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When Our Space Closes, It Opens Our Minds

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Abstract. The object of the study is the problem of the ongoing epidemic, which affects the entire society and many fields of activity. Using associative logic, I focused on the approach which states that development based on ecology cannot be learned at school as the key of development is awareness. I presented the topic examining the social factors in three time period sections (Reorganization 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0), and I analysed it using historical sources as well as my previous studies referring to village research.

Keywords: pandemic, Covid-19, Szekler village laws, sustainable development, awareness

Introduction/Topic

My work was carried out in the context of the research on the effects of the pandemic, within the science of historical geography, and it can contribute to the handling of the crisis caused by the epidemic as an auxiliary or background science. It can also make people aware of the importance of reorganization.

In this spirit, the topic of the study is guided by the social problems caused by the epidemic as well as the rules and regulations which include an ecological perspective. These prove that the communities of a given period of time and space were aware of the fact that the survival of the inhabitants of the settlement depended on the 'right regulations' which concerned the entire community (Imreh 1983: 5–7). Given their ancient nature and the fact that they were tested during the centuries, we can presume that the deep unity of these regulations were not based on some vision coming from higher authorities, on an irresponsible practice of development through quantity and growth but on a specific ecological perspective which brings benefits to the entire community. In fact, in the crisis caused by Covid-19, all that people need to do is to continue what they realized, applied, and operated during the centuries. If we turn to organic, subject-based community models which respect nature and were matured by the past centuries, it does not

mean a step back, a regression. It can mean a wise search for the right path, a hope to rediscover the respect for the laws of nature.

I examined these social factors, and I will present the topic in three time period sections (1.0, 2.0, and 3.0). I analysed them using the historical sources and my previous studies. I relied on mentality, which assumes functionality, and on interdisciplinarity based on geography as I tried to prove, in my way and with my instruments, that a learning and awareness process can help us handle different processes of life, including a pandemic, if we recognize and apply the best possible solutions. If we run into a dead-end, we do not need more knowledge but recognition, partly renewed knowledge, and, first of all, awareness based on system-oriented, holistic thinking. This holistic, system-based approach includes ecological knowledge as we live in a unitary, evolving, and organic system where everything is interconnected and every change has its reasons and consequences. Sustainability cannot be understood without the recognition of that. If we turn to the system-based knowledge of the Szekler village *tízes*, not only history, local history, and the individual can get richer, but we can also have the chance to realize that we can still live comfortably with less consumption and more saving.

Types of Reorganization after Global Crises

There have been several crises and states of emergency in the history of mankind. However, these were mainly local. It is remarkable that the first phenomenon which can be called global was an epidemic. It was the plague epidemic called the 'Great Death' or the 'Black Death',[1] which started in 1347, in the Middle Ages. According to our current knowledge, this epidemic also originated from China and reached the shores of the Black Sea through India, sweeping through the whole of Europe and other inhabited continents beyond in several waves (*Figure 1*). One of the defining traits of this global phenomenon was also mobility as people, animals, merchandise, and money moved in this space. It is well-known that the plague was carried through the main trade routes by merchant ships as these ships were infested with rats and fleas, which spread the bacteria called Yersinia pestis. When they got ashore, these infected domestic animals and people ended up killing approximately one third of the mainland population.

The epidemic soon spread in Szeklerland, too. Between the 14th and 18th centuries, we can keep count of more than 40 plague epidemic waves which reached this corner of the Earth. In many cases, this tiny pathogenic agent decided the fate of families and settlements. The data we have show that the plague killed

1 European writers contemporary with the plague described it first in Latin (*pestis* or *pestilentia*). Later, most European languages used the expression 'Great Death' and, from the 16th and 17th century, 'Black Death'.

38–40% of Szeklerland (Pál-Antal 2012: 3–23). Drought and the subsequent famine made this situation even worse.



Source: https://www.britannica.com/event/Black-Death, December 2020

Figure 1. *The spread of the plague in the 14th century*

Table 1. *The total population of Szeklerland between 1614 and 1722*

The Szekler *Széks*	**1614**		**1703**		**1721–1722**	
	Families	**Persons**	**Families**	**Persons**	**Families**	**Persons**
The *Szék* of Aranyos	950	4 750	1 116	5 580	1 205	5 422
The *Szék* of Csík-Gyergyó-Kászon	4 700	23 500	5 236	26 180	4 775	16 712
Háromszék	7 000	35 000	9 833	49 165	7 181	25 133
The *Szék* of Maros	4 400	22 000	5 750	28 750	28 750	19 880
The *Szék* of Udvarhely	5 150	25 750	6 350	32 250	6 324	22 134
Total	**22 200**	**111 000**	**28 285**	**141 425**	**25 165**	**89 281**

Source: based on data provided by Pál-Antal, 2012; edited by the author

Obtaining, sharing, and spreading information and experience in the Middle Ages was slower than the rate of spread of the bacteria causing the disease. Thus, treatment outcomes mostly remained within the local context although the crisis caused by the disease gradually increased to a global level. Previous experience showed that the first step to isolate the disease and stop its spread, the only rational way, is the quarantine. According to historical data, the first official quarantine was installed in Raguza, in 1347. This expression appeared here and then, and it acquired its own sense: the Italian word *quarante/quaranta* and the French word *quarante* refer to the period of forty days of isolation (https://arsmilitaria.blog.hu – 25.04.2020).

As far as the general consequences are concerned, it may be surprising, but we need to notice that the pandemic of the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Age did not have only negative effects (the loss of human lives – and it was a biological warfare in the sense that as part of the war technique of the time, the corpses of the people who had died of the disease were sent behind the besieged walls of the castles, or the wells were infected with animal corpses) but had positive effects, as well. The epidemic spread because of the infected drinking water and the generally bad hygienic conditions; so, people urged the construction of canal and water conduit systems, and they improved and enlarged the ancient establishments inherited from the Romans, Indians, or Chinese. Furthermore, in time, more and more researchers and doctors began to study bacteriology, virology, and epidemiology as well as the importance and methodology of washing their hands with soap and calcium hypochlorite solutions and of the cleanliness and hygiene of the dwellings.

Reorganization 1.0

The fight against the epidemic could be observed in its dimension and its geographical expansion as well as in the formation of its nature. This evolution led to a new paradigm in the Middle Ages because the current problems required a cooperative strategy and a reorganization (1.0) – a term borrowed from informatics and military literature. These reorganizations from the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Age (1.0) did not interfere with the order of nature, and they did not change the natural, dynamic balance of the ecological systems. They counted on the maintaining, supporting, and regenerating capability of the given region. Looking back from the 21st century, it is quite easy to say that it was only natural that, given the historical situation and the technological development, they recognized the maintaining, supporting, and regenerating capability of the given region. However, the content of the locally enacted laws and regulations of the villages proves the fact that they recognized the essence of this approach. The valuable part of the

regulations does not lie in *what* they thought about the ecological systems, the created world, but *how* they thought about it.

Based on historical geography and functionality, we can think that the solutions of Reorganization 1.0 were present in the lives of several groups of people through the responsible rules and regulations. Using their natural reasoning, these groups of people realized that the only way of getting out of the dead-end caused by the negative events to their local scene is to appeal to the concept of the value-organizing regulations. It is well-known that in the Carpathian Basin, in the Szekler village *tízes* and *szeg* (forms of village organization), rules, regulations, and laws appeared. These contained an ecological approach and they prove, through associative logic, that the community of the given age and space was aware of the fact that the survival of the inhabitants of the community 'depended on the right regulations' (Imreh 1983: 5–7), which were responsible and referred to the entire community. 'The right regulations' also applied to the prevention of epidemics and infection and dealing with them.

In his book entitled *The Law-Making Szekler Village*, he points to the fact that the leaders of the settlements, the health inspector, and observance of the village laws had a significant role in preventing the spread of the epidemic. At the same time, he guides the researcher through reading in the records of the villages about the regulations referring to hygiene such as 'the necessity of the vaccine for smallpox, the treatment of dysentery and the spastic, feverish diseases, but mainly the means of curing the plague, then cholera', 'looking after the body', and the tradition of obeying the laws. Therefore, in the Szekler village *tízes* and *szeg*, the order did not refer only to farming and the practice of religion but also to the dispositions concerning the epidemic and human relations. The rules and ethical conventions were not only conceived, but they were strictly applied. A group of village judges punished those who broke the law. Thus, 'the law could flourish, the commandment urging the respect for each other could become respected, and the rule banning the evil, harmful deeds could become powerful' (Imreh 1983: 5). The rules and applying the rules prove the constitutional disposition of the local community, but they can only be interpreted there and then, in those smallest border-protecting, administrative, economy-organizing units.

We must state that the concept of village laws and their order and practice were not created by the Szeklers, but they did not copy or imitate it, either. It was a necessary self-controlling product of the Szekler community life in the villages. In different parts of Europe, there are several written sources which prove the regulations of the rural communities which led a self-sufficient way of life. For example, it appeared in the German, northern French, and Scandinavian regions but also in the case of eastern Slavic peoples and in the Hungarian counties (Csizmadia 1972: 8–27, Garda 2002: 5–32). We can also mention the institution of the communities, the cells organized according to a given territory, in the

Transylvanian Saxon settlements. This was the so-called Vicinity, and it worked on the basis of laws which applied to everybody and which were willingly accepted by everybody. Apart from the ethnic differences, these institutions worked on the basis of similar principles. It is important and relevant to study them because they reflect the inner, organic order of the relations within a community, and they prove that they are the results of an organic development organized from 'below'. As a result, the written, certified data are not the only means to describe or prove the historicity of a compact region or community, interpreted from a natural or social point of view. The cohesive power of a given community, the wisdom which helped it to ripen and build its way of life, its value system, its farming, its ethical norms, and its spiritual and material values can also help us to do that.

Reorganization 2.0

The Enlightenment and Romanticism made society discover the beauty, the healing and refreshing potential of nature, and they established the roots of nature conservation in people's mentality. However, the false illusion of development in the 20th century (bigger, more, brighter) and the approach aiming at growth, quantity, and success on the eve of the 21st century made the ecology-oriented knowledge and practice, which was developed by the communities of the village *tízes* and *szeg* and the communities beyond them during the centuries, sink into oblivion. I call this period in the development of mankind *Reorganization 2.0*.

The original concept of sustainable development was correct, but the official definition was conceived by political institutions and the representatives of economic growth, according to their own interests. They set the goal to be achieved, that is, to ensure clean air, water, and bread to our descendants, but they did not tell or teach people how to do that – not because they did not know how but because the solutions were of material nature. The story began half a century ago, but now the situation is much worse than then. On their way to development, societies urged production to become more and more intense. We talked about sustainability, but did we really know what we wanted to sustain? Politics, projects, decades of strategies and science have only got this far. We can see now that this is not enough because nature and people – who do research rationally, understand 'the real nature of revolutions', and teach that part of the essence of human existence is the responsible use of nature – deserve more respect.

We arrived at the time period when a full and continuous regeneration and 'natural' evolution of nature is not possible any more. It is becoming more and more obvious that this regeneration, this new state of balance has its limits. It seems that we have reached those limits or at least have become aware of those limits. The social, economic, and environmental problems appeared in an extremely complex

system of relations. The need for the protection of the environment – concrete actions instead of words – has come into the focus of attention in our days because, exceeding the local level, it has become not only global but also urgently important.

If we are looking for the relation between cause and effect, the development of the problem and the crisis is due to the fact that we have an inappropriate relationship with nature and do not use the natural and human resources in the right way. In many cases, we have to realize that it is not an 'accidental' virus that causes a global crisis. The functioning, mentality, and lifestyle of the modern societies are the sources of the problem. The essence of the current problems is that a significant part of mankind has given up their cooperative strategy with life-sustaining nature and aims at an uncontrolled, speculative, and exponential growth by the unreasonable exploitation of the natural resources.

We seem to have forgotten or do not want to remember the ancient knowledge that our existence and lifestyle depend on nature, a fact also corroborated by our unceasing desire to prove our superiority. We thought that the created world began with us, humans, and it will end with us. Although we were part of the system, we thought that we were superior because we understood it. It seemed that there was nothing that we could not do. We forgot that nature knows better or 'otherwise': we are inferior, we need to define ourselves as parts of a subsystem, we need to adapt to nature, the main life support system. Even if we leave this speculative verve behind, nobody can say for certain who 'the master' and who 'the slave' is in the often life-and-death struggle for survival. It is a fact that we have to reorganize things (Reorganization 3.0) because our arrogance is not justified. We became vulnerable although we thought we were safe. The global world became vulnerable. We cannot stay healthy in a sick world.

The everyday dreams of the consuming society became nightmares within days. These people were the most unprepared when 'the danger' reached them, although the scientists and the network science have been making models for several decades and warning them 'how everything is connected and what this means in science, in business, and in everyday life' (Barabási 2008: 4–29)[2]. Countries, regions, settlements, and families isolated themselves because of the coronavirus, and they partially got out of the swirl and mobility of the world. I think that no political power could have done this. However, if our space closes, we can open our minds. We have come home to think, to reorganize things, to be afraid. Many people are afraid of thinking, of the changes, but the world cannot be the same as it was before the epidemic. There are more and more people who say that the 'unsustainable' world that existed before the crisis should not come back. Many of them understood that there is a combination, a network of problems, and we have to change things, for example, shopping, eating, and dealing with rubbish. We must also say a few words about those who doubt or deny the reality of the world

2 Quotation translated by the author of this paper.

crisis caused by Covid-19. They promise 'normality' and its continuation. These points of view are also the results of development as they cannot find their way in the multitude of accumulated lies and ultraliberal thoughts. Hence, maybe it is not appropriate for us to make a valid statement, but we can ask a valid question: What is wrong about closing the space if we open our minds?

Reorganization 3.0

If we treat the issue of Reorganization 3.0 from the perspective of historical ecology development, the diachronic aspect, and the unitary, evolving, and organic system, then the world of the Szekler village *tízes* and the organizing principles beyond it will offer a methodological handhold following the principle that nature ensures all the conditions and necessities of our existence and our civilization and that everything is interconnected and every change has its reasons and consequences. That is the reason why the organizing, working, and developing model of these life-sustaining units can provide the foundation for the development of human systems. The central or ultraliberal mentality and action is not a solution. When we plan our future, we have to adapt to nature. Nature is the perfect source of wisdom, and it dictates its order to us (Hajnal 2012: 7). We need wise organizers who have clear plans for the future, who respect the laws of nature, and who got their chance – in the past months – to map and make an inventory of what is important in our lives on Earth. Wisdom originally lies in people, and ingenuity lies in their genes (Ambrus 2018: 17).

Many times we can get out of the dead-end of the negative events on the global stage only if we turn to the complex, organic, subject-based community models which ripened in the past centuries and which seem to be the best solutions until now. Getting out of the dead-end does not mean a step back, a regression (Ambrus 2012: 181). It can mean a wise search for the right path, hope and confidence in finding the right direction and the treatment of the trauma caused by Covid-19. The communities which already developed the regulations in the Middle Ages have something to turn to. The *tízes* and the *szeg* have the well-developed historical experience and tradition to do that. In fact, they only continue what they successfully realized and operated during the centuries.

Global commerce and monetary systems still work, in a limited way. Furthermore, the free and fast flow of information has made it possible to deal with the epidemic in a relatively uniform way, to share our experience and to acquire knowledge about the behaviour and the nature of the virus. Thus, it is likely that the consequences of Covid-19 will not be as tragic as the negative effects of the plague in the Middle Ages, and it will not ravage like the big epidemics in the past.

We can correctly approach the content of Reorganization 3.0 only as a system, based on natural sciences and natural laws. The reorganization of this period also

has to follow the phases designated by the regenerative capability of nature. It is now and it is here that we have to realize that if we think in a system referring to the whole, to the entire world (holistic), we can offer a new chance to mankind and we will have the opportunity to reorganize, to change a little bit our old lifestyle.

We must realize that the responsibility of the individual is huge. If we are optimistic, we can say that Covid-19 shows where the place of people in the world is, and 'the creativity' of people increases in cases of emergency. Everybody has to practise this type of creativity where they live, in the family, at school, at work, in the street, or in the nature. That is to say, in the period of anthropocentrism, sooner or later we have to extend limited locality to globality and totality. In the isolation and helplessness caused by the coronavirus, we can all experience that our human relationships keep us alive. This is the moment when, using our revelation, our knowledge, and the possibility for a flow of information, we can confute the notorious proposition (ascribed to Albert Einstein, but without any proved source): 'The day when technology will be more important than personal relationships, there will be a generation of idiots in the world.'

Of course, the effects of the reorganization will not be as fast as Covid-19 because the authorities, the multinational companies, the banks, and the media and marketing representing their interest are trying to conserve their power, making way to commercial and political manipulation and speculation. At the same time, different types of consensus, individual habits, the familiar means of physical and mental comfort, and the question of status, which often determines people's behaviour, have a great retentive power. The problem is not *what* we think about the world but *how* we think about it. It is almost impossible to see through the complex, often illogical connections because the main goal of the chaos creators is to create more chaos. Being optimistic, I conclude that it is a natural process that the price of rising is sinking. I am one of those people who have learned from the phenomenon of Covid-19 that we need to diminish our dependence on food and energy. We can live comfortably even if we consume less and save more.

The current environment protection, green economy, and green technology are not sustainable solutions. The 'Blue Economy' model (Pauli 2010) and its practice (Hajnal 2010: 105) represent the real sustainability. However, 'blue economy' cannot be learned and taught at school as the key of development is awareness. Without awareness, there is no chance to do things differently. Modern science cannot cross the threshold of awareness, either. Education in its current form, the church, or the families cannot teach it; they can only suggest the way to awareness. If school, families, and the church inspire us properly, we can learn from what happens with and around us. It seems that the threat and the fact of disease and death, as well as the fear originating from them (Hajnal 2020), make us reconsider our value system, reinterpret our existence, and wish for reorganization (3.0) with the human power and determination needed to achieve it. We want to live in a

family, in a community, in the life-sustaining nature, on Earth: we would like to get back the social frame which provides us security.

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A Few Chapters of the Earlier History of Operational Urban Development in Central Europe

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Abstract. The necessity of operational urban development becomes obvious if we intend to respond with a planned urban development to the challenges posed by an environmentally, socially, and economically sustainable urbanization. We all know the means necessary to enable operational urban development, the ones making planned urban development possible in the most developed founding Member States of the EU as well as in Central Europe – the region of the former 'Mitteleuropa'. Operational urban development needs to be fully consistent with its objective in a constantly changing public policy, market, economic, and social environment while also being guided by the current local conditions, which is why improving and developing its toolbox and methodology according to scientific standards is an ongoing task. In terms of the evolution of this process, the culture ensuring its control is a crucial factor, wherefore not only the existing toolbox and methodology, serving as its subject, is worth investigating but the very historical foundation it relies on. Indeed, this is a factor that, even despite an uncertain public policy and social environment, can prove conclusively that operational urban development, acting as a prerequisite for a conscious and planned urban development, is possible not merely because there is an established and rich toolbox in place in the most developed Western European EU Member States, which has been functioning continuously and efficiently since the end of World War II and which has, since 1990, increasingly provided for the reintegrating countries

of Central Europe too, allowing for adaptation to the local conditions, but it is also possible because what we call in today's terms operational urban development is not some questionable practice of uncertain past but is nearly as ancient as the present-day European civilization with thousands of years of history, taken root in the wake of the Greek, Roman, Jewish, and Christian cultures – and this statement holds true not only for the most developed and richest countries but for those of Central Europe as well. The activity known today by the name of operational urban development already yielded some results in the past without which our cities would not be the same. This is not just the case in Western Europe but also in Central Europe. The mainstream of the European history of operational urban development that can be identified in connection with Italy, France, Germany, Spain, and England is a better-known and internationally more addressed topic in the literature even if it does not emerge in public awareness directly by this name but as a phenomenon integrated in other dimensions of the history of urbanism and architecture, the history of ideas, engineering, history, and geography. At the same time, although the turning points in its Central European history are increasingly present in scientific publications, the latter is still awaiting substantive treatment. In the above-specified context, the present study aims to facilitate this European cognitive process focused on Central Europe for 'the history of science is science itself'.

Keywords: conscious urban development, planned urbanization, structural and cohesion funds, Multiannual Financial Framework

The Significance of the History of Operational Urban Development

Scientific publications point out that operational urban development (Lacaze 1995) is clearly a necessary aspect if we intend to respond with a planned urban development to the challenges posed by an environmentally, socially, and economically sustainable urbanization (Bajnai 2016: 8–11). Indeed, these challenges can only be addressed through extensive, long-lasting interventions that are already complex in themselves, that lead to comprehensive and profound transformations in the spatial and physical structure as well as urban fabric of cities and the villages located in their attraction zone, and that pay off in the long run but almost never in full, at least not in a direct manner – and these interventions cannot be expected from the spontaneous development of the cities but from consciously performed, planned development alone (Bajnai 2016: 105–112).

