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FOREWORD

Political science has made great progress in Eastern and Central Europe since its beginnings – or at least emancipation from ideological constraints - in the years of post communist transition to the point marked by the first issue of this journal. The usually self-made pioneers of "politology", as the discipline came to be called in most of the region, sometimes had remarkable influence on public discourse in their countries. But the institutionalization and academic standards of the discipline were invariably modest throughout the region in the early 1990s. In most countries, the readers of the mainstream political science journals probably noticed only a modest improvement since. Yet, below this surface, a far more dramatic change occurred as proper political science programs emerged at ever more universities.

A whole new generation of young scholars is eager to earn a name for themselves by impressing specifically academic, rather than just lay audiences with the way they master the tools of a profession. There is probably no better signal of this change than the fact that a group of graduate students decided to launch a journal that, in its procedures - and indeed even in its language of communication – emulates the best academic journals of our time. Manuscripts are solicited from all members of a virtual community only united by a shared interest in analyzing politics in a truly scholarly - if you like, scientific - way, and not divided by political, linguistic, institutional, and social network boundaries. The manuscripts are peer-reviewed in a double-blind system where only academic merit can count; the authors receive feedback on reasons of rejection or expected improvements; and the target audience of the journal is no more and no less than the whole universe of potential contributors.

There is no need to point out that this firmly puts us in a new world in the history of Eastern and Central European political science, which will certainly feed enthusiasm among everyone committed to advancing a sound understanding of modern societies by creating social niches where the only trump cards are reasoned arguments. The role of my institution is merely to provide the logistics that allows the production of such a journal, and wait with great excitement to see how the content and impact of this journal will live up to the noble expectations of its founders. I wish all readers to find as many inspirational and eye-opening articles in this journal as the editors hope in their bravest moments. The talent, skill, and knowledge of the potential authors are certainly out there for such an enterprise, and it is up to all of us to see their best contributions reaching the audience of this journal.

GABOR TOKA - HEAD OF DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

DO SMALL SETTLEMENT SCHOOLS PROVIDE EDUCATION OF INFERIOR QUALITY? THE CASE OF HUNGARY[1]

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Abstract[2]

The aim of this study is to analyze the performance of small settlement primary schools and establish whether the argument that these schools are of worse quality holds at all. Using cross-sectional secondary level continuation data it seems that the size of the school and the settlement do not matter at all. Controlling for exogenous features outside the influence of the primary schools – family background, contextual effects and distance from closest secondary schools – the initial performance differences disappear. Nevertheless we cannot be lulled into complacency; we can only assert that small settlement schools are just as bad as the larger ones in compensating for initial social inequalities, but at least they do not increase the differences inherent in society. Additional policy suggestions are also offered.

Introduction

In explaining cross-national and urban-rural differences in economic growth, employment, migration levels or social inequality, many studies use the average years of school attendance or the level of schooling attained[3] But it is also commonly recognized that not only the quantity but also the quality of education plays an important role in affecting individual earnings and economic growth.[4] Assuming similar levels of education, the quality of schooling thus makes a large difference. Although the effect of social background on educational performance has been well recorded since the middle of the last century[5] and most unadjusted variation between the quality of urban and rural schools can most likely be explained by the differences in the average socio-economic status of the students, the original question still needs to be explored. First of all, it is essential to identify those factors that diminish the initial differences between the quality of rural and urban schools—besides the socio-economic variables—since these might provide indispensable clues to crafting new policies. The answer to the question of rural school performance can set the path of future development policies. Whether schools are of worse quality in rural areas *per se*, or whether unadjusted differences can be modified by policies is a crucial question for policy-makers. Secondly, it is important to analyze the magnitude of these effects, including the size of the individual background variables, for similar reasons. Finally, and most importantly, it is not at all obvious that small schools provide inferior quality education. There are significant arguments for, as well as against, the existence of small community schools.

The advantages of small settlement schools are numerous: smaller class size allows for a more student focused education, since teachers can concentrate more on teaching the pupils and less on disciplining them; small communities allow for a better parent-school relationship; the teacher is an important, highly respected member of the whole community when doing her/his job properly; smaller schools are easier to govern and thus create a smaller number of bureaucratic problems; and a smaller school staff allows for more efficient peer review and greater responsibility for the children.[6] All these factors point towards a learning environment that allows for higher quality education.

On the other hand, small schools are more expensive; they can exploit neither economies of size – i.e. they have larger per student costs – nor economies of scope by offering an adequate diversity of courses, sporting possibilities, music or dance lessons, or differentiated language classes.[7]

These two streams of argumentation, both pro and con, regarding the higher productivity of small settlement schools, have been present in the literature for quite some time. Some economists have pushed for the consolidation of educational systems,[8] arguing that the savings gained by the use of economies of scale could increase the overall quality of education, or suggesting that small schools are of lower quality because of other features, like managerial

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[1] This article represents an adapted form of the MA Thesis defended at the Department of Political Science in June 2004.

[2] This research was supported by a grant from the CERGE-EI Foundation under a program of the Global Development Network (research project "The efficiency and effectiveness of Hungarian primary school", RRC IV-07). All opinions expressed are those of the author and have not been endorsed by CERGE-EI, or the GDN.

[3] M. A. Ulubasoglu and B. A. Cardak, "International Comparisons of Rural-Urban Educational Attainment: Data and Determinants," *SSRN electronic paper collection*, (December 2004). http://ssrn.com/abstract=649883 accessed on 06.16.2005.

[4] Eric A. Hanushek, "Some Simple Analytics of School Quality," *NBER Working Paper 10229,* http://www.nber.org/papers/w10229 accessed on 01.28.2004 .

[5] James. S. Coleman, E. Campbell, A. Mood, E. Weinfeld, D. Hobson, R. York and J. McPartland, *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (Washington, DC, US GPO, 1966).

[6] Bruce O. Barker, "The Advantages of Small Schools." *ERIC Digest.* (February 1986).

[7] Matthew Andrews, William Duncombe and John Yinger, "Revisiting economies of size in American education: are we any closer to a consensus?" *Economics of Education Review* (21/2002): 245-262.

[8] Anita Papp, "Local or regional, Cost-benefit analysis of a hypothetical new structure in public primary education in Hungary", *Acta Oeconomica*, 52/2 (2002): 237-253.

inefficiency.[9] On the other side, some social scientists emphasize the benefits of these small schools and reject the idea of school closings.[10] These arguments suggest that there are advantages and disadvantages of small schools. Just like Dunn has argued, "rurality and smallness have their greatest impact at the school and classroom level, but this same rurality creates problems at the school district or system level."[11]

The present paper attempts to answer the question raised in the title. Using Hungarian school continuation data, I will address the question of the quality of small settlement primary schools to determine whether they are better or worse than their larger urban peers. First, I will describe the policy relevance of the topic, as it is viewed in Hungary today. Note that these issues are not country-specific; most problems and the characteristics of the system are relevant for countries in the entire Central-Eastern European region. Second, I will briefly describe the specificities of the Hungarian educational sector, and third, the data and methodology used. Next, I will present the empirical results, and finally draw conclusions from the study.

Small village school effectiveness: the Hungarian context

Due to the recent major demographic decline in Hungary,[12] the existence of small settlement primary schools has been highly questioned, bringing forth arguments both for and against the consolidation of primary education. Hermann has estimated the possible cost savings if all schools were operating on the level of economies of scale. He has shown that if all schools had at least 250 students, the overall savings would not exceed 3%, while if their size went up to 600 students, the savings would be 7% of total local government spending on primary schools.[13] He also concluded that the additional cost connected to the diseconomies of scale by itself cannot be seen as the major reason for the efficiency-losses in the Hungarian public education sector. [14]

Another argument against the closing of primary schools is the effect of such policy on migration, due to the value people attach to the presence of schools. Imre[15] has tested the "population preserving power" of institutions in small settlements (under 700 inhabitants) and Hermann[16] has examined "the effect of local schools on migration in small villages," but none of them found significant results for the population as a whole. However, both studies found weak associations between the presence of schools and migration in certain groups of settlements. They both concluded that it may be the lack of proper and adequate data that provided such results, and that further analysis should be done. Thus it seems that small settlement schools in Hungary are not the major causes of national budget deficit but they are also "not highly valued" in terms of migration effects.

In addition to these factors, the decentralized school system in Hungary – in which financing is based on government-financed, per-student lump-sum grants and local subsidies – necessarily hinders small settlements since they are less able to collect additional resources to compensate for their larger per-student costs.[17] The option of free school choice, which is also provided in Hungary, is another disadvantage for small settlements schools. Since both parents and schools are free to seek each other out, a relatively segregated schooling system is allowed to evolve, in which schools become homogeneous with respect to students' socio-economic backgrounds. The logic is simple: every child is better off when s/he is in a classroom with academically higher-performing children and schools can also deal more easily with less-troublesome/high-performing students. The resulting equilibrium is a clear systemic-level segregation along student performance. Yet since students' background characteristics are well correlated with performance – as argued by Robertson and Symons[18] and Kertesi and Kézdi[19] – the resulting performance segregation also indicates social status-based segregation. More mobile, usually higher-class families will exit small local schools, either by moving or by commuting to a larger settlement with larger

[9] Steven C. Deller and Edward Rudnicki, "Managerial efficiency in local government: Implications on jurisdictional consolidation". *Public Choice* 74 (1992): 221-231.

[10] Barker, "The Advantages", 23.

[11] Randy J. Dunn , "The Rural Education Dichotomy: Disadvantaged Systems and School Strengths, North Central Regional Educational Laboratory: Educational Policy" http://www.ncrel.org/policy/pubs/html/dichot.htm accessed on 06.08.2005 (2001)

[12] "According to long term forecasts, the number of students in public education will drop by one sixth between 2001 and 2015." (Lannert and Halász, Education in Hungary, 12)

[13] Note that the economies of scale in education according to Hermann ("Falusi kisikolák") starts at about 250 students, but still the costs decrease till over 1000.

[14] Zoltan Hermann, "Falusi kisiskolák és a méretgazdaságossággal összefüggő hatékonyságveszteségek" [Small village-schools and efficiency loss due to diseconomies of scale] In Hermann Z. ed. *Hatékonysági problémák a közoktatásban* [*Efficiency problems in the public education*] (Budapest: National Institute for Public Education, 2005), 85.

[15] Anna Imre, "A kistelepülési iskolák szerepe a települések népességmegtartó erejében" [The function of small settlement schools in preserving the population of settlements] *Műhelytanulmányok 5*. (Budapest: National Institute for Public Education, 2004)

[16] Zoltan Hermann, "A helyi iskola működésének hatása a migrációra a kistelepüléseken" [The Effect of Local Schools on Migration in Small Villages], *Discussion Papers*. *Hungarian Academy of Sciences*, MT-DP. (2002/12).

[17] Judit Lannert and Gabor Halász, eds., *Education in Hungary,* (Budapest: National Institute for Public Education 2004), 25.

[18] Donald Robertson and James Symons, "Self-Selection in the State School System" *Education Economics,* Vol. 11, No. 3, (2003): 270.

[19] Gabor Kertesi and Gabor Kézdi, "Általános iskolai szegregáció I–II." [Primary School Segregation] *Közgazdasági Szemle,* (April 2005): 317-355 and (May 2005): 472-479.

schools. Given that students' socio-economic background affects student attainment to a great extent, these larger schools in cities will outperform small schools in villages. Thus small settlement schools' unadjusted quality measures will be lower than the larger ones' on two grounds: economies of size and scope (inefficient supply) and sorting (higher status students leaving the school).

Unadjusted quality differences between settlement types are clearly recognized by the public. Parents will look at raw rather than adjusted school continuation data when choosing between different schools. As Kertesi and Kézdi[20] argue, their aim is not only to choose the school that can provide the best teachers, but also to pick the school that has a similar socio-economic composition to their own background, thereby deepening the cleavages between the schools' performance in different types of settlements.

If we measure the performance of primary schools by the percentage of their students continuing studies in academic, vocational secondary or vocational training schools, the unadjusted differences between the various settlement types are quite significant. While more than 50% of primary school students enter academic secondary schools, this ratio is only around 20% in smaller settlements. The larger a settlement is, the higher the rate of children entering academic schools and the lower the percentage of students going to vocational technical schools. (See Table 1. below)

Table 1. Unadjusted continuation rates

	Type of settlement				
Type of school	Small Village	Large Village	Town	City	Capital
Voc. Tech.	36,09%	33,37%	26,61%	20,62%	11,02%
Voc. Sec.	44,10%	44,18%	38,74%	40,75%	38,63%
Academic	19,81%	22,46%	34,64%	38,63%	50,35%

The question therefore is whether schools in small settlements are worse according to this measure of quality because of the schools' internal unobservable features, or because of external reasons such as the socio-economic status of the parents or the possibility of school choice, which allows sorting. To put it differently: can the differences in school quality between settlement types be explained by systemic features – and thus be modified by policy, - or do they remain even if most factors are controlled for?

The Hungarian system and the source of data

The Hungarian educational system is very similar to that of the post-communist countries of the region. Compulsory education – recently extended to age 18 – is divided into two main parts: primary (elementary) and secondary. Primary education typically lasts for eight years and at age 14 each student has to choose one of the three types of secondary schools. Academic and vocational secondary schools offer a secondary-school diploma (similar to the German *abitur*) for their graduates, which enables them to enter institutions of higher education; vocational training schools provide a license for the specific occupation the student studied at the school, but s/he cannot continue her/his studies unless attending additional years at an academic or a vocational secondary school.[21] Accordingly, it can be stated that academic schools are ranked highest in society; vocational secondary schools are of lower value, since they offer less chance for college/university attendance, and very few students opt for vocational training schools, if they have other opportunities. The difference between the performances of the three secondary school types is evident from the international PISA studies as well. Students of the academic secondary schools scored higher in mathematics than any of the participating nations' average, while vocational training schools underperformed the last one. It is also shown by Varga[22] and others that rates of returns measured by expected income of the various levels of completed education in Hungary significantly increase with each additional level.

Although the students must take the first step by applying to a secondary school, the school is also allowed to select from among the applying children. The selection thus consists of a two step procedure: first parents and students decide where to apply, then the school selects from the applicants according to their own specific criteria.

As a consequence, it seems adequate to use continuation data to measure the performance of primary schools, because the future earnings and life circumstances of people depend heavily on the length and completed level of education. Since schools select the most promising children, using the continuation data to measure quality can come close to measuring the students' future level of education and the schools' success of helping them to continue their studies in better schools. However, one must note that the selection of a secondary school measures not only individual merit or talent but also depends heavily on individual motivation. Unfortunately, at present there is no other performance measure available for eighth graders, such as literacy or math scores. Hence I must assume that these unobserved characteristics of students' ability or motivation correlate heavily with their socio-economic background, which is controlled for.

As I have mentioned before the school system in Hungary is highly decentralized both in regulating and in financing the institutes. This fact allows for a highly

[20] Kertesi and Kézdi, "Altonos," 483.

[21] A detailed English description of the Hungarian education system can be found in Lannert and Halász, *Education in Hungary*.

[22] Julia Varga, "Az oktatás megtérülési rátái Magyarországon" [Educational rates of return in Hungary] *Közgazdasági Szemle* (June. 1995): 583-605.

differentiated quality of schooling in different settlements.

In March 2003, the Research Center of the Hungarian National Institute for Public Education carried out a research project which included a short questionnaire sent to all ninth grade students studying in academic, secondary vocational or vocational training schools. In this survey the students were asked to name the primary school where they had finished their studies. This created a possibility to trace the path of individual students. In other words, it became possible to estimate the percentage of students continuing studies in academic secondary, vocational secondary and vocational training schools from each primary school, and hence to create an output measure based on these percentages. Data on socio-economic background characteristics were also collected.

Out of the 122,262 ninth grade students officially registered in secondary schools in the 2002/03 academic year, 113,649 responded to the survey, of which a little less than 100,000 responses could be considered, due to missing data in some questionnaires. The number of schools that replied to the survey was also quite large; more than 85% of all secondary level institutions replied. The response rate was 85% at the academic secondary schools, 92% at the vocational secondary schools, and only 69% at the purely vocational training schools.

On the primary school level there are three potential reasons why there would be no information about a specific student: either s/he did not continue her/his studies, or was missing from the class when the questionnaire was filled out (or simply declined to respond), or the entire secondary school failed to respond to the survey. The first two types of non-responses are unavoidable. We can assume randomized individual non-responses in class, but the lack of information about those who dropped out of the system is a greater problem. Since the number of these cases is supposedly higher in small settlements, this would lead to an overestimation of small settlement school effectiveness. I have attempted to correct the institutional and individual non-responses by generating weighting formulations for the primary schools, the types of the secondary schools where the students entered, and the small regions where the secondary schools are located.

Other school level data were obtained from the official national educational statistics and population data were gained from the official annual statistics of the National Statistical Bureau. (Sources of variables are in Table 3.)

Method and variables

The outcome is a nominal three-value "continuing studies" variable. I used individual level multinomial logit regressions with standard errors clustered on institutional level to compare the percentage of students continuing studies in academic, vocational secondary and vocational training schools, with vocational secondary schools being the comparison category. Hence when interpreting the results, we might consider the vocational training school as a "negative" and the academic school as a "positive" outcome, meaning that the goal of the school should be to lower the percentage of students continuing their studies in vocational training schools – as compared to vocational secondary schools providing both vocational and academic training – and increase the number of students entering academic secondary institutions. The multinomial logit regression enables us to compare these two measures of effectiveness simultaneously, on the same sample. Since most of the variables in the regression are dummy variables, the interpretation shouldn't pose a problem either. Clustering standard errors on the institutional level was necessary since school selection is not random, and thus we cannot assume independence of the students within schools.

