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Contents

DOGS KNOW IT, TREES WAIT FOR IT, AND THE WIND SNATCHES IT: VERBAL COLLEXEMES AND SEMANTIC DOMAINS OF NOUN + VERB PERSONIFICATIONS IN HUNGARIAN

GÁBOR SIMON

ELTE Eötvös Loránd University
simon.gabor@btk.elte.hu
https://orcid.org/ 0000-0001-5233-6313

Abstract

Verbal constructions of personification (i.e. nonhuman subject + predicate verb primarily used for human beings only) can be considered a key linguistic realization of personification. Although as grammatical metaphors they are rather invisible, the verb's selection restrictions have a crucial role in expressing conceptual personification. In other words, the nominal form of personification as cross-domain mapping (e.g. WIND IS A THIEF) is often realized via verb + argument structures (e.g. *the wind grabbed the papers out of my hand*). In a previous study, the domains of MOVEMENT, CONTROL and MENTAL ACT proved to be the most frequent conceptual categories of verbal personifications in a corpus of 20th-century Hungarian poems. However, despite these initial findings, we have relatively little knowledge about what are the typical verbal components of personifications in Hungarian on a more general level.

The present paper aims to extend the scope of personification research, adopting corpus linguistic methodology to explore the semantic domains of verbal personification in Hungarian. In a collostructional analysis, I investigate the significant verbal collexemes of noun + verb personifications in the huTenTen12 corpus, using three categories of nominal keywords: animals (*dog, horse, fish*), plants (*tree, fruit, flower*) and inanimate natural phenomena (*water, air, fire*). The study hypothesises that verbs of MENTAL ACT will dominate the first category, MOVEMENT and CONTROL will be prominent among the verbal collexemes of nouns denoting personified natural phenomena, while the semantic domains of verbal personifications will be more heterogeneous in the realm of plants.

Keywords: personification, corpus, collostruction, collexeme, conceptual domain

1. Introduction

Despite recent developments in research on personification (see Dorst 2011, Dorst–Mulder–Steen 2011, Melion–Ramakers 2016), we have relatively little knowledge about the linguistic organization of personifying expressions. Clearly, one reason for this is that personification does not have a specific linguistic structure. Its variability extends from verbal expressions to adverbial, nominal and adjectival structures to mention only one linguistic factor, part of speech category (for an overview of the variability of personification in Hungarian, see Sájter 2008). Another likely reason is the preference for the exploration of conceptual modelling in cognitive linguistics, instead of focusing on the linguistic realization of personification. This approach assumes that one can distinguish the linguistic manifestation of personifications from their conceptual organization, and this is exactly what is emphasized by Aletta G. Dorst (2011: 122): a human-related but conventional meaning of a verb (e.g., *run, take, give* or *make*) does not count automatically as personification at the level of conceptualization, whereas at the level of lexical meaning it can be identified as personification, and in a specific context (e.g., in poetry) such personifying effects may become stronger. Thus, the literature emphasizes that the definition of personification may vary with the perspective and scope

of the analysis. However, we can also agree with Dorst (2011: 132) that "[t]he literature suggests a bias in favour of conceptual personification", which means that in the last decades researchers of the field were interested in shedding light on the conceptual organization of personification, without making observations about its linguistic realization. (An important exception is the work of Aletta G. Dorst and her colleagues, see Dorst–Mulder–Steen 2011.) The overall aim of the present study is to change this situation by initiating a thorough corpus linguistic examination of noun + verb personification in Hungarian.

Due to the fact that contemporary cognitive linguistics puts a premium on explaining the conceptual background of figurative language use, there are numerous alternative models for personifying meaning generation in the literature. Without going into the details, personification can be described as a kind of conceptual metaphor, either as an ontological metaphor (see Kövecses 2010) or as the specification of the EVENTS ARE ACTIONS generic metaphor (see Lakoff 2006); as motivated by conceptual metonymy (Low 1999, Dorst–Mulder–Steen 2011);[1] or as the functioning of more than one type of conceptual integration (Long 2018). Moreover, Bocharova (2016) suggests a structured connectionist approach to personifying meaning, in which embodied experience, basic-level categories, and primary and complex metaphors contribute to the process of meaning generation through projection and cultural associations. And though there is no consensus on whether one or more conceptual operations are essential for personification, the researcher can encounter an abundance of models and analyses in the field of cognitive linguistics.

The result of an overview is much more modest when we turn to the linguistic realization of personifying conceptualizations. There is a scarcity of studies focusing on the language of personification. In her aforementioned paper, Dorst (2011) highlights the difference between the conceptual organization of verbal personifications on the one hand and personifying meaning generation with nominal expressions on the other. The main difference lies in the process of elaborating the meaning: whereas in the case of verb + argument constructions the argument violates the selectional restrictions of the verb (or at least some of them, Dorst 2011: 119), with nominal expressions (e.g., body-part personifications) two conceptual structures are mapped onto each other, initiating the reconceptualization of an entity with the use of another (human) one. Thus, verbal, adjectival, and adverbial personifications are based on the elaboration of one piece of a conceptual representation (for instance the primary schematic figure) with a non-expected entity, while the conceptualization of nominal personifications extends to the whole concepts involved in the process of construal. According to this proposal, we can agree with Dorst (2011: 117) that "at the linguistic level, the role of word class cannot be ignored" in the examination of personifications.

Another striking aspect of linguistic personifications is that they are not confined to only one word in the discourse: as noted by Long (2018: 25), personifying expressions can be considered "extended units of meaning", including a node word and its collocation (frequently co-occurring context), colligation (a grammatical category associated with the node word), semantic preference (the meaning categories frequently occurring in the context of the node word) and semantic prosody (the positive or negative evaluation associated with the whole unit). In other words, linguistic personifications are multi-word expressions in general, and this statement is supported by the empirical result of the study reported by Dorst–Mulder–Steen (2011: 192): 62% of personifications recognized by non-expert readers were word-combinations.

As regards the make-up of these combinations, Long (2018: 23) observes that they can be varied but they usually consist of a "predicate verb (used for human beings only)", a "nonhuman subject" and "others" (i.e., other potential elements of the clause). Although this description seems to be an appropriate starting point for further analysis, it is clear that the expressions instantiating one variation of this pattern are verbal personifications, therefore this proposal cannot be extended to the description of other non-verbal expressions of personification. In addition, Long's observations

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[1] Although Low (1999) regards metonymically motivated personification as "weak" personification, the results of the empirical study performed by Dorst and her colleagues contradict this wiew: according to their identification test metonymic personifications behave similar to novel (i.e., creative) personifications (see Dorst–Mulder–Steen 2011).

come from some illustrative examples of personification in English, lacking any solid and large-scale empirical basis.

There is a similar problem with Sájter's (2008) comprehensive description of Hungarian personifications. Although it offers a rich list of typical linguistic patterns of personification in Hungarian, including e.g. verb + argument structures, the possessive construction, nominal and adverbial cases, and the vocative, this yields a rather heterogeneous category (extending to morphological, syntactic, and even pragmatic markers). Moreover, the list is the result of individual observations, it is not based on systematic empirical investigation. These lists, thus, serve at most as a baseline for further research, and they cannot be evaluated as exhaustive descriptions of the linguistic manifestation of personifications in a language.

Finally, even the most specified grammatical pattern does not ensure that personification unfolds. As highlighted by Dorst (2011: 122–123), when the verbal element of a personifying expression is polysemous, it can have a conventionalized personifying meaning that is directly accessible to the language user. Thus, the basic human meaning remains inactive in the process of meaning generation, and though the verb + argument structure fails to satisfy the original selectional restrictions of the verb, the frequent personifying use of the verb makes it possible to override this process, and treat the actual occurrence of the verb as conventional. Dorst's example is the verb *run*, which is highly polysemous, and according to the Macmillan dictionary, 10 out of its 19 senses are non-human, hence inherently personifying. These "dead personifications" instantiate the grammatical schema without initiating personifying meaning in the discourse.

To sum up, we know that the participating elements' part of speech category is an important factor in generating personifying meaning, but we do not know what instances of a given grammatical category are involved in personifications.[2] We know that personification is generally a multi-word expression in discourse, but we do not know the exact patterns of such expressions. And we know that personification is an extended unit of meaning including semantic preference as well, but we do not know what these preferences are in the discourse. Put differently, previous research on linguistic personification has brought important aspects to light, without turning the qualitative analysis of personifying expressions into a full-fledged empirical description.

Corpus linguistics seems to be the next step in the research since it can provide a solid empirical foundation and new methods for analysing personifying structures. The present study demonstrates the benefits of using corpus linguistic methodology in the analysis of figurative language use. Not on the level of corpus building and annotation (for these issues see Simon 2022), but on pattern extraction from existing corpora and examination of the observed patterns. The investigation focuses on verb + argument structures. This kind of construction is known to be central in expressing personifying meaning, however, we have relatively little knowledge about what verbs and what arguments participate in personification frequently in Hungarian. Accordingly, the research questions of the study are the following: (i) How can we explore typical noun + verb personifications with the use of corpus linguistic methodology? (ii) What is the difference between typical verbal personifications related to different personified entities?

As a possible answer to the second question, I assume that the semantic preferences of various classes of nouns will differ, and this difference can be observed by examining the typical, recurring verbal components of these personifications. Specifically, my hypothesis is that while nouns referring to animals are personified dominantly in the domain of MENTAL ACT (i.e., mental capacity is frequently attributed to animals), in the case of plants the preference lies in the MOVEMENT domain (i.e., the typical personification of plants describes them as moving agents or agents being able to move their body), and nouns referring to natural phenomena prefer the domain of CONTROL (i.e., intentional and self-performed manipulation of objects; about the domains see Dorst–Mulder–

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[2] The dictionary-based method for personification identification elaborated by Dorst and her colleagues (Dorst–Mulder–Steen 2011, for Hungarian see Simon 2022) can prove a solution to this problem. However, it requires manual analysis of each and every component of a potentially personifying expression, therefore it is really time-consuming and usable only in small-scale research.

Steen 2011, for their application to Hungarian data see Simon 2021). In the following, I discuss the material and methodology of my analysis (2). Then the results are presented in the form of a thorough examination of verbal collexemes of one keyword from each category (3.1) as well as a broader overview of the extracted patterns (3.2). The paper ends with some concluding remarks (4).

2. Material and method

The first, merely technical assumption of the present study is that corpus linguistic methods can shed new light on linguistic personification. Particularly, I refer here to the ways of extracting and analysing a large sample of data, within the broader framework of a corpus-driven approach to language (Tognini-Bonelli 2001, Biber 2010). For such an investigation one needs an existing corpus of a language composed of oral, written and/or online texts. I have chosen the Hungarian Web Corpus (huTenTen12), which is a corpus of online Hungarian texts with a size of almost 2.5 billion words. The corpus is available in the Sketch Engine web-based corpus analysing platform,[3] and its linguistic material is tokenized, lemmatized, PoS-tagged, and morphologically preprocessed. Although the Hungarian Web Corpus is not the most modern linguistic database of Hungarian, it is relatively new, and it is a member of the so-called TenTen corpus family (see Jakubícek et al. 2013), which is a collection of corpora designed with the same theoretical and methodological principles for different languages. (Image 1 illustrates the dashboard surface of the enTenTen15 corpus in Sketch Engine: it is the English equivalent of the Hungarian Web Corpus, compiled in 2015.)

Image 1. The online surface of the enTenTen15 corpus in Sketch Engine

One of the advantages of the huTenTen12 corpus is that it was annotated both with the tagset of the Hungarian National Corpus (MSD code tagset)[4] and with an independent morphological tagset

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[3] https://www.sketchengine.eu/hutenten-hungarian-corpus/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI37Hrqe65-gIV0_V3Ch3SJgh3EAAYASA-AEgL5VvD_BwE (last access: 29/09/2022)
[4] The tagset is available here: https://www.sketchengine.eu/hungarian-msd-code/ (last access: 22/11/2022).

(emorph tagset),[5] thus, its annotational precision outperforms other available corpora in Hungarian.[6] In addition, the huTenTen12 was carefully composed of crawled online texts, avoiding duplication in the source material, therefore the analysis of co-occurrence data in this corpus results in more precise patterns than for instance in the HNC corpus. And finally, the complete Sketch Engine toolkit is available for those working with this corpus, which means that the researcher can generate not only concordances, word lists and frequency lists but keyword analysis, n-gram extraction, and collocation measurement are also performable in huTenTen12.

The large size of the corpus makes it possible to extract a vast amount of data with noun + verb patterns. To limit the scope of the study, I concentrated on three categories of nominal referents, namely animals, plants and natural phenomena. The main reason for this is that the personification of these kinds of entities is presumably frequent in everyday online discourse represented in the corpus. Additionally, these categories are distinct enough from each other to test the hypothesis that the semantic preferences of their personification are different. As a preliminary step of sampling, a frequency list of nominal lemmas was generated, from which the following keywords of the analysis were chosen:

- animals: *kutya* ('dog'), *ló* ('horse'), *hal* ('fish')
- plants: *fa* ('tree'), *gyümölcs* ('fruit'), *virág* ('flower')
- natural phenomena: *víz* ('water'), *levegő* ('air'), *tűz* ('fire').

It is worth noting that the keywords are not always the most frequent members of the given group, as other nouns referring to plants or natural phenomena have a higher token number in the corpus. However, these additional candidates would not have been ideal keywords, either because of their nominal homonymy (e.g., *szél*$_1$ refers to the wind and *szél*$_2$ to the edge of something),[7] or due to their more complex or general meaning (e.g., the Hungarian noun *erdő* 'forest' refers to plants, but not individual specimens; the Hungarian noun *növény* 'plant' has a more general meaning, therefore its personified use is presumably not so frequent).

After selecting frequent nominal components of a construction, all the verbal lemmas occurring immediately after the particular nouns (in the R1 position) were needed. This step of sampling was performed by obtaining those occurrences of the nominal keywords in which they are followed by a verb form in the past or present tense, in 3Sg or 3Pl. I used a CQL form to perform this filtering. The specification of the contextual position of the verbs made it possible to omit data in which the verb occurs in the closer context of the keyword, but the latter is not the verb's subject argument. However, this means also that due to the word order limitation of the query, alternative realizations of the noun + verb structure are omitted from the sample. The last phase was to generate a list of verbal lemmas in the R1 position. For the sake of rendering the amount of data perceptible, in table 1 I specify the number of total occurrences of the keywords and the number of verbal lemmas following them.

Keyword	Frequency	Number of verbal lemmas following it
kutya ('dog')	452146	20915
ló ('horse')	224227	8061
hal ('fish')	137746	1330

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[5] The tagset is available here: https://www.sketchengine.eu/hungarian-emmorph-based-part-of-speech-tagset/ (last access: 22/11/2022).

[6] Since the former tagset is more limited, it covers only one part of PoS categories and morphological phenomena. The latter tagset is more extended, thus, using both of them results in a large range of identified and labelled grammatical categories. Moreover, because of the adoptation of the tagset used in the Hungarian National Corpus, the two corpora can be compared with each other regarding PoS categories and morphological phenomena.

[7] Although the Hungarian word *tűz* is also homonymous, it has a nominal and a verbal meaning ('fire' and 'pin', respectively), thus the in-built PoS-analysis can sort the data according to word classes.

fa ('tree')	428044	9661
gyümölcs ('fruit')	178338	2475
virág ('flower')	176991	4846
víz ('water')	888590	31950
levegő ('air')	330502	9617
tűz ('fire')	187858	9473

Table 1. The total frequency of the nominal keywords and the number of
the verbal lemmas following them in the corpus

As a result of careful sampling and querying, all the verbs adjacent to the nouns became available for analysis. But this means a vast amount of information that cannot be examined manually. In addition, for a semantic analysis of typical personifications, one needs not only the verbs occurring in the context of the keywords but those verbs that occur significantly frequently with the keyword. To extract the most relevant lexemes occurring in a given construction, corpus linguistics offers the method of collostructional analysis (Stefanowitsch 2013, Stefanowitsch 2020). To put it simply, collostructional analysis explores which words are associated with a particular construction. These words are called the collexemes of the construction. Collostructional analysis has three different but theoretically and methodologically related ways of collexeme analysis: simple collexeme analysis (measuring the association of words with a construction), distinctive collexeme analysis (measuring and comparing the association of words with two or more constructions), and covarying collexeme analysis (identifying words that co-occur frequently in two slots of a given construction). In the present study, I adopted only the first method, but of course, the other two are also good candidates for a sophisticated corpus-driven analysis of figurative language.

At the heart of collostructional analysis is statistical testing of the contingency of a word in a construction. In other words, the analyst examines not only the frequency of a word in a construction: this data is compared to the overall frequency of the word in the corpus (i.e., its frequency in any other constructions) and to the total number of constructions in the corpus.[8] Therefore, a collostructional analysis is based on the data of contingency tables, and the most widespread function for contingency testing is the Fisher-Yates exact test (see Levshina 2015 and Stefanowitsch 2013 for other optional tests).

To explore the verbal collexemes of personifying noun + verb patterns, I performed a simple collexeme analysis with the RStudio statistical testing software (version 4.1.0, R Core Team 2021). For implementing the contingency test, the collostructions package developed by Suzanne Flach (2021) was used. This package offers multiple ways of statistical testing, including the canonical Fisher-Yates exact test, with the logarithmic transformation of the results recommended by the literature (Levshina 2015: 232). Image 2 illustrates the platform used for the analysis.

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[8] Fort the sake of simplicity, the last number is calculated by counting the occurrences of verbs in the corpus. Since constructions are mainly centred around verbs, the absolute frequency of verb forms in a corpus can be considered to be roughly equal to the number of constructions (see Levshina 2015: 227).

Image 2. The platform of RStudio

With the use of RStudio, simple collexeme analysis can be implemented easily. Even so, it requires considerable effort to test all the verbal lemmas occurring after the keywords in the corpus, since for example in the case of 20150 verbs, we need exactly the same number of contingency tables. Therefore, I limited the scope of the empirical measurement again, taking only the first 150 members of the verb lists into consideration. This limitation, however, does not distort the overall picture strongly, because after the first 150 the individual occurrences of verbal collexemes in the construction are so infrequent that these verbs cannot be considered typical collexemes, but rather hapaxes.[9]

One advantage of this analysis is that it provides information not only about the associated collexemes of a construction but also about the repelled words, i.e., those lexemes that significantly avoid the given grammatical pattern. Since personification is not an infrequent phenomenon in everyday language use either, we can have the expectation that there will be personifying (i.e., basically human-oriented) verbal collexemes among the associated words.

3. Results and discussion

I will discuss the results of the analysis in two steps. First, I demonstrate the data type of collexemes extractable from a simple collexeme analysis. As we will see, the aforementioned expectation about the correlation between personification and associated collexemes was not borne out. Secondly, by zooming out from the individual keywords toward the categories, a broader picture can be provided about personifying meanings that unfold with the use of a noun + verb pattern.

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[9] The limitation of the analysed material may, of course, hide personifying instantiations of the construction, since among the verbal collexemes with low frequency there can be interesting data. However, the study is interested in the typical, frequently recurring instances of personification in the construction. Therefore, the potential strength of the analysis is to shed light on this pattern, whereas its weakness resides in excluding non-typical but theoretically relevant expressions. In future research, it will be worth comparing personifying occurrences among strongly and weakly associated verbs of the construction.

3.1. Verbal collexemes of nominal keywords

The aim of this section is to illustrate what kinds of data can be obtained as a result of collostructional analysis. This method is used to assess the lexical and/or grammatical variability of constructions, thus it is not self-evident how it can be adapted in the cognitive linguistic investigation of figurative language use. The main idea in the background of this endeavour is that figurative expressions show construction-like behaviour, or at least they can be described with recurring patterns. Consequently, even though the noun + verb pattern cannot be considered a specific marker of personification, moreover, its description as a construction requires more in-depth examination, using the collected dataset of nominal keywords and their neighbouring verbal lemmas as the input of collexeme analysis will shed light on some typical semantic patterns of personification in Hungarian.

COLLEX	CORP.FREQ	OBS	EXP	ASSOC	COLL.STR.FYE	SIGNIF
ugat 'bark'	17431	1289	0,7	attr	Inf	*****
baszik 'fuck'	26259	214	1	attr	Inf	*****
megharap 'bite'	6484	155	0,2	attr	Inf	*****
harap 'snap'	29233	173	1,1	attr	305,88417	*****
van 'be, exist'	49067995	3514	1888	attr	292,13044	*****
lesz 'will be'	6669952	872	256,6	attr	203,61689	*****
kerül 'get (somewhere)'	2559553	447	98,5	attr	145,79027	*****
megugat 'bark at'	1062	47	0	attr	125,17871	*****
támad 'attack'	217304	146	8,4	attr	123,33076	*****
megtámad 'assault'	42489	80	1,6	attr	102,60135	*****
fekszik 'lie'	204888	122	7,9	attr	97,20096	*****
csahol 'bay'	1133	38	0	attr	96,73201	*****
kóborol 'roam'	4496	46	0,2	attr	92,99589	*****
őriz 'watch over'	154078	100	5,9	attr	83,37047	*****
megtanul 'learn'	189522	107	7,3	attr	83,06096	*****
él 'live'	1640815	268	63,1	attr	81,44237	*****
vonít 'howl'	689	30	0	attr	80,02327	*****
szalad 'run'	57135	71	2,2	attr	78,67071	*****
marcangol 'lacerate'	2926	36	0,1	attr	75,87754	*****
megeszik 'eat'	68454	72	2,6	attr	74,71934	*****
vezet 'lead'	918577	30	35,3	rep	0,67798	ns
dolgozik 'work'	1185360	39	45,6	rep	0,73636	ns
kezd 'start'	1713455	57	65,9	rep	0,82821	ns
jár 'move, go'	1597749	51	61,5	rep	1,00658	ns
hagy 'leave'	980044	29	37,7	rep	1,06386	ns
megy 'go'	2723229	89	104,8	rep	1,19231	ns
ért 'understand'	1089696	28	41,9	rep	1,83262	*
néz 'look'	1837588	50	70,7	rep	2,22949	**
ismer 'know, be familiar with'	1014583	22	39	rep	2,66273	**
fog 'take'	3350463	92	128,9	rep	3,43736	***
csinál 'do'	1191689	21	45,9	rep	4,4897	****

hoz 'bring'	1553475	29	59,8	rep	5,12516	*****
tesz 'put'	4065887	95	156,4	rep	7,15571	*****
akar 'want'	3024986	57	116,4	rep	9,16751	*****
lát 'see'	3679625	58	141,6	rep	14,98278	*****
tud 'know, can'	9142019	202	351,8	rep	17,91354	*****
ad 'give'	2697447	25	103,8	rep	19,83909	*****
tart 'hold'	2525031	20	97,2	rep	20,82327	*****
kell 'need, must'	9961946	159	383,3	rep	38,70377	*****
mond 'say, tell'	5293753	25	203,7	rep	56,36016	*****

Table 2. Associated and repelled verbal collexemes of the noun + verb pattern
with the *kutya* ('dog') keyword

Table 2 represents the first 20 and the last 20 collexemes of the investigated pattern, from the total amount of 150 verbs.[10] The first column contains the collexemes and their English meanings. The second tells us the number of occurrences of the individual verbs in the entire corpus, whereas the third and fourth columns specify the observed and the expected frequency of the verbs in the pattern under investigation. The most important information can be found in the last three columns. In the fifth, the status of the collexeme is given (i.e. whether it is associated or repelled), in the sixth there is the statistical result of the Fisher-Yates exact test, and finally, the last column informs the reader about the significance of association/repellence. (The number of asterisks indicates the degree of significance: the higher their number is, the more significant is the relationship.)

Focusing on the keywords, an unexpected result can be observed in the table. Among the associated collexemes, we can hardly find any good examples of personification. The verbs *őriz* ('watch over') and *megtanul* ('learn') personifies the animal subject, attributing human (or prototypically human) mental capacities and intentions to it.[11] However, the rest of the verbs refer to the typical behaviour of dogs (e.g. barking, howling, biting, attacking) or to the general processes of animal life (e.g. living, eating, running, lying). And even the potentially personifying verbs denote activities that are frequently associated with dogs. Thus, on the one hand, simple collexeme analysis works in general: it demonstrates what are the most salient processes performed by dogs. On the other hand, however, it fails to extract personifications with dogs, since the verbal collexemes associated with the keyword the most are used literally, or their figurative meanings can be considered rather typical (or even "dead") personification.

But if we turn to the list of repelled verbs, a surprising fact comes to the fore: 6 out of 20 are personifications (*vezet* 'lead', *ért* 'understand', *ismer* 'know, be familiar with', *akar* 'want', *tud* 'know, can', *mond* 'say, tell'), and if we count the more conventional (and thus less human-centred or even "dead" personifying) meanings as well (e.g. *dolgozik* 'work', *ad* 'give'), roughly 40% of the repelled words count as potential personification. By way of explanation, verbs that are not associated with the investigated pattern (because they occur rarely in it, and they are more infrequent in the pattern than in the whole corpus) instantiate relatively strong personifications.

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[10] Although it is typical in collostructional analyses to focus only on the strongest collexemes of a construction, in the case of personification the analysis may benefit from observing the repelled words as well, on the basis of the assumption that personification itself is not necessary typical instantiation of the construction. However, there is also a limitation even in this decision: there can be data deserving more attention among the collexemes between the first 20 and the last 20 verbs, but they remain invisible from the perspective of the analysis. Adapting collostructional analysis to the investigation of figurative meaning needs further methodological considerations, thus in future research, it will be worth observing systematically the distribution of personification in the whole sample.

[11] The basic meaning of *megtanul* (according to the Concise Dictionary of Hungarian (Pusztai ed. in chief 2003)) is ' aquire knowledge or competence through studying', thus it refers to an intentional act of studying (accomplished by a human being). Similarly, the basic meaning of *őriz* ('keep an eye on somebody or something, in order to prevent them/it from an undesirable event') presupposes complex intentional and causal thinking characteristic of human minds.

It is worth checking whether the situation is similar with other keywords as well. Table 3 presents the first 20 associated and the last 20 repelled verbal collexemes of the noun *fa* ('tree') from the analysed 150 verbs.

COLLEX	CORP.FREQ	OBS	EXP	ASSOC	COLL.STR.FYE	SIGNIF
áll 'stand'	2234011	520	42,5	attr	Inf	*****
nő 'grow'	806740	360	15,3	attr	Inf	*****
dől 'fall/timber'	60634	198	1,2	attr	Inf	*****
szegélyez 'border'	5102	109	0,1	attr	287,4986	*****
kidől 'fall'	3880	52	0,1	attr	127,0341	*****
van 'be, exist'	49067995	1661	933,1	attr	121,0339	*****
kiszárad 'die/wither'	21390	60	0,4	attr	105,6764	*****
kizöldül 'come into leaf'	985	33	0	attr	94,21944	*****
övez 'surround'	24069	52	0,5	attr	85,85474	*****
eltakar 'hide'	20312	50	0,4	attr	85,40339	*****
elpusztul 'perish'	44884	57	0,9	attr	81,00264	*****
elszárad 'wither'	4064	32	0,1	attr	71,11725	*****
korhad 'moulder'	3017	29	0,1	attr	67,05141	*****
alkot 'create/make'	266622	81	5,1	attr	66,01048	*****
magasodik 'rise'	7403	33	0,1	attr	65,1592	*****
less 'will be'	6669952	355	126,8	attr	62,71369	*****
borít 'cover'	67291	51	1,3	attr	61,3565	*****
árnyékol 'shade'	5161	29	0,1	attr	60,28246	*****
pusztul 'die'	31141	41	0,6	attr	59,16456	*****
takar 'cover/hide'	64208	47	1,2	attr	55,92597	*****
enged 'let/allow'	518890	10	9,9	attr	0,27946	ns
fordul 'turn'	560231	9	10,7	rep	0,42124	ns
tetszik 'be liked'	760793	10	14,5	rep	0,8343	ns
választ 'choose'	1021860	14	19,4	rep	0,89126	ns
segít 'help'	1214134	17	23,1	rep	0,92515	ns
mutat 'show/point'	1045263	14	19,9	rep	0,96109	ns
számít 'count (as)'	822433	10	15,6	rep	1,04436	ns
válik 'become'	1306079	16	24,8	rep	1,39701	*
kezd 'begin'	1713455	22	32,6	rep	1,48776	*
fog 'take'	3350463	47	63,7	rep	1,76439	*
hoz 'bring'	1553475	16	29,5	rep	2,31979	**
kell 'need/must'	9961946	148	189,4	rep	3,04317	***
tart 'hold'	2525031	25	48	rep	3,7244	***
jön 'come'	2355900	20	44,8	rep	4,59225	****
jár 'go/move'	1597749	10	30,4	rep	4,77769	****
tesz 'put'	4065887	38	77,3	rep	6,30785	*****
megy 'go'	2723229	18	51,8	rep	7,29759	*****
kap 'get/receive'	2125871	9	40,4	rep	8,58189	*****

lát 'see'	3679625	14	70	rep	15,50282	*****
tud 'know/can'	9142019	37	173,8	rep	36,23789	*****

Table 3. Associated and repelled verbal collexemes of the noun + verb pattern
with the *fa* ('tree') keyword

Again, the list of associated verbs does not abound with clear examples for personification: it is dominated by the biological processes of plants (e.g. coming into leaf, withering, falling, rising, growing) and the description of a landscape with trees (they border, surround, cover, shade or hide something). One weak candidate for personifying meaning generation is *alkot* ('create/make'), but it can refer again to the formation of trees (e.g., *Fák – rozsdabarna lombsátort alkotnak* 'Trees – creating a rusty brown leaf canopy'),[12] which can be considered neither an intentional act of creation nor an example of strong personification.

In contrast, 7 out of 20 repelled collexemes (35%) clearly exemplify personification, attributing the ability to move (coming, going, turning, moving) or other mental capacities (seeing, knowing/being able to, choosing) to trees. And, again, we can observe the fuzzy zone of conventional verbal meanings (e.g. beginning something, showing/demonstrating/pointing to something, putting something) with either conventional non-human primary figures (as the lexicalised extension of the basic human meaning) or a schematic meaning that can be elaborated as personification or not, depending on the context.

From the third category of keywords consider the 20 most associated and the 20 most repelled verbal collexemes of *levegő* ('air'), presented in Table 4.

COLLEX	CORP.FREQ	OBS	EXP	ASSOC	COLL.STR.FYE	SIGNIF
áramlik 'stream'	26866	868	0,5	attr	Inf	*****
érkezik 'arrive'	672725	465	13,4	attr	Inf	*****
lehűl 'cool down'	6561	125	0,1	attr	320,9718	*****
megtelik 'fill up'	32562	132	0,6	attr	249,8656	*****
csap 'whip'	113077	158	2,2	attr	226,3986	*****
árad 'flow'	29365	106	0,6	attr	195,484	*****
jut 'get to'	1355538	295	27	attr	193,891	*****
felmelegszik 'get warm'	7112	75	0,1	attr	173,4994	*****
beáramlik 'stream into'	1957	56	0	attr	154,2576	*****
átjár 'permeate'	14429	71	0,3	attr	140,7716	*****
okoz 'cause'	615419	173	12,2	attr	131,4505	*****
vibrál 'vibrate'	5114	51	0,1	attr	117,0458	*****
áraszt 'give out/radiate/exude'	25824	67	0,5	attr	114,3404	*****
kerül 'get somewhere'	2559533	270	50,9	attr	103,4662	*****
megcsap 'whip'	6219	47	0,1	attr	102,2687	*****
megfagy 'freeze'	13256	53	0,3	attr	100,5591	*****
távozik 'leave'	143681	88	2,9	attr	95,59648	*****
izzik 'glow'	8787	39	0,2	attr	76,0112	*****
felszáll 'fly up'	23606	47	0,5	attr	75,1318	*****
felemelkedik 'rise'	15191	39	0,3	attr	66,77728	*****

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[12] http://drsoregistvan.lapunk.hu/galeria/novenyvilag-fak-cserjek-viragok/fak-rozsdabarna-lombsatort-alkotnak-783119 (Last access: 10/05/2022)

lép 'step'	701194	14	13,9	attr	0,27606	ns
ér 'get to/reach (a place)'	556035	11	11,1	rep	0,24221	ns
tesz 'put'	4065887	80	80,8	rep	0,30826	ns
nyújt 'stretch'	624953	11	12,4	rep	0,38341	ns
alakul 'take shape'	540150	9	10,7	rep	0,43278	ns
végez 'finish'	666380	10	13,3	rep	0,63725	ns
kell 'must/need'	9961946	187	198,1	rep	0,64926	ns
vár 'wait'	1521333	24	30,3	rep	0,83477	ns
ad 'give'	2697447	44	53,6	rep	0,98895	ns
hagy 'let/leave/allow'	980044	12	19,5	rep	1,31154	*
hoz 'bring'	1553475	21	30,9	rep	1,40652	*
számít 'count as'	822433	9	16,4	rep	1,44165	*
lesz 'will be'	6669952	109	132,6	rep	1,72092	*
tart 'hold'	2525031	32	50,2	rep	2,40321	**
vesz 'take'	2821985	36	56,1	rep	2,57166	**
nincs 'not exist'	3054168	31	60,7	rep	4,73453	****
jelent 'mean'	1879193	11	37,4	rep	6,40767	*****
fog 'take'	3350463	30	66,6	rep	6,43828	*****
van 'be/exist'	49067995	788	975,7	rep	10,74173	*****
tud 'know/can'	9142019	38	181,8	rep	38,32197	*****

Table 4. Associated and repelled verbal collexemes of the noun + verb pattern
with the *levegő* ('air') keyword

As it can be observed, the associated verbs do not initiate personification in the third case either. Mainly physical (but not intentional) motion and the change of physical state are described by them. In other words, the construction's collexemes refer to the mechanics and thermodynamics of air as material. Only the verbs *csap/megcsap* ('whip') and maybe *távozik* ('leave') have also human-related meanings, but the first pair of words denotes the experience of perceiving an intense stimulus through the air (for example an olfactory perception of an unpleasant smell), and the second one seems to be a more formal alternative of describing the situation when something lets the air go. Thus, even if they may have some kind of figurative meaning, it is conventional and not primarily human-related.

Turning to the repelled lexemes a similar pattern can be recognized: there are potential personifications in the list with relatively clear human-oriented basic meanings (e.g. *lép* 'step', *nyújt* 'stretch', *végez* 'finish', tud 'know/can' or *vár* 'wait'), and some of the verbal collexemes can be considered as transitions between clear and conventional personifications (e.g. *ad* 'give', *hagy* 'let/leave/allow', hoz 'bring' or *vesz* 'take'). The proportion of potential personifying verbs is a little higher (10 out of 20, 50%) in this case than in the previous samples; however, there are more examples of conventional (and thus less recognizable) expressions among the collexemes. Put differently, the proportion of strong personifications is roughly equal or even lower with this keyword when compared to the other two.

Two conclusions can be drawn from the results of collostructional analysis. On the one hand, personifying verbs are not strongly associated with the investigated construction, since they can be found at the end of the collexeme list, among the repelled lexemes. This does not mean that the investigated grammatical pattern itself would not be used for expressing personifying meaning. But its main semantic profile (explored with statistical analysis) involves species-specific processes and behaviour or processes which are peculiar to the given entity. On the other hand, the

method of collostructional analysis can be adapted to the exploration of figurative language use, since good candidates of verbal personifications can be extracted with it. However, the method needs to be used in a reverse way, not focusing on the associated collexemes but rather examining the verbs that are not preferred by the pattern, i.e. which are very infrequent among its instantiations in the corpus.

3.2. The analysis of verbal collexemes of the keywords – conceptual domains of personification

Based on the previous findings, we can make an attempt at scrutinizing whether there are typical conceptual domains in the background of personifying animals, plants and natural phenomena. With more technical terms, the following semantic analysis answers the question whether the conceptual type of the target domain of personification has some correlation with typical source domains or not. As a set for optional source domains, the list proposed by Dorst and her colleagues (2011: 180) has been used in the analysis, namely HUMAN BODY, CHARACTER TRAITS, MOVEMENT and CONTROL) completed with the domains of MENTAL ACT and COMMUNICATION in accordance with the basic meaning of the verbal collexemes. (For an extended list of conceptual domains of personification see Simon 2021.) Since simple collexeme analysis produces verbal lemmata associated with the construction, their categorization into conceptual domains is based on their basic (human-related) meaning. In the following, I focus only on potential personifications, and the non-personifying collexemes are disregarded here.

3.2.1. Verbal personifications of animals

The keywords in this category occur in the context of the following personifying verbs. (After the English equivalent of collexemes, the abbreviation of the nature of the verb and the grammatical pattern can be found: "a" means associated and "r" means repelled.)

- *kutya* ('dog'): *megtanul* ('learn', a), *őriz* ('watch over', a), *ért* ('understand', r), *ismer* ('know/be familiar with', r), *akar* ('want', r), *tud* ('know/can', r), *néz* ('look', r), *vezet* ('lead', r), *mond* ('say/tell', r)
- *ló* ('horse'): *mutat* ('show/demonstrate/point', r), *segít* ('help', r), *néz* ('look', r), *szeret* ('love/like', r), *akar* ('want', r), *tud* ('know/can', r), *kezd* ('begin', r), *mond* ('say/tell', r)
- *hal* ('fish'): *beszél* ('speak/talk', r), *érez* ('feel', r), *vár* ('wait', r), *szeret* ('love/like', r), *akar* ('want', r), *kezd* ('begin', r)

The number of potential personifications is not the same for the three keywords, and the results clearly demonstrate that personification is a scalar phenomenon regarding both its strength (ranging from clear human-oriented meaning to less personifying, more conventional cases) and its lexical semantic richness. Although animals are on the same level on the scale of empathetic recognisability, which means that in general, they attract more attention from the perceiver than inanimate objects (Gibbons–Whiteley 2018: 153, based on Stockwell's cognitive poetics), therefore, their personification does not count as a marked departure from ordinary attentional arrangement, the collexemes nevertheless do tell us something about how different animal species tend to be personified. The more behavioural interaction with a species we have, the more diverse its profile is in personification.

Considering the conceptual domains, a relatively homogeneous pattern can be recognized in the sample. The majority of the verbs belong to the domain of MENTAL ACT (thinking, emotion and awareness), which means that it seems to be typical to attribute (intentional) mental capacity to animals in Hungarian. The other recurring domain is CONTROL (leading, showing, beginning something), which can be characterized by some kind of intentionality, too. Finally, the domain of COMMUNICATION also has verbs in the sample, referring to the human capacity of saying something or

speaking in general. These domains make it possible to conceptualize animals as higher-order entities since the activities belonging to them are not only volitional or involve some level of agency but they presuppose an intentional mind and conscious planning of actions.

3.2.2. Verbal personifications of plants

The pattern of verbal personifications of plants does not differ considerably from the previous one of animals, but there is a certain divergence between the samples. The keywords in this group are personified with the following verbs in Hungarian.

- *fa* ('tree'): *fordul* ('turn', r), *választ* ('choose', r), *segít* ('help', r), *mutat* ('show/demonstrate/point', r), *kezd* ('begin', r), *hoz* ('bring', r), *jön* ('come', r), *jár* ('move/go', r), *tesz* ('put/do', r), *megy* ('go', r), *lát* ('see', r), *tud* ('know/can', r)
- *gyümölcs* ('fruit'): *mutat* ('show/demonstrate/point', r), *játszik* ('play', r), *tesz* ('put/do', r), *kezd* ('begin', r), *talál* ('find', r), *hoz* ('bring', r), *jár* ('move/go', r), *tud* ('know/can', r)
- *virág* ('flower'): *szokik* ('do something regularly', r), *hoz* ('bring', r), *vesz* ('take', r), *jön* ('come', r), *ad* ('give', r), *segít* ('help', r), *jár* ('move/go', r), *szeret* ('love/like', r), *megy* ('go', r), *akar* ('want', r), *tud* ('know/can', r)

The keywords in this group do not refer to different species of plants: the noun *fa* ('tree') denotes a general type of plants and the other two keywords describe the parts of vegetal organisms. Therefore, there are no observable differences in the lexical diversity of personification between the nominal expressions. Both the number of potential personifications and their strength seem to be similar for the keywords. It is worth noting, however, that the verbs which have been considered conventional personifications in the case of animals (e.g., *ad* 'give', *tesz* 'put', *hoz* 'bring') previously, are evaluated as more clear personifications due to the fact that plants have different bodily organization and they cannot engage in motion or manipulation of objects, whereas some animal species are able to perform these activities (even if not with arms, for instance).

The frequent domains of personification are MOVEMENT, CONTROL and MENTAL ACT. Since plants are not able to move volitionally, the verbs from the first domain can constitute prominent personifications, despite the fact that motion itself is not a very complex and human-specific ability. It is even more interesting that the other two domains occur in the sample as well, rendering it possible to attribute higher-order mental capacity to plants, too. Consequently, the boundary between animals and plants is not strict from the perspective of personifications: according to the results, plants can also be construed as having minds and performing intentional and planned actions in Hungarian.

3.2.3. Verbal personifications of natural phenomena

Moving on along the great chain of beings (Kövecses 2010: 151), natural phenomena count as the least human-like entities: without bodies and intellectual capabilities, all the processes they participate in are conceptualized essentially figuratively. The question is whether there are some tendencies of personification peculiar to this group of keywords compared to animals and plants. The potential verbal personifications of natural phenomena are listed in the following.

- *levegő* ('air'): *lép* ('step', r), *tesz* ('put/do', r), *nyújt* ('stretch/provide', r), *végez* ('finish', r), *vár* ('wait', r), *ad* ('give', r), *hoz* ('bring', r), *vesz* ('take', r), *tud* ('know/can', r)
- *tűz* ('fire): *vezet* ('lead', r), *segít* ('help', r), *játszik* ('play', r), *ad* ('give', r), *hoz* ('bring', r), *vár* ('wait', r), *megy* ('go', r), *tesz* ('put/do', r), *tud* ('know/can', r)

- *víz* ('water'): *halad* ('go', r), *visz* ('take', r), *nyújt* ('stretch/provide', r), *vár* ('wait', r), *szokik* ('do something regularly', r), *fogad* ('receive', r), *hoz* ('bring', r), *ad* ('give', r), *vesz* ('take', r), *választ* ('choose', r), *jár* ('move/go', r), *játszik* ('play', r), *tesz* ('put/do', r), *tud* ('know/can', r)

What may catch our attention first is that there are more potential personifications in this sample than in the other two. There are two possible explanations for this. On the one hand, natural phenomena do not have any agency and/or volitional capacities, thus, even the conventionally human-oriented meanings (which count as weak or "dead" personifications in other samples) can be considered relevant data. On the other hand, some of the prominent verbs have more than one function in discourse: they can behave as light verbs for example, like in the examples *a […] levegő nyújt biztonság-ot* (the […] air provide.Prs.3Sg safety-acc 'the […] air provides safety')[13] or *a víz játszik fontos szerep-et* (the water play.Prs.3Sg important role-acc 'the water plays an important role').[14] The latter observation demonstrates also the limitations of the study and the application of collexeme analysis to research on figurativity: as non-literal meaning generation always depends on the context, and collostructional analysis results in lemmata (without any specification), polysemy cannot be disregarded in the interpretation of the data, and a further check is needed for identifying genuine instances of figurative usage.[15]

Taking this limitation into consideration, and handling carefully the potentially personifying verbal collexemes, the conceptual domains of MOVEMENT, CONTROL and MENTAL ACT can be identified in the category. Whereas rather conventional and schematic verbs belong to the first two domains (e.g., *hoz* 'bring', *vesz* 'take', *megy* 'go', *ad* 'give'), the third domain is represented with only one or two verbs (e.g., *választ* 'choose' or *tud* 'know/can'), and they are not necessarily prototypical activities of the human mind.[16] Moreover, an overlap can be assumed between the domains of MOVEMENT and MENTAL ACT, or CONTROL and MENTAL ACT: for illustration, the verb *vár* ('wait') also denotes the meaning of 'having expectations', and *vezet* ('lead') describes not only a physical act of 'moving ahead' but also the intentional act of 'taking the role of a leader'.

In sum, there is only a superficial similarity between the conceptual backgrounds of personifying plants and natural phenomena: the potential verbal personifications of air, water and fire are more conventional (regarding their lexical meaning) and less clear instances of personification in Hungarian. Nevertheless, they are good candidates for further analysis, especially in the realm of literature.

4. Conclusions and future prospectives

After the overview of the broader pattern of collexemes and focusing on the conceptual domains of personification in the categories of the keywords, what lessons can be drawn from the collostructional analysis of personifying noun + verb patterns? The first research question (How can we explore typical noun + verb personifications using corpus linguistic methodology?) can be answered by saying that simple collexeme analysis can be adapted to the exploration of figurative language use only with restrictions. First of all, the chosen method is used for examining typical words in a given constructional pattern; however, the potential personifications occurred among the repelled verbs almost without exceptions.

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[13] https://www.zeptermagazin.hu/tisztabb-levego-hosszabb-elet/ (last access: 10/07/2022)

[14] https://ma7.sk/tajaink/mesefilmet-forgatnak-a-tallosi-vizimalomnal (last access: 10/07/2022)

[15] This additional step can prove the personifying usage of the collexeme, too: in the example *a nap és a víz játszik egymással* (the sun and the water play.Prs.3Sg together-ins'the sun and the water plays with each other' https://hu-hu.facebook.com/akvariumklub/videos/im%C3%A1djuk-ahogy-a-nap-%C3%A9s-a-v%C3%ADz-j%C3%A1tszik-egym%C3%A1ssal-huppanj-le-%C3%A9s-%C3%A9lvezd-a-naps%C3%BCt%C3%A9st-/1727498907270894/, last access: 10/07/2022) the verb *játszik* ('play') functions as personification.

[16] The verb *választ* ('choose') can be integrated with verbal prefixes as *szét-* ('apart') or *el-* ('away') resulting the meaning of 'separate', which not necessarily an intentional mental act. And if the verb *tud* ('know/can') refers to a kind of (physical) ability in a context, it does not instantiate the schematic meaning of having knowledge about something.

Thus, a new question emerges from the analysis: how typical are these verbal collexemes as personifications? Obviously, they appear in the construction with a certain frequency in the corpus, but the absolute numbers of their occurrences are low, in addition to the fact that they are not associated with the pattern. A potential cause of this might be that the pattern itself is too restricted: remember that only one variation of word order has been queried, namely when the verb directly follows the noun. Consequently, with a more flexible pattern (for instance, in a three-word-sized window before and after the nominal keyword) one can expect both more personifying verbs and perhaps more typical ones. To put it simply, the typicality of personifications found with collostructional analysis depends partly on the way the researcher defines the pattern. Another explanation of the results is that personification itself is not so typical in online discourse represented in the chosen corpus, therefore personifying verbs are also underrepresented in the sample. This assumption can be tested easily, by changing the corpus and hence the scope of the analysis from general language use and its texts to literary discourse, i.e., by performing a simple collexeme analysis on a corpus of literary works of art.

