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Foxy Ladies and Men with Guns: Desires and Fantasies in Two Modernist Fox Stories

Tamás Tukacs

1 Introduction

The use of animals in fables has a long tradition in European (and in world) literature. Most of these allegorical stories can, in general, be easily decoded, for most of them are elaborated presentations of some truth or morale deemed to be universally valid. One of the most common animal characters that features in these allegories is the fox. The fox can be found in Aesop's fables, served as the basis of the medieval Reynard cycle, and through this cycle found its way into Chaucer's "The Nun Priest's Tale," later appearing in La Fontaine's tales, and so on. Over the centuries, "the stylized concept of the fox as a subversive, disruptive, intelligent marauder" (Asker, *Aspects* 38) has established itself in literature. Foxes, however, not only served as immutable characters in plots that follow roughly the same pattern. According to D. B. D. Asker, the "fox fairy" appears as a financial and spiritual helper in Japanese and Chinese tales, evoking connotations that transcend the traditions of the above-mentioned, intelligent, shrewd marauder-type of fox. Bearing essentially feminine traits, it opens up rather exciting (and disturbing) possibilities of interpretation in the fox-man relationship, with "an association of the fox with the fulfilment of the carnal desires of men" (*Aspects* 31). The vixen figure often appears as a truly carnivalesque figure, eschewing traditional morality, subverting established (male-dominated) systems, and with its trickster-like qualities, calling into question firm hierarchies, and mobilising various fantasies and desires (see the peculiar connotations of "the foxy lady" in contemporary popular culture).

In an especially revealing passage of his autobiography, Henry Green, one of the most idiosyncratic English writers of the twentieth century, compares the task of remembering to a foxhunt: "As we listen to what we remember, to the echoes, there is no question but the notes are muted, [...] now no louder than the cry of the huntsman on the hill a mile or more away when he views the fox. We who must die soon, or so it seems to me, should chase our memories back, standing, when they are found, enough apart not to be too near what they once meant. Like the huntsman, on a hill and when he blows his horn, like him some way away from us" (97). Later in that chapter, however, after recounting a peculiarly embarrassing childhood event, it is the fox that he identifies with,

instead of the rememberer (the hunter): “Later, when the accident I have described disrupted me, I felt, and it is hard to explain, as though the feelings I thought I ought to have were hunting me. I was as much alone as any hunted fox,” and this feeling persisted “until the fox I was was caught” (102). Green here reveals an intriguing dynamic between the hunter and the prey, opening up a field rich in the connotations of “hunting” and “haunting.” In the man-animal, fox-hunter relationship, both can take the position of the victim and the killer alike, which is especially true in the gender-determined relationship of the male hunter and the vixen. A curious transference is often to be seen in this relationship that goes back at least to the time of Ovid and his story about Acteon and Diana: when the former is transformed by the gods into a stag and is violently killed, “a powerful residual element of sympathetic magic” is mobilised (Asker, “Vixens” 182), and through a process of animal metamorphosis, the hunter and the hunted change positions.

In what follows, I shall look at this “interpersonal” dynamics between the hunter and the hunted by examining two Modernist texts, “Lady into Fox” by David Garnett (1922) and “The Fox” by D. H. Lawrence (1923). Both stories emphasise the subversive quality of the animal figure, revealing the dynamism of this dyadic relationship. I am going to analyse “Lady into Fox” along the lines of a dream text and the structure of a double fantasy, and in the second part of the essay, I shall look at “The Fox” from the point of view of the Hegelian master-slave relationship.

2 A Case-Study of a Childless Marriage: David Garnett’s “Lady into Fox”

2.1 The nature of the text

The first thing that astounds any reader of David Garnett’s “Lady into Fox” is the way the author begins to shake his or her confidence in the authority of the text by blurring the boundaries of “real” and “supernatural.” The tone Garnett employs in the first few pages of the story is not unlike any serious writing, or, let us say, a psychoanalytical case-history. He talks in a scientific tone, cites facts and asserts that “the sudden changing of Mrs. Tebrick into a vixen is an established fact” (7), a “true story fully proved” (8). A few pages later he goes on outlining the background of the events, relating Mrs. Tebrick’s family name (which was—not accidentally—Fox), how she was married to Tebrick in 1879, how she spent her childhood and so on. At the level of form and diction everything seems to be acceptable for the reader to give credit to the narration. What is problematic, of course, is what the text is about, the transformation of a human being into an animal. However carefully the narrator wants to preserve his authority to tell us the case history, he seemingly contradicts himself. First he suggests that it is pure facts that he is going to write about, later he emphasises the profane nature of the miracle that may happen in a material world,

unsupported by the interpretive force of any authoritative text: “it is indeed *a miracle*; something from outside our world altogether; an event which we would willingly accept if we were to meet it invested with the authority of Divine Revelation in the scriptures” (9, emphasis in the original).

There is one option, however, with the help of which one may look at such a text in which the contradiction of impossibility and reality need not be resolved: approaching the story as a dream text (by definition a wish-fulfilling text). As Freud points out, miracle or fantasy taking the place of reality can only happen in dreams, where contraries and contradictions are simply not represented (Dreams 429). The narrator makes several references to dreams and dreaming in the main body of the text as well. After Silvia changes into a fox, her husband—quite naturally, we could add—exclaims, “Can it be she? Am I not dreaming?” (14). Later, he “had [...] gone about paying off his servants and shooting his dogs as if he were in a dream” (22). When there is a hope that both Tebrick and Silvia are going to be able to “wake” from this dream-like state, he says, “Surely this affliction will pass soon as suddenly as it came, and it will all seem to us as an evil dream” (40). It is around this point that this dream-text about the fox begins to show its dangerous facet for both wife and husband. After Tebrick can do nothing but release Silvia into the woods, he starts to display more and more serious symptoms: “Indeed I am crazy now! My affliction has made me lose what little reason I ever had! [...] I am thin and wasted by this consuming passion, my reason is gone and I feed myself on dreams” (95). Just like in the introductory pages, fantasy and dream totally replace what we could call “reality” or “normality.” On the basis of these quotations we can conclude that the text of the novel can be regarded as a chronologically ordered, “polished” version of an extremely disturbing and neurotic dream-text. The question *whose* dream it is will soon be discussed.

Another important characteristic feature of the text is its *regressive* quality. According to the “classical” Freudian theory, dreams (and other psychological phenomena that display the surfacing of unconscious material) often display signs of regression, going back to infantile states of being. This regression appears in two ways in Garnett’s story. On the one hand, as I shall demonstrate, the story of the transformation can be conceived of as an infantile regressive fantasy; on the other hand, the text’s mode of representation is likewise regressive.

On a superficial level, “Lady into Fox” is an easily decodable allegorical story, in which the figure of the fox embodies an ancient Rousseauian notion of “back to nature,” or, in an alternative approach, just like in Lawrence’s “The Fox,” the fox becomes the symbol of some primeval energy, an invigorating force that brings life, mysticism, freedom, and some sort of higher level of existence into the stale and limiting English post-war environment (see Asker, *Aspects* 38). The fox can be seen as the allegory of a natural, uncorrupted force that cannot live within the boundaries of modern civilisation, and is bound to be destroyed. What seems to be more important here is that the text exposes a

decided “indifference to reality as we ordinary perceive it” (Skura 140). Being an allegorical narrative, this story, just like regressive modes of consciousness, “ignore[s] the conventions of realism the way a child does” (Skura 140). The allegorical and regressive mode of representation is another factor that justifies one in evaluating the text as a dream, since dreams always look for the best, concretised and pictorial way of representation, being unable to signify abstract notions (Freud, *Dreams* 455). Here the figure of the fox (and that of the dogs, too) serves as a tangible, representable object. There is an important difference, however. While, in psychoanalytic terms, regression ignores or escapes from the “reality principle” for the sake of uncontrolled pleasure, allegories usually work the other way round: it is often the pleasant (subversive, disruptive, disturbing) story that is supposed to be replaced and concealed by the authority-giving, moral-driven, “serious” allegorical version. Thus, Garnett’s story, conceived of as a dream text, reveals the potentially disturbing and desire-driven content of a conventional allegorical story or fable.

2.2 Silvia’s fantasy

Regression into childhood is not only perceivable on the level of the narrative form, but on the level of the plot as well. To illustrate this, first we must take a look at Silvia’s “case-history” to be able to show the motivating force that sets this regressive process in motion.

In the first few pages of the text the reader is informed that Silvia Fox was married, “after a short courtship” (10) to Richard Tebrick. The narrator ascertains that they were indeed a very happy couple. A look into the prehistory of this marriage may, however, also prove to be fruitful. Though the narrator does not attribute much importance to the fact that Silvia “having once hunted when she was a child of ten and having been blooded [...] took great fright and disgust at it, and vomited after it was done” (10), one feels that this childhood event must be of great importance. We are also informed that “she had been strictly brought up by a woman of excellent principles and considerable attainments, who died a year or so before the marriage. And owing to the circumstance that her mother had been dead many years, her father bedridden, and not altogether rational for a little while before his death, they had a few visitors but her uncle” (12). It is impossible not to remember the case of Dora, Freud’s patient, who also began to show signs of hysteria during the illness of her father, her hysteric coughing being the result of a transference and subsequent identification following the kiss given by “Herr K.,” and who started to develop a father-complex. It is no wonder that after these preliminaries (the trauma of being covered by fox blood), Silvia “was reserved almost to shyness” (11). It is one year after the wedding that Silvia’s fox-fantasy is set in motion. It is while fox hunting that memories of childhood begin to surface in a traumatic manner, the second event recalling and reinterpreting the first one in a traumatic way. Tebrick wants to force Silvia to go with him after the fox: she “hung back,

and he, holding her hand, began almost to drag her [...] she suddenly snatched her hand away from his very violently [unusual of a shy wife!] and cried out” (13). This is naturally related to the childhood memory mentioned above, displaying the link between Silvia’s nervousness and the infantile event, since in a dream, causal relations can be expressed with a scene of transformation: “The other method of representing a causal relation is adapted to less extensive material and consists in one image in the dream, whether a person or a thing, being transformed into another” (Freud, *Dreams* 427). In this climactic moment the infantile memory is mobilised and bursts out. But why is Silvia transformed into a fox, and why a fox?

When Silvia is transformed, she unconsciously identifies with the fox in her fantasy. This identification is, on a certain level, the result of her attachment to the two most powerful male figures in her life, her father and her husband. Her father, because he, like the fox, inevitably dies, and her husband, because of her intimate relationship with him. According to the Freudian theory, “identification is most frequently used in hysteria to express a common *sexual* element. A hysterical woman identifies herself in her symptoms most readily—though not exclusively—with people with whom she has had sexual relations or with people who have had sexual relations with the same people as herself. [...] In hysterical phantasies, just as in dreams, it is enough for purposes of identification that the subject should have thoughts of sexual relation without their having necessarily taken place in reality” (*Dreams* 233). It shall be remembered that, since wild animals often, as a result of a transference, stand for persons feared by the hysteric, the fox is an available figure for her to denote both her father and husband: “a dreaded father is [often] represented by a beast of prey or a dog or wild horse—a form of representation recalling totemism” (Freud, *Dreams* 536). Thus, according to this approach, Silvia’s transformation into a fox is the result of her Oedipal identification of the two threatening male authorities in her life.

On the other hand, a fox can mean *herself* in a neurotic fantasy in relation to her husband. Thus she comes to mean a (potential) victim in the eyes of her husband who has a gun and has power over such a creature: during the story he could kill her at any moment. Thus, fox becomes a double symbol, at once motivated by Oedipal fantasies and identification with the father/husband, and produced by an identification with a victim position. Naturally, the whole process is instigated by her own name, Silvia Fox. In her neurotic fantasies, just like in dreams and with children, a proper name comes to mean an object (Freud, *Dreams* 412).

There are other factors that make it especially apt for Sylvia to identify with a fox. With the help of identification she can reach back to her infantile fantasies. After she changes into a fox, her husband “took her in his arms. She lay very close to him, nestling under his coat and fell to licking his face” (14). This is not at all unlike a scene when a child is taken up to his mother’s breast, as it is pointed out in the story: “for when we are overcome with the greatest sorrow we act not like men or women but like children whose comfort in all

their troubles is to press themselves against their mother's breast" (15–16). Of course we need not neglect the Oedipal fantasies (Tebrick as a symbolic father) and the "normal" sexual aspects (Silvia licking her husband's face) in this scene, either. Similar infantile fantasies are mobilised when Tebrick makes a remark to his wife: "Silvia, what a light-hearted childish creature you are" (36). It is not surprising that apart from Tebrick, only her old nurse, Mrs Cork recognises her. After she comes back for a while she treats her like a child: "the old woman talked to her as though she were a baby and treated her as such" (61). Later Tebrick decides to move from Stokoe to Nanny's house, which is near Tangle Hall, where she "would feel at home," "having known it from her childhood" (65). Apart from these instances of identification, an animal is an excellent figure to represent a child: it is playful, it cannot eat properly, walks on all fours, cannot dress itself, cannot talk, does not observe the traditional rules of "civilised" behaviour. She gradually regresses into this childhood state: first she is able to recognise the cards they play with, later they are nothing more than sheets of paper.

Apart from regression and identification, another very important fantasy of Silvia is becoming independent of her husband, and leading a life of her own in the woods. One can thus observe a double movement: one backwards, into childhood, and one forward, leading to an independent life, and finding one's true self, fulfilling one's fantasies. We have to bear in mind that Silvia and Tebrick at this point have no children, so her desire for offspring is quite natural. This is all the more probable since generally in dreams "small animals and vermin [here the cubs] represent small children (*Dreams* 474). Mrs. Cork's statement, however, is revealing in this respect: "But whatever she looks like, you should trust her the same as ever. If you do, she'll do her best to be a good wife to you, if you don't I shouldn't wonder if she did turn into a *proper fox*" (58, my emphasis). That is, as long as Tebrick forces an emotional bond on Silvia, and is able to exert power over her, she cannot be free and be rid of her neurotic fantasies, and lead a "normal" life again (that is, have a happy family and children). As long as she is bound to Tebrick, who expects his "fox to be as candid and honest with him in all things as the country girl he has married" (79), her wish cannot be fulfilled. It is only in the idyllic sphere of her fox-family that Silvia can experience the happiness she lacks in her real life. Of course the reality principle, symbolised by the hounds, does not let this fantasy be long-lived. In the final dramatic scene when the dogs tear her apart, she again tries to find a shelter in the arms of Tebrick, that is, regress again into an infantile fantasy. This solution has proved to be insufficient once, so the subject of fantasy has to perish.

2.3 Tebrick's fantasy

The peculiarity of the text is that it can be interpreted both as Silvia's and Tebrick's fantasy at the same time. As it has already been pointed out, the fox,

being a manifold, overdetermined symbol can mean at the same time Silvia's father as a sort of fearful totem, Tebrick, a similarly violent fantasy object, but also a vulnerable creature (a child or a weak woman) exposed to the violence of hunters, hounds and Tebrick.

In Tebrick's fantasy text, his wife is transformed into a fox that can be kept in captivity and be possessed exclusively. The sadistic desire fantasy of Tebrick, a hunter, naturally fancies an animal whose life depends entirely on him. First, the cruel aspect of the fantasy does not surface, for he keeps kissing and caressing his wife as if it/she was still a human being. The key problem with the transformation of his wife is that it has to be kept a secret from other people: "Having got her into the house the next thing he thought of was to hide her from the servants" (16). Tebrick starts to build a fantasy world, but, as Freud remarks, "he [the creative writer, the one who fantasises in general] is expected not to go on playing or phantasing any longer but act in the real world; on the other hand, some of the wishes which give rise to his phantasies are of a kind which it is essential to *conceal*" ("Creative" 134, emphasis mine). Indeed, Tebrick does not act the way that could be expected of an adult: instead of killing a fox, he looks after it, but this fantasy of his has to be concealed. At the beginning he tries to shut out the reality principle from the fantasy world: he sends the servants off, and shoots the dogs (that may kill his fantasy).

His wife as a fox represents at least two kinds of fantasy for Tebrick. On the one hand, as has been pointed out above, Silvia as a fox is an especially good way of representing a child-like state. Thus, the more "civilised" or polished fantasy of Tebrick would be an ambitious one: to have a child, who can be played with, who has to be taken care of, with whom he can go for a walk, who is funny and mischievous. On the other hand, his wife as a fox represents another, not so elegant undercurrent in his fantasy, a sadistic daydream. Being a wild animal, she is very difficult to keep under control, and so has to be punished again and again. After he presents a rabbit to her,

when he went in what a horrid shambles was spread before his eyes. Blood on the carpet, blood on the armchairs and antimacassars, even a little blood spurted onto the wall, and what was worse, Mrs Tebrick tearing and growling over a little piece of skin and legs, for she had eaten up all the rest of it. The poor gentleman was so heartbroken over this that he was likely to have done himself an injury, and at one moment thought of getting his gun, *to have shot himself and the vixen, too.* (emphasis mine, 47)

After a few minutes, "though he beat her off four or five times even giving her blows and kicks, she still came back to him, crawling on her belly, and imploring his forgiveness with wide and sorrowful eyes" (47). No wonder that he—apparently out of pure compassion—"almost wish[es] her to be a mere fox than to suffer so much by being a half-human" (50). By transforming his wife

into a fox, he could maintain this ideal master-slave relationship and do whatever he wanted to her, without feeling guilt or remorse. If one recalls Silvia's nickname, given her by Tebrick, Puss (in expletive slang, in the form of "pussy" also means the female sexual organ) or his gun, which can equally serve as a phallic symbol, this daydream, doubtlessly, has strong sexual connotations. This sadistic fantasy has to be kept carefully in secret, first in the house, later, in the garden of Nanny's house surrounded by walls (cf. Tebrick's name!). As the narrator reports, "The next morning he looked about him at the place and found the thing that he most wanted, and that was a little walled-in garden where his wife could run in freedom and yet be in safety" (69). For a while Tebrick's fantasy provides him with a secure field, the only important thing is that the fox must not transgress this symbolic wall.

The situation becomes really dangerous when he sees that it is almost impossible to keep her back. Sadistic fantasies that seemed to have been successfully repressed now threaten to become charged with forces from the unconscious and transformed into motility. He resolves to release Silvia into the woods, that is, he seems to give up his fantasy. Of course he cannot simply give up his fantasy; what Tebrick wants to do is seemingly repress his fantasy by providing it another secure place. It is just after this repression of the sadistic fantasies that signs of hysteria and neurosis start to appear in him: "he went out of the room and up to bed, and lay down as he was, in his clothes, utterly exhausted, and fell into a dog's sleep" (85). He also starts to insult a hunter, prohibiting him to hunt around the premises, who understands nothing whatever of the situation. Tebrick begins to display more and more serious signs of neurosis. In search of his wife, he "dared not to go himself, lest his passion should master him and he might commit a murder" (89). He does not care about himself anymore, "gave up washing himself for a week or two at a stretch," eats next to nothing, turns away from civilization, and lives a secluded life (which is also a form of regression). It is worth quoting a longer passage that illustrates well his state of mind:

All this disorder fed a malignant pleasure in him. For by now he had come to hate his fellow-men and was embittered against all human decencies and decorum. For strange to tell he never in these months regretted his dear wife whom he had so much loved. No, all that he grieved for now was his departed vixen. *He was haunted all this time not by the memory of a sweet and gentle woman, but by the recollection of an animal [...].* His one hope was the recovery of this beast, and of this he dreamed continually. Likewise both walking and sleeping he was visited by visions of her; her mask, her full white-tagged brush, white throat, and thick fur in her ears all *haunted* him. (91, emphasis mine)

When the repressed desire fantasy begins to be really dangerous, Tebrick tries to neutralize it with sublimation—he wishes to lead a religious life. His efforts prove fruitless since Silvia's uncle, Rev. Fox, seeing that his mental state is somewhat precarious, does not encourage him to join the church.

Following this, Tebrick attempts to cope with his neurosis by visiting his wife's fox-family in the woods. This stage corresponds to Silvia's infantile regressive fantasy. The civilized, ambitious layer of this fantasy is the same as that of his wife: to have a happy family with several children. Gradually, however, Tebrick discards all attempts at seriousness and regresses into a child-like state. "He understood, *or so he fancied*, what it was to be happy, and that he found complete happiness now, living from day to day, careless of the future [...]" (emphasis mine, 109–110). When in an idyllic scene he carelessly plays with the cubs "all human customs and institutions seemed to him nothing but folly" (121). Finally "he had got a way of going doubled up, often almost on all fours [...]" (125). However, this way of coping with his neurosis is not successful, either: the sadistic fantasy cannot be repressed with regression and done away with. Chased by hounds, Silvia, the fox, "ran straight to the open gate to him" (129). The censorship of the ego that blocked his repressed fantasy falls away, and the energy-charged sadistic primal scene now returns, but, having to meet the reality-principle symbolized by the hounds, it is bound to perish.

