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Present and Future of Higher Education in the Hungarian Language in Romania

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Abstract. The purpose of the study is to analyse the current problems and challenges of Hungarian language education policy in Romania, in the context of the education policy of the European Union, respectively the processes going on in the European Higher Education Area. In this sphere of thought we briefly outline some of the consequences of the so-called Bologna Process regarding domestic higher education (and Hungarian minority higher education within it), after which we attempt to analyse the specific problems of Hungarian language university education. In the course of the latter inquiry, which is the larger part of our study, we intend to be mindful of both the national policy, demographic and minority aspects pertaining to the Transylvanian Hungarian minority and the higher education offer and institutional system in a qualified sense. Our analyses can obviously not ignore the ‘topos’ of the independent, Hungarian language state university either - its dilemmas and questions constitute the last thematic unit of our study.

Keywords: higher education policy in the EU, Hungarian language higher education in Romania, minority educational policy, Hungarian system of higher education in Transylvania, European Higher Education Area

It is no simple task nowadays to attempt to give a detailed analysis of the situation and the objectives of higher education in the Hungarian language in Romania. The difficulty lies in the fact that by today the issue has grown into a complex problem, characterised by divergent points of view and considerations, and therefore inquiries into it also necessitate expertise in many different fields, thorough knowledge, a large number of statistical data and exhaustive ‘background information’. Consequently, the author of

the present paper pays his tribute with plain respect and recognition to all those experts, institutions and bodies that have been trying recently – including the past two years – to perform a thorough analysis of the state of affairs and the tasks of our minority higher education. They had to be mindful of the transformations of the European system of education (the “Bologna Process”), and of its consequences in Romania; they had to be aware of statistical data referring to Romanian (and within it Hungarian language) higher education; of the labour market analyses and indicators, of demand and supply predictions, they had to be able to link demographic data with educational policy considerations, they had to know their way around domestic legislation with reference to higher education, respectively the development opportunities lying therein, they had to be well-informed in connection with Romanian normative funding, respectively the opportunities in Hungarian support policy – and the list could probably be continued. To all of this, one can add the national and minority policy aspect, as a clear-cut common element of various strategic papers, which fundamentally defines the present and future of higher education in the Hungarian language in Romania, in other words the collection of principles and objectives that create a context, in which even issues that could otherwise be discussed easily in a narrow professional, educational policy setting, become problematic, questionable, disputable.

The full and exhaustive analysis of the complex issues outlined is not the aim of this paper. We do not strive to deduce present-day Transylvanian Hungarian higher education from a historic perspective, or from the traditions of the past, nor is it our aim to argue why independent, full-spectrum higher education in the mother tongue is of decisive importance for a national community. Similarly, an extremely significant issue of our education policy, the placement of higher education in Hungarian into the context of the challenges of general European higher education is not the subject of our present inquiries, either. It goes without saying that a part of the present problems and tasks of Hungarian language higher education in Romania is completely identical with the current issues of domestic Romanian language higher education, and also with those of higher education in Hungary, or even with those of the unified European higher education (the so-called *European Higher Education Area*). Such challenges, well-known today by universities and academics are: the expansion of higher education, respectively that BSc (*Bachelor of Science*) level diplomas become more and more widespread, and gradually take over the role of former high-school graduation; the decline in quality as a negative consequence of expansion and of the normative system of financing (the so-called per capita funding) also represents a serious problem as higher education is

struggling trapped between the imperativeness of quantity and quality; the fact that higher education institutions have become market players is yet another challenge worldwide and on a European level, just as the handling of the resulting inherent strategic problems (oversupply, competition etc.); but at the same time we could also mention the questions related to the theoretically existing equivalent curricula and diplomas, which still cause so many problems on the level of the European Union. It is no mere chance therefore that the examination of these major challenges and problems, the analyses of the advantages and disadvantages of the Bologna Process and the search to resolve its negative consequences have been in the forefront of educational policy specialist literature in recent years – obviously including the inquiries regarding Hungarian language higher education in Romania.

As we have earlier noted, Transylvanian (or in a wider sense, Romanian) Hungarian educational policy has nonetheless an inevitable national strategic component, which weighs heavy primarily on analyses and debates referring to the vision or the future prospects of our higher education. This is the aspect related to *present* and *future*, which we will attempt to discuss in this essay, and even if we cannot provide exhaustive, ample answers, we still at least hope to formulate viewpoints worthy of the consideration of specialists, academics, and the social public sensitive of the strategic questions of our higher education.

In order to assess the present state of affairs of Transylvanian Hungarian higher education, let us consider the last, fully concluded academic year, i.e. that of 2009/2010. The table below presents all the institutions and locations, where the major part of higher education in the Hungarian language is presently carried out, summing up at the same time the total numbers of students and full-time academic staff.¹

The last series of data from academic year 2009/2010 – nearly 12,000 students and a total number of almost 800 teaching staff – throws a light first of all on the fact that the higher education training offer in the Hungarian language in Transylvania, the number of students, and of academic staff have been growing continuously over the past 20 years, and it can also be clearly seen from

¹The data for the report was collected in June 2010, by means of a direct poll addressed to the concerning higher education institutions. The author hereby wishes to thank for the helpful co-operation of the leaders of the Hungarian section of the Babeş-Bolyai University, the Tg. Mureş (Marosvásárhely) University of Arts and the Partium Christian University (Vice-Rector Tivadar Magyari, and Rectors Attila Gáspárik and Szabolcs János-Szatmári), respectively of the officials of the secretariats at the Hungarian section of the Medical and Pharmaceutical University of Tg. Mureş (Marosvásárhely), the Protestant Theological Institute and the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, including for their correct and undistorted data supply.

the table that a so-called *Hungarian system of higher education* has gradually developed in Transylvania following the political system change in 1989, both from a geographic perspective, and from the point of view of the numbers of students and teaching staff. In spite of that, the Hungarian youth continues to be underrepresented in higher education (in comparison with the majority population), and in certain fields there is still no university level education in Hungarian. (Such fields are for instance Veterinary Science, Agriculture, and a large part of the Engineering and Music programmes. In 2010 there has probably been a single positive ‘breakthrough’ in this respect: Law education in Hungarian has (re)started in Transylvania, at the Cluj (Kolozsvár) Faculty of the Sapientia University. The imperfections of the full-spectrum of higher education in the mother tongue can further be detailed if we study separately the availability of undergraduate, master’s degree, and PhD programmes.)

The data referring to the total number of students also highlights an interesting, noteworthy state of affairs. If we take into account the student numbers of the programmes of Hungarian universities run in Romania, which are not included in the previous table, then – by a rough approximation – we could say that a total of 12,000 students studied within the framework of the Transylvanian system of Hungarian higher education in the academic year of 2009/2010 if counting the full cycles of training (all years of study). Taking the different lengths of the various academic programmes – undergraduate, master’s degree, PhD – into consideration, respectively having regard for the weighted number of participating students (in other words, dividing the total number of 12,000 students in a year by the average length of 3.8–4 years of a study programme) we can conclude that approximately 3,000 students were enrolled in the respective analysed year into each year of study of all the Hungarian programmes of the different Transylvanian higher education institutions – and this number included all the students in their first undergraduate programmes, as well as those striving to obtain a ‘second diploma’, respectively the ones that partook in several academic programmes in parallel. At the same time, based on the internal statistics of our higher education institutions, we can say that a rough number of 2,000-2,200 ‘new students’ enrol into a Hungarian language undergraduate programme of a higher education institution in a given academic year, as freshly graduating from secondary schools (or having graduated in earlier years). What is the problem detected from these numbers? We know from a series of other surveys done in the past years that there is a constant number of around 8,300-8,500 Hungarian secondary school graduates applying to take their graduation examinations each year since 2006 in Transylvania, and that the number of those successfully taking their final secondary school

Table 1: Academic year 2009/2010 in figures

Institution ^a	Location	BSc students	MSc students	Other	Total no. of students	Full-time academic staff
Babeş-Bolyai University (BBU)	Cluj (Kolozsvár) and training in the Hungarian language at its affiliated departments (Gheorgheni/Gyergyószentmiklós, Sfântu-Gheorghe/Sepsiszentgyörgy)	5,586	1,185	300	7,071	327
Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania (SU)	Miercurea Ciuc (Csíkszereda), Cluj (Kolozsvár), Tg. Mureş (Marosvásárhely)	1,874	-	-	1,874	184
Medical and Pharmaceutical University of Tg. Mureş (Marosvásárhely) (MPUTGM)	Tg. Mureş (Marosvásárhely)	n/a	n/a	n/a	1,500	125
Partium Christian University (PCE)	Oradea (Nagyvárad)	880	70	-	950	86
Tg. Mureş (Marosvásárhely) University of Arts (TGMUA)	Tg. Mureş (Marosvásárhely)	118	48	21 (PhD)	187	27
Protestant Theological Institute (PTI)	Cluj (Kolozsvár)	119	119	-	119	14
Total					11,701	763

^aThe first column of the table includes the institutions which in the past few years have formed the backbone of Transylvanian Hungarian language higher education, both due to their territorial coverage and the size of their teaching staffs, as well as the number of their students. Nevertheless, it also has to be mentioned that some Hungarian universities (the Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary, the University of Debrecen, the Corvinus University of Budapest, or the College for Modern Business Studies) operate further undergraduate programmes in Tg. Mureş (Marosvásárhely), Oradea (Nagyvárad), Miercurea Nirajului (Nyárádszereda) and Odorheiu Secuiesc (Székelyudvarhely), and at the same time the Budapest Business School and the Corvinus University of Budapest have started master's degree programmes in Cluj (Kolozsvár) and Miercurea Ciuc (Csíkszereda). These programmes differ from one another regarding their forms, some of them are full-time, while others part-time.

examinations is around 8,000. If these two numbers are compared, it becomes evident that only about one fourth of our secondary school graduates carry on with their studies in one of the academic programmes in Hungarian. This state of affairs has been recently confirmed by a study undertaken by the Higher Education Work-Group of the Regional Committee in Cluj (Kolozsvár) of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, as well as the secondary school survey conducted by the “Omnibus” Ltd. from Gheorgheni (Gyergyószentmiklós), making it clear at the same time that only half of those graduating in Hungarian from a secondary school carry on with their studies on a higher level, of which about 50-50% partake in Hungarian, respectively Romanian language higher education in Romania.

A further problem (challenge) of Hungarian higher education in Romania (Transylvania) could be the dissolution of its current, relative ‘closed character’, i.e. its more powerful, more explicit engagement in domestic and international scientific life. It can be ascertained that our higher education programmes in Hungarian have established educational and scientific co-operations primarily with partners from Hungary, which is without any doubt a natural and positive fact, yet it also purports a certain danger of ‘linguistic closure’. Student mobility statistics in the recent years uphold this state of affairs (Hungary being the primary target country of Transylvanian Hungarian students), and another symptom of the mentioned ‘linguistic closure’ could be the infrequency of Hungarian-Romanian scientific and professional communications in some fields.

When discussing about the present and future of Hungarian language higher education in Romania, one obviously must not omit the issue related to the existence and likelihood of the independent Hungarian language public university. Since the change of the political system in 1989 (or since the 1959 suspension of the Bolyai University, to go back even further in time) the creation of a state-funded, independent Hungarian university in Romania has been the permanent, legitimate, and so far unfulfilled demand, claim of the Hungarian minority. This right, request of the Transylvanian Hungarian community can obviously not be given up either today or in the future – if not for any other reason, then because of the obligations of the Romanian State toward its own (minority) citizens. However, in relation with the events and occurrences connected to Hungarian language higher education in Romania in the past 21 years, especially the last decade, one can rightfully ask how the foundation and the functioning of the independent, state-funded Hungarian university would be practical in the present higher education circumstances. What do we mean, what could we mean when talking about the “Bolyai University” today? The

author of the present paper is strongly convinced that the name of the former Hungarian university of Cluj (Kolozsvár) has grown out its narrow “geographical” borders, having risen above the restricted space defined by the walls and corridors of its one-time building-complex. The “Bolyai University” in our days has become the symbol of independent, state-financed Transylvanian Hungarian higher education on the whole. The symbol of the “Bolyai University” comprises today practically all the unfulfilled claims, demands, needs and desires that the Transylvanian Hungarian community strives for in connection with its own higher education. In so far as this is true, the question arises how, by which means and according to what strategies this symbol can/must be filled with contents, in such a way as to create a vision that is based on the realities of domestic Romanian and Hungarian higher education, on the realities of Romanian and Hungarian politics, and at the same time based on the pragmatics of construction. As for ourselves – taking into account the main topoi in the social-professional publicity of the past more than two decades –, with respect to the achievement of the independent, full-spectrum Hungarian language higher education, we basically consider three possibilities, three strategic ‘visions’ worth examining: the thought of the re-establishment of a public university that would be the successor of the independent “Bolyai University” dissolved in 1959; the issues of the Romanian public funding of the independent private university network (i.e. the university system represented by the four locations where the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania and the Partium Christian University operate); and finally the possibility of a looser-tighter alliance and common interest representation of the existing – public and private – actors of Hungarian language university education in Romania (the “Consortium” Principle).²

We consider that the thought of a “Bolyai University” in Cluj (Kolozsvár) as an independent Hungarian university seceding from the present Babeş-Bolyai University by the division of its existing structure, personnel, fellowship and assets lacks realistic chances today, for at least four reasons. One the one hand,

²In the discourse about the strategy and vision of Hungarian language higher education in Romania, two concepts have been formulated recently that we consider very unrealistic, primarily because they lack expedience and pragmatism. One of these is the thought of a new independent university to be established in addition to the already existing ones, which seems a rather questionable strategy given the fact that the mere accreditation procedure of new higher education institutions in Romania is rather lengthy, lasting at least ten years of time. The other idea would transfer the Hungarian section from within the Babeş-Bolyai University to the Sapientia-PCE network, in which case there would be a strong risk of losing the per capita normative funding presently provided by the Romanian State for the academic programmes carried out in the Hungarian language.

ever since the moments of the changes in 1989 there has practically never been a determined and true political will on the side of the Romanian power that would have made the re-establishment of the former “Bolyai University” or the return of the confiscated and nationalised possessions, buildings, and assets possible in the first place. Concerning the latter ones – jointly with or irrespective of the ‘university issue’ – the Hungarian community in Transylvania must continue to uphold the demand and claim for legal remedy. Chances for the establishment of an independent university by ‘division’ are further diminished by the fact that even the teaching staff of the Hungarian section of the BBU has been lacking an adequate consensus with regard to that solution: both the idea of separation, of independence by secession from the university and the will to maintain the present status quo have many devotees and committed supporters within the Hungarian section, and this lack of consensus undoubtedly weakens the opportunities to politically achieve ‘separation’.³ At the same time – being particularly aware of the objectives formulated by the Romanian leadership of the university – we must not forget that the ‘pullout’ of the Hungarian section would practically make the main strategic aim of the BBU declared on several occasions (namely to become one of the largest multicultural higher education institutions in Central-Eastern Europe and in that respect a success story, an example to follow) hollow and trifling. Lastly, a fourth reason that makes an independent Hungarian university born from the BBU unrealistic is the significantly changed context of Transylvanian Hungarian higher education that has developed over the past ten years, the coming into existence of the PCE and of the SU, with a continuously enlarged number of students and extended programme spectrum.

Another alternative for the establishment of the state-funded, independent Hungarian university is usually also formulated in the latter context. By the already obtained accreditation of the Partium Christian University, respectively the imminent one of the Sapientia University, the formal conditions for a possible support from the Romanian State are/will be fulfilled as stipulated by the law (the Romanian State *may* provide funding for private universities functioning on its territory within the national system of education). Such a situation would not be without precedent in Europe, as the Åbo Akademi University in Turku followed a similar trajectory (becoming a public institu-

³Being aware of the fact that such opinions and evaluations could touch upon sensitive spots today, the author of the present study considers it important to remark that his diagnosis had not been formulated as one of an ‘external observer’, but of a participant in the debates on the future status of the Hungarian section, as well as based on the experiences gathered as a full-time teaching staff of the BBU between the years of 1996–2006.

tion in 1981, after six decades of existence as a private entity), but the Free University of Bolzano (Bozen) also functions with mixed funding (in this case the funding legislation of 1997 declared the establishment of a private entity, where the state contributes to cover the expenses of education and research). The present private university network functioning with support from the Hungarian budget must undoubtedly formulate its claims for Romanian state support, given the fact that it takes over public tasks of education, yet an indirect and truly problematic result of such a claim could be the appearance of a ‘discriminatory’ treatment among private universities in Romania: on what grounds could the Romanian State provide support to the Hungarian private universities, while denying it from other private institutions functioning on its territory? In this context domestic state support could only be feasible or realistic if the Sapientia-PCE system was conferred some sort a ‘special’ status by the Romanian State, recognising the fact that the institutions undertake public tasks related to the full-spectrum education in the mother tongue of the Hungarian minority in Romania. On the other hand the legal-normative conditions for such a solution are rather deficient and vague, and it is also true that the Romanian political elite at present is quite determined in not considering any kind of state funding for the Hungarian private university network. The feasibility of this scenario of establishing an independent, state-funded Hungarian university is made even more difficult by the question how in this case the public tasks undertaken by the existing Hungarian sections of public universities and those undertaken by the also partly publicly funded private university network would relate to each other? Or approaching the issue in a different way: by what algorithm and by what institutional division would the Romanian budget fund a full-spectrum of academic programmes perceived as a *onetime* obligation toward minority taxpayers?

A third alternative of the independent Hungarian university can also be formulated as an intermediary, mixed solution, yet which may be faster, and easier to achieve. The question or proposal put in simple terms is the following: would it not be practical to ‘assemble’ the independent Hungarian university in Romania (i.e. all we mean by the symbol of the “Bolyai University”) from our existing higher education institutions, as a network? We envisage a consortium-type co-operation based on a looser-tighter alliance, in which the main partakers would be the institutions engaged in higher education in Hungarian, the ones appearing in the table presented earlier: the Hungarian section of the BBU, the SU, the PCE, the Hungarian sections of the TGMUA and of the MPUTGM, the PTI. Such a union or network would practically yield an (almost) full-spectrum Transylvanian university, both geographically – from

Oradea (Nagyvárad) to Miercurea Ciuc (Csíkszereda) – and from the point of view of the academic programmes, in other words, the entirety of the symbol, or the demand of the “Bolyai University” as we mean it today. In addition to the almost complete programme offer in Hungarian and the comprehensive territorial or geographic span, such a university union would undoubtedly have the advantage that the institutions existing today would be obliged to develop their common strategy, it would lead to a much stronger ‘lobby power’ and a better representation of the specific problems of higher education in Hungarian, and not the least, it would create the setting for the joint request of Romanian state funding for an integrated institutional system which provides higher education in the mother tongue (and thus performs public duties). It is important to stress that such a co-operation (or union) could help in adjusting to each other the different, publicly declared or silently enforced independent strategies of the various institutions existing today, in formulating a relatively uniform Transylvanian Hungarian vision on higher education – and furthermore, this could happen while the independence of the different institutions working together within the consortium would remain intact.

Obviously this solution has also got its question marks and practical difficulties. Thus for instance, the Hungarian sections within the presently existing public universities would certainly need more decision power and autonomy regarding their functioning, so as to permit them to become a ‘contracting partner’ in a higher education alliance on a Transylvanian level. At the same time the academic communities and the leaders of the institutions participating in such a consortium, will effectively have to assume the meaning and the realisation of such a vision of the Hungarian higher education in Transylvania – even if at times the narrow institutional interests and strategies of the partnering institutions will have to be sacrificed for the sake of a common interest. If on the other hand no reasonable arrangements, covenants, alliances are born, which would truly be subordinated to the future of Hungarian higher education in Romania; in case each of our universities will continue to define the educational needs of the Transylvanian Hungarian minority and the strategic objectives originating from them separately, and what is more, if they continue to think that these objectives must be assumed exclusively by their respective institutions, well in this case one can fear that – as the Hungarian proverb says – the child will be thrown out with the bathwater, i.e. among the numerous debates about various visions for the Transylvanian Hungarian higher education, merely the essence will be lost.

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European Citizenship as a New Concept for European Identity

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Abstract. In the Lisbon Treaty the European symbols are no longer expressing European identity. Because of this, the ‘making’ of a European identity after the model of a national identity can be called unsuccessful. In this paper, it will be argued that neither other cultural-historical ideas offer a fruitful approach to set up a European identity. Instead of a top-down approach, we will argue for the reversed approach that is able to anchor the European identity in the architecture of the Union, namely the linking of European identity to the concept taking a central position in Union law after Lisbon, the so-called European citizenship.

Keywords: national identity, European identity, European civil society, European citizenship

1 On European identity

From the new ‘Treaty text’ that was formulated by the European Commission in Lisbon in December 2007 the European symbols, the flag and the hymn were dropped. The European symbols, the characteristic deep blue flag with the twelve yellow stars and Beethoven’s hymn “Alle Menschen werden Brüder” that is known from the introduction of Eurovision broadcasting have been banned on the initiative of the Netherlands from judicial practice. The use of these symbols is not strictly forbidden after Lisbon but due to their marginalization they will not be able to function as an additional binding force as they were originally intended. Symbols are out of favour to serve as the identity markers of the new Europe. The abolition of these external identity markers

that stood for a number of other, vaguely formulated markers necessarily will lead to the redrafting of the problem of European identity.

Anthony Smith has been right after all. (Smith 1999) The British researcher of 'national identity' has frequently argued that the so-called transposition of markers of national identity to fill the content of European identity is impossible. The problem with the markers of national identity is that, although these markers can be captured in a matrix, these markers are less constant within space and time, i.e. they are fluctuating. (Leerssen 2006) According to Smith, (1991:14) there are five fundamental markers of national identity that identify a nation: "A named human population sharing a historic territory, or homeland, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members."