Nevertheless, the analysis rendered it possible to extract potential personifying verbs in the context of the nominal keywords. This means that we have candidate expressions for studying how language users personify animals, plants and natural phenomena in Hungarian. In other words, we do have some clues about what the salient verbs are for generating personifying meaning. Collostructional analysis has a filtering role in research on figurative language: the emerging collexemes can serve as input for a more precise process of extracting genuine personifications from the corpus.

The answer to the second question of the study (Is there any difference in typical verbal personifications related to different personified entities?) is not so simple again. There is a clear dissimilarity between the investigated categories of keywords: while animals are personified mainly in the domain of MENTAL ACT and COMMUNICATION (overlapping with the domain of CONTROL), in the case of plants and natural phenomena MOVEMENT and CONTROL dominate the data. However, the representative verbs of the domain of MENTAL ACT do not disappear in the latter two categories, even if their proportion decreases and their strength as personifications weakens. Furthermore, the number of conventional personifications becomes higher as we move from animals to natural phenomena, which means that the distinction between linguistic and conceptual personifications becomes sharper at the non-animate end of the scale. As Dorst (2011: 122) claims, "[w]hen linguistic, conceptual and behavioural analyses of personification are kept separate, this creates the possibility of analysing examples as personifications at the linguistic level but not necessarily the conceptual or cognitive level." In the present study, we witnessed the reverse of this: a verbal collexeme does not count as good or strong personification at the linguistic level (based on its basic meaning and its polysemy or polyfunctionality), but at the conceptual level it has the potential of initiating personifying meaning in the discourse (which depends on the context as well).

Therefore, the main conclusion drawn from collexeme analysis is that there is a remarkable difference between verbal personifications regarding the personified target, but neither the conceptual nor the linguistic level of analysis is sufficient in itself to describe this difference. Collostructional analysis can shed light on recurring personifying instantiations of a pattern, and so it may open up new ways of mapping the diversity of personifications in a language. A distinctive collexeme analysis or another simple collexeme analysis using verbs as keywords seem to be promising next steps in this endeavour.

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ANNOTATION OF PERSON MARKING CONSTRUCTIONS IN THE CORPUS OF HUNGARIAN LYRICAL POETRY: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES

PÉTER HORVÁTH

ELTE Eötvös Loránd University
horvath.peter@btk.elte.hu
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3517-5623

GÁBOR SIMON

ELTE Eötvös Loránd University
simon.gabor@btk.elte.hu
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5233-6313

SZILÁRD TÁTRAI

ELTE Eötvös Loránd University / Jagiellonian University
tatrai.szilard@btk.elte.hu
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1069-6676

Abstract

This paper presents the annotation scheme for the manual annotation of the Corpus of Hungarian Lyrical Poetry. The corpus will consist of 400-600 annotated texts, grouped into four sub-corpora: 20th century lyrical texts from the canon of Hungarian public education, contemporary lyrical texts, slam poetry texts, and song lyrics. The manual annotation is based on automatically generated and manually checked annotations of lemmas, parts of speech and morphosyntactic features. The manual annotation of syntactic properties proposed in the annotation scheme follows a dependency analysis approach and allows us to obtain quantitative data on person marking constructions in Hungarian lyrical texts. Besides the annotation of verb-dependent relations, the paper also presents the annotation of specific phenomena such as auxiliary verbs, vocatives, elliptical structures, and nominal predicates. The annotation scheme was tested using a test corpus of 16 texts. We also provide some examples of the types of quantitative data that can be extracted from the annotated corpus.

Keywords: Corpus of Hungarian Lyrical Poetry, person marking, manual annotation, annotation scheme, dependency analysis

1. Introduction

The constructions of person marking constitute a subsystem of the grammar of a language (see Cysouw 2009), and may seem to fulfill a mere grammatical function in the paradigm of pronouns and in verb agreement. However, our key theoretical assumption is that these constructions contribute significantly to the poetic character of lyrical texts. The questions of who speaks to whom in a lyrical discourse, or what is the role of apostrophe in lyrical poetry have a long history in literary criticism (see e.g. Culler 2015, Waters 2003, Jackson–Prins eds. 2014, and Pethő–Tukacs, this

volume). Moreover, one can consider the role of personification or anthropomorphisation in the unfoldment of apostrophic addresses. In other words, the identification of figures and characters in poetry can be considered a defining factor in both genre theory and lyric theory. Despite its theoretical significance, the systematic study of person marking in lyrical poetry is yet to be carried out. The main aim of our paper is to narrow the gap between theoretical and empirical research, providing a solid methodological framework for investigating person marking in Hungarian lyrical poetry in a corpus-based manner.

The contribution of person marking to the emergence of poetic quality can only be partially explored through case studies based on qualitative analyses. To gain more general insight into the functioning of person marking in poetic discourses, quantitative data are needed. In linguistics, there are two ways to obtain quantitative data about a linguistic phenomenon. The first is the use of experimental methods, which aim to collect quantitative data from informants. The second option is to use a corpus and collect quantitative data by observing and measuring linguistic patterns in the corpus. By building the Corpus of Hungarian Lyrical Poetry, we aim to obtain quantitative data in the latter way. Currently, there is no annotated corpus that allows the detailed quantitative analysis of syntactic features related to person marking in Hungarian lyrical discourses.

This paper focuses on the annotation scheme developed for the manual annotation of syntactic features related to person marking in the Corpus of Hungarian Lyrical Poetry. In section 2, we briefly present the sub-corpora and the annotation methods of the Corpus of Hungarian Lyrical Poetry. Section 3 outlines the main principles of the annotation procedure. Sections 4 and 5 present the annotation scheme in detail with examples from a test corpus of 16 texts. Section 6 highlights some quantitative data types that can be extracted from the annotated data. Finally, in section 7, we give a brief summary and suggest some further possibilities for extending the annotation scheme.

2. The Corpus of Hungarian Lyrical Poetry

When designing the corpus, it was a crucial hypothesis that lyricism can be described as a continuum, with more lyrical and less lyrical texts. This means that the defining properties of lyrical texts, such as poetic simultaneity (see Volk 2002), lyrical directness and apostrophic fiction (see Culler 1981: 135–154, Tátrai 2015), are not only present in the canonical lyrical texts of so-called high literature, but also in song lyrics and slam poetry. The total size of the corpus will be 400-600 texts. The corpus will consist of 4 sub-corpora, each containing 100-150 manually annotated texts. The sub-corpora are the following.

- 20th century lyrical texts from the canon of Hungarian public education
- Contemporary lyrical texts
- Song lyrics
- Slam poetry texts

Dividing the corpus into sub-corpora containing different types of lyrical texts has two benefits. On the one hand, it allows for a comparison of trends between discourse types and on the other hand, it offers the possibility to include further sub-corpora in the future.

The manual annotation of syntactic features is based on the automatic annotation methods of ELTE Poetry Corpus. ELTE Poetry Corpus is a database containing all the poems of 50 canonical Hungarian poets (Horváth et al. 2022). Besides the texts of the poems, ELTE Poetry Corpus contains automatic annotations of structural units (titles, stanzas, lines) and sound devices such as rhyme patterns, rhyme pairs, rhythm of lines, alliterations, and phonological features of words (Horváth 2020). In addition to the annotation of structural units and sound devices, the texts of ELTE Poetry Corpus were tokenized and the lemma, part of speech and morphosyntactic features of the words were also automatically annotated by the e-magyar toolchain (Váradi–Simon–Sass et al. 2018;

Indig–Sass–Simon et. al. 2019; Simon–Indig–Kalivoda et al. 2020). In the case of the Corpus of Hungarian Lyrical Poetry, the same workflow and tools are used for the automatic annotation as in the case of ELTE Poetry Corpus.

3. The main principles of the annotation scheme

The annotation scheme presented in this paper has been elaborated in several phases and the different phases have been tested on a test corpus of 16 texts. The test corpus contains 13 poems written in the 20th century and 3 song lyrics. Besides the authors of this paper, 5 annotators participated in the test annotations.[1] They were all academics or PhD students. For the test annotations we used WebAnno, a corpus tool developed for projects using multiple annotators (Yimam–Gurevych–Eckart de Castilho et al. 2013; Eckart de Castilho–Mújdricza-Maydt–Yimam et al. 2016). WebAnno's interface made it possible to assess inter-annotator agreement and to detect and modify problematic parts of the annotation scheme. In the course of developing the annotation scheme, we had several meetings, where the annotators reported on the difficulties encountered. This feedback from the annotators was also taken into account when we finalized the annotation scheme.

At the heart of the elaborated scheme is the annotation of verbs and their direct dependents, which play a fundamental role in the expression of person relations. The manual annotations will be based on the automatic annotation of the lemma, part of speech and morphosyntactic features of words. Thanks to the automatic annotations checked manually, only syntactic relations between the elements of verbal structures need to be annotated manually. We mostly annotate relations between the elements of verbal structures in the usual way of dependency analyses. Besides constituency analysis, dependency analysis is the most typical way to annotate syntactic structures. One of the main advantages of dependency analysis is that it is compatible with the syntactic analysis of computational methods and with the cognitive linguistic theoretical framework of this research project (see Geeraerts–Cuyckens eds. 2007, Langacker 2008, Tolcsvai Nagy szerk. 2017). For instance, in the D1 dimension of the multi-dimensional functional cognitive model of the Hungarian sentence elaborated by Imrényi (2013, 2017, 2019), relations between the verb and linguistic elements referring to the participants and circumstances of the event expressed by the verb are described as dependency relations.

The dependency analysis results in a dependency tree for each sentence or verb structure analyzed. A dependency tree is a graph whose nodes are the words of the sentence and the root node, i.e. the node at the top of the graph, is by default the verb of the sentence. The edges between the nodes represent dependency relations between the words. These dependency relations can be described as a relation between a head node and a dependent node. Nodes of the dependency tree that are not at the top or the bottom level are heads and dependents at the same time. For example, the root node of the Hungarian sentence (1) is the verb *elment*. The nouns *lány* and *boltba* functioning in the sentence as subject and adverbial argument are direct dependents of the verb. However, the noun *lány* is not only the direct dependent of the verb, but also the direct head of the preceding article and the adjective *legfiatalabb.* Similarly, the noun *boltba* is the direct head of the article preceding it. The dependency analysis of sentence (1) is shown in Figure 1.

(1) A   leg-fiatal-abb   lány   el-men-t   a   bolt-ba.
     The   Sᴜᴘ-young-Cᴍᴘʀ   girl   Vᴘꜰx-go-Psᴛ.3Sɢ.Nᴅᴇꜰ   the   shop-Iɴᴇ

     'The youngest girl went to the shop.'

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[1] Besides the authors of this paper, the following researchers from the Stylistic Research Group took part in the test annotations: Júlia Ballagó, Ágnes Kuna, Andrea Pap, József Pethő, Réka Sólyom.

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                              element
                           /          \
                        lány          boltba
                       /    \            \
                     a   legfiatalabb      a
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
Figure 1.

Although the nodes in dependency analysis are usually words, in the annotation scheme, in some cases, we have allowed the node to be a structure of two or more words placed side by side (noun + postposition structures, vocatives).

When designing the annotation scheme, we followed the principle that the nodes of the dependency tree can only be actual words or structures that are linguistically realized in the sentence. In other words, we do not complete sentences with zero pronouns and zero copulas, nor do we complete elliptical structures with the missing verb (this approach is followed by Vadász 2020). However, we have built the annotation of elliptical structures and predicate structures without copula into the annotation scheme.

In the course of manual annotation, two types of information are annotated. On the one hand, we annotate the verbal structures' elements having different syntactic and semantic roles. On the other hand, we annotate the relations between these elements. This means that the labels of the manual annotation have two main groups: they refer either to a word or a structure consisting of more than one word, or to a relation between words or structures. In some cases, additional information is added to the labels. In most cases, the labels annotating the nodes and the relations between nodes result in redundancy. For instance, preverbs get a Prev label, and the relation between the verb and the preverb also gets a prev label. However, the redundant labeling of relations makes it easier to check and correct annotations and to write scripts converting the corpus to other formats.

4. The first stage of the annotation of verbal structures

Since the annotators can only focus on a few things at a time, we have defined a first, less detailed stage of the annotation process, which is followed by further stages adding further annotations to the existing ones. This first stage consists of the annotation of verbs constituting the root nodes of dependency trees and the annotation of direct dependents of the verb, auxiliary verbs, preverbs, and vocatives.

4.1. Annotating verb + dependent relations

Verbs get a label Core and direct dependents get a label Arg. Verbs get the label Core even when they have no dependents. We annotate as dependents the arguments of the verbs and the nominal adjuncts. Other types of adjuncts are not annotated.[2] For example, adjuncts referring to the time or mode of the action expressed by the verb are usually not labeled, as they are mostly not nouns but

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[2] It is not the aim of this research to theoretically clarify the difference between arguments and adjuncts. However, for the annotation to be successful in the future, the annotation scheme should be refined to provide some "practical" aspects that will help the annotator to distinguish between these two categories.

adverbs. Adjectives and articles before the dependents are not labeled as part of the dependent. The verb is linked to the dependents by an arrow pointing from label Core to label Arg. The link gets a tr (trajector) or lm (landmark) label. In the terminology of Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 2008), a trajector is in the focus of attention, it is the primary figure of the process expressed by the verb. Usually, its thematic role is agent and its syntactic function is subject. Landmarks are additional, non-agent figures of the process, usually appearing in the sentence as direct or indirect object. Since the morphosyntactic features of words are annotated automatically, it is not necessary to manually annotate the case or number of the verbal dependents. (However, the manual checking of these automatic annotations is necessary.)[3]

(2) 'but they don't reply [Core] , so they reply [Core]'

(3) 'an ancient Hungarian song [Arg-tr] still rings [Core] in my ears [Arg-lm]'

(4) 'your candle [Arg-tr] goes out [Core] in the wind [Arg-lm]'

When a verb has more than one direct dependent with the same role, they are labeled and linked to the verb separately.

(5) 'in order to protect [Core] you with her/his arm [Arg], lap [Arg], knees [Arg]'

In the case of noun + postposition structures, the structure is annotated with one Arg label, and it is linked to the verb as one unit.

(6) 'The word [Arg-tr] throws [Core] sparks [Arg-lm] in my teeth [Arg-lm]'

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[3] Due to technical reasons, the images demonstrating the examples cannot be edited directly. To ensure the comprehension of both the examples and the marking conventions, we provide the literal translation after each example, with the labels after the English expressions.

When a word is a dependent of more than one verb, the label of the dependent is linked to each verb.

Arg — tr — Core   Core — lm — Arg
A zene szóljon, szálljon az éjen át,

(7) 'Let the music [Arg-tr] play [Core], fly [Core] through the night [Arg-lm]'

In the case of structures consisting of a finite verb and an infinitive, the infinitive is annotated as the dependent of the verb, in the same way as the other dependents. We do not annotate the dependents of the infinitive.

Arg   Arg — lm — Core
mi meg mesélni kezdtünk róla:

(8) 'We [Arg-tr] started [Core] to tell (stories) [Arg-lm] about him'

4.2. Annotating auxiliary verbs and preverbs

In the case of structures consisting of an auxiliary verb and an infinitive, the infinitive receives the label Core and the auxiliary verb gets the label Aux. The infinitive is linked to the auxiliary verb by an arrow pointing from the label Core to the label Aux. The relation receives the label aux. The dependents of the auxiliary verb + infinitive structure are also linked to the infinitive. It should be noted that the cognitive linguistic literature emphasizes that in Hungarian the auxiliary verb and the infinitive form a semantic unit (Tolcsvai Nagy 2009). This means that it is not necessary to assume a head-dependent relationship between the infinitive and the auxiliary verb. However, due to the dependency approach followed in the annotation system, we had to decide which element of the structure is the head and which is the dependent. The annotation scheme is designed so that in the first phase of the annotation process, all elements are directly linked to the root node (Core element). In other words, we did not want to get chains consisting of more than two elements.[4] To avoid getting a chain of three elements, we made the infinitive the root node of the structure, since the dependents of the auxiliary + infinitive structure are usually semantically more closely related to the infinitive than to the auxiliary. In a more formal approach, we could say that the selectional restrictions of the infinitive tend to have a stronger effect on dependent choice than the selectional restrictions of the auxiliary verb.

Core — aux — Aux   Arg
Érdekelni nem tudnának ők

(9) 'I would [Aux] not care [Core] them [Arg]'

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[4] Chains consisting of more than two elements make it difficult to query the annotations and convert the exported annotations from one format to another. In addition, the annotators' task is probably less difficult if they do not have to annotate three-element chains. However, as it can be seen in the next section, we could not avoid the annotation of three-element chains for possessive structures.

——lm——
[Core]—aux—[Aux]　　　　　　　[Arg]
És látni　　fogjuk a kelő napot,

(10) 'And we will [Aux] see [Core] the sun [Arg] coming up'

[Core]——aux—[Aux]　　[Core]—lm—[Arg]
tanulni sem kell , tudjuk　　ezt　rég:

(11) 'you don't even need [Aux] to learn [Core], we've known [Core] this [Arg] for long:'

The infinitives standing alone, without a finite verb or an auxiliary verb, also get the label Core and the dependents of these infinitives are annotated in the same way as the dependents of finite verbs.

[Core]　　　　　[Core]
eltűnni és feküdni holtan.

(12) 'to disappear [Core] and lie [Core] dead'

[Core]——lm——[Arg]
látni　az ablakon át,

(13) 'and it can be seen [Core] through the window [Arg]'

We also annotate preverbs which are separated from the verb stem, since the verb stem and the preverb form a semantic unit. The preverbs get the Prev label and the relation between the verb and the preverb gets the prev label.

[Core]—lm—[Arg]　　[Prev]—prev—[Core]—tr—[Arg]
Megyek hozzád,　meg nem állok　én　.

(14) 'I'm coming [Core] to you [Arg-lm], I [Arg-tr]'m not stopping [Core+Prev]'

4.3. Annotating vocatives

We usually also annotate vocatives by linking them to the verb, even though syntactically the vocative is not the dependent of the verb. Semantically, however, they elaborate or specify an argument of the verb, so it seemed logical to annotate them as part of the verbal structure. The vocative receives the label Voc, which is linked to the verb by an arrow pointing from the label Core to the label Voc. The relation between the vocative and the verb is labeled either tr or lm, depending on whether the vocative corresponds to a participant functioning as trajector or landmark. When there is a dependent in the structure that is coreferential with the vocative, then the dependent's Arg label is linked to the label of the vocative and the relation is labeled cor (coreference). With the label Voc, we annotate not only the noun itself but rather the whole vocative structure as one unit, together with adjectives and exclamation words preceding the noun. The advantage of this labeling is that the internal structure of vocatives can also be examined in the future.

Pajtás, dalolj hát, mondd utánam:

(15) 'Dude [Voc], sing [Core], say [Core] it after me [Arg]:'

„Hogy hívnak téged, szép, öreg Úr,

(16) 'What do they call [Core] you [Arg], dear old Lord [Voc],'

Sometimes the vocative does not refer to a participant elaborated by an explicit or implicit dependent of the verb. In such cases, we also label the vocative but we do not link it to anything.

"Édes fiacskám, egy kis sajtot ennék",

(17) 'My dear son [Voc], I'd eat [Core] a piece of cheese [Arg]'

Ó, jaj, barátság, és jaj, szerelem!

(18) 'Oh, alas, friendship and alas, love'

4.4. Annotating elliptical structures

In lyrical texts, we find elliptical clauses quite often. These clauses have an argument structure in which the verb supplying the head of the dependency tree is omitted: it occurs only in a previous (or sometimes in a subsequent) clause. As we have noted, we do not complete such elliptical clauses with the missing verb. When annotating such structures, another Core label is added to the verb having two or more argument structures and the dependents in the elliptical structure are linked to this label. For the Core label of an elliptical structure, ticking a checkbox indicates that the verb is only implicitly present in the annotated argument structure.

jóhírt vár , szép asszonyi szót, szabad emberi sorsot,

(19) 'he is waiting [Core] for good news [Arg], a nice word [Arg] of a woman, a free human destiny [Arg]'

Conventional similes containing the conjunction word *mint* 'like, as' are treated as similar elliptical structures.

és szőtte álmát, mint színes fonált:

(20) 'and (s)he wove [Core] her/his dream [Arg] like a colorful yarn [Arg]'

In some cases, one or more dependents are also omitted in the elliptical structure in addition to the verb. In such situations, not only the explicit verb but also the explicit dependent gets a second label (Arg) in the preceding non-elliptical structure and this label is linked to the second label of the verb in the same way as for explicit dependents. The only difference is that the checkbox indicating that the argument is implicit has to be ticked.

Mily ős bút   zokog a vérnek a fény,

Földnek az ég , elemnek az elem?

(21) 'What ancient sorrow [Arg-lm] does the light [Arg-tr] cry [Core] to the blood [Arg-lm] , the sky [Arg-tr] to the ground [Arg-lm], element [Arg-tr] to element [Arg-lm]?'

If an auxiliary verb + infinitive structure has an additional elliptical argument structure then the auxiliary verb and the infinitive both receive a further label of Aux and Core, the checkbox is ticked and the dependents of the elliptical structure are linked to the Core label of the infinitive. We have not found examples of this case in the test corpus.

5. Further stages of the annotation of verbal structures

In the further stages of the manual annotation of verbal structures, we plan to annotate additional phenomena which enable us to investigate more complex constructions. The annotation of these phenomena is built on the annotation of the first stage. These further stages include the annotation of nominal predicates, possessive nouns, negation words, and implicit arguments.

5.1. Annotating nominal predicates

Nominal predicates receive the label CoreN. When the subject is linguistically elaborated in the structure, it receives the label Arg and it is linked to the nominal predicates with the label tr. If the structure contains adverbial nouns (as well), then an Arg tag is added to it, and it is linked to the CoreN tag, with the relation receiving the lm tag.

Mégis győztes, mégis   új   és magyar.

(22) 'yet victorious [CoreN], yet new [CoreN] and Hungarian [CoreN]'

tölgykerités, barakk oly lebegő

(23) 'oak fence [Arg], barack [Arg] so floating [CoreN]'

hogy milliók közt az egyetlenegy.

(24) 'that among millions [Arg] (s)he is the one [CoreN] '

As we have already noted, similes containing the conjunction word *mint* are treated as a special elliptical structure that implies a preceding explicit predicate. When annotating them, the nominal predicate in the first part of the structure is given a second CoreN tag and the checkbox indicating the omission of the predicate is ticked. The standard of comparison in the second part of the structure is linked to this CoreN tag.

mely messze, mint az ég .

(25) 'which [Arg-tr] is as far [CoreN] as the sky [Arg-tr]'

In the case of nominal predicates with a copula, the copula receives a Cop label and it is linked to the nominal's CoreN tag. The relation receives a cop tag.

Fáradt vagyok.

(26) 'I am [Cop] tired [CoreN].'

Milyen volt szőkesége,

(27) 'how [CoreN] was [Cop] her blondness [Arg]'

Riadt vagyok, mint egy vadállat.

(28) 'I am [Cop] scared [CoreN] like a wild animal [Arg].'

5.2. Annotating negation words and possessive nouns

We also plan to annotate negation words of verbal and nominal predicates. Negation words receive the label Neg, and are linked to the verb or the nominal part of the nominal predicates by an arrow pointing from the Core or CoreN tag to the Neg tag. The relation receives the label neg.

(29) 'and your eyes [Arg-tr] do not [Neg] find [Core] the ground [Arg-lm]'

(30) 'and we are [Cop] not [Neg] heroes [CoreN] either'

After the first stage of the annotation, we also intend to annotate possessive nouns modifying verbal dependents and nominal predicates. Since possessive nouns often anchor the possessions to persons, their annotation has particular importance in the context of this research. The possessive noun is given a Poss tag, which is linked to the Arg tag of the verbal dependent or to the CoreN tag of the nominal predicate. The relation receives the label poss.

(31) 'And do you understand [Core] the wrinkles [Arg] of transience [Poss]'

(32) 'I [Arg] am [Cop] the son [CoreN] of Gog [Poss] and Magiog [Poss]'

5.3. Annotating argument structures without verb

In some cases, the elliptical structure does not have a verb in a preceding or following argument structure. This means that the dependents have no head at all. In this case the dependent functioning as the trajector (subject) recieves an ArgIC label (Argument + Implicit Core) and when there are additional dependents, they are connected to it by a link with an lm label. Negation words and vocatives are also linked to the ArgIC tag.

[ArgIC] ——lm—— [ArgIC] —lm— [Arg]

Törődött csönd, öreg szülők a házban.

(33) 'Tired silence [ArgIC], old parents [ArgIC] (are) in the house [Arg].'

[Poss] —poss— [Arg] —lm— [ArgIC]

az érvek foszló szélein a szárny,

(34) 'the wing [ArgIC] on the parting edges [Arg] of arguments [Poss]'

[ArgIC]   [ArgIC]

Éghajlatok. Feltételek.

(35) 'Climates [ArgIC]. Conditions [ArgIC].'

5.4. Extending grammatical annotations

Following the first stage of annotation, we plan not only to label additional elements, but also to elaborate on the annotations of elements labeled in the first phase. On the one hand, this allows us to search for more specific patterns. On the other hand, by extending existing syntactic annotations, we can make better use of the theoretical insights of cognitive and construction grammars.

When a verbal dependent labeled is part of the clausal core, it is indicated by ticking a checkbox. The clausal core is the minimal unit within a Hungarian clause "which expresses the grounded process profiled by the clause, thus it is constituted by elements necessary for evoking a process type and for grounding an instance of that type" (Imrényi 2017: 703, see Imrényi 2019: 83). Usually the clausal core is the verb of the clause. However, there are cases where the process type of the sentence is expressed by the verb and a dependent of the verb together, forming a closer semantic unit (e.g. *intézkedést hoz* 'take measures', *feleségül vesz* 'get married to'). By annotating dependents that are part of such clausal cores, we obtain a more accurate picture of typical events in lyrical texts.

Annotations of pronouns are also extended if they refer anaphorically or cataphorically to a noun in a preceding or following structure. The antecedent or postcedent of the pronoun can be entered in an empty field. When the pronoun refers to a whole subordinate clause, this is indicated by entering the abbreviation 'sub'.

Although we have not yet taken a definitive position on how to annotate them, we also plan to annotate implicit arguments.

6. Quantitative data extracted from annotations

In the course of the test annotation, 16 lyrical texts were annotated. The annotation was carried out on the basis of the first stage of the annotation procedure. Among the texts annotated, there are 13 poems from the 20th century and 3 song lyrics.[5] Naturally, 16 texts are not enough to draw

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[5] The test corpus consists of the following poems and song lyrics: *A Sion-hegy alatt* and *Góg és Magóg fia vagyok én…* by Endre Ady; *Az örök folyosó* by Mihály Babits; *Nagyon fáj* and *Reménytelenül* by Attila József; *Milyen volt…* by Gyula Juhász; *Mesteremberek* by Lajos Kassák; *Ének a semmiről* and *Halotti beszéd* by Dezső Kosztolányi; *Között* by Ágnes Nemes Nagy; *Apokrif* by János Pilinszky; *Hetedik ecloga* by Miklós Radnóti; *Lélektől lélekig* by Árpád Tóth; *Csavard fel a szőnyeget* by István S. Nagy; *Az utcán* by János Bródy; *Zsákmányállat* by András Lovasi.

general conclusions about lyrical discourses. However, this test corpus is suitable for presenting some of the quantitative data types that can be extracted from the annotations. Table 1 shows the number of tokens in the test corpus and the number of occurrences of some annotated phenomena.

Token	3824
Core label	545
Explicit Core (verb or infinitive)	505
Elliptical structure with implicit Core element (verb or infinitive)	40
Vocative	22
Vocative related to verbal structure	15
Vocative standing alone	7
Trajector dependent	275
Landmark dependent	408
Verbal structure with linguistically elaborated trajector	278
Verbal structure without linguistically elaborated trajector	267

Table 1. Quantitative data from the test corpus

From the data, it can be seen that 7% of the Core tags refer to implicit verbs of elliptical structures. The use of vocatives, which is an integral element of apostrophe, is probably one of the central features of lyrical discourses. This is not contradicted by the data of the test corpus, since there are 22 vocatives in the 16 poems. Although it should be noted that 10 of the 22 vocatives occur in the poem *Nagyon fáj* written by Attila József. There are seven vocatives that stand alone, i.e. which do not elaborate any verbal dependents (trajector or landmark). The significantly lower number of trajectors than landmarks is also in line with the prototype for lyrical discourses in which the agent or experiencer of the events expressed by verbs is typically the fictive speaker or the fictive addressee, who are usually only referred to by verb inflections. In the last two rows, the number of argument structures with and without an explicit trajector is also listed. The number of argument structures with an explicit trajector also includes those cases where the trajector role is elaborated only by a vocative.

The frequency of verbal structures with different dependent numbers can be interesting as well. Table 2 shows the number of occurrences of verbal structures with different dependent numbers. Verbal structures with a single dependent are the most frequent in the test corpus.

Number of dependents	Number of verbal structures
0	122
1	241
2	128
3	42
4	7
5	2
6	1
7	1
9	1

Table 2. Numbers of verbal structures with different dependent numbers

Although the test corpus does not contain the morphosyntactic properties of words, it should be stressed that the manual annotation presented in this paper is based on automatically created and manually checked morphosyntactic annotations. As the result of automatic annotation, the corpus will specify the lemma, the part of speech and the morphosyntactic features of words. By integrating automatic and manual annotations, we can obtain numerous additional quantitative data. It will be possible to investigate typical lexical realizations of different types of verbal constructions or possessive constructions. For example, it could be investigated which are the typical lexemes that appear as the subject, direct object or indirect object of certain types of verbs. We could also find out which are the typical possessive nouns of third-person entities. One could also look at the types of events that have been conceptualized as non-factual, that is, by conditional or imperative verb forms, with negation words or with auxiliary verbs. It will also be possible to analyze the typical structural and lexical properties of vocatives.

7. Conclusion

In this paper, we have presented the annotation scheme of the Corpus of Hungarian Lyrical Poetry. The corpus under construction will consist of four sub-corpora: 20th century lyrical texts from the canon of Hungarian public education, contemporary lyrical texts, slam poetry, and song lyrics. In total, it will contain 400-600 manually annotated texts. The manual annotation allows us to obtain quantitative data on the syntactic structures of Hungarian lyrical texts, in particular on person marking constructions. It extends the automatic and manually checked annotations of lemma, part of speech and morphosyntactic features of words. We have outlined the main principles behind the annotation scheme and presented in detail the proposed way of annotating specific linguistic phenomena. The annotation scheme was tested using a test corpus of 16 texts. We have also provided some examples of the types of quantitative data that can be extracted from the annotated corpus.

Naturally, the annotation scheme presented here can be extended in the future to annotate additional phenomena related to person marking. For instance, the annotation of place and time deixis can be a further extension of the annotation scheme, since deictic reference to place and time implies a reference to the speaker and/or hearer of the fictive lyrical speech situation as well. Besides deictic reference, the personification of inanimate entities is also a fairly common phenomenon related to person marking. It is part of our future plans to elaborate the categorization system of various types of personification (see Simon 2022) and to integrate it into the annotation scheme.

Acknowledgements

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PERSON-MARKING CONSTRUCTIONS
IN REWRITTEN VERSIONS OF A POEM BY ENDRE ADY

ÁGNES DOMONKOSI
ELKH Hungarian Research Centre for Linguistics / Eszterházy Károly Catholic University
domonkosi.agnes@nytud.hu
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8602-1985

ÁGNES KUNA
ELTE Eötvös Loránd University
kuna.agnes@btk.elte.hu
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9447-6285

Abstract

Genres are characterized by specific patterns of person-marking constructions including pronouns, morpho-syntactic elements and vocatives. The goal of this paper is to verify this hypothesis through an analysis of rewritten versions of a poem. The paper analyses various rewritten versions of *Hawk Mating on the Fallen Leaves* (Hu. Héja-nász az avaron) by Endre Ady and conducts software-assisted qualitative research on basic devices for person-marking in order to explore the features of person-marking constructions in the categories of "bad" poetry,[1] pop song lyrics, rap and prose (Domonkosi–Kuna 2018a). The analysis reveals that in speakers' everyday, intuitive knowledge of genres, schemas related to various opportunities for person-marking play a fundamental role. This is suggested by the fact that the rewriting of the poem, its transposition into new genres went hand in hand with changes in the choice of person-marking constructions.

Keywords: person-marking, creative-productive approach, caleidoscopic method, genre, qualitative text analysis, apostrophic fiction

1. Introduction

The main goal of this paper is to highlight the relationship between genres, variants of lyrical speech in particular registers on the one hand and person-marking constructions on the other, based on an analysis of poetic and prose texts which have been produced by rewriting a designated original text. The method of text transformation described by Benkes and Petőfi S. (1993) was empirically tested with secondary school and university students as well as adults over the age of 35. Their task was to create bad poems as well as pop song lyrics, rap and prose on the basis of *Hawk Mating on the Fallen Leaves* (Hu. Héja-nász az avaron), a well-known, canonical poem by Endre Ady. Our expectation was that tasks aimed at distorting the poetic text and shifting between genres would activate the speakers' implicit knowledge of genres, style types and particular stylistic operations, and that the process of text transformation would also be accompanied by changes in the person-marking constructions being adopted. The analysis presented in this paper forms part of a research project exploring the nature of poeticity along with its overt manifestations in practical linguistic knowledge and creative language activity (Domonkosi–Kuna 2018a, 2018b).

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[1] We use the term *"bad" poem* or *poetry* to indicate that the participants were told to write a new version which deliberately distorted the original poem, making it worse.

The analysis primarily focuses on the varied patterns of person-marking, and the differences and similarities that can be discerned across rewritten text variants belonging to highly different genres and style types.

In accordance with these goals, we begin by first discussing theoretical issues of person-marking and text classification (2.) before presenting the material, method and hypotheses of the research (3.). This is followed by an overview of results and lessons derived from the empirical study (4.). Finally, the paper concludes with a short summary (5.).

2. Person-marking and the variability of speech forms

The analysis in this paper adopts a cognitive linguistic perspective on the classification of texts, according to which genre-related knowledge is an organic component of cognition fundamentally aiding conceptual-linguistic orientation, interaction and the social acts that can be performed in interactive settings (Stukker et al. 2016; Kuna–Simon 2017). Genres are cognitive and cultural schemas that are linked to particular types of speech situations, speech events, they emerge and function on this basis, then become conventionalized and undergo changes in accordance with communicative demands in the interactive practice of specific speech communities (Taavitsainen 2001: 139–140; Tolcsvai Nagy 2008; Kuna 2016: 194–197). One's knowledge of particular genres is not made up of separate "blocks of knowledge" but rather it emerges and functions in interactions as a rich network of interconnected components. This knowledge functions in language use in strong connection with other levels of text categorization, such as text type and register. While genre is interpreted as "cultural schemata used to organize knowledge and experience through language" (Taavitsainen 2004: 75–76) (e.g. personal letter, film review), text type represents classes of texts which are similar in co-occurences of linguistic patterns (Paltridge 1996: 237) (e.g. procedure, description). Another important concept is register, which is interpreted in relation to the communicative context (e.g. legal, formal).[2] Beyond linguistic text typology, everyday text categorization points to the fact that these concepts are not sharply differentiated in language use. They appear in the cognitive operations of language users in combination with other concepts rather than separately, and the task of text transformation is particularly well suited to the study of these cognitive operations. In our research design, we therefore did not focus on a single concept such as genre, text type or register. Instead, we investigated the complex interplay of these concepts in everyday operations. Partly as a result of this, the individual text variants are not homologous, they are not at the same level of abstraction in text categorization (see Section 3 and 4). Specific patterns of person-marking display a strong correlation with genres, text types and registers. For example, American-style CVs, news items construed from a neutral vantage point (Sanders–Spooren 1997: 86) typically via third person or impersonal constructions, diaries with their characteristic first person singular constructions, and first or second person forms appearing in apostrophic fiction as a basic feature of lyrical poetry exemplify genre-specific or indeed genre-defining linguistic devices. Thus, a speech community's schematic knowledge of genres crucially includes (besides other properties) the person-marking constructions that are typically activated in them.

With regard to conventionalized links between person-marking and genres, it can be stated that lyrical discourses, the characteristic operations of lyrical poetry are fundamentally shaped by the manner in which personal relations are construed. Therefore, our investigation rests on the assumption made by cognitive poetics that in the creation of poeticity, a decisive role is played by discourse organization (Black 2006: 15; Simon 2016: 89), modulated in part through patterns of person-marking. More specifically, it can be regarded as an essential feature of lyrical poetry that participation in a joint attentional scene and representations of an observed or imagined sequence of scenes are at continuous interplay, which endows lyrical speech with dual perspectivization

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[2] These concepts can be best understood in relation to each other, but it is not the purpose of this paper to discuss their complex relationship (see Lee 2001).

(for details, see Simon 2016: 82–130). This approach is harmonious with the way in which literary theorists have recognized the role of "apostrophic power" in lyrical poetry (Culler 2000; Frye 2007). Additionally, it is strongly related to Tátrai's (2012, 2018a) approach that interprets apostrophe as a special way in which joint attention functions as a feature of language activities and at the same time as a characteristic property of lyrical speech. Under these assumptions, lyrical speech is characterized by a parallel functioning of real and apostrophic discourse (Simon–Tátrai 2017: 168–172).

In keeping with the view that posits a continuum between everyday and literary language use (Stockwell 2002: 4; Tsur 2002: 281; Vandaele–Brône 2009: 24), person-marking devices in lyrical discourses draw on person-marking characteristic of everyday speech; however, their discursive processing is more complex, requiring more mental effort. Whereas in everyday situations, the identification of discourse referents depends on understanding and processing a given, physically and mentally observable speech situation, in lyrical discourses, the reader needs to create in her mind a fictitious discourse world, partly by keeping track of person-marking constructions. This discourse world involves an apostrophic addressee, and it is through apostrophic fiction that the referential scene becomes accessible (for details, see Simon 2016; Tátrai 2018a).

Accordingly, the poetic effect of lyrical discourses, disrupting conceptual stability and coherence as characteristic of everyday cognition, is fundamentally determined by the joint functioning of a real discourse and a fictitious apostrophic discourse. And in the interplay unfolding between these parallel dimensions, a prominent role is played by referential operations prompted by the use of person-marking elements. Therefore, the present analysis starts off with the assumption that the poeticity of lyrical discourses correlates with particular patterns of person-marking, and that person-marking constructions constitute key factors of poetic effect in lyrical poetry.

The interpretation of lyrical poetry as a discursive category amounts to an extension of the notion of lyricalness which allows the category to subsume not only canonical literary texts but also folk songs and even the lyrics of pop songs (Tátrai 2018a, 2018b). This extension is in no small measure motivated by the fact that the contextualizing and perspectivizing operations of person-marking, the fictitious apostrophic acts that we find in these genres (canonical poetry, folk songs, pop songs and even rap) are highly similar. Specifically, the lyrics of pop songs are also characterized by a discursive schema in which running in parallel with the real discourse, a fictitious apostrophic discourse also emerges that simulates face-to-face interaction, with the participants of this discourse directing their attention to an immediately observable referential scene (Tátrai 2012; Simon–Tátrai 2017: 168–72). Such apostrophic acts can be considered as characteristic, defining features of lyrical discourses which play a fundamental role in the creation of a lyrical speech situation (Culler 1981) and which, albeit in varied ways, prevail across genres (as well as variants defined by cultural context and register) of lyrical poetry.

In prose texts, a range of additional discursive schemas come into play, which are different from those in lyrical poetry, and which are also related to variations in person marking. Narrative, descriptive and argumentative prose are realised through fundamentally different operations, and although they differ primarily in their spatial and temporal organisation (Brown 1994; Tátrai 2005; Tolcsvai Nagy 2001), they can also differ in person-marking. In addition, the personal and impersonal versions of narrative discourse are clearly distinguished in terms of person-marking. Finally, it is worth highlighting the fact that narrative discourses show an egocentric organization to a much lesser extent than lyrical discourses (Tátrai 2000).

3. The method of rewriting texts and person-marking constructions. Material, method and hypotheses

The analysis presented in this paper forms part of a larger, more comprehensive study that uses an experimental method (the rewriting of a poetic text) to find out about everyday knowledge concerning lyrical poetry and related popular genres. An empirical survey was conducted in April 2016 with three informant groups, namely secondary school students, university students and adults

over the age of 35.[3] The text used as a point of departure was *Hawk Mating on the Fallen Leaves* (Hu. Héja-nász az avaron)[4], a well-known, canonical poem by Endre Ady. Research participants were invited to write "bad" poems, pop song lyrics, rap and prose on the basis of this text. It was not mandatory to produce all four versions. Secondary school and university students also had the option of working in groups. In this way, a total of 89 rewritten texts were produced, forming a corpus of 8.007 word tokens (see Table 1).

	BAD POEM	POP SONG LYRICS	RAP	PROSE
secondary school	9	4	7	4
university	15	13	9	9
adult	6	4	5	4
in total	30	21	21	17

Table 1. Data on the texts under study

The selection of Ady's poem was motivated by the following criteria. *Hawk Mating on the Fallen Leaves* is part of the canonized curriculum in Hungary; it is a much studied, well-known text; it has a short, song-like structure in terms of meter and rhyme; the topic of love is close to all age groups in the research; in the text, several easily accessible conceptual domains are activated (e.g. LOVE, SUMMER-AUTUMN, TRAVEL, DESTRUCTION, BEING BENEATH, FIGHTING). Regarding person-marking, the text is peculiar because the speaker and addressee of apostrophic fiction are construed in first person plural, thus the ME-YOU RELATION that is especially characteristic of lyrical poetry (and the song genre in particular) is not manifested in the prototypical first and second person singular constructions. As a point of departure for rewriting, this choice may be efficient because it allows for alternative construals of personal relations and thus makes it possible to assess the effects of the original text and background expectations about lyrical speech.

In the experimental study, we started off with the assumption that the task of distorting the poetic text and producing various shifts in text types would activate the informants' knowledge about various text categories (genres, style types, registers and stylistic operations). In this process, the original text served as a reference point or control text with respect to the production and analysis of new texts. This method of text production has the advantage that it facilitates the comparison of genres and other concepts by revealing how the original text affects the conceptual-linguistic construal of new, rewritten ones. Moreover, by bringing the specified genres and text categories into play, the task leads to the production of texts that give evidence of relevant genre-related and register-related features (Domonkosi–Kuna 2018a, 2018b). The processes of distorting the text and making various shifts in genre allows for the recognition of poetic conventions that are associated with specific text categories in the informants' metapoetic knowledge.

For the activation of knowledge about poetic operations and genres, the exercise type requiring the rewriting or transformation of an original text (Petőfi S.–Benkes 1992, 1998) seemed particularly well-suited as it allowed us to specify genres, text types, registers as target schemas for the texts to be produced.

The specification of four different but interrelated tasks in the experiment had partially different motivations and goals, and therefore the four aspects are not homologous. Distorting of a literary

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[3] Secondary school students participating in the research were students of Tóth Árpád Gimnázium (Debrecen) and Budapesti Komplex Szakképzési Centrum (Budapest). We owe special thanks to them and their teachers for sharing the texts for publication. Students in higher education were undergraduate students of Hungarian langauge and literature at Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church and at Eszterházy Károly University.

[4] The original poem and its English translation are available at the following link: https://www.babelmatrix.org/works/hu/Ady_Endre-1877/H%C3%A9ja-n%C3%A1sz_az_avaron/en/3502-Hawk_mating_on_the_fallen_leaves

text is an inverse procedure for identifying potentially effective linguistic and poetic devices. Discrepancies in linguistic construal across the various genres set as target for text transformation may bring us closer to capturing poeticity in its continuum, and may also highlight genre and text type specific features.

Our previous analyses have shown up differences in register, modes of metaphorization and saturation, the use of figures of speech, rhyme and meter across the four groups of rewritten texts, i.e. bad poems, pop song lyrics, rap and prose (Domonkosi–Kuna 2018a, 2018b). The present paper focuses on basic features of person-marking and the ways in which rewritten text variants differ in this respect.

Person-marking constructions were studied in the entire material. Trends regarding frequency patterns were investigated on a 25-text sample with the help of ATLAS.ti, a software for qualitative data analysis (for details, see Domonkosi–Kuna 2018a). The sample proportionately included 6 rewritten texts from each category in addition to the original text. In the sample, grammatically marked 1st, 2nd and 3rd person forms were systematically processed, in a total of 620 constructions. In addition, from the entire database of rewritten texts, we collected vocative elements in view of the prominent role of addressing constructions in the apostrophic situation characteristic of lyrical speech.

In the research, the following hypotheses were tested:

1) Person-marking constructions form part of speakers' schematic knowledge about genres and particular variants of lyrical speech, thus the changing of genre in the course of rewriting a text is accompanied by clearly observable modifications in the patterns of person-marking.

2) Personal relations define the context for apostrophic fiction characteristic of lyrical poetry in general and the classical song genre in particular. Therefore, in pop song lyrics and rap, which are closely related to this genre, the immediacy of me-you relations is also prominent.

3) As a result of rewriting Ady's poem in prose, the share of 3rd person constructions greatly increases.

4) Vocatives play an important role in the construal of apostrophic fiction, by marking the addressee of lyrical speech. Differences across text variants also show up in the frequency of vocatives.

5) Person-marking features of the original text are not completely overridden by patterns characteristic of the target genres of text transformation. Despite genre-related differences, first person plural forms remain frequent.

4. Person-marking constructions in the text variants

Our analysis of person-marking relies primarily on qualitative methodology. We have analysed morphosyntactically definable features of person-marking in the original text as well as in 6 text variants from each text group, which allows us to make quantifiable observations in a preliminary manner. With regard to vocatives, the entire material has been subjected to analysis, thus the interpretation of data may be informed by the token frequency of vocative constructions. In addition, we have also analysed concrete examples in terms of the poetic effects of person-marking from a broader perspective, observing such factors as the duality of the joint attentional scene and the referential scene, the nature of epistemic grounding, subjectivization and frames of reference (Tolcsvai Nagy 2018). In part, this is performed with the aim of assessing the codability, formalizability of these factors in support of further analysis.

4.1. Person-marking in *Hawk Mating on the Fallen Leaves*

The interpretation of person-marking constructions in the original text serves as a point of departure for spotting differences and similarities across text variants. In the manner described in the methodological section, we measured instances of person-marking as elaborated by verbs,

pronouns and nouns. This in turn supported the interpretation of perspectivization in the text and the role of how personal relations are elaborated.

