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Central and Eastern Europe: An Invisible Sewing Shop

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Abstract. Developed countries started to outsource labour-intensive production processes to lower-cost countries decades ago such as the ones belonging to Central Eastern Europe, where subcontracting became significant from the 1950s. During the past few years, tendencies of relocation came to the fore and received a fresh boost because of the economic situation caused by the coronavirus pandemic. The growing need for shorter supply chains creates a noteworthy situation in the region's fashion industry. But we have to make a difference between the 'headquarter' country of the brand and the actual country of origin: even if luxury products are made here, the relations in production remain hidden.

Keywords: fashion industry, Central Eastern Europe, supply chain, relocation, outsourcing

Introduction

Central and Eastern European countries have been playing an important role in fashion production for decades: the factories are big employers, especially in rural areas, and the companies are partners of foreign, well-known 'household name' fashion brands. But why can we say that the region's fashion production is an invisible sewing shop? The answer is quite simple: the relations of production remain hidden. It is the purpose of the brands, and the regulations of the country of origin allow it. Even if there is no complete agreement on how to define Central and Eastern Europe, in the context of fashion production, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia are among the most representative countries of this region (Faust 2005). In my paper, I focus on the Visegrád Four: Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.

The structure of my paper follows the concept of the international conference *The Past, Present and the Future of Central Europe*, organized by the Central Europe Research Group and Sapientia University's Department of International Relations and European Studies on 20 November 2020. It consists of three main parts: at first, I present the 'past' – the period from the intensified outsourcing activity till the regime change, the 'present' – from the regime change to the 2010s, a period characterized by the intense international competition and the global supply chain, and the 'future', i.e. the period from the 2010s, which is marked by relocation tendencies. My research method is qualitative: besides the literature review, I have also conducted deep interviews with representatives of the region's fashion industry with the aim of filling the gap caused by the lack of scientific and policy interest towards the fashion industry's production part.

The fashion industry covers several fields: from the production of raw materials, design, production to retail and even marketing (Steele–Major 2020). Under this term, I refer to the segment of fashion production – textile, garment, leather and shoes and fur industry –, where mainly garment production makes up the final pieces.

According to the latest figures of the World Trade Statistical Review 2020 (World Trade Organization 2019), the European Union (the 2019 trade data still includes Great Britain) is the second biggest garment exporter (after China), with 136 billion dollars of annual turnover, which means 27.6% of the world trade in clothing export. 2019 was the first year that brought a decline in the continuing growth of the garment trade. In Europe, the Romanian garment industry is the biggest employer (Spin360 2018). In the context of European garment production, in 2019, Italy exported clothes worth €12 billion to non-EU Member States (34% of total extra-EU exports of clothes by value), followed by Germany (€6 billion, 16%), Spain (€5 billion, 15%), France (€4 billion, 13%), and the Netherlands (€2 billion, 5%) (Eurostat 2020). However, being the importer country and where production can actually take place is different, as the clothing production in Central Eastern Europe is significant, which I will specify later on.

The second part of the 20th century and the globalization brought changes in the geography of production and economic structure as well. Developed countries with higher wages (with the purpose of the improvement of their competitiveness) outsourced high labour need, work-intense production processes to regions with lower wages – to Central and Eastern Europe as well. According to the 'experiences' of the world economy, this intensified outsourcing and the fragmentation of production are some of the main characteristics of fashion industry today besides electronics and mechanics. But while the latter mentioned industries were building strategic partnerships and operate their supply chains through subsidiaries, the fashion industry mainly works with independent companies and short-term contracts. The practice of subcontracting (contract work) means that the contractor (the fashion brand) owns the raw materials and other necessary equipment (such as zippers,

buttons) and entrusts the subcontractor (the company who makes the production) to make the ordered garments after the specified documents and gaining a surcharge (Antalóczy–Sass 1998). Nevertheless, the pattern of outsourcing was not shaped only by lower wages, increasing productivity, scale of economics, and the growing costs in the home country, but transport, the development of (communication) technologies, (de)regulation of international trade and capital flow, trade conventions, the dismantling of the MFA quota system,[1] and the European integration also affected (Molnár 2017) the tendencies besides the structure of the fashion industry, especially the growing mass-produced fast-fashion sector. Nowadays, the perception of fashion brands, consumer demands, and the need towards sustainability and transparency also affect the production decision of the fashion brands.

The fashion industry has a huge need for capital and labour as well (Mendes–de la Haye 2010). Globalization has radically redrawn the map of the fashion industry during the past decades. Previously, garments (and other fashion products) were made locally, but then production activities were outsourced: the lowest value-added, mainly assembly and cut-make-trim processes took place in developing countries with lower wages (first in Asia, Central Eastern Europe and now to certain African countries as well) (Thomas 2007). As the fashion industry – and especially mass production – was looking for low wages, a tense price competition emerged (Robb 2016), and while developed countries (such as the ones in Western Europe) kept higher value-added processes (such as design, product development, and marketing), high labour-intense – i.e. less profitable – processes took place in Eastern Central Europe (Molnár 2017). While the fragmentation of production and outsourcing is a strategy for cost reduction, it also has a degrading effect on the traditional light industry's sectors, including fashion (Amighini–Rabellotti 2010).

Outsourcing can have different forms: companies can delocate their entire production, foreign direct investment (for example, buying of production capacities), strategic partnerships, and collaboration with different subcontractors – they can also outsource certain processes such as garment assembly (Amighini–Rabellotti 2010: 4).

Why Is Central Eastern Europe an Invisible Sewing Shop?

Meghan Markle Wears a Coat Made by Exploited Hungarian Workers; *Revealed: The Romanian Site Where Louis Vuitton Makes Its Italian Shoes* – I just mentioned a few from the headlines about issues when the hidden production relations within the fashion industry came to the surface and grabbed the attention of the

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1   The MFA quota system (Multi Fibre Arrangement) regulated the trade of textile and garment products between 1974 and 1994 and incorporated the quote of quantity that was allowed to import from developing to developed countries.

world press. But how is this possible in practice and legally? With the headway of globalization, we must make a difference between the 'home country', the headquarters of the fashion brands, and the country where production actually takes place. The higher market segments of the fashion industry, namely the luxury and the high-end, designer categories, are especially sensitive to their image because consumers connect the brands to a certain heritage, status, and high quality. And in the eye of the consumers, the lower market segments, such as fast-fashion and high-street brands, can more easily declare that their products are made in China, for example. Consumer perception is different with luxury brands, as Western Europe – especially France, Italy, and the United Kingdom – is considered to be home to 'luxury capitals'. So, production relations remain more hidden here as the country of origin, the 'Made in' label as a guarantee indicates craftsmanship, expertise and proper working conditions. However, as I have mentioned earlier, ethical, sustainable, and conscious consumption is growing among consumers (FutureBrand 2014). The regulation of the country of origin in the European Union allows that even luxury products be made in CEE countries under not quite decent working conditions and for low wages.

We must make a difference between the concept of invisibility and non-transparency. The first one refers rather to the non-existing relationship between customer and the production facility, that the exact place of origin is not indicated on the final product; invisibility also means the lack of appreciation of the manufacturers. On the other hand, non-transparency – as fashion brands do not represent their suppliers, and if they do, it is voluntary – can serve as a tool for hiding the not so decent working conditions and possible right violations, but it is also a tool of competition: fashion brands hide their suppliers because they do not want their rivals to know who they are working with.

There is currently no harmonized ruling and unified practice among the Member States of the European Union regarding the country of origin. The regulation in force allows but does not make it compulsory to use the 'Made in Europe' label if a product is made within the EU's borders nor does it inhibit the use of a single, concrete country. It is the interest of the fashion brands to indicate a high-prestige country (think about Italy and France, for example) as country of origin. This practice, however, is in contrast with the EU's interest, as consumers can differentiate products based on the COO (country of origin) sign, even if the products came from the internal single market. The 2004 amendment of the Act of 1997, Article CLV on consumer protection declares that the marking of the COO is not in compliance with the expectations, originated by the European community law, as consumer differentiation goes against the fundamental freedom of the free movement of goods. In 2014, a draft legislation was introduced to the European Parliament that would make it compulsory to mark the concrete country of origin, the country where the product underwent the last, substantial, economically justified processing or working. This draft was taken off the

agenda of the Working Party on Consumer Protection and Information of the Council of the European Union. According to the existing case law of the EU, indication of the concrete country of origin is compulsory if a product is coming from outside the EU. But legal regulation and practice are different: *Made in China* can appear on products as removable stickers, or a product can be made there, apart from the last processing step, which is performed within the EU – and the latter will be indicated on the label as COO (Thomas 2007).

Subcontracting: Garment Production in the V4 Countries

The delocation of garment production started in the 1950s: first, Japanese, European, and American fashion brands outsourced their production to Asia and Western Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) to East European countries. After the Second World War, the formerly garment-maker craft industry / fashion salons / tailors and workshops were ceased, and the fashion salons were deprivatized, socialized, and confection production started.[2] Quantity became important over quality, and factories exported the result of the 'overproduction' to the Comecon market (Csipes 2006). Subcontracting was significant in the centrally managed Hungarian textile and garment industry from the 1950s: first, for the Soviet socialist market and then for Western clients, as an additional activity in the first step. The capacity of the Hungarian confection industry started to grow in the 1970s (Valuch 2004). During the seventies and the eighties, collaboration with well-known global brands became more important: Hungarian trade and production companies were rushed to gain production rights: the products of Lee Cooper and Levi Strauss were made at the factory *Május 1* and Pierre Cardin at *Hungarotex* (Valuch 2004).

The Hungarian *Elegant Május 1* clothing factory was ranked among Central Europe's biggest and most advanced, developed garment factories (Csipes 2006). The factory's several thousand production series made from textile, leather, and fur products were exported – besides the Soviet market products' export to the United States of America, England, and Italy – before the regime change. After making uniforms, the big socialist factory started to produce female and male confection garments from 1955, and it took on the name *Elegant*, especially because of the Western markets. During its golden age, it employed 6,000 people in 7-8 facilities and also employed homeworkers (Vámos 2009). The Soviet export was politically compulsory and also offered advanced capacity planning for factories as quantity quotas were settled 1-1.5 years ahead. The remaining capacity of *Elegant Május 1* was assigned to make sophisticated products 'finomkonfekció' (underwear and

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2   Confection garment making is characterized by the mass production of ready-made garment after standardized size, that is, in contrast to made-to-order garment making.

knitted products) that were imported by Denmark, England, Sweden, Germany, Italy, the USA, and Canada. Under state socialism, Hungarian factories received orders through the Light Industry Ministry's agreements, and thus the ministry decided on the contracts with foreign trade firms – Hungarotex and Tanimpex transmitted contract work and orders for Hungarian companies and dealt with the presence in foreign countries (Deés 2009). Within the framework of the 'bilateral socialist collaboration', post-socialist countries' fashion representatives agreed on different concepts and information packages, and also different models of clothes were exchanged between factories of the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Even if there is an ongoing discussion between the Visegrád Countries about cooperation, collaboration, and economic convergence (Sáringer 2019), there is no example for any of these within the countries' fashion industry.

The so-called reform socialism had brought certain openness and relaxation to former economic principles in Czechoslovakia from 1967, in Hungary from 1968, and in the case of Poland from 1972, after Gorbachev had introduced his policy of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) with the aim of reforming the Soviet Union. This policy also allowed making certain business connections with the West. Hungary and Poland had a relatively marketized economy thanks to certain reforms of the state socialist economy till the end of the 1980s (Bohle–Greskovits 2007). From the 1980s, six CEE countries became the European Union's main textile and garment export partners: Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, the Czech Republic Slovakia, and Poland, where Western and contractor–subcontractor connections have been established – the basis of contract work was already given. With the end of the Comecon market and the Russian export, in parallel with the decreasing tendencies of the production background in Western Europe, wages were rising in the home countries, and they started to source products from Asia and CEE (Begg–Pickles–Smith 2003).

At the 1990s, when trade was liberalized, even if OPT agreements[3] were left off, they remained in practice. Even if all six countries' garment and textile export had increased and almost every EU Member State's garment import has grown, there were relative winners and losers as well. Germany exported 60 percent of the garments from these six CEE countries in 1989, but then this rate fell back to 44 percent by 2000. Approximately the 7 percent of Italy's garment export came from the CEE countries, and this rate had increased to 17 percent by 2000. Poland and Hungary have lost some of their market share, but the Czech Republic's, Slovakia's, Bulgaria's, and Romania's share in supplier connections has increased. Trade

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3   The OPT (outward processing trade) was a trade practice between the European Economic Community and Central Eastern European countries: raw materials, cut components, or even half-made products were sent to the latter countries' subcontractors and assembly activities took place in CEE, and then the final products were sent back to Western European countries tax free, where the products got the original country's 'Made in' label.

between Romania and Italy has increased, while between Hungary and Germany has drastically decreased (Begg–Pickles–Smith 2003).

Contract work provides opportunity for an increased competitiveness for companies who are 'poor' in financial instruments and for the utilization of difference between labour costs, especially in so-called 'declining' industries,[4] including the textile and garment industry as well (Antalóczy–Sass 1998). As I have written previously, contract work connections (between CEE countries and Western Europe) existed before the regime change or the transition to market economy, especially in the case of Yugoslavia's, Hungary's, Poland's, and Romania's fashion industry. From the 1990s, CEE countries have enjoyed a growing portion in contract work, and an increasingly important share of their export came from contract work.

Underwear, outer garments, and shoes made up steadily a significant percentage of the contract work export. That was preferred by the European Union – through its customs system –, while the EU tried to keep the raw material production within its borders. The contract work system of the EU has been geographically redrawn from the 1990s: the importance of Eastern European countries was realized because of the geographical proximity and the even lower labour costs compared to certain developing countries. From the second half of the 1980s, the underperformance of the Comecon market urged fashion companies to increase the portion of contract work in their activity as they were unable to increase their own products' (that were designed and made by them) export because of financial problems (lack of capital). The end of the Comecon market rapidly increased the rate of Western European contract work. From the beginning of the 1990s, 80-85% of the garment and shoe export of the Hungarian companies was done by contract work. The subservience to contract work was even increased during the second part of the 20th century by another factor: the degradation of the textile factories. The lack of locally made and available textiles and other equipment limited the opportunities of the export of locally designed and developed products (Antalóczy–Sass 1998).

Different Paths for the Visegrád Four Countries

Nowadays, part of the former *Május 1* clothing factory's activity is continued by *Elegant Design Modelltervező és Gyártás-előkészítő Zrt* [Elegant Design Model Designer and Development of Production Private Limited Company]: 70% of the outer garments manufactured at the factory are exported to France; the processes are performed through contract work. By this time, the company operates in an

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4   There are two meanings of the declining industries: first, an industry can decline because its products have been replaced by new and better products, and, second, industries can decline because now it is cheaper to produce a certain product in another country and export it – the second definition refers to our case in terms of garment production.

upgraded role as an intermediary: the facility based in Budapest is a site of the development of production and a logistic centre. Elegant Design is working together with some 20 Hungarian and 12 Romanian factories.

The transition to market economy and the increased need for competitiveness in the global market radically decimated the former industrial companies and segments. The transition also caused a geographical shift from the core countries to Eastern European and Far East countries, which were veritable repositories of low-cost labour force. But in parallel with this, fashion industry was taken to the back seat in terms of technological development and training. During the first two years after the regime change, the Hungarian fashion industry lost its market share faster than ever. In 1989, the Hungarian government cancelled the governmental guarantee of the Eastern export: that step meant making null and void almost half of the local factories' exports. The textile and garment factories were crippled and left without any help. The industry went through privatization, while its value was lost: numerous valuable machines were sold, and a significant number of the industry's professionals left the sector (TMTE 2009).

Contract work for mainly German, Italian, and French companies became significant in contrast with the former, steady Comecon-market (Hanzl–Pavlik 2003), so products made by Eastern European companies entered the market under foreign fashion brand names. Contract work in the fashion industry also means short-term contracts and insecurity, as a single garment is attached to a collection that is characterized by the actual season. That means about half a year's time. But we cannot exclude the opportunity of working together with fashion brands constantly, for longer time in practice.

The competitiveness of Eastern European fashion companies also has its drawbacks. Besides the mentioned geographical proximity, the closeness to Western culture, the formerly existed (and unexploited) working capacities, and the low respect and inadequate enforcement of national labour laws were also significant factors that shaped fashion brands' sourcing strategy (Clean Clothes Campaign 2016b). The report *Labour on a Shoestring*[5] carried a warning that high-end, Italian and German shoe brand products are made with low-labour-cost Eastern European sweatshops[6] through the OPT scheme, while the term 'Made in Europe' means a certain guarantee for the customers for proper working conditions and fair wages (Clean Clothes Campaign 2016a).

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5   The Clean Clothes Campaign (established in 1998) is a global network dedicated to improving working conditions and empowering workers in the global garment and sportswear industries. Their experts have done research in Albanian, Bosnia-Herzegovinian, Macedonian, Polish, Romanian, and Slovakian shoe factories to examine the working conditions of the workers who are behind the well-known shoe brands.

6   A sweatshop (or sweat factory) is a factory or workshop, especially in the garment industry, where manual workers are employed at very low wages for long hours and under poor conditions.

OPT was first used by German companies who started to rely on subsidiaries and subcontractors in foreign countries, and then the authorities of the European Union started to use the system as well. The system was explicitly supported by the German textile industry, which was expecting to stay in business more easily thanks to this measure. Increasing internationalization was accompanied by a steady decline in employment. Garment producers mostly transferred the remaining mass production parts and the less time critical items to foreign, low-cost facilities (Faust 2005: 16). The main destinations of the OPT activity were Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, as these countries are close to the Western European market. The mentioned countries became more and more significant subcontractors of the European market. Every country has been trying to specialize itself in a certain product category, and their export rate towards OECD countries significantly increased from the 1980s. From 1991, the former Yugoslavia's 'empty place' urged foreign investors and producers to look around and outsource their production into the direction of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Croatia, Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. There are examples for ultra-modern facilities in garment production who were able to compete with Western European facilities and produce 'European quality level' (Cseh 1997).

While the textile and garment segments are not so significant economically, they are even more important from an employment point of view because of their great need of live labour. The charged sum of the contract work is based on the agreement of the contractor and the subcontractors' negotiation every time. It can be done directly between the two parties, but more often it was negotiated through intermediary agents. The newly developed situation has transformed the conditions under which employment contracts were concluded. On the one hand, the bargaining position of companies, who predominantly or exclusively earned their living from contract work, has deteriorated. On the other hand, the wages offered in the employment contract were also influenced by the growth of the 'contract work supply' with the entrance and emergence of other Eastern European countries in the contract work market. Anyway, thanks to the expertise and qualification of Hungarian labourers and their former experience in quality and work organization, management skills, Hungarian fashion companies could meet the highest requirements of the clients (Antalóczy–Sass 1998).

According to the country profile of the Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), in the Czech Republic, 383 companies employ more than 10 thousand people in the garment sector, and its export rate is 73%[7] (CCC 2016c). In contrast with the Hungarian situation, where companies were left alone without any governmental help, in the Czech Republic, a governmental agency, the CzechInvest[8] connects production facilities

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7   It is important to point out that the numbers were published before the COVID-19 pandemic that made a huge impact on employment.

8   CzechInvest is a governmental agency specialized in investment and business development,

and companies to potential business partners and gives them help in applying for regional, municipal, and European Union funding, and this way they can invest into the development of their technology. The agency also supports foreign direct investment (FDI) and develops Czech small and medium enterprises (SMEs) besides acting as an intermediary stakeholder. We can also notice the specialization of Czech companies after the transition (to market economy). Veronika Ruppert, an independent Czech journalist, who made interviews with Czech fashion company owners and representatives for several years, points out the phenomenon that:

> Most of the big colossuses that were put together without business sense broke apart. Lots of factories could not handle the transition, but there is actually a surprising number of factories that managed to go on or that started completely anew in the 1990s using the remaining human and technological capital. Czech factories produce high-end fine leather handbags (ELEGA) for local and foreign brands. The Tonak factory is one of the biggest producers of hats in the world (for example, even American Stetsons are made from their stock). Tilak successfully designs and produces high-quality urban outdoor garments in foreign markets, most of them in Japan. We have few stable shoe manufacturers focused on pracovní boty,[9] mostly for the Czech and the German markets. We still have textile factories, there is the production of buttons, threads, and other necessary particles. We have several factories producing underwear; one of them, Triola, will celebrate its 100th anniversary in 2 years. (Dobos 2019)

Poland's position is different, as there are companies that relied on traditional contract work and stayed, and there are several fashion companies that are significant in the global market. One example for producer facilities is Warmia SA, which was established in 1959, employs more than 1,000 people, and it works for Hugo Boss, Bugatti, and Burberry as well. Well-known Polish brands are Reserved, Mohito, and the CCC shoe brand.[10] By this time, there is no other Visegrád Country that would be home to such relevant fashion player in the global competition. According to CCC's latest (2015) data, 2,283 registered garment companies employ 97,200 people. The export rate is lower compared to other CEE countries, 'only' 50.7% – a significant production for the local market can be spotted here, which is in conformity with the big size of the Polish market.

There were 238 registered garment companies in Hungary according to CCC's 2017 data, and the sector employed more than 12 thousand people, with a 63% export rate. Comparing these data with the Czech Republic, Hungary's garment sector is definitely a bigger employer.

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and it was established in 1992 by the Czech Republic's Industrial and Commercial Ministry.
9   Work boots in English.
10   In this paper, I do not examine the local production of the mentioned Polish fashion brands.

Slovakia also had huge textile and garment factories during the 20th century. The development of the Slovakian textile industry started after 1948: thanks to the forced industrialization, formerly existing factories were rebuilt and transformed, and new factories with modern technology were built (Slovakia was part of Czechoslovakia at that time). After the regime change, the Slovakian textile and garment industry decreased significantly in terms of rate of production and employment as well. Several companies were facing crisis after the changing business and economic conditions. According to the data from SARIO,[11] textile and garment production fell by 30% between 1990 and 1999. The main cause is the digressive path of the local industry, which was suffering because of the competitiveness of the developing countries' low labour costs. The beginning of the 21st century brought renewal for the Slovakian segment that now employs 40 thousand people (that is a 30% decrease compared to the figures of 1990), and its export rate to Western European markets is over 75%. The order of the Western fashion brands is stagnating because of cheaper Asian productions. Furthermore, moving towards upgrading and higher value-added activities was challenging for the Slovakian fashion industry. Low investment rate (and mood) and more expensive technology led to the depreciation of the companies' technological background. Likewise, according to SARIO's data, in 1990, 18 production companies were operating, whereas nowadays there are 218 of them (86 in textile and 132 in garment production, which usually employ more than 20 people, so we can talk about SMEs). But foreign capital is also in the sector: the Italian Mediconf and the Swiss Schiesser made smaller investments besides Danish and Belgian companies. Texicom operates in Ružomberok, and the BZVIL textile factory gave work for 5,000 people in the 1960s-70s: it was privatized in 1989.

CCC also examined the working conditions in the Polish and the Czech fashion industry and shed light on the fact that even if the two countries' production can be characterized by high quality, there are low wages, and salaries often do not reach the nationally guaranteed minimum wage levels. That was in 2015 (when the research was made): 312 dollars in Poland and 390 dollars in the Czech Republic. Their conclusion is that for a decent living workers should earn the triple amount of that wage.

What Will the Future Bring?

It is nearly impossible to see or predict what the future of the CEE and the Visegrád Four countries' fashion companies will be, as the COVID-19 pandemic has created unprecedented circumstances, and its long-term effect is unpredictable. Companies that rely on raw materials from Asia have suffered from the lack of supply and clients,

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11 SARIO is a Slovakian investment and industrial development agency that was established in 2001 and operates under the supervision of the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic.

were ceased, or their orders were reduced. There is also a constant debate within the industry that there is need for a shorter supply chain and the reform of existing sourcing practices. But there is an ongoing phenomenon that can give hope to the fashion companies of the region: relocation tendencies (reshoring, nearshoring, and onshoring) have been examined and spotted for the 2010s. Relocation as the action of moving to a new place primary focuses on fashion on moving away from Asian production, and it takes place in nearshoring as the practice of transferring a business operation to a nearby country, especially as a preference over a more distant one, and backshoring, or onshoring as the repatriation of production to the home country (Fratocchi et al. 2014).