2.4 The Psychopathology of Marriage?

David Garnett's "Lady into Fox" shows several ways of coping with desire and the lack of wish-fulfillment: in the case of Silvia, two solutions are available. The first is a regressive infantile fantasy, with the help of which she identifies with a fox and wishes to be taken care of and treated like a child. (This is presumably a late wish-fulfillment, since she, owing to her family conditions, lacked the happiness a child can expect.) The other solution for her is to turn this infantile fantasy into an ambitious one: she desires to have children and a happy family, but *without* the help of her husband, and to lead a "natural" or "normal" life. We cannot ignore two other possible interpretations, one of them presenting her husband as a fearful hunter, a sort of Oedipal totemic figure with a gun, the other being an identification with the dead father in the form of a dead fox.

In the case of Tebrick, the lack of wish fulfillment surfaces in four ways: the first, and most prominent one is a sadistic daydream, by which he conceives of his wife as an object of violence, a victim, over whose life he has complete power. No wonder he gradually wishes his wife's entire transformation into an animal that can be done violence to without any censorship of the ego. He has to conceal this fantasy from other people, of which the symbol is a garden surrounded by walls. Secondly, when the sadistic fantasy begins to threaten his integrity, he tries repression, which corresponds with his releasing his fox into the woods. For a short time he does not have access to her, and this is the short period when he makes an attempt at sublimation (that is, wants to be a priest).

After this, he starts to regress—under the cover of an ambitious dream similar to that of his wife—by regularly visiting his “family” in the woods, slipping back gradually into a childlike state. However, Silvia—the repressed sadistic fantasy—returns to him and begins to *haunt* him. In the end, he cannot cope with this return, and Tebrick has to give the fantasy up by symbolically killing his wife.

“The plot implied, rather clumsily in my view, that there is some essential quality of foxness in Mrs. Tebrick [...]. Her metamorphosis is meant to suggest a rebuff of the married state itself,” Asker suggests (*Aspects* 40), unfolding the idea that Silvia was simply unprepared for marriage. For all the ambiguities of the “fox” symbol, we should not forget that, throughout the story, Silvia remains Tebrick’s *wife*. That is, all biological and emotional bonds are overturned, and a “weak” legal bond represented by marriage is the only thing that survives into the fox-stage. If one follows the logic outlined above, that is, that Garnett’s text unfurls a double fantasy, laden with all sorts of sadistic, masochistic and regressive motivations, and if one attempts to forget about the fantasy layer of the story, we might be able to catch a glimpse of what could be called—following the Freudian term—the psychopathology of married life. Let us imagine for a moment that Silvia does not turn into a fox: the result would be the narrative of a neurotic, shy wife, married too early and too soon to a man who drinks and does violence to her, and who eventually becomes a misanthrope. In this scenario, Silvia would feel uncomfortable in the confines of her home, would go to perhaps London (as rumour has it in the village) and find another man and her happiness, but Tebrick, ruined and enraged, would find them and kill Silvia. This could be the realistic story covered by both the allegorical and the dream text layer of Garnett’s version.

3 Master(s) and Slave(s): D. H. Lawrence’s “The Fox”

In a letter to John Middleton Murry in September 1923, D. H. Lawrence called Garnett’s fox story “pretty piffle—just playboy stuff” (Warren et al., ed. 500). To Lawrence’s mind, his version of the fox story (a story in which the central symbol is also a fox) is allegedly more mature, more serious, “deeper” and reveals layers of interpersonal connections that are painfully missing from Garnett’s “playboy stuff.” A careful reading of the two novellas, however, reveals that they centre on roughly the same ideas: female independence, male authority, mutual domination and the fox as a subversive element in these relationships. In what follows, I shall look into the changes in the structure of domination that unfolds in this claustrophobically close community between the three principal characters, March, Banford and the intruder, Henry. What is the initial situation modified by the appearance of the fox? What kinds of modification take place in this structure? How is this attraction connected to gender roles and, more specifically, to sadomasochistic relationships? How can the title be interpreted, that is, what or who is the fox in Lawrence’s scheme? What is the role of identifications? Though I am aware of the fact that often it is

not the best method, in this case, however, a chronological presentation of the storyline seems an appropriate way in analysing the process of the modification of power relations.

3.1 March's "primal scene"

March's first encounter with the (real) fox can be evaluated as a "primal scene," which simulates an "ideal" or classic master-slave relationship as defined by Hegel and is based on a dialectic process in which the master is equally in the power of the slave he is attempting to subjugate. As Jessica Benjamin puts it, "If I completely control the other, the other ceases to exist, and if the other completely controls me, then I cease to exist" (53). This initial structure is disturbed by the appearance of Henry, which distorts March's original contact with the fox, and repeats it in a considerably different manner. This relationship can be said to be a "real" master and slave relationship, which inevitably tends towards death and which risks death (Benjamin 63), the participants unconsciously being aware of this fact. By the end of the story, Henry manages to transform March from a "male" master-figure into a "masochist" mother figure. In relation to all this, it is going to be pointed out that in spite of the fact that the title promises the story of one specific fox, practically all three characters become foxes in the novella, so that by the end we cannot talk about *the* fox, but about the *position* of a fox that the characters subsequently occupy.

At the beginning of the story, a stable structure is suggested in the presentation of the two women, March and Banford, characterised by a clear distribution of gender roles, regardless of the two women's biological sex. Exactly what kind of relationship exists between the two women, and how they became acquainted with each other, are hard to determine; the 1968 film version makes lesbianism explicit (Preston 41, see also Wachman 176). March is introduced as a "male" participant in the relationship: "March was the more robust [...]. She would be the man about the place" (3). Banford, on the other hand, is a "small, delicate thing with spectacles" (3). Later it is made clear that March does about four-fifths of the work around the house like a husband, while Banford is relegated to the position of a "wife" doing household chores. What asserts March's masculinity is that it is she who possesses the gun with which they try to ward off the fox that has been raiding their poultry. On the surface it may seem that there is a balance or harmony between the two characters, and that they are quite content with this distribution of the gender roles. This seeming harmony can, however, be questioned on the basis of little signs: their endless quarrels and the constant references to March's pursed lips may be seen as signs of repression. The fox, which is brought into the story as an intruder from the woods that steals hens, is an intruder in the relationship of March and Banford. In this respect March's first face-to-face encounter with the animal is of crucial importance. This meeting reasserts March's position as master, but at the same time challenges this position. Let us see what happens:

She lowered her eyes, and suddenly saw the fox. He was looking up at her. Her chin was pressed down, and his eyes were looking up. They met her eyes. And he knew her. She was spellbound—she knew he knew her. So he looked into her eyes, and her soul failed her. He knew her, he was not daunted. (9)

What is taking place here is the creation of a subtle balance of mutual domination. The fox is in an inferior position, looking up at March, like a slave, while it is he that possesses her through the power of looking. Two aspects are significant here: one is the eye contact, which is exceptionally clear and makes the participants equal partners (in the sense that both of them are masters and slaves at the same time). The other is the metaphors of copulation with the repeated assertion of “knowing” the female, with its archaic undertones, referring to an intimate sexual relationship. These two aspects are, in fact, the two different versions of one problem, and that is the problem of boundaries. As Benjamin remarks, “It should be noted [...] that the break must never *really* dissolve the boundaries—else death results. Excitement resides in the *risk* of death, not in death itself”(63). In this “original” scene, the trope of intrusion is of utmost importance, and it is as if the two participants were aware of the subtle mechanisms of master and slave relationship, that is, they respect each others’ frontiers, intrude into the other’s sphere, but make sure that these boundaries are not dissolved. This encounter with the fox does not only reassert March as a master (making her a slave at the same time), but as a woman as well, which she is denied in her relationship with Banford. According to Peter Preston, the significance of the fox’s appearance is that it painfully forces March into recognising her own sexuality (42) and helps to heal the scar that is the result of her divided personality (39); I would say, however, that this encounter widens the gap further between March’s role at home as a “male” master and as a “female” “subject,” thus reasserting her divided personality.

3.2 From male master to masochist mother

The appearance of Henry is an obvious repetition of the previous situation. The differences between the two situations, however, are more intriguing. Henry also makes March painfully aware of the (real, biological) difference between man and woman, and the stress must fall on the word “painfully.” Her relationship with Henry is substantially different from her encounter with the fox. It is first and foremost characterised by reversals as compared to the previous scene. March (and several critics) often uncritically identify Henry with the fox she saw; to quote Asker, for instance: “the trope of the fox is unmistakable in that it represents (metaphorically) a male presence and threat that is used to expunge the all-female relationship of March and Banford” (*Aspects* 37). However, March does not seem to realise that, instead of Henry, it is *herself* who slowly

becomes “the fox” in this relationship. One evening, when they are all sitting inside the house, she is exposed to Henry’s penetrating male gaze:

She was very sensitive in her knees. Having no skirts to cover them, and being forced to sit with them boldly exposed, she suffered. She shrank and shrank trying not to be seen. And the youth [...] glanced up at her with long, steady, penetrating looks, till she was almost ready to disappear [...]. Her desire to be invisible was so strong that it quite baffled the youth. He felt he could not see her distinctly. She seemed like a shadow within a shadow. (18)

This scene is, on the one hand, a repetition of the “original” fox scene. The most important difference, however, is that, as opposed to the clear vision that characterised the encounter of March and the fox, here that vision is blurred or distorted (it is significant, by the way, that all the scenes charged with tension take place in the dusk or in darkness). Henry is ready to push March to the margins, like the fox was “pushed back” into the woods by the look of March. Here, March becomes the fox and Henry the person with a gun, with the important difference that he would be ready to extinguish her: “she shrank and shrank [...] till she was almost ready to disappear.” Henry does not maintain the boundary between March and himself; he wants to know her, but, at the same time, he risks killing her, and thus risks losing his status as master, because there would then be no one to give him recognition as a master if he extinguishes March. We now have three foxes altogether: the real animal, and March and Henry as foxes, with different roles. “The fox” now becomes a position (of the master and the slave at the same time) that is taken by various characters.

Indeed, a look into March’s first dream of the two might serve to illustrate this point. In this dream she has a “painful” experience, as she dreams with a (the?) fox.

She dreamed she heard a singing outside, which she could not understand [...]. She went out, and suddenly she knew it was the fox singing [...], he ran away and ceased singing. He seemed near, she wanted to touch him. She stretched out her hand and he bit her wrist and at the same instant, as she drew back, the fox, turning round to bound away, whisked his brush across her face, and it seemed his brush was on fire for it seared and burned her mouth with great pain. (23–24)

In fact there are two fox-figures in her dream: the one which is singing around the house (the “real” fox) and the other that bites March (Henry). This dream scene is often interpreted as March’s longing for submission, since she identifies Henry with the fox. However, a choice (?) is symbolised in her dream between the harmonic, equal and dialectic relationship with the real fox, which is pleasant (she is “spellbound”) and the violent, transgressive and risky relationship with Henry.

This difference becomes more emphatic when Henry proposes to March. Before that scene, eye contact is again emphasised: “Particularly he wanted March. She was a strange character to him [...]. Her dark eyes made something rise in his soul, [...] an excitement he was afraid to let be seen [...]. He felt he must go further, he was inevitably impelled” (28). His is precisely the pleasure of the sadist who feels impelled by the slave’s submission and interprets it as love. He seeks to prolong his pleasure and find new levels of resistance (Benjamin 58). Ideally, this prolongation serves to avoid the extinction of the object; however, it seems that that is precisely what Henry is especially bad at. Significantly, it is in darkness that he proposes marriage to her, which is another instance of the “blurred,” “distorted” vision mentioned above. What is more, it is with a dead rabbit in his hands that he first thinks of marrying March (29), which is ironic considering the controversies involved in their relationship and is indicative of the risks Henry is running concerning the two of them. The whole proposal appears in the context of the sadistic framework of March’s dream: Henry’s voice is like the “the subtle touch” (32) of the fox in the dream, and after her refusal, he thinks that “he had missed” (32), as if March was a target to be shot at. One of March’s objections is that she is old enough to be Henry’s mother (32). Although it is not true, since Henry is around twenty, and the two women are around thirty (4), yet this aspect might enrich the discussion of the relationship between the two people. If, symbolically, March can be conceived as Henry’s mother, this places their contact in the framework of Oedipality. In this case Henry’s sadism would be fuelled by a boy’s need of differentiation from and disidentification with the mother and a subsequent repudiation of the maternal body (Benjamin 76). This objectifying tendency seems to be reinforced by the next scene, in which Henry tries to force her to say yes and kiss her, which evokes her first dream. She can hardly articulate “Oh, I can’t” (33), “she wailed helplessly [...] as if semi-conscious, and as if in pain, like one who dies,” which underlines the dangers in Henry’s marrying March.

The following scene, when March is crocheting, can be read as a summary of the different power-relations and the positions of the fox that are occupied. It seems that while she is engaged in crocheting, she is dreaming about *the* fox:

March [...] was spasmodically crocheting. Her mouth was pursed in an odd way, as when she had dreamed the fox’s brush burned it. [...] In a sort of semi-dream she seemed to be hearing the fox singing round the house in the wind, singing wildly and sweetly, like a madness. With *red* but well-shaped hands she slowly crocheted the *white* cotton, very slowly, awkwardly. (37–38, emphasis mine)

Here the three fox figures are represented in one paragraph: Henry, who burns the face of March, the real fox singing, and she herself with red hands and white cotton.

3.3 “Something was missing”: the bad master

It is at this point that power-relations begin to alter, and Banford, who has not played a significant role up till now, begins to emerge as an important factor. A rivalry begins for the domination of March, who, by now, has been converted from a master into a masochist.

To begin with, the importance of looking and gazing indicates that Banford starts to occupy the place of Henry, or rather imitate very faintly what Henry had done to March up till now. So far Banford's impaired eyesight has been remarked upon, but has not been of utmost importance. Now she stresses that her eyes are bad (38) and that she does not like to look at Henry. This seems to be the exact opposite of Henry's powerful male gaze; however, she tries to assign him a marginal position, just like Henry did to March. The real turning point comes when Henry and March announce that they are going to get married. “Never!”, Banford exclaims. Why is she so anxious? Is her newly acquired position (that is, her starting dominance over Henry) under threat? Or does it upset the “subtle” balance of March and herself, described at the beginning? Most probably, since in their relationship, it is March that gave her recognition as a master, as the “man” around the house, and now that balance is threatened by Henry, who is making March a masochist subject. Banford simply *has* to acquire the position of the master if she is to survive. She acts as if her life depended on March (“I should be dead in a month” [49]), which is true: her existence as a master is risked by the marriage. Naturally, it is Banford who thinks of Henry as a “master”: “He'd soon think he was master of both of us, he thinks he's master of you already” (49–50). This statement probably serves only to disguise that it is she who wishes to be the master of them.

One of the story's climaxes is Henry's shooting of the fox. There has been much discussion over why Henry kills the fox with which he is identified (cf. Preston 43). By now it is clear that it is another sign of Henry's attempt to dominate March to the extent of her extinction, repeatedly trying to transgress the boundaries of the dialectics of the master and slave dichotomy. When Henry announces that he has killed the fox, it is March who is frightened to death—not surprisingly, since her existence as slave/masochist becomes jeopardised. Henry, not realising that he is playing a very dangerous game, offers March the fur of the fox to wear (symbolically trying to transform her into a fox), which March—instinctively perhaps—refuses.

It is in this context of the violation of the master-slave relationship that March's second dream takes place. In the dream, she unconsciously tries to transform Banford into a fox (putting the fur under her corpse and covering her with the fox's skin). What is the significance of this wish fulfilment? There are at least two plausible explanations. One is that March tries to put her in the position of Henry (as a sadistic fox), and thereby exclude him. The other explanation may be that she attempts to transfer the position of the fox (as victim) to Banford. The decision is not easy, since the first option would mean

that March would reintroduce the slave-master dichotomy only substituting Henry for Banford, the latter would mean that she wishes Banford dead, which would be a catastrophe for her, since it is she who used to recognise her as a master and now would, as a master, confirm her position as a slave.

This tension culminates in the murder of Banford. Why does Henry kill her? Is it a willful act? According to the logic of the early Lawrence, “women tend to engulf or devour their loved ones” (Ruderman 110). In the first version of *The Fox*, Henry kills Banford because he feels that he is inextricably caught in her web (Ruderman 110). However, I want to suggest that both March and Henry have to face almost unsolvable dilemmas. After killing the fox, and looking at the two women approaching—naturally—in the dusk, he “realised that she was a woman, vulnerable, accessible, a certain heaviness had possessed his soul. He did not want to make love to her. He shrank from any such performance, almost with fear [...] he held back from that which was ahead almost with dread” (73). By now Henry seems to be cognisant of the fact that instead of March he had killed the fox, but this was only a temporary solution. As for March, she also feels that should they continue their relationship, it would culminate in her extinction, and that is why she enters a new relationship with Banford and rejects Henry who still wants to marry her. After their separation, she sends a letter to Henry in which she states that “when you aren’t there, I see what a fool I am. When you are there, you seem to blind me to things as they actually are. You make me see things all unreal and I don’t know what. Then when I am alone again with Jill, I come to my own senses [...]” (79). What March is longing for is the clarity of vision that she used to have when she was staring into the eyes of the fox, and for which she has been looking, trying to recreate the “original” scene. Henry’s answer to the problem is killing Banford, because he is dimly aware that otherwise he would kill March.

What takes place after the murder seems to be the exact reversal of the original fox-scene, but actually it is a distorted version of that: “She sank down on the grass [...]. He stood above her, looking down on her, mute, pale, and everlasting seeming. He never moved, but looked down on her [...]. She gazed on him as if sightless, yet looking up to him” (92) March can never again regain the clear vision, the subtle and finely balanced master-slave relationship she once possessed for a moment, and she is doomed to have this limited, blurred sight. By now, however, from a “male master” she has managed to become a “proper” masochist: “She wanted to be alone: with him at her side” (97), which is exactly like the attitude of a masochist, who wants to search for aloneness *with* the other (Benjamin 72). “She *wanted* him to possess her, she wanted it, she wanted nothing else, now, still he did not quite succeed. Something was missing” (93). That something is precisely the security of the master-slave relationship, the dialectics that creates new tensions and prolongs the liaison, without extinguishing the other. No wonder Henry is not happy at the end, since he is aware of the fact that after two murders March may be, symbolically, the next victim. By the end of the story, alongside the five “M”s mentioned so far

(the progress of March from a male master to a masochist [symbolic] mother), a sixth “m” is introduced: melancholia, which begins to possess March, as a result of which she is unable to reflect on herself and her loss (Butler 23).

By now it is clear that this narrative is not about one fox, but the position of a fox, the fox as a metaphor whose site is occupied by all three major characters. The appearance of Henry starts to subvert the (after all, not that stable) initial structure, and he, taking the position of a (sadistic) fox subsequently forces the other two women to play the same role. He pushes March from the position of a masculine master to that of a masochist subject (partly, perhaps motivated by Oedipal fantasies of destruction), and threatens her with extinction, thereby forcing Banford to take the position of March’s master, which leads to the death of the former. Henry does not prove to be a “good” master, and after killing the fox and Banford (Banford, the fox), he ends up in a particularly distressing situation, with the would-be victim March at his side.

4 Conclusion

In an era when social transformations profoundly questioned and redefined the role of women, both Garnett and Lawrence carried on negotiating the most prominent theme of the traditional realist novel, that is, married life and the position of women in these relationships. Moreover, in these two novellas, they managed to do this in a perfectly idiosyncratic way, using the allegory (or the disguise of an allegory) of the fox-tale to express profound concerns about domination, subjugation, identification and master and slave relationships. The common point in the two texts is putting women in the position of the fox, which unfolds the multi-layered significance of the genre of the fable. The peculiarity of Garnett’s “Lady into Fox” is that both Richard Tebrick, the husband, and Silvia Fox, the wife, may be read as fox figures, with different aspects of meaning. In the former case, the husband appears as a threatening Oedipal figure, a wild animal, in the latter, Silvia as fox may also be interpreted in two ways: as a free animal, wishing to lead a life of her own, and—from the husband’s point of view—a victim, prey, or a child (a weak figure that must be dominated). Both options leads to tragic consequences, that is, Silvia’s death.

In Lawrence’s tale, the theme of domination and identification is somewhat more subtly elaborated. All the three principal characters (March, Banford and Henry) take the position of the fox, but contrary to what seems obvious at first, that is, the identification of Henry with the fox, it can be argued that it is primarily March who is conflated with the fox figure. Henry’s appearance repeats March’s first encounter with the real fox, which is the perfect Hegelian master-slave relationship. The crucial difference is that Henry is unable to maintain that subtle balance of the original encounter, and threatens to dissolve the boundaries between March and himself. After the death of the real fox and Branford as a fox figure, now it is March’s turn to be symbolically annihilated in

this male-dominated relationship. Eventually, both novellas offer new insights into what could be called “the psychopathology of married life.”