What seems to be right for national identity does not seem to work for European identity. Note that the "named population" is already problematic. In the case of Europe, we should speak of 'Europeans' but the question arises who are Europeans in fact? In the case of nations we refer to Dutch, German, English, French, Hungarian, Polish, and so on. Clear identity markers identify the members of these nations. In any case, there is a marked national language and there is a connection to a native country where the national identity is autochthonous. 'Europeans' do not have a common language, nor do they possess a fixed historic territory. The European *lingua franca* of the Middle Ages, Latin cannot be revitalised anymore. Other possible European *lingua franca*, like one of the three big languages English, French and German are indeed dominant in certain areas of Europe and in some walks of life. English in the commercial field and sciences or German in Central Europe come to mind. However, these languages will have no chance to be accepted as the European *lingua franca* for political reasons. Moreover, the diverse linguistic landscape of Europe is an obstacle for the development of an unambiguous European identity. European multilingualism has caused in the past and is causing in the present a number of ethnic and national tensions and conflicts.

Michael Wintle and other researchers of European identity have convincingly demonstrated that the borders of Europe, especially the Eastern borders of this continent have changed throughout history. In some periods of history, Eastern Europe and Russia did belong to Europe; in some periods they were not a part of the civilised Europe. (Wintle 2007) Language and territory are visual markers that can be tested rather simply in the case of national identities but in the case of European identity this is not possible. This is also true for the other markers that Smith refers to concerning national identity. If we try to get to the heart of the legal system of different member states we will observe

a number of important differences as well.

In December 2007 the results of research into the legal conditions of civil organisations in the Union were presented at an Amsterdam conference by a research team consisting of researchers affiliated to the University of Amsterdam and the Free University of Amsterdam assisted by country specialists from the Union member states, including the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Greece, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Great Britain.¹ The results were collected in a matrix. In the matrix the above countries were set off against legal features of civil organisations, like the legal restriction of their activities; rules and procedures to establish NGOs; external supervision and sanctions; the public function of NGOs; and the position of persons with a foreign nationality in NGOs and the position of international NGOs in the member states of the Union. The matrix displayed a rather inconsistent, diffuse picture of pluses and minuses. The conclusion of the symposium was that the legal conditions governing the establishment of a civil society are rather different from European to European country. For example, in all the countries there is an obligation to register civil organisations but in each country the procedure is different. It is safe to consider the aspects of the legal system as expressions of national identity. In the near future it is not possible – and this is a somewhat disappointing conclusion – to elaborate an overall European legal system for the organisations participating in the civil society. From this it follows that there are no real cross-border legal guarantees for a European civil society.

Next to the attempt to transpose the identity markers of national identity to a European ‘super-state in the making’ it has also been argued to represent European identity in a more conceptual framework. These concepts are often based on cultural-historical notions like ‘a common European heritage’. In order to make the model work, European cultural-historical developments are being reviewed. From this review a set of ‘European’ identity markers is composed. After checking whether a specific country or region shares those features, the European identity of the country or region is determined. This so-called conceptual approach of European identity actually poses more ques-

¹The objectives of this research were presented in 2005. See Marácz, László, Tymen van der Ploeg, Wino van Veen and Lia Versteegh, Civil society and the legal approach of voluntary organisations in Europe. First European Conference: *International Society for Third-Sector Research (ISTR) and the EMES European Network's: Concepts of the third-sector; The European Debate, Civil Society, Voluntary Organizations, Social and Solidarity-Based Economy*, April 27-29, 2005, Paris, France, 20 pp. See conference web page: www.crida-fr.org (accessed February 26, 2011).

tions than it is able to solve. Has Christianity, which has been an indispensable building block of the identity of the Western part of Europe, been that important for the identity of the Western Balkans, a region that will be included in the Union in the next decade or so? As is well-known, the Western Balkans did belong for ages to the sphere of influence of the Islamic Ottoman Empire, although it is true Christians were rather free to practise their religion.

Because of its expansion the Union will cover large parts of Europe that have experienced more or less the same cultural-historical developments but still the intensity of these developments is very different. The ideals of Enlightenment were implemented in most of the countries of Europe but the modus of implementation and its effects were very different. Some nations received the principles of Enlightenment with a delay, sometimes Enlightenment was brought to European countries by guns, sometimes by the activities of enlightened aristocrat or despot and sometimes Enlightenment only reached the upper echelons of society. Smith characterizes this European state of affairs as a “family of cultures”. It is obvious that the new European identity in the modern age can not be founded on the ‘family of European cultures’. It is all too diffuse, too incomparable, inherent categories are being excluded and other not-wanted categories are being included, but the biggest anomaly of this approach in terms of “common heritages”, “family of cultures” and so on is that these concepts have no place in the architecture of the Union.

Another problem that makes the confusion even bigger but should be taken seriously if we want to solve the issue of European identity is that there are in fact two European traditions of national identity. Because of the expansion of the Union these two traditions will clearly come to the surface. Western Europe acknowledges a tradition of civil identity that has shaped national identity with the means of legal-civil concepts. In the other part of Europe, in Central and Eastern Europe an ethnic concept of national identity has been dominating. This is strikingly illustrated by the fact that Central and Eastern European nations have no problems assigning a national citizenship to ethnic co-nationals living outside of their kin-state. The most important features of ethnic identity include language, culture and folklore. Next to this, the introduction of a civil concept in Central and Eastern Europe might be possible, vice versa will however lead to insurmountable problems. Hence, the starting point for the formulation of a common European identity can only be found within the civil approach of identity. As a consequence, the only way to anchor European identity in the Union not depending on informally defined cultural-historical concepts is to reverse the present top-down attempts and to start on the base, i.e. to link the concept of European identity to European citizenship.

2 Towards a new European identity concept

The European Union is a treaty organisation that was founded in 1957 as an economic community. When the Union was established, the European citizen was clearly non-existent. The concept of European citizenship was not even formulated at that time. The becoming of conscious European citizens has contributed to the development of the notion of 'European citizen'. There are two important factors that played a decisive role in this. Firstly, the objective of the Founding Treaty was to promote the European integration of participating countries by means of economic freedoms, including the free movements of goods, persons, services and capital. The Court of Justice reviews hindrances of these free movements. When the Dutch company Van Gend & Loos was confronted with an unfair tax measurement of the Dutch authorities for the import of products from Germany, the company decided to turn to the law, without knowing whether a citizen or company was entitled to go to Court directly. The positive sentence of the Court in this case created a precedent for all European citizens and companies to appeal to the Court in case of economic discrimination by national authorities.²

In the course of time, European law making and Brussels bureaucracy expanded tremendously yielding doubt about the European institutional structure. The lack of transparency and the enormous distance between the citizens and the political European community was being criticized. With the accession of new member states the critical voices increased. The citizens felt that 'Brussels' was governing every aspect of daily life without allowing democratic involvement in the political and legal processes. This state of affairs made the European Council get officially interested in the 'Europe of the citizens'. This resulted finally in the inclusion of European citizenship into the Maastricht Treaty, the Union's treaty adopted in 1992. This was an important fact of a new European policy.³

The most important aspect of Article 17 of the Lisbon Treaty, which regulates citizenship within the Union, covers the relation between European citizenship and national citizenship.⁴ The status of EU-citizenship is exclusively depending on the status of one's nationality. EU-citizenship is not an inde-

²Van Gend & Loos against the Dutch Tax Administration, Court of Justice case 26/62, 1963, ECR 1; in the case of Costa Enel the European Court decided that European law enjoys priority over national law.

³This was proposed already at the summit of the European Council of Fontainebleau in 1984.

⁴This article corresponds with Article 8 of the Maastricht Treaty.

pendent citizenship. It is in fact an addition to the status of the nationality. Henceforth, it is better to speak of a dual citizenship. The ‘European addition’ to this national citizenship consists of a set of rights and duties, including the free movement and the freedom of establishment within the Union (compare with Article 39), the right to vote and the right to candidate for the European Parliament (see Article 19), the right to receive protection from diplomatic or consular representatives from any member state in third countries (see Article 20) and the right to hand in a request to the European Parliament and the Ombudsman of the Union (see Article 21). The most important article of the EU-Treaty is Article 6.⁵ This Article emphasizes that the Union is based on the principles of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights, the fundamental rights and the rule of law. According to the protocols of this article the general principles of Union law, like the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are guaranteed. Implicitly this article provides the basis for the duties of citizens with respect to each other. Furthermore, this article is crucial in respecting the common rights of EU-citizens against their national authorities. The third protocol of Article 6 also acknowledges the respect of the national identity of the member states.

The legitimacy of the concept of European citizenship is being questioned, however, because ‘citizenship’ is traditionally linked to the nation state. The Union is, however, not a state, although the participating members have given partial power to the institutions of the Union. Moreover, until the Maastricht Treaty the direct relation between the EU and its citizens did not even exist. In case of controversies, the proponents of the notion of European citizenship are referring to the advancement of European integration. The opponents of the notion – who are at the same time proponents of the Europe of the nation states – regard European citizenship as an artificial concept that does not offer any advantage to the citizens and may endanger national identities and traditions. (Monar 1998: 168) The reality of Union law is, however, relentless. It is clear that European citizenship is no longer the same as market-citizenship and includes next to economic rights, political, social and cultural rights as well. Sometimes these rights are not very clear because they have been elaborated on the national level. In the case of *Bickel and Franz*, the question arose whether Union law offers a provision for undertaking legal action in the field of criminal law in one’s own mother tongue, without being discriminated compared to the inhabitants of a host country. In reaction to this, the Court defined that “Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of

⁵This article is based on protocol F of Article 2 of the Maastricht Treaty.

the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same position to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for.” With this the Court became the driving force in order to promote European citizenship adopting the principle of non-discrimination as the key principle: “Within the jurisdiction of the Treaty and in the special clauses of the Treaty as well, discrimination on the basis of nationality is prohibited.”

In all sorts of cases where EU-citizenship plays a role, the Court of Justice makes its own decisions. The concept of ‘fundamental rights’ is accentuated by referring to human rights in the EU Treaty. The protection of these rights was triggered by the well-known *Stauder* case in 1969. The Court stated in this case that “fundamental rights are included in the general principles of Union law and protected by the Court.” In other cases the Court claimed that the protection of human rights is a source of inspiration for the common constitutional traditions of the member states of the European Union.⁶ The Court places fundamental rights on an equal footing with fundamental freedoms which include economic rights. This clearly emphasizes that the Union has developed from an economic community into a community of values, facilitating the rights and duties of the European citizens.

The duties include behaving oneself as a good market-citizen, which is regulated in the Treaty under the prohibition of unfair competition. The political duties lie in the field of human rights as far as citizens are affected, like in the field of activity. These duties involve the duty to provide the right to family life or the duty to provide leisure time. One can imagine that in the future other duties will be introduced, like European taxes or the duty to serve in European peace missions. The development of a functional system of rights and duties for citizens without referring to a ‘European identity’ or a ‘European feeling’ should be possible. Although the European Commission does not mention ‘European citizenship’ in her “Agenda 2000”, the Commission uses notions as social cohesion when speaking about the integration process. Furthermore, the Commission publishes directives and policy papers to give European culture and languages a position as well. This policy clearly creates social and cultural opportunities for European citizens. It is obvious that ‘European citizenship’ is being used as an instrument in the relation between the Commission and its European citizens.

⁶Court of Justice 1970, December 17, *Internationale Handelsgesellschaft GmbH, Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel*, case 11/70 (1970) ECR 1125 and Court of Justice 1974, May 14, *Nold KG Commission*, case 4.73, 1974 ECR 491.

The Lisbon Treaty, which was concluded in 2007, although not ratified yet because of Irish obstruction, includes the rights, freedoms and principles recognized in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. The Treaty explicitly mentions in several articles fundamental rights like freedom, dignity, equality and solidarity, which can be referred to by citizens.⁷ These rights are, however, absolute. Apart from this, the Treaty accepts the superiority of the European Court of Justice as the most important institution for the protection of human rights in the Union. It is the task of the European Agency for Fundamental Rights, which was recently established in Vienna in 2007 to provide the Union and its member states professional support in these matters.⁸ The fact that the Union considers itself a community of values undeniably follows from Article 1a of the Lisbon Treaty: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and man prevail.” It is imaginable that in this Europe as a community of values – apart from the fact whether one is emotionally connected to it or not – common languages can be used to serve common interests. These languages could be the well established ‘big’ European languages like English, French and German, but it may not be excluded that a completely new language will be chosen as a working language. That language will have the function of a *lingua franca* comparably to Latin in the Middle Ages. To maintain neutrality, a completely new working language with a practical character could be chosen as well, such as Esperanto. Then it will be possible to develop a European community of values that will exist independently from national citizenship and identity. The citizens of the EU will be like members of a family all belonging to this community of values, and this will give content to their European identity.

⁷The directives on fundamental rights have been adopted from the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (2000), which is not binding.

⁸The European Agency for Fundamental Rights has been established in Vienna by law (EU) nr. 168/2007, February 15, 2007.

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Transnational Co-operations in Europe from Local to Regional Level

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“Most often the course of history is determined by the encounter between a situation and one or more persons capable of catching the meaning of the situation in order to control it.”¹

Abstract.

The strengthening political, ideological and cultural diversity in Europe overshadowed and in many cases broke the existent connections, and not in one case the earlier organically related and strongly co-operating ethnic and social groups became opponents, even enemies.

Although the conceptions of a peaceful and co-operative Europe, which can guarantee solidarity and well-being to its citizens look back on a long history, the beginning of the process which started to turn the idea of the co-operation of European citizens into practice dates back only to one and a half century.

There is consensus about the necessity of a European Union built top-down and bottom-up at the same time, and one can meet ever newer examples of its practical effectuation. Transnational, local, micro- and interregional partnerships are getting increasing attention, these helping the reconstruction of the torn connections all over Europe.

Keywords: transnational co-operation, twin towns, microregion, euroregion

¹Speech of French President François Mitterrand at the National Assembly on June 25, 1986 while commemorating Robert Schuman's 100th birthday. In Schuman, R., *Európáért [Pour l'Europe]*. Pécs: Pannónia könyvek, 1991, 15.

The film based on Tibor Cseres's novel "*Cold Days*", which revealed the massacre of Novi Sad, presents a most thought-raising event. The Hungarian officers in search for partisans forced the cashier of a small provincial railway station to "classify" the passengers descending the train. "I know them, I don't know them, I know them, I know them, I don't know them . . ." – depending on whether the passengers were locals or foreigners. Suddenly she felt that those she did not know were awaiting a horrible future. So she kept repeating it in a monotonous voice: "I know them, I know them, I know them as well . . ." – irrespective of the reality. The 'strangers' were shot into the Danube. And the woman, tormented by remorse, mumbled to herself: "*I should have known everybody.*"

1 The local level – twin town relations

"These initiatives fulfil a bridging role. The united Europe can be reached only through co-operation and personal relations." ²

The cultural, historical and economic versatility of Europe has always provided the best terrain for co-operation between nations, peoples and institutions. The oldest twin-city movement appeared in the domain of education and culture, while the motivation in establishing cross-border co-operation lay in recognizing the mutual interest and advantages in economy and administration. There is a visible difference between the twin-city partnerships, which are usually first bottom-up initiatives and acquire an organizational form later, and the cross-border co-operation, which is regularly a top-down initiative launched by the institutions. The most successful and lasting co-operations have proved those that could merge the two approaches, some of which will be highlighted below.

Learning to have a decent life and behaviour presupposes a proper social environment. Largely speaking, socialization is a life-long process developing in a specific milieu, within formal and informal communities. Among the formal ones we can mention family, school, workplace, the civil society, organizations, whereas the informal ones include friends, the micro-communities of the school or the living environment (the street, the district, etc.).

In this respect *twin town relations encompass underlying major features of both formal* (local governments, signed agreements), that is, 'official' and *informal* (relatives, friends, acquaintances), that is, 'random' relations. These

²Speech of the German Cultural Attaché Claudia Spahl on May 9, 2008, in Zalaegerszeg.

co-operations are the expression of a most successful transnational and local complex integration based on volunteering.

Some examples of bi- or multilateral co-operations between smaller or larger settlements are the co-operations in one or several domains between self-governments, educational institutions, cultural and scientific associations, economic and professional organizations (from chambers of commerce to fire brigades) or members of NGOs safeguarding the local traditions. As most often these relations operate in a ‘network’ form, we believe that in addition to fostering the common values and volunteering, the future of the twinning process can be enhanced by extended networking.

1.1 “East and West – undivided”

Co-operation between settlements, nowadays commonly called town twinning/twin-towns, friendship, Partnerstädte, sister cities, has been present in Europe for a long time, fewer in number than at the turn of the 21st century and mainly between towns (Hansa towns, medieval town associations, friendship between towns along the Rhine and the Danube). In addition to these formal co-operations, there have been informal relations (family, friends, etc.) between the members of these settlements, which obviously are more difficult to ‘document’.

The number of formal and as such recordable twin town relations showed visible increase in the second half of the 20th century, primarily between settlements in Western Europe. At the time the densest network had been the French-German twinning.³ The towns of Northern Europe had also woven strong ties.

The *initiators of the partnerships* usually ranged from the self-government of a particular settlement to NGOs, a process which ended with the official signing ceremony of the agreement. In most cases the signature of the agreement was preceded by a tested and viable several-year-long co-operation at local government level. When relations do not reach a final official agreement as mentioned above, the relationship is called partnership or simply international co-operation.

The town twinning relations of the 1950s and 1960s were born primarily from “the endeavour to learn about the life and culture of people living in small and scattered settlements.” Nevertheless, highly motivating factors have also been sharing similar historical roots and traditions, common identity, the need for

³The first partnership was established on May 31, 1950 between the German Ludwigsburg and the French Montbéliard.

mutual empathy, sharing experience, recognizing common economic interests.

The twin town relations in the eastern part of the politically divided Europe started somewhat later, in the 1970s. Compared to their Western counterparts, these “nets had a looser fabric”, and only in few instances can we talk about equal-status co-operations. Most of them were built on ideological grounds, based on political “community of fate” or “brotherhood”. At the level of the town leadership the one county-seat – one ‘assigned’ and not chosen Soviet (eventually Central-European) larger city partnership was the rule. Most of these relations did not outlive the change of regime. If they did, it was when the partnership safeguarded top-down by the ‘leading political power’ became substantially enriched by formal (company) or informal (family) ties.⁴

In the 1970s there were some exceptional East-West partnerships, but these mostly remained at the level of the so called ‘mayor’s tourism’ or travelling of the local elite, and were very far from the genuine objectives of the original twinning activities. This ‘top-down’ practice was abandoned only in the second half of the 1980s, when a new course was set up and the settlements and citizens of Central and Western Europe started developing extended networks based on common values and interests. In building the Eastern-Western partnership, the Germans were leading the way; from the 1990s onwards a yearly average of 200 new partnerships were established.⁵

1.2 Europe for Citizens programme

The town twinning movement has been continuously supported by a considerable number of international (transnational) organizations by initiating governmental relations at local level, recognizing the importance of already operating partnerships, creating forums of international publicity, organizing conferences. The first such event worth mentioning is the International Congress of Mayors in 1948, which was created to facilitate the German-French co-operation and led to the foundation of the intergovernmental organization called the ‘*International Union of Mayors for German-French communication and European co-operation*’ (IUM) as well as to the establishment of the French-German town twinning. Its activity was mainly anchored in interpersonal relations between citizens and supported primarily youth exchange programmes, as a guarantee

⁴In the town of Veszprém, we can find examples for both: only street names are commemorating the partnership with the former East-German Halle or the Bulgarian Haszkovó, whereas the relations with the German Bottrop are still successful and fruitful at several levels.

⁵The relations between former Soviet states and Western Europe set off almost a decade later, and have remained relatively few to the present.

for future peace and security. From the 1970s onwards its activity slowly declined, its organizations mostly integrated into the *Council of European Municipalities and Regions* (CEMR), created in 1951 in Geneva by a group of Belgian, French, German, Dutch and Italian mayors. Currently the CEMR is the largest lobby organization of local governments in Europe.

The *United Towns Organization* (UTO) was born from the association called *Monde Bilingue*, created in 1957 in Aix-les-Bains to promote French-English bilingualism. Today the UTO is considered an international “umbrella organization” of settlements and local governments, which in 2004 integrated the *International Union of Local Authorities* (IULA), an organization founded in 1913 in the Hague.⁶ Some of its major objectives are the consolidation of peace, solidarity, co-operation, the democracy of participation, consequently, from its foundation the organization promoted the establishment of East-West town twinning relations.

From the 1980s the *European Community* allotted more attention to support the twin town movement, therefore at the proposal of the Commission, from 1989 it subsidizes projects aimed at reinforcing the twin town relations. The financed activities: exchange programmes between the citizens of existing or planned twin towns (*partnership* strengthening), organizing conferences, reinforcing the already existing relations (*co-operation*), training the managers of the twin town movements (seminars, trainings).⁷

The applicants range from towns, counties, local, to municipal or county self-governments, including their associations and committees (‘old’ and ‘new’ members), to whom since 2003 new partner settlements have been invited from South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia).⁸

“Town twinning is a great tool in bringing forward the integration of Europe at grass-roots level” – said Viviane Reding, European Commissioner for Education and Culture in 2003. “European integration could not have progressed so far without the willing efforts of individuals who dedicate their time to establishing partnerships with people and organizations from other cities, towns and municipalities throughout Europe. This year the European Commission is funding some 1,400 town twinning partnerships worth EUR 12,000,000, in

⁶Its new name is United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), and is seated in Barcelona.

⁷From 1990 to 2003 more than 11,000 European cities benefited from the Commission’s financial aid to town twinning. The largest number of towns participating in the twinning actions come from France (2804) and Germany (2327).