The organizational, legal, and financial instruments enabling operational urban development, having different maturity level in each country, and being used with varying degrees of efficiency are well known from practice, the international literature (Audon–Figeat–Gay–Lambert–Parcollet–Roux–Subileau 1996: 21–22),

and the scientific publications of our Central European homeland (Bajnai 2007: 35–146) – these are the instruments that, besides the most developed founding Member States of the EU, make planned, operational urban development possible in Central Europe as well (Bajnai 2018: 79). These nation-state instruments are supplemented by financial assistance – so far primarily in the form of non-refundable financial aid – granted through EU public policies, under the aegis of regional politics and within the framework of structural and cohesion funds. The objectives and rules of utilizing these funds are established every seven years together with the adoption of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). Presently, at the time of writing this study, we are amidst the preparatory and adoption procedures of a new MFF – covering the period of 2021–2027 and entering into force as of 1 January 2021 –, on the eve of the new MFF's coming into effect. The efficient use of the financial support provided either directly or indirectly by the EU's structural and cohesion funds with a view to facilitate urban development and address the challenges posed by sustainable urbanization depends very much upon the level of development of a given Member State's operational urban development toolbox and the efficient use thereof. Drawing on literature and the experiences, we can conclude that where the nation-state's toolbox is more developed and its intended use is more efficient, the grants available through the EU's structural and cohesion funds can also be more efficiently utilized in the service of urban development objectives as compared to situations where this is not the case. Indeed, as evidenced by cohesion reports, the financial support for the development (such interventions would naturally include those aimed directly as well as indirectly at urban development) of EU Member States of the Central European region, with accession in the years 2004 and 2007, would generally take place from the EU's funding sources and the additionally provided governmental co-financing. Therefore, if this issue bears some significance in any geographical area of the EU – and we know it does –, then it is of particular importance in the countries of Central Europe to find out the extent to which operational urban development is possible considering the toolboxes available at the level of each Member State. And this issue – especially in terms of the Central European countries – cannot boil down simply to the specific instruments available at a given moment.

As a matter of fact, operational urban development as such needs to be fully consistent with its objective in a constantly changing public policy, market, economic, and social environment while also being guided by the current local conditions (Bajnai 2020: 113–135), which also holds true for countries and historical moments where and when there is a developed and rich toolbox in place that can be used efficiently and has been used continuously in everyday practice, routinely and in accordance with its intended purpose, for over half a century (Bajnai 2007: 157–191). Consequently, improving and developing the toolbox and methodology according to scientific standards is an ongoing task in such cases too. Assuming that is the case, it is not

necessary to particularly demonstrate the significance of this issue in EU Member States where in the past decades the toolbox of operational urban development could not have (re)developed at all or only to a limited extent. In such cases, it also adds to the difficulty that the politics and public opinion of a given region, or in some places even the academic world and the professional public, have trouble accepting the activity – guided and managed by the public sphere – what we call in today's terms operational urban development. It is not unusual that while the meaning of the strengthening urban, urban development dimension of EU public policies remains hidden from it for the most part, it is able to interpret it, even well over a decade after EU accession, as a short-term fundraising opportunity serving merely particularist interests in everyday practice.

While also preventing the efficient use of financial support targeting urban development in the framework of the new EU development period (2021–2027), this precarious situation acts as a formidable barrier against the conscious and planned (Bajnai 2018: 71–80) operational urban development – which is the only type of intervention able to address the urbanization challenges of sustainable development – because it indicates some perceptional problems attributable to cultural attitudes, the correction of which is at least as difficult as finding a remedy for financing gap, since experience has shown that changing mindsets is one of the most difficult undertakings, and, even if possible, it requires consistent awareness-raising work. This also reveals that, like in other areas of life, culture plays a crucial role (Mannheim 1995) with regard to the process of operational urban development and to how the necessary toolbox is ensured at the level of each Member State, considering that controlling the above-mentioned development process is defined by the culture (Mannheim 1995) of those who have decisive influence on it. Therefore, when – in the context of the previously mentioned circumstances and the uncertainties associated with them – we investigate the prerequisites of the conscious (Bierbauer 1940: 53) and planned urban development, it is appropriate to look beyond the horizon emerging upon the initial brutal approach, from the available instruments considered in isolation. The claim that operational urban development is possible is confirmed not only by the fact that there are instruments – depending on the specific circumstances and with differing levels of development as well as of various modes of use in each country and region – available at a specific time and place, whose efficiency has been demonstrated over the past three (or seven in Western Europe) decades, but also by the fact that the activity that we here and now call in today's terms operational urban development was already practised by our forefathers on a regular bases in the distant past – and it was done with the highest degree of awareness possible under the given circumstances, resorting to public management procedures and technical solutions in line with the level of the social, economic, and technical development of their time. Further, it can be stated that this is the case not just in developed

Western European countries that are the pioneers of this process and where the different phases and operations are well documented by contemporary sources and international literature but also in less favoured Central European areas with a much more tumultuous history, what we illustrate in the present study through the example of Hungary and what can be revealed in the same way in other areas of the Central European region as an outcome of research work. Now, if we can trace down that the conscious and planned actions of operational urban development were already practised by our ancestors – sometimes with results of worldwide importance –, then it could only be so because the thoughts and ideas guiding the development and building activities of cities at the time formed an inseparable part of their culture. Therefore, they also form part of our inherited culture despite the fact that certain elements of this culture that are presented here would in their original form fade into oblivion from time to time during the turbulences of history, and perhaps they are not widely known even in our days, and also despite the fact that a more in-depth exploration – complying with scientific standards – of this historical and spiritual heritage would only be viable in the long term and assisted by numerous future research studies.

The present study has the ambition to put its modest resources to work in a bid to contribute to the facilitation of this process. It does so partly in order to make our knowledge more complete with regard to our heritage in terms of history as well as history of ideas so as to serve the interests of the general enrichment of our culture.

On the other hand, it particularly takes on this commitment due to the real topicality of the issue: by claiming some significant moments and results from the past of operational urban development in Hungary, it aims to show that it is possible not only because we have some of the relevant instruments in place but because what we call today operational urban development was already practised by the state and more generally by the public sphere on a regular basis (with periodic breaks) and in the most conscious way possible over the past thousand years – if looking back from 2020.

In doing so, the present study wishes to address the overwhelming obstacles standing in the way of operational urban development, a key factor that sustainable urbanization cannot go without, placing specific focus on the elimination of conceptual barriers. As a matter of course, any activity carried out in accordance with scientific standards, suitable to remedy perceptional problems traceable to cultural origins can only be achieved by way of a culture-transforming awareness-raising process, whereby the science of urbanization itself (as they would say in Hungary in the first half of the 20th century: urban science, or as it would enter the public consciousness after 1949: settlement science) is enriched since ‘the history of science is science itself’ (Goethe 1810).

With a view to facilitate awareness-raising, the paper at hand attempts to recall this story through the schematic presentation of eras of paramount importance in

terms of urbanization, having the intended purpose of exploring a much-needed knowledge base and promoting the better understanding of the current, modern instruments developed as a result of a lengthy and complex process from former approaches and public management attitudes as well as solutions.

Further research studies will be able to present the Central European history of operational urban development, including its chapter dedicated to Hungary, with more completeness and in more detail since this is a largely unexplored area as far as we know. Experts of the specific aspects of history, legal science, and art history certainly feel superior at several points in connection with the issues discussed in this study. However, our aim – similarly to an excellent specialist of a later era, Dezső Dercsényi (Dercsényi 1990: 6) – was not to bring out publications of scientific results but rather to structure the available knowledge according to the internal logic of our own field of science and by glancing through 270 years of history that bequeathed to us but a few original written documents, which is why we can draw exclusively on results achieved in the fields of history, history of architecture, and legal history as reliable sources. It follows from the nature of things that we cannot gain a complete picture even regarding the period under study, those centuries abounding in unknown or less charted areas and blind spots. 'Often only the contours are visible, while at other times the pieces of the picture must be put together as if it were a jigsaw puzzle'[1] (Dercsényi 1990: 6). As with all general works, the goal is not merely to obtain a broad outline, summarize the results attained so far in terms of our own field of interest, and create a consistent image but to embark on the trail to recover the missing pieces.

Therefore, and due to the above-mentioned aspects, we considered, despite the uncharted areas, that the present circumstances impose the overriding requirement that the available factual material be published, leaving no room for any time delay that might be justified by making up for the blind spots and working out a more complex and sizeable scientific publication.

Additions to the History of Operational Urban Development in Central Europe in the Light of Some of Its Significant Moments in Hungary

What is today known under the name operational urban development has already existed in the past, hundreds of years before the formation of the present-day concept. Consequently, our review – which cannot be comprehensive for reasons already known, wherefore it is rather mosaic-like, sketchy, preliminary, and indicative – attempts to show the historical beginnings, the milestones of the Early Middle Ages still having considerable impact on our times.

1 All translations throughout the paper belong to the author.

The Work of King Saint Stephen and His Descendants – The Planned Building of the Urban Network in the Period of 1000–1270

The Works of King Saint Stephen

The backbone of the 21st-century urban network of Hungary was shaped by Stephen I a thousand years ago (ruled: 1001–1038). He was directing the state-building process in the country – with a sedentary population, established borders, and a culture forced to accelerated lifestyle change under his rule and radically transformed in an (historically speaking) extremely short space of time through joining Western Christianity and thereby being irrevocably connected to the Western European civilization – in such a way that the organization of the public administration inextricably intertwined with construction projects realized under his direct control and as a result of his stimulating support. A great many royal castles were built during his reign in the territory of today's Hungary as follows: Esztergom, Sopronvár, Mosonvár, Visegrád, Veszprémvár, Vasvár, Fehérvár, Kolonvár, Somogyvár, Tolna Castle, Hontvár, Borsod Castle, Szolnok, Csongrád, Szeged, Szabolcsvár, Békésvár, and Csanád Castle. In addition, he built numerous castles in the territory of his kingdom: in Central Europe, north of the country borders of present-day Hungary: Borona Castle, Sasvár, the Trenčín Castle, Zobor Castle, Pozsonyvár, Nyitravár, Barsvár, Komáromvá, Gömörvár, Újvár, Zemplénvár, Ungvár, and Borsova Castle; east of the borders: Szatmár Castle, Biharvár, Dobokavár, Kolozsvár, Tordavár, Arad, Zarándvár, and Küküllővár; south of the borders: Baranya Castle, Bodrog Castle, Valkó Castle, Bácsvár, Nándorfehérvár, Kevevár, Krassóvár, Temesvár, and Hunyadvár (Györffy 1977: 184–185) – 48 castles altogether, of which 18 fall within the territory of Hungary and 30 are situated in other countries of Central Europe as follows: 12 in Slovakia, 2 in Ukraine, 10 in Romania, 1 in Croatia, and 6 in Serbia. Parts of Budapest, the Hungarian capital, are not included in this list of building locations unlike two other Central European capitals: Bratislava (Pozsonyvár), the capital of Slovakia, and Belgrade (Nándorfehérvár), the capital of Serbia.

Upon his encouragement, serving as a royal incentive, princes, provincial lords, and other aristocrats also began to build castles. György Györffy's view implies that this is how the preconditions for protection necessary for the establishment of bishoprics may have been created.

In addition to the above, the following castles were built under Stephen I in the territories of ducal 'dux', count 'comes'/'ispán', and prefectural 'praefectus' seats within the framework of the state management activity under the guidance of the king, as specified by György Györffy (Györffy 1977: 206–207): Oroszvár, Kapuvár, Budavár (prefectural seat), Pestvár, Úrhida Castle, Regöly, Váty Castle, Nógrád,

Pata, Heves, and Szerencs within the territory of Hungary; north of Hungary: Vasvár; east of Hungary: Krasznavár, Várad, Désvár, and Gyula-Fehérvár (dux); south of Hungary: Szerém (dux). Thus, in addition to the above-summarized 48 castles, the building of further 18 are credited to him and other 2 (in Pécs and Eger) are also presumed to be his work, thus amounting to an additional 20. This makes up a total of 68 built and fortified castles.

Have there been any precedents of castle building? Apart from archaeological findings, there are first of all linguistic research studies whose results can be employed. It has long attracted archaeologists' attention in Hungary that a significant part of the settlement names in the Carpathian Basin can be traced back to Slavic languages. Linking this finding with the also Slavic-origin denominations of the settlements giving the name for several counties (Visegrád, Nógrád, Csongrád, Baranya, Pest, etc.), they inferred the Slavic, and thus the pre-conquest, origin of the county system. Archaeologists of the neighbouring countries (Slovakia, Romania) had a penchant for adopting Erik Molnár's theory, while the most comprehensive refutation is credited to Gyula Kristó. According to the prevailing theory, castle names originate from personal names. The issue concerning the relationship between the historical figures and castle names was the most impressive in the Carpathian Basin, where Anonymous named several castles after various figures (Örsúr, Óbars, Szabolcs, Borsod, Gyöngyöspata, Veszprém). However, some of these proved to be nothing more than the products of the anonymous scrivener's imagination (e.g. Alpár) (Mordovin 2016: 89–91).

Besides his castle-building activities, King Saint Stephen established the Archdiocese of Esztergom, the bishoprics seated in Győrvár, Veszprémvár, Pécs, Eger, Kalocsa, and Gyulafehérvár – all of them being of Latin rite (pertaining to Western Christianity under the leadership of the Pope of Rome) and within the jurisdiction of the Archdiocese –, and a Latin abbey with episcopal status in Pannonhalma, until around the year 1030 (Györffy 1977: 178–187). Built on St Martin Hill, named after Saint Martin of Tours born in Roman Savaria in 316 AD, the abbey was dedicated to St. Martin, and, following the teachings of St Benedict and the example of the abbey of Monte Cassino, it nurtured and further enriched St Martin's legacy that had a major influence on the fate of the whole of Europe (Bajnai 2014: 152–159). It was one of the most significant spiritual centres of King St Stephen's Hungary, and its cultural role is still very much alive, having survived a thousand years of history.

As can be seen from the above-listed place names, King St Stephen would normally designate bishop's seats where there was already a palace or castle owned by a royal family member or a provincial lord and where the military escorts or armour-clad warriors of these royalties and noblemen could provide protection to the church leader (Györffy 1977: 186). This is how the archbishopric came to be located in the royal seat of Esztergom, the Bishopric of Kalocsa in the first royal

family seat of the Arpads, and the Bishopric of Veszprém in the queen consort's castle. Furthermore, 'the bishoprics of Pécs, Eger, and Győr must also have been ducal or provincial seats, even though this cannot be proven in all cases', claims György Györffy.

The churches and the related system of services provide an important starting point for modelling the settlement network. The papal tithe register made between 1332 and 1337 is perhaps the most important document of the transition period between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Late Middle Ages, whose analysis can serve with key points of reference. Over 4,000 parishes are included in the register, but processing the data revealed certain shortcomings as well – these concern primarily significant territories of the Diocese of Győr and of the Great Hungarian Plain. While the former might have partly got lost, the latter may be owing to the fact that, on the one hand, a farm-like settlement structure was characteristic of the territory already in this period because of animal husbandry, and, on the other, the Cumanians that would later inhabit the area have not yet settled completely (Romhányi 2019: 402–403).

The diocesan cathedral and the bishop's palace were built within the castle walls, next to the king's, the queen's, and the duke's court. The presence of the church leader infused new blood into life in the castle and the 'castledom' developed under its jurisdiction. This way, by building the royal and provincial castles as well as the bishopric and archbishopric established under their patronage, Stephen I of Hungary created a momentum for urban development in the European sense. As a result of the king's state management activities and construction works, the bishop's castles – initially called 'civitas' or 'urbs' – were established and under them the suburbia including the houses of various subject populations, craftsmen, and merchants (Györffy 1977: 186). Subsequent upon their internal social and economic processes and as a result of royal decisions – esp. of Béla III in the 12th and of Béla IV in the 13th century – of a political, state management, legal, and economic nature, implemented through public administration management and building activities, these next-level settlements established in consequence of conscious and planned building activities guided and organized by the king would develop by the end of the 13th century into cities in the strictest Western European sense of the word.

There was a close connection between the development of the settlement structure and the region's road network. Their division into two separate groups is necessary since in Pannonia there was a strong tradition around the development of the Roman road network that served as a basis for the mediaeval system. The greatest difficulty in the research focusing on the roads of the Great Hungarian Plain is the lack of built trails unlike in the case of several paved roads in Pannonia. Frequent changes in the course of the River Tisza as well as its tributaries, and hence the occasional relocation of the harbours, had a serious impact on the

associated roads too. Therefore, routes in this area functioned much rather as transport corridors, which, however, had some individual stations that can be pinpointed. Such transport corridors were the salt roads, where the 'white gold' was transported from the Transylvanian mines to the west and the south (Romhányi 2019: 400).

In the course of his research, Gyula Kristó (2003) took into account those elements of spatial planning for which we have contemporary written sources of sufficient amount and quality so that conclusions can be made as to whether or not the spatial organization network roughly covered the available mediaeval space. Kristó analyses mediaeval spatial planning and its related changes by distinguishing three or sometimes even four timelines that are clearly comprehensible for him from a geographical point of view. In doing so, he establishes consistent historical timelines that more or less overlap in time. When analysing these individual 'timelines', he also focuses on presenting the changes that took place between them. His division of timelines is as follows: I. – King Saint Stephen and the age of conquest; II. – the middle of the 12th century, the conditions developed up to this point in history also being outlined; III. – early/first half of the 14th century; IV. – we can encounter this final timeline in almost all cases, covering the turn of the 15th-16th centuries.

In one of his greatest works, Pál Engel (2001) looks into the history of the Kingdom of Hungary and seeks to support the existing base of evidence with reliable sources. In this context, he notes that 'the Hungarian history is remarkably poor in narrative sources, and even the existing ones are not exactly matterful' (author's translation). Probably this is one of the reasons why his description of the still obscure period of the state foundation is highly fragmented and broken down into several parts. According to Pál Engel, the social organization of the Kingdom following the conquest was not established 'ex nihilo' – there might have been (were) various antecedents. He represents social hierarchy from top to bottom and claims that the major difficulty in the process of social transformation was the protection of landed property, which would lead to the transformation of the counties (and within that the castle estates) into national counties only in the time of Andrew II.

Stephen I's planned organizing activities targeting public administration, and the building initiatives inextricably linked with them, launched the urbanization processes that through the work of his descendants would result in the emergence of cities in the Western European sense of the word, proliferating all over the territory of early mediaeval Hungary by the end of the 13th century. It was owing to King St Stephen's operational urban development interventions that two – Óbuda and Pest – of the three districts, merged in the year 1870 to form the capital of present-day Hungary, Budapest, made a step forward towards truly becoming a city, followed by Sopron, Győr, Veszprém, Székesfehérvár, Pécs, Eger, Szolnok, and

Szeged of today's 23 cities with county rights, all three of the currently functioning archiepiscopal sees (Esztergom, Kalocsa, and Eger – the latter two as diocesan towns at the time), and some of the smaller towns as follows: Moson, Vasvár, Tolna, Heves, Szerencs, Csongrád, and Békés. Therefore, it can be stated that Stephen I's development efforts created the backbone of the historical as well as present-day urban network of Hungary. This was completed in the subsequent centuries by further products of both spontaneous and conscious urban development. However, in the light of the analysis of historical data, it shows that King St Stephen's public administration management and building activities set in motion the urbanization process of the key nodes and pivotal elements in the urban network not just regarding present-day Hungary but also including the Central European countries neighbouring Hungary: in Slovakia: the capital (Bratislava), Trenčín, Nitra, and Komárno; in Ukraine: Ungvár; in Romania: Kolozsvár, Nagyvárad, Arad, Temesvár, and Gyulafehérvár; in Serbia: the capital (Belgrade). Therefore, the past of operational urban development, dating back to an era a thousand years ago, and its achievements form an integral part of the common cultural heritage of the above-mentioned Central European countries.

Establishing the New Capital, Buda, and Further Results of Béla IV's City-Building Activities

Over two centuries after St. Stephen's reign, following the ravages of the Mongol invasion and the 1241-42 destruction of large parts of the country, it was the turn of Béla IV, 'the second founder of the state' (Rados 1971: 84), to rebuild the country. In the context of his conscious urban development activities of a significance and magnitude comparable to Stephen I's creations, architectural history literature credits him with the building of 40 castles fortified with stone walls, making it possible to prevent a new surge of attacks by the Tatars (Rados 1971: 83). Some of these achievements were realized in the form of a royal castle, as newly-built – e.g. Visegrád Castle (Rados 1971: 86) built for the queen or the Castle of Sárospatak – or fortified structures – e.g. the Castle of Esztergom – erected directly in the context of his undertakings, while some other works were carried out by bishops and the king's high officials at Béla IV's royal instigation, just like in King St Stephen's time. Eger serves as a fine example for the first case and Kőszeg for the second one.