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Burlap's Angels and Daemons **Aspects of the Mansfield Myth in Aldous Huxley's** ***Point Counter Point***

Angelika Reichmann

Among the continental writers who had a profound impact on major figures of English Modernism, the Russian classic F. M. Dostoevsky ranks highly. As Helen Muchnic points out, Dostoevsky's "cult-like" popularity (qtd. in Kaye 19) in Britain was fuelled by the publication of Constance Garnett's translations starting in 1912 (cf. Kaye 1–7). He was a presence few writers of the time could escape—Katherine Mansfield and John Middleton Murry were no exception. The latter published his monograph entitled *Fyodor Dostoevsky: A Critical Study* in 1916, and, parallel with that, Mansfield devoured the Russian writer's major novels (Mansfield 63–5)—an experience that would stay with her until the end of her short life (cf. Bényei 122). Peter Kaye even emphasises that the atmosphere of the period might be best described in Mansfield's own words: in a 1919 article of the *Athenaeum* she compares the London literary scene to the world of a Dostoevsky novel, teeming with "young gentleman-writers declaring (in strict confidence) that they were the real Dostoevsky" (Mansfield qtd. in Kaye 19). Indeed, as a fascinating episode of those times illustrates, Russianness or Dostoevsky's name became popular catchwords of modernity: the evening of Boxing Day, 1916, saw the acting out of a half-impromptu "Ibsen-Russian play" penned by Mansfield at Lady Ottoline Morrell's Garsington, in which both Mansfield and her husband featured—the latter as "a Dostoevsky character" (Alpers 227).

It is in this context that I would like to discuss a most curious phenomenon: Aldous Huxley, in 1916 an ardent participant not only in this Dostoevskian play but also in the Russian writer's cult-like admiration associated with Murry, launched, in his 1928 *Point Counter Point*, a harsh attack against his fellow writer by caricaturing him as Denis Burlap (Roston 381). Apparently, Huxley's satire is focussed on Murry's stomach-turning exploitation of his dead wife's legacy by creating the Mansfield Myth, which is clearly recognisable in Burlap's idolisation of his dead wife. In my analysis I will argue that this specific feature of Huxley's Murry critique is not only linked to a debate with Burlap's—Murry's—aesthetics, but it gains such prominence because Murry/Burlap is an epitome of Huxley's major target of criticism in *Point Counter Point*. It is

nothing else but “modern romanticism”—i.e. spiritual quest as a solution for the dilemmas of modern consciousness—summed up for Huxley at the time in Dostoevsky’s name. The factors pointing in this direction include Burlap’s echoing of Murry’s critical ideas growing out of his Dostoevsky study over the 1920s and his representation as a Dostoevskian figure. Through the half-comic fight of angels and demons for Burlap’s soul the Mansfield Myth and Murry’s Christian aesthetics, crystallised in his reading of Dostoevsky, are represented as two interrelated fictions that mutually discredit each other.

Huxley’s satire on “modern romanticism” in *Point Counter Point* is, to a great extent, a rejection of the Dostoevskian spiritual quest, which he saw—at the time—as a defining feature of diseased modern consciousness. In Robert Baker’s analysis it is a “sustained attack” on romanticism that “governs Huxley’s social satire” in his major works (4). With some simplification, the romanticism referred to here is an intellectual and spiritual approach to life at the cost of denying the body. Originally rooted in Platonic philosophy and most prominently embodied in ascetic Christianity, in Huxley’s view romanticism in its “inverted” or “modern” version results in the satanic and sadistic attitudes of the “looking-glass Christian”—the Marquis de Sade, Baudelaire or Dostoevsky (*On Art and Artists* 183). In his 1929 essay “Baudelaire” the analogy between the two latter writers is expanded upon in the context of Dostoevsky’s *Devils*, the novel *Point Counter Point* systematically rewrites.¹ Characteristically for the Dostoevsky reception of the era, Huxley identifies Dostoevsky’s most demonic characters with the author—in fact, he formulates his image of the writer solely on the basis of his demonic figures.²

On the one hand, Murry offers himself as an easy target for satire in this context because his critical output of the period, as William Heath emphasises, categorises him as a “subjective romantic” (53)—with a pronouncedly Christian twist. By 1924 Murry coined his own definition of romanticism, which is, according to Heath, “divorced from historical significance” (53). In his 1924 “Literature and Religion” Murry declares that great literature tackles a central issue that is religious in nature: the resolution of the paradox presented by the relationship of the I and the not-I, that is, the internal, spiritual world and the external world of necessity. A most acute awareness of this paradox is what defines for Murry modern, that is, rebellious post-Renaissance consciousness, which rejects “external spiritual authority” and “begins historically with the repudiation of established Christianity” (149–51) He calls this modern

¹ Huxley reads its main character, Stavrogin, remodelled in his own novel as Spandrell, in terms of psychopathology (perversion, abjection, masochism, solipsism and monomania) resulting from the unhealthy liberty and dominance of intelligence (*On Art and Artists* 178–9).

² This reading deserves comparison with D. H. Lawrence’s similar interpretation of the Russian novelist as an embodiment of diseased modern “mental consciousness,” also based on the identification of the writer with his most troubled fictional characters (Kaye 44–5).

consciousness, in turn, Romantic (155–8).³ Throughout the essay Dostoevsky is one of the most often mentioned examples of Romantics in the wider sense (e.g. 158). Not by chance: the germs of this train of thought are clearly recognisable in Murry's Dostoevsky monograph, mostly in his constant emphasis on the disembodied, purely spiritual nature of Dostoevsky's heroes.⁴ Even in that text, he almost idolises the most troubled, rebellious—and demonic—Dostoevskian characters (Svidrigaylov and Stavrogin), whom he identifies with Dostoevsky (58–9; 198). Thus there seems to be an almost straight line leading from Murry's reading of Dostoevsky as a creator of rebellious spirits, through his concept of romanticism and modern consciousness, to his notoriously religious phase in his thirties (Frank Lea qtd. in Kimber 85).

On the other hand, Murry might have lent himself easily to Huxley's critique because in the eyes of some contemporaries he was actually identified with Dostoevsky. Burlap as editor of the *Literary World* evokes the *Athenaeum* years of Huxley's actual contact with the Murrys, 1919 and 1920. It was the heyday of Dostoevskian influence in Britain, during which Murry featured in Huxley's world as a "Dostoevskian character." The novel, however, was written in 1927–28, and thus much later events were layered over Huxley's personal reminiscences of Murry from 1916–20.⁵ The first of these, Huxley's relationship with D. H. Lawrence, might have had a central role in both the formulation of Huxley's Dostoevsky critique and the reinforcement of Murry's rejection as a Dostoevskian character. As Peter Kaye describes, back in 1916 Murry's posturing as the "amanuensis" of the Russian classic was most sharply criticised by Lawrence, his close friend then.⁶ In their heated debates Lawrence identified the "acolyte," Murry with Dostoevsky himself (35–44). By 1925–26, however, allegiances were shifted: the Huxleys and the Lawrences, both having broken with the Murrys, established a close attachment to each other (cf. Cushman passim). Its deep impact is clearly palpable, among other things, in the close affinity between Lawrence's and Huxley's Dostoevsky critique. One cannot stop wondering whether Lawrence's Dostoevskian vision of the Murrys, so biting and fictionalised in *Women in Love* (cf. Alpers 206), also influenced Huxley's

³ Historical Romanticism is only a sub-period within this larger era which is characterised by a momentary mystical resolution of the above paradox ("Literature and Religion" 155).

⁴ E.g. Dostoevsky's characters are "disembodied spirits," whose "bodies are but symbols" (*Fyodor Dostoevsky* 47).

⁵ This overlaying is highlighted by Huxley's method of blurring together two slightly distinctive historical-biographical periods in *Point Counter Point* through his two fictional alter egos, Walter Bidlake and Philip Quarles (Firchow 530). The former character—a young writer involved in the tedious chore of producing reviews for Burlap—clearly associates Huxley's literary apprenticeship mentioned above (cf. Alpers 216–35, 290–306; Murray 111–21). However, Quarles—a mature writer just back from India with his wife and a five-year-old son—points to the years 1925–26 in Huxley's life (cf. Murray 173–85).

⁶ In fact, it was Murry's excessive praise and somewhat idiosyncratic reading of the Russian classic as a "prophet" that caused a major break between Murry and Lawrence (Kaye 35–44).

understanding of Murry as the embodiment of Dostoevskian, diseased modern consciousness. The other sad event that played a crucial role in the shaping of Burlap's character was Mansfield's death in 1923. The Mansfield industry working at full power by 1925–27 served as a convenient target⁷ and an easy tool for the revelation of the falsity behind Murry's "Dostoevskian" spiritual stance both as a critic and a human individual.

It is so because certain elements of the Mansfield Myth, whose constants were formulated by Murry on its emergence, right after Mansfield's death (cf. Meyers 24–5), seem to reverberate the terms and rhetoric of his religious-romantic aesthetics: the myth seems to be both a product and a justification of Murry's critical theory. First and foremost, Murry's accent on spirituality clearly finds its echo in depriving Mansfield of her body.⁸ As several critics have pointed out, what remains of her in the myth is a disembodied spirit (Meyers 19–21; Kimber 81)—an "otherworldly" creature (Kimber 74), an angel. But this angel, if she also wants to be an artist of the higher order, must also embark on a religious/spiritual quest. And indeed, as Gerri Kimber does not fail to emphasise, the transformation of Mansfield's whole artistic career into a systematic mystical quest was so successful, that her reception in France, for example, is often spoken about in terms of hagiography (72–84). Nevertheless, to rank among the greatest, she must also be a Romantic; hence, as it has been often noticed, she is mentioned consistently together with Shelley, Keats and Blake (Meyers 32, cf. Murry, "Katherine Mansfield" 54–64).⁹

Needless to point out, it is the satirical representation of this mythologising in Huxley's novel that most prominently identifies Burlap with Murry. Burlap creates a fictional image of his dead wife, Susan, as a child-like, fully spiritual, angelic creature—a household saint—in a "more than usually painful series of [...] always painfully personal articles" (Huxley, *Point Counter Point* 172). Susan is replaced by a "phantom" (Huxley, *Point* 73) whose sole importance is that she is a major prop for authenticating Burlap's narcissistic role-playing as the devout admirer of absolute spiritual beauty. The role involves wallowing in grief and producing "abject" scenes—self-humiliating emotional outbursts.¹⁰ The phantom and the disgusting scenes result from a process which Huxley tellingly describes through an analogy with the "churning up" of emotions in the

⁷ Huxley also gave vent to his distaste for it in the essay "The Traveller's Eye View" in 1925 (qtd. in Kimber 75).

⁸ A body, that was not only prominently physical—because ill—but also transgressively so: a female, lesbian and somewhat promiscuous body torn not only by the romantic and mentionable illness of tuberculosis but also by STD.

⁹ Her aesthetically perceived death in the myth evokes instances of the cruellest romantic treatment of the female body: Poe's fascination with the death of the child-like beautiful woman as the most proper subject matter and inspiration for art.

¹⁰ They are highly reminiscent of Dostoevskian novels, a connection clearly indicated by the phrase "spiritual masturbation" (Huxley, *Point* 173), which features both in the novel and Huxley's Baudelaire essay.

meditations of a Jesuit novice to evoke “a vivid, mystical and personal realisation of the Saviour’s real existence and sufferings” (Huxley, *Point* 173).¹¹ Indeed, Huxley gives a sharp-eyed description of Murry’s creation of the Mansfield Myth as hagiography in his rather distasteful personal outpourings sold as literary criticism.

Huxley is also a keen-eyed perceiver of the connection between the angelic Mansfield image and Murry’s spiritual-romantic-Dostoevskian posturing as a literary critic: Burlap’s catchword is spirituality both in his fictional narrative of his dead wife and in his critical credo. Just as with Murry’s reputation, in which according to Meyers the handling of Mansfield’s heritage discredits his stance as a literary critic (38), in the novel these two versions of “spirituality” mutually undermine each other. One of them, the angelic Susan’s narrative is a cover-story that both saves Burlap from the effort of building up mature emotional-sexual relationships, and serves as his major tool for seducing women into his bed both before and after his wife’s death:

he had such a pure, *child-like and platonic* way of going to bed with women, that neither they nor he ever considered that the process really counted as going to bed. [...] Susan died [...]. [In front of Ethel Cobbet] he plunged into an orgy of regrets, [...] of repentances, excruciating for being too late, of unnecessary confessions and self-abasements. [...] A broken-hearted *child* in need of consolation, he would have liked to lure his consoler, *ever so spiritually and platonically*, into a gentle and delicious incest. (Huxley, *Point* 174–5, emphasis added)

Burlap’s other version of spirituality, his critical credo also reeks of inauthenticity: he portentously sounds it to everyone willing to listen, ridiculously regurgitating his own editorials, like pre-written theatrical roles. This is the impression he makes right from his first appearance: his introduction during a literary discussion with a Mrs Betterton at a party. During the evening, Burlap declares that “A great artist [...] is a man who synthesises all experience”, yet “there are more spiritual than bodily experiences,” and by implication these are the “great subjects” that define great artists (Huxley, *Point* 67–8). Presumably, under the influence of their lofty discussion Mrs Betterton sees Burlap’s face as “spiritual” and therefore “beautiful” (Huxley, *Point* 67), while young Walter Bidlake, who has just faced the same ideas in the proof of next

¹¹ As Jeffrey Meyers highlights, these elements point to Huxley’s acute perception of such components of the Mansfield machinery as “the falseness of the cult,” “Murry’s pitiful exploitation of his grief”, the “emotional immaturity and childish role-playing of both Murry and Katherine” and “the destructive aspect of Murry’s ‘mystical’ love [described] in the metaphor of sexual perversion” (17–8).

week's editorial, cannot help but find them "rather ridiculous" (Huxley, *Point* 69).¹²

The inauthenticity of Burlap's spiritual stance—and by implication the untenable nature of the kind of spiritual-Dostoevskian solution Murry embodies for Huxley—is further underscored by at least two most Dostoevskian motifs in Burlap's character. The first is his split consciousness represented through the devil as his hallucinatory double. It is a distinctive feature of a favourite Dostoevsky character for Murry: Stavrogin. Similarly to Ivan Karamazov's devil it indicates his irreversible identity crisis and ontological insecurity. In Burlap's case the motif is devoid of the tragic Dostoevskian overtones: his own petty devil evokes a parodistic, sacrilegious morality play as a rather ironic reflection of Murry's own reading of Dostoevsky's novels as tragic "moral allegories" (Heath 56).¹³ Rather comically, Burlap has the annoying habit of talking to one as if "he were addressing some little personage invisible to everyone but himself [...] his private daemon, perhaps; an emanation of himself, his Doppelgänger" (Huxley, *Point* 66). Whenever Burlap pronounces one of his hypocritical, sententious statements, his other, sceptical, ironic, and honestly immoral self—his demon or devil—interferes. Thus, when Burlap rejects the idea of a cynic as a great artist in the discussion quoted above, in his thoughts, the "mocking devil" immediately chips: "Though why you want to make an impression [...] unless it's because she's rich and useful, goodness knows" (Huxley, *Point* 67).¹⁴ A sign of Dostoevskian-romantic self-division, rebellion and ontological crisis, the devil turns into a comic device for revealing Burlap's rather unextraordinary hypocrisy. This is also a caricature of Murry's—and Dostoevsky's—affiliation with established Christian churches, since Burlap is the one character in the novel who is most consistently associated with an overtly religious stance, more particularly with Catholicism.

Finally, the utter falsity of Burlap's spiritual stance is revealed by a second Dostoevskian motif: the archetypal crime in several of his texts, driving a child/woman to suicide. Among other Dostoevskian characters, Stavrogin drives a child to take this fatal step in *Devils* by sexually abusing her, while arguably in *The Idiot* Mishkin's inability to acknowledge Nastasya Philippovna as a physical

¹² The ironic intertwining of Burlap's two fictions of spirituality is further emphasised by the fact that in this scene he mentally relegates Mrs Betterton—a woman of much material wealth, but of rather limited understanding, ungainly appearance and adulterous past—"to the side of the angels" (Huxley, *Point* 67) simply because she provides a faithful audience to his posturing as a prophet of spirituality.

¹³ Burlap's dividedness is the first piece of information about him: he is both "a movie villain and St Anthony of Padua" (Huxley, *Point* 67) and his *epitheton ornans* is his "Sodoma smile" (Huxley, *Point* 69). The latter is an ingenious pun on the two meanings of Sodoma: the more well-known Biblical one, and a reference to a Renaissance painter, contemporary of Leonardo da Vinci—by implication a painter associated with the Gioconda smile.

¹⁴ To add to this irony, it is right after this comment that Burlap recognises Mrs Betterton as an angel.

and sexual being is also a major factor in her suicidal return to Rogozhin, which leads to her murder. Huxley repeats Murry's reading strategy of blurring the boundaries between all kinds of Dostoevsky characters—saints and villains (cf. Kaye 38)—here: Burlap drives Ether Cobbett to suicide under the cover-story of a Mishkin-like pure spirituality, but his real motifs are those of Stavrogin-like seduction. In fact, Ethel kills herself not because she is seduced, but because she is ultimately rejected, though it is so because seeing through the hypocrisy of Burlap's platonic love—the thing that makes her fall for him in the first place—makes it impossible for her to succumb to his advances. Burlap manages to lure Ethel, his dead wife's schoolmate, to London with his pathetic role of the grieving widow, but she takes it too seriously and falls in love with him because of the romantic image Burlap creates about Susan. Naturally, she finds his narrative of pure spirituality incompatible with his attempts to start an affair with her, and working for him as a secretary she becomes a burden after rejecting his advances. The novel culminates with Burlap's summoning up his courage to finally get rid of her when he has found his ideal partner: Beatrice, who takes part willingly in his game of childlike innocence and spirituality; she idolises him—and most platonically goes to bed with him. Ethel's love for Burlap—and thus ultimately her suicide after her dismissal—is the product of his fiction of spirituality. Thus her story makes a powerfully ironic comment on the mortally harmful aspects of what Huxley conceives to be Dostoevskian spirituality.

This might suffice to illustrate that Huxley's satire on Murry in *Point Counter Point* is far from being an arbitrary personal attack that has lost all its significance for today's readers. It seems to be rather an organic part of Huxley's concern with modern consciousness, with the dilemmas the individual has to face in the modern world, and with the function of literature in their representation and potential resolution. One kind of solution—spiritual quest—was summed up in the name of Dostoevsky at the time, but for the Huxley of the late 1920s it appeared to be unacceptable. He satirises Murry as the closest thing available to the original. The creation of the Mansfield Myth—the figurative destruction of the female body which serves as a stage for the poet-creator to parade on as a prophet of spiritual truth—made Murry an easy target both because it repeats a Dostoevskian motif and because it simultaneously sums up and undermines Murry's critical stance. Not that Huxley's regurgitation of Lawrence's gospel of blood-consciousness through Rampion as his mouthpiece in the novel stood the test of time. However, his ingenious satire clearly illustrates how devastating myth-making is at least in one respect. Huxley never associates Burlap's wife, Susan, with literature. Thus he most effectively demonstrates how Katherine Mansfield, the brilliant woman writer disappears—within five years of her death—behind the angelic figure of the Mansfield Myth in fictional and non-fictional worlds of critical debate, male rivalry and devilish counterfeit. The mythical angel—similarly to that other, more famous “phantom” of Virginia Woolf—kills.

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Districts and Circles

Péter Dolmányos

The relationship between Seamus Heaney and the Tollund Man has become virtually metonymic. The widely anthologised poem “The Tollund Man” is generally considered trade-mark Heaney with all its laconic ambivalence and quasi-religious tone. The tentative parallel between past and present outlined in the poem facilitated a more comprehensive assessment of the potential of the motif which was subsequently re-examined and reconsidered, and though the aesthetic aspect remained consistent, Heaney discovered inadequacies in the parallel and concluded his sequence of bog-poems on a tone of resignation. The promise of the original parallel, however, proved tempting to occasion another return to it in a moment of historic significance. The poem “Tollund” was based on the same tentative parallel as “The Tollund Man”, reinstating the relation, this time in the form of a peaceful rural world, between Jutland and Northern Ireland with the implicit idea that the sacrifice was perhaps not in vain.

Though Heaney’s most recent collection, *District and Circle* takes its title from names in the London underground, wider implications of the title are also possible as several poems of the collection revisit earlier topics or openly allude to poems from Heaney’s oeuvre. Among these there is a return to the figure of the Tollund Man, who is resurrected in a sequence of sonnets entitled “The Tollund Man in Springtime.” Heaney evokes familiar districts—primarily Jutland, both old and new, the home of the Tollund Man, and by allusion a wider world including his own homeland. The return, yet another one, creates the impression of circles, and as the sonnets constitute a circular structure in their sequence, there appears a Joycean technique at work in the considerably enlarged set of bog-poems.

