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PAKISTANI GUEST WORKERS IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Ivan Szelenyi

ABSTRACT

Utilizing new survey results and qualitative sociological findings the below paper analyzes the working and living experiences of migrant workers in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The paper demonstrates that while Pakistani workers' working and living conditions are much worse than those of Emiratis or white expats, most of them have better earnings than in Pakistan. The research shows that return migrants in Pakistan are upwardly mobile in the social hierarchy of Pakistan. The paper faces two analytical puzzles. The first puzzle is that while direct incomes, job opportunities are better in the UAE than in Pakistan, nevertheless return migrants express dissatisfaction at varying but substantial degrees with their living conditions in the UAE due to hidden, not planned financial, social and emotional costs occurring during their stay. The second puzzle is that, though return migrants usually complain – often bitterly – about their UAE experience, nevertheless many return migrants hope to return to UAE if a new job opportunity is offered to them. Thus using focus groups, individual interviews, quantitative analysis of survey answers and regression models the paper analyzes what individual and/or household level mechanisms and factors play a crucial role in this mass return migration and its perception among migrants themselves?

Keywords: migration, Gulf states, return migration, migration theory, neo-classical economics, new economics of labor migration

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INTRODUCTION

The Gulf monarchies are nations constituted only by natives, descendent of people who lived in the national territory already at a predetermined time (usually before the discovery of oil resources). They admit non-nationals only temporarily with no promises, institutions or procedures to ever grant them citizenship and in anticipation that they (and even their children born in the Gulf monarchies) will return to their home country once their services are not needed any longer (Fargues, 2011, pp.273-292; Kapiszewski, 2001; 2006; Migration and the Gulf, 2010).

This paper is a case study from the Gulf, the United Arab Emirates. Next to Qatar the UAE is the most extreme case of nation building based on the social exclusion of guest workers by a shrinking minority. The "nationals" – as the natives are referred to – are a distinct minority, by the 2005 census they represented just over 20% of the population, by the 2011 census just slightly more than 10%[1].

For this study one of the major "sending countries" of migrant workers to the UAE (and to the other Gulf Monarchies) has been selected: Pakistan. While a law prevents the UAE statistical offices to release data on ethnic origins and religions of the population, and even the population number is estimated variously, according to the best estimates – including the recent ones of the World Bank – the population of the UAE is close to 9.3 million[2] Among them Emiratis represent something like 900,000, and half of the remaining 8 million are south Asians, 2.5 million from India, over 1 million from Pakistan, close to 1 million from Bangladesh[3]. Since I had an old Pakistani friend, Riaz Hassan, who taught at NYU Abu Dhabi during 2010-11, I decided to focus my study on Pakistanis.

This paper is a chapter from a forthcoming book, tentatively entitled: "Building nations with non-nationals - The exclusionary immigration regimes of the Gulf

[1] Population size and percentage of "nationals" is hotly debated, for a reasonably balanced overview of census results see Dubai FAQs, 2017.
[2] For 2016 it was 9.269 million.See: World Bank Data - Population, total - World Bank Group, 2017.
[3] See World Bank, 2017; CIA, 2017. The CIA seems to overestimate the Emirati population at 15%. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>

Monarchies with a case study of Pakistani return migrants from and prospective migrants to the United Arab Emirates"[4].

For this project I formulated two major empirical research questions.

(1) I compared identity and ethno-sectarian prejudices of prospective and return migrants in order to explore whether time spent in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious/cultural UAE created a more universal identity and less prejudice against "others" among return migrants than what we can observe among prospective migrants. This is a question of some importance since one observes at least an apparent ethno-sectarian peace in the UAE and I wanted to test whether exposure to other ethno-sectarian groups is the reason for this (since they have more contact with them) or is this ethno-sectarian peace merely the result of effective system of surveillance and the imminent threat of deportation of trouble makers. If return migrants have more universalistic identities and more tolerant attitudes towards "other" ethno-sectarian groups than prospective migrants that can be interpreted as a support for "contact hypothesis" (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Hewstone, 2003); if we find no difference between the two groups it support the theory that ethno-sectarian peace in the UAE is the result of the tight system of surveillance and threat of deportation. (This is Chapter 3 of the book, Chapter 1 gives an overview of different immigration regimes and indentifies the Gulf Monarchies as an "exclusionary regime", Chapter 2 gives a historical account of guest workers in the UAE.)

(2) I documented the work and living experiences of migrant workers in the UAE. The research material analysed documented the working and living experiences of migrant workers in the UAE. We found that while Pakistani workers' working and living conditions are – not surprisingly – much worse than those of Emiratis or white expats, most of them have better earnings than in Pakistan and their living conditions while in the UAE are poor but reasonably tolerable. The research shows that return migrants are upwardly mobile in the social hierarchy of Pakistan. We are faced with two puzzles. The first is that while direct incomes, job opportunities are better in the UAE than in Pakistan, return migrants express dissatisfaction at varying but substantial degrees with their living conditions in the UAE due to hidden, not planned financial, social and emotional costs occurring during their stay. The second puzzle is that though return migrants usually

[4] I am writing this book in collaboration with Riaz Hassan and Vladislav Maksimov

complain – often bitterly – about their UAE experience, nevertheless many return migrants hope to return to UAE if a new job opportunity is offered to them. Thus the key question is: what individual and/or household level mechanisms and decisions are behind this mass return migration seen by actors as very exploitative? (Chapter 4 in the book reports on these finding, the current paper is an abridged version of nthat chapter. Chapter 5 in the book offers our theoreical and policy conclusions).

Data and Methods

We collected both qualitative and quantitative data. The field work was carried out by the Institute of Social Sciences (ISS) in Lahore (www.isspk.org) under the supervision of Rafiq Jaffer and Razia Jaffer.

During the research process six focus group discussions were carried out each with 6-8 workers (using a purposive sampling method in order to include the diversity of workers: urban/rural, age, trade etc.). Rafiq Jaffer and three senior researchers conducted all six focus group interviews. In addition, 54 individual in-depth face-to-face interviews were also conducted.

During the the execution of the survey we tried to approximate as much as possible a before-after research design and we split our sample equally between prospective and return migrants. We interviewed 250 prospective and 260 return migrants.

We defined prospective migrants as people who were about to leave for the first time for a job in the UAE (people who secured or at least applied for work permit and visa in the UAE). We interviewed return migrants who came back from the UAE in the past five years to settle in Pakistan, but we also interviewed people who were at the time of our research working in the UAE and were back home for shorter or longer family visits (out of the 260 return migrants 53 were such "visitors").

In our survey we made an effort to get as close to random sampling as possible. But we had to make quite a few compromises. First of all in cities it was impossible to find prospective or return migrants by any random method (with the research budget at our disposal). Lahore has 9 million[5] inhabitants, but Abbottabad and Rawalpindi are also far too large to go household-by-household and locate migrants. Therefore in these three cities we used basically

[5] World Population Review, 2017.

snowballing samples (sampling often started in a barbershop: the owner or operator of the shop gave us names and often even arranged interviews with some of their customers. The interviews often took place in the barbershops.

In predominantly rural districts of Swabi and Chakwal and the rural areas of Abbottabad and Rawalpindi we randomly selected villages which were listed as having large numbers of migrants. We identified the first household by a random number and we went household-by-household to find intending and return migrants. We stopped interviewing when we reached the desired sample size.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Beyond other analytical perspectives including cumulative causation, social capital world system theory and following Douglas Massey (Massey et al., 1993; 1998; Constant and Massey, 2002; Massey, 2009) we utilize two theoretical perspectives: neo-classical economics, NE (Todaro, 1976) and the new economics of labor migration, NELM (Stark and Bloom, 1985).

NE (Todaro, 1976; Massey et al., 1993, pp.433-436; de Haas, 2010, pp.230–231) sees migrants as atomistic, utility maximizing individuals. People make individual decisions to move if they anticipate that with the move they will maximize their income.[6] Migration is related to geographic differences in supply and demand for labor on a macro level. Countries[7] with large endowment of labor relative to capital tend to have low wages so people tend to migrate from these places to countries with limited endowment of labor relative to capital, hence with higher wages. But the migration of labor is accompanied also by a flow of capital: capital (including human capital) tends to move to countries with low capital endowments and low wages, which will eventually produce an equilibrium of the distribution of capital and labor and the leveling of incomesin the case of a completely free flow of goods and capital and unrestricted flow of people, In this perspective migration leads to optimal allocation of production factors, which benefits both the sending and receiving countries. Since the NE conceptualizes highly skilled labor in terms of human capital, the patterns of migration will be

[6] Todaro specifically writes about "expected" rather than "actual" income (Todaro, 1980, p.364), hence – to be fair to the Todaro model – it should be noted that the decision to migrate will be made by calculating the odds to get a job and the level of income for the job. Nevertheless it is an individual decision based on rational calculation of the likelihood of long-term earnings.

[7] Michael P. Todaro (1976) conceptualizes the problem in terms of rural-urban migration, but the same logic applies to international migration.

the opposite for highly skilled and unskilled labor. It is not inconceivable that highly skilled labor will move to countries with low capital (low human capital) endowments, while low skilled workers move in the opposite direction. According to NE return migration should only occur if the migrant's expectations for higher earnings were not met, hence they tend to see return migrants as "failures" after all rational migrants tend to move abroad permanently. Furthermore, social attachment and social commitments at home (e.g. taking care of the elderly) is on the cost side of the equation for NE if it si taken into account. Attachment to people at home raises the costs of remaining abroad and lowers the costs to return home. Remittances are anomalous (Constant and Massey, 2002, p.10), migrants should use earnings to maximize utility in the destination country rather than sending it home[8].

NELM's (Stark and Bloom, 1985; de Haas, 2010, pp. 242-243; Massey et al., 1993, pp.436-440; Constant and Massey, 2002, pp.10-12) major initial insight is that migration decisions are not being made by isolated individuals but by larger units, usually by the family. According to Stark and Bloom, "a migrant is not necessarily the decision-making entity accountable for his or her migration. Migration decisions are often made jointly by the migrant and by some non-migrants…. Costs and returns are shared…one important component of the direct returns to the non-migrating family from the migration of the family member are his or her remittances" (Stark and Bloom, 1985, p.174; see also Massey et al., 1993, p.436). Hence remittances are not anomalies for NELM, on the contrary the anticipated amount of remittances may be the crucial consideration for the migration decision. Unlike the assumption of the developmentalist view, remittances may not only or even primarily serve investment goals, but could just help the families in the home country to survive, to pay health care or earn them prestige and respect at home in their "reference group." (Stark and Bloom, 1985, p.173). NELM does not see return migrants necessarily as "failures" – migrants may have specific goals in mind when they go abroad to achieve something at home (for instance to find a bride who might not be available without them taking a job abroad, or to start a business which may not provide them with as much income as they could earn in the country of immigration but provides them enough livelihood at home and the kind of prestige or reputation they were yearning for).

[8] Hein de Haas (2010) however identifies the "developmentalist" version of neo-classical economics (pp.231-232). Remittances are a major source of hard currency. This theory anticipates that guest workers reinvest in enterprises in the country of origin after their "widely expected return", hence it is conceivable to conceptualize within NE. Migrant workers were seen as representing a hope for industrial development of their native land and it was widely thought that large scale emigration can contribute to the best of both worlds: rapid growth in the country of immigration and a rapid growth in the country or origin.

Furthermore, while NE is mainly a theory about the working of labor markets, for NELM the labor market is not the only and probably not even the main consideration for migration decisions. NELM assumes that the decision to migrate or not will not depend only on maximizing expected incomes, but also on minimizing risks associated with various market failures. In developed countries risks to household incomes are minimized by private insurances or government programs (welfare systems). In developing countries – so do Massey and his collaborators claim (Massey et al., 1993, p.436) – these are largely non-existent or at least not available to poor households. The same goes for capital markets, or credit. Poor families may not have collaterals to obtain credit (or credits may not be available in poor countries) to improve the productivity of their assets. Income from migrant labor can cover health care costs, expenditures on education and the care for the elderly. Income from migrant labor can be a source for investment, but again not necessarily as the developmentalist view would anticipate it, namely not because this maximizes incomes for the person who migrates, but primarily because it assures capital for the family which stays at home. Families and not individuals are the appropriate units of analysis for NELM.

To put it very simply: NE model is driven by the desire to maximize individual incomes (to get higher incomes in the immigration country – after deduction of remittances and other costs - than they would get in the home country; NELM is driven by home family needs and strategy, the migrant will move if this way the migrant can improve the well-being of the home family. In NE the migration decision is by the individual, in NELM the decision is made by the family (with or without consultation of the individual) and in this framework some of the "costs" of this move on an individual level are suppressed, not taken into account explicitly for the sake of accomplishing the family goals and the improvement of the status of the family in the community of origin. This can be crucial and this is what we can learn from sociological and economic studies of "family economy", most importantly from Chayanov being a classic in this field, clearly showed that when own costs (like labour costs of family members) are not taken into account then these economies operate on a mechanism of "self-exploitation" and has a "strange" attitude toward the market and the immediate cash they earn via the economic activity (Chayanov 1986). We are aware of the fact that in our case not peasant economies are the objects of observation, but often self-employed people who work for wages in a foreign country, and who also use mechanisms of family economy. We argue nonetheless that when families are the key units of migrant labour decisions then they often disregard certain elements of individual costs of being away, travel and unpaid social contributions and thus they behave "strangely" for the sake of pooling

income to promote various family strategies, family wellbeing.[9] This we can also translate to the ways of these migrants subordinate their own interests to family interests. In addition to this, NE primarily explains migrants who tend to become permanent settlers in the destination country (return migrants being just failures), while NELM is mainly a tool to understand temporary migrants, return migrants, guest workers or "transnationals."

The problem of return migrationWithin the immigration literature the study of return migration is challenging, data on return migrants are typically not collected. Portes' concept of transnationals for instance does not assume that they will necessarily return to the home country, but he also defines transnational entrepreneurs, or wage laborers who do not maximize labor market outcomes but maintain close ties with families and other networks in the home country. They maximize remittances (or their transnational, global businesses) and do not have to go through the often painful process of "acculturation" (Portes, Haller, and Guarnizo, 2001, p.6) since permanent settlement is virtually impossible. In the UAE and Gulf monarchies in general this is an almost "laboratory situation" to test whether NE is sufficient to understand return migrants or whether NELM offers insights absent in NE in the case of migration regimes based on exclusion.

There are also substantial differences in the scholarly literature on what proportion of immigrants eventually return. Even less is known about what the composition of return migrants is in comparison with those who settle permanently, and what are the motives of emigration (Constant and Massey, 2002, pp.7-8). For instance, Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) estimated using cohort data that within the first 10 years after immigration cumulative emigration (among legal immigrants!) ranged from 30 to 50% (data from Social Security Administration and Census Bureau vary but fit within this range). There is no agreement in the scholarly literature about the social composition of return migrants from the US. Some found that skilled immigrants had a higher probability to return (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1988), others found no educational effect or negative selectivity (Massey et al., 1987, p.305), or even found that people of lower education were more likely to return.

Since permanent settlement in the UAE/Gulf monarchies is impossible, returning home or going to a third country is expected. What needs an explanation is how the initial decision to migrate was made. Are there

[9] On the basis of narratives see that migrants very often understand and justify migration in terms family well-being instead of individual considerations Kovács-Melegh 2001, among domestic servants see Gábriel-Melegh 2017

any differences in who is staying for how long? Were the pre-migration expectations met during the time migrants spent in the UAE, and what are the consequences if they were not met? How much remittances did guest workers send home, for what purposes? Were remittances seen by them as a burden or the purpose of their stay? Who among return migrants would like to find a job again in the UAE?

It is rather difficult to adjudicate between the two competing theories, as Massey acknowledged. The lower the home income and higher the destination country income promises to be, it is more likely that people will decide initially to migrate. Guest workers who after one or more spells in the UAE went home are also more likely to try to return to the UAE if they expect a higher income there than what they earn at home. This is of course consistent with NE theory. NELM theory will be supported to the extent the initial decision to migrate was made by the family rather than the migrants themselves. Guest workers who during their stay in the UAE could send home remittances which exceeded the subsistence needs of their families accumulated enough assets to achieve their family aims, and they may decide to stay at home even if incomes in Pakistan are lower than the income they could earn in the UAE.

In order to weigh the relative explanatory power of competing theories this paper is divided into three sections:

(1) the recruitment process:support for NELM if initial migration theory is made by family as far as initial decision is concerned): H1

(2) working and living conditions while in the UAE:support for NELM if incomes in UAE were high enough to improve the long term living conditions of families at home and counterbalance costs on a family level. Also we support NELM if some of the individual costs are "forgotten" for the sake of the well-being of the family: H2

(3) experiences in Pakistan after return and desire to find a job again in the UAE: NELM theory is supported as long as return migrants do not consider a new job in the UAE if at home the family can earn high enough incomes to cover family needs, though those incomes are lower than what they could additionally earn in the UAE. NE theory will be supported if aspiration to return is driven by the difference in home country and destination country income after deducing all possible costs (people make "balance sheets" on an individual level), return migrants want to return to the UAE if their net income in Pakistan is lower than what they earned in the UAE: H3

THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS

Before making the initial decision to look for a job in the UAE about a third of our respondents (32%) did not have any job (*Figure 1*). A quarter of them (25%) did not answer the income satisfaction question, so probably did not a have a regular job, and more than half (54%) who had regular income found it to be insufficient (*Figure 2*).

Figure 1: Employment status befor leaving for UAE

Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

At the first glance the high proportion of "self-employed" (35%) is striking in *Figure 1*, though as *Figure 2* demonstrates these self-employed by all likelihood are in very marginal "businesses" (small peasants, street vendors, scavengers etc.) and they might not earn incomes to provide a decent living standard for their families. Furthermore, the 35% self-employed is small by Pakistani standards. Around 60% of Pakistani men are self-employed (the proportion of self-employed is even higher, closer to 80% among women)[10]. Hence self-employment actually decreases the likelihood that one takes the chance to look for and obtain a job in the Gulf monarchies.

[10] https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/pakistan/self-employed#SL.EMP.SELF.FE.ZS [accessed 7 October 2016].

Figure 2: How sufficient was your income before you decided to move to the?



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

Hence the absence of jobs or the lack or insufficiency of income was a good enough reason to consider migration. *Figures 1* and *2* are consistent with both NE and NELM theories. Who made the initial decision to move? When in the survey we asked respondents this question, 49% said it was their individual decision but 48% said their family wanted them to take a job in the Emirates, and many told us they were not even consulted. *Figure 3* though supports NELM theory and is consistent with H1. The difference is of course not significant (*Figure 3*).

Figure 3: Who took the decision to take a job in the UAE?



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

In a focus group in Chakwal (a township between Islamabad and Lahore) some respondents were actually quite bitter about the pressure from their families to go and work hard in the UAE. One said: "We are not relative of anyone, only our money is relative of all." Another respondent from the same focus group added: "Our families consider us a machine. Our social status is that we will be working continuously. We have no life, no status, just earn money." A respondent in a focus group in Rawalpindi (a town located between Islamabad and Lahore) echoed similar sentiments: "Even the family started to worship money. Dirhams took the place of a person." These comments are also in line with the idea of a collective family economy which suppresses individual needs and calculations.

Family was also important for motivating and financially facilitating a move to the UAE. During the study we take UAE Dirham as somewhere around a quarter USD, thus four Dirham is one USD while 60-65 Indian Rupee add up to one USD. In the text we refer to currencies given by interviewees.