I divided the different settlements into five distinct categories described in Table 2. Since the question in focus is the effectiveness of small settlements, I have used the middle category of small settlements – large villages – as the comparison category. The division between small and large villages was necessary in order to separate out those primary schools that are "in danger" of closing. Schools in small villages with fewer than 150 children, i.e. fewer than 20 students per grade, are by definition running under the level of economies of scale, and settlements under 1500 inhabitants usually do not have adequate resources to compensate for this fact. The definition of towns here is somewhat ad hoc[23]: they can still be considered as small settlements compared to cities (the average population of towns as administrative units is 18,779; towns under 10,000 inhabitants are in the bottom quartile with a population mean of 6917), but more than two-thirds of them have an academic secondary school, unlike the large villages (with a population mean of 3031), among which only 4% have an academic school. In addition to these, I have included a set of dummy variables to adjust for missing individual and institutional non-responses (not listed here- see Table 4 in the Appendix).

Empirical results

Individual level variables - Basic specification

The difference between the small and the large village schools are minor even before controlling for socio-economic status of the students, and are significant only at the 5% level. Town schools do not differ significantly from those in large villages where vocational training school continuation is concerned; i.e. there are no major differences between schools in

[23] Different specifications – namely towns defined as being fewer than 20000 inhabitants – produced similar results.

smaller settlements – small and large villages and towns - in negative performance. The initial unadjusted differences between larger settlement types are vast both on the negative and on the positive effectiveness side. Children in cities have a 16% chance to go to academic schools, which rises to 29% in Budapest. Similarly, students in cities have a 13% lower chance of entering vocational training schools compared to 8th graders in large villages, which rises to 23% in the capital.

Impact of socio-economic status

A notorious fact from the PISA 2000 study[24] is that among all participating nations, Hungarian children's performance correlated the most with their parents' socio-economic characteristics (230). The Hungarian educational system is highly incapable of reducing initial differences between children of different backgrounds. The magnitude of the individual-level factors seems to support this conclusion. In the analysis, the comparison category consisted of parents with secondary level education, each having a secondary school diploma from either a secondary vocational or an academic school. A university diploma of either the mother or the father increased the chances of the children to enter an academic school by more than 20%, separately. The same effect of a college degree is around 10-15%, while a lower than primary school educational level of the parents decreased the chances of the children by 12-13%. Similarly, if either the mother or the father was unemployed the year before the survey, the probability of choosing vocational training schools increased by 5%. In addition, if the family was entitled to educational aid – meaning that they are a low-income family – the vocational training school choice was 11% more probable.

Controlling for socio-economic status, the small and large village differences fully disappear, while the cleavage between large villages as opposed to the cities and the capital diminishes to 6% and 8% in positive performance terms, and to 3% and 8% in negative performance terms.

Distance

The distance from the nearest academic school – the distance between settlements – can be considered as a constraint; children must travel at least this much if they want to attend an academic school. If there is an academic school present in a settlement, the student has a choice of staying at home or entering a secondary school that has a dormitory in a different location, while students in small settlements usually do not have this option. This is clearly an exogenous constraint when we study the continuation of students. Although the marginal effect or the odds ratio of the square root of distance is less interpretable than the actual, linear distance, the square root is used since the effect of distance is more likely decreasing in size. Once the child has left home, the additional kilometers traveled matter less.

The effect of distance is not only significant; it also fully eliminates the differences across settlement types. After adjusting for socio-economic background and distance, almost all of the differences between settlement types vanish, and thus villages are undoubtedly not of worse quality as measured either by the negative or the positive quality measure (Figure 1 and 2). However, I must note that this does not mean that village schools are just as good as the others, but rather that they are just as bad in compensating for disadvantages.

Two additional peculiarities or exceptions can be observed in the 3rd regression below. The first is that primary schools in the capital have kept their advantage in negative terms, while they have lost it in positive terms. After adjusting for socio-economic characteristics and distance, students in smaller settlements will be just as likely to go to academic secondary schools as students in the capital (Figure 1). On the other hand, students in Budapest are still more likely to opt for secondary vocational schools than for vocational training schools. This remaining advantage in negative performance could be due to immeasurable features of the capital, such as the presence of many universities urging students to obtain a secondary school diploma, or the relative oversupply of jobs requiring not only vocational, but also more general training.

The other surprising result is that the adjusted positive performance of town schools still remains highly significant and becomes higher than that of the larger cities or the capital. Among the several hypotheses I have tried to use to address this fact, many have failed to explain this difference. Due to free school choice those children who can afford commuting, or whose cost of commuting is lower than the additional gains s/he expects to make from attending school in a larger settlement, will be more likely to choose a different primary school outside the school district. These students are likely to be more strongly motivated than the average. The first hypothesis explaining the outstanding performance of town schools is that more motivated students in small or large villages could potentially raise the effectiveness of town schools if many of these children chose them, instead of staying in their own primary schools. I have tried to proxy the effect by creating the "commuting up" variable, but it did not affect the performance of the town schools (Table 2, Equation 4). The proxy nevertheless worked, since it showed a significant effect both in the negative and in the positive effectiveness measures. Those children who chose to go to a primary school in a larger settlement were 4% more likely to enter academic secondary institutions than the others, while those same

[24] OECD, PISA

commuting students would be 2% more likely to opt for vocational training schools.

Table 2. Results of the individual level multinomial logit regressions

Means, standard deviations and sources of variables

	(1) National mean	(2) Capital	(3) City	(4) Town	(5) Large Village	(6) Small Village	Source of data
Primary, father	0.09	0,04	0,07	0,10	0,13	0,14	1
	(0.28)	(0,20)	(0,25)	(0,31)	(0,34)	(0,35)	
Vocational training, father	0.36	0.17	0.32	0.42	0.46	0.49	1
	(0.48)	(0.38)	(0.47)	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.50)	
Academic or Vocational Secondary. father	0.32	0.34	0.34	0.32	0.28	0.26	1
	(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.45)	(0.44)	
College. father	0.09	0.15	0.12	0.06	0.05	0.03	1
	(0.29)	(0.36)	(0.32)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.17)	
University. father	0.09	0.23	0.10	0.04	0.02	0.01	1
	(0.28)	(0.42)	(0.30)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.11)	
Primary. mother	0.15	0.06	0.11	0.20	0.23	0.25	1
	(0.36)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.43)	
Vocational training. mother	0.21	0.10	0.20	0.24	0.28	0.31	1
	(0.41)	(0.30)	(0.40)	(0.43)	(0.45)	(0.46)	
Academic or Vocational Secondary. mother	0.39	0.40	0.41	0.39	0.35	0.33	1
	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.48)	(0.47)	
College. mother	0.15	0.22	0.18	0.12	0.09	0.07	1
	(0.36)	(0.42)	(0.38)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.25)	
University. mother	0.07	0.18	0.07	0.03	0.02	0.01	1
	(0.25)	(0.38)	(0.26)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.09)	
Unemployed. father	0.13	0.07	0.11	0.16	0.18	0.19	1
	(0.34)	(0.25)	(0.31)	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.40)	
Unemployed. mother	0.18	0.10	0.15	0.22	0.24	0.26	1
	(0.39)	(0.30)	(0.36)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.44)	
Educational aid	0.26	0.20	0.22	0.30	0.33	0.35	1
	(0.44)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.48)	
Female	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.48	1
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	
Commuting up	0.11	0.10	0.13	0.13	0.09	0.13	1
	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.28)	(0.33)	
Merged class	0.19	0.02	0.08	0.56	0.34	0.18	2
	(0.39)	(0.13)	(0.28)	(0.50)	(0.47)	(0.38)	
6 or 8 year long academic secondary	0.09	0.20	0.12	0.08	0.01	0.00	2
	(0.29)	(0.40)	(0.33)	(0.27)	(0.08)	(0.00)	
Ratio of teachers with university degree	0.14	0.30	0.16	0.09	0.06	0.04	2
	(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.06)	
Ratio of teachers with lower than college degree	0.26	0.20	0.24	0.29	0.30	0.28	2
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.21)	
More than 2 types of vocational training available in the settlement	0.55	0.85	0.88	0.27	0.04	0.01	2
	(0.50)	(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.44)	(0.20)	(0.11)	
No academic school present in the settlement	0.35	0.00	0.01	0.34	0.96	1.00	2
	(0.48)	(0.00)	(0.12)	(0.47)	(0.19)	(0.06)	
Distance from nearest academic school	4.64	0.00	0.19	5.17	12.45	14.51	3
	(7.26)	(0.00)	(1.06)	(8.09)	(6.26)	(6.57)	
Village	0.05	-	-	-	-	-	3
	(0.22)						
Small Settlement	0.28	-	-	-	-	-	3
	(0.45)						
Town	0.08	-	-	-	-	-	3
	(0.27)						
City	0.45	-	-	-	-	-	3
	(0.50)						
Capital	0.14	-	-	-	-	-	3
	(0.35)						

Notes: Individual level means shown with standard deviation in parentheses below. Source codes: 1 - National Institute for Public Education. Survey; 2 - Annual Statistics of the Ministry of Education; 3 - Central Statistical Bureau

This seemingly controversial impact of the variable can be explained by the differences in settlement types. In small villages, where there is no primary school, or where the primary school lasts only for four years, children must attend a larger school. These children are more likely to attend vocational training schools later. On the other hand, those children who opt for a larger settlement school not due to some constraint, but rather for motivational reasons, are to be expected to enter academic schools.

The second possible way of explaining the outstanding performance of town schools is based on the constraints apparent in towns. In most towns, there is an academic school present, and thus children will most likely stay in these after finishing primary school. Therefore, the towns – having otherwise similar socio-economic and school level characteristics – appear to be more efficient than large village institutions. Nevertheless, the supply of vocational schools is much more constrained in towns than in cities or in Budapest. Children with a special occupation in mind have fewer chances to enter the appropriate specific vocational school in their town, and thus will more likely opt for the present academic school (Table 2, Equation 5). However appealing this argumentation is, the inclusion of the two dummies – no academic school present in towns, and presence of more than two of the four possible types of vocational schools – did not decrease the differences in the performance between cities and towns with an academic school. The included variables, on the other hand, showed the hypothesized effect: the absence of an academic school in towns lowered the chances of choosing an academic instead of a vocational secondary school by 7%. The presence of more than two available vocational tracks lowered by almost 3% the likelihood of opting for academic schools, but the influence was not very strong and is significant only on the 5% level.

I could not test the third possible reason for the unresolved performance difference of town schools versus city schools due to its highly theoretical character. The schools and the towns themselves are small enough to incorporate both the advantages of smallness without the problems of economies of size and the benefit of having an academic secondary school nearby. In essence, small towns incorporate the advantages of villages and cities without their drawbacks.[1] Needless to say, even if this assumption is correct, the question of the quality of the academic schools in towns still needs to be researched, particularly whether they provide the same rates of return or the same literacy and math skills as schools in larger settlements.

Figure 1. Predicted percentage of students going to academic schools



Figure 2. Predicted percentage of students going to vocational training schools



In short, it seems that individual social status and choice constraints fully account for the differences between the urban and rural settlements. Interestingly though, it is well known that schools in larger settlements are better equipped, employ more qualified teachers, and use other techniques – like the 6 or 8 year long academic tracks – to select children at an early stage. This means that small settlement schools can most probably make use of their smallness, since even before controlling for school-level characteristics they can provide the same quality education. In the following, I will test the effects of these average school differences, since most policy conclusions can only be drawn on the school level.

Impact of school level variables

The variables tested above are assumed to be exogenous—neither the socio-economic status nor the distance traveled should matter when a child applies to

[1] "At the school level, production function studies provide some evidence that moderately-sized elementary schools (300-500 students) and high schools (600-900 students) may optimally balance economies of size with the negative effects of large schools." (Andrews, Duncombe and Yinger, "Revisiting economies of size in American education", 246.)

a secondary school. Although the reality sometimes contradicts this assumption, theoretically we should control for the students' background characteristics when measuring the performance of schools.

The Hungarian educational system, similar to many decentralized, free school-choice systems, is highly segregating. Parents usually do not look at the adjusted effectiveness of the schools or how well it teaches its students, but rather at the socio-economic composition of school peers or the unadjusted performance measured by university or college acceptance ratios. On the other hand, schools will do many things to attract the best students, since that allows them to attract the best teachers and creates more money – for example through parental donations – and less work. In the following, I will try to test four variables that have the potential of being interconnected with the error term or may proxy features that result from the dependent variable.

Early selection and merged classes

If a secondary school program runs for six or eight years, the students will probably stay in the same school for the additional four years after eighth grade. Merged classes are only necessary in those schools where the number of students or the lack of money does not allow for separate classes for the different age cohorts. Controlling for these should result in more accurate measures of performance, since they basically lie outside the decisions of the recent school leadership or the staff. Nevertheless, they still can be considered somewhat problematic in the equation; the percentage of six- and eight-year long schools is higher in larger settlements, while the merged classes are more typical of small schools. After the transition, in the middle of the 1990s, most "elite" secondary schools started to run either a six- or an eight-year long track, with a quasi-explicit incentive for skimming off the most talented students at a younger age. Although the possibility of founding such new programs was abolished in 1998, running programs were preserved and the system had already been segregated by then. Needless to say, if we control for these, we will implicitly assume that each settlement has the same ratio of "elite" schools (the merged class being on the opposite end). Equation 6 shows how the different settlement effects have changed. The differences between large villages versus cities and the capital have grown, so that the probability for a student in a small settlement to enter academic secondary school is now greater than that of a larger-city student. This means that by controlling for the effect of early selection of students into academic tracks, small settlement schools outperform larger ones. That is, "normal," eight-year long primary schools, without merged classes, perform better in smaller settlements, in positive performance terms.

Highly qualified teachers

The effect of highly educated teachers is also controversial. It is possible that the ratio of teachers with a university degree and its opposite, the ratio of teachers with a lower than college degree, is endogenous in the estimation. Highly educated teachers tend to be occupied in cities mainly due not to financial reasons – the salary of civil servants is legally regulated – but because of better living conditions and more importantly, because of less problematic students. Nonetheless, controlling for this ratio is essential for policy reasons. It can proxy three interconnected features of the educational system: first, that highly educated teachers teach better; second, the sorting between schools; and finally that economies of size might be present (large schools can pay more for teachers due to the per-student lump-sum grant financing). All of the above can be modified by policy; one can improve teacher education, change the selection mechanisms in the system, or allocate more resources for teachers' salaries. Because of the ambiguous character of the variable, the size of its effect cannot truly be judged, but it is highly significant in both positive and negative performance terms and the changes it induces in the coefficient of the settlement effect in the capital is also important: it lowers the predicted ratio of students entering academic schools in Budapest.

The significance of these two school-level variables can lead to two conclusions. The first is that six- or eight-year long academic schools, or schools with more qualified teachers, are better. Since adjusting for the qualified teachers decreased school performance, one could assume that the quality of education is higher when there are a higher number of qualified teachers. However a second conclusion can also be drawn. It is possible that these variables proxy a selection among schools according to unobserved characteristics of the students. If quality teachers prefer to teach children who are more motivated or have higher ability, the measures of teacher quality can proxy the effect of these on the output.

The increasing differences in settlement effects can be similarly understood. If we assume equally qualified teachers and compare only eight-year long primary schools without merged classes, small settlement institutions perform better. This can indicate two things: small settlement schools are better, or there is a selection according to unobserved characteristics. Small schools might be better due to smallness of the school or of the settlement itself, according to reasons listed in the introduction. However, if we assume that this observed difference is due to selection, we might suppose that average eight-year long primary schools in the capital are more likely to be adversely selected. For instance, those students who had the chance to enter the six- or eight-year long secondary schools already did

so, and qualified teachers will also more probably opt to teach there. The apparent difference in performance between the small settlements and the capital show this adverse-selection effect.

Although most studies suggest that selection is apparent in a decentralized system of free choice,[2] one cannot settle the issue using this cross-sectional data. In order to decide which of these effects is better captured by the school variables, longitudinal data should be used. However troubling is the inadequacy of data available with which to continue research, the initial question has clearly been answered: small settlement schools are not of inferior quality.

Conclusions

The aim of this study was to analyze the performance of small settlement schools. In general, I can conclude that small settlement schools do not provide education of inferior quality compared to larger-settlement schools, yet the major gaps in unadjusted performances still call for major changes. The possibility of free school choice and the decentralized structure of the Hungarian education produce a school system highly segregated along socio-economic lines, and even if it seems tempting to conclude that small schools, or small settlements are no worse than their larger city peers after adjusting for socio-economic status and exogenous constraints, we cannot be lulled into complacency. We can only assert that small settlement schools are just as bad as the larger ones in compensating for initial social inequalities, but at least they do not increase the differences inherent in society. Additional attention and structural changes are called for in order to decrease these existing cleavages. Nevertheless, proponents of primary school consolidation should not argue with quality differences.

Surprisingly, towns with academic schools can assist their students better in entering academic schools, maybe by utilizing smallness and low constraints. Smallness most likely has its purported advantages, since small settlement schools can provide the same educational quality even if we do not control for school-level features. It is also evident that the availability of school choice options, measured by the distance from the nearest academic school, increases the performance of schools. Policies that decrease the cost of choosing schools outside of one's settlement – for instance by providing bussing, or better dormitory systems – could increase the percentage of children attending academic schools.

Finally, it is suggested either that larger six- or eight-year long academic schools with more qualified teachers perform better, an advantage that is counterbalanced by the smallness of the small settlements, or more probably that the school level features proxy unobserved selection among schools, and larger settlements benefit more from this process than smaller ones.

Table 4. and 5. can be found in Appendix A

[2] Denis Epple and Richard Romano, "Neighborhood Schools, Choice, and the Distribution of Educational benefits", *NBER Working Paper Series 7850* (August 2000).