Heaney’s interest in the bog had its first expression in the seminal poem “Bogland”, yet the first real and at once typical bog-poem was “The Tollund Man” as it provided the first character in a series of encounters with people from the past. The poem opens with a description of the body embedded in the image of an imaginary pilgrimage to the present location of its remains, and then moves on to a tentative invocation and an even more tentative identification with the experience of the contemplated figure; Heaney uses these latter two sections to negotiate his imaginative parallel between the distant world of the Iron Age community of Jutland and the contemporary society of the Troubles of Northern Ireland. The description of the body follows what was to become the ‘classical’

Heaney pattern in the later bog-poems: the body is described in terms of the bog itself, evoking Wordsworthian dimensions of at-one-ness with the surrounding world, and at the same time this technique diminishes the shock of the otherwise explicit reference to the status of the Tollund Man as a victim of a sacrificial cult. The invocation builds on this ennobled image of the figure: the “saint’s kept body” (Heaney, *New Selected Poems 1966–1987*, 31) becomes the proper figure to address in the hope of a better world beyond the violent conflict of the present. Heaney’s persona even suggests a sharing of the experience of the victim during his envisioned pilgrimage, leading him to a rather disquieting conclusion:

Out there in Jutland
 In the old man-killing parishes
 I will feel lost,
 Unhappy and at home.
 (Heaney, *New Selected Poems 1966–1987*, 32)

Heaney’s gesture in the last section of the poem has drawn doubts concerning the nature of his sharing of the victim’s experience. (cf. Parker 108: “Motoring through a foreign country hardly seems a comparable experience [...].”) However far-fetched the parallel between a sacrificial victim and a leisurely tourist may be, Heaney still has a point: the bold overstatement of the kinship of their feelings leads to the rather disillusioned closure of the poem in which the concept of ‘home’ is revised along the complicated confines of the conflict-ridden home province of the poet. The paradoxical relation of being at once “lost, / Unhappy and at home” is also indicative of Heaney’s stance in relation to the conflict itself as he attempts to stay clear of openly taking sides yet cannot fully ignore his own position as a Northern Catholic, with all his experience of grievances and discrimination.

Heaney returns to the bog-motif in his volume *North* on a larger scale. There is a section in the first part of the collection which creates a myth of the motif with an adequate narrative pattern to it, and this myth is in turn embedded in the myth of the North outlined by the whole of the collection. The section of the bog-poems complements the achievement of “The Tollund Man” by providing a variety of characters who are recruited to sustain the imaginative parallel between the past and the present, yet Heaney is honest enough to acknowledge the limitations of his construct, and in the concluding poem of the section (“Kinship”) he takes up the position of the detached observer who has no intention to dignify any further what has become in his eyes the simple and raw fact of murder.

Though *North* provides a gallery of bog-characters, the Tollund Man is missing from the collection. Instead, another victim of the cult is portrayed, yet the Grauballe Man does not receive the same elevated status of the earlier figure: though the initial description is done in similar terms, there is a strong contrast

between the “repose” of the Tollund Man and the horrific sight of the slashed throat of the Grauballe Man. This leads to a more complex evaluation of the figure at the end of the poem as “beauty and atrocity” (Heaney, *North*, 29) are linked to each other in the final moments of contemplation, and this time the Heaney-persona does not hint at any form of shared experience.

Heaney’s first return to the Tollund Man, or rather, to his emblematic role was undertaken in the poem “Tollund”, published in the volume *The Spirit Level*, well after he seemed to have abandoned the bog-motif. The figure is not explicitly conjured but the allusion to the earlier poem is impossible to miss: the poem is an account of a visit to the place where the Tollund Man was found, and the occasion is of historic significance as the poem is dated “September 1994” (Heaney, *The Spirit Level*, 69), making a clear-cut reference to the IRA ceasefire, which effectively brought to an end a 25-year-long period of civil unrest and violence. Writing in 1998, Helen Vendler suggested that “‘Tollund’ can stand for a poem of Afterwards, marking [...] one’s response in a post-catastrophic moment” (Vendler 156).

In “The Tollund Man” Heaney’s persona promised a pilgrimage to contemplate the remains of the Iron Age man. This promise is fulfilled here yet “Tollund” focuses on the location of the bog where the discovery happened rather than on a visit to a museum with its carefully arranged display of reconstructed history. The place is approached as a location in nature, though the description is proportionately shared between the bog and the altered landscape of country life. There is an eye on the touristic significance of the place too, yet no conflict arises out of this communion of nature and civilisation, the scene is that of near-pastoral harmony.

In contrast with the desperate conditions at the time of writing “The Tollund Man”, “Tollund” is characterised by a markedly different atmosphere. The form of the poem also embodies this difference as the leisurely long lines conclude in neat patterns of enclosed rhymes, which is in stark contrast with the narrow, and nearly claustrophobic, drilling-like and unrhymed lines of “The Tollund Man”. As the persona’s eyes follow the orderly modern world, there is a cataloguing of the landmarks: Heaney makes a list of the items of the modern landscape and this list-like account with its slow movement further contributes to the relaxed atmosphere of the poem. The masterful juxtaposition of the scarecrow and the satellite dish hints at the peaceful reconciliation of old and new, which prepares for the re-establishment of Heaney’s earlier parallel between the past of Jutland and the present of his home district through a simple use of place names from the latter. Heaney never ventures farther than this in making his point: the rather low-key sentence “Things had moved on” (Heaney, *The Spirit Level*, 69) solves his problem in a majestic way by suggesting a continuity of experience between the world of the Tollund Man and the present in the same location with the implication that fertility has been granted in the long run through the figure of the sacrificial victim. This is as yet only a hope in

relation to Northern Ireland, but the moment of a historic ceasefire is an indication of a possible new world.

The possibility of a new beginning is expressed through an allusion to a passage in Shakespeare, as Heaney explains it, but he provides the borrowed image with his own landmarks too:

One of the most beautiful passages in Shakespeare has to do with an old belief about the spirit walking abroad after death but having to return to purgatory at dawn when the cocks crow and the light brightens. In the next poem, however, I will revise this superstition and end with an image of ghosts coming back to life, re-entering the light and managing to begin again with a new energy and resolution. (*Stepping Stones*, comment preceding the poem “Tollund”)

Something of the ambivalence of the conclusion of “The Tollund Man” survives into this poem as the “Hallucinatory and familiar” nature of the experience is described at the beginning of the poem and as paradoxical phrases indicate the persona’s stance at the end: “it was user-friendly outback / Where we stood footloose, at home beyond the tribe” (Heaney, *The Spirit Level*, 69). The new beginning is one without earlier constraints though not without previous experience—this is indicated by the final stanza of the poem:

More scouts than strangers, ghosts who’d walked abroad
Unfazed by light, to make a new beginning
And make a go of it, alive and sinning,
Ourselves again, free-willed again, not bad. (ibid)

Though the figure of the Tollund Man does not appear in the poem, it is *apropos* the figure itself that the location acquires significance. The place would possess little power if it were not for the man, and it is exactly this imaginative appeal lent to the location by the human figure that Heaney deliberately exploits in the chosen moment. The same deliberate effort was not present at the writing of the first poem as Heaney claims:

The Tollund Man seemed to me like an ancestor almost, one of my old uncles, one of those moustached archaic faces you used to meet all over the Irish countryside. I felt very close to this. And the sacrificial element, the territorial religious element, the whole mythological field surrounding these images was very potent. So I tried, not explicitly, to make a connection between the sacrificial, ritual, religious element in the violence of contemporary Ireland and this terrible sacrificial religious thing in *The Bog People*. This wasn’t thought out. It began with a genuinely magnetic, almost entranced relationship with those heads. ... And when I wrote that poem (‘The Tollund Man’) I had the

sense of crossing a line really, that my whole being was involved in the sense of—the root sense—of religion, being bonded to something, being bound to do something. I felt it a vow; I felt my whole being caught in this. (Heaney quoted by Kirkland 258–9)

With the second poem, however, Heaney could safely build on a foundation which has been tested (though not unequivocally shared by every member of the audience), and there is a self-conscious literary foundation for the later poem beyond Shakespeare:

[...] [“Tollund”] was written after the IRA ceasefire of August 1994. The Sunday after that historic Wednesday I just happened to be for the first time in this bog in Jutland where they had found the body of the Tollund Man about whom I’d written about 24 years earlier. The mood of this more recent poem is as different from the earlier one as the dark mood of the early 1970s in Ulster was from the more sanguine mid ‘90s. (*Stepping Stones*, comment preceding the poem “Tollund”)

The bog-poems of *North* represented a resurrection of the motif and considerably widened the circle of its characters yet they did not involve the Tollund Man. Heaney’s latest collection, however, finds an occasion for the figure to come to life again and Heaney is generous enough to endow the figure with life and even a voice, so that it can recount experience from a personal perspective. As Heaney himself explains it,

[...] in a new start that was both unexpected and exhilarating, I returned to a figure who had given me rare poetic strength more than 30 years earlier. I began a sequence of sonnets in the voice of the Tollund Man; this Iron Age revenant was, as they used to say in stage directions, ‘discovered’ in a new setting, keeping step with me in the world of surveillance cameras and closed-circuit TV, of greenhouse gases and acid rain. He functioned as a kind of guardian other, risen out of the Jutland bog to ‘gather / From the display-case peat his staying powers’. The convention is to call such a figure a ‘persona’ but in this case he felt more like a transfusion [...] (Heaney, *The Times*, March 25, 2006)

“The Tollund Man in Springtime” is a sequence of sonnets. Heaney opts for the form for its inherent system of balance and dynamism, for its subtle organisation of its parts towards constructing a whole which is at once more than the sum of its components. Heaney, however, seems to prefer the more organic romantic version of the sonnet rather than the traditional Renaissance structure with its neat division into easily identifiable units. The closure of the last sonnet is linked with the beginning of the first one, which creates a circular structure in the

sequence: the figure has to be resurrected first to be able to recount the story of his resurrection.

The first of the sonnets outlines the context of the revival of the figure, dropping him into the contemporary world. Heaney employs the Future Perfect to indicate the coming to a new life of the figure, and the modern world is quickly evoked through an imagery of “scans, screens, hidden eyes” (Heaney, *District and Circle*, 55). The status of the figure, however, remains something of a mystery, self-definition stops short as he is “neither god nor ghost, / Not at odds or at one” (ibid). The only concrete elements mentioned are those of the bog, with its unique communion of “seeding grass” and “Dead bracken” (ibid), reminiscent of the basic cycle of the natural world. This builds a contrast between the temporal world of the bog and the timeless figure of the speaker as the former is adequately defined by its elements whereas the latter is stranded in the act of interpreting himself.

The resurrected figure has drawn energies from his ‘dormant’ state according to his own claims: “I reawoke to revel in the spirit / They strengthened when they chose to put me down / For their own good” (Heaney, *District and Circle*, 55). The resurrection runs parallel with an understanding and an act of forgiveness towards the event of his sacrifice, which is in concord with Heaney’s observation of the “repose” of the character in “The Tollund Man”. The past indeed is closed down, and the changed surroundings provide a different kind of threat for the figure, “a sixth-sensed threat” (ibid) of the modern world, “Clear alteration in the bog-pooled rain” (ibid). Alteration works on multiple levels as the normally short-term literal change from night to day becomes a far-reaching metaphorical one for the figure, and the whole world surrounding the bog has also undergone a profound change since the Tollund Man last contemplated it.

In the second poem the main resource of the bog, peat is explored, and the self-definition of the Tollund Man is complemented by this element. Peat is the proto-form of coal, a rather meagre source of energy which is “Ashless, flameless, its very smoke a sullen / Waft of swamp-breath” (Heaney, *District and Circle*, 55) as it never fully loses its water content even if it is left to dry in the sun for a long time. The Tollund Man ‘enjoyed’ a communion with this substance until his discovery, yet the approach to the figure in terms of this material is a new element in his description. The moment of discovery is seen in religious terms borrowed from Christianity: the “unrisen” figure comes to light when “the levered sod / Got lifted up” (ibid), and as a result, the Tollund Man is resituated in the Christian universe as a creation specifically placed in the bog:

[...]; then once I felt the air
I was like turned turf in the breath of God,
Bog-bodied on the sixth day, brown and bare,
And on the last, all told, unatrophied. (ibid)

With the allusion to the Creation the Tollund Man is safely established in his own private mythology which is reconciled with Christianity.

The third poem offers a catalogue of the body of the Tollund Man, or rather, of what has remained of it. It is only the head which is still displayed in a museum as the rest of the body was sacrificed to scientific investigations, and the description focuses on this item as it is carefully arranged on display. The verbless list of the parts and features of the head contrasts with the past tense of the “phantom head / And arm and leg and shoulder” (Heaney, *District and Circle*, 56) which also hints at the long period between the burial of the victim and the discovery of his remains. That long period was one with a mutual relation between the body and its surroundings: it was a time “when the bog pith weighed / To mould me to itself and it to me” (ibid), which is at once a self-reflexive commentary on Heaney’s use of the figure and the whole bog-myth as it suggests the evolution of the motif in Heaney’s sequence on the bog people. There is an allusion to the poem “The Tollund Man” too: the invocation of the poem is recalled as “Faith placed in me” (ibid), and the reference to the head being “On show for years while all that lay in wait / Still waited” (ibid) echoes the relation of “The Tollund Man” to “Tollund”.

The paradoxical idea of faith placed in the man while he was faithless as a sacrificial victim at first and a museum item later finds its analogue in the image of “a stone / The harrow turned up when the crop was sown” (ibid). The accidental discovery is at once an act of unsettling, and this evokes Yeats and his stone that troubles the living stream—and indeed the victims of the contemporary violence create their own ‘troubles’ for the living, and tentatively they also function as the Yeatsean stone, with all its ambiguity: the stone unsettles the course of the stream yet it is also what shocks it out of its inertia and gives it a new direction. The invocation to the Tollund Man, blasphemous as it may have been, served exactly the same purpose: by evading the direct confrontation of the contemporary world, it launched a course of profound enquiry into the nature of violence related to religion and territory.

This richly evocative section is concluded by a relaxed yet enigmatic pair of lines: “Out in the Danish night I’d hear soft wind / And remember moony water in a rut” (ibid). Neither time nor space is satisfactorily specified—the past habitual “would” does not make it clear whether it happened before the discovery or between that and the present reawakening of the figure, and similarly the “out in the Danish night” is vague enough to create a sense of ambiguity. The peaceful associations of the experience, however, are clear and they further strengthen the intertextual relation of the present poem with the earlier ones.

The fourth sonnet of the sequence concentrates on the Tollund Man’s reconstruction of himself. The museum item enacts a process of re-creation in a rather ingenious way: the reconstruction is a tentative rejuvenation course based purely on the power of the word. The self-empowered *logos* ushers in the return of sensation: seeing, hearing and smelling are all recovered not only to revive

the Tollund Man but also to relocate him in Heaney's usual poetic world which is dominated by a rich combination of these sensory fields.

The newly rejuvenated figure sets out on a course of learning. His education is conducted by an observation of cattle in the rain: it is "their knowledgeable / Solid standing and readiness to wait" (Heaney, *District and Circle*, 57) which provides the example with a strong emphasis on the element of patience and accompanying wisdom. Contemplation uncovers previous experience: "Of another world, unlearnable, and so / To be lived by, whatever it was I knew / Came back to me" (ibid). The lived but so far not contemplated and interpreted experience returns, yet it is at odds with the present of "check-out lines" and "cash-points" (ibid), thus the figure appears as a strange bystander, as "Bulrush, head in air, far from its lough" (ibid).

Despite modern techniques and equipment the Tollund Man manages to preserve a secret of his own, corresponding to his mental separation from the present. "Through every check and scan I carried with me / A bunch of Tollund rushes" (Heaney, *District and Circle*, 57): by carrying pollen on his skin the figure steals something out of his old world and into the new, driven by the hope of bringing it back to life again, yet it eludes him: "I had hoped they'd stay / Damp until transplanted," but "they went musty" (ibid). The recognition leaves the figure with a dilemma as to the possibility of continuity which becomes resonant with self-reflexive considerations on the part of the poet too:

Dust in my palm
And in my nostrils dust, should I shake it off
Or mix it in with spit in pollen's name
And my own? (ibid)

The resolution, however, is quickly made, and in another instance of self-reflexive allusion the figure decides in favour of giving it a try: "As a man would, cutting turf, / I straightened, spat on my hands, felt benefit / And spirited myself into the street" (ibid). This resolution also includes a reference to the first sonnet of the sequence ("Into your virtual city I'll have passed"), thus the circle is made full at the end of the last poem: the Tollund Man has been resurrected and now he can recount his resurrection.

The dilemma of the Tollund Man is on one level that of continuity, shared by Heaney himself. The question whether an imaginative parallel can be drawn between Iron Age Jutland and modern Northern Ireland is asked by the poem "The Tollund Man", yet it is only partly answered by it, thus Heaney makes a return to the motif. This in itself is another instance of the dilemma, and so is the latest revisiting of the topic through the resurrection of the Tollund Man in the new sequence. The choice of the poet to involve the figure once again implies his conviction that his initial idea was potent but at the same time it admits the persistence of his doubts concerning its validity, and the new approach to the

figure, though it generously avoids explicit references to the violent cult of the past, serves as a reinforcement of the imaginative power of the Tollund Man. The allusion to the turf-cutter, a possible reference to the grandfather of the poet as evoked in the poem “Digging” suggests a similar drive to strengthen the belief in the possibility of continuity despite a radical presence of discontinuity between the occupations of the family members of different generations, and in this way another circle is closed and thus made full—at least for the time being.

The poem “The Tollund Man” employed the framework of an imaginary pilgrimage, a promise for the future emerging from a finding from the past. The figure is excavated yet this does not correspond to a resurrection, and it is exclusively the observing speaker who governs the poem. “Tollund” depicts a world in the time of late summer and early autumn, a world at the height of its powers in which nothing is explicitly reminiscent of sacrifice. It is only through the significance Heaney attributes to the place that the past is evoked and the figure looms in the imaginative background. “The Tollund Man in Springtime” functions then both as the ‘missing link’ as well as a new beginning. The poem brings the old association of rebirth yet the title is also a reminder of spring as a part of the regular cycle, a recurring element rather than a peculiar one. Still, the revival of the figure is a unique occasion and Heaney is cunning enough to exclude references to the regular recurrence of the cycle itself.

Some of the reviewers of *District and Circle* question the wisdom and purpose of returning to the figure, seeing no real advancement in comparison with the earlier poems (cf. Wooten; Wheatley). Yet it is part of the traditional Heaney tactics of self-enquiry, self-testing and necessary revision. This drive occasions returns to earlier motifs and themes in his poetry, thus it is an act of complementation, of making the circle full, which is regularly practiced by Heaney. Speaking about the aestheticisation of the bog bodies, Helen Vendler raises the question: “What would the corpse himself say posthumously about his own state?” (Vendler 45) With “The Tollund Man in Springtime” Heaney answers this question in a comprehensive way, moreover, he compels his subject to face not only himself but an altered world as well. The overwhelmingly different environment into which the Tollund Man steps still leaves some space for him to contemplate himself and this leads to the humanisation of the figure—he is no longer a museum item, a curious memorial of the past but there opens about him a genuinely human dimension, however limited that may be.

The resurrection of the figure has yet another dimension in relation to the previous elements of the motif. “Bog Queen” in *North* resurrected the goddess of the Iron Age cult, though the long waiting of the goddess did not pass without the process of disintegration (cf. Vendler 45). The reawakening of the remains of the Tollund Man is carried out through a similar process, thus the coming to life of the figure now provides what appears to be a fitting bridegroom to the goddess: as he was in his death, so he will be in his new life—bridegroom to the goddess in winter and a revived bridegroom to the revived goddess in spring.

The symbolic sacrifice is now balanced by a symbolic resurrection, and yet another circle is completed.

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From Poetic to Cognitive: Bridging Literature and Science in Cognitive Poetics*

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Although the relationship between literature and philosophy is sanctioned by a long tradition, such a link reveals many limitations: philosophically anchored text analyses are subjective, impressionistic and reductive in their use of “text-active models” (Holland 1995). Cognitive poetics (Tsur 1992; Stockwell 2002), a burgeoning school of literary criticism, avoids those traps by re-shifting its attention to the reader’s mind and by “applying the principles of cognitive science to the interpretation of literary texts” (Louwse & van Peer 424). In doing so, it attempts to build a bridge between the sciences and the humanities. Despite its refreshing approach, CP is still banished to the margins of criticism; the reason being that it is seen by the humanities as: (1) foregrounding the cognitive at the expense of the poetic (Danaher 2) and (2) relying too heavily on cognitive neuroscience. This paper explores to what extent cognitive science has influenced the field of literary studies. Through examination of three seminal books on CP (Stockwell 2002; Gavins and Steen 2003; Brône and Vandaele 2009) and the essay “Music and Movement” (2012) by Lawrence Zbikowski, it aims both (1) to demarcate the boundaries between the cognitive and the poetic in selected cognitive analyses of literary texts and (2) to explore to what extent the application of scientific theories has had an impact on the language cognitive scholars use in their papers. Finally, this paper argues that if CP is to be recognized as a reliable methodology, it should borrow insights from reception theory and go truly empirical.