While the mass production is taking place in Asia, smaller production series in the higher market segment are performed within the region. Two decades ago, European and American fashion brands were in a hurry to outsource their production to Asia as they wanted to reduce their costs. The traditional supply chain of fashion is facing challenges due to the convergence of labour cost. While in 2005, Chinese wages were one tenth of the American salaries, that rate is now 'only' a one third. Time is also money: with geographically closer production, significant costs can be saved. For American fashion brands, Mexico now offers lower labour, and it is closer to the American market (Amed 2019). Even if labour costs are higher in Eastern Europe than in China, that rate changes. While wages in Turkey were five time more than in China, now they are less than the double. And we have to add the saving of cost in transport and time. 'Now deadline has become more important than price. Why are fashion brands produced here? It is simple. It is cheaper than in the Western European countries, while we offer the same quality. Formerly, the rate was 2.5 between production price and final price. Now it is bigger and bigger' – says Anna Szabó Hannauerné, Head of the Textile and Garments Section of the National Association of Entrepreneurs and Employers (VOSZ) (Dobos 2019).

The fashion industry has arrived at a crossroads where speed beats costs regarding marginal advantages, and concerns of sustainability are getting stronger. Transportation is also significant: sea transport is the most common one, but it takes time: it takes around 30 days for a parcel to reach Western European markets from Asia, while air transport is considered to be too expensive (Andersson et al. 2018), and the 'slowness' of transport is likely unable to serve the current speed of the fashion industry. Former advantages of delocation are also derogated by geopolitical tension, trade agreements, and the insecurity caused by fluctuation in exchange rates as well.

Conventional organizational structures and forecast-driven supply chains have been formerly declared not to be adequate to meet the challenges of volatile and turbulent demand which typify fashion markets today, and there is a constant call for agile supply chain (Christopher–Lowson–Peck 2004). Even if there is a tendency for the rationalization of the supply chain (that means lesser suppliers for fashion

brands), relying on a smaller number of suppliers can increase the risk of supply chain disruption (McMaster et al. 2020). Even if we can declare delocation as a tendency, increasing costs and management challenges have urged several fashion brands to reconsider the direction and the expansion of their production, namely relocation, and switch to local suppliers (Robinson–Hsieh 2016).

Conclusions

Several industry reports predict relocation tendencies and the growing importance of the Central European region, including the Visegrád Four countries, as the fashion industry's supply chains are not serving the interest of the brands – referring to long lead times and growing costs. The tradition, the heritage, the expertise, and the existing connections are all respected and noticed by the clients. The years 2020 and 2021 with the COVID-19 have brought unprecedented times, and as the regions' fashion companies rely on foreign fashion brand orders, their future is mainly in their hands as well. The pandemic also had a devastating effect on the global and the local economies. Even if we consider relocation an ongoing and continuous, intensifying tendency, local fashion industries are facing several challenges, and numerous factors will actually shape the associated phenomena in the long run. In the short term, the survival of the companies is the top priority, while several other challenges are hanging over their head and will be subjects of my further research. One of the biggest challenges are the urgent lack of workforce and its aging tendencies. The lack of industrial policy and the cessation of trainings means an aging workforce, and there is barely any second generation on the horizon. Even if high-end, luxury, household name fashion products are made in the region, who will get the 'credit'? Since working in fashion production is underpaid compared to the complexity and the exactitude of the job, it is understandable that the young generation is looking for other occupations. But if we look at the undeservedly neglected social sustainability: fashion companies could be big and inclusive employers, as the segment gives job to thousands of people in rural areas and to people with disabilities. With contract work and in the trap of subcontracting, dependency means a lifebuoy but not a possible path for the companies who are suffering from lack of capital, which makes challenging for them to move forward.

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Spatial Dimensions of Regional Innovativeness in Romania

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Abstract. This paper contains the analysis of regional innovation performance in the NUTS 2 regions of Romania, based on the European Innovation Scoreboard evaluation for 2011 and 2019, and the identification of the most significant influencing factors of county-level R&D activity, for the 1997–2018 period. The Regional Innovation Index (RII) provides a profound characterization for Romanian regions regarding their innovation performance, which was studied using the GIS (Geographic Information System) methodology in relation with the regional R&D activity, GDP per capita, and entrepreneurship innovation. In the following, the Romanian R&D activity is analysed at the county level. The influencing factors of R&D expenditures and employment in Romanian counties were studied based on two panel regression models and using exogenous variables, for economic development, entrepreneurship, education, and infrastructure.

Keywords: regional innovation, geographic information system, entrepreneurship innovation, R&D

Introduction

The innovative performance of NUTS 2 regions in the European Union was assessed by the European Commission using the Regional Innovation Scoreboard's methodology.[1] Due to the complexity of innovation, in addition to the economic importance, there are regional-level policy, academic, institutional, entrepreneurial, infrastructural, and labour market implications and conditions. Previous studies have focused on the determining factors of regional innovation

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1   https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/policy/innovation/regional_en.

employment and activities (Silva et al. 2021), regional innovation potential in the EU regions (Żółtaszek–Olejnik 2017), the regional labour market structure's impact on innovation activities (Roper–Love 2006), the role of local institutions and administration in the Italian regional innovation performance (Arbolino et al. 2019), the typologies of European regions according to the knowledge base, and R&D activities and innovation potential (Blažek–Kadlec 2019).

The regional innovation activities have a significant policy implication, as Silva et al. (2021) suggest, and depend on regional R&D investments and expenditures, as well as on the innovation activities of SMEs. Based on an EU database containing 238 regions, Silva et al. (2021) investigated regional innovation. They developed two panel models describing the regional innovation impact on high-tech employment and firm innovation caused by new market sales. They suggest that the conditions for regional high-tech employment (for example, in knowledge-intensive services) include lifelong learning and a share of population with tertiary education, also depending on business sector investments in R&D and the SMEs' innovative collaborations and public–private co-publications.

Arbolino et al. (2019) have studied the annual innovation outcome by regions in the Italian regions, including a set of explanatory variables, of which we highlight regional GDP per capita, the share of micro-enterprises, and motorway kilometres per inhabitant as an infrastructural factor.

Well-qualified human capital and R&D financial resources were identified by Żółtaszek and Olejnik (2017) as having significant effects on regional innovation potential in the European Union, while in Zygmunt (2020) tertiary education graduates are included in the explanatory model of firms' innovation activities in Poland and the Czech Republic.

The wide array of tools adopted in the regional methods of analysis examine the spatial differences regarding the regional indicators, such as the GIS (Geographic Information System) methodology, on the one hand and identify the influencing factors of an economic situation, using in general panel type regression models, which include regional explanatory variables across a period of time on the other hand. The GIS (Geographic Information System) was used by Goschin and Druica (2020) to perform the spatial analysis of Romanian regions, focusing on the changes in entrepreneurial activity at the county level, and by Goschin (2020) to identify, based on economic activities, the NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 levels of regional specializations and to identify the spatial differences in terms of employment in the settlements of Harghita County (Madaras 2019). The panel data model methodology was used in Arbolino et al. (2019) in the determining factor analysis of regional innovation performance, and panel regression models were used to identify the influencing factors of regional competitiveness in Györfy and Madaras (2017), using a set of exogenous variables based on the European Commission's Regional Competitiveness Index (RCI) pillars.

   In this paper, we examine the following questions: Which are the most important economic characteristics of the most innovative NUTS 2 regions in Romania? Which are the influencing factors of regional R&D (research and development) employment and expenditures in the counties of Romania? The structure of the paper is as follows: the introduction contains the review of the most appropriate studies; the first chapter focuses on the GIS analysis of innovations in the Romanian NUTS 2 regions; the second chapter contains the panel regression estimations for the regional innovation employment and expenditures in the Romanian counties. These are followed by the discussion of the results, and, finally, the conclusions are formulated.

GIS (Geographic Information System) Analysis of Regional Innovativeness in Romania

The Regional Innovation Index (RII), provided by the European Innovation Scoreboard, indicates a decrease in all NUTS 2 regions in the 2011–2019 period. The highest values for both years appear in the Bucharest-Ilfov Region (0.287 and 0.251), while the lowest in the South-West Oltenia Region (0.146) for the year 2011 and in the South – Muntenia Region (0.09) for the year 2019. The order of regions also changed: in 2011, the second and third were the South-East Region (0.198) and the North-West Region (0.189), while in 2019 the West Region (0.159) and the North-West Region (0.144) (*Figure 1a–b*).

| 0.05 – 0.1 |
| 0.1 – 0.125 |
| 0,125 – 0.15 |
| 0.15 – 0.175 |
| 0.175 – 0.2 |
| 0.2 – 0.25 |
| 0.25 – 0.3 |

Figure 1a. *Regional Innovation Index in 2011*

	0.05 – 0.125
	0.125 – 0.15
	0.15 – 0.175
	0.175 – 0.2
	0.2 – 0.25
	0.25 – 0.3

Source: European Innovation Scoreboard[2]

Figure 1b. *Regional Innovation Index in 2019*

In the following, we will examine the R&D employees and expenditures in the Romanian regions in 2012 and 2018. In both years, the highest number of R&D employees were in the Bucharest-Ilfov Region (16,972 and 17,700 people), more than in all the other regions combined. A relatively large decrease in the South-West Oltenia Region (57.67%) and in the South – Muntenia Region (22.55%), a growth of 43.55% in the Centre Region and of 30.91% in the West Region have led to a new structure in 2018, when the Centre Region (3,715 people) came second and the West Region (2,393 people) third (*Figure 2a–c*).

2   Data source: Regional Innovation Scoreboard 2019, the Regional Profiles for Romania; available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/research-and-innovation/statistics/performance-indicators/regional-innovation-scoreboard_en.

Figure 2a. *R&D employees in 2012*

Figure 2b. *R&D employees in 2018*

Figure 2c. *R&D employees – difference between 2012 and 2018*

The highest R&D expenditure was registered in the Bucharest-Ilfov Region for both years (1,575,613 and 3,001,082 thousand lei); in 2018, this value is 69.72% more than all the other regions combined (*Figure 3a–c*).

Figure 3a. *R&D expenditure (thousand lei) in 2012*

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3   Data source: CDP102E – employees from research; development activity from: http://statistici. insse.ro:8077/tempo-online/#/pages/tables/insse-table.

Figure 3b. *R&D expenditure (thousand lei) in 2018*

Figure 3c. *R&D expenditure – difference between 2012 and 2018*

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4   Data source: CDP104B – total expenditure from research and development activity; available at: http://statistici.insse.ro:8077/tempo-online/#/pages/tables/insse-table.

The Bucharest-Ilfov Region is the most developed region in Romania: the regional GDP per capita was 68,933.4 thousand lei in 2012 and 111,159.5 thousand lei in 2018. Significant increase was observed in the South-West Oltenia Region (193.23% in plus), the West Region (139.85% in plus), and the Centre Region (117.23% in plus), and a decrease in the North-West Region (21.42% in minus) and the North-East Region (16.24% in minus). In 2012, the second and the third places were occupied by the South – Muntenia Region (331,591 thousand lei) and the North-West Region (298,616 thousand lei), while in 2018 by the West Region (374,229 thousand lei) and the South – Muntenia Region (363,924 thousand lei).

The structure of R&D employees and expenditures partially follows those of the Regional Innovation Index (RII) from 2019.

The regional GDP per capita shows the same order in both years: the Bucharest-Ilfov Region, the West Region, the Centre Region, followed by the others. We can see a parallel with this order and that of the Regional Innovation Index (RII) (*Figure 4a–b*).

Figure 4a. *GDP per capita (lei) in 2012*

In 2012, the highest share of innovative enterprises was registered in the South-East Region (36.48%) followed by the North-East Region (32.17%); however, the regional order changed in 2018: the highest became the Bucharest-Ilfov Region (25.47%) followed by the North-West Region (21.07%). In 2012, the share of innovative enterprises in all regions was above 12%, while in 2018 relatively low values were observed in the West Region (3.98%), the South-West Oltenia Region (4.42%), and the South – Muntenia Region (6.33%) (*Figure 5a–b*).

	15,000 – 25,000
	25,000 – 35,000
	35,000 – 45,000
	45,000 – 55,000
	55,000 – 120,000

Source: INSSE data[5]

Figure 4b. *GDP per capita (lei) in 2018*

	0 – 5
	5 – 10
	10 – 20
	20 – 30
	30 – 40

Figure 5a. *The share of innovative enterprises in Romanian regions in 2012*

Source: own calculation based on the INSSE database[6]

Figure 5b. *The share of innovative enterprises in Romanian regions in 2018*

Factors Influencing Regional R&D Employment and Expenditure

In the next part, we set up a Romanian county-level database to study the most significant influencing factors of regional R&D employment and expenditure. The data for the 1997–2018 period were taken from the National Statistical Institute, also including six indicators as follows:

1. regional R&D employees per 1,000 inhabitants (RDemp),
2. logarithmic values of regional R&D expenditure (RDexpt),
3. GDP per capita (in 1,000 lei) (GDPpc),
4. number of enterprises on 1,000 inhabitants (entrpc),
5. proportion of secondary school graduates from the total (educsec),
6. proportion of modern roads from the total (modinfr).

These indicators contain different characteristics of regional development: firstly the R&D dimension, secondly the economic development and entrepreneurial willingness, thirdly the education and entrepreneurial, and fourthly the regional infrastructure. We need to mention here that other regional indicators (as the proportion of tertiary graduates in education, the proportion of Internet users among the population, etc.) would have been useful in our estimation, but we omitted them due to lack of data for the studied period. Also

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6　　Data source: INO101C – Innovative and non-innovative enterprises; available at: http://statistici.insse.ro:8077/tempo-online/#/pages/tables/insse-table.

due to lack of data, Giurgiu, Ialomița, and Mehedinți counties were eliminated from the database (*Table 1*).

Dachin and Postoiu (2015) studied the Romanian county-level R&D expenditures in relation with the GDP per capita, using Pearson's correlation and confirming a direct link between them. Also, in Arbolino et al. (2019), the regional GDP per capita was included in their regional innovation's panel model.

In Roper and Love (2006), among other regional labour market indicators, the tertiary education level was included as explanatory among the firms' achieved innovation estimations, as well as in Zygmunt (2020). Similar to our data, in Arbolino et al. (2019), the regional proportion of micro-enterprises and of motorways was used as entrepreneurial and infrastructural variables.

The estimations were performed based on the final form of the panel database, containing 858 observations for the 39 counties and the span of 22 years (the 1997–2018 period) (*Table 1*).

Table 1. *The statistics of regional indicators*

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
RDexp	858	8.675876	2.0099	3.78419	14.33754
RDemp	858	1.381488	2.136829	.0021572	14.30862
GDPpc	858	16.55678	13.70346	.6843671	108.564
entrpc	858	17.93532	8.096328	6.366763	60.24409
educsec	858	42.15496	7.937213	18.24592	61.78968
modinfr	858	32.75466	16.47025	11.39169	100

Source: own calculation based on the INSSE database

Table 2. *The regional R&D employment and cost model statistics*

	Coefficients			
	Fixed-effects (within) regression	**Random-effects GLS regression**	**Fixed-effects (within) regression**	**Random-effects GLS regression**
Dependent	RDemp	RDemp	RDexp	RDexp
Variable				
RDemp			.258691***	.3345463***
GDPpc	-.0164201***	-.0220177***	-.0004744	-.0007774
entrpc	.0414945***	.0567405***	.0562351***	.0604068***
educsec	-.0117829***	-.0159419***	.0139609***	.0103363**
modinfr	.003447	.0061849**	.0945378***	.0930452***
_cons	1.292936***	1.197819***	-183.0691***	-180.0947***
F	106.54		170.66	
Prob > F	0.0000		0.0000	

	Coefficients			
	Fixed-effects (within) regression	Random-effects GLS regression	Fixed-effects (within) regression	Random-effects GLS regression
Wald chi2		48.12		904.66
Prob > chi2		0.0000		0.0000

Source: own calculation based on the INSSE database[7]

** Significant at the 0.05 level.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.

The regional R&D employment (RDemp) in the fixed-effects model is positively influenced by the number of enterprises per 1,000 inhabitants (entrpc) and negatively influenced by GDP per capita (GDPpc); the share of secondary school graduates (educsec) is at the 1% level. The random-effects model's results confirmed these results and also included the infrastructural indicator (share of modern roads, modinfr) at the 5% level (*Table 2*).

The regional R&D expenditure (RDexp) in the fixed effects-model is positively influenced by the regional R&D employment (RDemp), the number of enterprises per 1,000 inhabitants (entrpc), the share of secondary school graduates (educsec), and the share of modern roads (modinfr) at the 1% level. The random effects-model's results confirmed the above positive significant influencing factors, except for one difference: the educational indicator is significant at the 5% level (*Table 2*).

Discussions

The spatial analysis of Romanian regional R&D activities highlighted the concentration into the Bucharest-Ilfov Region, which seems to be an essential characteristic, as Dachin and Postoiu (2015) stated it. The high values of the regional innovation index in some regions seem to be related more to the economic development than to the innovation activities of the enterprises. This trend does not mean the lack of innovative opportunities in the counties placed in the low RII value regions. For example, the Ministry of Research, Innovation, and Digitalization has established and operates a wide network of innovation and technology transfer entities (technology incubators, IT centres, technology transfer centres in sectors such as energy, construction, food industry, biotechnology, tourism, environmental protection, and others) in 15 counties in Romania.[8]

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7   Data source: http://statistici.insse.ro:8077/tempo-online/#/pages/tables/insse-table.
8   Source: https://www.research.gov.ro/ro/articol/4728/sistemul-de-cercetare-infrastructuri-de-cercetare-infrastructura-de-inovare-si-transfer-tehnologic-entitati-de-inovare-si-transfer-tehnologic.

The regional GDP per capita has significant influence on regional R&D employment, but it does not have impact on the regional R&D costs. This could be interpreted to mean that the regional R&D activity does not depend on the economic development in a given county, but R&D employment is related to it. The importance of regional GDP per capita with regard to regional innovation performance was highlighted in Dachin and Postoiu (2015) and Arbolino et al. (2019).

The secondary education influences the regional R&D employment negatively in both models, but this is not the standard indicator used in literature, as the share of tertiary (higher) education was replaced by this indicator due to lack of data. As Roper and Love (2006) and Zygmunt (2020) suggest, tertiary education graduates are more appropriate explanatory variables for regional innovation. The role of education played in the regional R&D process could not be properly included in our estimations due to lack of data on the tertiary education level for the studied period (1997–2018).

The importance of infrastructure in regional economic development was studied in Györfy and Madaras (2017), where the proportion of modern roads in the counties of the Central Region was used, and in Arbolino et al. (2019), where the share of motorways in regions was assumed to have an impact on regional innovation. In the present estimation, the regional R&D employment and costs are also positively influenced by this infrastructural indicator although other R&D-related infrastructural indicators (Internet connection, entrepreneurship digitalization, etc.) were omitted from our database due to lack of data on the Romanian regions.

Our results highlight the importance of regional entrepreneurship with regard to R&D activity, as also found in Arbolino et al. (2019). Local firms may get involved in new product development research activities with local/academic institutes, as a public–private cooperation. The analysis of Romanian enterprises' innovation activity between 2012 and 2018 pointed out that the proportion of innovators has grown, as well as the cooperation with other companies or institutes, although there were several obstructive factors concerning innovation such as the lack of financial resources, of well-trained personnel, and others (Madaras 2020: 122–129).

Conclusions

Regional innovation index (RII) values and the spatial structure in the Romanian NUTS 2 regions in 2011 and 2019 were presented using the GIS technology. Regional innovation in Romania has significant spatial differences and, although it reveals a concentrated nature in the most developed regions, local examples of successful R&D cooperation could be found in all over the country. The GIS analysis of the Romanian regions indicates that R&D employment and expenditure and GPD per capita partially follow the RII's spatial distribution, while enterprises'

innovation activities are independent from them. The most outstanding position in terms of regional innovation in Romania was occupied by the Bucharest-Ilfov Region, and in 2019 the second and third places were taken by the West Region and the North-West Region.

The Romanian county-level R&D number of employees and the amount of expenditures were studied in a dataset including 39 counties for the 1997–2018 period. The results indicate a significant positive effect on R&D employment by the number of enterprises per 1,000 inhabitants and the share of modern roads and a negative effect by the regional GDP per capita and the share of secondary school graduates. As Roper and Love (2006) and Zygmunt (2020) indicate, regional innovation activity depends on tertiary graduates, but, due to lack of data on this indicator for the studied period, we made our estimation using the share of secondary graduates.

In the second estimation, regional R&D expenditures depended on R&D employees, the relative number of enterprises, the share of secondary graduates, and the share of modern roads – at the 1% significance level. Our results are in line with the findings of Żółtaszek and Olejnik (2017) and Arbolino et al. (2019) and suggest that the well-trained employees, the potential of private sector, the level of education, and the infrastructure lead to prosperous R&D activities in Romanian regions.

The limitations of this study are as follows: the Regional Innovation Scoreboard's methodology includes further dimensions such as lifelong learning, scientific activities, sales to new market segments, product innovations, etc., which – partially due to lack of data – were not included in our explanatory models of regional R&D activity. Future research needs to be performed to discuss all these features of innovation in the Romanian regions.

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Spatial Distribution of the Rural Development Programme in Relation to Population Retention between 2015 and 2019

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Abstract. The common agricultural policy accounts for more than 38% of the European Union's budget. In the 2014–2020 cycle, 8.9 billion euros went in Hungary to the first pillar and 4.1 billion euros to the second pillar for rural development, the mobilization of which was coordinated by the Rural Development Programme. The second pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy plays an important role in catching up with the lagging and depopulated Hungarian countryside. It serves key objectives such as sustainable environmental management, strengthening and diversifying the rural economy, or a fair standard of living. In my dissertation, I explore the territorial distribution of the payments of the rural development programme between 2015 and 2019 and how it affects unemployment and incomes.

Keywords: payments, development programme, income, unemployment, spatial distribution

Introduction

In the 2007–2013 programming period, Hungary prepared its first rural development programme within the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union, which contains a set of instruments for the agricultural priorities of the community. The New Hungary Rural Development Programme was used to schedule and draw on the resources of the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development. Grant items were identified along four priority axes. The first was to improve the competitiveness of agriculture and forestry, and the second was to preserve environmental sustainability and landscape character. The third axis was aimed at improving the quality of life in rural areas, making economic activities more colourful, and the fourth aimed at improving local employment and diversification.

At the end of the cycle, all payments will be drawn only by 2015. In the meantime, an agricultural policy for rural development from 2014 to 2020, based on the new foundations, began to be called the Rural Development Programme (RDP). Compared to its predecessor, grants can already be applied for via tenders. I would like to present the territorial distribution of the new programme and to get an answer to my hypothesis that these development resources contribute to the population retention force and the strengthening of regional incomes.

Theoretical Background

District System

According to Dr Mihály Burai, the district system is an important stage in the transformation of the territorial administration, the formation of the Good State, which appeared conceptually in the process of administrative policy strategic planning. After the abolition of districts dating back hundreds of years in 1983, the re-introduction of 'reinterpreted', geographically delimited territorial units aimed at the more efficient operation of the Hungarian administrative system. In the spirit of modern public administration, the district system has become an important institutional player in creating efficiency. At the same time, efficiency is not the only determining factor in the renewal of the territorial administration, as cost-saving and customer-oriented service provider attitudes are still requirements in the detailed rules of district design. As of 1 January 2013, district offices were established in Hungary as new administrative bodies, so the counties of Hungary would be divided into districts again after a 29-year break. Unlike before, the competence of district offices extends to all cities and villages, and in Budapest there are district offices with similar tasks in each district. Based on Urbánné Malomsoki et al. (2013), the districts started operating on 1 January 2013. Their organizational units are the district offices. 175 districts and 23 districts of the capital were established. Districts are the smallest territorial units of public administration operating within the system of government agencies. The seat of the district office is in the city designated as the seat of the district (Urbánné Malomsoki et al. 2013).

Based on the regional development and spatial planning objectives, the government organized the districts into three groups according to their beneficiaries. When classifying districts according to territorial development, it is necessary to take into account a complex indicator formed by social and demographic, housing and living conditions, local economy and labour market, as well as infrastructure and environmental indicators (four groups of indicators) (290/2014. (XI. 26.) Regulation, 2014).

1. Districts to be developed: within the beneficiary districts, those districts with the lowest complex indicator in which 15% of the cumulative population of the country live;
2. Beneficiary districts: districts with a complex indicator less than the average of the complex indicators of all districts;
3. Districts to be developed with a complex programme: within the beneficiary districts, those districts with the lowest complex indicator in which 10% of the country's cumulative population live.

