workplaces (De Vaan et al. 2011, Kochan et al 2003).

Representatives of a strongly interdisciplinary approach known as the "economics of language" consider that multilingualism, by itself, is a value and can have a positive effect on economic development. For instance, according to Grin, Sfreddo and Vaillancourt (2010), about 10 percent of Switzerland's GDP is due to linguistic diversity. Thus, the 0.5 percent that is spent on children's multilingual education appears to be a rather good investment (Grin – Vaillancourt 1997), even if the development of multilingual communication in institutions may incur further costs.

In those Central and Eastern European countries that joined the European Union in the last decade, significant changes have taken place regarding the institutional enforcement of the common law on economic cooperation. These changes sought the implementation and standardization of the EU regulations and the institutional improvement of control, prevention of corruption, opportunism, the free rider and rent seeking activities. It seems that the above-mentioned institutional conditions for the exploitation of aggregate economic benefits stemming from ethno-linguistic diversity have been created.

Here, we are not talking about the direct promotion of multiculturalism in the European Union. Cultural and human resource development programs supported by the EU are recommended to have components that promote multiculturalism, and the beneficiaries are urged to meet this requirement. Therefore, following Romania's EU accession in 2007 the public diffusion of this official canon has started, it became widespread in a growing number of political and public declarations, and it is one of the buzzwords of different development projects and their host institutions. Beyond public communication and PR materials, however, this approach is barely present in the practical implementation of the programs.[14] These initiatives are also ineffective because they lack the allusion to the aggregate welfare benefits multilingualism/multiculturalism can have for the society as a whole (Grin 1999).

There are very few attempts that go beyond considering multiculturalism as a value in itself and try to attribute economic benefits to diversity. One of these initiatives is the "Igen, tessék!" ("Yes, please!") movement,[15] which has been launched in 2012 in Cluj Napoca/Kolozsvár, but it is expanding to other Transylvanian towns as well. The movement aims to encourage communication in native language in commercial life and public spaces (shops, markets, coffee houses,

[14] A good example for this is the Cluj-Napoca Youth Capital 2015 project. One of its websites which promotes multiculturalism (http://clujmulticultural.ro) had no Hungarian version for a long time and while they showcased detailed reports about immigrant families and communities in Cluj, they omitted to mention the 50,000 Hungarians living in the city. After several online protests a Hungarian translation of the website became available. The official website of the city's administration, however, continues to be monolingual, Romanian.

[15] "Da, poftiți!" in Romanian.

cashiers etc.). An economic network has been established of those firms that serve their customers in their mother tongue. The initiative is based on the philosophy that the use of native language in everyday interactions gives extra comfort for the participants/consumers, leaving them with favourable impressions about shopping. Therefore they urge the commercial businesses to recognize: if they are trying to communicate with their customers in their native language – and if they take into account the needs of different regions with different cultures – then they can expect more revenues. Being supporters of culturally sensitive marketing, they use economic arguments and strategies to encourage sellers to practice multilingualism and they are offering a variety of marketing interfaces for this purpose (stickers in the windows of shops, monthly community magazine, website and interactive mobile application). Until now the movement has only focused on marketing among Hungarian-speaking customers in Romania. Although they intend to expand their services to other minorities in Romania and to the Romanian communities in neighbouring countries (Ukraine, Hungary), this has not yet happened.

In their communication strategy towards the Romanian majority, the members of the organization emphasize that multilingualism and multiculturalism is an important source of returns. As a result of diversity, products and services containing greater added value and thus more attractive to consumers, become accessible. As there is an increasing demand for varied, innovative services (e.g. in gastronomy, music, etc.) ethnic diversity increases consumer satisfaction and it generates a positive amenity effect as an externality. This same positive effect can prevail in the development of public goods and public services as well, through which the amenity value of cities and regions could increase.

3.2.2. Economic advantages of minority status

Economic sociologists, especially those around the "new economic sociology" school believe that the success of the economic exploitation of ethno-linguistic diversity depends not just on the existence of appropriate institutional conditions (democracy and well-functioning bureaucracies). Cultural characteristics and social organizational patterns of individual minorities in the same region can also lead to varying economic strategies and outcomes (Aldrich 1990, Granovetter 1995, Portes – Sensenbrenner 1999, and Light – Gold 2000). Their success or failure, in their turn will determine the aggregate welfare of the whole society.

Thus, more attention has to be paid to the structural, networking and cultural resources minorities possess, and to what extent and how do they succeed in utilizing these in the economy, for their benefit and for the benefit of the society as a whole. Granovetter (1995) localized those minority community resources which could represent a comparative advantage vis-à-vis the majority and other immigrant minorities. He classified these benefits into four categories: *1. cultural advantages*: some social norms might be relevant to the majorities, but not to the minorities, which creates an unadulterated market opportunity for the latter. *2. networking advantages:* valuable market information and opportunities, access to multiple resources through bridging or broker positions (Kim – Aldrich 2005) in "structural holes" (Burt 1992. 3). *advantages stemming from solidarity:* "bounded solidarity", "enforceable trust" (Portes 1998), "bonding" social capital (Putnam 2000). *4. advantages arising from marginal situations:* In some cases the minority is not bound to satisfy local traditional obligations. It can employ new, more competitive commercial techniques without risking the danger of (further) ostracism and sanctioning.

Since the historical minorities in Central and Eastern Europe significantly differ from the American immigrant groups in many respects, some of the resources cited by Granovetter are not relevant for the Hungarians in Romania. After centuries-old coexistence there still might

be some differences in everyday culture of Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania – most of them attributable to the differences of language and religion – but in the context of globalization these are far from being spectacular. Furthermore, after the change of regime the formally institutionalized discrimination against the Transylvanian Hungarians was withdrawn. So in these dimensions (1,4) we can hardly talk about economically useful comparative advantages. The bonding and bridging capital of ethnic Hungarians, however can carry significant economic potential. In the following, we will take a look to a few relevant examples in this respect.

In Transylvania there is an increasing number of entrepreneurial initiative under way, which, appealing to the *ethnic solidarity* of Hungarians, attempt to gain a competitive market advantage (Gáll 2011). The popularity of local products specifically positioned as Hungarian brands in Szeklerland, for example, shows that consumer ethnocentrism is not only present at the level of dispositions, but rather increasingly determines the purchasing decisions of locals as well.

The biggest player in this market is undoubtedly the Merkúr supermarket chain, created in 2007 from a formal local convenience store chain in Odorheiu Secuiesc (Hun. Székelyudvarhely). With its twelve locations in five towns in Szeklerland, Merkúr is a successful competitor of multinational retail stores in the region (Kaufland, Lidl, Penny Market etc.). The company currently has more than 700 employees and in 2014 their turnover reached 50 million euros.

A significant part of the revenues comes from the Góbé® product line, which is commercialized as a kind of own brand using a unique marketing concept. Under the same image they bring together 350 products made by 64 individual producers exclusively from Szeklerland. Although the Góbé behaves like a trademark, since it promotes and sells the products of locals, it is rather a community brand. The Merkúr advertises itself as *the* Szekler store chain, the logo and the image elements on Góbé products (containing stylized elements about a fictional traditional Szekler village) refer exclusively to this region.

Although the management defines Góbé as a regional brand, which any producer from Szeklerland could join, for now the only suppliers are local Hungarians. So it is not a coincidence that the products carry an added value based on Hungarian ethnicity. This identity is further reinforced by the fact that in Merkúr supermarkets Hungarian products made in Hungary are also commercialized in a large scale.

An even more pronounced commodification of ethno-regional solidarity takes place in the case of a recently created Szekler product, the "Igazi Csíki Sör" ("The Real Ciuc Beer" in Hungarian). This brand was established in 2014 and in the creation of product image they used symbols and narratives inspired exclusively from the history, folklore and cultural heritage of Szeklerland. Although the business model was a success from the very beginning, the beer brewery became widely popular when the Dutch multinational company, Heineken sued the producers for using the Igazi Csíki Sör brand name. Heineken argued that they patented earlier the Romanian translation of the Csíki Sör, the Ciuc Premium which has been produced for decades in the Szekler town of Miercurea Ciuc (Hun. Csíkszereda).

For the Igazi Csíki Sör, the dispute seems to come in handy, because it gave the impression to the consumers that this is a David-Goliath battle between the Szekler beer brewery and the profit-oriented, heartless multinational company who is pushing the local producers to inability (Sipos 2014). Thanks to the cleverly constructed narrative and campaign, an online community advocacy group was quickly formed around the Igazi Csíki Sör, who called for a collective boycott of Heineken products. The boycott became widespread after the Heineken management committed a mistake making a statement where they were questioning the very existence of Szeklerland.

The sales of Ciuc Premium dropped,[16] the legal dispute around the brand is still going on and the Igazi Csíki Sör enjoys an unbroken popularity among Hungarian consumers in Szeklerland.

Both of these examples illustrate well that the business model built on the bounded solidarity and enforceable trust of Hungarian population in the region is successful in Szeklerland and it has more and more followers. The success could also be attributed to the fact that beyond the ethnic markers, these product concepts successfully integrate other elements of ethical consumption as well (regionalism, anti-globalization, environmental awareness, biodiversity etc.). Therefore the phenomenon could be legitimately considered as a form of collective manifestation of ethical consumption.[17]

These examples show that Transylvanian Hungarians (and particularly those from Szeklerland) enjoy advantages stemming from "bounded solidarity" and it seems that the "bonding" type of social capital has an increasing economic utility. Moreover, from an anthropological perspective, it is particularly interesting that viable Hungarian companies, brands, products and economic cooperation practices also contribute to the further reinforcement of ethnic-regional identity. Furthermore – and this is important from our point of view – on the ground of market deregulation, using classical instruments of consumer marketing they spontaneously contribute to the development of multilingualism in the economy. We think that without the enforcement of the laws of free competition by the European Union, this process would have encountered more obstacles from the Romanian authorities.

4 Conclusions

In this study we argued that the problem of multilingualism is not just a matter of principles, it is a practical issue as well, since the acquisition of the majority language puts a disproportionately higher burden on the members of the linguistic minority, and the status differences of languages generate chances inequalities.

An equitable solution to this problem would be 1. either to replace the lingua franca with English (or with another "third" language), 2. or to create the conditions for a symmetric multilingualism. The latter would mean that the languages used in the region would be given equal status in all interaction situations. This requires the majority to learn the language of minority(ies). Although this possibility doesn't seem to be realistic at the time being, along with the diffusion of local, grass-roots initiatives it can have more serious chances.

For this, however, a rhetorical shift is also necessary: besides the confrontational, militant discourse of ethical nature against the hegemony of majority language, greater emphasis should be given to economic considerations, which illustrate along rational arguments that the linguistic asymmetry creates chance disadvantages for minorities. An even more important component of this argumentation – based on co-operation and the search of consensus – is a more efficient presentation of the fact that multilingualism is a social resource that could generate economic and welfare benefits for everyone, so it is worth investing in it, regardless of nationality.

The market deregulation that followed the EU membership opened up new possibilities for a

[16] Another interesting element of the story is that after Heineken realized that they insulted the Hungarian customers questioning the existence of Szeklerland, they decided to use Szekler symbols on the label of their cheaper local brand, the Harghita.

[17] Regarding the research perspective on ethical consumption and conscious consumerism see a recent analysis by Bartley et al. (2015).

"grass-roots", spontaneous expansion of multilingualism in the economy. These "new" strategies on one hand argue that multilingualism is beneficial not only for the minority, but for society as a whole in terms of aggregate welfare; and in an appropriate institutional environment, diversity has tangible (economic) benefits for everyone. On the other hand, they encourage economic actors to take the advantages given by the market and "capitalize" the solidarity of ethnic minorities: to communicate with consumers in their native language in the commercialization of their products and services and thereby to gain additional revenues. These strategies are promising, because along legitimate customer needs, as "a latent effect" or a "positive externality" they introduce multilingualism in the economy "through the back door". ❋

Acknowledgments

This article was supported by the János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences

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Partnerships norms and childlessness in Hungary and Transylvania in European view



Abstract This paper provides an overview of female childlessness and partnerships in Europe by using European Values Study – an international survey. Furthermore it focuses on Hungary and Transylvania more deeply based on interview analysis in these two societies. According to our findings, fundamental changes are currently in progress in Europe and the correlation of childbearing and the changes of relationships is going to be weaker and weaker. We found that childless women in Hungary are more tolerant towards childbearing by single mothers than their Transylvanian peers who are more emphasized the dimension of selfishness and the lack of a father model related to single motherhood. As for having children in same-sex partnership there are different attitudes: in northern and western countries were more liberal than in the southern or eastern countries. The interviews revealed that this issue has strong connection with traditional attitudes regarding families.

Keywords childlessness; partnerships; single motherhood; adoption by same-sex couples

DOI 10.14232/belv.2016.2.5 http://dx.doi.org/10.14232/belv.2016.2.5

Cikkre való hivatkozás / How to cite this article: Szalma, Ivett (2016): Partnerships norms and childlessness in Hungary and Transylvania in European view. Belvedere Meridionale vol. 28. no. 2. 66–81. pp

ISSN 1419-0222 (print) ISSN 2064-5929 (online, pdf)

www.belvedere-meridionale.hu

1 Introduction

Historically and across societies, failure to marry has been the most common reason for childlessness (Miettinen et al. 2015). This strong link between the lack of partnership formation and childlessness remained in the contemporary societies (Berrington 2004; Szalma – Takács 2015). In today's Europe, single women are still the most likely to be childless while married women are the least likely to be childless (see e.g. Portanti – Withworth 2009; Tanturri 2009). However, the link between marriage and childlessness is expected to weaken due to some social changes (Miettinen et al. 2015).

One of the social changes that can influence the strong relationship between marriage and childbearing is the substantial increase in non-marital fertility in recent decades in most European countries. In the early 1960s, no more than 10 per cent of births took place outside marriage in any European regions, while by 2012 in most European regions the proportion of births out of wedlock was around 40% (Oláh 2015). Since Scandinavian countries are often the forerunners in demographic trends, out-of-wedlock births started to increase there already from the 1960s, and other regions (Western-Europe and Central-East European societies) followed two decades later. Finally, in the last decades Southern European countries also showed increase in out-of-wedlock births (Oláh 2015).

The spread of new partnership formations such as living apart together (Levin 2004) also contributes to some form of single parenthood, since the partners do not live in the same household. However, some researches showed that in most cases this partnership formation is chosen by partners who have children from their former relationships and try to avoid disrupting the environment their resident children are familiar with (Beaujouan et. al 2009).

As regards childbearing, not only cohabitation was an indispensable partnership norm but also heteronormativity was a strong norm in all societies until the 21 century. However, new forms of families have emerged since 2001, when the adoption of children by same-sex couples was allowed for the first time in the Netherlands.[1] By now it has become legal in 15 European countries so the link between heteronormativity and having children has also weakened.

The other social change which can weaken the relationship between marriage and childlessness is the availability of fertility treatments for single women and same-sex couples. ART is increasingly perceived as one way to alleviate the problems of involuntary childlessness. 'An estimated five million babies have been born with the help of assisted reproduction in the past four decades, a sizable share of them in Europe' (Prag–Mills 2015).

This paper contains two parts: in the first part we examine what kinds of norms are needed to have children regarding partnership norms in all over Europe. In particular we try to understand whether there is any difference among European countries or we cannot observe any different patterns across Europe. To map the European attitudes in this question we analyse international survey data. In the second part of the analysis we try to dig deeper in understanding the relationship between norms regarding partnership formation and childlessness by analysing 31 interviews conducted with childless women in Hungary and Transylvania.

2 Social norms of childbearing: norms regarding partnership

As regards childbearing a commonly shared opinion is that this life event has great significance not only on micro but also on macro level (e.g. Ellingsaeter et. al 2013; Szalma 2011).

[1] robably this forms of families existed before 2001 but it was the first time when it became visible and legally accepted

Childbearing is beyond question directly indispensable for a society to reproduce itself. Taking a close look at the issue of childbearing we realize it is no different from any other life event: it is again a socially embedded life event interwoven by an array of norms. Several norms define e.g. the ideal age of having children (Paksi – Szalma 2009); we only need to think of pregnancy at a young or an old age, towards which the majority of society is not liberal. Norms also influence what material conditions we consider required to become parents (Szalma 2010), or what marital status we regard as ideal for raising children (Szalma 2010).

❖

Most sociologists believe that in order to regard a rule or expectation to be a norm, three criteria have to be fulfilled. Firstly, it has to prescribe certain behaviour (or on the contrary, prohibit it). Secondly, society needs to share consensus about the rule in question. Finally, the third criterion is that the rule or expectation has to be of constraint character, i.e. its violation must be punished by some sanction (Settersten 2003). Does it entail any sanctions if one has a baby at an age not considered ideal by most people? Sanctions may be informal as well, such as mocking, disdain and gossip. For example, if a woman has no partner, her pregnancy might become the object of ridicule in a specific community.

Heckhausen's (1999) argumentation says that it is unnecessary to propose sanctions connected to age norms since they are norms that have already been internalized by the majority of people. It can be also true for norms regarding partnership formation for childbearing- they have also been internalized: stable heterosexual partnership was needed for the transition to parenthood. Due to the social changes both at individual level (types of partnership) and macro level (changes in the legal background of access to assisted reproduction technologies and legitimizing adoption by same-sex partnerships in some countries) the social norms regarding partnership formations might have changed.

Since births out of wedlock became more and more widespread, the high divorce rate and single parenting swept away the informal sanctions so the social norms became more and more liberal regarding partnership formations at individual level. Furthermore, we can also witness how the legal sanction appears with the spread of assisted reproduction technologies. The following European countries permit singles to utilize ART services in 2013: Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Russia, Spain and the United Kingdom (Prag – Mills 2015). When it comes to lesbian women, the situation is less liberal, only the following European countries permit them to use this service: Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Spain and the United Kingdom. Additionally, the new legislation such as adoption by same sex parents at macro level also brings legal possibilities for gay and lesbians to have children (Takács–Szalma 2014).

3 Data, variables and methods

The European Value Study (EVS) is a large-scale longitudinal survey research programme applying multistage probabilistic sampling and has been assessing the value choices, attitudes and norms of citizens on the continent according to a standardized set of criteria every nine years since 1981. The EVS is a cross-national comparative survey planned according to rigorous standards. The survey was recorded with the help of interviewers. The representative sample

of Hungarian citizens over 18 included 1513 respondents, while the sample for 34 countries consisted of 45863. The sample size of the specific countries was as follows: 808 respondents (in Iceland) and 2075 in Germany. The survey has always contained questions investigating social norms related to childbearing. However, we examine them only from the second wave of 1990 as that was when Eastern European countries, among others Hungary, joined the EVS for the first time.

Two questions are included concerning family formations: *'If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent, but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?'* and *'If someone says a child needs a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily, would you tend to agree or disagree?'* At both variables the only possible answers are 'yes' or 'no'.

In addition, the question of our interest examining attitudes to adoption by homosexual couples and assisted reproduction was included in the last round of EVS. Each participating country must (should) list and ask variables in exactly the same form as they appear in the central survey. Despite that, the Hungarian version of the questionnaire included a statement completely different to the original question of our interest. Instead of the original variable saying: *'Homosexual couples should be able to adopt children'* – the Hungarian version of the questionnaire included a statement to the contrary: *'Homosexual couples should not be allowed to adopt children'*. Even if the scale is reversed the two statements are methodologically incomparable, thus we will bear this difference in mind when comparing Hungarian data with other countries.

To analyse survey data descriptive statistical methods were applied to show European's attitudes to family formations connected to childbearing. The 34 countries examined were the following: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Holland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. We want to demonstrate differences among the countries as well as changes with time, so we also present cross-sectional data whenever possible - of 1990, 1999 and 2008.

Beside the secondary analysis of survey data we also made an interview survey. In the summer of 2012 twenty life path interviews in Hungary[2] and in the spring of 2014 eleven interviews were conducted with childless heterosexual women in Transylvania[3]. From age point of view the sample was selected as follows: women aged minimum 35, but the sample was carefully chosen to include women from every age group. The sample is stratified according to educational level: low educated (no secondary school leaving exam), secondary level as well as higher educated women were represented. Beside age and educational level the sample was also stratified according to the place of residence in Hungary: it included interviewees from Budapest, the capital, some from a regional capital and some from a village of 3000 residents. However the interviews were conducted only in the biggest city of Transylvania: Cluj-Napoca with Hungarian minorities. The composition of the sample is summarized in Table 1.

[2] The 20 interviews conducted in Hungary were analyzed in detail in a previous publication titled: Szalma – Takács 2014.

[3] Here I would like to thank Izabella Szabó, who conducted the interviews for her BA thesis and kindly allowed me to analyse the data.

Table 1 ❖ *Sample composition*

Educational level		Partnership		Residence		Age	
HUNGARY							
Low	7	Married	3	Village	10	35–45	7
Secondary	7	Single	12	Regional capital	5	46–59	9
High	6	Other partnership (cohabitation, LAT)	5	Budapest	5	over 60	3
Total	20	**Total**	20	**Total**	20	**Total**	20
TRANSYLVANIA							
Low	2	Married	5	Cluj-Napoca 46-59 over 60		35-45	7
Secondary	4	Single	3			2	
High	5	Other partnership (cohabitation, LAT)	3			2	
Total	11	**Total**	11	**Total**	11	**Total**	11

The interviewees were sought with the help of the snowball method. The social sensitivity of the topic was clearly demonstrated as many people eagerly "protected" their childless acquaintances by not forwarding our interview request, saying it would be emotionally painful for them to discuss. However, only few interview respondents secluded themselves completely. In this respect differences appeared according to age: those in their early forties were especially sensitive to the topic, presumably because they were in the process of accepting their childlessness to be final.

4 Results from the survey data

4.1 Childbearing as a single parent

As the single-parent family model is abundant in every European society (due to divorce, the death of one parent or women's decision to have children without a stable relationship) it is worth examining the attitudes of people in the various societies to women who want to be single parents (see Figure 1).

Figure 1 ❖ *If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent, but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship with a man*
Agreement rate with the above statement (%)



Source: European Values Study 1990, 1999 and 2008

Interestingly, in this issue we cannot find any differences among northern, eastern and western countries. For example Croatia is on the supportive side along with Lithuania, Serbia, Romania and Slovenia. The most supportive countries are Iceland and Spain, while Norway, the UK, Ireland, Portugal and Italy are less tolerant. Surprising as it may be, Norway is among the less supportive countries in spite of the fact that it is very often a precursor to most demographic changes. This might be due to the strong cultural norm of Norwegian society saying that childbearing must be a mutual decision of the parents (Ravn – Lie 2013). The least tolerant countries include Turkey, Malta, Cyprus, Albania and Slovakia. If we consider the trend over time, we can observe that except for Finland, Portugal and Italy all the countries became more and more supportive of the idea that women can have children even without a stable relationship.

This very mixed picture according to European regions might be because respondents may have associated different things to this statement. For example some people might have thought that if a woman stays alone with her children (because of divorce or death of the partner) she can opt to raise a child as a single mother in some Eastern European countries.

The following statement analyses a similar issue: 'A child needs a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily'.

Figure 2 ❖ A child needs a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily
Agreement rate with the above statement (%)



Source: European Values Study 1990, 1999 and 2008

Demonstrably (see Figure 2) in all the countries in 1990 more than two third of respondents agreed with the statement that children needed mothers as well as fathers to grow up happily. By 2008 the rate of supporters in the northern countries had significantly decreased. The highest agreement rate was found in Greece and the post-socialist countries. In contrast, the northern countries, the UK, Ireland and Portugal agreed with this statement to the least.

4.2 Childbearing by same-sex couples

The investigation of social attitudes towards adoption by same-sex couples has particular relevance because since the 2000s the legal institution of adoption by same-sex couples have been established in several European countries (for example in Holland in 2001, in Sweden in 2003, in Spain in 2005, in Ireland and Belgium in 2006, in Norway and Denmark in 2009, and in France in 2013).

In countries where same-sex couples are allowed to adopt children the society is much more liberal towards same-sex partnerships, while respondents are the most dismissive in countries where neither same-sex partnership nor adoption by such couples has been institutionalized. The relationship might be a two-way one. On the one hand, legal institutions for same-sex couples could only have been set up in countries with more liberal societies, and on the other hand, any legal acknowledgement of same-sex partnership and/or adoption by homosexual or lesbian couples may affect and shape social attitudes as well (Takács–Szalma 2011).

Figure 3 ❖ Homosexual couples should be able to adopt children (1-strong disagreement 5-strong agreement)



Source: European Values Study 2008

According to Figure 3 we can observe that the most tolerant countries are the ones with legal possibility for same-sex adoption, such as the Netherlands, Belgium and the northern countries.

5 Results from the interview data: Hungary and Transylvania

In Central-Eastern Europe there have been only a limited number of empirical studies focusing specifically on childlessness [see, for example, Hašková 2010, 2011 and Mynarska et al. 2013. for Czech and Polish findings]. However, it can be expected that (at least partly) different reasons contribute to the development and increase of childlessness in Central-Eastern Europe than in Western Europe, especially regarding partnership norms.

According to the statistics we can find similarities between Hungary and Romania in the traditional family attitudes (Murinkó 2014), low fertility rate and low childlessness rate (OECD Family Database), although we can find different rates in the share of births outside of marriages in Romania (31%), which is much lower than in Hungary (44,5%).

As for legal backgrounds there is no legal option allowing joint adoption by same-sex couples either in Hungary or in Romania. Furthermore, in Hungary there is institutional discrimination regarding the impossibility of assisted reproduction for women living in a lesbian partnership (See: Article 167 of the Hungarian Health Care Act – No. CLIV. of 1997). In Romania there is not even a legal option for partnership formation for gays and lesbians, so the aforementioned discrimination against lesbian women in case of assisted reproduction does not exist.

