




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AARMS

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Introduction to the Special Issue

The South America, South Europe International Conference *New Approaches to Defense and Security in South America and Southern Europe*, organised by the Department of International Security Studies of Ludovika – University of Public Service (UPS) and the Doctoral Student Association of UPS took place on 17 April 2021. More than 40 lectures, related to security studies, regional security, defence studies, military engineering and international studies were held online, organised in ten sessions in English, Spanish or Hungarian. Participants came from over ten countries, many from the studied regions, including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Spain.

Such a conference of course had antecedents at the university. A series of joint conferences *Dialogue and Conflicts in the Mediterranean* organised by the University of Public Service and the Anna Lindh Foundation have been taking place since the middle of the 2010s, held at the university with the participation of Hungarian and foreign researchers, diplomats and NGO representatives. Various discussion and research results were summed up in the book *Az Európai Unió mediterrán térséggel összefüggő kapcsolata* [Connections of the European Union with the Mediterranean Region].¹ Currently UPS is leading a 3-year international project headed by Anna Molnár as scientific coordinator: ‘EUSecure Project: *An Interdisciplinary Training on EU Security, Resilience and Sustainability – A Simulation Supported Massive Open Online Course (SimMOOC)*, to be carried out in partnership with the Piraeus University of Greece, the University Fernando Pessoa in Porto, Portugal, the University of Salento in Lecce, Italy and Sapientia, the Hungarian University of Transylvania in Romania. Due to its participants and their approach, the project is to have a strong Mediterranean edge. As for Latin America, two scientific events took place in 2017, one on the cultural connections with Hungary (resulting in a bilingual Spanish–English 14-chapter book: *Latin America and Hungary – Cultural Ties*)² and a workshop on the current situation in South America (followed by the book *Dél-Amerika a 21. században – társadalmi, gazdasági és politikai konfliktusok* [South America in the 21st Century – Social, Economic and Political Conflicts]).³ The latter two publications were elaborated in the framework of the Ludovika research group ‘Latin America and Hungary – Intersections’ (2017–2018), formed by Zoltán Bács, Barbara Hegedűs, Béla Soltész and headed by Mónika Szente-Varga.

Ludovika – University of Public Service provides courses which are fully or partially related to either the Mediterranean or Latin America. For example, there are Introduction to Civilization Studies, Regional Studies, Regional Security courses, taught by various instructors both in Hungarian and in English, covering and teaching their own area of research, including the above-mentioned two regions. Elective courses include Mediterranean Region; Italian Foreign and Domestic Policy; Spanish History – Spanish

¹ Anna Molnár and Orsolya Komlósi (ed.), *Az Európai Unió mediterrán térséggel összefüggő kapcsolata* (Budapest: Dialóg Campus, 2019).

² Mónika Szente-Varga (ed.), *Latin America and Hungary – Cultural Ties* (Budapest: Dialóg Campus, 2020).

³ Zoltán György Bács, Barbara Hegedűs, Katalin Marianna Racs, Béla Soltész and Mónika Szente-Varga, *Dél-Amerika a 21. században – társadalmi, gazdasági és politikai konfliktusok* (Budapest: Dialóg Campus, 2019).

Culture; South America portraits – South America in the 21st century; Mexican and Central American Studies. These are mostly taught in Hungarian and are available for students studying international BA and MA programmes, such as International Public Management, International Relations, International Public Service Relations and International Defence and Security Policy. Further studies on issues related to regional and other fields of security are possible in the Doctoral School of Military Science of UPS.

Traditionally defined as the lack of being threatened or the ability to defend oneself, and attached to the military field, security is still a rather elusive concept, in which both real and perceived threats play an important role. Nonetheless, the idea and ideas attached to security did undergo important changes, due to the democratisation processes in Southern Europe in the 1970s (Portugal, Spain, Greece), in South America in the 1980s (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, etc.) followed by other states, and due to the end of bipolar rivalry. In the post-Cold War era there has been a growing convergence between national and international security⁴ and a broadening of the concept of security, leading to the “redefinition of the referent objects and sources of threat”.⁵ The latter might be grouped in distinguishable yet overlapping sectors, including military, political, economic, societal and environmental fields, as defined by the Copenhagen School at the beginning of the 21st century.⁶ Nowadays these tend to be complemented by new sectors, such as health security, energy security and cybersecurity. These threats affect states to different degrees, but will pose a challenge to all, and will need to be treated with the help of international cooperation, based on shared values and common approaches such as representative democracy, respect for human rights and values, respect for the rule of law, education, social justice and enhanced participation of women.⁷

Studying South Europe and South America in one event has various reasons. These two regions are connected by numerous historic, economic, cultural and migratory ties, yet occupy different positions in the current international system. South Europe, though considered less developed than the northern parts of the continent, is regarded a part of the Global North, whereas South America is seen as Global South. Yet security threats are increasingly multidimensional, cross-border and international. Thus, states tend to face challenges that are getting more similar. Therefore, studying how others cope with security threats can help tackling challenges in one’s own country/region, and lead to adopting good practices.

It is worth keeping in mind the list of threats and challenges featuring in the *Declaration on Security in the Americas* “terrorism, transnational organized crime, the global drug problem, corruption, asset laundering, illicit trafficking in weapons, and the connections among them [...]; extreme poverty and social exclusion [...]; natural and man-made

⁴ Monica Herz, ‘Concepts of Security in South America’, *International Peacekeeping* 17, no 5 (2010), 603; Didier Bigo, ‘Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease’, *Alternatives* 27 (2002), 63.

⁵ Herz, ‘Security and Immigration’, 603.

⁶ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

⁷ Organization of American States, *Declaration on Security in the Americas*. Mexico, 2003, OEA/Ser.K/XXXVIII, CES/DEC.1/03 rev. 1, 28 October 2003. Online: www.oas.org/en/sms/docs/declaration%20security%20americas%20rev%201%20-%2028%20oct%202003%20ce00339.pdf

disasters, [...] diseases [...]; trafficking in persons [...]; attacks to cyber security”⁸ closely correspond to areas examined in this special issue of AARMS, consisting of nine studies. All of these writings are based on lectures presented at the South America, South Europe International Conference in 2021. The paper of Zoltán György Bács (*Dynamic Asymmetry and Converging Threats*) focuses on the paradigm change in the methods of financing terrorism and studies money laundering and infiltration on behalf of terrorist organisations as well as the links and complementary activities they developed with narco-cartels. The rivalry of organised crime groups for resources and the resulting violence is studied by Ketiane Guerreiro in the paper *Criminality and Armed Groups in the International and Legal Amazon*, where she examines the struggle to control the extraction of gold, and by Gerardo Reyes Guzmán in the study *Guanajuato: A Struggle to Control Oil Theft*, in which the correlation between growing homicide rates and the rivalry of criminal groups for gasoline is demonstrated. The connections among violence, poverty, inequality and social exclusion are explored by Ágnes Deák via the case study of Colombia (*Violence as a Dimension of Poverty*). Economic and political crises, rampant corruption and profound disenchantment of the population in the political establishment as well as growing societal polarisation are investigated by Giovanna Borges Aguiar in order to explain the principal motives for rising political populism in Brazil (*Populism in Time of Crisis: The Brazilian Case of Bolsonaro*). The study of Attila Horváth (*Possible Applications of High Altitude Platform Systems for the Security of South America and South Europe*) takes us to neighbouring Venezuela, which features in his investigation on the capabilities and potential applications of High Altitude Platform Systems (HAPS) as an imaginary operational scenario. Iryna Leroy also examines military technology, in particular, the change in the direction of technology transfer. This transfer used to be from the military towards civilian fields (for example business) and has recently been shifting to include the applications of cyber technologies – already employed in business – in military conflicts (*Cyber Autonomy Toolbox – Project Management Digital Transformation*). Current trends and challenges also form the focus of the paper of Veronika Hornyák, but in her case it is not cybersecurity but health threats. She analyses the responses of the Spanish military for the Covid-19 epidemic in the course of the year 2020 (*The Role of the Spanish Armed Forces in the Fight against the Covid-19 Pandemic*). The paper of László Palotás (*How Britain’s and Colombia’s Privileged Partnerships with the United States Influenced Their Respective Journeys through the European Community and UNASUR*) completes the wide array of studies comprising this special issue, where he examines how the self-perception of Colombia in security–defence aspects (being a special partner of the USA) affected her behaviour with respect to UNASUR, originally set up as a kind of counter-organisation to the OAS, with plans to take over some of its tasks, including the resolution of regional conflicts.

Bringing scholars and PhD students together for a South America – South Europe conference also had, from the very beginning, the aim to share and compare investigations in the realm of security and contribute to common projects among researchers of South America and South Europe in the middle or long run. The 2021 conference was the first

⁸ Ibid. 4.

one, hopefully in a chain of scientific events that with the passing of time can turn into a tradition at Ludovika – UPS, but never a routine. The 2022 South America – South Europe conference is already being organised, this time in a hybrid form.

Last but not least, I would like to express my special thanks to the Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training and to the Doctoral Student Association of the University of Public Service, in particular to Anna Urbanovics, Gabriella Thomázy and Gyula Speck, as well as to my numerous colleagues, members of the Department of International Security Studies and scholars from other universities (University of Szeged, University of Pécs, University of Debrecen, Corvinus University of Budapest, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University). Their work and enthusiasm were indispensable for the organisation of the conference and the launching of this publication. We are all very grateful for the editors of AARMS, for supporting the idea of the special issue.

Mónika Szente-Varga

President of the Scientific Committee of the Conference

Dynamic Asymmetry and Converging Threats¹

Zoltán BÁCS² 

Terrorism is changing its paradigm. The superb adaptive capability and the diversification of the methods of financing terrorism give the chance to infiltrate into the political establishment of the most vulnerable countries. The terrorist and the criminal syndicates as allies have common methods, common structures but never merge their organisations. Their strategic goals remain different.

Keywords: asymmetric methods, dynamism, harmonisation of tasks, structured cooperation, transnational organised crime, narco business

Introduction

When unusual expressions like asymmetry, dynamism and convergence emerge, one hesitates how he or she should understand these notions beyond mathematics and physics. What these words refer in the context of terrorism and counter-terrorism? What are the characteristics of a situation where the permanently on-going changes of the correlations between these notions play a highly important role and determine political, economic and social processes not only in the given society but also far beyond that?

This study intends to give a limited picture of the changes already occurred and going on today in the field of terrorism during the last fifteen years. Due to the permanent transformations and adaptations of the terrorists' modus operandi and paradigm on the one hand and tactics and counter-measure of the counter-terrorist forces on other, the study is rather based on the perceived phenomena, conclusions about the possible tendencies, made by experts, discussions of professionals in this field, than academic publications. However, there are many different academic materials, publications and articles of renowned authors worldwide, whose long experience and authority in the matter is undisputable. The goal is clear: to present the evolution of terrorism in the context of its recent changes and – following the palpable tendencies – to advert the forthcoming threats. To raise awareness of all the social groups including the most vulnerable ones is also an important goal of the present study.

¹ The present publication was presented in oral form on the “South America, South Europe International Conference” at the Ludovika University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary, on 17 April 2021.

² PhD, lecturer at the National Security Institute of the University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary, e-mail: bacszygorgy@gmail.com

The methods used in this study follow the complexity of the topic combining the comparative analysis of the analogue patterns in the evolution of different fields of criminal activities like organised crime, drug-related crime and terrorism with the analysis of probabilities of the possible consequences in high priority fields like economy and policy-making.

The study is composed of several parts. The first part after the introduction highlights the present conditions in terrorism. After that, the next part focuses on the convergence of the criminal organisations, logically leading to the next part dealing with convergence between organised crime and terrorism.

The next part is about other fields of convergence threatening different levels of policy-making beginning from the local up to the much higher levels. In this chapter, one can find a short retrospective view on the historic background of convergence of the organised crime with politics in the United States of America in the 1930s and its linkage to the new fields of criminal activities in the present days.

The following part deals with one of the most essential fields of crime, i.e. financing terrorism and terrorist organisations. Acts of this kind are criminalised by the penal codes of the majority of countries.

The conclusion – as usually does – summarises what the previous parts dealt with. It underlines the most important features of the convergences paying a special attention to the characteristics separating organised crime from terrorism. The conclusion also reiterates the ultimate threat for the democratic societies, the hardly visible, slow penetration of terrorism in the societies through the most vulnerable social groups.

Actual conditions and circumstances

As one follows the facts and as terrorism is changing in different ways in different regions of our planet since it was downed in the battlefields by the military forces, some new phenomena have come up to the surface related to terrorist organisations.³ At first sight, some of these phenomena are far from being related to financing terrorism. They cover issues of logistics, markets to be used to finance the terrorist organisations' activities, the oscillations between the offers and demands of different merchandises and services, labour force related issues, economic features and/or the technical background of the production of fast-moving consumer goods, mostly household appliances and electronic items. Although these things seem peripheral, they play an important role in financing terrorism under the new conditions. What kind of conditions do we speak about?

It is obvious that the terrorism of the 20th–21st centuries has no continental limits. It has only continental specialties within the global phenomenon called terrorism. It means that terrorism is a present and clear threat not only in the target countries but even in those states which did not suffer violent terrorist attacks on their territories. Since terrorism is not an autochthonous phenomenon, it has to be a research object in

³ U.S. Government Publishing Office, 'A Dangerous Nexus: Terrorism, Crime, and Corruption', Hearing before the Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing, 21 May 2015, U.S. House of Representatives.

the global context of international correlation of political, economic and military forces, capabilities and interests as well as international organised crime. “During a hearing in the United States’ Senate in 2015 it was stated: “The Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, identified terrorism and transnational organized crime as among the top eight global threats to U.S. national security when he testified this past February before the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Armed Services. According to Director Clapper, both terrorist and transnational criminal groups thrive in highly insecure regions of the world, with terrorist groups contributing to regional instability and internal conflict, while transnational organized crime groups exploit these environments for financial gain and corruptive influence.”⁴

One of the key elements of the operational capabilities and survival of terrorism is the use of asymmetric methods.⁵ Terrorists are highly mobile, flexible and resilient, they have well-structured networks, thus they have a certain tactical advantage against the counter-terrorism forces which design their counteractions on the already received information from different sources ranging from civilians to intelligence data. It is clear that the gap between real time information and information received after a certain time affects the probability to prevent any crime including terrorist attacks. Terrorists widely use asymmetric methods, beginning from the background checking of the potential recruits, the recruiting process, the planning of operations, financing, procurement of weapons, explosives, vehicles, clothes, different auxiliary materials and services, selection and training of perpetrators up to the appointment of alternative targets and methods of perpetration. Seemingly, this dynamic asymmetry is the key element of the successful terrorist acts; this is the way to use the tactical advantage by changing the methods and keeping them dynamic. The aim of the dynamically changing operational and network-keeping factors is nothing but to prevent the success of counter-terrorism and national security forces. Another feature of the advantage given to the terrorists by asymmetric dynamism is that their steps do not need to be coordinated in details with their superiors while all the measures to be taken by the law enforcement, national security and counter-terrorism services require coordination and planned operations with the superiors and have to be implemented according to the existing protocols within the law.

Convergence among the criminal organisations

What converges to what? The cross-border links of organised crime – especially in the field of drug-trafficking, trafficking of humans, weapons and other merchandises – and terrorism have a common feature: the complexity, which means horizontally and vertically structured planning and the implementation and timing of measures, building one level upon the other.⁶ If we take an example from the economic cooperation, the convergence is

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ See István Resperger, Álmos Péter Kiss and Bálint Somkuti, *Aszimmetrikus hadviselés a modern korban. Kis háborúk nagy hatással* (Budapest: Zrínyi, 2014); József Padányi, ‘Az aszimmetrikus hadviselés során alkalmazandó eljárások, eszközök és módszerek’, *Hadtudomány* 25, no 1–2 (2015), 81–82.

⁶ U.S. Government Publishing Office, ‘A Dangerous Nexus’.

a natural process based upon the vertical harmonisation of the separate phases, depending on how complicated the next phase is and which level of combination and harmonisation is required for its successful implementation.

We see the same in the world of the transnational organised crime and terrorism. The coincidence of the tactical interests, the material advantages and in case of terrorism, the need to obtain the tools for the implementation of the political intentions generates a 'natural', sometimes strategic cooperation between the groups and organisations specialised in different kinds of criminal activities. Thus, the different kinds of criminal activities are to be implemented complementing each other for common tactical goals. Due to the fact that the organisational background keeps being separated, there is no fusion between the criminal organisations. They only converge towards each other in their functions. Therefore, we can state that there is a functional convergence between different criminal organisations.

Convergence and terrorism

Terrorism, as a special form of contemporary organised political crime, is also special from the point of view of convergence. As we have already seen, the tactical cooperation with criminal organisations in the preparation of terrorist acts is a common practice of terrorist organisations. At the same time, there is a special field, an extremely dangerous area of the transnational organised crime, where the strategic sectoral convergence is imminent. This covers transnational drug-related crimes and the financing of terrorism. In this case the creation of the material and financial background for financing the functioning of the organisation and the terrorist acts is the common interest what motivates the permanent and solid relations between the organisations. The consequence is that many of the terrorist organisations are active in the drug business, their activities ranging from production via trafficking, to protection of the plantations and the laboratories. Of course, everyone will think about the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*, FARC) and the Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*) of Peru, but it is also important to be aware of the fact that it is the Hezbollah, which holds in its hands the production of Captagon, amphetamines and methamphetamines in the Middle East.⁷

Further processing, refining and transporting the drugs to the markets and the sale is entirely the task of the criminal groups specialised in these activities.

Robert Charles, former Assistant Secretary of State, responsible for international drug and law enforcement affairs, also confirmed the convergence between the world of terrorists and international organised crime.⁸ Another high ranking expert, Dennis Lormel, head of the department of the FBI dealing with financial crimes, said that organised criminal

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Frank S Perri, Terrance G Lichtenwald and Paula M MacKenzie, 'Evil Twins: The Crime-Terror Nexus', *Forensic Examiner* 18, no 4 (2009), 16.

groups assist terrorist organisations in obtaining the necessary funds.⁹ According to the list of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) more than half of the forty-one terrorist organisations on the list maintain relations with drug syndicates.¹⁰ Since 2004, when the statements above were made, the statistics have changed only a little. Actually, there are 72 designated terrorist organisations on the list of the State Department, among them there are more than three dozen involved in the narco business.¹¹ The tendencies of the past years confirm the forecast in the report prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of the United States Congress in 2002.¹²

If we look at the whole picture, we might notice how the levels of convergence are built upon each other. At the basic level, the organisations complement each other resulting in crimes converge. On the next level, crime syndicates acting on different sides of the border establish converging cooperation, and at the top level, we see the convergence between international organised crime and terrorism.

Another field of convergence

There is another structured field of convergence, too. Some of its bases have already been touched upon in this writing. The local covert enterprises used for money laundering, confessionals and cultural schools, sport clubs and charity groups exercise influence on the most vulnerable social groups, approaching through them the local political, economic, cultural, sport and religious organisations as well as the representatives of local administration and legislation. The goal of the terrorist organisations hiding behind these covert enterprises is the infiltration, penetration and integration into the local bodies of power in order to gain influence there. They do it in the most acceptable way, observing the legal frameworks, holding the appearance of legally operating companies and organisations whereas in fact a terrorist organisation is converging with the power behind the curtains – for the time being, at the local level.¹³

Terrorism in many places, in several countries of Latin America and not only, has already converted into political forces and factors of power, thus it has become a threat for the national security of the affected states. The secret, why terrorism is so viable, lies in its adaptive capability. It can adapt rapidly to the changing circumstances and conditions; it can change its own ‘profile’. Terrorism – facing the new circumstances – will find the more profitable conditions, the ways, how to take advantage for its survival and extend its influence on the organisation under the new rules. Terrorism will profit from the social

⁹ U.S. Government Printing Office, ‘Three Years after September 11: Keeping America Safe. U.S. Senate Committee of Justice’, testimony of Denis M Lormer before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, 2003, 61–64.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ U.S. Department of State, ‘Foreign Terrorist Organizations’, Bureau of Counterterrorism, s. a.

¹² See The Library of Congress, ‘A Global Overview of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and other Extremist Groups’. A Report Prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress under an Interagency Agreement with the Department of Defense, May 2002, 1–2.

¹³ Ibid.

and economic problems of the most vulnerable social strata, of the dysfunctions of the political, social, cultural institutions and will use them to achieve its strategic goals.

If we consider these ideas from the point of view of organised criminal activities, we will see a similar situation. It is not a new phenomenon in the organised crime's world. In the 1930s, when big organised crime syndicates in the U.S. realised that the bloodshed was not good for the business for it estranged profitable activities and possible partners, they opted for reconciliation and the splitting up of zones of influence and types of crimes. The result was imminent: the adaptation and integration of the legally opened enterprises covering the criminal organisations into the economic, social, cultural, labour and not the least, the political structures of the country. Moreover, there are other common features between the two illegal crime complexes and the perpetrators. Both groups pursue illegal activities which are to be sanctioned by law, both use extreme violence including kidnapping, hostage taking, homicide, extortion, arson, corruption and bombing. During the last decade some new types of crimes have also appeared. Among them, it is worth mentioning the crimes through computer networks causing material, financial damages and losses affecting or destroying computational systems, databases, etc. This is the realm of the cybercrimes.

Both organisations, terrorist groups and organised crime, have a horizontally and vertically well-structured organisational system with clear subordination, high discipline where the commands of the superiors are implemented strictly. Both organisations have well-equipped and trained paramilitary structures with intelligence, reconnaissance, counter-intelligence, analytics and assessment, operational, logistic and IT capabilities. Another important point is that both organisations have a very wide and efficient international connection network. These connections are used for different purposes by the different organisations.¹⁴ Organised crime syndicates use them to support the core business activities while terrorist organisations use them for the creation of the indispensable conditions for their core activity, the perpetration of terrorist attacks.¹⁵ In both cases the activities through the transnational connections include the acquiring of financial funds, purchasing of weapons, explosives, services, trafficking of drugs, weapons, humans – illegal migrants and potential perpetrators as well, and money laundering.

The terrorist acts in Brussels and Paris of 2015 and 2016 are the best examples of the interconnected transnational network activities. The modus operandi in Paris was very much like the terrorist acts perpetrated in 2008 in Mumbai, where ten terrorists with submachine guns and explosives massacred 164 people. According to the *Time*, this attack gave the idea to the Paris attacks.¹⁶ Purchasing the handguns was not a problem since in the Western Balkans there are 3 to 6 million (!) units of these weapons.¹⁷ In connection with

¹⁴ See Zoltán György Bács, *Terrorizmus és kábítószer-kereskedelem Latin-Amerikában 1980 és 2019 között* (Budapest: Nemzeti Közzolgálati Egyetem, 2020).

¹⁵ See also Boaz Ganor and Miri Halperin Wernli, 'The Infiltration of Terrorist Organizations Into the Pharmaceutical Industry: Hezbollah as a Case Study', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36, no 9 (2013), 699–712.

¹⁶ Naina Bajekal and Vivienne Walt, 'How Europe's Terrorists Get Their Guns?', *Time*, 07 December 2015.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

the Paris attacks, Christophe Crépin, the representative of the French Police Syndicate said: “There is connection between organized crime and terrorists.”¹⁸

Transmission of funds

Both crime syndicates and terrorist organisations widely use the methods of transmission of values and financial means and obligations based upon IT solutions. The traditional transmission of money in cash is based upon couriers or the ‘hawala’ system or banking transactions,¹⁹ but terrorists use a higher level of FinTech methods for transferring money in small amounts. For these purposes they can use the ‘Simple’ application or the Revolut and the Transferwise.

It is more than shocking to see the amounts of money criminal organisations with Latin American connections move illegally in a year. The best example is the case of the HSBC Bank. Through this bank the Mexican Sinaloa cartel and the Colombian Norte del Valle cartel laundered 881 million U.S. dollars clean. Through the HSBC Bank, the Mexican crime syndicates yearly transfer 19 to 31 billion (!) U.S. dollars illegally.²⁰

Among the contemporary solutions one can find the virtual means as well, including crypto-currencies, like bitcoins, the electronic payment services operating on the cellphone networks, like PayPass, or the M-Pesa system and the Prepaid cards. Salah Abdeslam and Abdelhamid Abaud, the perpetrators of the Paris terrorist attacks on 13 November 2015 also used prepaid cards.²¹ Celina Realuyo in her study draws attention to a peculiar novelty. The implementation of the illegal banking transactions through the dark web is becoming more and more similar to the exchange operations, where ‘couriers’ operate between the sides interested in the exchange or investment, searching and finding the appropriate and reliable partners according to the requests and information transmitted to them earlier.²² From the point of view of the “black” exchange market it does not matter whether the business without requiring direct contact is done between criminal syndicates and terrorist organisations. This solution helps to occult the identity of the partners thus reducing the risk of deconspiration.

The difference between terrorist organisations and organised crime groups is mostly in the motivation. Organised crime is interested in the maximum material or financial benefits for what it uses the means described earlier. In case of terrorist organisations, the motivation is political, to gain power.²³

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Commission, ‘Paris attacks showed role of small transactions in terror finance; UN meeting hears’, 15 April 2016.

²⁰ Celina B Realuyo, “Siguiendo el rastro del dinero” para combatir el terrorismo, el crimen y la corrupción en las Américas’, in *El crimen organizado en América Latina: manifestaciones, facilitadores y reacciones*, ed. by Carolina Sampó and Valeska Troncoso (UNED: Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado, 2017), 192–193.

²¹ Kimberley L Thachuk and Rollie Lal (eds), *Terrorist Criminal Enterprises: Financing Terrorism through Organized Crime* (Praeger Security International, 2018), 51.

²² Realuyo, “Siguiendo el rastro del dinero”, 196.

²³ Boaz and Halperin, ‘The Infiltration of Terrorist Organizations’, 699–712.

Conclusion

The similarities and differences described in this study make clear that the link between organised crime groups and terrorist organisations is narco business. This kind of illegal activity does not depend on whether the participants are non-state actors, or proxy groups linked to state actors or different structures related to governmental bodies or national security services through their covert enterprises. The difference is the following: when a state actor participates in the narco business it may be qualified as outbound state terrorism or covert operation within the asymmetric warfare. Obviously, in the given case the foreign state follows far-going political goals in the target country. The states in trying to extend their influence over other entities of the international law often use some proxy organisations to keep the blame in case of deconspiracy of the operation far away from their boundaries.

The terrorist organisations also pursue political aims. These conglomerates as non-state actors neither subjects of international law are not bounded by any legal or moral commitment. Their goals vary depending on the target country. On the one hand, the terrorists might aim to constitute their own statehood by taking over the power in a weak state hardly capable and governable to resist the terrorists' violent warfare. On the other hand, they might intend to overtake the power and systematically increase their influence on local decision-makers first and widening the range of their interest gradually through other levels of power. The convergence of the terrorist organisations with the legal political system is the major strategic threat. The cooperation and convergence of terrorist groups with the organised crime syndicates including the narco cartels is an important and indispensable step on the way of the terrorist organisations approaching to their goals which means a higher level of security threats for the international community.

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Populism in Times of Crisis: The Brazilian Case of Bolsonaro¹

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A new wave of Populism has been on the ascent around the world. In Brazil, the situation is not different, and the populist rhetoric strongly seized the most recent presidential election in 2018. The aim of this paper is to explore the reasons for President Jair Bolsonaro's (considered a populist politician) victory. The potential motivations for this triumph are discussed in this paper, with the finding that a multidimensional crisis gripped the country in the years prior to the election, leading people to sympathise with those who were in opposition to the dominant party, which culminated in a heavily divisive presidential campaign. The nation was engulfed by an economic depression that coincided with a political crisis, which had legal, social, and even cultural repercussions, with polarisation and corruption playing key roles. The paper also explores the multifaceted phenomenon of populism, and why Bolsonaro is considered to be a populist; the latter mainly related to his appealing speeches, in which he tried to show himself as a politician of the people who governs for them, in opposition to the villainous establishment.

Keywords: Populism, Bolsonaro, Brazil, crisis, elections

Introduction

A new wave of Populism has been on the ascent in Europe and the West for several years, being, for example, the main reason for Brexit (the United Kingdom leaving the European Union) and for Donald Trump's presidential election in the United States of America.³ In Latin America, specifically in Brazil, the situation is not different.

The South American political scene was previously dominated by governments from the left-wing, which began to weaken in the 2010s, primarily due to corruption, but also because of ruptures within the social, economic and cultural status quo as a result of

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³ Kirk A Hawkins and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Introduction: The ideational approach', in *The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Method*, ed. by Kirk A Hawkins, Ryan Carlin, Levente Littvay and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (New York: Routledge, 2019).

inclusivity and diversity policies that generated regressive reactions and social distinction, especially among the middle classes.⁴

The success of populist rhetoric in the world can be worrying when we consider that the movement may pose a threat to national and international institutions, to the rule of law and to other fundamental free-market democratic institutions, such as press freedom and the independence of the judiciary system.⁵ Several studies seem to agree on the decline of liberal democracy and the repressive toughening of democratically chosen political regimes, bringing concerns regarding the consequences of the phenomenon for democratic governance.

By doing an analysis related to the rise of populism in the world context, Kurlantzick stressed that social protection policies tended to empower the poorest, generating pressure and revolt from the middle classes.⁶ Inglehart and Norris, based on a cultural approach, indicates that there is a dichotomy between populism and cosmopolitan liberal values; the latter referring to the ideas of open borders and a single global community.⁷

Another possible explanation for the recent electoral fortunes of populism would be related to the perspective of economic inequality, which emphasises that the increase in economic insecurity has boosted mass support for populist leaders.⁸ Cas Mudde highlights that other factors can also have a notable effect on the receptivity of populism, for example, the new broad role of the media in political discourse. As well, the emancipation of citizens who have become more educated and informed, feeling that they are better able to evaluate the actions of politicians, and which should then be part of the most important decisions, is another factor to consider.⁹

In Brazil, in October 2018, the sum of these factors resulted in the victory of the far-right populist candidate Jair Bolsonaro to the presidential seat of the republic of the largest country in Latin America. Bolsonaro was elected the 38th president of Brazil by obtaining 55.13% of the valid votes in the Brazilian general election, defeating Fernando Haddad. His was a highly polarised presidential campaign, in which the share of voters who voted for each candidate was very similar to the share that expressed a strong aversion for the opposing candidate.

In parallel with the downturn in the economy in 2013, Brazil faced a societal, cultural and even juridical crisis at once. The unprecedented levels of crime on the streets, the economic instability, and the tremendous corruption scheme uncovered by the Lava Jato investigations, which led to the corruption conviction of the former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party or PT). This caused

⁴ Matheus de Almeida and Fernando Henrique da Silva Horita, 'Análise Crítica da Operação Lava Jato: Ativismo Judicial, Mídiaização e Jurisdição De Exceção', *Revista Jurídica Luso Brasileira* 3, no 6 (2017), 1631–1658.

⁵ Evgenia Passari, 'The Great Recession and the Rise of Populism', *Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy* 55, no 1 (2020), 17–21.

⁶ Joshua Kurlantzick, *Democracy in Retreat* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).

⁷ Ronald F Inglehart and Pippa Norris, 'Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash', *HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP16-026*, August 2016.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Cas Mudde, 'The Populist Zeitgeist', *Government and Opposition* 39, no 4 (2004), 541–562.

Brazilians to blame the established PT party for the general crisis that the country was facing.¹⁰

In this paper, I intend to explain in more detail what were the main causes that led the populist candidate Jair Bolsonaro to the presidency of the ninth largest economy in the world. On the whole, the conservatism wave, economic insecurity, mass support of evangelical religious movements, and *antipetism* (antipathy towards the PT Party), were the main factors that, added to the wide strategic use of social media, resulted in the election of the current president.

