Acta Universitatis Sapientiae

European and Regional Studies

Volume 9, 2016

Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania
Scientia Publishing House

Contents

Book Reviews

DE GRUYTER OPEN

Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, **9** (2016) 5–6

DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2016-0001

Linguistic Justice Scrutinized

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We humans are linguistic beings. We are endowed with the ability to speak and to understand what others say. It is to this ability that we owe our potential for civilization, for behaving with each other in a civilized, fair way. Or, at least, it is to this ability that we owe the reasonable hope that we possess such a potential. However, once there is more than one language, more than one code for facilitating communication, and once people mastering distinct languages interact with one another on a regular basis, a language is not only a medium for sharing information, instructions, and reasons. It is also a means of exclusion, hierarchy, domination, and unfairness.

In today's world, interaction between people who do not possess the same native language has reached an unprecedented level. This fact I regard not only as irreversible but also as bound to further gain in importance in the coming decennia. At the same time, and largely for related reasons, human populations are becoming increasingly interdependent – throughout the world and more intensively within Europe. They are, therefore, in ever greater need of finding civilized ways of sharing a continent and a planet. And this requires being able to talk and listen more intensively, more effectively, and more cheaply than ever before.

For reasons spelt out at the onset of my *Linguistic Justice*, there is no promising way of achieving this except through the democratization of competence in one natural language, and this language will be something that can be called 'English'.[1] Since this indispensable lingua franca is very unequally close to the native languages of European citizens and of human beings generally, its dominance creates sizeable inequalities that can legitimately be regarded as unjust. The bulk of *Linguistic Justice* consists in discussing them in a systematic way and in proposing strategies for neutralizing or alleviating them.

1 See Chapter 1 of P. Van Parijs, *Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011; paperback 2015; German edition: *Sprachengerechtigkeit für Europa und die Welt*, Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2013; Dutch edition: *Taal en rechtvaardigheid in Europa en de wereld*, Leuven: Lannoo Campus, 2015.

The set of insightful essays collected in the present volume stems from a particularly intense and stimulating international workshop that took place at the University of Amsterdam in November 2015. They question either my assumptions or my conclusions or both in ways that force me to think harder on some of the issues I discussed in *Linguistic Justice*, often by convincingly highlighting the need for further empirical research.

In particular, the essays argue that I dismiss too lightly artificial languages as an alternative to English as lingua franca (Gobbo, Maat), that I misconstrue the maxi-min dynamics (Kruse), that I fail to address the question of the democratic legitimacy (as opposed to the usefulness for democracy) of the language regime I propose (Garcia), that I am assuming too easily that the latter will have a positive effect on the viability of a strongly 'social' Europe (Marácz), that I do not pay enough attention to the impoverishment of inter-cultural communication induced by the convergence on English (Wickström) or to the loss of cultural diversity induced by universal exposure to the Anglo-American culture (Morales-Gálvez), that I underestimate the possibility that the attempt to democratize the lingua franca might widen rather than narrow the gap between the better-off and the worse-off (Iannàccaro and Dell'Aquila), that I overlook the potential English may have for inter-communication in linguistically divided countries (Csata), that I fail to document sufficiently the brain drain effect of implementing the territorial protection of weaker languages (Houtkamp), and that I undervalue the virtues of weak versions of the latter (Salverda).

I do not agree with each of these criticisms, but I have learned from all of the essays. There is nothing as gratifying for an author than having his writings read carefully, pondered over open-mindedly, and discussed rigorously, especially when all this is done by scholars with competences he does not himself possess.[2] This is how we can broaden together our knowledge, deepen our understanding, and improve our institutions and policies in a domain that is more important than ever for the smooth and fair funding of our societies and our world. I am most grateful to all the contributors to this volume, and especially to the latter's coordinator, László Marácz, for this wonderful opportunity.

2 See also the critical essays collected in P. Van Parijs & al., *The Linguistic Territoriality Principle. Right Violation or Parity of Esteem?* Brussels: Re-Bel e-book n°11, 2011, www.rethinkingbelgium.eu; and in H. De Schutter & D. Robichaud (eds), *Linguistic Justice; Van Parijs and his Critics*, London: Routledge, 2016.

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Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, **9** (2016) 7–14

DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2016-0002

Linguistic Justice for which *Demos*? The Democratic Legitimacy of Language Regime Choices

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Abstract. In the European Union language regime debate, theorists of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism have framed their arguments in reference to different theories of justice and democracy. Philippe Van Parijs advocates the diffusion of a *lingua franca*, namely English, as means of changing the scale of the justificatory community to the European level and allowing the creation of a transnational *demos*. Paradoxically, one key dimension of democracy has hardly been addressed in this discussion: the question of the democratic legitimacy of language regime choices and citizens' preferences on the different language regime scenarios. Addressing the question of the congruence of language policy choices operated by national and European elites and ordinary citizens' preferences, this paper argues first that the dimension of democratic legitimacy is crucial and needs to be taken into account in discussions around linguistic justice. Criticizing the assumption of a direct correspondence between individuals' language learning choices and citizens' language regime preferences made by different authors, the analysis shows the ambivalence of citizens' preferences measured by survey data. The article secondly raises the question of the boundaries of the political community at which the expression of citizens' preferences should be measured and demonstrates that the outcome and the fairness of territorial linguistic regimes may vary significantly according to the level at which this democratic legitimacy is taken into account.

Keywords: linguistic justice, democracy, legitimacy, European Union, language regime

Much of the debate opposing defenders of a multilingual language regime for the European Union and those arguing in favour of establishing English as *lingua franca* on the European level has been framed in reference to different theories of justice and democracy between theorists of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism (Archibugi 2005). Multiculturalists emphasize the importance of democratic participation in citizens' own language and call for 'politics in the vernacular' (Kymlicka 2001), where citizens have the right to debate in their mother tongue. Cosmopolitanists, on the other hand, consider the existence of a shared language of communication as precondition for the emergence of a democratic public sphere on the European level. Along this strand of literature analysing which language regime is the most apt to foster the emergence of a European *demos* (Bourdieu et al. 2001), Philippe van Parijs assessed various language policy scenarios in regard to different conceptualizations of social justice (van Parijs 2011). Van Parijs advocates the diffusion of a *lingua franca*, namely English, as means of changing the scale of the justificatory community to the European level and allowing the creation of a transnational *demos*.

Paradoxically, one key dimension of democracy has hardly been addressed in this debate: the question of the democratic legitimacy of language regime choices and citizens' preferences on the different language regime scenarios. This question raises the larger issue of the role of political decision-makers in the field of language policy from a democratic point of view: should European elites attempt to change citizens' language policy preferences by raising their awareness of the implications of different language regime scenarios? Or should they be merely responsive to citizens' preferences such as expressed through their language learning choices and different opinion polls? Addressing the question of the congruence of language policy choices operated by national and European elites and ordinary citizens' preferences, I will argue first that the dimension of democratic legitimacy is crucial and needs to be taken into account in discussions around linguistic justice. Secondly, I will show that the outcome and the fairness of territorial linguistic regimes may vary significantly according to the level at which this democratic legitimacy is taken into account.

The Democratic Legitimacy of Language Regime Choices: a Forgotten Dimension

The question of the democratic legitimacy of language regime choices and the responsiveness of language policies to citizens' preferences points to gaps in both the empirical and the theoretical literature on the EU language regime debate. On the empirical level, European citizens have so far not had the possibility to express themselves directly by means of a vote in favour or against a given language regime. The EU's institutional structure and the delegation mechanisms of its decision-making process make it difficult to take into account citizens' preferences independently from Member States interests. Since its institutionalization in 1958, the principle of equal treatment of all official languages – which are national languages of one or more Member States – has been sanctified, although the increase of the number of official languages has led *de facto* to strengthen the position of English. While one could imagine the organization of an EU-wide referendum on language policies, this scenario is unlikely, as even during the drafting of the European constitutional treaty the question of the European language regime was sidestepped (Van Els 2005, 269). The avoidance of a political debate on language regime choices and the absence of integrated multi-level policies regulating language use in the EU have entailed that citizens' language regime preferences have been taken into consideration only indirectly in the literature on language policy as well as by decision-makers themselves.

The scarcity of the available empirical data on citizens' language regime preferences also raises a number of theoretical issues. In the literature on language policies, citizens' preferences are usually inferred from their language learning choices or skills. While authors such as van Parijs and de Swaan agree that the spread of languages through compulsory secondary education is one of the main factors contributing to the dynamism of the European and global language system, the congruence between individual language learning choices, national language education policies, and citizens' EU language regime preferences is considered unproblematic and self-evident. The underlying assumption of a direct correspondence between individuals' language learning choices and citizens' language regime preferences neglects both the institutional and contextual constraints determining individual choices and preferences and the impact of mechanisms of aggregation of preference from the individual to the collective level. More largely, the question of the scale or the policy level at which the expression of citizens' preferences should be measured is not directly addressed by the majority of authors: in the absence of a European *demos*, which is the political community that decides, formulates collective choices and gives legitimacy to language regime choices?

Same Data, Different Conclusions

In the EU language regime debate, defenders of multilingualism and supporters of English as *lingua franca* have based their argument on similar survey data on European citizens' language skills. Calculating the rates of 'language disenfranchisement' entailed by different language regime scenarios on the basis of the 2001 Eurobarometer data on citizens' language skills, Ginsburg and Weber argue in favour of a limited multilingualism scenario for the EU with the retention of French and German as working languages (Ginsburgh et Weber 2005). Based on the same data, van Parijs defends, on the other hand, the recognition of English as European *lingua franca* and suggests compensating the inequalities this policy option entails by measures facilitating language learning in education and through media policies banning dubbing (van Parijs 2004). For de Swaan, citizens' language learning choices have already led to make the English-as-lingua-franca scenario an empirical reality that cannot be easily reserved (de Swaan 2007, 14). This view is also shared by Laitin, who considers that the recognition of English as international *lingua franca* will be part of an institutionalized European language constellation recognizing, at the same time, state and regional languages (Laitin 1997, 299). Finally, on the basis of the *Adult Education Survey* data on European citizens' language skills, Gazzola argues in favour of the current multilingual EU language regime since a reduction of the number of official languages would lead to the disenfranchisement of an important part of the EU population (Gazzola 2015).

The fact that similar data is used to back up arguments in favour of contradictory language regime scenarios reveals the problematic nature of using citizens' language skills as proxy for their language regime choices. In all these analyses, European citizens' preferences are inferred on the basis of either their self-declared language skills or data on pupils' language learning choices. In doing so, these analyses neglect that the locus of the expression of these preferences remains that of the different Member States and that language learning decisions may be guided primarily by individual motivations such as the maximization of one's communication potential. It appears, hence, problematic to hypothesize a direct correspondence between individual language learning choices, which are constrained by national language education policies, and citizens' preferences for the different language regime scenarios of the EU. Van Parijs' and de Swaan's works, by analysing the global predominance of English as the unintentional result produced by the aggregation of individual decisions, perfectly illustrate that there might be a gap between citizens' language learning choices and their language regime preferences.

The Ambiguity of Citizens' Preferences Measured by Survey Data

Confronting citizens' language learning choices with survey data on citizens' language regime preferences reveals the ambivalence characterizing language policy preferences. While the data from the three Eurobarometer surveys on languages published in 2001, 2006, and 2012 contains certain biases linked to the choice and wording of the questions, it provides nonetheless a rough assessment of the major trends in the support of the principles guiding EU language policies. The EB data reveals that both the principle of equal treatment of all languages –

which in the wording of the question could be understood to include far more languages than the official languages of the EU – and the need for a common language spoken by all European citizens receive a considerable degree of support. First, the statement 'all languages spoken within the European Union should be treated equally' collects the agreement of 82.7% of respondents in 2006 and of 86.1% in 2012. Secondly, the statement according to which 'the European institutions should adopt one single language to communicate with European citizens' is also supported by a less important majority but still by a high percentage of citizens in 2006 (55.4%) and 2012 (54.1%). Moreover, the need for a common language is mentioned more often in the last two EB waves: in 2006, 68.3% of respondents tend to agree that 'everyone in the European Union should be able to speak a common language', while 66.6% of respondents do so in 2012. The 2001 EB survey reveals an interesting discrepancy between only 37.6% of respondents agreeing with the statement 'we will all have to start speaking a common language' and 75.2% of respondents supporting the statement that 'everyone in the EU should be able to speak English'.

These inconsistencies observed in citizens' preferences mirror the tension that exists on the level of national and EU policy makers between favouring English for the sake of efficiency and the will to protect Member States' national languages. David Laitin has analysed the discrepancy between public and private language policy preferences in post-colonial settings in terms of 'the private subversion of the public good' (Laitin 1994, 43). Similar mechanisms appear to be at work inside the European Union, with citizens supporting the EU commitment to multilingualism, while simultaneously undermining this same multilingualism by choosing English as first foreign language for their children. The EB data confirms again that there is no direct correspondence between foreign language learning choices and citizens' language regime preferences. The fact that citizens' preferences are characterized by the same tensions as those inherent in official EU language policy raises the question of citizens' preference formation and the role of political elites in this process even more. As it stands, the ambivalence in European citizens' language regime preferences can only be resolved through a true democratic debate on different language scenarios. In this deliberation, European policy makers and national representatives have a key role to play in defending alternative policy options and to elaborate an integrated policy regulating language use and multilingualism in Europe.

Language Regime Choice as *Object* of Democratic Deliberation

As the definition of an 'optimal' language regime for the European Union ultimately relies on the victory of one normative position over another, namely the support or the abandoning of the principle of equal language treatment (Pool 1996), a democratic deliberation taking into account citizens' preferences more directly is vital for the legitimacy of EU language regime choices. Surprisingly, language has so far mainly been analysed as a *means* of allowing a democratic deliberation by a European *demos*, while language regime choice as *object* of a democratic debate between European citizens or their representatives has not retained much attention. This shortcoming is partly linked to the much-debated democratic deficit of the EU with delegation mechanisms rendering classic conceptions of democratic accountability and responsiveness difficult to apply.

Considering that any European language regime scenario requires a certain degree of democratic legitimacy raises the question of the boundaries of the political community or the *demos* that confers this legitimacy. The outcomes produced by the territorial linguistic regime scenario defended by van Parijs may indeed vary significantly according to the level at which this democratic legitimacy is taken into account. Van Parijs argues that the implementation of an English *lingua franca* regime on the European level should coexist with territorially differentiated linguistic regimes in order to secure linguistic justice as 'parity of esteem' between speakers of different languages. Territorial linguistic regimes are defined as consisting in 'public authorities deciding to impose specific constraints on the conduct of the inhabitants of a territory as regards the medium of education and the public use of language' (van Parijs 2011, 138). The criteria of definition of the boundaries of this territorial linguistic regimes are, however, not clearly spelled out: van Parijs states that 'a territorial linguistic regime requires administrative borders that define the various linguistic areas, but it does not require these borders to be political borders in any sense' (van Parijs 2011, 147), while simultaneously claiming that 'the political entities that currently exist are not sacrosanct' (p. 148) and referring to 'the territories claimed by various languages' (van Parijs 2011, 149). This raises the more fundamental question whether and to what extent the boundaries of the political community should coincide with those of the linguistic communities. A soft reading of van Parijs' argument would imply the defence of the preservation of the *status quo* and essentially benefit to languages that are currently already the official languages of a state. Interpreted in a more radical way, the same territorial linguistic regimes would, on the contrary, amount to redrawing the boundaries of sovereignty and the locus of democratic decision-making on the bases of linguistic communities claiming a territory. While van Parijs concedes that 'some kind of democratic process' (p. 169) would undoubtedly be necessary to settle disagreements regarding the borders of the territorial linguistic regimes, the question of whether the boundaries of the *demos* that decides the implementation of language regimes are those of existing political communities or whether the realization of linguistic justice entails the redrawing of political boundaries remains open.

Conclusion

Whether arguing in favour of English as a *lingua franca* or defending multilingualism, discussions around linguistic justice need to take into account the dimension of democratic legitimacy of language regimes that has so far been eluded in the existing literature. A just language regime for the European Union cannot be inferred from citizens' current language skills or language learning preferences, but it ultimately relies on a choice of one normative principle over another. As a consequence, in order to be legitimate, a language regime scenario needs to be acceptable to and be supported by a large majority of the citizens. More specifically, a discussion around the level at which this democratic legitimacy is taken into account and the boundaries of the *demos* that expresses its collective language regime choice is crucial since the outcome and the fairness of territorial linguistic regimes may vary significantly according to this criterion. The debate around the definition of a European language regime is further complicated by the multilevel nature and democratic deficit of the EU, where citizens' preferences are taken into account only through the intermediation of Member States' representation. The argument according to which we need 'to meet the linguistic preconditions for turning Europe, and ultimately the world, into one *demos*' (van Parijs 2004, 118) should hence be reversed as follows: we need to meet the democratic preconditions for allowing the European *demos* or European citizens to decide on a legitimate language regime for the EU.

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DE GRUYTER OPEN
ACTA UNIV. SAPIENTIAE, EUROPEAN AND REGIONAL STUDIES, **9** (2016) 15–22
DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2016-0003

Why Should We Prevent a Global Anglo-American Life-World? A Democratic-Deliberative Answer[1]

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Abstract. Should English be promoted as a worldwide lingua franca for justice-related reasons? Philippe Van Parijs answers affirmatively in order to promote global distributive justice. In contrast, I argue that a rapid expansion of English could lead to one undesirable consequence that ought to be prevented: the globalization of an Anglo-American life-world that impoverishes democratic-deliberative debates. Inspired by John Stuart Mill, I will defend the idea that the more dominant the Anglo-American life-world is, the less diversity of life-worlds and, therefore, the less diversity of substantial voices in the global democratic-deliberative process there will be. It might be that more voices could be heard (because of the lingua franca), but with less substantial diversity of opinions. In that sense, the life-worlds (and language as an access key to them) have an instrumental value that enables plurality and better deliberative discussion. For that reason, I contend that there is a *pro tanto* reason to prevent the expansion of English as a lingua franca.

Keywords: linguistic justice, life-world, English as lingua franca, deliberative democracy, Van Parijs

1. Introduction

The global expansion of English as a lingua franca is a fact that we are experiencing in our daily life. Like all important political events, political philosophers should deal with the normative desirability of that fact: Is the spread of English around the world (un)desirable? Is that spread carrying some injustices that should be prevented? Or, in contrast, should English be promoted because of some desirable consequences?

1 I want to express thanks to Helder De Schutter, Nenad Stojanovic, Michael Jewkes, Elvira Riera, and Nicolás Brando for having provided valuable comments.

The first political philosopher who has dedicated one monograph to that issue is Philippe Van Parijs. In his insightful book *Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World* (2011), he defends the desirability of spreading English around the world in order to promote global distributive justice. In this respect, I want to point out one possible critique of his proposal. I will argue that a rapid expansion of English can lead to one undesirable consequence that ought to be prevented: the globalization of an Anglo-American life-world that can impoverish democratic-deliberative debates.

2. Four Kinds of Injustices because of the Spread of English

In the first chapter of his book, Van Parijs clearly points out that the expansion of English around the world leads to three kinds of injustices: a communicative injustice, a resource injustice, and a dignity injustice. Firstly, there is a communicative injustice because English native speakers are, of course, more fluent in English than the non-native ones. Secondly, there is a resource injustice because the general investment (in money, effort, and time) of non-native speakers to learn English will always be higher than the native speakers' one. Finally, there is a dignity injustice because the status assigned to a language is usually seen as a definer of individuals' status. In this regard, the inequality of language status between English and all the other languages could affect the self-esteem and dignity of the non-Anglophones.

Van Parijs tries to solve the three mentioned injustices through three different proposals: fair cooperation, equal opportunities, and parity of esteem. Whether or not we agree with him, I am not going to focus my attention on those kind of injustices already discussed in the literature (De Schutter forthcoming; Van Parijs 2000, 2011). My focus will be on a fourth kind of injustice, not developed by Van Parijs and suggested by Helder De Schutter (forthcoming).

De Schutter points out the life-world injustice based on 'the idea that the dominance of English is not the dominance of a neutral linguistic code but one imbued with a cultural life-world that also comes to dominate over other life-worlds' (ib.: 3). De Schutter defines life-world as the 'shared common understandings, shared assumptions about the world, about who we are, what we believe, what shocks and offends us, what we desire…' (ib.: 7). In a similar way, François Grin argues that language 'is a carrier of intellectual and cultural references' (Grin 2011, 31). I agree. Language acts as a key that gives us access to different life-worlds. In Kymlicka's terminology, I would say that a life-world can be defined as a 'context of choice' that gives to us meaningful options for living our lives, a medium 'through which we come to an awareness of the options available to us, and their significance; and this is a precondition of making intelligent judgements about how to lead our lives' (Kymlicka 1989, 165). A language, therefore, would be a key to have access to a life-world, the glasses through which we can see the world.

Van Parijs does not label such 'life-world complain' as an injustice. He argues that languages do not carry with them any kind of ideological bias (2011: 31–36), and I totally agree. English does not have 'neoliberal' connotations as Russian does not have 'communist' connotations either. There are no proofs that connect 'linguistic structure and political conceptions' (ib.: 32). The problem, rather, is that a global access to English can facilitate immersion to an Anglo-American life-world, clearly influencing non-Anglophone ways of life, and not the other way around. Van Parijs brightly explains that with the following words:

> As a consequence of such processes, there is now, and there will continue to be, an asymmetrical process of cultural diffusion, with inequalities in the cultural flows from and to the Anglophone countries far exceeding what could be expected on the basis of the relative sizes of their populations or cultural production. Arguably, a national culture is not ideologically neutral. It is rather suffused, albeit in a fuzzy and plural way, by a set of beliefs about what makes a good society. To the extent that this is the case, the asymmetry of intercultural flows intimately linked with the spreading of a lingua franca that is much closer to one language of culture than to any other is another potential factor of ideological bias (ib.: 35).

Van Parijs' solution to this sort of problem is to spread English as quickly as possible in order to disseminate this content through the 'global appropriation of English' (ib.: 33). Only with such a rapid spread would non-Anglophones be able to create new contents in English (blogs, best-sellers, films, etc.) and avoid the expansion of the English-only way of life.

However, I agree with De Schutter and Grin with regard to the assumption that the globalization of English would lead to a life-world injustice. In a way, a growth of English as a lingua franca would create more 'disconnection between that language and the life-world within which non-native speakers live' (De Schutter forthcoming, 8). The Anglo-American world would become dominant and this could lead to a *peripheralization* (in De Schutter's words) of non-English contexts and the consolidation of a hegemonic Anglo-American way of life. Grin, too, points out some real examples (beyond the genuinely cultural): international law, for example, is mostly based on Anglo-American law (Grin 2011, 31). Of course, language is not the most important factor at stake. There already exists an Anglo-American life-world domination due to economic and political reasons, but language is a relevant agent of that process. Whereas non-native English speakers would conduct parts of their lives in a language that comes from a different life-world, English native speakers would be 'increasingly leading their life in a purely Anglo-American life-world' (De Schutter forthcoming, 8). This process of life-world dominance could be more accelerated with a fast expansion of English, especially making non-native English speakers more vulnerable to the Anglo-American life-world.[2]

3. A Democratic-Deliberative Approach to the 'Life-World' Injustice

Whereas De Schutter exposes a *cultural* perspective of the life-world injustice, I would like to develop an argument of the undesirability of an Anglo-American life-world from a *deliberative-democratic* perspective. I will argue that the problem is not only the loss of one's culture because of the dominance of Anglo-American life-world (and the consequent injustices created by that situation) but also the loss of substantial diversity that can damage democracy (notice that diversity is usually central in the democratic-deliberative debate).[3]

In contrast with Brian Barry's arguments in favour of a convergence towards one unique language if we want democracy to work (Barry 2001, 228), I shall argue for the moral value of diversity from a democratic perspective. Inspired by John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty*,[4] I will defend the following statements: the more dominant the Anglo-life-world, the less diversity of life-worlds and, therefore, the less plurality of substantial voices in the global democratic-deliberative process. It might be that more voices could be heard (because of the lingua franca), but with less substantial diversity of opinions. In that sense, the life-worlds[5] (and

2 It is important to remark the concept of 'Anglo-American' and not that of 'Anglophone' because the dominant life-world is the former one and not all the Anglophone world. The Anglo-American life-world does not include (for the time being) the Indian or South-African English-speaking life-worlds despite that all the Anglophone-world would benefit of the spread of English. However, from a power-dominant perspective (and for now), only the Anglo-American life-world has a dominant role.

3 There is not enough space for a deep explanation of what deliberative democracy consists in. I just want to clarify that I understand deliberation as a democratic decision-making procedure which implies discussing and listening to everyone's opinion, helping to depurate arguments and reasons through the criticism of everybody. Therefore, diversity plays an important role from a deliberative-democratic perspective. For an empirical approach of the (positive) value of linguistic diversity for deliberative democracy, see Caluwaerts and Deschouwer (2013).

4 Mill's position in *Considerations on the Representative Government* (1998 [1861]) is quite different from the one defended in this paper. I do not have enough space to contrast Mill's argument in both books, the reason why I will use only Mill's *On Liberty* conception of diversity.

5 I do not have enough space to deal with the distinction (or not) between culture and life-world. In the text, I assume that these concepts are interchangeable.

language as a key) have an instrumental value that enable plurality and a better deliberative discussion.

I will develop my argument following Van Parijs' main premise. In his view, the spread of English as a lingua franca could facilitate the creation of two relevant conditions for global social justice: *ethical contagion* and *ensuring a real demos*. The first says that sharing a space of communication would allow to perceive the other individuals as something 'more than sheer curiosities or trade partners', but an equal participant who requires my explanations and deliberations (Van Parijs 2011, 26). It is a way to introduce all individuals in what Van Parijs calls a 'justificatory community'. The inclusion in this justificatory community is just the way to *ensure a real demos*. He argues about the necessity to achieve a shared forum, a common space for deliberation and mobilization, defining the *demos* as the 'possibility of all citizens to effectively deliberate and mobilize' (ib.: 28–30). His logic says, then, that the more English is spread, the more people would be included in such 'justificatory community' of deliberation.

In fact, Van Parijs' logic leads to the following consequences: the more people participate in such 'justificatory community', the more powerful the dominance of the Anglo-American life-world and the more *peripheralized* the other life-worlds become. However, could this dominance–*peripheralization* logic lead to a decrease of diversity? My answer is affirmative because the more powerful the dominance of the Anglo-American life-world (and the *peripheralization* of the other life-worlds) becomes, the more susceptible non-native speakers would be to the broader moral consensus of the Anglo-American life-world. As I have pointed out before, even Van Parijs agrees with this point in his book. As Michael Jewkes (2015) argues, using John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville as guidelines, the existence of a single deliberative sphere (as Van Parijs suggests) could endanger the flourishing of societal diversity because of the 'dominating force of public opinion' (Jewkes 2015, 14). Public opinion is usually created through key influential agents that use 'their opportune status to stimulate and guide public debate: establishing initial terms and staking out competing poles of opinions around which the public subsequently gathers' (ib.: 13). Therefore, unified deliberative spheres facilitate one central set of key actors who usually converge upon some kind of broad consensus. If we apply that understanding to Van Parijs's 'justificatory community', we can say that the spread of English (and the dominance–*peripheralization* logic) could facilitate the decrease of diversity exactly because people could enter into a single deliberative sphere already shaped by the Anglo-American life-world, their references and some broad moral consensus, which clearly would affect the non-native English speakers (and not the other way round, that is, the fact that non-native speakers' life-world contribution to shape this single deliberative sphere would be more *peripheral*).

