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NOVA SERIES TOM. XXI.

REDIGIGUNT:
TAMÁS PÓCS ET RÓZSA V. RAISZ

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

KÁROLY ESZTERHÁZY TEACHERS' TRAINING COLLEGE
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

KÁROLY ESZTERHÁZY TEACHERS' TRAINING COLLEGE
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EDITORIAL NOTE

The Department of American Studies at Eszterházy Károly Teachers' Training College is pleased to present Volume I of the *Eger Journal of American Studies*.

The *Eger Journal of American Studies* is the first scholarly journal published in Hungary devoted solely to the publication of articles investigating and exploring various aspects of American Culture. We intend to cover all major and minor areas of interest ranging from American literature, history, and society to language, popular culture, etc.

The journal welcomes original articles, essays, and book reviews in English by scholars in Hungary and abroad.

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CSABA CZEGLÉDI

ON CONSTATIVE AND PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES

In this article I discuss a problem that arises from a basic distinction in Speech Act Theory (SAT) as developed in Austin (1962 and 1975) between the categories introduced in the title. I will show that constative utterances as such do not exist, that the performative—constative distinction in its original form is false, but that the validity of the linguistic observations which motivated the distinction is regained by slightly modifying the theory, and that those observations will be interpretable within the framework of the theory without any detriment to its descriptive power or its general principles. First I will briefly discuss the speech-act theoretical apparatus that will be used.

1. SAT as a theory of verbal behavior

1.1 Speech acts and the nature of their rules

In SAT verbal communication is interpreted as a type of rule-governed human behavior. From the perspective of SAT "speaking a language is a matter of performing speech acts according to systems of constitutive rules" (cf. Searle 1969: 38).

The *speech act*, the fundamental unit of verbal communication, is the central category of the theory. A speech act is the action that is performed in saying an utterance. The particular kind of action performed can be characterized in terms of the consequences that are believed to exist

in the speech situation following the performance of the speech act. To be more or less familiar with the rules of verbal communication is to be more or less familiar with the typical consequences of particular kinds of speech acts with respect to the speech situation as a whole.

Regulative or normative rules, e.g. the rules of etiquette, are contrasted with constitutive rules[1], e.g. the rules of several kinds of games, in that the former regulate actions whose existence is logically independent of the rules. *Constitutive* rules, on the other hand, have the special property that the existence of the actions governed by constitutive rules is logically dependent on the existence of the rules. A game of chess, e.g., deserves the name only if the pieces are moved in accordance with the constitutive rules of the game. If you take away the rules, you will have taken away the game.

1.2 Explicit and implicit speech acts

Speech acts are characterized by the manner in which the communicative intention of the speaker is expressed in them. Accordingly, we will distinguish between *explicit* and *implicit* speech acts. Typically, a speaker will perform the act of opening a meeting and making a promise, respectively, in saying the following utterances.

(1) I declare the meeting open.

(2) I promise I won't tell anybody.

Both examples contain an (explicit) performative verb, which refers to the kind of speech act performed: *declare open* in (1) and *promise* in (2). Utterances like (1—2), which contain an (explicit) performative verb, are called *explicit performative utterances* (or *explicit performatives*, for short).

Consider now the following utterance:

(3) I won't tell anybody.

(3) may be said under conditions similar to those of (2), and then it will have essentially the same kind of consequences with respect to the speech situation. In other words, in saying (3) the speaker may perform a speech act which is identical to that performed by saying (2): both (2) and (3) can

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[1] For a detailed discussion of regulative and constitutive rules see Searle (1969: 33—35 and 1971: 41—42).

be used to make a promise. But (3) does not contain an explicit performative verb. Therefore utterances like (3) are called *implicit performative utterances.*

1.3 Locution and illocution

When considering "how many senses there are in which to say something *is* to do something, or *in* saying something we do something, and even *by* saying something we do something" Austin (1975: 94) concludes that a speech act may and should be divided into several different acts. I mention only two of these here: the *locutionary act* and the *illocutionary act.* A speaker performs a locutionary act when he says something in the words of a language in accordance with the grammatical rules of that language. An illocutionary act is performed when the speaker attributes some communicative function or force to his utterance. If, e.g., (3) is said in a natural speech situation, the locutionary act will be performed in saying a grammatically well-formed English sentence. The illocutionary act will be performed in saying (3) with the communicative intention of making a promise. We perform both a locutionary and an illocutionary act in every utterance we say.

2. The problem: performatives versus constatives

After this brief introduction to the fundamental categories of the theoretical apparatus, let us turn to the problem. The last explication of the performative—constative distinction is found in Austin (1962) and Austin (1975). Let us now consider carefully what exactly the distinction consisted in at various points in the explication of the idea. Henceforth, all page references will be to the 1975 edition edited by J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa (Austin 1975) unless otherwise indicated.

Austin (1975) highlights the performative—constative distinction through the analysis of performative utterances of the kind illustrated below (a—c). These performative utterances, as opposed to constatives, have the distinguishing property that to issue them "is not to *describe* my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it:

it is to do it. None of these utterances cited is either true or false: I assert this as obvious and do not argue it" (p. 6).

(a) "I name this ship the *Queen Elizabeth*"

(b) "I give and bequeath my watch to my brother"

(c) "I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow." (p. 5)

It suggests that constative utterances are assumed to be familiar and the two types of utterances are defined in a mutually contrastive fashion with reference to each other: constative utterances are the ones that possess the negatively specified features of the performatives and do not posses their positively specified features and conversely. The idea may be diagrammed like this:

Constative and (explicit) performative utterances

Utterance type	To say the utterance is to perform the speech act denoted by the verb	May be true or false
CONSTATIVE	—	+
PERFORMATIVE (EXPLICIT)	+	—

That is to say, a constative utterance is a description or statement of the action denoted by the verb but it is not the performance of that action, and a constative utterance may be true or false: "to issue a constative utterance . . . is to make a statement. To issue a performative utterance is, for example, to make a bet" (p. 6, footnote 2).

In the explication of the "doctrine of the *Infelicities*" in Lectures II and III, Austin points out that an additional distinguishing property of performatives is that they are characterized by the set of conditions that must be met for each performative to be "happy" (p. 14) and by the ways in which a performative can "go wrong" or be "unhappy" (p. 18).

It is important to bear in mind that the characterization of performatives is based on their distinction from the "supposedly familiar" (p. 20) constatives, which are assumed to typically go wrong by being false.

What Austin meant by the sensitivity of constatives to the true—false distinction was that "in ordinary cases, for example running, it is the fact that he is running which makes the statement that he is running *true*, or again, that the truth of the constative utterance 'he is running' depends on his being running" (p. 47). On the other hand, Austin notes that constatives are not only true or false but there are other ways in which they can go wrong. For example, the statement "The present King of France is bald" (p. 20) is neither true, nor false. What is wrong with it is that a presupposition which is associated with it is not met. Constative utterances which are neither true nor false are thus similar to performatives (in that they are neither true nor false). Furthermore, Austin says, "there are obvious similarities between a lie and a false promise" (p. 20). It turns out then that some utterances which we would like to consider constatives are insensitive to the true—false distinction and appear to be similar to performatives.

Austin argues, on the other hand, that some performative utterances are characterized by "an obvious slide towards truth or falsity" (p. 141). He claims that "we may: estimate rightly or wrongly . . . find correctly or incorrectly . . . pronounce correctly or incorrectly" (p. 141).

Furthermore, there are utterances that must be considered performative but cannot be characterized in terms of the familiar felicity conditions. It is something else that goes wrong with them. This is how Austin characterizes them (p. 55):

> . . . connected with the performative (I presume it is one) 'I warn you that the bull is about to charge' is the fact, if it is one, that the bull is about to charge: if the bull is *not*, then indeed the utterance 'I warn you that the bull is about to charge' is open to criticism—but not in any of the ways we have hitherto characterized as varieties of unhappiness. We should not in this case say the warning was void—i.e. that he did not warn but only went through a form of warning—nor that it was insincere: we should feel much more inclined to say the warning was false or (better) mistaken, as with a statement. So that considerations of the happiness and

unhappiness type may infect statements (or some statements) and considerations of the type of truth and falsity may infect performatives (or some performatives).

Since it seems that neither the distinction in terms of truth or falsity nor the distinction in terms of happiness or unhappiness can uniquely apply to one or the other type of utterances, Austin searches for grammatical criteria to distinguish them. But, he concludes, the search leads to "an impasse over any *single simple* criterion of grammar or vocabulary" (p. 59) because all the grammatical criteria that characterize performative utterances will also be met by utterances like "I state that . . .," which are considered constative. Moreover, since "statements *are* liable to every kind of infelicity to which performatives are liable" (p. 136), that is to say, as speech acts they are subject to the same felicity conditions as performatives, "there can hardly be any longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is performing an act" (p. 139). Thus we are forced to conclude that statements are performatives, which amounts to saying that constatives are performatives.

Considerations of this kind lead Austin to conclude that the performative—constative distinction is to be discarded and that it must be replaced by the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts within the speech act, because "in general and for all utterances that we have considered (except perhaps for swearing), we have found:

(1) Happiness/unhappiness dimension,
(1a) An illocutionary force,
(2) Truth/falsehood dimension,
(2a) A locutionary meaning (sense and reference)" (p. 148).

Thus we are forced to conclude that there are no constative utterances, at least in terms of the original performative versus constative distinction. All of our utterances are performatives. The original idea does not necessarily have to be abandoned, however, since examples like

(4) I am cold
(5) This line is printed in bold.

are different in an important sense from (1—3). While (1—3) do not have truth values, (4—5) may be true or false. ((5) is obviously false.) This was the original idea underlying the performative—constative distinction: constative utterances do, performative utterances do not have truth values. Thus an utterance may be either performative or constative but not both. Therefore (4—5) are not performatives, since they are true—false sensitive.

But if the term *constative* is taken to mean 'may be true or false' and if the idea is abandoned that an utterance is either constative or performative but not both, and if we assume instead that every utterance is performative, then an utterance may be both constative and performative at the same time (cf. (4—5)). In this case, however, the original performative—constative distinction becomes meaningless, since the so-called constative utterances are on longer in contrast with performatives, but constitute a subclass of the latter.

After a careful consideration of the performative—constative distinction several factors seem to suggest that we must take a closer look at the expression *constative utterance* and, particularly, we must reconsider the true—false distinction. Only statements can be true or false. Both (4) and (5) can be true or false, therefore both are statements. The statement is a logical or clausal semantic category. (4—5) can be characterized thus: (a) they are sentences, (b) they are statements, and (c) they can be true or false. (4—5), however, are not only characterized by the properties (a—c), but also by the properties that (d) they are utterances, and when issued as such (e) they are speech acts.

The term *statement,* however, can be given a different interpretation. Used in the pragmatic sense, the expression may refer to the *action* of making a statement, i.e., to the *speech act.* An action cannot be true or false, just as goals in football are not true or false. A goal is or is not *scored.* Similarly, an event may or may not have happened, an action may or may not have been performed but goals, events, and actions are neither true nor false: they do not have truth values. It is in this sense that we may say that performatives have no truth values. And constatives? They do not have truth values either. Both performatives and constatives are speech acts, and speech acts have no truth values. But if all utterances are speech acts, what

kind of speech acts are constative utterances? They are by no means speech acts that can be true or false. Such speech acts do not exist. Every utterance is performative, because every utterance is the performance of an act: a speech act. Indeed, the expression *performative utterance* is a tautology. Therefore we have two options: we either modify the sense of the term *constative* and reinterpret the original distinction thus retaining it in a new sense which is compatible with the (intuitively convincing) original idea or discard the distinction as untenable. Austin opted for the second alternative.

I do not think, however, that one has to pay such a high price for rescuing the theory. We have at least two reasons to choose the less expensive option. The so-called constative utterances *are* different in an important manner from the so-called performatives. Secondly, a careful consideration of the nature of our problem reveals the intriguing ambiguity of the term *utterance*, which, it seems, must take some responsibility for the conflicting conclusions that we were forced draw above.

Utterances like (4—5) *are* systematically different from utterances like (1—3). The typical consequence of saying (1) is that the meeting will begin, and that the meeting will be considered open by everybody concerned. Moreover, for the meeting to be considered open, it is a precondition that (1) must have been said (by a specific type of speaker in specific circumstances, neither of which will be discussed now). A consequence of issuing (2) or (3) is that if the speaker "does tell somebody" he will become answerable for that, and that for him to become answerable for it, it is a precondition that he must have said (2) or (3). To issue (4—5) (as opposed to (1—3)) is to issue utterances that correspond to sentences which in turn are semantically characterized as expressing statements. To issue (4) or (5) (as opposed to (1), (2) or (3)) is to perform the act of making a statement. Pragmatically, the speech acts performed in saying (4—5) are statements. Statements are just as much speech acts as promises and openings of meetings. It is true that normally nobody feels cold as a consequence of saying (4), and that anybody may feel cold without saying anything like (4), and that the way (5) is printed is totally independent of saying it; its content may be false (as indeed it is), but its existence is indisputable.

3. Conclusion

Utterances like (4—5), although different from utterances like (1—3) in ways we have just discussed, share an important property with them: just as most normal utterances, they are not simply "issued out of speakers' heads" for no reason at all. They are issued with a communicative force or intention. When they are said, a speech act is performed: the speech act of making a statement. The so-called constative utterances are statements and as such they constitute a subclass of performatives. We no longer contrast constatives with performatives, because every utterance is a performative. We will say instead that statements are a subclass of speech acts along with other subclasses of speech acts, which include promises, threats, warnings, bets, orders, etc.

It turns out that we must make a careful distinction between *speech acts* on the one hand and *utterances* on the other. The former are actions performed in issuing the latter and the latter are products of performing the former (cf. Szabolcsi 1983). In addition, we must distinguish both from *sentences*. The former are pragmatic categories and the latter is a syntactic category. A sentence may be characterized semantically by saying that it expresses a statement, which may be either true or false, but the question of truth or falsity cannot even be raised in connection with actions.

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LÁSZLÓ DÁNYI

BELONGING AND PERSPECTIVE: AN INTERPRETATION OF TWO NATIVE AMERICAN SHORT STORIES

A few years ago the 100th anniversary issue of National Geographic Magazine was published with a nice holographic cover showing a picture of the fragile Earth on the front and that of the growing world of McDonalds on the back. I read an article about Hungary in it, and I came across a picture in the top left corner of a page. The text below the picture reads as follows: "...Hungarian style, Nándor and Ilona Budai possess... attractive clothes—even a Soviet-made car for picnics in the country (top left)."[1]

The picture showed a middle-aged couple with two children. They were eating canned food and all around them—even on the top of the car—they had a lot of cartons of orange juice and apple drink. I thought that there was something disturbing about the article and the picture. I found the journalist's image about "Hungarian style" completely incongruent with my ideas. Likewise, this article brought to mind two questions of viewpoint and perspective: how do two different cultures see one another?, what is significant in another's culture? In order to answer these questions I chose two Native American writers whose short stories raised similar questions. The points of view in Kimberley M. Blaeser's "From Aboard the Night Train" and Patricia Riley's "Adventures of an Indian Princess" are different.

[1] *National Geographic Magazine*, 174 (December 1988), pp. 928—929.

The former is narrated in the first person singular and the latter in the third person singular, but the narrators are both Native Americans.

Being a Native American is an important determining factor from the Eurocentric point of view as it is expressed in Elaine Showalter's article.[2] Native Americans presently occupy a marginal status and they belong to a "muted group" as do, according to E. Showalter, feminist writers. If we accept that Native Americans and feminists are both muted in a way that they fall far behind the expectations of the Western Eurocentric value system,[3] it is even more difficult for a female Native American to accept the Western Eurocentric value system and its standards and to fit into them.

In Patricia Riley's story the same events are viewed through various perspectives. Arletta, a Native American foster-child, is taken to a trading post by her white foster-parents, Mr. and Mrs. Rapier. Symbolism is connected with the name "Rapier",it is a particularly vicious sword since it is double edged. The parents want to impose their value system on Arletta. They know the girl would love the place as they have "sophisticated knowledge" about it from Hollywood movies. The parents think the place to be realistic but the girl realizes how fake everything is. The Indian in strange clothing is disturbing to Arletta but for the parents he is so authentic that they want to take a picture of the girl and the Indian.

To make the picture more accurate Mr. Rapier walks back to the trading post and buys some genuine Indian arts-and-crafts and puts them on the girl. The girl knows how false these things are and she is shocked by seeing the vendors and the Indian man who also insists on her standing beside him for the photo. The fake Indian man and the vendors have fallen victims to commercialism which appears in the form of the Coke-machine at the trading post. They are exploited by the need to manufacture commodities and offer their services for money in order to survive. Charles Hudson concludes that "If the Indians could not produce commodities, they

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[2] Elaine Showalter, "Feminist Criticism in the Wilderness," in *Modern Criticism and Theory*, ed. David Lodge (New York: Longman, 1988), pp. 330—53.

[3] Paula Gunn Allen, "'Border' Studies: The Interaction of Gender and Color," in *Introduction to Scholarship in Modern Languages and Literatures*, ed. Joseph Gibaldi, 2nd ed. (New York: Modern Language Association, 1992), n.p.

were on the road to cultural extinction... He had to produce a commodity which was valuable enough to earn him some protection".[4]

The goods bought at the trading post have no value for Arletta. The beads are ugly and large and not elaborate. They were made in Japan, a country with an ancient culture that has different standards than the Eurocentric value system, but it has also been oppressed and exploited by the adulation of the dollar. For the girl the disproportionate arrangement of the beads expesses the disruption of the inherent relationship between nature and man; animal and the Indian hunter.

The differences between Mr. and Mrs. Rapier's and Arletta's perspectives are compelling in their dialogs, questions and responses. The whole situation is two sweet for Arletta; like syrupy soda. On the way home she begins to feel sick and asks Mr. Rapier to stop. He responds by turning the air-conditioning on, so he interpreted Arletta's request in his own way. He does something but not the thing Arletta wants him to do.

In the car Mrs. Rapier says to Arletta: "You've just worn yourself out from the heat and playing Indian".[5] This sentence can have two interpretations at least. Perhaps she knows that the whole situation that is set up by her and her husband is a fake game, and it proves how cruel they are because they force the girl into this situation. The second possibility is that living and acting like an Indian is only a game or a play; it is like a show in a circus, and this view expresses Mrs. Rapier's feeling of superiority over the way Indians act.

At the end of the short story Riley extends her scope of observation as she mentions a little black girl who was involved in almost the same situation. In a Safari Park the Rapiers took a picture of her dressed up in African clothes, or what they thought was African clothing. The girl was standing next to a papier-mâché lion. The Rapier's could understand neither the African girl's nor the Indian girl's culture.

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[4] Jane Tompkins, " 'Indians': Textualism, Morality, and the Problem of History," in *"Race," Writing, and Difference*, ed. Henry L. Gates (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 67.

[5] Patricia Riley, "Adventures of an Indian Princess," in *Earth Song, Sky Spirit*, ed. Clifford E. Trafzer (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1992), p. 140.

In Kimberley M. Blaeser's short story the author remembers her stay in Paris, as well as her childhood. In France she saw a celebration and the first day she could not understand anything. She says about it "... I never forgot that first night, when the whole world was happening without me."[6] She was there but she did not belong to that place. The next day she went back to the carnival with friends and she enjoyed it. In Paris the loss of belonging to a place was temporary, but she realizes the significance of the situation. "And yet I feel these scenes add up to something, some meaning or lesson about all life and I try to put it into words for myself but I can't."[7]

Later on this feeling deepens. The various stages of this process are described in the short story and these phases show how her perspective changes. Starting from the Paris experience there are further shifts between Paris and urban America. The sudden switches express how her mind becomes more and more obsessed with the idea of finding a place where she belongs. In Martin Heidegger's concept every human being is preoccupied with finding some way in which he can feel "Dasein", literally the sense of "being there".[8] The author of this short story seeks this attachment as well.

The place where she is from is not the same as it used to be. She recollects images of the past and she relies on dream states as an escape from reality. But the dreams do not bring peace and relief. She cannot find her place in her dreams which gradually become nightmarish. She remembers the way they lived and the animals they watched. Her past haunts her: "I feel my past alive on the other side of the screen, hiding in the shadows of the bushes, about to jump out. With that hope or expectation pressing against all my organs, pressing against my very skin, I reenter the present night." [9] She has to face the present.

The present is frustrating. A gambling hall is opened where everything and everybody work like a mechanism. The hall is the place where

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[6] Kimberly M. Blaeser, "From Aboard the Night Train," in *Earth Song, Sky Spirit*, ed. Clifford E. Trafzer (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1992), p. 26.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[8] See R. May, et al., *Existence—A New Dimension in Psychiatry*, (New York, 1958).

[9] Blaeser, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

absurdity becomes reality, where the apprentice medicine man is the dealer. For the people who work there the hall is not terrible at all, they are even proud of having a job and wearing nice uniforms. For her these people are paper-doll images. People who are exploited by commercialism make paper-doll images of themselves and sacifice their own culture. These paper-doll people with tabs, as it is mentioned in the story, have been spoilt to such a degree that they would seem unreal without the tabs.

The gambling hall is a symbol of the consumer society in which people are alienated from each other, and their ancient culture; from animals, from plants, from everything that is human. They insert one coin after the other into the slot-machine and listen to the fake Elvis Presley singing.

In the two short stories there is a strong similarity in perspective. The Indian backgound, the white American culture and the Eurocentric values are depicted through the consciousness of the two Native American characters. The difference is in the response to the alienated and hostile world. Arletta cannot express her objection and her astonishment orally. Her stubborn face and her gestures express the rejection of the values offered by the Rapiers. Only at the end of the story does she dare to object to her foster-mother and the objection pleases Arletta:

"Arletta!" Mrs. Rapier screamed. "Look what you've done! You've ruined all those lovely things we bought. Aren't you ashamed of yourself?"

Arletta flashed a genuine smile for the first time that day. "No, ma'am," she said. "No, ma'am, I'm not."[10]

Kimberley M. Blaeser's character is more deeply affected.The loss of belonging some place evokes spiritual hollowness in her. The author describes how the dominance of Eurocentric culture leads to the detachment of human beings and to the loss of common awareness of those people who once belonged to each other in a culture.

The conclusion of the essay is that a surface perspective is not satisfactory because it will lead to labels like "'marginal', the 'poor', the 'victims'".[11] If this pespective is followed, Indians will be viewed as people having a romantic life in the forest or as savages dancing around a fire; and

[10] Riley, p. 140.
[11] Allen, p. 304.

Hungarians as the ones who ride on horseback, eat goulash, and do not have peanut butter in the stores. If you observe characters and cultures from this perspective, the characters and you will never belong to that culture.

Being at a place is not enough to appreciate its culture and perceive its significance. Only attachment to a place gives an abiding identity "because places associated with family, community, and history have depth."[12]

[12] Charles Reagan, and William Ferris (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Southern Culture* (Chapel Hill & London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. 1138.

PÉTER EGRI

FROM THE BRITISH GROTESQUE TO THE AMERICAN ABSURD: THE DRAMATIST'S DILEMMA

Edward Albee's reworking (1967) of Giles Cooper's play *Everything in the Garden* (1962) received diametrically divergent critical interpretations. While it was called "one of the ... most outrageous cop outs in recent theatrical history",[1] it was also referred to as "the first important American play of the season".[2] For Michael E. Rutenberg, the author of a full-length monograph on Albee, "Garden will probably be the most successful of the Albee adaptations ... Albee has added and changed just enough of the structure to warrant the new play's examination."[3]

Albee himself at first simply considered the Americanization of Cooper's work as a commercial commission, and did not even wish to have his name put on the theatre bill. But in the course of remodelling the play he caught himself in the act of recomposing, rather than simply adapting, the drama. In his own words, "Something happened, and by the time I was finished with my work there was hardly a word left of the original ... Cooper's play became a catalyst and set me to working my own variations on his theme ... the play ... is not an adaptation of another man's work but a much more intense collaboration."[4]

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[1] Cf. M. E. Rutenberg, *Edward Albee: Playwright in Protest* (New York, 1969), p. 172.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.* Cf. pp. 180, 181, 229.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 171.

A comparative close reading of Cooper's and Albee's versions may show that the American dramatist has not only transplanted but has also considerably transformed the British playwright's work. In composing his American variations on a British theme, Albee has also achieved a thoroughgoing reinterpretation of his model. His transformation of the original—despite parallel details of incident and accident—affects not only external circumstances but also internal qualities: the very focus and form of the play. His Americanization is, in fact, a reassessment.

He has kept the framework of his model—as he has in his dramatizations of Carson McCullers's novella *The Ballad of the Sad Café* (1963), James Purdy's novel *Malcolm* (1965) or Vladimir Nabokov's novel *Lolita* (1980—81)[5]—but his idiosyncratic fingerprint is nowhere more recognizable than in retouching and reshaping Cooper's *Everything in the Garden*, where Albee did not have to leave his own dramatic medium, and so he could use directly his own theatrical experience ranging from *The Zoo Story* (1958), *The Death of Bessie Smith* (1959) and *The Sandbox* (1959) to *The American Dream* (1960), *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?* (1961—62), *Tiny Alice* (1964) and *A Delicate Balance* (1966).

Though no part of the oeuvre of a world-famous dramatist, Cooper's *Everything in the Garden* is more than a mere springboard for Albee; it is, in fact, a remarkable play in its own right. It was first presented by the Royal Shakespeare Theatre Company at the Arts Theatre in London on 13 March 1962; and it was shown by Michael Codron at the Duke of York's Theatre in London on 16 May 1962. First performed at Plymouth Theatre in New York City on 16 November 1967, and published in 1968, Albee's version was not only based on Cooper's play but it was also dedicated to the memory of the British playwright. The printed acknowledgement is not simply a statement

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[5] The place of Albee's theatrical adaptations and dramatic remouldings in his oeuvre has been analysed in: C. W. E. Bigsby, *Albee* (Edinburgh, 1969), pp. 71—95; R. E. Amacher, *Edward Albee* (New York, 1969), pp. 109—29; R. Hayman, *Edward Albee* (London, 1971), pp. 45—51, 64—7, 80—4; C. W. E. Bigsby, *A Critical Introduction to Twentieth-Century American Drama 2: Tennessee Williams, Arthur Miller, Edward Albee* (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 278—9, 287—9.

required by law; it is also an expression of personal warmth prompted by appreciation.

Initial stage directions: the Americanization of locale and the doubling of stage space. The fusion of the real and unreal

The first set of differences between Cooper's and Albee's versions appears at the first description of the stage-set. Cooper's representation of the sitting-room of a British suburban house is relatively long; Albee's presentation of its American counterpart is considerably shorter. Cooper enlists a number of objects (a television set, magazines, just a few books, the absence of pictures in the room and the presence of playing-fields at the bottom of the garden) which constitute a milieu determining and characterizing people; Albee cuts these out and concentrates on dramatically functional detail (a lawnmower, empty packets of cigarettes, etc). Cooper's emphasis on the environment sometimes leads to a kind of phrasing which not only turns to an actor or director but also to a potential reader: "*It is a fine evening in late April though cool enough for a fire to be burning in the grate.*"[6] Albee has deleted the fire, the grate and the narrative turn of "*though cool enough*", and has restricted his stage instructions to a dramatically necessary minimum.

The practical lack of stage directions in Sophocles and Shakespeare indicates autonomous characters who create their conditions and dominate their surroundings even if in the last resort, at the peak of the tragic or comic conflict, they cannot disregard and avoid what makes them fall or err. The abundance of factual detail in the scene descriptions of the Ibsen—Shaw—Hauptmann—O'Neill period suggests the domination of circumstances over characters even if they make an effort to oppose them. Cooper's "aggressively normal"[7] set links him with the naturalist-realist tradition. Albee's sketchy set signals a provisional, playful, imaginary and imaginative disregard of heavy determinism which the characters are

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[6] G. Cooper, *Everything in the Garden*, in *New English Dramatists 7* (Harmondsworth, 1963), p. 143.
[7] *Ibid.*

exposed to but momentarily—from moment to moment—try to dodge and strive to suspend. The dramatic situation in Albee is an inheritance from Cooper. Its treatment, however, is different.

The difference is dramatically expressed not only by the substantial extenuation, the breaking up and thinning down in Albee of the thick crust of the objective environment, but also by the reinterpretation of whatever has been left of that environment. Albee not only drops out a number of objects but also changes their character. A case in point is the lawnmower which in Cooper's description is a motor-mower heard going to and fro on the grass of the garden, but in Albee's presentation is a hand-mower heard *and* seen through the glass door of the sunroom. Since the protagonists of Albee's drama, Richard and Jenny (called, with American informality, by their first names even when they first appear), are obviously better off than are the main characters of Cooper's play, Bernard and Jenny Acton (introduced to the audiences and readers, with British reservation, by their Christian *and* surnames), it is unlikely that the American couple could not afford what the British couple could, and Richard should only dream about a power mower (neatly ironized by the mumbling nursery rhyme of its name), while Bernard is day-dreaming about a king-size motor-mower, a real Monarch (also ironized by the royal connotations of its trade mark). Richard, in fact, complains that he is the only natural-born citizen east of the Rockies who has not got a power mower.[8] Cooper builds his world on actual reality. Albee anchors his on the border-line between what is likely and unlikely, what is real and unreal.

The reality and unreality of Albee's initial scene is simultaneously increased by doubling, as it were, the visible space of the stage. The audience is watching Jenny in the foreground frame of the stage, while Jenny is watching Richard in the background frame of the glass doors which serve as a "picture window".[9] She is in an immediate theatrical space; he is in a mediated, withdrawn region. As Richard passes the picture window, mows, stops, mops, mows again, and cannot hear what Jenny tells

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[8] E. Albee, *Everything in the Garden*, in *The Plays IV* (New York, 1982), p. 8.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

him, he gains a queer, mechanical and marionette-like quality. Communication is difficult. Communion is doubtful.

The fusion of the real and unreal is a characteristic feature of Albee's plays written before and after *Everything in the Garden* as well. If a work of art is basically a sensuous values judgement, then "the substitution of artificial for real values"[10] may logically lead to the absurd merger of the real and the unreal (Mommy's beige or wheat-coloured little hat, Grandma's neatly wrapped and tied boxes and Day-Old Cake, a bundle or bumble of joy in *The American Dream;* the death of the fantasy child in *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?;* the implications and consequences of Harry's and Edna's fear in *A Delicate Balance;* the cube in *Box* and the incongruously patterned yet ingeniously counterpointed stylistic stereotypes in *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*). Richard's hand-mower in *Everything in the Garden* is a link in this chain. Bernard's motor-mower is just a tool.

Esposition: the Americanization of stakes, risks and dimensions. Prostitution as a symbol of social status

As the plays progress, differences increase. The exposition in Cooper's drama ranges over the whole of the first act, while in Albee's play it only covers the first scene of the first act: Cooper presents the milieu in more minute detail, whereas Albee builds the plot more dynamically.

The first section of the exposition reveals the narrow financial position of the protagonists. Jenny in Cooper, with a touch of sentimentality, saves the silver paper in cigarette packets to decorate her room with at a sometime party or ball, while Jenny in Albee, with American practical common sense, collects coupons to save money.[11]

The second section of the exposition concerns Jenny's meeting a procuress of a high-class brothel. In keeping with his emphasis on the psychic gravitational pull of the environment, Cooper throws into relief the easy stages through which Jenny is transformed from a respectable

[10] E. Albee, "Preface," *The American Dream,* in *New American Drama* (Harmondsworth, 1966), p. 21.

[11] Cf. M. E. Rutenberg, *Edward Albee: Playwright in Protest,* p. 172.

housewife into a part-time prostitute. Being short of money and a keen gardener, and wishing to help her husband, who is also a passionate gardener, she puts an advertisement in the local paper indicating that she is ready to take a part-time job. She gives her phone number, and Leonie Pimosz, the Polish pander, loses no time to call her and to call at her flat. After all, as her name may suggest, she has the relentless force of a lion, she is shrewd enough to know how to lionize a place and a person secretly, and she is sufficiently impudent to claim that "Nothing is disgusting, unless you are disgusted".[12] Since it is Bernard who answers the phone when Leonie is telephoning, and Jenny knows that her husband is opposed to her taking any job, she lies to Bernard that a dressmaker is giving her a ring, and so she becomes Leonie's accomplice before she has ever met her. When she does meet her, Leonie offers Jenny fifty pounds. Jenny refuses to take the money, and Leonie, with the gesture of Nastasya Filippovna in Dostoevsky's *The Idiot*, throws the bills into the fire. While, however, Nastasya thus rejects to be bought, Leonie tries to buy Jenny. At first Jenny suggests that Leonie had better leave her home, but when Leonie starts flinging another bundle of notes into the fire, Jenny is tempted to take the money as an advance of salary. The job is not difficult at all, Jenny is only supposed to work in the afternoons, the place (in Wimpole Street) seems to be respectable, the fee (twenty-five guineas each time) generous, and the clients are all gentlemen. For some time the nature of the job is unclear, but then the penny drops and Jenny orders Leonie out of her home.

