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# Measurability of Social Development Reflections on the Applicability of Social Progress Indices with Reference to Brexit

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**Abstract.** The question is how the global and local economic actors' innovation-based local social and environmental objectives and results can modify the social cohesion strategies, how the disparities in economic and social development can be measured and evaluated at regional level in addition to a comparison across countries. We have seen that any one indicator in itself is not enough since it does not provide sufficient explanation for either the development disparities or their reasons. Anyway, in addition to GDP per capita, it is worth applying – and it is important to apply – such indicators as SPI and Well-Being, and various indices of social progress.

**Keywords:** economic development, purchasing power parity, GDP, Social Progress Index, country-level comparison, EU regional policy

*'Not everything that counts can be counted,*
*and not everything that can be counted counts.'*
*(from the wall of Einstein's office at Princeton)*

## Introduction

One of the most commonly used measures of economic development is GDP per capita. It is based on gross domestic product (GDP), a measure for the output of economic activity. GDP is the value of all goods and services produced less the value of any goods or services used in their creation. GDP per capita can be calculated from this corrected with population. Comparisons between countries can be made by calculating with the internationally accepted methodology of purchasing power parity (PPP).

PPP is a territorial price index and can be calculated from the price ratios of the same goods and services across countries. With a comparison of PPPs, the differences in price levels between countries are eliminated, which allows meaningful volume comparisons.

GDP per capita is a commonly used indicator for a country's average standard of living. This, however, can be considered an oversimplification.

To measure well-being, it is not enough to examine merely the accumulation of material goods. Several factors allowing objective measurement are known that do or at least may affect people's well-being such as life expectancy at birth, infant mortality, housing conditions, access to clean drinking water, education, literacy, degree of freedom and democracy, and the relationship between natural environment and well-being. It is for this measurement that the methodology of Well-Being index calculation has been formulated.

Some kind of element, however, is missing from each approach, and the survey may seem to be one-sided. So, demand has already appeared for establishing complex indicators or systems of indices that break with the traditional one-sided attitude and do not focus on either the goods produced by a society or the incomes but demonstrate social progress as a complex process with man and demand for living a better life and achieving social well-being in its centre.

The Hungarian Central Statistical Office, in line with the principles laid down by the OECD, has also started to develop a system of statistical indices that – we think – describe processes considerably affecting social changes. References to it can be found under Social Progress Index.

Indicators based on the same principles allow – in addition to comparisons across countries – regional comparisons too, which – in a given case – will better help to reveal the reasons for differences in development and enable deeper analysis.

## 1. Country-Level Comparison of Economic Development

The most commonly used indicator for overall comparisons of economic development is GDP per capita calculated at purchasing power parity (PPP). And *Figure 1* also shows the changes between 2005 and 2015 (EU-28 = 100; calculated at PPP).

Researchers also try to describe differences in development with various spatial images seeking to reveal some homogeneity and cohesion in development, such as the so-called Pentagon image or the Cross Banana image, etc.




*Source*: Eurostat, Yearbook 2016

**Figure 1.** *Changes in GDP per capita in countries of Europe between 2005 and 2015*


**Figure 2.** *Pentagon*



*Source*: Pál Szabó 2009

**Figure 3.** *Cross Banana*

According to a certain approach, Europe cannot be described with a formalized spatial pattern, yet regions need to be categorized. 'Since individualities cannot be handled by the EU's regional policy due to the vast territory: the delimitation of assisted regions can be based upon statistics rather than a city view or regional image' (Szabó 2009).

Compared to the popular spatial figures, an analysis of regional-level (NUTS 2) statistics can provide more realistic explanation for political and social orientations not necessarily interpretable with economic rationality, as we could also see e.g. in connection with Brexit. It should also be emphasized in advance that various economic development and well-being statistics compared at a higher (e.g. country) level of aggregation and separately from the other indicators can – similarly to formalized spatial models – show a picture (and correlations) different from the reality of lower regional levels, which can also be seen in the nation-wide totalling of local referendum results.

### 1.1. Country-Level Comparison of Well-Being

After the Stiglitz Report published in 2009 – in which the renowned economics professor queried GDP's omnipotence –, a lively debate arose between statisticians and economists about measuring social well-being. The debate was especially hot about the role of GDP, i.e. gross domestic product. It should be noted that statisticians have never claimed GDP would be the only measure for the development of a society and the well-being of people living in it. GDP is one slice of the big system of national accounts and an important but not exclusive indicator of economic development, let alone of well-being. GDP as an indicator is widely used and accepted even today, primarily instead of national income, which is much more difficult to work out. It is calculated according to an established and internationally prescribed methodology. Its calculation methodology is laid down in EU law.

Meanwhile, an extensive methodology for calculating the Well-Being Index has also evolved. So, in addition to the possibility of objective measurement, there is also a so-called subjective well-being (SWB) measurement. Its methodology is currently being formulated. Tamás Gáspár distinguishes three levels of measuring SWB: the level of pleasure, the level of involvement or flow-state, and the level of meaningful life. Of course, the three levels are structured hierarchically, and efforts are made to formulate measures for the studied phenomenon with the help of numerous empirical surveys and databases (Gáspár 2013).

The methodology is still very diverse, but good practices have been consistently applied for years such as the survey by the London-based Legatum Institute, which even ranks countries. They consider 89 variables in their ranking. Explanatory variables include per capita GDP, percentage of the active population, security of Internet servers, but also subjective factors such as how well-rested citizens feel. The 89 variables are then further examined in 8 categories, so to say clusters, and even within the categories they rank the countries. The 8 categories are: Economy, Education, Entrepreneurship and Opportunity, Governance, Health, Personal Freedom, Safety and Security, and Social Capital.

In 2015, the following countries ranked in the top five: 1. Norway, 2. Switzerland, 3. Denmark, 4. New-Zealand, 5. Sweden. Hungary was ranked 45th. Beyond the absolute ranks – once a longer time series is available –, it will also be worth analysing changes over time.

### 1.2. Social Progress Indices

A system of social indicators, or social indices started to be developed in the middle of the 20th century. One of the best known social indicators is the Human Development Index (HDI), worked out under the UN's Development Programme. HDI has three dimensions: health, education, and standard of living, having a highly composite measurement system based on at least four indicators according to the original definition. So, it is not widely used as yet (Köpeczi-Boócz 2011).

In Hungary, a complex index system designed to measure social progress is being developed under the control of the Central Statistical Office. Participating in this work is the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, while representatives of the main professional organizations are also involved.

The main groups of the currently used index system are as follows:

1. Economic Ratios
   - 1.1. Level of Development and Growth
   - 1.2. Efficiency, Competitiveness, and Stability
   - 1.3. Knowledge-Based Economy
   - 1.4. Infrastructure
2. Social Indicators
   - 2.1. Population and Family
   - 2.2. Education
   - 2.3. Labour Market
   - 2.4. Status of the Young
   - 2.5. Status of the Elderly
   - 2.6. Financial Status and Consumption
   - 2.7. Housing
   - 2.8. Health
   - 2.9. Social Safety Net
   - 2.10. Culture and Leisure
   - 2.11. Public Security
3. Environmental Indicators
   - 3.1. Climate Change and Energy
   - 3.2. Natural Resources
   - 3.3. Sustainable Production

It is apparent how complex the index system is and how much care is required already for country-level comparisons. We also think the synthesized indicators

can hide a lot, so it is worth examining the differences in development more deeply at both the economic and social level. And thereafter we should search into the causes of differences. Of course, even significantly different rankings obtained with the various indicators can help the analyst draw important conclusions.

## 2. Certain Economic and Social Indicators and Their Regional Political Aspects with Reference to Brexit

Several reasons are listed with regard to the Brexit results, and big differences are visualized between the various regions of the United Kingdom. Differences in the level of development are often referred to as one of the main reasons for the differences of opinion. Hereafter, we would like to examine whether a political orientation so different from that of the EU member countries with similar levels of economic and social development can be attributed to differences measurable at a regional level.

When examining regional policy, we usually presume that the achievements of social, political, and economic integration processes – which promote the development of a local economy operating in the global market – provide sufficient motivation and support among the population of voting age so that the intention of actually accomplishing an exit from the integration should not come up seriously.

Apart from the outcome of the Brexit decision, we must reflect on what real processes can be detected behind the 'popular will' seemingly manifested against economic rationalities in one of the oldest parliamentary democracies, since their recognition can help us not only to handle the integration problems affecting the EU but – in a wider sense – also to address global economic, social, and environmental sustainability issues.

We will also be able to see what wider factors interpretable also at European or international level we should reasonably face instead of identifying those voting against integration as low-skilled and belonging to older age-groups.

To start with, by reviewing some socio-economic indicators and immigration data measured at regional level, we will try to draw conclusions – supported by data and somewhat divergent from the popular statements – on the basis of comparisons with the European core area, which is most closely connected to the UK also geographically (including Germany, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, and Ireland, linked by a thousand threads with the UK).

*Figure 4* shows development levels by GDP down to a depth of NUTS 2 regions in the selected countries. The only significant variance is (inner) London's extraordinarily high GDP rate, which represents a significant disparity not only within the country but also compared to the other member states' leading regions.

Considering that the percentage of those desiring to remain within the EU was in a vast majority here (in contrast to the other regions of England), a significant economic lag behind the central region (a difference in development level) can be a factor to be definitely taken into account.




*Source*: Eurostat 2014 (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/RSI/)

**Figure 4.** *Economic development in the NUTS 2 Regions of Selected Countries (by GDP)*

Unemployment trends by region show an interesting picture. A consolidated and actually very favourable picture, very similar to Germany in this respect, is characteristic of the UK – in contrast to France, Belgium, and Ireland, belonging to the same category of economic development. This implies, on the one hand, that at a given (relatively high) level of economic development a higher unemployment rate reflecting an uncertain economic situation cannot be considered a significant factor against integration aspirations. On the other hand, a high employment rate in itself is neither a guarantee of the support of integration aspirations nor a direct indicator of a development disparity.




*Source*: Eurostat 2014 (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/RSI/)

**Figure 5.** *Unemployment rates in the NUTS 2 Regions of selected countries (age: 15–65)*

According to a frequently heard opinion, lower educational attainment also hides behind anti-integration. Well, actually, in a cross-European comparison (e.g. compared to Germany), UK has a significant advantage in respect of tertiary educational attainment. So, the rejection of integration cannot be explained by lower educational attainment, at least when differences across countries are considered.

It can be seen in *Figure 6* that (inner) London stands out from the domestic as well as the international field in terms of both GDP per capita and higher educational studies. This leads us to conclude that a higher percentage of people with tertiary education means a clearly stronger support for the integration processes typically in the regions with outstanding incomes. So, for the measurement of differences in development it seems to be worth including the income levels as well.

In areas lagging behind the strong central region, a higher educational level can have a less decisive role in supporting integration.




*Source*: Eurostat 2015 (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/RSI/)

**Figure 6.** *Percentage of people with tertiary education in the NUTS 2 regions of selected countries (age: 25–64)*

Based on UN Population Division data for 2015 (ref.: http://metrocosm.com/get-the-data/), of the UK's population of 65M, almost 5 million live abroad as opposed to the 8.5 million foreign immigrants (or, to put it more nicely, 'expats').

At 8%, the ratio of British citizens living outside their home country in the largest number from EU member states (apart from the 19% ratio of the Irish) is considerably higher than the German (5%), French (3%), Belgian (5%), Dutch (6%), and Danish (4%) indicators.

The 13% ratio of immigrants to resident population roughly equals the 12% ratio for France, Belgium, and Holland, but it is below Germany's 15% and Ireland's 16% ratios. Denmark with its 10% ratio lies a little outside the surveyed countries.




Source: http://metrocosm.com/eu-diaspora-map/ (with reference to UN Population Division data)

**Figure 7.** *Number of EU member states' citizens living abroad in 2015*

Immigration – in international comparisons – does not actually cause significant fear in the UK's society. This is also indicated by the fact that, although according to a survey by Ipsos MORI in 2014 the over one thousand British respondents aged 16–64 also overestimate negative phenomena (or phenomena considered negative) in public perceptions of social issues (except for life expectancy) compared to facts, the deviation from reality is by no means so significant as e.g. in Eastern Europe (or Japan and South Korea), but it is actually similar to that in the European core countries (Ipsos MORI 2014).




Source: https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3466/Perceptions-are-not-reality-Things-the-world-gets-wrong.aspx

**Figure 8.** *Guesses by British respondents on certain social issues vs facts*

Relying upon these findings, in comparison with the European core countries, we should not consider the effect of anxiety about immigration on the Brexit decision extremely important either.

## 3. New Approach to Social Progress Indicators: Social Progress Index

The Social Progress Imperative, also renowned under the name of Michael E. Porter, originally developed an index system for the social progress of nations. Today, however, the methodology is already applied at regional and even municipal levels. Based on the methodological summary for the European regions (also considering European peculiarities), we have found it worth investigating further (European Commission DG Regional 2016).

The Social Progress Index framework considers 4 components along each of the following 3 dimensions: Basic Human Needs, Foundations of Well-Being, and Opportunity. Each component is measured through several indicators.

Four key principles guided the selection of indicators:

– they are exclusively social and environmental indicators (no economic measure is included);

– they measure outcomes and not inputs;

– they are relevant to all the countries (or regions);

– they allow the determination of direct intervention steps.

By excluding economic indicators, the index becomes suitable for a systematic analysis of the relationship between social progress and economic progress (e.g. to define the connection between per capita GDP figures and SPI indicators). In line with the above four principles, the Social Progress Index (SPI) – complementary to GDP indicators – allows a thoroughly elaborated and comprehensive measurement of sustainable development widely applicable in practice. The Social Progress Imperative published its Social Progress Index 2016 Report in June 2016 (Social Progress Imperative 2016a), where the following figure presenting the level of development by GDP and the level of social progress across countries is also included:

An interesting conclusion can be drawn from the shape of the curve. With a (relatively high) level of economic development achieved, the social progress scores do/can decreasingly result from the stepping up or revving up of economic performance. That is, the existence and enforcement of a more conscious social and environmental strategy increasingly tends to be the driving force in the 'formation' of an advantage realizable on account of social progress.




Source: Social Progress Imperative 2016a

**Figure 9.** *Social Progress Index vs economic development by GDP across countries*

Compared to the previous (2015) SPI Report, the UK has increased its relative lead over the otherwise economically better-performing EU-core. While the EU-core (apart from Holland) has lost from its social progress position, the UK has improved its ranking (getting ahead of Iceland and New Zealand, it has jumped from the 11$^{th}$ to the 9$^{th}$ place, whereas in respect of GDP per capita it was only ranked 16$^{th}$ in 2014). The current SPI values are generated from the data of the previous 3 years; therefore, we can speak about a trend of change. It remains to be seen how the UK will be able to maintain and realize this lead in social progress under circumstances changed by the Brexit referendum.

It is less a divergence of the individual districts'/regions' economic development but rather the generations' divergent experience, judgement, and benefit of the achievements and prospects of social progress that is behind the outcome of the Brexit referendum and the subsequent political changes within the UK. In this respect, no wonder that the majority of the elderly (over 45) and, on a European scale, by no means underqualified population – presumably more preferring

the achievements in social progress against economic growth – voted for exit or rather against integration.

Higher commitment by younger generations to integration can well be explained by the (extra) income resulting from higher economic performance – otherwise, with a view to their career, absolutely understandably – being more important for them than preserving a favourable (in comparison to other countries) social progress position already achieved. All this points out one of the significant contradictions deriving from global economic competition, i.e. beyond a certain level the enhancement of global competitiveness and the economic growth are realized to the detriment of social cohesion, one of the striking consequences of which is a decline of the middle classes, evolved throughout centuries in certain developed societies, even in the case of the most powerful economies (see the US).




Source: BBC (http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-36616028)

**Figure 10.** *Brexit referendum results by age-group*

Social cohesion, however (based on social progress results achieved so far), may also be of higher significance than a change in economic performance with a view to achieving sustainability objectives more closely linked to social and environmental progress. In this respect, the British – according to historical experiences and the achieved social progress results – are doing quite well.

In a nation-wide manifestation of political will, both the central regions (mostly linked to a given country's capital city and economic centre) with an extremely outstanding level of economic development by GDP having real interests in supporting international integration (see Inner London) and the regions lagging behind in terms of economic growth (such as certain regions in Wales and Scotland) having aspirations to join the more developed areas may remain in a minority if the majority of eligible voters prefer to keep the – more important

for them – social and environmental achievements rather than opting for some benefits resulting from economic growth (less) realizable by them.

It should also be noted, however, that at a higher level of economic development there are few examples of the loss of economic competitive advantages having an 'instantaneous' reaction to preferences for the retention of social and environmental advantages.

The overwhelming majority of global Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the UN in 2015 (United Nations General Assembly 2015) can be linked with the improvement of social progress results in addition to or – at a high level of development achieved – rather instead of economic growth. For that matter, the high priority of sustainability goals can already be observed in handling not just real social needs but also business risks involved and increasingly recognized in the operation of global corporate value chains (see the concept of 'creating shared value' propagated by Porter and Kramer) (Porter–Kramer 2011).

The following question can be rightly raised with respect to arguments for economic advantages resulting from strengthening inter-regional integration: How can we achieve a more favourable social progress result compared to the present level of economic development, and how can we realize and maintain this advantage? This question also arises globally since – according to a relevant Deloitte analysis – it is most likely that the Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the UN in 2015 cannot be met by 2030 merely on the basis of the GDP growth forecast (Deloitte 2015).


Source: http://www.ted.com/talks/michael_green_how_we_can_make_the_world_a_better_place_by_2030?linkId=17951655

**Figure 11.** *SPI for global sustainable development goals and SPI forecast relative to per capita GDP expected in 2030*

In his answer to the above challenge, Michael Green, an expert from the Social Progress Imperative, points out the incidental development opportunities deriving from the improvement of social progress results (Green 2015). In his opinion, the present regression curve (based on 'business as usual') can be positioned higher with the implementation of the states' and regions' development programmes for conscious social progress (promised by the member states' leaders by accepting global sustainable development goals in 2015) and the – either voluntary or forced – change in business actors' preferences, certainly under close social control (continuous measurement and accountability).

Behind the economic actors' corporate social responsibility (CSR) endeavours, there are – for the most part – business motivations instead of an intention to identify and meet real social needs. The approach of 'creating shared value' (CSV) focuses on how business interests and social needs can as well coincide, moreover, result in further (increasing) business profits. Along the CSV approach, the key members of global corporate value chains – similarly to state and community actors – can become participants in local programmes and initiatives serving social progress.

A great dilemma of sustainable development is whether social progress can exist without (also locally) measurable economic growth. As you can see in *Figure 9*, at country level, there is a strong correlation (of around 80%) between GDP figures and SPI, measuring social progress, excluding economic performance indicators. Nevertheless, there is high variance in social progress results between countries and regions at a given GDP level. Studying the competitiveness and spatial aspects of social progress indices, we can find that the better than average social development levels of the countries and regions representing the same economic development level can provide *a relative and temporary competitive advantage* for the businesses in the region. Therefore, more favourable conditions are also granted for economic growth.

On the basis of the 2016 EU Regional Social Progress Index, published on 11 October 2016, it can be proved, on the one hand, that there is a very close relationship between social progress development and competitiveness also at regional level (see *Figure 12*), but, on the other, it can also be observed that – compared to a similarly strong correlation between GDP and social progress at country level – in regional comparisons the closeness of relationship with GDP-based development is weakening, with household income taking its place as a stronger explanatory factor (see *Figure 13*) (Social Progress Index 2016b).




Source: Social Progress Imperative (2016b)

**Figure 12.** *Strength of relationship between regional SPI and competitiveness ($R^2$=0.728)*




Source: http://www.slideshare.net/socprog/2016-eu-regional-social-progress-index/

**Figure 13.** Relationship between regional SPI and household income

However, according to the published regional SPIs, no correlation can be found – on the whole – between the favourable or unfavourable positions of regional social progress results in an international comparison and the majority willingness/voting results as to leave or remain. Based on this finding, searching into the causes behind the majority rejection of integration, we should reasonably go on examining the relationships within the country – locally – first of all. Another question to be analysed is whether behind the willingness to leave we may presume an intention to preserve the social progress results achieved at the given level of economic development.

The presumption that the employment rate does not affect willingness to reject or support integration is also confirmed by the rather weak connection between regional social progress indices and employment (see *Figure 14*).




Source: http://www.slideshare.net/socprog/2016-eu-regional-social-progress-index/

**Figure 14.** Relationship between regional SPI and employment rate

## 4. Conclusions with Reference to Factors Affecting EU Integration

With reference to the European Union, we think of the cohesion policy as a tool applied to eliminate regional, economic, social, cultural, etc. disparities hindering integration – either appreciatively or critically. To put it somewhat simpler (and

disregarding the other problems in the Eurozone): the more developed core countries are willing to pay contributions towards the 'catch-up' in order to enjoy access to a bigger market and cheaper labour and, as a result, the growth of their own economy. This economic structure – based on recourse to funds received for the illusion of catching up – on the peripheries leads to corruption being reinforced and accepted at the societal level, servant and defenceless roles being fixed within the global value chain with local business competitiveness decreasing.

On the basis of the experience and criticism of the EU's cohesion policy, a strong doubt may arise whether the programmes aimed at convergence, competitiveness, and territorial cooperation for the period of 2007–2013 have – on the whole – produced a more favourable effect than if the same resources had been given to the more developed regions, being able to use them more efficiently, for the enhancement of their communication systems meeting their specific functional requirements. In its critical review, the Barca Report of 2009 basically pointed out the low efficiency of applying general (GDP-based) convergence criteria, disregard for specific (local) conditions, and concentration on the distribution of resources rather than on true results (Barca 2009).

If a certain general level of consumption – determined by economic development – can be reached in return for expenditure acceptable to the majority, the 'enjoyment' of social progress results becomes the number one priority for the part (ideally the majority) of the society who are no more interested in or concerned with the exploitation of the benefits arising from economic growth exceeding or just wishing to reach the generally 'accepted' level of consumption. As mentioned earlier, the population of the UK aged over 45 enjoying work-related income or pension at a high standard of living, in other words the bourgeois middle class, is less responsive to arguments proclaiming the possibilities or at least the promise of economic growth exploiting the EU integration – by all means advantageous for the UK as a core country – yet for them not providing (additional) concrete benefits.

On the other hand, in the people arriving e.g. from the historically not colonized territories, such as free employees from the new EU member states – actually employed in areas required for the operation of local economy –, they (mostly generalizing based on false information or half-truths) see aliens jeopardizing their social progress results achieved.

Even about the EU's inefficient cohesion policy they notice not a bad structure formulated along the core countries' interests but income taken away from them and 'handed out' to the unworthy. Considering that in the EU's political phraseology the strengthening of integration and not the improvement of local (!) social progress results is specified as a goal, the existing structural and institutional problems to be solved also devalue integration as an attainable goal. If the integration processes were treated properly – i.e. as a tool instead of a goal –, the subject of communication would be the need to improve solution methods, and not

the questioning of common goals. That would have been especially important in the case of the population of a country viewing itself with particular 'self-esteem', citing its colonial empire's past and Commonwealth present, and thereby having significant political and economic relationships extending beyond the EU.

Having compared the development disparities examined at regional level, we can come to the conclusion that – rather than suggesting that nationalistic aspirations spreading in Europe are also strengthening within the UK – the Brexit referendum's outcome indicates the problem that even in western liberal democracies there is no widely supported answer to the question of how we can ensure the permanent protection of local social progress results instead of sealing off – which is otherwise damaging to economic relationships and growth –, and thus aiming to isolate and hinder the movement of the increasing percentage of lagging social layers and immigrants.

That explains the 'position' taken up by a middle class continuously losing or fearing to lose its self-esteem and real economic power even in the UK, having a higher education and a lower unemployment rate by European (as well as wider, international) standards.

As the protection and further improvement of social progress results already achieved were not properly emphasized – besides catch-up – in the wording and communication of the policies aiming to strengthen European integration processes when social cohesion between and within the territorial units was set as a goal, the middle classes – exposed to the (real or presumed) risk of falling behind, and not benefitting directly from economic growth yet still being in a favourable financial and social situation – obviously feel the disadvantages of European integration stronger than its advantages. Social, economic, and territorial cohesion being merely interpreted and communicated with an emphasis on the catch-up will appear to players fearing for their previous favourable status as a position against their local interests (linked to everyday life).

Of course, the question can also be asked as follows: Will or can leaving the EU improve the competitive positions of regions with a majority favouring the exit? No exact answer can be given to that as yet. Anyway, ruled out at the present level of economic development (we are talking about the world's 5$^{th}$ largest economy!), the average or better than average English and Scottish economic regions will remain viable and – in international comparisons – competitive outside the established EU-integration framework as well. However, for the less advanced territories with considerably smaller populations, new regional development policies will – presumably – need to be developed.

In connection with the social progress results and global Sustainable Development Goals, we have already mentioned the role of national and regional development programmes for conscious social progress, as a result of which the global improvement of social and environmental results can be implemented

more favourably compared to the 'business-as-usual'-type operation of a society and economy.

Also large international corporations have recently been increasingly recognizing that the improvement of local social and environmental results creates more stable and profitable business conditions for them as well as for the other actors in global value chains. As the institutions of national and local governments are forced to assume a new attitude to their roles along sustainability goals, the leaders of global value chains are also becoming more open to the formulation of new business models closely linked to a change in the innovation culture. To maintain or enhance their competitiveness and reputation, large international corporations are – willing or not – 'compelled' to address social and environmental problems and to produce local results. So, their role has to be considered crucial also in the reinterpretation of social cohesion.

The question is how the global and local economic actors' innovation-based local social and environmental objectives and results can modify the social cohesion strategies and how the disparities in economic and social development can be measured and evaluated at regional level in addition to a comparison across countries. We have seen that any one indicator in itself is not enough since it does not provide sufficient explanation for either the development disparities or their reasons. Anyway, in addition to GDP per capita, it is worth applying – and it is important to apply – such indicators as SPI and Well-Being as well as various indices of social progress.

As a concrete example, the outcomes of the Brexit referendum demonstrate that – in addition to a need to enforce the efficiency-enhancement aspects of integration policies aimed at catching up and traditionally considering increase in productivity and employment as a basis – there is also a need for social and environmental usefulness and the achieved social progress results to be promoted and improved by both the state or community operators and business actors. And that applies not only to lagging regions but also to areas with higher and outstanding levels of economic development.

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# Regions – between History and Social Construction[1]

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**Abstract**. The study aims to give a comprehensive explanation on how regional construction took place in the European history related to the state-building processes and how the historical heritage of the European state-construction influences today the social construction of the regions. With regard to the state-building processes, the study started from Hechter's model of 'primary' and 'secondary' state and his interpretation on the relationship between core regions and peripheries. This model operates with the centralizing power of the state, but from the last decades of the 20th century it was proved via the 'new regionalism' that social construction processes became more relevant in shaping new subnational regions. This last aspect is described by Paasi, and the study argues for a new concept of regional identity as a territorial 'product' of interacting governance and local society.

**Keywords**: Europe of regions, obscured regions, core regions, peripheries, state building, regional identity, social construction

The notion of 'region' came to the front after the 1970s, and it has become an important key concept both for political science and human geography or history (see Murphy 1991, Paasi 2001, and others). With it, a 'new Europe' seems to rise based on the transformation of capitalism, namely the altered relations between national economies and the international market, which simultaneously induced a radical reorganization of the geographical scale. This process gets new dynamism in the 1990s by the 'new regionalism', which transcended the classical territorial-administrative frameworks and shaped new, 'transnational' regional spaces (Keating 1998).

On behalf of the historians and philosophers, important statements on the coming regionalism of Europe were made by Denis de Rougemont, Tom Nairn, Hans Mommsen, and others (see Applegate 1999: 1157–8). Important contributions were made by geographers as Anssi Paasi and many anthropologists.

1 The study is part of a larger paper, which is under elaboration.

The phrase 'Europe of the regions' was coined firstly by Denis de Rougemont in an interview in 1962.[2] Later, the changes observed from the 1980s highlighted the fact that the regions as territorial-political entities became important actors and had an important contribution in reshaping the European states. As Paasi stated: the 'Europe of regions' is a manifestation of the re-scaling of state spaces and the 'assignments of new meanings to territory' (Paasi 2009: 121).

## The Modernization Paradigm – Obscured Regions

From historical point of view, it seems undoubtedly that the consolidation of the new nation-state model in Europe from the beginning of the 19th century made the historical regions invisible. The approach offered by a *paradigm of the modernization* obscures in the 19th century and in the first part of the 20th century the view of the regions which constitutes the European states.

This *modernization paradigm* colligates a) the state transformations from the primary Westphalian model to the newer nation-states, b) the emergence of the nation from its premodern structures, and c) the institutionalizing processes of the democracy. It operates in the political, social-communicational, or economic theories' field. For instance, Gellner (1996) explained the emergence of the nation-states as an economic and social-communicational process, as a shift from agricultural societies to industrialized ones. Anderson (1991) emphasized the cultural-communicational evolution (as a result of the *print-capitalism*-induced public sphere); Greenfeld (1996) stressed the way of gaining political legitimacy by medieval elites etc.

According to Applegate (1999: 1163), the basic tendencies of the modernization paradigm with regard to regions can be reduced to three, each of them described as a kind of a disappearance of the region – economically, politically, and culturally. First – and this was fundamental –, regions disappeared as economic entities; their distinctive economic strengths and weaknesses gradually attenuated when they became absorbed into nationally-based markets, regulated by national economic institutions, and homogenized by the effects of labour and capital mobility. Second, classic modernization theory established a normal process of political development in which the central institutions of the nation-state gathered more and more civic and governing functions to them. Third, modernization entailed the development of national cultures, expressed in a common language, disseminated through educational and artistic institutions, and represented in all

2 As Ruge (2015) demonstrated, the idea of the 'Europe of the regions' was more anti-liberal, more conservative, but not connected with the totalitarian roots of Nazism. De Rougemont and other members of the French Ordre Nouveau circle considered that the feelings of belonging can evolve only in smaller but 'organic' communities, such as the family, communal entities, or regions (see Ruge 2015: 13).

manner of central monuments, rituals, and common experiences. The common outcome of these three tendencies was the nationalism, the discourse, mental disposition, and mobilization by which citizens identified themselves with the collective subject of the nation.

## A Prehistory of Regions in Europe

A historical view which summarized the regional 'prehistory' of the late medieval or modern state is thoroughly shaped by Szűcs (1997). Szűcs was seeking the funding circumstances in the early feudalism of the European 'nationalities' within the specific contrary of Christian universalism and feudal particularism, and he found three ways how the European ethnic entities constituted parts of the later states (1997: 12–25).

The first two ways appear in the southern and western part of Europe between 900 and 1100 A.D. as political growths without any 'national substances'. Around 1000, on the map of Europe, were taking shape those historical-territorial entities which became later the frames of the European 'national structures'. In the consciousness of that era, these entities had not any 'national sense'. Of course, said Szűcs, a *regnum Francorum* or a *regnum Teutonicorum* appears in contemporary historical sources (moreover, some sources mention a *lingua romana rustica* or a *lingua theudisca*), but – in that period – the expressions 'French people' or 'English people' did not mean belonging to a *gens* or a *nation,* understood as a collective entity with self-consciousness (i. e. a set of social groups, which could have been premodern antecedents of modern ethnic/national groups). It seems that behind the cited names the societies of that time saw nothing which could have been considered 'something' similar to a *gens* or a *nation*.

On other hand, the third way can be localized on the central-eastern and northern part of today's Europe, where there existed also a *regnum Boemorum*, a *regnum Ungarorum*, or a *regnum Danorum* at that time, which were clearly identified by the spirit of that age with existing and known *gens*, but which were groups without a European 'content' as a balance between Christian universalism and feudal particularism (Szűcs 1997: 12–13).

In the first European region, the emerging 'nationalities' were born from an organic rebuilding of the fragments from the former Carolingian Empire (8–9$^{th}$ centuries). Whilst in the central-eastern and northern Europe the existence of a sociological 'we-consciousness' appeared – proved by a lot of historical data and proved to have a continuity to the latter feudal periods (12–13$^{th}$ centuries) –, in the ancient (approximately Carolingian) part of Europe, there were a craggy discontinuity between the early feudal territorial communities, the Carolingian and earlier fragments, and the newly nascent 'nationalities' after the 9–10$^{th}$ centuries.

At the beginning of the early feudalism (around the years 500–600), the ethnical-political entities created on the ruins of the Roman Empire were very original fusions of the elements of the Roman heritage and barbarian rules. This early feudal entities of the Burgundians, Vandalics, Alemanni, Lombards, Bavarians, Franks, Goths, and others were small territorial kingdoms set up by migrating tribes in several historical circumstances, most of them being fitted in the civilizational vestiges of the Roman Empire. But these peoples (tribes), as ethnically featured political entities, disappeared in the 7–9th centuries, and they remained only as territorial frames in the newer European integration, the Carolingian Empire (Szűcs 1997: 15). The history of a lot of Germanic tribes proves this logic of the early European integration.

The German-speaking tribes dominated the European space from the Rhine in the west (which line before the Roman conquest was an approximate boundary between Europe's Germanic and Celtic speakers) to beyond the River Vistula in the east, and from the Danube in the south to the North and Baltic seas (Heather 2006: 49). Entering into conflict with the Roman power on the decline, they succeeded in establishing kingdoms inside the Empire (around the years 500–600), but the ethno-sociological base of these kingdoms disappeared over time, the founding ethnical groups were gradually assimilated till the 7–9th centuries. What remained after them were the first western territorial frames of the European feudalism: the ethnical identity of these territories passed into a specific feudal one, laid down by a longer feudal rule of the territory. For example, the East Germanic tribe or group of tribes of the *Burgundians* (having Scandinavian origins) came from the Vistula, and founded the Kingdom of the Burgundians within the empire in the late Roman period, in the western Alps region, where the modern France, Switzerland, and Italy meet. The territorial entity of the Burgundian kingdom became later a component of the Frankish empire, and after its decay the name of this Kingdom survives in the regional appellation, Burgundy, nowadays a region in modern France.

For the sake of accuracy, it must be noted that the dissolution of the ethnic feature of these territorial entities differed based on where these territories were placed. As Szűcs emphasized, in the southern and western part of Europe, there are two subregions, which is why he spoke about two ways. At first, in the European zone with antique (Roman) legacy, which means *Italia*, *Gallia*, or *Hispania*, the salient feature is the above mentioned discontinuity. The remaining names of some regions, such as *Lombardia*, *Burgundia*, or *Francia* (nominating the *Franks*), did not cover any ethnical realities as these entities represented completely new territorialities around 900–1000. Much more so, *Francia* (French) gains a new, larger, and more integrative political sense (Szűcs 1997: 16).

Secondly, the other southern and western European zone clasps the western part of the antique *Germania Magna* with a spread-out to the isle of *Britannia.* Here, the ethnic continuity between the early and late medieval *gentes* and *nationes* was not

cut completely despite the fact that the names *Anglo-Saxon*, *Saxon*, *Bavarian*, and *Thuringii* began to denote some more 'territorialized' entities than before when they referred to tribes, *gentes*. Besides the 'territorialized' sense, the new use of these names contains a kind of integration too. The nascent English or German national consciousness was larger (integrating more 'ethnical entities') and more territorialized than the former purely ethnical denominations (see Szűcs 1997: 16).

So, the third way of the feudal political integration in the northern and central-eastern part of Europe differs from the two western-southern models because here, in Scandinavia, Poland, or Hungary, a transformation took place from the ethnical (non-territorial) frame to the 'national' (political-territorial) one, without any discontinuity.

Szűcs examined the process of the formation of the medieval 'national consciousness',[3] but what is important from our point of view is the transformed and reconstructed nature of the historical regions' 'ethnical origin' in Europe, the nature of a lot of regions which are nowadays constitutive parts of the modern European states.

These historical constituents were made invisible by the above mentioned *modernization paradigm*.

The *modernization paradigm* was challenged after the Second World War, mainly beginning from the 70s. Since the 1970s, a powerful resurgence of regional unrest and regional assertion has been taking place in a number of European nations, which has become, as phenomena, a new task for scholars and launched the 'regional studies' (Applegate 1999: 1164–5). One of the results was a dilemma regarding 'the true nature of regions, whether as ethnic enclaves, economic powerhouses, or civic utopias' (Applegate 1999: 1165).

New explanations, new paradigms arose and the most notable ones tried to harmonize the universality of the classical *modernization paradigm* with a culturally and historically underpinned unequal development.

## States and Peripheries

Most of the newer explanations operate with the centre–periphery differences. As Hechter pointed out, 'most modern states were initially composed of two or more distinct cultural groups. In the course of their development, effective bureaucratic administrations arose in certain regions of the territories later to become the modern States of Western Europe. It was in these *core* regions – Castile in Spain; Île-de-France in France; first Wessex, then London and the Home

3 In the latter discipline of the Nationalism Theory, this means the options for the 'perennialism' defined as the idea that a lot of contemporary nations have revived after an earlier existence in the distant past or during the Middle Ages (see Smith 2001).

Counties in England – that strong central governments were first established' (Hechter 1999: 4–5). This happened to such an extent that the core regions of the developing states advanced economically and technologically, their political control extended outwards to the peripheral regions.

With regard to the way peripheral regional societies reacted to the growing political control, Hechter took into account two models of interaction in the 'national development' process. The models give two explanations of how the 'national development' process stalled or amplified territorial disparities in the Western societies where the industrialization faced the 'territorialized entities' of mediaeval origin. Both of the models are set up on two opposed territorial entities: (1) the *core*, or dominant cultural group, which occupies the territory extending from the political centre (the locus of the central government) outward to those territories largely occupied by the subordinate and (2) the *peripheral* cultural group (Hechter 1999: 18).