Let us contemplate the following hypothetical scenario in which I compare two situations: A, in which there are five opinions: three in English and two in Magyar, and B, in which there are also five opinions: all of them in English. Why is A better than B? Van Parijs could say that in B everyone is included in the deliberation and diversity would be heard. In contrast, I would answer that this single deliberative sphere (justificatory community) could tend to walk towards a broad moral consensus that can impoverish diversity. Van Parijs could answer that this is not true because 5 opinions are more than 3 and 2. But imagine that the two new English members of B were Magyar-native speakers: they would be included in a pre-existent justificatory community, with an existing moral consensus and powerful actors, which would be very difficult to contest. In fact, the Magyars would be much more vulnerable to their new Anglo-American life-world than the English native-speakers with respect to the Magyar life-world. My proposal is that A is better than B for three consequential reasons: (1) two different 'justificatory communities' would make people less vulnerable to the dominant life-world and, therefore, more able to preserve their own; (2) The less vulnerability, the more possibilities to have different moral consensus; (3) the more possibilities to have different moral consensus, the more substantially different opinions would be at stake in the deliberative debate.

Now, one could ask, so what? What is the problem if this kind of diversity decreases? Is this diversity morally relevant? Does this include worthless opinions? Is all kind of diversity worth enough? I would respond affirmatively. Diversity allows people to discuss amidst different conceptions of the good and refine and polish their arguments and moral convictions.[6] Thinking differently could lead to some kind of infallibility perception of oneself, as John Stuart Mill pointed out (Mill 2010 [1859]).

As already mentioned, languages (as the key to cultural life-worlds) are relevant tools to preserve moral diversity. In Mill's words: 'All languages and literatures are full of general observations on life, both as to what it is and how to conduct oneself in it; […].' (ib.: 44). However, languages *per se* do not carry with them any concrete moral connotation. Why, then, languages are useful to preserve that diversity?[7] I see two main reasons: First, as explained before, language is a key to access a life-world. It is not the life-world by itself but the

6 For the various Millian arguments in favour of the moral value of diversity, see Jewkes (2015, 4–8).

7 Notice that I am using the verb 'preserve' and not 'create'. One could say that if diversity is good for democracy then it could be a good idea to promote the creation of new languages (or the revival of dead ones). Of course, I do not think that we should create new languages to improve democracy, but keeping the existing ones and their life-worlds. That is, it is more preferable a world with 8 languages than with 2, but that does not mean that we should create 'zombie-languages' in order to promote desirable diversity. In the end, we want to take care of individual interests/preferences, and that only involves 'alive languages'.

glasses through which we can check reality and assess valuable options. Second, language usually works as a natural barrier. The existence of a language group makes it easier to protect some concrete life-worlds despite that they are neither a sufficient condition (Anglo-American music is listened around the world, even by people who do not speak English at all) nor a necessary condition (both Colombia and Spain have Spanish as their main language, but we might agree that their life-worlds are quite different).[8] However, a really strong spread of English would make non-native English speakers more vulnerable to the Anglo-American life-world. Even Van Parijs said something similar to that some years ago. He literally 'stresses the long-term general benefits of linguistic diversity. Given the nature and reach of present and future media, linguistic diversity is the firmest, and increasingly the only serious protection of cultural diversity. And the latter permits a diversity of experimentation in private and social life, from which mankind as a whole will arguably, in the long run, benefit' (Van Parijs 2000, 226). On Tocquevillian grounds, I would support Van Parijs's words saying that language could act as a limiting wall over the tyranny of the majority, in our case the Anglo-American life-world.

Therefore, as I argued at the beginning, the existence of substantially different moral opinions is something valuable for democracy, especially in some kind of global justificatory community. As John Stuart Mill states: 'I believe that other ethics than any which can be evolved from exclusively Christian sources, must exist side by side with Christian ethics to produce the moral regeneration of mankind; and that the Christian system is no exception to the rule, that in an imperfect state of the human mind, the interests of truth require a diversity of opinions' (Mill 2010 [1859], 52). That could also be applied to life-worlds instead of religion. Then, a global Anglo-American life-world is something to be prevented from a democratic point of view because we need all the life-world sources in order to be closer to the 'truth' (as Mill said) in democratic-deliberative debates. If not, what is the point of wanting a global 'justificatory community'? If all diversity of voices is not voiced, because of the domination of one life-world, there is no justification to achieve such 'justificatory community'. Therefore, I would argue that there exists a *pro tanto* reason to prevent the expansion of English as a lingua franca.

8 It is said that past colonialism is a form of life-world domination. Of course, it could have an influence especially if this past is a recent one, but probably it is not the case with nowadays Colombia (and Latin America in general) with regard to its past metropolis.

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DE GRUYTER OPEN

Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, **9** (2016) 23–29

DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2016-0004

English and the Brain Drain: an Uncertain Relationship

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Abstract. In his book *Linguistic Justice for Europe and the World*, Van Parijs analyses in one of his chapters the brain drain from non-Anglophone to Anglophone countries, which hurts the economic development of the non-Anglophone states. Van Parijs deems it clear that English is a very important factor to explain high-skilled migration. He, therefore, urges the non-Anglophone countries to relax their linguistic territorial constraints and allow English as a communication language in many different sectors, most notably higher education and scientific research. This would remove the incentive for potential expatriate brains to migrate for linguistic reasons. This article takes a closer look at Van Parijs' reasoning and proposed solutions. It is concluded that the assumed connection between English and high-skilled migration cannot be proven empirically for research on this topic is scarcely available. Furthermore, the solutions presented by Van Parijs will produce uncertain results at best. Van Parijs rightfully puts the brain drain problem on the political and research agenda, but much more additional studies are needed to formulate solid solutions.

Keywords: brain drain, English, high-skilled migration, expats, language and migration

Introduction

In his book *Linguistic Justice for Europe and the World*, Philippe van Parijs argues extensively in favour of embracing English as a lingua franca and of using it as a means to combat global injustice. One of his many arguments is that a more liberal, pro-English language regime in non-Anglophone countries could help combat the exodus of high-skilled migrants towards the English-speaking worlds. This is an interesting argument in the context of migration research for it assumes a clear connection between 'language' and 'migration'.

The body of theoretical work on explaining migration is rather expansive, too expansive to be discussed here in depth. Some of the more dominant theories seek to explain it through e.g. economic differences (Sjaastad 1962, Todaro and Maruszko 1987, Borjas 1989), the presence of social networks in the country of destination (Stahl 1993), and psychological factors (i.e. status enhancement) (De Jong–Fawcett 1981). These explanations are naturally not mutually exclusive: for instance, economic as well as psychological factors can play a role when explaining one's migration. These theories have been empirically tested in different contexts. In addition to these established theories, migration is also sometimes explained through other, more recently introduced factors, such as climate change, public attitudes toward migrants in the country of destination (Doomernik–Koslowski–Thränhardt 2009), and – particularly important in the case of high-skilled migration – the presence of a policy framework to attract expatriate brains (i.e. green-card- of blue-card-type initiatives). It may have become clear that one factor has been missing until now in this summing-up of factors, namely 'language'. Language is compared to the other mentioned explanations severely understudied in migration research. It is sometimes considered as an auxiliary factor, for instance when analysing migration from former colonies to their former colonial 'motherland', but it is rarely considered separately.

Van Parijs' emphasis on the role of language to explain migration is thus quite exceptional in the current field of migration studies. In this contribution, I will briefly discuss his argument and its merits.

English, Linguistic Territoriality, and the Brain Drain

In his chapter on 'linguistic territoriality', Van Parijs analyses several downsides of the linguistic territoriality principle (i.e. the idea that linguistic rights should be defined based on territory). One of these downsides is the asymmetric flow of human capital towards the so-called 'ground floor' of the world. The ground floor are those countries where English is the dominant language, i.e. 'the greater part of North America, the British Isles, Australia, and New Zealand' (Van Parijs 2011: 159). Van Parijs lists several facts to back up his argument: 75% of the world's expatriate brains, which are defined as graduates of tertiary education who do not live in their country of birth, are based in just three ground-floor countries (the U.S., Canada, and Great Britain). In 2000, there was a surplus of 12 million brains in the OECD regions. In other words: the sum of high-skilled immigration and emigration nets a positive result of 12 million for the OECD regions. Even within the OECD, the English-speaking countries are the largest beneficiaries of high-skilled migration. The six Anglophone OECD countries alone had a surplus of 14 million brains, with 10 million residing in the USA, whilst the non-English OECD states suffered a net loss of 2 million brains. In other words: looking at these statistics, it is evident that the English-speaking part of the world is an incredible magnet for high-skilled migration. The result is a tremendous brain drain from the non-English towards the English-speaking world, a development that can perpetuate global inequality.

Van Parijs acknowledges that there are many factors to explain this brain drain, but he claims that ‘It would be hard to deny the importance of the linguistic factor’ (Van Parijs 2011: 160). According to him, migrants, especially high-skilled migrants, are more likely to move to countries where they can be well-informed of the job opportunities and where their children can learn a language that is widely used in the world. It is obvious that many migrants opt for an English-speaking destination. Van Parijs describes the likely future migration trend as follows:

> In a world in which English is being snowballed, through the mechanism sketched at the start (1.3–1.5), into the single global lingua franca, we can expect the formation of a huge ground floor towards which the highly skilled of India and China, Finland and Hungary, Germany and France will tend to converge more and more, without anything like a matching tendency for the highly skilled of the United States or Britain to climb up to the Mandarin plateau, let alone to the Hungarian peak (Van Parijs 2011: 161).

To (partly) prevent large-scale high-skilled emigration, Van Parijs urges the upper-floor territories to reconsider their language policies and relax the linguistic territoriality principle. By refusing to allow some use of English within their linguistic territories, he argues, they might be shooting themselves in their own foot. He is convinced that the exodus of their high-skilled citizens towards the ground floor would then continue and the upper-floor states will perpetually be set behind in the current knowledge-based economy. Even though the future for the upper floor looks rather bleak, Van Parijs does also point out several potential perks of high-skilled emigration which he calls ‘diaspora buffers’ (Van Parijs 2011: 162). Firstly, migrants often send resources back home, the so-called ‘remittances’. Secondly, migrants can use the knowledge gained during their stay in the ground floor to help develop their countries of origin upon returning. Thirdly, the presence of foreign brains makes ground-floor information vulnerable to world-wide spreading, from which the upper floor can profit. Lastly, high-skilled migrants, due to their presumed influence on the domestic politics of their country of destination, may have a potential positive influence on international development policies towards upper-floor countries.

As already briefly mentioned, Van Parijs calls for a relaxation of the territorial constraints on language to combat the brain drain. Especially in higher education and scientific research, students and staff should be allowed to do their work in English. Van Parijs also offers a policy solution to attract high-skilled migrants to the upper floor: the creation of – temporary – ‘linguistically free zones’ where the territorial constraints are lifted for a period of time regarding English. The people residing in these zones would be exempt of the heavy ‘tax’ of learning the local language and could confine themselves just to speaking English (Van Parijs 2011: 163).

The Causes of Migration: the Role of Language

As we have seen, Van Parijs attaches great importance to the linguistic factor in order to explain high-skilled migration. For an accurate assessment of his arguments’ merits, it is important to consider whether these claims can withstand theoretical and empirical scrutiny. Thus, this section will compare the assumptions in Van Parijs’ arguments with existing work in the field of migration and determine the strength of his claims.

The facts presented by Van Parijs regarding the excessive surplus of expatriate brains in the Anglophone world are thought-provoking. On a first glance, it is not surprising that these statistics lead him to his aforementioned conclusions. However, there are two potential main problems with his line of reasoning. The first problem is of a methodological nature. As most researchers will realize, correlation does not equal causation. The fact that many expats reside in Anglophone countries is not a sufficient argument to claim that English is an explaining factor. Additional research that specifically analyses the connection between English and high-skilled migration is limitedly available. So, even though it is not unreasonable to assume that English plays at least some role, we have scarce means to weigh its exact impact and we have no understanding as to how the ‘English high-skilled migration’ mechanism exactly works. One of the rare empirical studies conducted by Adsera and Pytlikova (2015) on the connection between language and migration may help us set a first step towards a fair evaluation of Van Parijs’ claims. They used a dataset on immigration flows and stocks of foreigners in 30 OECD destination countries from 223 source countries, originating from the years 1980–2010. The dataset contains many linguistic indicators, including linguistic proximity (i.e. the degree of similarity between the migrant’s mother tongue and the language spoken in the country of destination) and linguistic diversity. The research yielded several main results (Adsera–Pytlikova 2015). Firstly, fluency in the language of the country of destination facilitates the transfer of human capital, meaning that the opportunity costs for migrants are lower when moving to a country where they have a good command of the dominant language. Secondly, migrants prefer to move to a country with a low degree of linguistic diversity since then they would only need to learn one language to gain access to the country’s facilities. Thirdly, migration seems to occur more between countries that are linguistically similar.

Fourthly, linguistic proximity matters most for non-English speakers. It is more likely for a Francophone to migrate to France than it is for an Anglophone to migrate to an English-speaking country. Especially this last finding is interesting in the context of Van Parijs' arguments. The authors speculatively argue that due to the likely higher proficiency of the average migrant in English rather than in other languages the role of English as an *explanans* diminishes. However, there is more emigration from countries with higher levels of tertiary education to the Anglophone world (Adsera–Pytlikova 2015), which is in line with Van Parijs' observation.

Next to the methodological issue, there is a second main problem. It lies in Van Parijs' proposed solutions. As explained earlier, he wishes to combat the brain drain from upper to ground floor by relaxing the linguistic territoriality regimes of upper-floor countries (Van Parijs 2011). High-skilled emigration might be diminished by expanding the role of English in higher education and scientific research, whilst upper-floor high-skilled immigration can be stimulated by forming linguistically free zones where territorial constraints are temporarily lifted, meaning that expats are not burdened with having to learn the local language (ibidem). Similarly to the first problem discussed in the previous section, there are few empirical studies to verify or deny Van Parijs' claims. His solutions will at least raise some questions. Let us start by mentioning that the solutions offered would probably have a very large impact on the upper-floor societies as a whole. Ricento's edited volume on *Language Policy & Political Economy* contains several case studies that show how a larger role of English negatively impacts the distribution of wealth in developing countries (Ricento 2015). In general, more English means more opportunities for the local elite and less or equal opportunities for the big masses.

Proposals to relax the linguistic territoriality constraints should thus be very well thought out and based on empirically founded assumptions. It is doubtful whether the proposal to make more room for English in upper-floor scientific research and higher education fits these criteria. Criticism can be adequately summarized by posing the following almost rhetoric question: would a high-skilled migrant from Ivory Coast who values his/her career prefer to study at Oxford/Cambridge/Harvard/Princeton or at the University of Science and Technology of Ivory Coast, even if the latter has introduced an all-English programme? The answer is most likely negative. It can even be argued that a bachelor programme at this new, rebranded 'Ivory Coast University' would in terms of language skills be a very good preparation to do a master's programme in the ground floor, hereby thus *increasing* rather than *decreasing* the high-skilled exodus. Furthermore, regarding the 'linguistic free zones' that are meant to attract high-skilled immigrants to the upper floor, it can be said that removing language constraints may reduce the barrier for these migrants to settle in, but it is most likely not sufficient to actually stimulate migration. In the current scenario, with a relatively large share of economic opportunities being in the ground floor and other OECD countries, one can wonder whether the expats would opt for going to the upper floor.

Conclusion

The connection between language as an explaining factor and migration is unjustly understudied in academic research. The fact that Van Parijs, as one of the few scholars, does see the importance of this connection deserves praise. He rightly points out that the enormous surplus of high-skilled migrants in the Anglophone world is a barrier to achieve global justice. It is a problem worth studying and one that begs for a solution. This article attempted to study Van Parijs' arguments and determine the merit of his claims.

The main problem in this whole matter is the limited availability of empirical research. The paper by Adsera and Pytlikova is a salutary exception. The discussion on language and high-skilled migration is therefore of a speculative nature. The causal mechanism of English and high-skilled migration cannot be proven, for instance, in a strict scientific sense, but – looking at the statistics presented by Van Parijs – it is not unreasonable to accept a great part of his interpretation of the data. The proposed solutions are, however, more problematic due to the high degree of uncertainty and the likely negative impact they have on upper-floor societies as a whole. Do the uncertain advantages outweigh the probable disadvantages?

The best way out of the impasse is more empirical research. Van Parijs' argument could be seen as the start of a new research agenda to unravel the connection between language and (high-skilled) migration. An important component of this research could focus on survey research about motivations to migrate. Why exactly do expats move to the ground floor and what specific role does language play in their choices? How important is language weighed against other motivations to migrate? What measures can be taken to incentivize the high-skilled migrants to stay in their country of origin or to move to an upper-floor country? In order to have some answers to these kinds of questions, we need to have a well-informed discussion on the brain drain. Until then, caution is advised when implementing solutions.

The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) under Grant Agreement No 613344.

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DE GRUYTER OPEN
ACTA UNIV. SAPIENTIAE, EUROPEAN AND REGIONAL STUDIES, **9** (2016) 31–38
DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2016-0005

Does Global English Support the Development of Social Europe?

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Abstract. The relevance of languages and multilingual communication for social policy and solidarity in the context of the nation-state has generally been recognized. However, in the context of Europeanization, this factor has been underestimated and neglected in scientific research. This paper argues that languages and multilingual communication are relevant for the design of Social Europe. In order to support this hypothesis, the paper relies on an analytical tool, the so-called floral figuration model proposed by De Swaan (1988). This model allows us to isolate social and linguistic actors and track down complex patterns of linguistic and communicative exclusion in Europe's system of multilevel governance. These patterns also refer to international or global English or its technically adapted Brussels variety, 'Euro-English'. From this, also follows that these patterns of linguistic and communicative exclusion must be rendered into inclusive ones before a European social policy can be realized.

Keywords: European languages and multilingual communication, Social Europe, floral figuration model, Eurostars, national cosmopolitans

1. Introduction

Commentators recognize that there is a close relation between politics, language, and solidarity at the level of national political cultures. According to Rothstein (1998), although not being completely convinced of the role political cultures play concerning solidarity, social protection is conditioned by the perception of reciprocity. Reciprocity is, however, guaranteed best in a system of bounding and bonding, as it is outlined in Ferrera (2005). According to Ferrera, social protection has always been dependent on two social mechanisms: first, the bounding of a territory, nation-state borders and, second, bonding, the creation of a bond of solidarity or sharing within the boundaries of the national community, which may temporarily include foreigners and relies on factors, such as territory, nationality, residence, language, citizenship, and a sense of belonging to community. Note that among the factors inducing solidarity Ferrera refers to language as well. Although this position considers the relation between politics and language to be relevant for solidarity at the national level, this relation is seriously underestimated and neglected in research in the context of Europeanization.

Even Philippe van Parijs, the advocate of turning international English into a global lingua franca in order to overcome the communication problem in Europe and the world, posing the basis for more justice in the world – and he honestly includes social justice –, admits that a common language is a prerequisite for forming a demos, i.e. a nation-state in the sense of Ferrera. Hence, this demos is an important precondition for economic solidarity at a local level (Van Parijs 2011: 195). However, solidarity, even within the context of the nation-state including a demos based on a common language, remains a difficult matter, as Jeene et al. (2013) point out. If common language is a building block for solidarity, it is hard to imagine how a social policy at the European level could be realized when a common language or communication patterns including the European citizen are absent. For now, this is the present state of affairs since linguistic diversity is considered as a cornerstone of European identity.

This paper will investigate the relation between languages, multilingual communication, and social policy in Europe; more precisely, it offers an analysis of the present state of affairs that is the result of the interplay of Europe's system of multilevel governance and its multilingual identity. This interplay is captured in De Swaan's (1988) floral figuration model, which is an analytical tool to isolate the linguistic groups and actors in the European Union and their mutual interaction on the different levels of governance, namely the EU, national and local levels. The model also gives insight into the position of international English which is functioning more and more as a lingua franca in the European institutions in Brussels. Below we will demonstrate that the floral figuration model makes patterns of exclusion of linguistic actors visible. Hence, such patterns seriously hamper the design of a social policy for Europe. We will conclude, however, that languages, lingua franca, and multilingual communication will be relevant for the realization of Social Europe. Let us first consider the floral figuration model in more detail.

2. The Floral Figuration Model

The starting point of an analysis of European multilingualism and multilingual communication is the concept of multilevel governance within the European Union, normally described as a tripartite system consisting of different levels of governance, including the supranational EU-level, the national level of the Member States, and the local or regional level of government and policy-making

(Hooghe–Marks 2002, McCormick 2015). The question is how multilingualism and multilingual communication in Europe fit into the system of multilevel governance. For this purpose, I will adopt the floral figuration model for languages, which has been proposed by De Swaan (1988). This model depicts the language competence of social groups and their hierarchical orderings in terms of power (Bourdieu, 1991). Although De Swaan introduced the floral figuration model to track down the socio-political implications of linguistic relations at the national level, it is my conviction that his model can be used as a fruitful analytical frame for European Union purposes as well.



Figure 1. *The floral figuration for linguistic actors in the European Union*

This figure depicts the language situation in the European Union. In the outer circles, the European masses, the commoners in Europe's Member States are located. The commoners speak a national or regional language as their mother tongue, they have received some sort of basic (elementary and secondary) education in their mother tongue and might speak a European language of wider communication such as English, Spanish, French, or German. If they do speak a language of wider communication, it is not the standardized variety of these languages. Rather it will be an 'anything goes' variety. The shaded area represents speakers who belong to the European plurilingual elites, who have a much better control of their mother tongue and the European languages of wider communication than the commoners. Fligstein (2010: 156) refers to them as '… the educated, owners of business, managers, and professionals, and the young.' These groups form in fact a 'class' and participate in transnational networks within Europe. Those in the core star are the European cosmopolitan elites, the Eurostars, as Favell (2008: 144, 145) calls them. They use English as the European communication language. Kuus (2014: 56), who interviewed a number of European diplomats in the European External Action Service, describes this operating language as 'a technical language of eurospeak'. Note further that in the floral figuration model local speech communities are hardly intersecting with each other, but all of them are linked to plurilingual local elites through the mediation of one central or national language. These local, regional, or national elites – I will refer to them as national cosmopolitans – are acting as interfaces between the commoners, who have basically monolingual language and communication skills, and the plurilingual Eurostars. 'Plurilingual' means, apart from the native tongue, first and foremost 'this technical language of eurosprak', which is based on English and functioning as a lingua franca. This adapted version of English in the Brussels institutions is sometimes also referred to as Euro-English. Hence, the shaded area is communicating via Euro-English at the expense of the other official European languages, including standard British English. My analysis in terms of this model is to be considered as a first approximation of the various interests that determine the sociological aspects of European linguistic diversity.

3. Languages and Multilingual Communication in Europe

From its founding treaty in 1958, Europe has stipulated that all the languages of the Member States are official languages. Language regulation 1/1958 turned four languages – official and regional languages in France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries – into official European languages (Labrie 1994). These four languages, including French, German, Italian, and Dutch, enjoyed an equal status in the institutions of the European Common Market, implying that they were to be used as institutional and working languages. With every new round of expansion, new Member States had the right to propose new official languages. The language regulation remained operative and, as a consequence, all official languages of new Member States were recognized as official European languages. At present, the EU recognizes 24 official languages. Linguistic diversity in Brussels is hard to manage, however. Hence, the distinction between 'official' versus 'working' language has become relevant, and this is practically used as a solution for the language issue in the Brussels institutions. The difference between official and working languages is defined in Article 6 of the language regulation: the institutions are allowed to freely choose their own language regime. The European Commission acknowledges three working languages, namely English, which is used the most, French, and German. The latter is used substantially less than the other two languages (Marácz–Rosello 2012). Another example of Article 6 is the fact that out of the fifteen Directorate Generals (DGs) only three use the 24 official languages on their website, including Employment, Social Affairs, and Inclusion (EMPL), Enterprise and Industry (ENTR), and Justice (Just) (Gazzola 2014). All other DGs use a reduced or a monolingual regime consisting of English-only.

It is clear that English is on the rise as a global lingua franca (Phillipson 2006, 2009, De Swaan 2001, Van Parijs 2011, Haselhuber 2012, Grin 2014, and Ricento 2015). It is convincingly argued that the expansion of English on a global scale is driven by the hegemonic political and economic positions established first by the British Empire and later on in the twentieth century by the United States. The situation of global English is for a number of reasons not unproblematic, though. Firstly, the conclusion is justified that English is associated with linguistic hegemony and domination at the expense of other languages. Secondly, English cannot function as a real lingua franca, that is as a neutral mediator language respecting the linguistic background of all speakers involved in communicative events due to the fact that English is spoken by native and non-native speakers alike. Thirdly, there are different versions of English in use, such as British English, American English, and so on, which makes it for the foreign speakers of English difficult to know what the precise norms of English are, although there exists the regularly accepted normative variety of English, standard British English, which is spread by important language mediators, such as BBC radio and television, and is taught to foreign speakers of English in formal education. So, the variety of global English functioning as a bridge language among non-natives should be English-as-a-foreign language in fact. However, it has been observed that this normative variety of English is not spoken across the globe, but rather a basic version of English mixing, intermingling, and sampling with local languages as an outcome of language use and communication (Edwards 2012: 34–38, *Hülmbauer–Böhringer–Seidlhofer 2008).*

Let us recall that *Figure 1* depicts linguistic diversity in terms of a demarcation between European elites and commoners. The European elites, i.e. the Eurostars and the national cosmopolitans, although positioned in different geographical spaces, i.e. the Brussels centre and the Member States, are positioned in a common virtual space. They form a connected transnational class and speak the same sort of fluid language for instrumental communicative purposes only, i.e. a European variety of international English, i.e. Euro-English. Euro-English is developing its own characteristics, such as misused English words and expressions (European Court of Auditors 2013), and has adopted artificial expressions, e.g. from the financial world, like ‘collateralized debt obligations’, ‘asset-backed securities’, and ‘credit default swaps’ (Maier, 2014: 210). This is ‘de-contextualized English’ pinned down in Barbier (2014) or ‘the technical language of eurospeak’ referred to in Kuus (2014). It is hard to imagine that this variety of English will be able to mediate between the different political cultures in Europe that are rooted in language, as Ferrera (2005) and Barbier (2013, 2014) argue for. However, whatever its status or quality according to the last dataset of Eurobarometer (see Eurobarometer 386), roughly 50 percent of the EU citizens do not have any knowledge of English at all. So, a restricted linguistic regime with English or consisting of English-only would privilege the higher educated, the better-off in Europe, seriously undermining Social Europe (Gazzola 2014).

4. Concluding Remarks

So far, Europeanization has been a project that has served the interests of the European elites, i.e. of those that can make optimal use of the European freedoms, mobility, and markets. In the framework of the floral figuration model, I referred to the European elites as Eurostars and national cosmopolitans. However, the challenge is to keep Europe attractive not only for its elites but also for its commoners. Wallace et al. (2015) observe that social policy within the EU is still a matter of the Member States. Hence, the task is to develop a genuine Social Europe that offers solidarity for all of its citizens. Although the diverging interests between the European elites and commoners has been noticed in the literature such as in Fligstein's 'Euro-clash' (Fligstein 2008), it has gone unnoticed that the Euro-clash between social groups involves unbridgeable language conflicts as well.

In this paper, I have argued that language issues are vital for the development of Social Europe. Although the importance of language and communication is recognized at the state level, this topic is quite often neglected when it comes to the European level. The interplay between multilevel and linguistic governance in Europe can best be analysed in terms of the floral figuration model in the sense of De Swaan (1988). The typology of social actors, their language skills, their communication channels and styles, and their positioning in this model demonstrate that in the present constellation transparent, efficient, and fair communication is impossible. The multilingual communication patterns are first and foremost group-specific and exclusivist. The introduction of an English-based lingua franca in Europe, a sort of Euro-English, will not be sufficient to solve the linguistic and communicative deficits. Hence, the absence of a neutral, transparent, and accessible lingua franca jeopardizes the development of Social Europe.