Tariq Islam[11], a married 46-year-old tailor in Lahore city wanted to build a house but could not afford it on his income in Lahore. His mother sold her golden bangles so he could pay the 3,000 dirhams for visa and travel. He found a job in a tailoring shop in Dubai. He worked 10 hours a day and earned a respectable income of 1,500 dirhams, but he could earn 2-3,000 dirhams during Eid. He sent 500 dirhams to his family every month, built the house, and whenever he visited home he spent all of his other savings on gifts. On such visits the family treated him as a guest. In his words: "The family treated me as if I was a newlywed bride". But when he returned after 14 years in Dubai he was devastated. During his absence his wife had an affair with another man. He asked his wife to apologize and was ready to forgive her but she refused. They divorced and she married the other man. He is now sorry he built the house rather than investing his savings to set up his own tailoring shop. With his divorce 14 years of hard work was lost. He may have to return to the UAE and start saving again, this time for a business back in Lahore.

Amjad Aziz, a young man is his late twenties from Abbottabad offered us a happier story. He dropped out from a BBA course from the University of Abbottabad and started to work as a laundry-man in a local hotel. His income was miserable, was paid 216 Rupees a day and his family was in poverty (he is still unmarried). His brother however got a good job in a good hotel in Abu Dhabi and helped Amjad to also get a visa and a job in the same hotel. He spent 120,000 rupees in various fees paid by his own savings and his family's contribution, but the job he got in Abu Dhabi paid well, 1,000 dirhams a month,

[11] All names are altered so the anonymity of respondents is preserved.

and working over-time he could earn 1.25-1.5 times the normal wage. Both his brother and Amjad could send "good money" back home and they succeeded in getting the family out of poverty by the time they returned to Pakistan.

But the family not only plays an important role to persuade people to take jobs in the Gulf, they also put pressure on them to stay there – no matter how miserably they feel – until they send back enough remittances so they could show off with their acquired "wealth", which goes directly against NE hypotheses. A return migrant in a focus group in Swabi (Northwest from Islamabad) complained: "Once a person reaches there, then he cannot go back, because his parents, relatives and others would say he had failed, he is good for nothing. Therefore I stayed there to save face. "

Not that it takes too much to be a "success" back home. NELM and H3 gets strong support from a focus group interview in Peshawar (all the way to the Northwest, near the Afghan border): "Half a salary at home is better than a full one away from home." And indeed, in an in depth interview a Swabi resident told us: "When I walked around in white cloth in the village, people envied me." Another return migrant also from Swabi in a focus group echoed the same sentiment: "When I saw people from UAE in good dress, I also wanted to be like them and this desire took me there."

Family/kinship was also a major mechanism to find a job. 51% in the survey told us they found a job with the help of relatives, only 38% relied exclusively on agents. The rest just applied for a visa or were directly approached by a company. Visa through relatives is mainly a visa provided by an employer (it may be the relative himself or the employer of the relative).

Figure 4: How were you recruited for your job in the UAE?



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

Jobs solicited by a family member can be a mixed blessing.

Yaseen Javed, a 32-year-old air conditioning technician and driver from Peshawar (a town in the Northwest, near the Afghan border, not far from Kabul) who worked in his father's shop got into a lot of trouble as the shop went into great loss and they were indebted. Nevertheless his brother who was already in Dubai helped him to get a sponsor and a visa as a driver and he could return the money his brother loaned him for visa, travel and sponsorship. Since his sponsor was his brother's friend he was also treated well, he was for instance allowed to go home every six months though by contract he was only entitled to a one-month leave once every other year.

Kinship was also vitally important for their lives in the UAE, 72% of the respondents had relatives in the Emirates.

Yaseen Javed also reported he spent most of his free time with his brother, cousins and friends. Sometimes he even took loans from them which he later returned. "Time passes because of socialization, otherwise it would be very difficult to pass time", he told us.

Figure 5: Did you have relatives in the UAE?



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

Saeed Arif from Swabi city who lived in Dubai for 16 years was even luckier. He left "compelled by financial problems of his family and personal desire for greener pastures" and he got a good job as a driver. His long stay abroad was punctuated by eight visits back home (almost every second year) and after his fourth year he got married. Given his good income he could get a permit to bring his wife to Dubai and could rent his own place for his family. So he is one of the few Pakistani workers who can afford to live with their wife and children in the UAE. He also has an extensive network of friends, all of them compatriots

and Muslims: he is "happy with friends", he even learned the local language and he claimed he became acquainted even with some natives [I suppose he meant Emiratis, though as we will see later that is likely to be rather unusual given the differences in social standing].

The very high percentage of relatives living in the UAE (72%) seems to indicate that the movement of guest workers to the Gulf monarchies is "chain migration" and that there is cumulative causation meaning previous migration leads to further migration (Massey at al., 1998). People learn about the nature of jobs in the UAE through relatives who already work in the Emirates and often act as intermediaries between sponsors and prospective migrants.

Surprisingly, only 35% told us they had to pay for the sponsorship (*Figure 6*). Among those who paid for sponsorship only 25% paid agents, 46% had to pay the employers, and 19% paid relatives (*Figure 7*), hence the role of agencies may not be that important or these payments are not revealed. On the one hand it looks like employers often directly approach people who are recommended to them by their employees, rather than use agencies to find workers.

Figure 6: Did you have to pay to get sponsorship?



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

On the other hand payments for visa and sponsorship may also be a sensitive issue. Such payments are probably illegal, and they are only revalead in the in-depth interviews. Almost all of our respondents in the interviews reported substantial fees paid for such purposes[12].

[12] It is also interesting that we got very different responses to this question from prospective migrants. Only 22% of them claimed they did not pay at all for sponsorship. They also paid mainly agencies (57%) and only 7% the employers. 77% reported expenses of over 100,000 rupees. The discrepancy in reporting expenses to get the job among return and prospective migrants is puzzling, it may have something to do with changing ways of getting a job and increased costs.

Figure 7: To whom did you have to pay get sponsprship?



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

From the in-depth interviews our impression is that some people not only do not report they had to pay for acquiring a job in the UAE, but they grossly underreport how much they paid to their kafeel (sponsor), relatives or recruiting agencies. Many end up deep in debt, it takes them a year or more to repay the money, and when they need to renew their visa some kafeel ask them for another payment. This is in itself a clear sign that there are problems concerning the individual rationality of migration in the region.

Figure 8: How much did you have to pay to get sponsorship? (in rupee, US$=100 rupee)



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

Mohammad Shahid, a 44-year-old driver from Peshawar for instance told us that his sponsor arranged for him a "free" visa but charged him 5,000 dirhams (close to 150,000 rupees) to cover his visa and travel expenses. This "loan" was deducted from his salary over the first two years (he earned 35 dirhams during a 12–15-hour long working day, hence about 1,000 dirhams a month). When his visa had to be renewed (one usually needs a new visa every third year) his sponsor charged him another 5,000 dirhams. Despite this he was happy with his sponsor, and even with this deduction he managed to save money to send remittances home.

Ahmad Khan, a 25-year-old car painter from Swabi had to take out a loan from his relatives and sister to cover visa and travel expenses. That amounted to 120,000 rupees. He spent two and a half years in Dubai and first he had to repay his loan, but eventually he managed to save some money. He told us that as he returned his social status in Swabi improved and he even managed to get married.

Among the 54 people with whom we conducted in-depth interviews we could find only one person (Imran Hussain, a 25-year-old from Chakwal who had basic training in computer science) whose family paid only 16,000 rupees, but this was for a visitor's visa. He landed a job during his visit in Dubai with the help of his brother. Imran did not tell us whether he had to pay anything to get the job, work permit or change in visa status. While not all of our in-depth interviewees confided in us the costs of getting their jobs, it typically ranged between 100,000-200,000 rupees, the money typically borrowed from family or from the sale of assets and paid to employers or relatives, which might also explain why these people can be subordinated to their families even in a longer run.

WORKING AND LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Not only the actual wage and working conditions, but the perception of working conditions can be also rather important factors in understanding the migration process. Much to our surprise one of the participants in a focus group in Rawalpindi told us: "About 90% of them [Emiratis] considered workers to be slaves. We did not talk much with them due to language barrier."

We decided to put this as a question in the survey and in the survey on a Lickert scale 58% said they agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "Workers were treated like slaves" (*Figure 9*).

Figure 9: Workers are generally treated as slaves



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

Another respondent in a personal in-depth interview in Chakwal expressed similar sentiments: "Only one out of a thousand [Emiratis] was affectionate and treated workers as humans."

Mohammad Amin, a 28-year-old motor mechanic from Peshawar who worked in Dubai and Sharjah for five years felt his "workplace was like a jail where he was imprisoned."

A member of a focus group in Chakwal put it this way: "Sponsors are not sympathetic to workers. Their ultimate goal is to take work from them... You are useless for them when you get old."

Zahid, a 27-year-old auto mechanic from Abbottabad formulated his overall experience poetically when he told us: "I would keep looking at the desert and desired to go home, and my friends used to say: What is the use of youth. Where have we spent our youth, and the family does not care."

As far as working conditions is considered the conflict is usually not with Emiratis, but mainly with supervisors, especially with Pakistani supervisors.

The UAE is one of the beloved, if not the most beloved, countries (though the reason for this is rather instrumental: they like it since there are jobs in the UAE). Emirati sponsors or owners were also rather distant from guest workers. 37% of return migrants told us they never met Emiratis at their workplace, and 77% never met an Emirati socially. When our respondents were asked whether they felt comfortable when interacting with Emiratis, only 19% said they were "quite comfortable" (*Figure 10*). The social distance between Emiratis and blue-collar guest workers is tremendous, and most of our respondents in the in-depth interviews expressed respect towards the host nation.

Figure 10: How comfortable were you when interacting with Emiratis?



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

Now let's turn our attention to incomes.

Return migrants earned a reasonable salary. The mean salary in the UAE was just below 1,500 dirhams a month (*Figure 11*). But upon their return to Pakistan those who have regular income at all earn on average below 15,000 rupees, which is about a third of the income they have earned in the UAE. And this is likely to be higher than the income they had before they left. We do not have survey data on earnings in Pakistan before return migrants left for the first time to the UAE, but in a few cases in in-depth interviews our respondents volunteered information on this.

Figure 11: What was your monthly income? (in Dirhams, US$1=3,67 Dirham)



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

Mohammad Qasim, the 42-year-old carpenter from Lahore earned back in Pakistan 110 rupees a day, thus about 3,000 rupees a month. His income in Dubai was a modest 1,000 dirhams, which nevertheless is ten times more. From other interviews it looks reasonable to assume that a decent income in Pakistan used to be between 100-200 rupees a day.

Even the worst income in the UAE looks adequate if one compares it with earning in Pakistan before or after taking a job in the UAE which supports both NE and NELM. Nevertheless, some 40% of our respondents complained that they got a lower wage than what they were promised (*Figure 12*)[13], and only 46% of them were fully satisfied with their paycheck (*Figure 13*).

Figure 12: Did you get the salary you were promised before you went to UAE?



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

One of these disappointed return migrants was 30-year-old Amin Masood, a driver from Rawalpindi who worked for three and a half years in Fujairah. One of his cousins arranged a driver's visa for him and he had to spend altogether 300,000 rupees on fees and costs. He was promised a 10-hour workday and a wage of 3,000 dirhams. Upon arrival he found out he has to work for 15-18 hours and the compensation was only 2,200 dirhams. On top of this he was not paid as much as he worked. He protested against his "betrayal" but he was threatened that he would be sent back, which he could not afford with the heavy debt on his shoulders. Eventually he was forced out of his job and he went to the labor court demanding to be paid for the last three months. At that time his employer produced a contract which set his wage at 700 dirhams a month, and that was what he was paid before

[13] This looks like a sensitive question, almost half of our respondents did not answer it.

leaving the UAE. (Prospective migrants do not always read carefully their contracts – the papers can also be in Arabic that few Pakistanis understand. In some in-depth interviews our respondents told us the employers kept a contract with a lower salary figure than what they paid them, just in case they leave and request unpaid salaries.)This in itself shows that while wage expectations are clearly important, the costs and the burdens are not carefully thought over.

Despite such disappointments almost half of our respondents (46%) were satisfied with their wage. Those who were without regular income back home, or who increased their salaries five-tenfold and thus sent back enough remittances to meet the needs of their family or even accumulate some capital to build a house or start a business upon return were satisfied with their earnings – a finding which supports NELM theory and is in particular consistent with H2.

Figure 13: Were you satisfied with your wage?



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

The Kafala system[14] restricts the choice of employers after a worker has arrived to the UAE and would like to change jobs. While the regulations were softened, nevertheless the workers still depend a great deal on their sponsors. Hence only 25% of our respondents changed their employer. Only one of our 54 in-depth interviewees (Adil Butt – I told his bitter story with his brother-in-law earlier) reported a change of employer. He reported it, since it must have been

[14] The Kafala, or sponsorship system effective in all Gulf Cooperation Countries requires workers to have a sponsor (usually their employer). While the system varies somewhat from country to country, if workers want to change employers they usually need the permission of their kafeel. Such a permission may also be needed if they want to leave the country, and if the kafeel withdraws sponsorship the workers usually have to leave.

troublesome to move away from an employer who was a friend of his intensively disliked brother-in-law and who treated him badly. Probably many others worked for various employers. If their initial sponsor gives its permission that could be painless. It is also important to note that guest worker migration to the Gulf monarchies is often a cyclical phenomenon: after one contract expires they may return to Pakistan, spend there a couple of months or even years and go back if they hear about a new job opening that will probably come from another sponsor. So I assume that in *Figure 13* respondents interpreted our question as whether they changed sponsors during their last spell in the UAE. We unfortunately were not careful enough when we phrased this question, though it is likely it was understood just for the last spell or at least during one of the spells. Changing sponsors during a contract is a big deal and while it is likely if one has to break his stay in the UAE since the employer momentarily doesn't need his services, one may or may not return to the same employer again for another spell.

The Kafala system is particularly harsh on female domestic workers, which shows that there are important gender aspects in migrating into UAE. who These workers are sometimes even sexually abused or ill-treated in other ways according to reports by Human Rights Watch [15]. Many of the domestic workers are from the Philippines, and at least in principle none come from Pakistan where the law forbids women to take maid's jobs in the UAE. The Embassy of the Philippines operated a safe house for Filipino maids who escaped their sponsor but did not have their exit visa, their passport or money to return home. One of our students at NYUAD volunteered in this safe house, but as she began to turn her volunteer services into research the Embassy told her not to come back again. This tells a lot about the difficulties people who want to do research on guest workers in the UAE face.

One effective, though by now in the UAE illegal way to monitor the movement of the workers of the kafeel is to take their passport away. While current laws forbid the confiscation of passports[16] by employers, many still do so, often telling workers they want to "keep the passport in a safe place". In fact a shocking 82% of the respondents in the survey told us that their sponsor took their passport, and 26% reported this was the reason why they could not leave. Many of our interviewees in the in-depth interviews also complained about this.

[15] Human Rights Watch, 2014. *United Arab Emirates: Trapped, Exploited, Abused. Migrant Domestic workers Get Scant Protection.* [online] 22 October. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/22/united-arab-emirates-trapped-exploited-abused> [Accessed on 7 October 2016].

[16] The UAE has many reasonably liberal labor laws, for instance requiring employers to give domestic workers a day off every week, putting limits on hours worked a day, setting the rules how much they have to pay for overtime, but compliance with these laws is far from perfect. Keeping the passports of workers – according to our data – is just one of such instances of systematic non-compliance.

Figure 14: Did you work for the same sponsor throughout your stay?



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

One example is Refiq Ali, a 36-year-old laborer from Swabi who spent seven and a half years in Abu Dhabi. He initially worked for 12 hours a day and with such wages he managed to send back regularly whatever little he could. But the business for the company did not go too well, so his working hours were reduced to eight and with a smaller salary he could not continue to send home the money his family needed. He wanted to look for another employer but his kafeel kept his passport and other documents so he could not leave.

Saleh Hussain, the 35-year-old driver from Lahore was not that happy with his job: he did not get overtime pay and his two-month leave was also without pay even though he got an award as "the best driver" (some companies offer paid home leaves every other year, some even every year). He wanted to leave, but he could not to take another job since the sponsor kept his passport. Saleh complained that if a person had an emergency, without a passport he could not travel to Pakistan even if he could have covered the travel expenses.

Amjad Aziz, the laundry man from Abbottabad who worked in an Abu Dhabi hotel also told us that the company kept his passport. But he did not complain. He received 30 days of leave (for the first year the company did not pay his airfare, but after 2 years they covered his travel expenses) and he could go home during his leave time.

Long working hours is one of the reasons for dissatisfaction with life and work in the UAE (see *Table 1* below). Only one third of respondents worked a daily eight-hour shift, one third of them worked more than 10 hours a day (*Figure 15*). Some – in particular taxi drivers – could not take even one day off a week.

As I learned from many taxi drivers the cars are typically owned by Emiratis and they collect half of all the fares. So in order to survive and be able to send home sufficient remittances they exploit themselves, working excessively long hours every day of the week. And most taxi drivers I talked to regard themselves privileged. Some told me they can earn up to 3,000 dirhams a month by self-exploitation, but they are pleased since they can support their families left behind in Pakistan.

Figure 15: How many hours did you work per day?



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

A good example for such a taxi driver among our in-depth interviewees is Saleh who worked 12 hours a day (probably every day of the week). And indeed he did reasonably well, he earned 2,000-2,500 dirhams a month. He returned from Dubai to Lahore after five-six years, before his visa expired since he saved enough money and could start a business with an American.

Accomodation is also a key problem for migrant workers. There are a few lucky ones who could rent a flat. Naeem Gul, a 44-year-old spray painter of vehicles from Abbottabad also got relatively lucky early on. When he arrived in Sharjah he shared an air-conditioned room with just four people from Pakistan, Iran and Bengal, and they could even cook their own meals. But the garage caught fire and the owner shifted them to a labor camp.

In our survey 62% of Pakistani guest workers told us they lived in labor camps which are typically located at the outskirts of cities and gated communities (*Figure 16*). Visitors are allowed to enter only by permission. Some of the labor camps are well equipped (some even have swimming pools), but rooms are usually overcrowded.

Figure 16: What kind of housing did you have in United Arab Emirates?



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

I could never get a permission to visit a labor camp though I asked an NYUAD compliance officer to allow me to join her when she visits the camp of workers constructing the new campus of NYUAD. She refused. We did have a student who managed to get access to a camp. He volunteered for a clergyman who was arranging to send gift-packages to the camps to deliver those. I learned a lot from him about life in the camps (he was especially interested in sex-life in the camps), but he became very concerned about his own security. Threats came not from workers but the police, and he received repeated warnings from NYUAD administration to avoid politically sensitive topics, so he abandoned his initial project to write his senior thesis on labor camps.

Figure 17: With how many people did you share your living space?



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

Overcrowded housing (especially in the labor camps) is one of the major downsides of working in the UAE. 41% of the respondents in our survey told us (*Figure 17*) they had to share a room with seven or more people and my impression from the in-depth interviews is that the survey may paint a rosier picture than it is on the ground (see later *Table 1*).

Yaseen Javed, the 32-year-old air conditioning technician and driver from Peshawar who became a driver in Dubai for instance shared an air-conditioned 10 by 12-feet room with 10-16 people, sleeping on the floor on a foam mattress.

Ifran Adeel, the security guard from Rawalpindi initially got very good accommodations in a bank where he worked and could live alone. But during the last four months of his two-year stay he had to share a room in a company-run labor camp with 27 other workers. They were Indians, Pakistanis, Nepalese, Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans and Egyptians. Three of them were Muslims; others were either Hindus or Christians. They had a very old AC which did not work properly (temperatures can go up to 120 Fahrenheit in the UAE).

The bottom line is: for South Asian guest workers life in the UAE was a long-term, painful separation from wives and children and their family, it was an experience of young males living together in crowded conditions.