The past few decades have witnessed intensified efforts to challenge the predominance of post-structuralism in literary studies. Apart from engendering

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interdisciplinary projects and collaborations¹ between neuropsychologists and literary critics, these efforts have led to insights into literary emotion (Antonio Damasio 1994, 2000)² and growing interest among cognitive scholars (George Lakoff, Mark Turner or Gilles Fauconnier) in domains that are traditionally ascribed to literature. These developments indeed account for the shift from a cultural to a more neurological focus that has been taking place in literary studies. In spite of the long-standing relationship between literature and philosophy, this gradual paradigm shift has revealed many limitations in philosophically anchored post-structuralist studies. It has shown them to be subjective, impressionistic and reductive in their focus on “text-active models” (Holland 1995). Clearly, a number of concurrent approaches that have arrived relatively recently on the academic scene, suffice it to mention neuroaesthetics (Zeki 1999), evolutionary humanism (Carroll 1995)³ and cognitive poetics (Stockwell 2002), attempt to avoid those traps by viewing literature in particular, and art in general, as strongly linked to the mind and the body.⁴ Their resistance to the post-structuralist doctrines of textuality and indeterminacy aside, these three disciplines are united by their emphasis on the biological aspects of the creative process. In his introduction to neuroaesthetics (2009), Zeki makes a convincing case for “studying the neural basis of visual art” by articulating the obvious: “Art [...] as a human activity [...] depends upon, and obeys, the laws of the brain.” In contrast, the radical biologism found in literary darwinism verges on the absurd unless we accept that Jane Austen’s oeuvre, as Brian Boyd (1–30) renders it, provides useful material for a study of preferences in human

¹ A prominent example is a close collaboration between the literary critic Elaine Scarry and the neuropsychologist and memory expert Daniel Schacter, which has, among other things, resulted in the publication of *Memory, Brain and Belief* (2000). An interdisciplinary project between the linguist Gilles Fauconnier and the literary critic Mark Turner has proved likewise fruitful. One of their collaborative studies, *The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities* (2002), has significantly advanced our understanding of the way human beings conceptualize metaphors.

² Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio has done intensive research on literary emotion. His somatic marker theory (1994) yields illuminating insight into reception aesthetics and brings us closer to an explanation for “why people laugh, cry or become excited when experiencing art” (Kohn 122). See Damasio’s *Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain* (New York, London: Penguin, 1994) and his *The Feeling of What Happens* (New York: Harvest, 2000).

³ See Joseph Carroll’s *Evolution and Literary Theory*, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995.

⁴ It would be a great oversight not to mention Richard Shusterman’s somaesthetics at this point. Indisputably, it has played a major part in bringing together the mind and the long-neglected body. In his 1999 formulation of somaesthetics, Shusterman maintains that “our sensory perception depends on how the body feels and functions, what it desires, does, and suffers” (301). This assumption, as Anna Budziak (2012) speculates, could provide a good starting point for explorations of the way an artist’s health condition or mental disorder is reflected in his/her style. Such explorations, for example, would allow us to explain how Ludwig van Beethoven’s deafness affected his later musical works or, as Budziak (2012) proposes, to investigate whether John Milton’s blindness had any impact on the syntax and lexis in *Paradise Lost*.

mate selection. Of these three approaches, cognitive poetics⁵ doubtless seems best suited to literary studies. With its interest in the “literary mind” (Turner 1996), it explicitly refers to Ingarden’s⁶ work and reader response theory.⁷ Most importantly, it “applies the principles of cognitive science to the interpretation of literary texts” (Louwse and van Peer 424). Consequently, in CP the discourses of literature become interwoven with the discourses of science and thus, as I will demonstrate, CP attempts to build the bridge between the sciences and the humanities.

This epistemic marriage implies that even though CP does not come out of nowhere, its labels of “a new brand of poetics” (Gavins and Steen 5) and “a new science of literature and reading” (Stockwell 11) might be justified. Indeed, CP’s fresh perspective may result from the fact that this approach makes frequent forays into psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence and neurobiology, or, in short, cognitive science. Rather than giving new interpretations, cognitive literary critics explore the ways in which we arrive at different interpretations. In doing so, they endeavour to find out how our minds work. Their efforts, then, aim at re-evaluating literature’s status by placing literature on a par with “the study of how the human being thinks” (Craig and Hamilton 8). Such a conviction, in turn, agrees with Stockwell’s slightly populist statement: the recognition that CP entails “the democratization of literary study” (11). In contrast to prescriptive post-structuralist approaches that teach us how to read literary texts, CP has a descriptive function. Establishing an intimate link between meaning and knowledge, it views literature “as a specific form of everyday human experience and especially cognition that is grounded in our general cognitive capacities for making sense of the world” (Gavins and Steen 1). It simultaneously brings the long-neglected emotional dimension of literature into view by “relating the structures of the work of art [...] to their presumed or observed psychological effects on the recipient” (Gavins and Steen 1). In other words, CP proposes an experientialist approach⁸ to account for both similar and different readings produced by readers’ minds.

⁵ For the sake of economy, I shall refer to cognitive poetics as CP.

⁶ Unlike his New Critical colleagues, Ingarden felt it inappropriate to treat texts as autonomous objects. He claimed that, rather than disconnecting literature from scientific knowledge, we should integrate it “within a general cognitive ecology” (Tabbi 79).

⁷ In their essay “From Iser to Turner and Beyond: Reception Theory Meets Cognitive Criticism” (2002), Craig Hamilton and Ralf Schneider reveal intriguing affinities between reader response theory and cognitive criticism. Both lines of research overlap not only in their interest in the human mind but also in their use of “different names to talk about similar things” (11).

⁸ As Stockwell eloquently puts it, CP’s experientialist approach means that CP “offers a means of describing and delineating different types of knowledge and belief in a systematic way, and a model of how to connect these matters of circumstance and use to the language of the literature” (4). Rational as it may sound in theory, it seems to be hardly feasible in practice. In his *CP: An Introduction*, Stockwell never hints at how to apply an experientialist approach in text analyses. Instead, he unabashedly reduces the texts he takes under discussion to linguistic data, a practice Stockwell frequently frowns upon in his essays.

Interestingly, despite its refreshing perspective, CP remains a stepchild within the field of literary studies. The angst that the humanities may feel for this doctrine is, above all, caused by CP's reliance on neuroscience and, by extension, empiricism, which supposedly reduces the autonomy of the humanities. To place too much faith in empiricism⁹ may not only slight the complexities of literary creativity but may also lead to obvious conclusions. Within the school of CP alone, there exists a rift concerning the appropriate method of research, with cognitive scholars opting either for empiricism (e.g. Louwerse and van Peer), indirect empiricism (e.g. Stockwell and Gavins) or introspection. If empiricism is accused of reductive bias, then the other two methods are considered selective and unreliable since they provide only "predictions for what readers do when they read" (Gavins and Steen 6). Furthermore, according to Danaher, CP "foregrounds the cognitive at the expense, and not in service of, the poetic" (6). Instead of enhancing our appreciation of literariness, it guides us through the reading jungle to deepen our understanding of the effects literary texts have on us. As a result, alongside attempting to grasp the ineffable, CP spoils the pleasure of reading. This undesirable side effect of CP can be illustrated by the example of Helen Keller. In *The Story of My Life* (1902), she writes that before she turned 6, she had had no name for *ice cream* and so whenever she felt like eating it, she would experience an immense cold feeling on her tongue. Unfortunately, upon acquiring the term *ice cream*, she lost this peculiar sensation. As an analogy, by applying CP, we run the risk of being deprived of an experience resulting from literariness. Finally, in his essay "Cognitive Poetics and Literariness: Metaphorical Analogy in *Anna Karenina*," Danaher downplays the revolutionary character of CP. He argues that this doctrine "assigns cognitive labels to concepts with a long and proven tradition in literary criticism, without adding any significant content"¹⁰ (2). For instance, the basic idea of the embodied mind on which CP is built originally stems from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's 1940s phenomenology,¹¹ even if it was only verified empirically in the 1990s. In the same vein, cognitive narratology, rather than marking a departure from the older paradigms, merely follows the path structuralist narratology paved earlier.

The purpose of this paper is therefore to investigate the validity of such charges against CP, specifically by exploring to what extent cognitive science has influenced the field of literary studies. My research material includes Peter

⁹ As Jeroen Vandaele and Geert Brône observe, "in some areas of literary studies there is fear of empiricism, with its formalization procedures and/or quantitative approaches" (22).

¹⁰ Much as Danaher's observation holds true, it cannot be denied that by affixing cognitive tags to long-established literary terms, CP seeks to redress those terms for the purpose of developing analytical tools to study the workings of the human mind. In her review of CP, F. Elizabeth Hart makes it clear that to cognitive literary scholars, "the tools literary scholars need not merely to dispense with the older paradigms but actually to surpass them in their ability to teach us about meaning-making are most readily and sensibly found in the cognitive sciences" (226).

¹¹ See Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception*, transl. C. Smith, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962.

Stockwell's seminal book *Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction* (2002), its companion publication *Cognitive Poetics in Practice* (2003) edited by Gavins and Steen, *Cognitive Poetics: Goals, Gains and Gaps* (2009) edited by Brône and Vandaele, and the essay "Music and Movement: A View from Cognitive Musicology" (2012) by Lawrence Zbikowski. In total, I have examined 36 chapters and essays, all of them providing theoretical and practical discussions of a wide range of cognitive tools: deixis (Green 1992); prototypes (Rosch 1975); text worlds (Werth 1999); conceptual metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980); cognitive narratology (Herman 2003); scripts (Schank and Abelson 1977); mental spaces (Fauconnier 1994); and cognitive grammar (Langacker 1987). Since some of the contributors in the edited sources specialize in cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics (CL), it is noteworthy that the scope of these sources is not solely restricted to poetics. Furthermore, the analyzed material mostly favours indirect empiricism, placing it in stark contrast to the predominant empirical practice found in CL. As Fabiszak and Konat report (2012), out of the 206 articles published from 1999–2012 in the journal *Cognitive Linguistics*,¹² 145 were empirical studies based on either corpus data or experiments.

As such, the aim of this paper is twofold. In the first instance, I want to find out whether the application of scientific theories has had an impact on the meta-language in CP. Secondly, I intend to demarcate the boundaries between the cognitive and the poetic in selected cognitive analyses of literary texts. In my understanding of the term *poetics*, I follow Jonathan Culler and Manfred Bierwisch's¹³ complementary views which, when combined, can be summarized in the following way: "poetics starts with attested meanings, effects or perceived regularities and asks how they are achieved" (61; 98–99). Additionally, in terms of the most basic classification, poetics can be divided into (a) descriptive poetics and (b) historical poetics. In this context, granted that poetics concerns the craft of literature and that cognition has to do with the mental processes involved in reading, the combination of these two components in CP, as Stockwell concludes, amounts to "a science of reading" (2).

With reference to the first aim of this paper, I found that the statement and documented references in the examined articles offer convincing proof that the *scientification* of literary studies in CP is underway. In their attempts to uncover the workings of the reader's mind, cognitive analysts notably borrow

¹² Remarkably, with its 21 empirical articles, the 2011 issue of *Cognitive Linguistics* set a record. Simultaneously, we can observe a sharp rise in empirical studies conducted by cognitive linguists (2002 and 2007 issues—3; 2010 issue—14)

¹³ Even though it specifically referred to poetry, Bierwisch's 1970 definition of poetics, and especially the concluding part on poetic competence, might have prefigured Culler's famous statement. Bierwisch writes, "The actual objects of poetics are the particular regularities that occur in literary texts and that determine the specific effects of poetry; in the final analysis—the human activity to produce poetic structures and understand their effect—that is, something which one might call poetic competence" (98–9).

explanatory and descriptive tools from a variety of disciplinary traditions. Their source material, for instance, comes from CL, pragmatics, neurophysiology, anthropology, computer science or neuropsychology. And these diverse, and conspicuously scientific influences confirm that CP is attuned to cognitive science. With regard to the study of literary emotion, Kohn indeed affirms that it was as early as the 1970s that the sciences and humanities began to join “forces in exploring both theoretically and empirically the source of emotion in literary narrative” (121). Reuven Tsur, who has been running a CP project for over 30 years, tends to support his analyses with evidence from brain research. In his chapter on deixis in *Cognitive Poetics in Practice*, for example, he draws on Newberg et al.’s Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography study of Tibetan meditators in order to account for the way readers follow the spatio-temporal coordinates in literary texts. In the same publication, the psychologist Raymond W. Gibbs Junior forcefully rejects evidence from phenomenology or philosophy in favour of evidence from empirical psychology. He states that “empirical work in cognitive psychology showed that a ‘family resemblance’ principle offered a better account than did the classical model for how people identify an instance as belonging or not to a category” (Gibbs 29). Zbikowski, on his part, finds justification for his claims in the neurophysiology of emotions, or—more specifically—in “mirror neurons” (Gallese et al. 1996). Elaborating on experiments on macaque monkeys, which indicate relationships between motor actions and cognition, Zbikowski speculates as to whether a similar mechanism works for the link between music and movement. Finally, Max Louwerse and Willie Van Peer’s article in *Cognitive Poetics: Goals, Gains and Gaps* constitutes an exceptional case in which advances in science not only set a theoretical basis for analytical analyses, but are directly applied to them. These scholars employ a computational model called Latent Semantic Analysis to argue that the understanding of literary language can be explained not only through embodied analyses conducted by most cognitive poetics, but also with recourse to a symbolic approach.

CP’s strong reliance on cognitive science is beyond doubt. Its subordinate position, however, is mainly due to the fact that, as Joseph Tabbi eloquently puts it, “literature needs to wait on confirmations from science” (80). Furthermore, some of its originators, like Mark Turner, tend to shift their attention from literature to mechanisms of thought and thus become cognitive scientists. But let us now examine this scientifically inclined doctrine in terms of the ratio between the cognitive and the poetic. Does CP strengthen or dampen our perception of a text’s literariness? Does it constitute, as Stockwell argues, a science of reading or rather a science of cognition? First of all, a glance at any of the 36 selected articles reveals that their authors reduce historical poetics to a minimum. In most of these essays this aspect is strikingly absent. Only Stockwell, Gavins and Semino make an effort to place the texts they analyze in their historical contexts. Take, for instance, Semino’s text-world analysis of Carol Ann Duffy’s poem “Mrs. Midas,” which is preceded by a biography of the writer and a remark

about her feminist affiliation. Another notable observation is that, even though the examined articles widely employ key issues of literary reading—such as tone, literariness, character, narrative, metaphor or plot—and they seem to do it as a pretext for affixing cognitive labels to those concepts and engaging in lengthy cognitive deliberations. In short, the poetic merely serves as a starting point for the cognitive. To substantiate this conclusion, let me give you a few selected examples: in CP, (1) “the use of the word wife [in Sir Henry Wotton’s poem “Upon the Death of Sir Albert Morton’s Wife”] activates *the marriage scenario* as a specific variant of *the love scenario*” (Steen 74); (2) “narrative perspective [...] can be interpreted *as a reflex of the mind* or minds conceptualizing scenes represented in narrative texts” (Herman 99); (3) “the world of a literary text consists of one or more *deictic fields*, which are composed of a whole range of expressions each of which can be categorized as *perceptual, spatial, temporal, textual and compositional* in nature” (Stockwell 47); (4) metaphors in “The Dream of the Rood” do not account for “a simple re-telling of the passion of Christ, but *a schema reinforcement*¹⁴ by simple repetition” (Stockwell 85). These examples show that, rather than focusing on a text’s literariness, CP analyses predominantly concentrate on a text’s potential utility for cognitive models. Still, there are exceptions to this rule. It may be convincingly argued that Semino’s possible-worlds analysis and Gavins’s text-worlds analysis indeed highlight the text’s literariness by illustrating its detailed internal structure and its ideal graphic representation as visualized by the reader.

Towards achieving the second aim of my present paper, I began with a test that slightly modifies Danaher’s observation that CP “foregrounds the cognitive at the expense of, and not in service of, the poetic” (6). In order to place the emphasis on the role of the poetic, I would say that: in CP, the poetic is in service of the cognitive, not the other way round. CP foregrounds the cognitive not only through the content oriented towards explaining the workings of the mind, but also, as I propose, through its meta-language. Predicated on complex analytical machinery, CP in a way exemplifies a return to the hermetic discourse of structuralism. It enforces its scientific meta-language both (a) on a purely verbal level and (b) by means of visual aids in the form of diagrams, tables and graphs. The verbal component is comprised of borrowings, mostly from linguistics and computer science. Consider, for example, Turner’s famous concepts of “blending,” “mapping” and “projecting,” all in circulation now. These terms encapsulate the ways we understand and process conceptual metaphors such as MELANCHOLY IS THE END OF THE WORLD, by mapping onto each other propositions taken from (a) the source domain of THE END OF THE WORLD and (b) the target domain of MELANCHOLY. Stockwell, for instance, chooses to resort to computer science. In his chapter on deixis, he introduces the term “edgework” to refer to the process of identifying the boundaries of deictic fields, and the terms “push” and “pop” (49) to describe deictic shifts. Some of

¹⁴ This and the previous emphases are my own.

the sentences in this chapter are almost incomprehensible, especially when taken out of context, for example: “Characters can also be kept ‘live’ by conjoining coordinate clauses to maintain co-reference to the character, by subject-chaining (using pronouns to keep the current entity-role live)” (54). In discussing how we scan cognitive input in his chapter on cognitive grammar, Stockwell distinguishes between “summary scanning” and “sequential scanning” (64). While “summary scanning” typically occurs when nominals are processed (“Look at the sun”; “It’s a sunny day”), “sequential scanning” takes place in the case of dynamic actions (“The sun crossed the sky in a blaze of light”). In Giora et al.’s article entitled “Does an ‘Ironic Situation’ Favor an Ironic Interpretation?”, we find yet another example of what may happen if dry empiricism is applied in literary studies. In this case it leads to mathematics:

The difference between the two was significant, $t(14)=15.34$, $p<.0001$. They demonstrate that there was no difference in the mean reading time of ironic targets following either a context featuring a frustrated expectation (1927 msec, $SD=421$) or a context featuring a realized expectation (1906 msec, $SD=453$), $t1(53)<1$, n.s., $t2(14)<1$, n.s. (Giora et al. 392)

Moreover, the complex and convoluted language in CP becomes even less palatable when used in analyses restricted to poems or short extracts—a preferred practice in CP which is, however, regarded as one of its weaknesses. As Semino notes, text-world diagrams “become impossibly complicated when applied to stretches of text longer than a few sentences” (59). Indeed, in CP, literary masterpieces are often reduced to static diagrams and building blocks, intricate graphs and tables full of mathematical jibber-jabber. CP, then, represents an attempt to apply logic in breaking down literature into its components. To use cognitive terms, COGNITIVE POETICS IS A LINGUISTIC DISSECTION OF LITERATURE.

In conclusion, CP (a) borrows considerably from the cognitive sciences, (b) uses literature as a tool to explore how the human mind works and (c) utilizes its own meta-language. But one important question still remains, namely: what is the future of CP within the field of literary studies? In this regard it is in the first instance advisable to find an alternative for the name ‘CP’, since it gives the false impression that the discipline’s main focus falls on poetics. One such alternative would be “Cognitive Criticism” (CC), which could indeed function as an umbrella term that also embraces related disciplines. In contrast to Stockwell’s “science of reading,” CC would be a science of art reception, which would emphasize its already wide scope of application. It is important, however, that CC should not neglect its roots in reception theory and should therefore adopt a truly empirical approach. But what I have in mind is not the stricter forms of empiricism preferred by Louwse and Van Peer, but rather the “soft” empiricism favoured by Norman Holland and David S. Miall. Finally, in its

disciplinary outlook, CC could primarily be geared towards its two main concerns: aesthetics and pedagogy. The latter has already been undertaken in combination with highly promising lines of inquiry into literary emotion. But, despite the fact that CC has enormous potential for application in education, the former has so far not been initiated. With the help of CC in a simplified and accessible version, students and pupils could, for example, learn about their cognitive experience and thus enhance their awareness as readers. Such an educational project seems especially relevant in the context of Nicholas Carr's discovery in his phenomenally popular book *The Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to Our Brains?* (2011): the prediction that the Internet will not only rewire our brain, but, more unsettlingly, that it will shallow the human mind so much as to strip it of the ability to derive sheer aesthetic pleasure from literature and art.