In the suburbia of the royal castles established by Stephen I of Hungary, it was Béla III's supporting policy that at the end of the 12th century laid the economic foundations of a growing merchant and industrial population and of a boom in urban development. Nevertheless, it was Béla IV who, on the solid foundations laid by his ancestors, led these achievements towards their rightful place in history and whose determined actions transformed these settlements into veritable cities in the mediaeval sense, comparable to their Western counterparts. He came to the

realization that their bourgeoisie can provide the most reliable support for the king from a political point of view and act as the most dependable funding source for the royal treasury from a long-term financing perspective, while its valuable role played in the national defence did not escape his attention either. Hence, he drove a sustained effort to rely in his nation-building endeavours on the support of these cities more than his ancestors had done before him, wherefore he sought to promote their development (Györffy 1973: 295). To this end, he established royal free cities, raising their status by granting extended (e.g. Pest) or, in other cases, new privileges to them (e.g. Körmend), and he would also surround them with fortified walls. These measures set a new direction for the development of the cities.

Nonetheless, Béla IV's embarking on a proactive policy aimed at urban development was not triggered by the Mongol invasion. The aftermath of the destructions probably just further reinforced his initial efforts, a fact also shown by his 1238 granting of town privileges to Nagyszombat. That interpretation is borne out by the fact that, as György Györffy claims, 'already in the year 1242 during his stay in Dalmatia, he confirmed and extended the privileges granted to the coastal and Slavonian towns, one after the other. In November the same year, he decreed that the settlers of Zagreb move to the Gréc Mountain, build their town on that place, and send ten well-armed soldiers for his army.' Thus, following King Saint Ladislaus's foundation of the Bishopric of Zagreb, the construction projects launched by Béla IV gave new impetus to the urbanization of Zagreb, the present-day capital of Croatia.

However, Béla IV did not confine himself to the above-mentioned interventions. He would establish settlements, mining towns regenerated with new settlers and elevated to the rank of royal free cities also north of today's borders of Hungary, populating these areas with German peoples coming from abroad – 'hospites' – as a means of developing the economy and strengthening the central royal power in the following settlements: Selmecbánya, Besztercebánya, and Gölnicbánya. In the same region, he founded a new mining town populated with German settlers in the place of a settlement completely destroyed during the Mongol invasion: Igló (Spišská Nová Ves). The settlement is first mentioned in documents in 1268, and it was granted town privileges by Béla IV's son, Stephen V of Hungary in the year 1271, although it would not become a royal free city until much later. Populated with German settlers, Késmárk is the product of a similar act of refoundation, its 'hospites' being granted town privileges by Béla IV in 1269.

Nevertheless, Béla IV's urban development achievement of the highest rank was probably founding the new capital of Hungary in one of the most significant strategic hubs of the contemporary country's urban and transport network, on the banks of the Danube River. With great foresight, he chose a location with favourable natural conditions and a strong defensive position, whose long-term sustainability

– ensured by the water sources and storage possibilities deep inside the mountain – was guaranteed also during times of sieges and epidemics. The king established Buda, the new royal seat and capital of the country, opposite to Pest, a mercantile city on the other side of the river, already flourishing before the Mongol invasion.

Even during his reign, he developed it into an actual, functioning city (Györffy 1973: 307) in less than twenty years and populated the new capital with the Hungarian bourgeoisie pouring in from the neighbouring Óbuda and Felhévíz and the territory of the suburbium as well as with the German bourgeoisie relocated from Pest. The still existing basic architecture of the fortified city established in the second half of the 13th century followed the dual segmentation of the royal cities of Stephen I. Its river-frontage on the Danube, the south-eastern part of the town gave home to the royal castle, the later Palace District that has since been serving central state functions, while the remaining major part of the developed plateau surrounded by castle walls and extending northwest included the civilian town divided into Hungarian and German districts. These two districts built on the higher-situated and larger block of Castle Hill show the picture of a regular settlement, realized in accordance with a planned city layout and adapted to natural conditions (Györffy 1973: 299).

In essence, Béla IV's city-building operations in Buda fulfilled the king's public management and urban development goal of settling the population of the two neighbouring cities, defenceless against the Tatar invaders, in a safe place and thereby merging Óbuda administration centre with Pest commercial centre (Györffy 1973: 297). On the other hand, based on a letter written by the king dated in the year 1253, stating that he entrusted the crusaders with the castles built 'in the heart of the country' 'along the Danube', there are valid reasons for believing that the Johannite/Hospitaller crusaders took part in the construction of the castle. The castles built by crusaders in Syria and in the vicinity of Jerusalem were state-of-the-art strongholds at the time, believed to be impregnable. A few decades earlier, Andrew II, Béla IV's father, sacrificed a fortune on them (Györffy 1973: 299).

Construction of the Buda Castle and settling the citizens of Pest on Castle Hill began in the spring of 1247 (Györffy 1973: 299). It was typical of the pace maintained throughout the city-building activities that as soon as three years later, around 1250, the Church of Mary Magdalene of the Hungarian bourgeoisie was already standing and the first bourgeois houses were also completed (Solymosi 1986:152). The completion of St Nicholas Dominican Monastery took place around the year 1253, where the grand chapter of the order was held already in the following year. This is also where the Provincial of France, Humbertus de Romanis, was elected as the fifth Master General of the Dominican Order, whose members were strong supporters – both in intelligence service and fortified construction works – of King Béla IV's policy pursued during the period of the Mongol invasions (Györffy 1973: 301). The significance of Buda and the king is witnessed through the fact that earlier sessions of the grand chapter would be held mostly at the headquarters of

the order, in Bologna or Paris, and once in each of the following cities: Cologne, Montpellier, and London; Buda was followed by Milan, Paris, Florence, and Toulouse. In 1255, a mint workshop was already operated near Szombat-kapu 'Saturday Gate' on the north side (Györffy 1973: 300), while we have data from the year 1264 confirming that the headquarters of the minting chamber was also housed here, and the necessary precious metal reserve was kept in the count of the chamber's house in Buda (Györffy 1973: 300). Thirteen years after construction works had started, around 1260, the Church of the Assumption, the present-day Matthias Church, was completed for the German bourgeoisie (Solymosi 1986: 157). In the 1250s, settlement took place on the southern, lower-situated, narrowing part of Castle Hill as well (Györffy 1973: 302). Further data certify that in the year 1268 the Franciscan's Saint John Monastery was definitely standing on the Danube side of the southern part (Györffy 1973: 303). György Györffy takes the view that the occupation of the southern part around 1258 and the appointment of the first rector in the year 1264 – that is, 17 years after construction works and the moving-in process began – can be considered as the final momentum in the process of settling the castle, i.e. creating the new city of Buda (Györffy 1973: 307).

In this short span of time, the churches in Buda, the monasteries of the Dominicans and Franciscans, the palaces, the public buildings, and the bourgeois houses were all built in the new, European architectural style of the age, in the Gothic idiom. The Mongol invasion swept through the country in the full bloom of Late Romanesque architecture. Destroyed cities and villages had to be rebuilt, and the catastrophic rupture had an appreciable effect on all areas of life, also triggering changes in style. The new wave of the religious orders' development and settlement in Hungary unfolding after the Mongol invasion also paved the way for these changes since members of these orders and the architects accompanying them brought the spirit of Christian renewal also manifested in the new architectural style. The history of architecture counts among its ranks some of the most fascinating artistic personalities such as Villard de Honnecourt, who – according to his entry in his sketchbook found in the National Library of France – visited Hungary between 1244 and 1251 (Rados 1971: 83). Although there is no conclusive proof of his collaboration in the construction works related to Buda, the mere journey of the French master to Hungary, the architectural and (military) engineering knowledge represented by the well-travelled Johannite crusaders, or the 1254 grand chapter of Dominicans – held in their own monastery in Buda seven years after construction works had begun – based in Bologna and Paris all give a sense of the European intellectual forces that, besides the political will of the contemporary state and the enormous financial resources, swung into action in support of rebuilding the physical and cultural reality in Hungary and the devastated Central European area and in support of building up the symbolic status of the new capital in the focus of the interventions. And imagine the cultural quality of the selection of the mandating and recipient

partners, embracing the European values in every way, this force in motion must have involved on the part of the royal house and the nobility as well as bourgeoisie moving into the city! Taking a different approach and looking at the 17-year process, carried out at record speed, in terms of an evaluation of the performance manifested in the visible results, the architectural quality of the works realized suggests the same. Regrettably, the devastation that occurred during the past seven and a half centuries full of vicissitudes denies us to get to know these achievements in their entirety. All there is left is but a few residential and public buildings to help us form an idea of these creations; however, Matthias Church still has the symbolic power to represent them. Still, this architectural creation is not the expression of the charmingly uncertain and immature groping and blundering that goes hand in hand with the process of becoming familiar with the formal manifestations of the new spirit, but it unfolds before our eyes as the mature manifestation of the Gothic style expressing the spirit of the age and also suggesting the past existence of some, by now completely destroyed, buildings/structures of exemplary architectural standard. Indeed, regarding the quality of the performance manifested during the construction activities of the new royal seat, nothing shows this more clearly than the finding that it is becoming increasingly probable that the wide-reaching example of the Buda workshop was not without effect in other parts of the country either, in cultural areas such as Sopron, Pozsony, Kassa, Besztercebánya, Lőcse, Kolozsvár, or Brassó (Rados 1971: 88), whose significant works of ecclesiastical architecture, bourgeois houses, and public buildings seven centuries ago and during the time that has since passed have functioned as decisive ingredients of the culture – and thereby the identity – of the population living in these regions just as they do today. Exploring the cultural influence of Béla IV's work and the specific impact of the Buda workshop is a task for the future, an exciting opportunity awaiting the new generations of researchers in architectural and art history. All the more so because there are two further circumstances that must not be forgotten. One of them is that the population of the above-mentioned cities was most probably ab initio the carrier of a culture comparable in quality to that existing in Buda. Secondly, given the fact that the majority of this population was made up of German or Latin hospites (mostly coming from the territory of present-day France, Belgium, or Italy), they were in all likelihood connected by a thousand threads to the homeland from where they, or perhaps their ancestors a few generations earlier, settled in the central region of Europe. Thereby, independently of the capital, in fact, concurrently with the events/processes taking place there, they must have been exposed to the same European cultural stimuli as the citizens of Buda. Accordingly, should future research not confirm the above, well-supported (Rados 1971: 88) yet – reasonably – very cautious hypothesis, it could not necessarily be inferred that the impact, which can be meaningfully measured in the dimension of culture, of the Buda workshop and thereby of Béla IV's city-building activity was not of a great order of magnitude.

Conclusions

The foregoing provide sufficient grounds to draw several conclusions that cannot be enlarged upon, however, without exceeding the limits of this paper and whose implications and large number would already require a standalone study, therefore excluding even a schematic overview within the confines of these pages.

Notwithstanding, in order to serve the purposes of this paper as stated in its first chapter, it is essential that – quasi pre-empting the other study already mentioned – we formulate the following two lessons learned:

1. To an extent far exceeding our original expectations, the facts known from the scientific literature and presented here demonstrate the truth value of our initial statement formulated in the first chapter as a hypothesis. In particular, it is not a mere hypothetical view but a proven fact that the activity known today under the name operational urban development was already practised by King Saint Stephen on a regular basis and was carried on by Béla IV in a conscious and planned manner, similar to our modern times, throughout his construction and state-building activities outlined in the previous chapter.

2. King St Stephen's and Béla IV's state and public administration management activities inextricably intertwined with their building activities[2] through which they transformed the physical reality inherited from nature and created the physical framework for the operation of social space as well as of the state, public administration, and economy. The state and public administration management work of Stephen I and Béla IV could not have led to the known outcome without their building activities being conducted in coordination with it, just as, manifestly, the latter would have been deprived of meaning and potential in lack of their state-building operations.

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2 In modern terms, non-existent in those times, we would say operational urban development activities that facilitated the process of urbanization in a conscious and planned manner.

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‘Land of Creation’: The Position, Brand Owners, and Contributors for Israel’s Branding

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Abstract. The modern and independent State of Israel celebrated the seventieth anniversary of its proclamation of independence in 2018. Besides this landmark anniversary, the remarkable development of Israel’s image in the past decade was also a cause for celebration. Nowadays, many people around the world consider Israel as a start-up nation, the stronghold of innovation and risk capital, and the home of outstanding researchers and research organizations – or at least people have this association. In recent years, the ‘industry of peace’, tourism has also undergone significant expansion in the country. This has not always been the case in the past – the change is the result of conscious efforts, which is primarily attributed to the real successes of the economic structure and secondarily to controlled positioning and country branding activity. How could this positive country brand of a ‘start-up nation’ and the ‘land of creation and creativity’ be created? How can it be that many people consider Israel as a country with vibrant, colourful, rich metropolises, the cradle of innovative enterprises, millions of USD in capital investment and world-changing patents instead of a powder keg and the Arab–Israeli conflict?

The methodology to analyse the topic is based on an examination of relevant literature and in-depth interviews conducted by the authors in Israel, involving a synthesis of interviews with the important figures of the innovation ecosystem and organizations involved in country branding. The present article aims to describe the branding ecosystem of Israel, introduce its main actors and activities in order to pave the way for future in-depth research.

Keywords: country branding, tourism destination marketing, Israel, start-up, innovation

1. Introduction – Preconceptions about Israel

It is a frequently asked and long-standing question about Israel as to whether the country actually belongs to Europe, Asia, or North Africa. In 1581, German Protestant pastor and theologian Heinrich Bünting drew a three-leaf-clover-shaped world map representing Europe, Asia, and Africa – with Jerusalem in the middle, as the centre of the three continents. Of course, Bünting's world map did not serve as a geographical and orientation compass but as a clear presentation of worldviews.

Today Israel's Ministry of Tourism still positions the country as lying in the crossroads of the three continents. In terms of natural geography, Israel is located in Asia, considering that the man-made border between Asia and Africa is the Egyptian Suez Canal, while the Bosporus forms the boundary between Europe and Asia. The question of affiliations is a more complex, controversial issue from a socio-geographical and cultural point of view.

The cradle of the three monotheistic world religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, is located here, including the Old City of Jerusalem, which incorporates the most important holy sites in an area of less than a square kilometre. The country is located in the Eastern Mediterranean, in the Levantine region, on the Western periphery of the Middle East. Its population is mixed in terms of ethnicity, origin, and religion. Jewish population from all over the world flowed into the country, bringing with them their culture and mentality. Israel also has a significant number of Arab, Druze, and Bedouin citizens, and Filipino and African guest workers are not to be neglected either.

For decades, the Middle East conflict and the desert environment that covers 60 percent of its territory determined the country. It took many years of conscious work to overwrite them.

2. Economic Development and Spatial Representation – Geo-Economic Success Story

Despite its small size, one must adapt to different climatic and topographical conditions in the narrow but 424-kilometer-long country. The northern part is dominated by agricultural production, the central region by the high-tech sector and the service industry, and the production areas in the sparsely populated southern region up to the border of the desert are mostly utilized for agriculture and the infrastructure of the army. They often describe Israel as a quasi-island country, referring to its isolation and confinement. As it has no or only limited trade with states in its neighbourhood and the region, and it is poor in raw materials and minerals, with little area and little arable land, it has consciously put the focus of its economic development on the production of high value-added, research-intensive, exportable products and services instead of

encouraging the development of industrial or processing activities. The extremely limited nature of land transport and the lack of large, solvent markets available nearby also limit the export of produced goods significantly, wherefore the country must focus on air, water, and digital transport.

Thanks to the World Wide Web, digital solutions and export products that require low resource, promise high yield, and target the global market can be sold immediately and do not require a container, packaging, or complicated customs procedures and insurance to reach their destination. Thus, it soon became clear that investing in research and development activities and software development has a huge economic potential – not to mention its contribution to Israel's national security defence capabilities, which is vital to the country. For example, we can mention CheckPoint, which is today one of the world's largest cybersecurity companies – it was founded in 1993, at the dawn of the Internet era, creating the first firewall in history. There are few who have not heard of the so-called Iron Dome air defence system designed to destroy short-range rockets fired at Israel. Nevertheless, the country does not only use the firewall and the Iron Dome for its own physical and virtual protection – it also exports them.

Today, CheckPoint is responsible for the security of several governments and large corporations. They also protect critical infrastructures and power plants from intrusions. The Iron Dome – and many other technologies used in tactics and defence – is also sold abroad by companies such as Rafael Advanced Technologies Ltd or Israeli Aerospace Industries Ltd.

3. Tourism Development – Government Incentives and the TravelTech Revolution

3.1. Statistics and General Overview

Israel – also known as the start-up nation – seeks to boost the service level of its tourism industry through the exploitation of its advanced innovation ecosystem and the introduction of government incentives. The country also tries to meet the dynamically growing demand primarily by increasing the number of hotel rooms. In 2019, a record number of tourists (4.55 million people) arrived in the country, posing a significant challenge to accommodation and catering establishments. To expand hotel rooms, the government has introduced a financial support programme and measures to cut through red tape. In addition, it created an international investor platform. They also try to involve the so-called TravelTech start-ups, whose number exceeds 300 thanks to support by state and municipal actors, hubs, industry incubators, and large companies that have opened R & D & I centres in the country.

The Ministry of Tourism estimates that the national economy's revenue from tourism was 23 billion new Israeli shekels in 2019 – including 1.9 billion shekels in the busiest month, June. This is due, among other things, to the European Open Skies Agreement, which made low-cost airline flight launches to Israel much more competitive. In terms of source countries: the United States tops the list with 890,000 tourists, followed by France (338,200), Russia (296,000), Germany (268,000), the United Kingdom (218,700), and China (144,000).

As for Europe, 177,500 tourists arrived from the old continent in the busiest month, June 2019, which represents a 19 percent increase compared to numbers from the same period of the previous year. The largest boost can be seen in the number of visitors arriving from Germany (21,200 tourists, meaning +47 percent) and Portugal (2,000 tourists, which is +100 percent), comparing the statistics of June 2018 and June 2019. The main reason for the doubling of the Portuguese number is that TAP launched a direct flight to Tel Aviv.

According to the Israel Hotel Association, the most guest nights were recorded in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Although big cities are still the most popular among tourists, the number of guest nights in Tiberias along the Lake of Gennesaret showed an 18 percent increase in 2019 over the previous year. The number of nights booked increased by 9 percent in Tel Aviv and by 8 percent in Jerusalem. Overall, inbound and outbound passenger traffic at Ben-Gurion International Airport has more than doubled in the past decade. Ilan and Asaf Ramon International Airport (located north of Eilat) was opened in January 2019 and had already received more than one million people by January 2020.

3.2. Policy, Campaigns, and Incentives

3.2.1. National-Level Policies

As part of the Land of Creation brand, Israel started to use the slogan 'Goisrael', which is also the web address of a tourist information portal and the name of a mobile application developed by the Ministry of Tourism. Israel's Ministry of Tourism operates four offices in the United States, one in Canada, ten in Europe, three in Asia, and one in Brazil.

The municipality of Tel Aviv-Yafo has four tourist information centres in the most frequented places of the city. Its city brand is 'Tel Aviv Nonstop City', and its company dealing with city marketing, economic development, and the start-up ecosystem is Tel Aviv Global.

In 2018, Israel launched an international tourism campaign with the slogan 'Two Cities One Break'. The follow-up to the successful project was 'Tel Aviv & Jerusalem – Two Sunny Cities. One Break'. Its key element is a short video presenting a vacation spent in the cities of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem through Instagram

stories featuring Sian Welby, the famous British TV presenter. In addition, public billboards, posters on public transport vehicles, and other online and offline tools also facilitated the greatest possible exposure.

Israel's Ministry of Tourism organized its first conference titled *Israel Hotel Investment Summit* in November 2018. As Yariv Levin, Minister of Tourism said, Israeli tourism had broken records from several perspectives in recent years – thus, in order to meet the growing demand, it is important to provide a platform for international investors, real estate developers, and leading hotel chains. Their aim is to enable international players looking for business opportunities to launch projects together with Israeli entrepreneurs and property owners.

The annual flagship event of the Israeli tourism industry is the so-called *International Mediterranean Tourism Market (IMTM)*, which has already been held 26 times. International interest is well demonstrated by the fact that ministers of tourism from fourteen countries attended the meeting in 2019, the number of countries setting up an exhibition section was 57, and the event attracted nearly 27,000 participants – including 17,000 tourism professionals and 215 decision makers.