⁸For example, Hungary received European financial support for 47 projects in 2002, 54 in 2003, and 79 in 2004.

which two or more towns or cities from different countries share ideas, explore solutions to common problems and discover each other's cultural heritage".

The programme entitled "*For Active European Citizenship*", launched in 2006, financed projects which "contribute to the development of the European identity, strengthen the relations and networks between local authorities, deepen the dialogue between the European citizens".

The new programme called "Citizens for Europe" 2007–2013 continues to promote the above mentioned objectives and formulates actions aimed at supporting the meetings of the citizens from twin towns, as well as the creation of thematic networks.

In 1993 the European Commission created the *Golden Stars of Town Twinning Prize* awarded to the best town twinning projects. Its aim is to recognize the best-practice-projects and facilitate the wide dissemination of their results. The projects are assessed by members of the European Parliament, the Commission, the CEMR and the UTO, the prize being awarded during an official ceremony.

At the 2008 awards, the European Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture and Youth, Ján Figel said: "Europe needs participation, needs the feedback of its citizens. The Europe for Citizens programme endorses and promotes successful efforts of active civic participation with concrete results. It is therefore not a surprise to find among the Golden Stars winners systematic, reflection-provoking initiatives that point in the same direction: the participation in, and promotion of common European concerns."

1.3 Town twinning in Hungary

The results of the national survey, which are related to the "*2002 Database of Self-Governments*" processed by TÁRKI, are based on the information provided by the self-governments on a voluntary basis.⁹ The results of the survey have been evaluated by Johanna Giczi and Endre Sík in a paper which concludes as follows below.

At the turn of the 21st century 33% of the Hungarian settlements had foreign twin town partnerships. Out of these 62% had only one, 18% had 2, 10–10% had 3 and 4 partnerships respectively. As far as their foundation year is concerned, the researchers identified two major periods (before and after the change of

⁹24% of the mailed questionnaires were returned, from altogether 736 settlements without Budapest.

regime), the latter one was further divided according to governance cycles and settlement types.

Table 1: Town twinning by year (according to period and settlement type)

Settlement	Period			
	1940-1988	1989-1993	1994-1997	1998-2002
County seat	34	10	6	3
Town	30	40	27	15
Village	36	50	67	82
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: GICZI, J., SÍK, E. (2007): A testvértelepülések kapcsolati tőkájének egy típusa – a testvértelepülések. *Szociológiai Szemle*, No 4.

As far as the number of the partnerships is concerned, before the change of regime county seats were leading the way (with 40% of the relations), the balance among the other settlement types remaining relatively even. Following the change of regime, villages became the major actors in initiating new relationships making up 80% of the town twinnings established at the turn of the century.¹⁰ Before the change of regime the settlements in Transdanubia and the Northern Great Plain were the main initiators; the Transdanubian region having preserved this role till the middle of the 1990s. The settlements in the Northern and Southern Great Plain regions only caught up around the year 2000.

With respect to *geographical orientation*, in the Western partnerships before the change of regime German and Finnish relations were preferred, while the Eastern ones were mostly marked by the Soviet and the Polish relations.

Right after the change of regime, relations with Austrian settlements added to the German partnerships.¹¹ Gradually English, French, Dutch town twinning co-operations were also created. Additionally, the period is marked by an extensive increase of the relationship between Hungary and the Romanian settlements inhabited by Hungarian minorities, a co-operation that has remained very strong to the present time.

The mid-1990s were marked by intensive activities in building Hungarian-Romanian and Hungarian-Slovak relations, to which new partnerships were added with Greece, Serbia and Israel. In 2000 the majority of the town twin-

¹⁰This percentage was counterbalanced by the fact that usually the county seats and the towns established several partnerships.

¹¹60% of the Hungarian-Austrian twinnings were established in this period.

ning relations were carried out with three countries – Romania, Slovakia and Germany – to which tight Hungarian-Polish, Hungarian-French and Hungarian-Italian relations were added. In 2002 the results ranged as follows: Romania (67), Germany (63), Slovakia (28), Finland (24) and France (24). At the turn of the century, as far as the initiative is concerned, 33% of the partnerships were with Romania, whereas in terms of intensity the Hungarian-Slovak town twinning relations were leading the way.

According to the latest, *2009 twinning relations survey*, the 19 county seats (without Budapest) have a total of 208 twin town agreements. This number shows that Hungarian county seats have a similar number of co-operations as their Western European counterparts. This number ranges from 6 (Tatabánya) to 18 (Szeged).¹² The foreign sister towns of county seats are the following, in decreasing order: German, Romanian, Finnish, Slovak, Polish and Italian.¹³ One fifth of the relations existed before the change of regime, half of them having become official by the mid-1990s.

Before the change of regime the foreigners – mainly the German towns – initiated co-operation with self-governments and schools. The network of these relations spreads along the entire country and includes all types of settlements.¹⁴

The Hungarian initiatives speeded up from the beginning of the 1990s and oriented towards German and Austrian settlements, as well as Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia. Before the change of regime there were only few Hungarian-Romanian relations, the majority of which were initiated by Hungary. Following the opening of the border, one third of the Hungarian settlements was looking for a strengthened co-operation in the aim of specific assistance. At the turn of the 21st century these relations were led mainly by cultural interests. The same process can be observed on the other side of the border: reviving the traditions, friendship, mutual understanding – and from both parts a loosening of reserves towards each other. Along the Hungarian-Slovak border, where we can find the largest number of small twinning settlements, after the change of regime the Slovaks proved more active in the field of reviving cultural relations. In addition to governmental and family relations, this region displays the largest number of civil organizations. The Finnish and

¹²Veszprém has 8 sister towns (Gladsaxe, Rovaniemi, Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, Tartu, Bottrop, Passau, Sepsiszentgyörgy, Tirat-Carmel) and 3 partnerships (Saumur, Sibenik, Ningbo).

¹³Veszprém has German, Finnish, Estonian, Belgian, Danish, Romanian and Israeli sister towns.

¹⁴Most Hungarian-German twinings are in the Balaton Highlands, in Tolna and Somogy counties and Budapest.

Polish relations have been set up mainly at the level of larger towns between governments and NGOs.

Table 2: Town twinning by factors of foundation (%)

Reason of twinning	Period			
	1940-1988	1989-1993	1994-1997	1998-2002
History, politics	12	12	7	9
Economy	33	29	29	26
Culture, traditions	38	51	47	45
Tourism	4	2	7	2
Education, youth exchange	9	5	7	9
Other	4	1	2	2
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: GICZI, J., SÍK, E. (2007): A testvértelepülések kapcsolati tőkájének egy típusa – a testvértelepülések. *Szociológiai Szemle*, No 4.

The reasons behind these co-operations can be considered constant.

The major role in setting up the co-operations has always been the transmission of cultural values, the safeguarding and promoting of traditions. The results of the research show that education and youth relations have been a highly motivating factor in a larger number of small settlements than in towns or county seats, where the economic contacts outnumber the average relation types (joint projects, economic partnerships). It is also worth considering that only 10% of the answering self-governments listed among their reasons for setting up a partnership the “brotherhood of Hungarian identity”. This reason is more frequent in case of small settlements.

Generally, it can be stated that the number of relations, their chance of establishment and continuous operation is proportional with the size of the twinning settlement. A town or a county seat has more resources necessary for the development of the relationship (information gathering, travel, ceremonies) than a small village of only a few inhabitants. Setting up a partnership and the intensity of the activity are also influenced by geographical vicinity and shared language, as this can facilitate the financing of the co-operation, from schools to cultural ensembles. An important role is also played by shared history (German and Hungarian minorities in foreign countries), ‘historical friendship’ (Polish towns) and shared language origins (Finnish relations).

Based on research carried out on the relations between Veszprém and its sister towns we can answer questions inquiring to what extent these twinnings can be regarded as self-supporting, *how important the relations will remain for the participants*, how the common values will survive along direct economic and material interests. Taking the Hungarian examples into account we can admit that after the change of regime, setting up the town twinning movement has become an important element of the international strategy of self-governments and has been integrated into the standard values of most Hungarian settlements and citizens. Though lacking updated national data, we presume that in relation to 2002 the number of registered relationships has been on the increase.

There is also a large number of settlements that have not formalised their international relations yet, but have taken the first steps at the level of civil organizations (schools, associations safeguarding traditions) or at citizens' level. The variety of the co-operation forms of these settlements is narrower, the financial resources being fewer than those of larger towns, but the need for the relationship has been formulated and presently they are at the stage of information gathering.

Our positive answers are built not only upon data provided by self-governments, as these, together with the mayors, can influence the setting up or management of a partnership. Actually, it is the schools, the civil organizations, the local small communities that can keep twinnings alive. A partnership can be launched top-down but can only be sustained bottom-up. As individualized as modern people might be, research proves that after meeting the physiological needs, all other needs are primarily met through societal relations (from local to transnational) and values ranging from security, confidence, volunteering to penchant for co-operation. Quoting Václav Havel: "Humans are not merely industrial actors, profit chasers, but deep inside they are all social beings longing for different forms of cohabitation and co-operation, who wish to influence the happenings and await appreciation for everything they do for their environment ..." – and this is the greatest self-sustaining power of twinning co-operation.

2 Co-operation of microregions

“Build bridges”¹⁵

2.1 “Way of Region” – Trans-European Municipality Association

A new form of this type of co-operation, which prolongs the twin town partnership, is a new, higher level local initiative, the first example of which lies in the creation on October 13, 2001 of the *Trans-European Municipality Association T.E.M.A.* (based on the Várpalota Agreement) with the participation of 40 local governments of four small regions (Várpalota, Valée Lavant, Fermano in Marche region and Koroška) in four countries (Hungary, Austria, Italy and Slovakia).

The former bilateral Hungarian-Austrian, Hungarian-Italian, and the emerging Austrian-Italian partnerships have been developed into a higher level international co-operation. The initiative was launched and accepted during the Várpalota Days in 2000, at an event called *Way of Region*, which by the intermediary of Lavant, also added the North Slovenian Koroška. The agreement formulated the main joint actions such as developing human relations based on the “basic European integration”, improving living standards, safeguarding social values, protecting the environment, developing regional economy. To quote Samuele Biondi’s words as mayor of Grottazzolina: “let each small brick contribute to build the peace and Europe.”

In the spring of 2004 the original four-party co-operation extended to five countries when *The Association of Self Governments from the Jiu Valley (Romania)* joined the partnership. Meanwhile the 5-year old TEMA enlarged to a 50-member transnational organization, with a new Italian partner joining (*The Association of the Localities in the Aso Valley*). Meanwhile the mayor of Kremnica expressed the intention to join the partnership, and the Zagłębie Dąbrowskie small region in Silesia (southern Poland) received an observer status.

The most successful domains of co-operation are the partnership forms also recommended by the European Commission, characteristic of the *Youth for Europe programme*, which play an important role in the mutual understanding of the national cultures and the creation of the cohesion of common social values. These forms of co-operation enlarge the partnership of the T.E.M.A. participants in the field of sports, culture, arts and education.

¹⁵Treaty of Várpalota, 2000.

The programmes launched by the T.E.M.A. and their results:

- Camps for primary school children in the field of national history (“*The paths of memory*”),
- International linguistic camps (for primary and secondary school children)
- Dialogue for secondary school students on the internet in the field of environmental protection – in view of further personal and family communication (“*Environmental Legacy*”)
- International youth choral festivals (St. Andrä, Ravne Na Koroskem, Várpalota, Fermo)
- International drawing competition (theme: Peace and Tolerance)
- Participation to each-other’s cultural and sports events and festivals (for adults)
- *T.E.M.A.* – logo (Build Bridges) and homepage design.

All the T.E.M.A. participants share the opinion that education and cultural relations are the ones that serve best “the reputation of the regions and the integration of the people”. This is also a field in which co-operation can be financed in the easiest way. The continuation should focus on the so far poorly exploited domains, such as economic development, employment, a task which seems to be more difficult to accomplish.

2.2 Pays-de-la-Loire and Veszprém – a three level network

*The 15-year old co-operation that was established between the Pays-de-la-Loire Region and the Balaton is a particular type of partnership which includes different forms of co-operation, from the twin city, twin county to the twin region.*¹⁶ The initiative for the partnership originated at the beginning of the 1990s from Olivier Guichard, President of the Regional Council of Pays-de-la-Loire, a person fully devoted to the concept of “the Europe of regions”. The first Eastern-Western interregional co-operation started with the relationship between the French region and the Federation of Lake Balaton.¹⁷

¹⁶Pays-de-la-Loire, stretching along the Atlantic coast, is the fourth most developed industrial region of France (processing, automobile and aircraft industry), with extensive tourism and developed agriculture. The territory of 32,000 square kilometres is inhabited by 322,000 people. The region consists of five counties: Loire-Atlantique (Nantes), Maine-et-Loire (Angers), Mayenne (Laval), Sarthe (le Mans) and Vendée (La Roche-sur Yon).

¹⁷The Balaton ‘Region’ (officially: Balaton Resort Area) including 152 localities and 11 smaller regions from three counties (Veszprém, Somogy and Zala) has 250,000 inhabitants,

*The French and Hungarian representatives signed the agreement between the Balaton Region and the Pays-de-la-Loire on June 6, 1996 and established the five main domains of co-operation (European integration, education and training, tourism, economic development, culture). As a first step, in April 1998, the town of Keszthely accommodated the “Balaton European Information Point”. In addition to providing information on the EU, the EIP played a major role in training teachers (activities within the “*Teachers for Europe*” programmes) and managing youth movements (“*Europe Circles*”).*

An important domain of co-operation included the development of the industry of tourism, sharing the experiences, elaborating regional marketing programmes in tourism, training (the RIGO-RET programme, the COFRAT trainings, COFRAT supported Leonardo da Vinci projects with Hungarian and Italian partners). Through the French partners, the Balaton Regions could participate in the VITOUR project as well. In the economic partnership so far the major part has been played by the chambers, the entrepreneurial co-operation still remaining incidental. On the other hand, the cultural and education relations are more than fruitful.

On June 6, 1997 the General Assemblies of Veszprém and Maine-et-Loire counties signed the co-operation agreement, which has been renewed every three years. The main domains are:

- Joint trainings in tourism
- Organization of conferences on environmental protection
- Search for joint investment
- Artistic exhibitions in Anjou and Balatonalmádi
- The Ferenc Széchenyi Professional Institute in Balatonfüred has successful co-operation with the Agricultural College in Angers, as well as the Brissac and Montreuil-Bellay secondary schools of vini- and viticulture.
- Within the Tempus programme, the University of Angers supported the setting up of the EU information centre of Veszprém.
- The University of Veszprém (from 2006 University of Pannonia) founded the Department of French Language and Literature, which is in close partnership with Maine-et-Loire County and the universities of Angers (scholarships, student mobility).

most of whom are employed in the tertiary sector. With the seasonal inhabitants (owners of resorts, entrepreneurs), the population reaches half a million. After Budapest, the region of Lake Balaton is Hungary’s second highlight.

The town of *Saumur*, a beautiful historical city situated in the valley of the Loire River, famous for its equestrian traditions and wine, and *Veszprém* ‘the Town of Queens’ has had close relations with each other since 2000, which in the spring of 2007 resulted in the official signature of a partnership between the two cities.

Altogether we may say that the three-level (Pays-de-la-Loire and the Balaton Region, Maine-et-Loire and Veszprém counties, as well as Saumur and Veszprém cities) co-operations are very intensive, successful and offering a wide range of programmes, thus setting a model-like example for the other regions.

3 Cross-border co-operation – euroregions

“From I to US. A major goal which is often difficult for individual citizens to appreciate and understand.”¹⁸

Following World War II, which caused the death of millions of people, the political elite of Europe realized that the conflict between the nations should be replaced by co-operation, friendly relationship reaching across the borders and mutual respect. *The concept of ‘euroregions’* and the implementation of this new approach originated in the minds of the Western European countries (or more precisely it emerged from the European Community).

From an economic and political point of view, the free crossing of borders is a most important factor. Joining their economic potential and exploiting all the advantages, the partners can stretch their markets, thus opening new perspectives of development and levelling the differences between the people living on both sides of the frontiers. As a result, the incentives for migration might diminish. In the light of this co-operation the importance of state frontiers becomes relative, as they become reduced to mere administrative bordering lines. Consequently, the instincts feeding the need to conquer new territories, as the major motives of the former wars in Europe, can fade away. Therefore, *the cross-border co-operation* turned into a major factor of stabilization, not only in the functioning of the Common Market, but also in the creation of the European Union.

Although the first cross-border initiatives date back to the 1950s, their administrative form was finalized only in the 1960s. In addition to the top-down initiatives along which the national governments have established intergovernmental relations, the local bottom-up endeavours and self-organizations are

¹⁸EuRegioWest/Nyugat-Pannonia, Broschüre EU 1/5. 0/11/9_4

gaining importance. Depending on the geographical expansion, the co-operation can have different forms, according to which we distinguish eurozones and working communities.

To sum it up, the concept of *eurometropolis* covers the union of the actors along the borders of two or more countries (local and regional authorities), who surmount the obstacles of the political borders to form an association created in the aim to provide the necessary financial resources that facilitate the implementation of their common economic, social, environmental and cultural development. In most cases these are bottom-to-top initiatives, launched by the local inhabitants or NGOs within the framework of everyday diplomacy, which sooner or later acquire a stable institutional form.

The first initiatives came into being on the Dutch-German border, when the successful cross-border co-operation – *Enschede-Gronau Region* ¹⁹ – was created in 1958. This initiative set a positive example which was followed in Western Europe by different other frontier regions. (1965: Regio Basiliensis on the German-French-Belgian border, 1977: Ems-Dollart on the Dutch-German border.)

The importance of euroregions is also indicated by their increasing number. Today almost the entire border of the European Union is organized into either regions or forms of regional co-operation. In 2008 their number outreached 200. The major aim of this co-operation is to facilitate the social, economic and cultural integration that leads to the implementation of joint regional administrative objectives. Its operation has been financed from several resources, including the European *INTERREG* programmes, which in 2007 was replaced by the European Regional Co-operation. Its main aim is to decrease the dividing character of borders, to foster cross-border infrastructure development and co-operation and to strengthen partnership between communities along the border.

While the eurometropolis is a local organizational form consisting of smaller territories, the working community is based on the co-operation of macro-regions. Due to the large number of participants, working communities are always multilateral organizations, most of which were founded between 1975 and 1978. Some examples are ALGE-ALP (1972), Alps-Adriatic Working Community (1978), Working Community of the Western Alps (1982), Working Community of the Pyrenees (1982) or the Working Community of the Jura (1985).

¹⁹Enschede-Gronau Region, from 1965 'EUROREGIO' – not only by name but also in its institutional structure (Council, Presidium, Secretariat, Work Groups) – served as a model for further co-operation. The EUREGIO, which has already 128 members, unites the activity of self-governments of townships, chambers and NGOs.

3.1 Cross-border co-operation – “East-West”

The turnaround of the beginning of the 1990s and the permeability of the frontiers led to an increasing number of cross-border co-operation forms in Central and Eastern Europe. These instances of co-operation covered the border zones of the EU member states and of Central European countries and macro-regions. On the East-West axis, the most active countries were Germany and Poland. In Hungary the idea of a united Europe was experienced live for the first time through the *EuRegio West/Nyugat-Pannónia* cross-border co-operation.

The region, composed of the province of Burgenland and three Hungarian counties (Győr-Moson-Sopron, Vas, Zala), situated ‘in the heart of Central Europe’, is equally a gate to the East and to the West. The 15,000 square kilometres are home for 1.3 million people. Although the borders established by the Treaty of Trianon and later the ‘iron curtain’ divided the territory, the several-century-old economic and cultural relations have never been fully eradicated. The inter-institutional co-operation had been flourishing from the 1970s to set up in 1992 the predecessor of the euroregion, namely the Cross-Border Regional Council (with the participation of Burgenland and two Hungarian counties, Győr-Moson-Sopron and Vas.)

*The agreement documenting the creation of the euroregion was signed in Eisenstadt on October 7, 1998 by the Territorial Chairman of the Burgenland and both Chairmen of General Assemblies for the counties Vas and Győr-Moson-Sopron.*²⁰ The main idea of the co-operation was formulated by Ferenc Ivanics, president of the general assembly of Győr-Moson-Sopron county: “The euroregion is a region created by the people for the people, which provides the necessary framework for extended co-operation and meanwhile represents the common interests of its members.” The main aims of the *EuRegio West/Nyugat Pannónia* region is to promote the joint regional development, the partnership in social, labour and educational affairs, to support the investments in economy and tourism, to safeguard the cultural patrimony, to enhance co-operation in environmental and water protection as well as in catastrophe relief. Priority was given to the preparation of Hungary’s accession to the European Union and to the levelling of economic differences with the help of joint European projects, such as *INTERREG-PHARE CBC*.

The *EuRegio West/Nyugat-Pannónia* is at the crossroads of five countries, merging different peoples and cultures. Its previous activity consisted in large-scale partnership, *varied and multifaceted forms of co-operation*, backed up by

²⁰The Hungarian county of Zala joined in 1999.

open and transparent structures. The mission of the region is to cherish the patrimony of the peoples and the cultures, recognizing that only joint efforts can lead to success in Central and Eastern Europe and in the European Union at large. Therefore, this co-operation is continuously strengthened by involving new partners from the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy and Serbia. Its future is defined by regional issues. *Its main objective is 'to form the new heart of Europe'. The whole future lies in the strong regions, in 'the Europe of the regions', where it assumes full participation.*

3.2 Cross-border co-operation – “East-East”

The political elite of the post-socialist countries recognized in their rhetoric the importance of subregional co-operation, but in the beginning they preserved the level of traditional intergovernmental partnerships (the Visegrád Group).