The first model actually means several models, which are described by Hetcher as *diffusionist models* (see Hechter 1999: 22–29). It is a model family because they include and reflect the abundance of interpretations under the *modernization paradigm.* These models assert that a regular interaction between the core and the periphery is crucial for *national development* and that industrialization is the necessary and most efficient condition for this development.

Cultural theories, which are convergent with the national development logic, tend to presume that the peripheral culture is 'traditionally oriented' in contrast to that of the modernized core group, and once the peripheral group becomes exposed to the cultural modernity of the core its values will necessarily undergo transformation. When this effect does not seem to occur, many cultural theorists interpret this as an irrational reaction of the group aiming to preserve a backward life-style, to remain in a collective isolation based on the incapacity of the group to face major and necessary changes. This problem of persisting cultural differences can be solved in the view of the mentioned cultural theories, first by stimulating a wide range of intercollectivity transactions,[4] and then by letting time work its inevitable course towards cultural integration (Hechter 1999: 23).

The second model, proposed as more adequate by Hechter, is the *internal colony* model (see 1999: 30–34) based on former scholar descriptions of 'colonial situation'.[5] The core culture as a 'metropolitan culture' here is dominating the periphery, condemning it to an instrumental role. The domination is not only cultural, its manifestation is not an 'osmosis': the cultural distinctions are superimposed upon class limits and tend to preserve a kind of social

4 According to Emile Durkheim, this desired process is analogous to the physical one of osmosis (see his work: *The Division of Labor in Society,* New York, 1964, p. 187).

5 Hechter refers to the writings of Georges Balandier regarding Africa and to those of André Gunder Frank regarding Latin America.

stratification and to compel a *cultural division of labour*. Thus, the ecological pattern of development differs in this 'colonial situation': it leads to an economic and social dualism. 'High status occupations tend to be reserved for those of metropolitan culture; while those of indigenous culture cluster at the bottom of the stratification system' (Hechter 1999: 30).

The novelty of this conceptualization (underlined by Hechter) is that this 'colonial development' does not characterize only the 19th century's overseas imperialism. Many Western European states developed in the 15th–16th centuries show similar relationship with their internal peripheries; Bretagne/Brittany, Scotland, Ireland, Navarra are some examples proving this.

What is more, the reconsidered *internal colony* model seems to have heuristic force in explaining today's regional disparities. Of course, the model does not appear in the European space today in its classical form (with connotations to racialism), but there is a bulk of social data which link the unequal territorial distribution of resources to clearly existing cultural differences.

Another approach which completes in paradigmatic manner the above described two models was offered by Rokkan in his cleavage line theory (see Lipset–Rokkan 1967; Flora–Kuhnle–Urwin 1999). Rokkan tried to model the old Europe of the Celtic, Latin, and Germanic peoples (approximately the southern and western part of Europe which was referred by Szűcs) with regard to the patterns of state formation, mass politics, and processes of territorial organization in the modern era. The factors taken into account by him for a successful state- and nation-building were: a) the city networks (weak or strong); b) the geopolitical type (seaward peripheries, seaward empires, European city-states, landward empires, landward buffers); c) religion (Catholic, Protestant, mixed); d) the presence (or not) of the Roman Law heritage (Flora–Kuhnle–Urwin 1999: 159–161). All these factors, supplemented with the economic type, were decisive for central consolidations and centre–periphery relationships in the modern European state.

From a linguistic point of view, the successful early standardization of the territorial languages was of two kinds. In the first case, in territories consolidated around a single centre before the Thirty Years' War, the standard language was developed from the dialect of the core area: Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, and Netherlands. If the early territorial consolidation took place with markedly differentiated populations (like in France or England), then – despite the consolidation of one dominant language – other dialects or 'subnational' languages would claim recognition.[6] Regarding these six languages (Portuguese, Danish, Swedish, Dutch, French, and English), the linguistic centralization was a direct consequence of political centre building.

The second case is that of the multi-centred territories strongly marked by the imperial heritage with continued fragmentation and multiple centres (i.e.

6 Mainly in the 19–20th centuries.

without one dominant centre), but with the homogeneity of the population in the core territories such as Italy and Germany (Flora–Kuhnle–Urwin 1999: 176–181).

Multilingual state structures based on equal regional status of languages were more likely developed within the city-belt zone of Europe, where a federal tradition was more consolidated (Switzerland and Belgium). An intermediary case is Spain, where the federal alliance strategy was a kind of instrumentality in achieving domination.

Rokkan examined the 'victorious peripheries' too, those regions/zones that were able to establish and maintain their own linguistic standards to which the territorial population remained loyal (Flora–Kuhnle–Urwin 1999: 185). Examples of these peripheral regions are in the Nordic countries, where two factors were important: a) inter-intelligibility of the metropolitan and peripheral languages (excepting the Finnish and Swedish); b) direct demographic contact between native populations and settlers (Flora–Kuhnle–Urwin 1999: 186).

With regard to the central-eastern part of today's Europe, the construction of present-day states followed another pattern. In this region, state building (i.e. the present-day states) was a subsequent process compared with nation building. As Hroch (1985) highlighted, the small nations of these region firstly proceeded on awakening and then agitating for 'national consciousness', aiming later for a political goal which was the political independence of the 'nation'. Compared with the historical process of the Western European states, in the Eastern part of Europe (including the Baltic states and Finland too), nation building somehow precedes state building.

Meanwhile, in the south-western part of Europe, nation building took place as a result of state building, most of the eastern nations being 'built' into a context without their 'own' political elite, acquiring an 'own' state on the basis of a national-political movement with a substantive and particularized ideology of self-determination.

## Centralism as Historical Heritage

Hechter (2004) described the organization of the territorial rule in the modern (post-Napoleonic) state introducing the double model of 'primary state'–'secondary state'.

The *primary state* is a kind of a supergroup whose individual members consist of groups too (and not persons). The supergroups are based on intergroup solidarity with two essential conditions. First, the solidarity must exist and must be maintained on the level of member groups. The members that are themselves groups will have to expend resources sufficient to maintain their internal order to be treated as unitary corporate actors on the level of the supergroup. Secondly, it is

necessary that solidarity on the level of the supergroup be maintained in order to be protected from reciprocal predation and to maintain a social order in the common territory for a better defence against external attackers. So, a primary state can be regarded as the top level of a hierarchy of nested groups extending downwards to the individual level. Assuring the resources for each level of solidarity, this state is 'practising' an *indirect rule*.[7] Primary state formation takes place only by the progressive confederation of highly solidary communities, and the indirect rule serves 'to control culturally distinctive territories' (see Hechter 2004: 37–43).

The genesis of the *secondary state* has a clear historical example: France. Before the Revolution (1789), France had had indirect rule, but the innovations launched after the Revolution (the division of the country into new administrative units – departments, districts with borders calculated on the basis of the power necessities, innovation in taxation, justice, the penetration of the national police into the local public order, etc.) concentrated all resources in Paris. According to Hechter (2004: 57–58), these innovations led to the birth of a strong central government, which used its new-found powers to create overall, unified markets, to stimulate economic growth, developing a highly efficacious state: Moreover, due to French aggressiveness, direct rule was either imposed on neighbouring states (the Napoleonic France imposing variants of direct rule on the vast territories it had succeeded in conquering) or adopted within them for reasons of defence (Benner 2001).

Thus, the historical preconditions of the regional structuring of the European state includes the traditions of the indirect/direct rule and the mode how the secondary state was institutionalized.

On the Balkan Peninsula of the 19th century, as a consequence of the delayed nation-building processes, the regions and borders of the newly constituted nation-states were always constructed and shifted for hegemonic purposes. All young Balkan nations adopted the *centralist French model*, which grants very little power to the regions, and not the federal one, which grants much more autonomy to the traditional provinces and regions. As a consequence, all new Southeast European nations divided their territories into politically weak and fully dependent administrative units, similar to the French prefectures, and often disregarded the inherited historical regions (Roth 2007: 23).

To some extent, a similar situation was in the Habsburg Empire, which fixed administrative regions in the same manner. But it must be remarked that the administrative regionalization made by the Habsburgs in some places in the 18th century was enough auspicious to fuel the spatial imaginary and resurrect

7 Hechter took into consideration the indirect rule in explaining why in some states the nationalism is missing. If nationalism is a collective action, designed to make the boundaries of the nation and governance unit congruent, he argued that then it can only emerge when there is a disjuncture between the boundaries. But in the premodern states the indirect rule thwarted nationalism because it often made the nation congruent with its governance unit (see Hechter 2004: 37).

imagined or real regional identities. These typical Habsburg-shaped places with their historical 'multiculturalism' (opposable to the 20–21st centuries' homogenization performed by the nation-states born on the ruins of the Habsburg Empire) seem to offer starting points for new regional movements. For example, such places are Galicia (torn between Poland and Ukraine) or the Banat (between Romania, Serbia, and Hungary) (see Bialasiewicz 2003, Giordano 2007).

As Roth showed (2007: 23), the purposeful creation and re-creation of formal territorial units despising the traditionally, informally, and historically 'grown' regions was even amplified in the socialist countries (with the exception of Yugoslavia), where the communist regimes made politically motivated efforts to centralize power and to maintain full control on all levels. It was only logical that these administrative regions remained almost meaningless for the majority of their population.[8]

For resuming these historical developments, Roth (2007) proposed a conceptual frame, containing three different ways in which regions are constituted: a) *given*, b) *grown*, or c) *intentionally formed*. Moreover, the real processes are a mixture of these three kinds (Roth 2007: 22–23):

a) A *given* region would be a territory that is clearly defined through its natural boundaries. Islands (such as Crete, Azores, or Madeira), peninsulas (such as Istria), or valleys between mountain ranges are such 'natural' regions. It is to mention that islands often have special constitutional status, recognizing their *given* character.

b) A *grown* region denotes a territory that has – on the basis of hegemonic, administrative, economic, structural, social, or ethnic factors – *grown* into a region through a historical process and is perceived as such by the people living in and around it. In many cases, there is an *initial element of forceful construction* such as wars and hegemony: the Ottoman conquest shaped new regions and likewise the Westphalian Treaty of 1648 established the principle of *cuius regio – eius religio*, and thereby created many new regions, but in both cases most of these constructs became, in the course of time, unquestioned realities, and people developed a sense of belonging and identity.

c) *Intentionally formed* or *formal* regions are different, their size and borders are always clearly defined. Regions and borders have always been constructed and shifted for hegemonic or administrative purposes, but never before in history have there been more systematic attempts to subject territories with rational control and mastery than in the last two centuries. The clear-cut nature of the modern region borders is serving this administrative mastery.

8 The case of Bulgaria, referred to by Roth, may be an extreme case, but it is nevertheless indicative that after the first establishment of administrative regions in 1880 the entire regional structure of the country was radically changed in 1887, 1901, 1934, 1944, 1947, 1948, 1959, and 1971 (see Roth 2007: 23).

Examining the region formation in Europe using the above presented typology of Roth, the historical difference between European regions can be outlined as the measure of the mixture of these three kinds. The regions in the old Europe (the western-southern part) are more recognized as *given* or are *grown*, and in a lesser extent are *intentionally formed*. In Central and Eastern Europe, the presence of *grown* regions is not so emphatic, the prevalent type being the *intentionally formed* regions.

## Regions between History and Social Constructs

The dynamism of the *new regionalism* imposed a new conceptual vision on regions. According to this understanding, *regions* today are conceptualized as *processes* that gain their boundaries, symbolisms, identity, and institutions in the process of institutionalization (see Paasi 2009). Whereas the formerly state shaped the key context for regions and identity building, after the 1990s, the new wave of regionalism stressed the importance of regional identity.

According to Paasi (2002: 140), regional identity is part of the institutionalization of regions, it comes into being by simultaneous processes, and due to these processes all regions have:

1. A *territorial shape* – boundaries that emerge in various social practices and distinguish the region and identity discourses from those of other regions. The functions and meanings of boundaries vary in the sense that some spatial practices are bounded/exclusive while others are not.

2. A *symbolic shape* that manifests itself in practices in economy, culture, media, and governance. This shape includes the name of the region and other symbols, and constructs narratives of identity.

3. A *number of institutions*, needed to maintain the territorial and symbolic shapes. They produce and reproduce distinctions between regions and social groups ('us'/'them').

4. An *established identity* in social practices and consciousness, both internally and externally. An established region can be used by social groups and movements as a medium in a struggle over resources and power. Actors involved in these struggles often use identity among their arguments.

Starting from this understanding of regional identity as a multiple process of institutionalization, the question that arose is how the above mentioned historical contextuality is the modulus of territorial and symbolic shape, of the institutions and identity.

With regard to territorial shape, it is a key question whether the secondary state is an 'organic' continuance of the primary state's organizational heritage. The Jacobin state-structuring model seems to be a total denial of this heritage, but

not all modernized European states neglected their 'structural heritage'. As Bakk (2016) pointed out, 11 present-day EU member states have some asymmetrical elements in their state structure (about 40% of the member states). This means that these states are – at first glance – in line with their 'primary-state' history.

Similarly, there are a lot of arguments proving that symbolic shape or institutions maintaining it are fuelled by historical antecedents.

A more integrative view of identity as both historical and social process in the same time was articulated by Paasi:

> The key question in understanding regional identity is not how the individual and the social are integrated in space but how can the socio-spatial be conceptualized in the 'production' of the individual/collective and vice versa ... This 'dialectics' introduces action that stems from two intertwined contexts: 'from above' in the form of territorial control/governance, and 'from below' in the form of territorial identification and resistance (Paasi 2003: 476).

That is, identity is a territorial 'product' of interacting governance and local society.

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# Hungarian Culture of Philosophy and Historiography of Philosophy in Transylvania

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**Abstract.** The first part of the study debates the role and the status of philosophy in the Hungarian culture in Transylvania, trying to explain why philosophy has not become an organic part of the Transylvanian culture as a whole. There are presented a few experimental and theoretical arguments, especially the theory of the so-called 'short philosophical traditon'. The second part the paper seeks to analyse the impact of the 'short philosophical tradition' on the current philosophy life in Transylvania, bringing an overwiew of the institutional structure of Hungarian philosophy in Transylvania.[1]

**Keywords:** minority (Hungarian) philosophy in Transylvania, literary-historical culture vs philosophical culture, the fragmentation of the Eastern European culture and the 'short philosophical tradition', periods of Hungarian philosophy in Transylvania (1880–1920, the period between the two world wars; the communist period; philosophy after 1989), philosophy life in our days: institutions, periodicals, publishers

Investigations referring to the past and present of philosophy and the history of philosophy in the Hungarian language in Transylvania sooner or later must necessarily take into consideration the role and status of philosophy in our culture – especially when such analyses are formulated within the environment of general researches of Hungarian Studies. Is philosophy present today in Hungarian culture and, within it, in Transylvanian culture? Is the philosophical thought an integrant part of our intellectual life, our cultural public sphere? Has philosophy become an organic part of our culture? What is the status and the role of philosophy in our public thinking? To what degree has the philosophical past become part of our collective recollection? In short: is philosophy at home today in Transylvanian Hungarian culture?

1 The first version of the present study was published in Márton Tonk: *Minority and Community. Studies on the History, Theory and Educational Policy of the Hungarian Minority of Transylvania*. The Romanian Institute of National Minorities, Cluj-Napoca, 2014, 39–53.

If we wish to give a brief answer to this question now, then we could say that philosophy is not really present in Transylvanian culture, which does not contain the 'familiarity' of philosophy, and philosophy has not become an organic part of our culture as a whole. In our cultural-intellectual public sphere, we rarely meet references to the philosophical past and present, and perhaps even more rarely face the propagation and enforcement of the role and function of philosophy. Philosophy is simply not present in our scientific life in a wider sense, and generally neither in our cultural public sphere. A whole series of examples and connected explanations can be given to sustain this state of affairs. One of the most often mentioned reasons for the deficient cultural status of philosophy is, for example, that we are fundamentally a literary-historical culture, the characters and the creations of our imaginative literature and history make up the most considerable part of our collective recollection, and in the cultural-intellectual discourses of our days we significantly draw our explanatory and legitimating arguments from these areas. This statement (and state of affairs) has got a special weight with relation to the 'conservative' Transylvanian Hungarian society, which is, at the same time, in a defensive situation as a minority, and, undoubtedly, it also greatly influences the cultural role of philosophy. In this context, it is not at all surprising that in 2004, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the existence of the philosophy journal entitled *Kellék*, appeared in Cluj (Kolozsvár), the editors placed the following statement as a short summary of the role and function of the publication on the cover of the jubilee number: 'We wished to speak to a medium that is not hostile towards philosophy, only indifferent.'[2] It is perhaps this indifference that most precisely paraphrases the relationship of Transylvanian Hungarian culture to philosophy – and, at the same time, it explains why the philosophical tradition, which is more difficult to digest anyway, did not become an organic part of our culture.

When identifying the place and the role occupied by philosophy in our culture, or the degree to which it has become an organic part of our culture, an excellent tool available for university instructors can be the quick assessment of the level of knowledge of the students about philosophy, more precisely about Hungarian philosophy. For the past two decades, the author of the present writing has also been teaching the history of Hungarian philosophy in several Transylvanian higher education institutions,[3] and his general experience is that students practically do not have either knowledge or information about the past

2 The 2004/25. anniversary issue of the review appeared under the title of 'Best of *Kellék*', and it includes a representative selection from earlier issues. The philosophical periodical in Transylvania, which is, at the same time, one of the 'handful' of such periodicals appearing in the Hungarian language area still appears with a number of 53 issues published until now.

3 Reference is being made to the philosophy programme of Babeş–Bolyai University and Partium Christian University in Oradea (Nagyvárad) and to the European Studies programme of the Cluj (Kolozsvár) Faculty of Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania.

of Hungarian philosophy, and the plain mentioning of the name of a Hungarian thinker means a pleasing exception. The situation is different, of course, if we ask about the literature and historical past of Transylvania. Here, even students at a lower level of knowledge are able to report in several sentences about a piece of our literature, an event of our history, or about some outstanding literary-historical personality. All this may be an experimental argument for the statement that Hungarian culture is primarily literary; and, at the same time, it reflects well the lack of 'familiarity' and integration of the culture of philosophy into Transylvanian Hungarian culture.

The fact that philosophy fails to be part of a wide public sphere, of culture in a general sense, and of public consciousness can be demonstrated through manifold examples, just as pertaining arguments meant to – mostly accurately – explain this state of affairs can be easily extended. Among these, we wish to formulate only one – though in our view very important – argument, which tries to explain the present situation of the Hungarian (Transylvanian) culture of philosophy from a narrower philosophical and history of philosophy viewpoint. Simultaneously with the problem of the cultural integration of philosophy, we must also ask the questions: *what in fact needs to become an organic part* of the Transylvanian Hungarian intellectual life and *what exactly are the philosophical contents* the presence of which we miss from the whole of our culture, cultural public sphere, and from the education of our students. In other words: what kind of a past, what kind of traditions has philosophy got in Transylvania? Since when may we talk about philosophy in Transylvania altogether? And with that question we have just rephrased – in a narrower, Transylvanian connection – one of the general problems of Hungarian philosophical historiography, a debate upon which up until today no consensus has ever been reached in specialist circles, i.e.: since when can we speak about independent Hungarian philosophy at all? What does the tradition include and which is the period in the history of thinking, which in a comprehensive sense may be called the history of Hungarian philosophy? *How far*, respectively, *how deep* do our philosophical traditions reach, and – again – *what is it* that should (have) become part of our culture? We will see that responding to this question carries a very important explanation for the current, 'neglected' situation of the Transylvanian culture of philosophy and also the outlining of the tasks and challenges in front of the pursuers and institutions of philosophy.

The canonization endeavours concerning the history of Hungarian philosophy can be fundamentally grouped around two important standpoints. The history of our philosophy dates back to several centuries according to the first standpoint, with its beginning placed somewhere in the decades of the 17$^{th}$ century, primarily around the oeuvre of János Apáczai Csere. According to the second viewpoint, on the other hand, this story covers a much shorter span of time: it can be roughly

derived from the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries and it begins with the oeuvre of Károly Böhm, the first important systematizer of Hungarian philosophical thinking. About the first variant, it can be undoubtedly related that it is based on the widest interpretation of philosophy and historiography of philosophy, and it includes into the history of Hungarian thinking a number of developments that had occurred in Hungarian language area, but which essentially belong to the history of ideas, culture, and reception. On grounds of this definition, the previously mentioned Apáczai becomes one of the first Hungarian philosophers, as a local herald and diffuser of the Cartesian ideas of the age, making it possible at the same time for an author, who could hardly be considered a 'philosopher' in the sense of professional philosophy, to take his place in the Pantheon of the Hungarian history of philosophy. We do not wish to challenge the undoubtable merits of Apáczai and his significance from the point of view of reception history, we merely try to ask the question whether it is possible here to talk about history of philosophy in the proper sense of the discipline without having at least an independent philosophical thought or creation. And another, possibly even more thought-provoking doubt: are we observing narrower professional (philosophical, philosophical history) aims or do we have entirely different objectives when we try to 'document' ourselves and our nation reaching back to centuries in the long history of universal thinking? Do we not exchange scientific objectivity for a certain type of national self-justification and derive demonstrative philosophical historiography? And do our doubts not turn even stronger when reading such works of philosophical history as the one written by János Erdélyi, who, in his volume entitled *Philosophy in Hungary*, published in 1885, starts to discuss our history of philosophy with the *Admonitions of King Saint Stephen* written to his son, Prince Imre: 'Stephen, the first king of the Hungarians, the first philosopher of the Hungarians' (Erdélyi 1885: 10).[4]

The second approach to describe the nature, contents, and periods of the Hungarian philosophical past successfully goes around the dangers of demonstrative philosophical historiography, but it also defines a much shorter period of time as the history of Hungarian philosophy, only covering some 130–140 years. Starting from a much narrower defintion of the history of philosophy than the former one, puts the beginnings of independent Hungarian philosophy to the turn of the 19th/20th century. The keynote of this idea belongs to the first important representative of the 20th century 'renaissance of Hungarian philosophical historiography', Tibor Hanák, who unambiguously argues in

4 Some of the researchers of Hungarian philosophy have also already called attention to the existence of demonstrative philosophical historiography. For instance, Béla Mester writes the following in his volume entitled *Magyar philosophia* (Hungarian Philosophy): 'There exists a demonstrative philosophical historiography, which tries to show a "healthy" national culture that must necessarily include philosophy. We have to show that we have got it, too' (Mester 2006: 28).

favour of a 'short' philosophical past. 'Until the end of the last century [i.e. the 19th/20th], Hungarian philosophy consisted of some isolated undertakings, the work a few excellent teachers, a number of good educational books, and the scholastic philosophy teaching of the theological seminaries' (Hanák 1980: 20). Or elsewhere: Hungarian culture only got to the stage 'when the institutional conditions necessary for the study of philosophy took shape at the turn of the century' (Hanák 1980: 22). And it is true indeed that a series of important events confirm the point of view that decisive steps were taken in the evolution of Hungarian philosophy and philosophy life at the turn of the century: around 1880, our first system-creating philosopher, Károly Böhm, starts publishing his work entitled *Man and his World*, which – in accordance with its author's endeavour – is indeed the first Hungarian philosophical *system*; in 1881, Alexander Bernát and József Bánóczi start the Hungarian-language edition of the classical authors of philosophy, the *Collection of Philosophical Writers*, and in the same year Károly Böhm lays the foundations of the *Magyar Philosophiai Szemle* (Hungarian Review of Philosophy); these are the years when the first philosophy department is established at the Budapest University (1895), and immediately following the turn of the century, in 1901, the Hungarian Philosophical Society also comes into existence. And although it cannot be connected to actual years, this is the period when modern Hungarian philosophical language or, as we would call it today, our academic terminology takes shape.[5] Transylvanian philosophical and history of philosophy developments are naturally tightly connected to these events: in 1896, the Kantian/Fichtean Károly Böhm becomes a full professor of philosophy at the University of Kolozsvár, and not much later one of the most important philosophical centres of Hungarian philosophy, the so-called 'Kolozsvár School of Thought' begins to take shape around him.

All in all, the happenings in the field of philosophy at the turn of the 19th/20th centuries, the regularity of the events of the forming philosophy life, the well-delineated directions of institutionalization (professional society, university, journal, book publisher etc.), the connections with the contemporary tendencies of philosophy, and, not the least, the birth of Hungarian philosophical creations carrying an independent message, all these lead to the conclusion that there is a sharp borderline in the history of Hungarian thinking and within it in the history of the culture of philosophy between the years preceding the 1880s and the period following it. We believe that – although the events and 'creations' of a philosophical nature in the period preceding the end of the 19th century had most important cultural and social returns (and in this respect we can also accept the benefits of demonstrative philosophical historiography) – under the history

5 The Szeged-based researcher of Hungarian philosophy history, Sándor Laczkó, published a thorough study about the issue, entitled *The Evolution of Hungarian Philosophical Terminology from the Time of Apáczai until the Turn of the 19th/20th Centuries* (Laczkó 2004).

of Hungarian philosophy, we can in the best case understand the narrow time span of one and a half centuries between the previous turn of the century and our days. Answering our question brought up earlier: this means the *historical perspective* that constitutes the actual tradition of Hungarian philosophy, the character and quality of the philosophical works born in this period represent the really significant *depths* of our philosophy; this is the *tradition, which is expected to become an organic part of Hungarian culture*.

Accepting these statements, additional inferences can be formulated regarding the present situation and status of philosophy within culture. Applying a historical, cultural, universal philosophical history scale, we reach to the conclusion that we only possess a short philosophical tradition of our own, and this state of affairs is certainly not very much in favour of the cultural integration of philosophy or of its role and effects in the social-intellectual public sphere. At the same time, in a Transylvanian context – in addition to the narrow tradition of independent Hungarian philosophy –, another very important factor, different from the situation in Hungary, acted against the cultural-social 'integration' of philosophy: the fragmentation of Transylvanian philosophy life and the periodicity of Transylvanian philosophical traditions. This explains why 'the culture of philosophy could never become an organic part of the Transylvanian intellectual processes and it did not integrate into Transylvanian Hungarian culture. With respect to these structural and content deficiencies, the Transylvanian Hungarian culture generally shared the common misery of the culture of other Eastern European people' (Demeter–Tonk–Veress 2002: 207).

What does this fragmentation, periodicity of Transylvanian tradition mean in fact? If we survey the 130–140 years of the history of Hungarian philosophy from a Transylvanian perspective, four bigger philosophical history/thematic periods can be delineated. The first one *lasts from the years before the turn of the century until Trianon*, respectively the change of supremacy, and from a philosophical viewpoint it is characterized by some kind of a 'clear', regular philosophy, the discussion of the big topics of philosophical thinking independent in space and time (epistemological, ontological, axiological, ethical, and metaphysical questions); and the keynote of its investigations, its intellectual environment – not surprisingly – are given and defined by contemporary German philosophy, the paradigms of the Kantianism, Fichteanism, and Neo-Kantianism. The work of the already mentioned Károly Böhm, aiming to create a 'clear philosophical system', the strong connections of his oeuvre to the city of Kolozsvár (Cluj) all fall into this period: between 1896 and 1911, he was Professor at the Franz Joseph University of Kolozsvár, an institution already recognized in Europe, but at the same time he was also a defining personality of Transylvanian culture and intellectual life. The great jurist of the turn of the century, Lajos Králik, writes beautifully about his deep relationship to Kolozsvár and the University: 'The academic life of

Kolozsvár was a big blessing for Böhm. [...] He revived. [...] The teaching staff of the University of Kolozsvár may proudly and confidently acknowledge the fact that they recognized Böhm's strength, and invited this strength in an appropriate manner to a most suitable place, the chair of a university professor. The country owes thanks to the teaching staff of the University of Kolozsvár for what they have done by inviting Károly Böhm. Böhm's gratitude is a known fact. He told me: "Kolozsvár was a great luck to me! I started to live a new, illustrious life!"' (Králik 1913: 356). As a university professor, a school founding philosopher, institution and journal founder, he did not merely play an outstanding role in the history of Hungarian philosophy but also in the entire Transylvanian cultural history. At a young age, he set his own programme to create the Hungarian national philosophy, and he represented it throughout his life with tenacious perseverance – and the first uniform philosophical system of Hungarian philosophy, reflecting the spirit of the syntheses of the 19th century in his paradigms and contents, came into existence along this endeavour (see Egyed 2000: 8).

The following period of the history of Transylvanian Hungarian philosophy is *the period between the two world wars*, the most significant feature of which is its turning from systematic philosophical questions towards the investigations aimed at the current problems of minority existence and culture. The radically changed political situation of the Transylvanian Hungarian community naturally brought the modification of the raised philosophical questions, and at the same time the still quite apparent effects of German philosophy were supplemented with the reception and topics of German existentialist philosophy. This latter aspect is well demonstrated by the thinking of the Cluj-based (Kolozsvár) Böhm school of thought, the major intellectual school of the period. The leading figures of the 'Kolozsvár School of Thought', or the 'Kolozsvár Böhm School', which by today has been proven to have great significance in the history of philosophy and history of ideas in the Hungarian language area, and has been canonized as such in circles of philosophical historians since the turn of the millennium – György Bartók, Sándor Kibédi Varga, György Kristóf, Sándor Makkai, László Ravasz, Béla Tankó, Sándor Tavaszy, and Béla Varga were in many ways defining personalities of Transylvanian intellectual-philosophy life for several generations.[6] Their thinking is generally characterized by the 'adaptation' of

6 The circle of the Böhm disciples in Cluj (Kolozsvár) was probably firstly defined as an independent intellectual centre, a school of thought by Sándor Makkai himself (see Makkai 1925), and the group was later called 'the Transylvanian school of thought' by Sándor Kibédi Varga (see Kibédi Varga 1980). It is significant for the date of canonization in the Hungarian history of philosophy, of the 'Kolozsvár school', that, in 2000, the volume including the lectures of the 1996 'Károly Böhm International Scientific Conference' is published with the following title: *Károly Böhm and the 'Kolozsvár School of Thought'*, and that, in 2003, a separate volume is published by Ildikó Veres, entitled: *The Kolozsvár School of Thought*. The author of the present study has dealt in detail with the role of the Böhm School of Thought in Kolozsvár and the evaluation of its philosophical aspects in his volume entitled *Idealizmus és egzisztenciafilozófia*

the contents of universal and contemporary European philosophy to analyse the problems of Transylvanian Hungarian culture, education and society, and for the ontological, ethical and axiological investigation of minority existence. 'They were not only looking for the theoretical solutions of minority existence, but, as practising clergymen, later as bishops or deputy bishops, but also in the bustling intellectual daily life, as teachers, publicists, members or leaders of various organizations, editorial offices, they were the active shapers of the reality after Trianon' (Veress 2003: 7). By attempting to catch the category of minority existence with the help of ontological or ethical-moral premises and by trying to draw practical conclusions from the analysed concept, the philosophers of the school of Kolozsvár represented some kind of ontological-moral minority theory, as opposed to such figures of Transylvanian thinking between the two world wars as Arthúr Balogh, Elemér Jakabbfy, or Bódog Somló. The latters represented a minority rights attitude and political philosophy, which can be called classical, and according to which the status and the situation of minorities are to be interpreted in the framework of the principles of the constitutional state and the constitutional rule of law. Still, as creators of the second period in the history of Transylvanian Hungarian philosophy, the common feature of their thinking is the prominence of theoretical reflection, aimed at minority existence and culture.

The continuity of Transylvanian philosophical thinking broke again with *the communist political transformation* following World War II. Ideological absolutism, non-existent philosophical public sphere, the strongly restricted reception of universal philosophical creations and contents due to geographical/intellectual isolation, and generally a political and ideological terror, making independent philosophical creation impossible, were characteristic of the philosophy in the period of political transformation. In this period of Romanian (Transylvanian) socialism, philosophical reflection – withdrawn into the inner space of the thinking – was still capable of presenting indisputable contents and results; it is enough to mention here the oeuvre of the tragical philosopher hero, who can also be considered typical for the period, György Bretter. The importance of his personality and oeuvre, his role played in the Transylvanian Hungarian thinking is perhaps well demonstrated by the fact that – although there is no such canonization in Hungarian philosophical historiography – his disciples and friends living today sometimes define themselves as 'the carriers of his legacy', or philosophers who belong to the 'Bretter school'.

Finally, the most recent period of the history of Transylvanian philosophy is *the period beginning with the 1989 political transformation*, which is characterized by the reawakening of philosophy life, by a philosophical 'close-up', and the reorganization of the fundamental institutions of philosophy life.

*Tavaszy Sándor gondolkodásában* (Idealism and Existentialist Philosophy in the Thought of Sándor Tavaszy) (Tonk 2002), and in the study *The Reception of Kant by Sándor Tavaszy and The Klausenburg School* (Tonk 2015).

> The philosophical activity of the 90s was primarily characterized by the seeking for paths and places. This, on the one hand, expressed itself in the endeavours to catch up with the events and processes of philosophy life in Hungary and generally in Europe, and in the reception of research directions, questions raised, and results achieved, and, on the other hand, in the endeavours aimed to make adequate conditions for independent research activity and creation, to find a special voice and place in Transylvanian Hungarian culture and in the wider context of philosophy life. These endeavours were necessarily associated with efforts of institution building, and connection establishment (Demeter–Tonk–Veress 2002: 210).

As a summary of this brief overview of Transylvanian philosophical tradition, it can be concluded that our tradition is not too continuous historically, politically, or even contentwise, but it is rather divided into sections and plentiful in breaks and turning points. If we add to this fact the hypothesis of the 'short', one-hundred-/one-hundred-and-fifty-year-long Hungarian (and within it Transylvanian) philosophical past, we may get closer to answer the question why philosophy failed to become an organic part of our intellectual life or how come it is not 'at home' within the Transylvanian culture of our days.

But what do the philosophy life of our days and its institutional system consist of in Transylvania? What are the results of the reawakening that followed the political transformations of 1989, and how successfully were the institutions of the philosophy life reorganized? An important realization of the past two decades was the restarting and reorganization of university-level philosophy teaching and research, as the result of which there are currently two higher educational institutions with philosophy education, the Cluj-based (Kolozsvár) Babeş–Bolyai University and Partium Christian University in Oradea (Nagyvárad). Philosophy education has been operational since 1990 in Cluj (Kolozsvár); by now, it provides all the levels (BSc, MA, PhD), whereas in Oradea (Nagyvárad) the academic programme of philosophy started in 1999, but it currently offers education only at the MA level. The reorganization and establishment of university-level institutions of Transylvanian philosophical education in the Hungarian language turned into a most important factor for the formation of academic workshops of philosophy, but at the same time also in ensuring the continuity and quality of high-school philosophy education.

Besides the educational-scientific activity carried out within the universities' framework, the publishing of specialist books and reviews are equally important factors of Transylvanian philosophy life. *Kellék,* the already cited philosophical review, has been continuously published as a specialized journal in philosophy since 1994 by the Pro Philosophia Foundation and the Publishing House of Cluj (Kolozsvár), and a few years ago a new philosophical periodical (entitled *Többlet*) was published in Cluj (Kolozsvár) as the initiative of the Transylvanian

Philosophical Society. As far as the publication of specialized books is concerned, after the political transformations of 1989, the publication of philosophical works increasingly gained ground, resulting in a series of Transylvanian publishers bringing out philosophical works besides the Pro Philosophia Publishing House, which prints exclusively philosophical works: Komp-Press – the publisher of the Korunk Friendly Association, Mentor, Scientia, BBU – University Press, the publishing houses of the Transylvanian Museum Society and of the Bolyai Society, etc. The Pro Philosophia Publishing House, operating as a specialized philosophy publisher, and as such functioning as an important centre for the popularization of Transylvanian philosophy culture has been in existence since 1999; its publications are grouped along two big thematic blocks: *The Sources of Philosophical Literature in the Hungarian Language* series and the *Workshop* series. The aim of the latter is to publish the works of contemporary Transylvanian Hungarian authors pursuing philosophy and philosophy teaching, hereby striving for the popularization of philosophy and seeking to increase the role, function, and prestige of philosophy in Transylvanian culture. The primary aim of *The Sources of Philosophical Literature in the Hungarian Language* publication series is to connect Hungarian (and particularly Transylvanian) philosophy tradition into the public spaces of culture and education: it publishes the critical text editions of 'forgotten' authors, who played a significant role in a certain period of our philosophical past, but it also brings out monographs valuing the oeuvre of these philosophers, contributing to the writing of the history of Hungarian philosophy. The 'forgotten' works of Bódog Somló, Sándor Tavaszy, György Bartók, Pál Sipos, József Halasy-Nagy, György Bretter, or their works left in manuscripts never having appeared before were critically adapted and published within the framework of the series, and at the same time monographs and studies were also born on the philosophy of Károly Böhm, Sándor Makkai, Sándor Tavaszy, Gusztáv Szontagh, János Asbóth, and György Bretter, presenting new directions and opportunities for philosophy research in the Hungarian language.

