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
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I. BORZSÁK, J. HARMATTA, GY. NÉMETH,
S. SZÁDECZKY-KARDOSS, CS. TÖTTÖSSY

REDIGIT
ZS. RITOÓK

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INDEX

<i>Pötscher, Walter</i> : Das Stiersprung-Fresko aus Knossos und der Sarkophag von Hagia Triada	1
<i>Steiger, Kornél</i> : Bruchstück und Darstellungseinheit. Zur Interpretation der metrischen Fragmente der Vorsokratiker	5
<i>Maróth, Miklós</i> : An Unknown Xenocratic Testimony	19
<i>Ruzsa, Ferenc</i> : Parmenides' Road to India	29
<i>Betegh, Gábor</i> : Papyrus on the Pyre (The Derveni Papyrus and its Archeological Context)	51
<i>Bodnár, István M.</i> : Science and Philosophy in the Academy	67
<i>Simon, Attila</i> : Das Wunderbare und das Verwundern (Die anthropologischen Beziehungen des Begriffs des <i>thaumaston</i> in der aristotelischen <i>Poetik</i>) ...	77
<i>Drozdek, Adam</i> : <i>Lekton</i> : Stoic Logic and Ontology	93
<i>Ittész, Dániel</i> : ΦΘΟΝΟΣ ΑΠΙΟΛΛΩΝΟΣ. Zur Interpretation des kallimacheischen Apollon-Hymnus	105
<i>Lautner, Péter</i> : Andronicus of Rhodes on Aristotle's <i>Physics</i> 202a13–21, b23–30	125
<i>László, Levente</i> : The Quantity of Final -u in the nominative–accusative Singular of Latin u-stem Neuter Nouns	133
<i>Olszaniec, Włodzimierz</i> : Two Latin Translations of a Passage of Plato's "Letters"	141
<i>Gloviczki, Zoltán</i> : Icarus	147
<i>Németh, György–Canós i Villena, Isabel</i> : Skylax. A Gem Carver in Politics	157
<i>Gradwohl, Edina</i> : "Dog-Like" Women: The Origin of the Rhythm Method	165
<i>Visy, Zsolt</i> : <i>Amicitia et invidia</i> . Diokletians Beziehungen zu seinen Mitregenten	173
<i>Kendeffy, Gábor</i> : Augustine on Divine Ideas as Epistemological Criteria	181
<i>Heidl, György</i> : The Initial State of Man in Augustine's <i>de genesi contra Manichaeos</i>	195
<i>M. Bugár, István</i> : How to Prove the Existence of a Supreme Being?	203
<i>Löfstedt, Bengt</i> : Drei neue Patristica	217
<i>Borzsák, István</i> : Die Antihelden in der frühchristlichen Hymnendichtung	223

CRITICA

Sub corona vendere. Quellenkritische Studien zu Kriegsgefangenschaft und Sklaverei in Rom bis zum Ende des Hannibalkrieges. Von Karl-Wilhelm Welwei. <i>Maróti, Egon</i>	229
Pierre Sanchez: L'Amphictionie des Pyles et de Delphes. <i>Németh, György</i>	232

WALTER PÖTSCHER

DAS STIERSPRUNG-FRESKO AUS KNOSSOS UND DER SARKOPHAG VON HAGIA TRIADA

EIN NACHTRAG

Summary: The background-color blue on the Bull-Leaping-Fresco (as well as on the Sarcophagus from Hagia Triada) stands for the night-time. At a clear full-moon-night or during dawn and during dusk the action of leaping is very difficult, but certainly possible, especially in the mind of the painter.

Key words: Bull-Leaping-Fresco from Knossos, sarcophagus from Hagia Triada, background-color.

Im Rahmen meines Buches über die minoische Religion¹ habe ich auch versucht, den Sarkophag von Hagia Triada neu zu deuten.² Dabei spielen die Hintergrundfarben eine wichtige Rolle; sie ermöglichen nämlich zu erkennen, dass der Künstler einen zeitlichen Ablauf der auf diesem Sarkophag dargestellten rituellen Handlungen, ob etwas bei Tag oder bei Nacht geschehen sei, darstellen wollte, wie lange das Fest gedauert habe und zu welcher Jahreszeit – nämlich im Sommer – dieses stattgefunden habe.

Abgesehen von dem nach antik-heidnischen Vorstellungen in sich immanent wahrscheinlichen Ablauf des Festes wird die Deutung der Hintergrundfarben durch die ziemlich exakte Proportion der Farben Gelb / Weiß einerseits und Blau andererseits (nämlich für Tag und Nacht), welche den Sommer als Zeit, wann dieses Fest stattgefunden habe,³ unterstrichen und ein weiteres Ausmaß an Wahrscheinlichkeit hinzugefügt. Überdies kommt Bestätigung durch andere Beispiele,⁴ welche diese Art der Verwendung der Hintergrundfarben zeigen, noch hinzu. Da ist jenes Fresko aus Ha-

¹ PÖTSCHER, W., *Aspekte und Probleme der minoischen Religion*, Hildesheim–Zürich–New York 1990. Vgl. aber auch MARINATOS, Nanno, *Minoan Religion. Ritual, Image, and Symbol*, Univ. of South Carolina, 1993 (mit Rez. von W. PÖTSCHER, in: *AAHG*, 46, 1993, 129–132). PÖTSCHER, W., Bemerkungen zum Sarkophag von Hagia Triada, in: *Österreichische Forschungen zur ägäischen Bronzezeit 1998* (Akten d. Tagung am Inst. f. Klass. Archäologie d. Univ. Wien), Wien 2000, 107f., ders. Die minoische Religion, in: *Religionswissenschaftl. Handbuch*, hg. v. Joh. FIGL, soll 2002 erscheinen.

² PÖTSCHER, W., *Aspekte und Probleme*, 171ff., dazu vgl. F. GRAF, in: *Numen*, 39, 1992, 261f.; DIETRICH, B. C., in: *GB* 18, 1992, 290–293. 292 u. a.

³ Zur Argumentation und Lit. vgl. PÖTSCHER, W., Der Termin des Festes auf dem Sarkophag von Hagia Triada, in: *Klio*, 76, 1994, 67–77.

⁴ Zur Argumentation und Lit. vgl. PÖTSCHER, W., Tag und Nacht auf dem Sarkophag von Hagia Triada, in: *Klio*, 79, 1, 1997, 19–22.

gia Triada,⁵ das eine Prozession darstellt, in welcher zwei Personen, die eine vor weiß-gelblichem Hintergrund auf einem Blasinstrument und eine andere auf einer Leier vor blauem Hintergrund, musizieren, ohne einander zu stören, obwohl der Abstand zwischen beiden gering ist, was also zeigt, dass es sich nicht um einen *räumlichen* Abstand, sondern um einen *zeitlichen* (Tag – Nacht) handelt. Ganz Ähnliches ist auch einem anderen Fresko aus Hagia Triada⁶ abzulesen, auf dem in zwei Phasen zwei Opfertiere zur Opferung geführt werden.

Das „Camp Stool Fresco“⁷ zeigt durch die Hintergrundfarbenreihe Gelblich-Blau-Gelblich ein Fest, welches sich über einen Tag, eine Nacht und wieder einen Tag hin erstreckt. Und die Kleinfresken⁸ gehören, auch wenn dort die Situation komplexer ist, hierher.

Man könnte die Frage stellen, ob auf dem Stiersprung-Fresko aus dem Palast von Knossos,⁹ auf dem die Hintergrundfarbe Blau deutlich zu sehen ist, diese Farbe auch als Ausdruck für die Nacht gemeint war.¹⁰ Die Gegebenheit, dass dort ein Geschehensablauf, nämlich das Springen von Menschen über einen Stier, dargestellt wird, und zwar in Phasen des einzelnen Sprunges, dürfte es nahelegen, dass auch eine *Zeitkomponente* zum Ausdruck kommt. Der Künstler könnte die besondere Schwierigkeit der Sprünge bewußt in seine Darstellung eingebaut haben.

Aber man könnte vielleicht auch fragen, ob solche Sprünge in der Dunkelheit der Nacht überhaupt möglich sind und daher als Darstellungsmotiv in Frage kamen.¹¹ Hier scheint die Antwort ziemlich klar zu sein: Diese Sprünge sind gefährlich, was der Maler wohl als „Leistungsqualifikation“ zum Ausdruck bringen wollte – wo und wann wären Stiersprünge nicht ein gefährliches Wagnis? –, aber sie sind durchaus möglich; bei Vollmond und heiterem, wolkenlosem Himmel sieht man Gegenstände, Leute, Tiere usw. sogar einigermaßen deutlich.¹² Warum sollte man gerade einen

⁵ Vgl. Archäolog. Mus. in Hiraklion, Saal XIV, Nr. 21 und W. PÖTSCHER, Tag und Nacht, Anm. 4 (mit Lit.).

⁶ Vgl. Archäolog. Mus. in Hiraklion, Saal XIV, Nr. 23 und W. PÖTSCHER, Tag und Nacht, Anm. 7 (mit Lit.).

⁷ Vgl. Archäolog. Mus. in Hiraklion, Saal XV, Nr. 28 und W. PÖTSCHER, Tag und Nacht, Anm. 9 (mit Lit.).

⁸ Vgl. Archäolog. Mus. in Hiraklion, Saal XV, Nr. 26; dazu vgl. PÖTSCHER, W., Nochmals: Tag und Nacht auf dem Sarkophag von Hagia Triada, in: *Klio*, 79, 2, 1997, 315f.

⁹ Vgl. dazu Nanno MARINATOS, *Minoan Religion*, 218–220 (mit Lit.).

¹⁰ Vgl. TRÜMPY, Catherine, Feste zur Vollmondszeit: die religiösen Feiern Attikas im Monatslauf und der vorgeschichtliche attische Kultkalender, in: *ZPE*, 121, 1998, 109–115. 112f. („... wenn wir uns die Mittelmeerverhältnisse vor Augen halten: Vollmondnächte sind dort ganz besonders eindrucksvoll und geben den richtigen Rahmen für Feste, die bis spät in die Nacht hinein gefeiert werden. Nächtliche Rituale sind denn auch für alle wichtigen attischen Feste bezeugt“).

¹¹ Das Problem, ob die Darstellung gleichsam realistisch oder nicht gemeint war, bzw. (eher) *inwieweit* diese Darstellung als realistisch oder doch als realistisch vorgestellt gemeint war, kann hier auf sich beruhen.

¹² Man konnte immerhin beispielsweise nächtliche Schlachten durchführen (vgl. Hdt. 1,74, 1: ... πόλεμος τοῖσι Λυδοῖσι καὶ τοῖσι Μήδοισι ἐγεγόνεε ἐπ' ἕτα πέντε, ἐν τοῖσι πολλάκις μὲν οἱ Μῆδοι τοὺς Λυδοὺς ἐνίκησαν, πολλάκις δὲ οἱ Λυδοὶ τοὺς Μήδους· ἐν δὲ καὶ νυκτομαχίην τινὰ ἐποίησαντο. Thuk., 7, 44, 1: ... ἐν δὲ νυκτομαχίᾳ, ἥ μόνη δὴ στρατοπέδων μεγάλων ἔν γε τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ ἐγένετο, πῶς ἂν τις σαφῶς τι ᾔδει; ἦν μὲν γὰρ σελήνη λαμπρά, ἐώρων δὲ οὕτως ἀλλήλους ὥς ἐν σελήνῃ εἰκὸς τὴν μὲν ὄψιν

Stier – der freilich sich rasch bewegt – nicht sehen können? Außerdem kann die blaue Hintergrundfarbe doch wohl nicht nur die tiefe Nacht, sondern auch die Dämmerung nach Sonnenuntergang oder vor Sonnenaufgang bedeuten. Auch dies kann den Maler der Szene zusätzlich beeinflusst haben.

Dazu kommt aber noch, dass der Maler bzw. die Maler einigen Raum für die Phantasie offen ließen; bei dem ersten nicht-blutigen Opfer auf Seite I des Sarkophages von Hagia Triada z. B. „schweben“ der Opferkorb und die Opferkanne gleichsam in der Luft (ohne dass damit gemeint war, dass diese *schwebten*; sie werden einfach als *anwesend*, aber in einer empirisch unmöglichen Form dieser Anwesenheit dargestellt).

Die Darstellung der ἄνοδος des πάρεδρος kommt aus religiöser Phantasie und ist mit der Abbildung von drei Priestern insofern verbunden, als diese in der Nacht zuvor ihre Gaben (Modelle von jungen Stieren und ein Schiffsmodell) bringen.

Die Deutung der Hintergrundfarbe Blau als künstlerische Ausdrucksweise für die Nacht auf dem Stiersprung-Fresko aus dem Palast von Knossos bietet also diesbezüglich keine Schwierigkeiten; es dürfte bei dieser Darstellung um ein Fest, das *nach* Sonnenuntergang oder *vor* Sonnenaufgang, jedenfalls in der Zeit zwischen Sonnenuntergang und Sonnenaufgang stattfand, gehen. Der Charakter dieses Freskos, der einen dynamischen Handlungsablauf in seinen Phasen bietet, was durch die Überlänge des Stieres noch unterstrichen wird, läßt vermuten, dass der Zeitaspekt des Geschehens in der Darstellung auch zum Ausdruck kommt und somit die blaue Hintergrundfarbe nach dem Ausdruckswillen des Malers die Nacht bedeutet, was sich bestens zur Verwendung der Hintergrundfarben auf dem Sarkophag von Hagia Triada fügt. Jedenfalls aber ließe sich die blaue Hintergrundfarbe auf dem Stiersprung-Fresko aus Knossos *nicht* als ein Argument gegen unsere Deutung der Hintergrundfarben auf dem Sarkophag von Hagia Triada verwenden.

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τοῦ σώματος προορᾶν, τὴν δὲ γνῶσιν τοῦ οἰκείου ἀπιστεῖσθαι, vgl. auch 7, 43, 6), was doch auch ein nicht unerhebliches Ausmaß an Sicht und Licht erforderte.

KORNÉL STEIGER

BRUCHSTÜCK UND DARSTELLUNGSEINHEIT. ZUR INTERPRETATION DER METRISCHEN FRAGMENTE DER VORSOKRATIKER

Summary: Thematic units in the metric fragments of the Presocratics: 1. A Presocratic poem have been composed as a set of thematic units. We can state the opening and the end of these units. 2. The thematic units content good identifiable structural elements. 3. Each unit has its very philosophical meaning and intention, therefore they are good analysable. In the antithetical reasoning the philosopher opposes the true knowledge to the opinion of ordinary men. It is an interesting feature of this sort of reasoning that the content of the ordinary opinion is expressed in a detailed form of a catalogue, the true knowledge on the other hand is formulated with gnomic conciseness. The quasi-geometrical proof is an argument in three steps: (a) exposition of the demonstrandum, (b) demonstration, (c) conclusion. This sort of proof shows a kinship with the structure of the Euclidean demonstration: *protasis, apodeixis, sumperasma*.

Key words: Presocratic poems, exposition, demonstration, conclusion, protasis, apodeixis, sumperasma, Xenophanes, Empedocles, Parmenides.

I. DAS FRAGMENT ALS GEGENSTAND DER INTERPRETATION

1.1 Die Anfänge der Forschung

Die Bruchstücke der antiken literarischen Werke wurden während des 16. Jahrhunderts in den Mittelpunkt des Interesses gestellt. Zu dieser Zeit fängt man an, die aus verlorenen Werken stammenden Zitate „fragmenta“ zu nennen. Das erste Vorkommen des Wortes in diesem Sinn ist mir unbekannt. Die früheste Angabe, die ich gefunden habe, kommt im Untertitel einer *Opera Salustii* (1554) vor.¹ Das Sammeln und Systematisieren der Fragmente hatten eine doppelte Bedeutung für den *homo eruditus* des Zeitalters.

(1) Man beschäftigte sich mit besonderer Vorliebe mit der Restitution mangelhafter antiker Texte. Dieses komplizierte Verfahren, das aus der *emendatio, transpo-*

¹ C. Crispi Salustii de L. Sergii Catilinae coniuratione, ac bello Iugurthino historiae. Ex castigatione Ioan. Rivii Athendoriensis. Cum adnotationib. marginalib. D. Philip Melanth. Adiecimus nunc primum in omnia Salustii, quae hodie extant fragmenta Henrici Glareani Helvetii poetae Laureati annotationes. Cum quibusdam aliis in Catilin. et Iugurth. Salust. Iacobi Bononensis annotatiunculis. Coloniae excudebat Ioan. Gymnicus, Anno M.D.XLIII.

sitio und coniectura der Teile des Texts besteht, heißt *castigatio* (διόρθωσις, Zurechtweisung). Die Fragmente wurden für eine künftige *castigatio* gesammelt. Das mustergültige Beispiel der Restitution wurde von Iosephus Iustus Scaliger gegeben, der das *De verborum significatione* von S. Pompeius Festus mit dieser Methode zu restituieren unternahm.²

(2) Die Kenntnis der Fragmente ermöglichte die Rekonstruktion einiger schwerverständlicher, dunkler Konzeptionen oder Lehren. 1568 ist *De historia commentarius* von A. Riccobono erschienen, der die Erklärung des vielbestrittenen Begriffes der *historiae* auf Grund der Werke und Fragmente antiker Verfasser geliefert hat.³ I. I. Scaliger hat die antike und biblische Chronologie mit Hilfe der Fragmente rekonstruiert.⁴

Henricus Stephanus ist der erste, der es unternahm, philosophische Fragmente zu sammeln. Seine Ausgabe von Diogenes Laertius erschien in Genf 1570 mit einem Anhang: *Pythagoreorum philosophorum fragmenta*. Seine andere, wichtige Sammlung ist die *Poesis philosophica* (Genf 1573), die die Fragmente einiger Vorsokratiker enthält. Während I. I. Scaliger (der als Stephanus' Mitarbeiter einige *emendationes ad Parmenidem* in der *Poesis philosophica* veröffentlicht hat) die Fragmente als Hilfsmittel der *castigatio* und *reconstructio* betrachtet, führt Stephanus drei weitere Gesichtspunkte der philosophischen Fragmente an: *veritas, utilitas, delectatio*.

Die Beschäftigung mit den philosophischen Bruchstücken ist bis zum Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts durch die fünf erwähnte Gesichtspunkte bestimmt. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt erschienen zwei neue Wissenschaften, die ebenfalls die Betreuung der philosophischen Fragmente unternahmen: die klassische Philologie und die spekulative Geschichte der Philosophie. Beide Wissenschaften haben je einen der Scaligerschen Gesichtspunkte verwendet: Die klassische Philologie setzte die Restitution der fragmentarischen Texte zum Ziel, die Geschichte der Philosophie beschäftigte sich mit der Rekonstruktion der philosophischen Lehren.

Anfangs versprach die Zusammenarbeit des Philologen und des Philosophiehistorikers ernsthaften Erfolg. Der Philologe hatte guten Grund zu hoffen, dass er das Paradigma des zu restituierenden Werkes, das Scaliger mit divinatischem kritischem Blick wahrgenommen hat, aus den Händen des Philosophiehistorikers als philosophisches System erhalten wird. Dennoch sind die vorzüglichsten Leistungen des Zeitalters diejenigen, die von einem und demselben Wissenschaftler zustande gebracht wurden, der gleichzeitig als restituierender Philologe und das System rekonstruierender Philosophiehistoriker arbeitete. Als Beispiele seien erwähnt die Arbeiten

² *Iosephi Scaligeri in Sex. Pompeii Festi libros de verborum significatione castigationes. Quibus adiunctae sunt doctissimorum virorum, ex Venetiano codice, annotationes.* Apud Petrum Santandream, M.D.LXXV.

³ *Antonii Riccoboni Rhodigini de historia commentarius. Cum fragmentis ab eodem Antonio summa diligentia collectis etc.* Cum privilegio Venetiis, apud Ioannem Barilettum M.D.LXVIII.

⁴ *De emendatione temporum.* Lutetiae 1583. Die zweite und dritte Auflage (Leyden 1597; 1629) nebst einem Anhang: *Veterum Graecorum fragmenta selecta, quibus loci aliquot obscurissimi Chronologiae sacrae et Biblicorum illustrantur.*

von Georg Gustav Fülleborn⁵ und die Sammlung der Fragmente des Herakleitos von Schleiermacher.⁶

Nach den anfänglichen Erfolgen hat aber das Programm der ebenso philologisch wie philosophisch relevanten Forschung der Fragmente der Vorsokratiker versagt: Der theoretische Forscher der Geschichte der Philosophie war außerstande, sich mit philologischen Lappalien abzugeben. Schleiermachers Sammlung und sogar die Sammlung der Fragmente als solche wurden z. B. von Hegel verächtlich erwähnt: „Dergleichen Sammlungen sind [...] in der Regel zu weitläufig. Sie enthalten eine Masse von Gelehrsamkeit, und man kann sie eher schreiben als lesen.“⁷

Das Bemühen um die Restituierung der philosophischen Fragmente ist eine interne Angelegenheit der Philologie geworden.

1.2 Das philosophische Fragment in der modernen Forschung

Der Umbruch auf diesem Gebiet geschah durch Hermann Diels. Im Vorwort zu seinem *Parmenides' Lehrgedicht* (1897) schreibt er: „Wenn heute nach dreißig Jahren zuerst wieder ein Text des Parmenideischen Gedichtes vorgelegt wird, so ist es für jeden, der die Entwicklung unserer philologischen Kritik mit wachem Sinne verfolgt hat, von vornherein klar, daß die neue Ausgabe sich wesentlich andere Ziele stecken muß, als die von Heinrich Stein in der *Symbola philologorum* seinem Lehrer Ritschl dargebrachte Festgabe. Die damalige Generation hoffte noch ihre Texte, die sie mit virtuosom Scharfsinn behandelte, der ursprünglichen Gestalt, wie aus den Händen der Meister hervorgegangen, wiedergeben zu können.“ – Am Ende des Vorworts kommt er nochmal auf das Problem zurück: „Wir kommen also in unserer Rezension bestenfalls auf ein attisches Exemplar des vierten Jahrhunderts, weiter nicht. Damit ist gesagt, daß es unmöglich ist den Text des Parmenides in der Form wiederzugewinnen, die der Verfasser niederschrieb. [...] Die urkundliche Fassung werden wir erst dann kennen lernen, wenn künftige Ausgrabungen im Μουσείον von Velia das Gedicht des Eleaten in Stein gegraben ans Tageslicht bringen sollten.“

Die Hoffnung auf die philologische Restitution der Urform hat sich nicht erfüllt. Die Strategie der Forschung der vorsokratischen Philosophie wurde gründlich umgestaltet. Die heutigen Versuche der Interpretation der Vorsokratik gehen in zwei Richtungen:

1. Es gibt eine philosophisch gefärbte Rekonstruktion der Lehre der Vorsokratiker. Die Fragmente werden in dieser Rekonstruktion als Illustrationsmaterial ver-

⁵ Georg Gustav FÜLLEBORN: *Xenophanes. Ein Versuch* (Beyträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie Bd. 1, Züllichau 1791); *Fragmente des Parmenides. Neu gesammelt, übersetzt und erläutert* (Beyträge ... Bd. 6, Züllichau 1795).

⁶ „Herakleitos der Dunkle von Ephesos, dargestellt aus den Trümmern seines Werkes und den Zeugnissen der Alten“, in: *Museum der Altertums-Wissenschaft* I (1807) S. 315-533. Neugedruckt: *Friedrich Schleiermachers Sämtliche Werke* Abt. III. Bd. 2. Berlin 1838, S. 1-146.

⁷ HEGEL, G. W. F.: *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*. Leipzig: Reclam 1982. Bd. 1, S. 262.

wendet. Der didaktische Nutzen dieses Verfahrens ist unbezweifelbar, aber sein wissenschaftlicher Wert ist nicht sehr hoch.

2. Der andere, philologisch gefärbte Interpretationsversuch besteht in der inhaltlich-grammatischen Analyse der Fragmente, mit sorgfältigem Vergleichen des Wortschatzes der Vorsokratiker mit dem des Homer, der Lyriker und Historiker. Die Werte dieses Unternehmens sind kaum zu bezweifeln. Die besten gegenwärtigen Monographien vertreten diese Richtung.

Die philologische Analyse involviert jedoch ein Problem, das man nicht (oder nicht immer) vor Augen hat, daß nämlich die Analyse eines Fragments eine *contradictio in adiecto* ist. Denn die Analyse ist nichts anderes als die Aufgliederung eines Ganzen in seine Teile. Nun wird ein Fragment eben wegen des Mangels der Ganzheit Fragment genannt. Was können wir eigentlich daran analysieren? Durch diese methodologische Aporie stoßen wir auf folgende Alternative: entweder verzichten wir auf die Analyse der Fragmente und begnügen uns mit der Instandhaltung der Texte, oder wir erklären die Fragmente für sekundäre Ganzheiten und führen deren Analyse durch. Die erste Proposition halte ich für sehr ehrenhaft, aber unfruchtbar. Die zweite ist fruchtbringend, aber in ihren Ergebnissen unkontrollierbar.

Ich bringe ein *tertium quid* in Vorschlag, zumindest in Bezug auf die metrischen Fragmente, die aus Lehrgedichten entstammen. Ich werde zeigen,

- daß die Lehrgedichte aus Darstellungseinheiten aufgebaut waren;
- daß die Darstellungseinheiten aus regelmäßigen Elementarteilen bestehen, d. h., analysierbar sind;
- daß eine Darstellungseinheit selbstständigen philosophischen Sinn und Intention hat.

2. DER ABSATZ ALS DARSTELLUNGSEINHEIT

2.1 Die Darstellungseinheit bei Homer

Die scheinbar fließend dahinströmende Rede der homerischen Gedichte wurde in Wirklichkeit aus kleineren, 10–30 Hexameter langen Abschnitten aufgebaut. Obwohl diese Tatsache allbekannt ist, aber der Text in den meisten Ausgaben typographisch gegliedert gedruckt wurde, kam immerhin der Begriff einer Texteinheit, die größer als der Satz, aber kleiner als ein Gesang oder Kapitel ist, zum erstenmal bei Roman Ingarden zur Sprache. Er nennt diese Einheit „Satzzusammenhang“ und schreibt wie folgt: „Jedes solche Ganze hat eine eigene kompositionelle Struktur, die freilich von den Sinngehalten und von der Anordnung der Sätze in ihrer Aufeinanderfolge und endlich von der Art ihres Zusammenhanges abhängig ist, die aber mit keiner Eigenschaft der einzelnen Sätze identisch ist.“⁸

⁸ INGARDEN, Roman: Das literarische Kunstwerk. Tübingen ²1960, S. 161.

Walter Nicolai, der Erforscher der Struktur des Textes von Homer und Hesiod, nennt den Satzzusammenhang von Ingarden „Zelle“ bzw. „Absatz“.⁹ Ich verwende seinen zweiten Ausdruck.

Die epischen Absätze sind klar voneinander absonderbar, weil sie einen eindeutig erkennbaren Anfang haben. „Bei den Anfängen sind vor allem zwei Arten der Einleitung zu unterscheiden: eine dient der Anknüpfung an das Vorgehende, die andere der Eröffnung des Neuen; beide können einzeln oder kombiniert auftreten.“¹⁰

Am Anfang des Absatzes ist gewöhnlich eine Eröffnungsformel zu finden. Eine derartige Eröffnungsformel – und zwar die häufigste Anknüpfungsformel bei Homer – ist das *ὡς φάτο* bzw. *ὡς ἔφατ’*.

ὡς ἔφατ’, ἔδεισεν δ’ ὁ γέρων καὶ ἐπείθετο μύθῳ,
 Βῆ δ’ ἀκέων παρὰ θίνα πολυφλοῖχβοιο θαλάσσης
 (A 33–34)

Häufige Eröffnungsformeln sind die Ausdrücke *ἐνθα*, *ἀλλ’ ὅτε*, *αὐτάρ*, *αὐτὰρ ἐπει*, *αὐτὰρ τοι*.

ἐνθα κεν Ἀργεῖοισιν ὑπέρμορα νόστος ἐτυχθῇ
 εἰ μὴ Ἀθηναίην Ἥρην πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν
 (B 155–156)

ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ ῥ’ ἐκ τοῖο δυωδεκάτῃ γένετ’ ἦώς,
 καὶ τότε δὴ πρὸς Ὀλυμπον ἴσαν θεοὶ αἰὲν ἐόντες
 (A 493–494)

αὐτὰρ ὁ μῆνι νηυσὶ παρήμενος ὠκυπόροισιν
 διογενὴς Πηλῆος υἱός, πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς
 (A 488–489)

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κόσμηθεν ἅμ’ ἡγεμόνεσσιν ἕκαστοι
 (Γ 1)

Ein weiteres, wichtiges Formelement ist, dass der Absatz immer am Beginn einer Hexamater-Zeile anfängt: demzufolge schließt er immer am Ende einer Zeile. Ein inhaltliches Kriterium des Anfangs bietet der Wechsel des Themas oder der des Darstellungsaspekts.

Über den Schluss des Absatzes kann man weitaus weniger sagen, weil in der archaischen Komposition keine Schlussformel gebraucht wird. Das einzige Kennzeichen eines Schlusses ist der neue Anfang am Beginn der nächstfolgenden Zeile.

Obzwar der Absatz – wie von Ingarden festgestellt wurde – eine eigene kompositionelle Struktur hat, wäre es sehr schwer, überhaupt eine Typologie der möglichen inneren Strukturvarianten des epischen Absatzes zu entwerfen. Es gibt aber im Text des Epos eine spezielle Darstellungsform, nämlich die Form des Katalogs, deren Absätze eine recht eigentümliche innere Struktur aufweisen. Im Schiffskatalog

⁹ NICOLAI, Walter: *Hesiods Erga. Beobachtungen zum Aufbau*. Heidelberg 1964. – Ders., *Kleine und große Darstellungseinheiten in der Ilias*. Heidelberg 1973.

¹⁰ NICOLAI, W.: *Kleine und große Einheiten* ... S. 45.

der *Ilias* (B 484–759) ist jeder der 29 Absätze aus den gleichen drei Elementen aufgebaut. Das erste ist die sog. Rubrik: der Name des Leiters; das zweite ist eine kurze Erzählung über die Familie und über das Land des Leiters, das dritte ist die Zahl der Schiffe.¹¹ Eine ähnliche Regelmäßigkeit ist zu beobachten im Troja-Katalog (B 815–877) und bei der katalogartigen Beschreibung des Schildes des Achilles (Σ 478–608).

2.2 Der Orakeltext als Darstellungseinheit

Auch die metrischen Orakeltexte aus Delphoi zeigen bemerkenswerte strukturelle Verwandtschaft. Diese Texte sind als singuläre Absätze aufzufassen, die nicht selten mit einer typischen Eröffnungsformel anfangen: ἄλλ' ὅταν, φράζω, ὦ μέλαιοι, ὄλβιος, ἔστι τις.¹²

ἄλλ' ὅταν ἡμιόνος βασιλεὺς Μήδοισι γένηται,
καὶ τότε, Λυδὲ ποδαβρέ, πολυψήδα παρ' Ἑρμον
φεύγειν μηδὲ μένειν, μηδ' αἰδεῖσθαι κακὸς εἶναι
(Herodotos 1, 55)

φράζω, βαρβαρόφωνος ὅταν ζυγὸν εἰς ἅλα βάλλῃ
βύβλιον, Εὐβοίης ἀπέχειν πολυμηκάδας αἶγας.
(Ibid. 8, 20)

ὦ μέλαιοι, τί κάθεσθε; λιπὼν φύγ' ἐς ἔσχατα γαίης
(Ibid. 7, 140)

ὄλβιος οὗτος ἀνὴρ, ὅς ἐμὸν δόμον ἐσκαταβαίνει,
Κύψελος Ἡετίδης κτλ.
(Ibid. 5, 92)

ἔστι τις Ἀρκαδίας Τεγέη λευρῷ ἐνὶ χώρῳ κτλ.
(Ibid. 1, 67)

Es gibt sechs verschiedene Strukturelemente, die in einem Orakeltext vorkommen können – selbstverständlich nicht zusammen: zumeist drei oder vier von den Elementen sind in einem Orakel zu finden, aber es gibt keinen Teil des Textes, der in keiner der sechs Klassen eingeordnet werden könnte. Die Elemente sind die folgenden: 1. der Gruß (Apollon begrüßt den Fragenden); 2. die Wiederholung der Frage; 3. die Bestätigung der Autorität Apollons; 4. die Aufzählung der Bedingungen der Erfüllung des Orakels; 5. die Botschaft; 6. die Auslegung der Botschaft.¹³

¹¹ BEYE, Charles R.: „The Catalogue as a Devise of Composition in the Iliad“, in: *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 65, 1961.

¹² FONTENROSE, Joseph E.: *The Delphic Oracle. Its Responses and Operations with a Catalogue of Responses*. Berkeley–Los Angeles–London 1968. S. 160 et passim.

¹³ J. E. FONTENROSE, *op. cit.* 165 et passim: Salutation – Restatement of Question – Assertion of Mantic Authority – Condition Precedent – Message – Explication.

2.3 Die Darstellungseinheiten der metrischen vorsokratischen Texte

Unter den Fragmenten des Xenophanes, Parmenides und Empedokles findet man teils Komponenten mangelhafter, aber erkennbarer Absätze, teils Abschnitte, die in sich als fehlerfreie Absätze aufzufassen sind. Es gibt sogar fünf größere Abschnitte (Xenophanes B1 und B2, Parmenides B1 und B8, Empedokles B17), die aus mehreren Absätzen bestehen. Vor allem zitiere ich zwei nachweisbar vollkommene Absätze.

Parmenides B8, 42–49

- 38 ... τῷ πάντ' ὀνόμασται,
 ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ,
 40 γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ ὄλλυσθαι, εἶναι τε καὶ οὐχί,
 καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διὰ τε χροᾶ φανὸν ἀμείβειν.
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πείρας πύματον, τετελεσμένον ἐστὶ
πάντοθεν, εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ,
μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντῃ, τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μείζον,
 45 οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεὸν ἐστὶ τῇ ἢ τῇ.
οὔτε γὰρ οὐκ ἓν ἐστὶ, τὸ κεν παῦοι μιν ἰκνεῖσθαι
εἰς ὁμόν, οὔτ' ἓν ἐστὶν ὅπως εἴη κεν ἓντος
τῇ μᾶλλον τῇ δ' ἥσσον, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστὶν ἄσυλον
οἱ γὰρ πάντοθεν ἴσον, ὁμῶς ἐν πείρασι κύρει.
 50 ἐν τῷ σοι παῦω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδέ νόημα
 ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης· δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας
 μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων.

(Darum ist alles Name, was die Sterblichen angesetzt haben, im Vertrauen darauf, es sei wahr: [40] Entstehen und Vergehen, Sein und Nichtsein, den Ort wechseln und die leuchtende Farbe ändern.

[42] Da es andererseits ein letztes Ende gibt, ist es allseits vollendet, gleich der Masse einer wohlgerundeten Kugel, vom Zentrum her in alle Richtungen sich gleichermaßen erstreckend. Denn es ist unumgänglich, daß es weder hier noch dort [45] etwas größer oder etwas kleiner ist. Es gibt nämlich kein Nichtseiendes, das es hindern würde, die Einheitlichkeit zu erreichen, und es ist auch nicht seiend derart, daß es hier mehr oder dort weniger von Seiendem gäbe, weil es als Ganzheit unverseht ist. Denn sich selbst allseits gleich begegnet es einheitlich seinen Grenzen.

[50] Damit beende ich dir verlässliche Aussage und Begriff hinsichtlich der Wahrheit. Von hier aber lerne die menschlichen Meinungen verstehen, indem du die trügerische Ordnung meiner Verse hörst.)¹⁴

Der Anfang des Absatzes (Z. 42) ist gut erkennbar: im Vergleich mit dem Inhalt der vorigen Zeilen ist hier ein Wechsel des Aspekts zu beobachten. Im bisherigen wurde die Beziehung des Erkennen zum Seienden dargestellt. Von hier ab hören

¹⁴ *Die Vorsokratiker*. Auswahl der Fragmente, Übersetzung und Erläuterungen von Jaap MANSFELD. Bd. I-II, Stuttgart 1983-1986. Bd. I, S. 321.

wir über eine andere Eigenschaft des Seienden. – Der Text fängt mit einer homerischen Eröffnungsformel an:

Das Ende des Absatzes (Z. 49), das gleichzeitig die Beendigung eines ganzen Blocks ist, wird kräftig akzentuiert am Anfang des nächsten Absatzes (Z. 50): „Damit beende ich dir verlässliche Aussage und Begriff“.

Empedokles B17, 14–20

- 12 ἦι δὲ διαλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει,
ταύτῃ δ' ἄν' ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον.
14 ἀλλ' ἄγε μύθων κλῦθι· μάθη γάρ τοι φρένας αὖξει
15 ὥς γὰρ καὶ πρὶν ἔειπα πιφάυσκον πείρατα μύθων,
δίπλ' ἑρέω· τοτὲ γὰρ ἔν ηὔξῃθι μόνον εἶναι
ἐκ πλεόνων, τοτὲ δ' αὖ διέφυ πλεόν' ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι,
πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα καὶ ἥερος ἄπλετον ὕψος,
Νεῖκός τ' οὐλόμενον δίχα τῶν, ἀτάλαντον ἀπάντηι,
20 καὶ Φιλότῃς ἐν τοῖσιν, ἴση μῆκος τε πλάτος τε·
τὴν σὺ νόωι δέρκευ, μηδ' ὄμμασιν ἦσο τεθηπώς·

(... sofern sie aber im Hin und Her vollends nie aufhören, diese wechselnde Pfade zu gehen, sind sie ewig, unverrückbar im Kreislauf.

[14] Ich fordere dich auf, meine Worte zu beachten. Denn das Lernen wird deinen Sinn gedeihen lassen. Wie ich zuvor schon sagte, als ich das Hauptthema erörterte, werde ich Doppeltes berichten: einmal wächst es zusammen, um ein alleiniges Eines zu sein aus Mehrerem, das andere Mal entwickelt es sich zu Verschiedenem, daß es Mehreres ist aus Einem: Feuer und Wasser und Erde und Luft unermeßliche Höhe. Und gesondert von diesen, aber sie in jeder Hinsicht aufwiegend: Haß, der verwünschte; und unter ihnen: Liebe, ihnen gleich an Länge und Breite. [21] Letztere schaue an mit deinem Verstand – sitze nicht da mit verdutztem Gesicht.)¹⁵

Am Anfang des Absatzes steht eine Eröffnungsformel: ἀλλ' ἄγε μύθων κλῦθι. In der nächsten Zeile ist ein anknüpfender Rückblick zu lesen: ὥς γὰρ καὶ πρὶν ἔειπα. Der Wechsel des Aspekts ist sowohl am Anfang wie am Ende des Abschnittes auch gut zu beobachten.

Die beiden Elegien des Xenophanes (B1 und 2) wurden aus je zwei Absätzen aufgebaut. Ich zitiere die zweite Elegie.

Xenophanes B2

- ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ταχυτῇτι ποδῶν νίκην τις ἄροιτο
ἢ πενταθλεύων, ἔνθα Διὸς τέμενος
πᾶρ Πίσαιοι· ὀῆις' ἐν Ὀλυμπίῃ, εἴτε παλαιῶν
ἢ καὶ πυκτοσύνην ἀλγινόεσσαν ἔχων,
5 εἴτε τι δεινὸν ἄεθλον ὃ παγκράτιον καλέουσιν,
ἀστοῖσιν κ' εἴη κυδρότερος προσοπᾶν
καὶ κε προεδρίην φανερὴν ἐν ἀγῶσιν ἄροιτο

¹⁵ Ebd. Bd. II, S. 81.

- καί κεν σῖτ' εἶη δημοσίων κτεάνων
 ἐκ πόλεως καὶ δῶρον ὃ οἱ κειμήλιον εἶη
 10 εἴτε καὶ ἵπποισιν, ταῦτά κε πάντα λάχοι,
 οὐκ ἐὼν ἄξιος ὥσπερ ἐγώ. ῥώμης γὰρ ἀμείνων
 ἀνδρῶν ἢδ' ἵππων ἡμετέρη σοφίη.
 ἀλλ' εἴ κ' ἡ μάλα τοῦτο νομίζεται, οὐδὲ δίκαιον
 προκρίνειν ῥώμην τῆς ἀγαθῆς σοφίης.
 15 οὔτε γὰρ εἰ πύκτης ἀγαθὸς λαοῖσι μετεῖη
 οὔτ' εἰ πενταθλεῖν, οὔτε παλαισμοσύνην
 οὐδὲ μὲν εἰ ταχυτῆτι ποδῶν, τόπερ ἐστὶ πρότιμον
 ῥώμης ὅσσοι ἀνδρῶν ἔργ' ἐν ἀγῶνι πέλει,
 τοῦνεκεν ἂν δὴ μάλλον ἐν εὐνομίῃ πόλιν εἶη.
 20 σμικρὸν δ' ἂν τι πόλει χάρμα γένοιτ' ἐπὶ τῷ,
 εἴ τις ἀεθλεύων νικῶι Πίσαιο παρ' ὄχθας·
 οὐ γὰρ πιαίνει ταῦτα μυχοὺς πόλεως.

(Nun gut, wenn einer mit der Schnelligkeit der Füße einen Sieg erränge, oder als Fünfkämpfer, dort wo der Hain des Zeus an den Fluten des Pises in Olympia, oder als Ringer, oder auch, weil er den schmerzhaften Faustkampf beherrscht, oder den schrecklichen Wettkampf, den sie Pankration nennen: für seine Mitbürger wäre er herrlicher anzuschauen, und einen Ehrensitz vor aller Augen bei den Veranstaltungen würde er erhalten, und Speisung gäbe es aus öffentlichem Vermögen, gewährt von der Gemeinde, und ein Geschenk als kostbaren Besitz; oder auch wenn er mit seinen Pferden <siegt>, würde er das alles erhalten – er der <dessen> nicht so würdig ist wie ich. Ist besser als Kraft von Männern und Pferden doch unsere Kunst und Kenntnis.

Nein, durchaus willkürlich ist dieser Brauch, und nicht ist es recht, Stärke höher zu schätzen als nützliche Weisheit. Denn mag einer tüchtig sein im Volk als Boxer, oder als Fünfkämpfer oder im Ringkampf, oder sogar durch Schnelligkeit der Füße, was am meisten gilt unter den Disziplinen, die es beim Wettkampf gibt, so wäre deshalb die Stadt nicht mehr <als vorher> in guter Ordnung; und kurz wäre das Vergnügen, das die Stadt daran hätte, wenn einer im Wettkampf siegte an den Ufern des Pises: denn nicht bereichert das die Kammern der Stadt.)¹⁶

Unter den Fragmenten der drei Philosophen sind insgesamt 26 fehlerfreie Absätze zu finden, und wir kennen weitere Bruchstücke, die eine Eröffnungsformel enthalten.¹⁷

Es wurde erwähnt, dass eine Typologie der inneren Komposition des metrischen Absatzes überhaupt schwer zu geben wäre. Aber wir haben gesehen, dass im Falle einiger spezieller Absätze – z. B. der des Schiffskatalogs oder des metrischen Orakeltextes – die Strukturelemente des Absatzes voneinander abzusondern und zu

¹⁶ Xenophanes. *Die Fragmente*. Herausgegeben, übersetzt und erläutert von Ernst HEITSCH. München und Zürich, 1983. S. 19–21.

¹⁷ Xenophanes 1,1 12; 1, 13–24; 2,1 12; 2,13–24. Parmenides 1,1–5; 1,6 10; 1,11–14; 1,15–21; 1,22–32; 8,5–21; 8,22–25; 8,26–31; 8,34–41; 8,42–49; 8,50–61. Empedokles 2,1–9; 17,1–13; 17,14–20; 17,21–26; 17,27–35; 21,1–14; 23,1–11; 35,1–17; 84,1–11; 100,1–25; 112,1–12.

benennen möglich war. Unter Berücksichtigung dessen, dass das philosophische Lehrgedicht eine mit der Absicht des Lehrens konzipierte Anrede ist, die eine spezielle, gut begreifbare Methode und Darstellungsform impliziert, nimmt man mit Recht an, dass die Absätze dieser Anrede manche typischen, regelmäßigen Formen des Aufbaus zeigen sollten. Der Verfasser eines Lehrgedichts wollte nämlich seinen ausgewählten Hörer nicht nur erziehen, noch weniger bloß amüsieren. Seine Absicht war, sich im Schüler eine Fähigkeit entwickeln zu lassen, in deren Besitz der Schüler sein eigenes Lehrgedicht erschaffen konnte. Der Meister wollte nicht nur den Inhalt seiner Gedanken, sondern auch den Algorithmus für die Erschaffung eines derartigen Lehrgebäudes übergeben.

Nennen wir den Absatz des philosophischen Lehrgedichts ein Philosophem! Im Folgenden zeige ich die Struktur von zwei Arten der Philosopheme: die der Antithese und des Beweises.

Die Antithese

Ein gutes Beispiel der antithetischen Struktur ist das Fragment B2 von Empedokles.

- στενωποὶ μὲν γὰρ παλάμαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται·
 πολλὰ δὲ δειλ' ἔμπαια, τὰ τ' ἀμβλύνουσι μέριμνας·
 παῦρον δὲ ζῶησι ὅλου μέρος ἀθρήσαντες
 ὠκύμοροι καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες ἀπέπταν,
 5 αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες, ὅτῳ προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος
 πάντος' ἐλαυνόμενοι τὸ δ' ὅλον <πως> εὐχεται εὐρεῖν·
 οὕτως οὐτ' ἐπιδερκτὰ τὰδ' ἀνδράσιν οὐτ' ἐπακουστά
 οὔτε νόωι περιληπτὰ. σὺ δ' οὖν, ἐπεὶ ᾧδ' ἐλίαστης,
 πεύσεαι· οὐ πλεῖον γε βροτεῖη μῆτις ὀρωρεν.

3 ὅλου Mansfeld; βίου Hss.

6 πως Mansfeld

(Denn einen engen Bereich umfassen die begreifenden Sinne, die über die <menschlichen> Glieder gebreitet sind; viel Leidvolles stößt zu, das dem grübelnden Sinn seine Schärfe nimmt. In ihrer Lebenszeit haben sie nur einen winzigen Teil des Ganzen erschaut; zum raschen Tode bestimmt, sind sie aufwärts getragen worden und zerstoßen wie Rauch, nur jener Einzelheit gewiß, worauf ein jeglicher eben gestoßen; nach allen möglichen Seiten werden sie getrieben – wie wird sich einer dann rühmen können, das Ganze ausfindig gemacht zu haben? Also ist, was ich zu sagen habe, für die <anderen> Menschen nicht mit Augen zu sehen, nicht mit Ohren zu hören, nicht mit ihrem Verstand zu erfassen.

Du aber, der du jetzt zu mir in die Einsamkeit gelangst, wirst es erfahren: so weit ist menschlicher Scharfsinn allerdings nicht vorgedrungen.)¹⁸

¹⁸ Übersetzung von J. MANSFELD, *op. cit.* Bd. II, S. 71–73.

Die ersten siebeneinhalb Zeilen zählen die Eigenschaften der minderwertigen, leidvollen, armseligen Sterblichen auf, die letzten anderthalb Zeilen stellen den Schüler dieser Welt gegenüber. Die Strukturelemente sind folgende: (1) eine katalogartige These, eine Aufzählung der Motive, die sich im Licht der (2) Antithese, die das Richtige, das Wahrhafte, das Gute präsentiert und repräsentiert, als wertlos erweisen.

Einer ähnlichen antithetischen Struktur begegnen wir bei Parmenides, im B8, 34–41.

- ταὐτὸν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐνεκεν ἔστι νόημα·
 35 οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐν ᾧ πεφασισμένον ἐστὶν
 εὐρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν· οὐδὲν γὰρ <ἦ> ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται
 ἄλλο πάρεξ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐπεὶ τόγε Μοῖρ' ἐπέδυσεν
 οὐλον ἀκίνητον τ' ἔμεναι· τῶι πάντ' ὀνόμασται,
 ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ,
 40 γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ ὄλλυσθαι, εἶναι τε καὶ οὐχί,
 καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διὰ τε χροά φανὸν ἀμείβειν.

(Und daß man es erkennt, ist dasselbe wie die Erkenntnis, daß es ist. Denn nicht ohne das Seiende, bezüglich dessen es als Ausgesagtes Bestand hat, wirst du das Erkenntnis finden. Denn es gibt sonst nichts und wird auch nichts geben außer dem Seienden, weil das Geschick verfügt hat, daß es ganz und unbeweglich/unveränderlich ist. Darum ist alles Name, was die Sterblichen angesetzt haben, im Vertrauen darauf, es sei wahr: Entstehen und Vergehen, Sein und Nichtsein, den Ort wechseln und die leuchtende Farbe ändern.)¹⁹

These (34–38a): die Welt der ἀλήθεια ist eins und homomorph; Antithese (38b–41): die Welt der ὀνόματα ist vielfältig und heteromorph.

Bei Xenophanes, im B2, 1–12 finden wir eine Gegenüberstellung von Körperkraft und Weisheit. Nach der Aufzählung der Sportarten sagt der Dichter: „Ist besser als Kraft von Männern und Pferden doch unsere Kunst und Kenntnis. – Nein, durchaus willkürlich ist dieser Brauch (εἰκῆι ... νομίζεται) und nicht ist es recht (οὐδὲ δίκαιον) Stärke höher zu schätzen als nützliche Weisheit.“

Die Motive der zitierten drei Philosopheme sind folgende:

- (1) antithetische Struktur;
- (2) katalogartiges Aufführen der minderwertigen Seite;
- (3) in den Gegensätzen wird jedesmal eine und dieselbe Opposition ausgeprägt: die des Natürlichen und des Konventionellen.

Unter den Fragmenten sind insgesamt 13 antithetische Strukturen zu finden.²⁰ Die philosophische Rede erhebt sich durch die antithetischen Philosopheme über die Menschenwelt, über das konventionelle Alltagsleben der Sterblichen, um das „unerschütterliche Herz der Wahrheit“ darstellen zu können.

¹⁹ Übersetzung von J. MANSFELD, *op. cit.* Bd. I, S. 321.

²⁰ Xenophanes 2,1–12; Parmenides 1,22–32; 2; 4; 6; 7; 8,34–41; Empedokles 2; 3; 4; 8; 17,21–26; 110.

Der Beweis

Kehren wir jetzt zu Parmenides B8, 42–49 zurück. Dieser Absatz ist in drei Teile gegliedert: (1) Zeilen 42–44a; (2) Zeilen 44b–48; (3) Zeile 49. Der dritte Teil ist eine Wiederholung des Gedankens des ersten Teils. Der Absatz enthält eine Argumentation für den Satz, der im ersten Teil des Philosophems ausgesagt wurde. Die dreiteilige Struktur des Philosophems sieht so aus: Satz – Argumentation – Wiederholung des Satzes.

Der Satz lautet:

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πείρας πύματον, τετελεσμένον ἐστί
πάντοθεν, εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ,
μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντῃ·

Ich gebe eine Paraphrase des Satzes: Wenn das Seiende eine letzte Grenze hat, muß es kugelförmig sein. – Daß das Seiende eine letzte Grenze hat, wurde in B8, 26–32 bewiesen. Die jetzt argumentierende These ist: es muß kugelförmig sein.

Argument: τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον,
45 οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῇ ἢ τῇ.

(Denn es ist unumgänglich, daß es weder hier noch dort etwas größer oder etwas kleiner ist.) Was bedeutet „größer“ und „kleiner“? In diesem Kontext sollen sie etwas bloß Räumliches bedeuten: Es ist unmöglich, daß das Seiende sich in diese Richtung vom Zentrum weiter erstreckt, weiter entfernt, weiter ausgedehnt sei als in jene Richtung.

Ja, aber diese Aussage benötigt noch eine universelle Begründung, um als Argument fungieren zu können. Jetzt weist Parmenides auf zwei frühere Sätze zurück:

1. οὔτε γὰρ οὐκ ἓόν ἔστι, τό κεν παύοι μιν ἰκνεῖσθαι
εἰς ὅμόν,

„Es gibt nämlich kein Nichtseiendes, das es hindern würde, die Einheitlichkeit zu erreichen“ – d. h. wenn etwas das hindern könnte, wäre es das Nichtseiende. Aber das Nichtseiende existiert nicht, cf. B2, B6, B7.

2. οὐτ' ἓόν ἔστιν ὅπως εἴη κεν ἓόντος
τῇ μάλλον τῇ δ' ἥσσον, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἔστιν ἄσυλον

„Und es ist auch nicht seiend derart, daß es hier mehr oder dort weniger von Seiendem gäbe, weil es als Ganzes unversehrt ist“ – d. h. es gibt keine Intensitätsdifferenz (kein „mehr“ oder „weniger“) innerhalb – oder hinsichtlich – des Seienden, cf. B8, 22–25. Wenn es aber gar keine Intensitätsdifferenz, keine Steigerung gibt, wird auch eine räumliche Differenz, ein „ferner und näher“ unmöglich.

Damit wurde der Satz bewiesen. Jetzt kommt der letzte Schritt.

Die Wiederholung des Satzes:

οἱ γὰρ πάντοθεν ἴσον, ὁμῶς ἐν πείρασι κύρει.

„Denn sich selbst allseits gleich begegnet es einheitlich seinen Grenzen.“

Die Struktur des beweisführenden Philosophems ist also folgende:

1. Exposition des Satzes
2. Beweisführung
3. Wiederholung des Satzes.

Dieser Aufbau ist wohl bekannt: die Sätze des Euklides zeigen dieselbe Struktur:

1. Exposition des Satzes (πρότασις)
 2. Beweisführung in vier Schritten (ἐκθεσις, διόρισμος, κατασκευή, ἀπόδειξις)
 3. Schlussfolgerung (συμπέρασμα)
- Die Schlußfolgerung ist eine wörtliche Wiederholung des Textes der Exposition.

Dasselbe dreigeteilte Philosophem ist schon bei Xenophanes zu finden:

Xenophanes B30

- πηγή δ' ἐστὶ θάλασσαν ὕδατος, πηγή δ' ἀνέμοιο
οὔτε γὰρ ἐν νέφεσιν <γίνοιτο κε ἴς ἀνέμοιο
ἐκπνείοντος> ἔσωθεν ἀνευ πόντου μέγαλοιο
οὔτε ῥ' οἱ ποταμῶν οὔτ' αἱ <θέρος> ὄμβριον ὕδωρ,
5 ἀλλὰ μέγας πόντος γενέτωρ αεφέων ἀνέμων τε
καὶ ποταμῶν.