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MOBILIZING POLITICAL SUPPORT DURING THE "ORANGE REVOLUTION": THE CONSTITUTIVE ROLE OF IDEOLOGICAL PRACTICES[1]

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Abstract

For almost a decade the countries of the former USSR that form the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) were characterized as "competitive authoritarian regimes" that have formal democratic institutions but "fail to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy"[2]. During this period, the image of the region was associated with the technologies of administrative control over political processes, including "managed elections" with predetermined results, referenda on the elimination of presidential term limits, and suppression of the free press and opposition. The subsequent success of the "revolutionary" political projects by the opposition in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan suggests a need to rethink this received view on "doing politics" in post-Soviet conditions (when decision-making takes place exclusively within bureaucratic-oligarchic "cabinets") and, particularly, to explore the issue of the direct involvement of masses in the political struggles. The spontaneity and absence of objective socio-economic preconditions of the "Orange revolution" makes it problematic to analyze the event in terms of traditional rationalist and structuralist methodologies. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to emphasize the role of ideological practices in mobilizing support and engaging millions of people in the manifestations of protest.

Introduction

A "Color revolution" is a new word in the contemporary political jargon that can be defined as massive street protests leading to an overthrow of a government that is accused of "authoritarianism", "corruption" and "national treason". The popular mobilization in response to rigged elections in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005) became a demonstration of the inability of the post-Soviet governments to legitimize themselves exclusively by means of administrative manipulations. The success of the Georgian "Rose revolution" that led to the resignation of President Eduard Schevarnadze was previously considered to be an outlying case, caused by the extreme unpopularity of Schevarnadze's government due to the prolonged period of economic depression and perpetual energy crisis.[3] Consequently, in the case of Ukraine, with its large administrative apparatus, influential oligarchs, and almost no access of the opposition to mass media, few international and Ukrainian experts believed in the ability of the opposition's candidate Viktor Yushchenko either to win the elections of 2004 or to engage his supporters in successful massive demonstrations of protest after an electoral fraud happened (most experts had agreed that there would be fraud). Interestingly, George Soros, during his public speech in Central European University (Budapest) on 9 November 2004 (between the first and the second round of the election), expressed doubts about Yushchenko's potential to lead a civil disobedience campaign after the elections were rigged.

The spontaneity and absence of objective socio-economic preconditions for the Ukrainian events suggest the need to approach the political processes and social movements in the countries of the former Soviet Union from a new angle. The methodology of post-Marxist discourse theory is applied to analyze the political project of the Orange revolution not in the essentialist terms of recruiting support on the basis of preexisting and relatively stable demographic characteristics or objective interests, but as an ideological construction of support base and political mobilization within the discourse of the project. The main argument of the paper is that the identification with the political project of the "Orange Revolution" went through the development of a construct of "the Ukrainian nation". I will argue that unlike traditional post-Soviet ethnocentric national projects, it became a heterogeneous formation, based on several discourses (nationalistic, socialist and liberal-democratic).

The hypothesis that I put forward is that popular identification with the "revolutionary" political project was achieved through the construction by ideological practices of collective imaginary around the signifier *"narod"* (Ukrainian and Russian for "people", "nation"). Secondly, this discourse was stabilized by condensing meanings around the antagonistic poles of *"narod"* and *"vlada"* ("authorities"). In the construction of this social antagonism, *the logic of equivalence* (the logic of polarization of society)[4] permitted the construction of equivalences amongst various groups as "narod" (nationalists = socialists = liberal democrats) versus "vlada" (the incumbent president Leonid Kuchma = the cabinet of Viktor Yanukovych = Central Electoral Committee = the oligarchs who supported the candidacy of

[1] This article represents an adapted form of the MA Thesis defended at the Department of Political Science in June 2005.

[2] Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13 (4/2002): 51–65.

[3] Revaz Sakevarishvili and Margarita Akhvlediani, "'Rose Revolution' Sweeps away Shevarnadze," *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, 24 November 2003. http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/cau/cau_200311_ga_01_1_eng.txt

[4] Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 2001), 129-130.

Yanukovych). I will argue that this articulation of political subject positions in the construction of the revolutionary agent on the basis of the overdetermination (multi-causality)[5] of various groups and movements played the decisive role in the successful mobilization of political support for the "revolutionary" project.

The paper will consist of two chapters. The first chapter will comprise a brief historical introduction to the "Orange revolution", where I will point out the absence of objective socio-economic factors that could be regarded as its causes. Then, upon explaining the reason for the rejection of structuralist methodology, I will go into the historical background of post-structuralist approaches to social movements and political projects (including post-Marxist discourse theory), which emphasize the role of construction of identity for a support base, instead of relying on predetermined essentialist social structures and identities. Finally, the theory of identification by Stuart Hall will be introduced and considered for application to my particular case.

The second chapter will analyze the ideological practices that provided for the political mobilization, based on a discourse analysis of the speeches of the leaders of the "Revolution", Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko. Two aspects of the "revolutionary" identity politics will be distinguished. First, I will focus on the constitution of the "revolutionary identity" around the signifier, the ideal object of identification – "Ukrainian nation" (*narod Ukrainy*). An outlook of the genealogy and the evolution of the construct of "Ukrainian nation" since the beginning of the 1990s will be taken, including the distinction of this category of identification with that of the classical Eastern European nationalistic projects of the 1990s. The second part of this chapter will focus on how "the enemy" was constructed as "the authorities" and how the discursive system that produced social positions for identification was stabilized around the social antagonism of the "Ukrainian nation versus the authorities". I will also pay attention to the discourses of criminalization of "the authorities" and the victimization of the leaders of the "Revolution" that contributed to the justification of the "revolutionary action".

The case of the "Orange Revolution": in search of a theoretical framework

The dichotomy of "conspiracy" versus "emancipatory struggle"

It is typical that unexpected regime changes in various parts of the world are received with suspicion by international observers, the questions usually being asked: "who financed it?" or "who plotted it?" (or more generally, "who is behind it all?"). Different sorts of conspiracy theories that reveal the presence of outside actors are born. The cases of "Color revolutions" in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan are no exceptions in that they gave rise to various speculations about the forces and interests involved.

However, in the case of the "Orange Revolution" more detailed observations show that the involvement of outside forces proved to be much more favorable for the governmental candidate prime minister Viktor Yanukovych, as he was heavily backed by Russian president Vladimir Putin, who made several visits to Ukraine before the elections and directly supported Yanukovych on Ukrainian TV. The financial support from Russia was even more substantial, as a Russian non-governmental edition states that Russian business groups that closely cooperate with government funded about 50 % of Yanukovych's 900 – 1,500 million US dollar campaign[6]. At the same time, the USA government officially assigned only about 18 million dollars to the Ukrainian NGOs that were monitoring the freedom and fairness of the elections and training observers and members of electoral committees, without supporting any particular candidate[7]. Certainly, there was an outflow of funds and/or human resources from the NGO grantees to the oppositional campaign organizers. However, the overall estimation of financial and administrative resources involved in the two campaigns shows a gigantic inequality between the opportunities of both sides. According to the data of The Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, the funding of Yushchenko's campaign was limited to 50 million dollars and was mainly funded by small and middle Ukrainian business[8], in contrast with Yanukovych's campaign, which was financed by Ukrainian and Russian oligarchs.

Another widespread explanation of the Ukrainian events is based on the representation of the "Orange revolution" as a popular democratic movement for freedom. The leading Ukrainian philosopher Myroslav Popovych, following the expression of President Yushchenko that "before, we were independent, now we have become independent and free", argues that the participants of the mass street protests against the government were mainly inspired by the desire to be free[9].

This emancipatory character of the "Orange revolution" is more than questionable from the point of view of radical plural democratic perspective,

[5] Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony*, 97-98.

[6] Maria Barinova, "Proekt Rossia" *Profil.ru*, 22 November 2004, (in Russian). http://www.profile.ru/items/?item=10201

[7] Dmitry Sudakov, "USA Assigns $ 20 Million for Elections in Ukraine in Moldova," *Pravda.ru*, 11 March 2005. http://english.pravda.ru/world/20/91/368/15092_usa.html

[8] Yuriy Yakimenko and Ihor Zhdanov, "The Formula of The Orange Victory: Notes by Concerned Observers," *Mirror Weekly*, 22 January 2005. http://www.mirror-weekly.com/ie/show/530/49002/

[9] Myroslav Popovych, "Pered Vichnym Maidanom," *Krytyka*, No. 3(89) (March 2005): 2-3.

advocated by the founders of the Essex school of post-Marxism, Laclau and Mouffe. A "revolutionary" movement that is constituted as a movement for "national freedom" represents an object of criticism from the post-Marxist perspective that postulates a need for "a chain of equivalence among the various democratic struggles against different forms of subordination" [10]. The fact that the existence of "alternative voices" was not recognized during the struggle under the slogans of "redistribution of powers" from "the authorities" to "the nation" results in the impossibility to recognize the "Orange revolution" as a radical plural democratic struggle. Instead of articulation of the anti-racist, feminist and environmentalist struggles with those of the workers, national minorities, the "Orange Revolution" became a project of formation of a homogeneous social movement with the focus on the national component.

Post-structuralist approaches to the political analysis: the application of post-Marxist discourse theory to the case of the "Orange Revolution"

In search of a theoretical framework for the analysis of the "Orange Revolution", the first impulse is to turn to the contemporary reinterpretations of classic Marxism that seek to explain social movements and revolutions with reference to social structures of societies. Though identified by some observers as "the revolution of the middle-class,"[11] it is hardly possible to represent the events in terms of objective class interests due to the involvement of various strata, interpellated by the "revolutionary" ideology as the "Ukrainian nation".

Therefore, the "Orange Revolution" is not an exceptional political phenomenon in that it is difficult to explain using structural approaches to political and social movements. In order to find famous analogous examples of "almost purely" ideological projects, we may turn to the sudden rise of the New Social Movements in the late 1970s and 1980s that signified a crisis for traditional Marxist approaches to politics. The support bases of the multitude of New Movements (e.g. feminist, environmentalist, pacifist) were difficult to define in class terms, as they encompassed the increasingly blurred together social stratum of the "new middle classes" and "new working class", and its members were not likely to have stable career paths. The institutional focus on the movements did not seem to be productive either, as, usually, no stable political organizations were formed.[12]

Therefore, "rather than seeing movements as appealing to and recruiting from support bases defined by certain preexisting and relatively stable demographic characteristics, observers now see movements as engaged in discourses and practices that create and constitute such support bases"[13]. Moreover, such dimensions of political participation as "affective attachment" and "sentiments of belonging to a … social group where members can feel powerful" have been included in the new approaches to social movements[14]. Consequently, in the postmodern era of new possibilities and flexible identity politics, political projects are often addressed as discursive formations that are constructed through intense political struggle and "create collective identities such as gender, nationality, sexual orientation, social class, religion, ethnicity, and race"[15].

In the context of the difficulties experienced by structure and organization-centered theoretical approaches in explaining the contemporary trends in social movements, new theories were developed that sought to investigate the contingent formation of social phenomena instead of pregiven social structures, and the processes of mobilizing political support instead of focusing on objective group interests. For example, the post-Marxist discourse theory rejects the class reductionism and economic determinism of classical Marxism. In their works, discourse theorists put emphasis on the constitution of social structures and identities in the process of power struggles, "conceived in terms of the political acts of inclusion and exclusion."[16]

A central aim of analysis in discourse theory is "to locate and analyze the mechanisms by which meaning is produced, fixed, contested, and subverted" in the process of articulation of discursive systems [17]. Therefore, among the research objects of discourse theory are "the constitution of political identities, the practices of hegemonic articulation among particular discourses and subjectivities, the construction of social antagonisms and the establishment of political frontiers," which are the myths and fantasies that make identification possible[18].

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[10] Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony*, xviii.

[11] Evgen Volynsky, "Klerki Vseh Stran, Obyediniaytes!" ili Uroki Ukrainskoy Revoliuzii dlia Zapada", *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 23 February 2005, (in Russian). http://www.pravda.com.ua/archive/2005/february/23/4.shtml

[12] Roberta Garner and John Tenuto, *Social Movement Theory and Research: an Annotated Bibliographical Guide* (Pasadena, Calif.: Salem Press, 1997), 34-35.

[13] Garner, *Social Movement Theory*, 34.

[14] Yannis Stavrakakis, "Passions of Identification: Discourse, Enjoyment, and European Identity," in *Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance*, ed. David Howarth and Jacob Torfing (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 71; Hank Johnston, Enrique Larana, and Joseph R. Gusfield, "Identities, grievances, and new social movements" in *New social movements: from sociology to identity*, ed. Hank Johnston, Enrique Larana, and Joseph R. Gusfield (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 10.

[15] Garner, *Social Movement Theory*, 38.

[16] David Howarth, "Discourse Theory" in *Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance*, ed. David Howarth and Jacob Torfing (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 23.

[17] David Howarth, "Applying Discourse Theory" in *Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance*, ed. David Howarth and Jacob Torfing (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 341.

[18] Howarth, "Applying Discourse Theory", 321.

Several characteristic features of the "Orange Revolution" include:

1) The formation of a contingent "revolutionary" identity that was not based on social structures and interests;
2) The identification of the actors across the newly constructed dichotomies, through which meanings of actions and social positions was created;
3) The formation of the emotional attachment to the project through the existence of a common "signifier", a desired object of identification, "the Ukrainian nation." These features all suggest the possibility of application of the methodology off post-Marxist discourse theory to the analysis of the issue of political mobilization during the "Orange Revolution" (through the production of collective "revolutionary" identity, which was not based on pre-given essentialist classes, nations or ethno-linguistic groups).

Dealing with the problem of identity formation as the basis of winning political support, it is important to recognize various aspects of identification as they are distinguished in the literature. For example, a British scholar of cultural studies, Stuart Hall, points out two approaches to the issue. One is based on the psychoanalytical accounts of "the processes, which produce subjectivities", and another is concerned with interpellating individuals into particular subject positions, thus stabilizing discursive formations[19].

Identity formation within a discourse is possible only through a relation to other identities. Therefore, Laclau and Mouffe introduce "articulation" as "any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified." [20] As a result of articulatory practices, discourses (discursive systems) are created that present "constructions that establish systems of relations between different objects and practices, while providing (subject) positions with which social agents can identify."[21]

The discursive approach to identification deals with the stabilization of a discursive system through the construction of social antagonisms, which contribute to "the production of political frontiers, which often invoke stereotyped pictures of friends and enemies."[22] Antagonisms are possible through the negation and exclusion of "outside" identities that present "a threat" to "our" identity. As a result, the identity of a social group is constructed as "what the other is not" (e.g. West - East, capitalism – socialism, democracy – authoritarianism). "A constitutive outside … is both the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of any identity" [23], since any identity, created within a discourse, will not have a meaning in itself. A meaning becomes possible only in a relational system of differences. Therefore, the annihilation of "the enemy" that presents "a threat" and "blocks our full identity" will inevitably confront "us with our own self-blockage"[24].

For a political project to become hegemonic a discursive formation is to be constructed that distributes fixed meanings to all subjects within a social field. As identification is possible only through social antagonisms, a mechanism is necessary to condense multiple meanings around two antagonistic points. Such a mechanism in discourse theory is distinguished as *chain of equivalence*, which emphasizes the "sameness" of several "other" elements while at the same time providing for the inclusion of a variety of elements in a "we-group." [25] In other words, the formation of a hegemonic discursive system involves construction of a dominant dichotomy that comprises several social antagonisms, with meanings that are condensed around the two poles by a chain of equivalence.

On the basis of the post-Marxist discourse theory and Hall's account of identification, I will first try to demonstrate how the political imaginary of the "Orange revolution" was constructed by ideological practices focusing on the identification with the construct of "the Ukrainian nation." According to my hypotheses, it is the signifier of "the nation" that served as the basis for the unification of various "protest discourses" into a single political movement, providing for the formation of an inclusive "revolutionary identity".

Secondly, as the "revolutionary" subjectivity was constituted (chronologically it happened simultaneously), the discursive system of the political project had to be established and fixed. Accordingly, I will argue that the discourse of the "Orange Revolution" was stabilized around the social antagonism "nation versus authorities" by means of emphasizing "the threat" from the authorities, accusing them of "criminal activities" against "the nation". At the same time, the presence of "the enemy" made it possible to unite nationalistic, socialist and liberal-democratic ideologies against the unified threatening "other", the object of hate and abjection.

As Burgos argues on the example of the Mexican Revolution, the revolutionary agent was "a heterogeneous composite of different social groups", whose "identity was constituted through successive processes of identification with images provided by plans, manifestos, demonstrations, emblems, music …

[19] Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay eds., *Questions of cultural identity* (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1996), 5-6.
[20] David Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis, "Introducing Discourse Theory and Political Analysis" in *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies, and Social Change*, ed. David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis (Manchester: Manchester University, 2000), 7.
[21] Howarth and Stavrakakis, "Introducing Discourse Theory", 3.
[22] David Howarth, "Discourse Theory", 15-16.
[23] Jacob Torfing, *New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe, and Zizek* (Oxford : Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 51.
[24] Torfing, *New Theories of Discourse*, 52.
[25] David Howarth, "Discourse Theory", 15.

closing" etc.[26]. In this light, the speeches by political leaders, addressed to their actual (and potential) supporters during the decisive moments of political struggle may be considered to be fruitful sources to look for articulatory ideological practices, directed at the construction of the identities of social actors.

In the second part I investigate the articulatory ideological practices that constituted the collective identity of the "revolutionary" agent and try to find the chains of equivalence that were formed amongst initially different groups to represent them in terms of a single social antagonism that stabilized the discursive system of the "Orange revolution," providing for a collective revolutionary imaginary and for the articulation of political subject positions in the construction of the revolutionary agent.

Formation of the "revolutionary" discourse

The constitution of the "revolutionary" identity as the "Ukrainian nation" (narod)

The prominent element that provided for the constitution of the "revolutionary" identity was the construction of the imaginary object of identification - "Ukrainian nation" (narod) by the variety of discursive ideological practices (textual and visual). One example of such a practice is Yushchenko's attempt to associate his political project (and his success in the first round of elections) with the project of "the Ukrainian nation" and, consequently, his victory with "the victory of the Ukrainian nation". This almost irresistible "offer" to identify with "the nation" to enjoy "the victory" was pronounced by Yushchenko during his TV debates with Yanukovych before the second round:

> "On this election the authorities have opposed not the opposition; the authorities have opposed the nation. Nevertheless, I have defeated in the first round the candidate from the authorities. And most important is not my victory - it is the victory of Ukrainian democracy, the victory of the Ukrainian nation."

