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Dear Reader,

Dear Africa Enthusiast,

It is always a great pleasure to write the welcoming remarks of a newly launched enterprise. This is the case right now when I am gathering my thoughts about the Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies (JCEEAS). The Doctoral School on Safety and Security Sciences has just recently set up its newest component, the Africa Research Institute in 2019. The Institute's very agile management is continuously working on new projects, building connections, and gathering the scholars dealing with African issues from all over the world. In this quest, an almost natural step was to launch a scientific journal. Having screened the region for similar initiatives, the Institute has concluded that African issues are not addressed quite enough, so they have decided to set up a quarterly that reflects on the importance of the Central and Eastern European region and the African continent. JCEEAS does not limit itself to scholars only from the region or to topics only concerning the CEE countries, only aims to give a little extra attention to this specific area. I believe that this approach is reflected by the list of contributors of this first, double issue, as well as the composition of the Editorial Board of the Journal.

In my view, Africa is unquestionably one of our greatest opportunities and challenges. A continent with more than half a hundred independent states, a colourful, complex, and versatile set of people, history, culture, values, and interests. This is one of the reasons why the research topics that the Journal aims to cover are very broad, ranging from culture and anthropology, through politics, conflict studies and migration to the economy and development studies, just to mention a few. I myself truly hope that this endeavour will be a great success on multiple counts, for the Institute and the researchers behind the Journal, as well as for the contributors—scholars, practitioners and professionals with different backgrounds – and last but not least for the future readership who will also benefit from the findings of the papers.

With all the above, I wish you all a great reading experience and plenty of fresh ideas and new approaches offered by the papers of our Journal!

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Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies

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The regional map of Africa

Identity and ambivalences

Mauricio Waldman¹

Abstract:

Maps are the most relevant contribution of geography to the interpretation of human presence in space. The Cartography of Africa is a central issue in the global order. The continent projects importance in several different themes, including the dynamics of the continental economy and its insertion with the regionalization. The cartographic production centered on the African experience is largely unknown. Commonly it is omitted due to the almost atavistic disqualifying perspective surrounding the continent, its peoples, and cultures. Therefore, the Africa Map demands fair debate and recognition. In May 1961, when the continent was witnessing the emergence of a veritable flood of independences, the UN Economic and Social Council initiated the United Nations Regional Cartographic Conference for Africa. Intending to standardize geoinformation in the continent, the Regional Map of Africa is one of the most relevant developments of this initiative. Approved in February-March 1976 at the 26th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, the Regional

Keywords:

regional map of Africa;
African cartography;
politic anthropology;
cultural geography;
historic cartography;
geopolitics;
history; Africanity;
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“Any shock, anywhere in the world, is immediately transmitted to the other side of the globe” [...] “The universal set, therefore, presents the characteristics of an international system: all events, wherever they happen, provoke mutual reactions” (Raymond Aron)

Introduction

Par excellence, according to a broad segment of specialists, maps are a powerful reference to decode the inhabited space and simultaneously a premise to inducing transformations or reinforce a spatial framework anchored in specific social, cultural, historical, and geographical processes.

Overall, the maps, as the main products of cartography, are graphic representations and interpretations of the real world, and in that way, they are practical tools to the apprehension of territorial architecture.

Maps or geographical charts reveal the space's natural features and, especially, the socio-spatial arrangements. In this sense, they highlight and evidence spatial-temporal mutations, the functions of the social structures, and the range of contradictions intertwined within the geographic *phenomena*.

As such, maps enable us to geographically understand the axial dynamics of societies, a notion increasingly indispensable as a bridge linking different levels of reality. Maps use a specific communicational codification, known as cartographic language, associated in a conceptual sphere to the spatial representations of the societies and the cultural imaginary.

Given these particularities, maps unveil ideological, topological, and iconological spatial indicators inextricably related to the *weltanschauung* of the societies (Waldman, 2017a, 2017b, 1997 and 1994; Tuan, 1980; Anjos, 2009, p. 12; Oliviera, 1968). In an objective approach, maps provide clues and directives to action plans (political, economic, administrative), legitimize decision-making and problem-solving. In that manner, as a tool and knowledge field (and more precisely, in a geographical prospect), cartography has been robust, strategic, and efficient support in the grandiose constellation of graphic description and visual information of the ecumene (*apud*, Anjos, 2009, p. 12).

This paper aims to analyze an emblematic African cartographic piece: the *Regional Map of Africa*. The focus of this map is a continent that is the world's second-largest and second-most-populous continent, around 30,4 million km² (including adjacent islands), covering 6% of Earth's total surface and 20% of its land area.

A byproduct of pan-African ideas in times post-colonization, the main goal of this chart has been identifying spatial macro-sets, taking into account the geographic dynamics to be translated in terms of a technically possible regionalization. The

starting point of the Regional Map of Africa was the independence processes of the new Africa's countries. In 1960, the *annus mirabilis* of Africa, no less than 17 new sovereign states, began to interact in the political geography of the continent.

Three years later, on 25 May 1963, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded by 32 newly independent nations in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia, summit spearheaded by Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie. The OAU was replaced by the African Union (AU) on 9 July 2002, and like the previous entity, its headquarters is in Addis-Ababa. In common, the binomial OUA-UA shares the same goal: the integration and the progress towards an African Unity.



Figure 1. Political map of Africa, 2021.

(Maurício Waldman's cartographic elaboration. Peters Projection. Scale 1: 53.125.000)

Nowadays, the political map of Africa displays 54 sovereign states (Figure 1), the most significant number of independent countries located in a single continent. On

purpose, it should be noted that the African bench in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which represents almost a quarter of the member states, is the most significant group of this world entity. For this reason, also, Addis-Ababa is an influential diplomatic pole, a prestigious decision-making center of the global order.

At the same time, it is essential to note that there are still traces of colonialist interference in the continent (Waldman, 2019). This issue refers to the authority exercised by Europeans over tiny islands, archipelagos, and coastal citadels, which, despite their limited geographical expression, are highly strategic because they are in charge of maritime passages and guarantee access to vast maritime resources (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Map of non-sovereign territories in Africa, 2021.
(Maurício Waldman's cartographic elaboration. Peters Projection. Scale 1: 53.125.000)

The former Spanish colony of Western Sahara is an exception to this rule. The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic independence (SADR), on behalf of the indigenous population of the territory, was thwarted due to the Moroccan occupation in 1975.

Despite this, led by the Polisario Front (Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro), the Sahrawi people grip their national liberation movement and the anti-occupation resistance. In 2020, the SADR government in exile maintained relations with 84 countries (36 are African Union states, 2/3 of the entity). The dispute remains a thorny issue mainly by materializing an indigestible case of colonialism in Africa exercise by an African country against the aspirations of another African population (See Besenyő, 2021, 2010, and 2009).

Since all cartographic thematic matrices in the continent take into account 54 sovereign countries (which, as we noted, could be 55), an essential observation would be to emphasize according to the continuously repeated argument about the artificiality of African borders. We can enhance that, except for Eritrea and South Sudan, the continent's national frontiers keep precisely the same for all countries since the 1960s. That is to say: the "tribalism" in Africa is less significant than "Afropessimists" imagine (Singoma, 2013).

As for the central proposition of the Regional Map of Africa - the quest for development - we must underline that in terms of African continentalism, referring only to "Africa" is a reductionism, unable to account for the continent's diversity. African reality points to thinking about the *countries* present in their political geography and also the *sets* to which they belong, an expression of heterogeneous interests, and the multiple paths and visions related to regional cooperation.

Thereby, to address the negative colonial legacy and promote African Unity, Africans need deliberate efforts at the regional and continental levels, carrying out programs to promote development. In this sense, a cartographic model is indispensable. Coherently, the Regional Map of Africa was an undertaking of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), as soon it is based and expounds on clear economic variants, essential to Africa's strides in management policies and development strategies.

At the same time, this chart exhibits an image that refers not merely to regionalism, regional spatial sets, or the new historical reality of the continent. In reality, norms do not exist in a vacuum. As the Brazilian geographer Milton SANTOS argued, "space is an unequal accumulation of times." (*passim*, 1978).

For that reason, a comprehensive understanding of this map foremost suggests unveiling an image rooted in Africa's history, cultures, and societies, intertwining the economy with the pulsations of the social sphere.



Europeans Maps, Maps About Africa and The Unsighted Africans

Geography is the science of territory. As noted by British geographer Denis Cosgrove, *landscape* and *map* are paradigmatic keywords of geography (2008, p. 1).

This fundamental component - the space in a broad sense - is an essential observation plan because it presents the signals and the perpetuation of spatial historicity, that is to say, recording the elements, social and natural, that act in the current territorial configuration, allowing forecasts about potential transformations, the natural unfolding of the socio-spatial dynamics, balanced by mutant and inertial factors (Anjos, 2009; Waldman, 2006 and 1997; Santos, 1978).

About the Regional Map of Africa, we need beforehand to consider two standpoints that frequently induce misconceptions and jeopardize the assessment nexus, basically aspects about the traditional African cartography and the studies centered in ancient African frontiers, correlated with one another.

Firstly, although this subject is not directly associated with Africa's regional map, we should remember that the modern maps about the continent have historical connections with traditional geographic knowledge. Despite the hegemony of Eurocentric thought, based solely on European maps of the continent and belittling the native cartographic record, we encounter, for instance, various evidence of African map-making in the nineteenth century in the reports of European explorers of the continent.

As argued by Thomas Bassett, an American specialist in the historical cartography of Africa, "most of the maps recorded in these travel accounts were solicited by explorers interested in the geography of areas unknown to Europeans [...] The ability and willingness of Africans across the continent to produce maps testify not only to their competency in map-making but also to Europeans' dependency on indigenous geographical knowledge for their own map-making" (Basset, 1998, pp. 33-34).

Ironically, this kind of geographic information, the so-called *solicited maps*, frequently drawn by the autochthones on the ground in the presence of the explorers, contributed to the improvement and accuracy of a *layout* of the continent hinterland that ultimately was recruited by the conquerors to dominate, oppress and divide Africa among alien powers (Waldman, 2018: 78; Basset, 1998, p. 33).

Secondly, due to western historiography's tendency to ignore the African continent as a civilization center (Waldman et al., 2007; Breton, 1990), the accounts regarding African cultures were continuously based on multifarious taxonomy of bias, invariably emphasizing "African barbarism" and consequently, accuracy lacunae concerning spatial notions, understood as dominated by non-rational understandings. Assuredly, when we study the African frontiers, all modern charts show us borders drawn by "ruler, protractor, and compass," disobeying natural roughness, and likewise, they are

frequently rectilinear, clear clues denouncing possible alien interference in map-making of the continent.

As remarked by several specialists, the African continent compound around 80,000 km of continental frontiers lines today (M'Bokolo, 2012, p. 651; Silva, 2008 and Döpcke, 1999). Howsoever, 87% of this total, corresponding to almost 70,000 km, resulted from agreements between colonialist European powers. Consequently, these numbers would convert the Regional Map Africa into an irrefutable western geographical product. Then, this perception implies in reviews and enlightenment that follows:

1. Traditional communities in the continent created multiple guidance systems and a wide variety of cartographic pieces, exhibiting abundant documentation concerning borders. In retrospect, Africa's traditional governance has always endeavored to clarify the spaces under their leadership, alias, an imperative *proviso* for the functioning of the indigenous political order (Evans-Pritchard and Fortes, 1977, p. 8). The native royalty preserved a comprehensive collection of cartographic products defining areas under diversified taxonomy of power structures, later co-opted by western colonizers.
2. On the contrary to common sense narratives, in addition to the fact that Europe did not disseminate ideas appropriately pioneering about boundaries postulates, the former traditional limits traced along with the centuries-old and millenary history of the continent ended up being reshaped by the European officials. Although this fact is essential for understanding the maps of Africa drafted by European colonizers, on the other hand, this *modus operandi* of colonial political geography has not received the attention it deserves in academic studies 3.
3. Historically, African traditional political patterns reveal extremely resilient pivoting tendencies. Consequently, the absorption of political entities before colonialism as regional circumscriptions in the spaces reorganized by Europeans was a usual occurrence. For example, England incorporated the Bunyoro Kingdom as an administrative division within the borders of the Uganda Protectorate and assimilated the Ashanti Confederation area into administrative borders of the British Colony of the Gold Coast (Nowadays the Republic of Ghana); France integrated the Bamoun Empire as a district in the Kamerun Protectorate and the nuclear area of Merina heartland into the departmental map Madagascar Colony. Beyond that, the borders of traditional political formations as the Mossi Kingdoms, Ngoyo (Cabinda), Rwanda, Burundi, Zanzibar, Lesotho, Comoros, Eswatini, Dahomey, Morocco, Kanem-Bornu, and Ethiopia, were tout court revalidated by the western authorities since the arrival of first troops (Waldman, 2018).



4. Moreover, spaces politically structured do not axiomatically define continental territoriality. Frequently, anthropogenic arrangements inherited from the long-standing work on nature by successive local community generations become *territorial compartments*, eventually impacted by occasional acting of one State apparatus. These geo-spatial frames, stimulating historical-spatial homologies to take over by lineages, clans, and ethnicity, were essential to shaping the contemporary geography of Africa. For instance, the Fezzan, Cyrenaica, and Tripolitania, spatial compartments of late antiquity were the cornerstone to demarcate the borders of Libya. The binomial Kush/Nubia, an ample segment of the Nile valley hinterland delineates in ancient pharaonic geography, became the reference to demarcate the Egypt-Sudan border. The old Rif and the mountainous crest that surrounds it became the axial area of the Spanish Morocco Protectorate (Waldman, 1997; Maull, 1959).
5. Finally, the ancient space flows that cut across the continent from coast to coast carried out a pivotal role. Trade routes have always interconnected the continent, associating politically more structured territories to the others and the lands outside Africa (Waldman, 2006). Herewith, the tracing of the colonial boundaries, annulling the *niemandsland*, "empty areas" without direct state governance, incorporate the induction of the spatial lines of force that magnetized the movements in the African space. Based on these lines of force, German colonialism in East Africa drew the borders of Tanganyika, a space articulated by immemorial ties that bound the Swahili cities on the Ocean Indian shoreline with the peoples of the Great Lakes region of the interior. In the same way, France divided the territories of the Sudanese belt according to the direction of the old caravan trails that connected the Sahel and the kingdoms of Africa humid to the coast of the Mediterranean Sea.

The Western civilization managed one process of globalization systematized by obstination to erase "the *vacuum*" in the planisphere 3. Therefore, this logic permeated the cartography of Africa as well the global mapping of the Earth. Nevertheless, this pretension has never entirely submerged the spatial processes inherent in the conquered spaces in Africa and other continents. The old processes remained actives and conditioned the colonizers' actions, a clear example of the highly inertial character that can mesmerize the territorial formation.

Africa Regional Map: Between Spatial Resilience and Temporal Changes

The map reflects space construction and is a technical process conditioned by history and whole social, political, and economic influences that organize territoriality.

Regarding the Regional Map of Africa, *the economic variable is the predominant note*, and as such, it is a measurement doable to plan and determine how the African economy is working.

Note that the United Nations Regional Cartographic Conference for Africa took place in Nairobi, Kenya, between 1-12 July 1963, event corroborated by the Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), pursuing Resolution 816 (XXXI) cast on 27 April 1961 by ECOSOC (hence before the OAU creating). The main focus of the conference was on African map-making, geodesy, toponymy, and standardization of the continent's geoinformation (ECA, 1963).

Moreover, there are manifest geographical imperatives to the economic sphere. The map of Africa proves that 16 states in the continent are land-locked countries: Mali, Niger, Chad, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Burundi, Malawi, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Eswatini, and South Sudan (13 of these categorized by UN as least developed nations). Non-coastal countries make up 28,3% of Africa's total surface and 40% of the continent's population.

Many small, non-coastal countries face tremendous challenges trading internationally. Several reports show that poor road infrastructures account for 40% of transport costs in non-landlocked countries and 60% in the case of landlocked countries. The absence of security outposts and control checkpoints on the extensive dry borders is a source of serious disarray, favoring the terrorist movements, accelerating the migratory crisis, and the rise of religious extremism due to poverty. Obligatorily, the economic integration in the African economy/ global trade and the security issue of these nations imposes de facto, a modality of inter-state governance 4.

Interestingly, in terms of political history and cultural geography, the continent has a great potential for imaginary representativeness. Compared to what some studies identify as *asiatism*, African space, unlike Asia, was not conducted by “core states” or, in other words, by kingdoms or empires that politically, geographically, culturally, and historically imposed their command to a majority part of the continent (Liu, 2013). Objectively, this backdrop favored proposals to think of Africa from a continental unicity perspective.

In this scenario, the UNECA, created in 1957 by ECOSOC, became the cornerstone of African economic themes during the 1963-1973 decade. UNECA leadership was ensured due to the abandonment of the debate about the continental economy by the OAU itself. Although Article 20 of the OAU Charter had instituted an Economic and Social Commission to promote inter-African cooperation, the body met only twice, in December 1963 and January 1965, and then went into absolute lethargy.

The UNECA's performance was fruitful in creating spatial/regional clusters, organized to control conflicts between different branches of state management, stopping potential dangers posed to social and political stability, if not peace. This premise guided, for example, the implementation of Multinational Centers for Programming and Project Execution: known by the acronym MULPOC, a patent effort to draft a cartographic regionalization (Figure 3).




Figure 3. Map of MULPOC
(UNECA, Addis-Abeba, in: UNESCO, 2010, Vol. VIII, p. 492)

Slowly but consistently, the map-making of the Regional Map of Africa was advancing. The 26th Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers (Addis-Ababa, 23 February-1 March 1976) approved a resolution defining the continent's regionalization according to a proposal that established four regional macro-sets: Northern, West, Central, and Eastern-Southern Africa. Afterward, from the *débâcle* of white supremacist minority regimes, the Eastern-Southern region was dismembered in two individual jurisdictions - Eastern and Southern -, complementing the regional shape of the map. Widely recognized as *the Map of the Five Regions*, these macro-sets were adopted by ECOSOC, the OAU, and last by the AU (Figure 4).




Figure 4. The regional map of Africa or map of five regions
(Maurício Waldman's cartographic elaboration. Peters Projection. Scale 1: 53.125.000.
Map-basis: < <https://mundoeducacao.uol.com.br/geografia/africa-2.htm> >, access: 04-20-2021).



We must keep in mind that this regional chart is representative of one contemporary ordering of continental space. Distinguishing itself by its African rooting, the proposal was initially conceived within the UNECA, subsequently becoming the reference map for all institutions working with the continent.

Mainly United Nations Statistical services have adopted this map as a basis for continental regionalization data in a Mundial prospect (See UNSC home page). Hereupon, a wide range of multilateral institutions, like interstate financial bodies, joint action plans, facilitators of inter-community trade, and other cooperation entities, make use of this model map. Fundamentally, for many Africans, this map is seen as a way to become rule-makers instead of rule-takers.

Thereby, Africa's Regional Economic Communities (REC) are conceived based on this map. As multilateral integration entities, the REC includes eight sub-regional bodies (frequently overlapping one another), which provides the overarching framework for continental economic integration (Figure 5). In addition, REC also key actors working in collaboration with the AU in ensuring peace and stability in their spaces. Hence, the *African Standby Force* is structured based on the circumscription of RECs (Waldman 2014; Khamis, 2013).

The Map of the Five Regions is possibly one of the rare cartographic productions accepted by consensus at the level of an entire continent. Approved by the OAU and subsequently revalidated by AU, this map was at the beginning of the 2nd Millennium, enriched with a Sixth Region: the one formed by the *African diaspora* 5 resulting from slave traffic of the past centuries and by nuclei of Afro-descendants sown by contemporary migrations.

Regardless of historical and techno-political attributes, the regional chart of Africa is a map, and therefore, includes not only consensus and proactive projects but also ambivalences and contradictions. So, we cannot afford not to realize that from the angle of the historical cartography, geopolitics, and international relations, the Regional Map of Africa analysis requests more provocative notions than expounded by generic/descriptive explanations.

Geographers willingly say that maps are a privileged research tool. However, as the renowned German geographer Friedrich Ratzel warned, *it is indispensable to problematize the charts* (Bord, 2003: 176). As such, this directive is precisely the backdrop that will magnetize the considerations that follow.

North Africa is the center of a capital debate. As we can observe, this region (except Western Sahara) already appears on the MULPOC map. The populations of this space had long-standing historical contact between them, with the Middle East and South European trade and the several Levant and European powerhouses and cultures (*passim* UNESCO, 2010).




Figure 5. African REC

(Map-basis: < <https://theexchange.africa/countries/accelerating-african-regional-integration-key-to-propel-continent-economy/> >. Peters Projection. Scale 1: 47.544.000.)

The peculiar physiognomy of the region looks through controversial concepts like "Arab Africa" and "White Africa" and classic indications of the geographers of the 18th-19th century defining Northern Africa as part of the Middle East (Maull, 1959). Indeed, these terms justify explicit criticism⁶. Nevertheless, *Septentrionalis Africa* has a oneness that unquestionably suggests recognizing the historical, geographical, and cultural fact.

Frequently, the influence of the Sahara Desert is at the center of numerous evaluations. Nevertheless, we must note that the aridity of the Sahara acted more as a kind of filter than as an insurmountable barrier. The Sahara Desert imposed a selectivity in historical exchanges but never resulting in a cultural cloistering, and precisely for this reason, the reciprocity between the "two Africas" dates back to early antiquity (M'Bokolo, 2012 and Paulme-Schaeffner, 1977).



Nothing allows arguing that the two cardinal macro-areas diluted by Saharan landscape have been historically and geographically impermeable to each other or that their cultural dynamics have developed in an unattended manner to one another. Herewith is evident that another taxonomy explains the differentiated perception between two Saharan edges. Since XIX century final times, side by side with the rising of Arab nationalist ideas in Northern Africa, in the colonial possessions between the Sahel and the *meridionalisfinisterra*, the notion of Africanity gained indisputable notoriety.

Africanity concerns cultural, geographic, and historical interrelation between hundreds of ethnic groups in the continent, encompassing the populations settled to the south of the Sahara Desert. Africanity is a cultural whole, or civilization, based on standard structural, cultural features unfolding in inter-ethnic unity, *so-called Black Africa or Black African Civilization*, deep-seated in Sub-Saharan Africa, Afro-descendants' groups abroad and black nations of Diaspora (Waldman et al. 2006; Mazrui, 2002; Breton, 1990).

It is an exciting note that the construction of Africanity notion thrives first in the black diaspora, influencing the Pan-Africanist ideal. In this interface, diaspora *intelligentsia* had always been a generous creditor of the Pan-African imaginary. The movement's *première* conference, bringing together activists from the United States, England, and the West Indies, took place in London in 1900, convened by Afro-Caribbean activist Henry Silvester Williams, a Trinidadian lawyer.

Afro-descendent militants such as Web Du Bois (USA) and Marcus Garvey (Jamaica), both defending the union of Africa and the strengthening of the diaspora's ties with the continent, were notable interpreters of Pan-Africanism, an expression not only of the African identity but about on the *whole black world*, now recreated externally to its original historical-geographical boundaries. In summary,

Africanity is a concept that does not encircle the entire African continental mass and concretely excludes North Africa. Africanity is an umbrella concept connected with a model of civilization, geopolitically polarizing with force-ideas like Arabism and Islamism, notably in the extremist versions.

South Sudan is a notorious example. The new country, which arises from a bitter divorce from the former central Khartoum regime, advocates at once withdrawal from Northern Africa by defending participation into the Eastern Region. Naturally, this formulation reflects ties of fidelity traditionally cultivated with groups that inhabit Ethiopia and Uganda (i.e., *Black Africa*), a position reinforced by the tough resistance struggles during five bloody decades against the Khartoum Arabization/Islamization politics 7.

As such, the definition of macro-groups and the states that comprise them is not fortuitous, even more so when multilateral bodies interact with delegations whose agenda express political programs or even a *weltanschauung* not necessarily associated in the realm of agreement or by consent (Waldman, 2014).

Cultural and historic syntaxes merged with economic interests are very clear, for example, in the Union of the Maghreb Arab (UMA). Comprising five countries: Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya (Figure 6), in this REC, the proximity with the powerful European Union encourages the strengthening of the regional partnership, that despite this, has not been able to achieve advances on its goals due to several disagreements, including Western Sahara, whose independence is since the 1970s supported by Algeria.



Figure 6. Union of the Maghreb Arab countries
(Maurício Waldman's cartographic elaboration. Peters Projection. Scale 1: 53.125.000)

However, what we should stand out is the REC executive official designation: the Arab Maghreb Union, a unilateral assertion that omits the presence of large concentrations of Berber populations and black ethnic groups, indigenous communities which have guided aspirations to assert their cultural-linguistic identity facing the Arabization, a silencing institutionalized that invades the framework of multilateral relations.



Figure 7. ECOWAS countries
(Maurício Waldman's cartographic elaboration. Peters Projection. Scale 1: 53.125.000)

Concomitantly, it would also be possible to exemplify regional blocks associated with one *inertia* identified by theoreticians like the Brazilian Milton Santos; a *geographical resilience* of the spatial arrangements linked to the dynamism inherited from the ancient territorial forms. Space is a historical construction, constantly aggregating new meanings and functions. After that, all that is new in temporal

sequences would be to adjust itself with the precedent's spatial form (*apud* Santos, 1978).

In this sense, the delimitation of two macro-regions, Western Africa and Central Africa, denounce one clear spatial homology with two colonial territorial predecessors: *L'Afrique-Occidentalefrançaise* (AOF), a general government embracing in the same federation eight *ex-colonies françaises* (now Mauritania, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Conakry, Mali, Benin, Senegal, and Niger), amid 1895-1958, and the *Afrique-Équatorialefrançaise* (AEF), another league of four French colonial countries in Equatorial Africa (Gabon, French Congo, Ubangi-Shari and Chad), extending northwards from the Congo River into the Sahel within 1910-1958 8.

A territorial reorganization in Africa Post-independence took into account a new reality, justifying, for instance, the incorporation of Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia, and Guinea-Bissau in Western Africa and, too, the embody the former Belgian francophone colonies (Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi), Angola and Cameroon in Central Africa. However, on the other side of the coin, we may see a corresponding replication of this regional framework in two African RECs: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of Central African State (ECCAS), a fundamental similarity with the two macro-sets in Regional Map of Africa (compare Figures 7 and 8 with Figure 4).

Back to the economic evaluation, it would be the case to comment about France's economic projection in the continent, or better, about its schemes of economic domination in the new African nations. Much more than other Western possessions, the former French colonies have maintained substantial ties with the former metropolis, backing opinions that detect all sorts of neocolonialist ties.

This synergy, invisible to the naked eye, dates from the singular independence process of French Africa colonies. Since the late 1950s, most colonies have detached from France through "nonviolent ways," which means the new republics retained deep-running links with Paris.

More precisely, in the 1960s, just before conceding to the African demands for independence, France, preoccupied to fulfill its long-term geopolitical requirements, promoted arrangements in the newly independent countries to pave it in a prominent position in the post-war scenario.



Figure 8. ECCAS countries

(Maurício Waldman's cartographic elaboration. Peters Projection. Scale 1: 53.125.000)

One of them is the franc de la *Communauté Financière Africaine* (CFA franc), a monetary system guaranteed by the Gaulish treasury, a central French cornerstone of economic politics to Africa. The franc CFA has divided into two currencies: the *West African CFA franc* (abbreviation *XOF*), accepted in eight West African nations and Guinea-Bissau, a former Portuguese colony; and the *Central African CFA franc* (*XAF*), utilized in six Central African countries and Equatorial Guinea, an early Spanish dependency. Although separate, both currencies have always been at parity, remaining interchangeable in a large area (Figure 9).




Figure 9. Franc CFA map

(Green: XOF area/ Blue: XAF area. Map-basis: < <https://www.mapsof.net/africa/cfa-franc-zone> >. Peters Projection. Scale 1: 53.000.000.)

The XAF as many the XOF are a liaison to two monetary unions: the *Union Economique et MonétaireOuestAfricaine* (UEMOA, also known by its English acronym, WAEMU) or the BCEAO's area (Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest); and the *Communautééconomique et monétaire de l'Afriquecentrale* (CEMAC, or ECCAS in English), over the control of BEAC (Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale). Admittedly, these blocks are a legacy of ancient colonial circumscriptions. But not only in the geographical scope.

Although the franc CFA is a robust and stable coin to 14 African countries, these nations have not had a national coin, depending on France to finance their savings. The

great franc CFA area nations are legally obliged to put 50% of their foreign currency reserves into the French Treasury, plus another 20% for financial liabilities. It is a continuing disadvantageous model to these countries because it deprived them of growth and wealth. Notwithstanding, it is continuing to be profitable for France.

Nonetheless, besides the amplification of a "spatial skeleton" related to old-fashioned colonial federations (AEF/AOF) toward an expanded REC (ECOWAS and ECCAS), the space resilience may be more incisive yet. In this case, South Africa is a fine example of the power and resourcefulness of old spatial frameworks.



*Figure 10. SACU countries
(Maurício Waldman's cartographic elaboration. Peters Projection. Scale 1: 53.125.000)*

The South African economy had an economic development differentiation. The Dutch and the English administrations invested in a functional model based in European settlements. The subsequent economic advancement happens but to the total detriment of the local Bantu population.

A regional economic pattern was established in 1910 when the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) was founded. It was a customs union including South Africa and the old British BNLS block, with four countries: Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, and Swaziland (Eswatini). Patronized by London, it is the oldest Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) still in force globally.

The Republic of South Africa (RSA) hegemony in the meridional Finisterre economic context was always self-evident. Step by step, the country has become the most diversified and industrialized economy in Africa, and geographically, RSA is an undisputed pivot area. Not accidentally, the delimitation of the Southern Region in the Africa Regional Map and the SACU is strictly the same, a complete spatial homology (compare Figure 10 and Figure 4).

The *Apartheid* Era (1992) end confirms the South African favoritism and paves a robust expansion of the RSA prominence in the whole continent. In the 2010s, the share of South Africans in the GNP of SACU reached 99.9% of the total, and the country rules 17.5% of Africa's total GNP. Further, demonstrating the dynamism of the locational forces from the past, through the Southern African Development Community (SADC), RSA has magnetized Central and East Africa, a visible gain compared with the *Apartheid* times 10.

SADC covers 9.9 million km², the third part of Africa (Figure 11), and is the continent's most potent regional block. In 2013, the entity represented 28% of the African GDP and 31% of the total population. Nevertheless, in isolation, RSA's GNP was three times greater than the national wealth of other SADC countries (Waldman, 2014).

Indeed, as in any other spatial arrangement, this geographic polarization depends directly on the smooth functioning of the system's driving center and one permanent feedback connecting fixed and flows (Santos, 1978). If there is any dysfunctionality in this equation, the progress achieved may disappear, freeze or even retract.

Viewed in this way, RSA has been a country that has wasted great opportunities to advance more. In the last decade, political turmoil has hindered its ability to meet its full potential. After experiencing consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth rates, the country faces a vicious recession cycle. The development has slowed, and GDP expanded by only 0.2% in 2019. These years of low growth are attributable to such determinants as low prices for commodity exports, weak investor confidence, policy uncertainty, and rigid local labor market laws (Cook, 2020).



*Figure 11. SADC countries
(Maurício Waldman's cartographic elaboration. Peters Projection. Scale 1: 53.125.000)*

Other key socioeconomic challenges include high poverty rates, unemployment, organized crime, labor unrest, environmental crisis (chiefly an explosive water shortage), protests over public service access disparities in service delivery, and governmental corruption. Last but not least, RSA has one of the highest rates of social inequality in the world 11. Under those circumstances, the country's economy in the African scenario has shrunk. The RSA's GDP (nominal) in 2020, US\$ 317 billion, was significantly lower than that of Nigeria (in order of nearby 37%), whose national wealth totaled around US\$ 500 billion in this same year.

On this account, Nigeria, the "Giant of Africa," arises as a potential regional superpower. World Bank reports show Nigeria's economy expanded 7% year-on-year

between 2000-2014, definitely at a fast pace. Although the growth has slowed to 2% in recent years due to political and social instability and shocks on petroleum production, the country has tried to move away from its significant reliance on oil refineries and processing plants. Now, Nigeria is the wealthiest country in Africa, apparently predestined to spearhead the ECOWAS and the Guinean megalopolis surrounding the city of Lagos 12.

Per contra, this West African country, with a population of over 207 million citizens (16% of African population), often appears as an illustration of faulty governance: environmental pollution, overpopulated urban clusters, business scams, inter-ethnic conflicts, and in the last decade, endemic terrorist activities (for example, the Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria).

As a deduction, it is challenging to identify well-structured scenarios that would be feasible for the Nigerian next future. The country needs to maintain an economically sustainable model, control the intemperately of demographic growth, mitigate the ethnic-religious tensions, and break up the regional gaps, an assortment of hurdles whose resolution, nevertheless, only the time may answer.

Finally, regardless of the Nigerian and South African cases, the African continent, more than sixty years after the *annus mirabilis*, exhibits very complex territoriality, topped by old and new Pivotal States, able to polarize different regions or groups of nations.

In this instance, a not definitive list, incorporating a pretty differentiated taxonomy, would indicate countries like Morocco and Algeria in the Maghreb; Egypt at Machrek; Senegal, in the vertex of West Africa; Nigeria and Ghana, in the Gulf of Guinea; Tanzania and Rwanda, in central-eastern Africa; Ethiopia, in the African Horn; Angola in the central-southern plexus of the continent; and the RSA in Austral space (Waldman, 2014; Almeida, 2011, p. 22-24; Boniface et al., 2009, p. 117; Badi, 1992, p. 85).

The performance of these Pivotal States tends to embarrass the schemes endorsed by the Africa Regional Map in the geopolitical, economic, and cultural fields. Furthermore, the strengthening of what we can label as regional powers may zero the initial purposes of the map-makers seduced by the proposals stated by the United Nations Regional Cartographic Conference for Africa. This possibility must be clear to all who study the map-making of the continent.

Accordingly, as a spatial expression of a distinct moment or period in history, the maps, including the one focused in this paper, cannot claim the condition of axiomatic geographic pieces, nor do they draft plans of understanding *a priori*. Not least because space is above all the result of decantation of unequal time flows in the ecumene (Santos, 1978).



Conclusions

Although understood as a product external to societies, maps teach much more about the contexts that placed them in the world than the other way around. The cartography involves several narratives, both those outlined in the map and those that, even though they do not show clearly, translate *a language of silence*.

We can observe in the Regional Map of Africa an articulation that permanently combines *resilient or inertial aspects* with *changeable features*, both connected and inscribed in the social imaginary, which in this configuration, materialize reinterpretations and too new territorial semantics, an essential matrix for apprehending the socio-spatial arrangements and regionalization processes documented in this cartographic piece.

It is essential to note that, whatever the degree of distancing or amplification of the original meanings of this map, Africa, a vastness formed by more than 30 million km², *unique and at the same time diverse*, remains as a matrix reference. Notwithstanding the meanings associated with each map-making idiosyncrasy, the continent remains legitimized as a singular landmark, repeatedly considered in its scope.

A fortiori, rescuing what we emphasize in the text, Pan-Africanism as an ideal was initially established as a political and cultural movement, thinking Africa and the Black Diaspora as two trunks of the same tree, rooted in a community of origin proposing a *Gemeinschaft* modulating a desired common destination for Africans and Afro-descendants.

In this sense, in opposition to the many readings that accentuate the fragmentation of African societies, it is interesting to note that the political map of Africa remains fundamentally the same as that brought to light in the wake of decolonization. In other words, thinking about unity and integration is not strange to the grammar of the political dictionary of Africans.

Nevertheless, in contrast to the centrifugal forces, which induce unity, the centripetal forces are also manifested, which constantly seek to restore disunity, especially because persistent structures of economic domination are at stake. So, the intending is to postpone *ad eternum* the movement that put African peoples' independence into action.

Of course, as the French philosopher Raymond Aron reasoned, it is impossible in a world governed by an international system to carry on any action in one part of the globe without reverberations in another part. Therefore, Africa interacts in different ways, according to the types of actions directed to the continent. Global crises affect Africa, that is for sure. However, in contrast, Africa's crises also affect the world.

As noted, the perpetuity of spatial forms inherited from the colonialist past is at the root of the great migrations of impoverished Africans. Therefore, it would be urgent to address this problem at its origin, in Africa, guaranteeing the governance of states that are still fragile in the spaces of origin of these migrants, promoting an effective integration and facing the economic texture of the conflicts (a great theme, deserving evaluation in a specific text) taking into account the development and the social progress.

This *tour de force* is essential for the maxim of the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes to become effective, for *whom the primary function of the State is to guarantee a safe civil society*. From the perspective of regionalization, better connectivity between countries, economic integration, and good governance are synonymous. Hence, guaranteeing the State's functionality and empowering the management models is the cornerstone for Africa's progress.

As the Nigerian historian, Ade Ajayi recalls: "The vision of a new African society must necessarily be developed in Africa, proceed from the African historical experience and the proper sense of the continuity of African history. The African is not yet a master of his destiny. *However, neither does he persist only as an object subject to the vagaries of this same destiny*" (in Asante and Chanaiwa, 2010, p. 896).

In this respect, the Africa Regional Map cartographical identity associates itself with the maxim of African unity, a notion of which this map is simultaneously its materiality and continuity, a road that awaits many contributions and re-readings in favor of the progress of the Africans.

Conflict of interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

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- UNSC - United Nations Statistical Commission < <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/commission.htm> > < <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm> > < <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#africa> >



Notes

- 1) Contrary to the verdicts that announce the multiethnic states as unfeasible - a preach that falls heavily on the new state formations of Black Africa - the history shows us that the Kingdom of Congo had accumulated at least three centuries of political evolution at the time of the appearance of the Portuguese in 1482. The Empire of Ghana lasted for nine centuries. Mali, for more than three. Thus, before declaring ethnic diversity as a problem in itself, the rub may reside in the capacity building or not of the so-called "more advanced" political structures (implanted in Africa to give rise to neocolonialist inspired political projects) to assume the plurality, a debate mingled at the center of the antinomies of Modernity.
- 2) It is to be regretted that this lack remains strong inside the horizon of cartographic studies: "When maps of Africa do receive attention, the focus is almost exclusively on European maps of the continent. The dearth of indigenous African mapmaking studies may be explained by some factors that have collectively served to marginalize the indigenous cartographic record" (BASSET, 1998: 24. See also WALDMAN, 2018; AUSTEN, 2001; DÖPCKE, 1999)
- 3) This process is also indicative of the *finitude of the Planet*. The French philosopher and writer Paul Valéry pondered: "There are no more voids on the map. The era of the finite world begins."
- 4) Ethiopia is the only African landlocked country for which the guarantee of access to the sea has traditionally intervened on a geopolitical agenda. The Abyssinian control of the port of Djibouti and possession of the Eritrean window to the Indian Ocean remain open questions for a large sector of Ethiopian society (See CASPIAN REPORT: 2019-06-28).
- 5) The African Union defines the African Diaspora as "Consisting of people of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union." Its constitutive act declares that it shall "invite and encourage the full participation of the African Diaspora as an important part of our continent, in the building of the African Union." (< <https://au.int/en/diaspora-division#:~:text=The%20African%20Union%20defines%20the,constitutive%20act%20declares%20that%20it> >. Access: 27-04-2021).
- 6) Although in North African countries the Islamization was historically synchronized with Arabization, this process was not complete. Several populations are Muslim but not Arabs. There is a strong presence of mixed people with black ancestry too. White Africa proper does not exist, and overall, the conception serves exclusively to ideological purposes.
- 7) This phenomenon is not restricting to Sudan. Since the 2000 decade, Muslim fundamentalists groups are carrying on skirmishes or open wars on diverse levels, in the all Sudanese strip, African Horn, and surrounding, different avatars of the same ethos of civilization clashes.
- 8) We note that the internal territorial circumscription of the AOF and AEF obey ancient traditional African borders, the localization of commerce centers and long-distance paths (chiefly caravans ways), spatial references acting as a prerequisite to the French political geography (MAULL, 1959: 406-407).
- 9) Critics assert that countries of CFA franc channel more money to France than they receive in aid and also that this policy results in impoverishing Africa (by the way, one of the reasons for the migratory crisis). This critique explains why, in May 2020, France agreed to end the Gaulish engagement in the West African CFA franc. Then, French and African administrators announced that an independent currency, called eco, would replace the West African currency (apud Caspian Report, 2019-06-10 and DW, 2019).
- 10) Note that even when Apartheid was in effect, RSA maintained exchanges with several African nations, particularly with Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, countries without access to the sea, and logistically made use of the South African rail network (Santos, 1999, p. 27; Fako, Miti and Mogalakwe, 1989).

- 11) The end of *Apartheid* did not result in significant alterations in the RSA's income structure. Low-income segments remain disproportionately concentrated in large crowds of Bantu ethnic groups, a fact that, due to the contemporary history of South Africa, can revive the irruption of new racial tensions.
- 12) Lagos has 14.8 million (2020 data). It is the most populous city in Nigeria and the third-largest city in Africa, after Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo) and Cairo (Egypt).



Spaces of interaction

Towards a new understanding of East-South relations

A case study on the Institute for World Economics

Bence Kocsev¹

Abstract:

Socialist global entanglements in the context of the Cold War constitute an open field of research, which brings together a wide range of studies dealing with the various political, economic, social, cultural and academic interactions. In this context, after briefly unfolding some of the main processes, practices and projects of socialist global relations and also shedding some light on how the political, ideological, and economic rationalities underpinning these relations changed over time, the current paper shifts the focus of analysis to specific academic spaces being responsible for the acceleration of interconnectedness between the socialist bloc and the Third World. Arguing that the “thick description” of these spaces could help us sketch a better overall picture on the nature of East-South relations and, in this case, more particularly on the circulation of economic knowledge and practices, the following pages zoom on the Institute for World Economics and its predecessor, the Centre for Afro-Asian Research in Budapest and aim to provide a micro-historical view on how discourses of development (and more generally of economic knowledge) were transferred, adopted and even reinterpreted within these particular spaces. The paper furthermore endeavors to take a closer look on actors being active in these institutions and show how they sought to position themselves beyond the dichotomies of the Cold War and attempted to function along the specific logic of own their fields of expertise.

Keywords:

East-South relations during the Cold War; spaces of interaction; development and area studies; Centre for Afro-Asian Research; Institute for World Academy; József Bognár; knowledge production and transfer.

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Introduction

Seizing on the opportunities offered by the gradual warming of the international climate in the wake of Khrushchev's thaw, a great variety of relations had been developed between the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the newly independent countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Based on a commonly shared anti-imperialist solidarity (often intertwined with socialist sentiments) and molded into various forms of cooperation, the two worlds became increasingly entangled in the collective attempt to create alternative (or even socialist) modernities. The initially vigorous expansion of trade agreements, joint development (or in the state socialist terminology: technical assistance) projects, political collaborations, or even academic, scientific, societal and cultural exchanges created many illusions about the effectiveness of these connections. However, once the external conditions had turned less favorable in the course of the following decades, and particularly in the aftermath of the global economic crisis of the early 1970s, the situation significantly changed and the affinities that once glued these countries together started gradually to decrease. While the rearrangement of political and economic priorities led to the decrease of these relations, their legacies and reverberations still linger and, in a number of direct and indirect ways, influencing the newly phrased global opening policies of the formerly socialist countries.

Inspired by the growing field of global, trans-regional and area studies, in recent years, a promising body of literature has been developed to scrutinize these East-South, i.e. socialist–postcolonial relations. In this context, researchers have analyzed the multiple avenues in which the socialist camp established connections with the postcolonial world. Building on these findings, the following pages shift the focus of examination to a specific aspect of these relations, namely to academic knowledge production on the postcolonial regions and seek to apply a tentative analytical concept to unravel certain characteristic features of these contexts. Through the lens of the notion of *spaces of interaction*, the following pages aim to identify a specific institution, the Institute for World Economics (IWE) in Budapest, as well as a well-defined group of actors (economists) who had been seminal in shaping the relations between Hungary and the newly independent countries. The reasons for choosing this particular institute are manifold. On the one hand, the IWE was not just of utmost importance in forging and consolidating relations with the postcolonial countries but – in certain cases – was even allowed to shape joint socialist policies towards these countries. On the other hand, from a purely scientific perspective, the extensive research carried out on the social, political and economic conditions of the postcolonial countries gradually elevated the Institute to the unique position of being a major hub of developmental thinking not just within the socialist bloc but – with a reputation radiating beyond the Iron Curtain – even globally. Its outstanding academic performance notwithstanding, the Institute has neither received enough attention in the global history of development nor did it get its rightful place in Hungarian



historiography.² Hence, teasing out more of the networks and connections that had been built in this specific space of interaction, and reflecting on some of the ideas, concepts and opinions that had been discussed and developed at the IWE might help us to raise more awareness to the importance of these institutions and experts. However, before embarking on the discussion of the topic, some rough and brief introductory reflections on the broader scholarship in which the current paper is positioned, seems to be necessary.

Some conceptual premises

The historiography of the Cold War has undergone a number of changes in the last couple of decades that led to the reconfiguration and reorientation of these studies both in approach and scope. Inclined to almost exclusively focus on the East–West axis of the Cold War, and – to a large extent – concentrating on the bipolar superpower competition and the ensuing arms race aspects of this period, Cold War historiography, for a long time, paid insufficient attention to the complexities of connections during this period (Hadler, 2018). Bolstered by the (partial) opening of the archives in the former Soviet Union, China and in East-Central Europe after the collapse of communism, the last couple of decades have, however, witnessed substantial changes, or even a paradigm shift, as Thomas Kuhn would call it, in the field of Cold War historiography. Based on the newly available materials and expanding the research methodology, the reshuffled scholarship gave rise to a number of new insights from which we will list here only those that are relevant for our purposes.

First, in their attempts to internationalize the history of the Cold War, a growing number of experts moved beyond discourses of East–West divide and embarked on projects seeking to reveal the more complex geographical entanglements of this period (see, e.g., Westad, 2005, Leffler et al, 2010). Reconceptualizing the era from a global perspective and considering events happening outside Europe as critical in determining the course of the Cold War, these studies substantially expanded the scope of research and provided fresh insights for further inquiries. In this context, projects gazing out to the “Third World” and investigating its complex connections and interactions with both the “First” and “Second Worlds” came increasingly to the fore and brought new attention to the many social, cultural, and political exchanges that produced geographies alternative to the Cold War dichotomy.

Second, with the wide(r) array of available archival and documentary sources entering the research circuit, a growing body of research started to focus on the socialist world in global history and, by focusing on their interactions with postcolonial countries, began to argue against the realist approach that claimed the total control of the Soviet Union on its junior allies and hence oversaw or neglected the agency of the smaller socialist states (cf. with Smith,

² While the history of Hungarian economics (especially its reformist efforts and interludes) during the Cold War era is a relatively well researched area and while the achievements of the institutions and experts seeking to shape the economic agenda has often brought to the fore of scholarly attention, the IWE has never received the amount of scrutiny it deserves.

2000). While previously it was widely assumed that the foreign policy priorities of these countries were aligned with the Soviet ones (Després, 1987; cf. with Thornton, 1961; Mosely, 1966; Valkenier, 1968), with new materials at hand, this approach turned to be untenable (Engerman, 2011, p. 184). Looking beyond the Soviet activities in the postcolonial world and demonstrating that these countries had their own priorities and ambitions, new studies on East-South relations started to erode the image of the Bloc as being a monolithic group of the obedient controlled by the power centers in Moscow (Winrow, 2009; Lorenzini, 2010; Kibbe, 2012; Muehlenbeck, 2016; Muehlenbeck and Telepneva, 2018; Adi, 2018; Calori et al, 2019, Mark et al, 2020). Moreover, and further blurring the picture, these studies have raised attention to the fact that socialist countries maintained a rather fragmented approach towards the decolonized world and – despite the principle of socialist friendship and cooperation – often engaged in competition with each other to gain better positions and access to resources. In addition, recent studies have raised attention to the fact that socialist countries maintained a rather fragmented approach towards the decolonized world and – despite the principle of socialist friendship and cooperation – often engaged in competition with each other to gain better positions and access to resources, a feature further blurring the supposedly monolithic nature of the bloc. This, however, does not mean that their foreign policy was independent when dealing with postcolonial countries and hence the Soviet Union was unable to impose control and principles on the countries within its orbit. Rather, by conveying the message that the iron cage, to use this Weberian term, of the Soviet power was not that ubiquitous as it was previously assumed, and by revealing a system in which various forms of autonomies were practiced (Lerner, 1965, p. 43) this approach opens up a number of possibilities to reexamine the nature of the bloc (cf. Marung et al, 2019).

Third, given the exponentially expanding scholarship on East–South relations, research on the global influence of socialism even argues that alternative practices and projects of globalization emerged and existed within the framework of these relations (Calori et al, 2019; Mark et al, 2020). Analyzing transnational connections and entanglements that had emerged out of socialist and non-aligned contexts as decisive processes in shaping post-war globalization, this approach breaks away from the “classic” understanding of globalization, which consider globalization as a ubiquitous process arising in and spreading from the capitalist North.

Fourth, the commonly accepted notion, which was based on the assumption that the Soviet Bloc was more or less an autarkic entity, and hence was insulated from the world economy, have increasingly been revised in the last couple of years (for an eminent effort see Sanchez-Sibony, 2014). Examining the economic entanglements of the socialist bloc in the post-Stalin era, these works analyze in detail its trade relations with the capitalist and developing world and emphasize the many ways the socialist economies were embedded and integrated in the world economy (Pula, 2018; cf. with Sanchez-Sibony, 2018).

Fifth, illuminating a wide range of subjects and actors, and looking well beyond the classic bipolar military and economic horizon of Cold War studies, a rapidly growing field of



examination is devoted, for instance, to the flourishing trans-regional mobilities. Researchers, in this context, extensively examined the student programs and exchanges that had been established between the socialist and the postcolonial countries with the ultimate aim to build a new elite for these newly independent societies (Rupprecht, 2010; Hilger, 2011; Katsakioris, 2017; Katsakioris, 2019a; Katsakioris, 2019b; Hannova, 2014; Matusevich, 2012; Guillory, 2014; Müller, 2018; Burton, 2018) and a special attention has likewise been given to the expanding labor migration (both white and blue collar) between the Second and Third Worlds (Behrends et al, 2003; Dennis, 2011; Schwenkel, 2014; Alamgir, 2018; Bódy, 2020). Similarly, the circulation of cultural knowledge and practices, or even societal relations are among the better researched topics (Gildea et al, 2011; Mark and Apor, 2015; Mark et al, 2015, Christiaens and Goddeeris, 2020). While the various transnational solidarities and the circulation of cultural ideas and practices have raised ample scientific interest, the academic and scientific relations as well as the topic of knowledge production – despite some exceptions (e.g. Darch, 2007; Marung, 2013; 2017; 2021) – received a somewhat lesser extent of attention yet. Keep filling this lacuna, with its limited scope and depth, this paper intends to make more attention to this latter and hitherto often ignored aspect of these relations and, at the same time, seeks to briefly touch upon some of the above-mentioned issues as well.