In the 20th century the drastic changes of borders reshaped the relationship between the peoples living in the area. The conflicts and ordeals were worsened by the relocations following the war (mainly along the Polish-German, Polish-Russian, Czech-German and Hungarian-Slovak borders). Another example of ethnic tension is the instance when the same ethnic group lives on both sides of a frontier (e.g. almost the entire exterior border of Hungary is inhabited by Hungarian minorities), a main source of tension in the past, and occasionally also at present. In the past decades the area was characterized by the birth of new states (the emergence of the Czech and Slovak republics, of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia). While in the EU the main issues were the abolishing of borders, in this part of Europe countries were reshaping them peacefully or through agreements following the war. This is why the cross-border co-operation is an urging need. In many instances the politically sensitive real or imaginary problems impede the efficient co-operation.

The success of cross-border co-operation did not depend only on the main political trends. The real success has been guaranteed by the members of the partnerships, by the intentions and actions of the people living along the borders. Nevertheless, the setting up of regions caused conflicts in most countries, as previously these levels of administrations had not been recognized as such, and regional policy did not have any traditions in Central Europe. The creation of the regions was not only a requirement of the European Union²¹ but a prerequisite for becoming eligible for the INTERREG programmes in financing cross-border co-operation.

²¹The region = NUTS III level, the most important supporting level of the structural and cohesive policy.

The first cross-border chain of co-operation was the partnership between large territorial units (Alps Adriatic Working Community, the Carpathian Euroregion), which provided important information and tasks in the pre-accession period to the EU. These regions contributed to the strengthening of stability in the large regions, providing a coordinating framework for the complex social, economic and cultural co-operation stretching across the borders.

The founding document of *the Carpathian Euroregion* was signed on February 14, 1993 by the governmental representatives of Poland, Hungary, Ukraine, Slovakia and representatives of two Romanian counties. But due to the reluctance of the administrative policy, the two Romanian counties as well as the Slovak region gained full membership only in 1997 and 1999, respectively.

Presently the territory of the Carpathian Euroregion is 160,000 square kilometres and is inhabited by 16 million people. Its administrative organization – similarly to the other Central and Eastern European countries – follows the models of Western European euroregions. In the light of Convention EC 106, the mission of the region is to provide a well-functioning framework assisting the faster regional and economic development and promoting mutual understanding with the neighbours.

The almost 15-year-old *transnational institution* has served as a precedent. Western European models could not be successfully adopted as local conditions did not prove mature enough. The political elite of the five countries had not yet realized the role of joint development and levelling of the border regions. Co-operation was also set back by the economy of the less developed peripheral areas, where the low economic potential could not meet the set up requirements. The regions poor in capital were suitable only for illegal economy. Representatives of the economic and political elite pronounced only on the level of rhetorics on the importance of innovation. The initiatives, if any, were directed towards their own regions rather than towards the development of the bordering areas. Successful steps were only the cultural relations and the co-operation between universities. To the present time the economy of these bordering regions could not be levelled, as the time span proved relatively short.

Co-operation within the Carpathian Euroregion did not fulfil the objectives set by the founding members. A successful continuation could be provided by a change within the administration (eventually turning into an umbrella institution), the strengthening of co-operation between the smaller units of the region, rethinking the objectives and the tasks, exploiting successfully the projects financed from European resources. (The situation has improved since Romania's accession to the EU in January 2007.)

The operation of the Carpathian Euroregion, as well as the political history of the recent past in the Carpathian Basin reflect the poor chances for successful co-operation in extended regions. On the other hand, what seem feasible are the cross-border partnerships that have tangible objectives, best illustrated by *the euroregions set up along the Slovak-Hungarian border*, where from the end of the 1990s the improved political relations and the new reform in public administration resulted in generating an increasing number of interregional partnerships.²²

Experts believe that the success is due to the fact that following World War I the Hungarian territory called Upland did not constitute a compact economic, geographical and administrative unit with the mother country from which it had been disannexed, as the area belonged to different centres (Budapest, Bratislava, Košice). Therefore, the people living in the region had more of a local, provincial identity rather than a regional one. This situation was fully exploited by the founders of the *Ister-Granum Euroregion*.²³ Its symbolic unity was actually restored on October 11, 2001 with the *opening of the Mária Valéria Bridge linking the towns of Esztergom and Štúrovo*. The regional co-operation agreement was signed on October 13, 2000 by the representatives of the Južný Region, of the Regional Development Association of Esztergom and Nyergesújfalu as well as of Tokod and Tokodaltáró, in the presence of Hans Beck, leader of the EU delegation in Hungary. On May 31, the area was named Ister-Granum Cross-Border Region. On November 17, 2003, 73 settlements along the border decided to create the Ister-Granum Euroregion.

Successful projects:

- Displaying the signboards indicating the tourist highlights of the euroregion
- Creating a thematic cycling track in the Pilis Mountains
- Setting up a regional economic e-portal for small enterprises
- Development of the NGO sector (trainings in project writing, editing a Hungarian-Slovak-English catalogue of the NGOs in the euroregion)

²²Presently 95% of the 697 kilometres of borders belongs to cross-border regions, (some border areas participating simultaneously in several different partnerships).

²³The territory of the euroregion, which is a historical and cultural district bearing the Latin names of the rivers Danube and Garam, exceeds 2,000 square kilometres and has 200,000 inhabitants.

Launched programmes:

- Expertising Governance for Transfrontier Conurbations (CEGTC-Urbact)
- Development of regional information bases for the NGOs

Future projects:

- New bridges of the Ister-Granum Euroregion (restoring the bridges on the lower parts of the river Ipoly).

The running and planned project will result not only in re-building the bridges on the river Ipoly, but also in strengthening the concept of euroregion, underlying the importance of co-operation on both sides of the border. The main idea of transnational co-operations was formulated by Hans Beck, representative of the Hungarian Regions in Brussels: “In the EuRegion people can live in peace, mutual respect and appreciate the other culture. It will be a pleasure to live and work in the enlarged Europe. With joint efforts and determination we can create our sustainable future.”

3.3 CENTROPE – a unique region in Europe

“We shape the future”²⁴

“CENTROPE – is a unique region in Europe considering that it borders three ‘new’ EU-member states (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) and an ‘old’ EU-member state (Austria). This region not only looks back at a long common history, but had strong functional ties in the past as well. It was only the political events of the 20th century and the ensuing changes to the borders (1918, 1921, 1993) that turned the region into a border region. Even though economic and systematic differences currently exist, the forthcoming accession to the EU of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary revive the spatial functionality of the region that is reflected in cross-border economic, cultural and social activities and transform it into a palpable experience” – these are the opening lines of the regional analysis of CENTROPE Region.²⁵

In the summer of 2002, recognizing the economic potential of the spontaneous co-operation launched in this ‘four-nation’ quadrangle (tourism, entrepreneurial and cultural partnerships), Vienna started the preparation to form a region within the INTERREG IIIA programme. Vienna’s intention

²⁴Vision Centrope 2015.

²⁵Annex: Table 3.

was to strengthen the synergic attraction of strong capital, therefore it concentrated on providing EU funds to assist the co-operation between the SMEs of the Austrian, Czech, Slovak and Hungarian regions. The declaration of the intention to set up the region was signed in September 2003 in Kittsee. Following the motto “We will be a Euroregion” the participants, building on the advantages of the already existing network, expressed their wish to create an internationally acknowledged multifunctional centre (the Central European Region, CENTROPE).

The participants in the co-operation: provinces, townships, counties and cities. The Centrope region in Austria covers the Vienna Region (the Austrian provinces of Burgenland, Lower Austria, Vienna and the cities Vienna, St. Pölten and Eisenstadt); in the Czech Republic the regions of South Bohemia, South Moravia and Brno city; in Slovakia the township of Bratislava, Trnava and the cities Bratislava, Trnava, and in Hungary the counties Győr-Moson-Sopron, Vas and Zala and the cities of Győr, Sopron and Szombathely.

The preparations of the CENTROPE programme, which lay on large-scale conceptions and long-term objectives was fully served by *OPENING (Optimized ENlargement TrainING Academy) model project*, which ended on July 1, 2005. Objective: to strengthen and institutionalize the co-operation between local and regional authorities and offices. Activity was built around seven themes (e.g. integrative town development, cross-border co-operation in the field of training management, renewing professional training, regional development of tourism industry, joint statistical database). The participants of the Vienna-Burgenland-Bratislava-Győr-Moson-Sopron-Brno regions attending the international conference shared their transnational experiences and discussed the conditions of further actions (appointing target groups, developing co-operation skills, project management, financing resources, etc.).

On April 19, 2005 in St. Pölten the representatives of the Central European Region in a closing conference memorandum formulated the future actions aimed at reinforcing the co-operation. Besides long-term objectives, the participants decided to launch pilot projects within specific domains:

- *LABOUR* – working out a long-term human resources development strategy, involving all the actors of the labour market, in order to enhance employment
- *MAP* – database for common regional planning and development
- *Bio-materials* – working out the future “biosphere region”, with the exploitation of the regions’ natural resources

- *Enter Centrope* – video films for the international marketing of the regions
- *IMAGE* – creating long-term PR and marketing products
- *Sound* – organizing joint concerts
- *Sailing* – organizing sailing competitions on Lake Fertő for the young generation in the region
- *Regional Management* – a project uniting development offices and organizations in the region. Objective: to assure the sustained development of rural areas. The main fields of co-operation are: tourism, regional environmental technologies, setting up clusters, creating the network of historical parks and castles.²⁶

In March 2006 the first stage of the CENTROPE co-operation ended. At the political conference entitled “CENTROPE 2006+” the “Vision CENTROPE 2015” contained the strengthening of the union of the four regions, the four central domains of co-operation and the tasks leading to its implementation. (Available on the homepage of the region). The members of CENTROPE and the designers of the ‘vision’ 2015 have envisaged the following:

“April 2015. Today the mayors, county presidents and governors of the Central European Region will meet for their annual General Assembly to discuss and adopt the CENTROPE working programme for the next two years. The annual assembly is also attended by prominent representatives of key enterprises and universities of the entire region, which play a vital role in the joint development of the Central European Region as associated CENTROPE partners.

The roughly six and a half million persons living and working in the Central European Region feel strong ties with this economic and living space at the heart of Central Europe and have an increasingly clear understanding of the many factors that link them and the potential advantages these harbour ... The citizens of CENTROPE use the same currency, move freely across the borders, and the last transition periods for the labour market and service sector

²⁶The *institutional network* of CENTROPE has also been established. Its main governing body is the Council, formed by the representatives of the regions. The council ensures the proper platforms and forums to negotiate the form and content of the co-operation. *The Steering Committee*, made up of the town mayors and the leaders of counties and townships, is responsible for the accomplishment of the tasks. The *CENTROPE Working Community* is provided by the permanent co-operation between institutions and organizations such as ECO PLUS, Europaforum Wien, Regional Consulting Ziviltechniker Ges.m.b.H, WIBAG, WWFF, Centrope Platform.

have long expired. Although they have remained Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians and Austrians, they self-confidently use their different cultural and linguistic backgrounds to exploit the opportunities the Central European Region offers as an economic, cultural and living place. People are proud that obstacles that formerly had seemed insurmountable were overcome in just a few years through a manifest decision . . . The Central European Region is today known as a model where European integration at the interface between ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU Member States has been achieved quickly and smoothly.”

In order that this vision turns into reality, in addition to mutual efforts, there is also need for long-term multilateral strategy and action in the field of economy, labour market, administration, environmental protection, education, R&D, culture. The economic and innovative potential of the area bordered by CENTROPE should be tuned according to the priorities of the 2007-2017 EU budget. Meanwhile, an effective communication should reinforce the inner cohesion of the region as well as its international reputation.

Wolfgang Weisgram, analyst for *Der Standard* wrote the following in April 2005: “The area which used to be called ‘Vienna Region’, an area which is called CENTROPE today, and whose official foundation ceremony was held in the autumn of 2003 in the castle of Kittsee, is already on its way. It is a logical historical consequence that the Czech, the Slovak, the Hungarian and the Austrian regions and cities started to co-operate in order to bring about an economic unity, a joint flourishing, the framework of industrial and infrastructural development, common plans for exploiting the economic and natural resources . . .” Hans Nissl, governor of Burgenland affirmed that the “growing together” i.e. the integration cannot be “ordered and imposed”. It has to proceed from bottom-to-top. We have already taken many steps, but these are not enough. This feeling is shared by the nearly six million people who are living and working in the area and send their children into the future.

4 Summary – One tree, one country

The ever strengthening political, ideological and cultural variety of modern age Europe has faded or fully eradicated the formerly binding strings, since ethnic and social groups, previously organically belonging together and mutually co-operating, have turned into enemies. Although the conceptions that shaped the vision of a co-operating peaceful and solid Europe, which guarantees high living standards, date far back into history, the process that began to turn the partnership between the European citizens from theory into practice appeared only half a century ago.

We know that everybody agrees to the need of a ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ development of the European Union, and day by day we meet its most remarkable fulfilment in the form of good practices worth following. The transnational – local, micro- and regional – partnerships are gaining ground and this way help patching together the threads torn by the stormy historical past.

The summer of 2004 (Santander, Spain): 15 young secondary school students from the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Europe were getting acquainted in the international camp organized by FACE (Federation of Association of Young Citizens of Europe). They shared views about the future of the integration, migration, ethics and development, violence and solidarity. At the end of the event the young people planted a tree, as the symbol of a united Europe A few years have passed since then. The leaves of trees are rustling merrily in the wind. They will turn into a forest while the young grow old. And these forests will calm the winds and tame the devastating tempests. But stopping the political storms, erasing the evil historical conditioning, appeasing the real or imaginary grievances will remain the task of those who have planted the trees – both ‘at the bottom’ and ‘at the top’.

ANNEX

Table 3: General Strengths and Weaknesses of CENTROPE Region

STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES
Geographical position at the heart of Europe	Distance to the West European economic centres, especially for the peripheral regions
The metropolitan area Vienna-Bratislava-(Győr) as the core of the region	In the rural regions, the poor situations of competition with regard to hard and soft location factors
Access to the Eastern European market	Differences in legal frameworks, administrative and regional competence structures and standards (e.g. environmental, technical)
Dynamic urban centres	Disparities as a consequence of the differences in prosperity and development level of the countries and regions
Region highly attractive for investment, attractive location for international enterprises and headquarters	Lacking development of cross-border regional competencies and development of locations
Cultural and social relationships between the 4	CENROPE countries lacking knowledge of the language of the respective neighbours
Existing contracts and cross-border co-operation structures	Varying speeds of the development process
Variety of languages	

Source: Regional Analysis of the CENTROPE region, *DIANE Project* (Direct Investment Agency Net) Vienna, September 2003, 50.

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Theodor Herzl's National Answer to the Misery of the Jewish People

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Abstract. Considering the complex web of cause-and-effect chains and motivating forces behind the creation of the State of Israel, the present study emphasises and analyses in detail the Zionist movement, with special regard to the work of Theodor Herzl (Herzl Tivadar).

Brought up according to the values and norms of European culture, Herzl, with his liberal worldview, was an advocate for assimilation and emancipation until his mid-thirties. Later, in the face of strengthening European antisemitism and especially the Dreyfus Affair, which exploded in 1894, with the antisemitic mass demonstrations in France, he would turn towards a radical solution for the Jewish question.

The study gives an in-depth analysis to the two Herzl-works which appeared in the intellectually fermenting period of the turn of the century: the booklet entitled *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State) appeared in 1896 and sketches the exodus process, and the *Altneuland* (Old New Land), a liberal utopia, was published in 1902 in German. The study also highlights the historical importance of Theodor Herzl.

Keywords: Zionism, Jewish national rebirth, Holy Land, Palestine, Theodor Herzl (Herzl Tivadar), responsibility

Scholarly works written on the catastrophes of 20th century Europe could easily fill a whole library. Historians have given thorough attention to the ways in which the horrible nightmares of collectivism became absorbed into the fabric of European societies. Historical scholarship has uncovered in detail the complex mechanisms behind the realisations of the grim National Socialist phantasm with its aim to suspend individual responsibility and annihilate personal integrity, as well as the workings of the Bolshevik obsession.

Among these large-scale catastrophes, it is perhaps the historical crime of the Holocaust¹ that has entered people's general awareness most within the Western world. The annihilation of European Jews is indeed a singular phenomenon in the history of mankind, as interpreted by French philosopher Paul Ricoeur: "The victims of Auschwitz are, par excellence, the delegates closest to our memory of all the victims of history". (Ricoeur 1985: 273)

It may not be stated that the birth of the Jewish state was the result of the Holocaust; in the background to its formation, however, we must be able to discern the most sophisticated and the roughest forms of *European* antisemitism as well as the Holocaust itself: the massive, systematic annihilation of Jews, which is one of the most terrible tragedies in history. At the beginning of World War II Jews in the Eastern part of Europe were exterminated on grounds of racism and family descent, but there were clearly apprehensible reasons, usually *economic* considerations behind their destruction. (Krausz 2004; 2006) In another approach, the Holocaust stands as a phenomenon of the past, incomparable to anything else. This extraordinary European experience, being one of the most gruesome chapters in world history, is not explicable in all its details. The advocates of this approach argue that it is futile to search for motivations, i.e. the whys in the background of the Holocaust, not because the past is so finite but because there are no rational reasons. The Holocaust is an *incomprehensible* historical phenomenon, and the processes behind the awful events are *impossible to unravel*: "The Holocaust may not be explained by historical conditions of any sort and no simultaneous summarising of its causes may determine any satiable final reason. The Holocaust was not only a great leap into Evil, but a totally irrational one, as well. This is why it stays outside of history." (Heller 1997: 86)

Nazis considered Jews harmful elements of society; their racial theory declared that Jews were the most corrupt race. The dramatic Nazi programme of ridding themselves of the Jews first focused on the concentration of Jews in ghettos and then, from 1941-42, on genocide – although three quarters of the Holocaust victims are known to have been alive in spring 1942. The Nazis and their supporters organised transports for millions of Jews, confining them to camps, humiliating, and killing them. Beside Germans, the nations of the Eastern European region also took action against their own Jewish populations, at times more aggressively than Nazis had planned and scheduled. Thus, responsibility for the unmatched crimes against the Jews must be assumed not

¹The Holocaust has been evaluated by Imre Kertész as the fragmentation of European culture. The National Socialist regime killed 4.5 to 6 million Jews according to the plans of "Endlösung" and "Umsiedlung".

only by Germans. (Krausz 2006: 46) The deportation and extermination of Jews across Europe is a shame pole of ethics. Western conscience wished to pay toward the immense debt to these victims with the creation of the Jewish state,² and Israel continued to be viewed as a victims' state.

If we wish to examine the complex web of cause-and-effect chains and motivating forces behind the creation of the Jewish state, we must look back upon the good half century before the birth of Israel, and look into the list of historical precedents. Among the historical processes whose merger and unfolding resulted in the genesis of Israel, we must pay special attention to the Zionist movement.

In the last third of the 19th century and the first three decades of the 20th, nationalist ideologies heavily affected European peoples, and the idea of the creation of a national homeland started to occupy the minds of groups of European Jews. At the first Zionist Congress, convened in August 1897 in the stately City Casino of Basel, the proposal for Jewish settlement into Palestine was passed and the founding of an organisation to aid land acquisition in Palestine and promote settlement there was also initiated. A man named Chaim Weizmann, professor of chemistry from a settlement near Minsk and a liberal thinker, took the lion's share of the political preparation of the congress, while a journalist called Herzl hoisted the flag of a programme for a return to Palestine and a Jewish national rebirth. Theodor Herzl (Herzl Tivadar) and his dream of a Jewish state to be established in Palestine would stir up life in Europe and the Middle East within a few decades with a slogan that seemed romantic to many: "If you will, it is no fairytale."

Born in 1860 to an affluent merchant's family and a resident of Budapest until the age of 18, Herzl's guiding stars as Jewish theoretician and Zionist thinker were first and foremost his emotions and personal experiences. Brought up according to the values and norms of European culture, Herzl, with his liberal worldview, was an advocate for assimilation and emancipation until his mid-thirties. Later, in the face of strengthening European antisemitism and especially the Dreyfus Affair, which exploded in 1894, with the antisemitic

²1948, the year of the declaration of the State of Israel, brings a turning point in Eastern European attitudes to the Holocaust: until 1948, all over the Eastern regions of Europe (in the Soviet Union, as well) the Holocaust is still a matter of discussion; after 1948 there come long years and decades of silence based on the idea that there cannot be any distinction made between victims of the World War. This silence, however, was not complete in the Soviet block as memories of extermination based on racial grounds were expressed in the form of art works.

mass demonstrations in France, he would turn towards a radical solution for the Jewish question.

Herzl, a successful journalist of the liberal *Neue Freie Presse* in Vienna, came to spearhead a movement which envisaged Jews as the leading, chosen people of the new Middle East. As the Paris correspondent of the *Neue Freie Presse* at the beginning of the last decade of the 19th century he could personally experience that even assimilation fails to provide effective protection for Jews in Western Europe. Antisemitism in Europe and Russia flared up as early as the 1880s, but the veritable ‘road to Damascus’, the moment of enlightenment for Herzl came with the Dreyfus Affair, quoted by historians as the first modern spy story in European history. In 1894, in a closed trial and without evidence, the French authorities condemned Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a talented General Staff officer of Alsatian Jewish descent, to banishment on Devil’s Island in South America for spying – he spent five years there as a convict. Herzl was deeply appalled by the fact that in the capital of the great revolution, which declared human rights and heralded liberty, equality, and fraternity, in Republican France, a man may be convicted solely on the ground of being a Jew. He was filled with fear by the havoc wreaked by the mobs. “The charges against the Jewish officer provided an excuse for anti-Jewish circles to start antisemitic riots. The artificially induced crowd in Paris – in the city where, exactly a century before, equality for Jews before the law had been enacted as first in Europe – cried out for ‘Death to the Jews!’ in the open street. They demanded death to tens of thousands of Jewish citizens, only because one of them – although innocent – had been accused of treason.” (Hahn 1996: 165) These phenomena in France indicated that the attempts for a European Jewish emancipation and assimilation launched by the philosopher Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) had failed. In the face of strengthening antisemitic disturbances attracting ever larger numbers of people in a Europe of antisemitic traditions, Herzl came to the conclusion that the struggle for equal rights for the Jewish people and their integration into secularised societies, which was started in the 18th century, had not reached its aim.