In order to increase the capacity of hotel accommodation, Israel's Ministry of Tourism created various incentives for the industry and its investors. The key elements of the complex action plan include financial support. The government provides a 20 percent contribution to the construction of new hotels and the expansion of existing ones; an additional 8 percent is added if low-priced accommodation is created and further 5 percent at the end of the calendar year if at least 25 percent of the hotel's revenue comes from tourist payments over an 18-month period in the first 3 years of operation. In addition to this support, several processes of investment planning and execution have been simplified through amendments to the Planning and Building Law.

3.2.2. Tel Aviv Municipal Tourism Policy

The Vision for 2030 of Tel Aviv Global & Tourism municipal company aims that the city will be one of the leading urban destinations in the world. By merging Jaffa and Tel-Aviv under one municipal entity, history, religion, and dynamic multiculturalism will be turned into an attractive and inspiring medley. 328 sunny days per year, 14-kilometer coastline with many public beaches, and the proximity of the holy sites, especially the Old City of Jerusalem, is a competitive advantage. Israeli policymakers and technology experts make great efforts to improve the quality and profitability of tourism. However, from an industrial perspective, many weaknesses and threats can be identified besides the strengths and opportunities. The number of hotels and rooms is below the demand, security fears and geopolitical situation have a great impact on inbound travel trends, the quality of service culture is not constant, and other further issues need to be resolved.

The policy paper defines 17 tourism zones about half of which are existing zones and the other half are zones that are planned to contain significant tourist activity in the future. The document places special emphasis on sustainable development, which takes into consideration the needs and sentiments of residents and involves them in the tourism development efforts. The municipality seeks to institute a mechanism for promoting tourism projects that will address the weaknesses of the city as a tourist destination. The Vision has a special focus on new market segments: senior tourists, tourists from Asia (mostly from China), and visitors from Muslim countries.

Table 1. *SWOT Analysis – Vision for 2030 Tel Aviv Tourism*

SWOT Analysis of the Vision for 2030 Tel Aviv Tourism Master Plan	
STRENGTHS – easy to access and read the document – policy makers are giving honest opinions – the paper contains valuable statistics – the master plan represents an ecosystem approach	**WEAKNESSES** – much of the valuable information is in the appendix – reference and planned actions with the booming travel tech industry of Israel and Tel Aviv are insufficient – there is no indication and strategy for emergency situations, e.g. war, pandemic, natural disasters, etc. – the core content has too much marketing material instead of, e.g., a policy paper
OPPORTUNITIES – the collection of projects in appendix is a great promotion material and opportunity for investors – findings can be challenged in the industry and academia – travel tech start-ups can identify problems to be solved and approach the municipality with their initiatives and solutions	**THREATS** – the change of political leadership can lead to the rejection of the policy paper – drastic budgetary measures can threaten the implementation – instability in the region and emergency situations

Source: authors' evaluation and findings

Critiques most often mentioned by tourists according to the study of Tel Aviv Municipality:

– The number of hotels and rooms is below the demand.
– Security fears and geopolitical situation have a great impact on inbound travel trends.
– The quality of service culture is not constant.
– Poor value for money.
– Taxis and public transportation are expensive and unreliable.
– The quality of information in foreign languages is poor.
– Tourists are not happy about the cleanliness of public areas.

Authors evaluated the policy document by using the framework of SWOT analysis. The method was based on the collection and analysis of primary and secondary sources as well as study visits and interviews in Tel Aviv. Further research should include the follow-up of the analysis, periodic evaluation, and providing feedback. Current barriers are the COVID-19 pandemic and the political and economic instability in the country.

3.3. TravelTech in the Israeli Innovation Ecosystem

The umbrella organization of the industry is called IITS – Israeli Traveltech Startups. It serves as a hub bringing together more than 300 start-up enterprises. Israel's largest conference on the subject is *TTI – Travel Tech Israel 2020*, which was planned to be held in Tel Aviv on 21 October this year.

They also have a corporate innovation centre called InnoVel in Tel Aviv, which focuses on the travel and hospitality industries. Its aim is to channel Israeli innovative solutions to corporate clients which can adapt these solutions in their operation and services. Its partners include but are not limited to global players such as booking.com, AirBnb, Hilton, Lufthansa, or Skyscanner. Several large companies in the industry have opened innovation and R&D centres in Israel. These include Booking.com, Boeing, or the Israeli national airline's programme called Cockpit Innovation.

The most important Israeli Travel Tech accelerator is EilatHub, which helps industry start-ups through its various programmes and platforms. It provides access to the largest hotel chains, airlines, and other important players. It supports pilot projects, offers office use, and runs both incubation and investment programmes.

Four companies out of the ten winners of World Tourism Organization's (UNWTO) 2018 start-up innovation challenge involving 3,000 start-ups were Israeli companies:

Refundit: offers a solution for VAT refunds.

Pruvo: if it finds cheaper hotel rates, it modifies the existing booking.

SeeVoov: an interactive video-based travel planner that uses artificial intelligence and deep learning to raise interest in different destinations and handles bookings.

Howazit: a platform that simplifies and facilitates communication between businesses in the tourism industry and tourists as well as a sales channel.

4. Start-Up Nation

Participants in the Israeli business and administration sector understood the importance of country branding and recognized that 'people (at least foreigners) think of a country in the same way as if they were thinking of a brand, whether

we are talking about travelling to that country or investing there' (PAPP-VÁRY 2019: 42).

Israel is the home of networks and hubs. This is no different with country branding – all actors whose profession is to develop a positive international perception of the 'start-up nation' are organized into informal and formal platforms. The spread of this image was facilitated by the contribution of a book published ten years ago, which has since been translated into more than thirty languages. *Start-up Nation: The Story of Israel's Economic Miracle* by Dan Senor and Saul Singer has been such a great success that many people visit the country because of this with the book in their hands. It is no exaggeration to say that a new kind of tourism has emerged driving crowds of businessmen and policymakers to visit Israel on study trips in hopes of making business deals and finding the secret sauce. In the international bestseller, authors Dan Senor and Saul Singer present how and why could the country – which was at the level of third world economies in the early 1950s – become an innovation centre. The book changed the country's public image worldwide, and it now includes concepts such as innovation and the cradle of business alongside conflict and politics.

In the book, the authors highlight two elements as keys to success – a conscious choice and development of economic structure and intensive country brand building. In connection with the latter, we must mention the Hebrew word hasbará (הַסְבָּרָה), which literally means 'explanation'. In practice, it refers to public relations efforts to present the perspective of the State of Israel and support the international acceptance of its political decisions. This tool is also present in cultural diplomacy and science diplomacy. In brand building, real performance reinforces the positive message, and the positive message also has its effects, increasing real performance.

The 'start-up nation' country brand has been created, which sees and shows the key to the country's success as the interaction of the following attributes:

- highly qualified people 'making aliyah', that is, Jews immigrating to the land of Israel;
- willingness to take risks;
- speed, flexibility, informal business culture, impatience;
- smart and intuitive young society;
- during the two or three years of compulsory military service for both men and women, young people aged 18–24 can work with the latest technology, and they must take decisions regarding life-and-death issues – after such a challenge, they are not afraid to take risk or improvise in business later;
- open communication: they often challenge hierarchy and supremacy – questions are answered with questions;
- at the same time, they accept new ideas, no matter what rank or position they come from within the organization;

– failure: even multiple failures are not a shame but are part of the learning process – it does not involve stigmatization;
– the size of the country results in a kind of test environment in all respects; it is not a market itself but an excellent springboard – they are already thinking about global sales when the business idea is born.

The bestseller also inspired the creation of one of the most important national branding organizations. Start-Up Nation Central is a non-profit organization maintained primarily by donations from philanthropic donors mostly from the United States, serving business development and country promotion purposes simultaneously.[1]

Other books presenting the recipe for Israel's economic rise and innovation superpower have also been written. These include New York Times and Los Angeles Times bestseller *Let There Be Water: Israel's Solution for a Water-Starved World* by Seth M. Siegel and *Thou Shalt Innovate: How Israeli Ingenuity Repairs the World* by Avi Jorisch.

Israel is truly a home for start-ups (and it is important to add: successful start-ups!) as well as innovation – this is also confirmed by statistics. Many factors, mostly formed as a result of the cultural worldview and special living conditions of the people living there, produce quickly and ingeniously adaptable, creative, risk-taking, highly qualified entrepreneurs and workforce. However, Israel's branding does not stop at the start-up nation: the official concept by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is already based on a broader foundation that goes beyond the economic sector: this is a 'creative energy' with three components: building the future, vibrant diversity, and entrepreneurial zeal.

5. The Jewish State – A Conscious Strategy of Country Branding

As we have seen, in order to counter the long-standing globally negative image, country image professionals have made efforts to broaden the conversation. The

1 Start-up Nation Central also has a significant contribution to the development of 'innovation tourism'. A large number of delegations visit the country from university students through delegations of large corporations seeking innovative solutions, ideas, and talent to politicians and state leaders. Each year the organization receives more than 60 groups of high-level business and political leaders and organizes complex programmes for them. China, Japan, India, the United States, African and Western European countries are the most interested in Israel's innovation ecosystem. Their target audience is perhaps the smartest choice possible – students from the best universities, politicians and decision-makers, businessmen, i.e. people who are prominent opinion leaders in their communities or will become ones in the future.

infrastructure responsible for local branding, which includes both state and NGO organizations, is briefly presented below (*Figure 1*).

Source: 'Brand Israel' presentation by Ran Natanzon, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Head of Division, Innovation & Brand Management, Media and Public Affairs

Figure 1. *The Israeli branding ecosystem*

5.1. State Actors – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Of all the interviews with state actors, the authors of this article highlight the interview with Ran Natanzon, Head of Innovation, Brand Management and Social Diplomacy Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Israel (25 April 2018, MFA headquarters, Israel). The interview revealed that the central actor, the MFA, does not consider country branding as a tourism marketing issue – however, it works closely with the Ministry of Tourism. The MFA has recently created the 'Creative Energy' brand, while the Ministry of Tourism has created 'Land of Creation'. According to Natanzon, it is an important guiding principle that the messages should have a human dimension, provide a direct experience for the recipients, and create a kind of dialogue – they should not appear as one-sided slogans but build partnerships and use micro-marketing.

Narratives of the Israeli brand (*Figure 2*):

– building the future,
– vibrant diversity,
– entrepreneurial zeal.



Source: 'Brand Israel' presentation by Ran Natanzon, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Head of Division, Innovation & Brand Management, Media and Public Affairs

Figure 2. *The components of Israel's brand-building process*

These are accompanied by the elements of the special cultural environment presented in detail in the book *Start-up Nation* (SENOR–SINGER 2009): questioning hierarchy, accepting failure and unsuccessful attempt, can-do attitude.

The most important tasks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this area include:

– Israel's country brand: developing strategic processes, creating the visual language of the brand;
– creation of policy documents for brand strategy;
– developing the ministry's network with the Israeli innovation ecosystem, promoting the interconnection of government institutions with key players in the high-tech sector;
– monitoring international and Israeli innovation trends;
– developing a programme for delegations from the international business press and media and drawing their attention to Israeli innovation;
– holding Israeli branding presentations for government and business actors, thus handing over key communication panels.

In the process of preparing its diplomats to be deployed, the MFA also places great emphasis on preparing people employed abroad for their contribution to country branding at their future stations with a focus on innovation and economy.

In addition, they seek to draw the attention of foreign diplomats accredited to Israel on programmes and actors deemed important by the MFA. For example,

their tools include the organization of innovation study tours with the aim of making participating diplomats report on the country's outstanding research and development achievements, conveying their willingness to cooperate, and providing a refined image of the country.



Source: https://vosizneias.com/2019/01/22/jerusalem-israel-takes-5th-place-in-bloomberg-ranking-of-worlds-most-innovative-nations/

Figure 3. *The world's most innovative economies in Bloomberg's ranking*

Supporting events and inviting international delegations (even by supporting their participation in some form) is also a tool for the practice of innovation and country branding. Examples include the so-called Start Tel Aviv Competition, whose main partners are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel's foreign representations and the Tel Aviv-Yafo City Municipality. The annual call for proposals by embassies and their local partners is open to young people from abroad who have launched innovative entrepreneurial projects, already have a prototype, and would like to attend a fully funded, nearly one-week-long seminar related to the globally significant DLD – Digital Life Design Festival.

The MFA continuously monitors participation in various innovation rankings and results, which are actively communicated. Specific examples include, but are

not limited to, the Bloomberg Innovation Index (*Figure 3*) (5th place in a list of 50 countries) and the FutureBrand Country Index (22nd place in a list of a 75 countries).

5.2. Agency for International Development Cooperation (MASHAV)2

The agency belonging to Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been active since the 1950s. It initially dealt with the alleviation of hunger, disease, and poverty in the developing world through technology transfer and training. Today, MASHAV also cooperates with many countries in the developed world such as Hungary and other countries from the Visegrád Group (V4).

The Agency holds many of its programmes in Israel with hundreds of participants each year. Most of them gain lifelong experiences and are grateful for the study trip during which they receive a dense and intensive ready-made programme from logistics to professional elements with little leisure time. Upon landing at Ben-Gurion International Airport, the narrative is provided by MASHAV right from the participants' first impressions, thus contributing to conscious country brand building.

Development programmes implemented by the Agency outside the country (for example, in Africa) also reinforce the positive image that Israel contributes to its own development and that of its international partners by transferring world-class technology and knowledge. In addition to deepening the slogans 'Land of creation' and 'Creative Energy', these trainings always provide an excellent opportunity to present Israel's position on the Arab–Israeli conflict.

5.3. Nonstop City and Tel Aviv Global – Metropolis Region

Besides the 'Creative Energy' and 'Land of Creation' slogans with the related complex promotion strategies coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Tourism, the 'Tel Aviv – Nonstop City' brand is also strongly present in the development of Israel's international image. According to a definition by the municipality, an extension of the city's vision is represented in it – they position themselves among the world's twenty leading global metropolises. They define innovation and the 'nonstop' character as a 'competitive identity' evident in all aspects of life and emphasize that there is much more real content behind it than just producing catchy slogans. In addition to developing communication panels and strategies, they are engaged in professional branding designed along five key values – pluralism, openness, freedom, innovation, urban creative energy –, which is indeed rich in programmes and projects. Moreover, the Tel Aviv brand combines five sub-brands, which also appear independently in many

2 Agency for International Development Cooperation.

communication materials and campaigns. These are Jaffa Old City,[3] The First Hebrew City,[4] The White City,[5] Tel Aviv Gay Vibe,[6] and The Startup City.

The organization implementing the initiative originated in 2010 is Tel Aviv Global, a municipal non-profit company. Its most important objective is to position the city of Tel Aviv-Yafo as an international business centre specialized in innovation. Its diverse activities include event organizing, conducting online and offline promotional campaigns, implementing smart city projects, and performing policy tasks.

In the field of innovation, it also maintains an incubator called Library where start-up enterprises can rent a workstation and participate in professional and community events much cheaper than market rates. Their organization receives delegations of foreign experts and companies. However, they do not only focus outward – with the help of the so-called ITAY (Innovation Tel Aviv Yafo) Model, the work of the 12,000 people employed by the municipality and its companies is placed in a new, inspiring, proactive, and flexible framework. Tel Aviv Global is also a tourism marketing company, handling economic development and the increasing number of the incoming tourists in a complex way. In addition to meeting the needs of leisure visitors, the company also seeks to attract the attention of potential immigrants promising the greatest added value in creative economy.

5.4. Non-State Actors – Innovation Without Borders Group

Innovation Without Borders is an informal, non-governmental actor. However, the umbrella organization is supported by the state with material and intangible assets. It currently brings together diplomats from 39 countries, dealing with science, technology, and innovation matters, accredited in Israel. The regular, non-profit programmes offer an excellent opportunity for networking – free of charge or on a cost reimbursement basis. Furthermore, each session is opened by the presentations of invited Israeli businessmen, innovation experts, or government actors. IWB typically organizes its events on a monthly basis, but their frequency is increasing with events often taking place every two to three weeks. For diplomats accredited in Israel, IWB brings together the most important entrepreneurship programmes and accelerators for foreign people. They also provide an opportunity for delegates from each country to present their own country-specific needs to the

3 It is the world's oldest port operating without interruption that has been active for five thousand years.
4 It is the very first city in the world where the renewed Hebrew language (also known as Modern Hebrew, or Ivrit) was spoken.
5 Referring to architecture, Bauhaus buildings, and white plasters.
6 They are proud to support gay communities, gay pride parades, and thriving gay communities – in addition to municipal 'thematic beaches', such as the orthodox and dog beaches, a 'gay beach' with rainbow-coloured pergolas was created.

NGOs' management during a personal consultation. Membership and participation in the programmes are free of charge.

5.5. The NoCamels and Israel21C Online Portals

The two most significant online portals presenting innovation, research and development news, and scientific breakthroughs in English are NoCamels and Israel21C.

The NoCamels brand responds to stereotypes about Israel with its name – it presents the region considered by many to be a deserted war zone that has lagged behind as a vibrant country being at the forefront of the world in terms of business and science. Although the 'international promotion of Israeli innovations' appears on the website as a mission, many articles refer to the Israeli origin of the invention only after reaching a certain reading time, also arousing interest and gaining reader recognition. This is a kind of conscious strategy that the operators of the online portal shared with the authors of this article during their meeting in the Herzliya campus of the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) at Raphael Recanati International School, founder and home to the NoCamels portal.

Israel21C and NoCamels are very similar portals, but the up-to-date content of the former one is also available in Spanish in addition to English. A special feature of Israel21C is that it runs a competition to select 'digital ambassadors' and support them by a financial scholarship. The difference compared to the NoCamels portal is that Israel21C does not have a university background, puts much more emphasis on presenting Israeli–American cooperation projects, and its articles and online content also include topics related to cultural, humanitarian, and everyday life.

6. Summary

Founded in 1948, just over seventy years ago, the state could hardly have achieved such results if its leaders had not used the tools of country branding and conscious economic development at the same time, without taking their eyes off the map for a moment when creating any new institution or strategy.

The resulting 'start-up nation' and 'land of creation' country brands and their communication platforms are well thought out and collected, taking into account the real values of the country. Following the establishment of a coherent system, it serves a variety of purposes, turning the country's scientific and business success into the impetus of tourism and politics.

Thanks to Israel's professional country branding, a part of the international public opinion, especially its formerly neutral or moderately pro-Israeli members, move closer and closer to the country and show attachment to it. As a result,

foreign politicians are increasingly willing to make gestures towards Israel. At the same time, pro-Israeli actors are also encouraged by the division of the Arab world and the relegation of the Palestinian question to the background because they can expect less intense focused international resistance from predominantly Muslim Arab and African countries, and they are not afraid of a significant shrinkage in their domestic voting bloc either.

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Between Mobility and Inclusion: The Position of Mother Tongue Instruction in Sweden and Denmark

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Abstract. Migration to Scandinavia has taken place quite similarly in Sweden and Denmark since the Second World War. However, from the 1980s onwards, Sweden and Denmark have become increasingly dissimilar in terms of migration policy, which went hand in hand with education policy for newcomers. Mother tongue instruction for newcomers may improve the process of integration and social cohesion; nevertheless, this is provided for differently in Sweden and Denmark. This study takes into account different social dynamics in order to research what the position of mother tongue instruction is in policy documents and media discourse in both Sweden and Denmark, to determine what the effects of mother tongue instruction are, and subsequently to figure out what is necessary to find the balance between mobility and inclusion – all these for creating further social cohesion and avoiding segregation.

Keywords: mother tongue instruction, mobility, inclusion, Sweden, Denmark

Introduction

During the past decade, Scandinavia became a territory where many people emigrated or fled. The growing presence of languages brought in by them causes major challenges within the society: e.g. questions about (not) belonging to a state, diversity, and complications of the political and economic situation in a country.[1] The current cultural and linguistic diversity in Sweden and Denmark is complex

1 *Migration and Inclusion in a Multicultural Europe (MIME)*, Amsterdam School for Regional, Transnational and European Studies (ARTES); accessed on 18 September 2019. Available at: https://artes.uva.nl/content/research-groups/migration-and-inclusion/migration-and-inclusion.html.

due to international mobility, migration, and globalization.[2] The tension between the *mobility* of citizens and the *inclusion* of citizens in today's Europe needs to be resolved.[3] Therefore, innovative policy responses are needed which take into account the national social dynamics and a multilingual society.[4] The present research distinguishes between EU citizens emigrating to Sweden and Denmark and third-country nationals (hereafter TCNs) emigrating to Sweden and Denmark. TCNs may emigrate for purposes of finding work but may also be political refugees or refugees due to the recent climate crisis. The distinction between EU citizens and TCNs is an important one to be made in relation to the EU policy that will be discussed later on.