The context: some selective remarks

As it was briefly touched upon in the introduction, cooperation between the socialist and newly independent countries gained impetus and significance from the late 1950s, when the Soviet Union, recognizing the opportunities the accelerating processes of decolonization could offer, began to change its attitude vis-à-vis the postcolonial world and – under the general framework of peaceful coexistence – started to pursue a more pragmatic foreign policy towards these regions (Westad, 2005, pp. 66-72; Boden, 2006, pp. 31-37; Hilger, 2017, pp. 322-333; Lorenzini, 2019, pp. 42-43; Rupprecht, 2015, pp. 1-22). This new discourse, based on the growing perception that in the international arena developing countries are becoming increasingly crucial areas for peaceful competition and ideological struggle (see, e.g., the argumentation of one of the protagonists of the current paper: Bognár, 1963, p. 509), then considerably expanded the room for the socialist countries to engage in relations with these newborn countries (or even with liberation movements striving to achieve independence).³

Envisioning of a common socialist world-system in which socialist and developing countries would share all the benefits the socialist way of development and modernity could offer, an alternative socio-economic model as well as generous aid to assist its implementation was

³ In this context, the engagement with the newly independent countries was often perceived as mean to gain international recognition or to increase the overall reputation of the respective countries. Most notably, for the German Democratic Republic and Hungary, establishing cordial relations with these countries was of great importance in order to loose off the shackles of the diplomatic isolation imposed on them either by the Hallstein-doctrine or as a result of the suppression of the Revolution of 1956 (for the case of the GDR, see, e.g., Engel and Schleicher 1998 and Winrow 2008; with regard to Hungary see, e.g., Búr 2010).

offered to these countries (Valkenier, 2002, p. 501). The subsequent measures and initiatives that were taken in both sides in order to boost these relations came quickly to fruition: the emergence of new possibilities, the circulation of people, goods, expertise, and ideas, as well as the creation of new markets and institutions created a complex web of exchanges and multiplied the volume of trans-regional relations in almost every aspect.

Whereas cooperation (especially in economic terms) achieved mixed results, given the intensity and variety of contacts and the new quality they brought into the global relations, some even argue that alternative practices and projects of globalization existed within the framework of these East-South relations. Indicating that these projects pursued by socialist agents were more global in their intentions than those of the West, as they did not reinforce the old metropole-colony relations but established new ones (Bockman, 2015), these studies raised attention to the capability of socialist countries to substantially shape processes of globalization. At the same time, however, the actual outcomes of the various agreements concluded within the framework of socialist internationalism were often in deep contrast with the overarching ideological claims underpinning these relations, as they often reinforced imperialist patterns and neo-colonial practices.

Initially, the anti-imperialist solidarity that underpinned these relations proved to be powerful enough to create the base of certain elective affinities, to use this Weberian term, that then brought the socialist and post-socialist countries closer together in forging a common future founded on economic and social equity. It seems, however, that, like chemical affinities, the elective affinities have the characteristics to decrease as rapidly as they have increased. Apparently, this was the case in this context too and once the large-scale structural changes of the 1970s (especially in economic terms) started to hit both the postcolonial and socialist countries, the hopes and illusions attached to the eagerly growing East-South cooperation started very quickly to droop (about the “shock of the global” in the 1970s, see Ferguson et al, 2011).

This did not mean that the relations between the two regions had immediately deteriorated, but the ideological premises, ideas and affinities that hitherto formed the basis of these exchanges were no longer sustained (Mark, 2019, p. 217). In this new phase, the line between solidarity/economic liberation and profitability became increasingly blurred and the crumbling economic relations had then serious repercussions on almost every dimension of these relations that “undermined faith in socialism itself not merely in the Third World but also at home.” (Valkenier, 2002, p. 499).

These processes eventually brought the Eastern European socialist countries closer to the West and many of them re-orientated their foreign relations while ceasing previous relations based on political affinities (Inotai, 2000, pp. 16-21; Mark, 2019, pp. 217-220). Amid these circumstances, the inability of the developing countries to pay back their liabilities to the (likewise indebted) socialist countries injected further tensions into an already constrained relationship (Bockman, 2017). During the 1990s, the transition and the related tasks opened



a whole new era in many dimensions while the region's international environment has fundamentally changed. Though an optimistic Hungarian report compiled for the comprehensive examination committee of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) claimed that the intensification of trade and economic relations with developing countries are expected to expand through exploring new avenues for co-operation, the reality, however, fell short of these expectations and the high hopes attached to them were left largely unfulfilled (GATT, 1991, p. 20). Under the motto "back to Europe" and with the hope to get re-positioned into the international community, this change of foreign policy entailed a decisive break of the former socialist countries with the South (Tarrósy, 2018) and the integration into the Western institutions destroyed many of the linkages that had survived even until the late 1980s. This approach lasted until the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, when some of the former socialist countries started to diversify and develop the global dimension of their foreign economic policies, and – within this framework – started to renew their ties with countries they once had intensive relations with (Tarrósy and Morenth, 2013). Hoping that the partnerships developed during the Cold War decades could successfully be converted into new type of relationships, former socialist countries approached many of their former partners in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (see e.g., Kugiel, 2016; Cibian, 2017; Kozár and Neszmélyi, 2018; Tarrósy, 2018).

From a micro-level perspective, a number of case studies has been carried out and analyzed the multiple ways how the shifts in both regions' political-economic integration impacted these relations. In this context, and by providing a methodological tool for the study of East–South relations, the concept of spaces of interaction has been advanced. The general idea behind the notion was to provide a tentative analytical and methodological tool to investigate and further nuance the macro level investigations on East-South relations and to investigate and categorize localities (both physical and imagined) that had been vital to forge and shape the interconnectedness between the socialist bloc and the Third World.

Against this background, zooming on the Institute for World Economics and its predecessor, the Centre for Afro-Asian Research and scrutinizing them as a space of interaction could provide a micro-historical view on how discourses of socialist and postcolonial development are tackled and adopted or even re-interpreted. Furthermore, the examination of these institutions would enable us to sketch a better overall picture on the global circulation of economic knowledge and practices during the Cold War. When speaking about circulation of knowledge it is rather difficult to prove how successful these efforts were. What is rather at stake here, is to briefly shed some light on how these transfers unfolded in the context of the Cold War.

The Institute for World Economics as a space of interaction

Responding to the new demands for adequate knowledge on these regions and to underpin political and economic interactions in particular, scholarly efforts increasingly expanded on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Although knowledge production followed different trajectories in East and West, some common features could nevertheless be detected. Most importantly, the anthropological, geographical and philological orientations that initially shaped and dominated the research on Africa, Asia and Latin America had largely been decentered to the margins of academic discourses and gave way for research agendas dominated by economic and political issues (Kemenes, 1967, p. 25). While the center of gravity of scholarship moved clearly towards more contemporary issues and allowed social scientists, and economists in particular, to gain ground in the research of postcolonial areas, this reshuffled focus did not lead to the disappearance of non-economic investigations. The shifting disciplinary context, however, went hand in hand with the rising importance of economists whose theoretical assumptions and advices – though with rather mixed results – quickly turned into practical prescriptions in a number of newly independent countries (Hirschman, 1963; Markoff and Montecinos, 1993; Lepenies, 2009; cf. with Coats, 1981).

Resonating with these worldwide paradigmatic changes and focusing on the socio-economic development of the decolonized nations, a mushrooming number of research centers and units were established throughout the socialist bloc (Marung, 2018, pp. 50-51). Arguably, the most peculiar (and in many ways, the most influential) institution dealing with the newly independent countries was the one in Budapest. Interestingly, the founding myth of the Centre for Afro-Asian Research of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (CAAR), which later transformed into the Institute for World Economy (IWE) circulates also around the above-mentioned economic advisory tasks, as it was established on the initiative of József Bognár, who had just returned from Ghana where he and his team was commissioned to contribute to the first seven-year plan of the country. According to the recollections of contemporaries, upon his visit in Hungary in 1961, Kwame Nkrumah was so impressed by a booklet on economic planning written by Bognár that he immediately invited him to join the international economic committee working on Ghana's development plan (Bácskai, 1997, p. 154). Bognár's African appointment, however, was not just an early recognition of his expertise in planning and development but also a sign of the gradual improvement of the international status of Hungary after the crushing of the Revolution of 1956. In this new international political context, foraying into the decolonizing world was perceived as a way to improve Hungary's fragile international position and hence to gain international recognition. Driven by the need to gain sound scientific information for the Hungarian policymaking towards these regions, Bognár and his few colleagues got the opportunity to form a research collective interested in analyzing the problems of developing countries (Inotai, 2000, pp. 3-6).

Being one of the most formative and outstanding economic scholars in the period under scrutiny, Bognár's social-scientific views and personality substantially shaped the intellectual character of the institute for more than twenty years and inspired its work even after his



retirement as director in 1986.⁴ His exceptionally broad interests and his engagement to raise attention to the mounting problems humanity had increasingly been facing made him one of the best-received economic experts within and beyond the socialist bloc. For today's reader it might even be surprising to what extent Bognár was committed to issues that are very high on the agenda today but received less popular attention in the 1970s and 1980s. He even suggested to discuss economic development in an "orbieconomic level". While his expression did not eventually stick in the international economic vocabularies, it shows his strong commitment to solve the global economic problems in a comprehensive way (Bognár, 1968). Dedicated to make ways for a more resilient economic, social, and environmental future, he consciously used his academic and public (including television and radio) appearances to raise awareness to global questions like non-renewable energies, food security, or technical and environmental hazards (cf. with Bognár, 1976, pp. 107-185). This ability to develop long-range visions and concepts made him perfectly suitable to become a member of international non-governmental organizations like the Club of Rome or the World Futures Studies Federation.

By wisely using his political embeddedness, Bognár constantly managed to provide a broad room for maneuver for his institute and thereby made it to a rather peculiar research unit within the bloc. Profiting from this political shield, a relatively free research environment and atmosphere was provided for the staff members of the CAAR that also allowed them to leave political indoctrination as much out of its scientific inquiries as possible and push Marxist-Leninist orthodoxies and propaganda into the margins of the dialogue. We should, however, immediately underline that this did not mean the total abandonment of ideological considerations, and even less that research and publication imbued with Marxism-Leninism were rendered obsolete. However, it can be safely stated that, compared to other similar socialist institutions, a relatively free environment for research was provided. Conferences and other academic encounters hosted by the Centre were likewise praised for the "unrestricted freedom of raising and discussing problems" and because of "the absence of schematic thinking" that, in turn, allowed participants to freely deal with the issues being on the academic agenda (Kádár, 1969, p. 321). Moreover, despite the generally scarce opportunities to conduct research on the spot, which was one of the major disadvantages of the state socialist scientists in comparison with their Western counterparts, researchers of the CAAR could easily obtain passports and gain valuable experience in the field (Simai, 2018; Velancsics, 2019). The comparatively high degree of research autonomy, the scholarships

⁴ Prior and parallel to pursuing an academic career, Bognár held a number of high political offices, including his mayorship in Budapest (he holds the record for being the youngest politician in this position), a more than four decades long membership in the Parliament (though under undemocratic conditions, but this holds also a record in Hungary), and a number of ministerial posts between 1946 and 1956. Being a widely appreciated politician (initially a member of the Smallholders' Party) who did not accept any high governmental function after the crushing of the Revolution of 1956, Bognár became an iconic figure of János Kádár's "policy of alliance" (szövetségi politika) that aimed at developing a socialist national unity. Between 1956 and 1990, he served in a number of influential political, cultural, social and academic functions and was involved in various economic reform initiatives, including the one in 1957 that circled around the outstanding (and, note bene, non-Marxist) economists, István Varga to provide comprehensive economic recommendations for the new government, or in the New Economic Mechanism of 1968, a major economic reform that, despite its curtailment a few years later, shaped Hungary's economic system until the 1980s, and led to the emergence of the notorious "Goulash Communism".

(including Western ones) and the number of renowned visiting scholars coming from abroad ensured that the quality was benchmarked to international standards.

Linking theoretical and practical work, the CAAR also took part in practical endeavors and participated in the preparation and instruction of specialists selected to be sent out to the developing countries, offered its consultancy services for economic organizations and governmental bodies, and contributed to the elaboration of policy papers with practical recommendations (Inotai, 2005, p. 5). In 1977, combining theory with practice, and on Bognár's initiative, the government founded a semi-governmental body, the World Economic Research Council (Világgazdasági Tudományos Tanács) for providing a forum where the representatives of the political and scientific fields could engage and work together. Commencing its activities in 1969, the Council sought to bring scientific research closer to decision-makers and thereby to facilitate the foreign economic policy-making of Hungary (Inotai, 2000, pp. 7-8). Besides closely following economic trends, experts involved in the work of the Council also considered and explored deeper social, cultural, and political contexts that might have an influence on economic policies.

Having gained the reputation of providing a more or less open research environment, the CAAR quickly acquired substantial reputation in socialist (Tjulpanov, 1972, p. 130) and broader international scientific circles and was well integrated into various global networks, which helped them to join research projects that were carried out under the auspices of international organizations like the United Nations (Kemenes, 1967, p. 260). Researchers of the Institute were furthermore often invited to take part in international expert and research groups, committees and sub-committees not only in their personal capacity but also on behalf of the institution they belong to. The Centre's multifaceted activities not just contributed to the expansion of scientific cooperation among East, South and West, but being a meeting place for bi- and multilateral dialogue, it significantly contributed to the Hungary's internationalization efforts.

This bridge building function of the CAAR was also reflected in its publication activity, in which the series *Studies on Developing Countries* (issued from 1965 to 1991) occupies a prominent place. Being a mediator of socialist scientific achievements in the field of development economics and comparative political economy, the series enjoyed considerable prestige abroad. Although regular publication of English-language publications was not peculiar to Hungary within the Bloc, for several Western scholars, the yellow-brown booklets (totally 134 was produced) were an easily accessible socialist publication. In this series, but also in the general research framework, sub-Saharan Africa and – to a lesser extent – the Middle-East and North African region (MENA) featured prominently. Providing a multidisciplinary framework that looks beyond the strict economic considerations was one of the greatest assets of the series that made it suitable for a wide range of readership (for earlier issues that consider non-economics topics, see, e.g., Fodor, 1966; Páricsy, 1969; 1971; Krizsán, 1970).



While the research at the IWE serves as a good example to showcase the upsurge of Hungarian world and development economic expertise, it substantially contributed to the development of a discipline what we might label today as area studies (Marung, 2018) by providing a broad framework for the study of non-European world regions and fostering the communication across disciplines. This latter manifested, for instance, in Bognár's chairmanship in the African Studies Coordinating Committee (Afrika Koordináló Bizottság) aiming at synchronizing and representing the Hungarian scholarship on the continent (Végh, 1968, p. 353). By rediscovering the importance of historical and cultural contexts in the study of the socioeconomic development of the postcolonial countries, philological, cultural, and historical efforts had never completely disappeared from the research agenda of the Institute, and, as a matter of fact, in certain cases they even flourished.⁵ Irrespective of its success of some of the endeavors, the Institute created a space for circulation and exchange of scientific inter-, and multidisciplinary knowledge.

In 1973, a major reorganization took place and the initial research portfolio was substantially expanded to cover the entire world economy, as the changing global environment required a more comprehensive research that would go beyond the East-South relations and take the general global trends more into account (Acta, 1973, p. 102; Almanach, 1976, p. 474). Although within an enhanced institutional setting and under a new name that reflects on these changes, one of the main task was still to provide a sound scientific foundation for government decisions. For the next more than fifteen years the Institute for World Economy had served as one of the main think tanks in economic policy-making. With the help of the publications of the Institute both the political class and the interested public could familiarize itself with the state and processes of world economy. For those who could read between the lines, the increasingly poor performance of the CMEA countries (including Hungary) became also apparent. Recommendations and advices attached to these studies have, however, often fell on deaf ears. For instance, as a pupil and friend of István Varga, one of the most influential Hungarian economists of the interwar period and a distinguished expert on business cycles, Bognár understood the mounting challenges the Hungarian economy was facing in the wake of the economic crisis of the 1970s. His Cassandra's prophecy that predicted severe consequences for the socialist countries unless they would adopt themselves to the new realities of the global economy was nevertheless largely and for a long time neglected (Simai, 1996, p. 215). In this context, it is also not surprising that, disillusioned by the reluctance of the policy-makers, Bognár – together with friends and colleagues – Rezső Nyers and Kálmán Kulcsár submitted a proposal on enhancing the role of social sciences in decision-making and called for a new attitude through which the initial mistrust of politicians towards

⁵ Strengthening the multidisciplinary character of the Institute, Bognár also commissioned experts from the fields of humanities. György Kalmár, who researched West-African and South-Asian issues extensively, László Krizsán, the notable Africanist, or Pál Páricsy, the renowned linguist of African languages had either a full or part-time status at the Institute, while others – like the above-cited István Fodor, who worked as a researcher at the Institute of Linguistics at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences – were hired on a temporary basis to carry out a specific task. Moreover, leading economic experts, like Bognár himself, who was initially trained in human sciences, which probably had an impact on how he approached topics, or Béla Kádár, who also pursued a career in Hispanic studies, brought interdisciplinary perspective to the discussion as well.

academic research could disappear (Pál, 2018, pp. 37-38) The general ignorance of the political leadership that downplayed the seriousness of the structural – or, in Bognár’s wording, epochal – change in the world economy eventually played an important role in plunging Hungary into massive debt to Western institutions (Kőrösi, 2017, p. 551). Recent studies, however, see Bognár’s assessment on the changing economic conditions rather biased, and lambasting it for implying that the economic problems are only the repercussions of a process in which the capitalist world is undergoing a paradigmatic change and the socialist economic model in itself would be otherwise in a good shape. From this point of view, so goes the argumentation, the idea of the epochal change in the world economy was purely a research construction aiming at concealing the inability of the socialist economy to cope with economic difficulties (Mihályi, 2013, p. 66).

Despite the broader research focus, the developing world remained a largely covered research direction. In this context, the IWE, like its predecessor, was also often assigned to organize and host international conferences focusing on the economic circumstances of the developing countries. During these events a special attention was paid to the evaluation of the experiences of socialist-Third World interactions.⁶ The deep understanding that both developing and socialist countries faced similar problems, led researchers of the Institute to translate their ideas into models for economic reforms both at home and in other world regions. Bognár himself, e.g., was not only actively engaged in reform plans in Ghana and other postcolonial countries but –as it was already mentioned in the footnotes – also in the elaboration of the main ideas of the so-called New Economic Mechanism. While the experience with the failure of systemic models encouraged a critical re-examination of official theories, it is also important to underline transnational and transregional academic encounters substantially contributed to the cross-fertilization of ideas and knowledge. Hence, acknowledging Third World agency in shaping these interactions seems to be necessary, as they often served as inspiration and thereby enriched economic reform initiatives.

Being in intense exchange with global academic networks, the IWE provided a transnational space for sharing experiences and for facilitating the flows of ideas on how to better manage economic development within the postcolonial conditions and was able to shape global research agendas. Questions like how to overcome general underdevelopment and mitigate the effects of the disadvantageous international conditions in the postcolonial countries were among the major preoccupations of the Institute (Tulpjanov et al, 1972, pp. 122-123; Kocsev, 2018, p. 188). What the researchers of the Institute, confronted by the demands of their Third World counterparts, quickly understood was that orthodox methods – be they based on capitalist or socialist theoretical groundings – should be avoided, and advices of any kind

⁶ See, e.g. the UNCTAD conference in 1978, which was attended by representatives of seven developing countries (Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Sudan, India, Iraq and Panama) and six socialist countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union). Besides the UNCTAD several other international organizations (UNIDO, AAPSO, Union of Banana Exporting Countries, Third World Forum) joined this forum (Dobozi 1978: 171-177). Also, the EADI (European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes) meeting held in 1981 discussed development issues in a multilateral, East-West-South framework (Mándi 1982: 185-193). As a recognition of the work carried out in Budapest, the IWE was the only socialist research organ that was allowed to join the EADI.



should be adapted to the conditions of the respective countries. Maintaining an alternative approach to developmental problems traditionally solved along ideological lines, researcher managed to extricate themselves from ideological straightjackets. While convinced that the postcolonial economies would flourish through the implementation of socialist principles, in his book, *Economic Policy and Planning in Developing Countries*, for which he received rather mixed reviews, Bognár maintains a view that Stalinist-style collectivization of agriculture as well as plan fetishism should be avoided (Bognár, 1968; cf. with Kádár, 1969, p. 316; Raichur, 1973, p. 74).

Most notably, by critically reexamining the phenomenon of underdevelopment, Tamás Szentes, one of the leading scientists of the IWE, managed to significantly contribute to the theorization of one of the most burning issues of development economics at that time. Upon his appointment as a professor at the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM), Szentes was not just able to familiarize himself with the postcolonial realities but was allowed to join an illustrious set of scholars linked either tightly or rather loosely to the university (Gerócs, 2018). This collaboration and exceptional intellectual atmosphere might even have a substantial influence on him in developing his conclusive argument on the causes of underdevelopment and in offering a road to its elimination. Contributing to the worldwide thinking on the causes of underdevelopment, Szentes's interpretation, in turn, inspired a wide range of scholars both in Tanzania (like fellow UDSM professor, Walter Rodney) and worldwide, as it went beyond of the orthodox development doctrines (be they based on modernization theory or Marxist-Leninist principles) and offered not just a very thorough analysis but also remedies that took historical and cultural context into account. Although this seminal book, the *Political Economy of Underdevelopment* was praised for its comprehensiveness, its pragmatism and critical approach towards Marxist fundamentals, it unsurprisingly received criticism from Western scholars, questioning its policy prescriptions which seemed to them not to rest on proper analysis (Rostow, 1973). The many editions and translations, however, seem to prove the contrary and show that in its own time, the book provided an essential background for the understanding of underdevelopment, and offered a useful analytical framework with which the examination of specific problems of the postcolonial countries could be better scrutinized.

Skimming through these works, it became also clear that after the initial efforts to make a distinct socialist trade bloc, economists at the IWE started to reject the idea of self-isolation and self-sufficiency and urged for increased economic interactions with the outside world. As it was summarized by László Csaba, the renowned Hungarian world economist, who started his career at the IWE, "the impacts of the external disturbances made it crystal clear that ... the individual centrally planned economies, as well as ... the CMEA does not in any way constitute a separate economic world socialist system functioning according to its own inherent laws" (Csaba, 1990, p. 365; cf. with Simai, 2018, p. 4). Apparently, while positioning themselves beyond the dichotomies of the Cold War these economists often blurred or even redraw the borders of East, West, and South (Hartmetz et al, 2018) Against this background, and in their efforts to make sense of the increasingly interconnected world, a growing variety of

narratives circulated in which Eastern bloc experts had positioned their region as periphery (Mark, 2019, p. 222) and conceptualized socialist market reforms against this background. Most prominently, Immanuel Wallerstein's World Systems Theory found substantial reverberations in the region, as it helped to rethink questions of peripherality, backwardness. Socialist authors, however not just simply related themselves to this theory, but, in some cases, they actively contributed to the development of the concept. With his critical approach to the concept, Tamás Szentes, for instance, helped to nuance the theory by pointing out that dependencies could take other forms than being exclusively external (Gerócs, 2018).

At that time, when it was substantially debated on how to better integrate into the world economy, their search for alternatives brought these economists closer to the idea of the New International Economic Order (NIEO).⁷ In fact, a separate research unit with eleven researchers was created within the IWE in order to analyze the concept from the perspective of CMEA countries (Inotai, 2000, p. 13; Simai, 2018, p. 1, for the common IWE effort to deal with the concept, see, Bognár, 1981). Despite the fact that the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) has never managed to have a common strategy vis-à-vis the NIEO, in Budapest, the concept was nevertheless regarded with serious interest which allowed the IWE to join the global thinking on this initiative which manifested, among others, in a number of publication both in Hungarian and English and in workshops and conferences on the idea (concerning the Hungarian positions vis-à-vis the concept, see, Simai, 2018; cf. with Simai, 1980). While researcher of the Institute often "criticized many of the views the USSR presented on behalf of the bloc at NIEO" (Simai, 2018, p. 4) and approached the question in a more cooperative way than the Soviets did,⁸ support for a new order was by no means unconditional. From a rather practical point of view, the already mentioned Tamás Szentes raises moreover awareness for potential pitfalls inherent to the concept of the NIEO and that might substantially affect East-South cooperation. According to him, the NIEO provide only a general framework for cooperation, but encouraging the developing countries to embark on self-reliant projects that could provide them their desired economic independence would also reduce the flow of raw material exports. Hence, the question automatically arises: how could a country like Hungary that suffers from the scarcity of basic resources meet its raw material demands from the developing countries without reinforcing their inherited one-sided specialization? Another issue was the contribution of foreign capital and technology in the

⁷ The NIEO was a series of proposals put forward by the postcolonial countries within different fora of the United Nations for reforms to the structure, governance, and norms of the global economy and thereby to complete the 'emancipation' of the Global South by creating binding institutional frameworks, legal regimes and redistributive mechanisms correcting the core-periphery disparities evolved in the previous centuries. The NIEO declaration was accompanied by a program of action and by the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. These documents created a certain political basis for elaborating a complex of practical measures aimed at improving the position of the developing countries in the world economy and at securing for them new sources for economic, scientific and technological progress. Although these three documents meant to forge discussion between the Northern and Southern hemisphere, they were too declaratory to fulfil this task. Moreover, and from a legal perspective, the biggest obstacle was that they were not binding.

⁸ The Soviets, for instance, presented the CMEA as an alternative model to the NIEO. The official socialist view claimed that "integration through equality" offered by the CMEA is the only solution to solve the mounting problems of the world economy and, consequently, everything that the NIEO could offer had already been achieved within the Socialist Commonwealth (Lorenzini 2014:189).



developing countries. In this regard, what alternative forms of production cooperation could Hungary apply instead of the export of direct investment capital resulting in long-lasting foreign ownership and control? Thirdly, it was unclear to what sort of industrialization projects the CMEA countries should assist in the developing countries (Szentés, 1976, Szentés, 1981). While the differing socialist stances vis-à-vis the NIEO translated into ambiguous positions, which eventually led to the fading of the idea, it became also clear that ideas on a reconfigured world (economic) order emerged not just from the centers of global capitalism but also from various (semi-) peripheries.

Final remarks

By zooming on these Hungarian institutes and understanding them as a space of interaction, the paper aimed to make some steps towards providing a micro-historical view on one of the aspects of the various interactions and exchanges between the socialist bloc and the Third World. In this context, the paper dealt with the transfers of economic knowledge and by doing so explored the rationales that guided the economists under scrutiny. As the previous pages aimed to suggest, the framework of analysis of these socialist experts was not (only) determined by the socialist-capitalist dichotomy, but, by breaking the supposed iron cage of bipolarity of the Cold War, and by producing alternative economic models, these economists have left traces of specific ways of experiencing and dealing with the global economy and with the position of both the developing and socialist economies within it.

The external conditions that provided opportunities for the development of these spaces had, however, changed drastically. While the 1960s and 1970s represented a peak period in the research on world economics, international political economics, and economic development, the overall conditions for these studies had significantly changed during the 1980s. Upon the change of the political conditions in 1989/1990, (and, as a matter of fact, even before this political juncture) countries of the later of the former socialist bloc started increasingly to pave their ways towards the Euro-Atlantic integration. As a result, the once important institutions dealing with the broader global issues, as well as the experts, the accumulated know-how and experience gained during the many years of research were put aside by politicians. While their legacies – in the strictest sense – seem not to have survived the transition period of the 1990s, their legacies have been bubbling up in certain ways up until today. Despite the CAAR and the IWE represented a heyday of the Hungarian scholarship on world economy, just a handful of studies have already touched upon on their oeuvre. While in 2000 a comprehensive overview has already been published by András Inotai, the later director of the Institute, more adequate inquiries have nonetheless not yet been conducted on this particular institute. To be sure, this paper with its bird's eye view approach is only an insufficient and fragmentary research effort to fill this gap. Accordingly, it serves simply as a discussion basis and hence its sole aim was to highlight – through the concept of spaces of interaction – some of the insights and perspectives this research could offer but more

thorough research is required to raise ample awareness to the body of research and the importance of these institutions and experts.

In the introductory remarks to the commemorative volume in honor of the already mentioned István Varga, József Bognár expressed his hope that Hungarian economics would be able and willing to deal with its greatest figures, „as their work and career are not only a contribution to the development of world science, but also an integral part of our current aspirations and abilities” (Bognár, 1982, p. 10). We could only hope that the protagonists of this paper (including those not properly been mentioned by their names) would find the place they deserve in the historiography of economics and in the pantheon of economic thinking.

Conflict of interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on contributor

Bence Kocsev is a historian, whose main research interests concern the economic history of the Cold War, the history of globalization (and Eastern Europe within these processes in particular), economic and academic relations between Eastern Europe and the Global South during the Cold War, and the history of area studies. In the last couple of years, he worked as a research fellow at the Collaborative Research Center 1199 at Leipzig University and at the Leibniz Institute for the History and Culture of Eastern Europe (GWZO). His PhD dissertation investigates the socialist knowledge production on economic development and development policy-making in academic institutions during the Cold War, and – within this context – he particularly focuses on the East-European reception of the world economic reform initiative called the New International Economic Order.

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Violence and identity in modern Nigeria

Inchoate feudalization in a failing polity

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Abstract:

Nigeria, a failing state with the second highest incidence of terrorist attacks worldwide and a simmering, low intensity civil conflict as well as protest and secessionist movements, is a place where intersectionality does not stop at class or at gender. Nigeria's structural violence and atrocities happen at the intersection of ethnic, religious, sub-religious, linguistic, and occupational groups, as well as class and sex. It is a polity where indigeneity creates a kaleidoscope of state (provincial level) apartheid, where sharia is practiced in criminal law in all but one of the Northern states, and where the law of the land, including a bastardized version of juju as well as feudal law, all remain valid sources of law along with common law, allowing for rampant thuggery and voter intimidation, and abuse of tenants by feudatories, with government sanction. The country, ostensibly democratic, is ruled by former military heads of state, with the help of the army, which is deployed in the majority of the states. The federal polity is subject to many centrifugal forces that actively threaten to fuel an explosion in the 2020s.

Keywords:

Nigeria; terrorism;
civil war;
intersectionality;
indigeneity;
feudalization.

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Introduction

The Nigerian federal polity (independence from Britain: 1960, First Republic: 1963, currently at its Fourth Republic since 1999 but governed by successive military administrations for most of its history), is a large multiethnic state, and it is an indisputable fact that it is a highly unstable one. After a multi-ethnic, or multi-national state collapses, analysts have the luxury of declaring it „an incubator of nations,” as the owl of Minerva flies only at dusk. This is definitely what happened in the case of the Napoleonic Empire, of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy, the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and in the global South to British India or to the Ottoman Empire, indeed to many multi-ethnic, multi-national states and empires historically but especially in the last two centuries when modern nation building in the Hobsbawmian sense was already an option (Hobsbawm, 2012).

The analyst’s task is incomparably more difficult when the particular multi-ethnic conglomerate is still intact. In West Africa, due to the decidedly artificial nature of the region’s borders, multi-ethnic and multi-national states are the norm, not the exception. Nigeria, the region’s giant, conforms to this regional pattern, and is archetypical in its staggering diversity. Today, a number of major ethnic, ethno-religious and class cleavages ravage the country: Boko Haram, bunkering and kidnapping in the Niger Delta by a number of groups, Fulani herdsmen (pastoralists) attacking sedentary villagers (farmers) in Yoruba areas, the Middle Belt and the South West, bandits in the North West applying Boko Haram’s tactics on an unprecedented scale (specifically *the kidnapping of schoolchildren*, see Lawal 2021), the Army and the Police resorting to more and more unorthodox methods in reacting to these challenges, and finally, recognizing federal failure, open discussion of secession in both Igbo and Yoruba circles and the setting up of regional security organs such as *Amotekun* (South West) and the *Eastern Security Network*, both with an unclear relationship to legality (see more on these later). Also the ‘normal’ functioning of the nominally liberal democratic federal state includes voter intimidation, thuggery and inter-group violence as canvassing tactics.

1960s Yoruba regional leader Chief Obafemi Awolowo’s highly accomplished daughter, who is by now also a former Ambassador of the federal nation to an EU member country, was invited in early 2021 to a definitive on line show on Nigerian politics, the *Toyin Falola Interviews*, on 21 February 2021 (Toyin Falola Interviews, 2021). Involving a number of high profile participants, the discussion after a while turned to openly weighing the pros and cons of Yoruba areas to stay or else leave, the Nigerian federation, with the Ambassador repeating words of caution in terms of avoiding secession *if and when Yoruba forces are not ready to fight a war* (in terms of combat readiness!). It is my intended point here that it would be a mistake to put such discussions down only to the legendary freedom and openness of Nigeria’s (now global and partly diaspora led) press. Nigeria’s press is vigorous even as it defies the security services (as in reporting the Omoyele Sowore incarceration cases of 2019-2021, ongoing on *Sahara Reporters*). What I am arguing here is that openly pondering avenues and expediency, as well as practicability, of armed insurgency by

Nigeria's major ethnic groups' elite representatives is now *mainstream* and not fringe discourse at all.

Definitive voices in Nigerian Area Studies have long predicted Balkanization/morselization, notably a breakup into major constituting units, meta-regions with perceived potential for forming majority nation states around the major ethnic groups (lastly the former US Ambassador to Nigeria, John Campbell, 2010). It is difficult to dispute that Nigeria's meta-regions (the North-West, the North-East, the South-West, the Middle Belt/North Central and the South-East and South-South) are fundamentally divergent in many ways: in their ethnic makeup, religious composition, language, and even climate. As we shall see, trade unions, human rights movements, progressive religious circles, and progressive clusters at universities in the media are exceptional in terms of drawing attention to the dangers and possibly, the menace of resurgent ethnic micro-nationalisms and other secessionist tendencies such as championed by the fundamentalist versions of the major religions. When we weigh these issues, it is necessary to look back and engage meaningfully, with the historical roots of the aforementioned cleavages. We shall observe how these structural conflicts do *not* originate in a primordial fog but are indeed historical products, such that identities in Nigeria are constructs that require reinforcement by the historical forces in action specifically in the 21st century.

A history of identity, violence and intersectionality in Nigeria

When we delineate Nigeria's pre-independence history, it is prudent to first note how the unit was formed by the British amalgamation of different territories under the new Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria (1914), christened so by Governor Lugard's then girlfriend. In terms of meaningful unification and the subsequent historical trajectory, two different analytical frameworks are usually used, depending on the analyst's ideological outlook. Wole Soyinka, the sole Nobel Prize winner of Nigeria (Literature, 1986), voiced the more widespread one of the two when he argued that Nigeria was „cobbled together” from its ethnic/tribal building blocks (Pilling, 2018). This argument constitutes the Yoruba, the Igbo, the Hausa/Fulani, the Tiv, the Ibibio, the Ijaw, and others as proto-nations, and views those through a primordialist analytical lense. A generalized extrapolation of the primordialist argument as universal theory is presented by the excellent Israeli scholar Azar Gat (2012). A minority, notably the Nigerian radical and socialist Left has long argued that those 'tribes'/micro-nations (copyright Edwin Madunagu)/ ethnicities/ nationalities are themselves not only products of British colonial policies such as the warrant chief system, indirect rule, colonial urbanization, and Western style patriarchy (for the latter especially, see Matera, Bastian and Kent, 2011; for others see Mayer, 2016) but also post-independence, post-colonial, 'national' federal politics. Ethno-constructivists include the Nigerian radical thinkers Yusufu Bala Usman, Edwin Madunagu, Eskor Toyo, Ikenna Nzimiro, Bade Onimode, Biodun Jeyifo, Akin Adesokan, Biko Agozino, Femi Aborisade and Baba Aye, who all follow Eric



Hobsbawm's and Benedict Anderson's well known take on the *recent* and *political* genealogy of modern nations.

The primordialist school that naturally includes most champions of ethnic and other particularist causes in the country, puts forth that the key to the history of Nigeria's history of internal violence lies in how the nation's tribes are competing for resources among themselves (Metz, 1992; Kew and Lewis, 2010; and also the single largest segment of Nigerian Political Science scholarship produced within and also on, Nigeria), (for a critique of those: see Usman, no date; Usman, 1979) and that such competition makes conflict *perpetual and also natural*.

This has direct repercussions for how we look at today's politics in Nigeria. The current conflict between the (mostly) Fulani pastoralists and the sedentary Igbo villages as it plays out in 2021, may be viewed as an ethnic conflict resulting out of a primordial inevitability, or else, as a conflict with intersectional and class connotations (Baba Aye, 2021). It is *not* self-explanatory to disregard the anti-identitarian (Leftist) argument outright, especially that the same argument had been made about the most archetypical of all Nigerian inter-group conflicts, the Biafra War (civil war, fought 1967-1970, with perhaps as many as two million victims) (Nzimiro, 1982) where it could be posited that two bureaucratic elites (as opposed to two ethnic groups) were responsible for initiating the fighting, serving their particular (less than selfless) aims in the process.

Identity and cleavages in Nigeria

Identities are intensely complex in Nigeria. Yoruba families routinely have both Muslim and Christian siblings within the selfsame family, conversions happen in any direction (with a continued role of traditional Yoruba religion), and even Igbos have families where Protestants and followers of ethnic Igbo judaism coexist (Afsai, 2016) – although Igbo Judaism is a religion that has appeared on the basis of (Protestant) Christian worship in all historical probability. Naturally, variations within religious lifeworlds, such as Roman Catholics and Protestants in the same family, are more common, in Nigeria as well as elsewhere. Thus drawing any strict definitive boundary between groups (in the Middle-Eastern fashion) will be misleading.

That said, it is necessary to spell out the major fault lines in popular understanding, of inter-Nigerian difference, and also that of strife. *The most acutely felt kind of distinction that sometimes borders on animosity is between the South-Western Yoruba ethnic group, and the South-East's Igbos*. This harks back to the civil war, to the Asaba Massacre (1967), the deaths on the Igbo side, and the post-war federated structure that is widely seen as less beneficial to Igbos in spite of Yakubu Gowon's amnesty which was issued right after the federal victory (1970). The reader is advised to ponder that the major 'tribes' of Nigeria may, depending on counting, number up to 80 million people, so in no way do they conform to classical visions

of ethnicity and especially not to colonial era concepts of tribal identity. Any group that numbers tens of millions of people and maintains its own global diaspora, literary culture, and in the Yoruba case, even its globalized religion, is one where the out-of-vogue Soviet category of „nationality” makes much more sense than does any residual concept of a tribe. Indeed during the 1990s the veteran radicals Mokwugo Okoye and Chief Anthony Enahoro advised Nigeria to become a federation of federations along USSR lines on exactly this logic – however out of touch this might really have been, given that the USSR itself had just dissolved in the early 1990s and Nigeria was in the grip of its worst years of dictatorship under Sani Abacha, a dictatorship even less prone to respecting minority rights than other military administrations.

Despite coexistence of different religions in especially Yoruba and to some extent Igbo cases, the Muslim-Christian, North-South cleavage is also a definitive one in the country, with the North steeped in an ever more political Islam (Falola, 2001), and the South experiencing one of the most sweeping Pentecostal revolutions in any region of the world (Marshall, 2009). Since 1963, no official population census happened in the country as it was a major source of the disturbances of 1966/1967 and the Civil War itself. No one really knows how many people live in Nigeria as federal revenue allocation rules provide state governors an incentive to lie about their respective population numbers (Mayer, 2016, p. 19). Many analysts see the Christian-Muslim conflict as a primordial problem and incompatibility, even as a clash of civilizations. What is important to consider here is that levels of monotheist religiosity that we are observing today, *are very much a recent phenomenon* in both the North and the South. Today in every single Northern Nigerian state except Adamawa, *Sharia* is a valid source of law (not only in terms of family law but also criminal law). At Independence, the rural North was *not* yet effectively Islamized, and only the cities followed the religion’s tenets to a higher level of ritual observance. Grand Khadi of the North, Abubakr Mahmud Gummi, with close links to Saudi Arabia, devoted in the 1960s tremendous resources to the orthodox Islamization of rural Northern Nigeria, where the former British ban on Christian missions during colonial times had prepared the ground for these policies.

In the South, ‘animist’ traditional African religion coexisted with Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism, and other metropolitan based churches, giving way to Africanized versions of Christianity as the first form of cultural decolonization, still in late Victorian times (Casely-Hayford, Fargion, Wallace, 2015, pp. 66-68). Politics was *never* independent of these religious and cultural developments. In the case of Islam, intensely politicised versions of the religion appeared even with the traditionalist Sufi *jihad* (Sokoto, Usman don Fodio) in 1804 with the Sokoto Caliphate, but it is also inevitable to posit that Nigerian Shiite Islam (a movement lead by Sheik Ibrahim Zakzaky) was and today still is, a phenomenon that is a result of Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979. In the South, neo-Protestants, televangelists and pentecostals have had a defining influence on the population’s outlook, even in terms of strengthening Nigeria’s Anglo-American cultural and foreign policy orientation.



In 1963 Nigeria adopted the Westminster political system, and later the 1979 constitution copied the political system of the United States, which subsequent constitutions retained: Nigeria has a presidential system. The creeping adoption of the Salafi interpretation of orthodox Sunni Islam first enabled the Maitatsine revolt, of Sunni Islamist extraction in the early 1980s, and then in the early 2000, the globally known Boko Haram insurgency sprung up, later with direct ISIS links and allegiance (Besenyő and Mayer, 2015). The latter's name means „Western Education is Forbidden.“ The intensely political nature of religion in the Nigerian context may be illustrated further by the existence of a pro-Biafra, anti-Fulani, anti-federal, secessionist Igbo 'hard core' of politicised quasi-Judaism (Indigenous People Of Biafra, IPOB, is led by the fugitive leader Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, currently supposed to be based in Jerusalem after a fiasco by the security services in 2015).

Also calls for the expulsion of the North from the federation, and Igbo secession, grew in the 2010s along with Islamist calls for an emirate on the part of Boko Haram, Ansaru, and other extremist forces in the country. A more complex inter-group cleavage has also existed between Hausa-Fulani Northern Muslim, and Yoruba Muslim (and other Yoruba) forces. The North Eastern Kanuri have undergone assimilation processes to the Hausa core. There are very recently, also *regional security networks* within Nigeria, such as the Yoruba dominated, controversially legal *Amotekun* (Western Nigeria Security Network) encompassing six Yoruba majority states (2020), and the South Eastern, Igbo dominated, doubtlessly illegal *Eastern Security Network* (2020), busy battling Fulani and other pastoralists, while the Nigerian Army is widely assumed to be most responsive to Northern (Hausa-Fulani) interests along with federal ones (federal political elite interests that supercede regional ones: „oga" network interests such as the ones belonging to former presidents Obasanjo, Babangida, and the Kaduna Mafia, as well as to incumbent president Muhammadu Buhari). The relative influence of these political overlords within the Army varies with time and is arguably as much an economic, as a political matter (meaning that *largesse* determines loyalties).

Indigeneity as it is practiced in Nigeria

An added element besides ethnicity and religion to identity formation in Nigeria, is political localism and the uniquely Nigerian concept of *indigeneity*. This originated in the 1960s. In the post-1999 'democratic' scenario, Nigerian citizens who reside in a certain state but whose ancestral roots are elsewhere, count legally as *non-indigenes in their respective states*. This means that they are not necessarily electable to political office, and cannot obtain government scholarships. Human Rights Watch sums up the situation thus: „According to common understanding in Nigeria and as a matter of government policy, the indigenes of any given locality are those persons who can prove that they belong to the ethnic community whose ancestors first settled the area. Everyone else is considered a non-indigene, no matter how strong their ties to the communities they live in.“ (Human Rights Watch 2006a). „Many spoke of being forced to abandon their hopes of university education

because of their non-indigene status, and of being locked out of scarce employment opportunities as civil servants, police officers, or military recruits.” (Human Rights Watch, 2006b). This two-tier system ostensibly protects indigenous local communities, but as it turns out, not the minority groups but *the majority ones*, constituting legally sanctioned discrimination. Some academic literature defends such legislation in the country (see Ademodi, 2012) and is also endorsed, unbelievably, by the Rapporteur of the Committee On the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of the International Law Association. In reality this is a system of localized second class citizenship, fueling conflict and violence in every single state of the federation. Ademodi openly states how the notion that indigenous groups should always be non-dominant ones *should be challenged* (Ademodi, 2012, p. 237) (!), opening the door to meta-legal recognition of a multitude of local level apartheid. This system very obviously runs contrary to any normative definition of a liberal democratic polity anywhere, and in fact creates in Nigeria a patchwork of ‘dictatorships of the ethnic/religious majority.’

Effects of legal feudalism in Nigeria

Negative effects of the Nigerian legal system do not stop with indigeneity. *Sharia* is notable here but so is the continuation of the ‘law of the land’ i.e. ‘*juju*’ and other forms of traditional land law, as well as feudal land law in the North (Olong, 2011) as those are all valid sources of law along with the common law system of British extraction. Chieftaincy and royal titles have proliferated since independence not only in the Northern Emirates but all over Nigeria (Mayer, 2020a), including areas where before the British there was no system of nobility, such as most Igbo areas where *acephaly*, age grades and secret societies had once provided a political system instead of aristocratic privileges. In 1979, traditional rulers were made *a fourth tier of government* even in regions where they had to be established *ex nihilo*. Competition increased with such cases of invented tradition and jockeying for titles within and among local communities. It has become fashionable in Western academia to celebrate traditional rulers in Africa as ones that are able to step in and help govern regions where democratic politicians failed (an example is Baldwin, 2016). This is problematic generally as these traditional rulers are *ipso facto* unelected. It is however even more problematic in Nigeria where traditional rulers have consistently proved themselves to be the staunchest supporters of every single military dictatorship in the country’s history, endorsing even Sani Abacha (Jega, 2001).

Nigeria has shifted between ‘democratic rule’ and military dictatorships; the latter 1970-1979, 1983-1985, 1985-1993, 1993-1999. In both its two different avatars, Nigeria’s political system embraced internal violence to a comparatively high degree even in a West African regional comparison and context. The political economy of resource extraction, and injustices around oil income distribution, came to add fuel to the fire from the later 1970s onwards. The colonial state, as Frantz Fanon argued, was built on violence in the first place (Fanon, 1961; 2001). The post-colonial state inherited this trait from its predecessor. In its



military avatar, the Nigerian state was obviously a violent institution. During the years of Nigeria's First, Second, Third and currently, Fourth Republic, Nigerian elections have been systematically marred by violence, godfatherism, voter intimidation, thuggery, 'area boys', and fraud (Ellis, 2018). The Nigerian political system since 1999 is intensely oligarchical (Campbell, 2010), the system also being called the '*oga system*', and described as *prebendal* (Joseph, 1987; 2014). Both *prebendia* and the *oga system* constitute also a special kind of political economy, where customs officers become billionaires and Vice Presidents (Atiku Abubakar), where former generals own oil rigs, and where the law is the handmaiden of monopolistic economic interests *down to chicken farming* (as in the case of former military head of state and former democratically elected President Obasanjo).

Oil incomes have defined Nigeria since the late 1970s. Oil income distribution methods that first concentrate incomes at the federal center in Abuja, and then re-distribute those resources to states according to their population figures, originally gave no extra compensation to states, regions and ethnic areas where the negative externalities of oil extraction had been so severe that they practically ended agriculture altogether, through oil spills and other environmental damage. During the worst years of the military dictator Sani Abacha (1993-1998), Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni Nine were captured, tried and executed for demanding exactly such compensation. Locals in the Niger Delta had little choice but to earn their living by illegal means, which meant bunkering (tapping into oil pipelines without authorization) and by joining the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and other Delta-based rebel groups that practiced kidnapping oil industry expatriates *as a form of livelihood*.

The North faced not only the consequences of its own feudal socio-political system (where emirs and aristocratic title holders retain their traditional role *even in the legal sense*) but a near-absence of modern industry and underdevelopment of other modern sectors. This was as true during the import substitution industrialization years (1950s-1983), as during the post-1983 years of self-managed neoliberal and then openly IMF-oriented Structural Adjustment Programmes, austerity and privatization. The North also had to bear the consequences of the *almajiri* system, whereby economically destitute Muslim boys attach themselves to religious instructors who take care of their livelihood by sending them to beg in the Northern cities' traffic jams. These *almajiri* boys have repeatedly proved themselves to be recruiting grounds for Islamist forces of extremism, and also banditry, apart from suffering terrible human rights abuses while in their particular form of bondage.

In the South, similar underclass elements have become 'area boys' (lumpen elements and outright criminals) with deindustrialization in the post-1983 political economy. Albeit Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida officially kicked off Nigeria's Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) only in 1986, his predecessor Muhammadu Buhari initiated the first austerity measures as early as 1983 after an oil crisis hit the economy in 1981. The South has also had to rely on what is sometimes called a 'miracle economy' with neo-Protestant pastors preaching a prosperity gospel, often very vicariously applicable to the average adherent while pastors

and apostles become millionaires in US dollar terms. Internationalized prostitution rings, internet scams, and campus cults (Ellis, 2018) complete this picture, with cults taking over campuses since the mid-1990s when radical student movements, hitherto important, gave way to campus cults that practice an inauthentic form of *juju*. Those cults also became the recruiting grounds of important segments of the Nigerian elite to such an extent that Braude calls this tier “the cultist bourgeoisie” (Braude, 2019).