Special Features of RDP

Within the Common Agricultural Policy, subsidies are divided into two pillars. The first pillar has been widely criticized for its interventionist, market-regulating policy and non-productivity-generating income replacement, leading to growing debate around it. Throughout its long history, the CAP accounts for almost 40% of the EU budget, with Pillar I accounting for 74%. We can say that the CAP system and its reforms are a strong buffer zone within the EU. Farmers prefer first-pillar direct payments, while others favour second-pillar rural development schemes that focus on the environment. The CAP reforms of recent decades have consistently led to a reduction in the overall budget, including a reduction in direct payments and an increase in the financial envelope of the second pillar. It has been calculated that the loss of Pillar II would lead to a 3.45% decrease in revenue for the more developed or more productive Member States, while a loss of 6.07 for the less developed countries such as Hungary. The loss of direct subsidies would affect the host society more severely than the loss of a possible second pillar, but in my view both are essential for catching up (Kiryluk–Dryjksa–Baer-Nawrocka 2019). In their study, Gohin and Zheng (2020) examine the impact of a measure halving direct payments. Production volume would show a negligible decrease (0.18%) with a slight increase in prices. $ 1,329 million would fall out of farmers' pockets, with negative welfare effects for European farmers. The non-farming European population and the US would be where there would be a slight increase in economic prosperity. In my opinion, this policy intervention, in particular the additional concentration of land on large estates, would lead to a reduction in the number of people living in the countryside and a decline in healthy food and short supply chains.

In addition to direct support, Bojnec and Fertő have also examined the effects of second-pillar rural development support at the NUTS 3 regional level in Hungary and Slovenia. An econometric and regression analysis explores the relationships between each pillar and the economic and social indicators it chooses. With regard to Pillar II, it has been noted that in Slovenia there is no correlation between employment data on family farms and rural development support, and paid workforce is further reduced even in the less-favoured areas, but other rural development support has a positive

effect. In Hungary, LFA subsidies and other rural development subsidies have a positive effect on the employment capacity of farms. The support of the second pillar is very important for the countryside but not for agricultural employment, which was also indicated by the low regression coefficient (Bojnec–Fertő 2021). No analysis has been carried out on rural development pillar support and the employment conditions of the rural population outside the agricultural sector.

The preparation of the Rural Development Programme is based on the national strategic development objectives set out in the Partnership Agreement, the draft National Development and Spatial Development Concept, and the National Rural Strategy. Each call for proposals was created along seven objectives, as the division by the previous item was rejected (Prime Minister's Office, 2014):

1. Preservation of the natural values and resources of our landscapes.
2. Diverse and viable agricultural production.
3. Food and food safety.
4. Providing the livelihood of rural economy, increasing rural employment.
5. Strengthening rural communities, improving the rural population's quality of life.
6. The overall objective of the strategy is to improve the population retention and the retention capacity of our rural areas through agricultural economics, rural development and environmental developments and interventions.
7. The strategic and professional goals of the strategy are considered during the planning of the RDP when selecting the national priorities and emphases of the EAFRD priorities and focus areas.

The objectives of the Rural Development Programme were delimited along six themes, breaking with the previous four (competitiveness, rural development, environment, and LEADER) priority axes (Reszkető 2015):

1. Knowledge transfer and innovation (Knowledge transfer 7 pcs + Innovation 2 pcs);
2. Agricultural production and food processing (Investments 7 pcs + Risk management and income stabilization 3 pcs + Environmental management 10 pcs + Quality systems and producer groups 3 pcs);
3. Forest management (Investment 8 pcs + Environmental management 3 pcs);
4. Development of rural areas (Local economic development 4 pcs + Local infrastructure and service development 3 pcs + LEADER 4 pcs);
5. Young farmer (2 pcs);
6. Short supply chain (2 pcs).

Countries of the European Union, the Member States, have the option to move money from one pillar to the other, up to a maximum of 15%. Most countries choose to move money from the first pillar to the second one; only five countries have chosen to transfer money from Pillar 2 to Pillar 1. So, on balance, almost 4 billion euros will be transferred from Pillar 1 to Pillar 2 during the 2014–2020 period. The European

Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), which is the funding instrument of the second pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union and one of the European Structural and Investment Funds, aims at strengthening the EU's agriculture, forestry sector, and rural areas in general (Financial Instruments, 2015). The Rural Development Programme (RDP) for Hungary was formally adopted by the European Commission on 10 August 2015 and last modified on 9 September 2019, outlining Hungary's priorities for using the 3.4 billion euros of EU budget money that is available for the 7-year period of 2014–2020 (European Commission 2019). Data on the amounts paid for the calls for proposals of the rural development programme were available to me for the period of 2015–2019. The selection of the CAP alternative measures by each Member State delays usually the start of the CAP implementation by one or two years. Member States have to construct their own CAP based on the EU CAP framework and choose from the different alternatives in order to adapt the CAP to their own requirements and environments, which is a really important aspect for agricultural sustainability (Mosquera–Losada et al. 2018). Based on the previous support methodology, i.e. the hand along the four axes, I systematized and grouped the payments of the calls for proposals. It also served to enable me to make a subsequent comparative analysis between the RDP and the New Hungary Rural Development Plan (NHRDP). I hypothesised that RDP payments have a linear effect on income and the unemployed, as objectives include priorities related to quality of life and increasing employment. In terms of territorial distribution, I believe that it focuses on the poorest areas of the country such as the Ózd area, Békés or Baranya County.

Data and Methods

During the spatial analysis, I examined at the district level which one is considered to be the LAU 1 territorial category according to the territorial statistical delimitation established by the European Union. Of the 175 districts established in 2013, Polgárd District was abolished by 2015, the area of which was annexed to Enying and Székesfehérvár districts. To set up more precise spatial relations, I excluded Budapest from the analysis, so I examined 173 districts. I requested the data on 2015–2019 from the Hungarian State Treasury, and then I aggregated them based on the axes of the previous cycle by merging the tender topics. Payments had not yet started in 2015, with most grants only starting in 2016 and data being available until 2019. Thus, I did not get the value of the amounts paid during the entire cycle. The four axes were subjected to a spatial autocorrelation analysis for the population. I also ran a summary analysis for the entire RDP, and I examined the effect of RDP on income and the unemployed using a linear regression analysis. By analysis of variance, I examined the correlation of district classifications by beneficiary in terms

of resources. To run these methodological analyses, I used GEODA and IBM SPSS, the former for map representation and autocorrelation and the latter for variance and regression analysis.

Analysis of Variance

Analysis of variance is a sample that explains a population that examines the effect of one or more independent variables on a dependent variable. It serves to explore the differences between population averages. ANOVA analysis of variance compares means with analysis of variance. The condition for performing the analysis is that the dependent variable must be measured at least on an interval scale. Another such factor is variance homogeneity, which means that the dependent variable must have the same standard deviation at different levels of the independent variable. The point is whether the independent variable has a detectable influence on the dependent. In our case, it is important to determine whether each district category is affected by the subsidies (Sajtos–Mitev 2007).

Linear Regression

The characterization of univariate linear regression is the relationship between an independent and a dependent variable along the regression line. The coefficient of determination, r2, shows how much the dependence on the independent variable explains the values of the dependent variable. If r2 approaches 0, then the independent does not explain the dependent, whereas if it approaches 1, the correlation is high. If there is a significant correlation between the two variables, but r2 is small, it means that other factors also play a role in determining the dependent variable. The simplest regression relationship between two variables is characterized by a straight line, suggesting a strong relationship (Csallner 2015).

Spatial Autocorrelation Analysis

Local Moran's I shows the relationship of the study area with its neighbours, so in areas with high values in the neighbourhood Moran's I shows whether this is typical or different (low) in the study area, and vice versa (Tóth 2003). In the case of the square grid-based neighbourhood, the names of the concepts were given based on chess pieces and their steps: bastion, runner, and queen. In our case, all directly contacting, neighbouring neighbours are involved in the neighbourhood (Tóth 2014). Therefore, it serves to map the neighbourhood relations between territorial units. It shows which areas are similar and which are not. Depending on the magnitude of the value, the strength of the similarity changes in a straight line: if the number is possibly negative, no correlation can be detected. The magnitude

of the values can be divided into two groups: high or low. Based on this, four values can come out due to the neighbourhood (Egri 2014).

1. High-High: Area units with high values for which the neighbourhood also has a high value;
2. High-Low: Area units with high values for which the neighbourhood has a low value;
3. Low-Low: Area units with low values where the neighbourhood also has a low value;
4. Low-High: Area units with low values for which the neighbourhood has a high value.

Results

Variance

Based on the significance level of the variance homogeneity, it can be said that the probability of agreement of variances within the group is only 0.1%, so the condition of identity is not met. Degree of freedom is the value by which we get the sum of squares of the difference between and within groups. According to Levene's test (*Table 1*), the standard deviation homogeneity was also not met due to its high value. So, we can state that the primary category in the allocation of resources did not cover the category of beneficiary in the given district.

Table 1. *Homogeneity of variance*

Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
5,557	3	170	.001

Source: author's calculation, 2021

In the first column of *Table 2*, we can see the sum of squares of the deviations, which are the squares of the total deviation. The degree of freedom column shows the degrees of freedom. Test F is the ratio of the squared deviation within and between groups, but the significance value is important, which, if below 0.05, is a reliable difference between the sub-averages of the categories.

Table 2. *Anova*

RDP/1,000 cap.	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sig.
Between groups	11,205	3	3,735	35,353	.000
Within groups	17,960	170	.106		
Total	29,165	173			

Source: author's calculation, 2021

Linear Regression
RDP – Income

Linear regression examines the strength of the relationship between numerical variables, i.e. how strong the correlation is between the independent and dependent variables. Considering the current situation, the correlation between the RDP / 1,000 capita and the Income / 1,000 capita indicator is medium (R^2 = 0.006), which does not show a relationship.

Table 3. *Model summary*

Model	R	R^2	Adjusted R^2	Std. error of the estimate	Change statistics				
					R square change	F change	df1	df2	Sig. F change
1	.075	.006	.000	0.0796	.000	.015	1	172	.000

Source: author's calculation, 2021

In the scatterplot diagram (*Figure 1*) below, I plotted the relationship between RDP resources and income. It appears that the values are not explicitly scattered along the regression line. In terms of income, Budakeszi, Dunaújváros, Szekszárd, Putnok, and a few other districts have the highest value. On the support side, the districts of Kiskőrös, Vásárosnamény, Fehérgyarmat, and the areas with typically higher agricultural values and higher values are scored high. The districts of Gyál, Mór, Szeged, and Keszthely have the lowest per capita income and the smallest amount of support. The highest are in Tiszafüred, Pannonhalma, and Záhony.

RDP – Unemployed

Table 4 shows that the relationship between the Unemployed / 1,000 capita and the RDP / 1,000 capita indicator is weak (R^2 = 0.153), as it is below 0.3. It can be deduced from this that the ratio of the amount paid to the RDP to the number of the unemployed was not actually related.

Table 4. *Model summary (RDP / 1,000 cap. – unemployed / 1,000 cap.)*

Model	R	R^2	Adjusted R^2	Std. error of the estimate	Change statistics				
					R square change	F change	df1	df2	Sig. F change
1	.391	.153	.148	0.3114	.149	.30.172	1	172	.000

*Source: author's calculation, 2021*

From the *Figure 2* diagram below, we can read that it is not possible to draw a regression line along which the individual districts would be scattered. In the worst case, there are passages located at the apex of the Y axis and close to the zero point of the X axis. I could mention Kazincbarcika, Ózd, Salgótarján, Bátonyterenye, Pásztó,

or even Tiszavasvár. The districts of Csornai, Téti, Sopron, Bicskei, and Gyula are in the best position, where support is high and unemployment is low.

**Figure 1.** *Distribution of income and RDP payments*

Figure 2. *Distribution of the unemployed and RDP payments*

Spatial Autocorrelation Analysis

By performing the analysis, the districts were grouped based on their neighbourhood conditions. I ran this on all 4 axes as well as the total RDP. The data are divided into four categories based on their neighbourhood, which are clearly visible on the maps.

Competitiveness Axis

By accumulating the sum of the above-mentioned competitiveness titles, I created the database that forms the basis of the map shown here (*Figure 3*). The sources of competitiveness with high values in the Trans-Tisza region were in the districts of Vásárosnamény, Fehérgyarmat, Csenger, Mátészalka, Baktalórántháza, Hajdúböszörmény, and in the south in Hódmezővásárhely. In the Kecskemét, Kalocsa, and Jánoshalma districts between the Danube and the Tisza, the value of the given district and those around it is also high. It can be faintly shown that in a kind of north-east-south-west direction are those who have received the least from this form of support. From Pápa District to Salgótarján District, they did not primarily benefit from the rural development programme's competitiveness support, which is not due to their development or underdevelopment but mainly to their geographical location, as this axis is primarily aimed at developing agricultural production. Rarely are there districts where their own value is low but those of around them are higher, such as the districts of Makó, Kunszentmiklós, Kiskunhalas, and Tolna. To the north, the districts of Tiszavasvár, Hajdúhadház, and Kemecse also belong here.


Source: author's creation, 2021

Figure 3. *Distribution of the competitiveness axis payments*

Rural Development Axis

These efforts are not aimed primarily at developing agriculture but at the everyday lives of people living in the countryside and improving their quality of life. There are also eight districts that did not receive funds for rural development – these are mostly the Budapest metropolitan area and Várpalota District. The individual focal points where resources have been concentrated in development policy are clearly outlined. Four key integrations emerge, one of which is in the Borsod Basin, formed by the districts of Szikszó and Encs. The districts of Vásárosnamény, Csenger, Fehérgyarmat, Záhony, Kisvárda, Mátészalka, and Nyírbátor are not far from it, where the concentration of resources of the rural development axis is also high. In the eastern half of the country, there is another high-high cluster around Püspökladány and Berettyóújfalu. For the last major region, we need to look to the west of the country. One is in the territory of the country bordering Croatia, which consists of the districts of Siklós, Sellye, Barcs, Szigetvár, and Hegyhát. There are several districts around the otherwise beneficiary areas, which have a low value of their own, but the surrounding ones are high – these are the districts of Sárospatak, Tabi, Dombóvár, Bonyhád, Szentlőrinc, and Bóly. Rarely highlighted points in the country, such as Mezőkovácsháza and Pásztó, too, the Central Hungarian Region and its neighbours are typically not the main beneficiaries of the resources. There are two larger clusters among those with low-low neighbourhoods: in the east from Pétervásárai to Szarvasi and in the south in the Bicske, Veszprém, and Dunaújváros triangles.


Source: author's creation, 2021

Figure 4. *Distribution of the rural development axis payments*

Environment Axis

Under the third axis, the protection of the environment was supported during the development package. The protection of grasslands and forest areas, gene conservation and other environmental protection includes tender payments, which also greatly influences the territorial distribution. The map (*Figure 5*) below shows well which districts are the ones where larger sums have been paid in proportion to the population. A north–south line is nicely drawn in the area of the Great Plain, which starts above with the grassy steppe of Hortobágy, through Nagykunság and Nagy-Sárrét, all the way to the northern region of Viharsarok. These districts are Mezőcsát, Tiszafüred, Balmazújváros, Hajdúböszörmény, Hajdúszoboszló, Püspökladány, and Szeghalom. Another such high-high zones are the districts of Csenger, Fehérgyarmat, and Mátészalka or Kecskemét, Kiskőrös, Kiskunmajsa, Kunszentmiklós, and Kalocsa in Kiskunság. It has a low value from Tata to Ózd. There are also outstanding areas in themselves, where the value of the given district is high and that of the neighbours is low, such as the Bicske and Székesfehérvár districts. In the low-high value areas, i.e. where the own value is low but that of its neighbours is above average, there are districts as Derecskei, Baktalórántháza, Hajdúhadháza, Nagykőrös, Kiskunfélegyháza, Jánoshalma, and Téti.

Environment Axis
- Not Significant (137)
- High-High (15)
- Low-Low (13)
- Low-High (7)
- High-Low (2)

Source: author's creation, 2021

Figure 5. *Distribution of the environment axis*

LEADER + HRN Axis

LEADER + HRN (Hungarian Rural Network) is a community initiative that aims to put the principle of subsidiarity into practice, i.e. local people can have a say

in the territorial distribution of resources. The areas are run by so-called LEADER Local Action Groups (LAGs), which do not have district status (administrative unit status), so a LAG has municipalities rather than districts. The Körös-Sárrét Rural Development Association, which includes 22 settlements, belongs to a development group that is part of Szeghalom District on the map. A significant part of the payments from the surrounding districts is concentrated in Szeghalom settlements because not the entire area of the surrounding districts belongs to the targeted, more backward settlements; therefore, in my opinion, their distribution should be examined most at the settlement level. There are even more significant districts, such as Miskolc and Eger, and significant areas on the western border of the country, in the Barcs, Marcali, and Tabi districts, and insular ones in the districts of Székesfehérvár and Tata. Six districts do not receive such payments at all.

<div align="right">*Source: author's creation, 2021*</div>

Figure 6. *Distribution of LEADER + HRN axis*

Complete Rural Development Programme

Figure 7 shows the territorial distribution of the amounts paid during the entire cycle of the Széchenyi 2020 Rural Development Programme, with the help of which the individual development nodes can be clearly seen. Based on their neighbourhood, the beneficiaries are the districts of Mátészalka, Csenger, Fehérgyarmat, Vásárosnamény, Kisvárda, Záhony, Cigánd, Sárospatak, Sátoraljaújhely, Gönc, and their surroundings; in Hortobágy, the districts of Balmazújváros, Hajdúszoboszló, Püspökladány, Karcag, and their surroundings and the area of Kalocsa District in Kiskunság. There are also scattered insular places where the indicator used for territorial distribution is as high as for Bicskei District or as low as for Kiskunhalas,

Pécs, or Szentlőrinc. It is interesting that the lines of the motorways starting from Budapest stand out. To the east, there is the M3, to the south the M5, and to the west the M1 and M7. These areas have benefited less from RDP payments. In this context, it is interesting that Nógrád County is not exactly the target of the developments despite having significant economic and social problems.

Complete Rural Development Programme
- Not Significant (127)
- High-High (17)
- Low-Low (26)
- Low-High (3)
- High-Low (1)

Source: author's creation, 2021

Figure 7. *Complete rural development programme*

Conclusions

I have come to the conclusion that there is no significant correlation between the amount of funds paid for rural development and the beneficiary classification. I looked at whether there was a link between income, the number of the unemployed, and RDP resources, as a result of which I found a weak correlation, i.e. subsidy amounts did not significantly affect unemployment and income developments, as they were also affected by many other factors, which confirms the findings of Bojnec and Fertő regarding the second pillar support of the CAP. There are significant differences between the four axes obtained after the aggregation of the RDP's topic groups, which is due to the area-specific directions; however, it can be stated that they did not focus on the Central Hungarian Region and its wider agglomeration. The sources of competitiveness fell mainly on Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County and between the Danube and the Tisza. In terms of rural development, the area of Szabolcs, the areas of Baranya County, which are struggling with serious economic and social problems, and the Borsod Basin in the North Hungarian Mountains have also emerged. In connection with environmental protection claims, the

most financed points from the EU fund are the central areas of the Great Plain, the Sár-meadow region, the districts of Kiskunság, and the fruit-growing region in the eastern part of Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County. In terms of LEADER + HRN resources, only a few significant points emerge in a few larger districts. Regarding the entire RDP, the most interesting part is the low-subsidized one, which roughly follows the trace of the motorways spreading from Budapest.

My hypothesis was partially confirmed because I proved the existence of the relationship, although it is very weak and many other, more emphasized factors also have an impact on profitability and employment. The distribution confirmed that the districts of Baranya County are beneficiaries and some of Békés County are also beneficiaries. But, unfortunately, Ózd is not among the beneficiaries at all, which is quite surprising.

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Vision and Market Segmentation in Urban Strategy through Marketing Approach: A Case Study of Sumy City

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Abstract. Competition for all kinds of resources has started among the Ukrainian cities and first of all for human capital. Therefore, a proper strategic planning is the uppermost priority for local governments. In this paper, the vision and market segmentation of the adopted strategy for the socio-economic development of the Ukrainian city of Sumy is analysed using the comparative method and content analysis. It aims to demonstrate that the city marketing approach towards strategy creation helps to make the strategy more concrete and visible. Existing city marketing strategies of Helsinki, Whitehorse, and North Port were used for comparison.

Keywords: urban strategy, city marketing, vision, market segmentation, target audience

Introduction

The main issue for the Ukrainian municipalities these days is their inability to comprehend how they are losing an enormous amount of human resources. Moreover, it is still not clear for them that competition for all kinds of resources has already started both inside and outside the country. A low standard of living and ongoing military conflicts make people search for higher-income opportunities. According to the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, the number of Ukrainians who are permanently employed abroad is 3.2 million. This is 18% of the total labour force of the country (Вінокуров 2019).

At the same time, according to The Global Competitiveness Index 4.0 (World Economic Forum 2019: 13), Ukraine occupies the 85th position among the total of 141 countries. It is the least competitive state after Moldova among the neighbouring countries. By competitiveness, we mean the country's productivity, which eventually leads to economic growth and the rise of human well-being (Cann 2017).

After the decentralization process and budgetary reform in 2015, Ukrainian cities received more resources and, consequently, power in determining their future (for comparison, the development budget of Sumy city for 2013 was 60 million UAH, and for 2016 it increased to 600 million) (Корнієнко 2020). Therefore, the municipality should have a clear vision of city marketing and development strategy in order to raise the city's competitiveness level. The attractiveness and investment potential of the settlement can and must be distributed by the efforts and cooperation of the local public administration and all the stakeholders.

Objective and Methodology

The objective of the paper is to demonstrate that the city marketing approach towards strategy creation, which includes market segmentation, helps to make the strategy more concrete and visible.

Research questions:
– Does city marketing strategy have a clearer semantic kernel than the socioeconomic one?
– Does the city marketing approach in strategy planning assist in detailed market segmentation and help to avoid generalization?

To answer the questions of the research, it was decided to analyse vision array and market segmentation in the developed and adopted strategy aimed at the socio-economic development of the city of Sumy. This is carried out with the help of content analysis of the strategy's vision and comparison of market segmentation with others in the city marketing strategies. The possibility to compare socio-economic strategies with city marketing ones is justified by the common intended output of both types of strategies: human well-being.

To analyse the vision of the strategies, the method of content analysis was chosen (Брянцева 2010: 69–81). A good example of content analysis of the strategies was observed in the article of Bokeriya S., Kerner E., and Kuznetsova D., *Analysis of Russian and US Arctic Strategies*, the methodology of which was chosen as a benchmark.

The indicator of the analysis is the frequency of the words. The online tool Advego is used for this purpose, as it automatically counts (the most frequently used) keywords in the provided text. The keywords are grouped by the author according to their meanings, e.g. words like 'space', 'neighbourhood', and 'access' belong to the group 'Infrastructure and urban planning'; 'Target group' includes such words as 'community', 'locals', 'students', etc. This grouping gives an understanding of the main strategic focus of each city. It can also be called a definition of the text's semantic kernel.

The comparison will be made in a cross-sectional framework, where target audiences in the cities' strategies will be compared. The benchmark city marketing strategies were selected by the author and include Helsinki, Whitehorse, and North Port. The chosen cities vary in the amount of population, geographical location, and level of economic development. Nevertheless, the choice is explained by a swell in population and the forecast of its further growth in these cities, which gives reason to consider the strategic planning of their local governments as effective and efficient.

Limitations of the Research

In the present research, the author does not analyse the strategies in their entirety but only the vision array and parts carrying information on the target groups. Therefore, the results of the comprehensive content analysis (semantic kernel), of the whole strategy would be different and lead to different conclusions.

Sumy's Economic Profile

There are nine economic regions in Ukraine. The city of Sumy is part of the Northeast Economic Region, which consists of the Poltava, Sumy, and Kharkiv administrative regions (*Figure 1*). The most developed industries of the Northeast Economic Region are mechanical engineering and metalworking, a significant share of which falls to the military-industrial complex. The second and third places are occupied by the consumer and food industries respectively, followed by the chemistry, petrochemistry, and building materials industry.

Source: uk.wikipedia.org and own inscriptions

Figure 1. *Northeast Economic Region of Ukraine*

Currently, the main problem for this economic region is the long border (over 600 km) with the Russian Federation. The military conflict in the Donbas region and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 became governing factors of the deterioration of trade relations. Moreover, it is considered to be a potential zone for further conflict development. Sumy is a regional centre of the Sumy Region located in the north-eastern part of the country. The population of the city is above 250,000, of which 100,000 constitute the labour force (40 per cent of the population). In addition, 30,000 students live in the settlement (12 per cent).

There are 3,050 active enterprises on the territory of the city: 4 large, 136 medium-sized, and 2,910 small. They include Concern Nicmas (manufacturer of drill collars and pipes), Sumy NPO (manufacturer of machinery and equipment for special purposes), Kusum Pharm (producer of pharmaceuticals), Limited Liability Company (LLC) 'Horobyna' (producer of alcoholic beverages), etc. There is also an economic cluster specialized in the manufacturing of packaging materials and closures, which is composed of LLC 'Gualapack Ukraine', LLC 'Guala Closures Ukraine', and the joint-stock company 'Technologia' (Invest in Sumy, 2020). The latter one is the leader among the Sumy enterprises in products sold for export. Throughout 2018, enterprises products sold and services for UAH 51.3 billion (EUR 1.5 billion) (Сумська міська рада 2019).