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On the Semantics of the English Resultative Present Perfect

Csaba Czeglédi

The paper discusses some issues and misunderstandings in the interpretation of what Huddleston and Pullum (2002) call ‘the resultative perfect’. It is shown, in particular, how and when Leech (1971) was right about the meaning of the English present perfect, when he thought he wasn’t (and how he wasn’t when he thought he was).

Key words: aspect, implicature, indefinite past event, people’s mental models of the world and of other minds, resultative perfect

1 Introduction

This paper is concerned with the interpretation of sentences like

- (1) She has broken her leg. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002:145)

We shall be interested in how what is often called the ‘resultative meaning’ associated with sentences like (1) is expressed and understood. The aspects of the grammatical structure of (1) that interest us now will be informally called ‘the present perfect’, following more or less generally accepted practice in the description of English. One of several different specific questions that arise in this connection is how much of the resultative meaning attributed to sentences like (1) is a matter of their grammatical structure. Another is this: If not all of it, where does the rest come from? Perhaps it is not premature at this point to informally indicate two of the general conclusions of this short essay. We will see, on the one hand, that very little of the resultative meaning of sentences in the present perfect is a matter of their grammar, contrary to what is almost universally claimed and accepted. In fact, in an important sense, none of the resultative meaning of sentences like (1) is a matter of grammar. Second, in answer to the second specific question informally formulated above, we shall conclude that most, perhaps all, of the resultative meaning of such sentences is the contribution of an interaction between partly cognitive and partly communicative principles, which lie beyond the domain of grammar, conventionally understood. We will see how the interpretation of sentences like (1) involves domains of knowledge in speakers’ and hearers’ minds beyond their

knowledge of language. Perhaps surprisingly, and contrary to the almost universally held belief, that will lead to the conclusion that little, if any, of the ‘resultative meaning of the present perfect’ is linguistic meaning at all, in the narrow and now conventional sense of the term *linguistic*.

2 The “Resultative Perfect”

In one form or another, all authoritative descriptive grammars of English recognize what is sometimes called the “resultative perfect” as a variant or use of the present perfect. As Huddleston and Pullum (2002:143) observe, “grammars commonly distinguish four major uses of the present perfect: the **continuative**, the **experiential** (or ‘existential’) perfect, the **resultative** perfect, and the perfect of **recent past**... [which] can be thought of as a classification of the main ways in which the concept of a time-span up to now can be involved in the use and interpretation of the present perfect—or as different ways in which the past situation may have ‘current relevance’.”

(1) above is claimed to be one of “the clearest cases of the resultative perfect..., where the situation is one that inherently involves a change of state: breaking a leg yields a resultant state where the leg is broken” (Huddleston and Pullum 2002:143). As Huddleston and Pullum (*ibid.*) note “the connection with the present in this resultative use is that the resultant state still obtains now.”

Now, what does it mean to claim or assume that there is such a thing as the resultative (present) perfect in English? Or, what does it mean to say that (1) is a particularly clear case of the resultative (present) perfect, which describes a past situation with current relevance, where the “current relevance” is the present result of the past event, which “still obtains now”? Notice that the descriptive statements of the sort just quoted carry an important contrastive implication, without which they are entirely uninteresting. This contrastive implication, which is just as simple as it is important, is that the descriptive statements in question identify specific distinctive properties of the (resultative) present perfect. If they did not, they would not only be without any interest at all but they would be misleading. For example, if the claim that the (resultative) present perfect expresses the “current relevance” or present result of a past event is meant without the implication that this is something specific and distinctive about the present perfect, meaning that it does not apply to any other type of report of a past event, such as a sentence in the past tense, for instance, then it would be no more interesting than, say, pointing out about rodents that they have four legs, which is an exceptionally banal statement, as it is one of several non-distinctive predictable properties they share with all other terrestrial mammals. Therefore, to introduce the ‘resultative perfect’ as a subcategory in English grammar must imply denying that there is such a thing as ‘the resultative past’, for instance, not only for it to be minimally interesting but also in order that the grammar and use of English is not given a misleading representation.

Having clarified the conceptually and logically necessary contrastive implications of the notion of the ‘resultative perfect’, let us move on to another logical consequence of the foregoing, which is in part an empirical matter, therefore crucial in the description of English. This is a very simple point—the implication just discussed has to be correct. If it is not, the notion of the ‘resultative perfect’, in the conventional sense, becomes practically meaningless and all accompanying claims are not only misleading but quite simply wrong. As just noted, for it to be interesting, meaningful, and correct, the notion of the ‘resultative perfect’ must imply the denial of the existence of the ‘resultative past’. What this means is that we should be unable to construct (or find) an English sentence which describes a past event in the past tense, where the event or situation described has ‘current relevance’ in the form of a resultant state which “still obtains now.” Fatally for the notion of the ‘resultative perfect’ and all accompanying claims, it is not at all difficult to find or construct such an English sentence. Indeed, there are an infinite number of them. Consider, for example, (2) below.

(2) She **broke** her leg yesterday.

What does (2) mean? How does it compare with the meaning of (1)? When we answer these questions, have we also answered the question about what a speaker of English understands when they hear or read (1) or (2)? These are not easy questions at all. It may not seem straightforward, for instance, that the best answer to the latter is very likely in the negative, as we shall see later. It is sometimes easier to say what a sentence does not mean. Take (1), for instance. As Huddleston and Pullum (2002:145) observe, “*She has broken her leg* does not mean “Her leg is broken”, but this is the likely implicature.” That is correct, indeed, (1) does not directly say anything about the condition of “her leg” at the time the event is reported. Instead, (1) merely reports a past event. That is what it “means.” If there is anything else a speaker-hearer understands in addition to the concept of the past event reported, that must come from a different source, as it is not, strictly speaking, part of the meaning of the sentence. The sentence is not a statement about the present state of “her leg” but a statement about what has happened. If, upon hearing or reading (1), a speaker-hearer can construct thoughts not only about the past state of the world but also about the present state of “her leg,” they must make use of knowledge beyond and different from their knowledge of grammar. Immediately, serious questions arise about what that knowledge is and how it is used in constructing thoughts about “the present state of the world,” including the state of “her leg,” and questions about how that domain of knowledge interacts with a speaker’s knowledge of grammar. We shall address some of these questions later.

To return to the meaning of (1) and (2) and the “likely implicature” they somehow involve, it is clear that the implicature ‘Her leg is broken’ is identical in both. It may be less clear how that implicature is mentally constructed by speakers of English and how the meaning of (1) or (2) contributes to that

process, questions to which we shall return directly. But it should be obvious now, as a matter of logical consequence, that the conventional notion of the ‘resultative (present) perfect’ is incoherent and that any claim about the meaning or interpretation of sentences like (1) formulated in terms of that notion is untenable (or utterly insipid). Nevertheless, as noted above, all major descriptions of English, including Huddleston and Pullum (2002), make such claims about what is sometimes called the “resultative use” of the present perfect (ibid., p. 143). These claims about the present perfect or its use are made in a variety of different styles and they sometimes vary in strength, but their core content, formulated in (3) below, is more or less identical. Call it the Resultative (Present) Perfect Rule (RPR).

- (3) *Resultative Perfect Rule (RPR)*
 The resultative present perfect expresses the present result of a past event.

Some aspects of the ambiguity of such a rule or claim have already been exposed above. Let us clarify that ambiguity in more explicit terms now in order to see first, how and why RPR is hopelessly equivocal and second, how it is simply wrong on the most interesting, perhaps generally intended, reading.

As any similar rule formulated in informal natural language terms, RPR may be assigned either a conditional or a biconditional reading. In fact, RPR corresponds to two different conditional readings and a third, biconditional reading. These may be spelled out as in (4a-c) below.

- (4) a. $\forall x P(x) \supset R(x)$ — conditional, correct (but not very interesting)
 b. $\forall x R(x) \supset P(x)$ — conditional, wrong (cf. (2))
 c. $\forall x P(x) \leftrightarrow R(x)$ — biconditional = ‘(4a) & (4b)’, wrong (cf. (2))

Where P = ‘Present Perfect’, R = ‘present Result’, and x is a variable over sentences which report a past event.

In English translation, (4a) could be paraphrased as something like this: For any English sentence, if it is in the present perfect (and if it contains the “right sort of verb,” a condition to which we shall return below), it will express the present result of the past event that is reported in it. (1) above is such an English sentence. Notice that (4a) says nothing about the interpretation of any other type of sentence which reports a past event, such as, for example, a sentence like (2) in the past tense. Therefore, on this reading, RPR would not be a terribly exciting rule of English, as it would be unable to distinguish between the meaning of (1) and the meaning of (2). Indeed, it is rarely assigned such a flimsy and uninspiring interpretation in grammars. But it sometimes is, as in Greenbaum and Quirk (1990:52), where it is said that “the use of the present perfect for recent events **may imply** that the result of the event still applies” (emphasis mine). This is a rare example of a completely vacuous rule. It does

not mean anything at all, since to say that something “may” be the case implies saying that it may or may not be the case, and that much is 100% predictable about any aspect of the meaning of any sentence.

(4b) is a more interesting alternative reading that can be assigned to RPR. RPR on this reading means that the present result of a past event can only be expressed in a sentence which reports that past event in the present perfect. As (2) above shows, this is not true. On the last possible reading, (4c), RPR is read as a logical biconditional, meaning that an English sentence which reports a past event is understood as implying that its present result still obtains if and only if that sentence is in the present perfect. This precludes that any such sentence in the past tense have such an implication. Again, as (2) testifies, that is not correct. To summarize, RPR is correct only on a pedestrian and practically meaningless reading, and it is wrong on both remaining alternative interpretations, of which the biconditional reading is clearly of most interest and, perhaps, the one that is generally intended, but flawed, in descriptions of English.

3 Predicates that allow a resultative reading

Let us return now to a condition noted above, which is rarely made clear in connection with the resultative interpretation of sentences that report a past event—either in the present perfect, as in (1), or in the past tense, as in (2). The condition in question has to do with the predicate of such reports and the type of event reported. As Quirk et al. (1985:193) note, “the... connotation, that the result of the action still obtains, applies to dynamic conclusive verbs..., ie verbs whose meaning implies the accomplishment of a change of state.” What Quirk et al. call dynamic conclusive verbs are otherwise known as predicates denoting accomplishments, such as e.g. *dismantle*, *run a mile*, *walk to school*, *paint a picture*, *grow up*, etc., and achievements, such as e.g. *arrive*, *recognize*, *find*, *win*, *stop*, *start*, *resume*, *be born*, or *break a leg*, etc., in Vendler’s (1967) typology of events. These two subcategories of events share some important properties—they inherently bring about a change of state, which is their ‘result’, when the event is completed, reaching its culmination point (cf. Kiefer 1994, 2009, Vendler 1967).

Note that accomplishments and achievements are not categories of language but subcategories of eventualities in speakers’ models of the world. This implies that speakers do construct models of the world, which include theories of events, among other things, perhaps very much like Vendler’s (1967), a reasonable assumption. A speaker with a theory of eventualities will understand that every time an accomplishment or achievement, such as someone breaking a leg, occurs and is completed, reaching its culmination point, the world will have changed as a consequence of the completion of the event. In our example, there will be a broken leg. To know such things is not a matter of speakers’ knowledge of English syntax but a matter of what we know about the bones in our legs and other parts of the body, how such bony parts break when they do, etc. Such elements of knowledge can then feed our innate logical faculty which allows us

to draw all sorts of inferences from them, none of which is a matter of language or syntax either (cf. Crain and Khlentzos 2008).

Grammar cannot express such things as the present result of a past event. Whenever such “elements of meaning” are understood, they are inferred in part from what we know about the world and in part from ideas conveyed by a sentence, such as the idea of a completed event, a matter of syntax, more specifically, a matter of aspect. The latter is indeed a matter of language. But whatever we know about our legs and the bones in them is not. In English, for instance, a sentence is always marked for its aspect. The two examples above, (1) and (2), are both perfective, which means that the events they report are described as completed. Therefore, not surprisingly, both imply that the resultant state, ‘Her leg is broken’, brought about by the completion of the achievement reported obtains following the completion of the events. How such resultant states are or are not interpreted as ‘relevant to the present’ is a more complex matter. We turn to that directly.

4 Understanding reports of past events

How speakers of a language intend and understand reports of past events is as much, or more, a matter of principles of cognition and communication as it is a matter of knowledge of language. As pointed out above, understanding the ‘present relevance’ of the result of a past event is not a matter of syntax at all. None of that is surprising. Indeed, it would be surprising if the division of labor among cognitive faculties in the human mind were different. It would indeed be surprising, for example, to find that such notions as the ‘result of a past event’ or its ‘present relevance’ were somehow coded in the grammar of a language. If this were the case, we would expect that it may be coded in different ways in different languages, or that it is perhaps not coded at all in the language of some community and therefore members of that community cannot communicate such ideas, or that the English present perfect is the realization of some language universal designed for the expression of that notion, with counterparts to be found in all languages. None of that seems to be true. In fact, you do not need to talk about past events at all in order to understand how some of them may or may not have brought about changes in the world, some of which are perhaps relevant to the present. You do not even need any language to understand such matters. Many animals appear to know such things without any language or the ability to communicate with one another verbally.

It is much more plausible to assume that a speaker’s knowledge of language interacts with other language-independent cognitive domains in the computation of such complex ideas as the ‘present relevance of a past event’. Two such domains stand out as particularly relevant for the understanding of the notions we are discussing, in addition to a person’s knowledge of language—their model of the world and their (largely) implicit knowledge of the principles of communication.

Assume, then, that a speaker (S) reports (1) to a hearer (H). Both S and H possess a model of the world (SM and HM, respectively), which includes a theory of events along the lines of Vendler (1967). This much, or this little, immediately accounts for how both S and H understand the resulting state (RS) brought about by the past event reported in (1), or in (2), for that matter, as discussed above.

What remains to be explained is how sentences like (1), or (2), may be specifically intended by S to get H to understand RS and to get H to understand that that is S's specific intention or communicative goal. In order to account for this, we need to assume that S and H construct what Givón (2005:7) calls "mental models of other minds" and that such models are constantly updated, meaning that S and H regularly update their mutual assumptions about what the other knows (*ibid.*, p. 104). Given S's model of HM, he expects H to infer RS brought about by the event reported in (1) or (2). Given H's model of SM, he too assumes that S would be justified in expecting H to infer RS. Given these conditions, H would be justified in inferring that that is indeed S's expectation or intention, i.e., for H to infer RS.

Given that both (1) and (2) report a past achievement that brings about a resultant state, the scenario sketched so far works for both. But (1) and (2) are slightly different. An important difference between them is that (1) reports an event as "news out of the blue," which is not necessarily the case in (2), though possible. To put it in terms of the system of assumptions sketched above, (1) is natural only if S assumes that HM does not contain a representation of the event reported in (1) prior to S actually saying (1) to H. In other words, for (1) to be natural, S must assume that, before it is actually reported, H cannot identify the representation of the event described in (1), as it is simply not there in HM.

(2) is slightly different. Whereas (1) is natural only under the conditions just discussed, (2) is natural in either of two different scenarios. One is very similar to the conditions just sketched for (1), modulo the contribution of the adverb *yesterday* to HM. The other is radically different from the conditions under which (1) is natural in that in this alternative scenario S assumes prior to his report about the past event that its representation is already there in HM. Once it is there, it can be identified as specific or unique, provided that the information about the event that is necessary for its identification is already available in HM or else it is supplied. This is precisely the alternative natural communicative goal S may specifically intend to achieve in (2)—supply H with that information, the time of the event reported.

All this is easy to misunderstand. It is indeed generally misunderstood as a choice determined by whether the time of a past event is or is not known. That is a serious misunderstanding on at least two different levels. First, note that it is pointless to talk about the knowledge of the time of a past event without specifying whose knowledge is meant. If it is S's knowledge, as is generally tacitly assumed, it is irrelevant. Regardless of what S knows about the event reported in (1) or (2), (1) is always a possible choice, even if S knows exactly

when the event occurred. What decides the choice between (1) and (2) is not what S knows about the event but what S assumes H knows about it. If this reminds some readers of the choice or contrast between definite and indefinite noun phrases, that is no coincidence. The choice or contrast between (1) and (2) is essentially of the same nature, as noted early by Leech (1971).

He very clearly points out that “with ‘event verbs’, the Present Perfect may refer to some **indefinite happening in the past**: ...All my family *have had* measles” (Leech 1971:32, bold mine), where *indefinite* can be understood in the regular sense, meaning that S assumes that the event is not identifiable as specific or unique in HM.

Leech adds, “At first glance, it looks as if there is **no element of ‘present involvement’ in this use of the Present Perfect, any more than there is in the Simple Past**. But in fact, a more precise definition of the indefinite past use must indicate that a period of time leading up to the present is involved here... the ‘indefinite past’ definition must be revised, and more exactly formulated as ‘at-least-once-in-a-period-up-to-the-present’. This longer wording... adds nothing material to the more concise label ‘indefinite past’” (Leech 1971:32, emphases mine).

He is absolutely right about the first point. Take our examples, (1) and (2). Indeed, the resultant state brought about by the event reported in them is no more relevant to the present in (1) than it is in (2). His second remark about “the indefinite past”, however, is a misunderstanding. What is decisive here is not the indefiniteness of “the past” or of some past time but the indefiniteness of the event, which turns on S’s assumptions about its identifiability in HM. His final, somewhat self-critical remark is justified. The “longer wording” of “a-period-up-to-the-present” adds nothing of interest, as such a period is simply called “past.”

5 Some concluding remarks

Steven Pinker’s book on “The Language Instinct” opens thus: “I have never met a person who is not interested in language. I wrote this book to try to satisfy that curiosity” (Pinker 1994:7). The grammatical structure of neither of these two opening statements is surprising or unnatural. The present perfect in the first is not unexpected. But the past tense in the second ought to be if the standard claims about the resultative perfect were right, on the only interesting implicitly contrastive reading which implies denying the existence of the “resultative past.” Aside from citations like the present one, which are completely irrelevant for obvious reasons, the only way anyone can read the statements just quoted is by reading Pinker’s book in which they were printed, the result of the action reported in the second statement in the past tense. Note, in addition, that the time of writing or completing the book is not specified, nor does it matter at all from the reader’s perspective. These properties of the meaning associated with the second statement under discussion combined with RPR would dictate that the

sentence ought to be formulated in the present perfect. That it is not shows that RPR is flawed. Notice, however, that the structure of both sentences is consistent with what Leech (1971) suggested early on—the “resultative” present perfect occurs in the description of indefinite past events. Any other aspect of meaning that users of English understand, including the ‘present relevance’ of some resultant state, is a matter of “pragmatic inference,” which involves interaction between linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive domains in the human mind, including speaker-hearers’ mental models of the world and of “other minds.”

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Semantic profiles of *dark* and *blak* in *The Canterbury Tales*

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The aim of the present paper is to analyse the semantic profiles of *black* and *dark* in *The Canterbury Tales*. The analysis will approach in detail the literal and metaphorical senses instantiated by the two words. The study will aim to point to the semantic differences existing between them. To begin with, the paper will account for the differences on the literal plane between ME *blak* and *dark*, which affected the nature of the metaphorical senses developed by the two words. On the metaphorical plane, *blak* will be shown to be a word that did not develop abstract, evaluative senses that could be projected via a mapping of the concrete onto a more abstract layer of conceptualisation. In other words, the study will emphasise that the metaphorical senses of *blak* were just symbolic associations of a colour rather than abstract senses separated from the concept of a colour. As for *dark*, the paper will reflect on its semantic flexibility on the metaphorical plane and will attempt to provide a hypothesis for why it happened so.

Key words: epistemic, conceptualisation, association, binary, symbolism.

1. Introduction

The present paper offers semantic profiles of the central and metaphorical senses projected by *dark* and *blak* in *The Canterbury Tales*. It should be emphasised that scarcely any linguistic research has been devoted to the study of the concepts of ‘black’ and ‘dark’. The concept of ‘dark’ has been often analysed together with ‘light’ (Kövecses 2002; Lakoff and Johnson 1980). As for the cognitive analyses of colours, works by Barley (1974), Biggam (1997) and Mac Laury (1992) to mention but a few, have contributed to the conceptualisation of colours not as fixed categories but as constantly changing ones, and contingent on culture and a system of beliefs. The aims of the present paper are the following:

To begin with, the study will focus on the existing differences between the two apparently related words on both the literal and metaphorical planes. On the literal plane, the paper will show what *blak* and *dark* actually meant and what shades they stood for in the medieval period. Moreover, the analysis will

investigate whether *blak* and *dark* were equally correlated with the concept of a colour. In other words, the analysis will aim to show whether the concept of a colour constituted a primary or a secondary association in the conceptual framework of the two lexemes. Furthermore, the paper will also draw upon the symbolic and cultural associations evoked by the two lexemes. On the metaphorical plane, *blak* and *dark* will be illustrated as source domains used to conceptualise target domains of an abstract nature. Additionally, the analysis will also attempt to show which of the two lexemes developed more metaphorical senses.