Leonie, however, is not offended, tells her that one of Jenny's friends has already undertaken the job, offers Jenny a cigarette which she badly needs and automatically accepts, though immediately throws away. Jenny's resistance is gradually weakening. She may tell the police, but then Leonie would admit how Jenny has approached her through advertisement. So Jenny does not summon the police, Leonie gives her time to think the matter over, asks her to telephone to her, establishes her superiority by

[12] G. Cooper, *Everything in the Garden*, p. 156. It may be merely coincidental, yet worth noting, that "pimasz" in Hungarian, if not in Polish, means impudent, cheeky.—If, for an English-speaking audience, Mrs Toothe is a more natural name than Leonie Pimosz, similarly, Richard is also a more common name than Bernard.

warning her not to call her before ten o'clock in the morning, leaves Jenny's home peacefully, and Jenny picks up the bills from the floor. After all, it is money. She locks it up in a drawer, and takes her husband out to dinner.

The *chief* motive underlying Jenny's choice is not voluptuous inconstancy, or capricious coquetry, or inexperienced levity as is the case with Cressida in Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida*. Nor is it poverty, the plight of Mrs Warren in her early years in G. B. Shaw's *Mrs Warren's Profession* and the predicament of Anna in O'Neill's *Anna Christie*. Nor is it greed, the propelling force in Mrs Warren's later career or in Leda's attitude in O'Neill's *The Calms of Capricorn*. Nor is it the momentary excitement of a cheap, if lucrative, adventure as it is with the nameless Woman in Miller's *Death of a Salesman*. It is not even pathological disintegration of the personality as it appears to be in the case of Blanche in Tennessee Williams's *A Streetcar Named Desire*. Jenny's decision is fundamentally motivated by the garden as a symbol of social and financial status.[13] This is where Cooper's originality lies in the conception and elaboration of *Everything in the Garden;* and this is the *leitmotiv* which caught Albee's ironic attention.

In the exposition of his play, however, Albee traces Cooper's dramatic blueprint with a difference. He removes Leonie's Jewish background, deletes her concentration camp experience, obliterates her Polish nationality, does away with her uneducated, racy and foreign accent, makes her English, and rechristens her as Mrs Toothe, a tag-name with a different connotation. In this way, Mrs Toothe's profession ceases to be a matter external to middle-class life, and the conflict becomes internalized, generalized and sharpened. Accordingly, she is no longer Cooper's "*squat, square figure*", "*an extraordinary creature*"[14] but "an elegantly dressed, handsome lady, 50 or so",[15] as she would usually appear and appeal to people of good society, where everybody is "pleasant-looking" (like Richard

[13] Cf. M. E. Rutenberg, *Edward Albee: Playwright in Protest*, p. 173.
[14] G. Cooper, *Everything in the Garden*, p. 152.
[15] E. Albee, *Everything in the Garden*, p. 1.

and his neighbour, Jack), "nice-looking" (like Roger, Richard's son), and "attractive"[16] (like Jenny), to the repeated point of patterned parody.[17]

The Americanization of Cooper's theme involves not only a change of place (from the outskirts of London to the suburb of an American city) but also a raise of stakes: Mrs Toothe throws on the burning logs of the fireplace a thousand dollars rather than fifty pounds; Jenny is supposed to get a hundred dollars rather than twenty-five guineas for an afternoon; Richard is a research chemist, while Bernard, his counterpart in Cooper, is employed as a clerk at a firm making office furniture; Jenny's admirer, Jack, in Albee is a rich painter, who is going to leave more than three million dollars to the couple and can afford making irreverent, if irrelevant, remarks about the colours of Jenny's panties, while Jack in Cooper makes his living by contributing to fashion magazines and drawing strip cartoons.

In Albee's drama Jenny's trapping by the brothel-keeper is a less transitional and more abrupt matter than it is in Cooper's play. The American dramatist has cut out much of the British playwright's circumstantial evidence (including references to the pimp's past and drinking habits as well as Jenny's advertisement), and has replaced Cooper's often understated conversations by a more direct, incisive and dynamic dialogue.[18]

Albee also makes the dramatic texture more closely-knit by focusing the leading motive of the garden as a symbol of social status more emphatically, and finishes his exposition with Richard wondering about the cost of a greenhouse.

Imbroglio, culmination and dénouement: the Americanization of form. Dual ending. Cooper and Albee: from incongruity to absurdity

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[16] *Ibid.*

[17] In an interview M. E. Rutenberg had with Albee on 7 August 1968, the dramatist explained his reasons for changing Leonie Pimosz into Mrs Toothe like this: "I wanted a symbol of something that Americans would be terribly impressed by. Since Americans *are* terribly impressed by money and by the English, it seems that the offering of money should come from the British." M. E. Rutenberg, *Edward Albee: Playwright in Protest*, p. 228.

[18] Cf. E. Albee, *Everything in the Garden*, p. 38.

The imbroglio or intrigue phase of the plot presents the arrival by post of a package containing £198 in Cooper and $4.900 in Albee, which leads to the husband's discovery of the wife's profession (Act Two in Cooper and Act One, Scene Two in Albee), and to a big celebration and party which reveals the fact that all the wives are involved in the business with the connivance of all the husbands,[19] who, when the police has found out about the brothel, cooperate with the madam in finding a no less lucrative but safer and more appropriate place (the bulk of Act Three in Cooper and of Act Two in Albee).

The culmination or crisis point of the action comes when Jack, who knows too much and, when drunk, talks more than desirable, is murdered in the room and buried in the garden ("Everything in the Garden"). In Cooper's play it is Jenny whose warning "Don't let him go!"[20] triggers a series of unavoidable actions leading to Jack's death. In Albee's drama it is the madam's "Stop him"[21] which starts the fatal act. In Albee the conflict is sharper: it is in the madam's presence that Jack identifies Mrs Toothe as a brothel-keeper he knew in London, and her "He'll talk" is "*a command*",[22] just as her "You must make him be quiet" is the order of "*a commander*".[23]

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[19] M. E. Rutenberg refers to "a similar operation blossoming in Long Island's suburbia (*Edward Albee: Playwright in Protest*, p. 175.), but he thinks that the dénouement in Albee's play is contrived in that "all of Jenny's friends turn out to be part of the same prostitution ring. Had Mrs Toothe given the party and invited Richard and Jenny, the ending would have been more convincing. It is simply too coincidental that every friend of Jenny's is a whore—unless Jenny knew who the other members of the ring were and invited only them". *Edward Albee: Playwright in Protest*, pp. 175—6. Such coincidences, freaks of fortune, accidental events, however, are dramatic means of concentration and generalization. Without them neither Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet* nor Gogol's *The Inspector-General* and Dürrenmatt's *The Visit* could have been written. Artistic plausibility differs from everyday probability. The same applies to "Jack's recognition of Mrs Toothe", which in M. E. Rutenberg's opinion is "too coincidental". Edward Albee: *Playwright in Protest*, p. 178.

[20] G. Cooper, *Everything in the Garden*, p. 211.

[21] E. Albee, *Everything in the Garden*, p. 183.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 184.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 185.

The dénouement or solution section of the plot shows the way in which the members of good society, after the shock of the murder, are reconciled—albeit sulkily—to the state of affairs (the rest of Act Three in Cooper and of Act Two in Albee).

It is remarkable that before finally resigning to having participated in an act of murder, both Bernard and Richard suggest that the police ought to be informed. In Cooper's play Jenny rejects her husband's idea with her "Don't be absurd".[24] It is at this point that Cooper's sense of incongruity comes closest to Albee's view. Cooper's casual insight is, in fact, the American dramatist's starting point and vantage point. It is the recognition of the fact that in a world where artificial values are substituted for real ones, absurdity prevails.[25] But exactly because Albee takes this reverse situation for granted, if unacceptable, he does not need to formulate its absurdity in a single admonishing sentence (which, absurdly enough, makes the right appear absurdly wrong). It is the entire form of his whole play which conveys the sense of absurdity. So in the course of rewriting Cooper's drama, Albee cut out Jenny's absurd reference to an alleged absurdity and made Mrs Toothe prove to everybody present how dangerously unfeasible Richard's idea to call the police was.

A play of this kind is very difficult to finish. Cooper, in fact, experimented with two endings. His first idea was to make the actor playing the part of Bernard revolt against his role. This "Pirandellian dodge"[26] openly confronted ideal with reality, but later Cooper found this solution was disturbing and discarded the idea. In Cooper's second (and final) ending Bernard and Jenny sink back to their ordinary life and bury their remorse in a routine conversation about pipe-cleaners and keeping up the garden of the new brothel. "Ours must look like all the others",[27] Jenny concludes. This is a fine and convincing ending which corresponds to Cooper's general concept about the deterministic power of external circumstances. It makes the author's indictment indirect.

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[24] G. Cooper, *Everything in the Garden*, p. 214.
[25] E. Albee, *Everything in the Garden*, pp. 123—5.
[26] Cf. J. W. Lambert, "Introduction," *New English Dramatists 7*, p. 12.
[27] G. Cooper, *Everything in the Garden*, p. 221.

Albee seems to have adopted, adapted, developed, changed and reversed both of Cooper's solutions in a single play. His first ending is Cooper's quiet acquiescence. What Mrs Toothe has to say to Jenny and Richard about the place in the garden where—along the cesspool line—Jack has been buried can be considered the equivalent of Cooper's second conclusion: "The grass will grow over; the earth will be rich, and soon—eventually—everything in the garden ... will be as it was. You'll see."[28]

Albee, however, appears to have been dissatisfied with such a peaceful, if ironical, solution at the end of such a violent play, and makes the otherwise dead Jack return in dirty clothes and with sod in his hair to draw the conclusion, speaking about himself as somebody who *was*, in the past tense. At this point of the plot he is an "Absurd Person Singular", to quote and adapt the title of Alan Ayckbourn's play. Since Jack now is neither alive nor a ghost but a *persona* standing for the author's idea, ideal and ironical position, he clearly corresponds to Bernard rebelling against his part. Is Jack's resurrection dramatically acceptable?

The answer to the question cannot be given in terms of everyday likelihood. The problem is a matter of artistic plausibility, of how far Albee has been able to create a dramatic medium in which such a solution is organic. Not only has Albee *used* the traditional dramatic structure of exposition, imbroglio, culmination and dénouement, crystallized by Sophocles, dynamized by Shakespeare, cross-bred with an analytical research of the past by Ibsen and Shaw, embedded and blurred in a more or less deterministic milieu by Hauptmann and O'Neill, and pointed and simplified in their well-made plays by Scribe, Sardou, Pinero, Jones, Boucicault and Belasco. Albee has also *relativized* this structure. Jack's return after his death is no less a corroboration and relativization of the dramatic climax of his murder than is George's announcement of the death of the imaginary son in *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?* The simultaneous use, misuse and abuse of the dramatic tradition results in an ingenious fusion of a realistic framework and an absurdist texture, which characterizes

[28] E. Albee, *Everything in the Garden*, p. 197.

Albee's dramatic form.[29] Hence is derived Cooper's importance for Albee: Cooper has provided him with the traditional frame which he could adopt and adapt, use and change, follow and reinterpret at the same time. Albee's difficulties in weaving a dramatic plot and building a firm structure in the traditional sense *after* his adaptations (in, for instance, *All Over* 1975, *Listening* 1976, *Counting the Ways* 1977 or *The Lady from Dubuque* 1978—79) point in the same direction.

For all these reasons, the dramatic validity of Jack's unexpected and grotesquely absurd resurrection at the end of Albee's *Everything in the Garden* largely depends on how persistently the American dramatist has been able to combine the adoption and relativization of dramatic tradition as he found it embodied in the British playwright's work. Scenic and reading evidence shows that Albee has, in fact, been doing this throughout his play.

A case in point is dialogue in Cooper and Albee. In Cooper's play Jenny defends her wish to take a job by a timid reference to Strindberg. She says she would like to be a useful person rather than a mere slave in the house like "that woman in that play"[30] by Strindberg. This is no more than a thematic element in a casual and natural conversation. With Albee the corresponding dialogue also seems to be real and actual, but at the same

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[29] For the relationship of Pinter, Beckett and Albee compare: R. Dutton, *Modern Tragicomedy and the British Tradition: Beckett, Pinter, Stoppard, Albee and Storey* (Brighton, 1986), pp. 114, 123. For a graphic "distinction between the European absurdist stance and Albee's" see: C. W. E. Bigsby, *A Critical Introduction to Twentieth-Century American Drama 2*, pp. 160, 263.—As G. Cooper's example also suggests, the dichotomy of ending a play idealistically or realistically is not unknown in Europe either. But the duality became especially acute in twentieth-century American drama. In E. O'Neill's *Days Without End*—a play which has eight draft versions and a number of different endings—the question of how to finish the work is the central problem both for the protagonist and the author. The final solution makes the ideal stand out victoriously with a loud gesture. In O'Neill's greatest play, *Long Day's Journey Into Night*, the conclusion is quiet, and the ideal is realistically mediated by a tragic situation which renders its manifestation indirect. At the end of T. Williams's *The Glass Menagerie* the ideal appears directly in Tom's sentimental and nostalgic reminiscence. By contrast, in the "Requiem" section of A. Miller's *Death of a Salesman*, Happy's sentimental pledge is effectively counterpointed by Biff's realistic position.

[30] G. Cooper, *Everything in the Garden*, p. 150.

time it is also repetitively ritualistic,[31] it expresses quick and abrupt changes of mood from tender feelings to savage disagreement, and it may lead to sheer absurdity, as it does in Richard's emphatic statement to Jenny: "You're up to hock in your eyebrows ... (*Realizes what he has said, tries to fix it, retaining dignity*) ... *up* in hock to your ... *in* hock up to your eyebrows, and why!"[32] Undercutting pathos by bathos and quarrelling in patterned "rounds" relativize the difference between sense and nonsense, raise the Strindbergian element from a thematic to a formal level, and create a dramatic atmosphere of conversational absurdity which is latent in Strindberg's *The Dance of Death* and becomes overt in Dürrenmatt's wittily parodistic *Play Strindberg* or Albee's *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?* The dialogue in Albee's *Everything in the Garden* uses the element of absurdity not to destroy but to modernize Cooper's traditional style and naturalistic-realistic tradition in general. In this it is different from Beckett's grimly grotesque and ingeniously patterned buffoonery.

The simultaneity of maintaining and transforming naturalistic-realistic tradition can also be observed in the relationship of Cooper's and Albee's stage directions not only at the start but throughout the two plays, and especially in the later phases of presenting the conflict. Cooper, as a rule, uses descriptive stage instructions. His procedure corresponds to the deterministic importance he attributes to the external conditions of human action. Albee, to a certain extent, keeps the descriptive element, but, in a considerable degree, also relativizes and modifies it. His technique is in keeping with his dramatic concept of delayed determinism and playful absurdity. Accordingly, Albee's stage instructions are sometimes short key phrases indicating a change of attitude by a playfully pretended change of person. When Richard feels he is going to hate the party, he is simply referred to as "*Little boy*".[33] The instruction plays a part. It can also speak and warn ("*Not in front of Roger*"),[34] it can combine an emotional state and a colloquial inference ("*Naked and embarrassed, but if you're in a nudist*

[31] E. Albee, *Everything in the Garden*, p. 18.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 16. Cf. pp. 18, 19, 22, 111—3, 118, 135, 143.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 128.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 127.

colony...");[35] and on occasion it could be a spoken line removing completely the difference between description and dialogue ("*What else?*").[36] Quite often Albee even provides experimentally optional stage directions leaving it to the actor or director which alternative to take.[37]

In a consistently composed play each constituent part or particle is an Archimedian point. In Albee's drama even an "aside" *is* and at the same time *is not* an "aside": Roger's is heard by Richard from whom it is supposed to be concealed.[38] Is it not natural then in this play that Jack, who in a sense is a continuous "aside" and a running commentary, could be raised from the dead to return for a final comment? Throughout Albee's drama he steps into and out of the action, his remarks are sometimes heard by the other characters in the play, and sometimes only by the audience. In Cooper's drama his resurrection would be unimaginable and unacceptable. The fact that his return is imaginable, imaginative and acceptable in Albee's play is indicative of the fact that the Americanization of a British drama in this case is a special and complex phenomenon. It certainly includes a change of locale from British to American (as it does in the American play and film version of Brian Clark's *Whose Life is it Anyway?*).[39] It also involves an expansion of dimensions (as it does in the Hollywood film adaptation of Peter Shaffer's *Amadeus*).[40] At the same time, however, it also implies a

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[35] *Ibid.*, p. 160.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 195.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 66—7, 90, 101, 103, 117, 145, 155, 160. G. Cooper's instructions offer a choice only once: *Everything in the Garden*, p. 212.

[38] E. Albee, Everything in the Garden, p. 128. Cf. p. 20, where Jenny speaks "Sniffling; the whole act which is not an act".

[39] For the Americanization of locale, cultural context and language in the Broadway version of Brian Clark's *Whose Life is it Anyway?* compare: A. R. Glaap, "*Whose Life is it Anyway?* in London and on Broadway: a contrastive analysis of the British and American versions of Brian Clark's play", in *The Play Out of Context: Transferring from Culture to Culture*, eds. H. Scolnicov and P. Holland (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 214—23.

[40] The filming of a play has the potential of increasing visual dimensions, replacing accents and focuses anyway. The *American* movie used this potential to a very great extent. Yet, as Milos Forman, the director of the film version of *Amadeus* has pointed out to Peter Shaffer, the novelty which the translation of play into film achieves is, in fact, "another

thorough-going reinterpretation of the original work both in matter and manner. If Jack's reappearance after his death relativizes, though does not annihilate, the validity of the dramatic climax in Albee's version of Cooper's play, then it is only the last link in a well-forged dramatic chain where *each* element performs the theatrical miracle of simultaneously upholding and undermining its own sense and significance.

Yet even if Jack's resurrection in Albee's play is dramatically organic and defendable, his drawing a conclusion, teaching a lesson and preaching a sermon are disturbing.

On the other hand, to embarrass his audience, to make it feel uneasy, to tip it out of its habitual expectations, to jolt and shock it out of its traditional complacency have invariably been Albee's characteristic dramatic gestures. In his wittily worded paper "Which Theater Is the Absurd One?" Albee claims in no uncertain terms that

> The Theater of the Absurd, in the sense that it is truly the contemporary theater, facing as it does man's condition as it is, is the Realistic theater of our time; and ... the supposed Realistic theater—the term used here to mean most of what is done on Broadway—in the sense that it panders to the public need for self-congratulation and reassurance and presents a false picture of ourselves to ourselves, is, with an occasional very lovely exception, really and truly The Theater of the Absurd.[41]

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fulfilment of the same impulse which has crated the original". P. Shaffer, "Postscript: The Play and the Film," in *Amadeus* (Harmondworth, 1985), p. 109.

[41] E. Albee, "Which Theater Is the Absurd One?," in *The Modern American Theater: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. A. B. Kernan (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1967), p. 173. Albee's interest in an updated version of realistic drama is also revealed in his appreciation of Chekhov. Cf. Ch. S. Krohn and J. N. Wasserman, "An Interview with Edward Albee, March 18, 1981," in *Edward Albee: An Interview and Essays*, ed. J. Wasserman (Houston, Texas, 1983), pp. 1, 4, 18, 22. For Albee's description of himself as an American dramatist compare: *ibid.*, pp. 12—3.

Albee's dramatic practice often cuts across and goes beyond the scope of this witty paradox. Unlike Beckett, who in *Waiting for Godot* has created an openly absurd universe in which the dramatic principle is ingeniously saved by referring the plight of inaction to the need of action, and unlike Pinter, who in plays like *The Birthday Party* has brought about a pseudo-naturalistic world where behind the seemingly solid crust of external reality absurdly irrational violence proves human action senseless and futile, in several of Albee's plays including *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?* and *Everything in the Garden* a cross-breeding of realistic and absurd drama is achieved in a characteristically American fusion. In these cases, however, realistic drama is not a well-made Broadway farce, melodrama or musical, but serious drama with a critical intent and cathartic action. In twentieth-century American drama it has been a well-established procedure and a long-standing practice to modernize traditional realism by cross-breeding it with aspects of other trends. Thus O'Neill in *The Hairy Ape* fuses realism and grotesque expressionism; Miller in *Death of a Salesman* uses modern simultaneity and expressionistic-surrealistic treatment of time; and Williams in *A Streetcar Named Desire* combines realistic characterization with symbolistic effects. In uniting realistic and absurdist aspects, Albee continues this achievement of modern American drama, and places his dramatic art in the mainstream of the dramatic movement. In this fusion the traditional realism of Cooper's *Everything in the Garden* proved a reliable factor.

At first, when Albee simply set out to retouch Cooper's play as a routine venture for the commercial stage, he no doubt cherished the idea of starting his task in terms of his parodistic paradox. Later, when he saw that Cooper was a more serious, original and innovative playwright challenging the spectators' complacency by treating prostitution as a status symbol, Albee's imagination was captured, and the process of adaptation—external Americanization—also became a more serious matter. "If you find something congenial to your own point of view," Albee observed, "then your adaptation of it becomes far closer to what you would have done";[42] and what he would have done was certainly increasing the grotesque elements

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

in the plot. When in the course of recomposing his British predecessor's drama Albee realized that the adaptation had given way to a real collaboration, the enhancement of the grotesque aspect in the original reached the point of absurdity. By using and relativizing the dramatic means, the structure, indeed the entire form of Cooper's play, Albee has generalized and intensified the aura of incongruity, already inherent in Cooper's theme, into a sense of absurdity. In the context of the Cooper—Albee relationship it is in this sense that Albee's Americanization[43] has achieved its internal stage and ultimate degree of modernization and revaluation. This was the way in which Albee has composed his absurd American variations on a grotesque British theme.

Cooper and Albee: a contrastive summary

A conclusion hardly needs an exposition either in a drama or in a dramatic analysis.

COOPER	ALBEE
1. Stage directions tend to be long.	They are much shorter: the field of play for individual initiative is broad er.
2. The dramatic action is embedded in an epic milieu.	Descriptive detail is dramatically functional: the gravitational pull of circumstances is challenged.
3. The viewers of the play are also considered to be potential readers of the text: a Shavian inheritance (cf. *Pygmalion*).	The spectators have only been as signed the role of an audience: the dramatic edge is sharper.

[43] Albee himself named the process as writing "the American version of that particular English play". Cf. M. E. Rutenberg, *Edward Albee: Playwright in Protest*, p. 229.

COOPER	ALBEE
4. External determinism is heavy.	It is, for a long time, playfully suspended: the possibility of a personal choice, or at least the illusion of an alternative are suggested.
5. Characters are introduced with British reservation and a measure of formality.	They are presented with American informality (first names, more common names).
6. The action of the play takes place in a real world; the reality of the actual is taken seriously even if it is ironized.	The dramatic action unfolds in a belt between the real and the unreal; the actual is reduced to a mere semblance of the real.
7. The theatrical space is immediate and calls for a direct emotional relationship.	It is often distanced and alienated; simetimes it is doubled. Alienation, certainly not unknown in European drama, is one of the central concerns and formative principles of the American dramatic tradition from O'Neill through Miller and Williams to Albee.
8. The plot evolves relatively slowly.	The action develops energetically: people take risks with less hesitation.
9. The procuress is socially and racially an outsider. The conflict between her principles and those of middle-class society is external.	She is within the social sphere of "good society". The conflict has been internalized and sharpened.

COOPER	ALBEE
10. Anti-Semitic views are voiced in Jenny's party; they are obviously not shared by Cooper. He also rejects outdated colonial consciousness.	Anti-Semitic opinions *and* anti-black prejudice are ridiculed by Albee. The thrust, focus and concern are unmistakably American.
11. The setting is emphatically British (the outskirts of London).	To meet the requirements of an American audience, it has been transferred to the suburbia of an American city.
12. The prices of people, the stakes of the game are moderate.	They have been substantially raised to suite American conditions. Dimensions *are* greater in the States both outside and inside the theatre. So are the expectations of the audience.
13. The conversation of characters is interspersed with understatement; it is sophisticated, urbane and suave. Only the madam speaks a coarse and curt language.	The dramatic dialogue is straightforward, incisive and dynamic; it is more jerky, rough and rugged, hitting harder and cutting deeper. It is part and parcel of the emotional range and passionate charge of American drama from O'Neill to Albee.
14. The motivation of prostitution by a status symbol is basically a thematic element. The "garden" is an umbrella term.	The status symbol is a fundamental principle of form, and so it is generalized. The "garden" is a leading motive, a structural element, a point of reference, and a linguistic unit of tightly controlled recurrence.

COOPER	ALBEE
15. The contrast between expected and actual standards leads to grotesque incongruity.	The substituion of artificial for real values results in absurdity.
16. Cooper's sense of incongruity is summarized in his ending the play in ironic acquiescence (after what he later considered was a false attempt at revolt).	Albee's absurd vision made him contrive a double conclusion, one of realistic resignation and one of absurd rebellion. Cooper's more traditional approach is thus both understood and undercut, adopted and relativized, continued and revalued, appreciated and Americanized in Albee's pattern of cross-breeding acute social criticism with an awareness of absurdity.

What is true of the work (*Everything in the Garden*) also holds good for the life-work: Cooper and Albee developed in opposite directions. Relying on his life-experience gained during the Second World War when he served in Burma as an infantry officer, and depending on his professional experience obtained as actor and as author of radio and television scripts, adaptations and full-length plays for the theatre, Giles Cooper developed an ever keener eye for external facts and underlying truths. He had an increasingly firm grasp on theme, character and plot. As John Russel Taylor puts it in *Anger and After*,

> *From Never Get Out!* (1950), an elusive duologue between an army deserter and a disconsolate woman with a death wish set in a house supposedly about to be bombed, Cooper has specialized in the exploration of strange emotional states in the margin of human experience, sometimes with strongly macabre overtones and generally on the surface at least in terms of comedy. A whole series of progressively more experimental plays culminated in *Mathry Beacon* (1956), a composite picture of the lives of a group of soldiers looking

> after a deflector hidden away in the Welsh mountains (and guarding the beacon well after the end of the war). His characteristic sinister-comic mode has subsequently been seen to advantage in such fantasies as *Unman, Wittering and Zigo* (1958), an obsessive tale of a teacher's persecution by his pupils; *Part of the View*, in which a Nigerian governess takes a roundabout revenge on her English employers for their condescension and ironically thereby saves their marriage; *Before the Monday* (1961), in which an innocent and a would-be suicide gradually change places; *Without the Grail* (1961), about mysterious happenings in the Assam hills, and *The Return of General Forefinger*, in which the desire of a general's widow to recover all the statues of her husband scattered round the world is met by a sculptor who secretly makes them himself.[44]

Thus the tangible solidity of theme and the actable narrativity of plot witnessed in Cooper's *Everything in the Garden* can be viewed as the results of an accumulating experience and a tentative development achieved in a prolific though short career (1918—1966).

By contrast, in Albee's case it is the plays of his early period written before his Americanized version of *Everything in the Garden* (*The Zoo Story*, *The Death of Bessie Smith*, *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?* or *A Delicate Balance*) which are characterized by a marked theme and a firm plot, and it is the later plays composed after *Everything in the Garden* (*All Over*, *Listening*, *Counting the Ways* or *The Lady from Dubuque*) in which patterned variation and stylistic orchestration seem to carry more of the sense and significance of the drama than stating and developing a theme do. Hence is derived the importance of Cooper's *Everything in the Garden* for Albee: the Anglo-Irish playwright provided the American dramatist with a grotesque theme which was sufficiently compact and weighty to survive its own relativization in Albee's absurd treatment and to support its American

[44] J. R. Taylor, *Anger and After: A Guide to New British Drama* (Harmondsworth, 1963), pp. 26—7.

variations that made it increasingly memorable. This is the way in which aspects of the pre-modern and the post-modern can invigorate and reinforce one another.

ANNA JAKABFI

REGIONALISM AND THE SURGEON FIGURE IN HUGH MACLENNAN'S FICTION

For Dr. B. E.

Hugh MacLennan was born on March 20, 1907 in Glace Bay, Nova Scotia and died on November 7, 1990 in Montreal, Québec. In between the two dates he had widely travelled in Europe and lived most of his life in Montreal. Had he obtained a job in the Maritimes he would never have ventured out so far from his birth place. Later in his life he visited his relatives, his home-town friends there. During the months of October-November 1982 he occupied the Winthorp Pickard Bell Chair of Maritime Studies at Mount Allison University in Sackville, New brunswick.

Hugh MacLennan was thrilled at being able to work "at home":

"Here I am working at last—in a Maritime University. Coming back to the Maritimes has always been a home-coming to hundreds of thousands of us exiles. Life is gentler here than in the great cities. It is certainly much healthier and saner... So now I am home again. On holiday, one might say, from the divided metropolis where I have spent nearly all my working life. I am very glad to be here..."[1]

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[1] Hugh MacLennan, *On Being a Maritime Writer.* (Sackville: Mount Allison University, 1984), p. 8.

The birthplace had been living on in Hugh MacLennan's memory and inspired him to make the area for several of his fictional characters' story. From among the seven movels he had published the plot of *Barometer Rising* (1941) and *Each Man's Son* (1951) totally and that of *The Watch That Ends the Night* (1959) partially takes place in the Maritime Provinces.

Incidentally these are the same novels which have surgeon figures in them, another biographical element. His father, Dr. Samuel MacLennan was a colliery doctor, a surgeon, a stern man who in his leisure time read the ancient classics in their original tongue. The father-doctor figure had had a life-long impact on Hugh MacLennan, the writer.

In the English speaking literature of the world—besides Somerset Maugham, a doctor himself—and Sinclair Lewis with his Arrowsmith, it was Hugh MacLennan who created in his fiction the most authentic doctor figures by giving accurate description of cases, diagnoses, hospitals, and shower his familiarity with the doctor's world in general.

Who are Hugh MacLennan's main doctor figures? They are: Angus Murray in *Barometer Rising*, Daniel Ainslie in *Each Man's Son*, and Jerome Martell in *The Watch That Ends the Night*.

What is the medical profession like at all? It is larger than life, it is overpowering any other human feeling and/or problem. Practising surgery, the toughest of all medical practices is a life long ambition, often a solution for life's problems. Surgical skill and the psyche of the surgeon are closely related. If a doctor masters the surgical skill, he feels superior to other human beings. He can do what other human beings cannot. And the wish to operate when the need arises surpasses any other wish, any other obligation the doctor may have.

The wish to operate is a call the doctor has to fulfil. It is a feeling that comes from the inside, it is a duty that nothing can alter or channel into another direction. A surgeon must operate, otherwise he feels crippled, maimed to a shallow, meaningless existence. The surgical skill is taken for granted with the maclennanian surgeons. The wish to operate too. Nothing and nobody can impair that quality or take it away.

Angus Murray's hands were not quite recovered from the war injuries, yet the first thing he does after the explosion in the Halifax harbour is that he sets up a hospital in the Wains' house and operates.

"Now there was no chance of turning back. His hand would have to do its work, and if it failed, no one would be able to repair the damage. His forehead was moist with sweat as he anaesthezied and washed out the conjunctival sac. Then he paused for the anaesthetic to take effect and observed that Mrs. Stevens had laid out the instruments in their proper order...

..She handed him the deWecker's scissors and he took them with his right hand and tested the strength and steadiness of his fingers. The movement hurt exceedingly, but the fingers were able to apply pressure and close the blades firmly. It would be a short operation. He had done dozens of prolapsed irises and used to think nothing of them. The trouble was that one had to use several instruments simultaneously. He had done it without help several times in France and he would do it now. He would be able to accomplish most of the preliminary work with his good hand, and that would rest the weak one. There was a faint smile around his mouth as he inserted a speculum into the eye and secured the lids with a pair of fixation-forceps."[2]

Jerome Martell after having been tortured in Ausswitz by the Nazis, and after having been transported to a Soviet concentration camp, and having lived in Hong Kong after escaping from the camp, upon coming home to Canada, wants to operate again:

"My hands—he held them out and for the first time I (George Stewart) noticed those splayed fingers—aren't much good for difficult operations. But they can do routine ones, and I'm still able to work."[3]

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[2] Hugh MacLennan, *Barometer Rising* (Toronto, Montreal: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1958), p. 174.

[3] Hugh MacLennan, *The Watch That Ends the Night* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1975), p. 368.

The wish to operate is nearly a superhuman feeling which is connected to the desire of healing others' wounds, to cure people, to serve people in the noblest sense of the word. This is what Angus Murray is doing and plans to do when his plans for a happy private life with Penelope crumble, this is what Daniel Ainslie had been doing all his life, and this is what Jerome Martell is hoping to do once again in the West.

The doctors achieve confidence, trust, respect, reverence and consequently authority in their community. When Angus Murray sets up his hospital in the Wains' house and takes hold of the place, even Aunt Mary, who had intensely disliked Murray "She hesitated, then looked directly at him. 'I have every confidence in you, Doctor.' He had heard this remark hundreds of times"...[4]

Daniel Ainslie's hospital is called "the lighthouse over the whole town".[5] Daniel Ainslie tells a patient: "..this is the place where people are made right again. We're going to take good care of you. You're in the best and safest place in the world."[6]

The hospital along with the doctors represents education, learning, culture, a behaviour set by a code of morale, consequently the surgeons reach out to the sick, the uneducated, the wretched, and want to save them. They want to cure the sick, educate the uneducated, psychologically heal the wretched, and serve society at large.