The question, I would like to address here is how the category of "Ukrainian nation" was constituted in Yushchenko's project. What elements made this political construct become an appealing object of identification? What were the promises that were giving to the people? What hopes did the people that became the members of "the nation" have?

As one of the main theoretical principles of the post-structural discourse theory is "the primacy of politics" (political practices) instead of the determinism of social structures,[27] following this approach I will address the category of "the Ukrainian nation" during the "Orange revolution" as a construct that was created by political (hegemonic) practices. On the other hand, new discourses and identities do not appear in vacuum. Instead, they arise through dislocations (that occur as a result of political practices) in the previous social structures[28]. Accordingly, a genealogical analysis of previous discursive and social constructions may help to understand the changes that happen during dislocations and to investigate the distinctive elements of new discursive formations.

Applying this genealogical perspective and looking for previous examples from the history of the region when the category of "nation" was used as the main object of identification in promoting political projects, one would obviously address the nationalistic ethnocentric enterprises of the 1990s. It is the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and of the Soviet Union in 1989-1991 that gave strong impulse to the unprecedented rise of nationalism in Eastern Europe. The great majority of post-Soviet leaders tried to preserve and increase their powers through the rhetoric of nationalism. "Ethnic entrepreneurs" realized that the revival of ethnic grievances could divert attention from the injustices of privatization and the formation of new economic oligarchies around the old nomenklatura.[29] The high point of the "nomenclatural nationalism" in early 1990s became the era when such leaders as Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, Ion Iliescu in Romania, and Dzhokhar Dudayev in Chechnya achieved their greatest successes by ethnicising disagreements over political issues and mobilizing support referring to the ethnical dividing lines. With different degree of efficiency, the pattern was applied all over the region.

The common feature of the successful nationalistic, ethno-linguistic, or ethno-religious projects of 1990s was the formation of essentialist ideals of nation, ethnos or religious confession. Myths about golden ages of national cultures were reinvented, and narratives about glorious ancestors were rediscovered. The history of Eastern European nations was and, in many respects, still is interpreted as continuous striving for national liberation, state independence, and restoration of "historical justice". Consequently, national identity is build around ethnically centered myth, symbols, values, songs, folklore, and traditions.

In the case of independent Ukraine, nationalistic ideology was a moderate success in legitimizing the authorities but the construct of "the Ukrainian nation" was never completely fixed. For example, American scholar Judy Batt, writing in 1998, summarizes this failure of ethnocentric-nationalistic project in post-

[26] Rosa Burgos, "The Mexican Revolutionary Mystique" in *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies, and Social Change*, ed. David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis (Manchester: Manchester University, 2000), 89-90.

[27] Torfing, *New Theories of Discourse*, 69.

[28] Howarth and Stavrakakis, "Introducing Discourse Theory", 13.

[29] Stefan Troebst and Farimah Daftary, *Radical Ethnic Movements in Contemporary Europe* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), 8.

Soviet Ukraine. "Ukraine is not and cannot be a 'nation-state,' not only because it contains a sizable minority of Russians with deep historical roots on their territory, but also because Ukrainians themselves are far from constituting a coherent and unified nation."[30] This lack of national identification prevented the first president Leonid Kravchuk from using the "nationalist card" to his advantage at the reelection in 1994, which he lost to Leonid Kuchma, the candidate strongly supported in Russian-speaking regions.

Kuchma's rise to presidency "signaled a shift to some degree in the prioritization of state policies with a greater emphasis upon state (not nation) hood" [31]. Instead of the attempts by national-democratic forces, with which Kravchuk allied himself, to form the Ukrainian nation according to the ethnocentric principle, the aim to create a state-centered national identity was put forward. The independence and relative stability of the new Ukrainian state was secured with the adoption of the constitution (however, Ukraine was the last post-Soviet state to have its modern constitution adopted) and the introduction of national currency in 1996, the signing of treaties on borders with Russia and Romania in 1997, where they refused their previous territorial demands to Ukraine and, finally, the achievement of economic growth for the first time since the independence in 2000. At the same time, politicians and scholars came to the understanding that loyalty to the state and patriotism could not appear without a coherent national ideology. As a Ukrainian author put it, "the state can have an army, police, ensure all-round political control. But, if it does not have the spiritual cement, an idea, then it is an entity without perspective, a weak creation"[32].

The inability of Ukrainians to win their national identity and "to became a real nation" is the painful experience of uncertainty and identity crisis that arouse feelings of a constant inferiority complex, constant loss and constant defeat. It is not accidental that on the first day of the "Orange revolution" Yulia Tymoshenko, the veteran of the opposition to president Kuchma and "second in command" after Yushchenko, giving a speech before the crowd of 100,000 on the Independence Square of Kiev and declaring the start of the organized actions of mass protests and civil disobedience, called to overcome the previous failures and defeats:

> "There will be no negotiations with these criminal authorities! There will be no mercy for they have ruined the choice of Ukraine. And I know: for the first time in thirteen years we will not leave Kiev without a victory. Is this right? - Yes!!!"

The victory of the opposition interpreted as "the victory of the nation" would, at the same time, signify the moment of nation formation. Tymoshenko gave her speech to the masses that had already been involved in several antagonisms that gave them motifs to act. People that comprised the crowd definitely knew their "enemies". This crowd had, however, different desires but still did not have unity. The main object of the project was to prove to the people that all those who associated themselves with projects of redistribution of the property of oligarchs, saving the nation, or defending themselves from state repressions were presenting a single group with common goals, desires and enemies. The interpellation of the crowd as "the Ukrainian nation" by Tymoshenko produced a fixed and appealing object of identification through the promise of victory, where the vague term "victory" signifies the realization of various and mostly incompatible desires of people.

> "The people will have their say. I don't believe in what Kuchma said about how the Ukrainian nation hasn't been born[33]. I want to ask you, do we exist? – (the crowd) Yes! - In this case, the victory will be ours! I believe in you. All the politicians, present here, believe in you!
>
> I want to ask you, will we be able to secure the victory?! – (the crowd) Yes!!! - I know that! I want to ask you, do you understand that a single person must not leave this square, except as a victor? - Yes!!!"

It was the promise of "victory", (which implies the promise of power and enjoyment), that was given to the crowd and became the reason for mobilization in the subject position of "the Ukrainian nation". As we see from the logic of the promise, it represents a kind of deal, where Tymoshenko speaks about "victory" only on condition that the people will form the group that will automatically enter the already delineated relations of social antagonism towards "the authorities."

The Constitution of "the Enemy" as "the Authorities" (Vlada) and the Stabilization of the Discursive System of the "Orange Revolution" around the Social Antagonism of "Nation versus Authorities"

"The exclusion of a threatening Otherness" is a crucial part in the construction of a social antagonism,

[30] Judy Batt, "Introduction" in *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation*, ed. Taras Kuzio, (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1998), 57.
[31] Taras Kuzio, ed., Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1998), 130.
[32] Kuzio, *Contemporary Ukraine*, 142.

[33] A decontextualization and misrepresentation of Kuchma's words by Tymoshenko. In one of his interviews Kuchma was complaining about the low degree of national identification of Ukrainians and said that nation formation was still in the process in Ukraine. Tymoshenko represented this as "denial of the existence of the nation".

which, first, complements (by adding meaning to) the formation of a social group (movement) and mobilizes this group against the "enemy."[34] The "others" are defined as those who commit a symbolic crime, the "stealing" of "our" possibility to identify with the object of desire (e.g. Jews, Gypsies, Blacks "steal" the purity of a nation and block a national identity)[35]. In the case of the "Orange Revolution" this blockage of the identification with the "nation" was expressed through the emphasis on the victory of the nation (victory as the electoral success and the formation of the nation "here and now"), which was "stolen" by the "enemy". And, in this context, the stealing of the newly achieved "true self" of the nation, or, rather, the blocking of the people's desire to fulfill their identification dreams, is the object of a particular stress ("There will be no mercy for they have ruined the choice of Ukraine").

The nation is presented as a group that "deserves" to have the object of desire, to achieve their full identity, as Tymoshenko is calling them "the best Ukrainian elite both on the square, and on the rostrum". The citizens of Kiev, to whom she is giving a speech on the Independence Square, are addressed as "the best, the most intellectual, the most active part that can give impetus to the rest of Ukraine". Therefore, the act of mobilization and struggle against "vlada" is not an aggressive war for power. Instead, it is a festival, a completely justified regaining of something that already belongs to the nation ("will we be able to secure the victory?! - Yes!!!", "today we start our triumphal procession!").

The crucial element in stabilizing the discursive system of the "Orange Revolution" was the condensing of meanings in constructing both the revolutionary agent ("the nation" - narod) and the "enemy" ("the authorities" - vlada) around the poles of the social antagonism through constructing chains of equivalence between several social elements. The logic of social antagonisms depends on a chain of equivalence that is used to achieve the effect of "the sameness of the excluded elements." This process is necessary for the creation of a unified "we-group" versus "they-group". For example, during the Mexican Revolution "the enemy was represented as the oppressor who could be impersonated by the government = the dictator president Porfirio Diaz = the Cientificos cabinet = the Church = the landlords = the entrepreneurs"[36]. An example of a practice producing a similar effect is Tymoshenko's speech in the parliament, when she calls the deputies not to recognize the official results of the second round (the victory of Yanukovych) due to fraud, and to declare Viktor Yushchenko president. The chain of equivalence is created between the authorities (the term itself constitutes an equivalence between the incumbent president Leonid Kuchma, the cabinet of Viktor Yanukovych, the pro-governmental candidate for the presidency, the pro-governmental deputies of Verkhovna Rada, the Central Electoral Committee) and oligarchs (who supported the candidacy of Yanukovych) to form the single element of "vlada", with the marker of criminality attached to it.

The substitutiveness of the "enemies" also provides for the overdetermination of several antagonisms to form a unified political process: nationalism – the struggle against "traitors of the Ukrainian nation", socialism – the movement to restore social justice and redistribute the wealth of "criminal oligarchs", and liberalism – the ideology that is aimed at protection of citizens from "the repressive state".

For example, nationalistic anti-Russian rhetoric was used by Yushchenko to accuse "the authorities" (under this label Yanukovych and Kuchma go together) of betraying national interests and directly submitting to orders from Russia. Several meetings of Kuchma and Yanukovych with Putin (including Kuchma's trips to Moscow and the Crimea) before and during the electoral campaign are presented as a "humiliation" of Ukrainian statesmen before a foreign power:

> "That is why I agree [with the protesters] on one point: it is time to stop electing the Ukrainian president in Moscow. And these visits either in the Crimea or Moscow humiliate any candidate from an independent Ukraine. This issue concerns Moscow, as well as Brussels and Warsaw. I am sure that we have a country that is capable of electing its president by its own will."

Liberal pro-free-market rhetoric was used by Yushchenko during the debates with Yanukovych to criticize "criminal authorities" of discouraging foreign investments in Ukraine. At the same time, logic of equivalence aims at uniting Kuchma, Yanukovych and Medvedchuk (head of Kuchma's administration) to present them as constituting "the criminal regime", which blocks the liberal dream of having "the most modern market in Europe" in Ukraine. While, of course, "the people" of Ukraine (together with "the opposition") do not present a threat to foreign investments:

> "We have enough capacities to have the most modern market in Europe here. What are investors afraid of? The criminal authorities! Excuse me, I am talking about the authorities, not about the opposition and not about the people. These are the authorities, who are criminal. Three billion dollars are invested in Russia, 7 billion dollars in Poland and hardly 600 million in our country. This is my question to you [to Yanukovych]. I am ready to repeat it today that the main problem for the development of Ukraine is the criminal regime of, excuse me, Kuchma-Medvedchuk-

[34] Howarth, "Discourse Theory", 15.
[35] Stavrakakis, "Passions of Identification", 73.
[36] Burgos, "The Mexican Revolutionary Mystique", 93.

Yanukovych. There is enough proof to this thesis."

The hybridity of Yushchenko's discourse is especially striking due to the presence of both liberal and socialist motives in it. Together with promoting the perspectives of the free market for the well being of Ukrainian nation, Yushchenko advocated a "socially-oriented economy" and blamed Ukrainian oligarchs for enlarging their capitals during the time Yanukovych was prime minister. Linking the two arguments together (the wealth of oligarchs and the need for a "socially just economy" to "rise the living standards, pensions, salaries") makes it easy for voters to draw an implication from it - the call for redistribution of property:

> "I am speaking about the authorities, the people you do not want to live with, because they are criminal. Second, because they organized a shadow economy, which is working for 3-4 families. Under your guidance, the GDP growth was 12 %, but only 2 % reached the budget. Where was the difference going? And you are speaking about all these successes. During your leadership Ukrainian oligarchs became 2-3 times richer than they were 1.5 years ago. That is why, when we are talking about economic paths to growth, Viktor Fedorovych [Yanukovych's patronymic], these economic indicators have to do not with Ukraine, but with 2-3 families, and you should explain to the 47 million [the population of Ukraine], how to use practically the 12 % of your economic wonder! Only a socially-just economy, an economy with a social orientation may raise the living standards of the people. If you want to raise the living standards, pensions, salaries of workers, officers, teachers, we have to remember one simple rule, we have to make politics honestly."

Yushchenko directly made the call for redistribution during his earlier debate with Yanukovych ("One of the fundamental problems of my nation is the inability to honestly and justly distribute in the society accumulated national resources"). Playing his socialist card, he directly makes the oligarchs guilty and responsible for the low income of the rest of population:

> "I am sincerely happy that before the elections pensioners twice got an increase of deposits to their accounts, though the absolute majority of voters understand that this is an electoral trick [made by the government of Yanukovych]. However, I guarantee that we on the basis of law will increase, really increase the pensions, so that they will be received on a constant term, notwithstanding will or unwillingness of a government or a certain official. Through the privatization of the Kryvorizhstal factory alone, for the two times reduced price, the oligarchs have stolen from each pensioner a sum, at least two times larger than the rise in pension, they got now."[37]

Through the construction of the chains of equivalence between the three social antagonisms, "the substitutability of the enemy" was made possible as "any of the signifiers of the chain could represent the enemy even if it was not the direct antagonistic pole of this social group."[38] Thus, instead of multiple social antagonisms (e.g. socialist movement vs. the oligarchs, nationalist movement vs. the traitors of the national interests, liberal-democratic movement vs. the government that violated the rights of the citizens), a single antagonism was produced due to the designation and exclusion of a series of "equivalent" identities out of the discursive system of the "Orange revolution".

The ties that keep the "objects of hate" together as those who have stolen "the object of desire" are strengthened by the criminalisation of the authorities, an important step of putting the opponents beyond the legal order. The games around interpreting and reinterpreting the legal aspects during any anti-governmental social action may be an object of separate analysis. Here, I would mention an important paradox that Foucault points out in his "Discipline and punish": it is "an effect of penalty that makes it possible to differentiate, accommodate and supervise illegalities"[39]. Therefore, the act of punishing (or presenting punishment as inevitable) as a "strategy of illegalities" alone is able to mark the acts of political opponents as "crimes" to be "prevented". Therefore, the criminal gets his identification as "criminal" imposed on him by the authorities during the act of power, when putting him in prison. During the decisive periods of political struggle, when the sides operate "on edge of legality", possibilities are open for similar acts of power. This This may be the attack of the protested by police or security forces, proclaimed to be "a persecution of the breach of public order" or "a persecution of mutiny". The crowd that is acting in the name of the "nation" may take over state buildings, arrest officials, exercising a penalty on "criminal authorities", the "traitors of the nation". The important aspect of attaching a "criminal identity" to "the others" is that a group produces the meaning of its actions as "legitimate". Thus, the stress legitimacy of a political or social action during the decisive moments of struggle

[37] The privatization of Kryvorizhstal factory in 2004 several months before the presidential elections by the company, controlled by Kuchma's son in law Viktor Pinchuk, became the most scandalous case of privatization in post-Soviet Ukraine.
[38] Burgos, "The Mexican Revolutionary Mystique," 93.
[39] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison* (London : Penguin Books, 1991), 277.

for identity is possible only versus the illegitimacy of the opponents.

The marking of opponents as "criminals" became an integral part of the discourse of "Orange Revolution". The claim for the legitimacy of the actions of mass protest was grounded on the accusation of the government of electoral fraud that was presented as a symbolic crime against the nation, the ruination of the possibility of national identification ("There will be no negotiations with these criminal authorities! There will be no forgiveness for they have ruined the choice of Ukraine"). Through the logic equivalence the emphasis is put on the "sameness" of the criminalizing elements, attaching a label of illegality to governmental actions and decisions ("What we must do now is to express distrust to the Central Electoral Committee, which with its head Serhiy Kivalov sided with the criminals and today plans to announce a criminal decision that Yanukovych, on the basis of falsification, may be President of Ukraine").

An interesting aspect of the "revolutionary" discourse is its gender coloring. For example, "the crime against the nation" is metaphorically presented as "the rape of the newly-formed nation" ("how can you study and work in a country that is going to be raped!"). It was also important to stress that the crime had been in the process, it had not yet ended, and could be prevented by political mobilization. The effect is increased by the fact that the speaker (Tymoshenko) is a woman, whose femininity represents the vulnerability of the "nation". The "vulnerability" and "need for protection" are emphasized by the fact of presence of her daughter ("My daughter is also on this square"). In such a way, the need to "protect our nation" was symbolically strengthened by the need to "protect our women".