In the original poem by Endre Ady, we found a total of 13 person-marking elements (see Table 2), among which first person plural and third person plural constructions have the highest share. The latter is characteristic of person construal in the 2nd stanza, in contrast with the other stanzas that see the domination of first person plural forms and associated adverbial participles.

	Data	Number of instances
1Sg	–	–
2Sg	–	–
3Sg	–	–
1Pl	*útra kelünk* 'we are departing', *megyünk* 'we are going', *szállunk* 'we are flying' (twice), *megállunk* 'we are stopping', *nászunk nékünk* 'our honeymoon', *beletépünk* 'we are tearing [into each other's flesh]* , *lehullunk* 'we are falling'	9
2Pl	–	–
3Pl	*új rablói vannak* 'has new thiefs', *csattognak az új héjaszárnyak* 'the hawk wings are clapping', *dúlnak a csókos ütközetek* 'the battles of kisses are raging'	3
vocative	–	–
ambiguous person construal	*két lankadt szárnyú héjamadár* 'two hawks with their weary wings'	1

Table 2. Person-marking elements in *Hawk Mating on the Fallen Leaves*

In the title, the nominal with a phrase-final adverbial is a construction implementing a neutral vantage point, with no overt marking of personal relations. The fact that the concept of HAWK is associated with the referential centre marked by first person plural does not become part of the poem's semantic structure until the third line of the text.

Although Ady's poem, based as it is on first person plural forms, does not create prototypical fictitious apostrophic discourse, the duality characteristic of lyrical speech is still discernible. The dual presence of the speaker and the other participant, with whom he is involved in shared activities in the referential scene, is supplemented by parallel construal of the speaker's relation to the reader. In terms of lyrical speech, the employment of first person plural forms gives rise to a situation in which even as there is no explicit apostrophic addressee, the other participant subsumed by the plural form still appears to be a recipient (co-conceptualizer) as well as a participant of the profiled activities. Key to this interpretation of first person plural forms is the use of present tense. In the fictitious discourse world, the participant implied by the plural form and distinct from the speaker can be interpreted as an apostrophic addressee because the adoption of present tense presupposes her presence as well. In other words, the opportunity for an inclusive interpretation of first person plural creates apostrophe-like lyrical speech by the activation of schemas associated with love songs of a strongly lyrical character.

The "Other" subsumed by first person plural is construed at a high level of integration with the speaker (with whom she is in a love relationship) through the use of a shared metaphor that applies to both. The speaker's storytelling in present tense and first person plural, by "informing" the participants simultaneously about events that they experienced, gives rise to the conception of eternal present tense and the experiencing of the story as evoked present.

The metaphorization of the poem, the way in which "the sight of a couple moving into autumn and falling on dead leaves does not so much symbolize as rather brings itself into metaphoric-

organic correspondence with the fate of lovers" (Eisemann 2007: 694, translation by the authors), evolves in strong association with person-marking. The speaker and the addressee appear in an objectivized fashion as birds through an appositive construction.

4.2. Person-marking in rewritten text variants

Based on qualitative analysis of the sample consisting of 24 rewritten texts in ATLAS.ti, it can be established that apart from the most frequent person-marking constructions of the original text, the material under study contained third person singular forms in a higher proportion (cf. Figure 1). In the course of software-assisted analysis, third person plural forms were coded separately. However, with regard to construal, in terms of perspectivization, third person utterances are basically of the same kind, thus these two paradigmatic values (i.e. third person singular and plural forms) could also be conflated.

Figure 1. The frequency of person-marking constructions in the sample

Besides highlighting similarities between the original and the rewritten texts, the numbers also reveal that the proportions of person-marking constructions vary greatly across text variations (cf. Table 3). The possible background of these quantitative data will be addressed in later subsections.

	ORIGINAL (N = 13)	BAD POEM (N = 113)	SONG (N = 149)	RAP (N = 200)	PROSE (N = 145)
1SG	–	3% (3)	15% (22)	6% (12)	1% (2)
2SG	–	4% (5)	17% (25)	8% (17)	–
3SG	–	24% (27)	31% (46)	32% (65)	30% (44)
1PL	69% (9)	42% (48)	26% (40)	34% (70)	13% (18)
2PL	– (0)	– (0)	1% (1)	2% (3)	–
3PL	23% (3)	22% (25)	6% (9)	14% (28)	56% (81)
vocatives	– (0)	2% (2)	4% (6)	3% (5)	–
ambiguity in person-marking	8% (1)	3% (3)	– (0)	– (0)	–

Table 3. The proportions (in percentages) of person-marking constructions (N = 620)

Vocatives, i.e. speech acts explicitly addressing the speech partner play a special role in the construal of personal relations and the elaboration of various speech situations, communicative forms (Sonnenhauser–Hanna 2013; Hill 2014). Although the original text does not include any vocative

element, the rewritten ones give evidence of the fact that the informants' knowledge about particular genres, text types also activates the vocative function.

With regard to proportions in the database of rewritten texts, bad poems include 3,54 vocatives per 1000 word tokens. With pop songs, this value is 4,83 with rap lyrics 8,06 and with prose text 1,17. These highly different proportions suggest that in general these communicative forms presumably differ in the frequency of vocatives, and that in the speakers' intuitive knowledge about text variations experiences related to person-marking are also activated during text transformation. It is also plausible to assume that vocatives differ not only in terms of frequency but also in terms of their functions across different text categories. The roles of vocatives and their dynamic functioning in discourses are highlighted in our analysis of a few selected examples below.

4.2.1. Person-marking in bad poems

Comparing the original text with rewritten versions that resulted from distorting it, turning it into a bad poem has the benefit of potentially shedding light on how the (similar or different) construal of personal relations may affect the informants' assessment of a text's poeticity.

The frequency of person-marking construction in the distorted, bad poems of the database displays similar trends as the original poem. First person plural forms have a high share (42%), with the appearance of third person forms also being typical (3Sg: 24%, 3Pl: 22%). The original text's influence is sometimes also manifested in the structure of rewritten texts, in the shifts of person-marking from one stanza to the next. This can be observed in (1) below, in which the first, second and fourth stanzas feature first person plural elements, whereas the second one includes third person plural verb forms. Personal relations regarding the speaker and a co-acting apostrophic addressee (subsumed by WE) as opposed to THEY are similar to what we find in the original poem. The author's strategy for distorting the original poem was not based on a novel construal of personal relations.

(1)
The Last Dirty-Dance[5]

We're hitting the road.
Crying, lamenting, weeping,
Two little birds with broken wings.

The Summer is robbed,
The bird-wings are crushed
and in the meantime they're kissing.

We're flying, flying,
Somewhere in the Autumn we sit down
Looking scruffy.

This is our last Dirty-dance:
We're groping each other's asses
Then split up on the street.

[1.22.][6]

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[5] Only the translated English examples are included in the paper. The original Hungarian texts can be found here.
[6] The first number indicates the category of texts produced in the experiement, with bad poems representing category number 1, pop song lyrics category 2, rap texts category 3 and prose texts category 4. The second number differentiates texts within a given category.

In the bad poems, as a result of person-marking operations reconstruing, re-evaluating the original text, the typical linguistic construction for apostrophic fiction, namely the direct elaboration of a ME-YOU RELATIONSHIP also appears, albeit in a low number. Since first and second person singular forms are basic person-marking elements of prototypical lyrical poetry, their use does not by itself contribute to the distorting of the text. However, as shown by (2), the disrupting of person-marking patterns, accompanied by the incoherent use of symbolic expressions, word choices subverting unity of register, the adoption of simple poetic conventions, and irregularities in rhyme and meter produce a text that is lacking in lyrical effect.

(2)
Like a dying hawk in the dead leaves of autumn,
reciting my words, just listen to me.
Crying, shouting we're chasing each other,
pursued by desire, who's like a horrible monster.
Our old summer is sometimes squinting at us,
we knowingly know our deed and stop in the autumn,
somewhere from the summer our fluffed feathers are breaking forth,
in love, we're suffering from our last honeymoon.
Pursued, we're flying, I'm tearing your flesh,
we're going because autumn has made it limp.

[1.10.]

As a way of distorting the original poem, narrative distancing also occurs in certain texts, which destroys the lyrical speech situation. Switching from the original poem's first person plural forms to third person has the effect of eliminating the symbolic character of speech. Whereas first and second person utterances contribute to a sense of experiencing the world in an intersubjective way (Simon 2016), the use of third person is less compatible with speech forms characteristic of lyrical poetry. In example (3), narrative distancing is already evident in the past tense verb form of the title. This supports the suggestion that among the steps of software-assisted qualitative analysis of person-marking constructions, it is important to develop coding for the co-occurrence between personal relations and tense. In (3), the series of events starting in past tense remains in third person throughout the text but it does switch to present tense after a while (the tense which prevails in the original text).

(3) The Hawks Departed

Two hawks with limp wings
Started their journey on this autumn day.
Through clouds and mountains
They are flying without stopping.

Autumn is gone, summer is coming
And the hawk couple is flying back
Their souls are thrilled
And a kiss finds their lips.

Summer is gone, autumn is coming,
All the while the couple is sitting in the window.
Their hearts are immersed in the joy of love
And peace covers the world around them.

This is the last summer night
The hawks are going away
They are going, travelling far,
And the thrill of their love is vanishing.

[1.2.]

When it comes to vocatives, out of 30 bad poems only 4 contain a total of 7 direct addresses. Among the new variants, it is worth highlighting the text in which despite a reconstrual of personal relations, the elaboration of a complex discursive situation involving vocatives and apostrophic shifts produces a lyrical effect. Vocatives in the text are directed at three different addressees. Even as this marks a deviation from the original poem, it contributes to the lyricity of the text. Indeed, in part it is precisely through the complex discursive situation elaborated through apostrophes that renders the bad poem poetic, even though it is formulated in a very different register.

(4)
Hawk Grief on the Ground

Off we go. To the autumn we run,
Blimey, more,[7] shouting, chasing each other,
two crippled hawks.

Look, the summer has thiefs,
Hey, the hawk-wings are beaten
Love is raging.

Blimey, come down good God from the Summer,
Somewhere the autumn we're stopping,
Lol, we're standing like bums, in fall in love.

This is our last one-night stand,
we're tearing into each other's flesh,
You, cannibal Grief.

[1.1.]

Besides other operations for distorting the poem, shifts in person-marking also play their part. This suggests that the construal of personal relations, the way in which they shape the discursive situation, is part of the informants' implicit knowledge about lyricity.

4.2.2. Person-marking in text variants rewritten as pop songs

In the task of rewriting the text as pop song lyrics, research participants were expected to maintain the lyrical speech situation but create a more popular, more casual text. With regard to variants produced in this way, it may be instructive to explore both features that are identical with the original and those which depart from it. The lyrical speech situation is preserved as a basic similarity, thus identical linguistic properties may highlight fundamental criteria of lyricity.

As for person-marking elements, among the text variants subjected to quantitative analysis, the group of pop song lyrics produced the highest share of marked first person singular (15%) and second person singular forms (17%). In the participants' knowledge about the lyrics of pop songs, the typicality of foregrounding a ME-YOU RELATIONSHIP is strongly present. Accordingly, in some of

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[7] *More* is a Gypsy word here, meaning 'Gypsy man'.

the target texts, the basic situation at the centre of the poem (the events involving the hawks) is developed through a relationship between ME and YOU. This suggests that the participants' knowledge of the schema of pop songs includes the markedness of an apostrophic situation.

(5)
Fly, just fly,
Hawk with a wounded heart,
Fly, just fly,
I still deserve one last minute.

At night into autumn, in daytime to summer,
With the last kisses into each other's necks.
Tear me apart, hug me, let me feel that it hurts,
Don't think about anything else, let the world stop.

Fly, just fly,
We're gonna go on crying,
Fly, just fly,
Our love is endless backwater.

[2.19.]

Example (5), through the vocative *sebzett szívű héja madár* 'hawk with a wounded heart', elaborates a participant of the events as the addressee of an apostrophic discourse. Besides this, the linguistic features of (5) also highlight the fact that pop song reminiscences may play a role in operations pertaining to personal relations. Second person forms of the passage taken over from other pop songs (*szállj, csak szállj* 'fly, just fly') have an impact on the emerging text as a whole.

Out of the 21 pop song variants, 4 include vocatives, with a total token number of 7. This is the second highest figure after rap. In those texts, however, which do include vocatives, the use of refrains as a typical feature of pop songs facilitates the recurrence of vocatives. Moreover, the address form in (6) also calls attention to the fact that it may be worth investigating genre-specificity even with regard to specific vocative forms. The vocative *baby* occurs in a variety of pop songs, thus its use by itself may help evoke the genre.

(6)
Come **baby**, let's go to the autumn,
Don't cry, it's still better than winter,
We'd better do something for our tired wings.

The young are ready to break out,
They can't wait to have
My cool little summer outfit.

Let's leave them and rush,
Let's go baby, but first let's close the door!
My hair is scruffy but it's fine, we'll wash it.

Finally here's the end for us,
Come, we'll have one more pint of beer
On an autumn day, with legs apart on the terrace.

[2.16.]

4.2.3. Person-marking in rap texts

As a special genre of popular music, rap is close to pop songs, but also distinguished from it by its subcultural status, its attachment to certain values, and aspects of the musical performance itself (Schusterman 2003; Kovács 2013). The 17 text variants produced by informants clearly shows up genre-related conventions of rap. While the lyrical speech situation is similar, a different register is instantiated, and new kinds of poetic functions emerge in novel patterns.

As also shown in our previous analyses, many of the rap text variants deviate from the topic of love, highlighting the fact that genre-related knowledge also involves a range of typical themes. For example, social issues, narcotics, gangs and gang conflicts commonly appear in rap songs. Many texts display the most striking feature of rap, with the authors aiming to create rhythm that facilitates flowing on beat.

For creating linguistic authenticity or realness (Werner 2019), a key role is played by the construal of personal relations (Weiner 2019). Rap is performed in the speech situation of simultaneous presence as characteristic of oral poetry (Kovács 2013) hence the apostrophic fiction being built up in parallel with the real discourse imitates the real discourse and the two blur together through performativity. With regard to person-marking, the rap genre is characterized by the fact that the performance is adjusted to the nature of spoken discourse, relying on the presence of an audience.

After pop songs, this text group has the second highest ratio and number of first and second person forms. It is only in rap texts that the addressee is occasionally construed in plural; in a low number, second person plural forms are attested. Preserving a property of the original text, the rap text in (7) construes the referential scene as ongoing activity, partly as joint action by the speaker and the addressee and partly as activity attributed to someone else. This goes to illustrate the kind of discursive situation that is typical of rap. The basic apostrophic situation, in which first person plural as well as first and second person singular forms objectify participants of the fictitious discourse as participants of the referential scene, are supplemented by an additional apostrophic operation. By the use of second person plural forms and imperative mood, the audience present in the immediate inter-active environment of the rap performance also becomes a participant of the referential scene.

(7)
BMX Fever on the Hungarians

We're hitting the road, DC on its feet, this is the coolest in the world,
Spitting, playing music, playing the cool kid
Two hipster, cool rapper kings

New bmxers are on the track
The cool wheels are rolling
Stay here kids.

Our saliva's in the sky, it's flying on you
Somewhere at the bottom of the slope we're stopping
You and me the rapper king

This is the last track for us
'Cos we ain't got no bikes, we're finished
And I ain't no more the rapper king

[3.11.]

Through operations transforming personal relations, a special text variant has also been produced in which the first person plural form of the original text (subsuming participants of apostrophic fiction) undergoes re-evaluation. In (8), the first person plural construction is exclusive rather than inclusive in reference. In particular, the referent of *társam* 'my companion' is part of the referential

scene, it is a third person entity whose conceptualization depends on accessing the speaker's person as a context-dependent vantage point (as marked by a first person singular possessedness suffix).

(8)
Me and my companion, we're stomping on Autumn's face (yo)
And we're butting in two burnt-out boozers' fight (yo)

New thiefs have arrived at the Coop supermarket (yo)
this ruined castle garden with fallen shelves (yo)

The cops are shooting their guns (yo)
gangsta rappers beatin' it in the Autumn (yee)

Joe's waiting for you in the slammer (yo)
but with Steve the bucks did a runner (ye)

[3.14.]

As for vocatives, the rap texts in the database contained them in an exceptionally high number. In the 21 texts of this group, 9 texts included vocatives, in an aggregate token number of 13. Some of these vocatives contribute to a blurring of the apostrophic discourse and the real discourse (of the audience's experience) by being directed at the audience or a larger group as a way of construing the addressee of the apostrophic discourse. This process can be observed, for example, in the vocative of (9) stepping out of the flow of storytelling.

(9)
The people are no longer willing, there are no fights any more. We're flying from the Factory, we're being pursued, we have no country… PEOPLE! Somewhere in the Autumn we're stopping, and now there are mountains, seas among us.

[3.8.]

Another group of vocatives designate a concept as the addressee of an apostrophic discourse, creating an apostrophic situation that is typical of lyrical poetry:

(10)
And the New and Beautiful keep coming
Old pictures continue to haunt us
I'm returning to Passing Away
Hey, come, **Love,** I'm beating it!

[3.17.]

In addition, similarly to what we found in pop song lyrics, address forms evoking rap as a genre also play a role. *Bébi* 'baby' occurs several times in this function, with vocatives specifically linked to the slang register (*tesó* 'bro', *tesám* 'my bro') also marking the socio-cultural situatedness of the participants of apostrophic discourse (Tátrai 2018b). This can be illustrated by the passage in (11), which also includes playful elements, internal rhymes:

(11)
The birds are coming, they are like
an endless brake. Who are they?
Perhaps a hawk-machine? Of course not, **bro**!

[3.1.]

4.2.4. Person-marking in text variants in prose

Among the rewriting tasks, rendering Ady's poem in prose required the creation of the largest distance with respect to the original text. Deviation from the lyrical speech situation also had a huge impact on the construal of personal relations. In the absence of a more fine-grained specification of the target text category, the task of rewriting the poem in prose also gave the informants more freedom. All of the collected 17 text present a narrative, they rewrite the poem into a story, with 10 of them following the original work closely in the sequence of events.

In terms of person-marking, impersonal narration, characterized by third person forms (9 texts), and personal narration, marking the storyteller's ego with first person elements (8 texts), have approximately the same share. Compared to other text variants, first and second person singular forms occur much less frequently. The proportion of third person plural forms is the highest in this text group (56%), whereas first person singular forms are the least common here (13%).

Among the texts created in prose, those variants appear to be the most effective which reflect the informants' text typological awareness by implementing the formal features of narrative texts with conventionalized, genre-specific linguistic devices. In seven cases, the original text was turned into a tale, basically by the use of traditional formulae evoking the genre. The narrative schema of tales is associated with third person elaboration of the characters and impersonal narration.

(12)
Once upon a time there was a hawk couple who were very very much in love. They set off on their journey, and were walking and walking, chasing each other happily. They had only one mistake, their wings were a little bit withered and they had got tired in their long quest for a home.

[4.10.]

The conventional schema of short news items is also strongly associated with impersonal narration and a neutral vantage point, thus recreating the genre's typical features also has an effect on the construal of personal relations (13):

(13)
Bird flu
A new epidemic has recently started among birds, especially hawks. A new type of bird flu has appeared. Among birds, typical symptoms include squawking, dashing, and on summer days they can be noisier too. In autumn it can be observed with sick specimens that they may even consume each other for the purpose of having food.

[4.7.]

In prose texts, vocatives were much less frequent than in any other category. Of the 17 texts in this group, only 2 included vocatives, with a total token number of 3. What is more, these vocatives do not contribute to creating a speech situation for storytelling; rather, they belong to embedded discourses, namely dialogues involving characters of the referential scene. In (14), the vocatives also have a role in evoking the genre of tales.

(14)
Auntie Uhu, are you here?, asked Hijj when they arrived at the large oak tree.

[4.8.]

5. Summary

The method of text rewriting may shed light on certain components of everyday, practical knowledge about genres, text types and registers. Rewritten text variants, when contrasted with each other, give evidence of features that informants consider to be characteristic of particular genres and the speech situations with which they are associated. Genre-based groups of texts created by rewriting Endre Ady's poem *Hawk Mating on the Fallen Leaves* in an empirical experiment have also been found to display fundamental differences with regard to the construal of personal relations. This suggests that certain aspects of the use of person-marking constructions are part of the speakers' schematic knowledge of genres.

The analysis has demonstrated that the operations for distorting a poem include the reconstrual of personal relations, and that typical person-marking devices of apostrophic fiction play a role in knowledge about lyricalness. The varied texts produced by rewriting Ady's poem also highlight the fact that within lyrical poetry, the classical genre of songs and thus also the related categories of pop song and rap lyrics are fundamentally characterized by an immediacy created by the ME-YOU relationship. In the texts rewritten in prose, third person constructions have been found to be predominant. A study of vocatives, crucial in the construal of apostrophic fiction, has detected significant genre-related variation with regard to the frequency of address forms. Despite differences among text variants, the person-marking features of the original text exerted a strong influence on text transformation, with first person plural forms being common in each group of rewritten texts.

Acknowledgements

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CONSTRUCTIONS OF PERSON MARKING AND POETIC STRUCTURES IN SELF-ADDRESSING POEMS

JÓZSEF PETHŐ
University of Miskolc
jozsef.petho@uni-miskolc.hu
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5680-6738

TAMÁS TUKACS
University of Nyíregyháza
tukacs.tamas@nye.hu
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6423-9254

Abstract

The paper attempts to approach and interpret the category of self-addressing poems from new perspectives. It chiefly focuses on the constructions of person marking and the poetic structures resulting from their various realizations, relying on the implicit assumptions and recent results of literary theory, cognitive poetics and stylistics. In the analyses, poems by Vörösmarty, Arany and Babits figure prominently but other texts are also touched upon. From the various results it is worth highlighting that several concepts and issues that are essential for the model of self-addressing poems, such as the relationship between the addressee and the addresser, the exhortation, the personal crisis (a contrast between role and personality), are given new interpretations. The analyses demonstrate that, contrary to the apparent 'simplicity' and homogeneity of the self-addressing poetic pattern, this kind of poem occurs in extremely varied poetic structures in the history of lyrical poetry.

Keywords: self-addressing poem, person marking, poetic structure, apostrophe, apostrophic discourse

1. Introduction

The significance of self-addressing poems, a category which was first coined, described and analysed in detail by Béla Németh G. (1966) in Hungarian criticism, is enormous in the history of poetry. This statement is corroborated, among other things, by the fact that in the recent period, too, a considerable amount of attention has been paid to this poem type in studies on poetics, exploiting the possibilities offered by the productivity of the basic model with new and relevant insights (cf. for example, Kulcsár Szabó 2000, 2018; Kulcsár-Szabó 1997, 2007: 93–104; Tolcsvai Nagy 2011; Tverdota 2013, Horváth 2017: 202–204 et passim, Balogh 2017, Laczházi 2020). But, apart from the "qualitative" indicator, one can refer to quantitative data as well. These include the statistics set up by Elemér Hankiss (1968: 17), which, although not complete, can still be considered representative to a certain extent, and classifies 9% of Arany's poems and 8% of Attila József's poems as belonging to the class of self-addressing poems.

In order to set the scene for the ensuing discussion, it is necessary to mention here that despite the adjective *self-addressing*, poems classified as such tend to allow for an interpretation not only as an address to the self but also offer other possibilities such as that of interpreting the subject

as having generic reference.[1] On the other hand, we must also take into account that self-addressing can only be interpreted as such in the context of apostrophic "fiction," since poetic texts, by their very nature, address the reader and, at the same time, "give voice to" him or her. The poetic text "does not come into being by merely being made audible, but only by being given voice with understanding [...] Now, if these hermeneutical considerations can be appreciated, Heinz Schlaffer's statement that 'the poetic structure of a poem does not derive its character from its author, but from its reader, its reciter, whose 'I' is thus nothing other than the 'I' as intended by the 'I' of the poem", does not sound astonishing either. But this can only be realised if [...] the grammatical subject of the poem is given an identity by the reader's speech (the 'saying after'), that is, if the reader lends the poem his or her own voice. Even in cases where lyrical apostrophe is a form of 'self-addressing' or in the figure of speaking without a subject" (Kulcsár Szabó 1997: 263; cf. Schlaffer 1995).[2]

As for the aims of the study of self-addressing poems here, two directions should be mentioned. Using recent developments, namely the basic assumptions and methodological principles of cognitive poetics (cf. e.g. Stockwell 2002, Simon 2016, Domonkosi–Simon eds. 2018) as a background, focusing on the constructions of person marking and their role in meaning-making, we aim to arrive at generalizable poetic, and mainly methodological and typological, results by examining, or more precisely, re-examining, canonical self-addressing poems that can still be considered as typical in some respects (although the aim of the study is not to define the "prototypical" self-addressing poem). Besides, we would like to contribute (to a greater or lesser extent) to the stylistic description of the poetic works analysed.

It is also necessary to point out here that, although it may already seem obvious from the large number of poems belonging to the self-addressing type and the extremely rich variety of realisations, this study does not aim at completeness either in terms of generalisations or in the presentation of the development of temporal variations, even for the purpose of a sketchy overview. Rather, it can only offer a discussion of certain poetic texts, poetic structures considered to be characteristic and important from various points of view and the conclusions that can be drawn from them.

The structure of the paper is as follows. First, a brief overview will be given on the original model of self-addressing poems, i.e., the model created by Béla Németh G., and on the approaches of literary and linguistic studies that partially carry it forward and reinterpret it (2). This is followed by an examination of poems by Vörösmarty, Arany and Babits (3), and finally a brief summary of the generalisable conclusions and some further aspects (4).

2. The basic model of the self-addressing poem and some new approaches

To approach the concept of self-addressing poems and to prepare the analysis of the poems to be examined below, it is first necessary to give a brief review of some of the conceptual components, poetic characteristics and issues of particular importance for the characterisation of the type of poem in question which are related to Béla Németh G.'s (1966) original model. In the context of this, special attention is paid to the questions that can be considered open to a certain extent, which serve as a starting point for the problems raised and the results discussed in the present paper. In this review, we will mainly draw on the most recent insights in the literature, which have given rise to new approaches.

In the original model of self-addressing poems, **the crisis of the lyric self** is given a prominent, "foundational" role. Béla Németh G. (1966: 547) concludes that in all the poems he analyses, the crisis is "the generating situation, the experience." He interprets the concept of crisis as follows:

> The crisis [...] arises out of an intuition, or awareness, one might say in simple terms, of the fact that role and personality, or social need, that is to say, possibility and role, have become contradictory: the role

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[1] It is arguably for this reason that the adjective in the term often appears between quotation marks.
[2] Passages from the Hungarian specialised literature are quoted in English translation produced by the authors of the present paper.

offered by society no longer coincides with personality, or the role that expresses personality is no longer necessary or possible for society. It is a variant of the extreme cases of Akakiy Akakievich or Don Quixote. The role hinders or distorts the personality; one's future becomes hopeless, and as a consequence, one's past acquires dubious value, and one's present becomes intolerable. The crisis becomes complete (Németh G. 1966: 549).

However, more recent literature has questioned not only the significance of the concept of crisis but also its applicability. This is, for example, the starting point of a strong critique by György Tverdota (2013). In Tverdota's view, the model of self-addressing poems was "born with a serious genetic defect", and this defect "has caused one-sidedness and distortions from the very beginning in analyses where research has applied the concept of the self-addressing poem in its original or improved form, and has extended it to analyses of other poets without subjecting the foundations of the concept to a stress test" (Tverdota 2013: 5). He considers this as a consequence of the fact that Németh G. highlighted Attila József's poem "Tudod, hogy nincs bocsánat" ("You Know That There is No Forgiveness") as an "exemplary poem" of the self-addressing type, "and he specified the characteristic features of this type of poem on the basis of this work." It was on this basis that he identified the "homogenizing common denominator", which is therefore none other than "the crisis" (ibid.). However, "only in certain developments of the self-addressing poem does it become an expression of crisis and a way of reaction in the service of eliminating it" (Tverdota 2013: 5–7). What is also remarkable is that this critique points to the uncertainty of the very notion of crisis (in general): "crisis is one of the most uncertain and difficult states to define. Very few human beings and situations in life can be confidently said to be free of any crisis, and the ubiquity of imbalance and failures weakens the explanatory power of the concept" (ibid.).

While not denying the importance of the role of crisis in self-addressing poetry in particular and in late modern poetry in general, since "the first decades of the 20th century appear as the culmination of a process" of what can be termed as the crisis of personality (Kulcsár-Szabó 2005: 65), it does seem necessary to consider broader possibilities of interpreting the concept of crisis. Let us cite one convincing example demonstrating that, in the interpretation of self-addressing poems, the "crisis situation" is not always, or at least not directly, attributable to the opposition between role and personality, but to much more complex relations. In his study on Gottfried Benn's poem "Immer schweigender," Zoltán Kulcsár-Szabó (2007) plausibly argues that the poem allows for two opposing readings: the *du* in the poem can not only be a person marker of direct self-address but it can also be identified with the text of the poem itself, thus allowing the poem to be read as a 'poetry of poetry,' according to which the poem would be a report on the possibilities of itself" (Kulcsár-Szabó 2007: 96–97).

Closely linked to the issue of crisis, a fundamental question is the relationship between **the addresser and the addressee**. The essence of this relationship is often most evidently and accessibly apparent to the recipient's interpretation in the speech act of **imperatives**. Starting from this grammatical-poetic specificity, Béla Németh G. (1966: 550) describes the self-addressing poems he analyses by stating that they are "not only about address, but also about the imperative. In fact, the true characteristic of the genre is **self-imperative**; if it is not present from the beginning, at a decisive point in the poem the self-address does turn into self-imperative, and the experience, the poem's final resonance, its meaning is gained by this very transformation" (emphasis in the original). Despite the seemingly very categorical, definitive and thus even possibly misleading linkage, it is possible, even necessary, to "loosen" the relationship in question in several ways. Such an "opening," a conceptual transformation is carried out in Lóránt Kabdebó (1996: 11), albeit in "harmony" with the original concept of Béla Németh G., when he (1996: 11) uses the category of "ethical command," which he considers to be more open in every respect, instead of the imperative, which is very strongly bound in its linguistic formulation, i.e., also grammatically. As he puts it, "self-address contains, and its dialogicity is always determined by, some ethical command, which also embodies the dissolution of the accumulating tragedy and the predominance of the elegiac voice." If we approach the question of imperative strictly from a typological point of view, we must take into account a caveat in one of the footnotes of the original text by Béla Németh G. (1966: 550) (the footnote being

a text type which is very important but not always prominent in all reading conventions): "There are, of course, other, non-self-**imperative** varieties of this poem type. Here we are talking about **one** of its main, and certainly the most important, varieties in the 20th century" (emphasis in the original).

The implicit suggestion to interpret and describe the concept of self-addressing poems in a way that goes beyond the "limits" of the imperative, i.e., in an expansive way, does not seem to have been taken into account much in later criticism. In fact, in some recent approaches, the character of the imperative, which is thus only characteristic of one of the varieties of the self-addressing poem, seems to have become an exclusive, definitive element, or at least is overemphasized. According to Horváth, "[Béla Németh G.] defines the basic linguistic-grammatical criterion of the verse type, the addressing, as self-imperative" (Horváth 2017: 145); and in Tverdota's formulation, "self-addressing gets filled with content when we move from vocative to imperative. We do not simply address but call upon, or call upon ourselves to perform some action, to demonstrate some behaviour" (Tverdota 2013: 7). In fact, however, the "non-self-imperative genres" mentioned by Béla Németh G. cannot be ignored in any case when the aim is to offer a more complete characterisation of self-addressing poems, or to demonstrate the productivity offered by the category through more complete poetic descriptions of certain lyrical texts of a self-addressing nature.

Furthermore, in connection with the imperative character of the self-addressing poem, it seems worthwhile to refer here, making use of the point of view of functional cognitive pragmatics and poetics, to an "imperative" in a broader sense. This imperative is "based" on apostrophic discourse. However, it is not directed at the addressee of this discourse but at that of the actual discourse (i.e., the lyrical speech situation) in the most general sense, which is by its very nature very open, i.e., carrying different modifications of meaning. For here too, the characteristic feature of poetry in general seems valid that "the speaker of apostrophic discourse, in the context of inter-subjective channelling of attention [...], expresses not only his/her emotions but also his/her presumptions, in order to influence the presumptions of the addressee of the apostrophe and, by transposing the fiction, of the addressee of the actual discourse (i.e., the lyric speech situation) which frames the apostrophe." On the one hand, this "influence" can appear in a dimension of cognition, i.e., the actual recipient (also) realizes something he or she already knew, or acquires knowledge about himself or herself and the world that he or she did not have before. On the other hand, the power of apostrophe can also be manifested, apart from sharing experiences, in a more "obvious" and concrete way, in the encouragement to act. In other words, in the sense that the actual recipient should himself or herself "initiate some kind of change in the world around him or her: do something he or she has not done before, or not do what he or she has done before, or, simply, admit the impossibility of action" (Simon–Tátrai 2017: 171).

It is clear from the above that the relation between the addresser and the addressed, as constituted, on the one hand, by a duality of the apostrophic and of the actual discourse, and on the other hand, in many cases, by other semantic factors, can only be interpreted and described in a much more complex network that goes beyond the "simple dialogue" (as in the Benn poem mentioned above). In keeping with the framework of this paper, we will refer here to just one more example that demonstrates this in a very transparent way, "Horace" by Dániel Berzsenyi:

Horace	Horác
Storming now Boreas there high above the hills,	Zúg immár Boreas a Kemenes fölött,
Clouds of dark and severe furies cover the sun	Zordon förgetegek rejtik el a napot,
Look at the hilltop enveloped in the snowstorm	Nézd, a Ság tetejét hófuvatok fedik,
All is set for wintery rest.	S minden bús telelésre dőlt.
Listen to the song of Flaccus's golden lute	Halljad, Flaccus arany lantja mit énekel:
Pour wine in your glass and stoke the fire of the hearth	Gerjeszd a szenelőt, tölts poharadba bort,
Let the magical balsam shine upon your head	Villogjon fejeden balzsamomos kenet,
It was boiled in the heat of Bengal.	Mellyet Bengala napja főz.

Use your days and whatever the present can give Embrace with a burning heart but don't exclude Love's tame emotions while the happy star of youth Will shine on your horizon.	Használd a napokat, s ami jelen vagyon, Forró szívvel öleld, s a szerelem szelíd Érzésit ki ne zárd, míg fiatal korod Boldog csillaga tündököl.
Don't dwell on tomorrow, do not dream of the far Be merry, have enjoyment while you can, While we talk time flies away suddenly Like the arrow and the roaring stream.	Holnappal ne törődj, messze ne álmodozz, Légy víg, légy te okos, míg lehet, élj s örűlj. Míg szólunk, az idő hirtelen elrepűl, Mint a nyíl s zuhogó patak.
Kabdebó Tamás	

In one of the possible readings, we are dealing here with a self-addressing poem. But at the same time, we can consider other possibilities when determining the addressee of the apostrophic discourse. What is even more important from our point of view is what Ágnes Bécsy (1985) also presents in detail in her analysis, i.e., that the speaker, the "addresser of the second person", is itself double, and that the two addressers are associated with different types of communicative elements and different types of imperatives. The "addressers" are the linguistically unmarked, "theoretical" "I" and the marked, quoted "golden lute of Flaccus":

> The direct call from the self is *to look* and *to listen*. And the one from Flaccus is *to stoke, to pour, to let [the balsam] shine, to use, not to dwell, not to dream, to be merry, to have enjoyment* [...]. The imperatives coming from the 'I' are all injunctions directed to an external object, the ones coming from Flaccus only to a lesser extent. At the same time, what the 'I' calls on the second person to do is only a meditative, passive 'action,' a purely visual attitude towards something: *look* at how all is set for a wintry rest, *listen* to the song of Flaccus's golden lute. What Flaccus's lute calls you to do, on the other hand, is an active, practical wish: *do* this, *don't* do that, *be* this and that. [New par.] However linguistically unmarked it may be, the poem has its origo in the original addressee, and the self 'evokes' the exhortative Flaccusian dictum as well (Bécsy 1985: 40–41).

If we want to approach the relationship between the addresser and the addressed in terms of the correspondence between the "I" and the "you," we can mostly rely on Zoltán Kulcsár-Szabó (2007: 97–99), who draws attention (while in fact, questioning the concept of literal **self**-addressing) to the "kinds of resistance" that the correlation between the "I" and the "you" may encounter. This can ensue, among other things, because "the voice lent to the 'I' cannot be easily attributed to the 'face' of the 'you,' and vice versa, identification with the 'you' will not be able to fully transfer to the 'I' behind the utterance."

It should also be taken into account that in some poetic structures, the fact that the addressee (the addressee of the apostrophe) can be "doubly imagined" may be considered as a salient, dominant textual feature. As, for example, in Dezső Kosztolányi's poem "Ha negyvenéves…" ("Once you're past forty")[3]:

Once you're past forty	Ha negyvenéves…
Once you're past forty, one night you wake up and afterwards you cannot go back to sleep. You look at your room there in the dark. You slowly ponder this and that. You lie, eyes open, as you will in the grave. This is the point at which your life takes a turn.	Ha negyvenéves elmúltál, egy éjjel, egyszer fölébredsz és aztán sokáig nem bírsz aludni. Nézed a szobádat ott a sötétben. Lassan eltünődöl ezen-azon. Fekszel, nyitott szemekkel, mint majd a sírban. Ez a forduló az, mikor az életed új útra tér.

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[3] https://www.magyarulbabelben.net/works/hu/Kosztol%C3%A1nyi_Dezs%C5%91-1885/Ha_negyven%C3%A9ves%E2%80%A6/en (Accessed: 21 September 2022).

You wonder about having lived between	Csodálkozol, hogy föld és csillagok közt
the earth and the stars. Some trivial thing comes to mind.	éltél. Eszedbe jut egy semmiség is.
You fiddle with it. Tire of it and drop it.	Babrálsz vele. Megúnod és elejted.
Every so often you hear a noise from the street.	Olykor egy-egy zajt hallasz künn az utcán.
You know what every noise means.	Minden zajról tudod, hogy mit jelent.
You are not even sad. Just sober and attentive.	Még bús se vagy. Csak józan és figyelmes.
Almost serene. Then suddenly you sigh.	Majdnem nyugodt. Egyszerre fölsóhajtasz.
You turn to the wall. You fall asleep again.	A fal felé fordulsz. Megint elalszol.

(1929; Kery, Leslie A.)

In his analysis of the poem, Ernő Kulcsár Szabó points out that the apostrophic speech of the self-addressing poem

> does not make the grammatical subject of the poem conceivable as both the speaker and the addressed person, only because it would give them a distinctive image. […] The simultaneity of the double conceivability is rather present because the lyrical figure of the apostrophe does not force the rhetorical subject of the poem to play the role of self-address exclusively, despite the fixity of the grammatical relations between the speaker and the addressed. In other words, it does not require the speech that gives voice to the text to limit or refer back the grammatical other or the addressed second person to the subject from which the address derives, neither in an assertive nor in a semantic way (Kulcsár Szabó 2018: 22).

Gábor Tolcsvai Nagy (2011) also distinguishes between several aspects of the relation between the addresser (speaker) and the addressee in self-addressing poems as one of the most specific realizations of subject construction from a cognitive linguistic point of view. He makes a distinction between a direct relation between speaker and addressee and an "open" relation towards the addressee, thus considering the recipient of the poem as a potential addressee. In his argument,

> the syntactical subject or the element bearing a possessive person marker is second person singular, which is anchored both as the direct addressee and the speaker at the same time, as a deictic centre and a deictic reference for itself and for the recipient, and also as part of the speech situation in the abstract space of the textual world [of self-addressing poems]. The identity of the addressee is open, and it is primarily the lyrical speaker (identical with the first person speaker), but may also be the recipient (Tolcsvai Nagy 2011: 193).[4]

3. The poetic variations of self-addressing poems

In what follows, we will briefly examine a few poems which have been selected partly on the basis of the relevant criticism (see below for references to the individual poems) and partly according to our own analytical style attributions. These works seem particularly suitable not only as illustrative examples of the questions addressed above, but also as possible answers, sometimes as contributions to the formulation of further questions, i.e., they may contribute to the reasoning in an "argumentative role." The poems are discussed in chronological order, but not with the assumption or intention of looking for an "arc of development." The reason for choosing a chronological order in this case is that it incorporates the aspect of historicity, but without any other theoretical presuppositions. In other words, this method was also a deliberate attempt to avoid an aprioristic poetic-stylistic typology (established before the analyses).

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[4] „A mondattani alany vagy a birtokos személyjelű elem E/2. személyű, amely egyszerre horgonyzódik le mint közvetlen megszólított és egyúttal mint beszélő, deiktikus középpontként és deiktikus referenciaként saját maga és a befogadó számára, illetve szintén a beszédhelyzet részeként a szövegvilág elvont terében. A megszólított kiléte nyitott, elsősorban a lírai beszélő (azonos az első személyű beszélővel), és lehet a befogadó is" (Tolcsvai Nagy 2011: 193).

3.1. Realisations of the schema of self-addressing poems in Mihály Vörösmarty's poetry[5]

The End	Vég
Burn pure, like the flame of the holy altar for your homeland, Strive towards the rocky roof of merit; What remains from you in the flame? The ashes of your broken heart, and above you A memory that gratitude and death mock you with. (1842)	Égj tisztán, mint a szent oltár lángja hazádért, Küzdj fel az érdemnek sziklatetője felé; Mid marad a lángból? tört szíved hamva, s fölötted Tán emlék, mellyel csúfol a hála s halál.

In this lesser-known poem of Vörösmarty's, the forms of person marking that are prototypical for self-addressing poems, such as second person singular imperative verb forms (*burn, strive towards*) and also noun and pronoun forms marked by second person singular possessive endings (*for your homeland, from you, your heart*)[6], not only allow but also invite a reading of the poem as a self-addressing one. The question arises here, obviously, whether the second person grammatical forms in themselves function as the foundation of this special discursive configuration or rather they only allow for a reading of this kind. It appears that the basic characteristic feature of a self-addressing poem is that it allows apostrophic fiction to emerge through the use of second person singular, without explicitly naming the addressee of the apostrophe. This in turn creates the possibility of identifying the reader as the addressee.

At the same time, a deviation from the prototypical self-addressing poem as defined by Béla Németh G. is obvious in the case above. The key characteristic feature of this deviation is that the speaker is far from being the speaker of the basic model, i.e., he is not someone who reveals a "positive message" or voices an exhortation that enables the self to overcome a crisis. If we start from the notion of crisis, which plays a key role in the basic model, or more precisely from the characterisation of the self-addressing poem by which "the poem type is not an expression of the experience of crisis, but of the will to overcome the crisis, the confidence that it can be overcome" (Németh G. 1966: 550), then we again see a cognitive-emotional movement in the opposite direction, which leads from a hopeful faith, from the will to act to doubt, from the hoped-for result to the mere "ashes" left behind after death and from the deserved, affirmative confirmations to its absence exacerbated by "mock"-ery.

However, what seems even more interesting and important from our point of view is that there are two substantially different readings of the personal relationships in the poem. The first is the "simple," truly characteristic apostrophic position of self-address, where the "I" addresses the "I," which is perceived and/or conceptualized as "you," and which is to be understood, influenced, encouraged, etc. In another, possibly more relevant reading, however, an even more specific fictional scene is being generated here. Namely, in a more complex reading, even **three "characters"** can be identified, if by "character" we mean the different occurrences and linguistic representations of the subject that are shared and are posited as individual "entities", having an "autonomous" consciousness, i.e., experiences and suppositions. In this case, the first "actor" on the "stage" of the apostrophic situation is the speaker uttering the pathetic, romantically rhetoricised exhortation. The second one is the one asking and answering the rhetorical question, which is a response to this exhortation, and the third actor (the addressee of the apostrophe understood as a self-address) is the subject "being taught" by the first speaker, that is, the "encouraged" "you", corresponding to the apostrophic addressee of the prototypical self-addressing poem, from whom the second questioner and teacher character (speaker) wishes to deny the faith and the confidence in the proposed future

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[5] When otherwise not indicated, the translations are the authors' own literal renderings.
[6] Due to the different morphological structure of the two languages, the person markings, such as the maker for the imperative and the second person possessive suffix in Hungarian will be unmarked in English.

action in the words the first speaker has uttered, with a mocking and threatening vision of being unrequited in the future.

Vörösmarty's other two famous self-addressing poems, "A vén cigány" ("The Old Gypsy") (1854) and the fragment beginning "Fogytán van a napod" ("Your day is waning"), can only be briefly discussed, so we will touch upon only a few important issues. While in the case of the latter there is unanimous agreement that it is a self-addressing poem, there seems to be uncertainty about the reading of "The Old Gypsy" as such a poem, also confirmed by the fact that its classification as such is usually accompanied by emphatic argumentation, rejection of objections, etc., as in the analysis of Lajos Csetri (1975: 375): "the atmosphere of the ode and of intoxication caused by wine is complicated by the fact, already known to Gyulai, that in the figure of the gypsy, the poet is addressing himself. This formally hidden self-addressing character, already noticed by his contemporaries, links the poem to the form of the modern poetry of crisis." From our point of view, the suggestion of "formal hiddenness" is particularly noteworthy, since the prototypical linguistic elements, the second-person singular imperative verb forms and possessive pronouns are present in large numbers in the poem's text. Thus, if we read *the gypsy* as a metaphorical self-address, the person marking does not render the self-address covert (cf. e.g. Kappanyos 2012: 69).

The self-addressing nature of "Your Day is Waning," (written probably around 1855) as opposed to "The Old Gypsy," is not questionable. In Béla Németh G.'s (1966) seminal study, it is one of the examples of the "half-formed" version of the self-addressing poem, alongside several other examples that already show the traits of the verse type. This, in many ways extraordinary, poem is also cited as an example of self-address in Gábor Nagy Tolcsvai's (2012) study on the history of the development of the subject in literature. It is significant, but not typical, from the point of view of the marking of personal relationships that in this poem Vörösmarty "partially resolves the ambiguity of the second person with the third person subject of the poor Hungarian poet" (Tolcsvai Nagy 2011: 193). However, as highlighted by Tolcsvai Nagy, this does not necessarily and exclusively refer to a single person, the "you" in the poem, but to Hungarian poets in general. Thus, the poem maintains or reconstitutes the familiar configuration of standard apostrophe.