Any of our interviewees in in-depth interviews expressed sorrow to live away from their families. We already learned the tragic story of Tariq Islam from Lahore, whose marriage broke up due to his long stay in the UAE. As many as 31% of our survey told us they knew of cases when wives left guest workers while they worked in UAE. Many of the interviewees complained that separation from the family has negative consequences for family relations and negative impacts on their children. Among the 260 return migrants 197 (76%) told us "the greatest loss they suffered by going abroad" had something to do with their family life. They missed their family (36%) or their family missed them, their relationship with their wives deteriorated and it had a negative effect on the children. These emotional and/or moral "costs" of the lack of family and sexual life are often suppressed when the migrant labour is thought over.

Shahid Awan, a 40-year-old grinder operator from Rawalpindi who worked for nine years in Dubai and earned only 1,200 dirhams (from which the company deducted various fees) could not send enough remittances back home and his family in Pakistan lived hand to mouth. Nevertheless after four years in Dubai he married, but "of course" could not afford to have his wife with him. He would have loved to have his family with him. In order to stay in touch with them he first wrote letters once or twice a month, and later on used the phone to call them twice a month.

Some tried to reduce such damage by trying to visit home as often as they could, but in our survey 23% reported they could never go home, only 31% could go back once a year (usually just for one month). Another 34% visited once in every two years, and some 12% even less frequently.

But now let's return where Irfan Adeel finished his interview. To live in such overwhelmingly young and male Pakistani enclaves means substantial sexual deprivation. Of course very few of our interviewees confessed to be engaged in hetero- or homosexual relations.

Islam strictly forbids pre- and extramarital sex, and it is especially harsh about homosexuality. Ifran was one of the rare exceptions to "confess", but Saleh Hussain, the 35–year-old married man from Lahore who already told us he was fortunate enough to share a two-bedroom flat with five other people admitted he was "sinful". Having a private flat might have been seductive for such "crimes", and as the interviewee said, "I am a sinful person. God forgive me and place me in heaven. If I feel like it, I say my prayers".

But most of our respondents in our survey and many in in-depth interviewees told us they knew about men visiting "clubs" (in the UAE this often stands for brothels), and many even knew about acquaintances who were engaged in homosexual relations.

In the survey when respondents were asked whether the statement that "most workers go to clubs for sex" is correct, only 6% disagreed, 17% were unsure, 77% agreed. Many also knew about homosexuality. When we posed the question "Some of the people I knew were homosexuals" only 25% disagreed, 33% were unsure, and 42% agreed[17].

NELM's key hypothesis is that migration is driven by the need of families left back home. Our survey data offer solid support to this theory. The overwhelming majority of our respondents did not spend all of their earnings, 81% reported they save money (*Figure 19*). Their annual saving is an extraordinary amount, on average near to 10,000 dirhams (*Figure 20*) from an average annual income well below 20,000 dirhams.

Answers to questions whether guest workers could save any money, send home enough remittances to invest and prepare for their return home, or if remittances were merely enough to help the family survive are crucial to adjudicate between NE and NELM theories. As I pointed our earlier guest workers in the Gulf monarchies

[17] Since in case of prostitutes our question asked whether most workers visit clubs the widespread use of such facilities is rather pervasive. More difficult to interpret is the question about homosexuality since in that case we only ask whether they know some people who are engaged in gay practices. It may not mean that this is a common practice.

could virtually never settle down in the host countries and gain citizenship. This is not an ideal case to test the two theories, but nevertheless NE theory would be supported if guest workers' main aim would be to improve their own welfare, increase consumption, and if they save to do it for their individual benefits.

Figure 18: Were you able to save any money from your income in UAE?



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

According to *Figure 19*, 75% of the guest workers did save some of their earnings. This is at least is an indication that workers with often very low incomes and high expenses (especially housing costs that are occasionally up to 30% of their incomes) tended to save, rather than maximize consumption.

Figure 19: How much could yous save in typical year? (in Dirham)



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

And their savings are substantial. While 18% told us they could not save any money, among those who saved 27% reported to have saved over 12,000 dirhams in a typical year, average savings being somewhere in the ranged of 9,000 dirhams. With an average monthly income under 1,500 dirhams this implies they saved approximately 50% of their earnings.

From *Figure 20* we also learn that basically all the savings (being alrge proportion of the salaries) were sent home as remittances. The distribution of how much people could save and how much money they sent back home is virtually identical. Savings for personal aims is practically non-existent, hence offering strong support for NELM theory and that these migrants workers think in terms of a rather compact family economy.

Figure 20: How much money did you remit annually to your family in Pakistan?



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

Nasir Sultan, a 24-year-old auto electrician from Chakwal who got a job in Sharjah in an air-conditioning company – just "as a laborer" as he called his position in the UAE –,worked 10-12 hours a day and earned only 5 dirhams an hour. He told us he "lived hand to mouth" and was often unable to remit. His problem was that "people in Pakistan expect an emigrant worker to become rich and to make an impression on friends and relatives beyond one's capacity".

Mohammad Qadir, the 42-year-old carpenter from Lahore is a good example of how important it is in the decision to take a job in the UAE to support the family. Qadir was actually happy with his income in Lahore, nevertheless he went to Dubai (and spent there several spells, altogether some 13 years) just because

he wanted to help his parents and contribute towards the marriage of his four sisters. During our fieldwork in 2013 he was only on a visit to Lahore, he was not married yet but planned to marry when he "can stand on his own feet". As soon as that happens he will move back to Pakistan.

Figure 21: Was your family dependent on the money you sent?



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

Naeem Gul, the spray painter from Abbottabad who worked in Sharjah is an interesting case. He reported that his social status increased a great deal while in the UAE. Indeed, after two years in Sharjah he managed to get married. (This seems to be rather typical: once they get a UAE job, Pakistani men suddenly become attractive to brides so fathers with daughters start exploring whether they would be ready to marry their child. A son-in-law with a UAE job is an attractive proposition). In Sharjah he had a reasonable job, salary, living and working conditions and he could send money back home regularly not only to support his wife and children but eventually to manage to build a home from his savings. 62% of respondents said this, and 83% of them reported that the remittances were (at least in part) to cover day-to-day family expenditures. Nevertheless more than half could use some of the remittances to invest – many of our in-depth interviewees told us those investments went into building homes or setting up businesses.

I already cited the interview with Tariq Islam twice, he is the 46-year-old tailor from Lahore city who worked 10 hours a day in a tailoring shop in Dubai and earned a respectable income of 1,500 from which he sent 500 dirhams every month to his family to build a home.

Figure 22: How was the money you spent mainly used?



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

Nevertheless, from *Figures 21* and *22* it looks likely that the decision to migrate for our guest workers was motivated by the brutal fact that their family could hardly survive without remittances, thus there are wage and income pooling economic units.

FACTORS OF SATISFACTION AMONG GUEST WORKERS

We designed a regression model to test the relative explanatory power of various factors likely to affect the satisfaction of guest workers in the UAE. We used the question "Were you treated like a slave?" to measure this satisfaction. The findings are very clear: the main problems are long working hours and miserable living conditions.

Table 1: Regression model no. 1 on factors of satisfaction among guest workers

	Dependent variable:			
	Treated like a slave? (1–5) *OLS (1)*	Treated like a slave? (Agree/ Strongly Agree=1) *Logistic (2)*	Treated like a slave? (1–5) *OLS (3)*	Treated like a slave? (Agree/ Strongly Agree=1) Logistic (4)
Work hours (9 to 10)	0.724*** p = 0.001	0.966*** p = 0.005	0.745*** p = 0.002	1.145*** p = 0.005
Work hours (11 to 12)	0.538** p = 0.030	0.521 p = 0.177	0.687*** p = 0.010	0.934** p = 0.044
Work hours (>12)	0.598* p = 0.059	0.635 p = 0.214	0.565 p = 0.115	0.411 p = 0.509
Quality of accommodation (Fair)	0.640*** p = 0.001	1.033*** p = 0.0005	0.657*** p = 0.002	1.313*** p = 0.0004
Quality of accommodation (Bad)	1.733*** p = 0.002	16.754 p = 0.985	1.702*** p = 0.003	17.186 p = 0.983
Time in UAE (in years)			0.005 p = 0.747	0.026 p = 0.402
Education (1–5 yrs)			0.740 p = 0.155	1.294 p = 0.211
Education (6–10 yrs)			–0.071 p = 0.813	–0.124 p = 0.802
Education (11–14 yrs)			0.291 p = 0.416	0.766 p = 0.223
Education (14> yrs)			–0.136 p = 0.839	0.197 p = 0.857

	Dependent variable:			
	Treated like a slave? (1–5)	Treated like a slave? (Agree/ Strongly Agree=1)	Treated like a slave? (1–5)	Treated like a slave? (Agree/ Strongly Agree=1)
	OLS (1)	*Logistic (2)*	*OLS (3)*	Logistic (4)
Income in UAE (500–1000 AED)			−0.649	−2.213*
			p = 0.192	p = 0.072
Income in UAE (1000–1500 AED)			−0.519	−1.733
			p = 0.295	p = 0.152
Income in UAE (1500–2000 AED)			−0.024	−0.750
			p = 0.965	p = 0.554
Income in UAE (2000–3000 AED)			0.241	−0.441
			p = 0.670	p = 0.736
Income in UAE (3000–4000 AED)			−0.022	−0.346
			p = 0.973	p = 0.814
Income in UAE (4000> AED)			0.043	−1.334
			p = 0.944	p = 0.318
Constant	2.696***	−0.642***	2.944***	0.431
	p = 0.000	p = 0.009	p = 0.00001	p = 0.743
Observations	243	244	220	221
R^2	0.143		0.234	
Adjusted R^2	0.125		0.174	
Log Likelihood		−148.528		−118.146
Akaike Inf. Crit.		309.056		270.291
Residual Std. Error	1.356		1.327	
	(df = 237)		(df = 203)	
F Statistic	7.906***		3.876***	
	(df = 5; 237)		(df = 16; 203)	

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Source: Survey of Pakistani return immigrants (ISS) (own calculations)

From *Table 1* it is quite obvious people would have preferred to work eight hours a day and have better accommodations, sharing rooms with fewer people. UAE incomes, the time spent there or the education of the respondent does not explain why so many agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that "they were treated like slaves". For policy makers in the UAE this can be seen as a rather encouraging message, probably a lot could be done to increase workers' satisfaction just by reducing working hours and overcrowding in labor camps.

Just one word of warning: there is a trade-off between working hours and incomes. You may remember Rafiq Ali, the 36-year-old laborer from Swabi who spent seven and a half years in Abu Dhabi. He initially worked for 12 hours a day but when his working hours were reduced to eight and he got a smaller salary he could not continue to send home the money his family needed so he wanted to look for another employer. So at least some guest workers do not mind even "slave" labor as long as they earn enough to meet the expectations of their families back in Pakistan. One more piece of evidence to support NELM hypotheses.

EXPERIENCES IN PAKISTAN AFTER RETURN AND DESIRE TO A FIND A JOB AGAIN IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

The majority of return migrants (65%) reported to us that their family is now financially better off than they were 10 years ago (the same figure is only 46% for prospective migrants, hence this can be read as an indicator that most return migrants see the time they spent away was not wasted but helped their family). Only 10% complained that their family situation got worse (that figure is 21% among prospective migrants). They were also proud that their status was enhanced among friends and relatives in Pakistan due to the job they had in the UAE: 57% felt this way.

The living standards of return migrants do not seem to be too high. While 91% have running water, 79% have modern toilets in their house. 83% have a refrigerator and 50% own a motorcycle. These figures are almost identical among prospective migrants. So why do they think their living standards improved as a result of them taking jobs in the UAE? This we see in *Figure 23.*

We should remember that there is a selection bias. There are more Pathans and fewer urban residents among the return migrants, while among prospective migrants there are more urban Punjabi. Hence while the current living standards of return and prospective migrants appear to be the same, the return migrants before their UAE jobs – being more likely to be Pathans and rural – indeed might have had poorer living conditions than they have upon their return.

The employment status of return and prospective migrants also looks rather similar but there appears to be two major differences: there are fewer employees and many more self-employed among the return migrants.

Figure 23: Employment status among return and prospective migrants



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

The higher percentage of self-employed among the return migrants makes a lot of sense, after all as we have seen in *Figure 21* guest workers sent back substantial funds annually to their families: on average about 10,000 dirhams that roughly equals 280,000 rupees, a little fortune in Pakistan (more than the annual average income of return migrants in Pakistan). We also saw in *Figure 22* that about 57% of the guest workers did use some of these remittances for investment, some going into building a house and a fair deal going into establishing a business (mostly shops). But the similar level of unemployment is again surprising.

Figure 24: Monthly income in rupees



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

There are disturbingly few valid responses to the income question (see *Figure 24*), but the trend appears to be clear: prospective migrants earn substantially less than return migrants. Half of them earn 10,000 or less in rupees, while among return migrants only one third has such a low income, their average income is just below 15,000. As we pointed out in *Figure 11* that is about a third of what they earned in the UAE – arguably the strongest evidence against NE theory.

But is it? About half of those who came back "permanently"[18] to Pakistan told us they would return to the UAE if they find an appropriate job. (see *Figure 25*) Only about a third of our respondents gave a definitive "no" answer to the question whether they would want to go back again to the UAE. When asked why, the answer was almost always: "to improve financial conditions".

So obviously the main reason for the desire to search for a new job in the UAE is the miserable living conditions, difficulties to get a decent job back in Pakistan and to raise meaningful sums of cash. Even if people managed to send home remittances and invested it in their business their business might not have worked so they would be forced back to "slavery" in one of the Gulf monarchies.

A good example of this is the very interesting case of Zahid, the taxi driver from Lahore. As we noted before he saved enough money to start a business with an American in Lahore, hence he went home full of optimism before his

[18] Since labor migration to the Gulf monarchies is a cyclical phenomenon, people take up jobs in the UAE or elsewhere in the Gulf in multiple spells, it is hard to say what is "permanent",. We interpret here as permanently returned migrants those who do not have a job in the UAE at the time of our survey.

visa expired. This appears to be evidence to support NELM theory. Well, it does only to some extent. For his newly established company the shipment came late, he could not sell the product (he did not share with us information what that business was) so he lost all of his money. During the interview he told us he renewed his passport, his visa is still valid so he is looking for a good job in the UAE to go back for another cycle.

Figure 25: Would you like to return to UAE for work?



Source: Survey of Pakistani return migrants (ISS) (own calculations).

Here are some cases of guest workers who would like to return to the UAE.

Muhammad Muneer, a laborer from Chakwal who worked in Dubai for two years complained that he earned little (less than promised, just 700 dirhams) and also complained that men's absence from home "disturbs families, children are affected psychologically". He could not save any money or send remittances back to his family. He eventually lost even this poor job but given the conditions in Chakwal and his family's need for support he would like to return to Dubai.

Nasir Sultan, the 24-year-old auto electrician from Chakwal also wants to take another job in Sharjah. As I cited him saying before, he earned a poor income with long hours of work and found that "a laborer's life is really though there", but his life is equally miserable in Chakwal so he would return to the UAE as soon as he finds a job in a better company than he had worked for.

Naeem Gul, the spray painter from Abbottabad returned home after 12 years in Sharjah and while he achieved his initial family aims (got married and bought a house) he nevertheless wants to get a new job in the UAE since his improved social status requires him to meet the expectations of his friends and relatives so he needs more income that he can get only in the Gulf.

But many of our in-depth interviewees want to stay in Pakistan or return as soon as possible. Here are some of the telling cases.

Umar, a 50-year-old welder from Abbottabad was luckier. He spent six years in Dubai. His economic conditions "improved tremendously" in the UAE due to good income and savings. He sent money to his family regularly, "gained respect" in his home town, and people who ignored him in the past now respected him a lot. He earned enough money and returned to Pakistan in 2005. He felt that his absence was affecting his family. They were lonely and insisted on his return (he was married before he first went to Dubai). After coming back he started his own workshop. He does not want to go again, as he was fed up and wanted to live with his family. Azeem Rehman, whose story will be told in the next pages, has a very similar story. Both Azeem and Umar are skilled people, they earned enough in the Gulf to return home and live a decent family life, respected by their community. I do not have data on their earnings in Pakistan, but given the low level of incomes generally in this country I can guess with some confidence that their salaries in the UAE were higher. Being home with one's family in decent living conditions and being respected by the community is good enough to justify return migration even if it means giving up a higher income.

Umar Khattab, the 40-year-old driver from Lahore is one of the few of our in-depth interviewees who definitely said he does not want to go to the UAE again, though his story is not one of great success. His income in Dubai was meager. He considers himself poor. He could not send enough to his family and found it difficult to make ends meet, as did his family in Pakistan. He returned home in 2006, when a friend bought a van and offered him a partnership. For lack of earning, contentment and respect he never wants to go back to the UAE, and he is proud to be a Pakistani.

It is interesting how the question of "respect" keeps coming up, its lack is one reason for disappointment in the UAE and an important factor which explains why people yearn to go home (and stay).

Zafar Haider, the 50-year-old salesman-cum-driver from Chakwal is also a very interesting case in this respect. He was interviewed while on a short visit to home before he went back to Dubai. As mentioned earlier he earns an unusually high income (3,500 dirhams a month) and he informed us that Dubai changed his socioeconomic status. "The change is obvious, there is a marked increase in our income, our diet has improved, so has our living. People respect us." So

why does he keep going back to Dubai? The improved social status has its price. To meet the expectations of his kins and neighbors he has to maintain the "pretense" of high status so he also borrowed a lot of money. This is what keeps him in Dubai even after 12 years.

We developed a regression model to test which factors are the most likely to explain the decision to return to the UAE. (see *Table 2*)

Table 2: Regression model no. 2 on factors of satisfaction among guest workers

	Dependent variable:			
	Wants to Return to UAE? (=1)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Current income z Score	−1.542*** p = 0.0003	−1.517*** p = 0.0004	−1.542*** p = 0.0003	−1.370*** p = 0.002
Income in UAE z Score	−0.535* p = 0.083	−0.524* p = 0.088	−0.535* p = 0.083	−0.405 p = 0.209
Decision made by (Alone=1/ Family=0)		−0.246 p = 0.585		−0.359 p = 0.435
Money improved life substantially				−0.856 p = 0.252
Money did not matter much				−0.386 p = 0.526
Constant	−1.150*** p = 0.0001	−0.994** p = 0.014	−1.150*** p = 0.0001	−0.647 p = 0.144
Observations	115	115	115	108
Log Likelihood	−60.538	−60.389	−60.538	−58.326
Akaike Inf. Crit.	127.075	128.777	127.075	128.651

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The data speak loud and clear: the single most important factor that drives people back to Gulf monarchy jobs is low income in Pakistan. This can be interpreted as strong support for NE theory. But let's not rush to conclusions. Interestingly, those who earned a low income in the UAE in Panel 1-3 of *Table 2* are also more inclined to seek jobs again in Dubai or Abu Dhabi. The coefficient is only marginally significant, but given the small number of cases in our survey this counter-intuitive finding (which contradicts NE hypothesis) deserves attention. It is also notable that in Panel 4 when we control whether the life of their families improved substantially the low UAE income loses its significance and while improved family conditions is not significant the coefficient is negative and its size is quite large (–0.856, with a lousy P=0.252). In *Table 2* in Panel 4 the coefficient for the variable whether the decision was made by the individual is not significant but it is negative, hence it points in the direction NELM theory expects (if the family made the initial decision the respondent is less likely to intend to return to the UAE).

We read the model as one offering a weak support for NELM theory: low income earners who went back after a number of years in the UAE to Pakistan will seek new UAE employment again if they were not successful in attaining a good job in Pakistan. Why? I speculate because with low UAE income they could not send enough remittances home so they could not start a successful business (many became unemployed). If they had good incomes in the UAE they were more likely to improve the living conditions and their own income chances in Pakistan, hence they prefer to stay at home. We experimented with a model which included whether they sent remittances home and whether some of the remittances went into investments. Both coefficients were positive (but not significant): that actually is a weak support for NE theory.