In 2019, the city council approved Sumy Development Strategy 2030. In the foreword, the mayor of the city, Oleksandr Lysenko, mentioned the state of competitiveness among settlements, which carries hope for the switch in the local government's vector of development: 'After all, everyone understands perfectly well that in the XXI century we are competing not only with cities within Ukraine, we are competing with the whole world. Therefore, it was important to properly formulate our priorities, strategic and operational goals' (Сумська міська рада 2019).[1]

The methodology of strategy creation was developed by the European Union as an instrument of development strategy planning and implementation (the researched strategy does not provide reference to the methodology description). It included opinion surveys, strategic sessions, and public hearings.

The strategy's paragraph on the investment potential of the city includes information on the project Сумський Бізнес Хаб (Sumy Business Hub). It intends to help entrepreneurs to cooperate, study, and exchange knowledge and experiences. The Hub has no website and can be accessed exclusively through its Facebook group. This project was created under the guidance of Sumy State University, what also explains the presence of the University's programme promotions in the news feed of the group. The researcher contacted eight owners of small businesses in Sumy, and none of them has ever heard about this project nor participated in its programmes.

In April 2020, the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine agreed on the allocation

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1   The quotation was translated by the author.

of cc. UAH 39 million of state funding over five years for the development of the Sumy Industrial Park territory (*Figure 2*), a concept already approved by the city council of Sumy (Кудлай 2020). The announced period of operation of the park is 30 years. On its territory of 17.5 ha, up to 1,050 jobs will be created according to preliminary calculations. The priority types of economic activity include the production of light metal packaging, components for cars, in particular electrical equipment and devices, the production of plastic products, and the food industry.

Figure 2. *The territory of Sumy Industrial Park*

Theoretical Framework: The City's Marketing Approach

'A strategy is about being different.'
Michael B. Porter

Early in this century, municipalities were perceived by citizens only as the organ of operational problem solving. Over and above, nowadays they handle the social and economic life of the city, a healthy living environment, and the welfare of the population. Local government officials as the chief executives and representatives

of cities' interests are the first ones who have a stake in the advantages brought by strategic planning, considering that 'the role of the political personality is strengthening' (Kis 2018: 84).

The overall success of the settlement directly depends on its economic prosperity. Therefore, urban development strategies always include an increase in direct foreign investments based on competitiveness, the creation of a sustainable environment, the construction of a strong local society, the support of high export of the local producers, etc. Lately, cities have started to create not only general development strategies but also marketing ones.

First, Martin Boisen brings up the question of a theoretical duality of city marketing, as scientists and practitioners have a different approach to it: 'A scientist looks at city marketing as a specific way in which cities react to a perceived state of inter-urban competition, whereas a practitioner looks at city marketing as a specific tool-box from which specific managerial practices can be employed' (Boisen 2007: 8).

Practitioners in the US have used city marketing since the 19th century (Ward 1998: 27–28). At that time was the visual identity of New York made ('I Love NY'). In 1990, the fundamental work of G. Ashworth and Jan Hendrik Voogd, *Selling the City: Marketing Approaches in Public Sector Urban Planning*, was published; the authors were one of the first who focused on the development and promotion goals of European cities. In 1992, J. van der Meer published his work *The Role of City Marketing in Urban Management*, in which the city was presented as a product offered to the target groups. Therefore, from a conceptual point of view, city marketing turned out to be the closest to the sociology of rational choice.

The work *Broadening the Concept of Marketing* by Kotler and Levy (1969) created the very first theoretical concept of place marketing and proposed to imply the marketing concept to non-business entities as well. As Gabriela Cecilia Stănciulescu hits the mark later: 'Marketing should not be exclusively the advantage of the private sector' (Stănciulescu 2009: 115).

After the place marketing concept had spread around the world, a lot of cities implemented it into their policies. In most cases, the concept was narrowed to the visual place branding (creation of logos and slogans) and promotion activities. The latter, as a rule, had a single goal – city visual brand awareness. But it goes far beyond and comprises economic, social, infrastructural, etc. dimensions. Above all, the so-called 'waste strategies' became a widespread phenomenon (Metaxas 2005: 49). They are made mostly for the sake of appearance and are partially implemented with no evaluation whatsoever.

Using a general simplified definition of strategy as a detailed plan for achieving success (Cambridge University Press), the author aims to adhere to the idea of its universal nature. The public sector started to borrow the managerial approaches from the business field in the 80s and the 90s – the scientific literature calls it new public management. It was an effective response to the crisis of the bureaucratic

administration model in many countries (Osborne–Gaebler 1992). Alongside performance measurement and result-oriented attitude, public administration began to plan with a long-term perspective. At the same time, we should not disregard the major difference between the goals of business strategy and the urban one. In the first case, companies see the result in the profit, whereas in the second case this is well-being (it is a direct consequence of superior economic performance). It causes huge difficulties in the evaluation of city strategies and their effectiveness considering the complexity of the 'welfare' concept and its numerical representation.

One of the most widespread ideas in business strategic planning belongs to Michael B. Porter. To sum up his keynote speech on strategy held at the event organized by the Institute for Competitiveness in India, the worst mistake one can make in terms of strategy is attempting to compete with rivals on the same dimension (*Keynote on Strategy* by Michael Porter, professor, Harvard Business School, 2017). In the 'urban world', it is impossible to be 'the best' among the cities – even considering the existence of various ratings – because each settlement serves its own audience and has its unique structure. The components of the city's audience are quite similar: residents, businesses, migrant workers, students, investors, and tourists (in some particular cases, we can add patients if the city is famous for its therapeutic potential). In each case, the profile of the resident or the investor will be different, and, therefore, it is necessary to conduct research and clearly understand who you serve. The only way to be 'the best' is to compete with your performance evaluation by your target audiences over the years.

The above idea can be supported by Erik Braun's integrated approach to city marketing: 'the core idea of marketing is to think in terms of wants and needs of the (potential) customers'. Thus, the philosophy of his work introduced the societal marketing concept based on city marketing; so, it may be called customer-oriented. Therefore, it is not only about infrastructure, urban planning, or economic development, but it is first about people, their needs and demands.

From another point of view, not every stakeholder is competent enough regarding strategic management or urban development issues and, therefore, cannot effectively influence the process. This approach can equal a national vote. It is fair enough to state that the majority of the society is not educated in political and social sciences, but this does not give grounds for depriving them of a voting right. It is an archaic way of thinking and has nothing in common with today's civic engagement and breakthrough in the equality of humans.

To sum up, the core function of city marketing is to identify and analyse the expectations of target groups regarding their settlement and to assess the possibilities of their satisfaction with actual resources.

Structure and Content Analysis of Vision in the Selected Strategies

The Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies defines strategy vision as 'a dream or picture of what the city wants to look like in the future to achieve its potential. A vision is the overall image of what the community wants to be at some point in the future.' The main accent should be made on the presence of 'community' in the provided definition and the importance of its participation in all stages of planning (Institute for Housing 2017).

In *Table 1*, the semantic kernel of four strategies is presented, which consists of the most frequently used words (keywords) and/or phrases in the text. The author introduces the first seven keywords in *Table 1*.

In the case of Helsinki (population c. 630,000), the capital of Finland, we can see that 'indicator' becomes the most widespread word, which along with the word 'performance' shows us the importance of further analysis of the strategy performance and effectiveness (Brand New Helsinki 2016). For example, if we look at the objective 'build our future vision and strengthen local pride', the performance indicators consist of image surveys with residents, usability assessment of marketing tools, and media monitoring. Marketing strategy evaluation remains the most difficult stage in the strategy 'lifecycle', wherefore it is necessary to define the evaluation mechanisms during the planning phase.

Whitehorse is a Canadian city located in the Yukon Territory (population c. 27 thousand). The semantic kernel of its strategy ('community', 'citizen', 'government') highlights the community-oriented approach of the document and mostly belongs to the 'target group' (City of Whitehorse Marketing Strategy 2013). We can also see a huge emphasis on 'access', what can be explained by the remote location of the city from the most vivid (culturally and economically) Saskatchewan, Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec provinces and also by a relatively small population. As noted before, Sumy faces the same geographic situation, and it has likewise listed 'accessibility' among the major points.

The strategy of the American city of North Port, Florida State (population c. 69 thousand) concentrates on community and its values ('target group'), planning and branding (2011–2013 Strategic Marketing Plan City of North Port, Florida 2011). The brand promotion was made part of the marketing strategy, where the community element shows the importance of 'brand ambassadors' (usually locals who share the positive messages about the settlement).

The case city of the article, Sumy, shows the most neutral semantic kernel, where the 'target group' is outside the kernel, but it still prevails in the marketing strategies. Meanwhile, 'economics' appeared for the first time in this research as a keyword. The conclusion can be made that the creators of Sumy's strategy see economics in and of itself as a source of its improvement, while in other strategies

collaboration with the community, accessibility, and brand are considered to be some of the basic layers of economic development. Above all, in Sumy's strategy alone, two adjectives became part of the vision's semantic kernel.

Table 1. *Semantic kernel of the strategies*

City	Title of the vision array	Number of symbols	Semantic kernel	Grouping
Helsinki	City marketing objectives and performance indicators	5,281	indicator	Evaluation
			business	Target group
			event	Promotion
			marketing organization	Planning
			performance	Planning
			development	Evaluation
				Planning
Whitehorse	Objective hierarchy and market positioning	6,234	access	Infrastructure
			community	Target group
			citizen	Target group
			government	Target group
			space	Infrastructure
			value	Neutral
			wilderness	Promotion
North Port	Focus, objectives, and goals	3,405	community	Target group
			marketing	Research
			plan	Planning
			brand	Promotion
			strategy	Planning
			help	Neutral
			community values	Target group
Sumy	Vision and mission	11,618	development	Planning
			governance	Planning
			life	Neutral
			economics	Neutral
			necessary	Neutral
			level	Neutral
			effective	Neutral

Source: own elaboration

Market Segmentation

As K. Rozhkov points out quite accurately, answers along the line of 'city for people' to the question 'For whom is the city?' will not be sufficient for a marketer (Рожков 2015: 84). Marketing practitioners need a detailed market segmentation to plan as precisely as possible and meet the needs of various consumers.

Market segmentation is one of the main features of city marketing strategy. It divides the entire consumer market into groups so as to be able to communicate with them and meet their specific wants and needs. Like in the business world, you must know who your (potential) buyers are.

According to Kotler et al. (1993: 21–27), the city's target audiences include visitors, residents, and working population, enterprises and industries and the foreign markets. The most detailed classification of city marketing target groups is proposed by I. Tózsa (2011: 19–20). They include the local population, managers (operators), investors, migrant workers, university students, patients, and tourists. It is important to mention that the order of the groups presented above is structured by the priority principle. The local population is always the first to satisfy, as they are an inevitable part of the city's competencies. The fact that managers occupy a higher position than investors is explained by the communication process between them. The managers are the people who work as 'filters' for the decision makers. Their subjective perception of the place undoubtedly influences the report and presentation of the location to the investor.

In this work, we will operate with the following target audiences of the city:

1) **Local population** (residents, locals, citizens): people who permanently reside in the settlement, usually work and pay taxes (does not refer to the underaged and elderly population). The author would like to raise the question for further research as to whether the fact of not paying taxes excludes homeless people from the 'local' group. In this study, we will not do that, guided by the concept 'right to the city' of H. Lefebvre. Some practitioners also make a distinction between low-cost and high-cost residents: low-cost are those people who provide a net profit for public revenues, and high-cost are those who consume more social services than they pay in taxes and fees for using public services.

2) **Business owners**: people, mostly residents, who have officially registered enterprises in the city and who pay taxes.

3) **Investors:** can be city locals or outsiders who are interested in a range of investment capabilities, e.g. investing in the development of the settlement and/or its enterprises, buying real property or municipal bonds, etc.

4) **Managers** (operators): employees of investors, whose obligations include collection of information, report preparation, analysis of the prospective investment projects and their evaluation. Managers are important for the city because their perception of the place and their conclusions about it directly influence the decision-making process of the investor.

5) **Migrant workers**: people who are employed in the city but reside in a different settlement. As a rule, this type of workers commutes daily.

6) **Students**: people who study at the educational institutions located on the territory of the settlement. Institutions include not only universities but boarding schools (e.g. sports), vocational training schools, conservatories, etc.

7) Tourists: short-term or long-term visitors of the city who reside in another settlement. The purposes of their visit can vary from sightseeing and event attendance to business.

8) Patients: visitors of the city who arrive with the purpose of medical treatment or check-up. This group is especially important for the places with unique treatment facilities (for example, Budapest is rich in thermal water, or Istanbul and Seoul, which are famous for plastic surgery facilities).

The importance of thorough market segmentation is explained by the different demands of the target audiences. It goes without saying that some demands can overlap. For example, each target group is interested in a safe and clean environment.

There are three types of segmentation strategies: concentrated, differentiated, and undifferentiated (Ashworth–Voogd 1988). The first type of strategy concentrates on one target group, the second one is focused on several groups, but it has a tailored approach to each of them, and the third one also encompasses more than one target audience – nevertheless, it has a 'one size fits all' approach.

In *Table 2*, we can see the target audiences defined in each researched strategy. The cities of Helsinki, Whitehorse, and North Port simultaneously outline residents and tourists as their customers. Whitehorse's strategy is the narrowest one in the sense of targeting, as far as it is explained by the limited resources and attempt to focus on the most important customers. Helsinki defines very peculiar target audiences such as potential start-uppers or business decision makers, who usually make part of a 'business' or 'investor' audience. Nevertheless, it gives the researcher a reason to expand Tózsa's list of the target group and add start-uppers as a unique group, which combines features of innovators, businesspersons, and potential investors. North Port has the most classical but short market segmentation (explained by the absence of 'students', 'investors' and their 'operators'). However, the author does not agree with the definition of the 'stakeholders' group, as stakeholders of the city – according to Freeman and Reed – are the residents, the government, and the business sphere. In other words, the stakeholders are the members of the entity, whose support and activities make it functional. Therefore, without them, the entity ceases to exist (Freeman–Reed 1983: 88–106). In the case of North Port, the stakeholders were limited to municipal officials and staff and community organizations.

The situation is more interesting with Sumy's development strategy, as there is no concrete market segmentation, but there is the repeatedly used term 'concerned parties' (in Ukrainian: зацікавлені сторони). Keeping in mind that stakeholders are a synonym of the latter, it is to be substituted hereafter. According to the strategy, stakeholders include city council representatives, business associations, universities, and the civilian sector. Interestingly, each target group is perceived as an institution ('university' instead of 'student', 'business association' instead of 'business owner'), which gives grounds for talking about the institutionalization of Sumy's political decision-making processes. It contradicts current global practices

when central and local governments go beyond the 'institution-based approach' in governance and prioritize interpersonal communication.

Figure 3. *Target groups of the researched strategies*

Conclusions

1. The visions of Sumy's socio-economic development strategy are vague. The semantic kernel of the vision array within the strategy does not provide a clear understanding of the strategy's focus and goals. It allows presuming that a strategy consists of a standard set of phrases and does not tackle specific problems of the city or take up challenges compared to Helsinki (start-up, business, event management) or Whitehorse (accessibility). The strategies created with the city marketing approach have a more specific semantic kernel than the ones without it.

2. As regards target audiences addressed in Sumy's strategy: they are considered as institutions but not as individuals, which gives grounds for talking about the institutionalization of governance and the generalization of the terms as a counterbalance to a customer-oriented approach. It makes the target groups of the strategy not explicit. The presence of clearly defined target groups in the researched city marketing strategies influences the content of the document and makes it sounder and more valid. The categorization of the city's customers provided by Kotler and Tózsa does not correspond to the groups addressed in Sumy's strategy.

3. Ostensibly, Sumy's development strategy does not pay much attention to the city's target audiences and accountability towards them. It is logical to turn

stakeholders into partners, but it is mistakenly understood that partnership is about compliance. A partnership has to be reciprocal and built on lasting cooperation, not only on the stage of creation. It is crucial to set objectives of the city's development that are supported by target groups. This support is vital for the long-term success of the strategy. Therefore, it is recommended that stakeholders' participation in the implementation of the strategy has a place in the vision formulated in the document.

In conclusion, strategies created through the marketing approach (Helsinki, Whitehorse, and North Port) have a clearer focus on vision and detailed market segmentation, which makes the document more intelligible and achievable.

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The Use of Language in the Making of Romanian Nationalism from Dimitrie Cantemir and Mihai Eminescu to the Iron Guard and National Communism

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Abstract. This article explores the role that language played in the development of national identity in Romanian cultural discourses from the writings of Dimitrie Cantemir in the 18th century to those of Mihai Eminescu in the second part of the 19th century. The article also makes use of the theories of Daco-Roman continuity and the theory of Latin descent. Seen in relation to the Latinization of Romanian that occurred in the 18th and the 19th centuries, these concepts are considered as contributing to the emergence of the so-called Romanian exceptionality. Cantemir's and Eminescu's writings are analysed in relation to the rise of fascism in interwar Romania as well as to the transformation of internationalist communism into nationalism after the purges of the 1950s and the re-orientation of the Romanian socialist regime towards the Right. The use of language for political purposes is ultimately considered as one of the elements that contributed to the hold that fascism and nationalism had on the Romanian psyche, so much so that nationalism survived (and was indeed boosted) throughout the socialist period and into post-socialism. The article concludes that this has contributed to the ongoing identity crisis of the national self-image and will continue to do so in the 21st century.

Keywords: nationalism, fascism, Romania, Eminescu, Cantemir, Codreanu, communism, Iron Guard, Ceauşescu

Introduction – What Is a 'Nation'?

As Friedrich Nietzsche observed vis-à-vis our relationship with the past in his essay *Uses and Abuses of History for Life*, 'We are the outcome of earlier generations, we are also the outcome of their aberrations, passions and errors, and indeed of their crimes; it is not possible wholly to free oneself from this chain.' To remedy this wrong, the philosopher suggests that 'we give [ourselves], as it were aposteriori, a past in which one would like to originate in opposition to that in which one did originate' (Nietzsche 1997: 76). Despite Nietzsche's positive intent, this effort also means that modernity would prefer to construct its own version of history, or histories, rather than accept the past *qua* past and that there are as many different histories as we have time to spin them in the form of self-spun tales.

The concept of self-spun tales belongs to historian Paul Cohen, who believes that 'narrativizing', or, as he puts it, 'spinning tales' out of the events we experienced at one point in our lives is the primary method through which we make sense of the past. Just as the Chinese who rebelled against foreign spheres of influence in 1901 were unaware of their participation in an event later called the Boxer Rebellion or as soldiers in 1914 did not know that they were fighting in World War I (Cohen 1998: 8) history is only written — as Nietzsche would put it — a posteriori. That does not only mean that history is written after the events which it narrates but that the narration of the events themselves is influenced by the point of view of the person narrating them. Extrapolating, Cohen argues that in our attempt to 'make sense' of what has happened to and before us, we reconstitute and resituate events from the exclusive perspective of the present moment.

If we are to believe Nietzsche and Cohen, it would not be far-fetched to argue that modernity, through the notion of progress it puts forward, represents the negation of its own existence in that in order to achieve the progress it seeks, modernity has to continually destroy the little progress it has made. What this view of history also implies is that in order to uphold modernity's premises, we necessarily lose sight of real history. Singled out as a contradiction by both Koselleck and Adorno, this leads one to see modernity as intrinsically and immediately dependent on its own continuous violent destruction, as evident in the amount of energy necessary to sustain it.

To better understand the effects of modernization on history, it is worth looking briefly at the main theories of modernization, which tried to make sense of the past by investigating the processes responsible for the emergence of nationalism. For all their complex and long-winded history, the theories of nationalism fall roughly into two camps. What I call 'the modernists' camp', represented by Ernest Gellner, postulated that nationalism sprung from the heavy industrialization period that occurred in Europe in the 19th century, therefore as a direct consequence of modernization. While Benedict Anderson famously posited that nations are the product of 'imaginary communities' connected to the emergence of national

literary languages, which were themselves aided by 'print capitalism' (Anderson 1983: 45), Gellner posits that 'nationalism is the direct, or indirect, consequence of industrialization with its new division of labour' (Conversi 2012: 14).

Subscribing to this view, the other scholar of nationalism, Eric Hobsbawm, goes as far as to affirm that nations, as we know them today, came into being as a consequence of 'invented traditions' and that before 1884 the word 'nation' simply meant 'the aggregate of the inhabitants of a province, a country or a kingdom' (Hobsbawm 1990: 14). Although they claim to be 'rooted in the remotest antiquity', nations 'must include a constructed or 'invented' component' (Hobsbawm 1983: 14). Supporting Hobsbawm's view, Hugh Trevor-Roper exemplifies the invention of the modern nation with the humorous case of the Scottish kilt and bagpipe tradition: Before the union with England, Trevor-Roper writes, both these markers were seen as a sign of barbarism, vestiges from a poverty-ridden past. In protest to the union, they acquired in modern times a distinct 'national' character, becoming an omnipresent symbol of uniqueness through their display in various ceremonial acts, whence they became the bearers of 'Scottish tradition' (Trevor-Roper 1983: 15).

Anthony D. Smith and Liah Greenfeld belong to a different camp, which, with some overemphasis perhaps, I call the 'essentialist' one. Unlike the modernists analysed above, Smith postulates that nations in the modern sense of the word have existed since at least the Middle Ages and that they represent the embodiment of a pre-modern *ethnie*, which Smith identifies with 'old elite high cultures' (Smith 1998: 42) that would later evolve and endure as nations (Smith 1998: 127–131). Greenfeld also coherently argues that the concept of the nation – a resurgence of the ancient *natio* of Latin origin – can first be recorded during the English civil war (1642–1651) and that the concept acquired enough tenure to be later adopted by the French, Russians, and Germans as a model of sorts, towards which the aristocracy of those nations aspired (Greenfeld 1992: 47). If the French and the Russians emulated early British nation-making practices, this was done in a very conscious manner, Greenfeld argues, as England represented a 'model' after which 'enlightened despots' (such as Peter the Great and Catherine the Great in Russia) moulded their own countries. Greenfeld makes the case that these leaders were 'people of ambition and energy far exceeding the average' (Greenfeld 1992: 191) and that they copied England's process of nation-building through the 'elevation of the populace to the position of an (at first specifically political) elite' (Greenfeld 1992: 6). However essentialistic some of her claims, Greenfeld is right to state that, after the Middle Ages, the concept of the 'nation' became associated with honour and political power – which the old Latin term lacked –, and this in turn represented the birth of the modern nation as we know it.

In this paper, I consider in what way the aforementioned theories can or cannot apply to Romanian nation-building practices, arguing that both Greenfeld's and Smith's theories regarding the transformation of the original *natio* into the modern *nation*

in the Middle Ages and Gellner's modernization via the industrialization thesis are relevant for the Romanian context, with slight differences. First, I will be arguing that while for Greenfeld and Smith *ethnie* acquired value in and of itself, in Romania, the concept of ethnicity was strongly correlated with language practices and linguistics, including the use of linguistics for political purposes. Indeed, I will support this view in the last part of the essay by invoking Katherine Verdery's view of the particular type of nationalism that, she argues, took hold in Romania in the 20th century.

Secondly, when applying Gellner's theories to 20th-century Romania, I will be arguing that not so much industrialization but the import of nationalist theories as well as the changing dynamics of modernity caused the emergence of ethnic consciousness. This later conduced to a romanticized version of nationhood, which in turn was refashioned into both fascist and (surprisingly) national-communist versions of nationalism. Put simply, I posit that the process that occurred since Cantemir's identification of Romanian as a Latin language led to the re-Latinization and continuity theory, both promoted by the representatives of *Şcoala Ardeleană*, or the so-called Transylvanian School for political purposes. These were later instrumentalized through the successive interventions of romanticism, fascism, and national communism into present-day Romanian nationalism.

Dimitrie Cantemir and the Theory of Latin Descent

Ascribing an overpowering role to Latin descent in the making of Romanian nationhood, the Romanian modernization process starts – not unlike Trevor-Roper's description (1983) of Scottish 'nationalization' of the kilt and bagpipe – with the thesis that Romanians are the direct descendants of the Dacians and the Romans. The Daco-Roman continuity theory prefigured by Cantemir stipulated that the ancient Dacian tribes intermarried with the conquering Romans in the territory of present-day Romania and thus birthed the Romanian language and ethnicity.[1] Popularized by the representatives of the Transylvanian School in late 18th century, this theory, which also represents the first attempt at building what Anderson (1983) later called 'an imagined community', has its origins in the writings of Dimitrie Cantemir. By tracing the evolution of this theory from Cantemir[2] into the contemporary period, I investigate the degree of politicization this theory acquired vis-à-vis the process of modernization and nation building with which it is inextricably linked.