Populism conceptualisation

Although populism is a central topic in modern world and politics, there is still no consensus about its definition. It is a popular viewpoint that ‘people’ is typically included in the definition of populism, although there are not many other consensuses in the academic debate. The struggle to establish a definition is in part because the term, according to Gidron and Bonikowski, has previously been used to represent the most diverse and confrontational components and contexts.¹¹ Nonetheless, populism is certainly a complex phenomenon, characterised by being highly contestable, and since it is difficult to describe, it is equally difficult to quantify.¹²

It is assumed that populism is prevalent across different historic periods (late 19th century till now) and countries and regions (from North and Latin America to Eastern Europe). The ideological divisions are also diverse, while in the mid-1920s in Latin America populism was primarily linked with the left-wing and associated with openness and inclusivity, in Europe, the right-wing form of populism arose in the 1980s and has only grown stronger since.¹³ For this reason, it is important to understand its three main conceptual approaches: populism as a discursive style, as a political strategy and as an ideology.¹⁴

The first approach considers populism a discursive style, a strategically used “rhetoric that constructs politics as the moral and ethical struggle between el pueblo [the people] and the oligarchy”.¹⁵ Hawkins understands populism as a Manichaeian discourse that gives a dichotomous moral component to political disputes.¹⁶ Panizza states it is “an anti-status quo discourse”.¹⁷ In a like manner, Laclau defends that populist rhetoric does not

¹⁰ Wendy Hunter and Timothy J Power, ‘Bolsonaro and Brazil’s Illiberal Backlash’, *Journal of Democracy* 30, no 1 (2019), 68–82.

¹¹ Noam Gidron and Bart Bonikowski, ‘Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda’, *Weatherhead Working Paper Series*, no 13-0004 (2013), 38.

¹² Benjamin Moffitt and Simon Tormey, ‘Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and Political Style’, *Political Studies* 62, no 2 (2014), 381–397.

¹³ Gidron and Bonikowski, ‘Varieties of Populism’.

¹⁴ Ibid. 5; Moffitt and Tormey, ‘Rethinking Populism’.

¹⁵ Carlos de la Torre, *Populist Seduction in Latin America: The Ecuadorian Experience* (Ohio University Press, 2000).

¹⁶ Kirk A Hawkins, *Venezuela’s Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

¹⁷ Francisco Panizza (ed.), *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy* (London: Verso, 2005).

reflect the real ideas of those who employ it, but rather is a deliberate method of political expression – utilised by both the right and left – that frames a moral battle between ‘us’ (oppressed) and ‘them’ (oppressors).¹⁸

The second approach, used mainly by scholars focused on Latin America, sets populism as a form of political strategy, which can take the form of policies and different types of mass mobilisation.¹⁹ The techniques and means of obtaining and exercising power, based on the support of a large number of followers, are the subject of this populist strategy.²⁰

According to Mudde, the two first interpretations of populism are quite damaging to the term. The first suggests that it is a discourse which is simple, charismatic and emotional directed at the masses. The second portrays populism as irrational policies that aim, of a short-sighted way, to please the people, without bearing in mind many other variables, in order to win the support of voters.²¹

Cas Mudde elucidates its own definition, closer to the academic community consensus, that places populism as an ideology that has elitism and pluralism as its antithesis and opposes the powerful elite with the people. The distinction between the antagonistic groups, “the corrupt elite” and “the pure people”, is indispensable, as compromise with the other’s ideas must be impossible. The ideology of populism also argues that “politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people”.²²

Each of the three approaches to populism described above have their own set of distinctions, but they also have places of convergence and intersection. The ideational and discursive approaches are particularly similar, prompting some researchers to interpret them as a single mode of explanation.²³ This study supports this converging definition, in line with Hawkins and Kaltwasser’s understanding of populism as a moral discourse that not only exalts people’s sovereign authority but also sees politics as a fundamental battle between “the people” and “the elite”.²⁴

According to the authors, three ideas combined make a populist politician: “a) a Manichean and moral cosmology; b) the proclamation of ‘the people’ as a homogenous and virtuous community; and c) the depiction of ‘the elite’ as a corrupt and self-serving entity”,²⁵ and Bolsonaro meets all these requirements. In his speeches, he portrays a Manichean conflict between a corrupt, immoral establishment and a virtuous, hardworking people. The traditional Brazilian family represents the “people”, who are good, honest, ethical and adhere to all conservative moral ideals, but are struggling at the hands of the corrupt and dishonest “elite”, represented by the established politicians, especially those affiliated with the PT party. Jair Bolsonaro has strong leadership characteristics (with authoritarian inclinations) and is highly appealing to his electorate, for whom he claims he would rule, implementing policies aligned with their interests,

¹⁸ Ernesto Laclau, *On Populist Reason* (London: Verso, 2005).

¹⁹ Panizza, *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*.

²⁰ Kurt Weyland, ‘Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics’, *Comparative Politics* 34, no 1 (2001), 1–22.

²¹ Mudde, ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’.

²² Ibid. 543.

²³ Gidron and Bonikowski, ‘Varieties of Populism’.

²⁴ Hawkins and Kaltwasser, ‘Introduction: The ideational approach’, 3.

²⁵ Ibid. 3.

thus favouring the will of “the good people”, and this will be explored in greater detail in subsequent sessions.

A multidimensional crisis

The crisis that affected Brazil assumed wide dimensions, configuring a reality of insecurity in the economy, caused by a lengthened recession. This occurred in parallel with a political crisis that brought legal, social and even cultural implications, with polarisation and corruption playing relevant roles and causing a multidimensional crisis that may be viewed as a major contextual factor in Bolsonaro’s election.

The economic field

Latin America in general had an excellent economic performance during the years from 2003 and 2012, thanks to the international commodity boom. The period became known as the Golden Era, a time of economic growth and reduction of poverty and inequality in the region. The commodities boom, predominantly due to the sharp increase in demand from emerging markets, especially from China, combined with low-interest rates in developed countries, brought prosperity to the region, with clear observed changes such as social inclusion, macroeconomic stability and growth.²⁶

Brazil achieved its highest growth rates between 2004 and 2010, along with significant reductions in social and regional inequalities. At the same time, that kept inflation rates under control. The country made sustained increases in wages, and in the level of formal employment, as well as improvements in public and external accounts.²⁷ The Brazilian president at the time, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, was founding member of the Workers’ Party, and served for two terms from 2003 through 2010. He made inclusionary efforts to reduce the number of poor and very poor people in the country, being considered the father of the poor by some, and acquiring high popularity among the lower social classes.

There is no dispute that there was a truly inclusive commitment through the policies adopted. The financial vigour gave governments throughout all the Latin American region unusual levels of resources and the usage of the resources was translated into a serious engagement to equality. But the improvement in social inclusion and wages has not corresponded with compelling investments for the future. By 2010, as pointed out by Maghin and Renon,²⁸ a gradual, inevitable and pronounced decline began to take place, and the normal pattern of falling commodity prices relative to manufactured products was recovered. This reflected crisis expectations for most economies dependent on commodity exports, due to a possible vulnerability to rising macroeconomic challenges. The authors

²⁶ Hélène Maghin and Eva Renon, ‘Latin America’s Golden Era’, in *The Political Economy of Latin America: Reflections on Neoliberalism and Development after the Commodity Boom*, ed. by Peter Kingstone (New York: Routledge, 2018).

²⁷ Laura Carvalho, *Valsa brasileira: Do boom ao caos econômico* (São Paulo: Todavia SA, 2018).

²⁸ Maghin and Renon, ‘Latin America’s Golden Era’, 138.

claim that by the end of 2012, it was revealed that decisions made during the boom were not sustainable: ‘The gains of golden era had been temporary, and at worst illusory.’²⁹

The economic situation started to worsen in 2014, after the re-election of Dilma Rousseff, the handpicked successor of President Lula, who had previously served as his Chief of Staff. The aggravation of economic indicators foresaw an astonishing recession in Brazil, which came in the form of widespread unemployment and misery, with the GDP growth reaching a negative 3.55% in 2015 (Figure 1).




Figure 1: Brazilian GDP Annual Percentage Growth, 2000–2018

Source: Compiled by the author based on The World Bank, World Development Indicators, ‘GDP growth (annual %) – Brazil’ [Data file]. September, 2020.

It is worth highlighting the widely accepted theory that the increase in economic inequality, linked, for example, to the growth in automation and globalisation, generates economic insecurity which, in turn, can lead to growing support for populism.³⁰ This theory can indicate one of the reasons why Bolsonaro’s popularity was enhanced by the economic crisis.

Mass mobilisation, the impeachment and social media

A wide wave of mobilisation had arisen in Brazil. In June 2013, the cities were taken over by popular movements that took place both on the streets, and in digital social networks. Initially, the demonstrations arose to contest the increases in public transport

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Inglehart and Norris, ‘Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism’.

fares in São Paulo.³¹ Growing into a national protest movement (especially after strong police repression), it began to communicate demands of all types, focused especially on corruption, the weak health and education systems, and on the high expenses related to the World Cup that would happen in the following year, among others.³²

Almeida points out the important role of social media on Rouseff's impeachment. Protesters constantly used digital networks as a platform for expression, information and political discussion, which was instrumental in summoning people to the streets.³³ In addition, it was instrumental in favouring the formation of an alternative stream of opinion to established editorial lines and the mainstream press.

These social media continued to play a relevant role during and after Bolsonaro's campaign. The digital platform WhatsApp, for example, became one of the main communication and campaign tools among Bolsonarists (*Bolsonaristas* – people who voted for and vehemently support the president), with a huge flow of links, especially from YouTube, as a preferred source of political information shared between them.³⁴ The information distributed via WhatsApp favours a more instantaneous and circumscribed interactivity. Pre-established preferences for partisan information (as the support networks for candidates tend to relate to users and content that share the same ideological inclination) helps to create the low quality of the information shared in these groups. Thus, info-mediation through social media platforms exposes people to information bubbles, and possible overproduction of content, which present precarious modes of regulation and absence of ethical standards for issuers, making it difficult to check the accuracy and authenticity of the content. Thus, the internet proved to be a decisive factor in mobilising voters, being crucial in the 2018 elections.³⁵

The intense mass demonstrations went through some major cycles of protest until it triggered the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016, causing the then Vice-President Michel Temer, to assume the presidency without mass or political support, especially after some corruption scandals linked to him came to light.³⁶

According to Hunter and Power, those protests also brought into view two emerging tendencies: '1) a deepening sentiment of rejection and hostility toward the PT (known colloquially as antipetismo); and 2) the presence of a small but visible far-right fringe openly expressing nostalgia for the "order" and "clean government" of the military dictatorship.'³⁷

³¹ Folha de São Paulo, 'Maioria da população é a favor dos protestos, mostra Datafolha', *Folha.Uol*, 14 June 2013.

³² Marie Fhoutine, '13 de junho, o dia que não terminou', *Carta Capital*, 16 September 2013.

³³ Ronaldo de Almeida, 'Bolsonaro presidente: conservadorismo, evangelismo e a crise brasileira', *Novos Estudos CEBRAP* 38, no 1 (2019), 185–213.

³⁴ Camila Mont'Alverne, Isabele Mitozo and Henrique Barbosa, 'WhatsApp e eleições: quais as características das informações disseminadas', *Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil*, 07 May 2019.

³⁵ Ricardo Ribeiro Ferreira, 'Desinformação em Processos Eleitorais: Um Estudo de Caso da Eleição Brasileira de 2018', *Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal*, 22 October 2019.

³⁶ Luciana Marques, 'Michel Temer fica, mas sem apoio político nem popular', *Radio France Internationale*, 18 May 2017.

³⁷ Hunter and Power, 'Bolsonaro and Brazil's Illiberal Backlash'.

The atmosphere of high political polarisation took over the country and the revelations of *Operação Lava Jato* (Operation Car Wash), the largest corruption and money laundering investigation in the history of Brazil, intensified the political crisis. The intentions of this anti-corruption operation were to investigate and to judge the highest Brazilian social level, as presidents, ministers of state, governors and other politicians, as well as owners of large financial resources groups were examined.³⁸ In spite of the fact that the investigation arrested politicians from different parties, many of the most important names were associated with the PT. On 12 July 2017, the ex-president, Lula, was convicted of money laundering and passive corruption by Judge Sérgio Moro (who became Minister of Justice and Public Security after the election of president Bolsonaro), thus being excluded from a possible presidential race.

The outcome of the Lava Jato investigations and arrests worked as an advantage for Bolsonaro, who would enter a presidential race with both established parties weakened, as the population was showing signs of resentment towards the traditional political class, considered corrupt or lenient on corruption.

Public insecurity and the hard-line politician

It is noteworthy that the disturbingly high levels of violent crime and public insecurity in Brazil also influenced the 2018 elections. A special report by Angelo Young presented Latin America as one of the most dangerous regions in the world in 2018, with 17 Brazilian cities among the 50 most dangerous and, among these, 3 cities in the top 10.³⁹

The Brazilian population was terrified by the huge crime wave that was ravaging the region, unveiling dissatisfaction with the established government, apparently failing to keep the people safe, which gave Bolsonaro another opportunity for political support. The candidate, considered a hard-line politician, ran a campaign with the extreme (right-wing) aggressiveness which has always characterised his political activity, demonstrating support for reducing arms use regulation, and advocating for stricter police, which should have “more freedom to act” as “violence is fought with violence”.⁴⁰

Bolsonaro, who used to be a military officer and graduated from the Military Academy of Agulhas Negras of the Brazilian Army, demonstrated, several times, a certain nostalgia for the Brazilian military dictatorship, which he called “democratic intervention”. This helped him gain support among some voters, calling for improvements in security and an end to corruption.⁴¹

According to Inglehart when there is physical insecurity, groups seek strong and authoritarian leaders to protect them, which may contribute to the increasing feeling of

³⁸ Almeida and Horita, ‘Análise Crítica da Operação Lava Jato’.

³⁹ Angelo Young, ‘Most Dangerous Cities in the World’, *24/7 Wall St.*, 23 July 2019.

⁴⁰ Thiago de Araújo, ‘Bolsonaro defende que a PM mate mais no Brasil’, *Exame Brazil*, 05 October 2015.

⁴¹ Jornal da Record, ‘Bolsonaro chama ditadura militar brasileira de “intervenção democrática”’, 31 March 2015.

xenophobia, authoritarian policies and strict adherence to traditional cultural norms, and that is exactly what the Brazilians did.⁴²

Conservatism and religion

Another decisive factor in the 2018 elections concerns the sense of morality and customs. According to Inglehart and Norris's cultural backlash thesis, rising support for populism comes from those who, for the most part, retain "traditional values", "including the older generation and less educated groups" that have not followed progressive cultural changes, which, in turn, advocate for environmental protection, human rights and gender equality. This perspective explains populism's support as "a social psychological phenomenon", reflecting a nostalgic reaction among part of the electorate that tries to defend itself and fight the cosmopolitan changes of liberal values.⁴³

In the view of the sociologist Angela Alonso "the changes that we have had in the country since the Constituent Assembly of 1988 have taken the institutions in a more progressive direction, and this is not a consensus".⁴⁴ Brazil, mostly after re-democratisation, went through several changes that can be considered progressive. On the other hand, a reaction intensified to contain this secularisation and liberal behaviours and values arose. In this context, the right-wing religious sectors stood out, especially Protestantism and Catholicism, bringing once again religion from the private and individual to the public sphere.⁴⁵

Since the masses' demonstrations in 2013, there was a clear political bifurcation between individuals among two ideological spectra: right and left, described as conservative and progressive, respectively. It is notable that the conservative wave in Brazil has advanced since then, and its support in 2018 was massively for Bolsonaro.⁴⁶

Bolsonaro's election

The course of the multidimensional crisis, with the downturn in the economy, the changes in the perception and tolerance of corruption, the exceptional levels of crime and the *antipetism* reaction, added to the wide strategic use of social media, implied the election of the president Jair Bolsonaro, currently without party.

⁴² Ronald F Inglehart, 'Modernization, Existential Security and Cultural Change: Reshaping Human Motivations and Society', in *Advances in Culture and Psychology*, ed. by Michele J Gelfand, Chi-yue Chiu and Ying-yi Hong (Oxford University Press, 2016).

⁴³ Ibid. 13.

⁴⁴ Gil Alessi, 'Angela Alonso: O Brasil é um país muito conservador, que não muda fácil, nem rápido e nem sem reação', *El País*, 06 February 2019.

⁴⁵ Almeida, 'Bolsonaro presidente'.

⁴⁶ Francisco Thiago Cavalcante Garcez, Laura Hêmilly Campos Martins, Ítalo Moura Guilherme and Kevin Samuel Alves Batista, 'O Avançar da Agenda Conservadora e o Fascismo Latente no Brasil', *Revista UNIABEU* 12, no 30 (2019), 161–174.

According to Angela Alonso, there are three trends within Bolsonaro's electorate. First of all, there are the aforementioned *Bolsonarists*, with an adherence by heart and by moral nature, sharing all the values that the president represents. For this group, supported by a moralising religious, nationalist and militarist discourse, and by the idea of traditional family, Bolsonaro is the homeland saviour and symbolises everything they want to correct in the society. This is a relatively small part of the people who voted for him. Secondly, the other group that helped to elect him followed the line of radical *antipetism*, in which the most important thing was to vote for a candidate who was the antithesis of the PT. Finally, there was a third group that Alonso considered a bit naive or frivolous, for thinking that Bolsonaro, despite the speeches made during the campaign, would be less inflexible and staunch, and more lenient when being the Chief Executive. "These people must be very surprised, and regretful."⁴⁷

Another fact that is worth being highlighted is that on 6 September 2018, as he was carried by his supporters in an election visit to Minas Gerais, Jair Bolsonaro was attacked and was stabbed in the abdomen. At that point, the candidate was already leading the polls, but he faced high rejection and was heavily attacked by opponents. The then candidate had to undergo emergency surgery and all this repercussion changed the course of the electoral campaign. Bolsonaro became less attacked by his opponents, for marketing reasons they did not want to appear attacking a competitor who was fighting for his life. Many voters became more empathetic towards the candidate, leading to an increase in intention to vote due to possible commotion in undecided voters. In addition, for alleged medical necessity, Bolsonaro became absent in all political debates, which could, in turn, be a possible compromise to his campaign due to his strong speech.⁴⁸

Affiliated with the Social Liberal Party (Partido Social Liberal – PSL) Bolsonaro took first place in the first round of the 2018 presidential elections, with candidate Fernando Haddad, from the Workers' Party (PT) in second. On 28 October of the same year, in the second round, Jair Messias Bolsonaro was elected the 38th president of the Federative Republic of Brazil, with 55.13% of the valid votes.

Bolsonaro, a populist politician

The events that led to Brazil's multidimensional crisis prior to the 2018 elections could be seen as a major contextual factor in Bolsonaro's election. In a heavy Manichean campaign, he stood out among the candidates by praising the virtuous Brazilian people (the traditional family) and exalting their popular will, toward which policies should be aimed, while casting the established party as corrupt and wicked. This in itself is a great indicator of the populist traits in Bolsonaro, if we consider Hawkins and Kaltwasser's populism definition, as previously mentioned.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Alessi, 'Angela Alonso'.

⁴⁸ Marcio Dolzan, 'Facada mudou rumos da campanha de Jair Bolsonaro', *Estadão*, 28 October 2018.

⁴⁹ Hawkins and Kaltwasser, 'Introduction: The ideational approach', 3.

Additionally, in order to better understand the magnitude of Jair Bolsonaro as a populist politician, Tamaki and Fuks, led by the *Team Populism* project, made an analysis, using *holistic grading* of his speeches at the time of the campaign, which presented a mixture of populist with patriotic and nationalist traits, as later indicated. The speeches scale goes from 0 to 2, being 0 classified as “not populist”, 0.5 as “somewhat populist”, 1.0 as “populist”, 1.5 as “very populist” and leaves 2.0 open for what can be called “perfectly populist”.⁵⁰

The analysis results show that Bolsonaro’s speeches contain a growing level of populism as elections approach. He begins his campaign with an average populist score of 0.5 and ends it with an average of 0.9, an increase of almost 100%. The current president uses some artifices to make his speeches catchier and more appealing. The praise of popular sovereignty can be seen when he uses words such as “people” and “popular will”, trying to show himself as a politician of the people who govern for them. The confrontation between him (and the good people) against the evil enemy, portrayed by his opposition (specially the left-wing and the Workers’ Party, framed as “corrupt” and “inefficient”, “accountable for the undermining of the traditional family and its values”), was another frame of his speeches, a Manichaeian move commonly used by populist politics.⁵¹

The authors also point out that the presence of Patriotism and Nationalism traits in Bolsonaro’s speeches was identified as the main reason why he did not score more in the populist analyses, like Hugo Chavez or even Donald Trump. “The core element of Bolsonaro’s speeches is not the people, but the state and the nation”, one of the reasons that the word “Brazil” is the most mentioned in his speeches, for instance, his campaign slogan was “Brazil above everything, God above all”.⁵²

The main distinction is that “patriotism, unlike populism, emphasizes the state”, which according to Hawkins and Kaltwasser has a more independent existence than the individuals living in it, being above everything else.⁵³ The authors’ great insight here was to understand that maybe this is due to the fact that, in the perspective of Bolsonaro, using words such as “People” is something that characterises his left-wing opposition, the Workers’ Party, his main enemies. He may have decided then, as a strategy, to replace it as much as possible for “Brazil” and “nation”, but the meaning would be the same, fact that would characterise it as even more populist than revealed.⁵⁴

Conclusion

This paper has set out to analyse the multidimensional crisis that took over Brazil and implied in the election of the president Jair Bolsonaro in 2018, a populist politician who

⁵⁰ Eduardo Ryo Tamaki and Mario Fuks, ‘Populism in Brazil’s 2018 General Elections: An Analysis of Bolsonaro’s Campaign Speeches’, *Lua Nova: Revista de Cultura e Política*, no 109 (2020), 103–127.

⁵¹ Tamaki and Fuks, ‘Populism in Brazil’s 2018 General Elections’, 12.

⁵² *Ibid.* 16.

⁵³ Kirk A Hawkins and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, ‘The Ideational Approach to Populism’, *Latin American Research Review* 52, no 4 (2017), 513–528.

⁵⁴ Tamaki and Fuks, ‘Populism in Brazil’s 2018 General Elections’, 14.

used a moral discourse in his campaign to portray a fundamental battle between the evil establishment and the good people, claiming that policies should be tailored to the latter's general will.

First, the economic depression, after many years of economic growth, which conducted negative GDP growth and raised levels of unemployment, resulting in a crisis that has persisted until today. Second, hand in hand with the economic, a huge political crisis absorbed Brazil, resulting in the Impeachment of the President Dilma Roussef, affiliated to the PT party. Add to that, the many corruption scandals led the former President Lula, from the same party, to be convicted of money laundering and passive corruption, bringing up an aversion feeling towards the established left-wing party PT, known as antipetism, being primordial in the political polarisation process and later in the election of the current president.

Third, the reluctance to the progressive cultural changes intensified in the region opening up to a conservative wave, retaining traditional values and a moralising religious discourse on behalf of the family entity, which heavily supported Bolsonaro. Finally, in addition to all this, there was a high crime rate and the intensive role of social media as a means of information, that contributed to shape a generalised crisis scenario, in which the population was seeking for a saviour and found in Bolsonaro a strong figure who could maybe solve all their problems.

It is in this troubling scenario, by using heavy polarised and populist rhetoric, that Bolsonaro was elected, despite his strong hate speech against women, blacks, homosexuals and minorities. His discourse *in defence of Honour, Morals and Good Customs of the traditional Brazilian Family* (one of his mottos) attracted a huge mass of supporters mainly disappointed and exhausted with the path Brazil have been taking.

It is concluded that this new trend of extreme right-wing populism in Brazil with Bolsonaro, poses a great challenge to the conservation of the current models of contemporary democratic and liberal societies.

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Violence as a Dimension of Poverty¹

The Case of Colombia

Ágnes DEÁK² 

Latin America continues to face a number of socio-economic challenges, despite being a middle-income region and the fact that it experienced alternative forms of development during the pink-tide era. The current increasing levels of poverty, inequality, violence and the harmful effects of extractive production on the environment and traditional rural communities represent a new situation at both regional and national levels. The concept of multidimensional poverty is an increasingly accepted approach to a better understanding of the characteristics and living conditions of vulnerable social groups: In these groups, violence is one of the dimensions that has received little attention so far. The paper focuses on the following questions: What is the relation between human security and human development concepts? How are violence and multidimensional poverty interconnected? What kinds of institutional and economic mechanisms sustain their complex relation? The article explores the origins of the human security and human development approaches and their relation to multidimensional poverty. The study relies on analysing academic and official government documents and papers by international organisations synthesising the evolution of the two branches. The case study of Colombia based on statistical data offers evidence about the complexity of the interconnectedness of security, human rights and development processes in different territorial, ethnic and social contexts. The analysis also reveals links between shortcomings in the institutional system and deficiencies in measuring poverty in persistent deprivation of marginalised social groups.

Keywords: *violence, multidimensional poverty, human security, human development, Colombia*

Introduction

Violence is a complex phenomenon manifested in interstate relations, public and private realms, characterised by multiple causes and forms rooted in systems and processes

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of dominance. To explore all its aspects affecting the population as a whole and each individual is difficult due to objective and subjective elements with indirect apparent forms, which can be structural and symbolic. The concept of structural violence, as Johan Galtung proposes, is caused by a whole set of structures, both physical and organisational, that impedes the satisfaction of basic human needs such as survival, identity, well-being or freedom.³ As introduced by Pierre Bourdieu, symbolic violence refers to an invisible nature of violence, which is implicit and conceals the fundamental interconnectedness of force relations appearing through acts or conventional behaviour patterns. Thus it recognises structural violence and reinforces it.⁴ These two approaches clearly reflect the impenetrability of violence in diverse spheres of reality and its impact at different levels: violence can happen not just among states, but between individuals and different social groups, frequently related to discrimination or to certain institutions having an impact on everyday life routine, opportunities and social cohesion, thus on the democratic system.

While interstate and armed conflicts had been emphasised during decades after World War II, as Mary Kaldor expresses in the concept of “new war”, new forms of violence have emerged in recent decades, in which the boundaries between state and non-state actors, public and private spheres are blurred, the majority of affected are civilians. In addition, criminal political economy is maintained by organised crime groups to generate revenue through violent activities.⁵ As data shows, the number of victims of criminal acts significantly exceeds the number of those killed in armed conflict or as victims of terrorism. Of particular note is the number of acts of violence resulting in the deaths of organised crime, which account for 20 per cent of all homicide cases.⁶ The recognition of the crucial role of violence appears in the Sustainable Development Goals agenda adopted by the United Nations in 2015, as well. In the Agenda, the international political community set out its objectives in target 16.1 by stating: “Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere.”⁷

At the same time, there has been a change of approach in the interpretation of security. Given the rise of chronic insecurity caused by a number of threats, a shift in the concept has brought violence, and insecurity experienced and interpreted at the individual level into focus within the human security framework as Mahhub ul Haq encapsulates it: “Security of all the people everywhere – in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities, in their environment [...] is not a concern with weapons [...]. It is a concern with human dignity.”⁸ The human security (HS) paradigm emerged in parallel

³ Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no 3 (1969), 167–191.

⁴ Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Sur le pouvoir symbolique’, *Annales* 32, no 3 (1977), 405–411.

⁵ Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era* (Polity Press, 2012).

⁶ UNODC, *Global Study on Homicide 2019: Executive Summary* (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019), 12.

⁷ UN, ‘Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform’, 2015. Identified as one of its indicators defining in SDGs 16.1.1 as: “Number of victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 population, by sex and age.” This target is a significant step forward from the previous UN agenda, the Millennium Development Goals, which set only 8 goals to be achieved and did not include the emphasis on action against violence and improvement of the justice system and strong institutions. See www.un.org/millenniumgoals/

⁸ Mahhub ul Haq, *Reflections on Human Development* (Oxford University Press, 1995), 15–16.

with the sustainable human development (HD) and the capability approach. A development model, its fundamental goal is to enhance human life and interprets development as offering opportunities, thus freedom to the individuals to unfold their capabilities instead of defining it as mere economic growth at an aggregate level. The HS concept focuses on “downside risks” and vulnerabilities that particularly affect disadvantaged groups in society, such as the extremely poor and socially needy people. The concept of poverty based on the HD approach has become widely accepted among the majority of scholars and also the public spheres as a multidimensional phenomenon taking many forms, as it is argued by Amartya Sen: “The role of income and wealth [...] has to be integrated into a broader and fuller picture of success and deprivation.”⁹ As deprived groups in society are particularly affected by threats, poverty is a highly important risk factor related to crime and victimisation at various levels. At the individual level, people may opt for violent crime to survive or to be subject to it as victims due to inefficient law enforcement and regulatory system. High level of violence affects individual property rights and deteriorates the business environment and activity leading to poverty. This paper aims to reveal the complexity of interconnectedness of violence and poverty in the Colombian context considering HS and HD complementary to each other and their increasingly important joint role in national public policies to address many forms of deprivations of its population.¹⁰

Colombia serves as a particularly interesting case in terms of examining these two facets of reality for several reasons: 1. Colombia is characterised by endemic violence with national homicide rate 25 (2019) and 23.7 (2020) per 100,000 persons,¹¹ even overpassing the respective data of Latin America and the Caribbean as the most violent region in the world, considering its high rates of homicides, which is almost three times the world average (17.2 homicides and 6.1 homicides for every 100,000 people, respectively in 2017).¹² Latin America, with its economic growth becoming a middle-income region with still the highest homicide rate in the globe since reliable records from 1990 shows an outlier case and Colombia as an upper-middle-income country even a special one. 2. Conventional wisdom is that long-standing problems of violence and poverty are the root causes of migrant waves, which are one of the most important global emergencies. Intra-regional migration within South America is also strikingly high, with the majority of international migrants moving within the subregion countries. Colombia is a special example for the theory even for international migration in the subregion and with more than 5.7 million internally displaced people until the end of 2018 – the second highest of its kind in the

⁹ Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 37.

¹⁰ Just as Galtung’s interpretation of positive peace includes the concept of sustainable economic development, among others e.g. democratic governance, transparent institutional system, social justice and equality or environmental protection. Johan Galtung, *Theories of Peace. A Synthetic Approach to Peace Thinking* (Oslo, International Peace Research Institute, 1967), 138. The relationship between development and security appears in Mahbub ul Haq’s interpretation as well, “security through development not through arms”. Haq, *Reflections*, 115; UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

¹¹ UN HRC, *Situation of Human Rights in Colombia – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (A/HRC/46/76)* (UN, February 2021).

¹² UNODC, *Global Study on Homicide 2019*. The latest data presented in the document is from 2017.

world.¹³ 3. The negative socio-economic effects of former neoliberal policies introduced under the Washington Consensus have added up to inherited development challenges, such as permanent high levels of informality and lack of access to services. Colombia has one of the highest rates of informal employment in the region with more than 50 per cent.¹⁴ 4. Latin America was the pioneering region¹⁵ where the concept of multidimensional poverty was first introduced into the measurement, such as Colombia in 2011. In the last decade, several countries in the region have paid particular attention to designing their own public policies and national strategies to reduce poverty based on information revealed by new multidimensional poverty measurements (on the characteristics of poverty at local and regional levels.) 5. As global poverty research confirms, there is an increasing emphasis on subnational concerns to address poverty challenges within a country due to the highly territorial feature of poverty distribution.¹⁶

This study provides a critical review of academic literature and expert documentation. The analysis of the Colombian case is based on official expert and ministerial, governmental and national and international NGOs, United Nations offices publications, documenting the advancement of the country-specific phenomenon, which also provided the opportunity to have a deep insight into the dynamics of processes. In addition, statistical data and publications were also analysed, mainly from the Colombian National Statistical Office (DANE¹⁷ by its initials in Spanish) and several ministries.

The paper includes four parts in addition to this introduction. The first provides an overview of the theories of HS and HD. The following part presents the current aspects of violence and poverty in Colombia, and the next part reveals the dynamics related to violence and poverty. The final part concludes.

Human security and sustainable human development

The discourse on security is inevitable and repeatedly emerges in the academic or public debates in relation to many global phenomena for various reasons. First, in the age of multiple interconnectedness, the external and internal distinction is disappearing. Equally, the threats themselves have a more global attitude. The current increasingly frequent and ubiquitous climate and health crisis or the operations of transnational organised crime groups indicate that the state alone cannot be an adequate, single relevant actor.¹⁸

¹³ WMR, *World Migration Report 2020* (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2020), 103. In the same year, approximately 139,000 Colombians lived as refugees or in refugee-like situations abroad, which is a significant decrease from more than 190,000 in 2017 and 300,000 in 2016 (Ibid).

¹⁴ OECD, 'Portraits of Informality'.

¹⁵ Julio Boltvinik, 'Medición Multidimensional de La Pobreza. AL de Precursora a Rezagada', *Revista Sociedad y Equidad*, no 5 (2013).

¹⁶ Ravi Kanbur and Andy Sumner, 'Poor Countries or Poor People? Development Assistance and the New Geography of Global Poverty', *Journal of International Development* 24, no 6 (2012), 686–695.