Finally, let us cast a short glance at the professional institutions and associations of today's Transylvanian philosophy life – as besides university training and academic publications these are the most important fora for the public life of philosophy. There are currently three – Cluj-based (Kolozsvár) – organizations in the Transylvanian Hungarian institutional system, which strive to promote and represent the culture of philosophy, organize and manage philosophy life, and generally aim for the professional/social representation of philosophy: the already mentioned Pro Philosophia Foundation has been functioning since 1997; the independent Philosophy Department within the framework of the Regional Committee in Kolozsvár of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the first institution of the Academy outside the borders of Hungary that came into existence in 2008; and, finally, in 2009, the Transylvanian Hungarian Philosophical Society was also

founded. It is not our aim here either to present the scopes of activity and the portfolios of the three institutions or to point out the differences, peculiarities that exist indeed in certain respects between the basic objectives of the operation of each and every organization. However, the obvious kinships and samenesses caught in the fundamental philosophical objectives and, at the same time, the personal parallelisms found within the institutions' internal lives and activities – which are inevitable considering the reduced number of the representatives of Transylvanian Hungarian philosophy – impose serious tasks upon our academic institutions. The concentration of the resources of the philosophical institutions functioning in a complex structure, made up of several frameworks and implying different strategies, the co-ordination of their activities, the parallel financial and professional-scientific sustainability of the organizations, and generally the rationality of the present status quo can be formulated as the big challenges of the present and the immediate future. Of course, the coin has a reverse side, too: at the turn of the past century – as we have seen earlier – exactly the large-scale institutional variety, the complex lines of force of philosophical activity yielded a much more essential development, which looked rather uniform in its consequences: the development of the actual Hungarian philosophy life and within it that of the independent Hungarian philosophy, and the integration of philosophy within Hungarian culture. Let us hope, therefore, that upon a new turn of a century history repeats itself and that the Transylvanian philosophy life and diversified professional system of institutions born around the turn of the 20th/21st centuries briefly presented above will again work in a unified direction, along the same line of force, if not else, then, at least, in the direction of the 'organic' integration of philosophy into the Transylvanian Hungarian culture and education.

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# Minority Civil Society

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**Abstract.** Both the concept and the issue of civil society is a matter of dispute in respect of theory and practice alike. The present paper has a triple ambition: outlining the history of ideas behind the concept, providing an interpretation, and carrying out a distinct analysis of the processes characteristic of the East-Central European region. Owing to the unrealistic expectations formed around the concept, mystification poses a great danger to present-day civil society. In what follows, we will analyse the dilemmas evolved around the issue of civil society.

**Keywords**: civil society, democratization, East-Central Europe, active individual and community, solidarity, civil roles and functions, Hungarian civil society in Romania

## 1. History of Ideas and Interpretation

When investigating the roots of the history of ideas concerning today's civil society, certain issues deserve special attention, such as: the relationship between state and society, social structure, and community action plan. The concept of civil society, either directly or indirectly, appears in almost every relevant philosophical system.

John Keane defines three categories of contemporary literature on civil society (Keane 2004: 38). The texts included in the first category discuss civil society as an interpretive framework, analysing the connections between socio-political powers and institutes. According to his categorization, the second group comprises the pragmatic authors, who first of all consider civil society as a directive and an action plan, the means of a good social system. Keane includes here several classics such as Thomas Hobbes, Edmund Burke, Tom Paine, and also names a few contemporaries: Guillermo O'Donnell, Ernest Gellner, Karl Popper, Juan Linz, and Alfred Stepan. The representatives of the third tendency (John Keane, Robert Putnam, Richard Rorty, and Adam Seligman) call into question the moral

superiority of pragmatism and make efforts to demonstrate that civil society is a necessary condition of democracy. There are some who list certain authors (e.g. Jeffrey Alexander, Ralf Dahrendorf) into a category of their own: according to these authors, civil society is the sphere of solidarity and mutual responses (Vercseg 2004: 6).

The ideal of civil society can be traced back to Aristotle. As postulated by him, a city-state (*polis*) is an independent community with a constitution (*politeia*) of its own, what he calls a political community (*koinonia politiké*). The Latin equivalent of the Greek term *politicos* is *civitas* – this is what led Cicero to create the term civil society (*societas civilis*).[1] With the spreading of Christianity, the issue of a certain differentiation comes to the front: besides the religious community – the congregation of believers found under the jurisdiction of the Church –, civil society is registered separately as a constituent part of the state, which leads to the distinction between *lex aeterna* and *lex terrana*. The issue of this distinction, apparently so simplistic today, was the source of centuries-long major tensions and the root cause of civil wars. Christian tradition has a decisive role in the modern-age interpretation of the individual taking responsibility for his/her community. Witnessing the bloody and painful processes (an all-out warfare) of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, Thomas Hobbes searches for a new interpretive framework (*Leviathan*), and gives up on considering social organizations as natural 'formations'. He believes that state is not a structure based upon the family pattern and, at the same time, it does not come into being by divine ordination; he lays stress upon civil associations, that is, to his mind, state comes into existence by way of a collective agreement. The term *contract* mentioned by Hobbes linked society to the state. First Hobbes, then John Locke hypothesises that people's peaceful living together presupposes a certain civil (rights and virtues) existence, but under no circumstances can we talk about a structure separate from the state. Furthermore, we may also exclude the idea of voluntary civic organizations; hereby, we refer to Montesquieu's interpretation, according to which civil society represents an ambition governed by public law so that it serves as a means of separating financial and family situations from the government. This is the trail followed by Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith, who both set out from the idea that society has laws of motion separate from the state. Ferguson considers the concept of civil society as the strengthening of individual freedom, and contrasts civil society with natural state as well as society governed by social contract and legal order with despotism (civil–savage dichotomy).

The direct precedent of the idea of civil society in the modern sense appears with Hegel, who distinguishes between state and society: in his philosophy, in spite of their coexistence, civil society (a system of financial and social relations)

1 See Judit Gesztiné Ajtósi – Dániel Csanády: *Együttműködés a harmadik szektorral (Co-operation with the Third Sector)*, Európai Tükör Műhely-tanulmányok sorozat, 2007/91.

detaches itself from the state (governing and direct policy). Hegel's civil society is built on Locke's and Montesquieu's philosophy: its members are economic operators whose ambition is to put forward their economic interests in and through politics. What was a concept devoid of ideology in Hegel becomes invested with a different interpretation in left- and right-wing politics. At the beginning of the 19th century, economy gained more and more significance in social life; the concept of civil society gets filled with actions and institutes of economic character. Civil society passes for a social sphere where individuals perform their material-economic actions. Marx, on the one hand, identifies the concept of civil society with the bourgeois society and, at the same time, he narrows it down to economy: in his view, the concept stands for the pursuit of egoistic interests as well as for alienation from human possibilities and environment. The right-wing view of the concept comprises the non-state components of society; it goes beyond economy, including culture as well.

F. Tönnies makes a distinction between community and society, which however does not refer to the difference between civil society and state but civil society is given a double interpretation. As postulated by Tönnies, a community is the complex entirety of the natural, direct relationships present in the civil life of pre-capitalist societies; this is compensated by the atomizing and alienating tendencies of (modern) society.

In summary: until the end of the 18th century, the concept of civil society appears as a synonym for the concept of state and political society. Such an interpretation of civil society suggests a civilizational development leading to the establishment of a 'civilized' society, a civil social order. The development of capitalism and the evolvement of political economics brought about the separation of state and civil society (Kumar 1992). The severance of civil society and government is well under way in several European countries. Thus, civil society is the result of a long and complicated historical transformation; its establishment is the achievement of the modern world. However, the dividing line between these two spheres, state and civil society, is not permanent: the boundary gets shifted every now and then, once deepening, once growing dim (Hankiss 1986).

The 20th century brings along certain novelties regarding civil society as well: the concept now becomes the dimension of institutes and social interactions located between state and market (A. Gramsci). According to the Polish political scientist from Oxford, Zbigniew Pełczyński, civil society is a sort of a social arena where individual interests, group actions, social solidarity, and the spheres of welfare dependency interlace with one another (Pełczyński 1984). John Keane believes that there is a mutual relationship between civil society and state, both of them being the precondition of the other's democratization (Keane 1999).

With the detachment of the state, civilization, citizenship, and political publicity (J. Habermas) have become the constituent parts of civil society.

According to Gramsci, the sphere of civil society falls outside of politics and economics, its essence being cultural publicity as well as the milieu for the civil core of society to create values and express their opinions (Honneth 1993: 28). He sees civil society as a transitional phenomenon, which is only needed as long as neither politics nor economy provide shelter for the people – this is the point where Gramsci's left-wing position may have led him to be mistaken.

The idea of civil society plays a key role in today's global and local politics alike. According to some of its interpreters, it is the natural model of the western social order, whose superiority urges its spreading all over the world. In Alain Touraine's opinion – who was among the first to recognize the connection between the new global situation and the civil society –, a new social paradigm is to develop in the post-industrial society, where the intermediate operators of social life become the constituent factors (Touraine 1969). Such a perception of civil society provides an ideological basis for maintaining the world order governed by the most developed countries (Gellner 2004: 136). As opposed to this, we will find the bottom-up civil movement, whose main ambition is self-defence, providing the fundamental conditions (food, safety, liveable environment, culture) of human life. Thus, the voluntary movement fuelled by the members of the society performs the duty of the government in power whenever the state, interwoven with foreign policy or economic interests, falls short of performance.

Civil society as the core issue of social structure and community action plan is considered a relatively novel approach among those dealing with the subject. A. de Tocqueville's analysis introduces a trichotomy: he outlines a triple system made up of state, political society, and civil society. While the dimension of state stands for representation, bureaucracy, parliament, etc., civil society provides ground for private actions. Thirdly, political society is the sphere of associations, public life, press, and publicity, exercising some sort of a controlling function over the state. In this context, civil society is the school of democracy: the question and ability to self-organize as well as safeguard interests and values (Tocqueville 1993).

The evolvement of civil society assumes a legally free, autonomously acting individual, and presupposes the existence of the private sector. Another precondition is the existence of the public sphere: such spaces where citizens, as private individuals, aspire to formulate their claims in order to put forward their own interests, live up to the expectations of their individual autonomy, and satisfy their different needs (Seligman 1997), doing all these within the framework and with the help of the various social self-organizing activities. Consequently, the existence of civil society is founded on the functioning of voluntary, self-motivated associations, various groups articulating, mediating, and asserting certain interests, professional bodies, etc., which all come into being as a result of their founding members' free and private decisions. With the role of the state

called into question, civil organizations increasingly come to the front, and the expectations related to them become more and more significant. Certain authors talk about a global 'associational revolution' (Salamon 1994), investing it with considerable significance in the 20th century, comparable only to the development of the nation-states in the 19th century.

Civil society and citizenship, which is intrinsically attached to it, stand for a protective shield, safety, somewhere to belong to, a home. According to Jeffrey Alexander, civil society can be perceived as a solidarity sphere, wherein a community that accepts general principles is gradually taking shape. The more emphatic is the presence of this solidarity community, the more increasingly it becomes expressed (in the public opinion), it develops its own cultural codes and narratives, and its – legal and media-pleasing – institutional forms come into being. Solidarity community itself appears in historically new, inter-conditional characteristics and practices, such as civility, criticism, and respect (Alexander 1998).

There is no civil society without citizenship, as the rights and permissions attached to it are the very ones capable of protecting the citizen against anomie and the predominant market. Miszlivetz Ferenc quotes from Dahrendorf, according to whom citizenship is the epitome of freedom while civil society is the medium that transmits, reinforces, and promulgates this freedom. In short, it is the medium where the citizen can be at home. 'Civil society and citizenship went one step ahead of free elections and the market. These are ambitions worth fighting for, and not mere perils to be avoided. These are moral ambitions' (Miszlivetz in Csefkó–Horváth 1999: 4).

Of particular concern is the role as well as the contribution expected of civil society in the East-Central European countries. Civil society in the communist countries of the eighties represents the medium of self-organizations, taking up the role of opposition against the dictatorial state: it stands for the synonym of 'anti-politics', 'parallel polis', and 'the power of the powerless' (György Konrád, Vaclav Havel, Adam Michnik). Civil society in the East-Central European socialist countries was unambiguously reflecting the dictatorial power while embodying the political strategy of resistance. The strategy was elaborated within the framework of the *Solidarity* movement – this momentum is closely intertwined with the role played by J. Kuron and A. Michnik. They set out from the fact that due to the oppressive regime and the overwhelming military power of the Soviet Union there is no prospect for traditional revolutions in the East-Central European region. The regime must be disrupted from the inside: according to their conceived strategy, the exposure of the single-party state requires its ousting from the everyday life. The objective was not to replace the power, but to contain it – Michnik named this strategy new evolutionism.

The sign that distinguishes democratic transitions from revolutions is that these processes are consciously kept within certain limits. Social movements

and their leaders gave evidence of a self-restraining attitude in order to achieve their aims without blood sacrifices. Civil society in East-Central Europe was the means and the purpose of transforming the system at the same time. The concept was used for specifying the existing social actors that represent the civil values against the regime in power.

Civil society in Eastern Europe formulates itself as the political strategy attached to human rights, the sphere for protesting against the oppressing state (Konrád 1986). In the opposition of civil society and state, the former entity has become the means of social self-defence. The opposition intellectuals borrowed the idea of civil society from their Polish colleagues in a critical situation, living in societies that have already used up their reserves. The Polish *Solidarity* movement could not do without self-discipline: avoiding conflicts with the single-party state, non-violence as well as omitting broad social participations and demagogy were of the first magnitude. The polysemantic concept of civil society, capable of comprising several ambitions from free-market economy to the social self-help of small communities, proved to be a suitable slogan for the union of a wide variety of opposition groupings (Honneth 1993: 26).

Despite its non-violent character, the final goal of the civil societies in the eighties was to overthrow the regime in power and take over the state functions. Such an approach of civil society is both a moral and political utopia; it is more of an ideal and a demand than reality; its essential element is the rejection of power and the awareness of intellectual power (Bodó 2001: 27).

As a response to the signs of change, the concept of civil society tended to become a political utopia by the second half of the eighties: certain elements became overemphasized, such as the need of direct participation as compared to understanding democracy based on party pluralism. The paradox of democratic transition is that, in case of a success, society gets rid of the previous regime, but this process of transformation is more of an exceptional condition that makes real historical action possible for the broad sections of society. We can talk about a successful transition when society demonstrates its power but it does not avail itself of it. Even though the role played by society is highly relevant in the democratic transition, it still remains symbolic.

In formulating his interpretation of freedom, István Bibó comes upon the idea of 'the small circles of freedom', often quoted in the literature on civil society. According to Bibó, modern freedom has evolved from the earlier versions of self-governance, certain privileges, and the small circles of freedom, and first of all indicates that political power is no more independent from the citizens, but civil consent is part of its conditionality. Power is not a personal domination but an impersonal service that cannot be monopolized by anyone or anything (Bibó 1947).

There was no democratic political culture and none such could possibly develop on the Balkans before 1989. Opposition to dictatorship received no

publicity whatsoever and the processes got under way with difficulty. Civil societies were mostly treated with distrust and doubt in these countries. The mental preconditions for change were not (yet) developed. The situation had been changing then for quite a while: after 1990, civil status in the region stood for the need of a change in mentality regarding the political, legal, economic, and every other kind of field, sometimes requiring the mutual crossing of civil and political boundaries from both directions. Despite that civil society is still underdeveloped and sparsely present in this region, today, we can talk about civil society (although it varies between countries) on the Balkans, too.

Civil society has a different face in every era. Nowadays, in the new medieval atmosphere of general fragmentation, there is a growing demand for 'home' and for belonging somewhere. As soon as it turned out that democracy and market economy are not in the position to offer a home, the focus of the research is transposed towards the fine fabrics of society, towards the world of identification, culture, and values. The concepts were to be fine-tuned.

Ferenc Miszlivetz's opinion may be regarded as a conclusion: he argues that the recurring motif in the critiques of civil society is mystification, having plenty of unrealistic expectations (the synonym for: progress, combating inequalities, and a good society in general) attached to it while also considered some sort of a panacea, the current bright side. Thus, the concept is involuntarily homogenized, loses its dynamic and contradictory character, its vividness. Unrealistic expectations are followed by disappointment: civil society does not live up to the expectations, which entails the usual bottom-line: one cannot do anything about it; it is useless; we should forget about it (Miszlivetz in Csefkó-Horváth 1999).

There are three main possible roles that assign the future duties to civil society structures (voluntary associations, networks, and social movements): protesting potential, initiation of critical discourses, and the social control of power functions. Social democratization is a process: we can never declare that it has come to an end. Therefore, the concept of civil society can be captured much more through the interactions of the various forms of organization instead of a single special organizational form (Alexander 1998).

The above interpretations do not allow for a uniform definition regarding the term of civil society; therefore, the authors either resort to formulating their own definitions or they just stick to one to their liking. In what follows, we will rely on Andrew Arató's definition: modern civil society is made up of the various forms of civil initiatives and self-organizations, which are institutionalized by the legal system that guarantees the promotion of basic human rights while also respecting social diversity. Civil organizations mediate between the state and its citizens as well as between the economic power and the citizens. The determinant momentum, the 'essence' of civil society is publicity, the public critical discourse (Arató 1999).

Due to reflexivity, heterogeneity, and an equal participation, the concept of civil society is unavoidably of contradictory nature. The organizational forms of civil society, the networks, carry out their activities, struggle, debate, and campaign, just like the multiple forms of voluntary associations. Civil society operators must also tackle the permanent contradiction between democratic participation and expeditious decision-making. They have to face the continuously threatening alternative of bureaucracy-co-optation or liquidation-disintegration. Therefore, fragility, provisionality, and existential vulnerability are constant attributes attached to the social phenomenon known by the name of civil society.

## 2. Civil Function – Minority Environment

Prior to dealing with the topic of civil function, let us consider what different authors and spiritual tendencies understand by civil society organization. First of all, a remark needs to be made: there is a full confusion of ideas. The denotation of civil society itself is not unambiguous because of its various interpretations by countries. The most relevant characteristic features of civil organizations are: institutional status, independence, prohibition of profit sharing, self-governance, and volunteering.

Denotations that may occur in different publications: NGO, third sector, non-profit, civil sector. NGO (non-governmental organizations) is the most inclusive denotation since it comprises all non-state organizations, including interest representation bodies as well (trade unions, employer representations, and professional chambers). We can usually come across the term of third sector in the American literature, where they use it as a distinguishing denomination from the other two economic spheres, the state/government and the business sector. The 'non-profit' label picks out a single important feature of civil organizations, namely the prohibition of profit sharing. In its 1997 reflection document, the European Committee refers to civil organizations as 'voluntary organizations and associations' (Geszti 2003: 84). The name of organizations, again, does not lead us to a common position of principle since the German 'Verein' (association) and 'Stiftung' (foundation), the French 'économie sociale' (social economy), the English 'public charities', the American 'non-profit sector', and the East-Central European 'foundation' differ from one another not just from a linguistic but also from a conceptual point of view. The French social economic sector includes co-operative societies, savings banks, and insurance companies, which are not considered part of the non-profit or the voluntary sector in other countries.

However, this chaos also comes with a certain freedom in the choice of names: when choosing the proper name, we tend to focus on the features that deserve special emphasis. If the existence and nature of civil initiatives are to be the focal

point, then we use the term of civil society. The same feature is highlighted by the names of stand-alone/voluntary organizations and civil self-organizations. Inasmuch as the main point is to indicate the separation from the state and politics, the appropriate denotation will be non-governmental organization. Should our name include the term of non-profit, then we indicate the significance of the prohibition of profit sharing. Unlike the other terms, we can attach a place of origin to the appearance of the third sector: it was introduced by the researchers of John Hopkins University, USA, once they recognized the economic importance of this evolving sphere and its manageability as an independent sector at the same time. This term lays stress upon the appearance of civil organizations as an independent sector. Politically, the civil – non-profit, or *public* (with a Hungarian turn of phrase) – sector may be discussed in the context of the bourgeois/civil society, while in economic terms the division denotes for-profit/non-profit sectors. This is how the denotations of non-profit and non-governmental are formed. The EU Committee defines the categories of voluntary organizations according to the functions fulfilled by them as follows:[2] service providers, interest representation bodies, self-helping organizations, mutual support groups, and organizations co-ordinating resources and resource allocations. It can be stated that the narrower is the geographical and subjective scope of a voluntary organization's activity, the wider variety of functions are integrated therein, and the more difficult becomes the separation of the single functions within the organization.

Considering the characteristic features of civil society, the following major roles can be assigned: mediation between the public and private sphere, ensuring social control, representing the interests of social-professional groups, and serving public welfare in accordance with the self-organizing needs of the society. There are some who tend to point out the role of civil society in democratization.[3] G. White (2007), quoted by M. Walzer, sums it up in four points as follows: 1) civil society shifts the balance between state and society for the favour of the latter. For instance: the civil organizations and movements create the space free from central control. 2) Civil society controls and supervises the state through the public's regard of public morality and of the justification of political decisions. In this case, the purpose is the politicians' and the government officials' accountability. 3) Civil society can act as an important mediator between state and society whenever it comes to negotiations between government institutions and certain social groups. 4) Civil society can increase the number of processes and institutions, which may help the democratic institutions and certain processes already set in motion to address the new challenges in a legitimate and predictable manner.

2 See *Az EU Bizottságának közleménye az önkéntes szervezetek és alapítványok szerepének erősítéséről*. Európa Ház, Budapest, 1998.

3 See M. Walzer: A civil szféra, és társadalomban betöltött szerepe. www.policy.hu/flora/miacivilszfera.htm.

There are certain authors who tend to discuss the roles and functions of civil society under one roof – in all probability, without any reason. While role implies expectations and established social norms, function is understood as purpose – the former concept is determined externally, the latter internally. Éva Kuti defines three categories for the role-function duet: roles and functions of social character, of economic character, and of socio-economic character at the same time (Kuti 1998).

Charles Taylor presents us three interpretations of the civil sphere: (1) Civil society in the minimal sense can be found with open organizations, which are not under state authority. (2) We can talk about civil society in the strict sense, where the society has the ability to build itself up as a whole; it can direct and coordinate its activities through open organizations. (3) The third interpretation is actually an alternative for the second one: we can talk about civil society anywhere, where the totality of associations can exert a relevant influence on government policy. Taylor presumes that civil sphere and the generally admitted definition of civil society will have a great impact both on our perspectives related to open society and our political practice (Taylor 1995).

The functions of civil society can be summarized as follows (Siegel–Yancey 1993):

– allows for the reflection and active approach of the various complex needs emerging in the society;

– stimulates the individuals to act as citizens in all aspects of social life instead of becoming dependent on it;

– promotes social plurality and diversity through, for instance, safeguarding and enhancing cultural, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and other identities;

– creates the mechanisms that allow for the public to call the government and market operators to account.

After all, civil organizations encourage active citizenship as well as educate the citizens and the new civil society thereby.

Ernest Gellner highlights the importance of control function and argues that civil society is the sum total of the non-governmental organizations that are powerful enough to counterbalance government authority (Gellner 2004).

The image of civil society gets further complicated if we are to analyse the civil society of national minorities. There are some of the above-quoted functions – the last one in the Siegel-Yancey list – that may seem highly unrealistic in a minority situation: minorities are incapable of thematizing the public majority in such a manner and with such intensity that the government or any other public actor could perceive it as a case of a community liability. If the scope of activity of a minority organization is not specifically minority-oriented and it is not linked to safeguarding cultural, ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other types of identities, then certain reactions may be expected – for instance, in the case of an environmental

issue – in the public sphere that can be seen as an actual liability. However, in this case, the civil organization is primarily environmental, and the fact that its (founding) members belong to a national minority is only a secondary feature.

Therefore, of primary concern is the kind of organizations that make up the minority civil society. The answer comes in handy: organizations established by members of a minority group or other individuals who – in their role determination – specify certain situations/dilemmas/ambitions linked to minority status as their top priority. In so far as we agree that civil society is the school of democracy (the issue and ability of self-organizations, promotion of interests and values), minority civil organizations are those whose ambition is serving the minority community. Although this issue might cause further dilemmas – given the fact that serving minority community cannot be conceived within the respective minority alone but also by stimulating and shaping the majority–minority dialogue –, our analysis considers minority (i.e. Hungarians, Germans, Serbians, etc. in Romania) organizations as such whose programmes are in the service of their respective minority, and they act in behalf thereof. In addition, their actions must aim to safeguard and strengthen the relevant elements of the respective community's identity. This civil sphere is called a self-building civil society.

In terms of civil society and civil organizations, independence and self-governance were considered relevant features. A good while ago (approx. ten years), it was formulated the dilemma in respect of the Hungarian civil society in Romania as to whether we can talk about an authentic Hungarian civil society in Romania which is capable of clearly articulating its ambitions and duties as well as carrying them out consistently (Bodó 2002). There was also a debate organized around the subject-matter, and those answering in the negative supported their position emphasizing the lack of the control function of the Hungarian minority civil society.

Minority civil society, inasmuch as it acts along the above option, and turns inwards, towards its community, gives up on formulating relevant messages towards the government and central politics in general, then – although not communicated – we believe that it accepts the very absence of the control function and its aborted nature, as the moral content represented by civil society is culturally conditioned.

Let us have a look at the concept of minority society. Ethnic communities living in minority are quite frequently discussed/debated in the context of society, while not even the concept of minority society is sufficiently clarified. Can we talk about society when its relevant institutes, although in the service of the community, are in a manner of speaking 'gateway institutes', or representative bodies? The term gateway indicates that although we talk about a minority school or theatre, it is also part of the institutional system pertaining to the majority society, constantly living up to a double expectation. On the other hand, representation refers to acting in behalf of minority values in various – majority – contexts.

In a minority status, the principle that different (political, economic, and civil) sectors fulfil separate function suffers damage. There are plenty of meaningful examples of this, which can perfectly illustrate the minority status. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) is the political representative of the Hungarians living in Romania – it acts as a party in the Romanian political system. In legislation, it represents the interests of the Hungarian minority, often acting as a partner in a government coalition. It also appears as a party in the international community when its representatives manage to get in the European Parliament or when it becomes the member of an international alliance. It is legally registered as a civil association, according to the Romanian laws: it was registered according to the Associations Act, which should include it into the civil sector. In certain cases, it makes use of this 'identity' as a reference: for instance, when it receives the financial instruments adjudged for the ethnic minority community from the national budget or when it administers these funds. However, the situation is even more complicated as the 1993 internal structural reforms of the DAHR anticipate the alliance as the local government of the Hungarian community in Romania, and the organizational structure was built on the local government model during several years to come. Although certain changes have occurred in this respect, the idea itself, the self-rating as local community government is still reflected here and there in the organizational documents. In such situations, civil organizations fall short of meeting the basic requirements to take up the role of the political elite and do their share in the government duties – for the DAHR has been a governmental factor in Romania throughout two decades.

An essential dilemma for the minority: who is part of the civil sector and against whom should community interests be represented? Against state and government organizations or the political institutions of the minority community? Furthermore, independence can only be mentioned within certain limits since one of the managers of the financial assistance that fall to the share of/are due to civil society is DAHR, with its politically unclarified status. Certain authors mention a triple dependence of the minority civil organizations:[4] regarding financial assistance, they depend on the political representation of the Hungarian community; they further depend on the Romanian governmental entities, and the third type of dependency is formed towards the government bodies of the motherland, which is also an opportunity.

4 See the discussions in the journal *Magyar Kisebbség* 2002/3.

## Conclusions

Civil society as a phenomenon is difficult to analyse. Yet, more difficult is the task when the research is focused on an ethno-civil society. There are several questions that have to be answered: can we find a definition for ethno-civil society? If we can, then what NGOs are part of it, as this is the civil society they are shaping? How can we add to this knowledge about the Hungarian minority civil society in Transylvania?

Theoretical research as well as analysing the issues around minority civil society have to be carried on for it has not yet been found a common ground accepted by most researchers. The sociological surveys also need to be continued so that we can further monitor the civil societies of the democratizing countries.

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# The Transylvanian Party between 1940 and 1944 A Brief History

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**Abstract.** The paper deals with the theme of the Transylvanian Party [Erdélyi Párt], one of the most important Hungarian political formations in Transylvania in the 20th century. After the reintegration of Northern Transylvania in the Hungarian state following the Second Vienna Arbitration, Hungarians became a majority in the region, established their own political party, the Transylvanian Party, with powerful local characteristics. The paper concentrates on the analysis of the Transylvanian Party, it presents its foundation, its representation in the Hungarian Parliament, and its relations with the Hungarian government. The paper tries to give an overview of the successes and failures of the party as well. Finally, the decline of the Transylvanian Party and its political heritage are presented. The source material of the paper consists of archival data, publications of the Transylvanian Party, special books, studies, articles of the contemporary press, and on-line publications.

**Keywords:** Second Vienna Arbitration, Northern Transylvania, integration, Transylvanian Party, members, local branches, deputies, parliament, party politics, political co-operation

The first steps to an independent Hungarian political life in Transylvania were taken at he beginning of the 19th century, in the so-called 'Age of Reforms'. In these times, Hungarian leaders from Transylvania made speeches against Metternich's Regime and the Austrian domination at County Assemblies or Transylvanian Diets. But an autonomous Transylvanian Hungarian Party had not been founded yet. The situation did not change after the formation of the Austrian–Hungarian Monarchy in 1867 either, and the Hungarian deputies from Transylvania took part in large national parties: the 1848 Independence Party (48-as Függetlenségi Párt) or the Party of Free Principles (Szabadelvű Párt), trying to support the interests of their region in the Hungarian Parliament.

A modern, independent Transylvanian Hungarian political life could have begun only after the separation from the Hungarian state. The Treaty of

Trianon made possible for the Transylvanians the creation of their own political formations, and, at the same time, it created an impresive need for these. The Hungarians became minoriy in the Transylvanian region, and could preserve their community in political unity only by this way. Besides this, it was a necessity to incorporate the 1.6 million Hungarian community in the Romanian political life.

In these circumstances, the Transylvanian Hungarian politics was born at the beginnings of the 1920s, by creating its independent political parties. On 5 June 1921, the Hungarian Peoples' Party (Magyar Néppárt) was established at the initiation of Károly Kós (Mikó 1987: 23), and after a short while, on 12 February 1922, the Hungarian National Party [Magyar Nemzeti Párt] was founded, led by Emil Grandpierre (Toth 2008: 26). But these were only temporary formations. The most important political party of the inter-war period was the National Hungarian Party (Országos Magyar Párt), which started its activity on 28 December 1922, under the leadership of Count Dr György Bethlen. This important party represented the Hungarian minority in the Romanian Parliament for almost two decades (Toth 2008: 99–202).

The new regime of royal dictatorship in Romania, instated in February 1938, transformed the Transylvanian Hungarian political circumstances. The National Hungarian Party, together with all of other political parties in Romania, was dissolved on 31 March 1938 by a royal regulation (Diószegi 1990: 39). Its place was taken over by a new minority formation, which incorporated the whole Hungarian community from Romania without taking into consideration the different political orientations of the people. The leader of this new national organization became the former Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Miklós Bánffy (L. Balogh, 2012). The new formation called Hungarian People's Community (Romániai Magyar Népközösség) was established on 11 February 1939 as the only Hungarian political party in Romania, but without real independence because it was nothing more than a department of the Romanian mass party, the Front of National Renaissance (Frontul Renaşterii Naţionale) (Hámori 2004: 69–75).

In this way, when the Second Vienna Award came into effect on 30 August 1940, in Transylvania, there did not exist any regional Hungarian political party, only a centralized, national mass organization without real social and ideological basis. But the idea of a Transylvanian Hungarian independent party with powerful regional characteristics – like Bethlen's National Hungarian Party was – still existed.

Following the German–Italian arbitration on 30 August 1940, the new Hungarian–Romanian border divided the historical Transylvanian region in two in such a way that 47.6% of its territory was taken under Hungarian rule and the other 52.4% remained under Romanian control (Korom 1988: 170). The Northern part of Transylvania as well as the Partium, Szeklerland, and Maramureş regions were given back to Hungary (L. Balogh 2002: 5). The total reannexed territory was 43,104 km$^2$ (Thirring 1940: 663), with a very mixed population. According to the 1941

Hungarian census, there was a Hungarian majority of 52.1% in a population of 2,557,000 people. The Romanian population comprised 41.5% (Fogarasi 1944: 4). Besides the 1,380,000 Hungarian inhabitants, there were 1,057,000 Romanians and 44,000 Germans living in this territory (Ablonczy 2011: 47). However, according to Romanian data, 50.2% of the population was Romanian and only 37.1% Hungarian (Aurică 1996: 363). We have to mention that at the same time approximately 440,000 Hungarians remained under Romanian rule in Southern Transylvania, from which in half a year after the Vienna Arbitration, until April 1941, almost 80,000 people crossed the new border to Northern Transylvania. In this way, only 363,000 native Hungarians remained in Southern Transylvania, forming 11% of the whole 3.3 million population of the region (L. Balogh–Bárdi 2008: 162).

In these circumstances, the Hungarian People's Community divided into two, and the local organization of it in Northern Transylvania was soon dissolved. Its Southern Transylvanian part could continue its activity, but only as a social charity organization, without any real political power.

The new borders satisfied neither the Hungarians nor the Romanians. In these circumstances, the division of the historical region of Transylvania, made by great powers without asking the two parts and without resolving the minority issue, could not be a definitive solution to the problem. The territory of Northern Transylvania, with a mainly mixed population, set hard tasks for the Hungarian government as well as for the Transylvanian politicians as to how to organize the political representation of the local population.

It was impossible to hold parliamentary elections because the last ones were held only one year and a few months before, on 28–29 May 1939 (Filep 2008: 155), and the political parties were against new elections in order to preserve their positions (Romsics 2003: 226). The idea of new elections would have favoured only the Hungarian extreme right.

In order to solve the problem, Prime Minister Pál Teleki called for a Cabinet meeting in Budapest on 25 September 1940. They discussed the bill regarding the annexations of the regained territories. They put together a list of names, following the Prime Minister's lead, of those people who would represent Northern Transylvania in the Hungarian Parliament.[1] The government decided to co-opt the Parliament with political representatives of the re-annexed territories by invitation. This was a solution applied after the former territorial reannexations in 1938 (southern part of Slovakia) and 1939 (region of Subcarpathian Rus – today Zakarpattia Oblast), when the Hungarian Parliament was completed by 38 new deputies, mostly Hungarians from these territories (Dobszay et al. 1998: 144).

Those who were chosen as new Transylvanian deputies were only Hungarians. According to Law XXVI of 1940 (Egry 2008: 29), those invited would be those

1 Teleki, Pál. 1940: Erdélyi feladatok (Transylvanian Duties). *Ellenzék*, 21 September 1940: LXI. 217: 1–2.

who had protected successfully the interests of the Hungarians in royal Romania. Thus, the leading politicians of the former National Hungarian Party became members of the Chamber of Deputies in the Hungarian Parliament. Among the fifty Transylvanian Hungarian deputies, twenty seven were former leading members of the National Hungarian Party. Besides György Bethlen, we could mention Dezső Albrecht, István Angi, Árpád Árvay, Artúr Balogh, Ignác Bartha, László Bethlen, Zoltán Bölöni, Gyula Deák, Géza Ember, Albert Figus, József György, Ákos Hinléder-Fels, Gábor Jodál, Ferenc Kölcsey, Gusztáv Kövér, Dezső László, Árpád Paál, Gábor Páll, Károly Pakocs, Ákos Székely, Béla Szentkereszty, Olivér Szilágyi, Ernő Teleki, Mihály Toldalaghy, Andor Török, and Gábor Tusa (Egry 2008: 30). Most of the politicians who had collaborated with the Romanian authorities by taking part in the Hungarian People's Community were left out of the invited deputies. Among them, there were well-known personalities of the Transylvanian Hungarian public life such as Károly Kós or Áron Tamási (Balázs 2003: 300).

The invited group of deputies were young, socially sensitive intellectuals who had effectively activated in the youth movements and had been generally known to reject the extreme right ideas (Balázs 2004: 99). Leading personalities from Transylvanian social-economic organizations were also invited. The most significant among them was Count Béla Teleki, Vice-President of the Transylvanian Hungarian Economic Association [Erdélyi Magyar Gazdasági Egyesület], who became later the leader of the Transylvanian Party (Tibori Szabó 1993: 5). The invited Transylvanian deputies were thus of a mixed type: while some were active politicians, others were young intellectuals or businessmen. At the beginning, the group was disturbed by inner conflicts, mainly because of different views on relationships with the Romanians. Still, the heterogeneous Transylvanian parliamentary panel achieved coherence within a few weeks. The common interest and the enforcement of Northern Transylvanian Hungarian expectations in the Hungarian Parliament pushed into the background the inherited inner conflicts, which were often of a personal character (Murádin 2014: 173).

Besides the fifty seats occupied by Hungarian deputies from Northern Transylvania (Egry 2008: 29–30), the Hungarian government reserved twelve more seats in the Chamber of Deputies for Romanians. But these remained unoccupied. The same situation was repeated in the Upper Chamber, where three seats from the fifteen of Northern Transylvania were reserved for leading Romanian politicians (for example: Iuliu Hossu, Greek Catholic bishop), which also remained unoccupied. During 1941 and 1942, the Hungarian government made some efforts to normalize the situation, but these were rejected every time by the local Romanian leaders, who cited the Romanian government's prohibition as the reason (Ablonczy 2011: 112—113). It has to be mentioned that in the same time the Hungarian community of Southern Transylvania with almost 363,000 people did not have even one deputy in the Romanian

Parliament. The Hungarian politicians from those territories were not invited at all in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies.

The new Northern Transylvanian deputies occupied their seats in the Hungarian Parliament on 10th October 1940.[2] At the beginning, they kept away from any Hungarian political party, forming a separate Northern Transylvanian parliamentary group, named officially The Independent Group of Transylvanian Hungarian Deputies (Erdélyi Magyar Képviselők Pártonkívüli Csoportja).[3] This group consisted the basis of the later Transylvanian Party.

The foundations of the party emerged quickly. The Hungarian government needed a brand new, independent Transylvanian Hungarian party to avoid the Hungarian party competition in Northern Transylvania, a region recently regained and having a very mixed population with a slight Hungarian majority. Prime Minister Pál Teleki wanted to strenghten the Hungarian characteristics of the re-integrated territory, and its main political objective was to unify all the political streams in a collective Hungarian party which would be able to support the politics of the Hungarian government. In this way, it became possible to prevent Northern Transylvanians from organizing extreme right political parties, at first the Arrow Cross Party (Nyilaskeresztes Párt) and the Party of Hungarian Renewal (Magyar Megújulás Pártja) (Szász 2012: 101).