In 1894, there is a radical change of outlook, an actual volte-face in Herzl’s life. An otherwise fervently liberal man, in 1893 Herzl would still dream of a specific way for the total assimilation of Central European Jews: the mass conversions to Catholicism of the Jews in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on Sundays outside the Stephanskirche in Vienna, with himself at the head of this movement, which would not lack in elements of theatricality. (Herzl 1922: 8) A year later he was contemplating the fact that the true issue is not whether Jews wish to be assimilated but whether majority societies wish to

accept assimilating Jews. As the contemporary European press was flooded by articles and pamphlets that fired up antisemitic sentiments, and political forces which utilised antisemitism to reach political aims also emerged, proving very effective, Herzl gave up all hope for the Jewish people to achieve de facto legal and social equality in Europe in the foreseeable future. Fearing for the survival of Jews in Europe, Herzl became convinced that no other political ideology may provide a lifebelt for Jews than that of independent statehood, and the rebirth of the Jewish people must come to pass in the Holy Land. In the intellectually fermenting period at the turn of the century, the journalist, casting a dreamy glance into the future, laid out the sketches of a wonderfully promising plan, the exodus process, in a booklet entitled *Der Judenstaat* (*The Jewish State*) in 1896. His work of liberal utopia published in 1902 in German, bearing the title *Altneuland* (*Old New Land*) projected the social picture of a new Palestine to be established within a few decades. There is no universal system to be discerned in either treatise but both qualify as philosophy, a specific attitude towards the world.

Herzl documented his thoughts and ideas in a passionate way; his works “were written in a bombastic, theatrical and grandiloquent style – especially *The Jewish State* –, and his proposals for the solutions are presented not only as if he had discovered them, but as if he had been the first to raise the question itself. When he attempts to wring help from the Jewish tycoons Edmund de Rothschild and Maurice de Hirsch, he voices the prophetic *hycpe* of a beggar supplicating in the name of the Jewish people.” (Avineri 1994: 108-9) Expounding the problems of Jewish emancipation as a playwright, Herzl discusses in the pamphlet *The Jewish State* that the people of four-thousand-year-old Israel are not only determined to be scattered but also to be gathered, and the new golden age for the Jewish *nation* is at hand, when it may live in its own homeland. The central idea of political Zionism promoting the return of the Jewish people to Palestine, the ancient Promised Land, quotes rights of two thousand years in declaring that Jews are entitled to return to the land of their ancestors and create a Jewish state there. The most sacred location for the Jewish people is to be found in the Holy Land, in Jerusalem Old Town: the remains of the Temple destroyed in 70 AD, the fifty-seven-metre-high and thirty-two-metre-long Wailing Wall. This retaining wall, built in 19 BC, became a place for pilgrimage; in the subsequent centuries (as in Herzl’s times) Jews came here to lament the destruction of the shrine and the loss of the independent state. Legitimacy for the Jews over Palestine (Canaan stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates) is asserted by Zionism on the basis of relations to the land of Biblical Israel and is built on the idea of historical

continuity. It is emphasised that it is not a state without precedents that is to be created there. This set of arguments nevertheless logically excludes the rights of Arabs to the same territory.

After completing law studies in Vienna commenced at the wish of his parents in 1878, the clever, sensitive journalist and writer continued to work mainly in the imperial city. He saw the antisemitic governments as the main allies of Zionism, purposely or unintentionally promoting the formation of the Jewish state. The foundation of the state in Palestine and the *recreation* of the Jewish state in Palestine for the Jewish *nation*, in effect, took place in Switzerland: “In Basel I founded the Jewish state”, wrote the leading figure of the self-asserting Jewish policy, Zionism, in his diary after the first Zionist congress of 1897, where almost all Zionist factions were represented. “If I said this aloud today, I would invariably be laughed at. Perhaps in five years, but surely in fifty years, it will be common knowledge.” (Schweitzer 2004) Fifty years is a fleeting moment on the historian’s time scale, thus he may not attempt to emotify the mathematical data of the number fifty, just as it is not his department to take a stance on issues of prophecy. The augury included in the diary entry, the message declared at the first conference of the Zionist movement in the Swiss city on the future New Jerusalem nevertheless came true in exactly half a century, with the declaration of Israel state in 1948.

The views of 19th century Zionist thinkers, especially the German Moses Hess and the Russian Leon Pinsker have contributed greatly to the foundation of the Jewish state in Palestine in the middle of the 20th century, but among them there emerges the paramount figure of the ‘fanciful’ forerunner to the new Jewish diplomacy: Theodor Herzl. Although familiar with his definition of Zionism (“Zionism is not a party; Zionism is the Jewish nation on the road”)³, (Blumenthal 1977: 195) we may not regard his theoretical activity a novelty as not even the basic notions of the ideology derive from him: the phrasing ‘Zionism’ and ‘Zionist’ were coined in 1890 (according to other sources, in 1885)⁴ by Nathan Birnbaum, born of a Viennese Jewish family, who conducted

³Ernst P. Blumenthal: “Der Zionismus ist keine Partei – der Zionismus ist das jüdische Volk unterwegs.”

⁴Source: <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/Birnbaum.html> (accessed October 20, 2009). Avi Shlaim designates 1885 as the birthdate of the phrase ‘Zionism’ in his 2001 volume entitled *The Iron Wall*. Of the rich literature on Zionism, I only refer to the most significant works: Shlomo Avineri, *A modern cionizmus kialakulása*. Budapest: Századvég, 1994; André Chouraqui, *Un visionnaire nommé Herzl: la résurrection d’Israël*. Paris: Laffont, 1991; Amos Elon, Herzl. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975; Klaus Dethloff (ed.), *Theodor Herzl oder Der Moses des Fin de Siecle*. Wien / Köln / Graz: Hermann Böhlau Nachf., 1986; Halász, Zoltán, Herzl. Budapest: Magyar Világ, 1995; Ha-

law studies and then chose to become a writer and journalist. The historical role of the initiator of the 1897 Basel Zionist congress constitutes in the fact that it was him who brought about a breakthrough for Zionism in Jewish and international public opinion. He put the phenomena of a marginalised Jewish life onto the palette of world politics for all future times. (Avineri 1994: 107-8) The Jewish journalist living in abysmal poverty, driven by a spirit of adventure, publishing light glosses and superficial quick written pieces (Avineri 1994: 108) not only gave new impetus to the Zionist movement but took practical steps toward the creation of the old new land, the Jewish state in Palestine. He sought the favours of diplomats, presidents, and crowned heads for his programme of action; he attempted to gain the support of influential, wealthy Jews, who were in a position to intervene in the highest political circles of the great powers. Although Herzl, always filled with a desire for success, (Bein 1934: 70) travelled round the capitals of Europe with daring plans in his luggage, his efforts proved to be futile (in his lifetime): Zionist aspirations were not embraced by any contemporary great power. We might add that the leaders of the Ottoman Empire, then holding the Holy Land, were also less than enthusiastic about the programme of the formation of the Jewish national homeland in the territory of Palestine.

The first decades after Herzl's death were characterised by a strong sense of division among Jews on the issue of the Jewish national rebirth. Sephardic Jews reacted neutrally to the ideas of Zionism; they had no pioneers either in the theoretical or practical political foundation of the movement. The decisive majority of Ashkenazi Jews living in Central Europe and mostly sympathetic to the ideas of liberalism also rejected the realisation of Jewish national integration in Palestine. In Budapest, Herzl's city of birth, the local Jewish community suspected his person as a British colonisation agent. Many accused him with the very notion that by propagating his Zionist views he inadvertently created grounds for a new wave of antisemitism, and worked to strengthen discrimination against Jews. Although antisemitic sentiments gained force in the years following World War I in the defeated European states, as mostly Jews came to be blamed for the catastrophe, the ideas of Zionism were not popular for a great part of the European Jewish population in the first third of

raszti, György, *Két világ határán*. Budapest: Múlt és Jövő, 1999; Novák, Attila, *Theodor Herzl*. Budapest: Vince, 2002; Patai, József, *Herzl*. Budapest: 1932; Alex Bein, *Theodor Herzl: Biographie*. Wien: Fiba, 1934; Julius H. Schoeps, *Theodor Herzl and the Zionist Dream*. London: Thames and Hudson, 1997; Carl E. Schorske, *Bécsi századvég: Politika és kultúra*. Budapest: Helikon, 1998, 136-163; Gideon Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology*. Hanover, N.H. / London: Brandeis University Press, 1995.

the 20th century: they continued to disfavour the programme of the creation of an independent Jewish state. As late as the mid-1920s, support for Zionism among Jews in Germany was rather low, amounting to a mere 4 to 5 per cent. This attitude of rejection was foreshadowed by the fact that the first Zionist congress, planned to convene in Munich, had to be transferred to the Swiss city of Basel because of indignation and protest from the German rabbis.

Significant changes were only brought about by the leaden times, when old-fashioned pogroms were replaced by death works organised on a national level. The cruellest racial hatred of all times burst to the surface in the Germany of the 1930s; racist atrocities became an everyday phenomenon and in the years preceding the outbreak of World War II 12 per cent of Germany's Jewish population emigrated to Palestine. Antisemitism, governed from the highest level of the state, also strengthened in the Soviet Union from the mid-1930s. As a reaction to acts of antisemitic discrimination, European Jews continued to migrate in ever higher numbers to Palestine (then under British authority), to the land that in their belief was assigned to them by the Almighty.

Pioneering personalities in the Zionist movement agreed that the basis of Jewish national existence is territorial concentration. At the same time, emotions clashed when it came to the marking out of the geographical area of the prospective Jewish state. Solutions in North and South America also emerged. The American Mordecai Manuel Noah (1785-1851), a journalist and author like Herzl, envisaged the formation of Jewish colonies in the Eastern regions of the United States in the first half of the 19th century.⁵ A few decades later, the Russian Leon Pinsker (1821-1891) would toy with the idea of the foundation of a Jewish national home in North America. In the final decade of the century, the ideas of Baron Maurice de Hirsch (1831-1896) sparked hot debates: in 1891 he proposed that Argentina should provide a place for Jewish colonies. The influential banker founded the Jewish Colonization Association and generously supported the transfer of poor Eastern European Jews to the new Jewish settlements in Argentina.⁶ On behalf of the British government, Colonial Secretary Lord Joseph Chamberlain put forward the proposal to create Jewish colonies in Eastern Africa in 1903 but Zionists firmly rejected the

⁵Seymour "Sy" Brody, *Mordecai Manuel Noah: An Ardent Patriot and Zionist*. Source: Florida Atlantic University Libraries, Jewish Heroes and Heroines in America from Colonial Times to 1900, <http://www.fau.edu/library/brody12.htm> (accessed October 12, 2009). See further: Selig Adler - Thomas E. Connolly, *From Ararat to Suburbia: The History of the Jewish Community of Buffalo*. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1960.

⁶For a detailed overview of the topic see: Theodore Norman, *An Outstretched Arm: A History of the Jewish Colonization Association*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985.

idea of the Uganda settlement. Emerging on the death of Baron Hirsch, Herzl and many of his followers professed that the Jewish national rebirth may not come to pass in a foreign land. "It is my sacred conviction that a wonderful New Jerusalem will be built beyond the walls of the Old Town", Theodor Herzl jotted down with enthusiasm an experience of Jerusalem on one of his trips to the Holy Land in autumn 1898. Herzl also calculated with transitory preparations, the creation of preliminary concentration areas in the region of el-Aris in the Sinai or in Uganda. It is nevertheless clear that he could imagine the birth of the Jewish national homeland exclusively in the territory of Palestine, then part of the Ottoman Empire, in the land of the forefathers, where once the state of Solomon and David lay. The conviction of the leading character of Zionism was further corroborated by his quotation of the text of the Psalm at the Uganda congress: "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning".

Zionists claiming rights for all sacred locations for the Jews, for the whole territory of Biblical and historical Israel did not pay proper attention to the fact that Palestine, belonging to the territorial unit known as historical Syria, is a sacred place for Jews and Muslims alike. On the Temple Mount in Eastern Jerusalem there stand not only the ruins of the twice-destroyed Temple of the Jews of Antiquity: the Wailing Wall, but the Prophet Muhammad also ascended to Heaven from this place. They did not take into consideration the fact that Western ideas of national consciousness and sovereignty are no longer unknown in the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean. Although in the course of his journeys across the Holy Land Herzl could gain the personal experience that Palestine is populated by Muslim Arabs, the leader of the political movement which unfolded around the idea of a "return" to Palestine for Jews scattered over the world still enthusiastically heralded the slogan "a land without a people for a people without a land" ("Ein Land ohne Volk für ein Volk ohne Land") of early Zionism.

The distinguished thinker simply did not calculate with the sharpening of the oppositions between the Arab and Jewish ethnic groups. He never conceived the demand for settling to what extent the Jewish state should be Jewish; instead, he emphasised the liberal quality of the state. He envisaged a cosmopolitan world in Palestine, one tolerant to languages and religions, where his prognosis showed the *disappearance of antisemitism* as opposed to its new wave. On transporting his reader into the foreseeable future, Herzl acts as a guide to a world of peace and harmonious coexistence, promising a cozy, nice and habitable, and altogether alluring land of happiness: "The Jewish question may be resolved in the framework of great and general peacemaking. We will

part as friends with our former enemies.” Although the leading figure of Zionism did not discuss in detail the issue of the type of state system possible to introduce into a multinational structure in the Holy Land, he considered the Republic of Venice, (Herzl 1896: 92) and Western liberal states as models for a secularised Jewish state. In the approach of the Zionist thinker, the creation of a state in Palestine by Jews does not mean oppression or forcing another nation into dependency. In the Promised Land, Arabs may live in more freedom than ever.

Herzl, advocating pragmatic solutions, offered a European perspective to Arabs: the Ottoman Middle Ages of Palestine may in a few decades be replaced by Western modernity; the Holy Land may catch up with the more developed contemporary continent in both economic and political respects. In the *Old New Land*, (Herzl 1902) describing a possible life of Palestine in 1923, he envisaged a historic transformation for the whole region. He thought that the Jewish national home to be born in the not-too-far future would not only prove to be viable but could be accepted as an integral part of the region. Herzl firmly believed that the achievement of an independent Jewish national existence in Palestine would positively affect the whole Middle East, and placed an emphasis on economic development and regional collaboration. At the same time it must be pointed out that the thinker writing on the mass homecoming of the Jews appropriated the self-soothing basic idea and mission-mindedness of 19th century colonialists. He prolonged the life of a major tenet of 19th century colonisation policies: the idea that the process of civilising ‘the backwards and undeveloped nations’ had to be undertaken by cultivated and broad-minded Jewish immigrants. It is in fact this well-intentioned civilisation mission by enlightened, charitable and considerate Jews what Arabs need. Jewish settlers bring with themselves a new world, well-being and prosperity, so the Jewish state offers an opportunity for resident Arabs to work off their significant civilisational deficit. “This immigration proved to be nothing but useful to all of us,” explains Beshid bey, the Arab character of the utopia novel *Old New Land* to the surprised strangers.⁷

Earthly happiness-seeking and everyday life differ greatly from ideal principles and utopistic pictures of society. The first wave of Jewish immigration to Palestine started before Herzl’s emergence, in 1881. From the beginning,

⁷Schweitzer, András, Álomállam. In: *Heti Világgazdaság* July 3, 2004, 71. András Schweitzer quotes the opinion of Yael Dayan, daughter of the late Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Dayan: “The fantasy train of thoughts that Jewish immigration ushers in the age of rise for the Arab population is of such effect in the history of Zionism that to date many feel that the occupation of the Gaza and Cisjordan territories is a blessing to Palestinians.”

Zionist colonisation regarded Palestine as a territory which “could and should be transformed into an ethnically homogeneous ‘national homeland’”⁸. Arabs felt threatened by increasing Zionist immigration, thus the Arab population did not show hospitality towards the ethnically horized Jews arriving in Palestine. While in Herzl’s vision resident Arabs declare that it was the Jews who had made them rich, flesh-and-blood Arabs living in the area thought the exact opposite: Jewish colonies representing secularised and nationalistic ideologies and settling in Arab territory appeared as foreign particles in their eyes. The immigration of Zionists to the Holy Land led to the strengthening of the anti-Jewish mood among the Arabs of the Middle East; their arrival into Palestine further enhanced the feeling of humiliation and subordination to the West in the inhabitants of the area. In contrast to the Old Testament story of David and Goliath, in the Zionist-Arab conflicts sparked by the Zionist colonisation of the Holy Land it is no longer absolutely clear who is David, and who Goliath. The leading figure of Zionists and their theoretician of greatest effect could not play a role in the creation and defence of Israel as he died in 1904, at the age of forty-four. As opposed to the hopeful ideas of the founding fathers of Zionism, the formation of Israel state in 1948 did in no respect have a healing power for the fundamental problems of the Jewish people. The thinker who made secular Zionism flourish wanted to organise Israel on secular grounds, and did not calculate with hostile sentiments from the large camp of religious Zionism, who give precedence to divine laws. He likewise did not take into consideration the so-called ultra-orthodox Jews, who reacted against the Zionism of a secular nature, and who accused Zionism of having capitalised on the Holocaust to give life to Israel. The ultra-orthodox religious leaders, along their principles based on Judaism, represent anti-Zionist views: the new Israel may only come to life by the actions of the Messiah, thus the Jewish state created by the Zionist movement must be destroyed.

The later masters of the Holy Land, the Zionists introduced new forms of violence in the Middle East in the years preceding the declaration of the state: the employment of explosive devices placed in cars, bombs in packages, letter bombs or time bombs against the civil population was previously unknown in the region. (Khalidi 1998) The followers of Herzl, who dreamt of the ideal picture of a multi-faceted and harmonious world, caused the most painful event in the history of Arabs living in the Holy Land in 1948: more than half a million Zionist settlers arriving in Palestine violently forced three quarters of a million

⁸Lugosi, Győző, Izrael mítoszai. In: *Öt Kontinens. Az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történelmi Tanszék tudományos közleményei*, Budapest: ELTE, 2003, 59-77.

of the Palestine Arabs to abandon their birthland and their homes. As a result of mass expulsion, Palestine Arabs lost their most important towns, all of their sea ports and railway lines as well as a great part of their water and agricultural land resources. In the middle of the 20th century there appears in the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean a Palestinian people driven by the idea of return and emphasising Palestinian priority of presence,⁹ the actual non-existence of which the leading politicians of the Jewish state will assert for decades.

History, if not repeating itself, seems to be composing variations on the same theme. After 1948, Palestine Arabs awaiting the opportunity to return, settled in camps and as a result losing the normality of everyday life, could not even guess that in two decades a new descent to hell would await them, when fresh refugee camps would collect Palestinians forced to flee their birthplaces. The political movement for the return to Palestine would also gain muscle, this time from Palestinians themselves. The avalanche of history at times proves unstoppable.

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⁹For a detailed exposition of the issue see Elias Sanbar, *Les Palestiniens dans le siècle*. Paris: Gallimard, 1994; Elias Sanbar, *Figures du Palestinien: identité des origines, identité de devenir*. Paris: Gallimard, 2004.

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The Barcelona Process Revisited and the SBH Presidency

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Abstract. Since the very start, European integration has borne the mark of imbalance in development, of inequality and diversity of interests.

The European Union is a multi-faceted entity, a conglomerate linking several regions, zones, systems and countries to the notion that is Europe. It is a politically and legally constructed macro-region with a specific *acquis communautaire* crisscrossed by major faultlines in politics, the economy, society, culture, language and traditions.

As a result of several subsequent enlargements, it is not only the territory and the borders of the EU that have changed but also its neighbours. The fifth enlargement of the EU meant the accession of ten countries from Eastern Central Europe which had undergone radical changes with respect to geographical borderlines and political systems. Among other factors, the efficient working of the European Union and its independent operation on an international scene will be facilitated by the introduction of the Team Presidency system and the widening of the Barcelona process (launched in November 1995) into the Union for the Mediterranean Programme under the European Neighbourhood Policy. This project, still in formation, is designed to provide new foundations for the Mediterranean policy of the EU, named the Barcelona process. The Union for the Mediterranean programme opens up the gates of the Barcelona process for all twenty-seven member states, thus forming a European Commonwealth of sorts.

Keywords: reform of EU, Union for the Mediterranean, European integration interests, Mediterranean Security and Cooperation, European Neighbourhood Policy

Since the very start, European integration has borne the mark of imbalance in development, of inequality and diversity of interests.

The European Union is a multifaceted entity, a conglomerate linking several regions, zones, systems and countries to the notion that is Europe. It is a politically and legally constructed macro-region with a specific *acquis communautaire* crisscrossed by major faultlines in politics, economy, society, culture, language and traditions. Distinctions may be made between the heartland composed of more affluent countries (Great Britain, France, Germany and the Benelux states); small and large states; developed, backward and ultra-peripheral regions. According to the terms of the Europe 2000+ Cooperation for European Territorial Development we may list North Sea regions, Centre Capitals, the Atlantic Arc, the Alpine Arc, the Continental Diagonal, New Länder, Mediterranean regions, Nordic countries, Central and Eastern Europe, South and East Mediterranean transnational regions, the group of the Cohesion countries, and states interested in strengthening ties with Eastern Central Europe or the Mediterranean.