Exposition: Das Meer ist Quelle des Wassers, Quelle des Windes.

Beweisführung: Denn in den Wolken würde weder die Kraft des Windes, der von innen herausbläst, entstehen ohne das große Meer, noch die Ströme der Flüsse, noch des Aithers Regenwasser;

Wiederholung: nein, das große Meer ist der Vater von Wolken, Winden und Flüssen.²¹

Insgesamt haben wir 12 fehlerfreie dreigeteilte Beweisführungen²² und weitere gebrochene, aber wiedererkennbare Stücke.

Wir haben festgestellt, daß der Text der philosophischen Lehrgedichte aus Darstellungseinheiten aufgebaut ist. Diese Einheiten haben wir Philosophem genannt. Es wurden zwei Typen der Philosopheme unterschieden: das antithetische Philosophem und die Beweisführung. Die beiden Typen enthalten insgesamt fünf Strukturelemente: These, Antithese, bzw. Exposition des Satzes, Argument (Beweis), Wiederholung des Satzes. In die fünf Gruppen können alle Sätze der Fragmente eingereiht werden, die von der Natur der Dinge handeln. Diese Einordnung bildet die Grundlage für eine strukturelle Analyse der Fragmente.

Wir kennen aber einige Sätze der Bruchstücke, die in die fünf erwähnten Gruppen nicht eingereiht werden können.

²¹ Übersetzung von J. MANSFELD, *op. cit.* Bd. I, S. 221.

²² Xenophanes 1,13–24; 2,13–22; 30; 34; Parmenides 8,5–21; 8,22–25; 8,26–31; 8,42–49; 8,50–61; Empedokles 17,1–13; 17,27–35; 100.

Empedokles B17,14

ἀλλ' ἄγε μύθων κλῦθι· μάθη γάρ τοι φρένας αὔξει

(Ich fordere dich auf, meine Worte zu beachten. Denn das Lernen wird deinen Sinn gedeihen lassen.)²³

Xenophanes B34

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὐδὲ τις ἔσται
εἰδὼς ἄμφι θεῶν τε καὶ ἅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·
εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,
αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε· δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

(Klares hat freilich kein Mensch gesehen, und es wird auch keinen geben, der es gesehen hat hinsichtlich der Götter und aller Dinge, die ich erkläre. Denn sogar wenn es einem in außerordentlichem Maße gelungen wäre, Vollkommenes zu sagen, würde er sich dessen trotzdem nicht bewußt sein: bei allen Dingen gibt es nur Annahme.)

Empedokles B25

... καὶ δις γάρ, ὃ δεῖ, καλὸν ἐστὶν ἐνισπεῖν.

(Es ist gut und schön, auch zweimal zu sagen, was not tut.)

Wegen dieser Schwierigkeit sollen wir neben der strukturellen Einordnung eine inhaltliche Klassifizierung einführen. Von diesem Standpunkt aus gehört ein jeder Satz der Fragmente einer der folgenden Gruppen an:

1. Aussage über die Natur der Dinge;
2. Anrede an den Schüler: Mahnung, Verbot, Berichtigung;
3. Aussage über die Natur der Erkenntnis bzw. über die des Wissens;
4. Reflexion auf die Lehre selbst.

Diese zweifache – strukturelle und inhaltliche – Klassifizierung kann den theoretischen Rahmen eines kompletten Katalogs der Elementarteile der metrischen Philosophie der Vorsokratiker bilden.

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²³ Übersetzungen von J. MANSFELD, *op. cit.*

MIKLÓS MARÓTH

AN UNKNOWN XENOCRATIC TESTIMONY

To Shaul Shaked on his 70th birthday

Summary: The paper examines a fragment of Xenocrates on definition preserved by Alfarabi. Proving that the exposition of Plato's and Aristotle's definitions in the same fragment reflect the views of the philosophers referred to in late antique wording the author accepts Alfarabi's report as reliable and authentic. Further comparison of Alfarabi's passage with late antique logical views results in the statement that Xenocrates' definition was connected with the emerging doctrine of relational syllogisms. Alfarabi's fragment exposition of Xenocrates' hitherto unknown teaching is, consequently, exposed as part of the late antique philosophical tradition.

Key words: Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates, Alfarabi, definition, relational syllogisms.

1. DESCRIPTION OF THE TEXT UNDER EXAMINATION

In his short commentary on the *Analytica deutera* al-Fārābī¹ dwelt on the issue of definitions at length. There is nothing surprising about this as the *Analytica deutera* has long been known to have treated the subjects of proofs and definitions.

Discussing the question of definitions al-Fārābī noted that three useful methods had come down to him from 'the elders' and were adopted, out of the several relevant theories. The first one came from Xenocrates. He thought the definition of a given entity could be arrived at syllogistically. The essence of the second method was identified as division. It was said to have come from Plato. The third one, the so called synthetic method, was worked out by Aristotle.²

If al-Fārābī had stopped in his exposure of the subject at this point, he would have caused us quite a bit of inconvenience. Fortunately, however, he added a few details and examples to his short statements.

Al-Fārābī thought that if, in the case of the Xenocratic definition, one aims to prove that a certain definition belongs to a particular thing, a middle term (*terminus*

¹ *Al-Mantiqiyyāt li-'l-Fārābī*, I. ed. Moḥammad Dānešpežuh, Qum, 1408 h. (1987).

² op. cit. 301: وَأَمَّا مَا يَظُنُّ بِهِ أَنَّهُ نَافِعٌ فِي التَّحْدِيدِ، فَإِنَّ الْمَأْخُودَ مِنْهَا عَنِ الْقَدَمَاءِ ثَلَاثَةُ طَرِيقٍ: أَحَدُهَا طَرِيقُ كَسَانْفَرَاتِيَسْ، وَهُوَ أَنْ يَبْرَهَنَ أَنَّ شَيْئًا مَا هُوَ حَدٌّ لَأَمْرٍ مَا، بِالْبَرْهَانِ الْمَطْلُوقِ. وَالثَّانِي طَرِيقُ الْقِسْمَةِ الَّتِي كَانَ يَخْتَارُهَا أَفْلَاطُونُ. وَالثَّالِثُ طَرِيقُ التَّرْكِيبِ الَّتِي نَكَرَهُ أَرِسْطُو طَالِيَسْ.

medius) is needed. This middle term also serves as a definition for the thing in question. However it is known that with evidential syllogisms the middle term plays the role of cause, and cause has a precedence over the generic concept, so the definition taking the place of the middle term must have preceded the definition occupying the place of the generic concept.³

This description is followed by an example: proof is to be provided for man's being 'a living creature walking on two legs'. In this case the 'preceding' definition in the place of the *terminus medius* could be a 'thinking mortal [living being]'. If the definition taking the place of the *terminus medius* itself needs to be proved, there must be a third definition, which is of even less recent origin than the 'preceding' one that has taken place of the *terminus medius*, and can thus serve as a proof for it, and so on, and so forth. If all that is not feasible, the existence of a primary definition requiring no further proofs is bound to be postulated.⁴

All rational, mortal animal is walking on two legs

All man is rational mortal animal

All man is walking on two legs

And this can be continued as described in al-Fārābī's Arabic text. But the question arises as to whether or not this locus is authentic and whether it can be proved that this is what Xenocrates had taught about definitions. The question should be raised all the more because Aristotle himself clearly stated that definitions belong to the set of principles and cannot be proved syllogistically.⁵ At the same time Aristotle also said that one thing can only have one definition.⁶ The essence of the Xenocratic teaching, on the other hand, is that one thing may have several definitions.

³ loc. cit. أما ريق كسانقر اطيس، فانه طريق غير مدفوع، غير أنه ليس ينتفع به في التحديدات كلها. من قبل أنه اذا أردنا أن نبرهن أن شيئاً ما هو حدّ الأمر ما بالبرهان المطلق، فانه ينبغي أن يؤخذ الحدّ الأوسط شيئاً ما آخر، هو ايضا حدّ لذلك الأمر بعينه. ولما كانت إحدى شرائط البرهان المطلق أن الحدّ الأوسط أقدم من الطرفين الأول على جهة تقدم سبب الشيء للشيء، فان الحدّ المتبرهن يلزم ضرورة أن يكون حدّاً للأمر له حدّ آخر أقدم من الحدّ المتبرهن.

⁴ loc. cit. 301: أما طريق كسانقر اطيس، فانه طريق غير مدفوع، غير أنه ليس ينتفع به في التحديدات كلها. من قبل أنه اذا أردنا شيئاً ما هو حدّ الأمر ما بالبرهان المطلق، فانه ينبغي أن يؤخذ الحدّ لذلك الأمر بعينه. ولما كانت إحدى شرائط البرهان المطلق أن الحدّ الأوسط أقدم من الطرفين الأول على جهة تقدم سبب الشيء للشيء، فان الحدّ المتبرهن يلزم ضرورة أن يكون حدّاً للأمر له حدّ آخر أقدم من الحدّ المتبرهن. مثال ذلك: الحيوان المشاء ذو الرجلين، ان تبرهن على الانسان، فانهما ينبغي أن يكون الحدّ الاسطى المستعمل فيه الحيوان الناطق المائت، ويؤلف هكذا: كل انسان حيوان ناطق مائت وكل حيوان ناطق مائت فهو حيوان مشاء ذو رجلين. وينبغي أن يكون قد علم أن الحدّ الأوسط هو أيضاً حدّ للأمر المطلوب حده. فان كانت معرفتنا به لا يصحّ الا ببرهان، لزم أن يكون له حدّ ثالث. وذلك الثالث أيضاً، ان كان لا يصحّ، الا ببرهان، يلزم أن يكون له حدّ رابع، وذلك الى غير نهاية. فان كان ذلك لا محال، لزم أن يكون أقدم حدود الشيء عرف لا ببرهان.

⁵ Aristotle: *Anal. post.* 93 b 15–17: 'Ὡς μὲν τοῖνυν λαμβάνεται τὸ τί ἐστι καὶ γίγνεται γνώριμον, εἴρηται, ὥστε συλλογισμὸς μὲν τοῦ τί ἐστι οὐ γίγνεται οὐδ' ἀποδείξις, δῆλον μέντοι διὰ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ ἀποδείξεως.

⁶ Aristotle: *Top.* 154 a 10–11: οὐτε γὰρ ἓνα δυοῖν οὐτε δύο τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὅρους δυνατόν ἐστιν εἶναι.

The simplest procedure in this case is to see whether the collection of Xenocrates' known fragments contains anything that confirms al-Fārābī's words.⁷ The answer is simple: There is not one among Xenocrates' known fragments to help either prove or deny everything that the Arabic text contains.

Now there is nothing else left for us to do but check what can be checked, that is, the account of Plato and Aristotle, and whether al-Fārābī's words hold true for them or not. Furthermore it must be examined whether Xenocrates can be visualised as having worked out teachings opposed to Aristotle's words, by way of comparing them to the teachings of logic from post-Aristotelian times.

2. OBSERVATIONS ABOUT PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

Plato said, if one wants to define something, one should first see which genus it is subordinated to. If something else is nearer to it than its uppermost (previous) genus, then the other (nearer) genus should be considered. If there is no such other genus, its uppermost (first) genus is to be taken. It then is to be divided by the two primary oppositional differences. Then it should be seen which of the two the thing to be defined falls below. If it is found below one of them, it must be examined whether the genus and the difference together are equal to it. If they are, the definition has been found. If they are broader, then they have to be divided by two new oppositional differences. This is to be carried on with a series of newly arising differences. It may need to be examined whether or not it is the individual entity falling under the concept thus gained that is to be defined. If it is, the definition will consist of a genus plus the differences listed in the correct order.⁸

As for the Aristotelian definition, arrived at synthetically, it may be obtained in the following way. The individual entities that we are aiming to define will be examined first. Take the predicates that can be associated with the individual entities and see if those predicates can be stated about the quiddity of the individual entities. When all these have been collected, it should be examined which of the predicates can be considered as a genus/genera and which ones cannot. Then the genera are to be compared and arranged proceeding towards the more and more general. In the course of these activities it can be found which genus is the most specific. Then the other possible predicate referring to quiddity will be looked at and the one that is even more specific than the last genus will be attached. We will go on combining these concepts until we get to the point where it becomes clear that their combination is equal to the thing to be defined.⁹

If you read these descriptions, you will realize immediately that they do not correspond exactly to either Plato's or Aristotle's words. The concepts of proximal

⁷ *Senocrate-Ermodoro: Frammenti*, ed. M. I. PARENTE, La scuola di Platone, III. Napoli, 1982.

⁸ Al-Fārābī, op. cit. 302–304.

⁹ op. cit., 304–305.

and distal genera occur under Plato, which is to say that the description is based on a hierarchy of genera. There is nothing like this, however, in Plato's work. Further on one can read about the orderly sequence of differences. As a matter of fact, that also presupposes a hierarchy of genera as the sequence of differences depends on which they are attached to. So the description cannot have come from Plato, even though it can often be observed in Plato's dialogues that concepts are clarified through division. This means that although the description is Platonic in its general character, it would be unthinkable without knowledge of the Neo-Platonic *Tabula Porphyriana*.

Summarily it should be established that in al-Fārābī's description the "proximal genus" (*genus proximum*), the "more distal genus", the "essential accidents" and the rest could only have emerged after Porphyrios, who lived in the third century, had written his *Eisagoge* containing the theory he worked out. Giving definitions through division (*diairesis*) is a typical Platonic procedure but the way it was described must have been inspired by a theory of logic of the late Antiquity.

The Middle Platonist Alcinous speaks in his *Handbook of Platonism* of a scientific procedure "'from above', by means of division and definition" as one can find it in al-Fārābī's text.¹⁰ In chapters 5 and 6 of this *Handbook* division is described as follows: "Division may consist in dividing a genus into species, or a whole into parts. ... It is primarily, however, the division of the genus into species that one must make us for the purpose of discerning what each thing is in itself by virtue of its essence. This, however, could not be achieved without definition. Definition arises from division in the following manner: when one wants to subject a thing to definition, one must first of all grasp the genus, as for instance in the case of man, 'living thing'; then one must divide this according to its proximate differentiae until one arrives at the species, as for instance into rational and irrational, and mortal and immortal, with the result that if the proximate differentiae are added to the genus which is composed of them, the definition of man results."¹¹

This is the procedure one can find in al-Fārābī's description. But there is a further division in al-Fārābī's text. He speaks of a first and a second division. The first one consists in the division of a genus by means of essential differences into two parts, whereas the second division consists either in the division of the species or the essential differences by means of further essential differences.¹²

The example one can find in Alcinous' text: 'living thing' can be either rational or irrational, but 'rational' beings can be either mortal or immortal. In the first case Alcinous divides the genus by means of two opposing differences into two species, whereas in the second case he divides the first essential *difference* (rational) by

¹⁰ Alcinous: *The Handbook of Platonism*, Translated with an Introduction and Commentary by John DILLON, Oxford, 1993, 8–9.

¹¹ op. cit. 8–9; Alkonou Didaskalikos, in: *Platonis dialogi*, VI. ed. C. F. Hermann, Lipsiae, 1902, 157: ὁ δὲ ὅρος ἐκ διαίρεσεως γεννᾶται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· τοῦ μέλλοντος ὄρω ὑποπίπτειν πράγματος δεῖ τὸ γένος λαβεῖν, ὡς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῶον, ἔπειτα τοῦτο τέμνειν κατὰ τὰς πρόσσεχεῖς διαφορὰς κατῴντας μέχρι τῶν εἰδῶν, οἷον εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ θνητὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον ... κτλ.

¹² Al-Fārābī: op. cit. 303: والقسمة ... هو قسمة الجنس بالفصول الذاتية... والقسمة الثانية، أما بفصول ذاتية للجنس المقسوم أولاً.

means of its essential difference into two subclasses. The result is the well known Platonic definition of man: ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν.

Al-Fārābī's text reminds the reader of Clement, who proceeds to mention three types of division: that of a genus into species, that of a whole into parts, and that of a subject into accidents.¹³ Two of these types are referred to by al-Fārābī.

The Aristotelian definition by synthesis means the examination of individual entities and their essential attributes. After having collected all common essential attributes one has to distinguish between those which are genera and those which are not. Comparing the genera first one has to find the most special one, and then comparing the rest of the attributes one has to choose the attribute which is equal to that last genus or more general, and then all the essential attributes of the individuals which are more special, than the genus. Then one has to find an appropriate set of all these elements which – as a collection – is equal to the thing to be defined.¹⁴

In the *Posterior Analytics* there is a similar description of how a definition can be attained by *division*. First one has to arrive at the *infimae species*, then to examine the peculiar properties in the light of the primary common attributes. As a result of this procedure the predicates are to be stated in the right order.¹⁵

The comparison of these passages proves the interrelation of the two doctrines in spite of all differences.

But there is no denying of the Platonic ancestry of the first, the Aristotelian ancestry of the second procedure. This observation must be maintained even if al-Fārābī's text talks about "primary" and "secondary" division, and the examples given sometimes bring Plato and the Middle Platonic school rather than Porphyrius to mind. This may be illustrated by the fact that the example given in the text for the primary division is that living beings can be divided into pedate ones and apods. This message could not have been communicated by Porphyrius, who used essential accidents, i.e., *differentiae* exclusively. (Apod, pedate, biped, etc. is Plato's favorite example.)

The same result may be arrived at, though with some changes, when the synthetic procedure of definition is being studied. Also the synthetic procedure of definition relies heavily on the collection of all the concepts that can be regarded as genera and their being put in a hierarchic order. The hierarchic order of genera, however, recalls the lessons of the *Tabula Porphyriana*, which arose five and a half centuries after Aristotle's time.

However, it is not so easy to assess the value of the Arabic text in this context from the standpoint of the history of Greek logic. When describing the process of definition in Book VI and the subsequent parts of *Topica*, Aristotle talks about the increasingly proximal or increasingly higher types of genera in the second half of the chapter 5th of Book VI. In the Greek texts the expressions τὸ ἐγγυτάτω γένος or ...

¹³ WITT, R. E.: *Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism*, Cambridge, 1937, 37.

¹⁴ op. cit. 304–305.

¹⁵ Aristotle: *Posterior Analytics*, 96 b 15–97 a 6.

τὰ ἐπάνω γένη may correspond to the expressions *أخص* or *أعم* جنس written down in the Arabic texts.¹⁶

Even though al-Fārābī's argumentation does not contradict what Aristotle says in his *Topica*, being as it is, in complete harmony with all of it the treatment of the question is imbued with Porphyrius' spirit. It is primarily terminological considerations that lead us to make this statement. It is not so much the Arabic phrase *aḥaṣṣ* quoted just recently that makes us say this, as it does not render the meaning "the closest" but stands for "more specific" or "most specific", which recalls the expression *species specialissima* in the *Tabula Porphyriana*. Much weightier is the circumstance that the Arabic text contains the expression *al-anwā' al-akhīra* (lowest genera), which the Arabic special literature attaches unequivocally to the description in *Tabula Porphyriana*.

It is true that writing on definition Aristotle did not demonstrate the process of making a definition the way al-Fārābī's text did, but also in this case the latter seems to be substantially pervaded by the spirit of Aristotle's *Topica*.

At the beginning of Book IV Aristotle himself described the way of finding the genus by examining the predicates embracing the individual entities comprehensively in a way similar to al-Fārābī's. He even made the remarks that all that was important from the point of view of definition.

There is an important difference, however, namely that Aristotle had no intention to set up a hierarchic system of genera as a result of his investigation, as al-Fārābī had. (In spite of the relevance of this important difference it is worth noting that Aristotle's work did not exclude that possibility either. Although with little emphasis, he still features the idea in his book that one species might fall under several genera, which contain one another.¹⁷)

Basically the same idea can be identified in the 143 a 15th to 29th parts of *Topica* quoted above, where it says that the higher genera can all be stated about the nearest genus and anything falling under it.

Our investigation suggests that in the case of the Aristotelian process of definition the construct is much more complicated than that of the Platonic procedure. Plato had not worked out the theory of definition yet, so there was nothing to confront the procedure associated with his name with. He also tried to define notions, and what we can read in al-Fārābī's writing resembles this Platonic procedure in many ways.

The trend to attribute teachings to Plato that were absent from his works – with Aristotle's system of philosophy already available – can be noticed in later ancient works as well. This may be accounted for by the circumstance that the missing points could have been regarded as deficiencies when confronted with Aristotle's measure of completeness. So, for instance Albinus (now again Alcinous) wrote very much like al-Fārābī in his *Eisagoge* to Plato's philosophy (as the passages quoted recently prove it).

He said, if one wants to find out what something actually is (ἐπισκοπεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ μὲν ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον), several courses may be taken. One of the options is to approach

¹⁶ Aristotle: *Topica* 143 a 15–29.

¹⁷ op. cit. 121 b 24–122 a 2.

it from above with division (ἀνωθεν διαιρετικῶς). Division naturally means the division of the genus into species, that is division of the whole into parts.¹⁸ After demonstrating this procedure the Platonic author says that the definition is to be made "along this road" of division (ὁ δὲ ὅρος ἐκ διαιρέσεως γεννᾶται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον).

On the basis of one of the loci and the approach represented by al-Fārābī's description, which comes from later Platonic authors, it may be said that although the statements referring to Plato do not hold true historically, the teachings of the Arabic text are still rooted in the late traditions of the Antiquities.

Roughly the same conclusion may be arrived at when examining the Aristotelian definition. Aristotle did write on definition and Aristotle's work was known by both Greeks and Arabs in later ages. Although this wording of the synthetic procedure of definition figuring in this Arabic passage is sure not to have from Aristotle and is much more likely to be associated with neo-Platonic traditions, generally speaking it would be hard to declare that Aristotle could not have written it in this form, unless some specific details were referred to.

This amounts to saying that the description of the synthetic definition is fairly elaborate and precise. Besides certain ways of expressing things, it is the entirety of the system of defining procedures, the presentation of the procedures based on division and synthesis as a whole that recall the traditions of the schools of the late antiquities. As an example let me refer again to the locus of Alcinous' treatise I have quoted, where the logical procedures are integrated in a system in such a way that the procedures proceeding downwards from above (which provide definitions through division and proofs syllogistically) are confronted with procedures progressing upwards from below (induction and analysis).

3. RELATIONAL SYLLOGISMS

Scrutinising the two methods associated with Plato and Aristotle it appears that they represent the knowledge and maintenance of the school traditions of Greek philosophy, even if they cannot be regarded as completely authentic. This circumstance adds to the value of the report on Xenocrates. Some other circumstances also seem to justify the sentences about Xenocrates as opposed to the evident contradictions mentioned above.

Let me mention one of them first: the Xenocratic syllogism, which can be used to prove definitions, contains definitions in the place of terms of syllogism. If one looks whether this was possible in the Greek tradition, the answer is yes. Aristotle himself said that the definition is an expression that can be used instead of a name, i. e., term.¹⁹ Though not the same use of the definition is described here as was seen in the Xenocratic syllogism, but in a sense definition and term come to be regarded as equals.

¹⁸ Alcinous, *Eisagoge*, 156-157.

¹⁹ Aristotle: *Topica* 101 b 38-102 a 2: ἔστι δ' ὅρος μὲν λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαίνων, ἀποδίδεται δὲ ἢ λόγος ἀντ' ὀνόματος ἢ λόγος ἀντ' ἑαυτοῦ.

Another thought-provoking circumstance is that what the Xenocratic syllogism does is precisely the statement of the identity of a name and a definition, and then that of a definition and another definition. This idea bears a resemblance to the concept that Aristotle expounded in Book III of *Topica*. Aristotle thought it was possible to carry through argumentations relying on relationships like 'more', 'less', or 'similarly'. The Xenocratic definition, on the other hand, relies on argumentation based on relationships like 'identically' and 'similarly'.

Aristotle did not think it was possible to prove a definition syllogistically, but from the angle of 'identically' and 'similarly' he approved of something similar to what Xenocrates did as dialectical argumentation.

This is of special interest, as a few centuries later Galen described the relational syllogisms in *Eisagoge dialektike*.²⁰ He said relational syllogisms were based on relationships like 'rather', 'more', 'less', and 'similarly'.

However, Galen gave only mathematical examples for the relationship of 'similarly', so it is, they are not good enough to take us any nearer the solution of our present problem. Nevertheless it seems important that Galen started the discussion of the question with the remark that Aristotle's pupils sought to squeeze the relational argumentation into the scheme of the categorical syllogisms.²¹

From his work it appears that these syllogisms were studied by Posidonius too. The last sentence of Chapter XVIII goes like this: "All these syllogisms, indeed, must be said to belong, first to the genus of relational syllogisms, but secondly, in species they are constructed according to the force of an axiom; as Posidonius also says they are called 'conclusive by force of axiom'."²²

In his commentary on this locus J. S. Kieffer points out that this short sentence is difficult to interpret. It is not clear whether Posidonius has limited his investigations to mathematical justifications or to syllogisms of similar nature in general. Kieffer thought some of Galen's words seemed to indicate that it was he who integrated the relational syllogisms in syllogistics.²³

From the point of view of our present problem it is worth examining a locus in Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary on the *Prior Analytics*. Commenting on a locus of Aristotle's work starting 47 a 22 he says that if a conclusion necessarily follows from the premises in an inference, it does mean unequivocally that we have to do with a syllogism. The facts that A is equal to B, and G is also equal to B, surely mean that A is equal to G. In spite of this, this inference cannot be called a syllogism. It will only be a syllogism if a premise of general validity comes to be prefixed to before the inference, like for instance the following:

²⁰ Galenos: *Eisagoge dialektike*, ed. C. KALBFLEISCH, Lipsiae, 1896, 38–42.

²¹ op. cit. 38: βιάζονται δ' αὐτοὺς οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην τοῖς κατηγορικοῖς συναριθμεῖν.

²² KIEFFER, J. S.: *Galen's Institutio Logica*, Baltimore, 1964, 53, with commentary on pp. 127–128.

²³ op. cit. 128.

1. Those that are identical with the same thing, are identical with each other.

Rewording the above premise into a single unit it may be said:

2. A and G are equal to B.

From this general premise and the individual one falling under it it follows syllogistically that A and G are equal to each other.²⁴

Alexander's and Galen's loci are interesting because the Xenocratic syllogism cannot clearly be considered to be a regular Aristotelian syllogism. This follows from two things. One of them is that in the place of the terms complex expressions, definitions can be found. This is conspicuous in a syllogism even if the *Topica* locus quoted above may also be interpreted in the way that a name can be substituted by a definition. The other thing is that the Xenocratic syllogism proves a definition. This is impossible if we consider Aristotle's words quoted above.

However both objections lose validity if the Xenocratic syllogism is not considered to be a regular syllogism of the kind one can find in Galen's and Alexander's work. This approach can easily be adopted because Xenocrates' syllogism has exactly the same setup as the example in Alexander's text.

On the one hand Xenocrates declares the identity of A (a human being) and B (a thinking, mortal being) and on the other, the identity of B (a thinking, mortal being) and G (a living being walking on two legs). This is what the identity of the human and the living being walking on two legs follows from in the conclusion. So in its structure the defining process coming from Xenocrates is identical with relational syllogisms based on identity. Besides it presents a categorical form, just as Galen said about Aristotle's followers.

Finally comparing the various loci we may conclude that the research into the relational syllogisms started in the work of the post-Aristotelian generation probably, under the inspiration of the *Topica* locus quoted above, just as the research into the hypothetical syllogisms was started at the same time, probably also spurred by Aristotle's hints.²⁵

There must have been similar debates about the logical foundation of the relational syllogisms as about that of the hypothetical syllogisms. Galen's and Alexander's words seem to refer to this. Just as there were efforts to legitimize the latter by aligning them formally with the categorical syllogisms, probably the relational syllogisms were treated in the same way with the same purpose.

4. THE VALUE OF AL-FĀRĀBĪ'S ACCOUNT

Al-Fārābī's locus may be considered to be a more or less authentic account of Xenocrates, because ultimately it reflects the conditions of the same post-Aristotelian

²⁴ *Alexandri in Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum Librum I. Commentarium*, ed. M. WALLIES, Berolini, 1883, 344.

²⁵ MARÓTH, M.: *Ibn Sīnā und die peripatetische „Aussagenlogik“*, Leiden, 1989, p. 22 sqq.

period as the account of Plato and Aristotle. Later traditions distorted Plato's ideas substantially – an influence Aristotle suffered much less from. Checking later Greek sources against al-Fārābī, it appears that al-Fārābī rendered Xenocrates' opinion in Aristotelian interpretation, but perhaps truer to the original than the Greeks, as everything that Alexander and Galen said contained later developments. Resorting to this authentic account, a clear picture can be formed of the history of a subordinate issue of logic, that of the relational syllogisms.

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PARMENIDES' ROAD TO INDIA

Summary: Parmenides' philosophy is unique in the history of ideas in Europe, but it has a striking parallel in India, from about the same age. The unchanging Absolute, called 'Being' or 'Existent'; the depreciation of everyday objects as mere 'names'; and the construction of the empirical world out of elements called 'forms' are all found in the first text of the *Sadvidyā* (Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI 1–7). Comparing details and taking into consideration other old Indian material this paper tries to prove that convergence of thought or parallel development is out of the question – there must have been actual contact. Also it suggests that the most probable scenario is that Parmenides travelled to India, learned the language and some important philosophical texts, and brought them back to Greece.

Key words: Parmenides, Chāndogya Upaniṣad, Greek–Indian contacts in philosophy.

¹As was noticed quite early², the philosophy of Parmenides shows very interesting and significant parallelisms with the thought of the Upaniṣads, especially the teaching of Uddālaka Āruṇi as imparted to his son, Śvetaketu in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. Both present a strong monism, calling their absolute principle that pervades the whole universe Being (or Existent), and traditionally both are understood as denying the reality of the phenomena, calling them mere names (as opposed to the Truth of Being).

Such similarities might be (1) the result of independent, analogous thinking; or (2) either of the two authors may have influenced the other; or (3) both received some common or related external influence. The standard position seems to be the first: 'The views of Parmenides, therefore, must be deemed a parallel of interest to Indian thought, but not derived from India.' (KEITH 1925, p. 637.) (Of course this position can be called *standard* only with some reservations, as many Indologists and most Greek scholars don't seem to be aware of the question at all.³) An excellent representative of this approach with many new textual comparisons can be found in

¹ The fundamental idea of this paper and many of the details were first presented in RUZSA (1982). I thank Kornél Steiger for his valuable comments. My researches were supported by the OTKA (the Hungarian National Scientific Research Fund) project no. T 034446.

² A useful summary can be found in KEITH (1925), Ch. 29.

³ Most of them would have heard of the possible Indian connections of Pythagoras, but keep silent on it. FLINTOFF (1980, pp. 88–91) gives a good account of the typical attitude of Greek scholars.

NAKAMURA (1975, pp. 103–112); he, however, does not even consider the possibility of influence, as his interest is in universal thought structures.

Sometimes the third alternative is suggested, in two distinct forms. The analysis of WEST (1971) is generally sound and convincing: he suggests that there was a general flow and mixing of religious and philosophical ideas and motives throughout the classical world, even as far to the East as China; and that our authors may have derived their common themes from this common pool.⁴ (West proposes this as a general model, not specifically to explain the close correspondences of Parmenides and the Upaniṣads; and as a general theory probably nothing stronger is possible.)

A little surprisingly the second form of the third position has been brought forward quite recently and by JEŽIĆ (1992) in an otherwise excellent article that points out many significant correspondences that usually avoid detection. He suggests that the source of the parallels is the common Indo-European tradition: ‘that philosophy and ontology are inherited from the times before Uddālaka and Parmenides, from a far deeper past than historians of philosophy used to dream of’ (p. 434). Notwithstanding the inherent absurdity of the hypothesis (nomadic tribes developing such abstract philosophical views and remembering them for about a thousand years), the suggestion is methodologically unsound. If the common points were indeed parts of an old inheritance, many of those elements should have surfaced before our thinkers. Now their parallelism is so easily noticed and so interesting exactly because both are so different from anything before them in their respective traditions.

In this paper I shall try to argue for the second position, i.e., that our texts have directly influenced each other. Beyond the essential parallelism there are numerous minor analogies of expression that cannot be explained in any other way. And in the end, having weighed the admittedly meagre evidence, I will suggest that most probably it was Parmenides who travelled to India, learned the language and some texts, and used their ideas and words to build his new synthesis.

As my conclusion will not be that Parmenides accidentally got hold of a copy of the 6th chapter of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, but that he went to India and familiarised himself with several philosophical texts and ideas, I will sometimes suggest Indian parallels from other texts as well, mostly from other old Upaniṣads. For the same reason the exposition will generally follow Parmenides (though the exact sequence of his fragments is sometimes debated), and try to find a possible source for a given idea or formulation.

THE FRAMEWORK

Parmenides wrote in hexameters, and his poem consists of three parts: introduction (*Prooimion*), ontology (*Alētheia*) and natural philosophy (*Doxa*). The *Sad-vidyā* (‘The knowledge of the Existent’, Chāndogya Upaniṣad Chapter VI – prose),

⁴ His more precise suggestion, that the bearers of eastern influence to Greece were the Magi, refugees from Media after its conquest by Cyrus in 549 BCE (pp. 239–241), is far from convincing. E. g., this could not explain Indian influence, as at that time no Indian territory was yet under Iranian rule.

although this is frequently overlooked, consists of two separate texts: the first is contained in parts 1–2, 4–7 (*khaṇḍa* 3 is a later addition), while the second is in parts 8–16.⁵ The first text shows a similar structure: introduction (1), ontology (2, 4) and some elements of a philosophy of nature (5–7).

The introduction in both cases sets the scene for the instruction itself, and then promises to teach an important universal truth; the similarities end here. In the Upaniṣad Śvetaketu returns home after a twelve-year training in traditional Vedic lore, proud of his learning. But when his father asks him if he had received 'that teaching by which ... what had [hitherto] not been known, is known?'⁶, he confesses that he had not even heard of it. Thereupon Uddālaka starts to instruct him.

In the Parmenidean proem the poet journeys on a horse-drawn chariot to the gates of day and night, led by the daughters of the Sun; persuaded by them, Dikē⁷ (goddess of justice) opens the heavy gate, and starts to instruct Parmenides: 'you should learn all things, both the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth, and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true reliance.'⁸

It is not at all unusual to have a frame story in an Upaniṣad where a man receives instruction from a god. Also in the Chāndogya, in Chapter VII, the sage Nārada goes to Sanatkumāra (son of the creator god) for teaching, and in VIII 7–12 the god Indra and the demon Virocana ask the Lord of Creation (Prajāpati) about the Self. In the Kauṣītaki (Chapter III) it is Indra who teaches the king Pratardana. In the Taittirīya, the sage Bhṛgu seeks wisdom from his father, Varuṇa, the ancient god of moral order.

But we have a really interesting parallel in the story of Naciketas as told in the Kāṭha Upaniṣad. This text has been more than once quoted in a Parmenidean context. BARUA (1921, p. 264) actually thinks 'that the place of Naciketas in Indian philosophy is very similar to that of Parmenides in the history of Greek thought. ... The analogy ... is in certain points very close.' Though this is partly based on unsubstantiated conjecture,⁹ there are noteworthy coincidences. In any case, the characters here and in the *Sadvidyā* suggest that the two texts are closely related: Naciketas is a grandson of Uddālaka Āruṇi.¹⁰

The story in the Upaniṣad is told in archaic, loose verse. Vājaśravasa gave away all his possessions at a great sacrifice; his son, Naciketas insisted that he should be given, too. The father finally declares: 'I'll give you to Death.' Now Death is away on some errand, and keeps Naciketas waiting in his palace for three days without offering him the hospitality due to a brāhmaṇa. As a compensation he offers the

⁵ HANEFELD (1976) pp. 142–143; on the intrusion of *khaṇḍa* 3 see pp. 146–149.

⁶ VI. 1.3, translation: GOODALL (1996), p. 132.

⁷ It is not entirely clear whether 'the Goddess' is really Dikē (named quite some lines before), or unnamed, or Nux.

⁸ Fr. 1. 28–30; translation: KIRK–RAVEN–SCHOFIELD (1983), p. 243.

⁹ 'There can be no doubt that the verse relating to the doctrine of Being is missing from the Kāthopaniṣad as we now have it. We supply it from the Bhagavad Gītā ...' (p. 272)

¹⁰ BARUA (1921, p. 265); OLIVELLE (1996, p. 376) understands the obscure patronymic in Kāṭha I. 11 as suggesting that Naciketas is a son of Uddālaka. MACDONELL–KEITH (1912, p. 432) probably rightly doubts the historicity of the attribution as 'due only to a desire to give Naciketas a connexion with the famous Āruṇi.' Still it shows that the two texts were considered as belonging to a related tradition.

boy three boons; and he selects to return to the earth alive and to get reconciled to his father. The third boon is the secret of whether there is existence after death: and with this topic the teaching starts.

Though it is far from apparent, COXON¹¹ has brilliantly demonstrated that Parmenides also travelled to the place of the dead. Quoting similar phrases from Homer and Hesiod he shows that the image of 'the gates of the paths of Night and Day' (1 11) recalls the gates of Tartarus. From the testimonies of Simplicius and Numenius we know that according to Parmenides the Goddess sends the mortal souls to birth, and then back to the gods ('now from the visible to the invisible, and now in the opposite direction' – Simplicius) through double gates. The epithet of Dikē, *polupoinos* (having many punishments, 1 14) identifies her as the goddess of retribution – judge of the dead. And the welcome in 1 26, 'No ill fate [*moira kakē*] has sent you' suggests the unusualness of Parmenides arriving here alive.

Coxon thinks that the route leads from the dark regions of the mortals through celestial gates to the gods, into the light, but this can be doubted.¹² As the terminology of Simplicius suggests (*tas psukhas pempein pote men ek tou emphanous eis to aides*¹³), the visible region of light must be understood as the world of men, and the invisible (*aides* ~ *Aidēs* = *Haidēs*) as the dark land of the dead. The expression 'the daughters of the Sun ... having left the halls of Night' (1. 9) clearly recalls the description in the Theogonia (744–766): the abode of the Night stands in Tartarus, and Day and Night meet daily on its threshold; in this palace live also the sons of Night, Sleep, and Death. So probably the divine maidens have left their dark home in the netherworld to meet Parmenides and lead him there.^{14–15}

Though the divinities mentioned in the two texts are not identical, their functions come close to each other: as we saw above, here Dikē supervises birth and death, while the Indian god of death, at least from the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka on (KEITH 1925, p. 409), also judges the dead, and in the epic is identified with Dharma, Law.

The similarity of the frame-stories lends some extra weight to an otherwise not fully convincing comparison, brought up again recently by JEŽIĆ (1992, pp. 429–

¹¹ 1986, pp. 12–17 and 161–167 (in the notes ad 1 11; 1 14 [*dikē poluponos*]; 1 22; 1 26–27).

¹² So also SEDLEY (1999, p. 113): 'an allegorical description of Parmenides' journey to the House of Night'. Actually BURKERT (1969) in his excellent study has already arrived at a conclusion very similar to the one suggested here: 'Die Fahrt des Parmenides ist weder ein Übergang von der Nacht zum Licht noch eine Auffahrt ... Parmenides fährt auf dem Weg des Daimon zum Rand der Welt, wo an der Grenze von Himmel und Erde ein hochragendes Tor Diesseits und Jenseits scheidet. Aus dem Haus der Nacht kommen ihm die Heliaden entgegen, sie geleiten ihn durch das Tor in die große 'Offenheit', wo ihn die Göttin empfängt ... Eher wäre die Reise – mit Morrison – eine Katabasis zu nennen. Richtiger aber ist es, die Vertikale, das Oben und Unten überhaupt aus dem Spiel zu lassen.' (pp. 14–15)

¹³ Simplicius *in phys.* p. 39, quoted from COXON (1986), testimonium 207 (p. 146).

¹⁴ That the proem describes a journey from the inferior sphere of light, the world of mortals, to the divine region of night, squares very well with the fascinating suggestion of POPPER (1998, pp. 68–104, esp. pp. 72–73, 87–88) that of the two forms that the mortals name (8 53–59, 9.), Night would be equivalent to Being, and Light (that should not have been mentioned) to Non-being. (But POPPER himself understood the journey to lead from darkness to light; see, e. g., p. 292.)

¹⁵ This argument is not central to our thesis, as in the older literature the Indian dead seem to live with the gods in heaven under their king, Yama. A little later Yama (already as god of Death) rules over both heaven and hell.

430). The Parmenidean journey is normally interpreted symbolically, as the progress of the seeker towards enlightenment; Sextus Empiricus (our only source for fragment 1) gives a more detailed 'translation'. His identifications are: horses: the unintelligent impulses and longings of the soul; journey on the road of the Goddess: contemplation through philosophical reasoning; maidens: the senses; wheels: the ears; daughters of the Sun: the eyes; and Dikē holding keys: the intellect grasping the facts.¹⁶ Though this analysis is normally discarded without giving it serious thought, the idea is old, as Plato also compares the soul to a chariot (Phaedrus 246 b ff.), and nothing excludes the possibility that it goes back to Parmenides. Now in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad we read:

Know this: the self is the owner of the chariot,
the chariot is the body.
Understanding is the charioteer,
and mind is the reins.

The senses, they say, are the horses,
and sense objects are their ranges. ...

The man whose charioteer is wisdom,
whose reins a mind [controlled],
reaches the journey's end,
Viṣṇu's highest step[, heaven].¹⁷

If Parmenides indeed had an allegorical interpretation of his poem, something like this could have been his model.

Besides having a mystical and a symbolic meaning, the description of the far-away journey in search of knowledge can also be a reminiscence of an actual chariot-ride some time in Parmenides' youth to India. If the reading *astē* in 1 3 is correct, then the characterisation of the road: 'which bears the man who knows over all cities' recalls the initial lines of the Odyssey; which is, after all, a (mythological) record of an earthly voyage.

METHOD AND CRITICISM

Parmenides begins his metaphysics with the following premise: Nothing, or the non-existent, does not exist; therefore there is only Being or (the) Existent (fr. 2, 6, 7). This strictly logical starting-point (and, in general, the formal-deductive mode of exposition) is alien to the Upaniṣads,¹⁸ and anything resembling it can be found only

¹⁶ *Adv. math.* VII, 111–113; in COXON (1986) testimonium 136 (p. 125). See STEIGER (1985) p. 46.

¹⁷ III. 3–4 and 9, translation based on GOODALL (1996), p. 175. A similar description is found at Maitrī Upaniṣad II. 6; further examples are listed in HUME (1931), p. 540.

¹⁸ The wording of Kaṭha VI. 12 seems Parmenidean, but the context is generally not argumentative. 'How could It be apprehended except by saying, *It is?*' *astīti bruvato'nyatra katham tad upalabhyate?*

in the Bhagavad-Gītā (probably several centuries later): ‘The non-existent cannot be, the existent cannot not-be: the boundary of the two has been seen by those who see their essence.’¹⁹

The Existent should be approached with the mind, not with the senses: ‘let [not] habit, born of much experience, force you down this way [of accepting non-existence], by making you use an aimless eye or an ear and a tongue full of meaningless sound: judge by reason the strife-encompassed refutation spoken by me.’²⁰ This warning also frequently recurs in the Upaniṣads, e.g.,

His form is not something that can be seen;
no one beholds him with the eye;
by heart, thought and mind is he conceived of.²¹

The insufficiency of the senses is also plainly stated by Uddālaka in the illustration of the fig-tree: the essence that cannot be seen in the tiny seed is the source of the gigantic *nyagrodha*-tree; and in the simile of salt water – the salt cannot be seen or grasped, but it is still there, dispersed in the water.²²

Frag. 4 of Parmenides, which is not entirely clear, seems to connect two ideas: with the mind we can see things far away, and (or because?) the ontological universe is homogenous. ‘Gaze on even absent things with your mind as present and do so steadily. For it will not sever Being from cleaving to Being, as either dispersing or gathering in every direction in every way in regular order.’²³ It is remarkable to find a very similar pair of ideas in India:

Whatever is here, the same is over there;
and what is over there is along here.
From death to death he goes,
who sees here any kind of diversity.

For that is this.

With your mind alone you must understand it –
there is here no diversity at all!²⁴

The vexed question of the relation of speech, thought and existence in Parmenides cannot be fully discussed here. Although some fragments suggest their identity,²⁵ it is safer to base our interpretation on the relatively clear places. ‘You can nei-

¹⁹ Il. 16. *nāsato vidyate bhāvo, nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ / ubhayor api dr̥ṣṭo'ntas tv anayos tattva-darśibhiḥ*.

²⁰ Fr. 7. 3–6; translation: KIRK–RAVEN–SCHOFIELD (1983), p. 248.

²¹ Kaṭha Upaniṣad VI. 9, translation based on GOODALL (1996), p. 182. (Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad IV. 20 is practically identical.)

²² Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI. 12 and 13.

²³ Translation: COXON (1986), p. 56.

²⁴ Kaṭha Upaniṣad IV. 10–11, translation based on OLIVELLE (1996), pp. 241–242. (Verse 11 occurs with small variation in Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV. 4.19.)

²⁵ Especially the frequently-cited fr. 3., *to gar auto noein estin te kai einai*, most easily understood as ‘for it is the same to think and to be’; and indeed all our sources interpret it that way. But it can

ther know what is not (for it is impossible) nor tell of it',²⁶ i.e., what can be cognised or expressed must exist.²⁷ On the other hand, thinking and saying do seem to be very close for Parmenides, and this connection is well established very early also in India. 'Thought (*mati*) is indeed speech: for he thinks all this with speech',²⁸ i.e., we express our thoughts in words.

In this part of the poem Parmenides repeatedly refers to the great tradition behind the argument about Being. To force the existence of non-existent things is a 'much-experienced habit' (*ethos polupeiron*),²⁹ while its refutation 'had many contests' (*poludēris elenkhos*)³⁰. And the third way is 'that on which mortals wander knowing nothing ... who believe that to be and not to be are the same and not the same'.³¹ In Greece we cannot think or talk about this tradition, as it does not exist. But in India the concept of Being as a cosmological principle has a decent Vedic ancestry.

In the *Sadvidyā* when Uddālaka finishes the ontological teaching in our first text, he says: 'It was, indeed, this that they knew, those extremely wealthy and immensely learned householders of old.'³² Of course this may be just to enhance the authenticity of the doctrine – we have no proof of its actual existence before Āruṇi. On the other hand when he talks about his opponents' view we are on safer ground. 'Of this some said – only the Non-existent was this [world?] in the beginning, one only without a second: from that Non-existent was born the Existent.'³³ Exactly this view is found in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (II 7.1): '[The] Non-existent was this in the beginning. Thence was born the Existent.' Similarly in an earlier chapter of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, with some admixture of the third way: 'only the Non-existent was this in the beginning. That became [/was] the Existent. That came to be.'³⁴ And the view appears even earlier, in the Brāhmaṇas: '[The] Non-existent was this in the beginning. Of that it was said: What was that Non-existent? The Non-existent was, indeed, those seers.'³⁵

also mean that 'the same thing can be thought of and can exist' (BODNÁR-KLIMA-RUZSA 1986, p. 288 = BODNÁR 1990, p. 62).

²⁶ Fr. 2 7–8; translation: COXON (1986), p. 52.

²⁷ If, however, Parmenides did mean to say that the Existent is essentially a conscious entity, then he was perfectly consonant with the Upaniṣads; indeed the canonical attribute of the Absolute will be *sat-cit-ānanda*, 'existence, consciousness and bliss.' Some early Upaniṣadic examples: 'Brahman is mind (*manas*)' (Chāndogya III 18.1), 'Brahman is understanding (*prajñā*)' (Aitareya III 3). In the *Sadvidyā* the Existent is also the Self (text 2), and in text 1 the origin of the phenomena is that the Existent 'thought to itself: "Let me become many. Let me propagate myself."' (VI 2.3, translation: OLIVELLE 1996, p. 149.)

²⁸ Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa VIII 1.2.7; for further examples see MEHLIG (1987), pp. 159–164.

²⁹ Fr. 7 3.

³⁰ Fr. 7 5.

³¹ Fr. 6 4–5, 8–9; translation: KIRK-RAVEN-SCHOFIELD (1983), p. 247.

³² Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI 4.5; translation: OLIVELLE (1996), p. 150.

³³ VI 2.1.

³⁴ III 19.1.

³⁵ Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa VI 1.1.1. (And again in the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa II 2.9.1: 'Dieses All war im Anfang wahrlich nichts. Nicht war der Himmel, nicht war der Erde, und nicht war der Luftraum. Dieses Nichtseiende faßte den Gedanken (*manas*): »Ich möchte sein.«' Translation: MEHLIG (1987), p. 180.)

The earliest extant example of Being as a cosmogonical principle is in the Ṛg-Veda, again closer to the third way: 'There was not the non-existent nor the existent then; there was not the air nor the heaven which is beyond.'³⁶ But even this text refers to previous thinkers³⁷ on the subject: 'Sages seeking in their hearts with wisdom found out the bond³⁸ of the existent in the non-existent.'³⁹

In general, the paradoxical third way seems to have been very popular in unorthodox circles. In many dialogues of the Buddha four alternatives are suggested (*catuṣkoti*), all of them said to be possible: A, non-A, A and non-A, neither A nor non-A. This comes very close to Parmenides' characterisation quoted above; e.g., when Māluṅkyāputta asks the Buddha whether 'the Tathāgata is after dying, the Tathāgata is not after dying, the Tathāgata both is and is not after dying, the Tathāgata neither is nor is not after dying.'⁴⁰

The characteristic Jaina 'doctrine of maybe' (*syād-vāda*) increases the number of options to 7 by combining *is*, *is not* and *inexpressible*. Although this scholastic formulation may be quite late, allowing contradictory answers from different viewpoints (*nayas*) seems to be a very old part of the system.⁴¹ And finally, Saṅjaya Belatṭhiputta, probably an older contemporary of the Buddha and the Jina, reiterates all positions, rejecting them all: I don't think that A, and I don't think that non-A, etc., and I don't deny that etc.⁴²

THE EXISTENT AND ITS ATTRIBUTES

The Absolute, the final ground of everything, is called by Parmenides *to eon*, the Existent. This concept is labelled in the Upaniṣads in many ways, the most frequent and later canonised name being Brahman ('magic, spell'). Though the Upaniṣads in general contain many heterogeneous doctrines, the parts dealing with the Absolute do have a certain unity; their central teaching is the identity of Brahman, the essence of the Universe, with the Self, the essence of the individual. This is strikingly

³⁶ X 129.1, translation: MACDONELL (1917), p. 207. – The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa adds the most interesting commentary: 'It was thought [or mind: *manas*] only ... for thought is not exactly [*neva*] existent and not exactly non-existent.' X 5.3.1.

³⁷ Clearly different from the author of X 129, as their position is criticised as one-sided: 'Their [measuring-]cord was stretched horizontally. Was there below? Was there above?' X 129.5, translation based on MACDONELL (1917), p. 210.

³⁸ This word, *bandhu*, normally means relation, relative, companion; bond would be *bandha* in Sanskrit.

³⁹ X 129.4, translation: MACDONELL (1917), p. 209. – Actually there is another, less philosophic and probably earlier reference to Being: 'In the earliest age of the gods, the existent was born from the non-existent.' X 72.1, translation based on DONIGER (1981), p. 38.

⁴⁰ Cūla-Māluṅkyā-Sutta, Majjhima Nikāya 63; translation: HORNER (1957), p. 97.

⁴¹ See e.g. FRAUWALLNER (1953–1956), pp. 199–201.

⁴² See e.g. BARUA (1921), pp. 325–332. He is normally labelled a sceptic. The most important original source is in the Dīgha Nikāya, Sāmañña-phala Sutta (Saṅcaya-Belatṭhiputta-vādo = DN I. 179–181; PTS ed. Vol. I. pp. 58–59).

formulated by saying 'I am Brahman',⁴³ and finds its most beautiful mystical expression in the *Śāndilya-vidyā* part of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.⁴⁴

This basic unity justifies the procedure followed here, i.e., that frequently attributes of the Absolute under different names will be cited as parallels to the Parmenidean *sēmata*. But of course whenever possible we will begin with the *Sadvidyā*, which is the only continuous Upaniṣad passage that calls the Absolute *sat*, the Existent. This word, accidentally, is not only semantically and syntactically analogous to Greek *eon*, but they are also etymologically equivalent, both being derived from an IE **(e)sont*.

The 'signs' of the Existent are discussed by Parmenides in a strictly logical way in his longest extant fragment, fr. 8.

(1) The Existent is ungenerated, 'For what birth will you seek for it? How and whence did it grow? I shall not allow you to say nor to think from not being: for it is not to be said nor thought that it is not; and what need would have driven it later rather than earlier, beginning from the nothing, to grow?'⁴⁵

The first argument is very close to Uddālaka's statement: 'Only the Existent was this [world?] in the beginning, one only without a second. Of this some said – only the Non-existent was this in the beginning, one only without a second: from that Non-existent was born the Existent. But indeed, my son, whence could it be then? he said. How could existent be born from non-existent?'⁴⁶ Again not only the logic but also the wording is related: the use of rhetorical questions, the same interrogatives (how and whence: *pēi pothen* – *kutas*, *katham*: again etymologically related), and most notably the concept of birth (instead of origin; Greek *gen-* and Sanskrit *jan-* are developments of the same IE root).

The second argument (lack of sufficient reason) is found in India only much later and in a more general form in the classical texts of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. This evidence is circumstantial, but not completely irrelevant, as the earliest roots of this school can be found exactly in our text and the Kaṭha Upaniṣad.⁴⁷ The Sāṅkhya Kārikā (4th cent. CE?) when proving the *sat-kārya-vāda*, the theory that an effect must have an existent cause, says: 'Because the non-existent does not act; ... because not everything comes to be ... therefore [the effect] is the effect of an existent.'⁴⁸ The first point is something of a tautology, presupposing the Buddhist definition of existence: *artha-kriyā-kāritva*, 'being the agent of an action',⁴⁹ and in its logical strictness parallels Parmenides; while the second is a generalisation of his second argu-

⁴³ Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad I 4.10

⁴⁴ III 14. 'This self (*ātman*) of mine that lies deep within my heart – it is smaller than a grain of rice or barley, smaller than a mustard seed, smaller even than a millet grain or a millet kernel; but it is larger than the earth, larger than the intermediate region, larger than the sky, larger even than all these worlds put together. ... It is *brahman*.' (3–4; translation: OLIVELLE (1996), p. 124.)