They do not spare themselves in the process. As duty calls them, surgeons work irregular hours up to the point of complete physical and mental exhaustion.

The fourth day after the explosion Angus Murray is on the verge of collapse. "Since Wednesday morning he had not had more than six hours' sleep, and although the strain and fatigue and the constant throbbing of his injured arm bowed his shoulders and made him appear like an old man, he was too nervy to want to rest. He wanted more than anything to be alone, he wanted to see something that had not been maimed or destroyed; above all,

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[4] Cf. op. cit. pp. 2, 173.

[5] Hugh MacLennan, *Each Man's Son* (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1971), p. 43.

[6] Cf. *op. cit.* pp. 5, 47.

he wanted to think and to have time to recover the only thing he had left in the world, the sense of his own personality."[7]

Daniel Ainslie quite often is felt sorry for by his wife Margaret when he is in the state of complete exhaustion.

"During the past three nights he had slept no more than a total of eleven hours, not counting the hour or two he might have dozed in his carriage. This morning he had performed five operations and then he had made his calls and seen patients in his surgery all afternoon."[8]

Jerome Martell is the strongest, he has an all enduring physical constitution which matches his spirit.

"His daily routine called for about six operations in addition to his calls, he lectured in the university, he spent two hours every day in a free clinic he had established for the unemployed, and he was involved in various public causes. Besides all this he managed to find time to read, to help people in trouble, and even to play with his child. The one thing he almost always did: he came home for dinner and reserved the half-hour before it for Sally."[9]

The surgeons of MacLennan feel a special tenderness for children and wish to have one. Just as Jerome Martell reserved his half an hour for his four-year old daughter, Sally before dinner, Angus Murray acknowledges the fact of liking children as if stating a diagnosis: "I've got a weakness for all children, I guess. So naturally I like this one."[10]

Daniel Ainslie at the age of forty is married to Margaret. She cannot have a child for she had to undergo an operation a few years before. This operation deprived the couple forever of having a child of their own. The craving for a child, a son is so strong with Daniel Ainslie that he would not think twice to get hold of Alan, eight-year old son of Molly and Archie MacNeil and give him proper education. The feeling overwhelms his psyche, his logic, his respect for other people. He takes it for granted that

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[7] Cf. *op. cit.* pp. 2, 203—4.

[8] Cf. *op. cit.* pp. 5, 25.

[9] Cf. *op. cit.* pp. 3, 150.

[10] Cf. *op. cit.* pp. 2, 73.

by sheer mental and financial superiority, let alone education, he has every right to get hold of the half-orphan small boy and take over the responsibility for Alan's future.

The surgeon does not like to have any authority limiting his action. This fact probably comes from the ability to operate, the medical knowledge which distinguishes him from other average human beings, who cannot do what he can. Just as Daniel Ainslie does not respect the motherly feelings of Molly in wanting to have Alan as his son, the same way but in magnified proportions does Jerome Martell not accept any judgement and authority regarding his own deeds be it of a medical or political nature.

Catherine had a rheumatic heart contition and was not supposed to give birth to a child unless she was ready to shorten her life. Jerome Martell challenges that medical evidence by marrying Catherine and getting her pregnant and giving her a daughter. The daughter makes Catherine a happy mother, but it is a medical challenge in the first place for Jerome Martell, the doctor.

"You know, he said, the purpose of medicine is supposed to be the preservation of life. But that's not my idea of the purpose of medicine. My idea is to help people get the most out of what life they have."[11]

Jerome Martell also challenges the medical authority within the hospital, when he takes part in the radical political movement of the Depressions years in Montreal, and gets involved in a love-affair with a Communist nurse in the hospital. The all enduring surgeon thinks he can decide for himself what to do irrespective of the codes of society his profession binds him to.

"Jerome—I really came to belive this—could never belong to any particular group of human beings; he belonged to humanity itself. This he never seemed to know. He had less ordinary social sense than anyone I ever knew, and if he met the King of England he would have been interested in him solely as a human being, and if the King bored him he would have been quite capanble of changing the subject of walking away to talk to somebody else. He was utterly without a sense of class distinction, and the subtle

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[11] Cf. *op. cit.* pp. 3, 154.

layers of these distinctions in Montreal entirely escaped his notice. I'm sure he was snubbed dozens of times; I'm equally sure he never noticed it."—says George Stewart—[12]

To carry his disrespect for morality into extreme, he applies violence, punches people when no other argument works. Jerome Martell's terms of human obligations seem superhuman just as his physical and spiritual abilites are superhuman. He embodies life-force. Towards the end of the novel Jerome Martell encourages George Stewart to live Catherine's death. No matter how strong George's anger towards Jerome is, for having shortened Catherine's life with moral strength to not only continue to stand by Catherine, but also to make her last years happy.

"You must learn to build a shell around yourself like a snail and every now and then you must creep inside of it. Two days inside and you'll come out able to face anything... The shell is death. You must crawl inside of death and die yourself. You must lose your life. You must lose it to yourself... When things become intolerable—you must die within yourself. Your soul is making your body revolt against what you think you have to bear. You can only live again by facing death. Then you outface it. You must say to yourself, and mean it when you say it: 'What difference does it make if she does? What difference does it make if I die? What difference does it make if I am disgraced? What difference does it make if everything we've done means nothing?' You must say those things and believe them. Then you will live."[13]

The doctor figures of Hugh MacLennan can love women, however, they are never romantic. Reason, logic, scientific knowledge, thus objectivity reigns over their emotions.

Angus Murray had once been married to an American girl and she died soon after he had left medical school. He left for France to fight in World War I and "Death suddenly seemed unimportant and life seemed everything" to him.[14]

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[12] Cf. *op. cit.* pp. 3, 157

[13] Cf. *op. cit.* pp. 3, 366.

[14] Cf. *op. cit.* pp. 2, 33.

Angus Murray overcomes his feeling for Penny too by rationalizing his thoughts about her as if setting up a diagnosis of Penny—thus once again the mind of the doctor takes over and is always in control as far as his emotions are concerned:

"He faced her with as much detachment as he could. God damn people like Penny with that tense calm like still water under pressure! The idea that he might have married her appalled him now. That calm, that potential energy in the girl would annihilate him if he ever had to live with it. A stubborn, imaginative, violent man like Neil MacRae would be just the sort to make her do whatever he wanted, make her forget to think, force her into the pattern of his own life without even knowing he was doing it. The next time he thought of getting married, Murray decided, he'd hunt someone capable of hysterics."[15]

Daniel Ainslie was keeping his emotional distance from his wife, Margaret. Instead he reads the Greek classics in the original, it is a feeling which lifts his spirit above the everyday routine sufferings he has to witness. It is an activity which makes up for the warmth, the tenderness he cannot show his wife for fear of giving away his fallibility as a human being who craves love and understanding.

Each Man's Son other doctor figure, Douglas MacKenzie attributes this to the puritanic past, the Protestant innate guilt feeling. I believe that it goes deeper than that. It goes back to what traditionally society expects of man: to be rock that the woman can lean on, be the dominant sex, the tower of strength in the family. This expected role is underligned by the fact that Daniel Ainslie is doctor, an authority not only in the operating theatre, but outside it in the local and very close-knit community of Broughton. If he lets himself go, he cannot go back to the role of the strong man, and he falls victim to his own fallibility. As long as he closes in himself, he does not betray his strength, he does not have to give himself away and thus become victim to the woman, his mate in life. It is obvious that he can give himself away, be sincere only to the older and much respected colleague Douglas MacKenzie, and also to a certain extent. They communicate verbally up to a

[15] Cf. *op. cit.* pp. 2, 193—4

certain point, and that communication comes from the common background of being surgeons.

On the other hand Daniel Ainslie finds himself suddenly in love with both Margaret and Molly: "He wanted to go off and lose himself in the forest and find there a woman with Margaret's body and the eyes—good God, the eyes of that girl Molly MacNeil—who would hold his head and tell him that for all his worthlessness she loved him and for all his confusion she understood him..."[16]

Anslie reaches communication with Molly, however, this contact is seen as communication by Margaret, his wife as communication attributed to the Gaelic origin of both her husband and that of Molly, whereas she comes from a Loyalist family said to be more outgoing and fun-loving. I think that Daniel Ainslie and Molly may be on the same wavelength—to use a modern term—or may not be at all at the same wavelength only Margaret feels that way. Maybe Dr. Ainslie is simply attracted to the pretty young woman—see the dream above—as a healthy male does in spite of the fact that he is a doctor.

Dr. Doucette in Louisbourg "grinned. He put his hand on Ainslie's kne and squeezed affectionately. 'Tell me something—when you've finished a gook job, do you feel you deserve a new woman?'

'Ouch!' said Ainslie.

'So you do!' He let a few seconds elapse. The he said, 'How's Margaret?'

'She's the same as ever.'"[17]

Jerome Martell was described "as the most attractive male animal in Montreal."[18] He loved Catherine in his own way, however, as Peter Buitenhuis pointed out, "...one of Jerome's main troubles is that he has too much energy. He constantly needs outlets that his invalid wife, Catherine, is not able to supply."[19]

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[16] Cf. *op. cit.* pp. 5, 65.
[17] Cf. *op. cit.* pp. 5, 126.
[18] Cf. *op. cit.* pp. 3, 121.
[19] Peter Buitenhuis, *Hugh MacLennan* (Toronto: Forum House, 1969), p. 60

For him life is a gift, all his morale is different, originating in the fact that he has too much energy. He feels he belongs to a world larger than his immediate environment, he wants to grasp and save the whole world, and challenges authority of any kind. He loves LIFE and not just one woman of a friend. His feelings belong to the world he claims his own and sets up his own moral code in everything he does. He, himself is a life-force, a healing force if in the right track. He is deeply convinced that he is always in the right track, because he sets up the rules for himself.

The doctors of Hugh MacLennan appreciate beauty when they meet with it. It satisfies their aesthetic need, it a strength they can draw inspiration from to continue their hard work on the one hand, and on the other, it makes them contemplate, to philosophize which in the end comes to the same thing, it helps them to face the sick, the operations, and death if necessary. The process is the following: they take delight in sheer beauty of the scene they are watching, the sight makes them contemplate on mankind, the very existence of man, their country Canada, which thoughts lead them back to reality, the immediate problem they have to solve.[20]

Angus Murray watches Halifax:

"Spread below him, the town lay with the mist concealing every ugly thing, and the splendour of its outline seemed the most perfect, natural composition he had ever seen. He thought that a man could only know the meaning of peace when he longer reached after the torment of hope. He had lost Penny, with to argue or justify himself any more; unhappiness could no longer have meaning, for there was no longer anything positive for him to be unhappy about. There was nothing to worry him. Last night he had relinquished the last thread of ambition which had held worries tight in his mind. But the beauty of the world remained and he found himself able to enjoy it; it stayed constant in spite of all mankind's hideous attempts to master it.

With eyes blinking in the light he surveyed Halifax fanning away under its bare trees from the rounded base of the Citadel. Almost every street and building held for him a fragment of personal history dating back to the time, twenty-seven years ago, when he had first come as a boy raw

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[20] Cf. *op. cit.* pp. 5, 143.

from the farm, to Dalhousie College. The faces of classmates crossed his memory; some were successful in the upper provinces or the States; one was famous; few were left in Nova Scotia.

Even as he watched, the mist was dissolving, and glancing down to the harbour, he saw the British cruiser coasting in to her anchorage. The incisive outline of the ship seemed to emphasize and sharpen the essential helplessness of all small places in the world to resist the impact of the outer world. Murray sighed. The town throbbed with the war and the people in their hearts were not sorry. They welcomed it the way a doctor welcomes a prospect of a dangerous operation which he alone can perform, for England could not fight the war without this town. The great cities which made the wars and sought to circumvent the nature of things could not do without Halifax now.

He took hold of his injured hand and began to manipulate the fingers. They were stiff with the morning cold, but it was obvious they were recovering and soon would be fit for work. He would still have his trade. That would have been enough from now on."

Daniel Ainslie's mind undergoes the same process when he wanders outside the town of Broughton to the sea and watches the night at the shore. Into his thinking comes the contemplation on God and man's existence, and on going home he is relaxed. He cured himself, he set his mind in peace. He contemplates:

"If there was no God, then there was nothing. If there was no love, then existence was an emptiness enclosed within nothing. He felt as though his spirit had hurled itself against the window of his life like a wounded bat and broken the glass. It has been caught in a prison and now it was free. But its freedom was the freedom of not caring, and the things it witnessed now were different from those it had seen before... a world where there were no gods, no devils, no laws, no certainties, no beginning, and no end. A world without purpose, without meaning, without intelligence; dependent upon nothing, out of nothing, within nothing; moving into an eternity which itself was nothing."[21]

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[21] Cf. *op. cit.* pp. 5, 44, 218—222.

These thoughts reminiscent of existentialism reveal the learned man whose mind can wander into nothingness to find his active, helping, healing self again.

Philosophizing is an important preoccupation which the mac-lennanian doctor is often engaged in. Here it also counterbalances the guilt feeling inflicted upon him by the pernicious influence of his puritanical upbringing on the one hand, and on the other it serves to illustrate the way the learned man solves his conflicts compared to the uneducated. For the miners in Broughton a punch-up is the solution to all their problems, for the doctor it is contemplation, watching nature, the procedure of combinig visual sensitivity to brainwork which serves not only as an eye-opener but as a physical outlet for tension in his organism.

For Daniel Ainslie the real beauty comes from having saved someone's life: "Life was never so vivid as when it was in danger nor was a human being ever so vitally himself as when he had passed through pain and emerged on the other side of it."[22]

REGIONALISM

Barometer Rising and *Each Man's Son* take place in the Maritimes, *Barometer Rising* in Halifax and *Each Man's Son* on the island of Cape Breton.

Jerome Martell's early childhood in *The Watch That Ends the Night* was spent in a logging camp in the woods of New Burnswick, and the description is so vivid that the reader can feel the physical presence of the woods. The first ten years of Jerome never sank into oblivion in spite of the fact that the obscurity of his origins haunts him all his life. This is the way the grown-up man remembers the New Bruswick area: "... those little fishing ports and lumber towns along the Gulf shore and in my mind I can smell them. Such ripe combination of smells they give out: balsam, lobster pots, drying fish, oakum, new lumber, bilge, and the stench of fish-offal on beaches under umbrellas of screaming gulls. But inland, even four miles inland in that country, there is no sense of ocean at all, but only of this primeaval forest of spruce with the tangle of deadfalls and the sound-

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[22] Cf. *op. cit.* pp. 5, 84.

absorbing carpet of spruce needles that have accumulated over the centuries. The rivers run through it teeming with trout and salmon, and moose, bear, deer, and all the northern animals large and small are at home in the tangle of threes. So are blackflies and mosquitoes in the spring, and in winter so is the snow. In winter this whole land is like Siberia."[23]

Hugh MacLennan's father died in 1939, almost two years before *Barometer Rising* appeared. He created the three doctor figures with roughly a decade's difference between them. Hugh MacLennan as a grown-up had formed a close and warm friendship with his father in the latter's few years. He could not get quite distanced from his father in his first novel. Angus Murray is a minor character in the book, well drawn, but not quite a round character.

As the years pass Hugh MacLennan got distanced enough from the immediate presence of his father, and as the doctor's figure lived on in him, he created and recreated not only his father's figure but he came closest to revive his parents' marriage in the Ainslie couple. Ainslie just like his own father was determined to live in Broughton, the colliery town.

Hugh MacLennan is quite ironical to people, like himself who had left the Maritimes: "It was a place, I used to assume, where more people were born than died. Ambitious men tended to leave it; having done so, they also tended to yearn for it and to save up to come home on vacations. Wherever they went, they had the habit of telling strangers it was one of the loveliest spots on earth."[24]

As the doctor figures grow in characters in the novels, so do they see not only more of Canada but also more of the world. Angus Murray lived in Halifax, fought in the first world war in Europe and then went bact to his home-town which he decided to leave and start a new life somewhere west of it.

Daniel Ainslie having lived in England, spends his life in Broughton.

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[23] Cf. *op. cit.* pp. 3, 173.

[24] Hugh MacLennan, *The Scottish Touch: Cape Breton* in *The Other Side of Hugh MacLennan*, ed. Elspeth Cameron (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1978), p. 214.

Jerome Martell started out from the New Brunswick woods, had been given an education in Halifax, lived many years in Montreal, then set out for Europe, has been to Asia and on getting back to Montreal, he decides to go West. To go West means in Canadian literature to start a new life, and that is what happens to each doctor protagonist at the end of the novels. Their life is bound to take a new turn which may result in the physical change of environment or a change of lifestyle as in the case of Daniel Ainslie, when he becomes a father by adopting Alan.

As the characters grow in importance in the novels, so they scan more of Canada and the world. They themselves psychologically grow in the process. However the purpose of their existence reaches a conscious definition: to live in Canada, to devote their surgical skill, their medical knowledge to Canada.

George Woodcock has been led to express this as follows: "... there is no doubt of the presence in MacLennan's novels of a strong but benign form of nationalism. Indeed, he is the first novelist in the history of his country who has been able to take the drama of development and survival of Canada and to use it effectively as the framework for his fiction. This nationalism which irradiates the novels is compound of a deep love of the physical land and a sence of belonging to a group of peoples which, dispite geographical anomalies and historic divisions, has plunged into the primeaval wilderness the roots of a unique human community."[25]

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[25] George Woodcock, *Hugh MacLennan* (Toronto: The Copp Clark Publishing Company 1969), p. 34

JUDIT KÁDÁR

HUGH MACLENNAN'S COMPLEX NARRATIVE TECHNIQUE IN HIS LAST NOVEL

As it is with the individual, so it may be with the whole world. When the individual is wanted in his soul he often wishes to die. But time passes and then, for no reason he understands, he wants to live again. Can it be the same with communities?

(Voices in Time 28)

Hugh MacLennan (1904—1990) played a great role in the deliberate creation of the literature which is undoubtedly and distinctively Canadian in its subject, setting and voice. *Voices in Time* has not received as broad literary criticism as some of his previous novels, neither is it as popular as for instance *The Watch that Ends the Night* or the *Two Solitudes*. His last novel did not continue the thematical tradition that had been estblished in his previous novels, i.e. the quest for personal and/or national self-conscious motif. Here MacLennan makes an attempt to broaden his scope; to turn towards more general human affairs. A closer examination of this not so well-known novel can illuminate features that would enlarge the readers' apprechiation and interest in 'the other sides of Hugh MacLennan'.

There is a tendency in his novels to portray historical patterns (such as the return of authocracies and regimes; wars, suffering and the sequence

of the permissive matrist and the authorian patrist cycles) in/through the lives of the individual characters. Some examples are the colonial mentality versus the search for the Canadian identity in *Barometer Rising*, the French and English conflict in *Two Solitudes;* or the American—Canadian relations in the *Precipice*. In *Each Man's Son* a more universal topic (i.e. human relations, here especially the one between the father and the son) is set in a Greek tragedy form; while *The Watch that Ends the Night*, his most powerful novel moves out to Europe. His last book: *Voices in Time* (1980) extends this line with its settings mostly in Germany. In a sense this novel tends to be a summary of his philosophical ideas touching universal themes and generalizing all his experience absorbed in his former novels. In an interview with Alan Twigg he says: "That book wasn't about Canadian politics. I had a very universal subject there" (Twigg, 86). The theme of the book is related to MacLennan's deepest concern: the misuse of human energy versus the purposeful direction of the same forces and its impact on the survival of mankind. His complex system of thoughts is embedded into a story which is interpreted from different aspects. The framework of the book is a twenty-first century (2039.) setting. The central character, John Wellfleet talks about the past, the world before the so called Second Bureaucracy, about the period of human history that he experienced in the second half of the twentieth century. The occasion for this story-telling is that a young man, André Gervais, had found a box full of documents, 'VOICES IN TIME', voices of people whose lives occured in our present time and our recent past. Wellfleet is confused about these papers, their value and effect, like MacLennan could have been about the critical acceptance and further impact of all his writings. A proof for this uncertainty could be his personal reaction to the criticism he received after each piece of work that appeared. Both the writer's and the narrator's role is to give a sense, a meaning to these voices.

The narrator's perspective of time is subjective and it creates a sense of relativity of viewpoint. Through these lenses a chance is given to look over and understand our present from past and future distances. The topic, style and atmosphere of the book shows the writer's opinion at a final, mature stage of his carreer, where MacLennan owned a wider perspective

on life, history and human nature. The same approach appears in his essays that stand for similar political and philosophical ideas (e.g. *A Disquisition on Elmer, Scotchman's Return, Scotland's Fate: Canada's Lesson* or *Two-Solitudes: Thirty-three Years Later*). MacLennan is concidered to be an writer of realistic style whose main concern is the Canadian national identity and its existence. His concious efforts to create something distinctively Canadian in his writings and to call the attention of Canadians to a national self-awareness as well as to call for other peoples' attention and interest lead to an ofter didactic tone which seemed to control his style. However, he alters his voice and subject matter as well. He shows the example of former times and draws the picture of a far too bad future as a warning for the present. This quest for being accepted as a cosmopolitan writer comes together with a peculiar sense of regionalism. He relates his topics to the spheres of individuals, couples, smaller communities; to nations; and finally draws the conclusion on a global level, (here: 'the World State') too, as a part of his morale, which is so much tied up with his purposes of artistic writing. I would like to focus on the complexity of his philosophical and artistic concept.

History, Time, Narration and Style

In *Voices in Time* MacLennan created a narrative framework on the basis of a relative time-system to provide a ground for expressing his own concept of human history in a way that seems natural and sufficient for the purpose of being able to shift the personal patterns narrated by the characters. This happens in three basic time-periods: in 2039, after a social explosion; between the two world wars and especially during World War II.; and during the 1970s October Crisis in Montreal, the city which was close to terror and in a state of total social chaos at that time.

Time in the novel has a distinctively important role. Within the structure of the subjective time approaches the author's aim is to underline and express objectively the idea which is described in the life and figure of the characters, namely: people of our ages have lost their way in existence as opposed to the previous generations.

He [Grandfather] had grown up in a time when most people in our part of the world knew exactly where they stood at any period of their existence. ... All this was gone now and Grandfather knew it. His sadness was not for himself but for his loved ones who would have to live in the chaos left by the war. (VT. 150)

Although MacLennan's attitude towards time is close to the treatment of time in modern fiction he was not able to abandon the traditional narrative techniques fully. He broke with the linear chronology of story-telling for the sake of findign a new perspective, a new focus, but not one which is overwhelmingly subjective. The mixture of the subjectivized narration and the authorial intention of objectivity lead to two consequences on the readers' side: we can treat *Voices in Time* as successful experiment of MacLennan, where he achieved to present his highbrow morals in an understandable but modern form; and we can also treat the novel as a not really powerful one since it stopped halfway between realism and modernist tendencies.

As for the narrative method, it is more conventional than original for it seems to have common features with the style of Aldous Huxley, Robert Merle and George Orwell in many ways, especially in the descriptive parts of the future vision. While reading the other parts of the book which are set in Germany (Ch.8) we can also think of Jorge Semprun's *Grand Voyage*, or Anne Frank's *Diary*, too. However, MacLennan's intention was different from the pure description of a given period and its people. Moreover, he denied the connection with any futuristic science-fiction where the emphasis is on the detailed description of the New World, while here, in this novel the future is a predicted result of our present and past without any importance in itself. Future has simply a narrative role, an angle to look back from. The whole visionary image and the author's historic awareness come from his Maritime heritage, his deep concern for human survival, as Janice Kulyn-Keefer pointed out (218); and his critical consciousness comes out of the age he lived in. History and moral philosophy are closely linked in MacLennan's mind, although he often oversimplifies and trivializes the basic notions in his philosophy. The question of the cyclical or spiral nature of

history is pessimistically treated on the surface. The constant reoccurance of the dehumanizing elements, pain and suffering would mean that it is difficult to find a sense for human life or a chance to improve human nature. On the other hand MacLennan suggests in all his writings that there must be evolution of some kind in our life. As a writer he feels the responsibility of searching for the creative, beneficial forces in human nature and society. However, he is pessimistic towards most of the intellectuals of Third Reich Germany for being concerned more with self-expression than common interests. This is also true for the post-war historians and scientists in his novel: those who were more interested in what destroyed the civilizations than what created them. The always reoccuring patterns of the past, which create a permanent up-and-down movement of the historical cycle reinforces the imprinted memory-traces of the collective subconscious—as it is explained in his essays (e.g. "Roman History and To-Day"). Patterns of war, for example, strategies, tactics don't change, just weapons do (VT 277), such as in the case of Genghis Kahn and Hitler: the methods to keep the mobs oppressed are similar. 'Great Fears' are folk legends that exist as myths in the common knowledge as well as on the level of the individuals. The revolutions come up always against the dull correctness of a strict social order; the wars come after and with the uprootedness and collapse of these systems and are often followed by the explosion of intellectual energy. The sequence of the extremely authoritarian patrist periods (eg. Hitler's time, or the Bureaucracies), and the excessive libertarianism in the matrist eras (such as modern Quebec) create the course of human history.

Both authoritarian and libertarian forces can mean the previously mentioned notion of the misused human energy which is the 'evil' of history. MacLennan considers bureaucracies, governments and any kind of leadership to be only for controlling the masses, which leads to extremities. He studies the possible ways of revolt against any form of aggression like the one in his book; individuals who more and more grow accustomed to violence and try to escape (like Einstein did when he left Germany for America), they try to accept their determined common fate (like the Jews, eg. Hanna Earlich or the old Polish Jew, who commits suicide after shooting Conrad instead of Heinrich); but most people should pretend to be blind in

order to protect themselves (either like Conrad when joining the Gestapo to save Hanna, or like Dr. Erlich when he pretends to have a nervous breakdown). This ability to survive either physically or mentally is 'the dignity of history' as MacLennan calls it in the book, the only dignit which small everyday heroes can bear and no one else. As a group bearing this dignity he favours the example of the Jewish people who seem to fight against their thousand-year-old fate, who had the collective intellectual power to survive even the concentration camps, who have the sensitivity and common experience imprinted in their soul. Esther, a symbolic female character is the embodiment of this power in the novel. Another example of the ability to accomodate and survive as a group is the German nation. MacLennan is careful about the description of these people here. He rejects that all Germans are blind loyalists to the hostile paternal authority of their leaders, such as Siegfried and Eva Schmidt are; he rejects the 'original sin' of that nation. Searching for a psychological explanation for this mass-madness he creates characters like Conrad Dehmel's father, who serves his country and ship before his family... However, the most vivid and complex character is Conrad, where the personal drives and actions explain each other throughout his life.

The author's criticism is strong also when he examines the society at the end of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the twenty-first century; the world of political corruption, hypocrites, organized crime and the dangerous mass-power of the media particularly emphasized in Timothy Wellfleet's figure; the world, which goes out of control step-by-step, day-by-day in front of our eyes. Looking for the causes which lead up to the present (here: the writer's actual present time) situation MacLennan found the historical analogies to be eternal, everlasting and reoccuring. In his eyes society tends towards chaos. Similar feeling, fear and philosophy is in the focus of the American entropic fiction of the 1960—1970s, the fear of the rising chaos; the annihilation of human life and relations; the growing force of powers like the mass media that can keep individual dreams and desires under control, or the bureaucracy that kills all the possibilities of individual action. MacLennan does not really reach philosophical depths and theories as far as the explanation and presentation of the process of human affairs is

concerned. He concentrates on the emotional effects and transfers them into the lives and interactions of individual characters. The main concern in *Voices in Time* is the misuse of human energy, the tendency which culminates in the limitless rule of organizations and mass media—the owner of information which is another keyword in the entropic fiction. This can add a new feature to the traditional concepts about MacLennan's writing although the freshness and force of the subject is a bit restrained by the author's didactic style. In MacLennan's novel the upper layer of the social order, the bureaucracy, and the intellectuals are morally responsible for the creation of violence, while the masses are victims, blind believers or servants, whose last means is violence, too. On their side the lost religious belief and the loss of the cultural values unites with the fear, the 'distant fear' (VT 144) coming from the bureaucracy, which leads to the state of social paranoia described by Dehmel in the following way:

> *In the relatively rare periods in the part that we call civilized people understood that a civilization is like a garden cultivated in a jungle. ... In nature, if there are no gardeners, the weeds that need no cultivation take over the garden and destroy it.... During my lifetime too many of the men who thought of themselves as civilization gardeners is nearly everything they did from the promotion of superhuman science to superhuman salesmanship, devoted the ambiguous genius of their programmed brains to the cultivation of the weeds.* (VT 121)

Psychologically the frustration leads intellectuals to the feeling that they can improve their self-importance by creating chaos, and by crime committed in the name of freedom (eg. Timothy Wellfleet's work at the TV), while the same is the result of the vulgarity and aggressivity of power owned by the Red Tape, such as the case of kidnappers hired directly by the Establishment in the 1970 crisis, or the permanent lying of the politicans in the media.

MacLennan's handling of time in this novel is two dimensional, it drives both back and forth in the course of time. Naturally he applies the

traditional narrative method with the chronological order; the linear time-aspect, especially when the subnarrators (John Wellfleet and Conrad Dehmel) talk about the events and their effects on others' lives and actions. However, there is another dimension of time which is vertical in the sense that it recalls the personal memories and deep reflections of the characters following their free association, a typical element of modern fiction, going back in their subconscious into their past. This step is rather forced, for instance John Wellfleet suffers from shock when André mentions keywords and figures of his by-gone happier life and Conrad Dehmel is also pushed to think about his life when Timothy attacks him with aggressive questions on TV. Perhaps the author projects his own feelings towards the question of searching for the past, going back on the memory traces, looking for the sense of this painful artistic process and finally finding it in his other important artistic concern i.e. the sequence of generations.

Consequently the stream of storytelling is complex. In the framework, the stories narrated by the characters sometimes overlap each other. These voices in time can reinforce or oppose the 'personal truths' of those partaking in the storytelling; the same event can appear different from a new aspect. The narrated parts not only talk about identical events and periods of time in the different characters' lives and human history, but also continue the story by adding a next step to the chain of events in the main line: the story of World War II is an example easy enough to understand because of its closeness to the reader in time. The retrospective shifts also help us understand the characters, especially Conrad Dehmel, whose character developed out of the shadow of John Wellfleet (since he was Wellfleet's step father) to an independent individual character who is driven, by his fate, his instincts and the surrounding world, and whose feelings and actions are convincingly explained in the book.

There is another element in MacLennan's narrative technique which is important in the retrospective narration, namely flashback panorama. Roger Hyman, one of MacLennan's critics, gives a strong criticism of his technique saying that

> *The weakness of the technique here, as in the earlier novels, is that MacLennan never fully integrates the action of the present and the action of the past... Instead of one novel, we have seen large documents:... They are, literally, voices in time, but there are too many voices, too many times.* (31)

Unfortunately Hyman's opinion seems to be right. Either John Wellfleet's or André Gervais's narrative role should have been stronger to balance the authorial voice. However, the writer seems to be satisfied with the traditional literary idea of having an old experienced man, a representative of the old world asked by a young, agile but unexperienced man of the future in the course of a lesson on history. On the other hand, Wellfleet is the one who the whole story is organized around, who is a link between the generations, ages, and he is also a medium to transfer the experience accumulated in his mind and in the documents. He is not a 'playback machine' like the one which they could have seen in Timothy's TV show. He has human feelings, especially sadness and nostalgia coming up from his oppressed subconscious. The writer's technique is especially powerful when he desribes the old man's dreamy memories because he recalls everything he had lost, and this image is often associated with music. Music is the form of intellectual value that survives even if a power tries to deny its presence because it can express the sense of loss and gives pleasure. In Dehmel's family there were the ones who were able 'to see the music'; in Timothy's life he associated love and sexual feelings with a symphony, and in the others' lives music appears quite often to be equally important.

Searching for the adequate form of his book MacLennan worked a lot on creating a chronology of the events and characters so as to be able to let these figures feel free with their associations and memories. There is an analogy which is presented in the story and in the narrative voice between the writer and the main character, John Wellfleet, too. Both want to arrange their life experience, to transfer it to the following generations, and to give a sense of the voices. Both take the role of the reserved old man, who had already given up the hope for a more mature, happier civilization, but after having the pleasure of meeting a young man who wished to learn, they

regain their intellectual power and want to find a new meaning and purpose of their lives.