Radical movements in Nigeria

Dissatisfaction with the lack of elementary security and pay arrears also strengthen labour movements and trade unions in the country, which then find ways of cooperation with middle class, human rights centered resistance (Omoyele Sowore, presidential candidate in 2019; Lekki Toll Gate Massacre in 2020). Trade union activism, and general strikes, centered on the piecemeal elimination of fuel subsidy since the early 2000s, most famously in 2012 with Occupy Nigeria (Chido Onumah should be mentioned in relation to those). Radicals at times seek links with certain representatives of particularist ethnic causes. In the years 1963-1966, many activists of the Socialist Workers and Farmers Party in Nigeria were ethnically Tiv (an underrepresented Middle Belt minority). In 2019, radical presidential candidate Omoyele Sowore met with Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, the exiled leader of IPOB - and this was a highly publicized meeting. This very occasion precipitated Sowore’s first arrest by the country’s security infrastructure in late 2019.

Army deployment and its discontents

The Nigerian Army is *deployed, not stationed*, in 22 of the 36 states of Nigeria as of 2021 (!). Both the Army and the Police operate in a violent manner. It may be said that they maintain a dynamic equilibrium of violence with rebel forces and armed robbers that rule most roads at night. Drug abuse, and irregular operational methods characterize both forces (Hansen, 2015) to an uncanny extent.

The most remarkable fact about the Fourth Republic is its counterintuitive longevity. Despite all expectations to the contrary, formal democracy has *not* been overthrown in a coup for twenty-two years. This is the single longest period of civilian rule in the country by far. The Republic’s president since 2015 (Muhammadu Buhari) is *a former military head of state* (1983-1985), with other former military heads of state (Olusegun Obasanjo, Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida) also retaining their unofficial but central role in the system. Levels of insecurity and violence have recently been rising to a level where the legitimacy of the state is called into question with increasing frequency by the country’s long suffering populace. In early 2021, Nigeria recorded the second highest level of deaths caused by terrorism worldwide, after Afghanistan (Varrella, 2021). At the same time, the heavy handed responses of the organs of the Nigerian state have been credited with kickstarting not only



Boko Haram itself (Hansen, 2015) but also reinvigorating the Indigenous People of Biafra under Nnamdi Kanu, who was unjustly harassed by the authorities before he restarted agitation for Biafra from exile in 2015 (Soyombo, 2017).

It is probably fair to say that fears of domination by the major ethnic group of any given geopolitical region in Nigeria, is a strong antidote to secessionism almost everywhere. At the same time, it is difficult to predict when the dynamic of ever increasing violence, including terrorist violence, would create its own momentum and enforce its logic on events. Losing the oil producing regions adjacent to, and within the Delta would probably hit the North hardest. Northern interests however, are perceived to dominate the Army. This is the essential factor that makes wishes for peaceful secession (of Igbos, Yorubas or anyone else, such as discussed by Soyombo 2017) a *mere pipe dream*. Any secession would most definitely carry with itself violence that would exceed today's levels of constant low intensity conflict and terrorism. The ten years preceding 2019 brought 23,500 deaths caused by terrorism in Nigeria, a number that was higher than the aggregate figures for the next ten African countries on the list combined, when that list included Somalia and the entire Sahel region (Varrella, 2021)!

Inchoate feudalization in prebendal Nigeria

Conceptualizing Nigeria's political economy, it has been customary to make use of Richard Joseph's masterful analysis that attributed a prebendal system to the country's Second Republic in 1987 (Joseph, 2014). It is not my intention to question the applicability of his model to Nigeria, as client-network systems of intricate detail have so obviously characterized how Nigeria spends its billions of oil money every year since then, with no major change in the structure that prompted Joseph's initial framing of this system. What I do call for is an examination of the social formation surrounding those prebendia (patron handouts to clients) in Nigeria's politico-economic system. In a recent article of mine (Mayer, 2020a) on the radical feminist writer Ifeoma Okoye's novel *Men Without Ears* (Okoye, 1984), I employed the concept of inchoate feudalization, originally found in Sir Charles Tupper's *Our Indian Protectorate* (Tupper, 2015, p. 98) and in Charles W. Nuckolls' article *The Durbar Incident* (Nuckolls, 1990, p. 531 ff.) (also quoted by Apter, 2005, p. 180). Their feudalism is inchoate as consensual selection practices are preventing a wholesale shift towards heredity for their titles (Harneit-Sievers, 1998). Far from an all-encompassing mode of production in a Marxian sense, but equally far from the a historical parody that Baldwin resents as the role of traditional rulers in today's Africa (Baldwin, 2016), chieftaincy and royal titles today are often the worst gems in the mosaic of neocolonialist rule on the continent – going as far as banditry with ideological sanction. Attahiru Jega (2001) focuses on the cementing role that traditional rulers played for the successive military administrations of Muhammadu Buhari (1983-1985), Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (1985-1993) and even the military dictator who

made Nigeria an international pariah, Sani Abacha (1993-1998), underwriting their every false step towards elusive promised elections and democracy along the way.

Nigeria's feudatories, beloved by the BBC (2013) are no ancient regime style patrons of arts who protect Venetian rococo architecture and build art collections in country homes. Most of them live in villas and mansions that look every bit as horrid as the narco mansions of other segments of the country's financial elite. But their grandezza is not without its ideological fortifications. Their religious fervor is notable, and in the decades of independence, fervor has also espoused radicalisms of hitherto unimaginable notions of exclusion. Amidst the general radicalization of the North, Boko Haram under Abubakar Shekau revels in its extremity, "we rape, we take slaves" thunders its leader. But in the South, a less extremely articulated but nonetheless implied Christian supremacist ideology has also gained ground. Even Mazi Nnamdi Kanu's ethnically Igbo, self-styled Judaism is on the *stricter side* of Judaism, always preferring from among G-d's Jewish names the less obvious choice "Elohim" (the Hebrew term is more remembered in 'Bible criticism' oriented circles for implying a polytheist creation narrative – but in Jewish Orthodoxy and its Kiruv outreach, "Elohim" refers to the Creator who disciplines and punishes with justice, as opposed to the Creator with *khesed*, mercy). Noted for his love for US president Donald Trump, Nnamdi Kanu does operationalize his version of the religion as somewhat anti-Islamic in its general orientation. In Southern Christian majority areas, employing Muslims even as guards has become controversial. Traditional elites do not necessarily act as agents of moderation, or the preservation of cultural values as well as we would suppose they could. Modern Nigerian art, including modernist paintings have a following in Lagos creative and cultural elites and the diaspora (an Enwonwu artwork just sold for millions of pounds) (BBC, 2018) but business elites and most feudatories exist in a world of neophyte and aggressive religion, capable and eager to support every invented tradition that supports those selfsame neocolonial elites, and care little about authentic art and culture. Northern Salafism with its Arabic style covering of women is an invented tradition (along with most other trappings of the Wahabiyya) but so are most other royal and aristocratic traditions in other regions and religions.

When I emphasize Nigeria's fascination with titles, chieftaincy and "royalty," (I use inverted commas here because, with some exceptions in the North, legitimacy in the sense of heredity is very far from most of these 'houses'), nothing is further from my intention than the demented claim that Nigeria would "live in the Middle Ages." Nigeria, as the now late Professor Tejumola Olaniyan always emphasized so pertinently, lives entirely in modernity. Not only that: it is one of the most important life worlds that constitute modernity in the 21st century. In fact Nigeria is one of the most fashion conscious, trendy, and up-to-date countries in the world, with no fondness of the quaint. It is not only the fact that months after Childish Gambino's *This is America* rap song was released, there appeared *This is Nigeria* by the incredible Nigerian rapper Falz. The even more interesting aspect to



this is that the original song *This is America* itself, was co-produced by a Nigerian-American music entrepreneur, none other than the radical Nigerian social scientist Claude'd Ake's son!

It is no accident that Nigeria today claims the richest person of Africa (Aliko Dangote), Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala is WTO's director general, and Netflix's *Dynasty* series sports a half-Igbo American bourgeois dynasty. Mainstream Anglo-Saxon feminism's most important public intellectual is Chimamanda Adichie - worldwide. It seems only a matter of time before Nigerians enter the private space race a la Elon Musk. Unlike in many other African countries where local elites are exclusively compradores, Nigeria's financial elite has significant economic power, one on a global scale (Mayer, 2020b).

Ideologies of a strict, exclusivist and identitarian nature (including extreme religion) thus support the democracy of former military dictators (Obasanjo, Buhari) ever since 1999. With its indigeneity, law of the land, sharia, and feudal law, as well as non-participatory, exclusivist practices that hinder elections (thuggery, voter intimidation, godfathers, campus cults, client networks, prebendalism), Nigeria is in effect maintaining a faux system of liberal democracy teetering on the edge with higher and higher (one would imagine elsewhere untenable) levels of violence and a number of casualties that may not be sustained indefinitely. However, it is important to note that as the new, enlightened order of Code Napoleon revoked the Jacobin abolishment of slavery, today's international system is also tolerant of local conflicts that have low incidence of blowback effects in metropolitan countries.

Many actors within Nigeria cling desperately to decency, from trade union activists to politically committed religious personalities (such as the well-known Bishop Matthew Kukah, or the Interfaith Community Center in Kaduna, a bastion of Muslim-Christian communication, cooperation and understanding). Simple people of faith in the Christian South, mainstream Muslims, or simple Igbo Jews of faith and principle, will not fall to siren voices of intercommunal hatred. But it is very important to note that they all have to cling to a moral imperative in a robber baron world of brutality and inhuman existence, where institutions whose main function would be the protection of life (such as the armed forces) are also part of a now generalized, and tragically multifaceted problem that might explode into civil war in the 2020s.

Conflict of interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exist for this manuscript.

Notes on contributor

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Turkey's growing interest in the African continent

János Besenyo¹

Abstract:

In the last decades major and regional powers became more and more involved in the economy of the African continent, where there is a so called “second scramble” for Africa’s raw materials. This is a major example of multiple economic and other possibilities Africa provides. Dozens of books and studies tell about the African presence of great powers such as the USA, China, Russia, UK or France. We know less about the regional powers that become increasingly important, such as Turkey, India, Japan, Brazil or Iran. Regional powers offer alternatives for African countries who want to cooperate with other states based on their genuine national interests. In this article I present Turkish-African relations because Turkey is a rising power in political, economic and other terms increasingly influencing the African continent. This fact became so obvious that the African Union recognized Turkey as its strategic partner since 2008. Turkey developed good relations with the North African countries because of its historic connections, but Ankara is also getting evermore involved in the economy of Sub-Saharan countries. This is done not only in the framework of inter-governmental cooperation but through Turkish Government-backed organizations – such as IHH and TIKA – and also by Turkish companies. This increased Turkish interest is greatly visible since there are more and more Turkish diplomatic missions in the continent. Turkey emphasises that Ankara also takes part in various humanitarian and reconstruction aid programs, mostly in Somalia, where Turkey is involved in the restoration of the country. The result of this is that Turkey has become an unavoidable actor not only in North Africa but also in East Africa. Furthermore, Turkey is engaged in cultural and educational activities, that is why many African students are studying in Turkish universities and multiple Turkish educational institutes are established and run in numerous African countries. I will specifically deal with the strengthening military, defence and security cooperation between Turkey and African countries.

Keywords:

Turkey; Africa;
economic cooperation;
commercial cooperation;
military cooperation;
cultural cooperation;
TUSKON; IHH;
Maarif Foundation;
humanitarian help;
educational programs.

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
Historical relations between Turkey and the mainland

Historical relations between Turkey and Africa go back at least four centuries. In terms of the evolution of political relations, two geographical areas can be distinguished: on the one hand, North Africa, with its Muslim population, and on the other hand, the sub-Saharan territories. The first region belonged to the Turkish Empire for centuries, in a looser, sometimes tighter system of dependence, and occupies a particularly important place in the broader interpretation of the Middle East. In this respect, it is still important for Turkey to this day. Although there has not been such a close relationship with the sub-Saharan region, in the last two decades the countries here have become increasingly important to the Turkish leadership, with whom they have begun to build better economic, diplomatic, military and other relations (Donelli, 2018, p. 57). In terms of historical interactions, three eras can be distinguished. The past dating back to the Ottoman times, the period from 1923 to 1998, and the period thereafter.

From the 16th century onwards, control of the Muslim territories of North Africa came into the hands of the Ottomans, partially or entirely. Egypt and Algeria were occupied by the Turkish armies in 1517, Libya in 1551, and Tunisia became a province of the empire in 1574 after several changes of ownership. However, the Southern parts of Africa have never been as closely associated with Istanbul as the Maghreb region. Although today's Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, and Somalia have repeatedly become Ottoman-dependent, they have never actually become part of the empire, so the Ottoman presence was only indirectly perceptible in the region (Aybar, 2016). By the end of the 19th century, in parallel with the general decline of the power of the sultans, the dependence of North African territories had eased. However, Turkey continued to have significant influence in the eyes of African Muslims. As a consequence, the leaders of the Dervish uprising – that broke out in British-occupied Somalia – asked for and received support from Turkey to fight the British (Abdinor, 2018, p. 83).


After 1923, the new Turkish Republic remained a distant observer of events in the African continent. After 1945, with the advent of the bipolar world order, the roles stabilized. With the end of their colonial status in the '60s and '70s, Turkey sought to build balanced diplomatic and political relations not only with North African but also with sub-Saharan states. While Turkey has recognized all African states that have become independent and has even actively contributed to the independence of Zimbabwe and Namibia, Turkey has tended to have well-functioning diplomatic and economic relations only with North African states. This policy did not change until 1990, when Turkey's place in world politics became precarious after the shakeup of its foreign policy balance, and its accession to the European Union was rejected in 1997, so that the Turkish leadership turned to Africa (Ozkan, 2016, p. 218). In the light of the new foreign policy objectives, an Africa Action Plan was launched in 1998 but its contents were put into practice only to a limited extent (Besenyő and Oláh, 2012, p. 137). However, the "Justice and Development Party," which came to power in 2002, succeeded in its implementation. They have strengthened their ties primarily with North African countries, but were soon open to Southern countries as well. This was particularly necessary because, after

the end of the bipolar world order, Turkey had established good relations primarily with Arab states, but this relationship with some countries (Egypt, Saudi Arabia) had deteriorated for some reasons and due to the events of the “Arab Spring,” markets had also shrunk. But Turkey has developed ties with sub-Saharan countries not only for economic reasons, but also for political benefits, as it generally needed the support of African countries voting in a bloc in the United Nations (Shinn, 2015, p. 5). This was evident when, with the support of largely African states in the United Nations Security Council, Turkey was elected as a temporary member for the period between 2009 and 2010 (Venkatachalam, 2019, p. 3). Turkey can count on the support of African states not only because of good diplomatic, economic, trade and humanitarian (aid) relations, but also because, unlike other great powers, it did not have colonies in the continent, at least not in the same way as most European countries did (Republic of Turkey, MFA, 2019). To further establish Turkish presence in Africa, the country also appears in Turkish official communications as an “Afro-Eurasian” state that has not just begun to explore Africa, but has been present for centuries in countries in the continent with which it has historical, religious, economic, etc. ties.



In 2003, under the leadership of Turkish Foreign Minister Ismael Cem, another economic strategy plan focusing on African countries was created, which the government successfully

implemented with the involvement of the civilian sector (Tepeciklioğlu, 2017, p. 4). In 2005, the government declared the “Year of Africa” and in the same year Turkey was granted observer status in the African Union, and in 2008 it became a strategic partner of the organization and established close relations with other regional African organizations (Habiyaemye and Oğuzlu, 2018, p. 314). In 2014, the Turkish president, who pursued a more active African policy than his predecessors, visited 20 African states and received 30 African heads of state (Sıradağ, 2018, p. 314). In addition, Turkey-organized Africa summits where not only politicians but also business and other leaders could meet. The first Turkish-African Economic Forum was held in Istanbul on 2-3 November 2016, where not only presentations and consultations took place, but also several cooperation agreements were concluded with African states (DEIK, 2016). Turkish foreign policy has made the importance of its "opening to the South" clear in other ways, as the number of Turkish embassies in the African continent almost quadrupled between 2008 and 2018 to 42 today, but the Turkish leadership wants to be represented in all 54 African states. However, not only the Turks increased their representation in Africa, but the Africans did the same in Turkey. While in 1997 only South Africa had an embassy in Ankara, today more than 32 African countries have foreign missions in the Turkish capital (Abdinor, 2019).






Humanitarian assistance and cultural cooperation

Humanitarian aid is perhaps the main and most effective political tool of the Turkish government. It is important to note that government work in Africa is also supported by the Turkish Agency for Cooperation and Coordination (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı, TİKA), which was established by the government in 1992 to deal with new political and economic challenges affecting Turkish successor states in the post-Soviet period. The agency has set up regional headquarters in three countries, Ethiopia, Sudan and Senegal, as well as offices in 21 countries, providing assistance to African countries (TİKA Overseas Offices, 2020). In 2002, the organization spent only \$ 85 million on various aid programs and grants, which steadily increased to \$ 780 million by 2008. Of this amount, \$ 51.73 million - 6.6% of the total - was awarded to programs in the African continent (*Presentation by Dr. Rahman Nurdun*, 2020). In 2010, this amount increased further, and between 2011 and 2014, \$ 315 million in aid was already provided to African states (Tepeciklioglu, 2017, p. 16). Among the supported countries, Sudan stood out, where various programs worth \$ 13.21 million were implemented. Sudan is currently the third African country to receive aid from TİKA, with only Somalia and Niger ahead. TİKA's African programs focus on health, agriculture, providing safe drinking water, education, and humanitarian (aid) programs (Turkish Development Assistance Report, 2017). In addition to TİKA, there are other Turkish aid organizations in the African continent (Cansuyu Foundation, Doctors Worldwide, Deniz Feneri Association, etc.) which provided \$ 93.22 million in aid in 2013, mainly to Somalia, Niger, Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso and Egypt (Tepeciklioglu, 2017, p. 17).

Between 2005 and 2007, the Turkish Government provided \$ 22.1 million in annual aid to the African continent, which increased to \$ 45.5 million a year between 2008 and 2010. This represented 3.5% and then 5.7% of the Turkish aid. The rate of Turkish aid began to grow significantly after the Erdogan government came to power (Aybar, 2016). In 2013, Turkey already spent \$ 1.6 billion on aid, making it the third largest donor country in the world after the US and Great-Britain (Tepeciklioglu, 2017, p. 15). According to the World Humanitarian Assistance Report, the Turkish development (aid) programs reached \$ 3.3 billion in 2014. This represented 0.42% of Turkish gross national income (GNI). Of this, \$383.3 million was spent on aid to sub-Saharan countries. The Turkish Government is involved in aid to Africa not only through its own organizations, but also through other international organizations – FAO, WFP, International Red Crescent (Ozkan, 2016, p. 218). In addition to aid programs, the Turks also play a role in the accommodation and care of refugees. Turkey currently accommodates 3.9 million refugees, including many Africans, hence the country has the world's largest refugee population (International Federation of Red Cross, 2019).

Somalia and Sudan receive most of the aid to African countries. Somalia is very heavily dependent on Turkish aid, with various subsidies accounting for 21% of its annual budget. And the country's largest donor is none other than Turkey. When the country was hit by a huge famine in 2011, the international community was not really in a hurry to help the country. In contrast, the Turkish president, heading a 200-strong delegation, visited Mogadishu. There

were two important benefits of the arrival of the Turks: firstly, they showed the Turkish people the tragedy of the Somalis, with which they sympathized, then made donations to the Somalis showing a high level of support and Islamic solidarity. The Turkish embassy was reopened in Mogadishu, almost the only one, and the Turkish national airline company Turkish Airlines launched regular flights to the country, making it possible to reconnect it to the international community. In addition to aid provided by Turkish NGOs, Turkish companies have also been involved in the reconstruction of the country and have made/are making significant investments in almost all spheres (Abdinor, 2018, p. 90). In addition, a significant number of Somali students are being awarded scholarships in Turkish higher education institutions. According to Turkish data, between 2011 and 2017, \$ 1 billion in aid was provided to Somalia (Meservey, 2017), while in 2016, the balance of bilateral trade reached \$ 120 million, which has been growing steadily since then. The activities of Turkish NGOs are greatly aided by their cooperation with local organizations and the majority of their staff are Somalis (Tepecikliogu, 2017, p. 17).



Another country receiving much Turkish aid is Sudan, which received \$ 22 million in 2017 to care for the 770,000 people fleeing the civil war that had erupted in South Sudan. According to some, if Turkey's influence and presence in the two countries were to decrease or cease,



the lost Turkish aid and the revenue generated by Turkish companies would not be replaced by the international community. This, in turn, could lead to a further deterioration of the current, not easy security situation in both countries (Venkatachalam, 2019, p. 13).

The Turkish president makes no secret of the significant role Islam plays in aid, linking both the donor and recipient. That is why the other non-governmental organization providing assistance, İHH (İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri ve İnsani Yardım Vakfı), prioritises the development of cultural and educational relations in addition to charitable actions. Religion plays a prominent role in their activities limited to Africa. Meeting needs is not just about basic food and hygiene-related products. The distribution of the Quran and mosque constructions also fall into the category of necessary assistance. During Ramadan, for example, collection and relief operations have been organized for hungry people in Africa for years (Besenyó and Oláh, 2012, pp. 145-146). The ideological approach represented by the Turks has been welcomed by several African countries that are trying to counteract the Wahhabite influence that had originated from Saudi Arabia, which is gaining ground in the continent (Tol, 2019). In Libya, the Turks are also gaining ground, where TİKA has been involved not only in rebuilding the public administration and health sector, but also in increasing livestock. Turkey has made particularly high investments in the health sector. To date, Ankara has concluded agreements with 20 African states where the Turks have not only renovated but also established new health facilities. Between 2007 and 2010, Turkish physicians organized and implemented several health programs in African countries. One project was the “Africa Cataract Project” with the support of İHH in the African continent since 1996, in 13 African countries – Sudan, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Mali, Chad, Uganda, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Niger, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Somalia – 100000 people underwent free cataract surgeries (İHH, 2017). In addition, the organization also has several other projects in the countries of the continent, such as the construction of wells, food donation, etc (Shinn, 2015, p. 15). TİKA established a 200-bed Turkish-Sudanese hospital in Nyala, Sudan, in 2014, which was handed over to the Sudanese Government in 2019. The organization has built another 200-bed hospital in Mogadishu in Somalia, named after the Turkish Prime Minister, which opened in 2015. Turkey has also provided significant funding for the construction of an educational hospital in Juba, South Sudan, and Black Lion Hospitals in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

One of the biggest concerns in Africa is access to safe, clean drinking water, which is why Turkish organizations also play a major role in providing access to safe drinking water and improving environmental conditions. In the recent period, TİKA has established 303 wells in African countries; 80 in Nigeria, 27 in Ethiopia, 41 in Sudan, 78 in Burkina Faso, 30 in Mali, 30 in West Africa and 17 in Somalia (TİKA’s water projects, 2020). The humanitarian work of the Turks was also recognized by the United Nations, so in 2016 the first World Humanitarian Summit was held in Istanbul (Republic of Turkey, MFA, 2019). Turkish humanitarian engagement in the African continent has grown to such an extent that Turkey became the largest donor in 2017 (Sıradağ, 2018, p. 308).

Not everyone views the rise of the Turks in the continent positively. Not only former colonizing states and countries struggling for raw materials and markets in Africa, but also Turkey's regional rivals – such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran – are watching with suspicion the success of the Turks when developing their relations with African countries through their humanitarian and education programs (Donelli, 2018, p. 60). As these countries seek to gain as much influence as possible in the continent, they repeatedly have conflicts of interest.

Turkey is also providing more and more scholarships to African students. Between 1991 and 2014, under the Türkiye Africa Scholarship Program, 4380 African students received scholarships from the Turkish Government and other non-governmental organizations, such as TÜBİTAK, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, IMKB (Borsa Istanbul) and TRT (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation). In recent years, the number of scholarships has increased exponentially, so that between 2015 and 2016, Turkey already provided 1239 scholarships to African students. There are currently 5437 African students studying in Turkish colleges and universities, and 116 African teachers and researchers working in some way in Turkish higher education at the expense of the Turkish state.

The importance of Africa for Turkey can also be seen in the fact that three Turkish universities – the Gazi University, the Ankara University, and the Istanbul Ticaret University – offer masters' courses in African studies and seven more universities – the Kadir Has University, the Ankara University, the Izmir University of Economics, the Kırklareli University, the Erciyes University, the Istanbul Aydın University and the Gazi University – conduct research on Africa. In addition, an African Institute has been established within the renowned TASAM (Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies), and research on Africa is carried out at several other Turkish research sites, think-tanks – USAK, TURKSAM – carry out research of Africa (Tepeciklioglu, 2017, pp. 11-12). AFAM – the Association of Researchers on Africa – which brings together researchers on African topics, not only produces publications and analyses, but has also participated in the preparation and implementation of various professional projects at the request of the Turkish government (Abdinor, 2019). Several other education and postgraduate training programs are provided for African youth in Turkish educational institutions. For example, the Turkish Foreign Ministry has been training young African diplomats since 1992 (Republic of Turkey, MFA, 2019). In June 2016, the Turkish Parliament established the Marif Foundation, the activities of which are coordinated by the Turkish Ministry of Education and Foreign Affairs. The primary task of the foundation is to organize and supervise Turkish education abroad. This organization also took over Gulen schools abroad (Donelli, 2018, p. 75), so in June 2019, they had more than 30000 students in 270 schools in 35 countries (Anadolu Agency, 2019). Besides a significant number of foreign students, including Africans, also study at Turkish higher education institutions having their costs reimbursed. In 2012, their number was only 25000, which increased to 125000 in the 2017/2018 school year and to 148000 during the 2018/2019 school year. But there seems to be no slowing down, as in May 2018, President Erdogan announced plans to increase the number of foreign students studying at Turkish institutions to 350000 (ICEF Monitor, 2019).



However, not only do African students go to Turkey to study, but also to African institutions with which the Turkish government cooperates and generously sponsors their activities. In addition, the Turks are also interested in the establishment of African universities. In 2016, it was agreed to establish the Turkish University of Sudan, which would operate in the Sudanese capital and provide mainly technical and agricultural training (Sawahel, 2016). Many people wonder why the Turkish government has been so generously supporting African education. The answer is simple; the Turkish government has assessed that their investment in education will pay off in the long run, and that a layer of intellectual leaders sympathetic to Turkey may emerge in African countries, which could greatly facilitate Turkish-African cooperation.

The results of Turkish aid and education are known not only to the beneficiaries of international organizations or local projects, but also in almost all the countries of the continent. This is largely due to the fact that the government-assisted “Natural TV” channel, as the only Turkish TV channel in the continent, regularly reports these activities along with various other programs. The channel is available in more than 5 million households in 22 African countries (Bilgehan, 2019).

Economic ties

The African continent has not been a target of Turkish foreign policy for a long time, but that changed in 1998. Since then, Turkey has built ever-growing and intensifying economic/trade relations with African countries under the "Opening to Africa Policy," in which various Turkish humanitarian and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a significant role. As the activities of Turkish organizations are primarily in the economic interests of African states, successful projects continue in economic/trade cooperation. Economic cooperation is not only coordinated by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but it also supports companies that want to do business in the African continent in a number of ways. In 2003, the government put forward the “Strategy on the Development of Economic Relations”, which clearly defined the direction of Turkish economic activity in Africa. It has already become clear that the Turks want to strengthen the development of not only multilateral but also bilateral economic/trade relations. Ankara wants to cooperate not only with states but also with the civil and economic sector of partners (Tepeciklioglu, 2017, p. 5). Shortly afterwards, Turkey officially declared 2005 the Year of Africa and gained observer status in the African Union. In 2008, Turkey already appeared as a strategic partner in the official communication of the African Union. This is probably closely related to the fact that the Anatolian state has become an associate member of the African Development Bank and the African Development Foundation (UNCTAD, 2010). The Turks have established good cooperation not only with the African Union, but also with several other African regional organizations too. In addition, efforts were made to cooperate with as many African countries as possible and to promote the conclusions of various bilateral agreements.

Turkey's economic growth in Africa is greatly facilitated by the fact that, unlike other countries that want to procure or control raw materials that are important to them, the Turks are primarily looking for a market for Turkish products and investment opportunities for Turkish companies. In most of the cases this is a win-win policy for all parties, both Turkish and African. Probably due to this, not only Turkish state-owned companies but also civil society organizations support the Turkish Africa policy through their activities. This is also evident taking into consideration the level of investment made by Turkish companies. In 2007, 350 Turkish companies made \$ 400 million investment in African countries, reaching \$ 5 billion in 2014 and \$ 6.2 billion in 2016 thanks to aid provided by the state. The development is clear, not only in terms of the level of investment, but also in the number of Turkish companies engaged. While there was only one Turkish company in Ethiopia in 2003, in 2014 there were already more than 300 companies (Tepecikliogu, 2017, p. 19). Turkish companies are mainly successful in the construction industry, in various infrastructure investments, so much so that the most popular investment opportunity for Turkish construction companies after the Gulf states is offered by the countries of the African continent. For example, by 2010, 115 Turkish construction companies had earned \$ 26.9 billion in projects in Libya, Algeria and Morocco. Recently, Turkish companies have also made significant investments in several sub-Saharan states.

By the end of 2018, Turkey had concluded bilateral economic cooperation agreements with 38 African states. It is clear that these agreements are working, as the volume of Turkish-African trade was at \$ 3 billion in 2000 (Ozkan and Orakci, 2015, p. 345), then \$ 5.4 billion in 2003, \$ 17.5 billion in 2015 and increased to \$ 18.9 billion in 2017 (Abdinor, 2019). During this period, Turkish companies participated in 1150 projects worth \$ 55 billion (Akin, 2018). The Turkish government plans to reach \$ 50 billion in trade with African countries by 2023 (Ozkan, 2016, p. 223). Although this represents a huge increase, the countries of the African continent are still not among Turkey's most important trading partners, as evidenced by the fact that in 2015, Turkish exports accounted for just 8.6% (\$ 12.4 billion) of sales to African countries. At the same time, goods purchased from African countries accounted for 2.5% (\$ 5 billion) of Turkish imports (Tepecikliogu, 2017, p. 25).

Turkey mainly exports processed food, iron, steel, construction materials, nuclear reactors, machinery, vehicles, electronics and clothing to African countries, and imports mainly oil, various agricultural products, raw materials, minerals and gold (World Trade Organization, 2018). Interestingly, unlike the BRIC states, Turkey is less present in the energy and mining sectors of Africa. Although Ankara needs imports in the energy sector, it imports only small amounts of crude oil and natural gas from Algeria and Nigeria, and Genel Energy PLC has acquired the right to extract potential oil fields in Somalia (Balthasar, 2014). It has also concluded bilateral agreements with Djibouti, Cameroon, Niger, Sudan, Angola, the Gambia, Rwanda and Kenya. However, these agreements are not about energy trade, but the development of energy sectors, in which Turkish companies, such as Hakan Mining, Karadeniz Energy Group, Aksa Energy, play a significant role. Economic cooperation is also facilitated by



the fact that Turkish Airlines now operates 52 flights in 35 African countries (Abdinor, 2019). Turkey's progress is also well illustrated by the fact that in 2008 it was among the 20 most important trading partners in the African continent, and in 2011 it was among the 5 countries that made most investments in the continent (Tepeciklioglu, 2017, p. 21). Although Turkey is trying to establish fruitful economic relations with as many African states as possible, its most serious trading partners are primarily North African states and, to a lesser extent, sub-Saharan states (Aybar, 2016).

Although Somalia is not one of Turkey's most important trading partners, it is a priority over them in many respects. It has received most Turkish aid in recent years (Ozkan, 2016, p. 224), and is seen by the Turkish leadership as a “gateway to Africa” and an important geostrategic location. The Turkish leadership has been working closely with the country since 2011, governed by a detailed long-term policy that sees the country not as a separate actor but as an important player and potential shaper in the East African region. Turkey has not only provided aid to the millions of Somalis in need, but has been actively involved in facilitating the signing of various peace agreements, providing some measure of political stability (Antonopoulos et al, 2017, p. 6). Turkey then began to build economic/trade relations and joined the reconstruction of the country, with Turkish companies employing mainly Somali workers. For example, the Turkish company called Albayrak has rebuilt and operates Mogadishu International Airport, and the creation of another airport has been offered for the Somali government. A Turkish company also operates Mogadishu’s largest seaport, which has been completely rebuilt and modernized. 55% of the revenue goes to the government, the remaining 45% goes to the company. Meanwhile, various humanitarian projects were constantly underway which also had a positive effect on the local economy. Turkey not only supports the activities of Turkish companies in Somalia, but also participated in the establishment of the Somalia-Turkey Business Forum, which held its first meeting on 7 April 2012, which has since been followed by several joint events. Since 2013, Turkish Airlines flights have been flying daily to Mogadishu, which also facilitates the development of economic relations, which is clearly visible. The volume of trade between Turkey and Somalia was \$ 516000 in 2001, \$ 6 million in 2010, increasing to \$ 42 million in 2011, and then reaching \$ 63 million in 2014 (Siradag, 2016, p. 100). Turkish exports were only \$ 3.5 million in 2009, reaching \$ 115 million by 2016 (Sazak and Woods, 2017, p. 172).

No matter how surprising it might be, another country, the Orthodox Christian dominated Ethiopia became an increasingly important business partner of Turkey, where in 2005 President Erdogan discussed possible forms of cooperation with the then African leadership (Aybar, 2016). In Ethiopia, Turkish companies are mainly involved in agricultural, railway construction and other projects. The development is also visible in the trade volume of the two countries, which reached \$ 27 million in 2000 (Osmond, 2016, p. 250), \$ 40 million in 2003, \$ 116 million in 2006, \$ 442 million in 2012 and then reached \$ 4 billion in 2016 (Donelli, 2018, p. 4). By the end of 2017, the value of Turkish investments in the country had reached \$ 2.5 billion (Abdinor, 2019). The Turks work mainly in the textile, construction and agricultural

industries and employ a significant number of locals, among whom there are more and more people who have obtained their qualifications in various Turkish educational institutions (Osmond, 2016, p. 255). Turkish companies have also grown significantly in Nigeria (Chigozie and Mesut, 2014, p. 224), Ghana and Sudan (Shinn, 2015, pp. 11-12).


As mentioned earlier, several countries that have taken positions in the African continent see the Turks as rivals, who are gaining more and more economic opportunities, and fear losing the positions they have gained so far. The fact that this fear is real is also evident from the achievements of Turkish construction companies, since they have recently got more contracts in Ethiopia and Rwanda than China, which had previously been the only country dominating infrastructure projects (Sano, 2018). Moreover, in Tanzania, together with the Portuguese, the Turks took over a major railway construction project from the Chinese (Akwei, 2018). There was also close competition between Turkish and Chinese companies in the textile industry in Ethiopia (Shinn, 2015, p. 12). Interestingly, the French are not jealous of Turkish positions and do not see them as rivals, but rather as a kind of ally against China, which is increasingly pushing them out of Africa (Chigozie and Mesut, 2014, p. 229).

Military assistance, hard diplomacy

While Turkey's humanitarian, cultural and economic presence has been largely welcomed in the world, its geopolitical activities and the strengthening of its military presence in Africa have raised several suspicions and concerns. When several Arab countries imposed a blockade on Qatar in June 2017, Turkey did not join them and, in fact, established closer cooperation with the secluded country than before, which neither Saudi Arabia, nor Egypt or the Gulf states accepted. Incidentally, Turkey has previously been considered a rival to the Gulf countries, which have a significant interest in the countries of the Horn of Africa, for whom the Turkish military presence in Somalia poses a high risk (Van den Berg and Meester, 2019).

The military industry, which is a top priority for the Turkish government, is also increasingly exploring African markets, providing new, untapped opportunities and secure revenues for Turkish military products. Although the Turks previously procured a significant portion of their military equipment from abroad, they have now become self-sufficient in more and more areas, producing devices and even newer, more advanced weapons and also joined the International Club of Arms Exporters (Stratfor, 2017). The Turks exported \$ 1.7 billion worth of military products abroad in 2017. This amount increased by a further 17% in 2018 and exceeded \$ 2 billion (Kirikcioglu, 2019). With this, the Turks became the 14th largest arms exporter in the world (Wezeman et al, 2019). The success of Turkish military companies seems to be guaranteed in 2019 as well, as exports of Turkish military equipment increased by more than 64% compared to the same period of the previous year. Although the Turks are not among the major arms exporters in the African continent, their presence there is important and the number of their deals is growing slowly but surely. In 2016, another \$ 63.79 million worth of military equipment was exported to the countries of the continent, while in 2018, it

was already worth \$ 84.35 million. The Turks mainly sell electronic and technical equipment and armored transport vehicles, ships for the African continent. The following states are the main recipients/purchasers: South Africa, Tunisia, Ghana, Nigeria, Chad, Libya, Egypt, Burkina Faso, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cameroon and Senegal (Sünneci, 2019). In September 2012, the Turks concluded a separate defense industry agreement with South Africa, under which the two countries bought each other's military products and even agreed on joint development (Kaya and Warner, 2013, p. 6). The African presence is so important for Turkish military companies that the 1st Turkey-Africa Defense, Security and Space Forum was organized on 7-9 November 2018, which became so successful that it was organized for the second time between 6 and 8 November 2019. In early 2019, Ankara agreed with Tanzania to buy Turkish weapons for its army (Bakeer, 2019). There are several Turkish military companies present in the area, the best known of which are Otokar (Otokar, 2019), Nurol Makina Sanayi (Sünneci, 2019), Aselsan and Turkish Aerospace Industries (Langan, 2016, p. 11).



The Turkish government has concluded military cooperation agreements with more than 25 countries in recent years, including Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Somalia and Sudan (Siradağ, 2018, p. 316), of which once again Somalia has the closest cooperation. The Turks first sent warships only to the American-led anti-piracy operation Combined Force 151

(Melvin, 2019). Later on, the Turkish leadership pledged humanitarian and military assistance to the country in the Horn of Africa at the UN-Somalia Summit in Istanbul in May 2010 to restore integrity, for the establishment and training of the Somali Army, Police and for the fight against terrorist organizations (Kaya and Warner, 2013, p. 6). The Turks have achieved this not only by providing financial and financial assistance for the reconstruction of the Somali Army, but also opening a \$ 50 million training center in Mogadishu on 30 September 2017, where the Turkish Task Force Command stations a 300-strong Turkish contingent (Rossiter and Cannon, 2019, p. 170), whose main task is to train Somali officers, non-commissioned officers known as the "Somali Eagles" and other Somali African soldiers (Ozer, 2018). 1 500 Somali soldiers are trained annually at the training base, but at least 10 000 Somali soldiers are planned to be trained here on a yearly basis (Melvin, 2019).

In the long run, this means that the leaders and staff of the Somali Army would get their higher military qualifications in Turkey, and most officers and NCOs would receive their training in their home country, but in Turkish-operated Training Schools (Ozkan, 2018, p. 574) and it is likely that the weaponry and equipment of the Somali Army would also be provided by the Turkish military industry (Rossiter and Cannon, 2019, p. 173). A military cooperation agreement was concluded with Sudan as early as 2006 and the level of cooperation has been continuously evolving since then (Ozkan, 2010, p. 95). In December 2017, several agreements were concluded, as a result of which the Turks can establish and operate a dual-use port on the island of Suakin, and set up a Turkish training center in Sudan (Abdinor, 2019). However, the possible military presence of the Turks in Sudan could significantly change the security situation in the region, which several Arab countries fear. Although a change of government has taken place in Sudan in the meantime, there are several indications that the relationship between the two countries and the existing military cooperation are not in jeopardy (Tanchum, 2019). A military co-operation agreement was signed with the Gambia in 2007 and it can be considered a significant success that 7500 of the nearly 8000 strong Gambian Army received Turkish training, and the Gambians bought Turkish weapons and equipment or received aid (Sorwar, 2019). A military cooperation agreement was first concluded with Nigeria in 2011, under which the Nigerian Navy purchased ships from the Turks and provided reciprocal training and exercises (Kaya and Warner, 2013). This agreement was expanded and extended in 2018 for another five years (Defenceweb, 2018).

Apart from Somalia, the Turkish government is increasingly involved in the training of soldiers and police forces of other African countries, such as Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia (Saleh 2018). In addition to growing military cooperation, Turkey has also become actively involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa. The Turks first took part in the 1993 UN operation in Somalia led by a Turkish general, Lieutenant General Çevik Bir, followed by further operations from 2005, UNAMSIL, MONUC, UNMIL, UNOCI, ONUB, UNMIS and MINURCAT. Currently, there are five UN missions in Africa where Turkish soldiers and police serve; MONUSCO, MINUSMA, MINUSCA, UNAMID, UNMISS. The Turks sent troops not only to the UN but also to NATO and EU peace operations, such as Libya (Republic of Turkey, Ministry



of Foreign Affairs, 2019) to the Central African Republic and Mali (Siradağ, 2018, pp. 315-317) and provided significant support to the AU peacekeeping operation in Somalia (Sazak and Woods, 2017, p. 179). In addition to participating in peacekeeping operations, Turkish troops also took part in several military exercises in the continent to practice cooperation. For example, between March and June 2014, three warships, a logistics ship and 781 people - the Barbaros Turkish Naval Task Force - took part in a joint military exercise in the Gulf of Guinea. During the exercise, Turkish warships tested several new weapons, including “Sea Sparrow” missiles. Furthermore, a joint military exercise was organized with units of the Sudanese Navy in 2015 (Shinn, 2015, p. 8). In 2018, in addition to Turkey and several African countries, Somali naval units also took part in the “Cutlass Express 2018” exercise (Africa Defence Forum, 2019).

Some countries, jealous of Turkey's growing role in Africa, say the Turks have implemented a number of humanitarian programs that may even have military implications in the future. These were mainly projects that developed the infrastructure of some African countries. Turkish companies have been involved in the construction and modernization of airports in several locations, such as Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Nairobi, Johannesburg or Lagos. Turkish companies have also taken part in the development of seaports in Mombasa/Kenya (Kaya and Warner, 2013, p. 6). Turkish rivals have also voiced concerns about the growing presence of the Turkish military industry, as they see a growing risk of large quantities of Turkish weapons falling into the hands of separatist or terrorist groups, with unforeseeable consequences (İkiz and Eriş, 2018, p. 185). The Arab states fearing the growing presence of the Turks did not just articulate their objections. To counterbalance the presence of the Turks, they had first begun to build their own bases, which they have been developing with great enthusiasm ever since. Saudi Arabia has established a naval base in Djibouti (Brewster, 2018), while its ally, the United Arab Emirates has reached an agreement with Eritrea, where it has been given the port of Assab for 30 years, from which it has built a modern military and civilian naval port. In addition, the port of Berbera was acquired from Somaliland, which rivals Somalia, for a period of 30 years (Mello and Knights, 2016).

Conclusion

In the recent period, the African continent has become more and more valuable, where besides former new players have also appeared, such as Turkey, Brazil, Iran, South Korea or even Japan. Turkey's emergence is considered new because, although historically embedded in the North African region, it was only marginally present in sub-Saharan Africa. During the Cold War, Africa was not important for Turkish diplomacy. The continent regained its importance only in the late 1990s, after the Turkish leadership, which had previously positioned itself within the boundaries of the Western Alliance, sought to find its original roots and once again define itself as an independent great power. This has been successfully implemented and the Turkish foreign policy has been diversified by the current AKP, in which Africa has been given a much greater role again. Turkey's more active presence on the African

continent is a clear signal that it defines itself as a key regional player and a resurgent great power and that Ankara is shaping its policy accordingly. This has also been recognized by the African Union and other regional African organizations, which see Turkey as a strategic partner with an increasingly “visible” and growing influence on the African continent, following a non-Western and non-Chinese approach in Ankara’s Africa policy.

Although the continent is important for the Turks as a market, and as a source of raw materials for the country. Thus it is also a vulnerability that Ankara can reduce traditional dependence on European markets. African raw materials and energy sources are valuable resources for the rapidly expanding Turkish economy, allowing further enhancement of trade. Nevertheless, the economic policy of the Turks in Africa differs from that of other great powers, as they are not primarily interested in obtaining the raw materials they need, but in developing bilateral trade relations, which is also beneficial for African states. Despite significantly developing economic and trade relations, the Turks do not gain influence primarily through economic means, but through their humanitarian, educational and cultural programs in response to issues considered important for local communities. For example, Turkish relief efforts have contributed significantly to the reconstruction of Somalia, which has been seen as a failed state and abandoned by the international community. This makes Turkey an indispensable player in the region and ever more visible in Africa. In addition, the education system created by the Turks and operated in Africa offers an alternative for Africans who are unable to prevail in the domestic education system and can later continue their studies at Turkish universities on a scholarship basis.

The Turkish security policy and defense economy are also gaining better opportunities in the continent, where they are training more and more military-police forces. These countries increasingly purchase Turkish weapons, since they are not worse than similar products of Western, Russian or Chinese military industrial companies’ products.

Although there has been some stagnation in Turkish-African relations in the recent past, Turkish gains have not stopped. Furthermore, Turkish influence is growing in the East African region, which has attracted the attention of several African states, leading to possible conflicts between Turkey and these states.

Conflict of interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

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The development of the national language of Somalia

Through which processes did Somali develop into it?

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Abstract:

The present work deals with the development of the Somali language in the 20th century, and tries to explain the different stages of development and development processes. Linguistically speaking, Somalia is an outstanding example as it is one of the few African countries with a homogeneous language group. This means that around 95% (cf. Warsame 2001, p. 342) of the Somali population speaks the Somali language, and communicates predominantly in this language. The focus of this work is mainly on the process of decision-making about a fixed writing style, and why Somalia came to a decision about a uniform writing form relatively late. In addition, the possibilities are explained that were up for discussion and thus seriously discussed, as well as how the decision made was justified. The literacy campaign, which was carried out between 1973 and 1975, represents a central aspect of this development and thus of this work. In addition, from a linguistic and strategic point of view, the processes by which the Somali language was modernized and which bodies played a role are described.

Keywords:

Somalia; language; Somali; linguistic development.

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Introduction

The following chapter is intended to provide an introduction to the subject as well as an outline of some important background information about the East African state of Somalia.

When we talk about Somalia, we are talking about an African state located along the east coast of Africa, on the Horn of Africa. Somalia covers an area of approximately 637,000 km². In 2020 the population of Somalia was around 15 million (see UK Visas and Immigration, 2016, p. 7). The official languages of Somalia are Somali and Arabic. In addition, as a result of the colonial past, Italian and English are still spoken in Somalia today. These framework conditions should be mentioned first in order to get a rough idea of Somalia.

In Africa we find a third of the approximately 6,500 languages in the world, divided into the Afro-Asian language family, the Khoisan languages, the Nilo-Saharan language family and the Niger-Congo languages. Somali is described as a language in the Cushitic branch of the Afro-Asian language family. In addition, Somali is considered to be the best-documented language of the Cushitic languages, as language descriptions have been handed down before 1900.

The Somali dialects can be divided into three different language groups: In addition to the (1) northern dialects, the (2) Benadir and the (3) Maay dialects. Somali, which was introduced as the national language, is derived from the northern Somali dialects. The Benadir dialects are spoken along the coast, from Adale to Merca (which also applies to the region around Mogadishu). In these linguistic variants of the coast there are additional phonemes that are not found in standard Somali. The Maay dialects are mainly spoken by the Digil and Mirifle clans in the southern regions of Somalia (see Lamberti, 1984). For more information, see the chapter on “Description of the Somali Language”.

In the first years of independence, the demand arose to determine a font in which Somali should be written from now on.

Nowadays, Somali is spoken in addition to Somalia in the surrounding countries of Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia, as well as by people of Somali origin in the diaspora, among others in Scandinavia and the United States.

The Arabic language is spoken by around 2 million people in Somalia. Since the time of the kingdom of Aksum (1st to 7th centuries AD) there was linguistic contact between the Somali language and the Arabic language, which is why an Arabic influence is noticeable to this day, for example through loanwords. These loanwords are mainly found in the religious area.

English is still taught in most schools in Somalia today and served as the language of the colonial administration in the former colonial protectorate. Due to globalization and the increased role of English as a world language, English is now also seen in Somalia as a language which, for example, enables students to have new career prospects.



Italian in Somalia was used as an official language in Italian Somaliland, for example very heavily in the administration, but the importance of the Italian language declined immensely as a result of independence. Nowadays, Italian is mainly spoken by citizens of the older generations.

There are also minority languages in Somalia such as Bravanese or Kibajuni, both of which are linguistic varieties of Swahili.

Linguistic description of the Somali language

The following chapter is intended to provide an overview of the extent to which linguists divide the Somali language into different language variants. This understanding is important in that there is not just one form of language, but many different linguistic varieties. Dialects are often described as "less valuable" than languages, although this is not a linguistic but rather a political argument to increase the prestige of one language over the other.

Enrico Cerulli was one of the first linguists to divide the Somali dialects into four different dialect groups (cf. Lamberti 1986: 25). According to him, these are the (1) Issaq group, which are spoken in northwestern Somalia, including the Issa and Gadabursi dialects. Cerulli describes the (2) Darood dialects, which comprise the largest dialectal language group and are found in Ogaden in Ethiopia, as well as in the regions of Bari, Nugaal and Mudug in Somalia. There are also the (3) Hawiye dialects, which are used along the coast between Hobbio and Shebelle, and the (4) Sab dialects, which are spoken in the Upper Juba Region and the Southern Shebelle. Lamberti, on the other hand, distinguishes between five different dialect groups, namely the (1) northern Somali dialect groups, the (2) Benadir dialects, the (3) Ashraf variants, the (4) Maay dialects and the (5) Digili variants.

The northern Somali dialects (cf. Lamberti, 1984, pp. 162-189) are spoken not only in the north but also in the south and consist of three subgroups: the dialects Issa, Gadabursi and Issaq, in the north and northwest of Somalia. Furthermore, the Darood dialects exist, which are mainly spoken in Dhulbahante, Marehan, Degodiya, Warsangel, in north-eastern Somalia. In addition, the dialects Af-Majerteen, Af-Marehan, Af-Degodiya in the Jubbada Hoose region, in southern Somalia, were transferred by people who emigrated into to the south of the country, from northern Somalia in the 19th century.

The linguistic varieties which are described as northern Somali dialects differ mainly in a few points such as the absence of the nasals [ŋ] and [ɲ], the pharyngeal phonemes (throat sounds) "c" and "x", as well as the specific article "- ku / -tu ", which is followed by (for example: *ninku halkanuu imaanayaa* "the man comes here").