⁴⁵ Fr. 8 6 10; translation: KIRK–RAVEN–SCHOFIELD (1983), p. 249.

⁴⁶ Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI 2.1–2.

⁴⁷ And to some extent in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. See, e.g., CHAKRAVARTI (1951), pp. 11–41.

⁴⁸ *a-sad-a-karaṇāt ... sarva-sambhavā-bhāvāt ... sat-kāryam*. Sāṅkhya Kārikā 9.

⁴⁹ DASGUPTA (1922), p. 163; he translates it as 'causal efficiency' or 'efficiency of causing any action or event.' This meaning is demonstrable only in Ratnakīrti (ca. 950), but he considers this the universally accepted definition of existence.

ment. That focused specifically on the time-aspect; but as the non-existent lacks any definition, anything could come out of it anywhere at any time.⁵⁰

The existent is also imperishable, but no specific arguments are given.⁵¹ In the Upaniṣads *akṣara* (indestructible), *avyaya* (undecaying), *amara* (undying), *amṛta* (immortal) are frequent epithets of the Absolute.⁵² That no need for extra proof was felt by either author is probably explained by the symmetry of origination and destruction, as their frequent occurrence together suggests. Uddālaka, in fact, seems to believe in a much stricter relation (later fairly generally accepted in India): whatever a thing originates from, into that will it return when destroyed. At least in the not perfectly coherent physiological theory he seems to suggest that at death a man's components return to the element from which they were taken (VI 5–7; 8.6; 15).

(2) The next *sēma* is closely related to the first; indeed, their exposition is not at all separate. 'It never was nor will be, since it is now, all together' 'And how could what is be in the future? How could it come to be? For if it came into being, it is not: nor is it if it is ever going to be in the future.'⁵³ Although the construal of the second quotation is problematic (COXON 1986, pp. 202–203), the minimal meaning of this sign is that the Existent is not a past or future state of the world, but it is so right now. On the face of it this may seem as a rebuttal of Āruṇi's 'in the beginning' (past); and in several places he says also that after death every creature will merge into the Existent (future).⁵⁴ However, this is rather a characterisation of the phenomenal world: the Existent itself is not past or future only, but also present. This is clearly emphasised by the ever-recurrent refrain of the second text: 'This finest essence – the whole universe has it as its Self: That is the Real: That is the Self: That *you* are, Śvetaketu!'⁵⁵

A stronger meaning of the Parmenidean *oude pot' ēn oud' estai* would be to suggest the atemporality of the Existent: it has never been, it will never be – because it has only an eternal present: it *is*. Instead of speculating on the plausibility of this interpretation (although it may be remarked that it is arrogance to underestimate the

⁵⁰ This is explicit both in the commentary Jayamaṅgalā and in the much later classical reformulation, the Sāṅkhya Sūtra I 116.

⁵¹ Unless in fr. 8. 12 ('Nor will the force of conviction allow anything besides it to come to be ever from <not> being') we emend *ek mē eontos* to *ek tou eontos*.

⁵² E. g. *akṣara* in Kaṭha III. 2 (immediately before the chariot-simile quoted); *avyaya* in Kaṭha III 15 (together with *nitya*, eternal), *amara* in Bṛhadāraṇyaka IV 4.25 ('And this is the immense and unborn self, unageing, undying, immortal, free from fear – the *brahman*', OLIVELLE (1996), p. 68.), *amṛta* in Chāndogya VIII 3.4–5 ('It is the Self ... it is immortal, free from fear: it is Brahman. And this Brahman has a name, Real (*satyam*). And these are those three syllables (*akṣara*): *sat-ti-yam*; there what is *sat* (existent), that is immortal ...')

⁵³ Fr. 8. 5, 19–20; translation: KIRK–RAVEN–SCHOFIELD (1983), pp. 249–250.

⁵⁴ All these belong to the second text: VI 8.6, 9, 10, 15. 'Now, take the bees, son. They prepare honey by gathering nectar from a variety of trees and by reducing that nectar to a homogeneous whole. In that state the nectar from each different tree is not able to differentiate: "I am the nectar of that tree", and "I am the nectar of that tree". In exactly the same way, son, when all these creatures merge into the existent, they are not aware that: "We are merging into the existent." No matter what they are in this world – whether it is a tiger, a lion, a wolf, a boar, a worm, a moth, a gnat, a mosquito – they all merge into that.' (VI 9.1–3; OLIVELLE 1996, p. 153.)

⁵⁵ VI 8–15; GOODALL (1996), pp. 137–140.

thinking powers of our great ancestors), a parallel thought and wording will be quoted from the Kaṭha Upaniṣad: *anyatra bhūtāc ca bhavyāc ca yat*, 'other than what was and what will be'.⁵⁶ This passage clearly refers to atemporality, as it continues a description that suggests that the Absolute is beyond predication (or dualities).⁵⁷

(3) The existent is 'one, continuous'; 'whole and of a single kind'. 'Nor is it divided, since it all exists alike; nor is it more here and less there, which would prevent it from holding together, but it is all full of being. So it is all continuous: for the existent draws near to the existent.' 'For it needs must not be somewhat more or somewhat less here or there. For neither is there non-existent, which would stop it from reaching its like, nor is the existent in such a way that there would be more being here, less there, since it is all inviolate'.⁵⁸

The uniqueness of the Absolute is something of a commonplace in the Upaniṣads; Āruṇi starts his teaching with its declaration: 'Only the Existent was this [world?] in the beginning, one only without a second.' But the proof of Parmenides is unknown in India. Neither the logical analysis (the predicate 'to be' is incapable of degrees), nor the spatial (even geometrical) image of the Existent, would be at home there.⁵⁹ Much later the concept of indivisibility (*abheda*) will be widely accepted and 'partless' (*akhaṇḍa*) will be a standard adjective of Brahman.

But in a less formal way the connection of homogeneity with oneness is suggested by the simile of the bees (see fn. 54), more literally translated: the bees 'send the juice to oneness (*ekatā*). They do not get distinction there.' Some reflections in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad show an awareness of the connection between universality and non-duality, or between separation and duality: 'when there is a duality of some kind, then one can see the other ... But when all has become his very self, what could he see and with what?' (IV 5.15) 'it does not see ... there is no second, other than it, separate, that it could see.' (IV 3.23)

The attribute 'whole' has no exact counterpart in Sanskrit. *Sarva* (whole, all) typically occurs in contexts like *sarvaṁ khalv idam brahma*,⁶⁰ that could be translated 'This Brahman is, indeed, whole', but more naturally as 'All this [world] is Brahman'. *Pūrṇa* (full, whole), though not very frequent,⁶¹ is important as being the focus of the famous invocation of the Īśā Upaniṣad: 'That [Brahman] is whole, this

⁵⁶ II 14; the referent is clearly Brahman (II 16), grasped in the form of the mystical *OM* syllable.

⁵⁷ The whole stanza runs: 'Tell me that which thou seest beyond right and wrong, beyond what is done or not done, beyond past and future.' (Translation: RADHAKRISHNAN 1953, p. 614.) Śaṅkara's commentary is also clear: 'other than what was: than past time; and what will be: and future; also [other] than present. The meaning is: what is not limited [or divided, *paricchidyate*] by the three times.'

⁵⁸ Fr. 8 6, 4, 22–25, 44 48; translation: KIRK RAVEN SCHOFIELD (1983), pp. 248–53. (With minimal modifications: *what is* in line 25 was changed to *the existent*; *is it* in line 46 to *is there* and *is it existent* in line 47 to *is the existent*.)

⁵⁹ But the omnipresence of the Absolute can be expressed locally; e. g., Āruṇi illustrates that the Existent is everywhere, though unseen, by making Śvetaketu sip from the middle and two ends of a pan of salt water: though the dissolved salt is invisible and intangible, it is present everywhere in the water (Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI 13).

⁶⁰ Chāndogya Upaniṣad III 14.1.

⁶¹ In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad occurs only in III 12.9, *pūrṇam apravartī*, whole and unmoving (said of Brahman as the outer space and the space within the heart). Similarly in Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad IV 8.

[world] is whole. From the whole rises a whole. Taking a whole of the whole, still a whole remains.⁶²

The adjective 'inviolate' (*asulon*) recalls the wording of the very important, four times recurring passage in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*: 'It is the *not, not* Self: ungraspable ... cannot be hurt ... unattached ... unbound ... does not tremble ... is not injured (*na riṣyati*).'⁶³

(4) The Absolute does not move, it is 'unshaken' (cf. the previous quotation from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*). 'But changeless within the limits of great bonds it exists without beginning or ceasing, since coming to be and perishing have wandered very far away, and true conviction has thrust them off. Remaining the same and in the same place it lies on its own.'⁶⁴ Actually 'immovable'⁶⁵ or 'motionless'⁶⁶ seem to be more exact for *akinēton* than 'changeless'. Parmenides' proof is not very clear here, but he probably thought along these lines: if the Existent moves, it moves to where it, before, was not; and in that place the non-existent changes to existent, and that is coming to be – but that has already been rejected.

In the early Indian texts this immobility, though usually taken for granted, is seldom expressed.⁶⁷ The classical epithets appear only a little later, e. g. in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*: 'eternal, omnipresent, stable, unmoving (*acala*), everlasting' (II 24).

(5) The Existent in the Parmenidean poem seems to be limited and globular. 'For strong Necessity holds it within the bonds of a limit, which keeps it on every side.' 'But since there is a furthest limit, it is perfected, like the bulk of a ball well-rounded on every side, equally balanced in every direction from the centre.'⁶⁸ It is debated whether this description should be taken literally, and, if the answer is yes, whether Parmenides was following Xenophanes who probably⁶⁹ described his one god as spherical. In any case all this stands in strong contrast with standard Indian thinking, where the world usually has no end, the spatial aspect of the Absolute is not emphasised, and the frequent attribute *ananta* (infinite) is not normally understood in a temporal sense only.⁷⁰

⁶² Found also in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* V 1.1.

⁶³ III 9.26, IV 2.4, 4.22, 5.15.

⁶⁴ Fr. 8 4, 26–29; translation: KIRK–RAVEN–SCHOFIELD (1983), pp. 248, 251.

⁶⁵ SELLMER (1998), p. 107 (unverrückbar).

⁶⁶ BARNES (1979), p. 179 and STEIGER (1985), p. 10 (mozdulatlan). But BARNES (1979, p. 220) remarks that '*Kinēsis* in philosophical Greek regularly carries wider connotations than 'motion' in English: it covers any form of change'.

⁶⁷ E.g. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* III 17.6 *acyuta* 'unmoved', *Īṣā Upaniṣad* 4 *anejat* 'not stirring' and *sthita* 'standing'.

⁶⁸ Fr. 8 30–31, 42–44; translation: KIRK–RAVEN–SCHOFIELD (1983), pp. 251–252.

⁶⁹ KIRK–RAVEN–SCHOFIELD (1983), p. 170, fn. 1.

⁷⁰ E. g., in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, III 15: 'undecaying ... eternal ... without beginning, without end, beyond the great, stable' where *mahataḥ param* (beyond the great) suggest spatial infinity and, further, temporal infinity has been mentioned before separately (*avyayam*, *nityam*: undecaying, eternal). Contrast the specifically temporal *anarkhon apauston* of Parmenides in fr. 8 27: 'without beginning or ceasing', while spatially limited: 'within the limits of great bonds' (8 26).

THE WORLD OF PHENOMENA

The most conspicuous parallelism – and also a marked difference between our texts – can be found in the relation of the Existent to the phenomena. What we normally perceive are only *names*, contrasted with the deeper, metaphysical *truth*; and the intermediaries between those two worlds are called *forms*. But the differences are also significant: Parmenides has two forms, belonging to the *doxa*, while Āruṇi (in the first text) speaks about three forms, and they belong to the sphere of truth.

'All those things will be name, which mortals fixed, believing them to be true: coming to be and perishing, to be and not to be, and to change place and to exchange their bright colour.' 'Men have fixed a name for them, as an emblem for each.'⁷¹ 'They fixed two forms to name their cognitions': 'all have been named Light and Night.'⁷² These are Parmenides' ideas on naming and truth; let us compare Āruṇi's expressions:

'As by one nail-cutter everything made of iron can be known, the modification being only a name arising from speech while the truth is that it is just iron.' 'What is red form in the fire, that is the form of Light; what is white, of Water; what is black, of Food. The fire-ness of fire has gone away, the modification being only a name arising from speech while the truth is that it is just the three forms.'⁷³

Both texts call the phenomena very clearly (using examples) *names*,⁷⁴ suggesting that they are *mere* names, and therefore not true or real (*alēthes* / *satyam*). This is traditionally understood as stating that the world as we see it is unreal.⁷⁵ Interestingly this interpretation should be rejected in both cases and for similar reasons: the contrast is not between truth and false appearance, but between unchanging, final, absolute and reliable reality and fleeting, subjective and doubtful experience.⁷⁶ The admit-

⁷¹ Fr. 8 38–41, 19 3 (in 8 38 reading *pant' onom' estai*).

⁷² 8 53, 9 1. The standard translation of 8. 53 ('they made up their minds to name two forms') could have been easily expressed, without violating the hexameter, by exchanging the order of *morphē* and *gnōmē*: **gnōmas gar katethento duo morphas onomazein*. In the other two occurrences of this verb, in 8 39 and 19 3, it always has this form, *katethento*; the subject is mortals or people (*brotoi, anthrōpoi*); and the object is names (*onoma*). Therefore it seems that the technical meaning of *katatithemai* for Parmenides is 'to postulate, settle/fix for oneself'; I rendered it with 'to fix'. *Gnōmē* in 8 61 means 'opinion, judgement, thought', i.e. what is in the head; here, before the first naming, a non-propositional word was needed – I picked 'cognition'.

⁷³ Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI 1.6, 4.1; the translation of the refrain *vācārambhanam vikāro nāma-dheyam, XX ity eva satyam* follows RADHAKRISHNAN (1953, p. 447).

⁷⁴ It might be worthy of a remark, that the worlds used for naming (*onoma katethento* / *nāma-dheya*) both use the same IE words (the verb is **dhē*, to put).

⁷⁵ 'It could hardly be stated more plainly that the Way of Opinion is a Way of Falsity ... Nor, after all, is it unusual for a philosopher to describe, at length, views with which he vehemently disagrees.' (BARNES 1979, p. 156.) And DEUSSEN (1921, p. 156) remarks on Āruṇi: 'This is the oldest passage in which the unreality of the manifold world is expressed. Not long after this, Parmenides in Greece attained to the same knowledge and uttered it almost in the same way...'

⁷⁶ A more detailed argument can be found on Parmenides in BODNÁR-KLIMA RUZSA 1986, p. 294 = BODNÁR 1990, pp. 73–75. The original meaning of Uddālaka's *vācārambhana*-refrain, unearthed from under the classical reinterpretation of Śaṅkara is suggested in RUZSA (2000): 'The designation is the specific modification, as the (first) grasping by language; only "clay" is (constant) truth.' I.e., though we first (or normally) designate things by their form, the material is constant, while the form is transient.

tedly striking, strong Parmenidean words on mortal opinion ('in which there is no true reliance', described by 'deceitful ordering of words'⁷⁷) do not mean anything more than that *doxa* is not necessary, logical truth; it is but the best description of the world based on perception. Therefore it is unreliable, and if it appears as certain truth, then it also deceives.⁷⁸

The apparent contradiction in Parmenides is rather the result of a literary device, emphasising the difference of *doxa* and *alētheia* in sharply contrasting words. When he says that there is no coming to be and destruction, movement and change or even difference, he denies these to the existent *as existent*. But when a dog dies, it dies *as a dog*, not as an existent: its carcass will still be there. There is no contradiction between movement and rest in the same locus, if viewed from a different angle: a man may sit perfectly motionless, still his thoughts, his blood, his heart and his eyes will move.

Parmenides clearly suggests that the perceptible word and the Existent are identical (or co-extensive – they occupy the same space). The wording of 8. 24 and 9. 3 is intentionally similar: *pan d' empleon estin eontos – pan pleon estin homou phaeos kai nuktos aphantou*, all is full of the Existent – all is full of Light and invisible Night.⁷⁹ Actually the relation is triple: it consists of the Existent, the two forms, and the empirical objects; and as a totality all three are identical. In the extant fragments the objects' similar status to that of the forms is noticeable in fr. 19, where the same idiom (people have fixed a name for them) is used for the phenomena as before for the two forms.

The same relation obtains between the Existent, the three forms and the objects in the *Sadvidyā*: they are coextensive. The three forms are the reality behind the different phenomena (fire, sun, moon, lightning, and, indeed, anything);⁸⁰ the Existent is the root of the three forms and of all creatures;⁸¹ and in the recurrent refrain of the second text the Existent is the self of everything.⁸²

The difference in the ontological status of the Greek and the Indian *forms* is important, but not as sharp as it appears at first sight. In the first text Āruṇi says that 'only the three forms is truth'⁸³, so while in Parmenides the forms belong to *doxa*, here they are part of metaphysical truth. But in the refrain of the second text Uddālaka says of the Absolute, 'that is truth', and the forms are not mentioned. In the simile

We say, 'This is a cup or spoon', not that 'This is metal'. But when we melt it, the metal will still be there, but the cup will be gone.

⁷⁷ Fr. 1 30, 8 52; translation: KIRK–RAVEN–SCHOFIELD (1983), pp. 242, 254.

⁷⁸ Unless we emend the deceitful *apatēlon* to the unusual *apatēton*, 'untrodden' with POPPER (1998, p. 100).

⁷⁹ STEIGER (1986, p. 208) and STEIGER (1985, p. 118–119) clearly notices this and draws the right conclusions, although he expresses this rather differently: he says that Parmenides boldly accepts the incompatibility of these two aspects of the world. '[D]iese Denker über die Widersprüchlichkeit der beiden Welten reflektierten und sich doch auch zu ihrer Unlösbarkeit bekannten.' '[D]as Verhältnis von *eon* und *morphē* zueinander das homogene des Kugeluniversums und die zweigestaltige der physischen Welt sind zwei inkompatible Aspekte derselben Entität des Teils.' STEIGER (1986, pp. 203 and 208).

⁸⁰ Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI 4

⁸¹ Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI 8.4.6.

⁸² Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI 8–16.

⁸³ Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI 4.1–4.6.

of the introduction, even 'iron' is truth, as compared to the name 'nail-cutter'. And that means that in the Chāndogya the opposition name–truth (or convention–reality) is only relative, starting with everyday objects and going higher and higher up until it reaches the Existent. In an absolute sense, of course, only the Absolute can be called unchanging truth; and that is the usage of the second text. So in Parmenides we find only a stricter usage, no doubt motivated by the different epistemological status: for him, the attributes of the Existent are deducible, and therefore logically necessary – so truth (and also necessity, *anankē*; but cf. fr. 10 6) is appropriate only here.

It is interesting to speculate on the terminology of the fundamental elements of the physical world. They are called forms (*morphē, rūpa*), and that is a little surprising. An important philosophical concept first appears on the stage, and does not play its own proper role! Form should be contrasted to matter, but here the forms are the fundamental material constituents of the world. We could try to explain the problem away saying that they are forms of the Existent; that would be acceptable, but there is nothing in the texts to suggest it.

But in the Chāndogya we have some clues. 'What is red form in the fire, that is the form of Light...' ⁸⁴ – here the other meaning of *rūpa*, 'colour' is evident. ⁸⁵ So the forms appear to be first 'the visible aspect' of each basic component of the word; and then the meaning secondarily extended to the components themselves.

Far more informative is the term *nāma-rūpa* (name and form). In the *Sadvidyā* it occurs only in the spurious 3rd *khaṇḍa*, but name (e.g., fire) is contrasted with the three forms also in the 4th *khaṇḍa*. The concept of *nāma-rūpa* is old and vague, ⁸⁶ but the basic intuition is probably the diversity of the word as named (conceptual: genera) and as seen (perceptual: individuals). In fact in Buddhist philosophical language *rūpa* means body or matter. ⁸⁷ So here also *rūpa* would mean 'perceptual or empirical aspect' or even 'matter'.

The actual forms are quite different in our authors, but there are common points as well. Parmenides has 'Light', 'the aetherial Fire of Flame, gentle, very light' and 'unknowing Night, a solid and heavy body'. ⁸⁸ Uddālaka's first *rūpa* is *tejas*, 'light, heat, energy'; its colour is red. Then follows water, white and food, black. Clearly here we have a contrast solid–liquid–fiery. He also uses the concept of weight, although differently: he produces different parts of humans from the heavy, medium and light parts of the *rūpas* consumed. Both set of forms have temporal overtones: night and day for Parmenides, hot / rainy / harvest season for Āruṇi; ⁸⁹ both the year and the day can represent a full circle in time.

The classical successor of the *rūpa*-theory is the three *guṇas*, 'qualities' of Sāṅkhya. ⁹⁰ The age of the details is uncertain, but some further similarities are note-

⁸⁴ Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI 4.1.

⁸⁵ Actually it is not a different meaning, but a different translation of the same meaning, for which we have no word: 'visible quality'.

⁸⁶ See MEHLIG (1987), pp. 174–178.

⁸⁷ And *nāmarūpa* 'individual, person'.

⁸⁸ Fr. 9 1, 8 56–57, 59.

⁸⁹ VAN BUITENEN (1957), pp. 91–92.

⁹⁰ This has been doubted, but see RUZSA (1997), pp. 69–70 or VAN BUITENEN (1957), p. 95.

worthy. The last *guṇa* is called *tamas*, ‘darkness’; actually *tamas* is a very old cosmological principle, appearing already in the Ṛg-Veda.⁹¹ The *guṇas* are bunches of qualities just like the *morphai*: the first, *sattva* (‘essence’) is kind,⁹² light, and illuminating; *rajas* (‘atmosphere’) is hostile, activating, supporting, and fickle; *tamas* is depressing, restraining, heavy, and covering.⁹³ Just by dropping *rajas*, the principle of strife, activity, and energy from the picture we get something very close to the Parmenidean arrangement.

The forms are not exactly like the usual elements, inasmuch as they do not normally appear singly, like fire, earth etc., but everything⁹⁴ is a mixture of all of them. ‘All is full of Light and invisible Night together, of both equally’,⁹⁵ says Parmenides, and in the Chāndogya even the fire and the sun have some admixture of Water and Food.

SOME DIFFERENCES

So far we have seen that most elements of Parmenidean philosophy could be borrowings from India, especially from chapter VI of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. Now we should consider the differences.

Two important traits of the *Sadvidyā* (second text) are missing from the Parmenidean account. Uddālaka clarifies the relation of the Existent to the everyday world, and also to the subject. The Existent is present everywhere, though invisible and intangible, like the lump of salt dissolved in a pan of water; and it is the essence not only of the material world, but ‘that is the Self: you are that, Śvetaketu!’ (VI 13.) Now Parmenides either did not know the second text (that is quite compatible with our thesis), or the omission was intentional.⁹⁶ Probably he made the gulf separating the Absolute and the empirical that much wider; or, he may have thought, like the Buddhists, that the Self is in fact our changing psyche, not the constant Being under it.

There are also two really significant innovations in Parmenides: logic and the number of forms. The logical mode of exposition has nothing parallel to it in India (nor in Greece); this seems to be Parmenides’ greatest contribution. In a sense he was forced to it: in India thinking about the Absolute already had a lengthy and respect-

⁹¹ E.g. X 129.4: ‘There was darkness hidden by darkness in the beginning.’

⁹² *prīti*...-*ātmakam*, ‘has joy/kindness/love as its essence’.

⁹³ Sāṅkhya Kārikā 12–13. Here it is not specifically mentioned, but *sattva* is also principle of knowledge, *rajas* of passion and *tamas* of ignorance.

⁹⁴ According to Parmenides this is probably not true for the extremities of the world – in fr. 12 1 *pur akrēton*, ‘unmixed fire’, or perhaps of heavenly bodies: ‘the pure torch of the sun’ (10 2–3) and the moon, which is called *allotriōn phōs*, ‘a light belonging to another’ [i.e., the sun] (14).

⁹⁵ Fr. 9 3–4. (reading *ison*; on the standard *isōn* we could translate line 4 as ‘... of both, that are equal, because neither has a share of Nothing’).

⁹⁶ Or the problematic fr. 1 31–32 refers to the first relation: the opinions/phenomena (*ta dokounta*) are acceptable because they reach everything (*panta*: the objects) through the All (*dia pantos*: the Existent). If *ta dokounta* stands for the two forms, this could mean that the three spheres pervade each other. But I think it more probable that Parmenides here suggests that his natural philosophy is better than others because it grows out of (and is coherent with) the teaching about the Existent.

able tradition, so a thinker could add to its description simply by saying 'it is so', or 'ancient seers knew it so'. This was clearly less viable with a Greek audience – argumentation was needed; and Parmenides was able to supply it. Of course the presence of logical demonstration should not make us blind to the transcendent source of his teaching – the divine revelation was probably not mere literary fiction. It was meant also to supply a little of the elevated status and traditional weight, missing in Greece, of the teaching about the Absolute.

Once he had perfected his demonstrations, he had to realize that their force could not be extended beyond the Existent; they cannot reach even the forms, not to speak of everyday phenomena. This forced him to emphasise the demarcation between an absolute, unchanging, and definitely knowable Existent on the one side, and changing and not fully reliable experience on the other. This made their relation less transparent, causing many misunderstandings among his interpreters. But it also gave him more freedom to reconsider the forms and their relation to the world.

Neither Greek nor Indian tradition had a very strong predilection for any particular fixed number of basic elements. E. g., in the Sāṅkhya philosophy we have two: soul and matter; three: the *guṇas*; five: the elements; and 25, the *tattvas* (factors: the elements, senses, etc.) So Parmenides decided here not to follow Āruṇi, but to find the theoretically best system, i.e., – applying Occam's razor – the minimal system of two different principles. In selecting a pair of opposites, Night and Light, he was following Indian as well as Greek examples (in Hesiod they come very early in the history of the gods). But by dropping the third *guṇa* of Sāṅkhya, he lost the principle of movement; his disciple, Empedocles had to re-introduce it as love and strife.

CONCLUSIONS

Having finished with the comparison, some questions must be answered, in order. First: about the nature of the parallels noted. Do they prove borrowing, or can they be accidental?

To my mind even the sheer number of correspondences seems to be decisive, but we have something more direct here. A similarity can be accidental; and there is a probability of such coincidence. This probability cannot be measured or calculated exactly, but it can be estimated. If we find a motive in a randomly selected group of 100 philosophers, say, twice, then we could say that its probability is around 2%. (Obviously we should filter for dependencies such as schools, but it is not that important here.)

Now I am proposing some probabilities (that I trust are higher than the actual ones) for three motives: a) An eternal, omnipresent Absolute that has its only designation as 'the Existent': 2%. b) The fundamental *material* components of the world are called 'forms'⁹⁷: 1%. c) The opposition phenomenal–essential is expressed as 'name–truth': 1%. For what follows it is extremely important that these motives are completely independent of each other – the acceptance of one would not make any-

⁹⁷ I.e., shapes (and colours), not meaning 'kind of'.

one more inclined to adopt another. If I call my Absolute 'Being', I can still name my elements roots, sources, parts, components, divinities, stuffs, beginnings or whatever; indeed, I can very easily go without any teaching on the elements. And similarly in all the other combinations.

This all means that the probability of their co-occurrence can be calculated with the standard methods of probability theory, and the result is 0.000002. That means roughly that we may expect to find a second thinker sharing these motives among half a million philosophers. Now, were there that many?

Or, to put it in other words: if we select our texts to compare on the basis of the first motive only (as I did), there is 0.01% probability (a chance of 1 : 1000) that the other two will occur as well. And such a remote possibility can safely be excluded – we may distinctly assert that our two texts cannot be independent.

The second question is whether there was direct borrowing or rather some more complicated relation is probable. Already in the introduction it has been shown that a common heritage is out of the question. Some intermediary (Persians, Magi) is theoretically possible, but highly improbable. The complexities of the ideas involved necessitate that the bearer should be a philosopher himself, and we do not know of any philosophy anywhere except in Greece, India, and China. Also a second translation could lead to more loss of information. And a direct contact could explain many of the parallelisms with texts other than the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. Occam's razor also points in the same direction. Instead of a man going somewhere to learn, returning home and then writing a book (not an unusual scenario) – we would have man 1 going somewhere to learn, then going somewhere else far away to teach man 2, who would then write the book.

The third question is, naturally, who borrowed. Both texts stand so far apart from anything around them⁹⁸, that an external influence seems inherently possible. But as we could show above for all common elements – notably for the terminology *existent, forms, name* – that they have clearly traceable roots and kinship in India that are lacking in Greece, it is practically clear that it was Parmenides who imported Indian ideas. The differences can also be seen as the result of an attempt at improvement, or at least adaptation to Greek soil, by Parmenides. (That, however, does not exclude the possibility of Parmenides also influencing Uddālaka Āruṇi, who is in several texts represented as quite unusually willing to learn, and even from non-orthodox sources.⁹⁹)

Our last question is: was it possible at all? Why and how could it happen? Chronologically we cannot really say much. According to OLIVELLE (1996) the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya, the earliest of the Upaniṣads, should be placed in

⁹⁸ For Parmenides this is very well known. On the *Sadvidyā* FRAUWALLNER (1953–1956, pp. 72) may be quoted: '... stands among the older Upaniṣads as completely sporadic and isolated.' 'It shows especially evidently how easily a judgement which blindly trusts the accidental character of tradition can easily go wrong and only takes into consideration the continuance of the text. Because, had not this one text remained preserved for us, nobody would have assumed or even conjectured a similar thought-process in this period.'

⁹⁹ See, e.g., the story of Śvetaketu, Jaivali Pravāhana and Uddālaka Āruṇi, especially in the version of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (VI 2; the other is in the Chāndogya, V 3–10).

the sixth to fifth centuries BCE, 'give or take a century or so.'¹⁰⁰ Parmenides composed his poem around 480, so we cannot know which text is older. Both authors are known to have travelled even at a fairly advanced age.¹⁰¹ When Parmenides was young, the city of his fathers (Phōkaia) and Gandhāra, mentioned by Āruṇi, both belonged to the same empire. And Darius took great care that his satrapies should be easily reached. His messengers travelled from Sousa to Sardeis on the Persian Royal Road in 9 days; that would be about half the distance to India. Of course a philosopher would not go that fast; starting from Elea in Southern Italy, the journey could take about half a year.

So the journey was perfectly possible, but why would Parmenides attempt it? Most probably not to learn philosophy. But probably he was a physician¹⁰² like his follower Empedocles, and he might have travelled to learn of new treatments and medicines. India has a strong old medical tradition, the *āyur-veda*; he could have heard of it (e.g., from the Indian soldiers fighting in Xerxes' army).

So the most probable scenario is that Parmenides travelled to India, learned Sanskrit (a language closely related to Greek) and came to know some Upaniṣadic philosophy. We cannot say exactly which texts, as the Upaniṣads as we have them are compound texts with many layers interwoven that are not of the same age. He could even have met Āruṇi or Śvetaketu, but we will never know. But he surely knew some version of the teaching that we now find in the *Sadvidyā* (text 1) and many others of which at least fragments survive elsewhere – among them the second text of the *Sadvidyā* and the Kaṭha Upaniṣad.

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¹⁰⁰ P. xxxvi. Actually he says 'seventh to sixth century', but in a footnote he adds that if Bechert's dating of the Buddha is accepted, 'then the dates of the early Upaniṣads should be pushed forward a century or so.' And, like Olivelle himself, I also accept Bechert's conclusions. Actually Japanese scholars have much earlier argued for ca. 386 BCE as the date of the Nirvāṇa, but it remained largely unnoticed in Europe; see NAKAMURA (1950–1956), p. 33 n. 23.

¹⁰¹ According to Plato, *Parmenides* 127b Parmenides visited Athens when he was about sixty-five. And Śvetaketu is already and independent, grown-up person (say, twenty-five) when Āruṇi follows him to get instruction from different princes (Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad I, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad VI 2, Chāndogya Upaniṣad V 3–10). At Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad III 7 he says that he had been living among the *Madras* (in the Punjab); as he belonged to the Kuru-Pāṇcāla territory around Delhi, that must be about 1000 km to the west. In the *Sadvidyā* (VI 14) he mentions Gandhāra further west.

¹⁰² The circumstantial evidence pointing in this direction is presented in COXON (1986), pp. 39–40.

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PAPYRUS ON THE PYRE

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS AND ITS ARCHEOLOGICAL CONTEXT¹

Summary: The paper examines the possible interrelations between the archeological context of the Derveni papyrus and the physical and eschatological doctrines held by its author. On the basis of a brief survey of the archeological data and the comparative material, Betegh argues that the placement of the papyrus is not by chance and that it probably had a role in the ritual. In the next step, he summarises the main results of a reconstruction of the physics and cosmology of the Derveni author, and raises the problem of the connection between the eschatological theme of the first six columns and the physics and cosmic theology of the remainder of the text. Finally, he suggests that the common denominator of all these themes, doctrines and lore is the fire with its cosmological and eschatological role. In this respect, an important claim of the Derveni author could be that the ultimate cosmological and eschatological principle is not fire, as e.g., for Heraclitus, quoted in the papyrus, but fire – in the form of the celestial bodies, the thunderbolt of Zeus, or the funeral pyre – is the instrument with the help of which the intelligent and divine air maintains cosmic order and divine justice.

Key words: Derveni papyrus, funerary ritual, archeology, Orphic.

Practically every paper and presentation on the Derveni papyrus starts with one or two sentences on the circumstances of the discovery. Yet after this brief obligatory introduction, everybody quickly passes on to his or her specific topic, and discusses this or that aspect of the papyrus text. And usually we don't hear anything more about the archeological context. One reason for this may be that the two most relevant publications are relatively recent. After the first preliminary reports published in the sixties, the full archeological description of the Derveni find by Petris Themelis and Ioannes Touratsoglou appeared only in 1997.² On the other hand, Kyriakos Tsantsanoglou published the most germane part of the papyrus – that is its first seven columns – also in 1997.³ What I intend to do in this paper is to take a closer look at the

¹ Parts of this paper are taken over from my PhD dissertation (BETEGH [1999]). I wrote the remainder at the Center for Hellenic Studies, where I received much help from my fellows, especially from Sandra Blakely, Nikolai Grintzer, Jens Holzhausen, Roberto Polito, Gretchen Reydams-Schils, and Sarolta Takács. I presented the penultimate version of this text at Harvard University, where I got useful comments and suggestions from the audience, in particular from Albert Henrichs, Gregory Nagy, and Raphael Woolf.

² THEMELIS–TOURATSOGLOU (1997).

³ TSANTSANOGLOU (1997).

archeological context, and examine the possible connections between the function and content of the papyrus and its place of discovery. First, I shall discuss what the archeological context can tell us about the function, or *Sitz im Leben*, of the papyrus. Then, I shall turn to the text and venture some hypotheses about its relation to the funeral context.

But, first of all, some methodological remarks and disclaimers are in order. Much of what I have to propose is highly hypothetical and tentative. In a way, this is inevitable in the case of the Derveni papyrus, owing to both the nature of the questions to be tackled and the state of preservation of the papyrus. However, some of my suggestions will be even more speculative than usual, and certainly much more speculative than I would normally like. Yet I see no other way in this instance to propose an overall interpretation of the evidence, and it is a challenge to do so. Interpreting the Derveni papyrus is something like bungee jumping for the mind: it can be a lot of fun, but one has to know that it is an extreme sport. What I find especially important is always to make clear how far we can rely on the internal and comparative evidence, and hence just how speculative a given hypothesis is. To elaborate on the bungee jumping analogy: it's always important to know before a jump what kind of rope you are using.

So, let's start where everybody starts – the circumstances of the find – but by giving a more detailed description of it, mainly on the basis of Themelis' and Touratsoglou's recent book. On 15th January, 1962, during the widening of the national road leading from Thessalonica to Kavala, a large unlooted cist grave was discovered at Derveni, some 10 km to the north of Thessalonica. The next day another similar but even larger cist grave came to light 4.5 metres away. The Greek Archaeological Service undertook a systematic excavation of the graves and the surrounding area between January and August 1962, and this survey led to the discovery of five more burials: the looted cist grave *Γ*, the cist graves *Δ*, *Ε* and *Η*, and the pit grave *Ζ*. The tombs and their grave goods proved to be of outstanding importance in many respects, but the two most notable objects are the stunning bronze krater with a Dionysiac scene found in tomb *Β*,⁴ and the remains of a charred papyrus scroll which was discovered, owing to the attentiveness of P. Themelis, among the remains of the funeral pyre on top of the covering slabs of tomb *Α*.

The site was located on the *khôra* of the ancient settlement of Lete. It is not clear however whether or not the burial ground was directly connected with the city. The tombs were built in the pass of Derveni, along the road known as the *via Egnatia*. Tombs *Α*, *Β* and *Δ*, located close by each other, are similar in architecture and size, and seem to form a group of their own. The walls of the tombs are constructed of large blocks of poros laid in isodomic masonry. In the case of tomb *Α* and *Β*, the grave was covered with four similar large blocks. Tomb *Δ* was only covered with a wooden ceiling which subsequently collapsed into the tomb and crushed most of the grave goods. The walls of the chambers in all three tombs were coated with plaster and painted. The chamber of tomb *Α* had a garland of blue leaves and berries on a red ground, bordered by a yellow and a blue band. The most colourful is tomb

⁴ For the Derveni krater, see GIOURI (1978).

B, where the lower half of the walls was painted red and decorated with a guilloche of branches with blue-red leaves and black berries (perhaps olive). The white plaster of tomb *A* was decorated only with a blue band.

Tombs *A* and *B* were remarkably rich in grave goods. According to the excavators, tomb *A* 'was suffocatingly full of bronze and clay pots, vessels, jewellery and various small objects'.⁵ Particularly notable in this tomb is the large bronze krater that contained the remains of the cremation and those of two wreaths, one of them of gold oak leaves, and the other of gilded bronze with gilded clay berries. Among other vases of clay and bronze (but none in silver or gold) found in tomb *A*, there were three *oinochoai* and other drinking vessels. Other objects included a bronze lamp, many alabastra, some in coloured glass, ivory figurines, bronze rings, several dozen strigils and many knucklebones.

On the basis of the coins, metal vessels and pottery, Themelis and Touratsoglou maintain that 'all the evidence favours a date for the burials in the late 4th to early 3rd century'⁶; this dating also must hold true for the objects found in and on top of tomb *A*.

The remains of the pyres of tombs *A* and *B* and the objects contained in them can offer us some idea of the ritual. The corpse was cremated a few metres from the grave, on top of a richly decorated couch; some of the objects found in the remains of the pyre of tomb *A* seem to have decorated the couch. According to the reconstruction of Themelis and Touratsoglou, the clay column capitals found in the ashes of the pyre formed part of an elaborate structure on which the couch was laid. Other objects found among the remains of the pyre of tomb *A* indicate that some offerings were burnt on the pyre with the body. After cremation the bones were wrapped in cloth and put into the krater, which was then placed in the grave. The grave was finally covered with the covering slabs, and the remains of the pyre thrown on top of the slabs.⁷

Among the remains of the funeral pyre found on top of the covering slabs there were spearheads, a pair of greaves, the remains of a horse's harness and a gilded wreath, various other small objects (including a large number of knucklebones, glass objects and two ivory eyes), fragments of at least six clay column capitals, and, in the north-west corner of the remains, the carbonized remains of a scroll, which would become famous as the 'Derveni papyrus'.⁸

The location of the papyrus in the remains of the pyre of tomb *A* poses an obvious problem. Why was it there? The more skeptical answer, raised first passingly by F. W. Walbank and now considered more seriously by Richard Janko,⁹ is that the

⁵ THEMELIS–TOURATSOGLOU (1997) 193.

⁶ THEMELIS–TOURATSOGLOU (1997) 221.

⁷ MAKARONAS (1963) implied that the pyre was originally burnt where its remains were found, that is, on the covering slabs of the tomb. This, as noted already by GINOUVÈS (1994) 187, cannot be correct, as the krater containing the ashes had to be put into the grave before the covering slabs were placed on top. (Ginouvès, however, mistakenly assigns the papyrus to tomb *B*.)

⁸ For the full catalogue of the objects found in and on tomb *A*, see THEMELIS–TOURATSOGLOU (1997) 28–59.

⁹ WALBANK *apud* KAPSOMENOS (1964–1965) 22 and JANKO (1997) 62. Janko's interest in this possibility is clearly related to his attempt to give a non-religious interpretation of the text.

papyrus was mere scrap, used quite simply to light the pyre. Indeed, we have some evidence about the Roman custom of putting papyrus on the funeral pyre in order to set it alight. Nevertheless this evidence is quite meagre. Both of the two most relevant passages come from Martial. In *Epigr.* 10.97.1 he writes *dum leuis arsura struitur Libitina papyro* ('While the light-heaped pyre was being laid with papyrus for the flame' trans. Ker). Standard editions of Martial connect this line with *Epigr.* 8.44.14 where we read *fartus papyro dum tibi torus crescit* ('while, stuffed with papyrus, your pyre is growing high' trans. Ker). If the two passages attest the same custom, then the latter text implies that one has to think not of a single roll kept whole, but rather a layer of torn papyrus put underneath the wood to help combustion.¹⁰ If so, these texts cannot provide a real parallel for the use of the Derveni papyrus.¹¹

There is, to the best of my knowledge, not a shred of evidence from the Classical or Hellenistic period for a comparable Greek or Macedonian practice of lighting a pyre with a roll of papyrus.

It is also important to note that the roll was not on its own in the remains of the pyre. As mentioned above, some other personal belongings of the person buried in tomb *A* were left among the ashes on top of the covering slabs. For example, a pair of greaves and some spearheads were found there. We can contrast this with the fact that the greaves and arms of the person buried in the neighbouring tomb *B* were neatly placed inside that tomb as valuable objects. And even if we suppose that the person was cremated in his greaves, the presence of other pretty objects, such as the alabaster, would need explanation. The presence of such objects in the remains of the pyre, I would maintain, strengthens the hypothesis that the papyrus was *not* treated as junk paper.

The alternative answer to the question concerning the location of the roll, and the one espoused by most interpreters, is that it was designed to be burnt with the corpse on the pyre, and thus that it had some function in the funerary ritual. In this event, its placement can be compared with other Greek texts found in tombs. These, however, apparently fall in different categories. Some of them have no obvious eschatological implication. For example, a papyrus roll from Hawara (P. Bodl. Ms. Gr. Cl. a. I(P), mid-second c. AD) contains two verses from *Iliad* 1 and the whole of *Iliad* 2,¹² whereas a roll from Saqqarah, also found in a tomb and dated to the fourth century BC – very close to the Derveni papyrus in time – preserves the *Persians* of

¹⁰ Cf. LEWIS (1974) 96.

¹¹ *Anth. Pal.* 9.174.2-6 (fifth c. AD) is sometimes also adduced in this context. The author is speaking here about the revoltingly low wages of teachers, and develops a nice simile: 'Here the nurse brings, perforce, the fee once a month, tying up the wretched pittance in byblus and paper, and puts the contemptible little paper, like a pinch of incense, by the master's seat, as if by a tomb.' (ἐνθα τροφός κατὰ μῆνα φέρει μισθὸν μετ' ἀνάγκης, / βύβλω καὶ χάρτῃ δισσαμένη πενίην / ὥς δὲ κάπνισμα τιθεῖ παρὰ τὸν θρόνον, ὥς παρὰ τύμβον, / τὸν μικρὸν χάρτην, τὸν παραριπτόμενον – trans. PATON). This text however does not refer to rolls but to the well-attested use of cheap papyrus (*charta emporetica*) and discarded and torn writing papyrus for wrapping incense. Therefore, this text, also very remote from the Derveni tombs in time, cannot be used as a parallel.

¹² One can compare this find with the testimony of Photius *Bibl.* 190.151a, according to which Cercidas of Arcadia (fourth c. BC) wanted to be buried with a copy of the first two books of the *Iliad*.

Timotheus of Miletus (P. Berol. 9875). Although different hypotheses have been advanced, the function of these rolls in graves remains unclear.¹³

On the other hand, some texts in tombs have an evident eschatological bearing, as we can see most conspicuously in the case of the gold leaves. More and more of these are coming to light, and help to reshape our view of the ancient mystery religions. Furthermore, owing to some momentous new discoveries, the gold leaves are now customarily treated again as 'Orphic' and/or 'Bacchic'.¹⁴ These tiny inscribed gold plates clearly have a place in the tomb, as they were meant to be guides for the deceased in their afterlife journey. The inscribed texts, despite their brevity and enigmatic wording, evince a distinct core of eschatological beliefs with a conception of the nature and fate of the soul as well as an elaborate topography of the underworld.¹⁵

Admittedly, a few verses inscribed on gold leaves are not the same thing as the longer, argumentative prose treatise on the Derveni papyrus – even though I shall try to show later that there might be significant connections between the Derveni text and the gold leaves. There are some indications, however, that papyri could be used for comparable purposes. For example, scholars have surmised on the basis of the archeological data that the papyrus roll found in the right hand of an inhumated person at Callatis could contain a Dionysiac/Orphic text possibly with eschatological content;¹⁶ but this is not more than sheer speculation, because the roll was unfortunately destroyed before anyone could read it.

A further indication may come from Euripides' *Hippolytus*. Theseus in his diatribe against Hippolytus depicts him as an hypocritical Orphic. He first alludes to the vegetarian diet customarily associated with Orphism, and then continues with the following words: 'Having Orpheus as your lord, you revel honouring the smoke of many writings' ('Ορφέα τ' ἀνακτ' ἔχων / βάκχευε πολλῶν γραμμάτων τιμῶν καπνοῦς *Hipp.* 953f.). The expression πολλῶν γραμμάτων ... καπνοῦς is usually understood as referring to the trifling or worthless nature of the Orphic texts. The word καπνός could indeed have this secondary meaning;¹⁷ yet, I suggest, Theseus' turn of phrase might be taken just as well as a play on words, also alluding to Orphic books burnt on pyres – such as the one at Derveni.

¹³ TURNER (1980) 76f., for example, raises the possibility that the Hawara case shows imitation of the Egyptian custom of putting a copy of the *Book of the Dead* in the tomb. But see the case of Cercidas, mentioned above, which does not show any apparent reference to Egyptian customs.

¹⁴ For a survey, see PUGLIESE CARRATELLI (1993), to which add also FREL (1994). PARKER (1995) 496ff. has good arguments for the case that the gold leaves can be treated as Orphic.

¹⁵ To complicate things even further, the eschatological relevance of a text cannot in itself guarantee its ritual function in a funeral context. MARTIN-PRIMAVERESI (1999) 36–38 argue for instance that the papyrus containing Empedocles' *Physica*, with its demonological story, was used as discarded paper, regardless of its content, for the fabrication of the funeral crown. But this view is also open to debate. (For the alternative, see MOST [1997] 130.) The case of the Empedocles papyrus is certainly different in that the papyrus was torn into pieces for this secondary use, and apparently only a small part of the roll was used, with no attention paid to equip the deceased with the entire text.

¹⁶ See PIPPIDI (1967) 210.

¹⁷ See LSJ sv I. So, e.g., BARRETT (1964) *ad loc.*; HALLERAN (1995) *ad loc.*; LINFORTH (1941) 52f.

We can also add the evidence offered by pictorial representations, the most notable of which is the funeral vase dated 330–320 BC. The vase painting depicts Orpheus with the heroized deceased who holds a papyrus roll in his hand.¹⁸ The scholars who published the vase suggest that this may be taken as a reference to the Orphic custom of fitting the dead out with texts. All these pieces of evidence, both textual and pictorial, refer to the prominent place texts and books had in Orphic circles – a phenomenon that has been analyzed by, among others, Marcel Detienne.¹⁹ But all this is admittedly very far from compelling in the case of the Derveni papyrus. We have to acknowledge, on the other hand, that the lack of comparable evidence might just as well be due to the fact that papyri are very rarely preserved in Greek tombs. And, surely, even more seldom if they were burnt, or meant to be burnt, on funeral pyres.

To conclude, acknowledging all these restrictions and uncertainties, I should still favour the hypothesis that the Derveni roll did have a function in the ritual. This is made likely by the presence of other valuable objects in the remains of the pyre, the specific Orphic concern for eschatology, and the Orphic custom of accompany the dead with texts, and possibly also, as I shall argue, by the special role allotted to fire in the Derveni text.

Let us now turn to the text. The extant text clearly falls into two parts. In the first badly fragmented six columns, the Derveni author gives the explanation of certain eschatological concepts – such as the relationship between daimones, Erinyes, Eumenides and souls – and offers a rationalistic explanation for some ritual, mainly sacrificial, acts. From this part of the text it seems clear that the author also conducted ritual and oracular activities, in the role of *mantis*.

Then, from the seventh column on, up to the end of the extant text, the author gives an allegorical interpretation of a poem attributed to Orpheus. This Orphic poem in hexameters centres on the story of Zeus. The poet tells us how Zeus obtains royal power; that he receives oracular instruction from his father Kronos and also from the primordial divinity Night; then that Zeus ensures his rule by swallowing and then creating anew the entire world, and finally that he started an incestuous relationship with his mother Rhea. In his running commentary on the poem, the Derveni author, as it were, translates this mythical story into a cosmogony.

The rough outlines of the Derveni author's cosmogony are as follows.²⁰ The starting point is an indistinct mass of matter. At this stage, separate entities cannot form because the particles of fire are mixed with the rest of matter and do not let it congeal. Then a cosmic divine Mind (*νοῦς*) – which the Derveni author identifies also with the physical element air and the Zeus of the poem – decides to create the cosmos as we now have it. Knowing that the excessive heat of fire does not allow separate entities to form, this divine Mind separates the particles of fire from the rest, withdrawing them to an appropriate location and thus creating the sun. But the sun

¹⁸ Cf. SCHMIDT (1975).

¹⁹ DETIENNE (1989).

²⁰ For a detailed reconstruction of the author's cosmology, see BETEGH (1999), esp. ch. 3 and 4.

would still have been too large, so Mind scatters the surplus of fire in small chunks all over the sky. This is how the stars are born. Mind fixes the stars at their location by the force of necessity, for otherwise, driven by the force of 'like to like', they would come together and join the mass of the sun, and this would mean the end of the present world order. Through this teleological cosmic activity, divine Mind attains a fine equilibrium. The fire of the sun communicates the required heat, but it does not emit too much heat, which would jeopardize the cosmic order and life on earth.

The author's cosmology clearly turns on the dynamic interplay between fire and air. In the initial situation fire prevents beings from taking shape. But once it is turned into the sun, it becomes the major generative force. The effect is destructive in the first stage and constructive in the second, but not because of any change in fire's activity or power. What fire does through all these cosmic processes is blindly emit its heat without any purpose or intention and with no consideration for its effects. Air, on the other hand, is intelligent and acts purposefully. This is no surprise, since it can also be called Mind. Its most important characteristic is that it is able to put at its own service the motive energy and the mechanical causation triggered off by fire. The air *qua* divine Mind uses the brute force of fire in order to actualize its cosmic vision.

It is interesting to note that earth has very little role in the author's physics, whereas water has apparently no function at all. So much so that the author equates even the god Okeanos of the poem with air, and shows no interest whatsoever when the poet sings about 'rivers and lovely springs' (col. 16).

Perhaps the most perplexing question in the study of the papyrus is that we do not know how these two parts of the text – i.e., the ritual, eschatological discourse of the first columns, on the one hand, and the physical interpretation of the Orphic poem, on the other – are related. In other words, what keeps the eschatology and physics of the author together? Dirk Obbink, André Laks and Glenn Most have articulated this problem in three recent papers, each of which was published in 1997. All three authors point out convincingly that we cannot claim to have arrived at a satisfying interpretation of the text without proposing an answer to this question. Moreover, all three authors agree that the answer should be sought in the direction set out in Richard Seaford's pioneering study 'Immortality, Salvation and the Elements': that is, in a connection between the theory of elements and a doctrine of salvation.²¹

The trouble is that the surviving text of the papyrus offers very little direct help. First of all, the first columns are so heavily fragmented that it seems impossible

²¹ SEAFORD (1986). It is also true that a link between eschatology and cosmology might exist on a more general level, as Luc Brisson pointed it out to me. In a sense, all eschatological doctrines necessarily imply a cosmology, for if the soul survives the death of the individual, one has to know where it goes after it leaves the body. Therefore the understanding of the organization of the cosmos can be fundamental for the understanding and acceptance of a doctrine of the afterlife. Even though I think this is a valid general interpretation, I would go further and examine whether we can find a closer relationship between a particular cosmology and the particular eschatology to which it is connected. In other words, I should like to examine whether or not specific eschatological tenets can govern or require specific cosmological doctrines, and, conversely, whether or not a specific cosmological theory can explain the eschatology related to it.

to reconstruct the author's course of argument and particular tenets. Moreover, this part does not say anything – or almost nothing – about cosmology or physics. The second part of the text, on the other hand, speaks about physics but does not contain anything on eschatology.

We might have one clue, however. In column 4, in the middle of the eschatological part, the Derveni author adduces Heraclitus' dictum about the sun. From the evidence provided by the papyrus, it appears that what we knew up until now as two separate fragments of Heraclitus, DK B3 and B94, originally formed one statement. This is how it reads in the papyrus:

The sun ... according to nature is a human foot in width, not transgressing its boundaries. If ... oversteps, the Erinyes, the guardians of Dike, will find it out.

This quotation is obviously linked to both parts of the text: it speaks both about the importance of the size of the sun for the conservation of cosmic order, and about the Erinyes who also appear in other parts of the first six columns in a clearly eschatological context. However, the fragmentary state of the column makes it difficult to decide exactly what the Derveni author wanted to say about Heraclitus and whether he quoted Heraclitus approvingly or critically.