One can take the aspect of generations, as a basic drive for MacLennan throughout his works as a common feature, a motif he always applies and goes back to. This notion is central in most of his novels as well as in this particular book, where the title *Voices in Time* can refer not only to the documents found by André, but also the different generations' voices in human history. The characters within this network take their more or less set roles. Such as for instance in *Barometer Rising* or in *Two Solitudes*, John Wellfleet is a narrator, preserver of the past, and moral guide of the present, André's generation, where latter's role is to bring John back to life again and to find the way out of the present blindness. Timothy stands for the so called 'instant generation', commercial society men, who can realize the failure in their lives only after a tragic event. This line leads up to Conrad Dehmel, a figure always in a Catch-22 situation. This ambiguous character is full of love and hate, death and life motifs. Out of his self-hatred and shame he comes to self-revelation; even his death is a trap for he was mixed up with another person.

Having a closer look at the strengths and the weaknesses of character-drawing in his book Hyman's opinion seems worth being concidered stating that there are many stereotypes and even some caricature-like figures (Hyman 322). Oversimplification can also be a problem in our age. To put his major characters into the place of the 'innocent victim trapped in history' is not very satisfying from an artistic point of view since today nearly anyone can claim to be one like that. Moreover, there is the question of the 'enemy' as such, if there is one, who is not a victim at the same time. As an example we can take Dehmel. Is it really true that he is driven by pure fate? In general if it was so, the strong pessimistic feeling of being in a trap of circumstances and history would overtake the whole atmosphere of the book. As a consequence of the oversimplifications of the philosophic background, the style of the book seems to be occasionally naive, overpurified or at least ironic. Here we can think of sentences like "What do you call a spaceship?" (VT 14); which seems ridiculous when future characters ask it of past characters. We can

also think of the choice of characters like Canaris, Heinrich, Einstein or Goebbels, obvious figures since they transfer the message for us too directly in their personality. They stand for themselves, for only one basic idea, as well as the other group of characters, namely women (eg. Esther Stahr, Hanna Erlich or Eva Schmidt) who stand for the traditional virtues and vices, the Jewish sensibility, tolerance, etc., or the aggressive woman figure, who blindly follows the Nazist ideas. None of these female characters are powerful enough since they are not so much individuals as representatives of a group of people.

MacLennan's style can also be described as one of symbolic nature. Let me just mention an example, the Icaros-motifs for instance, when he writes about the girls and boys who sailed into the sun and burned to death (VT 15). Here the image may stand for the lost generation, who were outsiders of the bureaucracy, who searched for their ego and place in the world, and ended up in an 'intellectual nowhere'. We could also mention the birds in the Old City (VT 20) as the topos for freedom or another interesting image, when he speaks about Ulm as the heart blasted city (VT 278). Perhaps one can make a parallel between the Dutch city of Rotterdam and MacLennan's Ulm. In the heart of Rotterdam, which was destroyed during World War II, there stands a statue with its heart torn out. Although the writer denied the connection with any futuristic writings when talking about his style, some interesting similarities with Orwell's style seem worth mentioning. First of all, the narrative aspect and the basic standpoint of the protagonist, John Wellfleet, is similar to the one's in Orwell's *1984*. Both see and show the events with the eyes of a survivor after a tragic turningpoint of the civilization. In both cases, another person, an outsider, comes (in Orwell's novel the girl, and here André). They open up the closed personality of the main figure (as MacLennan writes: "It almost makes me feel human again." (VT 15). Their common problem was that they did not fit into the system, and as renegated people they took up the fight against the inhuman forces. As far as narration in the two books is concerned, the time aspects are widened and this broad overview gives a new perspective to explore the present. Moreover, the naturalism of the images about the

future are similar and serve the purpose of being an opposition to all the true, humanistic values in our lives.

One can find the strength of the novel rather in MacLennan's method of pointing out the general human ingenuity, and man's dual nature. I consider Conrad and Timothy to be the most powerful characters, since they are described from many angles in a realistic way through their personal reflections. For example, Conrad Dehmel is not the hero perhaps one could expect to act like a hero. After physical tortures he finally gives up his beloved and her father, which is a rather unheroic action at that moment. Also, Conrad's relationship with Hanna is vivid, touching, as far as emotions are concerned. Here sexuality seems to have a different role and description than in any other novels by the same author. He writes about this love affair in a very honest, passionate way. As for his voice in general, MacLennan is rather resigned, desperate, and often tragic or sarcastic probably due to his philosophical views, too.

In this paper my point was to show the innovation in MacLennan's book, namely that he tried to merge a traditional and a new method of story-telling within the framework of a book which is about the general problems of human history. He does this by talking about wars, especially *within* people, and about the writer's belief in the new generations, the ability of the old one to be reborn, and bring new enthusiasm for the new generations. I feel that the achievment lies in MacLennan's thematical innovation in contrast with his previous novels rather than in the form of narration. His style is emotionally touching and suggestive though in the artistic sense it is not so powerful as for exapmle it was in *Barometer Rising* or *The Watch that Ends the Night.* Nevertheless, the last novel of Hugh MacLennan could deserve more attention among readers and critics of one of Canada's most popular and well-known writers.

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DONALD E. MORSE

"WHY NOT YOU?" KURT VONNEGUT'S DEBT TO THE BOOK OF JOB

"And I alone am escaped to tell you."
The Messenger to Job

For many—perhaps, for most—of Kurt Vonnegut's readers, *Slaughterhouse-Five* (1969) remains his finest work—an impressive achievement whether looked at as a human document or as a work of art. Although many critics have discussed the novel, its themes, debts to other writers, reliance on personal experience, and so forth, no one has yet discussed Vonnegut's considerable debt to the Book of Job.

Vonnegut wrote *Slaughterhouse-Five* looking back on the Second World War from the vantage point of twenty to twenty-five years later. Unlike Joseph Heller who wrote his equally well-known *Catch-22* (1961) under similar circumstances, Vonnegut criticizes the moral confusion occasioned by this or any war's brutal, excessive destruction done in the name of goodness, justice, and Mom's apple pie rather than focusing on the utter cynicism and greed summarized in Heller's often repeated pejorative phrase "everyone cashing in." In contrast, Vonnegut ironically admits that "one way or another, I got two or three dollars for every person killed [in Dresden]. Some business I'm in."[1] Like Lot's wife, whom he applauds for daring to witness the firey destruction of Sodom and Gomorah at the price

[1] *Palm Sunday* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1981), p. 302.

of being turned into a pillar of salt, Vonnegut, too, "because it was so human" looked back at the conflagration of Dresden.[2] Further, he insists that, as in the case of god's destruction of "the cities of the plain," the human destruction of Dresden in all its horror was done in the name of the best of causes: the overcoming of evil.

Looking back Vonnegut raises anew Job's questions: "Why do the innocent suffer?" "Why do the evil prosper?" The answers Job heard finally from out of the whirlwind puzzled him for they explained nothing. God's words implied that a person's goodness does not guarantee that he or she will escape evil nor that he or she is incapable of doing evil. Job's expectation, that evil would not be visited upon a good or an innocent person, was as ill-founded as the modern American belief in the end justifying the means and, therefore, no evil will be committed in a good cause; such as the defeat of Hitler, Japan, or Iraq. Vonnegut demurs suggesting that the destruction of the innocent was as common during the second world war as it was when Job bewailed his fate.

For much of his career as a writer and for half his career as a novelist, Vonnegut wrestled with the attendant Jobian issue of why he personally survived while one hundred-thirty-five thousand people died during the Dresden fire storm in which "the city appeared to boil" (*Palm Sunday*, p. 302). Returning home after being repatriated as a prisoner of war he discovered that although he could share interesting stories of the war and the camaraderie he experienced, again and again he failed to find the right words or theme through which to describe the massacre, its after-math, or its meaning—if any. Unable to accept passively the destruction, he asked the survivor's questions, "Why was I allowed to survive when so many innocent, good people perished?" "How could this terrible destruction have been allowed to happen?" "How could human beings do such awful things to one another?"

In novel after novel Vonnegut tried to deal with these difficult questions either directly or indirectly. In *The Sirens of Titan* (1959), for

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[2] *Slaughterhouse-Five* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1969), p. 19.
All quotations are to this edition, since the various paperback reprints, although more readily available, use different pagination.

example, he probed into history for the answers, but found nothing there but absurdity. In *Mother Night* (1962) he examined the possibility of good collaborating with the forces of evil in order to subvert and ultimately destroy such forces, but concluded that this kind of naivete was no match for a truly powerful evil force, such as Fascism. In *Cat's Cradle* (1963), on the other hand, he explored the possibility of stoic cynicism as an answer to the moral dilemma through his splendid creation of Bokonon and Bokononism.[3] If human beings are so hell-bent on their own destruction, then, suggests *Cat's Cradle*, no one or nothing can stop them, and all the novelist can do is warn against the impending disaster becoming the proverbial canary in a coal mine.

In *God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater* (1965) Vonnegut explored the opposite tact examining the possibility of doing good works as a way of stopping or at least retarding the forces of evil. "Sell all you have and give it to the poor," was Jesus' admonition in the first century, so Eliot Rosewater established his foundation to give away money. When the phone rang he answered: "Rosewater Foundation, how may we help you?" and hoped that money might indeed help the person on the other end of the line. But good works ultimately did not appear to slow evil down. Instead, they actually may have encouraged it to greater extravagances of connivance and fraud. Evil itself wormed its way into the very heart of his good works and so threatened to destroy the Rosewater Foundation itself until Eliot thwarted it by giving away all he had.

When Vonnegut finally came to write directly about surviving the Dresden massacre in *Slaughterhouse-Five* he discovered that dwelling on such massive destruction had a profound impact on the novel's style:

> ". . . I felt the need to say this every time a character died: "So it goes." This exasperated many critics, and it seemed fancy and tiresome to me, too. But it somehow had to be said. It was a clumsy way of saying what Celine managed to imply so much more naturally in everything he wrote, in effect: "Death

[3] Diogenes, the patron saint of cynics, would warmly approve of Bokonon and his view of life as given in the *Books of Bokonon*.

> and suffering can't matter nearly as much as I think they do. Since they are so common, my taking them so seriously must mean that I am insane. I must try to be saner." [4]

The significant achievement of *Slaughterhouse-Five* lies in Vonnegut's discovering artistically—in the novel's form and style—and personally—with his feelings and thoughts—how to deal with commonplace death and suffering. Through his happy invention of the Tralfamadorians he shifts the novel's perspective from a human one, such as that of most of the Book of Job, to God's, such as that found in the conclusion of the Book of Job. When Billy Pilgrim finds himself in the Tralfamadorian zoo he asks the obvious human question: "Why me?" The answer he receives both puzzles and instructs him:

> "That is a very Earthling question to ask, Mr. Pilgrim. Why you? . . . Why anything? Because this moment simply is. . . . Well, here we are, Mr. Pilgrim trapped in . . . this moment. There is no why." (*Slaughterhouse-Five*, p. 66)

Job asked the same question, "Why me?" hundreds of years before Billy beginning in the prologue to the Book of Job when a series of messengers arrive bringing news to Job not of family members being captured by strange beings in a flying saucer, but of horrendous destruction. The first reveals that all of Job's servants have been killed; the second that his sheep have been destroyed by fire from heaven; the third that nomads have carried off his camels and slaughtered his herdsmen; and the fourth brings the worst news of all, that a hurricane suddenly killed all his sons and daughters. Naturally Job is heart-stricken. He rends his clothes, and goes and sits on the village dunghill in deep mourning. As the book proper begins he receives visits from three friends who attempt to comfort

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[4] *Palm Sunday*, p. 296.

him with conventional wisdom arguing that evil occurs to a a person who has done evil.[5]

But Job's tragedy is that he is a good man who although he did no evil nevertheless experienced great loss. Similarly, Dresden was a "good" city—that is, an "open," unarmed civilian city whose architectural beauty was legendary—yet Dresden was destroyed for a good purpose: "to hasten the end of the war" (*Slaughterhouse-Five*, p. 155). One of Job's friends maintains that his innocent sons and daughters were destroyed for a comparable reason: to "teach Job a lesson." (Both Vonnegut and Job suggest that the price paid in innocent deaths is too high.) By the end of the book, Job accepts the imperfection of the world, and his inability to account for the evil in it. As the man of faith he also comes to accept the goodness of his Creator, although that goodness may not always be apparent in the less than perfect world in which he must live. In effect, he states simply: "I believe; help Thou mine unbelief."

Vonnegut, as a rational atheist, derives none of the consolation which Job did from the answers of traditional faith. He can and does find some consolation, however, in accepting an imperfect world where the power to destroy is real and often terrifying, whether the agent be nature or human. Writing "A Letter to the Next Generation" in an "Open Forum" series of ads sponsored by Volkswagen, Vonnegut concludes by giving a lengthy list of natural disasters and saying: "If people think Nature is their friend, then they sure don't need an enemy." In other words, do not look to Nature for moral guidance.

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[5] Job claims, rightly, that he is innocent, god-fearing, and has always done good not evil. The second friend contends that evil occurs because a person neglects to perform certain required ceremonies or religious duties, and if only Job will repent and perform them, all will be well.

But Job says correctly that he has been a model of piety and has left no ceremony unobserved nor any duty unperformed. The third friend then argues that evil never occurs without a reason, and, therefore, if destruction has been visited upon Job then that is ipso facto proof that Job is indeed guilty of something. If he will but "search his heart" to discover his mistake, and repent of it then all will be well. But Job has done no wrong. As Jesus was to say a few centuries later: "The rain falls on the just and the unjust." If a hurricane destroys people or property that is no reason to believe such people were guilty of any wrong-doing.

In a few of his novels however, the power of reason and goodness does prove real and occasionally even wins out over evil. So Eliot Rosewater gives all he has away to frustrate the unscrupulous young lawyer, Norman Mushari, and Malachi Constant in *Sirens of Titan* at long last learns "to love whoever is around to be loved." As a character in one of Bertolt Brecht plays says: "In the worst of times, there are good people." In *Slaughter-house-Five* there may well be a momentary triumph of goodness, but if so it is fleeting and fairly complex: Billy Pilgrim becomes the chief attraction in a zoo on the planet Tralfamadore in another galaxy where he and Montana Wildhack are put on exhibit as interesting specimens of an endangered species. Although their captors have long ago concluded, based upon thousands of years of observation, that the most prominent characteristic of human beings appears to be their ability to self-destruct, these two copulate and produce an off-spring while being held captive in the zoo. Their action illustrates humanity's drive to continue the race which counterbalances its drive to destroy it.[6]

This modest hopefulness is a far cry from the total despair experienced in *Cat's Cradle* by Mona the incredibly beautiful woman of the Sunday supplements who, as the world ends, refuses to make love to Jonah-John because "that's how babies are made," and no sane person would want to have a child as the world ends. But Montana Wildhack and Billy Pilgrim, less worldly-wise and far more childlike, under much less favorable conditions in the Tralfamadorian zoo amidst their Sears Roebuck furnishings, reproduce to the delight and glee of their audience. Perhaps they represent humanity's ultimate function in the universe: to puzzle and delight extra-terrestial on-lookers with the paradox of beings who both reproduce—that is, give life—and destroy themselves—that is, take life—at one and the same time.

Pointing to this human penchant for self-destruction through war and brutality becomes part of Vonnegut's role as a latter-day Jobian messenger who brings the news of the "commonness" of death. To account

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[6] Compare *Deadeye Dick* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1982) where the voice of God announces that the purpose of humanity is "to reproduce. Nothing else really interests Me. All the rest is frippery" (p. 185).

for unmotivated human suffering he looks to the accidental nature of life. Some of this reasoning is already familiar from *The Sirens of Titan* where the Space Traveler maintains that "I was the victim of a series of accidents. ... As are we all." There is an important difference between the novels, however, for in *The Sirens of Titan* the accidents are caused by visitors from Tralfamadore who manipulated all human history for their own ends. Worse, as Salo their messenger, points out, these visitors are not even human beings or sentient creatures, but are machines. In *Slaughterhouse-Five*, on the other hand, there appears no purpose whatsoever in human history nor is anything or anyone in control. Rather than continue to wrestle with the issue of "purpose" or lack of it, Vonnegut replaces the question, "Why me?" with its twin to which there is no answer, "Why not you?" Exactly the same pair of questions were posed in the conclusion of the Book of Job first by Elihu then by God as each asks Job in turn: Why did you expect that your goodness would give you immunity from the effects of evil or from accidents of nature? Human beings do not enjoy such immunity. Good people suffer and bad people suffer—"the rain falls on the just and the unjust." Suffering, by itself, is no measure either of a person's evil—as Job's three friends mistakenly maintain—nor of a person's goodness—as Job had assumed. Suffering simply is a part of this world and all human experience, and as Vonnegut suggests through his choice of epigraph from Martin Luther's Christmas carol "Away in the Manger": suffering is part of the human not the divine condition and no divine force will interveen in human history to modify much less to stop it:

> the little Lord Jesus
> No crying He makes.

Informing Vonnegut's novel, therefore, is what might be called a fairly orthodox form of Judeo-Christian theology which nevertheless has often proven too challenging for some narrow-minded American school boards and other official bodies who, like Job's three friends, hold a simpler, safer view of human beings and their relation to the deity. Such people have many times attempted to ban, censor, or otherwise destroy the novel. Once, at

least, "*Slaughterhouse-Five* was actually burned in a furnace by a school janitor ... on instructions from the school committee."[7] Clearly the members of that committee were attempting to protect the young from the contents of this novel which they believed threatened their view of the world and religion. Vonnegut's book thus takes its place in an honorable company that includes the Book of Job, the Old Testament Prophets, and Jesus's Sermon on the Mount—all of which have at various times threatened the beliefs of those in authority.[8]

Much of the perceived threat stems from the morality central to these works, including *Slaughterhouse-Five*, which challenges orthodoxy by asserting that the terms, "punishment" and "reward" along with the values they embody do not make a lot of sense from the human, but only from the divine perspective. The unnerving implications of such a position are clear: If human beings cannot perceive much less receive rewards or punishments, then why would anyone do good rather than evil? According to the Book of Job and much of Judeo-Christian belief, a good person is simply a person who does good for its own sake rather than out of hope of reward or from fear of punishment. Good people are good rather than evil because that is who and what good people are. When people do good that becomes their reward. Someone who does evil, on the other hand, is simply someone who does evil which in turn becomes its own punishment. (Compare Ralph Waldo Emerson's equally disquieting notion of evil as "merely privative" in his "Divinity School Address.") None of Vonnegut's characters, including those in *Slaughterhouse-Five* is fundamentally evil; rather each is a human being to whom accidents happen. Most are innocent. As Vonnegut's father once astutely observed: "you never wrote a story with a villain in it" (*Slaughterhouse-Five*, p. 7). Billy Pilgrim is neither

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[7] *Palm Sunday*, p. 4; see also pp. 3—17. In a "Dear Friend" letter written to solicit funds for the ACLU (The American Civil Liberties Union), Vonnegut reveals that *Slaughterhouse-Five* is among the ten "most frequently censored [and banned] books" in American public schools and libraries. Others in the top ten include John Steinbeck, *The Grapes of Wrath* and *Of Mice and Men*, Judy Blume, *Forever*, and Mark Twain, *Huckleberry Finn*. "Kurt Vonnegut," undated letter, pp. 2—3.

[8] See for example the prologue to Vonnegut's *Jailbird* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1979), especially pages XVIII—XIX.

John Wayne, riding into the sunset to save Western civilization from the Fascists nor Jesus preaching the necessity of "doing good to those who do evil to you." Instead he is a young soldier in war and a child in peace who illustrates Celine's observation—quoted with approval by Vonnegut in *Slaughterhouse-Five*—that: "When not actually killing, your soldier's a child."

The child is, of course, not morally responsible as an adult would be. Someone else besides the child-soldier must be in charge and that person or persons can be held morally accountable for what happens. Vonnegut extends Celine's identification of soldiers as children through the novel's subtitle *Slaughterhouse-Five or The Children's Crusade* which in turn links the great war to end all wars with one of the most futile, exploitive, cynical events in all of western European history: the Children's Crusade—a crusade that never went anywhere and never accomplished anything, except to provide ample prey for all kinds of human vultures to feed upon. In *Slaughterhouse-Five* the soldiers in World War II, like the children on their crusade, have little or no idea about what they are doing and often do not know even where they are. It was the generals who planned such glorious operations as the destruction of Dresden (see, for example, *Slaughterhouse-Five*, pp. 161-62).[9] The reduction of a monument of human civilization, such as the lovely city on the Elbe, to a pile of rubble overnight or the metamorphosis of hundreds-of-thousands of unarmed people into a "corpse factory" can, and, indeed, has happened in a world where "everything is permitted." In such a world, says Ivan Karamazov in *The Brothers Karamazov*, the issue is not whether to believe in God or not, but the sheer overwhelming horror of the power of evil. Yet, as Eliot Rosewater, who also "found life meaningless, partly because of what [he] ... had seen in war," says to Billy Pilgrim in *Slaughterhouse-Five*: "everything there was to know about life was in *The Brothers Karamazov*. ... 'But that isn't enough any more' . . ." (p. 87). Perhaps all anyone can do is to follow Theodore Roethke's advice, which Vonnegut quotes with approval, to "learn by going

[9] Vonnegut may also be echoing the title of General Dwight D. Eisenhower's famous account of World War II *Crusade in Europe*.

where [we] . . . have to go" (*Slaughterhouse-Five*, p. 18). But what of the child-soldiers who survive the massacre?

> When the Americans and their guards did come out [next noontime after the Dresden fire storm], the sky was black with smoke. The sun was an angry little pinhead. Dresden was like the moon now, nothing but minerals. The stones were hot. Everybody else in the neighborhood was dead. (*Slaughterhouse-Five*, p. 153).

What do you say after a massacre? "Everything is supposed to be very quiet after a massacre, and it always is, except for the birds. And what do the birds say? All there is to say about a massacre, things like "Poo-tee-weet?" (*Slaughterhouse-Five*, p. 17).

If the slaughterhouse itself, from which the novel takes its title, was once a house of death, it became, paradoxically during the inferno of the Dresden fire-bombing, a house of salvation when it gave oxygen to its occupants rather than to the fire storm. Similarly, while Vonnegut's novel is, in part, an account of the worst massacre of unarmed civilians in modern Europe, it is also a plea for a change in values and attitudes which would make other such massacres impossible. One way he accomplishes this mission is by playing the role of the messenger to Job and making the massacre itself public knowledge. The novel thrusts back into living memory in a way that cannot be ignored, a portion of American history which had never officially been acknowledged, and which had been either inadvertently or deliberately concealed. According to Vonnegut in the "twenty-seven-volume *Official History of the Army Air Force in World War Two* . . . there was almost nothing . . . about the Dresden raid, even though it had been such a howling success. The extent of the success had been kept a secret for many years after the war—a secret from the American people" (*Slaughterhouse-Five*, p. 165).

In the pre-*Slaughterhouse-Five* novels, the bitterest satire occurs in another novel of even worse destruction *Cat's Cradle* where the purpose of human beings, to love whoever is around to love, is completely thwarted. On

the day the world ended, the question, "Who is left for me to love?" becomes as meaningless as a bird's call at the end of a massacre, "*Poo-tee-weet*," and in its place is another terrible question: "How can I, in this now empty world, 'find some neat way to die, too'?" (*Cat's Cradle*, p. 190). Vonnegut, so clearly passionate about the sacredness of human life, thus comments trenchantly on human stupidity and folly. His view of humanity, however, culminates—at least in his fiction through *Slaughterhouse-Five*—not in continued bitter reproaches nor in invective and threat, but in the serenity embodied in the Tralfamadorian total view of all time which eventually the hero of the novel, Billy Pilgrim, is able to share.

Like the writer of the Book of Job, Vonnegut affirms the essential goodness of *all* creation: "Everything was beautiful and nothing hurt"—an appropriate Tralfamadorian epitaph for Billy Pilgrim or anyone else able to "come unstuck in time." Critics, such as Tony Tanner, negate this consolation, however, when they ignore or argue away the fantastic premise of the novel which is essential if Billy is to experience then adopt the Tralfamadorian view of time. Tanner asserts that:

> Billy Pilgrim . . . takes refuge in an intense fantasy life, which involves his being captured and sent to a remote planet . . . . He also comes "unstuck in time" and present moments during the war may either give way to an intense re-experiencing of moments from the past or unexpected hallucinations [sic] of life in the future.[10]

Following such critics' reasoning, one might equally well suggest that Gregor Samsa only hallucinates becoming a cockroach in Kafka's "The Metamorphosis." But both Vonnegut's and Kafka's stories are fantastic, rather than realistic and neither hero is bound by the conventions of realistic fiction. Billy does not hallucinate; instead, as Vonnegut tells us repeatedly, he simply, if fantastically, comes unstuck in time and is, therefore, able to move in time forward as well as backward. In other words,

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[10] Tanner, *City of Words: American Fiction, 1950—1970* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1971), p. 195.

he enjoys the nonhuman consolation of seeing time and events as God or as the Tralfamadorians see them: all at once. Equally fantastic is Billy's ability to escape suffering by viewing only those good moments in his life where "nothing hurt."

But besides Billy's non-human perspective Vonnegut offers a more human, less Godlike one through the many references to Reinhold Neibuhr's prayer which Montana Wildhack carries in a locket about her neck. The prayer asks for help in viewing the human situation in light of each person's individual abilities to cope with suffering and loss:

> God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and the wisdom always to tell the difference. (*Slaughterhouse-Five*, p. 181).

Familiar to many Americans as the prayer of Alcoholics Anonymous, Neibuhr's words describe the end point of Vonnegut's moral odyssey through his first six novels as, like Job, he moves from anger through disbelief to rebellion until finally coming to accept what is and what must be.

Such a change in vision comes about through Vonnegut's acceptance in this novel of suffering's central place in human experience—suffering which may be as total as the fire-bombing of Dresden or the atomic bombing of Hiroshima or the destruction of all that Job held dear. Donald Shriver, writing about Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the martyred Lutheran German pastor executed for his part in the plot to assassinate Hitler, describes the value of such acceptance:

> Suffering is the chief equalizer of human experience, and the authority of suffering . . . goes far on the way toward convincing us that there is such a thing as a "human community." Whatever the anthropologists tell us about human differences, a touch of suffering makes the whole world kin.[11]

[11] "Bonhoeffer Remembered," *Union News* (New York: September 1984), p. 2.

Vonnegut thus accepts the mystery of human suffering and the presence of evil in the world for which there is not now nor can there ever be a fully satisfactory human explanation. Like Job before them, characters in Vonnegut's fiction ask, "Why me?" And like Job they hear only an echo, "Why not you?"

By accepting both motivated or unmotivated suffering as integral to human experience Vonnegut becomes free in the novels after *Slaughterhouse-Five* to satirize particular evils in the modern world rather than continuing to wrestle with the question of the nature and power of evil itself. *Galápagos* (1982), his eleventh novel, for example, makes brilliantly, satirically clear what many of his other novels along with a Kilgore Trout short story, "The Planet Gobblers" (*Palm Sunday*, p. 209), had only implied: human beings are a danger to the planet, and if they are not controlled in some way, they will destroy all forms of life.

Slaughterhouse-Five itself, however, reflects William Butler Yeats's belief that: "a poet writes out of his personal life [and] in his finest work out of its tragedy, whatever it be . . . ." Vonnegut writes out of the "tragedy" he personally experienced which raised acutely the profound moral issues with which he has had to wrestle as an adult human being and as a writer. He says that *Slaughterhouse-Five* results from his "duty dance with death" without which, he adds quoting Celine, "no art is possible" (*Slaughterhouse-Five*, p. 18). Perhaps the rigors of this duty dance help account for the difficulties he encountered in writing this novel as well as the relief he experienced in completing it: "I felt," he says, "after I finished *Slaughterhouse-Five* that I didn't have to write at all anymore if I didn't want to. It was the end of some sort of career."[12] After wrestling with some of the most profound and some of the most difficult human questions in *Slaughterhouse-Five*, Vonnegut promised himself: "The next one I write is going to be fun" (*Slaughterhouse-Five*, p.19), which proved true in the wild comedy of *Breakfast of Champions* (1973).

It would be almost twenty years after the completion of *Slaughterhouse-Five* before Vonnegut would return to the Jobian issues raised for him

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[12] *Wampeters, Foma & Granfaloons* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1976), p. 280.

by World War II, and in *Bluebeard* (1987) present a picture of the end of the war in Europe as a field crowded with people: the lunatics, the refugees, the war prisoners, the concentration camp victims—all the ragged remnants of an exhausted world, but more important: all survivors. These are living human beings, rather than the stacked corpses of the Hospital of Hope and Mercy in *Cat's Cradle* or the "corpse mine" found in the desolate Dresden landscape of *Slaughterhouse-Five*. But *Bluebeard* with its happy ending in praise of human creativity and community will appear only two decades later.[13]

In *Slaughterhouse-Five* Vonnegut as the Jobian messenger having looked into the depths of the fire storm brings news of the disaster together with an incisive examination of the profound moral, social, and theological issues it raises—issues which will remain central to all human experience: the question of the power of evil, the awareness of inhuman destruction, and the omnipresence of human suffering. Like the author of the Book of Job, he parries the most human of all questions "Why me?" with the unanswerable assertion "Why not you?" Like the editor of the Book of Job who hundreds of years after the book's composition tacked on the happy ending in which Job receives everything he lost back and more—except for his children—Vonnegut, too, adds the Tralfamadorian affirmation about all life in whatever form: "Everything was beautiful and nothing hurt." A most fitting epitaph for Billy Pilgrim who "alone . . . escaped to tell you."

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[13] See my forthcoming essay, "'O Happy Meat': Joy and Acceptance in Kurt Vonnegut's *Galápagos* and *Bluebeard*."

ANDRÁS TARNÓC

THE POLITICS OF A CAST-IRON MAN
JOHN C. CALHOUN AND HIS VIEWS ON GOVERNMENT

I.

In 1763 Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon began working on the geographic description of the Eastern Seaboard of the North American Continent. One result of their five year project outlined the Pennsylvania-Maryland border.[1] The line bearing their name turned out to be more than an innocuous boundary. It divided the Atlantic Seaboard in two distinct sections setting the course for centuries of separate social, economic, political and cultural development. While commerce and industry flourished in the North, the South was more suitable for agriculture.

Dixie's semi-tropical climate favored cultivation of such exotic harvest items as tobacco, sugar, cotton and rice. Tobacco production tended to exhaust the soil and left no room to grow wheat, corn and other staples. Since European countries, especially England provided the best markets for American tobacco, prospective planters sought out vast territories near rivers with oceanic access. The need for large scale production and proximity of transatlantic shipping gave rise to a unique economic entity, the Southern plantation.[2]

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[1] Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Americans: The National Experience* (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), p. 161.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 170.

The South's plantation based economy demanded a captive labor force leading to a burgeoning slave trade. A different economy contributed to the evolution of an unprecedented mindset, paving the way for the gentleman plantation owner's entry into American mythology. According to Boorstin, the South became an "island within the United States", a land part myth, part fact. Despite evidence to the contrary Southerners fervently believed in the area's cultural, political homogeneity and social harmony.[3]

While the plantation gentry saw only one South,[4] the "peculiar institution" of slavery led to profound political differences that eventually shattered the myth and deposited the "Southern gentleman" on history's dust-heap. The subject of this essay is such a gentleman planter whose political career and personality development acutely reflected the crisis of conscience of the Pre-Civil War South.

John Caldwell Calhoun was born on March 18, 1782 in Abbeville, South Carolina.[5] He was named after his maternal uncle who gave his life in the Revolutionary War. John's father, Patrick was an Irish immigrant who settled in Western Pennsylvania in 1733. Harassed by constant Indian attacks he moved southward, eventually reaching Long Canes Creek of the Carolina country in 1756. Patrick fought the British and hostile natives alike to keep the family farm. In 1769 he ran in a local election championing the cause of the backcountry gentry against encroachment by Charleston's planter aristocracy. Having been elected to the provincial assembly he became the voice of middle-class plantation owners throughout the state. Patrick's fiery individualism and political ingenuity were passed on to John, one of his five children.

Although John grew up on his father's farm, he was not formally taught until the age of thirteen. In 1795 he was enrolled in his paternal uncle's boys' academy. In the school's strict, disciplined atmosphere he discovered the joy of learning and the pleasure of reading. Patrick Calhoun's death in 1796 interrupted John's promising academic career, making him

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[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] Merill D. Peterson, *The Great Triumvirate* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 18.

return to the family estate. In the next five years the young Calhoun became an accomplished farmer and avid planter. At his family's urging he resumed his studies, returning to Moses Waddel's boys' school. In 1804 he graduated from Yale University. Having obtained a Bachelor's Degree he read law in Litchfield, Connecticut and Charleston, South Carolina.

In 1807 he returned to Abbeville to open a law office and run the family farm. In the same year seething British-American hostilities exploded in the so-called Chesapeake Affair. A British frigate attacked an American merchant vessel, named the Chesapeake, in order to prevent U. S. ships from supplying Napoleon's Europe. London's blatant aggression and the loss of American lives aroused waves of frenetic national resentment. Calhoun's impassionate speech commemorating the event earned him his father's seat in the South Carolina Assembly, paving the way for his ascent in the national legislature.