Born in a princely family in Moldova but raised at the Sultan's court, Dimitrie Cantemir (1673–1723) was undoubtedly one of the earliest humanists and foremost

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1   The thesis held despite the brief duration of Roman presence in Dacia, namely between Trajan's Wars in 101–106 and the Roman retreat under Aurelian in 271–275.

2   Although Cantemir based some of his theories on earlier chroniclers who had made similar claims, an in-depth historiographic approach of the continuity theory falls outside the bounds of this article.

representatives of enlightenment in Eastern Europe. A philosopher, geographer, linguist, musicologist, and composer, this veritable *Renaissance man* was also the first Romanian-born scholar who attempted to establish a historiography of the Romanian principalities at a time when imperial domination and internal regicide made these mysterious territories some of the least known in Europe.

Mainly for this reason, in a work that Cantemir envisioned as the ultimate authority on the origin of the Romanians and which was commissioned by the Berlin Academy in 1711, he resolved to dispel some of the mystery surrounding the Romanians' nebulous past and stoically convince his readers of the Latin origin of the Romanian nation (which he variably also called Moldavian or Vlach). What is of chief notice in this massive oeuvre loosely translatable as *The Chronicle of the Durability of the Roman-Moldovian-Wallachians* is that Cantemir, despite his declared purpose of 'fighting for [his] fiefdom' (Cantemir 1717: 5), is uninterested in making ethnic statements. Somewhat disproving Smith's and Greenfeld's theses, Cantemir seems keen on basing the theory of Latin descent on language alone, being convinced that should Romanians enjoy any sort of glory, their ethnicity would have nothing to do with it.

Differing from the English elite that Smith and Greenfeld saw as the core of later British identity, Cantemir does not hold any visions of grandeur vis-à-vis the future Romanian nation when he states that: 'no one should think we would fancy that the Roman-Moldo-Vlach people have no foreign blood mixed in their own' (Cantemir 1717: 19).[3] Even when writing eulogistically about Latin origins, Cantemir has no qualms about accepting the mixture of ethnicities as a natural phenomenon. He matter-of-factly declares that of the many individuals that make up the Moldavian people none is a purebred Moldavian (*Rusticus pure Moldavus nullus est* in orig.), but 'those [peasants] that are they are of either Russian or Transylvanian [i.e. Hungarian] origin' (Cantemir 1933: 123). Moreover, he is *de facto* proud to affirm that it is almost unbelievable that such a small country could be home to so many ethnicities (Cantemir 1933: 121). In other words, proving Gellner and Hobsbawm right, language and ethnicity (let alone race) were completely distinct concepts in Cantemir's time (if even acknowledged as such), and the fact that the inhabitants of Moldova were of mixed heritage did not detract from the Moldavian pride of using a language that is assuredly (in Cantemir's view) descended from Latin.

Despite his goal of writing unbiased history, it becomes obvious relatively early in the text that what is at stake for Cantemir is not only memory, glory, or language alone (all of which Cantemir holds dear) but also the Moldavian throne, which the prince had lost three years prior when being forced to flee from the conquering Turks (Lemny 2009: 131). Under these unpropitious circumstances and faced with the probability of being unable to return to this privileged position, Cantemir feels compelled to offer as an argument for Moldavia's independence the theory of Latin

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3   In this paper, all quotations from Cantemir were translated by the author.

descent, as if (and here Greenfeld's reading of nationhood applies perfectly) the privileged status of Latin at the time could save Moldavian identity from being swallowed by one of the threatening neighbouring empires (be it Ottoman Turkish or Tsarist Russian).

Self-consciously agreeing that, according to an old proverb, 'the mouth that praises itself stinks', (Cantemir 1717: 100) he is sensible to stick to his linguistic guns, afraid to either fall into the trap of self-delusion or wake too much criticism from either the Porte or the Tsardom. Walking a fine line between politics and historiography, he argues that the Moldavian language is of direct Latin descent, notwithstanding the presence of substantial loanwords from Greek, which the author acknowledges in his previous treaty, *Descriptio Moldaviae*. Although he is conscious that the 'love of country might darken [his] sight' (Cantemir 1933: 154), he postulates that Moldavian is not derived from some later Italian dialect, as preceding chroniclers had held. He attempts to prove this by quoting the existence of words in Moldavian for which Italian later found 'barbaric' equivalents and lists the Latin/Moldavian/Italian triptychs *incipio/început/commincio* (where *commincio* is the barbaric term) and *albus/alb/bianco* as evidence for the close adherence of Moldavian to Latin.

As ground-breaking as his linguistic arguments were in the early 18th-century East of Europe, some fissures are also present in his argumentation. Quoting a dubious statement by Cravtius, according to which it is assumed that Dacians became Roman slaves and that Roman colonists married Dacian women (Cantemir 1933: 154), he claims that words whose etymology cannot be easily inferred as descending from known languages, *must* be Dacian. This appears surprising coming from a polyglot like Cantemir, who not only knew Turkish and Greek but ended up living under the Tsar's protection in Russia and becoming an equal master of Slavic tongues.

Sacrificing scientific accuracy to the very love of country he feared, Cantemir makes a list of potential Dacian words, which includes the terms *stejar* 'oak' and *heleşteu* 'fishing pond'. Knowing today that the word for 'oak' in neighbouring Bulgarian is *stezer*, while in Czech *stožar* means 'pole' or 'mast', and in Slovenian *stežeru* means 'stick', it becomes obvious that Cantemir is going out on a limb in making not necessarily demonstrable assumptions. Similarly, there is no dissent among modern linguists today that *heleşte* comes from the very similar *halastó*, which means fishing pond in Hungarian from the root *hal* 'fish' and *tó* 'lake'.

Political Linguistics

Cantemir's naïve mistakes of the enlightenment era would influence the subsequent history of linguistics and also contribute to the creation of domestic nationalistic discourses: After almost 300 years of linguistic haggling, the etymology of the term *stejar* – to the surprise of professional linguists – remains a mystery in Romanian

linguistics. If in both Cioranescu's *Diccionario Etimologico Rumano* from 1966 and in Breban's 1987 *Dicționar general al limbii române* the word *stejar* figures correctly with its Bulgarian etymology, in the 2010 edition of the *Dicționarul Limbii Române* published by the Romanian Academy, the word *stejar* appears as having an 'unknown origin', probably as a recognition of Cantemir's initial wayward statement in the context of the re-emergence of nationalism in post-socialism.

The different etymological explanations of a word like *stejar* in the various stages of Romanian nation building demonstrates the predominantly political role that linguistics has held in Romanian discourses ever since its birth in the throes of Romanian political emancipation from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

Pushing Cantemir's Latin-descent argument to the extremes, Petru Maior of the Transylvanian School, or *Şcoala Ardeleană* – as this linguistic-nationalist movement of the 19th century was known –, initiates a discourse of lasting influence when in 1814 he asserts that Romanian and Italian were purportedly very similar to one another at the time of the Dacian conquest. However, the Romanian philologist argues that, because Italian was later modified by the lasting influences of poets like Dante, Petrarca, and Boccaccio, Romanian preserved a purity once lost in Italian. Adding more fuel to the fire of Cantemir's Latinity, Maior follows this line of argument to sing praises to a language which deserves to be reunited with its former self (which it undeservedly lost) and is among the first to call for a purification of Romanian of its Slavic elements, which, in his opinion, can be easily disposed of (Close 1974: 19).

Despite the fact that Cantemir took pride in the mixed character of Romanian, and he acknowledged influences such as those brought about by Turkish and Greek dominance of Wallachia and Moldavia, the eclectic character of the language became, in line with Greenfeld's nobility thesis, a reason for dishonour in Petru Maior's time. Indeed, 19th-century intellectuals, for reasons that need to be further researched, disapproved so strongly of Slavic languages that they considered their influence in Romanian beyond barbaric: '[...] The spectre of Slavic languages rises its ugly head above the Romanian language like an iron-clad, dark sky, such is the filthiness of the Slavic character',[4] wrote Timotei Cipariu, a 19th-century cleric and academic, who was founding member of the Romanian Academy. Linguist Radu Mârza rightfully mentions that 'the concern of Latinists to marginalize foreign influences on the language and the Romanian people is well known. So is the emphasis on the external, reversible character of these influences' (Mârza 2003: 347).[5]

Counting on the supposed reversibility of Slavic influences, Petru Maior advocated the reform of the language in a politically motivated attempt to bestow upon Romanianness the nobility of Latinity. Proving Greenfeld's theory of noble descent correct, Maior essentialized the original *ethnie* that Smith claims is the core of the modern nation, but he did so with a twist. While Greenfeld and Smith

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4   Cipariu qtd. by Mârza (2003: 347) – author's translation.
5   Quotation translated by the author.

referred to the English aristocracy as possessing the mediaeval power to later shape the *ethnie* into a nation, Maior chose a people and a culture as remote from enlightenment-era Romanians as it was physically and chronologically possible: the ancient Romans. Motivated by this noble lineage, in a ceaseless race meant to expunge all local influences from the language, despite a past shaped by Slavonic, Turkish, Hungarian, and Greek influences, Maior and the Transylvanian School's scholars turned to French and – because of the enduring legacy of Latin continuity – to Italian for sources to 'enrich' (but *de facto* to purify) the Romanian language, and they called on other intellectuals to do the same.

Heeding his call, Ion Heliade Rădulescu worked hard in order to single-mindedly and authoritatively turn Romanian into a 'literary language'. In tone with Maior's advice, Heliade's work amounted to not only a purging of much of the Slavic heritage from Romanian but to a practical replacement of Slavic words with loanwords from Italian (which he considered Romanian to be no less than a dialect of). He further encouraged this practice by calling it less 'borrowing' than 'taking boldly from our mother's heritage, and from our sisters, that which is rightfully ours' (Heliade qtd. in Close 1974: 76). Despite great purification efforts, Heliade was forced to reluctantly admit at the end of his career in a letter dated to 1839 that the language naturalized too many 'foreign sayings' for Romanians to go back and completely 'cleanse it', and he considered this fact 'a fatality'. These 'foreign sayings' were the surrounding influence of Slavic and Finno-Ugric languages.

Despite sustained efforts in the subsequent decades and the transformation of a language that begins to sound increasingly Latin-based, the historiographical discourse of the first half of the 19th century does not see much change in respect to Cantemir's concept of ethnicity. Thus, early 19th-century Romanians still see themselves as a naturally mixed people whose heritage is progressively more Latin, in a context in which blood lineage mattered less than the language one spoke, or rather, the language one was proud to speak.

Language, however, in agreement with Greenfeld's theories, did gain importance after 1830 in the political discourse as a vehicle meant to represent a 'sophisticated culture', which was literally being created under the pens of the likes of Heliade. Doubters of Maior's Latin-descent theory, such as Jernej Kopitar and Franz Miklosich, Slovenian linguists who maintained that Romanian had a closer affiliation with Slavic languages than previously thought, were being silenced, as national sentiment was gaining ground by endowing the language with 'superior qualities' and 'genius' in line with its exceptionality, under which the most 'essential traits of the national spirit' lay in waiting (Hitchins 1996: 193).

Maior's and Heliade's efforts were of a political nature. When discussing the 'utopian regressive' tendencies of the epoch, historian Sorin Antohi names not only Heliade but also Nicolae Bălcescu, Bogdan Petriceicu Hasdeu, Alecu Russo, and Gh. Asachi among 'the intellectuals of a modern nation, which had just been

"discovered" by the West [who] were reaching into the past to legitimate their messianism' (Antohi 1999: 128). In agreement with both Nietzsche and Greenfeld, these romantics were fashioning a new past for a nation that, as Lemny put it vis-à-vis Cantemir (but applicable a century later), was still 'very little known in Europe' (Lemny 2009: 133). Moreover, this situation was not isolated to the Romanian context. Surrounding cultures in the late 18th and early 19th century were equally striving to create a national language and a national identity. Not unlike Vuk Karadžić in Serbia, the Romanian intellectuals at the time were beginning to use linguistic arguments politically in order to raise the status of the Romanian minority in Transylvania, or, as in Heliade's case, to gain prestige for a Wallachian culture heretofore smothered under the presence of Greek and Turkish political and commercial domination. Although their efforts can hardly be seen as contributing to the creation of Romanian nationalism, they did contribute towards the proverbial awakening of national conscience at a time when such a conscience, as elsewhere in the Balkans and Central Europe, did not truly exist. Indeed, it is only during the late 19th century that nationalism would start to come into being, and even then in a slightly different way than it did in Western Europe.

From Ethnic Consciousness to Nationalism

It is important to point out that nationalism in Central Eastern Europe was culturally imported from the West. The revolutionary year of 1848, known mostly in Eastern Europe as the Springtime of Nations, had a very different function in Western Europe. Indeed, in Italy and France, where the movement first started, the purpose of the revolution was to replace monarchic institutions with liberal and democratic ones. As John Breuilly writes, 'nationalism had little popular appeal. What nationalism there was of political significance was rather different from the romantic, linguistic and ethnic ideas which intellectual historians have emphasized' (Breuilly 1993: 96).

In Italy and Germany, the movement also sought to unite fragmented provinces, which were a rather disbanded conglomerate of regions incorporated under several empires, in which common political and ethnic consciousness was mainly lacking. Breuilly is right when he states that Italian and German nationalisms were non-existent before unification and that it was only the success of unification which retroactively saw the revolution as nationalistic (Breuilly 1993: 96). While it is true that revolutionaries in Western Europe fought for the Voltairian ideas of freedom of religion and democracy, the concept of self-determination that ultimately led to nationalism took longer to develop.

In its romantic form, nationalism came into existence at the time of the German enlightenment. Johann Gottfried Herder in the 18th century was one of the first

philosophers to define culture as an expression of *Volksgeist*. A term alternatively translated as either 'spirit of the people' or 'national character', *Volksgeist* made itself manifest for Herder through the vernacular language spoken by a particular ethnic community and thus carried the essentializing mission of modelling the national spirit through the expression of national language. Inspired by ancient Greek poetry, which he saw as expressing the spirit of the age and its people, Herder advocated for a change of language that would accommodate his essentialist view of culture, positing that 'each national language forms itself in accordance with the ethics and manner of thought of its people' (Herder 2002: 50).

It becomes clearer in this context that Maior's mission is largely indebted to Herder's ideas and that the theories of Greenfeld and Smith are only partially applicable to the Eastern European context. Instead, repositioning slightly Gellner's argument that industrialization caused nationalism to emerge as a defensive reaction against modernization, it might be fruitful to regard the arrival of nationalist theories in 19th-century Transylvania as a result of awareness of class status in relations of agricultural and industrial production. This rather Marxian view is supported by the vehemence of the anti-imperial ethos of the linguistic movement initiated by the Transylvanian School. This movement ultimately had the effect of upsetting the ethnical mix considered the norm until the 19th century and led to the emergence of ethnic consciousness, a concept that would have real political consequences for the region.

By the middle of the 19th century, in the wake of the 1848 revolution, ethnic consciousness and proto-nationalism would become indelibly connected with the rise of romantic nationalism in Eastern Europe and with the organicist views propagated by German enlightenment-era philosophy. If Herder set the basis of *Volksgeist*, Hegel developed the concept in his *Phenomenology of the Spirit* in a way that would have lasting influence over the next two centuries, particularly on the Romantic Movement. For Hegel, individual peoples were carriers of a certain spirit, which manifested itself in the essence of the nation (Hegel 1998: 439–440), a spirit which identified the nation as unique in relation to other peoples. This philosophy would have a powerful effect on Eastern European students in Berlin who, coming from countries under Russian or Habsburg occupation, would find them liberatory and would use them to infuse the 1848 revolutions in Central Eastern Europe with a particularly nationalistic character. For such revolutionaries, the national-linguistic connection was paramount, as it helped not only distinguish their nations from the surrounding ones but also position their nations as victims of the imperial regimes that ruled over them using a language which they perceived as alien to their own *Volksgeist*.

Historian Adrian Webb believes that in Western Europe the state came into existence *before* the principle of nationalism, while, by contrast, in Eastern Europe, since the theory was imported from the West, 'the sense of cultural identity had come first, and

it demanded a nation state for its expression' (Webb 2008: 14). This is supported by the late formation of the nation-state in East Central Europe, which, more often than not, as in the Polish, Yugoslav,[6] Czechoslovak, and Romanian cases, came into being as a result of the dismemberment of multinational empires at the end of WWI. As Gellner puts it, 'nations can be defined only in terms of the age of nationalism, rather than, as you might expect, the other way round' (Gellner 1983: 55).

The movement from ethnic consciousness to the birth of the nation-state is a process that took place in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries in Central Eastern Europe, and it was dominated by the imported theory of ethno-linguistic nationalism that first saw its development under Herder and Hegel. When it came to the political applications of this theory, unlike in France, Italy, or Germany, which sought no implementation of nationalism in the late 19th century until the emergence of fascism in the 1920s, in Eastern Europe the primacy of language and its strong connection with ethnicity would enjoy increasing popular appeal in the age of romantic nationalism.

Eminescu's Use of Language

Mihai Eminescu, the Romanian national poet, perfectly exemplifies what Webb called the need of incipient national culture to find a national state for its expression. Born immediately after the failed Romanian revolution of 1848 to a Ruthenian father and a Romanian mother in Bukovina, which was at the time part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Eminescu went to Berlin to study philosophy in the 1870s. Influenced by Herder and Hegel, upon his return to his native land, he developed theories of national identity which had been brewing in the cauldron of linguists, politicians, and theorists before him but only found in Eminescu's romantic-nationalist poetry a unified voice that represented their interests.

In a period of political upheaval, when anti-monarchic sentiment was developing in the Polish, Czech, Slovak, and Ruthenian territories, the Romanians in Bukovina, an ethnically mixed province of Ukrainian, Jewish, and Romanian ethnicities, were demanding greater political rights, including the right to use their own language in official institutions. Here, as in all territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire that contained mixed ethnic populations, Western nationalism percolated to the level of the political discourse in the form of anti-imperial sentiment. Revolutions and demonstrations in Poland in 1830 and 1863 against Habsburg and Tsarist occupation, as well as the Czech National Revival movement of the 19th century, in which the Czech language was institutionalized for the first time, contributed to the spread of romantic nationalism. But while the implementation of modernity in

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6   The new country was called in 1918 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Its name would be changed to Yugoslavia only in 1929, but its political structure would remain the same.

France and Italy took a bottom-up approach, in the East the institutions, languages, and the national state itself were imposed via a top-down effort.

This action became a double-edged sword in Romanian modernization policies. While eager to modernize along Western lines and to achieve statehood, Romania in the late 19th century also had to face the havoc brought about by modernization. This meant a change in agricultural and social relations, the beginning of urbanization, and the slow disappearance of the romantic notion of the Romanian peasant, who was forced to enter increasingly tenuous production relations with an increasingly demanding aristocracy. While in the West the battle of modernization hinged primarily on the industrial revolution and focused on changing social relations between the old aristocracy and the emerging proletariat, in Eastern Europe, modernization acquired a primarily ethnic and linguistic character, as these attributes were the only political weapons used by the local intelligentsia in the local fight against imperialism.

Unlike previous poets in whose hands the language created through the purges of the Transylvanian School sounded awkward, Eminescu not only navigated with sophisticated ease the new waters of vocabulary, rhyme, and syntax, but he bestowed on language such attributes as 'sweetness', 'beauty', and 'experienced old age'. Making use of language as an instrument that purportedly proved the beauty of Romanian literature and history to the detriment of other cultures surrounding it, Eminescu shows a pronounced tendency towards the glorification and hyperbolization of Romanian culture that had overt xenophobic tendencies. Under the politically explicable threat of Austro-Hungarian domination in Transylvania and Bukovina, he makes clear in his political writings not only that the Romanian language is of superior calibre to Hungarian but that other languages (especially Finno-Ugric and Slavic) are downright uglier and distinctly unable to express the particular beauty of the superior 'Romanian soul'. The slander Eminescu subsequently unfurls against Hungarian has frighteningly racial overtones: 'The language? They should be ashamed of it. Its sounds can terrify stones.' Unsurprisingly, this is extrapolated to politics: 'Whose servants should we be? Those of the most decayed population in Europe, whose vanity and bragging is but a long and disgusting Donquixotism? What do these people have that makes them superior to us? [...] Do they have a language?' (Eminescu 1990: 22)

Not only are all Eminescu's predecessors, irrespective of rank and file, equally sanctified as heroes of the Romanian language (Cantemir is accorded roughly the same space as Barbu Mumuleanu and Alexandru Sihleanu, naïve debutants in poetry), but, according to Eminescu, the bare fact that they write in Romanian automatically allows them to enter into the monumental pantheon of Romanian literature.

Eminescu's self-professed gift is to use the purported Romanian exceptionality (which is stressed to the point of obsession both in poetry and in his political writings) to create a poetic language never before heard in Romanian discourses. In

the folktale-turned-love poem, *Călin file din poveste*, Eminescu parades some of his most obsessive and representative motifs: nature meets libido in a purified, virginal, spotlessly natural milieu replete with romantic favourites such as moonlit forests, ruined castles, and the feminine element in various unavailable but voluptuous guises. Out of this marriage of folk tradition and natural elements, Eminescu creates a utopic universe, which, just like language was able to cradle the Romanian soul from generations past, features nature as a protective womb against the ills of modernity. The language in this strangely haunting love poem reaches a paroxysm of lyricism and romantic melody unparalleled in Romanian literature:

> When on my breast you lean your head feeling my heart's enamoured beat / And I in passion press my lips upon your rounded shoulder sweet; / And when our thirsty lips unite, I drink thy breath into my soul, / Our hearts grown heavy in our breasts, that each the other's pain console. (Eminescu, *Călin*)[7]

Eminescu's linguistic gift comes at a hefty prize, however. If ethnicity did not find a way into Eminescu's poetry until late, when it did in *The Third Epistle* it did so with a bang. Identifying and vilifying foreigners as enemies of the Romanian people in the smoothest-sounding xenophobic discourse ever written in Romanian verse, Eminescu lashes out at the Other with unrestrained ferociousness:

> As sly as artful foxes will they the benches throng / Frenetically applauding our country game and song; / Then meeting in the Senate each other's praises speak / This heavy-throated Bulgar, that long and hook-nosed Greek. / Each claims to be Romanian, whatever mask he wears, / These Bulgo-Greeks pretending that they are Trajan's heirs; / This poison froth, this dung-heap, this foul and filthy brood / Have they indeed inherited our nation's master hood ! [...] Until at last these nothings, this foul and loath full scum, / These cripple-minded stammerers lords of our land become. (Eminescu, *The Third Epistle*)

When confronted with the challenging political difficulties that the Romanian Principalities were facing in the late 19th century, Eminescu invariably reverted to autocratic authoritarianism. This comes as a surprise especially in the context where the poet abhorred the tyranny of the Austro-Hungarians oppressing the Romanians of Transylvania. Despite this, at the end of *The Third Epistle*, the poet does not hesitate to invoke bloodthirsty warlords of the self-styled 'glorious' Romanian past such as Vlad Țepeș (the infamous Dracula), whom Eminescu summons to purge the country of its ethnic 'filth', which had 'shamed' the ancestors, the language, and the Romanian traditions. As Antohi warns, Eminescu's use of history is always

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7   All translations from Eminescu's political writings belong to the author. Those from his poetry belong to Corneliu Popescu.

'contaminated by utopian and mythical elements' (Antohi 1999: 123), which, in agreement with Cohen's writings on history, reinterpret, resituate, and embellish the past in accordance with the 'narrativizing' demanded by the ideology of the day.

Cantemir's acceptance of a mixture of ethnicities making up the evasive concept of the 'Romanian people' has by now been entirely disposed of and replaced by that of purity understood as a lack of interference in the language and peaceable activities of Romanians by outside elements. The Bulgar and the Greek filth have been joined by 'the crooked-face Găgăuz' (sacrificed from Popescu's translation), and, of course, by the omnipresent Jew, who figures relentlessly in Eminescu's political writings as the primordial threat to Romanians everywhere, however, nowhere as melodious as in this example of poetic racist slur.

In practice, Eminescu differs little from the politically motivated enlightenment theorists predating him. Like them, subsuming language to his political aims, he dreams of recreating the mesmerizing feel of ancestral Dacia (which Cantemir equally praised for its quasi-mythical properties) and of returning to an ancestral linguistic and social order. Seen in his verse as the golden age of Romanian civilization, this mystified order would contribute to the resurgence of the Daco-Roman continuity theory and, as we shall see, its employment in more drastic ideological platforms. And if language is indeed the ideological vehicle for this manoeuvre, its enabling agent is the peasantry.