The Heraclitus quotation is, however, a further indication that the most obvious common denominator for all these texts and contexts is fire. Laks tentatively raises this possibility,²² whereas Glenn W. Most goes one step further and suggests a more specific hypothesis by bringing in the evidence of the gold leaves.²³ Most tries to connect the Derveni author's physics primarily with group B of the gold leaves, in which the central motif is the thirst of the dead person's soul and the quenching of this thirst. Although this line of interpretation seems promising at the start, it does not turn out to be convincing enough at the final stage. An immediate objection to Most's conjecture is that there is a basic discord between the use of physical elements in the two groups of evidence. The accent is on water in the Underworld situation described on the gold leaves, and, on the whole, there is no question of air and fire, whereas the Derveni author focuses on air and fire and is not at all interested in water. More important, Most's interpretation cannot account for the fact that for the Derveni author fire is not only, and not even primarily, destructive; indeed, once it is properly mastered by the divine Mind, it becomes the source of all generation.

In what follows I shall offer an alternative hypothesis just as tentative as the one proposed by Most. My suggestion is that we should expect a clue not from group B of the Thurii gold leaves as Most did, but from group A, and gold leaf C.²⁴ Gold leaf C was found in the Timpone Grande, inside a coffin of a cremated person, close to the head of the skeleton. This tablet is a tiny gold plate which was folded and into

²² LAKS (1997) 140; MOST (1997).

²³ MOST (1997) 131ff.

²⁴ I do not intend to enter into the debate whether or not the gold plates are 'Orphic'. The first editors and commentators were convinced that they were. Then came a long period of denial, culminating in the work of Zuntz. However, on the force of the new evidence from Hipponion, Pelinna and elsewhere, scholars nowadays tend to give justice to the first opinion.

which Gold leaf A4 was wrapped.²⁵ The text of C is notoriously difficult to read and interpret. Ten lines of writing are squeezed onto a tiny surface, while the wrinkles caused by folding of the plate further obscure the original inscription.²⁶ But what makes the decipherment practically hopeless is that the text seems to contain not only scribal errors (inversions of letters, reduplications, omissions) and a mixture of different dialectal forms, but also manifestly unintelligible letter combinations. It is far from clear whether these strings of letters stem from complete carelessness, or are abbreviations, cryptic codes, Greek transcriptions of words of another language, or magical abracadabra.²⁷

Even though longer intelligible syntactical units cannot be found on this gold leaf, certain words and shorter phrases are legible or can be reconstructed with a fair degree of confidence. Diels defined the resulting 'text' as an Orphic hymn to Demeter,²⁸ whereas Zuntz, more convincingly, tried to explain it as Kore's prayer to her mother Demeter.

To make reference easier, I present here Zuntz's tentative reading of the more or less intelligible parts (alternative readings and further, still less certain suggestions are indicated by a pair of solidi):²⁹

1. *Πρωτογονιδ* / *την* / *Γην* / ... *Γα* / *τα* / *ματρι* / *εφα*
Κυβελεια korra ... Δημητρος ήτ-
2. -*ταται* ... *Ζευ* / *ιατηρ* / *πατηρ* / *τυ αερ* ... *Ηλιε πυρ δη παντ*
αστη / *παντας την* / ... *ένικαι*.
3. (*δηδε τυχαι τ' εφανης* / *τε Φανης* / *παμμηστ,αρι* *Μοιραι*) ...
εν κλυτε / (*ά*)*παιτη* / *την* *στην* / *δαιμον ευχη* / *δ ευχη* /
4. *πατερ* / ... *παντ* *αδαμαστα παντ(η)* / *παντα δαμα* / *στα παντ* /
...
-ντα / *-νταις* / ... *-οντα δε παντ* *εμοι* / (*ε*)*λαβοι* / *τα* / /
ελα / *βροντα δε παντ* *επ'* *ωοιβης* / ... *τλητα* / *πα* /
5. *τη μη αερ* / *πυρ* ... *ματερ* *εστι* *κοι* / *λυες τι κοι* / *επτα* /
επτατο / / *επτατον* / *εσιν* *νηστ* / *νυξιν η μεθ ημεραν* ...
6. *εννημαρ* / / *επτημαρ* / ... *νηστιας* ... *Ζευ* / *Ολιμπε* / *και*
πανοπτα *Αλ* / *ιε* *αie διε* ... *ματερ* *εμας επ*-
7. *ακλουσον* ... *ευχας* / *α* / *τακτα* / *πυρας* ... *πεδιω* / *χι* / *αμα τ'* / *εμαν*
/ *καλη* / *δ ιερα* / *διερα* / *ευδα* / *μ* / *κονοι* / *δαμναι* /
8. *στακτηρ ιερα* / *στακτηρι* *εραμαι* / *Δημητερ* *πυρ* *Ζευ* *και η*
χθονια ... / *μ* / *ητρος* / ...
9. ... *εσ φρενα* *ματρι* ...
10. ... *εσ τον αερ* - ... *εσ φρενα* *ματρι*

²⁵ For the description of the excavation and the archaeological details, see ZUNTZ (1971) 287ff., esp. 290.

²⁶ On the paleographical difficulties, see ZUNTZ (1971) 345.

²⁷ 'A text more corrupt than this will not easily be found...' ZUNTZ (1971) 345.

²⁸ DIELS (1902). It should be noted that Diels' textual conjectures were severely criticized by all subsequent commentators, cf., e.g., KERN (1922) *ad loc.*

²⁹ For the transcript and critical apparatus, see ZUNTZ (1971) pp. 346–348. Cf. also the alternative reconstruction, short discussion and facsimile (drawn by M. PUCETTI) in OF 47.

Obviously, I do not pretend to understand much of this. Nonetheless, I still think that it shows undeniable points of contact with the Derveni text. To begin with, no matter how incomprehensible this text is, it undoubtedly connects divinities with physical elements and parts of the cosmos. Moreover, the divinities and elements mentioned on this gold leaf, and possibly the correspondences established between them, fit surprisingly well with what we find in the Derveni papyrus. For convenience's sake, I have underlined the most relevant parts of the text. Diels has suggested that in the first line *Δημήτηρ* is identified with *Γῆ* and *μήτηρ*. This identification explicitly turns up in the Derveni papyrus (col. 22. 7–11). Then line 2, analyzed in detail by Zuntz, is particularly interesting from our point of view. Zuntz suggests first that Zeus may here be identified with air – a momentous detail for us. Furthermore there is the connection between the sun (or Helios) and fire – true, not very surprising in itself. Then in the next line we find a reference to Moira, and the rare epithet *παμμήτωρ* ‘who devises all’. In the Derveni poem, the cognate verb *ἐμήσατο* is used to describe Zeus’ creative power.³⁰ The Derveni author, moreover, presents an interesting line of argument about Moira being the wisdom of Zeus, ordaining ‘how the things that are and the things that come to be and the things that going to be must come to be and be and cease.’³¹ A further portentous observation is that of all the elements air (perhaps equated with Zeus) and fire, mainly in the form of the sun,³² seem to play a major role, while earth appears in a secondary place, and water does not turn up at all. It may be sheer coincidence, but this is exactly the distribution we have found in the papyrus.

The fact that most of the intelligible words of this gold tablet are indeed catchwords in the Derveni text (air, fire, sun, Zeus, Demeter, Ge, mother, Moira) makes it at least defensible to evoke the evidence of the gold plates in the interpretation of the papyrus. Now, as I have already mentioned, the folded Gold leaf A4 was wrapped in C. This arrangement secures that C and A4 were somehow related in the ritual; and, as has been shown by Zuntz, A4 belongs to the same family as A1, A2, and A3.³³

The most complete and least corrupt of group A is A1,³⁴ found in the Timpone Piccolo of Thurii.³⁵ Most important for us is the central line 4. In line four the speaker says that his death was by lightning and caused by Moira. (*ἀλλά με μοῖρ*

³⁰ Cf. col. 23. 4 and col. 25.

³¹ Col. 19. 4–7: *Μοῖραι, δ' ἐπικλῶσαι / λέγοντες τοῦ Διὸς τῇμ φρόνησιν ἐπικυρῶσαι / λέγουσιν τὰ ἔοντα καὶ τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα, / ὅπως χρή γενέσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι καὶ παύσασθαι*. Cf. also col. 18. 2ff.

³² I wonder if the last letters in the sequence *Ηλιε πυρ δη παιτ' αστη* is not connected to *ἀστήρ*. Diels adduces Parmenides B 1.3.

³³ Incidentally, the two Thessalian gold leaves found in a tomb in 1985 on the site of ancient Pellina are the most closely related to this group. This is important as far as the Thessalian leaves contain a clear reference to the Orphic myth of the rending of Dionysus.

³⁴ For a critical discussion of the text, with the differences compared to the other tablets of the same group, see ZUNTZ (1971) 299–327.

³⁵ GRAF (1991) 96f. argues convincingly that the Pelinna and Hipponion plates bridge the gap between Zuntz's A and B groups, showing that, in fact, all these tablets are closely connected and must have belonged to the same religious movement. It has to be noted that the gold plates from other locations still do not parallel or explain the text on Tablet C.

ἐδάμασσε καὶ ἀστεροβλῆτα κεραυνῶ). We have just seen that Moira has an eminent role in the text of Gold leaf C, where her name appears close to different forms of the verb δαμάω, and also in the Derveni papyrus. But for us, another momentous point is the reference to lightning. There has been some discussion in the literature whether or not all three buried in the Timone Piccolo with a similar text by them actually died by lightning.³⁶ Of course, the question is quite impossible to answer definitely; and I agree with those like Peter Kingsley who say that the main interest of this body of evidence does not lie in this matter of fact.³⁷ It pertains rather to the more general theme of heroization – or even deification – by lightning and fire.

This time Zeus' thunderbolt, not as a means of heroization, but as a tool of punishment, turns up at a crucial point in the Orphic mythological narratives, where Zeus strikes down with his thunderbolt the Titans who have just killed, dismembered and devoured the young Dionysus. It is highly likely that the Orphic poem commented on in the Derveni papyrus contained this episode, but, regrettably, the text is cut off at the preceding stage of the narrative.

Even more interesting for us is that Zeus' thunderbolt, as a means of heroization, is sometimes related to the funeral pyre. Heracles' death has a prominent place in this tradition. As soon as Heracles' pyre on mount Oeta was lit a thunderstorm came and the hero was lifted into heaven by lightning.³⁸ The fire of the thunderbolt and that of the pyre have thus become symbolically connected. The pyre and the thunderbolt of Zeus are connected also in the story of Asclepius. Apollo falls in love with the Thessalian Coronis. But the girl, already pregnant with the child of Apollo, sleeps with a mortal man. Artemis punishes the unfaithful girl with death. When the girl is already on the funeral pyre, Apollo decides to save the unborn baby, Asclepius. The centaur Chiron brings up the child and teaches him the art of medicine. But Asclepius transgresses the limits of his art, and not only heals the sick but also raises the dead. For this excess Zeus strikes him with the thunderbolt. Thus Asclepius, who was born on a funeral pyre, receives divine punishment and at the same time heroization by Zeus' thunderbolt. Fire is the element of birth, death and heroic rebirth, the element which sets the limits of mortal life.

In the figure and story of Asclepius, I maintain, we find together numerous elements that are relevant to the Derveni papyrus and its author. Asclepius, like Orpheus, is a Thessalian hero. Apollo has a distinguished role both in the cult of Asclepius and the Thessalian cult of Orpheus. Like the figure of Orpheus, the figure of Asclepius combines chthonic elements with the cult of the Sun. Moreover, the art of Asclepius corresponds in many ways to that of an Orphic initiation-priest, someone like the Derveni author. It brings together healing – primarily magical healing in the Thessalian version of Asclepius – with oracles, mainly dream oracles. In col. 5, the Derveni author makes clear that he was interested also in the interpretation of dreams.

³⁶ J. Harrison maintained that they did not, and that the reference is purely mythical (HARRISON [1922] 587), whereas Zuntz finds it more likely that the people buried in this tumulus were actually struck by thunderbolts, and thereby 'sanctified' (ZUNTZ [1971] 316).

³⁷ KINGSLEY (1995) 257f.

³⁸ See, e.g., Diodorus Siculus 4. 38. 4; Lucian, *Hermotimus* 7, *Apoll.* 2. 7. 7 with further references in FRASER'S note *ad loc.* in the Loeb edition of the *Bibliotheca*.

On the other hand, he uses certain words (e.g., *θάψις*) that stem from medical terminology. It is perhaps also worth mentioning that the Thessalian gold leaves, related to the ones from Thurii, were found very close to the ancient Trikka, the mythical birth-place and a major cult centre of Asclepius.³⁹

Another interesting piece of evidence comes from Plato. At the end of the final book of the *Republic*, Socrates relates the story of the Pamphylian Er. Conspicuously, the account of the brave Er, chosen by the gods to be their messenger, brings together some of the central themes of the papyrus: we get not only the description of the journey and the lottery of souls – that is a colourful presentation of a retributive eschatology that props up the ethical tenets of Plato – and a detailed topology of the Underworld to give the settings for the story, but also a cosmological account.⁴⁰ Now it is generally agreed that Plato incorporated many Orphico-Pythagorean elements in the story of Er. And, quite notably, Er, whom everybody thought to be dead, was revived to transmit the divine message by disclosing the fate of the soul and the major motive forces that govern the cosmos *on the pyre* (ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ κείμενος ἀνεβίω *Rep.* 614b7).

Thus far we have seen that the thunderbolt and the pyre, often connected with each other, have a central role both in the eschatology of the individual souls on the gold leaves of group A, in the Orphic mythological narrative about Dionysus and the Titans, in the myth of Heracles and in the Thessalian cult of Asclepius, and the myth of Er, which probably shows a strong Orphic influence. At a more general level, not specific either to the eschatology of the gold leaves or to the Orphic narrative, the thunderbolt is the means by which Zeus maintains and reaffirms divine justice. The connection between these elements may or may not have been explicit in the minds or writings of those involved.⁴¹

The only author mentioned by name in the extant text of the Derveni papyrus other than Orpheus is Heraclitus. The importance of fire in the philosophy of Heraclitus needs no special pleading. But, more specifically, fire seems to have an eschatological role also for Heraclitus. In this respect, the most explicit is perhaps DK B66, quoted by Hippolytus of Rome: 'Fire, he [Heraclitus] says, when it comes upon, will judge and convict all things.' (πάντα γὰρ ... τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὼν κρινεῖ καὶ καταλήψεται). The parallel use of καταλαμβάνω in B28 'Dike will convict the fabricators of lies and those who bear witness to them.' (Δίκη καταλήψεται ψευδῶν

³⁹ It is perhaps also worth mentioning that the same kind of preliminary sacrifice consisting of wineless libations and sacrificial cakes was offered to Asclepius as the ones offered to the Eumenides as described in col. 6. Cf. HENRICH (1984) 258.

⁴⁰ Even though also this part of the account is expressed in mythical terms (especially because of its reference to the four goddesses, Ananke, Lachesis, Clotho, and Athropos), it gives the first approximation of a much more sophisticated explanatory model for the heavenly motions.

⁴¹ As, e.g., KIRK–RAVEN–SCHOFIELD (1983) 30 suggest, the statement of the dead person 'I am the son of Earth and starry Sky' on the Hipponion gold plate can be taken as a reference to the Titanic origin of man. This evidence might also reinforce the conviction of the early editors of the Thurii gold plates that the dead man's claim to be of the gods' race, followed by the statement about death by lightning, is to be connected with the Orphic anthropogony, or at least with the story of the Titans devouring Dionysus.

τέκτονας καὶ μάρτυρας) reinforces the feeling that divine justice is involved here.⁴² It is noteworthy for our discussion that B66 is immediately followed by B64 in Hippolytus' text: 'The thunderbolt steers all things' (τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει κεραυνός). In this fragment, the thunderbolt offers an easy mediation between the Heraclitean cosmic fire and Zeus, the traditional representation of the supreme divine power.⁴³

Fire and divine justice, from which there is no escape, return in a somewhat more cryptic manner in B16: 'How could one escape the notice of that which never sets?' (τὸ μὴ δύνόν ποτε πῶς ἄν τις λάθοι). This fragment is yet again a corrective re-appropriation of a traditional concept, this time that of ἥλιος πανόπτης, the 'sun which sees all'. The meaning of this fragment, as generally agreed by commentators, is well captured in Plato's *Cratylus* in the passage where the etymology of the word δίκαιον, 'just', is discussed. The sun in itself cannot fulfill the role of 'the eye of Zeus' or 'the eye of Justice' because it sets every night – but the cosmic divine fire, the sun that never sets, can easily take up this function.⁴⁴ Thus, the cosmic fire appears here in the role of the supreme cosmic watchman, assuming the role traditionally ascribed to the sun.⁴⁵ The general image we get from all these fragments is that, for Heraclitus, cosmic and eschatological guidance, justice, and surveillance are closely related, or rather identical, functions of the supreme divine power that is fire.⁴⁶

If I interpret him right, the Derveni author would agree with much of this – except the very last word: fire. First and foremost, he would certainly concur with Heraclitus on the point that cosmic justice and eschatology are just two facets of the same divine order. Besides, he would also assent to the view that fire's role is central both in cosmology and eschatology. Yet he would not concede that the supreme

⁴² Cf. MARCOVICH *ad loc.*

⁴³ B 11 (πάν (γὰρ) ἔρπετον πληγῇ νέμεται) probably also belongs in this context. As DK suggest, θεοῦ or Διός is to be understood with πληγῇ, and the whole concept evidently alludes to Zeus' thunderbolt (cf., e.g., Hes. *Thg.* 853ff., adduced by MARCOVICH *ad loc.*).

⁴⁴ Plato *Crat.* 413 b: [reflecting on the former hypothesis that the δίκαιον is the sun] ... καὶ ἐρωτᾷ εἰ οὐδὲν δίκαιον οἶμαι εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπειδὴν ὁ ἥλιος δύη. λιπαροῦντος οὖν ἐμοῦ ὃ τι αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνος λέγει αὐτό, τὸ πῦρ φησιν

⁴⁵ It is worth noting that the same concept also appears on the Tablet C (cf. πανοπτα Ἀλφειε in line 6), where the physical interpretation of the sun as fire is almost certain (cf., e.g., *Ηλιε πυρ* in line 2, with Zuntz' comments *ad loc.*).

⁴⁶ Another notable point of contact is that the interrelation between cosmology and eschatology is *dynamic* both in Heraclitus and the Derveni papyrus. By this I mean that the most important psychic and eschatological processes receive a physical interpretation (e.g., that the betterment of the soul can be described as becoming more fiery, or joining the cosmic fire etc.), and thus such changes modify also the physical set up of the cosmos. This is also strongly related to the point that the cosmic divine principle is identified with one of the physical elements. The dynamic interplay between cosmology and eschatology is also characteristic of Empedocles, as has become more evident than ever with the publication of the Strasbourg papyrus (MARTIN-PRIMAVESI [1999]): the history of the physical constitution of the cosmos and the history of the souls are not independent processes. This conception can be contrasted with those accounts where the relationship between cosmology and eschatology is *static*. This is what we find for example in Plato's great eschatological myths. In these texts, the quite detailed cosmological description is an unalienable part of the narrative, but the cosmological account is static, and the cosmic topography provides only the stage on which the drama of the souls can take place. This point would however need a more thorough analysis, which I cannot undertake here. For some important remarks on this question, see NAGY A. (2000) 91–100.

divine power is fire. True, it is the force of fire whose effect we can immediately perceive in the workings of the sun, the thunderbolt, or the pyre. But fire is neither divine, nor intelligent in itself: it is not more than a brute force. It is only the apparatus with the help of which the cosmic divinity communicates its will to the world. *Pace* Heraclitus, not the thunderbolt steers the world, but Zeus, that is, air, and fire is but a tool in his hand.

As a matter of fact, the Derveni author could point out that in the sentence he quotes in col. 4, Heraclitus apparently *contradicts* his own principal doctrine. For is not the sun the most magnificent cosmic manifestation and concentration of fire? And if the fire of the sun is intelligent and divine in itself, as Heraclitus maintains, then why should it be under the surveillance of Dike and the Erinyes? Is it not true that Dike is, or is a function of, the cosmic intelligence? Conversely, if the sun, this huge mass of fire, fundamental to cosmic order and life, needs some coercive force to ensure that it keeps to its proper measure, then fire cannot be the supreme cosmic intelligence.⁴⁷ By referring to Heraclitus, the Derveni author can insist on the cosmological and eschatological importance of fire; whereas by quoting B3+B94 he can point out that even Heraclitus is obliged to admit that the fire concentrated in the sun is *not* the ultimate intelligent principle.

On this basis, let me offer a tentative free paraphrase of the author's main tenet. Fire – the lightning in a thunderstorm, the burning flames of the pyre, or the fire of Hades – can appear terrifying; but is in fact nothing to be feared.⁴⁸ True, fire is an immense and possibly destructive power, yet it does not act on its own. On the contrary, it is the principal means through which divine justice and intervention can manifest themselves, both at the cosmic level and at the level of the individual soul. Fire is instrumental: its tremendous force is under the control of the supreme divine intelligence, be it called air or Zeus. Just look at the heavenly bodies. That vast amount of fire concentrated in them could, in principle, destroy everything. But once fire is mastered and fashioned in a proper form by the cosmic intelligence, it becomes the source of all becoming. For fire is nothing but the device with the help of which the god, the intelligent divine air, keeps justice and governs the world. Thus, they who have no reason to be afraid of divine retribution should not fear fire either. The fire of the pyre, or that of the thunderbolt, destroys the corpse, but the soul is airy⁴⁹

⁴⁷ These questions, which I am putting in the mouth of the author, indicate genuine problems – irrespective from the Derveni text – since the (Fire-Logos)-Dike-Erinyes-sun relationship is certainly problematic. Dike, as universal Justice, must have a close relationship to the Logos and the ordering fire (cf., e.g., KAHN [1979] 273). SCHÖNBECK (1998) 103ff. lists important questions concerning the sun (HA/OC)-Erinyes relationship. I agree with Schönbeck that the role the Erinyes play in connection with the sun/Helios in the Heraclitus fragment depends on the reading and interpretation of the conditional particle in line 8 of column 4.

⁴⁸ As commonly agreed, the main aim of mysteries was to provide relief from some kind of anxiety connected with eschatology; see, e.g., BURKERT (1987) 21ff.

⁴⁹ That the individual soul is airy is not stated in the papyrus. But in all those systems where we get a physical description of the cosmic divine intellect, the individual soul, or at least the most valuable, rational or divine part of it shares in the basic physical nature of the cosmic divinity. This pattern is certainly present in the respective systems of those philosophers who had the most impact on the Derveni author's doctrines: Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia and Heraclitus. Moreover, Aristotle explicitly states that according to the Orphic *logoi* the soul is something that we breathe in (*De An.* 410b27ff:

and fire has no power over it. Moreover, in so far as the individual soul is assimilated to the cosmic intelligence, fire becomes its helper: by destroying something inferior – the corpse – it promotes the birth of something superior.⁵⁰ The ultimate message, therefore, is the proper understanding of the relationship between air and fire; and the main clue is the exegesis of the verse that the Derveni author quotes from the Orphic poem at a central moment of his commentary:

Ζεὺς βασιλεύς, Ζεὺς δ' ἀρχὸς ἀπαντων ἀργικέραυτος
'Zeus the king, Zeus who rules all with the bright bolt'.

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τοῦτο δὲ πέποιθε καὶ ὁ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς καλουμένοις ἔπειε λόγος· φησὶ γάρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου εἰσεῖναι ἀναπνεύοντων, φερομένην ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων κτλ.)

⁵⁰ The first lines of col. 4, preceding the Heraclitus quotation, seem to express something in this vein: something/someone does something positive rather than doing harm (ἰδοῦναι / μάλλον ἢ] εἰνεται). I wonder if in ὁ κείμε...] μεταθ. there could be a reference to the corpse, cf. LSJ sv. κείμεν I. 4–5.

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SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE ACADEMY*

Summary: The evidence for a philosophical project assignment for the mathematical sciences in the Academy can be traced back to the generation after Plato, and as such it is the result of philosophical reflection on the intellectual enterprise pursued at the Academy. This is then contrasted with the histories of the mathematical sciences compiled in Aristotle's school, which acknowledged the methodological and ontological independence of these disciplines.

Key words: Mathematical sciences at the Academy; Pythagoreans; Eleatics; Aristotle's planetary observations; Eudemus' histories of the mathematical sciences; hypomnematic writings; Eudoxus; Callippus; *sôzein ta phainomena*.

The core of this paper will concern the interaction of philosophy and the sciences in the two most important Athenian philosophical schools of the classical period, the Academy and the Peripatus. To many readers much of what I am going to say will certainly appear as belabouring the obvious. Nevertheless, I shall need to go into some detail about the place of mathematical sciences in the curriculum of Plato's school, and then in the program of research in the Academy and the Peripatus. For contrary to a recently emerging orthodoxy, I shall maintain that at least the Academy was not exclusively a philosophical school and the stories about the philosophical guidance of scientific enquiry conducted there capture important aspects of the atmosphere of its common intellectual enterprise. Needless to say, I shall be able to present only the bare bones of the philological arguments to this effect, and, although it might seem premature to some readers, I shall proceed to some preliminary conclusions from what I hope to have established by the end of the paper.

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1

Any account of the interaction of science and philosophy in the Academy should first take stock of the course of philosophy and science in the preceding centuries. This is certainly not the place to provide an overall view. Instead, as an introduction, I want to stress only a few points about the parallel development, interaction, social and institutional background of science and philosophy.

What stands out most about early Greek philosophy is the almost kaleidoscopic multiplicity of the aims, objectives and methods of this intellectual enterprise – if we are entitled at all to speak about such an enterprise in the singular, instead of presenting our findings about different and competing notions of philosophy in the plural. What needs to be singled out here, even to the exclusion of other Presocratics, are the two *schools*, of the Pythagoreans and the Eleatics, respectively. Unlike other figures in early Greek philosophy both Pythagoreans and Eleatics formed intellectual communities. This is clear in the case of the Pythagoreans, with their alleged almost proverbial secrecy. We do not hear of anything similar in the case of the Eleatics, yet it is remarkable, considering the deviations of students from their masters in other lines of intellectual succession, how Zeno rested content with defending Parmenides' convictions and how cautiously Melissus introduced a few – albeit major – modifications to Parmenidean doctrines, clearly in order to enhance their overall coherence rather than to advance some independent vein of thought. It is also remarkable that these two philosophical schools worked in close proximity to each other in what was called Magna Graecia, in Southern Italy and Sicily. Apart from the traces of Pythagorean influence on Eleatic thought, which suggest some sort of interaction or even affiliation, territorial proximity itself, as Hermann Diels stressed more than a hundred years ago, might account for institutional similarities: confronted with the Pythagorean school the Eleatics had to adopt a similar institutional framework in order to be able to compete for talented young students who would be later suitable colleagues.¹

Although Socrates and the Sophists, in their distinctive ways, also attracted herds of adolescent Athenians on a more or less permanent basis, in their case we cannot speak about the organisation of a school proper: neither Socratic ignorance and the repeated examinations of *bioi* from scratch, nor the itinerant Sophists with their intellectual one-man shows, allowed for systematic enquiry within institutional framework. Pythagoreans and Eleatics, the two earliest schools, are all the more important from the point of the Academy, because Plato clearly drew some inspiration for shaping his school in Athens from what he saw and heard from Pythagorean friends on his visits to Sicily. The little we know about the Pythagoreans tells us that they integrated mathematical instruction and research with a philosophical way of

¹ DIELS, H., "Über die ältesten Philosophenschulen der Griechen," in: *Philosophische Aufsätze. Eduard Zeller zu seinem fünfzigjährigen Doctor-Jubiläum gewidmet.* (Leipzig 1887), 241–60, esp. pp. 247f.

life.² This was, in a modified way, characteristic of the Platonic Academy as well, as I shall argue below in defence of the traditional view.

2

In what follows I shall first pursue what might seem a rather indirect approach. Prior to an evaluation of testimonies about the Academy, I shall discuss what we can learn about the activities of the Academy from the writings of Aristotle, a member of the school for twenty years, from the age of 17 to 37. Since Aristotle's works are the best preserved from all those of Plato's students, we might hope to find some clues in them about the instruction and the ensuing scientific project assignments Aristotle received during his two decades at the school.

First of all there are the repeated and implacable criticisms Aristotle made of the doctrines of Plato, and his followers, particularly Speusippus, Plato's nephew and successor as head of the Academy. Aristotle unceasingly chastises Speusippus for mistaking (a theory or ontology of) mathematics for philosophy. Similar remarks are also made about Plato's other students. This shows that both fields must have been discussed at the school, otherwise there would have been no temptation to mistake (the principles of) the one for (principles of) the other. This alone might be enough to convince some. Nevertheless, since it has been argued recently that the Academy was interested only in the philosophy of mathematics to the exclusion of mathematics proper, we may want to look into Aristotle's knowledge of mathematics, assuming that all or at least most of it was acquired during his formative years at the Academy.

The most momentuous piece of knowledge mentioned is the new theory of proportions, referred to in *Posterior Analytics* I.5. Aristotle says that previously the various forms of proportion – proportions between numbers, lines, volumes and times – were treated separately in a parallel manner, and a theorem intended to apply to all these different forms of proportion had to be proved for these different domains in separate procedures. Aristotle adds that the new theory of proportions makes such a piecemeal procedure superfluous, having been superseded by a general proof.³ Strictly speaking this assertion might be true of theories of proportions other than the Eudoxan theory, nevertheless one would be hard pressed to name any other suitable candidate for a theory of proportions that Aristotle could have had in mind here. But in the present context, it is almost immaterial what theory of proportions Aristotle refers to here, since it is far more important that Aristotle is aware of different proof procedures and of an overall advance from an earlier methodology to novel discoveries. It is certainly not an advance in the philosophy or ontology of mathematics that Aristotle reports, but rather an advance in mathematical methods themselves.

² Note that the order of initiation and instruction is different – Plato will claim that mathematical studies lead up, and are subservient, to the appropriation of dialectics, which provides the deepest philosophical insights.

³ See also *Posterior Analytics* I.24 85a36–b1.

The other major area of mathematical research we encounter in Aristotle's works is astronomy. As explicitly asserted in *Metaphysics* XII.8, Aristotle relies here on the astronomical systems of Eudoxus and Callippus. As Eudoxus features more than once in this discussion, we should take stock of the the evidence for the details of his affiliation to the Academy before making inferences about Aristotle's knowledge of his work.

This affiliation needs scrutiny because, in contrast to the earlier understanding of biographical reports, it is often doubted today whether Eudoxus worked at the Academy at all. This is clearly falling into the other extreme. We are told that he spent some time at Athens and that his students remained for some time at the Academy after he had returned to his native Cnidus. This suggests that he took part in the debates and enquiries of the Academy not as an occasional guest, but in the capacity of somebody with some sort of regular affiliation – would we expect occasional guests to bring a whole retinue of their own students, and then leave? We are told that he spoke of Plato after his death in words of utmost reverence. We also hear of a debate between Menaechmus, a student of Eudoxus, and Speusippus and Amphinomus on the status of mathematical knowledge. This latter piece of information – unless “the debate [is] not historically factual, but the product of [Proclus’] understanding of the difference latent in two Academic theories of geometrical demonstration”⁴ – is most valuable because it shows to what extent his students, the “school” of Eudoxus if you wish, was able to retain its intellectual integrity, in the course of encounters with members of the Academy. All this suggests that it is not the particular form of affiliation that is important here. What needs to be stressed is that, in whatever institutional form, Eudoxus (and his students) clearly engaged in an ongoing dialogue with Plato and his disciples. This was nothing out of the ordinary. Athens at the time was the unrivalled intellectual centre of Greece – one recalls Plato's fictional dialogues about Parmenides and Zeno visiting Athens and meeting the young Socrates there, surrounded by an exclusively small audience; or other dialogues that feature various intellectual luminaries or their disciples. It was not exceptional, either on Aristotle's or on Eudoxus' part, or even on the part of Eudoxus' students, to visit Athens and take part in the intellectual exchange there. As there is no doubt that Eudoxus visited Athens several times, a school interested in the progress of mathematical research could easily have had access to his important mathematical and astronomical discoveries.

After these general considerations we should turn to what Aristotle tells us about Eudoxus. The first, not yet mathematical or astronomical testimony is in *Nicomachean Ethics* X.2. There Eudoxus is said to propound an important, metaphysically loaded theory of value that underpins an ethical doctrine. Although it cannot be excluded, it does seem unwarranted to stipulate that Aristotle learnt about this doctrine only through intermediaries after Eudoxus' death. If, however, Aristotle could have had first hand information on ethical considerations by Eudoxus, then we have

⁴ As BOWEN, Alan C., “Menaechmus versus the Platonists: Two Theories of Science in the Early Academy,” *Ancient Philosophy* 3 (1983) p. 15 formulates the alternative he finds less appealing.

no reason to doubt that he could also gain first hand information on his mathematical results.⁵

Putting aside Aristotle's testimony about Eudoxus' theory of values, the next step is to determine when Aristotle could have learnt the details of the Eudoxan theory of celestial motions. Since I cannot go into details here, I can only dogmatically assert that attempts to sever (as later additions) the more technical remarks in *De caelo* II.12 from the rest of that work do not carry conviction. The theory propounded there is in the same vein as in the preceding chapters of the second book of *De caelo*. At the same time there is a marked difference between the system of homocentric spheres propounded here and in *Metaphysics* XII.8. This suggests that the latter indeed is a later addition to the general investigation of the principles of substance. These two chapters, one early and one late, attest then to Aristotle's life long interest in the development of contemporary theoretical astronomy.⁶

But there is more to Aristotle's interest in astronomy than these two chapters with their slightly differing versions of theories of homocentric spheres. Aristotle reports on two astronomical observations he himself made. The first is in the very same chapter of *De caelo* that describes the nested spheres of Eudoxus, at 292a3ff. Aristotle tells of having observed himself how Mars was occulted by the crescent Moon in its first quarter. There are four possible dates for this observation between 380 and 320 BCE: March 20, 361 BCE, May 4, 357 BCE, June 24, 340 BCE and September 7, 336 BCE.⁷ At the time of the first two occultations Aristotle was a student or junior member at the Academy. In 340 he most probably was at the Macedonian court in Pella and in 336 in his hometown Stagira. Clearly the more likely dates for these observations are the first two: the observation Aristotle refers to needed ex-

⁵ Objection: Plato apparently does not know about the Eudoxan system of homocentric celestial spheres, which do not appear even in the *Laws*. Neither is there any hint to it in the later pseudo-Platonic *Epinomis* (appendix to the *Laws*). The objection remains unconvincing: the *Epinomis* certainly does not have to be any more modern than the Platonic dialogues it imitates, whereas Plato, writing dialogues, did not have to follow up the latest results in the sciences, when he was admittedly reporting a conversation between speakers who were no experts in mathematical astronomy.

⁶ Aristotle's metaphysical use of theoretical astronomy can be paralleled by Theophrastus' remarks in his *Metaphysics* about the limits of the contribution of astronomy to the investigation of first principles.

⁷ The computations of these occultations were kindly made for me by Chris Peat of the Heavens Above GmbH <www.heavens-above.com>. For the calculations the new long duration planetary and lunar ephemerides (DE-406/LE-406) of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (Pasadena, Calif.) were used, for the clock error of the Earth's rotation the value for ΔT as given in: F. R. STEPHENSON, *Historical Eclipses and Earth's Rotation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Output from the Horizons ephemeris system of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the NASA, accessible at <http://ssd.jpl.nasa.gov/horizons.html>, indicates that the 8 September 336 BCE occultation was not visible from Greece. Moreover, according to the Horizons system the 24–25 June 340 BCE occultation was quite close to the horizon, Mars – as viewed from Pella – is indicated to reappear from behind the Moon thirty minutes before its setting. If we take into consideration that the clock error of the Earth's rotation has a comparable margin of precision for Aristotle's times, there is a very slight probability that the second phase of the 340 BCE occultation did not occur above the horizon of Pella. But neither this consideration, nor the rejection of the 8 September 336 BCE occultation affects the claim that Aristotle's observational reports were linked to the Academy (cf. also note 7 above). (I am grateful to Prof. Henry Mendell for advice on the occultations and on the Horizons system.)

pert guidance. It is easiest to suppose that Aristotle was alerted to the impending occultation by someone who was making regular observations, and had at least a short range method for projecting the planetary paths. This series of observations did not require a Eudoxan theory. If we accept the most pessimistic estimates about Eudoxus' visits to Athens, he was not even at Athens during the years between 367 BCE and 350 BCE. If the occultation Aristotle talks about is either the one in 361 or in 357 BCE, then Aristotle must have been exposed to an ongoing collection of ephemerides that allowed him to follow the most spectacular sightings of these observations. Similarly it can be argued that if Aristotle made the observation he described in *De caelo* only later at Pella or when he was already in Stagira, he most probably took with himself to these (at least intellectually) more provincial locations the project of research incorporating observational astronomy from Athens, and then most probably from the Academy.

The other observation Aristotle reports on is far less easy to fix to a particular date: Aristotle says in *Meteorology* I.6 343b30 that he has observed the conjunction of one of the stars of Gemini with the planet Jupiter. As we do not know which of the many stars within the constellation he is referring to, we can only give the years when Jupiter spent several months in that constellation.⁸ As these follow each other in periods of twelve years, only three observational seasons could have been applicable: 359 BCE (when Aristotle was at the Academy), 347 BCE (when he was still at the Academy or already at Assos) and 335 BCE (when he was in Stagira, or already back in Athens). Again, we can infer that either Aristotle could at least have dropped in occasionally at an ongoing series of observations in Athens, presumably at the Academy; or that he had set up something similar later when he was away from Athens in Assos or Stagira. Either way, the research most probably followed the pattern he had encountered in Athens during the years at the Academy.⁹

3

Now we can turn to the traditional testimonies by later authors on the Academy. Remarkably enough, defenders of an internalist account of the development of mathematics could only claim, with all their sceptical arsenal, that the notion of a collaboration or a philosophical project assignment within mathematics and astronomy went back to Academic circles in the late fourth century BCE. There are two points to stress about this evasive move: Firstly, this date is perilously close to Plato's lifetime (he died in 347 BCE), and a school tradition over a generation or a generation and a half might as well contain some important grain of truth. Secondly, even if

⁸ These computations have also been kindly supplied to me by Chris Peat.

⁹ In a recent note, ("A lunar occultation of Mars observed by Aristotle," *Journal for the History of Astronomy* 31 (2000) 342–344) F. Richard STEPHENSON reports that his computations produce May 4, 357 BCE as the sole possible date for the occultation between 370 BCE (when Aristotle was 14) and Aristotle's death in 322 BCE. Note that the rejection of the other three dates does not affect the status of mathematical and astronomical research at the Academy, as it squarely situates the observation during the years of Aristotle's tenure there.

these stories originate from the Old Academy, they are transmitted by intermediaries who cannot be suspected of much love for Plato and his school. Eratosthenes, head of the Alexandrian library, and for a while disciple of Arcesilaus of the Middle Academy, had no particular inclination towards orthodox Platonism. His choice of the dialogue form and of a plot where the Delian problem of doubling the volume of the cube is submitted to a (beyond doubt, fictitious) gathering of Plato, Archytas, Eudoxus and Menaechmus was designed to present alternative solutions to the problem.¹⁰ The role Eratosthenes assigns to Plato in this dialogue is a resounding tribute to his alleged insight into the nature of geometric research. Such tribute, as even sceptical historians of mathematics admit, must have rested on some source from within the Old Academy. The Epicurean (!) philosopher, Philodemus (1st c. BCE) in his *Academica* (preserved on a papyrus roll from Herculanaeum) quotes an author who describes Plato as the organiser and architect of scientific enterprises. Guesses as to the identity of the quoted author range from Dicaearchus (a disciple of Aristotle's) to Philip of Opus (a disciple and, in fact, secretary of Plato, credited with editing Plato's *Laws* and writing the *Epinomis*). With both options we reach the generation after Plato, as it is highly unlikely that the Peripatetic Dicaearchus would assert such architectonic activity without previous testimonies to this effect. Of less weight is the testimony about this alleged organisational activity of Plato by Sosigenes, a Peripatetic (!) commentator from the first century CE and teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias. He attributes to Plato the program of *sôzein ta phainomena* (saving the appearances) i.e., accounting for the apparently irregular motions of the planets by means of a combination of circular motions. Again, this was probably no mere conjecture on Sosigenes' part: he presumably relied on a school tradition. Notice that some cardinal elements of this school tradition are present when Theo Smyrnaeus, a contemporary of Sosigenes quotes the account of Adrastus, which also described the task and endeavours of the ancient astronomers in this idiom.¹¹ Plato is explicitly credited neither with setting this task for the astronomers, nor even with observing

¹⁰ The solutions of Archytas, Eudoxus and Menaechmus are also presented in Eratosthenes' letter and in his dedicatory epigram to Ptolemy, where he stresses the feasibility of his own solution, by means of a special device, the *mesolabê*, that can construct means between given magnitudes.

¹¹ The expression is not present in Aristotle's writings, instead he describes the aim of introducing Callippus' additional spheres into Eudoxus' system (*Metaphysics* XII.8 1073b36–37) and of adding his own counteracting spheres to the Callippian system (1073b38–1074a1) in terms of *apodidonai ta phainomena* (render the appearances). Prior to Sosigenes we find the phrase used for the fit of a theory with the data it is supposed to explain in the 2nd century BCE by Attalus (quoted and criticised by Hipparchus) and by Hipparchus himself. Then the expression is employed by Geminus (as reported by Simplicius, see below), and Adrastus (as excerpted by Theo) – who even recasts Aristotle's *apodidonai ta phainomena* in this idiom at 180.9f HILLER –, and among the contemporaries of Sosigenes by Plutarch (about Aristarchus). Note that the occurrence of the expression in 2nd century BCE astronomical literature might allow that when Simplicius' report (at *In De caelo* 497.17–22 = Eudemos fr. 149 WEHRLI) on Eudemos' report about Callippus' reasons for introducing his additional spheres is formulated in terms of saving the appearances, the phrase need not necessarily have been introduced by Simplicius, but might as well have already been present in Eudemos' report. (Cf. also Simplicius' reports on Heraclides of Pontus' celestial theory in Heraclides frr. 106, 107, 108 and 110 WEHRLI, (the last item being a quote of Alexander from Geminus' *Epitome of Posidonius' Meteorology*) in terms of saving the appearances.)

the constraints ensuing from it for astronomical theory,¹² but Adrastus in fact imputes far more to Plato than Sosigenes, when he asserts the vastly more momentous, and in fact impossible, claim that Plato preferred a theory of epicycles to a theory of eccentric circles.¹³ The difference, then, between Sosigenes and Adrastus will be that Adrastus does not claim that the program was actually formulated and set as a task for astronomers by Plato himself, but that he himself reached the (by contemporary methodological standards) sound and in its essential insights valid solution. Consequently, in the presence of these even stronger claims we cannot credit Sosigenes with *originating* the story about Plato's formulating the essential tasks for contemporary astronomers: in an intellectual climate in which Adrastus' account could find credence, in view of the passage in *Republic* VII where Plato calls for a radical reform of the astronomical enterprise and demands that astronomers should, instead of paying almost exclusive attention to the actual paths of the celestial bodies, rather be prepared to treat these issues in problems (*problêmasin*), the conclusion was inescapable that Plato not only employed the most up to date methodology of saving the appearances, but was also responsible for its introduction as a research program. Again, behind the assertion of a Peripatetic interpreter we encounter a school tradition which stretches back at least to Adrastus' time.

Clearly, among the three testimonies the first two are more important. Not because they would be more trustworthy reporters of historical facts of the actual course of interaction between metaphysics and mathematics, but because they can be traced back to the generation after Plato. They represent the way the Old Academy wanted to project itself as the centre of research among other contemporary institutions. Sosigenes' report is important, not so much for adding further details to this portrayal, but rather as evidence of the fact that later historiographers of Greek philosophy and science, whether Epicureans or Peripatetics, could describe the early history of the mathematical disciplines only in the idiom provided by the Academy. There were no alternative constructions available. When modern historians of science defend internalist accounts, all they can do is to excise all these Academic intrusions. Even if

¹² See, however, 160.18 HILLER, where in a passage describing how a theory of epicycles saves the appearances, Plato's assent – albeit only to the annual motion of the Sun along the ecliptic – is mentioned. Nothing in the passage suggests that Plato's assent would be limited to this motion only, and that he would not have subscribed to the overarching methodological considerations mentioned here.

¹³ See pp. 188f HILLER. Note that although the claim is patently false, in an anachronistically technical idiom, it grasps a major feature of Plato's account about planetary motion. As reconstructed by Wilbur KNORR, "Plato and Eudoxus on Planetary Motions," *Journal for the History of Astronomy* 21 (1990) 113–123 the Platonic account cannot be brought into line with a Eudoxan theory of homocentric spheres, as it acknowledges three components in planetary motion: diurnal rotation, rotation in the opposite direction, characteristic to the planet itself (its mean period), and a third factor that can move in both directions, thus accounting for the retrogradations and progressions of the planet. If this third component must also be produced by a regular, circular motion, the easiest paradigm will be a rudimentary theory of epicycles. This suggests that, as soon as a theory of epicycles had been proposed, it could have appeared a most natural claim that Plato had also already adumbrated such a theory. Adrastus' claim should be compared with the similar remark at 202.6f HILLER, in the Dercyllides section of Theo's work, where it is asserted that Plato maintained the astronomical hypotheses which rule out the introduction of eccentric celestial paths. Dercyllides, however, does not contrast a theory of eccenters with a theory of epicycles, but rather with the theory of homocentric spheres of (Eudoxus,) Menaechmus, Callippus and Aristotle.

modern historians are right in claiming that Eudemus' histories of mathematics and astronomy did not contain stories about Plato, Eudemus did not present self-contained disciplinary histories in a way that would have made such an interaction utterly implausible.

4

On balance, then, two points should be allowed. Firstly, that instruction at the Academy must have included some exposure to recent developments in mathematics and astronomy. The tradition we have encountered in so many, and so many different sources, which credits Plato with an authority to direct research leading to these developments, may represent the result of philosophical reflection on this fact.

The second point is connected to the first, and can be best approached by stating my reason for dealing with science and philosophy in such detail. After all, our workshop is concerned with the ways intellectuals are influenced by the patterns available within the humanities. Certainly, a lot could be said about instances of such influence in the case of the Academy or the Peripatus. However, these would not necessarily reveal a feature of fundamental significance about the philosophical enterprise in these schools. While in Presocratic philosophy the scientific and the philosophical enterprise often merged, these two schools stand at the crossroads where these traditions have begun to drift apart intellectually and institutionally. The fact is that, in their distinctive ways both pursued grand projects of reintegration: the Academy in the form of an imaginary rather than real metaphysical tutelage of the mathematical sciences, the Peripatus by acknowledging the autonomy of these disciplines,¹⁴ and by producing an encyclopedic collection of their rationally reconstructed histories. These histories, together with the vast collections of data (e.g. of the institutional and social history of Greece), and the theoretical and doctrinal compendia (e.g. of different philosophical subjects and schools) constitute the class of hypomnematic writings among the works of the Peripatetic philosophers. But the fact that these writings belong to the class of hypomnematic works cannot conceal the fact that the relationship between the histories of the different sciences and the sciences themselves is fundamentally different from the relationship of the other collections and compendia to the fields of enquiry where they were put to use. Hence, albeit writing the histories of the mathematical sciences, or even of medicine, was a project of major philosophical significance, these histories did not collect raw material for the actual research into these fields, nor were there any presuppositions that mathematical research should conform to philosophical considerations.

Plato's precepts about how to treat and regulate poets and musicians in the ideal city need not be recounted here. It will suffice to stress that, for these philosophers, the humanities could present an acute problem, one that needed treatment or

¹⁴ See Aristotle's remarks about the relationship between astronomy and metaphysics to this effect. The results of astronomy had to be accepted by the student of theology/metaphysics only to become objects for further theological analysis.

even a cure for the sake of a healthy social organism, yet they did not see any need to argue over the demarcation line between the humanities and philosophy. Such a line of demarcation between philosophy and the mathematical sciences was, on the other hand, in the process of being constituted through the ongoing debate in the circle of Plato and his students about the nature of mathematical objects and the status of mathematical knowledge. By writing the histories of the different sciences in a way that acknowledged their methodological and ontological independence, Aristotle and his disciples provided, in turn, a new and highly successful framework for this demarcation. Thus they were able to break definitively with the Pythagorean tradition of integrating philosophical insight and mathematical research, as transformed and continued in the Academy.¹⁵

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¹⁵ Besides being the originator of what can be called an internalist historiography of the mathematical sciences, the Lycaean also prepared the way for the activities of the Alexandrian library. It is interesting to note that the classificatory, cataloguing and organisational labour of the Alexandrian library effected a new form of the integration of the different branches of knowledge. Without going into details, one should recall here that Eratosthenes, one of the authors who reintroduced the notion of philosophically supervised mathematical research in the Old Academy, was chief librarian at Alexandria.

ATTILA SIMON

DAS WUNDERBARE UND DAS VERWUNDERN

DIE ANTHROPOLOGISCHEN BEZIEHUNGEN DES BEGRIFFS DES *THAUMASTON* IN DER ARISTOTELISCHEN *POETIK*

Summary: This study discusses the anthropological implications of the concept of *thaumaston* (astonishing, astonishment) in Aristotle's *Poetics*. The astonishment caused by the works of art does not end in the stable knowledge (differently from the case of theoretical sciences). We cannot have any total knowledge about the *praxis* represented by *mimesis* – just it is the attractiveness of art.

Key words: astonishing, astonishment, learning, understanding, *thaumaston*, *mimesis*, *praxis*, *phronesis*.

Bekanntlich spielt der Begriff des Wunderbaren (*θαυμαστόν*) eine wichtige Rolle bei der Wirkungstheorie der aristotelischen *Poetik*.¹ Das *θαυμαστόν* ist ein wirksames Element bei der Erzeugung der *ἐκπληξίς*, diese ist wiederum unentbehrlich für die Erregung des *ἔλεος* und des *φόβος*. Insofern ist das Wunderbare nicht nur „ein wirkungsvolles, sondern ein notwendiges Element der Tragödie“.² Aus den Erklärungen der strukturellen Elemente der Tragödie³ geht es klar hervor, dass die als Erschütterung (*ἐκπληξίς*) begriffene Wirkung sich aus zwei gegensätzlichen Vorgängen ergibt: Einerseits müssen die Wiedererkennung und die Peripetie sich der Wahrscheinlichkeit oder der Notwendigkeit gemäß (*κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ ἀναγκαῖον*) vollziehen,⁴ andererseits aber müssen sie unerwartet, überraschend sein. Diese zweifache Forderung der Unerwartetheit, Unvorhersehbarkeit, Unberechenbarkeit und der organischen, auf Wahrscheinlichkeit oder Notwendigkeit beruhenden Beziehung erfüllt sich gleichzeitig im Begriff des *Wunderbaren*. Von dem Verhältnis zwischen der Tragödie und dem Wunderbaren spricht am aufschlussreichsten die fünfte Forde-

¹ Siehe darüber ausführlicher meine Studie: Das *thaumaston* in der Tragödie. Zur Wirkungstheorie der *Poetik* des Aristoteles. *ACD* XXXVI (2000), 11–24.

² Aristoteles, *Poetik*. Einl., Komm. usw. von A. GUDEMAN. Berlin–Leipzig 1934, 424, 217. „It is in fact the key not only to Aristotle's conception of the complex plot but to his doctrine of *hamartia* and catharsis, and thereby to his apparent (...) view of the »tragic«.“ *Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument*. By G. F. ELSE. Leiden 1957, 329 f. Ähnlich E. S. BELFIORE, *Tragic Pleasures. Aristotle on Plot and Emotion*. Princeton NJ 1992, 222.

³ *Poet.* 1455a 17–19, 1454a 2–4 und 1452a 22–26; vgl. 1452a 24, 33 und 1454b 31–34.

⁴ Vgl. 1451a 37–38.

rung (1452a 1–11), die Aristoteles an den Mythos gestellt hat.⁵ Entsprechend der im siebenten Kapitel abgefassten Forderung müssen die Ereignisse eine organische Einheit bilden, auseinander folgen und in kausalem Zusammenhang miteinander (δι' ἄλληλα) stehen. Daraus ergibt sich, dass der Zuschauer aufgrund des Wahrscheinlichen oder Notwendigen das Dargestellte für möglich hält, dass er aus ihnen einen kohärenten, rational nachvollziehbaren Sinnzusammenhang zusammenstellen kann. Gleichzeitig aber können die Furcht und das Mitleid mit Hilfe des Unerwarteten hervorgerufen werden, durch „Täuschen“ der Meinungen und Erwartungen. Die Formulierung παρὰ τὴν δόξαν bezieht sich eben darauf: sie bezeichnet nicht Sinnlosigkeit, sondern Ereignisse solcher Art, die gerade dem gegenüberstehen, was wir erwarten, es handelt sich also um unerwartete, aber logisch eintretende Geschehnisse.⁶

Die Wirkung des Wunderbaren lässt sich in zwei Momente aufteilen, sie fasst emotionelle und kognitive Leistungen in sich.⁷

1. Das Unerwartete im Wunderbaren hebt die Gültigkeit unserer vorherigen Vermutungen auf, wodurch das Sicherheitsgefühl der Menschen erschüttert und solcherweise in ihnen Furcht und Mitleid erweckt werden.⁸ Das Wunderbare trägt also durch die Erweckung der notwendigen Affekte, seine rührend-erschütternde Wirkung, d. h. eine Art unmittelbaren emotionellen Erlebnisses, zum „Lernen“ des Zuschauers der Tragödie bei: das leidenschaftliche Erleben der Unberechenbarkeit, folglich der Beirrbarkeit und der Verletzlichkeit mag ein wirkungsvolles Mittel gegen *hybris* sein. Im Fall der Tragödie trägt die Erschütterung, die besonders das Wunderbare hervorrufen kann, verknüpft mit den Peripetien und Wiedererkennungen sowie mit dem Leid, zur Lehre bei, dass „human suffering is in fact likely even when it appears unexpected.“⁹

2. Das Wunderbare aber, weil es nicht nur der Regel des Unerwarteten, sondern auch der rationalen Erkennbarkeit entgegenkommt, trägt über seine rührend-erschütternde Wirkung auch zum „Lernen“ (zum „Selbstverstehen“) des Zuschauers der Tragödie bei. Das Wunderbare (θαυμαστόν) spielt nämlich nicht nur als affektive (und erst dadurch „lehrende“ oder „erziehende“) Wirkung, sondern – im Begriff des θαυμάζειν (erstaunen, verwundern) – auch als wichtiges Moment der anthropologischen Begründung der im allgemeinen mit dem Lernen zusammenhängenden mimetischen Tätigkeit eine Rolle im Denken des Aristoteles. Im Folgenden, nach der

⁵ Die Passage lautet: „Die Darstellung hat nicht nur eine in sich geschlossene Handlung zum Gegenstand, sondern auch Furchtbares und Mitleiderregendes [καὶ φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλεεινῶν]. Diese Wirkungen kommen vor allem dann zustande, wenn die Ereignisse wider Erwarten [παρὰ τὴν δόξαν] eintreten und gleichwohl folgerichtig auseinander [δι' ἄλληλα] hervorgehen. So haben sie nämlich mehr den Charakter des Wunderbaren, als wenn sie in wechselseitiger Unabhängigkeit und durch Zufall [ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου καὶ τῆς τύχης] vonstatten gehen usw.“ Zitiert in der deutschen Übersetzung von M. Fuhrmann (Aristoteles, *Poetik*. Übers. und hrsg. von M. FUHRMANN. Stuttgart 1994). Die Übersetzung ist terminologisch geändert.