John C. Calhoun entered the national political spotlight as an avid supporter of the second war against Britain, the War of 1812. He started in the House of Representatives' Foreign Relations Committee working his way up to majority floor leader. In 1817 he joined President James Monroe's cabinet as Secretary of War. In 1825 he became John Quincy Adams' Vice-President and remained in the same capacity during Andrew Jackson's first term. Seven years later he resigned citing irreconcilable political and personal differences. In 1833 he was elected to the Senate and with the exception of a brief interval as President Tyler's Secretary of State, he served in the upper house until his death. He left a formidable legislative and intellectual legacy. This essay will examine the main components of his political philosophy: the nullification principle, the Calhounian democracy and an unapologetic defense of slavery.

II.

The Theory of Nullification

Although the American colonies declared independence in 1776 and the Peace of Paris codified the existence of the United States, the nation

building process had not begun in earnest until the early 1800s. The War of 1812, or America's second war of independence, generated outbursts of patriotism unseen since the Revolution. The Treaty of Ghent confirmed America's economic autonomy and removed the obstacles from the development of efficient liberal capitalism. The nation's revival depended on the creation of banking and transportation networks and the implementation of protectionist policies. The expiration of the First National Bank's charter caused financial difficulties, cheap British imports threatened domestic industry and a chronic lack of adequate roadways hindered interstate commerce.[6]

Calhoun began his congressional career as an enthusiastic supporter of economic and political unity.[7] He felt that the spirit of nationalism would greatly benefit the South, eventually leading it to domination of the Union. In order to stem the onslaught of low-priced British goods Congress passed the Tariff of 1816. This measure was the first piece of protective legislation in American history. It imposed an almost fifty percent tax on foreign wool, cotton, iron, paper, leather and sugar. Most Southern Congressmen, fearing increased costs of imported goods for their constituents, voted against the bill. Calhoun, on the other hand, enthusiastically supported the Tariff, hoping the law would promote manufacturing below the Mason-Dixon Line.

The Depression of 1819 shook postwar economic optimism, placing an additional burden on planters. The Tariff caused a drop in cotton prices making imported, mostly English goods unaffordable. Planter associations such as the Virginia Agricultural Society actively lobbied against the measure, branding it "an unequal tax that awarded exclusive privileges to oppressive monopolies and aimed to grind Southern farmers and their children into dust and ashes".[8]

Meanwhile Calhoun's nationalistic fervor gradually subsided giving way to sectionalist thoughts. As a Southern cotton grower he sought a way

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[6] George Brown Tindall and David E. Shi, *America* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984), p. 231.

[7] Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), p. 91.

[8] Mary Beth Norton et al., *A People and the Nation* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), p. 231.

to abolish the Tariff and preserve the fragile intersectional balance. He continued to serve as Andrew Jackson's Vice-President, but the passage of the 1828 Tariff made him reveal his true colors. He registered his grievances in a seminal essay, titled "The South Carolina Exposition and Protest".

Written anonymously, the Exposition reinforced the idea of states' rights and its progeny, the nullification principle. States' rightists argued that the United States Constitution was based on a political contract between the states and the federal government. This was contrary to the accepted view that derived the power of the national administration from the people. The state compact theory of government was first expressed by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison's "Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions". Responding to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, the authors condemned the Adams administration's suppression of civil liberties and emphasized a state's power to decide the constitutionality of the legislative branch's actions.[9]

Calhoun, seeking a way to preserve the Union and protect Southern interests, went beyond the Resolutions. He proposed a state convention for the purpose of adjudicating federal statutes. If an act of Congress was declared unconstitutional, a state had the power to pronounce it "null and void" and prevent its enforcement. The national administration could respond either by acceptance or by calling a constitutional convention. Should a three-fourths majority overrule a nullification proclamation, a state could have two options: acquiescence or secession.[10]

Calhoun viewed secession as the last possibility and felt his concept would in fact keep the Union intact. The nullification theory distinguished between two powers: constitution and law making authorities, leaving little doubt about the indentity of each. The author considered the South's code writing ability the only guarantee against Northern tyranny and its dire consequence, the break up of the United States.[11]

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[9] George Brown Tindall and David E. Shi, *America* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984), p. 200.

[10] Alfred H. Kelly et al., *The American Constitution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 215.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 215.

The Exposition became one of the most controversial political documents of its time. Senator Daniel Webster of Massachusetts impassionately declared that one state's ability to overturn a federal law could relegate the Union into a "rope of sand".[12] Calhoun also fell out of favor in Washington as Andrew Jackson selected a new running mate for the upcoming election.

Although Jackson shrewdly lowered tariff rates to cool nullificationist tempers, such Southern staples as cotton, wool and iron carried a fifty percent extra charge. In 1832 South Carolina called a convention to debate the constitutionality of the Tariffs of 1828 and 1832. The assembly issued the South Carolina Ordinance deeming both measures illegal and banning their collection effective February 1, 1833.

Dashing Charleston's hopes of a regional alliance, no other state joined the nullification drive. Georgia rejected it as "rash and revolutionary" and Alabama branded Calhoun's ideas "unsound and dangerous". Despite Jackson's private threats against Calhoun's life, the administration's response was relatively moderate.[13]

A presidential decree called on South Carolinians to disobey the state's misguided leaders and warned that any opposition to federal tax collection amounted to treason. When the Commander in Chief sent government troops to Charleston Harbor, South Carolina began to organize her defense. Fifty-six years after its inception the nation stood on the brink of civil war.

Having resigned from the Vice-Presidency Calhoun openly championed the nullificationist cause in the Senate. His motivation was threefold: after losing the President's confidence he had no other avenues for advancement, by taking the helm of the movement he hoped to prevent South Carolina's secession and he felt nullification was the only constitutional method of keeping the South in the Union and protecting it from Northern dominance.

Calhoun, along with Henry Clay of Kentucky, introduced a compromise tariff calling for a gradual reduction of import duties to twenty

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[12] George Brown Tindall and David E. Shi, *America* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984), p. 258.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 261.

percent by 1842. Although South Carolina preferred even lower rates, Charleston withdrew the nullification ordinance. When the legislative stalemate was broken, the South declared victory and hailed Calhoun as the nation's savior.[14]

John C. Calhoun's political socialization process was instrumental in the formation of the nullification theory. Political socialization, an individual's preparation for participation in a given political culture, can be studied from several vantage points.

According to David Easton and Jack Dennis' systems' concept, political orientation develops in a generational framework. Politically socialized persons offer two types of support to their government: specific and diffuse allegiance. Specific support is given in return to a government's ability to satisfy one's economic and political needs. Diffuse support, on the other hand, is independent of private conviction. It is based on general loyalty to a nation.[15]

Calhoun extended specific support to his state and region. As a slave holder and plantation owner he could have realized his material goals exclusively below the Mason-Dixon Line. While he was immensely dissatisfied with the Union, he fervently fought for its integrity, offering diffuse support to the Constitution and to the United States.

Political socialization is based on the work of primary and secondary agents. The former group includes family background, school experiences, and peer relations.[16]

Patrick Calhoun played a dominant role in shaping his son's political philosophy. He was an Irish immigrant brought up in the Manichean perspective of Calvinistic Presbyterianism. He viewed life as a continuous battle of good against evil, limiting himself to a perpetually dualist mindset. He was never without enemies to fight or burdens to bear. The Western frontier with its constant Indian attacks and obligatory natural disasters

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[14] Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), p. 94.

[15] Fred R. Harris, *America's Democracy* (Glenview: Scott-Foresman Co., 1986), p. 183.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 184.

ominously resembled Hobbes' world.[17] He escaped this "nasty, brutish and short" existence by moving to the South. After the French and Indian War he answered the call of civic duty to fight for the plantation gentry's political equality. Patrick Calhoun was also a slave master, an inveterate states' rightist and a bitter opponent of the Constitution. He stubbornly believed in a Jeffersonian limited government with its emphasis on individual freedom.

John C. Calhoun's family heritage included the self-reliance of a fierce pioneer, a habitual mistrust of government, a Manichean world view and an unshakeable belief in republicanism.

Patrick's legacy was evident in the nullification theory. Nullification was an extreme offspring of republicanism, the idea that government is based on the consent of the governed. The notion of a state's power to abolish a federal law adverse to its economic or political interests, was not only a radical interpretation of the social contract, but a reinforcement of the covenant theory of government. A Manichean perspective was apparent in John's regard of the South as a positive actor fighting a heroic battle against the undemocratic North. Although the elder Calhoun fought in the Revolutionary War, he rejected the Constitution as a blueprint of tyranny. John—like his father—believed in the Union, but saw the repository of popular sovereignty in the states, not in the people.

According to Merelman, one's level of political participation is proportional to the degree of egalitarianism he experienced as a child. Consequently, the more children get involved in family decision making, the more they value the power of the vote. Calhoun seems to be an exception, for he grew up in an extremely undemocratic environment. He was not only excluded from the inner circle of family government, but was denied education opportunities until the age of thirteen. Merelman's theory points toward an apolitical adult but Calhoun as an outstanding statesman and political scientist rejects the mold.[18]

Calhoun's political philosophy was considerably influenced by his school experiences. He started his educational career in the South. In the

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[17] Kenneth M. Dolbeare, *American Political Thought* (New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1981), p. 17.

[18] Fred R. Harris, *America's Democracy* (Glenview: Scott-Foresman Co., 1986), p. 185.

austere circumstances of Waddel's academy he got acquainted with the classics. Despite his youth and relative inexperience Calhoun became a voracious reader eagerly consuming such tomes as Rollin's *Ancient History*, Robertson's *Charles V*, Voltaire's *Charles XII* and Locke's *Treatises on Understanding*.[19]

Waddel's combination of intellectual endeavor and physical activity followed the classic Greco-Roman ideal leading John to submerge in the beauty of Homer while fending for himself in the surrounding woods. Calhoun's paragon of a warrior-statesman, a person of exceptional intellect and physique, became unattainable for his health failed under the rigorous pace of study.[20]

Although he furthered his education in the North, he chose one of the more conservative institutions, Yale. Calhoun's early years laid the foundation of a conventionalist mindset. What followed was simply another step in the execution of a master plan.

Having taken Timothy Dwight's class on ethics he eagerly accepted the university president's traditionalist view of God and man's place in society. Furthermore John seemed to have made a definite career choice demonstrated by the title of his commencement address: "The qualifications necessary to constitute a perfect statesman".[21]

He left Yale with reinforced conservative convictions and a burning desire to become a politician. He fulfilled the last requirement, possession of a law degree, by attending law schools both in the North and the South.

Calhoun the politician was undoubtedly the product of his childhood and student years. He was influenced by the institutions he attended and by his classmates and his professors.

According to Harris, secondary factors also play a significant role in the formation of one's political opinion. Group identity, social setting, class status, occupation, age, gender, race and religion belong to this category.[22]

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[19] Merill D. Peterson, *The Great Triumvirate* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 20.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[22] Fred R. Harris, *America's Democracy* (Glenview: Scott-Foresman Co., 1986), p. 183.

Calhoun was a member of a greater group, the South. As a plantation owner and slave holder he worked out a theory to ensure the survival of the region's social hierarchy. The Exposition was written by both a planter and a lawyer. Nullification favored the cash strapped gentry and the principle itself was uniquely deduced from the Constitution and from early works of the states' rights school. Calhoun's social standing, race and gender predetermined his political philosophy contributing to the development of an elitist and reactionary perspective. While he was given a strict Presbyterian upbringing, he belonged to no organized church as an adult. His view of the North as an evil entity aiming to destroy the innocent South was attributable to the dualist outlook of Calvinism.

The foundations of the nullification theory entailed Calhoun's political socialization, his interpretation of the Constitution and early Jeffersonian-Madisonian ideals. John C. Calhoun represented the frustration and anxiety of Southern planters over the region's gradual isolation. The Exposition was the brainchild of a remarkably prescient man understanding that opposing political and economic viewpoints within one country would eventually lead to a national catastrophe.

John C. Calhoun started his legislative career as a supporter of economic nationalism, but threats to his region's financial well-being compelled him to entertain sectionalist thoughts. While "The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions" provided a logical point of departure, his derivation of the nullification principle from the Constitution begs further analysis.

Article VI of the United States Constitution contains the so-called Supremacy Clause, declaring: "This Constitution and the Laws of the United States … shall be the supreme law of the land". Article I, Section 8 enumerating the powers of Congress, asserts that the latter has authority "to collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises to provide for the common welfare".

Consequently issuance of tariffs fell within the authority of Congress and South Carolina had no legal basis to overturn the import taxes of 1828 and 1832. Nevertheless, two other arguments remain. According to the Tenth Amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states

respectively". One could contend that the Constitution's omission of nullification automatically placed it among the reserved powers. This line of reasoning is fallacious, akin to basing God's existence on our inability to prove otherwise. Furthermore, Calhoun could have shown that the tariff's salutary effects in the North and damaging consequences in the South unconstitutionally benefited one region over an other.

He, however, proposed a concept that in fact violated one of the fundamental principles of the Constitution, the doctrine of separation of powers. Although not expressed in the document, Chief Justice John Marshall assigned the power of judicial review, in other words deciding whether an act of government is constitutional or not, exclusively to the court system.[23] Thus nullification usurped the authority of the third component of American government, the judicial branch.

While most historians condemned Calhoun for putting forth a divisive and "inherently disunionist" concept, Kelly found the author's intent praiseworthy. In his view nullification was only a different expression of Calhoun's nationalism, since the theory's main goal was to keep the South in the Union.[24] Regardless of original intent and his efforts in working out a compromise, after 1833 only one John C. Calhoun existed in the national psyche; a dogmatic sectionalist ready to defend the South to the bitter end.

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[23] Geoffrey R. Stone et al., *Constitutional Law* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1986), p. 27.

[24] Alfred H. Kelly et al., *The American Constitution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 216.

The Calhounian Democracy

In 1845 John C. Calhoun published his political ars poetica, titled "A Disquisition on Government". The Disquisition was a systematic inquiry into the nature of government and the political process. In the essay the author pondered several questions offering his point of view on the "Republican Dilemma", the quandary of contending interests within a democracy.[25]

Calhoun posits man at the foundation of all political structures. He recognizes that human beings live in the crossfire of direct and indirect effects. The former is felt by man himself, the latter impacts him through the experiences of others. Direct effects evoke individual feelings, indirect influences elicit societal or sympathetic emotions. Since individual feelings are stronger than societal motivations, a community must harness the former and nurture the latter. Man is born as a social being, associates with his own kind and always orients himself toward fellow humans. Since only the framework of society can provide the means for man's ascent from the animal kingdom, the former has to be formed.

While man organizes society to ensure the preservation of the race, governments secure societies' existence. Society's function to provide the means and conditions for individual personal development cannot be carried out without law and order.

Calhoun recognizes man's dual nature: the social animal and mysanthropic monster. Human beings operate in the confluence of opposing inner drives and governments are necessary to keep hostile instincts in check. But government is made up by men and if individual feelings remain unchecked, personal motives will set public policy eventually leading to tyranny.

Constitution, or limits on the power of government, offer protection against the development of a dictatorship. While man is predetermined to have some form of government, a constitution is not a spontaneous outcome of the human condition. Calhoun understands the complex nature of democracy as he writes: "the foundation of a perfect constitution that would

[25] Kenneth M. Dolbeare, *American Political Thought* (New Jersey: Chatham House, 1981), p. 271.

completely counteract the tendency of government to oppression and abuse has thus far exceeded human wisdom and possibly ever will".[26]

Constitutions are based on suffrage, the power of the vote. Voting leads to popular sovereignty, making the ruler responsible to the ruled. Since the power of the ballot box effects a transfer of authority, removing it from the leaders and depositing it with the people, suffrage provides a guarantee against tyranny.

While voting leads to popular sovereignty, by itself it is insufficient to stop tyranny. It has an other, less beneficial effect. Voting can unleash a fierce struggle for the control of government and divide society in two antagonistic parts, a majority and a minority.

The hostilities between these two groups are based on a lack of equality. Each society produces a section that possesses a greater portion of the wealth and influence. Governmental policies, such as taxation, not only promote but institutionalize inequality. Tax collection creates two classes: tax consumers enjoying the fruit of tax payers' labor and tax producers financing public policies.

Elections yield two types of political preponderance: numerical and concurrent majorities. A numerical, or absolute majority emerges solely through voting results. The whole community is viewed as one and suffrage is equated with unanimous consent. When government is dominated by such a group that is representative of all competing interests, a concurrent, or constitutional majority is formed.

A constitutional democracy has two requirements: presence of a concurrent majority and the separation of powers. The numerical majority is not the true representative of the people, it is only a reflection of one section of the popular will. The concurrent majority acts as a counterbalance against absolute majorities. A constitutional government is based on a negative power, the people's ability to resist abuse of authority. Examples of negative power include the Roman tribunal system, the British parliamentary structure and the threepronged plan of the federal administration.

Calhoun, however, found neither of these sufficient to maintain American democracy. He created a new bulwark for constitutional

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[26] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

government, tailor-made to the current political situation. The identity of the latest safeguard was revealed in the Disquisition's companion essay, titled "A Discourse on the Constitution".[27]

Recognizing that antagonistic sectional interests might eventually drive the Union apart, Calhoun designed a system of dual executives as a barrier against centrifugal influences. Just as man lives in the vortex of conflicting emotions, society is the product of competing forces too. Positive force is exerted in the form of governmental action such as law making. The embodiment of negative power is the popular veto. Constitutional democracies are based on the equilibrium of positive and negative forces. Since the guiding principles of the Constitution could not ensure this balance and protect the South from Northern domination, a new line of defense was needed. Each section had to have a president with mutual veto power.

Calhoun, similarly to the Founding Fathers expressed a pessimistic view of humanity and contemplated the "Republican Dilemma". Sixty years prior to Calhoun James Madison published his seminal analysis of democracy, "Federalist No. 10". Written in support of ratification of the Constitution the essay recognized democracy's fundamental weakness, its tendency to turn into a "tyranny of the majority".

Since in a democratic society public policy is based on interest group competition, a ruling faction might emerge violating minority concerns. In addition to a strong central government and a political system based on separation of powers, Madison proposed a "Republican Remedy". The political arena should be expanded to allow equal participation for all competing interests. The higher the number of factions, the lesser the likelihood of a tyrannical majority.[28]

Calhoun came to a different conclusion. After examining the question of balancing the result of political participation with community

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[27] Merill D. Peterson, *The Great Triumvirate* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 413.

[28] Kenneth M. Dolbeare, *American Political Thought* (New Jersey: Chatham House, 1981), p. 271.

interests, he rejected pluralism's guarantee and recommended a bisectional government.

The Disquisition also expounded on the subject of liberty and equality. While he was familiar with the giants of the Enlightenment, his notion of freedom and fairness contradicted the Jeffersonian ideal.

The Declaration of Independence reaffirmed the trinity of natural rights; privileges human beings possess by birth. It pronounced equality in the eye of the law and promoted such general prerogatives as one's right to life, liberty and acquisition of property.

For Calhoun, liberty was not a right but a reward to be earned. He rejected the concept that based freedom on equality. The moving force behind progress was inequality. Humans were born with different skills and abilities and they had to realize their full potential without governmental constraints.

He rejected social engineering attempts with an acid tongue: "to force the front rank (of society) back to the rear or to attempt to push forward the rear into line with the front with the interposition of government, ... would effectually arrest the march of progress".[29]

Easton and Dennis' model can be applied to Calhoun's theory of democracy. Both specific and diffuse support are present. He offers the former to the South, the embodiment of constitutional majority. Calhoun feels the ideal society exists below the Mason-Dixon Line, not in the tension infested North. The concept of dual executives and its apparent purpose of keeping the South in the Union, is evidence of Calhoun's diffuse allegiance to the United States.

His views on democracy are based on the work of political socialization's primary agents: the family, school experiences, and peer relations. Calhoun's dualist perception of the political process can be attributed to his father's Manichean mindset and the dominant religion of his childhood, Calvinistic Presbyterianism. John's respect of parliamentarism and the institutions of democracy originate in Patrick Calhoun's legislative activity. According to Hofstadter, the concurrent majority

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[29] *Ibid.*, p. 282.

principle was in effect in South Carolina, dividing state law making powers between "upcountry farmers and seaboard planters".[30]

Moses Waddel's academy and subsequent studies at Yale familiarized him with the works of prominent political theorists ranging from Plato to Adams. The influence of Timothy Dwight, Yale's president, was instrumental in the young Calhoun's personal and political development. His prediction of John reaching the Presidency, not only steered the latter toward a public career but the dual executive system indicated Calhoun's desire for the highest office. Calhoun's choice of educational institutions reflected an appreciation of rigorous discipline and challenging curriculum. Since he became an outstanding student on his own, he grew up to value individualism and forged a personal philosophy of self-reliance.

The results of his Presbyterian upbringing and arduous education were unbending mental toughness coupled with extreme moralistic purity. He did not believe in a "golden mean", becoming an incarnation of "Doric simplicity"[31] and stubborn rigidity. He learned to value principle over emotion and esteem probity over humanity.

Calhoun's view of democracy can be attributed to secondary factors of political socialization as well. His class status as a prosperous planter along with racial and regional determinants led him to protect the interests of his own group. The 1830's and 40's were the time of increasing social and political tensions marking the dawn of the abolition movement. As the South became gradually isolated, Northern anti-slavery forces threatened Dixie's governmental and economic stability.

Since the United States government was the embodiment of absolute majority, Southern concurrent majority needed protection from the abolitionist spirit of the federal administration. A Southern president equipped with national veto power over the actions of his Northern counterpart offered the best defense.

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[30] Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Traditon.*(New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), p. 112.

[31] Merill D. Peterson, *The Great Triumvirate* (New York:Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 27.

The fact that Calhoun was trained as a lawyer should not be overlooked. His legal education not only imparted formidable reasoning skills, but implanted a steady reverence of the Constitution. Calhoun recognized the dangers of sectional polarization and proposed a solution within the legal system.

Calhoun's pessimistic conservatism was based on the work of several thinkers including Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Hobbes, John Adams and Francis Lieber.

In the "Republic", Plato described man as a tyranny prone creature infested with greed and jealousy. He also described a dual political system warning: "Any ordinary city is in fact two cities, one the city of the poor, the other of the rich, each at war with the other—you would make a great mistake if you treated them as single states".[32]

Aristotle rejected equality as a foundation of democracy and proposed a constitutional government as a buffer against tyranny.[33]

Calhoun repudiated the spirit of the Declaration of Independence and discarded its original premise, the state of nature. Declaring "there was no such thing as a natural state where man was born equal and free"[34] he distinguished between the natural and political state. Since man was not born free and equal, the egalitarian natural state never existed. Man's dual nature places him in the political state where governmental interference keeps his opposing emotions under control.

Calhoun's rejection of the natural state placed him a step beyond Augustine and Thomas Hobbes, both well-known critics of this idea. Augustine asserted man's capability of understanding natural laws, thus abiding by them. Human self-indulgence and moral frailty however, necessitated the development of the political state. Hobbes deemed the

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[32] Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1926), p. 20.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 89.
[34] Kenneth M. Dolbeare, *American Political Thought* (New Jersey: Chatham House, 1981), p. 282.

natural state "an egalitarian utopia" and based its failure on man's fear of death.[35]

John C. Calhoun proved to be an astute reader of John Adams. The second president of the United States viewed humans as selfish creatures preferring individual goals to the common weal. Adams' society was based on the balance of orders, the equalizing ability of opposite classes. He realized that inequality was an innate human condition to be expressed in the nation's political structure. He recognized the threat of an oppressive majority and outlined the division of governmental powers and a strong executive veto for protection.[36]

Calhoun not only shared Adam's pessimistic view of humanity, but regarded the balance of orders or the neutralizing effects of bipolar powers as the foundation of democracy. Both writers emphasized property rights as a basis of social order and condemned encroachment on the former for leading to the greatest evil, anarchy.

Calhoun's restricted view of liberty originated in his friend Francis Lieber's writings. Lieber distinguished between Anglican and Gallican liberty basing the former on natural laws, the latter on the right to vote and on majority rule. Calhoun rejected the Gallican version for its tendency to lead to tyranny.[37]

In the final analysis, Calhoun's political philosophy suffers from the fallacy of false choice. While he viewed the North and South as principal elements of the national agenda, he ignored the West, a region which was on the verge of country-wide prominence. Neither politics, nor human relationships could be expressed as binary propositions.

His system of dual executives not only promoted sectionalism but institutionalized political fragmentation. Two executives with mutual veto powers were tantamount to political deadlock and governmental paralysis.

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[35] John Locke, *Értekezés a Polgári Kormányzat Igazi Eredetéről, Hatásköréről és Céljairól* (Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó, 1986), p. 11.

[36] Kenneth M. Dolbeare, *American Political Thought* (New Jersey: Chatham House, 1981), p. 64.

[37] Merill. D. Peterson, *The Great Triumvirate* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 410.

Calhoun's recognition of sectionalism's dire consequences were certainly praiseworthy, but his remedy, an unwavering reverence of the Founding Document notwithstanding, was unconstitutional. The Constitution expressly provided for one chief executive only. Two presidents would not only have lead to a division of national powers, but following the first citizen's responsibility of Commander in Chief, two armed forces as well.

Calhoun's political theory was his answer to the "Republican Dilemma". While he recognized democracy's innate shortcomings, he placed the solution on the wrong premise. The American South with its racial, economic, and political stratification fell far below the standards of democracy.

Blinded by sectionalist zeal, the author committed such errors in reasoning as the fallacy of the slippery slope. In Calhoun's democracy, liberty was assigned to its own sphere and any expansion beyond a predetermined boundary would have led to anarchy. It was typical of the author to predict the gravest consequences of given actions, disregarding options in-between.

John C. Calhoun's theory of democracy contained a small number of positive elements. The writer displayed a thorough if misguided appreciation of the Constitution and employed the tools of democracy in his line of defense against tyranny, leading to a new understanding of the role interest groups play in the democratic process.

Whereas Calhoun regarded himself to be a champion of democracy, he hated the expression and always referred to himself as a republican.[38] His notoriously dualist perspective and obstinate conservatism forged a rigid, merciless personal philosophy and a political creed, that described by Hofstadter's words, "made him a minority spokesman in a democracy, a particularist in the age of nationalism, a slave holder in an age of advancing liberties and an agrarian in a furiously capitalistic country".[39]

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[38] *Ibid.*, p. 338.

[39] Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), p. 117.

Calhoun and "the peculiar institution"

No effort of analyzing Calhoun's intellectual and political legacy would be complete without a look at his opinion on slavery. The issue of slavery had been one of the most divisive elements of American public discourse. During the 1830's this Southern arrangement came under heavy fire from Northern abolitionists. One of the most enthusiastic leaders of the anti-slavery movement was William Lloyd Garrison, a newspaperman and publicist. He established a journal entitled "The Liberator". The publication became the abolition movement's mouthpiece, spreading Garrison's radical message all over the country.

When the magazine found its way to the South, Dixie became frightened. Southern fears reached record heights in 1831 following the aborted Nat Turner slave rebellion. The whole region was abound with rumors concerning Northern complicity and Garrison's paper was singled out as a prime instigator.[40]

As a response to an apparent threat to the Southern "lifestyle", a bizarre school of thought developed with an express aim of defending slavery. One of the notable representatives of the pro-slavery movement was Thomas R. Dew.

Dew based his defense on the idea that slaves and their masters could not be separated. Since abolition was only possible through removal of blacks from America and Southern finances made cost of transportation prohibitive, furthermore because negroes were "unfit for freedom", slavery became a "necessary condition".

Slaves were considered to be "indelible immigrants", unable to assimilate into mainstream America. Slavery as an immigration dilemma gave rise to institutionalized separation within the region, contributing to the emergence of America's first ghettoes.[41]

Dew discarded emancipation arguing the skin color of slaves would be an eternal reminder of their servitude. His words speak for themselves:

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[40] George Brown Tindall and David E. Shi, *America* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984) p. 366.

[41] Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Americans. The National Experience.*(New York: Vintage Books, 1965), p. 188.

"The slave of Italy and France could be emancipated and soon all records of his former state would perish, but unfortunately the emancipated black carries a mark which no time can erase, he forever wears the mark of his inferior condition, the Ethiopian cannot change his skin, nor the leopard his spots".[42]

Calhoun's argument was placed on economic foundations as well. Accepting Dew's interpretation of slavery within an American context (immigration), he viewed the "peculiar institution" as the underpinning of economic prosperity and political stability. In his estimation labor relations in the North were a form of wage slavery. Northern working conditions were more detrimental, for the factory extracted the employees' last drop of blood cruelly ignoring them in their later years. Southern slavery however, ensured a life time of care for black laborers, due to the owners' concern to protect their investment. Slavery represented the best relationship possible between master and servant. Since negroes were classified as property, planters had a financial stake in their humane and compassionate treatment.[43]

Calhoun recognized that history moved forward as a result of social strife. A forerunner to Marx, he pointed out the antagonistic relationship between the ruler and the ruled. He distinguished between two classes, capitalists and operatives which would inevitably end up in a historic clash. Calhoun realized capital's tendency to destroy the instruments of labor leaving no alternative to workers but a violent uprising.

Southern society represented a counterbalance against worrisome Northern political tensions. In the South, a lack of antagonistic labor relationships coupled with an increased sense of community contributed to social and economic harmony. Calhoun viewed the South Atlantic Region as a totality of plantation communities where master and slave worked for a common purpose.[44]

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[42] *Ibid.*, p. 190.

[43] Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), p. 103.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

A Southern planter-Northern capitalist alliance could have forestalled the oncoming revolution. Since abolition struck at the heart of Southern stability—a guarantor of the Union's precarious existence—slavery assumed a familiar role: a savior of the nation.

Although Calhoun recognized the importance of class struggle and the notion of permanent exploitation, his thought process was not based on personal identification with the oppressed. His chief motivation was protection of the survival of Southern slavery. Hofstadter called him "the Marx of the master class",[45] a historical oxymoron, a sort of "elitist Marxist" starting from the opposite direction but producing the same result.

Calhoun spared no effort to prove that slavery was the best of all possible worlds. He cited census figures showing a higher ratio of mental and physical deficiency among people of the North. In 1837 he declared in the Senate that slavery "was, instead of and evil, a good—a positive good".[46]

When the country's territorial growth exacerbated sectional tensions and the admission of new states threatened the fragile balance between slavery and freedom, Calhoun's reaction was archetypal of Southern intransigence.

After Mexico recognized the independent state of Texas, a new dilemma arose concerning the latter's admission in the Union. Calhoun lobbied for Congress' authority to establish slavery in Texas. He put his argument in a geopolitical context.

In 1843, as Secretary of State in the Tyler administration, Calhoun completed a treaty outlining Texas' annexation. Wary of British abolitionist influence in the territory Calhoun wrote a letter to the English minister, Sir Richard Pakenham. Calhoun warned that abolition in Texas would jeopardize slavery in the South, destroy the United States and destabilize the Western Hemisphere. After the Pakenham letter was revealed in the Senate Calhoun's treaty went down in defeat.[47]

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[45] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 103.

[47] Merill D. Peterson, *The Great Triumvirate* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 436—447.

Political socialization explains Calhoun's relentless support of slavery. His specific support to the "peculiar institution" was obvious, so was a diffuse allegiance to the Union. Calhoun was first and foremost a Southerner, and then an American.

He was exposed to slavery at an early age as his father owned several captive laborers. The young Calhoun often worked the field and played with slaves. Similarly to Southern boys of his age, most of his playmates were slaves.

Calhoun's education provided additional clues. He became an avid reader of Greco-Roman literature and history, cultures built on slavery. Aristotle's words were his main inspiration: "From the hour of birth some are marked out for subjection, and others for command. For he who can foresee with his mind is by nature intended to be lord and master and he who can only work with his body is by nature a slave".[48]

A great contributor to the development of Calhoun's attitude was the Anglican church. According to Boorstin such practices as refusal of baptism and non-acceptance of slave marriages "allowed religion to confirm the absoluteness of Southern slavery".[49]

Calhoun's class status, occupation, residence and race were also instrumental. He was a representative of the Southern planter elite with a chief aim of continuation of the "peculiar institution". Calhoun's behavior accurately fitted into Campbell's concept. According to the latter three-fourths of Americans vote based on the needs of the class they belong to.[50]

John's occupation as a planter-lawyer generated respect and appreciation of farming coupled with unconditional reverence of the law. He viewed plantation life as an effective counterweight against the effeminate and decaying North. Calhoun, the lawyer-politician expressed the slavery issue in a geopolitical context and cast the "peculiar institution" in light of national salvation.

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48 Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1926), p. 82.

49 Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Americans The National Experience* (New York:Vintage Books, 1965), p. 203.

50 Fred R. Harris, *America's Democracy* (Glenview: Scott-Foresman, 1986), p. 209.

III.

According to Harris, America stands for human rights, limited government and equal opportunity in political participation.[51] The first ideal refers to the trinity of natural rights, the second tenet echoes the Jeffersonian definition of an authority "strong enough to protect people's natural rights, but too weak to take them away" and political participation is secured through a social contract.