In such circumstances, the foundation of an independent Transylvanian Hungarian political party was not an option, but it became a current political requirement initialized by the Hungarian government. The idea of a brand new Transylvanian Hungarian party was accepted by almost all of the Transylvanian deputies. But, anyway, some of the leading Transylvanian political personalities were against it: Count György Bethlen hoped to reestablish the National Hungarian Party from the Inter-war Period, others, such as Áron Tamási, Dezső Albrecht, or Sándor Vita, tried to create a Transylvanian Hungarian Union based on the idea of 'do not make politics: make social construction!' (Ne politizálj: építkezz!).[4] None of this was possible to realize because the majority of the Hungarians from Northern Transylvania assumed the idea of a political party, and the government from Budapest made considerable efforts in order to accelerate the process of a new party foundation.

This was carried out in the following way: the Independent Group of Transylvanian Hungarian Deputies simply assumed the name Transylvanian

2 Erdély képviselőit lelkes ünnepléssel fogadta a parlament (The Parliament welcomed the deputies of Transylvania with enthusiastic celebration). *Ellenzék*, 11 October 1940: LXI. 234: 1.

3 Erdélyi magyar szövetség alakítását kezdeményezik az erdélyi képviselők (The Transylvanian Deputies Initiate the Creation of a Transylvanian Hungarian Union). *Ellenzék*, 19 November 1940: LXI. 265: 8.

4 Dr Mikó, Imre: Zászlót bontott az Erdélyi Párt (The Transylvanian Party has been established). *Ellenzék*, 23 December 1940: LXI. 294: 1.

Party (Erdélyi Párt) at the meeting held between 13 and 15 December 1940,[5] and started to work as a club party (Ablonczy, 2011: 110). Shortly after changing its name, the new political formation built up its system of local organizations in Northern Transylvania between January and May 1941. In this way, the party became a centralized, well-organized political formation, which was created in a unique way, starting out from the Parliament. After all, the Transylvanian Party was highly unusual because it achieved to become part of the Parliament without participating in any of the elections, and its local branches were created by central directives in cooperation with the government from Budapest.

Finally, on 28 May 1941, the Transylvanian Party held its founding general assembly in the capital of Northern Transylvania, Kolozsvár [today: Cluj-Napoca, Romania] (Egry 2008: 35). Here, a party programme was voted and a new, national board of directors was elected. Count Béla Teleki, landlord from Zsibó [today: Jibou, Romania] became the President of the Northern Transylvanian political formation. He was a distant relative of Prime Minister Pál Teleki, who tragically died in the meantime (Ablonczy 2011: 110). Deputy Dezső Albrecht from Bánffyhunyad [today: Huedin, Romania] became the Executive Vice-President of the party; Géza Ember, deputy of Szatmárnémeti [today: Satu Mare, Romania] and József Kolumbán, a lawyer from Csíkszereda [today: Miercurea Ciuc, Romania] were elected as vice-presidents and Deputy Imre Mikó became the general secretary of the Transylvanian Party.[6]

In short time, the party became the most powerful political formation of the eastern part of Hungary. In only a few months, it would dominate ten counties of Northern Transylvania: Szatmár, Szilágy, Bihar, Kolozs, Szolnok-Doboka, Beszterce-Naszód, Maros-Torda, Udvarhely, Csík, and Háromszék. The Northern Transylvanian Hungarians joined the new political formation in large numbers starting from January 1941. The members represented all social classes from the land-owning aristocracy to the middle classes of towns, through the tradesmen and from the working classes to the peasants.

By the founding general assembly in May 1941, the number of party members reached 200,000,[7] and the maximum was reached in January 1942, when the Party had 700 local branches and 243,500 active members (Egry 2008: 44). In December 1943, the Transylvanian Party still had 231,181 members.[8] All the social strata

5 Három napig tartó értekezleten határozták el az erdélyi képviselők az >>Erdélyi Párt<< megalakítását (The Transylvanian Deputies Decided the Creation of the 'Transylvanian Party' in a Three Days' Meeting). *Ellenzék*, 17 December 1940: LXI. 289: 8.

6 Megválasztották a párt országos vezetőségét (The National Leadership of the Party Was Elected). *Kolozsvári Estilap*, 28 May 1941: IX. 121: 6.

7 Ibidem.

8 Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár. Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archives. State Archives – in continuous: HNA. SA). *Teleki Béla iratai 1942–1944* (Documents of Béla Teleki 1942–1944). P 2256. 117. 1. 143. 'Dr Páll György főtitkár jelentése Teleki Béla pártelnöknek' (The Report of General Secretary Dr György Páll to Party Leader Béla Teleki). Cluj, 9 December 1943: 1.

of the Hungarians of the region were represented in the Transylvanian Party, whose sometimes contrary interests had a disruptive force (Balázs 2003: 329–330). Thus, the Transylvanian Party had to make compromises, which made the activity of this political formation more difficult and contributed to the decrease of its flexibility. Even so, the Party was held together by its regional identity, the solidarity of the Transylvanian Hungarians seasoned during minority existence, its Transylvanian viewpoint, which was more sensible to social relationships than the Hungarians in general, and, last but not least, the common demand to rebuild and revitalize the Hungarian character of Transylvania.

The Party was a unique political formation in Hungarian political history. Not only by the special circumstances in which it had been established and not only by its unusual formation process, starting directly from the Chamber of Deputies. It was a special political formation because it was a traditional political party and it functioned as an interest group at the same time. The source of the Party's internal dilemma was that it could not decide whether to be a simple party or a national political organization. Further, it was the only political party of the Hungarians of Transylvania which had been founded in a majority period – from a Hungarian point of view – in Transylvania in the whole of the 20th century. No other Hungarian political party has had such great possibilities in Transilvania to realize their political programme as the Transylvanian Party. Due to the government's support, immediately after its founding, the Party became an organic part of the national political life. Meanwhile, it preserved a lot of regional Transylvanian characteristics based on local political traditions. At the beginning, the Transylvanian Party had three principal roles: to hold together the Northern Transylvanian Hungarians, to represent Northern Transylvanians in the Hungarian Parliament, and to mediate between the local Hungarian, Romanian, German, and Jewish populations and the Hungarian government. Based on these roles, the Transylvanian Party proposed three elementary objectives. These were:

1.) To preserve the political, economic, and cultural unity of the Hungarians in Transylvania;

2.) To rebuild Transylvania in co-operation with the Hungarian government and connect it into the single national circulation;

3.) To serve Hungary's inner change and strengthen it with Transylvanian mentality.[9]

The most important task of the Party was to help the government in its efforts to establish a new, effective minority policy in order to relieve the interethnic

9 *Magyar reformot! Gróf Teleki Béla beszéde az Erdélyi Párt kolozsvári és Kolozs vármegyei tagozatainak 1943. szeptember hó 12-én, Kolozsváron tartott nagyválasztmányi gyűlésén* (Hungarian Reform! Discourse of Count Béla Teleki at the Committee Meeting of the Transylvanian Party's Local Branch of Cluj and County Branch of Cluj Held on 12 September 1943 in Cluj). Kolozsvár: az Erdélyi Párt kiadása. 1943: 16.

tensions of the re-annexed territories. The leaders of the Transylvanian Party, in their concepts and actions on minority issues, often based on their own minority experiences from the period of Romanian rule in the inter-war period, serving as negative models not to be followed. These covered: exclusion of minorities from the political life of the country, impediment of their development, and forced assimilation. Such measures proved to be no solution to the minority problem. That is why the Transylvanian Party worked out new, more effective modalities of a functional minority policy. On the one hand, the inclusion of minorities in the Hungarian political nation and, on the other hand, the consolidation of the Hungarian nation itself in every possible way – political, economic, cultural, and demographic – in order to speed up the natural assimilation process by re-enforcing the attractiveness of the Hungarian nation.[10]

The Transylvanian Party incorporated the majority of the Northern Transylvanian deputies in the Hungarian Parliament between 1940 and 1944. From those 50 deputies invited from the Transylvanian territories re-encorporated by Hungary in 1940, 36 became deputies of the Transylvanian Party. They formed together 9.75% of the whole Chamber of Deputies with 369 members. After the Party of Hungarian Life (Magyar Élet Pártja), the governing political power, which had 214 mandates in May 1941, occupying 58% of the seats in Chamber of Deputies, the Transylvanian Party became the second political party in the Hungarian Parliament immediately after its establishment.

Its relative power in the Hungarian political life had some negative aspects too: it gives an important impetus for the governing party to integrate the Transylvanian Party, putting an end to its independence. Prime ministers László Bárdossy and Miklós Kállay, who were at the same time leaders of the Party of Hungarian Life, tried to reinforce their party with the incorporation of the 'intractable' Transylvanian Party with all of its quarter of a million members (Tibori Szabó 1993: 16). The party fusion could be avoided by the Transylvanian Party, but not the political alliance with the governing party. It was signed on 3 February 1942 in Budapest.[11]

In spite of this close relation with the Party of Hungarian Life, the Transylvanian Party still had primarily Transylvanian characteristics. Its deputies held their speeches in the Parliament mostly on Transylvanian issues: inter-ethnic relations (the situation of the Romanian minority in Northern Transylvania), economic problems (agriculture, industry, trade), infrastructural investments in Northern Transylvania, and especially in Szeklerland (road and railway constructions), social issues (situation of the pensioners), Hungarian cultural politics in

10 *Erdély a magyar Képviselőházban II* (Transylvania in the Hungarian Chamber of Deputies II). Kolozsvár: az Erdélyi Párt kiadása. 1943: 42.

11 HNA. SA. *Teleki Béla iratai 1942–1944* (Documents of Béla Teleki 1942–1944). P 2256. 117. 1. 1. Állásfoglalás [Standpoint]. 3 February 1942: 1.

multiethnic regions of Hungary, special educational problems in Northern Transylvania (the situation of the Hungarian university in Kolozsvár (Cluj-Napoca), state grants for the confessional schools), and the implementation of a main administrative reform. At the level of forreign politics, the Transylvanian Party urged Hungarian–Romanian international negotiations on improving the situation of the Hungarian minority in Southern Transylvania, having remained part of Romania after 1940, and of the Romanian minority under Hungarian rule in Northern Transylvania. The party's deputies tried to influence the relations of Hungary with Germany and Italy, the great powers who signed the Second Vienna Award.[12]

Besides its parliamentary activity, the Transylvanian Party made an institutional connection between the local Hungarian political leaders from Northern Transylvania and the Hungarian government. It was in close relation with ministries, and especially with the Prime Minister's Office, which helped it in the transmission of the local, Transylvanian expectations toward the government. Sometimes the party's interventions were succesful, mostly in special cases, like clerical salaries, state grants for confessional schools, etc.,[13] but in really hard problems, as the general national administrative reform was, the party's influence proved to be insufficient (Tibori Szabó 1993: 15).

The situation of the Transylvanian Party, during all of its four years of functioning, was very delicate. Using the words of Count Béla Teleki, the President of the Party, until the German occupation, the party's situation 'was hard, and then hopelessly impossible' (Tibori Szabó 1993: 16). After losing its remaining sovereignity, as a result of the German aggression on 19 March 1944, Hungary was ruled by the puppet government of Döme Sztójay, former Ambassador to Berlin, which followed Hitler's directives (Romsics 2003: 262). These new conditions put the Transylvanian Party into a very difficult situation. The Party divided into two. Many politicians of the party, led by Sándor Vita and Count Béla Teleki, stepped aside and gave up their parliamentary seats. But other Transylvanian Party deputies, lead by Dezső Albrecht, carried on their work in the Parliament and consistently supported the steps taken by the government. The transformation of the country in a veritable battlefield in late summer 1944, followed by the general suspension of the political activities,[14] made the functioning of the Transylvanian

12 *Erdély a magyar Képviselőházban* (Transylvania in the Hungarian Chamber of Deputies). Kolozsvár: az Erdélyi Párt kiadása. 1942; *Erdély a magyar Képviselőházban II* (Transylvania in the Hungarian Chamber of Deputies II). Kolozsvár: az Erdélyi Párt kiadása. 1943; *Erdély a magyar Országgyűlésen* (Transylvania in the Hungarian Parliament). Kolozsvár: az Erdélyi Párt kiadása. 1944.

13 Az Erdélyi Párt elnöksége a miniszterelnöknél és a kultuszminiszternél (The Presidency of the Transylvanian Party at the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Culture). *Kolozsvári Estilap*, 14 August 1941: IX. 183: 5.

14 HNA. SA. *Teleki Béla iratai 1942–1944* (Documents of Béla Teleki 1942–1944). P 2256. 117. 1. 268. 634/1944. Bizalmas tájékoztató (Confidential Information). 8 June 1944: 1.

Party impossible. It became unable to coordonate its everyday relation with the party members, and the local branches became unoperational. Finally, the decree regarding the dissolution of all political parties issued on 24 August 1944, the second day after Romania changed sides (Ablonczy 2011: 114), led to the total disintegration of the Transylvanian Party.

Taking into consideration that the Transylvanian Party had a very short time of activity, the following question can be asked: does it have any importance to research its history or it has no significance? Has it left behind any political heritage or not? In my oppinion, the Transylvanian Party was an important political formation, which had to be researched. Although it functioned only for four years, it has a great political heritage, which can be classified into five points:

1. Sustenance of the most important Transylvanian regional political traditions after the integration of the territory into the Hungarian state. This means more tolerant minority politics and high-level social sensibility.

2. The idea of realizing an absolute Transylvanian Hungarian political union, with main local characteristics.

3. Need of general social reform realized in a constitutional way.

4. Permanent communication with the Romanian population of Transylvania, in order to reach ethnic conciliation.

5. Abolition of barriers between different social classes and establishment of a truly unified Hungarian nation in order to stop the spread of extreme left or right political ideologies.

These made the Transylvanian Party worthy to research. During the communist age, this was impossible because the Party was seen as one that functioned in 'fascist times'… Until 1989, it was almost forgotten, and unfortunately today it is already impossible to bring it back in all of its aspects. The research work on this theme needs interdisciplinarity. The party could be studied with different methods used in research work in history, anthropology, and sociology. It is important to research into the party's ideology, its parliamentary representation, institutional history, the main characteristics of its leaders, and the different social groups represented in its membership. Realizing the Party's chronology is one of the most interesting tasks. But at the same time it is important to research the Transylvanian Party's relations with other political formations of those times. Some special research works on the Party's minority politics could lead to interesting results.

The study of the Transylvanian Party is quite difficult. Most of the archival data disappeared or were destroyed during the Second World War, and the method of oral history could not be used because of the long time passed since the existence of the Party. In spite of these, a research work is possible by using sporadic archival data and the minutes of the Chamber of Deputies as well as the Party's brochures and the memoirs of its political leaders. The contemporary

Hungarian press, and in some special aspects the on-line databases, proved to be very useful sources.

The realization of a sufficiently detailed research work on the topic of the Transylvanian Party is still a debt to be paid to the Hungarian community of Transylvania. Hopefully, the publication of the author's new book entitled *The History of the Transylvanian Party between 1940 and 1944* will pare down this debt, at least partially.

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# Hungarian Minority Politics in Post-Socialist Romania: Interests, Strategies, and Discourses[1]

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**Abstract.** This paper analyses the integration strategies formulated by the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania and the Hungarian political elite in the post-communist period. It argues that the internal debates of the political community are formulated in a field where other actors (the Hungarian and the Romanian state, political parties, European institutions, etc.) carry out their activities, which deeply influences both the chosen strategies and the needed resources for their implementation. Moreover, it questions the monolithic organization of the minority organization, showing that DAHR as the representative of the minority community was shaped by several internal debates and conflicts. Also from 2003 these conflicts have grown beyond the borders of the organization and since 2008 we can follow a whole new type of institutionalization. In achieving this, I introduce three strategies – individual integration, collective integration, and organizational integration – which are chosen by different fragments of the Hungarian minority elite both toward the Hungarian and the Romanian political sphere. Throughout the 1989–2012 period, the outcome of the conflict between the supporters of these strategies is deeply influenced by the policies of the two states.

**Keywords:** minorities, Hungarians in Romania, elites, post-communism, political mobilization

After the 1989 Revolution, the Hungarian minority in Romania organized itself quickly, the Hungarian elite formed its political organization, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR), right at the peak of the new era. This Organization was the sole representative of the Hungarians of Romania until 2008, still being the most influential organization.

This paper analyses the integration strategies formulated by the DAHR and the Hungarian political elite in the 1989–2012 period, by linking these efforts to the actions of the Hungarian and the Romanian government. It is important to

1 The paper was written within the *Government and Minority Representation in CCE* research programme, financed by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund.

underline that these strategies and interests of a minority community are neither constant nor unified. First, the internal debates of the political community are formulated under the influence of other actors (the Hungarian and the Romanian state, political parties, European institutions, etc.) and, second, the DAHR as the representative of the minority community is not a monolithic organization – its 22 years of existence were shaped by several internal debates and conflicts. Also from 2003 these conflicts have grown beyond the borders of the organization and since 2008 we can follow a whole new type of institutionalization.[2] In the paper, I present three integration models that have influenced the formulated strategies of the Hungarian community toward the Hungarian and Romanian state and I argue that the supporters of these strategies were constantly competing for power positions, and their success is determinatively influenced by the changes within Hungarian and Romanian state politics. Consequently, the success of different actors within the minority political field is determined by their adaptability to these changes.

I have chosen to analyse the 1989–2012 period because of two reasons. First, the post-2012 period opens up new processes both within the Hungarian minority's relationship with the Hungarian and the Romanian government, but as these do not comprise in a completed cycle it seemed logical to close the analysis in 2012.[3] Second, as the paper is aimed more at how interest is constructed and how the political field of the two involved states influence it, the inclusion of the post-2012 period would not change the argument substantially.

From methodological point of view, I critically analyse the existing secondary literature and I process interviews conducted with Hungarian local and national political elite in 2006, 2012, and 2016. Also, in my analysis, I use primary sources such as documents and memoirs.

In order the grasp both the internal diversity of the Hungarian political community and the possible external influences, I use Rogers Brubaker's 'triadic nexus' theory (Brubaker 1996: 55–76) as an analytical framework, which would allow the usage of both internal and external relational approaches. Analysed this way, the internal political debates, decisions, expectations, and strategies developed within the DAHR and the Hungarian political community are framed by events occurred in the Hungarian and Romanian political spheres. These events shape the context of the decisions, forcing the actors representing the minority to adapt their strategies to the new situation. This view is not novel to the literature dealing with the future of the Hungarian political community in

2 In 2003, the internal opposition left the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania forming a new Hungarian political party, the Hungarian Civic Party, in 2008. In 2011, a third party, the Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania (HPPT) is founded.

3 A good analysis that tries to grasp these changes from the Hungarian–Romanian relations' point of view is Kiss & Székely's 2016 work.

Romania (Kántor 2002, Salat 2003), but a coherent analysis from this perspective has not been conceived as yet.

The article is organized as follows. The first section clarifies the most important aspects of the triadic nexus theory developed by Brubaker, presenting its shortcomings as well. The second section presents three models of integration that were used by the Hungarian political elite in Romania in their relationship with Hungary and the Romanian political sphere. The third section emphasizes the contextual character of these strategies, demonstrating how the changes within these latter spheres cause changes within the power structures of the minority field.

## I. The Triadic Nexus as a Possible Analytical Framework

In Central and Eastern Europe, at the dawn of the post-socialist transition, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, nationalism and claims for national minority rights dominated public discourse and ethnic conflicts emerged in several of the democratizing states. In order to shape the research on these processes, Rogers Brubaker developed a widely usable and intuitive analytical framework, which could not only explain the nature of the conflicts but shifted the focus from nations and ethnic groups 'as real entities, as communities, as substantial, enduring collectivities' (Brubaker 1996: 13) to the relational and institutional aspect of group formation and group identification process.

In the triadic nexus, the initial point of departure is a system with three actors: two states and a national minority which is linked to one state by citizenship and to the other by culture. The members of the minority experience opposite processes: on the one hand, the nationalizing nationalism of the state where they live in and the unifying nationalism of their national homeland, on the other. Therefore, a triadic nexus is formed, where the strategies and decisions of each actor are influenced by the other two actors' behaviour.

Brubaker does not conceive the states and the national minority as compact groups or fixed entities, but changing and ever-redefined political fields, which accommodate to the situation.[4] The national minority, for example, is a 'dynamical political stance', which, on the one hand, needs a 'public claim', a formulation of the minority as a category, and the presence of a group of people, who identify themselves with this category. On the other hand, it assumes the existence of an elite that can formulate claims on political and cultural rights in the name of the 'group'. From this perspective, the national minority is 'a field of differentiated positions and stances adopted by different organizations, parties, movements, or individual

4 Brubaker rejects those who make the unit of their analysis the groups themselves, labelling these approaches as groupisms (Brubaker 2004: 3–10).

political entrepreneurs, each seeking to represent the minority (…) each seeking to monopolize the legitimate representation of the group' (Brubaker 1996: 60–62).

Similarly, the nationalizing state has as objective the formation of a nation-state. The process of nation building requires concrete political decisions and programmes from in-state actors. Therefore, these actions are not directed by the state itself but by actors that are legitimate representatives of the state. A state does not become nationalizing only if it declares such intentions and conducts activities that can be considered nationalizing or if these activities are considered nationalizing by the other actors involved (Brubaker 1996: 63–66).

The kin-state can be considered a dynamic political stance as well. This status is conditioned by a declaration of interest in the kin-state role and by decisions, strategies, and types of behaviour that have as objective to support the national minority. Within the homeland, as a political field, different policies, strategies, and declarations compete for how the involvement should look like. Some would even negate the necessity of support, while others could urge even the outbreak of an armed conflict (Brubaker 1996: 66–67).

An important specificity of the model is that the above presented dynamical fields are in interaction. They not only influence each other but a decision in one of them can change the whole internal dynamics of the other two (Brubaker 1996: 68). In other words, for example, the radicalization of the actions in one field not only forces the other fields to react but it could generate internal movement in all of them that would change the internal hierarchies and strategies.

The 'triadic nexus' became an important explanatory framework of the Central and Eastern European conflicts and nationalism, but as a result of its broad usage several important critiques were formulated.

One of the major critiques is related to its operational difficulties. As Vello Pettai points out in a review of three books that use the triadic nexus as their methodological framework, most of the authors use only a 'conventional understanding' of the model, ignoring the inner dynamics of the involved fields, which would allow the understanding of how the perceptions and positions of some actors form or change (Pettai 2007: 134).

Another critic argues that Brubaker does not deliver any guidance on how one can decide if a state is 'nationalizing' or not. In other words, which are the criteria of the nationalizing stance, what policies, decisions or strategies come into consideration (Wolczuk 2010: 676). In a latter paper, Brubaker answers some of the critiques, underlying the consequences and the nature of the involved fields. He redefines the concept of 'nationalizing state' by drawing attention to the fact that it cannot be grasped by criteria and characteristics: 'First, the concept of nationalizing states is not a theory. It does not enable one to predict *how nationalizing* states will be or – more interestingly – *how* they will be *nationalizing*. Second, the concept of nationalizing states is not a device for

classifying states as nationalizing or non-nationalizing…' (Brubaker 2011: 1807). The concept is only an analytical category, which assumes the appearance of some specific political and discursive processes. Therefore, the state can become both the agent and the subject of the nationalizing project: the agent, through its representatives and political institutions, and its subject from the perspective of the population, which is 'undergoing' nationalization (Brubaker 2011: 1808).

This paper focuses only on one of the fields: the national minority stance. My goal is to present its relation to the other two fields, emphasizing the internal changes that can be linked to outside transformations. In other words, I try to explain the changing aspects of the minority strategies and internal power relations with the help of external factors. Although this approach is inevitably one-sided as it does not address the possible changes within the politics of the kin-state and the nationalizing state as a result to the minority decisions, it reveals new features on the transformation of the political representation of the Hungarian minority in Romania.

## II. Three Models of Political Integration

In the following section, I present three models of integration – individual integration, organizational integration, and collective integration – that were used by the Hungarian political elite in the past 22 years in order to pursue the interests of the Hungarian community in its relationship with Hungary and Romania. Before moving on, three comments need to be made. First, the ones presented are not the only existing strategies within the Hungarian community in the analysed period, but these can be considered the dominant ones, consequently the others may be disregarded. Second, I do not intend to introduce an accurate history of the events that took place, but I seek to present a possible typology from three perspectives: what objectives, strategies, and discourse characterize them and how its presence changed the internal power relations and hierarchies of the minority. Third, I explain how these models influenced the internal debates of the Hungarian community and how their success or failure is conditioned by the outside influence of the nationalizing state and kin-state.

### 1. The Individual Integration Model

The 1980s in Romania were one of the darkest periods of the century for Hungarians as they had to endure both the tyranny of the totalitarian state and the national-communist politics of the Romanian Communist Party (Gilberg 1990, King 1980, Verdery 1991). In this context, minority rights were out of the question as survival and keeping the national identity of minorities was at

stake.[5] Consequently, Hungarians were under-represented in the structures of the Communist Party and by the middle of the 1980s only a few were named in responsible positions on national or county level. Moreover, those who managed to keep their position could not represent efficiently and openly the interests of the Hungarian community.[6]

Despite all the attempts, the communist system could not destroy in totality the reproduction of the Hungarian community in Romania. In the 1980s, several underground journals appeared and the members of the cultural elite tried to cope with the situation by meeting small informal societies, where the most important problems of the Hungarian minority where discussed.[7] Also, the function of identity reproduction was filled by the cultural elite, who formulated messages relevant from communitarian and identity formation perspective through literature, theatre, and journalism, on a metaphorical voice. Lőrincz D. József called this strategy ambivalent discourse, where the language of Marxist-Leninist discourse was kept, but the message was nationally altered (Lőrincz 2004: 68–88). The usage of ambivalent discourse therefore not only contributed decisively to the reproduction of identity but it was used by the members of the elite to keep their legitimacy in spite of the positions filled in the communist regime.

After 1989, the same cultural elite was the one organizing the Hungarian community. Within a week after the revolution, local DAHR organizations were formed in many of the Hungarian-inhabited cities, and the national organization was founded in Bucharest by a small group of intellectuals. It is clear that in the first few months the dominant groups, which started building the organization on local and national level, were those who managed to convert their cultural capital gathered in the communist era into a political and social one. The other group which managed to seize power were the dissidents, which was formed of persons who actively resisted the communist regime or participated in the anti-communist uprising, gathering a considerable amount of symbolic capital as a result of their action.[8] Although the engagement of the cultural elite in post-communist transition is not uncommon to the Central and Eastern European countries (Bozóki 1999, Tismăneanu 2005, Wasilewski & Wnuk-Lipiński 2001), in our case, it differs in three ways. First, the Hungarian cultural elite in Romania is the only motor of transformation, while in other cases (the national elites in Hungary, Czechoslovakia,

5 The repressive policies involved the degradation of the minority educational system (Vincze 1998), the persecution of the minority elite, discrimination in language use, and employment policy (Salat et al. 2008).

6 Partial results could be achieved in book publishing, where the members of the elite used their own network and social capital in order to prevent censorship of books considered to be important. About these activities, see the memoirs of Géza Domokos, Director of Kriterion Publishing House in the 1980s and the first President of the DAHR (Domokos 1996: 56–57).

7 On these journals and societies, see Salat et al. 2008: 51.

8 The most eloquent example of this category is László Tőkés, the Protestant priest from Timişoara, whose actions led to the outburst of the 1989 Revolution. See Ratesh 1991.

Poland, or even Romania) it is only one of the groups who came to power. Second, as presented above, the Hungarian cultural elite in Romania had a singular pathway in the communist era (individual integration and ambivalent discourse), while many of the members of the cultural elite in CEE countries were dissidents and open opponents of the communist system. Third, the Hungarian cultural elite in Romania did not seek power in the classical sense, they only organized politically the Hungarian minority and formulated their claims.

The DAHR formulated its claims in its first documents: internal self-determination of the Hungarians in Romania and collective rights (Bakk 1999). Their optimism was backed up by the Romanian state and the politics of the National Salvation Front, which committed itself to resolving the problem of minorities in a declaration (January 6, 1990). However, the optimistic atmosphere of the first weeks was gradually repressed by the changing politics of Iliescu's National Salvation Front. Starting from February 1990, propaganda against the Hungarians and the newly formed democratic parties was growing. The situation peaked in March, when an interethnic conflict between Hungarians and Romanians broke out in Târgu-Mureş, a split city of 50 percent Romanians and 50 percent Hungarians, ending up in a large number of casualties.[9] Most of the political analyses of the period agree that the nationalizing politics of the state was used by the Iliescu regime to strengthen its legitimacy and to 'take out' its potential challengers in the upcoming elections in May 1990.[10]

In this context of euphoria and deception, the leaders of the DAHR, both on the local and the national level, chose similar strategies in order to pursue the perceived interests of the Hungarian community. I named this individual integration model. At the basis of the model are the strategies adapted from the communist period: individual integration in power structures and the use of both their position-given power and network to change the decision-making process in their favour. In Transylvania, most National Salvation Front councils[11] had Hungarian members, while Iliescu invited three of the prominent Hungarian intellectuals – Géza Domokos, László Tőkés, and Károly Király – to take part in the activities on national level. In order to back up this statement, I present an important example. In its programme, the DAHR formulated the need of collective rights, but their first and most important official claim was the restoration of the

9 On the riots in Târgu-Mureş, see Stroschein 2012: 94–123 or László & Novák 2012.

10 Alina Mungiu, in a book written on the Romanian transition, presents in detail the propaganda mechanism of the Front. She argues that by controlling the mass media and by taking advantage of the lack of democratic political culture of the population Iliescu managed to seize power, but in order to mask the growing number of economic and social problems he needed to divert attention from these issues (Mungiu 1995).

11 The National Salvation Front was formed as the provisional ruling body after the revolution, but it gradually changed into a political party. In February, when Iliescu announced that the Front will transform into a political party, the rule was transferred to Provisional Councils of National Unity (proto-parliament on the national and proto-councils on the local level).

Hungarian educational system, which was abolished by the previous regime.[12] In order to achieve this goal, the Hungarian leaders resorted to their social and cultural capital. Géza Domokos, President of the DAHR, relied on his membership in the Front and his personal friendship with President Iliescu to convince the Romanian authorities, while the Hungarians present in the ministry of education were working on the issue from the inside (Domokos 1996: 149–50). Similarly, in many places at the local level, members of the local elite managed to resolve the re-establishment of the independent Hungarian high-schools by using their informal network (Toró 2015). These talks, however, had occasional successes and depended mostly on the context, and not on the power or social capital of the persons involved.[13]

Toward the Hungarian government and the international community, the individual integration model worked similarly. Some of the DAHR's leaders used their individual network and social capital to attract funds and support or to represent the Hungarian minority in its external relations. Many of the DAHR leaders (e.g.: László Tőkés, the Honorary President, or Szőcs Géza, the Vice President of the organization) managed to build foreign relations not only with representatives of Hungarian parties but many western countries as well.[14] Although functioning similarly, the two strategies had one important difference. Most of the politicians involved tried to exploit their own symbolic and social capital, but while in their relationship with the Romanian government this had been earned before 1989, in the case of the Hungarian and international relations, it was gathered from their resistance to the communist regime.

In sum, the individual integration model did not create any real positions of power neither for the Hungarian minority nor for the DAHR because it did not assure decision-making or institutional resource-distribution positions. It mostly tried to influence decision-making, to set the agenda, or to gather resources for the organization in a limited way. In other words, it personalized power relations, assuring the leading positions in the DAHR for those who had the necessary social capital to influence the Hungarian or the Romanian government in some way.

12 The situation of the Hungarian school system under communism is analysed in detail by Vincze (1998). He argues that the Communist Party was forcing assimilation by weakening the educational system. They used several strategies: 1. abolishing the Hungarian high schools and creating mixed Romanian-Hungarian ones, 2. reducing the number of Hungarians admitted and the number of Hungarian teaching hours at the University, 3. controlling the labour market by forcing the Hungarian students to take jobs outside Transylvania, leaving the Hungarian schools without new teaching personnel.

13 The strategy on the national level is clearly a failure since there is no clear pattern of success in the restoration of Hungarian schools. Schools were separated and restored in Timişoara or Cluj, but not in Satu Mare, Arad, or Târgu-Mureş. In the latter case, the issue served as a starting point for the bloody riots in March.

14 For example, László Tőkés, in his speech at the 1st Congress of the DAHR, enumerates the results he achieved on his international tour (Varga 1990).

## 2. The Collective Integration Model

Similarly to the previously presented model, the collective integration model is valid in both the Romanian and Hungarian relations, but it has a different meaning and objectives.

In its founding documents, the DAHR was envisaged as an organization with a dual structure. On the one hand, a political organization which fights for the collective rights and internal self-determination of the Hungarian minority in Romania[15] and, on other hand, a social network that intends to reconstruct an autonomous Hungarian society in Romania. In order to achieve this, the DAHR defined itself as an umbrella organization which holds together 'all professional, advocacy, cultural, religious organizations and associations'.[16] Strictly speaking, the DAHR formulated the Hungarian community's need for cultural and territorial autonomy and looked at itself as a framework where the Hungarian civil society could develop.

The collective integration model, therefore, had two important pillars. First, since the beginning of the 1990s an autonomist political block had made its presence, which not only criticized the consensus-oriented politics of the DAHR leaders but propagated information on the several types of autonomy – cultural, territorial, and personal – which function in Europe. In 1991, as a result of their activity, the DAHR formulated a document entitled *The Kolozsvár (Cluj) Declaration*, which named internal self-determination as its main objective.[17] Furthermore, in 1993, on the 3rd Congress of the DAHR, the idea of autonomy became the central element of the adopted programme. Since then, several draft laws have been formulated and submitted to the Parliament.

Despite the clear objectives, this pillar of the collective integration model did not develop a crystallized agenda. Two competing options were propagated. On the one hand, many of its early supporters believed that there is no point in looking for a dialogue with the Romanian majority, but problems should be solved by involving the international organizations and democratic powers such as the Council of Europe, OSCE, the EU, or the USA. Therefore, these members of the DAHR were looking for partners outside the borders of Romania, triggering the resistance and protest of almost all actors from the Romanian political sphere (Pavel & Huiu 2003). On the other hand, the newer representatives of the collective integration model – gathered around the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania (HNCT) and the Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania (HPPT)

15 See the Manifesto of the Provisional Executive Committee of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (Bárdi & Éger 2000).

16 Memorandum of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania. *Romániai Magyar Szó*. January 18, 2012.

17 See the Declaration of the DAHR on the national question in the first issue of *Magyar Kisebbség* in 1995.

since 2003 – recognized the importance of the Romanian–Hungarian cooperation, but believed that the autonomy of the Hungarian community cannot be reached without a clear formulation of the claim and a constant public pressure. From a discursive point of view, the model presented a mixture of references to European norms, to nationalist claims of self-determination and victimization.

The second pillar of the model is related to the internal organization of the Hungarian community. As the DAHR formulated itself as both a framework for civil society and as a political party that is specialized in the representation of Hungarians in Romania, it had to present itself as a unified ethnic party to the outside and as a pluralistic organization to the inside. To resolve this tension, at the 3rd Congress, they introduced the principle of internal self-government, which aimed to manage the internal ideological conflicts of the Organization. In other words, it created a 'state within a state' model (Bakk 1999), according to which Hungarians would have had their own political organizations, president, parliament-like representative system, and a specialized governing body, the executive presidency being all under the umbrella of the DAHR. Although most of the members agreed on this new structure, certain procedural aspects caused its failure: some proposed that only DAHR members should vote, while others demanded voting rights for all Hungarians in Romania (Szilágyi 2003).

From a social perspective, several professional, cultural, and advocacy organizations were created,[18] which should have served as bases for the reconstruction of the Hungarian society in Romania. However, as Bíró A. Zoltán points out, the primary objective of these organizations was not their professional devotion but the construction, reconstruction, and maintenance of ethnic boundaries. Also, these national umbrella organizations helped the elite to take control of the social spheres they had created (Bíró 1995: 251). Moreover, Bíró argues that by focusing on boundary construction and power conservation the elite gets further and further away from the Hungarian society, misunderstanding their 'real' needs (Biró 1998: 42). While Bíró mostly focuses on the relationship between elites and society, the processes described above can be analysed from a minority–majority perspective as well. Bíró sees institution building as an agent for the elite to seize power. However, it can be interpreted as a response to the nationalizing politics and discourse of the state: the ethnic claims, ethnic institutions, and ethnic voting are results of the xenophobic state propaganda as well.[19]

It is important to point out that the debates on the internal organization of the Hungarian society are over-politicized. While in the 1993–2003 period the

18 Hungarian Cultural Society of Transylvania, the Transylvanian Museum Society, the Hungarian Teachers' Association of Romania, Hungarian Farmers' Association in Romania, and others as well.

19 The nationalistic threat is a recurring element in several writings and memoirs of the early 90s: Domokos 1996, Király 1995, Zonda 1998.

ideological pluralism of the DAHR and the unity of the political representation were constantly under debate,[20] the social and economic construction of the community was not developed. Although intellectuals criticized party politics on this issue, the responses from the political sphere are formulated strictly in political terms. The answer of László Borbély, one of the DAHR leaders in 1994, to a study written by Levente Salat is eloquent from this perspective. While Salat points out the lack of programmes that address the social and economic problems of the Hungarian community (Salat 1994), Borbély in his answer enumerates the institutional developments of the DAHR, underlining how well the newly formed executive presidency works (Borbély 1994).