One good example is our in-depth interview with 65-year-old Azeem Rehman from Abbottabad. Azeem was one of the best qualified persons among our in-depth interviewees. He was a welder and car mechanic and was eventually promoted in Dubai (where he lived between 1993 and 2003) into the position of a foreman. While he had to work 12 hours a day, with overtime he earned 2,200 dirhams a month. He was "happy with his income". When asked whether he would consider going back for another spell of work to the UAE he said he would not since he "had enough, and in Pakistan could work with respect and dignity". A good case to show high salary is enough to make the UAE job attractive, but if one finds a job back home which provides livelihood for his family people may not want to go. Living with "respect and dignity" at home is crucial in the decision to stay at home.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we find some consistent support for NELM theory.

While NE theory is correct, higher incomes in the destination country is a major driving force for the initial migration decision, nevertheless half of the respondents in the survey told us that the decision was not made by themselves individually, but rather by their family (or jointly between the individual and the family). There is a great deal of qualitative evidence from focus group and in-depth interviews that guest workers took jobs in the UAE because there was a need for higher incomes in their families that were left behind, and some were even rather bitter to be used as money makers by their kin. Also there are findings from the qualitative and survey part which shows that the actions of the migrants are integrated into the sending family economy. The paper above presented rather massive evidence that when directly asked respondents also reported a number of "costs" which they nonetheless suppressed for the sake of the financial, economic and social advancement of the family at home. Sending families clearly shaped the migration process and decided even against the will of the migrants if needed. This offers support to H1.

We also found substantial dissatisfaction with working and living conditions in the UAE, but that is mainly caused by poor housing and excessive working hours. But even long working hours and disappointment with wages lower than what was promised before migration were accepted as long as the guest workers could send home enough remittances to help their family survive and in some cases to invest into building a house or starting a business. The main aim of guest workers was not maximal income, but to be able to send home the maximum amount in remittances. The ability to remit made guest workers accept living and working conditions that many of them regarded "slave-like". This offers support to H2.

Finally we also found that return migrants who rejected the possibility to take another job in the UAE did so while accepting substantially lower incomes than what they had in the UAE, since they preferred to live with their families, live and work in respect and dignity they often missed in the UAE.

Those return migrants who are planning to find a new job in the Gulf do so primarily because they could not find a job or sufficient income to support their families in Pakistan, but in in-depth interviews some told us they want to come "home" as soon as those needs are met. This supports H3.

As it is so often the case in empirical research the glass is half full and half empty. We did not "verify" NELM theory, but our data are more consistent with hypotheses derived from this theory than from NE.

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MIGRATION AND DIASPORA POLICY INSTITUTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

Béla Soltész

ABSTRACT

Many Latin American countries face the challenge of mass emigration. Some of them have created complex policy institutions to tackle this challenge and to maintain ties with the growing diaspora, while others have done little in this respect. This article analyses Latin American diaspora governance based on the existing institutions in each country. It shows that it is not necessarily the most affected countries that have the most developed policy responses. There is a group of countries with high emigration rate but with low governmental capacities (e.g. Bolivia, Honduras) where no significant policy diaspora institutions and policies were created. Another group of countries shows sufficient government capacities, but the emigration issue is not seen as very relevant there, thus diaspora policy institutions and policies are also lacking – or they were created only for specific groups, such as the highly skilled emigrants (e.g. Brazil, Chile). Finally, a group of countries with medium to high emigration rate and medium governmental capacities created the most innovative and robust diaspora institutions and policies (e.g. Mexico, Ecuador).

Keywords: Migration, migration management, diaspora and migration policy institutions, Latin America

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INTRODUCTION

Middle- and lower-middle income countries all around the globe are getting increasingly affected by outward migration processes. While the overall developmental effects of mass emigration are debated, it is sure that several mechanisms exist to design and implement policies that manage the process. However, systematic research on migration policies and their institutional background is a rather new area of studies, and the literature focuses mostly on immigration, not on emigration policies. This article wishes to fill a gap by observing the issue of migration from the perspective of the government of a country from where a large number of people emigrate. In other words: what can a government do if people leave the country?

Diaspora policies – as these activities are usually labelled – might have different historical, institutional and structural features in different countries.[1] This article observes how a set of countries of a given region designed new governmental institutions in order to maintain transnational ties with their emigrant citizens.[2] The region observed is Latin America, one of the most important sending areas of labour migration worldwide. Although it does not engage in cross-regional comparisons, it can be understood as a point of reference for scholars and policymakers in the field of diaspora policies in other regions of the world, including Hungary and the Central and South Eastern European region.

The article is divided into four parts. First, I present the historical background of Latin American migration patterns and its management. Second, I evaluate the relative importance of emigration and the capabilities for policymaking (as independent variables) for Latin American countries. Third, I present the institutional and legal reactions of these governments to migration and diaspora issues (as dependent variables). Finally, I analyze the correlation between these two factors and draw conclusions on the viability of transnational diaspora governance.

[1] Sources of information for this article include the results of a survey, to be referred as Diaspora Unit Survey (DUS, 2014-2015), carried out for the PhD thesis of the author (Corvinus University of Budapest, Institute of International Studies). Ten Latin American Ministries of Foreign Affairs provided information on the functioning of their respective governmental unit. For further information, see Soltész, 2016.

[2] By diaspora, the totality of the emigrants are understood here, i.e. the people who were born in a given country and live in another country, regardless of their citizenship and legal status (documented or undocumented).

BACKGROUND

Latin America[3] was a region of net immigration for approximately 450 years, although most of this time migration was either forced or administered within a framework of colonial systems. Net migration rates for the whole continent turned negative in the late 1950s, yet showing important regional differences. By 1950, net migration rate was negative in 10 out of 19 Latin American countries, and for four more countries it was around zero (see *Table 1*). The main immigration countries of the early 1900s, such as Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil and Uruguay gradually lost their attractiveness, partly because the countries of origin of former migration flows (mainly Southwest Europe) experienced economic growth, and partly because economic hardships and political imbalances made these countries less and less attractive for prospective migrants – however, immigrants kept on arriving from neighbouring countries (Radcliffe and Westwood, 1996).

Mass emigration flows occurred due to economic and political shocks, many of which stand out from the time series in the table of net migration rate, such as Fidel Castro's coming to power in 1959, the coup d'état in Uruguay in 1973 or the Mexican debt crisis in 1982. What definitely turned the tide was, however, the wave of structural adjustments that swept through Latin America in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the consequences thereof.

In the meantime, however, a handful of 'success stories' are also present, i. e. countries that due to their good economic performance (and also to the hectic situation of their neighbors) became small regional hubs of inward migration, such as Costa Rica, Chile and Panama. The majority of Latin American countries are nonetheless sending more migrants than they receive.

Regarding the current situation, the single largest country of origin in Latin America is Mexico, and almost every Mexican migrant is in the United States. Mexicans add up to almost half of the total Latin American emigrant stock (including intraregional migrants), and a bit more than half of those who are outside Latin America (see details in *Table 2*). Very far from Mexico's 13.2 million stock of emigrants, Colombia holds the second place with 2.4 million and Brazil comes third with 1.8 million emigrants. Data for all Latin American countries, based on estimations of United Nations (2013), are shown below.

[3] By Latin America, the Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking sovereign nations of the Americas are understood here, 19 countries altogether.

Table 1: Net migration rate in Latin American countries per 5-year periods (person/1000)

Country	1950 1955	1955 1960	1960 1965	1965 1970	1970 1975	1975 1980	1980 1985	1985 1990	1990 1995	1995 2000	2000 2005	2005 2010
Argentina	3	1	1	1	2	–2	1	1	0	0	–1	–1
Bolivia	–2	–2	–2	–2	–2	–1	–2	–2	–3	–2	–3	–3
Brazil	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	–1	–1
Chile	–1	–1	–1	–1	–2	–1	–1	–1	1	1	0	0
Colombia	–2	–3	–3	–3	–2	–2	–2	–1	–1	–1	–1	–1
Costa Rica	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	4	7	4	3
Cuba	–1	–2	–5	–6	–4	–3	–5	–1	–2	–3	–3	–3
Dominican R.	–2	–2	–2	–3	–3	–3	–3	–3	–3	–3	–3	–3
Ecuador	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	–1	–1
El Salvador	–6	–4	–1	–3	–5	–9	–10	–11	–9	–14	–12	–9
Guatemala	0	0	–1	–2	–4	–7	–7	–7	–8	–7	–5	–3
Honduras	1	1	1	–6	–3	–2	–3	–3	–5	–6	–5	–3
Mexico	–1	–1	–2	–2	–3	–3	–5	–3	–2	–4	–5	–4
Nicaragua	–2	–1	–1	–2	–3	–4	–6	–8	–5	–6	–8	–7
Panama	–3	–2	–2	–2	–1	–1	–1	–1	0	1	1	1
Paraguay	–10	–8	–7	–6	–4	–3	–1	–1	–1	–2	–2	–1
Peru	0	0	0	0	0	0	–1	–2	–3	–3	–5	–5
Uruguay	1	2	0	–2	–10	–4	–2	–2	–1	–2	–6	–3
Venezuela	6	5	1	1	6	6	1	1	0	0	0	0
Latin America	0	–1	–1	–1	–1	–1	–2	–2	–1	–2	–2	–2

Source: United Nations Population Database (2013b).

As seen in *Table 2*'s right column, it is not only the absolute numbers that count. While from the perspective of the country of destination, the sheer flow or stock number of migrants already tells a story, from the point of view of the country of origin it is the ratio of emigrants to the total population that is important. Tiny El Salvador is heading this list with 25%, followed by Cuba (13%), Paraguay (11.9%) and the Dominican Republic (11.6%).

Regarding the destinations for Latin American migrants, the United States is by far the most important one, being the number one destination in 12 out of 19 cases and the number two in four further cases. The second destination is Spain (figuring three times as first and seven times as second most important), while the third one is Argentina (first destination for three countries and second for one more). In the top 20, there are nine countries in Latin America, seven in Europe, the two countries of North America (excluding Mexico), one in Asia and one in

Australia. It is worth noting that migration between neighbouring countries is very significant in Latin America, especially where regional integration processes such as the Mercosur have been facilitating the free movement of their citizens (United Nations, 2013).

Table 2: Emigrant stock (by country of birth) of Latin American countries, total values and as compared to usually resident population (%) (2013)

Emigrant stock from Latin American countries (total)		Emigrant stock as compared to usually resident population (%)	
Mexico	13 212 419	El Salvador	25,06
Colombia	2 448 385	Cuba	12,99
Brazil	1 769 639	Paraguay	11,92
El Salvador	1 526 093	Dominican R.	11,58
Cuba	1 476 344	Nicaragua	11,02
Peru	1 373 387	Mexico	10,68
Dominican R.	1 190 441	Uruguay	9,88
Ecuador	1 144 408	Honduras	8,40
Guatemala	1 049 865	Bolivia	7,35
Argentina	980 580	Ecuador	7,31
Paraguay	770 441	Guatemala	6,69
Bolivia	764 862	Colombia	5,17
Honduras	659 606	Peru	4,49
Nicaragua	655 117	Panama	3,94
Venezuela	630 686	Chile	3,44
Chile	604 008	Costa Rica	2,77
Uruguay	336 741	Argentina	2,31
Panama	149 952	Venezuela	2,08
Costa Rica	130 364	Brazil	0,87
Total	30 873 338	Total	5,16

Source: United Nations (2013a).

An obvious result of the emigration flows is that remittances have skyrocketed in the 1990s. Mexico is the largest remittance receiver in terms of absolute value, not only in Latin America but in the whole world. Other countries with a significant diaspora follow Mexico, with Guatemala coming second, followed by Colombia, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic. *Table 3* shows the absolute values of remittances in (current) US dollars and the percentage of this value related to their nominal GDP (in which remittances are not included).

Table 3: Inflow of remittances to Latin America (total and as % of GDP, in current million USD, 2013)[4]

Remittances (total, in current million USD, 2013)		Remittances as % of GDP (total current, 2013)	
Mexico	23 022	Honduras	16,95%
Guatemala	5 379	El Salvador	16,37%
Dominican R.	4 485	Guatemala	9,99%
Colombia	4 449	Nicaragua	9,97%
El Salvador	3 971	Dominican R.	7,33%
Honduras	3 136	Bolivia	3,93%
Peru	2 707	Ecuador	2,60%
Brazil	2 537	Paraguay	2,05%
Ecuador	2 458	Mexico	1,82%
Bolivia	1 201	Peru	1,34%
Nicaragua	1 081	Costa Rica	1,21%
Costa Rica	596	Colombia	1,17%
Paraguay	591	Panama	1,06%
Argentina	533	Uruguay	0,21%
Panama	451	Brazil	0,11%
Chile	136	Argentina	0,09%
Uruguay	122	Chile	0,05%
Venezuela	120	Venezuela	0,03%

Source: World Bank (2015b). For Cuba no data is available.

Among other factors the above ones already explain, why Latin American policymakers have focused their attention on emigration-related issues. However, as already mentioned, in the Latin American context 'migration' meant, for centuries, 'immigration'. If a Latin American country had migration-related policies, it meant policies of immigration, with few, although notable, exceptions such as Mexico. Meanwhile, by the end of the 1990s, many Latin American governments had to realize that a large part of the country's population has moved abroad for a longer period and they are not willing to return within a shorter time period, even if political oppression or extreme economic hardships have ended. Reanimating the contact with the diaspora emerged as a new goal in the context of the gradual restriction in US (and, later, European) immigration policies also undocumented immigrants' right to enter and stay in these countries became an issue. Together with the wish to attract

[4] Given the nature of the issue, the figures on remittances shown here are rough estimations.

emigrants' remittances and investment, these are the aims of present-day Latin American governments when designing transnational policies towards their diaspora.

In the current context, the government of a Latin American country of origin is basically interested in that its citizens can enter safely and legally the country of destination, have their rights respected there, have their requirements met to become economically successful, and still maintain their contacts with their household members in the country of origin, so the latter can get financial contributions. Once the government of a country of origin decides to build policies in order to achieve these goals, they will start being gradually included into the agenda of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of each country.

RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF EMIGRATION AND THE CAPABILITIES FOR POLICYMAKING

The level of development of a country has an effect on the level of outward migration it experiences. Yet, it can be assumed that not only the emigration ratio, but also other factors come into play when institutions and policies are to be built in order to tackle the challenges. In the following, I present the factors that can be seen as independent variables of a diaspora policy architecture. These are: 1) the level of income and development of a country; 2) the overall quality and effectiveness of a country's governance; 3) the size of the diaspora. With relevant indicators, I construct categories which feed into a general categorization of Latin American countries.

Income and level of development

Development can be conceptualized around many indicators, the most convenient of which are Gross Domestic Product and Gross National Income. In this respect, a categorization of the World Bank (2014) which groups national economies into four categories is relevant. According to this categorization, there are three country groups in Latin America (as no "low-income" country can be found in the region):

- Lower-middle (1,046–4,125 USD): Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua;
- Upper-middle (4,126–12,736 USD): Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru;
- High (12,736 USD <) Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Venezuela.

These categories can be a good starting point, however, there are other indicators to take into account. For an analysis with a focus on development, the HDI (Human Development Index) is also fundamental. According to the latest Human Development Report, there are four categories – again, there is no Latin American country in the lowest-ranking group. The division is therefore the following (UNDP, 2014):

- Very high (HDI 0.8–1): Argentina, Chile, Cuba;
- High (HDI 0.7–0.799): Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
- Medium (HDI 0.55–0.699): Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay.

By combining these two categorizations, it can be said that Argentina and Chile are definitely of the highest rank, and Uruguay (with a HDI of 0.79) can also be added to the top three. Following these three, there are two 'uneasy' countries: Venezuela (with high GNI and high HDI) and Cuba (with upper-middle GNI and very high HDI). Venezuela owes its high GNI to its petroleum-based economy, while Cuba's high HDI is shadowed by the scarcity of consumption goods and the restrictions of personal freedom. To these two countries, Brazil should be added: while it scores lower in GNI per capita and HDI values than the Southern Cone countries and Venezuela, due to its sheer size (and to the fact that Brazilian middle and higher classes comprise tens of millions of people), it should be separated from the rest of 'mid-range' countries.

'Mid-range', in this respect, means an upper-middle GNI and a high HDI. This is the case of Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama and Peru. Most of these countries are important countries of origin for large stocks of emigrants – perhaps with the exception of Costa Rica and Panama. Mexico is obviously on a different scale than the other countries in this group, however, as opposed to Brazil, there is no justification for treating it separately, as geographical and income features are less diverse than in the Brazilian case.

Finally, countries with a lower-middle income and medium human development include Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Paraguay can also be added to this group, despite having a slightly higher GNI than the others. The common feature of these countries is the (relatively) small

size (with the exception of Bolivia) and a lower level of development and the economic focus on the export of raw materials.

A developmental classification of Latin American countries can therefore be sketched as follows:

Table 4: A possible categorization of Latin American countries based on their level of development

Category	Countries
High development	Argentina, Chile, Uruguay
Asymmetrical high development[a]	Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela
Medium development	Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru
Low development	Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay

Source: Own compilation based on World Bank (2014) and UNDP (2014).
[a] In the case of Cuba and Venezuela, development patterns are very different from the rest of the countries, and reliable data are scarce. In general it can be raised that the scores for some countries should be critically evaluated, like in the case of Cuba.

Governance

The next issue to be assessed is the question of governance. Very much related to the question of development, Latin American governments have different capacities and capabilities for conceiving, designing and implementing public policies. For the present analysis, this notion has to be completed with the specific aspect of whether these governments are capable of making policies towards the diaspora, i.e. if there are severe hindering factors that would make these attempts unviable.

The most convenient indicators in this respect are the World Bank's series of "Worldwide Governance Indicators" (WGIs) which measure six key dimensions of governance, from 1996 onwards: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Lack of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. While WGIs are widely contested and criticized, they are still the most overarching indicators for quantifying the overall quality of governance.

For the purposes of this study, and in order to answer the question set above, it is the Government Effectiveness Index (GEI) which seems to be the most telling.

As of 2014, Latin American countries had the following scores (the best possible score being 2.5, the worst possible score being -2.5) (World Bank, 2015i):

- 1–1.5: Chile;
- 0.5–1: none;
- 0–0.5: Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay;
- –0.5–0: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru;
- –1––0.5: Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay;
- –1.5–1: Venezuela.

While many of the country scores seem to correlate with developmental scores, it is interesting to observe those that are very different. Among higher income countries, Argentina scores bad and Venezuela extremely bad, while among mid-range countries, Costa Rica, Mexico and Panama have a better score. The following table shows a simplified categorization based on the World Bank's Government Effectiveness Index (GEI):

Table 5: A possible categorization of Latin American countries based on the effectiveness of their governance in 2014

Category	Countries
High effectiveness of governance	Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay
Intermediate effectiveness of governance	Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru
Low effectiveness of governance	Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Venezuela

Source: Own compilation based on World Bank GEI (2015c).

It has to be added that there are two countries where significant political discrepancies exist between the government and the diaspora: Cuba and Venezuela. In these two cases it is predictable that overall government effectiveness will deteriorate when it comes to possible cooperation with the diaspora. As Venezuela already scores low, it affects the medium score of Cuba which is arguably low instead.

Diaspora size

Third, the size and the distribution of the diaspora should be categorized, together with its economic importance for the country of origin, based on the net amount of remittances they send, and more importantly, the ratio of this amount to the country's GDP.

Regarding the emigrant stock as compared to usually resident populations, Latin American countries can be distributed into three groups of approximately equal size:

- 10%–25.1%: Salvador, Cuba, Paraguay, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Mexico;
- 5%–9.9%: Uruguay, Honduras, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Colombia;
- 0.8%–4.9%: Peru, Panama, Chile, Costa Rica, Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil.