In the next subchapters we will focus on partnerships norms related to childbearing based on the 31 interviews in the two societies.

5.1 Lack of partnership and childlessness

The Hungarian sample includes 11 single women, two of whom used to be married. Four women never cohabited with anyone before. In their cases there were various underlying causes such as problems brought from the parental home or the lack of social relationships.

'As a matter of fact my choice was quite out of my league… our dear mother is rather dominant, that's why I accepted a lot of things the way she wanted, just to keep peace.' (Evelin, 45, high educated, Hungary)

One of the respondents blames the career she chose in her twenties for keeping her at home and not allowing her to socialize enough.

'In other words I kept sitting at home beside my sewing machine and didn't go out. Well, who or how on earth could have met me? Not a chance.' (Irén 58, low educated, Hungary)

The other key reason is that the parents, especially the mothers do not want the youngest children to leave home.

'And for two years, but then some time passed, and he could eventually come into our house, but then in the end my dear mother did manage to scare him off.' (Jusztika, 67, low educated, Hungary)

They all have in common that they regret the way this part of their lives turned out and said if they could have a fresh start, they would make different choices and try to establish relationships.

'That period (of mating) is the only time in my life which, if I could have another go at it, I would probably do it somewhat differently' (Evelin, 45, higher educated, Hungary).

'I've realized since then what a bad decision it was. It was quite early, let's say, for me to stay at home at the age of 20… If I hadn't stayed and I had found a job somewhere else, I may not have remained single.' (Irén, 58, low educated, Hungary)

'I should have been more independent and determined' (Jusztika, 67, low educated, Hungary).

The Transylvanian sample includes 4 single women, all of whom have partnership experiences from the past. The main features of singleness here are too much work and/or distance between the partners. For example one of the women still lives in a LAT partnership but she considers herself single.

'Did you say you were single?' (interviewer)

'You cannot call a long-distance relationship cohabitation, there's no common life actually… The idea of having children has come up, but we don't live in the same household, so I don't think it makes any sense' (Gréta, 40, higher educated, Transylvania).

'I did not follow him (abroad), he didn't stay here, so we broke up' (Márta, 35, secondary school education, Transylvania)

'We were busy working and we rarely allowed ourselves any spare time' (Szabina, 46, secondary school education, Transylvania)

We can observe that in Transylvania more respondents explained their lack of partner status (more precisely quasi lack of partner status) by the distance. It seems that living in minorities often induced that people chose partners from a different settlement than their own hometown.

5.1.1 Quality of relationships

Regarding childbearing questionnaire surveys have also highlighted the importance of having a relationship, i.e. married couples have a bigger chance of having children than cohabiting couples, and people in any type of relationship have a bigger chance to have children than singles. Questionnaire surveys, however, do not allow us to understand the potential reasons why a couple remains childless in spite of having no health problems. Although demographic surveys (e.g. 'Turning Points of our Life') normally include questions concerning relationship quality, due to social pressure on respondents to view their current relationships as good, they can hardly be considered reliable (Kapitány 2012).

From the 20 Hungarian interviewees one married and one cohabiting woman reported the reason why they chose not to have children was because they were dissatisfied with the quality of their relationships.

'The one I live together with is a horrible character. Maybe he would like children, but he never clearly says so. He only says now that I'm 40, I should do something for this purpose. I think he suspects I don't want a child into such a relationship. I never told him that exactly, but I think he feels it. It's in the air.' (Erika, 40, low educated, Hungary).

Marika cheated on her husband several times and they have already thought of divorce. Eventually they did not get divorced, but since their ideas about raising children were extremely different, Marika decided not to bring children into the relationship.

'And when he stated once in a while that upbringing children requires a belt, I said not mine. And I thought as we don't share exactly the same ideas about child raising, we would probably have divorced after their birth, if not sooner.' (Marika, 50, secondary school education, Hungary)

It is interesting that the quality of the relationship appeared as an important factor also in the Transylvanian sample.

'In those (previous) relationships, I mean the way there were, I simply didn't feel any urge to have children. I would have felt trapped in either of them with a baby.' (Eszter, 35, higher educated, Transylvania).

'Although we meet every day, a partnership takes a bit more than that, so the issue of having children has never come up.' (Szabina, 46, secondary school education, Transylvania).

All in all we can say that having a relationship is necessary to have children in most cases but not a sufficient factor in itself. The quality of the relationship also matters in both societies and this question can hardly be investigated by surveys.

5.2 Childbearing without relationship is acceptable?

Although most single respondents regarded the lack of relationship as the reason for childlessness, we asked all of them about their opinion of women who raise their children by themselves, and if they had ever thought of having children alone. Various opinions were expressed. Some considered it brave, others simply selfish. Astonishingly no remarkable differences could be observed in this issue either according to educational level or age (or settlement types in Hungary). The differences were rather determined by religious values: women who claimed to be religious tended to view single parenting as selfish.

'I regard it as a rather selfish objective that I say okay, I want a child, and then I subordinate everything to that goal.' (Emma, higher educated, aged 40, Hungary).

'That's a very brave thing to do.' (Kati, secondary school education, aged 62, Hungary).

"She is not able to have a child alone" (Orsolya, 40, secondary school education, Transylvania)

'If there's no other solution and a woman really wants to have a child alone, then she should do so. I think it's alright' (Eszter, 35, higher educated, Transylvania).

In Transylvania the importance of the two genders is more emphatic so they have more concerns about single parenthood. However, all of them emphasized that if a woman's life takes a turn and she ends up being left alone with a child, she has to do her best to bring up the child. This indicates that some of them did not even understand the question regarding having children alone, but immediately pursued the idea and wondered what might possibly result in a situation when a woman must raise a child by herself (divorce, death of the partner).

'It's not okay because a child needs parents of different genders both from the point of view of sharing household chores and the normal development of the child's own gender identity' (Gréta, 46, university education, Transylvania).

'A child with only a mother will never learn what it's like to have a man in the family and what are a man's roles in a family.' (Marika, 50, secondary school education, Hungary)

'I think a child needs to see both a woman's attitude as well as a man's to find their own reference.' (Orsolya, with a secondary school leaving exam, 40 years old, Transylvania)

All interviewees agreed that raising a child can be very difficult, both financially and mentally. Low educated women lay a bigger emphasis on the financial side, while higher educated on the lack of free time in Hungary.

'Well, it's tough. Also financially.' (Aranka, 45, lower educated, Hungary)

'Nowadays demands are so high, children need to be dressed so perfectly that I think the mother alone could not afford that.' (Irénke, 78, low educated, Hungary)

*'Well, it's a financial challenge in the first place as she has to earn what's needed for everyday life' (*Izabella 40, with a secondary school leaving exam, Transylvania)

'Single parents can't make it to a lot of places, and many issues are more difficult to solve.' (Lili, higher educated, Hungary).

'Well, nowadays it's a financial difficulty, not to mention a schedule, which depends on how much help a mother gets from her parents or friends'. (Márta, 35, secondary school education, Transylvania).

All of them agreed that a supportive environment (mostly grandparents, relatives, friends, nursery school and kindergarten) is indispensable if you want to raise children alone.

'It could be an aunt, an uncle, a cousin, or someone else from the wider family, anybody. I don't believe it should necessarily be the child's father, but somebody or some people who can help once in a while. Sometimes physical or constant presence isn't even the point, but the thought itself might also be very helpful, in my opinion, to have someone I can turn to in case of trouble.' (Evelin, higher educated, 48, Hungary)

'And for my mom too, because my grandma was there. So we were looked after, and as I said, we had this cohesive supervision in the street.' (Kati, secondary level education, aged 62, Hungary).

'It's great to be able to count on the parent financially, or when help is needed to look after the kids or something similar, a parent is the best support.' (Jusztika, low educated, aged 68, Hungary).

'Some help from outside is definitely necessary' (Aliz, 40, university education, Transylvania).

Beside personal relationships the lack of nursery and kindergarten services were mentioned as well, which is an enormous problem especially for single parent families.

'If there's only one breadwinner in the family, the only way to manage the children is with the help of nursery schools or kindergartens. I don't really think there are enough of them.' (Lili, higher educated, aged 43, Hungary).

5.2.1 Would you dare to have a child alone?

As for whether they themselves would have had children alone, we received heterogeneous answers. Again, no differences were shown according to residence type or educational level, but rather according to age in Hungary. Members of the older generation believe that in their times they would have been scandalized, thus even if they could start their lives again they would make the same choices. However, if they could have a fresh start under the current social circumstances, they would decide to have children on their own in Hungary. In the Transylvanian sample women were less open-minded with this idea.

'I didn't think of that, I wouldn't have had the courage to do it alone. Those days it was still a very sensitive topic, single parenting was considered improper. And nowadays, if I was still young? I might decide differently. Moreover, I'm sure of it.' (Jusztika, 68,low educated)

'According to my view, and especially at that time, a family was supposed to be made up of two parents and their children. So one mother with her child was not a complete family… Well, today my opinion of that would probably be something else.' (Judit, 60, higher educated)

We found that those who refuse the idea of single parenting do not differentiate between biological or adopted children.

'A child should arrive into a relationship. I would definitely not want a child by myself. No, I haven't thought of adoption before. That also takes a couple, it's healthier that way.' (Zsuzsi, 45, higher educated, Hungary)

'You have the same sort of issues with a child be it either adopted or biologically your own, so I don't think it makes sense to have one alone.' (Evelin, 45, higher educated, Hungary)

Those who do not seclude themselves from having children alone and have no partners do not rule out the possibility of adoption either. Nevertheless they are aware of the disadvantages they would have compared to couples.

'I've always been interested in that, but I didn't have… And I heard that couples definitely had an advantage here, so I didn't think I should spend time on looking into the topic more deeply. But I often toyed with the idea.' (Gyöngyi, 50, low educated, Hungary)

'And then I opted for adoption and I did actually initiate the procedure, I mean the adoption procedure. But unfortunately [being single], I wasn't able to pull it through the Hungarian administration that time.' (Lili, 42, higher educated, Hungary).

In the Transylvanian sample most of the women stated that they would not dare to become single parents because they do not consider it as an ideal situation and they are more able to accept not having any children than having one alone. There was only one exception, a 40 year-old single woman with university degree who considers assisted reproduction as an option for her.

'I'd like to have a child so I'm seriously considering assisted reproduction' (Aliz, 40, university education, Transylvania).

5.3 Adoption by same sex couples

Surprisingly, attitudes to adoption by homosexual couples showed no difference according to social origin. Even low-educated respondents from the countryside in Hungary were permissive about the idea. It was rather in correlation with traditional views: respondents who found it important that a child has a mother and a father model were more dismissive.

'I really have nothing against it. I've always thought they're humans too. So why not? If they want a child…. and they could have one, then why shouldn't they? That's all. I mean it's such a dumb expression, so I'm not discriminative; it's their own right to make their choices I think.' (Gyöngyi, 50, low educated, Hungary)

'It's again such a degenerate thing, like, a woman raising either a boy or a girl all alone, or even worse, because what will that child see? That they're being raised by two women? Even if that child is a girl. I mean how does it look?' » (Marika, 50, secondary school education, Hungary).

In contrast, opinions in Transylvania are more reserved and permeated with hesitation due to the novelty of the phenomenon, thus they haven't formed their opinions yet or show a neutral attitude. Usually they argue that it is still better for a child to live in a family than in an orphanage.

'As an outsider I think a parentless child is still better off in the home of a same-sex couple than in an orphanage' (Tamara, 46, higher educated, Transylvania).

'For a child it's a thousand times better than growing up in an orphanage. But you just have to wait and see what opinions will emerge, as it is quite a new issue, but intuitively I would say it's okay.' (Eszter, 35, higher educated, Transylvania).

'I don't have the faintest idea. If I wanted to be politically correct, I could say I'm positive about it, but the truth is I've never had any relationship with such persons. So I'm not speaking from experience, only theoretically. I don't see any reason why they shouldn't be allowed to adopt children' (Lili, 36, higher educated, Transylvania).

In Transylvania it is also only a small minority who are definitely dismissive. Opponents again build their arguments on the idea that if a same-sex couple raises a child, the child will miss to see a father and a mother model, and one respondent distances herself on religious grounds.

'Well I don't disapprove of them, but I don't fully approve of the idea either.
That's because I think a child needs both a mother and a father, and I just don't believe either can substitute the other' (Márta, 35, secondary school education, Transylvania).

'That's a sin in front of God. It's what already happened in Sodom and Gomorrah leading to their destruction. I firmly condemn it; I condemn it as much as I possibly can. Because the judgement is not mine' (Orsolya, 40, secondary school education, Transylvania).

6 Summary

Childbearing is defined by various norms for example the one concerning age or expectations about the parents' financial situation. In the present study we only reviewed the norms regarding partnership and their evolution in Europe during the past two decades. We investigated social opinions about women choosing single parenthood, i.e. without having a relationship. We found crucial differences across Europe. In Romania for example attitudes are more liberal about

having children alone than in Hungary. Nevertheless, we assume that some of these differences are due to unclear question formation. Some respondents may have interpreted the question as one asking if it was proper of a mother to choose to raise her child alone after being left alone. Results gained from our interview survey also support this hypothesis. A lesson learned from the interview survey is that in Transylvania many did not understand how a single mother could have a child, thus considered instead extreme circumstances under which a woman remains alone and whether it is the right choice to raise her child on her own. In Hungary no such misinterpretation occurred.

In addition, the interviews also reflect that childless women in Hungary are more tolerant towards childbearing by single mothers than their Transylvanian peers. In their view women who dare to have children alone are brave in the first place, although admittedly they may be in great need of interpersonal relationships as well as an institutional network. Regarding this issue, in Transylvania the dimension of selfishness and the lack of a father model are more emphasized. Supporters again highlighted the significance of external help, by which they only meant family and relatives without mentioning any institutions.

The other topic of our interest was Europeans' opinions about adoption by same-sex couples. Just like the legal regulations, attitudes across Europe also show a great variety. We saw that respondents in the northern and western countries were more liberal than in the southern or eastern countries. This is also in harmony with the liberalization of legal regulations. In many northern and western countries gay and lesbian couples are allowed e.g. to adopt children or participate in ART as homosexual couples.

Based on the interview survey we can state that attitudes regarding adoption by same-sex couples show no difference according to social status. The issue is rather in connection with traditional attitudes regarding families. Respondents who claimed that maternal and paternal roles were equally crucial for raising children were less supportive of same-sex adoption. Moreover, in Transylvania many interviewees emphasized their uncertainty due to the novelty of this phenomenon and hence they could not formulate mature opinions. At the same time a unique argumentation also appeared saying a child might be better off if raised by a same-sex couple than in a public institution.

All in all the findings of the survey and interview analysis point out that fundamental changes are currently in progress in Europe and the correlation of childbearing and the evolution of relationships is going to be weaker and weaker. ❋

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"Even history has forgotten to write the story of women"[1]

The way of women's study to institutionalization

Abstract This study presents discourses and phenomena whose results have induced the examination of the history of women, eventually the need to discover the conflict and differences between women and men. All these have led to the methodology and examination of the differently developed identities. The institutionalization process of women's studies has promoted the emergence of the concept of social gender: gender is also a methodology to examine the domination forms created by men and women, also to examine the differences between those forms. This methodology can be used for examining their forms of connection to power as well. The way of thinking in social genders has led to historical epistemology, that is, to that theory of knowledge, with which we can understand what formation can serve the survival of a given – the forms of genders – cultural form. The study analyses those phenomena that feminist history have ignored, because mainly women's identity and their development have been examined; and those phenomena that have resulted in neglecting important issues, like: how women have determined their identity in regard of religion, race etc. At present, the discourse is in process along the so-called, 'autonomy or integration' debate, which debate is one of those important characteristics that form feminist studies; in fact, they only strive for recognition to elevate relevant feminist research into academic levels.

Keywords types of feminism, feminist historical science, women's studies, social gender, women's movements

DOI 10.14232/belv.2016.2.6 http://dx.doi.org/10.14232/belv.2016.2.6

Cikkre való hivatkozás / How to cite this article: Czibere, Ibolya: (2016): "Even history has forgotten to write the story of women." The way of women's study to institutionalization. Belvedere Meridionale vol. 28. no. 2. 82–92. pp

ISSN 1419-0222 (print) ISSN 2064-5929 (online, pdf)

www.belvedere-meridionale.hu

[1] Lajos Kiss' quote (1966): Life of Poor People. Művelt Nép Tudományos és Ismeretterjesztő Kiadó, Budapest, pg. 275

1 Discovering women for history – feminist aspirations in the tense of 'unity and diversity'

Do women have history? This question originally emerged as the title of a volume edited by Scott (2001a) calling attention to the problems of disparities between men and women and between women and women, and also to the representation of these disparities. During its long history, feminism has been struggling with the controversial consequences of disparities that arise, on the one hand, from the fact that feminism denies the idea that women would form a group based on one common biological property. In their reasoning, anatomy does not mean fate, "our mind, soul and citizenship do not have gender". On the other hand, they have started national and international political movements for the right to study and work, for the right to vote, and for the right to reproduction claiming that 'something' connects them, and not only the common experiences of exclusion determine women but the similar social and psychological 'feminine' characteristics as well. The feminists' effort to discover women for history reaches far and it is a complex and controversial process. The mystery of parity-disparity creates a tension that the feminists have been facing for a long time when they claim equality with men. Historians who have aimed to improve women's situation have searched the past for centuries to find model personalities depending on age and purpose, for example, women scientists, women writers, women artists, women politicians. They have collected stories that can refute the theories about the incapability of women declared in descriptive literature or law books. "When the argument was about education, feminists presented excellent examples to prove that learning did not distort femininity and – more radically – gender has nothing to do with how the brain works. When women demanded civil rights during the democratic revolution in the 18th century, they pointed out women with political abilities like queens or Jeanne d'Arc stating: they should not be deprived from political rights because of their gender." (Scott 2001a. 11.)

❖

Could be there a general, common identity for women if their life conditions and meaning of deeds are fundamentally different from the similar features of the modern women? Feminist history and history of feminism focus on such unanswered questions, as whether the group of women is a unique or radically complex category, whether women belong to a social category that existed before history or it is created by history. The politics of feminism turns to 'women' and act in the name of them as if they formed a permanent and easily distinguishable social group, as they should be compacted into one coherent political movement. Thereby, feminism's history is the decrease of differences (class, race, gender ethnicity, political religion and socio-economic status) in order to form a common female identity (usually against male domination). As long as feminist history serves the political objectives of feminism, it takes part in the creation of this essential, common female identity. However, feminist history analyses the conditions that create or do not create common female identity in a way: it examines the different environments women lived in - and their effects, and whether women accepted or refused those behavioural rules that societies set up. The results of the examinations showed fundamental differences between the identity attributed to women and identity recognised by women. These identities change over time and are different in every society; moreover, they change in the case of the same woman depending on the environment. The extremely great historical and cultural differences between women apparently make it impossible that history should treat this social group as a homoge-

neous group, even the differences have a history that can be examined. These differences are created in a specific environment, and "(…) the differences create such relations that are usually hierarchical in the groups, and make it possible to ignore complexity, contradiction and inner inequalities. How and to what extent the differences work (with multiple references and metaphorical associations) is a question that can be only answered in each example." (Scott, 2001a. 9.). In this sense, the history of women does not mean the examination of oppression or heroism, it rather means the exploration of how the gender differences were used for different social and political legitimations and for the formulation and rejection of different social norms. In agreement with Scott's view, the research should not aim to eliminate differences but to discover and understand them. The feminist history has considered women to be an existing social category before history; nevertheless, it has also proved that the existence of this social category changed along with history. "We are to realize that if we write women into history, it would necessarily bring about the re-definition and expansion of traditional definitions with historical importance, as well as the framework of personal and subjective experience, public and political activities. It is not an exaggeration to say that despite the uncertain initial steps, this methodology re-writes not only women's history but history itself." (Gordon–Buble–Shrom Dye 1976. 89.).

In the 60's, historians who researched women aimed not only to demonstrate women's presence in the events that formed history but also to find proof that women took active part in these events. According to them, if women's subordination was assured by their invisibility, then historians can stimulate emancipatory processes with works on social struggles and political achievements that make women visible. By exploring stories about women's activity, these historians not only presented new information but also created a new point of view and approach regarding what we consider history. "When the question arose, why these facts were ignored and how these can be understood today, history became more than fact-finding. Since the new approach to history depends on the historians' point of view and the question they raise, the process of making women visible was no longer a simple search for new facts. Rather, it became the exposure of such new interpretations which not only offered new understandings of politics, but that of the changing significance of family and gender." (Scott 2001a. 13.). With all these, historians provided empirical evidence for the persisting differences between women thus refuting feminism's right of a requisite for the homogeneous female unity. Therefore, the history of feminist movements can be mainly interpreted in the context of the tension between unity and diversity. This conflict is exemplified by the documented feminist conference held in France at the beginning of the 20th century, which was deeply divided by the class issue. The debate broke out because a proposal was submitted that demanded a day-off for maids; it was rejected on the ground that the maids would work as prostitutes in their free time. As a result, socialist accused feminists that they only stood for middle-class women. Those who considered women as a homogeneous group and feminism as the movement of every women responded, that since there were no two female genders, there could not be a bourgeois and a socialist feminism at the same time. Here the issue arose that solidarity might never be established between women belonging to different classes.

However, the feminist movements of the second half of the 20th century organised their debates and clarified their messages along diversity, that is, they recognised the problem of class differences. A good example was shown for this, when in the USA, Afro-American women took up using the term 'coloured women' at the end of the 1970s to emphasise that feminism was so obviously "white". They claimed that race cannot be separate when it comes to interpreting female

experience, therefore, irreconcilable differences exist between white and non-white women, their different needs and interest make establishing a common program impossible. To illustrate this, Scott presented a speech made by an African-American poetess in a conference in New York in 1979: 'If white America's feminist theory does not have to deal with the differences between us and the differences in oppression resulting from it; then how you would deal with the fact that those women who clean your houses and take care of your children while you are taking part in a conference about feminist theory are mostly poor and coloured people. What theory is behind racist feminism?" (Scott 2001a. 17.). By the end of the 20th century, the approaches to diversity became an important analytical category of feminism, which provides a new type of interpretation framework since it interprets the differences and different identities between women in relation to certain circumstances and history. As seen before, the history of women is one of those topics that history has recognised since the 1970s. This short period can be divided into 3 phrases and cognitive models (Pető 2001). The compensation phase or separation school advocated the writing of 'her story' instead of 'his story' and fought for women's visibility and that history would ever bear women in mind. In this regard, it was time to change Virginia Wolf's famous statement ("For most of history, Anonymous was a woman"). Works appeared in this phase that dealt with the biography of famous women. It was easy to research these women – successful in men's world too –, since there was a relatively rich source of material available. Pető includes those topics in this phase that deal with the history of women's institutes, women's education and their right to vote, furthermore, works dealing with women's employment, world of paid work and being at home, or issues of family and reproduction. The criticism of this conception is rooted in "that any personality or historical deed becomes positive and significant because of being a woman or done by a woman" (Pető 2001. 43.). The second phase is the so-called contribution school that examines women within sociohistory as a separate social group and it uses the methodology of sociohistorical schools like sociology and ethnography. Its significance is that it focuses on a particular social group within sociohistory. These two schools led to the institutionalization of women's studies. By the beginning of the 1980s (third phase), the term, social gender emerges, which is also a methodology to examine the forms of domination created by men and women, what differences determine these, and how they relate to power.

2 "The best that has happened to women in science is the birth of women's studies"[2]

2.1 Social genders in public discourses

The beginning of the conceptual etymology of gender relates to de Beauvoir who first separated analytical and political use of biological and social gender in his work with his famous statement (one is not born to be a woman, but becomes one) (Beauvoir 1969). The primary aim of the gender concept was to question the validity of those theoretical explanations that traced inequalities between genders back to nature, that is, to biology and consequently considering them unchangeable, fatal and deterministic. The differentiation based on gender is a universal phenomenon just like the labour division between genders, yet determining the content of

[2] Shulamith Reinharz's thoughts. In "It is important to have our own home" – Andrea Pető talks about women's studies with Professor Shulamith Reinharz. *Saturday* 22 November 2014

divided tasks differs in each culture (Magyari-Vincze quotes Oakley 2006). The emergence of this concept was a great step in terms of the development of paradigms that critically analysed women's disadvantageous positions and subordinated status. "But why did not the sense of gender mutuality arise? Why does one member of this relationship consider himself absolute essential rejecting every kind of comparison to his correlation and determining that otherness as a very different being? Why do not women doubt the sovereignty of men? None of the subjects considers themselves inherently or spontaneously unimportant; One is not determined by Other by supposing itself to be the Other, it is just the opposite: One determines it as the Other by supposing itself to be One. In order to avoid reversal from Other to One, it is necessary for the subject to be subordinated to this unknown point of view. "But how come that the woman is willing to get subordinated?" (Beauvoir 1969. 13.). This question was formulated in this from in 1949. The duality of genders, as every duality, had generated significant conflicts by that time and these conflicts caused significant changes in the public awareness in the first half of the 20th century. Beauvoir illustrated this with Bernard Shaw's well-known saying: "The white American who has doomed Negros to clean shoes comes to the conclusion that these people are not suitable for anything else.". Beauvoir claims that this creates a regularity, when a person or group of people are kept in inferiority, eventually that person becomes inferior indeed. The relevant question arose whether it should stay this way. In America, in the 1940s, most men considered women's emancipation as a threat to men's morals and interests. Some men were afraid of female rivals as a statement published in one of the contemporary newspapers proved it. A university student claimed, "every female university student, who is going to be a doctor or lawyer, steals a place from men" (Beauvoir, 1969). It is nothing more than men's unwavering belief in their prerogatives. Nonetheless, the idea already arose that the process of emancipation might damage not only economic interests. In general, one aspect of oppression is that the oppressor benefits from oppression so that even the most miserable can feel themselves superior. As de Beauvoir said in this example: in the southern states of the USA "a poor white" could be consoled by at least not being a "dirty nigger", while the rich whites could exploit this kind of pride of the poor; similarly, in this period resulting from oppression "even the most middling man could imagine himself as a semi-god compared to women". Still, in the 1940s in America, most men did not enforce their social advantages openly. They did not claim clearly that women would be inferior since democracy permeated them more than questioning the theory that every human being was equal. At the same time however, while men treat women with benevolence and assume same interest, they claim the principle of abstract equality, yet they do not acknowledge detailed equality in practice. Therefore, as soon as men are in conflict the situation changes, men thematise practical inequality and formulate a rule to reject theoretical equality. Certain situations prove this, for example, when a man claims that his wife is worth no less just because she has no job or does not work, since housework is just as important as any other job. Yet, when they start quarrelling, the first thing the man cries out is "you would starve to death without me!". In other words, a situation emerges wherein most men honestly proclaim equality between men and women, as well as state that women have not a thing to demand, claiming simultaneously that women can never be equal with men and women futilely demand that. One of Judith Butler's thoughts may explain this phenomenon (1990): "the relationship between masculine and feminine cannot be represented in a marker economic system, in which the masculine represents the closed circle of marker and marked. Fairly controversially, de Beauvoir foresaw it coming in her work of 'The Second Sex' when she argued that men cannot settle the issue of women since they would have to play both roles of judge and litigant" (Butler 2006. 55.)