The collective integration model toward Hungary works in a different way. In 2010, the Hungarian government changed the Hungarian Citizenship Law, according to which non-Hungarian citizens – 'whose ascendant was a Hungarian citizen or whose origin from Hungary is probable and whose Hungarian language knowledge is proved' – can apply for Hungarian citizenship easier and without an active residency in Hungary (Tóth 2010). Furthermore, the electoral law was changed as well, permitting the new citizens to vote in the Hungarian elections. As pointed out in several articles (Kopper 2010, Körtvélyesi 2011), this is a change of paradigm in the citizenship politics of the country. On the one hand, it legally integrates in the nation those members of the Hungarian cultural nation who live outside the borders of Hungary, and by granting them voting rights makes them members of two different political nations (in our case, the Hungarian and the Romanian). On the other hand, it is the first time when the Hungarian state establishes a direct legal connection with Hungarians living outside its border without addressing their representative associations first.[21] In this new condition, even the existence of the minority political sphere as an independent field can be questioned. For example, the leaders of the Hungarian Civic Party (HCP) believed at that time that the Hungarian community in Romania is part of the Hungarian nation as a whole, its main interest should be the development of a common national politics, while the European and Romanian political context is secondary. Moreover, the Party's leaders believed that the political organizations of the Hungarians in Romania need to choose their partners in Hungary on ideological bases, the HCP aligning to the governing party, the FIDESZ.[22] Thus, the collective integration model in this

20 See, for example, the debates published in the journal *Magyar Kisebbség* (Hungarian Minority) in 1998 and 1999.

21 Levente Salat, for example, argues that this new politics have major pitfalls because, on the one hand, it creates a cleavage between those who applied for citizenship and those who did not and, on other hand, by linking the members of the minority to the kin-state individually, it atomizes the community as well (Salat 2011: 186–190). In this paper, I do not intend to analyse the validity of these ideas; I am more interested in the changing relationship between the Hungarian kin-state and the leaders of the Hungarian community.

22 'The real solution of the problem is a Budapest-centred politics (…) The Carpathian-Basin should be defined and influenced from and through Budapest. The leaders [of the Hungarian minority]

case denies the existence of the minority field, and envisages a common Hungarian nation that expands outside the borders of Hungary, reproducing even the main ideological and party cleavages of the kin-state.

## 3. The Organizational Integration Model

The main principle behind the organizational integration model is that in its relations with the state the political organization(s) of the minority should develop some institutional and elite-driven relations. Although the DAHR has participated in parliamentary and local elections since 1990, this type of integration became salient only after the 1996 elections, when the Alliance entered the governing coalition formed by the Democratic Convention. The new strategy was backed up by an ideological stance as well, which argued that the 'situation of the Hungarian minority can be sold only in Romania and by participating in the government', which has become the main idea of the DAHR politics ever since.

Although the governmental cycles differ in the function of the achieved results, there are several common features which constitute the main characteristics of the model. First, from a minority perspective, in the 1996–2004 period, several important laws were adopted (decentralization, educational law, language law), important results were achieved (restitution of real estate, land, forest), and many Hungarians were appointed in important positions (ministers, state secretaries, prefects, sub-prefect, agency directors).[23] However, in spite of these successes, the central claims of the organization (territorial and cultural autonomy, Hungarian state university) were overshadowed. This process can be explained in two ways. For example, István Székely believes that when entering the government the leaders of the DAHR kept only the consensual claims of the Alliance, leaving out those that were still disputed. This generated conflict in the heart of the organization, which led to the marginalization of the supporters of the collective integration model, who in the end left the organization. However, according to the dominant interpretation, in the coalition talks, the DAHR leaders 'presented only those elements of their programme which were compatible with the rhetoric and minimal programme-consensus of the Romanian parties' (Salat 2003: 560). This point of view is backed up by Romanian analysts as well. Dan Pavel in a book written on the history of the Democratic Convention states that several elements of the DAHR politics (autonomy statutes, the memorandum presented in front of the CoE, etc.) created conflict within the coalition. In order to be fully

regardless of party affiliation should think in the capital of every Hungarian. Because, when we speak of Hungarian interests, the capital is Budapest, not Belgrade, Bucharest, or Bratislava. I am positive about this' (interview with Jenő Szász, president of HCP at the time – 2012).

23 For the analysis of the first and second governmental cycle, see Kántor & Bárdi 2002, Márton 2003, 2004.

accepted, the DAHR signed a declaration of the Democratic Convention, which guaranteed that all the members accept the territorial integrity of the country and that they would not claim autonomy for a specific region but equally for every county (Pavel & Huiu 2003).

Second, the organizational integration model guaranteed resources and power positions. By participating in the government, the DAHR leaders not only gathered insights and knowledge on state administration but gained the right to influence the resource allocation process, directing important funds to Hungarian-inhabited areas of the country.[24] Therefore, this power contributed to the growth of the Hungarian community, and strengthened the power of the DAHR leaders in their relationship with the local political elites at the same time. This possibility produced two strategies. First, the ethnic boundary construction is redefined. The DAHR leaders argued that the acquired rights and positions can only be preserved by a continuous participation in the government, which is possible solely through a strong and united Hungarian ethnic mobilization. In other words, the fate of the community is linked to the electoral success of the organization. Second, as no new rights were achieved after the post-2004 period, they developed a position- and resource-centred attitude. This attitude can be traced in an interview with the current President of the organization, who – when asked about the achieved results – starts to enumerate the new power positions achieved by minority representatives.[25]

The new objectives produced new types of strategies. Most of the scholars agreed that the Alliance did not only break with the collective integration model but in its relation with the Romanian political sphere it developed a consociational strategy.[26] According to this, the DAHR imagines the Hungarian community as a pillar that is integrated into the Romanian society by its elite, which resolves its claims by participating in the government. Also, as a result of its power positions, the DAHR would control the claims of the Hungarian community

24 The DAHR became the sole organization responsible for distributing the budgetary resources allocated for the Hungarian minority and they also could successfully influence the allocation of resources to infrastructure improvements. As in the Romanian political practice a lot of funds are distributed by 'manual control', these were considered important achievements by many of the Hungarian political actors involved (interview with Béla Markó – 2012).

25 'The Romanians are very pragmatic, our manoeuvring space was growing with each and every cycle. In '96, we achieved only a state secretary position in education and culture (…) later we accessed ministry positions and several state secretary positions. Also, many institutions opened up in front of Hungarian policy makers. (…) In 2005, we had a Minister for Communications, Minister of the Environment…' (interview with Hunor Kelemen, the President of the DAHR).

26 These studies heavily relied on the theory of Aarend Lijphart, who believed that in deeply divided societies a consociational or power-sharing model of democracy should be used. In his opinion, a successful power-sharing system has five characteristics: 1) grand coalition between the different segments of the elite, 2) mutual veto, 3) the depoliticization of different segments and institutions of the society, 4) proportionality, 5) autonomy for the different groups (Daalder 1974, Lijphart 2014: 258).

(Bakk 2000b, Salat 2003). However, as the integration of Hungarians in Romania lacked both the structural and institutional characteristics of the consociational model, scholars used it more in a normative sense. On the one hand, it presented a working and achievable model for Romanian–Hungarian reconciliation,[27] and, on the other hand, it was a critique of the DAHR politics as it demonstrated that the behaviour of the Alliance would have been compatible with an ethnic power-sharing system, but without the institutional and legal guarantees it is a very controverted strategy. Most of the critics argued that without the institutional guarantees, the organizational integration model only 'institutionalizes bargain' (Kántor 2004: 112) as the main motor for satisfying their claims. In other words, the rights and positions are assured by governmental presence and coalition talks, and not by a clear and unimpeachable system of rights and institution. This construction has clearly an 'ad-hoc' nature: benefits are specified by the outcome of the coalition talks, and not by strategic planning and long-term political programme (Salat 2003: 564). Moreover, as the participation in government is not automatically granted, failure is always an option. Leaders of the DAHR, however, used this uncertainty for their own advantage. First, they linked the possible drop-out to the loss of the already gained rights and, second, they underlined the necessity of a single, unified political option for all Hungarians. Therefore, the ad-hoc nature of the organizational integration strategy is exploited not only for ethnic mobilization for the elections but in de-legitimating the other ethnic organizations that threaten the Alliance's singularity.[28]

A second strategy used within the organizational integration model is the de-ethnicization of political issues. In the Romanian Parliament, when 'Hungarian issues' are on the agenda, the Hungarian MPs try to conceal the 'Hungarianness' of these topics, believing that they would pass more easily if their ethnic character is missing. Usually, they use the so-called professionalization strategy, which would allow them to emphasize the professional aspects of the problem, instead of its Hungarian–Romanian confrontational or ethnic nature (Toró 2017).

The organizational integration model strengthened the party-like functions of the organization to the detriment of the society and community-building functions. The DAHR centred its human resources mainly on administrative

27 This idea was present most emphatically in the writings of the Provincia-group, a group of Romanian and Hungarian intellectuals, who deliberated the possibilities of the consociational transformation of Romania (Molnár & Szokoly 2001).

28 'I've said it a lot of times: we can negotiate successfully with the Romanians, only because they see 1.5 million Hungarians behind us. If they won't see this anymore, even though we are prepared, we can achieve nothing. The Romanian President is already coming to Szeklerland as a sugar daddy to the kindergarten. Why are we fooling ourselves?'
'Everything could fall: the laws that would limit our language rights are in parliament. (…) The ex-mayor of Cluj, Gheorghe Funar [a well-known Romanian nationalist politician], who is now an MP, is delivering amendments in order to expulse Hungarians and to banish Hungarian language and symbols in the public sphere on a daily basis' (Markó 2007).

issues related to government and the different aspects of negotiation, gradually leaving the actions taken for the (re-)construction of the Hungarian institutional system behind (Bakk 2000a: 26–31, Biró 1998: 148, Salat 2003: 560).

The ideological perspective of the organizational integration model was formulated by the former president of the organization ('Markó-doctrine') and it has three pillars: 1) compromise and recognition of mutual interest with the Romanians, 2) ideology-free ethnic politics, and 3) sovereign Hungarian politics in Transylvania.

The first pillar is based on governmental participation. On the one hand, it believes that 'for the Hungarian communities from the Carpathian basin results can be achieved through moderation, which is the sign of true courage as well' – it recognizes that some claims need to be forgotten in order for others to become achievable. On the other hand, it believes that the Romanian–Hungarian relationship should be based on the recognition of common interests.[29]

The second pillar, the ideology of ideology-free ethnic politics, on the one hand, legitimizes the government-oriented politics since it declares that the DAHR should look for partnerships in order to advance the Hungarian–Romanian reconciliation and to secure the rights of the Hungarians in Romania, and thus it should not chose its coalition partners on ideological basis.[30] Moreover, by the institutionalization of bargaining, the main element of ethnic politics is participation in government and accession to resources and positions. This understanding is used in Hungarian relations as well: the DAHR believes that in their relations with the Hungarian government the minority political organizations should not take account of the ideological affiliation of the parties in power. On the other hand, ethnic politics means the permanent construction and reconstruction of the boundaries of the Hungarian identity. The constant reference to unity,[31] collective rights, the society-building function of the DAHR,[32] and the periodical allusion to the nationalist threat of the state[33] serve

29 'The classic mutually exclusive alternatives – the space is ours or the space is yours – should be substituted with something else, with common space, the ideology of common space, which is not in contradiction with autonomy and the idea of an autonomous decision' (Markó 2009a).

30 'The moral of the story is that Hungarian–Romanian relations can be changed only by political means, and this change becomes sustainable only if we choose ethnic politics. (…) In other words, to think about who is the DAHR or the Hungarian political representation governing with the left or the right is totally unnecessary because it is a matter of political conjuncture. The collaboration is not ideological, it is ethnic: it is not a Hungarian–liberal, Hungarian–social democrat, or Hungarian–Christian democrat union, but it is based on Hungarian–Romanian reconciliation' (Markó 2009b).

31 'The DAHR believes that in our fight for ethnic rights parliamentary politics can be successful if we all say black or we all say white. By seeing one and a half million Hungarians behind us, the Romanian political actors can be forced to solve our problems' (Markó 2008).

32 Until recently, the DAHR leaders underlined the society-building functions of the organization as against its party-nature.

33 'In Transylvania, the punchers are always Romanians and the ones suffering (or not!) are always

both as mobilizing strategy and as consolidation of power. One could say that the two elements of ethnic politics are in contradiction: the former emphasizes the importance of Hungarian–Romanian reconciliation, while the latter is used for boundary construction between the two. The two elements, however, activate in different fields. While the first works within the Romanian political sphere, the second is aimed at the members of the Hungarian minority.

The last pillar is the idea of sovereign Hungarian politics in Transylvania,[34] meaning that every decision regarding the Hungarians in Romania should be made with the inclusion of their legitimate representatives. While in the case of the DAHR's relationship with the Romanian political field this can be understood as participation in government coalitions, it has a slightly different meaning in their relationship with the kin-state. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Hungarian government has been taking responsibility for the Hungarian minority outside its borders, meaning mostly financial, professional, and moral support (Bárdi 2004). Simply put, the sovereign Hungarian politics in Transylvania asks for involvement in decision-making on legal issues and principles, and also in how the financial, professional, and moral resources are distributed.

## III. How Does the Triadic Model Work? The Hungarian Minority in Its Relationship with Romania and Hungary

In order to illustrate how the triadic model works in our case, I will analyse the relationship between some changes in the internal politics of Romania and Hungary and the changes within the chosen strategies and internal structure of the Hungarian minority. The models presented above did not exist in a vacuum, they coexisted, and conflict existed between their followers. The main argument of the paper, presented in detail below, is that the outcome of these conflicts were highly influenced by the political context dictated by political changes in Hungary and Romania.

Michael Krzyzanowski and Ruth Wodak in a study that theorizes the analysis of social change in Central and Eastern European context argue that change can be grasped by the co-usage of two important concepts, modernization and transformation. Relying on several modernization theories, they argue that while modernization has a cyclical nature, transformation is a gradual and linear

Hungarians. The boss is Romanian, the subaltern Hungarian, power is Romanian and opposition (or the enemy) is Hungarian. In 1968, in the abolished Hungarian Autonomous Province, there was a saying: 'the car is Hungarian, but the driver is Romanian' (Markó 2009b).

34 This element appeared in the political strategies of the DAHR already in 1994, soon after Béla Markó was elected President (Béla Markó's speech at the 3rd Congress of the DAHR – *Orient expressz*, January 22, 1993).

process. Social change can be understood only by combining these two processes as all the important events of transformation have their own antecedents and run-times. Also, these cannot be separated – the seeds of one action co-exist or even depend on the consequences of another (Krzyzanowski & Wodak 2009). With these considerations, in the post-1989 period, in addition to the Fall of Communism in 1989, one can define four changing points in Hungary (1994, 1998, 2002, and 2010) and three in Romania (1996, 2008, and 2012).[35] These are mainly related to the electoral results and governmental changes within the two countries. Also, beyond these, important turning-points are the 1997 failed NATO- and the successful EU-accession of Romania in 2007.

1. Although after the 1989 revolution local Hungarian organizations were founded in several cities, the DAHR was formed by a group of Hungarian intellectuals in Bucharest, who published a proclamation on December 25, 1989 in the only national Hungarian newspaper Romániai Magyar Szó. By using their social network in Bucharest, they managed to convince the newly formed provisional government to grant several symbolic and practical gestures in minority rights. Also, encouraged by these gestures, in the first documents and at the first meetings of the DAHR, demands for autonomy and self-determination were formulated. However, this initial optimism gradually changed to confusion and despair as the number of nationalistic actions from the government grew. In April, as the 1st Congress of the DAHR was organized, the individual integration model and the collective integration model co-existed, but there was no clear conflict between the two, several of the newly elected leaders believing that both of them can and should be followed. This dualism was codified in the new structure as well: the DAHR had two centres: Bucharest, where the Hungarian community should build its relations with the Romanian political sphere and the representatives of the international community, and in Cluj, 'the capital of Transylvania', for relations with the members of the Hungarian community and local DAHR organizations.[36] While in the first few month the few Hungarian leaders living in Bucharest tried to use their earlier relations with Romanian intellectuals and the nomenclature, after the first parliamentary elections their number increased to 41, the number of elected MPs in the Senate and the House of Deputies.

The two-headed DAHR structure and the nationalizing Romanian government had several consequences. First, as DAHR-structures were in formation, there was no informational link and control between the two centres. This resulted in a lack of transparency in the actions of the representatives in Bucharest.

35 Although between 1996 and 2008 the Romanian government changed in 2000 and 2004 as well, the DAHR participated in one way or another in the newly formed governing coalitions. Because of this, I did not consider these events as turning-points.

36 See the documents of the 1st Congress of the DAHR, 1990 (Varga 1990).

They participated in meetings and made political decisions in the name of the DAHR without notifying the governing bodies of the organization (Domokos 1996). Second, in the growing nationalistic intolerance, those in support of the individual integration model believed that they could pursue best the interest of the Hungarian community by avoiding interethnic conflicts. This was hard to comply with because DAHR-leaders were constantly incriminated by Romanian nationalists that they work together with Hungary in order to cede Transylvania to Hungary as a result of the politics of the newly elected Hungarian government, which announced its desire to support the Hungarians in Romania.[37] As a response to these accusations, those believing in the individual integration strategy distanced themselves from Hungary, arguing that the problem of the Hungarians should be solved within the borders of Romania by the Hungarian community itself.

The growing Romanian nationalism blocked the resolution of Hungarian claims, and those present in Bucharest put up a stout resistance, trying to protect the already existing institutional system and rights and avoiding political confrontation as much as possible. This strategy outraged those believing in the collective integration model. They argued that the minority rights should not be negotiated, and suspected the other side of betrayal. Moreover, they demanded the DAHR that it should ask for help from the international community, and force Romania to recognize the rights of Hungarians. In response, the President of the organization, one of the strongest supporters of the individual integration model, argued that 'here, in Central Europe, the region of tragic clashes, dialogue, mutual goodwill (…) has no alternative. More exactly, it has: confrontation, decay, hatred for a long-long time. The DAHR, knowing its historical responsibility, rejects this second road' (Domokos 1991).

Since results failed to appear, more and more believed that the collective integration model, the clear formulation of the autonomist claims, and a good foreign politics with the help of Hungary would prevail. At the 2nd Congress of the DAHR, although Géza Domokos remained president, most of the members of his presidency were selected from those who demanded strategic changes and believed that parliamentary politics was futile. This group reached its peak in the 1991–1993 period, when the DAHR formulated two important claims: Hungarians should be accepted as a co-nation in Romania (Borbély 1991) and in a document entitled *The Kolozsvár (Cluj) Declaration* they stated that the main political claim of Hungarians in Romania is internal self-determination. On the international

37 In a famous speech, József Antall, the then Prime Minister of Hungary, announced that he considers himself the Prime Minister of 15 million Hungarians instead of the 10 million living in Hungary. Also, the Hungarian Democratic Forum included in the Hungarian constitution a passage declaring that the Hungarian state feels responsible for the life of Hungarians living outside the borders of Hungary.

level, they recorded temporary successes: László Tőkés, the Honorary President of the DAHR, participated in an official visit to the United States, the DAHR was accepted in the Federal Union of European Nationalities,[38] and the Council of Europe accepted the problems reported by the DAHR in a memorandum on the accession of Romania.[39] As the external politics of the Alliance was getting stronger, its situation worsened in Romania. The Organization has become more and more isolated – in addition to the attacks on the part of the governing party, it had to support the attack on the part of the Romanian opposition parties as well.

The shift to the collective integration model needed a modified internal structure as well. In 1993, at the 3rd Congress of the DAHR, self-determination and autonomy was included in the Framework Programme of the Organization and the plan of an internal governing system was developed with state-like institutions and processes (own parliament, government, federal president, and internal elections).[40]

In conclusion, in the first few years of the 90s, the success rate of the chosen strategy was converted into power relations within the organization. As for the first half year of existence, there were no clear interest groups, only strategic options, which were all represented in the leading board of the DAHR. As the tensions grew between the two sides, the two-headed structure changed from collaboration to confrontation. Also, as a result to the growing nationalism of the Romanian government, the possibilities of those believing in Hungarian–Romanian collaboration decreased. The growing discontent with the Romanian political system gave the opportunity to act for those who believed in self-determination and international coercion.

2. The 1994 parliamentary elections in Hungary generated changes within the political strategies of the Hungarian leaders in Romania. As Nándor Bárdi points out, the newly elected socialist government changed its approach toward the Hungarians outside the borders of Hungary, believing that the Euro-Atlantic integration of the country and its reconciliation with the neighbouring countries is more important than the kin-state politics pursued by the previous

38 Speech of Géza Szőcs, General Secretary of the DAHR at the 2nd Congress of the Alliance – *Romániai Magyar Szó*, 29 May 1991.

39 The DAHR Memorandum addressed for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe formulates in 15 points its objections and expectations on the Romanian legal system. The Memorandum is published by Bárdi–Éger (2000), while its reception is analysed by Miklós Bakk (1994).

40 The DAHR did not consider itself a political party but an ethnic umbrella organization where all kind of ideological groups would fit into. Therefore, in the newly developed structure, these groups could have formed their own 'parties' and platforms within the DAHR and could have participated at internal elections, entering into the Council of Representatives as national parties enter into the parliament. The organizational method of the internal elections was heavily disputed and never organized.

government. In their opinion, 'issues concerning Hungarians living abroad could not – even seemingly – endanger the stability of the region' (Bárdi 2003), and in order to achieve this they initiated the signature of bilateral treaties with Romania, Slovakia, and the Ukraine. The treaty with Romania was signed after long diplomatic negotiations on September 16, 1996. The DAHR disagreed with the text of the treaty and lost one of its major allies in its international agenda at the same time.[41] Moreover, as the interest in minority rights gradually disappeared from the international context, the external politics encouraged by the followers of the collective integration model was becoming more and more fruitless. Therefore, the changing aspect of Hungarian kin-state politics reshaped the internal politics of the DAHR as well, its leaders looking for closer cooperation with the Romanian opposition.[42]

János Márton, in a comparative analysis of the political programmes of the DAHR, argues that a potential participation in government was prepared even from this period because all elements that were not accepted by their Romanian partners (autonomy, collective rights, co-national status, etc.) were erased from the electoral programme of the organization (Márton 2003: 329, 2004: 548). This fact is backed up by political declarations as well since both György Frunda, presidential candidate for the DAHR in 1996, and Béla Markó, the President of the DAHR, made allusions to a potential involvement in the government (Márton 2003: 313–316).

After the Democratic Convention had won the elections and the DAHR had been invited to participate in the governing coalition, claims such as autonomy, collective rights, and the separate Hungarian university were put aside. The new political course received severe critics from those believing in the collective integration strategy. They argued that the leaders of the DAHR consciously abandoned the most important claims and legitimated the minority politics of the country in return for positions and resources (Toró 1998: 223–224, 235).

Also, as the Romanian parties were open to accept the DAHR in the governing coalitions, the organizational integration model had become the norm,[43] which created internal tensions, and in the end it changed the internal balance of power. These can be grasped on three levels. First, from a normative point of view, the question 'Is morally acceptable for a minority organization to participate in the

41 The former president of the DAHR has seen this opportunity in the following way: 'I couldn't say that someone threw away chances. We could blame Hungary, but they tried desperately to get closer to the European Union. Same as Romania, they were busy with integration' (interview with Béla Markó – 2012).

42 This is backed up by Zoltán Kántor and Nándor Bárdi as well (Kántor & Bárdi 2002: 160), and it is mentioned even by Party President Béla Markó in 2004: 'we had to learn that there are no miracles. The bilateral treaty is clearly not one, nobody will resolve our problems instead of us' (Markó 2004: 27).

43 The DAHR participated in the governing coalition in the priods of 1996–2000, 2004–2008, and 2009–2012 and supported from the opposition the minority government in 2000–2004.

governing coalition or not?' created severe tensions within the organization. Second, for the supporters of the organizational integration model, the government positions opened up new resources and negotiating possibilities. That is, those who had supported the participation in government successfully managed the 'redistribution of symbolic and material resource' gained in Bucharest (on these two aspects, see Biró 1998: 142–144, 148). Third, as pointed out earlier, for lack of a solid legal and structural framework, the 'bargain was institutionalized'. Nevertheless, this was not compatible with the pluralistic structure introduced in 1993 as the internal critiques and alternative voices would have weakened the negotiating position of the Organization.[44] Thus, a gradual weakening of the opposition and the creation of a party-like structure emerged. This can be grasped in several decisive actions such as: the repeated postponement of the general internal elections, the increasing of the Presidency's power to the detriment of the Council of Representatives (the Alliance's parliament-like institution), the expansion of the Council with the technocratic elite[45] in order to strengthen the power of the leadership. Consequently the inevitable break comes in 2003, at the 7th Congress of the DAHR, when the representatives of the collective integration model leave the Alliance, and form the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania, a movement-like organization without legal entity, which formulates as its most important claim the achievement of cultural and territorial autonomy for Hungarians in Romania.

3. An important aspect of the organizational integration model is its desire of sovereign politics in the relationship with the Hungarian and Romanian government. While in the case of Romania this was fulfilled by the participation in the governing coalition, in the case of Hungary, it meant equality, partnership, and decision-making authority in issues related to Hungarians living in Romania. This second expectation was backed up by the fact that in the periods of 1996–2000 and 2004–2012 the DAHR–Hungarian government relationship received a second dimension: an official Hungarian–Romanian one, as in intergovernmental meetings the Romanian government was represented in many cases by a DAHR politician.

In this context, after the FIDESZ had won the elections in 1998, the kin-state politics of Hungary changed radically, propagating a more active policy toward the Hungarians living abroad. This approach created tensions between the Hungarian and the Romanian government, leaving the DAHR in a rather delicate situation in the middle (Kántor 2002: 213–215). The new Hungarian government

44 In the 1996–2004 period, members of the internal opposition, advocates of the collective integration model were present in the Romanian Parliament as well, representing around one-third of the parliamentary group of the DAHR. In 2002, they even created their own group named Polgári Szárny (Civil Wing).

45 Those persons who hold institutional and power positions at the local or the national level as a result of the participation in the governing coalition.

defended the rights of Hungarians more actively and supported their claims for autonomy and collective rights as well. Moreover, it adopted the so-called Status Law, which focused on helping Hungarians from the neighbouring countries. The law promoted a new, cultural definition for the nation that included the Hungarians living abroad as well. The law was sharply criticized by the Romanian government, but was welcomed by the Hungarian community. The DAHR tried to conciliate the two attitudes, but it was rather a lose-lose situation because it could not address the issue in clear ethnic terms, as the Hungarian community would have wanted, and could not criticize the nationalistic outburst of his Romanian partners either (Kemp 2006: 117–118). As a consequence, those believing in the collective integration model found reinforcement from the FIDESZ-government to the detriment of the DAHR leadership.

After 2002, when the socialists won the Hungarian elections, the kin-state politics changed again. The Hungarian government granted the DAHR the right to decide what to do with the resources given to the support of the Hungarian cultural, social, and economic sphere in Romania. In this situation, the followers of the organizational integration model controlled the resource redistribution coming from both the Romanian and the Hungarian government. Its opposition, institutionalized in 2003, was marginalized, relying only on its relationship with the FIDESZ, which attempted to monopolize the national politics of Hungary, portraying itself as the real representative of the kin-state politics of the country. This generated tensions between the DAHR and the FIDESZ. The Alliance criticized the Hungarian opposition party for its relation with its own opposition, charging them with the exportation of inner tensions of the Hungarian domestic politics to Romania. Moreover, in the 2003–2012 period, as a member or supporter of the Romanian government, DAHR politicians took the liberty of taking up a more critical position toward the Hungarian opposition.[46]

In conclusion, the influence of Hungarian domestic politics and the Hungarian kin-state politics is two-folded. On the one hand, it has created the possibility for Hungarian politicians in Romania to build partnership with parties in Hungary and, on the other hand, after the FIDESZ had lost the elections in 2002, the supporters of the collective integration model lost their external support, and found themselves marginalized within the Hungarian minority.

4. The last two important examples for the influence of the Hungarian and Romanian political sphere came in the 2007–2011 period. In 2007, László Tőkés,

46 On the DAHR–FIDESZ relationship, see (Toró & Toró 2011: 22–23), but some declarations of Béla Markó, the President of the DAHR at the time, are telling as well: '(…) we should not talk about the interests of Béla Markó and László Tőkés, or even Viktor Orbán – I wondered why the domestic politics of Hungary appeared in this context. We should talk about the interests of the common Hungarians in Transylvania' (Markó 2008).

the President of the HNCT, ran as an independent for a position in the European Parliamentary, and won against the DAHR. In this campaign, he had the moral and political support of the FIDESZ. Encouraged by these results, the Hungarian Civic Party is founded in 2008, which gained several important positions at the local elections in Szeklerland. After the FIDESZ had come to government for the second time in 2010, they supported the formation of a new party, the Hungarian Peoples' Party in Transylvania. The appearance of the new parties marginalized the DAHR in its relations with Hungary. On the one hand, as a consequence of the previous DAHR–FIDESZ conflicts, the new Hungarian government rejects the DAHR's sovereign politics and signs a partnership agreement with HNCT, and implicitly HPPT.[47] On the other hand, as a result of a new citizenship law in Hungary, the strategy of collective integration model appears in the Hungarian–Hungarian relationship as well, but this time driven by the actions and decisions of the Hungarian government.

Although the two smaller parties do not reshape decisively the Hungarian ethnic voters' preferences,[48] their appearance changes the inner power structure of the DAHR. First, in the 2008 parliamentary elections, many national politicians of the DAHR leave their parliamentary position in order to run for positions at the local level. This, on the one hand, is related to the appearance of the HCP and the HPPT, which, by creating competition for the DAHR in municipalities and counties where Hungarians are in majority, forced the Alliance to choose its best candidates. On the other hand, these local positions were attractive as the law on decentralization, the administrational and local electoral law gave more rights and resources to mayors and county council chairmen.

The increasing decentralization strengthened the power of local leaders. Within the DAHR, this did not question the legitimacy of the organizational integration model, but it changed the strategic priorities of the Alliance. For example, in the 2010 report of the DAHR,[49] the main results are not related to minority rights and identity politics but to budgetary assistance given to local bodies and organizations in various areas (education, healthcare, infrastructural development, etc.). Also, since 2011, a structural change can be observed within the organization, through which the hierarchical construction is transformed to a horizontal one,[50] where local leaders have a greater manoeuvring space.

47 Beyond the partnership agreement, the HNCT has gained influential decision-making positions in the supporting politics of the Hungarian government and receives financial support for operating an institutional system called Democracy Centres, which, on the one hand, are actively involved in the assistance given in the acquisition of Hungarian citizenship and, on other hand, take on different tasks related to the Hungarian community's claims.

48 In the 2008 and 2012 local and parliamentary elections, the two smaller parties obtained around 12–20% of the Hungarian votes.

49 This is our work. Results and implementations in 2010. DAHR Executive Presidency, Cluj.

50 This horizontal organizational structure was strengthened by the electoral law adopted in 2008 as well, which changed the existing proportional electoral system to a hybrid majoritarian system (Székely 2009).

## IV. Conclusion

In this paper, I intended to present three integration models that shaped the political development of the Hungarians in Romania, which were formulated by different segments of the Hungarian political elite in order to pursue the perceived interest of the community. These strategies imply different objectives, styles, and discourses and can become successful in different structural conditions. In the 1989–2012 period, the supporters of these strategies competed with one another, sometimes even in a conflictual manner. Furthermore, by contextualizing these debates in a triadic nexus, I argued that in most of the cases the competition between these strategies, and the important structural and strategic changes resulting from it, were decisively influenced by changes within the political spheres of Hungary and Romania and by changes within the Hungarian community in Romania. In this perspective, for the members of the Hungarian elite, the most important resources which fuel success in the 'in-field disputes' are their capacity to recognize change in the other two fields and their capacity of adaptation to these.

This argument is important from several perspectives. On the one hand, most of the political actors and many of the political scientists and analysts consider the minority political field independently from the other two. Although they accept that some external events or changes affect its internal process, they focus on the internal debates, cleavages, and conflicts, giving the impression that the minority political elite gives its answers autonomously. Also, in this approach, they disregard the fact that the Hungarian political field in Romania does not have either legal or structural guarantees for this independence. On the other hand, by re-contextualizing the events in this new way, several disturbing processes can be reported, such as the absence of social and community-building agenda, the downfalls of the lack of legal and structural framework, or the growing tension between the Hungarian kin-state policy and the dominant organizational integration model on both the social and the political level within the minority sphere. Having said this, one could say that despite its past results, resource-gathering potential, and organizational development, the current Hungarian political elite in Romania is in crisis, and it is clear that a re-evaluation of the political programme and a reconciliation of the different political actors is necessary.

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# Property Law in the New Romanian Civil Code[1]

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**Abstract.** Taking into account the recent change in Romanian civil legislation, we consider the present scientific material very useful for an overview of this institution under the auspices of the New Civil Code. The national legal provisions set clear, therefore, that the property is divided into two institutions, the public property and the private property. Property classification is very important in this form for us to understand the legal nature and the applicable regime for each type of property. Moreover, the property right, either private or public, has an elite regulation in most European laws, but also in universal laws the respect for it and the guarantee of this right can be also found in the fundamental human rights, in the international treaties, and in the constitutions of different nations. We will try, therefore, to offer a brief overview of the new Romanian legislation in the mentioned field, which is already harmonized with European legislation, the result being the New Romanian Civil Code. We believe that the interpretation should be considerably more extensive, but – pragmatically – we will try to capture the main theoretical and practical features to denote the importance of this institution.

**Keywords:** property, property rights, private property, public property, definition, human rights, special incapacities, legal inalienabilities, constitution, international treaties, movables, immovables, physical entities, legal entities, the state, territorial-administrative units, citizens, foreign citizens, expatriates, pre-emption, resolvable property, annullable property, conditioned property, common property, periodical property

## 1. Notion of the Right to Private Property

Property right is closely linked to patrimony, and in the Romanian doctrine it has been proposed that it is also linked to the owner. The New Civil Code (in the following: NCC) recognizes *the priority of private property in relation to public property*. This is the reason why Art. 554, paragraph 2 stipulates that *if*

1 The New Civil Code was adopted in Romania on 1 October 2011.

*the law does not state the contrary the applicable dispositions of private property rights are also applied to public property rights, but only to the degree that these dispositions are compatible with the latter*. In the NCC, private property rights are regulated by art-s 555–692, and public property rights by art-s 858–875.

The standard definition of the right to private property is found in the NCC Art. 555, paragraph 1: *private property is the right of the owner to possess, use, and dispose of goods exclusively, absolutely, and perpetually, within the limits defined by the law*.

This definition, in our conception, is far from being complete (Stătescu, Bîrsan 1980: 31–32). This is why, in defining property, one must start from the legal concept of the right to property, comprised of the prerogatives (attributes) recognized by the law, on the one hand; on the other hand, these prerogatives are exercised without the intervention of other persons, who form a general, passive, and undefined subject. In addition, there are many situations in which a part or all of these attributes are exercised by some person other than the owner, on the basis of another real right derived from the right to property. For example, the usufructuary, to whom the law grants attributes of possession and use of the object of the usufruct, or the superficiary, who can also exercise the attributes of material and legal disposition beyond the attributes of possession and use.

To the question of how an owner differs from other persons entitled to parts of a property, who exercise some of the attributes belonging to the owner, the response is that the owner of the property exercises his/her attributes in *his/her own power and in his/her own interest*. *In his/her own power* means that he/she is not legally subordinated to anybody, except the law, and all the other persons exercising real rights are obliged to know this. *In his/her own interest* means that the exercise of the right to property is done exclusively to satisfy the property owner's own interests, without obligations toward other people.

When we define the right to private property, we focus, first and foremost, on the general definition of property. The form of private property is stipulated in Art. 136.5 of the Constitution and Art. 552 of the NCC. In the context of putting our civil rights on new foundations, with the adoption and implementation of the NCC, private property has become dominant (not only in a theoretical sense) because the goods that make up private property are in a general civil sphere, which make them overwhelmingly important in ensuring the permanent material needs of the members of society. The dominating force of private property, in contrary to public property, derives from the fact that it is found in commerce, and the healthier and more responsive its sphere is, the greater the development of a competitive economy of society, satisfying general and particular interests. In contrast, public property is outside the civil sphere, and within the system of property *private property is the norm and public property, through its strict system, constitutes an exception*. The constitutional guarantee and protection of private property is also

found in Art. 44, paragraph 1 of the fundamental law, which stipulates that *the right to private property, as well as debts and claims against the state, are guaranteed*; and in Art. 44, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, according to which *private property is protected and guaranteed equally by the law, no matter the titleholder*.

Private property, besides the Constitution and NCC, is also regulated in a series of normative acts, organic and ordinary laws, including Law No 18/1991 of the Land Registry, Law No 7/1996 regarding Cadastre and Real Estate Registry, etc. The most complete regulation of the legal system of the right to private property is in the NCC.

As far as terminology is concerned, from the evolving legislative conceptions and the attributes of property law, the following notions are used: *private property, particular property,* and *the state's or the territorial-administrative units' private domain*.

The given definition leads to the exercise of the three attributes, in one's own right and own interest, regardless of whether they are exercised directly or through persons whose benefit certain real rights have been granted to (usufruct, location, superficies, etc.) (Sabău-Pop 2000: 45).

Starting from the legal conception of the right to private property and appreciating the specific position of the owner, one can define the *right to private property* as *a real right that confers upon the title holder the attributes of possession, use and disposition of a good, appropriated in private form; attributes which he/she can exercise in their totality, in his/her own power and own interest, in an exclusive, absolute, and perpetual manner, respecting the material and legal limits defined by the law*. Exercising private property is realized through the correspondence that must exist between legal capacity and subjective right.

The conclusion drawn from this definition is that it takes into consideration the legal content of the right to property, consisting of the totality of attributes recognized as belonging to the owner.

In the modern age, there is a new method of analysis that tends to show that private property is not easily confined to the simple stature of a subjective law; even though this may be complex, it fulfils a real social function. This new dimension justifies the restrictions on the exercise of property right, which today are more and more numerous, emphasizing the tendency that property ceases to be an intangible and absolute subjective right in order to become, along with family, a supple and orderly institution, in the service of the community.