Regarding remittances, groups can be formed according to the ratio of remittances as compared to the total amount of GDP (with the exception of Cuba having no data):

- 4–17%: Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic;
- 1–3.9%: Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Mexico, Peru, Costa Rica, Colombia, Panama;
- 0–0.9%: Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela.

Relative importance of emigration for a country can therefore be summarized based on these two features. Most of the countries belong to the same 'range' according to both categorizations. There are cases when diaspora appear to be more important regarding its absolute size than regarding the proportional amount of remittances they send (Paraguay, Mexico, Uruguay), while opposite cases (Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Panama, Costa Rica) also occur. In general, data on remittances seem to be more telling about the importance of the diaspora, thus this has been the base for categorization. As there is no reliable remittances data for Cuba, it has been classified according to the size of its diaspora to the first category.

Table 6: A possible categorization of Latin American countries based on the relative economic importance of their diaspora

Category	Countries
Very important	Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua
Rather important	Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru
Rather unimportant	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Venezuela

Source: Own compilation based on United Nations (2013) and World Bank (2015b).

Categorization of Latin American diaspora policies

Based on these three categorizations, a lot can be said about the importance and the capabilities of the diaspora policy issue in each country. By assigning numerical values to the categories, we could foresee how motivated decision makers could handle the issue, and how successful they could be. The logical maximum of points would therefore go to countries with low development level, high governance effectiveness and high economic importance of the diaspora. On the other hand, the logical minimum would go to countries which enjoy a high development, have a very ineffective government and the diaspora is economically unimportant.

It is obvious that these are artificial combinations, as a high development level usually correlates with higher effectiveness of the government and with a lower level of economic importance of the diaspora, and accordingly, lower development level implies lower effectiveness of government and higher level of economic importance of the diaspora. Actually, when looking at the *Tables 4, 5* and *6*, we can identify clusters of countries that show these features. For example, Chile is a good example for the former case, and Honduras for the latter.

Therefore, it seems to be reasonable to draw three 'patterns' of emigration and diaspora, seen from the perspective of their possible implications for diaspora policymaking. These patterns are summarized in the following table.

Table 7: Categorization of Latin American countries based on the economic importance of their diaspora and the governmental capabilities for diaspora policymaking

Pattern	Development level	Governance effectiveness	Economic importance of the diaspora	Countries
1	High	High or intermediate	Low	Argentina, Brazil (2), Chile, Uruguay
2	Intermediate	Intermediate	Intermediate	Bolivia (3), Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay (3), Peru
3	Low	Low or intermediate	High	Dominican Republic (2), El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua
4	Asymmetrical	Low	Controversial	Cuba, Venezuela

Numbers in brackets show that the given country could arguably be classified to another category.
Source: Own compilation, see details at Tables 4, 5 and 6.

What has been summarized above is a preliminary assessment on the importance of the diaspora in the economic and social processes of each Latin American country – based on the overall development level of the country, the absolute and relative size of the diaspora itself and of the remittances they send home – and on the general effectiveness of the governmental activities of the given country. By these factors, four patterns have been identified, three of which are logical positions in an 'importance – capabilities matrix'. Pattern 1 marks the position of 'lower importance' (i.e. of the diaspora) and 'high capabilities' (i.e. for policymaking). Pattern 2 stands for 'intermediate importance' and 'intermediate capabilities', while pattern 3 is for 'high importance' and 'low capabilities'. Pattern 4, however, covers two 'outlier' countries, Venezuela and Cuba, in which cases neither the development level nor the capabilities of diaspora policymaking can be 'matched' to the rest of the countries, due to their different political systems. It is therefore expected that they will show different features regarding their diaspora policies as well.

INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL CHANGES IN POLICYMAKING

Why would a state want to build institutions and policies for its diaspora? The most evident answer is because the diaspora has resources. Obviously, they are voters, and many times they can fund political or social movements which can favor an actual government or opposition party in the country of origin. Also, given the largely economic nature of today's migratory processes, and the spectacular growth in remittance flows, countries of origin are becoming more and more dependent on the money that their citizens are earning abroad. With all the developmental potential that remittances (can) have, governments of countries of origin are motivated to invent ways of "diaspora engagement" because of the opportunity to capitalize on these resources (Vertovec, 2005; Gamlen, 2010; Délano and Gamlen, 2014).

In the following, I present the factors that can be seen as dependent variables of a migration and diaspora policy architecture, i. e. the achievements of a country to keep emigrants within the realm of its *polity*, through rights, policies and institutions. The most important features are: 1) dual citizenship regimes and extraterritorial voting rights; 2) diaspora-related laws and policy documents; 3) specialized institutional bodies in a country's governance. Based on these features, I construct categories which feed into a general categorization of Latin American countries.

Dual citizenship regimes and extraterritorial voting rights in Latin America

Very importantly, *diaspora politics* is not the same as *diaspora policies,* however, the latter would hardly exist without the former. Diaspora politics is understood here as a regular transnational political activity involving political actors of the country of origin (political parties, presidential candidates, etc.) and formal and informal groups of migrants in the country of destination (migrant associations, informal circles, etc.). It is a usual practice in electoral democracies that political actors meet, negotiate with and promise benefits for the members of every possible interest group, hoping to have their votes in the elections. The diaspora should be no exception to that: this is why diaspora politics exists.

However, the 'diaspora vote' is somewhat different from the vote of other interest groups, such as 'the agricultors' or 'the landless peasants'. First and foremost, they are physically absent. Depending on the laws and regulations of each country, citizens living abroad on a permanent basis and with no registered address in the country of origin may or may not vote in the elections. Second, even if they may, sometimes it is really difficult for them to cast their votes personally at the consulate of the country of origin which might be very far away from the place where they live. Third, even if the diaspora is a group with some common needs and interests, they are not necessarily one single "interest group", and fourth, they might not even care about politics in their country of origin any longer, as they expect to have their problems solved by the country of destination instead (Gamlen, 2006).

Vocal diaspora groups have nonetheless tried to have their say ever since Latin American emigration started to gain a significant dimension. Members of the exiled political opposition of the military governments in the 1970s were therefore limited in the legal means to intervene in the political life of the country that they had left behind, thus voting rights were suspended (regardless of whether elections were actually held or not), and if emigrants received the citizenship of their country of destination, it automatically meant the loss of the citizenship of the country of origin. Restrictions on dual citizenship have been in force in many Latin American countries, typically in those that went through a military regime, as in the case of Argentina, Chile or Panama (Poletti, 2007).

Regarding the right to vote, nowadays the majority of Latin American countries allow their citizens to vote in presidential elections even if they live permanently abroad, but they have to go personally to the consulate in order to exercise this right. Exceptions to this general trend are right-restricting Chile, Cuba, El Salvador and Uruguay on the one hand, as they do not provide this right to their citizens; and right-extending Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico and Peru on the other (see below).

Table 8 summarizes the main features of dual citizenship regimes and extraterritorial voting rights in Latin America. Most of the information has been compiled based on the "Diaspora Unit Survey" (DUS, 2014-2015) which I conducted with the Diaspora Units of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of ten Latin American countries.

Table 8: Dual citizenship regimes and extraterritorial voting rights in Latin America

Country	Dual citizenship (in case of obtaining second nationality, does the first one remain vigent)	Right to vote from abroad (year when ceded and type of elections in which they can participate)	Remarks (taken from the Diaspora Unit Survey)
Argentina	No (except on the basis of bilateral treaties, e. g. with Spain)	1993, consulate, presidential, parliamentary	In referendums only if explicitly stated by the election authority
Bolivia	Yes	1984, consulate, presidential	
Brazil	Yes	1965, consulate, presidential	If a Brazilian citizen is inscribed on the electoral list, the "transit vote" rule is applied, as if he/she were a tourist outside Brazil
Chile	No (except on the basis of bilateral treaties, e. g. with Spain)	no	The Law Nr. 20.748 allowing the right to vote for the Chilean diaspora has been passed, by the next presidential election (in 2017) it should be applied.
Colombia	Yes	1961, consulate, presidential, parliamentary (upper house), one special MP at the lower house	Vote is counted to the upper house. Referendums: depends on the concrete case.
Costa Rica	Yes	2014, consulate, presidential	
Cuba	No	no	
Dominican Republic	Yes	1997, consulate, presidential, parliamentary (upper house), from 2011 migrants send 7 MPs to the lower house	
Ecuador	Yes	2002, consulate, presidential	Vote is facultative.

Source: Own compilation based on the Diaspora Unit Survey (2014-2015), Nohlen, et al. (2007), Poletti (2007), Didou (2009), Castillo (2010) and Vargas (2011) and, if relevant, the website of each institution.

Table 8: Dual citizenship regimes and extraterritorial voting rights in Latin America

Country	Dual citizenship (in case of obtaining second nationality, does the first one remain vigent)	Right to vote from abroad (year when ceded and type of elections in which they can participate)	Remarks (taken from the Diaspora Unit Survey)
El Salvador	Yes	no	
Guatemala	Yes	From 2015, consulate, presidential	
Honduras	No (except on the basis of bilateral treaties, e. g. with Spain)	2001, consulate, presidential	
Mexico	Yes	2006, postal, presidential (from 2012 also governor in Distrito Federal, Michoacán and Morelos states)	
Nicaragua	No (except on the basis of bilateral treaties, e. g. with Spain and Central American countries)	2000, consulate, presidential (in practice, however, it is rarely performed, due to lack of funding and administrative capacity)	
Panama	No	2009, postal, presidential	
Paraguay	Yes	From 2018 (approved by a 2011 referendum)	
Peru	Yes	1998, consulate (internet voting mechanism is under testing), presidential, parliamentary (extraterritorial MPs from 2010)	The feasibility of a special extraterritorial electoral district is under testing.
Uruguay	Yes	No (invalid referendum in 2009)	A draft law has been submitted to the Parliament in September 2014 by the government, still not approved.
Venezuela	Yes	1997, consulate, presidential	

Source: Own compilation based on the Diaspora Unit Survey (2014-2015), Nohlen, et al. (2007), Poletti (2007), Didou (2009), Castillo (2010) and Vargas (2011) and, if relevant, the website of each institution.

The *'standard'* is that citizens of Latin American countries living abroad on a permanent basis can maintain the citizenship of their country of origin even after obtaining the citizenship of their country of destination. Also, they can participate in the presidential elections of their country of origin (but not in other, local or referendum-type elections) if they go personally to the consulate of the country of origin. This is the case of Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala and Venezuela.

However, there are countries which are more *restrictive*. Regarding dual citizenship, there are countries which deny it altogether (Cuba and Panama) or recognize it only in the case if there is a special bilateral treaty with the country concerned (Argentina, Chile, Honduras and Nicaragua, all of which have an agreement with Spain on recognizing dual citizenship with that particular country).

There are also countries that do not restrict dual citizenship but they restrict the right to vote for migrants who live abroad on a permanent basis. This is currently the case with two countries from the previous group (Chile and Cuba) and with three others (El Salvador, Paraguay and Uruguay). However, two of these five (Chile and Paraguay) have already adopted a law allowing the diaspora to vote in the next presidential elections (2017 and 2018, respectively).

Finally, there are countries which are more *'liberal'* regarding the political participation of the diaspora. Mexico allows postal voting and Peru and Ecuador are testing the feasibility of internet voting. And there are a handful of countries which provide migrants not only with the right to vote but also with the right to be voted for. Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Peru have migrant members of the parliament. This means that there are 'extraterritorial' electoral districts: in the Dominican parliament there are MPs who represent the voters of the district of Florida or New York (Nohlen, et al., 2007; Vargas, 2011).

Within these different frameworks of *diaspora politics,* it can be expected that diaspora policies have also developed showing different features. The following section presents the legal and institutional framework of diaspora policies, their outreach and their concrete scope(s) of activity.

Legal and policy documents of diaspora policies

Traditionally, citizens of a country being abroad are entitled to consular protection, in line with many international agreements, the most important being the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963).

With the increase of emigration from Latin American countries, however, governments had to face with the challenge of having tens or hundreds of thousands of citizens in one consular district and for a staff of less than ten people. Especially during elections, when migrants lined up in long queues in front of the consulates to cast their votes, it became clear that consulates need a reinforcement in order to be able to carry out all the activities they are supposed to do (procedures of passports and visas, assisting citizens who got in trouble abroad, public notary procedures etc.). This is a *quantitative* challenge which could (or should) have been tackled by the increase in staff, budget and consular districts in the areas with a large diaspora.

Nonetheless, there are *qualitative* challenges as well. Migrants are not mere travelers or tourists but permanent residents of the country of destination where – especially if they do not hold a residence permit – they are subject to unfavorable treatment. Therefore, consulates should deal with issues of legal advice, law enforcement, and helping in an eventual return migration. All these qualitative changes need a *legal* and an *institutional* foundation (Gamlen, 2006).

Regarding the legal framework, all countries have a general legislation on migration which might or might not deal with emigrations issues, but sometimes the legal instruments regulating the Foreign Service contain the legal provisions for dealing with the diaspora. On other occasions, self-standing laws or decrees are adopted to deal with specific topics, most importantly return migration.

Regarding the institutional framework, there are many examples of how a 'Diaspora Unit' (understood from here onwards as a specialized institutional unit – department, division etc. – which has the main objective of dealing with the issues of the diaspora) came into being within the framework of the respective Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In many cases, there have already existed 'Immigration Units' within the respective Ministry of Interior. Usually, these two units are linked with a coordination mechanism (regular meetings etc.) but they work separately, as the target population they cover is different. Immigration Units are also larger and better equipped with legal and financial instruments for their operation.

The creation of emigration-related institutional or interinstitutional units or strategic lines of action is therefore presented in various steps, starting with the legal instruments and policy documents on which they are based. These are summarized in the following table.

Table 9: Laws and policy documents outlining diaspora policies in Latin America

Country	Relevant laws and policy documents
Argentina	Migration Law (Nº 25.871, in 2004) New Argentine Migratory Policy (*Nueva Política Migratoria argentina, NPMA*, on immigration only, in 2003)
Bolivia	Migration Law (Nº 370, in 2013)
Brazil	Alien Statute Law (Nº 6815, in 1980) Proposal for a Migration Law, Bill (*Projeto de Lei* PL 2516/15 approved on 6 December 2016)
Chile	Decree-Law on Alien Affairs (Nº1094, in 1975)
Colombia	Law on the National Migration System(Nº 1465, in 2011) Law on Return Migration (Nº 1565, in 2012) Decree on the National Intersectorial Commission on Migration (Nº 1239, in 2003) Decree on the Modification of the Structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Nº 3355, in 2009) Integral Migration Policy (*Política Integral Migratoria*, Document Nº 3603 CONPES, in 2009)
Costa Rica	Law on Migration and Alien Affairs (Nº 8764, in 2010) "Integral Migratory Policy" (*Política Migratoria Integral*) document by the National Council of Migration (in 2013)
Cuba	Decree-Law on Migration (Nº 302, in 2013)
Dominican Republic	Migration Law (Nº 285, in 2004)
Ecuador	Migration Law (in 2005, modified several times) National Plan on Ecuadorians Abroad (*Plan Nacional de Ecuatorianos en el Exterior*, in 2001) National Plan on Human Development for Migrations (*Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Humano para las Migraciones 2007–2010*, in 2007) Plan of Return for the Ecuadorian Migrant (*Plan de Retorno para el Migrante Ecuatoriano*, in 2008) Proposal for a Law on Human Mobility (*Proyecto de Ley de Movilidad Humana*) Proposal for an Organic Law on Protection and Equality of Rights of Ecuadorian Migrants Residing Abroad (*Ley Orgánica de Protección e Igualdad de Derechos de los Migrantes Ecuatorianos Residentes en el Exterior*)
El Salvador	Migration Law (in 1959) Special Law for the Protection and Development of the Salvadorian Migrant Person and his/her Family (*Ley Especial para la Protección y Desarrollo de la Persona Migrante Salvadoreña y su Familia*, in 2011) Institutional Policy of Protection and Linkage for the Migrant Salvadoreans (*Política Institucional de Protección y Vinculación para los Salvadoreños Migrantes*, in 2014)

Source: DUS (2014-2015) and websites on legislation.

Table 9: Laws and policy documents outlining diaspora policies in Latin America

Country	Relevant laws and policy documents
Guatemala	Migration Law (in 1999)
Honduras	Law on Migration and Alien Affairs (Decree Nº 208, in 2003) Law on the Protection of Migrant Hondurans and their Families (*Ley de Protección de los Hondureños Migrantes y sus Familiares*, Decree Nº, in 2013)
Mexico	Migration Law (in 2011) Decree creating the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (*Decreto por el que se crea el Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior, con el carácter de órgano administrativo desconcentrado de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, D.O.F. 16 abril 2003*, in 2003) Proposal for a Law on Attention to and Protection of Mexicans Abroad (*Proyecto de Ley de Atención y Protección de los Mexicanos en el Exterior*)
Nicaragua	Migration Law (Nº 761, in 2011) Special Law on [Return] Migration Incentives (*Ley especial de Incentivos Migratorios*, Nº 535, in 2005) Proposal for a Law on Attention to and Protection of the Nicaraguan Migrant Abroad (*Proyecto Ley de atencion y proteccion al migrante nicaraguense en el exterior)*
Panama	Decree-Law on the National Migration Service (*Decreto-Ley que crea el Servicio Nacional de Migración, la Carrera Migratoria y dicta otras disposiciones, in* 2008)
Paraguay	Migration Law (Nº 978, in 1996)
Peru	Migration Law (Legislative Decree Nº 1236, in 2015) Law on the Consultative Councils of Peruvian Communities Abroad (*Ley de los Consejos de Consulta de las Comunidades Peruanas*, Law Nº 29495, in 2012) Law on the Economic and Social Reinsertion of the Returned Migrant (*Ley de reinserción económica y social del migrante retornado,* Nº 30001, in 2013) Resolutions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs No.1197 of 2002 and No.0687 of 2004
Uruguay	Law on Migration and Return (Nº 18.250, in 2008)
Venezuela	Law on Alien Affairs and Migration (Nº 37. 944, in 2004) Proposal for a Law of Repatriation of Goods of Venezuelans Abroad (*Ley de Repatriación de Bienes de venezolanos en el exterior*) (or an emigrant tax, not adopted)

Source: DUS (2014-2015) and websites on legislation.

As it can be seen from *Table 9,* all Latin American countries have a specific law which usually sets the terms and conditions of entry and stay of foreign citizens and the institutional competences of the different governmental units that deal with them. Many of these laws date back to the mid-20th century and they were often conceived under a military dictatorship. This is the case with the migration laws of Brazil and Chile, for example (although there are attempts in both countries to create a more modern migration law).

New migration laws entered into force in the past 10 years in Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay, many of which make several references to the emigration and diaspora issue. Some of these countries also created specialized laws for a concrete topic within the emigration issue, the two most important being the protection of vulnerable migrant groups abroad and return migration. Some of the countries also have a law or a ministerial decree concerning the institutionalization of their Diaspora Unit: Colombia, Mexico and Peru counts with such a document (DUS 2014-2015).

There are comprehensive policy papers on an 'integral' migration policy in five countries: Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and El Salvador. However, this enumeration can be misleading: Argentina's "New Argentine Migratory Policy" deals only with immigration issues, while significant countries of origin like Mexico or Peru do not count with one single document – nonetheless, they have important achievements on the policy level.

Specialized institutional bodies and their activities

Meanwhile, as of 2016, roughly half of Latin American countries still have little more achievement in the institutionalization of their diaspora-related policies than an administrative unit for visa issues for those citizens who reside abroad which sometimes issues an informative material for emigrants or prospective returnees. These countries (for example Bolivia, Panama or Paraguay) do not actively 'make policy' in institutional terms, conceiving emigration primarily as an issue of documentation and public administration.