¹⁷ See <https://dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/pobreza-y-condiciones-de-vida/pobreza-y-desigualdad/pobreza-monetaria-y-multidimensional-en-colombia-2019>

¹⁸ Related to this is Ulrich Beck's concept of the Risk Society, according to which new elements appearing in technological progress are sources of potential danger, and thus the results of modernity itself. It fits into this process that cyberattacks, biological issues, both in theory and in policy, are within the scope of security.

Second, the weak institutions in relation to the absence of the rule of law within the state creates a destabilised context (political, social). It causes insecurity perception for the citizens and has spillover effects on their survival and well-being.¹⁹ Although the idea of HS and HD was conceived in the 1990s and stems from the same seed planted by Mahbub ul Haq, both as normative claims having become part of mainstream international policy, even later have followed a separate path of acceptance by academia, government agencies and multilateral organisations.

The concept of HS first appeared in the Human Development Report in 1994²⁰ published by the United Nations Development Programme. As an agenda-setting document for the next year World Summit for Social Development, proposed new foundations, namely security and sustainability, for the post-Cold War period in the international cooperation. The two main elements of HS as a basic idea already appeared as early as the founding of the United Nations, in 1945 in a speech by the U.S. Secretary of State (highlighting President F. D. Roosevelt's 1941 vision of a future for humanity based on four fundamental freedoms) stating: "The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front, where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front, where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of enduring peace."²¹ In the report, HS was conceptualised in seven categories: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, security of individual persons, security of the community and political security, and entered the academic and government agendas with discussion. The interpretations about the security concept in the "new war" era have been extended in four directions, summarised by Emma Rothschild. "Downward" is from the security of states to groups and individuals, "upward" from national to international level, even to the biosphere, "horizontally" from military to political, economic, social, environmental or human security, and "multi-sectoral" way as from national political actors to international institutions, local and regional bodies, the NGOs, the media and the market, as well.²² The original proposal of the United Nations Development Programme evolved and incorporated the human dignity aspect due to the spread and strengthening of the protection and promotion of human rights. It encompasses a complex approach that implies freedom from fear (threats to survival e.g. violence, physical abuse or death), freedom from want (threats from livelihoods e.g. food insecurity, unemployment, etc.), and living in dignity (to be free from e.g. discrimination, exclusion, lack of human rights). Its main characteristics are as follows: 1. universal: relevant for developing and developed countries; 2. interconnectedness: threats are interrelated and in general have a domino effect which requires a comprehensive approach and multidimensional analysis; 3. emphasizes prevention to avoid major threats and to build resilience; 4. people-centeredness: that individuals and communities can act as agents and

¹⁹ See Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

²⁰ UNDP, *HDR 1994*.

²¹ *Ibid.* 3.

²² Emma Rothschild, 'What Is Security?', *Daedalus* 124, no 3 (1995), 55.

beneficiaries; 5. empowerment and protection also became pillars of propositions in the Commission on Human Security's 2003 report.²³

Mahbub ul Haq's concept of security puts people in focus. The same approach appears in his interpretation of development, as he summarised that a country's true values are its people, and they are the means and ends of economic development. The basic idea of HD, as it is stated in the first Human Development Report, "here denotes both the process of widening people's choices and the level of their achieved well-being".²⁴ The goal is to equally realise people's capabilities in all areas of their lives, political, economic, cultural and social, in the present and the future. It is formulated on Amartya Sen's theory called the *capability approach*, which focuses on people's capabilities and to enable people to have an agency about their own lives in their community. In such a context, development is based on people's freedom who have to decide for themselves the kind of development they want. Since people and communities determine it and thus the tools leading to it. The agency is closely linked to the opportunities that enable individuals to have a dignified life, e.g. an education. Still, the agency also means that they shape the environment in which they can have a fulfilled life. The perspective of HD is multidimensional, encompassing different public policies instead of concentrating on only one type of policy such as health, education or fiscal policy. In Sen's theory, functionings and capabilities are fundamental elements. The former are things that people have reason to value, and the latter refers to freedom that allows them to experience different functions.²⁵ In the HD approach, in addition to the goal of development, the process itself is similarly emphasised, about which ul Haq makes four important statements: equity, efficiency, participation and sustainability.²⁶ Sen's invention of the capability approach and development was decisive in interpreting poverty, which placed the previous income-based approach in a multidimensional perspective.

As a result of the 2008–2009 global economic crisis, the Stiglitz–Sen–Fitoussi report made it clear that a new approach (including new statistical methods and data) is required to appropriately map socio-economic processes and thus to provide adequate information to decision-makers to elaborate proper public policies. As the report puts it: "What you measure affects what you do; and if our measurements are flawed, decisions may be distorted."²⁷ Reflecting the report, new initiatives were launched, such as the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index of the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative,²⁸ inspiring the elaboration of national poverty indices, especially in Latin America. Although these indices provide a much more detailed picture of deprivations of people living in poverty, they still lack measurement of critical dimensions, such as violence revealed in global participatory research about vulnerable social groups

²³ Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now: Protecting Empowering People* (UN, 2003).

²⁴ United Nations, *Human Development Report 1990. Published for the United Nations (New York) Development Programme* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 10.

²⁵ Sen, 'Development as Freedom'.

²⁶ Haq, *Reflections*.

²⁷ Joseph E Stiglitz, Amartya Sen and Jean Fitoussi, *The Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress Revisited* (Paris: Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, 2009), 7.

²⁸ Sabina Alkire and James Foster, 'Counting and Multidimensional Poverty Measurement', *Journal of Public Economics* 95, no 7–8 (2011), 476–487.

worldwide.²⁹ HS is concerned with basic needs as human rights and as “downside risks” such as threats embedded in people’s everyday lives hindering them from unfolding their functions safely. United Nations Development Programme reports of the past decade show an increasing focus on attempts with little success to tackle personal and citizen security issues regarding organised physical violence or threats to personal safety and property.³⁰ I argue that HS and HD complement each other. They form a comprehensive, integrated approach while exploring the shortcomings of socio-economic-institutional complexity and revealing subregional and horizontal inequalities. As a holistic approach it can be suitable to elaborate the necessary context-specific, preventive measures and public policies based on adequate measurement.

Violence and poverty in Colombia

Although violence was present in Latin America in pre-Columbian cultures, the emergence of structural violence can be linked to the establishment of colonialism, mainly related to the extermination of indigenous communities and partly to the forcible importation of Africans by the transatlantic slave trade. In later centuries, the civil wars and in the mid-20th century, the successive dictatorships with brutal secret service apparatus, organised armed insurgency groups all reinforced the role of violence and arms. Violence does not affect and characterise the countries in the region in the same way; Colombia ranks 10th in the South American region on the Global Peace Index, and 144th in the global ranking.³¹ Colombia today is characterised by many forms of violence that permeate society in its socio-economic and political aspects. However, different social groups are affected in diverse ways and degrees. The violence began to have a major impact on the country, especially from the second half of the 20th century, beginning in the period 1948–1960, which is specifically referred to in Colombian history as “La Violencia” [The Violence], with around 200,000 victims, mainly in rural areas.³²

²⁹ Deepa Narayan et al., *Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us?* (World Bank, 2000).

³⁰ Des Gasper and Oscar A Gómez, ‘Human Security Thinking in Practice: “Personal Security”, “Citizen Security” and Comprehensive Mappings’, *Contemporary Politics* 21, no 1 (2015).

³¹ Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Peace Index 2021: Measuring Peace in a Complex World* (Sydney: June 2021).

³² Bruce M Bagley and Jonathan D Rosen, *Colombia’s Political Economy at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century: From Uribe to Santos and Beyond* (Lexington Books, 2015).





Figure 1: Homicide rate in Colombia 2010–2020

Low risk: Amazonas, Atlántico, Bolívar, Boyacá, Caldas, Casanare, Cesar, Córdoba, Cundinamarca, Guainía, Guajira, Huila, Magdalena, Santander, Sucre, Tolima, Vaupés, Vichada
Medium risk: Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Risaralda, San Andrés
High risk: Antioquia, Arauca, Caquetá, Cauca, Chocó, Guaviare, Quindío

Source: Compiled by the author based on the online data of the ‘Policía Nacional de Colombia’, s. a.

Aggregate data in Figure 1 shows a declining trend at the national level in the homicide rate over the past decade, albeit with significant variation across different country departments. The provinces with high homicide ratios are closer to the southern border of the country and those in the Pacific and Amazon regions, especially Putumayo, Valle de Cauca, Cauca, Antioquia and Arauca departments. At the same time, aggregate data, whether for mortality or other acts of violence, obscures the attributes of dynamics related to territory, ethnicity, and social group characteristics and special features. Despite the declining trend, specific data in Figure 2 show one of the most striking figures: the attacks on and killings of environmental activists and human rights defenders, a record number as Colombia accounts for 30 per cent of all global cases. The country has also experienced a 150 per cent increase compared to the previous year.



Map 1: Departments and their homicide rate in 2019

Source: Compiled by the author based on the online data of the ‘Policía Nacional de Colombia’, s. a.

Meanwhile, half of the victims belonged to indigenous communities.³³ Various human rights organisations have different data on human rights violations and killings (the highest number of 942 aggression). Still, each one reports an intensifying trend, primarily against community and social leaders, whose especially high proportion belongs to ethnic groups.³⁴ The severity of the phenomenon is shown by the fact that a demonstration at the national level was organised for the victims and their communities in November 2019. Map 1 shows departments with different homicide rates (2019), while Map 2 shows the territorial distribution of Afro-Colombian and indigenous people and communities. Regarding the last census (2018), we can observe a territorial coincidence.

³³ Global Witness, ‘Defending Tomorrow’, July 2020.

³⁴ See SIADDHH, ‘La Mala Hora Informe Anual 2020’; Business and Human Rights Resource Center, ‘Business and Human Rights Defenders in Colombia’, March 2020; UN HRC, *Situation of Human Rights in Colombia*.



Figure 2: Killings of environmental activists

Source: Compiled by the author based on Global Witness data.

In Colombia, poverty reduction has been identified as one of the key objectives of the 2010 National Development Plan presented by President Juan Manuel Santos. To achieve this, new measurement methods were introduced in 2011. The National Planning Department has elaborated not only a completely new multidimensional poverty measurement but also a new income poverty measurement was put forward. It was explicitly aimed that the measurement should have characteristics that are appropriate for consistent analysis, change in public policy decisions, and a reflection of the current living conditions of Colombians. The final version of the measurement consists of five dimensions: household education conditions, childhood and youth conditions, employment, health and access to public utilities and housing conditions, each defined by five indicators,³⁵ whose data source is the Living Standards Measurements Survey. All indicators together determine the national multidimensional poverty index using the Alkire–Foster method.³⁶ The index assigns the same weight to each dimension (20 per cent), and the poverty line is considered at one-third of the weighted dimensions. It is important to mention that this is the only measurement in the Latin American region that has put exceptional emphasis on a special dimension, namely the living conditions of children and young people, which reflects the demographic conditions of the country. However, a significant shortcoming is that the dimension of violence and physical security was not included in this measurement. It happened despite the fact of the endemic violence, which has particularly accompanied the modern history of the country, not just prior to the peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC by its initials in Spanish) in 2016. Empirical research conducted by participatory approach also revealed that for the poor living in Colombia, in addition to livelihood and education, the most significant deprivation is the persistence

³⁵ Roberto Carlos Angulo Salazar, Yadira Díaz Cuervo and Renata Pardo, *Índice de Pobreza Multidimensional Para Colombia* (Archivos de Economía, Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 7 November 2011).

³⁶ Alkire and Foster, ‘Counting and Multidimensional Poverty Measurement’.

of violence and physical vulnerability.³⁷ The significance of the new method is shown by the fact that, as an indicator, it is a determining element of a number of important national social policies, such as the poverty and inequality reduction programs (e.g. early childhood care and food security programs) and also the geographical targeting of the conditional cash transfer program called in Spanish “Más Familias en Acción” [More Families in Action]. Figure 3 shows that all forms of poverty, income poverty (including extreme) and multidimensional decreased under the Santos Government in 2010–2018, but the most significant change happened in multidimensional poverty at the national level from 30.4 per cent to 17.8 per cent, while in rural areas from 53.1 per cent to 37.6 per cent.





Figure 3: Left: Income poverty and extreme poverty 2012–2019; right: Multidimensional poverty 2010–2018

Source: Compiled by the author based on DANE online data.

After 2018, under the government of Iván Duque, all trends show stagnation and, slightly, deterioration. Map 2 shows poverty and Afro-Colombian and indigenous population distribution regarding the departments. In the map, we can see that it does not coincide with the departments with elevated numbers in the homicide rate, but at the same time coincides with the areas of the Amazon region, where only 3 per cent of the total population lives almost exclusively in small indigenous communities. The Afro-Colombian community is 9.34 per cent; the indigenous is 4.4 per cent from the total population (48 million people). The multidimensional poverty rate of Afro-Colombians is 11 per cent higher than the national level, it is 30.6 per cent and 19.6 per cent, respectively. Nariño, Cauca and Valle del Cauca display the highest difference and the more striking divergences are shown in informal employment and education indicators of the measurement. Indigenous communities show a similar trend of living at an inferior level in all socio-economic indicators than the national average, regarding the new 2018 census data.

³⁷ Jairo A Arboleda, Patti L Petesch and James Blackburn, *Voices of the Poor in Colombia: Strengthening Livelihoods, Families, and Communities* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2004).



Map 2: Multidimensional poverty distribution and distribution of indigenous and Afro-Colombian people (2019)

Source: Compiled by the author based on DANE online data.

Old–new dynamics behind the scenes

A number of factors and processes need to be taken into account to understand the background to some particular worsening trend in violence. Colombia is a country with a high-risk factor for climate change, which mainly manifests in floods, landslides and droughts. Especially, livelihoods and food production will become an increasing challenge in rural areas, causing further internal migration.³⁸ Despite the commitment of the Colombian Government under President Juan Manuel Santos to manage the climate crisis as part of the peace process in accordance with the Paris Agreement, it has continued to support carbon-intensive mining. (Colombia is among the ten largest coal producers in the world). Moreover, it has boosted the agroindustry, e.g. by planting oil palms and relying on hydroelectric projects. At the same time, data from different sources and current trends show that social conflict is constant in Colombia, partly because of the extraction of natural resources and its negative impacts on the environment and the lives of local, mainly indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. The conflict is essentially due to the non-compliance with the legal framework of their rights, such as the right of communities to their territory and the institution of prior consultation. These are, in principle, guaranteed by the 1991 Colombian Constitution.

Colombia with 14 other Latin American countries, ratified the institution of prior consultation based on the Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization on

³⁸ UNDP, *Mainstreaming Climate Change in Colombia* (New York: UNDP Project Team, 2010).

Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, 1989. The institution is particularly significant since extractive projects are of major importance in terms of the GDP of the countries, but concurrently is a general source of tension and conflictive actions between different social groups in the entire region.

Despite the ratification, the implementation process has encountered several setbacks at many points because the national economy's reliance on natural resources seeks the interests of transnational corporations and business associations. However, the possibility of consultation process under current domestic legal circumstances is increasingly constrained, partly due to a lack of political will since the beginning of Iván Duque's government in 2018, which also reflects the asymmetry of power between political-economic elites and the indigenous groups.³⁹ In a few cases, the companies themselves contributed to the violence. Still, it is difficult to directly link most of the atrocities on community defenders and environmental activists to the companies as actors.⁴⁰ In 2018, the current President Iván Duque announced and implemented partly a program in favour of private investment in community areas, proving he has not taken some points of the FARC peace agreement further. Moreover, he tries to handle the ongoing violence caused by the residual guerrilla and armed paramilitary groups through militarism, increasing again the presence of arms in the country as a conflict solution tool.

In Colombia, the oil and mining sector, which already accounted for 32 per cent of the \$14.5 trillion in FDI inflows in 2019, even before the pandemic, is projected to be the motor of economic recovery from the economic crisis.⁴¹ Colombia's gold production has grown significantly and steadily over the past decade, thanks to the ever-rising international gold price, which was mainly due to the 2008–2009 financial crisis as a safe form for financial assets (Figure 4).

³⁹ The institution of prior consultation has become a weak or strong institutional element to varying degrees in different Latin American countries. See Daniel M Brinks, Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo, *The Politics of Institutional Weakness in Latin America* (Cambridge University Press, 2020).

⁴⁰ In a few cases, the companies themselves contributed to the violence, but it is difficult to link most of the atrocities on defenders directly to the companies as actors. 44% of the atrocities were committed by five companies, which are also the largest mining companies in the country.

⁴¹ UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2020: International Production beyond the Pandemic* (Geneva – New York: United Nations, 2020).




Figure 4: Gold and coal production 2000–2020, gold price 2000–2020

Source: Compiled by the author based on Goldhub and Knoema⁴² online data.

The increased importance of gold is demonstrated by the fact that just like legal mining, illegal gold mining has also been increased in many departments over the last decade. Illegal alluvial gold mining has a significant environmental impact, using heavy machinery and toxic substances, resulting in significant irreversible land and water pollution. In addition to the environmental damage, the social damage is just as significant, as the extraction process and much of its territory are controlled by organised crime groups. These activities are closely linked to other illegal ones such as trafficking in human beings and arms and various forms of threats to local populations, e.g. extortion. In 2020 alluvial gold mining was carried out in 12 departments (out of 32) in 100,752 ha, (an increase of 3 per cent compared to 2019), of which 69 per cent was illegal. Antioquia, Chocó and Bolívar are the three departments with the highest extraction rate, having a share of 88 per cent since 2014.⁴³

⁴² See www.gold.org/goldhub/data/gold-prices, www.gold.org/goldhub/data/historical-mine-production, <https://public.knoema.com/sdybxie/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-main-indicators?location=1001250&variable=1000050&frequency=A>

⁴³ UNODC and Government of Colombia, ‘Alluvial Gold Exploitation Evidences from Remote Sensing 2016’, May 2018; UNODC and Government of Colombia, ‘Colombia Explotación de Oro de Aluvión Evidencias a Partir de Percepción Remota 2020’, July 2021.

Table 1: Alluvial gold extraction on land (EVOA) between 2014 and 2020

| Departments affected by EVOA | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|-------------------------------|------------------|------------|------------------|-------------------------------|------------------|------------|------------------|------------|------------------|
| National area detected for EVOA Year | 78,939 ha | | 83,620 ha | | 92,046 ha | | 98,028 ha | | 100,752 ha | |
| | 2014 | | 2016 | | 2018 | | 2019 | | 2020 | |
| | EVOA (ha) | Total national % | EVOA (ha) | Total national % | EVOA (ha) | Total national % | EVOA (ha) | Total national % | EVOA (ha) | Total national % |
| Department | 36,185 | 46% | 33,024 | 39% | 35,194 | 38% | 35,105 | 36% | 36,552 | 36% |
| Chocó | 26,323 | 33% | 30,897 | 37% | 36,447 | 40% | 40,201 | 41% | 40,890 | 41% |
| Antioquia | 7,361 | 9% | 7,820 | 9% | 8,913 | 10% | 10,642 | 11% | 10,583 | 11% |
| Bolívar | 1,408 | 2% | 3,702 | 4% | 3,004 | 3% | 2,697 | 3% | 2,807 | 3% |
| Cauca | 3,544 | 4% | 3,592 | 4% | 3,982 | 4% | 4,976 | 5% | 4,975 | 5% |
| Córdoba | 1,676 | 2% | 2,677 | 3% | 2,921 | 3% | 3,171 | 3% | 3,374 | 3% |
| Nariño | 1,570 | 2% | 1,023 | 1% | 889 | 1% | 608 | 1% | 765 | 1% |
| Valle | 872 | 1% | 885 | 1% | 696 | 1% | 626 | 1% | 807 | 1% |
| Others | | | | | | | | | | |
| Special Management Areas | Areas EVOA 2016 | | | | Areas EVOA 2020 | | | | | |
| | EVOA (ha) | | National % | | EVOA (ha) | | National % | | | |
| Afro-Colombian Community Territories | 34,858 | | 42% | | 41,006 | | 40% | | | |
| National Natural Parks and Protected Areas | 3,887 | | 5% | | 6,459 | | 6% | | | |
| Indigenous Reserves | 780 | | 1% | | 627 | | <1% | | | |
| | EVOA under legal figures 2016 | | | | EVOA under legal figures 2020 | | | | | |
| Without figures of law | 66% | | | | 69% | | | | | |
| Environmental and/or technical licenses | 27% | | | | 24% | | | | | |
| Requests for legalisation | 7% | | | | 7% | | | | | |

Source: Compiled by the author based on UNODC and Government of Colombia, 'Alluvial Gold Exploitation Evidences from Remote Sensing 2016'.

The complexity of the situation is illustrated by the fact that coca plantations were also observed in 41 per cent of the areas where EVOA was present, further increasing the vulnerability of the inhabitants of these areas plagued by poverty, marginality and activity of armed, organised crime groups. These figures coincide with research, revealing how illegal mining has spread beyond the Andean region to Venezuela and Brazil and become a more lucrative criminal economy than drug trafficking during the last half-decade.⁴⁴

The devastating impact of various illegal activities on the environment is also illustrated by a study highlighting the loss of forest area, which in 2020 increased by 8 per cent compared to the previous year, reaching 171,685 ha nationwide. The most affected areas with 70 per cent of the total loss are located in 5 departments of the Amazon region

⁴⁴ The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 'El Crimen Organizado y la Minería Ilegal de Oro en América Latina', April 2016.

Meta, Caquetá, Guaviare, Putumayo and Antioquia. There are five delineated causes behind environmental crime, all of which are linked to land grabbing: expansion of agricultural activity into protected areas with clearing forest for cattle ranching, illicit crop cultivation, illegal mining and road construction and logging. In the three departments of the Amazon region of Colombia, deforestation for land grabbing, which will be used for livestock, coca cultivation and agricultural activities, increased by 80 per cent in 2020 compared to the previous year. This phenomenon is sustained by the fact that there are different interests and power asymmetry among the various local actors involved, such as politicians, the private sector, communities and organised environmental criminal groups.⁴⁵ Illicit crop cultivation is a driver not just for deforestation, but for violence as well. Around 13,000 hectares new areas were cleared for coca crops mainly in Putumayo and Antioquia departments, which are among the most affected ones with violent acts as well. Especially Antioquia, where a 27.5 per cent increase is documented in coca crops cultivation from 2019. At the same time, Putumayo and Caquetá continue to fight against illicit crop cultivation even after the pandemic lockdown and despite eradication efforts.⁴⁶

Conclusion

The case of Colombia shows the complex interplay of different threats, local factors and dynamics, and the crucial role of the institutional failure in sustaining the analysed processes and their cumulative impact on vulnerable social groups. In the current climate emergency situation, which is directly linked to other issues such as economic insecurity, rising inequality in many aspects, especially affecting ethnic minorities, environmental activists and human rights defenders play an essential and visible role. Violence against them can be considered an indicator. Despite the rising number of atrocities against the activists, governmental agencies and businesses fail to protect them, especially from those engaged in illegal economic activities due to poor law enforcement, non-compliance and high corruption at the local level. Overall, decreasing the levels of violence does not only need to include some further variables into the analysis but the application of a comprehensive, holistic approach offered by the complementarity of the human security and human development concepts.

I argue that violence is a phenomenon affecting the lives and opportunities of all citizens in varying degrees in terms of territorial, ethnic and social distribution. Measuring its impact should be a particularly important element in the multidimensional poverty measurement, based on normative choices by decision-makers. The measurement of the violence dimension can be better understood as a threat from the citizen security perspective. In most cases, violence and the threat of personal and citizen security is related to economic, environmental and livelihood threats. This study points to the need

⁴⁵ Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales, 'Resultados Del Monitoreo de Deforestación 2020', 2021.

⁴⁶ UNODC and Government of Colombia, 'Colombia: Monitoreo de Territorios Afectados Por Cultivos Ilícitos 2020', July 2021.

for further research to analyse processes at the municipality level related to violence and other dimensions of poverty with a special focus on departments inhabited by Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities, where most illegal activities and legal mining concentrate, as well.

An appropriate measurement can lead to design public policies with an impact on the triad of freedom from fear, freedom from want and living in dignity. They are intertwined aspects – none of them can be achieved without the other two conditions.

Change processes in the Colombian context require the elimination of the historically inherited mistrust between the state and marginalised social groups, a comprehensive rural development approach to help accomplish the points of agreement with the FARC through community building and offering economic alternatives for illegal activities. Ensuring and implementing proper institutions linked to many forms of security, with a wider range of livelihood opportunities, can reduce citizens' vulnerability. Weak institutions, which are in many cases historically inherited and further weakened by governance failures, have serious consequences and can reduce the impact of well-designed and useful public policies. As the case of Colombia has illustrated, political will throughout consecutive presidential cycles is an essential requirement for changing complex processes.

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Guanajuato: A Struggle to Control Oil Theft

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Guanajuato became Mexico's most dangerous entity in 2019. It used to be a peaceful state in the 1990s, but with the evolution of criminal groups and organised crime, Guanajuato became a strategic region because of its geographical location, road network, economic development and fuel pipelines. The aim of this paper is to identify the factors that brought Guanajuato to the first place in terms of homicides in 2019 nationwide. The hypothesis states that violence in the entity was the result of an invasion of the CJNG and its fight against the CSRL to dominate the theft of gasoline. To prove this hypothesis, we use a multiple regression model to correlate homicides taking place from 2015 to 2019 between the most dangerous municipalities of Guanajuato with those occurring in Jalisco and Michoacán. The correlation parameters which also take into account the road network were significant for Leon, (Guanajuato) vs. San Pedro de Tlaquepaque (Jalisco), Tlajomulco de Zúñiga (Jalisco), Tonalá (Jalisco), Zamora (Michoacán) and El Salto (Jalisco); Irapuato vs. Guadalajara (Jalisco) and San Pedro de Tlaquepaque (Jalisco) and Salamanca vs. Guadalajara (Jalisco), Tonalá (Jalisco), Zamora (Michoacán) and Lagos de Moreno (Jalisco).

Keywords: Guanajuato, violence, oil theft, GJNG, CSRL

Introduction

According to the former director of the Mexican Ministry of Public Security Alfonso Durazo Montaña, the number of homicides in Mexico diminished from January to November 2019 making hitherto a total of 31,688. However, the most dangerous federal states in terms of homicides were: Guanajuato 3,211; Baja California: 2,567;

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Estado de México: 2,603; Jalisco: 2,465 and Chihuahua: 2,379.⁴ Guanajuato used to be a peaceful federal state with 5 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2008; then it took off to 13 in 2012; 16 in 2017 and 54 in 2019.⁵ The peculiar peak in homicides coincided with the sudden increase in the price of gasoline in 2017. The price per litre went from 15.5 MXN in June 2017 to 19.34 MXN in November 2018, a spike of 24.7%.⁶ The theft of gasoline soared by that time in several regions in Mexico, but particularly in Salamanca, Guanajuato, because of the refinery operating there and the vast number of pipelines installed in its underground surroundings. Thus, oil theft, also dubbed as “Huachicol”, turned into a high profitable business for organised crime. In Guanajuato, a criminal organisation named Cartel Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL) emerged under the leadership of José Antonio Yepes, whose nickname is “El Marro”, (detained by the authorities on 2 August 2020). The CSRL has been fighting the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CLNG) for several years. This warfare has taken place in Guanajuato and has already affected seven of its municipalities: León, Irapuato, Salamanca, Villagrán, Celaya, Apaseo el Alto and Apaseo el Grande. The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the nature of this conflict by outlining its main traits. We have posed two guiding questions: Which are the main criminal groups involved in Guanajuato’s conflict and what do they pursue? And: Which are the most violent municipalities in Guanajuato in terms of homicides and how do they correlate with the neighbouring states’ municipalities of Jalisco and Michoacán including the road network? To answer these questions we have divided this paper into three sections and a concluding part. To begin with, we synthesise the evolution of the main criminal organisations involved in Guanajuato’s conflict. Secondly, we compare Guanajuato with its neighbour entities in terms of homicides and rank Jalisco and Michoacán as the main source of violence. In the third section, we correlate the number of homicides on a monthly basis from 2015 to 2019 between León, Irapuato and Salamanca with those municipalities belonging to Jalisco and Michoacán to see if patterns of behaviour – which also considers the road network – can be observed. At the end, we conclude that the violence in Guanajuato can be explained by the confrontation between CJNG and CSRL seeking to take control of oil theft profits.

Evolution of organised crime in Mexico

Along the Mexican territory, different criminal organisations are carrying out illegal activities and fighting each other to control trade, routes and territory. The government’s strategy to fight organised crime since President Felipe Calderón until the first year of

⁴ Aristigui Noticias, ‘Van más de 30 mil homicidios en 2019; Guanajuato, primer lugar en este delito: Durazo’, 17 December 2019.

⁵ Brenda Yañez, ‘AMLO cerró su primer año con 34,579 homicidios dolosos (4 cada hora)’, *Expansión Política*, 20 December 2019; Tania L Montalvo, ‘El Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación creció con EPN hasta ser el más importante del país’, *NarcoData*, 30 August 2016.

⁶ Manuel A Botello, ‘Comparación Del Precio De La Gasolina, Mexico–USA’, *Mexico–Maxico*, 31 December 2019.

Andrés Manuel López Obrador, has focused on incarcerating the main leaders. That has triggered a permanent war while new alliances emerge and new leaders replace the ones killed or imprisoned.⁷ There has been nine criminal organisations in the last four decades: 1. El Cartel de Tijuana/Arellano Félix; 2. Cartel de Juárez, 3. Cartel de Sinaloa; 4. Cartel del Golfo; 5. Cartel de los Beltrán Leyva; 6. Cartel de los Zetas; 7. La Familia Michoacana; 8. Los Caballeros Templarios; and 9. Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación. Along the years, there has been a reshuffling process and shifting of power from one another. New and fewer joint ventures have emerged from the original groups; they are now better organised and armed; they are more aggressive and have infiltrated the authorities and the government. They have also improved their products evolving from the traditional drugs like marijuana and cocaine to fentanyl, methamphetamines and heroin. They also controlled the trafficking of people and the theft of oil. Authorities have played a key role since they have assumed full responsibility to fight insecurity. However, there is a growing suspiciousness of a wide synergy between authorities and criminal leaders. Well known communicators and researchers have pointed out that Mexican authorities are bribed by criminal leaders so that they can operate with impunity. Highly respected journalists and social researchers⁸ affirm that authorities are interested in the illegal business to continue and flourish.

Jorge Fernández Menéndez, an expert in security matters, believes that there are 70 criminal groups performing illegal trading in Mexico. However, only two of them can be classified as Cartels: Cartel del Pacífico and Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJANG). Among the numerous criminal groups identified by the press and local authorities are Cartel de la Unión de Tepito, the H3, Cartel de Tláhuac in Mexico City, Los Viagra in Michoacán, Cartel Independiente in Acapulco and the Rojos and Guerreros Unidos. In Guanajuato, the following names have caught the attention, la Unión de León, Los Carranza, Los Mickeys, Los Puños, Cáteles Unidos and Fuerzas Especiales Grupo Sombra, and the most important, Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL).⁹ We will synthesise the background of the criminal groups involved in Guanajuato's violence also tracked by the U.S. authorities.¹⁰

⁷ Felipe Calderon Hinojosa, *Los retos que enfrentamos* (CDMX: Debate, 2014); Auditoría Superior de la Federación, *Evaluación No. 1207 "Política Pública de Seguridad Pública"* (CDMX: Cámara de Diputados, 2013); Seguridad y Defensa, 'Así operan los carteles por el control territorial en el país', *Agencia de Información en Seguridad y Defensa*, 25 August 2020; Lorena Moguel, 'Peña admite el fracaso de su gobierno en materia de seguridad', *Proceso*, 14 November 2017.

⁸ Edgardo Buscalia, *Vacios de poder en México. El camino de México hacia la Seguridad humana* (Mexico: Debate, 2013); Jorge Fernández Menéndez and Víctor Ronquillo, *De los Maras a los Zetas* (Mexico: Debolsillo, 2006); Anabel Hernández, *Los señores del narco* (Mexico: Grijalbo, 2010); Ricardo Ravelo, *Osiel. Vida y Tragedia de un Capo* (Mexico: Grijalbo, 2012); Anabel Hernández, *El Traidor. El diario del hijo del Mayo* (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 2020); María E Garay, *Los Policías: una averiguación atropológica* (Tlaquepaque, Jalisco: ITESO, 2016); Zona Franca, 'Crimen organizado está infiltrado en siete municipios de Guanajuato', 15 October 2019.