The author is indebted to Jean-Claude Barbier for inspiring discussions on Social Europe. The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) under Grant Agreement No 613344.

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DE GRUYTER OPEN

Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, **9** (2016) 39–47

DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2016-0006

Linguistic Justice and Endangered Languages

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Abstract. This contribution will engage with Van Parijs's approach to linguistic justice and his working principles for the reduction of unfairness in the language domain (in particular, the need for intervention and his territorial principle), reflecting on a range of cases of multilingual practice and linguistic coexistence – respectively, in the multilingual capital of the world which is London today; in Fryslân, the minority language area in northern Netherlands; and in Europe, through its European Charter of Regional Minority Languages.
Overall, my argument, on a theoretical level, is for the further exploration of the relationship between linguistic diversity and human rights in civil society; and, on a practical level, for the development of a World Language Atlas as envisaged by UNESCO, containing vital information on all the world's languages – an urgently needed basic resource for policy-making, to ensure, especially for the world's many endangered languages, the linguistic justice and fairness advocated by Van Parijs.

Keywords: European Charter of Regional Minority Languages, Frisian, linguistic coexistence, London multilingualism, territorial principle

Introduction

In this contribution, we will consider the ideas put forward by Philippe Van Parijs in his *Linguistic Justice* (2011), with particular reference to the endangered languages of Europe. In the first section below, we will discuss the issue of intervention in the domain of languages and explore how our thinking about linguistic justice may benefit from the multilingual practices we encounter today in metropolitan London and its civil society. In Section 2, we will argue for a modification of Van Parijs's territorial principle, so as to take account of the language-political lessons we can draw from the case of Frisian, a European minority language spoken by some 300,000 people in Fryslân, in the north of the Netherlands. In the final section, we will consider the instruments available to minority languages in the

European Charter of Regional Minority Languages and discuss what such policy instruments can contribute to the well-being of those languages.

Our exploration of these three cases takes place in the context of relevant ideas on multilingualism and minority languages, put forward by organizations such as the WWF (World Wild Life Fund), the FEL (Foundation for Endangered Languages), and UNESCO. Our aim here is to see how these various sources of ideas, practices, and principles for a just, fair, and equal treatment of languages in the multilingual world we are living in can be combined with and contribute to the linguistic justice approach of Van Parijs.

The Need for Interventions and the Multilingual Practices Developing in London

My first point concerns Van Parijs's claim – arrived at through a series of political-economic cost-benefit analyses of language learning situations – viz. that in the domain of language and languages interventions will always be necessary if our aim is to ensure some sort of fairness and a reduction of inequality and injustice between the languages involved.

The next question then is: What kind of interventions? Here, London, the world's capital of multilingualism, provides us with a fascinating microcosm, a model really, for trying out good practice and working principles for the use of all kinds of languages in domains such as education, the health sector, the justice system, etcetera. In the United Kingdom (unlike in France), the national language has not been enshrined in the constitution. This pragmatic position has an interesting corollary: language matters, instead of being tied into issues of national prestige, statehood and political symbolism, are linked rather more into societal needs and practical politics and can be tackled from the starting point of general rights for anyone – such as the European Human Rights Legislation (which has been included into the British legal system) as well as the basic right people have – under various charters in fields such as healthcare and the law – to a translation which meets professional standards of communication.

Over the last few decades, this approach has inspired a range of practices of multilingual interaction in London. For example, the well-known slogan 'no taxation without representation', a very basic English principle, has, when necessary, been expanded to include languages other than English: at election time, voters have a right to be informed about the choice of candidates and policies before them, and so large numbers of voters are provided with relevant information in some twenty different languages that are widely used. Other examples are: In the London education sector, one can find private schools offering the full curriculum in Welsh, German, Maori, French, Chinese, or Japanese. The well-established freedoms of religion and congregation include the right to worship in the language of one's religious community. The Patient's Charter gives people the right to be properly informed, in a language they can understand, about a medical treatment before they consent to it – so the National Health Service disseminates information on colonoscopy in 13 different languages – Arabic, Bengali, Chinese, Farsi, Greek, Gujarati, Hindi, Polish, Portuguese, Punjabi, Somali, Spanish, Turkish, Vietnamese, and Urdu. A suspect held by the police, or a defendant in a court case, is entitled to the provision of translation and interpretation. And to facilitate all this, language services in some 150 languages are provided by the London Language Line, which offers a humane, social, and often vital service (Salverda 2006: 3).

The result, as we see, is not necessarily a language policy as such, i.e. a policy focussed specifically and exclusively on language. Rather, what we see at work in these London developments are social policies, with an emphasis on matters of contact and communication in civil society. This approach, focussed as it is on people's practical needs in communication, would appear to be both effective and sustainable, and provides us with important building blocks for best practice in how to handle multilingual situations. No less important is that this approach gives room for taking into account the arrival of large numbers of speakers of languages from outside the European Union (EU), which generally have no rights or status at all in Europe – even if they are very present and widely spoken, they are still the big elephant in the room.

In my view, it makes good sense to link up these effective multilingual practices developed in London with the working principles (principles of cooperation, fair distribution, parity of esteem, respect, democracy, and territoriality) Van Parijs has worked out for the reduction of unfairness in the domain of languages.

Van Parijs's Territoriality Principle and the Situation in Fryslân

My second case concerns the territorial principle proposed by Van Parijs. As he claims in Chapter 5, the territorial principle ('in France one speaks French') is the most important safeguard a language can have: 'language survival requires a territorially differentiated coercive linguistic regime'. This principle is clearly relevant to an understanding of the situation in trilingual Belgium, where it is the first basic principle of the constitution. But while, generally speaking, languages with a territory of their own are doing better than languages without one, there is a problem here. The world today counts some 200 states, as against an estimated 7,000 languages. So, if we were to give each of these languages and their communities a concrete, physical, geographical territory of their own, this could only lead to endless conflicts, it would seem – taking us away, precisely, from the justice we are aiming at fostering. Instead, when we want to assign to a language a territory of its own, we should consider how we can do this in such a way that it does contribute to linguistic justice.

The Frisian language situation is a case in point here. Fryslân, the area where Frisian is used, is a wide open space, without natural barriers, not remote, open to the sea and to the continent, and completely integrated into modern Dutch, European, and global society. Within the Netherlands as a whole, the Frisians enjoy a positive image; they are well-respected and seen as a people with character. And they also have a language of their own.

At any rate, that is the case today. Less than a century ago, however, the Frisian language was officially non-existent. In 1864, when Karl Marx visited Amsterdam, he wrote home: 'I've been very well supplied with Dutch literature. But something in Frisian could not be found here, even though there is a bookshop that sells publications in 88 modern languages. The people of Amsterdam evidently feel themselves more connected to the languages of Africa than to the Frisian language – *but man always contrives to neglect the things that are nearest to him*' (own translation, qtd from Mulder 1997: 125).

Today, the situation of Frisian is rather better than it was in Marx's time. From the 1930s onwards, Frisian has been officially recognized in the fields of education, law, administration, politics, media, religion, and culture. In 2013, this process culminated in a national law on Frisian – the first ever language law in the Netherlands –, backed up by an official agreement between the national and the provincial governments, detailing the provision for Frisian in a wide range of social and cultural domains for the period of 2013–2018.

This is not to say that all is well for Frisian. Within the unified and centralized nation-state that the Netherlands is, Frisian has for a long time been at the receiving end of a tradition of official monolingualism after the French fashion, and today there are still strong pressures on Frisian. There is an ongoing shift away from Frisian towards the national language, Dutch, and one can find negative social attitudes towards Frisian amongst Dutch speaking monolinguals who come and settle in Frisian villages, and not just refuse to learn and speak Frisian but want to impose the sole use of their language, Dutch. In the streets of Leeuwarden – which will be European Capital of Culture in 2018 –, there are no bilingual street signs. Research of its linguistic landscape (cf. Gorter et al. (ed.) 2012) reveals that sixty percent of its street signs are in Dutch, thirty-five percent in English, and the remaining five percent in Frisian reflect the tenuous position of this language (Gorter (ed.) 2012).

This unequal coexistence of the three languages is indicative of the minority position of Frisian. Note that it is often a struggle to get or to retain facilities for Frisian. In education, for example, from 1997 onwards, the innovative approach of the Trilingual School has produced good results for children learning Dutch, English, and Frisian in primary school. But the provincial authorities do not have powers over education, and so the further dissemination of this model is dependent on voluntary admission by schools – and only 50 out of 450 primary schools in the province have taken up this model. Similarly, the ongoing Frisian Language Survey shows that the Frisian language is in a stable position, which – in the face of the pressures it is exposed to – is quite significant. Intergenerational transmission is the key here, and research shows that Frisian-speaking parents always want more and better Frisian language education for their children – but the schools do not deliver it, pressed as they are by the national government's priorities concerning the three Rs, in Dutch.

In other words, in the trilingual area that is Fryslân, the territorial principle is not a realistic prospect for the Frisian language. The situation we are faced with here is one of a linguistic coexistence within the same territory. This is never a matter of either/or – different languages can easily complement each other; and we can always learn and use each other's languages to cooperate across language barriers. Here lies an opportunity for creative innovation. Instead of an enforceable geographic 'territory', what we need is a more open and creative notion of 'space'. This we can achieve by developing useable spaces of other kinds – in domains that have symbolic value [religious spaces, temples, churches, mosques], cultural significance [works of literature, imagination, mental space], private importance [home, society, club], social meaning [e.g. multilingual education on the formula of Mother Tongue plus Two Other Languages, from the Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights (Barcelona, 1996)], virtual modernity [e-learning of languages, using private niches (blogs, social media)], or business potential, as in Google Translate, where Frisian is expected to become its 99th or 100th language.

These and other such spaces can be used as havens for communication and for the use, transmission, and enjoyment of languages. Such amended territoriality opens up a space for stimulating new developments – from introducing bilingual street signs to attaining educational excellence by learning more than one language early in life. Such interventions can help to give substance to linguistic coexistence and interaction, making it work for Frisian and sustaining this language in the face of the ongoing dutchification of Fryslân.

The European Charter of Regional Minority Languages

Our third case is that of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages of the Council of Europe, which, with 47 members, is the leading human rights organization on the continent. Although in his book Van Parijs does pay attention to well-known minority languages such as Basque, Catalan, and Gaelic, he does not discuss the Charter and the languages it covers. But the case merits our attention. Language issues are an important matter to the Council of Europe. Its Language Policy Unit plays an important role in developing ideas on learning modern languages, on the role of minority and migrant languages in plurilingual education, and on the promotion of language learning.

Of special significance is the Council's Charter for European Regional Minority Languages, which presents a Europe-wide intervention in the domain of languages, focussing on the recognition and support of those languages and their communities, with policy measures aiming at stimulating the preservation, promotion, transmission, and provision of resources for learning, as well as the investment necessary to make this work.

So far, the Charter has been ratified by 24 of its member states. This is a rather recent development: most of the ratifications occurred post-2000, as a precondition for EU membership. At the same time, a number of larger member states – such as France, Greece, Portugal, Russia, and Turkey – have not ratified the Charter despite having significant linguistic minorities within their borders. As things stand today, across Europe, some sixty minority languages – ranging from Albanian, Armenian, and Basque via Frisian, Karelian, Romany, and Saami to Turkish, Welsh, Yezidi, and Yiddish – benefit from official recognition under the Charter. The top scorer here is undoubtedly Romania, with 20 such indigenous minority languages, followed by Herzegovina (16), Poland (15), and Ukraine (13). All in all then, while thanks to the Charter there has been considerable progress over the past twenty years, only a minority of the existing European regional minority languages are covered by the Charter, and we do still have a long way to go.

Despite this patchy situation, the Charter does contribute to the goals defined by Van Parijs in *Linguistic Justice* – the reduction of inequality, working towards parity of esteem, more respect, fairness, and democracy. The Charter constitutes a mechanism for intervention in the sense of Van Parijs by offering a set of means – such as European funding, policies and principles, good practice and monitoring, for the preservation, development, and promotion of minority languages – which all contribute to the achievement of linguistic justice goals such as fairness and equality (c.q. reduction of inequality). The Charter helps to do so in a number of practical ways: first, by providing Information and Documentation: there are more than forty Mercator Regional Dossiers on these minorities available online; secondly, by stimulating networks for learning, aiming at promotion and improvement of language learning in multilingual contact situations, the development of innovative resources, facilities, learning models and strategies for the (re-)vitalization of languages; thirdly, by the exchange and dissemination of best practice, defusion of conflict situations, and moving instead to information and understanding, language learning, and cooperation.

In 2016, the Charter's agenda will receive a significant boost from this year's European Capital of Culture in Donostia/San Sebastian, where in January the European Language Diversity Summit (ELDS) was launched. Running through the year, the Summit's objectives include: (1) to declare that guaranteeing language diversity and ensuring language development are keys to peaceful coexistence; (2) to create an effective instrument for language equality and revitalizing languages in unfavourable situations; (3) to ensure that language communities are the actors in this process and assert that the civil society's involvement guarantees fair play. In the course of the year, the Summit will develop a protocol for ensuring linguistic equality for each linguistic community that will be presented at a two-day conference in December 2016 in Donostia/San Sebastian. The ELDS project is sponsored by a European coalition of, among others, the Basque Language Organization, the European Centre for Minority Issues in Flensburg, the European Language Equality Network (ELEN), the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), the Linguapax organization, as well as the writers' organization PEN International, with its Girona Manifesto of 2011 demanding that 'the right to use and protect one's own language must be recognized by the United Nations as one of the fundamental human rights'.

There can be no doubt that this process of fully implementing the European Charter for Regional Minority Languages in all the member states of the Council of Europe will be a long, hard slog. The Charter is not EU Law but a voluntary, optional extra for individual governments; it is not in force across all of the EU and not included amongst the basic rights that a European citizen could call into effect; and EU Law takes no account of group or community rights in the domain of culture or language. Difficult as it may be, then, when it comes to realizing linguistic rights and justice for endangered languages, we must see the Charter and what it can offer as a very basic and very necessary first step which does contribute to the goals defined by Van Parijs in his *Linguistic Justice* – viz. reduction of inequality, working towards parity of esteem, more respect, fairness, and democracy.

Outlook

Our findings above suggest that bringing these various strands of thinking and practice together will be to the benefit of the endangered languages of Europe and the world. There is a clear urgency to this since, as a matter of fact, for large parts of the world's population, we are still a very long way off a real implementation of language rights.

UNESCO – like other international bodies we have mentioned – is working hard in this direction, with its IFAP (Information for All Programme), its Recommendation for Universal Access to Multilingual Cyberspace, and its

Atlas of Endangered Languages, which already includes more than 2,500 such languages. But why stop there? A comprehensive, state-of-the-art *Atlas of the World's Languages* – giving data on the users, the structure and the vitality of all those languages, and using the latest technology – does not even exist and is a much-needed basic resource.

It is technically feasible. It will contribute to linguistic justice for all. It is a basic necessity to expand and complete our knowledge of the world's linguistic diversity. So, what is keeping us back?

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FEL – Foundation for Endangered Languages (FEL) – www.ogmios.org

Mercator European Research Centre on Multilingualism and Language Learning – www.mercator-research.eu

PEN International Writers Organization – www.pen-international.org

TLA – The Language Archive (TLA) – https://tla.mpi.nl

UNESCO Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger – www.unesco.org

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ACTA UNIV. SAPIENTIAE, EUROPEAN AND REGIONAL STUDIES, **9** (2016) 49–54

DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2016-0007

On Linguistic Abilities, Multilingualism, and Linguistic Justice

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Abstract. The notion of *linguistic justice* should be related to the concept of *linguistic ease*, by which we mean the full social and communicative freedom of concern of the speaker in a given social interaction involving the use of language(s) present in the society, according to the social norms of use. To acquire an acceptable degree of linguistic ease, the knowledge of at least one L2 is considered important. But the acquisition of a L2 is interfered by the previous linguistic skills of the learner/speaker who, in many cases, does not have a suitable competence even of the languages of the society in which he/she lives.

Keywords: linguistic justice, language ease, CEFR, multilingualism, diglossia

1. The notion of *linguistic justice* is becoming increasingly important in the scientific debate (for a complete and recent overview, see Alcalde 2015). Lately, the idea has been gaining ground that defining a linguistic environment as 'just' should not only mean that people have equal access to public resources across the world but also that a less uneven distribution of linguistic abilities should be pursued (Skutnabb-Kangas–Phillipson 1995, Phillipson 2003, Fiedler 2010, Iannàccaro–Gobbo–Dell'Aquila forthcoming). This draws our attention to the concept of *linguistic ease*, by which we mean the full social and communicative freedom of concern of the speaker in a given social interaction involving the use of language(s), for example in different communicative situations like chatting with friends in a pub or talking with teachers during lessons or in front of a civil servant. In every society, as we know, different varieties are used, and their use is ruled by binding sociolinguistic norms (see at least Ammon–Dittmar–Mattheier–Trudgill 2006/2008). In monolingual communities, we define these varieties as *registers* of the same language, whilst in multilingual settings the varieties – even structurally quite different from one another – receive a specific name by the speakers themselves (like 'dialects', 'languages', 'patois', and so forth).

Now, it is self-evident that a 'just' linguistic society should ensure such kind of ease at least in the relationships between speakers and institutions (Wickström 2013, Gazzola 2014): undoubtedly, interactions among individual speakers are outside the scope of a democratic linguistic policy. In Europe, a three-faceted competence is usually regarded as a balanced one: a fully competent EU citizen should master (1) her/his local variety, where it exists, (2) the national language, and (3) a L2 as the international code (implicitly English); also some observers consider the mastery of a fourth 'election' L2 desirable. Of course, all these languages must be acquired either spontaneously or by means of formal education.

As for the linguistic acquisition, institutions are not usually interested in the acquisition of (1), which is mainly left to families and peer groups, while (2) is typically the concern of the nation-states' educational institutions (Gazzola 2006). The 'real' L2 acquisition, while still factually under the control of nation-states through their school systems, is more and more the interest of the EU, at least for what concerns the frameworks of reference for linguistic competence and certifications and guidelines to achieve the learning goals. European institutions, for instance, show particular attention to the 6-level scale of L2 acquisition, from A1 to C2 (CEFR 2011). Ideally, reaching C2 level in a given acquired L2 would ensure a complete linguistic ease in any situation requiring the use of that language.

But if we now turn to situations of language acquisition different from the 'classical' prestigious L2 acquisition, and consider – admittedly, with a forced reading of the parameters – also formal L1 acquisition, we suspect that reaching a C2 level is not only depending upon the mere knowledge of a given language but also on a general capacity of verbal expression at large. In this case, acquiring a complete linguistic ease can be an issue for L1 too, and it can pose interesting questions of linguistic justice. If we take, for instance, the average European situation, we can suppose that, in a number of cases at least, level C2 is *not* acquired even by a number of individuals that are normally considered 'mother tongue' speakers. In fact, a person who

> can understand with ease virtually everything heard or read. Can summarise information from different spoken and written sources, reconstructing arguments and accounts in a coherent presentation. Can express him/herself spontaneously, very fluently and precisely, differentiating finer shades of meaning even in more complex situations (CEFR 2011: 24),

as stated in the declaration for level C2, is a highly educated person who masters high skills in dealing with complex (socio)linguistic situations. However, not all

European citizens – as for our experience – can read with ease *all* types of texts in their language of education, for instance. Nor can they deal – even orally – with *all* possible communicative settings. To understand 'with ease' a given text (oral or written), to 'express [...] spontaneously, very fluently and precisely', and especially to 'summarise information from different spoken and written sources' in formal and difficult (linguistic) situations requires a *cultural* skill which is not easy to acquire. This skill is related to a set of factors, the first one being the level of formal education reached by the speaker. This implies that the structure and the functioning of the educational system is one of the main issues that governs the achievement of the highest linguistic/communicative levels, independently from the language of tuition.

According to Eurostat, more than half of the EU's population does *not* reach the Upper Secondary Education level (European Qualifications Framework – Level 4), with figures ranging from the Czech Republic – 31% – to Portugal – 77% – (2013): we can imagine that this high percentage of population does not feel at ease in every linguistic situation, not even in their mother tongue (or at least the language in which they received their formal education). Other factors are nonetheless equally important: the traditional level of complexity of the formal or bureaucratic language in use and the degree of social acceptance of linguistic deviance (commonly called 'mistakes'). Languages like French, Italian, English, or German show a quite high internal variation between everyday (written) language and 'formal jargons' such as the language of a number of newspapers, the language of the political discourse or of medical reports, and especially the language of legal or bureaucratic texts. A compulsory schooling, in most cases, is not enough to achieve a full communicative competence in whatever language (Beacco et alii 2010).

2. So much for speech communities which, with a simplification, we have previously defined as monolingual: in fact, in many parts of Europe (and as a norm in the world), society is characterized by the use of more than one code (i.e. languages, dialects, patois, and so forth), even structurally quite different from each other, at the same time in the same community – and these codes necessarily show functional specializations. We are, of course, not referring to the rare and maybe hypothetical cases of societal bilingualism, in which all the members of the community can speak and use two languages for all verbal communicative purposes and situations, but to what is broadly known as *diglossia* and/or *dilalia* (Ferguson 1959, Berruto 1995, Dell'Aquila–Iannàccaro 2004). With these two terms, we mean – here we will not take into consideration the rather important differences between the two notions – all the actual social situations of functional differentiation between at least a high-status and high-function code and a low-function code. In a diglossic situation, such as in German-speaking Switzerland (where there is one code which is written and nearly only written, *Hochdeutsch*, and another which is spoken and nearly only spoken, *Schwytzertütsch/Dialekt*), in North Africa (Classical Arabic / Standard Arabic / regional Arabics), or in many parts of Italy (Italian / Romance varieties), and so on, the actual competence of a speaker can be *split*, in other words, distributed among different languages. An average speaker may well have different levels of competence in different codes, and this imbalance can be tolerated or even fostered by the repertory norms of the speech community. In Zürich, for instance, no member of the speech community is expected to *write* the very code she/he *speaks*, in nearly no occasion, but, for example, in jokes or very informal texts, mainly in form of chat or phone messages: a 'just' and perfect linguistic competence here means acquiring different levels in different codes, more or less like:

	Spoken	Written
Schwytzertütsch	C2	–
Hochdeutsch	B1 (> C2)	C2

The point is that while in a monolingual society the same level of competence is required for all communicative skills of one language (with a conscious knowledge of the social rules that underlie the use of language registers), here the abilities are distributed among the codes: and it is 'just' for this community that the members do *not* reach the highest level in every single code of the repertoire – rather they should acquire a split general communicative ability.

Now, it is obvious that CEFR levels are meant as goals to achieve in learning a specific L2, and not as a description of complex sociolinguistic situation; nonetheless, it is noteworthy that such a view presupposes linguistic communities in which all the known languages reach the highest levels (the cell 9) in the well-known Kloss's model (Kloss 1952, Darquennes 2005). In reality, not all the codes shared by a given speech community react in the same way, as to their position in Kloss's model, nor is this considered as desirable by the community. The asymmetry, quite evident in terms of multilingual speakers' linguistic competence, has interesting consequences for the acquisition of a second language: learning, even perfectly, (standard) Arabic or German does *not* assure the ease in dealing with mother tongue speakers of these languages – at least, in many real situations. At the same time, being perfectly at ease with their spoken counterparts only, maybe as a result of informal acquisition, poses problems of formal communication, and opens the door to severe linguistic unease.

3. In dealing with linguistic justice, then, we would like to draw researchers' attention to these two simple points:

a) Real speech communities are often multilingual and have well-defined social norms that control coexistence and the alternation of codes in different linguistic situations. Habits, competences, and the speakers' will, deriving from fine-grain understanding of the relationships between the codes in their speech community, should not be forgotten or neglected.

b) Before inserting elements of (further) multilingualism in any speech community, it is vital to strengthen communicative competence, absolute expressiveness, culture, and metalinguistic awareness at large within the members of the community. This is a prerequisite to be acquired, starting from any language of the speaker, preferably from the strongest at her/his disposal. Every L2 acquisition policy – in order to master a prestigious international L2 and 'justly' accede to more societal and intellectual resources – should start in the form of acquisition of more refined skills in *any* language, and only thereafter in the target one. An L2 acquisition policy that does not take into consideration the possible lack of linguistic communicative skills of the target population can run the risk of not reaching a higher level of linguistic justice but, on the contrary, of increasing the gap between the highly educated population (being then able to communicate in L1 and L2) and the less educated population, thus not reaching a suitable degree of language competence in any language.

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ACTA UNIV. SAPIENTIAE, EUROPEAN AND REGIONAL STUDIES, **9** (2016) 55–61

DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2016-0008

Linguistic Justice, van Parijs, and Esperanto

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Abstract. In the European and world-wide scenario of linguistic justice offered by van Parijs (2011), it is argued that we need one *lingua franca* only and that the only suitable candidate is English. In order to sustain his argument, the author has to reject three known alternatives against the English-only scenario. The second alternative is Esperanto. Van Parijs argues that there are some inner defects in the Esperanto language, and therefore Esperanto is not suitable for the role of world-wide *lingua franca*. This paper offers counterarguments based on the evidence of facts, showing that if nowadays Esperanto is only a lesser-used language the reason is not in the inner traits of the language, rather in geopolitical decisions. I argue that in the most probable global scenario English still plays the actual major role, but along with other cultural languages being regional *lingua francas*.

Keywords: linguistic justice, Esperanto, political neutrality, cultural languages, regional lingua francas

The first time I met Philippe van Parijs we were in Vilnius, Lithuania. It was 2005, and the occasion was the Nitobe Symposium 4, a conference devoted to delve into the aspects of the language politics of enlargement of the European Union. Van Parijs was an invited speaker in Vilnius. That conference series is organized by the Centre for Research and Documentation on World Language Problems, with the fundings of the Esperantic Studies Foundation. The working languages were English, Esperanto, and Lithuanian. When he published his very influential book on linguistic justice (van Parijs 2011), obviously, he had already been well-informed about Esperanto for at least six years.

For this reason, when I read his book, finding a part about Esperanto was not a surprise. But it was a surprise to me finding inaccuracies and even untrue statements. I take the occasion here to put forward my counterarguments. I will focus myself on the arguments against Esperanto published in van Parijs (2011), assuming that his position on the topic has not changed since then.

The number of pages devoted to Esperanto are only seven in total (39–46), in the Appendix after the first chapter. There, readers can read the counterarguments to the central tenet of the whole book – the need of English as the only *lingua franca* of the planet. The Appendix shows the *pars destruens* of the three alternatives and crucially sets the ground to all the argumentation *pro* English presented in the rest of the book. Esperanto is the second alternative.

First of all, there is a historical inaccuracy about the relation between Esperanto and the League of Nations. That language was never directly proposed as a working language of the League unlike what is stated in the book. It is true that a report written by Edmond Privat was submitted in 1921 (and not 1923 unlike what is stated in the book) by Dr Nitobe to the attention of the League. That report illustrated the achievement of Esperanto since then. Nitobe was the leader of the Japanese delegation to the League, born in a samurai family (from Japanese nobility) from Honshu, the main island of Japan. Raised as a Christian, he then became a Friend (Quaker). In 1921, Communist parties were founded in many parts of Europe: among others, in France, Italy, and Spain. The leftist wing in the Esperanto Movement was at its acme. Many intellectuals associated Esperanto with the Soviet revolution. Nitobe checked in person that the Esperanto movement was not necessarily pro-Communist, participating in the World Esperanto Congress in Prague in 1921. Then, he decided to bring that report to the League. Because of the fierce opposition by France, any scenario of having Esperanto as a working language turned out to be impossible before any proposal would have been made. Ironically enough, at the same time, France accepted that the English versions of the documents produced by the League were equally valid as the French ones. In fear of Esperanto, French lost the monopoly of the international language of diplomacy, admitting English in the club.