If Cantemir sees the peasants as the least representative elements of Romanianism in the gamut of social organization, Eminescu comes to idolatrize the peasants and to make out of them the single bearers of the torch of purity. Eminescu cannot conceive of a different political orientation for Romania but a return to traditionalism, ruralism, and a 'real' language, which should not be mixed with foreign elements. Could Eminescu have been deceiving himself so much as to ignore that the 'real' language, as even Cantemir acknowledged, was even more interspersed with Slavicisms and Graecisms than the one spoken in the 19th century?

Confirming Eminescu's political short-sightedness, Garabet Ibrăileanu attests that Eminescu '... cannot conceive of another state but the past' and is unable to put together an objective forecast for the future (Ibrăileanu 1970: 48). Later exegetes are able to identify in Eminescu an evident fear of the present based on the fact that he attacked and was afraid of modernity (Drace-Francis 2013: 174), as if he were part of a minority himself (Drace-Francis 2013: 184).

Indeed, save for a psychoanalytical exploration of his discourse, we shall probably never know what Eminescu was practically afraid of when he was lashing out at modernity. However, multiple elements from both his poetic and political discourses hint at anxiety in relation to foreign elements penetrating the language and point to a psychotic, schizoid personality, which, given his frequent hospitalizations in later years for 'madness' might suggest an unstable psychology.

In support of this view, Ibrăileanu claims that Eminescu went through several different ideological phases contingent on his geographical positioning at the time. In the beginning, he took a Maiorescian approach, refusing an 'absolute purification', as to purify the language of all its foreign elements would have meant to 'tear out the entire fabric in order to take them out' (qtd. in Ibăileanu: 41). This is in line with Maiorescu's thinking that 'the purity of the language is an unjust demand which could nowhere be realized' (Maiorescu 1966: 140), as well as with Alecu Russo's impassioned plea against the surplus Latinization and destruction of the language (Ibrăileanu 1970: 23).

However, Ibrăileanu claims that later Eminescu disagreed with his protector as well as with the fact that the Transylvanian School's writers 'falsified historical truth' (Maiorescu 1966: 79) through their Latinizing of the language, ending up disagreeing again with Maiorescu's warning that 'a people cannot live with a falsified culture' (Ibrăileanu 1970: 83). Instead, later Eminescu became an ardent supporter of his earlier teacher, Aron Pumnul, who maintained that '... just as a body without soul is dead, so is the nation dead without language' (Pumnul qtd. in Drace-Francis 2013: 163) and who militated for a thorough cleansing of Romanian of all its Greek and Slavic elements and for a Latinization of the current vocabulary that made the language sound nothing short of ridiculous (Maiorescu 1966: 142). What Eminescu's position-shifting proves is that his approach to linguistics was entirely speculative. Instead of following a systematic language-based analytical approach, he was content to take the opposite position, namely to follow the political stand of earlier theorists such as Cantemir and the Transylvanian School's writers, and, without criticizing their theories on exceptionality, blindly to apply their concepts of the 'noble lineage' to a language to which he added the poetic valence of 'beauty'.

It is in this form and at this precise moment that a new notion of Romanian identity started to be born out of the efforts of post-Eminescian ideologues eager to perpetuate the attributes of the 'beauty' of the language and the greatness of the past, both concepts exceedingly dear to Eminescu. However, this identity, based as it was on speculative argumentation, is hardly scientific and features common misconceptions and empty markers such as 'greatness', 'nobility', and 'beauty', which are used as umbrella notions to cover the hole left open by the vague national identity. It is here that Greenfeld's theory, which sees nationalism as a glorification of past nobility, applies to the romantic-nationalist moment in Romanian historiography: What used to be a mixed language of Latin descent and a mixed race becomes with Eminescu (himself of mixed origins) a pure language and a pure race whose purest representatives are (ironically) the peasants, whom Eminescu chooses to worship.

Another difference needs to be pointed out in the movement from ethnic consciousness to the future national state. Despite Cantemir's less biased approach to history, the concept that struck a deep chord with his followers in the 19th century was that of the 'Romanian exception'. According to Cantemir, this is the view that,

unlike the rest of the Europeans who trace their roots back solely to barbarians, the Romanians, through virtue of their Latin heritage, are the only real descendants of the 'illustrious Romans' (Cantemir qtd. in Lemny 2009: 133). Although Lemny calls this statement 'très discutable', this does not stop him from excusing Cantemir of naïveté on the basis of the latter's need to popularize knowledge of his people, otherwise 'très peu connu en Europe' (Lemny 2009: 133).

Cantemir justifies this exceptionality both through the language argument (a Latin people surrounded by Slavic and Finno-Ugric neighbours) and through Moldavian and Wallachian resistance to Muslim conquest, which he sees as superior to that of the surrounding Bulgarians, Hungarians, Serbs, and Greeks, who accepted Turkish occupation (Lemny 2009: 131).[8] Ignoring that the Romanian territories were nominally under the jurisdiction of the Porte until 1877, this stance initiates a recurring historiographical practice which hinges on the heroism and audacity of the Romanian people. This is also the stance that empowers Eminescu's unparalleled glorification of the language and the nation, which, through the later dissemination of his poetry in mass education campaigns was going to drastically change the way Romanians saw themselves in the 20th century.

From Romantic Nationalism to Fascism

In his attempt to define the concept of nationalism, Gellner makes use of Weber's definition of the nation-state. According to Webber, the state is 'that agency within society that possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence' (Gellner 1983: 3). Considering that subsequent critical theorists such as Foucault would develop the metaphor of the panopticon to describe the operation of power in the institution of the state, by invoking Weber's definition, Gellner stresses the connection between nationalism and violence. Although not in agreement with Gellner over the origins of nationalism, Breuilly also clearly states that 'nationalism is, above and beyond all else, about politics and that politics is about power' (Breuilly 1993: 1).

So far, we have traced the development of ethnic consciousness in Romanian cultural history from the 18th to the 19th century. The first part of the 20th century would witness not only the establishment of the modern Romanian nation-state in 1918 but also the rise, in its aftermath, of the most violent form of Romanian nationalism. The Iron Guard, a domestic form of fascism inspired by Mussolini's 'fascia' movement (Schmitt 2017: 64) and Hitler's Nazism, which received financial backing from Nazi Germany (Webb 2008: 329), would become in the interwar period the self-styled guardian of tradition in the face of Semitic contagion of Romanian purity. The movement's ideologue, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, would use among

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8   The reason why he considered that the Romanian principalities preserved their independence in the face of Turkish invasion despite his forced exile to the court of the Russian Tsar is that the Ottomans did not rule themselves in the Romanian principalities but chose local rulers as representatives.

others the uniqueness of the Romanian language to defend the values of Orthodoxy and nationalism and raise Romanianness to the status of a religious cult, in whose defence the use of violence was not only permitted but highly encouraged.

If historian Nicolae Iorga was proud to state at the end of the 19th century about Eminescu that 'the poetic interpreter of the soul of an entire nation was finally born' (Iorga), the 20th century clearly proved that the opposite was true. The treaties of Trianon and Versailles of 1919 almost doubled the territory of the new Romanian state, now called 'Greater Romania', because it was given the provinces of Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transylvania, parts of Banat and Dobruja (including Dobruja's Southern Quadrilateral, which Romania seized from Bulgaria after the Second Balkan War and whose population was only 20% Romanian). It did not matter to Romanian ideologues that the Paris accords enlarged Romania only to stem the expansion of Bolshevik Russia (MacMillan 2001: 125). Trianon was seen as the place where 'the centuries-old dream of Romanians' came true (Anghel 2016: 33–35).

According to historian Margaret MacMillan, the enlargement of Romania was mainly due to the impassioned pleas of Prime Minister Ionel Brătianu, whose curious pathos during the Paris conference (MacMillan 2001: 125) desperately tried to convince the Western powers that Romania is a Latin country which should be considered a sister of France. He explained that 'the Rumanian upper classes loved France: they bought educations in Paris for their children, and clothes and furniture for themselves'. What Brătianu did not mention was that 'the Rumanian aristocrats who spoke such beautiful French and who came to Paris to buy their clothes had portraits of their grandparents in caftans and turbans' (MacMillan 2001: 128). Despite the fact that, as MacMillan puts it, 'visitors to Rumania from Western Europe were struck by its exotic, even Oriental, flavor,' (MacMillan 2001: 129) Brătianu was schooled on the benches of romantic nationalism. He knew how to use Eminescu's nobility argument to convince Westerners that the Romanians 'were the heirs of the Roman empire, part of Western civilization. Conveniently for the peace negotiations, [the Romanians] could argue that all the old Roman province of Dacia including part of Transylvania, which belonged to Hungary, should be restored to them' (MacMillan 2001: 128). Although Brătianu's rhetoric was considered pathetic by members of the British delegation (Harold Nicolson considered him a 'humbug' who 'catches his own profile in the glass') (MacMillan 2001: 126), Romania's position as a 'useful buffer' between Europe and Russia forced the allies to take a conciliatory position on Brătianu's 'excessive' territorial demands, even though Romania was a 'notoriously unreliable' wartime ally (MacMillan 2001: 128).

Brătianu's victory at the Paris conference gave an unprecedented boost to a new discourse focused on unity and indivisibility. What interwar nationalist ideologues ignored, however, was that the celebrated state that gave a new home to all Romanians also comprised almost 30% non-Romanian speakers (Antohi 2000: 69).[9]

9　　Sorin Antohi puts the figure at 28%.

As Adrian Webb put it, this meant that the discourse that 'stressed on the unity of one people implied its lack of unity with any other people' (Webb 2008: 15). Czech journalist Walter Kolarz also warned later in 1946 that the 'life and happiness of one country and people meant death and disaster for the other' (Kolarz 1946: 104). It was obvious in the aftermath of what was termed 'The Great Union' that Romanians would have difficulty cohabitating with Jewish, Magyar, Ukrainian, Bulgarian, and Turkish ethnics, whom the 1919 Treaty of Trianon suddenly designated as Romanian citizens. Ironically, these were exactly the same ethnicities that Eminescu lambasted in his impassioned xenophobic discourse some four decades prior. The presence of such a large contingent of foreign ethnics who did not speak Romanian in 1919 led to a resurgence of the cult of the language, as Romanians perceived the foreigners as a threat to the confused sense of identity they derived from the sudden and unexpected unification. As Antohi also acknowledges, this inculcated a sense of identity crisis in the new Romanian state, which rushed through a process of Romanianization policies, 'thus betraying the spirit of the Paris Treaties, and the tolerant program of Transylvanian Romanian elites who, upon agreeing to join the Romanian Kingdom, had insisted that substantial minority rights be guaranteed' (Antohi 2000: 69).

In line with Nietzsche's innocent call for the a posteriori re-creation of a past that is different from the historical one, Romanian nationalism reinterpreted history for its own benefit and with tragic consequences. Designating the Jews as the most dangerous of the ethnicity that made up a third of 'Greater Romania', Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu wrote in 1936: 'We face a Judaic State, an army that comes into our land to conquer us. Jewish population movements are effected against Romania according to a well-established plan. […] Where is the naive person who can believe that the population movements of Jewish masses occur unplanned?' (Codreanu 2011[1936]: 81). A devotee of Eminescu, Codreanu hailed from a Bukovinian family of mixed ethnic heritage, like that of the poet himself. His father, a German teacher and Romanian nationalist ideologue, changed his name in 1902 from the Polish-Ukrainian Zelinski to the more Romanian-sounding 'Codreanu'[10] (Schmitt 2017: 37).

Not even a decade after the Paris treaties, Corneliu Codreanu became the charismatic leader of the Iron Guard, one of Europe's most fanatical fascist organizations, also known as the Legion of the Archangel Michael or the Legionary Movement, which fought on ultra-religious nationalist lines for the purification of the Romanian nation of all foreign influences, primarily Jewish. It is undisputed that Codreanu's far-right ideology borrowed massively from Eminescu's political writings. In his autobiography *For My Legionaries*, Codreanu lists the poet among 'the great men of Romania of 1879' and quotes Eminescu as asking: 'By what labors or sacrifices have [the Jews] won for themselves the right to aspire to equality with the Romanian people? Was it they who fought the Turks, Tartars, Poles, and Hungarians? […] Was it through their efforts that the fame of this country spread, that this language was disinterred from the veilings

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10   In Romanian, the word *codru* means 'forest', wherefore *Codreanu* would translate as 'of the forest'.

of the past? Was it through one of them that the Romanian people won its right to sunlight?' (Eminescu qtd. in Codreanu (2011[1936]: 76). If many academic studies emphasized the legionaries' fanaticism and devotion to both right-wing extremism and the Romanian Orthodox religion (Schmitt 2017), Romanian studies scholar Alex Drace-Francis is the last in a series of academics to uphold the view that '... the legionaries' cult of sacrifice in the name of the nation came not only from Orthodox theology, nor yet from concepts of fatality in Romanian folk literature, but also, and possibly predominantly, from Eminescu himself' (Drace-Francis 2013: 176).

The evolving of nationalism into fascism has been thoroughly discussed by a wide variety of scholars, and the relationship between the two ideologies has been confirmed, with fascism seen as a backlash against the effect modernity had on a mainly traditional Europe. Nationalism scholar Daniele Conversi writes that 'Nazism transformed the "traumatic modernism" resulting from the abrupt irruption of modernity and the decline of traditional lifestyles into a redemptive mission informed by an eschatological longing and technocratic idolatry' (Conversi 2012: 23). Weber's prophetic dictum that the modern nation-state possessed a monopoly on violence would prove true in Romania when Codreanu's movement grew stronger after his death in 1938 to pronounce the birth of the Legionary Romanian State in 1940. The short-lived state (it was abrogated in 1941) would spawn the even more violent dictatorship of Marshal Ion Antonescu – the de facto inheritor of the now suppressed Legionary Movement –, who declared in 1941 that Romania would 'march without hesitation on the side of the great Führer and Duce' (Webb 2008: 160). Started in the name of national reunification, Antonescu's war against the Soviets on the side of Nazi Germany would lead to the temporary recovery of eastern territories, which, ironically, Hitler himself had given away to Stalin in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact two years earlier. The Nazi-Soviet pact was further grounded in the fact that the award of the disputed region of Bessarabia to Romania in 1919 was never ratified at the Paris conference due to the opposition of the United States and Britain (Anghel 2016: 39). This made Russia (and later the Soviet Union) the *de jure* owner of the province since 1812, when it was ceded to the Tsar by the Ottoman Empire in the Treaty of Bucharest.

Nevertheless, the invasion of the Soviet Union would put Romania in control of the Transnistria Governorate for three years, during which historian Andrei Oişteanu asserts that thousands of Jews and Gypsies deported there from Romania died (Oişteanu 2009: 67). Mirroring Brătianu's demands on parts of Hungary two decades earlier: during WWII, the Romanian army came into control of territories that had never been Romanian, nor did they have a majority Romanian-speaking population. In Transnistria, speakers of Romanian stood at around 8%. This did not stop Antonescu, in a gesture of brutal cruelty enacted during his eastward advance, to order in October 1941 that approximately 25,000 Jews be 'shot to death, burned alive, or hung in the streets of Odessa' (Oişteanu 2009: 323).

Romania's loss of Transnistria and the retaking of Bessarabia by the Soviets in 1944 during the second Jassy–Kishinev offensive can hardly be seen – in the light of Romania's Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union – as unfair. To stress the illegitimate Russian occupation of the region after the Treaty of Bucharest and its 'imperial rule' by Russia since 1812 (Caşu 2015: 347, 351), the nationalist ideology whitewashes the role played by fascist Romania during WWII. The self-victimizing Romanian attitude in the purported loss of Bessarabia at the end of the war is predicated on a type of discourse inherited from romantic nationalism and solidified by the fascist period.

If – to paraphrase Nietzsche – modernity sought the erasure of a history it claimed to improve, this led to the even more dangerous emergence of fascism as the apex of modernity's unwanted side-effects. In tracing the evolution of nationalism from the enlightenment to the 20th century in Romania, it is important to emphasize the role that language progressively played in defining ethnicity and Romania's relation to other nationalities. The lack of scientific rigour with which linguistic practices were treated during this time, from Cantemir's naïve mistakes to Eminescu's emphatic exaggerations, instilled a methodology of politically-motivated amateurism that would facilitate the elaboration of a racist discourse which saw ethnic Romanians as superior to about a third of their non-Romanian co-nationals after WWI. Moreover, the new nationalist ideology focusing on the union of all Romanians in a single state would assure the survival of 'Greater Romania' for 20 years and would provide the nostalgic call for reunification (*reîntregire*) that would resound in nationalist ears throughout the national-communist and post-socialist periods. During this time, Romanian identity remained a confused concept and continued to slide to the right of the political spectrum even after the establishment of Marxism–Leninism and the official rule of the country by the communist regime.

National Communism

As early as 1957, former communist revolutionary and Deputy Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Milovan Djilas, who was ousted from Tito's government in 1954, asserted that the national component of the communist revolutions took over their erstwhile internationalist character, and although Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, and Bukharin all 'expected that the state would rapidly wither away, that democracy would be strengthened', in actuality 'the reverse happened' (Djilas: 37). Although Djilas made no mention of it, it was nationalism that destroyed the initial goals of internationalist socialism, or, as Katherine Verdery puts it, 'although the early years of socialist internationalism suppressed [the nationalist] discourse, it gradually crept back in' (Verdery 1993: 181). Peter Zwick argued in 1983 that this transformation allowed communism to survive and that 'whatever vitality persists in contemporary communism actually derives from its national orientations' (Zwick

1983: 2). Another way to look at the situation with the hindsight allowed by the regime's demise in 1989 is to admit that communism failed precisely because in all the countries where it once ruled it transformed into nationalism.

The advance of communist power in post-war Romania in the late 1940s promised to right many of the wrongs committed by nationalism and fascism. In terms of language, in a sudden re-orientation of cultural discourse to the left, the early communists were eager to stress the Slavic connections between Romanian and Russian. Russian became a mandatory (yet unpopular) subject in secondary schools, and linguists pointed out the affinities between Romanian and its Slavic counterparts. The Daco-Roman continuity discourse was temporarily halted, while historical accounts mentioned the Romanians as once strongly connected with their Eastern European neighbours. Yet, in a situation that paralleled political developments signalling cooling relations with Moscow, Russian language and the pro-Russian orientation gradually fell out of favour with the Romanian communist officials by 1965 to be replaced by an inward-looking, self-celebrating discourse.

The context was made possible by Khrushchev's denunciations of Stalin's crimes in 1956, which marked a turn in all satellite country politics. Petrescu argues that, confronted with Soviet de-Stalinization, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, prime secretary of the party at the time, realized that 'national identity is a crucial social and political resource … to ensure [the party's] political survival' and 'after 1956, the Romanian Stalinist elite engaged cautiously in a process of "community building"' (Petrescu 2009: 402). In tune with the newfound nationalist course, this community was to be purged of Semitic elements. The anti-Semitic purges of the early 1950s initially copied Stalin's own. After Ana Pauker and other hard-line Stalinists were ousted from leadership, however, the purges were seen as another means to reinforce the nationalistic course, which culminated in the retreat of the Soviet army from the country in 1958.

Another episode contributing to the Bucharest–Moscow split occurred in 1962, when Khrushchev mused on instating a bloc-wide economic policy that would have a strong nationalist backlash: He proposed that satellite countries specialize in various fields of production that befitted their industrial contexts. This drew heavy criticism from Dej and a young Nicolae Ceauşescu, who saw the policy as an attempt to subordinate Romania's primarily agricultural production to Soviet economic and political interests (Kemp 1999: 149).

Nicolae Ceauşescu merely continued Dej's policies when he took over in 1965, and he remained committed to make Romania increasingly independent from the Soviets. While this may have been a courageous act in the beginning (as it was when he denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968), the unexpected result was the isolation of the country and its turning into an increasingly powerful bastion of nationalism from the late 1960s onwards. Verdery states about this period that 'national interests gave ready expression to

the anti-imperial feelings of many East Europeans … against Soviet or Russian domination' (Verdery 1993: 181). Indeed, as journalist Henry Shapiro put it upon his visit to Bucharest in 1965, 'ideologically, the Romanian leaders remain hard line Marxist Communists, but it appears to be a communism neither of Moscow nor Peking style, but strictly national Romanian' (Shapiro 1965).

If fascist ideologues such as Radu Gyr or Nichifor Crainic were imprisoned in the 1950s, the 1964 amnesty allowed them to progressively return to cultural life and hold leading or contributing roles in nationalist publications such as *Glasul patriei*. Similarly, of the names listed as forbidden by the communists in 1945, which included among others Titu Maiorescu, Garabet Ibrăileanu, Ion Heliade Rădulescu, Octavian Goga, and Nicolae Bălcescu – who were considered of a nationalist orientation and therefore in disagreement with the goals of internationalist communism –, all would be rehabilitated in the 1960s (Tismăneanu: 490). Moreover, these writers and the nationalist ideology they promoted would entirely replace the early communists' pro-Russian/internationalist orientation, becoming the foremost representatives of Romanian nationalism in the 1980s.

Anthropologist Katherine Verdery states that during Ceauşescu's rule the Communist Party incorporated nationalist ideology into its policies in order to strengthen its political position. It was also for its domination of political life, Verdery claims, that the party co-opted all Romanian intellectuals, regardless of political orientation, to take part in the administrative apparatus (Verdery 1991: 310). She also states that the lack of opposition to the regime that was perceivable in late socialist Romania, unlike in other countries of the Bloc, was due to the mollification of the intellectuals by the regime, as the Party offered writers an outlet of expression for their nationalist tendencies and fervent promotion of the concept of the 'nation' (Verdery 1991: 312). It was therefore the nationalist intellectuals' own participation in the communist state apparatus that generated the transformation of internationalism into national communism because '… the Nation was so well entrenched discursively in Romanian life. It was the one subject that was guaranteed to get Romanians' attention, because so many of them were using it themselves' (Verdery 1991: 125).

Eminescu's name, having topped the list of forbidden writers in the 1940s, would not only return to prominence after 1965 as well but would come to completely dominate the new nationalist cultural course. Ironically, Eminescu's vituperative xenophobia and nationalism, which powerfully influenced fascist ideology, impacted the programme of national communism to the extreme although his political writings were not made public. Not only was Eminescu's nationalism allowed to flourish during the second part of the socialist period, but for the better part of the 20th century Eminescu's cult was elevated to second rank after Ceauşescu's own through what historian Lucian Boia called the 'tyrannical effect' of 'the Eminescian musicality' whose 'spell [...] Romanians have been under [...] for more than a century' (Boia 2001: 244).

If early 20th-century nationalist ideologues, such as Nicolae Iorga, condensed the soul of the nation into Eminescu's poetry, or rather manufactured this soul under Eminescu's authority as the national poet, the communist ideologues returned to this very image at the end of the regime in order to promote a nationalistic version of communism which had nothing to do with Marxism. Indeed, a new ideology of the 'Romanian soul', or Romanianism, was born in the 1980s, which was fed to the Romanian psyche in the image of Eminescu. As Lucian Boia puts it, 'a portrait from his early youth is imprinted on the retina of every Romanian' (Boia 2001: 244). Even right-leaning critics such as George Călinescu did not shy from stating that '[...] Eminescu becomes after his death, through an equally violent exaggeration of [his] cult [...] the beginning and end of each and every discipline, the supreme authority, the all-knowing one' (Călinescu qtd. in Drace-Francis 2013: 183).

Comparative literature scholar Călin Mihailescu claims that the same portrait referenced by Boia 'has grown a mythical halo coincident with the country's symbolic borders, and its culture's claim to universal recognition', thus merging Eminescu's poetic and political discourses into a nationalist spirit that was gradually introduced in the Romanian public opinion, ever more strongly, and that turned Eminescu into a quasi-sanctified figure. Alongside Eminescu's deification by late communism, Romanian language would reclaim its 'musicality' and 'beauty' and with these attributes a return to the glorification of Latin descent and the Daco-Roman continuity theories. This political move not only obscured once again the nebulous origins of the Romanian language and Romanian ethnicity, but it instated a veritable taboo on research contravening the ideologically-sanctioned discourse. With language reacquiring its sanctified status in the guise of poetic beauty, Eminescu's highly speculative argumentation, which up to his time was still only a theoretical framework, becomes – helped by favourable political circumstances in late communism – an official political line.

The Eminescu moment is therefore not only the *finis coronat opus* of the laborious work of language theorists toiling to find a continuous identity for the disparate and mixed Romanian heritage reflected both in the language and the ethnic make-up of the country in the 19th century. Eminescu also managed to superbly fill the identitarian void that plagued Romanian modernity with the most admirable filling there was: poetic language. It is in this manner that we should understand Benedict Anderson's claim about the shaping of the imaginary community in Romania: Having found an efficient resolution for their identity crisis, Romanians proceeded to identify both with Eminescu's poetry and the re-affirmation of the Latin character of Romanian language. Out of these ingredients, they were then free to manufacture the 'Romanian soul'.