As Attila Ágh has put it: “[...] The definition of the EU has been more a social construction that has changed radically after each wave of enlargement. After the Eastern enlargement from the EU15 to the EU27, however, this situation has changed beyond recognition. The subsequent redefinitions of the EU at the earlier enlargements were present-oriented as conceptual frameworks for the existing Union. With the Eastern enlargement of the EU seems to have reached its internal and external limits, neither widening nor deepening can continue as before. Nowadays the EU needs a new future oriented definition.” (Ágh 2008: 1) As a result of several subsequent enlargements, it is not only the territory and the borders of the EU that have changed but also its neighbours. The fifth enlargement of the EU meant the accession of ten countries from Eastern Central Europe which had undergone radical changes with respect to geographical borderlines and political systems. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the 1st May 2004 accession of the Ten as well as the new memberships of Bulgaria and Romania from 1st Jan 2007 has made the internal reform of the system a matter not to be deferred. Rethinking the terms of further enlargement – primarily the accession of Turkey and the states of the West Balkan region – has become inevitable; at the same time new considerations concerning widening and deepening links in addition to scenarios of future EU development have surfaced, alongside the necessity to reassess the role played by the integrative organisation in international relations. Questions regarding the operability and competitiveness of the EU have also been raised in the light of challenges posed by an increasingly globalised interna-

tional system in the 21st century. After the failure of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the Lisbon Treaty (ratification outstanding) is meant to serve as the legal foundation for the functioning of the EU. Among other factors, the efficient working of the European Union and its independent operation on an international scene will be facilitated by the introduction of the Team Presidency system and the widening of the Barcelona process (launched in November 1995) into the Union for the Mediterranean Programme under the European Neighbourhood Policy. This project, still in formation, is designed to provide new foundations for the Mediterranean policy of the EU, named the Barcelona process. The Union for the Mediterranean programme opens up the gates of the Barcelona process for all twenty-seven member states, thus forming a European Commonwealth of sorts. (Palmer 2008) The 13-14 March 2008 European Council Brussels Summit Presidency Conclusion Annex I. *Statement on “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean”* contains the following: “The European Council approved the principle of a Union for the Mediterranean which will include the Member States of the EU and the non-EU Mediterranean coastal states. It invited the Commission to present to the Council the necessary proposals for defining the modalities of what will be called ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ with a view to the Summit which will take place in Paris on 13 July 2008.”¹

1 The Barcelona Process

Apart from the role of France, the Mediterranean policy of the European Union has significantly been influenced by Spain, the larger country of the Iberian Peninsula acting as a medium-size regional power, and its strategic ally, Portugal. Certain groups of the social elites in these two states have long shared a historical perspective, engaging in a centuries-long struggle for the modernisation and Europeanisation of their homelands, which in broader terms means the joining of the Mediterranean region into the circulatory system of the Continent. Certain lines written by José Ortega y Gasset at the beginning of the second decade of the 20th century, attesting to an attitude of commitment to Europe, permeated by patriotic pride and a drive to promote the interests of the nation became proverbial in Spain at the turn of the millennium: “In struggling for the Europeanisation for Spain” – the text reads – “we want nothing else but to create a new form of culture, different from the French and German ones. [...] We want a Spanish interpretation of the world. We

¹*Presidency Conclusions*. Brussels European Council 13/14 March 2008, 19.

nevertheless lack the substance to create it, we lack the material we must prepare: the culture [...] We are only asking for Spain to be looked at from a European viewpoint. [...] A Europe fatigued in France, exhausted in Germany and weakened in England needs the fresh youth of our sunny land. Spain is a European possibility. Spain may exist only if looked at from Europe.” In the obituary written of Joaquin Costa, his spiritual precursor, in the 20th February 1911 issue of *El Imparcial* Ortega stresses the following: “[...] when we start talking about revival, we talk about *Europeanisation* [...] Revival is inseparable from *Europeanisation*; thus anyone who has the slightest feeling of rebirth: of anguish, shame and desire, will think as a Europeaniser. Rebirth is the object of desire; Europeanisation, an instrument to satisfy this desire. As a matter of fact, it was clear from the beginning: Spain was the problem and Europe, the solution.” (Ortega y Gasset 1983: 138)

The intellectual elite of Portugal, ‘preparing to join Europe’ and eventually acceding the European Community also casts its glance beyond the Pyrenees. Eduardo Lourenço searches for the historical and geopolitical characteristics, boundaries, values and roots of his homeland and Europe in the volume entitled: *We and Europe* (published in Hungarian). In fact, no one knows exactly what Europe means, says Lourenço. “This name no longer means the same in London, Moscow, Prague, Athens or Lisbon [...] The difficulty lies in the fact that this proper name is vested with a historical, cultural and political meaning which, beyond the geographical designation, also signifies the piece of reality we call Europe. [...] In the last few years a certain part of Europe has introduced specific structures and social behaviour patterns in the economic, political, legal and even cultural domains. At the same time, no one would dare to reduce the meaning of ‘Europe’ to the entity called the Europe of the Twelve.”² (Lourenço 1999: 56) Then he continues: “The order of accession to the European Community, the reluctance of a few to join and the resistance of others towards the new members roughly maps the imaginative space where the ‘distance’ separating each state from the ‘hard core’ of Europe becomes visible. When we hear that Turkey or Morocco also wish to join to the ‘European region’, at any rate in an economic or political sense, the feeling of ‘no fit’ allows us to apprehend the non-European quality that Europe would appropriate if extended to countries that the European reality was formed against. On these occasions we are made to feel that if, at least as far as traditions are concerned, Europe is not a historical and spiritual formation, an ever-working,

²In 1987, at the time the essay was written, the EU consisted of only 12 member states.

undeterminably rent and contradiction-ridden remembrance, then this name has no content at all.”

It is a well known fact that a strongly Mediterranean-focused yet far from unified group was formed in the European Community with the participation of the founding members Italy and France, complemented by Greece in 1981 and Portugal and Spain on their 1985 accession. Due to the complexity of the issue, further investigations in this paper will focus on the Mediterranean-related policy of Spain and the allied Portugal, which significantly affects EU external policy decision-making as a result of the 2010-2011 Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian team presidency. Portugal and Spain both have their separate interests in the European integration. These differences are partly connected to the foreign policy links and ties of the two countries. Portuguese foreign policy has had three priorities from the beginning of the sixties: the Atlantic alignment, the European option and the creation of the Lusitanian unity.

As a medium-size continental power, Spain focused on Latin America, Europe and the Maghreb grouping in the Mediterranean region. In the fifties, Atlantism for Spain primarily meant a treaty-based connections network with the United States. The country joined NATO as late as May 1982, in the final days of the Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo cabinet.³ As opposed to this, Felipe Gonzales’s socialist government, which came into power on 28 October 1982 included stepping out of the organisation in its programme. The March 1986 referendum, albeit on new terms, did eventually keep the country within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.⁴

Spain has been striving to deepen and develop the system of connections linking the Mediterranean region and the European Community. At the beginning of the nineties, this led to the rise of the North-and-South opposite poles, and later, as the Eastern enlargement was put on the agenda, the East-South contrast became a manifest one. It was Spain that played the most important role in asserting and representing this line of policy. Spain was also far more efficient in influencing European Community policy than Portugal. Contemporary sources write of Felipe Gonzales as of the De Gaulle of Southern Europe, a clear reference to the Spanish Prime Minister’s unwavering conduct at negotiations concerning agricultural and fishing policies during the Northern

³For details see Szilágyi, István, *Demokratikus átmenet és konszolidáció Spanyolországban*. [Democratic Transition and the Consolidation of Democracy in Spain], Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 1996, 151-173.

⁴For details see Szilágyi, István, *Európa és a hispán világ*. [Europe and the Hispanic World] Veszprém: Veszprémi Egyetemi Kiadó, 1998, 85-103.

enlargement: the accession process of Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway. (Barbé 1999)

With regard to its economic importance, the number of its population, foreign relations, and roles, Spain is a medium-size power among the larger countries in the EU. In addition to the previously mentioned issues, Great Britain viewed the voting weights system and the rise of the blocking minority ratio ushered in by the Northern enlargement as seriously damaging to its interests, and voiced disagreement in the Council of Ministers. The Spanish Prime Minister held out the prospect of the country's veto in case a solution based on agreement was rejected. The conflict eventually ended with the signing of the Ioannina Compromise in March 1994.

At the time the Northern enlargement appeared on the EU agenda, Spain and Portugal conducted a campaign of increasing intensity to direct the attention of the Community to the Mediterranean region. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the Spanish foreign policy made enormous efforts to deepen Euro-Mediterranean ties and integrate these into the system of the organisation. The Spanish presidencies of the first half of 1989 and the second half of 1995 provided excellent occasions for these activities. As a final event of the latter period, the first Euro-Mediterranean Conference convened in the Catalan capital, composing and issuing a joint declaration and launching the Barcelona Process, which puts Mediterranean links and ties to the forefront of the Union's policy. Nevertheless, the meeting organised between 27th and 28th November 1995 was in itself the peak of a years-long series of preliminary talks and negotiations. A line of conferences had previously been organised at the behest of the Spanish and partially the Portuguese as well as the Italians and with heavy French participation.

Foreign affairs ministers from EU and Maghreb states also held numerous meetings to help formulate close cooperation between the European Community and the countries of the Northern Mediterranean. As contemporary Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernández Ordoñez declared, in 1989 there were three factors making this region troublesome for the European Community and a potential threat to the old continent's security: the periodically recurrent social problems causing unemployment and unrest; Islamic fundamentalism triggering xenophobia in Europe; and finally, the wave of immigration targeting the European Community. The European integration organisation was thus urged by its political, economic, cultural and security interests to set up institutionalised, neighbourly and cooperative treaty-based relationships with the Northern Mediterranean region. The European integration, however, did not have a clearly formulated and common Mediterranean strategy. Spain's

initiatives launched within the Community and the designated area all served this aim.

1989 saw two bilateral summits (a Spanish-Italian and a Spanish-French one) on Spanish proposal. The participants passed decisions on the setup of a military and a political Mediterranean workgroup. Later that same year, Portugal was also included in the analysis process. At this stage the 5+5 process initiated by France and backed by Spain, Portugal and Italy did not leave the organisational framework or indeed the very walls of Quai d'Orsay. Negotiations between the five European states (France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Malta) and the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Lybia, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia) aimed at creating a regional dialogue that encompassed the fields of environmental protection, finance, scientific issues, technology and cooperation in security policy.

The foreign ministers of the above states first met on 21 March 1990 in Rome and last, on 26 October the same year in Algiers. It soon became evident that (as the then Foreign Minister of France, Dumas put it) France had no Mediterranean policy, only Mediterranean interests. As a result of this, initiative and control over the process were increasingly transferred to the Spanish. The Madrid (and Lisbon) governments realised as early as 1990 that although bilateral relationships may have high importance, they cannot resolve the problems of political stability in the region. From this time on the Spanish foreign policy strove to create the institutional framework of an all-encompassing agreement which would globally integrate the interests of the Western and Eastern Mediterranean as well as those of the European Community. As a result, Foreign Minister Francisco Fernández Ordoñez raised the idea of a Mediterranean Security and Cooperation Meeting (one similar to the European Security Meeting) at the "Open Sky" conference in Ottawa at the beginning of 1990.

The idea of the CSCM (*Conferencia para la Seguridad y Cooperación en el Mediterraneo*), nevertheless, did not acquire significant support there and then. The Spanish envisaged three main aims for the Mediterranean Security and Cooperation Meeting: strengthening economic cooperation, putting the human dimension in focus and creating stability in the region beyond military security. France however was less than enthusiastic about the Spanish initiative and the Kuwait war also broke out in the meantime. Regardless of these, the Madrid government continued to carry out its policy to strengthen cooperation between the European Community and the Mediterranean zone. At the Palma de Mallorca meeting in September 1990 the Italian and Spanish foreign ministers officially advanced their ideas concerning the Mediterranean Secu-

rity and Cooperation Meeting and reached their aim of including a paragraph on the Mediterranean in the European Security and Cooperation Conference document.

The June 1992 Lisbon Summit brought yet another step forward, with participants acknowledging that the Mediterranean and the Middle East were indeed important zones for the interests of the European Union. The meeting gave green lights to a new Euro-Maghreb joint agreement. The June 1994 Corfu Summit accepted the idea of the convention of the Euro-Mediterranean conference. Later that year, in December Spain was commissioned by the Essen Session of the European Council to summon the Euro-Mediterranean meeting due in the second half of 1995. Germany, wishing to avert allegations by its Southern European allies about the Berlin government exclusively focusing its attention on Eastern Europe, gave full support to the Spanish proposals, thus playing a major role in passing these decisions.

The Cannes Summit in June 1995, nevertheless, did not lack in dramatic events. Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales entered into a hefty argument with Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Minister Theo Weigel on the issue of financial support for the Mediterranean. The head of the Madrid government managed to double the financial resources allocated to the region in the 1996-1999 time period, which thus reached 4.6 billion ECUs in sharp contrast to the previous term. This meant a significant improvement between the ratios of the 10ECUs/person subvention directed to Eastern Central Europe and the 2ECUs/person sum that had been channelled to the Mediterranean region. (Baixeras 1996: 159) The Spanish-Portuguese efforts finally yielded results on 27-28 November 1995. The Euro-Mediterranean Declaration was issued and a work programme was also accepted.⁵ The Declaration contained plans for wide-ranging political, economic, security and cultural cooperation spanning out until 2010 and supported by fourteen EU member states⁶ and eleven countries from Africa and the Mediterranean (Israel, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey). The document published in the Catalan capital became the fundament of the Barcelona process pressed ahead by the two states of the Iberian Peninsula.

The Declaration consists of four major parts. The first chapter (*Political and security partnership: Establishing a common area of peace and stability*) discusses issues of political and security cooperation as well as the mapping

⁵Conferencia Euromediterranea. *Revista de las Instituciones Europeas*. 1995, no 3, 1039-1062; Barcelona declaration. Adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference- 27-28/11/95, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm (accessed November 10, 2010).

⁶Denmark did not partake in the conference.

out of a common space for peace and stability. The declaration establishes the principles for dialogue between the signing parties, promises respect for human rights; rule of law; political democracy and fundamental rights for freedom; exchange of information; tolerance; measures against xenophobia and racism; the acknowledgement of equality and sovereignty; respect for the autonomy of nations; non-interference; upholding the norms of international law; respect for territorial integrity; peaceful settlement of debates; common action against terrorism and crime; the preservation of regional security and the maintenance of the nuclear-weapons-free zone. The second part setting the rules for economic and financial cooperation (*Economic and financial partnership: Creating an area of shared prosperity*) shows commitment for sustainable balanced economic growth at the same time as declaring the dedication to largely increase the EU financial presence in the region. It also states the undertaking to create a free-trade zone until 2010. The third section (*Partnership in social, cultural and Human affairs: Developing human resources, promoting understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies*) details issues of cooperation between the social, cultural and human spheres and civil societies.⁷ The fourth chapter contains the follow-up measures to the conference (*Follow-up to the conference*). The *Work Programme* appended records the practical measures to be carried out in connection with the principles and fields described in the Declaration. In summary, it may be stated that the Barcelona Process spearheaded by Spain works toward the institutionalisation of the complex system of ties linking the European Union and the Southern Mediterranean, and gives a new meaning to the notion of security. The principle of the free-trade zone creates the opportunity for the partner countries to acquire a partnership status similar to the position of East-Central European countries in 1995.

The Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Barcelona marked the starting point of the European Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process), a wide framework of political, economic and social relations between the Member States of the European Union and Partners of the Southern Mediterranean. The latest EU enlargement, on 1 May 2004 and 1 January 2007, brought two Mediterranean Partners (Cyprus and Malta) into the European Union, while adding a total of 10 to the number of Mem-

⁷Parallel to the foreign ministers' meeting, Barcelona provided the venue for several other conferences convened by other Mediterranean organisations. The local council deputies were also in session at this time (the so-called Conference of Cities). The regional meeting for the NGOs also took place at this time as well as the Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum backed by the Catalan and Spanish governments and the European Commission.

ber States. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership thus comprises 37 members, 27 EU Member States and 10 Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestine Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey). Libya has observer status. The Euro-Mediterranean partners – as already emphasised – established the three main objectives of the Partnership:

- The definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue;
- The construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area;
- The rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural and human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership comprises two complementary dimensions: *The Bilateral and the Regional dimensions*. In the frame of the *bilateral dimension* the EU carries out a number of activities bilaterally with each country. The most important are the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements that the Union negotiates with the Mediterranean Partners individually. They reflect the general principles governing the new Euro-Mediterranean relationship, although they each contain characteristics specific of the relations between the EU and each Mediterranean Partner.

The regional dimension represents one of the most innovative aspects of the Partnership, covering at the same time the political, economic and cultural fields and has a considerable strategic impact as it deals with problems that are common to many Mediterranean Partners while it emphasises the national complementarities. The multilateral dimension supports and complements the bilateral actions and dialogue taking place under the Association Agreements.

The Barcelona Process, launched in 1995, has created a tradition and has become institutionalised during the past thirteen years. The series of Euro-Mediterranean Conferences have been carried on. Foreign ministers of partner states met on Malta in 1997, in Stuttgart in 1999, Marseilles in 2000, Valencia in 2002, Naples in 2003, and in Luxembourg in 2005. The bilateral Association Agreements between EU and Mediterranean Partner States were signed in 2003; and on 3 December 2003 in Naples by decision of the Ministerial Conference of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership the parties agreed to set up the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA), which held its first session in Cairo, 12-15 May 2005. The EMPA Final Declaration “emphasizes

the centrality of the Barcelona Process as the main instrument for partnership and dialogue between the Euro-Mediterranean Partners.”⁸

The European Union’s European Neighbourhood Policy launched in 2003 was also welcome: “Welcome the progress made in developing the European Neighbourhood Policy” – the text reads – “as a policy to enhance the Barcelona Process, provided it does not eclipse either the principles – equality, co-responsibility, mutual respect, solidarity and cooperation - or the multilateral framework of Barcelona.”⁹ The members of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly “[u]nderline the principle of co-ownership of the Barcelona Process and the often-repeated request of Mediterranean partners to participate fully in the formulation and implementation of policies and programmes within the framework of the Barcelona Process.”¹⁰ Attention was called to the importance of financial resources allocated to Mediterranean partner countries in the financial term 2007-2013 and emphasis was given to “[...] the necessity for financial and technical assistance, easier access of Mediterranean agricultural and industrial exports to EU markets, and practical translation of facilitating benefit from the four freedoms by Mediterranean Partners into actions, in accordance with the Commission’s communication of 11 March 2003, and in the run-up to the completion of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010.”¹¹

The EMPA plays a consultative role. It provides parliamentary impetus, input and support for the consolidation and development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It expresses its views on all issues relating to the Partnership, including the implementation of the association agreements. It adopts resolutions or recommendations, which are no legally binding, addressed to the Euro-Mediterranean Conference. The EMPA consists of parliamentarians appointed by the national parliaments of EU Member States, the national parliaments of the ten Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey) and the representatives of the European Parliament. The EMPA consists of a maximum of 240 members, of which 120 are Europeans (75 from the EU national parliaments and 45 from the EP) and 120 are from the national parliaments of the EU’s Mediterranean Partner countries, so as to guarantee North-South parity.

⁸*Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly. First Session.* (Cairo, Egypt, 12-15 March 2005) Final Declaration, p. 2.

⁹*Ibidem.* p. 3.

¹⁰*Ibidem.* p. 4.

¹¹*Ibidem.* p. 5.

The Fourth Plenary Session of the Euro-Mediterranean Assembly convened in Athens on 28 March, 2008. The Final Declaration of the Presidency declared “[...] strong commitment to strengthening the parliamentary dimension of the Barcelona Process [...] that will contribute to the establishment of operational ties between the EMPA and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Acknowledging the fact that the Mediterranean was and remains a meeting point between East and West, North and South, a melting pot of world traditions and cultures [...] the EMPA notes the statement made by the European Council on ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ and expresses its support towards developing initiatives to further promote the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and calls on the European Commission to enhance EMPA’s role, including a reinforced legal basis, as the legitimised parliamentary dimension of the revised process.”¹²

The EMPA Presidency Final Declaration was issued after the Union for the Mediterranean concept first announced by Nicolas Sarkozy, as well as the European Council Brussels Declaration on 13 March, 2008, and the ENP launched in 2003. Detailed discussion of these issues follows in the next section of this paper. The fact to be emphasized with view to team presidency is EMPA’s support for the political, social-economic, cultural, migration and human rights-related aims, etc., i.e. the continuity of its aims and instruments contained in the 28 March Athens Declaration. Embracing the Slovenian presidential initiative to establish a Euro-Mediterranean University is also a novelty. “Recognizing the Slovenian initiative to create a Euro-Mediterranean University as an important step forward through a cooperation network of existing universities [...] [c]alls on the European Council” – the passage reads – “and the Mediterranean Countries to undertake actions to create a budget line enabling the further development of the Euro-Mediterranean University.”¹³

The EMPA Presidency Declaration reflects the spirit of the Chairman’s Statement at the Council of the European Union, 10th Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit, held in Barcelona on 27-28 November 2005, which received press publicity three years ago: “[t]hey reaffirm their commitment to the principles and objectives of the Barcelona Declaration” – the statement reads – and at the same time it calls attention to the changes that have occurred in the meantime in EU external policy and its position: “[t]hey recognise that major changes have occurred in the European Union and internationally since the Barcelona Declaration was signed in 1995. The EU has launched the

¹²*Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly. Fourth Plenary Session.* Athens, 28 March 2008. Final Declaration of the Presidency, p. 2.

¹³*Ibidem*, p. 4.