2.2 The social gender in academic discourse

"According to feminist science interpretation, science and scientific observations have been established on an ideological (sexist) basis that were previously assumed as objective and accepted. Scientific statements are based on one-sided observations, and draw conclusions and generalize over the whole society as well as explanations for power relations, only based on men's experience. This ideology has permeated everything and it is present everywhere, ensuring more advantageous positions for men, while ignoring the real values, needs and skills of women. The male-dominated research has distorted reality. They have not accepted problems relating to women authentically as women have been considered emotion-controlled. Only men can be the bearers of real creation and knowledge who are capable of independence and objectivity." (Thun 1996. 410.). The category of social gender is such an organizing principle that determines the genders' relations to each other and to the world as well as to their environment too. Moreover, in Thun's opinion, this is the organizing principle of a particular culture in terms of what power, scope of action and privileges it guarantees to the individual through the determination of social institutions. She regards knowledge and science to be such power factors and privileges, and she considers social determination of knowledge as well as the politics of knowledge and the idealistic nature of it - as basic issues of feminist research. Feminist research places women into the focus of research, just as it examines power relations from the point of view of the subordinated and oppressed; meanwhile it analyses the gender order of a role in the reproduction of social inequalities, which structures situations and experience on individual level (Magyari-Vincze 2006). The research of social gender draws the attention to two things. The first, 'gender' is a central category structuring social inequalities, which determines chances for life and the range of available social positions, that is, the relationship of genders has a hierarchical nature on a social level (Belinszki 2003). The second is that the relationship between social gender and biological gender is complex; therefore, it is impossible and misleading to identify biological differences with different social behaviours, or to trace inequalities to biological roots. Consequently, the social gender can also mean that information about women is the information about men as well; examining one of the genders includes the examination of the other. It rejects the idea of considering spheres separate as means of interpretation, maintaining the idea that separated examination of women would perpetuate the myth that experience of one gender does not or only marginally relates to the experience of the other gender. The term of social gender also denotes the social relationships between the genders. Its usage openly rejects biological explanations such as the one that finds a common ground in the different forms of women's inferiority by that, that women are able to give birth and men have greater physical power. Instead, gender becomes the indicator of cultural construction – the indicator of such socially created theories that designate the proper female and male roles. Thus, it appears that the subjective identity of women and men has only a social origin.

The social practice of critical-theoretical basis of gender-specific differentiation comprises moral-philosophical core values such as equality and justice, as well as the demand for the enforcement of universal human rights and moral rights. Accordingly, the presence and extent of discrimination against women in every sphere of life – including private life – are examined, wherever the existence of male-female relationship makes it necessary. Academic disciplines (like gender-oriented sociology, science of economics, law, philosophy and ethics, political philosophy, literature, neuroscience, psychology, linguistics, pedagogy, history, anthropology etc.) that examine and criticize relationships between genders are formed in accordance with the field of manifestation, types and tools of gender discrimination.

The formation of feminist research is the part of a widely interpretable, critical socio-scientific theory (Thun 1996). It primarily raised questions from the perspective of power, economic situation, and how it embedded into historical background, then it deducted the conclusion that power relations and ideologies -ubiquitous in the whole society - prevail the same way in the scientific research like in any other social medium. According to Thun, this view challenged the status quo that so strongly permeated the world of science promoting the epistemological breakthrough that was later unfolded by postmodernism.

2.3 Women's studies, gender studies – in higher education

Women's movements initiated significant changes in institutions of higher education as well, with a continuously increasing influence on the public life in universities. Women's studies was created in the American and Western European universities in the 1970s and 1980s, and later social gender studies was established, whose departments and research centres emerged as the result of a unique development process. The feminine scientific approach arrived in higher education from outside. In reaction to civil movements, feminist-minded professors and students criticized the content and methods of education at universities, emphasizing that higher education was an exceptionally influential intermediary and conservator of the patriarchal establishment by interpreting and representing science unilaterally and exclusively. The emergence and spread of women's studies in universities and different researches took place in cascading phases of development. In the first phase – the so-called 'science without women' –, women were basically excluded from both the subject and practice of science. In the second phase – the so-called 'add women and shake them together' – women appeared as the subject of the scientific analysis. This had great importance because women stepped out of invisibility and became the subject of scientific researches with the help of being the subject; nevertheless, the statements and methods of researches still reflected male bias. In the third phase, women appeared as part of the problems concerned or as a kind of subordinate group. In this phase, the emphasis was on finding and analysing the obstacles limiting women's and ethnic groups' scope of motion in a society that was fundamentally and palpably characterized by the general and systematical discrimination of women embedded in a historical perspective. All three phases lack an essential change of attitude that would investigate society or scientific phenomena through women's experiences (Thun 1996). That is why, the fourth phase is important, which finally "interprets women within their own system of interpretation, starting from their own experiences and using their own concepts." This is the phase when being a woman and experiencing as a woman are in all respects considered values as well as authentic. Women's studies as an official scientific field developed in the USA and Great Britain in the 1960s and, as seen before, the concept of social gender became its central organizing principle. Experiences and thinking of women that developed during history became the subject of women's studies, which is necessary to correct the distorted androcentric interpretations of human behaviour, culture and society. Through this, women's studies refuses the rigidity of traditional categories and labels, while it insists on the flexibility of interdisciplinary approach.

The University of California in San Diego launched the first officially recognized program of women's studies in 1970. In Europe, women's studies first appeared in the western countries in 1970s as part of the woman's rights movement. In university courses, the disciplines hosting women's studies were sociology, history and literature. Today, women's studies is widespread everywhere in a broader sense within humanities and natural sciences. Examining the ins-

titutionalization process of women's studies in Europe, four phases of development can be distinguished. In the first phase – the so-called activist –, women's studies are embedded in the facultative subjects of a key science. In the second phase, women studies is an independent discipline, wherein universities offer general and thematic courses, which brings forth a sort of interdisciplinary-coordinated course. The third phase is dedicated to becoming more professional when an independent teaching faculty and departmental staff are appointed and postgraduate courses are launched. In the fourth phase, the phase of autonomy, women's studies is a recognized field of science with the same level of autonomy, same financial background and the same degree-granting accreditation like the faculty of any other field of science. Silius states that (2003), the institutionalization of women's studies is the most difficult where "typically, structures are rigidly fragmented to fit certain fields of science, where the level of university autonomy is low, and where a severe political opposition towards woman rights movements exists. (...) The modular structure of different university degrees, the possibility of interdisciplinary approach, as well as the doctrinal and financial support of state feminism (politicians of equality and/or female politicians) facilitate the institutionalization of women's studies" (Silius 2003. 61.). The institutionalization of women's studies has not yet been fully accomplished in any country, only a few countries have an independent faculty led by a women's studies professor. Remarkably, women's studies is probably the only subject in higher education that has been institutionalized entirely by women – female academicians have fought for the development of the subject, feminist female researchers have launched the first courses and women have fought for the discipline to be accepted by universities. In Katalin Koncz's summary, women's studies is "(...) the feminist science of describing-analysing women's situation. In an approach of science history, it is a stage in the organization of disciplines of a feminist perspective into an interdisciplinary science. Many consider sciences and arts cultivated by women as parts of women's studies because they contain concepts about the world formed by women. The subject of its examinations is the female gender, although it eventually collides with men, in every question during its analysis. (...) Although women's studies is aware of this, it 'only' focuses on understanding the female gender's status and only includes men in its examinations as a basis for comparison. Thus, it tries to pay back those debts of science, which make the process of scientific understanding more complete by unfolding women's actual status and mapping the reasons for their discrimination" (Koncz 2005. 126.). The experience of developed countries shows that the institutionalization of gender studies provides a number of advantages on one hand, as material resources get allocated for financing, and a considerable infrastructure (courses, specializations, professorship, and so on) gets built around it. On the other hand, its development has taken a path which has closed it up," meaning that researchers of this topic have remained among themselves. They discuss their research results in isolation in the women's section of conferences, they publish one for the other in their own professional journals, and consequently, the published information hardly finds its way to a wider audience. On one hand, this means the construction of a narrow scientific perspective; on the other hand, it carries the political risk of giving an impression of an interest representation embedded in science, or in other words, researches dealing with women or social genders are easily accused of misandry, especially if aimed at examining and proving social inequalities. All this has been formulated along the 'autonomy or integration?' debate, which is one of the most important characteristics that form feminist studies, and its most vital goal is to actually gain recognition for feminist researches amongst academic societies. Integration strategy aims to introduce women's point of view and the perspective of relations between genders to every

discipline and academic program, in a way that it highlights sensitivity towards differences and inequalities between genders and highlights gender awareness during the discussion of every social problem. Still, the arguments raised against integration are warning that feminist research will or may lose its radical potential due to its integration into a conservative institution. That is why, autonomist strategy is more desirable which attempts to create independent programs. This is none other than the strategy of establishing a new type of discipline and academic structure, which questions the traditional establishment of universities. The main arguments put forward against autonomy point out the dangers and negative consequences of ghettoization and the stigmatization of committing misandry.

2.4 Research methods and epistemology of women's studies

Feminist theories and research methods have endeavoured to deconstruct the previously uniform social category of 'the woman'. In consequence, a revolutionary conclusion have been reached – which therefore causes a lot of controversy – that states "one can reach more realistic knowledge and describe reality more precisely if one examines women's cultural and social statuses in a way, that as a starting point, one assumes that there are differences between women and so there is heterogeneity. We only get a real image of ourselves if we examine the roots of these differences together with the consequences in the cross section of different social definitions. Women's studies claim to have great importance of coefficient consequences rooted in gender affiliation and in belonging to an ethnic or social group" (Thun 2002. 2.). Different theories have emerged over the years connected to gender-based research methods. Harding (1987) assumes that these should be investigated on three levels, from three viewpoints: research methods, research methodology, and epistemological questions. One determinative idea for researches highlighted the perceived experiences of women, and the most appropriate ways for that are the so-called qualitative methods. The criticism of this approach articulates the importance of quantitative methods (among others), because through quantitative methods, information and data expressing the social occurrence and distribution of an examined problem can be exposed to show its importance. According to these arguments, statistics often have a greater convincing power than narratives that investigate reports. The third approach assumes that the combined application of the two methods is the most efficient.

A significant issue in the methodology of gender-based researches is how to formulate our questions, how to use our methods and how to use the results of our research. Researches of this kind usually ask questions in connection to women and the hierarchical relationship between genders, and the questions are drawn from real life and examined from the subordinate's perspective. However, such a research may not necessarily intend to make theories, but instead to draw attention to social problems connected to the investigated phenomena, to react and suggest solutions to them. It is essential that the created knowledge should have a direct social benefit, it should bring a change into people's lives through pointing out, for example, how hierarchical relationships could be turned into partnerships, how social exclusion or gender-based (and other kind of) discrimination could be eliminated. Harding (1987) analyses three major gender-based epistemological branches: the empirical, the standpoint, the postmodern feminist epistemologies. According to her statements, the empirical branch developed during the period when the question of how to create their legitimacy among sciences stood in the centre of feminist researches. Among their principles, she mentions the pursuit of objectivity, neutral

data acquisition and showing the truth from women's point of view. The attitude according to which feminists can describe women's experiences better just because they experience the same events was called a naive concept by Harding. Perspective epistemology sets the Hegelian explanation in the centre, which claims that scientists and researchers dealing with women in subordinate situations are capable of identifying the problems because they achieve it from a privileged situation in some respect. This situation is the perspective of the subordinate subject, who, due to their situation, has a clearer view on reality than the one in superordinate position, and therefore not interested in changing the status quo or in recognizing the injustices of the world. Harding's third group is dedicated to postmodern epistemologies. This school eradicates the objectivist idea of scientism in the way of questioning the possibility of a universal, the existence of absolute truth, and explains that feminist knowledge is just another one of reality's possible representations. As a result of all this, a question (later answered by Haraway 1991) arises: the question of why the feminist knowledge would be any better, any more valid or any more legitimate than any non-feminist or even masculine knowledge about the same topic (e.g. considering relationships between genders). Haraway (1991) starts her argument with stating that the dichotomy between objectivism and subjectivism should be resolved. Because, she believes that the fact that we always perceive reality from a certain position or, in other words, subjectively does not necessarily mean that we could not be objective as well; therefore we may be capable of arranging our knowledge in relation to all other kinds of knowledge. In addition to these, the contrast of relativism and absolutism should also be resolved because we do not build our knowledge on the approach of one or the other; instead, we always produce partial, localized knowledge. Haraway's opinion therefore is none other than the epistemology of partial perspectives that reinterprets both subjectivity and objectivity, defining this latter clearly as the only possible localized knowledge, which is responsible and at the same time accountable compared to the principles that it clearly expresses and raises awareness for them. Many people say that this type of epistemology combines the immobility of scientism with the social responsibility for the generated knowledge most effectively.

Summary

Overall, research results employing feminist epistemology have created woman-based science. The thesis of the determining role of gender affiliation has entered the organizing principles of science from the point of view of both researcher and researched. As Thun (2002) summarizes it, "(…) women's and gender studies has performed three 'great tasks' during the past twenty years.

a) It has corrected the fact-findings of social sciences, humanities, even natural sciences to some extent, also corrected theories about 'the human being': it integrated women's knowledge about themselves and the world as a part of scientific discipline. b) It has done enormous exploratory work, created a system of new data sources about women's role and status in culture and society – as a result of historical and comparative researches. c) It has created a new scientific paradigm, a new framework for interpretation and reference. Thereby, it has modified and creatively improved the scientific thinking in structure as well as in content. It has not only expanded traditional, 'masculine' science, but pulled down its rigid framework and intended to recreate it in a polyphonic way, that is: to integrate and broadcast the values accumulated by gender and

women's studies to other fields of science through interdisciplinarity" (Thun 2002. 3.). Studies about women legitimize certain dialogue methods about women and relationships between genders, and they increase women's chances to live in a society that considers gender equality discourse and practice as natural and normal. According to Scott (2001), the phrase 'social gender' is a synonym for the word 'woman' in its simplest usage. In some cases this wording, although it only faintly refers to certain analytic terms, in fact marks the acceptability of this field of science from a political perspective. In this case, the usage of the phrase social gender serves as an indication of the scientific basis for a work, because social gender is more neutral and objective than 'women'. "Social gender is easier to insert into scientific terminology, thus it becomes separated from the feminist policy often believed to be shrill. What is more, it does not carry the inevitable declarations of inequality and authority, and it does not specify the offended party. The usage of the phrase social gender signifies a phase that can be formulated as the period of the feminist science seeking for its rightful academic place in the 1980s." (Scott 2001. 130.) ✻

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The Evolution of Social and Spatial Inequalities During Transition and Stabilization Periods in the Post-Socialist "Winner" City of Cluj, Romania

Abstract This paper deals with spatial processes linked to social inequalities in the city of Cluj, Romania during the past twenty-five years from the collapse of communism. The article is based on different methods (statistical data analysis for segregation indexes, qualitative data for interpretation) and argues that the forced urbanization process specific to the socialist period "made the foundation" for the spatial and social segregation developed during transition and economic restructuration after the post-Fordist turn reached the Transylvanian major city, Cluj. The author presents the spatial patterns of segregation through social variables like education, ethnicity, type of residence and district in tables and illustrative visual maps.

Keywords spatial inequality, segregation, quantitative analyses, maps, post-socialist city

DOI 10.14232/belv.2016.2.7 http://dx.doi.org/10.14232/belv.2016.2.7

Cikkre való hivatkozás / How to cite this article: Pásztor, Gyöngyi (2016): The Evolution of Social and Spatial Inequalities During Transition and Stabilization Periods in the Post-Socialist "Winner" City of Cluj, Romania. Belvedere Meridionale vol. 28. no. 2. 92–108. pp

ISSN 1419-0222 (print) ISSN 2064-5929 (online, pdf)

www.belvedere-meridionale.hu

Introduction

In their attempt to grasp the most salient differences between cities, photos and films usually juxtapose luxury houses with small, deteriorated ones located in poor districts on the fringes of localities. Such vivid visualizations of social inequalities, despite of their attempt to be realistic, lack an important aspect: to depict distances among social categories like the wealthy and the jobless poor. These visual representations overlook the most important principle that shape modern cities: the spatial delimitation of certain social categories, or–in other words–the fact that "*social and cultural distances*" are objectivised into "*spatial and physical distances*", certain social categories being spatially discerned too.

To open up, social realities go against these visual representations, therefore radically different types of residences will almost never be found in one another's proximity; on the contrary, same social categories are usually living in a significant proximity from each other.

This paper deals with spatial processes linked to social inequalities in the city of Cluj during the past twenty-five years from the collapse of communist regime. Although the huge literature on social inequalities in Romania (see Zamfir E. 1995; Zamfir C. 2001; Molnar 1999, 2009; Péter 2006, 2007) carefully accounts quantitative and qualitative aspects of the issue, territorial representation of social disparities are approached only by a few of them (see Stănculescu – Berevoiescu 2004; Mionel 2010; Pásztor 2003, 2006, 2007). Meanwhile the West-European and American urban sociology literature gives a special focus to the issues of segregation of the poverty and wealth, to that of ghettoes, slums and gated communities, in Romania only a small number of analyses focus on spatial inequalities and segregation.

The former socialist states engendered some special forms for social and spatial segregation. It was so, as their egalitarian politics–together with a series of social and economical decisions–shaped the very structures responsible for distributing houses for the personal use of the population. A main target for socialist modernization and urbanization was to vanish „old societies" and destroy the inner framework of traditional communities. Modifying the structure of houses by building large districts of blocks of flats which provided standardized living spaces for all social categories was one possible mean to reach that political goal (Mihăilescu – Nicolau – Greorghiu – Olaru 1994).

In communist times the housing stock was in state ownership, meanwhile the rights to distribute living- and workplaces were in charge of the central administration. Thus, either the chance of changing a workplace or that of accessing a new residence were equally reduced, or residential segregation was kept in an inferior level compared to the western states (Ladányi 1989). During transition to market economy the majority of the housing stock was passed over the property of dwellers, and thus the demand, supply and prices of homes became regulated by free market laws. If so, there is to investigate, how do economic and social changes modify the urban structures, making them to follow Western European trends?

This study seeks answers for the following questions: *How the post-1989 models of spatial inequality and urban segregation can be described? How the features of the housing stock inherited by the communist system influence the new models of spatial organizations?* Quantitative data for this analysis were taken out from various sources, some providing measurements for the analysis itself, others contribute in contextualizing the phenomena. Sources were the followings: Detailed data on sections of the 1992, 2002 and 2011 official censuses. Further, statistical database containing values of the estates in 2012 and finally data sets from the Department for Estate Records of the Cluj City Hall.

Methods for data analysis were the followings: First, analysis of the detailed census data,

by using indicators for segregation developed by Duncan and Duncan (1973) as a central category.[1] These quantitative tools were built up following Shevsky and Bell's model based on one hand on economical condition of the population (occupation, education, features of the living space) and on the other hand on demographic aspects of the family. I used methods to trace and describe the ethnic structure of the space in Cluj (see SHEVSKY – BELL in. Cséfalvay 1994. 252.). Second, I build up a database of the local real estate market based on statistics from commercials on properties available for sale. In doing so I tried to grasp differences in prices between estates settled in different areas of the city. Finally, I used some qualitative methods, such as semi-structured interviews and participant observation, which served as tools to reveal the emic aspects of these social phenomena. By using them I intended to understand *how social processes function in urban context* (e.g. Pásztor 2003)?

Major Social and Urbanization Processes in Cluj, Transylvania

Cluj is the third largest city in Romania, following Bucharest and Iaşi, as concerns its number of inhabitants; the city has an important economical, social and cultural role as a centre of the whole Transylvanian region. According to the 2011 census, the city population was 319,582 persons (418,153 persons in larger metropolitan area). Urban development of the area is defined in line with two (plus one) periods of time: the first is the historical past, reaching out until the end of WW II. followed by the socialist period; the third in this line were years of transition and post-socialist stability. However the pre-socialist period encompasses important periods of economic and social development, this paper deals only with the second and third one: the socialist and post-socialist times. The socialist system (1947-1989) developed its specific urban structure, different from the West-European model (Szelényi 1996). During these years the number of population had significantly increased, triplicating its value during the XXth Century.

Table 1 ❖ *Evolution of the City Population in Cluj Between 1930 and 2012*

Year	Population	Growth[2] (%)
1930	100 844	00.00
1956	154 723	53.43
1966	185 663	84.11
1977	262 858	160.66
1992	328 602	225.85
2002	318 938	216.27
2011	319 582	216.90

Source: CNS, 2004; INS Tempo, 2013

[1] In line with these authors, calculation of such indicators comes from the sum of the absolute value of the differences in procentual division of given social categories on a given area. 0 and 1. where 1 denotes that position of these two categories mutually exclude each other (if one meets a certain category in a certain area. it is sure that the very same category does not occur elswhere. too; this is called total segregation in accordance with the literature); 0 denotes the case where dispersion of these two categories is equal. both being present in a given percentage in the investigated area. Formula: $S=1/2*\Sigma |Ai/A-Bi/B|$. where B=Total – A. S – indicator of segregation. Ai – number of population A on the area i. Bi – number of population B (Total – A) on i. A – total number of the A population. B – total number of B population (Total – A). Some scholars define this indicator ast he number of those. who ought to move in certain areas. to obtain an equality in dispersion (Csanádi–Ladányi 1992. 94.).

[2] The increase percentage is related to the population in 1930 as the interval between the censuses differs.

This extreme ascension of the population in Cluj between 1930–1992 was caused by a forced modernization (industrialization and urbanization) and the rural-urban migration, specific for state socialism. Strong industrialization caused a major change in the occupational structure of the city: for example in 1956 the percent of industrial population was 48.1 percent, encompassing the ones employed in commerce as well as the auxiliary personnel of small-trade business owners. In that year 37.5 percent of the population were clerks and intellectuals, 7.6 percent were agricultural workers and 5.31 percent small-trade businessmen. In 1970 out of the 108,904 of employees of the city a number of 77,531 (71.2 percent) were workers (Csetri 2001). This development in industry employment remained a dominant trend in the 80's, followed by a shift in the occupational structure (see Pásztor 2003).

Lack of a Master Plan as a reference for urban planning was a specific feature of the Romanian socialist urbanization. It was so, as decisions about territorial placement of the industrial objectives were short-time ones taken at the highest political level (Benedek 2004). These local socialist types of interventions reshaped the towns and cities; meanwhile politics of systematization[3] (Deletant 1993) channelled into new directions the previously existing "classic" processes of modernization and urbanization. This is why demarcation lines of these settlements are different from the ones in Western countries.

The historical city centre of Cluj, despite of modernization in local road system, preserved its traditional aspects, and remained mainly untouched by the "grand socialist systematizations". Simultaneously other "*new socialist urban places and centres*" were constructed to become real symbols of the system: two "new centres" in Cluj were made up in the 1960's to alter the historical ones: Lucian Blaga Square[4] and Mihai Viteazul Square,[5] which lie outside of the old city walls, in it's proximity. Other areas, like the industrial (Iris, Bulgaria) and the residential ones (Mănăștur, Mărăști, Grigorescu, Zorilor) were attached to these central places of the city. Great industrial investments of the communist times took place in the north-eastern parts of the city, in the immediate proximity of the railways area.[6]

An utmost aim for socialist forced modernization and urbanization was to alter or even

[3] Notorious, known as "systematization", a Romanian socialist way to conceive urban development gave a special stress to (alternative) centers, considered being spatial representations of the new proletarian political power. "Old" and "New Centers" became places of political power, administration, education, public health services and the most important cultural activities. In many cases the urbanization conceived in the spirit of socialist notion of space meant the demolition – at least partially – of the old bourgeoisie town and its reconstruction in line with new ideology. Bucharest and Miercurea-Ciuc (administrative capital of Harghita County in Szeklerland, situated in eastern part of Transylvania) are telling and eloquent examples of these brutal policies, where new socialist centers were built to alter the old ones–these being let gone by the board.

[4] The old square, bearing the name of Saint George, was a central area until the mid XIXth century due to the presence of the University Library. Under the impact of communist policies it was enlarged in a triangular shape, becoming an area, where some new, typically communist buildings were constructed in the 1960's: the Student's House of Culture and a block of flat on its opposite side. The Saint George statue was removed into Kogălniceanu Street, the square being renamed as Peace Square, re-baptized later in 1990 in Lucian Blaga.