"Your Day is Waning" (excerpt)	(Fogytán van a napod. . .)
Your day is waning,	Fogytán van a napod,
Your luck is waning,	Fogytán van szerencséd,
Even if you had some, wherefore?	Ha volna is, minek?
You couldn't use it in any way.	Nincs ahova tennéd.
Your blood has thickened,	Véred megsűrűdött,
Your brain has dried,	Agyvelőd kiapadt,
On your tired shoulders	Fáradt vállaidról
Your old cloak is all tattered.	Vén gunyád leszakadt.
Your purse is low,	Fogytán van erszényed,
You are running out of wine,	Fogytán van a borod,
Poor Hungarian poet,	Szegény magyar költő,
What are you waking up to?	Mire virradsz te még?
[...]	

Also, a more far-reaching and productive aspect in the modelling of self-addressing poems is the specificity of the poem (and also the insight of this study) that

in the text of the poem, some of the formal subjects are not the addressee but his/her grammatical "possessions" ("your day", "your luck", "your blood", "your brain"). These nouns, [...] as reference point structures, indicate the factors of the mode of being of the addressee (and thus of the speaker) as semantic targets, starting from the reference point of the addressee, foregrounding the concepts they denote. The concepts evoked in this way are clearly factors of Dasein (existence, being-there), which are

categorised starting from the Dasein itself and then are reattached in the subject's understanding of being (Tolcsvai Nagy 2011: 193–194).[7]

3.2. The synecdochic-metaphoric constructions of self-address: Arany János's "Mindvégig" ("Until the End")

As Béla Németh G. (1966) also notes, the self-addressing poem type and the "experience and attitude" associated with it became common from the time of János Arany (G. Németh 1966: 547; cf. the statistics of Hankiss [1968] cited above). It is therefore not surprising that this type of verse appears in Arany's oeuvre in different poetic forms, relatively often and with great importance. It is not possible here to give an overview of these works, so we shall only discuss one poem that is, in many respects, outstanding and relevant, the poem "Mindvégig" ("Until the End") (1877), and we shall only deal with the most important of the possible approaches to it from our point of view.

Until the End	Mindvégig
The lute, the lute	A lantot, a lantot
Hold close to your bosom	Szorítsd kebeledhez
When death comes;	Ha jő a halál;
Until your fingers may play on it,	Ujjod valamíg azt
It may be a comfort to you	Pengetheti: vígaszt
A sorrowful mind will find.	Bús elme talál.
Though love and wine	Bár a szerelem s bor
In your veins boil not:	Ereidben nem forr:
Put it not down;	Ne tedd le azért;
Have you no joy, have	Hát nincs örömed, hát
You no sorrow allotted to you	Nincs bánat, amit rád
By the hand of ill fate?...	Balsors keze mért?...
For this life is beautiful	Hisz szép ez az élet
Until the end if you spare	Fogytig, ha kíméled
What is left;	Azt ami maradt;
Only at the turn of autumn,	Csak az ősz fordultán,
When your leaves fall	Leveleid hulltán
Do not wish for summer.	Ne kivánj nyarat.
Though your hopes go up in smoke, -	Bár füstbe reményid, -
And on your sky	S egeden felényit
The sun is not half up:	Sincs már fel a nap:
That which is sunny, enjoy,	Ami derüs, élvezd,
And make its cloudiness go:	Boruját meg széleszd:
Be you merrier.	Légy te vidorabb.
And believe not that the power	S ne hidd, hogy a lantnak
Of the lute is faltering:	Ereje meglankadt:
It is but its range of note that is different;	Csak hangköre más;
If you are content with that,	Ezzel ha elégszel,
You can expect enough times more	Még várhat elégszer
A song of merriment.	Dalban vidulás.

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[7] „a vers szövegében a formális alanyok egy része nem a megszólított, hanem annak valamely grammatikai »birtoka« *(napod, szerencséd, véred, agyvelőd)*. Ezek a főnevek […] referenciapont-szerkezetként a megszólított (és ekképp a beszélő) létezésmódjának tényezőit jelölik szemantikai célként a megszólított referenciapontjából kiindulva, előtérbe helyezve az általuk jelölt fogalmakat. Az így előhívott fogalmak egyértelműen a jelenvalólét létezésének tényezői, amelyek magából a jelenvalólétből kiindulva kategorizálódnak, majd csatolódnak vissza a szubjektum létmegértésében" (Tolcsvai Nagy 2011: 193–194).

There is a subject out there and in yourself -
And emotion, there is enough
　　While the heart beats;
And a new idea, when it sparkles;
Be not reluctant, lazily
　　When the lute calls.

Have you a listener? Have you none?
Speak on, as God has given you
　　The gift to speak,
Even if on a bare land
- Like that of the cricket in summer -
　　Your song is lost.

Tárgy künn, s temagadban -
És érzelem, az van,
　　Míg dobban a szív;
S új eszme ha pezsdűl;
Ne vonakodj restűl
　　Mikor a lant hív.

Van hallgatód? nincsen?
Te mondd, ahogy isten
　　Adta mondanod,
Bár puszta kopáron
- Mint tücsöké nyáron -
　　Vész is ki dalod.

Among the second person singular self-addressing linguistic elements, synecdochic-metaphorical constructions play a prominent role in the poem: *to your bosom; your fingers; in your veins; When your leaves fall / Do not wish for summer; And on your sky / The sun is not half up*. As a consequence, in this poem of Arany's, as elsewhere, the distance between the subject represented as the "you" in the poem and the speaking "I" increases, and the inherently subjective relationship becomes more "objective" (cf. Simon–Tátrai 2017: 181).

For a more complete and precise analysis, however, we must also take into account the linguistic elements and constructions that are not in second person singular, which, although only indirectly, clearly refer to the person addressed, based on the context of the text (the co-text). Examples include *mind* and *heart*, which are also synecdochic. Let us now first examine in this respect the place of *mind* in the text a little more closely. The *mind* occurs in the semantic structure of following sentence: *The lute, the lute / Hold close to your bosom / When death comes; / Until your fingers may play on it,/ It may be a comfort to you/ A sorrowful mind will find*. Here, the addressee is anchored by the second person singular verb and noun forms, like *hold*, *to your bosom*, *your fingers*, and as a result, *mind* can mostly be coherently interpreted by the recipient as 'your mind', though not excluding a reference to general wisdom about the effects of playing an instrument.

 Even more significant is the textual role of *the lute*, which is also in the third person. The noun, which has a metaphorical meaning, foregrounded in various ways such as by placing it in the opening position and by word repetition, and by the fact that "the lute" refers to poetry itself, can also be linked to the addressee, or more precisely, **has to be linked,** since it can only be understood in the sense of 'your lute'. It is obvious that it is not a matter of attachment to poetry in general, but of attachment to one's own poetry, to the creative activity of the self that is at issue here.

Similar is the case for the nominal *the heart*. In the complete sentence (*There is a subject out there and in yourself - / And emotion, there is enough / While the heart beats; / And a new idea, when it sparkles; / Be not reluctant, lazily/ When the lute calls.*) the following elements are decisive for the person marking of the person addressed: *in yourself*, *be not reluctant*. On this basis, *the heart* is also incorporated into the meaning of the sentence as "your heart" (though, obviously, not excluding the possibility of a reference to a general assumption about human nature, according to which "heart" provides the basis for poetry).

Distancing, i.e., the linguistic construction of a distance between the addressed self (subject), represented as the "you" in the poem, and the speaking self, is thus realised on several planes and in different constructions. The basic poetic procedures of this work together to create the poem's unique poetic structure. As we have seen, the main components include direct, second person singular forms of address (*hold close, speak,* etc.) which divide the lyric self into "I" and "you," second person singular possessive constructions (*to your bosom, your fingers,* etc.), the use of the lyric self as a self and you, and the use of the lyric self as a self. Added to these are syndecdochic and metaphorical conceptualisations that are even more distancing, i.e., creating even more salient degrees of separation, and linguistic elements seemingly (i.e., grammatically) in third person singular which nevertheless function as second person in the meaning structure of the sentence.

3.3. The constructions of elaborating the lyric "I" and the addressee in the self-addressing poems of Mihály Babits

In Babits's oeuvre, self-addressing poems are also frequent, and these types of poems "becoming less frequent from time to time" have a more characteristic role in marking out a certain period within the oeuvre than their "proliferation" (Németh G. 1966: 555). Let us now take a closer look at the particular poetic structure of some of these poems, focusing on the construction of person marking.

"Ecetdal" ("Vinegar Song"), written in 1914, is of interest in this respect because it begins with a self-addressing question[8] (*Did you ever think, once, in your strength and outdoors, / running through thorns as one blinded by the sun, / that you would be stung, and it would hurt, that you would be afraid in the evening / and how good it would feel to love someone?*) and, for the most part, the poem goes on with these poetic constructions. Following the schema of self-addressing poems, the second person singular subject and the second person singular possessive personal markers are anchored simultaneously in the text as both speaker and direct addressee (cf. Tolcsvai Nagy 2011: 192): *You will not love, you thought, you did not appreciate, you would reclaim, you would recall your dropped moments, in you, your tears*, etc. But in the concluding part, he departs from this pattern, first with the first person singular verb form:

But even mild liquid can quickly boil into a burn, no emotion can remain in your tub without spirits; And so your light tears become corrosive and poisonous, and *you swallow* its drops with a hiss, you poor... *I swallow*...	De benned enyhe nedv is hamar forr égetővé, szesztelen nem maradhat kádadban érzelem; igy válik könnyü könnyed maróvá; étetővé és cseppjeit sziszegve *nyeled* szegény... *nyelem*...

The sequel, however, then develops a new apostrophic fiction, starting with the address "*Poor*" and "*my weak poem*," in a complex poetic structure in which figurative elements such as personification, synecdoche and possessive structures, whose initial point of reference (which still foregrounds the speaking subject) is the first person singular speaker, receives a prominent role:

Poor now, my weak poem, go, little orphan weeper, yet a poem of my blood, and to me a dear poem, who confesses to the world that in my veins the strange old beat is running, and dare to weep for me.	*Szegény most, gyenge versem,* menj árva kis pityergő, véremnek verse mégis és nékem drága vers, ki vallod a világnak, hogy még erembe csergő a régi furcsa taktus s helyettem sirni mersz.

Thus, the constructions of personification in the poem, together with the self-address, elaborate three different types of representation of the lyric self, thus breaking the text down into three distinct units of poetic organization. Nevertheless, they are connected and mutually interpretative by the fact that the "I" (as speaker, addressee, and initial point of reference), together with the lyrical position and the "state of being" of the self (understood as referential scene) are directly foregrounded in each of them.

In his analysis of Babits's poem "The Farmer Fences His House," written in 1925, György Rába (1983: 215) suggests that in this work the poet "occasionally enlivens the message of allegory with self-address, with sighs, sometimes enriching it with associations that spill over into visions in the visual floodplain of similes." In our reading of the undoubtedly very complex apostrophic network of the poem, the self-address does not appear "occasionally." It is only at the end of the poem that the person marking allows for a reading as self-address, and even there – and this is a decisive poetic peculiarity – only offering a metaphorical reading.

At the beginning of the poem, there is no linguistically marked apostrophic addressee, and it is not made clear whom the lyric self is addressing:

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[8] This non-specific characteristic feature may open the possibility of a self-addressing reading, although we are aware that other kinds of reading are also possible in this case. (For instance, the questions may at first seem to refer to an unspecified "you", an unknown addressee.)

My picket-soldiers are lined up, my tiny plot is marked out of the ground, as light, upright lancers standing as guards, mighty in their justice; they are the law, they are the right, they are my strength, my labour, my rest and my reward, and a sign that I am; the thorns of my hedgehog life are they in this broken existence, excluding all strangers, but letting through what is left in common between brothers and sisters: the magic of the landscape [...]	Léckatonáim sorban állnak már, pici földem a földből kikerítve, könnyü szál dzsidások módján állnak őrt, hatalmasan igazságukban; ők a törvény, ők a jog, erőm, munkám, nyugalmam és jutalmam ők, s jel hogy vagyok; sün-életem tüskéi e szakadt létben, kizárva minden idegent, de átbocsátva ami még közös maradt a testvérek közt: táj varázsát [...]

The following unit, in which the personal pronoun "we" marks out the group of the addressed, though very vaguely, does not contain self-addressing either:

[...] Oh *we*, trained already for younger brothers with sharper claws, we, elder brothers, arriving from a richer last year: what, to flat-ter to the modern winds? [...]	[...] Óh *mi* edzve karmosabb öcsökhöz már, kincses tavalyból érkezett bátyák mi magunk: mit, hízelegni a modern szeleknek? [...]

It should also be noted that the first clause of the quote above can be interpreted as a strongly elliptical structure constructed for emotional reasons in which the "we" does not have a function of address: *Oh we [are] trained already / for younger brothers [...], what [sense therefore would it make for us] to flatter to the modern / winds?*

The first clearly apostrophic addressee is the garden:

[...] *My garden, protect* the seed that remained from the grass of the richer last year and do not mind the barbarous winds!	[...] *kertem, ódd* a magvat ami megmaradt kincses tavaly, füvéből és barbár szelekkel *ne törődj*!

The passage beginning here with "*my garden*" allows for two readings. One, according to the first level of textual processing, and also on the basis of the textual antecedents, is a direct, "naturally" suggested reading, where the garden is the addressee. The second reading, however, is that the second person singular is a marker of **self-addressing**:

[...] *you* should just remain last year's keeper! and if the newcomer says, looking down, "I am the New!", *answer*: "The Old was better" – Behind *your* heroic *pickets* Like a medieval monk used to, from rugged, helmeted hoards, mongrel nomads, iconoclasts With whips, hide a few old books, so should you *Hide your seeds* till, spring coming, a living lilac In the place of *your* fallen *picket-soldiers* Calls with fragrance the bees of the future.	[...] *te* csak maradj a tavaly őre! s ha a jövevény lenézve így szól: „Én vagyok az Új!"– *feleld*: „A Régi jobb volt"– Hősi *léceid* mögött mint középkori szerzetes dugott a zord sisakos hordák, korcs nomádok, ostoros képégetők elől pár régi könyvet: úgy *dugd magvaid*, míg, tavasz jőve, elesett *léckatonáid* helyén élő orgona hívja illattal a jövendő méheit.

However, the two readings outlined above are not mutually exclusive. It is still advisable to distinguish between them in order to better model the semantic-stylistic-poetic structure of the text. Thus, we are talking about two isotopic planes (cf. Kemény 2002: 37), and connecting them is not only possible but also necessary, since, in a metaphorical sense, the garden and the lyrical "I" become identical (*you*). It is on this metaphorical plane that both the second person singular verb forms (*protect, answer, hide*), which call for actions that can only be performed by human actors, and the second person singular possessive noun structures (*your pickets, your seeds, your picket-soldiers*), which can even be directly linked to the garden on the first isotopic plane, acquire their poetic meaning.

Béla Németh G. (1966) gives a detailed analysis of Babits's poem "Csak posta voltál" ("You Were Just a Go-Between"),[9] (1932) primarily focusing on the "experience of thought" of the poem, which is mainly related to Husserl, concluding that in this poem "it is not the [Heideggerian] word *Sorge* that performs the imperative, and it is not the rejection of sociality, but the assumption of that which constitutes for the poet 'seine eigenste Existenzmöglichkeit' ['his very own existential possibility']" (Németh G. 1966: 555–557). The poem's aesthetic quality is undoubtedly significantly influenced by the self-address, the specific organization of the I-You relation. In this respect, Béla Németh G. emphasizes the "questioning attitude" (1966: 556), which also appears in a complex way, since, in the greater part of the poem, "the attitude of questioning and answering is explicitly assigned to the subject addressed in a quasi-dialogue, by establishing and authorizing the self's speech beyond him ('you answered the barbarian peaks with no, / because your homeland answered through you.')" (Lőrincz 2008: 535). The last stanza, however, is different:

Your life is a feeble yarn woven by	Életed gyenge szál amellyel szőnek
Landscapes and the past throws a loop to the future:	a tájak s mult dob hurkot a jövőnek:
What you have brought is yours inasmuch as	amit hoztál, csak annyira tied
The dust left by your foot on the carpet.	mint a por mit lábad a szőnyegen hagy.
You do not leave a trace: you yourself are	Nem magad nyomát veted: csupa nyom vagy
Composed of traces left by the steps of the dead.	magad is, kit a holtak lépte vet.

In the last stanza, as Csongor Lőrincz (2008: 535) puts it, a "superimposed response" from an "apostrophic instance" (transcendental instance) appears, and with it, dialogicity is "closed and is not interrupted in the openness of the undecidable outcome of the lyrical questioning."

4. Conclusions

We have attempted above to approach and interpret, from a new perspective, the category of the self-addressing poem, focusing primarily on the constructions of person marking and the poetic structures resulting from their various realisations. Drawing on the background assumptions and findings of cognitive poetics and stylistics, understood as part of literary studies and functional cognitive linguistics, we analysed both canonical poems and ones which are not in the forefront of related criticism.

The first, theoretical part, which reviews the basic model of Béla Németh G. and related approaches within literary criticism, reveals that several concepts and issues closely related to the model of the self-addressing poem, such as the relationship between the addressee and the addressed, personal crisis, imperative, etc., need further elaboration and clarification – partly on the basis of the unelaborated but clearly indicated guidelines of Béla Németh G. himself (1966). This can of course be done by maintaining a unity between theory and practice, i.e., on the basis of further textual analysis.

In the second part of the paper, we examined some typical self-addressing poems in more detail. Analyses focusing on the forms of person marking, the ensuing poetic structures and variations lent support to the theoretical part, showing that in the poems of Vörösmarty, Arany and Babits, there are highly varied forms of self-addressing, which at the same time contribute decisively to the textual meaning. The analyses thus demonstrate that the self-referential poem – in contrast to the apparent simplicity and uniformity of the basic model – can occur in extremely diverse poetic structures, with a rich variety of aesthetic qualities and textual meanings.

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[9] Throughout the poem, the two meanings, or more precisely conceptual domains, associated with the Hungarian word *posta* prevail simultaneously: that of "message" and "messenger." The relationship between the two meanings would require a separate study, and the translation cannot render the two meanings simultaneously. Thus, in the title, the translation "go-between," which seems more appropriate here, is given as "a person who transmits or conveys a message".

Consequently, it can be stated that the modelling and further description of the specific poetic structures of the sub-types and of their realisations may have important implications for both literary studies and cognitive poetics and stylistics.

Finally, the general conclusion can be drawn from the above interpretations that self-address is possible only when the second person addressee is not evoked properly, i.e., if there is no explicitly named addressee in the poem (or if there is, it can be considered a synecdochic variation of the lyrical "I", e.g., its "heart" or "mind"). When there is an explicit addressee, such as the "garden" in Babits's poem, or the poem itself in the same text, or the "poor Hungarian poet" in the case of Vörösmarty, self-address is only partial, and an allegoric interpretation seems to be much more readily available. Therefore, the discursive situation of a prototypical self-addressing poem includes the speaker (lyric "I") and at least one second person singular addressee without any specification of the latter. When the poem maintains this kind of configuration, a self-addressing reading can prove to be authentic and/or intensive. But when the specification of a second person singular character unfolds somewhere in the text, there is no strict boundary between self-address, cataphoric reference, and allegory.

Based on the above, a redefinition of self-addressing poems seems necessary. Poetic self-address is (i) a schema of the lyrical discourse, the instantiation of which is a matter of degree; and (ii) a specific process of reading poetry, during which the reader elaborates and maintains two different but tightly connected mental vantage points (or subjects of consciousness). Regarding the first aspect, it can be emphasised that a given poem does not always instantiate the whole schema as a prototype. Regarding the second aspect, it needs to be admitted that a self-addressing reading competes with other alternatives for construing the discourse world. The analyses provided by the paper demonstrate both the scalar variability of schema and instantiation and the dynamic unfoldment of a self-addressing reading.

As a further reflection on the above, and as a sort of "outlook," it is necessary to emphasise the aspect of historicity here, which would here mean specifically examining the specific poetic characteristics of the figure of self-addressing in different periods (cf. Németh G. 1966, Laczházi 2020).

Another issue that requires further investigation is the question raised above but not elaborated in detail, but which is of paramount importance in the context of person marking, namely, that "in many cases there is essentially no way of distinguishing between self-addressing and addressing, between the addressed 'I' and the addressed 'other' [...], i.e., the delineation of the 'I' in relation to the outside world or the other at any given time is far from clear at the level of utterance" (Kulcsár-Szabó 2005: 70; cf. see also Kulcsár Szabó 2015: 187–8).

The exploration of how the different realisations of style relate to the generalisation that the "poem type [...] is characterized by extreme *structural closur*e, *rigour* and *clarity*, *dramatic atmosphere*, a tone of voice imbued with *pathos*, a style of delivery with elevated *rhetorical style*, and *sententious* syntax" (Németh G. 1966: 551; emphasis in the original) could also be an exciting field of inquiry directly aimed at the field of style. The poems examined above also suggest, although it was not possible to develop this in detail within the framework of the present paper, that within the schema of the self-addressing poem, due to the nature of literariness, an essentially infinite number of individual variations of style can be created.

Acknowledgements

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ADDRESS, SELF-ADDRESS

Zoltán Kulcsár-Szabó

ELTE Eötvös Loránd University
kulcsar-szabo.zoltan@btk.elte.hu
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8001-8360

Abstract

The paper takes as its starting point the premise that address can be understood as a speech act. It asks wherein lies the performative outcome and power of address and self-address, in particular with regard to the effect of the address on the addressee. The problem is put in a specific light by the lyrical figure of self-addressing, which the paper examines in the context of a close reading of Attila József's poem *Tudod, hogy nincs bocsánat* (*Mercy Denied Forever*, transl. by Zs. Ozsváth and F. Turner), also commenting on Béla G. Németh's classical essay on self-addressing. Throughout the analysis, an important role is given to the ambivalent relations of person marking in the poem and to the ethical dilemmas implied in the figure of self-address. The paper also discusses those aspects of performative language (above all the speech act of the promise) that play a central role in the articulation of self-address. It seeks to interpret the ethical problems they reveal, especially in the closing section of the poem, within the philosophical framework provided by Derridian deconstructivism. The arguments drawn here help to make addressability understood as one of the guarantees of being a person the object of critical reflection.

Keywords: address, performativity, promise, self-address, testimony

1. Introduction

Anyone able to address him- or herself also runs the risk of confusing him- or herself with him- or herself, the questioner with the answerer, the addresser with the addressee. Bearing in mind that address is a specific, perhaps not even so specific, *speech act*, it is also necessary to clarify here what the person who addresses him- or herself does, what exactly (s)he does by addressing him- or herself. First, (s)he transforms him- or herself into a self – from another point of view: (s)he confronts him- or herself with his or her selfhood, reminds him- or herself of it – and consequently uses a technique of self-forming. The self that addresses itself convinces itself (and at the same time gets convinced about the fact) that it is indeed a *self*. The result is not, of course, a mere acknowledgement, since self-addressing also imposes a kind of burden, the burden of self-forming, in that the self thus becomes, in the very literal sense of the word, responsible for itself and towards itself as a subject. The orientation of the self towards itself makes it perhaps indispensable, perhaps cannot be realized otherwise than in the form of the production of an "ethical subject". This is a process, writes Michel Foucault, "in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal. And this requires him to act upon himself, to *monitor*, test, improve, and transform himself" (Foucault 1990: 28; emph. added). As the highlighted phrase suggests, the subject's turning towards itself can hardly be without a moment of self-knowledge. Is it the case that the one who addresses him- or herself does not – yet – know, does not know exactly, whom (s)he is turning to? It is easy to argue that self-addressing also inevitably entails confronting the fact that everything that makes a self a self and, thus, makes it addressable as a self (or formally here: a *you*), cannot be fully accounted for by the individual

him- or herself, simply because (s)he hardly has full control over the multiplicity of norms and structures which enable him or her to treat him- or herself as him- or herself and thus to be able to orient him- or herself towards him- or herself. Put simply, the structures that allow the self to recognize (and accept) itself as self, do not originate from it and are not born with it (see on this Butler 2005: 33–35). Is it even possible, from this point of view, or, if it were possible, would it still make sense to address the self on the assumption that for the addresser the addressee is already revealed and identifiable?

Lyric genres offer the most promising support for testing this question, not least because they are perhaps the most spectacular or concentrated in their ability to make the gesture of self-address (which may be present in epic texts in a dominant way, but rarely underpins their overall speech situation, see on this Fludernik 1993, Fludernik [ed.] 1994) into an organising principle, not only because in poetry *you* is the pronoun in which the need for identification is most acute (Waters 2003: 15) but also because poetry implies the image of a voice speaking to itself: a kind of the *soliloquy* John L. Austin mentions in a much-quoted passage immediately after the poetic utterance as an example of those communicative situations that invalidate speech acts (Austin 1962: 22). In reference to John Stuart Mill's famous definition (lyric is an overheard utterance), Northrop Frye describes the lyric speech situation thus: "the lyric poet normally pretends to be talking to himself or to someone else" (Frye 1957: 249), where the latter phrase, "someone else", is intended to indicate the apostrophic turning away, that is, the same seclusion from the actual addressee (the audience, the reader) that the speaker is performing. From this point of view, it can indeed be said that the actual addressee of a poem can only be the one who cannot read it (Agamben 2014). Is it, however, possible, even taking into account the considerations just mentioned, to be completely alone on the scene? Though this cannot be discussed in detail here, it is worth pointing out that the theory of performative language, or of communicative action in general, may raise well-founded doubts in this respect. In a context slightly different from Austin's, it can be stated, for example, that performative sentences cannot in fact be used in a monological frame (not even *in foro interno*, see Habermas 1985: 440). It can be argued with good reason that the moment of address and of coming to speech in general (can a real distinction be made between the two?), the moment when the speaker, breaking the silence, begins to speak, is in a certain sense already a response, because its manifestation cannot derive its performative force from itself alone, nor perhaps from a language posited as an impersonal set of rules, but only from the presence of another, even if it is not always worth thinking of the latter as an empirical presence: speech perhaps derives from the necessary difference manifested by the posited presence of the other (see on this Mersch 2003: 91-94). For would it make sense to speak if the other were not there? From this point of view, taking into consideration Niklas Luhmann's warning that the self cannot treat itself as someone who does not (yet) know what it knows, or whom it can only reach by coding and use of signs[1], self-addressing would not only not make sense[2] but finally would not be possible at all. And although this objection should (also) not be hastily dismissed (can one negotiate with oneself exclusively by formulating one's own words?; is it impossible to enter the dimension of a pre-symbolic, negative semiology, the terrain that Julia Kristeva once called "semiotic"?), there are equally strong arguments that the so-called inner speech – and thus also self-address – cannot exclude the exteriority that opens the way to the other, the non-identical, and without which the *you* of self-address would be at best a mere fiction (see on this Derrida 1973: 70).

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[1] „Denn weder behandelt das Ich sich selbst als jemanden, der noch nicht weiß, was er weiß; noch als jemanden, der möglicherweise ablehnt, was er vorschlägt; noch als jemanden, der nur über Codierung und Zeichengebrauch erreichbar ist." (Luhmann 1986: 75)

[2] "Elmondanám ezt néked. Ha nem unnád" ["I would tell you this – I hope it won't bore you."] – the formula of the overture to Dezső Kosztolányi's poem *Hajnali részegség* [*Daybreak Drunkenness*, transl. Th. Kabdebo], which is difficult to read as a self-addressing poem, must be implicitly inscribed in every kind of self-address, as a way of self-justifying the lyrical utterance through excuse.

2. The "self-addressing poem type"

Attila József's late poem *Tudod, hogy nincs bocsánat* (1937; *Mercy Denied Forever*, transl. Zs. Ozsváth and F. Turner), which served as a paradigmatic example for Béla G. Németh's category of the so-called "self-addressing poem type", a figure discussed surprisingly rarely in the discourse of lyric theory,[3] confronts this problem with striking poignancy right in the opening, in the very title of the poem (which literally reads: 'you know there is no forgiveness'). And through this, of course, also with a host of further problems, e.g. with the question to what extent the self, represented in the poem by a series of addresses and calls, overlaps with, or to what extent it can be delimited from, the *you*, from the other (other?) self, from another *I*, which appears (almost exclusively) in its silence in the poem. Is it possible to say here, as Németh's classical reading might suggest at certain points, that the speaker knows more, knows everything that the addressed you can know about itself, that there is therefore no difference in this respect, which would mean that in the dialogue, "of which we hear only one half", "the whole process of the dialectic of the inner debate is essentially reproduced, relived", and thus also the part that cannot be heard, that is not written down, is reproduced? (Németh 1982: 117) Or − in this direction Németh provides more support − is the self-address the very event in the course of which something (e.g. moral, challenging imperatives) is being produced that is not available in the knowledge of the self (i.e. the addressed you) without this speech act or prior to it? The addressee would thus be the "knowing intellect", which, even if it does not separate itself from the "personality", would nevertheless be at a distance, since, according to Németh (115), it can observe the latter "from the outside and from above", from a somewhat analytical position? Németh seems to legitimise the whole possibility of the speech act of self-addressing in this event-like character, far beyond literature: "Everyone has addressed him- or herself. Experience shows that, almost unanimously, this happens when one realises, in a state of brooding, that one has made a mistake in some important personal matter, in one's behaviour, that one should have behaved and acted in a different way" (114). In other words, when it has learned something that the person addressed itself does or did *not* know. Or is it even possible that the negative knowledge that Németh thinks can be detected on the part of the speaker (as a "crisis") is in fact a kind of projection, the source of which is the tension or ambiguity in the speaker's part, a kind of internal debate that could call into question the superiority of the speaker's knowledge? (See on this Tverdota 2010: 189–191.) Or must it remain, in a certain sense, an indisputable condition of the self's dialogue with itself? Roman Jakobson, using the example of Poe's *The Raven*, thought it possible to demonstrate that "inner speech" is in a sense a "quasi-dialogue" in which the utterance (here realised as a question) is always the result of a temporal inversion, that is, of the fact that the speaker who addresses him- or herself already knows the answer: "the subject knows beforehand the reply to the question he will put to himself" (Jakobson 1987: 52; see also 53: "the question is dependent on the reply"). Recalling, however, a thought-provoking argument by Osip Mandelstam ("If I know the person I am addressing, I know in advance how he will react to my words, to whatever I say, and consequently, I will not succeed in being astonished in his astonishment, in rejoicing in his joy, in loving in his love" [Mandelstam 1997: 47]), it is far from self-evident that the formal permeability or exchange between addresser and addressee is a condition of identification: rather, Mandelstam seems to suggest that, paradoxically, it is precisely this that blocks access in addressing to the addressee.

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[3] Cf. nevertheless Schlaffer 1995: 44−46; 2015: 121−122. Schlaffer's approach is guided by the assumption that the "genetic and structural centre" of lyric is constituted by speech acts and that this determines the behaviour of lyric persona, too (2008: 38). The Austinian sense of the validity deficit of lyric speech acts can be neutralized in the reception of poems because their understanding cannot take place without belief in the actual completion of the lyric speech acts (24). There is also a historical pattern at work in Schlaffer's conception, which in a sense counts address among the more archaic techniques of lyricism, assuming that, in modern poetry − as shown by the growing popularity of impersonality − the dominance of first and second person pronouns is decreasing (2015: 24, 124). Of course, this diagnosis can only really be apt in relation to certain traditions of lyric modernity.

3. (False) witness

Tudod, hogy nincs bocsánat – the Attila József poem begins, thus, with this address of a constative character, which then, in the following verse, confirms and reaffirms the constative emphasis of this message by means of a conclusion in the form of an impersonal statement (*hiába hát a bánat* 'pain's but a vain endeavour'). You know – how many modalities intersect here? There is even the vague one of questioning (you know?; you know, don't you?), and a much stronger one of persuasion: you know, don't contradict, don't run away into illusions, because you know, so admit, confess (?) that you know! In fact, the objective subordinate clause, in a certain sense, leans back on this act of (self-)persuasion, acting as both self-reflexive explanation and consequence. There is no excuse, since you know what you know, there is no option of excusing (forgiving) on the grounds of not knowing. But on the other hand: since you know what you know, you know much rather than you don't know, therefore – there is no excuse, no sense, no linguistic option for any excuse. Perhaps even more importantly, this opening statement of the poem also dramatizes the linguistic dilemma of the meaning or possibility of self-address discussed above. When a self addresses itself by saying *you know*, it calls into question – according to at least one possibility – the meaning and function of the whole address, of address itself. Since you know, you know what I know, it is in a sense superfluous to speak, both for *me*, the self, and for you. That the poem seriously reckons with this dilemma is clearly indicated on the lexical and grammatical levels (the adverb *hiába* 'in vain' appears in the very next verse, then in the second, and a little later in the same position in the fifth stanza: *hiába hull a könnyed* 'weeping, vain self-abhorrence', literally: 'your tears falling in vain'; *s hiába könyörögtél* 'you begged for pity, croaking, / in vain'; in both cases, therefore, referring to some kind of communicative – or at least expressive – gesture), and, on the other hand, quite simply, in the fact that the other voice (the part of the *you*) remains – apart from some not insignificant grammatical ambiguities to be mentioned later – silent in the position of the *I*. It would speak in vain. *De hát kinek is szólanék* ('To whom, though, might their sound make sense?', literally: 'But whom could I be speaking to'), as the conclusion of another, somewhat earlier poem, *Reménytelenül (Vas-színű égboltban…)* (*Without Hope [In heaven's ironblue vault…]*, transl. by Ozsváth and Turner) puts it. To whom? To myself?

The silence on the side of the you, the addressee, led Németh's interpretation, as is well known, towards the scenario of the call of conscience in *Being and Time*, or more precisely toward a somewhat specific application of Heidegger (esp. Németh 1982: 123-124; on Németh's understanding of Heidegger see Bónus 2012: 46-49), which was a decisive step in his argumentation on the self-addressing poem type. This call, "Ruf", is, of course, inherently silent in Heidegger: it calls its addressee – in Heidegger: "the summoned" (Angerufene) – to *its own self* precisely by saying nothing, "*speaking solely and constantly in the mode of silence*", moreover, it is by this very not-speaking that it silences the addressee, since "it forces Da-sein thus summoned and called upon to the reticence of itself" (Heidegger 1996: 252-253; 1977: 373). For Da-sein, according to Heidegger's diagnosis, cannot hear itself precisely from the surrounding speech (which is, of course, idle talk, "Gerede"). It seems, therefore, that the speechless address of conscience is rather the elimination of this sound disturbance, of noise – not forgetting, of course, that this silence remains still in the mode of speech, Da-sein is perhaps precisely drawn into language by this deprivation from voice.[4] Since the "voice" of conscience in Heideggerian analysis is uncannily unidentifiable in its origin, it cannot in fact take shape as an instance of the *interrogation* of Da-sein, which could have the power to force it to give account, in a sense it even prevents it from taking up the position of a subject or even of a *self* in some public sphere. Conscience, from this point of view, is not the conscience of the self, since it is precisely the self that is silenced by the call of conscience. At a much later point in *Being and Time*, Heidegger reduces the *self* to an irrelevant accessory of the so-called selfhood, precisely in relation to the silent being here: "Da-sein is *authentically itself* in the mode of primordial

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[4] "Losing itself in the publicness of the they and its idle speech, it *fails to hear* its own self in listening to the they-self." (250, see also 251). See on the above further esp. Agamben 1997: 97.

individuation of reticent resoluteness that expects (zumutenden) *Angst* of itself. *In keeping silent, authentic being-one's-self does not keep on saying 'I,' but rather 'is' in reticence the thrown being that it can authentically be.*" (297; 427). Conscience perhaps rather calls into question the possibility of a self-testifying of the self as *self*, an address which, on the one hand, does not necessarily affirm the addressee, and at the same time seems to prevent it from being given voice. From this point of view, it could be said that when Németh's interpretation detects in Heidegger's call the possibility of textualization, it is perhaps only justified in that – by placing Attila József's poem in this context – it indirectly highlights the ungroundedness of the address that manifests itself in a kind of futility.

A grammatical playground similar to the one revealed in the opening verse opens up – as Németh also points out, thanks to the "unmarked relations" (Németh 1982: 141) – in the verse *Légy, ami lennél: férfi* ('be what you should be: manly'), i.e. in the gesture that initiates in the poem a series of addresses and even imperative calls, which can indeed be connected to the broader context of the stanza in consequential or contradictory and even further ways. Moreover, since the semantics of the phrase may even be citational or indirect ('what you should be': 'what you are supposed to be'), the imperative is also partly withdrawn, since it renders itself redundant, at least in the sense of calling into question or judging ineffective its illocutionary power to act, to produce, to change. No wonder, then, that the poem soon afterwards deploys a whole arsenal of prohibitive imperatives, calling for non-action rather than action. This occupies the whole of the third stanza (*Ne vádolj, ne fogadkozz, / ne légy komisz magadhoz, / ne hódolj és ne hódíts, / ne csatlakozz a hadhoz* 'Renounce self-flagellations, / promises, accusations, / both conquest and surrender, / the call of crowds and nations'; literally: 'Do not accuse, do not vow, / do not be nasty to yourself, / do not obey and do not conquer, / do not join armies'), and then partly the fourth (*ne lesd meg*, *ne vesd meg*; 'nor spy', 'do not corn' – the latter of course also partly mocked, ridiculed by a homonymic effect, since *nevesd meg* would mean *laugh at*; see on this Fried 2005: 52). It is important that these prohibitions are partly directed at explicit performative actions (*Ne vádolj* and especially *Ne fogadkozz*, i.e.: 'do not promise', 'do not swear', 'do not commit yourself towards a future – or past – , towards yourself'; this is unfolded and explained in a later "accusation": *Hamis tanúvá lettél / saját igaz pörödnél*; 'and bore yourself false witness / in your own trial's convoking'). On the one hand, the addressed self is advised against something that it – in the addresser's part – is persistently experimenting with, since in a moral sense it persuades, dissuades, and confronts itself with prohibitions. These gestures can be summarised, with some simplification, in the paradox of a forbidding speech act: *I forbid you to perform speech acts*. Moreover, it is precisely in this series of prohibitions that the self (in the position of the *you*), *almost* consistently silenced in the position of the addressee, emerges, speaks up, speaks back for the first time. *Ne vádolj*, here, because of the indefinite conjugation, is not only interpretable as referring to a general action without a concrete object, but also as a kind of retort, 'do not accuse me'. This is one of the passages in the poem where the self relates its speech to itself without objectifying and distancing itself as a you. The latent symmetry of the structure of the address may, however, rather emphasize here that this distancing is far from being suspended, it is merely reversed: the you speaks back – thus indeed announcing a kind of resistance not only by its silence, but also in this latent voice (see Balogh 2017: 188) – to the self that is continuously speaking to it. It does so in such a way that it confirms and countersigns the statement that opens the series of addresses (and of course the poem itself), which in a certain sense articulates a kind of evidence (*tudod, hogy*). The appealing, pleading modality it reveals reflects the relentless nature of the accusation (a modality made explicit by the poem itself through the characterisation of the almost but not quite silent you: *hiába könyörögtél*), *ne vádolj* 'do not accuse', the accused pleads, but *there is no forgiveness*. The prohibition in the next verse, *ne légy komisz magadhoz* 'do not be nasty to yourself', continues more or less the above-mentioned reversal (the series of addresses from the denial of forgiveness to the instruction to reject principles at the end of the poem is ultimately: nasty [see on this further Tverdota 2010: 188]), but here suspends the distance between self and you. This imperative seems to remind the self of its identity with or at least of its proximity to the you addressed (which, namely a certain degree of proximity, is perhaps a necessary product of address in the lyric genres).

The observation of the movement of the distance between the "parts" of the two pronouns inevitably leads to the question of what creates the link between the self, addressing itself and addressed self, or how this link is represented in the poem. While this relationship is not broken – it is hardly possible (or worthwhile) to set aside the identification of self with self – it is not entirely self-evident in the text. This may be emphasised, on the one hand, by the densely ironic, at some moments perhaps even scornful tone of the series of questions (see further Seregi 2001: 49–51), and, on the other hand, by the inherent characteristic of the poem that it repeatedly attempts to describe and characterise the relationship between the two voices or positions in some way. Here is, e.g., the *testimony* mentioned above. The addressed you, as mentioned earlier, rightly embodies this testimony, he even is the testimony itself, in that in his futile resistance, in pleading, projected even into the utterance of the voice that speaks for a moment, in the performative weakness, he confirms the initial statement of the poem. The fact that there is no forgiveness, and that *a bűn az nem lesz könnyebb* ('Sin is beyond endurance'), is not revealed by some external, objective, referential proof, nor even from the position of a judging third, but by the structure of self-address itself. And since less than two positions are not enough to reveal this testimony, i.e., since the condition of becoming a testimony is the self-address and the self-duplication that formally establishes the former, it can also be said to be consistent that the testimony, which is identical with the you addressed, since it is embodied by that you, still does not originate in or come from him, but needs another, namely the addresser, to whom it remains indebted. The relentless imperative (*Hogy bizonyság vagy erre, / legalább azt köszönjed* 'Even for this, be grateful, / warrant for your existence'; literally: 'for this you are a witness, at least be thankful for this') highlights this debt, which perhaps requires the countersignature of gratitude precisely because it can hardly expect a more emphatic compensation. The self-consciousness with which Attila József thought through this structure at this crucial point is clearly demonstrated by his decision to correct the earlier version of the verse (*Hogy erre van bizonyság* 'for there is witness for this') in this very respect (József 2005: 471). Then, of course, there is the imperative of *ne légy komisz magadhoz*. This time, the self-address reflects itself in a kind of mise-en-abyme, since here – assuming, at least, that the addresses really place the self in the position of the accused – the addressing self addresses not only the addressed self, but also itself, namely the self who performs the mischievous or nasty addresses, and moreover, in a way that is even more mischievous, since it does not obey itself! As will be discussed later, in characterizing the you, the poem constantly assigns an important role to an interpersonal structure, in most cases including its manifest linguistic aspects, too, which lacks the referential certainty provided or to be provided by a third, external or superior position. Or, where it, at least implicitly, assumes it, by alluding to the conventions of a legal procedure – most openly in the second half of the fifth stanza, which unfolds both the consequence and the cause of the futility of the plea: *Hamis tanúvá lettél / saját igaz pörödnél* – it highlights the credibility deficit of such a testimony. No matter how righteous this lawsuit, i.e., no matter how well-founded the testimony that applies for forgiveness by implying a counteraccusation of injustice is, it necessarily (at least potentially) becomes false testimony. For, it might be added, maintaining the identity of self and you, the accusation itself becomes in fact the testimony that a self can produce about itself. The testimony is in fact nothing other than the testimony of this perjury, and from this point of view the self has good reason to dissuade itself from testifying under oath (*ne fogadkozz*).

What does this testimony mean here? Its most important structural factor could be identified, following Derrida, in the fact that, to paraphrase the philosopher's argumentation, which has been put forward in several places, testimony is necessarily performative in character, since it implies an action – e.g., an oath, a vow – which is made indispensable by the fact that the witness must convince the person (s)he is addressing. It becomes a witness, it is a witness only due to the fact that the addressee cannot bear witness to what it is reporting, to the knowledge to which it is committing itself, any more than the witness itself can bear witness to it, since when the latter becomes a witness, that is, when it testifies, it belongs no longer to the very present, to the scene it is giving account of. An oath, precisely because it is an oath and, further, because it is inextricable from the structure of testimony, thus implicitly assumes or manifests the burden of false witness. The one

who bears witness also bears witness to the fact that what (s)he says can also be insincere or a lie (see esp. Derrida 2000: 194-197). Moreover, the structure of testimony cannot go without a shift that is very significant in the text of *Tudod, hogy nincs bocsánat*. The absurd condition that the witness, who is made a witness precisely because (s)he him- or herself, his or her becoming a witness, has no witness, cannot be witnessed, must nevertheless in a certain sense still be witnessed, must be recognized as a witness, at least the verbal occurrence of the act of testifying must be countersigned by someone else (200). Thus, when the self of the poem dissuades the person addressed from swearing and reminds him of the paradoxical turning false in his testimony, it also expresses the reluctance to stand by as a witness. Speaking as a self, he is averting the threat, the possibility of becoming a false witness, which he detects in the position of the person (the same self) he is speaking to. From this point of view, it could be said – at the risk of a certain paradox – that it is precisely this knowledge and the resulting reluctance that he verbalises by forcing the other voice in the dialogue to remain silent.

4. Testimony, trust, and faith

Since, as Németh has observed, the moral vocabulary that defines the lexicon of the language of the poem "takes on repeatedly legal, even judicial traces" (Németh 1982: 158), the structure of testimony is also worth bearing in mind where the characterisation of the (linguistic) attitude of the you does not employ strictly legal categories. *Hittél a könnyű szóknak* ('You trusted words' illusions') – this, in the light of the preceding stanzas, sounds like a convincing accusation (what else can one do who can only speak as a false witness in his own true trial?), and moreover, since these are 'easy words', i.e. words without credibility, there is perhaps no real alternative but to trust (and this, ultimately, can again be extended to the context of the whole poem, the whole series of addresses, which the you can only resist in exceptional cases). Nevertheless, the progression of the sentence that forms the stanza modifies this pattern somewhat. The good will of trust is not confirmed by the words: *s lásd, soha, soha senki / nem mondta, hogy te jó vagy* ('but no one ever trusted / the goodness of your visions'; literally: 'and see, never, never did anyone say that you are good'). This subsequent testimony has some factual basis this time: no one has said it, this seems to be verifiable and reasonable (see, there is no such quotation, these words have never been uttered, as the text emphasizes by the repetition), so how can one who trusts words, gives credence to words, know whether (s)he is good or not. In the sentence, however, trust is directed not only to these easy "words" but also to the further extension attached to them, *fizetett pártfogóknak* ('paid comforters' delusion'; literally: 'patrons'), which indicates some ambivalence. Trusting in paid patrons – this happens to be rather a kind of calculable credit, where trust can be rooted in some economical kind of transaction, a kind of pre-programed trust that is not really trust, since it is calculable. The one who grounds and exchanges his faith for (credited) certainty (testimony) in this way does not in fact believe, and, more importantly, does not believe in faith, it is precisely faith s(he) does not trust.