⁶ ELSE, 329 f., W. SÖFFING, *Deskriptive und normative Bestimmungen in der Poetik des Aristoteles*. Amsterdam 1981, 119.

⁷ S. HALLIWELL, *Aristotle's Poetics*. London 1986, 75. Vgl. S. MATUSCHEK, *Über das Staunen. Eine ideengeschichtliche Analyse*. Tübingen 1991, 24–39.

⁸ *Rhet.* 1383a 8–12, 1382b 25 f.

⁹ BELFIORE, 134. Vgl. HALLIWELL, 76–81.

obigen Charakterisierung der einen Funktion des Wunderbaren (in der lateinischen rhetorischen Tradition: *movere*), untersuche ich seine angedeutete zweite, nicht weniger grundsätzliche, das Erkennen motivierende Rolle (*docere*).

In einem ersten Schritt stelle ich die psychologische Bestimmtheit des Strebens nach Wissen dar, dann untersuche ich die Bedeutung des Verwunderns im philosophischen Forschen, und endlich versuche ich zu beweisen, dass dem Wunderbaren in diesem weiten Sinne nicht nur durch die tragischen Affekte, sondern überhaupt im Zusammenhang mit dem menschlichen Leben (*βίος*), Tätigkeit (*ἐνέργεια*) oder Handeln (*πρᾶξις*) eine „lehrende“ Funktion zufallen kann.

1. DIE PSYCHOLOGIE DES VERWUNDERNS

Das Eigentümliche des Menschen, das ihn unter anderen Lebewesen auszeichnet, ist nach Aristoteles, dass er Vernunft (*νοῦς*) hat, verständig und rational (*κατὰ λόγον, μετὰ λόγου*) zu handeln vermag. Eigentümlicher Zweck und Aufgabe des menschlichen Lebens ist, dieses hervorragende, von allen anderen Lebewesen unterscheidende Organ und Vermögen ins Werk zu setzen: „Wir nehmen nun an, dass die dem Menschen eigentümliche Leistung ist: ein Tätigsein der Seele gemäß dem rationalen Element oder jedenfalls nicht ohne dieses“; „setzen wir als Aufgabe und Leistung des Menschen eine bestimmte Lebensform und als deren Inhalt ein Tätigsein und Wirken der Seele, gestützt auf ein rationelles Element“.¹⁰ Das Lernen (*μανθάνειν*) ist das Mittel der Aneignung des vernünftigen Handelns.

Neben die teleologische Erklärung der Ethik kann eine kausale („physische“), die in der *Rhetorik* aufzufinden ist, gestellt werden (freilich steht auch im Hintergrund der letzteren eine teleologische Erklärung im Sinne von „Zweck-Ursache“). Da wird das Lernen mit dem Verwundern in Zusammenhang gebracht: „Auch Lernen [*τὸ μανθάνειν*] und Verwundern [*τὸ θαυμάζειν*] ist in den meisten Fällen angenehm [*ἡδὺ*], denn im Verwundern steckt die Begierde zu lernen, so dass das Wunderbare [*τὸ θαυμάσιον*] etwas Begehrtes ist, im Lernen der Vorgang, sich in den naturgemäßen Zustand zu versetzen.“¹¹

Im Sinne dieser Erklärung ist nicht das Verwundern selbst angenehm, sondern es ruft bloß die Begierde zu lernen hervor (*ἐπιθυμεῖν μάθεῖν*). Das Lernen selber aber ist angenehm, weil es uns in den naturgemäßen Zustand versetzt (*<τὸ> εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καθίστασθαι*). Vom Genuss her wird das Verwundern dem Lernen untergeordnet (d. h. dem Wissen, nachdem die „natürliche Ordnung“ „wiederhergestellt“ worden ist). Das Verwundern ist angenehm, weil in ihm (Wissens)Begierde steckt, und wenn diese Begierde in Erfüllung geht, stellt sich die natürliche Ordnung wieder her, was mit dem Gefühl des Genusses einhergeht. Das Verwundern ist nur angenehm, weil wir in ihm zu lernen begehren, und diese Begierde wird meistens erfüllt

¹⁰ EN 1098a 7f.; 1098a 13f.; vgl. 1097b 22–28. Aristoteles, *Nikomachische Ethik*. Übersetzt von F. DIRLMEIER. Berlin 1956.

¹¹ *Rhet.* 1371a 31–34. Aristoteles, *Rhetorik*. Übersetzt und hrsg. von G. KRAPINGER. Stuttgart 1999. Die Übersetzung ist terminologisch geändert.

(wenn wir das zu Lernende erlernen, wenn wir dies vermögen). Das zu Lernende ist zugleich das Begehrte (ὥστε τὸ θαυμαστόν ἐπιθυμητόν), und das ist ein Umstand, der bei weitem nicht zu vernachlässigen ist: mit dieser Begierde gewinnt man gleichsam eine Anregung mehr zum Vollenden seiner eigentümlichen Aufgabe. Diese Komponente muss wohl auf Grund des physiologischen Gepräges der hier entfaltenen Lehre vom Genuss auftauchen: denn hier ist das Nicht-Wissen ein vom Mangel bestimmter Zustand, der unangenehm und schmerzlich ist, während man nach der Genuss-Lehre der *Nikomachischen Ethik* nicht darum nach Wissen strebt, weil man früher ein schmerzliches Mangelgefühl hatte.

Das zu Lernende ist also zugleich etwas Begehrtes. Eine so radikale Verknüpfung von Begierde und Lernen findet sich bei Aristoteles an keiner anderen Stelle. Die Begierde wirkt bei der Selbsterhaltung und Fortpflanzung mit, der verständige Teil der Seele hat aber eine andere Funktion. Das Streben nach Wissen erhält aber auch an anderen Stellen eine psychologische Erklärung, und zwar eben durch den Begriff des Strebens (ὄρεξις); das Streben nach Wissen ist eine ebenso starke natürliche Triebkraft wie unsere anderen Bestrebungen, obwohl es nicht unmittelbar für die Lebensfunktionen zuständig ist. Zum Beispiel steht im berühmten ersten Satz der *Metaphysik* ein auf das Wissen zu beziehendes Verb, das der ὄρεξις verwandt ist: „Alle Menschen streben von Natur aus [ὁρέγονται φύσει] nach Wissen.“¹²

Im Werk *Über die Seele* wird dargelegt, dass die Begierde (ἐπιθυμία), der Mut (θῦμος) und der Wille (βούλησις) Teile des Strebens (ὄρεξις) sind.¹³ Die Begierde ist das Streben nach dem Angenehmen; das Angenehme aber steht hier mit der Wahrnehmung, d. h. mit leiblichen Erscheinungen, im Zusammenhang: „Für die wahrnehmenden Wesen aber gibt es auch Lust und Schmerz, Lust- und Schmerzvolles, und wo es das gibt, besteht auch Begierde. Diese ist ja Streben nach dem Lustvollen.“¹⁴ Zugleich aber steht, wie es in der *Metaphysik* und in der Arbeit *Über die Seele* entfaltet ist, zwischen der Wahrnehmung und dem Denken keine undurchdringliche Mauer. Das Streben ist in jedem Seelenteil da und hat eine eigentümliche Funktion. Der sich an Überlegung anknüpfende Wille, der im verständigen Seelenteil entsteht und zum Streben wird, ist der edlere Verwandte der Begierde; sie sind verwandt durch den Begriff des Strebens, das alle die verschiedenen Seelenteile durchzieht. „Dazu kommt der strebende Teil, der nach Begriff und Vermögen von allen anderen verschieden zu sein scheint. Und es ist auch unsinnig, diesen auseinanderzureißen [διασπᾶν]. Denn im überlegenden Teil gibt es den Willen, im unvernünftigen Begierde und Mut. Wenn die Seele aber dreiteilig ist, dann wird in jedem Teil ein Streben sein.“¹⁵

Die Bewegung des Lebewesens, also auch des Menschen, die für die Selbsterhaltung grundlegend ist, ergibt sich nicht von der Vernunft, sondern vom Streben her. Dies bewirkt, dass die Begierde die verständige Überlegung überlisten kann: In bestimmten Fällen stellt sich das Streben gegen die Überlegung, die Macht der Be-

¹² *Met.* 980a 21. Aristoteles, *Metaphysik*. Übersetzt und hrsg. von F. F. SCHWARZ. Stuttgart 1997.

¹³ *De an.* 414b 2. Aristoteles, *Über die Seele*. Übersetzt von W. THEILER. Berlin 1959.

¹⁴ *De an.* 414b 4–6.

¹⁵ *De an.* 432b 3–7.

gierde ist gelegentlich größer als die der Vernunft. Und Aristoteles behauptet am Ende der Passage, dass die Begierde (*Rhetorik*) eine bestimmte Art des Strebens sei (*Metaphysik*). „So ist das Bewegende etwas Einheitliches, das Strebevermögen. Wenn es nämlich zwei wären, die Vernunft und das Streben, würden sie dank einer gemeinsamen Art (Form) bewegen. Nun aber scheint die Denkkraft nicht ohne Streben zu bewegen – denn der Wille ist ein Streben; wenn man sich aber nach der Überlegung bewegt, bewegt man sich auch nach dem Willen –, das Streben aber bewegt auch entgegen der Überlegung; denn *die Begierde ist eine Art Streben* [ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ὁρεξις τίς ἐστιν].“¹⁶

Das Streben nach Wissen lässt sich also als eine eigentümliche Wirkungsweise der grundsätzlichen, zur Selbsterhaltung nötigen Sphäre der psychologischen Konstitution des Menschen deuten. Die durch das Wunderbare erweckte Verwunderung fügt sich in diese naturbestimmte Struktur ein und fördert ihr Funktionieren.

2. DIE VERWUNDERUNG UND DIE PHILOSOPHIE

Nach Aristoteles ist Triebkraft und Ursprung des Strebens nach Wissen die Verwunderung, das Erstaunen. Am besten richtet sie sich aber auf etwas, was wirklich erkennbar ist, was *nicht anders sein kann als so, wie es eben ist*. Weniger wertvoll, aber nicht wertlos ist die Verwunderung, die sich auf solches bezieht, was *auch anders sein kann*. Die Verwunderung ist nach Aristoteles sehr bedeutend, sogar von größter Bedeutung im Hinblick auf das Wissen – aber allein als ein Zustand, der zu überwinden und aufzuheben ist.¹⁷ Der Wissende wundert sich nicht mehr. Die Verwunderung ist zwar der Anfang des Erkennens, aber auf keinen Fall sein Ziel. Wenn die Kunstwerke uns immer wieder verwundern, ohne aber uns zum Besitz des Wissens zu führen, so sind sie doch weniger wertvoll als die Philosophie – obwohl sie nicht völlig nutzlos sind.

Nach Aristoteles ist das Wunderbarste die Weisheit (σοφία), die erste Philosophie (πρώτη φιλοσοφία), das Erkennen der Ursachen (τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν); seine Ansichten über das Erstaunen als Ursprung der Philosophie sind in ihrer grundsätzlichen Tendenz ähnlich den diesbezüglichen Vorstellungen Platos. Im Dialog *Theätet* sagt Sokrates: „Denn dein Zustand [τοῦτο τὸ πάθος], die Verwunderung [τὸ θαυμάζειν], ist recht typisch für einen Philosophen. Es gibt nämlich keinen anderen Anfang [ἀρχή] der Philosophie, als die Verwunderung.“¹⁸ Die Philosophie entspringt der Verwunderung. Dem Philosophen ist eigen, sich auch über solches verwundern zu können, was die Anderen vielleicht nicht einmal bemerken. Die bloße Verwunderung ist aber an sich noch keine Philosophie, der Philosoph ist nicht einfach ein bloßer verwunderter Mensch – mehr als fraglich ist, ob es überhaupt so etwas wie

¹⁶ *De an.* 433a 21–26. Die Hervorhebung von mir: A. S.

¹⁷ Vgl. J. LEAR, *Aristotle: the desire to understand*. Cambridge 1988, 6, bzw. die ganze Einleitung (1–14), die deutlich macht, dass Lear unter „understand“ die Erklärung, das Angeben der Ursache versteht.

¹⁸ *Theätet* 155D. Platon, *Theätet*. Übersetzt und hrsg. von E. MARTENS. Stuttgart 1989.

bloße Verwunderung gibt –, der sich im Verwundern vergesse, sich ihm hingebe, und der durch das Wunder einfach gebannt, befremdet, geblendet sei. Der Philosoph will das Wunder *erklären*, das Wundern über das Unverständliche ist für ihn kein Programm, sondern es ist ein Problem, eine Aufgabe und nicht bloß ein Erlebnis. Er nimmt die wunderbaren Ansichten von außerordentlichen Männern nicht bloß als überraschende Meinungen hin, die ein neues Gesicht, einen neuen Aspekt oder Erscheinung der Welt zum Vorschein bringen, sondern er geht – wie Sokrates – weiter: „Wirst du mir auch Dank abstatten, wenn ich zusammen mit dir die verborgene Wahrheit im Denken dieses berühmten Mannes [Protagoras], oder vielmehr berühmter Männer herauszubekommen versuche?“ Er versucht die verborgene Wahrheit (τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην) in einer mühsamen, gemeinsamen Arbeit zu Tage zu fördern.¹⁹

Im zweiten Kapitel des ersten Buches der *Metaphysik* kommt Aristoteles zu einer näheren Bestimmung der Weisheit (σοφία).²⁰ Seine Untersuchung bezieht sich zunächst nicht auf die Weisheit selbst, sondern auf ihren Repräsentanten, den Weisen. Im ersten Schritt wird behauptet, dass der Weise alles weiß (ἐπίστασθαι πάντα), wenn es irgendwie oder insofern es möglich ist, aber sein Wissen sich nicht auf das Einzelne bezieht (μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον). Man hält unter den Wissenschaften vielmehr diejenige für Weisheit, die um ihrer selbst willen (τὴν αὐτῆς ἕνεκεν) und wegen des Wissens selbst (τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν) gewählt wird. Eben dadurch unterscheidet sie sich von der Wissenschaft, die um solcher Ergebnisse willen gewählt wird, die außer ihrer selbst liegen; im Unterschied zu dienender Wissenschaft kommt der ersteren die Rolle des Führens zu. Diese eigentlich alles – aber nicht einzelweise alles – wissende Wissenschaft aber, die für sich ist, wird um des Wissens willen gewählt. Diese ist zugleich eine beherrschende Wissenschaft, die über das Allgemeine handelt (τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην), das zu wissen das Schwierigste ist. Diese Wissenschaft ist die vom höchsten Guten und Zweck, von letzten (ersten) Prinzipien und Ursachen (τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν), die am meisten gewiss sind, weil alles andere von ihnen her erkannt werden kann. Diese Wissenschaft kann von den alltäglichen Bedürfnissen nicht abgeleitet werden, daher ist sie allein frei (μόνην οὖσαν ἐλευθέραν), weil allein sie für sich ist, folglich ist sie gleichsam keine menschliche, mehr als menschliche, eben eine göttliche Wissenschaft, da sie sich auf einen göttlichen Gegenstand bezieht und da allein Gott sie vollends besitzt – und diese wunderbarste Wissenschaft wurde durch die Verwunderung hervorgebracht. „Dass es sich aber dabei nicht um eine hervorbringende Wissenschaft [οὐ ποιητική] handelt, ergibt sich aus den Beispielen der frühesten Philosophen. Weil sie sich nämlich wunderten [διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν], haben die Menschen zuerst wie jetzt noch zu philosophieren begonnen; sie wunderten sich anfangs über das Unerklärliche, das ihnen entgegentrat. Allmählich machten sie auf diese Weise Fortschritte und stellten sich über Größeres Fragen und nahmen zugleich Untersuchungen vor, etwa über die Affektionen des Mondes und die von Sonne und Sternen und über die Entstehung des Alls. Der jedoch, der voller Fragen ist und sich wundert [ὁ δ' ἀπορώων καὶ θαυμάζων], ver-

¹⁹ 155 D–E.

²⁰ *Met.* 982a 4–983a 23.

meint, in Unkenntnis zu sein [ἀγνοεῖν]. (So ist auch ein Liebhaber von Mythen in gewisser Hinsicht ein Philosoph [ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφος πῶς ἐστίν], setzt sich doch ein Mythos aus Wunderbarem zusammen.) So begannen sie zu philosophieren zwar aus dem Grunde [διὰ], der Unwissenheit zu entkommen, es ist aber klar, dass sie nach wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen um des Wissens willen [διὰ] strebten, keineswegs aber um eines Nutzens willen.²¹

Die *poetische* Wissenschaft, die ihren Zweck in der Hervorbringung von etwas Anderem hat, ist streng zu unterscheiden von dieser Wissenschaft, die eine theoretische ist: theoretisch, gleichsam mit inneren Augen schaut sie die Wahrheiten an, die von den unveränderlichen Prinzipien der Natur festgestellt werden können. Die hervorbringende Wissenschaft, wie sehr sie auch *poetisch* sei, hat ihren Zweck nicht in sich selbst, sie ist eigentlich eine Sklavin. Sie ist von großartigem Erscheinen und Vermögen, sie ist wunderschön und nützlich – aber sklavisch. Die freie Wissenschaft aber, wie der freie Mensch, ist vorzuziehen. Und wir sind frei. Unsere Freiheit nimmt stufenweise zu, weil wir uns mit immer ferneren und komplizierteren Sachen beschäftigen, welche zugleich immer weniger von praktischem Nutzen sind. Früher hatten wir den Mythos (und eventuell die Dichtung) lieb, jetzt aber können wir die Weisheit lieben. Unsere Ver- und Bewunderung ist nun von den uns unmittelbar begegnenden Dingen endgültig losgelöst. Jetzt interessiert uns allein das Wissen. Zwar ist es wahr, dass früher, am Anfang der Verwunderung, die Furcht unsere Wissensbegierde ausgelöst hatte, die Flucht vor dem Nicht-Wissen, dies war aber eigentlich nie eine Flucht vor, sondern ein Streben nach etwas: wir strebten danach, immer weniger von dem Nutzen überwältigt, immer weniger, gleichsam sklavisch, vom Nutzen geleitet zu werden, immer weniger nützlich zu sein.²²

Dennoch verbindet sich unser Wissen mit Nutzen, mit einem einzigen, welchen man trotz allem Nutzen zu nennen hat: und dies ist das Wissen selbst. Dieses eigentümliche Marionettenspiel, diese besondere Automatik, diese wunderbare Selbstbewegung und unnützlicher Nutzen bringt eben den Nutzen, dass wir umgestellt, verändert werden (καταστῆναι ... εἰς τοῦναντίον), dass wir, nachdem wir das Wissen erworben haben (τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτῆς), andere werden: wir, die früher Nicht-Wissenden, werden Wissende. Und dies ist unsere unumgängliche Aufgabe, die unsere Tätigkeit doch durchaus bestimmt; anders gesagt, es ist die Aufgabe der Verwunderung. „In gewisser Hinsicht allerdings muss ihr Besitz [als Eigentum, als Erworbenes: τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτῆς] gegenüber den anfänglichen Untersuchungen für uns ins Gegenteil umschlagen. Alle nämlich beginnen, wie gesagt, mit der Verwunderung [ἀπὸ τοῦ θαυμάζειν], dass die Dinge so sind, wie sie sind, wie etwa angesichts sich selbst bewegender Marionetten, der Sonnenwende oder der Inkommensurabilität der Diago-

²¹ 982b 11–21. Die Übersetzung ist geändert.

²² Diese Nutzlosigkeit kann freilich für die öffentliche Meinung eine Quelle der Verachtung, sogar des Spottes sein (man soll nur an Thales denken). So äußert sich die öffentliche Meinung: „man schreibt ihnen ein Wissen um bedeutende, wunderbare (θαυμαστά), schwer verständliche und unergründlich rätselhafte, fürs Leben aber unbrauchbare Dinge zu, weil sie nicht das suchen, was ein »Gut für den Menschen« ist.“ (EN 1141b 6–8.) Vgl. 1177b 2–4: Ein Zeichen für das göttliche Wesen der Kontemplation ist: „außer dem Vollzug der geistigen Schau (τὸ θεωρῆσαι) erwartet man von ihr nichts weiter, während wir vom praktischen Wirken mehr oder minder großen Gewinn noch neben dem bloßen Handeln haben.“

nale [mit der Seite] (denn es scheint allen verwunderlich, die noch nicht die Ursache betrachtet haben, dass es etwas gibt, das nicht mit dem kleinsten Maß gemessen werden kann). Doch es muss sich nach dem Sprichwort zum Gegenteil und zum besseren Ende umkehren, auch in diesem Fall, wenn man die Ursache zu verstehen gelernt hat. Über nichts geriete nämlich ein Geometer mehr in Erstaunen, als wenn die Diagonale [mit der Seite] kommensurabel wäre.“²³

Die Menschen fangen mit der Verwunderung an, und das ist nur der Anfang, dass sie sich wundern, den eigenen Augen nicht trauen. Wenn sie aber gelernt haben (ὅταν μάθωσιν), was gelernt werden muss, wundern sie sich am wenigsten, denn sie haben sich über nichts mehr zu wundern. Im Gegenteil: wenn – nehmen wir an – etwas, was *nicht anders als so, wie es ist, sein kann*, etwas, was demonstrativ eingesehen worden und unsere unveränderliche und wahre Erkenntnis ist, wenn also solch ein Ding einmal, zufälligerweise, nicht so wäre wie bisher, nicht so, *wie es ist* – so wäre jetzt eben dies wunderbar. Eine unmögliche Voraussetzung. Manches betreffend können wir nicht wieder Nicht-Wissende werden. Wenn wir von richtig gewählten Prinzipien ausgehend auf richtige Weise verfahren haben, so sind wir dann endgültig wissend geworden. Wir wissen nämlich die Ursachen. In der *Mechanik* ist es so formuliert, dass unter allem, was naturmäßig ist und sich vollzieht, alles das wunderbar bleibt, von dem wir die Ursache nicht kennen. Unter den nicht naturmäßig entstehenden Dingen ist aber wunderbar, was irgendeine Kunst hervorbringt, und zwar zum Nutzen der Menschen. Die Natur wirkt nämlich meistens gerade nicht zu unserem Nutzen.²⁴

Der die Ursache kennende Weise wundert sich nicht mehr. Er schaut (θεωρεῖ) solches, mit dauerndem Genuss, was sich nie mehr verändert, was nicht anders sein kann, z. B. die Wahrheiten der ersten Philosophie oder der Mathematik. Das Allgemeine, das Universelle selbst (τὸ καθόλου), nicht aber das, was „mehr“ (μᾶλλον) das Allgemeine (τὰ καθόλου) darstellt. Wie es die Dichtung macht, die zwar philosophischer als die Geschichtsschreibung, aber weniger philosophisch als die Philosophie selbst ist. Die Dichtung hat zwar mit dem Notwendigen zu tun, aber nur um das Mögliche mit Hilfe von ihm und von dem mal als Alternative, mal als mitwirkende Konstituente auftretenden Wahrscheinlichen darzustellen (οἷα ἂν γένοιτο καὶ τὰ δυνατόα κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον). Sie steht gleichsam mitten zwischen dem Allgemeinen und dem Einzelnen, zwischen der bloß Geschehenes (τὰ γεγόμενα) erzählenden unphilosophischen Geschichtsschreibung und der Philosophie.²⁵ Der Weise schaut meistens das Wahre selbst, die Wahrheiten der reinen Theorie selbst, und nicht – oder nur gelegentlich, wenn er eben weniger weise ist – die Nachgeahmten (μιμήματα) oder die Nachahmung (μίμησις). Nicht diese, selbst wenn sie Werk oder Dichtung (ποίησις) einer wunderbaren, natürlichen (κατὰ φύσιν) Kunst (τέχνη) sind. Wir aber, und in gewissen Fällen auch die Weisen, bewundern diese Werke, genießen sie und lernen von ihnen. Aber wie könnte man dieses Lernen genauer bestimmen?

²³ *Met.* 983a 11–21.

²⁴ *Mech.* 847a 10–14.

²⁵ *Poet.* 1451a 36–b 7.

3. DAS WUNDERBARE, DAS LERNEN UND DIE TRAGÖDIE

Das in der Genusslehre der *Rhetorik* aufgefundene Beispiel von der Zusammengehörigkeit des Lernens und des Wunderbaren (der Verwunderung) lässt eine unmittelbare – und zwar auch textuelle – Anknüpfung an die Problematik der *Poetik* zu. Die Verwunderung und das Lernen verknüpfen sich nämlich paradigmatisch in der mimetischen Tätigkeit. „Da Lernen [μᾶνθάνειν] und Verwundern [θαυμάζειν] Freude bereiten [ἡδὺ], muss das auch auf das Nachbilden [τό τε μιμούμενον], z. B. in der Malerei, Bildhauerei und Dichtung zutreffen, ja überhaupt auf jede gute Nachbildung, auch wenn der Gegenstand der Nachbildung selbst nicht Freude erweckt, denn nicht über ihn empfindet man Freude [χαίρει], sondern hier kommt es zu einem logischen Schluss [συλλογισμὸς], dass dieses jenes abbilde [τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο], so dass ein Lernprozess [μᾶνθάνειν] abläuft. Auch plötzliche Änderung der Dinge [περιπέτεια] und Rettung aus Gefahren in letzter Sekunde sind erfreulich, denn über all das kann man sich wundern [θαυμάσῃ].“²⁶

Neben den terminologischen Übereinstimmungen spricht für den engen Zusammenhang der beiden Stellen auch, dass die zitierte Passage der *Rhetorik* auf die in der *Poetik* als Bestandteil der Tragödienhandlung aufgezählte „unerwartete Wende“ (περιπέτεια) nachdrücklich hinweist, aber auch auf die Rettung aus gefährlichen Situationen, die in erster Linie mit dem Epos in Zusammenhang zu bringen ist. Der parallele Locus in der *Poetik* lautet also folgenderweise: „Allgemein scheinen zwei Ursachen die Dichtkunst hervorgebracht zu haben, und zwar naturgegebene Ursachen. Denn sowohl das Nachahmen [μιμεῖσθαι] selbst ist den Menschen angeboren – es zeigt sich von Kindheit an, und der Mensch unterscheidet sich dadurch von den übrigen Lebewesen, dass er in besonderem Maße zur Nachahmung befähigt ist und seine ersten Kenntnisse durch Nachahmung erwirbt [τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας] – als auch die Freude, die jedermann an Nachahmungen hat [τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι]. Als Beweis hierfür kann eine Erfahrungstatsache dienen. Denn von Dingen, die wir in der Wirklichkeit nur ungern erblicken, sehen wir mit Freude [χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες] möglichst getreue Abbildungen, z. B. Darstellungen von äußerst unansehnlichen Tieren und von Leichen. Ursache hiervon ist folgendes: Das Lernen bereitet nicht nur den Philosophen größtes Vergnügen [μᾶνθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἡδιστον], sondern in ähnlicher Weise auch den übrigen Menschen (diese haben freilich nur wenig Anteil daran). Sie freuen sich also deshalb über den Anblick von Bildern, weil sie beim Betrachten etwas lernen [μᾶνθάνειν] und zu erschließen suchen [συλλογίζεσθαι], was ein jedes sei, z. B. dass diese Gestalt den und den darstelle [οὗτος ἐκεῖνος]. (Wenn man indes den dargestellten Gegenstand noch nie erblickt hat, dann bereitet das Werk nicht als Nachahmung [οὐχ ἢ μίμημα] Vergnügen [ἡδονήν], sondern wegen der Ausführung oder der Farbe oder einer anderen derartigen Eigenschaft. Da nun das Nachahmen unserer Natur gemäß ist [κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ὄντος ἡμῖν τοῦ μιμεῖσθαι], und ebenso die Melodie und der Rhythmus – denn dass die Verse Einheiten der Rhythmen sind, ist offenkun-

²⁶ *Rhet.* 1371b 4–12. Die Übersetzung ist terminologisch geändert.

dig –, haben die hierfür besonders Begabten von den Anfängen an allmählich Fortschritte gemacht und so aus den Improvisationen die Dichtung hervorgebracht.“²⁷

Zwischen den beiden Stellen scheint ein bedeutender Unterschied zu sein, dass die *Poetik* den Begriff der Verwunderung hier nicht erwähnt. Zugleich aber hat nach der *Metaphysik* und der *Rhetorik* jede erkennende Tätigkeit in der Verwunderung ihren Anfang. Die *mimesis* steht auch in der *Poetik* mit dem Erkennen im Zusammenhang, also lässt sich die Verwunderung auch auf diese Stelle beziehen – unabhängig davon, dass dieses Wort an dieser Stelle nicht vorkommt. Sehen wir also die Übereinstimmungen und die Parallelen. Die Quelle der mimetischen Tätigkeit wird an beiden Stellen in naturgegebenen Ursachen aufgefunden.²⁸ Die Dichtung hervorbringende *mimesis* wird in der *Rhetorik* aus der natürlichen Wissensbegierde, in der *Poetik* aus dem ebenfalls mit der Wissensbegierde, genauer mit dem Streben nach Lernen in Zusammenhang gebrachten mimetischen Trieb entfaltet. Die Neigung zur Nachahmung ist dem Menschen angeboren und wächst mit ihm. Von seiner Kindheit an erwirbt er Kenntnisse durch die Nachahmung.²⁹ Die nachahmende Neigung und Geschicklichkeit ist eine der Eigenschaften und Fähigkeiten, die den Menschen von anderen Lebewesen unterscheiden: Es gehört zum Wesen des Menschen, dass „er in besonderem Maße zur Nachahmung befähigt ist“. Diese anthropologische Eigenart drückt sich im Vergnügen beim Anschauen von Nachgeahmtem aus.

Der Mensch freut sich über Nachbildungen vor allem, weil er bei ihrem Anschauen etwas lernt. Die Freude an der Ausarbeitung von schönen Nachbildungen

²⁷ *Poet.* 1448b 4–24.

²⁸ Welche diese umstrittenen „Ursachen“ in der *Poetik* sind, ist von unserem Gesichtspunkt her nicht von Gewicht. (Vgl. aber zu der Frage: Arisztotelész, *Poétika és más költészettani írások*. Fordította RITÓÓK Zs.; összeállította, a töredékeket fordította, a jegyzeteket és a kisértő tanulmányokat írta BOLONYAI G. H. n., 1997, 26; Aristotle, *Poetics*. Intr., comm. and appendixes by D. W. LUCAS. Oxford 1968, 74; GUDEMAN, 116 f.) Nach Gudeman richtet sich der Ausdruck der „naturgegebenen Ursache“ in erster Linie gegen die Inspirationstheorie, somit vor allem gegen Platon. (115.) An einer Stelle der pseudo-aristotelischen *Problemata physika* erscheint die „in besonderem Maße mimetische“ und dadurch lernende Eigenart auf der gleichen Ebene mit solchen anderen Wesensbestimmungen wie diejenige, die sich auf der Fähigkeit des mathematischen Erkennens gründet (so auch bei Platon), oder diejenige, die auf der Fähigkeit der Hervorbringung von religiösen (nicht unbedingt theologischen, aber auf jeden Fall gottbezogenen) Vorstellungen beruht (956a 11–14). Zum naturgegebenen, den Menschen unter allen anderen Lebewesen auszeichnenden Wesen des Sinnes für Melodie und Rhythmus siehe *Probl. phys.* 920b 29–32, vgl. Platon: *Gesetze* 653E. An der oben angeführten Stelle der *Poetik* handelt es sich um die menschliche Natur; an anderen Stellen erfahren wir in Verbindung mit der naturphilosophischen Erörterung der *techne*, dass die menschliche Kunst, die *techne*, die Natur nachahmt, indem sie ihr Wirken vollendet: *Physik* 199a 8–20, vgl. 194a 21 f., 199a 15–17; *Meteorologie* 381b 6; *Protreptikos* 13. 2 f., 14. 1 f., 23. 3; siehe darüber: H. BLUMENBERG, „Nachahmung der Natur“. Zur Vorgeschichte der Idee des schöpferischen Menschen. In: H. B., *Wirklichkeiten, in denen wir leben*. Stuttgart 1981, 55–103.

²⁹ Siehe *Politik* 1336a 28–b 35, wo die Nachahmung in der ersten Phase der Erziehung eine bedeutende Rolle spielt: Die Kinderspiele haben die späteren ersten Tätigkeiten nachzuahmen (μιμήσεις), und die Kinder sollen den Anblick von niedrigen Szenen und Handlungen vermeiden, weil die Neigung der Nachahmung zu dieser Zeit von keinem Bewertungsvermögen begleitet wird. Das Begriffsfeld der Nachahmung (z. B. im Falle der Freundschaft) verknüpft sich auch im Bezug auf Erwachsene mit dem des Lernens: im Zusammenleben „nehmen die Freunde zu an sittlichem Gehalt: es ist eine Freundschaft der Tat und der gegenseitigen Vervollkommenung. Denn sie bilden gleichsam die Vorzüge in sich ab [ἀπομάττονται], an denen sie Gefallen finden, indem sie voneinander das Modell nehmen.“ (*EN* 1172a 11–13)

(eine Art reines ästhetisches Vergnügen) ist im Vergleich zum Wiedererkennen zweitrangig. Die Ausdrücke συλλογισμός bzw. συλλογίζεσθαι stehen hier nicht als Termini, sondern sie beziehen sich einfach auf das Lernen im Wiedererkennen oder auf das sich aus dem Schluss herstellende Wiedererkennen. Zugleich aber gehören sie zu der Tätigkeit, die oben nach der *Nikomachischen Ethik* wiederum als zum Menschenwesen gehörend erkannt werden konnte.³⁰ Durch die Erkenntnis, die sich in der Identifizierung erschöpft, und den Schluss, dass „diese Gestalt den und den darstelle“ (wörtlich: dass dieser der und der sei) wäre der Geltungsbereich des „Lernens“ einigermaßen beschränkt: Diese Art Erkenntnis lässt sich im Fall der bildlichen Darstellung deuten. Zugleich aber müsse man, wie Lucas bemerkt, das Beispiel der bildenden Kunst bloß als eine Art Illustration nehmen, denn die Untersuchung des Aristoteles richte sich im Grunde nicht darauf.³¹ Etwas als *Nachbildung* anzuschauen, heißt im Fall der Tragödie nicht, dass die Nachbildung als Repräsentation von etwas Anderem, dem sie ontologisch untergeordnet und im Vergleich zu dem sie weniger wertvoll wäre, angeschaut wird. Als Zuschauer einer Tragödie hören und sehen wir einerseits Menschen, die bestimmte Eigenschaften haben (auf eine bestimmte Weise sprechen, aussehen), und erst danach „sehen“ und verstehen wir andererseits, aufgrund des Gesehenen, eine organische Struktur, die Anfang, Mitte und Ende hat und sich als Struktur der Notwendigkeit und der Wahrscheinlichkeit gemäß aufbaut, als Vorgang denselben gemäß stattfindet. Wir sehen Oedipus als einen hochgeachteten und glücklichen Menschen, der infolge wahrscheinlicher oder notwendiger Begebenheiten unglücklich wird. Oedipus erscheint vor uns als ein Leidender, und insofern kann er als ein Beispiel für das mögliche menschliche Schicksal, das Allgemeine (τὸ καθόλου) verstanden werden.³² Wobei der Begriff des „Wahrscheinlichen“ eindeutig macht, dass das aristotelische „Allgemeine“ auch an dieser Stelle nicht im Sinne der platonischen Ideen, der „wirklich Seienden“ zu verstehen ist: es muss im kunsttheoretischen Zusammenhang vielmehr im Sinne vom gemeinschaftlich-kulturell bestimmten, „intersubjektiven Allgemeinen“ stehen.³³ Laut des ungarischen Kommentars behauptet „Aristoteles im Gegensatz zu Platon, dass das Ergebnis der *mimesis* nicht ärmer, sondern gerade reicher als das Original ist. Die dichterische Nachahmung gibt nämlich dem Leser oder Zuschauer über das menschliche Betragen ein reineres Bild, als wenn das Original der Nachahmung: das Verhalten der Menschen selbst beobachtet wird.“³⁴

Diese sich immer erneuernde Anziehungskraft des das menschliche Verhalten betreffenden Lernens hat Aristoteles zwar hochgeschätzt, aber nicht höher als alles.

³⁰ BELFIORE, 47.

³¹ LUCAS, 73. Nach Jonathan BARNES hätten Platon und Aristoteles auf die übereinstimmende Natur der bildlichen und der sprachlichen Repräsentation unrichtig geschlossen. (J. B., *Rhetoric and poetics*. In: Ders. [ed.], *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*. Cambridge/New York 1996, 274.) Zu der im Prinzip nicht repräsentationellen Erklärung des „Nachbildes“ siehe weiter BELFIORE, 62 f. Zu der schwierigen – ohne Titelangabe geradezu unmöglichen – Erkennbarkeit der Gestalten auf Bildern von alten Malern s. *Topik* 140a 21 f.

³² BELFIORE, *ibid.*

³³ RITOÓK Zs., Vagy, költészet, megismerés. A görög esztétikai gondolkodás egy vonulata. *Holmi*, 1992/5 664.

³⁴ RITOÓK–BOLONYAI, Kommentar, 44. Vgl. 1451b 5–7.

Neben allen anderen Kenntnissen blieb für ihn das Höchste die Erkenntnis der ersten Ursachen. Daher werden die sich in der Kunst ergebenden Erkenntnisse im Vergleich zu den wirklichen wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen unterbewertet in einem Text, der nicht nur von diesem Gesichtspunkt her gewichtig ist, sondern auch, weil man in ihm einen neuen (obwohl bereits an den zwei obigen Stellen – sekundär – berührten) Aspekt der Deutung der ästhetischen Erfahrung erblicken kann. Es geht nicht nur darum, dass der Betrachter eines Kunstwerks sich in das Dargestellte versetzt (ästhetische Identifikation), sondern zugleich auch darum, dass er sich zu ihm mit einer gewissen („ästhetischen“) Distanz verhält. Er betrachtet nicht nur das Dargestellte als ein Wiedererkennbares, sondern auch die Technik und die Ausarbeitung der Darstellung als etwas, was mit Vergnügen anzuschauen ist. „Denn die als Meister hervorbringende Natur [δημιουργήσασα φύσις] bereitet einen unermesslichen Genuss selbst im Falle der hinsichtlich des Wahrnehmens unangenehmen Dinge durch das Anschauen dieser für diejenigen alle, die die Ursachen zu erkennen vermögen und die von Natur aus Philosophen sind. Und es wäre ja wider den nüchternen Verstand und wäre seltsam, wenn – während wir die Nachbildungen von natürlichen Dingen mit Vergnügen anschauen, weil wir die sie meisterhaft hervorbringende Kunst [δημιουργήσασαν τέχνην] mitanschauen [συνθεωροῦμεν] wie z. B. die Kunst des Malers oder des Bildhauers – der Anblick der naturgegebenen Dinge für uns doch nicht vielmehr lieb wäre, da wir auch die Ursachen mitanzuschauen vermögen. Denn es gibt in jedem natürlichen Ding etwas Wunderbares [θαυμάσιόν].“³⁵ Unter den Werken der *physis* und der *techne* sind die ersteren mehr würdig, betrachtet und untersucht zu werden. So verhält es sich zumindest, wenn wir Philosophennaturen sind, d. h. wenn die Erkenntnis der Ursachen für uns das Höchste ist – wie es ja natürlich ist. Die menschliche *techne* ist wunderbar, die Sachkenntnis eines Handwerks ist immer bewunderungswürdig – wie sachkundig und kunstgerecht aber die Natur ist, bleibt für uns womöglich noch wunderbarer. Die so festgestellte Hierarchie von *physis* und *techne* wird freilich dadurch einigermaßen ins Wanken gebracht, dass der Text für die Tätigkeit der Natur eine technische Metapher einsetzt, und nicht umgekehrt. Nach der *Physik* ist die *techne* eine Art verlängerter Natur; nach *Bestandteile der Tiere* ist die Natur eine vollkommene *techne*. Beide sind im gleichen Maße wunderbar, erstaunlich, und beide setzen uns im gleichen Maße in Verwunderung. Wie es denn nicht anders um das beinahe umkehrbar scheinende hierarchische Verhältnis zwischen ihnen bestellt ist – was aber aus einem höheren, den Zweck beachtenden Gesichtspunkt nebensächlich bleibt. Denn über den Wert von Werken der natürlichen Kunst und der künstlerischen Natur entscheidet erst ihr Vermögen, zu wirken.

Es gehört zum „Wirken“ der Tragödie, dass sie ihren Zuschauern zu irgendeiner von der theoretischen unterschiedenen „Erkenntnis“ als ein Element der *hedone* verhilft. Aber was ist das für eine „Erkenntnis“, die aus der Tragödie gewonnen werden kann?

³⁵ *De part. an.* 645a 7–15. Über den Zusammenhang von dem Schönen und der Verwunderung s. H.-G. GADAMER, *Bildkunst und Wortkunst*. In: G. BOEHM (Hrsg.), *Was ist ein Bild?* München 1994, 94, 104.

Die Tragödie ist Nachahmung von Handlungen ($\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$), *mimesis* von handelnden Menschen ($\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\omicron\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$), die nicht über sie erzählt, sondern sie darstellt, eben dann, wenn sie handeln. Die Handelnden müssen so handeln, dass im Zuschauer der Tragödie Mitleid und Furcht erweckt wird, damit er dann von ebendiesen Erregungen und Gefühlen gereinigt wird. Die $\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$ ist menschliche Handlung, und $\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\omicron\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ bedeutet, dass Menschen handeln, und zwar eben so, wie die Menschen im allgemeinen zu handeln pflegen, wie wir Menschen zu handeln pflegen.³⁶ Das Gefühl von Furcht und Mitleid kann in uns nur in Bezug auf menschliche Welt und Menschen erweckt werden. Beide Emotionen – zusammen ebenso wie einzeln – ergeben sich aus dem Spiel von Identifizierung und Distanz. Furcht können wir nur mit Bezug auf uns selbst fühlen; man kann nur für sich selbst fürchten. Als Zuschauer von Tragödien sind wir uns aber zugleich auf eine Weise klar darüber, dass das auf der Bühne erscheinende, Furcht erregende Geschehen *in Wirklichkeit* keine Bedrohung für uns darstellt, dass wir *eigentlich* nichts zu befürchten haben. Und Mitleid fühlen wir, wenn z. B. einer der Unrigen, Verwandten und uns Lieben ein Übel erleidet. Oder wenn einer, der es nicht verdient hat, ein Übel erleidet, „ein Übel, das erwartungsgemäß auch uns selbst oder einen der Unrigen treffen könnte, und das ist besonders der Fall, wenn dieses nahe zu sein scheint. Es ist ja klar, dass derjenige, der Mitleid empfinden soll, gerade in einer solcher Verfassung sein muss, dass er glaubt, er selbst oder einer der Seinen würde ein Übel erleiden“.³⁷ Beide Emotionen beruhen auf dem Bewusstsein unserer Verletzlichkeit, Hinfälligkeit; die Furcht steht unmittelbar mit uns selbst, das Mitleid mit den uns nahe Stehenden in Verbindung.

Die Furcht und das Mitleid setzen definitionsmäßig die Selbstbezüge voraus, die eine Vorbedingung für jedes Verstehen, so auch das der Tragödie, sind. Der Zuschauer bezieht die tragische *praxis* auf sich selbst, auf seine eigene *praxis*. „Die Nachahmenden ahmen handelnde Menschen nach. Diese sind notwendigerweise entweder gut oder schlecht. Denn die Charaktere fallen fast stets unter eine dieser beiden Kategorien; alle Menschen unterscheiden sich nämlich, was ihren Charakter betrifft, durch Schlechtigkeit und Güte. Demzufolge werden Handelnde nachgeahmt, die entweder besser oder schlechter sind, als wir zu sein pflegen [$\beta\epsilon\lambda\tau\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu\alpha\varsigma$ ἢ καὶ ἡμᾶς], oder auch ebenso wie wir.“³⁸ Die auf der Bühne erscheinenden Menschen sind uns ähnlich, der Charakter ($\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$) muss „ähnlich“ sein, gerade um die entsprechende Wirkung auslösen zu können: „Andererseits darf man auch nicht zeigen, wie der ganz Schlechte einen Umschlag vom Glück ins Unglück erlebt. Eine solche Zusammenfügung enthielte zwar Menschenfreundlichkeit, aber weder Furcht noch Mitleid. Denn das eine stellt sich bei dem ein, der sein Unglück nicht verdient, das andere bei dem, der dem Zuschauer ähnelt [$\tau\omicron\nu\upsilon\ \omicron\mu\omicron\tau\omicron\nu$] – das Mitleid bei dem unverdient Leidenden, die Furcht bei dem Ähnlichen.“ „Das dritte Merkmal ist das Ähnliche [$\tau\omicron\ \omicron\mu\omicron\tau\omicron\nu$]. Denn dies ist etwas anderes, als den Charakter so zu zeichnen, dass er –

³⁶ E. GRASSI, *Die Theorie des Schönen in der Antike*. Köln 1962, 127.

³⁷ *Rhet.* 1385b 13–18.

³⁸ *Poet.* 1448a 1–5. Vgl. 1448a 16–18: „Auf Grund desselben Unterschiedes weicht auch die Tragödie von der Komödie ab: die Komödie sucht schlechtere, die Tragödie bessere Menschen nachzuahmen, als sie in der Wirklichkeit vorkommen.“

in dem soeben umschriebenen Sinne – tüchtig und angemessen ist.“³⁹ Solch ein Ähnlichkeitsverhältnis kann gegebenenfalls zwischen dem (eben schaffenden) Dichter und seinem Publikum bestehen: „Am überzeugendsten sind infolge der gleichen Natur diejenigen, die sich in Leidenschaft versetzt haben, und der selbst Erregte stellt Erregung, der selbst Zürnende Zorn am wahrheitsgetreuesten dar.“⁴⁰ Welche Möglichkeit man auch bei der Deutung der „Besseren“ und der „Ähnlichkeit“ annehmen mag, soviel ist nach diesen Begriffen auf jeden Fall klar, dass die Bestimmung der gattungsbestimmenden Unterschiede (der gattungsinternen *differentia specifica*) von Gegenständen der Mimesis bzw. die Bedingungen für die Auslösung der entsprechenden Wirkung mit der Voraussetzung verfasst werden, dass der Zuschauer das auf der Bühne Geschehende auf sich selbst bezieht. Wie selten und fast unglaublich die Situation einer Tragödie auch immer sei, eine grundsätzliche Bestimmtheit des menschlichen Lebens erscheint doch darin, dass jeder und zu jeder Zeit, wiewohl nicht auf dieselbe Weise, in tragische Situation kommen kann. Für die Tragödie ist diese Beziehbarkeit und die in der Applikation vollzogene Beziehung wesentlich: auf der Bühne *tua res agitur*, geschieht solches, was jeden Menschen betrifft und jedem zustoßen kann.⁴¹

In der *Poetik* werden also die Bedingungen für die Auslösung der für die Tragödie kennzeichnenden, ihr entsprechenden Wirkung mit der Voraussetzung verfasst, dass der Zuschauer das auf der Bühne Geschehende auf sich bezieht, und zwar unter anderem den aus den ethischen Werken bekannten Gesichtspunkten gemäß. So kann er annäherungsweise eine Erkenntnis von einem „Allgemeinen“ erwerben, in welchem bereits sein eigenes Sein betroffen ist und wo das „Mögliche“ auch als Möglichkeit seines eigenen Seins zu verstehen ist. „Sie [die Werke echter Dichtung] erschließen sich dem teilnehmenden Verstehen [...]. Und sie erschließen solchem teilnehmenden Verstehen *das menschliche Sein in seinen Möglichkeiten als den eigenen Möglichkeiten des Verstehenden*“, und darum richtet sich das wahre Verstehen nicht auf eine zum Vergnügen führende Betrachtung irgendwelcher fremden Individualität als solcher, sondern im Grunde auf die im Individuum sich zeigenden Mög-

³⁹ *Poet.* 1453a 1–6; 1454a 24 f. Die Übersetzung ist terminologisch geändert. Für die Übersetzung „Furcht und Mitleid“ argumentiert überzeugend R. DILCHER, Furcht und Mitleid! Zu Lessings Ehrenrettung. *Antike und Abendland* XLII (1996), 85–102. Gleichviel, ob es an der angeführten Stelle darum geht, dass die Ähnlichkeit „1. die Grenzen bestimmt, unter denen ein durchschnittlicher Zuschauer sich eben noch mit dem tragischen Helden, der möglicherweise besser als er ist, identifizieren kann“, oder darum, dass „2. der Held seiner in den überlieferten Mythen befestigten »ursprünglichen« Gestalt ähnlich sein muss“ (RITOÓK–BOLONYAI, Kommentar, 62), wird auf jeden Fall in der Formulierung die Selbstbeziehung vorausgesetzt, wie denn die Gattungsbestimmung an den Stellen 1448a 1–5 und 1448a 16–18 auch im Falle der Mythen mit Bezug auf die „Gegenwärtigen“ vollzogen wird.

⁴⁰ *Poet.* 1455a 30–32. Fuhrmanns Übersetzung habe ich geändert, weil „die gleiche Natur“ sich an dieser Stelle auch auf den Dichter und sein Publikum beziehen *kann*, wie auch auf zwei Dichter, die gleich begabt, aber hinsichtlich der Stärke des Erlebens beim Schaffen unterschiedlich sind. (RITOÓK–BOLONYAI, Kommentar, 68).

⁴¹ K. von FRITZ, Entstehung und Inhalt des neunten Kapitels von Aristoteles’ *Poetik*. In: Ders., *Antike und moderne Tragödie*. Berlin, 1962, 449. Die Zusammenhänge von Wunderbarem, Selbstbeziehung und Lernen werden von RITOÓK, 665 ff. ähnlich wie weiter unten erörtert.

lichkeiten des menschlichen Seins, die Möglichkeiten auch des Verstehenden sind und die als solche erst im Verstehen bewusst werden.⁴²

Die Bultmannsche Maxime des hermeneutischen Verstehens und die Gadamer-sche „Verwandlung ins Gemeinsame hin, in der man nicht bleibt, was man war“, heißt nicht, die „Erlebnisse“ des Anderen in der Illusion der „Empathie“ „nachzu-vollziehen“, heißt also kein mystisches Einswerden, was letzten Endes die Auslö-schung der Individualität des Anderen (und unserer selbst) bedeuten würde,⁴³ son-der sie heißt eben ein differenziertes Verstehen des Unterschiedenen im Gemeinsa-men und des Gemeinsamen im Unterschiedenen. Und zwar ein Verstehen, das sich nie in einer endgültigen, festgesetzten Formel fassen lässt – wegen der Veränderlich-keit des menschlichen Seins.

Der Zuschauer der Tragödie erfährt etwas über das menschliche Betragen, sei-ne eigene Tätigkeit, Handeln und Leiden, denn die Tragödie ist eine Nachbildung von Handeln (μίμησις πράξεως), Nachbildung von Leben (μίμησις βίου), und sie muss vom Glück und Unglück (εὐδαιμονία καὶ κακοδαιμονία) handeln. Die Ge-stalten der Tragödie werden aufgrund ihres Charakters (ἦθος), der sich in ihrem Ent-schluss (προαίρεσις) äußert, beurteilt; kurz: Die entscheidende Mehrheit der Schlüs-selbegriffe der aristotelischen Tragödientheorie lässt sich eminenterweise auch im ethischen Kontext deuten. „Die μίμησις τῆς πράξεως richtet sich demnach nicht auf jede beliebige Handlung, die sich als Gegenstand der Mimesis darbietet, sondern ausschließlich auf die *menschliche Praxis*, in der ihr eigens zukommenden Möglich-keit, gut, schlecht oder durchschnittlich zu sein, und *in ihrer Sinnggebung durch das Ethos*.“ „Für Aristoteles zeigen sich erst durch die Philosophie und durch die Be-wertung des menschlichen Tuns im Hinblick auf das Ethos die verschiedenen Mög-lichkeiten des Menschen, das heißt das Gelingen oder Scheitern seines Werkes als Mensch. Dies offensichtlich zu machen ist die Aufgabe der Kunst.“⁴⁴

Die Tragödie handelt von der *praxis*, von Sachen, die – wie es von Aristoteles öfters ausgesagt wird – *auch anders sein können als so, wie sie eben sind* (τὰ ἐνδε-χόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν).⁴⁵ Darum ist das Anschauen von Nachbildungen der *praxis* weniger wertvoll als die Betrachtung solcher Dinge, die *nicht anders sein können als so wie sie sind*: wie die im Bereich der *praxis* tätige „praktische Vernunft“ oder „Klugheit“, die *phronesis*, weniger wertvoll ist als die „Weisheit“, die *sophia*, der für das Schauen der ewigen Wahrheiten bestimmten theoretischen Vernunft.⁴⁶ Die menschliche *phronesis* ist aber ausschließlich im Vergleich zur göttlichen *sophia* weniger wertvoll: die für das menschliche Leben wichtigste dianoetische Tugend, die *phronesis*, überlegt nämlich, was für das Leben gut sei, und sie entscheidet, in ihrer

⁴² R. BULTMANN, Das Problem der Hermeneutik. In: Ders., *Glauben und Verstehen*. Bd. 2. Mün-chen 1993, 221–227.

⁴³ H.-G. GADAMER, *Wahrheit und Methode. Gesammelte Werke* Bd. 1. Tübingen 1990, 384–387.