Mother tongue instruction (hereafter MTI) for newcomers in their host country is the 'teaching in or of the language of their country of origin' (Houtkamp 2018: 98). This is an interesting concept to investigate with the aim of becoming aware of the tension between mobility and inclusion. When discussing MTI for newcomers in this paper, 'newcomers' refers to TCNs integrating into a host country to become a citizen of the state. Furthermore, the concept of MTI and its possible implications helps shed light on 'how governments might improve on increasing intra-EU mobility of citizens, while at the same time preventing it from fostering possible segregation' (Id. 98–99). This matter is approached from *the MIME Vademecum*, the knowledge framework of this paper. From the examination of the concept of MTI, this paper argues that the provision of MTI seems to differ in the national educational policies of Sweden and Denmark, 'and over time, became closely linked' to migration matters such as integration (Salö et al. 2018: 603).

Hence, the research question of this paper is what position MTI has in the national educational policy of both Sweden and Denmark and, consequently, what this means for the integration of newcomers in both countries. Within the matter of integration, the concepts of mobility and inclusion are central in this paper, just as broader questions about whether states must provide mother tongue education to newcomers and whether 'English is sufficient to reach out to newcomers before they learn the local languages' (Dunbar–McKelvey 2018: 90, Mamadouh–el Ayadi 2019: 92).

The further methodology of this paper is to first examine the concepts of mobility and inclusion, followed by an explanation of MTI and its possible complications. Subsequently, minority language education in both Sweden and Denmark is examined to describe and substantiate the context for this research. Within the concept of minority language education, MTI is instrumental and is a means for providing for the teaching in or of the language of origin of a newcomer. In the third part of the paper, the position of MTI will be analysed by comparing

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.

the educational policies of Sweden and Denmark through a media analysis and a policy document analysis. This is relevant, while the political and media discourse influences the manner in which policy makers think about migration and integration more generally, and hence it influences the position of MTI in the educational policies of Sweden and Denmark. Political documents in this analysis are therefore also examined through the literature on the subject and refer to MTI for newcomers specifically. For the media analysis, the arguments about MTI that the media observes are located. Moreover, a brief in-depth case study of two minority groups who receive MTI in Sweden and Denmark is included. For this in-depth case study, the Somali and Turkish minority groups are selected to examine – they make up a similar number within the demographics of Sweden and Denmark, respectively, and they initially emigrated to Scandinavia in the same post-war period. This analysis is concluded in the last part of this paper. The research is supported by sources which encourage making education inclusive for all citizens regardless of their descent and language background. In this way, this research complements existing views on the subject while focusing essentially on the position MTI occupies in the discourse on integration in both Sweden and Denmark.

Mobility and Inclusion

The MIME Vademecum, the knowledge framework of this research, stands for 'Mobility and Inclusion in Multilingual Europe'. This project addresses the challenge of how Europeans can 'balance the requirements of mobility in a modern, integrated, technologically advanced society' while maintaining Europe's cultural and linguistic diversity (Grin 2018: 15). Innovative policies concerning cultural and linguistic diversity are needed to resolve the tension between mobility and inclusion in present-day Europe. The European integrating society pursues the objectives of both mobility and inclusion; nevertheless, they diverge in practice. In effect, more mobility often means less inclusion and vice versa. Mobility, on the one hand, stands for the notion of free movement across and free settlement in the EU Member States. 'Mobility requires efficient communication among people with different language backgrounds', and hence it also takes place in the dimension of the digital world and social media (Ibid.). Inclusion, on the other hand, refers to 'a sense of belonging to and connection with one's place of residence' (Id. 19). Hence, it implies acquaintance with the local language. For newcomers, adaptation to the local environment should nevertheless not mean that they abandon their own linguistic and cultural features. It has become apparent that the tension between mobility and inclusion is especially critical in the case of language (Ibid.).

At the same time, however, by approaching this tension from a linguistic perspective, there may be solutions to how these two objectives may partly converge. *The MIME Vademecum* opts for the 'intelligent use of social dynamics in civil society and regarding language and multilingualism'.[5] Mobility and inclusion taken together create social cohesion on the European level 'also in the terms of language usage' (Ibid: 20). Social cohesion is thus the outcome of the balance of mobility and inclusion in society, and subsequently it makes integration possible. Hence, 'linguistic diversity must be handled as a social issue' (Ibid: 27).

The tension between mobility and inclusion is reflected in the case of MTI for newcomers. MTI, 'the teaching of minority languages within national systems of education', is often a politicized object and raises the question what social worth multilingualism has in society (Salö et al. 2018: 592). The provision of MTI differs among states. It may be implemented on 'a private or community basis or through the national curriculum of a state or a state-sponsored educational structure' (Ibid.). An essential question in the discussion about MTI is whether states must provide MTI to newcomers.

It is a fact that providing education in the host language to newcomers would 'make their inclusion into the host society more efficient and provides for a better position on the labour market' (Houtkamp–Marácz 2018: 40). However, this should not lead to the full assimilation of the newcomers' languages. According to Houtkamp and Marácz, the 'full assimilation of migrant languages would violate the linguistic rights of migrants to speak and cultivate one's own heritage language and violate the EU's linguistic diversity policy' (Ibid.). Hence, the provision of MTI is in a broader sense backed up by the following legal implications. In the first place, Article 3, paragraph 3 of the *Treaty on European Union* states that the EU 'shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity and shall ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced'.[6] Subsequently, Article 22 of the *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union* states that the EU 'shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity'.[7] Furthermore, Article 165, paragraph 1 of the *Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union* states that the EU 'shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education

5 Amsterdam School for Regional, Transnational and European Studies (ARTES), *Migration and Inclusion in a Multicultural Europe (MIME).*

6 Treaty on European Union, Article 3. *Official Journal* C 326, 26/10/2012 P. 0001 - 0390.

7 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 22. 26 October 2012, 2012/C 326/02.

systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity'.[8] Besides the former primary EU law, the secondary legal act Council Directive 77/486/EEC likewise observed more specifically that 'language education of children of EU newcomers was of importance in advancing the mobility of persons throughout the EU' (Dunbar 2018: 54).

The directive provided that Member States must take appropriate measures 'to ensure the teaching of the official language or one of the official languages of the host state as well as the teaching of the child's mother tongue and the culture of the state of origin' (Ibid.). It is a complication for the efficient provision of MTI that this secondary legal act is a directive as directives are binding as to the result to be achieved. For the Member State, there is – within a certain time period – some room for manoeuvre as to how to implement the directive. Council Directive 77/486/EEC hence does not have a direct effect and causes an unequal provision of MTI among the EU Member States also due to the fact that education is merely an ancillary competence of the EU. The latter means that the EU can only 'carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States'.[9]

MTI as a concept thus has gained legitimacy on the European level, and it is clear to policymakers that solely English is not 'sufficient to reach out to newcomers before they learn the local languages' (Mamadouh–el Ayadi 2018: 92). Migration agencies will accomplish their tasks most effectively by communicating with the arriving migrants in a language they understand. It would be most efficient if information about societal aspects (e.g. access to the labour market, administrative procedures, health, and education) were translated into the mother tongue of the newcomer; additionally, language in general represents 'a means to the identification' of the newcomer (Houtkamp 2014: 17). For example, in Göteborg, Sweden, Romanian is most commonly used by migration organizations. In a framework of multilevel governance (MLG), the complications arising from newcomers' language competencies and their implications for the tension between mobility and inclusion may be resolved (Houtkamp–Marácz 2018).

MTI in Sweden and Denmark

In order to explain the educational policies of Sweden and Denmark in relation to migration, this paper first elaborates on the migration policy of both Sweden and Denmark. This is essential since over the years Sweden and Denmark 'have become increasingly dissimilar in terms of migration policy' (Myrberg 2017: 323). The first specific policy focussing on newcomers, 'their rights and responsibilities

8 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 165. *Official Journal* C 326, 26/10/2012 P. 0001 - 0390.

9 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 6.

and their way to inclusion in the Scandinavian welfare state was created in Sweden in 1975' (Brännström et al. 2018: 26). In general, post-Second World War 'migration to Scandinavia has followed a similar pattern' in both Sweden and Denmark, even though there are some differences (Brochmann–Hagelund 2012: 8). Migration to Sweden started earlier and had a greater capacity than Denmark. In integration policy, 'the controversy between different aims for justice and welfare' has become more evident over the years (Ibid. 14). Brännström et al. explain how in Sweden integration and migration became a policy area of their own in 1998. Moreover, there was an establishment reform in 2010, which made it possible for newcomers to establish themselves in society more quickly and easily. Sweden became a 'state of hope' for refugees, among others. Various activities and measures, such as Swedish-language education, proved to be effective in helping newcomers to become more employable (Brännström et al. 2018). However, since 2015, Swedish migration policies have been both restrictive and welcoming in their nature. Denmark reacted differently to migration than Sweden around 1975. Jønsson and Petersen note that the Danish society – characterized by a homogeneous nature – was confronted with stagnation in economy and rising unemployment, which led to a more restrictive attitude towards migration and integration (Jønsson–Petersen 2012). What is subsequently interesting to note is that, unlike in Sweden, it was characteristic of the Danish discussion about migration that there was no actual (public) discussion of the conflicts arising such as assimilation and multiculturalism. This follows from the cultural differences between Sweden and Denmark that the Swedish discourse is more open and transparent, while the Danish discourse is more closed and private. Since 2001, the Danish People's Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*) has been on the rise and demanded even more restrictive policies. Østergaard-Nielsen is a researcher of the rise of the Far Right in Europe and wrote that: 'The electoral success of the Danish People's Party has been interpreted as a Danish outcry of racism and anti-foreigner sentiment. The reality is, however, a little more complex than that' (*Østergaard*-Nielsen 2003: 448). She argues that the success of the Danish People's Party is a result of the discontent of the population. How to integrate already residing refugees in Denmark remains the main theme of Danish debates about migration. Thus, in order to understand the educational policies of Sweden and Denmark, it is important to have in mind how migration policies have evolved in Sweden and Denmark and what political shifts were driving changes.

Sweden

Before examining minority language education in Sweden, this paper will first consider the various languages spoken in Sweden. The multilingual landscape broadly consists of migrant minority languages, national minority languages, Swedish, and English. In this paper, minority language education is perceived as any language

education provided for 'others' (i.e. not Swedish or Danish). In practice, this takes form in language education for migrant minorities on the one hand and national minorities on the other. National minority languages have long been ignored 'since linguistic and cultural diversity was seen as a threat to national unity in Sweden' (Cabau 2014: 410). Notwithstanding, with Sweden's entry into the EU in 1995 in mind, Sweden did accept Saami, Meänkieli, Finnish, Yiddish, and Romani as minority languages in 1998/1999 and subsequently ratified the *European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages*. What is interesting to note is that only in 2009 did the so-called *Language Act* established Swedish as the main language in Sweden and also reasserted the five above-listed minority languages as national minority languages. Subsequently, the act stated that 'persons belonging to a national minority are to be given the opportunity to learn, develop and use the minority language'.[10] Hence, the – perhaps symbolic – recognition of national minority languages is essential to subsequently enhance the development and provision of MTI in educational policy also for migrant minority languages, which is of relevance today.

Cabau's work clarifies that in Sweden policymakers have already responded for a long time to the needs and issues in relation to multilingualism in education as a consequence of migration. For instance, 'the concept of MTI has a long tradition in Sweden compared to other European countries' (Id. 409). Sweden is commonly regarded as a model country in the field of language and integration. However, there are shortcomings and complications in this field in Sweden too. The initial concept of MTI collapsed in the early 1990s along with the progressive national education policy for newcomers of that time. This caused the emergence of independent bilingual schools: MTI used to take place as part of a regular school day but was now 'offered almost exclusively outside the regular curriculum', in evening classes (Lindberg 2007: 77). Cabau notes about MTI in Sweden that: 'The fact that there are shortcomings in the implementation of MTI in Sweden may come as a surprise to external observers, given the country's good reputation in the field of minority language education policy and planning' (Cabau 2014: 412). It seems that 'Swedish remains central in shaping what it means to be Swedish, particularly in the case of education' (Lundberg 2018: 48). How MTI currently plays a role within this educational culture is to be elaborated on in the analysis.

Denmark

In Denmark, the multilingual landscape broadly consists out of migrant minority languages, Danish, and English. Denmark does not quite acknowledge national minority languages except for Faroese spoken mainly on the Faroe Islands (part of the Kingdom of Denmark) and a small German area within the Danish territory

10 Ministry of Culture, *Language Act (2009):600*. Retrieved from: http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/13/81/33/c424146c.pdf.3.

(Salö et al. 2018). Thus, while Danish is not particularly threatened, Denmark represents the type of language policy in the context of which the government has not yet ratified the status of the official language as the main language of the state or national minority languages (Siiner 2014).

The changes in power constellations in 2001 led to considerable changes in the political agenda, leading to a general negative attitude towards newcomers and bilingualism in the official discourse and the media (Ibid.). Amendments made to citizenship legislation at the time included a demand of knowledge of the Danish language as a requirement for the granting of Danish citizenship (Ibid.). Additional amendments made to the *Folkeskoleloven* (the Basic Schools Act) enacted that it was no longer obligatory for municipalities to offer free classes in the mother tongue to bilingual children from outside the EU/EEA. The latter shows a strong decentralization tendency: traditionally, the Danish education system has been characterized by local involvement according to national target subjects and guidelines. However, since 2001, the local municipalities have been the main agents responsible for the language screening of bilingual children and for providing extra classes in Danish as a second language, if necessary (Ibid.). The decentralization of minority language education has both its benefits and difficulties. Local municipalities have the necessary substantive allocative resources to solve challenges to minority language education and are closer to the people, which may lead to the most efficient problem solving in this case. However, the economic capacities of local municipalities need to be sufficient to meet their high-level responsibilities, and, as Lex and Mouritsen argue in their report on the topic: in the Danish political context, there is a lack of 'political will to any significant degree of diversity politics' (Lex–Mouritsen 2009: 2). Moreover, they mention the relative absence of policies in the field of minority language education. How MTI for newcomers plays a role within this educational culture is to be elaborated on in the analysis.

Comparison

From this descriptive case study, it becomes clear that Sweden and Denmark are great cases to compare. They both are relatively 'small and open welfare states, built around the same welfare ideology and system' (Borevi et al. 2017: 5–6). However, Sweden and Denmark are dissimilar in their minority language education. One could characterize Sweden's approach as 'permissive', while Denmark's approach is typified as more 'restrictive' (Ibid: 6).

> Moreover, as elaborated on in a previous research:
> In Denmark's approach towards migration and integration, the 'society-centered' and 'bottom-up' perspective is dominant. The existing cultural homogeneity in Denmark is seen as necessary for the welfare state. In Sweden, a

> more 'state-centred' and 'top-down' perspective dominates, through which the modernizing welfare state advances social inclusion and equal treatment in society. (Ibid: 7)

While Sweden and Denmark thus resemble one another in essential ways, they are different with regard to organization and in the case of recognition of MTI (Salö et al. 2018: 592). For instance, unlike as in Sweden, Denmark did not adopt an official state policy with regard to multiculturalism (Ibid: 597). In line with this, the motivation to provide MTI for newcomers was not a way of meeting the demands of the society but rather an aspect of labour politics (Hegelund 2002).

Position of MTI and Its Effects

In order to evaluate what the position of MTI is in the national educational policy of both Sweden and Denmark and what this consequently means for the integration of newcomers in both countries, this comparative analysis will take two variables into account. For determining what the position of MTI is in Sweden and Denmark, this paper will analyse and compare policy documents and the media discourse of both countries. Subsequently, in order to determine what the position of MTI means for the integration of newcomers in both countries, this paper will focus on the effect of MTI through an in-depth case study of two minority groups who receive MTI in Sweden and Denmark.

MTI: Position

Table 1. *Analysis: policy documents and media discourse on MTI in Sweden and Denmark*

Sweden	Denmark
Policy Documents	
• **Introduction** of MTI in 1976 along with an introduced multicultural policy and active recognition of minority cultures (Fernández–Jensen 2017: 7–8). • 1991: connection of bilingualism and interculturalism to the specific challenges and opportunities of internationalization (Ibid.). • 1994: **MTI, a subject in its own right** with a syllabus (Prop. 1992/92:220).	• **Introduction** of MTI in 1976, with the primary reason of repatriation of minority cultures. Pedagogical guidelines were not set up (Fernández–Jensen 2017: 8). • 2002: **abolition of MTI** for non-EU citizens, which had already been a point of discussion since 1995 (Ibid.). • The right to MTI has not been pursued in any parliamentary motions or law proposals since 2002 (Ibid: 9).

Sweden	Denmark
Policy Documents	
• 2010: the schools' obligation to offer MTI was upgraded from regulation to law and simultaneously reinforced in pre- and secondary education (Prop. 2009/10:165). • The Swedish school law allows schools to offer newcomers' children in grades 1–6 half of the teaching time in the mother tongue (Fernández–Jensen 2017: 9). • It is **the objective of MTI** to provide students with the opportunity to develop knowledge in and about their mother tongues. At the same time, the objective makes students aware about the importance of MTI in their studying the different school subjects.[11]	• **The objective of MTI** is for students to 'acquire competences and skills in order to become capable of understanding the spoken and written language and of expressing themselves in speaking and writing'. 'The instruction will give the students insight into culture and society and the country of origin, among other things, in order to ease the students' possible return to this country'.[12]
Media Discourse	
• In the Swedish media discourse, MTI is **rarely discussed.** TCNs are welcome in the Swedish schools, and this message is also represented in the media. • The media does write about how Sweden and different actors consider expanding mother tongue education. 'Roughly 280,000 students are eligible for this education, but only approximately 170,000 are actively participating in the courses.' Small reforms in the organization of MTI could improve the latter. Once MTI becomes more integrated as part of the school day, rather than treated as a separate subject at the end of the day, students will be more motivated to participate in MTI.	• In the Danish media discourse, it becomes predominant that there is a discussion between the political sphere and the educational sphere about whether MTI should be abolished for TCNs. This discussion follows from the fact that there is **an uneven offer of MTI in Denmark**. • The municipality of Copenhagen provides MTI from their budget of 23 million Danish krones. MTI is therefore free for TCNs. Other municipalities in Denmark do not have this financial capacity to offer MTI, which leads to an unequal situation in Denmark for TCNs and for the further integration of TCNs. Due to this, Pia Allerslev of the *Venstre* party wants to remove the concept of MTI as a whole. She calls MTI unnecessary and a waste of money. This caused a new debate between academics, schools, and politicians.

11 Prop. (Bill) 1992/92:220, *En ny läroplan för grundskolan och ett nytt betygssystem för grundskolan, sameskolan, specialskolan och den obligatoriska särskolan.*
Prop. (Bill) 2009/10:165, *Den nya skollagen – för kunskap, valfrihet och trygghet.*
Swedish National Agency for Education, *Curriculum for the Compulsory School, Preschool Class and the Recreation Centre 2011.* Stockholm: Skolverket, 2011.

12 Danish Ministry of Education, *Modersmålsundervisning*, Fælles Mål 2009:46. Copenhagen: Undervisningsministeriet, 2009.

Sweden	Denmark
Media Discourse	
• The most used languages in mother tongue education in Sweden are Arabic, Somali, English, Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, Persian, Kurdish, Spanish, Finnish, Albanian, and Polish. • Politicians from the Radical Party argue that MTI should remain because mastering one language completely will make it easier for the student to learn other subjects to their full effect. Schools contend that MTI improves the quality of society and social cohesion. TCNs get the feeling that their culture is accepted in the host country, which contributes to a better integrated society. • Regardless of what the outcome of this debate will be, municipalities will continue to offer MTI to EU/EEA citizens as well as citizens from the Faroe Islands and Greenland.	• Politicians from the Radical Party argue that MTI should remain because mastering one language completely will make it easier for the student to learn other subjects to their full effect. Schools contend that MTI improves the quality of society and social cohesion. TCNs get the feeling that their culture is accepted in the host country, which contributes to a better integrated society. • Regardless of what the outcome of this debate will be, municipalities will continue to offer MTI to EU/EEA citizens as well as citizens from the Faroe Islands and Greenland.

In its essence, the Danish and Swedish school systems are quite similar. According to Telhaug, Mediås, and Aasen, "they combine state centralization in the choice and prioritization of subjects and in the formulation of binding learning goals for the individual subjects with a high degree of teacher/school autonomy in deciding how to achieve these goals through teaching style and curriculum selection" (Fernández–Jensen 2017: 6). Swedish and Danish school systems hence share a commitment to comprehensive public schooling in order to reduce socioeconomic inequality (Fernández–Jensen 2017: 6).