Megcsaltak, úgy szerettek ('They loved you by their lying') – this is the second passage where the self comes to word (or, to put it another way, the self speaks not only by addressing *you* but also addressing itself). As with the unmarked or unspecified subject of the imperative *Ne vádolj*, the text allows here for two grammatical amendments: this statement can be applied to the self ('they loved me by betraying me') in the same way as to the addressee ('they loved you by betraying you'). With the relation of betrayal and love in the second verse of the eighth stanza (*csaltál s így nem szerethetsz* 'your lying killed your loving'), which is thus arranged in a chiasmus, a variant of the opposition between trust in easy words and paid, calculated trust revealed in the previous stanza comes to the fore, this time between the (destroyed) certainty of love, led astray by easy words, and the lie, conceived here as a kind of calculation that discredits and makes love impossible by pointing to the falsehood (betrayal? mimicking? delusion?) at its core. And perhaps it is precisely this negative dialectic that Attila József breaks with the possibility of a literal interpretation. In fact, he himself, as the reader of his own poem, prescribes this reading, since the verse here too is a result of the revising of an earlier version of the text: *Megcsaltak, nem szerettek* ('I was / you were

betrayed, not loved'), which he has rewritten in the final, paradoxical formula. I/you was/were loved precisely by betrayal – that Attila József seriously considered this impossible possibility can be seen, among other things, in the similar paradoxical formulations of the somewhat later poem *(Az Isten itt állt a hátam mögött…)* (*[God was standing here, behind my back]*, transl. by L. A. Kery): *Ugy segitett, hogy nem segithetett* ('He helped me by not helping from above'); *Ugy van velem, hogy itt hagyott magamra* ('Fact is He left me, I'm all alone, bereft'; literally: 'he is by my side by having left me here alone'). In the context of *Tudod, hogy nincs bocsánat*, this may perhaps turn the attention to the threatening, destructive power of the paired structures on which the very speech act of self-address relies incessantly. The operation of self-address, which posits the closest possible proximity of the self to itself, deceives, since in it or through it the self betrays its alliance with his very same self, betrays itself – if such a thing is possible, which is not entirely self-evident (see on this Derrida 2002a: 67). And perhaps it is precisely in the exposure of the betrayal, of the self-address as betrayal, that a kind of solidarity manifests itself towards the one targeted by the self-address, namely by expelling him from the imposed structure. The performance of the address here seems to be a destructive, and yet in this destruction somehow rescuing or excusing, catastrophic turn, to borrow a category from Derrida: *cat'apostrophe* (Derrida 1997: 151, 174). The call for suicide (*Most hát a töltött fegyvert / szorítsd üres szívedhez* 'therefore the pistol-barrel / aimed at your blank heart dying') in fact sums up the destructive series of addresses, as it were turning the gun into a metaphor for addressing. The loaded (*töltött*) weapon, as the poem puts it, can deliver to the heart what it lacks: the heart is blank, empty, it has nothing in it, in a sense it is lifeless. Its destruction thus implies, in a particular sense, still a coming to life, perhaps a life over which subjectivity, which produces and controls itself through legal, moral, linguistic, performative means, has no power. However implausible this conclusion may seem, it has nonetheless to be considered that, unlike an earlier version of the poem, which, according to the recollection of a contemporary (Illyés 1987: 49-50), ended at this point, the final text still contains a stanza.

The two stanzas just discussed are, in a sense, a rewording of Mihály Csokonai Vitéz, who in his famous poem from 1803 addresses a similarly exhaustive series of addresses not to himself (indeed not?) but to an allegorical figure, Hope. The gravitational point of intertextual contact in Csokonai's poem is the conclusion of the first stanza, which is echoed in the seventh and eighth stanzas of *Tudod, hogy nincs bocsánat*, further in the first verse of the fourth (*maradj fölöslegesnek* 'Avoid another's uses'): *Csak maradj magadnak! / Biztatóm valál; / Hittem szép szavadnak: / Mégis megcsalál!* (*A Reményhez*; 'Stay far and fair beyond my reach, / as first my soul you greeted! / I had depended on your speech'; literal: 'I trusted your beautiful word, / but you have ever cheated'; *To Hope*, transl. by W. Kirkconnell). What may be of particular importance from the present point of view is that this, that is, the Csokonai intertext introduces the notion of hope, along with those of faith, trust, and love, into the last stanza of the Attila József poem, in which the triad of the Pauline virtues – faith, hope, love – is thus brought together. The alternative to suicide, revealed by the rejection of principles (an unconditional condition, one may add), is expressed in this triple concept, to which trust is added. *[S] még remélj hű szerelmet, / hisz mint a kutya hinnél / abban, ki bízna benned* ('hope true love yet will flower, / doglike, you'd trust whoever / trusted you for an hour'). It is still to be remembered that here the self is sending an instruction (*remélj*) to itself addressed as *you*, although it would be difficult to eliminate from the performative tone of this a kind of doubt, a kind of resignation: hope for love that (perhaps?) is faithful, this can only follow after the moral judgment that can be drawn from the principles (*elvek*) has already been made and after it has become clear that the only person who can really hope is the one who is loved only by betrayal, or even who cannot love (*nem szerethetsz*). However, the conjunction *hisz* ('since, because') which introduces the final verses of the poem offers a different explication: there is reason to hope, which, somewhat tautologically, follows precisely from faith. You have faith (though it seems to have a condition: trust), and *therefore* you are allowed to hope.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to overlook the tautology that pervades the entire stanza in the last three verses. It is also striking, in terms of the performative aspects evoked, that the actions that are listed here, while far from being identical, basically share a structural feature. To hope, to

believe, to trust (love, although more difficult to formalise within the frames of performativity, is perhaps also relevant here): in all three operations or attitudes, it can be observed that, whatever the degree of linguistic articulation, they are linked to a fundamental condition of commitment, namely a commitment to a future for which no common referential testimony is available or can be obtained. The one who hopes anticipates, triggers, or presupposes something, in affirmative form, which has not yet appeared, does not exist, or has not occurred, just as the one who believes or the one who trusts. In many respects, this central feature also evokes the structure of testimony discussed above, with the difference that here empirical certainty is explicitly unavailable to the one who performs the operation and who could thus at least expose his or her own experience to the threat of perjury, and of course with the similarity that, at the same time, he is subject to the same kind of confirmatory countersignature as the witness itself. Indeed, at the very heart of trust, hope, faith and, yes, love, is the need for such a countersignature, which is in fact underlined by Attila József's poem: the object of hope is trustworthiness, a true love, while faith is faith in someone (*abban*), and so is trust (*bízna benned*). And such an orientation is in fact rooted in the performativity presupposed in or by language, for without it, i.e., without the belief, hope or trust that 1) speech can produce something or bear witness to something, on the existence and knowledge of which it cannot rely, and 2) that this ability or this activity will be reconfirmed as such, there can be no performativity. The basic structure is of course carried by the prototype of all speech acts, the promise. Without promise, trust is not possible, since trust, in its very essence, can only be anticipated, and it can only be received as the consequence of a kind of promise. For example, someone who is said to be trustworthy, carries a promise, the promise that (s)he will not disappoint those who trust (this promise can, of course, be detached from and turned against the person who made it – for an example in Kleist's novella *Die Marquise von O…*, see Lőrincz 2016: 243). Nor can faith, the appeal to faith, to credibility, be conceived without a promise: in order to establish itself, faith (which is therefore understood here as "faith without dogma" [Derrida 2002b: 57]) must presuppose a promise, and of course, in order to verbalise or in any way manifest itself, it must also promise. This relation, moreover, while in a sense implying radically unconditional speech acts, is also mutually conditional: no promise can fulfil its status, it will not be a promise if it is not trusted, not given credence. What is more, the address itself, which from this point of view is (also) always, necessarily, self-address, and even the preverbal experience of the relation to the other, or the renouncing of address, cannot ground itself as such without appealing to trust, which is easy to see in the case of explicitly promising addresses, but also beyond that: without trust or faith, without the implied imperative of 'believe me', any structure of address would not be given.[5] The statement *Tudod, hogy nincs bocsánat* is in a sense nothing more than a covert version of 'believe me, there is no forgiveness'. Finally, the possibility itself, without which to believe, trust, hope, love (and promise) would be meaningless, that is, the assumption that what these (speech) acts are directed at is not exclusively non-existent, cannot renounce the structure of promise either: the possibility of the promise, Hamacher warns,[6] is always also a promise of possibility, a promise is only possible by positing, affirming what is (only) possible, and in which one, thus, must hope, trust, believe.

These performatives, which are represented by (since not performed, but referred to: imperatives, statements) or form the subject of conditional assertions and which appear very frequently in the poem's closure, in a certain sense repeat, reproduce or mirror each other. This performative

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[5] "No to-come without some sort of messianic memory and promise, of a messianicity older than all religion, more originary than all messianism. No discourse or address of the other without the possibility of an elementary promise. Perjury and broken promises require the *same* possibility. No promise, therefore, without the promise of a confirmation of the *yes*. This *yes* will have implied and will always imply the trustworthiness and fidelity of a faith" (Derrida 2002b: 83; see also: 80–81). See also Derrida 1999: 250–251.

[6] See his comments on the Derrida passage cited in the preceding footnote: "Everything, in short, begins with the possibility – with the possibility of projecting possibilities in the promise and of confirming these possibilities, repeating and transferring them. The possibility of the promise is already the possibility of its repetition" (Hamacher 1999: 203). Promise, thus, is not a figure but the promise of a figure (188).

congestion, the throng of promises that almost intersect, though never uttered, must necessarily leave their mark on the semantic level of the text. Without the semantic proximity of the verbs that populate the stanza (*remél* 'hope', *hisz* 'believe', *bízik* 'trust'), there could hardly be any contact between their performative aspects. Moreover, Attila József draws attention to this proximity in a particularly spectacular way: he extends it to the non-verbal domains of the stanza's vocabulary, in such a way as to reveal, through etymological connections, the infinitely tautological organisation of the closing verses. Not only the adjective of hoped-for love (*hű* 'faithful') can be traced back to the verb *hisz*, but also the conjunction that opens the third verse, *hisz* 'since', which is the abbreviated form of *hiszen* (which itself goes back to the singular first-person verb form of the verb: *hiszem* 'I believe'; see Benkő [ed.] 1992: 562–563). By this shortening, the phrase here also establishes a homonymic relationship with the mentioned verb (see on this further Fried's reading attentive to the puns in the poem: Fried: 55–57), which in fact doubles the simile in the third line: *hisz mint a kutya hinnél* may be interpreted as both 'believes like a dog' and as 'like a dog you would believe'. By basically repeating the same animal simile in this way, the verse naturally draws attention to the challenge posed by its interpretation. The appearance of the animal is not surprising, since it logically follows from the anticlimactic sequence of the levels of being listed and addressed in the poem, which leads "downwards" (this is summarised in the sixth stanza: first Father and God, then man, then kiddies: *romlott kölkök* 'wicked children'). In Németh's interpretation, the dog simile, which would obviously replace the trust in easy words and paid patrons, is in fact a non-real alternative, an "animal alternative", which would suggest that the remaining possibilities for the self are outside the realms of social existence, moral agency, and human intellect (Németh 1982: 146). One may further raise the question what animal faith or trust is based on, whether there is any difference between the two at all. Is it relevant from the dog's point of view to understand, as sociological approaches sometimes do, trust as a kind of complexity reduction tool, which identifies trustworthiness in the coincidence between a person's actual behaviour and what he or she consciously or unconsciously communicates about himself or herself (Luhmann 1979: 40–41)? Or is it to be conceived merely as the obedience of the submissive or the vulnerable?

At least as interesting is the above-mentioned proliferation of the verb *hisz* throughout the text of the stanza, including its semantic proximity to the neighbouring verbs and even to the concept of love (if its relevant meaning here is determined by its opposition to betrayal and deception, which is what the preceding stanza prescribes, then it also enters into a synonymous relationship with faithfulness and belief) which outlines a completely self-referential, tautological pattern, that almost monomaniacally argues for the possibility of faith, confesses its faith – in faith. The stanza is constantly asserting faith. It is worth noting that this kind of homonymic tautology is already apparent in the opening verse of the stanza (see on this again Fried 2005: 58-59): *vess el minden elvet* ('cast out doctrine's power', literally: 'reject/throw away all principles'), where *elvet* (*elv*, 'principle' in accusative) is homonymous with the indicative third person singular form of the verb *elvet*, which appears as an imperative in the verse, as if the impersonal voice of an interposing dramatic instruction were to acknowledge the obedience of the you (*vess el* 'throw away' – *elvet* 'he/she throws away')! If only for the sake of play, it is worth attempting, despite the not insignificant differences, to replace all those phrases in the three closing verses of the poem with the verb *hisz* and its derivations, which are semantically related to it. Roughly, such a paraphrase would emerge: 'And still believe in faithful belief, I believe that you would believe like a dog in the one who would believe in you'. On the one hand, this monomaniac repetition of the testimony of faith implies a kind of unconditionality: 'believe in me, do not set conditions for what I say' (tells the self to the you? or is this how it characterizes the you's attitude?). Yet it also manifests, precisely through tautological repetition, a kind of doubt, if only a doubt that would compensate for the ungroundedness of belief through performative practice. Somebody who constantly says (s)he believes may indeed begin to believe, according to the Pascalian pattern paraphrased by Louis Althusser (*Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you will believe*; Althusser 1971: 169; cf. the 250. *Pensée* in Pascal 1958: 73; see further: Pepper 1995).

5. Conclusion

Is this, then, the animalic alternative that Németh referred to and, finally, however, *threw away*? The autosuggestion of a faith renouncing the referential confirmation of one's own confession and speaking position by the other? Is it here, through the manifestation of an unconditional faith, that the self could escape from the authority of the paired structure imposed by self-address? Even if this alternative announces itself, the poem's closure suggests that it must ultimately be reinscribed in a conditional structure.[7] *[H]isz mint a kutya hinnél / abban ki bízna benned*, a condition is still formulated here, even if in an almost self-reflexive form. You would believe in, you can believe only in the one who trusts you, who believes in you, this is almost as if the lyric voice were saying that it can believe only in itself, in the self that is confirmed as trustworthy, as a reliable self. The importance of this structure for the late Attila József is attested to by the opening of the slightly earlier *Kész a leltár* (*Inventory Closed*, transl. by Ozsváth and Turner), which combines a psalm paraphrase with an animal analogy: *Magamban bíztam eleitől fogva – / ha semmije sincs, nem is kerül sokba / ez az embernek. Semmiképp se többe, / mint az állatnak, mely elhull örökre* ('I trusted in myself from the beginning – / If nothing's there that's worth the cost of winning, / there's nothing left to lose. Our death's no heavier / than that of voiceless beasts, who cease forever'). But how can a self consider itself *trustworthy*? (S)he who has nothing cannot trust but him- or herself – this is easy to see, since trust makes one a debtor, it imposes the burden of a debt to be paid, which presupposes the ability to give. At the same time, of course, the one who *gives* trust inevitably makes a weapon of this referential vulnerability, since his or her trust can be imposed as a norm on the actions of the one (s)he has judged trustworthy (see on this Luhmann 1979: 43–44; to consider trust as something that could be justified or deserved would lead to epistemological problems: 79) and who thus becomes subordinated or dependent on the very trust (s)he has appealed to. Trust, moreover, in its cognitive and interpersonal conditionality, is of course not identical with faith. When X trusts or even trusts in Y to do something, this implies a kind of interpersonal dependence that is not implied by the case when X believes or even believes in Y to do something. Trust in any case implies faith, but not necessarily the other way round (for a meticulous analysis of the grammatical and logical structures underlying the concept of *trust* which applies also to the equivalent use in Hungarian, see McMyler 2011: 113-141). 'I trust that Z will not misinterpret Attila József's poem' is not the same as saying 'I believe that Z will not misinterpret Attila József's poem'. The interpersonal relation on which trust is built is also a relation of responsibility, of being held accountable. If X trusts Y, (s)he also makes him or her responsible, the guarantor of his or her faith. Consequently, when the self, turning to the addressee makes the judgment that the latter would believe in the person who would trust him, he is also saying that he subordinates his belief to a relation which makes this belief dependent on another who can be called to account. The inversion of the verbs – 'you would trust in the one who would believe in you' – would yield a more open, looser, but more contradictory structure, at least insofar as, logically, it is trust that presupposes belief and not vice versa. The belief of the addressee in *Tudod, hogy nincs bocsánat*, and thus the possibility of unbinding the testimony of the self from the deathly grip of self-addressing interrogation and accusation, becomes impossible, since it turns conditional the very moment it gets tied to the interpersonal relation of trust and thus inscribed in the structure of responsibility. Faith thus becomes nothing more than a quid pro quo in exchange for a trust (self-trust or self-confidence) of which, however, the series of self-addresses throughout the poem has provided rather negative examples – being nasty, false witness, easy words, deceitful love – and whose fragile status is recalled by the sceptical rhetorical question hidden in the poem's conclusion, yet made visible by the abbreviated form of the relevant pronoun: *ki bízna benned?*, 'who would trust you?'. The destructive machine of self-address cannot be neutralised here either. There really is no forgiveness.

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[7] This compositional principle, which is thus fulfilled in the return, is also reflected in the metrical scheme (AAXA; the return of the initial couplet's rhyme after the unrhymed third verse at the end of the stanza) that dominates most of the stanzas.

Acknowledgements

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Appendix

Tudod, hogy nincs bocsánat	Mercy Denied Forever	Literal translation:
Tudod, hogy nincs bocsánat, hiába hát a bánat. Légy, ami lennél: férfi. A fű kinő utánad.	Mercy denied forever, pain's but a vain endeavour, be what you should be: manly. Grass in your footsteps ever.	You know there is no forgiveness, so the sorrow is in vain. Be what you would be: a man. Grass will grow after you.
A bűn az nem lesz könnyebb, hiába hull a könnyed. Hogy bizonyság vagy erre, legalább azt köszönjed.	Sin is beyond endurance, weeping, vain self-abhorrence. Even for this, be grateful, warrant for your existence.	Sin won't get easier, your tears falling in vain. For this you are a witness, at least be thankful for this.
Ne vádolj, ne fogadkozz, ne légy komisz magadhoz, ne hódolj és ne hódits, ne csatlakozz a hadhoz.	Renounce self-flagellations, promises, accusations, both conquest and surrender, the call of crowds and nations.	Do not accuse, do not vow, do not be nasty to yourself, do not obey and do not conquer, do not join armies.
Maradj fölöslegesnek, a titkokat ne lesd meg. S ezt az emberiséget, hisz ember vagy, ne vesd meg.	Avoid another's uses, nor spy into abuses. And do not scorn the human: you are what it produces.	Remain superfluous, Do not spy the secrets, Since you are a human, do not scorn this humankind.
Emlékezz, hogy hörögtél s hiába könyörögtél. Hamis tanúvá lettél saját igaz pörödnél.	You begged for pity, croaking, in vain, remember, choking, and bore yourself false witness in your own trial's convoking.	Remember how you rattled and pleaded in vain. You have become false witness in your own righteous trial.
Atyát hivtál elesten, embert, ha nincsen isten. S romlott kölkökre leltél pszichoanalizisben.	You sought a father, even on earth, if not in heaven. In Freud the wicked children you found, still unforgiven.	You called a father in despair, a man if there is no god. An found perverted kids in psychoanalysis.
Hittél a könnyü szóknak, fizetett pártfogóknak s lásd, soha, soha senki nem mondta, hogy te jó vagy.	You trusted words' illusions, paid comforters' delusions, but no one ever trusted the goodness of your visions.	You trusted easy words, paid patrons and see, never, never did anyone say that you are good,
Megcsaltak, úgy szerettek, csaltál s igy nem szerethetsz. Most hát a töltött fegyvert szoritsd üres szivedhez.	They loved you by their lying, your lying killed your loving, therefore the pistol-barrel aimed at your blank heart dying.	They loved you by betraying, you cheated and so you cannot love, so now point the loaded gun at your empty heart.
Vagy vess el minden elvet s még remélj hű szerelmet, hisz mint a kutya hinnél abban, ki bízna benned.	Or cast out doctrine's power, hope true love yet will flower, doglike, you'd trust whoever trusted you for an hour. (trasl. Zs. Ozsváth – F. Turner)	Or throw away all principle and hope still for faithful love, since like a dog you would believe the one who would trust you.

SUBJECT AND SUBIECTUM

GÁBOR TOLCSVAI NAGY

ELTE Eötvös Loránd University / Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra
tolcsvai.nagy.gabor@btk.elte.hu
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1780-3710

Abstract

The paper discusses the relationship between subject and subiectum in the theoretical and methodological framework of cognitive grammar and poetics, in literary texts. The grammatical subject is a grammatical function, placing a thing, i.e., a participant in the focus of attention within the scene expressed in the sentence, and functioning as a semantic starting point. The grammatical subject and the subiectum elaborated in the text are separated from each other in specific cases, and in the process of partition, the two are connected again in various ways. In a literary work, the subiectum is not formed through the direct elaboration of a grammatical subject, but by meeting different ways of the subiectum's self-creation and self-reference, along the intersubjective actions of the speaker and the recipient, in the text and in the discourse space. The paper presents this relationship, among others, in the poetic processes of separating the syntactic subject and the lyrical speaking subiectum, by self-addressing, depersonalization, subjectification, and subject extension.

Keywords: clause, Dasein, depersonalization, participant, scene, subiectum, subject, subjectification, speaker

1. Introduction

Speakers normally know several meanings of a word. This is also the case in scientific cognition. The noun *alany* 'subject' in the Hungarian language, as in most European languages, has developed several different meanings, not independently of the noun *subiectum* of Latin origin. The subiectum, in the modern sense, is the self-conscious self, directed at an object, always in a process of cognition, and this is also where its orientation lies. Also, in that process this subiectum is directed at the other, the partner.

The clause apparently expresses a relationship between subiect and object, that is, between the grammatical subject and the grammatical object, in which the subject is the primary one (at least in nominative-accusative languages, so for example in European languages in general, including Hungarian), as if a kind of rationalist philosophy governed the sentence. This would even be strengthened by the cognitive explanation to be used below, which sees the subject as graspable in relation to the object, through the semantics of the verb: this is what the two figures of the verb, with asymmetrical roles, represent. However, speakers do not speak in formal logical structures and do not make formal logical judgments.

Furthermore – as clearly outlined not only in hermeneutics, but also in usage-based linguistic theories – the orientation and intentionality of the speaking and acting subiectum is not directed merely at some formal object, but primarily at the other, the partner. This is where one of the essential components of the theory of action formulated by Max Weber is revealed, according to which the joint meaning of the action (i.e. orientation towards others) is a determining factor (Weber 1922: 14–16). Intersubjectivity is decisive in this broader sense, which is always feedback oriented. In linguistic structures, evidently in the clause, the context provides the environment that contains these factors of orientation to the other, in different versions.

In the radical conception of language interpretations in usage-based cognitive linguistics, the subject is the grammaticalized function of the topicalized concept (functioning as a reference point) placed in the focus of attention in the clause. The subiectum in the interpretation of hermeneutic philosophy is the entity that "Das Dasein bestimmt sich als Seiendes je aus seiner Möglichkeit, die es *ist* und in seinem Sein irgendwie versteht"[1] (Heidegger 1972: 43), that is, being present. This ontological state is designated by the noun Dasein. In other words: "the subiectum is self-reference itself as the basis of cognition and action" (Luhmann 1998: 868). The subiectum is thus characterized by its historical nature. The subiectum is the underlying, "carrying" reality, which essentially expresses reference to a "carried" reality "resting on" it. At the same time, "das sogenannte Subjekt der Erkenntnis von der Seinsart des Objektes ist, [...] Der Subjekt-Objekt-Gegensatz hat zwar dort seine Angemessenheit, wo das Objekt gegenüber der res cogitans das schlechthin andere der res extensa ist" (Gadamer 1975: 499).[2] Is this point of view consistent with the subject category of language, and if so, how?

The subject is usually identified by grammatical markers in the sentence. In the Hungarian language, for example, nominative case as well as person and number agreement with the verb are the evident markers, or in English, the sentence initial position of the noun. But the meaning of the subject can hardly be exhausted with such a short pseudo-definition. In Hungarian, for example, in some sentences, things denoted by nouns in dative or accusative are more in the focus of attention than nominative nouns (for example, a *fiúnak tetszik a lány* 'the boy likes the girl', *a fiút a biológia érdekli* 'the boy is interested in biology'). The pronominal and especially the first or second person singular subjects partly represent a different semantic structure than the nouns. This is particularly important in literary texts, from the point of view of the speaker's or narrator's self-creation and self-reference.

Things with the subject function are primarily named by nouns. From a formal (morpho-syntactic) point of view, language apparently does not differentiate between things, as if the speaker represented all things ontically as subjects. However, the question is whether this formal uniformity is really unbroken between the Dasein (the human as being present) and things at hand as existents (entities that exist) or not, between existents and being as such or not. Also, the question arises how speakers construe these semantic structures, as it is known in hermeneutic philosophy, primarily due to Heidegger's ontological difference.

And the question is whether the subject (subiectum), in any sense, is a logical function of the object (obiectum) or not. Also: whether the subject (subiectum), in any sense, is a logical function of the predicate (predicate in the formal logical sense) or not.

The following explanation starts from linguistics in the presentation of a possible set of answers to the above questions. In the usage-based cognitive theoretical framework, the canonized, idealized category of the subject is being reinterpreted, on the one hand, by recognizing non-prototypical subjects, and on the other hand, in the linguistic mapping of the semantic and pragmatic functions of the grammatical subject in a broader category, including the functional description of topichood.

In close connection with this, the prototypical elaborations in the 19th and 20th century Hungarian literature, the correspondence between the hermeneutic interpretation of the subiectum and the cognitive description of the subject and topic is introduced below. These correspondences indicate that the speaking person is capable of highly variable and cognitively flexible operations in conceptually based linguistic construals, and philosophical insights are not far from these operations.

This is made possible by the common areas of cognitive linguistics and hermeneutics, the joint elaboration of the conditions and processes of understanding.

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[1] "understands itself in some way in its being".

[2] "the so-called subiectum of knowledge has the same mode of existence as the object, [...] although the subiectum-object contrast is appropriate where, in contrast to the res cogitans, the object is something completely different: the res extensa".

2. The linguistic interpretation of the subject

Both the philosophical tradition and the linguistic discourse of the last two hundred years treated the basic syntactic categories as non-historical formal structural or logical categories and considered them universally existing and essentially the same regardless of language. This attitude was not changed by the application of logic with varying degrees of rigor behind these descriptions, nor by the fact that the variability of syntactic markedness was gradually recognized by some structural linguistic descriptions. According to some post-generative and post-structuralist trends in linguistics, the functions of the categories determined by the structure gradually played a role in the description, but in fact this did not bring about a substantial change in the formal commitment either. However, in addition to the mainstream structuralist and generative theories, the functional approaches, starting with the Prague Linguistic Circle and several, mainly British, functional theories and descriptions of the 1960s challenged the omnipotence of the structural and formal logical basis.

Of course, the functional diversity at the system level is confusingly rich. In terms of the main features of the predicate and its arguments, typological research has separated two large groups of language types, the nominative and ergative languages. In nominative (or accusative) languages (including the Indo-European and Finno-Ugric languages), the subject of intransitive verbs is an unmarked nominative both as agent and patient, and the subject of transitive verbs is unmarked nominative as agent, and its grammatical object is patient marked by accusative case. In ergative languages (such as Caucasian, Australian languages, Basque, Eskimo-Aleut, etc.), this happens differently with transitive verbs: the subject of intransitive verbs is an unmarked absolutive, both as agent and patient, while the subject of transitive verbs is ergative marked as agent, and the grammatical object is unmarked absolutive as patient (cf. Dixon 1994). In the following, we will only talk about the subjects of nominative/accusative languages, primarily the subject of the Hungarian language.

For a long time, the syntactic structure of the sentence has been presented by grammarians according to two typical linguistic trends. One type is constituent or configurational grammar, which is based on the arrangement of phrases (verb phrase, noun phrase) according to their constituents. The other type is dependency or relational grammar, which interprets grammatical functions (predicate, subject, object) as relations in a network.

A well-known example of the theory based on the distinction between underlying and surface structure is the *Új magyar nyelvtan* (New Hungarian grammar), and the generative syntactic works of Katalin É. Kiss (É. Kiss 2002). In this explanation, the structure of the sentence is not divided according to the predicate and the subject, but according to the topic and the comment (with the latter treated as logical predicate in É. Kiss's approach). The topic (the "logical subject") is a structural position, a slot to be filled, characterized by sentence initial position and unstressed pronunciation. According to this, a topic is a noun phrase that refers to one element of an already known set to which an existential presupposition can thus be attributed.

The category of subject and object thus loses its importance, but the logical topic-comment segmentation does not elaborate the grammatical relationship between the predicate and the subject, object. It is not by chance that M. A. K. Halliday remarked about the above-mentioned types of grammar that "Bracketing is a way of showing what goes with what: in what logical (as opposed to sequential) order the elements of a linguistic structure are combined. It says nothing about either the nature or the function of the elements themselves" (Halliday 1994: 25).

The more general, consensual structuralist syntactic canon that emerged in the 1970s and is still largely valid today can be summarized as follows from the point of view of the subject (see Palmer 1994; Foley−van Valin 1985). The components of grammatical structure encode the semantic and pragmatic functions of a linguistic element, the coding elements denote the grammatical structure of the sentence, the grammatical structure determines the semantic and pragmatic functions. The structural core of the sentence is the predicate, the subject and the object; the subject and the object are the arguments (complements) of the predicate, prototypically in the semantic role of the agent and the patient.

This explanation also uses formal criteria, as long as it starts from the coding forms and considers the semantic roles (agent, patient) as the logical arguments of the verb. In these models, the subject and the object are relations and not things.

A change in the general, universal linguistic definition of the subject was brought about by the gradual recognition of language typology and the diversity within individual languages. The empirical data disentangles each of the formal description theories and methodologies outlined above. After all, in different languages different coding means mark the subject, and the structural distribution of coding properties differs from language to language (García-Miguel 2007: 755). One of the most demanding initiatives to answer the questions that arise can be found in the studies in the volume edited by Li (Li ed. 1976). In this volume, Keenan (1976) systematizes the general properties of the subject from a typological point of view. These features can be divided into three groups: "coding features: word order position > case marking > verb agreement; behavior and control properties: deletion, movement, case changing, control of crossreference properties; semantic properties: agency, autonomous existence, selectional restrictions" (Keenan 1976: 324). The main advantage of Keenan's model is that it includes both structural and functional aspects, and it also allows the compilation of different combinations and matrices from the individual properties to describe different types of subjects. Keenan's model adopts the prototype principle: the more properties a grammatical relation has, the more it can be considered to have a subject role. It thus offers an easier solution for the theoretical and descriptive treatment of the subject's structural and semantic variability.

Following British initiatives of the 1960s in diverse trends in linguistics, functional schools of linguistic theory began to emerge in the 1970s. One such trend was developed by M.A.K. Halliday, another by Talmy Givón. Each attaches fundamental importance to meaning, context, and the perspective of the speaker/listener at any given time. In Halliday's grammar, grammatical relations, such as the subject and functions, indicate the role the element plays in the given structure. Halliday (1994: 31–35) distinguishes between three subject concepts, referring to the earlier tradition, but reinterpreting the categories. The three subject concepts are as follows: the psychological subject is the theme ("Theme is the point of departure for the message"), the grammatical subject is the subject ("Subject is the warranty of the exchange"), the logical subject is the actor ("Actor is the active participant in the process") (Halliday 1994: 34). The three functions contribute to the meaning of the sentence with three different meanings and are connected to the predicate part of the sentence.

Givón's grammar is organized by correspondences between syntactic structures and semantic relations. Givón (2001: 196) connects the subject with the functional, discourse-pragmatic explanation of the topic, condenses Keenan's functional subject properties (independence, indispensability, referentiality, definiteness, topicality, agency) into the function of the topic. The topic is the thing that the speaker places in the center of attention in a sentence, or more precisely in a longer, multi-propositon discourse, which is characterized by cognitive salience and textual continuity.

The prototypical grammatical expression of the thing in the focus of attention is the syntactic role (i.e. relation) of the subject. The subject is a grammaticalized primary topic, the object is a grammaticalized secondary topic. The more a formal marker of the subject or object is associated with the function of the topic, the more universal this marker is. Givón's implication hierarchy is as follows, starting with the most universal and transparent property of grammatical relations and ending with the least characteristic (Givón 2001: 196): "functional reference-and-topicality properties, behavior-and-control properties, word-order, grammatical agreement, nominal case-marking".

In Givón's grammar, topic is a cognitive dimension, the result of attention focusing on one or two important participants in a sentence, which is influenced by two factors: cognitive salience in the event and communicative salience in the discourse. The topic is therefore a pragmatic function related to the text, and not to the event in the sentence, coded by grammar, characterized by cataphoric persistence and anaphoric accessibility.Although Halliday and Givón's explanations of the subject are partly different, common factors can be identified that indicate progress in the theoretical and descriptive history of the grammar of the sentence. The prototypical subject denotes the thing in the focus of attention, and this element in the sentence is a starting point, a reference point compared to other elements in the sentence. The category of the subject is not only a formal function of the predicate, but a functional element of the sentence and the text (e.g. a paragraph).

This subject definition was radicalized by cognitive linguistics, especially Ronald Langacker's Cognitive Grammar (the summary below is primarily based on Langacker's works) (cf. Langacker 1987, 2008). Through linguistic expressions, the speaker conceptually construes the content to which he wishes to direct the listener's attention, using the potential of human cognition. According to the basic principles of Cognitive Grammar, grammar is organized by experience-based, conceptual meaning, with prototype effects. There is no inherent difference between morphology, syntax, and lexicon, because the same semantic principles apply in each language domain. Grammar consists of semantic structures, phonological structures, and the symbolic and categorization relations between the two. This precludes a purely syntactic definition of the subject and the predicate but does not preclude the conceptual characterization of these basic concepts or the existence of formal reflections.

In the simple clause, the speaker (the conceptualizer) construes a scene in an intersubjective relationship with the listener. The scene is the schematic meaning of the clause. As a complex archetype, the prototypical simple clause expresses a canonical event, a one-way asymmetric transfer of energy between two participants represented in an action chain (*Péter becsukta az ablakot* 'Peter closed the window'). An action chain is a series of power transfer interactions from one participant to another. In addition to canonical events, this schema is a variant of the source-path-goal schema in which both the source and the goal are participants. A language has many different event schemas.

In the central part of the simple clause, the meanings of the noun and the verb are semantically related, connected as a composite structure, through semantic correspondences (Langacker 2008: 60). In the clause, the schematic figures of the verb are elaborated by nouns (in the traditional nomenclature, dependents), creating a semantic composite structure: for example, someone enters somewhere > The rector entered the hall. The schematic figures of the verb do not have the same status in terms of attention focusing and salience, their relationship is asymmetrical. The figure in the focus of attention is the trajector, the other figure, the landmark, is secondary: "trajector and landmark are the primary and secondary focal participants in a profiled relationship" (Langacker 2008: 365).

The selection of the trajector and the landmark is a matter of construal, it depends on the conceptual perspective, the control of attention, which the speaker sets up during the conceptual construal of a scene. The same scene can be conceptually constructed in several ways, by choosing a different trajector from among the participants: a) *Pisti betörte az ablakot* 'Pisti broke the window'; b) *Az ablak betört* 'The window was broken'.

In the examples above, a different part of the action chain is profiled (expressed) in each sentence. The trajector and the subject are selected accordingly (*Pisti* or *window*). It is particularly important to see that the asymmetric distribution of the semantic roles and the asymmetric distribution of attention focusing functions do not overlap. Semantic roles (agent, patient) are inherently part of the conceptual content, while the assignment of attention control functions (trajector, landmark) belongs to the construal and is the result of the linguistic coding of the event in the clause (Langacker 2008: 366). In the example, in both sentences the *window* is the patient, in the first *Pisti* is the agent, while in a) it is Pisti, and in b) the window is the trajector, which is the landmark in a).

As can be seen above, the trajector can be expressed with several semantic roles. Langacker distinguishes between two types of orientation of the trajector (Langacker 2008: 366): the agent-oriented trajector (then the trajector expresses something that acts) and the theme-oriented trajector (such semantic roles are the patient, the mover, the experiencer, the zero). In canonical events, the head of the action chain is the agent initiating the interaction, also the trajector in most languages. The prototypical subject is the agent. In the prototypical clause, the inherent agent, the trajector and the grammatical subject are realized together. But it is precisely the different nature of the various construal factors and their variation possibilities that allow for a high degree of diversity both typologically and within a language. The schematic sentence description that emerges in this way acknowledges the high degree of variability of construal, the multifactorial determination of the clausal semantics of nouns, and the highly grammaticalized role of the grammatical subject in this. While the subject has generally preserved its formal characteristics (for example, according to Keenan's characteristics), its function has been partially taken over by other semantic factors

(such factors include topichood and trajector status). The subject cannot be defined by features of the specific semantic content or semantic roles.

Since the subject is not always, not necessarily, and not in all languages, a trajector, and therefore not always a participant in the focus of attention, the general category of the subject shows a certain degree of functional emptying historically. In the Hungarian language, in everyday texts, there are clause types in which the formal grammatical subject is not the same as the topic in the center of attention. Note, for instance, the examples mentioned above, with the dative case: a *fiúnak tetszik a lány* 'the boy likes the girl', *a fiút a biológia érdekli* 'the boy is interested in biology'. In the first sentence, the boy is given a topic role in a cognitive sense (the speaker focuses on this in the conceptual structure), in the second, the listener, although neither is a subject nor a trajector.

It is necessary to extend the interpretation of the subject with aspects of its construal in the discourse that arise from the conceptualizing role of the speaker and the listener in the conceived speech situation.

In the clause, the speaker does not merely name the things, but makes them identifiable for the listener, anchors them epistemically (Langacker 1987; Brisard ed. 2002). The things and processes named in the speech event are construed by the speaker (conceptualizer) in relation to the participants of the discourse space and their situation. All entities are grounded in the discourse space, in particular within its core, the ground.

The first-person singular subject is both the speaker (conceptualizing subiectum), offstage in the sentence and the subject marked as a participant onstage in the sentence, also with deictic self-reference from the speaker's point of view, and deictic reference from the addressee's point of view. The second-person singular subject is both the listener (conceptualizing subiectum), offstage in the sentence and the subject marked as a participant onstage in the sentence, with deictic reference from the speaker's point of view, and deictic self-reference from the addressee's point of view. The third-person singular subject is the subject marked as a participant onstage in the sentence, with reference from the point of view of the speaker and the receiver (with a weak or zero degree of deictic content). The factors of perspective and epistemic grounding indicate a strong relationship between the grammatical subject and the subiectum constructed in the discourse, but also that this relationship can be of several types.

The Osiris Grammar (Tolcsvai Nagy ed. 2017), a cognitive and dependency grammar for Hungarian characterizes the clause as constructions of form–meaning pairs, constructional schemas in particular.

The prototypical Hungarian sentence is a neutral positive declarative sentence, which is affirmative according to polarity, not negative, declarative according to speech act value, neutral, i.e. without a specific context, and is characterized by even emphasis, a descending intonation, and a flexible word order among dependents (Imrényi 2017: 666). The network character of the structural form is determined by the dependency relations, with the finite verb as head. Imrényi (2017: 688) states the following about the subject. "Events containing an action chain are interpreted according to the billiard ball model: things and persons undergo changes under the influence of other things or persons, and as a result, they affect the state of other things and persons as well – similarly to how billiard balls continue on a different path after they collide, and they can also hit other balls. The individual verbs differ in how many participants are included in a scene processed as an element in the discourse (in the case of *n* actors, with *n-1* number of collisions): *becsukódik* 'being closed' only one, *becsuk* 'close' two, and *becsukat* 'make close' three. Based on this, it can be said that the subject is the primary, highest order profiled actor within the hierarchy of the billiard ball model – according to energy transfer, volitional action, awareness, etc."

Summarizing what has been overviewed so far, the following can be established:

- the clause expresses an event, a scene prototypically between two participants in a temporal relationship
- in the semantic construal of the two participants, their semantic roles follow from the conceptual content of the scene, inherently

- this conceptual content is further shaped semantically by the focusing of attention by the speaker; one participant is foregrounded, while the other participant does not come to the fore as a reference point
- the subject element of the clause, which can be defined in its structural form, is prototypically the figure in the foreground, the highest-order profiled actor.

In the following, some characteristics of literary texts will be analyzed.

3. Approaches to the literary subject

The general variability of linguistic expressions of the grammatical subject and the possibilities of the subiectum's voice obviously also show historical characteristics. In this case, too, it is necessary to emphasize the historical disposition of the writer and poet and the simultaneity of non-simultaneous literary works, which also affects the recipient's knowledge and comprehension processes. The present study is not even suitable for outlining the historical subject typology of Hungarian literature, so it is only possible to present a few major types with one example each. The examples represent individual subject types, in their complex semantic, syntactic, and textual relations, and they also construe historically determined subiectum interpretations. The grammatical subject, with its highly schematic nature, cannot directly correspond to the subiectum interpretations formed in literary texts within the interaction of the writer, the text, and the recipient. The grammatical subject does not cover complex subiectum concepts, but its formation in specific contexts gives definite clues to the subiectum interpretations.

The history of the division of subject/subiectum shows directions from the combination of the canonical subject – actor – primary figure (most important participant) towards the discovery and elaboration of various conceptual constructions and poetic possibilities. From the middle of the 19th century, the subject and subiectum types vary to a greater extent than before. Instead of the clear separation of the speaker and actor (participant) roles, by definition, diverse types of convergence between the two were developed, combined with the use of the semantic possibilities of first and third person references, or the grounding of the direct personal character of the speaker's talk within the discourse space to the alternations of depersonalization. The historical chronology prevailing in the presentation of the examples stems from this factor and does not in any way imply any teleological historical process. In addition, it should be emphasized that the historic process of the subject in the grammatical and functional sense in Hungarian literature shows trends with parallel European correspondences.

3.1. Direct correspondence between the subject and the subiectum

In Sándor Petőfi's poetry, the lyrical speaker is identical to himself, he refers to himself in the first person singular, as a grammatical subject, so that the recipient can identify it: the confessor is speaking. This lyrical speaker is undoubtedly in the focus of the speaker's and recipient's attention, he is the actor (he speaks, and he acts in the poem), semantically the topic and the trajector. The grammatical subject and the subiectum in the focus of attention, as well as the speaker referring deictically to himself, are identical.

> Befordúltam a konyhára,
> Rágyújtottam a pipára…[3]
> 　　　　　(Befordúltam a konyhára…)[4]

---

[3] Literary citations are given in literal translation.
[4] I turned to the kitchen, I lit the pipe...

> Fölrepűlök ekkor gondolatban
> Túl a földön felhők közelébe
> (Az alföld)[5]

The features outlined above are semantically extended to Petőfi's lyrical and epic works, in which there is either a third-person singular real or metaphorical actor, or a first-person singular speaker or quoted character.

> Kukoricza Jancsi fölkapta subáját,
> S sebes lépésekkel ment keresni nyáját,
> (János vitéz)[6]

> A nap lement.
> Eljött a csend.
> Szellőüzött
> Felhők között
> Merengve jár
> A holdsugár
> (Est)[7]

From a cognitive point of view, the direct subject-subiectum (agent, topic) correspondence is one of the most expected and common ways of construing sentences in everyday texts as well. Its general, rhetorically ideal character was gradually suspended in literature with the fading of its authenticity.

3.2. Detachment of the syntactic subject and the lyrical speaking subiectum

In this version, the non-direct deictic referentiality of the lyrical speaker is characteristic, and its conceptual construction is effected by metaphorical or reference-point reification.

The characteristics mentioned in connection with Petőfi can be identified in János Arany's first epic works, especially in the epic poem Toldi. The constant realization of the most expected general co-occurrences in Toldi for cognitive reasons certainly contributes to its success to this day. But in the lyrical poems written in the 1850s, which are the first works of Hungarian lyrical modernity, the picture is already different. In the basic conceptual structure of Arany's poem *A lejtőn* 'On the Slope', both realization versions have a prominent poetic role.

> Száll az este. Hollószárnya
> Megrezzenti ablakom,
> Ereszkedik lelkem árnya,
> Elborong a múltakon.
>
> [...]
>
> Most ez a hit... néma kétség,
> S minél messzebb haladok,
> Annál mélyebb a sötétség;
> Vissza nem fordulhatok.
>   Nem magasba tör, mint másszor –
>   Éltem lejtős útja ez;
>   Mint ki éjjel vízbe gázol
>   S minden lépést óva tesz.[8]

---

[5] I soar in thought Beyond the earth to the clouds

[6] Jancsi Kukoricza picked up his sheepskin coat, And with quick steps he went to look for his flock,

[7] The sun has gone down. Silence has come. It was windy Between clouds It walks pensively The moonbeam

[8] The evening is coming. Raven's wing My window shakes The shadow of my soul descends, He broods over the past. [...] Now that faith... silent doubt, And the further I go, The deeper the darkness; I can't turn back. It

A subiectum is at the center of the speaker's and recipient's attention, it is the speaker himself, but he does not create the attention directed to himself by speaking in the first person singular, as a grammatical subject. In the reception process, the participants of the poetic clauses are given priority as grammatical subjects, and through them the understanding reaches the actual speaker.

In the linguistic representation, in the course of dynamic conceptual construal, the lyrical speaker and the discourse participant are separated. The latter is *este* 'evening' and *árny* 'shadow'. The *este* 'evening' goes through multiple metaphorization in the entire poem, from a natural phenomenon to aging to darkness as a failure of cognition, to doubts about the self-creation and self-representation of personality. The *árny* 'shadow' is a visual imprint of the disembodied soul of the lyrical speaker, a double transference to the speaking subiectum, with a transparently vague and uncertain outline. The noun *árny* 'shadow' brings the recipient to the speaker more directly, but still indirectly. The complex metaphorization process takes place during the lyrical speaker's monologue and self-interpreting cognitive operations, therefore the deictically grounded subiectum is represented for the recipient only partially and through mediation by the participants of this self-reflexive mental and emotional process.

At the same time, the noun *árny* 'shadow' is part of another conceptual and semantic operation, which also creates a separation and connection between the central lyrical speaker (subiectum) and the participants who appear as grammatical subjects in the monologue. The noun *árny* 'shadow' is a component of the possessive structure *lelkem árnya* 'the shadow of my soul', just like the linguistic unit expressing another central conceptual structure, *éltem lejtős útja* 'the steep road of my life'. In most cases, the possessive does not express possession, it is a semantically complex reference point structure.

One type of complex semantic structures is the reference point structure, in which a conceptualizer makes something accessible and conceivable by naming and activating another thing (Langacker 1999: 171–201). Figure 1 details the reference point structure (cf. Langacker 1999: 174). C is the conceptualizer (the speaker or the listener), R is the reference point (the conceptual starting point), T is the conceptual target to be reached by the conceptualizer through the reference point, the arrow indicates the mental path of the conceptualizer, and finally D the dominion, conceptual domain to which the reference point provides direct access.

C = conceptualizer
R = reference point
T = target
D = dominion

Figure 1.