Lamberti (see Lamberti, 1986) again divides the Benadir dialects into five subgroups, all of which are predominantly spoken in the south, namely as follows, the (1) Abgal dialects, the (2) Galjeel dialects, the (3) Ajuran dialects, the (4) Hamar dialects and the (5) Biimal dialects.

As the Norwegian organization LandInfo (The Norwegian Country of Origin Information Center) describes, these dialects differ among other things in the "form" of various expressions (for example for "we say" there are three different forms: *waa - niraahdaa / niraadaa / nira*). (see LandInfo, 2011, p. 13).

Furthermore, there are the Ashraf dialects, which are spoken along the southern coast of Somalia and mainly consist of two variants (cf. Lamberti, 1986, p. 37): the Ashraf dialects in Mogadishu (also called Af-Shingani) and the Ashraf dialects in Shabeellaha Hoose (the Merka region in southern Somalia).

In addition, (cf. Lamberti, 1986, p. 39) the May dialects, also described under the name Rahanweyn, are spoken mainly in Jilib (in southern Somalia). According to Lamberti (cf. *ibid.*), however, it is difficult to classify them into subgroups based on linguistic differences, since the differences between the individual variants are not always sufficient for this. Typical of the linguistic varieties of the May dialects are, above all, the presence of the vowel [ɿ], which does not appear in the other dialects, and the pharyngeal phonemes "c" and "x" are missing. In addition, the plural forms of the nouns are masculine.

There are also the Digil dialects, which Lamberti (cf. Lamberti, 1986) divides into the Tunni dialect, the Dabarre dialect and the Garre dialect.

As already mentioned, Somali is not only spoken by the people of Somalia, but also by people from the surrounding countries, i.e. Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. In Djibouti, the number of those who speak Somali reaches around 40% of the total population (cf. LandInfo, 2011, p. 7). In Djibouti and the region around the city of Zeila (in northwest Somalia), the speakers use the Issa dialect. In the north-eastern part of Ethiopia, around the Harar region, the Af-Gadabursi dialect is used. In the south of Ethiopia, around Jijiga in the Ogaden region, linguists describe the Ogaden and Wardey dialects. In Kenya, on the other hand, the Darood dialects Af-Aulihan and Af-Harti are spoken. I would like to show that there are some dialects of Somali, therefore a brief description of the situation in the surrounding areas.

There are also different reasons why there are different variants of Somali. As Lamberti (cf. Lamberti, 1986, p. 9) describes, the clan system (in Somalia there are numerous so-called clans), the nomadic way of life and migration contribute to the fact that more and more dialects have developed over time. In addition, the development of the language is continuous.

The linguistic history of Somali

As described by Labahn (see Labahn, 1983, p. 268), political, economic and social processes can be planned with greater efficiency through a homogeneous language culture in a country. The government spares itself the cost-implicating multiplication of planning. In most African countries, the search for an African national language was made difficult by the



fact that there would be unrest among the individual peoples if one language were preferred over the other. That is why it was agreed to continue the former colonial language as the official language. In addition, it was also in the interests of the political “elite” of the time to continue to maintain these colonial languages in their form, as this provided a safeguard of power. This means that the broad mass of the population, on the other hand, made it difficult or impossible to influence public discussion.

In 1960, the merger of English and Italian colonial areas resulted in the Republic of Somalia, whose official languages became English, Italian and Arabic, although about 97% of the Somali population were powerful. One of the reasons for this is that there was no standardized script for Somali until then, which is immeasurable for an official language, which is represented in schools, administration and the media. In 1972 a new language policy was implemented. Thomas Labahn describes the implementation of the language policy in four phases. The first phase, lasts until the end of the Second World War; while the second phase is characterized by a new "sense of state" and it seamlessly passes over into the third phase of independence. In the third phase, a Somali national idea is formed. When the military came to power in 1969, the fourth phase began, in which Somali national sentiment expanded.

Before the 1950s, the Somali language was used orally rather than in writing; during this period we mainly find religious writings that were written in Arabic, for example, and published by Enrico Cerulli, for example (cf. Andrzejewski, 2011, p. 9). Oral literature, on the other hand, was very lively according to Andrzejewski, with the indication that this is literature that includes learning by heart, the transmission and dissemination of this literature. These are mainly songs, as well as fairy tales and anecdotes for adults and animal fables for children. Furthermore, the “classical verse” took over an important part of the oral literature, which was primarily intended to further disseminate historical knowledge.

The first attempts to develop a script for the Somali language were made (cf. Warsame, 2001, p. 343) by Sheikh Yusuf bin Ahmed al-Kowneyn, who came to the East African region in the 13th century. Sheikh Yusuf introduced a collection of technical terms. Sheikh Yusuf also taught some students from the Koranic schools the subtleties of Arabic script and distinguished the Somali language with the Arabic alphabet. With this, Sheikh Yusuf can be seen as the first person who has dealt scientifically with Somali phonology. Variants of the script introduced by Sheikh Yusuf have received great recognition in Somalia. His attempt to distribute mass literature in Arabic script among the citizens of Somalia thus formed the preliminary stage of a Somali script.

Later, European missionaries attempted to introduce the Latin alphabet for Somali, when Evangelist de Larajasse and Cyprien de Sampont published a first grammatical textbook of the Somali language in 1897 (*Practical Grammar of the Somali Language*) (cf. Warsame, 2001, p. 344).

Sayyid Mohamed Abdille Hassan, who appeared scientifically at the end of the 19th century and can be seen as a Somali national hero, not only wrote poems in Arabic, but also used the Arabic script for his poems in Somali. In 1919, Sheikh Uways ibn Maxamed al-Barawani introduced the Barawanese-Arabic script for the Somali language. Sheikh Uways published Qasidaas, poems in which he honors the Muslim prophet. Sheikh Abdirahman also introduced Sheikh Noor of Borama, another Somali font, in 1933. His writing, which is described by linguists such as Ali Warsame (cf. Warsame, 2001, p. 344) as phonetically very precise, received little attention from the population. According to his own statements, Sheikh Abdirahman did not aim to increase the confusion about the choice of a standardized spelling, which is why he only published a small number of works in this font.

In 1938 Sheikh Mohamed Abdi Makahil published a book in which he wrote down a modern form of phoneme-grapheme correspondence (sound-letter assignment). He did this using the standard Arabic script. In the same year the British colonial government tried to introduce Somali written in Latin in elementary schools (including in the city of Burco (cf. Warsame, 2001, p. 344)), which, however, triggered demonstrations by the population. The plans were then discontinued in this form. In the southern part of Somalia, however, the attempt was also successful, so that the Italian colonial government installed a permanent committee in the southern part in 1955. The *Kullanka Afka Soomaaliaga* (Conference on the Somali Language).

However, the Somali nationalists saw it as a sign of their own strength and identity to establish a national writing system. To promote independence, a separate script for the unique Somali language should be introduced. This was the opinion of Osman Yusuf Kenadid, a Somali nationalist and member of the Somali Youth League. He developed the Osmaniya script (Som.: Far Soomaali) between 1920 and 1922. As Martino Moreno (cf. Moreno, 1955, p. 290) describes, this written form is a very precise rendering of the Somali language due to the phonetic details and precise distinctions, for example in vowel length. Even at the end of the 1970s, Horseed magazine was still published in Osmaniya script (cf. Warsame, 2001, p. 345).

Somali was introduced as the only official language of Somalia on October 21, 1972 and is now also the language of education in schools until the last two years of schooling. It was also due to political reasons why the Somali government at the time decided not to keep a former colonial language as an official language, but to encourage the role and development of Somali. As Andrzejewski (cf. Andrzejewski, 1983, p. 69) describes Somali intellectuals, there is the term "*Gumeysi maskaxeed*", which means "colonization of the brain") and by which one understands the excessive veneration of foreign languages and cultures which often results in the opinion that the African languages do not seem appropriate in today's modern world.

According to Andrzejewski (cf. Andrzejewski, 1983, p. 70), there were two weighty advantages to using the literary campaign in 1972. Firstly, a large majority of Somali citizens



should speak a single language and, secondly, that a common linguistic variety of Somali should serve as a means of communication for all Somalis.

In the years before 1972, linguists developed a common orthography, a script that Somali should use from now on. Two of these linguists were Muuse Xaaji Ismaaciil Galaal and Shire Jaamac Axmed, who both studied the Somali language abroad. While Galaal dealt with phonology in London, Axmed dealt with philological studies in the United States. The Latin alphabet was seen as the most suitable; as it reproduces the phonemes best and, for example, better reproduces the vowels which are expressed in Somali compared to Arabic. When we look at the Somali font, the first thing we notice is that, unlike most European languages, “c” and “x” are expressed differently (like ɕ and ɸ, respectively) and the length of vowels is expressed by doubling these vowels becomes.

Linguists who have studied the Somali language leaned heavily on the IPA (the International Phonetic Alphabet) after Andrzejewski (cf. Andrzejewski, 1972, p. 39). Linguists used this IPA to help them when they wanted to record descriptions of the individual phonemes for a language whose writing they could not read. Each individual sound should be expressed by a letter and at the same time express special accents or tones. Andrzejewski also grants the IPA a particularly appropriate role in that, on the other hand, to previous attempts by European linguists to describe African languages, no longer from an ethnocentric point of view, through which many researchers use the new language with expressions from their own language tried to describe, but there was now a uniform phonetic alphabet for all languages.

While the Somali language appeared in oral communication, the former colonial languages were used for the written area. Until the end of the Second World War, Arabic was much more widely used in the written field (but more by missionaries to document individual records), after which the Arabic script competed with Italian and English.

The Latin script was used mainly by a small layer, but very actively, mainly to record the oral Somali literature. A big advantage of the Latin script was that typewriters in Somalia did not need to be changed, but simply the same letters could be used.

When Somalia and Somaliland united in 1960 and the colonial countries gained independence, there were now language difficulties in the country.

First there was a discussion about which language or script should be used. There were those who advocated Somali in Latin, those who supported Somali in Arabic, and those who welcomed the Cismaaniya script. In addition, those who demanded Somali as their national language and those who aspired to the Arabic language longed for it. As a result, there was a split in supporters, as Arabic was supported because of religious motives and therefore viewed the Latin script as inappropriate. Until 1960, when Somalia gained independence, a common script had not yet been agreed, which is why Arabic, Italian and English were retained as the official languages (cf. Warsame, 2001, p. 345).

So there were different languages in the country that were used for administration and education, and so there were communication difficulties in writing with fellow citizens of the same nation. That is why the then government of Somalia introduced steps to minimize these difficulties. A linguistic commission was initiated and a cultural department in the Ministry of Education was set up with the aim of creating a uniform script. However, these steps have been made more difficult because the choice of a typeface created controversy as to why one typeface should be preferred over the other.

Choosing a suitable font

The different scripts were accompanied by different experiences, opinions and motives, why exactly one script is more suitable for the Somali language than the other. The main discussion was between supporters of (1) the Osmaniya script, (2) supporters of the Latin script, and (3) supporters of the Arabic script for Somali. The latter were mainly for religious reasons of the conviction that the Arabic script is the most suitable, since they saw an influence on religion through the script as undesirable. The Latin script was regarded or despised as *Laa diin* (som. For: religionless / godless).

In addition, there was the discussion whether Somali should be established as the national language, whereby it was not primarily about the writing, but these supporters simply wanted Somali as the national language, regardless of the then selected written form. In addition, the supporters of Arabic as the national language and a few who have even spoken out in favor of Italian as the national language, which were then rejected. According to Warsame (cf. Warsame, 2001, p. 345), English was not up for discussion and should be introduced as the national language.

For Somali nationalists it was of immense importance that the then becoming independent state should establish its own language with a unique script.

During the process of independence, when Somalia and Somaliland merged into the Somali Republic in 1960, there was a status that Warsame (cf. Warsame 2001: 346) calls "linguistic chaos". In order to be able to work in the public service, it was sufficient to speak one of the three languages English, Italian and Arabic.

In 1960, a commission was set up by the Somali government to find out, based on several criteria, which script should be introduced to serve as the standard for the now young independent republic. The aim was to make a decision by March 1961. So now, there was a choice between nine fonts, which were subjected to seventeen different criteria. Since it would go beyond the scope to describe and assess every criterion, only the most important are mentioned here. Among other things, it was analyzed how well the sounds of the Somali language could be reproduced by the phonemes of the writing. That means, briefly summarized here, for example, a phoneme stands for a sound or a combination of different phonemes has to be written in order to reproduce a sound. Or it was analyzed, among other



things, whether phonemes can be easily distinguished from one another, or whether phonemes can describe several sounds. As Warsame describes, after an analysis of the seventeen criteria it was found that the Latin script was best suited for the written reproduction of the Somali language.

The then government of Somalia did not want to implement this result, however, because the population was divided on the choice of a fixed font and so the government did not want to trigger any domestic political conflict with regard to the choice of font. That is why in 1966 there was another commission by the government under Aden Abdulle Osman and his Prime Minister Abdirisak Hagi Hussein. This time, linguists were invited by UNESCO to work on a solution. Among other things, the Polish linguist B.W. Andrzejewski, who dealt with the Somali language, participated in Mogadishu 1966, at the commission for searching a national script. This commission encountered a crowd of demonstrators who favored the Arabic script. However, this commission, did not really contribute to the decision-making process as different sections of society favored different scripts, and especially those citizens who do not support the Latin script wanted to delay the matter. Shortly thereafter, in 1967, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke became President of Somalia after old President Aden Abdullah Osman Daar was overthrown. The following quote has come down to us from Abdirashid Ali Shermarke:

“As long as I am in the power, I shall never permit the adoption of Latin characters for Somali” (cf. Laitin, 1977, p. 111).

Also noteworthy is the quote on Radio Mogadishu, which pays tribute to the written Somali, as the state of a written Somali was sometimes inaccessible and therefore not known to the Somali population. The quote reads as follows: “In the world, our language was taking no part; but the sunrise appeared uncovering our language from darkness; the fence was cleared, so the livestock could graze. Give me your pen, the words I wrote from you. It is not a foreign language; the tongue does not slip. Like milk, it can be swallowed smoothly.” (cf. Warsame, 2001, p. 347). The media, too, should now have an influence that should lead to the Latin script being accepted and used in society.

Steps towards a uniform writing system

The following chapter is intended to give an overview of the chronological order in which the font selection process was carried out. When the Siad Barre regime came to power in 1969, this process accelerated in the following years.

Until October 1969, there was hardly any progress in this regard, and due to the internal political tensions surrounding the overthrow of Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, there was hardly any progress in the process of choosing a font. In 1969 Somalia came to power (coup d'état) by the Supreme Revolutionary Council, led by Siad Barre. One of the main goals of the new government was to develop a uniform script. Through this body of power, a larger linguistic

commission was set up, the aim of which, unlike the previous commissions, was not to decide on a uniform script for the Somali language. Instead, this commission has now been given the task of developing numerous textbooks for primary schools, as well as a uniform Somali grammar and a dictionary that should contain 10,000 terms. This dictionary should include especially terms relating to the areas of language, mathematics, science, geography and history and, where necessary, new terminology should be developed. However, Warsame also mentions that citizens who tried to take action against the plans of the new government were treated brutally (cf. Warsame, 2001, p. 347). That means that the government had pushed so hard to use a uniform writing format that it had muted controversial opinions. As a result, the era of free expression and discussion of political decisions in public space was over.

On October 21, 1972, the then President of the Supreme Revolutionary Council announced the decision to introduce the Latin writing system as the official writing system in Somalia. Leaflets in Latin script were circulated over the crowd listening to the national script designation speech, and announcements of the decision were made across the country with the main aim of silencing oppositional voices. Every employee in the government was required to pass a literacy test. Failure of the test resulted in discharge for that person.

According to Warsame (cf. Warsame, 2001, p. 348), literacy is an important factor for the development of a country. However, since not all citizens of Somalia had access to education, literacy among the masses took place in the 1970s.

A linguistic congress was held to define the goals and tasks of language policy. Tasks included the introduction of a modern Somali grammar work, the introduction of a modern Somali dictionary and the strengthening of Somali as an educational language. In a very short time, more than 260,000 books for schools and more than 1.2 million books for the general public have been written and published.

In addition, the radio and the press played a special role, such as the "*Xiddigta Oktoobar*" (October star), which published exclusively in Somali within a few months. Talks were held on the radio about what is now the national language in order to support the language skills of the population.

In 1973 Somali was first introduced as the only language of education in the lower elementary school classes, then also in higher school classes. The National Printing Agency, which was commissioned to publish numerous school books in the Somali language, played an important role here. In addition, literarisation campaigns were carried out, initially in cities, which citizens should help with language acquisition. These language lessons were mainly undertaken by volunteers and if the students succeeded in learning (recorded by language tests), the teachers were awarded a state certificate.



In the same year (1973), two important steps were taken, which should further strengthen the position of Somali, and thus a primacy of the Somali language should be secured. The Ministry of Education was divided into two sub-groups, namely the Ministry of Higher Education and Culture and the Ministry of Education and Youth Education. The former introduced a culture academy which took on the tasks of the cultural sector, mainly through researching and collecting oral literature and the cultural heritage of Somalia by full-time employees. In addition, this institute made it possible to provide financial support for authors who have written in Somali.

Development through the choice of font

In the following chapter I would like to bring closer the aspects of how the choice of a fixed script was observed or received in Somalia, a country or a society that was previously characterized by its oral literary wealth. Not all sections of the population immediately agreed to write the language, pressure was often triggered on these citizens, or propaganda was sometimes used so that the position of writing would gain popularity.

Somalia is one of the few African nations with a homogeneous linguistic population, as almost 95% of the citizens of Somali speak Somali as their mother tongue. Arabic and Swahili, among others, are also spoken. Somali has a rich oral literary tradition, but for a long time there was little or no written material due to the lack of a uniform writing system. Ali Warsame describes in his text that Somalia is a great role model for other African countries to reflect on its own culture and values. Language has a great influence on identity and some countries succeeded in becoming aware of this in the years after they gained independence. Somalia serves as a classic example of this.

Warsame also describes that the introduction of the Somali language represents a major step in the development of Somalia's literary history, among other things. Above all, this would secure Somalia's independence and detachment from its colonial past and the Somali people are aware of their own culture and identity. There would be a great increase in publishing in Somali as many intellectuals are encouraged to publish in Somali.

The official writing system should be explained to the population, among other things through the transcription system of Shire Jaamac Axmed in his literary magazine "*Iftiinka-Aqoonta*" (Light of Education).

Nevertheless, from a linguistic point of view, there are areas in the language that cannot be expressed using the Latin script, but are part of the Somali language. Among other things (cf. Andrzejewski 1977) there is no possibility of expressing accents that are expressed through tone or lexical stress. There is no accentuation, among other things, to express certain vowels differently. For example, *duul* means "to fly" and "to attack", or *dhis* means "to build" and "he has built". In his text from 1977, Andrzejewski describes that this is not

necessary to express in the written language, but that the context brings the intended meaning with it.

In the process of developing a uniform orthography, writers and poets have also contributed, who held by Andrzejewski (cf. *ibid.*), the role of searching aesthetical criterias in the Somali Language.

In the following years after 1973, Andrzejewski also noticed a social development. The gap between the small elite who enjoyed education abroad and those who in Somalia and there sometimes had little or no access to education, the social gap has narrowed. This means that people with less education can now fully participate in public life within a few months or weeks (cf. Andrzejewski, 1977), since Somali is the only official language in Somalia. Accordingly, the knowledge of foreign languages has lost a lot of its importance.

The literacy campaigns in Somalia in the 1970s

This is followed by an observation of the literacy campaigns of the 1970s, especially in the years between 1973 and 1975, which is an extraordinary campaign, not only in Africa but also worldwide. In a few years, a large part of the population learned to read and write through the help or lessons of fellow citizens.

According to the government of that time under Siad Barre, a change should also take place in the education system. First of all, the language of education should be Somali, which was a great benefit for the students who spoke Somali at home instead of studying in a foreign language (especially English). In addition, the private schools that were run by people from abroad were to be closed, which is why 42 schools in which 15,000 students were studying (cf. Warsame 2001: 348) were closed. For the first time in the history of Somalia, a standardized education system came into being (cf. Warsame, 2001, p. 349).

The goals of the government under Siad Barre can be expressed through four principles. In addition to (1) disseminating educational opportunities, the aim was also (2) democratization, (3) vocational training and (4) Somalization (cf. *ibid.*). From 1975, compulsory schooling was introduced for children between the ages of six and fourteen, which falls under the first point. The second point (democratization) means that education has now become free of charge and this for all parts or regions of Somalia. The third point, vocational training, means that a new curriculum was introduced, i.e. a new curriculum that provided that through education the students could acquire technical as well as practical skills. This was seen as an advantage for the individual and the service of society (cf. *ibid.*). Accordingly, the education of children was also of little value if it did not benefit society in some way (cf. Somali Ministry of Education, 1977, p. 4). Ali Warsame describes that the principle of Somalization was pursued most ambitiously and was also most successful after it (Warsame, 2001, p. 350). For example, Somali was introduced as the language of instruction in primary schools in 1972 and as the language of instruction in the middle school between



1973 and 1975 and as the language of instruction in the upper school in 1977. Another focus of the new curriculum was also on the theming of Somali history and culture. The Somali culture, for example, in the way of life of the different population groups, such as the nomads, here the students should be taught that this is also a part of the Somali tradition, or also poetics, the Somali oral literature, which by (in the chapter on literary culture of Somalia more on this), certain characteristics stand out. So we can already see here that the government in the post-independence era is moving away from the colonial thought patterns that the colonial countries have "brought with them" (such as the inferior position of African culture and social systems) and towards an attitude towards African identity and thus the emphasis on various typical aspects of Somali identity.

As Ingemar Sallnas describes (cf. Sallnas, 1975, p. 326), the Ministry of Education now faced difficulties in developing a curriculum and corresponding teaching material. Sallnas describes that the difficulty here was not due to the actual production of the textbooks, but rather to the time pressure under which the Ministry of Education found itself due to the plans and demands of the government. There was a production of almost 263,000 books for schools and around 1.2 million books for the public sector, as well as adult education (figures from Warsame 2001: 350). In addition, books were published in Arabic and English, which, however, dealt with Somali culture and now, instead of former books in foreign languages, did not deal with foreign culture but (as already mentioned) Somali culture.

In the following I name some figures and data that show the development of the education sector in Somalia in these years:

While in 1969 there were a little more than 200 primary schools, as well as almost 38,000 students and 1,100 teachers, in 1976 there were almost 1,000 primary schools with around 230,000 students and around 6,500 teachers. (Figures from Ministry of Education 1987: 18).

According to Warsame (cf. Warsame 2001: 348), literacy is a decisive key for the development of a country. However, since not all citizens of Somalia had access to education, literacy among the masses took place in the 1970s. While the literacy campaign took place between 1973 and 1974, the literacy campaign for the rural population took place between 1974 and 1975.

In the urban population, literacy took place among around 500,000 citizens (cf. Warsame, 2001, p. 351), although Warsame notes here that a number of no fewer than 600,000 citizens learned to read and write through media such as radio, for example. So more than a million people among the urban population took part in the literary campaign and learned the alphabet. However, there was no other option than literalization if citizens wanted to acquire or keep a profession. After three months there were exams that civil servants had to pass, if they had not yet been successfully passed after three attempts, the person was dismissed from his / her office.

The literacy campaign of the rural population was exposed to a different situation. Since the rural population mainly followed a nomadic way of life and the population was larger than in the cities, the scope and effort of this campaign was greater than in the urban regions of Somalia.

Since this campaign now required a strategic effort, there was a three-week conference in Mogadishu, mainly by representatives of the respective districts to develop the organization and planning of the campaign. The commission decided to close schools across the country for a year so that there would be enough teachers to teach the rural population.

A total of five different bodies participated in the process. In addition to the (1) Central Committee for Rural Development Campaign, which had set the goals for the campaign, these were the (2) Central Office for the Rural Development Campaign, which had collected information and documentation from the rural population, the (3) Regional Committee for Development Campaign that contributed to the process by exercising the regional role of educational planning in the respective region, and the (4) District Committee for the Rural Development Campaign, which took over the educational planning in the districts. The last body the (5) District Inspection Office, which consisted of the education ministers of the individual districts and individual school directors.

In addition to literacy of the population, one of the goals of the government at the time was to locate diseases and, if possible, to combat them by vaccinating the population (cf. Warsame, 2001, p. 354).

According to Ali Warsame (and as we can see from some of the following data) the literacy campaign has been very successful. Volunteer teachers, who took on the task of teaching the rural population to read and write, made a significant contribution. It was often necessary for these teachers to adapt to the living conditions and habits of the nomadic population, so they often had to live like nomads (cf. Osman, 1978, p. 34).

Because the schools in Somalia were closed for one year, over 1000 teachers were able to deal with the task of literarization, as well as over 15,000 students who stood by their teachers. In the rural population, over 1.2 million people took part in the education program, of which over 900,000 passed a final test and 795,000 passed this test (cf. Warsame, 2001, p. 356).

In 1975 the literary campaign had to be canceled due to a drought that had spread across the country.

In 1974 and 1975, a literary campaign aimed at the general public, this time also in rural areas, achieved excellent results (cf. Andrzejewski, 1972, p. 74). This made about 15,000 teachers available who were confronted with the national obligation to literate their fellow citizens. In addition, there were financial supporters through which (cf. Warsame, 2001, p. 356) this campaign was a great success and a jump from 5% who could speak and read the



language to at least 80% succeeded. For this merit, Somalia was awarded the UNESCO Literature Prize in 1975.

The Somali script, and thus Somali, was also able to gain great popularity primarily through the radio. There were two literary programs that the population should hear. In addition, the national theater in Somalia put the focus on local culture on local artists and mainly local films were shown, such as *Heesaha Hirgalay* or *Keddis*.

In addition, in 1976, a Somali Language and Literature Department was introduced at the National University of Somalia so that students can choose Somali as a subject for a bachelor's degree.

Another ministry, the Ministry of Information and thus the Somalia National News Agency, had to change its offers. Thus the operation of the up to then regular magazines *Najmat October* (in Arabic) and *Stella d'Ottobre* (in Italian, ceased on January 21, 1973) and now joined the *Xiddigta Oktoobar*, a daily newspaper in Somali this role.

Vocabulary modernization of the Somali language

Because the Somali language was written down and became more and more popular, the role of Somali increased, including as a language of education. In order to modernize or expand the Somali vocabulary, poets and linguists worked closely together through commissions. In the following I would like to describe some of the means used.

Somalia has long been inhabited by nomads who roamed the country and dedicated themselves to agriculture. There was little contact with the outside world, mainly with countries on the Arabian Peninsula. Through this contact, there was not only a cultural exchange, but also a language contact or a linguistic exchange. Not long after trade contacts between Somalia and Arab countries intensified, Arabic words that were now used in the Somali language began to be borrowed. At first, words were predominantly borrowed from the religious field, from Muslim culture, and then more and more descriptions for innovations, such as, for example, for "gunpowder" or "airplane" (som. "*baaruud*", arab. "*albarud* ", or som. "*diyaarad* ", arab. "*tayira*"). Loan words from European languages, however, were a rarity for a long time (cf. Andrzejewski, 1977).

In the years of the Second World War, the radio gained much in importance, so there were also a number of initially technical terms, which the broad monolingual mass, however, could not understand. Because of this, some terms were designed during these years to modernize the Somali language. Instead of borrowing words from other foreign languages (for example from English or Italian), attempts were made to use paraphrases from Somali to create new words to describe these technical innovations. Andrzejewski describes (cf. Andrzejewski, 1983, p. 75) that this has to do with the patriotic ulterior motive on the one hand, and with the cooperation between the broadcasters and the writers on the other. In

Somalia, poets usually enjoy a high reputation and can therefore have a say in what is linguistically aesthetic, which is why these well-known poets were also placed at the side of the translators in order to create uniform translations.

Linguistic "games" which these poets used included creating new words from existing stems or adding affixes to words.

According to Andrzejewski, there were three different forms that language developers used to create new terms. There were (1) the method of composition, the method of semantic shift (2) (to be translated into German as semantic change) and the method of (3) borrowing foreign words. In addition, new terms were often created from a combination of the methods just mentioned.

Examples of new words:

(1) Composition

Kacaan for „Revolution”, is a combination of *kicid* („to rise”) and the affix of nouns -*aan*

Curiye for „element”, a combination of the word *curin* for „begin” and the affix of the noun „-e”

(2) Semantic Shift

eber, which meant „to be empty”, now also for the number „0”

suummad for „chemical symbol”, which meant „mark”

(3) Loanwords:

Jamhuuriyad for „Republic” from the Arabic word *jumhuriyyah*

ordinayt for „ordinate (mathem. Term) from English word *ordinate*

In addition, mixtures of the above options were used

(4) Composition and semantic shift

Agaasime for director from the word *agaasimid*, which previously meant „to take care of sb/sth”, and the nominalization suffix -*e*

Codayn for phonetics, from *cod*, with the original meaning „voice” and the suffix: -*ayn* for use

(Examples all from Andrzejewski, 1983, pp. 78-81)



The role of poetics in language modernization

As mentioned earlier, poets worked with linguists to modernize the language. The oral literary tradition of Somalia, which can be divided into different genres, also played an important part in this. In the following I would like to give details about the methods used by poets to modernize Somali vocabulary.

As Warsame describes (cf. Warsame, 2001, p. 343), the language of oral writers is part of Somali culture, as this form of communication has a long history within Somali society. Particularly noticeable in this form is the expression through proverbs or pictorial descriptions, which have gained meaning during speeches at numerous events.

The oral literary tradition in Somalia encompasses pretty much all areas of social life. Alliteration in literature follows clear rules, so that a certain tone should appear in every line throughout the poem. A poem by Xuseen Aw Faarax should explain more here (cf. Andrzejewski, 2011, p. 81), with the letter "d" appearing in every line:

1. *Waa duni gabowdoo*
2. *Illeen wa dumaale*
3. *Ninna malab darsanayoo*
4. *Ninna dacar ka leefa*
5. *Kay dooranaysow*
6. *Ha ka moodin daacade*
7. *Kay dooni siisow*
8. *Way kaa dalooline*
9. *Kay meel degsiisow*
10. *Daadkay ku raaciine*

This literary game can be very long and thus fill many lines; in some cases it is regulated by an additional meter (cf. *ibid.*). As a result, some Somali poets use the creation of new words and then make them understandable in a different way through the context expressed in the poem. To make these poems as entertaining as possible, some poets use wordplay or word derivations. These word games and word derivations also played an important role in the modernization of the Somali vocabulary and led to the fact that some terms found a place in the dictionary (cf. Andrzejewski, 2011, p. 82).

The process of vocabulary modernization began with radio, mainly radio in the early 1940s. Somali translators quickly agreed that the innovations that arose around the 1940s, many of which were introduced by the colonial countries, should get terms from Somali. Instead of borrowing numerous words, the vocabulary developers decided to use paraphrases from their own Somali language and work closely with poets. (see *ibid.*).

The workers of the Somali radio soon saw the potential of the respective programs, namely the demand not only for information but also for entertainment. The genres used included, for example, *gabay*, *geeraar*, *jiifto* or *guurow*. While these radio programs initially

reported or entertained private affairs such as love life, social and political issues were soon discussed, often with the help of the literary form of allegory (from ancient Greek “*allegoría*”, in German as much as “on others Wise ”expressed) - sometimes also known as semantic shift - here one thing is used as a sign of another thing because of, for example, family relationships.

Poets have also played an important role on the radio, as they were highly regarded and played with the language, which, in the form of oral literary tradition, was part of Somali culture.

Some examples of the resulting new meanings or new words were:

Dayax gacmeed for „artificial satellite”, which originally meant „handmade moon”

Hubka halista *ah*, now as „nuclear weapons”, before it had the meaning of „weapons of extreme danger”

The role of literature in Somalia

So we see that terms have now been used in a different context and the speakers have also recognized the meaning of the word in the new context.

Since radio programs (Andrzejewski, 2011, p. 83) were very popular, even in the most remote regions of Somalia, the population could become familiar with these terms through the constant use of newly introduced or at least newly used words.

According to Amin Warsan (cf. Warsan, 2016, p. 8), orality means verbally expressing a train of thought, although scientists only began to look at it in this way in the second half of the 20th century. Before Warsan, orality and literature were always seen as two separate areas. According to Warsan, the analysis of orality and literature differs significantly. Oral literature is about analyzing the speech, the expression of the speaker is the focus, and gestures and facial expressions are also analyzed. In the case of written literature, the focus is on other areas, such as sentence structure (see *ibid.*, p. 9), here the author quotes Walter J. Ong and his work from 1982 “Orality and literacy: The technologising of the word (London: Methuen)”. The narrators use mnemonics, with the help of which they (the narrators) can better speak by heart.

This chapter describes the state of oral Somali literature, which is characterized by a long history or tradition and is of great importance for the Somali population. While oral Somali literature went unnoticed for a long time or was undervalued by the colonial powers or missionaries, it now plays a much more central role, especially since one now better understands the methods and approaches of literary workers and gives more recognition to their artistic components. As Andrzejewski describes, there was „a thriving oral literature, which was truly oral in the sense that its composition, memorization, transmission and



dissemination all took place without recourse at any stage to writing or any other technology of communication and memory storage" (vgl. Andrzejewski, 2011, p. 9).

Nowadays one can also find numerous translations of Somali poems in different languages (cf. *ibid.*). Somali literature has special characteristics, especially with regard to its composition, memorization and the transmission of oral literature (cf. *ibid.*).

If we take a closer look at the written literature before the 1950s, we find a few religious poems in Somali that were recorded in Arabic script (cf. *ibid.*). Some of them were translated into Italian by Enrico Cerulli (cf. Cerulli, 1964, pp. 118-138).

Most of the oral literary works dealt with recurring themes. In addition to poetic texts about work or religious content, these included songs, as well as fairy tales and anecdotes for adults (cf. Andrzejewski, 2011, pp. 9), as well as animal fables for children.

In addition, Andrzejewski describes another literary style that was particularly formative for Somali literature, which is referred to as Andrzejewski's classical verse (cf. *ibid.*). This style was very complex, strongly emphasized by emotions and served as a public communication forum as well as a further narration of Somali history.

Even in pre-colonial Somalia, the poets of oral literature held a representative function, among other things, of clans or population groups (cf. *ibid.*), who sometimes expressed their political views in the form of poems. In some cases, these poems even dealt with very private matters of certain people who also dealt with the marriage covenant (cf. *ibid.*, p. 10). In some clans this was a matter for the whole group, as a functioning marriage was a success for the sense of community of the whole clan (cf. *ibid.*). However, as in the clans, poetics also had another function worthy of a political name, since in some cases poetics was used to make peace or even war could be triggered by this literary form.

Andrzejewski (*ibid.*) Describes another notable point by speaking of the fact that these poetic texts were under unwritten protection of copyright, since the reproduction of an orally transmitted poem was subject to strict rules, as he describes:

Anyone who memorized someone else's poem and wanted to recite it afterwards was under a strict obligation to remember the text accurately to the best of his ability and to reproduce it faithfully at each recital, for he was considered to be a channel of communication and in no way a co-author with the original poet" (vgl. Andrzejewski, 2011, p. 10).

As described by Andrzejewski, these oral texts had to be retold as well as possible, since poetics was a means of communication. In addition, different statements, different opinions or interests were expressed.

However, if it happened that text passages were improvised, changed or even left out, then that person was accused of dishonesty and these errors were excused solely because of the inability to remember (cf. Andrzejewski, 2011, p. 10). In addition, the narrators had to

name the poet for each narration, otherwise this was condemned as a moral error (cf. *ibid.*). So much for the framework of oral poetics, what role they played in society and in which contexts oral literature was used.

In Somali poetics we typically find the form of alliteration, whereby here in each line at least one or two words should contain the same consonant or the same vowel (cf. *ibid.*).

At the beginning of the 20th century there was the Somali Dervish Movement, which rebelled against the colonial powers and strongly supported the use of Somali poetics (*ibid.*), Which led to a strong increase in historical narrative prose. The leader of this Somali Dervish Movement, Mohamed Abdille Hassan, who was himself a poet, used his oral literature as a means of propaganda to get his compatriots to rebel against the power of the colonial countries (*ibid.*). As Andrzejewski also describes, Hassan sometimes dealt with his strategic thinking in his poems in order to announce his plans to his fellow citizens (*ibid.*) And in his poems denounced not only the foreign powers, but also the Somali fellow citizens who had not sided with the colonial powers (*ibid.*). Andrzejewski describes a poetic war that took place between the supporters of Mohamed Abdille Hassan and the neutral Somali citizens (cf. Andrzejewski 2011: 10). The literary level did not suffer as a result, instead the poets remained aware of their role and thus these poems continued to follow the aesthetic and literary guidelines (*ibid.*). As the following quote is supposed to describe: „the formal skills of poetry continued to be highly cultivated and so were the devices of poetic diction such as the use of figurative language and the insertion of descriptive passages in poems with otherwise quite practical message” (*ibid.*, pp. 10-11).

In the 1950s there were more and more researchers who had noted Somali oral literature in many different written forms (*ibid.*, p. 12). Through independence and the definition of a script, the government oriented itself more intensively to its own Somali identity and also pushed it, which is why, for example, the task was now placed to collect oral oral texts, first by the Ministry of Education, then later by the newly created Academy of the Arts and sciences (cf. Andrzejewski, 2011, p. 12). Because a lot of the texts of Somali poetics have now been written down, they could be offered to a wider audience and often summarized in anthologies or in articles (*ibid.*). Meanwhile there are also many students who are writing a dissertation on the Somali language and literature, mainly at the National University of Somalia, in Mogadishu, mainly at the Institute for Somali Language and Literature.

So, as we have seen in this chapter, Somali oral literature has spanned a wide variety of fields, and even in the context of politics and propaganda, or persuasion, the poets followed certain guidelines that are relevant to Somali poetics.



Conclusion

This work endeavored to give an overview of the history of the Somali language, especially with regard to the developments in Somalia after the end of the Second World War. In doing so, it investigated the question of how the language was developed, especially after the choice for a script. Tests were based on the assumption that language encompasses very many different areas and also expresses different ideologies, such as religious motives when choosing a suitable writing system. For a long time, Somali society did not need to be written down, since Somali oral literature was used, among other things, to tell stories or to criticize; it was not standardized in writing until after independence. It was only with independence and the orientation towards one's own identity, which was suppressed by the colonial government that the first steps were taken towards the development of a standardized written form for the Somali language.

From a language that was not written down until 1972 to a language that has an immensely greater position in Somalia than the foreign languages Arabic, Italian and English, which were still the most important languages for administration and education in the colonial era, the Somali language has gone through a tough process. The literacy campaigns between 1973 and 1975 among the urban and rural populations made a major contribution to this process of the new position of the Somali language. On the other hand, through modernization processes, which were established by several linguistic commissions in the (partly dependent, partly independent) cooperation between poets and linguists, many new terms were established in the language. An unprecedented production of school books and literary texts for adults also contributed to the fact that writing no longer represented alienation for the population, but was seen as a progress in language.

Somalia is an extraordinary example of the countries in Africa in which, after independence, people have reflected on their own African identity, as foreign languages have lost much of their importance and through their own African language Somali, all strata of the population can communicate with each other and pupils offer prospects for later professional life.

Conflict of interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

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Different times, same methods

The impact of the National Security Service on the operations of the National Intelligence and Security Agency

Gábor Sinkó¹

Abstract:

This article examines the impact of the National Security Service (NSS) on the operations on the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). It begins with the short history of Somalia between 1960 and 1991 and then the article analyzes the activities of the NSS, the main intelligence apparatus of the Siad Barre regime, and the NISA, the primary intelligence service of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). It contends that instead of reestablishing the NISA as an organization serving the interests of the general public, it continues to operate as an instrument of political power. The study argues that although times may differ, methods remain the same when scrutinizing the operations of these Somali intelligence apparatuses. There are many common features characterizing the agencies, including the governments' use of these intelligence services for the consolidation of their personal power, getting rid of political opponents or conducting extrajudicial activities. The interconnectedness of military and political power, the dominance of patron-client relationships, the conduct of intelligence and counterintelligence operations in neighboring countries, and the prioritization of clan loyalty are additional similarities. The reconfiguration and reorganization of the security sector is needed for peace to be restored in the country.

Keywords:

NSS; NISA;
intelligence; security;
extrajudicial activities;
personalization of power;
politicization of power.

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Introduction

Clanism and nepotism have played a central role in African postcolonial conflicts, since they have completely pervaded power struggles for government positions, state institutions and public funds in the continent. During the postcolonial period, the exploitation of authority and power was common practice among the military governments of Africa to discriminate in the treatment of their citizens by the use of predatory politics and personalization of power (Ingiriis, 2016a). Writing about the Horn of Africa at the end of the Cold War, Roy Pateman emphasized that with the intention of preserving national security, intelligence services seemed to be focused on gathering confidential data and information (Pateman, 1995). This argument may be correct, however, it does not explore the potential connection between the politicization of power and the operation of intelligence agencies.

While there have been a large number of studies dealing with the security sector in Somalia (Robinson, 2016; 2019a; 2019b; Hills, 2013; 2014a; 2014b), the intelligence apparatuses in the country have not been in the limelight of academic research (Ingiriis, 2020a; 2020b). This article begins with the short history of Somalia between 1960 and 1991 as an introduction to understand how fragile the country has been politically, economically, and socially since it gained independence. Then it analyzes the operations and activities of the National Security Service (NSS), the main intelligence apparatus of the Siad Barre regime from 1970 to 1990, and the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), the primary intelligence service of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). The study seeks to examine the impact of the former on the latter and identify similarities between the two intelligence agencies to determine if the flaws of the NSS continue to persist in the NISA or Somalia was able to learn from past mistakes and set up a more efficient intelligence apparatus.

The article adopts the qualitative research approach and is based on the application of various research methods, including studying reports, field interviews conducted in Mogadishu, document content analyses of open source, peer-reviewed academic works and journals. On top of them, despite them being fragmentary or politicized, media articles have been analyzed with the intent of painting a clearer image. The article is intended to enrich the growing literature on fragile and failed states in conflict-ridden societies as a whole, and intelligence and security studies in the Somali context in particular. Apart from the political field, the security sector is also of paramount importance, thus critically analyzing the operation and activities of the NSS and the NISA can help us better understand Somali conflict dynamics.

The short history of Somalia (1960-1991)

Following the independence of British and Italian Somaliland, the two territories were unified to form the Republic of Somalia on July 1, 1960 and Aden Abdulle Osman Daar became the first formally and democratically elected president of the Somali Republic. He served until



1967, during which time his main objectives were to rid the country of the remnants of colonialism and strengthen the unity of the Somalis. Nevertheless, his former Prime Minister, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke defeated him in the presidential election of 1967, becoming the second president of Somalia (Los Angeles Times, 2007).

The reason behind the transfer of power must have been Osman's stance to prioritize the economic and social issues prevailing in the country, instead of working towards realizing the concept of 'Greater Somalia', which was centered on the unification of all ethnic Somalis (although at the expense of creating tensions with Somalia's neighbors) (Kiss-Besenyő-Resperger, 2014, pp. 39-42). Maintaining Ethiopian and Kenyan sovereignty over Somali territories seemed to be politically irreconcilable with the Daar's focus on internal development. At the same time, both the United States and the Soviet Union strived to bring the country under its influence that led to conflict within the government.²

The political career of Shermarke was cut short as he was assassinated by one of his bodyguards while visiting the city of Las Anod on October 15, 1969. Sheikh Mukhtar Mohamed Hussein became the interim president for a couple of days, after which Chief of the Somali National Army (SNA) and Major General, Mohamed Siad Barre staged a military coup against the civilian government on October 21, 1969 (Payton, 1980). He explained its necessity by stating that "intervention by the Armed Forces was inevitable. It was no longer possible to ignore the evil things like corruption, bribery, nepotism, theft or public funds, injustice and disrespect to our religion and the laws of the country" (Barre, 1970).

While Somalia may have appeared as a stable and emerging democracy for an outsider (besides peaceful transfers of power, the country had a free press with regular publications of anti-government material), the civil government was actually involved in various illegal activities, such as corruption, vote-buying and the (s)election of members belonging to their own clans for political positions. As David D. Laitin argues "what had started out as a putative nation was being torn apart at the seams through clan 'tribalism'" (Laitin, 1976, p. 452).

Siad Barre began the modernization and restructuring of the country from the previously democratic and sovereign state, the Somali Republic to the Soviet-style authoritarian military regime, the Somali Democratic Republic (Ingiriis, 2016a).³ He built a top-down 'developmental dictatorship', which is conventionally defined as a system "that restricts the people's participation in politics based on the reason that political security is a prerequisite to economic growth" (Byeong-cheon, 2006, p. 5) He wanted healthcare and education to be available to wider social strata and he also invested in Somali community projects. In addition, he took up the fight against illiteracy and helped in the resettlement of drought victims. However, Siad Barre relied heavily on the military institution to consolidate his personal power, too.

² For more information, see Robinson, C. D. (2019) 'Glimpse into an army at its peak: notes on the Somali National Army in the 1960-80s', *Defense & Security Analysis*, Vol. 35, No. 4 and Lewis, I. M. (1988) 'A modern history of Somalia: Nation and state in the Horn of Africa', Westview Press, London

³ Castagno, A. A. (1970; 1969), 'Somalia Goes Military', *Africa Report*, pp. 25-27 and 'President's Assassination Followed by Coup', *Africa Research Bulletin*, Vol. 6, No. 10, pp. 1548-1551

With support received from the USSR, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Somalia was able to set up and modernize one of the best-equipped, largest, and well-trained armies in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ingiriis, 2016a).⁴ In the Siad Barre regime, Somalia started to wage an increasing number of wars with some of its neighbors, including Ethiopia and Kenya. Before the 1977-78 Ogaden War, Siad Barre got substantial amounts of military assistance from the Soviet Union and economic support from the Arab states, China and the European Community. After breaking up with the USSR, it was the United States and the World Bank that provided all necessary aid to the country (Adam, 1992).

Under the leadership of Siad Barre, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) became the governing body of the country. It suspended the postcolonial constitution, disbanded the National Assembly, arrested and detained prominent members of the Somali Republic and banned political parties (Metz, 1992, pp. 36-37). While in the late 1970s Barre's popularity rocketed during the Ethiopian-Somali War (due to the fact that the Somalis were unified by the concept of 'Greater Somalia'), the 1980s were characterized by growing opposition against the government that could be explained by the increase in autocratic rule, genocidal campaigns in the North, economic downturn and the government's abuse of power. The regime of Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991 by clan-based armed opposition groups in the Somali Rebellion, which can be viewed as the beginning of the ongoing civil war in the country (Metz, 1992, pp. 186-187).

The NSS

With help from the USSR, the National Security Service (NSS) was established in Somalia in 1970, which was modeled after the Committee for State Security (KGB) and had unlimited powers. Besides playing a significant role in the suppression of clans and getting rid of Barre's political adversaries, the NSS was in charge of espionage, information-gathering, reconnaissance, intelligence and counterintelligence. It was founded and led by Ahmed Suleiman Abdalla 'Dafle', a son-in-law of Siad Barre and member of the SRC.⁵ Clan loyalty heavily impacted the selection and promotion of NSS soldiers, and the USSR also had a huge influence on the organization, since Somali intelligence agents were trained by the Soviets.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union wanted to exercise control over the NSS (subordinated to the Interior Ministry) and the SNA (subordinated to the Defense Ministry) by placing individuals loyal to the USSR in leading government positions. For instance, Abdikassim Salaad Hassan, both Interior and Finance Minister of the Barre regime, and Mohamed Ali Samatar, Somalia's defense minister, had previously studied in the Soviet Union (at Moscow State University and the Frunze Military Academy respectively) (Ingiriis, 2016b, pp. 125-126, 156). Siad Barre himself was also affiliated to the KGB, hence there is the possibility that the secret

⁴ 'Somalia: How Much Soviet Influence' (1973), *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 14, No. 14, pp. 1-3

⁵ After becoming too powerful, Dafle was forced to resign. He was succeeded by General Mohamed Jibriil Muuse (1981-1986) and then Ali Hussein Dinle (1986-1991) as the head of the NSS.



service of the USSR was involved in the organization of the coup d'état. While the NSS and the KGB collaborated with each other in terms of planning and executing joint activities, misinformation about US operations was also spread to the Somali security unit (Andrew and Mitrokhin, 2006, pp. 447-449).

Since a large number of intelligence agents worked in the NSS, the operation of the agency required significant financial support from the government, which meant that funds had to be taken away from other sectors and reallocated to the organization. This way, they were able to install their operatives and informers in any stratum of Somali society. There was constant fear and suspicion, since nobody could be certain that their friends, relatives or even partners were not members of the NSS. Among the local population, the agency became infamous for conducting extrajudicial activities, such as the imprisonment, torture and even execution of individuals who were considered to be political adversaries of Siad Barre or who were thought to pose any threat to the regime (Ingiriis, 2016b, pp. 95-97, 113).

Not only were political opponents but also Islamic leaders and sheiks raising their voice against Barre's scientific socialism silenced. NSS agents constantly supervised mosques and other religious institutions, reporting on the sheiks' activities or causing damage to these Islamic centers (Ingiriis, 2016b, pp. 107-115; Metz, 1992, pp. 126-130).⁶ The National Security Court (NSC), which was established to make the Somali population submit to the government of Siad Barre, complimented the activities of the intelligence agency, arresting and detaining individuals who were seen as enemies of the state. Under the direction of General Mohamoud Geelee, life sentences and public executions became commonplace, as there was no appeal – only in minor cases – against the verdicts of the NSC (Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio Rivoluzionario Supremo, 1971, p. 500).

Aside from the court, the NSS possessed its own interrogation centers and prisons. While the headquarters of the security service, its notorious underground jail, Godka ('the Hole') and the Central Prison were located in Mogadishu, there were other maximum security prisons in Bur Wein, Labaatan-Jirow and Lanta Bur (National Academy of Sciences Committee on Human Rights, 1988, pp. 17-19). They were all placed under NSS surveillance (along with other government and intelligence agencies) and were infamous for their torture methods, including the use of electric shock or forcing dissidents to drink sea water until they confessed a crime they had not even been involved in. Besides, torture could take a degrading and dehumanizing form, for example, individuals who were suspected of plotting against the government of Siad Barre had to get undressed, surrounded by their loved ones.⁷ Detainments were considered as a source of income for NSS agents, and as long as prisoners had money, they could bribe the authorities and buy themselves out.