Secondly, the emergence of new abstract senses can be analysed in parallel with the tendencies of unidirectionality (Traugott 1989), according to which change always proceeds from the objective to the subjective proposition. Thus, the initial, concrete meaning from the real-world domain becomes the basis for the emergence of the epistemic, abstract, logical sense, which focuses on the internal world of the speaker's belief state. The study will illustrate that the semantic paths of *blak* and *dark* did not overlap to the same extent with the development of the abstract senses reflected in the tendencies of unidirectionality. In other words, the paper will point to the lexeme which, in the metaphorical context, preserved the link with the initial, root sense, as well as to the one which severed the link with the early basic sense.

The analysis utilises Caxton's *The Canterbury Tales: The British Library Copies* (ed. by Barbara Bordalejo), which is a CD-ROM containing the first full-colour facsimiles of all copies of William Caxton's first and second editions of Geoffrey Chaucer's *The Canterbury Tales*. The semantic analysis focuses on all the contexts and phrases in which the two words were recorded, and views them from a cognitive perspective.

2. The analysis of *dark*

Dark (CEDEL, sv. dark) originated from PGmc *derkaz*, 'to hide, conceal'. According to the *Middle English Dictionary* (MED, sv. dark), *dark* contained the following senses in the Middle English period:

- 1)
 - a) of a room, the underworld, the grave etc: lacking illumination: dark, dusky, dismal
 - b) of the atmosphere, the weather, etc; dark (night), lowering, threatening (clouds, weather)
 - c) of a luminous body: dim, obscured, and inconspicuous
 - d) of various things: lacking brightness; dark, dull, murky

- 2)
 - a) of a colour; not bright, dull, dark
 - b) of the skin or complexion: pallid, wan

- 3)
- a) obscure or unclear (statement, word)
 - b) hard to understand, mysterious
 - c) unaware, unperceptive, ignorant, unenlightened
- 4) intentionally obscure, deceptive, malicious

One can view these stages as a path to the development of greater subjectivity. The senses covering stages 1 and 2 are literal or less metaphorical. The concept of a colour is central in their conceptual framework. The senses in stages 3 and 4 encode an increase in the level of abstractness and subjectivity. They are more personal and the link with the literal darkness is either barely noticeable or bleached from their conceptual framework.

2.1 Literal and less metaphorical senses of dark

According to the corpus, when related to literal and less metaphorical contexts, *dark* was recorded in the following contexts:

Places

(1) *Myn is the prison in the derk cote* (The Knight's Tale 1599).
(Mine is the prison in the dark cell).

(2) *And nyste neuer where she was for it was derk* (The Reeve's Tale 305).
(And she never knew where she was for it was dark).

Dark renders the attribute of a place, which is dismal, dusky and lacks illumination. *Dark*, then, applies to places, in which there is no light.

Hell

The other place projected by the source domain of darkness was Hell. When describing Hell, *dark* was more metaphorical than *dark* when it pertained to other places. It did not describe a place that is merely devoid of light, but primarily implied religious undertones, and hence an atmosphere of sin and depravity. The literal absence of light was a starting point for further associations with Hell, such as misery, evil or torture.

Darkness that projected the concept of Hell can be exemplified by the following contexts:

(3) *But in helle her sight shal be ful of derkness of smoke and ful of teris*
(The Parson's Tale 134).
(But in Hell her sight will be full of darkness of smoke and full of tears)

- (4) *All the horrible devylles that hem tormente covered with the **derknes of deth***
That ben the synnes that the wrecched man hath don. (The Parson's Tale 109–111)
 (All the horrible devils that torment him covered with the **darkness of death** that is the sins that the wretched man had done).

In (3), the domain of 'darkness' is used to structure the target domain of misery. On the literal plane, 'darkness' is illustrated as an attribute which precludes vision. The eyes full of tears and the dark smoke around are factors which make it hardly possible for the man to see. Yet, connected with Hell, 'darkness' also evokes further metaphorical associations. First and foremost, 'darkness' creates an atmosphere of sin and depravity; hence a consequence of life in sin without life and God. 'Darkness' becomes the reflection of the sins committed by humans. Juxtaposed with tears, it evokes a state of melancholy, anguish and grief. 'Darkness' is then often experienced in Hell, and is thus linked with annihilation and torture. In (4), it corresponds to a lack of life, and thus to death.

Moreover, *dark* could also function as part of descriptive phrases that refer to Hell indirectly, as in (5, 6):

- (5) *I may go retornyng to the **derk erthe and coveryd with derknes, the land of Miserye and of derknes** where ther is shadow of deth wher ther is non other ordenance but grisly drede that shal euer laste.* (The Parson's Tale 102–103)
 (I may go and return to the **dark earth covered with darkness, the land of misery and of darkness** where there is shadow of death where there is no other order but terrible dread that shall ever last).
- (6) *And for that faith is ded withoute werkis*
So forto werkyn yeue me witte and space
*That I be quyrt from thens **that most derk** is.* (The Second Nun's Prologue 64–67)
 (And as faith is dead without deeds
 So for to work give me wit and space
 So that I will be set free from **the place that most dark is**).

It should be emphasised that in medieval times, Hell was a taboo subject. Consequently, people avoided talking about Hell openly and used neutral, indirect descriptive phrases instead, namely, the metaphorical expressions containing the adjective *dark*, such as *dark earth*, or *dark place* (Wawrzyniak 2012). A closer look at the indirect expressions suggests that in medieval times (covering the time-span recorded in *The Canterbury Tales*) Hell was considered as taboo and that it may have evoked fear and a feeling of uncertainty. People,

therefore, may have believed that by articulating this word aloud, they would attract evil powers and draw the attention of the adversary. Therefore, they preferred to refer to Hell in a roundabout way rather than directly. The recorded circuitous, indirect phrases, like *dark place* or *dark earth* performed, thus, the role of euphemisms; hence they were substitutions for an expression that might have been regarded as offensive to the receiver. They were conventional expressions used on an everyday basis. Though they initially sounded metaphorical, the phrases gradually lost their metaphorical status and became conventionalised, deeply entrenched in the speakers' conceptual system. In other words, they started to be perceived as ordinary expressions. Such was the perception of the phrases *dark earth* or *dark place*, which did not sound odd to speakers of Medieval English and constituted a set of agreeable and less offensive expressions related to religious concepts.

Moreover, the expression *dark earth* can be considered as a semi-metaphor based on metonymy rather than as a pure metaphor. The metonymic basis that constitutes the basis for the metaphorisation is one attribute of Hell, hence the part ('darkness' or 'lack of light') that stands for the whole, hence for the entire concept associated with Hell. The semi-metaphor, or the half metaphor can be explained on the grounds that the link with literal 'darkness', that is, with the lack of light, is still preserved.

Atmosphere, weather

Dark pertaining to weather was recorded in the following contexts:

(7) *Derk was the nyght as piche or cool* (The Miller's Tale 543).
(Dark was the night as pitch or coal).

(8) *Night is dark and rude* (The Merchant's Tale 554).
(Night is dark and rude).

(9) *A derk cloude between vs and the sonne* (The Parson's Tale 111).
(A dark cloud between us and the Sun).

When referring to the atmosphere or weather, *dark* could be a descriptive element highlighting a lack of light (7). Additionally, it could imply threatening undertones (8), as it describes a place that is literally dark and thereby creates an atmosphere of danger and unpredictability. Moreover, *dark* could be a purely figurative element (9). The expression *a derk cloude* 'a dark cloud', is a metaphor that refers to sins committed by humans. Those sins 'give rise to a cloud' that makes it almost impossible for humanity to see the light.

2.2 Metaphorical senses projected by dark

Evil deeds, actions

‘Darkness’ could also denote *evil*, perceived in terms of *evil deeds* or *actions*, which can be exemplified by the context:

- (10) *Now cristis owen knyghtis leef and deer
Cast al away the workis of derknesse.* (The Second Nun’s Tale 383–384)
(Now Christ’s own beloved knights cast away all works of darkness).

Evil nature

The concept of ‘darkness’ associated with the human psyche can be noticed in the following contexts:

- (11) *And thus they her sorowes for to slake
Prayde her on their knees for goddis sake
To come and rome her in company
Awey to druyen her **derk fantasie**
And finally she grauntid that request
For well she saw it was for the best* (The Franklin’s Tale 136)
(And thus in order to assuage her sorrows they prayed for her on their knees for God’s sake *to come* accompany her to drive away her dark fantasy; and finally she granted that request for she saw it was for the best).
- (12) *Ther the body of man, that whilom was foul and dark,
Is moore cleer than the sonne.* (The Man of Law’s Tale 382–383)
(There was the body of a man that at some point was wicked and dark, is more clear than the Sun).
- (13) *The derk ymagnynge of felonye, and al the compassynge* (The Knight’s Tale 1137)
(The dark image of felony, and all its dimensions).

The analysis of the contexts shows no physical, literal image of ‘darkness’. Consequently, when referring to the human psyche, *dark* is a metaphorical element with no literal sense behind it. *Dark* was an abstract, epistemic and subjective element as it could evoke the features of evil and cruelty in contexts where the link with the literal ‘lack of light’ was cut off. At that point the notions of subjectivity and abstractness require some clarification.

As for subjectivity, *dark* referring to ‘lack of light’ and *dark* applied to human psyche are, to some extent, subjective. Both ‘psychic darkness’ and

‘physical darkness’ can be viewed as a matter of human subjective perception. Consequently, both senses could be viewed as, to some extent, subjective.

The notions of epistemicity and abstractness are used in the present paper with a view to showing that *dark*, when used with reference to human psyche or any other non-physical objects, is all about abstract values, such as evil or cruelty, while the notion of the ‘physical lack of light’ recedes into the background. *Dark* then becomes more abstract as it pertains to values and not to the physical lack of light. One could, however, argue that whenever the word *dark* is used to characterise the human psyche or any other non-physical object, it cannot denote the objects’ physical darkness as such objects are not physical objects. The interpretation of *dark* is then contingent on the object it is linked with. Physical objects rely on the concept of the ‘lack of light’, whereas the application of this concept to non-physical objects seems a negligible and unnecessary tool. From this perspective, different contexts accompanying *dark* require different interpretations. However, a different analysis of *dark* could also be drawn. This approach will show that different senses in *dark* are interconnected and that there is not such a sharp difference in the interpretation of *dark* modifying physical and non-physical objects. Before illustrating the approach, a few issues should be illustrated.

As the data from the corpus indicate, *dark* was a polysemous adjective. Firstly, it could be a descriptive element of objects lacking light. Secondly, *dark* could also apply to objects devoid of light, but which additionally evoked the features of evil (e.g., Hell). In such contexts, *dark* was more than just a descriptive element. It referred to objects which were literally dark, but which were also imbued with values associated with a lack of light.’ Thirdly, *dark* could be associated with the attributes of evil rather than with any ‘physical lack of light’. These senses reflect the gradual increase in the level of abstractness. *Dark* could be conceived of as an element highlighting a lack of light or just a lack of positive values. Yet, a close correspondence between a more literal sense ‘lack of light’ and a more abstract one ‘lack of positive values’ should be emphasised. The latter (a lack of positive values) could be the result of the metaphorical application of the former (a lack of light). Therefore, the notion of the ‘physical lack of light’ recedes into the background, yet it does not entirely disappear. The aspect of ‘a lack of light’ is not a literal element present in the interpretation of an expression, but an element salient on some abstract layer of conceptualisation needed to interpret *dark* in terms of negative values. Hence, the literal sense ‘a lack of light’ does not disappear once the context is changed, but acquires a new interpretation tightly linked with values. Consequently, different contexts do not require distinct and unconnected interpretations, but only slight modifications.

Moreover, to put it metaphorically, ‘dark’ creates a binary opposition with ‘light’. The concept of ‘light’ gives rise to the metaphor LIGHT IS GOODNESS, NOBLENESS, whereas ‘darkness’ creates the opposite, namely

DARKNESS IS EVIL AND DEPRAVITY. The abstract and epistemic senses of *dark* are a subject to Tendency I (Traugott 1989), which states:

Meaning based on the external described situation > meaning based on the internal situation.

At this point, *dark* is an abstract, epistemic element, which evokes the association of evil, even if analysed out of context. According to Traugott, the notion of an 'external described situation' applies to the way a situation or an object is perceived by most people. People rely on their senses in describing the so called 'external reality'. Consequently, if an object is perceived as black or dark, it cannot be referred to as yellow or red. We take it for granted that our sight is objective and thus it lets us view the world in which we live in a very similar way. Therefore, the description of external properties of objects is not based on evaluative judgements, but rather on the way things are accessible to our eyes. For cognitivists, sight is believed to be the most reliable of all human senses (Traugott 1989; Sweetser 1990, Krzeszowski 1997). In short, an external situation or reality is referred to as the reality that can be described in a roughly similar if not same way as it reflects the way things are accessible to human senses. The internal situation or reality, however, is associated with human subjective, evaluative judgement, and thus its perception varies among people. It is based on the way humans perceive reality and judge it rather than just physically see it. Such an approach, though it may seem simplified, is frequently adopted in order to show semantic changes occurring in a diachronic perspective in lexemes. Therefore, given the adjective *dark*, the sense standing for 'lack of light' is referred to as 'external reality' as it captures the description that would be shared by people. Contrariwise, *dark* applying to evil is viewed as the internal reality as it involves the individual, subjective approach which reflects one's experiences shaping the perception of reality. As already mentioned, the approach advocated by Traugott may seem simplified once one approaches more philosophical views on objective and subjective reality. Accordingly, there is no such a thing as an 'objective proposition' because there is always an individual standing behind each proposition, hence it is always subjectively marked. Likewise, the notion of 'a real world domain' may also seem meaningless because we as humans do not have access to 'the real world'. What is, in a simplified way called the real world, is the world AS IT IS PERCEIVED by people, which again entails the notions of subjectivity rather than objectivity or impartiality. Nevertheless, the present paper, whose aim is to deal with profiles of *dark* and *blak*, is more cognitivist than philosophical. Therefore, it adopts the approaches to internal/ external reality advocated by the above mentioned cognitivists.

Hard to understand, mysterious

- (14) *Bet certayn menys as knowen clerkis
Doth thingis that for certeyn ende ful derk is
to mannys wit that for our ignoraunce* (The Man of Law's Tale 382–384).
(But certain men as clerks know; do things that at some point are obscure to man's wit; due to our ignorance).

Likewise, in this context 'light' and 'darkness' form binary oppositions. The concept of 'light' gives rise to the metaphor LIGHT IS WISDOM, whereas the concept of darkness instantiates the opposite, namely DARKNESS (or LACK OF LIGHT) IS OBSCURITY, IGNORANCE. 'Darkness' is here an abstract domain, which is cut off from the concrete sense.

3. Analysis of *blak*

Following *The Etymological Dictionary of English Language* (CEDEL, sv. *blak*), *blak* originated from PGmc *blakaz* 'burned'. In Old English *blæc* denoted 'dark', whereas its cognates were ON *blakkr* 'dark', OHG *blah* 'black', Swed. *black* 'ink', and Du. *blaken* 'to burn'. According to the Middle English Dictionary (MED, sv. *blak*), ME *blak*—PDE 'black' contained the following senses:

- 1) of a black colour
 - it was applied in similes: *black and blo* 'black and livid', *black or whit* 'black or white'; of any colour or kind, *black as col* (*blacche*, *crove*, *inde*, *mode*, *pich*), *blacker than pich*
 - armed in black, clothed in black, bound in black
 - the colour of sin, sorrow, e.g., *black berd*—the Devil, *black in his eye*—'he is guilty'
- 2) inclining to blackness, dark, discoloured
 - of eyes: dark, brown
 - of persons: swarthy, dark, brunette, black-haired
 - of colours: dark, deep
- 3) without light
 - dark, gloomy, murky
 - fierce, terrible, wicked
- 4) in compounds and combinations:

black frères ‘the Dominican friars’, *black monk/none* ‘a Benedictine monk/nun’, *black smith* ‘a smith who works in iron’, *black mondai* ‘Easter Monday’, *black order* ‘the Benedictines’, *black rent* ‘a type of blackmail’, *black moneie* ‘coins of copper or brass’, *black poding* ‘a kind of pudding’, *black sop* ‘a dark colour of soup’, *blak ston* ‘a kind of a dark stone’, *black sugar* ‘brown sugar’, *black berie* ‘a black berry’, *black brid* ‘the English blackbird’, *black mint* ‘pepper mint’, *black pepper* ‘black pepper’, *black poppi* ‘a variety of red poppy with black seeds’, *black thorn* ‘the shrub blackthorn’, *black jaunes* ‘jaundice with deep discolouration’, *black colre (galle)* ‘black bile, the humour melancholy’.

3.1 Literal senses of *blak* in *The Canterbury Tales*

***Blak* related to the body**

Blak was, to a large extent, related to the body:

- (15) *His nostrelis blak were and wyde* (The General Prologue 559).
(His nostrils were black and wide).
- (16) *Black was his berd and manly was his face* (The Knight’s Tale 1272).
(His face was black and his face was manly).
- (17) *His longe heris were kempt behynd his bak*
As ony rauen fethir it shoon for blak (The Knight’s Tale 1258–1286).
(His long hair were combed behind his back; as any raven feather, it shone black).
- (18) *His browis two were bent and blak as ony slo* (The Miller’s Tale 59–60).
(His two eyebrows were bent and black as any plum).
- (19) *Blake yen* (The Knight’s Tale 925).
(Black eyes).
- (20) *A few frakelis in his face were spreynt*
Betwix yellow and somdeel blak meynt (The Knight’s Tale 1311–1312).
(A few freckles were scattered in his face; mingled between yellow and somewhat black).
- (21) *And Saint Iherome sayde*
Whan he long tyme had dwellid in desert
(..)
Where as he no mete but herbes and water to drynk
Ne no bed but naked erthe.
For whyche his flesh was blak as an Ethyope for hete and destroyde
for colde (The Parson’s Tale 271).

(Where as he had no meat but herbs and water to drink; no bed but naked earth; because of which his flesh was black as an Ethiope due to heat and destroyed because of cold).

The above contexts illustrate literal senses of *blak* (either black, dark or inclining to blackness) with no metaphorical undertones behind them. The data from the corpus show that *blak* was frequently linked with parts of the body (eyes, eyebrows, nostrils, beard, hair, freckles) or the whole body. In such contexts, it was used purely with reference to one's appearance. The range of references *blak* could be linked with was wide. Moreover, the entities described as *blak* did not evoke negative associations, but rather neutral or even positive ones. Furthermore, in most contexts *blak* did not evoke the equivalent of PDE black, but was mostly a colour that could be classified as dark as it only approximated black. It was only in context (18) that *blak* corresponded to the PDE sense of black. *Blak* here was used in the simile in which the shade of *blak* was compared to a raven. In other contexts, ME *blak* was largely related to dark. In (19), *blak* is juxtaposed with a plum, thereby evoking the association of a dark purple colour. In (21), freckles are described as yellow and *somehow blak*. Consequently, *blak* was more of a mixture, containing even dark yellow in its framework. Additionally, *blak* could describe eyes, body or nostrils, a meaning which is closer to dark brown rather than black. As for hair, *blak* could correspond to PDE black, but also to *dark*. The context does not specify what colour was meant. In other words, the recorded contexts show that the range of shades embraced by *blak* was wide. ME *blak* could apply to a pure black approximating a coal, but also to brown or even to a dark shade mixed with yellow. Consequently, *blak* can be considered a macro-colour term for dark colours. Therefore, the application of *blak* with no modifying elements could evoke the idea of both dark or black. The similes often specified which particular shade of *blak* was intended.

***Blak* related to clothes**

The literal sense of *blak* was also related to clothes, which can be exemplified by the following contexts:

(22) *A companye of ladies (...)*

Eche aftir othe clothed blake

But such a cry and such a woo they make

That in worlde nys creature lyuyng

That herde suche an othe weymentyng (The Knight's Tale 40–45).

(A company of ladies; each after another clothed in black; but they made such a cry and such a weep; that in the world there is no living creature that heard such a lamentation).

(23) *In clothis blak dropped al with teris* (The Knight's Tale 2020).

(In black clothes all dripped with tears).

(24) *But in his blake clothis sorrowfully*

He cam at his comaundement an hye (The Knight's Tale 2114–2115).

(But in his black clothes full of sorrow; he followed his commandment from Heaven).

(25) *Ne wolde he that she were loue ne wyf*

But euer lyue in clothis blake

Sool as the turtyl that hath lost his make (The Merchant's Tale 834–836).

(He did not want her to be love nor wife; but that she ever should live in black clothes; alone as the turtle that lost his mate).