In every post-Soviet "Color revolution", there was a symbolic woman's figure of "national heroine" present, standing at the defense of the nation, and, at the same time, "a victim", who herself needed to be protected. Nino Burdzhanadze in Georgia, Roza Otunbaeva in Kyrgyzstan and Yulia Tymoshenko (called by her supporters and national mass media "the Goddess of the Revolution"[40]) in Ukraine played these roles. Yulia Tymoshenko (Prime Minister of Ukraine in January-September 2005) was a vice prime-minister in 1999-2000, a former president of a privately own company that became the main importer of Russian natural gas in 1996 - "United Energy Systems of Ukraine" (connected with political and financial activity of the former, later imprisoned in the US Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko)[41] - a famous "gas princess", was one of the richest women in the country (before her business was destroyed), and one of the main leaders of the national opposition to the former President of the country Leonid Kuchma, (firstly in the oppositional political party "Batkivshchina" ("Fatherland"), and later in the "Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko", and finally in the oppositional "Committee of National Salvation", founded in November 2004).

It is interesting to go back to observe the transformations around Tymoshenko's public image during the last several years and how she turned from a corrupted "gas princess", who reportedly made a fortune from questionable gas trading in the 1990s, into an unselfish national heroine sacrificing herself for the sake of "the nation". Her brief arrest in February 2001, when she was accused of bribing Russian officials, smuggling nearly three billion cubic meters of gas, laundering money, and evading taxes, became a turning point of the transformation of the previously unattainable "gas princess" into a "victim of the corrupted government". The transformation of Tymoshenko into "a national heroine" was achieved not only through rhetoric, but also by means of non-linguistic discursive practices: after leaving prison, "lady Yu" (another Tymoshenko's nickname) changed her hairstyle from a stylish haircut to a plait arranged around her head in a complete resemblance with the portrait of the most famous Ukrainian women's writer and national heroic women's image of Ukraine Lesya Ukrainka, placed, by twist of fate, on the biggest Ukrainian banknote in 200 Hrivnas.

The discourse of victimization, as well as the discourse of restoring lost (or, more precisely, never complete) national identification, was one of the dominant ideological motives during the oppositional struggles against Kuchma's regime both before and during the "Orange revolution". The accounts of moral and physical sufferings made possible the transformation of the image of Viktor Yushchenko from a successful and loyal bureaucrat to a "victim of Kuchma's regime".

Yushchenko's political career started in 1993, when he became head of the national bank in the newly independent Ukraine. Under his direction of the country's monetary system, Ukraine moved from hyperinflation and surrogate money to the hryvnya - the country's own and fairly stable currency. After managing to reduce the impact of the Russian debt default in 1998, Yushchenko was appointed Ukrainian Prime Minister by President Kuchma. Many analysts believe that while Yushchenko was serving in that post Kuchma was preparing him to become his successor. As the country's economy improved, with salaries and pensions paid on time and corruption reduced, nobody doubted the prime minister's loyalty to the president. The liberal and nationalist opposition urged him to become their leader, but Yushchenko remained, at least officially, on the presidential side.

[40] Marina Denysenko, "Ukraine's '*Goddess of Revolution*," *BBC News*. 5 December, 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4070663.stm

[41] James Meek, "The millionaire revolutionary," *The Guardian*, 26 November 2004. http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0%2C3604%2C1359986%2C00.html

The transformation of Yushchenko's image from that that of a successful technocrat to the image of a "victim" has two decisive points. In 2001 the president dismissed him from the post of Prime Minister, staking all on the support of industrial groups based in eastern Ukraine and Moscow. Since that time Yushchenko appeared in news reports as a charismatic leader of the nationalist opposition to president Kuchma and his government. His personal hobby of collecting artifacts of Ukrainian traditional culture, including folk ceramics and archeology, started to be advertised. His rival mass media emphasized the fact that his wife is a Ukrainian-American born in Chicago, a former official with the US State Department, who remained a US citizen after the marriage. In 2001 Yushchenko became the leader of the "Nasha Ukrayina" ("Our Ukraine") political coalition, which received a plurality of votes in the parliamentary election next year but failed to receive the majority of seats in parliament due to the peculiarities of the half-majoritarian electoral system. Before and during the presidential campaign of 2004, as a lot was at stake, the struggle between the opposite interpretations of Yushchenko's image intensified. While Ukrainian oppositional media presented him as a "savior of the nation", pro-governmental and Russian TV channels and spin doctors close to the Kremlin portrayed Yushchenko as an agent of the West who would plunge the country into civil war.

The second step of transforming Yushchenko's image towards "victim" was the result of his alleged poisoning one day after attending a reception and dinner with the Ukrainian Security Service leaders in the beginning of September 2004 at the height of the presidential election campaign. Yushchenko was rushed to hospital in Vienna but resumed campaigning later in the month. However, his mysterious illness had left his face pockmarked and ashen with a series of symptoms, including back pain, acute pancreatitis and nerve paralysis on the left side of his face. Yushchenko accused Ukrainian authorities of trying to poison him ahead of Ukraine's presidential vote, an allegation they denied. The doctors of the Austrian hospital where Yushchenko was treated made an official statement that he had been intentionally poisoned with dioxin[42] .

The alleged poisoning of Yushchenko contributed greatly to the development of his image as "victim" for democracy. He has become an ideal example of visual discursive practices (the most striking of them is the contrast between the photos of Yushchenko before and after the poisoning that were frequently shown by Ukrainian and international mass media) that "constructed" his political image as that of "our leader who needs support and protection".

Not only were the masses promised the "victory" of the "nation", which would be their victory since they became "the nation", but the masses were also promised that "the authorities" would be punished, and they would become "authorities" themselves, to have the power that "the authorities" possess. The temptations that such promises aroused were particularly strong due to the peculiarities of Eastern Slavonic cultures and languages. In Ukrainian and Russian there is a single equivalent for both the notions of "authorities" and "power" (*vlada* in Ukrainian and *vlast'* in Russian). This may be the reason of the long absence of stable order that would permanently attach "power" to fixed institutions marked as "authorities". Consequently, the phrases "to have the power" and "to have the authority" are both translated into Ukrainian as *otrymaty vladu* in every possible sense, institutional or symbolic[43] . Thus, those who have *vlada* have both power and authority. Accordingly, Tymoshenko manipulated the desire of the powerless masses to become powerful and their hatred towards those in whose hands both power and legitimized authority were concentrated.

Conclusion

As we see now, the central characteristic feature of the project of the "Orange Revolution" became the mobilization of several social movements, groups and, accordingly, antagonisms into the dominant dichotomy of "the nation versus the authorities". This dichotomy was made possible by the constitution of the political imaginary (social construct and an object for identification) of "the Ukrainian nation" by the ideological practices, analyzed in this research based on the example of political speeches by the "revolutionary" leaders. Paradoxically, the realization of various incompatible dreams was promised within the successful completion of the projects, including those of the nationalists, socialists and liberals. Motivations to join the project were strengthened by the narratives that marked the opposite side: the authorities as "criminal", with the leaders of the "Revolution", Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, being presented as "victims" of the crimes. The drive for "victory" was also increased by showing it as something already achieved. The political event was being represented as a festival, the enjoyment of spiritual unification of the masses, materialized in the gatherings on the Independence Square. The only thing to be done was to "secure" the "victory" from "the criminal authorities", who "did not represent the interests of the nation." The threat to having the already-achieved enjoyment "stolen" had to be effectively averted by a radical action in which the masses would not just have an abstract "victory", but would find themselves in the

[42] "Doctor: Yushchenko poisoned with dioxin", *The Associated Press*, 11 December 2004. http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=321156

[43] If it is necessary to be precise, it is explained or recognized by the context what type of *vlada* is meant. Tymoshenko, however, presented *vlada* as an all-encompassing object of desire.

position of "authorities", and would have the power to decide the fate of the country.

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THE MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION

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Abstract

This article focuses on the December 1989 Revolution that ended the dictatorship of Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania. The research question explores the specificity and the consequences of the live coverage of the Revolution. In order to test, whether the television informed and mobilised people and, at the same time, legitimate the uprising, an empirical examination of the broadcast is conducted. The method chosen to study the speeches of the revolutionists is discourse analysis. The major findings are that the broadcast contributed to the victory of democratic forces by informing about the current situation, by legitimating the revolution and by mobilizing the population.

Introduction

The emancipation of the "satellite" states in Eastern and Central Europe from the authority of the USSR has often been described as a series of revolutions. However, with the exception of Romania, no real fighting occurred, only round-table discussions, mass demonstrations and clashes with the police. By the end of 1989, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Bulgaria witnessed the decisive transfer of power. In this context, the Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu obstructed any development towards reform and proclaimed himself the last defender of communism. Consequently, the uprising that started in the western city of Timisoara and continued from the 21st of December in Bucharest was a violent one. According to the official sources, during the street fights, 1104 people were killed and 3552 were wounded.

Sixteen years after the events, the debates about the origins of the Revolution are still among the main issues on the Romanian political agenda. Many questions regarding the identity of the pro-regime terrorists, the role of the Soviet Union, or the names of those who ordered fire remained without answer. The lack of precise information created conspiracy scenarios and alternative explanations. In his article, "The Revolution after the Revolution", Peter Siani-Davies explains that: "Many Romanians still feel that the full story has not been told and the accusations and counter-accusations that continue to flow have only deepened the sense that something must be hidden."[44]

Rather than focusing on the dilemmas surrounding the origins of the uprising or the implication of the foreign actors, this work will examine *the role played in Revolution by the live broadcast of the National Television.* No systematic analysis of the problem has been conducted until now. Therefore, my intention is to fill up this niche in the existing literature.

Immediately after Ceausescu's departure from Bucharest, the Television became the *headquarters* of the protests, transmitting without interruption, for 72 hours, messages from the revolutionists. Many of the speeches and much of the celebration had been carried live by the broadcast of the newly entitled "Free Romanian Television".

My research question explores *the specificity and the consequences of the live coverage* of the Romanian Revolution. My working hypothesis is that the Television contributed to the victory of the democratic forces by *informing* the population about the actual state of facts, by *mobilizing* civilians to participate in the rallies, and by *legitimating* the anti-Communist uprising.

Throughout the whole paper, I will refer to revolution as "a rapid, fundamental transformation of the state and social structure, accompanied by mass uprising from below."[45] The term "information" will be used as "a message received and understood that reduces the recipient's uncertainty." [46] The terms "legitimation" and "delegitimation" imply the "active processes by which legitimacy is created and maintained or eroded and lost."[47] "Legitimacy is the foundation of such governmental power as is exercised both with a consciousness on the government's part that it has a right to govern and with some recognition by the governed of that right." [48] "Mobilization" will designate the "process of activating resources including personnel, equipment and supplies. The process would include notification, reporting, and setup to attain readiness to initiate response and recovery actions."[49] In his "Mobilization Model"[50], Charles Tilly places this process in the middle of the three-variable causal chain: organization, mobilization, and collective action. Therefore, mobilization is considered the principal cause for collective action.

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[44] Peter Siani-Davies, "The Revolution after the Revolution", in *Post-Communist Romania. Coming to Terms with Transition*, ed. Duncan Light (Palgrave Publishers, 2001), 15.

[45] Definition according to *The International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences* (Elsevier, 2001).

[46] The definitions of "information" are according to *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* (Oxford University Press 1995)

[47] According to the *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (Collier-Macmillan Publishers, London, 1991), volume 9.

[48] According to *International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences*, (Elsevier, 2001), volume 13.

[49] Definition available at http://www1.va.gov/emshg/apps/emp/emp/definitions.htm

[50] Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Addison-Wesley, 1978), chapter 3.

In order to test whether the television indeed informed and mobilized people and, at the same time, legitimated the uprising, an empirical examination of the broadcast was conducted. The method chosen to study the revolutionary's speeches was *discourse analysis*. The definitions of the key terms used in this field of research and the scheme of analysis applied in the paper will be included later. In addition, since this research was designed as a discourse examination, the whole structure of the work follows the stages of media discourse analysis presented by Norman Fairclough. [51]

The sources under scrutiny were the *transcripts of the videotapes* recorded on the 22nd of December 1989. The "Multimedia Archive" of Romanian Television declined my request to access the original tapes, with the explanation that their space was under reconstruction and the material could not be found. Given these facts, I used as a primary source a *documentary book,*[52] from the library of the Television, containing the transcripts, the personalized information about those defending the institution and some ulterior testimonies regarding the events. A second important material was an autobiographical book of Teodor Brates[53], the reporter considered the spokesman of the Revolution.

The Communicative Event

A methodological review of discourse analysis points out that the analysis of media discourse requires two synchronized centers of attention: *communicative events* (particular instances) and the order of discourse. In this section, the emphasis will be on the former: the program of The Romanian Television from the 22nd of December 1989, the first day of broadcast revolution. At the same time, my interest is to identify evidence of the three functions that characterized the broadcast of the public TV station during the event: information, legitimation, and mobilization.

1. The context

The government-run national television network, "Televiziunea Română" (more commonly referred to as TVR) was established in 1956[54], and first transmitted on the 31st of December the same year. A second channel, TVR2, was created in the 1970s, but was suspended from 1985 until after the fall of the Communist regime.

1.1 The communist censorship

Like other mass communication channels, television was subject to severe supervision in Communist Romania. Censorship was omnipresent; experts who were faithful to the regime checked with vigilance each story and each broadcast. In the late 1980s, the TVR agenda was strictly limited: only 2 hours per day (between 8 and 10 p.m.), most of which was devoted to the cult of personalities of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu. The only exception was on Sundays, when it was half propaganda and half real television. The content meant to impose the image of the new man and worship of its only personification, the leader. Plays and films with young workers who exceeded their quotas through hard work and enthusiasm for the budding of socialist Romania were broadcast weekly and then constantly rescheduled.

For years, Romanians watched only the programs of TVR, perceived as a misinformation instrument. A few people received satellite programs, but they ran the risk of being discovered by the secret police, the Securitate. Overall, the outcome was a critical lack of information and individual isolation within the reality that was fabricated for them on the TV screen.

In this context, the live broadcast of the Romanian Revolution represented a break in the model. In the following lines, a short chronology will present the broadcast events that occurred immediately before the Television became headquarter of the Revolution.

1.2 A break in the "pattern"

The first modifications in the usual TV program appeared in the evening of the 20th of December, when Ceausescu decided to make a direct appeal to the people regarding the revolts that started on the 16th of December in the city of Timisoara. He spoke about "international and terrorist actions by imperialist circles and foreign espionage agencies" designed to "provoke disorder and destroy the institutions" of the country. He encouraged the army to defend the country and suggested that no more than 10 people had been killed.

For the next morning, Ceausescu organized a demonstration of support in the "Square of the Republic", in front of the Central Committee Building. 100,000 workers were taken from their workplaces to hear Ceausescu speak. According to the official media it was a spontaneous movement in support of Ceauşescu. Soon after he began to talk, from the back of the crowd could be heard screams of "Timisoara". Shortly, the protest becomes noisier through hoots and whistles. Confusion appears on the balcony where Ceausescu stops speaking, but is still filmed. Soon after, the live TV broadcast is cut. No more information or images were provided that day, but crowds in the city grew as more and more people headed into the streets burning photographs of the dictator and chanting "Timisoara".

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[51] Norman Fairclough, *Media discourse* (London : E. Arnold, 1995).

[52] Mihai Tatulici, ed, *Revolutia Romana in direct*, English Translation of the title: *The Romanian Revolution Live* (Bucuresti 1990).

[53] Teodor Brates, *Explozia unei clipe. 22 decembrie 1989. O zi in studioul 4*, English translation of the title *The Explosion of a Moment. The 22nd of December 1989. One day in the Studio 4*. (Bucuresti, Scripta, 1992).

[54] The history of the institution is available in English at http://www.tvr.ro/org/about_us/index.php

On the 22nd of December the dictator tried one more time to speak to the crowd from the balcony of the Central Committee, but he became the target of the rage of the crowd. He managed to escape in a helicopter from the roof of the building. Meanwhile, the troops still loyal to Ceausescu continue to shoot the manifestants, but some of their representatives succeed in addressing the crowd from the balcony where Ceausescu had once stood.

1.3 The live broadcast

A column of demonstrators moved towards the Romanian Television station. The group wanted to make sure that their voices and their message would be heard in the whole country. Soon, the television station was taken over and began to broadcast that Ceausescu has been overturned. The cameras moved constantly back and forth between the Square of the Republic and studio 4 of the television station, where some of the newly important people came to address the nation. Many of those who would become important in the post-revolutionary governing body appeared before the cameras making statements and announcements. In studio 4 of the television station, instantly renamed "The Free Romanian Television" ("Televiziunea Romana Libera" or TVRL), everybody sent messages, appeals were made, and people were called to defend one or another building under attack by "terrorists". At the same time, the army was requested to defend the "revolution" and the citizens were constantly asked to remain calm and to preserve order.

Throughout this period, the main source of information for the Romanian Television consisted of rumors and it created, in the first instance, a state of panic instead of acting as an informational environment. However, according to Teodor Brates[55], one of the representatives of the TVRL in the studio 4, the information was constantly accompanied by calls to verify each piece of broadcast information. Nonetheless, any action of verification would have required free access to information and transparency on behalf of the authorities.

On the 22nd of December 1989, the format of the transmission from studio 4 of The Free Romanian Television and, alternatively from the Square of the Republic, had no regular or predictable structure. The on-camera news read by the reporters was interrupted by short speeches from the revolutionists in the studio. Most of them started without any introduction and had no coherent structure. The newly created picture confirmed that people were in a hurry to transmit everything they kept inside "untold" during the "golden era".

By contrast, the few leaders of the revolution who came to address the nation that day delivered long, consistent and articulate speeches. Appeals for help received from the capital and from other cities became also the focus of the reporters' interventions. They always mentioned a telephone number for people to call. Demands for additional information were directed at possible witnesses of the shootings in the streets. Constantly repeated motifs were that there was someone out there who had information about those responsible for crimes, and that any verified information could be useful.