Having examined three elements of Calhoun's political philosophy these conclusions can be drawn. The author discarded the first component of the American ideal. For Calhoun, equality and human rights were privileges of the Southern ruling elite. His definition of "liberty" was contrary to the Enlightenment's interpretation. It was the freedom of the slave master to continue the system of captive labor, and the right of the state assembly to negate federal laws at its convenience.

The Calhounian democracy as a solution to the Republican Dilemma corresponded to the outlines of limited government. Having grappled with the question of protecting a minority from a hostile majority, he found the elements of democracy, mainly a constitutional government, an adequate defense mechanism. His system of dual executives however, overstepped constitutional boundaries.

Calhoun's restrictive view of political participation and placement of slavery on shaky biological foundations and his promotion of white supremacy and negro inferiority violated one of America's most cherished principles, equality.

One of the Senator's best friends, Harriet Martineau characterized him as a "cast-iron man, who looks as if he had never been born or could never be extinguished".[52] Although Calhoun's political philosophy seems to be devoid of feelings, he reared nine children. Despite Calhoun's vast

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[51] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[52] Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), p. 97.

contributions to the field of political science, he never realized that the most important ingredient of politics was the human factor.

The cast-iron man's greatest achievement was his gravest error as well. While recognizing the impending constitutional and political crisis and designing an elaborate system of safeguards, he failed to understand that neither states' rights conservatism, nor two presidents could stop the oncoming storm which would severely rattle Dixie, forcing slavery and the "Southern gentleman" into the abyss of history.

ANDRÁS TARNÓC

"JEFFERSON STILL SURVIVES"

I.

The Fourth of July is a special day in American history marking the birthday of the Declaration of Independence and of the United States as well. The day is usually celebrated by patriotic speeches, marching bands, picnics and fireworks. Lost in the revelry is another less joyous milestone. On July 4, 1826, 50 years after the issuance of the Declaration of Independence the second and third presidents of the United States, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson passed away. While Adams and Jefferson were bitter political enemies, Adams' dying words; "Jefferson still survives" paid homage to the accomplishment of his foe and laid the foundation of an enduring Jefferson myth.

In an era when heroes seem to fall by the wayside everyday as an ungrateful posterity rocks one too many pedestal, Jefferson seems to have stayed above the fray of deheroization. While the wind of historical revisionism has not spared the Jefferson image, the author of the Declaration of Independence remained a revered character of American and world history.

II.

Thomas Jefferson was born on April 13, 1743 in Shadwell, Virginia. His father Peter was a wealthy surveyor and member of the Virginia House of Burgesses, and his mother Jane Randolph was a noble woman. The young Thomas learned several things from his father including responsibility, dilligence and a respect for books and learning.

Jefferson began to study the classics at age nine and by age seventeen he became an expert in ancient Greeco-Roman thought. At age eighteen he enrolled in the University of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia. Having met his mentor, the only non-denominational teacher at the college, Dr. William Small of Scotland, he wrote: "I got my first views of the expansion of science and the system of things in which we are placed and it was this influence that probably fixed the destiny of my life".[1]

Upon graduation in 1762 he began to read law and in 1764 he inherited an estate of 2,750 acres from his father. In 1767 Jefferson was admitted to the Virginia Bar and in 1769 he became a member of the Virginia House of Burgesses. In 1772 he married a 23 year old widow, named Martha Wayles Skelton.

By the time Jefferson reached adulthood in 1764 he had encountered several life forming experiences. His father taught him the value of education, self-reliance and political participation, his teachers introduced him to the Enlightenment, his classical studies presented him with the model of the ideal statesman: the philosopher king, and the estate got him acquainted with the institution of slavery.

In 1774 Thomas Jefferson participated in his state's first revolutionary convention and his instructions for Virginia's delegates to the First Continental Congress were published under the title "A Summary View of the Rights of British America". In this pamphlet he asserted the colonists' natural rights to self-government but stopped short of declaring independence.[2]

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[1] Merill D. Peterson, "Thomas Jefferson: A Brief Life," in *Thomas Jefferson. The Man. His World. His Influence.* ed. Lally Weymouth (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1973), p. 14.

[2] Thomas Jefferson, *Writings* (The Library of America, 1984), p. 1520.

In June 1776 Jefferson was appointed to head a committee charged with the writing of the Declaration of Independence. He was finished with the draft on July 2 and after a two and a half day debate the Declaration of Independence was adopted by the Continental Congress.

The Declaration was technically a painstakingly written lawyer's brief indicting the king of Britain on various violations of the social contract and justifying America's desire for independence.

In the next 3 years Jefferson served in the Virginia House of Delegates and on July 1, 1779 he was elected governor of his state. While his gubernatorial administration was marked with frustration and a general inability to lead the state during wartime, his attempts to rewrite Virginia's legal code introduced changes in the school system and promoted freedom of religion. Although in 1781 his term expired and he returned to his Monticello estate, grief over his wife's death forced him back to the political arena a year later.

From 1785 Jefferson served as a Minister to France. His stay in Paris reenforced his acceptance of the Enlightenment and exposed him to the ideas of the French Revolution. As Jefferson became Secretary of State of the Washington government in 1790 the Virginia planter holding agrarian beliefs got into several conflicts with the more urbane Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton. Jefferson and his followers, the Republicans opposed the growing power of the central government, emphasized the importance of agriculture and supported France in the post 1789 European conflict. In 1796 he was elected vice president of the incoming administration of John Adams and in the following year he was chosen president of the American Philosophical Society.

As the relationship between France and the United States exacerbated due to the pro-British policies of the Adams government, Jefferson became politically isolated and he was portrayed by the popular press as a supporter of French Jacobines. When the Federalist Adams administration introduced the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 aimed at crippling Republican opposition, Jefferson returned to Monticello to work on his reply, known as the Kentucky Resolutions. The resolutions promoted the so-called state compact theory arguing that the United States Constitution had

resulted from a compact between the states and the federal government, giving states a right to nullify laws deemed hostile to their interests.

In 1800 Thomas Jefferson rode the crest of a society wide dissatisfaction with the Federalist Adams administration to the White House. In his inauguration speech he counseled unity and forgiveness as he declared: "We have called by different names brethren of the same principle. We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists. If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its Republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it".[3]

Jefferson was the first President to be inaugurated in Federal City, the future seat of U.S. government. In contrast to the lavish life-style of the previous administration Jefferson embraced simplicity and prudence. He intended to run the nation as a prudent farmer forcing government to live within its means. He cut down the size of the military and began to sell lands between the Mississippi and Ohio rivers to finance government activities.

His greatest presidential achievement was the acquisition of the Mississippi Valley. The contract executed between Jefferson and Napoleon went into history as the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 and for a mere 15 million dollars doubled the size of the United States.

In light of the Louisiana Purchase Jefferson's reelection in 1804 was hardly a surprise. Whereas the Jefferson administration achieved its greatest triumph in the foreign policy arena, the President's mishandling of international relations proved to be his downfall as well.

In 1803 Europe was set ablaze by the Napoleonic Wars and Jefferson wanted to keep the United States out of overseas hostilities. America as a trading partner to the main belligerents: France and Britain, was in a precarious situation. In 1805 Napoleon following up on his historic victory at Austerlitz assumed control of most of continental Europe and in 1806 Admiral Nelson's triumph at Trafalgar resulted in a British naval blockade around Europe. American merchant ships were caught in the middle where

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 493.

complying with British trade regulations could have meant seizure of goods by French authorities.

British frigates repeatedly harassed American vessels and through a practice called impressment they raided United States merchant ships and kidnapped sailors deemed subjects of the Queen. In 1807 seething British-American hostilities reached the boiling point in the Chesapeake Affair. A British warship, "Leopard" had attacked the United States vessel "Chesapeake" killing three sailors and kidnapping four. Following a nation wide uproar Congress on Jefferson's prodding passed the Embargo Act effectively stopping all foreign trade.

Jefferson's efforts to protect the United States from "entangling alliances" with economic measures were frustrated by his own countrymen as the historically commercial and shipping towns of New England turned to smuggling to recover lost profits. The Act had also thrown American agriculture in a crisis exposing Jefferson to broad-based public criticism. After the election of 1808 a tired and disillusioned Jefferson returned to his beloved Monticello estate in Virginia.

Freed from the pressure of governing Jefferson turned his attention to one of his favorite causes, education. In 1814 in a letter to Peter Carr he outlined his comprehensive education reform plan and later donated his library to become the foundation of the Library of Congress. In 1817, the cornerstone of the University of Virginia—his long cherished dream—was laid and the University opened for instruction in 1825. In the last year of his life the two time president of the United States and the author of the Declaration of Independence was forced to live in financial uncertainty. While the Virginia legislature authorized a lottery at Monticello, friends and supporters raised funds to help Jefferson to keep his estate.

Any attempt to summarize the achievement of Thomas Jefferson is doomed by the greatness and complexity of his lifework. A frustrated writer, however, might find solace in the words of the man himself, as Jefferson's epitaph describes the three deeds he was the most proud of. "Here was buried Thomas Jefferson, Author of the Declaration of American Inde-

pendence, of the Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom and Father of the University of Virginia".[4]

Unarguably the Declaration of Independence is Thomas Jefferson's most significant achievement. While on the surface the Declaration appears to be a lawyerly brief explaining the causes of America's separation from Britain, the text assured a place for its author among the immortals of human history. Whereas the Declaration is addressed to the British King, it has a greater audience as well, humanity. The famous opening line: "When in the course of human events ..." removes the conflict from a British—American context and emphasizes its cosmopolitan significance.[5] The need for independence arises from natural law as freedom and equality are natural rights guaranteed by God.

The well-known next paragraph is the expression of the American Ideal. In Jefferson's and consequently all Americans' view humans are equal and possess inalienable natural rights; the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Should a government entrusted by the people to protect these rights refuse to carry out this responsibility, it can be removed from power.

According to Norton the Declaration is the pinnacle of Anglo-Saxon and American political thinking. Jefferson's ideas are based on the Mayflower Compact, Hobbes' "Leviathan" and Locke's "Two Treatises of Government".

When Jefferson declares "these self evident truths" he speaks to everyone as life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are universal principles, the holy trinity of liberal capitalism. Much has been written about the phrase "the pursuit of happiness" and Commager offers a succinct explanation: "Happiness meant milk for the children, and meat on the table, a well-built house, and a well-filled barn, freedom from tyranny of the State,

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[4] *Ibid.*, p. 706.

[5] Henry Steele Commager, "The Declaration of Independence," in *Thomas Jefferson. The Man. His World. His Influence*. ed. Lally Weymouth (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1973), p. 182.

the superstition of the Church, the authority of the military and the malaise of ignorance".[6]

The lofty egalitarianism of the Declaration notwithstanding, Jefferson is often criticized as an elitist since the text does not make mention of women and slaves. The famous clause "all men are created equal" is frequently held up as a mirror to force American society to face its paradox nature.

The greatest asset of the Declaration of Independence is not its presentment of hitherto unheard of revolutionary ideas, but its eloquent yet succinct elevation of the achievements of Western thought to universal level. The famous statement: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with inherent and inalienable rights: that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" reverberated through not only American but world history as well.

Eighty-seven years later Abraham Lincoln equated the Civil War with the defense of the ideas of the Declaration and in 1963 Martin Luther King in his celebrated "I have a dream" speech at the Washington Memorial rebuked America for her digression from the Jeffersonian ideal. Jefferson's ideas inspired revolutionaries in Paris in 1789, in Budapest in 1848 and even in Saigon in 1945.

While the Declaration is a call to arms of individual political freedom, the Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom defends the independence of the human mind. The statute was written in 1781 at a time when the clergy dominated all aspects of public life in the Old World and five of the thirteen American states displayed elements of an established church.[7]

Whereas Rousseau, Mably and Sebastien Mercier attacked the abuses of the church, these philosophes accepted the notion of an establishment or a state supported church. Jefferson rejected the idea of an

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. 186.

[7] Henry Steele Commager, "Jefferson and the Enlightenment," in *Thomas Jefferson. The Man. His World. His Influence* ed. Lally Weymouth (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1973), p. 56.

established church as he examined Virginia's jurisdiction over spiritual matters.[8]

While laws abridging religious freedom had been eliminated, the state's assembly could still punish individuals deemed to be heretics for denying the existence of God or of the Holy Trinity. Jefferson having branded this practice "religious slavery"[9] argued that government could only control those areas of individual life that had been surrendered to it.

Human conscience, or the spiritual sphere could have but one ruler, God itself. Jefferson eloquently limited the authority of government to the protection of one's "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" asserting that diverse religious views did not threaten one's natural rights. "The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods or no god. It neither picks my pocket, nor breaks my leg."[10] Although the General Assembly enacted the statute in 1786, freedom of religion was not federally recognized in the United States until the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791.

Thomas Jefferson's last gift to posterity was the University of Virginia. Believing that the best guarantee of democracy was an educated citizenry Jefferson strove to establish a school dedicated to the inculcation of the values of the Enlightenment. In 1779 he put forth a threepartite plan to promote public education calling for the establishment of public elementary schools, reforming the College of William and Mary and the creation of a state library. The Northwest Ordinance co-sponsored by him divided the territories between the Mississippi and Ohio rivers to townships with 36 sections and the income derived from one section was set aside for public schools.

In an 1810 letter to Governor John Tyler, Jefferson described public schools and public education as the foundations of democracy. Having retired from the Presidency Jefferson decided to devote all his efforts to the

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[8] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

[9] Thomas Jefferson, *Writings.* (The Library of America, 1984), p. 285.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 285.

creation of a university, a "future bulwark of the human mind in the Western Hemisphere".[11]

Jefferson was involved in all phases of the building process including planning, fund-raising, organizing and as Whitehill asserted: the University of Virginia represented the pinnacle of his career as an architect.[12] He was the school's first rector as well enabling him to control all aspects of academic life at Charlottesville.

The university was part of a two stage educational system where primary schools taught reading, writing, arithmetic, geography and history to provide a foundation for entry to higher education. The University offered instruction in ten fields: Ancient and Modern Languages, Mathematics, Physico-Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, Botany, Medicine, Government, Law and Ideology.

Jefferson viewed education as a means of self-improvement not only for the individual but society as well as he wrote: "Nothing more than education advances the power, the prosperity and the happiness of a nation."[13]

Whereas the Declaration of Independence, the Statute for Virginia of Religious Freedom and the University of Virginia are arguably among the greatest achievements of humanity, a complete picture of the man must include his inconsistencies as well.

Historians found Jefferson's achilles heel in his ownership of slaves. Douglas L. Wilson tackles the paradox of Jefferson the author of the Declaration of Independence and a slave holder arguing that such criticism is a result of a faulty view of history called presentism, or judging the past through the standards of the present.[14]

It is beyond doubt that some of Jefferson's writings might appear racist to today's observer. In his "Notes on Virginia" Jefferson argued that

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[11] Walter Muir Whitehill, "Thomas Jefferson. Architect," in *Thomas Jefferson. The Man. His World. His Influence* ed. Lally Weymouth (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1973), p. 176.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 177.

[13] Thomas Jefferson, *Writings* (The Library of America, 1984), p. 462.

[14] Douglas L.Wilson, "Thomas Jefferson and the Character Issue," in *Jefferson Anniversary Series* (United States Information Service, 1993)

racial integration was not desirable preferring gradual emancipation and resettlement instead. In his musings on possible locations for the University of Virginia he emphasized the proximity of white areas as a selection guideline.

There are three arguments in Jefferson's defense. He admitted that his conclusions had resulted strictly from personal observations of his own slaves. He was aware that his knowledge was insufficient in this respect, and the first version of the Declaration of Independence contained a passage on slavery condemning the King for this heinous practice, but fears of Southern opposition forced its omission.[15]

Jefferson was also a staunch advocate of agriculture rejecting the values of urban America. In an age of ardent economic expansionism he argued the supremacy of agriculture: "Farmers whose interests are entirely agricultural are the true representatives of the Great American interest, and are alone to be relied on for expressing the proper American sentiments."[16]

Jefferson also fervently believed in small government, a limited administrative bureaucracy, and for a proponent of a government "strong enough to protect natural rights but not strong enough to take them away", the power of the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of the actions of the President and Congress created a dangerous precedent.

Jefferson's response to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, known as the Kentucky Resolutions forwarded the compact theory of government. In his reply to the Adams administration's anti-Republican and anti-French measures he asserted that the United States Constitution was a result of a compact or agreement between the federal government and the states, therefore individual states had a right to nullify or interpose laws found hostile to their interests. While no state took that course and Jefferson warned against violence, he unwittingly laid the foundations of the states' rights movement, the cornerstone of Southern ideology leading to the Civil War.

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[15] *Ibid.*

[16] Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), p. 36.

The second term of Jefferson's presidency also contained a disappointment as his inability to deal with the European crisis led to the divisive Embargo Act and brought the nation closer to America's second war with Britain, the War of 1812.

Leonard Levy found several inconsistencies in the Jefferson image establishing a sharp contrast between the champion of freedom of the "Notes" and the advocate of tyranny in his response to the acquittal of Aaron Burr.

Aaron Burr a former vice president of Jefferson was caught up in a bizarre scheme to establish a separate republic in the Louisiana territory. Although he was tried for treason, a lack of two constitutionally warranted witnesses led to his acquittal. Jefferson, frustrated by the legal wrangling wrote: "There are extreme cases when the laws become inadequate even to their own preservation and where the universal resource is a dictator or martial law".[17]

Also the author of the Kentucky Resolutions protesting governmental restrictions on freedom of speech and press signed a bill in 1806 making the utterance of "contemptuous and disrespectful words" against Congress and the President a crime.[18]

III.

The Jeffersonian legacy is as complex as the man himself. He was a Renaissance man, a rare specimen in today's specialization who in James Parton's words could calculate an eclipse, survey an estate, tie an artery, plan an edifice, try a cause, break a horse, dance a minuet and play the violin.[19]

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[17] Leonard Levy, "Jefferson as a Civil Libertarian," in *Thomas Jefferson. The Man. His World. His Influence* ed. Lally Weymouth (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1973), p. 193.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 194.

[19] Douglas L. Wilson, "Thomas Jefferson and the Character Issue," in *Jefferson Anniversary Series* (United States Information Service, 1993)

In addition to the historic significance of his vast lifework Jefferson was an ardent advocate of healthy living, daily exercise and a fat free diet.[20]

According to one of the foremost experts of the field Merrill D. Peterson, the Jefferson image consists of three elements. He exists as a political symbol: the Father of the Declaration of Independence and the champion of liberty; a cultural hero: the creator of the University of Virginia, and a world citizen whose political views are guiding posts for anyone embarking on the treacherous road toward democracy.[21]

John Catanzariti anoints him with the title of American Leonardo[22] and George F. Will celebrates in his person the victory of homo faber over homo politicus.[23]

Jefferson is applicable to all aspects of human existence as he speaks to all levels of man. The Declaration addresses the political being, his views on religion underline the independence of the human mind and the University of Virginia represents man's neverending struggle for self-improvement. His inventions: the moldboard plow, and the swivel chair are living monuments of human curiosity. His values: frugality, personal independence, appreciation of work and education can show the way to anyone lost in the complexities of the waning years of the twentieth century. Jefferson, however, was not beyond human frailty and he was susceptible to inconsistencies as in Levy's words his pen often proved mightier than his practice. The complexity of his character invited controversy for he was a slave owner and a revolutionary, a cosmopolitan and a patriot,[24] a champion of political equality stopping short of universal manhood suffrage.[25] None of these inconsistencies can diminish the fact that on the 250th anniversary of

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[20] *Ibid.*

[21] Merill D. Peterson, "The Image of Jefferson," in *Jefferson Anniversary Series* (United States Information Service, 1993)

[22] John Catanzariti, "An American Leonardo," (Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society)

[23] George F. Will, "Mr. Jefferson Comes to Town," *Public Interest* (Summer 1993): p. 50.

[24] Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), p. 32.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

his birth the world celebrates a person who achieved two of the greatest standards a human being can ever dream of: the universal self-actualized man and the philosopher king.

LEHEL VADON

HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW IN HUNGARY

Next to Edgar Allan Poe Longfellow was considered to be the most international poet of nineteenth century America. He was the American epigon of European romantic poetry who planted the seeds of culture in an uncultivated land and during America's adolescence he discovered Europe for the New World. His romantic European style is no ordinary plagiarism as his poetry was born in America but his themes, sentiments and perfection of form remind one of the "Old Continent".

He is the first to express patriotic feelings and to perpetuate episodes of American history and the elements of American traditions through the North American landscape. Through Longfellow the American landscape becomes an integral part of world literature not as a romantic oddity but as a dignified, traditional sphere of domestic progress.

Although he mainly chose domestic themes, he rejected the label of a true-blue American poet.[1] In his epic poems he described the romantic and legendary episodes of European history integrating the most popular themes and elaborate forms into American literature. Longfellow as the first professional poet of the United States deliberately strove to create traditions. He was a versatile, scholar poet who wanted to write in "an elegant, European influenced American style".

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[1] "As our national character and world of thought do not differ fundamentally from England, therefore our literature may not differ either." In: Samuel Longfellow: *Life of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow* (1891).

His Puritan New England upper class bred romantic conscience was in a continuous conflict with his educated self and his imagination and expressive power failed to enable him to transcend the limits of his knowledge. Whereas in his poetry culture and civilization take precedence over creativity and originality, his message reached the masses and he was the most celebrated poet of his age not only in the English speaking countries but all over the world. Due to consciencious efforts to satisfy the literary tastes of the middle class he enjoyed immense popularity in his home country and Hungary as well. "His lyrical poetry was devoid of strange and heated passion as he only sang about the idealized aspects of ordinary middle class life. Longfellow, a sophisticated gentleman with Victorian manners intentionally avoided vulgar, coarse or plain ugly themes."[2]

Written by the prolific publicist and translator Imre Huszár in 1866, the first Hungarian article on Longfellow and his poetry appeared in the *Fővárosi Lapok.* Huszár introduced one of Longfellow's less famous poems titled "Flower-de-luce", a book of verses where the author paid homage to his former schoolmate and colleague, Nathaniel Hawthorne. According to Huszár Flower-de-luce impressively presented the "pure and simple beauty of reality and attempted to enhance its objectivity with the colors of imagination". Huszár viewed Longfellow as "an artist who had addressed not a nation or an era, but whose eternal appeals voiced the concerns of humanity".[3]

József Csukássi's—one of Longfellow's first Hungarian translators—more extensive essay appeared in the same paper three years later. The article that retraced Longfellow's life and achievements was the first Hungarian treatise to emphasize the poet's European qualities. "Although a different flower, it gains its fragrance from European soil, a different fruit yet its delicious taste was bequeathed by the same land."[4] In Csukássi's view Longfellow along with the "grimly original Poe" and the "lofty Bryant"

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[2] László Országh, *Az amerikai irodalom története* (Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó, 1967), p. 158.

[3] Imre Huszár, "Külirodalmi Szemle. (Longfellow legújabb müve: Flower-de-luce)," *Fővárosi Lapok,* 289 (1866): pp. 1182—1183.

[4] József Csukássi, "Longfellow Wadsworth Henry. I.," *Fővárosi Lapok,* 12 (1869): p. 44.

belonged to the "Holy Trinity of American poetry." "He consciously trained himself to attain the highest artistic standards possible and as an erudite, yet impressionable poet with supreme acquisitive and elaborative skills always strove to enhance form with color".[5] According to Csukássi a lack of humor and vitality along with the limited creative force and the relatively low number of artistic innovations in Longfellow's poetry were the author's Achilles heels. The aesthetician critic and one of Longfellow's first translators Tamás Szana held a similar opinion.[6]

Emil Ábrányi, the noted literary translator and poet considered Longfellow not as the poet of genius but of talent "who not only made a mark for himself in American poetry but demanded a dominant position in European literature as well". Longfellow's tranquil creative process reminded him of the Hungarian poet, János Arany.[7]

The poet and translator János Dömötör appreciated Longfellow's translatory skills and respected his efforts to integrate the motives of European poetry into America's cultural heritage. According to him Longfellow was the most popular foreign poet in Hungary in the 1870s whose most of his poetry was traslated into Hungarian, and widely and enthusiastically read by the Hungarian reading public. Dömötör considered Zsigmond Ács, Károly Szász, Béla Szász, Zsigmond Lőrinczy /Lehr/ and József Lévai as the most successful interpreters of Longfellow's works and encouraged them to continue transplanting his words into Hungarian.[8]

József Prém also acknowledged Longfellow's translating achievements and highly praised his unique and often intranslatable poetic language, his noble attitude, lucid thinking and gentle spirit. He highlighted the dignified, profound and sincere morality of Longfellow's poetry that was devoid of humor, witticism or any traces of piquancy.[9]

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[5] József Csukássi, "Longfellow Wadsworth Henry. II.," *Fővárosi Lapok*, 13 (1869): pp. 48.

[6] (SZ.T.) (Tamás Szana), "Az észak-amerikai költészet. II.," *Fővárosi Lapok*, 199 (1869): pp. 748—785. — The same article: (Tamás Szana), "Az Észak-Amerikai költészet," *Figyelő*, 46 (1875): pp. 545—548.; *Figyelő* 47 (1875): pp. 557—559.

[7] Emil Ábrányi, "Longfellow Henrik," *Ország-Világ*, 22 (1871): pp. 254—256.

[8] (D. J.) (János Bömötör), "Longfellow," *Vasárnapi Újság*, 21 (1876): pp. 321—322.

[9] József Prém, "Longfellow," *Képes Világ*, XI (1871): pp. 247—248.

Two Hungarian journals—that previously provided the most extensive coverage of Longfellow's artistic achievements—the *Vasárnapi Újság* and the *Fővárosi Lapok* carried obituaries to mark the poet's death. The *Vasárnapi Újság* recalling the highlights of the life and achievements of the "most popular poet of the century" eulogized him as "a religious man who accepted the present world order, a philanthrope who was devoted to furthering the interests of humanity, an optimist scholar who viewed the history of Christianity with pious reverence and as an impressionable spirit who was open to all elements of Eropean culture."[10] Imre Czakó and János Dömötör bid farewell on the same pages with the former's rendition of "A Day of Sunshine" and the latter's translation of "A Psalm of Life".[11]

In his Fővárosi Lapok obituary Gyula Pekár recalled his personal encounter with Longfellow[12]. On December 12, 1881 Pekár, then a high school student, visited the elderly poet in his Cambridge home near Harvard University which served as George Washington's headquarters during the War of Independence. Having signed Pekár's copies Longfellow astonishedly learned about the immense popularity of his poems in Hungary and recalled his personal encounter with the famous Hungarian composer Franz Liszt whose portrait had been painted by the poet's friend while both visited the composer during Longfellow's European tour. The painting was displayed in Longfellow's home after his painter friend had offered it to him as a gift. As a measure of Liszt's appreciation of Longfellow's work he set one of his poems to music in 1874. The title of the cantata is Die Glocken des Strassburgen Münsters which was conducted by the composer in Budapest on March 10, 1875.[13]

In 1897 Béla Szász one of the foremost Hungarian experts on Longfellow and the most prolific translator of his works authored the only anthology published to this day. In his inaugural address at the Hungarian

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[10] —á—r—, "Longfellow (1807–1882)," *Vasárnapi Újság*, 15 (1882): pp. 225—226.

[11] Imre Czakó, *Egy napsugár*, János Dömötör, *Az élet zsoltára*, *Vasárnapi Újság* 15 (1882): p. 226.

[12] Gyula Pekár, "Látogatás Longfellownál," *Fővárosi Lapok*, 15 (1882): p. 490.

[13] *Zenei Lexikon*, Vol II. (Budapest: Zeneműkiadó Vállalat, 1965), p. 475.

Academy of Arts and Sciences on October 6, 1884 he analyzed the reflexive and ethico-religious elements of Longfellow's poetry.[14]

Due to changes of literary tastes of post-1900 America Longfellow fell out of the twentieth century readers' favor and only anthologies and school books ensured his survival in the public conscience. While the significance of Longfellow's literary achievements is beyond dispute, his creative efforts fade into obsolescence as his poems disappeared from the pages of Hungarian literary journals and he was celebrated only at so-called "great anniversaries".

In 1907 in honor of the one hundredth anniversary of Longfellow's birth Antal Radó wrote a commemorative article for the *Vasárnapi Újság*. In his estimation "the erstwhile popular poet did not rank among the giants of literary spirit as he was not a golden tongued bard with soaring imagination and penetrating vision, or a majestic genius, an 'os magna sonaturum', but one of the less significant poets of world literature." Radó sorely missed traces of originality, an "American style" especially in Longfellow's narrative and epic poems arguing that the poet's fame would only be preserved by "those heart stirring, sweet tongued songs where his noble and puritan soul proclaimed the loftiest wisdom without a false note or a pose singing the Psalm of Life"[15]. Dezső Kosztolányi could only voice his discontent in the *Hét* and pointed to a few ballads such as the *Excelsior*, the *Evangeline* and a fraction of *Hiawatha* in his commemorative article. "Although Longfellow's poetry sounds as clear as the churchbell, he is only our Sunday entertainment, a delightful afternoon reading to curl up with after a busy day."[16] Nonetheless Kosztolányi grudgingly acknowledged that Longfellow's everlasting fame had been due to his perfection of style.

Professor Arthur Yolland was likely to have been influenced by the Longfellow anniversary in his offer to present a weekly one hour lecture at

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[14] Béla Szász, "A reflexiv és vallás-erkölcsi elem a költészetben s Longfellow," *Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Értekezései a Nyelv- és Széptudomány Köréből*, (1884): pp. 3—43.

[15] Antal Radó, "Longfellow évszázados ünnepén," *Vasárnapi Újság*, 8 (1907): pp. 147—148.

[16] Lehotai (Dezső Kosztolányi), "Longfellow," *A Hét*, 9 (1907): p. 143. — The same article: Dezső Kosztolányi, *Ércnél maradandóbb* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1975), pp. 103—105.

the Péter Pázmány University in 1908. The course which was titled "Longfellow's selected poems" was the second university level subject on American literature in the history of American Studies in Hungary.[17]

In József Reményi's pantheon of American literature where the author presented a thorough analysis of Longfellow's art, perspective and style the poet appeared as an aesthetician and bard of the evolving American middle class. In Reményi's view Longfellow, a descendant of Puritans had been unable to conceal the didactic purpose of his poems making his lines often sound like textbooks put into verse. While acknowledging Longfellow's poetic skills and creative imagination dedicated to the commemoration of life's beauty, Reményi declared that Longfellow's works could not be enjoyed by someone with refined aesthetic taste and ranked him as a second class poet.[18]

Antal Szerb regarded Longfellow as the poet of secondary romanticism who worked with romantic elements despite a lack of a romantic spirit. In his view Longfellow was the poet of the petty bourgeoisie "whose tremendous world-wide success was due to the fact that his works were tailormade to middle class tastes as he sang about the fabulous Middle Ages and his idealistic poems reenforced loyalty to the prevailing political order[19]. According to Mihály Babits "Longfellow was the forerunner of American poetry's supercilious eclecticism harvesting and integrating the ripe stylistic and thematic treasures of European literature into American poetry, much the same way as American billionaires collected priceless pieces of art in their homes from European museums."[20]

In 1957 commemorating the 150th anniversary of Longfellow's birth the Irodalmi Színpad of Budapest paid homage to the poet's achievemts in a

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[17] Joseph Szentmihályi, "Outline of Professor Yolland's Activity," *Angol Filológiai Tanulmányok*, II (1973): p. 13.

[18] József Reményi, "Henry Wadsworth Longfellow," *Vasárnap*, 14 (1936): pp. 263—265. — The same essay: József Reményi, *Amerikai írók* (Budapest: Franklin-Társulat, [1938]), pp. 24—33.

[19] Antal Szerb, *A világirodalom története* (Budapest: Magvető Könyvkiadó, 1962), pp. 622—623.

[20] Mihály Babits, "Líra Amerikában," (1930) in Mihály Babits, *Arcképek és tanulmányok* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1977), p. 372.

special production.[21] Two articles were published for the occasion as well. The tone of János Viktor's article in *Könyvbarát* reflected the value systems of the indoctrinaire 1950's as he ranked Longfellow among those who "had turned to the humanistic tradition of European culture to seek an antidote for the perceptibly oppressive inhumanity of the first boom period of American capitalism."[22] The fact that Longfellow along with Poe approached European standards and paved the way for the first "true-blue" American poet, Walt Whitman, was Longfellow's greatest achievement.

In Tibor Lutter's carefully researched study which appeared in *Magyar Tudomány* the author emphathized with the plight of Longfellow who despite being born in a period when the flames of the romantic movement were about to subside, viewed the bicontinental advance of the latter as his greatest formative experience. Lutter wrote: "He was a wrong man in the wrong time as had he been born a half generation earlier his genius could have achieved the white fiery passion of romanticism and he only preceded Whitman's celebration of America's blossoming into adulthood by a school generation."[23] Longfellow, the poet of the "golden mean" fulfilled the requirements established by János Arany's Ars Poetica demonstrated by his sophistication, humanity, and well crafted elegant style. "He was the poet who under the peculiar climate of his time clad in the fading robe of romanticism undertook an arduous, productive effort especially invaluable in the promotion of national culture." Lutter considered Longfellow's consistent realization of his artistic goals—an elegant European influenced American style—the poet's most significant achievement and greatest asset. He defended Longfellow's intergrity from charges of plagiarism as he declared his work "a refined masterpiece of English literature, which, while rooted in American soil, met the lofty standards of European elegance." Lutter argued that Longfellow's poetry had shaped the American nation and culture during the period of the revival of the romantic movement making it a significant element of world literature.