The reference point relationship is a dynamic linguistic phenomenon. In the interpretation of cognitive linguistics, dynamism stems from the temporality, parallelism and succession of the processing of linguistic units. The entity serving as a reference point can fulfill its function because it is easier for the conceptualizer to access and activate than the target. The concept of a more accessible entity opens up a domain, a domain in which the target is already easy to reach. The reference point status functions until its role is exhausted, that is, until it directs the conceptualizer to the target. At a later stage of conceptualization, the target becomes the focus of attention because it is considered more accessible through the reference point.

---

doesn't get high like other times - The steep road of my life; Like wading into water at night And taking care of every step.

In the poem by Arany, *lelkem* 'my soul' is the reference point and *árnya* 'its shadow' is the target, in the second structure, *éltem* 'my life' is the reference point and *lejtős útja* 'its steep road' is the target. The formal subject of the sentence *Ereszkedik lelkem árnya* 'The shadow of my soul descends' is in the third person, only the possessive suffix is in the first person, but this is only a reference point (starting point) for the noun *árnya* 'shadow', which is not the same as the speaker. At the same time, both elements that function as reference points themselves involve a reference point structure: *én* 'self' (reference point) – *lélek* 'soul' (target), *én* 'self' (reference point) – *élet* 'life' (target).

These semantic structures bring about a significant change compared to the poetics of confessional lyric: the semantic starting point is the self, the lyrical speaker, epistemically grounded, identifiable for the recipient, placed in the focus of attention as a topic, but the entire structure shifts attention to something else, which in the course of construal is not the same as the speaker himself. In these structures, the concept of life or soul is reified (becomes a thing that is represented as a grammatical subject) and ontically separated from its "possessor" (the reference point), so that they constitute the ontological essence of the speaking subiectum. The ontic character comes to the fore and the ontological to the background, greatly amplifying doubts about the subject's self-representation and self-creation. Among János Arany's lyrical poems from this period, the poetic process described here prevails also in *Balzsamcsepp* 'Drop of the Balm' and partly in the poem *Az örök zsidó* 'The Eternal Jew'.

3.3. Self-address

The grammatical and semantic implementation of self-address is one of the most specific instantiations of subject construal. The syntactic subject or the possessive person-marked element is in the second person singular, which is simultaneously grounded as the directly addressed addressee and at the same time as the speaker, as a deictic center and deictic reference for itself and the addressee, and also as part of the speech situation in the abstract discourse space. The identity of the addressee is overt, primarily the lyrical speaker (identical with the first-person speaker, if there is one), and may also be the recipient.

This possibility of a lyrical change was recognized by Mihály Vörösmarty, in his last surviving poem. The self-addressing singular second-person forms of *Fogytán van a napod* construe the subject in two ways:

Fogytán van a napod,
Fogytán van szerencséd,
Ha volna is, minek?
Nincs ahova tennéd.
Véred megsürűdött,
Agyvelőd kiapadt,
Fáradt vállaidról
Vén gunyád leszakadt.
Fogytán van erszényed,
Fogytán van a borod,
Szegény magyar költő,
Mire virradsz te még?[9]

The self-addressing clause contains two scenes. In one of the scenes, the event related to the participant expressed in second person as a grammatical subject, primary figure, and trajector is construed explicitly. In the second scene, the event related to the relationship between the speaker and the second-person primary figure is construed, focusing on the ontic speech situation and

---

[9] Your day is running out You're out of luck If there was, why? There's nowhere to put it. Your blood has thinned Your brain is dead From your tired shoulders Your old coat is broken. You're out of wallet You're out of wine Poor Hungarian poet, What else are you up for?

ontological self-referential and self-creating relationship between them. The tension between the two related scenes gives the characteristic of the self-addressing clause. The speaking agent, who is not overt, directs his speech towards the addressee as an existential agent, putting it in the focus. Then, the process also takes place in the opposite direction, thus reception reaches the unmarked speaker through the addressed figure.

Construing the subject through a second-person subject and an unmarked speaker with additional textual elements can result in extremely complex subiectum interpretations. The basis for this, in addition to what has been said so far, is that the speaker views himself from outside as a Dasein, ontically, as a being, and at the same time as a person who reflexively, ontologically responds to his own existence and to being in general. He grounds the addressee to himself and interprets it in a self-reflexive way with questions or statements about existence within an ontological framework. (Béla Németh G.'s early study emphasizes how self-addressing poems focus on the double characteristics of existentia and essentia in Heidegger's sense; cf. Németh G. 1970: 621–670; Heidegger 1975.) In this way, the traditional ontological model of the subject-object division is replaced by the epistemic grounding based on mutual determination.

In his poem *Fogytán van a napod*, Vörösmarty partially resolves the ambiguity of the second person with the third person subject of the *szegény magyar költő* 'poor Hungarian poet', but again this does not or cannot only apply to a single person, the speaker, but also to Hungarian poets in general. It should be noted that some of the formal subjects in the poem do not refer to the addressee but rather to the addressee's grammatical "possessions" (*napod* 'your day', *szerencséd* 'your luck', *véred* 'your blood', *agyvelőd* 'your brain'). These nouns, as components in reference point structures, denote aspects of the addressee's (and therefore the speaker's) mode of existence, starting from the addressee's reference point as a semantic target, putting the concepts they denote to the fore. The concepts evoked in this way are clearly aspects of the existence of the Dasein, which are categorized starting from the Dasein itself, and then reattached in the subject's understanding of existence.

4. Subjectification

The clause expresses a scene or event which has participants. The speaker also marks these figures in the clause with formal markers, for example as subject or object. One of these two figures (prototypically trajector and landmark) is either openly the speaker himself, or he is not. In other cases, however, the speaker is an implicit part of the clause, or a larger fragment.

In Kálmán Mikszáth's novel *Szent Péter esernyője* 'Saint Peter's umbrella', in the first chapter (*Viszik a kis Veronkát* 'Little Veronka is taken away') the narrator does not appear overtly at all in some sentences (he is not a participant in the scene), only the third-person characters are named and grounded. Such is the first sentence of the first chapter taken as an example. The directly quoted utterances of the characters in the novel are related to these scenes construed with third-person figures, also with some first-person utterances by the participants. In other cases, the narrator speaks directly in first person singular (*Se nem mondok, se nem gondolok* 'I neither say nor think'). In these two cases, the grounding is clear for both the narrator and the recipient, both the speaker and the participants in the sentence can be identified, by their grammatical designation as the subject and by temporarily being in the focus of attention.

> Özvegy tanítóné halt meg Halápon.
> Mikor tanító hal is meg, szomjasan maradnak a sírásók. Hát még mikor az özvegy megy utána? Nem maradt annak a világon semmije, csak egy kecskéje, egy hizlalás alatt levő libája és egy kétéves leánygyereke. [...] A kis poronty az apja halála után született, de nem későre, egy vagy legfeljebb két hónap múlva. Megérdemelném, hogy a nyelvemet kivágják, ha rosszat mondanék. Se nem mondok, se nem gondolok.
> Jó, becsületes asszony volt – de mire való volt már neki ez a vakarcs? Könnyebben ment volna a másvilágra, ha magával vihette volna a terhet, mintsem hogy itt hagyja.
> Aztán meg nem is illett, Isten bűneül ne vegye.

> Hiszen uramfia, egy nagy káplán fiuk volt már a tanítóéknak. Az bizony jó fiú, kár, hogy nem segíthette még anyját, mert maga is csak káplán volt eddig valami igen-igen szegény plébánosnál, messze Tótországban, […][10]

However, the first few paragraphs of *Szent Péter esernyője* also include a third procedure for conceptually construing a speaker or an actor. Some expressions classified as traditionally spoken vernacular (*aztán meg* 'and then', *bizony* 'of course', *hiszen uramfia* 'after all, my goodness') implicitly bring the narrator into play. With these expressions, the speaker indicates that he is speaking, that he conceptualizes and construes what is narrated, that his point of view prevails in the narration (most of the quoted expressions have a causal meaning, too), although the speaker himself in fact remains outside the narratives. This is a typical realization of semantic subjectification.

Subjectification is usually present in discourses. "An entity is said to be objectively construed[11] to the extent that it goes 'onstage' as an explicit, focused object of conception. An entity is subjectively construed to the extent that it remains 'offstage' as an implicit, unselfconscious subject of conception" (Langacker 2006: 18). There is an asymmetry between subjectified and objectified elements. The meaning of an expression always contains subjectively and objectively construed elements. Subjectively construed elements primarily include the speaker and, secondarily, the addressee in their offstage conceptualizing role.

In the Mikszáth quote above, each clause construes an elementary scene from the story of the introductory chapter. In each clause, attention is directed at one participant as a grammatical subject, a primary figure, mostly a human actor in relation to other participants. In addition to these overt semantic and syntactic structural correspondences, another person, the narrator, appears in the narrative, most typically implicitly, outside of the scenes, but within the narrative situation. In a semantic sense, the participating subiectums (characters) are represented in the story via conceptual construal and conceptual elaboration by another subject, the narrator. The narrator becomes a subiectum by implementing his own point of view in the process of storytelling in such a way that, as a conceptualizer, he implicitly indicates the validity of this point of view without direct self-reference. The phrases quoted from the excerpt (*aztán meg* 'and then', *bizony* 'of course', *hiszen uramfia* 'after all, my goodness') ground the narrated story directly to the speaking conceptualizer (as a speaking subject), to the central part of the speech situation.

5. Depersonalization

One of the linguistic and poetic developments in objective lyrical poetry is putting the personality in the background, instead naming mere things, placing these in the focus of attention. The subject construction of János Pilinszky's poem *Egy arckép alá* 'Under a portrait' is a semantic process in which attention is transferred from the lyrical speaker to things, typically objects.

> […]
>
> Öreg vagyok, lerombolt arcomon
> csupán a víz ijesztő pusztasága.
> A szürkület gránitpora. Csupán
> a pórusok brutális csipkefátyla!

---

[10] The widow of the school-master died in Haláp. When a school-master dies, the mourners remain thirsty. Even when the widow goes after him? She had nothing left in the world, only a goat, a fattening goose and a two-year-old daughter. […] The little kid was born after his father's death, but not too late, one or two months at the most. I deserve to have my tongue cut out if I say a wrong thing. I neither say nor think. She was a good, honest woman - but what was this baby for her? It would have been easier for her to go to the other world if she could have taken the burden with her, rather than leaving it here. Then it wasn't even appropriate, God forbid. After all, my goodness, the school-master already had a grown up chaplain son. He's a good boy, it's a shame that he couldn't help his mother, because he himself was only a chaplain to some very, very poor parish priest, far away in Tótland […].

[11] Emphasis in the original.

[…]

És egyedűl a feneketlen ágyban.
És egyedűl a párnáim között.
Magam vagyok az örökös magányban.
Akár a víz. Akár az anyaföld.[12]

In the entire poem, formally, this speaker is the topic and trajector, in the focus of attention, in first person singular. However, this foregrounding is only partial, because the speaker does not indicate himself in certain sentences. Thus, in the latter sentences, the speaker is backgrounded, and the things referred to come to the fore (such as granite dust, pore, lace veil, water, motherland). Here semantic construal is of a specific nature: the names of things would be metaphorically or analogically the speaker's conceptual elaborations, but they are not epistemically grounded to the conceived speech situation.

The metaphorical mapping (in the first part of the quote), which consists indirectly of visual associations projected onto the face, the simile (in the last line), which is a conceptual blending of two elementary, global surface and subsurface forms of matter and space, with emptiness and the concept of solitude, in fact they do not function with their figurative nature, but with their materiality. Nominal sentences without overt verbs place mere things in the short-term focus of attention, as quasi-subjects, and the ungroundedness and complete lack of subjectivization of these expressions show the contingent nature of named things. The most accurate realization of this can be found in the third stanza:

Hullámverés. Aztán a puha éj
boldogtalan zajai. Vak rovar,
magam vagyok a rámsötétedő,
a világárva papundekliben.[13]

The listing of the two nominals expressing events in the first two lines (wave, noise) is followed by a third nominal (*vak rovar* 'blind insect'), apparently continuing the list of possible things. This is followed in the third line, separated by the end of the line and a comma, so apparently independently, with the expression *magam* 'myself', which nevertheless identifies itself, as the most concise expression of the matter-likeness, contingency and unboundedness of the speaker. The speaker does not identify himself as a Dasein, but only as a reified existing being, for a moment without any references in the ongoing processing of the poem.

The contingent things are not significant in themselves, although the clause structures would suggest the opposite, but in their relation to the speaking subiectum. The speaker speaking in first person singular construes self-reference, through the deixis directed at himself and functioning as a deictic center for accessing contingent and impersonal things. This relationship is essentially the "inauthentic self-understanding of the Dasein from things" in everyday life, which is reflected in this lyric through linguistic form, the semantic construal of the clauses, recognizing the inauthentic nature of the self (Heidegger 1975: 15.§. c)).

6. Subject extension

From the 1970s, some authors of Hungarian prose changed their relationship to language again, and in this process, among other things, they sought to realize the previously unexplored possibilities of Hungarian. Two significant versions of this are worth mentioning here, both developed by

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[12] […] I am old, with a ruined face only the frightening waste of water. The granite dust of twilight. Only the brutal lace veil of the pores! […] And alone in the bottomless bed. And alone among my pillows. I am alone in eternal loneliness. Like water. Like the motherland.

[13] Surf. Then unhappy noises of the soft night. Blind insect, Me I am the one whithin the darkening, the world orphan cardboard paper.

Péter Esterházy. In the first part of Harmonia Cælestis, several entries begin with the phrase *édesapám* 'my father' (page and entry numbers in parentheses):

> Édesapám, vélhetően, édesapám volt az, aki kabátja alatt a festőpalettával visszament a múzeumba, visszaosont, hogy az ott függő képeit kijavítsa, de legalábbis javításokat eszközöljön rajtuk. (8/3)

> Édesapám a XVII. századi magyar történelem és kultúrtörténet egyik legsokoldalúbb alakja volt, politikai pályájának csúcsán a nádori címet és a birodalmi hercegi rangot nyerte el. A kismartoni kastélyt fényűző rezidenciává tette, számos templomot építtetett, udvarában festőket és szobrászokat foglalkoztatott. (9/5)

> Édesapám a XVIII. században a vallást, a XIX. században az Istent, a XX. században az embert ölte meg. (118/132)

> Édesapám addig-addig hezitált, menjen, ne menjen, mígnem aztán vitték, vittek mindenkit, édesapám fiát is, anyámat is, de aztán a nőket máshová terelték, minket meg bevagoníroztak. (225/230)

> Édesapám, a tündöklő ifjú: aki a végzetes párbajt megelőző éjszaka lefektette az ún. csoportelmélet alapjait. (261/267)[14]

The expressions *édesapám* 'my father' have the same grammatical status in the quoted passages. Each mention is a grammatical subject in sentence-initial position, primary figure (trajector), agent, participant in the focus of attention in the clausal scene. The noun word form itself is more complex than this function, a possessive structure, in which the starting reference point is the speaker in the first person singular. The conceptual construal of the grammatical subject in the clause as the primary participant starts from the speaker, thereby grounding it first in the conceived speech situation. This poetic procedure makes several layers of comprehensibility accessible by regular attention shifting. On the one hand, each subject at the beginning of a clause contains the father-son relationship by itself, moreover, in the access order of son-father: first the speaking son is grounded, then the father, through the additional semantic components of the clause. In this relationship, the components of the concept of *apa* 'father' are fertility (from whom someone originates), age (adult, older compared to offspring), superiority and authority. The components of the concept of *fiú* 'son' are the result of fertility (who comes from someone), age (child or youth, younger compared to your predecessor), subordination. This is how the biological link, family and authority dependence are mapped with the realizations of identification and separation.

On the other hand, in Esterházy's text, *édesapám* 'my father' is always a different historical father, in the relationship of the constant (or so interpretable) speaker. The repetition of the word with its unchanged semantic characteristics (grammatical subject, primary figure, subject, in sentence-initial position) creates an extension in which the current mention is both anaphoric (finds and activates previous mentions, or a part of them) and cataphoric (creates anticipation for the meaning of the following mentions).

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[14] My father, probably my father, was the one who went back to the museum with the paint palette under his coat, sneaked back to correct the pictures hanging there, or at least make corrections on them. (8/3)

My father was one of the most versatile figures in Hungarian history and cultural history of the 17th century, at the peak of his political career he won the title of palatine and the rank of imperial duke. He turned the Kismarton castle into a luxurious residence, had many churches built, and employed painters and sculptors in his yard. (9/5)

My father killed religion in the 18th century, God in the 19th century, people in the 20th century. (118/132)

My father hesitated until then, go, don't go, until then they took him, they took everyone, including my father's son and my mother, but then the women were sent somewhere else and we were put in a wagon. (225/230)

My father, the shining young man: who laid down the foundations of the so-called group theory, the night before the fatal duel. (261/267)

From the *édesapám* 'my father' subjects construed in this way, a double concept of father is developed. One is the narrator's own concept of father, which is contradictory with its metaphorical and metonymic foundation, but it forms a complete personality, whose actions regularly reflect the actions and behaviors of the ancestors. The other is the prototype of the historical Christian European man, with his traditions, his historical and momentary disposition, his irresolvable contradictions, and his everyday factual self-understanding (see Tolcsvai Nagy 2003 for more details).

The subjects of *édesapám* 'my father' refer to this complex father as a topic in the third person, and at the same time they also carry out the self-reference and self-reflection of the speaking subiectum.

7. Subject blending

Another realization of the semantic extension of the schematized grammatical subject that can be mentioned here is the blending of subjects, also in Esterházy's prose. In some parts of the volumes that focus on the mother (*A szív segédigéi* 'Helping Verbs of the Heart', *Semmi művészet* 'No Art') the monologue of the narrating boy, speaking in the first person, and the mother, also speaking in the first person (although often referred to in the third person), merge, the two referential centers coalesce:

> Kétségtelenül volt valami gyanúra okot adó elvi elszántság anyám kezdeményezéseiben, ezzel szemben a legtermészetesebb módon, izomból, kisfiam, izomból, szeretett férfiakkal barátkozni (Semmi művészet, 92)

> végignéztem az egész átváltozási csiribi-csiribát. [...] És a kalap. Kalap le, mindig elfelejtem, hogy proletárdiktatúrában élünk. Kalap föl, de hát végül mégiscsak férfihoz megyek. Kalap le, viszont a Magyar Népköztársaság tisztjéhez. Kalap föl, nincs ennek jelentősége, egy kalap ide vagy oda, akkor inkább legyek szép. (Semmi művészet, 97)

> soha nem gurult a labda két arasznál messzebb a lábától, ami csak úgy képzelhető el, hogy oda van kötve a bokájához [...] soha nem nézte, kisfiam, a labdát [Görög Miki] (Semmi művészet, 213)[15]

Most of the clauses in *Semmi művészet* are complex structures in which the starting matrix sentence construes the speaker as a narrator in diverse ways, and the narrated story with its participants, including the narrator, is based on this. The grammatical subject in the quotations is indicated by first-person verb forms and possessive pronouns. The first person is continuous in these clauses, but the speaker it denotes alternates between the boy and the mother. As a result, the grounding and self-reference of first-person subjects, and more broadly, reference points, constantly alternate. The dual role of these figures is associated with constantly changing combinations of objectification and subjectification. The current speaker is regularly an overt participant in the narrated story (objectification) and also, an implicit conceptualizer of the narrated story with the minimized markers of first person (subjectification).

The current grammatical subject can be recognized in the individual clauses, as the momentarily most important participant of the narrated story, according to the narrative construal, so it is in the center of attention. However, the status of the grammatical subject is constantly related to things that strive for a topic function. Among these, the continuous presence and regular

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[15] Undoubtedly, there was some suspicious principled determination in my mother's initiatives, on the other hand, she loved making friends with men in the most natural way, out of muscle, my little boy, out of muscle (No Art, 92).

I watched the whole metamorphosis thing. [...] And the hat. Hat off, I always forget that we live in a proletarian dictatorship. Hat up, but in the end, I still go to a man. Hat off, but to the officer of the Hungarian People's Republic. Hat up, it doesn't matter, a hat here or there, then I'd rather be beautiful. (No Art, 97)

the ball never rolled more than two spans away from his feet, which can only be imagined as being tied to his ankle [...] he never looked, my boy, at the ball [Miki Görög] (No Ar, 213).

prominence of one or both of the two narrators is realized independently of the formal grammatical subjects. The formal, conceptual and semantic integration of the two grounded first persons result in the elaboration of two subjects with topic status in the text, in relation to each other. In the absence of further interpretation, it should only be noted here that in Esterházy's prose, the father-son relationship tends towards separation, while the mother-son relationship emphasizes inseparability.

8. Subject and subiectum: summary

The grammatical subject is a grammatical function which, by default, fulfils its role together with additional semantic factors. In the process of producing and understanding linguistic structures, i.e. construal in the speech event, during the processes of dynamic social meaning formation, it is primarily a grammatical function related to the role of a named thing in the sentence scene, placing it in the foreground and focus of attention, and functioning as a semantic starting point. The functioning or emptying of the subject is influenced by the distribution of semantic roles and trajector-landmark alignment. Semantic complexity may be increased by the mapping or non-mapping of the speaker and the listener as subject or object in the sentence.

The relationship of the subject to the predicate and the object can be characterized as a partial dependency if these relationships in the sentence do not by themselves exhaust the meaning of the sentence. The subject is related to the verb (predicate) in a composite structure expressing a temporal process through semantic correspondences, in the processes of elaboration and the selection of the active zone. The subject meets the object in the agent-patient and trajector-landmark alignments, by the foreground-background relationship in the construal process.

All of this enables extreme variability in conceptual construal and linguistic expression. The subject is not an a priori structural or logical designation, but a highly schematized mode of conceptualization. The subject can be both the Dasein and the existent (a reified thing), but only the Dasein has its first person or second person singular grounding. In the latter case, the subject can contribute to the process of linguistic mapping of the subiectum as a Dasein, by linguistically implementing the reflexivity of self-reference.

The grammatical subject and the subiectum elaborated in the literary text are or may be separated from each other, and at the same time, in the process of separation, the two are connected again in the most different ways. In a literary work, the subiectum is not formed through the direct elaboration of a grammatical subject, but by meeting different ways of the subject's self-creation and self-reference, in the intersubjective actions of the speaker and the recipient, in the discourse space. The essence of these processing operations is the formation of social meaning in the joint attention scenes.

The grammatical subject can be a function of the grammatical predicate within a sentence, but the conceptual development of the subject cannot be tied to a single schematic reference point. The intersubjective construal of the subiectum is the construal of a Dasein that understands itself in its existence. The ontological difference between the Dasein and the existent is also reflected in the dynamics of social meaning formation, insofar as the distinction between the grammatical subject and the subiectum is decisive in linguistic construals of the Dasein.

The literary history of the subject-subiectum is of fundamental importance for literary creation and literary understanding, at least since the beginning of modernity. Verlaine, Mallarmé, Proust, Joyce, Woolf or Rilke, Musil, Benn, the Hungarian Mihály Babits, Géza Ottlik, Lőrinc Szabó, Attila József, Dezső Tandori or György Petri developed the most diverse versions of the subject-subiectum relationship. These historical processes are not independent of the partial schematization and desemantization of the subject functions of everyday texts.

Acknowledgements

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PERSONALIZATION IS IN THE DETAILS:
A CASE STUDY OF POLITICAL PERSONALIZATION
IN AMERICAN POLITICS

Lilla Petronella Szabó

Corvinus University of Budapest
lilla.szabo@uni-corvinus.hu
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5509-2158

Abstract

The process of political personalization (namely, politicians taking the center stage rather than political collectives) has been observed from many perspectives by scholars of political communication. A wide range of research measured whether politics was becoming personalized; however, these studies were largely data-driven. In this paper, I argue that in order to gain a fuller understanding of personalized politics, more nuanced analyses need to be conducted, as the detailed interpretation of political communication reveals aspects of political personalization which data-based approaches may overlook. The relevance of qualitative analysis in terms of the personalization of politics is interpreted through the use of first-person singular and plural pronouns in Ronald Reagan's 1984 and Barack Obama's 2008 presidential nomination acceptance speeches. The results show that despite a similar level of personalization in quantitative terms in the two speeches, a closer analysis of the texts reveals differences in terms of the semantic categories represented by first-person pronouns.

Keywords: political personalization, experiential view of deixis, first-person pronouns

1. Introduction

The process of political personalization means that politicians (along with their personal and professional lives) are foregrounded in political communication rather than political collectives (such as parties; Szabó 2022). While in an era when politicians can reach millions of people by setting up a profile on social media platforms it may appear straightforward that individuals are at the center of politics, research indicates different levels of personalization persisting in various countries (Karvonen 2010; Rahat–Kenig 2018), on national versus local levels (McAllister 2015), and depending on whether candidates were mandated by the party or voters (Papp–Zorigt 2016). Since political personalization is a process (cf. Karvonen 2010), several studies took a longitudinal stance. This is evident in the case of Rahat and Kenig's (2018) work, in which indicators such as party-membership density, party-identification, and party continuity were generally declining in the observed 26 democracies (including Austria, Japan, and New Zealand). Karvonen's (2010) results confirm another aspect of personalization: the growth of individual politicians and more precisely, the prime ministers' power in numerous parliamentary democracies. Prime ministers' significance was measured by formal power, funding, and staff, for example. Thus, these pieces of research confirm that personalization has been present in politics.

Data-driven results about personalized political communication are also available from the perspective of politicians' language use. For example, Szabó (2021, 2022) attributed the emerging

occurrence of first-person singular (1PS)[1] pronouns to the increasing level of personalization in American presidential candidates' nomination acceptance speeches between 1960 and 2020 (Szabó 2021) and 1932 and 2020 (Szabó 2022), respectively. First-person singular pronouns can be connected to personalization in the sense that the politician speaks for themselves rather than on behalf of a collective, such as a political party (cf. Van Zoonen–Holtz-Bacha 2000; Liu 2022; Rahat–Kenig 2018; Szabó 2021, 2022). By way of illustration, example (1) from Mitt Romney's 2012 and example (2) from Jimmy Carter's 1976 presidential nomination acceptance speeches demonstrate two contrasting ways of using the 1PS *I*.

(1) "I grew up in Detroit in love with cars and wanted to be a car guy, like my dad." (Romney 2012)

(2) "As a governor, I had to deal each day with the complicated and confused and overlapping and wasteful federal government bureaucracy." (Carter 1976)

A study of political personalization based merely on data would reveal that the use of the 1PS *I* in example (1) and example (2) correspond to the personalization of politics. This statement is plausible as long as we accept that political personalization focuses attention on individual politicians and therefore, when using the 1PS *I* in speeches, politicians speak on their own behalf (rather than their parties, for example). However, upon closer inspection it becomes apparent that the two candidates spoke from different perspectives. In example (1), Romney mentioned his childhood ("I grew up in Detroit") taking a more personal stance as compared to example (2) in which Carter detailed his work (i.e., addressed the nation as a professional) in the capacity of Governor of Detroit ("I had to deal each day with the complicated and confused and overlapping and wasteful federal government bureaucracy"). Example (1) and (2) thus reveal that politicians speak from different perspectives in their speeches even when they use the same pronoun (cf. Van Zoonen–Holtz-Bacha 2000).

Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to demonstrate through two case studies discussing Barack Obama's 2008 and Ronald Reagan's 1984 presidential nomination acceptance speeches that a fine-tuned analysis of the semantic categories referred to by first-person pronouns can shed new light on political personalization.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of research on personalized political communication. Section 3 presents the corpus and methodology, while section 4 details the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.

2. An overview of political personalization research

Political personalization has been examined on a diverse set of data and with numerous methodological tools. First, Rahat and Kenig (2018) state that political personalization can be studied on three main levels. The level of institutions corresponds to institutional changes which enhance the power of politicians. By way of illustration, the introduction of primary elections contributes to the personalization of politics on the institutional level, as it gives voters the possibility to elect candidates (Rahat–Sheafer 2007). Furthermore, the media can also contribute to political personalization, which is exemplified by the increasing focus on politicians' personal traits and private life. For example, Langer (2007) showed that in *The Times*, British Prime Ministers' visibility (indicated by the number of articles which referred to the PMs) grew from 21 to 74 articles per week between 1945 and 1999. Additionally, Langer (2010) later revealed that following Tony Blair's premiership (and as a result of the so-called "Blair effect"), the subsequent PMs' personal traits were emphasized in British journalism: Gordon Brown was characterized as "dour," while David Cameron was described as a "young family-man."

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[1] The abbreviation of the first-person singular (1PS) and the first-person plural (1PP) follows Wales (1996).

Finally, on the behavioral level politicians themselves contribute to the personalization of political communication with their social media presence, for example. Personalization on social media is exemplified in the work undertaken by Metz et al. (2020), who studied German politicians' Facebook activity during the last two weeks of November 2016 (which was not a campaign period, and thus, politicians did not need to actively campaign on social media). The results showed that politicians tend to share professional (e.g., images of the politician at their workplace) and emotional (e.g., posts containing emojis which express feelings) personalized posts in the largest ratio, along with private content (e.g., images showing the politician as a private person) on Facebook.[2]

The present paper is concerned with the behavioral level and more precisely, with politicians' linguistic behavior (i.e., language use).

2.1. The linguistic research of personalized political communication

The personalization of politics has been approached from many different viewpoints; however, there is still a paucity of research which observes personalization from the perspective of linguistics. Although Rahat and Kenig (2018) and Van Zoonen and Holtz-Bacha (2000) note that language use – and more precisely, the use of the 1PS rather than the 1PP pronouns – may indicate the process of personalization in political communication, they did not investigate pronominal language in detail and their observations do not stem from linguistics.

Liu (2022) undertook to determine the personalization of power (i.e., "the power to decide", cf. Liu 2022: 1258) *ex ante* with the help of the 1PS *I* and 1PP *we* in the rhetoric of various Mandarin Chinese-speaking politicians in China, Singapore and Taiwan from the 1940s. The research was complemented with a study of speeches from Albania's Enver Hoxha, Ecuador's Rafael Correa, Hungary's Viktor Orbán, and North Korea's Kim Il Sung. The paper argued that as leaders personalize power, they use the 1PS *I* less and the 1PP *we* more. The 1PS *I* is associated with "credit claiming" and "blame avoiding" (Liu 2022: 1259). However, the use of the 1PS assigns moral and personal responsibility to the speaker (Allen 2007; Beard 2000; Mühlhäusler–Harré, 1990; Wilson 1990) and therefore, in the case of unsuccessful measures and negative outcomes, it is the politician who needs to bear the blame if they use the 1PS. The 1PP *we* is associated with situations in which more power is assigned to politicians, as "there are few constraints on their personalization of power" (Liu 2022: 1260).

The study distinguished between two categories of the 1PP *we*. The exclusive "royal" *we* meant that politicians are authorized to speak "for" citizens, while the inclusive *we* signifies group identity and exemplifies when politicians speak "with" citizens. Whereas Liu (2022) does prove that as politicians' personal power increased, the use of 1PP *we* she observed also increased, it must be noted that there are multiple issues with the 1PP categories she proposed. Regarding the royal *we*, Liu (2022: 1263) claims that leaders "[do] not always or strictly" assign a divine right for themselves standing for authority. However, historically the royal *we* served two purposes according to H. Varga (2017). First, monarchs could speak in general terms and say things everyone must accept using the royal *we* and second, monarchs spoke on behalf of their subjects as well. In fact, the latter use overlaps with Liu's (2022) inclusive *we*.[3] With regard to the inclusive *we*, it is important to identify which groups the politicians speak "with." When there are fewer institutional constraints, which marks the personalization of power, one would expect that politicians refer to these

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[2] Apparently, professional personalization is the aspect of political personalization that members of Generation Z find the most appealing. According to Parmelee et al.'s (2022) results, Generation Z respondents favored the "backstage pass aesthetic," namely, they wanted to gain insight into politicians' work and see what is behind the scenes in politics.

[3] Although Liu (2022) spoke about politicians she labelled as "dictators," it must be added that politicians' use of royal *we* is not always appreciated. One notable example is Margaret Thatcher who said "We are a grandmother" as she announced the birth of her grandchild (Beard 2000: 44). Thatcher was mocked for her statement at the time because it made her sound too self-important (Beard 2000).

institutions less frequently by using pronominal references. Thus, in line with the definition of personalization, they would refer to parties less frequently with 1PP pronouns. However, this contradicts Liu's (2022: 1264) hypothesis which claims that as executive constraints decrease, the frequency of 1PP pronouns increase.

A more detailed account of the uses of the 1PS *I* and 1PP *we* is provided by Szabó (2021, 2022), who also claimed that the study of personal pronouns can be attributed to the personalization of politics. However, Szabó (2021, 2022) observed personal pronouns from the perspective of the "experiential view of deixis" (Marmaridou 2000). The experiential view of deixis means that the linguistic act of pointing is based on the physical act of pointing which is performed by a human being in the presence of another human being (Marmaridou 2000). Accordingly, when a person points to someone or something, their reference point – namely, the deictic center – is themselves. Thus, the 1PS designates the speaker's own perspective and for this reason, it can be considered as an indicator of political personalization (Szabó 2021, 2022).

Upon the act of pointing, we can notice that there are entities which are closer to us and there are entities which are further from us. This observation is also mapped onto the experiential perspective on deixis on the basis of the CENTER-PERIPHERY image schema (Marmaridou 2000). The CENTER corresponds to a human's experiential center, while the PERIPHERY refers to the fact that human experience is limited: the further entities are from the experiencer, the closer they are to the periphery of our perception (Johnson 1987). Rees' model (1983, cited by Wilson 1990) shows that the CENTER-PERIPHERY image schema can be translated into the use of personal pronouns as well.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
I	We	You (Direct)	One	You (Indefinite)	It	She	He	They

Distancing from self

Figure 1. Distancing from the self via personal pronouns as devised by Rees (1983, cited by Maitland–Wilson 1987: 498)

As Rees's model demonstrates, the center is constituted by the 1PS and the third-person plural (3PP) pronoun is the most peripheral one from the speaker's perspective because the speaker is not a member of the group designated by the 3PP.

Based on the experiential view of deixis (Marmaridou 2000) and Rees's model, Szabó (2021, 2022) claimed that the 1PS can be considered as a direct indicator of personalization in American nomination acceptance speeches, as it presents the politician's own perspective. Another personal pronoun she studied was the 1PP *we*. However, as compared to Liu (2022), Szabó (2021, 2022) created rather different categories. Building on the pragmatic differentiation between inclusive (the 1PP includes the speaker, the addressee and third parties) and exclusive (the 1PP includes speaker and third parties) 1PP use (Laczkó–Tátrai 2015; Tátrai 2010, 2011, 2017) as well as on the literature on political communicaion (Beard, 2000; Fetzer & Bull, 2008; Íñigo-Mora, 2004; Szabó, 2020, 2021; Maitland & Wilson, 1987; Wilson, 1990; Zupnik, 1994), Szabó (2021, 2022) set up three major categories of *we*: *we*Family, *we*Party, and *we*Nation. *We*Family included the politician and one or more members of their family. *We*Party referred to a larger group which involved the politician and their party (along with the government, if applicable). Finally, *we*Nation was the most inclusive category on the national level as it included the presidential candidate and American citizens. This categorization can be translated into Rees's model as captured by Figure 2.

Figure 2. Relative distance of the referents of first-person plural pronouns
to the deictic center based on Szabó (2022)

Figure 2 – conforming to Lakoff's (1987) idea that the CENTER-PERIPHERY image schema can be applied to radial categories – offers a radial representation of Rees's model. As Figure 2 shows, it is the category of we_{Family} which is closest to the 1PS *I*, i.e., the deictic center, followed by we_{Party}, and we_{Nation}. It must be added that Figure 2 does not presuppose inclusivity in the sense that it does not claim that a politician's family members (we_{Family}) automatically belong to their political party (we_{Party}). The positioning of the categories draws on the INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS and the SOCIAL DISTANCE IS SPATIAL DISTANCE (Winter–Matlock 2017) conceptual metaphors, which capture the fact that we tend to be physically closer to those with whom we feel emotionally closer.[4]

In line with Figure 2, Szabó (2021, 2022) stated that the following tendencies correspond to an increase of personalization in political communication. The more frequent occurrence of we_{Family} shows that the politician refers to their private lives in their speeches. The decrease of we_{Party} suggests that the dominance of parties is fading. Finally, the increase of we_{Nation} reveals that presidential candidates aim to address the whole nation, as citizens' votes may not be strongly determined by party membership anymore.

Whereas the categorization presented in Figure 2 makes it possible to capture a general tendency of personalization, it does not allow for a more detailed analysis of the meaning behind pronominal references. To tackle this issue, two case studies are presented in the following section which show more aspects of the role of pronouns in personalization as compared to Szabó (2021, 2022).

3. Corpus and methodology
3.1. Two presidential nomination acceptance speeches

The texts under scrutiny are American presidential nomination acceptance speeches. The reason why American politics is under investigation is that personalization is believed to have started in

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[4] The experiments carried out by Matthews and Matlock (2011) underpin that people move physically closer to those with whom they feel emotionally closer. Matthews and Matlock (2011) conducted three experiments in which they asked participants to imagine that they were delivering a package to a "friend" or a "stranger" and draw the route of their journey which they made walking through a park, driving a car, and riding a taxi, respectively. Their data showed that participants drew their routes of delivery closer to "friends" in comparison with "strangers," even when direct interaction with "friends" was made impossible because participants had to imagine that they were driving or sitting in a taxi. Overall, Matthews and Matlock's (2011) results show that when humans think about intimacy, they immediately access the domain of physical distance.

the USA (Adam–Maier 2010) and personalization itself is ordinary in US politics (Ohr 2015), enhanced by the presidential system. American presidential nomination acceptance speeches are traditionally given by nominees at the Democratic National Convention and the Republican National Convention as part of the campaigns leading up to the selection of Democratic and Republican presidential candidates. Acceptance speeches have a pivotal role in establishing party unity and in the designation of the presidential candidate as the party leader (Trent et al. 2016). For this reason, the presidential nomination acceptance speech can be regarded as a "legitimation ritual" (Ritter 1980: 153). Finally, the acceptance speech is the most important presidential campaign speech (Ritter 1980): it gives candidates the chance to generate a positive response from viewers which can lead to their vote (Trent et al. 2016).

This paper focuses on two addresses: the Democratic Barack Obama's 2008, and the Republican Ronald Reagan's 1984 speech, ensuring that both major political parties in the US are represented. Based on Szabó's (2022) results, it became apparent that personalization in the US was the most dominant since the 1980s. Hence, nomination speeches following the 1980s were taken into consideration. The next criterion was to identify those politicians who gained the most popular vote in the elections. The popular vote – the vote cast by the electorate in the USA – reflects citizens' sympathy towards the given politician. Based on the *Statista*[5] database, Barack Obama in 2008 (52.9%) and Ronald Reagan in 1984 (58.8%) were the nominees who could generate the highest ratio of popular votes up until the 2020 elections.

3.2. Analysis

The first step of the analysis was the close reading of Obama's (2008) and Reagan's (1984) speeches (Proctor–Su 2011). Subsequently, the subjective (*I* and *we*), objective (*me* and *us*), and genitive cases (the determinative *my* and *our* forms and the independent *mine* and *ours* forms) along with reflexive forms (*myself* and *ourselves*) of the 1PS and 1PP pronouns were extracted with the help of AntConc (Anthony 2020). Finally, the hits returned by the "concordances" function of AntConc (Anthony 2020) were inspected in their immediate context.

The referents of the pronouns were determined based on anaphoric reference (Bazzanella 2002; Jobst 2007, 2010). When there was no anaphoric reference in the sentence, the larger context was observed in which the sentence occurred, and the closest anaphoric reference was identified. When the 1PP reference was compatible with the referent of the closest (non-pronominal) subject, the 1PP was marked as a co-referent. When the 1PP was not compatible with the closest (non-pronominal) subject, I selected the 1PS or 1PP category on the basis of the larger context, "shared knowledge" and "the ongoing interaction" (Bazzanella 2002: 248).

Whereas Szabó (2021, 2022) marked the categories with the actual subjective pronoun they represented (e.g., the 1PP reference to the candidate's family was indicated as *we*Family), in this paper 1PSX (first-person singular) and 1PPX (first-person plural) are used as the pronominal forms are not treated individually.

Since the aim of the analysis was to provide a more exhaustive account regarding the semantic categories embodied by the pronouns, the pronouns were listed in more detailed groups. In the case of 1PS, it can be determined whether the candidate spoke as a politician or a private person (cf. Holtz-Bacha et al. 2014). Accordingly, when candidates used pronominal constructions related to their political activities, they were considered as 1PSProfessional as in example (3).

(3) "As Governor of California, I successfully made such vetos over 900 times." (Reagan 1984)

[5] ProCon, & Encyclopædia Britannica, & National Archives and Records Administration, & 270towin.com. (December 16, 2020). Share of electoral college and popular votes from each winning candidate, in all United States presidential elections from 1789 to 2020 [Graph]. In *Statista*. Retrieved 18 December 2021, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/1034688/share-electoral-popular-votes-each-president-since-1789/

However, pronouns in candidates' speeches were categorized as 1PS$_{Private}$ when their utterances were related to their private lives by means of pronouns as shown by example (4).

(4) "She's [Obama's grandmother] the one who put off buying a new car or a new dress for herself so that I could have a better life." (Obama 2008)

With regard to 1PP pronouns, the categories of 1PP$_{Family}$ and 1PP$_{Nation}$ were retained based on Szabó (2021, 2022). However, in contrast with Szabó (2021, 2022), where references to the Republican/Democratic Party and to the candidate's (future) administration were grouped into the same category (1PP$_{Party}$), this paper separates references to the Democratic Party and the Republican Party (1PP$_{Democrats}$/$_{Republicans}$) and candidates' prospective administration (1PP$_{Administration}$) for a more detailed image of political references. Furthermore, depending on the observed speech, novel categories were introduced, such as 1PP$_{Parties}$, referring to both the Democratic Party and Republican Party. By creating groups of pronouns based on the texts themselves, it was possible to put each first-person pronoun into a category.

4. Results and discussion
4.1. Barack Obama's 2008 presidential nomination acceptance speech

Barack Obama delivered his acceptance speech entitled "The American promise" at the Democratic National Convention in Denver, Colorado. The address marked Obama's first run for presidency which he subsequently won. The speech contained 4652 words altogether. With the help of AntConc (Anthony, 2020), 267 first-person pronouns were identified in the address, 113 (42%) of which were 1PS and 154 (58%) 1PP pronouns.

4.1.1. 1PS pronouns in Obama's 2008 presidential nomination acceptance speech

Obama's speech contained 113 1PS pronouns (81 subjective, 12 objective, and 20 possessive pronouns). In the study, two broader categories were established first, indicating whether the politician spoke from a professional (1PS$_{Professional}$) or a private (1PS$_{Private}$) perspective.

Obama spoke in a personal manner in 22% of 1PS references in the sense that the context of his utterances showed him as a private person. He took three main roles in these pronominal references: husband (example 5), father (example 6), and (grand)son (example 7).

(5) "To the love of my life, our next First Lady, Michelle Obama, and to Sasha and Malia – I love you so much, and I'm so proud of all of you." (Obama 2008)

(6) "And now is the time to keep the promise of equal pay for an equal day's work, because I want my daughters to have exactly the same opportunities as your sons." (Obama 2008)

(7) "She [Obama's grandmother] poured everything she had into me." (Obama 2008)

Therefore, private 1PS pronouns directed attention to the nominee's family rather than other personal relationships or interests.

The second group of 1PS pronouns were the ones which portray Obama as a politician and not a private person. 1PS$_{Professional}$ utterances took up the majority, 78% of Obama's first-person pronominal references. Naturally, as a first-time nominee Obama could not refer to any previous achievements as president. Consequently, the pronominal structures of his 2008 DNC speech were future-oriented: in laying out his plans for his prospective administration 30% of subjective 1PS statements contained "I will" or "I'll" in example (8).

(8) "I will cut taxes – cut taxes – for 95% of all working families." (Obama 2008)

Furthermore, he also talked about his ideas as "my plan" and "my call," which correspond to the personal role he wished to undertake on the basis of these utterances.

A closer relationship between the candidate and the people was also initiated in the speech by means of directly addressing the audience. In 23% of his 1PS$_{Professional}$ statements, Obama sought to establish a connection with his viewers as in example (9).

(9) "So don't tell me that Democrats won't defend this country." (Obama 2008)

This imitation of an interaction between speaker and audience further reinforces a more familiar and essentially more personal connection.

4.1.2. 1PP pronouns in Obama's 2008 presidential nomination acceptance speech

Altogether 154 1PP references (72 subjective, 22 objective, 58 genitive, 2 reflexive) were found in Obama's speech. Three main levels of pronominal reference can be separated: the private level (1PP$_{Family}$), the group level (1PP$_{Parties}$, 1PP$_{Democrats}$, 1PP$_{Administration}$, 1PP$_{Convention}$) and the national level (1PP$_{Nation}$). There was a single reference to the whole of humanity (example 10):

(10) "And for the sake of our economy, our security, and the future of our planet, I will set a clear goal as President: in ten years, we will finally end our dependence on oil from the Middle East." (Obama 2008)

Additionally, Obama also referred to his work as Senator of Illinois on one occasion (example 11).

(11) "I've seen it in Illinois, when we provided health care to more children and moved more families from welfare to work" (Obama 2008)

Due to the lack of tokens, 1PP$_{Humanity}$ and 1PP$_{Illinois}$ are not discussed further.

The first level which was observed in detail was the private one. The private level in the case of Obama's DNC address included two examples (1% of 1PP references). One of them was in reference to him and his sister (example 12).

(12) "I think about my mom, who raised my sister and me on her own, […] who once turned to food stamps but was still able to send us to the best schools in the country…" (Obama 2008)

In the other instance, the nominee talked about his wife and himself (example 13).

(13) "Michelle and I are only here tonight because we were given a chance at an education." (Obama 2008)

The private aspect of personalization was more dominant in 1PS utterances (9% of 1PS pronouns) as compared to 1PP pronouns (0.7% of 1PP pronouns). Moreover, it appears that when using pronominal language related to the private sphere, Obama talked about his family rather than other relations.

19% of 1PP pronouns were categorized as belonging to the group level. The group level in Obama's DNC address refers to political groups, namely 1PP$_{Democrats}$ (8%), 1PP$_{Administration}$ (5%), 1PP$_{Parties}$ (4%), and 1PP$_{Convention}$ (2%). Firstly, we find two types of party-reference in the address. In the first type, Obama identified with his own political community, the Democratic Party. Party references are illustrated by example (14).

(14) "You see, we Democrats have a very different measure of what constitutes progress in this country." (Obama 2008)

The DNC speech also highlighted a common "sense" and "purpose" of the Democratic Party and the Republican Party: Obama pointed to times when members of the two leading parties in the USA needed to work conjointly as seen in example (15).