[5] The Mihai Viteazul Square is located on the old Széchenyi Square. In this place a new block of flats was constructed, dividing the place into two. On the ground level this block hosts one of the biggest and well-known cinemas of the city, Republica. In front of the cinema erecting the statue of Mihai Viteazul created a new, representative location for national communism. On the opposite side of the block an indoor market was made, which captured the old, traditional place of the old, local community of Hostát.

[6] Technofrig and the Matchmaking Factory were built closest to the railway station, and in the eastward direction one finds Dermata shoe factory (rebaptized as Clujana), Unirea and Carbochim, all in Bulgaria districts; Iris and Libertatea were built in Iris. CUG and Sanex were in Someșeni district.

vanish "old societies" and destroy traditional communities and collective memories. Modifying the internal structure of residential spaces by building districts of blocks of flats in order to erase the old areas was one efficient mean to reach that goal (Mihăilescu – Nicolau – Greorghiu – Olaru 1994). Owners of the demolished old houses were allocated apartments in the newly built districts, thus in 1990, in accordance with data provided by the Office for Registering Estates of the local government of the city of Cluj, only 19 percent of the population lived in (detached and semi-detached) houses–the remaining 81 percent dwelled in blocks of flats. According to the directives of the well-known Systematization Plan, previously significant residential areas should been partially demolished, and „bad-famed" ones (so called *colonies*) populated by the poor and/or Roma, were erased. In Cluj the biggest achievement of urban systematization were the five districts with blocks of flats,[7] had being built from the 1960's onwards, with uniformed, ready-made, low-quality buildings, which have been serving as living places for the majority of present-day Cluj dwellers. These districts are highly populated, with a short distance between the buildings. Number of the inhabitants is over 200-300 on 100 m^2 of the total surface. A medium surface for these apartments was of 34.9 square meter; the living area was 12 m^2 per one resident (Pásztor 2003).

Features and intensity of the post-1990 urban development were influenced by the following major processes: a) the democratization of the political system, which engendered a stronger influence of local, political and administrative bodies on decision-making, and which also made room for local initiatives; b) the changes in the economic structures, transition to market economy through privatization, the increase of private property followed by a strong globalization of the local economy; c) changes in the economic structures which enhanced a decrease in industrial sector in favour of the third one; d) Industrial restructuring (deindustrialization) and e) EU-integration (Benedek 2004).

Occupational structure between 1992 and 2011 had radically changed as well: meanwhile in 1992 census data show that 46.39 percent out of the urban population worked in manufacturing and processing industry, this percentage had been almost gone half by year 2002 and decreased to a fifth by 2010. In opposition, the number of employees in the third sector had significantly raised: in 1992 it was 47.4 percent, 67.9 percent in 2002 and 77.8 percent in 2010. Major increases occurred in the realm of commerce, public alimentation, and hotel services from 9 to 21 percent, financing, banks and insurances from below 1 percent to almost 6 percent from the total number of the active population; such change too appeared in the realm of education.

Due to the neo-liberal politics applied by the local government after 2004, foreign investments were increased, one may even say, the city became a dragger of them.[8] Development in communication and transport enhanced a real post-Fordist transition (Pásztor – Péter 2009) with high impact. Together with all districts with houses and socialist blocks some new ones appeared for the elites and upper middle class (Gheorgheni, Europa, Bună Ziua), as well as districts for the new lower middle class (especially Baciu and Floreşti).

[7] Grigorescu, Mănăştur, Zorilor, Gheorgheni and Mărăşti

[8] Cluj has three industrial parks: Tetarom 1. Tetarom 2 (totally occupied by Emerson) and Tetarom 3 (initially occupied by Nokia and Transcarpatica, but after the withdrawal of the former the majority of the place is now used by Italian DeLonghi); plans for developing a Tetarom 4 were already carried out. A great majority of the investments in Cluj are malls and supermarkets. The biggest of this kind is Polus Center (140,000 m2., 140 millions of Euro). followed by Iulius Mall (85,000 m2., 45 millions of Euro). Important investments were made in the realm of communication (UPC cable network bought the locally founded Astra), as well as in the industrial sector (Ranbaxy bought medicine factory Terapia for 325 million USD. Source: http://www.capital.ro/index.php).

Spatial Inequalities and Residential Segregation

To measure social status, a series of statistical variables were used in this research: *occupation, level of education, occupational status, demographic features, ethnic structures* as well as conditions of the *housing stock*. In order to grasp the core of the residential segregation in Cluj, the variables with strong impact on spatial inequalities are subjected to a detailed analysis and presentation through this section; these ones are: *ethnicity, level of education and data on the real estate*.

In line with 2011 census data, 75.7 percent of the Cluj population was Romanians, 15.3 percent Hungarians, and only a tiny 1.0 percent was Roma (0.9 percent of other ethnic origins). These percentages are not divided equally in space; proportions of certain ethnic groups in the different districts are higher or lower than the medium. Percentage of the Hungarians, for instance is higher in districts like the downtown area (Bulgaria, Gheorgheni, house-are in Grigorescu, Abator) and their number is lower in the neighbourhoods built in communist period (like Mănăştur, Mărăşti, Plopilor or even Între Lacuri). Proportion of the Roma is higher in peripheral areas of Someşeni, Bulgaria and Iris. The following table presents the segregation indexes in case of different ethnic groups in 1992, 2002 and 2011:

Table 2 ❖ Segregation Indexes Based on the Variable of Ethnicity

Categories	1992	2002	2011
Romanians	0.2419	0.2465	0.2454
Hungarians	0.2480	0.2441	0.2421
Roma	0.5555	0.8059	0.8450
Other	0.4894	0.4311	0.4221

Source: Censes 1992, 2002, 2011.

As it comes out from this table above, indicator for segregation varies for different ethnic groups. Meanwhile it shows a low and relatively constant value for Romanians and Hungarians, while it is high for the Roma, and has been considerably increased during 1992–2011. In this case, the segregation index of 0.83 denotes that over 80 percent of the local Roma ought to move into other urban areas for their segregation to become zero!

Figure Nr.1



Source: Census 2011

Analysis after the level of education reveals that over one third (35.33%) of the population graduated high school and 14.3 percent vocational school. Almost one fifth (17.67%) has only primary school or no graduated school. In this case, the segregation indexes are usually similar with the ones for ethnicity, bringing into light that the city is almost equally diversified alongside to this variable. As this table below shows, level of segregation measured through the dimension of educational attainment had lowered during the 1990's and began to increase again fast in the following century. In the beginning of the 2000's the most segregated were those with university degrees and vocational schools, as well as the population without any graduated school.

Table 3 ❖ *Segregation indexes measured through the variable of education*

	1992	2002	2011
Higher education	0.5175	0.3887	0.4223
Colleges and college-level technical schools	0.2643	0.2227	0.2227
High schools	0.2108	0.1680	0.1680
Vocational schools	0.3097	0.3080	0.2998
Gymnasium, and graduation of 10 classes	0.2262	0.1751	0.1751
Primary school without graduation	0.5746	0.3250	0.3764

Source: 1992. 2002. 2011

Figure Nr. 2.



Source: Census 2011

Figure Nr. 3.



Source: Census 2011

Thus, those with superior studies are over-represented among downtown (city centre) dwellers, as well as in historical districts located alongside the north-west–south-west axis: Andrei Mureşanu, Grigorescu, Dorobanţilor and Pata Streets area. Their number is much lower in marginal districts as Someşeni, Baciu or Iris, which are areas populated mainly by dwellers with low education.

Analysis of the spatial aspects of social inequalities approached through the perspective of the housing inequalities is a controversial account, still quite frequently used by the first scholars of urban ecology as well as by today's economists and sociologists. Greer (1966) speaks about a link between living condition and social structure, coining the thesis of vicious circle of housing. In his view the structural position of housing takes in certain possibilities and social advantages; and this states for the other way round: lack of such advantages are hardly to get through. The vicious circle appears in the context of repayment: those who perform socially useful or desirable activities have better chances for accessing better living conditions, which–at a certain point–become material and symbolical resources themselves. Following this logic an inferior position in the structure of living conditions may become a structural obstacle for performing activities recognized by the society, and the default of such practices is sanctioned and reflected in the quality of living. Thus, the housing inequalities are reproduced and reinforced (Greer 1966) turning gradually individuals, who face the same housing conditions into housing classes (see Szelényi 1990). This concept enables a macro-social analysis of this issue, as it grasps the system of structural positions of housing. Rex (1968) coins his basic idea in the same line; in his view there is a shortage in (high quality) housing stock in urban areas, thus members of different social groups have unequal chances to access it (Rex 1968). Completing this theory, Musil (1982) states that social stratification could be approached only through social and cultural elements, which could be the most visible entities in the housing structure of a certain urban environments.

Such differences are important for two reasons: firstly because differences in average prices of estates settled in different areas indicate that acquisition of a certain property could be much difficult in an area than in an other. Secondly, it also reveals that amplitude and ratio of the accumulated capital will vary in function of the prices and inflation. Thus, in a considerable proportion, the location of one estate influences the amount of profit or loss deriving from its exploitation (Hamnett 1992). Thirdly, these differences are socially conditioned, or depending on the occupation, income or gender (Hamnett 1992).

In my opinion, the analysis of property prices could be and adequate method to grasp spatial segregation, as these values are–at one hand–indicators for estate quality and also an index of those social factors that influence the evolution of prices. The social perception of the area, for instance, may have a strong and special role in this evolution. Therefore I made up a database of commercials/announcements about selling and buying real estates; it contains ads that occur in the most important real estate agencies from Cluj[9] in the print and on-line version of the *Piaţa* weekly newspaper.[10] This database contains 1002 individual cases, indicating the type, area, dimensions, price of the estate, and pieces of information about its quality (metering systems, finishes, stand for parking). Despite of many advantages, such database has its limits too. It does not contain clues about the real prices one property was sold or bought at. (Still, even if the recorded prices are higher than the real ones. differences between them are systematic, thus our statistics are not biased). To go further, these methods are unable to provide a very concise

[9] Welt Imobiliare. Edil. Nobila Casa. Elite Imobiliare. Rems şi Pitas

[10] The most important weekly with free ads issued in print and on-line version: http://www.piata-az.ro/.

image on social stratification, because our announcements do not reveal extreme poverty. The formal real estate market excludes devastated and extreme areas like Pata Rât or Byron Street, with a predominantly Roma population. It is so as these are districts with social houses, where residents may live with no legalized property rights or registered addresses. As a starting point, a regression analysis was applied to identify factors and their weight that shape estate prices. Then, by using the method of comparing means *I analysed the average estate prices for each district*. This was applied to find out how location and features of a certain estate influences its prices, in other words, to what extent could be social differences considered spatial ones? Dependent variable for this regression analysis[11] was the *estate price*, independent variables were *estate type* (old district – dummy, communist district – dummy, new district – dummy, reference variable district, Centre), estate type (block of flats – dummy), *estate surface* in square meters, existence of finishes (dummy), *metric systems* (dummy), *parking stand* (dummy), *energy efficiency* (dummy). Results are summarized in the following table.[12]

Table 4 ❖ *Regression Analysis on Variables that Influence the Estate Price in Cluj*

	Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)		5.881	.000
Surface in square meters	.887	59.392	.000
New District	-.207	-11.012	.000
Communist District	-.155	-7.115	.000
Old District	-.064	-3.392	.001
Block of Flats	-.064	-3.071	.002
Energy Efficiency	.045	3.029	.003

Dependent Variable: Estate Price. Reference Variable: Centre District
Source: Constructed Estate Database, 2012

As the table reveals, the variables defining estate prices are: *surface* (in sq. meters), *district type* (old one, built before the 1960's,[13] communist one,[14] new one[15]), *estate type* (block of flats, detached or semi-detached houses) and *energy efficiency*. The highest Beta value has the useful surface, this being the variable considerably influencing estate price; surface is followed by district type. All variables referring to the three districts take a negative Beta value, meaning that all of these have negative influence on the price compared with the reference variable, Centre. It is also noteworthy that for New District we have the highest Beta value (β=-0.207). Variables that also influence the price, true their impact is less important are the block of flats (β=-0.064) and energy efficiency (β=0.045).

To sum up, *the estate size has the strongest influence over the price, however location is impor-*

[11] To find the most suitable regression model, I used Stepwise, which includes only variables that have a p value lower than 0.05.

[12] The coefficient of determination (r2) is 0.833; one may consider this model with a high explaining value: the property price being in 83.3% explained by variables included in the model.

[13] Railway Station area. Andrei Mureşanu. Bulgaria. Gruia. Gheorgheni case

[14] Mănăştur. Mărăşti. Grigorescu. Gheorgheni. Zorilor. Iris. Plopilor

[15] Baciu. Bună Ziua. Floreşti. Borhanci

tant too for this equation. In order to grasp the meaning of such differentiation, we compared the average estate price for each district.

Figure Nr. 4.



Source: Constructed Estate Database, 2012

The analysis was carried on separately for blocks of flats, detached houses with gardens and semi-detached ones. Average prices for the former (total and standard prices for sq. m) are the following for the districts:

Table 5 ❖ *Average Prices and Average Surfaces of the Apartments in Cluj*

District	Price[16]/ m²	Estate price	Surface in m²
Centre	1 035.87	67 087.67	65.58
Gruia	1 015.75	46 606.25	43.69
Zona Gării	969.94	48 542.86	50.00
Andrei Mureșanu	963.08	77 437.50	81.00
Bună Ziua	958.17	65 178.95	71.32
Zorilor	943.53	52 000.00	56.46
Borhanci	931.88	45 600.00	49.60

[16] All prices are in Euro, this being the currency in all the ads.

Gheorgheni	920.98	43 966.41	48.82
Plopilor	910.71	57 166.67	62.42
Mărăşti	897.98	47 160.96	52.98
Grigorescu	897.55	48 423.73	54.56
Mănăştur	885.96	44 981.28	51.40
Baciu	812.29	42 188.24	53.35
Iris	796.39	23 218.75	30.13
Dâmbul Rotund	768.36	35 471.43	49.14
Someşeni	745.17	18 785.71	25.14
Floreşti	540.42	37 113.64	70.27
Total	906.16	48 832.61	54.53

Source: Constructed Estate Database, 2012

In Cluj the average price for an apartment in block of flats is 906 Euro/m^2, as well as 48,832 Euro, the medium size of an average apartment for sale is 55 m^2. The lowest prices per m^2 are in the new districts with blocks built in the 2000's like Baciu (812,29 Euro/ m^2) and Floreşti (540,42 Euro/ m^2) and in the communist districts settled in the industrial areas of the city, like Iris (796,39 Euro/ m^2) and Dâmbul Rotund (768,36 Euro/ m^2); Someşeni is an exception for this case,[17] this being an area with detached houses and–except one building built in the 1990's–only a very few blocks built in the 1970's that served as dormitories for industrial workers and the army. As the following table shows, price per $m^2$of an apartment settled in the downtown area is almost double compared to one in Floreşti.

Cheaper apartments can be found in these districts too. It is so, as houses with the smallest surface in the city were built in these areas. Except Someşeni, the cheapest houses in Cluj are in Iris (average surface 30.13 m^2. average price 23,219 Euro), Dâmbul Rotund (average surface 49.14 m^2. average price 35 471 Euro), new districts in Floreşti[18] (average surface 70.27 m^2. average price 37,114 Euro), Baciu[19] (average surface 53.35 m^2. average price 42,188 Euro). Average prices for detached or semi-detached houses (total price and standard price for m^2) are the following in each district:

[17] It is a former village attached to the city in 1968 (Gaal 2001). which preserved its rurual features until today. A significant part of the residents live in detached houses. many do gardening as second activity or live out of agricultural work even nowdays. The airport was built in the area. and so was the European road E576. and the place is traversed by the railways. too. All these make the district an important industrial and commercial region.

[18] This is a neighboring bigger village located in the western part of the city. Due to the local property investments the place became one of the most important suburbs of Cluj. Until the late 1990's the village preserved its rural character. having residents. who lived in detached houses with gardens. The aggregate of new buildings. mainly blocks of flats. were erected on the former agricultural lands. According to the 2011 census. the local population is 21,832 persons. Meanwhile in 2002 their number was only 7,470

[19] Although Baciu is not a district but a bigger village settled near Cluj, it was included in this analysis. It was so. as the area become an important Cluj suburbia due the property investments during the 2000's. The place mainly preserved its rural character: locals are living in detached houses with gardens; the new properties were built between the village and the city of Cluj.

Table 6 ❖ *Average Price and Average Surface of the Houses in Districts of Cluj*

District	**Price_** m^2	**Property price**	**Surface in** m^2	**Surface of the building plot in** m^2
Andrei Mureşanu	1 563.82	392 461.54	241.85	604.54
Zorilor	1 396.48	197 846.15	162.38	368.00
Grigorescu	1 231.92	183 166.67	149.50	589.67
Gheorgheni	1 195.91	163 454.55	135.91	452.10
Centru	1 175.27	135 125.00	111.63	446.80
Bună Ziua	1 163.23	172 125.00	150.50	635.50
Mărăşti	1 089.69	99 285.71	95.71	123.20
Gruia	1 024.44	112 772.73	108.05	391.90
Bulgaria	915.79	94 500.00	108.33	253.33
Mănăştur	853.06	122 250.00	145.00	180.50
Someşeni	847.48	92 416.67	117.75	352.17
Iris	818.73	84 000.00	114.08	262.00
Zona Gării	754.79	32 333.33	42.00	120.00
Dâmbul Rotund	748.12	115 916.67	162.17	463.45
Plopilor	740.50	62 142.86	78.71	139.00
Baciu	673.64	100 555.56	165.22	588.89
Floreşti	540.05	79 812.50	149.75	323.63
Total	993.69	138 952.66	137.92	395.42

Source: Constructed Estate Database, 2012

Houses show a somehow similar stratification, slightly changed due to the differences between districts. Average price per $m^2$for the houses for sale in Cluj is of 993.7 Euro with an average price of 139,953 Euro. These estates have an average surface of 138 $m^2$with an adjacent medium size of the building plot of 395sqm. Average prices for each district are: Andrei Mureşanu (price/ m^2 1,569 Euro, average price 392,462 Euro), Zorilor (price/ $m^2$1,396 Euro, average price 197,846 Euro), Grigorescu (price/ m^2 1,232 Euro, average price 183,167 Euro) and Gheorgheni (price/ m^2 1,196 Euro, average price 163,455 Euro).

House-type estates are, on the contrary, the cheapest in districts like Floreşi (price/ m^2 540 Euro, average price 79,813 Euro), Baciu (price m^2 674 Euro, average price 100,556 Euro), Plopilor (price/ m^2 741 Euro, average price 62,143 Euro), Dâmbul Rotund (price/ m^2 748 Euro, average price 115,916 Euro) and Railway Station area (price/ m^2 755 Euro, average price 32,334 Euro).

Conclusions

I may conclude that Cluj is a relatively segregated city, having the highest segregation index for the Roma population, a group growing in size; for population with high level; and for population with low level of education. In the same time analysis of the property market shows

too, a significant degree of spatial inequality, where the district type and physical/geographical location of the estate are of high importance.

Although the analysis shows a change in the measures of the indices of segregation in post-socialist period, the character of the present territorial inequality is defined by the social structure defined by past socialist period. Before 1989 the administration of houses as well as that of workplaces was centralized, the housing stock being state owned, which kept segregation on a level lower than in western countries (Ladányi 1989). But during the 90's the majority of the houses suddenly became property of the residents and the real estate market fast started to follow the market rules. Still, estates built in socialist times make up a significant part of the housing stock. In Cluj, during the socialist forced urbanization the extremes were cleared away (poor districts as well as some houses of the previous elite groups', their residents being forced to move in newly built blocks). But these policies became unsuccessful in healing embedded social problems: poverty, previously dispersed in different areas was practically blurred; however due to the socialist housing policies a highest number of the population after the change of regime became subjected to impoverishment. Subsequently, the "traditional" poor areas disappeared from Cluj, being turned into block of flats districts that lie in a higher surface of land.

Urbanization and the housing policies (housing allocations for dwellers) during socialism heavily influenced the later segregation and the tendencies of social diversification in the following ways (Pásztor 2003):

1. The official homogenization policies were not entirely reflected in housing policies: in most of the cases, blocks of different qualities and levels of conveniences were built in various areas. Such architecture followed in fact economic and technical reasoning, as simultaneous constructions of the same type of blocks could have been finished much cheaply and in a shorter time. Thus, areas where the blocks with low level of qualities were concentrated gradually became socially disadvantaged zones. In other words, the later spatial and social segregation was already "coded" in socialist urbanization patterns.

2. Before 1989 different industrial units and institutions were in charge with the allocation of houses. Thus, despite of the politics for social homogenization, the system initiated conditions for segregation too. It was so, as in most cases employees of the same institution were living (were allocated apartments) in the same area.[20] As apartments in different areas had different quality, a series of districts became status symbols for their residents; meanwhile others were labelled as „no-go areas". After 1989 a series of industrial units, which previously were in charge with allocating apartments, were restructured or even closed, their employees became out of job, and this engendered and fastened the impoverishment of certain areas.

3. Allocations of the apartments were up to the family size:[21] the young, unmarried persons were usually living in worker's dormitories, young couples were allocated one-roomed apartments, depending of the family size. This system was perceived as one in move, thus the beneficiaries were exchanging their allocated apartments between each other during the years of

[20] Let's see one significant example among many, related to the subject of this analysis. Blocks of flats from Splaiul Independenței or Pavlov street were allocated in the 1960's to university teachers (Interview with the historian Ákos Egyed).

[21] Families or married couples were allocated apartaments according to family size. number of family-members and number of children. According to this process. the number of rooms in an allocated apartament should have been equal or one higher than the number of family members. For instance, to a family with four members was given a three- or four roomed apartament, however this principle was observed in accordance with the housing stock each industrial unit administrated.

socialism, according to individual or family needs. Situation of those young ones, who met the 1989 changes as dwellers of workers' dormitories became extremely hard, because in lack of an owned apartment they were much exposed to the risks of impoverishment (Zamfir 2001. 49.).

Common infrastructure and overhead expenses are an other important factor, these providing costs that families are unable to control, which may seriously influence families with low income. Those, who become unable to pay these costs, are forced to sell their apartments and move into a cheaper one, or refuse to pay the overhead expenses, together with others. This phenomenon may influence two issues: the urban areas these houses are in, as well as the association of the house owners. ❋

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A short history of Hungarian industrial towns from the 1950s until the regime change

Abstract My study focuses on the current conditions prevailing in the Hungarian industrial towns and post-communist industrial towns. The 11 industrial towns built during the communist era exhibit widely divergent development paths both prior and following the regime change. However, all of them are characterized as being heavily politicized; this political influence on their lives applies even today. In this paper I attempt to find both common features and divergences in the present situation of these towns, the solutions they attempted to implement to rescue their economies, prevent depopulation; and finally, the form of future vision they seek to realize to ensure their continued existence and viability. The post-communist industrial towns do not have any historical roots; their prosperity was mainly due to the industrialization policies of the past regime. Most of the political attention and a sizable part of the available resources for some decades were focused on these towns, resulting in rapidly rising populations and the emergence of non-traditional urban structures. The regime change in 1989–1990 found the 11 Hungarian post-communist industrial towns in widely dissimilar conditions; by now the initial gap between the prosperous Tiszaújváros, Tatabánya, and Százhalombatta and stagnant or even declining Oroszlány, Ózd, and Komló has grown even further.

In the analysis of the 11 towns I utilized on the one hand the various pertaining documentation and policy papers of which the integrated urban development plans are the most significant, while on the other a wide array of available statistics and surveys, which aimed to provide the required background data for compiling the relevant statistics.

Keywords industrial town, productivity, innovation, European trends, Hungarian distinctiveness

DOI 10.14232/belv.2016.2.8 http://dx.doi.org/10.14232/belv.2016.2.8

Cikkre való hivatkozás / How to cite this article: Laki, Ildikó (2016): A short history of Hungarian industrial towns from the 1950s until the regime change. Belvedere Meridionale vol. 28. no. 2. 109–119. pp

ISSN 1419-0222 (print) ISSN 2064-5929 (online, pdf)

Introduction

The 'socialist' town has been the last utopian vision of 20th century urbanism: at its inception it aimed to create the ideal built space for a workers' town, simultaneously also engendering the idea of remoulding society into its preconceived vision. During the Stalinist era the image of the ideal socialist town degenerated into a set of dogmatic planning directives. With the weakening of the internal cohesion of the communist system the observance of this design orthodoxy also laxed and it survived only as a loose collection of unimaginative urban design solutions. (Germuska 2004)

In the development of socialist industrial towns a primary importance was given to the post-WW2 economic, social, and political processes undergoing in Hungary. Such reality resulted in a state of dependency, while it also led to new economic, social, and political conditions, which had a tremendous impact on every facet of life in Hungary.