In order to allay the tense atmosphere, those present in the studio made appeals for calm and order. The program could be easily regarded as contributing to a general state of panic, and such attempts to reassure people indicate sensitivity on that score.

1.4 The television and its audience

These contextual considerations about the special structure of the broadcast may give an initial meaning of the articulation of voices, which is one of my main focuses. It suggests that voices are not clearly associated with roles, and in particular, that the presentation of breaking news and of appeals to the population was divided between reporters of the television and the revolutionists in the studio. This attempt to diminish the differences between mediators and the citizens was the first element in the process of reconstructing the relation between the television and its audience.

Furthermore, the break in the pattern and the spread of the news that was not dictated from the center are proof of *the information* role that the television came to assume. The acceptance of the protesters in the news studio contributed in the first moments to the identification of the institution with the "porte-parole" of the people. From this role it will derive its *legitimation.* The first appeals to the public also had as an effect *the mobilization* of civilians towards the main squares of Bucharest.

To take the examination further, the next sections will highlight aspects of discourse practice and intertextuality, supported with selective textual analysis.

2. Genre Analysis

The complex constraints of such a live broadcast and its multiple purposes manifest themselves through the heterogeneity of the texts. The feature is also valid in the discussion of genres, so that at least three main genres can be identified: narrative, biography and public appeal. They are connected in sequential and embedded forms of intertextuality[56]. That means that

[55] Brates, *Explozia unei clipe. 22 decembrie 1989. O zi in studioul 4*, 12.

[56] According to Fairclough (1992, 118), there are three different modes of intertextual relations: sequential intertextuality, embedded intertextuality and mixed intertextuality.

the different generic types alternate within a text and some are also embedded within the others.

2.1 Typical interventions

The narratives about what was happening on the streets of Bucharest were constantly interrupted by public calls for urgent matters. As evidence of the atrocity of the Ceausescu regime, the speakers were bringing up autobiographical details regarding their experiences in the recent years and also in the last days.

The following examples of discourse representation are taken from the complete transcripts [57] of the broadcast of the Romanian Television on the 22nd of December 1989[58].

"The transmission returns in the Studio 4. Near Petre Popescu are standing Teodor Brates and Liviu Tudor Samuila[59].

Brates: Brothers, I speak to you again on behalf of the personnel of the Television. Please defend those who, from now on, will tell you the truth and only truth, those who put themselves in the service of the people. We have here doctors who say that blood is needed, blood donors…

Popescu: Come in…He is doctor Popescu from the Emergency Hospital.

Doctor: Brothers, in these hard moments, I am making an appeal to all the medical personnel: doctors, nurses, to help those who have been shot, those who have been ran down by the tanks. In our hospital there are several dozens of people, some of them have been directly carried to the morgue…We found out, from sources that are not very reliable, that apart of those who are wounded have been blended…wounded persons with corpses, and transported to Jilava[60]. We have to give immediate help to these national heroes!

Brates: Thank you. Brothers, pay attention to this message. Every person who might help whose suffering…(applauses). I want to say one more thing…

Samuila: We ask you from the bottom of the heart, in order to win for good what we already won, let us do our job…

The sound is sputtering, then it disappears. The image is commuted to the courtyard of the Television, still without sound."[61]

This example of sequential intertextuality can be considered representative of the succession of episodes that occurred that day. It starts with a short introduction from the reporter, and then the person who has been introduced presents himself and talks about an urgent matter. Finally, an appeal to the population it is made and emphasized.

"Sergiu Nicolaescu [62]: Now, we have here Mircea Dinescu [63], whom we do not know unfortunately by face, only by voice[64]. Few months ago, he was fired from "Romania Literara" magazine, as a result of an interview against the dictator, granted to the French newspaper "Liberation". He was arrested at his residence…Please…

Mircea Dinescu: I will make a short statement for the country. I am addressing now the workers, the peasants, the intellectuals and especially the students, to whom the entire country is thankful for their blood and life sacrifice from this heroic days…Do not leave your television sets! They are very important…Tonight, let's hope that till tonight…We make a call to the leadership of the army. Some high representatives should come here…from the Army and from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Be with us! Speak to the army and to the people! Workers, intellectuals…come to the Romanian Television. We will put together a declaration for the people…

Voice: The manifestations should continue…

Dinescu: Manifestations…Calm, be calm, calm…The people won in Romania.

Voice: The manifestations should continue…

Dinescu: The Romanian people rediscovered his present and his future that is so important in these moments…"[65]

2.2. Autobiographical testimonies

The three genres can be identified also together, in a single speech as a form of embedded intertextuality. Often, the opportunity to address the nation included the autobiographical data, the narratives about the tension-filled situation in the country and the final decisive public appeals. The time framework was limited both by the uncertain situation and by the large number of people that wanted to speak, and as a consequence the speeches had a compressed form and an alert rhythm.

"Gelu Voican: My name is Gelu Voican and I have known the prisons of Securitate. My thought is now with those who are imprisoned, under false charges of common law. Amnesty for those in jail! The judiciary situations of those recently imprisoned should be revised!

[57] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct*, 27.

[58] In order to differentiate in a clear manner my text from the translation of the transcripts for the former ones I will use letters in Italics.

[59] Petre Popescu was the news speaker during the last years of Ceausesu's regime; Teodor Brates was the assistant chief editor in the News Department; Samuila was a news reporter.

[60] Jilava is a village near Bucharest. The king Carol I of Romania built a fort here, in order to assure the defensive system of his capital. Later, this fort became a prison and its sad fame is linked to the communist rule of Romania.

[61] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct* , 33.

[62] Sergiu Nicolaescu is a famous Romanian film director.

[63] Mircea Dinescu is a Romanian poet and former dissident during the Ceausescu regime.

[64] Allusion to "Radio Free Europe" and "Radio Voice of America."

[65] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct*, 27-28.

> At the same time, I want to make a declaration for our people. In these moments, the whole world is looking at us. We have to prove that we are trustworthy, that we are a nation that knows its order, its hierarchy and its legality. Even though we suffered…even though we suffered, we should not be revengeful. We must get the Securitate archives, the archives of the minister of foreign Affairs and we must organize the verification of the files and the conviction of those who activated against us during all these years. Only on legal grounds and in virtue of the existing laws. Let's organize self-defense committees that will ensure the order and the discipline at all the levels! I am hoarse because I have been on the tanks[66] and last night I have been to Intercontinental…"[67]

Another sample of coexisting narratives, biography and public appeals uncover the uncertain condition of the political prisoners:

> "Dragomir Horomnea: I am the writer Dragomir Horomnea, the author of the novel "The Road of the Knights", that was forbidden by the censorship of the former dictatorship…I do not want to insist upon the masquerade built in turn of me and of this novel. I just want to thank the colleagues that stood next to me and also to the people that, from now on, will stay next to us. I speak also on behalf of the patriots from "Romania Libera" [68] and most of all, of two exceptional journalists: Anton Uncu and Petrica Bacanu[69]. We know still very few about their destiny…We only know that Anton Uncu might be somewhere in a little town from Moldova, in a insignificant position that is very far away from his capabilities and his talent. About Petre Bacanu [70] we do not know anything, he might as well be dead. We want them near us! As soon as possible. "[71]

2.3 The role of the three genres

The succession of the three genres proved to be a requisite. Firstly, the biographies proved either that the person was an opponent of the regime or that he was an important figure of the public sphere that deserved to be heard. In some cases, it was relevant that the speaker represented a certain social group as special attention was given to the fair representation of each category.

Secondly, the narratives were informing about the current dramatic events from the streets of Bucharest. The legitimacy of the change was constructed through the several references to the victims and to the brutal reaction of the so-called "terrorists" (presented in narratives and biographies). Moreover, there were two forms of political action: the dissidence and the revolution were justified by being placed in antithesis with the totalitarian rule.

Lastly, the public appeals were completing the picture, requiring solidarity and mobilization. The civilians were asked to make humanitarian acts in order to help the victims. The medical personnel were explicitly solicited to assist the wounded victims.

The examples indicate that the broadcast was generically complex by being at the same time narrative, biographical and mobilizing. The narrative on its own is generically complex, unifying the relating from outside with the individual declarations of witnesses. This complex nature of narratives will be analyzed in the next section.

3. The stories

A substantial proportion of the broadcast from the 22nd of December 1989 consisted of narratives. On the one hand, this feature can be considered normal, as the term "reporting" comprises the description of events and the story-telling. On the other hand however, the happenings are not only recounted, but also commented on and interpreted. As Fairclough[72] suggests, we must therefore distinguish between the actual story ("an ordered series of events") and its presentation ("the way in which the story is realized and organized").

3.1 The stories

The stories told in front of the cameras by the revolutionists illustrate at least two main functions of the narratives. Firstly, stories represent a central part of group formation and a key element for the analysis of identity politics. Groups used stories to explain their long and recent history and in what direction they intended to go. The speakers in the studio and those addressing the crowd from the balcony of the Central Committee building constructed their new identity of free citizens by describing the unfortunate life conditions during Ceausescu's rule and the recent carnage in the streets of Bucharest and Timisoara. Secondly, narratives are the way human beings explain significant changes in human relationships. The dramatic individual and collective stories revealed the real situation of the country, disguised under false data. The radical change of power was therefore regarded as a necessity.

[66] In front of the Intercontinental Hotel in Bucharest, in front of the tanks, the people organised barricades during the night of 21st of December.
[67] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct* , 37.
[68] A group of journalists from the daily "Romania Libera" published in January 1989 the first clandestine journal called "Romania". The members of the group had been arrested and condemned.
[69] A short history of the event is presented in the on-line version of the daily "Romania Libera" from the 21st of January 2004, see http://www.romanialibera.ro/editie/index.php?url=articol&tabel=z21012004&idx=36.
[70] Petre Mihai Bacanu was released from prison that day and he became the chief-editor of the daily where he worked before the arrest, "Romania Libera" ("The Free Romania").
[71] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct* , 37.
[72] Fairclough, *Media discourse*, 91.

3.2 The emotional presentations

The way people frame events can indicate what they consider valuable. In particular, the stories including personal experiences can lead to discourses connected to practices and what is valued in practice. The evaluation of the reports revealed a single standpoint regarding the event. Three arguments sustain this claim.

Despite the variety of topics present in the narrations, the perspective from which they were commented was only one. All the speeches were strongly against the personal dictatorship of Nicolae Ceausescu and were denouncing its atrocities. The list can be also regarded as an indictment of the regime. Each story was an accusation and each new abuse an argument for the revolution.

The emotional dimension of the stories is manifest both in the external narratives and in the testimonies. The external narratives told the stories from the point of view of an outsider who is able to take an overview. By contrast, the testimonies are stories told from the point of view of those involved. However, the revolution constructed a feeling of solidarity and a sense of identification with the victims that made the boundary between the different points of view insignificant.

The presence of "sensationalism" and of "spectacularization", two common media techniques, was also a feature of the speeches. Nevertheless, the violent character of the events and the pressure to which the revolutionists were exposed might explain the exaggerations. From the balcony of the Central Committee, those addressing the nation could actually see "terrorists" shooting the crowd. The upper floors of the Television building (and especially the 11th floor where the direction's offices were located) were a permanent target for bullets shot from the neighboring houses.

2.3. The effects of the narratives

The stories represented a convincing strategy *to legitimize* the uprising of the masses. With the purpose of *mobilizing* people, the majority of messages followed a simple logic: react immediately before the danger. The civilians were now not only asked to come in the streets, but also to defend threatened institutions, like the National Radio.

The use of a simple method brought significant results. After a long period of listening to fabricated news and seeing on the TV screen the same personages each evening, the Romanians could finally hear authentic *informations.* They could see people like themselves talking about things they themselves experienced and doing things that they had long wished to do, but never had the chance. In addition to the new reports describing the conflicts in the streets, the stories presented the "untold" and "unseen" Romania and it was through the power of this message that the audience was convinced.

Legitimation by Media

1. The "topoi" of argumentation

As stated in the "argumentation theory", a standardized method of constructing an argument is called "topos"[73]. In other words, it is a content related rule that justifies the transition from arguments to deduction. During the revolutionary days, the universal conclusion was the necessity of Ceausescu's fall. The following lines will attempt to identify the "topoi" used to validate this logic.[74] Each new paragraph will start with the acknowledged structure of the argument[75] and will continue with its illustration through examples extracted from the speeches.

The topos of "definition" can be paraphrased through the following conclusion rule: if a person is denominated as X, the person should carry the traits contained in the literal meaning of X. From the moment the studio 4 was occupied by protesters, Ceausescu was designated as the "dictator". All later arguments sustained this statement. He was accused of creating a persuasive personality cult (giving himself titles such as "Genius of Carpathians"), of investing his wife and other members of his family with high positions in the government (his regime was labeled as "sultanistic"), and of the introduction of food rationing. He was blamed for the frequent heating, gas, and electricity stoppages, for the general decrease in living standards, and for transforming Romania into Europe's fourth biggest exporter of weapons.

The topos of "danger" or of "threat" is based on the presupposition that if a political decision will produce dangerous consequences, one should not do it. Or, formulated differently: if specific dangers are identified, one should do something against them. The country, which had no information of the Timisoara events from the national media, heard about the revolt from western radio stations like Voice of America and Radio Free Europe and by word of mouth. When the confirmation came from the TV transmission, the immediate reaction was the imperative to act against the violence and therefore every intervention was finished by appeals for unity and for mobilization.

The topos of "responsibility" can be summarized by the formula: because a group of persons is responsible for the emergence of specific problems, they should act in order to find solutions to these problems. This type of argument was partially forced, since a group of people decided voluntarily to assume responsibility for the events and consequently they formed the Council of the National Salvation Front. Ion

[73] In the context of classical Greek rhetoric, a topos (literally: a place, plural: topoi) referred to a classic method of constructing or treating an argument, http://encyclopedia.laborlawtalk.com/Literary_topos.

[74] For a list of topoi see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/supplement2.html.

[75] The description of "topoi" is based on table 4.2, page 74 from Ruth Wodak, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, (London: Sage, 2001).

Iliescu, the future president of Romania, read the official announcement for the country on behalf of the new organized structure of power. The document summarized the accusations against the communist regime and proposed 10 provisional solutions for the situation of crises.

The topos of "burdening" is to be regarded as a topos of consequence and can be reduced to the conditional: if an institution or country is burdened by specific problems, one should act in order to diminish these burdens. The review of harms was made public by a revolutionist who also formulated the expected compensatory measurements.

> "Florin Filipoiu: I belong to the group of people that raised last night the barricade at Inter[76]. Then we formed the group "social justice" and those from the first line put on paper their requests. We do not know yet if they are going to be approved, but we will present them:
>
> - the everlasting abolition of any form of personality cult
> - the liberation of the political prisoners
> - the cessation of the food export and their redistribution on the internal market
> - the abolishment of the shops for nomenklatura
> - the reduction of the industrial electric consume and the stopping of the energy savings requested from the population
> - the abdication of the "Securitate" spying on people
> - the free circulation of people inside and outside the country
> - the independence of the Television, the freedom of the press, the freedom of speech, the abolition of censorship
> - the right of circulation for the cars for every Sunday[77]
> - the abolition of the gas "rationalization"
> - the creation of a new system of food distribution for the population
> - the return to a normal working timetable
> - economic rights for the "little" landowners and for the peasants
> - the abolition of the conditional system of supplying aliments to the peasants
> - the exclusion of the political ideological education from schools and universities
> - the abolition of the criminal demographic policies and the liberalization of the abortions[78]
> - the surcease of the demolition of villages
> - the right to free association
> - commissions to investigate the abuses of the nomenklatura
> - the creation of a committee to revise the Romanian history
> - a new name for the country: "The Republic of Romania"
> - the setting up of a commission of specialists to edit a new constitution that will guarantee that never again a dictatorial regime will rule Romania
> - the appointment of specialists as head of the Ministers
> - and… finally… democratic elections.
>
> All these have been required by the people who formed last night the barricade at Inter. Long live the Free Romania! Long live the Republic of Romania!"[79]

Lastly, the topos of "history" can be described as follows: because history teaches that particular actions have specific consequences, one should perform a specific action in a situation comparable with the historical example referred to. Frequent references to the recent events in Eastern Europe ended up with the appeal to follow their example and manifest till the fall of the regime. A few people also mentioned the French Revolution and they noted that the main objectives are the same in Bucharest as they were exactly 200 years ago in Paris.

To sum up, the different forms of argumentation unveiled the same conclusion: the requirement to replace the personal dictatorship with a democratic regime. Accordingly, the statements were not open to many readings and the formulations were simple and explicit.

2. *Voices and legitimation*

I intend now to begin shifting the analysis of the discourse practice and intertextuality towards discourses. I will do so by looking at the range of voices that were included in the program, what relationships are set between the voices, and what the association is between voices and legitimacy.

Traditional legitimization

Starting with the first broadcast interventions, it was requested that all social categories be represented in the studio.

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[76] The Intercontinental hotel.

[77] To reduce the demand of gas, the law stipulated that the cars with matriculation numbers finished by an "even" number can circulate two Sundays per month. The "odd" numbers could circulate during the others two Sundays.

[78] An abstract about the reproductive policy of Ceausescu is available in Gail Kligman, *The politics of duplicity : controlling reproduction in Ceausescu's Romania*, (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1998), 6.

[79] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct* , 53-54.

"Woman (addressing the crowd in the courtyard of the Television): Fifteen minutes ago the Television transmitted the first revolutionary communiqué. We need upstairs in the studio for the next announcement: two sociologists, two economists, two lawyers from each social category two representatives

A voice: Please repeat: two economists, two sociologists, two lawyers…also two students." [80]

Later on, in his appeal to the nation, the dissident poet Mircea Dinescu reinforced the message:

"Workers, intellectuals…come to the Romanian Television. We will put together a declaration for the people…"[81]

The demand for correct representation can be considered a "heritage" of the egalitarian communist ideology. Ceausescu's main concern for public celebration or congresses was that each social group be appropriately represented. It was a component of his authority built on the principle of valuing traditions[82] and on the presupposition that a command will be obeyed if it is in accordance with a learnt convention.