This story tells us a simple but seldom admitted true: the main reason of the fact that Esperanto is not a widely recognized international language but rather the language of a minority of enthusiasts is political. This was true in the 1920s just as nowadays, almost one century later. At that time, the French linguist Antoine Meillet – briefly mentioned on page 39 – said: every theoretical discussion is in vain, Esperanto works. Van Parijs knows very well that Esperanto works, so the dismissal of the alternative to his English-only-lingua-franca scenario relies on different pillars. ‘The two key advantages [Esperanto] claims are neutrality and simplicity’, argues the author, then attacking these ‘claims’. In the sequel, I will proceed with the illustration of the arguments by the author, along with my counterarguments.

The first argument is neutrality: ‘Esperanto is very far from being neutral in the demanding sense of being equidistant from all existing languages.’ But the truth is that no language can be equidistant from all the others because such an equidistance simply does not exist. A language was even planned following the idea that a ‘learnability score’ depends on the frequency of sounds appearing in a given word in different natural languages. The name of this almost forgotten rival of Esperanto is Loglan. It is known among the specialists for being the most spectacular failure in the whole history of languages planned for serious purposes. For the interested reader, Chapter 19 of Okrent (2010) tells this story with a good accuracy.

But a good question is why such feature of equidistance should be a prerequisite. In my understanding, the author has two ideas in mind. First, he thinks that this is crucial because his route for linguistic justice passes through *one single* lingua franca for Europe and for the world. Second, he is convinced that equidistance is a measure of neutrality in the sense of fair learnability. The second idea has neither theoretical nor empirical evidence. The structural distance between two languages is certainly one of the factors for assessing the learnability of the target language, but it is by no means *the* main factor. Extralinguistic variables, such as concrete needs, quantity of exposure, attitudes of the learner towards the target languages – and, of course, the *political* power associated with the target language –, play an important role. In many cases, they stand for more than the structural features of the language. For this reason, neutrality in this sense of fair learnability cannot be measured for any language.

Turning back to the first idea, let us accept for the moment – for the sake of the argument – that only *one* lingua franca is the desideratum for Europe and the world; let us call it the 'one lingua franca scenario'. If this were the case, clearly Esperanto, being a contact language (in the sense of Lindstedt 2009), is more respectful than English out of the variety of languages in the world. The phonological system of Esperanto, with its five Mediterranean vowels (Wells 1989), such as Croatian and a Germanic-Slavic consonant system (visible especially in clusters such as *akvo* for 'water'), is mastered by second-language learners far easier than that of English, which is known to be incredibly rich and complex. Not to mention the distance between the speech and the writing system of English, which is periodically challenged by proposals for spelling reforms, doomed to failure. The writing system of Esperanto is very respectful of its phonology, and a lot of its letters coincide with the corresponding IPA symbols. The morphology is productive and incredibly regular, compared to any natural language. Its agglutinative strategy resembles languages such as Hungarian, Finnish, or Turkish. Van Parijs subsumes this argument *pro* Esperanto under the rubric 'simplicity'. The morphology permits the construction of a dictionary comparable to major European languages (approximately 120,000 lexical entries) with only 16,000 radicals and twenty or so derivational morphemes (Gledhill 2000). There is no need 'to beef up its lexical stock massively', as claimed by the author. The language as it is right now is already suitable for most contexts. In the one lingua franca scenario (which I accept only for the sake of the argument), Esperanto would be far more acceptable for non-Europeans than English.

Unlike what van Parijs said, Esperanto is neutral enough to respect the linguistic and cultural habits of European citizens, regardless if they come from

Romance, Germanic, or Slavic origins. The lexicon is more Western European, but the underlying structure is more Eastern European (Lindstedt 2009). This is a good compromise. Moreover, its agglutinative morphology was used for teaching foreign languages to Hungarians using Esperanto as a facilitator. It is without doubt more respectful than English, which is a Germanic language with a lot of Latin and Romance words in it, but unbalanced in favour of the Northern-Western European habits. The Esperanto European scenario would be a concrete motivation for, let us say, Chinese people for learning the language – regardless their level of English.

Apparently, van Parijs admits only one lingua franca for Europe and the world. But there is a point in which the author contradicts himself. Let us consider Indians, Nigerians, South Africans, or Chinese, argues van Parijs, who already invested time, money, and energy to master English: why should they be willing to learn *another* European-based language? In saying this, the author admits that *more than one lingua franca is possible*.

Unlike van Parijs, I do not believe that one lingua franca is enough for the world. The world is not flat. *Kultursprachen*, cultural languages, usually play the role of vehicular languages in definite areas. Think, for instance, of Arabic and Swahili in Africa, Spanish and Portuguese in South America, Chinese in China. Most probably, the more we will move across the globe, the more lingua francas we will need. In history, international languages were never decided democratically among the nations, rather they were pushed forward by strong political powers. I already presented elsewhere (Gobbo 2005) different scenarios for the language politics of the European Union, arguing that Esperanto is the most suitable candidate for playing the role of the second language for European citizens if the European Union became a confederation or a federation of states. Let us call it the 'European Esperanto scenario'. Then, van Parijs' argument against Esperanto based on the weakness of a bottom-up, voluntary-based movement also fails. The 'European Esperanto scenario' would counterbalance the tremendous impact of English as the main representative of the American way of life, proposing an alternative European dream to the American dream (Gobbo 2005).

A 'more modest sense' (p. 41) of neutrality is the fact that Esperanto 'needs to be learned by everybody'. This is simply false as Esperantists do exist. Esperanto is a unique case in history because a stable community of practice formed around it at the end of the XIX century and still lives in spite of two world wars – during the Second World War, it was explicitly persecuted. Unlike the speech communities of natural languages, which are defined by extra-linguistic sociological traits, such as ethnicity, territory, religion, and cultural habits, the community of practice (in the sense of Eckert 2006) of Esperanto is defined by a shared practice and the meta-reasoning over the practice itself: this practice is exactly the language. The colour of your skin, your social class, income, origins, and political ideas do not matter. You will be automatically part of the community of practice of Esperanto.

The language is the product of its past and present speakers. They always reshape the language with their cultural products, most notably literature. William Auld, a Scottish poet in Esperanto, was a candidate for the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1999, 2004, and 2006. The presence of the *Akademio de Esperanto*, the linguistic authority is similar to the Italian *Accademia della Crusca*. The reality of Esperanto is that of a living language.

On the one hand, Van Parijs seems to admit that Esperanto is a non-ethnic language, and therefore it does not give unfair advantage to any group of native speakers because ‘it does not belong to any particular people, to any community of native speakers’. On the other hand, he argues that ‘it is no longer strictly true that it is no one’s mother tongue’, and therefore it is no more neutral. But this is not the case. The fact that Esperanto is spoken in families is a proof of its language vitality, not a barrier to its ethnic neutrality. Lindstedt (2010), one of the leading scholars in the study of the use of Esperanto in multilingual families, shows that ‘native’ or L1 speakers of Esperanto, unlike the situation of many other languages, do not have a special variety which is considered more prestigious than all the others. Mainly, this happens because there is no *Sprachraum*, i.e. proper linguistic space, of Esperanto: it is a stateless language, without territory. Moreover, there is no monolingual Esperanto speaker, and most probably there will never exist one. The counterargument to my defence is quite obvious. Let us reprise, for the sake of the argument, the European Esperanto scenario. There, the European Union is opportunely transformed into a confederation (like Switzerland) or a federation (like the United States), which, by the way, was what Zamenhof, the founder of Esperanto, believed in (Zamenhof 1915). After one generation, a process of nativization would occur, similar to what happened to Modern Hebrew at the time of the establishment of the state of Israel. Here, van Parijs tries to demolish the scenario with an argument without any empirical evidence: ‘once turned into a really living language (…) the longer, more regular forms [will be] gradually driven into obsolescence by the shorter and less regular ones.’ The truth is that nobody knows what would happen from a linguistic point of view, as we have no cases in history similar to the European Esperanto scenario.

The European Esperantophones would be more equal than the others – paraphrasing Orwell –, and therefore the language would be no more *politically* neutral. Van Parijs rhetorically asks: ‘would their language [Esperanto] retain its flavour and their community retain its warmth once appropriated by capitalists and bureaucrats?’ (p. 46). I can add a stronger example. Think of the case of a European army speaking in Esperanto. For the majority of Esperantophones, Esperanto is *par excellence* the language of peace (Lins 2000): the idea of an army going to war shouting in Esperanto is simply repugnant.

In my view, the argument of the lack of political neutrality in any scenario where Esperanto is widely used in a *Sprachraum* is the only one solid and incontrovertible. Are the Esperantists ready to make such a jump, dismissing the idea of *political* neutrality, which is at the base of their ideology since the beginning (Sikosek 2006)? It is important to underline the fact that this is the only argument of van Parijs that has no relation with the language in itself. Esperanto, as a language, is ready to make the jump. For decades. But the majority of Esperantists are probably not. Also, Europeans themselves do not believe this European Esperanto dream. Unfortunately, the European Union is associated in our daily lives with banks and capitalists much more than with democracy and opportunities of growth.

I am convinced, as van Parijs is, that Europe will not go towards Esperanto but towards English (Gobbo 2015). But, for purely political reasons, not because of claimed defects of Esperanto. What divides us is the consideration of this scenario under the perspective of linguistic justice: for me, such a scenario is clearly linguistically unjust and totally unfair, but the most likely. Europe will not play a leading geopolitical role and linguistic justice for the world will not be achieved.

The research leading to these results received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) under Grant Agreement No 613344.

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DE GRUYTER OPEN
Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, **9** (2016) 63–70

DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2016-0009

Maxi-Min Language Use A Critical Remark on a Concept by Philippe van Parijs

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Look, I know wherein our most basic value judgements are rooted – in compassion, in our sense for the suffering of the others
(Herbert Marcuse)[1]

Abstract. Philippe van Parijs explains in *Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World* the concept of maxi-min language use as a process of language choice. He suggests that the language chosen as a common language should maximize the minimal competence of a community. Within a multilingual group of people, the chosen language is the language known best by a participant who knows it least. For obvious reasons, only English would qualify for having that status. This article argues that maxi-min is rather a normative concept, not only because the process itself remains empirically unfounded. Moreover, language choice is the result of complex social and psychological structures. As a descriptive process, the maxi-min choice happens in the reality fairly seldom, whereas the max-min use of languages seen as a normative process could be a very effective tool to measure linguistic justice.

Keywords: maxi-min, minimex, linguistic justice, language policy, language choice

Linguistic justice is a concept of responding to political language and participation needs. Philippe van Parijs sheds light on the manifold aspects of this concept in his book *Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World* and in various articles. In his book, he explains why linguistic justice is understood as an important contribution to egalitarian justice, which itself is the basic principle of a free democratic world. Under conditions of justice, people are enabled to contribute to the international civil society, to the European political public sphere, and to a commonly shared political culture, which is necessary for building

1 Cited in Pennycook 2010: 7.

up a transnational demos in the sense of Habermas' idea of a European *demos* (Habermas 2001: 118 ff.). Van Parijs argues that a single common language is a precondition for egalitarian justice. It is also a precondition for the sustainability of political institutions and hence for the stability of democracy. He identifies English as a language most appropriate for this status. A transnational demos sharing a single common language and a plurality of *ethnos* on a regional level form the basis for such linguistic justice. The language chosen as a single common language should maximize the minimal competence of a community. Van Parijs suggests that for obvious reasons only English qualifies for having that status. Within a group of people with different mother tongues, it is the language known best by a participant who knows it least. This 'micro-mechanism' (van Parijs 2011: 15) is called the rule of minimal exclusion or *minimex* (van Parijs 2004; van Parijs 2007a). In other publications, it is also called the language of maximal minimal competence: *maxi-min* (van Parijs 2011: 14; van Parijs 2007b). Although the terms may vary, both seem to refer to the same concept. The term *maxi-min* is possibly chosen to avoid confusion with the theory of decision-making and the respective abbreviation *minimax* – 'minimum de moyens d'existence'. However, in decision-making theory, the term *maxi-min* is also used, namely for selecting the course of action whose worst (maximum) loss is better than the least (minimum) loss of all other courses of action possible in given circumstances. Anyhow, in van Parijs' words, this rule 'is a somewhat less obvious but no less general mechanism' (van Parijs 2011: 13) for the communication among multilingual speakers. In his view, self-reflection on one's own experience in multilingual contexts allows us to draw a conclusion that efficient and inclusive communication leads to the maxi-min principle of the language choice. Additionally, the maxi-min criterion has another, more general, meaning. He proposes a process of self-reinforcement, called *probability-driven learning*. This means some sort of a virtuous circle: most probably, particularly the languages which are expected to be most frequently used are also most frequently learned as foreign languages. Van Parijs calls this process 'maxi-min dynamics' (van Parijs 2011: 19–21).

In this article, I will argue that due to our knowledge about communication strategies the maxi-min use of languages is rather a normative concept, which arises from the idea of egalitarian justice in international communication. I am aware of the fact that van Parijs does not want to be an advocate of maxi-min as a normative concept. However, according to van Parijs, this principle contributes to justice if factual freedom is shared through a sustainable maxi-min criterion (van Parijs 2014). His main concern, therefore, is to generally maximize the chances in communication, particularly for the individuals who have the least knowledge of a language, which I consider a very important and a most relevant feature of critically applied linguistics in the sense of Pennycook (Pennycook 2010). However, the maxi-min process remains empirically unfounded so far.

Therefore, Grin comes to the conclusion that 'the "maxi-min" (or "minimax") rule may sometimes apply, but is also often a sham' (Grin 2011).[2] The *probability-driven learning* principle seems to reflect the reality, whereas the maxi-min use of language does not. The reason for English being the winner has generally other reasons, which have been discussed by other authors (Ammon 2015, Gerhards 2010, Wright 2009, Van Els 2005, Phillipson 2003). The problem of empirical foundation of factors leading to a certain language choice is that these factors normally have no single or isolated cause but are the result of complex social and psychological structures (Ammon 2015: 52). They interact with numerous other influences on a given situation. These factors are the rules of social interaction like the rules of power, politeness, or identification. In some cases, it might be impolite to choose the language other than the language of the host (Brown 2005). In such cases, the mother tongue or the preferred language of a communication partner is chosen, even though someone else (or someone less important) would be excluded from communication or has to fall back on other strategies like interpreting, code-switching, intercomprehension, or machine translation (for research on mediation strategies, see the project MIME www.mime-project.org). The choice of the language of the host is very common in political communication. For example, when Barroso held a laudation on the occasion of the International Charlemagne Prize of Aachen in 2011, he spoke German because the award was given in Germany and not because he was sure that German was the language best known by the participant who knows it least. Presumably, even the awardee Jean-Claude Trichet was not able to understand German. Barroso held the final part of his speech in French, probably because of his better competences in that language and because it was the mother tongue of the awardee.

In fact, van Parijs acknowledges that there are different criteria for the choice of a language (van Parijs 2011: 16 f., 2007: 217). He mentions some of them: the maxi-min rule, didactic reasons, results of certain institutional language rules, parental contexts, symbolic reasons, expressive reasons, and sheer power. In his view, these factors influence the choice 'only on minor magnitude' (van Parijs 2011: 20). As soon as the efficiency has a priority, the maxi-min rule would apply. However, the mechanisms behind remain unclear. Moreover, van Parijs seems to be ambiguous about it when he resumes: 'But even if the maxi-min dynamic accounts fully for the trends observed, it operates against a background deeply shaped by power relations, struggles, victories, and defeats in the case of the spreading of English as in any other language' (van Parijs 2011: 21). Precisely against this background, the descriptive notion of maxi-min should not be sustained. There exists a lot of evidence for the complex nature of language choice,

2 According to the terminology in van Parijs' latest publication *Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World*, which I mainly refer to in this article, further on, I will only use the term 'maxi-min'.

and some evidence shows that the choice for English follows the rules linked to the criteria other than the communicative justice. Furthermore, my point is based on the assumption that the rules for a fair and cooperative language choice imply appropriate knowledge about the group in which the communication takes place. In fact, to follow the maxi-min rule, one has to identify the mastered languages of everyone in a given group. A guess (van Parijs 2011: 14) would not be sufficient to establish a strategy for fair communication. This is an important difference between the maxi-min rule and other factors and rules of communication as described below. The rules of communication are mostly based on inherent social or introspective knowledge (for speaker-based decisions), while for making a maxi-min choice one has to be informed about the language competence of all others in order to be able to minimize the exclusion effectively.

Criteria that influence the language choice are based on various interactive rules: for instance, on the cooperation principle first formulated by Grice (Grice 1975). Following Grice's theory, conversational cooperation is divided into different conversational maxims. Accordingly, it might be more perspicuous to choose the language the speaker is able to express himself best in rather than choose a language in which the speaker could not guarantee the *maxim of manner*. This means to put what is said in the clearest, briefest, and most orderly manner. This can be understood as the opposite of maxi-min because it is speaker-orientated. In addition, the 'communication accommodation theory' developed by Giles (Giles–Coupland–Coupland 1991) was shown to be an influencing factor on the language choice (Ammon–Dittmar–Mattheier et al. 2006: 1590). Going beyond general assumptions about the interaction of the language choice and communication situation, Wodak et al. conducted a qualitative study on the language choice of various communication groups in EU institutions, and came to the conclusion that 'language choice and CS [Code switching] depend on a plethora of context-dependent factors' (Wodak–Forchtner–Krzyżanowski 2012: 180). Furthermore, any situation which would qualify for a maxi-min process is characterized by asymmetric language competences. As Coulmas states in a chapter about the language choice of groups, 'it is very rare that contact is between equals and more or less symmetric' (Coulmas 2013: 164). Therefore, there is no automatic process of language choice and there is no general process of communicative justice. The passive or active use of a language, which is only poorly mastered, can make somebody feel discriminated or even excluded (Lüdi–Höchle–Kohler et al. 2010: 5). On the other hand, one should keep in mind that failure to understand a language does not automatically mean exclusion from communication since there exist alternative mediation strategies. The study of multilingual groups done by the authors mentioned above shows that there is indeed a whole active network of foreground and background factors which influence the language choice. This network leads to the use of manifold multilingual strategies including code-switching, interpretation, and possibly machine translation, or what is sometimes called translanguaging and 'multilingual speech' (Lüdi 2006: 14). But even in the so-called OLAT situations (one language at a time), asymmetric competence does not generally lead to a maxi-min decision. According to Ammon (2015: 54 f.), the rules of politeness, interaction, or power form the basis for the language choice which might develop into norms of communication. Furthermore, these norms can shape personal identity structures, whereby norms and social roles interact. As a result, individuals and groups can assign themselves to specific groups and develop a specific social identity. The attribution to a certain social identity thus can determine the language choice. Hence, various possibilities lie behind such a choice. Ammon (Ammon 2015: 58–63, 430) identifies eleven factors which influence the language choice. Due to space constraints, I only enumerate these factors: legal regulation, language competence, power, politeness, attitudes, identity, self-presentation, willingness to learn, follow-up communication, personal prominence, and specific social-linguistic knowledge about self-reinforcement through language choice. All these instrumental motivations can have influence on the decision which language to use in a given situation. The maxi-min rule is certainly one of the rules of interaction. All in all, in a given situation, we decide to use a specific language depending on the rules of interaction, our instrumental motivations, and social knowledge.

As stated above, the language knowledge of everyone in the group has to be enquired in order to establish a fair and cooperative use of a language. I have no personal experience with such situations, but I have experienced that social identity does not allow people to report the absent or poor knowledge of a specific language. This is particularly true for the English language. Even though the maxi-min rule would apply on the basis of any inherent knowledge, or the best language knowledge of each individual in a group, I argue that it is not valid for English. Accordingly, very often, the choice of English is rather the result of a cosmopolitan identity in the sense of someone's own belief being a cosmopolitan than the result of justice considerations. The following scene took place in December 2015 in an international artist residence in Germany (this data material is obviously not representative, but I consider it being a typical situation): four Germans, two Russians, one Dutch, and one Polish came together for an informal get-to-know; they all had their national languages as mother tongues. The language competences were as follows: the two Russians spoke Russian and German; the Polish understood German very well, but was not willing to speak it; the Dutch spoke and understood German and French; the Germans spoke English, Dutch, and French. Without any prior agreements, the group started to speak in English, even though someone pointed out that the Russians would be excluded from the communication. Consequently, the Dutch translated from English into German for the Russians. The group as a whole kept on speaking in English. Following the maxi-min rule, German would have been the only language the group should have chosen. This example illustrates that other motivations like identity or resentment towards German may play a role in this situation. Another frequent example is the choice of English within a 100% German-speaking academic context, e.g. at university lectures, or EU commissioners who use mainly English for press conferences (Kruse–Ammon 2013) although they are able to speak other languages as well and the language competence of the audience was not likely to have been enquired.

I argue that the examples and theories mentioned above provide evidence for the assumption that other factors than the maxi-min rule lead to the choice of English as the common language of a group. This choice might be far less fair and cooperative than the maxi-min rule suggests. Choosing English might very often be the result of a cosmopolitan identity. The reason is the development of English towards a lingua franca. Though English cannot be considered a real lingua franca since it lacks the respective important features such as the absence of mother tongue speakers of a relevant amount, there is the notion of *English as lingua franca* (ELF). Nevertheless, Seidlhofer defines ELF as 'any use of English among speakers of different first languages for whom English is the communicative medium of choice, and often the only option' (Seidlhofer 2011: 7). The English language is not unique in this sense, other languages might also be used as lingua franca, but English outstands them all in this function. Therefore, some authors call English the 'international default language'; for example, Phillipson when he talks about the EU institutions (Phillipson 2015: 5) or Bolton & Kuteeva when they refer to the academic world (Bolton–Kuteeva 2012: 430). This means that ELF is the default language for people with a certain group identity, no matter what the precise language knowledge of all members of a group is. Ammon comes to the conclusion that 'the decision towards using a specific language for international contacts is the more common (or natural) and therefore more accepted, the more meaningful its international status is' (Ammon 2015: 427). People, therefore, choose English to suit their cosmopolitan identity, even at the cost of understanding.

I conclude that the maxi-min or minimax use of languages should be best understood as a normative process rather than a descriptive one. As argued above, a descriptive process happens in the reality fairly seldom, whereas the max-mini use of languages seen as a normative process could be a very effective tool for measuring linguistic justice. For a fair and cooperative process, the language which is really and not only assumedly the language or strategy with minimal exclusion is chosen. This language would not necessarily be English. The normative process would enable members of a certain group to openly reflect on their language use and its positive or negative effects for communicative justice. It would allow to reflect upon failures and chances a single lingua franca might have.

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DE GRUYTER OPEN

Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, **9** (2016) 71–76

DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2016-0010

English-Only Language Policy: The Road to Provincialism?[1]

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Abstract. In this note, we outline various possible long-run effects of an English-only acquisition policy in the European Union. The point of departure is how individual behaviour adapts to constraints in the environment. This leads to changes in collective behaviour, which becomes part of the environment, again influencing individual behaviour. Possible equilibria of this feedback mechanism are discussed. It is argued that domain loss and diglossia may result. The process is further characterized by external effects. Looking at language knowledge as a merit good, path dependencies and multiple stable equilibria can be explained.

Keywords: acquisition planning, adaptive individual behaviour, diglossia, domain loss, external effects, language dynamics, language policy, merit good, path dependencies

1. Introduction – Language Policy is More than Meets the Eye

At first glance, one might think that the analysis of language policy and language use is a relatively simple cost–benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis. Benefits would not only be the value of easy communication but also the subjective value of the possibility of using one's chosen language in various situations. These values should be compared to the implementation costs guaranteeing the realization of the different possibilities.[2] Van Parijs's (2011) work is in spirit a cost–benefit

1 I thank Michele Gazzola and Torsten Templin for the many constructive comments. Part of the work leading to this comment has received funding from the European Community's Seventh Framework Program under Grant Agreement No 613344 (Project MIME), which is gratefully acknowledged.

2 For a further discussion of language rights from a welfare economics point of view, see, for instance, Wickström (2016).

analysis that concentrates on the short-run effects and mainly on the efficiency gain in communication. By having a *lingua franca* or a vehicular language as the sole working language in the European Union, every citizen has to learn at most only one language in addition to his or her mother tongue, and, in addition, by choosing one of the big languages as a vehicular language, the number of people having to learn no second language is maximized and the aggregated learning costs are minimized.[3] Hence, everyone can communicate at minimal costs.

Van Parijs is also aware of the short-term distributional effects of the English-only policy favouring the English speakers and being a disadvantage to all the others.[4] He also discusses various possible compensation measures. All in all, the arguments are in accordance with a straightforward cost–benefit analysis. Independently of whether the distributional issue is given weight or not, the efficiency gain is undoubtedly present, and due to the network externality effect of language acquisition it is even more pronounced than one might think at the first glance.[5]

What is missing in the very convincing arguments of Van Parijs, however, is an analysis of dynamic long-term effects, and in my opinion they can be substantial. The static analysis gives us a very myopic view since people's demand for language rights and their linguistic behaviour cannot be assumed to be stationary and constant. An individual's linguistic preferences can be strongly influenced by the environment the individual is born and socialized into. This environment is at least partially determined by the language policy conducted. In that way, language usage and language preferences are endogenous results of language policy and we are faced with path dependencies in the analysis. Especially acquisition planning can be expected to have a strong influence, but status planning cannot be neglected either. We can distinguish two channels of influence. There is a direct influence on mature individuals who might change their already acquired preferences, and there is an effect on the new generations – people in their youth whose preferences are being formed – that can be expected to be more pronounced. Status-planning policy is considered to influence both

3 Strictly speaking, this would be an argument for the biggest mother tongue in the EU, German. However, in the current situation in Europe with English being the language most widely spoken, the argument makes sense.

4 In addition, there are distributional effects due to the varying proficiency levels in English of the population of the various countries; see, for instance, Gazzola (2014).

5 Had I not been forced to learn English at school, I could have made a personal cost–benefit calculus. One benefit for me was that I could communicate with quite a few additional people in the world, and the cost was the time I invested in learning it. However, the benefits to society were higher than what would have entered into my calculus since I did not take into account the benefits accruing to everyone else who knows English, due to the fact that they could now communicate with me. Hence, the network externality property amplifies the benefits of an individual calculus, and this is the raison d'être for the need of a language policy promoting the use of a *lingua franca*. See also Church and King (1993).

groups, whereas acquisition-planning policy, of course, has an impact mainly on younger people. *In nuce*, language policy has to be analysed as essentially a dynamic problem with path dependencies that can lead to very different situations in the long run.

We, hence, have to distinguish the short-run effects of an English-only policy from the long-run effects. What are then the long-run effects? As mentioned above, the preferences for language rights and language use can be expected to change with the linguistic environment, which is, at least partially, determined by the consequences of the higher status given to English by making it the sole working language on the EU level. The accompanying acquisition planning will reinforce these effects. In this note, I will concentrate on the domain losses that might occur to other languages as well as on the unintended welfare effects of changes in language use due to changed perceptions and possibilities. Finally, the dilemma in evaluating different ex post states will be discussed.

2. Domain Loss and the Development of Diglossia

The status of a language is relative. That is, when the status of English is increased, the status of other languages will decrease relative to English. One consequence will certainly be that in schools in the EU the position of English as a second language will become stronger and stronger at the cost of other languages. The internationalization of research and the resulting strong trend towards the sole use of English in domains like higher education (especially in the natural sciences) and in research activities is further reinforced by the language policy in corporate management. Slowly, these and similar domains will be lost for the other vernaculars in the EU.