⁹ Jorge Fernández Menéndez, *La nueva guerra. Del Chapo al fentanilo* (CDMX: Grijalbo, 2020).

¹⁰ Congressional Research Service, Mexico, 'Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations', *CRS Report*, 20 December 2019.

Los Zetas

This band was founded by deserters from an army elite squad called GAFE (Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas Especiales). Originally, they were hired by the Cartel del Golfo but later they became independent and specialised in oil theft, extortion, kidnapping and human trafficking. They dwelled in the east part of the Gulf of Mexico but have set foot in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua. They have established a trade net with Central America and South America, cooperating with elite forces of Guatemala called Kaibiles. As a method to terrorise the population and enemies, they exhibit hung dead bodies from bridges and are known for their extreme brutality. They have created such a bad reputation that even local gangs pretend to be members of Zetas to frighten their victims. According to the press, they set on fire The Royal Casino in 2011 in Monterrey Nuevo León, causing the death of 53 people. They were also responsible for the execution of 72 migrants in 2010 and for 193 dead bodies found in a clandestine pit, all in a place called San Fernando, Tamaulipas.¹¹ The Zetas are known for killing those who refuse to work for them, especially illegal migrants, or victims who reject to pay extortions. The Mexican Navy killed one of the founders of this organisation in Coahuila in 2012; his name was Heriberto Lazcano, “El Lasca”. Miguel Ángel Treviño Morales “El Z-40” became the new leader, but was also annihilated by the authorities in 2013. Later, his brother Omar Treviño Morales, “El Z-42” was also detained by the federal forces in 2015. With the elimination of the main leaders, the Zetas started to fade away. The Zetas focused on oil theft as one of their key trades, causing losses to Pemex (Mexican Oil and Public Enterprise) calculated in 1.15 billion USD in 2014. It was estimated that the Zetas dominated 40% of the oil theft in the country, mainly in the federal states of Tamaulipas and Veracruz.¹² As the Zetas were dispersed, two groups emerged from them, La Vieja Escuela and the Cartel del Noreste. They still command illegal trade in Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, Veracruz, Oaxaca, Tabasco, Campeche and Quintana Roo.

La Familia Michoacana

This group emerged in the 1980s and was initially moved by religious principles. At the beginning, they worked for the Zetas but broke with them, became enemies and from 2006 to 2010 went to war with one another. They have spent money to finance social projects to gain the sympathy of the population. In 2010, they announced their will to give up their weapons and quit their violent crimes. One of its main leaders, Nazario Moreno González, was allegedly killed but his body was never found. Years later, he showed up and was shot in a fire fight with the police forces in 2014. While facing a downturn, Nazario Moreno created in 2011 a surrogate organisation and gave it the name of “Los Caballeros Templarios”. This new group was initially commanded by

¹¹ Gustavo Castillo García, ‘Mexicanos, los asesinados en San Fernando Tamaulipas’, *La Jornada*, 13 October 2011.

¹² Congressional Research Service, ‘Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations’.

José de Jesús Méndez Vargas, “El Chango”. The members of this group have received military training and made money out of extortion, abduction, as well as drug trafficking which includes cocaine, heroin, marihuana and methamphetamines. Los Caballeros Templarios lay their vision and mission in Christianity and social justice. Their main purpose is allegedly to protect the people of Michoacán from the Zetas but operate also in other states like Guerrero, the State of Mexico and Mexico City. They are also known for extorting avocado entrepreneurs, lime producers and miners among others. They have settled down in several municipalities of Michoacán like Apatzingán, Abarrotes la Ruana, Tepalcatepec, and also the port of Lázaro Cárdenas from which they have already exported iron to China.¹³

El Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG)

Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, known as “El Mencho” is the leader of this group. The CJNG is considered the most powerful syndicate in Mexico and Latin America. According to *The Economist*, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes was brought to justice in 1992 in San Francisco, California for selling heroin and spent three years in jail in Texas. He was deported to Mexico and joined the police forces in Jalisco. Later on, he created the Cartel del Milenio.¹⁴ From the disintegration of this Cartel emerged the CJNG working together with a group named “Los Cunis”, leaded by his brother-in-law Abigael González Valencia, who was captured in February 2015. The CJNG was detected by the Mexican Government in 2011, when they presented themselves in a public video as “Matazetas” (Zetaskillers). They tried to gain the sympathy among the population pretending to be marshals who could protect them from the dangerous menace posed by the Zetas. At the beginning, the CJNG established its headquarters in Jalisco, Nayarit and Colima, but has been expanding ever since to 24 federal states like Michoacán, Guanajuato, Veracruz, Guerrero, Morelos, San Luis Potosí, State of Mexico and from 2014 on, Mexico City. In 2016, the CJNG was already in Aguascalientes, Baja California, Oaxaca and Chiapas. It also took control of the Guadalajara–Manzanillo–Lázaro Cárdenas route to ease the export of methamphetamines and the import of chemical precursors from China.

Cartel Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)

On Sunday, 2 August 2020, the Mexican police arrested the leader of the Cartel Santa Rosa de Lima, José Antonio Yépez Ortiz, dubbed as “El Marro”. José Antonio Yépez belonged to “Los Zetas”. In 2008, he was captured by the authorities and accused of robbery in the road network. In 2014, he joined the CSRL whose boss by that time was David Roel Figueroa, “El R”. David Roel commanded a group of thugs specialised

¹³ La Jornada, ‘Controlan *Caballeros templarios* exportación de mineral de hierro’, 03 January 2014.

¹⁴ The Economist, ‘How will Mexico’s president handle “El Mencho”, a kingpin on the rise?’, 15 August 2020.

in oil theft.¹⁵ By 2017, José Antonio Yépez takes the leadership of the CSRL; he does not only keep stealing gasoline from pipelines, but extended the business to further illegal activities, e.g. drug trafficking, kidnapping and extortion. In that year, the CSRL declares war to CJNG in order to expel it from Guanajuato and put it out of the way from the oil theft business. The main fire encounters have been taking place in León, Irapuato, Celaya, Apaseo el Grande and Apaseo el Alto. There is an underground pipeline transporting fuel to different facilities of PEMEX in the region, all connected to the Salamanca Refinery in Guanajuato.

The CSRL took its name from a place called Santa Rosa de Lima, which belongs to Villagrán where most of the members of this group – aged between 20 and 35 – were born, including relatives of José Antonio Yépez himself. The CSRL group controls illegal trade in Celaya, Salamanca, Santa Cruz, Juventino Rosas, Valle de Santiago and Villagrán.¹⁶ Pundits do not classify the CSRL as a Cartel itself, but as a criminal group which makes most of its profit out of oil theft. The CSRL has established a wide net of corruption with local authorities. The CSRL has its followers among the natives who do not hesitate to confront the Federal Police and Army when they penetrate the region to chase the leaders of the CSRL. By any intention of the authorities to step in or detain any of the members of the CSRL, they resort to roadblocks and fires, as well as throwing Molotov cocktails to patrols and other official vehicles. The CSRL has threatened Salamanca's Refinery with bombs several times.¹⁷ The Army has already spotted a warehouse called "El Hoyo" located in a small town known as San Salvador Torrecillas, where the CSRL hoards large deposits of stolen fuel, lorries and truckloads.

Guanajuato: The most violent entity in 2019

The organised crime has been expanding along the Mexican territory as a whole. Nevertheless, violence in Guanajuato can be explained by the evolution of three powerful criminal groups coming from the neighbouring states. First of all, the Zetas came from the state of Veracruz and trained the members of CSRL in all illegal trades, but in particular oil theft. As mentioned before, "El Marro", the former leader of the CSRL, had been himself a member of Zetas. On the other side, the CJNG came from the neighbour state of Jalisco and "Los Caballeros Templarios" came from Michoacán. Once in Guanajuato, the clashes began with the local mobs which tried to defend their territory.

Figure 1 shows the number of homicides in the states of Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, Querétaro, Aguascalientes and Zacatecas from 1990 to 2018. We can see

¹⁵ Manuel Espino Bucio, '¿Cuándo y cómo surgió el Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima?', *El Universal*, 05 March 2019; BBC News Mundo, 'El Marro: quién es José Antonio Yépez y por qué su captura puede suponer el fin del cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima en México', 02 August 2020.

¹⁶ Espino Bucio, '¿Cuándo y cómo surgió el Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima?'.

¹⁷ On 19 September 2021, the owner of a restaurant in Salamanca was indeed killed by explosion of a bomb hidden in a package (El Financiero, 'Salamanca: esto es lo que sabemos de la explosión que dejó dos muertos', 20 September 2021).

that Guanajuato used to be a peaceful state along the 1990s and early 2000s, but from 2008 on, homicides started to increase and in 2016, the rate of growth became almost exponential. We correlated the monthly number of homicides from 1990 to 2019 in Guanajuato with those occurring in its neighbour entities depicted in Figure 1. By taking into consideration the value of beta (β_2) and the proportion of the variance explained by the model (R^2), we found positive correlations with all Guanajuato's neighbour states, but among the most important were: a) between Guanajuato and Jalisco: ($\beta_2 = 0.591$; $R^2 = 0.8188$) and b) Guanajuato and Michoacán: ($\beta_2 = 0.419$; $R^2 = 0.7186$).




Figure 1: Homicides in Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, Querétaro, Aguascalientes and Zacatecas

Source: Compiled by Gerardo Reyes based on Instituto Nacional de Geografía e Informática (INEGI), 'Defunciones por homicidios', s. a.

Juan Miguel Alcántara Soria found 11 criminal organisations operating in Guanajuato from 2015 to 2019.¹⁸ David Saucedo¹⁹ has detected several groups fighting to control geographical areas of Guanajuato depicted in Figure 2; the skull icons represent the hostilities detected by the media. The antagonistic groups are La Unión de León, El Grupo Sombra and Cáteles Unidos. Clashes between the CJNG and El Grupo Sombra have taken place in León; in Pénjamo fights have developed between the CJNG, CSRL, Grupos Sombra and Caballeros Templarios. The shootings have broadened along Irapuato and Salamanca. Saucedo points out that the CJNG has tried to take control over León and Pénjamo since 2013 by invading in the poorest communities, where they recruit new members from the existing gangs and bribe or terrorise the local authorities. Their

¹⁸ Juan Miguel Alcántara Soria, 'Camino de Guanajuato ¿desde y hasta cuándo violentos', *Milenio*, 16 October 2019.

¹⁹ David Saucedo, 'Guanajuato bajo asedio criminal: radiografía de la guerra', *Periodismo y Opinión Pública*, 16 October 2019.

mission is to expel Los Caballeros Templarios out of the zone. Saucedo rates the clashes between the CJNG and CSRL as the bloodiest and most important in Guanajuato. Fights between the two groups have also occurred in Valle de Santiago, Celaya, Acámbaro, Apaseo el Alto, Apaseo el Grande and San Miguel de Allende. The CJNG has already taken control of Guanajuato’s municipalities of Purísima del Rincón, San Francisco del Rincón, Manuel Doblado, Romita, León, Ocampo and San Felipe, all located in the border with Jalisco. Once there, the CJNG has spread along the most important industrial corridor of Guanajuato and heavy skirmishes have taken place in Irapuato, Salamanca and Celaya. On the other hand, the CSRL commands over the centre and the east of Guanajuato; its sphere of influence covers the municipalities of Villagrán, Juventino Rosas, Comonfort, Apaseo el Alto, Apaseo el Grande, San Miguel de Allende, San José Iturbide, Doctor Mora, San Luis de la Paz, Victoria and Tierra Blanca, most of them located in the border with Querétaro. There were 1,729 homicides registered from January to June 2020 attributable to the war between the CJNG and CSRL. In this context, *Proceso*, a well-known Mexican magazine, published that between 2016 and 2019 the oil theft amounted to 13.5 million litres of gasoline extracted directly from the underground pipelines belonging to PEMEX, the Mexican State Oil Company.²⁰




Figure 2: Fighting groups and strategic areas in Guanajuato

Source: Compiled by Gerardo Reyes based on Saucedo, ‘Guanajuato bajo asedio criminal’.

²⁰ Verónica Espinosa, ‘Huachicoleo en Guanajuato: roban 13.5 millones de litros de gasolina en tres años’, *Proceso*, 01 January 2019.

Homicides: correlation among the municipalities

Jorge Fernández asserts that there are three main pathways by which illegal products are moved from South to North by the criminal organisations: a) along the Gulf of Mexico; b) the Pacific shore; and c) through the centre of the Caribbean.²¹ The Caribbean route crosses the state of Guanajuato connecting several municipalities. If we track violence by correlating roads and municipalities based on the number of homicides, we could throw some light on the *modus operandi* of the criminal groups. To start with, 11,580 murders were reported from 2015 to 2019 in 18 municipalities located in the states of Jalisco, Guanajuato and Michoacán.²² From that tally, the share of the municipalities mentioned were distributed as follows: Guadalajara (13%) and León (13%); followed by Tlaquepaque (9%) and Irapuato (8%); the threesome: Tlajomulco de Zúñiga (7%), Morelia (7%) and Salamanca (7%). In a less dangerous level we found: Celaya (6%), Tonalá (5%) and Zamora (5%). The municipalities with the least share in this analysis were: Pénjamo (3%), Silao (3%), Salvatierra (3%), El Salto (3%), Acámbaro (2%), Sahuayo (2%), Lagos de Moreno (2%) and La Piedad (1%).




Figure 3: Guanajuato: homicides 2015–2019

Source: Compiled by Gerardo Reyes based on SESNSP, ‘Datos Abiertos de Incidencia Delictiva’.

²¹ Menéndez, ‘La nueva guerra’.

²² Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública (SESNSP), ‘Datos Abiertos de Incidencia Delictiva’, s. a.

Figure 3 shows that 70% of the homicides committed in Guanajuato from 2015 to 2019 took place on 10 municipalities out of which, three are accountable for 40% of the murders: León, Irapuato and Salamanca. Table 1 displays the number of homicides per 100,000 people. León ranks in the first place with 128 in 2015 with a downward trend. However, in the rest of the municipalities we noticed an upward tendency. Among the most noticeable are Apaseo el Grande which goes from 15 in 2015 to 124 in 2019, an increment of 825% or an annual average rate (Y-AVG) of 52.56%; Celaya jumped (+) 500% from 11 to 56 homicides per 100,000 people, or an equivalent of 38.47 Y-AVG; Valle de Santiago, from 17 to 77, +450%, 35.27 Y-AVG; Salvatierra, from 31 to 122, +400%, 31.52 Y-AVG and Salamanca, from 33 to 122, +360%, 29.88 Y-AVG. Those numbers suggest that violence soared from 2015 on and rebounded in 2017, the year in which the price increase in gasoline took place.

Table 1: Guanajuato: number of homicides per 100,000 people

| | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | Y-AVG |
|--------------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| León | 128 | 126 | 125 | 123 | 120 | -1.28 |
| Irapuato | 26 | 32 | 57 | 59 | 75 | 23.59 |
| Salamanca | 33 | 29 | 25 | 132 | 122 | 29.88 |
| Celaya | 11 | 13 | 16 | 55 | 56 | 38.47 |
| Pénjamo | 48 | 64 | 59 | 120 | 125 | 21.98 |
| Silao | 25 | 31 | 26 | 66 | 54 | 16.65 |
| Salvatierra | 31 | 30 | 39 | 128 | 122 | 31.52 |
| Acámbaro | 36 | 34 | 33 | 96 | 71 | 14.54 |
| V. Santiago | 17 | 28 | 18 | 53 | 77 | 35.27 |
| A. el Grande | 15 | 15 | 19 | 96 | 124 | 52.56 |

Source: Compiled by Gerardo Reyes based on SESNSP, ‘Datos Abiertos de Incidencia Delictiva’.

We correlated monthly homicides between Guanajuato’s top three municipalities and the neighbouring municipalities of Jalisco and Michoacán from 2015 to 2019. We also took into consideration the distance between the municipalities and the time it takes to drive from one another according to google maps.

In the first regression model the dependent variable was León and the independent variables were Tlaquepaque, Tlajomulco de Zúñiga, Tonalá, Zamora and El Salto.

$$\hat{y}_{Leon} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{SP_Tlaque} + \beta_2 x_{T_dZuniga} + \beta_3 x_{Tonalá} + \beta_4 x_{zamora} + \beta_5 x_{EL_Salto} \tag{1}$$

Table 2: Regression parameters

| Coefficients | Estimate | Std. Error | t value | Pr(> t) | Sig | Dist/Time |
|--|----------|------------|---------|----------|-----|----------------|
| (Intercept) | 1.6586 | 2.1572 | 0.769 | 0.44531 | | |
| SP_Tlaque | 0.4247 | 0.1389 | 3.058 | 0.00346 | ** | 238 km; 2:40 h |
| T_dZuniga | 0.4406 | 0.1509 | 2.921 | 0.00509 | ** | 242 km; 2:58 h |
| Tonala | 0.9052 | 0.2001 | 4.524 | 3.37e-05 | *** | 207 km; 2:22 h |
| Zamora | 0.4821 | 0.1493 | 3.230 | 0.00211 | ** | 169 km; 2:35 h |
| El_Salto | -0.7486 | 0.3238 | -2.312 | 0.02463 | * | 212 km; 2:35 h |
| Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 | | | | | | |
| Residual standard error: 6.119 on 54 degrees of freedom | | | | | | |
| Multiple R ² : 0.7192, Adjusted R ² : 0.6932 | | | | | | |
| F-statistic: 27.66 on 5 and 54 DF, p-value: 9.029e-14 | | | | | | |

Source: Compiled by Gerardo Reyes based on SESNSP, 'Datos Abiertos de Incidencia Delictiva'.

Table 2 displays the model’s results which proved to be significant based on p-values and the adjusted R² (almost 0.7). The highest correlation coefficient turned to be with Tonalá which is located 207 km away from León or 2:22 h drive. For every homicide committed in Tonalá (β_3), 0.9052 homicides occurred in Leon. Secondly, for every homicides taking place in Zamora (β_4), there were 0.4821 homicides in León. Zamora is 169 km away from León or 2:35 h drive. San Pedro de Tlaquepaque (β_1) and Tlajomulco de Zuñiga (β_2) have similar beta values as well as distance and driving time. We noticed an inverse relationship between the distance time and the beta value, thus, the smaller the distance time factor, the higher the value of beta. Tlajomulco de Zuñiga, Tonalá and Tlaquepaque – all of them belonging to Jalisco – are on the road network that conveys to León. On the other side, Zamora, which is located in Michoacán, has also a direct connection with León.

We proceeded analogously with Irapuato. In model 2, the dependent variable represents the homicides happening in Irapuato and the independent variables, those homicides occurring in Guadalajara and Tlaquepaque.

$$\hat{y}_{\text{Irapuato}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{\text{Guadala}} + \beta_2 x_{\text{SP_Tlaquepaque}} \tag{2}$$

Table 3: Regression parameters

| Coefficients | Estimate | Std. Error | t value | Pr(> t) | Sig | Dist/Time |
|--|----------|------------|---------|----------|-----|---------------|
| (Intercept) | -5.7663 | 2.2457 | -2.568 | 0.01288 | * | |
| Guadala | 0.4052 | 0.1263 | 3.209 | 0.00219 | ** | 245 km; 3:0 h |
| SP_Tlaque | 0.7122 | 0.1490 | 4.780 | 1.27e-05 | *** | 239 km; 2:5 h |
| Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 | | | | | | |
| Residual standard error: 7.225 on 57 degrees of freedom | | | | | | |
| Multiple R ² : 0.7023, Adjusted R ² : 0.6918 | | | | | | |
| F-statistic: 67.22 on 2 and 57 DF, p-value: 1.011e-15 | | | | | | |

Source: Compiled by Gerardo Reyes based on SESNSP, 'Datos Abiertos de Incidencia Delictiva'.

Table 3 displays the model’s parameters which proved to be significant based on p-values and an adjusted R² of 0.6918. The highest correlation based on a p-value turned to be with San Pedro de Tlaquepaque (β_2); for every homicide reported in this municipality, 0.7122 violent murders took place in Irapuato. Tlaquepaque belongs to Jalisco and it is 239 km away from Irapuato or almost 3 h drive. Secondly, Guadalajara had a significant correlation; it is 245 km away or 2:5 h drive. Again, we also noticed in this model an inverse relationship between distance time and the beta value. That matches with the fact that there is a direct road that connects Guadalajara – San Pedro de Tlaquepaque – Jalisco–Irapuato.

Finally, we run a correlation model with Salamanca representing the dependent variable and Guadalajara, Tonalá, Zamora and Lagos de Moreno as the independent variables.

$$\hat{y}_{Salamanca} = \beta_0 + \beta_1x_{Guadala} + \beta_2x_{Tonalá} + \beta_3x_{Zamora} + \beta_4x_{L_dMoreno} \tag{3}$$

Table 4: Regression parameters

| Coefficients | Estimate | Std. Error | t value | Pr(> t) | Sig | Dist/Time |
|--|----------|------------|---------|----------|-----|----------------|
| (Intercept) | -7.7327 | 2.2234 | -3.478 | 0.00101 | ** | |
| Guadala | 0.5122 | 0.0709 | 7.225 | 1.78e-09 | *** | 264 km; 3:14 h |
| Tonalá | 0.3259 | 0.1604 | 2.032 | 0.04712 | * | 252 km; 3:02 h |
| Zamora | 0.3712 | 0.1200 | 3.093 | 0.00313 | ** | 163 km; 2:03 h |
| L_dMoreno | 0.7296 | 0.2184 | 3.340 | 0.00152 | ** | 136 km; 1:4 h |
| Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 | | | | | | |
| Residual standard error: 4.924 on 54 degrees of freedom | | | | | | |
| Multiple R ² : 0.8024, Adjusted R ² : 0.7842 | | | | | | |
| F-statistic: 43.87 on 5 and 54 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-1 | | | | | | |

Source: Compiled by Gerardo Reyes based on SESNSP, ‘Datos Abiertos de Incidencia Delictiva’.

Table 4 displays the model’s parameters which proved to be significant based on p-values and adjusted R² of 0.7842. Guadalajara presented the most significant p-value and a beta of 0.5122; this municipality is located 264 km away from Salamanca or a 3:14 h drive. Lagos de Moreno had a p-value of 0.00152 and a beta of 0.7296. Lagos de Moreno is 136 km away from Salamanca or 1:40 h drive. Zamora had a beta of 0.3712 and a p-value of 0.00313. Zamora belongs to Michoacán and is 163 km away from Salamanca or 2:03 h drive. Tonalá presented the weakest correlation with a p-value of 0.04712. Tonalá is 252 km away from Salamanca or 3:02 h drive. Except for the case of Guadalajara, the inverse relationship between the value of beta and the distance time factor remained.

Conclusions

We can answer the guiding questions posed at the beginning as follows. Three criminal groups have arrived in Guanajuato to take control of oil theft: CJNG, the remainings of La Familia Michoacana or Los Caballeros Templarios and Los Zetas. A fourth group

flourishes in Guanajuato with close connections with Los Zetas: CSRL. There is evidence that this invasion started in 2010, but it became more intense from 2015 onwards. It seems that the rise of gasoline price in 2017 coincides with the spike of homicides that year. Oil theft turned into a high profitable business and unleashed a war among these criminal groups, all seeking to control that trade. The corridor Salamanca–Irapuato–Leon turned into a dangerous pathway. The hypothesis that binds the road network with violence becomes relevant. The regression model shed some light on a regional problem involving the neighbouring states of Jalisco and Michoacán as the main factors explaining the increase of violence in Guanajuato from 2015 onwards. The inverse relationship between the distance time factor and the value of beta in the regression clearly correlates the municipalities which present the highest levels of homicides, suggesting the existence of a common *modus operandi* of the criminal groups involved. Thus, federal roads have become a key mean of transportation of oil theft and further criminal trades, a fact that should be considered by the authorities in order to implement a peace strategy in Guanajuato.

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The Role of the Spanish Armed Forces in the Fight against the Covid-19 Pandemic

Veronika HORNYÁK¹ 

Similarly to other European countries, the Spanish Government decided to take extensive measures against the spread of the Covid-19 virus in the country with the announcement of special legal order, curfews and the deployment of the armed forces. The ‘Fuerzas Armadas Españolas’, the FAS, have had an active role in the fight against the pandemic ever since executing a wide variety of tasks on a daily basis, including disinfecting critical infrastructure, and supporting the detection and the monitoring of infected citizens. Besides summarising the role of the Spanish Armed Forces in the fight against Covid-19 in the first year of the pandemic, the present paper explores other aspects of the deployment, such as civil–military relations and the attitude of the society towards military personnel.

Keywords: Spain, Spanish Armed Forces, Covid-19 pandemic, Operation Balmis, Mission Baluarte

Introduction

The Covid-19 epidemic reached Europe in less than 60 days following the first distant news release in the beginning of 2020, which subsequently forced European nations to their knees in just a few short weeks. For officially unknown reasons, the two largest European countries in the Mediterranean region, Italy and Spain, were affected earlier and more severely by the virus than other EU countries, especially during the first wave. The Kingdom of Spain, which has had a long-standing historical military tradition, responded to the outbreak of Covid-19 in March 2020 with one of the strictest measures in the EU, including curfew and other restrictions. This should not be surprising, as the pandemic claimed approximately 50,000 casualties in the country alone during 2020, the initial year of the outbreak.² One possible reason for this high number of fatalities within EU nations was that, similarly to Italy, almost 20 per cent of the 47 million population of Spain was over the age of 65, which caused a much higher mortality rate following infection by the virus.³ In response to the epidemic, the government enacted a special legal order in the

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² Statista, ‘Número total de personas fallecidas a causa del coronavirus en España entre el 6 de marzo y el 4 de diciembre de 2020’, 2020.

³ The World Factbook, ‘Spain’, *United States Central Intelligence Agency*, 2020.

country. During the second wave of the Covid-19, compared to the first one and to the situation in other European countries, the pandemic did not claim a significant number of casualties in Spain. Nevertheless, the events of Spring 2020, the shocking emergency during the first wave has fundamentally determined the Spanish attitude towards the epidemic, as well as the role of the Spanish Armed Forces in fighting the pandemic.

The role and tasks of the armed forces were not specified in detail, rather held as a special legal order in the relevant Spanish statute,⁴ thus, the conditions and circumstances of a possible deployment were based on the decisions of the actual political leadership, the government. The latter occurred accordingly regarding the outbreak of the coronavirus epidemic. Following the announcement by the World Health Organization on 11 March 2020 classifying Covid-19 as a pandemic,⁵ the Spanish Administration, led by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, ordered the establishment of a special legal order within a few days. On 14 March 2020, a state of emergency was announced in a royal decree, which was followed immediately by the launch of *Operación Balmis*, or Operation Balmis.⁶ The Spanish Armed Forces⁷ (henceforth: FAS) domestic epidemic control operation was the largest military operation in the country's history to date during peacetime. All branches of the FAS participated in the operation, with the basic task of assisting in the fight against the epidemic, including military patrolling, protecting, securing, and disinfecting hospitals and other critical infrastructure.⁸

This study aims to summarise the role of the Spanish Armed Forces based on mixed method research, with a brief examination of the relevant legal instruments connected to the special legal order, as well as the role, tasks and functions of the armed forces in domestic crisis management regarding the pandemic. The paper introduces the circumstances of the deployment of the FAS in the fight against Covid-19 in 2020, with special focus on the Operation Balmis and Mission Baluarte. Besides the research on the relevant statutes and strategic documents of the Kingdom of Spain, other primer and secondary resources were used for the understanding of the topic, such as: government publications, statistics – including personnel and gender statistics – and communications particularly from the Spanish Ministry. Moreover, local and national press materials, as well as an outlook on social media supports the understanding of the civil–military aspects of the deployment of the Spanish Armed Forces in Operation Balmis and Mission Baluarte in the first year of the fight against Covid-19. The concluding chapter highlights several aspects of the changes that have taken place in connection with the use of the FAS members deployed in domestic measures involved in epidemiological control, with focusing on what conclusions can be drawn and directions of development can be forecasted as a consequence of the Operation Balmis and Mission Baluarte.

⁴ 'Ley Orgánica 4/1981, de 1 día de junio, de los estados de alarma, excepción y sitio'.

⁵ World Health Organization, 'WHO Director-General's opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19', 11 March 2020.

⁶ Ministerio de Defensa, 'Reportajes: En primera línea', 15 March 2020.

⁷ Fuerzas Armadas de España.

⁸ Ministerio de Defensa, 'Reportajes'.

The Spanish Armed Forces and the special legal order

The Spanish Armed Forces have centuries-old traditions, dating back to the 15th century, which would undoubtedly classify them as one of the European Union's top armies.⁹ Based on several indicators, such as defence budget, capabilities or the number of personnel, the Spanish Armed Forces ranked in the top 20 militaries in the world.¹⁰ This is still the case, despite the fact that Spain is one of only two of the NATO allies with Italy, which have had to reduce their defence budget percentage of their GDP share in recent years.¹¹ The task and purpose of the Spanish Armed Forces were set out in Article 8 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978, according to which the purpose of the FAS is to protect the 'territorial integrity and constitutional order' of the Kingdom of Spain.¹² The detailed conditions of its operation and deployment laid down in a number of organic laws, such as Act No. 9 of 2011¹³ on the rights and obligation of the members of the Spanish Armed Forces, and in other legal instruments, such as royal and/or government decrees, and decrees of the Ministry of Defence.¹⁴ An important example is the Royal Decree 416 of 2006 (11/04/2006) highlighting the organisation and the deployment of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Military Emergency Unit¹⁵ (henceforth: UME).¹⁶ In the Spanish legal system, in case of an emergency by simplifying and shortening the ordinary legislative and decision-making procedure, the current political leadership could promulgate a special legal order to respond quickly to threatening emergencies. The provisions for such cases are primarily determined by two pieces of legislation: the Spanish Constitution¹⁷ and the Organic Law 1981/4.¹⁸ The latter differentiates between three types of special legal order situations possibly used in case of national emergency situations: 'estado de alarma' – state of alarm,¹⁹ 'estado de sitio' – state of siege, and 'estado de excepción' – state of emergency.²⁰

Besides the relevant legal instruments, it is worth taking a brief look to a more political, strategic document, the Spanish National Security Strategy 2017, which was born under the previous administration led by Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, from the Popular Party²¹ of Spain.²² The document does not mention epidemiological situations and pandemics as a direct threat to Spanish national security, but as a challenge 'to

⁹ Ministerio de Defensa, 'Ejército de Tierra', 2021.

¹⁰ Global Firepower, '2021 Military Strength Ranking', 2021.

¹¹ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2020* (London: Routledge, 2021), 70.

¹² 'Constitución Española', 1978.

¹³ 'Ley Orgánica 9/2011, de 27 de julio, de derechos y deberes de los miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas'.

¹⁴ Ministerio de Defensa, 'Legislación', 2021.

¹⁵ Unidad Militar de Emergencias.

¹⁶ 'Real Decreto 416/2006, de 11 de abril, por el que se establece la organización y el despliegue de la Fuerza del Ejército de Tierra, de la Armada y del Ejército del Aire, así como de la Unidad Militar de Emergencias'.

¹⁷ 'Constitución Española', 1978.

¹⁸ 'Ley Orgánica 4/1981, de 1 día de junio, de los estados de alarma, excepción y sitio'.

¹⁹ Presidencia del Gobierno, 'Estado de Alarma', 2020.

²⁰ 'Ley Orgánica 4/1981, de 1 día de junio, de los estados de alarma, excepción y sitio'.

²¹ Partido Popular.