Moreover, as Verdery attests, 'the national and self identity of many Romanians emphasizes unjust suffering' (Verdery 1993: 196). This closely parallels the way in which, as Cohen would put it, Eminescu's biography was spun in both socialism

and post-socialism: the poet never enjoyed the fruits of his hard-earned labour, was mostly poor and destitute, and his life was one 'of suffering, of the misunderstood genius struck down by insanity at the age of only 33' (Boia 2001: 244). It is easy for the national psyche to identify with the image of self-martyrdom because 'all across the region, local historiographies represented nations as innocent victims' and 'historians have presented their nations as suffering for the salvation of western civilization, sacrificed on an Ottoman altar so that the glory of western Christendom might endure' (Verdery 1993: 196). By the most recognizable figure of the 'Romanian Soul', self-martyrdom appealed even more strongly to Romanian national imagination when, in post-socialism, various writers and public political figures spread conspiracy theories involving Eminescu in alleged murder plots following which the poet was 'killed at the order of the Freemason movement' (Coja 2011), 'politically detained' (Zamfirache), or murdered by 'the Romanian state, who signed a secret alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1883' (Țene 2017).

In this case, it is less Gellner's theory on nationalism, which looks primarily at the socio-economic conditions necessary for its emergence in the 19th century, and more Greenfeld's one that applies to the Romanian case. With an industry and agriculture that were barely embryonic in the 19th century, it was culture that Romania promoted as a marker of its identity (and as Greenfeld would say, nobility) in the period of romantic nationalism. However, unlike Greenfeld, who sees the nation as an organic product created after the elite model in the late middle-ages, Romanian identitary discourses *retroactively* and self-consciously stressed the importance of the Romanian middle ages (mainly by focusing on historical figures, local rulers, and despots) during the enlightenment and romantic periods, thus leading to the emergence and stabilization of the nationalist discourse per se in the 20th century.

Post-Socialism and Conclusions

Even though Zygmunt Bauman states that 'the collapse of communism was the final nail in the coffin of the modern ambitions which drew the horizon of European... history of the last two centuries' (Bauman 1992: xxv), the perpetuation of the enlightenment-romantic-fascist-national-communist discourse into the post-socialist era tends to prove him wrong. It would be too early to state that the post-socialist world is 'a world without a collective utopia', as the Polish sociologist argues (Bauman 1992: xxv). Instead of reappraising the past at its right value, the attempt to give the Romanian people – paraphrasing Nietzsche – a different past from the one it hails from seems to have reached new extremes in post-socialism.

If odes to the Romanian language were as common during socialism as those dedicated to the 'father of the nation' himself, the post-socialist intellectuals only

expunged from their vocabulary the presence of communist leaders, preserving its highly nationalistic character. Intellectuals privileged by the communist regime would return to the sanctity of the language after the 1989 revolution. Adrian Păunescu, one of communist Romania's most recognizable cultural figures, would declare in an interview in 2010, the year of his death, that Romanian did not disappear as a language like others around it because it borrowed freely from Magyar, Slavic languages, Turkish, and Greek. While we see with Păunescu a certain return to Cantemir's mixed linguistic character, Eminescu still represents for the socialist-era poet the 'propping structure of the nation'. Interestingly, Păunescu also refers to Eminescu's influence as both 'luck and divine condemnation', which helps Romanians, unlike other people, 'recognize each other and identify with him' (Păunescu 2010).

The continuing sanctification of Eminescu's name, coupled with what Verdery calls 'the post-revolutionary vogue for prison memoirs', which in her view 'contributed further to [the] sense of a history of national victims' (Verdery 1993: 196), would suddenly affirm not only the anti-communism of the socialist-era intelligentsia but also their unwavering dedication to the national project after 1989. Furthermore, the choice of the political union between Transylvania and the Kingdom of Romania as the country's national day since 1990 as well as the pronouncement of a 'Romanian language day' in 2013 by the centre-right government of Traian Băsescu point to an increasingly closer relationship between language and national identity. Post-socialism also saw an abrupt revalorization of the interwar period, whitewashed of its fascist character. Despite the fact that, as Antohi phrases it, 'the interwar European Zeitgeist and political practices were not exactly favorable to non-ethnic political contracts, or nonethnic collective identities' (Antohi 2000: 69), the period acquired in post-socialism the aura of another golden age, possibly seen as secondary in character only to Eminescu's idealized Dacia. Moreover, to return to linguistic practices, in post-socialism etymologies which had been gradually inched in the direction of realistic definitions during socialism – as we have seen in the afore-mentioned case of the dictionary published by the Romanian Academy – started to be reverted to forms that were re-purified of their Slavic references.

Finally, Verdery claims that in post-socialism 'the meaning of "nation" has shifted:' if it ever was affected at all by communist ideology (although this is debatable), its meaning in post-socialism has re-become ethnic. Even if their regimes are no more, the nationalist, fascist, and national communist ideologies did not fail in their endeavour to reinterpret history. What seems to endure after the successive changes in Romanian administrations is Cohen's statement that every generation is willing to 'spin its own tale' based on its own understanding of the past. Nationalism has all the ingredients to provide a consumerist-type identitarian discourse, which no capitalist consumer would find easy to ditch.

In conclusion, it is not far-fetched to state that the totalitarianism of nationalism in Romania has been more penetrating than that of communist ideology and that

post-socialist society has institutionalized nationalism as a constitutional right of the predominating ethnicity in the country. This is also the argument of Ioana Lungu, who, referencing the language of the 1991 'flawed constitution' (Lungu 2002: 410), argues that all the Eastern European constitutions after 1989 are defined by 'a pronounced concern for national identity' (Lungu: 399). Quoting Robert Heyden, Lungu makes the case that Romanian ethnicity is identified as a 'sovereign being with its own defining language, culture and perhaps "biological essence", which must be defended at any cost' (Heyden qtd. in Lungu 2002: 399). This gives Romania's neoliberalism a profound totalitarian character that is entrenched in its only apparently democratic covering.

Under communism, culture became synonymous with 'nation' because it proved easier (and, as Verdery argues, beneficial for the government) to incorporate nationalism into the goals of a revised version of communism than to get rid of it. Its incorporation, however, helped legitimize Cantemir's naïve linguistic mistakes from the 18th century and validate the discourse that made those mistakes part of dubious nationalistic practices. Going further in time, even though Eminescu popularized Cantemir's Daco-Roman ideology and Latin-descent theory in his unparalleled poetic achievements, it is the later promoters of nationalism based on Eminescu's discourse that dealt a staggering blow to scientific rigour by enforcing the assimilation of such attributes as 'beauty' and 'melody' into the nationalistic discourses of the 20th and even 21st centuries. Far from diminishing the positive influence that first Cantemir and later Eminescu had on the development of cultural life and literature inside as well as outside Romanian national borders, it is important to address the contributions they had to the instatement of language as a political tool used for the continuing support of Romanian nationalism.

If Nietzsche found a certain degree of abuse of history positive for creating a more acceptable version of modernity, one that overlooked the ignoble and criminal past from which humanity hailed, his pronouncement has all the more chances to appeal to a nation submerged in a fictitious sense of self-identity, like the one of the Romanians. As I have argued here, romantic nationalism, fascism, and the national communist regime, in their attempt to purge the Romanian language and the Romanian *ethnie* of foreign elements, misread historical evidence in favour of a discourse meant to attribute Romanians a nobility they did not possess. If, as Greenfeld contends, this is not an isolated case in the history of European nationalisms, it is also a potentially dangerous endeavour which Greenfeld, whose theory is indeed applicable to Romanian nation-making practices, does not necessarily address. As long as this nationalism prevails, the possibility of overcoming Romania's romantic attachment to exceptionality, beauty, and superiority remains minimal. This will only perpetuate the identity crisis which plagued linguistic and ethnic discourses from Cantemir and Eminescu to the tragedies of the 20th century and for an unforeseeable time into the future.

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Dobruja's Public Administration and Its Role in the Romanian Nation- and State-Building Process (1878–1926)

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Abstract. The paper is devoted to providing a schematic presentation of the evolution of Dobruja's administrative-territorial system as part of Romania, presenting and highlighting the factors that contributed to the Romanian nation- and state-building process. As its primary objective, the study describes the evolution and conscious development of the above-mentioned region as part of Romania between the years 1878 and 1926. Also, it formulates as a secondary goal the impact of Dobruja's numerous administrative-territorial reorganizations on the fate of the multicultural community living in the region. At the same time, the aim is also to list and emphasize the strategies, procedures of assimilation, integration, and colonization of the region.

Keywords: Dobruja, public administration history, Romanian nation- and state-building

Introduction

Dobruja is a land between the Danube and the Black Sea that is geologically connected to the Balkans. In terms of its precise geographical delimitation, it is surrounded on the north and the west by the Danube Delta and the Danube shore, on the east by the Black Sea coast, and on the south by the boundaries of Silistra and Dobrich counties on the Bulgarian mainland (Iordachi 2000). In ancient times, the region called Scythia Minor (or Lesser Scythia) was located in approximately the same area as today's historical region of Dobruja, the total area of which is now divided between Romania and Bulgaria (Szabó 2014: 27–36). The area of North Dobruja, which now forms part of Romania and includes two counties, has 15,570 km², while the area of South Dobruja (Cadrilater) including two counties, which

are under Bulgarian jurisdiction, is 7,565 km² (Cociu 1993: 11). The region came under Romanian and Bulgarian rule in 1878, after the 1877–78 Russo–Turkish war had ended, having signed the peace treaty in the Turkish San Stefano,[1] a treaty that was confirmed by the Congress of Berlin with a significant number of amendments (Balla 1998: 4–9). At that time, 70% of Dobruja's population was still of Turkish-Tatar origin (Tóth S. 2009: 21).

The main issues related to Dobruja in the 1878–1926 period are the ethnic composition as well as the sociology of the region, the Romanian nationalization historiography and its symbolic role in nation- and state-building process, and the administrative-territorial reorganization strategies in correlation with cultural and educational policies. We can define nation-state as a form of political organization under which a relatively homogeneous people inhabits a sovereign state (Merriam-Webster 2021). Processes and strategies leading up to the establishment of a nation-state are often referred to as nation-building and state-building. The difference between these two terms could be found in the soft and hard aspects of state construction, a distinction which is commonly used in political science literature too (Birch 1989: 40). Nation building in my usage pertains to the soft aspects of establishing a state, which includes construction of a shared identity, sense of unity in the state's population, and the implementation strategies of identity consolidation. State building, in contrast, concerns only the hard aspects of state construction such as the administrative, economic, and military groundwork of functional states (Brubaker 1996: 80–83). Romania and, generally speaking, the 'national' territorial Balkan states of the 19th-20th centuries were validly created from the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire by Britain, France, Russia, and Austria through the mechanism of the Berlin Treaty of 1878. The purpose of the establishment of these independent and autonomous nation-states was to avoid another all-out war between the above-mentioned powers. So, creating these new 'artificial' states was considered the only reasonable solution; besides that, their populations consisted of many disparate ethnic groups speaking different languages and lacking any sense of common identity. These minority groups were considered undesirable, against whom the majority had to develop national defence strategies (Karpat 1997: 329–359). After its formation, Romania used all means at its disposal (the administrative, the educational, and military system, the church, and the media) to accelerate the process of constructing national identities. This kind of overall perception led to a turbulent, nationalistic, and irrational ethnic series of nation- and state-building processes, policies (Harris 2013: 53–70). A key factor in Romania's political development is the prioritization of centralization. As a result, political participation soon became restricted to a small segment of the population that was related to the ruling apparatus through the system of clientelism and public corruption (Crampton et al. 2021).

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1   Today Yesilköy.

As for the ethnic composition of Dobruja, most specialists agree on its multi-ethnic and multi-cultural aspect (Rădulescu et al. 1998), but they are arguing over which nationality was in majority or how and when the majority group came to live here.[2] Adrian Rădulescu and Ion Bitoleanu claim that during the Russo–Turkish War of 1877-78 most of the Muslim population was evacuated to Bulgaria and Turkey. Similarly, part of the Lipovans and Ukrainians emigrated from the region, mostly to Ukraine. After the above-mentioned war had ended, the fairly empty territory of Dobruja was mostly filled with settlers from Romania's other regions and with the immigrants from other countries as part of a colonization process that was in line with Romania's planned, strategic considerations. According to Nicolae T. Negulescu – in consensus with Rădulescu and Bitoleanu –, in 1878, the Romanians reclaimed the region which between the years 1388 and 1418 was part of the united Romanian princedom (Negulescu 1928: 719–734). Thus, the right of sovereignty – supported by historical facts – belongs to the Romanian nation, into which residents of other nationalities will be integrated. In contrast to the above-mentioned persons, Constantin Iordachi highlights that many politicians of the time were perceiving the province's geopolitical location and multi-ethnic population as a danger to the country's ethnic homogeneity and political stability. Not to mention that in fact after the 1877-1878 Russo–Turkish war had ended, Romania wanted to keep the regained territory of Southern Bessarabia (Budjak), resigning Dobruja (Iordachi 2002: 9–14).

As it has been many times underlined by the leaders of Tulcea and Constanța counties, Romania took over this region in a state of dilapidation, where the lack of infrastructure, state authorities, and basic resources were dominant, and the small number of people living here were battling disease and starvation. After the control over Northern Dobruja had been given to the new independent Romania, according to Nicolae T. Negulescu, former Prefect of Constanța County, it was necessary to include the region in the Romanian administrative-territorial system, creating three provisory counties. With the mobilization of large material resources, state institutions were created within two years, the necessary buildings, health centres, pharmacies, public baths, economic and cultural associations, banks, schools, and churches being brought to life (Negulescu 1928: 719–734). By the end of the year 1878, the region was regarded as an ancient Romanian land and an integral part of Romania's national heritage. But how exactly did the whole process take place?

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2 Turks, Tartars, Romanians, Bulgarians, Russians, Ukrainians, Lipovans, Greeks, Armenians, Serbs, Jews, Italians, Albanians, and Arabs.

The Romanian Administrative-Territorial System and the Development of North Dobruja between 1878 and 1913

The Romanian administration was created during the period of 1859–1866 in the course of the unification of Moldavia and Muntenia; the administrative-territorial system of these two autonomous principalities within the Ottoman Empire was also unified during this period. The country now called Romania was divided into counties (Ro: *județ*),[3] the counties into districts (Ro: *plasă, ocol*),[4] and the districts into communes and villages. A commune was made up of villages and farmsteads, which were the smallest administrative units.[5] The head of a county was the prefect. In the districts, the vice-prefect was the leader in the beginning, but then, starting from 1918, this role was taken over by the praetor, while the towns and villages were led by a mayor (Ro: *primar*). The members of the county and local councils were elected based on census. As this short presentation shows, the constitution of Romania had very modern objectives, among which sharing of power (Ungureanu 2009).

The independence of Romania as a monarchy was officially proclaimed on 13 March 1881, after which event the former prince was crowned as Charles I;[6] however, the Romanian state based on a constitutional monarchy started the transformation of its administrative-territorial system in 1878, even before the Congress of Berlin. The new, internationally recognized state borrowed its administrative-territorial, cultural, and educational models from France, just as it did during the above-mentioned period at the time of the unification of Moldavia and Muntenia (Raffay 1989).

Based on the administrative-territorial system of Romania, three provisory counties are created[7] in Dobruja, with a total of nine districts, on 28–30 September 1878:[8] Tulcea County with Măcin, Sulina, Tulcea, and Babadag; Constanța County with Constanța, Mangalia, and Hârşova; New Silistra County with Megidia and Silistra Nouă. The seats of the counties were in Tulcea, Constanța, and Rasova.[9] According to the data provided by Leonida Colescu in 1878, Northern Dobruja had approximately 169,000 inhabitants (Iordachi 2002: 9–10). Immediately after the new administrative units and their institutions had been created, the functioning of

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3   Until now, the mid-level settlements in Moldavia have been the lands (Ro: *ținut*).
4   In Muntenia, the district system had a tradition, but not in Moldavia.
5   The unified Moldavia and Muntenia principalities started using the name Romania from 1866 based on the new Constitution of the same year, issued on 1 July.
6   Karl von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen.
7   Constanța, Tulcea, and Silistra Nouă.
8   Before the territory of Dobruja was divided between the Principality of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Romania based on the 1864 administrative reform of the Ottoman Empire, the whole of the region had reorganized into the Danube Vilayet that had two sanjaks, Silistra and Tulcea. Within the Sanjak of Tulcea, which was given to Romania, there were thirteen kazas, and their capital was the town of Tulcea, which also gave the name of the sanjak.
9   Prefects of the counties: Constanța – Remus Opreanu, Tulcea – Gheroghe M. Ghica, Silistra Nouă – Grigore P. Cantilli.

the three counties needed special procedures. First, every village was treated as an independent commune, and then the local council was formed, and the mayors took their offices in each of them by the end of the year. According to Remus Opreanu, the Prefect of Constanța County, this was a necessary step because the whole region was dominated by anarchy, the settlements were in a dilapidated condition, the population was starving, and a great number of robbers was looting the villages.[10] The derogation from the law and the extension of control were necessary in order to ensure the stabilization of these conditions, to create living spaces, to ensure security and other basic needs. It is probable that due to the above causes the continuous changes were thought necessary by the authorities: e.g. both in the case of Tulcea and Constanța, the prefects were replaced, the seat of New Silistra County was first moved to Cernavodă and then to Medgidia already before April 1879 (Negulescu 1928: 719–734). However, Constatin Iordachi considers that this special administrative regime in the province was meant to give the government a free hand in implementing a gradual programme aimed at the socioeconomic, political, and ethnic assimilation of Dobruja's inhabitants. To confirm his theory, he invokes the political debate of the time between the liberal and conservative parties, which were focusing on the assimilation/dissimilation issue of the region. The Conservative Party was pleading for an autonomous, multicultural confessional organization in the region whereby each ethnic group would govern itself in its own language, whereas the Liberal Party desired the complete assimilation of the region with an administrative-territorial, cultural, and educational system directed from Bucharest (Iordachi 2002: 9–14). As we will see in more detail below, a decision was made to fully assimilate the region, the exact aspects of which strategy will be developed by 1882. In essence, this decision is the first step that the independent Romania will take with regard to the integration policy of a newly acquired territory.

Based on a new law regarding the reorganization of Dobruja promulgated on 9 May 1880, a new administrative-territorial division was implemented. Instead of the three counties, only two were created, Tulcea and Constanța, the latter now also comprising the whole of Silistra Nouă County. Tulcea County was made up of four[11] districts and Constanța of five.[12] Within the districts, both counties had seven townships;[13] Tulcea had 56 communes made up of 120 villages and Constanța 72 communes made up of 301 villages. According to Dumitru Valentin Pătrașcu (2011), this administrative reorganization and the preceding implementation of laws regarding justice, tax system and customs service, land and forest management, a system similar to the other regions of the state was created in only two years. Although Dobruja was formally

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10   The population of the region was around 135,000-140,000.
11   Babadag, Tulcea, Macin, and Sulina districts.
12   Constanța, Mangalia, Medgidia, Harsova, and Silistra Nouă.
13   Tulcea townships: Tulcea, Chilia Veche, Babadag, Sulina, Isaccea, Măcin, and Mahmudia; the townships of Constanța: Constanța, Medjidia, Cernavodă, Hîrșova, Mangalia, Cuzgun, and Ostrov.

incorporated into Romania, it still had a separate, exceptional administrative regime. Thus, the inhabitants of the region gained their citizenships in 1878, but they did not gain political rights. After the 1880 law had come into force, they were theoretically able to exercise their political rights. Practically, from 1878 to 1908, the inhabitants of the region enjoyed only a local type of citizenship, but their political emancipation was only gradually validated in 1908–1913 (Iordachi 2002: 20–24). This means that every administrative-territorial unit and institution was governed by Romanians moved to Dobruja from other regions of the state. Following these measures, which meant to rebuild and repopulate the province, the boundaries of the counties were no more modified (Negulescu 1928: 722–732) though the districts of the region were reorganized several times (Lahovari 1902: 651–657).[14] It is clear that the management of the region remained highly centralized even after a series of administrative reorganizations, a fact that indicates that until a clear assimilation of the area's inhabitants took place, the administrative tasks would be performed by external management.

Starting with 1879, the population of Constanța was on the rise, and in 1880 it had a population of 64,902, out of which 14,884 were Romanians, 14,974 Turkish, 22,584 Tartars, 8,492 Bulgarians, and 4,000 other nationalities. Tulcea County shows a similar tendency and ethnic composition. In the same period, the population of the latter county was 75,070. From 1881 onwards, the population of Dobruja is mostly filled with settlers from Romania's other regions and with the immigrants of other countries (Rădulescu et al. 1998: 358–360), a process that was in line with Romania's planned, strategic considerations. The significant number of the settlers is also confirmed by the fact that new villages were created for them, e.g. Făgăraşul Nou, Caramurat (Negulescu 1928: 723). Another important aspect was that, especially during the early years of the new administrative system, the Principality of Bulgaria encouraged ethnic Bulgarians to move from Northern Dobruja to Southern Dobruja (Rădulescu et al. 1998: 363–364). This could have resulted in a drop in population, but it was not the case as the empty villages were almost immediately colonized with the newly arrived settlers. Starting with 1880, Italians from Friuli and Veneto also settled in the northern regions of Dobruja: some worked in the granite mines of the Măcin Mountains, while others worked as simple farmers (Marian et al. 2008: 133–147). These population exchange practices suggest that they are part of a more complex plan. What we can see between 1879 and 1881 is practically the partial evacuation of the region, the reduction of its indigenous population, and then, as a second step, its replenishment from other regions of Romania and establishing settlements of ethnic groups belonging to different Latin language families.

There was a great number of factors defining the development of North Dobruja and its organization similar to the rest of Romania's other regions. As it was mentioned in the introduction, Romania took over this region in 1878 in a state of dilapidation, where the lack of infrastructure, state authorities, and basic resources

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14   In 1892, 1897, and 1909.

were dominant. The process of rebuilding the region and its infrastructure was rapid in order to replace and reshape the above-mentioned aspects but also to quickly assimilate local minorities (Iordachi 2002). In just two years, the infrastructure of public institutions, the buildings that accommodated them, and economic and educational institutions were established. Special attention was given to education, and one of the objectives was to aid the assimilation of the different nationalities. As an illustration of the above, the 19 newly built schools of Constanța County that operated between 1879 and 1880 had courses exclusively in Romanian language but also hired Muslim (Turkish and Tartar) teachers.[15] One could see this as a gesture of good faith towards a community still in majority, but at the same time one could ask why none of these newly founded educational institutions were not exclusively made available for the Muslim community. Furthermore, it was a custom to send away pupils to Bucharest and Iași on a scholarship, and to be seen off by their colleagues and teachers on the day of their departure while the anthem of Romania was being played. The data regarding Tulcea County are scarcer, but the report of Prefect Paul Stănescu shows that in 1885 there were 105 educational institutions in the county. It is probable that the practices detailed regarding Constanța County were valid in this case as well, as the strategies of the central power regarding Dobruja were based on a unified vision (Negulescu 1928).

In 1881, 25 Romanian churches were built on the territory of Constanța County, and in 1882 the cathedral of Constanța was also finished, all these being financed by the state. During the same period, the local Romanian leaders encouraged the Muslim population to build mosques, but there is no information regarding whether the Romanian state offered any financing, which leads us to the conclusion that there were none. According to the Bulgarian historians, after 1885, the Romanian church authorities took control of all local churches, except two in the cities of Tulcea and Constanța, which managed to retain their traditional Slavic Bulgarian liturgy (Kosev et al. 1963). In contrast with the 25 Romanian churches built within one year, between 1879 and 1900, the ethnic Bulgarians built 15 new churches in North Dobruja (Rădulescu et al. 1998: 365). Although the lands and other possessions were not owned by a narrow layer of the local communities, these properties were still reallocated among the native and settled populations in order to 'ensure public welfare'. Ultimately, in 1882, monuments that commemorated the region's annexation to Romania and the symbols of the state were erected (Negulescu 1928: 722–727). Although the increase in the region's population can be attributed to those who moved largely from other regions of Romania, in terms of education policies and church construction directives, these strategies were primarily aimed at assimilating indigenous communities and not serving the newly arrived inhabitants.