What will prevent this process to continue with one domain loss after the other, leading to a situation of diglossia, and ultimately even to the disappearance of some European languages?[6] After these domains, which are the next ones to go?

The loss of the domain and the development of diglossia also brings a loss in the richness of the concerned languages. The languages will no longer be adequate as vehicles to discuss themes belonging to the lost domains. Should we neglect the possibility of such a development?

6 On the European level, German, French, Italian, etc. might become regional minority languages, with English playing the role of Europe-wide 'national' language. The regional languages will then follow the path of Gaelic in Scotland (Dorian 1981) or Hungarian in Burgenland (Gal 1979).

3. Choice, Perception, and Provincialism

In today's Europe, English has become the first foreign language in most elementary and secondary schools – in many cases, the only one. This, of course, is the result of a conscious acquisition planning and is totally in accordance with the language policy proposed by Van Parijs. This policy increases the status of English compared to other languages. A plausible consequence is that Anglophone culture becomes the most, if not the only, accessible culture to the younger cohorts. The resulting cultural provincialism, of course, has positive and negative sides. The added appreciation of English-language culture in all its diverse forms is certainly a gain for us all, but the marginalization of cultures originating in other language communities is a considerable loss. More important is perhaps the loss in variety due to the strong concentration on one single language at the cost of all others.

3.1. Acquisition Planning Creates Perceptions

The next consequence of the English-only policy is that the perceptions and resulting norms of young people change. It is not unusual to hear young people claim that the international norm is given by English and the local language has no particular value beyond the immediate surroundings. When talking about French institutions in German, for instance, the names of the French institutions are given in English: *Académie française* becomes the 'French Academy' and not 'Académie française' or 'Die französische Akademie'. This is slowly becoming the norm also in serious journalism.[7]

Do we really want this *Weltanschauung* with (US) English usage as the only international norm? Is this not the ultimate provincialism, making all references to something foreign in English and by English?

3.2. Acquisition Planning Changes Behaviour, Inducing Externalities

More important than the emotional side is probably that with the decline in the knowledge of other languages than English the information flows from the world become biased. The average European is likely to know more about the life of an average family in Kalamazoo than in Katowice. This does not really further European integration. The reporter working in Madrid, speaking no Spanish beyond ordering a restaurant meal, is bound to look for sources speaking English and will in that way get a rather biased view of what is happening in Spain, relying mostly on the elites of society. This is a clear negative external effect of

7 The other day, in the Austrian public radio in a review of a new staging of Wagner's opera 'Das Liebesverbot' in *Teatro Real* in Madrid, the generally very competent reviewer in the German language programme referred to the theatre as the 'Royal Theatre'!

the English-only policy, causing considerable social costs. Whether the increased ease of communication in some domains compensates for these social costs, is, of course, a matter of individual taste. To make people aware of the consequences of the different alternatives is, however, a matter of efficiency.[8]

3.3. An Example

When I went to school in Sweden about 50 years ago, we learned some elementary Danish and Norwegian, and the same was true with respect to the three Scandinavian languages in the other two countries. This small investment was enough to overcome the initial hurdles and pave the road to an almost native, passive knowledge of the other Scandinavian languages. When a Swede and a Dane met, they could hence communicate on a rather sophisticated level – each speaking his or her native tongue.

Today, young people learn mainly English at school. When Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes meet today, as a consequence, they often follow the path of the least resistance, conducting simple conversations in English. The result is a rather limited level of communication. Furthermore, out of myopia, very few young people make then the rather small investment needed to learn the basic differences between the three Scandinavian languages. They hence never achieve the potential benefits of mastering them passively at an almost native level. The community feeling of being part of Scandinavia is slowly lost, and the access to the cultural and political life of the other two countries becomes very limited. Also, this is a negative external effect of the English-only language policy in Scandinavian schools.

4. Merit Good, *ex ante* and *ex post* Evaluation

A fundamental problem facing us when discussing the desirability of a specific language policy is that the policy influences the preferences of the people subjected to the policy. On the other hand, those preferences are the basis for the evaluation. Hence, an *ex ante* and an *ex post* analysis can give very different results. In other words, we are dealing with path dependencies.[9] This is closely related to the concept of merit good.[10] This basically says that there are goods or activities that we, at the time of consumption, might not like, but after the consumption activity are happy to have consumed, for instance, education.

8 When it comes to tobacco products, our politicians have realized this. Maybe all providers of English courses should be forced to add a sentence to their advertisements: 'An English-only policy is dangerous to your cultural health.'

9 For a more detailed analysis, see Wickström (2016).

10 For the original source, see Musgrave (1956/1957).

An English-only policy that after many generations leads to diglossia or even the death of many vernaculars, as outlined in Section 2, might be by the then living individuals hailed as both wise and visionary. How many descendants of Cornish speakers today mourn the loss of Cornish as a living language?[11] This is, of course, a rational argument and justifies the acceptance of the linguistic evolution of the world over the last many thousand years. The question that remains, however, is whether it is a sensible policy to actively and consciously promote such an evolution. The welfare loss discussed in the previous sections will at least apply to many individuals during the transition, affecting quite a few generations of Europeans. Do they not count?

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11 According to Ferdinand (2013), about one in 1,000 people in Cornwall has some knowledge of the language today, and presumably at least they do care.

DE GRUYTER
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Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, **9** (2016) 77–81

DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2016-0011

Linguistic Justice Requires an Artificial Language: a Comment on van Parijs

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Abstract. In advocating the use of a global auxiliary language, Van Parijs forms part of a tradition that stretches back to the seventeenth century. However, he differs from this tradition in promoting the use of English rather than an artificial language of some sort. This paper examines the theoretical situation that van Parijs proposes as the most fair, in which English functions world-wide as the preferred auxiliary language and in which certain measures have been taken to counterbalance injustices of three types. I draw attention to injustices of each of these types done to speakers of English in that situation. This leads to the conclusion that proposals to use an artificial language as a global lingua franca that were made in the seventeenth and later centuries have a stronger case than van Parijs has argued.

Keywords: artificial languages, seventeenth-century language planners, Esperanto, injustice to Anglophones, multilingualism

1.

In welcoming a development that he believes is leading to the large-scale adoption of English as a world-wide lingua franca, van Parijs places himself in a tradition which, in the Western world, goes back as far as the seventeenth century. In this paper, I first point out that he shares with tradition his advocating the use of an auxiliary language for communication across the globe, whereas his rejection of the use of an artificial language for the purpose sets him apart from it. I then examine the linguistic situation that van Parijs proposes as the most fair, assuming that English strengthens and consolidates its position as the preferred world language. I call attention to some injustices done to speakers of English that van Parijs has not exactly overlooked but, I think, could have given more consideration to. This then leads to the conclusion that proposals to use an artificial language as a global lingua franca that were made in the seventeenth and later centuries have a stronger case than van Parijs has argued. That is to say, if we take linguistic justice, not the current language situation as a starting point, and if we disregard the likelihood of such proposals ever to succeed.

2.

In the seventeenth century, the idea of instituting a universal language for the use of all mankind gained currency, and numerous projects were undertaken with a view to this goal. These projects were driven by a range of motives, one of which was invariably that a remedy should be sought for the 'curse of Babel,' i.e. the fact that large groups of people are unable to communicate with each other because they speak different languages. As John Wilkins, the author of an elaborate artificial language, puts it:

'He that knows how to estimate that judgment inflicted on Mankind in the Curse of the *Confusion*, with all the unhappy consequences of it, may thereby judge what great advantages and benefit there will be, in a remedy against it' (An Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language, 1668, Epistle Dedicatory).

He proposed his own creation as one such remedy. Wilkins and his contemporaries knew that in certain regions international auxiliary languages were in use, such as Malay in South-East Asia and Latin among the learned in Europe, but they did not believe that a language of that sort could reverse Babel altogether. They proposed the adoption of an artificial language, newly contrived using sound linguistic principles, for two main reasons: first, such a language would in many respects be a better language than the supposedly deficient languages that were in use and, second, it was deemed impossible to single out any of these existing languages for use as an international one as these were all, by and large, connected with particular peoples and nations, and it seemed obvious that no nation would be prepared to adopt the language of another one.

It is easy to see the parallel between Wilkins's and van Parijs's motives, both wishing to counteract the 'unhappy consequences' of language barriers and both expecting great advantages once these are overcome. In this respect, Wilkins's project as well as those of his contemporaries were a complete failure. Nevertheless, the idea continued to have some appeal, and similar projects were pursued in later centuries, mostly in the margin of mainstream intellectual history.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, there was a noticeable upsurge in projects for a universal language, with, first, Volapük and shortly after that Esperanto attracting a spectacular number of supporters. In comparison with the seventeenth-century projects, the goals of Zamenhof, the inventor of Esperanto, were more modest. He had no intention of providing a language superior to those already existing, although he purposefully observed simplicity and regularity in constructing Esperanto. He did this for the sake of making the language easy to learn, which, in turn, served the primary purpose of inducing as many people as possible to use Esperanto as an international language. For the rest, he made no attempts to surpass existing languages with respect to logical or representational characteristics, which was a major feature of the seventeenth-century projects.

Linguistic justice was foremost among Zamenhof's motives for creating Esperanto. In the multilingual environment in which he grew up, he noticed that speakers of languages with a higher status than those spoken by others enjoyed undeserved advantages. In his view, only a newly made artificial language could neutralize this unjustified inequality. Again, a parallel with Van Parijs's concerns is obvious. However, it is also clear that van Parijs dismisses Esperanto, and implicitly all languages of this type as a viable alternative to English. I have no doubt that, given the current dynamics with respect to global language use, van Parijs is right about this. Changes in this regard have been enormous. When Wilkins put forward his plan for a universal language in English, his book was hard to access for a large number of intellectuals even in Europe, such as the philosopher Leibniz. Zamenhof first published his plan in Russian, with reasonable hopes of attracting an international readership. However, if a consideration of linguistic justice is to be more than a justification of the status quo, or an extrapolation of this to a new situation on the basis of current trends – and I think it should be more than that –, then there is reason to reconsider the case for an artificial language.

3.

Although Van Parijs proposes to embrace and stimulate rather than to obstruct the rapid spreading of English as a lingua franca, he notes that three types of injustice may follow from this development. Those who profit are the Anglophones; the losers, at least initially, are the rest of the world's population. He then shows that each type of unfairness is either not as bad as it may seem or can be effectively counterbalanced by certain measures. I do not object to any of van Parijs's claims concerning these points, which are all convincing. However, I think it may be illuminating to look again at the three types of unfairness in turn, but from the perspective of the Anglophones, for it will then turn out that certain costs and benefits are missing from the balance sheet.

First, cooperative justice. The particular unfairness on this score, as van Parijs rightly notes, is that the non-native learners of the lingua franca pay the cost of language learning, whereas the native speakers are free riders. However, the distribution of costs and benefits is not as straightforward as that. Learning a foreign language requires time and effort, but it cannot be counted exclusively as a cost. It carries considerable advantages with it: cognitive capacities are exercised and possibly enhanced and the learners enjoy a widening of their intellectual and cultural awareness as a rich cultural heritage becomes accessible. Thus, in addition to enabling them to communicate with a larger number of people, there is an intrinsic pay-off, not just a burden for the non-native learners of English.

In principle, these benefits are also available to Anglophones, who are free to learn whichever language they fancy. But the sociolinguistic situation is not conducive to such learning. And even it if were, the fact remains that for native speakers of English the double advantage of both acquiring the lingua franca and enjoying the intrinsic benefit of language learning is not available. Furthermore, their opportunities to learn a foreign language through exposure and practice are far more limited than those of non-Anglophones, especially when the language concerned has many bilingual or multilingual speakers. For example, Anglophones trying to learn Dutch typically complain that their efforts are thwarted by the native speakers' habitually switching to English. In practice, the chances of ending up as a monolingual are much greater for Anglophones than for native speakers of other languages.

Second, distributive justice. Native speakers of English have economic advantages, for example, better opportunities on the international job market. As van Parijs notes, this advantage is bound to shrink as the lingua franca spreads more and more. One could add that non-native speakers of English frequently become sufficiently fluent in English to be little disadvantaged by their linguistic upbringing. Furthermore, they may profit from their bi- or multilingualism when it comes to acquiring jobs as translators or diplomats, and they may contrast favourably with the typical monolingual Anglophone in international contexts.

Third, parity of esteem. In order to pursue linguistic justice in this regard, van Parijs recommends that each linguistic community be granted the right to impose its own language as the medium of instruction within their territory, and to require immigrants to learn their language. It is worth noting that for Anglophones this right is vacuous for the most part, for there is a disparity in what immigrants are required to learn. If Anglophones move to another country, they are supposed, or forced, to learn a language which is, normally, unknown to them. If others move to an Anglophone country, they are required to learn a language that they, normally, already know. More importantly, native speakers of the lingua franca are robbed of the collective identity all linguistic communities but theirs are entitled to. Since the whole world is appropriating their language, Anglophones lose the sovereignty others are allowed to foster. If the situation that van Parijs foresees obtains, people across the globe will have (at least) two languages: on the one hand, their own native tongue which they can identify with and which they use for all personal and local affairs and, on the other hand, the lingua franca, which they use for international communication. The only exception to this is formed by the Anglophones: for them, the local and the global languages coincide. Linguistically speaking, they will end up as the poor of this world.

4.

The points just made have not escaped van Parijs's thoroughness. In Subchapter 3.9 of his book, he draws attention to what he calls a paradoxical corollary of the policies he advocates, namely that the Anglophones will be at a disadvantage in the longer run. But since this prospect is still a long way off, he postpones a discussion of what distributive justice will require when the prospect will be a reality until some indefinite point of time in the future. But we can see now that it will be very hard if not impossible to achieve linguistic justice in that future situation. It seems a slightly paradoxical characteristic of van Parijs's proposals, then, that he advocates policies in the name of linguistic justice that he expects will lead to injustice, adding that this is only a long-term effect which we will see about later.

It may be clear at this point why I would suggest that the earlier language planners from the seventeenth century onward were basically right in their opinion that a common language for the world cannot be any of the natural languages already in use. The practical argument for this – that people would never be willing to adopt the language of another nation as the common language – has been proven wrong. The current spreading of English is only one of many counterexamples. The argument from justice, however, put forward by Zamenhof in particular, has lost nothing of its strength. Van Parijs's analyses have brought great clarity to the discussion of these issues. They have also revealed that if a natural language becomes the lingua franca of the world, an imbalance is introduced causing multiple disadvantages and various types of injustice, affecting all language users, that is, everybody, including the native speakers of the lingua franca. All or most of these effects could in principle be avoided if everybody would retain their own native tongue for local use, and use a common language for international communication provided that this language is owned by all mankind in equal measure, which means that this must be an artificial one. But this is only in principle, and it is a thought that – as the fate of the universal language movement has shown – has just a faint effect in the real world.

DE GRUYTER OPEN

ACTA UNIV. SAPIENTIAE, EUROPEAN AND REGIONAL STUDIES, **9** (2016) 83–93

DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2016-0012

Linguistic Justice and English as a Lingua Franca from a Minority Perspective

– *The Case of Hungarians in Transylvania* –

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Abstract. The article is a brief evaluation of the regulatory environment of language use in Transylvania, Romania based on Van Parijs' conceptual toolkit presented in his 2011 book *Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World*. This linguistic regime is a coercive hybrid regulation containing elements stemming from both the categorical regime (personality principle) and territoriality. In municipalities or counties where the official use of minority languages is permitted, it is typically present in a conjunctive manner, but its enforcement is weak and inconsistent. The principle of territorially coercive linguistic subdivision – proposed by Van Parijs as an optimal solution for a greater linguistic justice – is not accommodated in any of the fields of official communication and under present political circumstances it has no further plausibility. A hypothetical alternative for the territorially coercive regime would be the introduction of English as a lingua franca in interethnic communication. We argued that this latter option would be fair only if English could entirely replace the official languages currently in use or it would receive a fully equivalent status at least in those regions where a considerable number of linguistic minorities live.

Keywords: multilingualism, language policies, Hungarians in Romania, English as a lingua franca

The Regulatory Context of Multilingualism in Transylvania

The demographic distribution of the nearly 1.3 million Hungarians in Transylvania, Romania shows a high regional disparity. One third of the Hungarians live in municipalities, where their proportion exceeds 80 percent, 54 percent is resident in settlements, where the Hungarians are in the majority, and every fifth

Hungarian resides in a town or village where the Hungarians make up less than 20 percent of the population. The not officially recognized Szeklerland is the only major historical-ethnographical region in Transylvania where Hungarians form a substantial majority; this area includes Harghita (Hargita), Covasna (Kovászna), and part of Mureş (Maros) counties and it is home to 38 percent of the Hungarian population in Romania.[1]

The regulatory environment of language use in Romania is without regard to this variability and the use of minority languages is controlled by country-wide uniform laws. In the terminology of Van Parijs, this regulatory regime has the following features:

– It is *coercive* rather than accommodating. There are specific laws concerning the use of language in different domains of public life; it is not determined by the mere utilitarian rationality of the actors or the neutrality of the market. The main element of this legislation is included in the Constitution, and it says that the Romanian is the only official language of the country, which means that its use cannot be subjected to any restrictions and is compulsory in official public communication. The treatment of minority languages in different domains is regulated by specific laws. The most important disposition in this respect is the law of local public administration, which came into force in 2001 and – even if it does not recognize them as equal official languages – it does permit the (parallel) use of minority languages in those municipalities where the proportion of citizens belonging to the respective nationality exceeds 20 percent.

The legislation concerning education is more permissive since the threshold rule refers to absolute numbers: according to the law of education, in primary and lower secondary levels, it is permitted to operate a separate class in a minority language if the number of (the parents of) pupils who are asking for it exceeds 12.[2]

– The threshold rule in public administration creates a *'hybrid' regulation*: the use of language becomes a personal right for the individual members of minorities: in this respect, it is a *categorical regime*; using the borders of an administrative unit for the threshold rule, however, introduces the *territorial principle*. The regulation concerning the language of education – since it is not linked to the proportion of minorities – is closer to a more permissive, categorical regime. The personality principle is endorsed in the healthcare system as well, which

1 For a more detailed demographic description of the Hungarians in Transylvania, Romania, see Veres 2015. In Romania, the strongest determinant of Hungarian ethnic identity is the language, so the number of ethnic Hungarians and the number of native Hungarian speakers do not differ too much from each other. For further details, see: Kiss 2015. Hence, for the sake of simplicity, the ethnic and linguistic categories will be used alternately, depending on the context.

2 Another element of concession in the law permits the merger of up to 4 grade-groups into a single class – if transportation of pupils to the closest Hungarian school is not possible –, which makes minority language education with only three children of the same age possible. At higher school levels, this merger is not possible.

means that patients have the right to receive information in their native language. However, the technical application of the law is often fraught with difficulties because there are no regulations that would compel hospitals to hire staff who speak the languages of minorities. Finally, the personality principle should be applied in the courthouse as well: in a hearing – by request –, it is mandatory to provide interpreters for those who wish to communicate in their native language.

– *The enforcement* of the regulations concerning linguistic rights *is weak*. For example, despite the obligation to post bilingual signs in public institutions above the 20 percent threshold, this is effectively realized in only 81 percent of the local council buildings concerned, 23 percent of post offices, and only in 14 percent of police stations (Horváth 2012, 188). There are many municipalities beyond the threshold where customer service in public institutions, hospitals, and courthouses is not functional in minority languages. Officials commonly explain the non-compliance with the law with the lack of financial resources and disregard its implementation.

– The application of the administrative law is *not consistent.* In an exemplary case, the court considered discriminatory the imposition of the knowledge of minority language for the occupation of a public position, even though it was clearly required by the job description.[3] This decision plainly ran counter to the provisions of the law.

– In municipalities or counties where the official use of minority languages is permitted, it is typically present in a *conjunctive* manner. However, this is a limited conjunction as an important condition is not met, without which – according to Van Parijs – it can hardly be functional: for Romanians, it is not required to learn Hungarian, for Hungarians, however, it is part of their compulsory education to learn the language of the state. This is a major cause that contributes to the reproduction of status asymmetry between the 'stronger' Romanian and the 'weaker' minority languages.

In education, there is a strengthening of a spontaneous disjunction: the proportion of those pupils who are studying in mixed-language schools is decreasing and there are more and more students enrolled in separated minority language schools.[4]

– *The principle of territorially coercive linguistic subdivision is not accommodated in any of the fields*; however, according to Van Parijs, this would be the only viable solution for the fair treatment of equity problems in a multilingual environment.

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3 The case was about a competition for the post of director at the Covasna County library, in the respective county 74 percent of the population being Hungarian.

4 It is obvious, however, that since the mutual learning of each other's' language is not compulsory this also remains a limited disjunction.

Democracy Deficit in the Debate on Linguistic Justice

The latter proposal, however, is firmly rejected by the state authorities and the overwhelming majority of the Romanian politicians, and it does not appear in any of the programmes of the major political party of the Hungarian community in Romania. In its last 'autonomy statute' elaborated for Szeklerland (2013), RMDSZ[5] – which alone has performed the political representation of Hungarians in Romania for almost 20 years – is promoting 'mandatory bilingualism', where the citizens of the region can choose which language they use in their official communication. There is no mention about the compulsory learning of Hungarian for the Romanians, without which even the conjunctive bilingualism remains only a one-sided wish. The idea that the Hungarian language would be the sole medium of official communication in Szeklerland was considered so unrealistic and offensive that it did not fit into the prudent and consensus-seeking political strategy of RMDSZ, and it was never introduced in a public debate.

Thus – although many Hungarians in Transylvania live in an ethnically homogeneous, geographically compact region and continuously express their dissatisfaction with their linguistic rights –, the chances of adopting a law based on a territorially coercive linguistic subdivision is equal to zero. All signs indicate that Romanian democracy is not yet mature enough to host a meaningful public debate on this topic.[6] Kymlicka and Grin wrote in 2003 that the arguments on linguistic justice in Eastern Europe are influenced mostly by irreconcilable values and ideologies, often times powered by nationalism (Kymlicka–Grin 2003)[7]. They are not thought through in economic terms and are not confined to technical aspects;[8] they are intrinsically political in nature and remain normative. Under the pressure for fulfilling the conditions for EU accession, the legal environment

5 In English: Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania.

6 A good indicator of how difficult it is to initiate a meaningful political debate on this issue is that in February 2015 a draft bill was submitted to the parliament that would have banned all kinds of civic or political initiatives – including discussion forums, demonstrations – organized around the topic of territorial autonomy. The initiative did not pass the parliament.

7 The most frequent counter-argument against the autonomy aspirations of the Hungarians – beyond the reference to the 1st article of the Romanian Constitution that 'Romania is a sovereign, independent, unitary, and indivisible Nation-State' – is the allusion to the 'right of the soil', which, according to Van Parijs is '(pre)historical speculation on who was first to tread on a particular bit of soil, on who can claim the territory as their ancestral land'. For a functional territorial regime – which 'is able to do what it needs to do for the sake of parity of esteem' – he proposes 'to give a privilege to the 'sons of the soil', in the precise sense of those residing in the territory concerned at the time the regime is put into place' (Van Parijs 2011, 138). According to the definition, in the case of Szeklerland, the 'sons of the soil' would be the resident Hungarians.

8 One of the most obvious economic arguments against the present regime would be that Hungarian education for the Romanians in Szeklerland would be less costly than the teaching of Romanian for the Hungarians who are in the majority in this region. This option, however, due to the cited arguments, is not realistic at all.

has considerably improved – for example, the law on the use of languages in public administration entered into force; the mainstream narratives of the majority related to linguistic justice, however, remained almost unchanged.[9]

The Consequences of Asymmetric Bilingualism

A fairly superficial, poorly elaborated, and not properly enforced regulation contributes to the subsistence of an asymmetrical bilingualism in Transylvania, where minorities are those who always have to do the linguistic 'bowing', jeopardizing the chances to secure a parity of esteem in interethnic relations. Such a regulation can at most slow down the linguistic assimilation of minorities, but it is hardly going to stop it. Under these conditions, along with probability-driven learning, maxi-min dynamics, Laponce's law, interlinguism etc., it is a highly probable prognosis that the number of Hungarian speakers in Transylvania will continue to decrease.

Besides the long-term consequences, however, the inequalities articulated along Van Parijs' dimensions of justice and originating in language disadvantages are clearly palpable even today. There is no room for their detailed discussion here, so we will highlight only one empirically well-documented example.

Surveys carried out among Transylvanian Hungarians show that – all other things being equal – those with a higher proficiency in Romanian have higher salaries. Income inequalities stemming from differences in the knowledge of Romanian could be legitimate if language learning solely depended on individual ambitions and efforts: it would be a fair expectation that a better knowledge of Romanian gained with a greater effort, as a human capital investment, would produce higher returns. But the circumstances of linguistic exposure are quite different, and they vary considerably from region to region: In Szeklerland, where the Hungarians are in majority, the exposure is low, the immersion method does not work, the teaching of Romanian is highly inefficient because it has to follow a programme created for native speakers, which is imposed by the ministry of education and in which they use outdated didactic methods relying almost exclusively on textbooks. It is true that the teaching of Romanian is funded by public sources (and thus every language group contributes to it in proportion to their presence), but there are no resources assigned and programmes created, however, to compensate this type of drawback. This creates an involuntary disadvantage for those Hungarians who are living with their

9 The stance of the Romanian public opinion towards minority language rights is well expressed by the fact that only 18.2 percent of the Romanian population agreed that the Hungarians should have the right to use their native language in their communication with local authorities (Kiss 2015, 43).

co-ethnics in homogeneous communities. Although empirically not tested yet, following this logic of argument, it is highly probable that part of the earning inequalities between the Romanians and Hungarians is explained by the differing competencies in Romanian.

So, the present linguistic arrangement in Transylvania has many shortcomings and it is a constant latent source of tension in the region; it not only creates inequalities but also challenges (interethnic) social solidarity and it is not beneficial for the aggregate welfare of the society either. Van Parijs's book proposes as a solution the enforcement of a territorially coercive regime and the use of a single official language spoken by the great majority of the locals (in Szeklerland that would be Hungarian). He does not raise, however, a very important question: what happens when the linguistic inequality is present, but the territorially coercive principle – as the only viable proposal to eliminate the equity problem – simply cannot be introduced and enforced because of a democracy deficit? Does the territorially coercive linguistic subdivision principle have a viable and feasible alternative, which, on the one hand, meets the criterion of fairness (would solve the equity problem) and, on the other, would it be acceptable for the speakers of the 'stronger language', the majority Romanians?

Possibilities of the Use of English as a Lingua Franca in an Interethnic Environment

Van Parijs' book 1) contains detailed arguments about the need for the introduction of English as a global lingua franca as a tool to achieve greater global distributive justice, 2) for the illustration of language policy solutions in response to linguistic injustice, it brings up examples that straighten out the asymmetry between minority and majority languages in a nation-state context (Quebec, Switzerland, Catalonia, etc.). The book – although it follows from the logic of arguments – does not make connection between these two topics: it does not come up with the possibility that English could function as a lingua franca in interethnic communication within the same country.[10] If English is recommended anyway for a greater global distributive justice, why could it not be the official language of communication between different nationalities within the same country? A positive latent effect or by-product of the externality of English as a lingua franca is that it would solve most of the equity problems encountered in language use between different nationalities.