²² 'Spanish National Security Strategy', 2017.

be addressed' classified it to lower risk category.²³ The strategy emphasises that the epidemiological and public health challenges, especially as a country attracting millions of tourists, deserve increasing attention as well as 'developed preparedness response plans for health threats and challenges, both generic and specific, with a multi-sector approach to ensure proper coordination of all the administrations involved'.²⁴ However, in the event of an emergency due to a possible pandemic, the strategy does not mention explicitly the possibility of deploying the FAS, but with referring to 'border control', 'developed preparedness' and 'multi-sector approach', it envisaged the use of uniformed personnel in case of pandemics, not specifying whether it shall be police or military personnel. Accordingly, and to bridge the gap between strategy and operation, as well as directly responding to the epidemic situation, the Spanish National Defense Directive²⁵ was born in 2020 replacing the previous one from 2012. The Directive explicitly highlights the Covid-19 pandemic and describes the deployment of FAS as follows: 'The Armed Forces are developing its permanent missions while regularly assisting civilian authorities in facing threats, frequently unconventional ones. The efforts to collaborate and support civilian authorities shall be maximized in handling crisis and emergency situations.'²⁶ The quoted part is one of the points of the Spanish National Defense Directive, which was formulated directly reflecting the Covid-19 epidemic, integrating the lessons of Operation Balmis, and paying special attention to the civilian–military cooperation and capacity building in this area.²⁷

The Spanish Armed Forces²⁸ – also referred to as Defence Staff in English – operating within the abovementioned theoretical, political and legal framework, is led by the commander-in-chief, who is the head of state, the Spanish monarch, currently King Felipe VI. Whereas civilian control is exercised by the Minister in charge of the Ministry of Defence through the actual government. The Minister of Defence, currently Margarita Robles Fernández since 2018, is also responsible for civilian control of the Armed Forces.²⁹ The Chief of Defence Staff (CHOD)³⁰ of the Spanish Armed Forces – a position equivalent to a secretary of state in Spain – is Admiral General Teodoro E López Calderón, General of the Spanish Navy since January 2020.³¹ The peculiarity of the Spanish Armed Forces is that, in addition to the presence of the three classical branches, the Air Force, the Navy and the Army, the Royal Guards – originally known as the *Guardia Real* – and already mentioned Military Emergency Unit (UME), is considered a joint special unit of the armed forces.³² As for the available military personnel, according to official statistics published by the Ministry of Defence in 2019, the FAS numbered a total of 145,417 soldiers, of which

²³ Ibid. 10.

²⁴ Ibid. 74.

²⁵ Presidencia del Gobierno, 'Directiva de Defensa Nacional', 2020.

²⁶ Ibid. 5–6.

²⁷ Ibid. 6.

²⁸ Estado Mayor de la Defensa (EMAD).

²⁹ Ministerio de Defensa, 'Organigrama', 2020.

³⁰ Jefe del Estado de la Defensa (JEMAD).

³¹ Estado Mayor de la Defensa, 'Jefe de Estado Mayor de la Defensa', 2021.

³² Ministerio de Defensa, 'Unidad Militar de Emergencia', 2020.

120,102 were in active service.³³ Another specialty of the Spanish defence system is that the armed forces are supplemented by the so-called *Guardia Civil*, the Civil Guard, in which more than 80,000 personnel serve (together with the reserve personnel), and which operates in the military structure; however, it also performs law enforcement tasks.³⁴ The duality of the status and purpose of the *Guardia Civil* is given by the fact that the Ministry of Defence has control over its personnel only in case of foreign deployment, such as NATO or EU-led missions and operations, but in all other cases, the Ministry of the Interior is the governing body of the *Guardia Civil*.³⁵

The 20th anniversary of the adoption of the landmark United Nations Security Council resolution, UNSCR 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security³⁶ coincided with the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. On this note, it is worth briefly mentioning the role of women in security and in the armed forces in Spain, which is also highlighted in the afore-mentioned National Defence Directive.³⁷ The *women, peace and security* agenda, also known as the *WPS agenda*³⁸ is at the forefront of the Spanish Government's policy on security and defence, in the framework of inter-ministerial cooperation.³⁹ Spain is one of those few countries globally where the position of the minister of defence has been held repeatedly by women. However, regarding the gender statistics of the Spanish Armed Forces, there is room for further improvement, which was highlighted at political levels in the strategic document on WPS in Spain from 2019.⁴⁰ In case of the FAS, 6.2 per cent of the total personnel are women, a ratio which varies between 3–8 per cent per branch. According to the personnel statistics by the Spanish Ministry of Defence from 2019, the ratio of women is the lowest in the army branch, with only 3.1 per cent represented, whereas it is the highest in the *Guardia Civil* and the UME. Nevertheless, in the cases of the latter two, the percentage of women barely reach 8 per cent, which is below the European average.⁴¹

Operation Balmis and Mission Baluarte: Spain against Covid-19

The first wave of the Covid-19 epidemic reached Spain as early as the end of February 2020, making them one of the first European countries to face the virus, presumably due to the multiple connection points and mobility with Italy. In the light of the emergency in Italy, the Spanish Government led by Pedro Sánchez, announced the first restrictive measures in the beginning of March 2020, in parallel with the growing number of Covid-19 cases in the country. As a result, state of alarm was declared in the country, and on 15 March 2020, the largest peacetime operation within state borders of Spanish history, Operation Balmis

³³ Ministerio de Defensa, 'Estadística de Personal Militar de Carrera de las FAS', 2019, 19.

³⁴ Ibid. 9.

³⁵ Guardia Civil, 2021.

³⁶ 'United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security'.

³⁷ Presidencia del Gobierno, 'Directiva de Defensa Nacional', 2.

³⁸ 'United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security'.

³⁹ Gobierno de España, 'Mujeres, Paz y Seguridad: Por una agenda eficaz y sostenida', May 2019.

⁴⁰ Ibid. 36.

⁴¹ Ministerio de Defensa, 'Estadística de Personal Militar de Carrera de las FAS', 55.

was launched to organise and conduct the intervention of the Spanish Armed Forces against the spread of the virus.⁴² The operation was named after Francisco Javier Balmis, a military doctor leading an overseas humanitarian expedition at the beginning of the 19th century.⁴³ Operation Balmis lasted a total of 98 days, and ended on 20 June 2020, during which period the Spanish Armed Forces carried out more than 20,000 interventions, more than half of which involved the disinfection of infected areas, buildings.⁴⁴ Out of the total of 11,000 cases, 5,000 were performed in nursing homes and 3,500 in hospitals.⁴⁵ Through Operation Balmis, the FAS helped the fight against the virus in all the provinces of Spain, as well as in more than 2,300 locations nationwide.⁴⁶




Figure 1: Percentage of the branches/units of the Spanish Armed Forces who participated in Operation Balmis

Source: Compiled by the author based on Estado Mayor de la Defensa, 'Las Fuerzas Armadas cumplen dos meses de lucha contra la COVID-19', May 2020.

The largest percentage of troops deployed in Operation Balmis were from the Military Emergency Unit, the UME.⁴⁷ The primary task of this joint special force unit established in 2005, was to intervene and provide assistance in case of national crisis, to carry out disaster management tasks, specifically in the field of natural disasters, and in other cases

⁴² European Parliament, 'The role of armed forces in the fight against coronavirus', April 2020, 3.

⁴³ Villarejo, Esteban, 'Operación Balmis: honor a la expedición militar que salvó a miles de niños en América y Filipinas'. *ABC.es*, 17 March 2020.

⁴⁴ Infodefensa.com, 'Las cifras de la Operación Balmis: 20.000 intervenciones en 98 días de lucha', 27 June 2020.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Estado Mayor de la Defensa, 'Operation 'Balmis' deploys more than 2.500 troops in 172 cities to control COVID-19', 24 March 2020.

endangering the civilian population.⁴⁸ In parallel with the epidemiological statistics, the largest mobilisation of the Spanish Armed Forces took place in April 2020, when 5,000 soldiers served in Operation Balmis daily as part of the fight against the Covid-19.⁴⁹ According to information provided by the Spanish Ministry of Defence, 43 per cent of the military personnel deployed in Operation Balmis came from the UME, 36 per cent from the Army, 16 per cent from the Navy, and 5 per cent from the Air Force, which is illustrated in Figure 1.⁵⁰

Following the completion of Operation Balmis, and a calmer period at the end of the summer, a second wave of the Covid-19 epidemic reached Europe in Autumn 2020. After the post-quarantine opening in Spain, as was typical in other EU member states as well, the society's fear of the virus decreased during the summer, and at the same time, due to the frustration of several months of closure and curfews, compliance with contact rules became a resurging problem. As a result, the Spanish Administration once again announced restrictive measures, alongside another deployment of the armed forces against Covid-19 beginning on 11 September 2020, named Mission Baluarte.⁵¹ In addition, on 24 October 2020, one of the cases of the special legal order, state of alarm was re-ordered. This time, restrictive measures were put in place for a longer period of time, but with regulations less strict than those imposed in spring 2020.⁵² In the last week of October 2020, the government declared a state of alarm for 15 days, which was extended a few days later with the approval of the Spanish legislation, the Congress, for a period of six months, until 9 May 2021.⁵³ Under this form of the special legal order guaranteed by the Constitution, a night curfew was imposed, from 11 PM to 6 AM in all the provinces of the country, with the exception of the Canary Islands.⁵⁴

Compared to Operation Balmis, Mission Baluarte used much more limited capabilities and personnel, and was based primarily and almost exclusively on non-armed service. In this current situation, the military forces deployed during the Mission Baluarte, soldiers from the Military Emergency Unit, the Navy, the Army and the Air Force, were tasked with operating a communications centre in cooperation with the provincial governments that continuously monitored and detected the spread of the virus.⁵⁵ By 6 January 2021, a total of 750,000 Covid-19 tests had been carried out with the support of Mission Baluarte, with approximately 2,400 troops deployed.⁵⁶ Another important aspect to be highlighted regarding the ongoing deployment of the FAS was that in contrast with Operation Balmis, Mission Baluarte was based on the offer of the Spanish central government to the 17 autonomous provinces of the country to help control the virus regionally. 15 out of the

⁴⁸ Ministerio de Defensa, 'Unidad Militar de Emergencia'.

⁴⁹ Infodefensa.com, 'Las cifras de la Operación Balmis'.

⁵⁰ Estado Mayor de la Defensa, 'Las Fuerzas Armadas cumplen dos meses de lucha'.

⁵¹ Revista Española de Defensa, 'Misión Baluarte: una defensa contra el COVID-19', October 2020, 8.

⁵² El País, 'España, en alarma: el Gobierno busca que dure hasta mayo y decreta toque de queda', 25 October 2020.

⁵³ Presidencia del Gobierno, 'Estado de Alarma'.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Revista Española de Defensa, 'Misión Baluarte', 8.

⁵⁶ Ministerio de Defensa, 'Discurso de la Ministra de Defensa en la Pascua Militar', 06 January 2021, 3.

17 have accepted the military tracking units offered by Mission Baluarte of the Sanchez Government, the two who refused them were Catalonia and the Basque country. While the province of Andalucía has the largest number of soldiers deployed with the total number of 360 troops, Valencia has the lowest number with only 150 members of the Spanish Armed Forces serving through Mission Baluarte.⁵⁷ Moreover, in spite of the deployment of the armed forces against the virus taking place primarily within the framework of Mission Baluarte, currently, UME, as the primary military body for crisis management, continues to be involved in the fight against Covid-19 nationwide on a day-to-day basis in different areas, such as the disinfection of critical infrastructure.

However, it is worth examining the balance of the deployment of the armed forces of Spain against the Covid-19 epidemic from a different angle, as effectiveness and success it is not determined only or exclusively by the volume, or the statistics of the defence measures taken by the Spanish Government. As an example, the nearly 100-day-long domestic operation of Balmis, has shed light on several problems regarding the employment of the FAS, which were less in the crossfire of professional and political attention during peacetime. Uniformed personnel have faced not only the virus itself and its societal effects, but also factors causing hardship during the deployments and carrying out tasks. Domestic travel restrictions, frozen salaries, infrastructural and other deficiencies, as well as the lack of adequate protection of the personnel deployed were highlighted as problematic issues.⁵⁸ The latter was probably the more major obstacle and was tackled by raising awareness via letters of complaint to the Spanish ombudsman, as well as the Ministry of Defence.⁵⁹ The unexpectedness and severity of the epidemic thus tested not only the public health, social security and administration system, but also many aspects of homeland security and defence policy, including the command-and-control system and the rights of the military personnel.

Additionally, historic aspects of military tradition in Spain must be emphasised, which still has an enormous effect on Spanish politics, and security and defence. Spanish society, which in many cases still deliberately distance itself from the military tradition of colonisation and the Franco dictatorship (1936–1975), in the 21st century once again found itself facing the vision of uniformed soldiers on the streets of Spain. During the interventions of the armed forces in defence of Covid-19, the daily work and efforts of the FAS soldiers became not only visible, but tangible to the Spanish population. According to a non-commissioned officer of the Army serving in Mission Baluarte, in the vast majority of cases, citizens responded positively to the calls made by the military tracking unit members when they were in touch with the civilian population: ‘They receive us very well when we say that we are soldiers.’⁶⁰ The fight against the epidemic has thus given, and still has many long-term opportunities for Spain in terms of civil–military relations in general, and attitudes of society towards the Spanish Armed Forces. An additional example of the latter – in this case via technology and social media – was the phrase used

⁵⁷ Revista Española de Defensa, ‘Misión Baluarte’, 8.

⁵⁸ European Organisation of Military Associations and Trade Unions, ‘Armed forces and COVID-19’, 2020.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Revista Española de Defensa, ‘Misión Baluarte’, 8.

for the promotion of the fight against Covid-19 by the Ministry of Defence and the FAS in parallel with the start of Operation Balmis, ‘Este virus lo paramos unidos’ [We stop this virus in unity].⁶¹ For instance, on one of the most popular content-sharing social media application, Instagram, more than 220,000 images, photos or videos have been uploaded using this motto, connecting the deployed military personnel with the civilian citizens.⁶² This is just a small, yet illustrative example of the points of connection between modern technology, society and the military, which have had an impact on Spanish civil–military relations in the immediate aftermath of the deployment of the FAS against the virus.

Conclusions and perspectives

The military aspects of controlling the Covid-19 pandemic in Spain were defined by Operation Balmis and Mission Baluarte in the year of the outbreak in 2020. While the first can be apostrophised as a shorter but unprecedented domestic military operation in Spanish history in peacetime, the mandate of Mission Baluarte was much narrower, both in terms of personnel and geographical coverage. Therefore, the virus was initially tackled by the Spanish Armed Forces through a relatively shorter, but intensive, nationwide military operation with high volume mobilisation. This was followed by a tracking and monitoring mission implemented by military tracking units regionally in Spain, which were planned for a longer and more permanent nature. However, as the world is currently facing the newest variants and returning waves of Covid-19, the role of armed forces in national crisis management in parallel with the continuous mobility and visibility of military personnel in Spain seems to be becoming more and more ordinary. In the first weeks of 2021, in preparation for the third wave of the epidemic, the Spanish leadership and provincial governments decided to tighten the general rules announced until May.⁶³ The extension of the curfew, the tightening of mask-wearing rules, and restrictions on the opening hours of restaurants all suggested that the Spanish Government was slowly re-prioritising the expansion of restrictions and ongoing preparedness one year after the outbreak. The latter may lead to changes in the role of the armed forces in the fight against the virus in 2021, as well as impacting further the civilian–military relations, development of the organisation and logistics of the armed forces, stemming from the lessons learned through primary Operation Balmis during the first wave of Covid-19.

Finally, it is worth identifying some important factors that might be of outmost importance in addition to statistical and other figures regarding the role of the FAS in controlling the virus. The deployment of troops in a special legal order in peacetime, in particular Operation Balmis, highlighted the shortcomings of infrastructure, logistics and the organisational system of the Spanish Armed Forces. In addition, other crucial elements ascended to the forefront of attention: civil–military relations, the visibility

⁶¹ Revista Española de Defensa, ‘Operación Balmis – Mision: Salvar Vidas’, May 2020.

⁶² Instagram, ‘#estevirusloparamosunidos’, 2021.

⁶³ El País, ‘Toques de queda adelantados, reducción de horarios, cierres: las comunidades endurecen medidas ante el coronavirus’, 15 January 2021.

of the military, and the societal attitudes toward the soldiers and the armed forces. The pandemic caused the FAS to become more visible, with the soldiers and their work more tangible to the citizens of a country where, due to the Franco dictatorship, many still saw the military and the uniform, as a symbol of a repressive power.⁶⁴ As a lieutenant of the Spanish air force deployed during the fight against the pandemic summarised: ‘We were allowed to get closer to the society, to make ourselves visible.’⁶⁵ The deployment of the Spanish Armed Forces in the fight against the epidemic could therefore benefit several aspects of the military, such as the social recognition and acceptance of the military profession, as well as the general public’s opinion of the armed forces in the long term. Consequently, the abovementioned aspects arising from the deployment of the armed forces against the virus in Spain could help to promote a broader recognition of Spanish uniformed personnel. On the other hand, military mobility, and deployment for controlling the virus could be significant for identifying the filling of the gaps, and deficiencies which the Spanish Armed Forces face. Accordingly, force development could be the other key issue benefited by the experiences and lessons learned during 2020 regarding which some tangible outputs have been identified. The Royal Decree issued in May 2020, based on the Spanish National Security Strategy 2017 and the 2020 National Defence Directive, sought to modernise, and update the structure of the armed forces, the objectives, and priorities for their deployment, through the experience gained by the deployment of the armed forces against the Covid-19 pandemic.

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⁶⁴ Rafael C Martínez Martínez, ‘Las fuerzas armadas en España: ¿último bastión del franquismo?’, *Revista Prolegómenos – Derechos y Valores* 14, no 28 (2011), 103–120.

⁶⁵ Fernando Cancio, ‘Militares contra el coronavirus: “Al servicio de los españoles”’, *La Razón*, 11 October 2020.

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Possible Applications of High Altitude Platform Systems for the Security of South America and South Europe¹

Attila HORVÁTH² 

High Altitude Platform Systems (HAPS)³, or pseudo satellites, are atmospheric, specifically, stratospheric Remotely Piloted Aerial Systems (RPAS).⁴ These systems can provide services comparable to outer space satellite systems, however, they can be operated without the need of an orbital launch capability. While their geographical coverage is limited compared to space satellites, they can provide persistent coverage over a given area for a long time, weeks or even months. Pseudo satellites can carry Earth observation or radiocommunication payloads, just like satellites.

In this article I will provide an overview of HAPS capabilities and potential applications, based on an imaginary operational scenario, namely, the reconnaissance support of a law enforcement operation to defend offshore gas facilities from a planned attack by an eco-terrorist group near Venezuela. At the same time, HAPS can support any defence, emergency response or natural resource observation operation.

The complex air–sea operation scenario will be presented using a simulation generated with the AGI Systems ToolKit multi-domain mission simulator software. My article contains maps and pictures of the operation, and the videos will be presented via the <https://horvath.space> website.

Keywords: HAPS, pseudo satellite, stratospheric UAS, High Altitude Platform System, Systems ToolKit

Introduction

Information has long been the decisive factor behind most human activities, military, law enforcement, and other security and defence related actions notwithstanding.

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³ Several sources use the expression High Altitude Platform Station. I prefer, and I am going to use System, since in my opinion, it is not right to separate the aerial vehicle from the whole operational architecture.

⁴ ‘Introduction to Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS)’, *Skybrary*, s. a.

According to Sun Tzū, “what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge”.⁵ This foreknowledge, information, needs to be collected, transmitted, analysed, and the products and orders disseminated.

Space satellites are widely used for these actions to support operations vital for state functions. But they are not the only one, especially when their drawbacks are also considered.

In this article I will present another tool, usually called High Altitude Platform Systems, which are atmospheric aircraft, but can provide services comparable to space satellites,⁶ and since in some respects they can even be considered superior to them,⁷ but at the same time they need the services of space satellites to operate effectively, they are two important assets to be used in an integrated way, to enhance the operational values of each of them synergistically.

The purpose of this article is to provide a comparative analysis by reviewing the potential services provided by pseudo satellites and contrasting them with the services nowadays provided by, on the one hand, remotely piloted aircraft powered by air-breathing engines, and on the other hand, outer space satellites.

The scenario

Disclaimer: this scenario is a work of fiction. It is used to give context for the mission analysis and the description of High Altitude Platform Systems and their capabilities.

Law enforcement services of Venezuela intercepted an encrypted text message sent from a suspected operations coordinator of the environmental terrorist organisation “El Fuego Verde”. This organisation has committed numerous attacks against chemical, petrochemical and nuclear facilities, causing severe damage, loss of property and life.

The encryption was partially broken, and part of the message recovered: “[...] Dragon field [...] pipeline [...] explosion.” Analysts of law enforcement services came to the conclusion that the plan of the terrorist organisation was to blow up the Dragon gas field facilities and/or the pipeline connecting Dragon to Hibiscus field facilities, offshore Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago.

Political decision has been made that deterring the terrorists from the attack is not enough: they need to be caught in the act, captured and taken before the court of law. Therefore, no sign of prior preparation by law enforcement must be detected by the terrorists, still, constant surveillance of the threat area is necessary. No time window for the attack could be determined.

⁵ Quoted from the translation by Lionel Giles, MA, Sun Tzū, *The Art of War* (trans. by Lionel Giles, MA, 1910).

⁶ Anggoro K Widiawan and Rahim Tafazolli, ‘High Altitude Platform Station (HAPS): A Review of New Infrastructure Development for Future Wireless Communications’, *Wireless Personal Communications* 42 (2007), 387–404.

⁷ Gunes Karabulut Kurt et al., ‘A Vision and Framework for the High Altitude Platform Station (HAPS) Networks of the Future’, *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials* 23, no 2 (2021).

To interdict the terrorists, law enforcement services asked for the assistance of the Bolivarian Navy of Venezuela. The Commandante General of the Bolivarian Navy designated the patrol vessel GC-21 Guacamacuto for the operation.




Figure 1: Infographic of the GC-21 Guaicamacuto class offshore patrol vessel⁸

Source: navalanalyses.com.

For the persistent surveillance, an unmanned stratospheric surveillance platform, conducting environmental survey with multispectral day/night electro-optical imaging payload in the Orinoco Delta, was re-tasked to fly toward the threat area.

⁸ The picture is a composite of the GC-21 and GC-23 Naiguatá; this ship sunk in 2020 after the collision with or ramming of RCGS Resolute during a controversial maritime interdiction operation.




Figure 2: Overview of the patrol area

Note: The HAPS entered from the south, over Trinidad Island, turned portside and started a counterclockwise patrol pattern, finally leaving the area to the east. The route of the HAPS is shown in white. The simulated sensor footprints are shown by the coloured ellipses.

Source: Systems ToolKit simulation by the author.

A patrol pattern was uploaded to the HAPS from the operations centre via satellite, and the aircraft started the continuous scanning of the surface. When an unidentified speedboat, not broadcasting AIS signals, was detected, the GC-21 was alerted. The patrol vessel moved from its hiding area behind Península de Paria, and steamed out to intercept the boat.




Figure 3: 3-dimensional overview of the operation

Note: Looking from the northwest (Trinidad Island is in the left upper corner). The HAPS uses two sensor footprints (either two separate sensors, or one sensor trained alternately towards the two targets) to observe the terrorist boat (magenta) and the GC-21 (yellow).

Source: Systems ToolKit simulation by the author.

Closing fast, onboard sensors and lookouts detected that one person on the boat lifted an RPG-7 style anti-armour grenade launcher onto his shoulder. The commander of the patrol vessel identified this as an immediate threat, and the GC-21 opened fire with her 76mm cannon. The terrorist boat was destroyed. GC-21 remained on site to search for survivors, bodies or evidence, but none were found. Guaicamacuto left the scene.




Figure 4: Overhead view of the final engagement

Note: The thin yellow line shows the line of sight/fire from the GC-21 to the terrorist boat. We can see that the rear gun mount (35mm autocannon) was behind the superstructure and could not engage the boat, necessitating the use of the 76mm speedfire cannon, even if it was oversized for the target.

Source: Systems ToolKit simulation by the author.

The scenario described above is a work of fiction, but it is certainly representative of the capabilities of HAPS, or pseudo satellites. These are RPAS, flying in the stratosphere, above 20 km altitude. From here, these aircraft can provide services that are comparable to services of outer space satellites. However, several differences can be found in these services, and even more in the operation of the HAPS, compared not only to satellites, but also to conventional atmospheric aircraft. In my doctoral research, supported by the Co-operative Doctoral Program, I examine these differences and develop applications and procedures for pseudo satellites to operate in an integrated mission support architecture, combined with space satellites.

Introduction to pseudo satellites

Pseudo satellites are being developed nowadays, and they are a technology for tomorrow. Developments in aero-structural engineering, material science, solar power and battery technology enables their realisation, after decades of theoretical studies.

High Altitude Platform Stations are aerostatic or aerodynamic atmospheric aircraft,⁹ typically operating between 20 and 30 km altitude.¹⁰ Here the atmosphere is relatively calm, compared to the lower-lying troposphere and the jet stream region. This enables effective operation, once the pseudo satellite ascends to operational altitude.



Figure 5: An Airbus Zephyr is being prepared for flight

Source: Airbus.

It must be emphasised that even if these systems are sometimes called pseudo satellites, they are not outer space satellites, and the legal framework they operate under is not governed by the Outer Space Treaty.¹¹ Therefore, the expression often used for these systems and the part of the atmosphere they operate, near space¹² is seriously misleading and should be avoided. To point out graphically the discrepancy of this expression, an Airbus Zephyr HAPS has a “typical operational altitude”,¹³ 74,000 feet maximum (22,555 metres), while a MiG-25, an undisputed aerodynamic atmospheric aircraft, in high altitude interceptor

⁹ Abbas Mohammed et al., ‘The Role of High-Altitude Platforms (HAPs) in the Global Wireless Connectivity’, *Proceedings of the IEEE* 99, no 11 (2011).

¹⁰ Enis A A Shatri, *High Altitude Platforms: Opportunities and Legal Challenges* (LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2019).

¹¹ ‘Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies’.

¹² Leonard David, ‘Sky Trek To The ‘Near Space’ Neighborhood’, *Space.com*, 09 November 2005.

¹³ ATSB Transport Safety Report, ‘In-flight break-up involving Airbus Zephyr unmanned aerial vehicle’, 28 September 2020.

configuration had a service ceiling of 23–24 km.¹⁴ Therefore, an atmospheric craft could be looking down on a “near space” craft?

Returning to HAPS, they can be physically realised in three distinct ways,¹⁵ and this can be used as a basis for categorisation. For all three we can find existing or planned products, and historical examples of development.¹⁶

The first category is the heavier-than-air aircraft, flying with aerodynamic lift, generated by wings and electrically-powered engines, and those engines provide power for manoeuvring also. The wings are covered with solar panels, and batteries store electricity for the flight during the night. The length of a flight is constrained by the maintenance requirements of the motors and the degradation rate of the batteries.

A prime example of this category is the aforementioned Airbus Zephyr.

The second category is the lighter-than-air airship, either soft (blimp) or semi-rigid, that flies with aerostatic lift, but carries electric motors that drive propellers for horizontal plane manoeuvring. Vertical manoeuvring is done by adjusting the buoyancy of the vehicle. Here the solar panels cover the upper part of the airship body. The body is filled with a lifting gas, typically helium, which is a non-renewable resource, expensive and diffuses through the body material even faster than hydrogen, but it is much safer. With these vehicles, the length of a flight is also constrained by the escape rate of the gas.



Figure 6: Artist's impression of a Stratobus airship in operation

Source: Thales Alenia Space.

¹⁴ 'Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-25 Foxbat', s. a.

¹⁵ Alejandro Aragón-Zavala et al., *High-Altitude Platforms for Wireless Communications* (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2008).

¹⁶ J Gavan et al., 'Concepts and Main Applications of High Altitude Platform Radio Relays', *The Radio Science Bulletin* no 330 (2009).

The third category is also lighter-than-air, the balloon design. Balloons also fly by aerostatic lift generated by a lifting gas, helium. Vertical manoeuvring is provided by buoyancy adjustment (it should be noted that compared to helium, even air can be used as adjustable ballast weight, so buoyancy control can be done by inflating or deflating an additional air balloon). Since the balloon carries no engines, horizontal plane manoeuvring is provided by carefully adjusting the altitude of the vehicle, and riding the wind that blows in different directions in different altitudes.¹⁷ Solar electric power is used to supply the payload and the vehicle systems that are very limited compared to the first or second category, since the electric motors are the most significant power consumers.

Station keeping by a balloon cannot be as exact as by motor-driven aircraft, but it is practically accurate enough for effective operations. However, balloons typically do not land at the end of their mission, unlike airships of fixed-wing airplanes that are recoverable. Balloons usually release the lifting gas at the end of their flight and fall to destruction, however, experiments are ongoing to recover them.



Figure 7: Launch of a Raven Industries Aerostar balloon carrying an experimental payload

Source: Raven Industries.

All high altitude platform systems need to ascend above controlled airspace (typically the upper limit of controlled airspace is at flight level 600–660, that is, 60–66,000 feet above mean sea level¹⁸) as fast as practicable, to avoid general air traffic. For this, a specially

¹⁷ Salvatore Candido, 'Drifting Efficiently Through the Stratosphere Using Deep Reinforcement Learning', 02 December 2020.

¹⁸ FAA, 'Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge, Chapter 15: Airspace'.

designed airspace needs to be coordinated with the air traffic management service provider or the responsible state authority.

Table 1: Comparison of pseudo satellite technologies

| | Fixed wing aircraft | Airship | Balloon |
|------------------------|--|-------------------------|----------------------|
| Type of lift | Aerodynamic | Aerostatic | Aerostatic |
| Source of lift | Motor-driven propellers, airflow over wing profile | Helium lifting gas | Helium lifting gas |
| Freedom of manoeuvring | Unlimited | Unlimited | Limited |
| Source of manoeuvring | Motor-driven propellers, control surfaces | Motor-driven propellers | Wind drift direction |
| Practical useful load | Few kilograms | Few hundred kilograms | Few dozen kilograms |

Source: Compiled by the author.

However, if the mission area is relatively far from the launch site, the HAPS can stay in the jet stream to get “blown” towards its destination, saving time and energy. In this case, since the jet stream is in controlled airspace, the appropriate flight planning needs to be done.

After reaching the mission area, the HAPS can start station keeping manoeuvres, that is, circling a predefined point, taking the high altitude winds into account; or it can fly on a preplanned patrol pattern (usually an elongated oval shape called racetrack pattern, but the actual patrol route can be different, just as we have seen in the scenario); or it can fly on a route. Daytime the solar panels charge the batteries, and in the case of lighter-than-air vehicles, heat the lifting gas. This energy abundance enables the HAPS to gain altitude, that is, convert the solar energy to potential energy. At night the vehicles descend, that is, they use their potential energy to save on lift (electrical power to drive the motors or lifting gas pressure).¹⁹ In the example scenario this day–night altitude variation was omitted.

Because of this day–night energy imbalance, we can identify a geographical limitation of HAPS operations: when and where the daytime solar irradiation is insufficient to generate enough energy storage to survive the night, the HAPS cannot operate. For every vehicle and even every flight (because of different payload mass), there is a geographical latitude boundary, limiting the distance from the Equator where the mission is possible.²⁰ Relatively close to the Equator, year-round operation is possible, but farther north or south, winter operations might not be viable.

A HAPS flight can last for months, so it is likely that the vehicle needs to be retasked during this time. While the pseudo satellites fly by their onboard autopilots, constant human control is exercised via line-of-sight radio or satellite communications links. The payload data is also downlinked via these connections. At the end of the flight, the HAPS is directed to a suitable landing site for recovery, or in the case of balloons, to a coordinated disposal area.

¹⁹ Mou Sun et al., ‘Flight Strategy Optimization for High-Altitude Solar-Powered Aircraft Based on Gravity Energy Reserving and Mission Altitude’, *MDPI Applied Sciences* 10, no 7 (2020), 2243.

²⁰ Lewis Page, ‘Airbus Zephyr: The eternal high-altitude surveillance sun-drone’, 18 February 2016.

Practical applications of High Altitude Platform Systems

The two system architectures used as a comparison to highlight the importance of pseudo satellite development are well known and established. They provide vital support for numerous human activities, including defence and security. Instead of discussing their technical parameters, these services are used as the basis of the investigation of pseudo satellite applicability.

It must be stated that it is impossible to select just one of these systems to solve all of our current mission support problems. The purpose of the comparative analysis is to highlight where pseudo satellites perform in a superior way, and what are the mission requirements that drive their applications. At the same time, the limitations of the pseudo satellites are also mentioned, again to support system designers and mission planners to build the best architectures for any given operational mission.

We have very limited practical experience operating pseudo satellites. But based on their capabilities, we can say that a typical HAPS lies in-between outer space satellites and the atmospheric high altitude long endurance (HALE) remotely piloted aircraft systems, such as the RQ-4 Global Hawk variants, the Bayraktar Akinci or the WZ-7 Soar Dragon.

The HALE aircraft can carry significantly heavier and more energy-intensive payloads and fly faster. Theoretically, they can operate globally, because after a transport or a ferry flight they can operate from a suitable base airfield, and they can be controlled via satellite links. Since they are powered by a gas turbine engine, they are independent of solar power, and the engine-driven generator can supply enough power to operate practically any payload, even active radar transmitters. Moreover, their day and night flight profile are similar.