The first generally recognized classification of towns in Hungary was compiled by György Markos in his work the *Economic geography of Hungary.* (Markos 1962) He emphasized that in the definition of the characteristics of a town not only the newly acquired, but also the inherited functions must be taken into account, i.e. the size of the local population, the peculiarities of historical development, the existing functional characteristics, and the pace of former development. However, he stressed the significance of existing functions, thereby classifying Hungarian towns into four main categories: administrative centres, transportation hubs, industrial towns, and agricultural towns. (Germuska 2004)

Within this stratification the 'new socialist industrial towns' appear as an independent subgroup including the towns of Ajka, Dunaújváros, Komló, Kazincbarcika, Oroszlány, Várpalota, which according to Markos are the glowing examples of the superiority of the planned economic model of the people's democracy. Györgyi Barta considers the new towns constructed during the communist period as a far cry from being socialist; although as new settlements they manifested noteworthy social, economic, architectural, and functional departures in comparison to other towns, but lacked any content to qualify them as socialist. (Barta 2010)

Weclawowitz in his work, the *Spatial-social structure of towns in East-Central Europe,* wrote in 1992 that there does not exist any universally recognized definition to what can be considered a 'socialist town'. In his opinion no countries in Eastern Europe actually had a fully developed socialist model in working order. All definitions related to the so-called socialist towns can be grouped around two basic preconceptions. The first focuses on the plans and entails the principles according to which such towns must be constructed and made functionally active; while the second is based on a wide range of analytical analyses of the specific characteristics of post-WW2 urban development processes. (Weclawowicz 1992)

A common thread of both is that the term of the socialist town is inseparably intertwined with that of the industrial town. The already established, larger urban settlements could not be easily transformed and adapted to the ideological needs of the new regimes, whereas the new industrial towns served as the urban models of the coming socialist era. (Weclawowicz 1992)

Merlin in his study the *New Towns and European Spatial Development* identifies three types of newly built urban settlements, i.e. the newly established capital cities - Canberra, Brasília, and Islamabad), the new industrial towns, the majority of which were located in the former Soviet Union and Central-Eastern European communist countries – Poland, Hungary, etc., and a small number of so-called factory towns in Northern-Canada and France. The founda-

tion of the latter towns was motivated by the desire to industrialize mainly rural regions and was centred on a single large industrial enterprise or complex. Merlin also differentiates the newly designed towns as ones which were the results of conscious urban development most frequently aiming to alleviate the overcrowdedness and overpopulation or large cities. Pál Beluszky considers the industrial town as a distinct type of settlement. He identifies three subgroups as well; the 'socialist (industrial) towns' including in Hungary Dunaújváros, Ajka, Kazincbarcika, Komló, Tiszaújváros, Várpalota, Oroszlány, and Martfű, the so-called industrial towns – Ózd, Paks, Nyergesújfalu, Simontornya, and Téglás, as well as the industrial towns with residential functions – Bonyhád, Mór, Dorog, Százhalombatta, Bátonyterenye, Tolna, Sajószentpéter, and Lőrinci. (Beluszky 2003) Györgyi Barta (Barta 2010) in her *A dual interpretation of the term 'socialist town'* sees such settlements as complex social-economic organisms, which, according to her, posed an irreconcilable dilemma to the various involved actors. From an *economic aspect* an essential feature of industrial development in the former communist countries had been the focus on large state-owned industrial enterprises, which thereby enjoyed a distinguished role in the specific towns and regions of their location. A town's sole large corporation and its management also became leading voices in municipal affairs at the town hall. Such peculiar economic model and political environment, but most of all, the general communist social framework shaped the distinctive character of the *communities* of socialist towns. In these communities differentiation and segregation in the local population did not emerge, a dominant position was taken by technical and engineering professionals with various levels of educational qualifications, simultaneously intelligentsia of the traditional humanities and free arts was almost completely lacking in most of them.

Finally, the list of definitions of industrial towns is closed by the term industrial town with an economic emphasis, according to which a settlement has industrial character if the majority of its active age population holds jobs in industrial enterprises located, or relocated, there. (Térport Fogalomtár 2011)

In Hungary, compared Western European countries, the process of industrialization commenced relatively late; it started in earnest only during the first half of the 19th century. From the 1930s and 40s onwards industrial development projects realized in Hungary followed essentially political goals: industrialization served as one of the tools to bring about the political and economic independence of the country. (Kőszegfalvi 1978)

Surveying the trajectory of industrial development prior to the conclusion of WW2 it can be stated that in general, despite the notable exception of some industrial centres, Hungary has remained an industrially underdeveloped country. The communist industrialization policies were put into place from 1950 in the form of 5-year plans, which sought to eradicate the inherited economic backwardness of the country and pursue rapid economic development through rapid industrialization.

During the first decades of the communist era the emphasis was clearly placed on the development of heavy industry, especially when based on the extraction of raw materials and minerals found in Hungary – mining and steel industries. (Kocsis–Schweitzer 2011)

One can find in the centre of the economic policies of the 'socialist system' the desire for forced rapid industrialization, especially in raw materials, the energy sector, heavy and arm industries. As a result of this uncompromising thrust for industrial growth by the end of the first 5-year plan (1951–1955) industrial production rose by 130% and there also commenced a radical shift in the employment structure of the country. The majority of community investment

projects were focused on urban settlements, therefore in this period a large number of public service providers were set up in towns and large villages. (Kocsis – Schweitzer 2011)

In Hungary it was a primary task in the construction of the new communist social order to extinguish the geographical inequalities of productive capacities through the use of a planned economic model. New industrial plants were established side by side with a number of high-capacity coal and oiled-fired power plants, and the extraction and utilization of the country's natural gas deposits also began. By 1968 industrial production increased more than fivefold while the GNP more than tripled compared to pre-WW2 levels. The employment structure of the active population altered significantly; with a marked increase in the number of industrial workers, the formerly outdated structure of the country's productive capacities was modernized. In the first phase of the communist industrialization program, between 1947 and 1954, the rapid industrial development of the previously neglected regions of the country began. The forced industrialization greatly accelerated the demand for energy, which meant the sometimes irrational expansion and opening of new poor quality coal and lignite mines (towns based on such mining activities were Oroszlány, Komló, Ajka, and Várpalota), while the town of Százhalombatta experienced rapid growth reliant on the newly discovered oil deposits through the construction of its power plant and refinery. Accentuated interest was paid to the towns of Kazincbarcika and Dunaújváros as well, the latter of which became the home of extensive steel manufacturing with its required power plant, building material and light industries.

Features of the socialist industrial cities

The socialist industrial towns in some respect showed a marked divergence from traditional and other types of industrial settlements. Pál Germuska found five such particular traits in relation to the socialist industrial towns.

The **first** and perhaps most important of these, inspired by the ideas of Iván Szelényi, the socialist towns received special attention and preference by the political leadership and in the economic policies of the past regime, thus they were the beneficiaries of the economic redistribution system of the country. This role is tangible in their status as towns, the mid-term economic plans, as well as the level of funding available to them from urban and regional development programs.

The **second** characteristic is that the foremost motive for the establishment of socialist towns used to be the industrial development of till then mainly rural areas. (Germuska 2004) In most cases this entailed the relocation of a specific industry to these locations giving steady employment and livelihood to the local populations.

The **third** trait is that in the socialist towns industry has always been the most significant sector of employment, including approximately 60% of the active working age populations. ((Germuska 2003) Among the various towns marked changes only occurred in those where industrialization was carried out without any local antecedents. In the town analysed in the study the local employment structure unquestionably tilted towards industry, thus by 1972 about 73.5% of the local labour force was employed in that sector. However, industrial activity by itself is insufficient to make a settlement a town. Besides this activity the role of the tertiary sector is indispensable. According to Lajos Tímár for the realization of a structured urban community it is necessary to possess a diverse employment mix, since the meaningful presence of the service sector contributes to the urbanization of the community. ((Germuska 2004) In his view the socialist towns do not fit this qualification as, by and large, this segment is lacking in their communities, or is too weak to meaningfully shape them.

The **fourth** main feature is that in the socialist towns urban traditions are either completely non-existent or are irrelevant. (Beluszky 2003) These towns are wholly devoid of any local traditions; on the one hand a long-established urban citizenry and social stratification are not present, on the other hand pertinent infrastructure and institutional background are also missing. The development of urban-cosmopolitan values since they were newly established communities could not materialize. The local populations were drawn from a wide range of backgrounds, mostly rural-agricultural, therefore contributing to a set of values and beliefs that were peculiar to these types of towns. The newly constructed housing estates, simultaneously, were often unable to preserve the former social networks or generate new ones, thereby positively impacting the genuine integration of these communities into functioning organisms. Furthermore, there is the insufficiency of the town centres to fulfil their role as such and the disconnected, not integrated nature of the individual town sections.

The **fifth** characteristic, a trademark of the socialist industrial towns for decades, used to be the rapid population growth. The number of residents in them increased sixfold on average between 1949 and 1990, whereas in the case of other towns in Hungary for the same period the figure stood at only 1.4. ((Germuska 2004)

However, in summary by surveying the general features of the socialist industrial towns, they failed to give an answer to the pressing question as to what made these settlements both socialist and industrial. As it can be found in the chapter dealing with Hungarian regional development during the communist era, the growth of a settlement and the attainment of the rank of a town could be accomplished only through the recommendation of the Presidential Council. The achievement of such status could be translated to receiving special prefrences especially in funding decisions. Such policy unmistakably contributed beneficially to urbanization and urban development as well as to the diversification of the geographical component units within one settlement.

By the 1980s, due to regional development concepts in place and the alteration in the economic environment, the established patterns somewhat altered and there appeared income and social status based spatial separation.

A brief history of the past and present of former industrial towns[1]

"From the 1960s as the result of the increasingly more conscious and better planned urban development initiatives and by incorporating a range of ideas almost inevitably surfacing during the construction process, some of them certainly unforeseen and unexpected, the definition of what constituted a socialist town gradually altered. Slowly new expectations and requirements were assembled that successfully expanded the notion of the socialist town, both theoretically and in practice far exceeding the formerly accepted concept." (Faluvégi 1973)

To use the terminology of the 1950s, of the new industrial towns primarily Dunaújváros, Kazincbarcika, Komló, Oroszlány, and Várpalota were referred to as socialist towns, later on also including Tiszaújváros (previously Leninváros) and Százhalombatta. The towns and settlement structure inherited from the former capitalist period after the conclusion of WW2, especially during the 50s, still manifested mainly the social and economic characteristics of the bygone age. The structure and functions of Hungarian towns not yet or only very slowly moulded to fit the needs of the new social system. Therefore, the newly planned and constructed towns pro-

[1] The town of Paks was omitted from the analytical focus of the chapter. The selection of towns was based upon the works of Pál Germuska and Pál Beluszky.

jected the type of urban settlement that suited the requirements of the communist social order. (Faluvégi 1973) The so-called transitional period (1945–1948) was a period that transformed the social structure and the economic system of the country down to its core; mainly entailing the legislative process, changes in ownership conditions, metamorphosis of the social system and of the political and bureaucratic elites of the country. (Beluszky 2003)

The communists in Hungary also constructed a soviet style economic system. On January 1, 1950 commenced the first 5-year plan, which aimed to make Hungary a country of iron and steel, irrespective of the prevailing economic-geography of the land. This plan had been in reality a blueprint for the development of heavy industry with most of the funds and resources allocated to the military, steel, mining, industries. (Kaposi 2002) In parallel, a policy of industrial decentralization was pursued, aiming to create a number of industrial hubs focusing on areas lacking in industrial enterprises, larger towns, county seats, and agricultural towns. (Faluvégi 1973) In the 1950s the most visible aspect of urban development had been the construction of the so-called socialist towns, their main purpose being the fulfilment of the labour needs of the large newly built industrial enterprises. (Beluszky 2003) The bulk of these development schemes materialized in the mineral rich mining regions of the country's mountainous areas along the energy hungry heavy-industrial rust belt spanning from Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county (Ózd, Kazincbarcika, Miskolc) through Budapest to Veszprém county (Várpalota, Ajka). (Enyedi – Horváth 2002) In the communist drive for industrialization, especially in its first phase, the emphasis was placed on the development of the energy sector; this being accomplished by the rapid development of coal mining, which necessarily resulted in a significant growth in the number of those employed there.

Figure 1 ❖ *Population changes in socialist industrial towns between 1949–2014*



Source: HELYSÉGNÉVTÁR, 2014, self-compiled data

In the first wave of 'socialist towns' the construction of Dunaújváros, Kazincbarcika, Komló, Oroszlány, and Ajka began. New power plants were built at Oroszlány, Komló, Ajka, Várpalota, Berente, and Gyöngyösvisonta, and the town of Százhalombatta was greatly expanded based on the booming oil industry of that period. The already existing iron smelters and steel mills at Diósgyőr and Ózd were heavily invested in. At Oroszlány brown coal mining and the attendant power plant, at Ajka coal and bauxite mining, as well as energy industry, at Várpalota coal and lignite mining, energy and aluminium industries, at Kazincbarcika coal mining, energy and chemical industries, at Tiszaújváros energy and chemical industries, at Dunaújváros energy industry serving the local steel mills, building material and light industries were established. (*Városépítés Magyarországon…* 1975) All these towns were created to serve the political ends of the then reigning regime. The 'designers' besides the prior industrial heritage, if there had been any, did not pay any consideration to any historical antecedents. The new towns served as symbols of modernity from their inception. ((Germuska 2004) These settlements can be also grouped according to their development targets; therefore, three distinct types can be deciphered: the first is that of industrial towns including Ajka, Tatabánya, Ózd, Várpalota, here an already existing industrial base was greatly expanded – to this group can be added the mining town of Komló as well. The second group contains those towns which did not possess any industrial roots previously and were established simply by a political diktat; such settlements were Dunaújváros, Paks, Tiszaújváros, and Százhalombatta. As entirely green field projects the construction of Dunaújváros (Danube Steelworks), in the vicinity of two small villages later incorporated in it, and of Tiszaújváros (Tisza Chemical Works) were carried out. In conjunction with the development of the town, but not as an integrated whole did the industrialization of Százhalombatta (Danube Refinery) take place, the main difference being in comparison to the two previous towns that here it occurred during the late 1960s and early 70s. (Csizmady 2013) In conjunction with the expansion of the industrial capacities the construction of residential housing, various leisure facilities, public welfare and retail units also commenced. In the then contemporary political thinking the housing estate was seen as the perfect tool to mitigate inequalities among various social groups. A significant symbolic act in the development of these new industrial settlements was their elevation to town status. (Csizmady 2013) In the first decade following 1949 the majority of urban population growth materialized, besides the capital and county seats, in the industrial towns. In this period the new industrial towns nearly doubled the number of their residents consisting one-fifth of the entire urban population of the country (in 1949 only 61 settlements enjoyed town status in Hungary).

Table 1 ❖ *Dates of town incorporations and unifications with previously separate settlements*

Towns in alphabetical order	Year of elevation to town status	Precursor settlements
Ajka	**1959**	1950 – Ajka=Ajka+Bódé 1959 – Ajka=Ajka+Tósokberénd 1977 – Ajka=Ajka+Ajkarendek+Bakonygyepes 1984 – Ajka=Ajka+Padragkút
Dunaújváros	**1951**	1961– Dunaújváros (formerly Sztálinváros)
Kazincbarcika	**1954**	1947 – Kazincbarcika=Barcika+Sajókazinc 1954 – Kazincbarcika=Berente+Kazincbarcika 1999 – Berente – separated from Kazincbarcika
Komló	**1951**	1954 – Komló=Kisbattyán+Komló+Mecsekfalu+Mecsekjánosi 1958 – Komló=Komló+Mánfa 1992 – Mánfa – separated from Komló
Oroszlány	**1954**	
Ózd	**1949**	1940 – Ózd=Bolyok+Ózd+Sajóvárkony 1978 – Ózd=Center+Hódoscsépány+Ózd+Susa+ Szentsimon+ Uraj 1999 Farkaslyuk – separated from Ózd
Salgótarján	**1922**	1950 – Salgótarján=Baglyasalja+Salgótarján 1961 – Salgótarján=Salgótarján+Zagyvapálfalva 1973 – Salgótarján=Salgótarján+Zagyvaróna 1977 – Salgótarján=Salgótarján+Somoskő+Somoskőfalu 2006 – Somoskőújfalu – separated from Salgótarján
Százhalombatta	**1970**	
Tatabánya	**1947**	1902 – incorporated as a village 1947 – Tatabánya=Alsógalla+Bánhida+Felsőgalla+Tatabánya
Tiszaújváros	**1966**	1995 – Tiszaújváros (formerly Leninváros)
Várpalota	**1951**	1951 – Várpalota=Inota+Várpalota 1997 – Pétfürdő – separated from Várpalota

Source: HELYSÉGNÉVTÁR, 2014, self-compiled data

In the last 25 years

Following the regime change the economic and social transformations have been as rapid and radical as those after the conclusion of WW2. The adjustment from a communist planned economy to a capitalist free market system came with the most drastic economic downturn recorded in Hungary, especially affecting the industrial sector. Due to this, at the end of 1995 gross industrial production still reached only three-fourths of the level ten years prior. The massive recession was most detrimental to the previous communist heavy industrial enterprises and mining centres; in essence entire industries went defunct and vanished without a trace. (Germuska 2002b) The changes of 1989–1990 found the eleven socialist industrial towns in widely different conditions and by now the gap between the prosperous Tiszaújváros, Tatabánya or Százhalombatta and the at best stagnant Oroszlány, Ózd or Komló is even greater. (Germuska 2002a)

In the settlement network of Hungary upon the regime change two distinct, yet simultaneous influences are discernible. The first category includes all the efforts and activities left unrealized in the past fifty years for political reasons, while the second involves the implementation of new urban development models concocted in the developed countries in the 1990s. (Enyedi–Horváth 2002)

In the case of the former socialist industrial towns an identical trend was followed. As these towns had no historical roots they were brought to life by policies aiming for the industrialization

of the country. For a few decades most of the attention and available resources were lavished on these towns, resulting in atypical urban arrangements and rising population figures. Upon the regime change these were the very settlements that found themselves in the most disadvantageous position and suffered the greatest shock. (Csizmady 2013) The forced industrialization policies of the communist era grossly inflated the populations of these towns, which from the 1990s onwards steadily decreased in all of the eleven towns under consideration. There can discerned distinct phases in this decline: until 1995 it was rather slow, after that until 2011 the pace accelerated rapidly, while currently stagnation is the most representative feature. These developments can be explained by two factors; the first is primarily labour related (shrinking of employment opportunities locally with the attendant changes in livelihoods), while the second is connected to negative population growth (falling birth rates and emigration in search of better opportunities). By surveying the population data between 1980–2011 it can be surmised that of the eleven former industrial towns only Százhalombatta's population rose, whereas all the others registered a loss between 10 and 20%.

Table 2 ❖ *Changes in population figures between 1980–2011*

town/ year	1980 residents	1990 residents	2001 residents	2011 residents
Ajka	**32 652**	33 832	31 805	**28 106**
Dunaújváros	**60 736**	59 028	55 309	**48 484**
Kazincbarcika	**35 552**	35 692	32 356	**29 010**
Komló	**29 354**	29 326	27 081	**24 394**
Oroszlány	**20 613**	20 982	20 280	**18 446**
Ózd	**46 372**	41 561	38 405	**34 481**
Salgótarján	**49 603**	47 822	44 964	**37 262**
Százhalombatta	**14 292**	16 573	16 602	**17 952**
Tatabánya	**75 971**	74 277	72 470	**67 756**
Tiszaújváros	**18 677**	18 685	17 207	**16 500**
Várpalota	**22 325**	21 646	21 779	**20 756**

Source: NÉPSZÁMLÁLÁSI ADATOK, 2001, 2011, self-compiled data

Besides the substantial drop in the size of the populations there has been an equally drastic contraction in the number of employees present in the local labour markets. Among the towns no divergences were visible in this respect either. Despite the introduction of new employers into all the towns they were, nevertheless, able to maintain their former positions based on industry only to some extent (Dunaújváros – ISD Dunaferr, Tatabánya – Industrial park, Ajka – Bakony Power Plant Corp.). Unemployment also emerged as a permanent phenomenon and had an especially severe impact on the former industrial towns compared to other settlements in Hungary. (In the communist period even unskilled workers had found employment in industry who were the first to lose their jobs following the economic dislocations of the regime change.) A dominant segment of the residents of these new towns were blue-collar workers whose skills, if any, were such that upon losing their jobs they could not at all or only after retraining find employment anew. The current condition of socialist industrial towns can be ascertained by using comparative analyses and clustering them according to the results gained. Thus, there can be observed three distinctive types of towns. The first are the developed new towns, including Százhalombatta and Tiszaújváros (if the town of Paks is also under consideration it is also

included in this group). The two towns managed to weather the post regime change period successfully. They adapted to the new economic-social conditions, incorporated new elements into their economic mix, their education and employment indicators are rising, while the local population is either rising or at worst is stagnant.

The second group includes the stagnating towns. They were able to cope with the economic downturn with structural readjustments, as in the case of Tatabánya, or with state support and intervention, e.g. Dunaújváros. They preserved their populations, although experienced some fluctuations (this does not apply to Dunaújváros), while the education level of the local residents is actually higher than of those in the first group. Currently the main challenge lies in finding investment and economic opportunities to guarantee their long-term viability as communities. Given the statistical data, this group includes Ajka, Dunaújváros, Oroszlány, Tatabánya, and Várpalota (Szirmai, 2013).

The third group consists of Kazincbarcika, Komló, Ózd, and Salgótarján (added by the author). These towns received prime consideration among settlements during the communist era. The former large industrial enterprises either completely disappeared or downscaled and converted to a number of small companies. Foreign direct investment has not materialized for the past 25 years in any significant measure, the educated active working population moves away making any local or even regional economic turnaround virtually impossible. (Szirmai 2013) Besides the population loss an additional problem is the increasing poverty and the appearance of minority groups with high unemployment rates. All four towns experienced a substantial degradation in their former functions in education, culture, and employment.

Summary

In my paper I intend to introduce socialist industrial towns, their foundation, the brief history and role in urban development schemes. From the study it can be discerned that the current condition of the former industrial towns is highly varied. Their peculiar characteristics are rooted in that some are prosperous even today, some are mainly stagnent, while the rest clearly demonstrate devolution – nearing a futher loss of their economic and social positions. A potentional solution for the revalitization of the two latter groups could be securing, new investment projects based on the previously exciting industrial basis of these towns. A vision for the future is in place it depends on these towns whether they are able to take advantage of it. ❋

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Youngsters Who Are Not in Employment, Education or Training

(About the NEET in a Hungarian Perspective)

Abstract This paper primarily focuses on the NEET (Not in Employment, Education or Training) phenomenon in Hungary, and also on the target group designated by the term. The study tries to walk around the concept of the NEET, and also this problematic phenomenon because this is a less published area in Hungary although the international literature on the subject is copious. The study designates the target group, it seeks to provide a definition of the concept, and it separates the NEET community from those who suffer from similar problems in Hungary but do not fall under the definition of NEET. In the second part of the work, data will be presented about the size of the NEET group. The study draws on current international data but also presents data on the size of the Hungarian NEET population. Comparing these statistics highlights the vulnerability of this special group. In the final part, the study seeks to demonstrate the importance of researching and tackling NEET issues from a Social Policy and Social Psychology point of view. During the study, besides the relatively few Hungarian literatures, I relied on papers written in the English language where the topic is presented, the definition is made, the target group is defined and also where the theme is generally introduced.

Keywords NEET; vulnerable youth; unemployment; education; training

DOI 10.14232/belv.2016.2.9 http://dx.doi.org/10.14232/belv.2016.2.9

Cikkre való hivatkozás / How to cite this article: Sánta, Tamás: (2016): Youngsters Who Are Not in Employment, Education or Training (About the NEET in a Hungarian Perspective). Belvedere Meridionale vol. 28. no. 2. 120–131. pp

ISSN 1419-0222 (print) ISSN 2064-5929 (online, pdf)

www.belvedere-meridionale.hu

1 Introduction

1.1 Definition of NEET:

The **NEET** is an acronym which means: **N**ot in **E**mployment, **E**ducation or **T**raining. That is a group of young people who are currently not working, basically unemployed although they are among the active population, are not studying or they are not taking part in any training. Reading together the initials of the English phrase the concept of NEET is given (House of Commons 2010).

The acronym was coined in the United Kingdom (Social Exclusion Unit 1999), however the concept shortly became known worldwide from the UK through the western European countries to Taiwan (Chen 2009). The concept of NEET indicates in which systems the focus group is not active, that is what they are not doing but, not visible form, the concept designates the age characteristics of the NEET group as well. The NEET is therefore, a separate, clearly defined and statistically measurable cohort whose members are aged between 15–24 years, and who are unemployed, they are not in the education system or taking part in any training.

The aforementioned age parameters are generally accepted internationally and commonly used in Europe (European Commission 2012). However, different countries, although slightly, can narrow or broaden the circle of the NEET group. In the UK the concept includes the 16–24 age group because the compulsory education system, just like in Hungary, lasts till 16 years of age (Sissons–Jones 2012; see also: DCSF. 2009; Dwyer–Shaw 2013). However, in Japan, for example, the concept includes the 15–34 age group, those who are unemployed, are not homemaker, are not enrolled in any type of school and are not taking part in any training and are not searching for jobs (Rahman 2007; See also: Bokányi–Szabó 2016).

In this paper – although it is clear for me that the borders of the concept is flexible and expandable which in many cases does not only depend on the law(s) of a given country but on their culture as well – the NEET is defined as a special group of young people whose age is between 15–24 years and who are unemployed, are neither member of any educational institutions nor taking part in any training.

1.2 Etymological approach of the concept:

The English phrase, and the use of that, provides further opportunity to analyse the concept of NEET etymologically. There are some documents where the meaning of NEET is the shortened version of the ordinary *Not in Employment, Education or Training* phrase (Britton et al. 2011; see also: Sissons – Jones 2012; Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment 2013; OECD 2013; European Commission 2013, 2014; Chzhen 2014).

However, I have also studied some source material in which the concept of NEET was interpreted as follows: *Not in Education, Employment or Training* (Audit Commission 2010; see also: DCSF 2008; DCSF 2008; Coles et al. 2010; DE & DWP 2014; NAO & DE 2014; DE 2014; Sloman 2014). These were primarily published in the UK.

Although I could not find explicit reference for the different use however I think, taking into account the studies guidelines, the deviation was the result of a conscious use.