Others already have a specialized body for diaspora communities, even if only a few countries have a separate, higher level institutional unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that deals with diaspora issues with a holistic approach. Most importantly, it is Mexico that has a large apparatus focusing on related areas, but Ecuador and El Salvador are also worth mentioning. Mexico's Institute for Mexicans Abroad (*Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior*) will be presented

in details below. Being more a paradigm shift than a simple agenda setting, institutionalization of the constant contact and assistance of a large number of citizens who live abroad have been a slow but important process in diaspora issues (Didou, 2009; Délano, 2011; Vargas, 2011).

In parallel, on the intergovernmental level, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of most Latin American countries have been dedicating increased efforts to advocate migrants' rights, with emigration becoming a basic issue in bilateral relations with the countries of destination. Cooperation with other countries of origin on international fora has been significant: most Latin American countries are signatories of the United Nations' International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW).

In *Table 10*, the specialized institutional bodies responsible for immigration and emigration/diaspora issues are shown for each Latin American country.

The largest and oldest Diaspora Unit, the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (*Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior, IME*) was created as an autonomous institution within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2000, following a landslide victory of a center-right party. Migrants' right to vote had been an issue for decades and the constitution was changed to provide Mexicans abroad with the right to vote in presidential elections at the consulates in 1997. Diaspora vote was decisive in the 2000 elections (Escobar Latapí, 2008).

Other Latin American countries also have their diaspora policy framework, although on a more moderate scale. The three Andean countries with developed institutions in this respect (Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) are worth mentioning, while Mercosur countries are not placing a real emphasis on the issue. Similar to Mexico, Peru also created its first diaspora institution after the electoral victory of a president backed by many migrant voters – Alejandro Toledo. The entity (now called General Directorate of Peruvian Communities Abroad and Consular Affairs) belongs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and it administrates several programmes of human rights protection, cultural and educational vinculation and productive vinculation (Vega, 2011). Ecuador created two special units for diaspora affairs within its Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2000, which were later integrated into a ministry called Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility (Araujo and Eguiguren, 2009). Colombia experinced several waves of forced migration due to violent civil war and drug mafia activity, and in 1998 a National Plan for Integral Assistance for the Population Displaced by Violence was created, together with a special governmental fund to cover the expenses of the activities. Later, migration and diaspora issues shifted from conflict management and legal protection issues to the diaspora and development area, as also seen in the cases above with Mexico, Peru and Ecuador (Araujo and Eguiguren, 2009).

Table 10: Specialized institutional bodies responsible for immigration and emigration/diaspora issues in each Latin American country

Country	Specialized Diaspora Unit	Founded (year)	Staff (approx.)
Argentina	Directorate of Argentineans Abroad (*Dirección de Argentinos en el Exterior*), within the General Directorate of Consular Affairs (*Dirección General de Asuntos Consulares*)		7–10 employees
Bolivia			
Brazil	General Subsecretariat for Brazilians Abroad (*Subsecretaria-Geral das Comunidades Brasileiras no Exterior, SGEB*), Department for Consular Affairs and for Brazilians Abroad (*Departamento Consular e de Brasileiros no Exterior, DCB*), Division of Brazilian Communities Abroad (*Divisão das Comunidades Brasileiras no Exterior, DBR*)	The General Subsecretariat for Brazilians Abroad (SGEB) was created in 2007	Approx. 10 employees (SGEB, DCB and DBR)
Chile	Directorate for the Community of Chileans Abroad (*Dirección para la Comunidad de Chilenos en el Exterior, DICOEX*), within the General Directorate of Consular Affairs and Immigration (*Dirección General de Asuntos Consulares y de Inmigración, DIGECONSU*) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The DICOEX is divided in two Subdirectorates: of Development (*de Desarrollo*) and of Operations (*de Operaciones*)	2000	14 employees: one director, two subdirectors, one secretary, nine professional employees and an auxiliary employee
Colombia	Directorate of Consular and Migratory Affairs and Citizen Service (*Dirección de Asuntos Consulares, Migratorios y de Atención al Ciudadano*)	No data on when did the Directorate adopt the "Migratory" element in its name	Variable
Costa Rica	Directorate of External Service (Dirección de Servicio Exterior)	1962	20 employees
Cuba			
Dominican Republic			
Ecuador	A whole Viceministry (*of Human Mobility, Viceministerio de Movilidad Humana*) is in charge of the diaspora affairs. In the other half of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*the Cancillería*), there are also related units, such as the Directorate of Travel Documents (*Dirección de Documentos de Viaje*), the Subsecretariat of the Ecuadorian Migrant Community (*Subsecretaria de la Comunidad Ecuatoriana Migrante*), the Directorate of Consular Affairs (*Dirección de Asuntos Consulares*), etc.	The National Secretariat of the Migrant (Secretaría Nacional del Migrante, SENAMI) was merged into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2013 and now it is called the Viceministry of Human Mobility	Variable

Source: DUS [(2014-2015]) and website of each institution.

Table 10: Specialized institutional bodies responsible for immigration and emigration/diaspora issues in each Latin American country

Country	Specialized Diaspora Unit	Founded (year)	Staff (approx.)
El Salvador			
Guatemala	General Directorate of Consular and Migratory Affairs (*Dirección General de Asuntos Consulares y Migratorios*)	2003, by enhancing the scope of action of the Directorate of Consular Affairs	37 employees
Honduras			
Mexico	Institute of Mexicans Abroad (*Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior, IME*)	2000	46 employees plus one special consular employee at every consulate
Nicaragua			
Panama			
Paraguay			
Peru	General Directorate of Peruvian Communities Abroad and Consular Affairs (*Dirección General de Comunidades Peruanas en el Exterior y Asuntos Consulares*)		
Uruguay	Directorate of Linkages (*Dirección de Vinculación*), but other units are also involved, such as the Office of Return and Welcome (*Oficina de Retorno y Bienvenida*), the Office of Assistance to the Compatriot (*Oficina de Asistencia al Compatriota*) or the Centre of Citizen Service, all of which are in daily contact with the Directorate of Linkages	The Directorate of Linkages was created in 2005, before which it was the Directorate of Consular Affairs that had been in charge of the issue	There are 3 employees at the Directorate of Linkages
Venezuela			

Source: DUS [(2014-2015]) and website of each institution.

Other Latin American countries also have their diaspora policy framework, although on a more moderate scale. The three Andean countries with developed institutions in this respect (Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) are worth mentioning, while Mercosur countries are not placing a real emphasis on the issue. Similar to Mexico, Peru also created its first diaspora institution after the electoral victory of a president backed by many migrant voters – Alejandro Toledo. The entity (now called General Directorate of Peruvian Communities Abroad and Consular

Affairs) belongs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and it administrates several programmes of human rights protection, cultural and educational vinculation and productive vinculation (Vega, 2011). Ecuador created two special units for diaspora affairs within its Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2000, which were later integrated into a ministry called Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility (Araujo and Eguiguren, 2009). Colombia experinced several waves of forced migration due to violent civil war and drug mafia activity, and in 1998 a National Plan for Integral Assistance for the Population Displaced by Violence was created, together with a special governmental fund to cover the expenses of the activities. Later, migration and diaspora issues shifted from conflict management and legal protection issues to the diaspora and development area, as also seen in the cases above with Mexico, Peru and Ecuador (Araujo and Eguiguren, 2009).

Three out of the five Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay) and Chile also have a specialized body within their Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Argentina, it is called the Directorate of Argentines Abroad. It focuses on the repatriation of the highly skilled, or those who face economic, social or health difficulties and they apply for this voluntary return with government assistance. Other Mercosur countries have also concentrated on these two issues, and thus Brazil, Uruguay and Venezuela also have programmes for the highly skilled, as does Chile. However, there is no special focus on the remittance-sending 'average' migrant workers in any of these countries (Buira, 2006). Finally, small Central American countries usually do not have the governmental capacities to pursue an active diaspora policy, but in some cases the diaspora organizes itself to the extent that they 'reach out' to their country of origin, as in the case of El Salvador (Nosthas, 2006).

Regarding their activities, Diaspora Units are the central elements in giving shape to the political and social ambitions towards an active governmental approach to the affairs of the diaspora. Nonetheless, it is clear that their staff size and their organizational role do not enable them to deal with all relevant issue related to the diaspora. Or, better said, they can *deal with* them, but they cannot *resolve* every problem on their own. Hence, there is a necessity to work together with other governmental entities that might have a different profile and focus, but which are also involved in the broader topic of migration.

Understood therefore as central but not exclusive actors of diaspora policymaking, Diaspora Units are 1) pursuing their own activities as specialized units within the respective Ministry of Foreign Affairs, contributing to the successful operation of the foreign service towards the diaspora (through the central office and through the consulates), and 2) coordinating the diaspora-related work of other governmental bodies (ministries, specialized institutions, etc.).

In the DUS (2014-2015), Diaspora Unit respondents mentioned a wide range of activities that they usually develop. However, given the fact that many times their activities are embedded in the work of the Department of Consular Affairs, within which they operate, a significant share of their activities is the same as any consular department would undertake: assisting citizens who got in trouble abroad, identity document procedures, visa procedures, public notary procedures, legal assistance, etc. There is a focus on vulnerable groups, victims of aggression or subjects to deportation in the case of some Diaspora Units, for example the Ecuadorian one (DUS Ecuador, 2014). On other occasions, Diaspora Units provide specific help for the consulates in providing them with common material and know-how on how to negotiate with the country of destination on specific issues, for example concerning bilateral agreements on social security and mutual recognition of titles and professional habilitation documents (DUS Brazil, 2014).

Besides their *own* activities, however, Diaspora Units also act as the coordinators of many other programmes or policies. This is stressed by the fact that many of these Diaspora Units also operate as the permanent background institution for the regular coordination mechanisms between the respective Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the other relevant institutional actors. For example, this is the case of Chile's Directorate for the Communities of Chileans Abroad (DICOEX), which has the function of the Technical Secretariat of the Interministerial Committee for the Chilean Community Abroad (DUS Chile, 2014).

Of all Latin American countries, Mexico has by far the largest number of institutionalized programmes for diaspora affairs. A wide range of programmes exists in the country, aiming at maintaining the physical and cultural integrity of migrants, providing information about their rights and obligations, promoting and assuring education for migrant children and youth who have studied both in Mexico and the United States, aiming at a high quality, or offering access to healthcare at the place of origin, during the migratory process and at the place of destination. Coordination of these different programmes is made by the Institute for Mexicans Abroad (*Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Extranjero, IME*) (DUS Mexico, 2015).

In other countries, main fields of activities might be similar, although not as developed as in the case of Mexico. Ecuador, for example, has many programmes focusing on communication and return migration. The latter include programmes of education at distance (with the Ministry of Education), repatriation of sick emigrants (*Programa Voy por Ti,* with the Ministry of Health), real estate bonds (*Bono de la vivienda*, with the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing) etc. Others, such as

Uruguay focus on the highly qualified emigrants, having programmes such as the "I am Uruguay" (*Soy Urugua*y) programme for knowledge networks in the diaspora, and the Circulation Programme for Highly Qualified Uruguayans (*Programa de Circulación de Uruguayos Altamente Capacitados, CUAC*).

To sum up, Diaspora Units operate and coordinate a wide range of development-related activities which have already had a significant institutional and project-level history.

EVALUATION

Main findings on the importance of the diaspora and the overall development level (as correlating variables) and effectiveness of governance (as an inversely correlating variable) are shown on the left side of *Table 11*. These follow the categorizations of *Tables 4, 5* and *6*, respectively. For every category shown in the table mentioned, a number is assigned, in line with the previous logical assessment of the potential effects of belonging to a given category on the conditions and capabilities for creating effective diaspora policies. In other words, 0 is assigned for the options which promise low level of diaspora policymaking (high level of development, ineffective governance, low economic importance of the diaspora), 2 for the opposites of these three stances, and 1 for the intermediate categories. Obviously, one of these three values is very likely to be an opposite of the other two, therefore medium stances might mean higher importance of migration but lower capacities for policymaking, or the other way round. Scores from these three features are summed up in a 'Score B' where B stands for 'background'.

On the right hand side of *Table 11,* there are the main findings regarding the actual achievements in diaspora policymaking. 'Citizenship and vote' makes a reference to the overall restrictiveness or liberal stance of a country concerning dual citizenship and the right to vote of the diaspora (as summarized in *Table 8*), with 2 points being assigned to the liberal stance, 0 to the restrictive and 1 to the intermediate positions. 'Laws' refer to the complexity of legal and policy framework of the diaspora issue (see *Table 9*, i. e. specialized laws and decrees; and policy documents are both worth 1-1 point), while 'Institutions' stand for the institutional framework (as presented in *Table 10*) in which a 'smaller' Diaspora Unit is coded as 1 point and a larger, or institutionally more autonomous unit (Institute, Viceministry) is coded as 2 points. The total of these three columns is summed up in a 'Score A' where A stands for 'achievements'.

Table 11 therefore summarizes all main findings of the analysis:

Table 11: Background for diaspora policies and changes in diaspora policies compared

	Develop-ment	Gover-nance	Diaspora Imp.	Score B	Citizen-ship, vote	Laws	Institu-tions	ScoreA	Match
Argentina	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	3	+
Bolivia	2	0	1	3	1	0	0	1	–
Brazil	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	2	0
Chile	0	2	0	2	0	0	1	1	0
Colombia	1	1	1	3	2	2	0	4	x
Costa Rica	1	2	1	4	1	1	0	2	–
Cuba	0	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	–
Dominican R	1	1	2	4	2	0	0	2	–
Ecuador	1	1	1	3	1	2	2	5	+
El Salvador	2	1	2	5	1	2	2	5	x
Guatemala	2	1	2	5	1	0	0	1	–
Honduras	2	0	2	4	1	1	0	2	–
Mexico	1	2	1	4	2	1	2	5	x
Nicaragua	2	0	2	4	1	1	0	2	–
Panama	1	2	1	4	1	0	0	1	–
Paraguay	2	0	1	3	1	0	0	1	–
Peru	1	1	1	3	2	1	1	4	x
Uruguay	0	2	0	2	1	0	1	2	0
Venezuela	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0

Source: Own compilation. Values are based on *Tables 4, 5, 6, 8, 9* and *10*.

The far right column of *Table 11* is titled as 'Match' because it evaluates how Scores A and B for each country are related. Coding is as follows:

- 0 0 or 1 points of difference, low score (0–3)
- x 0 or 1 points of difference, high score (4–6)
- – More than 1 points of difference, A is lower than B
- + More than 1 points of difference, A is higher than B

These four categories can be translated into the following categories:

0 It was expected that these countries will have a lower level of institutionalization of diaspora policies because the issue is not so relevant for them, and the expectations turned out to be correct. These countries are: Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela.

x It was expected that these countries will have a higher level of institutionalization of diaspora policies because the issue is very relevant for them, and the expectations turned out to be correct. These countries are: Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru.

– These countries have a lower level of institutionalization of diaspora policies than could have been expected based on the importance of their diaspora. These countries are: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay.

+ These countries have a higher level of institutionalization of diaspora policies than it could have been expected based on the importance of their diaspora. These countries are: Argentina and Ecuador.

The interesting feature in the above grouping is that the first three categories largely overlap with the three profiles set up in *Table 7*. Pattern 1 in *Table 7* is almost the same as the country group marked with O in *Table 11*. Pattern 2 overlaps with the X group, and pattern 3 with the – group. The two controversial members of pattern 4 and the two 'over-achievers' of the + group are different.

What does this demonstrate? Basically, it shows that the patterns identified regarding the background of diaspora affairs are more or less the same as the patterns of institutional achievements in legal and policy matters about the diaspora. There are countries which could do a lot but are not interested (Pattern 1, mark O), countries for which the topic is important and they have done a lot (Pattern 2, mark X) and countries for which the topic is important but they could not achieve too much (Pattern 3, mark -).

CONCLUSION

While many Latin American countries face the challenges of mass emigration, it is not necessarily the most affected countries that have the most developed policy responses. This article has shown that:

- There is a group of countries with high emigration rate but with low governmental capacities (e.g. Bolivia, Honduras) where no significant diaspora institutions and policies were created.
- Another group of countries shows sufficient government capacities, but the emigration issue is not seen as very relevant there, thus diaspora policy institutions and policies are also lacking – or they were created only for specific groups, such as the highly skilled emigrants (e.g. Brazil, Chile).
- Finally, a group of countries with medium to high emigration rate and medium governmental capacities created the most innovative and robust diaspora institutions and policies (e.g. Mexico, Ecuador).

As stated in the introduction, this study on Latin American diaspora institutions did not engage in cross-regional comparisons. However, it can be understood as a point of reference for scholars and policymakers in Hungary and the Central and South Eastern European region as well. While the basic differences between the two regions should be assessed from the perspective of their effects on migration patterns, migration legislation and spaces for independent policymaking, emigration trends in Central and South Eastern Europe show many parallel features to those of Latin America, and institutional or policy solutions might also be similar. I consider that a comparative analysis of Latin American and Central and South Eastern European diaspora policy settings and solutions would be a very fruitful path for further research.

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THE IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDES AND THE UPTAKE OF RESEARCH EVIDENCE

THE CASE OF THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD POPULATION CONFERENCES[1]

Dragana Avramov – Robert Cliquet

ABSTRACT

Population policies have been supported and considerably boosted by the activities of the United Nations, and in particularly by the UN Commission on Population and Development, the UN Population Division, and the United Nations Population fund (UNFPA). The authors document how the researcher community has presented a significant body of research evidence to world leaders in view of their policy deliberations and decision-making at the UN World Population Conferences in Bucharest in 1974, Mexico City in 1984 and Cairo in 1994.

The focus in this contribution on the last three 20th century population conferences is explained as follows. Scientific world population conferences in Rome 1954 and Belgrade 1965 were organised under the auspices of the UN as deliberation events. The Bucharest conference of 1974 was a turning point because it was a political event, in which representatives of 149 member states not only debated but also decided about the draft World Population Plan of Action (WPPA) in which principles and directives for population policy and action were formulated. The two following conferences followed along the same action oriented rationale.

[1] This contribution builds on the methodology for impact review developed under the IMPACT_EV project funded by the European Commission under FP7 and is part of the study on Monitoring and evaluation tools in promoting European Research Area.

The authors review policy achievements and missed opportunities of the three last world population forums from a scientific point of view by examining how research evidence was used for informing and transforming global population policies.

Keywords: population policy, world population conferences, demography, global data

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INTRODUCTION

This contribution looks at the UN world population conferences of 1974, 1984 and 1994 in a comparative perspective, and evaluate their achievements, missed opportunities, continuities and discontinuities of policy choices affecting world population developments. In particular, it takes into account the tensions existing between worldviews about population growth, development and the ecosystems in the developing and developed regions of the world.

There exists an extensive scientific literature about the United Nations' role and activities in the field of population, and in particular about its three major world population conferences. Most of those publications concern one of those conferences, Bucharest, Mexico City, or Cairo,[2] while comparative contributions are rarer.[3] Here, the purpose is not only to compare the shifts in focus of the three conferences, but also to view their policy recommendations in light of the contemporaneously available scientific knowledge about population and development.

The main sources of information for this contribution are:

- Key scientific literature on the past and expected world population-related developments in the 20th and 21st century (e.g. United Nations, 2015; Basten et al., 2013; Dodds, 2008; Ewing et al., 2010; Avramov, 1993).
- Scientific reports commissioned by the UN in preparation of the UN conferences of 1974, 1984 and 1994.
- Reports of the UN World Population Conferences (United Nations, 1975; 1984; 1994a).
- Publications by the authors on the UN World Population Conferences and population development (Cliquet and Veys, 1975; Cliquet and Van de Velde, 1984; Cliquet and Thienpont, 1994; 1995).
- Reports of the annual meetings of UN Population Committee/UN Committee on Population and Development related to the UN World Population Conferences (United Nations, 2004; 2014).
- The participation and involvement of one of the authors to the three UN World Population Conferences as scientific advisor to the Belgian governmental delegation at those conferences and several of their preparatory meetings.