At the same time, fuel capacity and engine maintenance limit their flight time to hours, days at most, while a pseudo satellite can fly for weeks or months. HALE RPAS fly lower, and this means they can cover less surface area. These combined means that more aircraft might be needed to execute a given mission, since more is needed to provide area coverage, and they need to be rotated more frequently. This also lowers the mission effectivity, as relatively more time is spent during transit to and from the mission area to the base airfield. More operators, maintainers need to be stationed at the base airfield, and this airfield needs to be located closer to the operational area, potentially increasing the vulnerability of personnel and equipment.

For example, a WZ-7 Soar Dragon can fly for 10 hours at 750 km/h.²¹ To reach a target area 1,500 km away, it needs two hours to fly to and from (practically a little more than that, because of the takeoff and landing manoeuvres), so it can spend somewhat less than 6 hours on station, so more than 4 sorties are necessary to provide constant coverage every 24 hours.

A Bayraktar Akinci can fly for 24 hours, but at half the speed and two-thirds of the altitude, compared to the Soar Dragon.²²

To illustrate these differences, the coverage of a HAPS flying at 20 km, a Soar Dragon flying at 18 km and a Bayraktar Akinci flying at 12 km has been simulated over the

²¹ Army Recognition, 'Chinese Soar Dragon HALE UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle used to spy US Navy USS Antietam', 04 August 2019.

²² 'Bayraktar AKINCI System', s. a.

northeastern Venezuelan coastal area near Trinidad Island. It must be noted that the HALE aircraft are displayed at their respective maximum nominal flight altitude, while the HAPS is set to its practical minimum.



Figure 8: Overhead visualisation of the coverage areas of a HAPS and two HALE RPAS

Source: Systems ToolKit simulation by the author.

To compare the pseudo satellites to outer space, Earth-orbiting satellites, we must first categorise the spacecraft. Based on the potential applications of HAPS, namely remote sensing and telecommunications, we should examine those spacecraft that provide comparable services. These are the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and the Geostationary/Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO or GSO) satellites.

LEO lies between the altitude where the aerobraking effect becomes practically negligible and the altitude of the lower end of the inner Van Allen belt, about 250–1,300 km. Satellites orbiting here rise above the horizon, ascend on an arc, then start to go down, and finally set beyond the horizon again.²³ They only spend minutes above the horizon, and, depending on the relative position of the target and the orbital plane, only a relatively short arc can be used for effective observation. At the same time, as the satellite moves on its orbit, it reaches different geographical areas (a polar-orbiting satellite can cover almost the whole globe sooner or later), but it spends only a short time at any given point.

As we have already seen, a HAPS conducting station keeping manoeuvre can spend days, weeks, even months at a predefined target or mission area, keeping it under observation constantly.²⁴ When the mission is this, the HAPS beats the space satellite. But a HAPS

²³ For a visual introduction to LEO satellites, the reader is advised to see the graphics at <https://horvath.space/svalbard/>

²⁴ Sanja Bauk et al., 'Review of Unmanned Aerial Systems for the Use as Maritime Surveillance Assets', *IEEE 2020 24th International Conference on Information Technology (IT)*, February 2020.

cannot move thousands of kilometres within minutes, cannot image geographically distant targets again and again.

Just like spacecraft, HAPS can carry remote sensing payloads.²⁵ However, on a typical pseudo satellite, active radars are unlikely to be operated, because the radar transmitter is a very power-intensive device. Visual (be it visible light or infrared) imagers and passive radio receivers (direction finders) can easily be carried, as they fit into the weight and power envelope of the platforms.

The HAPS can cooperate with a satellite-based Earth observation architecture. The space satellites provide early warning of predefined events globally, and when any such trigger event is detected, persistent pseudo satellite overwatch can be activated. After securing the necessary permits and licenses, the HAPS can be transported or can execute a ferry flight to the operational area under control provided via satellite communication. To facilitate effective sensor data download, a suitable ground station can be transported (by a commercial or military cargo aircraft) to the mission area to maintain line-of-sight communications, relieving the satellite communication channels of this burden. At the same time, remotely executed flight control activities can still be conducted via SATCOM, to keep the operators at their existing and optimised workstations, just like space satellites are operated.

If we compare HAPS and geostationary satellites, the service should be telecommunications. The geosynchronous orbit lies approximately 36,000 km above the Earth, where the orbital period of a satellite equals one rotation of the Earth around its axis.²⁶ If the orbit has zero inclination, that is, the orbital plane lies in the plane of the Equator, the satellite seems stationary for an observer on the Earth. The satellite always covers the same area, theoretically, 44% of the surface of the Earth. Extreme northern and southern areas close to the poles lie behind the Earth curvature, so no service can be provided there from a geostationary satellite. However, within the coverage area, the satellites provide high-quality, constant, persistent service.²⁷

These satellites, however, are huge (typically 3–5 metric tons), very expensive, and the manufacturing and launching capabilities are constrained to a few countries and commercial entities. The design lifetime of such a satellite is 12–15 years, and with careful operation, this can be extended by a few years (which, since the price of such a satellite is counted in hundred million Euros, is very desirable by the operators). This means that the designer has to plan forward 20–23 years into the future – or an operator needs to work with technology designed more than two decades earlier.

The distance between the satellite and the ground station communicating with it is approximately 40,000 km. Double that to reach another ground station via the satellite, and one can find that telecommunication protocols used in terrestrial systems are not designed to

²⁵ Sanja Bauk et al., 'Advantages and Disadvantages of Some Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Deployed in Maritime Surveillance', *Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Ciència i Enginyeria Nàutiques*, September 2020.

²⁶ Clarke, Arthur C, 'Extra-terrestrial relays', *Wireless World*, October 1945.

²⁷ For a visual introduction to the geosynchronous orbit, the reader is advised to visit <https://horvath.space/comconf-2019-material/>

handle such propagation delay, and even voice communication can be uncomfortable for the users because of the delay.

Pseudo satellites cannot cover such a huge area, but can provide focused service for a selected and pre-determined mission area. Interestingly, we see that even in space satellite communication technology, the coverage area is divided into several smaller “cells” or “sub-beams” to optimise the service for the user requirements (this technology is usually called HTS²⁸).

The big geographical coverage area of a telecommunication satellite, if not segmented into sub-beams by HTS, is a serious vulnerability (electronic warfare actions, either jamming or reception, is possible via an unauthorised station installed anywhere within the coverage area) and a waste of spectrum resources. The relatively focused service coverage of the HAPS inherently overcomes these disadvantages.

Moreover, the HAPS can be recovered and serviced between flights, so the transponder payload can be adapted to the mission and can always be state-of-the-art. This way the HAPS can always provide an ultimately mission-optimised service, which can constantly evolve with the advance of technology and user requirements.

The highest service value can be realised, again, by the cooperation of the two system architectures. The pseudo satellite provides service between the users within its coverage area, that is tailored to the operation supported. Only long-distance, out-of-area links need to be carried over satellites.

Potential applications of High Altitude Platform Systems to support security and defence operations relevant to South America and South Europe

Almost all South American countries (with the exception of the Plurinational State of Bolivia and the Republic of Paraguay) have sea coastlines. A sea coast comes with a maritime border to guard, an economical zone to oversee and administer, a maritime search and rescue area to be prepared to be deployed to. Moreover, Chile and Argentina also have significant Antarctic territories.

The same can be said about South European countries, within the Mediterranean area, but in the case of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic, a significant section of the Atlantic Ocean also comes under their responsibility, and for the French Republic, even the Indian Ocean is important in addition to the aforementioned areas.

Covering these areas with conventional maritime patrol aircraft is very personnel- and equipment-intensive. Most states operate legacy turboprop aircraft for this mission, only the Airbus C-295 MPA and a few modernised P-3 Orion versions can be considered up-to-date. The Embraer KC-390 could be a candidate platform for a maritime patrol aircraft, but as the developer country, Brazil, has already two MPA types in its inventory (and operates the cargo version of the C-295, on which the MPA is based), such a move is unlikely.

²⁸ Gonzalo de Dios, *High-Throughput Satellites Technology Trends* (Lima, Peru: ITU Regional Radiocommunication Seminar 2017 for the Americas [RRS-17-Americas], 2017).

The temporary nature of aircraft presence (or the necessity of an impractical number of aircraft to provide permanent presence) is a serious limitation of aerial support.²⁹ Comparing this limitation to the vast ocean and ground area to be covered, we see that when a mission requires persistent coverage and high resolution imagery or fast and adaptive telecommunication coverage, pseudo satellites are a logical choice, especially when operated jointly by the several countries.

Constant, persistent surveillance by Earth-orbiting satellites would require dozens of spacecraft, that would spend most of their lifetime above areas far away. While this can also be considered a valuable service, a HAPS is better optimised for such a task.

Piracy and smuggling, an important law enforcement problem in the Caribbean, more confined to coastal waters, needs even more focused attention and faster reaction, which is particularly fitting for a pseudo satellite operation.

Just like that, surveillance of the large and sparsely inhabited inland areas, like the Amazonas Basin, the Mato Grosso or Patagonia are important for conservation, law enforcement and emergency management reasons. HAPS can provide overwatch of these areas also, and when surface forces need to be deployed, the surveillance and telecommunication capabilities can be readily directed to support them.

The situation is practically the same in case of the Mediterranean, where the illegal transportation, smuggling of displaced persons is important to detect because of humanitarian and law enforcement reasons.

In the Indian Ocean, again, piracy needs the attention of maritime surveillance operators, and Réunion or Mayotte, French overseas departments, could be very good operational bases for pseudo satellites escorting ships transiting the Arabian Sea, the Mozambique Channel and the central Indian Ocean.

Conclusion

High Altitude Platform Systems, or pseudo satellites, are an emerging technology. And they can safely be called disruptive also. These remotely piloted aerial vehicles fly in the stratosphere, undisturbed by the weather influencing flight operations in the lower atmosphere, and are capable of covering a selected operational area for weeks or months on, unlike LEO space satellites that move away within minutes, and do not return (unless operated in greater numbers) for hours.

HAPS close the gap between aircraft and space operations, and can provide intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance or telecommunication support to military, border guard, inland or maritime law enforcement, emergency response operations, or any state or commercial activity typically supported nowadays by those two platforms.

In this article, based on an imaginary scenario, I introduced the technology behind these stratospheric stations, and compared the services provided by them to both lower atmospheric

²⁹ Michael Spencer, *Pseudosatellites Disrupting Air Power Impermanence* (Canberra: Air Power Development Centre, 2019).

aircraft and outer space satellites. We have seen that their services, be it remote sensing or telecommunication, can most effectively be utilised by operating them combined.

Finally, I have shown examples, relevant to the nations of South America and South Europe, how HAPS could be deployed to support their relevant defence and security activities.

The illustrations for this article were generated with the Analytical Graphics Systems ToolKit³⁰ software. This industry standard multidomain mission simulator is used, for example, by the NATO Space Center, and also the Hungarian Defence Forces Modernization Institute.

This article is based on my presentation at the South America, South Europe International Conference organised by the Doctorates' Council of the Ludovika – University of Public Service and the Department of International Security Studies of the Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training.

More visuals, including pictures and videos can be found at the website <https://horvath.space/haps-scenario>.

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³⁰ Systems ToolKit, online: www.agi.com/products/stk

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Cyber Autonomy Toolbox – Project Management Digital Transformation

Iryna LEROY¹ 

There was a time when military technology reinforced and provided added value and expertise to business and government organisations. There are a number of technologies, specific military applications and solutions such as the Internet, GPS or sunglasses, and methodologies like strategic planning and negotiation systems that were developed in the past within military domains and later evaluated and implemented, which brought increases in speed and added business value. There are now many diverse digital transformation projects being implemented in several business domains – ranging from small and medium businesses like an Italian family restaurant to the global oil and gas companies such as Shell or British Petroleum or even executive branches of the European Union/European Commission. All these organisations use different technologies to optimise processes, innovate faster, collaborate efficiently and deliver more value with less effort. Economic defence – like never before – means national security. For that reason, Cyber Security initiatives associated with digital transformations include a “testing mode” period, along with Cyber Autonomy functions that aim to support business critical infrastructures. Different methodologies are in place to optimise for the new data-driven economy and support digital transformation. It is the responsibility of the business to adopt best practices and techniques to reinforce national security and offer effective tool support for effective Cyber Autonomy with digital transformation projects.

Keywords: *project management, cyber autonomy, information security, reputation defence, reputation management, computer security, critical infrastructures, risk management process*

Introduction

The research is based on the principles of a systematic approach and objectivity. The purpose of this form of research is to provide better understanding of the research issues. This paper is divided into four stages, namely:

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- To answer the research questions, we firstly conducted a systematic literature review of the academic research on Cyber Autonomy. In order to progress with the literature review, a keyword search was done on the largest electronic databases of peer-reviewed literature: Scopus, Web of Science and EBSCO databases and citation databases for peer-reviewed literature, covering scientific journals. We decided to include in the research: official statements of the European Commission, Articles, Reviews and Book Chapters. We identify and describe the Model of Cyber Autonomy and its 7 essential elements.
- To choose different project management methods that can be used for Cyber Autonomy implementation. It includes methodologies, reviews and tools in each methodology and how they differ from each other in terms of structure, types, characteristics, features, target audience and goals.
- To define and describe project management tools that could be useful and suitable for Cyber Autonomy. It includes information regarding project tools and the organisation best suited to deploy the best tools and best practices.
- To define and outline the critical phases of project management and associated tools that could be deployed for Cyber Autonomy. This section presents an overview of best practices and some common steps, based on the type of the organisation and goals of the projects.

The target audience of the study has the following characteristics:

enterprises that belong to the critical infrastructure in the European Union; organisations that work for a large enterprise belonging to high-quality value chains operating in industrialised economies, belonging to the European institutions or related government agencies and having information security departments, engineering teams, research and development departments or belonging to European local member states institutions, having information security departments, engineering teams or research and development departments; Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the European Union.

In this paper we discuss about the following hypotheses:

- existing project management tools that can be used in Cyber Autonomy for digital transformation
- different phases of Cyber Autonomy for digital transformation require different project management tools that can be organised in the Cyber Autonomy Toolbox
- there is a specific set of tools that leads to Cyber Autonomy, which can be referred to as the Cyber Autonomy Toolbox

Literature review

Autonomy could help decentralised decision-making processes in hierarchical structures and at the same time provide tangible benefits to information security processes. The concept of Cyber Autonomy is considered from multiple viewpoints by many researchers who are working on the subject of cyber security and defence capabilities.

From a technical point of view some authors believe that the goal of Cyber Autonomy is achieved when any computing user – regardless of his/her technical background – is able to protect himself/herself against cyberattacks and attribute the attack sources. Since 2017, IT vendors have started moving towards ‘security automation’ (as evidenced by the recent rise in automation vendors at the RSA conferences in 2017 and 2018 – the world’s largest cyber security vendor trade show in San Francisco) – the first leap towards cyber autonomy. The holy grail for cyber autonomy is that we can deter attacks and patch vulnerable computing systems in real-time, at scale and without disrupting normal operations.² For example, Blasch, Erik & Raz in the article related to traffic management look at Cyber Autonomy as effective positioning in response to various cyberattacks.³ Lack of effective action in the area of cyberattack could increase vulnerability to cyberattacks.⁴ Surely, software systems, particularly those running critical infrastructure, emergency services, and 24/7 manufacturing, have very complex dependencies.⁵ Nevertheless, nowadays, the digital economy is no longer just about the tech sector and digital firms, it is increasingly digitising supply chains across all sectors of the global economy.⁶ New technologies give a new quality of technological infrastructure, but the same ones raise questions of the security of the different Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) areas. For example, as revealed by the EU’s policy documents, 5G technology, as well as its suppliers, represent considerable internal security risks and pose a threat to Europe’s technological sovereignty and autonomy.⁷

Cyber infrastructure now plays a significant role in the context of cyber autonomy and could potentially increase the degree of information and data protection as well as fill in the current gaps of the cyber and information security industry.⁸ Basically, autonomy is defined as the ability of an entity to structure its own action and environment independently and without unwanted influence from the outside. In Artificial Intelligence, autonomous agents are not dependent upon the goals of other entities.⁹ Agent autonomy means that agents have control over both their internal state and over their behaviour.¹⁰ The same could be applied also for Information Security and Cyberspace in the area of Cyber

² Ryan KL Ko, ‘Cyber Autonomy: Automating the hacker – self-healing, self-adaptive, automatic cyber defense systems and their impact to the industry, society and national security’, in *Emerging Technologies and International Security*, ed. by Reuben Steff, Joe Burton and Simona R Soare (Routledge, 2020), 12–14.

³ Erik Blasch et al., ‘Information Fusion as an Autonomy enabler for UAS Traffic Management’, *AIAA Science and Technology Forum and Exposition. AIAA SciTech Forum*, 04 January 2021, 1–12.

⁴ Victor Bolbot et al., ‘A novel cyber-risk assessment method for ship systems’, *Safety Science* 131 (2020).

⁵ Ryan K.L. Ko, ‘Cyber Autonomy’, 12–14.

⁶ T S Kuprevich, ‘Tsifrovyye platformy v mirovoy ekonomike: sovremennyye tendentsii i napravleniya razvitiya’, *Ekonomicheskii vestnik universiteta* (2018), 311–318.

⁷ Márton Varju, ‘5G Networks, (Cyber)Security Harmonisation and the Internal Market’, *European Law Review* 45, no 4 (2020), 471–486.

⁸ Bram Vonsée, Wina Crijns-Graus and Wen Liu, ‘Energy technology dependence – A value chain analysis of geothermal power in the EU’, *Energy* 178 (2019), 419–435.

⁹ Michael Luck and Mark d’Inverno, ‘Formal Framework for Agency and Autonomy’, *Proceedings of the First International Conference on Multiagent Systems – ICMAS*, 1995.

¹⁰ Bob van der Vecht, Frank Dignum, John-Jules Ch Meyer, Martijn Neef, ‘A Dynamic Coordination Mechanism Using Adjustable Autonomy’, in *International Workshop on Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Norms in Agent Systems III*, ed. by Jaime Simão Sichman, Julian Padget, Sascha Ossowski and Pablo Noriega (Springer, 2007), 83–96.

Autonomy. Therefore, new definitions of autonomy are useful when applied to production systems that include a variety of diverse participants and items: private firms, non-profits, governments, individuals, processes, as well as physical cyber devices, computers and servers, software and communication technologies.¹¹

In 2020, the authors of the book *Emerging Technologies and International Security* proposed four phases of maturity for full cyber autonomy. This book also reviews new and emerging cyber security automation techniques and tools, and discusses their impact on society, the perceived cyber security skills shortage and national security.¹² According to the authors, cyber autonomy can be supported by cyber security and used against cyberattack. The role of technology has shifted recently with the result that those who do not (or cannot) keep up experience significant disadvantages. Technology no longer supplements our real-life interactions. Rather, real life supplements our technological interactions in all areas of activities. Dependence on technology has dramatically increased due to Covid-19 in different business areas.¹³ Technology dependence has become bottlenecks in the European Union (EU) strategy and for European businesses. The dependence of the industry on external vendors can be seen as a major dependence bottleneck and a major stumbling block to the project towards the digital transformation of both the government and private organisations. It could jeopardise the future of information security for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and the adoption of technologies in the EU.¹⁴

Building Cyber Autonomy should include a project management phase to ensure that the system achieves the desired result. Information security forums and practices are at their peak with digital transformation of organisations all around the world. A project management approach for cyber security is more comprehensive and effective for implementation of these practices. Project managers can help in the following ways: streamline project execution, enable strategic alignment, optimise continuous resource allocation, resolve problems and effectively manage risks.¹⁵

An effective Cyber Autonomy Toolbox would help to reduce risks and attain data security and solid data strategy through effective and professional management. With a Cyber Autonomy Toolbox, insights can be provided into the choice between traditional planning methods and agile project management methods which could increase the speed of digital transformation implementation, if risks are clearly assessed, then planning complexity can be reduced.

¹¹ Norbert Gronau, 'Determinants of an Appropriate Degree of Autonomy in Cyber-physical Production Systems', *CIRP Journal of Manufacturing Science and Technology* 26 (2016), 70–80.

¹² Reuben Steff, Joe Burton and Simona R Soare, *Emerging Technologies and International Security* (Routledge, 2020), 174–189.

¹³ Jeffrey Allen, 'Increasing Dependence on Technology in the Law Practice in the Time of COVID', *American Journal of Family Law* 34, no 4 (2021), 160–164.

¹⁴ Katie Reveno, 'Technological dependency in a post-COVID-19 society', *Stanford Daily*, 19 November 2020.

¹⁵ Bhavyatta Bhardwaj, 'Project Management: Changing the way Cyber Security works in an organization', *PM World Journal* 8, no 9 (2019), 1–11.

The model of Cyber Autonomy and supportive process-based methods for effective project management during digital transformation

The matrix approach to the modelling of Cyber Autonomy allows us to determine the structural elements, and functional capabilities of this system. Cyber autonomy could be envisioned as a multi-layer defence system with several elements and functionalities in each layer for Information Security Strategy (ISS). Analysis of the increasing frequency of cyberattacks and threats leads to the need to supplement each structural element of cyber autonomy with new functions (clarify functions of these elements). Thus, without changing the existing structure of a company or organisation and management “traditions” that belong to it, it is possible to set up effective functionality in conditions of increased cyber danger and increased threats to enhance organisational resistance and reinforce ISS. In our opinion, the traditional structural model of the organisation from the point of view of Cyber Autonomy can be represented in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Model Elements: Seven elements of the Cyber Autonomy model

Source: Compiled by the author.

At the company or organisation, Cyber Autonomy aims the development of opportunities and rights to determine, prevent, defend and develop sovereignty, and the creation of the resilience of infrastructure to the atmosphere; such a system is stable. Based on the described model above, Cyber Autonomy includes the following elements:

1. Goal of Cyber Autonomy
2. Strategy of Cyber Autonomy
3. Implementation Methods
4. Technology

- 5. Organisation
- 6. Reputation defence
- 7. Result of Cyber Autonomy

With the purpose of ensuring Cyber Autonomy and the uninterrupted functioning of Cyber Autonomy, these structural elements should provide the following functions indicated. The Cyber Autonomy functions described below are aimed at supporting the Cyber Autonomy model with detailed descriptions of the functions that Cyber Autonomy elements perform. The seven structural elements of the Cyber Autonomy model are supported by seven main functions.¹⁶ Below are listed the seven main functions:

- 1. Create “Autonomy of IT infrastructure”
- 2. Ensure “Autonomy of suppliers”
- 3. Follow “Autonomy of directives, frameworks and guidelines”
- 4. Secure “Autonomy of professionals”
- 5. Increase “Autonomy of communication”
- 6. Develop “Autonomy of processes”
- 7. Protect “Autonomy of territory”




Figure 2: Supportive functions of Cyber Autonomy

Source: Compiled by the author.

¹⁶ Iryna Leroy, *Cyber autonomy for business: building a European cyber resilience. Views on the progress of CSDP* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021).

Following the extensive literature review we analysed different project management methods from the different angles such as the target audience (type of organisations), the structure of a method, types, characteristics, features, capability to handle IT and non IT projects for SMEs and government institutions, scalability and applicability for Cyber Autonomy digital transformation. After analysing in-depth, we estimate that four of them would match essential parameters for Cyber Autonomy.

Project management methods and tools in the context of Cyber Autonomy

Currently, none of the world’s top 15 digital companies is European. There is no significant European operating system, browser, social media network or search engine, meanwhile the investment gap compared to the USA and China is estimated at 190 million euro per year.¹⁷ There is a growing interest in Europe for the concepts of “digital sovereignty” and “strategic autonomy in cyberspace”.¹⁸ In our opinion, digital transformation projects of an organisation to ensure Cyber Autonomy should have some parameters that help improve processes in an organisation. There are no universal solutions in the creation of Cyber Autonomy and in the IT sector. We propose to choose a set of methods focused on ensuring Cyber Autonomy, which avoids the need to have more resources or spare time at each stage in case of any complications or increased risks. We cannot define one or other methodologies that are of the most frequently used methodology and involve all necessary parameters and elements for Cyber Autonomy which are suitable for both business organisations and government organisations. As Cyber Autonomy aims the development of opportunities and rights to determine, prevent, defend and develop sovereignty in an organisation, to mitigate threats and maintain resilient infrastructures – such a system must be stable. Therefore, it is important to choose combinations of tools from different project management methods of which one would be appropriate for these organisations.

Table 1: Tools of reputation management relative to cyberattacks

| Essential parameters for Cyber Autonomy | Agile Yes/No | Lean Six Sigma Yes/No | PM ² Yes/No | PRINCE2 Yes/No |
|--|-----------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|
| Meet the goal of Cyber Autonomy that refers to the technological area and describes it as technological capabilities and rights of an organisation to determine, prevent, defend and develop sovereignty to mitigate threats and the resilience of infrastructure. | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Be suitable for business and government domains. | Y | Y | Y | Y |

¹⁷ Axel Voss, ‘Digital autonomy’, *The Parliament Magazine*, 17 March 2020.

¹⁸ Didier Danet and Alix Desforges, ‘Digital sovereignty and strategic autonomy in Europe: From concept to geopolitical reality’, *Hérodote* 177–178, no 2–3 (2020), 179–195.

| Essential parameters for Cyber Autonomy | Agile Yes/No | Lean Six Sigma Yes/No | PM ² Yes/No | PRINCE2 Yes/No |
|---|-----------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|
| Have an average project duration from 1 up to 6 months. | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Include risk management evaluation. | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Include compatibility with process transformation. | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Be suitable for SMEs and startups. | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Enable collaboration between different functional and business teams. | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Correspond to Information Security standards. | Y | Y | Y | Y |

Source: Compiled by the author.

Various authors describe project management tools. Nicolai Andler has the list of the most important tools for the workshops and evaluation offered by tools and concepts for projects that are characterised by complexity and uncertainty.¹⁹ It becomes essential to identify the areas of IT project streamlining, as applications developed by employees and enterprises can much more efficiently perform their tasks, achieve their goals and create value for their clients. There are many IT tools on the market which can be useful in the process of managing IT projects.²⁰ One of the most famous project management books on software project management is *The Mythical Man-Month*. It describes tools, practice of suggestions on factors affecting success of software development projects. Author Frederick P Brooks provides information especially about estimation, resources and overall planning, not just for software projects. Brooks emphasises that for an optimal work specialists should have their own specific set of tools that are highly customised and suitable for the type of job that the team is doing, and all tools should be built and maintained by a common tools team, led by a project manager.²¹ Kim Helaman offers the basic principles and tools of project management as well as revised material on project management methods and practices from different methodologies such as Agile or PMP.²² Author Hugo pays special attention to the levels of use of quantitative risk management tools and the benefits gained from their use, and describes critical success factors.²³ The combination of tools helps achieve the final result. Below is a list of the most effective and commonly used tools in project management methodologies.²⁴

¹⁹ Nicolai Andler, *Tools for Project Management, Workshops and Consulting: A Must-Have Compendium of Essential Tools and Techniques* (Erlangen: Publicis, 2020), 36.

²⁰ Jolanta Pondel and Maciej Pondel, 'Stages and Areas of the Use of IT Tools Supporting the Management of IT Projects', *Management Sciences/Nauki o Zarządzaniu* 23, no 1 (2018), 45–57.

²¹ Frederick P Brooks, 'The Mythical Man-Month: After 20 Years', *IEEE Software* 12, no 5 (1995), 57.

²² Kim Heldman, *Project Management JumpStart* (Wiley, 2011), 16–17, 258–279.

²³ Francois D Hugo, Leon Pretorius and Siebert J Benade, 'Some Aspects of the Use and Usefulness of Quantitative Risk Analysis Tools in Project Management', *The South African Journal of Industrial Engineering* 29, no 4 (2018), 116–128.

²⁴ Maneesh Kumar, Jiju Antony and Byung Rae Cho, 'Project selection and its impact on the successful deployment of Six Sigma', *Business Process Management Journal* 15, no 5 (2009), 669–686; Eldon Larsen, 'Adapting project management principles and tools for research and development', *AICHe Annual Meeting Conference Proceedings*, 2014, 1–8; David Hinde, *PRINCE2 Study Guide, Second Edition Overview of PRINCE2* (Wiley, 2018), 391–413, 345–390; Six Sigma Qualtec, 'The Importance of Project Selection: Why Six Sigma Projects Falter, How to Assure Success and Sustainability', *White Paper*, 2020.

Table 2: Project management tools for Cyber Autonomy

| Method | Tools of the project | Description | Domain |
|-----------------|--|---|---|
| Agile | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scrum/Kanban • Lessons learnt • Risk assessment | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Source: to achieve incremental growth • Source: to promote disciplined project management • Source: frequent inspection and adaptation • Source: self-organisation and adaptability | IT, manufacturing, software development, etc. |
| Lean Six Sigma | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brainstorming • Process mapping • Project charter • Root cause analysis • The 5 whys • Voice of the customer (VOC) • SIPOC (suppliers, inputs, processes, outputs and customers) • Kaizen (continuous improvement) • Value stream mapping | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Source: skill to predict, prevent and control defects in a process • Source: understanding the elements of waste • Source: skills to achieve sustainable quality improvement through process improvement • Source: understanding of variation in processes | IT, manufacturing, software development, retail, airline industry, etc. |
| PM ² | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PESTEL analysis risk • Likelihood/impact matrix • Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) • Deliverable Breakdown Structure (DBS) • Effort and cost estimates • Decision trees • Gantt charts • Critical Path Method (CPM) • Critical Chain Method (CCM) • Earned Value Management (EVM) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Source: improving communication and the dissemination of information • Source: clarifying expectations as early as possible in the project lifecycle • Source: defining the project lifecycle (from initiating to closing) • Source: providing guidelines for project planning • Source: introducing monitor and control activities • Source: proposing management activities and outputs (plans, meetings, decisions) • Source: providing a link to agile practices (Agile PM²) | IT, manufacturing, software development, retail, healthcare, government, etc. |

| Method | Tools of the project | Description | Domain |
|---------|--|---|---|
| PRINCE2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effort and cost estimates • Decision trees project • Scheduling resource • Levelling Gantt charts • Pareto analysis risk • Assessment Lean/ Kaizen • Lessons learned | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Source: continued business justification • Source: a project must make good business sense • Source: learn from experience • Source: project teams should take lessons from previous projects into account • Source: define roles and responsibilities • Source: manage by stages • Source: manage by exception • Source: focus on products • Source: tailor to the environment | IT, manufacturing, software development, retail, healthcare, government, etc. |

Source: Compiled by the author.

It is apparent that the use of project management tools (25%), and that of a project management methodology (25%) are the most common measures to increase comfort levels to achieve successful project execution.²⁵ The iSixSigma Magazine benchmarking study of the project selections sought to characterise how companies identify, prioritise and approve projects in their Six Sigma programs.²⁶ According to the study, 84% of the Lean Six Sigma Master Black Belt respondents reported that they “always” used Project management tools, 81% always used Project chapter and 55% always used SIPOC (suppliers, inputs, process, outputs and customers). PRINCE2 themes and processes also include a host of study tools, case studies.²⁷ PRINCE2 studies show that PRINCE2 includes seven principles, seven topics and ten knowledge areas.²⁸ Within the European Union institutions and agencies, PM² is often used. The result of the integration demonstrates that it is possible to advance management and raise the level of project success. PM² methodology is often used by government institutions and organisations. The PM² project management methodology has been developed and actively supported by the European Commission as a project management standard. The European Commission recommends PM² for the management of projects funded under the Horizon 2020 program. It is important to note

²⁵ Project Success Survey, *Driving project success in Belgium* (PwC, 2018), 17–18.
²⁶ iSixSigma Magazine, ‘Six Sigma Project Selection’, 2005.
²⁷ David Hinde, *PRINCE2 Study Guide, Second Edition Overview of PRINCE2* (Wiley, 2018), 1–45.
²⁸ Roman R Veynberg, Nikita A Moiseev and Sofja M Sakharova, ‘Applying project management standards in IT industry: PRINCE2 PMBoK’, *Vestnik of the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics* 17, no 1 (2020), 56–66.

that PM² provides for the integration with agile methods and Lean Six Sigma tools, etc. Thus, the methods complement each other.²⁹

Phases of project management and tools that could be used and suitable for Cyber Autonomy

The most obvious way to make your project more manageable is to break down the execution process into successive steps. It is on this linear structure that traditional project management is based on. Project management is strictly tied to the execution time of tasks, which are, as a rule, predetermined at the planning stage; tools are excellent for the implementation of projects within this approach. Our suggestions for the phases are described below.³⁰

The main focus which is central to the project is to deliver specialist products. This chapter explores how the project manager controls the staging process to manage each delivery stage. It provides a fixed point in time at which acceptance of the main outputs of the project can be confirmed. Acceptance is the formal act of acknowledgement by the client, user or operation team that the project has met agreed acceptance criteria as defined in the project product description. The project manager creates the end project report which focuses on how the project is performed against its planned targets concerning time, cost, quality, scope, benefits and risk.³¹ Results show that while Agile methods are being adopted across a wide range of industries and sizes of organisations, if you look at the teams within those companies practicing Agile, they are predominantly within the IT, software development/engineering and project management departments. The majority of Agile users (19%) are in IT/Software Development and Financial Services.³² In comparison to PM², the description of the processes is separate from the description of the tools, which is rendered in the Project Management Tools 7 Techniques application.³³ The principles of project management in Cyber Autonomy should be adequate, flexible, coherent and iterative. Different stages of a software project life cycle should identify competence and development gaps and opportunities.³⁴ Projects are divided into several phases to provide better management control and appropriate links to the ongoing operations of the organisation. The phases generally comprise an initiation phase, a planning phase, an implementation or execution phase, a monitoring and control phase, and lastly, a closure

²⁹ European Commission, *PM² Project Management Methodology. Guide 3.0* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018).