However, from the policy document analysis (see *Table 1*), it becomes clear that Sweden and Denmark diverge in their policy on MTI. The conclusions stemming from this analysis are based on the relevant literature taking likewise into account the political dynamics behind the provision of MTI in Sweden and Denmark. In Sweden, most of the political parties understand that MTI is 'vital to the intellectual and personal development of newcomers, and particularly children, which is in turn favourable to their integration into the host country' (Ibid: 9). The latter is not the case in Denmark. Following from this understanding, in Sweden, MTI has a relatively strong legal and institutional support, while in Denmark MTI is anchored more liberally in legal and institutional frameworks, and 'thus it occupies a vague and unstable position in the national curriculum as well as in the local context' (Salö et al. 2018: 593). This observation is recognized in the fact that the Danish Conservative Party and the Liberal Party both argued in 2002 that no scientific evidence supported the instrumental value of MTI for

learning Danish and, moreover, that cultural identity belonged to the private sphere and not to the school. The main motivation in Denmark for MTI was to sustain children's language skills in order to facilitate a future repatriation to their countries of origin (Ibid: 598).

From the media discourse analysis (see *Table 1*), it becomes clear that MTI in Denmark is first and foremost a political matter and has become an issue in the MLG organization of MTI. Several actors cooperate in this matter at the national level and the local level as well. A similar MLG organization of MTI is enacted in Sweden, where transitions and the overall process, however, seem more stable and hence do not cause conflicting political debates in the media. This is perhaps due to the fact that the Swedish discussion on MTI may be defined as having been academically founded, while the Danish discussion on MTI remained a matter and 'balancing act for political ends' (Ibid: 592). This remark, suggested by Salö et al., could thus explain the difference in the position of MTI in the media discourse of both countries and has consequences for the further implementation of MTI in Sweden and Denmark. In Sweden, MTI is a right within the multicultural scheme, while in Denmark MTI has become predominantly an instrument for enhancing the acquisition of Danish and the future repatriation of TCNs to their country of origin (Id. 603). Danish politicians debate about the question whether MTI is an investment or an obligation in order to solve integration issues in society.

MTI: Effect

It is in the interest of this research to study a case of a minority group receiving MTI in the countries concerned in this paper. In the light of two studies, this paper will examine the effect of MTI for the Somali diaspora in Sweden and a Turkish minority in Denmark. As conclusion, it is possible to determine what MTI means for the integration of newcomers in Sweden and Denmark.

Sweden

In Sweden, the Somali diaspora is a major group that deserves an in-depth study. Migration to Sweden from Somalia (the Horn of Africa) began in the late 1980s as a consequence of the downfall of the Somali state and following civil wars (Palm–Ganuza–Hedman 2019: 65). Until now, this migration flow from Somalia is still an ongoing process. Thus, a relatively large Somali diaspora has emerged in Sweden. Most of the Somali students in Sweden are entitled to MTI in the Swedish curriculum, and many Somali-speaking parents choose to enrol their children for MTI. Palm, Ganuza, and Hedman illustrate that it is difficult to maintain and develop a minoritized language in a majority language context. Moreover, they argue that the use of language by (young) people will also depend on the 'wider

society's attitude and reaction to the use of the language and to multilingual practices in general' (Id. 64). From the article by Palm et al., it becomes, however, clear that MTI has the effect that the Somali language is not solely used in the private sphere at home anymore but also in the daily lives of the Somali diaspora and at school (Id. 72). MTI thus achieves and contributes to further integration, also in combination with the increased linguistic independence of the Somali diaspora. In a sense, MTI hence prevents the segregation of Somali-speaking minorities in multicultural Sweden.

Denmark

In Denmark, the Turkish minority is a major social factor and thus is worth studying more closely. Turkish migration to Denmark went hand in hand with the general migration flow from Turkey to Europe from the 1960s onwards. In comparison to the Somali-speaking parents in Sweden, Turkish parents have a strong disinterest towards school due to problematic school administration–parent relations and the lack of MTI (especially in Odense, Denmark.) The issues originate from the fact that students only know limited Turkish and limited Danish and not one language very well. The concept of MTI is built on the fact that 'having systematic mother tongue knowledge facilitates development of the secondary language structure' (Deveci–Gunduz 2012: 5809). Hence, effective implementation of MTI would improve both Turkish and Danish and would therefore subsequently create a new social cohesion, as explained in the Somali/Swedish case. However, the Danish municipalities, with the exception of Copenhagen, stopped providing MTI due to economic reasons, as recognized in the media discourse analysis as well (Ibid.).

Conclusions

To sum up, this study has shown that, indeed, the national educational policies of Sweden and Denmark are dissimilar in terms of the position of MTI for newcomers. What this means for the integration of newcomers in both countries has been clarified via the concepts of mobility and inclusion. These concepts are often in tension with each other. However, in the case of language policy, mobility and inclusion can also exist in a certain balance, which would subsequently enhance integration and social cohesion according to *the MIME Vademecum*, the knowledge framework of this research. This is withal true in the case of MTI provision for newcomers in their host country.

In conclusion, MTI has a strong position in the national educational policy of Sweden; it is of importance in academic debates and in the media discourse on migration and integration. Despite small implementation problems in the organization

of MTI and the emergence of independent bilingual schools, MTI has a major influence on preventing segregation, as visible in the case of the Somali participants in MTI. In Denmark, MTI has rather become a balancing act for political ends. From the comparative analysis, it can be concluded that the position of MTI is weak in the national educational policy of Denmark; MTI has been abolished for TCNs since 2002, but municipalities continue to have the right to provide MTI for them. However, this is problematic for the municipalities in financial terms and causes the unequal provision of MTI throughout Denmark. Danish politicians use this situation to do away with the concept of MTI as a whole. As in Sweden, there is no possibility for a TCN in Denmark to take up school subjects in their own mother tongue during the regular school days. The case of the Turkish students demonstrates that there is a need for an effective implementation of MTI in Denmark. Nevertheless, the main objective of MTI in Denmark seems to be facilitating future repatriation of TCNs to their country of origin, which is problematic for the process of integration as such. In comparison to Denmark, the further integration of newcomers as a consequence of MTI is hence more successful in Sweden.

All in all, the weak position of MTI in Denmark requires international attention among academics and European policy makers. By taking into account the social value of language and the concepts of mobility and inclusion in a specific context, this research has complemented existing research on the subject of MTI from a new perspective. In future research, it would be valuable to be able to interview actors providing and receiving MTI, to take into account again the position of MTI in policy documents and the actual effect of this in practice. This research method could be used to integrate new observations in order to provide a comprehensive awareness of the importance of MTI for newcomers and the consequences thereof for European integration in general.

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The Boundaries of the Carpathian Basin – Frontiers and Regions

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Abstract. The Carpathian Basin (or Pannonian Basin) is the south-eastern part of Central Europe, its geopolitical place being defined by geography (it is placed between the Eastern Alps, the Dinaric Alps, and the Carpathian Mountains) and from historical point of view by the fact that its core region was ruled for many centuries by the Hungarian Kingdom and the Habsburg Monarchy, and the neighbouring states aimed to extend their territories in the basin reducing the central role of the basin from the margins. The changes of the spatial domination in the Carpathian Basin created several centre–periphery relations, which established, through a *longue durée*, specific social features in some border regions of the Carpathian Basin. This paper examines from the viewpoint of limology (border studies) three frontier regions of the basin, Spiš, Székely Land, and Banat, and investigates the historical process of the regional construction in order to ascertain what circumstances helped or blocked these periphery constructions.

Keywords: frontiers, regions in the Carpathian Basin, historical peripheries, Spiš, Székely Land, Banat.

1. Introduction

The following paper examines the border regions of the Carpathian (or Pannonian) Basin and its regional structure from some points of view provided by limology (border studies) and geopolitics. The main interpretive framework in this study is provided by (1) frontier research (part of border studies) and (2) the socio-geographical process of region formation modelled by Anssi Paasi.

My initial hypotheses are:

(a) The Carpathian Basin is a kind of geopolitically meaningful 'unit' within Central and Eastern Europe, the boundaries of which can be examined as frontiers.

(b) One of the characteristic features of this 'unit' is that its adaptability is given by the regions that have been created by institutionalizing the frontier.

The analysis compares the process of individualization and institutionalization of three border regions in the Carpathian/Pannonian Basin (Spiš/Szepesség, Székely Land/Székelyföld, and Banat/Bánság) and tries to formulate some conclusions based on it.

2. Boundary Productions, Conceptions of the Frontier and the Borderland

2.1. Concepts and Frames in Limology

The issue of borders has long been addressed in political geography. From the 1990s, *border studies* (limology) became an independent field of research on the interface between geography (including human geography) and regional sciences. As a result of these research studies, the *political border* (of which the demarcating, line-like concept used to be decisive) was transformed, expanded, and supplemented by the examination of cross-borderness and border areas (see Hardi 2015: 34–36). At this turning point, the issue became related to another research tradition that kept the *frontiers* of civilization in focus.

The interdisciplinary study of the frontiers dates back to the mid-1970s, when the study of the frontiers began to reflect in the social sciences, political sciences, and the theory of international relations alike. From all these emerged a 'new political geography, renovated and more analytically rigorous than its predecessor' (Kolossov 2005: 607).

The examination of the historical dimension became more and more important – Kolossov (2005: 619) quoted French philosopher O. Marcard in this regard, who said that borders are 'scars of history'.

As a result, the question of the border was linked more and more to the question of identity, or, as Kolossov stated (2005: 615): 'Territorial boundaries are one of the major elements of ethnic and political identity.' What is more, cultural boundaries (based on identity) can preserve themselves for a *longue durée*, and so 'boundaries which existed in the remote past can usually be easily found in the cultural and political landscape, and sometimes even remain quite visible in the physical landscape' (Kolossov 2005: 619–620).

From the 1980s onwards, we can also talk about a postmodern turn in border studies (limology). The essence of this turn: the concept of the border was extended to several issues examined by sociology and anthropology, such as the dynamics of

social groups and the transformation of identity communities (see Ilyés 2004). Thus, for example, the 'sociology of flow' has emerged, which examines the flow of people, goods, capital, knowledge, information, or ideas based on a *new frontier paradigm*, providing entirely new, fruitful thematic opportunities for social science research.

The new frontier/boundary paradigm could have – according to Böröcz (2002) – a good starting point in Georg Simmel's 1909 essay *Bridge and Door*. As Simmel (1909) stated, the metaphor of 'bridge' signifies the 'will to be connected', and its supplement is the metaphor of 'door'. The door 'demonstrates in a decisive fashion how separating and connecting are only two faces of one and the same action'.

Interpreting Simmel, the social meaning of the bridge metaphor is 'attraction, connection, unification', and its complement, the 'door', has two states on the bridge, closed or open, by which a power controls the flows between 'outside' and 'inside'.

The boundary is thus – as Böröcz (2002: 135) resumed – 'a bridge equipped with doors', which makes a wide range of conditional social exclusion and admission mechanisms interpretable in this way.

Projecting all this back to the notion of the classical political boundary, it can also be defined as 'the totality of points where a society introduces and/or relaxes the technologies of disjoining which are disposable for state sovereignty'[1] (Böröcz 2002: 134).

Around this extended interpretation of the concept of state border, a diverse field for scientific research emerged in the 1990s. Although the state-centric conception of the state border has remained, questions have also emerged that examine the participation of other non-state actors in 'boundary producing', which means the related practices and discourse of these actors. In this line, 'boundaries [are] not merely static lines but as sets of practices and discourses which are "spread" into the whole society, not merely to the border areas' (Paasi 1999: 676–678).

In political geography, two boundary concepts have become commonly known: a) the notion of *boundary* focuses on the line-like concept of classical political geography (emphasizing the separating function); b) the concept of *frontier*, somehow on the contrary, means a moving edge zone, a buffer zone, a moving lane of spatially advancing processes. The anthropological-sociological turn outlined above has rewritten these two concepts/types and presents them as complementary.

2.2. Frontier and Region

According to Kocsis (2004: 23), the *frontier* is 'a political-geographical zone that lies behind the integrated territory of a political unit (state) and separates it from other, non-integrated, non-civilized territories. It is also called the edge of a civilization where that civilization comes into contact with an area not yet influenced by it.'[2]

1 Translated by the author.
2 Translated by the author

Kristof (1959: 270) and then Houtum and Lacy (2017: 1) considered that while the boundary is a manifestation of the state's 'centripetal forces', the frontier is not 'the imprint of a political project's claim over space but a phenomenon of the "facts of life"', that is an indicator of the social changes.

Consequently, the changes described by the *frontier* as the move, the drift of a geographical edge can be very diverse.

The first, 'founding' sense of this term was given by Turner (1893), who describes the 'American frontier' as the shaping effect of the expansion of American society to the west, at the 'meeting point between savagery and civilization'. According to Turner, 'the American frontier lies at the hither edge of free land (…) in the census reports it is treated as the margin of that settlement which has a density of two or more to the square mile'. This frontier belt includes the Indian country and the outer margin of the settled area, shown by the census reports. Concluding the importance of this edge, he considered that 'the true point of view in the history of this nation is not the Atlantic coast, it is the Great West' (Turner 1893).

So, the western front of the United States was an uninhabited, westward-moving lane whose way of social possession defined American identity and the model of American democracy.

There are three defining features of the movement of this edge: a) egalitarianism; b) lack of interest in high culture (a 'practical, inventive turn of mind', a 'masterful grasp of material things, lacking in the artistic'); c) violence (Turner 1893).

Consequently, American democracy was not formed as a dream (ideology) of theorizing philosophers but deep in the American forests, shaped not by some higher culture but by 'rugged individualism' (Houtum–Lacy 2017: 3). The 'frontier' – in its Turnerian understanding – can thus create a specific social structure and a kind of community identity.

From this point, the term *frontier* has been applied to very different civilizational situations. In the case of the Brazilian Amazonas Basin of Rondônia (member state of Brazil), the Turner model was used as a basis for examining the difference between the first and second generations of pioneers by examining on the basis of three thesis the generational change (Browder et al. 2008). These are: a) the thesis of capitalist penetration, b) the thesis of intersectoral articulation, and c) the thesis of the household life cycle.

With regard to the Central and Eastern European region, Karácsonyi (2008) compared the American 'frontier' with the Great Hungarian Plain and the Ukrainian steppe; the peculiarity of the latter two is given by the fact that here the concept of frontier is connected with the question of peripheries. It was recognized here that the border regions from the age of feudalism also functioned as *frontiers*, but – unlike the frontiers of classical (essentially capitalist) colonization – integration took place slowly, less spectacularly (Beluszki 2001, Karácsonyi 2008: 187). The historical *longue durée*, on the other hand, conserved and institutionalized specific

life forms in frontier areas, where these forms get stuck. Among these, we find, for example, the Székely Land, institutionalized as a territorial-political unit following the frontier March system of the Árpád dynasty era or the Cossack border region along the Dnieper.

According to O'Reilly (2018), the Central and Eastern European frontier, which developed in the Habsburg Empire and then survived in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy for some time, looks back on historical antecedents that lead to a different interpretation from Turner's thesis.

The Austrian *Militärgrenze* was established after the liberation of Hungary from the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 17th century and the beginning of the 18th century, and it consisted of the territorial edge connecting the border guard regions, which represented the defensive line from the Adriatic to Transylvania between the Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire. The Croatian, Slavonian, Banat (German, Romanian, and Serbian), and Transylvanian (Szekler and Romanian) border guards were part of this defence zone. This is typologically a 'borderland' that, according to O'Reilly (2018: 29), differs from Turner's frontier because it is not a moving lane, but it contains 'contact zones' (regions) that have persisted for a long time and within which cultures meet, collide with each other, often in an asymmetric system of power relations. 'Borderlands' became 'borders' only with the emergence of new nation-states (O'Reilly 2018: 9), which rewrote the older centre–periphery relationship.

The question of the historical frontiers of Central and Eastern Europe thus transformed (expanded) the *frontier* conception of Turner. Knowing the different historical frontiers also made it possible to generalize the concept; and examining this enlarged concept, Houtum and Lacy (2017) distinguish four types of frontiers.

The first type is the *imperial frontier* (Houtum–Lacy 2017, 3); this is Turner's classic American frontier. It usually designates the enemy as a geopolitical boundary, and its 'dark side' is that it creates a buffer zone in which ethnic cleansing and genocide could take place (e.g. the case of the Indians in the US). The *frontier of imagination* is not 'material' but the product of the geographical imagination; however, it does have political and/or cultural causes and then consequences (Houtum–Lacy 2017: 4). A good example of this is Edward Said's concept of orientalism (Said 1979), according to which the concept of the East was shaped by the approach, interests, and colonization practices of the developed West. A similar intention can be discovered in Western scholarly interest in the *Militärgrenze*: the interest in developing a conceptual framework for the *Balkans* and *Balkanism* (O'Reilly 2018: 14). The *frontier of exploration* is usually observed in cartographic development; this also includes political interests, so political plans have projected 'zones of transition' and areas of 'uncertain sovereignty' on the map (on ancient maps: *terra nullius*, *terra incognita*, *hic sunt dracones*, *hic sunt leones*) (Houtum–Lacy 2017: 5–6). Finally, the type of *frontier of integration*

highlights that the borderlands not only separate but also create receptive contexts in which way unforeseen compatibilities could be created.

These frontier types, of course, characterize the different, historically formed boundary belts and borderlands in a complementary way.

In connection with the above presented notions and typologies must be mentioned Anssi Paasi's conception of boundaries. In his proposed view, boundaries are not merely static lines but act as 'sets of practices and discourses which are "spread" into the whole society, not merely to the border areas. The production and reproduction of boundaries is part of the institutionalization of territories' (Paasi 1999: 669–670).

The questions of boundary production and of the institutionalization of territories are tightly connected to another conception of Paasi. He considers the regions as 'time- and space-specific' entities, and 'in that sense that they have their beginning and end in the perpetual regional transformation. The institutionalization of each "concrete" region is a manifestation of numerous institutional practices and discourses related to governance, politics, culture and economy that are constitutive of and constituted by the institutionalization of the region – this is a dialectical process' (Paasi 2011: 11).

This perpetual construction of the regions has four dimensions, stages (Paasi 2011: 12–13) as follows:

1) *territorial shaping* (making of 'soft'/'hard' boundaries), which takes place by an interaction between internal and external actors;
2) *symbolic shaping* (naming/other symbols); the symbols could be: flags, coats of arms, traditional names of territories, a.s.o.;
3) *institutional shaping* (institutions producing/reproducing other shapes), including political actors, representative bodies, planning institutions, a.s.o.;
4) *the establishment of the region as part of the regional system* and social consciousness.

Paasi made a very important distinction between the *identity of the region* and *regional identity*. The *identity of a region* consists of 'such features of nature, culture and inhabitants that distinguish a region from others'. And in practice these identities are 'typically discourses of scientists, politicians, administrators, cultural activists or entrepreneurs that aim to distinguish a region from some others' (Paasi 2011: 14). On other hand, regional identity is the inhabitants' identity – their *regional consciousness* is a 'hierarchical phenomenon but not inevitably fixed with certain existing regional levels and this can be based on natural or cultural elements that have been classified, often stereotypically, by regional activists, institutions or organizations as the constituents of the identity of a region' (Paasi 2011: 14).

3. Border Regions, Border Areas in the Carpathian Basin

3.1. The Carpathian Basin between Frontiers

The Carpathian/Pannonian Basin is a part of Central Europe that is, at first glance, geographically defined: it is a basin surrounded by the Carpathians, the Alps, and the Dinaric Mountains, which includes the drainage basin of the middle course of the Danube. Today, its territory is shared by several countries: Hungary and Slovakia are in their entirety part of the basin, while Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, and Ukraine cover only greater or lesser parts of it. If we examine the spatial domination of this basin in a historical dimension, it can be seen that the spatial governance issues of the Carpathian Basin were primarily central issues from the perspective of historical Hungary. One of the consequences of this was that from the period of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 (which restored territorial integrity to Hungary) Hungarian geographical research on the state was shaped by a kind of 'imperial consciousness' (Hajdú 2008: 75).

The 14th-15th-century larger Central European region was divided into two geopolitically clearly demarcated subregions. From the reign of Louis I. (the Great) (1308–1342) to Matthias Corvinus (1458–1490), a Hungarian imperial concept emerged in the Carpathian Basin, which saw the idea of the 'Holy Crown' institutionalized through Werbőczy (by his corpus juris of the Hungarian Customary Law, named *Tripartitum* and published in 1517) as an empire with joined provinces and the 'subdued parts' (Hajdú 2008: 83). Frontier-type boundary belt changes and drifts took place on the fringes of this empire.