The analysis shows that *blak* was also extensively used with reference to clothes. Black clothes were highly symbolic and evoked unbearable sadness and mourning. *Blak* was thus conceived of as a colour of sorrow.

Other literal contexts of blackness

***Blak* linked with a surrounding reality**

Other elements from the corpus described as *blak* can be exemplified by the following contexts:

(26) *The smyler with the knyf under the cloke*

The shepen brennyng with the blak smoke

The treson of the murdryng in the bed

The open werris with woundis alle bled (The Knight's Tale 1141–1144).

(The murderer with the knife under the cloak; the shed burning with black smoke; the treason of murder in the bed, the open wars with wounds all bleeding).

(27) *This grisly rockis blake*

That sownen rather vnto foul confusion

Of wreke than to ony maner creation (The Franklin's Tale 160–162).

(These awful black rocks; that seem rather a foul confusion of work rather than of any good creation).

In these contexts, *blak* is a describing element of smoke (27) and rocks (28), hence objects of a surrounding reality. It approximates dark rather than PDE *black*. Moreover, in literary and figurative contexts *blak* could also be used to draw an atmosphere of evil, unpredictability and danger. Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that *blak* evoked only the associations of evil when it was put in

contexts evoking an atmosphere of evil. In other words, collocations such as *blak smoke*, or *blak rock* did not evoke the sense of evil when they were approached as isolated entities separated from a particular context. Used out of context, the expressions *black smoke* or *black rocks* were neutral and connected with the every-day, external reality, rather than evaluative, abstract senses pertaining to subjective judgments or attitudes.

The juxtaposition of *blak* and *dark* reveals some striking differences between the two words. Both *blak* and *dark* could evoke a sense of evil and unpredictability bordering on danger. Nevertheless, in the case of *blak*, the sense of evil was just one of the associations of the colour rather than an abstract, epistemic sense. This connotation was tightly bound with the concept and visual image of a colour. Hence, rocks or smoke had to be literally black (or dark) in order to evoke the atmosphere of terror. Therefore, *blak* does not mark the completion of Traugott's Tendency I, as the image of a colour is still imprinted in the conceptual framework of *blak* referring to evil or danger. The sense of evil, however, developed by *dark* was not one of the associations evoked by the literal sense, but an abstract, epistemic layer developed via a mapping of the concrete upon the abstract. The sense of evil could thus be considered one of the polysemous senses developed by *dark*. The expression *dark fantasie* evoked abstract, epistemic, evaluative senses even when approached out of context. Moreover, this expression was perceived as conventionalised and ordinary, with no metaphorical colouring behind it. Similarly, when applied to actions, or knowledge, *dark* was only an abstract term, cut off from its literal sense.

***Blak* linked with devil**

ME *blak* was recorded in the collocation *blak devil*, where it evoked the concept of evil. In such contexts, *blak* is imbued with the concept of sin. Nevertheless, the concept of evil projected by *blak* is only partially abstract, as the link with the literal blackness is also preserved. In other words, blackness constitutes a literal meaning upon which metaphorical associations are projected. The devil was not conceived of in light colours, but as black or as dark. Therefore, the concept of a colour is not bleached from its framework. In other words, the new layer in *blak* is not an independent concept cut off from the colour term, but a new symbolic association entirely related with the colour. The idea of evil implied by *blak* can be seen in the following contexts:

(28) *I telle yow trouthe ye may trust me (...)*

Of arowes and of fyre with rede lemys

Of grete bestes that wole hym byte(...)

For feer of grete bolis and blake beris

*Or ellis **blake deuyll**es wol hem take.* (The Nun's Prologue 107–116).

(I will tell you the truth you can trust me (...) of arrows and of fire with red limbs of great beasts that will bite him(..). For fear of great bulls and black bears or else black devils that will take him).

It should be emphasised that *blak* evoked an association with evil, but not because this lexeme was abstract enough, but because it was juxtaposed with the devil, which was viewed as an embodiment of evil. The devil was literally visualised and portrayed as *blak*. Moreover, it also evoked the connotations of evil and cruelty. The juxtaposition of *blak* and evil in the mind of the conceptualiser might have led to the gradual association of *blak* with evil. In a similar way, bears were viewed as black and, thus evil. Consequently, in such contexts *blak* was not a neutral colour term, but a descriptive element marked by evil. In other words, the connection of *blak* with evil could be a consequence of an identification and perception of the devil in black colours, and a subsequent transfer of values linked with devil upon the element modifying it. Consequently, from a purely descriptive element, *blak* develops a more abstract layer and becomes more than just a descriptive element related to the appearance of a devil. Yet, *blak* is not an evaluative, epistemic sense, as the concept of a colour is central in its conceptual framework.

The juxtaposition of *blak* and *dark* in religious contexts also reveals some differences. As has already been mentioned, *dark* was a part of circuitous phrases referring to Hell, namely *dark earth*, or *dark place*, which originally were associated with Hell due to the scarcity of light. It should be emphasised that *dark* is not linked with the lexeme Hell directly. *Blak*, however, collocates with the devil and not with any other creature that could only stand for or symbolise the devil. *Dark* then allowed for a variety of understatements unlike *blak*, which was more concrete, and thereby needed a proper context and clearly identified entities.

4. Conclusions

To conclude, the paper aimed to show the existing differences between *blak* and *dark* in *The Canterbury Tales* on both the literal and metaphorical planes.

On the literal plane, *dark* could be paraphrased as ‘deficient in light’. The concept of a colour played a secondary role in its conceptual framework. It was merely a colour that resulted from a lack of light. Moreover, the range of entities *dark* was linked with was rather limited. The lexeme was mostly used with reference to places and weather, and thus entities that could be characterised by a small amount of light. Additionally, *dark* functioned as a euphemism for Hell, which was considered a taboo. It constituted a part of conventional phrases used automatically to avoid direct references to Hell.

On the metaphorical plane, *dark* could refer to evil, as well as to obscurity or ignorance. In these applications, *dark* was an autonomous, subjective element with no literal sense behind it, thereby marking Traugott’s Tendency I (1989):

Meaning based on the external described situation > meaning based on the internal situation

The semantic flexibility of *dark* measured by means of the variety of its metaphorical senses could be explained on the grounds of the literal sense of

dark, namely the ‘lack of light’. In other words, the literal sense ‘lack of light’ was conducive to the further emergence of metaphorical senses, as the concept of ‘darkness’ and of ‘light’ could complement each other. ‘Dark’ and ‘light’ formed binary oppositions, giving rise to similar abstract values in spite of being on opposite poles.

The analysis of *blak* has shown that it did not evoke the equivalent of PDE black, but was primarily a colour term, which could stand for black, dark, brown, or even a dark shade mixed with yellow. The similes often specified which particular shade was intended. Nevertheless, although broad and including different shades, the idea of a colour was central in the conceptual framework of *blak*. The lexeme was used mostly with reference to body parts, where it evoked neutral or positive associations, as well as to clothes, where it possessed the attribute of unbearable sadness and mourning.

Furthermore, *blak* could also be used to evoke an atmosphere of evil, unpredictability and danger when it modified every-day objects. Yet, unlike *dark*, these senses did not mark the completion of Traugott’s Tendency I, as the sense of evil was just one of the symbolic associations of the colour, rather than an abstract, epistemic sense. Consequently, contrary to *dark*, *blak* in *The Canterbury Tales* did not develop abstract, evaluative senses that could be projected via a mapping of the concrete on a more abstract layer of conceptualisation.

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Gender Assignment of Anglicisms in French

Tibor Órsi

Modern English does not distinguish the grammatical gender of nouns. The French language has two grammatical genders: masculine and feminine. What happens to Anglicisms that enter French? In the process of borrowing, the so-called “masculine tendency” seems to operate: Most Anglicisms including *meeting*, *remake* and *show* are assigned to the masculine gender. Anglicisms denoting women become feminine: *call-girl*, *suffragette*. Words containing suffixes that are feminine in French (*efficiency*, *inflation*) as well as certain words that can be associated with feminine referents also take the feminine gender. *Pomme* ‘apple’ is feminine in French. This explains why *golden* and *granny*, which refer to species of apple, become feminine in French. We come across inconsistencies and hesitations in daily usage. We also take a short look at gender assignment of Anglicisms in Modern Norwegian.

1. Introduction

Most languages of the world distinguish the category of grammatical gender. Genders divide nouns into formally and semantically motivated groups. The number of classes depends on the criteria that serve as the basis of classification. In certain exotic languages, general semantic categories like *plant*, *animal*, *edible*, etc. may constitute genders, as in Mandarin Chinese.

2. The role of grammatical gender

It constitutes the basis of pronominal reference. In French, for example, *homme* ‘man’ is masculine (= m.), which corresponds to its natural gender, that is why it can be replaced by the masculine personal pronoun *il* ‘he’. *Femme* ‘woman’ is feminine (= f.) and can be referred to by the feminine personal pronoun *elle* ‘she’.

Grammatical gender governs adjectival, pronominal and sometimes even verbal agreement. In the French phrase *cette table ronde* ‘this round table’, the noun *table* is feminine, which is why the attributive adjective *rond* ‘round’ takes the feminine form *ronde*. The demonstrative adjective, which usually occurs in

post-nominal position in French, also becomes feminine (*cette*), in contrast with the masculine forms *ce*, *cet*.

By far the most important function of grammatical gender, however, is to assign nouns into various declension types. For example, in Latin, *mare* ‘sea’ was neutral. In Old English, the gender of nouns was grammatical, not natural or biological. The Old English words for both ‘woman’ (*wif*) and ‘child’ (*cild*) were neuter. Old English *wifmann*, also meaning ‘woman’, was masculine, and *hlæfdige* ‘lady’ was feminine. *Hunta* ‘hunter’ was masculine, *tid* ‘time; hour’ was feminine and *treow* ‘tree’ was neutral.

3. Markedness

When languages are described, the morphologically simpler and more frequent form is treated as the base form within a category. The other forms are given with reference to the base form. Generally, the singular is considered as unmarked, and the plural is the marked form. In the French gender system, masculine is the unmarked form. The feminine form is considered as the morphological variety of the masculine: *le prince* ‘the prince’ // *la princesse* ‘the princess’. The unmarked masculine form takes the suffix *-esse* to form the marked feminine form *princesse*.

4. Is the assignment of grammatical gender predictable?

In *Language* (1933:280), Bloomfield claims: “There seems to be no practical criterion by which the gender of a noun in German, French, or Latin could be determined.” By contrast, Tucker et al. (1977) quoted in Corbett (1991:57–61) prove that gender assignment is coherent in French. There are more exceptions than in other languages, but the rules form a clear system. The major rules are phonological. It does not suffice to focus only on the last phoneme of a particular word; in some cases we must also take into account the penultimate and the antepenultimate phonemes. If we do so, the grammatical gender of any French noun can be predicted with a hundred per cent accuracy.

5. The change of grammatical gender within the history of a language

The grammatical gender of certain words may change within the history of a particular language. In Classical Latin, *flos*, *florem* ‘flower’ was masculine. In French, *fleur* is feminine. Also in Classical Latin, *arbor* ‘tree’ was feminine, perhaps because trees were associated with the ideas of maternity and fertility. Already in Old French and similarly in Modern French, *arbre* is assigned to the masculine class. In the 16th century, owing to the growing familiarity with Classical Latin, the original masculine gender was also used. This type of hesitation, which only comes to an end in the 17th century, can be observed in the case of other “transgender” nouns as well. Modern French *art* (m.) ‘art’,

from Latin *ars* (f.) is frequently feminine. In the 16th and 17th centuries, words of learned origin like *épithète* ‘epithet’ and *horreur* ‘horror’ are used either as masculine or feminine, but both will take the feminine gender afterwards. The deverbal noun *échange* ‘exchange’ alternates between masculine and feminine, but is finally fixed as masculine in gender.

6. The change of grammatical gender in the process of borrowing

Borrowing often leads to the change of the gender of the borrowed items. According to Hock (1991:401), “gender assignment seems to operate in terms of the following parameters:

1. Formal criteria;
2. general semantic criteria;
3. considerations of the gender of semantically related native words;
4. a ‘default class’ to which words are assigned if none of the other criteria provides a solution.”

Latin *fenestra* ‘window’ developed into French *fenêtre*. The feminine gender of the Modern French word corresponds to that of the Latin etymon. But why is Modern German *Fenster* ‘window’ neuter? It can be traced back to the same Latin word. Among other words, Old Norse used the compound word *vindauga* to refer to ‘window’. For the sake of gaining a better understanding, I “modernize” the form of the Old Norse word into what it would be in its Modern German form: **Windaugē*. It is an endocentric compound: *der Wind* ‘wind’ + *das Auge* ‘eye’. Since the morphological head of the compound word is neuter, the whole compound takes the neuter gender: **das Windaugē*. In the meantime, the borrowed word *Fenster* ousted the **windauga* form in German, the latter, however, continued to serve as a semantic model and determined the neuter gender of *Fenster*. English *window* reflects the same compound; over time its second element has become opaque.

7. Grammatical gender in the history of Indo-European languages

Grammatical gender is a major category of the Indo-European languages. Linguistic change affected these languages differently. Old English distinguished the three grammatical genders of nouns, adjectives and pronouns. By the end of the Middle English period (15th century), the noun abandoned the category of grammatical gender in favour of natural gender. In Modern English, grammatical distinctions of gender are mainly confined to the third-person singular (personal, reflexive and relative) pronouns.

Following the collapse of the Latin three-gender system, in Romance languages such as French, nouns fall into two gender classes: masculine and feminine. Anglicisms that enter other languages appear to conform to the rules of the borrowing languages. To what grammatical gender are Anglicisms allotted in French? The rest of the present paper focuses on this issue.

8. The proportion of feminine Anglicisms in the history of the French language

Data supplied by Nymansson (1995:96) indicate that the percentage of feminine Anglicisms is gradually decreasing in French. They represented 24.7% of all the Anglicisms borrowed in the 17th century, 16.1% in the 18th century, 14.6% in the 19th century and, finally, they amounted to only 12.7% in the 20th century. These data clearly show that words borrowed from English tend to be assigned to the masculine class. The masculine tendency can be explained by the neutralization of the differences of the grammatical genders. Anglicisms were automatically interpreted as masculine in French. As a result, their grammatical gender can, to a large extent, be predicted: *le jazz, le jogging, un drink, un thriller, un avatar*. Certain Anglicisms that refer to persons can be used both as masculine and feminine words: *coach, fan, free-lance, skinhead, snob, teenager*.

9. Factors influencing the feminization of Anglicisms

9.1. Natural gender is preferred for persons.

Anglicisms that refer to women usually take the feminine gender: *la barmaid, la business-woman, la call-girl, la first lady, la girl-friend, la girl-scout, la majorette, la rock queen, la suffragette, la vamp, la working woman*.

9.2. Inanimate referents take the gender of an existing French word.

Inanimate referents are usually allocated to the unmarked, that is, the masculine gender unless some special factor prevails: *le copyright, le derby, le folklore*. Such a factor can be what Humbley (1974:67) refers to as *attraction homonymique*: An Anglicism may take the gender of a French word that has similar form and etymology. English *check-list* becomes feminine as an Anglicism in French since *liste* 'list' is feminine. *Dose*, the morphological head of English *overdose*, is identical in form and meaning with the French word *dose*. The Anglicism *overdose* as well as its variety *surdose*, partially nativized by means of a French prefix, are both feminine. The feminine gender of *science-fiction* agrees with that of the French word *fiction* '(work of) fiction'.

9.3. Semantic analogy in general

Certain Anglicisms may become feminine if they can be associated with a feminine word in French. *Les sixties* 'the sixties' is feminine, since *année* 'year' is feminine in French. French dictionaries uniformly classify the Anglicism *country music* as a feminine word, since its morphological head *music* corresponds to the French feminine word *musique*. However, if *country* is used elliptically to refer to the whole phrase, it can be both masculine and feminine.

Golden, *granny (smith)* and *starking* denote various species of apple. They become feminine on the analogy of the French feminine word *pomme* ‘apple’. The French word *bière* ‘beer’ is feminine. This may explain that *ale* and *lager* take the feminine gender.

9.4. Semantic analogy in the case of compounds

Compounds of English origin may take the gender of the obvious French equivalent of the last element of the Anglicism. The second element of the Anglicisms cover-story and detective story corresponds to the feminine word *histoire* in French, which is why the Anglicism is attributed to the feminine class. In spite of the fact that French speakers are aware of the foreignness of these expressions, there is a constraint to assign grammatical gender to them and integrate them into the system of the French language. *Fashion victim* (1995) is a fairly recent Anglicism in French. *Victime*, the corresponding French word with a slightly different spelling, accounts for the feminine gender of the Anglicism.

9.5. Semantic analogy in the case of shortened forms

Accepted shortenings may preserve the feminine gender, since they are used side by side with the full forms: *la sitcom* < *situational comedy* “comédie” (f.), *la rave* < *rave party*, *rave music* “partie” (f.), “*musique*” (f.).

9.6. Semantic and phonological analogy

Nymansson (1995:105) supposes that *house* [‘aus] < *house music* [‘ausmjuzik] is feminine, possibly because for French speakers unfamiliar with English, the phonetic form of *house* and *épouse* [uz] may appear similar. This preserves the feminine gender. In French, the majority of words ending in the phoneme [v] belong to the feminine gender. The pronunciation of *rave* resembles that of *relève*. Nymansson is of the opinion that *rave* will remain feminine.

9.7. Analogy motivated by suffixes

Owing to the particularities of the development of the English and French languages, a considerable number of words of the two languages are identical. Anglicisms may belong to this group as well. Suffixes spelt identically but pronounced differently obviously correspond to each other. In French, certain suffixes are always feminine: *-ence/-ance*, *-ion/-tion*, *-ette*. Whenever the English word ends in a suffix that is feminine in French, the Anglicism will become feminine. The grammatical feminization of French *performance* is motivated by the analogy of French words like *alliance*, *correspondance* and *renaissance*. *Efficiency*, modelled on English *efficiency*, a term used in economics, is feminine, since *confidence*, *exigence*, *patience*, *science*, etc. are

feminine in French. Some Anglicisms contain the French diminutive suffix –*ette*, which refers to the feminine form. It goes without saying that *disquette* and *kitchenette* are attributed to the feminine gender.

10. Gender assignment in Norwegian

The following overview relies heavily on Graedler (2002). Historically, Norwegian has a three-gender system, with masculine, feminine and neuter genders. This is reflected in most of the traditional dialects and in the *Nynorsk* variety, whereas in the *Bokmål* variety, masculine and feminine are regarded as one common gender. The neuter gender is treated separately. From the point of view of gender assignment, the interesting question is when Anglicisms become neuter, in contrast to the common gender. In *Bokmål*, the unmarked form is the masculine, and between eighty and ninety per cent of the borrowed nouns are assigned to this class. Gender assignment seems to be based mainly on semantic principles; for instance, animacy almost invariably results in masculine gender in new words: *call girl*, *he-man*, *bitch*, *pitbull*.

Formal features also have an impact on gender assignment. In case of conflict, semantic features seem to overrule the formal ones.

1. Monosyllabic words tend to become neuter: *kick*, *scoop*, but *look* (m.).

2. Endings:

2.a. Some derivational endings are identical (*-er*, *-ing*) or similar (*-sjon*, *-tion*) in English and in Norwegian. Here analogy seems to be quite strong. Words with these endings take common gender: *farmer*, *doping*, *audition*.

2.b. Words ending in *-ment* are neuter in Norwegian. And that is also the gender favoured by most English loans: *understatement* (n.), *gentlemen's agreement* (n.) as well as loans from French: *appartement* (n.)

Anglicisms with inanimate referents may take the same gender as the native equivalent: *race* is neuter on the analogy of Norwegian *løp* (n.) 'race, running event'. Sometimes the source of analogy is purely speculative: *cover* (n.) is neuter, perhaps on the analogy of *omslag* 'cover'. *Mappe* (m.) could also have served as the source of the analogy. In that case, Norwegian *cover* ought to be masculine.

11. Summary

The majority of the Anglicisms that enter French are assigned to the masculine gender. The number of feminine Anglicisms is gradually decreasing. Gender assignment varies in some cases: *sex-shop*, *trade-union*. Sometimes dictionaries provide contradictory information. In most cases, semantic factors motivate gender assignment, but in a number of cases we come across inconsistencies.

Morpho-phonological factors influence gender assignment when Anglicisms end in certain suffixes. There seems to be no perfect hierarchy between the aforementioned criteria. The Anglicism *holding* tends to be masculine, similarly to other Anglicisms ending in *-ing*. Since it is a shortened form of *holding*

company, it can be interpreted as ‘company’, that is ‘*société, forme, maison*’, which are all feminine. This possible interpretation accounts for the occasional allocation to the feminine gender.

We also investigated gender assignment in Norwegian. We found that it functioned along remarkably similar lines.

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