[21] A. G., "Longfellow est," *Film Színház Muzsika*, 3 (1957): p. 5.

[22] (János Viktor), "Henry Wadsworth Longfellow," *Könyvbarát*, 3 (1957): pp. 26—27.

[23] Tibor Lutter, "Henry Wadsworth Longfellow," Magyar Tudomány, 5—6 (1957): pp. 169—174.

Although Longfellow became one of the most popular Western poets in Hungary in the second half of the nineteenth century, his place in literary history and the evaluation of his achievements are still uneven and controversial. A careful and comprehensive analysis of the true nature of his poetry is still a matter of extensive future research.

ZSOLT VIRÁGOS

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON MYTH AND 'PRACTICAL' PRAGMATISM IN AMERICAN CULTURE

Before focusing on the major issues addressed here, it may be necessary to sort out in what special senses the concept of *myth* and that of *pragmatism* are going to be used in the present context. Let me begin with the latter. By *pragmatism* I simply mean the American philosophy of pragmatism, an intellectual development that surfaced in the post-Civil War era, with the undeclared but optimistic intention of providing Americans with a more viable sense of reality. The collective output of the first generation of pragmatic philosophers, the well-known triumvirate *Peirce, James,* and *Dewey*, explored segments of this reality as diverse as human psychology, education, religious experience, social and political philosophy. However, I am not going to be concerned with favorite pragmatic issues like behavioristic semantics or empirical psychology; I will be preoccupied here with the pragmatic concept and theory of truth.

As regards *myth,* it must be decided from the outset whether it will denote in this discussion an archaic, ancient phenomenon or a modern one, i.e., modern in the sense that it is roughly contemporaneous with the active phase of a given social milieu and cultural fabric. In the present discussion it is in this latter, still rather broad, context that I am going to use the concept. To be a bit more specific, cultural or social myths will be conceived of as self-justifying intellectual constructs which explain, rationalize, justify, legit-

imize past and present phenomena, or serve as projective devices with reference to future events. Thus the primary function of myth is to make sense of the world of actuality by creating its own mythic quasi-reality for group consumption in ways that have been variously identified as supernatural, unhistorical, ahistorical, unobservable, mistaken, irrational, etc. Thus, to put it as briefly as possible, my definition of myth here will be this: *justification for whatever reason.*

For our immediate purposes it is useful at this point to take a brief look at what I would loosely call the anatomy of myth, i.e., to isolate the main functional aspects and ingredients, as well as those epistemologically incompatible but structurally interlocking constituent elements that myth as a larger entity incorporates and fuses.[1] Suffice it to offer at this point just a mere list: the component of factual reality, the element of falsehood, the so-called "rooted-in-reality" aspect, the pragmatic aspect, the aspect of obviousness, emotional and volitional aspects, myth's ideological dimension, group acceptance, group cohesion, and what I would label as the so-called "time index".

Two of the above elements require comment here. First, the *pragmatic aspect.* Perhaps the most intriguing quality inherent in virtually every vital cultural myth is the dimension of pragmatic utility. This simply means that myths are made, designed as it were, to claim truth in response to a special kind of sense-making need and purpose. What is actually operative in this mechanism is the unique, and often puzzling, power of myth to reconcile what could be described as "the factually false" with "the psychologically true". Thus, in spite of its ultimate falsehood, myth can be useful, it can have "operational validity," which, of course, serves as a potent reason for group acceptance. This sense-making purpose of myth is both a voluntaristic and an arbitrary drive, a characteristic quality that together with the above-mentioned persistence of psychological truth, is bound to prompt a look at our other item selected for brief consideration, at what I have identified above as "emotional and volitional aspects". In terms of how the psychological truth of myth is incorporated in the belief-system

[1] For a detailed discussion of this idea see my "Versions of Myth in American Culture and Literature," *Hungarian Studies in English* 17 (1984): 49—84.

of a given community, it is essential that "the will to believe" or "the willing suspension of disbelief" should be part of the operative mechanism because these tend to reinforce, sometimes even replace the so-called "rooted in reality" aspect of myth while the latter is still in its vital cycle.

If we bear in mind, as suggested in the title of my paper, that we are concerned here with the possible connection between aspects of the myth-making urge in American culture and the philosophy of pragmatism, even this sketchy outline of the relevant conceptual framework is likely to suggest a few obvious analogies. On the face of it, even conceptual fragments like "pragmatic utility," "the will to believe," the apparently utilitarian drive towards a special kind of truth-seeking, the relativistic conception of truth, or the American pragmatists', especially William James's, voluntaristic ethics of belief may suggest that we are dealing with issues where at least a formal kinship is likely to exist between a special philosophical concentration on the need for pragmatic clarification of ideas and the relative prominence of cultural myths in the American social consciousness. Indeed, what I am going to show is that these powerful lines of force in the culture somehow intersect and that pragmatism reinforced certain deep-rooted tendencies of thinking that had been there from the very birth of the republic. In doing so, the pragmatists, themselves historically situated, ostensibly made order of historically conditioned perceptual chaos and liberated or at least sanctioned voluntaristic habits of reasoning by providing blueprints for what I would describe as "expedient" selection and arbitrary combinatory operations of reasoning. Both, let me add, are staple modes of myth-making.

It requires no special demonstration to realize that like any other nation's, the social consciousness of the United States bears out the diagnosis that the affinity for a particular kind of truth-seeking, legitimization and self-justification has not been alien to the American cultural climate. Indeed, any student of American culture will soon realize the apparent contradiction that in spite of the unprecedented accumulation of objectively verifiable knowledge in this century—the result of the dramatic expansion of education, the rapid progress of scientific research and technological advance in general—in some loosely related special areas the

United States appears to be one of the top consumers and generators of myth. Some obvious domains of these special areas are ethnic consciousness, racism, certain areas of literature and literary scholarship, political thought, or national history. As regards this last department, it might be illustrative to quote N. Cords and P. Gerster: "Comparatively, it appears that American history is more myth-laden than that of any other Western nation".[2]

The questions we should answer at this point are these: (1) What, after all, is the pragmatic conception of truth? (2) What were those conditions of intellectual uncertainty and confusion that served as the formative dispositions and historical origins of pragmatism? In other words, was it a habitual bias in social practice that the pragmatists tried to capture in the net of philosophical conceptualization?

In this brief essay I must pass over many of the technical and conceptual aspects of pragmatic thought. The pragmatic theory of truth itself can be reconstructed from a complex of contributory beliefs and assertions, some supporting others. In this sense, the dominant and most influential member of the triumvirate was *William James*, often regarded as the American pragmatist, though Peirce also made significant contributions, especially in his 1877 essay, "The Fixation of Belief," which appeared in *Popular Science Monthly*, and in "How To Make Our Ideas Clear," which was published in the following year. Peirce argued, basically on behavioral grounds, that beliefs are really rules for acting and that the meaning of having a belief can only be discovered by assessing its consequences for action. James's most relevant works in this respect are the title essay in his *The Will to Believe* (1897), his lectures on *Pragmatism* (1907), and *The Meaning of Truth* (1909), its sequel.

Declining to accept what he calls the agnostic rules for truth-seeking, James analyzes the question of truth in three classes of propositions and recommends criteria of validation for each one. In matters of empirical fact the suggested touchstone of corroboration is direct, face-to-face empirical verification. In the category of *a priori* truths, which he calls

[2] Nicholas Cords and Patrick Gerster (eds.) *Myth and the American Experience* (Encino, Calif.: Glencoe Publishing Co., 1978), vol. I, XI.

"nonfactual beliefs" or "necessary propositions," he recommends, among other things, reliance on convention. The really problematic category is made up of moral and aesthetic judgments, i.e., beliefs whose function is to satisfy our moral and emotional requirements. In this department James, assuming an indeterministic position, proposes that a belief is to be accounted true if it gives one satisfaction to hold.

I have counted over a dozen definitions or near-definitions of truth James gave. The feature they share is that their conceptual drift is *contextualist* in the sense that the final test of an idea's validity is its coherence with the rest of one's experience. A sample of the typical Jamesian formulations: "the true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons;" or "truth *happens* to an idea;" or, "it is useful because it is true... it is true because it is useful;" or, one more, "'the true', to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving..."[3] To be fair, I have to add that James did make certain, tentative and feeble, reservations at this point. Nonetheless, as A. J. Ayer has remarked, "it has been almost universally assumed by James's critics that he puts this forward unconditionally as a general criterion of truth."[4]

If we accept the oft-repeated assertion that pragmatism is "uniquely and perhaps characteristically associated with American experience itself"[5] and that "in abstraction from this larger historical context, the movement is largely unintelligible,"[6] we can rightly suppose that in the late 19th century it emerged as *a reflection upon already-existing procedures.* Let me add at this point that Peirce, who was the first pragmatist to grapple with the

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[3] William James, *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1907), pp. 76, 201, 204, 222.

[4] Alfred Jules Ayer, *The Origins of Pragmatism: Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sander Peirce and William James* (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 201.

[5] Robert J. Mulvaney and Philip M. Zeltner (eds.) *Pragmatism: Its Sources and Prospects* (Columbia, S. C.: The Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1981), VII.

[6] *Ibid.*

"coercive factors external to belief,"[7] thought of pragmatism as a theory of meaning, while James thought of it as a theory of both meaning and truth. We can rightly assume that there must have existed broader influential forces and currents in American culture at the time that appeared as a wider social context of unusual diversity and tensions and powerful divisions of interest. This means that in the Century of Progress, which made the magic words Progress, Growth, Unlimited Prosperity, and Science rule supreme, and in which, having the Puritan temper reconciled somehow with the instruments of progress, it was taken for granted that even God's plan was evolutionary, tensions arising from incompatible ethical trends began to erode the 19th-century paradise. Indeed, as H. S. Thayer contends, "American history is such a record of periodic disruption and mounting discord that one wonders how the notion of inevitable progress rooted itself so powerfully in the mind of laymen and visionaries".[8] Evidence was gradually mounting that Growth and Progress were no longer supposed to be synonymous and that within the nation powerful forces were working at cross purposes.

The most spectacular conflict and threat of disunion, of course, came with the Civil War, which was basically a Constitutional crisis. The potential forces of disruption, however, had been there earlier: the slavery issue, the War of 1812, the Missouri Compromise, the threat in 1832 that South Carolina would secede from the Union, the Compromise of 1850, the events in Kansas, Harpers Ferry, etc. What is perhaps less spectacular, but more relevant to our discussion, is that much of the tension was generated by diverse *methods of interpretation* and that conditions of conflict were generated by particular approaches to *meaning*.

From the very birth of the Republic, much friction and confusion were created by the meaning and acceptable modes of interpreting the role of the federal government and especially the Constitution generally. When, for instance, Alexander Hamilton introduced his bill for the purposes of establishing a national bank, the proposal ran into a hornet's nest. Jefferson

[7] H. S. Thayer, "Pragmatism: A Reinterpretation of the Origins and Consequences," in: R. J. Mulvaney and P. M. Zeltner, eds., *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

argued that the Constitution expressly enumerates all the powers belonging to the federal government and nowhere was the government empowered to set up a bank. Hamilton's plan, however, was still accepted and a precedent was established. In hardly more than a decade, when the Louisiana Purchase was coming up, it was Jefferson who was willing to yield to urgent pleas to stretch meanings in interpreting the President's treaty-making power to include the right of acquiring territory. Likewise, the various compromises from 1820 onward between the North and the South on the constitutional rights pertaining to the institution of slavery, as well as the Dred Scott decision of 1857 were, in a way, exercises in the explication of meaning.

A great number of similar instances could be cited. Diverse interpretations of one and the same thing, the question of the plausibility of interpretation, the apparent resilience of the techniques involved were obviously indicative not only of rival interests, competing norms and demands of conduct but also of a kind of intellectual and epistemological uncertainty concerning the relativistic nature of beliefs and the cavalier treatment of truth. At least this is how the perception of the average citizen may have registered his social environment. Perhaps I am not over-simplifying the issue in suggesting that in the light of the above it might be legitimate to consider the pragmatic theory of truth as a kind of philosophical rescue operation, a sort of unitive strategy, or as a socially conditioned philosophical manoeuvre. The pragmatists even may have cherished the hope that philosophy would participate in the main enterprise of human affairs.

It should be added, however, that not everyone who subscribes to the pragmatist theory of truth understands or is interested in the conceptual apparatus of postulates, premisses, or ostensibly watertight validation processes. In the popular consciousness pragmatism has undergone the inevitable process of fragmentation and (over)simplification and it has, in the popular idiom survived in piecemeal fashion, in catchphrases like "getting practical results," "getting things done," or thought of as an idea conveying a sense of business ethos, a call to action involving unprincipled expediency. Yet another widely shared view is that pragmatism is a

philosophy reflecting American commercial interests, social Darwinism, and imperialism in government and business. Indeed, as Kenneth R. Merrill remarks, "To many James's version of pragmatism seemed an invitation to cynicism, to a kind of philosophical Machiavellianism."[9] Or, as Josiah Royce observed sarcastically, "a pragmatist on a witness stand in court would, presumably, swear to tell the expedient, the whole expedient, and nothing but the expedient, so help him future experience."[10] In a technical and conceptual sense James's fundamental belief that the "truth" is the "successful" connection of perceiver and world (and in stressing the importance of the human perceiver's intentions he certaily reached back to Emerson) may have been misunderstood. For practical purposes, however, it has been the ostensibly misunderstood James (just like the misunderstood Freud a few years later) who has had a wide social appeal. After all, the fallibilistic allegation that the test of a truth is the experience it foretells is not too remote from the irresistible doctrine of man as a truth-maker. The idea that man is largely the author rather than discoverer of truth—the method of *making* truth rather than *finding* it—has been reinforced in this century by people like F. C. S. Schiller,[11] an adherent of the so-called hypothetico-deductive method,[12] who seems to make us believe that whatever we wish were true until it proves troublesome, perverting hereby an epistemologically responsible inquiry into a matter of convenience. James's tacit encouragement that in moments of doubt or moral dilemma we may take the answer that we find most satisfying, smacks of the grossest sort of relativism. The "try it—if it works, it is right" cliché can encourage a variety of responses—cheerful "way-out" solutions to painful dilemmas, therapeutic rescue operations in hopeless deadlocks—but it can also contribute to dangerous adventurism in politics, business,

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[9] Kenneth R. Merrill, "From Edwards to Quine: Two Hundred Years of American Philosophy," in: *Issues and Ideas in America*, eds. Benjamin J. Taylor and Thurman J. White (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1976), p. 238.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] F. C. S. Schiller, "William James and the Making of Pragmatism," *The Personalist* 8 (1927): pp. 81—93.

[12] W. V. Quine, "The Pragmatist's Place in Empirism," in: R. J. Mulvaney and P. M. Zeltner, eds. *op. cit.*, p. 33.

whatever. What can be especially disconcerting is the fact that "practical" pragmatism can be interpreted as offering a *carte blanche* for any kind of wild or erratic belief and it can thus create a loose terrain of responsibility. If truth is a matter of convenience, logic, even the logic of moral reservations, can be thrown overboard.

The epistemology of pragmatism, or at least the popular understanding of the pragmatist theory of truth, thus certaily encouraged strategies of validation which could not merely reinforce myth-making urges but, by elevating man to the position of truth-maker, tended to virtually coincide with myth itself in the sense that pragmatism could eminently satisfy our earlier functional definition of myth: *justification for whatever reason.*

MÁRIA BARTA

IN MEMORIAM LÁSZLÓ ORSZÁGH

Vadon, Lehel, ed. *Emlékkönyv Országh László tiszteletére.* Eger, Hungary: Eszterházy Károly Tanárképző Főiskola Nyomdája, 1993. 405 pp.

In 1994 honoring the 10th anniversary of László Országh's death the Department of American Studies of the Károly Eszterházy Teachers' Training College issued a special memorial volume edited by Lehel Vadon.

Primarily known as a lexicographer Országh was born in Szombathely on October 25, 1907. Having completed his primary and secondary education in his home town he began his studies as a Hungarian and German major at the Péter Pázmány University of Budapest and in the fall of 1926 he took on an additional specialization, English language and literature.

His desire to become familiar with all aspects of Anglo-Saxon culture resulted in a scholarship enabling him to spend the 1930–31 school year at Rollins College, Florida. The results of his research were summed up in a 1931–32 paper titled: "The Evolution of American Literary Historiography".

Although he started his career as a secondary school teacher, in 1937 he joined the famed Eötvös College and in 1942 he became a private-docent of the Péter Pázmány University. After military service and subsequent years of captivity as a prisoner of war in American occcupied Bavaria Országh returned to Hungary where he was asked to organize and run an English department at the University of Debrecen. While the department was eliminated in the fall of 1950, seven years later Országh was

commissioned in the same capacity again. During his tenure he had established a departmental library which became the most siginificant research library dedicated to English and American Studies in Hungary. He ran the Department of English at the Lajos Kosssuth University of Debrecen until his retirement in 1968.

Országh's lexicographic career began in 1948 with the publication of his Concise English-Hungarian Dictionary. In 1953 the famous comprehensive Hungarian-English and in 1960 its English-Hungarian counterpart appeared. From 1950 to 1957 he headed the Linguistic Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences where he organized and guided the publication of the Dictionary of the Hungarian Language. Országh continuously revised his dictionaries and he summed up his lexicographic experiences in his 1962 treatise titled: "Application of Lexicographic Theory and Practice during the Compilation of the Dictionary of the Hungarian Language" and in his "Lexicographic Studies". (1966)

Országh's scholastic versatility is vividly demonstrated by such seminal works as "The Origins of the English Novel"(1941) "Shakespeare" (1944). "The History of American Literature" (1967) and the "Introduction to American Studies" (1972). He was also a devoted researcher of English loan words adopted by the Hungarian language and wrote about the development of Hungarian-English and Hungarian-American cultural connections as well. (E.g.: English Travelers in Szombathely 200 Years Ago")

While according to Gyula Kodolányi Országh's academic activity was only "tolerated at best in his homeland", as an internationally renowned scholar Országh was awarded the Diamond Anniversary Medal of the London Institute of Linguistics in 1970 and nine years later his lifetime achievement was honored by Parliament's bestowal of the title: "Commander of the Order of the British Empire". After his death on January 27, 1984 László Országh was laid to rest in Szombathely according to his will.

The memorial edition is a tribute to Professor Országh's tremendous academic achievement. Despite its primary focus on literary history and analysis, the volume contains articles on linguistics (Csaba Czeglédy: "Indirect Questions in the English, Hungarian and Russian Languages",

József Csapó: "On Synthetic Compounds" and Béla Korponay: "A Few Thoughts on the Causative") and lexicography. (Tamás Magay: "László Országh, the Lexicographer" and Miklós Kontra: "The Use of "Hello" as a Form of Greeting in Hungary")

Two articles are dedicated to Hungary's image in the world, a subject so dear to Országh as well. Géza Jeszenszky's essay concentrates on the historic development of Hungary's image and warns of the dangers of a nation's unfavorable reputation. Tamás Magyarits analyzes New York Times articles on Hungary in an attempt to recapture Hungary's image in America in the 1920's.

Országh's interest in the English Renaissance is reflected in István Pálffy's piece on the "psychological drama" of the somewhat obscure playwright, John Ford.

Two articles are devoted to Irish literature, another integral element of Anglo–Saxon culture. Mária Kurdi briefly retraces the development of the Irish drama and analyzes two nationalism inspired contemporary plays offering peaceful solutions to that nation's centuries old crisis. Csilla Bertha distinguishes and defines mythic elements in 20th century Irish plays.

The memorial edition contains numerous articles on the subject of American Studies. In his essay titled: "Hungarian Reception of the Literary Achievements of the Colonial Period of the United States" Lehel Vadon analyzes Hungary's response to the works of the legendary adventurer Captain John Smith and retraces his footsteps in early 17th century Transylvania. Furthermore the author focuses on the achievements of the religious reformer and founder of the state of Rhode Island, Roger Williams (1603–1683) and probes the domestic reception of Increase Mather's (1639–1723) "Occidental Indies" as well.

István Géher's examination of Faulkner's Snopes trilogy reveals the Southern author's peculiar views concerning novels and the family saga. László Dányi also draws on the literature of the American South as his analysis of the thought processes of William Styron's two protagonists probe the "question of survival in this world."

Zoltán Abádi-Nagy's Walker Percy interview reveals the author's wiews on changes in American society and searches for the roots of Percy's

catholic existentialism through an analysis of his works.

Sarolta Kretzoi contrasts the romantic image and the sobering reality of the Westward Movement and examines the influence of the disappearance of the frontier and other social and economic developments of turn of the 20th century America on the evolution of literary realism and naturalism.

The book contains two essays devoted to literary theory. Enikő Bollobás and Donald Wesling retrace the development of the free verse and highlight its principal characteristics. Zsolt Virágos analyzes readers' reactions to myths and symbols arguing that the mere presence of such elements is no guarantee of lasting artistic value.

While the memorial Országh edition is a comprehensive publication meeting the highest professional requirements, thematic grouping of the articles would be a welcome help for the interested reader.

JOHN C. CHALBERG

AUGUST HECKSCHER: WOODROW WILSON
Macmillan, 1991, 734 pp.

Since the Civil War there have been but seven elected Democratic presidents, nearly half of whom advanced from relative obscurity directly to the White House. The first post-Civil war Democrat to run for and win the presidency was Grover Cleveland, who was the mayor of Buffalo, New York, at the time. Nearly a century later Jimmy Carter set out on his improbable quest for the Oval Office as a former one-term governor of Georgia. Between these two unlikely presidencies looms Woodrow Wilson, who waited until he was fifty-three to place himself before any electorate, and who, a scant two years later, had nearly completed his first term as the Governor of New Jersey when he wrested the 1912 Democratic presidential nomination from a small pack of better known rivals.

Cleveland, Carter, and Wilson...three gasping Democrats bobbing for political breath in a sea littered with marauding Republicans. Take away the thirty-six year New Deal interregnum between 1932 and 1968 and they are the only bona fide post-Civil War Democratic presidents (save Andrew Johnson who ran with Lincoln on the Union Party ticket in 1864). Cleveland, Carter, and Wilson...three accidental presidents whose accidental presidencies were not the result of presedential deaths.

Cleveland, Carter, and Wilson...three presidential aspirants who were the direct beneficiaries of intra-Republican squabbling. Fights between reformist Mugwumps and stand-pat Stalwarts helped elevate Mayor

Cleveland. In 1976 the one-two punch of Watergate and the Ford-Reagan fight proved slightly too much for the GOP to overcome. And in 1912 Wilson's victory was made possible by the titanic Roosevelt-Taft split.

Cleveland, Carter, and Wilson...three Democratic presidents whose presidencies punctured eras of Republican dominance. And there the similarity ends. After all, Wilson was both a forthrightly liberal president and a wartime president, while Cleveland and Carter were almost defiantly neither. Moreover, Wilson and Carter were southerners to one latitudinal degree or another; Cleveland, though sympathetic to the old Confederacy and the New South, was not.

Thirdly, to hear him tell it, the Reverend Carter lusted only "in the heart"; not so Cleveland, who fathered a child out of wedlock, and Wilson, who carried on an adulterous affair with the shadowy Mrs. Peck. And, of course, it was Carter who managed to confine all of his presidential failures to a single term; whereas Cleveland and Wilson took eight years to establish their own marks for futility. Finally, Cleveland and Carter were actually rejected by the voters; Wilson was never accorded that particular comeuppance.

But there is one other common thread. And therein lies a tale which goes beyond matters electoral, personal, and political and to the heart of what is wrong with the first single volume biography of Woodrow Wilson in better than three decades. Presidents Cleveland, Carter, and Wilson all interpreted their meteoric ascents to power to mean that they thought they had a direct pipeline to the American people. Each believed that he could safely ignore the advice of professional politicians, because each had convinced himself that he had achieved his lofty status without the assistance of professional politicians.

To one emotional degree or another, all three operated as thought they personally embodied the national will. Therefore, all three possessed a significant measure of disdain for those political mortals within their own party whose misfortune it was to dwell beneath them. In sum, all three inhabited the worst of all psychological worlds in that each was a professional politician who disliked other professional politicians as a matter of course and who refused to see himself as a member of the species.

August Heckscher, however, is bent upon separating Wilson from this trio of Democrats. To him, Woodrow Wilson was a self-acknowledged and accomplished professional politician.

Wilson, of course, spent most of his adult life away from the rough and tumble word of politics and in the sometimes rougher—and often more cruel—world of academia. Therefore, Heckscher properly invests nearly a third of this biography in the pre-presidential life of his subject. Son of a Presbyterian minister, young "Tommy" Wilson lived a well-travelled life in a number of southern parsonages before finding a home within Princeton University.

After a false start as a lawyer, a professionally reborn Woodrow Wilson earned a John Hopkins doctorate and set out on the path of an academic climber, culminating with his return to his beloved Princeton. For the ensuing eighteen years Wilson taught at (1892—1902) and presided over (1902—1910) the institution which had provided him with his "magical" undergraduate years.

Driven to succeed by a doting mother and a demanding father, Wilson established a name for himself as a scholar of politics long before he became a scholar in politics. Nonetheless, the substance of his most significant work, *Congressional Goverment*, was, in Heckscher's view, "not new." By the time of its 1885 publication the decline of presidential power was both obvious and well-documented. What set Wilson's contribution apart was his "method and style." At base, the young professor was less a scholar than he was a writer. As Heckscher notes, Wilson has often been accused of failing to investigate Congress directly "before sitting down to describe its workings." But such critics "miss the point; the book was in essence a work of the imagination. And the imagination was that born of the statesman."

Shortly before his elevation to the presidency of Princeton, Wilson confided to friend and fellow historian Frederick Jackson Turner that he had been "born a politician." Curiously, this self-characterization was not made with an eye toward his impending promotion, but in light of a pending request for a leave of absence so that he might travel, think, and write his "philosophy of politics." For Wilson, who as a young man was wont to

distribute calling cards labeled "Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Senator from Virgina," being a "politician" was not distinct from being a "scholar." His immediate goal was to satisfy both ambitions by producing his magnum opus. Instead, he was soon to embark on a more overtly political career which would leave him no time for leisurely travel, little time for reflective thought, and not enough time to write anything of substance.

By the spring of 1902 dissatisfaction with the six-year presidency of Francis L. Patton had reached "crisis proportions." With faculty morale low and academic standards in decline, the board of trustees (one of whose members was a former President of the United States by the name of Grover Cleveland) asked for Patton's resignation and replaced him with a "beloved figure within the whole Princeton community", Professor Woodrow Wilson.

Thus ended his years as a Princeton faculty member when Woodrow Wilson had been "as close to being a happy man as would ever be the case." By all accounts (Heckscher's included) Wilson loved the academic life. And with good reason: as a teacher and scholar Woodrow Wilson was a resounding success. That rarest of professorial birds, he was both a captivating lecturer and a highly regarded published historian.

Moreover, when he was not crafting either the spoken or written word Woodrow Wilson was the compleat family man, with a wife (Ellen Axson Wilson) whom he deeply loved and three daughters of whom he was thoroughly and equally proud. It would seem that nothing could have enhanced —or disturbed— this placid and productive scene. And yet Wilson thought he could improve upon perfection by crowning his academic career, not with a literaray masterpiece, but with the presidency of his treasured Princeton.

For most of the next eight years the Wilson biography is not a story of the Peter Principle in action. In fact, Heckscher judges the first half of his tenure to have been a "time of accomplishment." With the goal of placing a liberal arts education "squarely at the center of Princeton's task," Wilson moved rapidly to introduce a freshman core curriculum and to tighten all undergraduate discipline. The centerpiece for all of his plans was the much-heralded "preceptorial system," which placed a significant measure of

Princeton undergraduate education in the hands of freshly minted products of American highher education. By the fall of 1905 more than forty "preceptors" had been recruited, leading Heckscher to conclude that "no college faculty has ever received at one stroke so dramatic an infusion of new blood."

But Wilson's remaining four years (not unlike the second term of his second presidency) were far less successful. And, as would be the case in 1919, physical problems contributed to his political decline. On May 28, 1906, President Wilson awoke to find himself blind in his left eye. The loss of vision was initially attributed to a burst blood vessel, stemming from general hypertension; but subsequent authorities have concluded that this was the first of a series of small strokes, all of which were precursors to his collapse in the midst of the struggle to ratify the Versailles Treaty in the fall of 1919.

Whatever the exact cause of his illness, the Woodrow Wilson who presided over Princeton after the spring of 1906 displayed "not only a different side of his character but at critical moments (made) painful errors of judgment". Gone too frequently was the gentle, demonstrably affectionate Wilson. In its place was the "irascible" Wilson, who "never forgot that he was the son of Presbyterians." Unwilling to bend, unable to admit defeat, this Woodrow Wilson was, but his own words, "a thorough Presbyterian," and one who often felt, in Heckscher's words, "called to prove it." For the remainder of his life the oscillation between these two Wilsons continued unabated.

Other torments in Wilson's private life had begun to surface as well. Subject to mystifying bouts of depression which had long bedeviled the Axson family, Ellen Wilson a year earlier had suffered a shock from which she would never fully recover. In late April of 1905 her favored younger brother, his wife, and their two-year old son were drowned in a tragic ferry accident. In her grief and depression Ellen Wilson abruptly abandoned her role as Princeton's First Lady and gradually withdrew from her husband. In his confusion and resentment Woodrow Wilson retreated to Bermuda in the winter of 1907. There he sought rest and rejuvenation, while she remained in Princeton, much "like the fixtures in the house."

And there he met May Allen Hulbert Peck, once widowed, once unhappily married, and finally a Bermuda regular for the preceding fifteen winters. Though the friendship long remained a platonic one, the "web of circumstance had been woven...In Ellen's depression, in Mary Peck's faltering spirit, in Woodrow's emotional isolation existed elements to bring these three into a complex human relationship."

Following a second winter interlude in Bermuda, Wilson decided to reveal the friendship to his wife and without apparent remorse promised to extinguish what Heckscher calls this "glimpse of an intoxicating happiness." Two months later, as was often his practice, Wilson publicly paraded his private thoughts. In his 1908 baccalaureate address Wilson expressed a preference for self-denial over repentance: "I am not sure," he confided to his undergraduates, "that it is of the first importance that you should be happy. Many an unhappy man has been of deep service to the world and to himself." Or so Woodrow Wilson had assumed was his own fate.

Nonetheless, Heckscher believes it to be highly probable that the unhappy Wilson sought to retrieve his "glimpse" of happiness, specifically that his relationship with Mrs. Peck shifted from a romantic friendship to a love affair sometime during 1909. Unhappiness acknowledged, he moved to achieve personal happiness at the same time that his presidency—and his opportunity for service?—were grinding to an ignominious end.

Ironically, this betrayal of his wife (which years later Wilson referred to as an act of "folly and gross impertinence") came on the heels of his own feelings of betrayal at the hands of his prized Princeton protege, Professor John Hibben. At issue was the location of the graduate school, which Wilson did not want physically removed from the rest of the university. In this fight he thought that he could count on the support of Hibben only to have his longtime confidante and ally take the lead in opposing him. A simple negative vote the president might have accepted: but command of the dissidents was to Wilson an act of unforgivable treachery. A decade later, the until-then-ubiquitous Colonel Edward House stood similarly accused before meeting the same ostracized fate.

Curiously, Wilson was quick to see himself as the one betrayed, but never was he willing to admit that he might himself be the betrayer. In 1915

he would tell the soon-to-be second Mrs. Wilson, Edith Bolling Galt, that Ellen Wilson "knew and understood and (had) forgiven" his "folly" with Mary Peck prior to her death from Bright's disease in August of 1914. No more apparently needed to be—or was—said.

To Heckscher, Wilson routinely saw himself as "two different men, the one scarcely aware of what the other was thinking." Thus, he, too, seeks to absolve his subject of any responsibility for his behavior. If it was not a case of "dualism," it was simply Wilson's "New Freedom" asserting control of his private life a few years before it would surface as a campaign slogan.

Heckscher's penchant for excusing Wilson persists in his treatment of the gubernatorial and presidential Wilson. To Heckscher the New Jersey governorship was not a convenient escape from defeat at Princeton, because Wilson "simply did not see his carreer at Princeton as ending in failure." Nor did Hecksher's Wilson take the support of the New Jersey Democratic machine only to spurn the politicians by becoming a reform-minded governor. Such behavior was beyond the psychological pale for this ever-righteous son of Presbyterians.