In addition to these accepted considerations, during the Revolution the appeal to all professional categories was a method for mobilizing people through "personalized" messages.

"Boris Zingher: I have a Ph.D. in Mathematics and I work at the National Center for statistics. I want to read a declaration that I edited together with my co-workers…Don't interrupt the manifestation till the fall of the Ceausescu regime! Ask for the formation of a provisional government!"[83]

"Sold Ionel: I am sport trainer. Last night I was alongside the others on the barricades…"[84]

"Dragomir Horomnea: I am the writer Dragomir Horomnea, the author of the novel "The Road of the Knights", that was forbidden by the censorship of the former dictatorship. I just want to thank the colleagues that stood next to me and also to the people that, from now on, will stay next to us."[85]

"Military pilot: I am a representative of the air forces. I want you know that the aircraft is with the people…I want to tell you that the planes are ready to go in the territory and bring the representatives of each county to meet the new power structures from Bucharest."[86]

"The colonel Rusi: Esteemed viewers, from the General Inspectorate of Militia[87] three people left to address the nation: The general Campeanu, who wants to be the spokesman of the people in blue uniform, the colonel Suceava and myself. We are here to publicly announce that "Militia is with the people!" (Applause) "Militia respects the people, militia defends the people and the products of its creative work."[88]

"Doctor Popescu: Brothers, in these hard moments, I am making an appeal to all the medical personnel: doctors, nurses, to help those who have been shot, those who have been hurt by the tanks."[89]

"Colonel lieutenant Stan Gheorghe: I am the colonel lieutenant engineer Stan Gheorghe and I represent here the "Securitate". I want to speak for my co-workers who certainly watch this transmission…I call the roll to you not to use your weapons, I make an appeal to you to lay down your weapons. Hand over your weapons because that's what the people expect from you. The massacre is not needed. Enough bad was done by the tyrant who was happily removed from office."[90]

"Dumitru Claudian: The ship skipper Dumitru Claudian is talking to you now. I am a sailor with dozens of years experience in this field. I consider myself the representative of the sailors from Danube, from the Black Sea, from all the rivers and ports of Romania. Sailors! Leave on the ship only the security team and organize patrols in the cities to maintain order and discipline and to prevent the act of vandalism by the Securitate members, dressed in civilians…"[91]

"Journalist: Dear colleagues, compatriots! The journalists and the printers of the daily "Scinteia"[92] decided to change the name of the newspaper to"Scinteia poporului"[93] and to transform it into a social daily. (Voices: "Adevarul", you should rename it "Adevarul") The first edition will appear in a couple of hours".

"Nifon Ploiesteanu: Always close to the people, the Romanian Orthodox Church is blessing you in these moments when Jesus Chris is to be born. We said prayers for those who died these days and we will not cease to pray…"[94]

[80] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct*, 23.
[81] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct*, 28.
[82] From the beginning one of the main futures of the Romanian communist was the reduction of the discrepancies between social categories and their correct representation in the governing structures.
[83] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct,* 36.
[84] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct,* 37.
[85] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct*, 37.
[86] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct,* 41.
[87] Militia was the name of the Romanian Police.
[88] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct* , 47.
[89] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct*, 33.
[90] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct*, 52.
[91] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct*, 54.
[92] "Scinteia" was the Communist official daily.
[93] For only a few days after the fall of Ceausescu it appeared as "Scinteia poporului "(People's Spark), switching to the name of "Adevarul" (The Truth) on the 25th of December 1989.
[94] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct*, 57.

"Constantin Radulescu: My name is Radulescu Constantin and I am the representative of the workers in the bread factories. I want to gladly announce that starting with today we will make sweet bread for the people, not for the dictators!"[95]

Thus, during the 22nd of December people from almost all-social categories addressed the nation. Their final words were always a plea for order and requests for solidarity with the revolution. Their voices had never been heard before, but it was to the multitude of their appeals that a unitary revolutionary discourse was created.

Charismatic legitimation

The first form of legitimation was directed at the "traditional" social categories. In addition, the presence in the studio of charismatic figures of the Romanian public sphere created the opportunity for innovation and for producing new kinds of institutions. Above all, those disowned by Ceausescu were presented as heroes and as an alternative to the authoritarian regime. In contrast with the ordinary people that had to present themselves, the spokesman was the one presenting the dissidents by brief and explicit references to their protester attitude.

In the years to come, these introductions became emblematic phrases for the revolution and have been often quoted in the media. In this context, it is however relevant to mention that few isolated dissidents had actually promoted the anti-Communist discourse in Ceausescu's Romania. The country lacked a human rights movement and a consistent "samizdat" press. Those presented as dissidents during the Revolution were, to a great extent, former communist officials who had expressed publicly their discontent towards the extreme measures of Ceausescu. As a consequence they had been expelled from the party, followed by the Securitate, or condemned to "forced residence".

A few hours after the historic flight of the helicopter, the future president of the country appeared in the studio 4 of the Television. The anchorman introduced him with these words:

"Esteemed viewers, we have the great joy to host here, in the studio, Ion Iliescu. He is the son of a revolutionary and patriot, he himself being a patriot."[96]

Other well-known or less famous opponents of Nicolae Ceausescu were introduced in similar ways.

The Romanian Orthodox Church, a victim-institution of the atheist regime, was represented by its Patriarch. He was the only figure of the public sphere that remained in the same high position after the changes from 1989:

"Teoctist, the Patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church: My dears, our deep-rooted Church, through us, its hierarchics, cannot be absent in these heroic moments of the Romanian history. Therefore, I express my total adhesion to this heroic moment and I make an appeal to the hierarchics, priests and believers of the Romanian Orthodox Church to collaborate and to listen to the new local committees. So that, the historic acts from the life of our people came to a good end."[97]

Apart from these personalities, presented through their brave acts, the Revolution produced its own appealing characters. Among them, the spokesman of the entire broadcast, who occupied till then the position of assistant chief editor in the News Department. Teodor Brates was the one that opened the "gates" of the Television for the revolutionists and remained in studio 4 for 72 hours. Writing about his experience, in a chronicle of the 22nd of December[98], he paraphrased Ernst Rohm[99]: "Was it necessary that in our country also, like in other times and places, the revolution devoured its own children?"[100]. The allusion was to the accusations of establishing panic and disseminating misinformation that he received constantly. As a consequence, he resigned from the Romanian Television a few months after the Revolution.

Legal legitimation

In the evening of the 22nd of December, a proclamation was addressed to the nation by the future president of Romania. It was the first attempt to legalize the change and it was immediately followed by the abolition of some communist laws. The people were therefore asked to obey the law rather than a person. For the specific legal framework of the country the initiative had at least two good effects: it demonstrated, after a long period, that laws could be enacted through a bottom to top communication and it gave the legal legitimation of the general discourse.

The proclamation was edited partly in the building of the Central Committee, partly on the 11th floor of the Television. Ion Iliescu[101] read it in the studio 4, after he was introduced as the representative of the Council of the National Salvation Front. He was the main political beneficent of the change, as he assumed leadership.

"*A* new page is opened in the political and economic history of Romania. In these hard moments, we decided to form the National Salvation Front which is an ally of the Army and that it is composed of all the "healthy" forces of the country, disregarding the nationality, and of all the organizations and groups who arose bravely in the defense of liberty and dignity. The purpose of the

[95] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct,* 79.
[96] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct,* 41.
[97] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct*, 68.
[98] Brates, *Explozia*.
[99] Ernst Rohm: "All revolutions devour their own children."
[100] Brates, *Explozia*, 14.
[101] Later on, when leader of the provisional government, Iliescu declared that he wished that Romanian would adopt an "original democracy", as opposed to the communist system and the western-style democracy.

> National Salvation Front is to establish democracy, freedom and dignity for the Romanian people. From this moment on, all power structures belonging to the Ceausescu clan are dissolved. The government is abolished. The State Council and its institutions will cease their activity. The Council of the National Salvation Front takes the whole power. Subordinated to it, there will be the Superior Military Council that coordinates the entire activity of the Army and that of the units of the Minister of Internal Affairs. All the ministers will continue the activity as subordinated to the National Salvation Front. In the territory, there will be constituted councils of the Front at all the administrative levels. The Militia will be in charge of the public order."[102]

Conclusions

To sum up, the three sources of *legitimation* listed in the typology of Max Weber are all identifiable in the discourse of the Romanian Revolution. An optimal combination of the three was the basis for both the legitimation of the new political power and the new political discourse. The traditional source made appeals to well-known social categories and requested their mobilization. The charismatic one recalled the exceptional personal traits of those challenging the former regime. Finally, the legal source completed the image of a trustworthy system that required people to obey the law. Through the means of the live broadcast, during only one day, a complex procedure was without delay schematized. The following days brought the consolidation of the process.

Besides, the appeals of the official representatives *mobilized* the weapons forces: the Army, the Navy, The Securitate and the Militia. Each of these delegates manifested public solidarity with the people. The military men were asked to stop the gunfire and to maintain order. The message was taken over by the people in the streets. The exclamation "The army is with us!" became emblematic for the victory of the Revolution.

Creating a New Political Discourse

The focus will now shift to the complementary discussion of the order of discourse. This examination will attempt to distinguish how the new political identities were constructed and how the final declaration was produced, distributed, and interpreted.

Constructing a New Identity

The creation of a new political discourse is illustrated through an analysis of the discourse practice of the televised broadcast. The focus will be on interpersonal relationships: the construction of an identity for the leaders, an identity for the public, and a relationship between the leaders and the public.

1. The "virtual" leaders

Out of the many figures that gain credibility through their participation in the Revolution, my focus will be on Petre Roman, the future prim-minister and on Ion Iliescu, the future president of Romania. The former was a new actor on the political scene; the latter had a long career in the communist structures of power, but since 1971 was relegated. They both faced the problem of constructing a plausible identity for a new political leader.

They used different strategies of legitimation. Petre Roman was a young professor of the Polytechnic Institute who fought on the barricades and participated in the manifestation of protest. He was among the first ones who arrived at the Television where he was designated to read the "People's Declaration", the first communiqué to the nation:

> "Petre Roman: People's Declaration. Compatriots, brothers! Today, the 22nd of December due to the unity of the people and with the direct help of the Army, the dictator was removed. In this moment, the people, together with the Army, require that the political power is taken by democratic institutions chosen by free people. In the name of the citizens of Bucharest, who are now manifestating in the streets and controlling the building of the Central Committee, we make an appeal to the entire nation, to maintain calm and the public order so that we can organize the free and democratic life."

According to his own account, the declaration was drafted "as a matter of urgency by four or five people who were there with me."[103] Petre Roman became the spokesman of the young people participating in the uprising. Furthermore, since the accepted claim was that young people had waged the revolution on the streets, Roman was considered the representative in the government of revolutionary youth.

By contrast, Ion Iliescu was the voice of "experience". He made a career in the Romanian nomenklatura, becoming in 1965 a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and in 1967, the Minister of Youth Problems. However, in 1971, due to his criticism of Ceausescu's policies, he was marginalized and removed from all his political functions. Iliescu showed up, a few hours after Ceausescu's escape, in studio 4 and was introduced with enthusiasm by the anchorman:

"…we have the great joy to host here, in the studio, Ion Iliescu. He is the son of a revolutionary[104] and patriot, he himself being a patriot."[105]

[102] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct*, 113-116.

[103] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct*, 234.

[104] He was the son of a railroad worker who was one of the few members of the pre-war Romanian Communist Party. Therefore, his

Giving his first speech, Iliescu displayed assurance and authority:

> "Twenty minutes ago, I spoke on the phone with General Stanculescu, the acting Defense Minister. He issued an order. The troops spread around the city with orders to shoot have been withdrawn. He turned back a column of armored vehicles which had been sent from Pitesti to Bucharest…Therefore, comrades, at this moment we have guarantees that the army is with the people."[106]

He went on to announce that during the same day a Committee of National Salvation would be formed with the aim of restoring order. During the afternoon of December 22, he enjoyed considerable recognition and authority. His leadership was accepted with little criticism and no contest. With a power void to be filled and no other leader or group strong enough to assert power, he had basically no obstacle to overcome and no rival to defeat.

Iliescu announced the creation of the National Salvation Front (NSF) in a radio and television address. Within four days, a provisional government was formed, with Petre Roman as Prime Minister and Iliescu as president of the front and interim president of the country.

2. The people

For a new political structure to obtain power, it has to carve out a political base, a determined electorate. Such a political base is partly brought into existence through the discourses of politicians that construct and reconstruct the "public". In the broadcast speeches, the future leaders frequently talked about "the Romanian people". Furthermore, they often did so by listing their attributes.

> "Mircea Dinescu: The Army should help the heroic Romanian people…"[107]
>
> "Petre Roman: …the united Romanian nation is victorious". [108]
>
> "Ion Iliescu: "Our people should demonstrate its wisdom and political maturity so that we can organize on a democratic basis. "
>
> "Ion Iliescu: The Romanians deserved to enter in the group of civilized nations of Europe."

The query of how the "audience" was constructed overlaps with the problem of what relationship was settled between the new leaders and the people. After the extreme experience of totalitarian rule, a certain tension can be identified between a rapport with the audience characterized by authority and one characterized by solidarity.

Regarding this issue, pronouns are worth examining. The pronoun "we" was sometimes used to include the audience. "We all obtained a historic victory against the dictatorship" [109] . By contrast, sometimes "we" was exclusively referring to the new leadership. "We have now the mission to organize the destiny of the country,"[110] said Ion Iliescu. This last feature was typical for Ceausescu's speeches that always separated him from the crowd. By contrast, the inclusive uses of "we" became a common feature of the new political discourse. Using it, solidarity could be claimed (since everybody was in the same boat), but also authority is respected (since the leader has the right to speak for all the people).

3. The revolution as a mode of legitimation

The NSF and its successors used the revolution as a mode of legitimation. The claim was that this organization has been the standard bearer of the event and the voice of the crowd. The new leaders asserted that they had been raised to their positions when they received the direct approbation of the crowd during their appearance on the balcony of the Central Committee and in the studios of the Television. In their speeches, Iliescu and the others NSF leaders constantly repeated this theme.

Arguing that the Revolution had imposed a broad consensus in Romania, they tried to use this to put up a new political system, which permitted the dialogue between different political opinions, but diminished any confrontation. The exact limits of this model were never fixed, but within it, the powers of NSF would have been considerable. The formation was the goal setter, the mediator of the debates, and the executor of decisions taken.

The epilogue of this story is that, even if seventy-three parties participated in the first democratic elections, held on the 20th of May 1990, the NSF candidates received an overwhelming 67% of the votes. Petre Roman was once again named Prime Minister. The candidate for Presidency, Ion Iliescu received 86% of the vote. The success of the NSF in the first postcommunist elections was unlike other East European parties and one cause may be their "use" of the Romanian Revolution.

The communiqué

The first day of live broadcast of the Romanian Revolution ended with an intervention of Ion Iliescu reading the document that certified the "birth" of the new authority and listing its priorities. The following lines will focus on the production, distribution and reception of this mediatized political discourse

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father was a revolutionary only of a type entirely opposite to what a revolutionary meant on the day of victory over communism.

[105] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct*, 41.

[106] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct*, 42.

[107] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct*, 27.

[108] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct*, 34.

[109] Petre Roman, in *Revolutia Romana in direct*, 34.

[110] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct*, 47.

The meeting

After announcing on television that during the same day a Committee of National Salvation would be formed with the aim of restoring order, Iliescu arrived at the Central Committee building, where a number of people were already waiting for him. Among them were former party and government representatives that had been relegated by Ceausescu, known dissidents, and some active and retired Army officials. A Romanian Television camera recorded his arrival and the meeting that followed.[111]

> "A voice from the crowd: Film and record everything!
>
> Iliescu: We are going in the large hall to discuss.
>
> Another voice: No! You must talk here. So that we know what is going on. We want to have control.
>
> Iliescu: We want to form a council…"[112]

According to the testimonies of the witnesses[113], the meeting was a disordered and unclear one. The speakers were talking at the same time and the phone conversations were overlapping with discussions between two or more people. The general atmosphere was a tense one and little substantive information could be heard. An agreement about the necessity to form a provisional structure of power had been reached. The problems still to discuss were its name and the gathering of all its desiderates in a communiqué for the people.

> "Roman: Salvation is not good…It belongs to a coup d'etat…The Front of National Democracy!
>
> Iliescu: Democracy is with everybody…
>
> Roman: But what does it mean "salvation"? Comrade Iliescu, when I spoke on the balcony, I said "People's Unity Front."
>
> Militaru: Call it "National Salvation Front."
>
> Iliescu: It creates a state of panic when you say salvation…"[114]

With regard to the issue of writing an announcement, a version of it seemed to have been already put on paper by the time of the meeting. After long argumentations and counter-argumentations, a 10-point program of the National Salvation Front was completed and included the aspirations for freedom, democracy, prosperity, and independence of the Romanian people.

The broadcast

Ion Iliescu announced the formation of the Council of the National Salvation Front, its membership and its program on the national television:

> "A new page is opened in the political and economical history of Romania. In these hard moments, we decided to form the National Salvation Front which is an ally of the Army and that it is composed of all the "healthy" forces of the country, disregarding the nationality, and of all the organisations and groups who arose bravely in the defence of liberty and dignity. The purpose of the National Salvation Front is to establish democracy, freedom and dignity for the Romanian people. From this moment on, all power structures belonging to the Ceausescu clan are dissolved. The government is abolished. The State Council and its institutions will cease their activity. The Council of the National Salvation Front takes the whole power."