⁶ Telephone interview with Maryan Haji Elmi, August 30, 2014

⁷ For more information on how the NSS interrogated people, see Askar, A. O. (1992), 'Sharks and Soldiers', Haan Publishing, Finland, pp. 11-13

Since many of the NSS agents lacked formal education, only oral reports attested to the killings of Somalis, whose deliberate or accidental deaths were considered as normal and natural by eyewitnesses. According to Law Number 14 of February 15, 1970, NSS agents had the power to ‘search any person’ without receiving any command to do so, and they also possessed the authority to ‘enter any licensed [sic] premises’ and arrest ‘any person’ (Legge numero 14 del 15 febbraio, 1970; Istituzione del servizio di sicurezza nazionale, 1970, pp. 203-205). In addition to that, the establishment of the Office of Intelligence Information further expanded the powers of the security unit. With the intent of preserving scientific socialism in the country, all imported written material went through the hands of NSS agents. If they accepted the content of the books as satisfactory, Somalis could access them in libraries, however if they stumbled upon something that might have gone against the ideology of the regime, they were never made available to the public (Ingiriis, 2016b, p. 97).

The NSS continuously monitored postal traffic, communications, foreign operations, and radio broadcast, while conducting intelligence and counterintelligence activities not only in Somalia, but in neighboring countries too. According to the 1987 summary of the Defense Intelligence Agency, in order to provide help to Somali police forces and the SNA, the organization set up an antiterrorist unit and a “combat department composed of paramilitary forces trained by West German police advisory personnel” (Defense Intelligence Agency, 1987, p. 30). Following the 1977-78 Ogaden War, Somalia’s relation with the USSR deteriorated, after the Soviets had decided to take sides with the country’s historical nemesis, Ethiopia. As a consequence, NSS began to collaborate with secret services from the US and South Africa (Pateman, 1992, p. 576).

In the midst of internal and external pressures placed on the regime, Siad Barre proved to be unable to relinquish power. He dissolved the formidable NSS and the draconian NSC in August 1990, however, by that time there had been strong opposition to the government and much hatred in the Somalis towards dictatorship. Instead of striving for a peaceful transfer of power, he sent delegations to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the US and the USSR with the aim of getting economic and military support (Ingiriis, 2016b, pp. 212, 214-215). Disbanding the NSS and the NSC could not put an end to the nationwide rebellion that led to the fall of Barre’s government and his going into exile to Nigeria.

The NISA

After the failure of UN peace operations (UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II), Somali armed groups and clans decided to establish the Transitional National Government (TNG) in 2000. Although it was unable to set up functional state institutions, reinstate the intelligence apparatus and provide security (Atta-Asamoah, 2013), since the TNG was rather engaged with the reconstruction of the police and the national army. Besides, there was growing Islamist influence in the country, as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was becoming more dominant in the southern parts of the country. Thus in 2004, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)



was formed with American and Ethiopian support, which could reclaim parts of Somalia. Its first president, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, was responsible for transforming the country's security architecture modeled on the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service (Menkhaus, 2006).

Despite the presence of terrorist and armed groups, a slow stabilization process has been initiated in the country. Somalia's willingness to rebuild its security sector was attested by the creation of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in 2012 and the reestablishment of its national intelligence service in the subsequent year. The powers of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) were extended by Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud between 2012 and 2017, and now the organization receives continuous support from Somali civil and federal law enforcement agencies, AMISOM forces and foreign secret services.⁸ While the country has set out on the road of stabilization, the Somali government appears to be only successful in its fight against al-Shabaab with the military assistance of AMISOM and financial support provided by the international community.

Following its expansion, the NISA was designed to be subordinated to the same purpose as the NSS, the personalization of power. With its empowerment, the government was able to suppress its political opponents and maintain order in territories controlled by them in the capital. As a way to consolidate his power, Hassan Sheikh resurrected the methods of Siad Barre's autocratic regime, for instance the arrest of individuals without any warrant who were 'allegedly' acting against the security of the state. During his presidency, the existence of the intelligence agency could be regarded as unconstitutional, since the application of Law Number 14 of the former military government was at odds with democracy (Yabarag, 2013).

Today, Somalis are continuously arrested by NISA agents for voicing their criticism against the government, even on social media. They are usually taken to NISA detention centers and maximum security prisons, including Mama Khadija, Party Investigations or Godka (Ingiriis, 2020b).⁹ The detention of civilians, who are either supposed members of al-Shabaab or individuals thought to have committed a crime against state security, is financially advantageous for NISA agents. Even if it was proven that these people belonged to the terrorist group, they could always bribe intelligence authorities or political brokers and buy their way out of prisons or detention centers (Ingiriis, 2020b).¹⁰

Furthermore, similarly to its predecessor in the Barre regime and the military police of the Somali Democratic Republic, the national intelligence agency operates as a paramilitary force. It was a commonly held view in the government of Hassan Sheikh that combining the

⁸ These foreign services include the intelligence agencies of Somalia's neighboring countries, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, the United States and the United Kingdom. They provide both equipment and training to civil and federal law enforcement bodies in the country. However, intelligence-sharing between the FGS and these services is rather limited.

⁹ Although, the government decided to close Godka in December 2018, Interviews with NISA agents in Mogadishu, July-September 2015 and May-July 2016

¹⁰ Individuals who have no political or personal influence in the government or are suspected to be or have been in contact with al-Shabaab are interrogated upon detention to see if money could be extorted from them. Focus group discussions in Mogadishu, May-September 2015 and April-August 2016

experience of former veteran soldiers and members of the authoritarian regime would result in a more effective and efficient security agency. As Mohamed Haji Ingiriis pointed out, five out of the eight NISA directors were somehow involved in the Siad Barre regime and almost all of them had moved in political circles prior to their appointment (Ingiriis, 2020a; 2020b). On top of that, when a new president is elected, former commanders currently responsible for the security sector demand to pursue either diplomatic or political careers (Starkey, 2016).¹¹ The interconnectedness of military and political power and the dominance of patron-client relationships in the Somali context render the government impossible to establish functioning security institutions in the country (Africa Intelligence, 2016). Besides, silencing political adversaries has become the de facto 'prerequisite' for presidents to remain in power, thus establishing an apolitical intelligence agency does not seem to be the priority.

Under the presidency of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed 'Farmaajo', the NISA was increasingly used to take up fight against the perceived enemies of the state and to promote the personalization of power. For example, without providing any specific reasons, intelligence agents arrested photographer and vlogger, Mukhtar Nur in July 2017. Only after he had been in custody for a couple of days and the hashtag #FreeMukhtarNuur had begun trending on social media was he released (Radio Dalsan, 2017). As a punishment for broadcasting anti-governmental content on Radio Hiigsi, editor of the station, Mohamed Abdiwahab Nuur, was taken to Godka, where he was tortured for three days before releasing him in March 2020 (Horn Observer, 2020). Farmaajo does not only work towards the oppression of political opponents, but also intimidates and threatens journalists and media practitioners, who voice their criticism against the regime (European Parliament, 2018).

Somali residents have always been reluctant to support the NISA wholeheartedly, since several members of the organization, as NSS agents at that time, were actively involved in the horrifying deeds of the Siad Barre government and those arrests, imprisonments, tortures or executions are still imprinted on their minds. Constant struggles with al-Shabaab provide a context for NISA to justify its extrajudicial operations, however the use of these activities can be considered as a source of public anxiety over the Somali government's power. According to the regime, al-Shabaab endangers state-building and securitization in Somalia, so the involvement of the national intelligence agency is needed. However, NISA agents are exempt from punishment, since "the interdependence between the government and [the intelligence agency] means there is no independent government office for people to complain about torture, murders, and misconducts" (Ingiriis, 2020b, p. 19).

The NISA appears to operate independently from the Ministry of Internal Security in Somalia, but, similarly to its predecessor, it conducts intelligence and counterintelligence activities outside the country, too. For instance, the organization installs their operatives as First Secretaries in the Somali embassies of its neighboring countries, such as Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya (Ingiriis, 2020b, p. 21). The NSS and the NISA both follow(ed) orders

¹¹ Military commanders from Somalia were described as 'corrupt communist-era generals' by The Times.



unconditionally, however, the latter does not possess the relatively clear organization structure and hierarchy of the former. With the personalization of power and the adoption of authoritarian policies, Farmaajo may pave the way for further violence in the country.

Conclusion

As Aili Mari Tripp remarked, “African societies are constrained [...] by political systems and weak institutions that are not conducive to good governance” (Tripp, 1997, p. 12). From a perspective of more than 20 years, unfortunately it seems to be true in the Somali context, since the security architecture in Somalia is still characterized by big-man politics. In addition to that, security institutions have always been favored to serve the interests (either personal or political) of the country’s top leadership. These individuals clinging to power at any price have continually reshaped the security sector to make favorable “personal investments in reciprocal relations with other individuals as a means of achieving goals that are seen as otherwise impossible to attain” (Hydén, 2006, p. 73).

The study argues that although times may differ, methods remain the same when scrutinizing the operations of the above-mentioned Somali intelligence apparatuses. There are many common features between the NSS and the NISA, including the governments’ use of these intelligence services for the consolidation of their personal power, getting rid of political opponents or conducting extrajudicial activities against individuals who voice criticism against the regime or purportedly commit anti-state crimes. Moreover, with the reintroduction of Law Number 14 of 1970, NISA agents can also enter buildings and search or arrest anyone without a warrant. The interconnectedness of military and political power, the dominance of patron-client relationships, the conduct of intelligence and counterintelligence operations in neighboring countries, and the prioritization of clan loyalty are other similarities that characterize the agencies. On top of that, the current Somali regime uses some of the same maximum security prisons and detention centers as Siad Barre did.

In lieu of striving to establish a stable security sector in the country, recent governments have tried to revive the autocratic regime and its tyrannical security architecture. Not only do the operations of the NISA aggravate insecurity in Somalia, but they also make already existing security institutions weaker. Preventing the Farmaajo government from bringing dictatorship into Somali politics and preserving the accountability and integrity of state institutions are of chief importance. For only through the reconfiguration and reorganization of the security sector will peace be restored in the country (Ingiriis, 2020b, p. 6, 23-24). The first step into the right direction could be an all-encompassing reform of the Somali intelligence apparatus to ensure that it will no longer be used for furthering personal objectives and eliminating political adversaries. Instead, it should be used to serve the interests of the general public. Without remodeling the security architecture in the country, the NISA, similarly to the NSS in the Siad Barre regime, will continue to operate as an instrument of political power.

Conflict of interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on contributor

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The Somali Navy from 1965 to the 1980s

A research note

Colin D. Robinson¹

Abstract:

Naval advising and assistance is an understudied field, in comparison to military advising and assistance on land. The author is only aware of three states whose navies have had to be rebuilt from nothing since 1999: East Timor, Iraq, and the varying efforts in Somalia. Advisory and assistance efforts of this type are helped by accurate data on the history that shapes and motivates new navies' personnel. Yet, as regards Somalia, there is virtually no authoritative discussion of the history of the Navy. The Navy had its origins as a civilian port management body in the 1950s; grew under Soviet tutelage after its first vessels were transferred in February 1965; and received considerable Soviet advice and support. But it was severed from its Soviet training and support after the Soviets had to choose sides during the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia. That split appears to have led to a severe decline in operational readiness during the 1980s. In 1987 U.S. intelligence reporting, now declassified, shows only two operational fighting vessels, of a total of 18 ships, only making short patrols from one of the Navy's three bases. After the collapse of the Somali state, some vessels fled to Aden, and possibly Mombasa. In the twenty-first century, international attention was roused by piracy off the Somali coast. Efforts to build new naval police forces, or a new Navy, in southern Somalia have faced constant challenges.

Keywords:

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Naval Advising and Assistance

Since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, interest in military advisory and assistance has grown exponentially. The U.S. necessity to rebuild armies in Afghanistan and Iraq, (Robinson, 2018) as well as elsewhere, including advisory activities in the Philippines, Syria, and Yemen, as well as other interventions under the UN banner in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and South Sudan, have kept developed-world assistance to other armies under the spotlight. Whole sets of military jargon have been created and reshaped, (Robinson and Matisek, 2021) keeping pace with the wider evolution of what was ‘security sector reform,’ but then became ‘security and justice development’ (Denney and Domingo, 2014) and is now more commonly referred to as ‘security and justice programming’ or simply ‘security and justice.’ (Van Veen, 2016)

Due to their function of applying state-endorsed military force on land, armies have attracted the lion’s share of the renewed attention to military advising and assistance. (Stoker, 2010; Stoker and Westermann, 2018; Stoker and McMaster, 2017) They have much more political importance, generally, than navies or air forces. There have been fifteen to twenty armies almost totally rebuilt following peace agreements since 1972, (Licklider, 2014; Robinson, 2012; 2018) but barely two or three either of navies or air forces in the same rough set of circumstances. As regards air forces, Afghanistan’s air force and the revitalized Iraqi Air Force have received most of the attention. The necessity to rebuild navies from scratch has received little or no attention, barring several Iraq-related articles in specialist journals such as *Jane’s Navy International*, though periodic articles on Western assistance to developing-world navies do appear. (Koch, 2005, p. 17; Willett, 2017) The three states where substantial efforts have been made to rebuild naval forces almost from scratch since 2000 include Iraq, East Timor, after the Indonesians withdrew,² and Somalia (Dodd, 2019).

Iraq, attracting great amounts of attention from major Western interveners like the U.S. and UK, was an outlier in terms of naval assistance. Most efforts have been focused on much smaller, poorer countries, such as in West Africa, where the Gulf of Guinea shades into Nigeria’s oil fields, and East Africa. The shipping lanes around the Horn of Africa flow through several choke points, and vessels passing Aden bound for southern Africa routinely travelled south off the Somali coast for hundreds of years. The disintegration of the Somali state in the late 1980s and up to January 1991 changed that. In the following decade, Somalis started to go to sea to hijack those vessels, and the presence or absence of a Somali Navy or Coast Guard quickly became an issue. When container shipping companies, such as Maersk Line, could not send ships safely down that coast, costs rose; the impact was quickly felt. (Ejdus, 2017, p. 472.)

While there is a growing literature on how, when, and under what circumstances Somali land forces might be recreated, there is vanishingly nothing on either air or naval forces. Exceptions include a brief reference in this author’s summary of the Somali Armed Forces in

² From 2003 the Navy had an authorized strength of about 60, with two ex-Portuguese *Albatroz* class patrol boats, assisted by a post-patrol-boat command Portuguese Navy officer.



2016, and the *Somali Security and Public Expenditure Review* (SJPER), whose final version was made public in January 2017. But neither of these works went beyond a brief sketch on the history of the Navy. It is vitally necessary to have a good understanding of key historical points in order to know ‘where the bodies are buried,’ when attempting to assist or rebuild an armed force. Not to do so may curtail or cripple assistance programmes. In addition, the history of the Somali Navy is as worth recording and analysing as any other longstanding Somali institution or phenomenon.

Beginnings

So where does the Somali Navy’s story start? What are the key facets? Somalia gained independence on 1 July 1960 and the two trusteeships, British in the north and Italian in the south, merged five days later. The SJPER makes a confusing reference to the navy being active before independence in 1960. (UN-World Bank, 2017, p. 37) Some key early facts about how the Somali Navy actually evolved can be drawn from translating a ‘Goobjoog News’ article of 2018. (Gurbiye, 2018) It appears that after 1950, when Italy returned to administer the south after being granted a Trusteeship, some kind of civilian port management grouping was established. So the Navy does trace its history to before 1965, but it was not actually a *Navy* to begin with. A British military intelligence report of October 1962 mentions an air wing, but nothing about naval forces; the grouping was clearly under civilian administrative control at the time. (SRNA, 1962) Nevertheless, despite its civilian status, the grouping supported Somali forces during clashes with Ethiopia in 1964, being moved to Dolow to transport supplies.

Ahead of actual Soviet assistance, the Soviet Navy had begun to make port calls to Somalia as early as 1962. On September 14, 1962, the *Sverdlov*-class gun cruiser *Ordzhonikidze*, and the patrol ships *Grizon* and *Korsak* arrived off Somalia under the flag of Vice-Admiral V. Chaly, First Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet. (Rozin, n.d.) The *Ordzhonikidze* was being sailed to Indonesia where it would be handed over the Indonesian Navy. They moored in the Bayer-Meraio anchorage, whose location is unclear from this perspective of 60 years later. Somali border guards arrived aboard the ships, ‘barefoot and with old rifles;’ they were fed and watered, ‘at the same time settling all formalities.’ Having been topped up with fuel, boiler water, and oil from the tanker *Maxim Gorkiy*, the ships sailed for the Indian Ocean the next day. Rozin writes that this visit was one of the first that the Soviet Navy had made to Somalia.

Warships need extensive port and support facilities. The port of Berbera (about 200 kilometres southwest of Djibouti city) was identified as a prime candidate for development early in the 1960s. It had been a key regional port for hundreds of years. Before the arrival of the Soviets, Berbera had only a single pier, with one five-ton crane. In 1962 the Soviets and Somalis mutually agreed on extensive expansion and rebuilding of the existing facilities, and by the end of that year a Soviet survey team had arrived. In 1963, during a visit to the Soviet Union by Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke and Brigadier General Daud Abdulle Hersi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, an agreement was made to transfer naval vessels

to Somalia. In December 1964 the grouping was officially placed under the Ministry of Defence, alongside the other services of the Somali National Armed Forces. It was about 45 personnel strong at the time, including three officers. The first commander of the Navy appears to have been Lieutenant Colonel Khalif Maow Hassan. (Rozin, n.d.) The Goobjoog source recounts how Soviet-promised ships arrived at Berbera on February 10, 1965. There they were transferred to naval officers now part of the Ministry of Defence. In recognition, February 10 was chosen as Somali Navy Day, and has been marked that way ever since.

The exact types of craft handed over that day are not crystal clear. Russian and Russian-translated sources are clear that two Project P386, Type 9 patrol boats, 29 metres long, with a crew of 15 were transferred. (Rozin, n.d.; *Torpedo Retrievers, Project T368*, n.d.) The puzzle lies in when the first amphibious craft were handed over. Russian language sources speak of several different types of patrol boats delivered up until 1969, but date the first transfer of amphibious craft to 1968. However, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in its *Handbook for Special Operations – Somali Republic*, dated July 1966, said that the Navy had two patrol craft and two amphibious craft.³ At a distance of sixty years it is hard to make a precise judgement, but it seems more likely that the Soviet sources were correct. The CIA was making its assessments on much more partial information. Russian language sources say that from 1965-69 a total of 13 more patrol boats and torpedo boats were handed over, and in 1968-69 four small tank landing craft, in Soviet terms, 'landing boats,' of the Project 1785 type, 20 metres long, capable of carrying one main battle tank or 20 personnel. (Rozin, n. d.; Landing craft Project 1785 / Project 1785T, n. d.) The design of the four large, wooden-hulled torpedo boats of the Project 183 type dated back to the years immediately after the Second World War. They were armed with two 533 mm (21 in) torpedo tubes, and could mount up to four 25-mm guns. If properly crewed, maintained, and handled the Project 183s could "outrun and outmanoeuvre anything" in the newly independent African states' naval inventory. (Hale, 1972, p. 50) Three more of the small Project P386 patrol craft were delivered in 1966, and six more Project 123bis small torpedo boats followed.

Rozin records the memories of Alexander Pavlovich Golovnikov, an engineer from the Yaroslavl shipyard, who was sent to Kismayo with a four-man team to transfer Project 368P small patrol craft to the Somalis. (Rozin, n. d.) There had been a problem with a Somali 368P crew which had been trained beforehand in the Soviet Union. Once they arrived in Somalia, Golovnikov and his colleagues could not get aboard the vessel for a month, because the crew trained in the USSR went 'on strike.' This was seemingly because the Soviet-trained crew found itself replaced once it arrived back in Somalia, a new crew sent aboard, and the Soviet-trained crew deprived of ranks and positions. Arrival of the 368P craft was complicated because the vessels had been shipped to Somalia on Soviet dry cargo ships, with some parts of the equipment removed. With the strike, reassembly, and crew training required, the whole

³ Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook for Special Operations – Somali Republic*, July 1966, 120. All declassified U.S. documents are searchable and accessible via foia.cia.gov (and at the comparable Defence Intelligence Agency site in some cases).



process took four months. Once that process had finished, Golovnikov and his colleagues were sent via Mogadishu up to Berbera, to repeat the process. In this case, the whole process was made much easier because, in Golovnikov's words, the new crew they were to train were 'ours.' What that appears to mean was that because this new Berbera crew's training had taken place in Baku, with the Soviet Caspian Sea Flotilla, it was closely affiliated with the team from the Yaroslavl shipyard. It appears that there was some sort of 'pairing' arrangement between Soviet shipyards and Soviet Navy training sites that is not fully explained.

The port in Kismayo, which was to become the Navy's main southern location, had actually been built by the United States, surveyed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Before the U.S.-backed construction work began in 1964, ships had to be loaded and unloaded offshore within the Kismayo roadstead (sheltered, safe anchorage). Survey works by the Army Corps of Engineers began in 1959; the major part of the construction finished in 1967; and then the military coup two years later led to the U.S. ceasing assistance. Rozin writes that some of the remaining U.S. steelwork was dumped offshore rather than handed over to the now-Soviet-aligned Somalis. The Soviet later built a torpedo boat base there.

Concepts and Opponents

The general concept for naval activities in these circumstances is based upon small craft, as fast as possible, to position themselves as best possible for an attack on larger warships, and then to escape afterwards. The heavier the punch they have, the better, to disable more powerful opponents quickly, to minimize their vulnerability and the time they are exposed to the enemy. They can be vulnerable to air attack; much later, during 'Operation Desert Storm' against Iraq in 1991, Iraqi Navy small craft were cut to pieces by the U.S.-led coalition's missile-firing helicopters. But in the mid-1960s, the helicopter threat was much less.

The prospective opponents for the growing Somali Navy were firstly Ethiopia, and later, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). The Ethiopian Navy had been established comparatively late, in 1955, and was generally comprised of the same type of small craft as the Somalis. Up until 1961, the Ethiopians had acquired two Yugoslav torpedo boats, five ex-U.S. patrol boats, plus the larger ex-U.S. training ship *Ethiopia*. (Lefever and Leiper, 1970, pp. 142-144) But by 1972 the Yugoslav torpedo boats had been scrapped, and the U.S. craft were 'too slow for even good anti-smuggling work'. (Blackman, 1972, p. 95) This author has not identified any reports of Ethio-Somali naval confrontations, before or since the early 1970s. The British only completed the evacuation of Aden, which was to become the capital of South Yemen, in November 1967. British Rear Admiral Edward Ashmore, Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East Fleet, had supervised Task Force 318, the British task force assembled to cover their last withdrawal from the former Federation of South Arabia.⁴

⁴ Lapping (1985) gives the background on the withdrawal; the Task Force designation is from Harnden (2011); note that *The Independent* incorrectly lists Ashmore's appointment at the time.

So for several years afterwards, South Yemen was absorbed with organising its new government, and was often since that point preoccupied with political strife.

Richard Hall, a former State Department official assessing naval developments in the early 1970s, wrote that the Somali Navy was the “strongest indigenous naval power in East Africa,” with Ethiopia ranked only third. This was based on his assessment of what he reported as the 18 patrol boats in the Somali Navy in 1972, twelve of them being the potent Project 183 type craft already mentioned. (Hale, 1972, p. 50) However, maintenance problems, as well as lack of through written documentation and reporting, may have both created problems. Reporting for the President’s Daily Brief in February 1967 was scathing of Somali Army maintenance, and declassified U.S. reporting of 1987 indicated ‘few of the [Navy] vessels were combat effective,’ at that time, due to a variety of technical problems.⁵ From these two related reports it seems quite likely that maintenance was at the very least imperfect in the Navy in the early 1970s. In addition, the military government only standardized the Somali language on a Latin alphabet in 1972, and English, Italian, and Russian, as well as Somali, would all have been in the mix for discussion over naval issues.

Another issue that would have impeded naval capability was literacy rates. Somalia (and Ethiopia too) both acknowledged literacy rates before the beginning of the first literacy campaigns as about 5-6%. (Hoeben, 1988, p. 113) Thus [Siad Barre announced in October 1972] *a full scale literacy campaign for Somalia. This campaign was directed at the total population, educated and illiterate alike, for virtually no-one knew how to read and write Somali in the new official script.*

Somalis have a strong oral tradition, and are noted for their poetry. But the oral emphasis of the culture, literacy rates, and the mix of languages requiring translation and careful usage probably hampered the new Navy getting the best out of its vessels. It seems likely that due to all these issues, operational effectiveness could have been significantly lower than Hall estimated.

The Soviet Navy and the Somalis in the 1970s

Somalis interviewed in the last eighteen months emphasize how their forefathers were sent away for military technical training in the Soviet Union for years at a time. Rozin writes that at least 3,066 Somali personnel were trained: including 1169 personnel graduated from the training establishment of the Ground Forces (Soviet Army), 510 people from the Air Defence Force, 590 from the Air Force, and 450 from the Navy. There are no indications as yet that any women were sent to undertake military training in the Soviet Union.⁶ (Metz, 1993, p. 207) Some 3,900 Soviet personnel served in Somalia from 1964-77.

⁵ President’s Daily Brief, issued by the CIA for 2 February 1967 (USDIA 1987, p. 19).

⁶ A Women’s Auxiliary Corps was formed in 1961, but was confined to the roles of administration, personnel, and military welfare.



A total of at least 45 visits were made by Soviet naval forces to Somalia from 1969 to October 1972. (Rozin, n. d.) Starting with two visits in 1969, and seven in 1970, there were then 22 visits made in 1971 and 20 in 1972. During a visit in April 1972 under the leadership of Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, an agreement was reached allowing the establishment of the 527th Material-Technical Support Point (Russian: Пунктматериально-технического обеспечения, ПМТО) for the Soviet Navy at Berbera. Restricted to floating barges and similar, this installation was technically not a base, something that was to gain importance later when it attracted more and more Western attention.

The Soviet Union achieved another significant step in April 1972. In that month an agreement was made with Somalia to allow periodic basing of Tupolev Tu-95RT (NATO designation “Bear D”) and Ilyushin Il-38 (NATO “May”) long range maritime patrol aircraft at the Berbera airfield. Soviet Naval Aviation thus had a forward base to conduct maritime patrol sorties over the Indian Ocean and Middle East. Rozin wrote that ‘to ensure the basing and maintenance of the airfield in an operational state, significant funds were spent, [and] huge reserves of fuel and lubricants were created.’ The United States publicly identified the base in Senate hearings in June 1975, and a month later, a party of U.S. senators and their aides were allowed to visit the base.

As base access expanded, the Soviet Union made decisions to transfer more small warships to the Somalis. Rozin writes that combat vessels transferred by the Soviet Union to the Somali Navy in 1974-77 included:

*One Project 1400E Grif (NATO ‘Zhuk-class’) patrol boat in 1974

*Two Project 205U (NATO ‘Osa-class’) missile boats in December 1975. The Osa-class missile boat was a formidable vessel in its time, capable of a speed of over 40 knots (70 kilometres an hour) depending on which engine variant was installed, whose four P-15 Termit (NATO SS-N-2 “Styx”) surface to surface missiles were capable of reaching 40-80 kilometres carrying a warhead of 454kg (1000 lbs) of high explosive. Three or four such vessels could ambush and destroy larger destroyers, given the right tactical situation.

*Four Project 205T and Project 205ET torpedo boats in 1976

*One Project 770 (NATO ‘Polnocny-A’) class medium landing ship in December 1976, capable of carrying five tanks and 120 soldiers.

Unfortunately, as yet, there is little detail available about the integration of these vessels in the 1970s. There are however declassified U.S. reports from the 1980s which will be addressed below.

The Somali dream of ‘liberating’ the Ogaden region, inhabited by Somali clansmen, from Ethiopia led to a rupture with the Soviet Union, the end of all Soviet assistance, and the hasty withdrawal of all Soviet forces in 1977. Siad Barre had decided to step up the efforts of the Somali Government-directed Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) guerrillas, an Ethiopian

armed resistance movement in the Ogaden region. The next step was to invade Ethiopia, and in June 1977 regular Somali forces became involved. (Metz, 1993, p. 184) A full-scale invasion involving virtually the entire Somali army was launched on July 12. (Ayele, 2014, p. 106) The Soviet Union found itself supplying both sides, and attempted to begin talks in Moscow about a peaceful settlement between Ethiopians and Somalis. Nothing resulted, and arms supplies to Somalia were halted. At the same time, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan began to consider supplying Somalia with weaponry.

Siad Barre then terminated the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. The Soviets were ordered to leave. As the day of October 13, 1977, passed, the attitudes of the Somalis to the Soviets changed. (Rozin, n. d.) They became hostile and threatening; electricity and water were cut off, and their houses were surrounded by Somali armed personnel to protect the Soviets from angry Somali mobs. Siad Barre declared all remaining Soviet equipment and facilities Somali property. Within a week, only seven employees of the Soviet Embassy in Somalia were allowed to stay; the Cubans were also expelled. For the Soviets, the evacuation was a nightmare, especially for the families; there was considerable harassment and much personal property was taken. The Soviet 8th Operational Squadron in the Indian Ocean, under Vice Admiral Nikolai Yasakov, sent ships to Mogadishu to evacuate what could be withdrawn, and other ships from the Black Sea Fleet were sent south from the Mediterranean. A considerable amount of military facilities and equipment, including the vital naval communications centre, was salvaged and withdrawn from Berbera. The abrupt split would have long-term consequences for the Somali Navy; it was severed from its patron and supplier at a stroke.

After months of bitter fighting, Somali forces withdrew from Ethiopia in March 1978, defeated by a Soviet change of sides, deploying Cuban forces, and Ethiopia's unexpected levels of resistance. The Navy did little during the war; its principle effort was to provide logistical support to Somali forces in the northern part of the country. (Directorate for Intelligence, 1982, p. 7)

The Navy and Politics: Mohammed Gelle Yusuf and Mohamed Osman

The navy commander's rank started off as a lieutenant colonel, and then rose to colonel. The third commander of the navy, initially a lieutenant colonel, was perhaps the most notorious officer the Navy ever produced: Mohamud Gelle Yusuf. Lieutenant Colonel Yusuf was commanding the Navy by March 1973, when he went aboard the visiting Soviet Sverdlov-class gun cruiser *Admiral Senyavin* in Mogadishu. Yet Yusuf gained his reputation not through any naval activities but because he became one of Siad Barre's fervent loyalists. In 1970 a special tribunal, the National Security Court, was established as the judicial arm of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, outside the ordinary legal system, "as watchdogs against activities considered to be counterrevolutionary." (Metz, 1993, p. 38) Yusuf as head of the court was given special powers under a presidential decree in order to carry out his activities. (Ingiriis,



2016, p. 95) Ingiriis (2016, pp. 95-96) writes eloquently of the sheer fear instituted by the National Security Court and its activities, killing those Barre suspected of disloyalty.

Barre's co-revolutionary General Salad Gabeire Kediye fell out with him, urging a loosening of tight controls, possibly even asking for a return to democracy within a year of the coup. (Ingiriis, 2016, p. 101) Barre feared his influence, and ordered a court to be assembled, hand-picking the members, including Yusuf as one of his Darod/Marehan fellow-clansmen. (Ingiriis, 2016, p. 103) The verdict was preordained: Gabeire and his co-conspirators were executed. Yusuf, continuing his repressive activities, was later described as 'one of the worst in the regime' by the Amnesty International director for the country, long after the collapse. (Ingiriis, 2016, p. 103) It appears Yusuf was both heading the Navy and the National Security Court at the same time. After handing over the Navy to Mohamed Omar Osman, he served as Minister of Ports and Maritime Transport three times, before becoming Minister of Finance and Revenues just before the final collapse. (Mukhtar, 2011, p. 273, 279)

The following commander of the Navy was Mohamed Omar Osman (Darod/Ogadeni). After receiving his military education in Cairo (Interview: ONLF Leader, Admiral Mohamed Omar Osman' (n. d.) and in the Soviet Union, he was diverted somewhat on return to Somalia, eventually becoming chief of Siad Barre's ruling party Politbureau. By November 1987 he had become Commander of the Navy, holding the rank of rear admiral, as the Defence Intelligence Agency reported. (USDIA, 1987, p. 9) The same U.S. reporting wrote that he was among senior military officers dissatisfied with Ethio-Somali peace efforts, because tentative talks that had begun in 1986 between the two countries might lead to selling 'a portion of the country to the Ethiopians.' Well after the Somali collapse, in 1998, he became chairman of the Ogaden National Liberation Front.

United States reporting from the 1980s

The Ogaden War was a disaster for Somalia, especially for its irredentist territorial ambitions. Much of the army and air force were destroyed. Hundreds of thousands of refugees began to increasingly strain the ability of Somalia to absorb them. Rumbblings against Siad Barre's direction of the war led to an attempted coup soon afterwards. (Ingiriis, 2016, pp. 157-163) Ethiopia re-established its military dominance along the border by 1981.

Because the Navy had been of so little help during the war, it became more and more neglected as the 1980s wore on. By this time the United States had become Somalia's patron and supplier, and as a result, U.S. intelligence reporting increased in scope and detail. CIA assessments in March 1982 gave a sorry picture. (Directorate for Intelligence, 1982, p. 7) The Navy could not effectively carry out its coastal defence and surveillance mission. Maintenance and engine problems were widespread. The two Osa-class missile boats, the Navy's most potent striking force, suffered continuing engine problems, frequent to the extent that they 'rarely' sailed from the base at Berbera. Before the expulsion of Soviet personnel, the Soviet technicians had carried out almost all maintenance, the CIA said. Probably this was partially

due to the challenges with translating and communicating regarding highly technical equipment, as the literacy discussion above emphasizes. After the Soviet withdrawal, spare parts and support facilities were inadequate, and limited Egyptian assistance ceased because of Somalia's 'inability to pay.' While Romania was training a small number of personnel, this could not make up for the largesse and range of assistance the Soviet Union had provided.

Several editions of the U.S. *Military Intelligence Summary* for the 1980s were released by the Defence Intelligence Agency after 2010. The November 1987 edition gives a detailed account of the Somali Navy. (USDIA 1987, pp. 18-20) The Navy was organised into three coastal areas located at Berbera, in the north where revolt was rising against Barre; in Mogadishu; and in Kismayo. In addition to the warships, there was a 100-mm coastal defence artillery battery at Berbera, six radar sites, four visual surveillance points, and twelve signals' stations. Of the 18 vessels the Navy had, three were operational; 13 non-operational, including two Mol-class torpedo boats, two Mol-class patrol boats, and four Project 183 torpedo boats; and the status of two ex-Soviet landing craft were unknown. The two operational fighting vessels were one of the Osa-class missile boats and a new acquisition, a 104-foot Swiftship which had defected from Ethiopia in the early 1980s. Also listed as operational was the single Project 770-class landing ship.

The crews of the two operational fighting vessels were highly qualified and well-capable of maintaining and operating their craft. (USDIA 1987, p. 18, p. 19) At the core of their crews were competent personnel who had been sailing the same platform for a decade. Procedures were passed on orally in some cases, rather than on paper. (USDIA 1987, p. 20) But they needed additional training and proper logistical support; facilities at Berbera were sparse and the radars aboard were non-operational for lack of spare parts. The Chinese had provided some spare parts in 1984, though, in return for samples of some Soviet weaponry. (USDIA 1987, p. 7) All the Navy's ships and vehicles bar the Ethiopian-defected Swiftship were of Soviet origin and were old and worn-out. Coastal patrols had been performed only on a 'very irregular basis' in the past, in 'specific areas such as Berbera, Mogadishu' and Kismayo. But since mid-1985 only the two operational vessels had gone to sea, remaining in the vicinity of their home base, Berbera. The DIA thus assessed that there were insufficient craft to patrol the coastline, and it can be seen from this description that the Horn of Africa itself, and the southern coastline down to Mogadishu had been left totally uncovered.

By this time, the authority of the Somali government had begun to disintegrate. In the north, beyond the Berbera base, the Issaq Somali National Movement was gaining strength. Within three to four years, Barre's remaining strongholds in Mogadishu would be under assault from the Hawiye United Somali Congress. Barre eventually fled Mogadishu for his clan lands in Gedo on January 27, 1991. Others who could, fled as well; it appears that one or both of the two operational fighting vessels, including the Osa-class missile boat, landed up in Aden, at that time the capital of South Yemen. (Gurbiye, 2018) The Goobjoog source says that 'the largest vessel was last reported in Mombasa,' which appears likely to have been the Project 770 landing craft, and other vessels were looted in Kismayo.



The Twenty-first Century Aftermath

Somalia has remained riven by strife since the early 1990s. While some areas have remained peaceful for long periods, such as Somaliland after the two civil wars there ended in 1994,⁷ the south has seen constant fighting. The two operational fighting craft had been making patrols in the Berbera area in the latter half of the 1980s, but since that time, Somalia's ability to maintain sovereign control over its territorial waters has dwindled enormously. Somaliland had a coast guard in operation by 2015, but efforts elsewhere have been patchy. The apparent situation in the new state of Puntland since 1998 has been confused by the hidden focus of the Puntland Maritime Police Force, some 660 strong in September 2014. Well-publicised activities and private security company support has ostensibly been focused on maritime activities. Yet the PMPF in 2017-18 remained, at its core, a regime security force, initially at the beck and call of former Puntland President Abdirahman Faroole.⁸

As the war and instability persisted, poverty in coastal communities grew. (Kerins, 2016) Somali fishermen grew increasingly angry at intrusions by illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) foreign fishing vessels. Infrequent and opportunistic pirate attacks began as early as 12 January 1991; 34 occurred between 1991 and 2004. (Westberg, 2015) But the attacks were not as organised and repetitive as those after 2005. Westberg (2015, p. 3) argues that it was principally the 'Indian Ocean tsunami on 26 December 2004, which wiped out the fishing sector in the South Mudug coastal villages of Hobyo and Harardhere' that led to the change in character and increase in number of pirate attacks from the southern of the two main pirate locations, the Galmudug coastline. The other main launch points have been further north, around Eyl and elsewhere, in what is now Puntland.

Whatever the extent of Somali piracy, the difference between outside and Somali reactions to such attacks reveals a great gulf in understanding. This lack of mutual understanding has already had significant detrimental effects, damaging efforts to rebuild a sovereign Somali maritime presence. Somalis are generally much more concerned by IUU fishing than piracy. (Kerins, 2016) They are also significantly concerned with arms smuggling and human trafficking. But for the maritime sphere, the dumping of illegal waste is possibly the most underappreciated aspect. Herring et al. (2020, pp. 5-7) point out that '...the illegal disposal of hazardous waste on a massive scale by an 'ecomafia' of Italian companies and criminal gangs is... long-established,' and that the existence of schemes to dump toxic, including nuclear waste, in Somalia has been proven. Between the scars of war and ongoing poverty, the destruction of livelihoods after the Indian Ocean tsunami, IUU fishing, and waste dumping, the justifications for Somali piracy can be better understood.

The efforts to re-establish a formal Somali Navy form an epilogue of sorts to this history. As international concerns about Somali piracy rose, the Djibouti Accords between two Somali warring factions, including the then Mogadishu Transitional Federal Government, were made

⁷ Discussions with well-informed observers in East Africa, 2017 and 2018.

⁸ Contacts with well-informed observers in East Africa, 2017, 2018, and 22 February 2021.

in August 2008. That led to the appointment by June 2009 of Admiral Farah Omar as Navy commander. He told the BBC that 500 recruits were under training, recruited through radio advertisements after being promised US \$60 per month. (Ross, 2009) Little had changed six months later, though the recruits were still in training. (Anderson, 2009) By 2017 the SJPER said the Navy had risen to 550 personnel, with 140 officers, and five boats. In June 2018 numbers were reported as 311, but both that and the 550 figure seem likely to be overestimates. Assessing exact Somali military personnel numbers is often challenging. (Robinson, 2019, p. 213) In any case, no real naval activity seemed to be taking place, and foreign assistance, notably via the European mission EUCAP Nestor, had begun to focus on civilian naval police forces.

Conclusions

The Somali Navy's first thirty years need to be assessed in the context of the Somali technical skills and infrastructure base that the British and Italian mandates left behind on independence in 1960. It was always going to be a difficult task to build a force dependent on high technology in a country that started with a 5-6% literacy rate, limited technical training arrangements, and limited facilities. The Navy also always seems to have been last in line, behind the Army, Air Force, and Air Defence Command.

The Navy to a great degree stood or fell with its Soviet supporters. Training, vessels, advice, and other support were significantly dependent on Soviet transfers. U.S. reporting from 1982 that Soviet advisors had carried out most maintenance up until 1977 emphasizes the level of dependence for navies in these circumstances which need working naval propulsion to carry out their activities. This left the Navy seemingly bereft when the Soviets left, with effective vessels reduced to reportedly to three out of a total of 18. The two fighting vessels remaining operational in 1987 had no capability to patrol much more than a limited area along the Somali coast.

Internal Somali politics was both a blessing and a curse. There was a strong will to push forward with the 'liberation' of the Ogaden region and other territories seen as Somali, but in the end, clan identity and feuding became Barre's tools to stay in power, and the country broke up. The civil war eroded skills, hardened attitudes and eventually spread collective trauma across Somali society. Thousands upon thousands went into exile; not good portents for any rebuilding of a Navy (or naval police) in the twenty-first century.

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Conflict of interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on contributor

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Resilience-based approach and management of human trafficking at the regions of natural disasters in Africa

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Abstract:

The exploitation of minor victims of human traffickers can be defined as one of the greatest security risks of our time which is an extraordinary global challenge and the intensity of it is significantly multiplied in the context of natural disasters and human trafficking, that affects the regions of Africa, mainly the area of Somalia. Due to the even more frequent disasters caused by climate change, human traffickers are exploiting the potential for huge economic gains that arise in disaster-stricken areas, which mainly affecting orphaned minors. As a result of the chaotic situation in these areas, environmental migration is emerging, which can concern all ages. As the effects of climate change are threatening both our natural values and our populations in the coming decades, I consider the resilient-based approach extremely important in order to draw attention to the links between human trafficking and natural disasters.

Keywords:

resilience;
environmental migration;
climate change;
human trafficking;
acculturation;
intercultural
communication;
sexual exploitation.

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Introduction

Climate change, one of the greatest challenges of our time is leading to more and more unexpected and unprecedented disasters. During these emergencies, the so-called domino effect often prevails, which aggravates the consequences of the catastrophe that occurred. For instance, this domino effect is clearly visible in the case of children orphaned during disasters, who can thus easily fall victim to human traffickers. As a result, the challenge of human trafficking is compounded by the climate change disaster and the challenges it poses, and in addition to tackling the devastation caused by the disaster, it raises a long-term social challenge. In this context, it is extremely important to clarify the significance of resilience in a psychosocial context and to apply it in practice by appropriate methods. In addition to psychosocial assistance for resilience, the steps to be taken by mostly humanitarian organizations could be the following: providing adequate health care; identifying orphaned children and, if possible, reuniting them with their families; protection against exploitation by human traffickers; providing education as soon as possible.

Consideration and implementation of these recommendations could make a significant contribution to developing rehabilitation needs because of the disaster and to curbing the process of human trafficking in human beings. Defining and building the protection of the population against the threats posed by climate change is a matter of great urgency, whereas it affects an extremely large number of minors who may disappear from the eyes of the world.

Environmental migration in Somalia

Most natural disasters have been caused by climate change and extreme weather over the past ten years. In four out of five cases, floods, storms and heat waves can be traced back to the consequences of the climate crisis. More than 410,000 people have died from natural disasters since 2010, and some 1.7 billion people have lost their homes, animals, farmland or livelihoods because of these disasters. The number of weather-related natural disasters has risen by nearly 35 percent every decade since the 1990s. Due to warming up, the ice caps are melting, because of this (and due to the thermal expansion of the oceans) sea levels are rising which threatens to overflow coastal areas and the habitats of billions of people (IFRC, 2019). Biodiversity and the species diversity are declining with the increase of temperatures, extreme weather events (heat waves, droughts; heavy rains, changes in rainfall distribution, more and more hectic rainfall; more frequent forest fires, storms and hurricanes) become more and more typical. As a result, much more unpredictable weather becomes the new norm - making life more difficult to plan. In some areas, water shortages are becoming permanent, which is radically changing, eliminating the possibility of growing food in many places. Diseases that were previously unknown appear in those areas. Because of all this, it is inevitable that large masses of people will leave their homes that have become uninhabitable and begin to migrate to where still there are or at least better living conditions (IFCR, 2020). This can be helped by

human traffickers, whose presence is constant in these developing countries, but their presence is multiplying in a hopeless situation caused by unexpected natural disasters.

The practical experience shows that the international community does not protect the most vulnerable groups from human traffickers, although this would be its primary responsibility. Furthermore, these countries, which are hardest hit by natural disasters, do not receive a sufficient share of the financial funds that the world spends to offset climate change. Somalia is most at risk from the adverse effects of climate change: in the form of droughts, floods, tropical storms and climate-related diseases and because of these the dangers of human trafficking are emerging as a consequence of the environmental migration (IFCR, 2018).

Nevertheless, Somalia does not benefit from most of the resources that could be devoted to tackling climate change, in the global list of beneficiaries, the African country ranks only 71st (IFCR, 2020).

The concept of human trafficking

Concerning the protection and rehabilitation of victims at the region of Somalia, it is important to separate the concepts of human trafficking and human smuggling, whereas in most cases, due to misidentification, victims of human trafficking are defined by the authorities as prostitutes who voluntarily choose this way of life. Human traffickers forcibly remove their victims from their homeland or they are sold by their own parents but there are many cases too in which they flee from poverty in search of reliable work, much of which unfortunately proves to have been only a false promise. Of course, in this case, we are no longer talking about human smuggling, but human trafficking.

In contrast, the main point of human smuggling is that people who want to emigrate pay the human smugglers for the transportation to the desired destination country (Herman et al., 2004).

Most emigrants become indebted from for the rest of their lives to pay for the cost of the ouptrip, in the hope of a new, free life while remaining slaves forever. This gr of migrants works as a slave for their smugglers and in case of women the most common form of exploitation is prostitution. Many young girls are being seduced by false promises from their country, encouraging them to be able to support their families in this way, but in reality, this work means only and exclusively prostituted work (Czine, 2011).

The methods of human traffickers are various. Due to the complexity of the concept of human trafficking and the different perceptions of the countries, it is difficult to define the concept of human trafficking precisely.

Pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation 55/25 of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, concluded in Palermo on 12 December 2000, the following definitions apply to human



trafficking: victim collection-recruitment, transportation, hiding, coercion, restraint, seduction, physical abuse (UNODOC, 2000, p.42.).

Human trafficking can be interpreted as a crime where victims for prostitution are mostly women and children.

However, the scope of subsequent conventions already extends to both sexes – therefore, both women and men can be victims of human trafficking. However, political statements and research emphasize that most victims are women and girls of human trafficking for material sexual exploitation (UNODC, 2020).

Since the countries have different criminal laws and cultural traditions, many cases are not recognized as human trafficking, but instead, the exploited victims are treated as criminals.

Due to globalization and the differences between fast-developing and slow-developing countries, different industrial environments and labor requirements are emerging.

This creates a higher standard of living and produces increased labor demand in some places. In contrast, it results a significant free supply of labor in poor regions flowing in organized or unorganized, legal or illegal ways into key and attractive labor markets, which is intensified by natural disasters due to climate change (Póczyk, 2008).

In this sense, we can state emphatically that the problem of human trafficking is a synthesis of many problems.

One such problem is environmental migration, which is part of the concept of illegal migration and which arises in the event of a hopeless situation resulting from natural disasters. In other words, many people leaving the disaster-stricken area become victims of human trafficking, as they find themselves in a vulnerable position where they can no longer shape their own destiny, their lives depend on the decisions of the traffickers.

The solution would be a degree of prevention in which countries adopt a uniform criterion treating the perpetrators to the same extent in all countries. A good example of this is convention of the European Commission of 2011 with the title "Report on the progress made in the fight against trafficking in human beings", which lays down the same criteria for each Member State for the tracing and conviction of the perpetrator and the rehabilitation of the victim, which was completed in 2016 with further additions (COM (2016) 267 final, 2016).

It is estimated that more than one million children are placed on the sex market worldwide each year, mainly from developing countries that are inflicted by unexpected natural disasters triggered by climate crisis. The same proportion of human traffickers exploit children as factory and farm workers. According to accurate data, 170 million minors perform forced labor by human traffickers in unworthy conditions (Holt, 2018).

We must mention the participation of children in armed struggles and their active role in drug trafficking, which is also operated and controlled by human trafficking networks

(Tiefenbrun, 2007). In addition, it is extremely common to train children from areas affected by environmental migration to be pickpockets in western, more developed countries such as the United Kingdom. It is also not uncommon for children to be considered domestic servants later (Jones, 2012, pp. 77-94).

It is difficult to find a uniform definition of the exploitation of vulnerable children, which is present in all cultures and social conditions and is of equal importance, as the practices of child labor vary from culture to culture. A good example of this is the fate of children in the third world who, despite their minority, regularly do heavy, strenuous physical work. Nevertheless, this does not cause outrage in local communities and authorities, as it has long been a common practice for children to participate in work (Bhalotra and Tzannatos, 2003). Forced child labor can be defined as a process that results in a significant deterioration in a child's performance at school, which work is done in the child's spare time or is degrading to the child (ILO, 2012). From these clear signs it is easy to deduce the forced labor done with children. According to the ILO, child prostitution and pornography are among the worst forms of forced labor required by traffickers, which, due to its complex nature, is the most horrific form of human trafficking (ILO, 2009). That is, children are repeatedly injured both physically and mentally, as in many cases, in addition to working around the house or in agriculture, they are also required to provide sexual services (Fehér et al., 2004, p. 91). In defining the concepts of human trafficking in minors, it is essential to define the types of sexual exploitation, which are: sex tourism, forced marriage, prostitution, sexual exploitation of children through intermediary's pornography, production, distribution of pornographic video, film, photo or sound recordings of children (UN, 2017, pp. 4-7). The commercial exploitation of children knows no borders, especially in areas where there is a particular demand for this terrible business and where this is ensured by the economic, social and legal situation. It is an unfortunate fact that we do not always know for sure the exact age and number of children exploited, which makes it fundamentally difficult to define the problem. Due to natural disasters, human traffickers in the area do not always export children to more developed countries, but many clients also travel to these less developed regions (Southeast Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean) to take advantage of child traffickers. The younger a child is, the more easily he or she is mentally impaired, as he or she does not yet have adequate mental protective and intellectual functions. In this sense, the younger a child underwent sexual exploitation, the more difficult it is to heal his or her mental wounds. Or, it can be said that the rehabilitation of a child with a more stable mental state is a much easier process (UNODC, 2020).