³⁰ Z Marketer, Z Guay and Z Callahan, 'Top-7 metodov upravljeniya proyektami: Agile, Scrum, Kanban, PRINCE2 i drugiyе', 08 July 2016.

³¹ David Hinde, *PRINCE2 Study Guide, Second Edition Overview of PRINCE2* (Wiley, 2018), 47–88, 391–413.

³² Eileen O'Loughlin, 'Agile Project Management Software User Report: 2020', *Project Management*, 05 February 2020.

³³ European Commission, *PM² Project Management Methodology. Guide 3.0*.

³⁴ Jonghyuk Cha and Eunice Maytorena-Sanchez, 'Prioritising project management competences across the software project life cycle', *International Journal of Managing Projects in Business* 12, no 4 (2019), 961–978.

phase.³⁵ In addition to project planning and control, it also covers the topics of teamwork, communication and the integration of projects into organisations.

When considering the impacts of an anthropogenic project, the expected life cycle needs to be considered.³⁶ Experts cite five major elements that define a project: creation, planning, execution, monitoring and completion, each tackled in a logical sequence. The creation has to do with defining a scope of work that is to be performed along with major goals that are to be accomplished.³⁷ Table 3 describes the phases of the project management.

Table 3: Phases of the project management

| Phase | Goal | Domain |
|-------------------------|--|---------------|
| Initiating | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make sure that the project can actually be implemented before investing in planning and follow-up tasks | All domains |
| Planning | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project strategy • Project definition, including planning stakeholder relations, environmental impacts • Identification of project risks • Work planning • Key roles and responsibilities • Success rates • Potential risks and barriers to efficiency • Expectations for intra-team communication • Project timetable | All domains |
| Executing | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Execution equates to working the plan • Coordinate the execution of project plans • Act in real time • Produce deliverables • Measure progress and activities • Coordinate the team work • Evaluate potential obstacles • Implement necessary changes | All domains |
| Monitoring and control | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitoring, or command as some call it, entails updating the plan as it is worked. • Actively reviewing the status of your project • Reviewing proceeds | All domains |
| Closing and controlling | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collection and evaluation of progress data • Integrated control of quality, time, resources, costs, financial means • Completion means closing out all open tasks required to reach the desired end | All domains |

Source: Compiled by the author.

³⁵ Gerrit van der Waldt, *The Project Administrator: Perspectives to Project Support Services* (New York: Nova, 2019).

³⁶ Cristina Cosma and Francis Hopcroft, *Environmental Project Management* (New York: Momentum Press, 2021).

³⁷ Jeff Davidson, *Everyday Project Management* (Oakland: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2019); James Taylor, *Project Scheduling and Cost Control: Planning, Monitoring and Controlling the Baseline* (J Ross Publishing, 2018); David Hinde, *PRINCE2 Study Guide, Second Edition Overview of PRINCE2. Identifying PRINCE2 Risk – Part 2* (Wiley, 2012).

Conclusion

Growing demand in the digital domain increases interest in Cyber Autonomy Project Management for Digital Transformations. A Cyber Autonomy Toolbox with defence tools should also focus on reversing the asymmetry between the power of the possibly exclusive different suppliers or company departments, the asymmetry between the rate of attacks and efficiencies of defence. Tools used by an organisation should be aligned with all phases of implementation to support the ongoing digital transformation processes.

Table 4: Cyber Autonomy Toolbox

| Elements (all 7 above) | Supportive functions (for each element) | Phase according to project management method | Cyber Autonomy Toolbox (that included in proposed Tools) |
|--|---|---|--|
| 1. Goal of Cyber Autonomy 2. Strategy of Cyber Autonomy | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create “Autonomy of IT infrastructure” • Protect “Autonomy territory” • Develop “Autonomy of processes” • Secure “Autonomy of professionals” • Increase “Autonomy of communication” | Initiating | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brainstorming • Process mapping project chapter • Root cause analysis • The 5 whys • Effort and cost estimates decision trees • Gantt charts • Critical Path Method (CPM) • Critical Chain Method (CCM) |
| 3. Implementation methods 4. Technology | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Follow “Autonomy of directives, frameworks and guidelines” • Create “Autonomy of IT infrastructure” • Ensure “Autonomy of suppliers” | Planning and executing | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Value Stream Mapping • Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) • Deliverable Breakdown Structure (DBS) • Scrum/Kanban • Voice of the Customer (VOC) • Deliverable Breakdown Structure (DBS) • Likelihood/Impact matrix |
| 5. Organisation 6. Reputation defence | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secure “Autonomy of professionals” • Ensure “Autonomy of suppliers” • Secure “Autonomy of professionals” • Increase “Autonomy of communication” • Develop “Autonomy of processes” | Monitoring and control | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SIPOC (suppliers, inputs, process, outputs and customers) • Pareto analysis risk • Levelling Gantt charts • Assessment Lean/Kaizen • Lessons learned • PESTEL Analysis Risk |

| Elements (all 7 above) | Supportive functions (for each element) | Phase according to project management method | Cyber Autonomy Toolbox (that included in proposed Tools) |
|-----------------------------|---|--|---|
| 7. Result of Cyber Autonomy | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create “Autonomy of IT infrastructure” • Insure “Autonomy of suppliers” • Develop “Autonomy of processes” • Protect “Autonomy territory” | Closing and controlling | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk assessment • Earned Value Management (EVM) • Kaizen (Continuous improvement) • Lessons learnt |

Source: Compiled by the author.

The effectiveness of Cyber Autonomy and proposed tools will also depend on its complementarity with the seven elements described above and supportive functions (for each element of the Toolbox). Generally, the success of project management for digital transformation will depend on the implementation of the Cyber Autonomy Toolbox. Through a set of elements, supportive functions and respective phases of project management (Initiating, Planning, Executing, Monitoring and control, Closing and controlling) described in Table 4 are designed to assist general management and support strategic digitisation projects. The Cyber Autonomy Toolbox and associated tools such as the approach should be used as a guideline in the design, construction, operation and modification of an organisation’s cybersecurity operations and digital project management transformation. The Cyber Autonomy Toolbox could be also part of business recovery or continuity plans for ongoing digital transformation process for an organisation.

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Crime and Armed Groups in the International and Legal Amazon

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Transnational illicit activities, in addition to the unbridled greed for mineral resources, strongly impact Amazonian territories extending from the Orinoco Mining Arc in Venezuela to northern Brazil, aggravating problems of environmental impacts and border security, due to groups of the armed forces that protect mineral explorers. In Venezuela, megabandas joined the political elite that controls gold mining, as well as members of the Colombian Armed Forces (FARC) and armed military groups representing institutionalised violence, placing Venezuela in second place for murder among South American countries in 2020, with a rate of 45.6 per 100,000 inhabitants. In turn, Brazil reached ninth place, with 19.3 per 100,000 inhabitants. Violent deaths in the North and Northeast regions increased up to a great extent due to clashes between the Red Command and Northern Family factions against the largest group, the First Command of the Capital (PCC), which has more and more Venezuelan members, modifying the criminal modus operandi on the Brazil–Venezuela border. Therefore, Security and Border Defence Plans are indispensable.

Keywords: *crime, transnational crimes, defence, homicide and security*

Introduction

Located in Latin America, Amazonia Legal² has mineral riches, which generates greed and the presence of social actors for exploration purposes, leveraging the illegal exploitation of gold, mineral ores and precious stones. It happens that in Venezuela, the incentive came from the government itself, although the practice is not legalised and is conditioned for some groups led by those who have government alliances.

The present study aims to discuss the dynamics of armed crime occurring in Venezuela, represented by gangs, *megabandas* and *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*, with genesis in Colombia. On the Brazilian side, crime is analysed with criminal faction practices in the border area, being the First Command of the Capital (PCC) with Venezuelan

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² Amazonia Legal refers to the Amazonian territories of Brazil. It covers the states of Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima and Tocantins, as well as most of Mato Grosso and some areas belonging to the state of Maranhão.

members acting in their illicit activities, modifying some characteristics of criminal practices, with characteristics of transnational crimes.

In the 2018 U.S. Department of State's Department of Travel Advisory, Venezuela was assessed as Level 3, with respect to the general crime and security situation. The U.S. State Department rated Caracas as a critical threat site for crimes targeting or affecting the official interests of the U.S. Government. It also considered Venezuela one of the most dangerous countries in the world. Since January 2019, Venezuela has been placed in the worst category: Level 4 – do not travel.³

Although official crime figures are not released, unofficial statistics indicate that most categories of crime have increased in Venezuela. The government often tries to refute or repudiate reports of increased crime and homicide rates; however, independent observers broadly reject these claims. Most of Caracas's crime and violence continues to be attributed to mobile street gangs and organised crime groups.⁴

Violent crime is the biggest threat in Caracas, affecting both Venezuelans and foreigners. The NGO *Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia* (Venezuelan Observatory of Violence, OVV) ranked Venezuela in 2016 as the second most murderous nation (91.8 homicide rate) only after El Salvador (103 homicide rate).⁵ By 2018, Venezuela was expected to take the lead.⁶ After homicide, the crimes of greatest concern in Caracas are kidnappings and robberies, including vehicle thefts, street robberies and home invasions. Increased crime is associated with violent practices in which the criminal profile makes Venezuela itself violent in an institutional way.

Insight Crime magazine emphasises that there is a correlation between Venezuelan state employees involved in criminal actions, through groups of armed civilians. There is a list of distinct groups, which we will mention in this work, with peculiar characteristics that develop their criminal practices throughout the national territory. The primary issue that connects these facts, are the segregation orders of the geographical spaces where mineral resources are present, and thus commanded by high-ranking military officers. In this way, the security forces allied with armed groups, coercively command various mines throughout the country.

As a result of Venezuela's economic crisis, more than 5.6 million people have left the country since 2015⁷ – that is, 1/6th of the population – and migrated mainly to Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Chile and Brazil. With access through a single highway that goes to Brazil, countless foreigners log in search of subsistence. There is no way for the authorities of Brazil to know if these individuals have a criminal record or have practiced any illegal activity in their country of origin, due to the lack of a database or agreement between the public security authorities of Venezuela and Brazil.

³ Conor Finnegan, 'US raises travel advisory for Venezuela to highest level: 'Do Not Travel',' *ABC News*, 29 January 2019; U.S. Department of State – Bureau of Consular Affairs, 'Travel Advisory – Venezuela', 28 January 2021.

⁴ *Insight Crime*, 'Colombia y Venezuela: Siameses criminales', 21 May 2018.

⁵ *El País*, 'With 28,479 killings, Venezuela takes second spot on world murder ranking', 29 December 2016.

⁶ Renzo Pipoli, 'Venezuela on track to be Latin America's most violent country in 2018', *UPI*, 28 December 2018.

⁷ (x) Center for Disaster Philanthropy, 'Venezuelan Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis', 20 September 2021.

In Brazil, mining practices are unrestrained and disorderly, occupying more and more territorial spaces, especially in the Brazil–Venezuela border, state of Roraima, a place that has an underground with exclusive use of the Union, and is mostly located in Indigenous Lands, which have only the use of the soil. In fact, the Amazon rainforest has been plundered due to covetousness for gold, various minerals and precious stones. It happens that these groups of prospectors carry a history of violence. Thus, crimes such as drug use, illegal possession of weapons, prostitution, murder and assaults have become more constant, social actors from armed crime, criminal organisations with territorial extension throughout the country as the First Command of the Capital (PCC) emerged.⁸

In the urban space of Boa Vista, capital of the state of Roraima, the insertion of Venezuelan members to organised crime PCC, was evidenced in 2021, with the deaths of several foreign members in broad daylight, in dispute over territory in the sale of drugs in the capital.

Orinoco Mining Arc

The National Strategic Development Zone of the Orinoco Mining Arc (*Arco Minero del Orinoco*, AMO) was signed in 2016 by President Nicolas Maduro, through Presidential Decree No. 2248, disclosed in the Official Gazette No. 40855. It comprises a territorial extension of 111,843 km² south of the river Orinoco, corresponding to 12% of the national territory. Thus the National Strategic Development Zone became established, under the aegis of the National Mining Plan from 2019 to 2025. New social actors emerged under shady agreements with national and international companies, for the precarious predatory exploitation with a high degree of pollution and expropriation of resources, generating a new process in the economy and territorialisation of the geographical space.⁹

The new predatory order of exploitation of mineral resources goes against the constitution of that country, leveraging several crises in power relations, and massive presence of military personnel in the region. It expands violence and occupation of nationals and foreigners in the search for the appropriation of mineral resources in a clandestine way, but at the same time a way institutionalised by government officials and their allies.¹⁰

Armed groups in Venezuela

In relation to violence and crime, Venezuela was considered a twin country with Colombia, with an area known for illicit flow and international trafficking. Whereas Colombia represents the largest production of cocaine in the world, and Venezuela, went on to smuggle drugs and weapons. The border space between Colombia and Venezuela has become,

⁸ State of Roraima has a triple border, comprising Venezuela, Brazil and Guyana.

⁹ *Emiliano Teran Mantovani*, 'La minería depredadora en Venezuela: Arco Minero del Orinoco, economías de enclave y Plan Minero Nacional', *Boletín WRM* 254, January–February 2021.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

especially in the last 15 years, a fruitful space for the operations of groups linked to drug and arms trafficking, as well as a strategic locus for the refuge of illegal armed groups and paramilitaries. This intensification stems largely from Colombian military operations to eradicate illegal crops and demobilise paramilitaries.¹¹

Venezuelan authorities believe there are about 10 groups of criminal organisations known as megabands, which operate nationwide, including inside prisons. Armed groups oppose the so-called “Los Pranes”, favouring certain prisoners, while the war arsenal is in charge of the state authorities. In addition to transnational crimes, it has to be mentioned that these groups acquire short weapons and weapons of large calibre, AK-47 and R-15, grenades, ballistic vest, with ease. As these groups grow, public security in Venezuela is declining, leaving individual and collective rights and guarantees endangered, with the *militares* being involved in arms trafficking, violence and corruption. Among the armed groups, what draws most attention is the presence of the National Liberation Army (ELN) and remaining factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), indicated by Insight Crime in 2018.¹²

With the permanence of armed groups and government involvement with criminals, the country is known for corruption and institutionalised acts of violence. Criminal lawyer and professor of criminology at the Central University of Venezuela (UCV) Luis Izquier, analysed crime in Caracas, coming to the conclusion that extortion is the crime that has had the highest growth in the last two years. He also states that armed criminal megabands seek their peace zones, and for this space to occur make use of strategies of violence with weapons of war. When asked why government institutions do not fight criminal organisations in Venezuela, he answered that informally, the government has handed over territorial spaces to these criminal groups, just like fiefdoms where they dominate geographical spaces and commit kidnapping even to police officers. Thus, they play a role in the scenario of terrorism in public spaces and in security areas, as in the case of the Invasion National Guard to steal anti-aircraft and private materials, committing homicides. Bolivarian National Service (SEBIN), became a true political group, becoming aware of the entire system of crime, but remain inert to the criminal practices that occur in Venezuela.¹³

According to Professor Roberto Briceño-León,¹⁴ there was an increase in police lethality in confrontation with civilians. He said that in 2020, 11,891 people died from violent causes, implying a rate of 45.6 per 100,000 inhabitants.¹⁵ Despite the fact that it is high, it has to be taken into account that there has been a reduction compared to 2019, when 16,506 people died from violent causes, with a rate of 60.3 per 100,000 inhabitants. He also added:

¹¹ Marília Carolina Barbosa de Souza Pimenta, *Strategic and Structural Zones for Illicit Transits (ZEETI): Challenges to the peace zone in South America* (Doctoral thesis, PUC/SP, São Paulo, 2016).

¹² Insight Crime, ‘Venezuela: ¿Un estado mafioso?’, 25 May 2018.

¹³ TVV Noticias, ‘Luis Izquier analiza el aumento de la violencia armada en Caracas’.

¹⁴ Investigator born in Venezuela in 1951. Degrees: Sociology (1974); PhD in Sociology (1984). He has been the coordinator of the Venezuelan Violence Observatory since 2005. Author of more than 20 books, he is currently Professor Emeritus.

¹⁵ Portugal Digital, ‘Venezuela foi o país da América Latina com mais mortes violentas em 2020’, 30 December 2020.

The number rose to 34 per 100 homicides in 2017, to 72 in 2018 and to 88 in 2019. In 2020, for the first time, there were more deaths at the hands of the police than of criminals; with 101 cases caused by law enforcement officers for every 100 delinquent homicides. Among the 4,231 victims of resistance to authority, 90% were between 18 and 40 years old, but 82 were only between 12 and 17 years old, in addition to three children under the age of 11.¹⁶

The omission of crime data in Venezuela is noticeable, despite numerous reports of increased crime and criminal megabands. The groups that make up criminal organisations in Venezuela are identified and have experience in criminal practices. We can describe them. The armed groups that emerged in Colombia have paramilitary training, until mid-2000, fighting the guerrillas, making it a militarised government struggle against terrorist groups, with the main groups being the National Liberation Army (ELN), FARC Dissidents, The People's Liberation Army (EPL), Colombian Mafia, Bolivarian Liberation Forces (FBL) and Bolivarian National Armed Force (FANB).

In principle, Plan Colombia, as the military aid package initiated in 2000 was named, released funded for anti-drug actions, but not specifically to combat the guerrillas. However, after the Terrorist Attacks of September 2001, and the U.S. declaration of war on terror, restrictions on the use of force ended, as both the FARC, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the paramilitaries were classified as terrorist groups.¹⁷

Through this research, the testimonies of prisoners in the state of Roraima affirm the presence of armed FARC groups, which occupy Venezuela in areas, carrying out activities to control access to individuals who transit in a certain region, with collusion of the government, effecting the idea of institutionalised violence in the country, initiated since the government of Hugo Chávez. In addition to these armed groups, Venezuela has the Legal Armed Collectives (CAI), which are those who remain in clandestine crime and claim to function in the name of defending the revolution they used to fight for.¹⁸

According to studies by the Venezuelan Observatory of Violence (OVV), “the use of the war arsenal by the unions in mines is another possible indication of complicity between criminals and uniformed men. In order that these weapons – used exclusively by the *Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana* – get to the south of the Orinoco, they must pass through several *alcabalas* (posts) guarded by the *Guardia Nacional Bolivariana*.”¹⁹ We can observe the presence of Brazilian criminal organisation in Venezuelan territory. These in turn perform drug barter for weapons, gold and other illicit transactions within this territory, in addition to carrying out the protection of the group with which it has an alliance.

With high war power, the criminal organisations of Venezuela carry out the sale of weapons to Brazilians, now with the new modality of barter quite peculiar. Through an

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Thiago Rodrigues, ‘Narcotráfico e militarização nas Américas: vício de Guerra’, *Contexto Internacional* 34, no 1 (2012), 9–41.

¹⁸ Thairi Moya Sánchez, ‘Grupos civiles armados en Venezuela: ¿Actores de un ‘aparato organizado de poder’?’, *ANIDIP* 6 (2018), 110–144.

¹⁹ Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia, ‘Bandas que operan al sur de Bolívar adoptan prácticas del pranato carcelario y de las mafias de la construcción’, 11 March 2016.

interview a police authority in the state of Roraima, who asked for anonymity, revealed the emergence of the sale of drugs from Colombia, carried out by members of the First Command of the Capital (PCC), with access by land, on BR-174, passing through the Amazon; change caused by the closure of the border with the Bolivarian country. The current strategy is to exchange the drug for gold, and this gold for weapons, for the supply of war power in the illegal prospectors in Roraima, since violence and territorial disputes are constant in the region.

Both the permanence of armed groups within the areas destined for mining as well as in the border areas are observed, in which ELN, PCC, FARC and other criminal organisations transit and execute various criminal practices and disputes over territorial spaces and dominance in the sale of drugs.²⁰

Going through a scenario similar to that of the neighbouring country, Roraima has been undergoing changes in the degradation of the environment due to mining practices, and the increase in crime due to rivalries in the market of the illegal exploitation of ores. Thus, the intentional violent deaths leveraged in the year 2021, with scenes of lifeless bodies thrown onto the ground on the approaches of roads that give access to prospectors.

According to prison documents in the state of Roraima, Venezuelans are co-opted in the PCC. The same criminal groups are present which operate in Venezuela,²¹ as we can see in the article in the newspaper *Folha de Boa Vista*, based on official testimony in the legal procedures that deal with the execution of arrests in flagrante. The writing has excerpts that reveal that “at least 740 of their compatriots have joined the faction groups in Roraima in recent years. In addition, the PCC would have made an alliance with the criminal group Trem de Aragua”.²²

In order to carry out this research, interviews were conducted with the operators of public security. They alleged that members of criminal groups in Venezuela associated with the PCC were identified (called The Syndicate), in particular in the border town of Pacaraima, dealing with drug and weapons transactions. Members of criminal organisations arrested for drug trafficking in possession of a certain amount of gold were observed. It is suspected that the group itself exchanges the drug for gold in the mining companies and later this same gold for weapons in Venezuela.

Former members of the FARC, ELN, Prantos, Los Soles Cartel and other groups active in Venezuela and now in neighbouring countries were identified in the other municipalities of the State of Roraima. The fact is that *the modus operandi* of local crime has been modifying and acquiring a new profile due to the new social actors present and transnational crimes. Another similarity with Venezuela was the emergence of PCC members with the prospectors. Fact confirmed in the Operation with the Federal Police, in indigenous land where illegal mining operates. On 13 May 2021, when they were received on Yanomami indigenous land with gunshots, something unusual happened in the conduct of prospectors who generally do not turn to the actions of public security. In this attack,

²⁰ Walter Barrero, ‘FARC e ELN: mais dois grupos terroristas em ação na Venezuela’, *RenovaMídia*, 26 February 2019.

²¹ Vitor Plácido dos Santos Peres, ‘Análises de Conjuntura’, Grupo de Estudos e Pesquisas em Segurança Internacional (GEPSI), s. a.

²² Folha Web, ‘Venezuelanos atuam em papel de liderança no crime organizado em RR’, 08 February 2021.

along with the president of the District Council of Indigenous Health Yanomami and Ye'kuana (*Considi-Y*), Junior *Hekurari*, there were three prospectors killed, five were shot and one *Yanomami* was injured. According to him, the bodies were taken by the prospectors to the camp where they work.²³

According to a survey conducted by Hutukara, the PCC and Aragua Train are present in the Yanomami Indigenous Lands, performing a kind of protection for prospectors, as observed in the map, the area of interest and speculation by members of said criminal organisations, according to the matter the PCC is held responsible for 12 attacks in the state of Roraima.²⁴

During the field research, I asked the police authority if in fact members of criminal organisations are present in the prospectors. The answer was that “the strategy is to take the drug to the mine, exchange it for gold and this gold is exchanged for weapons at the border of Pacaraima/Venezuela, which will be taken to the mine, in order to carry out the safety of certain owners of deposits”.

Within the local criminological context, what draws attention is the use of drugs as a bargaining chip. Due to the crisis in Venezuela and the official closure of the border as a factor that hindered the entry of drugs into Venezuela, their value has considerably increased in the state of Roraima, making it more profitable to exchange drugs for gold and gold for weapons. Thus was the way found by crime to supply the state of Amazonas with weaponry. With the increase in the price of drugs, it became unfeasible to sell drugs in the city to addicts. In this sense, the crime scenario in the state of Roraima and Amazonia has been changing. Neglected by authorities of the State of Roraima until mid-2015, criminal factions modified criminal practices, and *modus operandi* of the local context, described empirically by public security agencies, intelligence institutions and judiciary. Thus, the involvement of young people as perpetrators of criminal practices was confirmed through reports of the police as well as printed and cyber media. Young people are inserted as victims and possible perpetrators of homicides.²⁵

In an interview conducted with the investigative police of the State of Roraima, it was possible to obtain information on practices similar to the Venezuelan faction. The Union operates in a neighbourhood of the capital Boavistense. It charges entrepreneurs a monthly fee to make an alleged security of trades, but these are members of the PCC in the state of Roraima, where there did not use to exist this illicit practice, and who aim to master a field in a certain spatial delimitation and start to charge a monthly fee for trades in general.

Conclusions

Considering the economic situation of Venezuela and the incentive through presidential decree for the extraction of mineral deposits, in addition to endogenous and exogenous

²³ Humanitas Unisinos Institute, ‘Como o PCC se infiltrou nos garimpos em Roraima’, 13 May 2021.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ketiane Guerreiro, Gilmar Pinheiro de Andrade and Regys Odlare Freitas, ‘O lúdico é matar: homicídio de jovens no estado de Roraima em 2018’, *IBCCRIM*, 2020, 1417–1438.

factors, the scenario of this country has undergone modifications, with accelerated growth of criminal groups. The institutionalisation of violence is evident through the military members themselves at the behest of the Bolivarian Government. It has segregated the areas of the mining arc, where several armed groups emerged, which act without any form of restriction exerted by the bodies of public security of Venezuela. The situation is further aggravated by exchange of information and criminal practices between members of criminal organisations in Venezuela and Brazil, observed through the testimonies of prisoners for trafficking drugs and weapons.

According to the changes in the dynamics of crime in the State of Roraima and the insertion of new actors in crime – such as the presence of three types of Venezuelan factions that are Trem de Araguá, Sindicato and Cartel de Los Soles – both the foreign members in the PCC expanded as well as the regulations, called “disciplines” of the PCC have been modified, aggregating practices from foreign factions.

Characteristics of transnationality are present in this territorial space where the border is only imaginary. Despite the various agreements in which Brazil is a signatory, it has no control of the dynamics of crime at the border of these countries, especially in the mining regions, which facilitate the recruitment of armed groups to carry out a kind of security and flow of mineral resources in both countries.

Finally, the extraction of ores in the Amazon has been accompanied by several crimes to the environment, and also crimes committed by armed groups, causing a greater sense of economic and social insecurity in the population. Those are especially affected who live on the banks of rivers, for now, with water inappropriate for consumption, their health and feeling of well-being are endangered. The incalculable destruction and depredation to the environment contributes to create a sense of insecurity and alliance between Brazilian, Venezuelan and Colombian armed groups.

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How Britain's and Colombia's Privileged Partnerships with the United States Influenced Their Respective Journeys through the European Community and UNASUR¹

László PALOTÁS² 

This paper explores how Britain's and Colombia's privileged relations with the United States (U.S.) influenced their journey through the European Community (EC) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). The Anglo–American Special Relationship (AASR) was compatible with British participation in the European Single Market, but not with adherence to creating the EC's common currency, nor with leadership in building a European defence structure autonomous from NATO. Thus, since the start of the Iraq war, Britain played a rather obstructive role in what later was called European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The US–Colombia Partnership (USCP), based on a longstanding military association reinforced under Plan Colombia, naturally discouraged any meaningful Colombian participation in UNASUR's South American Security Council (CDS), a regional cooperative security project, promoted by Brazil. Cherished projects of the liberal CAP – such as triangular cooperation (to export Colombian security expertise to Central America with U.S. co-financing and oversight) and NATO partnership – also distracted Colombia's interest from UNASUR, diminishing the latter's relevance collaterally. A role for UNASUR – alongside the Organization of American States (OAS) – in South American security management was compatible with the liberal CAP, but not with the neoconservative CAP. Even a lopsided complementation – such as the one between NATO and the CSDP – proved unviable between the OAS and UNASUR.

Keywords: *Anglo–American Special Relationship, Colombo–American Partnership, European Community/Union, Common Security and Defence Policy, UNASUR, South American Defense Council, collateral, exclusive, inter/intra-institutional balancing*

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Introduction

The U.S. has maintained privileged hierarchical relationships with Britain³ and Colombia, both adjacent to regions of great American influence. Britain is located on the rim of Western Europe, although it has retained its global maritime horizon. Colombia is situated between the Caribbean Basin, where U.S. influence has been highest, and the Southern Cone, where it has been much lower.

This paper surveys the influence of the Anglo–American Special Relationship (AASR) and the Colombo–American Partnership (CAP) on Britain's and Colombia's respective journeys through the European Community (EC)⁴ and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), including their entry, limited participation and exit. It reviews both influences and journeys according to the same concepts, and makes some comparisons.

Although not a special relationship, the CAP is based on a longstanding, highly institutionalised security association and, more recently, exclusive cooperation in fighting transnational organised crime.⁵ Colombia is NATO's only partner in Latin America. Pro-Americanism is traditionally high among Colombian elites, perfectly coupled to their American peers, and (to a somewhat lesser extent) at grassroots' level as well.

UNASUR comprised the quite peaceful Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay), and the more turbulent Andean Crest (Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile), along with former British and Dutch colonies, tiny Guyana and Surinam.

Certainly, changes in the AASR and the CAP impacted Britain's and Colombia's regional ties in Europe and South America, concerning regional integration–cooperation processes substantially. UNASUR was even created essentially as a Brazilian reaction to Plan Colombia.

Conversely, British and Colombian conducts within – or concerning – the EC and UNASUR, affected the AASR and the CAP, remaining compatible or becoming incompatible with them.

Conceptual framework

This section describes key concepts that help explain how did the AASR and the CAP influence Britain's journey through the EC and Colombia's passage through UNASUR.

³ Or Great Britain or the U.K.: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

⁴ EC denotes in this text not only the European Community, but also the European Economic Communities (EEC) and the European Union (EU).

⁵ This cooperation emerged from Plan Colombia, a multibillion-dollar CAP effort to stabilise the country and fight the intertwined drug and guerrilla war (Adam Isacson, 'It's Not Too Late for the Land of Mercenaries', *The New York Times*, 05 August 2021).

Hard and soft balancing: U.S. ambivalence toward European integration

Rees contrasts U.S. Atlanticism (viewed through liberal institutionalist lens) with America's ambivalent attitude towards European integration (depicted in neorealist terms).⁶

Facing perceived Soviet threat, America built a liberal Atlantic order with Western European allies, stationing its conventional forces in their territories and providing them nuclear protection. Despite power disparity, the U.S. led NATO as *primus inter pares*, which allowed allies acting in cohesion.⁷

America's support for European integration proved more ambiguous. Although the U.S. voiced backing for integration as a means of European unity, it was aware that – being an outsider – it had limited influence on the EC's trajectory.⁸

With time, there was a risk that the EC would evolve into an institutional framework antagonistic towards the U.S. Between Atlanticism and European integration existed the potential for future conflict. For realists, America faced the efforts of others to counterbalance its power.⁹ Posen saw European defence efforts as an attempt to challenge American hegemony through hard balancing.¹⁰

For others, the problem was the EC's weakness. Lacking hard resources to counterbalance the U.S., the EC resorted to soft balancing through the creation of the euro or the use of international institutions. The capabilities of the EC's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) were designed to complement NATO structures, rather than to compete with them.¹¹

Varieties of institutional balancing – EU–CSDP, NATO, UNASUR–CDS, OAS

Both the EC's CSDP and UNASUR's CDS fitted into several types of institutional balancing (that is soft balancing through institutions).