> (15) "Democrats as well as Republicans will need to cast off the worn-out ideas and politics of the past. [...] What has also been lost is our sense of common purpose – our sense of higher purpose. And that's what we have to restore." (Obama 2008)

This statement reinforces that party divides belong to the "past" and shared ideas need to be brought forward. Emphasizing the shared objectives is further continued in the address, as seen in example (16).

> (16) "We may not agree on abortion, but surely we can agree on reducing the number of un-wanted pregnancies in this country." (Obama 2008)

Thus, even though the text does bear references to political parties, diminishing the divide between them also appeared.

The speech also exhibits 1PP pronouns designating the prospective Obama administration, namely 1PP$_{Administration}$. When detailing his future policies, the candidate noted the following in example (17).

> (17) "we will keep our promise to every young American – if you commit to serving your community or your country, we will make sure you can afford a college education." (Obama, 2008)

Clearly, as a first-time nominee, Obama could not speak about achievements of his administration yet; therefore, future-oriented ideas were described, and promises were made in these utterances.

Each reference which explicitly addressed the audience who were at the convention was marked as 1PP$_{Convention}$, as in example (18).

> (18) "And we are here because we love this country too much to let the next four years look like the last eight" (Obama 2008).

From the perspective of personalization, it is of interest to compare Obama's future-oriented "I will," "I'll" and "my X" (specifically "my call" and "my plan") statements relative to all the pronouns in his 2008 speech (n=268). The results show that relative to all pronominal language use, Obama used 1PS statements in 10% of the cases when he referred to his promises and ideas for the future, whereas only 3% of pronominal language pointed to his future administration. The predominance of 1PS regarding prospective measures further points to a person-centered political agenda.

Finally, the national level includes pronouns which refer to the United States of America. The majority of 1PP references in Obama's speech (80%) pointed to the United States, as in example (19).

> (19) "This country of ours has more wealth than any nation, but that's not what makes us rich." (Obama 2008).

From the perspective of political personalization, the fact that the majority of Obama's 1PP references express a national group identification underpins the idea that it is no longer only the members of the political party who the nominee wishes to address. Rather, by utilizing 1PP$_{Nation}$, the former president wished to identify with the nation and speak as their voice (since 1PP pronouns assume group identification and the speaker's role as a spokesperson). Thus, the lower number of party identification as compared to national references further reinforces the pattern of political personaliza-tion: namely, it is the nation that is highlighted in convention speeches rather than political parties.

4.2. Ronald Reagan's 1984 presidential nomination acceptance speech

Ronald Reagan ran for his reelection as President of the United States in 1984. He addressed the Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas on 23 August 1984, and he was subsequently reelected. His speech contained 5060 words. Using AntConc (Anthony 2020), 237 first-person pronouns were identified in his remarks, 33 (14%) of which was 1PS pronouns and 204 (86%) were 1PP pronouns.

4.2.1. The 1PS pronouns in Reagan's speech

Similarly to Obama's speech, first I discuss 1PS pronouns. Altogether 33 (24 subjective, 5 objective, and 4 genitive) 1PS pronouns were identified which were categorized as 1PS$_{Professional}$ when the President spoke from a professional, and 1PS$_{Private}$ when he addressed viewers from a personal perspective.

Reagan made his remarks from a personal angle in 21% of 1PS pronouns. In his speech, the President talked about his past using 1PS pronouns on the one hand in example (20).

> (20) "None of the four wars in my lifetime came about because we were too strong." (Reagan, 1984)

On the other hand, Reagan explicitly noted that he would speak as a private person in the following segment of his speech (example 21).

> (21) "Could I share a personal thought with you tonight, because tonight's kind of special to me." (Reagan, 1984)

As opposed to Obama's 1PS$_{Private}$ pronoun use, Reagan did not mention his family but instead restricted his remarks to his own personal experiences.

The 1PS$_{Professional}$ pronouns were used in 79% of 1PS pronominal references in Reagan's address. As the incumbent president at the time, he talked from this perspective in a presidential capacity in example (22).

> (22) "Little Leah Kline was asked by her teacher to describe my duties. She said: 'The President goes to meetings.'" (Reagan, 1984)

24% of Reagan's 1PS references discussed what he achieved by the time of the 1984 RNC, (example 23) and 6% of his 1PS pronouns were related to the future (example 24).

> (23) "I have addressed parliaments, have spoken to parliaments in Europe and Asia during these last 3 1/2 years…" (Reagan, 1984)

> (24) "I will campaign on behalf of the principles of our party which lift America confidently into the future." (Reagan, 1984)

This tendency is in contrast with Obama's use of pronouns who was a first-time nominee at the time of his address. Whereas Obama was more outspoken about his subsequent plans, Reagan did not rely on the 1PS to talk about his intentions for his second term. Naturally, individual differences must be taken into account when contrasting the two candidates. Nevertheless, personal aspects and the political context possibly influenced the distinct tendencies in the two texts.

4.2.2. 1PP pronouns in Reagan's speech

Reagan's 1984 address contained 204 1PP pronouns (100 subjective, 23 objective, 81 genitive) altogether. Three main levels of 1PP references were examined here. The private level (1PP$_{Family}$), the group level (1PP$_{Parties}$, 1PP$_{Republicans}$, 1PP$_{Administration}$) and the national level (1PP$_{Nation}$).

Szabó's (2021, 2022) results indicated that in terms of the 1PP subjective pronoun *we*, no reference was made to candidates' families from the start of the observed period, i.e., 1932 to 1984. In the case of Reagan's 1984 remarks (involving all the pronoun usage analyzed in this chapter), merely 1% of pronominal references point to him and his wife (example 25).

> (25) "Nancy and I will be forever grateful for the honor you've done us, for the opportunity to serve, and for your friendship and trust." (Reagan, 1984)

However, even in this case, the utterance in which 1PP$_{Family}$ appears is related to presidential duties, namely the way Ronald and Nancy Reagan served their country, rather than their personal life. Thus, as compared to Obama's speech in which he appeared as a husband and (grand)child, Reagan only takes the role of a husband, but a more professional capacity is assumed.

Of all 1PP references in Reagan's speech, 55% designated the group level including 1PP$_{Republicans}$ (34%), 1PP$_{Administration}$ (14%), 1PP$_{Convention}$ (1.5%), and 1PP$_{Parties}$ (0.5%). Reference to the Reagan administration (1PP$_{Administration}$) is seen in example (26).

> (26) "In the first 2 years of our administration, that annual increase fell to 5.3 percent." (Reagan, 1984)

The pronoun use can be attributed to the fact that (as noted above) Reagan ran for his second term as president, thus he had the possibility to highlight the achievements his government made. The ratio of party references (1PP$_{Republicans}$; 34%) is relatively high compared to party identification in Obama's 2008 speech (10%) which may point to an increase in political personalization (with the proviso that the ratio can also be attributed to individual politicians' willingness to refer to their own parties). Republicans were mentioned in utterances such as in example (27).

> (27) "I will campaign on behalf of the principles of our party which lift America confidently into the future." (Reagan, 1984)

Mention needs to be made of two categories which occurred in a relatively low number. Reagan (similarly to Obama) made one reference to the two parties (the Democratic Party and the Republican Party) in example (28).

> (28) "The distinction between our two parties and the different philosophy of our political opponents are at the heart of this campaign and America's future." (Reagan, 1984)

Finally, Reagan referred to the RNC (1PP$_{Convention}$) directly in his speech as showed in example (29).

> (29) "And now you really know why we're here tonight." (Reagan, 1984)

In example (29), place (*here*) and time (*tonight*) deictic references reveal that the nominee pointed to the audience who was present at the RNC with the help of person deixis.

The national level (1PP$_{Nation}$) appeared in 44% of all 1PP references in Reagan's speech. In this instance as well, it needs to be noted that the differences may stem from the nominees' different personas. However, (in light of Obama's remarks) the comparatively low number of 1PP$_{Nation}$ references in Reagan's speech and the relatively high number of party references (1PP$_{Rebublicans}$) verify the idea of political personalization being in motion over the years.

Finally, a single reference (0.5% of all 1PP pronouns) was made to the United States of America and the Soviet Union, which still existed at the time of Reagan's speech.

(30) "For the sake of our children and the safety of this Earth, we ask the Soviets — who have walked out of our negotiations — to join us in reducing and, yes, ridding the Earth of this awful threat." (Reagan, 1984)

As example (30) demonstrates, 1PP$_{USA+Soviet\ Union}$ can be detected in Reagan's 1984 speech.

The results of the analysis point to important conclusions regarding the study of personalized political communication. Generally, 1PS pronouns were more dominant in Obama's speech, as they amounted to 42% of all first-person pronoun use. In comparison, only 14% of all pronominal language use was 1PS in the case of Reagan. It cannot be declared that the difference can only be attributed to political personalization. Nevertheless, the results lend support to the hypothesis that personalization – the process of putting the candidates themselves in the center – has expanded over the years. The increasing number of 1PS references correspond to the idea that attention has shifted from political collectives to individual politicians. In terms of 1PS pronouns, the use of 1PS$_{Private}$ reflects the trend of political personalization when Obama's speech is compared to Reagan's. Figure 1 displays quantitative data on the use of 1PS pronouns in the politicians' speeches.

Figure 3. 1PS pronouns in Obama's and Reagan's presidential nomination acceptance speech

As shown by Figure 3, there is no substantial difference with regards to ratio of 1PS$_{Private}$ and 1PS$_{Professional}$ pronouns in Obama's and Reagan's speeches. However, as the qualitative analysis revealed, President Obama spoke about family issues and history using the 1PS, while President Reagan told stories about himself.

The analysis also included 1PP references in the addresses, the results of which are summarized in Figure 4.

Figure 4. 1PP pronouns in Obama's and Reagan's presidential nomination acceptance speech

The private level of 1PP references, namely 1PP_Family also point towards a more intimate and personalized way of political communication. Although there is no difference in terms of the percentage of the private level in the two speeches, qualitative analysis highlights a contrast between the two candidates. In this regard, while Obama referred to his family by professing his love, (see example 5), Reagan confined himself to a more professional capacity even when mentioning his wife (see example 25). Party references identified in the corpus also exhibit the tendencies of political personalization. Namely, regarding all first-person references and 1PP pronouns, Reagan referred to his party on more occasions as compared to Obama. This is also in line with political personalization, which comes with a decreasing role of political parties. Naturally, more references to the administration were made by Reagan, who was the incumbent president at the time of his RNC remarks, as compared to Obama, a first-time presidential candidate in 2008. As for the nation (1PP_Nation), it was mentioned on more occasions by Obama than Reagan, signaling that the former attempted to address a wider range of voters and not just his own political party, which is further in line with political personalization.

5. Conclusion

The present paper aimed to contribute to research on political personalization from a linguistic perspective. Complementing a data-driven approach to the study of personalization via the use of first-person pronouns (Szabó 2021, 2022), the study offered an in-depth analysis of Obama's and Reagan's presidential nomination acceptance speeches.

The results show that qualitative analyses can provide a more complete picture of *how* political personalization happens and account for the subtleties of personalization which are easily overlooked in a data-driven approach. This is supported by the study of private 1PS and 1PP references in Obama's and Reagan's speeches: while there is no significant difference in terms of the ratio of references which were categorized as private in the two addresses, variation can still be detected. Whereas Obama used the private sense of 1PS and 1PP to talk about his family, Reagan rather mentioned himself or his wife and himself in a professional capacity.

Although no broad generalizations can be drawn from the comparison of two speeches, the results also confirm that personalization grew as time passed in terms of pronominal language, as Obama's 2008 address is more "personal" than Reagan's 1984 speech. However, it must be added that external factors must be weighed in this connection. For example, politicians may simply not be willing to share details of their personal life. Additionally, a politician's looser relationship with their party may also affect the way they include it in their address.

Overall, the paper confirmed that to understand the personalization of political communication in political speeches better, their in-depth analysis is necessary. In order to reveal the role personal pronouns play in the process, the analysis of multiple speeches from the same politician from different periods, roles, and occasions would provide a clearer picture of the tendency of personalization.

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POSSESSING A PROCESS: A COGNITIVE SEMANTIC APPROACH
TO THE ACTION NOMINAL CONSTRUCTION IN HUNGARIAN

László Palágyi

ELTE Eötvös Loránd University
palagyi.laszlo@btk.elte.hu
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1437-4746

Abstract

This paper investigates the semantics of action nominal constructions (ANCs) in Hungarian. The theoretical assumptions concerning grammatical structures are defined in the framework of usage-based construction grammar. ANCs are investigated in the model of conceptual integration. The input spaces of the ANC network are intransitive and transitive constructions characteristic of nominative-accusative languages on the one hand, and nominal possessive constructions on the other. Agent and patient semantic roles correspond to the formal components of certain possessive constructions. The ergative nature of mapping can be explained by the symbolic structure and grammaticalization of the possessor in Hungarian. Although the use of dative case is claimed in the literature to be a secondary (marked) way to express the possessor, it proved to be dominant before the reform era (1772–1825) according to our corpus analysis. The motivation behind the mapping between constructions can be captured by a generic space. The constructions share a mental path semantic structure and an inflectional pattern that makes the grounding of a person possible. However, the emergent nature of the meaning of ANC is also reflected in grounding, as instead of the asymmetric reference-point structure of possession, it holistically serves to refer to a person or thing. Compression and passivation are further functions that cannot be simply traced back to possessive or verbal constructions. These cognitive advantages might also motivate the use of ANC.

Keywords: construction, action nominal, possession, conceptual network

1. Introduction

The action nominal construction (ANC) is a highly problematic phenomenon in the world's languages as it exhibits a combination of formal and semantic properties that are systematically distinguished in grammatical description. An action nominal (AN) is a deverbal noun "with the general meaning of an action or a process" (Comrie 1976: 178). As for ANC, certain semantic and syntactic relations characteristic of verbs (and finite clauses) are mapped onto a noun-headed structure. Accordingly, Hungarian AN – which is expressed by the *-ás/-és* deverbal suffix with "automatic" (inflection-like) productivity (Berrár 1973) – may have adverbial relations (see example 1) and participant roles similar to those of the base verb (see examples 2 and 3).[1] Examples 2 and 3 show that *állatok* 'animals' is the possessor in accordance with the Hungarian possessive structure (featureless possessor always precedes the possessed), however, its relationship with the possessed obviously corresponds to the syntactic relations of the base verb. That is to say, the argument structure expressed by the syntactic relations of the finite verb still prevails in the meaning of ANC and it is (at least partly) inherited in nominalization (Laczkó 2000). That is why Grimshaw (1990) characterizes this class of words as complex event nouns.

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[1] In the glosses, "NLZR" is used as an abbreviation for "nominalizer".

(1) erdő-ben   fut-ás
    forest.SG-INE run-NLZR.SG.NOM
    'running in (the) forest'

(2) az   állat-ok   ki-hal-ás-a
    the   animal-PL   out-die-NLZR-PX3SG.NOM
    'extinction of animals'

(3) az   állat-ok   megfigyel-és-e
    the   animal-PL   observe-NLZR-PX3SG.NOM
    'observation of animals'

One of the main issues in our knowledge of ANC is a lack of (conceptual) semantic considerations, and there has been little discussion on the motivation behind the use of a possessive structure in the construction. Instead of treating the possessor function as semantically unrestricted in Hungarian (cf. Laczkó 1997), this paper adopts the symbolic thesis (Langacker 1987) and considers the possessor function as being polysemous. Therefore, ANC is treated as an extended schema, a construction distinct from other possessive structures. The paper attempts to explore the semantic basis of the two-faced nature of Hungarian ANC in a usage-based constructionist framework. It also aims to demonstrate that though Hungarian ANC exhibits several properties of possessive constructions as well as those of transitive and intransitive ones, it has some characteristics which none of them manifest (cf. Comrie 2011). The reason for this is that not all the elements of the constructions mentioned above are mapped onto it, and it has emergent meaning. We chose the model of conceptual networks (Fauconnier and Turner 2002) to describe the emergent nature of ANC in the network of constructions.

The next part of the paper provides an overview of the core features of the Hungarian ANC. The third part outlines the main assumptions of our usage-based constructionist approach. Such an assumption is the associative relationship between the argument structure and the verb, and the epiphenomenal nature of word classes. In the fourth part, the constructions in question are investigated as components in a single-scope network. The fifth part concludes.

2. Some characteristics of the Hungarian ANC

As for the number of arguments in ANC, Hungarian belongs to the restricted type (Koptjevskaja-Tamm 2005) as the structure contains only one argument (as a possessor). This argument is the single one of an intransitive AN (cf. "subjective genitive"), or the patient of a transitive AN (cf. "objective genitive"), see again examples (2) and (3).

The use of *való* ~ 'being' grammaticalized from the present participial form of the existential verb *van* 'be' is also characteristic, especially when the ANC expresses a participant as well as a circumstance, as illustrated in example (4a). This paper does not deal with *való*, which presumably provides ANC with temporality and contributes to the sequential (Langacker 1987) link between an action and an adverbial circumstance. Otherwise, in accordance with the schema of Hungarian noun phrases, it is also possible to express an adverbial circumstance and a participant role without *való* if the former follows the ANC, as shown in (4b).

(4a) az állat-ok   erdő-ben   való   megfigyel-és-e
      the animal-PL   forest.SG-INE. be.PTCP   observe-NLZR-PX3SG.NOM
      'observing animals in the forest'

(4b) az állat-ok   megfigyel-és-e   az   erdő-ben
      the animal-PL   observe-NLZR-PX3SG.NOM   the   forest.SG-INE
      'observing animals in the forest'

Although this paper does not address compounding and lexicalization either, in a more nuanced approach, another argument may arise in the structure when the possessed is a deverbal compound, as in example (5a). In this case, the rather passive meaning of Hungarian compounds (see Kiefer 2003; Kugler and Simon 2017) overrides the ergative nature of the Hungarian AN. In addition, the AN can take an agent as a possessor if it is lexicalized via conversion, which has further formal indicators (Szabolcsi and Laczkó 1992). The AN in example (5b), *megfigyelés* 'observation' has been lexicalized – and became a simple event noun (Grimshaw 1990) – according to the action→result metonymic pattern (Palágyi 2021).

(5a)   az   etológus   állat-megfigyel-és-e
       the   ethologist.SG   animal-observe-NLZR-PX3SG
       'ethologist's animal observation'

(5b)   az   etológus   új   megfigyel-és-e
       the   ethologist.SG   new   observe-NLZR-PX3SG
       'the ethologist's new observation'

Metonymic extension of action nominals is often responsible for the ambiguous meaning of the constructs. One might understand *megfigyelés* as a result nominal metonymically extended from the noun *megfigyelés* 'observation' as well as an actual AN derived from the 'surveil' meaning of the polysemous base verb *megfigyel*, see (5c).

(5c)   az   etológus   megfigyel-és-e
       the   ethologist.SG   observe-NLZR-PX3SG
       'the ethologist's observation' / 'surveillance of the ethologist'

3. Usage-based constructionist assumptions

In this section, the issue of the relationship between argument structures and verbs, and that of lexical classes are outlined in a usage-based constructionist framework. We consider morphological and syntactic structures as constructions in terms of schematic form-meaning pairings (Goldberg 1995). Modelling constructions is possible in the first place because they have schematic meaning (relatively) independent of exemplars. The main reason for defining ANC as a particular construction is that the meaning of the construct goes beyond the meaning of the components, i.e., it cannot be completely traced back to the meaning of the possessive structure, and the transitive and intransitive meanings are unmarked (unfeatured) on the formal side.

3.1. Verbs and argument structures

The relationship between verbs and argument structures is important to be clarified because the AN schema is built on a source-oriented generalization (see Bybee 2001) that involves the circumstances and participants of the process type evoked by the base verb. An argument structure involving specific semantic roles inherently relates to the meaning of a syntactic construction. Semantic roles in Hungarian are typically marked via morphological constructions and not by word order or prepositions. Although morphological constructions and syntactic relations contribute to the meaning of the construction, it cannot be derived from them, as shown in examples (6) and (7). A ditransitive construction with a so-called indirective alignment (Haspelmath 2015) can be observed in example (6), *Sári* (diminutive form of the Hungarian version of *Sarah*) in the (default) nominative case designates the agent acting by volition, *játékbabák* 'dolls' in the accusative case (with -*at* suffix) denotes the patients affected by the action, and *gyerekeknek* 'children.DAT' refers to the beneficiaries of the profiled action. In example (7), the nouns take the same case markers; however, *Sári* marks the experiencer who undergoes a cognitive experience, *játékbabák* 'dolls' fulfil

the theme semantic role, and *gyerekek* 'children' expresses the assumed-role (cf. Imrényi 2021) semantic role. Both constructions are considered form-meaning pairings learnt holistically, therefore, the semantic distinction between the two sentences cannot be reduced either to the particular morphological cases or the distinct meanings of the verbs (*ajándékoz* 'give as a gift', *hisz* 'believe'). Instead, we claim that the schematic meaning (and argument structure) of the construction is directly associated with the relevant inflectional constructions, and it is evoked by verbs that are semantically compatible with them.

(6) Sári   a   játékbabák-at gyerekek-nek   ajándékozta.
     Sári.SG.NOM the   doll.PL-ACC   child.PL-DAT   give(as a gift).PST.3SG.DEF
     'Sári gave the dolls to children.'

(7) Sári   a   játékbabák-at gyerekek-nek   hitte.
     Sári.SG.NOM the   doll.PL-ACC   child.PL-DAT   beleive.PST.3SG.DEF
     'Sári thought the dolls were children.'

There are several other verbs capable of representing the constructions illustrated above. The verb of (6) may be replaced by *ad* 'give', *adományoz* 'donate', *küld* 'send', etc., verbs which directly activate three participant roles. However, *ígér* 'promise' and *vesz* 'buy' are also capable of expressing possessive transfer, even if the lexical meaning of the former does not contain a participant role similar to a patient, and that of the latter lacks a beneficiary. Thus, they gain the 'transfer' meaning in the construction (even if it may be lexicalized), in other words, their meaning is compatible with the ditransitive construction metonymically (serving as a reference-point to a complex script from the act of PROMISING/BUYING to that of GIVING).

Accordingly, the verb of (7) could be replaced by *gondol* 'think', *vél* 'reckon', *néz* 'look', etc., verbs which are semantically compatible with the 'perceive and interpret' constructional meaning. Again, each verb mentioned above may activate the script of the cognitive process expressed by the constructional meaning, but their metonymic shift is sanctioned by the construction. The lexical meaning of *gondol* 'think' and *vél* 'reckon' gains the 'perceive' semantic component when fusing with the construction, while that of *néz* 'look' is extended by the 'interpret' semantic component.

All this does not mean that the inflectional constructions and syntactic relations lack usage-based knowledge of the given syntactic constructions to which they contribute. As for the constructions illustrated above, the Hungarian dative case that relates to the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema (Kothencz 2012; Pomázi 2022) is semantically motivated since it indicates the endpoint of a process ("end" of transfer, "result" of cognition) in both constructs. However, the semantic change of morphological constructions is an aspect of constructionalization during which the meaning of morphological constructions is fading compared to the whole, i.e., the meaning of the syntactic construction.

It should be highlighted that while semantic roles serve to describe the meaning of constructions, syntactic roles (SUB, OBJ) belong to their formal side according to Goldberg's construction grammar (1995). However, a purely formal view of syntax is highly problematic from a usage-based perspective; terms like subject, object, and verb (!) should not be treated as formal primitives without any functional (usage-based, semantic) basis (Croft and Cruse 2004). As opposed to the notion of purely formal syntactic properties we adopt the symbolic thesis (Langacker 1987) according to which grammatical structures and relations are inherently semantic and represent (schematic) semantic structures and relations. In our view unipolar (purely formal) relations of grammar are represented by phonological structures, but the terms subject and object refer to (highly schematic and polysemous) semantic relations required for representing the participants of a process. We assume that subject and object do not represent syntactic roles but rather relations within a clause, therefore, constructions not only form a network but their internal structure itself is a network (Imrényi 2021). In Hungarian, these syntactic relations are marked by inflection. A pattern of inflectional constructions is associated with one or more patterns of semantic roles, thus constructions with different meanings may have similar internal network structure. The meaning of an inflected

nominal word-form depends on the activated syntactic construction (see again (6) and (7)). In this spirit, the Hungarian ditransitive construction can be characterized as below.

AGENT	TRANSFER	PATIENT	BENEFICIARY
N_{nom}	V	N_{acc}	N_{dat}

Figure 1. Transfer schema adapted from Imrényi (2021)

As far as the issue of lexical verbs is concerned, they profile participant roles (Goldberg 1995, Langacker 2008), e.g., *ígér* 'promise' profiles someone who makes a promise and someone to whom the promise is made. However, we take a more lexicalist stance according to which verbs evoke semantic roles and syntactic relations as well. According to *Magyar értelmező kéziszótár* "Hungarian Explanatory Dictionary", the verb *ígér* 'promise' activates the nominative–accusative–dative pattern that symbolizes two distinct constructions in which the verb may mean: 1) 'promise something to someone'; 2) 'promise to give an object to someone' (cf. example (6) and Figure 1). We reject the "bottom-up or top-down" dilemma of clausal meaning, and hypothesise that constructions do not only originate with the meaning of frequently used verbs (Goldberg 2006) but the instances play an essential role in the schematized constructions as well (Langacker 2008). Thus, syntactic constructions can be considered exemplar-based schemas, their instantiations are produced by analogical extension (Bybee 2010). Knowing a clausal construction implies knowledge of the verbs which represent it, accordingly, knowing a verb demands knowledge of the constructions which it usually represents. As Taylor puts it: "To know a word is to know, inter alia, the kinds of constructions in which it can occur […]. A further crucial aspect of knowing a word is knowing its frequency in the language, both its overall frequency and its frequency with respect to a range of contextual and situational variables" (2017: 253). From this perspective, the relationship between the verb and the argument structure is still not inherent, but a rather gradual associative relationship for which the *verb → syntactic construction* and *syntactic construction → verb* connections are both responsible. These usage-based connections originate in the semantic integration of the verb's participant roles with the construction's semantic roles. Several verbs may strongly associate the same construction (and argument structure), a verb may associate several constructions, and constructions can take unexpected verbs creatively (on the analogy of the strongly associated ones).

The associative relationship between verbal meaning and the semantic role of the subject must be highlighted in Hungarian. The Hungarian verb may function as a finite clause in itself since it morphologically always expresses tense, mood, person and number, that is to say, the verb is the basis of agreement as it always involves the subject (Imrényi 2021).[2] Although a verb may evoke constructions that vary in transitivity as well (see *készül* 'sy prepare for sg', 'sg is being made'), knowledge of a Hungarian verb typically includes the semantic role associated with its subject, i.e. the nominative dependent with which it agrees in person and number (Imrényi 2017). What is more, the type of profiled participants belongs to the meaning of Hungarian verbal derivational constructions. For instance, a derivate with an *-ít* suffix profiles an active participant (see *meleg* 'warm' → *melegít* 'to warm sg'), while one with an *-od(ik)/ed(ik)/öd(ik)* ending profiles a passive one (see *meleg* 'warm' → *meleged(ik)* 'sg is warming').

Although action nominals evoke the constructional meanings typically represented by the base verb, the circumstances and participants of the process type can be backgrounded when it is integrated into the AN morphological construction, as shown in example (8). According to the rule-based description (see Laczkó 2000), *készítés* 'making, preparing' should only appear as a

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[2] The historical reason for this is that the Hungarian finite verb is an ancient clause (Havas 2003), thus syntactic constructions are partly grammaticalized within it.

possessee in the ANC (see (8a)) because its base verb requires a patient semantic role (*Peti készít √ 'Peti is making/preparing'). However, in the case of (8b), the transitive meaning obligatory at the base verb is not represented, and the result of "making" is accessible only contextually. Examples (8a) and (8b) demonstrate that the relationship between the clausal construction evoked by the verb and the ANC is not transformational in any sense. Instead, they are constructions more or less associated in the constructicon (network of constructions), and this associative relationship is obviously observable on the level of constructs (what is more, it is built on the lexical level from a usage-based perspective).

(8a) ajándék   készít-és-e
      gift.SG   prepare-NLZR-PX3SG.NOM
      'preparing a gift'

(8b) A **készít-és**[3] fortélyait   a   saját nagyapjától   leste el[4]
      the make-NLZR finesse.PL-PX3SG.ACC   the own   grandfather.PX3SG.ABL   learn.PST.3SG.DEF
      'He learned the tricks of making from his own grandfather.'

3.2. Word classes

Adjectival, adverbial, and nominal schemas have relatively fuzzy boundaries in Hungarian, but the verbal schema is clearly delimited regarding morphological as well as syntactic constructions. This means that Hungarian nominal and verbal constructions are easily separable. The two schemas primarily differ in their construal (Langacker 1987). The cognitive motivation behind the AN morphological construction is that while in the case of the base verb, the process is represented as a sequence of instantaneous states, it can be holistically represented as a THING when integrated into nominal morphosyntactic schemas, and all instantaneous states are mapped onto each other. As we have seen in examples (1) and (8b), the schematic participants are not necessarily part of the meaning (Tolcsvai Nagy 2017). However, the AN only partially represents the nominal schema, strictly speaking, an AN construct cannot be defined as being a noun. It does not take numerous nominal determiners and its inflectional pattern is defective as it lacks plural forms. This could be in correlation with its capability of expressing verbal meaning and semantic components of clausal constructions.

The lexical status of AN is unclear (see section 4), thus it is worth outlining a usage-based notion of word classes. As far as word classes and schematicity relations are concerned, low-level generalisations need to be primary in a usage-based framework. We assume that rich knowledge characterizes low-level schemas that can be lexically instantiated. Information is not cumulated but schematized in high-level schemas that are based on the shared properties of the more specific ones. Thus, we do not assume either inheritance links (cf. Booij 2017) or morphosyntactic properties without word class labels (cf. Kenesei 2010). Word classes can be defined as extremely general (and so widely functioning) language-specific, epiphenomenal (Croft 2001) schemas of different constructions with few characteristics. The characteristics of word classes are possibly overlapping. In the rest of the paper, we approach ANC as a morphosyntactic blend of possessive (nominal) and transitive, intransitive (verbal) constructions.

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[3] It could be raised that the noun in the example is a simple event nominal (Grimshaw 1990). In that case it would take plural (Szabolcsi and Laczkó 1994; Palágyi 2021). However, the plural form of the noun only appears as a result nominal with 'products' meaning in the Hungarian Gigaword Corpus (Oravecz et al. 2014).
[4] Source: Hungarian Gigaword Corpus (Oravecz et al. 2014).

4. Action nominal construction as a blend in a single-scope network

In this section, ANC is investigated as a conceptual blend. The model of blending (Fauconnier and Turner 2002) originally serves to handle the semantic integration of mental spaces and not that of relatively stable conceptual structures such as constructions. Although we do not treat the elaboration of ANC, and the schema extension of possessive structure as an on-line mental operation, it can still be assumed that constructions are interrelated, a construct of ANC is (at least partially) motivated and sanctioned by other verbal and nominal constructions.

     In conceptual integration, two input spaces are mapped onto each other to create a new, integrated space. The structure of the input spaces mirrors that of the generic space that motivates the integration. As can be seen in Figure 2, correspondences between generic, input, and blended spaces play an important role in the emergence and structure of the network. Only those components of the input space are mapped onto the integrated space which correspond to components in the other input space.

Figure 2. A basic integration network
(adapted from Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 46)

Different types of conceptual networks are distinguished according to the nature of mapping. Single-scope networks are relevant from our perspective as ANC clearly shows formal properties of the possessive structure, that is to say, the integrated space mirrors the structure of only one input space. The single-scope network is based on metaphorization, an input space is understood in the terms of another one. The latter is a framing input that organises the former called focus input. As shown in Figure 3, the blend inherits the internal structure of the framing input, while the focus input is mapped onto the blend in a rather diffuse way.

Figure 3. Structuring focus input by inner-space projection from framing input
(adapted from Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 130)

4.1. Input spaces

The input spaces of ANC are possessive constructions (as the framing input) and verbal constructions (as the focus input). The correspondences between input spaces make mappings onto ANC possible. The input spaces and correspondences in question are examined below.

4.1.1. Framing input – possessive constructions

Constructions expressing possession can be modelled as reference-point structures (Langacker 1999). Tolcsvai Nagy (2017) describes the Hungarian possessor as a reference-point (R), a mental starting point that provides access to a target (T) (the possessee) within a conceptual domain (D). In example (9a), *Sári* serves as a reference-point for the real topic of the discourse event, i.e., the dog that is placed at the centre of attention. As illustrated in examples (9b–e), the reference-point may be the speaker and the partner, either separately (9b–c) or together (9d).

(9a) Sári kutyá-ja　　　　(9b) a kutyá-m.　　　　(9c) a kutyá-d
　　　Sári dog-PX3SG.NOM　　　　the dog-PX1SG.NOM　　　　the dog-PX2SG.NOM
　　　'Sári's dog'　　　　　　　'my dog'　　　　　　　　'your dog'

(9d) a kutyá-nk　　　　(9e) a kutyá-tok　　　　(9f) a kutyá-ja
　　　the dog-PX1PL.NOM　　　　the dog-PX2PL.NOM　　　　the dog-PX3SG.NOM
　　　'our dog'　　　　　　　　'your dog'　　　　　　　'his/her dog'

Concerning the 1st and 2nd persons, it is always sufficient to mark the T in the reference-point structure outlined above, because the given speaker and his/her partners are known in the discourse event (when the 1st or 2nd person pronouns precede the possessee, they usually receive stress on the formal side and more attention on the semantic side). However, in 3rd person (see (9a) and (9f)), omitting the R (the possessor) is only possible if it has been activated in the discourse.

　　　The use of a morphologically featured possessor is also a characteristic way, especially in the 3rd person, of expressing a reference-point structure. The possessor can also be in the dative case that is functionally similar to the genitive of Indo-European languages. Word order plays an important role in the reference-point structure. When the possessor is in its default, unfeatured form, the R always precedes the T. As illustrated in examples (10a) and (10b), the use of dative case allows word order to be flexible. Nevertheless, the iconic mapping of the mental path is still more characteristic, the R goes before the T more frequently even when it is in the dative case (Pomázi 2022). The motivation behind the grammaticalization of dative is that the construction expresses the result of getting hold of something. The spatiality and direction of the goal are metaphorical (Tolcsvai Nagy 2013: 264).

(10a) Sári-nak　　a　　kutyá-ja　　　　(10b) a　　kutyá-ja　　　　Sári-nak
　　　Sári.SG-DAT the dog-PX3SG.NOM　　　　the dog-PX3SG.NOM Sári.SG-DAT
　　　'Sári's dog'　　　　　　　　　　　　　'the dog of Sári'

Two types of formal elaboration might cooccur in the 3rd person, thus it is possible to express multiple reference-point structures. In the case of example (11), Sári's dog is a T and R at the same time. The construction focuses attention on the dog in relation to Sári, but the dog is backgrounded in relation to its profiled collar.

(11)　　Sári　　　　kutyá-já-nak　　a　　nyakörv-e
　　　Sári　　　　dog-PX3SG-DAT　　the collar-PX3SG.NOM
　　　'the collar of Sári's dog'

The possessive relationship expressed by -é also needs to be mentioned in the network of Hungarian possessive constructions. It is worth comparing the reference-point structure in example (12a) with example (12b), which has already been dealt with. Supposing that the constructs refer to the same scene, the T is the possessee in both cases. The meaning of R (Sári) is specific and that of T is schematic in example (12a). On the other hand, the T is detailed (the dog) and the R is schematized in (12b). This is in close connection with the information structure of the two expressions. The category of DOG needs to be activated to understand (12a), and Sári needs to be contextually accessible to understand (12b).

(12a)   a   Sári-é   ugat
          the   Sári-POSS.NOM   bark.PRS.3SG
          'Sári's one is barking'

(12b)   a   kutyá-ja   ugat
          the   dog-PX3SG.NOM   bark.PRS.3SG
          'his/her dog is barking'

As opposed to the examples above, the existence of the mental path is highlighted in examples (13) and (14), and its direction is expressed by the meaning of the whole clause. In (13), the possessor and the possessee mark a conceptual domain the conceptualizer can share with his/her partner(s). The possessee (the dog) is the "topic" in the information structure of the clause, while the possessor is the "comment". The information structure of the clause is responsible for the foreground/background alignment of the possessor and the possessee, but their relationship is more symmetric than that of the reference-point structure, attention is not shifted on the possessor, and the possessee is not backgrounded either. A possessive clause with the so-called dative-possessive (see 14) also serves to share a conceptual domain in Hungarian.[5] Unlike the reference-point structures of (12a) and (12b), the possessor and the possessee have a temporally construed syntactic relationship in (13) and (14). Both (13) and (14) may be used to direct attention to a relationship between the possessor and the possessee. This relationship is construed differently by the two with regard to information structure but both contain temporality and (here indicative) mood of the clausal meaning.

(13)   a   kutya   Sári-é
        the   dog.SG.NOM   Sári-POSS.NOM
        'the dog belongs to Sári'

(14)   Sári-nak   van   kutyá-ja.
        Sári.SG-DAT(POSS)   be.PRS.3SG   dog-PX3SG.NOM
        'Sári has a dog'

4.1.2. Focus input – intransitive and transitive constructions

Hungarian is a nominative-accusative language, thus the targeted participant of an action is marked with respect to the participant that is not targeted no matter whether it is an active or passive participant. The secondary role of a transitive action with two participants is represented by the accusative case with -(V)t suffix. The so-called primary and secondary character of the roles can be described in terms of a trajector–landmark asymmetry (Langacker 1987); however, this relation is supplemented by another type of cognitive hierarchy in Hungarian. In his analysis, Imrényi (2020) draws our attention to the explanatory value of Langacker's billiard-ball model concerning the Hungarian subject. In terms of the model, participants of a scene represented by a clause are described as discrete physical objects that move around in space due to some form of energy, especially that acquired through interactions with other objects. In this sense, the Hungarian

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[5] The motivation behind the grammaticalization of the existential verb in 3rd person resides in its 'existing' semantic component (Tolcsvai Nagy 2016).

subject profiles the most important participant regarding energy transfer, it represents the source of the action (or action chain) represented by a verb. For instance, the verb *becsuk* 'close', 'shut down' profiles two participant roles and the one that is the starting point of the energy transfer is the subject, as illustrated in (15a). When the base verb takes the *-ódik* suffix, the middle verb *becsukódik* 'sg closes' profiles a single participant which is represented as a subject, as shown in (15b). When elaborating a causative derivational construction, the verb *becsukat* 'get sg closed' profiles three participant roles, and again, the source of the energy transfer is represented by the subject relation, as illustrated in (15c) (adapted from Imrényi 2020: 175). Accusative case, for its part, marks the endpoint (the door, the shop) of the action chain in (15a) and (15c) as well.

(15a)   Péter   becsukta   az   ajtó-t.
        Péter.SG.NOM   close.PST.3SG.DEF   the   door.SG-ACC
        'Péter closed the door.'

(15b)   Az ajtó   becsukódott.
        the door.SG.NOM   close.PST.3SG
        'The door has closed.'

(15c)   A hatóság   becsukatta   a boltossal   a   bolt-ot.
        the authority.SG.NOM   close.PST.3SG.DEF   the shopkeeper.SG.INS   the shop.SG-ACC
        'The authority had the shopkeeper close the shop.'

In the constructs above, the nominative case can express the agent (see (15a), (15c)) and patient (see (15b)) thematic roles, while the accusative represents the patient (see (15a) and (15c)). In other constructions with a single participant, the nominative case might represent a theme as well, as it is illustrated in (16a). The nominative–accusative pattern of a clause might also express a lower degree of transitivity. It typically represents an experiencer–theme semantic relationship associated with sense verbs (see (16b)); or agent–location relationship evoked by motion verbs (see (16c)). The nominative–accusative pattern can represent the theme–experiencer semantic relationship as well, but it is associated only with a few verbs such as *érdekel* '(to) interest (someone)' and *foglalkoztat* '(to) concern (someone)', see (16d).

(16a)   Innen   látszik   a   torony.
        from here   seem.PRS.3SG the   tower.SG.NOM
        'The tower can be seen from here.'

(16b)   Innen   jól   látom   a   koncert-et.
        from here   well   see.PRS.1SG.DEF   the   concert.SG-ACC
        'I can see the concert well from here.'

(16c)   Budapesten   kíváncsian   jártam   az   utcák-at.
        Budapest.SG.SUPE curiously   walk.PST.1SG.DEF   the   street.PL-ACC
        'I curiously walked the streets in Budapest.'

(16d)   Peti-t   érdekli   az   irodalom.
        Peti.SG-ACC   interest.PRS.3SG.DEF   the   literature.SG.NOM
        'Literature interests Peti.'

The next section explores the correspondence between the possessive and verbal constructions.

4.1.3. Mappings of elements across inputs

As it has been already mentioned, the network that results in the ANC can be described as a single-scope network because it is the possessive structure that basically frames the components of the transitive and intransitive constructions evoked by a verb. In the case of single-scope networks, it should be emphasized that the framing input is a well-structured space, while the focus input is a rather diffuse one (see again Figure 3). In our case, this means that the semantic pole of the clausal construction evoked by a verb is (partially) mapped onto the symbolic elements of the possessive construction, the former is therefore purely conceptual, more flexible and abstract, while the latter is symbolic, formally fixed knowledge (residing in the associative relationship between the phono-logical and semantic poles).

As shown in Figure 4, the possessee corresponds to the process type evoked by a base verb (we deal with the nominalization of the verb concerning the blended space). The possessor corresponds to the noun that has the agent or patient thematic role with subject or object dependency relation-ship of the intransitive construction; or the transitive construction's patient or object dependency relationship (which are marked by the nominative and accusative case). As it has been already mentioned in section 2, one actor can be mapped onto the possessor in the noun construction, thus the mapping is partial from this point of view.


Figure 4. Mappings across inputs

The meaning of the subject and object dependency relation is mapped onto the AN in such a way that it is formally marked by a possessive structure. Although, as shown in Figure 4, the subject and object relationship between the verb and the noun corresponds to the reference-point structure of the possessee and the possessor, the construal of the ANC is fundamentally different from the reference-point structure of the possessive construction. In the ANC, the relationship between the possessee and the possessor does not denote the relationship between two things, but that between a THING and a PROCESS. Participant roles of the process type evoked by a verb can optionally be backgrounded (see (8b)), thus it is obviously not the THING that makes the PROCESS accessible. When they cooccur, the participant role and the process type form a conceptual unit and they are semantic conditions for each other. Proof of this is that even when an additional AN is added to the semantic unit expressed by the possessive relationship, the participant role and the AN still fulfil the modifier function in a conceptually indivisible manner. While in example (11), Sári (the first possessor) became finally backgrounded with respect to the collar, and the dog is R and T at the same time, in example (17), the 'minister' is not backgrounded, the 'visit' in dative is neither an R nor a T, disapproval concerns the whole scene of which the minister is the main actor. The seman-tic distinction between the two construal can be described as follows:

PS [[[participant]participant]]participant] ↔ ANC [[participant−process]process].

(17) a   miniszter   Budapestre   látogat-ás-á-nak   helytelenít-és-e
     the   minister.SG Budapest.SG.SUB   visit-NLZR-PX3SG-DAT   disapprove-NLZR-PX3SG
     'disapproval of the minister's visitation to Budapest'

Accordingly, even when the participant is backgrounded, as in example (18a), the meaning of AN (*látogatás* 'visitation') might be anchored to a person; however, the construal of *kutya* 'dog' is not anchored to the owner of the dog , he/she is simply not part of the semantic structure (the owner can play a role in comprehension from a purely conceptual, unipolar aspect, e.g. with the collar evoking that it is not a stray dog).

(18a) a   látogat-ás   helytelenít-és-e   (18b) a   kutya   nyakörv-e
      the   visit-NLZR.SG   disapprove-NLZR-PX3SG   the   dog.SG.NOM   collar-PX3SG
      'disapproval of the visitation'   'collar of the dog'

It is important to consider that the meaning of clausal constructions characterized by lower transitivity degree cannot always be mapped onto the possessive structure (and hence to the ANC). Those verbs are easily compatible with AN and ANC that can evoke dynamism, change of state. Although the verbs *látszik* 'seem', *lát* 'see', *érdekel* 'interest' elaborate clausal constructions with subject and object dependency relations (as it has been outlined in 4.1.2), it is difficult to fit them into the ANC: ?*a torony látsz-ás-a* (seem-NLZR-PX3SG) 'seeming of the tower', ?*a koncert lát-ás-a* (see-NLZR-PX3SG) 'seeing the concert', **Peti érdeklése* (interest-NLZR-PX3SG) 'interesting (of) Peti'. The probable reason for this is that there is no change of state in the processes evoked by the base verbs above. This suggests that the subject and object syntactic relations do not correspond to the possessive construction in general, but specifically in the framework of the transitive and intransitive constructions containing the thematic roles of agent and patient – which, like other constructions outlined in 4.1.2, are based on (the schematic relational meaning of) the subject and object dependencies. Nor does it seem sufficient for semantic compatibility if one of the two actors performs a dynamic action. The lack of semantic coherence can be observable with the nominal derivate of the verb *jár* 'walk' (see 16c) as a possessee even if it evokes the nominative−accusative pattern with agent−location meaning: ?*a város jár-ás-a* (walk-NLZR-PX3SG) 'walking the city'. Here, *a város* 'the city' denotes the circumstance of motion, but it does not undergo a change of state.

   Mapping of the experiencer and the theme with transitive meaning, as well as in some cases the intransitive theme, becomes possible when a verbal particle construes a change of state by means of indicating an endpoint and/or starting point of the action. This semantic operation is very important in relation to the transitivity scale, since it provides the action with punctuality and telicity (Hopper and Thompson 1980). The Hungarian verbal particle fulfils this semantic criterion. The punctual aspect of a process can be foregrounded as follows: *a koncert meg-hall-ás-a* (PERF-hear-NLZR-PX3SG) 'hearing (all of a sudden) the concert'. The telic aspect of an action can be foregrounded as follows: *a város be-jár-ás-a* (PERF-walk-NLZR-PX3SG) 'walking around the city'. The semantic criterion can be met without verbal particles as well. For instance, it is possible for the theme of the verb *észlel* 'perceive, detect' to correspond to the possessor because of its punctual meaning: *a hiba észlel-és-e* (detect-NLZR-PX3SG) 'detecting the error'. Based on all of this, it seems that the meaning of the ANC rests on the meaning of transitive and intransitive constructions with agent and patient thematic roles.