In the first form of expression the *work – education – training* trend can be observed. This probably means that the job-creation stands in the first place in order for the target group to be supported. The central aim of the scheme is to re-integrate the youngsters who are NEET into the labour market. Inasmuch the skills and education level of some members of the group is not enough to reach the main goal so these members would be redirected by the targeted programs

into the education and training system by which resulting the re-integration into the labour market may become easier. A good example of this approach is the work of Paul Sissons and Katy Jones (Sissons – Jones 2012).

In the second form of expression where the education stands in the first place, I think, it may refer to a variety of targeted programs. In this approach to the concept a combination of *education – work – training* receives the main emphasis. This approach is applied by those studies which, according to my assumptions, suggest new guidelines for the makers of complex projects in order for the members of NEET who are at risk to be supported. That means, greater emphasis is placed on education as a means of tackling NEET issues under this approach. In these papers the research has already distinguished within the NEET two different age groups: 16–17 year olds and 18–19 years of age (DE & DWP 2014; NAO & DE 2014). It suggests that the importance and effectiveness of education is maybe able to significantly reduce the number of the NEET group. In the second place in the concept is the employment, more precisely the lack of it. It could indicate appropriate and successful teaching can effectively lead to the integration of the different members of the NEET into the world of work.

The final word of the phrase, according to my experiences, may indicate that the specifically specialised training is needed by which a young people would be able to get a position successfully. This approach is indicated in the following studies of the Department for Children, Schools and Families: *Reducing number of young people not in education, employment or training (NEET) The strategy furthermore, NEET Toolkit Reducing the proportion of young people not in education, employment or training (NEET).*

In summary, I suppose that the differentiation within the concept of NEET is a result of a conscious use which probably shows on one hand the main emphasis of the guidelines, on the other hand, it may indicate the definite direction of solutions.

One direction of the complex solutions can be providing work-places and/or integrating into different education/training systems in order to relieve the problem of NEET.

While the other direction may suggest that a high standard of the education system is able to ensure easier transition into the world of work, after that the system, with specialised training, will ensure the possibility of staying longer at work.

1.3 Characteristics of the NEET group:

The NEET group is not considered as a homogeneous group (Audit Commission 2010). Fundamental differences are needed to be considered in order to get a more precise demarcation.

On one hand young people in the NEET group are not identical with the group of young people who are unemployed even if significant overlap can be found between them. On the other hand, it needs to be distinguished from those who are at a considerable risk, and those who are not at risk (or less at risk) within the NEET group, and also the sub-groups of the former one.

Although the NEET group and the group of young unemployed are inter-related concepts yet there are important differences between the two (Sissons–Jones 2012). In Hungary there are two known concepts for defining unemployment and those can be connected in two different measurement procedures.

Since November 2005 the National Employment Services has used the registered jobseeker instead of registered unemployed (National Employment Services; called NFSZ in Hungary). Registered jobseekers are those who cooperate with the competent offices, and are also registered by these offices (NFSZ). The competent office is usually called Employment Centre (called MK in Hungary).

However the Central Statistics Office (called KSH in Hungary) derives the number of unemployment from a survey which was taken in the general population. That is, while the National Employment Services can measure the group as registered job seekers who were included in the database of the competent offices (MKs), the Central Statistics Office works with a larger coverage when processes the questionnaires from the general population but within a certain margins of error.

Considering the subject of this paper it means that the surveyed NEET group rate by the KSH is presumably larger than the NEET group rate measured by the MK. Because there can be some members of the NEET group who are not (or did not want to be) registered in the database of the MK therefore the National Employment Services does not count them. However, in the KSH's database they are included.

Furthermore, the early leavers from education and training are not necessarily classed as NEETs, despite the fact that this can be typically a NEET issue too. The concept is defined by the topic expert that the early leavers from education and training are those who are aged between 18 and 24, they do not have secondary education, and four weeks preceding the survey the members of this group do not take part in education or training (Szegedi 2014). The experts particularly separate the two groups from each other when they claim that "the indicator of the NEET group try to estimate the size of those who are «in trouble». Because there are some who cannot find jobs although they have qualifications but there are others who work without qualification" (Szegedi 2014). And indeed among the NEET group there are some who completed their education, they have qualifications, even high degrees, but they do not have jobs and do not turn towards education or training systems in order for them to improve their situation.

Therefore, those who deal with young unemployed, they approach the problem from the side of the labour market and employment policy. Those who deal with early leavers from education and training, they approach the problem from the side of the education policy. But those who deal with the NEET group, and try to change their situation, they, at the same time, take into account employment policy and education policy as well when they work on different strategies.

Within the NEET group we can differentiate the members based on the degree of threat. Among the NEETs there are some members who are less at risk while there are some who are at high-risk category.

In the NEET group I consider those members less vulnerable who have, for example, completed their secondary education and they have made a successful entrance examination in a higher education institution, and expect to continue their studies. This includes those also who have successfully completed their secondary or higher education studies, and have already successfully applied for a job however they are in a transition position until they can begin their occupations. During this short period of time they are members of the NEET group but certainly are not in danger. Furthermore, it also includes those who completed their studies but they do not wish to work yet. Although they have opportunities to obtain jobs but they do not want to. This transition period, which was consciously accepted by them, has been filled, for instance, with some travelling combined with learning new experiences.

A study, published by The University of York (Coles et al. 2010), provides detailed group-breakdown those who are NEET and are in a high-risk position. The authors listed the key risk factors for 16 to 18 year olds. However, I think that list can be applied to the entire NEET age group. According to this study those young people are particularly at risk (Coles et al. 2010. 6.) they:

- have parents who are poor or unemployed;
- live in a deprived neighbourhood near schools with poor overall average attainment;

- are or have been in care;
- become pregnant and a parent in their mid-teenage years;
- have a disability, special educational need or learning disability;
- are young carers;
- are homeless;
- have a mental illness;
- misuse drugs or alcohol;
- are involved in offending;
- have experienced pre-16 educational disaffection (truancy and/or school exclusion);
- have poor or no qualifications at age 16 plus;
- have dropped out of post-16 education attainment.

The degree of risk can also be distinguishable by the time factor, age and gender. Researchers claim that at greatest risk are those who stay within this vulnerable group for six months or more (Coles et al. 2010; see also: Audit Commission 2010).

Further research has shown that the NEET rates increase with age. Furthermore, rates are higher for men than women. Coles et al. (2010) illustrates this in their paper by showing the following trend: the 16-year-olds boys 6,3%, the 17-year-olds boys 9,5% however, the 18-year-olds boys 17,7% were in the NEET group the period under review. For the girls this figures changed as follows: the rate increased from 3,9% to 9,5%, and by the age of 18 the rate reached the 15,3%.

Thomas Spielhofer and his colleagues in their study (2009) divided the NEET group into three categories which involve the degrees of risk as well. The paper suggests that the first category should be called sustained NEET. According to their research this sub-group includes those youngsters who have a specifically negative experience from their former schools, suffered from bullying or were excluded from them, furthermore have behaviour problems, special educational needs, learning disability, and they felt under a considerable pressure. These young people probably do not have sufficient qualifications and low school performance is likely among them.

The second category, which is called open to learning NEET group, includes those who are more likely to believe in the importance of higher qualifications. The name of this category shows the members of it are opened to learn and eager to gain more experience.

The third category is called undecided NEET group. The members of that are those youngsters who are not staying on the path for a prolonged period of time because of their indecision. This malfunction is probably due to the lack of information about their possibilities, and it may be due to insufficient financial support (Spielhofer et al. 2009). One of the key conclusions of this paper was: "The majority of young people who were NEET wanted to work in order to earn money. However, one of the main barriers young people come across when looking for work was their lack of experience. They were unable to get a job until they had experience, but could not get a job to get that experience in the first place." (Spielhofer et al. 2009. 11.) This is a typical 'catch 22' which makes it very difficult for them to obtain a suitable occupation. That can lead to a feeling of disappointment which, in turn, can lead to a lack of motivation and, ultimately, long term NEET membership.

2 Information about the extent of the NEET group

The paper separates three sub-groups in this section. Firstly the data of the UNICEF, the EUROSTAT and the OECD are presented about the NEET group. After that the size of the NEET

group in Hungary is presented by the data of the same informants. Finally the local research data will be discussed.

With the presentation of data my aim is to give a comprehensive picture about the size of the NEET group, thus demonstrating the importance of the problem.

2.1 International data about the NEET group:

According to The UNICEF Office of Research: "7.5 million young people aged 15–24 – roughly the total population of Switzerland – were not in employment, education or training (referred to as 'NEET') across the European Union in 2013. In Greece alone it was one in five, nearly a quarter of a million young people" (Chzhen 2014).

According to the EUROSTAT, the average NEET population across the European Union was 13.2 percent in 2012. The organisation determined the minimum and maximum points as well. The NEET population was the lowest in Holland (4.3%), while the largest population was measured in Bulgaria, 21.5 percent (European Commission 2013).

The next year, in 2013 the data of the published report was a slightly modified. The European Union was expanded by a new member, Croatia, and although the NEET population in the Union decreased slightly, the rate of the two endpoints increased. The average of the NEET group was 13 percent and this was divided between Luxemburg (5%) and Italy (22.2%) (European Commission 2014).

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also collected statistical data of the NEET in respect of its members. However, the data was divided into two age groups, the 15-19 years of age and the 20-24 years of age. This method seems to follow the method of the latest British researches. The data presented by the OECD showed that those classified as NEET accounted for 8.25% of the 15-19 age group in 2005, with this number falling to 7.1% by 2013. However, the rate was significantly higher in the 20-24 age group – in line with earlier observations concerning the positive correlation between age and NEET rates. The OECD NEET average in this age group was 17.5% in 2005, rising to 18.21% by 2013 (OECD, 2015). The data therefore shows a dramatic increase in NEET rates above 19 years of age.

2.2 International data about the size of the Hungarian NEET group:

EUROSTAT presents statistical data for Hungary connected to the NEET group as well (European Commission, 2013, 2014). This data measured the percentage of the NEET population across the 15 – 24 age group between 2001 and 2012. According to the statistical data, the NEET population in Hungary was 14.6% in 2001. This then fell slowly but steadily to 11.3% by 2007. But then a new rise occurred and, by 2012, the rate reached 14.7%, that is, the total was 0.1% point higher than in the baseline year data (European Commission 2013).

However, in the next year 2013, the EUROSTAT data showed a further significant increase, with the rate of the NEET group within the 15–24 age range jumping to 15.4% (European Commission, 2014). This rate was 2.4 percent higher than the European Union average (European Commission, 2014).

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also published NEET statistical data for Hungary (OECD, 2015). As noted above, the OECD analyse two age groups separately; 15 – 19 and 20–24. From 2005 to 2013, the rate of the 15–19 age group decreased from 6.42% to 5.95% (OECD, 2015). However, the 20–24 age population showed a dramatic increase in this period, from 18.93% in 2005 to 26.07% in 2013 (OECD, 2015). That means, apart from the fact that these number are very high, the same trend can be observed in Hungary as

internationally. The rate of younger people within the total 15 – 24 year-olds population is much lower than the rate of the older population in the NEET group.

2.3 Researches on NEET in Hungary:

During my research I did not find any Hungarian papers that expressly dealt with the NEET group in Hungary or presented local statistical data about the rate of the Hungarian NEET group.

Hungary, as a member of the European Union, outlines goals according to the recommendation of the EU2020. The Government of Hungary made certain aims in the National Reform Program (Reform Program, 2013) in 2013. Among them there are some which relates to the object of this work:

Increasing employment rate up to 75 %.

Decreasing the number of people who live in poverty by 500,000.

Decreasing the rate of the early leavers from education and training by 10%.

A 75% employment rate means full employment in the European Union, and achieving this aim would almost certainly decrease the NEET rate in Hungary. Similarly, NEET numbers would also be expected to fall if the poverty and education targets were met.

Elements of employment policy appear in the new operational programs, and two are important to be mentioned in terms of the main theme of this paper. One of them is called Economic Development and Innovation Operational Program (called GINOP in Hungary). This program has 40 percent out of the total source (7480 billion forints) which means 2719 billion forints. According to the present plan the program can spend 620 billion forints for employment. The elements of this employment policy are: expansion of employment, social inclusion (or social integration), fight against poverty, and also investment in education, skill development and life long learning (Molnár et. al. 2014).

There is another program as well, called: Human Resources Development Operational Program (called EFOP in Hungary). This source has some 885 billion forints which is 11.8% of the total source. The elements of the planned program are: decreasing the social exclusion and poverty and improving employability of disadvantaged groups (Molnár et. al. 2014).

The aims of the two programs are the expansion of employment, educational development and improving the situation of marginalised groups. That means research on the NEET group, program development and effective support and also promoting alternatives can take place in the operational programs. The two programs overlap each other in many ways (Molnár et. al. 2014).

One illustrative example is a new program called: *Youth Guarantee Scheme* which began in 2015. The program tries to support young people who are NEET in different regions in Hungary. The coordination tasks are for the local Employment Departments. (kormany.hu, 2015)

Only a few Hungarian literatures focusing on the subject can be found despite international statistical data being available. It seems research on this topic has not begun yet.

Molnár György and his colleagues published recently a paper, called: *A munkaerőpiac peremén lévők és a költségvetés* [Those who are at the edge of the labour market and the budget] (Molnár et. al. 2014). Although the study did not specifically explore the NEET group, it contained considerable relevant information. The author and his colleagues divided into six groups those who are in the margins of the labour market, as follows:

1. Those in employment but earning minimum wage or less.
2. Those do odd jobs; earning higher than the monthly minimal wage.
3. Unemployed most months.

4. Declared themselves to be inactive in the most months.

5. *16-24 years of age, who are not students, they have never worked and they have qualification up to vocational education.*

6. Those who are not belong to 1-5 groups.

In this list the fifth group is highlighted because this category comes closest to the concept of NEET. Although the authors did not mention expressly this concept and the research also did not focus on the NEET group.

Furthermore, it is important to mention that this study made a special group as well, called: "margin-households". This concept provided some interesting further data to this research. The authors divided the margin-households into three categories as follows:

1. Those where the members are typically employed.

2. Those where the members are typically unemployed.

3. Those which can be called mixed margin-households.

This last one means, margin-household where one of the parents is employed but the other one is unemployed. Molnár et. al. claim, which is important for this study, that the above indicated fifth group occurs in the highest proportion in the mixed margin-households (Molnár et. al. 2014). That means, according to this study a certain group of young people from the NEET group maybe come from a household where in one of the parents works but the other one is unemployed.

Another important contribution to the literature on the subject is Gere Ilona's study, which is called: *Ifjúsági munkanélküliség: a probléma jellemzése, eddigi intézkedések hatása, további teendők* [Youth unemployment: analyse the problem, impact of actions taken so far, further things to do] (2001). The aim of this paper was to review and analyse the labour market situation of the Hungarian young people in the 1990s. Furthermore, the author examined the supported program whether the result of that is synchronized with the employment directives of the European Union (Gere 2001). The study expressly did not use the NEET term yet it makes important statements connection with the labour market situation of the local 15-24 age group. Moreover, the paper divided the group into two age groups distinguishing the 15-19-year-olds and the 20-24-year-olds. When Gere referred to statistical data, beside data from the OECD and the European Union, she used data from the Central Statistics Office (called Központi Statisztikai Hivatal in Hungary) as well. However, the study as a whole mainly draws attention to youth unemployment and the action to be taken on employment as the paper's title clarifies. Beside this, it is important to mention that the statistical data focus "*only*" on the youth unemployed and not on the NEET group, and the study only covers periods up to and including 1999 and it therefore is out of date.

Csoba Judit, in one of her papers (Csoba 2010), also mentions the 15-24 age group. In this study the author derives the unemployment data from the European Union and the Central Statistics Office. Csoba calls this group as "the generation of heirs" (Csoba 2010. 122.). Within this age group the author distinguishes those who live in a family whose position is above than the social average and those who live under this average. The members in the first group are the privileged heirs because they will inherit their parents' social capital. This heritage, when they look for certain jobs, will provide serious benefits for them but their contemporaries who belong to the second group "cannot even dream about that" (Csoba 2010. 122.; See also: Krémer 2014). Without the explicit mention of the NEET and its problem, Csoba draws attention to a

very important aspect of the whole issue: the lower the social capital of the parents of young people who are NEET, the higher the probability that those individuals stay in the NEET group for a prolonged period of time. (Csoba 2010) Spielhofer et. al. (2009) mention similar results in their study to which this paper has already referred earlier.

There are two other papers in Hungarian language that are relevant when discussing the present problem of the 15-24 year-olds age group.One of them called *Az európai fiatalok világa a 21. század elején* [The world of young people in Europe in the early 21th century] (Jancsák 2011a) has two parts. The first one contains the European Union Youth Report from 2009 while the other is also a translation of a study summary, called *Ifjúságkutatás Európában* [Youth research in Europe], also from 2009. Both of them contain interesting information about the 15 to 24 age group and mention expressly the concept of NEET (Jancsák 2011a). Because the book translated two international works thus the Hungarian NEET problem is just generally mentioned in there, and also when they refer to the Hungarian situation they use statistical data from international surveys to which I have already referred in this section.

The other one is a translation again called *Sebezhető ifjúság* [Vulnerable youth] (Furlong et. al. 2003). This short study shows the vulnerability of young people in education, in employment and in the European Union (See also: Jancsák 2011b). However, the valuable information come also from international surveys, and the study tries to present the European situation and does not expressly reflect on the Hungarian situation.

Finally, in closing this section, three further authors need mentioned – Csoboth, Kopp and Szedmák and their study called: *Fiatalok lelki veszélyeztetettsége*, [Psychological vulnerability of young people] published in 1998. The concept of NEET is not mentioned in this work but it refers to the 16 to 24 age group. The study examines this young age group from the perspective of their psychological vulnerability (Csoboth – Kopp – Szedmák 1998). In summary it can be said: belonging to the NEET group may entail exclusion (certainly the feeling of it) and the resulting mental deterioration.

As I have already mentioned Hungarian literature does not abound as much in scope as the international literature and the explanation of that could be that the research on NEET is a quite young discipline among these types of research areas. The NEET research in Hungary is just beginning and hopefully this paper is one of the pioneering works.

3 Why does the research of the NEET group require special attention in Hungary?

The final unit of this paper outlines two approaches in its answer for the question. One of them is Social Policy approach while the other one, closely related to the first one, is Social Psychology approach. I do not separate the two from each other sharply because, I think, it follows directly from one to the other, while the other has a serious impact on the first one. The NEET group can be examined from the point of view of employment policy, education policy, housing policy, health policy or even issue of the pension term. The variety of research areas however mention psychological effects of the issue as well as raise questions connected to social exclusion.

The members of the NEET group make connections with other members of the same group therefore they somehow isolate themselves from the 'outside world' thus they may have less possibility to leave that group. On the other hand, the group identifies the individual and

vice versa the individual determines him/herself by the group where (s)he feels to be connected to (Smith–Mackie 2000). This may cause a spiral which may not allow the members from the NEET to leave it for a prolonged period of time.

Coles et al. (2010) claims that a significant number of members of the NEET group live in inadequate housing and in neighbourhoods with high levels of crime.

Young people with low qualifications are typically among the members of the NEET group who cannot take part in the labour market therefore, their health and mental ability continuously deteriorate (Spielhofer et al. 2009; see also: Institute of Health Equity 2010; Sissons 2011).

Besides the fact that it is important to examine the NEET group in Hungary in order to find the proper ways out from the issue however, it should also focus attention on the financial issue. How much the NEET group costs and will cost in the future for tax-paying citizens if the numbers in the group increase. This issue can be seen from two approaches.

One of those is to see the issue from the members' point of view of the NEET group. Young people, who are NEET, do not pay any contribution to the budget because they are unemployed. They do not contribute either to the nation's economic growth or pay to the healthcare contribution. The income, which supports them, often comes from the grey or black economy by which they eventually diminish the redistributive total capital that is necessary to maintain the welfare state. Furthermore the growth of the NEET group will jeopardize our already fragile pension system in the future. Related to this the feeling of exclusion may continuously growth, and resulting from this the problem of a vicious circle. The longer someone is a member of the NEET group the less chance to have possibilities to find his/her own way back to the labour market and leave behind the danger of a hopeless life. However, staying in this particular state so long can cause a deterioration of mental abilities and a decrease of physical fitness which makes it increasingly difficult for that person to re-integrate into the world of work and/or education. As it mentioned earlier the members of this community just crave interaction and close cohesion with others as the members of the non-NEET group. And they will find it just inside the NEET group where the majority of the members are likely to permanently lose the motivation to return to society (Spielhofer et al. 2009). That is, it is vital to break this vicious circle through external, social support in order to avoid that this generation to be a 'lost generation' (Sissons–Jones 2012).

On the other hand, the issue can be seen from society's point of view. The government is trying to solve the problem of the NEET group with various allowances that fewer and fewer taxpayers are able to provide. One of the most obvious dangers of being a member of the NEET group is the possibility of physical and mental deterioration (Institute of Health Equity, 2010). And this entails the support of the heath system, the system which is vulnerable at the moment in Hungary and that is not supported financially by the large number of the NEET community. Furthermore, within the NEET group there are many young people who committed a breach of the current laws (Coles et al. 2010). The cost arising from these events will be paid by the government, that is, ultimately by the taxpayers.

These view points need to be seen, heard and understood primarily by the decision makers because it is doubtless fact that the embracing of the NEET-problem requires significant financial investment. Even, I think, it cannot be expected that these investment returns in a spectacular way and apparently in a short period of time. But I am sure about that the long term postponement of solving the problem will cause serious damage in the society as well as the national economy. ❋

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Hungarian – Serbian mixed marriages in Vojvodina

Abstract This article is about marriages between Hungarian and Serbian peoples in Vojvodina. In this case we speak about marriages between people whit different religion, language, nationality and cultural identity. The research was made in Vojvodina. I used demographic dates, and interviews with 11 people. I made the interviews in St. Moravica, a town mostly inhabited by Hungarians. The result shows, that a Hungarian woman more likely gets a mixed marriage, than a Hungarian man. The article searches for the reasons of this phenomenon, and analyses the primer characteristics of mixed marriages. Another important question was, why some of them who live in mixed marriages assimilate, while the others manage to live in two cultures side by side.

Keywords mixed marriage, interview, national identity, assimilation, endogamy, exogamy

DOI 10.14232/belv.2016.2.10 http://dx.doi.org/10.14232/belv.2016.2.10

Cikkre való hivatkozás / How to cite this article: Ladancsik, Tibor (2016): Hungarian–Serbian mixed marriages in Vojvodina. Belvedere Meridionale vol. 28. no. 2. 132–143. pp

ISSN 1419-0222 (print) ISSN 2064-5929 (online, pdf)

www.belvedere-meridionale.hu

Mixed marriage

A marriage is endogamous, when the spouses origins from the same social stratum, the same area, or the same nation. In this case we can speak about endogamy, when two Serbian or two Hungarian get married. We can speak about exogamy, when two people with different nationality get married, in this case a Hungarian and a Serbian.

Exogamy can make a stronger bound between nations. When the members of a group or a nation often get married with each other, then the bounds of two groups will be stronger. A mixed marriage is an alliance not just between two people, but two families. By marriage the members of both families can make contact, they get acquainted with each other's culture, habits. It's not everywhere the case, the research shows some contradictories. The interviews show that some of the spouses are not in contact with the relatives of their husbands/wives. There is a case when all contact is lost with one spouse's affinitive. In this case there is no contact between families or nations.

In the mixed marriages the national differences break surface. The spouses can be tolerant but the differences will outcrop. A relationship cannot exist without a common language. The best case scenario is, when both spouses speak each other's language. But this case often does not last. And even when it is the case, there is always a dominant language in the family. For the common language one of the spouses already did the first step and learned his or her partner's language. If his or her partner also learned the other language, then their relationship is in "balance", both of the languages are used in everyday life. If the communication happens in one language, then this is the first step to assimilation. The birth of a child can dissolve or make stronger this system. If the parents speak with the child in both languages, than the balance will be stronger, or be restored (if the system was unbalanced). But if the communication with the child happens only in one language, the one that is not used will be definitely overshadowed, and the child will never learn this language. The phrase mother tongue in this situation can be misleading, because in the most cases it's not the mother's language that will be dominant for the child. In the case of a Hungarian mother and a Serbian father, mostly the Serbian language gets to be the child's mother tongue (Mirnics 1994). This can happen even then, when the mother speaks her language better, as the father speaks his (ex. the mother is a teacher the father is a factory worker).

A mixed marriage can be a form of social mobility. If somebody lives as a minority, and chooses a partner form the major nation that can be interpreted as upward mobility (Hoóz 2002). If a woman has high education, than she usually want a partner on the same or even higher education level (Seagalen 1982). I hypothesize, that in mixed marriages there will be more couple with a Hungarian wife and a Serbian husband, than a Serbian wife and a Hungarian husband, and in that phenomenon the upward mobility plays an important role.

It is an important question that mixed marriages can or cannot bring reconciliation between nations. Sadly there are only bad examples for that question. In the Yugoslavian civil war the most atrocious and bloody fights and genocide happened in that territory where the most mixed marriages were. In that territory according to the 1981 census the children's 25-40% were born in mixed marriages- those children were soldiers 10 years later during the war (Hoóz 2002). Hopefully, this kind of conflict will never happen again, and that is only an isolated example, but it shows that mixed marriages cannot bring peace between nations. What is more, the identity crisis of the children who were born in mixed marriages, perpetuate the possibility of a conflict.

A short historical review

In the Carpathian Basin different nations had been living together ever since. In the Hungarian Kingdom, from the very beginning lived Germans, Slavs and Romanians together. Even nowadays it is typical for the Carpathian Basin, that in an area where the majority nation lives, we can find settlements where the minority is in absolute majority. Moravica is such a village, where the Hungarians are in absolute majority. This phenomenon can be observed while reading the interviews.