The political demands were parts of the general human rights discourse and their formulation was clear and concise:

- the establishment of a pluralist and democratic system of government
- free elections in April
- the separation of legislative, executive and judicial power and the election of the country's leaders for no more than two terms
- respect for the rights of national minorities and guarantees for their equal status with the Romanians
- domestic and foreign policies based on the needs and interests of the human being
- full respect of human rights and liberties.

By comparison with the political ones, the economic problems were treated with a more hesitant and ambiguous approach:

- the reconstruction of the national economy with the purpose of obtaining efficiency and profitability
- the reduction of export
- support for small farm production
- the reorganization of trade to meet the daily needs of the population.

Nevertheless, the proclamation was the start that raised high hopes among the population. Additionally, its live broadcast transformed the birth of a new political power from a local event into a performance that could be watched by spectators from all over the world. The Romanian Television received messages of support from all over the world in the days to come, from the USA and the USSR to all the newly- formed political structures in Eastern and Central Europe. In the following days moral support was followed by material support. Large quantities of food, medicine, clothing, and medical equipment were sent to Romania.

[111] The images were transmitted the next day.
[112] Nestor Ratesh, *Romania: the Entangled Revolution*, (Praeger, The Washington Papers, 1991), 53.
[113] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct*, 187-240.
[114] Ratesh, *Romania*, 54.

Around the world, the press dedicated entire pages and sometimes even complete issues to the Romanian revolution and its heroes.

The impact

In discussing the first reactions to the formation of the Council of the National Salvation Front and their discourse, my focus will be on the first appeal to its legitimacy. The main problem was that Iliescu and most of the others who formed the National Salvation Front were former members of the Romanian Communist Party. The question was whether they could really adapt to democracy and at the same time liberate themselves from their communist background.

In the case of Iliescu, the worry was increased by the mere fact that he was not just a simple party member, but one of its leading militants. During his first televised speeches, he seemed "infiltrated" by the communist imagery and way of speaking. Speaking in front of the cameras, he constantly used the designation "comrade", and people addressed him with the same term. Moreover, in one of his interventions he tried to separate the Party and the communist ideology from Ceausescu's personal tyranny.

> "They[115] proclaimed themselves leaders, they proclaimed themselves representatives of the people, they proclaimed themselves communists. But they don't have anything to do with the socialism or with the ideology of scientific communism. They defiled the name of the Romanian communist party, they defiled the memory of those who died for the principle of socialism in this country…"[116]

It can only be speculated whether the intention of Iliescu was to excuse and preserve the party. In any case, his vocabulary and his formulations reflected a state of facts that was in contradiction with the meaning of the revolution. And, even though, afterwards, he modified his style of address, there would still be many indications of Iliescu's incapability of freeing himself of Communist categories and terminology.[117]

All those accused of collaborating with the former regime used as a defence strategy their personal disputes with Ceausescu in the last years of his rule and moreover, the relegations and sentences that followed. In his testimony from the book "The Romanian Revolution Live", he remembers that: "For several years I was surveyed in different ways, but starting with the spring of 1989 this surveillance became very serious and obvious. Three Securitate crew were incessantly following me, my wife and everyone who was coming to see us."[118]

This approach did not however answer the main dilemma that was raised: were former communist leaders entitled to represent the ideals of an anti-Communist Revolution? As a result, a few weeks after the events, on the 12th of January 1990, the first serious challenge to the new power emerged. Thousands of people demonstrated in front of the building that was the headquarters of the new government. They clearly expressed their anti-Communist ideas and their opposition to a regime dominated by communists. Later on, from April till June 1990, in the University Square of Bucharest, a peaceful protest was organized against the predominance of former Communists in the new regime. The protest was violently repressed, but the problem remained on the public agenda and continues to be one of the major topics of political debates. It was best summarized by the motto of the anti-Communist manifestations: "The only solution: another Revolution!"

Conclusion

This section illustrated two facets of the mediatized political discourse from the days of the Romanian Revolution. On one hand, after a broadcast characterised by chaos and contradictions, the communiqué of the National Salvation Front represented the first official *information* on behalf of the new authorities. The demands and the expectations of the manifestants took the explicit form of a declaration transmitted to the country. After years of manipulation and censorship, the national television broadcasted the first authentic information.

In addition, through this announcement the new political power claimed *legitimation.* The leaders presented themselves as alternatives to the totalitarian rule. The audience was created in their discourses through heroic attributes and through the inclusive use of the pronoun "we". The claim was that the new leaders represent the ideals of the revolutionary change and identified themselves with the people.

Consequently, the National Salvation Front was accused of "confiscating" the Revolution and of using it for political purposes. Moreover, another strong charge was that its legitimacy was debatable, since the new representatives took part in the old communist structures of power. The accusations were never answered properly and therefore, the legitimation and the veracity of the new political discourse are still subject to controversy.

Final conclusions

What were the role and the consequences of the live coverage of the Romanian Revolution? My research question was answered at the beginning by the hypothesis claiming that the Television contributed to

[115] Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife, Elena.
[116] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct*, 46.
[117] In April 2005, for example, at one conference of the Social Democrat Party he introduced his succeeding speaker by the term "comrade."
[118] Tatulici, *Revolutia Romana in direct,* 222.

the victory of the democratic forces by *informing* the population about the actual state of facts, by *mobilizing* civilians to participate in the rallies, and by *legitimating* the anti-Communist uprising.

In order to verify this premise, I analyzed the transcripts of the Romanian Television broadcast using discourse analysis. The findings of the empirical research justify the restatement of the working hypothesis. The three assumed roles - information, legitimation and mobilization - have been confirmed, but a more detailed presentation of their effects is needed.

I. Firstly, the people were *informed about both the past* situation and the *current* one. During the last years of communism, the television was subject to strict censorship in Romania and its programming was mainly devoted to the personality cults of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu. The first real information about the consequences of Ceausescu's dictatorship appeared on the 22nd of December through the speeches of the revolutionists. The delegitimation of the communist regime was realized through references to the political and economic situation of the country:

1. The political regime was a "sultanistic" dictatorship; the authorities disregarded the human rights discourse and punished any criticism.
2. The economic situation was a difficult one, the population lived in poverty, there was a slump on the internal market of food, and frequent heating, gas and electricity stoppages occurred.

The information about the unfolding situation started with the announcement of Ceausescu's departure from Bucharest. Then, details about the violent repression of the rally and the continuing street fights completed the picture. The positive reactions of the foreign political actors (ONU, USA and USSR) brought about the first argument for the acceptance of the new political discourse.

II. The process of *legitimation* had two main directions: the legitimation of the revolutionary actions and that of the new political discourse.

1. The former was based on the legitimation of the actions of the dissidents: the opponents of the regime were brought into the studio and introduced as heroes. Consequently, the uprising was presented as the only solution for ending the absolute rule of Nicolae Ceausescu.
2. The latter implied the justification of the democratic requests and the legitimation of the new leaders.

From my perspective, *the legitimation of the new political discourse* represented the core contribution to the victory of the revolution brought about by the Television broadcast. According to Max Weber's typology of the sources of legitimation, a combination of the three (traditional, charismatic, and legal) represented the basis for both the legitimation of the new political power and the new political discourse. The traditional source made appeals to the well-known social categories and requested their mobilization. The charismatic one recalled the exceptional personal traits of those challenging the former regime. Finally, the legal source completed the image of a trustworthy system, requiring people to obey the law.

Through the means of the live broadcast, in only one day a complex procedure was schematized without delay.

III. The *mobilization* process had two targets: the civilians and the armed forces. The citizens of Bucharest were asked to participate in the rally from the Central Committee's square. Moreover, when the buildings of the National Radio and the Television were attacked by gun shots, the civilians were asked to defend them. Public appeals to humanitarian acts such as blood donation were repeated throughout the broadcast.

The appearance in the studio of the Army officials confirmed the solidarity of this institution with the revolutionists and the causes they defended. Later on, representatives of the Navy, the Aircraft, the Militia, and the Securitate made similar appeals. The forces of the Army and the Securitate were commended to cease-fire and to support the revolution. Finally, the defence of the public order was another request addressed to the armed forces.

To sum up, the three roles of the broadcasted Revolution - information, legitimation, and mobilization - contributed directly to the victory of the democratic forces. The Television was in those days the headquarters of the events. Moreover, the narration of the violent scenes, the launching of public appeals, and the recitation of official communiqués transformed the institution into the real center of power in the country. The live broadcast of the events transformed a revolt in Bucharest into a revolution at a national level. Aurel Munteanu, the first director of Free Romanian television, identified the critical role played by the media in those days by saying: "Television make the Revolution, television is the Revolution".[119]

My final considerations will point out the possible future continuation of this research. My study represents an empirical original work that was concluded with a model describing the role of the television in the Revolution. My intention was to fill up a niche in the literature surrounding the events of December 1989, since no previous material analyzed in a structured manner the role played by the Television. I claim that the final model can be tested in comparative studies discussing the role of the media in other revolutions, especially in recent times. As Jurgen

[119] Martyn Rady, *Romania in Turmoil*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1992), 99.

Habermas [120] asserts, the modern revolutionary events "took place for the first time in the unorthodox space of an international arena of participating and partial observers, created by the uninterrupted presence of the electronic media."

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Chart 1

The Role of the Public Television during the Romanian Revolution



Appendix A (for DO SMALL SETTLEMENT SCHOOLS PROVIDE EDUCATION OF INFERIOR QUALITY? THE CASE OF HUNGARY

DANIEL HORN)

Table 4. Multinomial logit regressions

Academic	Odds ratios						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Small village	0.884**	0.983	1.025	1.015	1.012	1.018	1.050
	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.063)
Town	1.749***	1.640***	1.277***	1.262***	1.565***	1.229***	1.237***
	(0.116)	(0.111)	(0.091)	(0.089)	(0.195)	(0.085)	(0.084)
City	1.875***	1.311***	0.889	0.874*	1.095	0.835**	0.794***
	(0.080)	(0.054)	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.118)	(0.059)	(0.056)
Capital	2.649***	1.333***	0.902	0.894	1.105	0.826**	0.652***
	(0.194)	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.131)	(0.066)	(0.051)
Primary, father		0.562***	0.565***	0.565***	0.563***	0.576***	0.587***
		(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Voc. Technical, father		0.639***	0.641***	0.640***	0.640***	0.652***	0.658***
		(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
College, father		1.593***	1.590***	1.591***	1.595***	1.545***	1.533***
		(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
University, father		2.686***	2.678***	2.684***	2.678***	2.386***	2.273***
		(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.091)	(0.086)
Primary, mother		0.569***	0.572***	0.572***	0.571***	0.582***	0.588***
		(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Voc. Technical, mother		0.550***	0.551***	0.551***	0.551***	0.556***	0.562***
		(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
College, mother		2.022***	2.024***	2.025***	2.024***	1.945***	1.920***
		(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.048)
University, mother		3.168***	3.166***	3.165***	3.170***	2.782***	2.633***
		(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.119)	(0.112)
Unemployed, father		0.924***	0.926**	0.926**	0.924**	0.939**	0.944*
		(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Unemployed, mother		0.965	0.967	0.963	0.964	0.963	0.969
		(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Educational aid		0.778***	0.779***	0.778***	0.778***	0.785***	0.786***
		(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Female		2.170***	2.174***	2.173***	2.175***	2.193***	2.203***
		(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Square root of distance			0.887***	0.886***	0.910***	0.934***	0.935***
			(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Merged class						0.980	1.037
						(0.046)	(0.048)
6/8 year long academic school						9.024***	2.566***
						(1.072)	(0.350)

Ratio of teach. with university deg.							10.917***
							(1.983)
Ratio of teach. with no college deg.							0.805***
							(0.068)
No academic school, towns (interaction)					0.699**		
					(0.105)		
More than 2 types of voc. school					0.859**		
					(0.058)		
Commuting up				1.307***			
				(0.051)			
Observations	98385	98385	98385	98385	98385	98385	98385
Robust standard errors in parentheses							
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Coefficients for controlling missing dummy variables not shown							

Vocational Technical	Odds Ratios						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Small village	1.103*	1.036	1.032	1.026	1.028	1.071	1.076
	(0.057)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Town	0.922	0.934	0.971	0.962	1.053	0.919	0.931
	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.100)	(0.051)	(0.053)
City	0.665***	0.888***	0.947	0.934	1.021	0.980	0.996
	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.075)	(0.057)	(0.060)
Capital	0.372***	0.583***	0.622***	0.619***	0.671***	0.646***	0.665***
	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.052)
Primary, father		2.098***	2.096***	2.095***	2.094***	2.083***	2.060***
		(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.072)
Voc. Technical, father		1.251***	1.250***	1.249***	1.249***	1.245***	1.242***
		(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
College, father		0.706***	0.707***	0.707***	0.707***	0.706***	0.707***
		(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
University, father		0.630***	0.630***	0.632***	0.630***	0.627***	0.632***
		(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Primary, mother		2.748***	2.745***	2.744***	2.743***	2.721***	2.695***
		(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.078)
Voc. Technical, mother		1.751***	1.751***	1.751***	1.750***	1.749***	1.744***
		(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.041)
College, mother		0.668***	0.668***	0.668***	0.668***	0.668***	0.669***
		(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
University, mother		0.648***	0.648***	0.647***	0.648***	0.647***	0.650***
		(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.061)
Unemployed, father		1.357***	1.356***	1.356***	1.356***	1.355***	1.354***
		(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Unemployed, mother		1.388***	1.387***	1.384***	1.386***	1.383***	1.379***
		(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Educational aid		1.828***	1.828***	1.828***	1.827***	1.819***	1.816***

		(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Female		0.571***	0.571***	0.570***	0.571***	0.571***	0.571***
		(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Square root of distance			1.019	1.018	1.028	1.013	1.015
			(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Merged class						1.238***	1.192***
						(0.046)	(0.043)
6/8 year long academic school						0.711***	0.801
						(0.083)	(0.119)
Ratio of teach. with university deg.							0.814
							(0.167)
Ratio of teach. with no college deg.							1.895***
							(0.153)
No academic school, towns (interaction)					0.876		
					(0.100)		
More than 2 types of voc. school					0.945		
					(0.047)		
Commuting up				1.251***			
				(0.041)			
Observations	98385	98385	98385	98385	98385	98385	98385
Robust standard errors in parentheses							
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Coefficients for controlling missing dummy variables not shown							

Table 5. Marginal changes in predicted probabilities

Equation	**1**		**2**		**3**		**4**		**5**		**6**		**7**	
	Voc. training	**Acad-emic**	**Voc. training**	**Acad-emic**	**Voc. training**	**Acad-emic**	**Voc. training**	**Acad-emic**	**Voc. training**	**Acad-emic**	**Voc. training**	**Acad-emic**	**Voc. training**	**Acad-emic**
Small village	0,032	-0,027	0,006	-0,005	0,004	0,003	0,003	0,002	0,004	0,001	0,009	0,000	0,009	0,006
Town	-0,065	0,118	-0,035	0,108	-0,016	0,050	-0,017	0,048	-0,016	0,090	-0,021	0,045	-0,020	0,045
City	-0,131	0,163	-0,030	0,060	-0,003	-0,019	-0,004	-0,021	-0,001	0,017	0,005	-0,032	0,009	-0,040
Capital	-0,232	0,288	-0,078	0,082	-0,058	-0,001	-0,058	-0,003	-0,057	0,037	-0,049	-0,019	-0,040	-0,058
Primary, father			0,171	-0,123	0,170	-0,121	0,169	-0,120	0,170	-0,122	0,163	-0,118	0,161	-0,113
Voc. Technical, father			0,057	-0,084	0,057	-0,082	0,056	-0,082	0,057	-0,083	0,054	-0,080	0,053	-0,077
College, father			-0,066	0,115	-0,066	0,114	-0,065	0,113	-0,066	0,115	-0,062	0,107	-0,062	0,104
University, father			-0,100	0,247	-0,099	0,245	-0,098	0,245	-0,100	0,246	-0,091	0,216	-0,089	0,202
Primary, mother			0,234	-0,134	0,234	-0,132	0,232	-0,131	0,234	-0,134	0,225	-0,130	0,224	-0,126
Voc. Technical, mother			0,131	-0,117	0,131	-0,116	0,130	-0,115	0,131	-0,117	0,126	-0,115	0,126	-0,111
College, mother			-0,082	0,174	-0,082	0,174	-0,081	0,173	-0,082	0,174	-0,077	0,164	-0,077	0,159
University, mother			-0,105	0,287	-0,105	0,286	-0,103	0,285	-0,105	0,287	-0,095	0,254	-0,093	0,238
Unemployed, father			0,055	-0,030	0,055	-0,029	0,054	-0,029	0,055	-0,030	0,052	-0,026	0,052	-0,025
Unemployed, mother			0,057	-0,023	0,057	-0,023	0,056	-0,023	0,057	-0,023	0,054	-0,023	0,054	-0,021
Educational aid			0,124	-0,074	0,124	-0,073	0,123	-0,072	0,124	-0,074	0,118	-0,071	0,119	-0,069
Female			-0,099	0,198	-0,099	0,198	-0,098	0,196	-0,099	0,199	-0,095	0,199	-0,096	0,199
Square root of distance (±0,5 unit change around the mean)					0,008	-0,023	0,008	-0,023	0,009	-0,019	0,005	-0,013	0,005	-0,013
Merged class											0,034	-0,014	0,026	-0,002
6/8 year long academic school											-0,135	0,513	-0,074	0,222
Ratio of teach. with university deg.(±0,5 unit change around the mean)													-0,131	0,437
Ratio of teach. with no college deg. (±0,5 unit change around the mean)													0,105	-0,068
No academic school, towns (interaction)									-0,005	-0,057				
More than 2 types of voc. school									-0,002	-0,025				
Commuting up							0,021	0,041						

Note: comparison category is large village parents with secondary school diploma, employed, no educational aid, male, not commuting, no merged class, no 6/8 year ac. school, distance and ratio of teachers are large village means.