North of the Carpathian Basin, in the northern part of the larger Eastern-Central European region, the Polish state had a state-territorial organizing performance, which was decisive for the northern half of this larger region. The Polish–Hungarian border, i.e. the north-eastern border of the Carpathian Basin (Carpathian border line), became a very stable border. The natural boundary, through its many river valleys and passes, allowed for intense contact, which resulted in mutual migration and settlements in the 16th-17th centuries. Sometimes conflict situations emerged, but measures were taken for their resolution in the 16th century by setting up border committees (Brzeziński 2014: 16). The history of the cities of Spiš/Szepesség also proves the agreed border maintenance. Here, the integrative function of the frontier came to the fore, although the formation of Spiš/Szepesség was also done for security reasons.

In the eastern and south-eastern parts of the Carpathian Basin, the Carpathian passes were important geographical objects primarily from a protection point of view. Protecting the basin against the Tatars from the east and then against the Turkish armies invading from the southeast was an important task. At the same

time, earlier, the religious missionary tasks of the Hungarian 'empire' made these passes the occasional routes of 'imperial' expansion.

The geopolitical situation changed from the year 1526: the period up to 1699 was defined by the 'problems of the shared state rule of the space in the Carpathian Basin'[3] (Hajdú 2008: 83–84), and then followed a period of the 'Hungarian state space integrated into the Habsburg power space (1699–1918)'[4] (ibid.). From the 20th century, however, the new nation-state logic also involved great power interests in the political spatial organization of the Carpathian Basin. The new nation-states then wanted to increase their part in the basin area at the expense of Hungary.

In the following, we will examine the historical regional institutionalization of the frontier-type border areas (edges) of the Carpathian Basin, outlining three examples. These three regions are Spiš (Szepesség, Zips), Székely Land (Székelyföld/Secuime/Szeklerland), and Banat (Bánság). Our study follows Paasi's model of regional formation, suggesting that here the subject of the study is a historical border area (edge) of the Central and Eastern European type, within which regions were formed from 'frozen' frontier sections or sectors. In the case of regions, we keep in mind the four stages of the Paasi-conception – the four stages of region formation – as well as the typological nature of the border belt.

3.2. Spiš/Szepesség/Zips

Territorial Shaping

The Spiš (in Hungarian: *Szepesség* or *Szepes*, German: *Zips*) territory today lies in the north-eastern part of Slovakia, with a very little area in the south-eastern part of Poland.

The territorial unit of Spiš/Szepesség was not clear; in the course of time, two territorial concepts emerged: a) Spiš/Szepesség as a geographical space, historical-geographical concept and b) Spiš/Szepes County as a territorial-administrative conglomerate, which reached its maximum extent only in 1876.

The uncertain territorial definition of Spiš was also formulated as a historical issue. The western half of today's Spiš belonged to Gömör County (county in the Hungarian Kingdom) in the earliest times, and two positions were developed regarding the county's character: according to some historians (e.g. Gyula Kristó), it was a royal county, while others (for example, Jenő Szücs) considered a change from royal lordship to special forestry district (see Zsoldos 2001: 23–25). We can even consider the area as 'an aggregation of several counties' (Zsoldos 2001: 30), which has at least four historical components. The so-called 'Little County'

3 Translated by the author

4 Translated by the author.

(in Hungarian: *Kisvármegye*), or 'Sedes of the Ten Lance Bearers' (in Hungarian: *Tízlándzsás szék*) was the territory of the Gömör guards (Kabar/Hungarian border guards) in the 11th century and became extinct during the Tartar invasion, so later only ten lance bearers could be delegated as it was needed (this gave the name of this territory after the Tartar invasion). In the 16th century, the number of so-called 'lance bearer villages' had decreased so much that in 1803 the representatives of the 'Sedes of the Ten Lance Bearers' in Levoča (in Hungarian: *Lőcse*) announced their unification with the 'Great County' (in Hungarian: *Nagyvármegye*). The area of the 'Great County' was constantly changing; until the 14th century, not even its borders could be defined. The third territorial-legal component consists of the Saxon (zipser) cities: their inhabitants are German, Flemish, and 'Latin' settlers, who received a charter of privilege in 1271 from the Hungarian king, including the right to elect their own counts (*ispáns*) and judges. From the 24 Saxon (zipser) cities in Spiš, Sigismund of Luxembourg pawned 13 to Poland (but these still belonged to the diocese of Esztergom), and 11 remained in Hungary. The pawned cities belonged to Poland between 1412 and 1772 (until the partition of Poland), but they managed to retain their privileges, to which their *hungarus* consciousness[5] of belonging to the 'Holy Crown' (Hungarian Kingdom) was also connected. Finally, the fourth component consists of the *mining towns*, which also arose from royal settlements but with the immigration of German settlers who differed in their dialect as well as in their rights from the other Saxon inhabitants of the county.

From this conglomerate, Spiš/Szepes County was established and existed between 1876 and 1919 as a unified modern administrative area.

Spiš/Szepesség as a territorial framework was thus not consolidated, and there are historical reasons for this. The need for border control towards Poland did not prove to be an intertemporal task across several historical periods, as in the case of Székely Land (for example), wherefore the intraregional development of the region did not receive an appropriate institutional framework. The peculiarities of the internal territorial units and city groups with the status of particular law were dissolved in a common civil administrative framework only by the 19th century, which appeared through the modern county of Spiš/Szepes. In this framework, the common history of the 'small world' of Spiš crystallized only later, by the end of the 19th century (Fried 2008: 82), and was tied to a mentality rather than a territorial framework.

Symbolic Shaping

The complexity of the territorial framework, and then the perpetual change of territorial fragmentation, suggest that the concept of Spiš/Szepesség as a territorial-political unit could not develop. The late formation of Spiš/Szepes County (1876)

5 Mediaeval non-ethnic identity of several social groups in the Hungarian Kingdom.

could not favour the canonization of common symbols either: the distance between the individual historical territorial fragments (mediaeval counties, city groups) was too great, and there was too little cooperation. This is also reflected in the late creation of the coat of arms of Spiš, which was donated by King Rudolf of Habsburg in 1593, and it – in the four quarters of the coat of arms – unites the coats of arms of the four greatest noble families in the county. The only element of collective privilege in it was the heart of the shield, which symbolized the 'Ten Lance Bearers' district, while the Saxon cities had separate coats of arms.

Institutional Shaping

There were very different spheres and jurisdictions in the area of Spiš/Szepesség. These made this region special. However, a higher-level institutional framework integrating these different institutions has not developed (see Zsoldos 2009: 419).

Establishment of the Region as Part of the Regional System

The 13 pawned cities of Spiš/Szepesség formed a municipal unit, which, paradoxically, represented the acceptance of at least part of Spiš/Szepesség within Poland. The municipalities of the thirteen cities (Grafenstuhl) also operated under the Polish government, and the Polish *starosta* did not interfere in their internal life. This meant that the 13 cities (and following them Hniezdne/Gnézda/Kniesen, Podolinec/Podolin/Pudlein, and Stará Ľubovna/Ólubló/Altlublau) joined Poland as independent territorial units, members of the Hungarian Holy Crown. After the partition of Poland, Maria Theresa (1740–1780) also treated the 13 + 3 cities as a unit and returned them to Hungary 'free of charge and without pay,' without paying the 360-year loan. The pawned cities did not represent the whole of Spiš/Szepesség, but they represented a local government unit between Hungary, Poland, and the Habsburg monarchy, to which some mediating role can also be attributed.

Mono-/Multiethnic Feature

Spiš/Szepesség is a multiethnic region in the mediaeval sense of the word: ethnic differentiation was determined not only by language but also by social status. From this diversity of statuses, crowded into a small area, a common 'zipser identity' emerged by the 18th and 19th centuries. It unfolded from the ethnicities associated with initial social status and led to an everyday multilingualism of the modern era. This was prepared by the *hungarus* patriotism, which developed mainly in the Saxon environment of the region. However, harmonious multilingualism, discovered in the 20th century and projected back to the context of the 19th-century civilization, was more of a 'backward utopia' (Fried 2008: 85).

3.3. Székely Land/Secuime/Székelyföld

Territorial Shaping

The *Székely Land* or *Szeklerland* (Hungarian: *Székelyföld*, Romanian: *Secuimea* or *Ținutul Secuiesc*, German: *Szeklerland*, Latin: *Terra Siculorum*) is a historical and ethnographic area in Transylvania (Romania), inhabited mainly by the Hungarian-speaking Szeklers.

The question of the origin and settlement of the Szeklers has long been debated in Hungarian history (Györffy 1941, Benkő et al. 2016). Their settlement began in the present-day Szeklerland in the 12th century (when the Szeklers of Telegd/Udvarhely could reach the Harghita mountain range), and then continued in the 13th century (when the Szeklers of Kézdi, Sepsi, and Aranyos seats occupied all their present-day settlements). The area inhabited by them was initially marked with the terms *terra* (land), *districtus* (district); we can certainly speak of *seats* (Hungarian: *szék*, Latin: *sedes*) only from the second half of the 14th century (Györffy 1942: 69). Although no historical source has survived mentioning that the Szeklers were settled by the Hungarian Kingdom in their present-day residential area, most historians today believe that settlements served as frontier guards.

The territory of Szeklerland, its settlements were divided into stems (war groups) by establishing a *tízes*[6] system of settlements serving 'immediate warfare' (Egyed 2006, Elekes 2011: 418, Ambrus 2017). The system of Szekler seats only consolidated in the second half of the 14th century, when the seven main seats were formed (Telegdi/Udvarhely, Maros, Csík, Kézdi, Sepsi, Orbai, Aranyos), and from then on we can talk about *a stable territorial framework*. Stable territoriality was given by the clear boundaries of the seats and their own internal legal order, which also mapped the territorial boundaries onto the character of society. This is also portrayed by the *tízes* units in the Szekler villages, which are landscape structural elements that evolved from the military technical necessities of defence (Ambrus 2009), necessities which became 'socially imprinted'. These village structural units still visible in Csík and Kászon (20–80 houses and families, each 100–500 meters apart from one another, which have grown into a single village over time) are 'community entities that still exist today' and define the internal functioning of villages (Ambrus 2009: 73). So, due to the Szekler border protection task, a certain borderline lifestyle shaped by the defence duties was preserved in a region with a clear demarcation.

Symbolic Shaping

The descriptive concept of Terra Siculorum, which represents the totality of the seats, became a cartographic designation after the ensemble of seats had also

6 *Tízes*: organization in structures by ten in the settlements, as space-specific elements.

gained political role. At the same time, the symbols of Szeklerland developed into Szekler heraldry. The so-called old Szekler coat of arms (the armoured sword pierces a golden crown, a heart, and the head of a bear) has been documented to exist since the beginning of the 1500s (in villages as Csíkcsobotfalva, Székelydálya, Csíkmenaság, Székelyderzs, a.s.o.) (Szekeres 2013: 9–13). This coat of arms has become a heraldic tradition: it is still present in the coats of arms of Covasna County and of the towns Târgu-Mureş/Marosvásárhely and Odorheiu Secuiesc/Székelyudvarhely (Szekeres 2013: 3). The *sun and the moon* as a symbol of Szeklerland appeared around 1580, and it was legalized by the Diet (regional parliament) of the Principality of Transylvania in 1659 as a symbol of Szeklers. It was included in the coat of arms of Transylvania in 1765 (following the order of Maria Theresa), but its external legitimacy can eventually be traced back to the *Unio Trium Nationum*.

Institutional Shaping

The system of Szekler seats served not only the organization of territorial rule, it was also the maintainer of the system of rules determining a social order and social practices. The seats were institutions of public law (the term *seat* appeared first in charters in 1366) that evolved from the power of the judiciary, the privilege of free choice of judges, and became self-governments with comprehensive powers. They performed jurisdiction and provided a record of military conscripts. Judging was provided both at the primary level and as a forum for appeal. The judiciary body consisted of the chief captain of the seat (in Hungarian: *székkapitány*), the chief judge of the seat (in Hungarian: *székbíró*, first mentioned in 1381), the royal judge, and 12 jurymen of the seat (in Hungarian: *székülők*, *széktartók*). The first stage of the appeal was the 'National Assembly' of the Szeklers in Udvarhely (today: Odorheiu Secuiesc), after which the Szekler *ispán* (count, in Latin: *comes*) could be approached (the Szekler *ispán* was appointed by the king). All these also 'prevailed' in the Szekler village communities, which organized their self-administrative order on the model of the seats, through an annually elected village judge, village council (in Hungarian: *faluszék*), and jurymen. The *tízes* units elected their own judges, and the common affairs of the village were decided by the village assembly, which adopted local home rules, the so-called 'village laws' (Hungarian: *falutörvények*) (Veress 2018: 136–140). For the administration of all these institutions and for the affairs of the Szeklers, the 'National Assembly' was organized as the supreme body of the Szekler self-government, which most often gathered in one of the settlements of Udvarhely Seat (Pál-Antal 2013: 26–28).

Establishment of the Region as Part of the Regional System

The system of Szekler seats was integrated into the administration of the Kingdom of Hungary, represented in Transylvania by the voivode. The voivode was the link between the royal court and the Szekler count (comes, ispán) and Szekler seats. The *Unio Trium Nationum* (Latin for Union of the Three Nations) was a codified pact for mutual aid, which in 1438 created an alliance of the three 'nations' (the Hungarian nobility, the Szeklers, and the Saxons). Later this became the constitutional basis of the Transylvanian Principality. The formation of the 'state-building peoples' of Transylvania began with the Parliament of Debrecen convened by György Fráter in 1541, the significance of which lies in the fact that the estates of the later independent state of Transylvania met here for the first time. The union of the three 'nations' (estates) was renewed by the Diet of Torda (in Romanian: Turda) in December 1542, now under the leadership of Queen Isabella and her son, John Sigismund (János Zsigmond) from the House of Zápolya, who had been invited to the country (Veress 2018: 187).

The Transylvanian constitution raised the constitutional status of Szeklerland to a higher level, making it part of the internal – territorial and estate-based – confederalism of Transylvania. This public recognition of Szeklerland preserved its status quo in Transylvania, which came under Habsburg rule following the Diploma Leopoldinum (1691), but this was slowly abolished by the Austrian absolutism of the 1760s. The Habsburg reorganization of the Szekler Border Guard, which removed the Szekler privileges (leading up to the Siculicidium of 1764), and the territorial-administrative reform of 1783, which abolished the seats, were the two most important moments in this process. They also abolished the system of nations (Veress 2018: 269).

Although the system of seats was restored after 1790 (upon the death of Joseph II), the weakened system of the 'Three Nations' was finally abolished by the 1848 revolution. The Szekler seats survived as territorial particularism until the 1876 administrative-territorial reform. Meanwhile – from the end of the 18th century to the administrative modernization of the age of dualism –, the integration of Szeklers into the modern Hungarian nation was completed.

Mono-/Multiethnic Feature

Szeklerland is a mono-ethnic region. According to the modern concept of ethnicity, this cannot be stated since from the 19th century ethnicity means a population that can be defined by 'linguistic race' (Ernest Renan) or cultural peculiarities (possibly traditions), and in this sense other linguistic-ethnic groups in Szeklerland also existed (Slavs in the early period and Romanians from the 16th century). The mono-ethnic nature of Szeklerland in the relational system of feudalism means that the institutionalization of the region was aligned with a single 'ethnic estate'

in which other 'ethnicities' did not appear in a legal sense. The other ethnic groups (as linguistic-cultural groups) had to accommodate to this and had to remain on the edge of this 'estate', in smaller social inclusions, without a group status.

3.4. The Banat

Territorial Shaping

The Banat region was established in the early 18th century, separated from the southern part of Hungary, which was considered earlier a broader historical concept. The geographical boundaries of the Banat are the Maros/Mureş River in the north, the Tisza/Tisa River in the west, and the Danube/Duna/Dunărea in the south, while the border in the east can be drawn along the perpendicular line connecting the *Iron Gates* on the Danube (Hungarian: *Vaskapu*, Romanian: *Porțile de Fier*, Serbian: *Đerdapska klisura*) with the River Maros. The Austrian military administration introduced in this territory after the Peace Treaty of Passarowitz (1718) made the foundations for a special development in this region, so the Banat was 'a historical, political, and economic region whose development in the 18th-19th centuries gave this region a specific socio-settlement, ethnic, ethnographic, and cultural image'[7] (Kókai 2010: 14). The administration led directly by the imperial court of the Habsburgs provided a clear territorial framework.

Symbolic Shaping

From the 11th century onwards, several unspecified spatial power structures were formed in the Banat region, which, over time, seemed to prove that this region was a buffer zone: a kind of floodgate, collector and distribution node, a cultural buffer (Kókai 2010: 6). This appeared in several historical variants, which meant different territorial-political formations under various names. After the formation of the first counties (Temes, Krassó, Csanád, Arad, Keve), the Duchy of Temes was established, which was abolished in 1106 during the reign of King Kálmán. The Szörényi Banat (Romanian: *Banatul de Severin*) was established for defence tasks in 1228, covering part of the territories of Oltenia and Krassó County, thus resulting in conflicts between the voivodes of Havasalföld (Romanian: earlier *Muntenia*, later *Țara Românească*) and the Hungarian Kingdom. It ceased to exist in 1524 after the Turks occupied Orsova and Sörényvár. The Banat of Karánsebes-Lugos (Romanian: *Banatul de Lugoj-Caransebeş*) lasted from 1536 to 1658.

The present-day name Banat covers the above-defined geographical region, which was under direct Austrian rule between 1718 and 1779. The Hungarian name Bánság comes from the German name Banat, which originated from the

7 Translated by the author.

Latin form *Banatus Temesiensis.* The German name Banat became established in Hungarian writing from the year 1748, and then it was transferred to the Romanian and Serbian languages as a landscape name (Kókai 2010: 13). These name variants cover the territorial framework described above. The region did not have provincial symbols, nor a coat of arms, although the coat of arms of Temesvár/Timişoara was sometimes used as the coat of arms of the Banat.

Institutional Shaping

The administrative institutionalization of the region was initially based on the *border protection function* arising from the geopolitical situation. This border defence function of the Banat from 1779 – after the restoration of the counties of the Hungarian Kingdom following the measures of Joseph II of Habsburg – remained as a triple territorial division of the southern edge of this region (until 1876), namely in a narrower border zone divided between the Romanian, Illyrian, and German border guard regiments. In the Banat, above the border defence zone of the area, the economic and administrative interventions of the Viennese court created a densely textured spatial structure (Kókai 2010: 53).

This was the basis for the extraordinary development of the Banat, which elevated the multiethnic (16 nationalities) area, created as a result of colonized settlements, in one century to be one of the dynamic regions of Europe with a high potential for modernization (Kókai 2010: 68, Bodó 2018).

Establishment of the Region as Part of the Regional System

As can be seen from the historical overview, the existence of the organized border region was initially justified by the defence needs of the Habsburg Empire, the strategy of the *Militärgrenze* (military frontier). Later, the upthrust of the established modernization model, as well as its cultural model, legitimated the separation of the region, which could only be partially eliminated by the nation-state logic.

Mono-/Multiethnic Feature

The peculiarity of the institutionalization of the Banat region is that, although having been created as a defence zone for military reasons, it created an interculturality, the survival of which was determined by two sociological – identity-creating – factors: 1) a 'civilizing pressure' (Kókai 2010: 189), which was mediated by the development of the economy but also appeared in the interaction of cultures in the early 19th century and which 2) replaced the 'community memory' of nationalities with a 'home consciousness' that could withstand the nationalizing processes (which, in turn, began to break down the interculturality of the region with different

hegemonies from the mid-19th century on). Despite these processes, until 1945, no dominant group had reached the hegemony that suppressed 'otherness' (Kókai 2010: 103). This was the regional consciousness that functioned for a very long time as a remnant of the discontinued administrative institutional framework.

3.5. Secondary Integrating Spaces, Renewed Regional Constructions

The border regions of the Carpathian Basin found themselves in a new situation after the disintegration of the historical Hungarian Kingdom, being part of the nationalizing space of the newly established and expanded peripheral states. The new situation also offered new conditions for building the region. One of the essential conditions became whether the former region was mono-ethnic or multiethnic in nature. In the case of the three examined regions, we saw that Székely Land was a mono-ethnic region, while Spiš/Szepesség and Banat/Bánság were multiethnic regions. Being the most obvious model for mono-ethnic regions is 21st-century ethnoregionalism, the question here (in the case of Székely Land) is under what internal and external conditions this type of region building is possible (also according to the pattern of the Paasi stages). For multiethnic regions, the 'new regionalism' (Keating 1998) outlined in the age of globalization calls for opportunities to create a secondary integration space (cross-borderness,[8] regional marketing, etc.).