For the nations who live in the Carpathian Basin, it was always important to keep their nationality, religion and language. If this didn't happen, the Carpathian Basin would be ethnically homogenous. But how those differences affect the partners choice, were there any ethnically mixed marriages in the Hungarian Kingdom. In those days the marriages motivated by love were not widespread. The rulers and the nobles choose their spouses according to their political interests, and the peasantry choose according to the size of the land and the assets. In these circumstances, were there any mixed marriages? The data hints that there were none. János Scitovszky wrote this in 1845: "Here the Hungarians live in peace and love with the Germans and Serbians, and the Protestants live in peace with the Catholics… The people of Baranya help their neighbour with pleasure. If somebody is building a house the whole village helps him. But there are no marriages between people who talk different languages."(Scitovszky 1845) This implicates that in the nineteenth century in Baranya were no mixed marriages. Most likely this was the case in the whole Hungarian Kingdom.

After the First World War the situation has changed. In Hungary the minority often contracts mixed marriages except the gypsies. These marriages are not just between Hungarians and minorities but between minorities and minorities. (Tóth – Vékás 2008) The reasons for the high mixed marriage rate are the low population of the minority and the fact they live in diaspora, not settled in one place.

There were big changes in the mixed marriages rate of the Hungarian minority after the First World War. The Hungarians became the constitutional nation of the country. In the early days there were few mixed marriages, but in the passage of time the rate increased.

Year	Hungarian	Slovakian
	nationality of the spouse	
1931-1933	9,4	3,8
1951-1953	16,3	4,7
1961-1963	20,1	6,7
1971-1973	23,9	6,7
1981-1983	25,9	6,2
1988-1990	27,9	6,6

The rate of the mixed marriages in Slovakia by nationality (percentages) (Hoóz 2002)

As it shows, mixed marriages in Czechoslovakia increased very fast. Between the first and the last examined period the rate of mixed marriages are three times more in the Hungarian minority, but this increase is much less in the Slovak population.

The situation in Yugoslavia was very similar. After 1945 the mixed marriages were forced by the dictatorship. The propaganda said that the mixed marriages only have good sides, and the leaders of the minorities were forced to get into mixed marriages. If somebody wanted to climb on the social ladder he has to cooperate: get a mixed marriage, say that his nationality is Yugoslavian or send his children into a Serbian language school. Because of these, the rate of the mixed marriages increased rapidly. In 1990 the 25-30% of all marriages were mixed marriages (Mirnics 1994).

Year	Serbian		Hungarian	
	husband	wife	husband	wife
1953	6,8	6,2	18	22,5
1961	10,3	15,7	19,9	25,8
1970	9,2	9,3	27,2	28,7
1971	9,4	9,5	26,7	29,1

The rate man and woman who get mixed marriages by nationality in Yugoslavia (percentages) (Hoóz 2002)

It is clear, that even in the socialism Hungarian woman get mixed marriages more often than the Hungarian man. Like in Czechoslovakia the Hungarians get mixed marriages more often than the majority nation, and the number of the mixed marriages increased by the progress of time. It is important to examine the mixed marriage rate of other nations in Yugoslavia.

The data of the 1990 census shows that the mixed marriages rate was not high, but by the Hungarians it reaches 25%, (1 700 Hungarian – Hungarian marriage and 400 Hungarian – Serbian mixed marriage). Correlated to the other nations this proportion is very high: by the Montenegrins 2 100 regular marriages and 400 Montenegrin – Serbian mixed marriage, By the Muslims nationality[1] 2 100 regular marriage and 100 Muslim – Serbian mixed marriage, by the Gypsies there are technically no mixed marriages (SEBŐK 2003). The Hungarians rate of mixed marriages is higher than the others nationalities of Yugoslavia. This phenomenon can be explained with the fact that the other nationalities (Slovenes, Montenegrins) have their own republic within Yugoslavia, where they were the majority, so they had no interest of getting mixed marriages. If a member of a minority chooses a member of the majority as his spouse, in all likelihood it will bring him bigger prestige, than a spouse from a minority. For example a Slovenian cannot get higher prestige (or upward mobility) by marrying a Serbian, because the Slovenian nationality is also a majority. The Hungarians were in neither Yugoslavian republic in majority, so if a Hungarian chooses a Serbian for partner it could mean upward mobility, because the Serbians are not a minority (unlike the Hungarians). This could be an important motive of the high mixed marriage rate of the Hungarians. It could be interesting to examine how many mixed marriages and how many homogenous marriages were in 2013.

[1] In Serbia, unlike the standard in Europa, a nation can be defined by religion.

	Serbia							
	Total	Northern region			Southern region			
		Total	Belgrade	Vojvodina	Total	Sumadia and West-Serbia	South- and East-Serbia	Kosovo
Marriages - Total	36 209	19207	9408	9799	17002	9679	7323	…
The spouses have the same nationality	32 875	16844	8822	8022	16031	9060	6971	…
The spouses have different nationalities	3 334	2363	586	1777	971	619	352	…

Marriages by nationalities in 2013

The most mixed marriages were in Vojvodina in total 1777. This is not strange because this is where most of the minorities live in the country. Without Kosovo in 2013, 9% of the total marriages were mixed marriages in Serbia. In Vojvodina that rate is 18% which is the double of the Serbian rate.

The rate of the mixed marriages

If we want to know anything for sure about mixed marriages, we first must observe the number of the mixed marriages in the last years. The following tables show how many mixed marriages were between 2000 and 2013 in Serbia, by genders.

		Serb - bride
2000	Hungarian - groom	215
2001		221
2002		232
2003		254
2004		217
2005		223
2006		209
2007		192
2008		193
2009		208
2010		184
2011		177
2012		156
2013		184

		Serb - groom
2000	Hungarian - bride	310
2001		343
2002		347
2003		327
2004		345
2005		293
2006		301
2007		324
2008		275
2009		263
2010		228
2011		245
2012		228
2013		254

Mixed marriages by nationalities (RZS 2014)

The tables show that each year there were more mixed marriages where the groom was Serbian, than where the groom is Hungarian. The hypothesis which say the Hungarian women get more mixed marriages than the Hungarian men was true. There are two more questions. The first comes out of the showed data, since it shows that the number of the mixed marriages is decreasing both in case of men and woman. This can be explained by the decreasing enthusiasm towards the mixed marriages or the decrease of the number of marriages in general. The second question: is Hungarian women actually motivated by upward mobility or not. Let's examine the first question first. If the decreased number of the mixed marriages comes from the decreasing enthusiasm towards the mixed marriages than we have to examine the total marriage rate in Serbia. If there is no decrease in that number, then we know that the cause is the decreasing enthusiasm. The crude marriage rate in Serbia is decreasing since the middle eighties (RZS 2014). We can see that the cause is not the decreasing enthusiasm towards the mixed marriages but the decrease the number in marriages in general.

Now we can examine the second question witch says that the Hungarian women are motivated by the upward mobility in marriages with the Serbs. To get into details we must get familiar with the data of the Serbian census. If we look at the Hungarian women with children then out of 65 986 marriages only in 53 830 cases were the nationality of the child Hungarian, nevertheless the husbands were Hungarians in 54 158 cases. We can see that even in cases when the family was homogenous (both parents were Hungarians), there were cases when the children became Serbians. In the case of 8 349 mixed marriages the children's and the father's nationality were the same: in 4 648 cases Serbian, in 287 cases Montenegrin, in 1 630 cases Croatian and in 722 cases Yugoslavian. Only in 875 mixed marriages were the mother's and the children's nationality the same (Mirnics 1995). We can see that the women who live in mixed marriages tend to give up on the idea their children became Hungarians, and in order to keep good relationships they choose majority nation as their children's nationality. Based on this we can conclude that the Hungarian women are truly motivated by the upward mobility in mixed marriages, if not for themselves than for their children. If we examine the rate of the divorces we can find interesting data. In 1981 in 9 023 broken families where the Hungarian mother was raising alone her children, in 7 688 cases both the mother's and the children's nationalities were the same (both Hungarians). In 1 753 broken families, where the Hungarian father was raising his children alone, in 1 636 cases their nationalities was the same (Mirnics 1995). The chances for children getting her mother's nationality were less even in cases of divorce.

Local mixed marriages

The following chapter is about the Hungarian – Serbian mixed marriages in Moravica. The village where 6 000 people live is mostly habited by Hungarians (90%). Therefor the Serbian spouses are usually not residents, but come from other villages for various reasons. In total there were 11 interviews made with resident peoples who live in mixed marriages. In the interviews we used Hungarian language except in cases where one of the spouses couldn't speak Hungarian. In that case we used Serbian. Because of the length of the article I do not want to describe all the interviews, only the ones implicating elementary conclusions.

The first subject

The first subject is a woman born in 1961. Her parents are both Hungarians; in the family there were no other mixed marriages. She is a dentist; in the interview she was blithesome and vigorous. She met her husband in 1982 and got married two years later in 1984. Her husband is a TV mechanic and that is the reason why they've met. When the subject's grandmother's TV got broken she helped her bring it to the mechanic, and that is how they met. There are a lot of mixed marriages in her friends circle. They have a good relationship with most of the relatives, because most of them are the same age. Between each other they speak Hungarian and Serbian. She said that they use mixed languages. "When a friend of ours from Hungary visits us, he can't understand us because we speak a mixed language. Usually half of the sentence is in Hungarian the other half is in Serbian. My husband also speaks Hungarian perfectly, so we do not notice how we speak between each other." They have two children a boy and a girl. In the primary school and in the high school they both learned in Hungarian, but on university they learn in Serbian. The firs subject and the children declare themselves Yugoslavian, the husband declares himself Serbian. So the marriage of the first subject is not only mixed by nationality. The subject is an intellectual because she is a dentist, and her husband is a skilled labour. The family could have a Hungarian cultural identity because the first subject has greater knowledge in the Hungarian culture and language, than the skilled worker husband has in the Serbian language and culture. But in the family we see the opposite. The Serbian identity gets over the Hungarian. The subject and the children said that they are Yugoslavians, although in the case of the first subject this is groundless, because both of her parents are Hungarians. And even the husband did not do so he said he is Serbian not Yugoslavian. The pair chooses their habitation bilocaly because both of their families live near. The family is big on both-sides and they hold intercourses with everybody. It turns out that the first subject thinks the cultural and lingual differences the biggest problem, those are the ground for the confrontations. But she thinks that there could be problems if she would not live in a mixed marriage too. She thinks marriage is not easy but every marriage has its own problems. All in all with, even with the problems she is happy that she lives in a mixed marriage. Their marriage is stable despite the national differences.

The second subject

The second subject is a woman born in 1962. Her father is a Bosnian Serb and her mother origins from a Russian – Ruthenian mixed marriage from Zakarpattia Oblast. The second subject says that she is Serbian but she speaks Hungarian perfectly without any accent. Her husband is Hungarian, born in 1955 and they get married in 1980. The second subject is an insurer and her husband is pensioner, he was before an engine driver in the local mill. They have two children: a girl born in 1981 and a boy born in 1987. The second subject went to school in Hungarian language, and she has sent her children also to a Hungarian school. She speaks with her husband in Hungarian, but with her children and grandchildren they also speak in Serbian, because they think that they must learn that language too. About nationality she told that: "I calling myself Serbian, because I cannot say that I am Hungarian, because I am not Hungarian. It is true that I speak Hungarian perfectly but I am not a Hungarian. I was born here I played whit Hungarian children when I was a child, I have Hungarian friends with whom I hold intercourses, my children are Hungarian, my husband is a Hungarian, but I cannot say that because my husband is a Hungarian, that I am a Hungarian too. This is the truth I cannot say anything else." We can see that the second subject, at the time of the census declared herself Serbian but she doesn't have

a solid national identity. Her mother origins from a Russian – Ruthenian mixed marriage and her father is a Serbian from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Neither of her parents have Vojvodinian origin so she cannot even have a territorial identity. In her original family they speak in Serbian, but she went to a Hungarian school and her friends were Hungarians too. She would like to be a Hungarian, but it would be a lie if she called herself Hungarian, because she does not have a Hungarian origin. Even the religion could not clarify her self-identification, because her original family was mixed in religion too. Her mother was evangelical and her father was orthodox, those religions have very few followers in the settlement. Maybe the urge for self-identification took part in all that, that she now lives in a mixed marriage. In the subject's new family the Hungarian identity is dominant. The subject's family has passed away, but she holds intercourses with her husband's family. During the interview she often said that "she came to a good family". She speaks with her husband in Hungarian, but with their children she speaks in Serbian too. In her new family she found the identity she couldn't find in her original family. She likes her job, because it provides her independence. She complained that she had to live in poverty when she was a child, and her parents could not help her when she was a young adult. She does not blame her parents for her childhood poverty, at the time of the interview she spoke positively about her parents. In her current family she thinks that she is more dominant because in her life she always had to fight her own battles, and because her husband is now retired. That implicates that she led her family toward the Hungarian identity, because she did not want to live in the same identity crises, like in her original family. She is very happy in her current family and they never had a nationality problem.

The fourth subject

The fourth subject is a woman born in 1957 and she is an accountant. She lives with her husband who was born in 1952 and now he is a pensioner. The subject is tired of her job because the constant raise of the retiring age made her lose all her hope to get her pension. They both are very helpful, the whole interview happened in good mood. At the time of the interview they spoke about a lot of problems, but despite that they seemed to be bouncing peoples. The subject's husband cannot speak Hungarian, but he mostly can understand what he hears in Hungarian. There are a lot of mixed marriages among their friends. They hold intercourses with all of their relatives, there are no grudges with anybody. In their case after the wedding the husband moved to his wife's place. They married in 1977, they have two daughters. The first was born in 1977 and the second in 1984. They both married to a men origin from mixed marriages. Between each other they speak in Serbian. The subject sometime uses Hungarian, but with the children they speak in both languages. The subject is Catholic, her husband is Orthodox but he says he is a communist so they are not quiet religious. But they commemorate both the orthodox and the catholic holidays. They have two TVs so they do not watch television together and they solved the language differences in this way. In their TV watching habits we can observe some gender differences. The husband watches sports on TV in any language, which the subject doesn't like. Their children went to Hungarian school but the subject would like better if they go to a Serbian school because she thinks that in that way her children could have a better emergence, but there is no Serbian school in the village. But the older daughter went to a Serbian university.

Nationality is an important question to them. In past they all declare themselves Yugoslavian, but today they act different. The husband said: „Back then when Yugoslavia existed we all declare ourselves Yugoslavian. I didn't want to say that I am Serbian I said I am Yugoslavian.

Since there is no Yugoslavia I declare myself Serbian." And the subject said: "He is Serbian, I am Hungarian, I will not deny it. Because there is no Yugoslavia, we can't do much about that." This implicates the husband's communist ideology. In the case of mixed marriages the Serbian spouse rarely declares himself Yugoslavian, we can see that from the interviews. He declared himself Yugoslavian because of his ideology. When they started to speak about the destruction of Yugoslavia their mood become darker. They mourned the destruction of their country which they liked. We can see a strong communist influence in their circle of friend, in their family, in their religion and in their national identity. Among their friends the mixed marriages are very frequent, which is an important component of the Yugoslav ideology. They took the "brotherhood – unity" motto very seriously in their family and in their everyday life. Their attitude toward the religious holidays also shows a communistic ideology: they do not go to the church but they celebrate the holidays. And in their national identity they have problems only since the dissolution of Yugoslavia. They think their marriage is good. They think the good marriage is not founded on nationality or religion, a good marriage needs good peoples first.

The sixth subject

The sixth subject is a Hungarian woman, born in 1943. She is a pensioner and before that she was an economic technician. She and her husband got married in 1969. The subject was born is Moravica, but her husband came from Sokolac. She and her husband worked at the local cooperative. She was an economic technician and her husband was an architect technician. They met there. At first the subject lived at her husbands place but later they moved to Moravica because it was easier for them to go to work form here. Among their friends there are only a few mixed marriages. They have a good relationship with all their relatives but lots of them past away already. They have two daughters. They went to a Hungarian elementary- and a Serbian High school. The first daughter went to a Serbian university, the second currently works abroad. Between each other they speak in Serbian because the sixth subject's husband cannot speak Hungarian. But with the children they speak in both languages. "I have 4 grandchildren and they know both languages. They usually prefer Serbian because they live or had been living in an area mostly populated by Serbians, but they understand Hungarian and they can even speak in that language more or less." The sixth subject is Hungarian and her husband is a Serbian. Before the children declared themselves Yugoslavians, but nowadays they do not speak about nationality. In the family the Serbian identity dominates. The subject said that they never had any problems with nationality. From that we can conclude that the nationality never was an important question in the family. The subject probably had a fair knowledge of Serbian before she met her husband because without that they would not be able to communicate. Her husband was probably not inclined to learn Hungarian, and the subject did not constrain that. Her husband kept his Serbian circle of friends and the subject kept her Hungarian circle of friends. With the mutual friends of the family the communication was probably in Serbian, because the husband cannot speak Hungarian. This could affect the socialisation of the children that could later become the basis of their stronger Serbian identity. Because in their marriage they did not pay much attention to national identity in general, the family had been naturally pushed towards the Serbian identity (because the effects of the mostly Serbian environment). The subject is pleased with her marriage she thinks that the tolerance is important. They make the decisions together, she thinks that this is the basis of a good marriage.

The seventh subject

The seventh subject is a Hungarian woman born in 1976. Her husband origins from a mixed marriage and he declares himself Yugoslavian. They got married in 1999. The seventh subject is a shop assistant and her husband is a manager in horticulture. There are a lot of mixed marriages among their friends. They speak with all of the relatives. They speak mostly Hungarian between each other, what the subject regrets because she thinks that learning Serbian language is important for their children. Their children went to a Hungarian school. They work hard and make decisions together: "My grandfather said that newer brawl with each other, always one of you will be right in the house anyway, sand that's a good marriage. And he was right, only one of the spouses should spar at the time."

In the family clearly the Hungarian identity dominates. Because the husband's original family was already mixed so he had no clear national identity. For the husband the national identity was not important, and he did not use Serbian language a lot in the family. Because they use Serbian infrequently, the Serbian identity is weaker. We can see this phenomenon in the previous interview with a slight difference, where the Serbian identity was supreme and here the Hungarian was pushed aside.

The eleventh subject

The eleventh subject is a Hungarian woman born in 1951. She and her husband married in 1973 and divorced in 1979. At that time the eleventh subject was a salesclerk, now she is a pensioner and her husband was an engineer in demesne lands. She does not hold intercourse whit her ex-husband since the divorce. There were mixed marriages among the friends of the eleventh subject but not among her husband's friends. They have hold intercourses with all of their relatives. Among themselves they were speaking only Serbian and they have watched only Serbian programmes on TV. In those days religion was important for them but today it is an important part of the subject's identity.

In her marriage her father in law was dominant which later led to problems. "In my marriage sadly my father in law was dominant and three peoples cannot live in a marriage. My husband resisted, wanted to resist, we didn't want our marriage to go to only one direction, the Serbian direction. In Serbian culture there is a strong patriarchal system, and my father in law, although we did not live in the same village, demanded to keep that principle which says that the man is a man and the woman is inferior. That was very stressful especially for my husband and he tried to solve this conflict… not with me but with his father… with alcohol. He was never drunk but he used it to calm himself. We did not have children because of that. I did not want just to give birth to a child and them to raise it, because that is what they wanted. The things did not work out… so I asked for a divorce, and I divorced"

In their marriage both participant had a strong national identity, but the subject's father in law wanted the marriage to go into the Serbian identity. That resulted an instable situation, which caused serious problems in the life of the couple. The subject did not want to forego her national identity and her husband couldn't manage this. This situation eventually caused a divorce. If the national identity of one of the spouses is forced to the other, the other side can feel endangered. And this situation can easily lead to a divorce.

Balance in the family

We can observe from the interviews that a marriage will be solid if the two national identities are in balance. If for both spouses their national identity is equally important, then both cultures will be represented in the marriage. The children will know both languages, and they will have a chance to create a solid national identity. But if for one of the spouses it is not important to preserve his or her identity, than the other identity will be dominant unwillingly. Forcing one of the identities can also result instability because it can create resistance on the other side. The balance can be maintained if both of the spouses preserve his/her own identity and neither of them tries to force his/her own identity to the other. The value of ones identity is influenced by many factors: circumstances in life, influence of the family, learned norms and social impacts. A good social policy can help to develop the balance in the family. If it can make both of the national identities an eligible alternative, it can stop the assimilation and mixed marriages can be a place for the intercommunication of cultures.

Summary

Mixed marriages have an important role in the social structure. Mixed marriages can form the aspect of the society but the society also can strongly affect the mixed marriages. This is a neutral phenomenon; it does not bring any positive or negative effects. But the acts of the state can make positive or negative effects to it. It is very important that the state politics do not force mixed marriages like the Yugoslavian government did in the fifties, but also do not forbid them. The Hungarian and the Serbian languages must be treated equally and not hold one of them in a subaltern status. For children who origin from mixed marriages must have the possible to go to school on the language which they would like, otherwise the official state language can easily come over the minority language. The conflicts of the past must be solved and not buried deeply because later it can re-surface even stronger. If the alternative for one of the nations is more attractive than it will lead to assimilation of the other nation, and if one nation disappears than it will cause pain mostly to that territory and to those who live there. The demographic data show that the Hungarian women get more into mixed marriages than the Hungarian men. Because they can easily abandon their nationality than men and the state politics will support the assimilation even if it remains neutral towards the issue. In Europe there are some good examples of minority policies. The model is given, we only have to adopt it. If in the family the spouses do not care for their national identity then the weaker identity (minority) will be inferior to the stronger (majority) one because of the milieu around them, the stronger identity will be dominant. The interviews show the model that we have seen in the demographic data. In the interviews the Hungarian women live in mixed marriages more often than the Hungarian men. But we can also see that a good mixed marriage is not just a dream, two cultures can coexist in a way that neither of them subjugates the other.

The marriages could affect the function of a state. If the marriages are stable that could result the stability of the society. The same is true for the mixed marriages, if they are stable then they could be a solid base of the state. ❋

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Hungarian ethnography in a historical perspective

An unpublished lecture by Gyula Ortutay from 1937

DOI 10.14232/belv.2016.2.11
http://dx.doi.org/10.14232/belv.2016.2.11

Cikkre való hivatkozás / How to cite this article: Lencsés, Gyula: (2016): Hungarian ethnography in a historical perspective. An unpublished lecture by Gyula Ortutay from 1937. Belvedere Meridionale vol. 28. no. 2. 144–153. pp
ISSN 1419-0222 (print)
ISSN 2064-5929 (online, pdf)

www.belvedere.meridionale.hu

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On the initiative of the Institute of Sociology, London a sociological-ethnographic field work was conducted in Dudar, a village in Hungary, in September 1937. The participants came from England and Germany, while the event was organized by a Hungarian staff, the members of the College of Arts of the Szeged Youth.[1]

For this occasion, a series of lectures were prepared and held by the members of this Szeged based organization and other Hungarian experts of social sciences and ethnography, including a paper by Béla Bartók too.[2] The topics of these lectures covered the structure of the Hungarian peasant society, the Hungarian agrarian reform, the psychology of the Hungarian peasantry and different aspects of Hungarian ethnography. These papers were published in a bilingual edition, on the 60th anniversary of the Dudar research project,[3] except for Gyula Ortutay's lecture on Hungarian folklore. It was not included for the simple reason that it was not yet available for the editors at the time of publication in 1997. It was only in 2013 that we could locate Ortutay's manuscript in the Archives of Keele University, where the papers of the Institute of Sociology are stored.[4] In this article we publish the original English language version of this lecture.

Gyula Ortutay (1910–1978) was an outstanding scholar of Hungarian ethnography. He was a founding member of the College of Arts of the Szeged Youth – an organization whose members were young social scientists and artists, engaged in the betterment of the social status of the Hungarian peasantry. This group flourished in the 1930s, which coincided with the first prolific and significant period in Ortutay's scientific career as an ethnographer.

In this lecture, prepared for the prestigious guests from England and Germany, Ortutay's aim was to present a realistic general view of Hungarian ethnography. It includes a short history of the main topics and of the methodology of Hungarian ethnological research, with regard to the impacts of the international trends in this science.

The lecture covers almost every branch of Hungarian folklore, showing the process of transformation and disintegration of the traditional peasant society. Ortutay's reasoning is based on a wide repertoire of the then recent results of Hungarian ethnographical research, including the folk music collections by Bartók and Kodály, and his own experiences in the

[1] For more details see Lencsés (2015a).

[2] Bartók's text on Hungarian peasant music was presented by his pupil and colleague, the Hungarian composer and folk music scholar Sándor Veress.

[3] Trencsényi 1997.

[4] Foundations of British Sociology Archive, Keele University Library. LP/4/1/3/7/10/3 i

field of folk tales. As this lecture was prepared for illustrious British and German scholars we can find plenty of examples from the culture of the countries where they came from. Ortutay quotes from Goethe's *Faust* in German, he mentions the *Grub Street Stories* and Scottish folk ballads, and refers to British and German scholars from Bishop Percy, Francis, James Child and Cecil Sharp to the Grimm brothers, Hans Naumann, and Adolf Bastian, author of the *Elementargedanke* theory. It is also remarkable that Ortutay finds the East-West relations as a crucial reference point for Hungarian culture and politics – a problem, which still lingers on. He feels it also important, in 1937, to distance himself from the "rather obscure" ideas comprised in the characterology of any social or national group, in this case the Hungarian peasantry, and from the "specious racial definitions".