Clearly, the fact that the child has had to endure exploitation also matters a lot in terms of prevention. It is also an interesting fact that girls experience greater trauma as a result of sexual exploitation than boys. The relationship between the perpetrator and the child is also an important factor (Kovács, 1997). Regarding the "success" of offenders, it is important to note organized businesses, which, with their well-coordinated operation, can handle their "turnover" smoothly. Organized networks acquire marketable children in two ways. One such



method is the false promise given to families that they will offer the child homework that can be done in appropriate conditions. Of course, in many cases, parents are aware of sexual exploitation and pass it on to their child. And in the case of children orphaned by natural disasters and war events, the most common means is the already mentioned tempting promise and abduction without consent (Vermeulen, 2005).

Acculturation

The exploited victims escaping from the areas devastated by natural disasters, mainly at the region of Africa, are facing with demanding acculturation, which can cause a harmful, life-long distress. These factors can be defined as the main features of the challenging integration into the new surrounding. Developing a successful resilience-based program requires the determination of this process.

Acculturation was first addressed in 1936 by American anthropologists Redfield, Linton, and Herskovits. The details of the acculturation process have been defined, where groups of individuals from different cultures come into constant contact with each other, resulting in changes in the original cultural background of one or both groups. (Redfield et al., 1936, pp. 149-152). Based on this initial idea, the researchers created and further developed the theory of acculturation. The concept of acculturation coined by Kim (1976) has also become publicly accepted in the new field of research in which “phenomena have been addressed where groups of people had different cultures and were directly related to changes in patterns in one or both groups”. Van de Vijver and his fellow workers (1999, pp.149-162) defined acculturation as “the process of cultural change that results from the long-term, continuous, direct contact of individuals from different cultural backgrounds”. The history of acculturation typologies came to a halt in 1983 when Berry and colleagues developed the current classification of assimilation, separation, integration, and marginalization. The number of researches on acculturation has grown rapidly. Since 1983, new typologies have been born continuously (Bourhis et al., 1997, pp. 369-386). Berry (2001) argued that this ‘direct relationship’ results in changes at both the individual and group levels. The individual level refers to values, attitudes, beliefs, and identities, whereas the group level refers to the social cultural system. Kim (1976) also proposed a review of these studies at individual levels, which aimed to understand the experiences of individuals who:

- used to socialize in one culture and find themselves in a foreign and different culture;
- although a little, but depend on the host environment in terms of their personal and community needs;
- to some extent rely on direct contact and communication with their environment.

According to Berry (2001, pp. 615-631), inclusion is not equal to acculturation, inclusion is actually a consequence of acculturation. Nevertheless, the terms acculturation and

assimilation are sometimes used interchangeably (Gordon, 1964). Kim (1976) viewed intercultural inclusion as a process that takes place during communication and lasts as long as the individual remains in interaction with the receiving environment. About the relationship between cultures, Kim wrote (1976) that this occurs in individuals after enculturation (or socialization) in childhood, when they become recognized members of a given cultural community. In the process of enculturation, individuals socialize as a particular childhood cultural community. By the time an individual manages to enter a new or unfamiliar culture, he or she is going through a cultural learning process such as mastering the specifics of eating habits and holidays specific to that culture. Learning resocialization activities is like acquiring native cultural practice on a large scale. Therefore, it often seems that the individual begins the enculturation process again when he or she enters a new culture as he or she encounters newly arriving situations that are different from the original culture.

Deculturation, acculturation, and assimilation are considered intercultural inclusion because of the continuous process of intercultural interaction. Based on this, acculturation is the process that is usually defined in terms of some, but not all, aspects of the host cultural elements. The primary goal is to adapt to the host society that the individual must deal with. Besides learning the new, the old cultural elements are at least partially forgotten. Deculturation (or forgetting what has been learned) means that the individual learns new responses to specific situations and inevitably ignores old cultural rules. The fact that the individual loses something from the original culture is clear as something is re-acquired in cultural practice. That is, in a new cultural environment, the old is forgotten. Minimal contact with members of an ethnic community and those outside the community leads to deculturation because the individual does not apply his or her cultural practices.

Acculturation, and to some extent deculturation, occurs when an individual lives in a new culture where the elements learned in childhood are no longer used. The newly arriving individual makes internal transformations in the direction of assimilation, as the interaction of acculturation and deculturation is a strong indicator of the process. Assimilation expresses the individual's acceptance of the most important cultural elements of the host society. Under conditions related to intercultural inclusion, assimilation can be seen as the ultimate goal and motivate some immigrants for maximum adaptation. Some move between minimal acculturation and deculturation while retaining their own ethnic identity. Although individuals may vary in the level of overall adaptation, immigrants must face the stress of adaptive change (Kim, 1976).

Concerning the exploited victims, another key element of the integration has to be clarified. Acculturation Psychology is named after Hall (1904), who also studied acculturation as a recognized psychologist at Clark University. He argues that "first and second culture adoption" means the same learning process. In this sense, the natives assimilating to European settlers are relatives of youthful settlers who are still learning their own culture. He further described that shortly after their arrival in Plymouth, the settlers tried to assimilate the natives, even though the settlers were the immigrant minority. A good example of this is



that Harvard University was originally founded as an Indian University in 1636 (Hall, 1904). The first major psychological theory of acculturation was developed by social psychologists Thomas and Znaniecki (1918/2002) in 1918. Empirical studies of Chicago immigrants have hypothesized that the culture of a minority group is made up of shared behaviors and habits called schemas, a definition applied to individuals' families, ethnic communities, and occupations.

Bartlett (1923/1970), an English psychologist, also professed the theory that psychological dimensions are decisive in acculturation processes. Thomas and Znaniecki stressed that unresolved acculturational tensions can lead to "pathological development of social life" (Bartlett, 1923/1970, pp. 144–145). Bartlett was among the first to argue that the attitude of the minority towards the dominant culture is extremely important. If none of the cultures is dominant, this results in a mixture of cultures, and the dominance that appears during the phenomenon can lead to the complete cultural assimilation of one group or the formation of a permanent "compromise". The other dimensional statement is whether the minority intends to save its culture or tends to change it, which is ultimately what determines the battery outcome. Furthermore, Bartlett found that cultural similarity can facilitate assimilation, especially when emotional meanings can be easily transferred from the old practice to the new. Bartlett stressed that there are unique differences in personalities that are important to consider. In this sense, it can be predicted that the rebellious spirit will cause cultural change and assimilation. Despite the interest of the dominant society in acculturation to the minority group and the initial arguments that acculturation takes place along a hostile attitude, that is, most acculturation researchers assumed, as did Bartlett (1923/1970), that the minority group was assimilated to the majority, which significantly determines and influences the process of acculturation, because of which there is a high probability that the minority may become ill in a sociological sense. This is also supported by the theory of Thomas and Znaniecki (1918/1958) that minority culture can be maintained or abandoned, which leads to theories that acculturation is a matter of adding and subtracting cultures.

In 1983, an interesting theory came to light that linked the loss of culture to the emergence of a confused state of mind, presumably caused by this loss. This type of acculturation has been called deculturation if it is transient and marginal if it is permanent. Furthermore, it has been argued that this is "an opportunity that is difficult to define precisely, probably because it is accompanied by a high degree of collective and individual confusion and anxiety" (Berry, 1983, p. 69).

Some thinkers, including Voget (1951, pp. 220-230), emphasize that all types of acculturation imply difficulties, anxiety, or other negative consequences. Ross (1920) argued that biculturalism is a compromise that evokes anxiety about giving up what one is actually entitled to. Redfield et al. (1936, p. 152) said that this "spiritual conflict" can be traced back to the fact that we try to harmonize different social behaviors and norms, as is the case with the adoption of biculture.

Overall, behavioral changes and patterns in the transition from one culture to another significantly determine an immigrant's ability to integrate into a given society, which is significantly hampered by acculturation stress resulting from new cultural challenges.

Culture and identity

In discussing this topic, it is also essential to clarify the definition of culture. According to Edward Taylor: "Culture, or civilization in the broader ethnographic sense, is a complex whole that includes knowledge, beliefs, art, law, morality, customs, and all other skills and behaviors that one acquires as a part of society." (Tylor, 1997, pp. 108-127.) Despite many well-founded criticisms, it is worth addressing this definition because it makes some particularly important findings. First, it states that people are not born with a particular culture but are constantly mastering it as part of society. This means that although the acquisition of culture is a universal human ability, cultural differences do not develop through genetic but through social learning. Culture is not the medium of the individual, but of the group. As for the specific nature of communication, each community creates its own communication rules and codes to reconcile the report, however, during the trial, not only the content of the information but also the identity of the interlocutors is a central issue.

Every communication process has a dual content, which concerns information on the one hand and relationship on the other. In addition, proper word choice, style, tone, emphasis are all involved in defining the relationship. According to Goffman (2015), participants in a communication interaction behave as if they were on stage, i.e., play more or less written roles (student, husband, bank manager, unemployed, etc.), which roles may be associated with certain type of situations. During the communication process, the role of the public is to continuously monitor compliance with the norms and communication rules related to the given role. In the communication game, the greatest punishment for the individual is the loss of his symbolic capital and personality, since the primary goal of each actor in the interaction is to create a positive impression, that is, to acknowledge his or her own identity. The process may be complicated by the fact that symbolic capital is not available indefinitely, and we must constantly compete with other members of society to obtain it. On the other hand, maintaining this positive impression in the absence of cooperation is an impossible goal. That is, keeping our own identity works only and exclusively by respecting the identity of the other individual, which we try to implement by developing complex algorithms, i.e., strategies that Goffman (2015) refers to as the collective name for facade protection.

It follows from all that successful intercultural communication requires that, while protecting and shaping our own identity, we respect and acknowledge the deep layers of the other's identity. If we do not convey resentment, it will be much easier for us to convey our own message to individuals with other cultural characteristics. The subsequent reintegration of exploited minors from areas affected by natural disasters is hampered by several stressors, such as the horror of the disaster they experienced in their country, the search for security



along the way, the exploitation by human traffickers, and finally the difficulties of integrating into a new environment. Surveys of these children clearly show the emergence of mental illness due to environmental migration, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, or generalized anxiety disorder. These types of mental illness cause significant difficulties for orphaned minors, as it hinders integration within the school and other institutional frameworks. Thus, the need for mental rehabilitation is indisputable, one of the outstandingly useful media of which could be the institution of education, either following the infrastructural restoration of disaster-stricken areas or in the context of a new environment. Due to the increasing intensity of the phenomenon, ensuring the mental health of this vulnerable group is essential for host countries (Hodes, 2000).

Traumatic experiences that cause mental problems for minors from disaster-stricken areas occur in the following situations:

Traumas along the way, mostly the results of abuse by human traffickers, multiply the traumatic experiences suffered during the war. The journey, which lasts for several months, involves many dangers for the minor refugees, as most of them start their journey as orphans or are sent by her own family in the hope of a better life. Due to the chaotic situation caused by natural disasters, the border guard is unable to perform its task, which significantly facilitates the export of minors from the country (Russel, 1999). Traffickers can easily circumvent border control even in countries with well-established disaster response and border control. After crossing the border, they are forced to engage in sexual and other slave-type work using the means of exploitation and physical violence (Ayott, 2001).

It is extremely stressful for children to integrate into the new environment, where the first step is to prove the victim status of either refugees or human traffickers from environmental migration. During integration, these minors experience a so-called “secondary” trauma, as they must integrate into a community with a completely different culture than their own. As a result, the primary medium of integration, the school, also contributes to additional mental difficulties, as they must integrate and make friends in the absence of knowledge of culture and language (Richman, 1998). Risk factors that contribute to the development of mental problems among minors fleeing environmental migration:

Parental factors (Pynoss, 2001):

- absence of parents;
- post-traumatic stress experienced by either parent;
- mothers with depression;
- torture of mothers;
- mourning for dead parents;
- parents' direct experience of feeling helpless;
- underestimation of stress affecting children by parents;

- parental unemployment.

Child factors (Garmezy, 1994)

- experiencing traumatic events directly and indirectly;
- significant language barriers;
- post-traumatic stress, which can result in long-term vulnerability to stressful conditions;
- physical problems or malnutrition due to psychosocial symptoms.

Environmental factors (Wood, 1993)

- the vicious road;
- poverty;
- the long period of determination of refugee or victim status;
- cultural isolation;
- period spent in a refugee camp or orphanage;
- the novel environment of the host country;
- school and find a peer group.

Post-traumatic stress disorder

- avoidance of conscious stimuli, constant stuttering, fear of loneliness, withdrawal;
- the trauma plays again and again in him, nightmares, hallucinations;
- feeling of helplessness and constant fear;
- the body is in constant “alarm”, in standby mode, irritability;
- disoriented behaviour, lack of concentration;
- anxiety disorders;
- increased irritability, restlessness;
- various sleep disorders;
- physical symptoms such as headache, abdominal pain;
- depression;
- lack of interest and joy, deteriorating of school performance.

The importance of school environment and education

Traumatic events affect a child’s emotional and cognitive development, and consequently affect a child’s definition of their own personality and the judgment and acceptance of other people.

However, it is extremely difficult to find the right treatment to process and treat the traumatic experiences of these children. I.e. the usefulness of clinical therapies can be disputed among children refugees / victims of environmental migration, whereas most clinical



practices use these therapies among children who have experienced one-off traumas (flood, school shooting), as opposed to children experiencing both natural disaster and exploitation, who experience constant anxiety due to prolonged insecurity and an orphan situation. In this sense, there is a need for a complex therapy that combines individual, family and school-based treatments. Drama and music, as well as art therapy, often used by cognitive behavioral therapy in one-off traumatic experiences, may also be useful in rehabilitating minor victims of human trafficking who have fled migration because of their environment (Lefcourt, 1984).

Overall, juvenile victims with severe mental symptoms and unstable personality may pose a potential safety risk to the host society, in this sense, it is in the interest of a given country to support integration within the school framework (Rudolph, 2001). However, it is a much more important factor that refugee children experiencing both natural disaster and exploitation are a group of vulnerable minors who are easily forgotten by most migration policies and institutions. In this sense, the development of rehabilitation measures for them is a matter of great urgency.

Methods – The resilience-based programs:

Characteristics of intercultural communication

The resilience-based programs could be appropriate method in order to help the victims of trafficking from the African region. These programs contain the intercultural communication as a main tool of prevention, rehabilitation or mental featured treatments.

Intercultural communication is complex phenomenon. In this sense, the process of communication means not just the transmission of messages, but rather the interaction between different cultures. A practical examination of intercultural communication in this case means an examination of situations in which individuals with different cultural skills, codes, and abilities communicate and collaborate with each other (Földes, 2007).

Based on historical approaches, we can call the phenomenon of intercultural communication in the conventional sense, which involves the encounter, the regular or possible contact between different cultures. From the point of view of cultural history, intercultural contact gained special significance during the discoveries for the first time in history (Bitterli, 1982). It is an indisputable fact that the early connection of different cultures is a significant historical part of intercultural communication. Nevertheless, when examining the significance of intercultural communication, the historical time interval of the phenomenon is not the main research aspect, but rather in what social medium, historical environment the concept of intercultural communication, developed. Based on this principle, the process takes place between individuals from different cultures, in which individuals who communicate with each other can be defined as the products of a culture, who have patterns of behaviour and thinking specific to that culture, fixed by their own culture. According to

many theories, intercultural communication cannot be interpreted as a separate process, but as part of a cognitive perspective defined by society.

Based on this theory, it is essential to examine the concept of culture as well as theories of cultural differences.

It can be clearly stated that the theoretical basis of intercultural communication, the observable peculiarities of the attitude, i.e., the norms of characteristic of the given culture, are the manifestations of the worldview.

Hall (1987) distinguishes between context-poor and context-rich communication. In many cultures, communication takes place primarily through context, that is, the resulting messages — the distance between the communicating parties, their location in space, or their clothes and ornaments — are considered much more than messages conveyed by language or any other code. Our European societies are among the context-poor cultures compared to migrants from cultures outside Europe and North America. As a result, we have difficulty or often little ability to decode messages from the environment carried by the communication framework, while paying close attention to explicit verbal and nonverbal messages. This process is particularly important in the psychosocial, social, and educational professions, which are based on direct and easy-to-interpret interviews.

Resilience-based approach and management of human trafficking

One of the effective tools for the preventive and rehabilitative solution of the exploitation of vulnerable groups can be the application of resilience in practice. Resilience is not only an *ability* for communities to respond immediately to events with a negative impact, but also an ever-changing *process*, like a process that shows the ever-changing face of human trafficking (Sáfár, 2020). Therefore, responding is also a much more complex process than dealing with the consequences of a natural disaster, and in this sense requires a comprehensive approach. Elements of a successful yet long-term approach are preparedness, relief and recovery. Resilience-based programs created for this purpose should be flexible, as both communities and circumstances are constantly changing. The problem can be interpreted as complex from a security point of view, so the existing experiences and strategies developed in different areas must be interpreted and applied in a unified and integrated way for the purpose. A preventive and rehabilitative solution to human trafficking in disaster-stricken areas can be tackled much more effectively and efficiently by setting aside resilience-based programs that use multiple perspectives and know-how in different areas, aside from traditional, disciplinary principles (IFCR, 2016).



Discussion

During the past years it became obvious that the environmental migration process caused by sudden natural disasters, becomes even more intense in which question human trafficking means a special challenge. Due to its global nature, it is a cross- border phenomenon worldwide, so the increase in the intensity of human trafficking as a result of the current environmental migration affects the territory of Africa too. The image and characteristics of the migration phenomenon have changed in recent years significantly. This means that human trafficking that previously existed on its own, has become an integral part of migration. Human traffickers see extraordinary gains in the increasingly intensive environmental migration phenomenon and take advantage of the economic gains implied by the huge human mass. Sexual exploitation committed by human traffickers contributes to the development of mental problems. This life-long trauma makes the integration into the target country more difficult. The targets of the human traffickers are mostly the unprotected minors without parental supervision temporarily or permanently. Resilience-based programs that contain appropriate intercultural communication skills and psychosocial aid may contribute to the recovery and integration of the victims of Somalia.

Conflict of interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

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An illusion of exoticism:

The evolution of the perception of Africa in Poland (1945-1989)

Błażej Popławski¹

Abstract:

The aim of this article is to describe the evolution of the perception of Africa, especially the Sub-Saharan part, and its inhabitants in Poland between 1945 and 1989 on the basis of official documents, literary sources, and memoirs. It is possible to assume that the process of conventionalization of the symbols generated the image of the “Dark Continent” and the substantial modification of the language of cognition – from “Afro-Optimistic” in the early 1960s to “Afro-Pessimistic” in the 1980s. This change was caused by various factors: cold-war geopolitics, anticolonial and “fraternal aid” rhetoric, frequency of social interaction, more visible presence of Africans in the cultural landscape of Poland, and liberalization in terms of “passport politics” in the People’s Republic of Poland (in Polish: Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa, PRL).

Keywords:

Africa; People’s Republic of Poland; perception; exoticism; stereotype; Afro-Pessimism.

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“Racism and colonialism are pathologies of recognition. (...) We look at Africa as we have been taught by Henryk Sienkiewicz – from under the cork helmet of Stas, from the height of the palanquin of Nel. God forbid, from the perspective of Kali! In a country where black people still aren’t called black, because we have better determination, and where people used to say “one hundred years behind blacks,” it’s sometimes worth to echo what Slawomir Mrozek said “black is the same man as white, just black.” (Tokarska-Bakir, 2011, p. 15)

Introduction: Discovery of Africa – toward periodization

In the Polish language, the phrase „discovery of America” means “proving an obvious truth.” “The rediscovery of Africa” – as the title of the book written by Basil Davidson (Davidson 1959) may be travestied – had a different character. After the end of the Second World War, the level of knowledge about Africa in the Polish society was negligible, and *the first studies on the countries of the “Third World” were simplistic, sometimes even clumsy* (Prokopczuk 1983). Initially, books concerned with Sub-Saharan Africa, published or translated in post-war Poland, described it in the language marked by martyrdom, exposition of suffering and oppression of innocents. The experience of colonialism in Africa was compared to the nation’s own cataclysmic periods: the partitions of Poland (1795-1918), or to the occupation of Poland by Nazi Germany (1939-1945), and the anticolonial movements were compared to the November Uprising (1830-1831), or to the January Uprising (1863-1864). This kind of parallel was quite easy to recognize and accept for Polish people born before 1918.

In the fifties “hate speech” – against the western oppressor mixed with the “language of compassion” to the oppressed – was supposed to gain the reader’s empathy for Africans and the hatred for the powers of the Western bloc: *we send [British] young men to use a whip, to destruct eardrums, similar to the practice of the Gestapo in Auschwitz and Sachsenhausen* (Kartun, 1955, p. 5). At the same time, writers emphasized the uniqueness of the post-war period for Africa: *we need to know more about the continent* (Kartun, 1955, p. 9). The thirst for knowledge about Africa was a result of a dynamic change of socio-political situation, transformation of thus far a neutral space into a sphere of conflict between two blocks. The language of description was an example of “hate speech” antagonizing worlds and social groups and, what is worth mentioning, predicting the imminent success of the communist ideology in the Third World: *the man who is able to read the instructions on how to circumvent the pneumatic drill can (...) read “The Communist Manifesto”* (Kartun, 1955, p. 8).

After the Second World War there were almost no Africans living in Poland except just a few (Sredzinski, 2010, pp. 173-175). In the capital city there was only one Nigerian, Agbola August – he arrived in Poland in 1922, took part in the Warsaw Uprising, and after 1945 worked as a pianist in several restaurants (Osinski, 2010, pp. 97-99). It was possible to meet the delegates from Africa during congresses conceptualized and approved by the Soviet Union – World Congress of Intellectuals in Defence of Peace (Wroclaw, 1948) with the participation of Aimé Césaire (Knopek, 2013, p. 132). However, the audience of these events



was limited to politicians and activists from the largest cities from Poland (Codogni, 2010, p. 117-120).

It should be noticed that before the death of Stalin (1953), and the outbreak of the Algerian War of Independence (1954), and the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1956), Russian policy focused its main attention on the Asia. The Fifth World Festival of Youth and Students (1955) launched the “thaw” understood in the sense of the birth of joyous and unfettered curiosity of an exotic Third World among Poles. The Festival was organized by the World Federation of Democratic Youth, an international organization, which described itself as an anti-imperialist and left-wing movement. The motto of the Festival – “For Peace and Friendship – Against the Aggressive Imperialist Pacts” – showed the real ideological background of the event: the concept of the peaceful coexistence introduced by Nikita Khrushchev, and also the legacy of the Bandung Conference. The context of the Festival should be also associated with Cold War politics: incorporation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, establishment of the Warsaw Pact, and – of course – propaganda of success of the communist regimes in Eastern Bloc. Not coincidentally the most important events took place in the “showcases” of the PRL: newly constructed the Palace of Culture and Science, and the July Manifesto 10th-Anniversary Stadium (Krzywicki, 2012, pp. 37-31).

Black Africans were a rarity at the Festival (from among 30,000 participants there were 1000 people from Africa, and only c.a. 100-200 from Sub-Saharan region), yet Varsovians long remembered their “dances” in Agricola Park or strolls around the capital city. Andrzej Krzywicki characterized the whole event as the “Post-Stalinist carnival of joy”. He wrote: *A view of a Black person was unusual and unique* (Krzywicki, 2009, p. 301). *The Festival certainly broadened the horizons of Varsovians, forced them to reflect, and – in some way – changed the perception of reality, which had been confronted with the experience of the Other* (Krzywicki, 2012, p. 40).

However, a proper local “discovery” of Africa, the emergence of the continent in the perceptual horizon of the Poles, followed the Year of Africa (1960). From this caesura, calls for international cooperation were made, social and research institutions – different friendship societies, committees for solidarity – were established (the structure of them resembled their Soviet prototypes). In the sixties the icon of Africa became Patrice Lumumba – “the martyr of the whole continent” (Anculewicz, 2010, p. 117). Poles celebrated the *Day of Lumumba* (the anniversary of his execution). Several avenues in Warsaw, Olsztyn, Lodz and Szczecin were named “Lumumba Street”. A district of Lodz, where Student Houses were situated, was called “Lumumbowo”. Also “Polityka” magazine established a special scholarship for Africans: the “Lumumba Fund” (Rakowski, 1998, pp. 273, 294).

The utopian gestures of Polish diplomacy towards Africa revealed the weakness and narrow manoeuvring space on the part of the Foreign Ministry. The level of sovereign decision making capacity in foreign policy was limited by Moscow, but there were some

exceptions – Poles sometimes became middlemen between Soviet Union and African countries which were quite sceptical of communism (for example: Ivory Coast [Knopek, 2013, pp. 182-183]). Certainly, Sub-Saharan Africa could not play any important role in the international trade of the PRL. The importance of the continent for the economy of the communist regime, despite far-reaching plans, turned out to be poor in the seventies.

The perception of the process of “discovering” Africa in Poland coincided with the undermining of the confidence in European models and theories of development – both socialist and capitalist. The Year of Africa (1960) preceded a watershed in culture (1968). This date can be seen as the symbolic end of “grand narratives,” demythologization of megalomaniacal post-Enlightenment discourse about the “burdens of the white man,” the duty of *mission civilisatrice* which “should” be carried to the Third World. *We understood that the research instruments in the classical disciplines are not sufficient for the recognition of reality of non-European territories; these instruments, formed in the circle of European civilization, are not able to show all the interdependencies that occur in a highly diverse “Third World.” This was especially true for mindsets, systems of values, socio-economic relationships* (Prokopczuk, 1983, p. 12). Step by step, researches questioned the existence of European based global civilization, the idea of a hierarchy of cultures. The onset of more relative interpretations was connected with the development of postcolonial studies, defining the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized not in the form of binary opposition, but in the form of a hybrid identity. In a dialogue with Africa a new vision of Europe had developed.

These ideas were slowly transferred to the PRL. In the late sixties and seventies the social perception of Africa was, however, still profoundly influenced by Polonocentric and Eurocentric depiction of the world. Europeans created an image of Africa that was the perverse opposite of Europe’s – its mirror image. This kind of perception was caused by: limited opportunity to travel to Africa, negligible presence of Africans in Poland, as well as the relatively homogeneous structure of the Polish society. Auto-stereotypes of Poles played an important role in shaping the image of Africa there. The most significant symbolic correlates of the collective identity of the nation were: the appreciation of such values as patriotism, tradition, Catholicism, national megalomania, or – created in the late Middle Ages, and supported in a modified form to this day – the myth of *antemurale christianitatis*, a boundary that separates the western civilization from “barbarians” (Tazbir, 1987). Such an auto-stereotype of Poles is saturated with non-multicultural, but ethnocentric content, which has a significant impact on the perception of other cultures.

It seems that another factor highly influencing the perception of Africans in Poland was – conceptualized by the Russian sociologist Alexander Zinoviev, and popularized in Poland by Fr. Jozef Tischner – the model of *homo sovieticus* – *a client of communism enslaved by the communist system, feeding on goods that communism has to offer. (...) It was possible to recognize him by a specific type of irresponsibility that was not a simple lack of responsibility, but presence of positive irresponsible – irresponsible with pretensions. (...) [He was] always*



full of demands, always ready to blame others rather than himself, insanely suspicious, infiltrated by a consciousness of misfortune, incapable of self-sacrifice. (...) Communism diffused in the country sui generis hermeneutics of human behaviour, which is rightly called the "hermeneutics of suspicion." (...) [This model of hermeneutics] *has left a trail of universal suspicion* (Tischner, 2005, pp. 141, 189-191). Tischner draws attention to the lack of empathy, instrumental treatment of social relationships by *homo sovieticus*. These features influenced the perception of "strangers." This conclusion was confirmed by representatives of the African diaspora, suggesting that the suspicion, intolerance and hypocrisy of Poles were immanent elements of the daily life in the Eastern Bloc (Krupinska, 2002, p. 39).

Opinions of Poles, who had contact with Africans, were testimonies of a cultural clash. Africa was usually imagined, reconstructed and designed on the basis of a discourse marked by Manichaean oppositions (according to evolutionist discourse: civilized – uncivilized, developed – backward, progressive – primitive; according to Marxian philosophy: progressive, revolutionary, national liberation – backward, imperialist, neo-colonial). One of the Polish journalists justified his excursion to Africa by saying: *We are from Poland, which is also a socialist state. We try to get to know the countries following the same path, to understand the people living there, their lives and problems* (Pol, 1987, p. 220).

Edward Said, in his groundbreaking work "Orientalism," assumed that the way of describing the Orient (the category may include the territory of Africa) is not only a way of thinking, but also a method of domination. Referring to the work of Michel Foucault, Said believed that the present image of the "Other" carries a hidden function of legitimizing the special epistemological status of the Europeans. By explaining, domesticating and organizing reality, the process reveals a Eurocentric, counter-dialogical and unquestionable vision of the world. Images of Africa are subordinate to – as a social anthropologist Arjun Appadurai wrote – essentialization (idealization of qualities which are attributed to them), exotization (highlighting the contrasts between the knowing subject and the instrumentally treated "others") and totalization (representation of African societies as an undifferentiated unity) (Appadurai, 1996).

The observations of socio-economic and political processes in the Global South have undermined the Marxist paradigm, claimant to the right to universal explanations. Finding the "leading role of the proletariat" in non-urbanized and unindustrialized countries, finding elements of socialism in eclectic and polysemantic declarations of African politicians, showing the impact of "base" on "superstructure" were perhaps an intellectually idle venture (Bobrowski, 1985, p. 284). For some researchers to study Afro-Socialism or Afro-Communism was a way of learning about "true" socialism, or "socialism with a human face" for others it was just an attempt to rescue the ideology of socialism itself (Solarz, 2009, p. 126).

The "discovery" of Africa made by Polish intellectuals has resulted in the creation of original and innovative works – e.g.: studies conducted by Marian Malowist on the World-

System (Malowist, 1964; 1969), the work of Michal Kalecki on mixed regimes (Kalecki, 1985). Analyses of such an exotic topic as “Africa” forced Polish researchers to intensify interdisciplinary collaboration (seminars of doctors, geographers, historians, economists, linguists), and between different nations (Paris very quickly became the most important place for exchanging relevant scientific ideas [Kula, 2010]). Some researchers chose Africa as the main target of their work because they wanted to “escape” from ideological plots and find an area partly free of censorship (Poplawski, 2012d). Roman Stopa – one of the “fathers” of the studies of African languages in Poland – wrote in his memories: *In my research practice I often met with questions, or even with the allegations: “And for what, and to whom it is useful?” I think that my work – quiet, devoid of any advertising – has its own justification and its own scientific usefulness* (Stopa, 1995, p. 103). About his students Stopa wrote: *they have demonstrated youthful enthusiasm, diligence, abilities, but also a feature of a researcher which is very rare in today's commercialized time – they showed “passion for science”* (Stopa, 1995, p. 175).

Another Afro-Enthusiast, Jan Giedwidz – a member of the economic delegation which was sent by the Polish authorities to Africa in 1960 – wrote in his memoirs: *There is a wide audience for everyday information, people hungry of knowledge about everything new and unknown, “ordinary readers” of newspapers and books who actually know nothing about current revolution in Africa. (...) Unfortunately, popularization of knowledge of the Dark Continent among Poles (...) did not keep up with the dynamics of global changes. Polish interests in Africa (...) are very much alive. It is quite understandable if we take into account that Poles used to sympathize with those who fight for national liberation* (Giedwidz, 1962, pp. 21, 218).

Polish authorities understood the necessity of creating specialized think tanks, and interdisciplinary institutions, concerned with multidimensional promotion of knowledge about Africa. Surely, it would not be possible without the involvement of prominent scientists – economist Michal Kalecki, linguist Stefan Strelcyn, sociologist Jozef Chalasinski, archaeologist Wladyslaw Filipowiak, and historian Marian Malowist (Poplawski, 2014). Thanks to their efforts, interdisciplinary research teams were created in the sixties, such as: Centre of African Studies (University of Warsaw), Laboratory of Social and Cultural Issues (Polish Academy of Sciences), Department of Intercollegiate Division of Least Developed Countries' Economical Problems (University of Warsaw – Main School of Planning and Statistics, currently – Warsaw School of Economics), Department of the History and Culture of the People of West Africa (National Museum in Szczecin) (Slojewska, 1965). The most important institution which undertook the effort to promote awareness about African cultures was the Polish-African Friendship Society (established in 1962; in the early seventies it consisted of more than 3000 members). Unfortunately, this organization quickly transformed into a think-tank, concentrating on scientific research and neglecting the purpose of popularization of Africa in Polish society. Another organization, the Polish Committee for Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America (established in



1965) focused on political and ideological purposes and the cooperation with Latin America and Asia (Poplawski, 2012c).

Public opinion research initiatives

During the PRL period there were only a few public opinion research initiatives dedicated to Africans. Of particular note are: two monographs written by Paulo de Carvalho, an Angolan who graduated from the University of Warsaw, and a brief study by Antonina Kloskowska (Kloskowska, 1962). In an academic article published just after the Year of Africa, the Polish sociologist examines the image of Africans among high school students in Lodz and Opole (probably it is possible to generalize the results of the survey to other Polish cities). The major conclusion of the study – apart from the appreciation of “national liberation”, “anticolonial” and “socialist” threads among Polish youth – can be summarized as follows: reduction of prejudice is a function of age. The youngest did not see the diversity of Africans and were quite afraid of them. Some of them believed in the image of Africa as a one country inhabited by fantastical beasts and cannibals who speak one “African” language. Their perception focused on the physical differences between races. Older students willingly agreed to a more intensive contact with their peers from Africa. Fear gave way to curiosity and sympathy. On the margin of the report, Kloskowska mentions the stereotyping image of Africa, enumerating the institutions with the strongest influence in this matter: family, school, literature, and mass media. *Kloskowska suggests that Poles were not aware of the fact that they know little about Africa.*

On the other hand, Carvalho in “The attitudes of Varsovians towards ethnical and racial groups” (Carvalho, 1987) shows the results of the survey he had conducted together with his wife among foreigners who studied in Poland and among Poles who had most frequent contact with foreigners. The second group consisted of employees of: Student Houses, LOT Polish Airlines, various cultural institutions, shops, hotels and academics. The study is the proof of culture shock between Africans and Poles (Pleskot, 2012, p. 24).

Poles did not know about the cultures of Africa almost at all. What they thought they knew about was mainly stereotypes, frequently loaded with a certain patronizing tonality. The cultures of Africans remained on a lower stage of development for them. None of Carvalho’s respondents were able to identify a single writer or politician of African origin. Of the whole cultural area, the strongest associations came about such elements of folk culture as Masai tribe dances or playing drums. The most generally known facts from African political history were slavery, colonialism, and the national liberation movement. Africa evoked several associative areas: beautiful, wild nature, underdevelopment, backwardness, savagery. “Negros” were described by Poles as: lazy, shy, loud and smooth, rich, spending time in discos and libraries – due to “questionable intellectual potential.” Polish students also envied Africans’ preferential ‘treatment’ by Polish lecturers and the effortless manner of them getting the permission to move abroad (especially to Berlin and Vienna, where it was

possible to get scarce goods and sell them after a return trip to Poland). *The most positive opinions were presented by women between 16 and 20, the worst judgements – by blue collar workers between 21 and 35.*

Carvalho, in addition to the quantitative survey, conducted a series of unstructured interviews. Parts of responses were cited in the work, e.g.: *we have witnessed the accident, when an old gentleman shouted with smile – “Oh! His teeth are not black!” [...]. Together with our friends we visited the zoological garden in Wloclawek. Suddenly, we realised that we were greater attraction for visitors than animals in cages. Some people smiled looking at us – others, not only children, pointed their fingers at us with amusement.* Africans pleasantly remembered the contacts with ministerial authorities, lecturers, teachers, workers of Polish airlines. However, their recollection of taxi drivers was the most negative.

A few years later, in a comprehensive monograph “Foreign students in Poland” (Carvalho, 1990) the Angolan scientist partly confirmed his results from the previous research. The next survey was made on a representative sample. According to the results, Poles perceived Africans in a more critical and political way, as a peculiar “heart of darkness” with permanent civil wars, economic ruin, and governmental mismanagement. Perception of African students was based on the belief that they were “parasites”, because their scholarships were funded by Polish authorities. The list of prejudices comprises new stereotypes: *Poles believe that we brought AIDS to Poland; Girls who walk in a company of dark-skinned, are often considered to be prostitutes”* (Carvalho, 1990, pp. 87-88). Africa evoked several associative areas: bad living conditions, poverty, illnesses, refugees, humanitarian aid, and intertribal conflicts. The image became more pessimistic in comparison with the former research. It should be noticed that Africa was still portrayed as the “continent of extremes” – the image of phoenix-like “Africa Rising” from the sixties was replaced by the old stereotype of the Heart of Darkness, with Africans suffering from epidemics, poverty, famine and war.

Direct intercultural contact: Africans in Poland

An important factor in creating the image of Africans in Poland was connected with the student exchange programs. It is not possible to bring up the exact figure of the population of African students because of non-complementarity and inadequacy of historical sources.

According to Polish journalist Ewa Winnicka, *the Resolution of the Council of Ministers, which was in force until 1988, treated education of foreigners as charity motivated by the political and ideological way. It was like an internationalist duty to support the progressive forces of the world by a country with a socialist system in order to “dissolve the problem of the shortage of highly qualified staff, and the formation of a new intelligence”* (Winnicka, 2000, p. 94). The scholarship policy performed a duty of a kind of “derivative” of foreign policy. Polish authorities invited students from socialist countries as part of the strategy of



“fraternal aid”. There were many – definitely too many – institutions responsible for student exchange programs: Ministry of Education and Higher Education, Cooperation Committee on Economic and Scientific-Technical, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Ministry of Culture and the Arts, Main Committee for Physical Culture and Tourism, The Central Council of Trade Unions, Polish Committee for Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, Polish-African Friendship Society (Gasztold-Sen, 2012, p. 46). Their activities were not sufficiently coordinated. They also did not cooperate with the institutions established by foreigners: Polish Nationwide Committee of Foreign Students or minor organizations like African Students’ Association.

The first students from the Global South arrived in Poland in the early fifties. According to UNESCO statistics 183 foreigners studied in Poland in the year 1950 (Chilczuk, 2001). After the Khrushchev Thaw, the population of them gradually increased to the level of 700-1000 (Pleskot, 2012, p. 16). More than a half of them came from North Korea. Only a small part of them were from Sub-Saharan Africa.

In the sixties the number of foreigners studying in Poland rose gradually to more than 2500, representing almost 40 different countries of origin – the largest group – almost 30 percent – came from Vietnam. More significant numbers of African students came from Ethiopia and Ghana (more than 50 students), Nigeria and Sudan (more than 100 students), as well as from Kenya, Mozambique, and Zaire.

During the seventies the number of foreigners studying in Poland rose to almost 3000. More than one third of them came from the eastern part of the European continent, another one third – from Asia (people from Vietnam still constituted one third of all foreigners studying in Poland). The population of Africans doubled – the number of citizens of Sudan and Ethiopia decreased, the number of students from Nigeria and Kenya increased (Kierska, 1974).

Because of the imposition of martial law (1981-1983) the number of countries from which students came to Poland fell by more than half. However, the representation of the developing countries became – proportionally – more visible. The major groups of students from Africa were from Nigeria (90-180), Ethiopia (40-90), Sudan (10-70), Tunisia (40-60), and Algeria (40-60). The largest population of foreigners were born in Iraq, and Syria.

It is worth to add, that according to the overall number of diplomas granted to foreigners, the Asian countries occupied the first place (43 percent), led by Vietnam, Iraq, and Syria; European countries occupied second place (32 percent), and African countries occupied second place, led by Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Tunisia (18 percent).




Figure 1. Numbers of foreign graduates of Polish institutions of higher education between the years 1950-2000. Classified according to number of countries per continent of origin and by decade. (Source – own study based on data of the Central Statistical Office of Poland)

One would assume the physical presence of Africans in the public sphere might break some stereotypes about Africa, even despite the fact that the foreign students were “barracked” in a few centres functioning like ghettos. The possibility of interaction with Poles was limited to the area of several institutions. First of them was the Institute of Polish Language for Foreigners established in Lodz in 1952. Foreigners usually stayed there for one year. Next phase of the *rite de passage* took place in the universities (particularly – the University of Warsaw and the Jagiellonian University, which diplomas were recognized abroad without any complicated procedure of nostrification), polytechnics, medical academies (majority of students used to choose technical and medical disciplines [Gastold-Sen, 2012, pp. 48-49]). Foreigners spent their leisure time in Student Houses and special clubs founded for them (“The Three Continents” was the most popular place in Warsaw for dancing as well as for debating; the club was closed in 1974 after seven years of activity because of complaints of neighbours [Wieliczko, 1974]). Foreign students also had the possibility to participate in different kinds of trips generally organized by the Union of Polish Youth (1948-1957) or its successors – Union of Socialist Youth (1957-1976), Polish Socialist Youth Union (established in 1976). The perception of Poland from these journeys was limited to “Potemkin village” – showcases which were chosen to justify the success of the development of the PRL.

The process of acculturation and cultural exchange was thwarted. According to the opinions of many Africans, this policy of ghettoization and bureaucratic chaos were the most important reasons why they did not settle in Eastern Europe. A high number of Africans left Poland after finishing academic courses and broke the relations with Poles (Zagorski, 1971).



One should agree with Michal Chilczuk who wrote: *Unfortunately Polish institutions of higher education do not have the tradition of maintaining contact with their foreign alumni* (Chilczuk, 2001). For example, among Africans who studied in Poland were: Alpha Oumar Konare (President of Mali for two five-year terms, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, a member of the Club de Madrid); Fernando dos Reis Ganhão (Dean of the University of Lourenço Marques in Maputo, President of the National Olympic Committee, Vice President of the National Commission for UNESCO, President of the Council of Deans of Mozambique); João Têta (Dean of the Universidade Agostinho Neto, State Secretary for Science and Technology), Nassaro Wamchilowa Malocho (Minister of State and Vice Chairman Planning Commission of Tanzania).

Direct intercultural contact – Poles in Africa

The journeys of Poles to Africa – especially before the decision to liberalize “passport politics” in the late seventies – played an important role in shaping the image of Africa in Poland in more nuanced, contextualised and balanced way. Motivations and expectations of people who managed to go abroad were complicated: *in my mind lots of questions are intermingling – what will this continent become for me? A Promised Land, flowing with milk and honey, or a ground with thorns and thistles?* (Filipiec, 1998, p. 76). After returning home, they constituted an important, opinion-making group, which shaped the image of Africa in the Polish society. Their stories triggered curiosity, longing for adventure, and sometimes also anxiety and fear: *What can happen to the missionary from Africa, especially to a man, who had spent lots of time in the interior, when he comes back to Poland? (...) Firstly, people will perceive him as a freak, who escaped from the hell, or at least from purgatory. Then, they will think: why isn't he tanned or charred? Why doesn't he have animal hair?* (Kozłowiecki, 1998, p. 135).

Africa was the destiny of escapes – from political repression, or just from “the dullness” of real socialism. For many people, a journey to the south was a promise to satisfy the hunger of “otherness”. In the Dark Continent a lot of Poles felt *free as a bird* (Froch, 1997, p. 88). For many of them this was the dreamed continent, “Eldorado”: *Africa, where the parents [Krzysztof and Helena Goldfarb] arrived after the war, is a land of great opportunities – at least for the whites (...) [Father] rejoiced at the idea of a land where everything is new and devoid of history, where everything is like a tabula rasa, which – thanks to the energy and skills of Europeans – will be fulfilled (...) In his opinion, Africa is a cure for the European disease of bloody massacres and destruction. (...). It is a place where you can clear the memory of the painful recollections and start everything ab ovo. Africa is the last step on his way to a new identity* (Godwin, 2008, p. 190-192).

Lots of Polish journalists and filmmakers travelled to Africa. Their journeys have resulted in a series of essays, nonfiction writings printed in magazines, books and documentary films, which were often shown by Polish Television (Poplawski, 2012a). Another group of Poles

who decided to travel to Africa consisted of workers employed by local firms, in accordance with the “PolSERVICE” rules. Africa became the continent with the highest concentration of Polish scientific and technical personnel working abroad (from the sixties, Africa – mostly Maghreb and Nigeria – was the destination of 70-80 percent of this group [Knopek, 2013, p. 328]). After coming back to Poland they became highly influential experts in African matters, partly responsible for creation of the two – seemingly contradictory – images of Africa: the wealthy “King Solomon’s Mines” (Haggard, 1885) and an area in need of European humanitarian aid.

For many urban planners and architects, Africa presented a chance to realize ideologically unfettered projects, free of socialist-realist limitations. The situation of missionaries was quite similar – for them the decision to participate in a mission became the opportunity to leave the secularized and anti-Catholic regime. The unknown world appeared as the unstructured area, waiting for the architects (physical or moral).

Many Polish people travelled to Africa because of political reasons – employed by the Foreign Trade and Foreign Affairs Ministries. The reports, which were prepared by them, played an important role in official perception of Africa, as well as political and economic strategies for the Third World. Symptomatically, in the long and comprehensive memoirs of Jozef Winiewicz, Africa appears only once and in a very anecdotal way, indicating a total lack of interest in the continent: *Two stops in Maiduguri and Kano allowed me to see the local estate. I was not really interested in it, but I had nothing to do when I was waiting for the plane* (Winiewicz, 1985, p. 231).

It is not possible to rule out that many Poles travelled to Africa for ideological purposes: “fight” against imperialism or even against communism – e.g. mercenaries from Congo (Gan-Ganowicz, 1989), Biafra (Zumbach, 2000). These groups had some impact on the stereotype of Africa as the continent of Thucydidesian / Hobbesian “bellum omnia contra omnes” and Conrad’s “heart of darkness”, the area of permanent, bloody struggle between the “insurgents” and the “dogs of war.” For many Poles, Africa also played a role of “springboard” for further migration (it was especially noticeable during the period of martial law in Poland, when thousands of Poles migrated from Africa to Canada and the US).

It should be emphasized that the perspective of people arriving to Africa was *a priori* ordered and structured. It resembles a medical gaze, vividly described by Michel Foucault (Foucault, 1969). It is a form of collecting experiences, consuming senses, searching for authenticity in social performances. The dramaturgical approach, conceptualized in sociology by Ervin Goffman (Goffman, 1959), allows the interpretation of time spent in Africa in terms of a subjective ritual of re-presentations. This kind of social behaviour is strictly connected with the reinforcement of the identity at the expense of classified space and people. European gaze is strongly determined by eyesight. Staying in Africa is a process of producing images, building essentialistic and sometimes preposterous portraits and mental maps. Europeans intuitively searched for a kind of exotic authenticity and instability in



Africa. According to Dean MacCannell, if a visitor is just a collector of experiences of diversity (different people, different places etc.), he starts to perceive the visited area as a miniature clone of the old subject of Western philosophy – consistent, universal, located in the centre, controlling the strangeness (McCannell, 1976). MacCannell divides the perception process into several stages. He defines the sacralisation phase of perception as searching for authenticity, giving name and delimitation of boundaries. Image – after cultural treatment – gets to the level of universality in a single representation of the place with the certain taxonomy of structural elements. This mechanism is called by Anna Wieczorkiewicz “cannibalistic.” She noticed that during this process scientific, anatomical, and etiological knowledge is substituted by the desire to absorb the difference (Wieczorkiewicz, 2008, p. 352).

According to John Urry, a person – especially a tourist – travelling to the countries of the Global South, resembles a romantic traveller, who is concentrated on searching for diversity, increasing the power of experiences, the intensity of sensations (Urry, 1990). Finding and admiring the view is a source of personal pleasure for travelers (increasing of our knowledge about the world plays only an auxiliary role). Urry also mentions the role of fascination with less developed countries in Europe – fascination, which dates back to the Enlightenment. According to him, people who come to the Third World do not admire the views, but only create idealized representations. His reflections can be used to interpret not only the behaviour of Poles migrating to Africa, but also the imaginarium of majority of Poles who have not ever decided to visit Africa.

Indirect contact with Africa – cultural and social messages

In the PRL Africa was fashionable in some way, which did not always mean the Poles were trying to understand the “strangeness.” The exotic image of the continent and its inhabitants was still widely spread in popular culture, e.g. a summer hit composed by Zbigniew Wodecki in 1985 – “Chalupy welcome to”: *You can meet a nude person like on the beach in Mombasa. (...) Africa wild – long ago discovered. (...) They treated all the people like bamboos.*

Currently, television is the main source of knowledge about Africa – in the PRL this role was played by repeatedly republished nonfiction writings (foreign – Karen Blixen [Blixen, 1937] and Ernest Hemingway [Hemingway 1935]; Polish – Ryszard Kapuscinski [Kapuscinski 1963, 1969, 1976, 1978], Arkady Fiedler [Fiedler, 1946, 1957, 1962, 1969, 1976, 1983, 1985, 1987], Olgierd Budrewicz [Budrewicz, 1965, 1977, 1979, 1987, 1989] and radio. Majority of texts and broadcasts solidified stereotypes: Afro-Optimistic image of untouched nature and predicted development (c.a. 1960-1970), and Afro-Pessimistic image of extreme poverty and permanent war (c.a. 1971-1989) (Poplawski, 2012b). Cognitive dissonance in perception of Africa among authors was caused by different reasons: geopolitical context, personal views, religious beliefs, profession, as well as the obvious factor of belonging to a certain generation (older writers, e.g. Arkady Fiedler, still heavily embedded in the evolutionistic

discourse). These complaints explain the co-existence of incoherent speech, oscillating between archetypes of the Rousseauian “bon sauvage”, the Kiplingian “white man’s burden”, or pioneer from the Maritime and Colonial League (fragment of the history of Polish-African relations which was completely absent in the official discourse in the PRL). Even in the memoirs of Janusz Makarczyk – a pre-war traveller, writer and diplomat – published in 1957, there were no references to his work in West Africa. Due to the censorship of the PRL, he consistently appeared as an opponent of colonial policy two decades after his journey to Liberia. He wrote: *I always thought that the possession of the colony is unrealistic. Not only that: it is immoral* (Makarczyk, 1957, pp. 73-74).