3.6. The Border Regions of the Carpathian Basin – A Comparative Outline

Table 1. *Comparing the characteristics of the three regions*

The region	Characteristics	Spiš/Szepesség	Szeklerland/ Székelyföld	Banat/Bánság
As frontier	defence	yes	yes	yes
	mediatory	yes		yes
	imperial		yes	yes
	of integration	yes		yes
As region in construction	Territorial shaping	Uncertain borders	Clear borders	Clear borders
	Symbolic shaping	Without canonized symbols	With canonized symbols	Without canonized symbols

8 Cross-border cooperation is an important 'agent' of the regional construction, but per se cannot substitute the weakness of other conditions. From this viewpoint, it is interesting to study the regional construction process in western Romania regarding the historical region of Partium (see Szilágyi 2019).

The region	Characteristics	Spiš/Szepesség	Szeklerland/ Székelyföld	Banat/Bánság
As region in construction	Institutional shaping	More peculiar institutions; an integrated, unified institutional framework does not exist	Specific institutions, proper jurisdiction, integrated territorial self-government	Habsburg military administration (1698–1779); after 1779, only the southern *Militärgrenze* remained under military authority
	Establishment of the region as part of the regional system	does not exist	According to the unwritten constitution of Transylvania (1437–1848)	First by military jurisdiction, later legitimacy by modernization success
	– Identity of the region	does not exist	yes	does not exist
	– Regional identity	late formation, blurry	yes	yes
	Mono-ethnic/ Multiethnic	Multiethnic	Mono-ethnic	Multiethnic
Reconstruction/reshaping of the region		Cultural marketing	Movement, political project	Movement

4. Conclusions

The peripheral regions of the Carpathian Basin were shaped due to the geopolitical features of the basin (imperialistic institutionalization of spatial rule of the Hungarian Kingdom and then the Habsburg Monarchy). The duration and legitimation of the expansion of the Hungarian and Habsburg frontiers were decisive and were followed by the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the entry of the peripheral territories under the rule of the new nationalizing peripheral states of the Carpathian Basin emerging after WWI.

The following circumstances were not conducive to the construction of the regions: a) the uncertainty of the territorial framework, b) the short duration of regional construction, and c) the excessive (ethnic-institutional) fragmentation of regional society. Furthermore, two other interrelated circumstances were important: the historically inherited mono- and multiethnic nature of the region and how this feature fit into the 18th-19th-century prehistory of the area's modernization.

At the same time, certain conditions were attached to the 'new start' of regional construction. Among these, the current situations of cross-borderness and the inherited strategies of the nationalizing states are decisive. One of the potential possibilities of the current regional construction efforts of Spiš/Szepesség and the Banat/Bánság may be the exploitation of cross-borderness. This may be decisive, especially in the case of the Banat, as it may even play the role of a modernization buffer zone in the process of European integration (but there are also geopolitical conditions for this). Cross-borderness seems to be a less significant option in the case of Spiš/Szepesség, on the Polish–Slovak border. Here, from the point of view of regional construction, there is a deceleration factor, that is, the blurring of regional consciousness.

In the case of Szeklerland, several conditions were given for the reconstruction of the region. The territorial framework still exists although the Hungarian administrative reform of 1876 and the Romanian administrative counties rewrote this somewhat (see Elekes–Szilágyi 2020). The institutionalization of the Szekler region started within the current administrative framework with the help of local self-governments and the local public policies. The regional consciousness of the Szeklers is also strong, but this was channelled in the 19th century towards the modern Hungarian national identity and, as a result, today towards the minority nation building in the political framework of the Romanian state. Thus, a strong confrontation has developed between the region and the Romanian nationalizing state, which is currently the biggest obstacle to achieving the fourth stage (the establishment of the region as part of the regional system) according to Paasi's model.

As a geopolitical consequence, it can be noted that the way in which the border regions of the Carpathian Basin are institutionalized is one of the most important factors shaping the transformation of the Central European region within the European integration process.

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The Future of Hungary in the New International Order after World War II

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A Review of the Volume
Sebess, Pedro: Így dőlt el Magyarország sorsa: Három eltérő elképzelés a háború utáni világrendről – Sztálin, Churchill és *Roosevelt*
[How Hungary's Fate was Sealed: Three Conflicting Views of the World Order After the War – Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt][1]

Pedro Sebess originally published his book in Spanish, in Argentina, with the title: *Stalin, Churchill y Roosevelt Tres Visiones Sobre El Orden Mundial De Posguerra Y El Destino De Hungría.* The translation into Hungarian was carried out by Peter Kiss and Nóra Szekér, resulting in a user-friendly, good read. As the title indicates, the book focuses on the role of the major powers and their policy objectives during World War II and how this determined Hungary's future.

Sebess begins his analysis by tracing Hungary's geopolitical status following World War I and the French-inspired and -imposed Treaty of Trianon (1920). This dictated treaty contradicted the Wilsonian war aims of self-determination of peoples, which was to replace the defeated imperial order of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Turkish Ottoman power centres. Out of this re-ordering, the author points out, Hungary was the big loser. (It lost 71.4% of its territory and 60% of its population, including three million ethnic Hungarians.) But, as he also points out, all the inhabitants of the region were losers in the long run because the punitive character of the settlement led Hungary and other revisionist states to work for its overthrow. This led to the horrors of World War II and its aftermath, to which Sebess devotes most of his study, particularly to the wartime decisions of the Big Three.

The study is well documented with the perspectives of the major decision makers based on sources and documents close to the scene. For Roosevelt, the author draws on the perspectives of his son, Elliott Roosevelt, as well as his close associates such as Harry Hopkins and Canada's Prime Minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King.

1 Published by Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 2020. pp. 269. ISBN 978-963-693-974-8.

For Churchill, the author draws on the prime minister's own writings as well as his private secretary, John Colville, the perspectives of Anthony Eden, and permanent Foreign Office Secretary Sir Alexander Cadogan's diaries. For Stalin, Chuev Feliks's interpretations via his Molotov interview and Stephen Kotkin's analysis are particularly insightful. These are tied together with the classical writings of John Lukacs, Liddell Hart, Nigel Hamilton, C. A. Macartney, and FDR's interpreter, diplomat Charles E. Bohlen. On the other side, particularly regarding the efforts of Italy, Hungary, and Romania to find a way out of the alliance with Hitler's Germany, the author depends on diaries – the diaries of Galeazzo Ciano, Miklós Horthy, Nicholas Kallay, and Joseph Goebbels as well as the records of the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg in 1945 and 1946. He supplements all this with the recollections of Zsuzsanna Bonczos, who was the wife of Jenő Zilahi-Sebess, the father of the author, who was sent to Istanbul in June 1943 by the Kallay administration to contact the Allies regarding Hungarian peace prospects.

After the appeasement policies of France and the British Empire failed to stop Hitler's march to war with Austria's incorporation into the Third Reich, followed by the destruction of Czechoslovakia and the Wehrmacht's defeat of Polish military forces in September 1939, Hungary finds itself wedged in between Germany and the Soviet Union. As Winston Churchill concedes at this point: In the direct shadow of the Third Reich, Hungary could no longer follow an openly anti-German policy. Furthermore, until this point, Hungary's revisionist policies received the support of both Italy and to a lesser extent also Germany. However, the efforts to overcome the losses of Trianon put the Hungarian governments on a one-way track, leading it to German satellite status.

After Hitler dumps the Ribbentrop-Molotov (August 1939) non-aggression pact and attacks the USSR in June 1941, Stalin turns in desperation to the Western Allies to open a second front at Archangel in the north or in the Caucasus or in the Balkans. Surviving the seemingly unstoppable German advance is his objective. However, he changes his tune as soon as the German advance falters on the outskirts of Leningrad and Moscow. From this point on he continues to press for the opening of a second front in the West but far from direct Soviet spheres of interest. For Stalin, the Balkans are no longer considered a desirable option for a Western landing!

Winston Churchill, on the other hand, remains steadfast in his support for opening a Balkan front. He is aware of the legacy of Russian expansionism and realizes that the Dardanelles, the Balkans, and Central Europe are in the crosshairs of the Soviet advance after the tide of war turns in Stalin's favour. However, Churchill also realizes that the determination of the Allied strategy is now mainly dependent on the industrial might of the United States and the massive manpower sacrifices of the Soviet Union. He knows he cannot convince Stalin on the wisdom of a Balkan landing, so he concentrates his efforts on FDR.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, on the other hand, is not committed to a European geo-political perspective. From the moment that the USA enters the war, he thinks it is his destiny to establish a new global order. To achieve this end, the old British and French empires stand in the way. During the course of the war, he is constantly exerting pressure on the British to cede more power and self-government to India in the face of Japanese expansion in South-East Asia and Burma. At the same time, he envisions the creation of the United Nations as an organization to stabilize world peace and order under the direction of the four major regional powers of the world, the USA, the Soviet Union, China, and the British Empire. To achieve this 'Wilsonian dream', he courts Stalin and is willing to think in terms of a new bipolar world, in which Soviet interests and spheres of influence are guaranteed. This means no Balkan landing!

Pedro Sebess points out (p. 21) that those historians who did not see the serious conflict between FDR and Churchill considered the creation of a Balkan front simply as a way to mislead the German military so they would disperse some of their forces in the Balkans and thereby make the Normandy landing easier. This thesis is contradicted by the consistent return of Churchill to this question even as early as the Cairo and Teheran conferences. It is also contradicted by Churchill's last-ditch effort to stop the Stalinist plans by sending the British navy to safeguard the Dardanelles and by landing troops in Greece to fight the Communist guerrillas, much to Roosevelt's displeasure.

On the part of the Hungarian efforts to find a way out of the war, the opening of the Balkan Front was critical. According to Sebess, this was also evident in the Hungarian government's efforts to establish potential exile governments by financing Tibor Eckhardt's mission in Washington DC and the funds transferred to Switzerland for a potential second such effort in London. But because Churchill and Roosevelt had very different views on this question, and the latter did not want to alienate Stalin, the Balkan landing was still-born. However, until the German occupation of the country in March 1944, Hungarian leaders could not believe that the West was not interested in reaching Central Europe before the Red Army. To the very end, or at least to the time of the botched plan to switch sides on 15 October that year, they hoped they would not be occupied solely by the Soviet power. Sebess points to the numerous contact efforts in Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland, where the different Budapest governments present their desire for a separate opportunity to withdraw from the conflict. He also stresses the instances when Hungary tries to keep its independence from Germany by refusing to grant the use of the country's railways to transport German troops to attack Poland from the rear; in fact, going one step further, by providing asylum for ca. 100,000 Polish troops that escape German captivity by crossing the Hungarian border. Attempts to keep out of the Nazi German alliance come to an end with the German attack on Yugoslavia through Hungary and the suicide of

Prime Minister Pál Teleki. Finally, after the bombing of Kassa (today Kosice), the Bárdossy government joins Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union. Even after this, there is a constant effort to limit Hungarian participation in the war, particularly by the Kállay administration, and, even after the Nazi occupation of the country, to forestall an Italy-style defection from the Axis. The most dramatic example of this was the action of Ferenc Koszorús's armoured division (on the orders of Miklós Horthy!) to stop the deportation of Jews from Budapest in July 1944. This saved the ca. 200,000 Jewish inhabitants of the capital, but it came too late to save the rest of the Jewish population from Adolf Eichmann's implementation of the Final Solution. Still, it was the only instance during World War II that an ally of the Third Reich used its troops to frustrate Hitler's policies to destroy the Jews of Europe.

I hope this interesting treatment of Hungary's fate during World War II is also translated into English. The narrative provided by Sebess is lively and interesting to the very end. Overall, I only missed a good name index and two or three explanatory maps.

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Partium – Borders, Ethnic Groups and Territorial Development

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A Review of the Volume
Bakk, Miklós – Süli-Zakar, István – Szilágyi, Ferenc: Partium – Borders, Ethnic Groups and Territorial Development[1]

Through studies emphasizing multiple aspects of its formation across various historical eras to the present day, this volume is focused on a detailed presentation of the Partium region first as an independent and then as a bisected region along the borderline set up during the Treaty of Trianon. The central theme of the volume's four main, partly separate chapters is thus Partium as a region. The authors treat the topic in a way typical of scientific works, combining different research methods and tools. It should already be noted that the way the topic is discussed is original and in many ways thought-provoking.

The four separate studies, in fact the main chapters of the volume, although structurally do not form a complex unit, are complementary in nature, which is clear and sufficiently transparent. The studies in question have a number of subsections, and at the end of each there is a list of bibliographic references.

The first chapter attempts to present in sufficient details the possible ways of cross-border cooperation, the possibilities of regional and territorial development through it, and the established Euroregions in Central and Eastern Europe. *István Süli-Zakar* begins with a historical introduction, more precisely, he describes the policies of European countries on regionalism, also the economic cooperation between France and Germany, which is the basis of the European Union and which will later enable the creation of Euroregions. Many consider the above mentioned cooperation to be the first example of Euroregions. The author explores the essential details and contexts by numerous practical examples for the processes

1 Miklós, BAKK – SÜLI-ZAKAR, István – SZILÁGYI, Ferenc. 2019. *Partium – Borders, Ethnic Groups and Territorial Development*. Budapest: Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary – Faculty of Law. ISSN 2676-9980.

just mentioned, which, in comparison with the events of the regime change in Central and Eastern Europe, provide answers to the failure of ethnic regionalism attempted in this region. At the same time, he discusses in several subsections primarily the role, the transformation, and development of Hungarian–Romanian border settlements, counties, and possible regions after cross-border cooperation come into view. In order to illustrate the collaborations in detail, the author presents as a case study the Carpathian Euroregion established in 1993 and the Danube-Kris-Mureş-Tisa (DKMT) Euroregion established in 1997 as well as a comprehensive analysis of the official cooperation and development since 2002 between Hungary's Hajdú-Bihar and Romania's Bihar counties,[2] taking into account the issues of minority existence. It can be observed that although the focus of the study is on the Partium region, the author also specifies international collaborations outside its territory, presenting all the examples operating along the Hungarian–Romanian border, including the Interregio Euroregion established in 2000, as the already mentioned DKMT Euroregion.[3]

The second chapter aims to present the different communities, regional reforms, and ethno-regional models of Europe. Miklós Bakk begins his study with a detailed historical overview, which discusses the mentioned issue from the initial processes of state- and nation-building particularities to the paradigms of the modern state. The author pays special attention to the maturation and consolidation of ethnic and national identity as well as to the development and transformation of the living space of different communities. In his description, he presents a number of definitions relevant to the subject, but he does so in such a way that the text remains easy-flowing and readable throughout. In the course of presenting the ethno-regional models, Bakk mentions Hechter's diffusion and internal colony model and Rokkan's theory, which details the relationship between the central and peripheral consolidations of a state; he also cites Hroch's approach to nation and state building as well as Roth's approach to regionalism. The work systematizes, explains meaningfully the presented models and to some extent creates correlations between them. Furthermore, for the sake of transparency and comparability, the author edited and inserted simple yet complex explanatory tables into his study. It then illustrates the state and administrative structures that exist and operate today by presenting a number of European states, regions, and autonomous provinces (Åland Islands, Catalonia, the Basque Country, North Tyrol, the decentralization of the United Kingdom), referring to all significant historical events concerning the mentioned territories and their populations. It is worth emphasizing that plans

2 Within the Hajdú-Bihar–Bihar Euroregion, also the Bihar/Bihor micro-Euroregion was established in 2003.

3 BARANYI, Béla. 2009. Paradigmaváltás a határon átnyúló kapcsolatokban. *Tér és Társadalom* 23(2): 25–43.

for regionalism, which have not yet been put into practice, are also mentioned (for ex., the case of France and Romania).

The third chapter focuses exclusively on the historical Partium region, from its formation after the Battle of Mohács to the present day. In addition to making the precise geographical delimitation of the region and to presenting the most important changes in its territory, Ferenc Szilágyi enumerates all significant historical events, the official conventions and contracts in chronological order that can be linked to the topic. He subdivides the subsections of his study according to the most defining moments concerning the region of Partium such as: the already mentioned Battle of Mohács as a result of which it became an independent region for the first time; the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, according to which it was included into the unified administrative system of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; the Treaty of Trianon as a result of which its historical territory is bisected by the newly drawn Romanian–Hungarian border; the administrative-territorial reorganization periods in Romania. It should be emphasized that in presenting these processes, the author also discusses the alternative ideas which were eventually not realized and put into practice – through these aspects, a much broader picture unfolds to the reader regarding the borders of the region, its internal organization, reorganization, and circumstances. Although the primary focus of the study is on the administrative-territorial reorganizations and decisions, the various and relevant social, ethnic, economic, and infrastructural aspects of the region are also mentioned as they are an integral part of the issue. Finally, the fourth chapter of the volume introduces the possibility of the Partium region's self-determination, more precisely the potential directions and obstacles related to it. Ferenc Szilágyi discusses the multicultural nature of Partium, the cohesive nature of the region, and its geographical location (along the country border) as arguments in favour of autonomy. At the same time, in the case of enforcing self-determination, perhaps the most significant limitation which he mentions is the existence of a less characteristic regional identity among both Hungarian and Romanian ethnic groups. The author presents and details these aspects through a comparison with Szeklerland.

The volume, while spanning vast distances of time and space, does not make it difficult for the reader to follow the detailed descriptions. In terms of content, the work is rich in knowledge, details, and examples, so it does not need to be supplemented; however, as for the structural composition, if the reader changes the reading order of the main chapters, the connections between them become more understandable. The editors of the volume, through the arrangement of the chapters, set up an order starting with the larger area in the geographical sense (Europe) and heading towards the description of the smaller one (Partium). If the reader does not have sufficient prior knowledge of the different European regions, it is likely that it will be difficult for him/her to comprehend the analysed

correlations with their own historical context as well as with many other specific features. From my point of view, it is thus worthwhile to read the third and fourth chapters first, which outline a detailed analysis of Partium from its formation to the present day. Afterwards, the study of European ethno-regional models is recommended, which provides a rich historical background for the formation of many states, regions, and autonomous provinces, thereby increasing the level of knowledge in this regard and establishing a framework for comparability. Finally, knowing the practices, theories, models, and, last but not least, the aspirations of state structures and regionalism, we can turn our attention to the possible ways of cross-border cooperation and, at the same time, to regional development.

This volume pays maximum attention to the systematization, synthesis, and a kind of further reflection of the knowledge processed in all studies related to the topic and their central issues, which goes beyond the cited references and provides additional information. Hungarian and Romanian as well as international authors are represented in approximately equal proportions in the case of citations, which fact demonstrates the knowledge and professionalism as well as the authors' successful attempt to go beyond the local and regional medium (the cited authors are: András A. Gergely, Thomas Benedikter, Csaba Béres, Luiza Bialasiewicz, Vernon Bogdanor, Gábor Csüllög, Daniel Elazar, György Éger, Yash Ghai, Christian Giordano, Ioan Horga, Alexandru Ilieş, Rudolf Joó, Michael Keating, Csaba Miklós Kovács, Will Kymlicka, Gheorghe Mahara, Svitlana Mitryayeva, Anssi Paasi, Miroslav Papa, Constantin Ţoca, and László Vofkori).

While making the background of Partium's administrative-territorial history known internationally, compared to the information found in the used bibliographic sources, the authors of this volume draw our attention to a number of new connections and contexts through the systematization and remodelling of existing knowledge.

From a methodological point of view, the only shortcoming is not providing a description of the historical comparative research methodology applied in writing the volume.[4] However, this fact is not equal to ignoring the research methodology procedures as both case study and historical comparative methods are clearly applied in the studies. As for the use of professional literature in the volume, the authors make use of legal documents and contemporary regulations, articles published in modern scientific journals as well as other professional works. Regarding the use of bibliographic reference, the authors prefer intertextual referencing, but both explanations in the footnotes and citations are used.

The style of the volume is basically objective in tone, transparent and well organized. Nevertheless, it is recommended not only for professionals active in the research area but also for students or researchers in the related domains as its understanding presupposes certain basic knowledge. The volume also includes

4 TOMKA, Béla. 2005. Az összehasonlító módszer a történetírásban – eredmények és kihasználatlan lehetőségek. *Aetas* 20(1–2): 243–258.

plenty of illustrations and tables embedded in the chapters, but the authors do not list these systematically as appendices. As for the printing of the volume, it was published as a paperback book under the care of the publisher of Károli Gáspár Reformed University in Budapest.

Overall, the work of Miklós Bakk, István Süli-Zakar, and Ferenc Szilágyi: *Partium – Borders, Ethnic Groups and Territorial Development* seeks to provide a broad insight into Partium as a historical region, also covering regional reforms, Euroregions and ethno-regional models as well as possible ways of cross-border cooperation. Although the scientific methodological procedures applied in writing this volume are not described in detail by the authors, their practical application can be ascertained while reading the study. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that both the practical and the theoretical aspects of the book are valuable. With all of these aspects, the scientific value of the volume is unquestionable; moreover, the authors are dealing with its central issue from a system approach perspective. Finally, I would like to point out that the present work would also be recommended for use in higher education.