At the same time, one notes a concerted universal or regional action of some organizations in order to adopt some norms for the protection of human rights, including the right to property. In addition to the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, adopted by the UN in 1948, of special importance is the *European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties* adopted by the member countries of the European Council in 1950, which came into effect in 1950 and in our country

on June 20th 1994. According to the additional Protocol No 1, *any physical or legal entity has the right of having his/her goods protected. No one can be deprived of his/her property unless for the purpose of public utility and according to the conditions stipulated in the law and the general principals of international law* (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended by Protocol No 11: 2001, 27).

On the other hand, returning to the idea of the social function of property, the second paragraph of the same text states that the dispositions are not of a nature to fulfil the rights of sovereign states to adopt laws that they deem necessary to regulate the use of private property goods, according to general interest.

Called upon to consider the applicability of a regulation of the European Council, the Luxembourg Court decided that *fundamental rights, property rights in particular, cannot generate absolute prerogatives, only prerogatives limited by their social functions. Such restrictions respond effectively to the Union's general interests, and so they cannot constitute an exaggerated and intolerable intervention, which could posit the existence of the guaranteed right* (Court of Justice of the European Community, 1991, Cause Georg Von Deetzen C. Hauptzollampt Oldenburg: 1989, 2).

## 2. Subjects to the Right to Private Property

From the definition, in principle, it follows that the right to private property can belong to any subject of the law: physical entities, legal entities, the state, and territorial-administrative units.

Similarly, according to Art. 553, paragraph 4 of the NCC, *goods, objects of private property, no matter the title holder, are and will stay in the civil sphere even though the law does not provide for it. They can be expropriated, can be the object of judicial execution, and can be acquired in any way stipulated in the law.* Therefore, immovables (land and constructions) in private ownership are in the general civil sphere, so they can be expropriated and acquired in any way regulated by the law (convention or contract, legal and testamentary inheritance, accession, usucaption, and court order). In the case of private property land – since it is part of the civil sphere –, the right to property is transmissible in its entirety or in its dependent parts.

*Exceptions to the norm* – that property right can be acquired absolutely by physical and legal entities – are those stipulated expressly in the law. There are cases of special incapacities and legal inalienabilities:

*a) Special incapacities*:

*– foreign citizens, expatriates, and legal persons can acquire the right to private ownership of land – in the limited conditions stipulated by Art. 44, paragraph 2 of the Constitution and Law No 312/2005.*

As far as private ownership of land is concerned, Art. 44, point 2 of the Constitution recognizes the possibility of acquiring property rights over land by foreign citizens and expatriates, but only under conditions resulting from Romania's joining the EU and other international treaties that Romania is part of, based on reciprocity, according to the conditions stipulated by organic law. According to this constitutional text, which is repeated by Art. 6, paragraph 1 of Law No 312/2005, in addition to the fulfilment of special conditions, the general condition of reciprocity[2] in such treaties is obligatory. So far, Romania has not signed such an international treaty, which allows certain foreign nationals and expatriates to acquire land in Romania.

Law No 312/2005, referring to the acquisition of private property right over lands by foreign citizens, expatriates, and other foreign legal entities, grants the possibility of acquisition of property rights over lands to these categories of people, delayed until Romania's joining the European Union (1 January 2007), and under the conditions of international treaties that Romania is part of.

According to Art. 5, paragraph 1 of Law No 312/2005, *the citizen of a member state, the expatriate with residency in a member state or in Romania, and the legal entity constituted according to the legislation of a member state can acquire property right over agricultural lands, forests, and forest-lands after 7 years from the date of Romania's joining the European Union*. This special limitation will be implemented on 1 January 2014, when the seven-year period stipulated in the legal text above expires.

Exceptions to this general rule are:

I) farmers, who carry out independent activities and are either citizens of member states or expatriates with domicile in a member state, who establish their residency in Romania, or expatriates with domicile in Romania. These persons acquire the property right over agricultural lands, forests, and forest-lands according to the same conditions applicable to Romanian citizens, from the date of Romania's joining the European Union. The state of being a farmer must be proved with issued documents, according to each case, either by the suitable authorities of the member state or the state of origin, or by the certificate issued by the Romanian Ministry of Agriculture, Forests, and Rural Development. All these persons have the obligation to not change the designation of the agricultural

2 The reciprocity condition has many exceptions in international law. As a rule, international treaties have a synallagmatic character, establishing reciprocal rights and obligations for both parties. However, in the context of the constitutional text, reciprocity becomes obligatory. In international law, the reciprocity condition has a second meaning: certain problems can be resolved through agreement of states or on the basis of reciprocity. Namely, reciprocity is a principle of solution, of solving the problems between the states, in the absence of a treaty. Art. 6, paragraph 1 of Law No 312/2005 states the condition of reciprocity: *The foreign citizen, expatriate, and legal entity belonging to tertiary states cannot acquire the right to private ownership of land in more favourable conditions than those applicable to a citizen of a member state and to the legal entity constituted according to the legislation of a member state.*

lands, forests, and forestlands before the expiration of the seven-year period, stipulated in Art. 5, paragraph 1, Law No 312/2005.

II) the citizen of a member state who is not a resident in Romania, the expatriate who is a non-resident in Romania with domicile in a member state, and the legal entity who is a non-resident constituted according to the legislation of a member state, can acquire property right over land for the purpose of secondary residency and secondary headquarters, respectively, at the fulfilment of 5 years from Romania's joining the European Union (1 January 2012).

– *foreign citizens and expatriates can acquire the right to private ownership of land through legal inheritance, according to the conditions stipulated in Art. 44, paragraph 2 of the Constitution*.

Therefore, through legal inheritance, foreign citizens can acquire the right to private property. *Per a contrario*, such individuals cannot acquire the right to private property in case of testamentary inheritance. Taking into consideration the principles guiding the application of civil law in time, foreign citizens and expatriates can acquire the right to private ownership of lands in Romania from the effective date of the Revision Law of the Romanian Constitution No 429/2003, but only if the succession case in reference to which the legal inheritance is exercised was opened after this date.

*b) Cases of legal inalienability*:

– *requirement of the authentic form of legal acts disposing of immovable goods (lands and constructions*);

– *land acquired according to the criteria in Art. 19, paragraph 1, art-s 21 and 43 of Law No 18/1991 of the Land Registry cannot be expropriated through agreements inter vivos for a period of ten years from the beginning of the year following the one in which the property was registered, under the sanction of absolute voidness of the expropriation act, and the acquired apartments by tenants or title holders of apartment contracts (apartments which are not restituted in nature to the former owners or their heirs) cannot be expropriated for a period of ten years from the date of purchase, according to Art. 9, last paragraph of Law No 112/1995*;

– *exercise of the right to pre-emption* (Deak 1992: 34–43, Beleiu 1992: 3–15) *in selling movables and immovables*. The right to pre-emption was defined in specialty books as *that subjective civil right recognized by law to certain titleholders, which gives priority to such individuals to purchase unincorporated agricultural areas, seriatim, and under other conditions prescribed by law* (Chelaru 1998: 19–25). Evidently, the cited author only consulted the provisions of Law No 18/1991 of the Land Registry valid at that time. Art. 1730, paragraph 1 of the NCC defines the right to pre-emption as, *according to the conditions established by the law or contract, the title holder of the right to pre-emption, called pre-emptor, can purchase a good with priority.* Therefore, the right to pre-emption

is a priority right to purchase a good, according to the conditions established by the law or through convention. At the same time, taking into consideration legal regulation, we can define the right to pre-emption as *a right with a temporary character, established by the law or through a convention of the parties, in which certain title holders called pre-emptors have the priority right to buy movables or immovables*.

The right to pre-emption must be viewed as a possibility conferred upon a person to purchase a good with precedence over any other buyer. This priority materializes through the exercise of the right to private property following the consent agreement of the parties, which allows the characterization of this institution as extra-contractual.

The right to pre-emption is provided by art-s 1730–1740 of the NCC, and its domain of application extends to all movables and immovables. Titleholders of the legal right to pre-emption are the following:

I) in the case of lands that belong to the forest registry in private property, these can be sold respecting, seriatim, the pre-emptive right of co-owners or neighbours (Art. 1746 of NCC);

II) in the case of agricultural goods, tenant farmers have the right to pre-emption over the rented agricultural goods (Art. 1849 of NCC).

Art. 1732 of NCC regarding the conditions of the exercise of the right to pre-emption provides that the seller is obliged to notify the pre-emptor immediately regarding a contract signed with a third party. Notification can also be done by the third party. It includes the first and last name of the seller, the description of the good, the responsibilities incumbent upon him/her, the terms and conditions of the sale, as well as the place where the good is situated. The pre-emptor can exercise his/her right by communicating to the seller his agreement to sign a selling contract, together with the specification of the price to the seller. The right to pre-emption is exercised, in the case of movable sales, in a period of at most 10 days, and in the case of immovable sales in a period of at most 30 days. In both cases, the time period is calculated from the pre-emptor's communication of the notification.

As regards the effects of the exercise of pre-emption (Art. 1733 of the NCC), the contract of sale is considered final between the pre-emptor and seller under the conditions included in the contract with the third party, and the latter contract is terminated retroactively. However, the seller is responsible to the third person for good faith for an eviction resulting from the exercise of pre-emption.

The NCC, inspired by French legislation, opts for the possibility of the exercise of the pre-emptive right following the consent agreement between the seller and the third party, under the form of a retraction. The contract is signed between the owner and the third party, subsequently the title holder of the pre-emptive right (co-owner or neighbour, in the case of lands belonging to the Forest Registry);

then, the tenant farmer, regarding rented agricultural goods, or the renter, when signing a new lease, is notified about the existence of the translative property act. These persons may exercise their rights, substituting themselves for the buyer from the initial contract, assuming in this way all the rights and obligations of the third party, as in the case of a cession (Malaurie, Aynès, and Gautier 2001: 132). We have reservations about this solution chosen by the Romanian legislature. We consider that the chosen option – the exercise of the right to pre-emption following the finalization of legal acts – will not prove its practical utility. The procedure needed to exercise this right is much more useful and pragmatic if it is carried out before the consent agreement on a good, which better serves the effectiveness of the civil sphere.

## 3. Legal Forms of Property Rights

The right to property is presented as pure and simple or affected by various forms. (Stătescu, Bîrsan 1980: 177–179, Beleiu 1994: 154).

*The pure and simple right to property is the right belonging to a single person and is acquired by its owner actually, surely, and irrevocably; its existence in the owner's patrimony does not depend on a future event or circumstance which could terminate it through resolution, revocation, or annulment.*

*The right to property affected by various modalities exists when its general characteristics are modified; its existence in the patrimony of a person is uncertain, another person exercises his/her attributes, or it belongs alike and at the same time to two or more subjects of the law, and each is entitled to a part of this right.*

The pure and simple right to property is the norm, and the right to property affected by various forms is the exception.

Clause 555, paragraph 2 of the NCC specifies that: *Under the law, the right to private property is susceptible to various modalities and partitions, according to the case in question*. One must note, however, that not only the right to property is susceptible to modifications but all the other main/principal real rights.

The Romanian Civil Law recognizes the following forms of property rights: a) resolvable property, b) annullable property, and c) common property. Some authors (Josserand: 1938: 1009–1014), due to the common characteristics of the resolvable and annullable properties, include both in the larger notion of *conditioned property*.

*Resolvable property* exists when the transfer of the right was done through a legal act affected by a resolutionary condition. It is also called revocable property. Let us suppose a person sells a good to another: under the condition that if he/she has a baby, that good should revert to his/her or his/her heirs' patrimony. In

the example given, the acquirer is an owner under resolutory condition, and the transmitter is an owner in suspension.

Conditional obligation is defined by Art. 1399 of the NCC: *an obligation affected by condition is an obligation whose efficacy or termination depends on an uncertain future event, and the condition is resolutory when its fulfilment determines the termination of the obligation* (Art. 1401, paragraph 1 of the NCC). The fate of the right to property depends on the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of the uncertain future event. Theoretically, we are in the presence of the *pendente conditione:* the good that is the object of expropriation belongs to two owners. Therefore, the expropriator has a right to property that is subject to a suspensive condition and the acquirer has a right to property that is subject to a resolutory condition. The acquirer's resolutory condition has the effects of a suspensive condition toward the transmitter, and vice versa. Namely, the acquirer is the actual and temporary owner; his right is made uncertain by the resolutory condition, and the transmitter has the possibility of becoming the owner of the property in question if the suspensive condition materializes.

Resolvable property can result from the convention of the parties; there are two cases when it results from the law. The first situation is regulated by Art. 1022, paragraphs 1–2 of the NCC: the promise of donation is revoked by right if one of the revocation cases for ingratitude appears anterior to its execution, as prescribed by Art. 1023 of the NCC (if the beneficiary attempted to harm the donor, a person close to him/her, or, knowing that others intend to harm the donor, did not notify him/her; if the beneficiary is guilty of penal acts, cruelty, or serious injuries to the donor; if the beneficiary unjustifiedly refuses to ensure food to the donor in need, limited to the actual worth of the donated good and considering the condition of the good at the time of donation). Similarly, the promise of donation is revoked by right when, anterior to its execution, the material situation of the promisor has deteriorated to the degree that the execution of the promise has become excessively onerous for him/her or the promisor has become insolvent. The second situation is regulated by Art. 1031 of the NCC, which stipulates that donations between married couples are revocable only during marriage, rendering uncertain the property rights of the beneficiary spouse.

*Annullable property* is a legal form of the right to property, which appears in the situation when the transfer of property from one person to another is done on the basis of a legal act struck down by relative (annullable) annulment. The relative annulment of the legal act is very important, that is, it should focus on the interests of the parties who signed the agreement, and therefore contain the possibility for the expressed or tacit confirmation of those who are interested to invoke annulment.

In the case of a relative annulment of the legal act, the action taken for its court annulment is prescribed by the law (in the NCC) within the time frame of three years.

The one who acquired the right to property is in an uncertain situation until the fulfilment of the prescribed term because the success of the annulment action will retroactively terminate his/her title.

We need to mention that if the annullable act is expressly confirmed by the one who could have invoked its annullability during this time period, the act's fragility disappears, and the right to property is definitely consolidated.

These are also the two effects of annullable property.

If the nullified act is confirmed by the one entitled to an annulment action, the right is consolidated without the right to return or oppose the annulment motive to a possible forced execution. The confirmation effects do not take place in the case of third parties, with the exception of universal successors or simple contract creditors.

The second effect takes place when the annulment motive is invoked and the title of the annullable property is annulled.

*Common property* is considered to be the most important form of the right to property. In the case of this property, the prerogatives of common law belong to two or more titleholders together and simultaneously. According to the provisions of Art. 632, paragraph 1 in the NCC, common property is of two kinds: *a) common property based on quota (co-ownership)* and *b) common property in joint ownership*.

Common property based on quota or co-ownership is a form of common property where a good belongs to more titleholders simultaneously and it is, at the same time, undivided in its entity. Each co-owner has an ideal, abstract, mathematical share determined, which is expressed by fraction or percentage. The right of each owner meets the rights of the other owners as regards every part of the good.

*The right to property in joint ownership* is a form of common property in which a good belongs undividedly, indivisibly to all titleholders, who own it together. According to Art. 667, joint ownership can result from the law or on the basis of a legal act.

The main characteristic of the right to common property in joint ownership is that the title holders of this right do not know either the extent of their property rights or the share they are entitled to or the goods each possesses in their entity.

*Periodical property* was introduced into the NCC (art-s 687–692) as an absolute novelty. It is possible for the right to private property to have more titleholders, each exercising successively and repetitively his/her attribute of use over an immovable or movable in equally or unequally determined intervals of time. This practical application generally appeared in the domain of real estate investments, especially in the case of vacation homes.

The general system of periodical property is applied obligatorily in the absence of some special regulations. In other words, whenever the characteristic elements

of periodical property are present, another legal system of private property cannot be chosen. This solution is provided by Art. 687 of NCC, according to which *the dispositions of the present chapter (periodical property) are applied in the absence of a special regulation. Per a contrario,* if a legal derogatory regime has been established, it will be applied.

The following characteristics result from the notion of periodical property:

– the right to property belongs to many title holders;

– the attribute of use is exercised successively and repetitively by the title holders in equally or unequally determined intervals of time;

– its objects can be any kind of movables or immovables.

According to the provisions of Art. 688 of the NCC, periodical property is formed on the basis of a legal act, in which *the dispositions regarding the land registry are applied accordingly*. The legal act can be a bequest or a convention. For example: the parties agree to acquire the right to periodical property for the building of a house; the parties agree to acquire periodical property right over the purchase of a certain good; the parties agree to transform co-ownership into periodical property.

## 4. The Right to Public Property

The right to public property is a property right belonging to the state or to a territorial-administrative unit over goods, which, in their nature or by law, are of public use or interest, under the condition that they be acquired through one of the ways prescribed by the law; the prerogatives of this right are exercised as public right, which is *inalienable*, *imprescriptible, and unseizable (exempt from seizure)*.

The normative acts regulating the right to public property provide for the titleholders of the right in a limiting manner. Accordingly, Art. 136.2 of the Constitution states that *public property is protected and guaranteed by law and belongs to the state and territorial-administrative units*. Similarly, Art. 1 of Law No 213/1998 stipulates that the right to public property belongs to the state or territorial-administrative units. Art. 860, paragraph 1 of NCC distinguishes between public property goods of the national, county, or local public domain. In reference to public property lands, Art. 4, paragraph 2 of Land Registry Law No 18/1991 prescribes that *the public domain can be of national interest, in which case the property, in the system of public rights, belongs to the state, or of local interest, in which case the property, also in the system of public rights, belongs to the towns, townships, cities, or counties*.

One concludes from the legal texts above that the titleholders of the right to public property are:

*a) the state*, over goods that are part of the national public domain;

*b) territorial administrative units* – townships, towns, cities, and counties –, over goods that are part of the local or county public domain and belong to territorial administrative units as legal entities of public right.

In this context, one must emphasize that no other subject of public or private right can be the titleholder of the right to property over goods that constitute the public domain. Such legal entities acquire, by law, the right to administer, use, lease, or rent the goods that are part of the public domain, which are real rights. However, these rights cannot be mistaken for the exercise of attributes of the public property right.

Art. 863 of NCC principally regulates cases of acquisition of public property rights. These are:

a) public acquisition carried out according to the law;

b) expropriation for public utility according to the law;

c) donation or bequest, accepted according to the law, if the good, through its nature or through the disposer's will, becomes of public use or interest;

d) contract with a gratuitous clause, if the good, through its nature or through the acquirer's will, becomes of public use or interest;

e) transfer of a good from the private domain of the state into its public domain, or from the private domain of a territorial-administrative unit into its public domain, according to the law;

f) other ways established by the law.

The inclusion of goods in the public domain can be accomplished through means of civil, administrative, or penal law.

It is important to note that the inclusion in the public or private domain of the state or the territorial-administrative units depends on the nature, distinction, or characteristics of the goods in question.

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# The Interoperability between the Public and Private Sectors in Light of Adult Education. Supplements to the Planned Downsizing in the Public Sector

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**Abstract.** The current study is a result of the Hungarian government's aspiration to cut bureaucracy and increase public administration's efficiency, thus impacting personnel and reorganizing the labour market. The public-sector headcount reduction is being justified in terms of Hungary's inadequate private-/public-sector employment ratio. This reorganization can come to fruition only via the development of intellectual capital and a well-designed system for retraining and further education. In cases of retraining and further education offered by the state, we must be wary of generational differences and possible motivations, while also keeping in mind the influence education can have on the market, society, and the individual. Our research has shown that the demand for a given type of instruction is also influenced by the generational differences among those who wish to learn. Overall, our respondents showed an interest in learning.

**Keywords:** public sector, private sector, employment, knowledge, education, retraining, bureaucracy

## I. Introductory Thoughts

2016 began with a significant announcement for the Hungarian public administration staff: on January 21st, the Minister of the Prime Minister's Office announced that the government planned the restructuring or elimination of more than seventy state/national background institutional budgetary entities.[1]

1 Mandiner, *Durva közigazgatási átszervezésre készül a kormány,* January 21st, 2016. Available at: http://mandiner.hu/cikk/20160121_durva_kozigazgatasi_atszervezesre_keszul_a_kormany (2016/03/21).
Quote from the article: 'János Lázár said that in the next few days negotiations would begin between the Ministry of the Prime Minister's Office and the various portfolios on how to return the background institutions and budgetary entities to the portfolios and eliminate outsourcing,

Since that initial announcement, the figure of 100–150 thousand dismissed public sector workers by the end of the term has been made known, which by all means will play a significant role in the reorganization of the Hungarian labour market. Although the announcement itself came as a surprise, there had been earlier indications. In 2015, the government published a document titled *Public Administration and Public Services Development Strategy 2014–2020*,[2] which made reference to streamlining bureaucracy, albeit in a different context. Earlier, the government had already set the goal of creating a strong, service-oriented and customer-friendly state in an attempt to elevate Hungarian public administration efficiency to European and international levels. The 2015 development strategy only confirmed this stance. One of the ways to achieve it is by reducing bureaucracy, which, on the one hand, means simplifying both the regulatory environment and client administration, thereby reducing cost and increasing transparency, and, on the other hand – and more importantly from the perspective of the current study –, modernizing the management of human resources.[3]

Since January, the government has been working on a plan to help those who will be negatively impacted find employment again, while at the same time confirming the launch of the Karrier Híd (Carrier Bridge) programme, which will spur migration from the public to the private sector through retraining and other means.[4]

In March 2016, we conducted a questionnaire survey in order to develop a broader picture of the interoperability between the public and private sectors, paying particular attention to the impact adult education had on employment mobility. In the current study, we wish to show this interrelationship, using our findings from the questionnaire, and to outline the possible outcomes of the impact and intercession of (re)training, as we believe that during the labour market reorganization timeframe (resulting from the planned bureaucratic downsizing) the examination of certain matters will indeed be relevant. Thus, we will review the scientific and policy aspects influencing the subject. The professional literature has extensively covered these aspects, and when considered on an individual basis each one could qualify as a research topic unto itself. That being the case, the goal of the current paper is only to identify and analyse the associated problems; no detailed solutions will be forthcoming.

thereby running the system more simply, cost-effectively, and expeditiously. He indicated that fifty thousand people are currently working in these institutions and organizations.'

2 *Közigazgatás és közszolgáltatás-fejlesztési stratégia 2014–2020*. Available at: http://www.kormany.hu/download/8/42/40000/K%C3%B6zigazgat%C3%A1s_feljeszt%C3%A9si_strat%C3%A9gia_.pdf (2016/03/21).

3 'The goal of the Strategy is complex: reducing gross procedural deadlines and resources used, including both human and financial resources. That is, we cannot allow shortened deadlines to lead to an increase in allocated resources. Rather we must achieve real growth in efficiency in public administration.' *Közigazgatás és közszolgáltatás-fejlesztési stratégia 2014–2020*, pp. 32.

4 See: http://www.vg.hu/gazdasag/hitel-a-karrier-hidban-464676. *Hitel a Karrier Hídban*, January 28th, 2016 (2016/03/21).

When defining the issue, we will have to deal with such questions as what knowledge is. Drawing conclusions about adult education will require us to review the professional literature pertaining to andragogy. Information, knowledge (both *explicit* and *tacit*), and the competencies essential from a labour market perspective all make up part of the conceptual foundation of the issue. Moreover, it raises the question: If the focus is on labour market mobility, then what are the most important lessons and competencies for the state, the market, and the individuals making up the market? Utilizing andragogical insights and the findings of both European and domestic surveys, we must review the adult population's attitudes towards education and where Hungary stands in making the European goal of *lifelong learning* a reality. The above concerns will surely be raised during the public sector's reorganization.

Adult education (whether within the framework of school or outside of it, formal or informal, or retraining or further education) has never been more indispensable than today. Questions open to debate, however, are what methods should be used in the transference of education and what kind of training/development is necessary. Another unresolved question is what knowledge is required nowadays by the market players that hire workers and by the state, which takes complicated economic and social goals into consideration. The value of knowledge is relative and depends on the circumstances in which it is used. Knowledge is both a destination and a journey (Szabóné Fenyvesi 2006: 246–247). So, if we are to examine the interoperability between the public and private sectors, then we must research where the interests of the market and the state overlap. We must pay special attention to the prevailing trends and objectives of public administration and to economic and labour market indicators.

Three different but nonetheless interrelated adult educational hypotheses have guided us:

– that adult education boosts the possibility for public/private sector career advancement and mobility;

– that public/private sector mobility as a result of adult education is an overall economic, social, and personal good;

– that public/private sector mobility as a result of adult education reduces unemployment.

Based on both our review of the professional literature and our own survey, we believe that adult education indeed increases mobility as it is in accordance with the development of expected labour market skills and competencies. Mobility certainly serves economic purposes as it drives savings at the state level and increased tax revenues, which lead to more competitive public administration. It also serves social purposes as, on the one hand, a labour market mobile employee does not depend on the state and, on the other hand, the state may therefore make budgetary assumptions of fewer pay-outs of unemployment benefits in the

long term. Mobility may serve the personal good too as long as we view personal development and financial security as such. Mobility also reduces unemployment.

## II. The Basic Data of the Questionnaire Examining Interoperability (March 2016)

We conducted the survey in March 2016, using a self-reporting questionnaire. Of the almost 360 responses, males made up 48.9%, females 51.1%. By age category, 10.3% was under 25 years of age; 27.7% between the ages of 25 and 40, which is to say belonging mainly to Generation Y; 31.6% between the ages of 40 and 55; 23.2% between 55 and 65.

The breakdown by educational attainment was the following: 6.1% lacked a general certificate of secondary education *(graduation/érettségi)*; 26.6% had a general certificate of secondary education and an intermediate- to advanced-level trade certificate; 67.3% had either a college or university degree.

The breakdown by employment was the following: a plurality of respondents (44.7%) were white-collar employees, while 14% were working in some other field of non-manual work. 17.3% were in leadership positions and 16.5% were entrepreneurs. The vast majority (64.8%) had more than fifteen years of work experience. At the time of the survey, 45.5% worked in the public sector, 31.3% in the private sector, 8.7% simultaneously in both, and 5.3% in the civil sector. The rest of the respondents were inactive (either retired, attending school, involuntarily unemployed, on maternity leave, etc.).

A high percentage of respondents (41.9%) had worked or were currently working in both sectors, thus disposing of an intimate familiarity of both sectors.

*Have you ever changed jobs, moving from the public sector to the private sector or vice versa, from the private sector to the public sector?*




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|---|---|---|
| *Yes, I moved from the private sector to the public sector.* | *56* | *15.6%* |
| *Yes, I moved from the public sector to the private sector.* | *31* | *8.7%* |
| *Yes, I have moved from one sector to the other several times.* | *63* | *17.6%* |
| *No.* | *208* | *58.1%* |

*Source*: Own survey, March 2016

**Diagram 1.** *Respondents' relationship with the public and private sectors*

## III. Knowledge and Competencies in the 21st Century

In our age, dwindling resources are becoming an increasing concern; simultaneously renewable energy resources are receiving increasing attention. Researchers believe that mankind's capacity for knowledge is similarly inexhaustible and deserves greater attention in the future. Despite its appearance of inexhaustibility, it should nonetheless be managed with care. 'An increasing number of studies shows that the only companies and economies capable of unlocking the inherent power of knowledge are the ones that properly manage it' (Szabóné Fenyvesi 2006: 243). In the history of humankind, the process by which and especially to what extent science and technology transform society, culture, the economy, and institutions has been unprecedented, giving rise to challenges that humankind may not be prepared to face. It would seem, however, that knowledge (more precisely, the ability and willingness to learn) presents the best solution if we wish to avoid being caught off-guard. Our mind-set towards education is being recast by the paradigm of lifelong learning.

What is the knowledge that today's active and responsible citizen/employee should possess? It is common to refer to our era as the Information Age. At the same time, however, one can sense that in the torrent of information knowledge has been relegated to a lesser role. At the very bottom of the hierarchy of knowledge is datum, which is nothing more than an element of information. That element becomes information only if it has meaning for the subject. Knowledge occupies a higher position in the hierarchy. Knowledge is 'interpreted and subjective information that can be activated and productively used. It is information that bears meaning and has the capacity to be applied and utilized' (Szabóné Fenyvesi 2006: 244). In simpler terms, it means that the human mind uses data to create information and knowledge. Knowledge belongs uniquely to who has possession of it.

The concept of knowledge can be further specified, which a famous researcher of Hungarian descent, Michael Polanyi, was the first to do. He divided knowledge into two types: *explicit* and *tacit*. Explicit knowledge is knowledge that can be expressed in numbers and words, while tacit knowledge is inferred knowledge that is entirely unique and difficult to explain (formalize). Premonitions, suspicions, and intuition are all classified as tacit knowledge and are deeply rooted in our actions and experiences. Tacit knowledge has a technical or practical component that translates into skills and proficiency, and a cognitive dimension composed of faith, ideas, values, schemata, and mental models (Szabóné Fenyvesi 2006: 245–246). This type of knowledge has as much to do with being successful as professional knowledge does.

*More than 90% of respondents in our survey believed that their tacit knowledge expanded greatly or at least sufficiently during their working years.*

*It has been said that an employee not only gains professional experience through his work but learns how to work. 'Learning to work' is a passive, personal knowledge that an employee acquires through practice, and it is as important as professional knowledge. How much has your passive, personal knowledge developed during your working career?*




| | | |
|---|---|---|
| *Greatly* | *213* | *59.5%* |
| *Sufficiently* | *113* | *31.6%* |
| *Little* | *18* | *5%* |
| *Not at all* | *14* | *3.9%* |

*Source*: Own survey, March, 2016

**Diagram 2.** *Tacit knowledge*

A competitive economy, sustainable growth, improving employment numbers, better and more job opportunities, and the attainment of social cohesion all depend on whether European society is capable of adapting its knowledge and competencies on a regular basis. In March 2000, the leaders of the European Union met in Lisbon to address the above issues. Afterwards, this action and developmental plan would be referred to as the *Lisbon Strategy*, the goal of which was to make the European Union by 2010 the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.[5] Obviously, the global financial crisis of 2008 up-ended these plans. In 2010, the European Commission proposed a new programme named *Europe 2020*,[6] which was considered an extension of the Lisbon Strategy. According to the new document, one of the three pillars of economic growth was smart growth, which indicated the formation of a knowledge- and innovation-based economy.

The pan-European strategies devised to bring forth a knowledge-based society focusing all attention on adult education, particularly on developing a successful European practice of *lifelong learning*. Since the beginning of the 2000's, a framework has been developed, going through several phases, which encompasses key competencies to spur learning over an entire lifetime.[7] On the

5 *The Lisbon Strategy 2000–2010. An Analysis and Evaluation of the Methods Used and Results Achieved.* Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201107/20110718ATT24270/20110718ATT 24270 EN.pdf (2013/03/21).

6 *Europe 2020: Europe's Growth Strategy: Growing to a Sustainable and Job-Rich Future.* http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/europe_2020_explained.pdf (2013/03/21).

7 A Hungarian-language article is available at the Hungarian Institute for Educational Research

one hand, the framework determines what we may refer to as key competencies and, on the other hand, it reveals their significance in driving personal success, be it at the workplace or any other area of life.

> Key competencies are the combination of knowledge, skills, and attitudes necessary for personal fulfilment and development, social inclusion, and employment. Key competencies should be acquired during compulsory education and training. These competencies will form the basis for further learning across a lifetime. …key competencies are transferable, which means that they may be applied in numerous different situations and contexts. Additionally, key competencies are multifunctional, which means that they may be used to reach different goals and solve different problems and tasks. They are the prerequisites to personal, work, and future educational success.[8]

The European Union framework has identified eight basic competencies (see the *Appendix*). These competencies should be learned in elementary school and further developed over a lifetime. This reference framework also applies to disadvantaged groups, who shall learn them in remedial instruction. These same competencies may also be applied in high-level further development/training to individuals active in the labour market.[9]

There is an obvious interrelation between successful work and the key competencies. A Hungarian Central Statistical Office study reports the following: The European statistical system (Eurostat) closely monitors businesses to see which competencies' development they are supporting. From the report: 'In the Continuing Vocational Training Survey (CVTS), participants were asked which skills and competencies among those listed were important. All of the skills and competencies deemed important in terms of work could be classified as a key competency or as being partially akin to one'.[10]

According to data gathered on Hungarian businesses in 2010, most of the businesses (irrespective of size) reported that technical, practical, and job-specific skills were the most important. More than 40% reported that teamwork was also important; likewise, more than 40% reported problem-solving skills as such. Foreign language knowledge and IT know-how were also considered to be sought-after skills, while typically only the larger businesses considered leadership skills to be important.[11]

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and Development website: *Az egész életen át tartó tanuláshoz szükséges kulcskompetenciák.* http://ofi.hu/tudastar/nemzetkozi-kitekintes/egesz-eleten-at-tarto (2013/03/21)

8 http://ofi.hu/tudastar/nemzetkozi-kitekintes/egesz-eleten-at-tarto (2013/03/21)

9 http://ofi.hu/tudastar/nemzetkozi-kitekintes/egesz-eleten-at-tarto (2013/03/21)

10 The Hungarian Central Statistical Office: *Felnőttoktatás, felnőttképzés*, March 2014. p. 20. https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/stattukor/felnottoktatas13.pdf (2013/03/22)

11 https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/stattukor/felnottoktatas13.pdf (2013/03/22)

*Employees recognize the perceived or real needs of the labour market, which our survey's answers also reflected. Professional training was the most popular, while demand for foreign language instruction and computer training were also high.*

*Currently, for which type of training would you have the most need? Which one would you consider as the most useful?*




| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *1.* | *Professional (further training in one's current field)* | *195* | *54.5%* |
| *2.* | *Legal* | *47* | *13.1%* |
| *3.* | *Economics/Finance* | *48* | *13.4%* |
| *4.* | *Marketing* | *51* | *14.2%* |
| *5.* | *Human Resources Management* | *38* | *10.6%* |
| *6.* | *IT* | *103* | *28.8%* |
| *7.* | *Communications* | *64* | *17.9%* |
| *8.* | *Foreign language* | *198* | *55.3%* |

*Source*: Own survey, March, 2016

**Diagram 3.** *Most useful trainings*

The compilation of data (on a like-for-like basis and employing a uniform methodology) related to adult education/adult training was begun in 2011/2012 in the member states of the European Union. Within this framework, Hungary began collecting data in Q1 2012, the findings of which the Hungarian Central Statistical Office published in March 2014. In 2011, 27.2% of Hungarians between the ages of 25 and 64 took part in some form of organized instruction or training. Broken down by sex, women had taken part in a slightly higher proportion (28.2% vs 26.2%). According to the survey, there was a strong correlation between economic engagement and participation in learning: '…those engaged in the economy – including those who are employed – learn in much higher numbers than those who do not. More than a third of employed Hungarians participated in some form of organized learning, including nearly 40% of women and less than 33% of men.'[12]

12 https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/stattukor/felnottoktatas13.pdf (2013/03/22).

The biggest gap in terms of participation in adult learning can be seen on the basis of highest educational level attained. It is worthwhile to take a closer look at these data if we wish to learn how and why it is possible for an individual to fall outside the influence of education, especially when considering training (instruction), whose purpose is to lower unemployment. What are the attitudes (or lack thereof) characteristic of someone unable to seize educational opportunities both within the school system and outside of it?[13] Presumably, the 'Learning to Learn' key competency plays a major role in explaining why the unemployable cannot effectively compete against the followers of *lifelong learning* in either the labour market or on a social level. According to the 2014 Hungarian Central Statistical Office report, '…while only 10% of individuals with at most a primary school education participated in some form of institutionalized learning, the percentage rises to 30% among those with a general certificate of secondary education and to 50% among those with a college or university education'.[14]

The same trend is observable in the forms of training (instruction) outside of the school system. One quarter of the population between the ages of 25 and 64 took part in such training and, with regards to educational attainment, while 47% of those with higher educational attainment participated, the number drops to approximately 10% for those with at most a primary school education.[15] The risk is high for individuals who choose not to participate in learning: Not only are they locked out of the labour market but the opportunities offered in our rapidly-changing 21st-century society may potentially be beyond their grasp as well, all while their lack of social integration manifests as a permanent and difficult-to-solve challenge for the state and society.

Thus, everyone could benefit from an improved understanding of certain key competencies, the means of which would be provided within the framework of social uplift for those who have been left behind, while the adjustments of the ever-changing needs of the labour market would help those citizens already participating in the labour market.

13 The 2009 study on adult education by the State Audit Office of Hungary makes note of the following when presenting the flaws and shortcomings of the Hungarian adult educational system: 'The people who have the greatest need to develop their competencies, those at a disadvantage on the labour market, participate in the lowest numbers in the training. The participation rate of Hungarians with at most an 8th-grade education is 25 percent, versus a 42-percent average for jobseekers'. Jánossy, Dániel–Dr Kiss, Daisy–Dr Pulay, Gyula: *A felnőttképzési rendszerek hatékonysága nemzetközi összehasonlításban*. The State Audit Office of Hungary, 2009. pp. 7–8. https://www.asz.hu/storage/files/files/Szakmai%20kutat%C3%A1s/2009/t312.pdf (2016/03/22).

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid. p. 16, 3rd diagram.