⁴⁴ GRASSI, 127; 133. Ähnlich auch P. RICOEUR, Die Fabelkomposition. Eine Lektüre von Aristot-eles' Poetik. In: Ders., *Zeit und Erzählung. Band I. Zeit und historische Erzählung*. München 1988, 54–86, bes. 61; und ELSE, 307.

⁴⁵ EN 1139a 6–14, 1139b 19–24, 1140a 30–b 7, 1140b 26–28, 1141a 1. Vgl. *Met.* 993b 20–23.

⁴⁶ EN 1141a 11–22, 1141b 2 f., 1143b 33 f. Vgl. *Met.* VI. 1.

„verweisenden Funktion“, vereinigt mit entsprechender ethischer Tugend, über unser Glück oder Wohlsein.

Die tragische *mimesis*, sofern ihr Gegenstand, die menschliche *praxis*, in den Bereich des „auch anders Möglichen“ gehört, führt die von ihr Faszinierten nie zum gewissen, festen und unveränderlichen Wissen; denn dem Charakter des Gegenstandes entsprechend ist dazu nicht einmal die systematische Forschung, die praktische Philosophie fähig: „Die Darlegung wird dann befriedigen, wenn sie jenen Klarheitsgrad erreicht, den der gegebene Stoff gestattet. Der Exaktheitsanspruch darf nämlich nicht bei allen wissenschaftlichen Problemen in gleicher Weise erhoben werden, genau so wenig wie bei handwerklich-künstlerischer Produktion. Bei den Erscheinungsformen des Edlen und Gerechten, die den Gegenstand der Staatswissenschaft bilden, gibt es so viele Unterschiede und Schwankungen [πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην], dass die Ansicht aufkommen konnte, sie beruhten nur auf Konvention, nicht aber auf natürlicher Notwendigkeit. Ähnliches Schwanken herrscht aber auch bei den Lebensgütern, weil schon so manchem Schaden daraus erwachsen ist: Es ist schon vorgekommen, dass der eine durch Reichtum, der andere durch Tapferkeit zugrunde ging. Man muss sich also damit bescheiden, bei einem solchen Thema und bei solchen Prämissen die Wahrheit nur grob und umrisshaft anzudeuten, sowie bei Gegenständen und Prämissen, die nur im großen und ganzen feststehen, in der Diskussion eben auch nur zu entsprechenden Schlüssen zu kommen.“⁴⁷

Über das menschliche Sein nachdenkend muss selbst der Philosoph auf die Hoffnung auf begründetes, feststehendes und für immer gültiges Wissen verzichten. Die Unsicherheit und Unberechenbarkeit unseres Seins ermöglicht kaum, den Gegenstand, der wir selbst sind, jemals vollständig zu erkennen, auf ihn bezogen wahres Wissen zu erwerben. So müssen es im besonderen Maße diejenigen erfahren, die ihr Sein in einem so sehr unsicheren Gegenstand betrachten, wie es Kunstwerke sind, und die ihre Aufgabe auch nicht als Philosoph angreifen. Wohl ist es möglich, dass Aristoteles eben in diesem Lernen ohne letztgültigen Aufschluss, eben in der eingesehenen Unmöglichkeit des festen Wissens und des ihm gemäß ausführbaren Entwerfens die höchste „Lehre“ der Tragödie erblickt habe. Aber in dieser Unzulänglichkeit liegt auch ein Vorteil: Wir wollen immer wieder wissen, was wir nie wissen werden können.

Darum auch schauen wir jederlei Nachbildungen mit Vergnügen an, weil sie Menschenwerke sind, vergnügt sind wir aber vielmehr, wenn Menschen nachahmen, wie die Menschen handeln; wenn dargestellt, aufgeführt wird, wie der Mensch handelt, wie eben wir handeln. Durch Andere zu erkennen, wie wir selbst handeln, ist schmerzlich und ergötzend. Und in jedem Fall wird etwas Anderes aufgeführt, wir können immer wieder anders sehen, wie wir immer wieder anders handeln. Und wir wundern uns darüber, und darin liegt das Wunderbare.

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⁴⁷ EN 1094b 11–22. Vgl. 1094b 11–22, 1098a 26–29, 1104b 34–a 10.

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LEKTON: STOIC LOGIC AND ONTOLOGY

Summary: For the Stoics, the *lekton* is as an intermediary between the thought and the object. They do not exist independently of the mind, but, at the same time, the mind does not create them. Due to this status, they guarantee intersubjectivity of the rational discourse. They are incorporeals that do not exist, but subsist and the Stoic Logos-God guarantees their permanent subsistence. The *lekta* are semantico-syntactic entities. Their role is analogous to the role of an interlingua used as a tool for automated translation of languages.

Key words: Stoics, ontology, semantics, the *lekton*.

According to Diogenes Laertius (DL 7.39–44), the Stoics divide philosophy into physics, ethics, and logic. Logic is divided into rhetoric and dialectic, and the latter into the study of language as sound and the study of language as what is said, the λεκτόν. The first part includes parts of speech, “solecism [wrong order of words] and barbarism and poems and ambiguities and harmonious utterance and music” which, roughly, is a province of phonetics and syntax. The second part of dialectic is devoted to the meaning of language and includes the study of presentations (φαντασίαι), *lekta*, and “arguments and modes and syllogisms and fallacies,” and so this part is the domain of syntax (logical reasoning), semantics, and epistemology. The present paper concentrates on the semantic side of dialectic, in particular, on the ontological status of the *lekta*. This is also the focus of dialectic because, as reported by Sextus Empiricus (SE 7.38), dialectic is the study of the true and the false, and only ἀξιώματα, a kind of *lekta*, can be true or false. Which means that syntactic analyses of dialectic are done from the perspective of semantics.

1 LEKTA AND THE STOIC ONTOLOGY

To the Stoics, φωνή is a sound; when it is divided, it is λέξις; its elements are 24 letters; λέξις can be meaningless, but discourse (λόγος) is always meaningful (DL 7.56–57, SE 8.80). In epistemological order, “the presentation is first and then the thought (διάνοια), which is verbally expressive, puts into *logos* what it experi-

ences because of presentation" (DL 7.49). This may be taken to mean that "as long as perceptual image is not expressed in articulated speech, it remains at the preperational stage."¹ The result of this mental operation is the rational presentation, φαντασία λογική, which is the thought, νόησις (DL 7.51), the sensory presentation expressed by language (λόγῳ παραστήσαι, SE 8.70) and grasped by the mind. Epictetus defines *logos* as "the system of various presentations (σύστημα ἐκ ποιῶν φαντασιῶν); thus, by nature, it also becomes contemplative of itself" (*Diss.* 1.20). Therefore, *logos* can be self-referent.

Language does not exist in written and spoken form only. Chrysippus recognizes inner language (Galen, *De plac.* 5.345 = 2.903),² that is, words are formed in the heart, the seat of the commanding faculty (ἡγεμονικόν), before they are uttered. In fact, man differs from irrational animals not in respect to uttered speech (τῷ προφορικῷ λόγῳ), but in respect to internal speech (τῷ ἐνδιαθέτῳ [λόγῳ]) (SE 8.275) and ἐνδιάθετος λόγος is defined as "the motion taking place in the mind without any utterance" (Nemesius, *De nat. hum.* 14). Therefore, the spoken word is dependent on the thought word.³

According to the Stoics, there are three things involved in understanding an utterance: the signifier (τὸ σημαῖνον), that is, the utterance itself, for example the word "stone"; the object (τὸ τυγχάνον), that is, the stone indicated by the word; and the thing signified (τὸ σημαινομένον), or the *lekton* (SE 8.11–12). "*Lekton*" is a neuter adjective of "*legein*," and "*legein*," "to say," is defined as "to utter the sound capable of signifying the object conceived" (SE 8.80), where the object conceived is apparently the *lekton*. It is far from clear how the word *lekton* should be translated and many different ways of rendering it have been proposed: sayable (Long); what can be said, and what is said (Graeser), what is said, what is meant (Mates, Kneale), that (judgments) which can be expressed (Watson); *das Ausgesagte* (Verbeke), *das Ausgesprochene* (Zeller), *l'exprimable* (Bréhier), *dicibile* (Orth), that which is meant (Mates), but it seems that it is sufficient to render it simply as meaning.

The need for the third entity – next to the utterance and the object – arises in the situation when a Greek and a barbarian hear the same word; the barbarian does not understand the word although he hears the same sound as the Greek. The *lekton* is induced by the word in the mind of the Greek but not in the barbarian's mind. The Greek and the barbarian have the same representation in their minds, the same intelligible object, but to the former a connection is made between the word and the object which is lacking to the latter. This connection between the stone and the word

¹ VERBEKE, Gerard: Der Nominalismus der stoischen Logik, *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 1977, p. 37; VERBEKE, Gerard: La philosophie du signe chez les Stoïciens, in *Les stoïciens et leur logique*, Paris: Vrin 1978, p. 403. On the Stoic concept of *logos*, cf. MATES, Benson: *Stoic logic*, Berkeley: University of California Press 1961, p. 134.

² Numbers after equal sign refer to ARNIM, Hans von: *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, v. 1–4, Leipzig: Teubner 1903–1924 [reprint: Dubuque: Brown 1967].

³ "The articulation of voice is only a mirror image of the corresponding dynamics of the inner *logos*, the development and formation of *dianoia*," POHLENZ, Max: Die Begründung der abendländischen Sprachlehre durch die Stoa, *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Philologisch-historische Klasse* 1939, p. 195; "*logos prophorikos* is the bodily form of the *logos endiathetos*," LÖBL, Rudolf: *Die Relation in der Philosophie der Stoiker*, Amsterdam: Rodopi 1986, p. 97.

“stone” is an attribute of the stone of being signified by “stone.” However, this attribute should not change the nature of the object, and so it must be an incorporeal. This is a departure from Aristotle, to whom, in the words of his commentator, Ammonius, utterances signify thoughts and objects through thoughts as intermediaries. But the Stoics include the *lekton* as an intermediary between the thought and the object (*In De interp.* 16a3 = 2.168). By introducing *lekta*, the Stoics avoid the problem of determining how the thoughts – modifications of the *hegemonikon*, and thus a form of an expression – of two people, or, for that matter, the thoughts of the same person at different moments, can have the same meaning. For the Stoics, comparison of thoughts is possible because there is a *tertium comparationis*, namely the objective meaning of the thought, the *lekton*. Thinking is a subjective process of independent minds and as such, it cannot be transferred from one mind to another to make communication possible. But by introducing an invariant, the *lekton*, the Stoics enable this communication. An interesting question is, what is the ontological status of the *lekta*?

There are two general categories in the Stoic ontology: something (τί, *quid*) and non-something (οὐτί). For Plato, to be something is already to exist (*Parm.* 132bc). However, the Stoic category of somethings is divided into 1. bodies, 2. incorporeals (*lekta*, void, place, time), and 3. entities “falsely formed by thought” (Centaur, Giants), and mathematical constructs (points, lines) which can be considered as neither corporeals nor incorporeals.⁴ On the other hand, there are concepts (ἐννοήματα) that correspond to Platonic ideas; they are non-entities, non-somethings, at best quasi-somethings or “figments of the soul.”⁵ The concepts are outside of somethings, and, in a sense, outside the Stoic ontology. They correspond to universals, but in the Stoic ontology there are only single, individual entities, whether corporeal or incorporeal; to be something is to be a particular, and there is no room in this ontology for anything that surpasses the level of particulars – such as an idea of man, a man in general, and so universals are excluded from the category of somethings.⁶

Incorporeals, including the *lekta*, are sometimes considered to be mental constructs.⁷ However, the *lekta* were introduced to assure the objectivity of the meanings of utterances. If they were mental constructs, they would be subjective, and thus the problem of possibility of interpersonal communication would still be unsolved. Therefore, the ontological status of the *lekta* has to be grounded outside the mind. But does it mean that the existence of the mind has nothing to do with the subsistence of the *lekta*?

Lekton is defined as “that which subsists according to a rational presentation” (τὸ κατὰ λογικὴν φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον, SE 8.70; DL 7.63). So the *lekta* are

⁴ Seneca, *Ep.* 58.13–15; SE 10.218; DL 7.135; LONG, A. A.–SEADLEY, D. N.: *The Hellenistic philosophers*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1987, v. 1, pp. 163, 165, 301, but see also BRUNSCHWIG, Jacques: *Papers in Hellenistic philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994, p. 97.

⁵ Stobaeus I.12.3 = 1.65; Alexander, *In Top.* 127a26 = 2.329; DL 7.60–61.

⁶ Syrianus, *In Met.* 104.17–21, 1078b12 = 2.361; cf. LONG–SEADLEY, *op. cit.*, pp. 164, 181.

⁷ WATSON, Gerard: *The Stoic theory of knowledge*, Belfast: Queen’s University 1966, p. 42; CHRISTENSEN, Johnny: *An essay on the unity of Stoic philosophy*, Copenhagen: Munksgaard 1962, p. 25; GRAESER, Andreas: *Zenon von Kiton: Positionen und Probleme*, Berlin: de Gruyter 1975, p. 19.

not independent entities. The presentation implies the existence of the mind on which it is imprinted; therefore, "just as 'walking' entails the existence of a walker, so *lekta* would appear to entail the existence of a mind."⁸ However, this does not mean that the *lekta* are constructs of the mind. They do not exist independently of the mind, but, at the same time, the mind does not create them. The definition of the *lekton* also suggests that it exists as long as the expressions corresponding to it.⁹ The mind, however, invokes a *lekton*; it does not construct it. The mind has no part in shaping the *lekta*, otherwise, the objectivity of the *lekta* would be destroyed.

Why are the *lekta* not bodies? It may be argued that their incorporeality is an expression of their objectivity. Of course, real bodies in the world are also objective, independent on people's minds. But the *lekta* are connected to language. If they were corporeal, then there would exist another corporeal world, the world of meaning, behind the real world, which is at least redundant. This would resemble a situation when a map is created which is a material copy of the real world. But little is thereby gained. The *lekta* should assure that rational discourse is really rational, really intersubjective. Therefore, incorporeality of the *lekta* is not just an expression of its objectivity, but objectivity of the aboutness of language, of intentionality of discourse.

2 SEMANTICS OF *AXIOMATA*

A particular type of *lekta* are *axiomata*. The *axioma* is defined as "a complete *lekton* that can be asserted in itself."¹⁰ As already mentioned, to the Stoics an *axioma* is either true or false¹¹ and only *axioma* can be true or false (SE 8.74), but Sextus who reports the latter restriction also says that presentations can be true (SE 7.243–244; Aetius 4.9.4 = 2.78). Presentations are modifications of the corporeal mind, and thus are corporeal. Can both presentations, which are corporeal, and *lekta*, which are incorporeal, be designated as true? Sextus states that "the sensibles are never true directly, but only as related to the corresponding intelligibles (τὰ παρακείμενα νοητά)" (SE 8.10); for Sextus, an intelligible designates an incorporeal¹²; therefore, true and false are necessarily predicates of an *axioma*, not of a presentation.¹³

⁸ LONG, A. A.: Language and thought in Stoicism, in A. A. LONG (ed.): *Problems in Stoicism*, London: The Athlone Press 1971, pp. 90, 94; also Nuchelmans seems to lean in this direction, NUCHELMANS, Gabriel: *Theories of the proposition*, Amsterdam: North-Holland 1973, pp. 86–87.

⁹ LONG, Language and thought, p. 97; GRAESER, Andreas: The Stoic theory of meaning, in RIST, J. M. (ed.): *The Stoics*, Berkeley: University of California Press 1978, pp. 88–89.

¹⁰ SE, PH 2.104; SE 7.38. *Axioma* is "an object that can be asserted in itself" (DL 7.65), where an object (*pragma*) means the same as a *lekton* (cf. TELEGDI, Zsigmond: Zur Herausbildung des Begriffs 'sprachliches Zeichen' und zur stoischen Sprachlehre, *Acta Linguistica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 26 (1976), p. 295). A question is a complete *lekton* that requires an answer (DL 7.66). It may be thus conjectured that the phrase "in itself" (ὄσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ) in the definition of an *axioma* may mean that the *axioma* does not require anything else beyond itself, see FREDE, Michael: *Stoische Logik*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1974, p. 37; BOBZIEN, Susanne: *Die stoische Modallogik*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 1986, pp. 12–13.

¹¹ DL 7.65–66; SE 8.12; Cicero, *De fato* 38 = 2.952.

¹² The *noeta* in the quoted fragment "must be equated with the mind's grasp of *lekta*," although, technically, *noeta*, being states of the *hegemonikon*, are corporeals, and *lekta* are not, KERFERD, George:

The Stoics propose an interesting theory of truth. According to Aristotle who formulates in his *Metaphysics* the classical theory of truth that was later summarized by the Scholastic formula *adequatio rei et intellectus*, truth value is assigned to sentences. To the Stoics, sentences are not true (or false), but the *axioma*: “one who says ‘it is day’ seems to accept that it is day; so when it is day, the present *axioma* becomes true, and when it is not, it becomes false” (DL 7.65). More generally, the *axioma* expressed by a sentence is true when the state of affairs corresponding to the *axioma* is the reality. However, the truth value of an *axioma* can be defined without mentioning a sentence expressing it. Sextus quotes the Stoics who state that the “true *axioma* [= the true] is that which is (ὑπάρχει) and is contradictory to something,” that is, to another *axioma* (SE 8.10, 85, 88).¹⁴ This definition includes a mixture of syntactic and semantic components.

On the one hand, the semantic component, “that which is” (τὸ ὑπάρχον), is defined as “that which activates the cognitive presentation (τὸ καταληπτικὴν κινεῖν φαντασίαν)” (SE 8.85; SE, PH 3.242), which can only be a body since only a body can excite anything and “a cognitive presentation is one which arises from what is and is stamped and impressed exactly according to what is, [and is] of such a kind that could not arise from what is not” (SE 7.248). *Hyparchon* is an efficient cause of cognitive presentations because of κινεῖν: white object activates (κινεῖν) us (or our soul) by inducing a corresponding sensation (Aetius 4.12.1 = 2.54). But directly after the definition of the true (and the false), Sextus says that this is an incorporeal *axioma* and an intelligible (νοητόν, SE 8.10). True *axiomata* are pronounced to be incorporeals but at the same time, *ta hyparchonta*, existing objects. Are incorporeals existing entities?

To the Stoics, *axiomata* are divided into definite, indefinite, and intermediate (SE 8.96–98; DL 7.69) and primarily the definite *axioma* can have truth values. An indefinite *axioma* is true when the corresponding definite *axioma* is true, otherwise, it can be neither true nor false.¹⁵ The definite *axioma* “this man is walking,” say the

The problem of synkatathesis and katalepsis in Stoic doctrine, in *Les stoïciens et leur logique*, pp. 259, 270. See also BRÉHIER, Émile: *La théorie des incorporels dans l'ancien Stoïcisme*, Paris: Vrin 1928 [1908], p. 32.

¹⁴ Day is not true, but an affirmation: there is a day, as remarks BRÉHIER, Émile: *Chrysippe et l'ancien Stoïcisme*, Paris: PUF 1951 [1910], p. 70. “*Alethes* applies primarily and strictly to *axiomata* and only secondarily and derivatively to *phantasiai*. That is, the truth of a *phantasia* is dependent upon the truth of an *axioma* to which it corresponds,” LONG, Anthony A.: The Stoic distinction between truth (ἡ ἀλήθεια) and the true (τὸ ἀληθές), in *Les stoïciens et leur logique*, p. 300; similarly, MATES, *op. cit.*, pp. 19–26; KNEALE, William and Martha: *The development of logic*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1991 [1962], pp. 150–151; NUCHELMANS, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

¹⁴ It is important to notice that the true (= true *axioma*) is not the same as the truth (Sextus is the only author who discusses this Stoic distinction between the truth and the true, SE, PH 2.80–83, SE 7.38–45). The truth is a body, thus not a set of true *axiomata*, but a mental disposition, a state of the *hegemonikon* which is a body (SE, PH 2.81); the truth is a system of concepts and presentations to be used to test the truth value of the *axioma*, “a coherent and comprehensive structure of valid general concepts which, in association with *kataleptikai phantasai*, guarantee the truth of all propositions [*axiomata*] corresponding to them,” LONG, The Stoic distinction, pp. 304, 307.

¹⁵ It is claimed that only definite *axioma* can have truth values, KERFERD, *op. cit.*, p. 264, but see SCHUBERT, Andreas: *Untersuchungen zur stoischen Bedeutungslehre*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1994, p. 64.

Stoics, “is true (ἀληθὲς ὑπάρχειν) when the predicate (κατηγορημα), such as ... walking, applies (συμβεβήκη) to the object indicated” (SE 8.100). This causes a problem because a predicate is incorporeal and it cannot literally apply to an object. However, its being applied invokes the concept of an attribute (συμβεβηκός), which is defined by Aristotle as something that belongs to a thing (*Top.* 102b4-10). Sextus’ definition could thus be rephrased to say that an *axioma* is true when the attribute corresponding to the predicate belongs to the object.¹⁶ In what sense does it belong? The Stoic ontology allows only for the existence of individual bodies that can act. Actions expressed by verbs are predicates that state something about bodies and as such, predicates are incorporeal. Having reported Zeno’s view that a cause is a body and the effect is a predicate, Stobaeus says that being prudent occurs because of prudence (1.13.1c = 1.89).

Definition of a true *axioma* as a *hyparchon* should not be connected with the definition of the *hyparchon* as a cause of a cognitive presentation, but with the definition of a true definite *axioma* in which the *axioma*’s being (*hyparchein*) true is explained as the correspondence of a predicate to a state of an object.¹⁷ Sextus passed from the definition of *axioma* as a *hyparchon* to the definition of the *hyparchon* to criticize the vicious circle he thought he discovered in the Stoic doctrine: cognitive presentation is defined by the *hyparchon*, the latter is defined as something which induces the former (SE 7.426, 8.85–86, *PH* 3.242; *DL* 7.50). Sextus did not make any remark concerning the possibility of an incongruity between the incorporeal character of the *axioma* and its being an existent, a *hyparchon*.

The *lekta* are dependent upon the mind for their subsistence, that is, there are no independently existing *lekta*; however, this dependence goes even further, namely, an expression can outlive the *lekta* associated with it. Chrysippus is reported to have said that the *axioma* “this man is dead” is destroyed (φθείρεσθαι) when “this man” refers to Dion and Dion died because the reference no longer exists and now it is impossible to say about Dion, “this man is dead” (Alexander, *In An. pr.* 177.25–178.1 = 2.202a). This means that “this man is dead” is a meaningless utterance because there is no object corresponding to “this man”; the statement cannot be accompanied by pointing to Dion to indicate the reference of “this man.” One can point to the body of dead Dion, but this is not a man any more, but a lifeless body. For such statements, there is no corresponding *lekton* and object, its utterance cannot induce an *axioma*. As a whole, the statement is devoid of meaning although we still understand what is being a man, on the one hand, and being dead, on the other. The statement becomes a statement of the same category as “this is a square circle,” since although we know the meanings of being square and being circular, “this is a square circle” is devoid of meaning since we cannot point to any object that has the two properties at the same time, and thus there is no *axioma* corresponding to the state-

¹⁶ REESOR, Margaret E.: *The nature of man in Early Stoic philosophy*, London: Duckworth 1989, p. 41.

¹⁷ In this sense, it is true that *axioma hyparchei* can be translated as “the *axioma* corresponds to a fact,” BOBZIEN, *op. cit.*, p. 16. Cf. LONG, *Language and thought*, p. 93.

ment. In this sense, “the destruction of an *axioma* is its ceasing to be expressible.”¹⁸ An expression becomes void and, quite literally, meaningless. However, there is no corresponding problem with “Dion is dead” after Dion’s death. “Dion” refers to an individual quality unique to Dion and can be expressed even if Dion is no longer alive. In that case, the *axioma* “Dion is dead” is not destroyed; it is also true because the object, Dion, is dead. Does the *lekton* also depend on the object of reference?¹⁹ If the object of reference is Dion, then no, since the object does not exist any more, and yet the *lekton* does.

This discussion indicates that it would be difficult to treat *axiomata*, and, generally, *lekta*, as non-existents. As indicated by Long, it would be a vain effort for Sextus to offer arguments against existence of the *lekta* if it were not clear to him that the Stoics consider them as existing entities.²⁰ Also, Sextus explicitly mentions some who disagree with a real existence (ὑπαρχίς) of the *lekta*, and Basileides who among the Stoics claimed that there are no incorporeals (SE 8.258).

Axiomata are said to exist, *hyparchein*, and to subsist, *hyphistasthai*. Which denomination is correct? As correctly indicated by Schubert, the main source for the application of the two terms is Sextus and the plethora of examples indicates that he has no scruples in switching between the two terms.²¹ Sextus applies both terms to both corporeals and incorporeals so that by the usage of the terms it is impossible to state that only bodies exist and incorporeals do not. However, because of their dependent existence, *lekta*’s existence can be considered somewhat lesser than the existence of bodies, mere subsistence, “the existence of a shadow.”²² But the *lekta* are incorporeal (SE 8.12, Seneca, *Ep.* 117.13), so their existence undermines the monistic character of the Stoic doctrine.²³ The *lekta* exist as, at the same time, a side-effect of the activity of the mind and the guarantee that different minds can meaningfully communicate. In that sense, the rational soul’s “capacity for abstract thought represents some kind of transcendence over the purely corporeal which is strictly the only kind of existence the Stoics recognised.”²⁴ Rationality does not seem to fit the monistic philosophy of the Stoics. To be sure, they could consider the *lekta* to be bodies, and they did not shun from extending the realm of bodies. After all, even

¹⁸ KNEALE, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

¹⁹ The Dion example is said to indicate that the *lekta* are dependent on the object of reference, LONG, *Language and thought*, p. 98.

²⁰ LONG, *Language and thought*, p. 84.

²¹ SCHUBERT, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

²² PASQUINO, Pasquale: Le statut ontologique des incorporels dans l’ancien stoïcisme, *Les stoïciens et leur logique*, p. 383; as he states somewhat picturesquely, incorporeals are “effects that are produced around the bodies, which appear and disappear, at the same time *tina* and *ouk onta*, the reality endowed with quasi existence, the reality accepted and disqualified at the same time,” p. 381; “there exists in nature an incorporeal, that is, an inexistent existent,” WEIL, Eric: Remarques sur le ‘matérialisme’ des stoïciens, *Mélanges Alexandre Koyré*, v. 2, Paris: Hermann 1964, p. 568.

²³ The mere discussion of incorporeals is considered to be a sign of the dualism of the Stoic doctrine, VIRIEUX-REYMOND, Antoinette: *La logique et l’épistémologie des Stoïciens*, Chambéry: Lire 1959, p. 62. Dualism can be found not only in the doctrine of the incorporeals; Popper sees in the Stoic concept of the *hegemonikon* “special form of body-mind dualism,” POPPER, Karl R.: *Objective knowledge*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1972, p. 157, note 6.

²⁴ LONG, A.A.: *Stoic studies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996, pp. 248–249.

virtues were bodies and they discussed whether walking, a body, is a breath sent by *hegemonikon* to the feet or *hegemonikon* itself (Seneca, *Ep.* 113.23 = 2.836). Why not *lekta*? It has been argued above that this would lead to a redundancy in the cosmos. It seems that the Stoics were more concerned about defending nominalism than monistic materialism. Therefore, the subsistence of the *lekta* would not be considered unacceptable by them, providing that the ἐννοήματα remain outside that category.

3 SYNTAX OF *AXIOMATA*

It has been mentioned that the definition of a true *axioma* as “that which is and is contradictory to something” is a mixture of syntactic and semantic components, the reference to a contradictory *axioma* being the syntactic component. Contradictory *axiomata* are defined as “such of which one exceeds the other by the negative” (SE 8.89). Two *axiomata*, *P* and *not P*, are contradictory because “the negative is prefixed to one of the *axiomata*” (SE 8.90). This is purely structural, syntactic criterion. Can an *axioma* be divided into an *axioma* and a negative? Can *axiomata*, or, more generally, *lekta* have parts? “No incorporeal can be either compounded or divided, for these are things peculiar to bodies,” says Sextus (SE 8.79), but according to Chrysippus, other incorporeals – namely space, time, and the void are divisible (Aetius 1.16.4 = 2.482). The problem is exacerbated by the Stoic division of the *lekta* into complete and incomplete. Incomplete *lekta* are expressed by incomplete sentences, e.g., “writes,” and they include predicates; complete *lekta* are given by complete sentences and they include *axiomata*, syllogisms, and questions (DL 7.63). Moreover, there are grammatical categories and their semantic counterparts. Common nouns signify (δηλοῦν) common properties, proper names signify individual properties (ιδίαν ποιότητα), that is, bodies, not *lekta*, because properties are bodies. Verbs signify uncompounded (ἄσύνθετον) predicates (DL 7.58), which are *lekta* and are joined with a nominative case (πτῶσις)²⁵; a predicate forms an *axioma*; that is, the *axioma* is compound because it consists of a subject and a predicate as, for example, the predicative *axioma* “Dion is walking.”²⁶ This may make an impression that the incorporeal *axioma* is composed of a corporeal and an incorporeal. However, a complete *lekton* is not a compound *lekton*. *Axioma* expressed by the sentence “Dion walks” is not composed of the corporeal Dion and incorporeal predicate “walks.” The *axioma* is a *lekton* which expresses the fact that Dion is walking and nothing else. It expresses only one attribute of Dion, namely, that he is walking, but not that he is bold, married, young, etc. The *axioma* reduced Dion to one aspect only, to the fact that he is walking. All other attributes are stripped from him except that he walks. “Dion walks” denotes one thing: walking(Dion), Dion in the process of walking, walking-

²⁵ *Prosis* is a case, a syntactic category, but it seems to be used here as a noun, or a subject, that is in a particular case, see SCHUBERT, *op. cit.*, p. 81; see also NUCHELMANS, *op. cit.*, p. 73; LERSCH, Laurenz: *Die Sprachphilosophie der Alten*, Bonn: König 1838 [reprint: Hildesheim: Olms 1971], v. 2, pp. 54, 185–190; TELEGDI, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

²⁶ DL 7.64–65, 70; Plutarch, *Quaest. Plat.* 1009c.

ness of Dion, Dion endowed with one attribute only: walking. Although the reference of the subject, Dion, is a real person, the attribute makes him unreal, incorporeal, because there is no one who can be characterized only by walking. It is not true, then, that “the true *axioma* has a structure corresponding to a similar structure in the object described.”²⁷ Although complete *lekton* is defined as a compound, the result is a seamless whole in which no subject and a predicate can be distinguished. In particular, the *axioma* expressed by the baffling statement “Dion is dead” can be true although there is no denotation for Dion.²⁸ It is true not because real Dion has to correspond to individual property *Dion*, on the one hand, and death has to correspond to predicate *dead*, on the other, but because the *axioma* as a whole connotes deadness of Dion, Dion’s being dead, an incorporeal entity corresponding at the same time to real (although not existing any more) Dion and real death.

The Tarskian definition of truth cannot be applied to the Stoic *axiomata*, at least to atomic *axiomata*. The definition says that the atomic statement $P_i(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ is satisfied in the domain $(U, r_1, \dots, r_m)$ for a particular valuation (a_i) of elements in U when $r_i(a_1, \dots, a_n)$. This means that there is an isomorphism between a language statement $P_i(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ and the event expressed by the metalanguage statement $r_i(a_1, \dots, a_n)$. Importantly, for Tarski, truth value is ascribed to language elements; to the Stoics, it is ascribed to the *axiomata*. Therefore, to the Stoics, $P_i(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ should be an *axioma* and $r_i(a_1, \dots, a_n)$ a state of affairs. However, the Stoics would not require structural correspondence between an atomic *axioma* and an event because there is no structure in them, at least not in the atomic *axioma*. They could at best say that an atomic *axioma* P is true when r . It is true then, that “the Stoic semantics challenges the possibility of reducing the meaning of an utterance to that of its terms.”²⁹ But this is true only for the atomic *axiomata*. The syntactic aspect of the *axioma* is not abolished altogether. For the Stoics, *axiomata* are the material of logic with its five unprovable arguments or syllogisms (ἀναπόδεικτοι λόγοι) and four corresponding, unprovable metarules (θέματα).³⁰ Syntax appears on the level of nonatomic *axiomata*, in the discussion of negation, conjunction, alternative, and, in particular, the conditional. Stoic logic is propositional logic in which propositional variables are used. This is a departure from Aristotelian logic which uses only term variables.³¹ For example, one syllogism is, “if the first, then the second, but the first, then the second” (SE 8.227) in which “first” and “second” are variables, so that the syllogism

²⁷ KNEALE, *op. cit.*, p. 153 seconded by GRAESER, The Stoic theory of meaning, p. 80, but he also says that because their ontology is the ontology of facts, not substances, the Stoics cannot grant the *lekta* any exact object reference in the sense of a known isomorphic correspondence, GRAESER, *Zenon*, p. 27.

²⁸ GREASER, The Stoic theory of meaning, p. 83.

²⁹ IMBERT, Claude: Théorie de la représentation et doctrine logique dans le stoïcisme ancien, in *Les stoïciens et leur logique*, p. 236.

³⁰ The sophistication of the Stoic logical theory is indicated by the fact that it can be shown to be complete, that is, any question posed in the language of this logic can be answered in positive or in negative, BECKER, Oskar: *Zwei Untersuchungen zur antiken Logik*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 1957, pp. 39, 46–48.

³¹ This point is stressed strongly by Łukasiewicz who sees in it a major step in the history of logic, ŁUKASIEWICZ, Jan: *Z historii logiki zdań* (1934), translated in his *Selected works*, Amsterdam: North-Holland 1970, p. 199.

can be rendered as “if p , then q , but p , then q .” Clearly, the structure, that is, syntax, of the *axiomata* “if p , then q ,” “ p ,” and “ q ” is of critical importance for the proper application of the syllogism.

It seems to be inescapable to include syntactic analyses in the Stoic semantics. But this is also a problem – a philosophical, not a logical problem – in the Tarskian semantics as well. In Tarski’s definition, a language L_1 statement $P_i(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ is in essence translated into a metalanguage statement $r_i(a_1, \dots, a_n)$ and then, possibly, into a statement in a language L_2 to be proven in a theory formed in L_2 . In this process, all steps are purely syntactic procedures.³²

The world of *lekta* is primarily a semantic entity, the world of meaning, but it is not structure-free. It has its syntax, so the *lekta* are semantico-syntactic entities.³³ Their role is to be invariants behind actual utterances in whatever language and at whatever time they can be phrased. It is interesting to see an analogy between this understanding of the *lekta* and an effort to construct an interlingua as a tool for automated translation of languages.

4 INTERLINGUA

A great challenge in machine translation was to minimize the amount of work needed in translating many languages into many other languages. For n languages, there are needed $n(n-1)$ translation systems to translate languages into one another. It is possible, however, to translate each language into one common language, an interlingua, and then interlingua into each language, which requires only $2n$ translation systems. From a purely practical point of view, the interlingual approach is more appealing than the language-to-language approach for at least four languages, $n > 3$.

In the syntactic interlingual approach, interlingua turns into summalingua that includes syntactic categories of all languages. In the semantic approach, interlingua is envisioned as a web of meanings lying behind all languages. One interesting approach is the conceptual dependency theory proposed by Roger Schank. The main assumption of the theory is the statement that “the basis of natural language is conceptual. That is ... there exists a conceptual base that is interlingual, onto which linguistic structures in a given language map during the understanding process and out of which such structures are created during generation.”³⁴ Schank proposes an intricate structure of the interlingua. It consists of different types of concepts, conceptual cases, and dependencies, which are relations between all these conceptual categories. He gives a set of rules specifying permissible conceptual dependencies, conceptual syntax rules, or syntax of the conceptual level, which forms the grammar

³² This problem is discussed in my paper, *Semantics of programming languages and the theory of truth*, *Epistemologia* 16 (1993), pp. 281–310.

³³ This is also phrased as that the *lekta* “have a syntax as well as a model theory,” EGLI, Urs: *Stoic syntax and semantics*, in *Les stoïciens et leur logique*, p. 138.

³⁴ SCHANK, Roger: *Conceptual dependency: a theory of natural language understanding*, *Cognitive Psychology* 3 (1972), pp. 553–554.

of meaningful semantic relationships. It is important that interlingua is a conceptual language, a language of concepts, that is, a semantic entity that has its syntax. Although semantics is a more important side of interlingua, the interlingua is a semantico-syntactic union. It seems that the Stoic *lekta* were intended to play the role of an interlingua.³⁵

5 GOD AND SUBSISTENCE OF *LEKTA*

There remains a problem of the subsistence of the *lekta* and their objectivity. They have clearly no independent existence. How can one person truly communicate with another person? In what situation two people who refer to the same thing, mean the same? If one person utters an expression, then, during the utterance, its meaning, the *axioma* subsists. However, if after that, another person utters the same expression, he does not mean the same thing since another *axioma* corresponds to it as long as the expression lasts. The two *axioma* are not the same, cannot be the same, and hence the two people mean different things. But if there is one timeless *axioma* whose eternal subsistence can somehow be guaranteed, then there is always one *axioma* corresponding to the same expression uttered by different people in different times.

In other philosophical systems the permanence of *axiomata* can be accomplished by positing eternal meanings. Platonic ideas exist even if there is no material instantiation of these ideas. They existed before the Demiurge molded the world from the preexisting matter. Bolzano's sentences in themselves, which are meanings of spoken or written sentences, are independent of any language and any being, even God. As Frege states in his 1918 paper *Der Gedanke*, a thought is the meaning of a sentence, and it has non-sensory nature. It can be expressed in a sentence, but it does not have to be. Thoughts are independent entities since if they required a sentence expressing them, science would be subjective and there would not be science common to all. Thoughts are the third kingdom, which invokes immediately the concept of the third world. Popper himself states that the *axioma* are "the most important third-world linguistic entities."³⁶ But because of the objective status of the third world, its components are not the Stoic *axioma*. Also, the *lekta* can be at best considered as approximations of Bolzano's sentences in themselves and Frege's *Gedanke* or *Sinn*.³⁷ But even in the Stoic system, the dependent subsistence of *axioma* does not necessarily mean that they cannot be eternal. It may be assumed that the Stoic Logos-God is capable of holding all possible statements expressing all possible *axioma* in his mind, in his divine *hegemonikon*, and thus all the corresponding *axioma* timelessly sub-

³⁵ "A *lekton* ... is what remains constant in translation from one language to another," KNEALE, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

³⁶ POPPER, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

³⁷ MATES, *op. cit.*, pp. 19–25; BOCHENSKI, Joseph M.: *A history of formal logic*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1961, p. 110; KAHN, Charles H.: Stoic logic and Stoic Logos, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 51 (1969), pp. 170–171, note 25.

sist.³⁸ Therefore, anyone who utters a particular expression refers to the same *axioma* as the expression existing from eternity in God's mind. Importantly, truth value of the *axioma* may evolve.³⁹ The truth value of the *axioma* corresponding to "Dion is dead" today may be different from that of the *axioma* corresponding to this expression tomorrow, after Dion's death, but, still it is only one *axioma* at any one time.

It is important to notice that there is no fundamental impossibility that God thinks at the same time all thoughts that induce the subsistence of requisite *lekta*. The universe is finite and thus God who is immanent in the universe is also finite. But although the world exists eternally, it undergoes periodic conflagration after which the same events happen in exactly the same order. Therefore, the number of different people and different thoughts and utterances is also finite. Incidentally, even if the Stoic doctrine did not include the thesis of eternal recurrences, God could accommodate an infinite number of the *lekta* as well. The Stoics could refer to Zeno's dichotomy paradox and say that some unit of the *hegemonikon* corresponds to all the thought sentences: a half of this unit corresponds to one sentence, one fourth to the second sentence, one eighth to the third sentence, etc. In this way, even a finite God can be a guarantor of the existence of an infinity of sentences and thereby of the subsistence of an infinity of *lekta*.

God-Logos saturates entire reality. He is present in all the nations, in all rational beings, regardless of what language they use, and thereby he can be a guarantor of a timeless subsistence of the *lekta*, of the eternal presence of the meanings of spoken and thought, or yet to be spoken and thought, statements. By the nature of the universe, there is one underlying interlingua, an eternal repository of meanings to which all languages of all rational beings can connect. The interlingua would thus be an incorporeal counterpart of the *cosmopolis* that transcends all institutions.

This solution can be strengthened by the fact that, after all, the whole of reality is dependent on God. The reality is in the eternal cycle of destruction and regeneration where God remains the only being the same in this cycle. Everything stems from God, all individual bodies and their properties, all the more, all incorporeals.

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³⁸ Kahn is convinced that "there should be some connection between the *lekta*" and the cosmic Logos, although the only suggestion he offers is that the *lekta* are "the mode of rationality reflected in human speech" as reflected in the word "logos," KAHN, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

³⁹ It seems to be correct that the Stoics have no atemporal *axioma*, an equivalent of today's proposition and that the *axiomata* that can change their truth-value, μεταπίπτοντα, form no special class of *axiomata*, since all *axiomata* can change their truth-value, BOBZIEN, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

DÁNIEL ITTZÉS

ΦΘΟΝΟΣ ΑΠΟΛΛΩΝΟΣ.
ZUR INTERPRETATION DES KALLIMACHEISCHEN
APOLLON-HYMNUS

Summary: The author's intention is to prove that the poetic structure of Callimachus' Hymn to Apollo is in fact a realisation of Apolline aesthetics. While perfecting divine art and poetry, however, the poet does not become conceited, unlike mythical figures such as Arachne, Marsyas or Thamyras. It is this trait that compels Apollo to push his own envy off the cliffs of Olympus, and declare his benevolence towards the Apolline poet.

Key words: Callimachus, Hymn to Apollo, poetic structure, Apolline aesthetics, ὕβρις, the envy of Apollo.

Die Kallimachos betreffende riesengroße Fachliteratur der mit der Hellenistischen Dichtung von Wilamowitz beginnenden und bis zu den letzten Jahrzehnten zunehmenden Hellenismus-Forschung wurde in Lehnus' Kallimachos-Bibliographien überschaubar in Ordnung gebracht¹. Das vielleicht meist interpretierte Stück der erhalten gebliebenen Texte des bei den modernen Forschern sehr beliebten Autors ist der zweite, an Apollon gerichtete Hymnus. Es fragt sich, ob nach den vielen Einzelauslegungen und allgemeinen Erläuterungen² eine neue Interpretation nötig ist. Das Vorhaben, einen neuen Aufsatz zu verfassen, könnte nicht nur wegen der großen Anzahl, sondern auch wegen der großen Verschiedenheit und Diversität der Interpretationen für bestreitbar gehalten werden. Die bisherigen Erklärungsversuche unterscheiden sich darin voneinander, dass die literaturgeschichtlichen Auslegungen den rein poetischen gegenüberstehen. Aufgrund der vielen divergierenden Anschauungen der Forscher über die in der Dichtung sprechende Person, das reale oder fiktive Kultgeschehen und die Schlusszene, kann kein befriedigendes Ergebnis der Gesamtinterpretation des Hymnus erzielt werden. Calame hat den ritualen und narrativen

¹ L. LEHNUS, *Bibliografia callimachea*, Genova, 1988, und ders., *Nuova bibliografia callimachea*, Alessandria, 2000. Über die Interpretationen s.: U. VON WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORF, *Hellenistische Dichtung in der Zeit des Kallimachos II*, Berlin, ²1962, 77; E. HOWALD, *Der Dichter Kallimachos von Kyrene*, Erlenbach-Zürich, 1943, 87.

² Einige frühere Beiträge: J. VAHLEN, Über einige Anspielungen in den Hymnen des Callimachus II: *SPAW* 1896/35, 797–827; E. BETHE, *Der Apollonhymnus des Kallimachos: Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig*, Philologisch-historische Klasse 78, 1926/3; H. ERBSE, Zum Apollonhymnos des Kallimachos: *Hermes* 83, 1955, 411–428.

Teil des Hymnus abgegrenzt, Wimmel die spezielle Rolle der die ganze Dichtung nachträglich beleuchtenden Schlussverse erkannt und Hübner die nicht-archaische, nicht-homerische Eigenart des kallimacheischen Hymnus nachgewiesen³. Ich bin der Meinung, dass, obwohl der Hymnus im letzten Jahrzehnt auch auf literaturtheoretischer Ebene erklärt worden ist⁴, die traditionelle Interpretation durch die Einbeziehung einiger neuer Gesichtspunkte nuanciert werden kann.

DIE STRUKTUR DES GEDICHTES

Ich bin davon überzeugt, dass der Schlüssel zur richtigen Interpretation die Analyse der Struktur und des Hinweissystems des Hymnus ist. Darum werde ich vom Aufbau der ganzen Dichtung ausgehen⁵.

1–31	Einleitung, ein fiktives Apollon-Fest ⁶
1–8	Wirkung der Apollon-Epiphanie
9–16	Mahnung an die Jünglinge, laut zu singen
17–24	Bestrafung mythologischer Gestalten, die dann dem Hymnus still zuhören
25–31	Belohnung des Chores ⁷
32–104	Apollon und seine Taten
32–41	Aussehen
42–46	Kunst

³ C. CALAME, *Legendary narration and poetic procedure in Callimachus' Hymn to Apollo*, *Callimachus*, ed. by M. A. HARDER, R. F. REGTUIT, G. C. WAKKER, Groningen, 1993, 49; W. WIMMEL, *Kallimachos in Rom. Die Nachfolge seines apologetischen Dichtens in der Augusteerzeit*, Wiesbaden, 1960, 60–61; U. HÜBNER, *Probleme der Verknüpfung in Kallimachos' Apollonhymnus: Hermes* 120, 1992, 283–284. Die bisherige Forschung wird bei den einzelnen Problemen ausführlich referiert.

⁴ S.: *Callimachus*, ed. by M. A. HARDER, R. F. REGTUIT, G. C. WAKKER, Groningen, 1993.

⁵ Andere Gliederungsmöglichkeiten: WILAMOWITZ (Anm. 1) I, 215: Epiphanie (V. 1–31), Chorlied (V. 32–104), *das persönliche Nachwort* (V. 105–113). K. KERÉNYI, *Apollon-Epiphanyen: Eranos-Jahrbuch* 13, 1945, 19: Kult (V. 1–16), Kultlied (V. 17–104), *Götterszene* (105–113). I. HOROWSKI, *De Callimachi hymnorum colore mimico: Eos* 54, 1964, 71–72: Während die Knaben am Fest auf die Epiphanie des Gottes warten, spricht der Narrator über den Seelenzustand der Teilnehmer, die wichtigsten Eigenschaften von Apollon, und erzählt einige Geschichten der Apollon-Mythologie. S. KOSTER, *Kallimachos als Apollonpriester*, ders., *Tessera. Sechs Beiträge zur Poesie und poetischen Theorie der Antike*, Erlangen, 1983, 17: *Vorbereitungsphase* (V. 1–31), *Vollzugsphase* (V. 32–68), *vollzogene Epiphany* (V. 69–113). HÜBNER (Anm. 3) 284 hält die Struktur des Gedichtes für eine lineare Komposition.

⁶ P. BING (*The Well-Read Muse. Present and Past in Callimachus and the Hellenistic Poets*, Göttingen, 1988, 186–187) nimmt keine Stellung zur Frage, wo die traditionelle hymnische Narrative nach den mimetischen Versen beginnt. Sie mag entweder mit dem Wort *φθέγγεσθε* (V. 25) oder im Vers 32, oder mit dem Wort *κυκλήσκομεν* (V. 47) beginnen. Ich halte den Vers 31 für den letzten Satz des die Festversammlung beschreibenden Teiles, weil es in diesem um die Möglichkeit geht, Apollon auf vielerlei Weise, mit vielen Epitheten besingen zu können. VAHLEN (Anm. 2) 803 nennt die ersten 31 Verse freies, „homerisches“ exordium.

⁷ BETHE (Anm. 2) 13 hält diese Verse für die Einleitung zum Hauptteil des Hymnus (V. 32–96) und die Verse 97–104 für das Aition desselben Abschnittes.

47–54	Apollon Nomios
55–64	Hörneraltar auf Delos
65–68	Wegweisung für Battos
69–84	Karneia-Fest in Kyrene
85–96	Die erste Karneia
97–104	Pythons Tötung
105–113	Apollon und der Dichter

VERSE 1–31

Im ersten Teil des Gedichtes sind nicht nur die lebendigen Bilder der Kultsituation⁸ für mimetische Darstellung zu halten, sondern es müssen auch die Ausdrücke, die an wirklichen Festen erklingen sind⁹, beachtet und zu den Methoden dieser poetischen Technik gerechnet werden. Zu den inhaltlichen Elementen, zu dem speziellen, kultischen Wortschatz kommen noch grammatische Formen in S/1, 2 und P/1, 2, die das persönliche Interesse des Sprechers und der Teilnehmer betonen¹⁰. Durch diese drei Komponenten wird die kallimacheische Intention erfüllt, damit es dem Leser seines Gedichtes und dem Gott, dem Zuhörer so vorkäme, *als ob* sie einem wirklichen Hymnus zuhören und an einem realen Apollon-Fest teilnehmen würden. Darum beschäftige ich mich nicht mit den folgenden Fragen – obwohl diese ganz ausführlich in der Forschung behandelt wurden –: Wer ist der Sprecher im Gedicht? Welcher Teil des Apollonhymnus darf für den eigentlichen Hymnus gehalten werden? Wenn man die oben erwähnte Mimesis-Theorie annimmt, sollen nicht die Identifikation des lyrischen Ichs, sondern die literarische Konstruktion des Textes und die Beziehungen zwischen dem Dichter und dem Gott der Schwerpunkt dieser Interpretation sein¹¹.

⁸ *Hymn.* 2, 4: οὐχ ὀράας, 8: οἱ δὲ νέοι μολπὴν τε καὶ ἐς χορὸν ἐντύνασθε, 16: ἡγασάμην τοὺς παῖδας, ἐπεὶ χέλυς οὐκέτ' ἀεργός. Alle Kallimachos-Stellen sind nach PFEIFFERS Ausgabe zitiert: *Callimachus*, Volumen I. *Fragmenta*, Volumen II. *Hymni et epigrammata*, ed. R. PFEIFFER, Oxford, 1949.

⁹ *Hymn.* 2, 2: ἐκάς ἐκάς ὅστις ἀλιτρός, 17: εὐφημεῖτ'. In dem Gegensatz ἀλιτροί >< ἐσθλοί sieht WILAMOWITZ (Anm. 1) II, 81 den Einfluss einer ritualen attischen Frage und einer Antwort: τίς τῇδε; πολλοὶ κάγαθοί. K. BASSIS Feststellung (The Poetics of Exclusion in Callimachus' Hymn to Apollo: *TAPhA* 119, 1989, 221–222) ist zu beherzigen, dass der kallimacheische Ausdruck sich nicht nur auf die *profani*, vom Kult Ausgeschlossenen, sondern auch auf die Leser bezieht, die nicht die Fähigkeit haben, das literarische Kunstwerk zu verstehen und zu interpretieren.

¹⁰ *Hymn.* 2, 4: οὐχ ὀράας, 6: ἀνακλίνασθε, 8: ἐντύνασθε, 11: ὀψόμεθ', ἐσσόμεθ', 17: εὐφημεῖτ', 25: φέγγεσθε. Anhand von BINGS Aufsatz (Impersonation of Voice in Callimachus *Hymn to Apollo*: *TAPhA* 123, 1993, 183–184) sind die Wörter οὐχ ὀράας nicht nur an die Teilnehmer gerichtet, sondern auch als ein die Leser aktivierender Ausdruck zu interpretieren. Dieses Ziel erreichen die vielen aspirierten Vokale der Verse 1–8, durch die die durchgegeistigten Festteilnehmer und ebenso die laut Lesenden zum Schnaufen veranlasst werden.

¹¹ In ihrem Beitrag (Mimesis and aetiology in Callimachus' *Hymns*, HARDER–REGTUIT–WAKKER [Anm. 4] 66) hat M. DEPEW ziemlich skeptisch auf die Identifikation der sprechenden Person der Verse 32–102 verzichtet, aber auf Grund der Schlusszene hält sie es für das wahrscheinlichste, dass der Dichter selbst in diesem Teil der Dichtung die Sprecherrolle spielt. Über die Sprecherrolle s.: KOSTER (Anm. 5). Zur literarischen Intention des Kallimachos s.: É. CAHEN, *Callimaque et son œuvre poétique*, Paris, 1929, 400.

Es kommt die lebensgefährliche Begegnung mit dem Gott im ersten Abschnitt des Hymnus vor, falls es sich nun um einen Teilnehmer am Apollon-Fest, der als *λιτός* der Apollon-Epiphanie harrt¹², oder um die sich brüstenden mythologischen Gestalten¹³, oder um die Feinde des vom Gott in Schutz genommenen Herrschers handelt¹⁴. Außer dem seine Gegner umbringenden Gott¹⁵ erscheint auch eine gnädige Apollon-Figur, nämlich die des Beschützers der das Kultlied vortragenden Jünglinge. Apollon beschützt die jungen Mitglieder des Chores für ihr ganzes Leben¹⁶, falls er sich in dem Hymnus gefällt¹⁷. Und der Chor hat alles zu tun, um ein „richtiges“ Lied zu singen, weil der Gott ein unerschöpfliches Thema zum Singen und Vortragen bietet. Welches und ein wie langes Lied muss also der Chor präsentieren¹⁸?

Es ist „allein“ der Name des Gottes, der außer den verschiedenen (der umbringenden bzw. der Leben schenkenden) Apollon-Aspekten die Kohärenz in den Versen 1–31 garantiert. In diesem Teil des Gedichtes steht viermal der Name *Ἀπόλλων*, fünfmal *Φοῖβος* und einmal die Epiklesis *Ἐκάεργος*. Es ist gar kein Zufall, dass die Festversammlung auf die Epiphanie des Bogenschützen, des mit seinen Pfeilen ge-

¹² Hymn. 2, 10: *ὅς οὐκ ἴδε, λιτός ἐκεῖνος*.

¹³ Zu Niobes Appositio (*διερὸς λίθος*) s.: F. WILLIAMS, Five Problems in Callimachus' Hymn to Apollo: *QUCC* 19, 1975, 136–139. Auf Grund der hesychischen Worterklärung: *διερὸς* = *ὑγρός, ζῶον*.