Furthermore, there are also compelling arguments that in linguistically heterogeneous societies the use of a third language as a lingua franca – in

10 He is reflecting briefly on the question, but only in the case of immigrant minorities.

addition, and corollary to ensuring fairness – contributes to an increase in trust and altruism among the communities, and to the general growth of social capital (Liu 2015). And where there is trust, the transaction costs are lower, which, in turn, will increase the competitiveness of the local economy. Similarly: since with the use of a lingua franca the linguistic barriers to conduct global business would be reduced, transactions would become more efficient. This is an important and relevant aspect of the situation in Transylvania as well, where interethnic distrust is high, and an ethnicity-based segmentation of the markets is also palpable (Csata–Deák 2010).

So, the use of English as a lingua franca as a power-neutralizing language regime could get important economic functions at two levels: it could increase the volume and the effectiveness of the transactions between different language groups and enhance a more equitable global integration of the national economy, reducing its distance from the 'ground-floor' countries. Obviously, the aggregate welfare benefits of the use of English as a lingua franca are hypothetical and difficult to estimate, their discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.

Beyond the equity and welfare aspects, the idea has several procedural advantages, too. First, along the detailed arguments presented in the book, it is more plausible that the majority decision-makers will start to discuss this possibility and make proposals for its broader social dissemination and programmatic elaboration. In the case of territorially coercive linguistic subdivision – as we mentioned earlier –, there is practically no chance for this. Although we do not have any survey data to confirm this, broader public support for the introduction of English as a lingua franca would be probably higher.

Second, in terms of minority language protection principles, it would solve the seemingly intractable problem of applying the territoriality or the personality (categorical) principle in regulation. The problem with the existing hybrid solutions (e.g. the threshold rule) and proposals (e.g. the autonomy statute of RMDSZ)[11] is not only that they are inconclusive/incomplete, and thus their introduction in legislation and their enforcement would encounter a lot of difficulties, but also that they lead to suboptimal results concerning the protection of minority rights.

In those municipalities and counties where the proportion of the minorities does not reach 20 percent, the protection of languages is, at best, limited to educational and cultural institutions.[12] Where the proportion of the minorities is higher, the situation is somewhat more favourable, but the arguments of the book are quite convincing that within the framework of asymmetric bilingualism due to the absence of a territorially coercive regime the 'weaker', lower status

11 RMDSZ calls for a territorial autonomy for Szeklerland and for a personality-based cultural autonomy for the rest of the Transylvanian Hungarians.

12 In the political terminology of RMDSZ, this is called 'cultural autonomy'.

language will be used by fewer and fewer people, and sooner or later they are prone to disappear. The introduction of the official use of English, as a third language, however, would eliminate the asymmetry of the linguistic rights based on the personality principle, while the threat of majority language dominance would ensure parity of esteem in everyday interactions (equal opportunity and proficiency, equality of symbolism).

Thirdly, the personality-based linguistic equity would favour those linguistic minorities as well who usually live in municipalities where their proportion is less than 20 percent (Roma, Germans, etc.).[13]

The introduction of English as an official language in Transylvania will obviously raise many further questions to be resolved. First of all, it is costly and a series of arguments warns us that it could endanger the development and survival of local and regional languages (Phillipson 2010). These global concerns are discussed in detail in Van Parijs' book, so we do not deal with them here because they affect everyone equally, regardless if they belong to a linguistic minority or majority in a specific country. We must agree with Van Parijs, however, that if there is a need for a lingua franca to get closer to a global distributive justice, English is the most accessible and efficient solution. We see that the use of English in everyday interactions is a rapidly spreading practice in Transylvania as well, especially at multinational companies and in intellectual professions. The fact that more and more people are getting familiar with the everyday use of English can further accelerate this process and it can show up in other areas as well.

English as an Official Language

Concerning the specific aspects of ELF related to linguistic minorities, we argue that the introduction of English as a lingua franca could eliminate the inequalities caused by asymmetric bilingualism only if it could entirely replace the official languages currently in use or if it received a fully equivalent status at least in those regions where a considerable number of people belong to linguistic minorities. In the case of Transylvania, this would mean that instead of Romanian minorities could use English in public administration, healthcare, court proceedings, etc. and the knowledge of Romanian would not be necessary to succeed.

The introduction of English as a lingua franca – along with Romanian as another compulsory official language in the country – does not necessarily solve the unequal opportunity problem mentioned above. For example, if, in addition to English, the Hungarian children would have to continue to learn Romanian as

13 Because of the limitations of this paper, we did not deal with the other linguistic minorities in Transylvania (Roma, Germans, etc.), but most of the problems relevant for the Hungarian minority apply to them as well.

well in order to succeed in life, the asymmetrical relation will persist since the Hungarian children will still need to learn one more language compared with the Romanians. Even if we assume that after learning a second language it is easier to learn a third one, the aggregate efforts of Hungarians to get along with interethnic communication will be higher than those of the Romanians. In other words: if the Hungarian and Romanian children spend the same amount of time learning other languages as their mother tongue, Romanian children will probably speak English better because in the case of Hungarians part of this time should be spent learning Romanian. This is an alternative cost which should be borne only by Hungarian pupils.

Studies on foreign language skills among the youth in Romania support this hypothesis: Hungarian-Romanian bilingual high-school students underperform in English tests compared with monolingual Romanians (Iatcu 2005, Molnár 2008). In relation to this, however, a number of alternative explanations must be taken into account. One of them is that it is easier for a Romanian pupil to learn English because Romanian closely resembles English. But both studies revealed that Romanian children even knew significantly more English words that do not resemble their Romanian equivalents (non-cognate words). A further alternative explanation is that in Romanian schools/classes the quality of foreign language education could be higher. Finally, slight differences could exist in the exposure to English.[14] These latter two hypotheses, therefore, need to be verified. Nevertheless, in all of these assumptions, the initial one appears to be the strongest, that is the English language skills of Hungarian students are poorer than those of Romanians because they have to learn two foreign languages instead of one and they spend time learning Romanian at the expense of English. Their disadvantage could only be partially compensated by the fact that due to the early compulsory learning of Romanian their meta-linguistic competencies could be more developed, thanks to which it might be easier to learn a third language (in this case, English).

Further analysis shows that this disadvantage is not evened out after studies either. According to the Mozaik 2001 survey data, among those Hungarian youngsters who live in central and western Transylvania and who have started to work, only 21.8 percent declared that they spoke English compared with 26.1 percent registered among the Transylvanian Romanians. Among the Hungarians in Eastern Transylvania – Szeklerland –, this ratio was even lower, only 7 percent.

14 For the exposure, we should consider the important example given by Van Parijs in the book (2011). He argues that it is much easier to learn English if, instead of dubbing, films were featured in their original language and were subtitled in the language of the country/region. In Romania, subtitles are generally used, while in Hungary dubbing is the common practice, and for a Hungarian native speaker in Romania it is obviously more comfortable to choose Hungarian dubbing instead of the original sound track and Romanian subtitles, which are both more difficult to understand.

According to the 2009 Ethnobarometer survey on an adult sample, 36 percent of the Romanians and only 22 percent of the Hungarians considered that their English was good enough to participate in a conversation.[15] As a conclusion, we can state that as long as the Romanian language will continue to be a compulsory subject to learn for the minorities the introduction of English as a lingua franca would probably not solve the equity problem caused by the asymmetrical bilingualism since it seems that the Hungarians accumulate a further disadvantage compared with the Romanians regarding their foreign language skills. The situation would radically change, however, if Romanian would be permitted and promoted to be completely replaced by English in interethnic communication. This option – although it might sound absurd in this part of the world – is already in practice in some countries and brings us closer to linguistic equality.[16]

Conclusions

Using Van Parijs' conceptual toolkit, we have carried out a brief evaluation of the regulatory environment of language use in Transylvania, Romania. We identified it as a coercive hybrid regulation containing elements stemming from both the categorical regime (personality principle) and territoriality. In Romania, the enforcement of the regulations concerning linguistic rights is weak and inconsistent. In municipalities or counties where the official use of minority languages is permitted, it is typically present in a conjunctive manner. The principle of territorially coercive linguistic subdivision – proposed by Van Parijs as an optimal solution for linguistic justice – is not accommodated in any of the fields of official communication and it has no further plausibility under present political circumstances.

A hypothetical alternative for the territorially coercive regime would be the introduction of English as a lingua franca in interethnic communication. This possibility has two obvious advantages: according to Van Parijs, this would bring the whole society closer to a global distributive equality, but on a local level it would eliminate the unhealthy asymmetry between the 'stronger' majority and 'weaker' minority languages and the inequalities stemming from that. We argued that this latter option would be fair only if English could entirely replace the official languages currently in use or if it received a fully equivalent status at least in those regions where linguistic minorities comprise a considerable number of people.

15 The estimated level of proficiency was higher among Romanians in all other foreign languages as well. The only exception was German, where the differences were not significant (10 percent of the population declared that they could make themselves understood in German).

16 Related to this solution, the positive example of Singapore is cited frequently, where the Chinese, Malay, and Indian populations communicate with each other in English. For details, see: Liu 2015.

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DE GRUYTER OPEN

Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, **9** (2016) 95–108

DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2016-0013

Phenomena of Linguistic Interference in Old Hungarian Texts

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Abstract. The analysis of interference is a popular topic in sociolinguistics, and the researchers addressing it investigate the phenomena of interference with a special regard to mother tongue texts of speakers living in a linguistic minority. In order to analyse the phenomenon, one needs to be clear about the identity of the author of the particular text, in addition to the linguistic environment, the circumstances in which the phenomenon appears, etc., and this is particularly difficult in the case of historical texts. The most frequent interference phenomenon in Old Hungarian texts is the occurrence of Latin elements in the utterances of Hungarian mother tongue speakers; nevertheless, we can find other linguistic interferences as within the regions inhabited by Hungarians the speakers came in contact with and learned the language(s) of several communities with other mother tongues. In this study, I analyse Romanian words and phrases that appear in the texts of Hungarian-language testimonies given by Romanians living in Transylvania; these linguistic elements cannot be classified as regional borrowings in the Hungarian lexicon, and if they can, they were used by the Hungarian speakers for a very short period of time. Thus, my paper analyses phenomena of interference that are connected to mother tongue elements appearing in a foreign language text.

Keywords: historical sociolinguistics, interference, Hungarian language, Romanian language

1. Introduction

Whether there is need for the renewal of the history of the Hungarian language has been a recurrent question of the past few decades. If there is need for that, why and in what direction? If there is not, are there any tasks, topics that need to be investigated? The majority of scholars answered the first question with a yes as research in the history of the Hungarian language seemed to be stagnating. Although the study of the language system involves the analysis of the lexicon, of meaning, of phraseology, this cannot be achieved with systematic knowledge alone; their changes are not triggered by the changes within certain sub-systems or their interactions: they are influenced by wider, socio-pragmatic or cognitive, psychological, human factors. That is why in the last third of the 20th century more and more researchers turned to the various materials found in archives: the materials stored in private and state archives were published, including the texts of witch trials, and these generated an interest not only among historians, litterateurs, and ethnographers but among linguists as well. Approaching historical texts from the perspective of language use threw new light upon the language system, the processes of change within it, and, of course – probably most importantly –, research was completed with the human factor. Thus, language description from the historical point of view does not lack the speaker and the listener anymore, two major actors and doers of communication. The representatives of the new trend known as dimensional linguistics not only take temporality into account, but – as seen in the research on the geography of language – they have also started to analyse spatial changes and variations; this is complemented with the juxtaposition of the spoken and written language, the human dimension. We now have the possibility to take sociolinguistic and pragmatic aspects into account as well.

The analysis of interference is a popular topic in sociolinguistics, and the researchers addressing it investigate the phenomena of interference with a special regard to mother tongue texts of speakers living in a linguistic minority. In order to analyse the phenomenon, one needs to be clear about the identity of the author of the particular text, in addition to the linguistic environment, the circumstances in which the phenomenon appears, etc., and this is particularly difficult in the case of historical texts. Moreover, interference and code-switching are phenomena very close to each other, both possibly leading to loans in time although the terms borrowing and loanword are used differently according to the different authors' interpretations.[1] I myself accept Lanstyák's (2006) definition, based on which the borrowings include the concepts of loanwords and foreign words previously used in linguistics. The analysis of borrowings is not the aim of this paper, I only refer to it tangentially. Regarding the difference between interference and code-switching, I accept Bartha's (1999) position, according to which code-switching is the manifestation of interference, and that is why I speak of interference and not code-switching in the texts analysed below. Interference is mostly found in the texts of bi- or plurilingual speakers, as a person speaking several languages can use the elements of two or more languages in one utterance. Thus, interference can function as an umbrella term for all linguistic phenomena that result from the fact that the bilingual speaker uses more than one language in everyday interaction (Bartha 1999: 118).

1 Cf. Kiss 1995, Kiss–Pusztai 2003, and Péntek–Benő 2003.

The most frequent interference phenomenon in Old Hungarian texts is the occurrence of Latin elements in the utterances of Hungarian mother tongue speakers; we can also find other linguistic interferences as within the regions inhabited by Hungarians the speakers came in contact with and learned the language(s) of several communities with other mother tongues, and as a result they could use foreign linguistic elements in their mother tongue texts without loaning these elements afterwards. However, during the editing process of the *Erdélyi magyar szótörténeti tár* (Transylvanian Hungarian Historical Thesaurus – henceforth SzT.), I noticed a phenomenon that is different from 'more usual' phenomena that are analysed. It is a general trend in sociolinguistic research for foreign elements in mother tongue texts to be the subject of investigation. What sparked my interest was not the high number of mother tongue words used in mother tongue texts: in the Hungarian-language testimonies made by Romanians living in Transylvania, there is a substantial number of Romanian words, phrases which cannot be classified as regional borrowings in the Hungarian lexicon, and, if they can, they were used by the Hungarian speakers for a very short period of time. Thus, my paper analyses phenomena of interference that are connected to mother tongue elements appearing in a foreign language text. At the same time – when related to my topic –, I discuss Romanian elements found in the texts of Hungarian mother tongue speakers as well.

2. Emerging Issues and the Corpus

The analysis is performed on texts produced in 16–19th-century Transylvania or in Romanian principalities, texts that constitute the material of the SzT. The texts are either testimonies or letters the authors of which are positively Romanian mother tongue speakers. The most important criterion is thus the fact that we know the identity of the author for certain. Moreover, the location where these texts were taken down is also not indifferent. On this basis, we can most likely assume the ethnicity and mother tongue of the scribe even if we have no other way of knowing it. In the majority of the cases, we have information about the ones testifying, as the scribes had to make accurate notes regarding that. The scriveners of the reports and accounts of censuses, urbaria, and granges are known to mostly having Hungarian as a native language except for those regions where Romanian or Saxon mother tongue speakers were hired to perform such tasks. The regions where the scriveners are most likely Romanian speakers are: Alsó-Fehér County, the southern part of Hunyad County, the Hátszeg and Fogaras Regions, as well as the eastern part of Banat (cf. Lukács s.a., Lukács 2004, Nagy 2012). Because of the absence of accurate data, I only included texts in my analysis in the case of which the confessor or the scrivener is a Romanian native speaker without a doubt. In this period, the correspondence of Moldavian and Wallachian voivodes, statesmen was usually aided by Transylvanian Hungarian scribes (Jakó 2012); thus, most of such texts cannot be included in the study. Although this implies speakers of at least two languages, Hungarian and Romanian, their mother tongue was most probably Hungarian. Only the letters written by Romanian mother tongue scribes can be included in this analysis.

The temporal and geographical distribution of these data is interesting. Most of them date back to the 18th century, although we find texts with interference phenomena from the 16–17th and the 19th century as well.[2] Their geographical distribution is the following: 59 of the 275 data was taken down in Hunyad County, 40 in Szolnok-Doboka County, 31 in Kolozs County, 31 around Fogaras, 26 in Alsó-Fehér County, 23 in Torda-Aranyos County, and 20 in Maros-Torda County.[3]

As mentioned above, I do not analyse words, phrases that were or are part of the Hungarian language as regional borrowings. There are some exceptions, however: cases in which – although adapted to Hungarian phonotactic rules in the speech of Hungarians, or having been used by Hungarian speakers – the phonetic variety in the text is identical to the Romanian dialectal or standard variant, and its author is without a doubt a Romanian native speaker. Such examples are *kláka*, *szkutár*, or *manasztira*, which as borrowings are used in the variant forms *kaláka* ('work party, work bee'), *eszkotár ~ iszkotár ~ oszkotár* ('shepherd'), *monasztéria ~ monosztéria ~ monosztíria* ('Orthodox monastery'), but the Romanian speakers use their native language variety. E.g.: 1633: Minketys hivot *Clakaban* Pentek es egieb Innep napokon [A.venice F; Szád. Lupul Myhaczy (80) vall.]; 1752: midŏn bujdosoban volt Avrám, ŏszve beszéltem volt az Feleségével hogj *klákát* csinállyunk [Abrudfva/Abrudbánya AF; Ks Barna Marjucza Bráskovics felesége (33) vall.]; 1806: mennyit nem dolgoztanak még *Klákába* azért Sípos Vaszilikának [O.bölkény MT; Born. G. XIII. 5 Nobilis Popa Trutza Alexandru (58) parochus gr. ritus unitorum vall.]; 1729: mondá még Kálnoki Farkas Ur Prov. Joh. *Szkutárja* valék [Apáca Br; BrÁLt IV. 15 Prov. Joh. oláh judex poss. Apátza vall.];[4] 1742: kezdé Dán Furdsat szidni káramolni, mondván baszam lelkedet, keresztedet, Evangeliamodott és *Manasztiradat* [Bulzest H; Ks 111 vegyes ir.].[5]

I found one interesting instance when the Romanian confessor uses the Hungarian equivalent of a word, while the utrum contains the Romanian word:

2 The temporal distribution can be explained by historical facts that exceed the scope of this paper (cf. Nagy 2012, Lukács 2004, Lukács s.a., Prodan 1970).

3 The remaining data are divided between 10 counties, and their number is very small compared to the above.

4 Nevertheless, we have examples for the opposite, meaning that the Romanian speaker uses the form with the epenthesized vowel in the consonant cluster. 1757: és Iffiu koromba is *Eszkotára* vóltam Lázár Ferenc úrnak [Gyszm; DE 3 Demetrius Vad (74) jb vall.].

5 Although we do not know the identity of the person confessing here, based mainly on the phonetic variety as well as on the settlement, it is not impossible to state that the author of the text is Romanian.

1708: (Az) Udvarházhelyen igazé hogy Pro nume egy nyomorult *Hruba* vagyon [Kissármás K; Rlt O. 4 vk. A hét román jobbágy vall-ban *házotskák-ról* emlékeznek meg]. As the interrogation contains the dialect variant of *hruba* 'earth hut' and not *huruba*, which is generally used in Hungarian texts (Cf. *hurubácska, hurubás, hurubaház, lakóhuruba, zsellérhuruba*, etc.), it is possible that the interrogator was also a Romanian native speaker.

3. Interference Phenomena

The majority of interference phenomena are one-word lexical code-switching; most of these Romanian words are used in Hungarian texts because they can be considered realia or culture-specific words. Thus, we have to deal with objects and concepts characteristic of the Romanian culture and everyday life, and as such they have no exact Hungarian equivalent; they also might be used in their foreign forms to separate them from the ones that are part of the Hungarian culture and everyday life. Most of such realia can be found among concepts related to customs, religion, certain professions, units of measurement, clothing items, foods, drinks, as well as functions. Of course, not only such phenomena, concepts, and actions can be included here: we find mother tongue words in foreign language texts from all walks of life.

3.1. Lexical, Single-Word Interference

3.1.1. In the field of occupations, we find the following words: *bárdás* 'carpenter, carver' (1793, 1805),[6] *dászkel ~ dászkál* 'cantor (teacher)' (1747, 1792), *szkutár* (*eszkotár ~ iszkotár ~ oszkotár*) 'stock-keeping shepherd', 'stock-keeping herdsman' and 'grange-keeper' (between 1632 and 1757); *gornyik* 'forester', 'border watch' (between 1726 and 1825); *hajtás* 'ranger' (between 1805 and 1812); *jungár* 'boy helping miners' (1806); *mósa* 'midwife' (1724, 1831); *munator* 'herd attendant' (1766)', *pakurár* 'shepherd' (1687, 1744, 1757); *piszár* 'scrivener' (1656); *pitár* 'baker' (1656); *plájás* 'border guard' (1650); *podar* 'ferryman' (1746, 1760, 1808); *porkár* 'swine-herd' (1715); *vákár* 'cowherd'; *vocsinik* 'apprentice' (1778); *zsitár* 'border watch' (1756, 1773).

Most of these refer to occupations mostly performed by Romanian mother tongue people, such as *gornyik, szkutár, munator, pakurár, plájás, porkár,* and *vákár*. I have previously presented the phonetic varieties *szkutár* can take in the speech of Hungarian and Romanian mother tongue speakers, respectively. We also consider *pakulár* to be a regional borrowing, but we have three instances where the transcribed variant refers to an interference phenomenon (*pakurár* cf.

6 The dates in brackets refer to the year of the taking down of the text.

Rom. *păcurar*): 1687: monda Komsa Mark a' *pakurarnak* [Huréz F; Szád. Kriszta Czigany (40) jb vall.]; 1744: en ő nekiek *Pakurárjak* voltam [M.pete K; SLt AY. 7 Molduvánj Jeftimie (55) zs vall.]; 1757: vóltam *Pakurárja* Lázár Ferencz Úrnak [Szárhegy CS; DE 3 Simon Czepelŭs (60) jb vall.].

The words *dászkel ~ dászkál, mósa, piszár, podár*, etc. appear as such in the texts as they refer to Romanian individuals. For example, the term *dászkél* was only applied to Romanian cantor teachers, and as such they refer to Romanians in texts of testimonies, too: 1792: (Popovits Péter) el mént a Bánatusba *Deszkélnek* ('Popovits Péter left for the Banat to become a *deszkél*') [F.lapugy H; Ks XLVIII/7g özv. Popovits Györgyné gr. kel. papné vall.].

The following text contains both the terms *bába* and *mósa* ('midwife'), the Romanian word denoting the ethnicity of the person, while the Hungarian word referring to the occupation: 1831: *Mosája* a Feleségemnek tanult *Bába Asszony* Isztrátyi Demeterné volt [Dés; DLt 332. 11].

3.1.2. Among the functions we find the following words: *dzsugya ~ dzsugye* 'village judge', 'court judge' (between 1681 and 1794); *jegumen* 'superior general' (1757), *kaluger ~ kalugyer* 'Orthodox monk' (1714, 1757); *krisznyik* 'sacristan' (1784), *parintye ~ perintye* 'name of Romanian priest' (1765), *szindia* 'village judge' (1633), *vladika* 'Greek Orthodox bishop' (1714). All of these names are used in the parlance of the Orthodox or Greek Orthodox Church, and they also refer to the fact that the particular functions are held by Romanian individuals. This last category contains the term *dzsugya ~ dzsugye* 'village judge' as well, data for which were found in Hunyad County and Beszterce-Naszód County.

3.1.3. There is one term in the category of units of measurement: *patrarica* 'quarter of a bushel'. However, the text of the testimony includes not only this one Romanian word, but also *tébujéc* meaning 'small sack': 1836: bé jŏvetelekkel egy *Tébujétzban* egy vékánnyit hoztak bé Gabonával ... az édgyik Cseléd ... azt a *Tébujétzot* a Szekérhez ki vitte, és Tŏrŏkbuzát hozott osztán bé, pálinkáért mint egy *Patraritzát* fizettek [Kendilóna SzD; RLt Zsimán Silipp (52) vall.]. Note that the Romanian professor uses a back-vowel suffix with the word *tébujéc.* This also demonstrates that it is an interference phenomenon, as a Hungarian native speaker would have used a front-vowel suffix.

3.1.4. The following words can be included in the group of clothing and accessories: *babó* 'woolen coat' (1797, 1798), *csercseje* 'earring' (1800),[7] *szálba* 'necklace' (1742), *szárika* '(baize)coat' (1739), *zgárda* 'necklace' (1731).

3.1.5. Among the foods and drinks, we find mainly terms related to sheep breeding: *bálmos* 'a dish made from corn flour with sheep cheese, sour cream or butter' (1652), *kaskavál* 'sheep or goat cheese' (1827), *kuretor* 'type of cheese'

7 It is to be noted that this word appears identically in the SzékK. (és fel wéwe az o^e yogyanak o^elto^ezetyth liliomyt, fo^eleybevalo éékes *čerčel'eyth*). Here, however, the drafter of the text is a Hungarian mother tongue speaker, and thus it is not related to the topic of the paper.

(1805). This group also includes *krupa* 'barley porridge' (1683, 1685), *munkatura* 'food aid' (1822), as well as *szuszla* 'first-brew pálinka' (1832).

3.1.6. The following terms, phrases can be included in the group related to customs and religious life: *ármingyin* 'maypole' (1749), *picere* 'chanting' (1819), *pomána* 'funeral reception' (1730, 1739, 1749), *preszkura* 'sacrificial bread' (1722), *prohod* 'funeral, burial' (1768), *prohodálás* 'burial' (1722), *prohodálatlan* 'without funeral rites' (1722), *szerekuszta* '40-day-long prayer for a deceased/ill person' (1765), *ruga* 'prayer' (1765), *jertecsuna* 'pardon, saying goodbye to a dying person' (1810), *léturgyia* 'liturgy' (1811), *szluzsba* 'Orthodox mess' (1757), *szerindár* 'mess of atonement' (1768, 1804).

It is also frequent that the Romanian word is embedded into the Hungarian text with Hungarian suffixes. This is especially interesting when they use képző-type (derivational) suffixes and not jel-type or rag-type suffixes (inflectional suffixes) of utmost importance to Hungarian syntax, as the latter are crucial syntactic elements and as such cannot be missing from a Hungarian text. This can be found in two testimonies from the same settlement in Szolnok-Doboka: 1722: Egj leánykám meghalván; a *p(ro)hodálására* hitta(m) az Berlai (!) Papot [Kecsed SzD; TL. Podár Juvon (42) prov. vall.] | egy Gyermekemet *p(ro)hodalatlan* Temettem el oda ne(m) hihattam[a] [Kecsed SzD; TL. Hrubán Gavrilla (38) prov. vall. – [a]A papot]. Meanwhile, later texts from Hunyad County contain forms similar to the Romanian standard variety (Cf. *provod*, dial. *prohod*): 1768: halálakor hagyta hogy az Evangeliumat olvassam, méllyért negyforintot defálcalt, és aztis hagyván hogy *Provodotis* szolgállyak ritusunk szerént [Vályebrád H; Ks 81. 57/17 Popa Gyorgy gör. kel. pap vall.].

The rites described in the appendices are described by phrases that confirm the fact that the individuals confessing are Romanian native speakers, as the verb *tesz* 'to do' / 'to make' is a loan translation of Romanian phrases. Pl. *rugát tesz* 'to pray' (1765: belém áll az nyavallya, elég rugát tésznek a Papok ... de tsak nyavallyában vagyok [Marosbogát TA; Mk V/97 Rusz Gavrilláné Popa Anucza (72) zs vall.]); *szluzsbát csinál/tesz* 'to celebrate a mass', as well as 'to bless' (1722: *Slusbat* ... Pap Péter ur(am) ne(m) *tőtt* I(ste)nni szolgálatott reá, hanem ugj hoztuk ki az Templombúl Penyiszessen [Kecsed SzD; TL. Makra Szavúl (50) prov. vall.]; 1757: az én Apám Popa lévén magátis a megnevezett Szakare Szimion eltemetvén minden költség nélkűl, a mint a mi rendűnken szoktak *Szlusbákat csinált* az Apám utánna [F.borgó BN; BK. Popa alias Flemind Andréás (55) jb vall.]); *szerekusztát csinál* 'prays for 40 days for an ill/deceased person' (1765: azt fogta volt réám, hogy Nyágujnak *Szerekusztát tsinyáltam* [Marosbogát TA; Mk V/V. 97 Popa Lup (30) pastor eccl. vall.]).