Keele University has two versions of Ortutay's text in its archives. The first is in the author's own typescript with hand-written corrections and there is a retyped, clean copy. All of the corrections and the retyping were made by Dorothea Farquharson, a member of the Institute of Sociology and the British organizer of the Dudar field work. After returning home from Hungary she worked on a volume to assemble and publish the results of the Dudar field research and the lectures held by the Hungarian experts, but this endeavour could not be accomplished. During these preparatory works Dorothea Farquharson, as a native speaker, felt it necessary to make some corrections in Ortutay's text.

These alterations affect the punctuation, the structure of a few sentences and to some extent Ortutay's terminology.[5] Most of the corrections were necessary due to Ortutay's limited experience in writing in English, which resulted in minor errors and sometimes in a somewhat complicated expression of thought. At some points, however, these modifications more or less altered the originally intended meaning of the text or even led to the misinterpretation of the author's thoughts.[6] Therefore, while accepting Dorothea Farquharson's suggestions for punctuation we retain Ortutay's original text. At the same time we use a different font style for the words and sentences that required modification according to Dorothea Farquharson, and give her corrections in footnotes. This allows the reader to enjoy the richness of the original text with all of its minor mistakes and follow the whole editing process by the native speaker editor.[7]

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Julius Ortutay[8]: Hungarian Folklore

Whenever we have to investigate – from whatever standpoint – the questions of intellectual life of the Hungarian people, we are always faced with that problem to hand primarily in its ethnical structure[9] *which our writers and politicians – and sometimes our scholars too – in the habit of characterising as the* contrast[10] *between East and West.* And indeed these[11] *constant* references[12] *met with in connection with all our national and European problems must be*

[5] For example, it was corrected when Ortutay inappropriately used the term *boorish* as a synonym of the attributes *primitive*, or *peasant* or *pagan*.

[6] Nevertheless, these modifications in meaning and the misinterpretations are interesting in their own right and they can shed light on the difficulties of intercultural communication between the Hungarian and British social scientists. See e.g. footnotes 3, 7, 19, 35, 52 for minor changes, and 38 and 57 for misunderstandings.

[7] For a Hungarian translation of Ortutay's lecture see Lencsés 2015b. – It is worth to be mentioned, that Ortutay himself could not be present personally at the Dudar meeting. His lecture is, however, a valuable document of this event.

[8] Ortutay used his name in this form in the manuscript.

[9] DF: having to deal in its ethnical structure with that problem *[„DF:" denotes Dorothea Farquharson's corrections]*

[10] DF: "conflict"

[11] DF: "The"

[12] DF: "references to this conflict"

more than mere poetical or political catchwords or convenient formulas usually[13] *employed to shirk the insolvable. Western Europe too has at all times taken note of our existence in terms* pregnant with under-appreciation[14], - has always[15] *observed primarily the exotic and the* oriental[16]*;* it is these peculiarities that[17] *have aroused Europe's interest and taken Europe's fancy,* while[18] *we ourselves have time without endeavoured and struggled desperately and indignantly to prove that we are good Europeans or have in anger and scorn turned our backs on a Europe which has failed to understand us. It is not my object in this short address of an informative character to attempt to describe the historical background of the Hungarian attitude; but I had at least to* refer it[19]*,* seeing that[20] *when speaking of the folklore of Hungarian peasantry we are constantly being faced with this question.*

To give only one instance, which may serve as a kind of starting-point, -[21] *a few days ago (*on September the eight[22]*) we celebrated* one of the Church festivals commemorating the Blessed Virgin Mary - the Day of Her Nativity[23]. *– For our peasantry that day is not only a Catholic festival, but a feast day of paramount importance* for other reasons of a[24] *by no means Christian origin. First of all it has a significance of pre-Christian origin, – it is the first day of Autumn. It is surrounded by a mass of ritual prohibitions: no woman's work must be done on this day, while willow branches, hay and apples are taken to church to be consecrated, that they may be used to protect the cows against all kinds of diseases and spells.* Naturally this instance too[25] *shows clearly that the* pagan beliefs – or rather non-Christian beliefs –[26] *of the peasants are interwoven also with Christian elements. This is what we see also in the worship of the Virgin Mary – ancient*[27] *mythical beliefs* absorbed[28] *in the teachings of the Christian Church. Some Hungarian scholars have actually shown similarities between the motives of the worship of certain goddesses of the mythology of our racial kin in the North (*this is true in particular[29] *of the mordvin mythology) and those of the mariolatry of the Hungarian peasantry.* All that this instance is intended for the present to prove is[30] *that in the intellectual attitude of our peasantry we find* this dualism[31] *in practically every instance; and even in cases where there can be no doubt about the European origin, we can trace these pagan and primitive* or - if you prefer it - boorish[32] *elements: though it is equally true that on the other hand* the boorish and[33] *primitive peculiarities have in most cases been disguised by the higher culture of Europe.* And this[34] *dualism is one of the fundamental problems of Hungarian ethnography; and even though we may not perhaps accept the* excessively simplifying[35] *theory of Hans Naumann, it is indubitable that the cultural structure of our peasantry must be investigated simultaneously both from the standpoint of the higher culture of Europe and from that of the* ancestral traditions and of the par excellence boorish.[36]

Hungarian ethnographical research at first

[13] DF: "formulae"
[14] DF: "of only partial appreciation"
[15] DF: "i.e. it has"
[16] DF: "oriental qualities"
[17] DF: "and while these qualities"
[18] *DF deleted this word.*
[19] DF: "refer to it"
[20] DF: "as"
[21] *DF deleted this part of the sentence.*
[22] DF: "on September 8th"
[23] DF: "the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary"
[24] DF: "for associations of"
[25] DF: "This example"
[26] DF: "traditions"
[27] DF: "where"
[28] DF: "have been absorbed"
[29] DF: "e.g."
[30] DF: "This serves to prove"
[31] DF: "a dualism"
[32] *DF deleted these words*
[33] *DF deleted these words*
[34] DF: "This"
[35] DF: "extreme simplification"
[36] DF: "ancestral and primitive traditions"

naturally[37] *set itself the task of investigating the ancient or ancestral. This attitude was perfectly in keeping with the romantic views of European science then in vogue. (We would refer in this connection merely to* Rousseauism[38]*, the* collecting efforts[39] *of Bishop Percy, Herder's theory, the researches of the Grimms, etc.). The first important Hungarian folklorists followed the example of Western Europe* and also attempted[40] *to reconstruct in its fullness the original religion of the Magyars, together with a complete system of deities, mythology and ancestral epic, as had been done in the case of the mythology of the Northern Germanic peoples. For this work the available material, particularly at that time, offered no assistance at all. The uncertain guesses and rather naive comparative attempts made by these first folklorists were naturally doomed to failure; and they themselves eventually took refuge in fiction. The most important figure of this period was Arnold Ipolyi, who supplemented his noteworthy collection by the addition of the romantic theory of the Grimms and endeavoured to prove from the scanty data at his disposal that the original religion of the Magyars was one of the most perfect examples of primitive monotheism. It goes without saying that his whole construction is fundamentally wrong. This romantic and uncritical period was followed by the reaction of a hypercritical school, which among other things actually doubted whether it was possible from the data available to draw any conclusions whatsoever as to the original religion of the Magyars or the antecedents of our popular epic. Their caution certainly made our scholars more sober; but research could not possibly take their rather barren attitude as the last word in the matter.*

What has Hungarian folklore to tell us in this question? Historical research and the ethnological investigation into the history of the peoples linguistically allied to us has at any rate proved that the original religion of the Magyars was undoubtedly shamanism, - the shamanism of the peoples of Northern Europe. This conclusion is supported, not only by historical suppositions and ethnological analogies, but also by the evidence of the Hungarian folklore of today. I would like to adduce one or two instances which may serve also to show out of what fragmentary material[41] *our ethnographers have had to reconstruct the past in imagination and how obstinately our peasantry cling to the old traditions which have already lost their original meaning. For instance, the "Vasorrú Bába", the so-called Iron-nosed Witch*, occurring so often[42] *in our tales, as a person possessing the power of evil magic, (as has been shown by Alexander Solymossy) is to be identified with the man-idol, or rather ancestral spirit,* enjoying such respect[43] *among the shamanists; and it was only under the influence of Christianity that this pagan spirit was converted into an evil-eyed woman who causes the hero of the tale so much trouble. We could naturally continue the enumeration of such fragments entitling us today to speak of the original shamanism of the Magyars with mush more justification than our predecessors. The memory of the shamanism and of the shamanistic magic drum, for instance, is preserved in one of our instruments of prophecy; according to one extremely interesting analysis the divining staff of the Hungarian shepherds and warrens is nothing but a fragment – now without its original meaning – of shamanistic cosmogony. Here and there our popular sayings have latent in them elements reminding us of the shamanistic cosmology;* and[44] *according to Alexander Solymossy, the Old Shepherd figuring in the popular Hungarian Christmas play – the Play of the Nativity- breathes the spirit of pre-Christian days, his satirical attitude and*

37 *DF deleted this word*
38 DF: "the teachings of Rousseau"
39 DF: "investigations"
40 DF: "in an attempt"
41 DF: "the fragmentary nature of material from which"
42 DF: "represented"
43 DF: "much respected"
44 *DF deleted this word and began a new sentence here.*

his refusal to believe during the pious play owing its origin to that fact[45]. *I shall refrain for the present from entering into any analysis of these conclusions – which are more than once very strongly hypothetical in character; I merely wished to show the path now being followed by Hungarian research into the primitive religion of the Magyars.*

And now, when briefly describing the religious disposition of the peasantry, we must repeat what we have said above concerning the dualism of Hungarian peasant (boorish)[46] *culture. This dualism is not however a peculiarly Hungarian speciality; it is characteristic of all peasant cultures alike*, being characteristic however only so long as it remains boorish[47], - *i.e. until the peasants pass beyond the limits of the peasant* (boorish)[48] *order of life and until their consciousness reaches a point at which they throw off the more primitive attitude. In the Hungarian peasantry generally – whether Roman Catholic or Protestant or Greek Oriental – the laws and liturgies of positive religion are saturated with* boorish[49] *beliefs and superstitions and peculiarly peasant* (boorish)[50] *idiosyncrasies and traditions. Indeed, in the case of the Roman Catholics (only sporadically in that of the Protestants) even in the religious sphere the positive religion is interwoven, not only with these peasant superstitions and idiosyncrasies, but also by primitive liturgical usage, - that fact being tacitly accepted by the Churches. For instance, during the church-ale in the Lower Town, Szeged, the morning confession and communion is followed by prayers offered by the peasantry as formulated by their own primitive liturgy, that being followed again by processions and by improvised prayers uttered under the spell of some ecstatic communal devotion.*

However, this peasant dualism of the religious outlook can be seen in every field. The Child Jesus and Virgin Mary figuring in our tales live entirely in the boorish atmosphere of the folk-tale, - as it were with the weapons of typically fabulous powers, the evil and the good magician. For instance, in a tale recently recorded by me in County Szabolcs, we find Christ figuring and employing the weapons exclusively of[51] *peasant superstition to overcome the shrewd and cunning Devil. Our Catholic festivals, the worship of our saints, family life, the usages of labour are saturated with elements of peasant belief which cannot be described in detail in this connection.* As for the power of the world of beliefs of the peasant community, nothing proves that better[52] *than what I found in one of the villages I visited, - namely a magician or "medicine man" whose magic power was respected far and wide and who himself believed in his skill. For example, he attributed the fertility of his land to his fertilising spells. He had lived for more than ten years in America, where he had been in business,* spoke[53] *English well; he lived and practised his trade under the shadow of a rationalistic culture, but when he returned to his native village, that culture disappeared from his life without leaving any profound effects. In the younger generation, on the other hand, a change is under way in this field too; the dissipation of the peasant communal order has naturally not failed to* affect this territory too[54]. *Since the Great War we have been witnesses of a transformation of peasant culture becoming ever more and more rapid. Although the economic, material and social roots of this change reach back to the eighteenth century, the breaking up of the form of this culture has*

[45] DF: "in the fact of Holy Nativity" *[This modification by DF is based on a misunderstanding of the sentence – LGy]*

[46] *DF deleted this word.*

[47] DF: "as long as they remain primitive"

[48] *DF deleted this word.*

[49] DF: "pagan"

[50] *DF deleted this word.*

[51] DF: "belonging exclusively to"

[52] DF: "Nothing can better demonstrate the power of the world of beliefs of the peasant community"

[53] DF: "and spoke"

[54] DF: "have its effect"

only been so[55] *clearly in evidence for a decade or two. A cultural break-up of this kind usually results in the peasantry losing its older order of communal conventions* not yet replaced[56] *by any other order of conventions calculated to* strongly cement[57] *that society;* the latter is[58] *dissolved into atoms, a circumstance that makes its effect felt also on the cultural attitude of the peasants. Just as the older and more primitive cosmography dissolves and the world of folk-tales disappears, this peculiarly peasant* religiousness[59] *wears away too. The views of the peasants become more rational and lead them towards a more and more* rational[60] *attitude, although in the nature of things the latter is not yet very clearly in evidence.*

When we investigate the creations of our people in Hungarian folklore, -tales, ballads, folklore-melodies, - we once more come across features which the Western European inquirer is quite unable under any circumstances to find anywhere in West Europe. Even in Hungary today they are anything but frequent. It is difficult today to find even in Hungary isolated story-tellers, - so-called "Yarn-spinners" – and the older rhythm of our folk-music is disappearing too. Only – a circumstance about which we may hear in another talk – whereas the older rhythm of our folk-songs now disappearing is being replaced by a newer one, which is constantly making, more and more headway, the extinction of the folk-tale is unchecked, for the process of extinction is originally connected with the transformation of our peasant culture as a whole. The life of the folk-song is not particularly affected by the rationalisation of views of life; but the rationalistic attitude is a serious menace to the folk-tale, particularly where the tale itself is only a humiliating reminder of the past which he has left behind and is actually ashamed of to the peasant awaking to full consciousness[61]. *When we survey the Hungarian folk-tales that have been collected, we find* that material affording[62] *interesting data relative to the peculiar position of the Magyars in Europe. Certain motives of our tales are closely connected with the traditions of the Ural-Altaic legends and deviate from the tales found in Western Europe. According to Solymossy, for instance, - who has done more than any other inquirer to through light on these motives, - the motive of a castle revolving on a duck's foot or on the foot of some other bird is a remnant of shamanistic cosmography. As against this theory John Honti has pointed out that we find the motive of a castle revolving by magic in the West European epics already in the Middle Ages and that the same motive occurs in Celtic epics too. However, the analyses may quite easily show that whereas the revolving castle of the West European version usually merely appears to revolve and never moves on the foot of any bird, in those of our tales which preserve shamanistic memories the characteristic point is that the castle does actually revolve on some bird's foot. We might enumerate other examples, - for instance, the mare's milk bath as a reminiscence of the Ural-Altaic horse-cult found in our tales; while the observations in our tales relating to the primitive system of cosmography also reach back to the world of Ural-Altaic mythology. However, when we investigate the three typical groups of Hungarian tales, - the beast stories, the so-called "true" tales and the playful tricky tales, - we see quite clearly that the material of the Hungarian tales fits without a hitch into the system of European tales. If we group our tales according to the system known as the Aarne-Thompson system invented by the two prominent representatives of the Finnish geographical-historical school, we cannot help*

[55] *DF deleted this word*
[56] DF: "before they can be replaced"
[57] DF: "cement with strength"
[58] DF: "which in consequence"
[59] DF: "attitude to religion"
[60] DF: "rationalistic"
[61] DF: "of which the peasant awaking to full consciousness is becoming actually ashamed"
[62] DF: "in them"

unconsciously thinking of the famous lines Goethe's "Faust":

"Hier dacht' ich lauter Unbekannte,
Und finde leider Nahverwandte,
Es ist ein altes Buch zu blättern,
Vom Harz bis Hellas immer Vettern!"

And we do indeed find tales related to ours everywhere, whether we look backwards, or merely have a look round among our neighbours. The most ancient records of human history – the records of the "subconscious" sphere of our humanity – haunt our beast stories and our aetiological sagas, and loom large in many a magic belief of the tales. Our tales do indeed preserve memories dating from all periods of the history of the tale – from the motive of transformation to be found already in the tales placed beside the mummies of Egyptian children. Like those of all other peoples, the Hungarian collection of tales also belongs to the huge and intricate network the basic origin of which has not yet been ascertained with any certainty. Arabian, Persian, Celtic tale-elements, the beliefs of medieval Christianity, Renaissance novelle, and anecdotes of a literary character blend in a kaleidoscopic jumble. Nor need we waste much time pointing out that tales akin to our own are to be found among the surrounding peoples; and it is the work of philological research to show how much of our epic traditions is our own contribution and how much we have received from elsewhere; as against the older nationalistic bias both parties must naturally establish the fact that the influence was a reciprocal one. Of course, if we had time, we could reveal more hidden connections too; we could show sporadic traces of one or other of the beautiful stories of the West European and Oriental epics may be found surviving in some scattered Hungarian superstitions or beliefs: we could show, for instance, how the motive of the "Unquiet Grave", one of the most famous ballads, figuring in Child's magnificent collection, is found recurring in the funeral superstitions of Hungary. All these things merely prove the great unity connecting the intellectual assets of those days. Unfortunately we do not know enough to ascertain whether these kindred elements are to be explained satisfactorily as the result of the geographical fact of migration or of the psychological principle of the "Elementargedanke" or of the sociological principle of identical situations.

It may be of interest to say a few words concerning story-telling, - concerning the function of the tale, - in the life of peasantry. When we examine the question sociologically, the first thing we are impelled to establish is that story-telling is the recreation of the poorer peasants; the well-to-do peasant farmer would regard it as infra dig (beneath his dignity)[63] *to tell a tale, though he is quite prepared to listen to stories of an evening: but he does not take any active part,* - we may safely ignore the exceptions[64], - *in the preservation or handing down of tales. The latter task has been undertaken by the poorer peasantry, - usually old beggars or warrens or women workers. – Traditions revive in their hands, - usually when doing work,- the rapidity and smooth progress of which is not disturbed by listening to the tales. We find this, for instance, in the case of tobacco-packing, and corn-hulling, and in spinneries. The story-tellers naturally tell their tales with the free variations of oral tradition though I have frequently come across a story-teller, who, though unable to read, had the gift of building up new stories out of the material read to him out of books, though his version was by no means a slavish one: while others again merely repeat the tales they have read or some "Grub Street" story, in a rather perfunctory manner. It is indubitable, that the less a story-teller is affected by our higher culture the more striking and highly coloured his manner of telling. There are story-tellers from whom their villages expect only certain stories, - for example, stories of a pornographic character, - finding the telling of such stories a distraction; but "specialists" of*

[63] DF: "beneath his dignity"

[64] DF: "except in the case of" *[This modification by DF is based on a misunderstanding of the sentence – LGy]*

the kind, - if I may use the term, - are rather rare, because a good story-teller usually has a considerable material at his disposal. I myself quite recently came across an old story-teller of eighty who knows enough interesting stories to fill volumes. It is quite certain, anyhow, that today we know of hardly any story-tellers of the kind; and seeing that the younger generations no longer take part in the preservation of the tales, (I have only rarely seen any signs of their doing so,) we must expect that in a few years the living tale will become mute in Hungary too, as in all other countries in which the peasantry is losing its older form of culture.

Another very valuable group of Hungarian folklore is our collection of popular ballads. And indeed the scholars who were primarily in search of aesthetic beauties, were perfectly justified in saying, that in perfection of form the Hungarian popular ballad is the Central European rival of the beauties of the Anglo-Scotch ballads. The monumental dignity and dramatic character of the form and its plastic strength must indeed deeply affect everyone; what a pity that it is so difficult to preserve the original beauties in translation. It goes without saying, that our popular ballads, - as being a branch of a European genre, not so very ancient in date, (reaching back as it does only to the twelfth or thirteenth century), - show ever closer kinship with the European popular epics than do our peasant tales. The origin of our popular ballads may be traced back definitely to the fifteenth century. Naturally here too it is possible to point also older traditions, - strange to say, in a comparatively recent stage of the popular ballad style; for our "highwaymen" ballads contain vague reminiscences of the epic form of the Ugrian heroic song spoken in the first person shown to date back to the period of Finn-Ugrian community. I do not propose on the present occasion to point to the ethnological significance of this fact; I would merely note that our ballads often contain primitive traditions differing entirely from those of the West European types. In the ballad "Kádár Kata" ("Kitty Kádár"), for example, the motive of the handkerchief turning red as a sign that the two lovers have get into trouble is to be find already in the tales told by the Egyptian Maspero. The motive of human sacrifice occurring in the ballad "Kőmíves Kelemenné" ("Mistress Clement Mason") takes us back to the far-distant spheres of comparative ethnology. (It should be noted that we have only Central and South-Eastern European versions of the latter ballad.)

If we would classify our ballads, we must distinguish several groups. We have, for instance, first of all the epic ballads of a historical character that reach back to the days of the struggles between the Hungarians and the Turks. Their style is more monumental and colder; and they breathe the air of the historical songs. To this group belong also these of our ballads, which, though their subjects are not historical, contain traditions which certainly centuries old. They are highly coloured, gloomy and hard; the epic course of their style is broken by dramatic elements; this group comprises our most beautiful popular ballads. The more recent ballad-style must have to some extent been transformed by the influence of "Grub Street": the subjects are stories of faithlessness in love of our highwaymen; the style is looser, the course of the story easier and smoother, while in structure these ballads show a closer kinship with the other groups of our folksongs, the other older popular ballads forming a separate group also in respect of structure. In connection with our ballads it must be noted, that the most frequent form of the North and West European ballad, - that with a refrain, - is only very exceptionally to be found in Hungary, seeing that we have very few dance-ballads either[65]. *Unfortunately, as a consequence of the mistaken methods of collection in vogue previously, only the text of very many extremely beautiful Hungarian ballads has been preserved, the tunes not have been recorded by the collectors, though there can be*

[65] DF: "as we have very few dance-ballads"

no doubt that those tunes would have given us numerous ancient themes, as is proved by the material contained in the collection of ballad-music made by Messrs.[66] *Kodály and Bartók. In conclusion I must note that the finest items of the treasure-house of Hungarian popular ballads have been recorded in Transylvania, among the Székelys, (the so-called Széklers,) although – as research has shown – the same ballads were extant also in the Lowlands and in Trans- Danubia and even in the Highlands. And yet, when we hear of Hungarian ballads, the first to occur to us are the popular ballads of the Székelys. I may mention in passing that in 1863 certain Romanian folklorists questioned the authenticity of the Székely ballads (in the so-called "Wild Rose" case) and assorted that our ballads are of the Romanian origin. Today, naturally, comparative folklore research has done away with all such nationalistic misinterpretations and bias; and, though it is indubitable that there are certain common Magyar-Romanian ballad-subjects, (subjects shared in common with many other peoples too), the origin of the themes is wrapped in obscurity and it is perhaps quite superfluous to broach the question of origins from that standpoint.*

Finally, a few words must be said concerning our folk-songs, though of course in a short summary of the kind we cannot possibly deal with every branch of Hungarian folklore. It would not be worthwhile to classify our folk-songs by subjects. Again, in connection with the question of folk-music much will be said later-on concerning the problem of the form of folk-poetry; for the tune and the text are absolutely inseparable in the case of a folk-song. Even where the tune and the text are not in permanent connection, - even where the tune may be attached to other texts and where the text may find other suitable tunes – the important point is, that there never is a text without a tune. All these matters will be dealt with in the talk concerning folk-music. What I would do here is rather to point out briefly that in Hungarian folk-poetry the creative ability of the community is still a living force. I do not propose in this connection to deal with the question of the relation between individual and community in peasant culture. There can be no doubt, of course, that ultimately it is the individual who is the creator of the song and the text; after all every act of creation demands individual initiative and inventiveness. In the peasant culture of Hungary, (and indeed in all peasant cultures, as has been proved also by the investigations of the British scholar Sharp[67]*), however*[68]*, no individual conceit or suggestion has ever been able to become a folk-song or a treasure of general acceptance in a popular culture unless it has accommodated itself to the principles of the communal conventions of style. Naturally these conventions of style have been always subject to changes, being formed and transformed constantly by individual initiative. But they have at all times been a guiding and shaping force; and everything not sanctioned by convention very soon disappeared as a version without function or influence. The Hungarian folk-song shows many stages, having during the course of history absorbed innumerable new elements: nevertheless, this impersonal folk-song material handed on orally from generation to generation is uniform, the several stages of style in themselves constituting a consistent whole. We are therefore able to observe in our folk-songs the laws governing popular creation still at work: folk-songs are found coming into being even today. This is the group of folk-culture that is most enduring and best able to resist all changes of system and all social transformations.*

The above is a short survey of the more important fields of Hungarian folklore. We have of course passed over many things in silence, - that being due to the lack of space and not to the material being scanty. We might have spoken of the dramatic customs of our people, which are

[66] *DF deleted this word.*

[67] DF: "Cecil Sharp"

[68] *DF deleted this word*

also an interesting blending of ancestral tradition and ethnological custom with European influences. We might have spoken of our dances, which have also for the most part preserved reminiscences of ancient dance-forms, that of Hungarian peasant, and that of Hungarian lord. We might have spoken of our children's games too, which also contain numerous fragmentary elements of primitive Hungarian traditions. To do so would however have far exceeded the limits at our disposal. I have not entered into a discussion either of the character of the structure of the Hungarian peasantry; for such character sketches are usually arbitrary and the ideas comprised in them rather obscure. They may be specious, but they do not tell us much. Nor have I been able to make any use of the specious racial definitions. Should there be any need of such, no doubt they will be explained in the psychological talks. ❋

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JANCSÁK CSABA

So keres, SZKRSZ?

A Szegedi Keresztény Roma Szakkollégium felsőoktatási és munkaerő-piaci eredményességhez való hozzájárulása értékszociológiai megközelítésben