¹⁴ Hymn. 2, 25–26: *κακὸν μακάρεσσιν ἐρίζειν. / ὃς μάχεται μακάρεσσιν, ἐμῷ βασιλῇ μάχοιτο. / ὅστις ἐμῷ βασιλῇ, καὶ Ἀπόλλωνι μάχοιτο*. Ich halte HEINRICHS' Konzeption (Gods in action: poetics of divine performance in the Hymns of Callimachus, HARDER-REGTUIT-WAKKER [Anm. 4] 146) für unwahrscheinlich und unannehmbar: ... both Ptolemy and Apollo as joint sponsors of choral performance, and of the poet. CAHEN (Anm. 11) 407 meint über die kyreneische Religion: *Elle est une religion où le souverain a sa place à côté des dieux...* Ebenso: G. CAPOVILLA, Callimaco, II, Roma, 1967, 81.

¹⁵ Hymn. 2, 11: *Ἐκάεργε*.

¹⁶ Hymn. 2, 14–15: *εἰ τελέειν μέλλουσι γάμον πολὴν τε κερεῖσθαι, / ἐστήξειν δὲ τὸ τεῖχος ἐπ' ἀρχαίοισι θεμέθοις*. In diesem Motiv sieht WILLIAMS (Anm. 13) 133–136 einen Hinweis auf ein Apollon zu bringendes Haaropfer, welches von den jungen Leuten (*νέοι*) um des Erwachsenwerdens, des langen, erfolgreichen Lebens willen angeboten wurde. Außer den vom Autor angeführten vier Epigrammen (*Anth. Pal.* 6, 155; 198; 242; 279) seien hier auch einige andere Parallelstellen zitiert: Hes. *Theog.* 346–348: *τίκτε δὲ θυγατέρων ἱερὸν γένος, αἱ κατὰ γαῖαν / ἄνδρας κουρίζουσι σὺν Ἀπόλλωνι ἄνακτι / καὶ Ποταμοῖς, ταύτην δὲ Διὸς πάρα μοῖραν ἔχουσι*. Theophr. *Char.* 21, 3: *καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἀποκεῖραι ἀγαγὼν εἰς Δελφοῦς*.

¹⁷ Hymn. 2, 28–29: *τὸν χορὸν ὠπόλλων, ὃ τι οἱ κατὰ θυμὸν αἰεῖδει, / τιμήσει· δύνανται γάρ, ἐπεὶ Διὶ δεξιὸς ἦσται*. Diese Verse wurden von K. J. MCKAY (Door Magic and the Epiphany Hymn: *CQ* New Ser. 17, 1967, 190) mit dem *Psalm* 109/110, 4–7 in Parallele gestellt. Im Neuen Testament (*Matth.* 26, 64: *πλὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ἅπ' ἄρτι ὤψεσθε τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καθήμενον ἐκ δεξιῶν τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ ἐρχόμενον ἐπὶ τῶν νεφελῶν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*) und im *Symb. Nic.* (... *sedet ad dexteram Patris*) ist die Phrase über Christus wiederaufgenommen worden.

¹⁸ WILAMOWITZ (Anm. 1) II, 82, E. L. BUNDY (The „Quarrel between Kallimachos and Apollonios“, Part I: The Epilogue of Kallimachos's *Hymn to Apollo*: *CSCA* 5, 1972, 45–49) und A. CAMERON (*Callimachus and His Critics*, Princeton, 1995, 406) legen alle besonderen Akzent auf die apologetische Eigenheit dieses Abschnittes, dessen Thema am Schluss des Gedichtes, in der Götterszene wiederkehrt. P. WÜLFING (Hymnos und Gebet. Zur Formengeschichte der älteren griechischen Hymnendichtung: *StudClass*, 20, 1981, 31) betont neuartig die gute und die mit künstlerischen Schwierigkeiten verbundene Seite der Tatsache, dass Apollon ein *θεὸς εὐύμνος* ist. So kann ganz einfach ein richtiges und hymnenartiges Thema gefunden werden, es besteht aber die Gefahr, das mythologische Thema nicht vollkommen zu erschöpfen.

nau treffenden und tötenden Gottes, wartet¹⁹. Apollon soll den *ἀλιτρός*, den Frevler, der weit vom Kultgeschehen entfernt bleiben muss, töten, wie er die Niobiden²⁰ und Achilleus mit seinen Pfeilen umgebracht hat. Die sehr häufig und bedeutungsvoll vorkommenden Namen und Epikleseis des Gottes würden allein genügen, damit die vier kleineren Themen der ersten 31 Verse sich verknüpfen²¹.

In den ersten Versen des Hymnus sind mehrere konkrete Hinweise auf die Apollon-Epiphanie zu beobachten²². Wegen dieser Tatsache und der vielen modernen Interpretationen muss die Frage beantwortet werden: Erscheint Apollon selbst in unserer Dichtung, und wenn ja, in welchem Teil oder in welchen Teilen des Gedichtes? Auf Grund der Verse 1–9 und 17–24 muss die Wirklichkeit der Apollon-Epiphanie für unzweifelhaft gehalten werden, weil die ganze Natur (Menschen, Tiere, Gegenstände)²³ unter dem Einfluss des Gottes steht. Man kann auch feststellen, dass die Epiphanie noch nicht geschehen ist, sich aber in kurzer Zeit nicht vor den Augen aller Teilnehmer, die auf Apollons Erscheinung warten, verwirklichen wird²⁴. Vom Text des Hymnus her ist der Standpunkt der Forscher, die die Epiphanie in dem einen oder anderen kleinen Abschnitt lokalisieren, gar nicht nachzuweisen²⁵. Es ist offenbar, dass nicht alle die geheime Begegnung des Menschlichen und Göttlichen (der

¹⁹ S.: K. WERNICKE, *RE* II, 1896, 17, s.v. Apollon: *ἐκάεργος, ἐκατηβέλης, ἐκατηβόλος, ἑκατος, ἑκεῖος, ἐκηβέλης, ἐκηβόλος*.

²⁰ Zur Hybris der Niobe vgl.: Ov. *Met.* 6, 150–152: *nec tamen admonita est poena popularis Arachnes, / cedere caelitibus verbisque minoribus uti. / Multa dabant animos...* 170–172: „*Quis furor auditos*“ inquit „*praeponere visis / caelestes? Aut cur colitur Latona per aras, / numen adhuc sine ture meum est.*“

²¹ In seinem über die rhetorischen Aspekte der griechischen Hymnendichtung verfassten Aufsatz (Aspects of Rhetorics and Form in Greek Hymns: *GRBS* 23, 1982, 5–8) hat W. H. RACE den nordenischen Er- und Du-Stil in den Einleitungen der Hymnen unterschieden. Dazu vgl. E. NORDENS epochales Werk: *Agnostos theos. Untersuchungen zur Formengeschichte religiöser Rede*, Leipzig–Berlin, 1913, 143–166. Im ersten Teil unseres Hymnus sind die Formen des Er-Stils, im zweiten aber die des anderen (69: *ᾠπολλον*, 72: *Καρνεῖε*, 79: *ὦ ἄνα*, 101: *σύ*, 103: *σε*) zu finden.

²² *Hymn.* 2, 3: *καὶ δὴ πού τὰ θύρετρα καλῶ ποδὶ Φοῖβος ἀράσσει*, 7: *ὁ γὰρ θεὸς οὐκέτι μακρὴν*, 13: *Φοῖβου... ἐπιδημήσαντος*. BETHE (Anm. 2) 4 interpretiert das Bild des an der Tür „klopfenden“ Gottes angesichts des 7. Verses: ... *schon erschüttert Phoibos die Pforten dadurch, daß er mit seinem schönen Fuße daherschreitet*.

²³ F. WILLIAMS, *Callimachus Hymn to Apollo. A Commentary*, Oxford, 1978, ad 9–16: Der aufgeregte Narrator und die sich von selbst aufschließenden Pforten weisen darauf hin, dass die Epiphanie im Gange ist (... *the epiphany proper is taking place*). Eine treffende Bemerkung von HEINRICHS (Anm. 14) 144–145 ist, dass eine wundersame Bewegtheit unter den Tieren, Bäumen, Gegenständen während der großen Passivität der Menschen konstatiert werden kann. MCKAY (Anm. 17) bes. 190–191 stellt dieses Motiv dadurch in einen breiteren literaturhistorischen Kontext, dass er den *Psalm* 23/24, 7–10 als eine Parallelstelle betrachtet.

²⁴ BETHE (Anm. 2) 5–6 Ansicht nach kann dies auf Grund des Wortes *χαίρει* (V. 113) festgestellt werden, weil es der Dichter, der allein die Epiphanie erlebt hat, selbst aussprechen soll. P. M. FRASER (*Ptolemaic Alexandria*, I, Oxford, 1972, 785) sieht in demselben Moment nur die ethischen Aspekte der kallimacheischen Apollon-Gestalt. BASSI (Anm. 9) kommt viel näher durch den Titel ihres Beitrages (*The Poetics of Exclusion in Callimachus' Hymn to Apollo*) an die richtige Interpretation heran, obwohl sie im besonderen die Schlusszene auslegt.

²⁵ WILLIAMS (Anm. 23) lokalisiert die Epiphanie in den Versen 56–57, CAHEN (Anm. 11) 399, ERBSE (Anm. 2) 422 und CALAME (Anm. 3) 46 konstatieren sie in der Python-Szene, HEINRICHS (Anm. 14) 145 und BING (Anm. 10) 193 aber in den Schlussversen.

menschlichen und göttlichen Sphäre)²⁶ erleben werden. Das rein apollinische Wesen ist m.E. im *ganzen* Text zu greifen²⁷, nicht, weil das Hauptthema und der Schwerpunkt des vom *apollinischen* Dichter verfassten Hymnus die *Apollon-Mythologie* und im besonderen der *Dichtergott* ist, sondern wegen der apollinischen Ordnung der *ganzen* Gedichtstruktur. Was für Eigenschaften diese apollinische Ordnung hat, werde ich im Folgenden erörtern.

VERSE 32–104

Im zweiten großen strukturellen Abschnitt des *Hymn. 2* sind mehrere voneinander ganz unabhängige mythologische Apollon-Geschichten dem Anschein nach ohne jede Verknüpfung nacheinander geordnet²⁸. Gibt es doch einige Zusammenhänge zwischen diesen Elementen, oder soll man die Auslegung akzeptieren, dass es ein Katalog der verschiedenen Geschichten der Apollon-Aretalogie ist, dessen Einzelteile nur dadurch verbunden sind, dass man alle diese in *einem* Gedicht des Kallimachos und als Themen eines möglichen Apollon-Hymnus liest²⁹? Ich bin der Meinung, dass die mythologischen Stücke sehr eng miteinander in Beziehung stehen. Diese Zusammenhänge entfalten sich jedoch vor den Augen des aufmerksamen, *ἑσθλός* Lesers, und diese werden im Folgenden betrachtet.

Das Hauptthema der Verse 32–41 ist das Äussere, das Aussehen des Gottes³⁰, das im Text durch drei Ausdrücke angedeutet ist. Phoibos Apollon ist ein strahlender, goldglänzender³¹, immerschöner und immerjünger³² Gott, und verleiht sein „Wunderheilmittel“ den von ihm aufgesuchten Städten³³. Durch das letzte Moment wird der Zusammenhang mit den späteren Einzelteilen der Dichtung (V. 42–46, 47–

²⁶ KERÉNYIS (Anm. 5) 19–20 Erachtens sind die menschliche und göttliche Sphäre durch die Person des Dichters verbunden. Diese Theorie ist im Fall des *fr. 1* der *Atia* für viel wichtiger zu halten. Im *Hymn. 2* ist der Zusammenhang der beiden Sphären durch den literarischen Text konstruiert, wie unten nachgewiesen wird.

²⁷ Vgl.: BING (Anm. 10) 186, 193: ... *whether we see the god or not depends on us. And if we do see the god, do we belong to a religious or a literary élite?*

²⁸ S. dazu HÜBNERs (Anm. 3) 282 völlig grundlose vernichtende Kritik: ... *in einer scheinbar konzeptlosen Mündlichkeit*..., ... *in ihrer gespielten Kunstlosigkeit*. Ders. (Anm. 3) 284–288 nennt die *ποικιλία* das Hauptorganisationsprinzip der Verse 65–96 und stellt fest, dass dieser Abschnitt aus linear nacheinander gestellten Elementen besteht, obwohl die die kleineren Teile verbindenden Fäden – meiner Meinung nach – von größerer Bedeutung sind.

²⁹ HÜBNERs (Anm. 3) 292 unannehmbare Meinung sei nochmals zitiert: ... *einer Art Stoffsammlung*..., ... *ein Leitfaden möglicher Themen für einen Hymnus*... VAHLEN (Anm. 2) 803 und DEPEW (Anm. 11) 66 halten die Verse 32–104, WILLIAMS (Anm. 23) ad loc. aber die Verse 32–96 für den „eigentlichen“ Hymnus.

³⁰ WILLIAMS (Anm. 23) ad loc. erklärt diese Verse anders, indem er die Gabe des Gottes für die besuchten Städte in den Mittelpunkt stellt. Vgl.: WILAMOWITZ (Anm. 1) II, 83–84; HEINRICHS (Anm. 14) 132.

³¹ *Hymn. 2, 34: πολύχρυσος*. CAPOVILLA (Anm. 14) II, 74–86 beschäftigt sich mit der kyrenischen Religion in archäologischer Hinsicht. Die Apollon-Gestalt des Hymnus ist seiner Meinung nach (Anm. 14) 76 auf Grund der Kultstatue von Kyrene abgebildet.

³² *Hymn. 2, 36: ἀεὶ καλὸς καὶ ἀεὶ νέος*

³³ *Hymn. 2, 39–40: οὐ λίπος Ἀπόλλωνος ἀποστᾶζουσιν ἔθειραι, / ἀλλ' αὐτὴν πανάκειαν*

54, 97–104)³⁴ hergestellt. In dem ersten Teil geht es um die Kunst des Gottes: Ihm sind die Bogenschützen, die Dichter (und auch Kallimachos selbst, wie es vom *fr.* 1 der *Aitia* bekannt ist), die Seher und die Ärzte zugeteilt worden. Apollon schenkt also seine eigene Kunst den Auserwählten, die Panakeia den Ärzten, um damit den Tod verzögern zu können³⁵.

Zwei auf den ersten Blick bedeutungslose Momente führen uns zu der Nomios-Gestalt³⁶ in den Versen 47–54 weiter. Der immerjunge Gott ist in den *jungen* Admetos verliebt³⁷, und das Panakeia-Motiv tritt hier wieder hervor: Die Panakeia ist der wunderbare Tau, womit Apollon als Hersos die Pflanzen, als Nomios aber die Felder nährt³⁸. Das Jugend-Motiv hat eine bedeutungsvolle Rolle auch in der Geschichte des delischen Hörneraltars: Apollon war erst vier Jahre alt, als er seinen ersten Altar auf der Insel Delos in minuziöser Arbeit „zusammengewebt“, aufgebaut und errichtet hat³⁹. Von da an legt Apollon den Grundstein zu allen Städten, darum hat er Battos den Weg in die neue Heimat durch Weissagungen, Orakel gewiesen⁴⁰, und dem kyrenischen König später das Versprechen gegeben, er dürfe die neue Stadt nach vielen Kämpfen und Mühen erbauen. Mit Rücksicht auf den oben Erwähnten ist es verständlich, warum der nächste Teil des Hymnus mit den Namen des Mantik- (Klarios) und des in Kämpfen Sieg schenkenden Gottes (Boedromios) beginnt⁴¹.

Von Vers 69 an wird Battos' Weg nach Kyrene geschildert, in die neue Stadt, in die er den Kult des Apollon Karneios bringt⁴². Der nächste Abschnitt handelt vom

³⁴ WIMMEL (Anm. 3) 69 erwähnt nur die Jugend des den Hörneraltar bauenden und den Python niederschlagenden Gottes.

³⁵ *Hymn.* 2, 45–46: *ἐκ δὲ νυ Φοῖβου / ἱητροὶ δεδάσιν ἀνάβλησιν θανάτοιο*. VAHLEN (Anm. 2) 808, WILLIAMS (Anm. 23) ad loc. und HEINRICHS (Anm. 14) 147 halten die gleichzeitig von dem Gott und dem Herrscher für künstlerische Leistungen geeigneten Umstände für den Schwerpunkt der Verse 42–46.

³⁶ HEINRICHS (Anm. 14) 129 legt besonderen Akzent darauf, dass das hymnische Epitheton in einen narrativen Teil weiterführt.

³⁷ *Hymn.* 2, 49: *ἡθέου ὑπ' ἔρωτι κεκαυμένος Ἀδμήτοιο*.

³⁸ K. J. MCKAY (Solar Motifs or, Something New Under the Sun: *Antichthon* 10, 1976, 42) führt die traditionellen Motive der Verse 38–41 (Haare, Tau) auf östliche, ägyptische Herkunft zurück. In diesen Gebieten hat es so wenig geregnet, dass Tau die Pflanzen und die Früchte genährt hat. Die biologische, ökologische Herkunft des Motivs schmälert Kallimachos' dichterische Leistung gar nicht. Zum hapax legomenon *ἐπιμηλάδες* (V. 51) und zu Eigenheiten der hellenistischen Wortbildung s.: WILLIAMS (Anm. 14) 139–143. Apollon als Gott der Vegetation: WERNICKE (Anm. 19) 9: *Ἐρίφυλλος*, *Ἐρσος*, *Νόμιος*, *Ἰλάτης*. DEPEW (Anm. 11) 74 zählt manche Beispiele auf, um zu beweisen, dass Nomios kein spezielles Apollon-Epitheton ist, weil es u.a. mit Pan, Dionysos, Hermes, Aristaios verknüpft werden kann.

³⁹ *Hymn.* 2, 57–58: *αὐτὸς δὲ θεμεΐλια Φοῖβος ὑφαίνει. / τετραέτης τὰ πρῶτα θεμεΐλια Φοῖβος ἔπηξε*.

⁴⁰ Vgl.: *Hymn.* 2, 45: *κείνον δὲ θριαὶ καὶ μάντιες*.

⁴¹ WILAMOWITZ (Anm. 1) II, 84: ... nur als pythischer Orakelgott hat er den Kolonien den Weg gewiesen. Apollon als Orakelgott und Gott der Verträge: WERNICKE (Anm. 19) 12–14: *Θέρμιος*, *Νόμιος*, *Ὀριος*; als Hilfgott in Kämpfen und Kriegen: ders. (Anm. 19) 11–12: *Βοάσων*, *λαοσσόος*, *Ὀριος*, *Παιών*, *Στρατάγιος*, *χρυσάορος*, *χρυσάωρ*. VAHLEN (Anm. 2) 823 meint, dass die Gründung der Stadt Kyrene nur ein persönliches Beispiel für „städtische“ Apollon-Aspekte ist.

⁴² W. KOFLER (Kallimachos' Wahlverwandtschaften. Zur poetischen Tradition und Gattung des Apollonhymnos: *Philologus* 140, 1996, 240–241) betont die Funktion der Verse 32–71, an deren Ende man über Kallimachos' Heimat liest. CALAME (Anm. 3) 43 hält die drei Apollon-Aspekte (Nomios, Phoibos, Karneios) des zur Stadtgründung führenden Abschnittes für wichtig. HEINRICHS (Anm. 14) 129 er-

ersten Karneia-Fest, im hornförmigen Myrtusa-Gebirge stattgefunden, wo die Nymphe Hypseis früher einen Löwen getötet hat⁴³. Das Erlegen des Wildes und der Siegesruf *ἰὴ ἰὴ* (V. 80) führt den Text zur delphischen Python-Episode (V. 97–102) weiter⁴⁴. Nach dieser Szene musste der Gott sich in Thessalien bei Admetos reinigen, dem zufolge Apollon selbst als *ἰατρόμαντις* oder *ἰατρός* die Kranken und die Sünder reinigen kann. In diesem Motiv wurde also ein Hinweis auf die Verse 44–45 gefunden.

Die Beziehungen der verschiedenen Teile des Textes sind, sei es auch nur verborgen, durch die Apollon-Attribute konstruiert⁴⁵. Kallimachos, der als Kind seinen Dichterberuf von Apollon erhielt, führt diese Struktur mit so minuziöser poetischer Technik durch, wie Apollon seinen Hörneraltar auf der Insel Delos im Vers 57, an zentraler Stelle des Hymnus, „zusammengewebt“ hat. Darum stellt oder fällt der Schwerpunkt des zweiten Teiles der Dichtung damit, ob der Sinn und die Bedeutung des Wortes *ὑπαίνω* erkannt werden⁴⁶. Motive (Gegenstände), scheinbar ohne jede Bedeutung, werden strukturelle Elemente eines Gedichtes (Kunstwerkes). Der Dichter imitiert nicht nur in seiner eigenen Person den Phoibos *ἄκερσεκόμης*, sondern auch seine Kunst erhebt sich in apollinische Höhe. Man kann wegen des fragmentarischen Erhaltungszustandes Vermutungen, wenngleich ziemlich sichere Vermutungen, über das Konstruktionsprinzip der zwei letzten Bücher der *Aitia* haben. Dasselbe Prinzip, nämlich aus selbständigen mythologischen Elementen ein Ganzes zu schaffen, kann am viel kürzeren Apollon-Hymnus in seiner völligen Konzentration und künstlerischen Vollkommenheit betrachtet werden⁴⁷. Bei der Mythologie handelt es sich um selbständige, nur durch die Figur des Gottes verbundene Mythen, in der kallimacheischen Dichtung aber um durch die Apollon-Attribute und geheime Geflechte verbundene Abschnitte – vom poeta doctus zur hohen Poesie erhöht.

Welches andere Konstruktionselement kann im Gedicht gefunden werden? In der Interpretation der Einleitung wurden schon die verschiedenen Benennungen des

klärt die in die Narrative eingefügten hymnischen Epitheten. Apollon als Gott der Kolonisation: WERNICKE (Anm. 19) 18: Ἀγῆτης, Ἀγήτωρ, Ἀρχηγέτης, Κτίστης, Οἰκιστής. Diese Funktion des Gottes steht mit seinem das ganze menschliche Leben, die Jahreszeitenwende und insbesondere den zur Kolonisation sehr gut passenden Frühling beschützenden Aspekt im Zusammenhang, dazu s.: ders. (Anm. 19) 10.

⁴³ Hymn. 2, 90–92: τοὺς μὲν ἀναξ ἶδεν αὐτός, ἔῃ δ' ἐπεδείξατο νύμφη / στάς ἐπὶ Μυρτούσσης κερατώδεος, ἥχι λέοντα / Ὑψηῖς κατέπεφνε βοῶν σίνιν Εὐρυπύλοιο.

⁴⁴ WILAMOWITZ (Anm. 1) II, 85; HEINRICHS (Anm. 14) 130; VAHLEN (Anm. 2) 824; WILLIAMS (Anm. 23) ad loc. Alle legen besondere Betonung auf die aitiologische Eigenart dieser Verse. CALAMES (Anm. 3) 44 Erachtens wird das Gedicht durch den ritualen Ruf (V. 80) Teil des Apollon-Festes.

⁴⁵ DEPEW (Anm. 11) 60 spricht über die zur *hic et nunc* Gedichtssituation angepassten Epikleseis, HEINRICHS (Anm. 14) 133 ist der Meinung, dass die Epitheten über die die Apollon-Epiphanie realisierende Funktion verfügen.

⁴⁶ WIMMEL (Anm. 3) 66–67 und WILLIAMS (Anm. 23) ad loc. zitieren lehrreiche Parallelstellen, aber diese treffen viel mehr auf das Problem des kallimacheischen Verhältnisses zu seinen Dichtervorbildern zu (vgl. *epigr.* 7, 27): *Hom. Hymn.* 2, 254–255 (= 294–295): ὥς εἰπὼν διέθηκε θεμεῖλια Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων / εὐρέα καὶ μάλα μακρὰ διηκεές. WIMMEL (Anm. 3) 69 erklärt den zentralen Teil des Hymnus hinsichtlich seiner Struktur: Apollons Grundsteinlegung passt mit der Aretalogie zusammen; der delische Altar ist ebenso wie der kyrenäische eine musische Gründung.

⁴⁷ Vgl.: CALAME (Anm. 3) 40–42. Der Autor beschreibt den Abschnitt ab Vers 47 als Zivilisationsprozess.

Gottes zitiert, und ich kehre jetzt zu diesen zurück⁴⁸. Es kommen der Name Apollon sechzehnmal, Phoibos siebzehnmal⁴⁹, Karneios dreimal, die Epikleseis Hekaergos, Nomios, Boedromios und Klarios einmal vor. Der angeredete Gott wird insgesamt neununddreißigmal beim Namen genannt. Demgegenüber erscheint in den beiden langen homerischen Apollon-Hymnen (insgesamt 546 Verse) der Name Apollon vierunddreißigmal, Phoibos aber zwanzigmal, und manchmal andere Epikleseis. Die neununddreißig Vorkommen der Benennung im hellenistischen Hymnus scheinen im Vergleich zu dem fünfmal so langen Text unverhältnismäßig viel zu sein. Dazu kommt noch, dass die Ausdrücke *Φοῖβος*, *Φοῖβω* am Wendepunkt der Dichtung, in jedem der Verse 55–58, aufzufinden sind. Da diese neuartige, eigentlich aber ganz mechanische, eine Einheit schaffende poetische Technik in diesem Abschnitt der Betonung der apollinischen Kunsttheorie dient, kommt der Name des Gottes hier so oft vor. Phoibos und kein anderer baut den Altar auf diese Weise.

Bevor ich fortfahre, kehre ich zu einigen semantischen Fragen zurück. Im kallimacheischen Werk begegnet man zweimal außerhalb des Apollon-Hymnus dem Wort *ὑφαίνω*⁵⁰. Es gibt ein irrelevantes Vorkommen im *fr.* 66, 3, aber im *fr.* 261, 5–8 lesen wir von der Zusammenstellung der Rhapsodengesänge⁵¹. Wir erfahren im *Hymn.* 2 über Apollon, dass er seinen Altar *ἔπηξε* (V. 58⁵², 62) und *ἔπλεκε* (V. 61)⁵³. Die Stellen, an denen sich das Wort *πήγνυμι* findet (*Hymn.* 5, 11 und 6, 53), leisten keinen Beistand, um den Ausdruck genauer interpretieren zu können. Ein Moment der Akontios-und-Kydippe-Geschichte ist aber besonders in Betracht zu ziehen. Hier geht es um das Zusammenflechten des Rohres und des Riedgrases⁵⁴. Man kann folglich darauf schließen, dass Kallimachos die minuziöse, künstlerische Arbeit auch in anderen Texten durch die im Hymnus zum Altarbauen verwendeten Verben ausdrückt. Die lehrreichsten und am meisten zum Weiterdenken anregenden Parallelstellen sind bei Wimmel zitiert⁵⁵. In diesen beiden Texten⁵⁶ ist der Gedanke ausgespro-

⁴⁸ DEPEW (Anm. 11) 74 zieht nur die Anfangswörter (*Φοῖβον* [V. 47], *Φοῖβω* [V. 55], *Φοῖβος* [V. 65]) der Einzelabschnitte des mythologischen Teiles in Betracht, die die Aufteilung des Gedichtes erleichtern.

⁴⁹ WILLIAMS (Anm. 23) ad 3 macht darauf aufmerksam, dass Kallimachos die beiden Namen nie in dem gleichen Ausdruck verwendet, wie es sich dagegen in den homerischen Hymnen findet.

⁵⁰ Zum Wortschatz der Hymnen s.: E. FERNANDEZ-GALIANO, *Lexico de los Himnos de Calimaco*, I–IV, Madrid, 1976–1980.

⁵¹ καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ ῥάβδῳ μῦθον ὑφαίνόμενον / ἀνέρες εἰ / πλαγτὸν / ἦνεκες ἀεῖδω δειδεγμένους.

⁵² Vgl.: WILLIAMS (Anm. 23) ad loc.: *surprising word*.

⁵³ Vgl.: WILLIAMS (Anm. 23) ad loc.: *LSJ are wrong to assign a special significance 'make by art' to this instance; the normal sense of 'plait' is opt, as at Theoc. Id. I. 52...*

⁵⁴ *fr.* 75, 23–25: Λύγαμιν οὐ γὰρ ἐμὴ τῆμος ἔκηδε κάσις / οὐδ' ἐν Ἀμυκλαίῳ θρύον ἐπλεκεν οὐδ' ἀπὸ θήρης / ἔκλυεν ποταμῷ λύματα Παρθενίῳ.

⁵⁵ S.: WIMMEL (Anm. 3) 67. WILLIAMS (Anm. 23) ad 57 meint, dass das Wort *ὑφαίνω* nur in Ausdrücken über das Haus- und Altarbauen erscheint, und hält WIMMELS Auslegung für *forced and unconvincing*. Die Erklärung des deutschen Philologen mag, aber das oben zitierte *Aitia*-Fragment kann gar nicht forciert sein.

⁵⁶ Schol. ad Pind. *Nem.* 7, 116: τὸ ποίημα ὑφάσματι παρέοικεν ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν ἄλλοις Ὑφαίνω δ' Ἀμυθονιάδαις ποικίλον ἄνθημα. Plut. *Mor.* 358f (De Is. et Os.): ... ποιηταὶ καὶ λογογράφοι, καθάπερ οἱ ἀράχνη, γεννῶντες ἀφ' ἐαυτῶν ἀπαρχὰς ἀνυποθέτους ὑφαίνουσι καὶ ἀπο-

chen, dass die die menschliche Sprache verwendenden Künstler (Dichter und Redner) der Spinne ähnlich ihre Werke bzw. Reden schaffen. So bin ich der Meinung, dass die Interpretation auf Grund der Verse 20–24 und der zitierten Pindaros- und Plutarchos-Stellen unter Einbeziehung der paradigmatischen Geschichten der auf ihre für vollkommen gehaltene Kunst stolzen mythologischen Gestalten fortgesetzt werden muss. Darf und kann der Hymnisdichter ungestraft den die Hybris strafen-den Gott imitieren und ihn zum künstlerischen Wettbewerb auffordern⁵⁷?

ARACHNE, MARSYAS, THAMYRIS

Wie J. Gy. Szilágyi es überzeugend nachgewiesen hat⁵⁸, soll die von Ovid bearbeitete Fassung⁵⁹ des mythologischen Arachne-Athene-Wettbewerbs vom 7.–6. Jahrhundert v.Chr. an eine allgemein bekannte Geschichte früher unter den Griechen, später aber auch in Italien gewesen sein. Darum, wenngleich der römische Dichter aktualisiert und sich den Mythos zu eigen macht, können die schon zur Zeit des Hellenismus allgemeinen Gedanken über die Geschichte von Arachne, die Athene zum Wettbewerb im Weben herausforderte, ergriffen werden. Im Zusammenhang mit dem Apollon-Hymnus von Kallimachos hebe ich drei Momente der ovidischen Fassung hervor. In der Einleitung lesen wir vom ruhmreichen Ruf des Mädchens, den es durch seine Kunst erworben hat. Arachne hat den Ruhm missbraucht und sich hochmütig nicht zu den Schützlingen der Göttin gerechnet⁶⁰.

Aus welchem Grund wurde Arachne bestraft? Was soll die eigentliche Ursache der Bestrafung gewesen sein? Mehrere Möglichkeiten sind aufzuführen: Das Thema des Tuches, die Liebesgeschichten der Götter, die unregelmäßige, „asymmetrische“, doch künstlerische Darstellung, die der harmonischen olympischen Götterwelt widerspricht⁶¹. Die treuen Schilderungen⁶² an Arachnes Tuch sind so schön und kunstvoll gelungen, dass weder Pallas noch der Neid es beanstanden konnte⁶³.

τείνουσιν... Vgl. (von WIMMEL nicht zitiert): Pind. *Nem.* 7, 114–117: *Μοῖσα τοι / κολλᾷ χρυσὸν ἐν τε λευκὸν ἐλέφανθ' ἄμᾳ / καὶ λείριον ἄνθεμον πον- / τίας ὑφελοῖσ' ἔερσας.*

⁵⁷ Vgl.: DEPEW (Anm. 11) 74–75 erklärt die dem Gott gefallende Dichtung auf Grund des *epigr.* 18. Sie beschäftigt sich nicht damit, dass der Dichter, der die künstlerische Technik und Höhe des Gottes imitiert, sich Apollons Zorn zuziehen mag.

⁵⁸ SZILÁGYI J. Gy., *Arachné: AntTan* 24, 1977, 125–138.

⁵⁹ Vor der ovidischen Version (*Met.* 6, 1–145) findet sich nur ein Hinweis auf den Mythos. Verg. *G.* 4, 244–247: *immunisque sedens aliena ad pabula fucus / aut asper crabro imparibus se immisit armis / aut dirum tiniae genus, aut invisa Minervae / laxos in foribus suspendit aranea cassis.* Keine sichere Bearbeitung des Mythos ist in den bildenden Künsten nachzuweisen. Vgl.: J. Gy. SZILÁGYI, *LIMC* II/1, 1984, 470–471, s.v. Arachne. Zur ovidischen Arachne-Geschichte s.: P. Ovidius Naso, *Metamorphosen*. Kommentar von F. BÖMER, Buch VI–VII, Heidelberg, 1976, ad 6, 1–145.

⁶⁰ Ov. *Met.* 6, 6–8: *quam [Arachnen] sibi lanificae non cedere laudibus artis / audierat [Tritonia]. Non illa loco nec origine gentis / clara sed arte fuit...* 23–24: *... scires a Pallade doctam. / Quod tamen ipsa negat tantaque offensa magistra.*

⁶¹ Über die frühere Forschung s.: SZILÁGYI (Anm. 58).

⁶² Ov. *Met.* 6, 104: *... verum taurum, freta vera putares.*

⁶³ Ov. *Met.* 6, 129–130: *Non illud Pallas non illud carpere Livor / possit opus.*

Ich habe weder vor, genaue philologische Parallelen zwischen den beiden Texten zu rekonstruieren, noch von der fast zweihundertfünfzig Jahre später verfassten ovidischen Version ausgehend den hellenistischen Hymnus zu interpretieren, aber möchte Folgendes immerhin feststellen. Ovidius hat den unbesiegbaren Künstler in der Arachne-Gestalt dargestellt, der, obwohl sein Talent göttlicher Herkunft ist, diese Gabe trotz mehrerer Mahnungen⁶⁴ missbraucht und dessen Werk nicht einmal der Neid der Gottheit bezwingen konnte. Seine Kunst wurde durch Rache und Strafe vernichtet⁶⁵. Ich bin davon überzeugt, dass die Gestalt des Neides (V. 105) nicht zu einem der Kallimachos-Kritiker (z.B. Apollonios Rhodios), sondern zu Apollon selbst in Beziehung steht. *Φθόνος* mag also als der Neid des Gottes interpretiert werden⁶⁶.

Die oben erwähnte Hybris- und Bestrafungsproblematik hat auch auf dem Gebiet der Apollon-Mythologie Daseinsberechtigung. Beide Gottheiten treten in der Marsyas-Geschichte auf, von deren römischen Fassungen die Version der ovidischen *Fasti* (6, 701–708) ausführlicher besprochen werden soll⁶⁷. Der Grundriss dieser Version ist Folgendes: Minerva verfluchte die von ihr selbst erfundene Flöte, weil sich ihr Gesicht, während sie die Flöte spielte, furchtbar verzerrte. Da Marsyas, der auf das Musikinstrument gestoßen war, die Flöte wunderbar ertönen ließ, war er sehr stolz auf sein Spiel. Apollon aber, der den Satyr bei einem musikalischen Wettbewerb überwunden hatte, erhängte ihn und zog ihm die Haut ab⁶⁸. Wie der Gott über den musizierenden Satyr triumphieren konnte, was für eine List Apollon anwendete, ist im Text nicht erwähnt. Zu erfassen ist nur, dass Marsyas' Kunst, obwohl er früher von ihr überzeugt gewesen ist, die des Gottes nicht besiegte⁶⁹. Apuleius' Fassung ist in einer anderen Hinsicht interessant. Der Autor hebt die verschiedenen Eigenheiten und Haltungen der beiden „Wettkämpfer“ hervor. Während der wilde Satyr Apollons Schönheit für Verweichlichung erklärt und den Gott beschimpft, lächeln die Muses⁷⁰. Nach Marsyas' furchtbarer Bestrafung schämt sich der Gott selbst des auch den Sieger erniedrigenden Erfolgs⁷¹. In der Fassung von Diodoros Siculus ist der Marsyas-Mythos in Beziehung zu der Kybele-Geschichte zu lesen. Der Sieg des Got-

⁶⁴ Pallas als altes Weib spricht zu dem Mädchen: *Ov. Met.* 6, 32–33: „*cede deae veniamque tuis, temeraria, dictis / supplice voce roga: veniam dabit illa roganti.*“ Über die Abbildungen an Pallas' Tuch: 83–85: *ut tamen exemplis intellegat aemula laudis, / quod pretium speret pro tam furialibus ausis, / quattuor in partes certamina addit.*

⁶⁵ *Ov. Met.* 6, 5: [Tritonia] *Maeoniaeque animum fatis intendit Arachnes...*

⁶⁶ Siehe unten.

⁶⁷ Eine andere ovidische Fassung ist in *Met.* 6, 382–400 zu finden, wo es am ausführlichsten um die Bestrafung geht. Ebenso *Plin. HN* 16, 89: *ibi [in Phrygia] platanus ostenditur, ex qua pependerit Marsuas victus ab Apolline, quae iam tum magnitudine electa est.*

⁶⁸ *Ov. Fast.* 6, 706–707: [satyrus] *iamque inter nymphas arte superbus erat: / provocat et Phoebum. Phoebo superante pendit.*

⁶⁹ Lukianos schreibt ironisch über die Entscheidung der Muses und weist auf eine mögliche Etymologie des Gottesnamens Apollon hin (*Dial. D.* 18, 2): *ἐκείνος [Ἀπόλλων] θαυμαστός, ὃν ὁ Μαρσύας, εἰ τὰ δίκαια αἱ Μοῦσαι δικάσαι ἤθελον, ἀπέδειρεν ἂν αὐτὸς κρατήσας τῇ μουσικῇ· νῦν δὲ κατασοφισθεὶς ἄθλιος ἀπόλλωλεν ἀδίκως ἀλούς.*

⁷⁰ *Apul. Flor.* 3: Adjektive zum Satyr: *taeter, agrestis, belua*. Apollons Attribute: *decorus, eruditus, deus*. Marsyas' Meinung: „*Haec omnia*“ inquit „*blandimenta nequaquam virtuti decora, sed luxuriae accomodata.*“

⁷¹ *Apul. Flor.* 3: *Enimvero Apollinem tam humilis victoriae puditum est.*

tes ist Ergebnis nicht nur seines musikalischen Talents, sondern auch der fast sophistischen Argumente, die den Schiedsrichtern, den Leuten von Nysa, richtiger dünken. In dieser Version weist auch der Satyr Marsyas ein schönes Ergebnis auf dem Gebiete der Musik auf⁷². Es gibt noch ganz kurze Bearbeitungen, nämlich die des Apollodoros (*Bibl.* 1, 4, 2) und des Hyginus (*Fab.* 165). Ein Hinweis auf den aus Marsyas' Blut stammenden Fluss ist bei Alexandros Polyhistor (*FGrH* 273, F 76) zu lesen.

Thamyris, Hyakinthos' Liebster fiel den Musen wegen seines Brüstens zum Opfer. Er war stolz auf sein Leierspiel und seine Schönheit, aber er musste den Götinnen unterliegen und zur Strafe um sein Augenlicht und seine Leier gebracht werden. Die homerische (*Il.* 2, 594–600) und apollodorische (*Bibl.* 1, 3, 3) Fassung unterscheiden sich voneinander nur in der Länge der Erzählung, die sonstigen Momente sind gleich bearbeitet. Die Thamyris-Geschichte hat viel mehr Beziehung zum Arachne-Mythos als die des Marsyas: Der sterbliche Rivale des Gottes ist in der musischen Kunst vollkommen und will den olympischen bzw. die helikonischen Gegner mit seinen eigenen Waffen schlagen. Dieses Großtun hat schwere Folgen, weil die Götter nicht unbestraft lassen, dass ein Sterblicher die Höhe der apollinischen und musischen Kunst mit Hochmut überwinden will.

VERSE 105–113

In der Interpretation der Schlusszene werden zuerst die Beziehungen zu den früheren Teilen des Gedichtes in Betracht gezogen⁷³. Ich halte die Erklärungen der Forscher, nach denen die letzten Verse anorganisch, sogar als spätere Interpolation zur Apollon-Aretalogie hinzugekommen sind⁷⁴, für unannehmbar. Die Einheit und Struktur gewährenden Verbindungen des ganzen Textes wurden oben ausführlich betrachtet. Wenn die Methode auf die Götterszene angewandt wird, sind die folgenden Zusammenhänge festzustellen⁷⁵.

Apollon tritt im Schlussabschnitt des Hymnus als Dichter- und Rachegott auf. Beide Motive haben ihre Parallelstelle im Text; man denke an die die Dichter schützenden Aspekte des Gottes und die Niobe- bzw. Achilleus-Gestalt. Auch das Quellbild der Antwort Apollons und die Unterwerfung von Phthonos haben ihre Vorbilder⁷⁶. Also die vielumstrittene Schlusszene ist trotz ihrer speziellen Eigenheiten ganz eng mit dem Gedichtganzen verknüpft, wie oben in der Einleitung (V. 1–31) erwiesen wurde. Durch die Apollon-Attribute kommen die Einheitsmerkmale des gan-

⁷² Diod. Sic. 3, 59: ἐπικρινάντων δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν τὸν Ἀπόλλω δίκαιότερα λέγειν bzw. διὰ τὴν εὐμέλειαν δόξαι πολὺ προέχειν τοῦ προηγωνισμένου [Ἀπόλλωνος].

⁷³ VAHLEN (Anm. 2) 825 und BING (Anm. 10) 192 heben die besondere Bedeutung des Abschnittes hervor.

⁷⁴ BUNDY (Anm. 18) 42–44.

⁷⁵ Zu den Ausdrücken, die aus früheren Motiven bestehen, s.: BETHE (Anm. 2) 5, 13; WIMMEL (Anm. 3) 64–65; BASSI (Anm. 9) 227–229, 231; M. W. HASLAM, Callimachus' Hymns, HARDER–REGTUIT–WAKKER (Anm. 4) 116–117; DEPEW (Anm. 11) 66.

⁷⁶ *Hymn.* 2, 20: οὐδὲ Θέτις Ἀχιλῆα κινύρεται αἴλινα μήτηρ, 22: ὁ δακρυόεις... πέτρος, 88: πηγῇσι Κύρης, 101: τὸν [Πύθωνα] μὲν σὺ κατήναρες...

zen Hymnus auch in der Phthonos-Episode zum Ausdruck⁷⁷. Es ist auch unbestritten, dass sich der Leier spielende Dichtergott am besten eignet, um eine *ars poetica* göttlicher Herkunft auszusprechen⁷⁸. Die Apollon-Gestalt der letzten Verse ist teilweise unabhängig von den anderen oben erwähnten Aspekten, indem sein Auftreten zur olympischen Rechtfertigung der hellenistischen *ars poetica* dient⁷⁹. Doch die Auslegung der Forscher, die *nur* Literaturtheoretisches bzw. Hinweise auf die Kallimachos-Kritiker in der Götterszene sehen, ist m.E. völlig unhaltbar⁸⁰.

Ich beginne mit den bisher allgemeinen Interpretationsmöglichkeiten der Verse 105–113⁸¹. Das Bindewort οὐδ' ὅσα, das in der auf quantitativer Ebene⁸² formulierten Kritik des Neides vorkommt, wurde von Traill untersucht. Auf Grund hellenistischer Parallelstellen kommt er zur Schlussfolgerung, dass diesem Bindewort immer ein Wort für einen kleineren Begriff folgt⁸³. In dieser Hinsicht interpretiert der Autor die Kallimachos-Stelle folgendermaßen: Das kallimacheische Gedicht kommt dem homerischen Apollon-Hymnus nicht einmal nahe, aber auch die frühere Dichtung ist zu kurz, um das Lob und das mythologische Thema auszuschöpfen.

⁷⁷ HÜBNERS (Anm. 3) 290 Erachtetens ist die Apollon-Phthonos-Szene mit der Aretalogie des Gottes verknüpft.

⁷⁸ Vgl.: FRASER (Anm. 24) I, 655. G. GIANGRANDE (The Final Line in Callimachus' Hymn to Apollo: *Habis* 23, 1992, 53–62) erklärt das Motiv der vom Gott gerechtfertigten kallimacheischen Poetik. Diese Poesie ist mächtiger als alle Kritiker des Dichters.

⁷⁹ WILAMOWITZ (Anm. 1) II, 86–87 betont die engen Beziehungen zwischen dem Dichter und dem Gott, KERÉNYI (Anm. 5) 21 aber die fast identischen Figuren beider Personen. Dazu s.: CALAME (Anm. 3) 54: *The final farewell to the god underlines privileged relationship between poet and divinity*. HOWALD (Anm. 1) 17 und HOWALD–STAIGER (*Die Dichtungen des Kallimachos griechisch und deutsch*, übertragen, eingeleitet und erklärt von E. HOWALD und E. STAIGER, Zürich, 1955, 56–57) sehen eine ausgesprochen aulische Gestalt in der Apollon-Figur. Den Gott identifizieren sie mit dem aktuellen Herrscher von Alexandria. S. dazu: Schol. Ψ ad Hymn. 2, 26: τῷ Πτολεμαίῳ τῷ Εὐεργέτῃ διὰ δὲ τὸ φιλόλογον αὐτὸν εἶναι ὡς θεὸν τιμᾶ und 68: τῷ Πτολεμαίῳ.

⁸⁰ Vgl.: H. HERTER, *RE Suppl.* V, 1931, 438, s.v. Kallimachos; WILAMOWITZ (Anm. 1) I, 207, II, 87; CAMERON (Anm. 18) 405–406. WILLIAMS (Anm. 23) ad 113 sieht keinen Hinweis auf Apollonios' Entfernung nach Rhodos in der Unterwerfung von Phthonos. Man hat dieser Meinung nur zuzustimmen. Auf Grund des *Aitia*-Prologs, in dem es um die Werke eines Dichters geht, meint ERBSE (Anm. 2) 425–428, man dürfe keinen Hinweis auf einen anderen Dichter (nämlich auf Apollonios Rhodios) in der Schlusszene des Hymnus sehen. WILLIAMS' (Anm. 23) Auslegungen zu den Versen 105–113 wurden von CAMERON (Anm. 18) 403–409 bestritten. In dieser Hinsicht wurde der hesiodische Eris-Mythos nicht zitiert (*Op.* 25–26): καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, / καὶ παῶδες παῶφ φθονέει καὶ αἰοῖδος αἰοῖδῳ.

⁸¹ Die früheste in zeitgenössischem Kontext aufgefasste Interpretation dieser Verse ist in Schol. Ψ ad Hymn. 2, 106 aufzufinden: ἐγκαλεῖ διὰ τούτων τοὺς σκώπτοντας αὐτὸν μὴ δύνασθαι ποιῆσαι μέγα ποίημα, ὅθεν ἡναγκάσθη ποιῆσαι τὴν Ἑκάλην.

⁸² Ein unausgesprochenes οἷα scheint WILLIAMS (Anm. 23) ad loc. im Vergleich zu sein. A. KÖHNKEN (Apollo's Retort to Envy' Criticism [Two Questions of relevance in Callimachus, Hymn 2, 105ff.]: *AJPh* 102, 1981, 417) beleuchtet überzeugend, Apollons Wörter seien deswegen von Bedeutung, weil der Neid die kallimacheische Poesie in quantitativer Hinsicht kritisiert.

⁸³ S.: D. A. TRAILL, Callimachus' Singing Sea (Hymn 2.106): *CPh* 93, 1998, 220–221. Vgl.: Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 3, 932–933; Theoc. *Id.* 7, 8–10. KÖHNKEN (Anm. 81) 417 übersetzt den Vers 106 anders: *I cannot admire this singer who does not even try to exhaust the sea. Actually, a hymn in your honour, Apollo, should never stop*. BUNDY (Anm. 18) 58–64 führt als Beispiel einer sehr langen Aufzählung den Schiffskatalog der *Ilias* (2, 484–759) und eine Aischylos-Stelle über die Toten bei Salamis *Pers.* 429–432 an: Κακῶν δὲ πλῆθος, οὐδ' ἂν εἰ δέκ' ἡμᾶτα / στοιχηγοροῖν, οὐκ ἂν ἐκπλήσαιμι σοι. / Εὐ γὰρ τόδ' ἴσθι, μηδᾶμ' ἡμέρα μιᾶ / πλῆθος τοσοῦτ' ἀριθμὸν ἀνθρώπων θανέειν.

Die quantitative Kritik wird durch zwei Metaphern verwandelt. Kallimachos formuliert das Bild des Wassers und der Biene, um die in der Szene des delischen Hörneraltars nur als Hinweis vorkommende poetische Technik auszusprechen, die der Gott als zu befolgend ansah. Im Appendix des Kommentars von Williams⁸⁴ und in Traills Beitrag sind mehrere Stellen angeführt, an denen die Autoren über Homeros als Okeanos sprechen. Wie Traill es nach der *Ilias*, Dionysios Halikarnasseus, einem Papyrusfund und Ailianos annimmt, ist der Epos-Dichter in der literarischen Tradition als Inspirationsquelle für spätere Dichter erschienen⁸⁵. Diesen Gemeinplatz verwendet Kallimachos, damit er seine *ars poetica* von Apollon aussagen lassen kann. Im Gespräch der mythologischen Gestalten bedeuten die Wasser verschiedener Arten folgendes: der große, reine *πόντος* ist Homeros⁸⁶, der große, schlammige *ποταμός* bedeutet die kyklischen Dichter, die kleine und die ursprüngliche Reinheit bewahrende *πίδαξ* ist als Kallimachos' Metapher bzw. die Metapher der kallimacheischen Ästhetik zu interpretieren. Man hat auch das von Erbse hervorgehobene Detail des Textes zu beachten, nämlich dass die kleine, reine Quelle nicht zum großen Meer, sondern zum schlammigen Fluss im relevanten Gegensatz steht⁸⁷. Der Dichtergott verwandelt die quantitative Kritik von Phthonos und stellt die Gabe der göttlichen, aus reiner Quelle stammenden Kunst in den Mittelpunkt seiner Dichtungstheorie. Die Quelle ist einerseits die Metapher des mit minuziösem Kunstfleiß vereinigten Talents, andererseits kommt das Kunstwerk durch Benennung die Fruchtbarkeit schenkenden Göttin in kultischen Kontext⁸⁸.

Die Biene-Metapher wurde ausführlich von Crane erklärt⁸⁹. Er legt die Tradition des honigsüßen Lieder singenden Poeten auf Grund der die Poesie und die Biologie betreffenden Parallelstellen dar⁹⁰. Von Homeros an bis zur römischen Literatur

⁸⁴ WILLIAMS (Anm. 25) 98–99.

⁸⁵ TRAILL (Anm. 82) 216–217: Hom. *Il.* 21, 193–197; Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 24. Das lehrreichste ist Ailianos' parodistische Fassung: *VH* 13, 22: Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Φιλοπάτωρ κατασκευάσας Ὀμήρω νεῶν, αὐτὸν μὲν καλὸν καλῶς ἐκάθισε, κύκλῳ δὲ τὰς πόλεις περιέστησε τοῦ ἀγάλματος, ὅσαι ἀντιποιούνται τοῦ Ὀμήρου. Γαλάτων δὲ ὁ ζωγράφος ἔγραψε τὸν μὲν Ὀμηρον αὐτὸν ἐμοῦντα, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ποιητὰς τὰ ἐμνησμένα ἀρνομένους.

⁸⁶ Vgl.: M. POLIAKOFF, Nectar, Springs, and the Sea: Critical Terminology in Pindar and Callimachus; *ZPE*, 39, 1980, 47: ... pace Homer, a large poem (*πόντος*) is by nature undesirable...

⁸⁷ ERBSE (Anm. 2) 424–425.

⁸⁸ WIMMEL (Anm. 3) 223–224. Vgl.: H. MAEHLER, *Die Auffassung des Dichterberufs im frühen Griechentum bis zur Zeit Pindars*, Göttingen, 1963, 93–95: Der Autor sieht im pindarischen σοφίας ἄωτος ἄκρος (*Olymp.* 2, 85) das dichterische *ingenium* und die *ars*. Die Frage stellt sich sehr oft, ob die dionysischen und apollinischen Aspekte der Dichtung in diesem Abschnitt und im *fr.* 2 anzunehmen sind. S. dazu und zur römischen Wandlung des Motivs: WIMMEL (Anm. 3) 225; N. B. CROWTHER, Water and Wine as Symbols of Inspiration: *Mnemosyne* Ser. IV, 32, 1979, 9–11; P. N. KNOX, Wine, Water and Callimachean Polemics: *HSCPh*, 89, 1985, 107–112; V. PÖSCHL, c. 3,25. Quo me, Bacche, rapis tui..., ders., *Horazische Lyrik. Interpretationen*, Heidelberg, 1970, 164–178. Im platonischen *Ion* schöpfen die Bacchanten aus dem Wasser Milch und Honig (534a): οὕτω καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ οὐκ ἐμφρονες ὄντες τὰ καλὰ μέλη ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴν ἐμβῶσιν εἰς τὴν ἀρμονίαν καὶ εἰς τὸν ρυθμὸν, βακχεύουσι καὶ κατεχόμενοι, ὥσπερ αἱ βάκχαι ἀρτύονται ἐκ τῶν ποταμῶν μέλι καὶ γάλα κατεχόμεναι, ἐμφρονες δὲ οὐσαι οὐ, καὶ τῶν μελοποιῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο ἐργάζεται, ὅπερ αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν.

⁸⁹ G. CRANE, Bees without Honey and Callimachean Taste: *AJPh* 108, 1987, 399–403.

⁹⁰ Hes. *Theog.* 83–84; Pl. *Ion* 534ab; Arist. *Hist. an.* 596b.

könnten die Vorbilder und das Nachleben des Quelle- und Biene-Motiv „durchwandert“ werden. Es sei hier allein auf Horatius *Carm.* 4, 2 hingewiesen, wo wir über den Dichter lesen, der als *apis Matina* die *per laborem plurimum* erwerbbaaren *thyma* zusammenbringt (V. 27–30). Dem steht Pindaros gegenüber, der *monte decurrens amnis* (V. 5) genannt wird.