European Neighbourhood Policy to reinforce and complement the Barcelona Process. The EU has also developed the European Security and Defence Policy on which a dialogue has been initiated with Mediterranean partners. They also recall Turkey's special situation as a candidate country and a member of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership."¹⁴

The Mediterranean Partners included in the Barcelona Process gained access to EU subvention funds through the MEDA programme. The MEDA programme is the principal financial instrument of the European Union for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The programme offers technical and financial support measures to accompany the reform of economic and social structures in the Mediterranean Partners. The aims and targets receiving funding are and have been in harmony with the principles contained in the Barcelona Declaration. During the 1995-1999 period the 3,435 million Euro funding provided by the MEDA I programme was supplemented by the European Investment Bank (EIB) to reach 4,808 million Euros. Between 2000 and 2006 the Mediterranean Partners received a further 5,350 million Euros under the MEDA II programme as well as 6,400 million Euros from the EIB; between 2000 and 2007 the European Investment Bank put another 1 billion Euros at their disposal for transnational projects. The MEDA programme was replaced by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in 2007. The Commission has proposed a budget of 14.93 billion Euros to cover the period 2007-2013. Funds allocated to individual country programmes will depend on their needs and absorption capacity as well their implementation of agreed reforms. Part of the funds will go to promote cross-border co-operation.

During the period 1995-1999, some 86% of the resources allocated to MEDA were channelled bilaterally to the partners (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority). The other 12% of the resources were devoted to regional activities: all Mediterranean Partners and the EU Member States are eligible to benefit from these activities. Two percent were set aside for technical assistance officers. For Turkey, the Enlargement Directorate-General both plans and implements the co-operation activities, which since 2002, come from a separate financial envelope and not MEDA.¹⁵

¹⁴*Council of the European Union. 10th Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit. Barcelona, 27 and 28 November 2005. Chairman's Statement, p. 2.*

¹⁵For more details see: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The MEDA Programme and the Financial Cooperation/MEDA Programme. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/meda/meda2_obj.htm (accessed November 10, 2010).

2 The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

The European Neighbourhood Policy is one of the European Union's newest external relations policies, aiming to bring Europe and its neighbours closer, to their mutual benefit and interest. It was conceived after the 2004 enlargement of the EU with 10 new member countries, in order to avoid creating new borders in Europe. "The European Neighbourhood Policy" – emphasizes communication from the Commission entitled *A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy* – "is substantially deepening the EU's relations with its neighbours, and has become the established vehicle for cooperation with these countries across a wide policy spectrum. The premise of the ENP is that the EU has a vital interest in seeing greater economic development, stability and better governance in its neighbourhood."¹⁶

The ENP works to widen the Barcelona Process. Apart from the nine states of the Mediterranean Partnership it integrates the former Soviet states, now independent countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and the Ukraine. Along with the Mediterranean aspect, the EU's connections network is further extended to include Eastern European and Asian aspects. This modification in the gravitational centre of the community's external policy also affects the strategy, functioning and set of priorities of the team presidency.

The ENP is not, however, about enlargement, nor does it offer participating countries the possibility of accession. It aims to promote good governance and social development in Europe's neighbours through:

- closer political links
- partial economic integration
- support to meet EU standards
- assistance with economic and social reforms.

The EU sees the ENP as a way to built upon a mutual commitment to common values - democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development. The level of development depends on the extent to which these values are effectively shared.

Negotiations cover the four ENP action areas in order to:

- strengthen the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights
- promote the market-oriented economic reforms

¹⁶ *Communication from the Commission. A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy*. Brussels, 05/12/2007. COM (2007) 774 final, p. 2.

- promote employment and social cohesion
- co-operate on key foreign policy objectives such as countering terrorism and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The ENP also forms part of the EU's strategy to reinforce security in neighbouring countries. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the European Commissioner for External Relations explained in a speech in March 2006 that the ENP is designed to offer "our eastern and southern neighbours many of the benefits previously associated only with membership, such as a stake in our internal market, involvement in EU programmes, and cooperation in transport and energy network. It is designed to offer a privileged partnership now, irrespective of the exact nature of the future relationship with the EU."¹⁷

3 The Union for the Mediterranean

As already discussed in the present paper, the Union for the Mediterranean (as part of the ENP) works to provide new foundations for the Mediterranean policy carried out within the framework of the European Union Barcelona Process. The opportunity to join is opened up to all 27 members of the European integration system. The initiative will be put forward by the President of France during the French-Czech-Swedish presidency term at the Paris Summit on 13 July 2008. The concept of the Union for the Mediterranean was first phrased as such by Nicolas Sarkozy during his election campaign in May 2007. Initially, it came to be commonly referred to as Mediterranean Union in EU community circles. Several analysts have stated that the plan serves to strengthen France's position within the Union and provides an alternative to the accession of Turkey. Turkey has consequently opposed the backing of the Sarkozy plan by EU forums. Turkey accepted the invitation to participate when was offered a guarantee, in March 2008, that it would not be an alternative to the EU. The project is supported by Spain, Italy, and Greece. However the EU itself and Germany have been more cautious about the idea. The European Commission has stated that such initiatives promoting regional co-operation are good, however they say the project should build on existing structures. The Commission declared the Barcelona Process effective and successful and called attention to the danger of creating parallel structures. Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Jansa also warned about this. When Slovenia took the EU presidency in 2008, Jansa said the following: "We do not need

¹⁷See <http://www.euromedinfo.eu/site.153.content.en.html> (accessed November 10, 2010).

a duplication of institutions, or institutions that would complete with EU, institutions that would cover part of the neighbourhood.”¹⁸

Germany has also turned down the original version of the Sarkozy plan. As a result of this, France’s Minister for European Affairs, Jean-Pierre Jouyet stated early February 2008 that there was no Mediterranean Union but rather a *Union for the Mediterranean*, which would only be completing and enriching the existing EU structures and policy in the region. This was followed by the 3 March 2008 Hannover meeting of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy. Angela Merkel, backed by José Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission managed to persuade the French President to accept a solution based on compromise. The main point is that the project would include all member states, not just those bordering the Mediterranean, and build upon the existing Barcelona process. The idea is to form a ‘bridge’ between Europe (including the Eastern members of the EU), North Africa and the Middle East.

4 Conclusion – the Barcelona Process revisited; possible priorities of the Spanish Team Presidency

The fusion of the Barcelona Process and the Union for the Mediterranean initiative may be realised after 13-14 July 2008. Harmony between the external policy interests of EU member states and a transformed set of geopolitical conditions may eventually be created. Under the new organisational and institutional system - which includes the EU ratification of the Lisbon Treaty – an enlargement strategy compatible with the new neighbourhood policy may be formed during the 2010-2011 Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian Team Presidency. Apart from issues concerning enlargement, answers may be provided to questions regarding widening and deepening, and possible future scenarios may be predicted and properly shaped.

All these issues are inseparable from Spanish interests, experience gained during Spanish presidencies to date,¹⁹ and the effect the Madrid government

¹⁸See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mediterranean_Union (accessed November 10, 2010).

¹⁹For more detailed discussions see Esther Barbé, *The Spanish Presidency: Catalising a New Axis in the EU?* *Journal of Common Market Studies, Annual Review of the European Union, 2003*, vol. 41, 45-48; Francesc Morata and Ana-Mar Fernandez, *The Spanish Presidencies of 1989, 1995 and 2002: From commitment to reluctance towards European Integration*. In: Ole Elgström, *European Union Council Presidencies*. London and New York: Routledge, 2003; Carlos Closa and Paul Heywood, *Spain and the European Union*. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004.

has on EU foreign policy decision-making. Spain has acted three times as EU rotary president: in the first half of 1989, in the second half of 1995 and between January-June 2002. History created the opportunity for the country to forward the cause of continental integration by acting in a series of strategic undertakings in 1995 and 2002, above all. In accordance with traditions developed during Spain's presidencies and based on previous experience,²⁰ attention will be directed to the task of institutionalisation outlined in the Lisbon Treaty. The Spanish are also expected to continue the legacy of former presidencies by supporting action to eliminate democratic deficit; opening up to the citizens of the EU is also likely to be entered into the official programme.

Expected developments seem to make tackling the issue of a further enlargement a point of priority within the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Barcelona Process inevitable. Analysts continue to consider economic and social convergence as an issue of primary importance: this entails the practice of economic and social cohesion and the creation of opportunities for backward regions to fall in line with more developed ones. All these attitudes are deeply embedded in the budget reform and review programme, which is fully backed by Hungary, along with several other member states.

It is considered an important task of the future Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian presidency to provide the institutional framework of sustainable growth with respect to the economy, society and environmental protection.

More Europe means more common foreign and security policy for Spain. In this connection, attention must be called to the person and role of High Representative for Common Foreign Policy, Javier Solana, who gave a detailed analysis of his country's and the EU's common foreign and security policy in the 2003 issues of the Madrid journal *Foreign Policy*.²¹ Spain is set on supporting the 1992 St. Petersburg decision of EU defence ministers to set up a European military service and the resolutions to create rapid reaction forces passed at the June 1999 Cologne and the December 1999 Helsinki summits. By 2003, the 60,000-strong military unit should have been ready to engage in land combat within sixty days in case Europe's peace and security came under threat. The Madrid government agreed to supply 10% of the Rapid Reaction Force, i.e. six thousand soldiers. It was not the responsibility of Moncloa Palace that

²⁰For more details see Szilágyi, István, Az Európai Unió spanyol elnökségeinek tapasztalatai és a várható prioritások [Experience Gained from Spanish Presidencies of the EU and Expected Priorities], *Comitatus*, 2007, no 4, 3-23.

²¹Javier Solana, Tres años como alto representante. *Política Exterior* 2003, no 91, 59-67; Javier Solana, Multilateralismo eficaz: una estrategia para la UE. *Política Exterior* 2003, no 95, 37-47.

the deadline was deferred. Similar determination characterises Spanish actions concerning the strengthening of the special institutional framework of EU foreign and security policy. Rafael Lorenzo (2002), Luis Feliú (2002) and José María Beneyto (2002) have written analyses concerning both the previously mentioned issue and matters on contributions to European defence industry development.

Questions regarding the strengthening of common foreign and security policy in the EU and on the European continent will certainly be points highlighted on the agenda of the Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian Team Presidency.

The same may be said of the issues of countering international terrorism, of coordinated action against drug trafficking and organised crime, of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, of common action undertaken to resolve regional conflicts, of securing human rights and of common contributions to abrogate the consequences of failed state scenarios.

A further strengthening of ties between Spain, the EU and Latin American states, peoples and integrative organisations is one of the main areas of action for the Spanish rota presidency and the Team Presidency. This does not only and primarily mean a succession of summits for the European and Latin American interregional strategic area. It also involves running and expanding targeted projects to reinforce economic, political and cultural links, the creation of a common integration organisation based on fourth-generation treaties, and an institutional joining of political and decision-making centres in the form of a Transatlantic Parliament, a Council of Ministers, specialist committees and a Common Secretariat.²²

Spain's role as a bridge will also become stronger in the period of the Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian Team Presidency. A further cementing of institutional, cultural and political ties between Spain and the Iberoamerican Community of Nations will reinforce Spain's international and EU roles and positions. (Szilágyi 2006)

Last but not least, the Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian Team Presidency puts great emphasis on the development and strengthening of institutionalised ties *with the Mediterranean area* as discussed in detail in the present paper.

²²For more details see Christian Freres and José Antonio Sanahuja (eds.), *América Latina y la Unión Europea. Estrategías para una asociación necesaria*. Barcelona: Icaria & Antrazyt, 2006; Juan José Martín Arribas (ed.), *La asociación estratégica entre la Unión Europea y América Latina*. Madrid: Editorial Catarata, 2006. Alvaro Iranzo, *La política mediterránea de España. Política Exterior* 2007, no 116, 137-162.

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Nagorno-Karabakh – Embedded in Geopolitics*

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Abstract. This article gives background information on the origins of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh taking into account the different perspectives of the various parties involved in the conflict. The author recommends focusing on the process of peaceful settlement and gives some step by step concrete suggestions.

Keywords: Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, ‘energy politics’, self-governance

1 Introduction

The European Union’s foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton declared the parliamentary elections in Nagorno-Karabakh¹ scheduled for May 23, 2010 to be illegal. On May 12, the same year it was the 16th anniversary of a cease-fire agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Although the frozen conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh in the EU neighborhood merits our permanent attention, developments in 2010 concerning the Minsk negotiations in the context of geopolitics ask for a recapitulation of the situation.

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¹The Russian name is Nagornyi Karabakh, whereby ‘nagorny’ is Russian for mountainous, ‘kara’ is Turkic for black or dark, and ‘bakh’ is derived from the Persian ‘bagh’, meaning gardens, or Turkish ‘bahçe’, also garden. The Armenian name for Karabakh is Artsakh.

Nagorno-Karabakh used to be an Autonomous Oblast (AO) in the Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) of Azerbaijan. But after a bloody war between Azerbaijan and Armenia it has become a self-proclaimed independent republic not recognized by any state² but protected by and connected to Armenia through a corridor³ on Azerbaijani soil. The occupied zone involves seven districts of Azerbaijan including the better known Lachin and Kelbajar provinces.

In the run-up to independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, upheavals in Nagorno-Karabakh began in 1988, escalating in vicious fights, and in the occupation of territory around Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenia until a ceasefire was signed in 1994 between Azerbaijan and Armenia. With its 8,322 square kilometres Nagorno-Karabakh is a bit larger than inhabited Israel without the Negev desert, or almost twice the size of South Ossetia. Its capital is Stepanakert. It has a predominantly Armenian population of about 140,000 people, mostly Apostolic Christians.

During the fights and upheavals both Armenians and Azerbaijanis had to flee from each other's territories. In total over half a million Azeris have been living as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Azerbaijan, having fled from Armenia, the provinces around the disputed area, and from Nagorno-Karabakh itself.⁴ The situation is complex, multifaceted and multilayered involving different issues: local, regional and foreign forces. The various 'layers' and issues will be unpacked in this article.

2 Different parties and issues involved

First of all, of course all the people from Nagorno-Karabakh – both the Armenians inside the self-proclaimed independent republic (140,000) and the Azeri IDPs surviving outside of it (more than half a million) – are concerned, although they are not involved in the talks. The two sovereign countries, Azerbaijan and Armenia are involved together with their allies. Turkey is a staunch supporter of Azerbaijan. These latter countries share a common heritage engendering mutual solidarity. Both closed their borders to Armenia in 1993

²Not even by Armenia.

³Various terms are used for this territory depending on one's perspective: Armenia refers to "liberated territory", "security belt" or "buffer zone". Azerbaijan refers to "occupied territory".

⁴UNHCR refers to approximately 586,000 IDPs on a total Azeri population of 8.8 million: it is difficult to get exact, verified numbers. The Military Balance 2010, for example, mentions total Azeri population of 8,238,672. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/> (accessed December 8, 2009).

as a means of pressure to resolve the conflict. Armenia, on the other hand, can count on the support of the Russian Federation. Fourthly, Russia, the USA and France are involved as OSCE Minsk group mediators and as countries representing interests. Finally, two issues are also linked to the conflict: the question of genocide in 1915, and the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia about reopening borders.

Since Armenia is landlocked between Turkey, Iran and Azerbaijan, the closure of borders in 1993 by Turkey and Azerbaijan, with the exception of recent years, has meant slow economic development for Armenia. All goods to Armenia formally have to come in through Georgia or Iran.⁵ The BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) pipeline, which could have followed a more direct line from Baku to Ceyhan through Armenia, was built with a detour through Georgia. Thus, both Armenia and Azerbaijan suffer from the frozen conflict: Armenia is relatively isolated and misses out on revenues; Azerbaijan misses part of its territory and is stuck with almost 600,000 IDPs.

With Turkey's efforts of meeting criteria to join the EU, under the zealous leadership of its Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, it is showing the world that it can be a regional power of significance. Turkey and Armenia began doing what was unthinkable during a good dozen years, namely talk about opening borders. Some of the meetings between Turkish and Armenian officials were arranged informally around soccer matches, hence the term 'soccer diplomacy'. But under the auspices of the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs the opening of borders was formalized in a protocol which, although signed by both parties in October 2009, has not been ratified yet. The Swiss realizing the complexity and interconnectedness of various issues, purposefully disentangled them: the protocols therefore state no preconditions on either the genocide question or on Nagorno-Karabakh. In this strength lies also its weakness because the issues do influence the process of opening borders and vice versa. Thus, even the meeting arranged with President Obama for both Prime Ministers Sargsyan of Armenia and Erdogan of Turkey on April 12, 2010 did not bring ratification of the border protocol closer. The problem is complex. Various issues are at stake.

⁵ Armenia has an estimated US\$200 million trade with Turkey - indirectly through Georgia and Iran. An estimated 40-75,000 Armenians work in Turkey illegally. J. Valiyev, *Azerbaijan in the World*. Vol. III. no 7, April 1, 2010.

3 Issues

Azerbaijan is of course not too thrilled with this protocol. Perhaps even feels a bit betrayed by 'brother' Turkey because Armenia had not met any conditions on the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh, reason why the borders were closed in the first place. Then there is the issue of genocide: Armenian pressure groups are lobbying various governments to have the massacre of 1915 recognized as genocide; thirdly, the United States wishes for a possible alternative corridor to Afghanistan through Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan; fourthly, 'energy politics' cannot be excluded from the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation politics. These four points are explained in the next paragraphs.

Armenia is traumatized by the loss of at least one million lives in war and deportations fighting the Turks in 1915, as the Ottoman Empire was crumbling. The Armenian Diaspora has a strong lobby in Washington D.C. and in European capitals to have the massacre of 1915 recognized as genocide. About 15 to 20 countries have recognized the genocide in the meantime. Turkey claims Turkish lives were also lost, and the Turkish government denies genocide, the difference lying in premeditated systematic murder or 'normal' casualties as a result of war.⁶ In an effort to conduct rational foreign policy, the question of genocide has been delegated to a scientific Turkish-Armenian commission. However, the Armenian Diaspora in the United States is relentless and more hawkish in its demands than the Armenian government itself. Mr. Obama, during his presidential election campaign in 2008 made some promises to the Armenian Diaspora on recognizing the genocide of Armenians. After Obama's election, in view of important relations with Turkey, this promise was played down, using the building up of relations between Turkey and Armenia as a reason.

The US Senate however, in April 2010 proposed and accepted an amendment with regard to the genocide, reintroducing this delicate and painful issue in present day US-South Caucasus politics. As a gesture of protest, Turkey temporarily summoned back its ambassador from Washington D.C. The USA does not want to put too much pressure on its relations with its NATO ally Turkey, but also needs cooperation from Armenia and Azerbaijan if it wants to open a possible new corridor to Afghanistan. This would be an alternative

⁶The term genocide did not exist in 1915 and was introduced by the UN in 1948. The criteria named in 1948 were then in retroaction applied to the killings in 1915. In the context of 'genocide in the Caucasus' the case of the Circassians (or Adygs) in the North Caucasus should be mentioned. Almost one million were deported with an estimated 400,000 killed in 1864 during the Russo-Caucasian War.

route in case the way through the Persian Gulf and Pakistan should become too unstable.⁷ As it turns out, this plan is an incentive to help resolve the conflict about Nagorno-Karabakh, or the alternative route will not offer much stability either.

Finally, ‘energy politics’ are also chipped in the negotiations around Nagorno-Karabakh. Some changes in energy supply deals can be read as a message of Azerbaijan’s discontentment with Turkey’s unconditional signing of the protocols. Azerbaijan has signed a deal with Russia, and Russia and Turkey have a gas line project going on. If Turkey and Armenia factually manage to open borders, this will weaken Russian influence in Armenia. But in view of the global economic crisis (from which Russia suffers as well) trade and energy revenues may be more important than politics.

In view of the complexity of the situation involving regional politics between Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan embedded in geopolitics with Russia, the USA and the EU, with each party having its own interests, it is not surprising that the protocols have not been ratified yet, nor that the updated Madrid principles in the negotiations around Karabakh have not been accepted yet.

4 The origin of the conflict in more detail: differing perspectives

The problem around Karabakh dates from the time when the South Caucasus countries, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia were about to be incorporated into the Soviet Union, after the Bolshevik revolutions in 1917, yet managing to remain independent for a few years (1918-1921) before the Soviet Army invaded the South Caucasus. The three South Caucasus countries had united shortly as a Federation before becoming independent Republics, thereby managing to postpone their incorporation into the Soviet Union. But by 1920, the intervention from Bolshevik Moscow was increasing: part of the population was against the Bolsheviks, but communist Azeri were helping them. It was a time of relative confusion with decisions being made and retracted even without the knowledge of who was formally and legally in charge.⁸ The young Joseph

⁷ *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, May (2010: 8-13) points out that “the US-Pakistan relationship is fragile”, that both countries have different regional imperatives, and that “further disagreements are probable”. On June 9, 20 NATO tractor trailers ferrying supplies to Afghanistan were torched, illustrating the desirability of a new corridor to Afghanistan.

⁸ The Azerbaijani Communist leader Nariman Narimanov declared Nakhichevan, Zangezur and Karabakh to be part of Soviet Armenia. His statement was soon retracted. It is unclear why.

Stalin was working for the ‘Kavkas Bureau’ at that time, dealing with issues of organizing the territory and its peoples from different ethnic backgrounds.

The Soviets developed an ethnic-territorial policy giving different (ethnic) regions various degrees of autonomy.⁹ Nagorno-Karabakh also needed to be given a formal place.¹⁰ According to Armenians, based for example on ancient texts of Strabo and Plinius the Second, this area has from times immemorial been Armenian, whilst Azeri can point to the city of Shusha in the Karabakh khanate, which was a big, predominantly Azeri cultural-political center founded by Panah Ali khan in the 1750s.¹¹ In the 19th century the Karabakh area came in Russian hands during Russian expansion into the South Caucasus after winning the Russo-Persian War (1826-1828). From the 1830s onwards, Shusha split into an Azeri Muslim part and an Armenian Christian part of the city.