During the whole PRL period the amount of published studies which were concentrated on Africa systematically increased – the average number of publication per year increased from 10-15 (1950s) to 100 (1960s), and after that decreased from 90 (1970s) to 45 (1980s). There were more than 135 publications per year between 1964 and 1969. However, the amount of foreign literature on Africa translated into Polish (mostly from English; and French) was smaller than the number of translations of Latin American literature. This phenomenon can be explained by cultural distance between Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa, ineptitude of translators, editors’ lack of openness. Unfortunately, the most valuable – from the literature-specialist point of view – texts were translated only partly, and published in specialized journals (e.g. “Przegląd Orientalistyczny”), which significantly limited their social impact. As Maciej Zabek wrote: *Africans as the creators of a higher literary culture were and are completely absent in the imagination of the Polish intelligentsia* (Zabek, 2007, p. 80).



Figure 2. *The number of publications connected with Africa in Polish scientific journals and popular magazines.* (Source – own study based on: Knopek, J., *Stosunki polsko-zachodnioafrykańskie* (Torun: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek) 2013, pp. 414-415.)




Figure 3. The number of African novels translated from English and French into Polish

(Source – own study based on:

2002-2007 Krzywicki, J., *Wprowadzenie do imaginarium literatury afrykanskiej*, t. 1-2 (Warszawa: Dialog);
 2000 Szymanska, J., *Polscy wydawcy przekladow z literatur orientalnych w XX wieku*, (Warszawa: Dialog);
 1988 *Stosunki literackie Polski z krajami Azji i Afryki*, ed. J. Danecki (Warszawa: Zarząd Główny ZLP, Interpress).

The Polish perspective on Africa was mediated by the works of Ryszard Kapuscinski, Arkady Fiedler, the “Around the World” publishing series, which crushed the dullness of communist reality. It is not possible to unambiguously evaluate the effect of daily newspapers, focusing on extraordinary issues (wars, coups d'état, revolutions) on the perception of Africa among Poles. In the “Trybuna Ludu”, “Zolnierz Wolnosci”, the Manichean vision of the Cold War era was promoted. Sub-Saharan Africa was treated only as the arena of the struggle between world powers. African partisans were presented as liberators, freedom fighters.

The list of required readings, geographical and historical atlases, and textbooks for pupils could hardly be called satisfactory in any way. As Maciej Zabek wrote: *Description of African countries is limited to narrowly conceived geography (descriptions of rivers, lakes and mountains). It usually does not present African cultures. The authors of textbooks used to name just some of the tribes, Pygmies and Bantu. They emphasize the richness of flora and fauna, and difficult living and working conditions in Africa* (Zabek, 2007, p. 86).

Many Poles associate Africans with Small Negro Bambo (the main character of the poem written by Julian Tuwim [1954]) or Kali (one of the heroes of the novel by Henryk Sienkiewicz [1911]) even today. The readers very often do not realize the power of the hidden stereotypes from the era of colonialism: attitudes of paternalism, self-indulgence, conviction of immaturity of Africans. Halina Witek, a literary scholar, commented on the prose of Sienkiewicz: *travellers do not only want to get to the truth, but they are tempted by self-creation and literary creation. They demonstrate a desire to take part in the rich history of the creation of images of the Black Continent, which are marked by subjectivism, and dominated by the stigma of the narrator* (Witek, 2009, p. 76). Therefore, it is not an entirely

positive idea to condemn those vestiges of traditional literary images of Africa, because they could at instances really awaken Polish interest in Africa, among people with otherwise low level of exposure to Africa and Africans. Sociologist Zygmunt Komorowski – proving the sustainability of the image of Africa taken from school readings – wrote: *a young man who made friends with little elephant from the Limpopo River, would not remain indifferent to the affairs of a true and real Africa* (Komorowski, 1974, p. 166).

Summary

The results of the analysis support the validity of the arguments made by sociologists. Poles under state socialism consumed meanings and punctured stereotypes of Africa. They were in some ways *gullible customers of great travel agency, who believed in the “truth” contained in folders showing beauties in bikinis on the seesaws, or Zulu dance groups dressed in pseudo-folkloristic costumes* (Ledochowski, 1988, p. 5). Breaking this Eurocentric vision was not possible during the PRL period.

The above discourse analysis conducted on the basis of official documents and testimonies from the Polish diaspora suggests that the perception of Africa has changed over time. Emblems of that continent were conventionalized and transformed – from “Afro-Optimism”, curiosity of the exoticism, to “Afro-Pessimism”, scepticism and doubt. The image of Africa over time became less and less ambivalent, and more and more negative. During the PRL period – despite the institutional shortcomings (financial problems, lack of coordination of different organizations, dependency on the Soviet Union and its foreign policy line) and discursive inadequacy (the superficiality of narratives about Africa, the fascination with exoticism, the lack of reliable literature, even descriptive) – a significant number of materials relating to Sub-Saharan Africa was produced. Some of these sources became a part of what we can call “strangeness training,” the process of better understanding of the problems of the Global South in Eastern Europe and different political strategies toward Africa (Besenyő, 2020).

Conflict of interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

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Medical missions of the African Hungarian Union

The XIXth Special Surgical Doctors Mission to Malawi

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Abstract:

This article discusses the charitable medical activities of the African Hungarian Union (AHU) – a Hungarian not-for-profit organization – in Africa and highlights one of the Ear-Nose-Throat (ENT) missions to Malawi. This paper also reviews food security issues in correlation with health and features the mission's anaesthetic procedures in details. As an aim, it also tries to draw attention to the positive effects of such medical operations.

AHU was established in 2006. Since 2009 the organisation has coordinated XXIV doctors' missions to different African countries, including the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, Madagascar, Guinea, Uganda and Malawi. These missions were sponsored mainly by AHU and its individual sponsors and companies, as well as the participating doctors, who sometimes devoted not only their precious time but fundraised money to contribute to the budget. The XIX mission was one of the seven special surgical missions. Out of all the recipient countries—due to mainly logistical reasons from AHU's side—only Malawi ended up in the fortunate situation to host surgical missions. This Medical Mission focused on Ear-Nose-Throat (ENT) surgeries, and general health care. The four Hungarian doctors, together with the local medical staff, performed 35 ENT operations in two operating theatres in two weeks. No postoperative Intensive Care Unit (ICU) admission was needed among the patients. Neither surgical nor anaesthesiologic complications occurred during the perioperative period, resulting in an overall very successful medical mission.

Keywords:

medical missions;
Sub-Saharan Africa;
health;
African Hungarian
Union;
Ear-Nose-Throat
surgeries.

Introduction

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Health care and its accessibility in Sub-Saharan Africa

Health care in the Sub-Saharan African region is generally of poor quality (Stierle et al, 1999; Mirabel et al, 2015; Ekenze et al, 2019). Neither the number of health care professionals nor medical equipment is adequate to serve the population suitably. Good quality health care is very often not available even to the handful of wealthy people who, if needs arise; have to travel outside the continent. Generally, expatriates in high paid jobs and well-to-do local business people can afford to have expensive health insurance that cover the costs of overseas trips or even the treatments of some of the scarcely found, well equipped and staffed private hospitals. For the masses of people, however, the options are limited to small clinics with less qualified medical staff or the so-called medicine/voodoo man. Especially in the countryside, hospitals can only be found far away from one another. Many sick people have to travel long hours, or if unlucky, even walk a day or two. According to F. Stierle et al (1999) in sub-Saharan Africa, the availability of, and geographical access to, health care services, particularly in rural areas, are rather low. In general, utilization of services is very low, too. If it comes to the worst-case scenario, far too often people do not even know the exact cause of death.

History of medical missions

The tradition of “Western” professionals going to Africa and trying to pass on their knowledge or volunteer their expertise is a long one. International medical missions to Africa have been organised for a long time now. It has a vast literature that is very well documented and preserved in the history books, as well. One of the most famous examples is David Livingstone, who himself worked as a medical doctor at the mission station in Kuruman, South Africa in the 1840s. Faith-based medical missions introduced Western medicine and public health in much of Africa decades in advance of health services provided by colonial governments (Good, 1991).

Despite immense documentation of Anglophone medical missions, very little is known of the first Hungarian medical missions. This could well be due to historical reasons. Hungary has never been a colonising country and therefore had few ties with Africa. Also, Hungary’s geopolitical situation – being a landlocked, small county that had to fight for its freedom rather than colonising another land – did not allow the country nor its citizens to make more than a handful of expeditions.

It has only been recently that a fairly new non-governmental organisation set out to put Hungary on the map of international medical missions to Sub-Saharan Africa.



History of AHU's medical missions

The African Hungarian Union is a non-governmental organisation based in Budapest, Hungary, established in 2006. AHU's main focuses are international development and supporting African-Hungarian relations. AHU organizes long-term support programs for social groups and minorities in Africa who are cumulatively disadvantaged. AHU has launched medical programs in more than ten African countries, the first one in 2009 to DRC, then others to Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania and Uganda. Since that first program in 2009, dozens of Hungarian volunteer health professionals have participated and thousands of patients have been examined throughout these medical missions. Doctors attended to patients at places such as the Kiwanja Refugee Camp (DRC), Bamako (Mali), Los Island (Guinea), Antsirabe (Madagascar), Mbale (Uganda), Blantyre (Malawi), and in villages where healthcare does not exist at all or is difficult to access. AHU has been the largest sponsor of the Hungarian Africa partnership since its foundation in Hungary. AHU is the continuous supporter and sponsor of science and expeditions, exhibitions, art activities, book publishing, and awareness-raising programs.

During these missions, Hungarian doctors and healthcare professionals reach thousands of people, especially children and women, who otherwise would have a very limited chance to get proper medical attention, if any at all. Through the missions, there is always an exceptionally strong spirit combined with genuine interest to help the underprivileged both by medical doctors and other members of the missions. Apart from solving urgent medical issues, the missions also empower the inhabitants of the target regions by spreading very useful knowledge on health and hygiene, as well as changing their attitude towards, and enhancing their knowledge of, the aforementioned points. Furthermore, donations ranging from medical equipment to educational material and children's toys are shared during the missions, which also contribute to the well-being of the target groups in the receiving country and create a sense of cooperation, empowerment and sustainability (ahu.hu).

Malawi

Malawi (*Figure 1*), a small, landlocked country that lies south of the Equator in Sub-Saharan Africa, stretches about 520 miles (840 kilometres) from north to south. It has a width varying from 5 to 100 miles (8 to 160 km). Its size (118.113 km²) is slightly bigger than the size of Hungary (93.030 km²). Malawi's climate is subtropical. The rainy season runs from November through April. There is little to no rainfall throughout most of the country from May to October (Stalker, 2010). Malawi has been experiencing rapid population growth at a rate above average for sub-Saharan Africa. Birth rate is among the highest in the continent, but mortality rate is also high, and life expectancy for both genders is significantly lower than the average for sub-Saharan Africa, primarily because of the incidence of HIV/AIDS. Nearly half the population is younger than 15, and about three-fourths of the population is 29 or younger. A modest reduction in the country's high fertility rates in the late 20th and early 21st centuries

may be attributed in part to government policy aimed at improving female literacy and promoting more-effective contraceptive methods (Ingham et al, 2021). The last census was carried out in 2018. According to its statistics the size of the population is 17,563,749. This is an approximate 35% increase in a decade, as the 2008 census enumerated 13 million residents. Life expectancy is 61.1 for men (79.4 in the UK) and 67.4 for women (83.1 in the UK) (UNDP, 2020; ONS, 2021). Although Malawi is one of the most densely populated countries in southern Africa, it is also one of the least urbanized, with more than four-fifths of its people living in rural locations. The official languages are Chichewa and English.



Figure 1. – Malawi. Source: Encyclopædia Britannica Inc. (2021)

Malawi's Economy

Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world: in 2019 it had per capita gross domestic product adjusted for purchasing power parity of US\$1,035, compared with per capita GDP/PPP US\$1,970 for Africa as a whole. For comparison in the same year per capita GDP was US\$46,071 in the UK. Agriculture accounts for more than one-third of GDP and 90% of export revenues. Nearly 90% of the population engages in subsistence farming. The performance of the tobacco sector is key to short-term growth as tobacco accounts for more than half of exports. The economy depends on substantial inflows of economic assistance from the IMF, the World Bank, and individual donor nations. Around 52.6 per cent of the population live below the national poverty line while 70.3 per cent of the population get less than PPPUS\$1.9 a day. Malawi was approved for relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)



program. The government faces many challenges, including developing a market economy, improving educational facilities, facing up to environmental problems, satisfying foreign donors with fiscal discipline being tightened. In 2019 the adult HIV/AIDS prevalence rate stood at 9.2% which has slightly improved, since it had stood at 11.9% in 2007 (UNDP, 2021).

Malawi and Food Security

It is quite straight forward for all people that the quantity and quality of food is crucial for the well-being of the individual, the community (family, village community), the country or the world, while at the same time complementing its health status.

While the population of developed countries is overwhelmed by the problems of civilization (obesity, cardiovascular diseases or mental disorders due to overconsumption), developing (in more recent terminology: emerging) countries are facing a serious challenge to access food in appropriate quantities. Although in many cases this can be traced back to other and various reasons, the greatest challenge has been found to be insufficient food quality in all categories, in all places (Juhász, 2017).

There are aspects which have been ignored by average consumers (in some cases, many professionals as well). For example, regarding food-vulnerability, they fall under the spell of statistics, and based on some significant results, ignore reality.

It can be stated that relatively few people deal with the mental effects of food vulnerability, which has had a major impact on people's physical and mental well-being, and thus health, as was even true during prehistoric times. This vulnerability has accompanied humanity throughout time and become part of the history of the living world. Access to food is the foundation of ages and civilizations. If sustenance is not available, one cannot talk about any basis of existence, especially not development.

Human food must be quantitatively adequate, which does not always ensure sustainability, as food ingredients, content value and the number of harmful substances in the human body greatly affect the quality of life and health of the population of the developed and developing (emerging) world (World Food Summit, 1996).

The living conditions and insufficient access to healthy foods also badly affect the health situation. Malawi is one of the worst countries in regard to food security and, consequently, the health situation there also ranks near the bottom statistically. In 2015, only sixteen countries performed worse than Malawi in this respect according to the Global Food Security Index. Based on the Human Development Index of the UNDP, out of the 188 examined countries, Malawi ranked 173rd (UNDP, 2015). When Malawi gained independence in 1964, the country was still able to produce its full supply of necessary food. However, today this is not the case, and neither food production, nor food trade supply, provides enough food for the population. In the region, the lack of food has become almost a constant issue and the

number of under-nourished is permanently high. In Malawi, peace and economic stability have been disrupted by smaller domestic disturbances since World War II. Different international sources contemplate the reasons for this, though among them the clearly disastrous economic policies of the 20th century are mentioned as a cause for the living standard of the population to be one of the worst in the world. Food crises are not new phenomena here; reports note an unfavourable situation almost every time during the last many years.


Medical Services in Malawi

Health care is divided into primary, secondary and tertiary levels of care. Primary care is generally composed of 68 dispensaries, 328 health centres, each with 5-10 beds and 16 maternity clinics. About 10-15 health centres feed into a district hospital, or mission hospital, which form the secondary level of care in Malawi. Not all districts have a government hospital and such gaps are met by faith-based mission hospitals. Each district or mission hospital has 100-200 beds and offers basic surgical services, such as trauma management and obstetric emergencies. Four central hospitals, each with the capacity of 600 – 1500 beds, form the tertiary level of care and offer more specialized medical and surgical treatments (Henry et al, 2015). The Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital in Blantyre, where the XIXth Medical Mission took place, was one of them (*Figure 2*).



Figure 2. – The Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital in Blantyre, Malawi with the members of the XIXth Medical Mission of the African-Hungarian Union, László Paput MD, Nelli Nepp MD, Éva Orosz MD, Csaba Loibl MD (left to right).

Malawi started a Medical College in 1991 to train medical doctors, but it still continues to face a chronic shortage of medical staff (Jiskoot, 2008). Due to the shortage of medical doctors, clinical officers (COs) represent the backbone of health care in Malawi. In 2007, Lavy et al. found that there were only 15 trained surgeons of any specialties in Malawi and there were no surgeons stationed at any district hospitals. In 2014, out of the 109 anaesthesia providers, 95.4 % were non-physician anaesthetists (Henry et al, 2015). Beginning in 1975, the country launched a three-year training program for COs. At the end of this training program, the candidate receives a Diploma in Clinical Medicine. After graduation, general COs complete a one-year internship at a district or a central hospital. During this period, they are being supervised by medical officers or by senior COs. To qualify for the annual registration of the Medical Council of Malawi (MCM), mandatory continuing professional development (CPD) courses, like for other healthcare staff, are required (Henry et al, 2015). As most anaesthetic procedures in Malawi are performed by COs, the Malawi School of Anaesthesia has begun qualifying Anaesthetic COs since 1988. Following the success of the above-mentioned generalist COs and CPD courses, medical assistants have become specialized Anaesthetic COs. During their qualification, they are obliged to document the anaesthetic procedure they performed (including general, regional and local anaesthetic procedures) in a logbook. In this logbook, not only the procedure and the demographic data of the patients must be registered, but adverse events (if any), the outcome, and the fact if the procedure was carried out alone or with the aid of a supervisor. At the end of each case, the remarks and the signature of the supervisor must be presented (*Figure 3*).



SERIAL #	DATE	NAME	AGE	SURGICAL D.I. PROCEDURE	ANESTHESIA	GA QUANT	OUTCOME	REMARKS	SIGN/ NAME
01	12/1/19		42		Thiopental Pethidine	200mg 100mg 2/	All ok complication arise		
02	16-04-19		15	Subbrachial Femoral II/III ASA class II				Well done Good job	M. Mphahlele
03	16-05-18		34	cut Pectoral tendon Tibia plateau II/ Debridement	Thiopental Pethidine Urethane	200mg 50mg 2% - 12/			
04	27/1/19		18	Chronic pain misplacement/ Cephalic application	Thiopental Halothane	350mg 2-12	All complication	Very good	Fern Koume
05	21/1/19		25	Baker's cyst/ Excision	Thiopental Halothane	350mg 2/	All complication	Well done	Wany
06	21/1/19		42	Cataract on contracted pupil/ LWOP pupiloplasty	Propofol Halothane	20mg 2 1/2/	All complication	well done	M. Mphahlele

2018/06/19

Figure 3. – Logbook sample of the Cos.

ENT in Malawi

“Prior to 2007, Malawi did not have a resident ENT surgeon or ENT service for its 14 million inhabitants and the burden of ENT disease was unknown. Malawi sent its first ENT specialist trainee to the University of Cape Town in South Africa in 2003; he returned to Malawi in 2007 as the first and only resident ENT surgeon. He is stationed at the southern city of Blantyre, where in 2008 he started up ENT services, training and research as part of improving teaching at the College of Medicine of Malawi, and the delivery of ENT services at its teaching hospital, the Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital.” (Mulwafu et al, 2014, p. 136)

When in Malawi AHU’s first general medical mission took place in 2014, it was Wakisa Mulwafu M.D. who still represented ENT as the only qualified and practicing surgeon. In 2016, one of the resident ENT doctors, Michael Ahoka M.D., got a 6-month-long scholarship from AHU and the University of Pecs. In 2018, Dr. Ahoka became the second qualified ENT surgeon in Malawi, finishing his studies in the Republic of South Africa.

The idea of the first ENT surgical mission was born during the inaugural general doctors’ mission to Malawi. One of the participants, Edina Pálinkás M.D., then a resident ENT specialist, was introduced to Dr. Mulwafu, who was the head of the ENT department at the Queen Elisabeth Central Hospital (QECH) in Blantyre, the biggest health institution in the country. Dr. Mulwafu explained that he was the sole ENT specialist in the country, which meant an approximate 1 to 16 million ratio. Dr. Mulwafu told Dr. Pálinkás not just about the hardships of the day-to-day running of the department, but also the opportunities that could arise from possible cooperation and the organisation of a surgical mission. Previously such missions had been organized to QECH with doctors from the USA and the UK. On her return to Hungary, Dr. Pálinkás raised the issue to the AHU, and with common interest and enthusiasm, the organization of the first surgical mission had started.

Materials and Methods

This article is based on the first-hand experiences of the authors who actively participated in the organisation and execution of medical missions. Thematic analysis of international literature was used to challenge and back up the findings of the authors.

Organising the Mission

To set up and manage a medical mission is a very complex task with numerous factors to address. The success of such a project depends not just on the many different participating experts (doctors, nurses, coordinators) and patients, but also on the many unforeseen aspects, incidents and events that do happen every time. While dangers are plentiful, people are still adamant about setting up and participating in these medical missions.



While there is a great need for medical attention all over the world, the major differences are in the quality of medical care provided and accessibility by the masses of people. This makes it inevitable that while in one part of the globe (mainly the developed countries) people have much better chances to retrieve a good quality health care; citizens of less developed nations often suffer from diseases that can be cured. Therefore, it seems perfectly justified that medical staff from developed countries are taking part in missions to deliver modern health care to people who otherwise could not receive such treatments.

There are a few key questions that an organiser needs to answer before starting the process:

- Is there a need for such a mission in the receiving country?
- Is there appropriate medical capacity (especially knowledge) in the sending country?
- Can a mission be beneficial for all parties involved?

Preparatory work in Hungary

Since 2009, the first doctors' mission, AHU has accumulated tremendous experience in organising such difficult operations. The usual method is always to keep advertising possible openings for doctors to participate in a mission and build up a database of available candidates. AHU has established that the ideal time frame of a surgical mission is around 2 weeks. That gives enough time for the doctors to have a positive impact in the receiving country and also this is an ideal length for the doctors to leave their practices in Hungary without risking falling behind. In the Hungarian headquarters, Ms. Zsuzsa Orzói, Head of Protocol, has coordinated this activity over the years. The planned size of each team is 6 people – 2 senior specialists with 2 resident specialists, an anaesthetic doctor and a coordinator. Ms. Orzói, with her colleagues Mr. Csaba Sélley and Ms. Kamilla Kiss, has also provided a training course for the volunteer doctors ahead of their mission. Over 2 to 3 afternoons, they covered subjects from security issues through introducing the destination country to different games (role/situation plays, quizzes) in order to prepare the participants. It was an important part of the pre-mission, as usually the team of doctors had only met each other for the first time on these occasions. It was crucial for the organisers to know that the doctors had a good connection and a “vibe” amongst them before embarking on these 3-to-5-week-long missions. Supporting others during critical times is a central component of medical missions.

The main commitments of AHU:

- AHU will screen Hungarian staff to make sure they are all qualified to participate;
- AHU informs applicants of all the mandatory paperwork and help them through the application processes (e.g. in Malawi all doctors who – even on a short voluntary basis – are dealing with patients need to register at the Medical Council that is a month long process at best);

- AHU provides applicants with all necessary information in order to prepare for them highly challenging tasks;
- AHU provides free training for all participants;
- AHU organizes medical camps in Malawi from beginning to end, including travel to and from, accommodation and catering, free time activities and assistance with any problems that might occur during the camp.

The main objectives of the XIXth medical mission were:

- to train the local medical staff – surgeons, clinical officers and nurses alike – to be able to perform advanced healing processes even without the help of the Hungarian doctors;
- to perform operations that could not be possible without the knowledge and expertise of the Hungarian medical staff;
- to donate much-needed medical equipment to certain Malawian healthcare centers;
- to establish connections between the Hungarian and Malawian doctors for further knowledge transfer via the Internet (email, chat applications, other electronic means);
- to find possible candidates in Malawi for Hungarian training in healthcare;
- to introduce the Hungarian doctors to a totally foreign environment with different type of health problems, especially knowing that the team had two resident doctors (who are medical school graduates and doctors in training).

Mission in Malawi

In the receiving countries, it is very important to establish strong connections with local health institutions, doctors and, not least, relevant government institutions. The role of the host doctor is exceptionally important. They can provide essential information ahead of the mission as well as build up a desired patient group, pre-examine the cases and set up an operating plan for the duration of the mission. Essential information is what human capacity is available locally, what the utilised medical equipment and pharmaceutical stock are. The local doctor can also help to secure the operating theatre with its equipment and local staff, both to ensure daily procedures and to provide opportunities for local medical people to learn while participating in the mission.

During the missions, it has become quite clear that it is preferable to have a person who both has local knowledge and also knows Hungarian, who therefore can be a good host who can understand the Hungarian medical staff and their needs. In Malawi, AHU established this connection through Csaba Szeremley who had been living in Malawi for several years as a businessman with vast knowledge of Malawi and a good network of local people both in healthcare and beyond. His tasks before the mission were to make sure all the required paperwork had been acquired on time for all the members of the medical team. This included



visa requirements and the registration at the Medical Council of Malawi. Further, if the doctors needed to bring medicine with them, it was then also required to report it to the relevant local authority. His duties were not exhausted by official arrangements only. A local expat can advise the missionaries on how to prepare themselves for the country they visit (climate, food, local customs, etc.). Nowadays it is very easy to get information from the Internet with a few clicks, however, the experiences and inputs of a known person weighs in stronger and can reassure participants on a different level. For the doctors to be able to perform to their highest standards, it was essential to provide a good atmosphere throughout the whole mission. That not only included secure accommodation, food and transport, but also programs for the evenings and weekends when Malawi's cultural and natural beauty were presented. While the doctors put all efforts into a successful mission, the local host organized different social events and visits to local sightseeing places for recreational and educational purposes. These activities let the doctors relax and recharge for the surgical duties, and furthermore help the mission's overall "marketability" for charming doctors to participate in the following missions (which is a really important factor for the organiser team).

The Queen Elisabeth Central Hospital, where the mission was headed in Blantyre, is the largest hospital in Malawi. It is also one of the few central hospitals with ENT and audiology departments and an ENT surgeon. The visits of several international doctors' teams to ease the burden laying on the handful of qualified medical staff are very important. However, a sustainable clinical service cannot be based on visiting specialists. These visiting doctors can play an important role in terms of training the local medical staff (surgeons, clinical officers, and nurses). As Fagan has expressed in his paper, having a permanent ENT service in a country such as Malawi provides an opportunity for improved international collaboration and may address logistical problems faced by otolaryngologists from developed countries who want to contribute to teaching and training in developing countries. (Fagan, 2012)

One of the main objectives of AHU's medical missions was to train the local doctors and nurses. This meant pre- and post-operational procedures, as well as training during surgeries. Working closely with the local staff had its difficulties. A main observation was that resident medical workers – both nurses, surgeons and resident doctors – had to be vigorously encouraged on a daily basis to actively engage with the work of foreign doctors.

Another significant purpose of medical missions is to highlight local medical issues, draw attention to them and try to facilitate sustainable programmes to tackle these problems. Foreign doctors with their experience can identify setbacks that local doctors might not be able to see themselves. Nevertheless, it is a common practice all over the world to bring in an outsider expert to try to solve matters. However, in these cases it is much more expected, as someone comes from a more developed workplace, who has already engaged with advanced practices, equipment and knowledge.

“Although much debate remains regarding the ethical obligations of surgeons who conduct mission trips in foreign countries, it seems certain from our experience that medical students who participate on such trips have invaluable educational opportunities. From patient care to resource allocation, medical students gain first-hand experience in relatively short periods. They develop skills of patient management along with an enhanced cultural sensitivity and sense of fiscal responsibility. With appropriate guidance and teaching, medical students gain experience that can positively influence their careers and shape their development into competent physicians.” (Gishen and Taller, 2015)

The Clinical aspects of the XIXth Medical Mission of AHU in Malawi

This operation was the fourth surgical mission, held between 11th and 27th of June 2018; the mission specialised in ENT and head- and neck surgery.

The members of this Medical Mission included 6 staff: four ENT doctors (two of them had their specialization exam in ENT), one doctor specializing in anaesthesiology and intensive care, and a coordinator. Due to an unexpected event occurring a few days before the departure, one of our ENT doctors had to stay in Hungary.

The present case report aims at discussing the details and the experience of the XIXth Medical Mission of the AHU from an anaesthesiologic perspective.

Anaesthesiology Policy

The essence of the applied anaesthesiology policy was that it should be simple and straightforward: using the available resources (drugs and equipment) in the perioperative period.

Airway – During the induction of general anaesthesia the “head-tilt, chin lift” and the “jaw thrust” manoeuvres – if necessary – were applied. For the preoxygenisation / denitrogenisation processes, face masks were used for both children and adults. When it was necessary, Guedel-tubes were used. In most cases for advanced airway management, enforced endotracheal (Woodbridge-type) tubes were used. For Functional Endoscopic Sphenoidal Surgery (FESS) or for Endoscopic Sphenoidal Surgery (ESS) procedures, cuffed oroendotracheal tubes were used with a throat pack. For paediatric cases, cuffed Woodbridge endotracheal tubes were available. The cuffs of the endotracheal tubes were inflated with a normal syringe, although no instruments to measure the cuff pressure were available. In case of a difficult airway, a stylet was inserted into the lumen of the endotracheal tube. Although gum elastic bougie was available, it never had to be used. Suction catheters were available all the time but the local practice was the use of Yankauer suction tips. Although laryngeal mask airway (LMA) was available in the Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital, due to the nature of the operations none of them were used.

Anaesthetic machine - For general anaesthesia, a Glostavent[®] machine was used (*Figure 4*). This machine has been designed to enable anaesthetists practicing in adverse conditions to overcome the difficulties they are likely to encounter. It consists of a draw over system with an Oxford Miniature Vaporizer (O.M.V.), combined with a Manley Multivent ventilator and an oxygen concentrator. The concentrator has been modified so that, in addition to oxygen, it can also produce air under sufficient pressure to drive the ventilator. It can be easily maintained and serviced using local skills and continues to function in the absence of soda lime, nitrous oxide, oxygen or electricity (Eltringham, 2003).



Figure 4. – Glostavent[®] anaesthetic machine.

Oxygen & other gases – Oxygen was delivered through pipelines from a central depot in the Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital. Oxygen cylinders for the anaesthetic machine were available too. Neither medical air nor nitrous-oxide was available, although the Glostavent[®] machine had a rotameter for medical air too.

Monitoring – The usual measurements of blood pressure, heart rate, peripheral oxygen saturation (SpO₂) and end-tidal carbon-dioxide (ETCO₂), the latter with a capnograph was used. Due to lack of equipment, no monitoring device for anaesthetic gas concentrations was available. All of these modalities were monitored out of the anaesthetic machine; the Glostavent[®] machine could measure the airway pressure only with a barometer.

Anaesthetic drugs – For the induction of anaesthesia, intravenous propofol 2% was used in a dosage of 0.1-0.3 mg/bwkg, depending on the patient's age and bodyweight. Intravenous thiopental was available too, but was not used. For inhalational induction and the maintenance of anaesthesia, Halothane was used. Propofol was administered only for the induction of anaesthesia, and due to lack of equipment, it was not used for Total Intravenous Anaesthesia (TIVA).

Analgesia – Intravenous fentanyl was available at the Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital. Despite its availability, for all cases, nalbuphin, diluted 20 mg in 10ml of normal saline was used and administered in doses of 0.1 – 0.3 mg/bwkg intravenously, titrated to the patient's current bodyweight. Given in small doses intravenously at frequent intervals, it was found to be effective in controlling pain and relieving anxiety. No problems were encountered with respiratory depression or with nausea and vomiting. Pethidine was available too for analgesia, but it was only used in adults to prevent postoperative shivering, if it was necessary. For this purpose, we used a dosage of 0.5 mg/bwkg intravenously. Non-opioid drugs were available from Hungary: diclofenac (75mg in 3ml) or metamizol (1g in 2 ml). These were used as part of multimodal analgesia in the perioperative period. For premedication, no analgetic drugs were given before any operations.

Antibiotics – For certain operations a single shot antibiotics dose was given. For this purpose, cefuroxime 1500 mg or amoxicillin & clavulanic acid 1200 mg were used. The antibiotics were given intravenously diluted in 10ml or 100ml of normal saline. Postoperative antibiotic treatment was to be defined by the operating surgeon. No allergic reactions were developed due to the administration of antibiotics.

Drugs for haemostasis – For this purpose iv. tranexamic acid (500 mg in 5 ml) or iv. etamsylate (250 mg in 1ml) were available, along with iv. calcium (1000 mg in 5 ml) from Hungary. Due to the special circumstances, we did not have any Prothrombin Complex Concentrate (PCC) or i.v. fibrinogen. Apart from the above-mentioned drugs, bleeding control was restricted to surgical haemostasis with monopolar electro catheter, and in case of transfusion full blood products were available only.

Muscle relaxants – From the local resources intravenous suxamethonium was available (100 mg in 2ml). For muscle relaxation at the induction of anaesthesia and during the operations, iv. atracurium (50 mg in 5 ml) was used from Hungary. Unlike our daily practice in adults (0.5 mg/bwkg at the induction and 10 mg if repeat is needed), an estimated dosage of 10 – 20 mg atracurium iv. during the induction was used, due to limited resources of non-depolarizing muscle relaxants. If repeat was needed an estimated dose of 5 – 10 mg iv. was used, depending on the situation. No other non-depolarizing muscle relaxants or Train of Four (TOF) monitoring were available during the medical mission. The estimation of the muscle relaxation was based on clinical signs (e.g., the patient's spontaneous breathing returned by detecting the movement of the balloon) or on the pharmacological features of the non-

depolarizing muscle relaxants. If it was necessary, atracurium was inhibited by the administration of iv. pyridostigmine (2.5 mg totally) and iv. atropine (1 mg).

Other drugs – Intravenous steroid (iv. dexamethasone 4 mg in 2ml) was available, it was used as an adjuvant drug for analgesia and for the prevention of postoperative nausea and vomiting (PONV). To prevent PONV iv. ondansetron (4mg in 2ml) was available from Hungary. In case of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), iv. adrenalin (1 mg in 1 ml) and iv. atropine (1 mg in 1 ml) were available. Iv. adrenalin was used as an adjuvant drug to lidocaine in the surgical field of the ENT surgeons. From local resources other drugs (e.g. diazepam, hydralazine) were available, but none of them were used by the medical mission's doctors.



Figure 5. – Pan endoscopy performed by Dr. Orosz in the Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital in Blantyre, Malawi.



Figure 6. – Foreign body removal performed by Dr. Nepp and Dr. Paput in the Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital in Blantyre, Malawi.

The medical mission performed 35 operations in two operating theatres. These operations included the following: mucocele 1, tympanoplasty 1, medial neck cyst 1, grommet insertion 1, tonsillectomy 1, lipoma excision 1, ESS (Endoscopic Sphenoidal Surgery) 5, oesophagoscope 2, direct laryngoscopy 3, adenotome 2, SND (Selective Neck Dissection) 1, total parotidectomy 4, thyroid lobectomy 8, total thyroidectomy 6 (*Figures 5 and 6*). Two cases were ASA 3, the rest of the patients were ASA 1 – 2. The relevant data of the patients were included in the ENT documentation, although no *per se* preoperative anaesthetic examination was done. Possible intubation difficulties had to be faced when the doctors met the patients in person, by checking the L-E-M-O-N (Look-Evaluate-Mallampati-Obstruction-Neck mobility) test (American Society of Anaesthesiologists, 2008). Interventions were done only after signing the informed consent by the patient or by their relatives. Paediatric anaesthesia was performed in four cases, the rest of the operations were on adults. In all cases, successful oroendotracheal intubations were performed as advanced airway management. No emergency coniotomy or tracheotomy was needed, and no endotracheal tube malposition occurred. Inhalational induction was done with Halothane for children. In adults intravenous induction was performed. No malignant arrhythmias were detected during the use of Halothane. After successful extubating and uncomplicated events, the patients were transferred to the recovery room (*Figure 7*), located next to the operating rooms. Transfusion of 2 units of full blood was needed in one case only. No patients were referred to the ICU after the operations performed by the medical mission's ENT doctors. No reoperations were needed among the cases operated by the medical mission's ENT doctors.



Figure 7. – Recovery room in the ENT Department in the Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital in Blantyre, Malawi.

Discussion

We found that organising a medical mission is a highly intensive and risky job. According to Roche et al. (2017), short term medical missions had been widely criticized for their risk to patients which is the fundamental starting point of any medical mission, namely to save and/or improve the life of sick people. AHU had managed to organize all of its doctors' missions in terms of successful surgeries conducted and both the local receiving team (including doctors, nurses, patients) and the travelling Hungarian doctors to feel productive about these missions. This is down to careful screening, selection and proper preparation of the Hungarian medical staff, as well as cautiously chosen destinations where felicitous circumstances and a well organised team waited for a joint cooperation. Another very important factor has been to put the travelling and receiving team in touch ahead of the mission. Through this connection, both parties could prepare themselves for the tasks. We established that the ideal length of a surgical mission is between 12 to 18 days, which gives enough time for a tangible result and allows Hungarian doctors to leave their work at home. During a mission a non-medical local guide, who is from the sending country (Hungary), had been proven to be essential in order for a mission to be highly successful and smooth. Besides securing a safe place, the guide can also organise extra activities to help relieve the stress of the medical staff.

Discussion of Anesthesiology of the XIXth Medical Mission

The anaesthesiology policy as described above was simple and conventional. As Halothane has not been used in Hungary since the 1990s, one of the lessons we learned was how to manage general anaesthesia with Halothane. As mentioned above, a Glostavent® anaesthetic machine is unknown in our everyday clinical practice; hence, this served as another valuable experience to learn how to work with this machine. The expensive and sophisticated 3rd and 4th generation anaesthetic machines which had been designed for “ideal” conditions proved to be unable to meet the harsh conditions (e.g. lack of electricity, lack of water) we encountered in the country. Despite special circumstances, no complications during the perioperative period occurred linked to our medical mission. Although English is one of the official languages in Malawi, most of the patients spoke the Chichewa language only. Language difficulties and the patients' fear of the operation procedure made our work more difficult to perform, but the aid of the medical staff of the Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital in the operating room worked toward our benefit.

Conclusion

AHU's medical missions had been proven to be needed and successful. It is based on the facts that one - from the receiving countries AHU has been getting ongoing requests for further missions, two – the number of volunteer medical professionals signing up for missions is not declining. Unfortunate international situations (Covid pandemic – travel restrictions – doctors being overwhelmed with work in Hungary) and some special logistic burdens within AHU's infrastructure have halted humanitarian medical missions organised by AHU since 2020.

In summary, we absolutely agree with the conclusion of Henry et al. (2015), who recommended further attention to training and professionalizing non-physician clinicians and their scope of work and increased involvement of surgeons and anaesthesiologists in training and working in Malawi. We can also conclude that despite challenging conditions, a successful cooperation between the members of the Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital's team and the medical mission's staff could be performed, which allowed us to carry out 35 uneventful ENT operations.

Conflict of interest

The authors hereby declare that no competing financial interest exist for this manuscript.

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Csaba Loibl MD. obtained his university degree at the Medical School of the University of Pécs, where he received a general medical degree in 2008 with a "cum laude" qualification. From 2008 he became a part time student at the Faculty of Law of the University of Pécs. In 2010 he graduated as a medical lawyer with a degree in law. He spent his anesthesiology and intensive care resident training and specialist doctoral candidate years at the Institute of Anaesthesiology and Intensive Care of the Clinical Center of the University of Pécs, as well as at the Hungarian Defense Forces „Dr. György Radó Honvéd Medical Center”. In 2013, he passed the anesthesiology and intensive care exam with an "excellent" rating. He has been working as a specialist since 2013 and as a university assistant since 2015. He has been practicing his medical profession beside the Clinical Center of the University of Pécs, at the St. Luke's Hospital in Dombóvár, at the Mohács Hospital, at the Szigetvár Hospital, and as a missionary doctor in Malawi. He has participated in several domestic and foreign professional congresses, and is the first and co-author of numerous presentations, lectures, and professional publications.

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The role of diplomatic missions in fostering international trade

A literature review to be considered in the Visegrad Countries when dealing with Sub-Saharan Africa

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Abstract:

The paper briefly shows the renewed interest in and fundamental reasons for establishing new diplomatic missions in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Old and new trading partners alike are trying to create more embassies and consulates because they strive to help the private sector by preparing the ground for bilateral trade. The Central and Eastern European (CEE), and the Visegrad (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovak Republic) countries have been following the international tendencies and they have placed and increased emphasis on their diplomatic missions in the hope of diversifying their exports. After synthesizing the related literature, the second part of the paper argues that embassies and consulates directly contribute to stronger bilateral trade links. It seems that by opening more embassies in the SSA region the V4 countries could find alternative markets for their products and services so the embassies count to be growth opportunities. By fostering stronger economic and political ties both regions could benefit from the new scramble for diplomatic missions in various forms.

Keywords:

diplomatic missions;
trade promotion;
V4, SSA.

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Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has seen many busy summers since the start of the growing international interests somewhere around the turn of the new millennium. There have been many chief of state visits from a number of countries like Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Germany, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (Devermont, 2018). This time is different because under the Cold War period the African leaders had limited choices, but now the countries can freely choose with whom they want to foster closer political and economic ties and with whom they want to do business. In the 8 March edition of The Economist magazine a completely new scramble for Africa is discussed in which the winners could be the Africans themselves. The African leaders welcome foreign investors with open arms and with the help of economic diplomacy the old and the new trading partners are trying to establish strong bilateral trade links. There has never been such an intense embassy building period in SSA so far and between 2010 and 2016 320 new embassies and consulates were being built. Many countries regard diplomatic missions as key in establishing export and import connections. The Central and Eastern European (CEE) and the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovak Republic) have been following the international tendencies and launched their own opening-ups toward the SSA region. This paper tries to show why there is such a renewed interest in establishing and re-establishing diplomatic missions in the region. It briefly describes that a number of active countries have managed to significantly increase their bilateral trade largely by placing more emphasis on having more embassies and consulates. Later the renewed interest of the V4 countries is introduced by highlighting the advantages of a more dynamic cooperation. Many V4 countries have been establishing stronger diplomatic ties as they believe that more intense trade connections are to be created by more dynamic diplomatic missions. In the hope of finding the connection between these two factors, the paper synthesizes the related literature and tries to shed light on the following question: Do embassies increase bilateral trade? Based on the literature review, it is quite clear that diplomatic missions (embassies especially) have a significant effect on fostering bilateral trade. By opening new posts in SSA, the first steps could be taken towards the diversifications of the exports of the CEE countries. The example of other countries and regions could be of high importance for the diplomats of the V4 and CEE diplomats so in the last section a couple of conclusions are drawn and suggestions are given.

A New Diplomatic Mission Scramble for Sub-Saharan Africa

After the turn of the new millennium the foreign counterparts of SSA have been forging ever closer partnerships with the regions as they see new trade and investment possibilities. China has been setting the fashion and a number of other countries following suit and they regard Africa as increasingly important to a wide range of economic, security, and political goals (Devermont, 2018). Many regard this spike in foreign engagement as a fundamental change in SSA's foreign relations. What is unique and truly remarkable this time is the number of 'new' countries turning their attention to Africa. At the University of Denver in the Frederick S.



Pardee Center for International Futures, Josef Korbel School of International Studies they have had a Diplometrics Project. This project calls our attention to the fact that between 2010 and 2016 more than 320 embassies and consulates were opened in Africa. Turkey alone opened 26 new embassies. According to the March 2020 issue of the African Business Magazine, between 2003 and 2021 the number of Turkish embassies in Africa jumped from 12 to 42. This almost 4-fold increase tells a lot about Recep Tayyip Erdogan's ambitions on the continent. In the light of this, trade between Turkey and Africa has ballooned from \$5.5bn in 2003 to more than \$26bn in 2020. The Turkish president seems to be a tireless visitor to African countries as he has visited more African countries than any other non-African leader. His plans are overly ambitious as Turkey wants to double the trade volume to \$50bn in the coming years. Turkey is not the only country being interested in SSA. According to Devermont (2018) Qatar opened 11, Japan 9, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom 6, Germany and Venezuela 5, and China, India, Spain, Sweden 4 new embassies in the region. The Diplometrics Project claims more than 150 new embassies have been opened in Sub Saharan Africa since 2010. A number of countries have launched brand new policies toward Africa. Poland unveiled its "Go Africa" programme in 2013, Hungary followed suit with its "Opening to the South" policy two years later at the second Budapest–Africa Forum, but a stronger focus on Africa has been on the agenda since 2009 (Tarrósy and Morenth, 2013). Several other countries and regions have placed much more emphasis on their Africa policies. Kuwait hosted the third Africa-Arab Summit in 2013, Russia hosted its first Russia-Africa summit in Sochi in 2019. Indonesia held its first Indonesia-Africa Forum in 2018. Japan hosted the seventh Tokyo International Conference on African Development in 2019.

According to the International Trade Centre, these diplomatic efforts seem to be fruitful because more than 65 countries increased their overall trade with Sub Saharan Africa between 2010 and 2017. India made remarkable progress as the country became the region's second largest trading partner. A number of Eastern European countries (for example Bulgaria and Serbia), and Russia doubled their trade with the African countries. Apart from China, several East Asian countries (for example Indonesia and Thailand) have remarkably increased their trade with the region. For a couple of other countries this period was less successful as a number of traditional trading partners like France, United Kingdom, and the USA did not manage to increase their trade numbers at all (*Figure 1*).

Best performers	2010	2017	Change (percent)	Worst performers	2010	2017	Change (percent)
Russia	1.6	4.2	260	United Arab Emirates	13.9	11.5	83
Thailand	4.7	10.9	230	Italy	14.7	11.7	81
Turkey	3.1	6.1	190	France	26.3	20.7	79
Indonesia	3.8	7.0	180	South Korea	12.7	9.9	78
China	91.2	165.4	180	Portugal	7.5	5.5	73

Mexico	0.9	1.4	140	United Kingdom	20.7	13.9	68
India	32.8	45.9	140	Japan	20.8	13.8	66
Qatar	0.4	0.58	140	Brazil	13.5	6.5	48
Saudi Arabia	8.1	9.7	120	United States	80.3	36.7	46
Germany	22.2	24.6	110	Canada	10.5	4.7	45

Figure 1. Some of the most and least successful countries in fostering bilateral trade with SSA (billions of USD, and percentage changes between 2010 and 2017). Source: CSIS (2018)

Africa’s new and old foreign trade partners want to access the region’s consumer base and mineral wealth. Also, they try to have a larger share of the dynamic marketplace. Among others, the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe claimed in 2016 that “we have a feeling in our gut that in Africa, where possibilities abound, Japan can grow vigorously.” It is very likely that the region will be even more populous by 1.3 billion people by 2050 making the cost of labour even cheaper although the labour force is and will remain (in the foreseeable future) relatively unskilled in comparison with different parts of Asia. Also, there is an increasing market potential for goods and services in those countries where there is a growing middle, and upper-middle class.

The Re-engagement of V4 and SSA

In CEE the economic and political transformation meant an enormous drop in political and economic relationships with SSA in the 1990s but private-sector actors have been trying to deepen the engagement on both sides. By recognising this and following the actions of the largest investors and trading partners to Africa, CEE governments started fostering stronger diplomatic ties after the turn of the new millennium. Since the early 2000s a kind of revival has been seen in the bilateral political relations between CEE states and SSA countries. During the European Union accession process it became clear for the candidate countries that they would put in place development assistance policies focusing on the SSA region as when becoming full members of the bloc. At the very beginning many CEE countries perceived it as a burden (Cibian, 2020). A smaller regional formation, the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic) henceforth V4 countries, have a special focus on connecting with African regional organizations, among others the East African Community (EAC). Apart from certain clear intentions, relations in general are inconsistent, and dependent on the political will and the priorities of the leadership of the countries (Cibian, 2020). The case of Poland for example is very telling as there was a significant opening-up towards SSA countries between 2007 and 2014 under the premiership of Donald Tusk, but relations were scaled back after he left office. Also, the various V4 countries are not uniformly interested in their SSA engagement. Several CEE countries have embassies that are responsible for more than one SSA countries with limited resources and staff and in many cases little support from their

national governments. This raises the question of efficiency as diplomatic missions have limited capacity to monitor and engage fully with every country covered (*Appendix 1*). The diplomatic missions of SSA countries are even more limited, laying the ground for the initial stages of economic cooperation between the different countries only (*Figure 2.*) It is interesting to notice that mainly the largest economies of the SSA region maintain embassies in the V4 countries and Slovakia with a population of less than 5 million is unable to attract any embassy from the south of the Sahara.

V4 countries	Embassies	Consulates and Honorary consulates
Czech Republic	Angola, DRC, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan	Angola, Benin, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, Seychelles, Sudan
Hungary	Angola, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan	Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia
Poland	Angola, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa	Gambia, Ghana, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zambia
Slovak Republic	None	DRC, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mali, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Uganda

Figure 2. SSA diplomatic missions in the V4 countries. Source: Cibian (2020)

Some CEE countries do not have any embassies in SSA. The new EU development policies intend to make trade and investment a top priority and it is likely that CEE ministers of finance and development banks will begin to increase their engagement on SSA. Cibian (2020) however calls our attention to the fact that an effective engagement is likely to be hindered by inexperience, lack of awareness of the context in which they will be operating. At home, the V4 countries have many investment support facilities which may help overcome the bottlenecks in SSA. The different services provide information and among others try to support the risk averse businesses (*Figure 3*).

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovak Republic
Investment promotion agencies	CzechInvest – focus on inward FDI	HIPA – Focus on inward FDI	PAIH – outward and inward FDI mandate and geographical focus on Africa	SARIO – focus on inward FDI
Foreign trade offices	No	Yes	Yes	No
National development institutions	Czech-Moravian Development Bank (CMZR) Czech Export Guarantee and Insurance Corporation (EGAP)	Hungarian Eximbank	Polish Development Bank (BGK)	Slovak Eximbanka

Figure 3. Government investment support to V4 businesses. Source: Kurtagic (2019)

Apart from these bottlenecks, Kurtagic (2019) calls our attention to the fact that there are growing economic links between the economies of CEE and SSA in terms of both trade and investment. He calls our attention to the fact that total exports from CEE countries to SSA more than doubled from \$2 billion in 2005 to more than \$4.5 billion in the early 2010s, before declining to just under \$3.5 billion in 2016. Cibian (2017) confirms the visible increase and points to the fact that the share of all imports to SSA from CEE rose from about 1.3 percent to more than 4 percent between 2005 and 2016. The latest World Bank (2021) data confirm the favourable economic relations also but the performance of Hungary cannot be compared to Poland (Figure 4). The Hungarian “Opening to the South” policy launched in 2015 visibly stopped the decrease of the volume of the bilateral trade. Hungary was the only country that could not increase its performance since 2015. Even Slovakia, with the previously mentioned limited capabilities, was able to do so.