By 1896, the population of Constanța County had doubled in comparison with the numbers of 1880, numbering a total of 112,227, out of which 56,617 people declared

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15   Previously, Constanța County had a total of 37 educational institutions.

themselves Romanian. The number of educational institutions also rose: at this time, there were 83 schools. At the same time, at the intervention of D. Bănescu, building the road system of the county also started. Regarding the development of Tulcea County, details are to be found in Luca Ionescu's report. Compared to the year 1880, here the population had also almost doubled by 1904, counting 136,213, out of which 51,442 considered themselves Romanians. Ionescu openly and clearly assumed the fact that the most important achievement of the last 25 years had been the population, colonization of the Danube Delta with ethnic Romanians and the total assimilation of the multi-ethnic population, namely the national, confessional, economic, and political unification. The 1904 report of Constanța County detailed similar results and directives, and according to this the population of Constanța was 139,570 at the time, out of which 80,137 people considered themselves Romanians. At the same time, Prefect Scarlat Vârnav, by expressing his thoughts on expanding the territorial possessions of the county, also revealed Romania's simple strategy regarding Dobruja, i.e. his single and continuous activity regarding the region can only be the strengthening of the Romanian nation by growing the numbers of the population. In 1911, the population of Constanța County was 172,838, and then, in 1921, it increased to 176,989, out of which 119,304 declared themselves Romanian (Negulescu 1928: 719–734). So, by the early 20th century, clear statements proved the intention of colonization as a strategy and goal underlying the artificial increase in the region's population.

After 1882, a well-transparent scheme was established among the many colonization strategies, defining four main categories that were implemented in the following order: (1) massive colonization with citizens from Romania's other regions; (2) colonization with ethnic Romanians from abroad; (3) colonization with ethnic groups of Latin origin, such as Italians, French, or Spanish people; (4) non-Latin foreign colonists. In addition to the massive colonization with ethnic Romanians of the region, other four main factors facilitated the assimilation of North Dobrogea: (1) the establishment of a highly centralized political and administrative regime; (2) the exclusion of Dobruja's non-Romanian economic elites from political rights; (3) cultural homogenization; (4) nationalization of landed property (Iordachi 2002: 28–32). Putting this strategy into practice, it is clear that in terms of the region's ethnic composition, homogenization was the primary goal and not the preservation of diversity and multiculturalism.

The next important change that affects Dobruja comes about in the first years of the 20th century. The nations of the Balkans organized different movements in a great number of cases for various reasons, the results of which were revolts, rebellions. Taking advantage of the development that after the Italo–Turkish War of 1911 the Ottoman Empire was considerably weakened, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia created the League of Balkans in 1912, having the objective the total liberation of the territories they considered their own. They declared war to the Ottoman Empire in the same year, and thus the First Balkan War has started. Within

six months, the League of Balkans emerged victorious, but due to the dissatisfaction with the results of the Treaty of London regarding the territories, the League broke up, and its former members, completed with the Ottoman Empire and Romania, started the Second Balkan War against Bulgaria. The second peace treaty was signed in August 1913 in Bucharest by Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia, putting a definitive end to the Balkan War. Under the provisions of the peace treaty, Romania obtained South Dobruja from Bulgaria,[16] including the fortress of Silistra and the town of Balchik (Jelavich 1996: 75–98).

The Administrative-Territorial Changes of North and South Dobruja between 1913 and 1926

Before South Dobruja became part of Romania, its administrative-territorial transformation had been slower compared to the northern territories annexed to Romania after 1878. The foundations for the development of the Principality of Bulgaria's state organization were laid with the help of the Russian Empire, and then in 1881 the framework and forms of administration were defined (Demeter et al. 2020: 155–225). The territory of the Principality of Bulgaria was divided into 21 administrative units (okrug), of which the territory of South Dobruja included Silistra and Varna counties. The counties were divided into districts (okolia) and these again into smaller areas (obshtina). The small areas with local administration contained several farmsteads, villages, and towns. Silistra had three and Varna five districts.[17] The county system of Bulgaria was modified first in 1888 and then again in 1893, but none of these changes had a significant effect on the territory of South Dobruja.[18] At the same time, it must be underlined that the three districts of Silistra were modified in 1888.[19] During the period of 1900–1910, a great number of administrative-territorial changes were implemented, this time affecting both counties in South Dobruja. Among the three districts of Silistra, one was merged into Varna, one into Ruse, and the remaining one was completely dismembered, abolishing its independence.[20] Varna County lost one of its districts from before 1900, but, being expanded with Kurt-Bunar[21] District of Silistra, its territory did not actually change (Cannon 2019).

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16   During the Second Balkan War, the Romanian generals used to call South Dobruja as Cardrilater, this name being in use today as well.

17   The districts of Silistra: Bazaurt, Khaskovo, Silistra; the districts of Varna: Balchic, Varna, Pazardzhik (Dobric from 1882), Khadzhioglu, and Dobrici.

18   First, the 21 counties are increased to 23, and then, by merging several counties, their final number is 20.

19   The new district system: Ak-Kadzhilar, Kurt-Bunar, Silistra (Bazaurt and Khaskovo disappeared).

20   Ak-Kadzhilar can no longer be found in any of the counties.

21   Districts of Ruse County: Biala, Razgrad, Ruse, Silistra, Tutrakan; districts of Varna County: Balchik, Dobrich, Kurt-Bunar, Provadiia, Varna.

As a result of signing the 1913 Bucharest Peace Treaty that ended the Balkan Wars, Cadrilater (Southern Dobruja) becomes part of Romania, and thus the number of the country's counties increases from 32 to 34 (Jelavich 1996). The Romanian authorities reorganize the Bulgarian administrative-territorial system of the region in the same year, creating Dobrici County out of the former Varna Okrug and Durostor County out of Silistra Okrug. While Dobrici was reorganized under the Romanian authority without major territorial changes, Durostor was expanded with the settlements of Constanța County's Ostrov District, thus increasing the territory it had under Bulgarian control. In Dobrici County, three districts were created with a total of 233 villages,[22] and its seat became the town of Dobrici with which the Romanian authorities have organized three townships.[23] The number of districts of the North Dobruja Constanța County was reduced to four from five, all except one being also renamed.[24] The town of Ostrov and the neighbouring territories were reorganized into Durostor County. The latter would have four districts with a total of 195 villages,[25] its seat became Silistra and with it there would be three townships. On 1 April 1914, just before the outbreak of WWI, both the name of Dobrici town and of the county were changed. The county would be given the name Caliacra of Greek origin,[26] while the town would be called Bazargic.[27] At the same time, the administrative-territorial reorganization took place in the region: similarly to North Dobruja, a fierce Romanization was started following the paradigms and practices detailed in the previous chapter. First, a decision was taken in Bucharest about assimilating the newly acquired territory without asking the local communities about their intentions. As a second step in the process, the immediate administrative-territorial reorganization and the nationalization of landed property were put into practice. In parallel, they established a highly centralized political and administrative regime, intentionally excluding South Dobruja's non-Romanian economic elites from political rights. The next step consisted in the implementation of colonization strategies described by Iordachi: the partial evacuation of the region, the reduction of its indigenous population, the population exchanges, replenishment from other regions of Romania, and establishing settlements of ethnic groups belonging to different Latin language families (Iordachi 2002: 28–32). The last step in the process was the cultural homogenization mostly by educational policies, language use restrictions, and church construction directives.

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22   Balchik (72 settlements), Casim (63 settlements), Ezibei (98 settlements).
23   Dobrici, Balchik, Cavarna.
24   Thus, the four districts of the county are: Dunărea (seat at Hârşova), Mangalia (seat at Mangalia), Ovidiu (seat at Constanța), and Traian (seat at Megidia).
25   Accadanlar (48 settlements), Curtbunar (41 settlements), Silistra (63 settlements), and Turtucaia (43 settlements).
26   Kaliakra received its name from Cape Caliacra of the Black Sea.
27   Three centuries before 1882, it was called Hacioglu Pazarcik (small market); its founder, Hacioglu Bakal was, an Ottoman merchant. The Romanian Bazargic is derived from the Turkish Pazarcik.

In 1913, the population of the territory just obtained from the Principality of Bulgaria had roughly a population of 300,000, 2% (6,000 people) of which considering themselves ethnic Romanians (Sweet 1957: 336). In the same year, the population of North Dobruja, which had been under Romanian authority for 35 years, numbered 380,430 persons, out of which 216,425 (56.8%) declared themselves Romanian (Roman 1919). Totalling these numbers, when Dobruja's territory was united under Romanian control in 1913, the region's population was just over 680,000, out of which only 222,000 people, i.e. 33% of the population considered themselves Romanian (Boia 2001: 182). It must be mentioned that until the 1925 administrative reforms, the territory of North Dobruja's counties and districts did not change.

Except for a few years, South Dobruja remained part of Romania during WW2, with insignificant changes in the administrative-territorial composition,[28] up until when the Treaty of Craiova[29] was signed by Bulgaria and Romania on 7 September 1940 (Ciorbea 2017: 51–76).[30] After Romania had entered WW1 as an ally of France and Russia, the Central Powers occupied many regions of Romania, including the whole of Dobruja. Starting with 1916, a German military general governorate was set up in Romania under Germany's control, which until 1918 represented the highest power in the state. Under the command of the general governorate, there were three military governorates,[31] one of which in Dobruja (both in the North and South) was working under Turkish, Bulgarian, and German government (Balla 2017: 114–120). Shortly after the end of WW1, in accordance with the Treaty of Neuilly of 1919, Romania had regained its lost territories and within a few months had reinstated the administrative-territorial system from before 1916, a system that was changed only in 1925 when a new law for the unification of administration was adopted in the wake of organizing Greater Romania.

Greater Romania's first administrative law adopted on 14 June 1925 was meant to unify the administration of the different regions, abolishing their characteristics (Lua 1925). Although starting with the adoption of the new administrative law all regulations came into force, the Parliament introduced an amending law on 22 December 1925 due to which the implementation of the first unifying administrative-territorial law took place only on 1 January 1926 (Lmp 1925). In regard to Dobruja's four counties, Tulcea suffered only minor changes, renaming the Sulina and Tulcea districts to Gurile Dunării and Topolog.[32] At this time, the four districts of Tulcea

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28 The Paris Treaty confirmed the 1940 borderline between the two countries.
29 According to the treaty, the ethnic Romanian (Aromanians and Megleno-Romanians, settlers from the other regions of Romania and natives) population was forced to leave the territories regained by Bulgaria, and in turn the Romanians drove the Northern Bulgarian minorities away; so, there was a population exchange.
30 During WW1, between 1916 and 1918, Bulgaria took the Cadrilater back from Romania.
31 Muntenia, Bucharest, and Dobruja.
32 Thus, the four districts of the county are: Babadag (seat at Babadag), Măcin (seat at Măcin), Gurile Dunării (seat at Tulcea), and Topolog (seat at Topolog).

County included 155 villages,[33] its seat remained the town of Tulcea, and the number of the town's communes was reduced from seven to five.[34] In the case of the other three counties, significant changes were implemented. The four districts of Constanța were increased to seven, and one of them was renamed.[35] At this time, the seven districts of the county were made up of 202 villages,[36] its seat remained at Constanța, and the number of the town's communes was increased from four to eight.[37] In Caliacra County, a fourth district of forty settlements was created under the name Stejarul. In the case of Durostor County, a similar renaming was implemented by dividing Silistra into two: District Doimuşlar with 33 villages and District Ostrov with 30 settlements were created. As a result of the administrative-territorial reorganizations, the four districts of the newly created Caliacra encompassed 233 villages,[38] its seat remained Bazargic, and it also retained the number of the communes.[39] The five districts of Durostor County encompassed a total of 195 villages,[40] retaining its seat at Silistra and also the number of the communes.

The regulations regarding the unification of administration manifested in measures meant to facilitate the assimilation of national minorities. As an example, one can highlight the law regarding elementary education adopted on 26 July 1926, which – as in the case of Szeklerland – did not favour Dobruja. Starting with the following academic year, paragraph 159 of the above mentioned law ordered the setting up of so-called 'culture zones' in the case of 20 counties[41] where the number of ethnic minorities was significant (Balogh 1996: 64). The essence of these provisions was to bring in ethnic Romanian teachers, offering significant financial aid for those who promoted the Romanian language and culture through their activities and worked in order to facilitate the assimilation of national minorities. The law ensured this financial aid for teachers for a period of ten years, and those who settled in the settlements in question were given a complimentary ten-acre property (Hamangiu 1926: 555).

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33   Babadag (27 villages), Măcin (37 settlements), Gurile Dunării (57 settlements), and Topolog (34 settlements).
34   Communes of Tulcea County: Tulcea, Babadag, Sulina, Isaccea, and Măcin.
35   Thus, the seven districts of the county are: Cernavodă (seat at Cernavodă), Dunărea (seat at Hârşova), Ferdinand I (seat at Constanța), Mangalia (seat at Mangalia), Megidia (seat at Megidia), Negru Vodă (seat at Negru Vodă), and Traian (seat at Corvin).
36   Cernavodă (15 settlements), Dunărea (26 settlements), Ferdinand I (37 settlements), Mangalia (24 settlements), Megidia (26 settlements), Negru Vodă (37 settlements), and Traian (37 settlements).
37   Communes of Constanța County: Constanța, Carmen-Sylva, Cernavodă, Hârşova, Mangalia, Megidia, Techirghiol.
38   Balchik (72 settlements), Casim (63 settlements), Ezibei (58 settlements), and Stejarul (40 settlements).
39   Dobrici, Balchik, Cavarna.
40   Accadanlar (48 settlements), Curtbunar (41 settlements), Silistra (33 settlements), Turtucaia (43 settlements), and Ostrov (30 settlements).
41   Ten in Transylvania: Bihor, Sălaj, Maramureş, Hunedoara, Odorhei, Ciuc, Trei Scaune, Mureş-Turda, Turda-Arieş; four in Bukovina: Vişniţa, Văscăuţi, Cotmani, Zastavna; four in Bessarabia: Hotin, Tighina, Cetatea-Albă, Ismail; two in South Dobruja (Cadrilater): Durostor, Caliacra.

Beyond the feeling of life resulted from this discriminative phenomenon (Tóth Sz. 2009: 525–532),[42] the indignation of the local communities was fuelled by the fact that the funds set apart for the building of schools were used only to build schools where the language of education was Romanian, and only those school buildings were repaired where the institution was then transformed into a Romanian one.

So far, Romania had largely succeeded in enforcing its assimilation strategies, and from this point on the region was treated in historiography as an integral part of the Romanian Old Kingdom. In spite of its highly individualized geographical and unique, ethnically diverse demographic character, the case of Dobruja as a distinguished region received only limited attention. This aspect can be explained by the process of the Romanian nation- and state-building and the aspect of the national consolidation of Greater Romania, which focuses almost unilaterally on the validation of the country's rights to the region (Iordachi 2002).

Conclusions

After the region had been broken off from the Ottoman Empire, Dobruja's administrative-territorial system changed several times in order to acclimatize and maintain the Romanian rule over the region. After Dobruja had been annexed to Romania, the state's central powers started a rapid administrative-territorial reorganization to begin the assimilation process of the local ethnicities, termed by them integration. In fact, this so-called integration manifested itself in implementing the strategies of the state leadership, supporting mass migration in the region by bringing settlers here in large groups, more precisely different communities from other Romanian regions. Taking this aspect into account, it can be stated that the political elite took the first step towards the colonization of Dobruja.

In addition to the region's massive colonization with ethnic Romanians, four main reasons facilitated assimilating the region: first of all, the nationalization of landed property, after which the establishment of a highly centralized political and administrative regime, the exclusion of Dobruja's non-Romanian economic elites from political rights, and, last but not least, cultural homogenization. Putting this assimilation strategy into practice, it is clear that in terms of the ethnic composition of the region, homogenization was the primary goal and not the preservation of diversity and multiculturalism. All these factors contributed to the Romanian nation- and state-building process, which later, especially after WWI, was considered a successful model and an example to follow in the case of Transylvania, the Székelyland, Partium, Banat, Bukovina, and Bessarabia.

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42   In the case of Romanians coming from other counties, we are talking about positive discrimination, while the local Romanian and ethnic Hungarian population was discriminated.

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Szeklers' Aspirations for Autonomy: Unconstitutionality or Lack of Political Will?

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A Review of the Volume
Attila Dabis: *Misbeliefs about Autonomy. The Constitutionality of the Autonomy of Szeklerland*[1]

Attila Dabis is a political scientist, the Foreign Affairs Commissioner of the Szekler National Council and the International Coordinator of the Institute for the Protection of Minority Rights. Personal motivations undoubtedly contributed to the writing of his book, which is why, although the publisher categorizes the volume as history and political science, emotions are present to some extent, and the reader might feel a frustration that is similar to what the Szeklers have experienced in many cases. The author also reports on his own experiences when he mentions that he was not allowed to cross the Hungarian–Romanian border to attend the annual Szekler Freedom Day in 2018.

In the introduction, the author defines the concept of autonomy as follows: 'Generally, autonomy in minority rights-related literature refers to self-government of a group or territory within a state and can be divided, most simplistically, into territorial and personal autonomy. (…) While the former is based on the whole population of a territorial unit, the latter is based on the members of a specific minority' (p. 22).

For the Szeklers, the goal is to achieve territorial autonomy. However, the Draft Law on the Autonomous Status of Szeklerland (DL) has already been rejected four times (2004, 2005, 2018, 2020) by Romanian decision makers, arguing that such a DL is unconstitutional as it endangers the sovereignty, unity, and indivisibility of the state. As the title suggests, the primary purpose of the book is to deconstruct misbeliefs and misconceptions about autonomy and to dispel the 'constitutional myth', which is perceived as an argument against Szekler autonomy by the Romanian majority.

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1   Attila Dabis. 2021. *Misbeliefs about Autonomy.* Berlin: Peter Lang Verlag, p. 186, ISBN 9783631855805.

On the one hand, the text is a retrospection outlining the events and important historical moments that contributed to the spread of this myth and, on the other hand, an analysis of the Romanian Constitution, the DL, and the decisions relating to the latter. As a conclusion, the author outlines feasible policy implications that may lead to the achievement of the Szekler (territorial) autonomy.

The book is well-structured, and it consists of five chapters as follows: (1) Introduction, (2) Autonomy and the Constitution of a Nation State, (3) Deconstructing the Constitutional Barrier, (4) Policy Implications, and (5) Conclusions. These are divided into subchapters, thus helping the reader along the way to learn the history and situation of the Szeklers, to form a general picture of autonomy, and to understand the arguments presented against the misbeliefs about autonomy.

The introduction may seem unusually long at first glance (61 pages). Nevertheless, this chapter allows those who have previously been completely unfamiliar with the debate over Szekler autonomy to explore the subject. In this section, the author defines several concepts (different forms of autonomy, self-government, home rule, self-rule, devolution, federalism, etc.) and then places the topic and the problem of autonomy rejection into a theoretical and methodological framework. The historical perspective focuses on the events, declarations, and treaties that contributed to the formation of today's borders and ethnic composition of Romania, the Hungarian minority's aspirations towards autonomy, and the country's political culture.

Part of the problem that Szeklerland (or Székely Land – another name used in English) is not recognized as an autonomous administrative unit is that Romania often appears internationally as a role model with regard to the discourse on national minorities. However, practice shows the opposite. The author presents the two rounds of evaluation (in 2012 and in 2017) of the Romanian undertakings of The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (see pp. 44–50) – this is one of the most important parts of the volume. The evaluations show that Romania fulfils only 14 out of the 61 undertakings, the most problematic part being the use of the Hungarian language by administrative authorities and public services.

The first chapter also covers the problem of religious and economic discrimination and the constraints on the use of Hungarian/Szekler symbols. It also highlights cases showing that the authorities use a double standard depending on whether, for example, a demonstration is being organized by the majority (Romanians) or the minority population (Hungarians/Szeklers). According to Dabis, this double standard stems (also) from the fact that there are often grey areas in the law (such as the usage of flags) that are deliberately misinterpreted. At the end of the first chapter, the author's position is already outlined: the obstacle to the pursuit of autonomy is not the law but the lack of political will.

The second chapter reviews the previous constitutions as well as the current one, the articles of which are presented by the decision makers as arguments against Szekler autonomy: 'Article 1 (1) Romania is a sovereign, independent, unitary and

indivisible National State'[2] (p. 27). The dominance of the majority has already been outlined in previous constitutions that did not grant citizenship to non-Christians – this perception has been inherited by today's Romanian society, which in this case would not deprive the minority of its citizenship, but it simply considers territorial autonomy unacceptable. It should be added, however, that the current constitution only rejects the notion of territorial autonomy but accepts personal autonomy, autonomy of religious cults, functional autonomy of universities, and local autonomy of territorial administrative units.

The rest of the chapter and the next one ('Deconstructing the Constitutional Barrier') are worth reading in parallel because Dabis is in fact challenging the arguments against Szekler territorial autonomy. Owing to the structure, the arguments and counter-arguments can be easily followed, which are divided into two major parts, and one can also read the analysis of Opinion No. 405/2004 and of Decision No. 80/2014 of the Constitutional Court of Romania. The study reveals the following substantive and procedural objections to Szekler autonomy and the DL: (1) the DL wants to create another entity besides the nation-state; (2) this issue is a national and not an international matter; (3) it violates the principle of equality between citizens; (4) it threatens the unity, indivisibility, and sovereignty of Romania; (5) the use of Hungarian national symbols is also unconstitutional; (6) the Hungarian and Romanian languages become equal; (7) the Romanian Constitution only recognizes the following administrative units: communes, towns, counties; the autonomy presupposes the creation of a new administrative unit; (8) referring to the Administrative Law 215/2001, they complain that a referendum should have taken place.

The author concludes in his analysis that the argument of unconstitutionality is not valid in either case since the establishment of Szeklerland as an autonomous region 'would not result in the creation of a separate state entity parallel with the Romanian state' (p. 105), the borders of the country would not change, and the Szeklers would remain Romanian citizens – and citizens must be guaranteed equal rights without discrimination. The use of Hungarian and Szekler symbols and the use of the Hungarian language are not part of a zero-sum game and do not imply the abolition of Romanian symbols in the territory; the Romanian language would not cease to be an official language. Furthermore, Dabis highlights another problem related to minority rights: 'if a national minority cannot use its symbols, not even in areas where it represents the overwhelming majority, that is equivalent to denying the right of national minorities to identity' (p. 120).

The reader can also learn about how other countries deal with the issue of autonomy, which can be a starting point for solving the 'Szekler problem'. The fourth chapter ('Policy Implications') is actually a set of recommendations formulated for the following political actors: the Romanian State, the minority community, the

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2   The original article in Romanian is as follows: „România este stat naţional, suveran şi independent, unitar şi indivizibil."

kin-state, and the international community. In formulating these proposals, the conclusions of Cunningham,[3] Ghai and Woodman,[4] Lapidoth,[5] and Shaykhutdinov[6] are important points of reference. They point out that the implementation of autonomy is positively influenced if the citizens belonging to a given minority are concentrated in a certain area within the country, there is a consensus within the minority group, there is an international mediator, the country has a democratic history and respects the rule of law, or the country is in some kind of crisis. In his book, Dabis proposes two solutions for the Romanian state: one requires the amendment of the Constitution or the adoption of a new one, resulting in a federation or a regionalized state, and the other one simply assumes a different interpretation of the Constitution. The minority group should work on domestic trust-building together with the majority, and the most influential minority party must also take a stand on the issue on an ongoing basis. Furthermore, it is necessary for the kin-state to maintain good neighbourly relations with Romania. Besides this, the international community can also play a role in the positive development of the Szekler autonomy (see the example of the Åland Islands).

All in all, Dabis concludes that the Constitution does not provide a real legal barrier to the creation of an autonomous administrative unit, and the rejection of autonomy stems from a lack of political will, as decision makers see this solution as a threat to national security. Citing the words of the author, 'if one reads the Romanian constitution without an ethnocentric mindset and in line with international documents ratified by Romania, it is very much possible to adopt an interpretation of the constitution that is open to accommodate minority claims on regional power-sharing' (p. 158). Overall, the author has made a real effort to deconstruct the 'constitutional myth', and the book fills a gap by offering a plan to achieve the goal. The volume is highly recommended to decision makers, previously listed political actors, scholars dedicated to political science, history, and law, and to any 'simple' citizen who is willing to read the book with an open mind and is able to leave the Romanian majority approach behind.

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3   See: Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher. 2007. *Divided and Conquered: Why States and Self-Determination Groups Fail in Bargaining over Autonomy.* San Diego: University of California Electronic Theses and Dissertations.

4   See: Ghai, Yash–Woodman, Sophia. 2013. Comparative Perspectives on Institutional Frameworks for Autonomy. In: Ghai, Yash–Woodman, Sophia (eds), *Practising Self-Government. A Comparative Study of Autonomous Regions.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 449–486.

5   See: Lapidoth, Ruth. 1997. *Autonomy – Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts.* Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press.

6   See: Shaykhutdinov, Renat. 2010. Give Peace a Chance: Nonviolent Protest and the Creation of Territorial Autonomy Arrangements. *Journal of Peace Research* 47(2): 179–191.

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