Thus, the origin of ‘ownership’ of Karabakh is defined differently at different points in time – even up to the final decision of the Bolshevik Caucasus Bureau in 1921, because it first attached Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, and shortly afterwards this decision was reversed by Stalin, who added it to Azerbaijan. The Armenians can refer to ancient history, to the Russian pre-Soviet period, and to the first decision of the Kavkaz Bureau, before it reversed its decision. The Azeri can refer to the 18th century khanate, to the 20th century Soviet period: Nagorno-Karabakh was part of the AzSSR and ‘thus’ belongs to Azerbaijan. This argument is not flawless in the eyes of Armenians since Azerbaijan in proclaiming its independence from the Soviet Union addressed the period 1918-1921, when it was independent from both Russia and the Soviet Union. At that time Nagorno-Karabakh was not formally part of the Democratic Republic. However, allegedly Stalin’s decision states: “to leave [sic!] Nagorno-Karabakh within the borders of Azerbaijan’s Soviet Socialist Republic”. Thus, Stalin perceived this area to be Azerbaijani territory, although Armenians can also defend that it was not.¹² Nevertheless, by 1923 Nagorno-Karabakh was proclaimed an Autonomous Region of the SSR Azerbaijan and so it remained

⁹AO or Autonomous Oblast, ASSR or Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, with more autonomy and SSR or Soviet Socialist Republic, with sovereign power.

¹⁰Along with Nakhichevan and Zanzegur. The first came under control of Azerbaijan, the second went to Armenia: <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagorny-karabakh/chronology.php> (accessed June 4, 2010).

¹¹Unesco world heritage <http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/1574/> (accessed June 4, 2010).

¹²Webpage Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nagorno-Karabakh, Commentary on Thomas de Waal’s report “The Karabakh Trap: Threats and Dilemmas of the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict” (accessed May 31, 2010).

during the whole Soviet period, confirmed in the Soviet Constitutions of 1936 and 1977, until unrest grew during *glasnost* and *perestroika* policy of the late 1980s.

In February 1988, the Assembly of Nagorno-Karabakh asked the authorities in Moscow for unification with the SSR Armenia. This request was not granted because the Soviet Constitution did not allow for borders to be changed. The request in itself however, was enough to trigger violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan with Azeris being expelled from Karabakh and pogroms held on Armenians living in Baku and Sumgait. The Russian army managed to reinstall some order but failed to restore a feeling of justice and the unrest spread. Azerbaijan declared itself independent from the Soviet Union in August 1991, and Nagorno-Karabakh did the same in the following month. Before the end of 1991 a referendum was held in Karabakh, pro-independence. This independence was formalized on January 6, 1992. Fights broke out again. Massacres took place on both sides, forcing thousands of ethnic Azeri and Armenians to flee. According to Human Rights Watch, the Khojaly Massacre on February 26, 1992, where about two hundred Azeri villagers, women and children were killed, is the largest massacre to date in the conflict. Armenians gained the upper hand with the assistance of the Russian 366th Rifle Regiment. A zone connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia was also conquered.

5 After independence from the Soviet Union: negotiations

Without going into further details of recent political history of Armenia and Azerbaijan we can conclude that so far, since the ceasefire of May 12, 1994, various leaders from both sides have lost their positions over the frozen conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh. Even if the Prime Ministers were prepared to make concessions, the voters back home dominated by feelings of nationalism were not, and people preferred to see their leaders resign.

Since the ceasefire was signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1994, little tangible progress has been made after the many meetings which took place between the Armenian and Azeri presidents. The OSCE mediators presented the Madrid principles¹³ on July 10, 2009 and called on the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to endorse and finalize the following basic principles: “1) the return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control; 2) an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security

¹³Preceded by the Paris and Prague principles.

and self-governance; 3) a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; 4) future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will; 5) the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence; 6) international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation”.¹⁴

These points were generally agreed to by both parties. In December 2009 and January 2010 the OSCE mediators handed over an ‘update’ of the Madrid Principles, stating with reference to point 4 that Karabakh should be included in the peace talks. Both presidents discussed this update jointly in Sochi, in January 2010 in the presence of the Russian foreign minister.¹⁵ In the meantime, president Aliiev claims to accept also the updated principles, although his answer implicitly assumes a final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh as a part of Azerbaijan, whereas point 4 does not stipulate this. Armenian President Sargsyan made it clear earlier that Karabakh could not return to Azerbaijan’s control, but he did not add his intentions with regard to the Armenian-controlled territories around Nagorno-Karabakh.¹⁶ So far, not even point 1 has been put to execution, although more details have been thought out as to how to withdraw from the districts.¹⁷ Partial withdrawal would allow for borders to open and communications and programs to be launched – such as the beginning of the return of IDPs to some areas under the watchful eye of international observers. The next stage would be to determine the status of Nagorno-Karabakh: for example a federation or confederation, independent, or a solution inspired by other existing models (Cyprus, Kosovo, Scotland, Åland, etc.)

Since a purely legal solution has not been found, a political solution is needed. Some argue that a solution will only be possible when it is in the interest of external powers to work together more intensively. At the United Nations level, resolutions were brought to the fore to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh and to allow the return of IDPs to Karabakh, but these resolutions so far have not won a majority of votes. Where, then, is the leverage for a breakthrough? Russia has an important role in the negotiations, but it is also trying to control it for its own interests. If Turkey and Armenia open borders and enjoy the

¹⁴<http://www.osce.org/item/38731.html> (accessed June 4, 2010).

¹⁵<http://asbarez.com/76649/update-madrid-principles-to-include-karabakh-in-talks/> (accessed June 4, 2010).

¹⁶http://www.armenianow.com/news/20959/armenia_azerbaijan_peace_talks (accessed June 4, 2010). Ghazinyan in ArmeniaNow.com, May 21, 2010 (accessed May 31, 2010).

¹⁷Ghazinyan in ArmeniaNow.com, May 21, 2010 (accessed May 31, 2010). http://www.armenianow.com/users/aris_ghazinyan “Updated Madrid Principles: Baku claims to have accepted document, expects Yerevan to follow suit” (accessed June 4, 2010).

profits of trade, Russia will have less influence in the region. On the one hand, the prolongation of the conflict can be in its interest. On the other hand, various plans are being made for building pipelines. This energy aspect is also good for Russian economy. The building of new, alternative pipelines is also in the interest of the EU. After the August 2008 war in South Ossetia, Europe again received a wake-up call about being dependent on Russian gas. The United States has both strategic and economic interest in the region. It is in the interest of the USA to have the protocols ratified and press to get the updated principles accepted so that a new corridor can be opened. Since some suggested solutions involve European institutions, perhaps the 'soft' and 'hard' powers had better work together on this problem involving almost 600,000 Azerbaijani IDPs living in stressful circumstances for 16 years now, not to mention the feelings of insecurity of many citizens in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh itself! In approaching the subject of possible solutions, we must remember that the non-resolution of a conflict can sometimes be in the advantage of the ruling powers, in spite of formal discourses claiming the contrary. Azerbaijan does not formally want to lose 15-20% of its territory, therefore may procrastinate. As long as the conflict is not solved, certain groups perhaps even hope for compensation in money or in land, especially in Armenia, should the genocide be formally recognized. The conflict is also used conveniently by both parties every now and then as distraction from national affairs. Even though resolving the conflict may be economically advantageous, politically, the conflict has an advantage for Russia to use the general feelings of insecurity as a means of influence in its 'backyard'. Iran has a balanced approach but currently does not have a significant role in the conflict resolution.

6 The military-geographical aspect

In the meantime, record oil revenues are being used to build an Azerbaijani army which aspires to be independent from NATO and Russia. Billions of US dollars are being pumped in the defence budget, although a relatively small amount is being used for equipment and training. In spite of agreements to use peaceful means for problem solving, a military solution is not totally unimaginable after what happened in South Ossetia in August 2008, but it is very unlikely. With recent investment and its population of more than 8 million, Azerbaijan has a bigger active capability than Armenia with a population of almost 3 million.¹⁸ However, Armenia is backed by a Russian military pres-

¹⁸For detailed comparisons see Armenia (2010: 174) and Azerbaijan (2010: 176) in *The Military Balance 2010*.

ence and air base in Yerevan.¹⁹ The military-geographical situation is, moreover, difficult. Karabakh is a small mountain area preceded by plains easy to overlook and defend. Whereas especially a sophisticated air attack might be needed, it is the Azerbaijani navy which has significantly increased its capabilities,²⁰ but which would be of little use in Nagorno-Karabakh. Finally, in a country with authoritarian rule, a real military force paradoxically remains a threat and a rival to the president. Therefore, we should not underestimate but nor overestimate the capacity of the Azerbaijani army in the coming decade.

7 Focus on the process

If perfect solutions are too difficult to find at the negotiation table, conflict theory recommends to focus on the process instead of the result, (Langer 1997) and begin work on practical issues such as: how to involve the citizens of Nagorno-Karabakh in a public debate on the future of Karabakh? The debate, of course, should be based on truthful and versatile information in a non-coercive environment. It is important that people can consider the various options. The second question at stake is: how to create a fair and just method for a population-vote on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh? It is important to involve the displaced people originally from Nagorno-Karabakh, or it would not be a fair referendum (even though this may pose some practical problems such as proof of where one has previously lived). Thirdly, how to involve spokesmen of Nagorno-Karabakh in the conflict resolution process? Finally, the Lachin corridor – Azerbaijani territory but strongly associated with the safety aspect of the Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh – should be included in the debate, referendum and conflict resolution process. It is suggested that the Armenian forces could leave the 13 villages, not the whole territory. How to go about this? These points can be worked on, for example with the help of NGOs, and more EU involvement in helping to redefine the situation away from the old Soviet politics based on territorial integrity and self-determination. Ratification of the protocols between Turkey and Armenia on opening borders should help develop trade and prosperity for all, thereby increasing stability and constructive solutions in the area.

¹⁹In Armenia, Russia has both a military (Gyumri) and airforce (Yerevan) presence. See *The Military Balance 2010*, 231, 174.

²⁰Looking to 2020: Azerbaijan's military aspirations. Richard Giragosyan, May 2008, Noravank Foundation, partly based on *Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst*, April 29, 2008.

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Book Reviews

Introductory Thoughts to the Theory of International Relations

A Review of the Volume

Murádin János Kristóf: *Nemzetközi Kapcsolatok Elmélete*
(*Theory of International Relations*).

Cluj-Napoca: Scientia Publishing House, 2009.

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In our days, the theory of international relations is a widely accepted and taught subject. But it hasn't always been so. This subject was promoted to the rank of an independent field of study after World War I.

The young Transylvanian university teacher, János Kristóf Murádin in his book aims to present and explain each mainstream school of thought of international relations. These are realism, idealism or liberalism and geopolitics. According to the author, these were the three main waves that defined the 20th century. The book tries to analyze each one of these schools, explaining their origin, their impact on international politics and ultimately their current status.

But to fully understand these schools of thought, one must also learn about the history of international relations itself. This is why the author starts his book right with the basics, explaining the meaning of 'international relations'. While the classic approach to this definition is that international relation denotes the economic, cultural and political contacts between two or more countries, the author stresses the importance of international organizations in today's society. In what follows, he explains the origins of international relations. We may talk about international relations even in the case of the early

city-states of Mesopotamia or Greece, but in the modern sense, a viable and commonly accepted international system was only created in the middle of the 17th century. Closing the Thirty Years' War, the Peace of Westphalia created the bases for the first modern international system. By carefully explaining the decisions and the consequences of this peace, the author only stresses the fact that understanding it is the key requisite for analyzing the last century's and today's international system. The most important element to remember from this chapter is the nature of the international system. According to the author, the three main pillars of the new system, sovereignty, territoriality and legality – while defining the status of individual states – created an anarchic international system. The importance of this notion lies in the fact that it will influence the next centuries' international events.

After setting the bases and explaining each aspect that had a profound effect on the evolution of the current international sphere, the author sets out to present the main schools of thoughts. As mentioned, the first one is the Realist school. The origins of this theory can be found in the antiquity. The first modern representative of realism, as concerns international relations was Niccolo Machiavelli. He was the first modern European philosopher who declared that politics and governing in general should not be led by moral and ethics, but instead by necessity and interest. This clearly reflects the essence of realism, which is the rational evaluation of the facts at hand and the actions resulting from them. Modern international realism was developed in the early 20th century in the writings of Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Joachim Morgenthau and Edward Hallett Carr. The realist international theory explains that human nature is also reflected in the international system. Humans tend to be aggressive, hungry for power and selfish, which also defines their way of governing states and shaping international decisions. These theoreticians stress that total peace is not attainable, instead, interpreting events in a rational and objective way and making decisions based on factual knowledge may limit the devastating effects of wars. The author mentions that this theory became less and less adopted in practice due to the significant technological advances in the second half of the twentieth century. As an adaptation to these changes several neorealist theories evolved. These theories are not focusing anymore on the interpretation and consequences of human nature. Instead, they put accent on the structural characteristics of the international system. This way they explain that the anarchic nature of the system is the cause of the conflicts and power imbalances in the world.

The second main wave which influenced the 20th century international relations was the Idealist or Liberal school of thought. The author points out the

fact that this theory is also deeply rooted in history. Yet, the main ideas of this wave can be traced back to the Enlightenment era. The 18-19th century liberalism is also regarded as one of the precursors of this theory. The liberal theory of international relations argues that human nature is good in essence and because of this, peace is attainable. Education is regarded as the main tool in shaping the future face of the world. Idealists stress the importance of demilitarization and international organizations. This was applied in practice by American president Woodrow Wilson, who by the creation of the League of Nations envisioned a new international system where a supranational organization would watch out for world peace and security. After World War II it became clear that the classical idealist theory was not applicable. As an answer, several new neoidealist or neoliberal theories saw the light of day. These theories, while not denying the anarchic nature of the international system, diminish its importance. Like classical idealist theories, these express the importance of global international organizations as defining elements of the system, but also accept the significance of sovereign states.

The third and last school of thought the author presents is geopolitics. According to this theory the actions of countries may be explained based on geographical, or rather geopolitical considerations. The shape of continents and the position, borders and resources of an individual country heavily determine the nature of international policies embraced. Geopolitics evolved in four different places of the world, which also denote the four separate branches, namely the American, British, German and French geopolitical school. The author states that due to the technological development and the rising importance of nuclear and aerial power, these theories lost from their importance in the second half of the 20th century.

The last chapter of the book describes the newer waves in the theory of international relations. Theories like constructivism, reflectivism, neo-functionalism, neo-Marxism, behaviourism and feminism are the newest in line trying to define the shape and essence of international relations. The author mentions that these globalist waves haven't yet completely manifested themselves as viable theories and defining them is still in progress.

Based on the above summary we may conclude that the book is a very good introductory reading into the theory of international relations. The book's target group is mainly students wishing to learn about the international system and its functioning. The structure of the book, by first explaining the notion, then the origins and history of international relations clearly follows these guidelines. Without knowing about the basics it is almost impossible to understand the complexity of international relations theory. It is obvious

that János Kristóf Murádin did a great job explaining all the basics of this subject. Presenting the three main theories, realism, idealism and geopolitics would not be possible without explaining notions like the balance of power, the Westphalian system or mentioning the teachings of ancient and medieval philosophers, who were precursors and source of inspiration to modern scholars and thinkers. The downside of this is visible in the fact that a considerable amount of space is spent on these chapters. But then again, as mentioned, this is a necessity and if left out, the book would lose from its comprehensibility and clearness. The presenting of the three major schools of thought is concise but clear. This is exactly what a beginning student of international relations needs. Relying on this knowledge and considering the further readings suggested in the book, students may deepen their exploration into this field. On the other hand, one thing that this book may seem to lack is the more in-depth presentation of newer and current waves. But if done, it would probably not serve the initially proposed purpose of introducing new students into the general theory of international relations.

Getting into more complex theories which are not even fully standardized yet may undermine the previous chapters. The old and the new theories can be put in two different categories, which would require separate and distinctly different approaches. While the chapters presenting the realist school, the idealist school and the geopolitical school are of a descriptive character, the new waves may possibly need a more interpretative or speculative attitude. But this point brings us exactly to the next issue which probably needs to be mentioned, namely the possible expansion of the subject in further books. I personally see two possible ways. The first one is a more in-depth elaboration of the three major schools of thoughts either in a single book or in three distinct ones. The second way is describing, presenting and interpreting the new thoughts mentioned in the final chapter of this book. Either way, as already mentioned, János Kristóf Murádin's present book serves its purpose well, and will certainly become a major and excellent tool for every student in the process of learning the basics of international relations theory.



Academy Affairs (News, Events)

The European Union and the Challenges of our Society

December 4, 2009, Kolozsvár – Cluj-Napoca

In December 2009, the Department of European Studies of the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania organized a regional interdisciplinary conference regarding the European Union and the challenges our present society faces.

Initially, the conference was aimed to reunite the academic body of the Department of European Studies in order to show to an extended public the researches conducted at this department and the latest scientific results. However, the event gradually gained regional importance as visiting professors of the faculty also submitted papers, and as a main conference theme was established: the European Union and the challenges it brings about in the present-day society. Reuniting contributions from different fields of science: philosophy, political sciences, European and minority studies, history, literature and law ensured in the meantime a broader, interdisciplinary approach to the main conference theme.

The conference began with the launching of several new publications, the latest volumes of faculty members: *Nations and National Minorities in the EU*, edited by Barna Bodó and Márton Tonk (Scientia Publishing House, 2009) was presented by Alpár Zoltán Szász; *Kistérségek – nagy remények? [Microregions – Great Expectations?]*, edited by Péter Cseke (KompPress Publishing House, 2009) was presented by Miklós Bakk. Professor István Szilágyi's volume: *Európa és a mediterrán világ [Europe and the Mediterranean World]* was also published in 2009, in Budapest, and it was presented to the audience by Barna Bodó.

The conference panel comprised presentations by Barna Bodó regarding theoretic dilemmas in the research of diaspora and identities, as well as by Radu

Lupescu, who discussed the role of Vajdahunyad/Hunedoara Castle in the reiteration of national identity and national consciousness.

János Kristóf Murádin's presentation focused on the moment when the German army occupied Cluj (Kolozsvár) in 1944, and then detailed the consequences this occupation had in the history of the city. Ágnes Baricz discussed in her paper the particularities of conversion narratives in the 17th century Hungary.

The last two presentations of the panel belonged to István Szilágyi (visiting professor from the University of Pannonia, Veszprém, Hungary), who talked about the Eastern expansion of the European Union and the policies regarding the Mediterranean Region and to Zsolt Kokoly, who presented a paper related to EU law, discussing companies' freedom of establishment in the European Union.

In their closing speeches, Radu Lupescu and Barna Bodó appreciated the attention of the audience, the impressive number of students and specialists present at the event, as well as the quality of the discussions and debates that took place after each presentation. Considering the professional success of the conference among the greater audience, the organizers concluded that a similar manifestation be organized biannually.

KOKOLY Zsolt

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Minority Politics within the Europe of Regions June 18-19, 2010, Kolozsvár – Cluj-Napoca

In June 2010, a major international conference took place at the Department of European Studies of the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania: the international conference on *Minority Politics within the Europe of Regions*, co-organized by the Faculty of Sciences and Arts Kolozsvár – Cluj-Napoca of the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities (RIRNM), the University of Amsterdam and the most important European organization on political studies, the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR).

The opening words were addressed to the audience by Dr. Márton Tonk, Dean of the Faculty of Sciences and Arts Kolozsvár – Cluj-Napoca, Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, István Horváth, director of the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities and László Marác from the University of Amsterdam.

The two conference days comprised a total number of 33 presentations, sustained by participants from Romania, Hungary and 12 other European countries, as well as from the United States of America (35 participants). Sessions were organized in five thematic panels: *Language Rights and Cultural Policies Targeting Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, with István Horváth as moderator*; *Ethno-regionalism, Stateless Nations, Autonomies and Federalism in Western Europe, with László Marác as moderator*; *The Political Representation of Minorities and the Prospects of Autonomy in Central and Eastern Europe*, having as moderator research fellow Ivan Serrano Balaguer from the Open University of Catalonia and *The Troubled Pasts and Presents of Ethnically or Religiously Divided Societies. Facts, Myths and Discourses* – with Sergiu Constantin from the European Academy of Bolzano presiding.

The panel Ethnopolitics and Minority Protection in Romania was presided by Alpár Zoltán Szász (Babeş-Bolyai University, Kolozsvár – Cluj-Napoca), and focused on specific Romanian aspects of minority rights and protection. Presentations in this panel included themes like the draft of law on the status of national minorities in Romania (by congressman Attila Varga), the probable line of evolution of the Romanian constitution (by Miklós Bakk from the Faculty of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences, Babeş-Bolyai University), achievements in the field of ethnopolitics and minority protection

(by István Horváth), political representations of the national minorities (by István Gergő Székely from RIRNM), as well as a case study on the Szekler land as brand name (by Benedek Nagy from the Faculty of Social and Human Studies, Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania).

Presentations at the conference were sustained in English and Hungarian language, and free access was offered to everyone interested in the topic. In the closing speeches of the conference, László Marác stressed the importance of the co-operation with the ECPR, while István Horváth talked about the conference volume, set to be published after September 2010.

The social programme of the conference comprised a trip to Rimetea (Torockó), a UNESCO World Heritage site, where participants visited the local ethnographic museum, the windmill, the Unitarian church and could admire the unique architecture of the famous white houses. The trip included visits to the picturesque village of Colțești (Torockószentgyörgy) and to the town of Aiud (Nagyenyed).

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