The verb *szolgáltat* 'to serve, to provide, to supply' also appears; however, it is part of the testimony of the same priest, quoted above as example for the word *provod* (Cf. with another testimony: 1768: 12, forintért egy *szerindárt szolgáltam* [Vályebrád H; Ks 81. 57. 17 Popa György gör. kel. pap vall.].)

3.1.7. In the case of words referring to origin, we have only one example for interference: *muntyán* 'from the mountains' (1700): 1700: Az utrumban Specificalt Személlyeknek az Attyokat hitták Opris Peter(ne)k; és nem Csonokosi örökös jobbágj vólt, hanem *Havasoly földi Muntyán* volt és onnan származat ki [H; Szer. Dumitru Sandon (50) jb vall.].

3.1.8. Words denoting different human and kinship relations are very frequent in the texts of Romanian testifiers. This group includes the following: *dusmán* 'enemy' (1656), *fertát* 'fellow, companion' (1728, 1752) *frátye* 'companion, buddy' (1756, 1759), *mujere* 'woman', 'wife' (1762), *sinuj* 'buddy' (1806), *szamunca* ~ *szemunca* 'offspring, relatives' (1715, 1718, 1743, 1753), *unty* 'uncle' (1740, 1765), *matusa* 'aunt' (1740, 1764), *nyepót* 'nephew' (1756), *nanás* 'godfather', 'best man' (1777, 1800, 1804), *kumnát* (dial. *komnát*) 'brother-in-law' (1725), *kuszkru* 'in-law' (1769).

There is only one example in texts of letters (1656: Irja Stefán vajda ő nagysága az *dusmánya* dolgát istenre hagyja [RákDiplÖ 443 Balogh Máté erdélyi kapikiha Konstantinápolyból a fej-hez]).

All other instances are found in texts of testimonies, and they always refer to a Romanian person. Pl. 1715: Tudok más darab kaszállót is ... Popa Pétru ... vetette zálogban közel száz forintba Sinár Pétrunak, kinek a Felesége ugjancsak abbol a *szemuncabol* valo [Ponor TA; WH. Czir Nikula (66) vall.]; 1725: Barna Birtolomély ... most Besztercze székben egy Sude Paskuly nevű *Comnattyoknál* commorál [Körtvélyes SzD; BK. Buta Birtolomej (78) vall.]; 1740: Engemet kűldőtt Demeterpatakára a Koszta Sztephán Felesége egy Jovanitza nevű *matusájához* [Herepe AF; BK. Herepei lev. Honesta Feomina Flora aluj Ruszán Kopatzin (35) vall.]; 1806: Pap Demeter el ment a Varázsló Asszonyhoz Babtzára, és magával el vitte az Exponenst is mind *Sinujját* [A.várca Sz; IB 130/1 Papp Urszully (24) ns vall.].

3.1.9. Almost all terms from wildlife, names of animals and plants are included in the Transylvanian Hungarian language variety. The majority of such terms are related to sheep and goat husbandry; they are regional borrowings from the Romanian population because the Hungarian community did not use different names for 1–2-year-old, young animals or to designate the utility or species of such animals: Hungarian speakers usually use adjectives for this purpose.[8] Thereby, it is actually possible to consider this borrowing: in the texts of Romanian speakers, we seldom find instances where there are phonetic or any other differences from the forms used in Hungarian. Perhaps the only word that can be included in our analysis is *turma* meaning 'flock', which is mostly used

8 Cf. the words *kirlán* 'one-year-old lamb'; *mióra* 'young lamb (until the age of 3)', as well as 'one-year-old goat'; *plekatura* 'dairy sheep'; *szterp* 'barren sheep', etc.

in testimonies of Romanian native speakers. Pl. 1763: Tudom azt hogy Mányika Iuonnak volt Circiter tiz vagy tőbbetske Juha aprostol edgyűtt, a' melyeket az Uraság Juhaítol kűlőn jártotat, ezek mind a' Marsinának *Turmájábol* valok voltak [Záh TA; Mk VII/1. 16 Sarmasán Gabrilla jb vall.]; 1829: ifiab koromban pakulár voltam kőzel jártunk azonn a vidéken egymáshoz a' Ditraiak *Turmájával* de ők soha ezenn Hellyre ... a *Turmajokkal* által nem jőttenek [Toplica MT; Born. XVc. 6 Voda Vaszilia (77) vall.].

Similarly, we find few instances of interference in the variants of plant names. This group includes *faszuly* 'beans' (cf. the Transylvanian varieties *fuszulyka*, *paszuly* 'beans'; as the appendix is fairly late, the person testifying is a Romanian native speaker, as by this time the variant *fuszulyka, paszuly* are generally used in the Hungarian language across Transylvania: e.g. így engedte el a' Kender munkát ... Kendermagot, *faszulyt* s egyebeket is [Zsibó Sz; WLt Florica Fátzán (25) vall.].

3.1.10. In the case of names of illnesses, only the word *csoma ~ csuma* 'plague, pestilence' can be included in our analysis, although it was widespread among Hungarian speakers in the 18th and 19th centuries. Nevertheless, Hungarian testifiers mostly used the variant with *o* (we have no instances – not even from earlier centuries – that have the *u* phoneme – cf. Rom. *ciumă*). Therefore, and also because the Romanian testifier quotes a Romanian native speaker, I can confirm that the 1744 data represent in fact an interference phenomenon. Nehai Gruz Todor Meg hagyatott özvegye Óltyán Ráda Maros szekben Uraljban lakó (58) ... Fassa est sic Tuda bizanyasan mondani, Mível Nehai Grúz Todornak én voltam Másadik Felesege ... Kormas Maríát az előttem Valo Felesegetís ígen jól ísmertem ítten Maras szekben Uraljban holt vala meg *Csumában* [SLt A et Y Nro. 7].

3.1.11. Among the names of utensils, tools, and weapons we find the following words: *csafling* 'iron wedge with ring and chain' (1803), *rugyica* 'small rod, pole' (1796), *cepusa* 'stanchion' (1796), *donyica* 'wooden churn' (1752), *fustély* 'pole' (1585), *galáta ~ galyáta* 'wooden pail (1808), *hirgó* 'cooking pot' (1762),[9] *kompona* 'hooked scale' (1769), *macsuka* 'club' (1767), *rezsnyice ~ rozsnyica* 'quern, grinder' (1796). Let us see an example where two of the above words can be found: 1796: Tkts Csernátoni Ur(am) Czigánnyai ... belénk akadtanak *Czepusával*, Vas Villával, és *rúgyitzával* űtettenek, vertenek [Mocs K; Eszt-Mk Nyikita Nyikuláj (25) béres vall.].

3.1.12. Among the names of buildings, besides the abovementioned *hurba ~ huruba, monasztéria*, only *kilia* 'little hut, hovel' can be considered a phenomenon of interference. (1726: lattamiis (!) Hogj opra popa kallugyer Fellessege Sztanka Aszszony az erdőben Levő *killiajaban* Főzőtt egetbort [A.árpás F; TL BB. X/30 Popa Szimion falu papja (28) vall.]). In other cases, besides the ethnicity of the author of the text, we have no other information that

9 *Hirgó* in fact is a Hungarian-origin word in Romanian, reborrowed and frequently used by 16-17th-century Hungarian speakers in Transylvania (cf. Tamás 1966).

would point to the existence of interference, as such words were used in the contemporary Hungarian language in Transylvania.

3.1.13. We can find, however, an abundance of examples regarding names of parts of settlements and geographical names: *brányista* 'mower' (1757), *delnice* 'small strip of land' (1717), *fundatura* 'hollow' (1743/1744), *ferdela* 'ancient (boyar) land' (1680/19. sz. eleje), *jáz* 'ditch' (1757/1758), *kuratura* 'cutting' (1784), *lunka* '(water) meadow' (1715, 1815), *mátka* 'riverbed' (1746, 1843), *mosia* 'estate' (between 1665 and 1780), *paró* 'riffle' (1777), *pláj* 'mountain path, border trail' (1803), *pojána* 'glade' (1714, 1728, 1803), *pojenica* 'small glade' (1782), *rozor* 'furrow' (1763), *szeketura* 'barren hill or mountainside' (1804), *zmnyida* 'thicket, greenwood' (1803).

The word *brázda* 'furrow' can also be included here, in the case of which – based on the variant and date – it is certain that at least one instance can be considered an interference phenomenon (1697: az Var megje Tiszteit ki vitŭk akor *brázdálták* fel az határt, és azan *brázdáig* mint nagj Barcsiak (!) birtak ... eő Nga gondviselője a *brázdán* belől Szántatott [Nagybarcsa H; BK sub nro 281 Serban Ignát (80) jb vall.]). This is because by that period the word of Slavic origin was already used in the forms *barázda* or *borozda* in Hungarian.

3.1.14. The rest of the words and phrases can be included in a variety of conceptual groups: *bácsokura* 'mockery, insult' (1763), *norok* 'luck' (1757), *cinemintyés* 'vengeful' (1756), *vájdemine* 'woe is me!' (1723), *porekla* 'surname', 'nickname' (1730, 1740), *dát* '(sheep) grazing service' (1700, 1701), *globa* 'fine' (1760), *sugubgyina* 'fine' (1761), *kolák* 'the sum paid by the injured part for finding a perpetrator' (1651), *ruptura* 'agreement with the landowner regarding services' (1761), *kuptor* 'baking oven' (1720), *papusa* 'bundle' (1849), *butuk* 'tree trunk, stump' (1754), *sztupatura* 'dam, padding' (1763), as well as the aforementioned *kláka* 'work bee'. Pl. 1740: A kérdésb(en) forgo Nyikitát hallottam magától hogy a' *Poreclája* Oltyán volt [Pujon SzD; WassLt Moldován Vaszil (28) zs vall.]; 1756: Tudom hogj Molduán Vonya *tzinemintyés* ember [Galac BN; WLt Rob Thodor (40) jb vall.]; 1757: Koszta tsak kiáltatta a' tolvajt hogy mennyünk az eö *norokjára* 500 forint birság alatt [Erdőalja KK; Ks 66. 45. 17g Hánk Péter (34) jb vall.]; 1763: az szomszédságb(an) lévő rétb(e) annyira nem szántottak mint ebbe(n) a Mikes részre valoba(n) az tsak *batsokura* [Széplak KK; Ks 82 hat r. tanú vall.]; 1849: 4 *papusa* Dohányt enis el vettem volt [Héjasfva NK; CsZ. Teskula Demeter (33) vall.].

In Old Hungarian spoken in Transylvania, the Romanian-origin words *kalács, kalák* 'sum paid for investigation' appears as *kolák* in a testimony given by a Romanian native speaker (cf. Rom. *colac*): 1651: az Budatelkj karos embernek *kolak* penzet 12 forintot veottek fel Kata Istua(n) es az tarsa Farkas az *kolak* szerint nem praestaltak igireteket [Lompért K; WLt Bota Tiuadar (35) jb vall.].

3.1.15. Among the analysed words, there is a significant number of verbs with Hungarian verbal suffixes, as otherwise they could not be interpreted as verbs in any Hungarian text: *dezlegál* ‘to absolve’ (1722), *fututál* ‘to curse’ (1687, 1748), *kintálódik* ‘to ululate, to whine (1761), *kommunikál* ‘to administer Holy Communion’ (1570), *kommunikáltat* ‘to administer Holy Communion’ (1780), *szokotál* ‘to consider, to think about sg’ (1831), *szokotálhat* ‘to count on sg’ (1775/1781). Pl. 1570: en azt mondom az Zent irassal, mert eok igazan nem *comunikalnak* mikeppen Christus parancsol [Lámkerék Szb; Hurm. XVI/1. 646 Tordasi Pál román püspök a beszt-i királybíróhoz]; 1687: Raduly ... egy nehanszor *fututala* az Annyat, Opra es Many Hertsegja Csititak Komsa Markat hogy ne üsse(n) hozza es ne szidgya az Annyokat [Hurez F; Szád. Salamon Stira Boer (71) vall.]; 1722: Egj leánykám meghalván; ă p(ro)hodálására hitta(m) az Berlai (!) Papot; mikor az Templomb(a) bé mentűnk, meg irt Berlai Pap hitta Pap Péter uramat, hogy *dezlegállya*, de el ne(m) jőtt, annak utanna adtam Négj máriást; de mind eddigis én hiremmel ne(m) *dezlegálta* [Kecsed SzD; TL. Podár Juvon jb vall.]; 1831: egyébre felelni nem tudok minthogy nem igen *szokotáltam* [A.csernáton Hsz; HSzjP Provid. Thodor vagy Vántsa György (24) vall.].

The most interesting part is not the presence of Romanian verbs with Hungarian verbal suffixes but the fact that there are instances of variants without preverbs: *egybefututál* ‘to scold, to rebuke’ (1774), *összefutul* ‘to scold, to rebuke’ (1714), *megkokosál* ‘to rape’ (1723), *elzohol* ‘to banish, to chase away’ (1801). Pl. 1714: *öszve futulának* benünket Ezt mondvan jertek hajcsuk ki meg az kukuruczajakbol is őket [Kisdenk H; BK sub nro 261 Fatuly Kasaska (70) jb vall.]; 1801: amig viszsza érkeztem az irt Tarsom el szalasztatta, a meg arestált őkrőket s a mellette levő személy *el-zoholta* a városi Erdőre [Koronka MT; Told. 10 Binda Vaszily (30) határpásztor vall.].

3.2. Quotations

Lexical interference also includes instances where the person testifying quotes the speech of a Romanian native speaker. These are seldom longer than one-word quotations. Pl. 1756: Petika demeter ... monda nékem mi dolog ez *Fratye* Biro, hogy most közelebb harom nap jarok a Kantzámon Rusra s mostis hurtzolyátok mellyre mondék *fratye* Demeter Semmi baja nintsen a kantzádnak [Bencenc H; BK Misc. 1143 Tót Togyer (35) judex pagi vall.]; 1761: kiáltotta Lup Togyika hogy űssétek ... őljétek meg mert vagyon még egy tehenűnk meg fizethetyűk a’ *Sugubgyináját* [Illyésfva Sz; BfR 45/9 Horvát Juon (30) zs vall.]; 1762: az éjjel bé jöve Apám ... Anyám már alutt és fel költvén aszt monda kely fel *mujere* [Gyeke K; Ks 4. VII. 12 Petka cons. inquilini Molduván Nyekita (33) vall.].

Sentence- or syntagm-long quotations can only be found in texts produced by Hungarian speakers; however, this is not the topic of the present study. One exception is *vajdemine* ‘woe is me!’ (1723: én a lovakat helyheztetém el azonb(an) hallok nagy puffogást *vajdeminét* [M.hodák MT; VGy. Prekup Ojnicza (40) jb vall.]), as this is a phrase containing three words; the testifying person, however, uses it as one word.

3.3. Explanations

In some of the texts, the Romanian words are explained by their Hungarian equivalents. In other cases, the speakers utter the Hungarian and Romanian words one after the other. Pl. 1803: egy *tisztás hellyből, Pojánábol* valami hat vagy hét Remetei Fegyveres Székelly Katona a' Juhait ... Remete felé már hajtottákis [Várhegy Cs; Born. XVc. 1 Iuon Dobrán (40) col. vall.]; 1808: a Groff Juonnak ... egy *Galyatáját, Sajtárját* ... el vetette volt [Szászerked K; LLt Szent Mihelyán Toma (33) vall.].

Frequently, they add the words *azaz* 'that is', *vagyis* 'namely', *oláh nyelven* 'in the Vlach language' or *oláhul* 'in Vlach'. 1633: az Boerok szabados Emberek, es az szegenyseg is *Szindiakys az az az Birak* [F.venicze F; Szád. Sztan Paszerey (45) vall.]; 1745: esmertem Rusz Gyurkát is ki ... *Csimponér vagy is Dudás* lévén [Halmány H; Ks 101]; 1755: az holottis most ... *Kőlőst vagyis Malájt* vetettek volt, és ennek előtte kaszálni nem lehetett ... eddig az hellyig ameddig az *Malaj vagyis Kőllős* vagyon megengedem hogy kaszálj [Oprakercisora F; TKhf 31/11 Iuon Boerás (60) jb vall.]; 1761: az oljan helly hogy mindenkor a' Dominus Terrestrisekkel *rupturájok vagyis oljas Conventiojok* lévén a' hogy megalkhattak, pénz s egyéb táxát fizettek [Sztanisa H; JHb LXVIII/2. 14 r. tanúk vall.]; 1768: az Emberek ... el vezettek engemet az régi *mosijajahoz, vagyis lako hazahoz* [Katona KK; Born. XL. 80 Kotis Todor (40) zs vall.]; 1777: éppen azon *árokig vagy is paroig* kelletik ezen földnek rugni [Gambuc AF; KP. Csora Juvon (85) jb vall.]; 1803: Ezen *Ösvenyen vagj Plajon* belöl [Gyszm; Born. XVc. 1/20 Antonius Moldván alias Csorsza (48) civis vall.] | itt az Orosztűknél az also *Vészt, vagy veszet vagy romlást, oláhul Zmnyidát*, Topplitzához ... értem biratni [Gyszm; Born. XVc. 1/16 Jacobus Petyekár alias Küs (83) vall.]; 1811: Midön az Egés volt Harang fére verés nem volt, Sem Tolvaj kiáltás, Mivel a' Papunk az Templomba lévén *Miset szolgaltatott, azaz Léturgyiát* [Cold K; JHb 5. 3/3 Stéfán Gyérán (50) col. vall.] | a' Pap éppen akkor *szolgáltatott Misét, vagy is Olá Nyelven Léturgyiát* [Cold K; JHb 5. 3/3 Ungur Toma (32) col. vall.].

There are, however, explanations originating not from the person testifying but the person making the notes.[10] These are sometimes longer and contain the description of the meaning of the Romanian word. Pl. 1803: a' Gyitrai Communitas el vett ... egy Testvéremtől ... egj lántzot, két *csafflingját* (: *a' melly valami hasitto szeg forma vas, a' melljet a' Tőkékbe szoktunk ütni, 's az ahoz foglalt karikákba*

10 In the explanations discussed above, it is possible for the scribe to have inserted the Hungarian equivalents in the Hungarian text; however, this can be surely stated only in the case of insertions in brackets made at the time of recording the text.

akasztyuk a lántzot :) [Toplica MT; Born. XVc. 1/122 Bukur Juonást senior (86) col. vall.]. The explanation, however, can consist of only one word, which is included in brackets in the text by the scribe. Pl. 1715: a Võlgjben volt valami darab *Lunka* (: *kaszálo* :) a mellj akkoris, mostis Magosnak hivattatott [Ponor TA; WH. Pracze Flora (64) jb vall.].

4. Conclusions and Further Tasks

Most lexical interferences in foreign, Hungarian language texts produced by Romanian native speakers can be dated to the 18th century. A significant part can be classified as realia or culture-specific words (denoting customs, phenomena related to religious life, buildings, functions, specific foods, etc.), and there is also a large number of words in the case of which the texts of testimonies contain the Romanian equivalent as a strategy to point out the mother tongue and the ethnicity of individuals.

A further analysis on Romanian phrases and words included in the speech of Hungarian native speakers, their form varieties, their frequency, as well as their derived forms and compositions would be important to conduct. Their temporal and geographical distribution is also significant. Upon completing the two studies, we could not only map the word use of various regions and individuals belonging to different social groups but the analyses could also be compared in order to get a more nuanced picture of the language use habits of speakers from this period. Of course, we should always keep in mind that in the case of historical texts – due to the lack of data – some questions cannot be unequivocally answered.

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Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, **9** (2016) 109–118

DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2016-0014

Methodological Issues in Monitoring the Hungarian Audiovisual Media in Romania

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Abstract. The programme which was planned for more stages started in 2010 and undertook the monitoring of Hungarian news programmes (since 2011, cultural programmes have also been monitored) of national audiovisual media from different regions. The aim of monitoring these programmes is to study the strength of samples as to what extent professional speakers, reporters observe the norms of vernacular language and to what extent their use of language acts as part of sample language in a regional, bilingual, and dialectical environment.

In my study, I present the methodological questions of media monitoring (the aspects of sampling, the requirements regarding content and form in processing documentary material), paying attention to the differences between Romanian and Hungarian media-monitoring programmes.

Kewwords: audiovisual media, monitoring, methodology, norms and values in media, regional vernacular language, linguistic fault

Introduction

My study aims at discussing the methodological issues in monitoring the Hungarian audiovisual media in Romania (aspects of sampling, content and formal requirements in processing the collected documentary material), with special regard to the differences of media monitoring in Romanian and Hungarian. In cases when audiovisual media is broadcasting in regional languages, press monitoring concerned about language use raises a series of methodological questions, as minority media has characteristic features compared to the mainstream just in the linguistic dimension.

In preparing the methodology of monitoring the Hungarian audiovisual media in Romania, a number of factors proved to be crucial. The particularities of minority media had to be taken into account, which basically shaped the sampling procedures, since indicators of mainstream media could not have been fully applied. The issue of the Hungarian language's (regional language) status was proven to be an essential factor not only because it limits the potential audience but also because the language sector is important to the Hungarian-speaking community, and this increases the value of the minority media in socialization realized through language. Thus, the complexity of norms had to be taken into account: sample norm, user norm, language and linguistic norm. The status of the Hungarian language in Romania necessitated defining and separating the concepts of vernacular language and regional vernacular language. The active bilingual situation had to be considered an important factor, which favours the frequent occurrence of contactology phenomena, as in the case of language use in a bilingual environment the effect of the majority language is reflected to a certain degree. In processing the collected linguistic material, the greatest challenge was facing the questions regarding 'linguistic misconduct': the problem of respecting and violating the norm, the issue of the adequacy and accuracy of linguistic expressions. Difficult methodological questions were raised by the factors regarding the norm because the methodology used for the Romanian audiovisual media, which served as a template, has clearly and coherently asserted the view that norm should be benchmarked to only a single language version, the literary language. The problem required a solution in two respects. On the one hand, it had to be taken into consideration that the Hungarian sociolinguistic view differs significantly from the Romanian linguistic approach, while, on the other hand, it should have been considered that the different Hungarian linguistic ideologies have different perceptions about the concept of 'linguistic misconduct', 'linguistic error'.

The question referring to the reason why the methodology of Romanian media monitoring was used as template is answered by the background of the examination: the monitoring of the Hungarian audiovisual media was possible only after the National Audiovisual Council of Romania, which performs the tasks of supervising media, extended the examination of language use to the media broadcasting in regional or minority languages.

The examination was preceded by several consecutive events. In 2007, the Romanian Parliament[1] ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Strasbourg 1992), which sets out general guidelines about the protection of regional or minority languages in the historical Europe in public education and mass media. The legal documents specify that the media authorities of the signatory member states have the duty of protecting minority cultures and languages; where the minority language community exceeds 20%, the media service providers are required to provide a surface for minority broadcasting.

In 2009, Romania has fulfilled its obligation to implement the audiovisual media services directive. The amendment referring to the legal harmonization

1 Legea 282 din 2007 (Law 282 of 2007).

of the audiovisual law adopted in 2002[2] with the European policy was carried out on regulatory level, which was later approved by the Romanian Parliament. The report (Raport 2010), which follows the legal harmonization process and also monitors the practical implementation of directives, was published in 2010. The report provides an objective and authentic picture of the current statutes of media broadcasting in regional language, outlining the shortcomings that should be resolved by the National Audiovisual Council of Romania. In planning our research, we relied on data on Hungarian audiovisual media from the document.

The need for monitoring Hungarian audiovisual media in terms of language use came to the fore when the legal harmonization process with the European directives has been completed in the Romanian legislation. The tasks of the media monitoring institution were completed by the obligations related to national minorities.[3] Therefore, the protection of regional or minority languages is not only a general principle in the description of the institution's tasks, but the responsibility of media supervising is also assigned. Formulated as an official obligation, it is required to monitor the usage of grammatically flawless language, which respects the existing linguistic norms.

Monitoring the Romanian Audiovisual Media

The Romanian Academy and the National Audiovisual Council of Romania in 2001 implemented the first monitoring of the Romanian audiovisual media of global nature, based on a national representative sample, focusing on linguistic aspects. The project leaders[4] highlighted the necessity of media monitoring by pointing out the negative changes resulting from the language use of audiovisual media. Paradoxically, in the 1990s, the possibility of free expression (the enforcement of press freedom) triggered a 'deterioration' of quality in language use because the concept of comprehensibility was misinterpreted. It was the result of an intention to improve audience metrics at all costs, the efforts made to attract listeners and viewers; therefore, the media aimed at addressing itself to everybody. This strategy, however, was not completed by the requirement to produce high-quality linguistic utterances; moreover, the standpoint according to which language use has to comply with existing linguistic standards became less important. This way, the media renounced one of its important roles, namely the cultural and educative function, and the consequences are serious:

2 Legea Audiovizualului nr. 504 din 11 iulie 2002 (Audiovisual Law no 504 of 11 July 2002).

3 The Audiovisual Law stipulates as one of the attributes of the National Audiovisual Council the obligation to ensure the protection of the culture and languages of national minorities, including by pursuing correct usage of these languages (Report 2010, 1).

4 Univ. Professor Mioara Avram, PhD, Professor Theodor Hristea.

the number of linguistic and grammatical errors is big, their occurrence is more and more frequent, inaccurate formulation got accepted, familiar language use is gaining ground, trivial expressions appeared in everyday speech, while the frequent occurrence of inadequate utterances for the given communication situation indicates that cultural competence is not effective, it does not help in the formulation of appropriate linguistic manifestations. (The analysis of the monitoring results from 2001 and 2008 was conducted by Gabriela Rusu-Păsărin in the study entitled *Limbajul audiovizual între libertate şi calitate* [Audiovisual Language Confined within Freedom and Quality].)

The methodological procedures applied in the monitoring from 2001 are the base of the methodology developed for systematic media monitoring.

In 2007, the National Audiovisual Council of Romania started the systematic monitoring of the Romanian audiovisual media, focusing on linguistic aspects. This way, the obligations imposed by the operational regulations were met, as it is required as a priority task that the existing linguistic standards be applied in the mass media communication. The tasks of media monitoring, the professional processing of the collected material have been and are conducted by the researchers of the 'Iorgu Iordan – Al. Rosetti' Institute of Linguistics of the Romanian Academy, and they publish the report about the characteristics of language use in the Romanian audiovisual media every year[5] and formulate recommendations so that the media can become a guidance source in terms of language use, too.

The methodology of monitoring the Hungarian audiovisual media in Romania discusses aspects of sampling as well as content and formal requirements in processing the collected documentary material. Representativeness was the key aspect of sampling: the national coverage was provided by the selected radio and television broadcasters, public and commercial channels were both selected for sampling. The examined programmes were selected from informative (mostly news), cultural programmes, or from those with educational purposes, considering viewer ratings (programmes with most viewers) as well as the place of the given programme in the programme structure (prime-time broadcasts). The monitoring programme was carried out in a specific time interval, a winter–spring and a summer–autumn period.

Not only sounding speaking, but subtitling was examined, too. In the case of sounding speaking, the wider context (communication situation, type of communication, type of discourse) was taken into account as well. Under the programme, the subject to the monitoring was the language use of radio and TV presenters, newsreaders, commentators, and moderators.

In processing the collected material, they followed the linguistic categorizations of the Romanian language, recording the incorrect linguistic expression, while

5 Materials can be accessed on the site of the National Audiovisual Council of Romania.

also indicating the correct form. (Two books were given as basis of reference: *Dicționarul explicativ al limbii române* /toate edițiile, *Dicționarul ortografic, ortoepic şi morfologic*, Bucureşti, 2005.)