   The cognitive hierarchy that characterizes the Hungarian clausal constructions (see 4.1.2) is not mapped onto the possessive construction. What is more, that of the possessive construction is just the opposite, the endpoint (or single actor) of the action chain corresponds to the possessor, the one to which something happens – the ergative nature of ANC is based on this cognitive hierarchy. Although a possessor expressed by word order, hence without morphological marker (see the examples in (9)) is more frequent in modern Hungarian (81,5% vs. 18,5% according to Pomázi 2022), the ergative semantic construction of the clausal meaning might be traced back to the dative case by which the possessor also can be expressed (see example (10)). The dative construction

typically denotes the direction and/or endpoint of a process (see the syntactic constructions illustrated by examples (6) and (7)), which can also be seen in the schematic meaning of possession. It is possible that the meaning of the dative morphological construction indeed motivated the correspondence between the patient (as the endpoint of an action) and the possessor. The use of dative in the possessive structure is much more characteristic in literary records of Old Hungarian, although Korompay (1991) claims that these texts (mainly translations) are not representative because of the influence of Latin. However, this reasoning does not concern data from Modern Hungarian (1772–1920). A random sample of 200 ANC construction from the Hungarian Historical Corpus between 1773 and 1847 suggests that the use of an unmarked (unfeatured) possessor became dominant only in this period.


Figure 5. Distribution of featured and unmarked (unfeatured) action nominal possessors between 1773 and 1847 in Hungarian Historical Corpus

As can be seen in Figure 5, the use of dative proved to be more frequent before the so-called Hungarian Reform Era (1825–1848). That is to say, it is possible that even if the unmarked (unfeatured) possessor became primary in the ANC, the semantic correspondence between the patient and the possessor prevails because of the dative case.

Between the input spaces, not only the existence of mappings, but also their absence is revealing. In the network of possessive constructions, the action noun is compatible with the meaning of some constructions and incompatible with others, that is, some constructions functionally related to the possessive construction as framing input have a corresponding one, while others have no correspondence on the focus input side. Among the possessive constructions outlined in 3.1.1, the construction with the -é marker is compatible with the possessor, however, only in the function illustrated by (12a), see (19a). As for the function illustrated by (13), the constructional meaning evoked by a verb cannot be mapped onto, see (19b). In the former case, the process expressed by ANC can be defined as a topic in the information structure of the sentence, that is why its elliptic use is comprehensible. Concerning the latter one, a conceptualizer should assign and share a conceptual domain containing a process and an actor, which is impossible in Hungarian. The possessor and the possessee, hence the process and the actor of ANC must play the same role in the information structure of the clause.

(19a)   Sári   kirúg-ás-a   bosszant,   Peti-é   nem.
        Sári.SG   dismiss-NLZR-PX3SG.NOM   upset.PRS.3SG Peti-POSS.NOM   not.
        'Sári's dismissal makes me upset, that of Peti does not.'

(19b)   *A   kirúg-ás   Sári-é.
         The   dismiss-NLZR.NOM   Sári-POSS.NOM
        'The dismissal belongs to Sári.'

Accordingly, another possessive construction that serves to assign and share a conceptual domain is also incompatible with the ANC's constructional meaning, see example (20).

(20) *Sári-nak   van   kirúg-ás-a.
       Sári.SG-DAT   be.PRS.3SG   dismiss-NLZR-PX3SG.NOM.
       'Sári has dismissal.'

The impossibility of assigning and sharing a domain, as well as the incompatibility of the AN meaning with these structures, can also be traced back to the fact that the actor and the process are conceptually inseparable from each other (the actor can only be backgrounded in the ANC), i.e., there is no point in emphasizing the relationship between them.

4.2. Generic space

Although we can see many correspondences between possessive constructions and clausal constructions, which are also mapped onto the ANC as a blend (see section 4.3), the existence of correspondences does not yet explain their creation. The generic space motivates the mappings between the input spaces, as it "provides information that is abstract enough to be common to both (or all) the inputs." (Croft and Cruse 2004: 404). The possessive construction and the clausal construction share quite abstract characteristics on both the semantic and formal sides.

Correspondences between the input spaces are motivated by the fact that a mental path is symbolized in both constructions. The possessive structure is a reference-point structure, during the comprehension of which the reference-point provides access to a target, while in the clausal construction the actors are connected to each other in a chain of actions. As for syntactic symbolization, both mental paths are expressed in a dependency relationship. The head of the clausal construction is the verb, that of the possessive construction is the possessee, the adjuncts are nouns in the former case, and the possessor is an adjunct in the latter. There are also similarities in the formal marking of these syntactic relations in Hungarian. In the case of a verb and a corresponding AN, there are (for historical reasons) parallels in the formal elaboration of personal deixis (see (21a)). Another morphological correlation is that the adjuncts that correspond to each other are in unfeatured default forms (see (21b)) or suffixed forms with -nAk (see (21c)).

(21a) lát-**om**   barát-**om**   lát-**od**   barát-**od**
       give-1SG.DEF   friend-PX1SG   give-2SG.DEF   friend-PX1SG
       'I see it'   'my friend'   'you see it'   'your friend'

(21b) Peti∅   lát-**ja**   Peti∅   barát-**ja**
       Peti.SG.NOM   give-3SG.DEF   Peti.SG   friend-PX3SG
       'Peti sees it'   'friend of Peti'

(21c) Peti-**nek** ad-ja   Peti-**nek**   barát-ja
       Peti-DAT   give-3SG.DEF   Peti-DAT   friend-PX3SG
       'He/she gives it to Peti'   'Peti's friend'

The abstract correspondences outlined above can be represented in terms of input spaces as follows. It is important to emphasize that these correspondences are the basis of the network, they motivate the formation of mappings between the input spaces, that is, their significance can be raised primarily from a diachronic point of view.

Figure 6. Generic space and input spaces of ANC

Among these correspondences of the generic space, the structure of the possessive construction and the action chain as a mental path are mapped onto the ANC. The mapping of correspondences of the input spaces motivated by the generic space onto the ANC, as well as person deixis and grounding in general, are already aspects of the ANC as a blended space.

4.3. Blended space

Correspondences between the input spaces motivated by the generic space are mapped onto the ANC as a blend. Nominalization is a key aspect of the mapping process. The formal elaboration of the possessive structure is possible if the verb that evokes the meaning of the syntactic construction is (at least partially) nominalized. The fact that the verb continues to evoke the meaning of the syntactic constructions in which it frequently participates proves the partial nature of nominalization. While conceptual autonomy is a principal characteristic of nominal meaning (Langacker 2008), the semantic structure of AN can in many cases be characterized by conceptual dependency (similar to the meaning of base verbs) in the sense that it denotes a RELATION between concepts that are construed as THINGS. As can be seen in examples (22a) and (22b), the AN also inherits the (morpho-syntactically expressed) conceptual dependency of the verb, i.e. – as already discussed in relation with example (8b) – often not all actors of the process type evoked by the verb can be backgrounded (cf. (22c) and (22d)).

(22a)   *abbahagy-ok
          break off.PRS-1SG
          'I'm breaking off'

(22b)   *abbahagy-ás
          break off-NLZR
          'breaking off'

(22c)   abbahagy-ok   egy   beszélgetést
          break off.PRS-1SG   a   dialogue.SG.ACC
          'I stop a conversation'

(22d)   a   beszélgetés   abbahagy-ás-a
         the   dialogue.SG.NOM   breaking off-NLZR-PX3SG.NOM
         'breaking off the dialogue'

As far as morphological formation is concerned, though the (partial) nominalization of the verb is necessary for the process type it evokes to be a possessee, knowledge of ANC is not restricted to the highly productive [V-Ás]ₙₐ morphological construction. As shown in example (23), the possessee may evoke a verbal meaning in other ways as well. The word *rekonstrukció* obviously functions as an AN, since it has verbal adjuncts in a "*való*" structure (see section 2, example (4a)). What is more, the Hungarian AN *rekonstrukció* 'reconstruction' and the verb *rekonstruál* 'reconstruct' it evokes are not in a concatenative relationship (unlike their English counterparts), but in a paradigmatic, lateral one. The combined functioning of the concatenative and paradigmatic morphological relations in the ANC suggests the adequacy of word-based morphological description (see Blevins 2006) as opposed to the morpheme-based approach.

(23)
elveszett naplóm   gondolati **anyag-á-nak**   emlékezetből való   **rekonstrukció-ja**[6]
lost   diary.PX1SG mental   material-PX3SG-DAT memory.SG.ILL be.PTCP reconstruction-PX3SG.NOM'
'reconstruction of the thought material of my lost diary from memory'

The word-based approach is also supported by the fact that ANs representing morphological construction that are no longer productive can also serve as possessees The lexicalized and highly polysemous noun *tétel* 'item', 'premise' can originally be traced back to the verb *tesz* 'take', 'put', 'do', 'make', but regardless of its opacity and polysemy, the noun has also preserved its function as an AN, i.e., in the ANC, it recalls the verb *tesz* despite the fact that it does not represent a productive pattern, and it no longer has the meaning of 'taking' or 'putting' by itself. Example (24) is an instance for *tétel* as an AN.

(24)   a   kép   átlátszóvá   **tétel-e**
        the   image   transparent.SG.TRANS   making-PX3SG.NOM
        'making the image transparent'

All of this suggest that the constituency of morphological formation has only a secondary importance concerning the V→AN formation, which is based on varied (paradigmatic, concatenative, productive, unproductive) word-based associative relationships (cf. Chomsky's (1970) notion on inflectional and derivational AN). That is to say, ANC is the result of simultaneous processes on different levels of the lexicon-grammar continuum. Simultaneity is reflected in the conceptual dependency of AN outlined above (see (19)): it can be assumed from a usage-based perspective that nominalization cannot precede the creation of the possessive structure, but it goes hand in hand with the mapping of the clausal construction onto the possessive structure. Furthermore, the fulfilment of the AN role in ANC has semantic criteria (even if the [V-Ás]ₙₐ morphological construction productively serves to fulfil them).

   As it can be seen in Figure 7 below, components of the input spaces are blended in the ANC, and the relationship between them corresponds to that between the base verb and its adjuncts.

[6] Source: Hungarian National Corpus.

Figure 7. Semantic network of action nominal construction

The blended nature of the ANC is also reflected in grounding. As for the partiality of nominalization mentioned above, it is also demonstrated by the fact that the typical nominal grounding elements function in a particular way in ANC. The adjustment of the process along with its participants to the speech situation is an important factor in the generic space concerning both input spaces (see section 4.2). Accordingly, the possessor and the possessed both contribute to the grounding of the action nominal construct, they are coreferential in ANC. However, the possessor (the participant of the process) plays the main role in grounding. The AN cannot symbolically be adjusted to the speech situation, it lacks quantifiers, it cannot have an indefinite article, and it does not have plural forms either.[7]

The lack of grounding elements mentioned above is in correlation with the unbounded construal of AN as well. It is true that the AN can take spatial case markers that are primarily associated with bounded objects (Pomázi 2020), but e.g. the meaning of inessive does not necessarily involve boundedness, even the boundaries of a CONTAINER can be fuzzy (cf., *víz-ben* water-INE 'in water'). There are a few constructions where the STATES ARE CONTAINERS metaphor contributes to the meaning of action nominals in inessive or elative case, with the ANs construed as denoting states via these spatial configurations, as illustrated by examples (25a) and (25b).

(25a)   most   jöttem   a   fut-ás-ból[8]
         now   come.PST.1SG   the   run-NLZR-ELA
         'I've just come from running.'

(25b)   minden   szület-és-ben   és   el-múl-ás-ban   van[9]
         everything born-NLZR-INE   and   away-pass-NLZR-INE   be.PRS.3SG
         'Everything is in birth and passing away.'

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[7] When a deverbal noun with *-ás* suffix has a determiner or appears in a plural form, it is understood as a simple event noun (Grimshaw 1990) with an actual 'event' meaning.
[8] Source: Hungarian National Corpus.
[9] Source: Hungarian National Corpus.

The lack of quantifiers and indefinite articles concerns not only ANs but the process as a possessee in ANC as well. However, the process in ANC is always grounded via its participant (agent or patient). The construal of this person has the characteristics of prototypical nouns, that is to say, it can be grounded by quantifiers and number marking, as illustrated by examples (26a) and (26b). Definite articles (*a* and *az*) can contribute to specific and unspecific readings of both singular and plural nouns in Hungarian. The nominal designating the main participants of (26a) (*a két szakszervezeti vezető* 'the two union leaders') has a specific meaning, the process of dismissal is grounded to two specific persons. By contrast, the nominal referring to the main participants of (26b) (*rendőri vezetők* 'police chiefs') has a generic meaning, consequently, the process of dismissal is not anchored to anyone specifically.

(26a) a   két   szakszervezeti vezető   kirúg-ás-a   kapcsán (…)   tiltakozik[10]
      the   two   union   leader   dismiss-NLZR-PX3SG   concerning   protest.PRS.3SG
      'He is protesting because of the dismissal of the two union leaders.'

(26b) általános   volt   a   rendőri   vezető-k   kirúg-ás-a[11]
      general   be.pst.3sg   the   police   leader-pl   dismiss-NLZR-PX3SG
      'Dismissal of police chiefs was common.'

As for temporality, the verbal grounding elements do not characterise the process as a possessee, temporal relations can be expressed metaphorically in ANC by spatial postpositions (see (27a-b)) and the [X$_N$-*kor*] 'at the time of X' morphological construction also known as temporal case in Hungarian (see (27c)). (27a) and (27b) make the originally sequential concept of running accessible as a whole. It is worth highlighting that there are 37 nouns with -*Ás* suffix among the 50 most frequent lexemes that represent the temporal case according to the HNC, that is to say, temporalis might be strongly associated with ANs. However, it can be decided only by qualitative analysis how many instances are actual action nominals with a 'process' meaning (complex event nominal) and how many have metonymically extended 'event' meanings (simple event nominal).

(27a) a   fut-ás-om   előtt   (27b) a   fut-ás-om   után
      the   run-NLZR-PX1SG   efore   the   run-NLZR-PX1SG   after
      'before my run'   'after my run'

(27c) a   fut-ás-om-kor
      the   run-NLZR-PX1SG-TEMP
      'when I run'

Finally, it is important to highlight those characteristics of ANC that the input spaces do not possess, in other words, the particular role that the ANC plays in the Hungarian constructicon. Firstly, since there is no passive construction in Hungarian on the clausal level (a passive-like meaning is usually expressed by 3rd person plural forms of active verbs), an essential advantage of using ANC is the possibility of backgrounding the agent and foregrounding the patient. In examples (26a) and (26b), the trajectors of the dismissal event are the ones who have been dismissed (the union leaders and police chiefs) and the landmark (those who fired them) are not elaborated at all. Secondly, complex events involving several processes are usually expressed by subordinated interclausal relations in Hungarian, see examples (28a) and (28b). The ANC makes the embedding of a process possible within a clause, see again examples (26a) and (26b). This means that though the clausal core (Imrényi 2017; 2022) does not involve the particular scene in the ANC (unlike (28a) and (28b),

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[10] Source: Hungarian National Corpus.
[11] Source: Hungarian National Corpus.

where firing is the process designated by the core of a subordinated clause), multiple actions are compressed into one clause in ANC.

(28a) Tiltakozik   azért,   mert   két   szakszervezeti vezetőt   kirúgtak.
       protest.PRS.3SG   for that   because   two   union   leader.SG.ACC   fire.PST.3PL
       '(S)he is protesting because two union leaders were fired.'

(28b) Általános volt   az,   hogy   a   rendőri vezetőket   kirúgták.
       common   be.PST.3SG   that   that   the   police chief.PL.ACC   fire.PST.3PL
       'It was common for police chiefs to be fired.'

5. Summary

This paper investigated the semantics of action nominal constructions (ANCs) in Hungarian. Our theoretical assumptions concerning grammatical structures were defined in the framework of usage-based construction grammar. ANCs were investigated in the model of conceptual integration.

   The input spaces of the ANC network are intransitive and transitive syntactic constructions characteristic of nominative-accusative languages on the one hand, and nominal possessive constructions on the other. Agent and patient semantic roles correspond to the formal components of certain possessive constructions. The ergative nature of mapping can be explained by the symbolic structure and the grammaticalization of the possessor in Hungarian. Although the use of dative case is claimed in the literature to be a secondary (marked) way to express the possessor, it proved to be dominant before the reform era (1773–1825) according to our corpus analysis. The motivation behind the mapping between constructions can be captured by a generic space. The constructions share a mental path semantic structure and an inflectional pattern that makes the grounding of a person possible. However, the emergent nature of the meaning of ANC is also reflected in grounding, as instead of the asymmetric reference-point structure of possession, it holistically serves to refer to a person or thing. Finally, compression and passivation are further functions that cannot be simply traced back to possessive or verbal constructions. These cognitive advantages might also motivate the use of ANC.

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INEFFABILITY AS A LINGUISTIC PROBLEM

Sergei Kuzeev

ELTE Eötvös Loránd University
sergei.kuzeev@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/ 0000-0003-4051-1676

Abstract

The paper deals with the problem of ineffability − intuitively felt unsayability of certain mental contents that are mainly concerned with our sensual domain − and tries to transfer this notion from philosophy into the domain of cognitive linguistics. It demonstrates that in both day-to-day communication and, especially, in the language of literature, ineffability is relativized through various strategies − trivialization, deixis, verbal ellipsis, and figurativity − of which the latter is of utmost importance. The recognition of the role of figurative language in the communication of the ineffable opens up new cognitive horizons both for the notion itself and for the verbal art, which is its principal realm.

Keywords: phenomenal consciousness, qualia, phenomeme, figurative language, ineffability

1. Introduction

For centuries, INEFFABILITY was viewed as a purely philosophical problem − somewhat peripheral even to the field itself due to its presumptive ties with the practices of mysticism and various religions (Gäb 2020). However, once cognitive approaches had started to dominate in all major domains of the humanities, interest in the ineffable ran high, as it clearly manifests itself as a mental phenomenon of an exceptional force, especially for the sensory and aesthetic spheres. The actual inclusion of ineffability into scholarly discourse followed the renunciation of the computational paradigm of the human mind in favor of a more holistic picture, in which verbal communication reigns supreme, linguistic meanings are intersubjective, and speech itself is a form of social behavior (Kravchenko 2007). With that in mind, this paper, conceived of as a headnote for a larger and still ongoing study of the new cognitive uses of figurativity, makes an attempt at transferring the notion of ineffability from pure philosophy to (cognitive) linguistics by asserting that rather than being an instance of verbal closure, the ineffable is, in fact, intrinsic to language.

I start with a brief overview of what is essential to the notion of ineffability in a broad sense and of the perspectives that were used to study the phenomenon, with a particular focus on its language-related effects. The account of the types, sources, and main implications of ineffability is followed by a discussion of the relativization effort based on recent advances in cognitive science and communication studies. The aim of the paper is thus to showcase, through carefully selected arguments, that what was long been considered as ineffable is overtly (although not exhaustively, and even less so − directly) communicable through various strategies, of which figurative language is of special prominence and research potential. Some prospects of further study, especially within the frameworks of discourse analysis and cognitive poetics, are also outlined with the aim of articulating certain practical dimensions of the problem.

2. Ineffability: towards the notion

There is a conviction, shared by much of the general public and scholars alike, that our public language is the most appropriate medium for articulate thought – that we appear to think with language, one way or another, hence it should be virtually unfailing in its power to communicate ideas of whatever level of complexity. This sentiment is epitomized in Searle's *principle of expressibility* – "whatever can be meant can be said" – that has since become a foundational maxim for positivist thinking (1969: 19). Although we might have all practical reasons to believe so, there is another widespread intuition of equal force, which contradicts Searle's dictum and holds that the linguistic mode of expression must have its inherent constraints, for every now and then we do encounter instances of verbal failure when putting some of our mental contents into words becomes strangely problematic.

One way to verify this intuition is to consider the relations between language and our sensual domain. On one level, we are endowed with the ability to introspect and meta-cognitively process the sensory contents of our minds (normally, still in the presence of covert speech); but on another, this introspective process often reveals a gap between the impressionistic richness of what is accessible to our "mind's eye" and those routine linguistic structures that we use for day-to-day communication. When one admires the grandeur of a natural landscape, or experiences intense romantic feelings towards someone else of their own species, or simply has a mug of refreshing coffee on a cold winter morning, they might realize that the common verbal labels that we use to refer to the feelings that thus emerge – *amazement*, *love*, or *invigoration* – do not do justice to the actual contents of our minds, either at this very instance or retrospectively. Observing this imbalance engenders the insight that our affective states, at least to a degree, are somewhat beyond the linguistic horizon: each time we try to communicate them, we are beset with the sense of their INEFFABILITY – the inability, for one reason or another, of being put into words.

The idea that the human language has its own boundaries, that not all aspects of reality and of lived experience can be conveyed through words has always been a part of philosophy – as a self-evident truth, a polemical claim, or a metaphor (Janowitz 2018). Augustine, Schopenhauer, Adorno, Nietzsche, Kant – almost all great philosophers before the second half of the 20th century touched upon the question of ineffable experiences, be they aesthetic, religious, or mystical, but made no attempt at the systematic analysis of ineffability, most probably due to the persistent tradition of brushing off the marginal, of not attaching significance to things unsaid, unwritten, or unobserved. Nevertheless, after the so-called "linguistic turn" had stirred up things, ineffability became a legitimate object of analysis, in many ways through the effort of Wittgenstein, the closing thesis of whose "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" runs as: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one should be silent" (2014: 89). In line with an outdated, but still widespread interpretation, what the philosopher asserts is that opinions on certain subjects – namely, metaphysics, ontology, ethics, and aesthetics that are devoid of empirically tested contents – cannot be formulated non-controversially by means of natural language, hence, talking of them is meaningless. A more comprehensive analysis of the claim reveals, however, that Wittgenstein did not nullify these as truths or objects of knowledge: rather, he considered them inexpressible, something of which we are bound to be silent (Nordmann 2005).

Fictional writing, where ineffability figures prominently, is another trusted source of evidence. In his essay "Cybernetics and Ghosts", Calvino puts it bluntly: "The struggle of literature is in fact to escape from the confines of language; it stretches out from the utmost limit of what can be said; what stirs literature is the call and attraction of what is not in the dictionary" (1986: 16). Thus, the protagonist of Poe's short story "Ms. Found in a Bottle" remarks at some point: "A feeling, for which I have no name, has taken possession of my soul – a sensation which will admit of no analysis, to which the lessons of by-gone times are inadequate, and for which I fear the futurity itself will offer me no key" (2003: 57). The visual artist O'Keeffe, on a different note, admits the futility of words for her own work, since "the meaning of a word to me is not as exact as the meaning of a color. Colors and shapes make a more definite statement than words" (quoted by Arbib 2014: 201).

At the end of the day, all this can lead one to think that our language is not an adequate medium for the communication of sensory contents altogether, since, as Langer once observed, it only "names certain vaguely and crudely conceived states, but fails miserably in any attempt to convey the ever-moving patterns, the ambivalence and intricacies of inner experience, the interplay of feelings with thoughts and impressions" (1942: 100). Our day-to-day communication seems to support this assumption: it will suffice to think of how often we either prefer to stay silent or resort to obscure openings like "Words cannot express…", similarly to Poe's fictional character. If this intuition of ineffability is valid, the next questions are: *what* is exactly ineffable, *why* is it so, and *how* do we handle this complication in reality if we need the message to somehow come through?

3. The *what* and *why* of the ineffable

The oldest known distinction with regards to ineffability that was already prominent in early medieval philosophy is the one between ineffable *objects* and ineffable *properties* (Hofweber 2016: 15–20). The former have long been the cornerstone of religious discourse; thus, to Moses's question what its name is, God replies: "I am who I am", signaling its own ineffability. Ineffable entities thus understood would include, among others, the Dao of the classical Chinese philosophy, the Logos of the Ancient Greeks, the One of the neo-Platonics, and the Absolut of Hegel. They are ineffable by virtue of our inability to produce true assertions on their account since suitable predicates are nowhere to be found – in metaphysics, such objects are also termed as "bare particulars", that is, entities devoid of nature and properties. Ineffable *properties* are close in meaning: although the logic of language guides us to the use of predicates in relation to objects, if the latter lack representational structures, ineffability necessarily arises. Such are the properties of God: "good", "benevolent", "eternal", or "gracious" are used for simplification and are predicated on our mind's anthropomorphic tendencies.

The very possibility of ineffable objects and properties has been repeatedly found logically inconsistent; moreover, supernatural entities as such ceased to be in the focus of philosophical analysis centuries ago. In more recent works on the subject, for instance in extensive research by Jonas, it is certain types of *experiences* that are ineffable (2017). Of these, the following are of major relevance: sensual (where mystical ideation is a subclass), aesthetic, and abstract – related to various complex ideas of, for instance, "infinity" and the like (Zwicky 2012: 198). Aesthetic and sensual ineffability are, in their turn, intricately related – if not collapsible into one – and are of major importance, for abstract ineffability takes us back to the inherently paradoxical discourse of ineffable objects and properties. On account of the former, Langer once remarked that

> every work of art expresses, more or less purely, more or less subtly, not feelings and emotions which the artist has, but feelings and emotions which the artist knows […] Such knowledge is not expressible in ordinary discourse […]. Verbal statement […] is almost useless for conveying knowledge about the precise character of our affective life (1942: 91).

A practical way of treating ineffable content is based on the distinction between its being *propositional* and *non-propositional*: while the former can be verbalized as a matter of course – since it represents facts – the latter represents what is thinkable, but is unsayable for the lack of a propositional structure. A paradigmatic example of non-propositional content is color with its infinite array of shades:

> Imagine a colour spectrum for varieties of red: we might have a concept for 'vermillion' and 'scarlet', maybe also for 'carmine' and 'crimson', but definitely not for every single one of the infinitely many kinds of red (Jonas 2017: 6).

This content can also be conceptualized as some kind of knowledge, more precisely, as *knowledge-how,* or procedural knowledge, as opposed to *knowledge-what,* or propositional knowledge. While

the latter can be conceived of as a set of propositions (the history of Ancient Greece, quantum mechanics, etc.), the former (swimming, riding a bike, etc.) is a skill that cannot be exhausted verbally (Lewis 1990).

This distinction certainly brings us much closer to the cognitive sense of ineffability as a signal of disparity between non-verbal thought and language, while the taxonomy developed by Liang, another prominent researcher of the subject, makes it even more apparent. Specifically, he differentiates between the following ineffabilities (2011: 31–32).

1. **Lexicogrammatical ineffability** means the impossibility of verbalizing a certain concept in a given language through a lexeme or a grammatical structure. The most obvious case in point is the mismatch between the names of color shades in different languages, but there are certainly more to this: the English *sibling* that has to be treated as either *one's brother* or *one's sister* in most other languages, the Portuguese *saudade*, the Spanish *duende*, and the German *Waldeinsamkeit*, which stands for the feeling of loneliness while walking in a forest, to mention just a few.

2. **Pragmatic ineffability**, which arises when producing linguistic utterances on a given occasion turns out to be "infelicitous" for the speaker. Most of the examples can be found in Austin's "How to do things with words": if one is not vested with a special authority, they cannot declare two people spouses, name a ship, or proclaim a war on another country (1975). This type of ineffability, following loosely the terminology of Austin, is "unperformability", that is, the inability to perform a desired action by uttering an existing verbal formula.

3. **Cognitive ineffability** is related to the speaker's inability to epistemically entertain a thought due to their cognitive limitations. If even the smartest of our pets, primates included, cannot conceptualize the world's economic crisis, or the fundamentals of quantum physics, why, when it comes to language-enabled humans, should we not likewise assume that we are "cognitively closed" from various aspects of reality, for instance, from the "hard problem of consciousness", as the famous piece by McGinn suggests (2004)?

4. **Pathological ineffability** means a speaker's inability to produce certain utterances due to a physical damage to the brain area. In this sense, the widely known case of aphasia is the prime example, as subjects suffering from this disorder cannot produce and adequately process either metaphors or metonymies, or both.

5. **Logico-syntactic ineffability** arises when speakers have to face the logical illegitimacy of what they intend to say. Some of the famous examples would include the Heideggerian maxim that "Nothing nothings" (2001: 78), Chomsky's "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously" (1979: 100) and the names of disciplines from Eco's "academy of unnecessary sciences": Aztecs' horse-breeding, silent film phonetics, contemporary Sumerian literature, etc. (1986: 32). This sort of ineffability may be re-formulated as an attempt to use legitimate words in illegitimate combinations, which creates a paradox – most often, a paradox of self-referentiality.

Liang refers to these five varieties of ineffability as *pseudo* or *disguised*, since all of them are transient and context-dependent: lexico-grammatical would vary from one linguistic community to another; pragmatic and pathological are rectified by a change in the speaker's social or health status; logico-syntactic can, as most other paradoxes, be resolved by weakening the premises; and cognitive is either indefensible or may wither away with time, at least in some aspects, as technology progresses. Liang, however, goes on to mention another type of ineffability, which is *genuine* on his approach and is termed "phenomenal", as this is the ineffability of the so-called phenomenal content, or of the subjective sensory content of our minds – bodily sensations and psychological emotions or moods (2011: 33). What needs to be stressed here – and what is the principal reason for maintaining the intuition of such content being ineffable – is its subjectivity, i.e. its being

inaccessible to other minds. Indeed, in contrast with facts of reality that can be verified, at least in theory, whatever we know of the sensual mental content of others would be based on their behavior, of which verbal reports are an important sub-class. This ineffability cannot be ruled out, for it relies on the impossibility to be someone else and to fully appropriate someone else's feelings and sensations – such thought experiments are repeatedly shown to be logically inconsistent (see, for instance, Márton–Tőzsér 2016) – what we refer to as our "self" remains closed from the third-person perspective. Many researchers adopt a similar view on what genuine ineffability is: thus, Magee (1998: 97) suggests that none of individual sensory experiences can be adequately put into words, but constitute a kind of "orchestral music", while Kravchenko (2007: 657) observes that the meaning of such linguistic signs "cannot be described completely and exhaustively". Despite this, such content still figures prominently in day-to-day communication, arts, and specialized domains like medicine, hence attempts at placing it in a practical context are more or less conceivable.

4. Ineffability relativized

What is most striking here, and what poses the major problem, both philosophically and linguistically, is the realization that no matter how subtle and ineffable various sensual, aesthetic and other experiences might seem on the surface, they nevertheless always remain reportable: that is, something can always be said on their account. They can be described to a certain detail and in a correct sequence, which, however, does not bridge the intuitively apparent gap in, or eliminate the feeling of inexhaustiveness of, such descriptions. This leads us to the idea that this perceived ineffability comes in degrees; thus, the idea of difference between *weakly* and *strongly* ineffable things.

Kukla (2005: 23) defines weak ineffability as something for which there is "no sentence […] in one or more of the languages which some human beings actually speak, or have spoken, or will speak". This is what Liang refers to as the lexico-grammatical ineffability, which is reminiscent of Whorf's notorious "linguistic relativity" claim, whereby facts of the world that are based on the Western "Aristotelian" logic are inexpressible in, for instance, the languages of native Americans (1956: 212). The conclusions that Whorf draws from this premise have been discussed elsewhere and were mostly found dubious for the reason that being inexpressible does not mean being unthinkable. Moreover, if weak ineffability thus conceived is premised on the lack of symbols, it must be superable by way of inventing new symbols or creating a meta-language, in which such elements are present. Gäb (2020: 1831) gives the following formal definition of weak ineffability: "What is weakly ineffable is ineffable in terms of a theory of meaning: a given language L does not contain any expression that (according to the semantic rules of L) designates what is to be expressed." By contrast, what is *strongly* ineffable precludes us from creating a sign that would carry the meaning which we need to express: strongly ineffable ideas, on this view, are those that cannot be communicated in any possible way and are equivalent to Liang's "cognitive" ineffability discussed above.

If we accept these premises, then the ineffability of sensory content that interests us here is certainly weak: undergoing a sensory or an aesthetic experience enables one to produce certain thoughts. But is it the lack of words that precludes us from communicating these experiences? The same question is, again, prominent in the later works of Wittgenstein – thus, in his "Philosophical investigations" he observes:

> Describe the aroma of coffee. Why can't it be done? Do we lack the words? And for what are words lacking? – But whence comes the idea that such a description must after all be possible? Have you ever felt the lack of such a description? Have you tried to describe the aroma and not succeeded? (2001: 610)

If there is something beyond the mere lack of words that prevents the aroma of coffee from being described conclusively, this problem has to be approached within a different paradigm: the paradigm of *non-exhaustiveness* of such potential descriptions, as none of them would fully capture the intrinsic nature of the content in question. As noted above, there is no talk of an exhaustive vocabulary for color shades, since the color spectrum is a continuum with only speculative boundaries

between what is perceived as its constituents. Our sensory sphere at large is contingent on the same complication: although we might invent as many names for individual mental states, we will never be able to have them all named, and all attempts at compiling exhaustive taxonomies of the type are inherently misguided. While everyday language (and, even more so, the sophisticated medical jargon with its "anhedonia", "euthymia", "cachexia", and a plethora of other terms) does technically discern between *anger* and *rage*, *sadness* and *anguish*, *excitement* and *happiness*, emotional experiences of the sort are still lived as continuums of transient feelings: there cannot be universally accepted criteria for defining at which point exactly *anger* becomes *rage*, *sadness* turns into *anguish*, and *excitement* grows into *happiness*, except for the speaker's inclination to pick up a specific word. But if the lack of words, and the possible remedies based on this idea, are thus out of the picture, then how does weakly – or relatively –ineffable content of the sort remain expressible?

First of all, once language is theorized about as a social practice rather than an exclusively cognitive phenomenon, it reveals a tendency to destabilize boundaries: polysemy, figurativeness, legitimization of error, relevance of silence, and various other "analogue" capacities of language harness it for the complexity and subtlety of human experience. This is the main reason why the strong ineffability thesis needs to be relativized: although systematic attempts of the sort are scarce, many researchers have at least mentioned the theoretical and practical possibility of such relativization – similarly to Dennett, who admits that the conceptual isolation between perception and language notwithstanding, "what it feels like to see Paris by moonlight in May can be adequately conveyed in a few thousand words (an empirical estimate based on the variable success of actual attempts by novelists)" (2005: 115). If the focus thus shifts from formal concerns to the question of *how* the corresponding communicative intent is fulfilled, this relativization effort becomes more transparent, especially when it comes to the sensual domain, since "the nature of a feeling may be conveyed in two ways: by being characterized or by being aroused" (Pugmire 1998: 102). This makes the apparent lack of affective predicates and the inability to retrieve the propositional content of our feelings superable in practice: the rest of the paper will focus on how this "arousal" is realized.

5. Ineffability overcome

It should be mentioned, at least in passing, that the ineffability in question can certainly be overcome by extra-linguistic means, of which silence, gestures, and facial mimics are the most salient. Numerous studies reveal (see, for instance, Bucci et al. 2016) that, when asked to verbally elaborate on their emotional states, most speakers first undergo the stage of arousal, that is, of resorting to gestures and facial mimics combined with or followed shortly by reporting their inability to fulfill the task immediately due to the lack of words (373). Silence is perfectly able to convey meanings in various contexts: it does not necessarily flag an inability to say or a denial to communicate. Many cultures have proverbs in the vein of the English "silence gives consent", or "no wisdom like silence", which can be interpreted in numerous ways, but may as well testify to the meaningfulness of silence as a path to overcoming ineffability. In general, being silent, or, in a wider sense, prioritizing other channels of communication over speech (for instance, visuals or music) is one of the most common ways of dealing with the mental states that the *sublime* puts in motion (beauty of nature, love, etc.).

But when it comes to the purely linguistic mode of "effing" the sensual content, a few communicative strategies may be outlined, of which **trivialization** is most prominent in day-to-day communication. It will comprise the following 3 tactics: 1) **naming** one's mental states via established terms, especially as the vocabularies of today's literary languages offer a plethora of options; 2) using **generic predicates** to add a qualitative dimension to such contents, as in, for instance, "to feel weird, good, bad", etc.; and, finally, 3) **mentioning (and thus construing) the experience** itself instead of the mental state that it causes to emerge, as in, for instance, in "You know what it feels like to fly in a shaky plane, don't you?".

These represent a commonsensical approach to the communication of what is subjective as long as the communicating parties rely on the HUMAN ENDOWMENT, i.e. the largely shared nature of our phenomenology. Despite their apparent triviality and lack of detail, these tactics are still capable of producing a sensible communicative effect; and if a particular name or predicate is out of immediate reach for one reason or another, we might expect our interlocutors to have a grasp of the associated phenomenology, that is, we should assume that what it feels like to "be caught into a pouring rain" or to "have a toothache" does not call for a detailed explanation.

Another strategy, extensively mentioned in the philosophy of mind, is to overturn the ineffability thesis as such through a purely logical argument. As a matter of fact, most analytical accounts of sensual mental contents treat them as conceptual, only that the concepts that we employ to make sense of what we feel (or, more precisely, of "what it feels like") are either demonstrative, or indexical, or quotational in nature, which means that they can be communicated through a **deictic reference**. DEIXIS is the use of concepts whose semantics is fixed, but whose denoted meaning varies depending on the specific context (personal and demonstrative pronouns, words like *today* and *now*, etc.) (Perry 1979). This means that elliptical utterances of the type "I have *this* feeling" convey phenomenal properties without actually naming them, which dispels the ineffability problem, at least in the technical sense. Of course, more often than not, deixis would be combined with one or two trivialization strategies, as in, for instance, "*I have this […] feeling of/when […]*".

Of course, both deictic and trivial statements discussed above remain informative only when the experiences themselves are shared, but they have limited practicability when this is not the case – when, for instance, they are too personal or deviant, when they transcend the boundaries of everyday life (being in a different sensory environment, taking unusual drugs, etc.). When this occurs, another strategy is often employed, known as the use of **qualifying statements** that make ineffability explicit and allow the speaker to paradoxically say much about things without actually naming them (Branham 1980: 13). This type of communication figures prominently in both fictional writing and day-to-day communication as exemplified above by the statements of the type "I just can't tell you…", "words cannot convey…", or "this feeling has no name". All of these strategies are widespread and mostly efficient; however, there is another roadmap as well, which deserves a separate section.

6. Figurative language

On close inspection, the question remains how ineffability is overcome when the following two premises co-occur: 1) the phenomenology in question is not shared, and 2) the subtlety of a description is of importance, i.e. when neither of the options listed above – trivialization, deixis, and verbal ellipsis – fulfills our communicative intent. To answer this, we need to return to those concepts that help us form phenomenal thoughts – known as "phenomenal concepts" for that matter (Balog 2009). Since they do not have a propositional content, they can only be connoted to or communicated through "terms of associated external properties, or […] associated causal roles" (Chalmers 1996: 20). This observation by Chalmers is readily compatible with Kukla's idea why strong ineffability does not in fact occur in natural languages (2005: 12): unlike artificial idioms of the Tarskian type, where limitations with regards to what can be expressed are inevitable, our public language is equipped with *non-literal modes of expression* enabling us to communicate non-propositional truths (with no strict borders between the literal and the non-literal, which increases the nuance). In fact, these two comments point in the exact same direction: while Chalmers mentions the possibility of communicating sensual contents based on what we associate them with (for instance, from our immediate surroundings), Kukla sees no place for the ineffable in practice, since there is always a possibility of saying things non-literally. Combined, these premises allow us to conclude that ineffability is most effectively overcome through the use of **figurative language**: even if something seems unexplainable by generating propositional content on a systematic level, it can be expressed through an analogy, which is the basis of figurativity.

Pilkington gives a convincing illustration of how figurative language helps convey states of affairs in the sensual domain beyond just stating facts and labeling concepts (Pilkington 2001: 5–6). Thus, he observes that there are many words in English to denote various types of walking: *march*, *mince*, *hobble*, *tread*, *pacer*, *strut*, *toddle*, *lurch*, etc. However, when other types of movement need to be described, for instance, the movement of the head, the choice becomes extremely limited: except for, perhaps, *nod*, there are no specific verbs that would easily come to mind. What happens when we need to describe the way a kangaroo's head moves when eating grass? Australian poet Robert Gray resolves this complication in his poem "A Kangaroo" with the following result: "That hungry face / Moves on grass / The way an artist's pencil / Retouches / Shadows." What deserves a special notice here is that the poem adds a phenomenal perspective to the description: the clear implication of the analogy used by the author is that it "felt like this" to him, while there remain other, virtually infinite ways of conveying the original message. Hence, the use of figurative language – at least in this and in similar contexts – works bidirectionally: not only does it allow to implement the subjective dimension verbally but it also supplements the message with one, even if not originally intended.

Interestingly enough, this also engenders the weak sense of ineffability of not only the mental states in question, but of figurative communication as such: poetic language is notorious for being hard to translate or paraphrase. As Zwicky (2012: 205) notes: "it is made of language, but in an odd and peculiar way: it consists of words, but only and exactly these words, in precisely this arrangement. Its meaning is uncapturable – in its original tongue – by any other use of language". This observation is especially relevant to the present discussion, since it is assumed by many that the communication of non-lexicalized concepts (that is, of the ineffable) is what poetry and literature in general are meant to do, beyond and in addition to all the other goals that they pursue. Literary critic M. Rosenthal resonates with this opinion by considering poets – the ones who resort to figurative language more often than people of other trades – as those able to respond to and communicate bodily and mental experiences for which the common language proves to be an inadequate means of expression (1974: ix-x). Ineffable is the supreme subject of poetry, that is why it relies on the use of figurative language so heavily. Seeking new verbal formulae and breaking the boundaries of our everyday language is what the search for poetic meaning amounts to. Although most of fiction, for its part, communicates ideas and narrates events, some of its genres can be close to poetry in this regard, not to mention the fact that fictional texts make systematic use of poetic language.

Figurativity means the use of various tools and techniques, but since indirect expression is its pivotal practice, its main asset is metaphor, upon which most of verbal symbolism is built. No wonder metaphor received so much attention in the last decades – mainly as a conceptual phenomenon – for being an inalienable characteristic of our thinking process. This has since become known as the Conceptual Metaphor theory first sketched by Lakoff and Johnson in 1980 in their book "Metaphors We Live By", followed by a barrage of books and essays on the subject by numerous other authors. But what is of utmost importance in the context of the ineffability problem is the understanding of metaphor as a fusion of several concepts into a new one which produces a new experience. The preliminary conclusion here is, hence, that those mental contents that we commonsensically treat as ineffable are, in fact, communicable in a public language, and that analogy-based figurative language must be viewed as the core of this communication, not something additional to it.

7. Conclusion

The aim of this paper is to come as close as possible to concisely answering Franke's following question:

> Is the unsayable beyond language altogether, as mystics often fervently maintain? Does this make it simply non-linguistic? Or is it the other of language and therefore inextricable from language […]? Or is it without relation to language […]? Or is it language itself […]? (2004: 77)

To address this, the first assumption that needs to be dispelled is that the problematics of ineffability lie in the purely metaphysical register. In fact, the notion of ineffability is widely used in the philosophy of mind and language as it has a testable cognitive dimension and figures prominently in discussions of conceptual vs. non-conceptual content, propositional vs. non-propositional knowledge, phenomenal ideation, and an array of other topics. On the other hand, the intuition of reaching "the limits of language" is a paradigmatic fact of life: our ineffable thoughts are not peripheric or insignificant, but are related to some of the most meaningful experiences that we undergo – for instance, to religious beliefs, being in love, or contemplating works of art. At first sight, and according to the long-standing tradition, ineffability is seen as a sign of a "clash" between reality itself (or the way it is mentally construed) and what we can truly say about it: although we seem to be able to produce relatively accurate descriptions thereof, there is always a "shadow" area, where linguistic descriptions will fail to convey the way the reality is, at least as given in our senses (Hofweber 2016: 2). Ineffability cannot be discarded in aesthetic applications of the public language either, for instance, in literature – it would not be an overstatement to even suggest that ineffable is one the prime matter of art as such. But there is much more to the phenomenon of ineffability, once it is relativized (weakened) and shown to be intrinsic to language, to be its basic convention right from the start: in a well-known sense, all objects are ineffable, since the words of our language only *denote* them, but do not genuinely *convey* them:

> in its use of general terms, such as "tree" and "squirrel," language operates in the realms of resemblance or commonness. It relies for its operation on the application of a general term to many particular objects that are held to be subsumed under the concept that corresponds to that term (Ho 2015: 70).

Language is an instrument of communication rather than a means of giving bonafide descriptions of the world, hence, it would be a logical error to ascribe the problematic status to a system's foundational aspect. Once we are equipped with the understanding of weak, or relative, ineffability that is contingent on the mismatch between the infinite continuums of sensory data and the limitations of language which can be overcome thanks to its astonishing flexibility, ineffability is easily reinstated into the domain of linguistics. It is no longer a verbal failure: it is an urge to convey meanings by way of arousing feelings in interlocutors instead of stating facts, since what appears ineffable is subjective, unverifiable, or phenomenal, to use the well-established philosophical terminology.

If communication is meant to arouse feelings, verbal arts may be said to aim at establishing the identification of a message recipient with the protagonists of narratives. Such identification is achieved, primarily, through referencing the ineffable via various strategies, of which figurative language is of special prominence as opposed to the use of the existing nomenclature of emotional and sensory states, which only invokes a third-person perspective, an observer's stance that is better suited for scientific descriptions and other non-fictional discourses. Taming this ineffability can thus be seen as a path to a more intimate involvement with what is normally inaccessible: the mind of the Other. It has been widely accepted in the post-Gricean pragmatics of communication that such "mind-reading", i.e. grasping and felicitously interpreting the speaker's meaning, lies at the core of mutual understanding as such (Watzlawick et al. 2014). But it is only in literature – a laboratory of devising new and reiterating the existing tools of communicating the unsayable –where the experience of shared phenomenology is of unmatched aesthetic and redemptive value. In this view, the problematics of the ineffable should figure prominently across the field of literary and pragmatic studies, since, as Pilkington notes:

> 'Poetic concepts' and 'poetic thoughts' […] are difficult and relatively ineffable for a special reason: they encourage extensive encyclopaedic exploration and elaborate concept construction that involves the evocation of intense and subtle qualitative states. Such qualitative states cannot be described satisfactorily: they are non-lexicalisable. But insofar as they are effable, they evoke/arouse rather than simply characterise/describe an experience. Any attempt at a full discussion of poetic effects and poetic

thoughts must discuss the evocation of qualitative states, and to this extent must reach out beyond pragmatic theorising (2001: 9).

Thus, recognizing the role of figurativity in the relativization of what is often viewed as ineffable deconstructs the artificial boundary between conventional and figurative language, which, in its turn and in line with the main assumption of cognitive poetics, helps better understand why verbal art is not peripheric to human cognition in general. This introductory – and perforce sketchy – analysis aims at setting in motion a relatively novel program for the investigation of ineffability from the linguistic perspective and at further integrating the verbal art into the agenda of cognitive sciences.

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