## IV. Some Traits of the Hungarian Private and Public Sectors in the Years Following the System Changeover

If the plans to cut government bureaucracy come to fruition, then the redundant public sector employees will inundate the private sector, raising problems related to interoperability between the two sectors. A commonality among studies is the constant comparing of the public and private sectors to each other, for best practices (irrespective of which sector they originate from) are an important aspect in public administration policy debates. An article published in 2014 compared and contrasted human resources management in both the public and private sectors on the international level, paying special attention to administrative trends and region affiliation in the examined countries. From the introduction of the article: 'The public/private sectors' debate is taking place on multiple levels: in the trade press as much as on the floor of legislatures and other areas of social life. The issues encompass the traditional problems associated with privatization such as questions about healthcare coverage and other services (utilities, pension plans, etc.) belonging in private hands or to the public in general' (Poór–Karoliny–Musztiné Bátfai–Pótó–Farkas 2014: 127). The surveys do evince that the public administration tendencies that characterized the years preceding the System Changeover from communism had left their mark, for even as late as 2004–2005 the human resources management teams in the public sectors of the Eastern and Central European countries had more in common with each other than with the management teams of those countries following the New Public Management (NPM) philosophy. By the time of the 2008–2010 surveys, however, the picture had changed, with Eastern and Central Europe moving into the direction of adopting NPM practices (Poór–Karoliny–Musztiné Bátfai–Pótó–Farkas 2014: 144).

Human resources management had earlier held three beliefs: 1) that public administration was a specialized field requiring skills that could not be gained from the outside or from other fields of the labour market; 2) that these skills could not be utilized outside of public administration; 3) that therefore interoperability between the public and private sectors was not characteristic (Gellén 2013: 37). As a result, none of these were valid any longer. Weber's Model for Bureaucracy had had deep roots in Hungarian society, but following the System Changeover, the introduction of the public management approach was attempted in several areas, which may have triggered interoperability between the sectors. Interoperability was further strengthened by the fact that following the System Changeover both healthcare services and education expanded into the private sector, thus operating within the framework of public services and outside them. Privately-

run hospitals and clinics appeared, as well as private universities, foundation schools, and nursery schools. The majority of the doctors, pharmacists, educators, and instructors working in these establishments had left the public sector behind, finding contentment in the private sector.

The survey results in the 2014 study shows that the similarities and differences in public and private sector human resources management practices are variable across countries, regions, and time. Currently in our region, the so-called *crossvergence* is trending. That is, both the similarities and differences equally prevail in bi-sector HR practice (Poór–Karoliny–Musztiné Bátfai–Pótó–Farkas 2014: 131–141). This supports our earlier supposition that interoperability between the two sectors could be successful given an adult education system capable of providing relevant and up-to-date knowledge. The answers provided by our own survey's respondents further support this premise.

*More than 50% of respondents believed that in a given field any work-related public-private sector divergence that may arise in everyday practice could be overcome with the right training.*

*Within a given field (for example, management), there are everyday differences between the private sector and the public sector. These may result from the peculiarities of each sector. Do you believe these sector-specific differences can be bridged with organized training for adults?*




| | | |
|---|---|---|
| *Yes, for the most part.* | *158* | *44.1%* |
| *No, for the most part.* | *65* | *18.2%* |
| *Yes, completely.* | *23* | *6.4%* |
| *Not completely.* | *18* | *5%* |
| *I do not know.* | *94* | *26.3%* |

*Source*: Own survey, March 2016

**Diagram 4.** *Sector-specific differences*

Interoperability is further strengthened by the fact that there is currently a large number of public administration employees with non-public administration educational backgrounds. In practice, their vocational/educational backgrounds are varied indeed. (Let us remember that despite their very different backgrounds, a cook working as a public sector employee in either a school or a hospital and a teacher or architect working as a public sector employee or civil servant at a ministry, a local government council, or a background institution are both

classified as state employees.) Furthermore, we must note that there are professions whose numbers are found equally in either sector. The people qualified for these roles can easily find work in either sector. For example, many lawyers are either employed by law firms or run their own, while just as many may work as jurists, prosecutors, or legal advisors in public administration. IT specialists are in a similar situation. Although demand for their work more typically comes from the private sector, many of them have found jobs in public administration or as civil servants. We may observe that those who work in operations – be it as IT specialists, machinists, or architects – are able to work in their fields in either sector. Interoperability is plausible for them, with no real need for retraining or further education. Training is typically necessary only if the given position is an administrative or leadership role because in that case in order to pass the public administration basic and department exams the employee must become familiar with administrative basics. What public institution the given employee works for, however, is irrelevant for professional and personal aptitude (the acquired and necessary experience and knowledge in public administration) must be present at all stages of the progression.

## V. Public-Sector Headcount

Following the System Changeover, the number of government officials, civil servants, public servants, individuals employed in professional services, individuals classified as employed per the Labour Code, individuals assigned public administrative tasks, and state-related corporate sector workers all increased. In Hungary, the role and importance of public administration grew even within the public sector; not only was the proportion of workers in the sector above the regional average but it also compared poorly to the other European countries.[16]

16 Kézdi, Gábor: *Foglalkoztatás és keresetek a közszférában*. In: Társadalmi riport, 1998. Kolosi, Tamás–Tóth, István György–Vukovich, György (eds). Budapest: TÁRKI, pp. 143–170. (TÁRKI's research analysed the circumstances of Hungarian public-sector workers from the 1970s to the end of the 1990s.) The article's online version appeared in 2006. Available at: http://www.tarki.hu/adatbank-h/kutjel/pdf/a868.pdf (2016/03/22): 'When compared to the other former communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe, the percentage of workers in the Hungarian public sector is extremely high: only Slovenia surpasses Hungary's 23%.' 'The Public administration's role in Hungary is especially significant; not only does the percentage, which is greater than 8%, stand out in the region but it is also considered to be extremely high across the whole of Europe… The picture changes, however, if we make the comparison versus total population instead of total number of workers: Hungary is near the bottom for public sector workers per capita among the transition economies.' These discrepancies are a result of Hungary's lower rates of employment. pp. 146–147.

In recent years, the number of employees in the public sector has continued to grow. Of the approximately four million Hungarians who are currently working, about one million are employed by the state, posing a serious risk to economic competitiveness. The number of private-sector employees is lower than what would be considered ideal, resulting in lower economic output, lower tax revenue for the state and stunted GDP growth. Reduced economic growth further results in diminished levels of service by the government (in education, healthcare, culture, infrastructure, etc.) and an overall falling standard of living. In January, Nándor Csepreghy, the Minister of State of the Prime Minister's Office, said that with one-tenth of all Hungarians, or one-fourth of all employees, working for the state, it was the government's goal in the long run to copy the *Scandinavian Model*, whereby only one-tenth of all employees would be composed of public-sector workers. Therefore, within five to ten years, approximately six hundred thousand individuals would move into the private sector, based upon the assumption that the private sector could generate an abundance of new jobs.[17] In other words, the main concern is the public-vs-private-sector employment ratio, and not the aggregate number of employees.[18]




*Source*: http://www.metropol.hu/itthon/cikk/1405209 (2016/03/22)

**Diagram 5.** *The progression of public-sector employment in recent years*

17 Mandiner, Csepreghy: *100–200 ezer közalkalmazottat át lehet terelni a versenyszférába*, January 6th, 2016. Available at: http://mandiner.hu/cikk/20160105_csepreghy_100_200_ezer_kozalkalmazottat_at_lehet_terelni _a_versenyszferaba (2016/03/22).

18 András Földiák, President of the Forum for the Co-operation of Trade Unions, said the following about the government's plans: 'When making a comparison to total population, if we exclude public workers from the total number of public service workers, then we can see right away that Hungary is below the European average. The numbers are not unfavourable at all with other comparisons, only when compared to the private-sector percentage. Let me emphasize that the issue is not so much that the number of public-service workers is high, but rather that the number of private-sector workers is low.' Profession.hu, *Elbocsátások ellen tiltakoznak a közszférában*, January 11th, 2016. https://www.profession.hu/cikk_felmondas/20160111/elbocsatasok-ellen-tiltakoznak-a-kozszferaban/6166# (2016/03/22).

## Number of Public-Sector Employees

In the chart below, we can clearly see the steady increase in the number of public-sector employees (including a year-over-year percentage comparison).

**Table 1.** *Civil servants'/public servants' headcount at state institutions*
State Institutions Total

| Period | | Total number of employed | From this: | | | | Total number of employed | From this: | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Government officials | Civil Servants | Public servants | | | Government officials | Civil Servants | Public servants | |
| | | | | | Total | From this: intellectual | | | | Total | From this: intellectual |
| | | per 1,000 | | | | | previous year = 100 | | | | |
| 2011. | Jan-Mar | 711,8 | 62,4 | 47,0 | 461,9 | 354,7 | 95,3 | .. | 43,3 | 99,1 | 99,4 |
| | Apr-Jun | 751,4 | 62,7 | 46,8 | 459,0 | 353,0 | 95,4 | .. | 43,1 | 98,3 | 98,7 |
| | Jan-Jun | 731,6 | 62,6 | 46,9 | 460,4 | 353,9 | 95,3 | .. | 43,2 | 98,7 | 99,0 |
| | Jul-Sep | 740,7 | 62,8 | 46,7 | 446,8 | 344,5 | 94,6 | .. | 43,0 | 96,6 | 97,3 |
| | Jan-Sep | 734,6 | 62,6 | 46,8 | 455,9 | 350,7 | 95,1 | .. | 43,1 | 98,0 | 98,5 |
| | Oct-Dec | 734,3 | 62,9 | 46,2 | 445,2 | 343,5 | 95,0 | .. | 42,8 | 95,6 | 96,1 |
| | Jan-Dec | 734,6 | 62,7 | 46,7 | 453,2 | 348,9 | 95,1 | .. | 43,1 | 97,4 | 97,9 |
| 2012. | Jan-Mar | 716,1 | 62,1 | 45,6 | 443,3 | 342,5 | 100,6 | 99,5 | 96,9 | 96,0 | 96,6 |
| | Apr-Jun | 768,4 | 62,0 | 45,3 | 442,2 | 341,9 | 102,3 | 98,9 | 96,8 | 96,4 | 96,9 |
| | Jan-Jun | 742,2 | 62,1 | 45,4 | 442,7 | 342,2 | 101,4 | 99,2 | 96,8 | 96,2 | 96,7 |
| | Jul-Sep | 763,0 | 62,2 | 45,1 | 435,3 | 336,6 | 103,0 | 99,1 | 96,6 | 97,4 | 97,7 |
| | Jan-Sep | 749,2 | 62,1 | 45,3 | 440,3 | 340,3 | 102,0 | 99,2 | 96,8 | 96,6 | 97,0 |
| | Oct-Dec | 757,6 | 62,6 | 45,1 | 436,2 | 337,9 | 103,2 | 995,0 | 97,6 | 98,0 | 98,4 |
| | Jan-Dec | 751,3 | 62,2 | 45,3 | 439,2 | 339,7 | 102,3 | 99,3 | 97,0 | 96,9 | 97,4 |
| 2013. | Jan-Mar | 699,4 | 72,9 | 35,5 | 432,0 | 335,8 | 97,7 | 117,4 | 77,8 | 97,4 | 98,0 |
| | Apr-Jun | 803,5 | 75,9 | 34,0 | 449,7 | 349,3 | 104,6 | 122,4 | 75,2 | 101,7 | 102,2 |
| | Jan-Jun | 751,5 | 74,4 | 34,7 | 440,8 | 342,6 | 101,2 | 119,9 | 76,5 | 99,6 | 100,1 |
| | Jul-Sep | 804,5 | 76,3 | 33,9 | 441,7 | 344,5 | 105,4 | 122,6 | 75,2 | 101,5 | 102,4 |
| | Jan-Sep | 769,1 | 75,0 | 34,5 | 441,1 | 343,2 | 102,7 | 120,8 | 76,1 | 100,2 | 100,9 |
| | Oct-Dec | 836,9 | 77,1 | 33,6 | 450,5 | 352,6 | 110,5 | 123,1 | 74,4 | 103,3 | 104,4 |
| | Jan-Dec | 786,1 | 75,6 | 34,3 | 443,5 | 345,6 | 104,6 | 121,4 | 75,7 | 101,0 | 101,7 |
| 2014. | Jan-Mar | 863,6 | 77,3 | 34,0 | 453,4 | 355,2 | 123,5 | 105,9 | 96,0 | 105,0 | 105,8 |
| | Apr-Jun | 831,7 | 78,3 | 34,6 | 455,1 | 355,8 | 103,5 | 103,1 | 101,6 | 101,2 | 101,9 |
| | Jan-Jun | 847,6 | 77,8 | 34,3 | 454,2 | 355,5 | 112,8 | 104,5 | 98,7 | 103,0 | 103,8 |
| | Jul-Sep | 866,2 | 77,7 | 34,7 | 454,3 | 355,5 | 107,7 | 101,9 | 102,3 | 102,8 | 103,2 |
| | Jan-Sep | 853,8 | 77,8 | 34,4 | 454,3 | 355,5 | 111,0 | 103,6 | 99,9 | 103,0 | 103,6 |
| | Oct-Dec | 855,1 | 78,0 | 34,5 | 458,1 | 359,4 | 102,2 | 101,1 | 102,9 | 101,7 | 101,9 |
| | Jan-Dec | 854,1 | 77,8 | 34,5 | 455,2 | 356,5 | 108,7 | 103,0 | 100,6 | 102,6 | 103,2 |

| Period | | Total number of employed | From this: | | | | Total number of employed | From this: | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Government officials | Civil Servants | Public servants | | | Government officials | Civil Servants | Public servants | |
| | | | | | Total | From this: intellectual | | | | Total | From this: intellectual |
| 2015. | Jan-Mar | 845,0 | 78,1 | 34,8 | 459,8 | 360,6 | 97,9 | 101,1 | 102,4 | 101,4 | 101,5 |
| | Apr-Jun | 866,6 | 78,5 | 34,9 | 459,5 | 360,2 | 104,2 | 100,2 | 100,9 | 101,0 | 101,2 |
| | Jan-Jun | 855,8 | 78,3 | 34,9 | 459,6 | 360,4 | 101,0 | 100,6 | 101,7 | 101,2 | 101,4 |
| | Jul-Sep | 886,4 | 79,1 | 34,9 | 457,8 | 359,3 | 102,3 | 101,8 | 100,6 | 100,8 | 101,1 |
| | Jan-Sep | 866,0 | 78,6 | 34,9 | 459,0 | 360,0 | 101,4 | 101,0 | 101,3 | 101,1 | 101,3 |
| | Oct-Dec | 874.7 | 79,8 | 33,3 | 458,6 | 360,4 | 102,3 | 102,3 | 96,5 | 100,1 | 100,3 |
| | Jan-Dec | 868.2 | 78,9 | 34,5 | 458,9 | 360,1 | 101,6 | 101,3 | 100,1 | 100,8 | 101,0 |
| 2016. | Jan-Mar | 860.6 | 78,0 | 34,3 | 451,9 | 355,7 | 101,8 | 99,9 | 98,4 | 98,3 | 98,6 |
| | Apr-Jun | 884.6 | 77,6 | 34,6 | 451,1 | 354,8 | 102,1 | 98,9 | 99,0 | 98,2 | 98,5 |
| | Jan-Jun | 872.6 | 77,8 | 34,4 | 451,5 | 355,2 | 102,0 | 99,4 | 98,7 | 98,2 | 98,6 |
| | Jul-Sep | 878.5 | 61,0 | 34,5 | 448,9 | 353,5 | 99,1 | 77,1 | 98,8 | 98,1 | 98,4 |
| | Jan-Sep | 874.6 | 72,2 | 34,4 | 450,6 | 354,7 | 101,0 | 91,9 | 98,7 | 98,2 | 98,5 |
| | Oct-Dec | 867.5 | 61,0 | 34,3 | 449,4 | 354,1 | 99,2 | 76,5 | 103,0 | 98,0 | 98,3 |
| | Jan-Dec | 872.8 | 69,4 | 34,4 | 450,3 | 354,5 | 100,5 | 88,0 | 99,8 | 98,1 | 98,4 |

*Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office*[19]

The government has already turned its attention to the challenges posed by headcount consolidation, as per *Public Administration and Public Services Development Strategy 2014–2020*:

> Government statute 1007/2013 (I.10.) has reorganized the public administration system concurrent to headcount consolidation. … Headcount consolidation, however, is only somewhat reflected in the data due to the effects of institutional reorganizations. In general, we may state that the number of employees in the public sector has been nearly constant since 2007. On the whole, public sector employment saw a slight decrease between 2010 and 2011, but by 2014 this tendency appears to be shifting. With respect to the public administration system, having been impacted by consolidation, a significant headcount increase commenced from the beginning of 2011 despite the number of organizations showing a falling trend. …demonstrating the need for additional efforts in the interests of establishing an efficiently-run state with a lower headcount. Improving both personal development and operating efficiency remains an important challenge.[20]

19 https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_evkozi/e_qli006.html (2016/03/22).

20 http://www.kormany.hu/download/8/42/40000/K%C3%B6zigazgat%C3%A1s_feljeszt%C3%A9si_strat% C3%A9gia_pdf (2016/03/22).

Therefore, reducing the number of public servants and improving the quality of their tasks are related goals, driving greater efficiency. The questions of who should stay and who should move to the private sector naturally arise. Will those less suited for government work exit the public realm while those best suited remain? For the service-oriented state will need to keep those public servants in the system who are most capable of high professionalism, the very people who assumedly will find work with relative ease in the private sector because of their high-level education and competencies. As we shall see, earlier research has already provided evidence in support of this. These are the main issues regarding the personal aspects of cutting bureaucracy, especially when the subject of incentives is broached.

## VI. The Possible Reasons and Circumstances for Moving between the Public and Private Sectors

A study published in 2013[21] analysing out-migration of labour from the public sector makes some important points regarding confirmation bias: For example, compared to the private sector, there is greater stability in the public sector, as the probability of either losing one's job, being moved into another area or taking on a different job is about half as likely compared to the private sector (Elek–Szabó 2013). (On the other hand, there is no significant difference between the two sectors concerning retirement or other types of inactive status.) Therefore, from a job stability point of view, the public sector is considered to be more stable.

*Nearly 40% of respondents felt greater security in the public sector, which could be related to greater stability in the sector's human resources management. Only 20% of respondents believed the private sector offered greater security. The percentage of the undecided, however, was very high.*

But what happened earlier to those forced to leave the public sector? Is the general suspicion true that former public sector employees' chances of finding another job were indeed lower?[22] Or that former public sector employees had

21 Elek, Péter–Szabó, Péter András: *A közszférából történő munkaerő-kiáramlás elemzése Magyarországon*. In: *Közgazdasági Szemle*. LX(May) 2013. pp. 601–602. http://epa.oszk.hu/00000/00017/00203/pdf/EPA00017_kozgazdasagi_szemle_2013_05_601-628.pdf (2016/03/22). The authors of the study analysed the number, composition, final destinations, and future job prospects of those leaving the public sector. The 2013 study used two different databases: the Hungarian Central Statistical Office's labour market survey data pertaining to the 1998 to 2010 period (Hereafter: MEF) and the Central Administration of National Pension Insurance's micro-level panel data on contributions pertaining to the 2000 and 2006 period (Hereafter: ONYF).

22 Elek–Szabó, p. 617. The job placement data are detailed in the study: '…the raw outplacement intensity of public sector leavers (via redundancy) was periodically 25 percent (MEF) or 5 percent (ONYF) lower than that of the private sector although the difference between the two job placement ratios was significant only in the previous case' (p. 614). '…based on the MEF and ONYF data, the possibility of finding work again among the poorly educated (those with a maximum of an 8th-grade education or having attended vocational school only) was respectively

had to accept jobs for which, based on their educational backgrounds, they were overqualified?[23]

*In which sector do you feel greater security?*




| | | |
|---|---|---|
| *Public sector* | *141* | *39.4%* |
| *Private sector* | *78* | *21.8%* |
| *Undecided* | *139* | *38.8%* |

*Source*: Own survey, March 2016

**Diagram 6.** *Job stability*

The truth is that earlier analyses do not bear out these suspicions. Based on the estimates of the Jenkins discrete-time risk model, public-sector employees who lost their jobs (irrespective of the reason) took on average 5 to 25% longer than private sector employees to find another job. At higher levels of educational attainment, the difference disappeared completely. Based on the work of the so-called Logit model, public-sector employees who transitioned to the private sector – irrespective of educational level – did not accept jobs for which they were overqualified in greater numbers than their private-sector counterparts (Elek–Szabó 2013: 602–603).

According to earlier analyses, in most cases, job opportunities and wage differences were the drivers behind migration from the public sector to the private sector. A 2013 study using Hungarian Central Statistical Office data analysed the 1998–2010 period in an attempt to explain headcount fluctuations in the public sector. The study determined that:

20 to 40 percent and 10 to 20 percent lower for those made redundant from the public sector versus their private sector counterparts' (pp. 616–617). 'In summary, therefore, the slightly weaker job placement chances (25 percent worse according to MEF, while not significantly worse according to ONYF) for those made redundant from the public sector can be entirely attributed to the lower possibilities of the poorly educated, … highly educated/trained public-sector workers have the same job placement chances as their private-sector counterparts, [which] is somewhat at odds with the conventional wisdom…' (p. 617).

23 Ibid.: First of all, we must take into consideration that: 'In summary, 14 percent of public-sector workers and 25 percent of private-sector workers are "overqualified" (p. 623).' '… If we do not look at the raw data pertaining to over-qualification only, but rather take into consideration the component parts that make up the difference between the two sectors, then we will see that there is no difference detected in over-qualification. On this basis, there is no way to support the claim that employees coming from the public sector are accepting "worse" jobs in significantly higher proportion than their private-sector counterparts' (p. 625).

In the first half of the period (on the basis of Hungarian Central Statistical Office labour survey data), the public-sector workforce grew by approximately eighty thousand people; in the second half of the period, up to 2008, the workforce fell by exactly the same number. Then, between 2009 and 2010, the number began to rise again. Simultaneously, public-sector relative wages also fluctuated significantly. Compared to the wages in the private sector, average public-sector wages (calculated based on statistics provided by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office) were lower at the beginning and end of the period, while in 2003–2004 they were fifteen percent higher (Elek–Szabó 2013: 602).

## Migration from the Public Sector to the Private Sector

On a five-level Likert scale, respondents considered the various incentives to leave the public sector for the private sector and to what extent a given incentive influenced their decision. Respondents' input regarding wages supported the professional literature's earlier findings, which was not necessarily the case regarding job opportunity.

The first question concerned greater pay and benefits; more than 70% of respondents believed that these determinants greatly influenced the decision to leave the public sector. Remuneration carried much less weight, however, going in the other direction. Only 36% believed that higher pay and benefits played a great part in the decision to leave the private sector for the public, while 22.1% claimed that it played no part. This is consistent with the professional literature's earlier findings that when leaving for the private sector the dominant factor for workers was pay and benefits.

*Higher salary and benefits [In your experience/opinion, to what extent has this determinant influenced your decision to leave the PUBLIC SECTOR for the PRIVATE SECTOR?]*




| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *1.* | *Not at all* | *11* | *3.1%* |
| *2.* | *Little* | *5* | *1.4%* |
| *3.* | *Somewhat* | *31* | *8.7%* |
| *4.* | *Much* | *55* | *15.4%* |
| *5.* | *Greatly* | *256* | *71.5%* |

*Source*: Own survey, March 2016

**Diagram 7.1.** *Higher salary and benefits – from the point of leaving the public sector*

*Higher salary and benefits [In your experience/opinion, to what extent has this determinant influenced your decision to leave the PRIVATE SECTOR for the PUBLIC SECTOR?]*




| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *1.* | *Not at all* | *79* | *22.1%* |
| *2.* | *Little* | *55* | *15.4%* |
| *3.* | *Somewhat* | *61* | *17%* |
| *4.* | *Much* | *34* | *9.5%* |
| *5.* | *Greatly* | *129* | *36%* |

*Source*: Own survey, March 2016

**Diagram 7.2.** *Higher salary and benefits – from the point of leaving the private sector*

The second determinant was job opportunity, specifically finding a job related to one's studies or for which one was ideally suited. As for public-sector workers leaving for the private sector, far fewer respondents believed these to be great influences on their decision when compared to salary considerations. Approximately the same number felt likewise among workers leaving the private sector for the public. Thus, we can say that the two main factors making up job opportunity (finding a job related to one's studies or for which one was ideally suited) showed no large variance between directions (going from public to private or vice versa).

*Finding a job related to one's studies [In your experience/opinion, to what extent has this determinant influenced your decision to leave the PUBLIC SECTOR for the PRIVATE SECTOR?]*




| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *1.* | *Not at all* | *28* | *7.8%* |
| *2.* | *Little* | *24* | *6.7%* |
| *3.* | *Somewhat* | *80* | *22.3%* |
| *4.* | *Much* | *93* | *26%* |
| *5.* | *Greatly* | *133* | *37.2%* |

*Source*: Own survey, March 2016

**Diagram 7.3.** *Finding a job related to one's studies – from the point of leaving the public sector*

*Job possibilities in line with one's educational attainment [In your experience/ opinion, to what extent has this determinant influenced your decision to leave the PUBLIC SECTOR for the PRIVATE SECTOR?]*




| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *1.* | *Not at all* | *29* | *8.1%* |
| *2.* | *Little* | *14* | *3.9%* |
| *3.* | *Somewhat* | *76* | *21.2%* |
| *4.* | *Much* | *109* | *30.4%* |
| *5.* | *Greatly* | *130* | *36.3%* |

*Source*: Own survey, March 2016

**Diagram 7.4.** *Job possibilities in line with one's educational attainment – from the point of leaving the public sector*

*Finding a job related to one's studies [In your experience/opinion, to what extent has this determinant influenced your decision to leave the PRIVATE SECTOR for the PUBLIC SECTOR?]*




| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *1.* | *Not at all* | *28* | *7.8%* |
| *2.* | *Little* | *24* | *6.7%* |
| *3.* | *Somewhat* | *80* | *22.3%* |
| *4.* | *Much* | *93* | *26%* |
| *5.* | *Greatly* | *133* | *37.2%* |

*Source*: Own survey, March 2016

**Diagram 7.5.** *Finding a job related to one's studies – from the point of leaving the private sector*

*[In your experience/opinion, to what extent has this determinant influenced your decision to leave the PRIVATE SECTOR for the PUBLIC SECTOR?]*




| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *1.* | *Not at all* | *47* | *13.1%* |
| *2.* | *Little* | *36* | *10.1%* |
| *3.* | *Somewhat* | *79* | *22.1%* |
| *4.* | *Much* | *85* | *23.7%* |
| *5.* | *Greatly* | *111* | *31%* |

*Source*: Own survey, March 2016

**Diagram 7.6.** *Job possibilities in line with one's educational attainment – from the point of leaving the private sector*

Some additional conclusions related to the 'quality' of public-sector labour: 'If we can demonstrate that a higher proportion of public-sector employees possesses an educational background that exceeds what their job requires, then this circumstance may hint at a lower-quality labour force when compared to its private-sector counterpart.' Or what we consider to be more likely: 'Those employees who leave view these positions for which they are overqualified as simply a stepping-stone' (Elek–Szabó 2013: 618). The review of job changers further confirmed that those accepting jobs for which they were overqualified were the ones most likely to migrate to the private sector, and that healthcare and social services employees were the least successful in leaving jobs that required higher or secondary educational backgrounds (Elek–Szabó 2013: 621). As per the findings of a 2008 Hungarian National Development Agency investigation, men between the ages of 25 and 34 with two to ten years of public-sector service were the most likely to leave the public sector, which is to say they made up the group of employees least committed to staying (Gellén 2013: 38).

The significant real wage variance that could be found in certain areas between the public and private sectors had the earlier effect of generationally rearranging the labour market. Despite the fluctuations in relative wages, even today the general view remains that public-sector work pays poorly, even though that is not always the case. It is a fact, however, that fresh university and college graduates between 1995 and 2000 (a time of higher education expansion) did not flow into the public sector, but rather the various private-sector areas undergoing a 'youth revitalization'. In these occupations requiring a higher education degree, every age-group saw relatively higher wages (Elek–Szabó 2013: 602).

## VII. Attitudes and Expectations of Employee Groups in the Light of Interoperability

It is beneficial to review which jobs (that is, which areas) those who leave the public sector are applying for and finding employment in. (We can find discrepancies based on educational attainment.) Public sector specialists (or experts) are finding job opportunities in financial services, law, accounting, sports, and culture. We can see based on these observations that public administration and education have counterparts in the private sector, which are the ones listed above. An individual migrating to the private sector from public administration is twice as likely to work in law or finance. Just as true is the fact that an individual working in education in the public sector is twice as likely to end up in a cultural or sports area in the private sector. The situation, however, is different for public-sector workers with only a secondary school or vocational educational background. They typically find private-sector work in industry (Elek–Szabó 2013: 621–622).

Márton Gellén's comparative study is based on a 2013 empirical study, which looked at mobility from the perspective of individual career planning. Since our study touches upon the findings of his work on several occasions, we find it justified to summarily outline those results now.

The 2013 survey used as its basis a 2008 empirical analysis by the Hungarian National Development Agency which looked at job loyalty in the public sector. As stated above, a non-representative survey completed within the framework of the State Reform Operational Programme showed that the least loyal – and therefore the most likely to leave – group was composed of men between the ages of 25 and 34 with two to ten years of public-sector service. However, many different factors influenced loyalty. For example, loyalty among 'rookie' (first-year) employees was high, but by their second and third year it had dropped to a much lower level. By the time of their tenth year of service, it was hovering around forty percent. The most vulnerable area in terms of crossing over was healthcare,[24] while geographically it was Hungary's central region. 'The level of loyalty is particularly important when the intention to leave the public sector for the private sector develops' (Gellén, 2013: 38–39). The survey attempted to determine the factors that made up employee empathy and encouraged a worker to stay. Developing a personal relationship with one's supervisor and colleagues was of paramount importance among these considerations. Also important were work environment, the reputation of the company, work-related tasks, work–life balance, recognition, responsibility, and a sense of being influential (Gellén 2013: 39).

Gellén's study also considered generational differences in assessing the issue of mobility by referencing the extensive foreign professional literature, which

24 Authors Elek and Szabó take the opposite view, although the timing of the surveys does not coincide.

detected Generation Y's susceptibility to postmodern sensibilities in their workplace attitudes and expectations. The so-called 'creative generation' enjoys being part of a decentralized structure, in a motivating environment and a flexible workplace community. Their proactivity towards lifelong learning, openness towards horizontal mobility, and genuine intentions for self-improvement all typify their philosophy. In Hungary, between 2009 and 2012, Generation Y made up a growing portion of public administration staff; thus, from a mobility perspective, it is particularly useful to become acquainted with their workplace expectations (Gellén 2013: 39–40).

The 2013 research made the following observations about employee satisfaction: the lowest levels were found among public-sector employees; in government and municipal offices, satisfaction could be said to be average or mixed; the most satisfied were state-enterprise employees. The overall public-sector sentiment was not good. Negative perceptions were driven by the sector's falling prestige, lower pay, workload, and a sense of being unappreciated. In conjunction with moving to the private sector, small businesses and large non-state corporations were not attractive destinations for public-sector employees (Gellén 2013: 42–44).

The results of the Forsense's representative questionnaire in 2013 revealed that working in the public sector was neither an overly attractive proposition nor particularly irresistible. It is interesting that among the reasons given for working in the public sector were to serve the public interest, 'to help others', and to do work weighted with responsibility. What this means is that in 2013 support for Weber's (classic) Model for Bureaucracy was still very strong, as were the model's cultural roots, which together significantly tamped down desires for migration to the private sector. In 2013, within the public sector, public servants showed the highest likelihood to move to the private sector or possibly abroad to find work (Gellén 2013: 45–47).

*One third of the respondents believed that the opportunity to serve the public interest greatly influenced their decision to leave the private sector. Nearly half believed that it greatly or duly ('much') influenced them.*

*Serving the public interest [In your experience/opinion, to what extent has this determinant influenced your decision to leave the PRIVATE SECTOR for the PUBLIC SECTOR?]*




| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *1.* | *Not at all* | *44* | *12.3%* |
| *2.* | *Little* | *53* | *14.8%* |
| *3.* | *Somewhat* | *95* | *26.5%* |
| *4.* | *Much* | *47* | *13.1%* |
| *5.* | *Greatly* | *119* | *33.2%* |

*Source*: Own survey, March 2016

**Diagram 8.** *Serving the public interest*

Based on all these, we believe it is beneficial to consider which (employee) groups show the highest inclinations for mobility – for leaving the public sector – and what motivations, expectations, and attitudes they harbour, in the light of the educational materials and competency development that adult education can provide.

## VIII. Useful Knowledge for the Market, the State, and the Individual

The government expects that for a significant number of public-sector workers migration to the private sector is contingent upon education, retraining, and further education. Providing meaningful knowledge for the employees on the labour market, however, is complicated by several factors. If we wish to forge a synthesis in terms of educational needs and competencies among the state, the economy, and the individual, then we must take into consideration the above aspects. We know:

1. that the scope of employees is complicated by generational considerations;

2. that employees' workplace expectations and demands are diverse due to generational differences;

3. and that employees' assessments of their workplace and their commitment are substantially influenced by generational differences, time of service, and workplace politics and changes therein.

In this ever-changing, multifactorial labour market environment, it is not easy to determine what knowledge will prove useful when a worker is forced to leave the public sector for the private sector. Andragogy often looks to answer the following related questions: Who are the adults returning to the classroom? For what reasons are they doing so? What are they trying to achieve?

With the first question ('Who will go back to school?'), we are already confronted by a belief that many people hold – mainly older generations – that when a person reaches adulthood he is no longer suited for learning. This pessimism towards

adult learning stubbornly endures despite the origins of adult learning tracing back to the 19th century. Nor have the debates about adult learning over the past several decades focused on the question of whether adults are capable of being taught (which has been settled), but rather on what and how they should be taught!

It is a fact that as a person ages, especially after 25 years of age, his learning capability goes into slow and then faster decline, but at the same time a learning specialization may develop, which is 'the premise that asserts an adult's ability to learn at any given stage of their life depends on the educational contents, forms, and results of their earlier stages of life' (Csoma 2009). Thus, it has a foreseeable influence on the learning method and educational materials the employee will need if further learning or retraining is anticipated for him.

## Generations and Learning Methods

In our research, we found that the blended and frontal methods were the most popular teaching methods. This correlates to the majority of respondents belonging to either Generation Y or the 40–55 age-group, both of which had to some degree spent years living in a digital culture. Correspondingly, they also showed greater receptiveness towards blended learning. The 25 to 55 age-group made up about 60%, while those who deemed blended learning as useful also made up close to 60%. Close to 20% believed frontal teaching was the most useful, while the older generation (55 and above), which was composed of people who may not be totally at ease living in a digital society, was approximately 30%. E-learning was chosen by 8.1% of the respondents; among the 16 to 25 age-group, this was 10.3%. There was some overlap between the age-groups and the teaching methods, confirming that adult education methods had to be in harmony with earlier learning experiences.

*Which adult education teaching method do you consider as the most useful?*




| | | |
|---|---|---|
| *Frontal teaching (traditional method, based on the teacher's explaining the material)* | *76* | *44.1%* |
| *E-learning (Internet-based)* | *29* | *8.1%* |
| *Blended learning (a combination of frontal teaching and e-learning)* | *202* | *56.4%* |
| *I do not know* | *51* | *14.2%* |

*Source*: Own survey, March 2016

**Diagram 9.1.** *Education teaching method*




| | | |
|---|---|---|
| *16–25 years old* | *37* | *10.3%* |
| *25–40 years old* | *99* | *27.5%* |
| *40–55 years old* | *113* | *31.7%* |
| *55–65 years old* | *83* | *23.1%* |
| *> 65 years old* | *27* | *7.5%* |

*Source*: Own survey, March 2016

**Diagram 9.2.** ***Age of respondents***

A 2009 State Audit Office of Hungary study determined that jobseekers who could choose for themselves the training that appeared to be the most appropriate for their needs were able to find jobs in greater numbers than those who had participated in training recommended by the employment centre. According to the article, this could be linked to motivation; however, we believe that motivation is only a partial answer. We believe individuals were drawn to those types of training with which they had had previous experience.[25]

Development is influenced by forces affecting personality; therefore, the adult personality must be analysed in a social context. The academic fields of sociology and social psychology offer tremendous assistance in this. Success in adult education is determined by a number of factors, including how much spare time the participant has, the degree to which they are preoccupied or burdened, the lifestyle they lead, and their intentions and motivations. A complicated web of interaction may result, which can be summarized in the following sentence: 'Lifestyle shapes adult education, while adult education shapes lifestyle.'[26]

The most significant influence on the question of what to learn is the demands of the labour market. Our study – among other things – tries to answer the question of whether unemployment can be kept at bay through the opportunities provided via adult retraining and further education. Studies have shown that financial considerations are the main drivers in making the decision to partake in organized adult education. The demand-side dynamics of the labour market prevail on the knowledge market, too, where knowledge becomes a commodity. Accordingly, knowledge market demand may influence personality development by making the knowledge to be acquired either specialized or comprehensive.[27]

The inadequate functioning of markets is often a topic of study in both the economics and public administration fields, and it manifests itself in debates

25 https://www.asz.hu/storage/files/files/Szakmai%20kutat%C3%A1s/2009/t312.pdf (2016/03/22).
26 http://ofi.hu/csoma-gyula-az-andragogiai-elmelet-kialakulasa-es-alapproblemai (2016/03/22).
27 Ibid.

about *public–private* interaction. What may be desired by the market and beneficial for the economy, however, may not be good for society. It is important to say a few words about market conditions in the light of the impact that the functioning of the knowledge market has, since the economic impact of human resources is a known fact. Economic growth may be directly impeded by some areas of the economy and certain hierarchical positions if retraining and further education are neglected (via lack of investment) in work that would demand specialization. In contrast, there are areas of the economy and workplace roles that do not require either basic knowledge or expertise. Therefore, the interests of the economy may or may not be in favour of training, but over-qualification in terms of expertise (manifested in the number of degrees an individual has) is in no way beneficial to the economy.[28]

If we analyse the impact education has on unemployment, then we must come to terms with this seemingly contradictory aspect.