Figure 4. Bilateral trade between the V4 countries and Sub Saharan Africa (2010 and 2018)

Source: World Bank (2021)

Many believe that the more intense bilateral trade relations between the CEE and SSA region are the direct effect of the increased diplomatic engagement and extended networks. Despite the fact that investment figures are hard to find, others like Kurtagic (2019) for example calls our attention to the fact that investments play an increasing role and are on the rise in some CEE countries. He mentions Poland and the total stock of Polish foreign direct investment (FDI) in SSA which reached almost \$240 million by 2017. This figure makes Poland the largest investor in SSA. In case of Hungary, among the top five African export destinations there is only one SSA country, South Africa. Coupled with Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria, South Africa represents almost 80 percent of the African exports. Those are the top five export destinations of Hungary in SSA where there are diplomatic missions (embassies) so in this respect we cannot question the impact of diplomatic presence on Hungarian–African bilateral trade. From an SSA perspective South Africa is the main investor and trade partner in CEE. (The country has embassies in the Visegrad countries.)

Economic re-engagement seems to be helping the inclusive growth both in CEE and SSA. A number of CEE countries have been trying to diversify their export structure and at the same time they have been looking for new markets for their businesses. Bearing the Chinese strategy in mind, some CEE countries consider SSA as an investment destination where labour is cheap and bottomless and by tapping the business opportunities they try to maintain their strong economic growth rates. Partly by building on the Cold War links, CEE countries can export their technologies and skills with which their SSA counterparts may realize their growth and development goals. In addition to the socialist links, the CEE countries never colonized SSA and in the eyes of many Africans they are regarded as equal partners.

Understanding the impact of diplomatic missions on bilateral trade

Growing international trade and the establishment of international organizations and institutions have made economic diplomacy even more important than before. Embassies and consulates are fundamental in helping private businesses reduce international business related transaction costs and barriers (Naray, 2010).

A number of authors point to the fact that diplomats prepare the ground for free trade and help the development of the export markets (Plouffe and van der Sterren, 2016). Diplomatic representations are relevant in minimizing potential risks that businesses encounter in their foreign operations. Diplomatic relations can take the forms of state visits, new trade missions, consulates, embassies. These are equally significant determinants of bilateral trade between countries. Afman and Maurel (2010) go so far and claim that facilitating exports is one of the explicit objectives of foreign diplomatic missions. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) claim that there is a high level of trade among high-income or capital-abundant countries as they generally have a higher level of trust. They argue that high levels of mistrust and insecurity acts as a hidden tax which increases the transaction cost of international trade, impeding trade among developing countries. There are a number of various forms: political, legal, credit risk and these may discourage potential exporters from entering foreign markets. However these risks may be reduced if there are established diplomatic or political ties between the countries. It is not too distant to link the low level of trade among developing countries to these potential risks because the trade among developing countries is more characterized by high levels of mistrust and insecurity.

Unfortunately there is a limited number of papers on the role of embassies and consulates on international trade and in most of the cases political economy and international business research deals with the impact of economic diplomacy on cross-border trade flows. However Okano and Heijmans (2008) point to the fact that diplomats lobby host governments to secure national political and economic interests. Apart from this, we are quite far from understanding the real forces at play but it seems to be clear that any official and diplomatic interaction can help build stronger bilateral trade flows.

This part of the paper tries to collect the most recent research findings which can be useful for the diplomats of the V4 countries as well. The paper of Rose (2007) has been usually mentioned as a seminal one. The author finds a significant link between foreign consulates and bilateral exports. Countries usually continue to increase the number of their highly costly foreign missions mainly to support economic relations with the chosen countries as well as to maintain the consular affairs or political interest (Rose, 2007). The paper is built on a cross-sectional analysis of the annual average bilateral trade over the period of 2002 and 2003 from 22 large source countries to 200 destinations in the world. A number of control variables are used and the paper finds positive and statistically significant (6-10 percent) embassy effect on exports.



A number of other authors came to the same conclusion. Nitsch (2005) for example claims that state visits play an important role in fostering trade. He uses a large data set covering the travel activities of the heads of state of France, Germany, and the USA between 1948 and 2003. According to the results, state and official visits are positively correlated with export. A typical visit is associated with higher bilateral exports by about 8-10 percent when holding other things constant.

Afrman and Maurel (2010) highlight the importance of ad valorem tariff reductions and the role of diplomatic missions in transition countries. Economic diplomacy is generally linked to growth in bilateral trade especially when there is a developing country among the trading partners (Veenstra et al., 2011). The paper of Yusuf (2017) tries to estimate if there is a causal relationship between the presence of an embassy and international trade using the example of 37 new embassies of Turkey between 2006 and 2014. Actually he analyses the impact of presence of foreign missions on trade by using Turkey's unique expansion in its foreign mission network. He concludes that the presence of an embassy increases export value by 27 percent and its increase comes mainly from volume effect. Also, he argues that an increase in differentiated goods exports explained almost all of the change in total export value. Creusen and Lejour (2011) try to find out the determinants of the entry decision of new exporter firms using the international trade transactions of Dutch firms between 2002 and 2008. They find stronger effects such that the presence of foreign missions stimulated both the entry decision and volume of trade by 5-20 percent. Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia (2008) study the trade impact of foreign missions through a cross-sectional bilateral trade analysis. They conclude that presence of a foreign service increases exports around 11-18 percent and this increase comes from the extensive margin channel. Gil et al. (2008) measure the impact of regional export promotion and find that diplomatic representations and trade promotion organizations have significant effects on aggregate bilateral trade. Martincus et al. (2010) focus on the impact of export promotion institutions on trade. By dealing with Latin American and Caribbean countries over the period of 1995 and 2004, they explore the existence of potentially asymmetric effects of export promotion institutions across export margins. Their results suggest that diplomatic foreign mission and trade promotion organisations tend to be associated with larger exports along both margins. Also, they claim that opening an office abroad seems to contribute more to increasing the number of goods sold abroad than to expanding average exports and this contribution is larger than that of additional diplomatic representations. Afrman and Maurel (2010) perform panel data analysis by using the new foreign mission openings in Eastern Europe after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. They specifically focus on the pairwise trade between 26 OECD countries and 30 transition countries in three observation periods (1995, 2000, and 2005) excluding the within group trade. The resulting impact is positive and high in magnitude (around 40%), but its statistical significance disappears when controlled for the pair and time fixed effects.

Contradicting the previous studies, Head and Ries (2009) performs a single country analysis by investigating the impact of the Canadian trade missions on the exports of Canada. By using

a panel of before and after the treatment periods, the authors run regressions for various treatment time spans (1-4 years). They handle the reverse causality by controlling unobserved characteristics with fixed effects and including the lag of the dependent variable among control variables. Their study finds no statistically significant effect on Canadian exports.

Van Bergeijk et al. (2011) argue that in general embassies have a larger impact on trade when comparing them to consulates. In addition they claim that honorary consulates have limited value added. Later Moons and Bergeijk (2013) confirm that embassies represent a more pronounced effect of economic diplomacy. Consulates, state visits, trade missions are less efficient in fostering stronger bilateral relations. Basically they compare 29 empirical studies on trade and investment impact of economic diplomacy, which contains embassies, consulates and other diplomatic facilities, investment and export promotion offices, trade and state visits. Actually they conclude that primary studies conducted on a single country basis will in general show a lower significance of the coefficient while studies using embassies as a proxy for economic diplomacy tend to produce higher t-values. Lederman et al. (2006) find that export promotion agencies have a strong and statistically significant effect on the total exports of countries.

Moons and van Bergeijk (2016) find that the impact of diplomatic exchange is conditional on the level of development of the trading partners. They argue that the effect of diplomatic exchange is more significant for South-South, North-South and South-North trade compared to North-North trade. Yakop and van Bergeijk (2011) show that diplomatic representations are even more relevant for developing countries as they contribute more significantly in enhancing South-South trade than North-North trade.

Afesorgbor (2016) focuses on economic diplomacy in Africa and examines the impact of regional integration and commercial diplomacy on export flows among African states. The effects of the two instruments are compared on bilateral trade by employing a gravity model for 45 African states over the period of 1980 and 2005. According to the results, bilateral diplomatic exchange is a relatively more significant determinant of bilateral exports among African states compared to regional integration.

The conclusions of the studies are quite uniform but most of the studies are far from being generalizable as they are built on limited data and we have to be cautious when controlling for the factors influencing cross border trade volumes. However almost all of the studies confirm that diplomatic ties promote and facilitate trade. (Plouffe and van der Sterren, 2016)



Summary and Conclusions

We have seen a remarkable shift in the interest in SSA since the early 2000s. The old and new trading partners alike have been (re)discovering the importance of economic diplomacy and are trying to attach a higher importance to the role of embassies and consulates in fostering bilateral trade. The paper briefly introduced this renewed interest and showed that the V4 countries have been active in the SSA region also. They have opened and reopened a number of diplomatic missions with the aim of breathing a new life into the export and import links. As the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic never colonized any country in the African continent and owing to the communist times they have limited experience with embassies as trade promotion tools in the region, a literature review on the role of embassies in fostering trade may be useful for the diplomats and for the economic decision makers. After synthesizing the research findings, it turns out the diplomatic missions in general are valuable assets and they can effectively help businesses find new export markets. Despite the fact the opening and maintaining an embassy is an expensive venture, it counts to be a growth opportunity and contributes to the export diversification of the V4 region and by spurring the trade links and economic growth it may contribute to solving the migration issues as well.

Conflict of interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exist for this manuscript.

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Appendix 1. Diplomatic missions of the V4 countries in SSA

Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovak Republic
Angola (H.C.)	Ethiopia (Embassy + H.C.)	Angola (Embassy)	Ethiopia (Embassy + H.C.)
South Africa (Embassy)	Ghana (Embassy + H.C.)	Benin (H.C.)	Kenya (Embassy + H.C.)
Nigeria (Embassy)	Kenya (Embassy + H.C.)	Ethiopia (Embassy)	Nigeria (Embassy + H.C.)
Botswana (H.C.)	Nigeria (Embassy + H.C.)	Gabon (H.C.)	South Africa (Embassy + H.C.)
Ghana (Embassy)	Angola (Embassy, H.C.)	Gambia (H.C.)	Madagascar (H.C.)
Burkina Faso (H.C.)	Botswana (H.C.)	Ghana (H.C.)	Mauritius (H.C.)
Kenya (Embassy)	South Africa (Embassy + H.C.)	Cameroon (H.C.)	Seychelles (H.C.)
Cameroon (H.C.)	Djibouti (H.C.)	Kenya (H.C. + Embassy)	Uganda (H.C.)
Cape Verde (H.C.)	Cote d'Ivoire (H.C.)	Madagascar (H.C.)	Comoros (H.C.)
Congo (H.C.)	Guinea (H.C.)	Mauritania (H.C.)	Tanzania (H.C.)
Congo (H.C.)	Cameroon (H.C.)	Mozambique (H.C.)	Togo (H.C.)
Cote d'Ivoire (H.C.)	DRC (H.C.)	Nigeria (Embassy)	Guinea (H.C.)
Ethiopia (Embassy)	Madagascar (H.C.)	South Africa (H.C. + Embassy)	Ghana (Embassy + H.C.)
Djibouti (H.C.)	Mali (H.C.)	Rwanda (H.C.)	Mozambique (H.C.)
Gabon (H.C.)	Mauritius (H.C.)	Senegal (Embassy)	Senegal (H.C.)
Guinea (H.C.)	Mozambique (H.C.)	Sudan (H.C.)	Zimbabwe (Embassy)
Senegal (H.C.)	Namibia (H.C.)	Tanzania (Embassy)	Malawi (H.C.)
Zambia (Embassy)	Sao Tomé and Príncipe (H.C.)	Zambia (H.C.)	Zambia (H.C.)
Malawi (H.C.)	Seychelles (H.C.)	Zimbabwe (H.C.)	
Mali (Embassy + H.C.)	Sierra Leone (H.C.)	Uganda (H.C.)	
Mauritania (H.C.)	Sudan (H.C.)		
Mauritius (H.C.)	Tanzania (H.C.)		
Mozambique (H.C.)	Uganda (H.C.)		
Namibia (H.C.)	Zambia (H.C.)		
Sudan (H.C.)	Cape Verde (H.C.)		
Niger (H.C.)			
Rwanda (H.C.)			
Senegal (Embassy)			
Seychelles (H.C.)			
Tanzania (H.C.)			
The Gambia (H.C.)			
Uganda (H.C.)			
Zambia (Embassy)			
Zimbabwe (H.C.)			

Note: H.C. indicates honorary consulate; source: Foreign Ministries of V4 countries.

Antonio Lasciac and his architectural works in Arabic eyes

Abdallah Abdel-Ati Al-Naggar¹

Abstract:

The cosmopolitan, remarkable designer and chief architect of (Abbas Hilmi II) Khedive's royal palaces, Antonio Lasciac (Italian and English) or Anton Laščak (Slovene) with multinational origin, was an exceptional personality, who played an influential role in the field of architecture in Egypt and overseas. He is one of the most appreciated foreign architects praised by the Arabs throughout modern history. Here, we focus on the picture of Antonio Lasciac and his architectural works as well as his undetermined citizenship together with the most well-known story about him as portrayed in the scientific studies and Arab press. Researchers and journalists published several interesting and positive reports, opinions and topics on him. Among the sources of this research I am presenting press articles, related studies, together with other trusted internet websites.

Keywords:

Egypt, Antonio Lasciac; architecture; belle époque; Austro-Hungarian.

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Introduction

Foreign architects who worked in Egypt during the reign of Mohamad Ali² and his successors left a great impact on Egyptian architecture. They played a prominent role and retained a monopoly in the reconstruction work after the British bombardment and occupation in 1882 (Saad, 2018, p. 131). The architects Pietro Avoscani,³ Mario Rossi⁴ and Antonio Lasciac were at the top of the most famous names in the world of architecture. They have implemented the magic of their country to the Egyptian architecture (Moustafa, 2014). Antonio Lasciac was “an architect and engineer, poet and musician, a man of talent and hobby, he left a legacy that is considered one of the architectural achievements not only in the Egyptian architectural heritage, but on the level of architecture in general” (Nasr, 2018, p. 84). In this article, I am presenting the following main points on Lasciac: brief biography about him, the issue of his undetermined citizenship, his picture and his architectural works as well as the most well-known story about him, as read in the Arab World.



Figure 1. Antonio Lasciac, chief architect of the Royal Palaces

² Mohamed Ali Pasha (1769–1849), was the governor of Egypt from 1805 to 1848. He is considered the founder of modern Egypt.

³ Pietro Avoscani (1816–1891) was an Italian architect, who emigrated to Egypt in 1837. Among his prominent works in Egypt, we can list: Palace of Gabbar (1846–48), Ras Al-Tin Palace (1847), Palaces of Abbasiyya and Hilmiyya (1849), Palaces of Gazira and Chubra, (1860–61), Khedivial Opera House (1869), Zizinia Theatre (1863).

⁴ Mario Rossi (1897–1961) was an Italian architect, specialized in Islamic architecture. Among his notable works in Egypt: Votive church of the Syriac Catholic Cemetery, Villa Hassan Sabry, Italian World War I Memorial, Latin Cemetery, Abbassia, Umar Makram Mosque at Tahrir Square, Zamalek Mosque, Abu Al-Abbas Al-Mursi Mosque, Abderrahim Al-Qenawi Mosque, Al-Qaed Ibrahim Mosque, Mahatet Al-Raml, Mohamed Kurayyim Mosque.

Brief biography of Lasciac and his works in Egypt

I am not going to give detailed analysis of Lasciac's life, as it was really well-studied and professionally covered by Eastern (See: Awad, 2008; Khalil, 2009; Ahmed, 2018; Rabbat, 2020; Abdel-Rahman, 2016; El-Wakil, 2016)⁵ and Western (See: Godoli, 2006; Barillari, 1998; Kuzmin, 2015) researchers, but it's still worth briefly investigating some main points in Lasciac's life and achievement in Egypt.

Lasciac – not well-known in Italy but with a huge professional experience and fame in the Arab World – was born in Gorizia in 1863 as the first of ten children, three among them died in their early childhood. He moved to Alexandria directly after the city's destruction by the British Army in 1882, in order to participate in the reconstruction works. From that date until the beginning of the First World War (WWI), Lasciac alternated long periods in Egypt with frequent trips to Europe to purchase marbles and furniture for the true luxury apartments and buildings he designed. In 1907, he was appointed as the chief architect of royal palaces, but "owing to his frequent stays in Gorizia, he lost his job at the Court of Abbas Hilmi, but above all he had to leave Egypt, because of his Austrian passport, being a citizen of an enemy state in time of war" (Kuzmin, 2015, p. 52). After the outbreak of WWI, the US representative received the authorities of the Austro-Hungarian Consul in Egypt, since the empire's diplomatic presence lasted in Cairo until September 1914,⁶ when General Maxwell, commander of the occupier British army ordered expelling the diplomats of the German and Austro-Hungarian consulates from Egypt's territory (Al-Naggar, 2011, p. 52). After WWI, Lasciac returned to Egypt, where he completed several successful works, in parallel with other notable architectural achievements abroad. Alternating winter in Egypt and summer in Europe, on 5 October 1946, he moved to Cairo, where he died on 26 December of the same year, and he was buried at the Latin Cemetery of the Egyptian Capital (Cochelli, Sdegno, Kuzmin, 2018, pp. 217–220).

Lasciac's notable projects can be found in Europe, Asia, and Africa. His African architectural accomplishment is still present in Egypt. Among his great works in Egypt, we can list the following: he built a series of residential apartments (1883–1886) for the Société Anonyme des Immeubles d'Égypte on the rue Cherif and the Place des Consuls, the Menasce Okelle (1883–1885). Then, he also built commercial and other facilities such as Ramleh railstation (1883) and the headquarters of the Jewish Alexandrian Community (1887), Palace of Prince Said Halim Pasha⁷ (1896–1899),⁸ Suarès Palace⁹ or the Risotto Club¹⁰ of Italian Neo-

⁵ The last study dealt with Antonio Lasciac was realized in 2019: a master thesis, discussed in the Higher Institute for Tourism and Hotels (*Egoth*, Alexandria), entitled "Political and public figures and their role in shaping the material heritage of Alexandria during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries," Antonio Lasciac was strongly present. The researcher Micheal Mohebb Makram Fahim aimed to portray the biography of some of the most prominent foreign figures including engineers, artists, writers, merchants and their role in drawing the features of the material heritage of Alexandria in the modern era.

⁶ Only one consular officer remained in Cairo until he was arrested by the British in December 1915.

⁷ Said Halim Pasha (1863–1921) was appointed in the Council of State in Istanbul in 1888, later in 1911, he served as Foreign Minister and in 1913 as Grand Vizier.

⁸ The palace reflects Neo-Baroque style with Art Nouveau ascents.

⁹ It was first used as residence of banker Raphaël Suarès (1844–1906).

¹⁰ Later it hosted the Italian social club Circolo del Risotto.



Renaissance style (1897), Villa Mazloum Pasha (1898–1899, Alexandria), Palace of Prince Kamal Al-Din Hussein And Princess Niemat-Allah¹¹ designed in Neo-Baroque style (1906, Cairo), as well as the building of the Assicurazioni Generali (Insurance Company) in Cairo in 1911 and the villa of Princess Fatma Al-Zahra in 1919 (today the fantastic Jewelry Museum of the Crown in Alexandria), the headquarters of the Misr¹² Bank (1922–1927) and the Alexandria railway station, completed in 1946 (See: Scientific Office of the Italian Embassy in Egypt, n.d, pp. 14–26; Cochelli, Sdegno, Kuzmin, 2018, pp. 218–219).

Lasciac's undetermined nationality in the Arab World

After a long-term research in many different Arabic sources on Lasciac, I realized that the real and accurate nationality of Lasciac is still undetermined in the Arab World. Many sources indicate that he was Italian, while others mention that he was Austrian or Austro-Hungarian, while others conclude that he was only Hungarian. He was also Italian-Slovenian, and a sole Slovenian according to some writings. Huge contradictions can be found concerning his nationality in Arab Academia and also in the press. Researchers and journalists disagree on this point. Here, I am going to explain and analyse the reasons of these contradictory statements, referring to the Arab mentality and mode of thinking, as the following:

Talking about being an Austro-Hungarian or only Austrian citizen comes from the fact that he was born in Gorizia, which was a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire¹³ at that time, and he completed his studies of architecture in Vienna (See: Kuzmin, 2015, p. 198; Cochelli, Sdegno, Kuzmin, 2018, p. 217).¹⁴ Only few Arab researchers and journalists know that Gorizia was a part of the Dual Monarchy, and they wrote, that he was Austro-Hungarian. The majority in the Arab world, especially non-researchers, do not know about the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as if it did not even exist, and they call it simply Austria without mentioning the Hungarian part of it, consequently, they said that he was only Austrian.

¹¹ The daughter of Khedive Mohamed Tawfik Pasha (1852–1892) and spouse of Prince Kamal Al-Din Hussein (1874–1932)

¹² This Arabic word means Egypt.

¹³ Austria-Hungary, or the Dual Monarchy was a great power in Central Europe between 1867 and 1918.

¹⁴ Diego Kuzmin affirmed that, he was graduated at the University of Vienna (See: Kuzmin, 2015, p. 198). Three years later of this first study, Paola Cochelli, Alberto Sdegno and the same scholar of the first study Diego Kuzmin confirmed in their study entitled *Researches on Architectural Heritage Drawing Between Italy and Slovenia: The Antonio Lasciac's Villa*: "Unlike described from preceding biographies, his graduation diploma at Vienna University of Technology has not been found, but recent researches have identified an internship at the Building Office of the Gorizia Municipality in 1876 and a period of professional activity in his city before leaving for the Egypt." (See: Cochelli, Sdegno, Kuzmin, 2018, p. 217).

It is also said that Lasciac was a Hungarian citizen. The reason for this is because he had a strong relationship with the Hungarians residing in Egypt in that era, especially with the famous Hungarian architect, Miksa Herz Pasha,¹⁵ who had relevant works in Cairo, and with May Török¹⁶ (See: Al-Naggar, 2019, pp. 6–17), the Hungarian wife of Abbas Helmi II, Khedive of Egypt, “the good spirit for Europeans at the Khedivial court” (Rafaat, 1994, p. 13). Lasciac was appointed as chief architect of royal palaces, maybe after the personal and direct intervention of May Török as he designed and built the Khedive's Palace (Saray) in Tchibukli,¹⁷ achieving all *the desires and dreams* of the Hungarian wife of the last Khedive of Egypt (Jarmik, 2017, pp. 1–13). The palace, completed in 1907 by Lasciac, was a turning point in Lasciac's life, as he was directly appointed in the same year as chief architect of royal palaces. Abbas's second wife claims in her memoirs *Harem*¹⁸ that: “she took an active role in the creation of Tchibukli Saray right from its drawing board phase to the selection of the wallpaper and upholstery material. It was also Countess May who assigned and approved the landscaping of the palace gardens, its winding footpaths, each re-planted tree, every rose bush, not forgetting 'lovers lane' connecting Chalet to Saray which held such a special memory for the royal couple. [...] It was there that she spent intimate holidays with the Khedive away from officialdom” (Rafaat, 1994, p. 13).



Figure 2. Tchibukli Saray (Khedive Palace, Çubuklu Palace) (Yalav-Heckerroth, 2016)

¹⁵ Miksa Herz (1856–1919) Hungarian architect, conservator, First Director of the Arab Museum, and architectural historian, active in Egypt.

¹⁶ May (Marianna) Török Szendrői (in Hungary), or as she referred to herself as Djavidan Hanem (in Arabic and Turkish), secret consort of Abbas Hilmi II (1900–1910), and Khediva of Egypt (1910–1913). The well-known Countess May Török was born in Philadelphia (USA) of Hungarian origin on 15 June 1877, when her parent's marriage was closed to its end. Her mother was Countess Zsófia Vetter von der Lilié, who was married three times to three different Hungarian men: her first husband was Count József Török, former head of Ung county. Later, she married Tivadar Puskás, the brilliant Hungarian entrepreneur and telephone pioneer. After Puskás's death, she married a painter, Károly Cserna (1867–1944).

¹⁷ The Khedive's Palace or Çubuklu Palace was designed in the Art Nouveau style, incorporating characteristics and details of neo-classical Ottoman architecture.

¹⁸ The original German *Harem* was published in Berlin in 1930. Its Arabic translation was published three times as follows: in 1980 by the state-run Dar Al-Hilal Publishing House, Cairo, and later reprinted by Al-Kahera journal of the Egyptian Ministry of Culture, and third in 2004 by Dar Almada, Damascus.



Figure 3. May Török (1877–1968)



Figure 4. Miksa Herz (1856–1919)

As for being Slovenian, it comes primarily because his family name *Laščak* is Slovenian and not Italian nor Austro-Hungarian, and his father *Peter*, a “tanner” descended from Slovenia. The family of Peter Lasciac came from the Valley of Soča river, today located in Slovenia. In addition, he began his life working with a Slovenian person and his wife, Maria Plesnizer (Marija Alojzija Plesničar) was also a Goritian woman coming from a Slovenian family (Kazamias, 2015).¹⁹

Most Arabic sources refer to his Italian citizenship due to several reasons: most of the arab journalists and also many specialized researchers are convinced that Gorizia, where Lasciac was born in the house of his mother’s parents,²⁰ has been an Italian city throughout history and it had no Austro-Hungarian dependency at all. The second reason is that Lasciac did many prominent architectural works in Italy, and lived there for long periods of his life, including the whole period of the WWI, although Italy was the enemy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.²¹ In addition, to Arabic speakers, the name Antonio sounds Italian. Moreover, Lasciac’s mother, Giuseppina Trampus, was Italian. Lasciac had three children with fully Italian names as follows: Plautilla Angelina Francesca, Fabrizio Antonio Giuseppe and Romeo Italico Alessandro. For Arab architects and specialists, his architectural designs and construction style, which tends

¹⁹ Talk given on 29 October, 2015 at the Hellenic Centre, London, for the book launch of Vittoria Capresi and Barbara Pampe, *Discovering Downtown Cairo: Architecture and Stories*, Berlin, Jovis, 2015.

²⁰ The house still exists today, at the corner of Via Veniero and Piazza San Rocco in Gorizia.

²¹ A question raised here in the Arab press: why Lasciac settled in Rome and not in his original city Gorizia during the WWI? The question remained unanswered for a long time, although the answer is so easy: Gorizia became the scene of serious battles between the Italian and Austro-Hungarian armies, and it was seriously damaged and most of its inhabitants were evacuated by early 1916, consequently he couldn’t accomodate there during that period.

to Italians,²² refer in their minds to that he was Italian. Additional persuasive reason, for being Italian citizen, is that Lasciac's most archival documents are kept in Gorizia, mainly in five official archives: in the Historical Archive of the Municipality of Gorizia,²³ in the State Archive of Gorizia,²⁴ in the Provincial Museums of Gorizia,²⁵ in the Historical Provincial Archive of Gorizia²⁶ and in the Photo Library of the Provincial Museums²⁷ (Kuzmin, 2015, p. 201). Furthermore, Lasciac had always expressed Italian feelings. We can say that in the point of view of the Arabs, Antonio Lasciac, mainly due to his Italian character and his Italian architectural heritage, was rather Italian than Slovene or Austrian or Hungarian.

In my own point of view, the truth on his nationality is the following: Lasciac was born in the County of Gorizia, which was part of the Austrian Littoral²⁸ in 1849,²⁹ and was granted regional autonomy after becoming the Princely County of Gorizia and Gradisca³⁰ in 1861. Lasciac possessed an Austrian passport until the end of the WWI, although he was settling in Italy. In November 1918, the Italian armed forces occupied Gorizia, where they introduced their own administration, and in 1920, the town became officially part of Italy. In 1927, it became a provincial capital within the Julian March administrative region. Although the town was shortly occupied by the Slovenians in September 1943, and by the Yugoslavians in May and June 1945, it remained Italian. Accordingly, Lasciac became an Italian citizen after WWI, as Gorizia was included in the territory of Italy.

Antonio Lasciac's picture and his works in the eyes of Arab Academia and Press

There are many comprehensive studies written, and seminars (See: Taher, 2018) organized by Arabic scholars and specialists, that dealt with the life and works of Antonio Lasciac, and these can be counted despite their large number. As for the short newspaper articles talking about one or more of his works, these cannot be enumerated. It suffices to write Antonio Lasciac "أنطونيو لاشياك" in Arabic on the Internet to see that, or you can do the same step in the database of the Egyptian National Library and Archives³¹ in Cairo to find out the huge amount of sources mentioning him. Here, I am going to focus on the most important Arabic sources and articles dealing with Lasciac and his works.

²² The usual stylistic European eclecticism often inspired by the Italian Renaissance – adopted by Lasciac, as he did for example, in the villa of Princess Fatma Al-Zahra, now the Museum of the Crown Jewels – refers to his Italianity in the Arabs' eyes.

²³ In Italian: Archivio Storico del Comune di Gorizia.

²⁴ In Italian: Archivio di Stato di Gorizia.

²⁵ In Italian: Musei Provinciali di Gorizia.

²⁶ In Italian: Archivio Storico Provinciale di Gorizia.

²⁷ In Italian: Fototeca dei Musei Provinciali.

²⁸ It was a crown land of the Austrian Empire, composed of Istria peninsula, Gorizia and Gradisca, and the Imperial Free City of Trieste.

²⁹ It was included in the Austrian Littoral along with Trieste and Istria.

³⁰ It was a crown land of the Habsburg dynasty within the Austrian Littoral. Now a border area between Italy and Slovenia.

³¹ It was established in 1870 in Cairo. It is the largest library in Egypt, and it is a non-profit government organization.



There are many Arabic studies that focus on analyzing and studying the works of Lasciac not only in Egypt, but also abroad. Dr. Karima Nasr, well-known Egyptian researcher and specialist, in her analytical study of Lasciac's style said: "Antonio Lasciac had a fixed style in building palaces: each one consists of two floors and a basement, while the styles of their façades differed according to their construction periods and the extent to which his architectural experience was affected by the Architecture of the Orient. The architectural styles of Lasciac in Downtown Cairo can be divided into four styles: first, he began designing using the new classical style, the revival of the Greek and Roman arts, which he brought from Italy, then he started relinquishing gradually the implementation of the new Renaissance style, followed by the newly introduced Baroque, and finally recognizing the greatness of the Islamic architecture, he turned to the new Islamic style." Moreover, it is worth dealing with his *meticulous or cumulative style*, which indicates the interference of the client's desires as most of them were from the royal family, princes and wealthy people, and by virtue of their spending long times outside the country, it was reflected on their own taste. All the downtown buildings established by Lasciac depend on the new classical style, excepting for the decorative elements, depending on the taste of the architect or the owner of the building. Lasciac arranged the architectural elements together in a style that reflects shadow and light (Nasr, 2016, p. 275). Completing the image of Lasciac's architectural style, Nasser Rabbat said:³² "Lasciac was gradually adopting the *eclectic Islamic styles* popular among architects in Egypt at the time, but was accommodating the taste of his clients among the ruling class, like Said Halim, who demanded the prevalent European styles for their buildings" (Rabbat, 2020, pp. 151–152).

Dr. Inas Abdelsabour Ahmed, Egyptian scholar and architectural historian, praises Lasciac's wonderful work: "Prince Yusuf Kamal's Palace was one of the most beautiful palaces of Mohamed Ali's family, and his palace had merged European Architecture in Eastern Architecture (Arabic Islamic). The palace was built in 1908 and was designed by the famous royal palace architect Antonio Lasciac, one of the most famous architects who came to Egypt [...] this palace was a model of the steadfastness of aesthetic values in the face of the attack of modern civilization" (Ahmed, 2018, pp. 719–737). Mohamed Hassan, director general of the Islamic Antiquities Sector in Qena,³³ said about the same palace: "It is one of the most important palaces in Egypt in general, and in southern Egypt in particular, because of its wonderful location on the Nile River and its unique architectural style" (Marie, 2019).

Regarding Lasciac's image in the Arab press, we can say that the Arab journalists published several interesting and positive reports and opinions on him, unusually without any criticism. Dina Moustafa, well-known Egyptian young journalist, in her long article published in Al-

³² Nasser Rabbat is an architect, historian, and the Director of the Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture at Department of Architecture at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His scholarly interests include the history and historiography of Islamic architecture, art, and cultures, urban history, and post-colonial criticism.

³³ Qena is a city in Upper Egypt, and it was known in antiquity as Kaine.

Ahram³⁴ dated 10 December, 2014, said: “History will not ignore the most famous designer of the presidential palaces in Egypt Antonio Lasciac, the Italian architect who designed buildings that are *European antiques* in Egypt. [...] Lasciac combined in his design the construction of downtown buildings between local and European architecture to form a *new classic style* representing an architectural edifice that is unparalleled in modern Egyptian architecture” (Moustafa, 2014).

The most well-known story on Lasciac in the Arab World

Since we are talking here about Lasciac from an Arab point of view, we must mention the most famous and widespread story about him, narrated by Dr. Amro Talaat, Egyptian historian, in his article posted by Rawi magazine, Egypt’s Heritage Review. Although it is a little funny, it also carries a kind of respect and appreciation for this man and his endless precision. When Ismail Pasha,³⁵ Khedive of Egypt, deposed from the throne, he took three of his four wives with him. In 1895, Khedive Ismail and his first wife (Shehret Feza Hanim)³⁶ passed away, then Djananiar Hanem³⁷ and Jeshm Afet Hanem³⁸ decided to return to reside in Egypt together! The two wives asked Antonio Lasciac, to design a palace for them in the garden of the old palace, so he built the Saffron Palace (Saray of Zafaran) for them,³⁹ which would be the only palace in Egypt and perhaps in all over the world that two wives built to reside in together, by mutual agreement and free will, after the death of their husband! The palace is composed of a basement and two floors and has five entrances and is surrounded by a 40-acre⁴⁰ garden. Upon entering the main entrance, you find yourself in a spacious, very luxurious hall surrounded by beautiful marble columns that add more and more to its splendor. The two wives were keen to decorate the walls with the letter “I”⁴¹ above the Egyptian crown in memory of their husband! A double staircase with a wonderful iron railing, which is one of the most beautiful elements of the palace, leads you to the foyer of the upper floor, which divides the floor into two wings, exactly equal in size and number of rooms, a suite for each of the two wives. As if Lasciac had intended his determination to help the continuation of friendship

³⁴ *Al-Ahram*: Founded in Alexandria in 1875 by two Lebanese brothers, Beshara Takla and Saleem Takla. It began as a weekly newspaper published every Saturday. Its first issue appeared on August 5, 1876. The paper was relaunched as a daily newspaper in January 1881. In addition to the main edition published in Egypt, the paper publishes two other Arabic-language editions, one geared to the Arab world and the other aimed at an international audience, as well as editions in English and French.

³⁵ Ismail Pasha (1830–1895), was the Khedive of Egypt from 1863 to 1879. He was removed at the behest of Great Britain and direct intervention of the Ottoman Sultan. He greatly modernized Egypt and Sudan developing the industrial and economic sectors, and expanding the country's boundaries in Africa.

³⁶ Shehret Feza Hanim (1829–1895) was the ethnic Circassian Princess, and the first wife of Khedive Ismail.

³⁷ Jananiyar Hanem (1835–1912) was the Princess consort of Khedive Ismail Pasha of Egypt. She married Ismail Pasha as his second wife before his accession to the throne. She gave birth to six children.

³⁸ Jeshm Afet Hanim (1863–1907), consort of Khedive Ismail Pasha of Egypt. She was the adoptive mother of the future Sultana of Egypt Melek Tourhan.

³⁹ It is located in Cairo. Now it is the main office of the Presidential Office of the Ain Shams University. The Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 was signed and the Arab League was founded in 1945 there.

⁴⁰ It is a unit of land area, which is exactly equal to 10 square chains, and approximately 4,047 m², or about 40% of a hectare.

⁴¹ The first letter of the name Ismail, their husband, Khedive of Egypt.

between them, so, he made sure to divide the space of the palace between them fairly! Indeed, the two wives lived there together in friendship until Jeshm Afet Hanem died in 1907, and Djananiar Hanem followed her in 1912, and she was the last member of the royal family to live in the palace (Talaat, n.d.).



Figure 5. Entrance and stairs of the Saffron Palace

As a conclusion, It is worth mentioning that using the aforementioned sources accompanied with structural analysis, I tried to draw the three main points of my research topic on how the Arabs portrayed the great architect Antonio Lasciac and his unforgettable works, still seen in many places. I hope that my research puts an accepted and persuasive clarifications to the controversy disributed in the Arab World on Lasciac's nationality, after giving more analitical details on the possible versions in this regard, as well as on the truth, I believe in, according to the previously mentioned historical facts, concerning his legal identification.

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Conflict of interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exist for this manuscript.

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A review of: “Ripe for Rebellion. Political and Military Insurgency in the Congo, 1946-1964” by Stephen Rookes¹

Lidia Papp²

The country in the heart of sub-Saharan Africa has been the scene of constant conflicts. Congo has always been part of political-economic and ethnic struggles. Its territory is populated by nearly 200 different ethnicities, and it has also been affected by the racial and religious tensions of neighbouring states. The Republic of Congo is a former colonial state. It was established as a Belgian colony in 1885 and continued to exist as the Belgian Congo from 1908. After numerous long periods of political battles, the Belgian Congo gained its independence in June 1960. However, the decolonized country proved too weak to establish an efficient democracy. *Ripe for Rebellion. Political and Military Insurgency in the Congo, 1946-1964* is a complex and engaging piece of history of the Congo. The *Ripe for Rebellion*'s main objective is to broaden the investigation of events that occurred in the Cold War atmosphere in the years before and right after the independence. The book shows entirely new aspects of progress in a country, which was believed to become the next battleground of the Cold War. *Ripe for Rebellion* is a well-organized and detailed study of a very complicated field of research and the first of two volumes analysing the so-called 'Congo Crisis'.

The first and second chapter introduces Congo's pre-independence era as well as the Congolese political development between 1946-1959.

The third chapter of the book analyses the transition period from independence which soon led to a crisis. The Congolese nationalist movement demanded the end of colonial rule: it led to the country's liberation on 30 June 1960. Minimal preparations were made and many issues, such as federalism, tribal and ethnic nationalism, remained unresolved. In the first week of July, a riot broke out in the army and violence evolved among black and white civilians. Belgium sent troops to protect the fleeing whites. Katanga and South Kasai was separated from Congo with Belgian support. Amid ongoing riots and violence, the UN deployed peacekeepers, however UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld was willing to use these troops to help the central government in Leopoldville to fight with the separatists. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, the charismatic leader of the largest nationalist faction, responded by asking for help from the Soviet Union, who immediately sent military advisers and other supports. Soviet involvement divided the Congolese government and led to a stalemate between Lumumba and President Joseph Kasa-Vubu. After Lumumba was removed from

¹ *Ripe for Rebellion. Political and Military Insurgency in the Congo, 1946-1964* by Stephen Rookes, Warwick, England: Helion and Company Limited, 2020. 65pp. ISBN: 978-1-913336-23-3.

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power in September 1960 and then assassinated in February 1961, the UN reinforced the peacekeeping mission.

From the fourth to the seventh chapters, Rookes describes the phases and military operations of insurgencies in Stanleyville, Katanga, Kwilu, and Kivu. This volume covers an impressive array of military vehicles, aircrafts, well-illustrated maps, and drawings of army officers, soldiers, UN peacekeepers, and rebels involved in the conflicts.

With the support of UN troops, Leopoldville defeated the secessionist movements in Katanga and South Kasai in early 1963. After Katanga and South Kasai returned to government control and UN troops left Congo, a conciliatory compromise constitution was adopted and the exiled Katangese leader Moïse Tshombe was recalled to head an interim administration.

The final chapter focuses on foreign intervention and the rescue operations during the sustained military conflict. The author uses a substantial number of references from both primary and secondary sources. The precise and detailed introduction of major events and circumstances is very comprehensible for non-specialists too. The author aimed to examine the role of the Congolese and the United States from a military perspective, which he continues to address in the second volume, entitled *For God and the CIA. Cuban Exile Forces in the Congo, 1962-1967*. I recommend the book to anyone interested in the history of Africa, especially the history of the Congo.

How many faces might migration have?

A review of: “Two Faces of European Migration” by Viktor Glied¹

János Besenyo²

Abstract:

AdLibrum Publishers recently published the book titled *Two Faces of European Migration*. The author, Viktor Glied strives to express with the choice of title that he does not see migration in black and white but presents several perspectives. This may even mean that the book will not generate huge revenue for the author, but during the reading it became clear to me that Viktor Glied is not interested in the number of copies sold, but rather he examines the issue of migration as much as possible. The ordinary reader could even neglect this fact, because so many articles, studies and even books have been written on this subject in the last few years that these could block the Danube. Understanding of this topic is also hindered, because this issue is significantly over-politicized, and the stakeholders do not attempt to have a professional debate on migration. The author seems to break with this “comfortable, well-established point of view” and, through 200 pages, lists various statements, arguments and counterarguments that raise questions for the readers to make them think about and then react to. As a reviewer, I recommend reading the book for this reason alone, to all those who are interested in migration and related phenomena that associated with it (terrorism, organized crime, employment of foreigners, issues on integration, tensions in social coexistence etc.).

Keywords:

migration;
European Union;
social tensions;
securitization.

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Two faces of European Migration

The book summarizes a 15-year-long intensive research period, during which the author – together with his colleagues – dealt with various aspects of migration in the framework of domestic and international projects. He also published several significant papers, (with) some of them being fundamental works in migration studies. Some of them became basic works in the migration-related literature³. In the meantime, besides theoretical research, the author obtained the account of personal experiences from those involved in migration, and those who have helped to understand the topic better with various inputs. At that time, only a few (researchers, university lecturers, experts, employees of non-governmental organizations) were engaged in this issue in Hungary, but then the situation changed after the 2015 “migration crisis”. The topic has become popular and now almost everyone is interested in this subject. According to a foreign friend of mine who spends a lot of time in Hungary, Hungarians consider themselves experts in two things: football and migration – they are able to talk about these topics for hours. Therefore, the author’s efforts to publish a book on migration that is understandable and usable for all are commendable. The reviewer of the volume is Professor Zoltán Dövényi, who also conducted research on migration and contributed to the objective view of the manuscript with his balanced opinion.

The book consists of three main chapters; the first is entitled ‘Migration Challenges in the European Union’. In this chapter, we learn about the migration history of Western European community, the nature of immigration, sending regions, and European responses. This is extremely important in order to understand that the majority of EU leaders and the average citizen also think about migration in a different way. This is important for this reason alone, as most Central and Eastern European countries that joined the European Union in 2004 have a completely different view on migration than Western European countries, for historical and other reasons. Hungary in particular, which has had a consciously designed “migration policy” for hundreds of years (Miletics and Stohl, 2019). Additionally, newly arrived countries did not have a colonial past, which also affects the composition of migrants who arrive in Western European countries. This distinction is illustrated very clearly by the author, as well as how Western European people rebuilt their countries after World War II, with the help of guest workers from the Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa, who were unwilling to be admitted at all. The first guest workers came from the former colonies because they had language skills, were familiar with the European atmosphere, and the expectations of host society. These relations continued, mainly with the former French- and British-ruled African countries like Morocco, Algeria, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, Chad, etc. However, the projected “business model” did not work as expected, so guest workers did not return to their homeland, but remained in Europe and were later followed by their family members. European countries were not prepared for this at all. They tried to trivialize

³ One of the best known of these books is the *Migration in the 21st Century*, published in 2016 together with István Tarrósy and Zoltán Vörös, which already processed the experiences of the 2015 migration crisis. He also edited the volume *Migration Trends Today* with co-editors in 2014. Intentionally the author often links his other field of research, water safety to migration, on which he has also published several publications.

the difficulties and problems of coexistence related to immigrants, trusted in the supposed positive effects of multiculturalism and started to implement their integration almost only at the 24th hour, when another mighty mass, more than one and a half million people arrived in the continent. The European Union was even not prepared for this, therefore managing the wave of migration was characterized by ‘communication battles’ rather than factual political actions adopted by the European Community (Glied, 2020). This is despite the fact that the states of the continent need to cope with an aging trend of population, the maintenance of social and pension systems is becoming more and more difficult, and sustaining economic competitiveness is facing difficulties, which would require a consciously managed migration policy. According to the author, a more coherent European immigration policy could provide an answer to the challenges of migration, but several European countries do not agree with this, and they want to keep most of migration regulations in a national competence. These contradictions were also visible in the management of the 2014-2016 refugee crisis where border defense systems clearly failed. This failure has forced some European states to revise their refugee policies and introduce stricter restrictions on the admission of migrants. Thus, the former “refugee-friendly” attitude was reversed, prompting European Union leaders to restore protection to the EU’s external borders and to come to an agreement with Turkey on tackling illegal migration. Glied (2015) wrote an article entitled *Submission* in which he examined the conflicts in detail and in more depth in this book, directly in the light of the migration crisis. He was noticeably influenced by the thoughts of Houellebecq’s book with the same title (Houellebecq, 2015) or Douglas Murray’s *dark skies* (Murray, 2019). ‘In the Two Faces of European Migration’ the author modulated pessimistic scenarios by adding other factors that redefine one-dimensional approaches to migration processes. In this chapter readers can read about immigrants who have been living in the European Union, discovering who they are, what their background is, how they have settled or how they have actually created parallel societies that are considered serious security challenges for the host countries.

Glied does not attempt to present bright stories, but also the fault-lines and challenges between the arrivals and host societies. Here we can also see migration policy documents, as well as the European Commission’s new findings on the feasible management of migration. Although they show recurring policy and regulatory elements, there is little elaborate content that really follows events and could be the starting point for a specific legislative act. Unfortunately, this also contributes to the fact that there is still no common European position on migration management.

The second chapter ‘The Two Faces of European Migration’ addresses deep social, political, economic issues and debates that have arisen over immigration in recent decades. First, the author takes security challenges into account. In the first half of the chapter, he emphasizes the potential benefits of migration (demography, maintenance of public/state systems, economic development etc.) as opposed to its risks, but at the end he fully agrees with Péter Tálás that migration has both “advantages and disadvantages” (Tálás, 2019). The



author concludes here that the EU can no longer exist without immigrants and guest workers – as the coronavirus epidemic has shown since 2020 – when labour shortages have been a major concern in certain areas of agriculture. Furthermore, Glied lists the risks, acknowledging language problems, growing ethnic, religious and cultural tensions, deteriorating security conditions and terrorist attacks, saying that many of those are perpetrated on a migrant background. Here, he also draws attention to an aspect that has already been noticed and utilized by political forces: social perception and subjective sense of security.⁴ He also mentions the inability of overburdened border guards as a problem to distinguish political refugees, asylum seekers and economic refugees, which raises human rights concerns as well. He dedicates this part to the fall of multiculturalism and Willkommenskultur, its reasons and background, and he raises the question what sort of integration strategies should be implemented.

It can also be traced in this chapter that the connotation of refugees as victims has been replaced by the formula for migrants as perpetrators; how the attitudes of Western societies towards migration have changed and the former open-minded attitude has been replaced by discretion, then distancing, and even rejection. Less interesting topics to society, mainly related to immigrants, have emerged, such as mosque constructions, the so-called headscarf debate, Islamization of Europe, and the escalation of conflicts between Christian–Jewish and Islamic populations. Regarding these elements Glied lists almost all the pros and cons, and finally concludes that most European countries have not been able to integrate the predominantly Muslim migrant masses that have already created and operated parallel societies. This could lead to the decline of Europe, the crisis of liberal democracy, and the strengthening of Islamic fundamentalism and far right.

The third chapter is about how the migration crisis was presented in the Hungarian government's policies and communication. In this part the author examines the migration crisis and its communication campaign through the lens of Hungary. Glied attempts to objectively present the migration period and the Hungarian government's answers to it. Although he accepts governmental decisions more or less, calling them reasonable, he often considers government communication simplified and divisive.

He considers certain elements of the government's communication, such as billboards and television advertisements with the words "If you come to Hungary, you have to be respected..." misleading, because the Hungarian population had no personal experience with the phenomenon. However, this statement only partially follows the reflects reality, because the experts of the Hungarian Army Scientific Research Center were already in the

⁴ In connection with this, I would note that the Hungarian Army Scientific Research Center, which I conducted between 2014 and 2018, was the only scientific organization whose staff conducted a questionnaire / interview survey at the border settlements where migrants crossed in 2015. The research focused on the issues of social perception and subjective sense of security. The public part of the research was finally published. Attila Rácz and Péter Balogh, „A migrációs válságon innen és túl. Együttérzés, elutasítás, bizalom és szolidaritás (egy szociális kutatás eredménye) in Europe and Migration, János Besenyo, Péter Miletics and Orbán, Balázs, Eds., Budapest, Hungary: Zrínyi Kiadó, 2019, pp. 335-363. and Rácz Attila, „The effects of Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF) border security deployment on the civilian population's subjective sense of security,” *Belvedere Meridionale*, 30(4), pp. 83-95, April 2018, doi: 10.14232/belv.2018.4.5.

border area at the beginning of the migrant crisis, where they were the only ones who made interviews with the affected settlements' residents. The research also got published. In this chapter we can also read about the temporary security fence erected at the southern border, which successfully diverted the wave of migrants to other countries, and then performed the recent border protection task with the active involvement of the Armed Forces and further significant developments. The author also addresses the issue of the refugee quota here, as well as the government's proposal, supported not only by the V4 countries but also by several European countries – that migrants' problems should be solved in their home countries by providing a livable, safe environment. It should be the preferred solution instead of allowing them into Europe, where we are not yet able to integrate them effectively. The author presents the international reactions triggered by the actions of the Hungarian government and European debates on the issue of migrants, which are still in progress.

The well-edited book contains a lot of useful information, which the author has sought to present to readers in the most objective way. However, minor mistakes can be found in the book in relation to literature, references and sources. However, these small errors do not reduce the value of the book. After reading this volume, it becomes clear that migration has not two, but many millions of faces. This is why the issue of migration cannot be managed in a uniform way, as every person, case or situation requires a different approach. By the time readers realize it, the book has already reached its goal.

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