Exclusive institutional balancing

This type of balancing emphasises the exclusion of the target state (primary power) from an institution (cooperation process) by one or more balancing states.¹² The U.S.

⁶ Wyn Rees, 'America, Brexit and the security of Europe', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 19, no 3 (2017).

⁷ Ibid. 3.

⁸ Ibid. 4.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Barry Posen, 'EU security and defence policy: Response to unipolarity?', *Security Studies* 15, no 2 (2006).

¹¹ Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, 'Hard Times for Soft Balancing', *International Security* 30, no 1 (2005).

¹² Kai He, 'Contested Regional Orders and Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific', *International Politics* 52, no 2 (2015), 215. Daniel Flemes and Rafael Castro, 'Institutional Contestation: Colombia in the Pacific Alliance', *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 35, no 1 (2016), 81.

was excluded from the EC, led by France and Germany. The U.S. (and Mexico) could not access UNASUR, led by Brazil.

Britain and Colombia – although members of these regional organisations – kept their strongest bilateral ties to the excluded global power. Hence the expectation of incompatibilities between their partnership with the U.S. and their regional cooperation–integration commitments.

Inter-institutional balancing

In this type of balancing, one (regional) institution is used to challenge the relevance of another.¹³

In its early years, UNASUR challenged the relevance of the OAS in South American security management (conflict resolution and democracy protection), since a critical mass of left-wing leaders led by Brazilian president Lula da Silva (able to attract others from the centre-right like Colombia's Juan Manuel Santos) acted quickly and efficiently on crises within and between countries in the region.

In 2013, German researchers still saw potential for division of labour between the UNASUR and the OAS,¹⁴ but warned: UNASUR's formation was a largely antagonistic process, aimed at weakening the influence of OAS in South American affairs.¹⁵

The CSDP did not challenge NATO's relevance, nor was entirely separate from it, but rather complementary. Still, when the Brexit process removed the habitual British veto on CSDP's deepening in 2017, the EU resumed its efforts towards some sort of strategic autonomy, creating some modest tools as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) or the European Defence Fund (EDF).¹⁶

Paradoxically, while the U.S. is pushing the EU to advance on its self-defence capacities, once these advancements are made, it tries to frame them inside NATO or block them. The U.S. perceives anything within NATO as under its control. If the EU develops its strategic autonomy, and the U.S. perceives that structure as non-aligned with NATO, it will consider the EU an external player and thus a geopolitical rival.¹⁷

¹³ A state supports institution "A" to undermine the influence of institution "B" if the latter does not respond to its interests (Ibid. 215, 217).

¹⁴ South American leaders would resolve conflicts at the sub-regional level, and the OAS would focus on problems affecting the entire hemisphere. Brigitte Weiffen, Leslie Wehner and Detlef Nolte, 'Overlapping regional security institutions in South America: The case of OAS and UNASUR', *International Area Studies Review* 16, no 4 (2013), 385.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Edgar Jiménez García, 'El ejército europeo y la PESCO: OTAN o nada', *Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos*, Documento de Opinión no 97 (2019), 9.

¹⁷ Ibid. 18–19.

Competition between nested organisations

Conflict potential is particularly high, when two nested regional organisations (that is, a larger one comprising all the member states of a smaller one) overlap in their main mandate as well. Such organisations tend to clash over the exclusive right to exercise that mandate within a regional domain.¹⁸

UNASUR was nested in the OAS, and the two organisations disputed the mandate of security management in South America, until “nested” members kept their dual membership alive. Nevertheless, overlaps in their actions occasionally led to outcomes beneficial to regional cooperation (until the Venezuelan multi-crisis became intractable in 2016).¹⁹

NATO (30) has 21 members in common with the EU (27).²⁰ The mandates of the CSDP and NATO overlapped most clearly in crisis management. NATO–CSDP complementation focused on avoiding duplication of functions. However, reconciling the EU’s quest for strategic autonomy and enhanced cooperation with NATO could be difficult.²¹

Intra-institutional balancing

In order to capture cooperative conducts in institutional balancing, along with competitive ones, Lee distinguishes analytically between inter- and intra-institutional balancing.²²

According to the latter (which adds a drop of liberal institutionalism to an otherwise neorealist conception), states cooperate to create an institution, when demand for collective goods is high. But once the institution providing the collective good is created, they show within its framework both cooperative and competitive (balancing) behaviours.²³

In the EC, the collective good which attracted Britain was the Single Market. In UNASUR, Brazil tried to provide regional stability, by assembling a cooperative security scheme, aimed at building a pluralist security community,²⁴ or regional autonomy.²⁵

¹⁸ Detlef Nolte, ‘Costs and Benefits of Overlapping Regional Organizations in Latin America: The Case of the OAS and UNASUR’, *Latin American Politics and Society* 60, no 1 (2018), 129, 147.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ The nine NATO countries outside the EU include the U.S. and lately Britain. The six EU members outside NATO include 4 neutrals.

²¹ Maria Eleni Koppa, ‘The relationship between CSDP and NATO after Brexit and the EU’s Global Strategy’, *FEPS Studies*, April 2019.

²² Seungjoo Lee, ‘Institutional Balancing and the Politics of Mega-FTAs in East Asia’, *Asian Survey* 56, no 6 (2016).

²³ Ibid. 1063.

²⁴ Mélanie Lepage, *Vers le développement d’une communauté de sécurité pluraliste en Amérique du Sud avec la mise en place de l’Union des nations sud-américaines* (Université Laval, IQHEI, Avril 2011).

²⁵ Victor Mijares, ‘Performance of the South American Defense Council Under Autonomy Pressures’, *Latin American Policy* 9, no 2 (2018).

British and Colombian cooperative conducts within the EC and UNASUR (contributing to regional integration) could be expected to diverge from the AASR and the CAP.

Collateral balancing

CAP projects, privileged by Colombia, had repercussions on other states or regional schemes. Such collateral effects could amount to hard balancing. Although not directed against Brazil, Plan Colombia enhanced U.S. military presence in its neighbour. Moreover, the Plan was inserted into the U.S. global war on terror by the neoconservative George W Bush – Álvaro Uribe duo. Thus, it prompted the Lula Government to establish UNASUR and endow it with the CDS.²⁶

Likewise, the Defense cooperation agreement (ACD) on formal U.S. access to Colombian bases did not target Brazil but challenged its geostrategic interests anyway as the primary power in South America (and the Amazon).²⁷

In other cases, collateral balancing was soft (inter-institutional): for example, Colombia's NATO partnership (in line with the CAP) was not directed against UNASUR, but still undermined its relevance, by distracting Colombia from cooperation within the CDS.

Institutional contestation

Less innocently, others saw Colombia's rapprochement to NATO as a tool of deliberate institutional contestation: a strategy of secondary powers in a region to question the legitimacy, centrality or effectiveness of institutions led by primary powers.²⁸

Institutional contestation (along with exclusive and inter-institutional balancing) is a form of buffering: the strategy of a secondary power that deepens its economic and security cooperation with other states in order to increase its influence over the primary power.²⁹

While the Uribe Government was willing to hard balance Brazil collaterally, the Santos Administration resorted only to (soft) buffering tools vis-à-vis the big South American neighbour.³⁰

²⁶ Olivier Dabène, 'La cuarta ola de regionalismo', in *Los desafíos del desarrollo en América Latina*, ed. by Carlos Quenan and Sébastien Velut (Paris: Institut des Amériques, 2014), 84–85.

²⁷ Daniel Flandes and Leslie Wehner, 'Drivers of strategic contestation: The case of South America', *International Politics* 52, no 2 (2015).

²⁸ Flandes and Castro, 'Institutional Contestation', 84.

²⁹ *Ibid.* 81.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

Structure of analysis

Applying the above conceptual framework, the next two sections examine how the AASR influenced Britain's passage through the EC, and how the CAP influenced Colombia's passage through UNASUR: entry, limited participation, exit.

Subsections on those limited participations check to what extent Britain's competitive conducts within the EC converged with – and its cooperative behaviours diverged from – the AASR, and whether the cooperative behaviours remained compatible or became incompatible with it.

They also review to what extent Colombia's competitive behaviours within UNASUR converged with – and its cooperative conducts diverged from – the CAP, and whether the cooperative ones were compatible or incompatible with it.

For a more nuanced picture of these (in)compatibilities, the CAP is adjusted with the ideological composition of presidential duos: neoconservative, liberal, mixed CAP.³¹

The same subsections explore the effects of the AASR on British behaviours concerning CSDP/NATO complementation, as well the effects of the CAP on Colombian strategies relative to UNASUR/OAS competition.

Influences of the AASR on Britain's passage through the EC

Entry: delayed and then urged by the AASR indirectly

French President Charles de Gaulle – who saw Britain as America's Trojan horse because of its strong attachment to the AASR and NATO – vetoed British EC accession twice, delaying it for a decade. Meanwhile, U.S. diplomacy redirected toward the EC and (after the French withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command in 1966) Federal Germany.³² The sidelining of the AASR in transatlantic relations pushed Britain to enter the EC.

When Britain first applied to the EC in 1961, people were polled which entity they would join, if they had the choice: the USA or Europe? 55 per cent of the respondents preferred the U.S. and only 22 per cent Europe.³³

President John F Kennedy (before the British candidature was presented) assured Prime Minister Harold Macmillan that the AASR “would be strengthened and not weakened” if London moved towards EC membership.³⁴ Macmillan adopted a strategy of

³¹ The AASR does not normally require such a distinction, as illustrated by the Bush–Blair “bromance”.

³² David Reynolds, ‘A ‘special relationship’? America, Britain and the international order since the Second World War’, *International Affairs* 62, no 1 (1985).

³³ Rebekah Brown, ‘History of the Anglo–American Special Relationship’, *Ashbrook Statesmanship Thesis*, 2012, 25.

³⁴ Reynolds, ‘A ‘special relationship’?’, 14.

“hedging”, by which the AASR would remain priority, and would only be complemented, as an insurance policy, with a new power base in Europe.³⁵

But Macmillan's attachment to the AASR thwarted his efforts to join the EC. In early 1963, de Gaulle not only rejected Kennedy's 'Grand Design' – which envisaged a multilateral nuclear force integrating U.S., British and French capabilities under U.S. command – as incompatible with his desire to create a national force of deterrence, but he also cited the Anglo–American missile agreement³⁶ as evidence of Britain's innate Atlanticism, vetoing its EC candidacy.³⁷

In 1967, the General again vetoed British accession to the EC, which would only materialise in 1973, four years after his resignation.

Limited participation

After taking part in the construction of the Single European Market, Britain remains outside the great supranational EC projects, such as the common currency, and (barring a brief period) plays a largely obstructive role in the CSDP.

Single market: British cooperative behaviour within the EC – compatible with the AASR

PM Margaret Thatcher signs the Single European Act of 1986.³⁸ Britain was actively involved in standards' harmonisation and financial liberalisation. While the single market discriminated against third parties such as the U.S., it also benefited U.S. companies established in Britain, particularly financial services firms.³⁹

³⁵ Nigel Ashton, 'Harold Macmillan and the 'Golden Days' of Anglo–American relations revisited, 1957–63', *Diplomatic History* 29, no 4 (2005).

³⁶ The deal provided for British nuclear submarines to be equipped with U.S. made ballistic missiles.

³⁷ Robert Frank, *Être ou ne pas être Européen? Les Britanniques et l'Europe du XVIIe siècle au Brexit* (Paris: Belin, 2018), 216–217; Lawrence Freedman, 'Britain Adrift. The United Kingdom's Search for a Post-Brexit Role', *Foreign Affairs*, May–June 2020.

³⁸ Commission President Delors ably convinced Thatcher, proposing a project imbued by economic liberalism that could only please her: a “single market” that guarantees completely free movement of people, goods, services and capital. Frank, *Être ou ne pas être*, 240–241.

³⁹ These firms could freely provide their services to customers located in any other EC (and European Economic Area) country, thanks to a “passport” system.

Saint-Malo: British cooperative conduct within the EC – diverges from the AASR

In the 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration, PM Tony Blair embraces the need to provide the EU with capability for “autonomous action backed up by credible military forces” in order to respond to international crises when NATO is not involved.⁴⁰

This Anglo–French agreement laid the ground for launching the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1999, leading to the CSDP in 2009.

During the Bosnian conflict (1992–1995), Europeans – including the British – realised their over-dependence on the U.S.⁴¹ Saint-Malo was a real compromise: the British adhered to the plan of EC autonomy in military crisis response, and the French agreed to rejoin NATO a bit more.⁴²

With Saint-Malo, the EU (which abandoned its traditional civilian identity) “overlapped” with NATO (whose post-Cold War diversification included anti-crisis operations) in its main mandate.⁴³ The U.S. tried to prevent the CFSP from taking root.⁴⁴ British leadership in this new field would have affected the AASR.

Opt-outs: British competitive behaviours within the EC – converge with the AASR

PM John Major’s government obtains opt-outs from future EU common policies. In order to pass the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 through the British parliament (against Eurosceptic resistance), Major obtained in Brussels an opt-out from the monetary union. When negotiating the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, he got another opt-out from the dismantling of intra-EU border controls (Schengen area) as well as a flexible opt-out of shared policies on internal security and justice.

With all these opt-outs, the British membership turns de facto partial, but Britain remains fully involved in EU decision-making⁴⁵ – an optimal arrangement for the AASR.

⁴⁰ ‘Joint Declaration on European Defence, issued at the British–French Summit, Saint-Malo’, 04 December 1998.

⁴¹ They could not end this war alone, although the Soviet threat ceased to exist (IRIS France, ‘Être ou ne pas être européen? Les Britanniques et l’Europe du XVIIe siècle au Brexit – 3 questions à Robert Frank’. Le point de vue de Pascal Boniface, 28 March 2019).

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Lorenzo Cladi and Andrea Locatelli, ‘Keep Calm and Carry On (Differently): NATO and CSDP after Brexit’, *Global Policy* 11, no 1 (2020).

⁴⁴ Tomáš Valášek, ‘European defense vs. NATO: Not the right fight’, *Politico*, 19 February 2018.

⁴⁵ Barbara Lippert and Nicolai von Ondarza, ‘Der Brexit als Neuland’, *SWP Aktuell* no 42 (2016), 6.

Eastward extension as a competitive British strategy within the EU – converges with the AASR

Britain promotes the EU's extension to the east in order to dilute its western core and slow down its deeper integration. In 2004 and 2007, the EU incorporated a dozen central and eastern former Communist countries.⁴⁶ Their fervent Atlanticism was an added benefit for the AASR.⁴⁷

Obstruction of the CSDP: competitive conduct within the EU and pro-NATO strategy in the complementation – converges with the AASR

Saint-Malo's promises were never fulfilled. Since the start of the Iraq War in 2003, Britain played a largely obstructive role in the CSDP, by diluting and vetoing in the name of the U.S. the initiatives that would have made the EU more autonomous in defence.⁴⁸

The myriad of compromises rendered the CSDP inoperative, and the British contribution to its actions was always negligible. With their defence inextricably tied into the American defence, the British never took the idea of European defence too seriously. Indebted to the Americans, they tried to block European cooperation initiatives such as Galileo. Their troops assigned to EU battle groups withdrew well ahead of the late 2019 elections that confirmed Brexit.⁴⁹

Brexit – influenced by the AASR indirectly

The U.S. inadvertently contributed to the Brexit vote, by using the AASR to manage its ambiguous relationship with the EU in defence.⁵⁰

When the U.S. used Britain to constrain the EU's range of defence capabilities, it fuelled British misgivings about its value.⁵¹ When the U.S. involved Britain in bilateral cooperation, instead of using it as a transatlantic bridge,⁵² it cultivated in the British people an image of their country as a natural ally of America, rather than a European power. When the U.S. rewarded Britain with benefits and status in defence cooperation,⁵³

⁴⁶ Britain granted full labour rights to intra-EU immigrants immediately, without transition period. "Taking back control" would then be the strongest pro-Brexit driver at the 2016 referendum.

⁴⁷ Rees, 'America, Brexit', 6.

⁴⁸ For example, in 2003 and 2011, Britain vetoed EU proposals to set up a comprehensive planning headquarters (for the CSDP), because it could have affected NATO's unique capabilities (Rees, 'America, Brexit', 7).

⁴⁹ Frédéric Mauro, 'European defence: Mourning England', *Tribune, IRIS France*, 22 January 2020.

⁵⁰ Rees, 'America, Brexit'.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* 10.

⁵² In the event of disagreements with EU states, the U.S. often refused to coordinate a shared policy, and followed its own course. In the run-up to the Iraq War, America drew Britain into bilateral cooperation, limiting the role it could play in alliance management. Thus, the U.S. not only provoked a soft balancing response by France and Germany, but left Britain detached from the European mainstream (*Ibid.* 13).

⁵³ Specifically, nuclear cooperation, reconnaissance imagery and communications intelligence, preferential access to conventional weapons, close institutional link between the armed forces.

it nurtured in the British political-military elite a self-perception of being apart from – and superior to – European allies in defence.⁵⁴

Influences of the CAP on Colombia's passage through UNASUR

Entry into CDS–UNASUR influenced by a cooling CAP

The Uribe Government entered UNASUR to avoid regional isolation following Operation Phoenix, an incursion into Ecuador which destroyed a FARC camp in March 2008.⁵⁵ Colombia's adherence to the CDS was also motivated by the cooling of the CAP with the arrival of the liberal Barack Obama to the U.S. presidency.⁵⁶

The creation of UNASUR as an organisation dedicated to regional security management was a process with such milestones as the signing of its Founding Treaty by South American leaders in May 2008 and the launch of the CDS in March 2009.

Operation Phoenix sparked a diplomatic crisis with Ecuador and Venezuela: both severed relations with Colombia, and a militarised dispute with Venezuela ensued. South American leaders pushed Colombia to join the CDS project so as to avoid escalation with Venezuela and isolation in South America.⁵⁷

Since January 2009, Uribe could not count any more on his close friend Bush in the White House. The CAP cooled down because the Obama Administration downgraded security in hemispheric relations and Colombia in the U.S. national security agenda.⁵⁸ Obama also showed benevolence toward UNASUR, tolerating its mediation in intra- and interstate crises in South America.⁵⁹

Limited participation

The military CAP, enhanced by Plan Colombia, discourages any meaningful Colombian participation in the UNASUR–CDS. Attractive opportunities under the liberal CAP (triangular cooperation and partnership with NATO) further distract Colombia from the South American cooperative security project.

⁵⁴ Rees, 'America, Brexit', 10.

⁵⁵ FARC: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. The attack killed FARC's "number two" Commander among twenty guerrillas.

⁵⁶ Victor Mijares, 'Filling the structural gap: Geopolitical links explaining the South American Defense Council', *Colombia Internacional* no 101 (2019).

⁵⁷ Martha Ardila and Juan Andrés Amado, 'Continuidades y cambios en las relaciones de Colombia con sus países vecinos: 2008–2009, año crítico con Ecuador y Venezuela', *OASIS* no 14 (2009).

⁵⁸ Mijares, 'Filling the structural gap', 20.

⁵⁹ During the 2009 Summit of the Americas, he met with his twelve South American colleagues.

Uribe defends the ACD in competitive conduct within UNASUR – result converges with the CAP (also serves UNASUR)

At a UNASUR summit in 2009, Uribe defended the ACD in preparation, which would grant the U.S. formal access to seven Colombian bases, causing an uproar in South America for its potential to alter the regional power balance.

Threatening to withdraw from UNASUR, Colombia managed to block a condemnation of the ACD despite adamant Venezuelan opposition and strong Brazilian reservations.⁶⁰

The Obama Administration insisted that the U.S. military presence in Colombia would not affect neighbours. It ruled out deploying an anti-aircraft system in Colombia fearing that it would only embolden Uribe to launch an anti-FARC incursion into Venezuela.⁶¹ The Uribe Government went on signing the ACD even without U.S. guarantees to protect Colombia from external aggression. Uribe must have calculated that the mere formalisation of U.S. military presence in Colombia would deter Venezuela.⁶²

The Obama Administration also wanted the ACD, but without provoking any Colombian–Venezuelan armed conflict. Discussing the ACD with Uribe within UNASUR served both objectives. As a result of the summit, initial normative parameters for the presence of foreign military forces in South America were established.⁶³

Summing up, Uribe's conduct within UNASUR was competitive, and the result converged with the mixed CAP. But it was also acceptable to UNASUR partners as a first step toward making Colombia take into consideration the regional consequences of its CAP commitments.

Minimalism: Colombia's competitive behaviours within the CDS – converge with the military CAP

Among CDS members, Colombia was the most averse to the idea of regional security autonomy. Colombian security cooperation remained bilateral and minimalist, focusing on the borders with Brazil, Peru and Ecuador. Colombians found it difficult to cooperate with Venezuelans within the CDS, and were uninterested in centralised decision-making.⁶⁴

Radseck noted two limitations of Colombia to cooperate within the CDS: the aversion to publish data on its defence sector (white papers), and the constant commitment to cultivate the most intimate relationship with the Pentagon. This commitment was only

⁶⁰ Tom Long, Sebastián Bitar and Gabriel Jiménez-Peña, 'Domestic Contestation and Presidential Prerogative in Colombian Foreign Policy', *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 39, no 4 (2020).

⁶¹ Consuelo Ahumada, 'Santos y el acuerdo militar con Estados Unidos: de la sumisión al pragmatismo', *Portafolio*, 13 January 2011.

⁶² Long, Bitar and Jiménez-Peña, 'Domestic Contestation', 7.

⁶³ Nolte, 'Cost and Benefits', 137.

⁶⁴ Mijares, 'Performance of the South American', 266, 273.

reaffirmed by the military CAP's strategic reorientation from intervention by invitation (internal security) toward triangular cooperation (external security).⁶⁵

Cooperative behaviours within UNASUR – compatible with the liberal CAP

Days after his inauguration in 2010, Santos meets with Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez – in the presence of UNASUR Secretary General Nestor Kirchner – to normalise the bilateral relationship. Chávez helped persuade FARC leaders to negotiate peace. Santos invited Venezuela to “accompany” the negotiations in La Havana. Obama quietly supported the peace process.

Santos lets the ACD perish (after the Constitutional Court conveniently tied its survival to Congressional ratification). This calmed Chávez, the ACD's staunchest critic within UNASUR. Santos was also able to convince the U.S. that a formal agreement was not indispensable. U.S. operations (military training, drug interdiction, communications, intelligence) in Colombia continued by using “quasi-bases” without formal lease.⁶⁶ The liberal CAP was not affected appreciably.

In 2014, Colombia's Foreign Minister Ángela Holguín – with her colleagues of Brazil and Ecuador – tries to mediate in Venezuela between Nicolás Maduro's government and the opposition on behalf of UNASUR. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry supported the mediation as long as it had a chance to enable a democratic transition in Venezuela.⁶⁷

Thus, all these Colombian cooperative behaviours within UNASUR were acceptable to the Obama Administration.

Santos's strategies concerning the UNASUR–OAS competition – under liberal and mixed CAPs

Santos ends the Uribe–Chávez game of chicken. After the Uribe Government denounced in the OAS the presence of FARC camps in Venezuela, Chávez rejected the jurisdiction of the OAS, severed relations with Colombia, and requested a meeting of UNASUR. By receiving Chávez with Kirchner, Santos ceded to the Venezuelan president and legitimised UNASUR.⁶⁸

Santos attends an urgent UNASUR summit in Buenos Aires to condemn a coup attempt in Ecuador against left-wing President Rafael Correa in late 2010.

The UNASUR triad's mediation in Venezuela delays attempts in the OAS to trigger the Inter-American Democratic Charter procedure regarding the Maduro Government's alterations of the democratic order.

⁶⁵ Michael Radseck, ‘Las relaciones colombo-brasileñas de defensa: panorama actual’, in *Estado y perspectivas de las relaciones colombo-brasileñas*, ed. by Daniel Flandes, Eduardo Pastrana and María Carpes (Bogotá: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2017), 83–84.

⁶⁶ Long, Bitar and Jiménez-Peña, ‘Domestic Contestation’, 8.

⁶⁷ La Prensa, ‘Kerry apoya mediación de Unasur en Venezuela’, 08 April 2014.

⁶⁸ Nolte, ‘Costs and Benefits’, 137.

During a humanitarian crisis with Venezuela in 2015, Santos tries to combine the OAS and UNASUR by proposing to discuss in both fora the expulsion of Colombians and closure of the border. When the motion was blocked at the OAS, and Caracas delayed addressing the issue at UNASUR, Bogota withdrew the proposal to avoid another setback.⁶⁹

Facing strong domestic resistance, Santos ends up sidelining UNASUR from the peace process. Although the United Nations accepted to verify implementation of the agreements, the OAS retained its support mission, winning the indirect competition with UNASUR.

At the end of his presidency, Santos – sharing the CAP with U.S. President Donald Trump – suspends Colombia's participation in UNASUR as part of a joint action of Lima Group members belonging to the South American organisation.

Note that the use of UNASUR alongside the OAS in the first five years of the Santos Presidency was compatible with the liberal CAP. Suspending participation in UNASUR came after the region's northward reorientation, under mixed CAP and Trump Administration pressure.

NATO partnership, triangular cooperation: balancing UNASUR–CDS collaterally – converging with liberal CAP

Triangular cooperation and NATO partnership were promoted under the liberal Obama–Santos CAP. Challenging UNASUR's relevance was not its objective, but a side effect or, if anything, an afterthought.

At the 2012 Cartagena Summit of the Americas, Obama supported an initiative by Santos to export Colombian expertise in confronting transnational crime to Central America with U.S. co-financing. His backing gave a boost to this kind of triangular cooperation.⁷⁰

Between 2010–2018, Colombian instructors trained more than 46 thousand officials from 81 countries in the fight against drugs, crime prevention and control, improvement of military and police forces, citizen security and organisational development: 60 per cent of them were trained in Central America under Colombian–American and Colombian–Canadian cooperation programs.⁷¹

NATO members approved an Individual Program of Cooperation and Partnership for Colombia in 2017, recognising the country as their global partner. The request to NATO was made ten years earlier, when Santos was Uribe's defence minister.⁷²

⁶⁹ Ibid. 143.

⁷⁰ Eduardo Pastrana and Diego Vera, 'Colombia y su agenda de seguridad. Del gobierno de Juan Manuel Santos al gobierno de Iván Duque', in *La región frente a los cambios globales en materia de seguridad*, ed. by Sandra Namihas (Lima: Equis Equis, 2019), 49.

⁷¹ 'The Untapped Potential of the US–Colombia Partnership: Creating a Modernized Plan for the Bilateral Relationship'. Independent Task Force Report (Washington: Atlantic Council, 2019), 17.

⁷² Although UNASUR was formed in 2008, its predecessor, the South American Community of Nations, existed since 2004.

In 2013, when Colombia signed an agreement with NATO to cooperate in peacekeeping operations, exchange confidential information, and fight organised crime and terrorism, Brazil and other left-wing governments questioned its commitment to the CDS.⁷³ Some scholars also saw the deal as a tool in the hands of the Santos Government to buffer UNASUR and Brazil.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, by 2018, when Colombia's global partner status was sealed during a visit by Santos to NATO headquarters, only one protester remained, the Bolivarian Government.

Common narrative

Plan Colombia and triangular cooperation underpinned a Colombian–American narrative about Colombia's transformation from a near-failed state into a security provider.⁷⁵ This semi-official success story (although soon overshadowed by reality) helped nurture in Colombia's political-military elite a self-perception of being distinct from, even superior to its neighbours in security.

Exit – loyalty to the U.S. and the OAS

As president-elect, Duque announces Colombia's exit from UNASUR in Washington, meeting Secretary General Almagro in OAS headquarters. After the August 2018 presidential inauguration, Bogotá is quick to notify UNASUR officially. Duque voiced two reasons: UNASUR was created to fracture the Inter-American System, and became an accomplice of the Venezuelan dictatorship.⁷⁶

Although abandoning UNASUR was a Colombian gesture of loyalty to the U.S. and the OAS,⁷⁷ it had little value. It was low-cost, because UNASUR lacked a trade dimension or solid institutionality.⁷⁸ It was also irrelevant, since UNASUR already suffered a fatal blow in April, when its members of the Lima Group suspended their participation indefinitely. Just to make sure UNASUR's demise, Duque championed the creation of Prosur, another ideologically inspired regional scheme.

⁷³ Brazilian Defense Minister Amorim expressed concern about the rapprochement of a CDS country to an extra-regional military alliance (El Universo, 'A Ecuador y Brasil les preocupa la relación Colombia–OTAN, comentario del ministro de defensa brasileño', 07 June 2013).

⁷⁴ Flandes and Castro, 'Institutional Contestation'.

⁷⁵ Mateo Morales and Arlene Tickner, 'Narrando la historia del éxito: experticia en seguridad y política exterior en Colombia', in *Nuevos enfoques para el estudio de las relaciones internacionales de Colombia*, ed. by Arlene Tickner and Sebastián Bitar (Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes, 2017).

⁷⁶ EFE, 'Colombia notifica a la Unasur que deja el bloque por no denunciar la crisis venezolana', 28 August 2018.

⁷⁷ Applauded by influential Republican Senator Rubio in a tweet.

⁷⁸ Victor Mijares and Detlef Nolte, 'Regionalismo posthegemónico en crisis', *Revista FAL* 18, no 3 (2018).

Conclusions

Britain's and Colombia's privileged bilateral relations with the U.S. influenced, directly or indirectly, their respective journey through the EC and UNASUR, including their entry, limited participation and exit – but they did it in rather different ways.

Entries

British and Colombian entry motivations – although had to do with the AASR and the CAP – had not much in common, except a feeling of regional isolation.

British entry to the EC was delayed by the vetoes of de Gaulle, who saw Britain as America's Trojan Horse. Then the sidelining of the AASR in transatlantic relations, as American diplomacy redirected towards the EC and Germany, gave a sense of urgency to accession.

The Uribe Government entered UNASUR to avoid regional isolation after Operation Phoenix, while its entry into the CDS was also motivated by the cooling of the CAP with liberal Obama's arrival to the White House.

Limited participations

British participation in the Single Market was compatible with the AASR, but other cooperative options within the EC – like an adherence to the euro (collective soft balancing against the dollar) or to a European defence autonomy drive (inter-institutional balancing against NATO) – would have been incompatible.

Even the Blair Government (seen as pro-European) desisted from both projects. Since the start of the Iraq War, Britain (ostensibly on U.S. behalf) played a rather obstructive role in the CFSP–CSDP which in twenty years of complementation with NATO has not achieved strategic autonomy.

Although less significant, Colombian cooperative actions within UNASUR during the first half of the Santos Presidency resulted compatible with the liberal CAP (until the Venezuelan conflict became intractable, and Obama was replaced by Trump in the White House).

Tolerant with UNASUR (despite its dealing with security without U.S. participation), the Obama Administration did not use Colombia to hinder the CDS project. Yet the robust military CAP naturally discouraged any meaningful Colombian contribution to this security community initiative, promoted by Brazil.

Furthermore, cherished security projects of the liberal Obama–Santos CAP, such as triangular cooperation and NATO partnership, attracted Colombia's political-military elite way more than UNASUR, diminishing the latter's relevance collaterally.

UNASUR–OAS competition

Assigning a role to UNASUR – alongside the OAS – in South American security management was compatible with the liberal CAP, but not with the neoconservative CAP. Even a lopsided complementation – such as the one between NATO and the CSDP – proved unviable between the OAS and UNASUR.

Mixed CAPs

The compatibility of mixed CAPs with UNASUR remained inconclusive. Uribe under Obama joined the CDS, but soon threatened to leave UNASUR altogether in his defence of the agreement on bases with the U.S. Santos under Trump suspended participation in UNASUR, but did not abandon the organisation for good.

Exits

The AASR and the CAP – with their close military ties – nurtured in Britain and Colombia a self-perception of being distinct from, even superior to their neighbours in security–defence, thus feeding their scepticism towards the CSDP and the CDS.

Ironically, Britain's last status in the EC (partial in integration, full in decision-making) was optimal for the U.S., and Obama argued against Brexit.

But previous U.S. administrations – that used bilateral collaboration with Britain to manage their ambiguous relationship with European allies – inadvertently contributed to British Euroscepticism and hence to Brexit.

By contrast, Colombia's departure from UNASUR was formalised by the Duque Government as a gesture of loyalty to the U.S. and the OAS, under neoconservative CAP with the Trump Administration.

But Colexit was too low-cost since UNASUR had no trade dimension (contrary to Brexit's high costs to Britain for lost privileges on its largest market).

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