They also focus on the language forms, in the case of which linguists do not share the same view, but they do point out in every situation that they follow the rules of literary language. In the case of subtitling, they categorize the errors based on the current Romanian orthography.

The National Audiovisual Council of Romania and the Academy of Sciences of Moldova conducted the monitoring of the Romanian audiovisual media in the Republic of Moldova in 2011. The report on media monitoring (Raport 2011) was published in the same year. From our perspective, this was important because we were hoping that we would find clues in defining 'linguistic misconduct', 'linguistic error' more permissively since in Moldavia a regional version of Romanian is spoken. However, the status of the language differs from the status of the Hungarian in Romania because it is the official language.

According to the report, they applied the same methodology as the one used in the case of Romanian audiovisual media. They point out in the introduction that the features of Romanian literary language should be followed in media, and that it is of prescriptive and compulsory nature. Accordingly, they create different groups for norm violations stemming from regional language use, such as regional variants of words, calques, and loan translations spreading as the result of the Russian language, cases of regional pronunciation and stress. Thus, in examining linguistic phenomena, they implement coherently the traditional view all along, according to which every case of deviation from the standard norm is considered an error, therefore, the regional language forms, too.

Monitoring Hungarian Audiovisual Media in Romania

The monitoring of Hungarian audiovisual media was initiated by the National Audiovisual Council of Romania, and the implementation of the media monitoring was made possible by the competition of the Media Board of the Communitas Foundation. The monitoring started in 2010 and has become regular in the following years; it was supported by the Hungarian Journalists' Association of Romania, which had a major role in realizing a professional dialogue between the research team of linguists carrying out the media monitoring and the media professionals.

According to the objectives of the programme, the tasks of the professionals conducting the analysis of language use in the audiovisual media are exploring the linguistic peculiarities, preparing the annual report, and formulating recommendations with the aim that the media can become the propagator of demanding, educated language use.

In preparing the research methodology, the methodology of monitoring the language use of the Romanian media served as an example, but we also had to modify several procedures. We had to take into account the features of Hungarian audiovisual media in Romania. 'The media of Hungarians in Transylvania […] has the characteristics of the national mainstream media, media markets, and consumer habits, yet, in many respects – financial resources, professionalism and target audience – it is marked by the disadvantages resulting from vulnerability and minority position (2012: 11–12). These characteristics resulted in modifications regarding both the sampling procedure and the processing of the material.

The main concern of the sampling procedure was to ensure the representativeness in our case, too; but we had to ensure the regional coverage instead of the national one because the real situation of the Hungarian audiovisual media could only be reflected this way since the regional differences are shown in the media system, too. The primary target audience of the Hungarian media is the Hungarian-speaking community of Transylvania, people who live in geographically different regions. The number of content-providing institutions in the different regions and counties is in harmony with the number of Hungarians from the counties. Cluj County can be considered an exception, where editorial offices of the media service providers can be found at a higher rate than the ratio of Hungarians would impose (Maksay 2012: 11). Looking at the coverage area of some media, it is obvious that the Hungarian coverage is not complete, and there are significant regional differences in the options of receiving Hungarian broadcasts. The regional coverage was provided by the audiovisual mediums that were chosen for sampling from Timişoara, Cluj-Napoca, Târgu-Mureş, Miercurea Ciuc, Sfântu Gheorghe, Odorheiu Secuiesc, and Bucharest.

Following the principle of representativeness, in the process of preparing the sample, we have taken into account the profile of the given medium: public, commercial, as well as local and regional. Grouping media based on their profile reflects the stratification of the Hungarian media in Transylvania, but it also reveals deficiencies and highlights the regional differences. The report of the National Audiovisual Council of Romania also sees a major deficit in the absence of an independent public radio and TV for the Hungarian-speaking community.[6] As a result, some of the commercial or regional media take on also public service tasks, realized to different degrees and different standards. In our programmes, we aim at preserving and nurturing the Hungarian identity, while the matter of preserving and nurturing the mother tongue is also emphasized.

6 "There is no public radio station exclusively in Hungarian" (Report, 2010, 11). "Vis-á-vis the text of the Charta and the engagement of Romanian authorities to facilitate the creation of at least one television channel in the Hungarian language, this provision has not yet been met by the public services" (Report 2010, 13).

In the case of the programmes under examination, we followed the criteria of the Romanian sampling: informative and cultural broadcasts were subject to the monitoring. We only examined news programmes among the informative broadcasts, these forming the larger part of the sample. From 2011, we also included cultural programmes, but we were not able to provide the variety of the Romanian sample. In selecting the programmes, we did not and could not take into account the audience rates or the criteria of broadcasting in prime-time because the Hungarian programmes of the Romanian public media have an unfavourable position in the programme structure and the assigned airtime is changing and fragmented as well. Significant differences result from the fact that the Hungarian programmes of the different mediums are aired on a daily or weekly basis and they have different time-frames. This aspect also arises methodological issues in the processing. The major disproportion in the quantity of the sample collected from the different mediums and the different nature of the broadcasts (for example, cultural programmes of different genres) have made it clear that comparing the different broadcasters is not relevant.

The monitoring was conducted in the assigned time interval, the audio and visual material was recorded. The date of sampling changed annually, but the monitoring interval was fourteen days in each of the cases. We were not able to follow the procedure of the Romanian media monitoring regarding the annual sampling in the winter–spring and summer–autumn periods because of the shorter duration of the competition.

In the study of linguistic phenomena, we followed the categories of the system of the Hungarian language: we traced the non-normative phenomena appearing in the given audio recordings on the phonetic, morphological, lexicological, and syntactic level.

In the processing of the recorded material, we followed the methodology of the Romanian media monitoring. The analysis of the materials collected from the media providers was performed by the members of the research group in the following way: the non-normative forms, grammatical errors, linguistic mistakes were recorded, indicating the data regarding the programme (where and when they occurred) and also giving a correct or acceptable form. The analysed materials were then summarized, the non-standard linguistic phenomena were grouped based on the type of violation. The finished report[7] is in fact a tabulated summary; the columns of the table are constant: they indicate the location of the given form (media provider, date, programme/column, time); the non-normative linguistic form or structure; the recommended standard form; the rows of the table record the non-standard linguistic form; the succession of the tables represents the classification based on the language system.

7 The reports can be found on the sites of the National Audiovisual Council of Romania (2011–2012) and Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania (since 2013).

The material of the sample was organized based on media types. After processing, it was archived for each year to make tracing the evolution of language use in time possible as well as to aid the researchers to have the complete material in analysing certain linguistic phenomena.

Specific Methodological Solutions

During regular media monitoring, the methodological procedures became more and more refined. We have not changed the criteria regarding data collection procedures created in the first year, as these provide the representativeness and stratification of the sample; nevertheless, we followed the changes that occurred on the Hungarian language audiovisual market (new media were included in the empirical research, while in the case of others there were significant alterations in the broadcast time).

In the process of media monitoring, we could not exclude the 'official' standpoint that qualifies linguistic phenomena in terms of 'correctness' in such a way that it compares them to the standard norm; in this, we had to fit the requirements of the application.

During the processing of the material, we complied with the basic requirements of the media-monitoring programme (analysing the language use of audiovisual media, outlining the characteristics of language use, preparing the annual report); however, we shifted our focus from the prescriptive approach of the Romanian methodology, which considers the ideal language variety, the standard to be the only norm. We decided upon applying a more descriptive standpoint, which reflects a more flexible approach to norm, taking into consideration the fact of language change and actual language use. According to Lajos Lőrincze: „a nyelvi helyességnek, a normának minden másnál fontosabb meghatározója a szokás, az úzus" (linguistic adequacy, norm is determined foremost by application, usage) (Lőrincze 1973: 267).

The Hungarian linguistic standpoint of a sociolinguistic nature (Gábor Tolcsvai Nagy, Imre Wacha, János Péntek) accepts the existence of several, interdependent norms, and this has proven more appropriate in our analysis of linguistic phenomena collected from Transylvanian media, as we had to study the extent to which the language use of the media fulfils its role as language norm in a regional, dialectal, and bilingual environment. We start from the concept that there are several norms and that they are connected to each other: 'I define media norm as a language variety based on the standard, but richer, more 'elevated' than the language used in everyday communication (...) The centre of ideal media language use is a more 'elevated' media norm based on the standard norm, being in a constant connection with the standard and the artistic norm. The ideal 'internal' norm is the media norm, while its direct 'external' norm is the standard and artistic norm and the external norm not included is group norm' (Balázs

1998: 91). We constantly followed the basic rule that the normative language variety has to be accepting and not exclusionary regarding the Hungarians living in a minority (Péntek 2001).

While processing the yearly collected linguistic data, we realized the fact that in analysing language use we had to strive to shift our focus from correctness to appropriateness. Consequently, we created a separate group for stylistic problems: the frequent cases when synonymous but stylistically different words were interchanged, the also frequent forms of style blending, the more rare examples for style breaking; we also created a separate group for linguistic phenomena where the violation of grammatical and socio-cultural norms are intertwined. From this point of view, 'linguistic correctness' guides us regarding the community system of values on linguistic utterances.

The linguistic phenomena occurring in one register of the language of the press, the official register were grouped separately, and reflected the impact of the Romanian language on the Hungarian language. This group includes the occurrence of calques, loan translations and hybrid words, the paraphrases related to the lack of competences in special languages, imperfect translations due to the lack of proficiency in the legal language, as well as unacceptable Hungarian equivalents of Romanian names of institutions.

Our research differs from the Romanian in terms of not formulating recommendations. We considered it appropriate to examine the phenomena and issues arising during the processing of the media-monitoring material and to publish our findings in articles and analyses. This was considered to be useful in several respects. The analytical approach can ensure the examination of the observed linguistic phenomena to be embedded in a theoretical framework; it makes possible to be cautious about the research of violations of norm based on our assumption that norm is multilayered. We considered exploring the sociocultural background of audiovisual media significant; we give a thorough examination of linguistic phenomena (e.g. contact phenomena) that are the result of the fact that the Transylvanian regional standard is in a more direct contact with dialects and the official language of the state. We also strived to describe the characteristics of language use in Hungarian audiovisual media in Romania. Based on the collected data, studies have been drawn up on the pronunciation characteristics of minority Hungarian language varieties, on the cases of regular errors in the use of affixes, on analytical structures that are more and more widespread as the result of the effect of foreign languages, on syntactic characteristics, on the frequency of occurrence of elements from the regional standard and sociolects, as well as on characteristics of language use resulting from translation.

We believe that these research documents are more suitable to reflect our intent to raise linguistic awareness and to encourage language use than recommendations. This is why a series was started: in each volume, we group the articles around a topic important from the point of view of media monitoring, such as the sociolinguistic status of the Hungarian language in Romania, aspects of language norm, and the culture of mother tongue language use in the Hungarian audiovisual media in Romania.

Unlike the Romanian media monitoring based on the prescriptive approach, we did not focus on finding incorrect forms; applying the descriptive approach, we aimed at outlining prevailing trends and phenomena in language use. So far, the studies present the linguistic situation at a given time, and as such they are reports on the language use of Hungarian media in Romania. After five years of monitoring, the following task that entails new methodological challenges is tracing the changes of certain linguistic phenomena in time.

Our wish is that our media-monitoring research becomes a usable, applicable basis for cooperation with professionals working in the media to think about what language patterns the viewers, listeners hear and see on television and on the radio.

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Book Reviews

DE GRUYTER OPEN

Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, **9** (2016) 121–124

DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2016-0015

Freedom of Language

A Review of the Volume *György Andrássy: Freedom of Language: A Universal Human Right to Be Universally Recognized*[1]

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When one finds out something new, he will soon become a minority;
a minority which has only one member: himself.[2]

Anyone who has for the past two decades followed the work of György Andrássy, Professor of Law at the University of Pécs, is not unfamiliar with the notion of freedom of language. He started to develop the idea that every people has the right to a so far lesser known and recognized freedom, i.e. freedom of language. In the early 90s – and since then –, he published about a dozen studies[3] on the subject in Hungarian and English languages. However, Andrássy's book, published in 2013, is far from a mere summary: the concept of freedom of language is being justified more thoroughly than ever, discussing questions so far not raised, from a logical as well as historical perspective, while processing an enormous amount of material from among the preparatory documents of the

1 Andrássy, György: *Nyelvszabadság: Egy egyetemes elismerésre váró egyetemes emberi jog*. Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest-Pécs, 2013.

2 Robert Fischer: *Hogyan tanítsuk gyermekeinket gondolkodni? [How to Teach Our Children to Think?]*. Műszaki Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 2000. p. 49. Cited by: Andrássy, György: ibid. p. 10. All translations here belong to the reviewer.

3 Among them, the following should be highlighted: Etnikai kisebbségek és emberi jogok [Ethnic Minorities and Human Rights]. *Regio*, 1993/2. 74–79; Etnikai kisebbségek és emberi jogok: Alkalmazható-e Rawls érvelése? [Ethinc Minorities and Human Rights: Is It Possible to Apply Rawls' Reasoning?]. In: *Erkölcs és változás* (186–191). Kaposvár, 1994; *Nyelvi jogok. A modern állam nyelvi jogának alapvető kérdései, különös tekintettel Európára és az európai integrációra [Language Rights. Basic Questions of Modern States' Language Law with Special Regard to Europe and the European Integration]*. Janus Pannonius Tudományegyetem Európa Központ, Pécs, 1998; Nyelvszabadság: egy elismerésre váró emberi jog [Freedom of Language: A Human Right to Be Recognized]. *Jogtudományi Közlöny*, Vol. LXIV. No. 11. 2009. 445–456; Freedom of Language: A Universal Human Right to Be Recognized. *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*. Vol. 19. No 2. 2012. 195–232.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Not only this material was unknown in the Hungarian language but the extensive international commentaries also failed to analyse the Declaration from the point of view of language rights. Andrássy's research related to the preparatory materials of the Declaration would reflect credit even on a legal historian, but for a legal scholar and philosopher it is especially commendable that he undertook such a large-scale task.

The genre of 'Freedom of Language' is basically jurisprudence and international law; however, due to its chapters related to philosophy and legal history – moreover, due to its linguistic and psychological references –, the book is indisputably multidisciplinary, in the best sense. Perhaps this somewhat explains why the author had been procrastinating to write the book for a long time, because as Head of the Department of Social Theory and Political Science of the University of Pécs he mainly taught philosophy. As a matter of fact, he discovered freedom of language in a philosophical context, via Rawls's theory of justice,[4] and thus he initially tried to justify the concept by means of well-known and widely accepted philosophical arguments. Since these arguments were borrowed from the philosophy of human rights, he quickly reached the conclusion that freedom of language is a human right, too, and therefore it should be given a place on the lists of human rights. As the most important lists of human rights were established within the international law of human rights, this theoretical problem has a serious practical, legislative significance, as well (cf. p. 9).

It is indeed extraordinary, and the reviewer has countless times raised the question of how it is possible that such a self-evident freedom – the right of every people to use their own language – has not been recognized by international law, and that international legislation on minority protection, revived in the 90s, has not led one single international lawyer to realize that there has been some fundamental deficiency here. After all, the notion of freedom of language is not a brand new one: the Belgian Constitution has already recognized it since 1831, the Swiss Constitution since 1998, and, in fact, international law also recognized this freedom once: between the two world wars, under the auspices of the minority protection system of the League of Nations. Since then, the matter has somehow been forgotten, and the issue of linguistic rights has arisen almost exclusively as a minority problem. Andrássy's question – raised with an almost naive naturalness – as to why persons belonging to the linguistic majority have no language rights, is usually followed by a stunned silence – as the writer of these lines has witnessed this several times. Scholars awakening from their perplexity tend to put forward the sort of arguments such as: 1. the fact that people belonging to the linguistic majority are entitled to these rights is self-evident, thus it would be pointless to formulate this right explicitly; 2. for the very same reason, people belonging to the linguistic majority have never requested this; 3. problems related to language

4 Rawls, John: *Az igazságosság elmélete [Theory of Justice]*. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 1997.

rights usually arise in connection with persons belonging to linguistic minorities; 4. persons belonging to the linguistic majority do not need to be protected by international law because their language rights are sufficiently safeguarded in the states' domestic law.[5] Andrássy gives a comprehensive answer to every objection, but here it seems to be sufficient to state that the last three arguments – whether we accept them as well-founded or not – are built upon purely practical considerations; however, we are dealing with a theoretical issue of particular importance, namely an issue of human rights. Since according to the doctrine of human rights people are entitled to human rights by their own existence as human beings, by their human essence, human nature, or human dignity, the recognition of these rights cannot depend on practical considerations at all.

To the first argument, the easiest answer is that the teachings of natural law and human rights law happen to formulate the obvious, self-evident, and indisputable truths. However, treating language rights as minority rights is problematic for another reason as well – a reason to which only Andrássy has drawn the attention so far: the fact that human rights are universal rights to which all people are entitled, implies by definition that minority language rights do not fit into these rights. For this reason, international human rights law has been overwhelmed with problems of coherence – using one of the author's favourite terms: paradigm anomalies –, which can only be eliminated by recognizing the linguistic rights of persons belonging to the linguistic majority as well. (As a matter of fact, these are implicitly inherent in the institution of official language; what is the obstacle then to an explicit recognition?)

Having said that, there seems nothing left to do but justify that freedom of language is indeed a human right. In fact, legal positivists would say that the very existence of human rights must be proved first. However, this is such a huge task which the author does not undertake, not even in a four-hundred-page book, and it turns out soon that there is no need to do so anyway. Although Andrássy 'does not want to deprive himself of the advantages' (p. 29.) that the various ways of justification offer, he basically chooses a simple but great method of argumentation requiring extreme rigour and logical clarity: he derives freedom of language from the prevailing theory of human rights and the national and international law of human rights. Therefore, he does not join the debate about the existence of human rights, rather he takes *recognized* human rights as his starting point. He derives freedom of language in a form in which it is missing from the *existing* lists of human rights. 'This method of argumentation has two major advantages: on the one hand, the derivation is logically compelling at several points, on the other hand, such a derivation leads to the conclusion that the theory or legal material from which the justification starts out includes and as such implicitly acknowledges freedom of language. And this, if

5 For more details, see: Andrássy, György: A nyelvszabadságról és a nyelvszabadság jelentőségéről [About Freedom of Language and Its Significance]. *Létünk*, 2013/különszám, 7–19.

the starting point of justification happens to be the domestic and international law of human rights, in fact means that the domestic and international law of human rights already include freedom of language, and therefore legislators only need to recognise what they already have recognised tacitly or implicitly' (p. 30).

This is the essence of Chapter IV, making up about two thirds of the book: the derivation of freedom of language from the perhaps best known and most authoritative list of human rights, i.e. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[6] Without 'depriving the reader of the advantages' which reading the book offers, it may be revealed that as a result of an incredibly thorough legal historical investigation and infallible logical deductions Andrássy proves that the Declaration is certainly incomplete and inadequate from both a historical and a logical point of view. 'First of all, because the drafters of the Declaration left a few questions related to linguistic human rights unresolved and, secondly, because the preparatory works of the Declaration actually included the answers to these questions left pending' (p. 355).

In the final chapter of the book, the author himself proposes a draft to supplement the Declaration with: the first point of this hypothetical new article refers to freedom of language in private life, while the second point concerns the use of own language as an official language. Although Andrássy's previous works also included similar draft supplements, in the current text, every single word is of significance since the careful choice of the terms used in the draft supplement – which can be considered as the essence of the book – was preceded by a theoretical discussion of several hundreds of pages.

To conclude, 'Freedom of Language: A Universal Human Right to be Universally Recognised' is a unique book filling a serious theoretical niche. The volume is a ripe fruit of György Andrássy's two-decade research on the subject, his extensive knowledge of philosophy and other disciplines, his common sense and logical acumen. The book is a must read for not only international jurists and scholars interested in human rights but – because of its multidisciplinary nature – it is strongly recommended for professionals of other areas of law, moreover, for linguists as well as philosophers. The reviewer expresses her hope that the message of the book will reach political decision-makers, what could lead to a new, perhaps fairer and more consistent approach towards the language issue: the recognition of freedom of language could provide just as substantive indications for the states' linguistic legislation as, for example, freedom of religion did for the legislation related to religions and churches.[7]

6 It is no secret of the author's that 'Freedom of Language' was planned to contain two volumes. In the second volume, freedom of language will be derived, among others, from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

7 Cf. Andrássy, György: A nyelvszabadságról és a nyelvszabadság jelentőségéről [About Freedom of Language and Its Significance]. *Létünk*, 2013/különszám, 7–19.

DE GRUYTER OPEN

Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, **9** (2016) 125–128

DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2016-0016

Name Geography beyond Borders

A Review of the Volume *Ferenc Vörös (ed.) From Linguistic Geography to Name Geography*[1]

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The meaning of special terms like linguistic geography and name geography might be obvious for linguists, but for the representatives of other scientific branches it is perhaps necessary to present in the introduction the definition of these two terms.

For linguists, linguistic geography is above all a way of approach and a research method. They are searching the answers – through the methods of linguistic geography – for some questions beyond general linguistics and linguistics in general. There are three main dimensions of the language: spatial, social, and time-related dimensions. Linguistic geography analyses the spatial dimension of language, respectively it approaches to social and time-related dimensions from the viewpoint of the former. Linguistic geography is a branch of linguistics dealing with the geographic distribution of languages; it can also be called Geolinguistics, and thus it can be regarded as spatial linguistics – yet, these two terms cannot be conceived as perfect synonyms. Linguistic geography deals with the problematic of language contacts (another term used for this is areal linguistics), and it also focuses on the study of different dialects and language variants. Linguistic geography presents the variants of a certain language in space, it elaborates maps regarding the linguistics phenomena, and, accepting the principle of spatial connections, it tries to draw linguistic and extralinguistic conclusions.

Linguistic geography – as a special term – is a calque similar to the German word Sprachgeographie. Both concepts refer to the geographical study of language. Linguistic geography is a more recent term than geolinguistics, a word of Greek-Latin origin used in contactology.

This field looks back on a rich tradition, it tries to draw historical and sociological conclusions based on the territorial aspects of proper names. In spite

1 Ferenc Vörös (ed.) A nyelvföldrajztól a névföldrajzig, UMIZ – Imre Samu Nyelvi Intézet, Unterwart/Alsóőr – Budapest 2015.

of the fact that the most important researches of the domain deal mainly with the early Hungarian toponyms and hydronyms, due to the growing quantity of data the analysis of micro-names becomes more and more important. Thus, we arrive at the field of name geography.

Scholarly literature dealing with name geography used the databases containing geographical names to define dialects and to make researches regarding the history of language and the history of dialects due to the fact that these were very well-localized linguistic data. Some of the researchers dealing with toponyms present from a geographical viewpoint the systematic features of naming and the inner characteristics of proper names (all these are relevant for the study of the formation of Hungarian toponyms). Newer data collection provides scholars with a large quantity of data containing proper names. These researches rose the possibility of mapping the spatial dimensions of naming similarly to the mapping of dialects.

The volume edited by Ferenc Vörös (*From Linguistic Geography to Name Geography VI. – Name Geography beyond Borders*, UMIZ – Imre Samu Nyelvi Intézet, Unterwart/Alsóőr – Budapest 2015) is the volume of the proceedings of a Conference organized at Unterwart in May 2015. It was published by the Imre Samu Linguistic Institute.

First of all, it is interesting that in a small locality of Burgenland, Austria there exists a linguistic institute functioning at the Hungarian Media and Information Centre in Unterwart/Alsóőr (UMIZ). We might wonder why this Institute functions in a small locality when the majority of research institutes exist in big cities. The answer to the former question lies in the fact that the research network called Termini, which expands to the whole Carpathian Basin, considers it important to have a research institute in all the countries having Hungarian minority.

The volume includes 11 studies geographically embracing Western Hungary and Burgenland, Subcarpathia, Moldavian Changos, Baranya, South-Hungary, Voivodina, Great Britain, Alto Adige, and South Tyrol. A study dealing with surnames and the typology of contact phenomenon must be mentioned as well due to its international character.

This is an article written by Attila Benő, István Lanstyák, and Ferenc Vörös and is entitled *The Typology of Language Contact Phenomena: the Case of Surnames*, focusing on Hungarian surnames and the typology of the language contact phenomena occurring in the case of surnames. In their analysis, the authors present direct and indirect effects and structural elements. Their data refer to Hungary as well, but they take into consideration the other regions of the Carpathian Basin having Hungarian inhabitants too. Their study presents the most important etymological issues regarding surnames borrowed from other languages and it enumerates the ways of their accommodation to the structure of the receiving language.

Tamás Farkas elaborated an article with the title *Surname and Ethnicity: Ways and Possibilities in Hungarian and International Applied Onomastic Research*, which deals with the ethnic etiquetting feature of proper names and it shows the interdisciplinary character of the study of toponyms. The first part of the article presents the role of synchronic study of toponyms in the reconstruction of ethnicity and it underlines the connections of proper names with ethnical identity. The most important part of the article presents the practical role of these researches, pointing out some issues for which these works can provide a theoretical background. Thus, marketing, public health, and genetics are mentioned in the article, accentuating the potential social advantages and disadvantages.

Another important article of the volume is entitled *Ince János Petrás's Registers of Family Names in the 19th-Century Moldavia. The Surnames of Somoska* and it is written by Vilmos Tánczos. This study – based on the documents existing in the Archive – presents the data included in the folklore collection of a priest in Cleja, elaborated between 1855 and 1876 and containing data regarding 14 villages in which he made a census of the families living there. The second part of the study compares the historical resources with the names actually used and officially registered in Somoska, a Moldavian Chango village. Another important aspect is that the researches dealing with surnames are important not only for toponymy but for cultural anthropology as well. A Moldavian Chango often asks the interviewer: Shall I tell my Romanian or my Chango name? In some cases, there is a great discrepancy between the two variants.

Ferenc Vörös in his study *Surnames in Western Hungary and Burgenland from the Perspective of Historical Surname Geography* (the first article of the volume) relies on a database collected during a national census in 1720. He defines six lexical and three morpho-semantic categories; in the cartograms, we may find both surnames used at national level and surnames used only in some regions. The cartograms offer supplementary data for the study of ethnic composition of western borderline and for the better definition of the language borders.

We do not have the possibility to present in a detailed manner all the articles, and thus we have decided to present one more study. This study is entitled *Family Names and Bilingualism in the Cemeteries of Burgenland* and was written by Szilvia Szoták. The author studies the epitaphs that can be found in the cemeteries of Burgenland. The epitaphs are used as a visual cartogram of proper names, and according to this map the author concluded that the Hungarian population of Burgenland was bilingual. The epitaphs offer information regarding the language composition of the population, the statute of the different languages, and the linguistic vitality of the local communities. The research shows that the number of German epitaphs grows even amongst Hungarian families. This shows that the local Hungarian population reached the last phase of language shift. The generation that used Hungarian is dying.

The volume is characterized by permanence, it is strongly related to the topic of the former conferences: surnames, toponyms, issues regarding national minorities. Some of the studies deal with interethnic relations as well. A very important aspect of the volume is that it embraces a large geographical region: it has some articles dealing with international topics as well and some focusing on the historical Hungarian regions. The volume and the conference are connected to the larger project dealing with the elaboration of the *Hungarian Surname Atlas*.

The volume is an interesting and useful book not only for linguists and anthropologists but for all the people somehow interested in the problematics of the Hungarians living in the Carpathian Basin.

ISSN 2066-639X
http://www.acta.sapientia.ro

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Printed by Idea Printing House
Director: Péter Nagy