Disregarding market rationale, this problem looks different from the state's perspective, for adult education is beneficial to society, helping personal development in adulthood and working against the onset of psychic stasis. The purpose of certain types of remedial training is to effectuate social cohesion rather than economic salvation. In certain cases, economic and social interests conflict with each other.[29]

The third aspect of adult education is personality development/improvement, which is in the interest of the individual, wholly independent of social and economic demands and expectations. Adult education mostly consists of competency development and the expansion of existing knowledge. Learning in adulthood more easily builds upon acquired routine. (Personality improvement, on the other hand, seeks the opposite: for example, stepping outside the bounds of one's comfort zone and letting go of habitual, negative behaviour.) Adult education, therefore, has three main functions, which may come into conflict with each other. If the goal is to reduce drastically the number of workers in the public sector, then the state and the market must work together to define what training the ex-workers will need in order to succeed in their future endeavours.

*In our survey, the majority of respondents (58.4%) would consider further developing their existing knowledge through supplemental training.*

*Which training method is more effective in helping an employee find a job in either the public sector or the private sector?*

28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.




| | | |
|---|---|---|
| *Retraining (learning an entirely new job/role)* | *113* | *31.6%* |
| *Supplemental training (expanding what one already knows about his profession)* | *209* | *58.4%* |
| *I do not know* | *36* | *10.1%* |

*Source*: Own survey, March 2016

**Diagram 10.** *Developing existing knowledge*

## IX. An Interoperable Assessment of Adult Education – a Survey's Lessons

The overall experience of conducting a questionnaire survey on interoperability-incentivizing training among the Hungarian populace was positive. We believe that the government's headcount reduction plan, which is to be packaged together with training to increase the likelihood of finding work, could be successful, assuming the willingness to learn is present, as our survey findings have indicated. We share our findings below.

*Nearly 80% of respondents had participated in some type of adult education and only 5.7% felt the training had been without merit.*

*Was participating in adult education useful in helping you accomplish your everyday tasks in either the public sector or the private sector?*




| | | |
|---|---|---|
| *Yes, it was useful in the public sector.* | *76* | *26.9%* |
| *Yes, it was useful in the private sector.* | *37* | *13.1%* |
| *Yes, it was useful in both sectors.* | *105* | *37.1%* |
| *No, it was not useful.* | *16* | *5.7%* |
| *Not applicable.* | *49* | *17.3%* |

*Source*: Own survey, March 2016

**Diagram 11.1.** *Participating in adult education*

*Nearly 70% of respondents believed that participating in some type of adult education increased interoperability between the public and private sectors.*

*Do you believe that adult education for employees increases interoperability between the public and private sectors?*




| | | |
|---|---|---|
| *Yes.* | *248* | *69.3%* |
| *No.* | *28* | *7.8%* |
| *I do not know.* | *82* | *22.9%* |

*Source*: Own survey, March 2016

**Diagram 11.2.** *The role of adult education in interoperability between the public and private sector*

*An overwhelming majority of respondents would participate in a state-sponsored (re)training if it were necessary. In other words, they would accept the state's assistance.*

*If you were forced to leave the public sector (through redundancy or some other means), would you participate in a state-sponsored retraining course?*




| | | |
|---|---|---|
| *Yes.* | *262* | *73.2%* |
| *No.* | *33* | *9.2%* |
| *I do not know.* | *63* | *17.6%* |

*Source*: Own survey, March 2016

**Diagram 11.3.** *State-sponsored retraining*

## X. Summary

The current study aims at analysing the context of the Hungarian government's aspiration to cut bureaucracy and increase public administration's efficiency, thus impacting personnel and reorganizing the labour market. The public-sector headcount reduction is being justified in terms of Hungary's inadequate private-/public-sector employment ratio. Out of four million employees, approximately one million receive their pay from the state. Despite the fact that the greater the number of workers in the private sector, the greater the amount of tax revenue flowing into the state coffers, the higher the GDP and the better the services provided by the state. To that end, the government would cut the percentage of public-sector employees to 10% of the total over the course of ten to fifteen years. This reorganization can come to fruition only via the development of intellectual capital and a well-designed system for retraining and further education.

According to the professional literature and the conclusions of various European Union and Hungarian strategic works, knowledge will be the most important renewable resource of the 21st century, and so knowledge itself must come under the microscope. As knowledge (and specifically the flourishing and renewal of tacit knowledge) is a lifelong endeavour, the European Union has proposed and defined key competencies that are essential for success on the labour market and numerous other areas of life. Citizens can benefit by better developing their knowledge and competencies through different types of adult education. But the desire to learn varies by person. Earlier studies have determined that those stuck on the margins of society, in other words, the people who would benefit the most from education, are the ones least open to it.

During the reorganization of Hungarian public administration, we must be cognizant of the fact that it is strongly rooted in Weber's Model for Bureaucracy. With earlier governments attempting to move it in the direction of New Public Management, we have today a mixed *crossvergence* setting. Today, there is no insurmountable gap between public administration, with its many managerial-style elements, and the mechanics of the private sector. In our survey, half of the respondents believed that with proper training the disparities between the two sectors could be overcome.

The Hungarian public sector – specifically public administration – saw increases in headcount following the System Changeover, but the government now believes that its extensive size has become detrimental to the sector's efficiency. Bearing that in mind, we have reviewed the earlier experiences of interoperability between the public and private sectors – for the main part our research conforms to professional literature.

Previously, the stability of the public sector versus the private sector was highlighted (the likelihood of unemployment, being moved into another area, or

taking on a different job was much lower in the public sector). A strong plurality of our respondents (40%) also believed that the public sector offered greater security, while only 20% believed that the private sector did so (in terms of job opportunities, livelihood, etc.).

Previously it had been shown that the chances of finding a new job for someone leaving the public sector were not significantly worse than for their private-sector counterpart (and above a certain educational level, there was no difference at all).

We also knew that migration between the public and private sectors occurred primarily because of job opportunities and wage differences. In our survey, 71.5% believed that higher compensation and better benefits were a strong catalyst for leaving the public sector, while 15.4% believed them to be rather strong. Thus, our research has supported our earlier conjecture. Job opportunities as a catalyst were not deemed to be as strong a driver between the private and public sectors.

Commitment to and expectations/demands of the workplace in the public sector are substantially influenced by generational differences, while adult retraining and further education are influenced by a web of complicated reasons behind possible motivations.

In cases of retraining and further education offered by the state, we must be wary of generational differences and possible motivations, while also keeping in mind the influence education can have on the market, society, and the individual. Our research has shown that the demand for a given type of instruction is also influenced by generational differences among those who wish to learn. Overall, our respondents showed an interest in learning.

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# APPENDIX

Source: The Hungarian Institute for Educational Research and Development – *Az egész életen át tartó tanuláshoz szükséges kulcskompetenciák*

**1. Table.** *A Summary of the Key Competencies*

| Competency | Definition |
|---|---|
| Communication in the mother tongue | Communication in the mother tongue is the ability to express feelings and facts in both oral and written form (listening, speaking, reading, and writing) and to interact linguistically in an appropriate way in a full range of societal and cultural contexts: in education and training, at work, at home, and in leisure activities. |
| Communication in foreign languages | Communication in foreign languages broadly shares many of the same characteristics of communication in the mother tongue: the ability to understand, express, and interpret thoughts, feelings, and facts in both oral and written form (listening, speaking, reading, and writing) in an appropriate range of societal and cultural contexts – in education and training, at work, home, and leisure – according to one's wants or needs. Communication in foreign languages also calls for skills such as mediation and intercultural understanding. An individual's level of proficiency will vary between the four dimensions (listening, speaking, reading, and writing) and between the different languages, and according to that individual's social and cultural background, environment, needs, and/or interests. |
| Mathematical competence and basic competences in science and technology | Mathematical competence includes the ability to add, subtract, multiply, and divide numbers, use percentages and fractions, in one's head and/or on paper in order to solve a range of problems in everyday situations. The emphasis is on process and activity, as well as knowledge, rather than outcome. Competence in science refers to the ability and willingness to use the body of knowledge and methodology employed to explain the natural world. Competence in technology is viewed as the application of that knowledge and methodology in response to perceived human wants or needs. |
| Digital competence | Digital competence involves the confident and critical use of electronic media for work, leisure, and communication. This competency is related to logical and critical thinking, high-level information management skills and well-developed communication skills. Information and communication technology prowess means having basic skills in the use of computers to retrieve, assess, store, produce, present, and exchange information and to communicate and participate in collaborative networks via the Internet. |
| Learning to learn | 'Learning to learn' is the ability to organize and conduct one's own learning, both individually and in groups. This competence includes efficient time management; problem-solving; gaining, processing, and assimilating new knowledge; the ability to use the new knowledge in a variety of contexts – at home, at work, in education, and training. More generally, learning to learn strongly influences to what extent an individual is capable of shaping his career path. |
| Social and civic competences | Social and civic competences include all those types of behaviours that an individual must acquire in order to function effectively and constructively in social life and to resolve conflict where necessary. Social and civic competences are necessary for efficient personal and group interactions and are applicable to both public and personal settings. |

| Competency | Definition |
|---|---|
| Sense of initiative and entrepreneurship | The sense of initiative and entrepreneurship has both active and passive components. While, on the one hand, it includes the desire to evoke change, it also means being accepting and supportive of external innovations. An entrepreneurial competency includes an individual's responsibility for their own actions (both positive and negative), the development of a strategic approach, the setting and achieving of goals, and being success-oriented. |
| Cultural awareness and expression | Cultural competency includes appreciating the importance of the creative expression of ideas, experiences, and emotions in a range of media including music, performing arts, literature, and the visual arts. |

# Book Reviews

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# Strategic Vision

## A Review of the Volume Zbigniew Brzezinski: *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power*[1]

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Besides Henry Kissinger and Samuel P. Huntington, the Polish-born Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski has been one of the most influential national security advisors and geopoliticians of the Presidential Cabinet in the United States of America during the last 50 years. However, his renown and authority are not specifically due to his advisory career but rather to his geopolitical activity, which he revealed to the world at large mostly in his volumes published in 1997, *The Grand Chessboard*, and in 2012, *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power*.

*Strategic Vision* appeared in the edition of the 'Antall József Political and Social Science Knowledge Centre' and in the translation of Tamás Magyarics, Hungary's Ambassador to Dublin. Based on past historical examples as references, in his book, Brzezinski analyses the current internal and foreign policy of the United States of America as well as the world political events and happenings, and takes a look into the future in an attempt to provide us an overall picture of the global world order after 2025. János Martonyi, Hungary's Minister of Foreign Affairs, writes in his foreword to the book that *Strategic Vision* is a geopolitical script in search of an answer as to whether the *unus inter pares* (one among equals) or the *primus inter pares* (the first among equals) principle will prevail in the new, emerging world order.

The picture that unfolds right before us throughout the some 300 pages is not too promising; it does not exactly provide grounds for great joy. In his book, *The Grand Chessboard*, the author placed his confidence in that the USA and the European Union would be able to counterbalance the changes in global power relations and the West losing ground; *Strategic Vision* does not strike such an optimistic note any

1 Edited by Basic Books, 2013.

more. The events that took place during the 15 years between the two publications suggest that the United States of America could not either hold on to or add to the immense benefits that it came by in world politics at the end of the Cold War.

The book contains an introduction, four chapters, and an epilogue. The central part is made up of the four vast chapters, each looking for potential answers to a specific issue concerning changes in global power.

A brief presentation of the questions raised:

1) what are the possible outcomes of the shift in emphasis that takes place from West to East at the level of the global power? (Part I: *The Receding West*);

2) what sort of external and internal regeneration does the United States of America have to undergo in order to keep its global influence and its current status of a superpower? (Part II: *The Waning of the American Dream*);

3) what are the most possible geopolitical outcomes should the USA lose its dominant status of a global power? (Part III: *The World after America: By 2025, not Chinese but Chaotic*);

4) the role and responsibility of America in developing the West in its wider sense (deepening the monetary and political union of the EU and developing a West that would include both Russia and Turkey) as well as the role of the USA in maintaining the eastern balance; what Brzezinski has in mind is that the USA should conduct such a constructive Asia policy which is not exclusively China-centred, but it also pays regard to Japan as America's key Asian strategic partner, while paying due attention to India as well, the other emerging regional superpower of the Asian continent.

We must make it clear from the start that Brzezinski does not intend on 'burying' the West – the West as such has not come to an end, and it never will. In turn, what becomes more and more certain is the approaching end of the unipolar world system, the status of the United States of America as a global power.

The wavering of the dominant position of the West in global politics has been influenced by several factors in the last period. In the case of the USA, Brzezinski deems important to highlight that the internal and foreign policy pursued by George Bush senior, Bill Clinton, and George Bush junior have significantly contributed to the weakening status of the USA as a superpower.

Internally, the USA is struggling with economic and financial crisis, an increasing public debt, deteriorating economic infrastructure, etc., which have all very much faded the world-wide attractiveness of the 'American dream', the country of infinite possibilities. In terms of external politics, Brzezinski brings up against the accountable leaders of the USA that in the period following the Cold War they ironically and self-assuredly propagated that the 21st century would be the century of the USA:

Bill Clinton (January 20, 1997): 'At this last presidential inauguration of the 20th century, let us lift our eyes towards the challenges that await us in the next

century . . . At the dawn of the 21st century . . . America stands alone as the world's indispensable nation.' George W. Bush sets an even more confident tone in his speech delivered on August 28, 2000, stating the following: 'Our nation is chosen by God and commissioned by history to be a model for the world.' These and other similar statements were followed by actions, too: after September 11, 2001, George W. Bush declares war against terrorism (2001 – attack on Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Taliban government; 2003 – attack on Iran and settling the score with the regime led by Saddam Hussein).

The Middle-Eastern politics of the George Bush period were not basically characterized by maintaining stability but rather by the liquidation of political systems supporting terrorism. 'The United States of America will not let the world's most dangerous regimes threaten us with the most destructive weapons in the world' (Iran, Iraq, and North Korea = the 'Evil Axis').

In addition to all of this, we also have to reckon with the fact that China has demonstrated a spectacular path of development over the past 15–20 years (by now, we can place it second only to the United States in terms of economic development), Russia, due to its vast oil and natural gas reserves and geopolitical situation, remains a relevant and unavoidable geopolitical factor in the future too, while India has developed into a regional superpower over the past decades, which nurtures ambitions of becoming a global superpower even though its disputes with China and Pakistan are a weakening factor.

All these suggest that the unipolar concentration of the former global power is scattered on four continents. Therefore, should the USA not be able to regenerate, to carry out internal reforms, and lay its external affairs on new foundations, that is to say, if its status of a global power becomes even weaker, then it may lead to the appearance of several regional conflicts, which will not yield great victors, but more and more losers will emerge. In case this script will prevail, the 21st century will not be that of China. 'The world after America' will not be dominated by China but rather by chaos mostly based on the competition and potential conflicts among the regional powers of Asia: China, India, and Japan.

In order to avoid this, the author comes up with a new kind of possible balance of global superpowers for the future, where the USA will play a double role. 'On the one part, it will be the driving force and the guarantor of the greater and larger unit in the West, while, on the other part, it has to create a balance and be the peacemaker among the great powers in the East.' The author immediately adds that these two roles will have to be simultaneously present in the American foreign policy; otherwise, success will not follow. In the West, the USA will be given a significant role in terms of commitment towards the NATO, in promoting the calculated and step-by-step western integration of Turkey and the increasingly democratizing Russia, as well as in deepening the EU monetary and political integration.

The challenge in the East does not get any simpler either, which the USA will have to meet. On the one hand, it will have to avoid military interventions in the future, which can only be adopted in case the threat and aggressiveness is aimed at countries where American military forces have already been stationed under contract as part of a long-standing international situation, that is the USA has signed a commitment (the case of China and South Korea). The USA has to acknowledge that peace and stability in Asia are not sustainable if associated with American military presence and its direct employment. The USA's participation in Asia will have to take place through making use of diplomatic and economic instruments and encouraging the key actors' low-profile attitude, thus contributing to the maintenance of a regional power balance. Instead of intimidation, terrorization, and military presence, peacemaking and diplomacy will have to form the credo of the 21st-century America's external policy.

As a final conclusion, we can state that in the age of nations and peoples awakening and taking political initiatives in the wake of modern communication technologies, where we can witness the restructuring and diffusion of the unipolar global power, the USA bears an enormous responsibility: a USA that is unable to control and manage the world, but one that is still present as an economic, military, and cultural superpower, will have to go under a process of regeneration both in terms of its internal and external politics. At least this is what Brzezinski considers the only secure guarantee of the 21st century's new world order. The only question left to be answered is whether the diagnosis proposed by the great doyen of the American security policy and geopolitics is a correct one and whether the cure plan prescribed for the treatment of the new world political situation that has taken shape over the past decades will be complied with, as well as whether it will yield the expected outcomes, or the 21st century will be the century of the chaos.

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# Festivals in Transylvania

## A Review of the Volume Barna Bodó (ed.): *Hungarian Civil Yearbook of Transylvania 2015*[1]

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The term Yearbook in the title of the book is slightly misleading because while yearbooks usually contain a collection of thematically diverse studies, in this case we are faced with a thematically strict, specific phenomenon: town and village festivals, celebratory events.

This volume focussed the attention on events which have become widespread in the past quarter of a century – this spread is indicated by the book as a whole, but especially the database at the end of the book, in which we can find information about 486 such events (the number of events is probably higher in reality because this result applies only to events that are available via Internet information).

The book consists of three chapters and an introductory study. The first chapter (*Days, Festivals, Events – Case Studies*) consists of studies about festivals. The book includes altogether eighteen 5–10-page case studies, whose primary aim is to describe and present the festivals, but some of the authors, besides giving a description, also try to interpret and analyse those cases (in this sense, I would like to highlight the study case of Andrea Sólyom from Székelyudvarhely/ Odorheiu Secuiesc). In the second chapter (*Days, Festivals, Events in the Press*), we may read about 17 additional festivals, but those do not exceed the selection and presentation of sources available on the Internet. Nevertheless, the third chapter (*The Register of Days, Festivals, and Events*) contains all the registers of festivals which can be found on Internet, split into urban and rural categories.

The introductory study of the volume, whose title is *The Steps of Occupancy*, is actually the most important part of the volume, in which the author – the editor of the volume –, after introducing the topic, does the analysis of the whole book.

1 Barna Bodó (ed.), *Erdélyi Magyar Civil Évkönyv 2015*. Erdélyi Múzeum Egyesület, Cluj-Napoca, 2016.

On the one hand, he outlines the story of the festivals existing today, splitting it into five eras based on the time when the respective festivals took shape.

a) The beginnings of a part of these festivals reach back before 1989 – typically, precursors of them being of religious and folk nature (country fairs, carnivals). Nowadays' festivals constitute a relatively little proportion of these.

b) The first town festivals, among which there were several ones related to the Hungarian population, were organized in the period of 1990–96. These town festivals had no precedent in Romania, and therefore can be considered as innovation.

c) In the period of 1997–2000, in an already changed political atmosphere, the number of the programmes slowly started to grow.

d) Between 2000 and 2008, there follows the period of a sudden increase. In these years – which are at the same time the years of the economic upheaval –, before the accession to the European Union, the programmes counting as innovations earlier became universally widespread. All locations which count and all Hungarian communities try to organize their own days, festivals.

e) This sudden increase slows down after 2008, the programmes become regular, and the number of festivals no longer increases.

The above process can be recognized in the distribution of festivals among villages and towns. While in the beginning we are facing an urban phenomenon, by today, village programmes have numerically exceeded city programmes. In this sense, the exceptions are the fragmented parts, the internal diaspora – for example, Banat –, where most of the rural, fragmented communities are too small to organize such programmes; here, the urban festivals are in predominance.

In the process of becoming universal types of festival organizing, there are some really important, successful programmes playing the role of examples for others, such as Szentgyörgy Napok/St George Days or Kolozsvári Magyar Napok/ Hungarian Days of Cluj-Napoca, while possibly the most important thing is that as a result of becoming large-scale events, they produce and accumulate a festival-organizing knowledge base, which leads to the development of the festival industry. Another result of the increased number and popularity of festivals is their becoming the object of political competition; at least in internal diaspora, these have become the explicit part of the political programme of the RMDSZ/ DAHR, which makes available and permanently secures the completion of the funds and sources needed for the organization of these events.

As part of the festival history, the book gives an elaborated idea of the types of festival-like programmes. The type systematization directs our attention to the most important features of the programmes and, at the same, indicates the possible explanations of differences. One aspect which helps determining the type of a festival is related to its organizers: whether these are representatives of the local government or civilians.

Usually, the local governments are the key characters of the festival organizations, but this is mostly in the Hungarian-majority territories. A general pattern seems to arise: the less the number of Hungarians is in a settlement (that is, the more they are in minority), the more civilians tend to become the main organizers of such festivals. The seemingly clear picture is complicated by the fact that in the majority of the situations the widespread form is the tight cooperation with civil organizations – civil participation depends on the cooperation policy of the local governments and the civil society.

Another aspect is the open or closed character of the programmes, which means that the venues of the programmes are either open-air or indoor places such as community centres or church buildings. In this sense, the position taken by the minority appears to be determinant. The more a Hungarian community is a local minority, the more it aims for organizing a closed programme.

The third viewpoint of type creation is the politically charged or apolitical approach of these programmes or the extent to which a certain festival aims at minority promotion or how much it is a counter-reaction for previous anti-minority public space politics. It is well known that the 80s' and the first part of the 90s' anti-minority politics were connected to the symbolism of the public space. At that time, a systematic endeavour was taking place, where the symbolic presence of the minorities in public spaces was suppressed. After the political transformation, from the very beginning, minority endeavours could be interpreted as part of this symbolical territory occupation fight. The endeavours of the Hungarian minority, ever since the first moment of the regime change, can be interpreted as part of their struggle for symbolic space. In the 1990s, the occupation of symbolic space was characterized mainly by erecting new statues and placing memorial tablets; later, however, this was replaced with or completed by festival organization.

In the understanding of the different manners of the festival organization, the key factor is the fragmented character of the Hungarian communities. Different organizational methods and techniques are typical where Hungarians form a local majority (Szeklerland), while on the other end there are Hungarians living in local minority (in Banat, South Transylvania, etc.). We can also encounter specific cases in ethnically balanced communities, where the symbolic presence in public places is the subject of conflicts – as the case study on Marosvásárhely/Târgu-Mureş presents it in details.

The book, primarily in the introductory study, approaches a lot of interesting topics related to the phenomenon of festivals. One such topic is the construction of self-image, which might cover a number of different issues, as a festival, while constructing its own image, can make attempts to fashion the image of the settlement itself, to build and change the brand of that settlement, but it can also target only and exclusively the Hungarian community in the given settlement.

The case studies would have made possible the examination of additional topics, but the interpretative study of the volume unfortunately does not deal with it. In this sense, even if quite latent, but in some case studies we can meet the elitist endeavour of the festivals. In the contrast between the junk, the 'grilled minced meat rolls' and the beer festivals, and the high-standard cultural programmes, the conflict of the elite culture with mass culture is highlighted, questioning which social class, strata festivals should be addressed. Furthermore, besides the ethnical exclusion or the dilemma of the dialogue, there appears the question of the Romany population, rather with a social character; however, the volume has yet to touch upon this issue.

# University Events

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# Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár/Klausenburg – 700. A Scientific Conference to Celebrate the 700th Anniversary of the First Town Privilege

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700 years ago, in a charter issued on 19 August 1316, King Charles I of Hungary granted new privileges to the inhabitants of Cluj (Kolozsvár, Klausenburg) as a reward for their help in his war against the oligarchs. By the same act, Cluj was elevated to the rank of royal free town. On this occasion, Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania together with Babeş–Bolyai University, the Transylvanian Museum Society, and the Romanian Academy Centre for Transylvanian Studies organized an international scientific conference in Cluj, Romania, between 10 and 13 November 2016.

Due to its long history and outstanding importance, Cluj has been the focus of the interest of historians, archaeologists, art historians, and of the general public for centuries, raising serious debates from time and again among scientists as well as the 'lay' public. The scientific answers to such inquiries are supposed to be re-evaluated from time to time, and this is true especially now when recent research has brought a number of new results.

The aim of the conference was to reveal the new trends in the research of the 700-year-old Cluj and to overview the latest results, taking into account the broader political, economic, and social context, considering the town as an organic part of Central European urbanity. The results of recent research on the history of the development of Central European towns are highly relevant, and thus the conference welcomed several presentations discussing this topic.

The conference concentrated on five major topics: the privilege from 1316, its antecedents and results, the legal status of towns – particularities and changes, the towns and their institutions, the topography of towns, the representative buildings and social space, and the everyday life of the towns. Since the conference was attended by almost seventy scholars, it was organized in two sections that took place at the two organizing universities.

The conference started with five plenary presentations. The first one was a historical approach to the town privilege of Cluj with special stress on the confusing political situation the king had been involved in before he issued the privilege (Attila Zsoldos: *The Antecedents of the Town Privilege of Cluj from 1316*). The author of the second paper, Adrian Andrei Rusu, was focusing on archaeological issues, especially on material culture revealed during archaeological excavations. He explained to what extent the activity of the local workshops was part of a process called the 'globalization' of the material culture in the late Middle Ages. The third author, András Kovács, analysed the first tax register of the Hungarian citizens of Cluj dated 1453. This is an important historical source concerning the medieval history of the town, and by using different methods of investigation the author tried to sketch the level of the town administration in the fifteenth century. The author of the last plenary paper, Maria Crăciun, explored the role of the parishes in the experience of the Anti-Trinitarian religion from the perspective of the theologians' discourse. Given both the religious transformation and reorganization of ecclesiastical space, the study attempted to predict how the parish church was used by the congregation and its role in the religious experience of the faithful.

An important number of papers presented at the conference was focusing on the town privilege, its antecedents, content, the political context in which the privilege was issued, and later transcriptions as well as the extension of the privileges. Katalin Szende presented the process how the status of the first settlers, called *hospites*, changed during the 13–15$^{th}$ centuries, Tudor Sălăgean stressed the importance of King Ladislaus V in establishing the hospes-type settlement in the second half of the 13$^{th}$ century, while Boglárka Weisz called our attention to a possible forgery of a privilege transcription dated 1336. The evolution of the status of the town was another issue largely debated, the fifteenth century being an important moment in this process (László Blazovich). Based on the mentioned presentations, it was once again stressed that the privileges obtained in 1316 were of outstanding importance in the life of the settlement. As a sign of self-government, the inhabitants of Cluj were free to elect their own town judge and parish priest and were exempted from customs duty on the whole territory of the country.

The town walls, indispensable and, at the same time, strongly symbolic elements of the status of town, were started to be built in these times, together with St Michael's parish church on the market square, today's Main Square. Against the abuses of power committed by the neighbouring landlords, the succeeding kings continued to strengthen and extend the above privileges, which ensured the dynamic political, social, and economic development of the town. Gradually, Cluj transcended its regional status, and became a town of national importance. This is clearly shown by the grants of King Sigismund of Luxembourg, who bestowed in 1405 not less than seven further privileges on the citizens of the town.

The archaeological investigation of the town, especially of its buildings, has flourished over the past few decades. The architectural research revealed also some important remains of the historical buildings. Those related to the town fortification were interpreted by Radu Lupescu. On the same topic but covering the Hungarian Kingdom, István Feld delivered a paper. Archaeology-related issues were discussed by Erwin Gáll (the early medieval settlement), Zsolt Csók (rescue excavations in the town), and Daniela Marcu Istrate (medieval burial customs). Architecture-related topics were covered by Szilárd Papp (the first parish church of the town), Sanda Salontai (identified some of the chapels and cloisters of Cluj, Braşov, and Sibiu), Ciprian Firea (the parish priests as patrons), Attila Weisz and Zsolt Kovács on some early modern houses, and János Orbán (architectural connections between Cluj and Târgu-Mureş).

The disintegration of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary in the 16th century and the rise of the independent Principality of Transylvania did not produce any recoil in the development of the town. On the contrary, Cluj started to flourish in this period. It was called 'wealthy Kolozsvár', '*civitas primaria'*, and the 'key to the country'. Although Alba Iulia (Gyulafehérvár in Hungarian) was the capital, Cluj remained without any doubt the cultural centre of the principality. It gave home to a number of general assemblies and national markets (these latter were organized several times a year), and sent more and more students to western centres of higher education. As a result, Cluj was one of the first towns in Transylvania to give home to the different currents of the reformation and itself became an important centre for the spread of the new religious ideas. Some of the conference papers were focusing on this historical period, reflecting the important changes that took place in the evolution and economic life of the town (Enikő Rüsz-Fogarasi, Emőke Gálfi, Zsolt Bogdándi, László Pakó). Changes occurred in the religious life of the town were also largely analysed. The changes in the early Protestant period were presented by Mária Lupescu Makó and Maria Crăciun. Following the Anti-Trinitarian period during the 17th century, the Calvinist community gained strength in the town, a process presented by Gábor Sipos. Interesting insights into the everyday life of the town were given by Klára Papp (the everyday life of the aristocracy in the town) and Andrea Fehér (delicts committed by women).

From the 16th century, Cluj was an important centre for education too. An overview of the educational establishments was presented by György Gaal, while some particular topics were covered by István Draskóczy (peregrination in Transylvania), László Szögi (the students from Cluj attending European universities), and Júlia Varga (the role played by the Jesuits in the town in this respect).

The end of the 17th century brought about the Habsburg rule in Transylvania and a number of changes in the life of Cluj. After a brief standstill in the first decades of the 18th century, a new period of economic and social prosperity followed.

Visible signs of this can still be perceived: baroque elements were introduced to enrich the general aspect of the town so far dominated by gothic- and renaissance-style structures. This was the period when the medieval privileges of the town were once again strengthened. The great effort made by the town in this respect was analysed by Ágnes Flóra.

By the end of the 18th century, Cluj became once again a political centre, and its inhabitants enjoyed a thriving cultural life throughout the 19th century. Quick and unbroken modernization continued to ensure the outstanding position of Cluj in the Hungarian Kingdom. The new stage of modernization was described by Miklós Székely (the foundation of a new museum for industry), Róbert Nagy with special focus on the period around 1900, and Ioana Rus Cacovean (the establishment of a house of correction). New tendencies in the life of the bourgeois, such as the *Flânerie*, were presented by Gábor Gyáni. Papers presenting visual sources of the town, such as postcards and advertising, were also of great interest (Radu Mârza and Ionuț Costea). The earliest drawings of the town were presented by Anda-Lucia Spânu. János Kristóf Murádin was focusing on the short period between 1941 and 1944, when the Transylvanian Party was active and played an important role in representing this historical region during war time. Among the last issues discussed was the role played by the local history research in strengthening local communities, with special regard to the Hungarian minority in Transylvania (Barna Bodó).

Besides Cluj, many papers presented at the conference dealt with different towns of the Hungarian Kingdom and especially of Transylvania, placing the topics related to Cluj into a wider context. The majority of them dealt with Sibiu, the most important town of the region for many centuries, but other towns were discussed as well: Baia Mare, Caransebeş, Focşani, Lipova, Satu Mare, Sighet, and Pécs.

Considering all the papers delivered, the conference may be regarded as a successful initiative, where many topics were discussed and many new scientific results were presented, laying down the basis for further research. It was also a great opportunity for Romanian and Hungarian scholars to have direct discussions and to establish scientific contacts.

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# Hungarians from Transylvania in Soviet Captivity between 1945 and 1953

## – Lectures, Exhibitions at Sapientia University –

With the occasion of the memorial year of the *Political Prisoners and Forced Labourers Deported to the Soviet Union*, between April 2016 and February 2017, there are organized presentation series at Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, Faculty of Sciences and Arts. The *A Magyarok szovjet fogságban 1944 és 1953 között* (Hungarians from Transylvania in Soviet Captivity between 1945 and 1953) titled presentation series' theme is about the civil population deported to the Soviet Gulags after the Second World War. According to the estimations, more than 200,000 Hungarian civilians were affected by this catastrophical event. Among them, more than 5,000 people were taken from Cluj-Napoca with the march of the Red Army units. More than a third of the prisoners perished in the several years of captivity.

Prestigious foreign and Transylvanian lecturers talk about the Hungarian captives forced into labour camps by the Soviet Union, the experience of the road to the camps, the life in the Gulags. The presentation series is open to everyone interested in this subject, and not just historians and students can get a glimpse at the Gulag world.

The Soviet imprisonment was a taboo subject in the years of communism. Generations grew up without knowing anything about the deportation of civilians to the Soviet Union. The presentation series' main purpose is to enlighten the general public about the deported Hungarians in 1944–1945 in the Soviet Gulag camps, bringing back history into the collective memory of the people.

The first lecture, entitled *Emlékezet és megemlékezés. Erdélyi magyar civilek szovjet fogságban 1944 és 1953 között* (Rememberence and Commemoration. Transylvanian Hungarians in Soviet Imprisonment between 1944 and 1953), was held by János Kristóf Murádin, PhD, historian, Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Sciences and Arts of Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, on 11th May 2016. The lecturer presented the waves of the Soviet deportation after the Second World War, the way the prisoners were transported to the camps, and the route to the Soviet Gulags. Memoirs of the prisoners were read, illustrating the whole story with statistics of the prisoners who died or came back alive from the camps.

The second lecture, entitled *Civilek elhurcolása Magyarországról a Szovjetunióba* (Deportation of the Civilians from Hungary to the Soviet Union), was held by Tamás Stark, PhD, historian at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Research Centre for the Humanities, Institute of History, on 26th May 2016. The public showed great interest in this subject and the lecture began with a reverence to the memory of all the prisoners. The presentation illustrated the main reasons the Hungarians were deported from their country. He also highlighted the importance of the prisoners in the Soviet economy and the political reasons of Moscow, eliminating those classes that did not fit into the Soviet plans. This is supported by the fact that so many people died in the camps. Tamás Stark exposed the idea that civilians in Hungary were deported in three waves. The first were war prisoners, the second wave were German people, but also Hungarians with German names were taken with them. Hungarians from Subcarpathia were deported with the purpose of 'ethnic cleansing' in the territory. An important number of Hungarian civilians arrived at the Gulags under the name of political prisoners, but they were just serving in a youth preparation programme for the protection of the country. According to Tamás Stark, from a number of 600,000 prisoners, 200,000 never returned home.

The next presentation was held by György Dupka, PhD, Secretary of Memorial Park from Szolyva (Svaliava, Ukraine), with the title of *A kárpátaljai magyarok 'malenkij robotra' hurcolása a GUPVI-GULÁG munkatáborokba az erőszakos szovjetizálás idején (1944–1953) és a lágerekben elhunytak emlékének megörökítése* (The Deportation of the Subcarpathian Hungarians to 'Malenkaya Rabota' in GUPVI-GULAG Labour Camps in the Period of Forced Sovietization (1944–1953) and the Preservation of the Memory of Those Who Passed Away in Captivity), on 16th June 2016. The lecturer presented the repercussions of the Soviet Union in the defeated territories and all the actions that the communist formation did to change the population integrity, mentality in the name of the communist ideology. György Dupka also highlighted the idea that it was important to have memorial sites in order to commemorate all those people who disappeared, suffered, and died in unfair circumstances.

The lecture entitled *Magyar civilek internálása 1944 őszén Romániában. A Barcaföldvári haláltábor a kollektív emlékezetben* (Hungarian Civilians' Relocation in the Autumn of 1944 in Romania. The Death Camp from Feldioara in the Collective Memory) was held on 17th August. At the beginning of his presentation, historian Levente Benkő recalled that 'There is no collective sinfulness! The happenings have original authors, principals, the culprits are not a community, they are individuals, who can be identified and named, and the happenings have no connection with the present.'

Zalán Bognár, PhD, Senior Lecturer at Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary, Research Centre for the Humanities, Institute of

History, held a presentation entitled *Hadifogolytáborok és (hadi)fogolysors a Kárpát-medencében, 1944–1945* (Political Prisoner Camps and the Destiny of the Prisoners in the Carpathian Basin, 1944–1945), on 29th September 2016. The lecture captivated the audience with contemporary documents, photos, quotes, and a lot of well-illustrated maps.

Erzsébet Molnár D., PhD, Assistant Professor at the Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute 'Ferenc Rákóczi II', Faculty of History and Social Science, researcher of 'Lehoczky Tivadar' Institute, held a very sucessful presentation with the title of *Kárpátaljai magyarok és németek szovjet hadifogoly- és kényszermunkatáborokba történő hurcolása* (Deportation of Subcarpathian Hungarians and Germans to Soviet War Prisoner and Forced Labour Camps) on 27th October 2016.

The presentation series continues with other interesting works of Attila Árvay, Péter Miklós, PhD, Eleonóra Matkovits-Kretz, and András Majorszki in the following months of the year 2016 and in January–February 2017.

Besides the presentation series, as another project of the memorial year, there is a unique exhibition at Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, Faculty of Sciences and Arts, entitled *It Is Easier to Die Than to Separate*. The exhibition had a large number of letters written by the prisoners from the labour camps, short, desperate messages that indicated their situation, personal objects and souvenirs from the GULAG/GUPVI lagers. The exhibition was opened by Faculty Dean Professor Márton Tonk and was followed by the lecture of historian Levente Benkő: *Foglyok emlékei között. Adalékok a romániai elhurcolások kutatásához* (Among the Memories of the Prisoners. Some Aspects to the Research of the Deportations in Romania), while the next lecture was presented by János Kristóf Murádin, PhD, historian, Assistant Professor of the Faculty of Sciences and Arts of Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, with the title of *Erdélyi magyarok szovjet fogságban – hét évtized távlatából* (Hungarians from Transylvania in Soviet Captivity – from the Perspective of Seven Decades).

Finally, the presentation series *Hungarians from Transylvania in Soviet Captivity between 1945 and 1953* gathered approximately an audience of 40–60 at every lecture, bringing back into the collective memory of the people that the GULAG and the GUPVI lagers were a real thing, where a lot of people perished, disappeared, and suffered innocently.

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