[2] For Bucharest see among others: Cliquet and Veys, 1974; Mauldin et al., 1974; Finkle and Crane, 1975. For Mexico see among others: Cliquet and Van de Velde, 1985; Brown, 1984; Wulf and Willson, 1984; Finkle and Crane, 1985. For Cairo see among others: Cliquet and Thienpont, 1995; Ashford, 1995; Johnson, 1995; Singh, 1998.
[3] For instance, Demeny, 1985; Finkle and McIntosh, 2002.

- The experience of the authors as members of the UN Population Commission/Commission on Population and Development in the 1990s and other international fora.

We first highlight the main features of the 20th century's unprecedented global population growth and its implications for the carrying capacity of the planet. We look at humans' ecological footprint, disparities in development and ambitions of both the developing and developed regions of the world.

Then, we briefly sketch the role of the United Nations bodies in addressing the world population question at the three UN world population conferences.

The body of the contribution consists of the comparison of the three conferences, first about their continuities and ruptures, and subsequently about their political achievements and difficulties in reconciling knowledge-based policy-making with worldviews embedded in ideologies.

The article is closed with some concluding reflections about the incorporation of research evidence for policy making as the ultimate measure of the impact of research in society.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES: THE PACE OF WORLD POPULATION GROWTH AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The unprecedented world population growth in the 20th century

Rapid population growth is a distinguishing feature of the twentieth century and is expected to continue during this century. While the annual population growth rate in the period before the industrial cultural phase was very low and very slowly increased from ≤0.04 per cent in the hunter-gatherer era to 0.1–0.2 per cent in the ancient agrarian era, during the short span of modernising it very rapidly and strongly rose to just above two per cent in the period 1965-1970 (e.g. Hassan, 1975; Winterhalder et al., 1988; Gignoux et al., 2011; Zahid et al., 2016; United Nations Population Division, 2015). Since then, the pace of growth has decreased again and by the end of the 21st century it is expected to be back at the very low values it had during most of human prehistory. The pace and rate of population growth thus represent a unique moment in the demographic history of humankind. It is pertinent to see how world leaders tackled this global challenge.

The onset and the intensity of the difference between the decrease in mortality and fertility during the demographic transition caused an exponential growth of the human species, which evolved from about one billion people around 1800 to two billion around 1930, four billion around 1975 and six billion in 2000. According to the medium variant of the UN Population Division's Population Prospects the world population will, over the course of the 21st century, further increase to about eleven billion by 2100[4] (*Figure 1*).

The extremely strong increase of the world population since the second half of the 20th century is mainly due to the remarkable decline in mortality and persistence of high fertility in the developing world as part of a modernisation process in which European and North American populations have been forerunners. Between 1950 and 2000, 89 per cent of the world population increase was due to population growth in less developed regions; in the 21st century, these regions were responsible for 98 per cent of global population growth. It is generally acknowledged that the pace of growth in many countries is a major challenge for the pace of socio-economic development and the ecological equilibria (e.g. Ehrlich et al., 1977; Wijkman and Rockström, 2012). There is less of an agreement whether less developed regions of the world need to achieve both mortality and fertility levels of the regions forerunners of demographic modernisation in order to enhance their socio-economic development.

Population, development and environment

The population in the more developed regions of the world accounts for 17 per cent of the world population but it is estimated that it uses or consumes 75 to 80 per cent of the Earth's resources, calculated per capita. In the developing world, those figures are reversed: the population of the less developed regions in the world accounts for 83 per cent of the world's population, but uses or consumes only 20 to 25 per cent of the Earth's resources, calculated per capita.[5]

[4] United Nations Population Division, 2015. https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/
[5] For the data see for instance, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator; Sustainable Europe Research Institute, 2009.

Figure 1: World population prospects: the 2015 revision



Source: United Nations Population Division, 2015.

On the basis of estimations of the Earth's Biocapacity (BC)[6] and the Ecological Footprint (EF)[7] of the human species, the Global Footprint Network[8] calculated that, in 2007, the ecological overshoot (EF/BC) amounts to 50 per cent above unity, meaning that humanity uses already the equivalent of 1.5 Earths to support its consumption (*Figure 2*).

[6] Biocapacity (BC) = area x bioproductivity (Ewing et al., 2010). The biocapacity is measured by calculating the amount of biologically productive land and sea area available to provide the resources a population consumes and to absorb its wastes, given current technology and management practices.

[7] Ecological footprint (EF) = population x consumption x resource and waste intensity (Ewing et al., 2010). When the BC>EF, there is an ecological reserve; when the BC<EF, there is an ecological deficit. The ratio EF/BC is the estimated ecological overshoot. In their Ecological Footprint Atlas 2010 edition, the Global Footprint Network estimated for 2007 the world's biocapacity at 11.9 billion global hectares (gha) and the ecological footprint at 18.0 billion global hectares (gha) for a world population of 6.7 billion people. This gives an average biocapacity per person of 1.8 global hectares (gha) and an average footprint per person of 2.7 global hectares (gha), giving an ecological overshoot (EF/BC) of 1.5.

[8] Wackernagel and Rees, 1998; Ewing et al., 2010; http://www.footprintnetwork.org/.

Figure 2: Biocapacity, Ecological Footprint and EF/BC ratio in 2007, per continent and world



Source: authors' calculations based on Ewing et al., 2010.

Were the whole world to acquire the level of prosperity of Europe with its current consumption patterns by 2050, estimates suggest humanity would require almost four Earths. If the European consumption further increased linearly between 2007 and 2050, as it did between 1991 and 2007, and this level of consumption is applied to the whole world population in 2050, humanity would need nine Earths (*Figure 3*).[9]

The aspirations of the developing world (expressed in all UN world gatherings on development) are to reach the well-being levels of the developed world as soon as possible. The latter undoubtedly wants to further progress in the modernisation process, competitiveness, innovation and growth. Research points in the direction of the conclusion that the increase of the well-being of the human species as a whole can be achieved partly by changes in the

[9] Cliquet and Avramov, 2018, p.365; see also Wackernagel and Rees, 1998; Smail, 2002, p.28.

consumption patterns, due to the limited nature of the Earth's resources, but also by the reduction of the world population size. In figure 4 we can see that there are countries which have a high Human Development Index in 2014 while they have relatively low ecological footprint a little bit earlier, so alternative developmental paths can be followed (*Figure 4*). UN world population conferences have drawn on and produced wealth of research evidence about the global challenges associated with needs to decrease the pace of growth of the world population.

Figure 3: Ecological deficit/reserve in 2007 and 2050, based on the hypothesis that the whole world acquires the level of prosperity and welfare of Europe with its current consumption patterns



Source: authors' calculations on the basis of data from Ewing et al. 2010.

To assess the impact of this research evidence we will look at the policy recommendations of the UN world population conferences of 1974, 1981 and 1994 against the background of the current world demographic prospects and the developmental objectives and ambitions of both the developing and developed world as expressed at UN conferences.

Figure 4: Relationship between Human Development Index (2014) and ecological footprint (2007) for 155 out of 188 countries in the world



Source: after United Nations Development Programme, 2013.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE WORLD POPULATION QUESTION

The UN Population Commission

Almost immediately after the creation the United Nations (UN) in 1945 the organization started addressing the world population problem. In 1946, within the Economic and Social Council, it founded the Population Commission. In 1994, following the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, the Population Commission was renamed the Commission on Population and Development.

The Commission meets annually and has the task of following the development of the world population, and to provide policy advice to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

Historically, the most important role of the Commission concerned the preparation of the major UN world population conferences in the last quarter of the twentieth century, namely, the 1974 UN World Population Conference in Bucharest (United Nations, 1975; Cliquet and Veys, 1974), the 1984 UN International Conference on Population in Mexico City (United Nations, 1984; Cliquet and Van de Velde, 1985), and the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo (United Nations, 1994b; Cliquet and Thienpont, 1994; 1995; Johnson, 1995). The Commission's main task today is to follow up and evaluate the implementation of the UN ICPD Programme of Action adopted in Cairo.

The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)

UNFPA was founded in 1969 as an agency of the United Nations and aims to assist UN Member States in developing their policies on population issues (Salas, 1976; Sadik, 2010). During the course of its existence, the UNFPA acquired an increasingly important role within the organizational structure of the United Nations, partly because of its success in acquiring significant voluntary contributions and partly because of the size and quality of its activities in development (Mousky, 2002).

Originally, the official mission of the UNFPA, as determined by ECOSOC in 1973 and confirmed in 1993, strongly focused on population issues (Mousky, 2002; Robinson, 2010).

Since 1994 the action of the UNFPA is determined by the ICPD Programme of Action, widening its traditional goals from exclusively focusing on family planning objectives to also encompass those concerning sexual and reproductive health. This includes not only the promotion of contraceptive behaviour, but also prenatal and postnatal care, assisted childbirth and prevention of sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS. The self-determination – i.e. empowerment – of women is an important field of action, with particular attention going towards adolescents and young adults. Of course, traditional demographic concerns, such as population dynamics, including growth rates, age structure, fertility, mortality and migration, remain a permanent point of consideration.

Since 2001, UNFPA's goals are co-determined by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that resulted from the Millennium Summit of 2000. Because of this a further shift in emphasis took place towards general development targets. Although the Millennium Development Goals refer in Objective 3 ("Promoting gender equality and empowerment of women") to the ICPD Programme of Action and mention family planning several times in Objective 5 ("Improve maternal health"), it must be observed with great concern that the stabilization of the world population that was generally accepted by the three UN world conferences, is not included in the Millennium Development goals. Rightly, the All Party Parliamentary Group on Population, Development and Reproductive Health (APPG) of the UK highlighted this striking policy gap and pertinently argued that a ninth MDG should be added to this list (APPG, 2007). The absence of the stationary population target in the MDGs is another indication that population growth is still a goal among many policy makers, or that suggestions to curtail the world population growth or reduce its volume is perceived by some policy makers as controversial.

THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD POPULATION CONFERENCES

The Bucharest Conference 1974

The scientific World Population Conferences in Rome 1954 and Belgrade 1965 were organised under the auspices of the UN as deliberation events. The Bucharest conference of 1974 was a political event, in which representatives of 149 member states not only debated but also decided about the draft World Population Plan of Action (WPPA) in which principles and directives for population policy and action were formulated.

The conference was organised by the UNFPA, and several other UN agencies were involved, mainly the UN Population Committee of the UN Economic and Social Council, and the UN Population Division of the UN Secretariat.

The Bucharest Conference was preceded by the production of more than 100 scientific reports that were especially prepared for the conference, four important scientific symposia, five regional governmental consultative conferences, and an inquiry among governments on population and development (E/CONF.60/CBP/32, 197). The scientific reports covered virtually all important issues that relate to world population development: recent population trends and future prospects in the world, population and socio-economic development, population

and food supply, health trends and prospects and population and development, family, family planning, education, human rights, population policy, status of women, population assistance, resources and environment.[10] Many of those documents provided an important input into the draft World Population Plan of Action (WPPA) prepared by the Conference Secretariat, working together with an experts' committee specially created for this purpose.

The World Population Plan of Action in Bucharest 1974

The WPPA contains a coherent set of principles, goals and recommendations concerning all important population issues and their relevance to economic and cultural development and the emancipation of human beings.

The plan is based on two fundamental principles:

1) All couples and individuals have the basic right to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education and means to do so;
2) Population goals and policies are integral parts of social, economic and cultural development, whose principal aim is to improve the living conditions and the quality of life of all people.

Overall, the draft WPPA was largely in line with the scientific studies and reports from which it emanated. Nevertheless, the (draft) WPPA was evidently far from an ideal policy instrument. The drafting body tried to implicitly and explicitly accommodate some ideological and political sensitivities and prejudices. This was visible in the following examples:

- There were diverging approaches in quantitative objectives concerning mortality decrease and fertility decrease;
- There was a repeated emphasis on national sovereignty in population policy decision-making. National governments were not even invited to take into account the world population aspects;
- Topics such as contraceptive methods, sterilisation and induced abortion were not dealt with;

[10] On population trends: E/CONF/60/CBP/14, 1974; E/CONF/60/CBP/15, 1974; on population and food supply: E.CONF/60/CBP/19, 1974; on health trends: E/CONF/60/CBP/26, 1974; on family: E/CONF/60/6, 1974; on family planning: E/CONF/60/CBP/30, 1974; on education: E/CONF/60/20, 1974; on human rights: E/CONF/60/6; on population policy: E/CONF/60/21; on status of women: E/CONF/60/5; on population assistance: E/CONF/60/24; on resources and environment: E/CONF/60/5, 1974.

- Recommendations for containing further world population growth insufficiently reflected the urgency and gravity it deserved;
- The importance of issues concerning the relationship between population growth, consumption volumes and patterns, resource availability and ecological impairments were insufficiently dealt with;
- The disequilibria between population growth, socio-economic development and environmental disruption were insufficiently approached in a longer time perspective.

At the Bucharest conference the largely scientific approach of the preparatory bodies was initially strongly shadowed because of major ideological confrontations, which dominated and divided the world community at that time. Ideological standpoints were omnipresent in political narratives and reported in media. The divide was marked along:

1) 'Capitalist' versus 'communist' political worldviews: in the 1970s the confrontation between the proponents of a 'market-driven' economy and a 'centrally planned' economy still dominated the ideological and power schism in the world; this cleavage often was also presented as confrontation of pluralist 'free world' and one-party 'authoritarian' societies. This political/economic divide permeated the Bucharest discussions and negotiations. In the minds of many politicians in those days this cleavage was believed to be reflected also in the choice between 'family planning policy' and 'socio-economic policy'. The family planning propagation of some 'Western' agencies and NGOs had strongly fuelled a clear bias for family planning, while the primacy of the socio-economic development was strongly propagated by some communist countries, particularly the Soviet-Union, China, virtually all developing countries, and the Holy See. In reality, the discussions and negotiations at the conference were rather confusing, because, on the one hand, some of the communist delegations - e.g. China, Cuba - practiced, in addition to their socio-economic policy, a strong family planning policy; on the other hand, many delegations of the Western world strongly supported socio-economic developmental policies, in addition to family planning.
2) Ideological-religious versus scientific-secular approaches to population issues: the religious and culturally traditionalist position was strongly advanced by a very active and motivated Holy See. It opposed strongly family planning, in particular modern contraceptive methods, and calls to halt or reduce population growth. The Holy See also advocated

traditionalist views on the family and the role of women. The positions of the Holy See were supported by a number of countries that were still strongly operating under Catholic Church hegemony.

3) Ideological or nationalistic expansionism versus global concerns formed another ideological cleavage in Bucharest: some governments still believed that population growth was a vehicle for increasing the national power position or economic wealth of the nation. This was the case for example for a number of South American and African countries that wanted their population to further grow. The nationalistic inspired demographic growth ideology was supported by an ideological mix of communist regimes, nationalist-expansionist or dictatorial regimes (e.g. several ultra-right South American regimes and a few African countries), as well as by religiously motivated or dominated delegations; they all shared a belief in unlimited population growth ideology. On the other hand, many Western countries expressed concern about the global population growth and its implications for socio-economic and ecological development.

These three ideological/political narratives weighed heavily on the discussions and resulted in two major ethical/political divides concerning the approach and solution of the population challenges:

1) Disagreement about the direction of causality between socio-economic and demographic dynamics;
2) The opposition between the population growth ideology and the quests for population stationary.

Notwithstanding all of those obstacles, it was largely thanks to the persistent action of population scientists, members of delegations of mostly small European countries and some forward-looking developing countries, that the finally approved WWPA, albeit weakened or diluted, remained fairly consistent with the scientific studies from which it emanated. A major merit of the WPPA is that, in a world where policies were still strongly determined by ideological convictions, it was built largely, in its objectives as well in its recommendations, on scientific insights.

Some of the statements of national delegations, and in particular the reporting in mass media, suggested that the main dispute in the conference concerned the opposition between the position that socio-economic development is the best contraception versus the position stressing the importance of modern birth control, while neglecting developmental issues. Yet, in reality, no national

delegation proposed strictly a family planning approach, and the draft WPPA included a well-balanced and integrated approach in which socio-economic, educational and demographic ('birth control') measures were interactively included.

The International Conference on Population, Mexico City 1984

In 1984, the UN convened a second intergovernmental world population conference in order to review and evaluate the WPPA and to adapt it in the light of the demographic and other developments that occurred since the Bucharest meeting and that were expected in the coming decades. This second UN world population conference was hosted by Mexico and was convened in Mexico City in August 1984 (United Nations, 1984).

The 1984 International Conference on Population (ICP) was also preceded by a substantial number of scientific studies, expert group meetings and regional preparatory conferences and consultations. These were aimed to fuel the draft recommendations to be prepared by the UN Population Division and amended and adopted by the UN Population Commission as preparatory committee (Prepcom) and finally by the ICP.

The expert group meetings concerned the following subjects: fertility and family; population distribution, migration and development; mortality and health policy; and population, resources, environment and development.[11] For each of these expert group meetings, several basic preparatory research papers were commissioned and additionally a large number of other background documents were provided by specialised UN agencies and other international organisations (Cliquet and Van de Velde, 1985).

The ICP 1984 took advantage of the improvements in knowledge about population issues and their complex relations with socio-economic problems that resulted from the 1974 Bucharest conference and the subsequent increased activity of the UNFPA. Many developing countries became much more aware of their population problems and/or experienced the favourable effects of family planning policies.

Consequently, the attitudes at the ICP were quite different than at the onset of the Bucharest conference. Many developing countries approached the

[11] On fertility and family: E/CONF.76/PC/6, 1984; on migration and development: E/CONF.76/PC/7, 1984; on health and mortality: E/CONF.76/PC/9, 1984; on population and development: E/CONF.76/PC/8, 1984.

population issues in a more knowledge-based and forward-looking way, the Soviet Bloc was much more restrained, China played a very cooperative role, the South Americans were more moderate in their traditionalism. Even the Holy See was not so vehemently opposing some degree of mastering of population growth.

To everybody's surprise, this time it was the United States that appeared the big ideological troublemaker, – a clear reversal in position compared to its diplomatic contribution to the Bucharest exercise. The Reagan administration suggested solving population problems by means of 'free enterprise' and introduced many amendments advocating that position. The stance of the US representatives was that the market would operate as an invisible hand bringing into balance population growth and economic development (Cliquet and Van de Velde, 1985; Finkle and Crane, 1985)

In addition, the conference was initially curbed and delayed in dealing with its specific mission by general discussions about issues of war and peace and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict despite the fact that there exist other, better equipped UN bodies for this mission.

It was again the scientific advisors of many small Western European countries, and Canada and Australia, and this time also some developing countries headed by women researchers or diplomats, strongly supported by the sagacious chair from Ghana[12], who tried (and largely succeeded) to keep the draft recommendations of the Prepcom within scientifically sound borders.

The Recommendations for the further implementation of the World Population Plan of Action

The Mexico City recommendations largely confirmed the WPPA principles and action proposals. Regarding demographic trends, it was more objective and all-inclusive than the Bucharest document.

The Mexico recommendations put more emphasis on the integration of population policies in general developmental policies, and highlighted the need to protect and restore ecological sustainability. However, despite the concern about the environment, there was still significant resistance to granting the environment issue priority status. Many developing countries insisted on a rational exploitation of resources, while developed countries were more

[12] All participants remember the chair's warning at the climax of one of the heated and confusing debates: "when the elephants fight, the grass suffers".

concerned about environmental protection. At the conference, the population-environment relationship was considered a less-important issue than population-socio-economic relationship.