If President Wilson was a reluctant gubernatorial candidate, then Governor Wilson was an equally hesitant presidential aspirant. With a biographer's shrug, Heckscher concludes that an almost apolitical Woodrow Wilson was "inclined to let matters take their course." But such nonchalance did not imply non-interest. Happy or unhappy, Woodrow Wilson was still a man of considerable ambition. Not that ambition ought to require a sacrifice of principle. As early as 1911 Wilson confided to Mary Peck his worry that the South might be too interested in his possible candidacy. In his view the South was conservative and "I am a radical." Given his "hatred" of "false colors," Wilson decided to go before an audience of prominent southern leaders to set the record straight by endorsing the initiative, referendum, and recall, which to Heckscher were then the "very symbols of radicalism in politics."

Once again Heckscher is willing to take Wilson at his word—and to note that his "radicalism" cost Wilson significant southern support at the 1912 Democratic convention. To Heckscher the Baltimore gathering was an "irresistible showpiece" of American politics—and one with a "happy

ending" as well. Not only was Wilson the nominee, but reformist progressivism was in control of the Democratic Party. Once again, Heckscher and Wilson are one.

Having taken Wilson to the doors of the White House, Heckscher permits the private Wilson a measure of reticence. The substance of the rest of the Wilson story is "less the tale of what the world did to him than of what he did to the world." Or tried to do, all in the name of something less than unbridled Wilsonian idealism, for August Heckscher, having already humanized the previously austere-appearing Professor Wilson, is determined to politicize the often dreamily protrayed President Wilson.

In fact, Heckscher takes pains to portray Wilson as the consummate consensus politician. Borrowing from an earlier Wilson biographer, Charles Seymour, Heckscher agrees that Wilson sought to "catch the trend of the inarticulate rather than the vociferous opinion." With a leadership style which "depended heavily on being able to interpret the national will," Wilson invariably waited for the majority view to surface magically—or "avoid[ed] action even when his personal views and preferences were clear."

The enactment of New Freedom legislation is a case in point. Laws were passed to "establish conditions for full and fair competition," but forgotten was his 1912 campaign "promise of social justice" as well. Here Heckscher and Herbert Croly, founding father of The New Republic, are one. To Heckscher, Wilson was all too content to leave "untouched the social and humanitarian issues that had been an underlying part of the New Freedom agenda." To Croly, Wilson was a conundrum: "How can a man of his shrewd and masculine intelligence possibly delude himself into making the extravagant clains which he makes on behalf of the Democratic legislative achievement." Heckscher thinks that he has an answer to "Croly's question: "Wilson's apparent belief that progressivism had been fulfilled...was at odds with his deeper convictions." However, Wilson the politician knew just what the traffic would bear and was quite content to settle for it.

On the foreign policy front Wilson pursued a similar strategy, his efforts to force Mexico to "elect good men" notwithstanding. Heckscher is not about to dismiss entirely the idealism that was a part of Woodrow

Wilson's nature, but he is insistent that that idealism was almost always tempered by political skill and historical knowledge. It is true that foreign policy was totally ignored in Wilson's first inaugural address. It is also true that his self-described "one track mind" focused primarily on domestic issues during the first months of his administration. And it is finally true that Wilson thought it would be a "supreme irony" if his presidency was engulfed by foreign policy.

Engulfed it became, but Heckscher argues that Wilson was "not as unprepared ... as has often been supposed." For years Professor Wilson had examined European forms of government and had pondered the "American march toward imperialism." For months President-elect and President Wilson had wondered about the fate of the previous graduate of Princeton University to occupy the White House. Woodrow Wilson, like James Madison before him, took pride in his scholarly erudition. But President Woodrow Wilson, unlike James Madison, was determined that he would never be drawn into war.

After August, 1914, Heckscher pursues Wilson's pursuit of peace, whether he was closeted in the White House with his thoughts and his typewriter, or at large on the golf course, out for a Sunday drive, or before a post-Lusitania crisis audience which learned that there was "such a thing as a man being too proud to fight." Clearly, Woodrow Wilson was not anxious to take his country into the maelstrom that was World War I. Neither were his countrymen anxious to be so led. To accomplish this peaceful end, Wilson had to steer between the Allied and Central powers and among any number of feuding advisers, from his first secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, who was too ready to sacrifice American interests, to his second secretary of state, Robert Lansing, who was too determined to join the allies on the field of battle.

Only Wilson, it seems, knew just when to urge peace, or to plot mediation, or to press the belligerents, or to begin the process of American mobilization. In fact, it was the "preparedness" issue that led Wilson to depart from his presidential practice of simultaneously listening to the people and remaining aloof from them. Until the end of 1915 and the decision to make the case for increased defense expenditures Wilson's

presidency had been "at least as taciturn as Cleveland's." Not so from that point on...until his fateful collapse in the midst of the fight for the treaty and the league.

These nearly four years of the Wilson admistration mark the slow birth, the temporary triumph and the final defeat of Wilsonian idealism. They also call into question Heckscher's portrait of a President Woodrow Wilson who was instinctively reluctant to waste personal energy or invest political capital. Gone was the Wilson who would wait for a national consensus to emerge. But gone as well were "his more attractive qualities—modesty and humor, courtesy under stress." Unhappily in Heckscher's view, this "human" side of Wilson's personality was never fully revealed to the American people. Unhappily for Wilson and those around him, it disappeared from private view as the question of peace or war intensified.

Gone also was Wilson the conciliator. In his place stood Wilson the oracle, Wilson the idealist, and Wilson the victim of his enemies' treachery.

Heckscher, in fact, discovers many Wilsons, but never does he come upon a hypocritical Wilson. In 1916 Wilson ran for re-election as the peace candidate. Even the departed Bryan "join[ed] with the American people in thanking God that we have a president who does not want this nation plunged into this war." Did God—or the president—deserve such thanks? Surely not the latter, Heckscher concludes, for he did little more than "pick up the antiwar theme of the (Democratic) convention and use it with devastating effectiveness."

Wilson proceeded to use his victory to attempt once more to stop what was to him an essentially European civil war in which both sides "professed allegiance to the same ultimate goals." The Allies were angered by Wilson's moral equation, but Heckscher is not. Whether offering mediation or delivering his "peace without victory" speech, Wilson was a representative of the "noblest tradition of western liberalism" at a time of rampant "militarism" throughout the western world.

And how did the German government respond to these overtures? With an act of premeditated betrayal by announcing the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. Wilson suffered a "profound shock," but neither he nor the American people were as yet ready for war.

Two months would pass before Wilson took the final "tragical" step. "Tragical" was Wilson's word, and by it he meant not just the loss of life, but the inevitable embrace of evil means to achieve what had always been his goal, namely the redemption of corrupt Europe. What he thought had been obtainable by peaceful example was now to be accomplished by force of arms.

"Tragical" might also be Heckscher's word to describe Woodrow Wilson's public life between the spring of 1917 and the fall of 1919, "tragical" not solely because of Wilson's debilitating stroke, but also because of his failure to achieve his larger vision. It is Heckscher's contetion that this failure was both preventable and lamentable.

He attributes Wilson's defeats to a series of errors in political judgment, rather than to a flawed—or inevitably interventionist— Wilsonian vision. Long reluctant to enter the war, Wilson also proved hesitant to demand wartime conformity at home or to eliminate Bolshevism in Russia. If there was hysteria on the homefront, it was beyond the president's power to conjure up or to control. And if Leninism was at odds with Wilsonianism, the president preferred more watchful waiting to military action, because he wanted the Russian people to have an opportunity to work out their own political destiny. To Wilson, Bolshevism was both an expression of Russian national will and a "protest against the way in which the world has worked." Wilson, of course, did ultimately sign on with the comic opera that was the allied intervention in the Russian civil war. Heckscher, however, sees this as a minor aberration rather than a symptom of the real Woodrow Wison at his evil worst.

Finally, Heckscher is covinced that had Wilson not suffered his crippling stroke there would have been no Palmer raids and no American Red Scare. Having denied a politically powerful and apparently healthy Woodrow Wilson responsibility for the anti-Hun excesses, Heckscher presumes that a politically weakened but physically able Woodrow Wilson would have blunted its anti-red counterpart.

But was Wilson as benign—or as powerful—as Heckscher suggests? Not when the peace settlement was at stake. Heckscher regrets Wilson's "almost inevitable" decision to go to Paris, but surmises that Wilson had an

inkling as to what was in store for him: "As martyrs before him had gone to their martyrdom, Woodrow Wilson went half-knowingly, not entirely cheerless, and ready to put up a good fight." Furthermore, this martyr went into the lion's den "an essentially modest man," uninterested in fighting alone and ready to make common cause with and left-liberals everywhere. In fact, in the early stages of the conference Wilson gave no hint of playing the martyr at all, but operated as a "model of open-minded, if determined, rationalism."

The rational approach was already at the work in the collectivity of the Inquiry, a stable of American experts on whom the "open-minded" Wilson "relied heavily." ("Show me the right and I will fight for it.") Wilson was also prepared to fall back on his well-tested skills as a persuader and negotiator. It was almost as though the old Woodrow Wilson had been born anew.

Far from being overcome by—or misreading the adulation of—the European masses, Wilson understood the French need for security and worked to form a "sincere friendship" with French Premier Georges Clemenceau. At the same time, Wilson saw the League of Nations as a "vital thing—not merely a formal thing." In his view the League was not to be restricted to enforcing the treaty. And in Heckscher's view Wilson's "overall conviction of the need for the League was certainly correct"—and not necessarily inimical to either American or French national interests.

In fact, Wilson's self-imposed task in the first phase of the conference was to imbed the League in the Treaty. That achieved, he returned to the United States in early March. But any initial success that Wilson enjoyed was not to be repeated when the conference reconvened in April.

Why? In Wilson's occasionally paranoiac mind the fault lay with Colonel House, who "ha(d) given away everything (Wilson) had won before (he) left Paris." Here was Wilson betrayed yet again—and by no less than another trusted ally whom the president loved like a brother. In truth, Wilson's conference colleagues used the League to exact concessions, concessions Wilson presumed would be corrected by a "vital" League. But for the time being Wilson was at the mercy of the "extremism of French

claims," claims which Heckscher subsequently characterized as "not unreasonable." In any event, the French occupation of the left bank of the Rhine and of the Saar Basin were not the result of any machination on the part of Colonel House, but of the process of the negotiations themselves. If anything, House could be accused of being unwilling to placate the new Mrs. Wilson who both distrusted and despised him.

But Edith Bolling Galt Wilson was not the only member of the Wilson household who held others in disdain in the spring of 1919. For his part, the president despised and disdained both Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and the entire Republican majority of the United States Senate. According to Heckscher, such feelings left Wilson "in no mood" to address the Congress upon his return to Washington following the pause in the Paris talks. All bitterness aside, Heckscher argues that Wilson erred significantly in refusing to take this "dramatic step to assert national leadership." And yet by not asserting presidential power Wilson was really doing no more and no less than Heckscher assures us had long been typical of this politically successful presidency. It was Theodore Roosevelt who climbed into the bully pulpit with little urging; Woodrow Wilson, on the other hand, generally preferred a more restrained approach, no matter his frame of mind. Besides, hadn't Professor Wilson himself asserted in *Constitutional Government* of the United States that the president ought to defer to the collective judgment of the senate when the issue at hand was treaty ratification?

Presumably, President Wilson had forgotten what Professor Wilson had written. Political errors or memory lapses aside, Woodrow Wilson in the summer of 1919 was not yet a man devoured by paranoia or driven by a martyr complex. At least August Heckscher's Woodrow Wilson was not such a man: "With a stubborn faith in the ultimate good sense of the people, Woodrow Wilson managed to avoid depression or despair...(Instead) he remained detached and integrated, hopeful but not quite fooled, either by himself or by others."

But as of mid-1919 President Wilson was a once adept politician who had lost a step or two. An earlier Wilson might have realized that the American infatuation with the idea of the League of Nations had cooled. An earlier Wilson would surely have come to terms with the force and depth of

the "partisan passions" arrayed against him. And an earlier Woodrow Wilson, the "shrewd and practical" Woodrow Wilson, no doubt would have forged a working coalition to secure ratification of the treaty in some acceptable form. But the Woodrow Wilson of the summer of 1919 was a "depleted man." It was this Wilson who made one of the "most fateful decisions" of his political career, and a decision which Heckscher argues was out of character for him, namely the decision to take his case for the Treaty and the League directly to the American people.

According to Heckscher, Wilson's "nature" as a political leader was to stand on principle, but to "take circumstances into due account" when applying his principles to political reality. As Lodge added reservation upon reservation Wilson had to have been aware that the Treaty would not pass the Senate without some changes. Instead of accepting—and modifying—the Lodge agenda, Wilson refused to "take circumstances into due account." Instead of dealing with the Senate he took to the hustings. The result was political defeat and a personal breakdown. "I don't seem to realize it," the president told his White House physician, "but I seem to have gone to pieces." That much at least he did come to realize. The loss of the treaty, however, he refused to accept.

Isolated in battle, Woodrow Wilson grew even more remote in the remaining months of his suddenly depleted presidency. Like Cleveland before him and Carter after him, Wilson left the White House a politically broken man. Though it was not necessarily his intention to do so, Heckscher has tried valiantly to separate his subject from the failures of these two Democrats, who also rose to the presidency almost without warning, who also preferred to stand apart from their party at critical junctures, and who met failure in Washington partly because of their refusal to play Washingtonian games.

For better or for worse, Woodrow Wilson was an oracle—and an idealist—before he was a politician. Heckscher would have it the other way around, but to minimize his idealism is to deny the reality of the man. Wilson himself said it best during his fight to keep the United States out of World War I: "I know I am an idealist, because I am an American and America is the only idealistic nation in the world."

In a sence, August Heckscher has written a biography of Woodrow Wilson that is very much in keeping with America's diminished view of itself at the end of the twentieth century. The Cold War has ended and much of the world seems to be asking to be made safe for democracy. And yet America shrinks from its historic role. Providential is the opportunity, but prudential is the operative word.

It may be ironic—or more likely just a quirk of history—that George Bush was born the year that Woodrow Wilson died. A product of the Good War and the American Century, Bush's political life and professional resume have been ample preparation for a Wilsonian presidency. Every internationlist gene in his body ought to command this president in the direction of a rejuvenated Wilsonianism. Instead, we have the New World Order which places a premium on stability and leader-to-leader confidentiality. As Wilson apparently sympathized with the security needs of France, so Bush claims to understand the very different security needs of the current Chinese gerontocracy.

Nowhere in the George Bush order of things is there room for leadership on the order of a Woodrow Wilson before August Heckscher got hold of him. To be blunt, Heckscher has given us Woodrow Wilson as a considerably more articulate and slighly more principled George Bush, instead of the Woodrow Wilson who was never bedeviled by the charge that he lacked a "vision thing."

The first Democratic president since Grover Cleveland may have been a blip on the political screen of Republican dominance in the White House, but he caused a mighty stir during his eight years in power. George Bush has had a stir fall into his lap, but he seems to have little clue as to what to do with it. The president as steward, he seems to want four more years in office.

Near the end of his second term Woodrow Wilson canvassed the country to preach to Americans that the time had come to join the community of nations. Throughout his presidency George Bush has circled and re-circled the globe in search of his elusive stability and, oh yes, in search of "jobs, jobs, and jobs" for Americans. The former believed that America had something to offer the world; the latter behaves as though the

world owes Americans a living. For George Bush, this may be a politically prudent course to follow, but it is not exactly what Woodrow Wilson had in mind.

LÁSZLÓ DÁNYI

STUDIES IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN CULTURE

Proceedings of the Conference on English and American Studies, Eger, 1989. 338 pp.
Edited by Lehel Vadon

The 338-page-long volume is published by Károly Eszterházy College of Education, Eger. There are 30 essays in the thick book and the essays are put into four categories. 11 essays are written in the Literature section, 2 essays cover Civilization and 14 essays are written in the field of Linguistics. 3 essays belong to the Education section. Most of the writers are from Eger and Debrecen but professors from Budapest and Szeged and Pécs can also be found among the authors. Two authors from foreign universities—Donald E. Morse, USA, and Tran Van Thank, Viet-Nam—offered their proceedings to the volume. Most of the articles are written in English and three of them are in Hungarian.

The publication of the proceedings is a major event in the history of English and American studies in Hungary. It is the first time that the connference on English and American studies has been held in Eger. The collection of essays and the conference prove that Károly Eszterházy College of Education has become one of the major centers of English and American studies.

Csilla Bertha analyzes "The Human Miracle in Thomas Murphy's Plays". The essay deserves special attention. The thorough analysis of the relationship between reason and imagination is further extended by

references to Hungarian literature. The consciousness of Irish people is linked to that of Hungarian people. The dialectal logic of both/and is examined and the coherence between suffering and redemption, guilt and forgiveness, hopelessness and hope, damnation and salvation is regarded as being rather in a dialectal unity than in the logical succession of cause and effect.

Pál Csontos' "Bernard Malamud: Human, Humane, Humanitanian?" focuses on the acceptance of life and art in Malamud's *Pictures of Fidelman* and *The Tenants*.

Unfortunately not many articles have been written on African literature. Katalin Egri's "An Interpretation of 'The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born' by Ayi Kwei Armah" observes the effect of corruption on culture in Ghana.

József Hruby also touches the corruptive influence of power in his essay "Writers in Arms: G. Orwell and A. Koestler on the Spanish Civil War." By analyzing the two authors' works Hruby draws the conclusion that Orwell was the great writer and Koestler was the great thinker.

Mária Kurdi introduces the poetry of Len Roberts whom she knows personally. In "On the Poetry of Len Roberts" she analyzes some poems by Roberts and reveals Roberts' past when he began his career as translator by rendering contemporary Hungarian poetry into English.

Éva Miklódy contrasts the traditional stereotypical roles of black women to their actual roles in Zora Neale Hurston's *Their Eyes Were Wathing God*.

In "Postmodernism, Modernism, Premodermism and the Fantastic Meet the American Consciousness and Literature Midway in the Twentieth Century" Donald E. Morse observes the shift in attitudes from the premodern and modern to the postmodern. The writer of the essay takes the example of three American presidents—Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Richard Milhous Nixon—whose careers typify the three types of consciousness.

Klára Szabó's "From Environmentalism to Right Brain Theater" begins with the history of Off-Broadway and Off-Off Broadway theaters. The

major tendencies that have emerged within the Off-Off Broadway movement are described in details.

Péter Szaffkó analyzes the role of historical drama in Canadian literature in his "History as a Subject in Modern English–Canadian Drama". He shows how history as a subject in Canadian Drama has contributed to the emergence of a truly Canadian form. Károly Szokolay illustrates the peculiarities of Dezső Mészöly's interpretations of Shakespeare.

Lehel Vadon writes about the reception of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow in Hungary. The essay regards Longfellow as being rather a genuine American poet growing up from American soil than a derivative poet immitating the manners of English poetry. The extensive notes prove that the essay covers a wide range of material. After the essay a full bibliography of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow in Hungary follows. The bibliography is divided into the following sections: Longfellows works in Hungarian translation, his poems in Hungarian anthologies and in periodicals, the Hiawatha in Hungarian periodicals and a list of secondary sources in Longfellow's reception in Hungary.

Two articles were published in the Civilization section. Tamás Magyarics discusses the Anglo–Irish Relations between 1825 and 1848. Zsolt Virágos analyzes the relationship of myth and ideology in the American civil religion.

In the Linguistics section all the essays except one are written in English. One third of the authors in this section are from the College of Education in Eger. The Education section closes the volume, in which three articles are published in the field of methodology.

The volume is of high standard and is well-arranged. It reflects the thorough research carried out by scholars all over Hungary at the end of the 80s.

DONALD E. MORSE

"A FIGHTER FOR RIGHTEOUS CAUSES ENCOUNTERS POLITICAL FASHION."

Lehel Vadon, *Upton Sinclair in Hungary*.
Eger: College Press, 1993. 125 pp.

In the United States, Upton Sinclair's (1878—1968) reputation was made with the publication of *The Jungle* (1906), the most powerful of all the muck-raking novels. So consistent and strong was this reputation for exposing evils and demanding reforms, especially of the Chicago stockyards, that sixty years later, in 1967 President Lyndon B. Johnson invited Sinclair to the White House "to witness the signing of the Wholesome Meat Act, which will gradually plug the loopholes left by the first Federal meat inspection law" (*New York Times*). It was Sinclair's writings, especially *The Jungle* which helped bring about enactment of the original meat inspection act! This visit was wholly consistent with Sinclair's reputation in America, for throughout his long career he has between viewed not so much as a novelist—despite winning a Pulitzer Prize in 1942 for *Dragon's Teeth* one of his *Lanny Budd* novels—as a vigorous, crusading journalist bent on exposing the evils and hypocrisy of social, political, educational, and economic institutions.

In Hungary, Sinclair's reception was highly influenced by doctrinaire rather than by aesthetic consideration, as Lehel Vadon has extensively demonstrated in a series of articles (see, for example, "Upton Sinclair

esztétikája a magyar irodalmi kritikában," *Hevesi Szemle*, 1979) and now most persuasively in *Upton Sinclair in Hungary* (Eger, 1993).

If Sinclair was undervalued as a writer as opposed to as a journalist in America, then clearly he was over-valued as a writer in Hungary. Political fashion hailed him first as a great writer until he fell from favor when he became virtually ignored. Vadon reports that "the change in attitude towards Upton Sinclair between 1949 and 1956 can be seen most strikingly in the *Népszava*. The paper which for fifty years had ceaselessly praised the writer now ... aimed to destroy the writer through a series of crude and malicious allegations." But this was only the beginning: "for ten years following ... nothing was published on ... Sinclair in any Hungarian newspaper or periodical"! Only with the '56 uprising and the subsequent relaxation of journal censorship, the opening up of the universities, and the decline of propaganda was Sinclair evaluated seriously in Hungary.

Kurt Vonnegut once wittily remarked that one of Hitler's worst crimes was that "he gave a good name to war." Similarly, one might say that one of despotic Communism's worst crimes was that it gave a bad name to socialism. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the reception of Sinclair in Hungary which is held hostage to official cultural values and taste in literature despite his well-earned socialist credentials. Thus Vadon traces the attacks on the very successful *Lanny Budd* novels, including the foremost bestseller in Hungary, *World's End* (1940): Hungarian "nazi-sympathizers considered the book to be anti-nazi ... [while] during the fifties because Sinclair had attacked Stalin and his policies both the cycle and its author were pronounced to be anti-soviet and reactionary." Another similar victim of political fashion was Sinclair's autobiographies. H. L. Mencken considered Sinclair's *Autobiography* (1962) which includes a revision of *American Outpost* (1932) his greatest work, yet despite two translations of the earlier work into Hungarian (1938 and 1947) the book of reminiscences went virtually unnoticed with only one highly negative review in *Korunk* (1939).

Notwithstanding such obstacles several Hungarian critics and scholars have offered well-considered views such as Géza Hegedűs on the Lanny Budd novels and László Országh on Sinclair's oevre, besides Zoltán

Fábry, Pál Tábori and a few others. Vadon's volume includes a useful Checklist of Sinclair works translated into Hungarian, notices and reviews, criticism and scholarship. There is also a helpful index to the volume which chronicles the Hungarian reception of the writer once described by his wife as "a brave and skillful fighter in the cause he loved" whose work reflects both his fighting ability and his belief in those causes he fought for.

ANDRÁS TARNÓC

ROBERT HUGHES: CULTURE OF COMPLAINT
Oxford University Press, 1993. 203 pp.

The United States has always occupied a special realm within the imagination of the world. From the moment of its inception it has been considered one of mankind's noble experiments, a country of second chances, where the sins of the Old World could be redeemed by the struggle for the foundation of the New. While the much celebrated fall of the Berlin Wall, the subsequent political regeneration of Central and Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Empire left the U.S.' historic superpower status untouched, America in the late 1980's and early 1990's began to show signs of inner decay. The collapse of the Soviet Union had a dual effect on American polity eliminating its chief adversary and tossing the nation into a paradoxical turmoil.

Whereas the worldwide defeat of communism signaled capitalism's greatest victory, the United States seemed to have lost its direction. A nation guided by the idea of the protracted conflict—a historic clash between two antagonistic political and economic systems—was suddenly searching for a new sense of mission in a unipolar world.

Robert Hughes, the art critic of TIME magazine is a keen observer of post Cold War America. In his latest effort he takes a concerned look at the current crisis of his adopted country.

The book's eloquent and succinct subtitle, "The Fraying of America", underscores Hughes' message; the United States after centuries of

inner stability and global domination is on the decline. The nation's crisis is caused by two culprits; political fragmentation and cultural separatism. Political fragmentation is brought about by the very nature of democracy and a redefinition of the nation's value system. Cultural balkanization is a harmful side effect of multiculturalism, a manifestation of America's demographic transition.

"Culture of Complaint" is a series of lectures compressed into 3 subsections where the author presents a detailed examination of several aspects of current American civilization.

The first chapter analyzes the relationship of culture to a politically and morally disintegrated state. Hughes discerns external and internal causes behind the decline of America. In the last 20 years national consensus fell victim to divisive political maneuvering and a failure of communication between liberals and conservatives.

The notion that the United States was a country where diverging interests and antagonistic aspirations could be placated by appeals for the welfare of the country became a casualty of a general obsession with victimhood, cultural separatism and the idea of political correctness.

America's current preoccupation with victimhood is a projection of Puritan thought processes onto the present. The Puritans escaped the evils of "religious and political persecution to create a new world in order to redeem the fall of European man". This "experiment in applied theology" developed into a nation devoted to the sanctity of political equality and individual rights.

It is one of the ironies of history that the ideas of erstwhile colonial victims came to be seen as the ideology of the oppressor. The Puritan value system based on the duality of victimhood and redemption became the accepted norm in the first 160 years of American democracy chiefly affording the privilege of the latter for inhabitants of European stock. The country underwent a demographic revolution in the post World War II. years as the principal origin of immigration shifted from Eastern and Southern Europe to Southeast Asia and Latin America. Furthermore the Civil Rights Movement culminated in the acquisition of political equality for the nation's largest ethnic minority, African-Americans, the descendants of

former slaves. Thus the notion of a heretofore white protestant mainstream American ideal faced a serious challenge as new groups began to demand their share of the "American Dream".

Whereas the civil rights revolution and subsequent ethnic awareness movements of the 1960's achieved political equality for minority groups, economic parity seemed to be out of reach. American society was divided between two opposing viewpoints; conservatives arguing the sufficiency of present gains and liberals voicing displeasure over the limits of political equality.

Frustrated by their inability to partake in the "American Dream" minorities found solace in ethnic pride movements where differences from the mainstream American norm were idolized in such slogans as "Black is Beautiful" and "Brown Power".

Ethnic achievements and racial equality suffered significant setbacks in the 1980's during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. As a former Democrat turned fiscal conservative Republican, Reagan capitalized on the division of American society and attempted to annihilate several privileges gained by minorities. The American Left's failure to mount an effective challenge against Reaganism found an expression in the political correctness movement.

Following the Puritan value system the politically correct school of thought views the American past in the framework of victims and villains. Similarly to the settlers of New England who condemned European intolerance, in the politically correct worldview of late 20th century America the role of the villain is assigned to a special category, the white European male. Consequently the history of the U.S. is viewed as a neverending laundry list of atrocities and violations perpetrated against a wide array of minority groups. Thus the newest object of a historic American obsession— the search for public enemy No. I.—the white European, or any person with a White Anglo-Saxon Protestant background must lower his head in shame and is held responsible for every injustice befallen on mankind, from slavery to the destruction of the ozone layer.

Political correctness is a multidisciplinary phenomenon encompassing three main objectives; the restructuring of the English language,

revision of American history and reforming public education. The movement's guiding principle is the notion of equality and it is aimed to recompensate heretofore neglected or oppressed components of American society at the expense of "mainstream American culture".

On the linguistic front a bizarre campaign is waged against gender-specific words reflecting oppressive male-female relationships or any sign of racial or physical difference.

In PC speak "chairman" becomes "chairperson" "woman" is replaced by the androgynous term "womyn" and a "cripple" turns out to be "physically challenged." Hughes mercilessly dissects this "linguistic Lourdes" as he writes. "Does the cripple rise from his wheelchair, or feel better about being stuck in it, because someone back in the days of the Carter administration decided that for official purposes he was physically challenged? Does the homosexual suppose others love him more or hate him less, because he is called a gay? The net gain is that thugs who used to go faggot-bashing now go gay bashing".

America's obsession with victimhood as an access to social and political acceptance made the white male a victim himself, seeking solace in esoteric male liberation movements and habitual shirking of public responsibility.

The nucleus of the political correctness movement is the academic world where the college campus is in danger of becoming, a modern day equivalent of Puritan Massachusetts. Speech codes governing student conduct in such venerable educational institutions as Stanford or the University of California Santa Cruz prohibite pejorative references to ethnic minorities, women and the disabled. The Santa Cruz campus' campaign against terms like "nip in the air" and "chink in one's armor" are just the few of the ever growing examples of this bizarre trend. In politically correct history books Columbus is depicted as a procurer of genocide, a "Hitler on caravel" and the Native American is assigned the role of an innocent historical bystander.

Hughes however, is not content with simple description, recognizing that the PC movement is no more than a band-aid solution, a surface treatment for the underlying problems of present day America. The economic gap between whites and minorities, the "glass ceiling" and the

"mommy track" keeping women from realizing their American Dream and the historic ethnocentrism of American public education will not be obliterated by the magic wand of euphemism and the onslaught of sensitivity courses.

The author also refrains from unilaterally blaming liberals for the present paralysis of public discourse, for ill-guided attempts of social engineering through language is a favored method of obfuscation employed by the "patriotically correct" American Right as well.

In the second section Hughes analyzes the multiculturalism phenomenon and its unwelcome companion, cultural separatism. Multi-culturalism, initially a government sponsored promotional program for public acceptance of minority cultures turned into a complex assault on the myth of an ethnically homogeneous American civilization. As a result of the demographic transition of the U.S. multiculturalism finds its origins in cultural relativism, a school of anthropology assigning equal value to all civilizations.

Hughes emphatically attacks the conservative perception of a uniform mainstream culture, arguing that American society had always been multiculturalist and continues to be so. He believes in intelligent multiculturalism and its mutual acceptance of all cultures. He laments the latest example of distorted multiculturalism, the emergence of Afro-centrism and its efforts to rewrite history.

Afro-centrists assert that prehistoric Egypt and its achievements are part of a lost black civilization and all human culture originates from the black continent. The author poignantly refutes the fallacies of Afro-entrism, but warns of the increasing influence of its tenets, manifested by the popularity of the Portland Baseline Essays and the curricula of the New York School District.

Multiculturalists aim to restructure the Canon, the nationally accepted reading list for public and higher education by eliminating works of Dead European Writers. Consequently Shakespeare and Dostoyevsky are claimed to be elitist and representative of an oppressive system irrelevant to the lives of ethnic minorities.

Hughes not only disputes the need for a Canon, but by quoting

Derek Walcott, a recent Nobel laureate, he proves that the masterpieces of European literature have universal appeal.

Hughes rejects the zero-sum game perception of education where the inclusion of European elements would automatically lead to the exclusion of the achievements of the Third World. He provides an eloquent defense of Eurocentric schooling, arguing that his Jesuit upbringing gave him the basic skills necessary to appreciate other cultures.

The author is concerned about an alarmingly anti-European oriented rewriting of history, where the white man and the Old Continent is habitually blamed for all ills that visited the peoples of the Third World.

Hughes acknowledges historians' indebtedness to Third World nations for "a systematic neglect of their history, but rejects any attempt to rewrite the past in the name of affirmative action".

In the last chapter Hughes raises his voice against the politicization of the art world, asserting that the current controversy around the National Endowment for the Arts, a non-profit organization devoted to the support of struggling artists, is another symptom of the crisis of American culture.

Hughes thoughtfully dispels the endearing myth of the therapeutic function of the arts and laments the fact that political correctness crept into the art world. Consequently museums have to navigate between pressures from the American Right and Left and quality and demands for artistic standards are viewed as the sexist and racist white society's attempts to suppress minority artists.

Eversince Crevecoeur's inquisitive cry; "What then is the American, this new man?" several attempts have been made the unravel the mystery of American culture. Hughes inquires about the direction America is taking and is concerned about the onset of cultural and political disintegration.

The author's greatest asset is his objectivity amidst the emotionally charged atmosphere. He dares discuss issues deemed touchy and too controversial by others and seeks the possibility of intelligent public discourse.

Few can argue with Hughes' conclusion that political correctness and multiculturalism signal the crisis of post Cold War America. These trends however, are only the latest manifestations of an American tradition,

a constant redefinition of the nation's values, as a lack of a tangible and potent outside adversary forced Americans to search for the enemy within.

Hughes and other observers of the American scene can find solace in the genius of American civilization, its built-in rejection of extremism. PC censoriousness will undoubtedly follow the path of the Salem witchhunts and the hysteria of McCarthyism, but until then it is reassuring to hear Robert Hughes, a sound of reason and tranquility over the jumbled noise of heated rhetoric and the deadlock of political paralysis.

Főiskola Nyomda, Eger