Although the role and status of women was already present in the 1974 WPPA, the Mexico recommendations placed a stronger emphasis on the emancipation of women. This is probably the most striking, although insufficiently publicized break-through of the 1984 World Population Conference.

Nevertheless, just as in the Bucharest WPPA, the Mexico recommendations included a number of weaknesses or omissions which show that ideological or direct political drives continued to motivate many governments and prevented them from adequately considering global challenges.

This weakness appeared most clearly in the continued absence of quantitative targets and time lines regarding population growth and fertility levels. Moreover, the quite general recommendation dealing with population growth rates included so many built-in brakes – such as respect for "…. religious beliefs, philosophical convictions, cultural values and fundamental rights of each individual and couple" – that the message was opaque and lacked policy direction. The dimension of responsibilities of institutions and individuals was neither given sufficient attention in deliberations nor prominence in recommendations.

The Mexico City Declaration on Population and Development

The host country cherished the hope that the Conference would give rise to a 'Mexico City Declaration on Population and Development' (E/CONF.76/L.4,1984). However, the draft version turned out to be a vague, non-committal, poorly documented and badly structured paper. Fortunately an editing committee, composed of eminent population policy experts, succeeded in producing a plausible text, providing a coherent and clear overview of the whole range of international population problems and their relationship to socio-economic development and environmental challenges.

The Mexico Declaration clearly emphasized the urgency for addressing the demographic problems and provided a faithful account of the most crucial demographic developments in terms of growth, life expectancy, fertility and its regulation, population structure, urbanization and international migration. It highlighted the relationship between population and environment, as well as the connection between population and development and the resulting contrasts between developing and developed nations. The Declaration paid heed to

the status of women and measures to empower women including freedom of reducing fertility. It called on the promotion of international cooperation in the spirit of universal solidarity and enlightened self-interest. It came as a surprise to many people that it was adopted without discussion in the Plenary of the Conference.

The International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), Cairo 1994

Just as the two former UN conferences on population, the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) organised in Cairo in 1994 (United Nations 1994b) was preceded by an impressive and lengthy preparation, consisting, among others, of six expert group meetings, five United Nations regional conferences and, most importantly, three gatherings of the Preparatory Committee (Prepcom), consisting of the UN Population Commission and every UN member state that is not a member of the Population Commission.

The six expert group meetings concerned the following topics: Population, environment and development, population policies and programmes, population and women, family planning, health and family well-being, population growth and demographic structure, and population distribution and migration.[13] They covered all major issues concerning the world population development and its relationship with major human, socio-economic and ecological challenges.

The Preparatory Committee met three times. At its first session in 1991, the Committee set the objectives of the meeting and defined the issues to be discussed. At its second Session in 1993, the Preparatory Committee agreed to establish a new programme of action to replace the WPPA and the Mexico recommendations to guide action on population in the next 20 years. However, no unanimous agreement on the one page table of contents was possible because Chapter V bore the title 'The Family' instead of 'Families'. Namely, some Islamic countries insisted that there is only one type of family (i.e. a heterosexual married couple and their biological or adopted children), while other countries argued that there are different family types (e.g. non-married couples, re-constituted families, gay and lesbian families, etc.). At its third session, early in 1994, the

[13] For population and development: United Nations, 1994a; for population policies: United Nations, 1993; for population and women: United Nations, 1996b; for family planning and health: United Nations, 1996a; for population growth: United Nations, 1999; for international migration: United Nations, 1998.

Preparatory Committee discussed the 'Draft Final Document: Programme of Action of the Conference' prepared by the ICPD Secretariat.

The ICPD Programme of Action

The text of the ICPD Programme of Action, approved in Cairo was completed in three phases:

1) The 'Draft final Document of the Conference' drawn up by the ICPD Secretariat;
2) The 'Draft Programme of Action' resulting from the Prepcom III negotiations;
3) The Programme of Action of the Conference', finalized and approved at the ICPD in Cairo.

As was the case for the two earlier UN world population documents, the preparation process, as well as the final outcome of the ICPD document, suffered from ideological prejudices and partisan ideological positions. This resulted, in many cases, in diluted or toned down principles or recommendations due to the UN practice of producing policy documents which can be accepted by consensus.

Major ideological oppositions, both at Prepcom III and the Cairo Conference, came mainly from the religious side, namely from some strongly doctrinarian Islamic states and the Holy See, supported by some Catholic countries. The religious versus secular conflict that emerged at the Cairo conference was sharper than during the previous conferences. The most disputed issues concerned:

- Opposition by the religious governments towards recognizing, in addition to religious values, a variety of other philosophical convictions or secular ethical values;
- Insistence on including in many sections, conditional formulations and references to full respect for cultural, traditional, or religious contexts or only approval of measures which are not impinging religious norms;
- Opposition to some recommendations relating to family diversity, sexual and reproductive rights and in particular abortion, gender equality and equity, and rights of adolescents.

For the sake of reaching a diplomatic consensus with the Holy See and some conservative Islamic countries, the dilution of the originally more scientifically based draft recommendations on subjects such as sexual and reproductive

health, abortion, adolescents, and family diversity was accepted for the sake of reaching a diplomatic consensus. Nevertheless, even after successfully watering down recommendations, the same delegations ultimately remained uncompromising and expressed reservations as to their validity.

Just as in the former UN population conferences, ideologically motivated influences concerning quantitative population growth could also be discerned. The ICPD document recognized the need to achieve an "early stabilisation of the world population" or "sustainable development". However, it still did not include quantitative targets regarding population growth or size or fertility levels. It did, however, set some targets for access to effective and safe contraceptives, life expectancy, infant mortality, maternal mortality, education, and the necessary financial resources for the programmes concerning reproductive health care.

Also, the traditional emphasis on national sovereignty in population policy matters still persisted. The first sentence in the Chapter on Principles regarding the implementation of the recommendations contained in the ICPD Programme of Action, allowed governments to choose to ignore any or all specific recommendations.

A UN deliberation on a sensitive and complex problem, such as the relation between population and development in a world characterised by enormous inequalities between the more and less developed regions in the world, will inevitably confront discrepant interests, ideologies and goals for policy actions. For instance, this was visible in the different respective discourses of developing and developed countries on 'sustained economic growth' versus 'sustainable development'. The UN practice in such cases resulted in pasting together different types of concerns, which consequently allowed interpretations about policy directions to be left to the individual delegations.

Notwithstanding some differences in setting goals and ideological confrontations, the draft/final ICPD Programme of Action was in line with the WPPA. It included a number of innovations and specificities that could, from a scientific point of view, be evaluated very positively. The ICPD programme of action was largely built upon a scientific analysis of reality and strived to promote knowledge-based solutions:

- The 1994 ICPD Programme of Action was a much longer, more detailed and better elaborated document for all of the relevant demographic aspects than the 1974 WPPA;

- It put a stronger and more extensive emphasis on environmental sustainability;
- It elaborated very extensively and pertinently on gender equality and equity and the empowerment of women;
- It broadened the goal of family planning to sexual and reproductive health and rights;
- It broadened the concept of development from its narrow economic perspective to the more comprehensive notion of quality of life of present and future generations (Van de Kaa, 1996).

Some authors believe that the ICPD arrived at an honourable settlement regarding the two main objectives in population policy, namely the macro approach, which is concerned with global growth and its adverse effects on development and environment (Wilmoth and Ball, 1992; Hodgson and Watkins, 1997), and the micro approach, which is concerned with the ability of individuals, particularly women, to decide freely about their reproductive behaviour (Lane, 1994; McIntosh and Finkle, 1995; Sinding 2007; Robinson, 2010; Women's Declaration of the International Women's Health Coalition, 2012).

Our analysis of the discussions at the three world conferences in fact shows that the concern for macro and micro approaches was present at all three conferences, and was no innovation of the ICPD (Cliquet and Thienpont, 1994; 1995). ICPD did mark a significant step forward in the same direction, however.

Nonetheless, by systematically comparing most of the scientific literature with the recommendations of the ICPD Programme of Action, one is inevitably left with the feeling that the UN document did not consider adequately the misbalance between the population growth supported by some governments and the desire to generalise modern levels of quality of life for all populations.

A side effect of the ideology-driven debates at the Conference was that the opposition to curtailing the pace of population growth was disproportionately reported by the mass media. The impression was created that the ICPD Programme of Action mainly concerned marginally relevant demographic issues, such as abortion, promiscuity, or homosexuality, thus diverting the attention from the focal topics of the ICPD Programme of Action (i.e. the interrelationships between population growth, development and environment).

FROM BUCHAREST TO CAIRO: CONTINUITIES AND RUPTURES

In the three UN world population conferences, we observe significant rifts on particular issues but, in our view, there was also significant continuity regarding efforts to use research knowledge for policy development.

More important than rifts between countries on single issues on which agreement could not be reached was, in our view, a divide between policy-making cultures.

Confrontations, alliances and policy-making culture

The three conferences were characterised by major changes in the narrative about differences that separate populations: the Bucharest conference was dominated by the then prevailing East-West ideological/political divide; the Mexico City conference faced a confrontation between the promotion of entrepreneurship to solve world challenges and comprehensive approaches to population policies; the Cairo conference was dominated by a sharpened antagonism between the religious and the secular worldviews.

Although all three world conferences were marked by religious opposition to family planning, the empowerment of women, and the slowdown of population growth, religious voices became more articulated and gained prominence in Cairo. The position of the Holy See advanced in Bucharest and Mexico was now reinforced as it blended with views of fundamentalist Islam countries, which states had become better organized as actors at the global level in the 1990s.

It may be argued that the world forum had numerous shortcomings. The world leaders could agree only on setting targets which had already been reached in the developed world. For the rest of the world, targets were either unrealistic or were not supported by adequate allocation of resources. Implementation of action plans occurred at variable geometry[14]. The narrative that the empowerment of women goes hand in hand with mastering of one's own fertility was too provocative for the traditionalists. They chose the narrative

[14] 'Variable-geometry' is the term used to describe the idea of a method that would enable groups of countries wishing to pursue a given goal to do so, while allowing those opposed to hold back. It is typically used in the European Union as "Variable-geometry" Europe. It may me used to describe the à la carte or cherry picking of UN standards and norms.

of boundless population growth and infinite carrying capacity of the planet as a 'politically correct' worldview, which disguised their opposition to the 'politically incorrect' policy concerning the subjugation of women. The UNFPA motto 'Poor, powerless and pregnant' to describe the position of women in some parts of the world quickly fell into oblivion.

Nevertheless, a significant broadening of the perspectives took place between the three world conferences that contributed to changes in the policy-making culture. We can identify:

- An increasingly stronger emphasis on environmental concerns and promotion of the notion of sustainable development;
- A shift from a predominantly economic to a more holistic conception of development, expressed through the notion of quality-of-life;
- A shift from family planning to the broader concept of sexual and reproductive health rights;
- A stronger and more extensive focus on women's emancipation and empowerment.

Some experts have argued that the stronger elaboration of the empowerment of women and the broadening of fertility discourse to sexual and reproductive health was a sign of a move away from macro population concerns towards micro focus on individuals (e.g. Bashford, 2014). We do not share this assessment as the Cairo charter was built on good scientific arguments for developing layered and holistic policies encapsulating both macro and micro level actions.

There was some continuity in the power of ideologies in the policy-making culture that persisted throughout all three conferences. We observe continuities that weakened or toned down policy directions and recommendations due to:

- The faith-based and science-based confrontations about a number of sexual and reproductive issues regarding the empowerment of women and contraception, for example, that peaked at the Cairo conference;
- The belief of some governments that they could increase their weight and power position in the global world through population growth;
- The absolute primacy on national sovereignty principles in population matters over any of the global concern that prevailed at all three world conferences.

Notwithstanding the significant confrontations at the three UN population conferences, one is struck by the strong continuities regarding the value of the consensual processes and the cumulative effects of their positive results.

A strong continuity is also observed in the use of research evidence for addressing demographic, socio-economic and ecological developments. The recommendations on these challenges show a striking continuity in the conference outputs: need for sustained attention to family planning, female emancipation, socio-economic progress in developing regions, environmental care and resource management.

THE UN WORLD POPULATION CONFERENCES: POLICY ACHIEVEMENTS AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

The UN population conferences and their outputs exhibit several policy achievements but also point to the missed opportunities with respect to the use of research evidence for achieving impact.

Policy achievements

The three UN population conferences have produced impressive research-based population-related policy charters that include important principles and recommendations to guide policies at national and global levels.

Those conferences stressed the need to manage the strong population growth in the world, to enable people to plan effectively their family size, to socially and culturally emancipate and empower women, to achieve sustainability in the relations between population, economic development and environmental management, and to assist developing countries financially and logistically in achieving those goals.

Among the UN World Population Conferences, the 1974 Bucharest conference probably had the most significant impact on population policy. It contributed considerably to the dissemination of population knowledge in many developing countries, where policy makers often had little knowledge about the importance of rapid population growth and its effects on socio-economic and ecological development. In the wake of the 1974 conference, the UNFPA got the opportunity to considerably increase its activities in aiding and financing population policy programmes in many developing countries (Cliquet, 2012). As result, many developing countries initiated population-related policies. This was done in full awareness that such policies are no substitute for socio-economic policies, but that they do contribute to and interact positively with socio-economic and other

welfare policies. Hence, the Bucharest conference can be considered to have been a crucial milestone and a highlight in the development of national and international population-related policies.

The 1984 Mexico City conference largely confirmed the established road map of the Bucharest conference, but with a much stronger emphasis on the needs for female emancipation and empowerment.

The 1994 Cairo conference elaborated all of the former conference goals in much greater detail, broadened some of the goals, and introduced a number of important new concepts in the population field, such as sexual and reproductive health, sustainable development, and quality-of-life.

Addressing population challenges as global issues and bringing them to the policy fore is a major policy impact of the research evidence (Avramov, 2017).

Failures to achieve impact

Their merits notwithstanding, the UN population policy charters included several gaps and shortcomings that weakened their power as knowledge-based moral and political standards:

- Prevalence of lopsided anthropocentrism in considering the relations between human demography, socio-economic development and environmental and resource sustainability;
- Hierarchical presentation of ethical and policy principles going from individual rights and state sovereignty, to global responsibilities. Absolute priority was given to individual rights without adequate consideration of natural resource availabilities, uses and overuses, and environmental abuses (climatic changes, air, water and soil pollution, decrease of biodiversity, destruction of natural ecosystems, etc.).

The key challenges were thus not coherently considered at the planetary level, transposed to the national level, and finally articulated through rights and responsibilities of individuals that would be placed in the global context;

- Emphasis of national sovereignty in population policy matters and lack of emphasis in national policies on global world;
- Omission of quantitative targets regarding fertility decrease;
- Omission or inadequate recommendations concerning sensitive issues, such as induced abortion and euthanasia;
- Although the issue of inadequate production and consumption patterns

and use/abuse of natural resources is mentioned in the UN world population charters (more in particular in the ICPD Programme of Action), more particularly in the developed world, it is clearly insufficiently elaborated.

The UN population policy charters also included several weaknesses of a procedural nature that are inherent to the way in which the UN is organised and operates:

- The UN practice to weaken or dilute all policy documents in view of trying to reach a general consensus at any cost;
- The practice at UN population meetings to involve or broaden the demographic issues to everything, including economic issues, international power struggles (e.g. 'the US or Western supremacy'), and conflicts (e.g. 'the Israeli-Palestinian question');
- The UN practice of not taking into consideration the population question when addressing the environment (e.g. the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, United Nations, 1992), development (e.g. 2010 UN Summit on the Millennium Development Goals, United Nations, 2000; 2011; 2015a.), or the climate (e.g. the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris, United Nations, 2015b);
- The presence of the Holy See as permanent observer state at population conferences where it does not act as state, but rather as representative of one religion. This created imbalance as other religions (e.g. Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, etc.) and secular philosophical ideologies (e.g. International Humanistic and Ethical Union) did not have the same prerogative, resulting in an ideological-philosophical disequilibrium at such meetings. The specific status of the Holy See may have been inspirational for some Islamic theocracies (e.g. Iran, Sudan) which acted in the same religion-driven policy approach as the Holy See at the Cairo Conference;
- Although the UN population charters are largely based on scientific analyses of the population question and its relation to developmental and environmental concerns, ideological oppositions to the empowerment of women and turning a blind-eye to needs to curtail population growth, succeeded to weaken the impact of robust scientific knowledge.

The 2004 and 2014 reports of the UN Commission on Population and Development review and appraisal of the progress made in achieving the

goals and objectives of the ICPD Programme of Action leaves the reader with very mixed feelings. On the one hand, the principles and recommendations of the ICPD are confirmed and much of the ICPD language is repeated. On the other hand, looking at some of the current demographic indicators of the UN Population Division and the UNFPA (UNFPA, 2016; , one is amazed by the salient absence in the Commission's reports of any reference to the persistent high population growth figures or still very high fertility levels in some of the world's most vulnerable regions.[15] Also, a reflection about the longer-term world population growth and its relations with ecological challenges, climate change, and the developmental objectives and ambitions of both the developing and developed world is missing.

One of the outcomes of changes in the way population challenges are deliberated and acted upon is the inadequate and insufficient long-term consideration of lessons learnt through the World Population Conferences. In the Millennium socio-economic, educational and health goals there is a striking absence of consideration of the ecological and demographic implications of population growth. Both the population growth ideology and the individual/family right to reproduce so strongly prevailed in many quarters that the need to decrease the population size to lower levels was never taken into consideration, let alone taken up as a valuable, honourable and adequate trajectory that could be pursued in the Millennium goals.

Yet, long-term demographic scenarios that build on below replacement-fertility assumptions show that very small differences in average fertility can make a huge difference in the trajectory of the total world population and have significant implications for sustainability and quality-of-life. For example, with a sustained Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 1.75 instead of 2.00 children per woman, the population on Earth by 2300 would only be three instead of eleven billion, i.e. eight billion less. If worldwide fertility decreased to the current average for Europe, the world population in 2300 would amount to approximately one billion (*Figure 5*). These scenarios are surely a valid basis for world deliberations about forward-looking policy choices.

[15] Total fertility rate lies on average above 3 children per woman in Arab States, above 4 in East- and South Africa, and above 5 in West- and Central Africa. Annual population growth rates are on average 2 per cent in Arab States (resulting in a doubling of the population in 35 years) and 2.7 per cent in East, West and South Africa (resulting in population doubling in 26 years).

Figure 5: World population since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and its hypothetical future growth assuming low and medium variants of the total fertility rate (TFR: 1.50; 1.75; 2.00) and an average life expectancy of 90 years



Source: based on Basten, Lutz, and Scherbov, 2013; see also United Nations Population Division, 2004.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

The population policy charters that resulting from the UN World Population Conferences of 1974, 1984 and 1994 are undoubtedly important documents that contributed strongly to increase the knowledge and awareness of global population issues and challenges. They stimulated, or even initiated, the development of population policy initiatives and action programmes in many developing countries.

Despite evidence of the value of world population deliberations and of action plans to support policy choices, the World Population Conference as a global forum was disbanded. There has been no post-Cairo global population forum.

The reasons for disbanding of world population conferences as a deliberation and policy platform may be summarized as follows. Anthropocentric population growth ideology is resilient. The achievements of the World Population Conferences for promoting knowledge-based policies are insufficiently known to the lay people and insufficiently valorised in the research community. Developed countries are not willing to financially support the organization of deliberations at a world event as shifts have occurred in the world order and in the political weight of secular worldviews since the 1994 Cairo conference. Greater prominence on the world stage has been acquired through alliances of governments supporting religious norms about fertility and population growth and there are risks that a new deliberation would likely result in watering down of action plans build over past decades.

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