Nach der dem Anschein nach kohärenten und auf Grund der vielfach selbst-reflexiven kallimacheischen Poesie gültig scheinenden Interpretation bleiben einige Fragen offen und unbeantwortet. Warum stehen die Verse 105–113, wenn sie eine dem *Aitia*-Prolog ähnliche Bedeutung haben, am Schluss des *Hymn.* 2? Was für eine Funktion ist der Götterszene in einem Gedicht zuzuschreiben, das, obwohl seine Länge nicht die der homerischen Apollon-Hymnen erreicht, länger ist als mehrere lyrische Dichtungen? Warum ist es Phthonos, der dem Dichter die kritischen Bemerkungen vorwirft, da die nörgelnde Momos-Gestalt viel besser zu dieser Rolle passen würde? Wer ist worauf neidisch in dieser Situation? Wer ist eigentlich Phthonos? Wen hat Apollon vom Olympos herabzuwerfen, damit der apollinische Geist und die apollinische Kunst sich in einem literarischen Werk entfalten können?

Ich habe die Antwort mit sprachlichen Bemerkungen zu beginnen. Der Genitiv des Verses 105 (Ἀπόλλωνος) wurde bisher mit dem Ausdruck ἐπ' οὐατα verknüpft. Es stößt weder auf grammatische noch semantische Hindernisse, den Genitiv mit dem Wort Φθόνος in Beziehung zu ziehen, die Glieder der possessiven Konstruktion stehen sogar oft in dieser Reihenfolge⁹¹. Es ist ein schwereres Problem, den Besitzer des Ausdruckes ἐπ' οὐατα ohne Personal- oder Possessivpronomen zu identifizieren. Es gibt zwei Interpretationsmöglichkeiten: die Ohren stehen entweder zum Gott oder zum Dichter (dem Sprecher) in Bezug. Es gibt Schwierigkeiten im ersten Fall (Apollons Neid flüsterte dem Gott in die Ohren): Warum wendet sich der personifizierte Neid des Gottes mit seiner Kritik an Apollon? In dieser Erklärung des ohnehin ziemlich komplizierten Verses gibt es eine erneute Schwierigkeit, falls der Satz, wie oben, im Sinne des persönlichen, inneren Konflikts Apollons interpretiert wird. Den Ausdruck ἐπ' οὐατα als „mir in die Ohren“ zu begreifen, ist auch nicht selbstverständlich. Man würde ein Personal- (μου, μοι) oder Possessivpronomen (ἐμῶ), wenigstens einen bestimmten Artikel demonstrativer Bedeutung als Ergänzung erwarten. Auf Grund der Vorkommen des Substantivs οὖς ist die nachstehende Folgerung zu ziehen. Wenn das Subjekt eines Satzes mit der sprechenden Person nicht identisch ist, die Ohren (οὐατα) aber zu ihm gehören, steht ein Akkusativ, Dativ oder ein Possessivpronomen als Ergänzung des Wortes οὖς⁹². Außerhalb der allgemein verwendeten

⁹¹ Vgl.: H. W. SMYTH, *Greek Grammar*, revised by G. M. MESSING, 1956, 294, §1161. BUNDY (Anm. 18) 39–41 sucht vom falschen Standpunkt aus (die Schlusszene steht mit Apollonios Rhodios im Zusammenhang) die Lösung des Problems in der Richtung, dass die Wörter ὁ Φθόνος Ἀπόλλωνος eine semantische Konstruktion bilden. Durch Assoziation konnten die Zeitgenossen den Ausdruck als *the envy of Apollonios* interpretieren.

⁹² S. dazu die Beispiele von LSJ, ⁹1996, 1274, s.v. οὖς: Soph. *Ant.* 1186–1188: καὶ τυγχάνω τε κληῖθρ' ἀνασπαστοῦ πύλης / χαλῶσα, καί με φθόγγος οἰκείου κακοῦ / βάλλει δι' ὧτων Eur. *Andr.* 1090–1091: Ἀγαμέμνωνος δὲ παῖς διαστείχων πόλιν / εἰς οὖς ἐκάστω δυσμενεῖς ἠῦδα λόγους· Soph. *Aj.* 148–150: τοιούσδε λόγους ψιθύρους πλάσσω / εἰς ὧτα φέρει πᾶσιν Ὀδυσσεύς, / καὶ σφοδρὰ πείθει. Eur. *Hipp.* 932–933: ἀλλ' ἢ τις εἰς σὸν οὖς με διαβαλὼν ἔχει / φίλων, νοσοῦμεν δ' οὐδὲν ὄντες αἴτιοι; In Aesch. *Pers.* 603–606 steht der Dativ in einem früheren Vers: ἐμοὶ γὰρ ἦδη

Formulierung sei hier eine andere Konstruktion betrachtet, nämlich die des Apollon-Hymnus. Dasselbe ist im pseudo-euripideischen *Rhesos* zu finden. Odysseus wendet sich an Diomedes mit folgenden Worten (565–566): *Διόμηδες, οὐκ ἤκουσας – ἧ κενὸς ψόφος / σταῖξει δι' ὧτων; – τευχέων τινὰ κτύπον;* Odysseus stellt seine eigenen Erfahrungen denen des Freundes gegenüber. Die Bedeutung der ganz alltäglichen Situation ist selbstverständlich: „Diomedes, hast du das Waffengetöse gehört, oder klingt es *mir* in den Ohren?“⁹³ Auf Grund der analysierten Stelle und unter Annahme der Hypothese, dass der Dichter selbst in den letzten Versen der Sprecher ist, interpretiere und übersetze ich den Vers 105 folgendermaßen: „Apollons Neid flüsterte mir in die Ohren.“

Mit dieser Veränderung erhält es die Bedeutung, dass die literarische Kritik vom Neid (und nicht vom den Telchines des *Aitia*-Prologs ähnlichen Tadel) ausgesprochen wird; die Schlusszene kommt so in engen Zusammenhang mit den früheren Motiven des Textes. Denken wir an die ovidische Fassung des Arachne-Mythos zurück, so sind Phthonos' Worte als die letzte Warnung vor Apollons Strafe zu erklären. Falls der Dichter der Warnung gehorcht, vermeidet er die Bestrafung. Es ist unbestritten, dass Apollons Urteile meistens nicht vom Neid berührt sind. Wenn man sich aber die oben zitierten, ironischen Lukianos- und Apuleius-Stellen in Erinnerung ruft, sind die negativen mythologischen Gestalten des Hymnus in ihrer Beziehung zu dem Gott leichter zu akzeptieren. Die Motivation für Sieg und Rache der Götter an ihren sterblichen Rivalen mögen das Niederschlagen der Hybris und sogar der Neid sein⁹⁴.

Die Interpretation der Verse 108–112 stößt wegen der oben erörterten Erklärung des Verses 105 auf keine Schwierigkeit. Die Antwort des Gottes auf Phthonos' Kritik bedeutet so die Abschwächung der apollinischen Rachgier. Apollon bekennt

πάντα μὲν φόβον πλέα· / ἐν ὄμμασιν τὰνταῖα φαίνεται θεῶν, / βοᾷ δ' ἐν ὧσὶ κέλαδος οὐ παίωνιος· / τοῖα κακῶν ἐκπληξίς ἐκφοβεῖ φρένας.

⁹³ HARTUNGs deutsche Version (*Euripides Werke*. Griechisch mit metrischer Uebersetzung und prüfenden und erklärenden Anmerkungen von J. A. HARTUNG. Siebzehntes Bändchen: *Rhesos*, Leipzig, 1852, 71) ist folgende: *Diomedes, hast du nicht gehört – schlug leerer Schall / Mir an die Ohren? – Waffenklirren irgendwo?* Die englische Übersetzung von A. S. WAY (*Euripides with an English translation* by A. S. WAY, I, Cambridge–London, 1949, 203) lautet wie folgt: *Diomedes, heard'st thou not – or through mine ears / Thrills but an empty sound? – a clash of arms?*

⁹⁴ Die θεὸς φθονερός-Vorstellung wird bei den Tragikern und Herodotos klar (Siehe LSJ, 1996⁹, 1929–1930, s.v. φθονερία, φθονέω, φθόνος). An diesen Stellen entfaltet sich die Tatsache, dass die Olympischen dem Menschen, falls er die göttliche Höhe und Seligkeit mit ὕβρις erreichen will, neidisch sind. Aesch. *Pers.* 361–363 (über Xerxes): *ὁ δ' εὐθύς ὡς ἤκουσεν, οὐ ξυνεῖς δόλον / Ἕλληνας ἀνδρὸς οὐδὲ τὸν θεῶν φθόνον, / πᾶσιν προφωνεῖ τόνδε ναυάρχοις λόγον* Eur. *Alc.* 1133–1135 (nach Alkestis' Rückkehr aus der Totenwelt): Admetos: *ὦ φιλότατης γυναικὸς ὄμμα καὶ δέμας, / ἔχω σ' ἀέλπτως, οὐποτ' ὄψεσθαι δοκῶν*. Herakles: *ἔχεις φθόνος δὲ μὴ γένοιτό τις θεῶν*. Herodotos 1, 32 (Solon zu Kroisos): *ᾧ Κροῖσε, ἐπιστάμενόν με τὸ θεῖον πᾶν ἐὼν φθονερόν τε καὶ ταραχῶδες ἐπειρωτὰς ἀνθρωπῶν πρηγμάτων περὶ*. 3, 40 (Amasis' Brief an Polykrates): *Ἀμασις Πολυκράτει ὡδε λέγει*. *ἦδ' οὐ μὲν πυνθάνεσθαι ἄνδρα φίλον καὶ ξείνον εὖ πρήσσοντα· ἐμοὶ δὲ αἱ σαὶ μεγάλαί ἐντυχίαι οὐκ ἀρέσκουσιν, τὸ θεῖον ἐπισταμένῳ ὡς ἐστί φθονερόν*. Der Dichter des Hymnus ist in *Hom. Hymn.* 1, 169–173 ohne Hochmut, aber mit dichterischem Selbstbewusstsein gezeigt: *ᾧ κοῦραι, τίς δ' ὕμνιν ἀνὴρ ἥδιτος αἰοιδῶν / ἐνθάδε πωλεῖται, καὶ τέω τέρεσθε μάλιστα; / Ὑμεῖς δ' εὖ μάλα πᾶσαι ὑποκρίνασθ' ἄμφ' ἡμέων / Τυφλὸς ἀνὴρ, οἰκεῖ δὲ Χίφ' ἐνι παιπαλοέσση· / τοῦ πᾶσαι μετόπισθεν ἀριστεύουσιν αἰοδαί*.

sich durch die beiden Metaphern (Wasser und Biene) zum apollinischen Dichter, der das göttliche Vorbild imitiert. Welche Ursache ist der Wandlung des Gottes zuzuschreiben? Die Antwort ist in der Tatsache zu ergreifen, dass der Dichter im Gegensatz zu der mythologischen Heroin (Arachne) mit seiner Kunst nicht großtut, sondern die göttliche Macht und die Inspiration des Dichtergottes bekennt. Darum halte ich die Ansicht der Forscher, die irgendeine Sphragis in der Schlusszene sehen, für unannehmbar⁹⁵.

Das Wort *χαίρε* (V. 113) ist auf zweierlei Art zu interpretieren. Es ist nicht nur die traditionelle Grußform der die Epiphanie erlebenden Festversammlung⁹⁶, sondern auch ein Ausdruck, um den Beifall und die Gunst des Gottes zu erlangen⁹⁷. Diese Auslegung passt auch gut zu den früheren Versen. Die Momos-Gestalt im Vers 113 (*ὁ δὲ Μῶμος, ἔν' ὃ Φθόνος, ἔνθα νέοιτο*) nähert sich den Kritikern, die, wie es über die Telchines im *Aitia*-Prolog festgestellt worden ist, die kallimacheische Poesie mit kleinlichen Tadeln unannehmbar machen wollen. Den Tadel kann der Dichter nur nach der Unterwerfung des Neides und Apollons Eintreten für den apollinischen Poeten ablehnen⁹⁸. Ich darf hier auf die allgemeinen menschlichen Haltungen Tadel und Neid hinweisen. Die Folge des peinvollen, Eifersucht hervorruhenden Neides ist der Tadel, das Bekritteln⁹⁹.

⁹⁵ WILAMOWITZ (Anm. 1) II, 77, 86; CAHEN (Anm. 11) 400; CAPOVILLA (Anm. 14) 80; FRASER (Anm. 24) I, 654.

⁹⁶ VAHLEN (Anm. 2) 827 übersetzt das Wort: *Lebe wohl!* Vgl. die Schlussformel der homerischen Hymnen.

⁹⁷ RACE (Anm. 21) 8–10 hält die Absicht des Erlangens göttlicher Gunst (*χάρις*) für den zweiten Teil des griechischen Hymnus. Er zitiert eine lehrreiche Parallelstelle: Pl. *Crat.* 400e: *οἵτινές τε καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρουσιν ὀνομαζόμενοι*. Der Zuhörer des Hymnus ist der Gott selbst. So – BUNDYS (Anm. 18) 83 Erachtens – muss das Gedicht ihm gefallen. Ders. (Anm. 18) 49–54 bearbeitet die homerischen Hymnen in dieser Hinsicht. Statt BUNDYS Zitaten (*Hom. Hymn.* 21, 5 und 25, 6–7) sei ein anderer homerischer Hymnus hier angeführt (9, 7): *χαίρε ἀοιδῇ*. Der Isis-Hymnus von Isidorus (V. 33–34) ist auch ein lehrreiches Beispiel für den Kontext des Wortes: *εὐχῶν ἡδ' ὕμνων τε θεοὶ κλύοντες ἐμεῖο / ἀνταπέδωκαν ἐμοὶ εὐθυμίαν χάριτα*.

⁹⁸ Vgl.: KOSTER (Anm. 5) 18; GIANGRANDE (Anm. 78) 56: *Mōmos is the effect of Φθόνος*. BUNDY (Anm. 18) 92 legt diese Verse anders aus, indem – obwohl er Φθόνος als die Böswilligkeit der Gottheit auffasst – Apollons positive Kritik in ihrem Verhältnis zum Vers 30 erklärt wird: Das Gedicht gefällt dem Gott, *obwohl* es kurz ist. Ders. (Anm. 18) 54–57 beschäftigt sich mit der Verwendung des Wortes Φθόνος in Hymnen und Enkomien und zieht die Schlussfolgerung, Apollon könnte in der ersteren literarischen Gattung durch das ihm nicht adäquate Kunstwerk, in der letzteren durch die göttlichen Heroen beleidigt werden sein.

⁹⁹ Vgl.: LSI, 1996⁹, 1158, 1930, s.v. μῶμος, φθόνος. Zur Definition des Neides s.: Pl. *Def.* 416b: *Φθόνος λύπη ἐπὶ φίλων ἀγαθοῖς ἢ οὖσιν ἢ γεγεννημένοις*. Viel ausführlicher darüber: Arist. *Rh.* 1387b21–1388a28. Momos ist das Kind der Νύξ auf Grund der hesiodischen Mythologie (*Theog.* 211–216): *Νύξ δ' ἔτεκε στρυγερὸν τε Μόρον καὶ Κῆρα μέλαιναν / καὶ Θάνατον, τέκε δ' ὕπνον, ἔτικτε δὲ φίλον Ὀνειρών. / δευτερον αὖ Μῶμον καὶ Ὀϊζὺν ἀλγινδέσσαν / οὐ τι νικιμήσεια θεῶν τέκε Νύξ ἐρεβεννῇ / Ἐσπερίδας θ', αἴς μῆλα πέρην κλυτοῦ Ὠκεανοῖο / χρύσεια καλὰ μέλουσι φέροντά τε δένδρεα καρπὸν*. Momos sucht und findet Fehler auch an den vollkommenen Kunstwerken, vgl. dazu: Pl. *Resp.* 487a: – *Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπη μὲμψη τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα, ὃ μὴ ποτ' ἂν τις οἶός τε γένοιτο ἰκανῶς ἐπιτηδεύσει, εἰ μὴ φύσει εἴη μνήμων, εὐμαθής, μεγαλοπρεπής, εὐχαρῖς, φίλος τε καὶ συγγενῆς ἀληθείας, δικαιοσύνης, ἀνδρείας, σωφροσύνης*; – *Οὐδ' ἂν ὁ Μῶμος, ἔφη, τό γε τοιοῦτον μέμψαιτο*. Babrios, 59, 16–18: Μῶμος und φθόνος sind synonymisch angewandt: *[Τί οὖν ὁ μῦθος φησιν ἐν διηγῇσει; / πειρῶ τι ποιεῖν, τὸν φθόνον δὲ μὴ κρίνειν. / ἀρεστὸν ἀπλῶς οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τῷ μῶμῳ]*. Moderne Literatur zur Interpretation beider Gestalten: WILAMOWITZ (Anm. 1) II, 86; WILLIAMS

Das veränderte Verhalten des Gottes, nämlich die gnädigen, belohnenden Aspekte, kann in anderen Kallimachos-Texten gefunden werden¹⁰⁰. Im *fr.* 114 der *Aitia* handelt es sich um das Gespräch der von Angelion und Tektaios geschaffenen delischen Apollon-Statue mit einem anderen Menschen, der nicht näher identifiziert werden kann¹⁰¹. Man darf aber vermuten, dass es sich um den Dichter selbst handelt. Der Besucher auf Delos fragt den Gott u.a. danach, warum Apollon die Pfeile in der Linken, die Chariten aber in der Rechten hält, obwohl eine frühere Statue die Göttinnen, jede mit einem von dem Gott erfundenen Musikinstrument, in seiner linken Hand hat¹⁰². Apollon erwidert ihm, soweit es dem sehr fragmentarischen Text zu entnehmen ist, dass er, während er die Guten (oft und gern) belohnt, träge in der Bestrafung der Bösen ist: um dies zu symbolisieren, hält er die Pfeile in seiner Linken¹⁰³. Der Gott fordert den Fragenden auf, seine Gesinnung und sein Leben zu ändern. Zu dieser Warnung sind der delphische Gedanke (Γνῶθι σεαυτόν.) und der Satz auf dem römischen Triumphus (Hominem te esse memento!) zu beachten. Wenn der Mensch – sei er „gewöhnlicher“ Sterblicher oder vom Gott Auserkorener (Dichter bzw. Künstler) – sich seiner Schranken bewusst ist, wende er sich an die Götter. Dieses Reinigungs-, Änderungsmotiv steht in engem Zusammenhang mit dem Apollon-Hymnus: Nach der Besiegung von Python musste Apollon sich bei Admetos in Thesalien reinigen; auch die *ιάτρος*- und *ιατρόμαντις*-Funktion des Gottes kommt im Text vor. Falls der Mensch die delische (apollinische) Warnung beherzigt, begehrt er nicht die Sünde der *ὑbris* und wird nicht bestraft, wie Niobe, Arachne, Marsyas, Thamyris oder – wenn ich auf ein anderes Stück der Hymnensammlung von Kallimachos hinweise – Teiresias im Gedicht an das Bad der Pallas. Er erblickte die Göttin, obwohl es ihm nicht erlaubt war, in einem unbewachten Augenblick. Darum wurde Tei-

(Anm. 23) ad loc.; KÖHNKEN (Anm. 81) 418, 421; W. KROLL, *RE* XVI, 1933, 42, s.v. Momos; E. BERNERT, *RE* XX, 1941, 961–964, s.v. Phthonos.

¹⁰⁰ Dieselbe Zweiheit wurde von KERÉNYI in der Asklepios-Gestalt analysiert: *Der göttliche Arzt. Studien über Asklepios und seine Kultstätten*, Darmstadt, 1953².

¹⁰¹ *fr.* 114, 8–9: *σκαίῃ μὲν ἔχεις χερὶ Κύνθιε πῶρον, / τὰς δ' ἐπὶ δεξιτερῇ σὰς ἰδανάς Χάριτας*. Über das Fragment s.: R. PFEIFFER, *The Image of the Delian Apollo and Apolline Ethics*, ders. *Ausgewählte Schriften. Aufsätze und Vorträge zur griechischen Dichtung und zum Humanismus*, hrsg. W. BÜHLER, München, 1960, 55–71 (= *The Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 25, 1952, 20–32); S. JACKSON, *Callimachus, Istrus and the Statue of Delian Apollo*: *ZPE* 110, 1996, 43–48; FRASER (Anm. 24) I, 785; WILLIAMS (Anm. 23) ad 19.

¹⁰² Über die erste, originale Statue: Antikleides, *FGrH* 150, F 14, und Istros, *FGrH* 334, F 52 (= *Plut. Mor.* 1135f–1136b [*De mus*]): *καὶ ἡ ἐν Δήλῳ δὲ τοῦ ἀγάλματος αὐτοῦ* [Ἀπόλλωνος] *ἀφιδρυσίς ἔχει ἐν μὲν τῇ δεξιᾷ τόξον, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀριστερᾷ Χάριτας, τῶν τῆς μουσικῆς ὀργάνων ἐκάστην τι ἔχουσιν* ἡ μὲν λύραν κρατεῖ, ἡ δ' αὐλούς, ἡ δὲ ἐν μέσῳ προσκειμένην ἔχει τῷ στόματι σύριγγα. Über die spätere, neue Statue: *Macrob. Sat.* 1, 17, 13: *Sed quia perpetuam praestat salubritatem, et pestilens ab illo casus rarior est, ideo Apollinis simulacra manu dextera Gratias gestant, arcum cum sagittis sinistra, quod ad noxam sit pigrior, et salutem manus promptior largiatur*.

¹⁰³ *fr.* 114. 11–13.: *ἀλγαθοῖς ὀρέγων / ἡτοῖσι κολασμοῖ / ἀργότερος*. Zu den beiden Apollon-Aspekten in der römischen Literatur s.: *Hor. Carm.* 2, 10, 18–20: *quondam cithara tacentem / suscitavit Musam neque semper arcum / tendit Apollo*. PFEIFFER (Anm. 101) 66–67 hebt interessante neuzeitliche Parallelstellen hervor: die Inschrift der Don-Carlos-Münze von Pompeo Leoni (1557): *in benignitatem promptior*. Im Roman von Swift (*Gulliver's voyage to Liliput*, 6) ist zu lesen: *The image of Justice... with a bag of gold open in her right hand, and a sword sheathed in her left to show she is more disposed to reward than to punish*.

resias um sein Augenlicht gebracht, während er an wunderbarer Scherfähigkeit gewann¹⁰⁴.

Es kann auch kein Zufall sein, dass der Name Phoibos so oft im Hymnus vorkommt. Während der strahlende Sonnengott seinen Segen den Sterblichen gibt, sieht er alle Menschen und alle ihre Taten. So schaut der Gott den allerschönsten Chor an, dessen Hymnus ihm besonders am Herzen liegt¹⁰⁵. Diese Gottheit, also der Sonnengott Phoibos Apollon, kann den *ἔσθλος* und den *λιτός* voneinander unterscheiden und läßt dem einen die göttliche Gabe, dem anderen aber die Bestrafung der ὕβρις zukommen¹⁰⁶.

H-1113 Budapest
Karolina út 35/a

¹⁰⁴ Ohne die ausführliche Betrachtung der ganzen Hymnensammlung ist auffällig, dass die Dichtungen über den gnädigen bzw. bestrafenden Apollon an der zweiten und vorletzten Stelle des Buches stehen.

¹⁰⁵ *Hymn.* 2, 93: οὐ κείνου χορὸν εἶδε θεώτερον ἄλλον Ἀπόλλων...

¹⁰⁶ MCKAY (Anm. 38) 37, 39–40 hat auf Grund der Verse 38–41 nachgewiesen, dass Kallimachos Apollon mit dem Sonnengott identifiziert hat.

PÉTER LAUTNER

ANDRONICUS OF RHODES ON ARISTOTLE'S *PHYSICS* 202a13–21, b23–30*

Summary: The aim of the paper is to show that the two testimonies on Andronicus' theory of physical change give a coherent picture. Both accounts stress that the factor responsible for change is not necessarily to be sought for outside of the things that change. Their change is due as much to their inner constitution as to external agents. Andronicus' view resembles Galen's critique of the Aristotelian position and there is a possibility that both authors drew on Stoic sources.

Key words: change, inner constitution, external agents, natural motion, previous disposition, substrate.

The evidence for Andronicus' views on physics is extremely sparse. We only have three testimonies, all in Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*. One of them concerns the order and arrangement of the books of the *Physics*. It sheds light upon the development of the division of Aristotle's treatise and therefore received considerable interest in the past. But it may be less interesting to those who are concerned with the doctrinal aspects of Aristotle's work. On the other hand, the Neoplatonist commentator, Simplicius also informs us that Andronicus (*floruit* in the second half of the 1st century BC) had a reading of 202a14 that was less clear than the version preferred by the majority of mss. and commentators. Later on, we find another report on Andronicus that deals with his interpretation of 202b23–30.

The aim of the paper is twofold: to show that the testimonies on Andronicus' view of 202a13–21 and b23–30 cohere, and to set them in the context of what we know about the physical theories of the Peripatetics in the late republican and early imperial period.

First, I shall quote Simplicius' reports.

A

ιστέον δὲ ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χωρίῳ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ σαφέστερον οὕτως γράφουσι ταύτην τὴν λέξιν· ἐντελέχεια γάρ ἐστι τούτου ὑπὸ τοῦ κινητικοῦ.

* I owe much to Han Baltussen and István Bodnár for their generous and detailed written comments on an earlier draft.

ὁ δὲ Ἀνδρόνικος οὕτως· ἐντελέχεια γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ κινητοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου· καὶ ἐξηγεῖται ὅτι κἂν ἔξωθεν ἢ τὸ κινεῖν, ἐκ τῆς ἐνούσης δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀγόμενον, ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖσθαι δοκεῖ τὸ κινούμενον.¹

(CAG IX, 440.12-17 Diels, emphasis is mine)

B

ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ κινεῖν εἶδος τι ὄν ἤδη τοῦτο ἐνδιδόναι τῷ κινουμένῳ· κινεῖται δὲ καὶ αὐτά, καθόσον ἢ πρότερον ἡρεμοῦσα ἕξις εἰς τὴν τοῦ κινεῖν ἐνέργειαν διεγείρεται κατὰ τὸ ὡς πρὸς ἐνέργειαν δυνάμει, ὅπερ πάντα ἔχει τὰ μὴ ἅμα ὅλην ἀποδιδόντα τὴν οἰκείαν ἐνέργειαν· ὅπερ τοῖς αἰωνίως ἐνεργοῦσι πρόσσεσι μόνοις. διὸ παρ' ὅλον τὸν τοῦ κινεῖν χρόνον ἄμφω ἔστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τε δυνάμει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐξ ἀτελοῦς προκοπὴν κινεῖνται, κατὰ δὲ τὸ τέλειον καὶ τῆς ἕξεως καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας κινεῖσθαι. ἡ δὲ φύσις καὶ προδιατιθεμένη διατίθησι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἔνδοθεν καθ' ἕκαστον κινήσεως εἶδος, ὡς καὶ ὁ Ἀνδρόνικος ἔλεγε· κἂν γὰρ θερμαίνεται ὑπὸ πυρὸς τὸ ὕδωρ, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι φύσις πρώτη θερμὴ γενομένη, οὕτως θερμαίνει ἢ συνθερμαίνει τὸ ὑποκείμενον.

(CAG IX, 450.9-20 Diels)

Text A gives not only Andronicus' reading of 202a14 but also his explanation. That might show that Andronicus not only edited the text but also commented on particular textual problems.² Perhaps, he had to choose between various readings and appended some remarks to justify his preference. Had he had only one version at his disposal there would have been no reason to argue for that. It cannot be ruled out either that the rival versions (or one version only) were accessible after his publication of Aristotle's works as well. They may also have reached Alexander of Aphrodisias who, along with Porphyry, was admittedly the main source for Simplicius in this commentary. They might form the basis of the reading accepted by Simplicius and the medieval copyists. In this respect, then, Andronicus could not provide a definitive edition.³ But we do not have to assume that he just gathered the rolls and published

¹ It is not quite clear why Diels put a comma after ἀγόμενον for it goes with τὸ κινούμενον. I owe this point to István Bodnár.

² On his notes on Aristotle's *Physics*, see M. PLEZIA: *De Andronici Rhodii studiis Aristotelicis*. Cracow 1946 (although he has not much to say about it, see p. 43); P. MORAUX: *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*. Bd. I, Berlin 1973, 113–116; H. B. GOTTSCHALK: *Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World*. *ANRW* II 36.2, 1079–1174, esp. 1092–1093; J. BARNES: *Roman Aristotle*, J. BARNES & M. GRIFFIN (eds.): *Philosophia Togata* II. Oxford 1997, 25–30. The version was also noted by H. DIELS: *Zur Textgeschichte der Aristotelischen Physik, Abhandlungen der Kgl. Pr. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, 1882, *Phil.-hist. Kl. I.*, 22–23. But he seems to say that in that case we have to think of the transmission through the commentators, not of Andronicus' transcript. Moraux thinks (p. 113) that Andronicus' version is a *Flüchtigkeitsfehler*. If so, why did Andronicus try to justify it? Simplicius clearly says that he made some explanation (ἐξηγεῖται) to support it. Moraux also points out (p. 114, n. 3) that the reading turns up in Cod. Vindob. phil. gr. 100 (9th century), though he takes it for another lapse.

³ As J. BARNES stresses, in his 'edition' of the *Physics*, Andronicus merely published copies of corrupt manuscripts, see *op. cit.* 31. Without rejecting that highly plausible hypothesis about the value of

them without trying to give a coherent interpretation. We cannot prove the existence of such a coherent view for the whole work. But we may be able to prove a more modest claim, that he had such an interpretation for a longer passage. For the explanation with which he supports his reading of 202a14 seems to be in line with the interpretation of 202b23–30. At any rate, Simplicius' report indicates that Andronicus had at least some overall interpretation of Aristotle's theory of change.

Whoever interprets 202b23–30, s/he must be aware of the fact that the passage sums up the content of the first three chapters of Book 3. The general nature of change is defined as the actualization of that which is potentially active or passive. This is the passage, then, where the commentator is given the opportunity to summarize his/her own interpretation of Aristotle's notion of change. Before examining Andronicus' interpretation of the passage, we have to mark off his testimony from the context of Simplicius' remarks. It is difficult to separate them for it seems that Simplicius uses Andronicus' view to illustrate a Neoplatonic doctrine which says that to take in a form the recipient has to be suitable for the reception of that form. Suitability (ἐπιτηδεϊότης) may in turn be the result of a previous impact by that same form.⁴ Simplicius makes clear that motion is or involves a certain transmission of form (450.9–10). To support the inclusion of this notion into an Aristotelian framework he refers to Andronicus who emphasizes the importance of the internal source of change.

However, as I think we can find an allusion to Andronicus' terminology, we might have a chance to attribute at least one short additional passage to Andronicus. On discussing the conditions whereby a thing can change Simplicius says that nature, which is also so predisposed, gives a kind of disposition from within to the substrate in relation to each form of change. One of the two terms I should like to pay special attention to the word "predisposed" (προδιατιθεμένη). Simplicius does not use it elsewhere in the commentary. We cannot find it in his commentary on *De Caelo* either. Neither does Aristotle apply the term – with good reason, one might add. As the clause ends with the words *ὥς καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος ἔλεγε*, there is some reason to assume that Simplicius took the clause "*ἡ δὲ φύσις ... ἔλεγε*" (450.16–18) either directly from Andronicus or, more plausibly, from Alexander of Aphrodisias who also wrote a commentary on the *Physics*. One might think that it would be too bold to say that here we have a direct quotation from Andronicus' work. But I think it is safe to conclude that, in the wake of Alexander, Simplicius paraphrased Andronicus in a

Andronicus' edition, one might admit that Andronicus at least made an attempt to support his choice between different readings.

⁴ The term may be of Megarian provenience but was also used by the Stoics and Epicurus (*Ep. Herod.* 46), see R. B. TODD: *EPITEDEIOTES* in *Philosophical Literature: Towards an Analysis, Acta Classica* XV (1972), 25–35. See also the detailed analysis of the term in the Neoplatonists by I. HADOT: *Aspects de la théorie de la perception chez les néoplatoniciens: sensation (αἴσθησις), sensation commune (κοινή αἴσθησις), sensibles communs (κοινὰ αἰσθητά) et conscience de soi (συναἴσθησις), Documenti i studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*, VIII (1997), 33–87, esp. 37–42. ἐπιτηδεϊότης as the result of a previous ἐμφασις of the form is discussed, e.g., in Ps.-Simplicius, in *DA* 56.21 ff. For further references, see my note 241 in Simplicius, *On Aristotle On the Soul* 1.1–2.4, translated by J. O. URMSON. London-Ithaca NY, 1995.

way that he kept some of the key terms. The next clause (κἄν γὰρ ... τὸ ὑποκείμενον) illustrates that general thesis. The use of συνθερμαίνει is also unique in Simplicius' *in Phys.* The commentary on *De Caelo* does not contain the verb and its cognates either.⁵ Therefore, perhaps, we are allowed to ascribe the passage 450.16-20 to Andronicus. Such a conclusion may be corroborated by the fact that the terms do not occur in any other treatise on physics by late antique authors. The rest of the section quoted above may also reflect his views, although it has no peculiar mark indicating that Simplicius took it from another author. It may well be that it contains nothing but the remarks that Simplicius made to clarify his own point. But, on occasion, it may also serve well to elucidate some problems in Andronicus' notion.⁶

Text **B** states that for Andronicus nature is predisposed towards every kind of change, and thus it is the inner source for the substrate to produce change in any way. There are two questions to be answered. What kind of nature is he talking about? What does he mean by substrate (τὸ ὑποκείμενον)? I suspect, what he has in mind is either the universal nature or the individual. If he thinks of the universal nature then he could say that nature as such has the kind of previous disposition that enables natural things to change. If he thinks of the individual nature then he may say that it is not nature as such but nature structured in a certain way that is predisposed and thus enables natural things to change. In my view, the first option may be more promising. Simplicius does not indicate that he takes the term in the second, restrictive sense. Moreover, the discussion is about change in general. Nature is said to be predisposed towards all kinds of change. In virtue of the previous disposition nature can provide the appropriate disposition for each individual thing. As for the meaning of ὑποκείμενον, the term may refer to the thing that is about to change. For to change is to receive a certain form (450.9-10), the changing thing is a ὑποκείμενον in relation to the form which it receives. Thus, of course, we can say that the thing that is about to change is matter in respect of the form it takes on during the change. In itself, the thing in question is a compound, but in respect of the change to come it receives the appropriate form. It will underlie the change. That seems to be the meaning of the term both in 450.17 and in 450.20.⁷

Because we have Andronicus' summary of his view of the general nature of change and assume that it is correctly represented in Simplicius' commentary, it is reasonable to expect that his reading and explanation of 202a14 must fit that summary. Right at the beginning of his commentary on *Physics* 3, in 395.20-22, Sim-

⁵ The term is attested in Aristotle (*HA* 562b21), as well as in early Peripatetic texts (Ps.-Aristotle, *Pr.* 888b28; Theophrastus *CP* I 3.4). These claims are based on a TLG search for the various forms of διατιθέναι and συνθερμαίνειν in the relevant authors.

⁶ I must add that, to my mind, the subject of the next sentence (δυνάμει οὖν κινητικὸν εἶπεν, ...) is, again, Aristotle, as the words ἔλεγε πρότερον (450.21) make clear.

⁷ Another possibility to explain ὑποκείμενον might be to side with Boethus and distinguish between ὕλη, unqualified matter, and ὑποκείμενον, matter as it exists in actual things and is endowed with form and limit, see ap. Themistius, *in Phys.* 26.20-23 and Simplicius, *in Phys.* 211.15-20. But it seems that in 450.20 ὑποκείμενον is distinguished from φύσις. As the latter term seems to refer to the inner constitution (including the matter that is qualified), the former can only signify the particular thing that is about to underlie change.

plicius announces that this book has a quite high number of text variants. This seems to be the reason why he devotes so much energy to discuss the different readings of certain passages. His notes on Andronicus' version are to be understood against this background. What is the difference between the two readings? The one accepted by the commentators, including Simplicius, says that change is the actualization of the changed by the source of change. The statement implies that things that change owe their activity exclusively to the external source of change. That goes well with the Aristotelian dictum that everything that changes is changed by something else.⁸ Andronicus seems to have dissented from Aristotle's view for he prefers a text which, although it defines change as the actualization of the thing that is capable of changing, adds at the same time that the change may also be initiated by the external source of change. He defends it by saying that, even if the changer is external, the thing in change seems to be changed by itself, since it is brought to actuality on account of its inherent potentiality. Instead of ascribing full responsibility for the change to the external mover, then, Andronicus endorses the view that the physical thing that is about to change can change also by itself, and that is due to its inner conditions. In text **A**, therefore, he announces a view which is the opposite to what Aristotle said. For Aristotle, every change implies a changer which is, in some sense, distinct from what is changed. By contrast, Andronicus seems to claim that it is the nature of the changing thing that is primarily responsible for the change. For this reason, he may tacitly admit such cases where we cannot find an external mover.

It may be easy to see that the two accounts on Andronicus' position are coherent. Both stress that the factor responsible for change is not necessarily to be sought for outside of the things that change. Things are capable of changing on their own account, or rather, their change is due as much to their inner constitution as to external agents. As the example in text **B** says, even if a particular amount of water be heated by fire, the nature inherent in the water first becomes warm and thus warms, or warms with itself, the substrate.⁹ The passage also raises an interesting problem about Aristotle's doctrine of the elements. When the nature of water becomes warm, how can this warm nature remain the nature of water? In such cases, Aristotle's doctrine requires that the warm water that has left its cold nature behind would no longer be water. It should be a kind of air. Theoretically speaking, Andronicus could give two answers to the query. (1) The warm nature of the water is in fact a nature of air. It implies that during the heating process there will be a substantial change which then takes hold of the whole matter. The heating process only communicates the warm to the water. The fact that the water comes to the boil and perishes can be explained with reference to the inner structure of the water. (2) The nature of warm water can itself be a water-nature. This is a paradoxical nature that becomes more paradoxical as the heating process goes on. But this nature has to come about first. It will receive the heat communicated to the water and will eventually perish as a result of further

⁸ See, e.g., *Physics* VIII 4, 255b29 ff.

⁹ Note that both passages make the same point in this respect: $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\nu\ \epsilon\tilde{\xi}\omega\theta\epsilon\nu\ \eta\ (440.16) - \kappa\acute{\alpha}\nu\ \gamma\grave{\alpha}\rho\ \theta\epsilon\rho\mu\acute{\alpha}\iota\nu\epsilon\tau\alpha\ (450.18)$.

heating. By the term συνθερμαίνει Andronicus might refer to the first horn of the dilemma. For there nature acts as a co-ordinate cause along with the external source of the heat. On this view, nature contributes to the process of heating the water. But these possibilities are highly conjectural. We simply do not have clear evidence for Andronicus' position in this matter.¹⁰

But that is a minor point. Whichever of the two possibilities may come to be true, it seems that Andronicus chose the reading of 202a14 in accordance with his general view of change. This kind of approach serves the purpose of Simplicius as well for he stresses the introduction of the internal initiation of change as something necessary (418.4–6) and new (423.12, 20–1).¹¹ We do not know whether Andronicus endorsed Aristotle's doctrine of elementary motions. But even if he accepted it, he could say that the mover is responsible for the motion of the element indirectly; it moves the element via the nature of the element.

The next task is to examine how Andronicus' notion of change fits in with the overall view of change in the late republican and early imperial period. As a result, we may be able to see clearly Andronicus' place in the development of the interpretation of Aristotle's notion of change. The sources are, again, scarce. In particular, we know hardly anything about the Peripatetics who lived in the 1st and 2nd century BC. Our evidence for their views on physics therefore does not enable us to compare them to Andronicus' notion of change. There are, however, other sources that reveal other kind of connections. At first sight, his position may appear similar to that of Epicurus who denied that what is in motion has to be moved by something.¹² On the other hand, Andronicus did not say that such change can be spontaneous. Natural things are a kind of self-movers but they change on account of their inner constitution, which makes their change predictable. The notion of self-motion was more prevalent in Stoicism.¹³ Chrysippus characterized fire as the one that moves through itself with most speed and vigour.¹⁴ Moreover, the Stoics seem to have distinguished four kinds of self-motion, the lowest one being attributed to inanimate natural objects.¹⁵ Inanimate objects thus can change by themselves. To use Stoic terminology, they are capable of activating change through themselves (δι' ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργεῖν τὴν κίνησιν, apud Simplicius, in *Cat.* 306.21–22). Given that Andronicus was influenced by the Stoics in other matters, there is a possibility that he was influenced by them in this point as well.¹⁶

¹⁰ Thanks to István Bodnár for helping me elaborate this point.

¹¹ I owe this point to Han Baltussen.

¹² See Lucretius II 216–293.

¹³ See the analysis in D. HAHM: *Self-Motion in Stoic Philosophy*, M. L. GILL & J. G. LENNOX (eds.), *Self-Motion. From Aristotle to Newton*. Princeton, 1994, 175–227.

¹⁴ *SVF* II 413.

¹⁵ Cf., Simplicius, in *Cat.* 306.19–27, Origen, *De principiis* III 1.2–3; *De oratione* 6.1. Alexander of Aphrodisias was well aware of the Stoic arguments, see *De fato* XIII 181.15–182.4. For a discussion, see R. W. SHARPLES, *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate*. London. 1978, 253–58.

¹⁶ The Stoic influence in other matters has been emphasized by H. B. GOTTSCHALK, *op. cit.* 1105, n. 6, and in L. TARÁN's review of P. MORAUX, *Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, Bd. 1, *Gnomon* 53 (1981), 741.

As Paul Moraux has already noted, text A may allude to a debate on the nature of change among natural philosophers in the 2nd century AD.¹⁷ The key evidence for the debate is the treatise by Alexander of Aphrodisias in which he sets out to refute Galen's notion of change.¹⁸ He evolved his theory as a response to Galen's objections to Aristotle's views. But Andronicus' position may also make understandable the fierce criticism that Alexander aimed at Galen's notion of change. Alexander's purpose in criticizing Galen was also to rebut erroneous conceptions within the Peripatetic tradition. Galen seems to have said that things that change essentially are those whose source of change is inherent. Such change is the linear motion of the sublunary elements to the places appropriate to them and the circular motion of the outermost sphere.¹⁹ These bodies consist of similar parts that "are no other than the whole".²⁰ Galen also launched an attack against the logic of Aristotle's argument.²¹ He criticized it on the ground that it makes an impossible *ὑπόθεσις* which says that when the whole AB moves *πρώτως καὶ καθ' αὐτό*, the part CB does not move. For present purposes, there is no need to follow up the whole debate. Let it suffice to stress that Galen referred to the local motions of the element which are due to its weight.

The difference between Galen and Andronicus is clear. As the example in Simplicius 450.19–20 shows, Andronicus did not necessarily bear in mind natural motions, the linear motion of the four elements to their natural places. Although he referred to the elements, or particular portions of the elements (this particular fire and this particular amount of water), the changes he considered useful for illustrating his point were not the natural locomotion of the elements. Instead, he mentioned warming and cooling, changes that were related to the basic qualities of the elements. But the body to change is a particular amount of water. To apply Galen's principle, the parts of this water are similar to the whole. Furthermore, Andronicus' criticism may not have been so radical as Galen's. He could reconcile his position with Aristotle's view by saying that the external mover of the elements can move them on account of their inner nature. On the other hand, the common feature in the views of Andronicus and Galen is that for both authors change can be initiated by the inanimate thing itself, which is due to the intrinsic characteristics of the natural thing in question. One might ask if there was a common source for the criticism. The answer is short and not free of conjecture. For Alexander says that Galen took the criticism from

¹⁷ P. MORAUX, *op. cit.*, 114.

¹⁸ See S. PINES: *Omne quod movetur necesse est ab aliquo moveri: A Refutation of Galen by Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Theory of Motion*, *Isis* 52 (1961), 21–55; N. RESCHER & M. E. MARMURA, *The Refutation by Alexander of Aphrodisias of Galen's Treatise on the Theory of Motion*. Islamabad, 1969.

¹⁹ 63a10 ff. Page and line are those of the Escorial ms., as I found it in N. RESCHER & M. E. MARMURA, *op. cit.*, 33–34.

²⁰ Translation is by N. RESCHER and M. E. MARMURA. It indicates that the elements are made up of homogeneous parts.

²¹ 63b20 ff. It was mentioned also by Simplicius, in *Phys.* 1039.13–15. Galen responded to *Physics* 241b24–242a16.

Chrysippus.²² In addition to that, we can repeat that Andronicus was clearly influenced by the Stoics in many issues. We cannot rule out either that he relied on them for making this point as well. As a speculation, then, we might be allowed to say that both Galen and Andronicus drew on Stoic sources. But if so, then those Stoics, presumably Chrysippus as well, knew the Aristotelian theory of change and heavily criticized it.

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²² 64a5 ff, p.36 RESCHER-MARMURA. Alexander must have been familiar with the Stoic concept. It is not clear, however, whether he hinted at the whole criticism when saying that Galen took it over from Chrysippus.

LEVENTE LÁSZLÓ

THE QUANTITY OF FINAL -U IN THE NOMINATIVE–ACCUSATIVE SINGULAR OF LATIN U-STEM NEUTER NOUNS

Summary: The opinion of traditional grammars and the hypothetical derived PIE form is inconsistent as concerns the quantity of the sing. nominative–accusative ending of Latin u-stem neuters. Since the received scholarly opinion holds that the quantity cannot be determined from the available sources, certain scholars have stated that the ending is a short -u. A comprehensive re-examination of the ancient grammatical opinion and the relevant metrical texts demonstrates that on the basis of two passages, namely *Aen.* XI 859 and *nux* 106, the truth of the traditional view, i.e., that the sing. nom.–acc. of u-stem neuters is long, can be confirmed.

Key words: Latin morphology, u-stem nouns, Roman grammarians, diptota, monoptota, quantity of -u.

1. THE PROBLEM AND ITS PREVIOUS SOLUTIONS

The progress of Latin linguistics inevitably brings a re-examination and re-valuation of previously accepted facts. This is true as well of the teaching of the accepted grammars on the quantity of final -u in the nominative, accusative, and vocative cases of Latin fourth declension neuters. Though the traditional opinion – taught also in the schools and ultimately stemming from the authority of Priscian – is that this final -u is long, one would expect, on the ground of comparative Indo-European linguistics, a short -u.¹ A change from short to long is theoretically impossible.

There are two major ways for scholars to make this contradiction clear. The first is to deny that the quantity of final -u is long, claiming that the cases where it is are artificial, the result of prosodical lengthening² or *poetica licentia*.³ In extreme cases this method leads to a total denial of the presence of nominative, accusative or vocative u-stem neuter forms in the metrical texts,⁴ which places long final -u in the realm of grammatical fantasy. Those scholars who choose the second method have

¹ Cf. Lat. *genū* ~ Gr. *γόνυ*, Skt. *jānu*.

² Before caesurae, see M. LEUMANN, *Lateinische Laut- und Formenlehre*. München 1977⁵. p. 441.

³ A. ERNOUT, *Morphologie historique du latin*. Paris 1953. pp. 64–65.

⁴ This is the most recent point of view, the one of P. M. SUÁREZ MARTÍNEZ, “La quantité de -u chez les neutres de quatrième déclinaison latine.” In: H. ROSÉN (ed.), *Aspects of Latin. Papers from the Seventh International Colloquium on Latin Linguistics, Jerusalem, April 1993*. Innsbruck 1996. pp. 91–98.

attempted to construct an explanation as to how these words evolved from other Indo-European morphological categories: from the dual⁵, or possibly from an original collective plural.⁶

But before we commit to one theory or the other, or begin to create a new one, an essential question must be answered: *is there any contradiction at all, or are we in fact dealing with a pseudo-problem?* The conclusion of Suárez Martínez⁷ makes sense: *it is possible that we cannot find any arguments for the existence of long -ū in u-stem neuters in the available texts.* And if we do not find any, what is the consequence? Should we accept that short -u is the most probable answer, or should we simply admit that we have no evidence for the quantity of -u? Or, if we *can* find evidence, is it really relevant?

Before we can answer these questions, we need first to discuss other problems connected with the u-stem neuters. In Latin these words are very few indeed: *cornu*, *gelu*, *genu*, *pecu*, and *veru*. Because they “*sunt perpauca*”⁸, this group of words is actually scarcely attested in the literature, and tends to variation in its forms.⁹ Sometimes even other u-stem neuters appear as variants of words originally from other declinations.¹⁰ Thus the main problem is twofold: quantitative and qualitative. What are the precise limits of the set of Latin u-stem neuters; what is their origin; how can a small and rather unsubstantial group of words be grasped?

There are two areas that any examination of u-stem neuters must cover. First, we need to examine the various opinions of the Roman grammarians. Second, we must find the relevant places in the Latin metrical texts where the quantity of -u can be determined.¹¹ The main criterion of examination is the demand for completeness both in the set of u-stem neuters – including the *hapax legomena* mentioned above – and in the selection of texts. There is no room to pick and choose. Not all texts have been examined previously.¹²

⁵ This is an ingenious theory of F. Sommer on the ground that *cornu* and *genu* usually mean parts of the body: F. SOMMER, *Kritische Erläuterungen zur lateinischen Laut- und Formenlehre*. Heidelberg 1914. p. 96. A critique of this theory is formulated by A. L. SIHLER, *New Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin*. New York–Oxford 1995. p. 323.

⁶ From the semantic change of PIE **pek'u* ‘single animal’ – **pek'ū* ‘cattle’: J. SCHMIDT, *Die Pluralbildungen der indogermanischen Neutra*. Weimar 1889. p. 49.

⁷ SUÁREZ MARTÍNEZ (n. 4), p. 98.

⁸ Phoc. GL V p. 414, 12–13 KEIL.

⁹ There are a number of formal variants in other declinations; e.g., u-stem masculine nouns: *cornus* (Varro *Men.* 131 ASTBURY; acc. *cornum* Ter. *Eun.* 775; Lucr. II 388; Ov. *met.* II 874, V 383; Avien. *Arat.* 437), *gelus* (Acc. *trag.* 376 DANGEL; Afr. *com.* 109 DAVIAULT); o-stem neuters: *cornum* (see above), *gelum* (Lucr. VI 877), *verum* (Plaut. *Rud.* 1302, 1304; *Truc.* 628); s-stem neuters: *genus* (Lucil. 166 KRENKEL; Cic. *Arat.* 27, 45, 46, 254, 375, 399, 403, fr. 21 SOUBIRAN; Ov. *Arat.* I COURTNEY).

¹⁰ The greater part of these words are cited by grammarians and not from the surviving texts: *algu*, *artu*, *ossu*, *penu*, *seru*, *specu*, *testu*, and *tonitru*. Cf. F. NEUE–C. WAGENER, *Formenlehre der lateinischen sprache*. Vol. I. Berlin 1902. pp. 531–535.

¹¹ On the theoretical level the third area would be the investigation of the development of the words in the Romance languages, but the phonological and morphological changes do not help to determine the exact quantitative value of -u.

¹² This is my first counter-argument against the work of SUÁREZ MARTÍNEZ who – although does not examine all relevant passages – makes his conclusion in such a way that one would first of all expect the use of all available material.

2. THE OPINIONS OF THE ROMAN GRAMMARIANS

As Suárez Martínez has stated,¹³ the opinions of the ancient grammarians on the quantity of final -u in fact vary.¹⁴ While the author of *De ultimis syllabis* (GL IV p. 224, 22–32) and Priscian in his *Institutio* (GL II p. 362, 6–11; also in other books: p. 187, 16–17 and p. 210, 14–15) claims it is long, a larger group of grammarians, namely Diomedes (GL I p. 308, 13–17; similarly on p. 309, 3–6), Pompeius (GL V p. 185, 1–4; similarly on p. 172, 3–4), Servius (GL IV p. 451, 27–28), Martianus Capella (*De nuptiis* p. 76, 14–15 Willis; the same on p. 78, 8–9) and Probus (GL IV p. 31, 23–27; the same on p. 32, 30–33) assert the contrary, i.e., the ending of the u-stem neuters in the nominative, accusative and vocative cases is short. To the latter group of grammarians belongs also Sacerdos (GL VI p. 482, 29–483, 1); and the authors of *De finalibus metrorum* (GL VI p. 231, 4–8; perhaps the work of Metrorius) and of the *Explanatio in Donatum* (GL IV p. 544, 28–31) should also be added.¹⁵

It is clear that the question cannot be decided in accordance with majority opinion, chiefly as there is a grammarian, the author of the *Explanatio*, who is inconsistent on the point. Thus, first the arguments of the grammarians must be scrutinized.¹⁶ To begin with the majority position, two arguments are given. First, all final vowels are short in the nominative, including the -u ending¹⁷; hence in the case of neuters the same is true of the accusative and vocative cases. This could be the effect of analogy: as the -a, -o and -e endings are beyond doubt short, in a dubious situation the quantity of -u easily can be settled as short too.¹⁸ The second type of argument is a comparison of cases: in the genitive,¹⁹ dative and ablative the -u is long (*productio*), while in the other cases it is short (*correptio*). As Diomedes says (GL I p. 308, 13–17), „*bipertita est quae altera casuum productione et correptione variatur, ut genu cornu*

¹³ SUÁREZ MARTÍNEZ (n. 4), p. 92–93.

¹⁴ None of the grammarians antedate the end of the 3rd cent. AD. Thus the cause of the difference of views could be the late date as well, when it had become difficult to determine the proper usage, especially in the case of a group of words which is small and apt to suffer both phonological and morphological alteration.

¹⁵ The so-called *Ars anonyma Berniensis* echoes the opinion of older grammarians, who contrast the cases with short and long -u endings (GL Suppl. p. 127, 5–12); but curiously it not only cites Priscian's argumentation for long -u in all cases (p. 127, 13–16), but at the beginning of the discussion it also deals with this group of words in this very way (p. 126, 35–127, 3). Thus the author of this grammatical summary accepted the opinion of Priscian, not only from his authority, while carefully alluding to the opinion of the opposing party.

¹⁶ I call 'arguments' the motivations from which the members of the opposing parties formulate their opinions. In this manner a declaration that „the -u is short” (*u terminatus brevis est, ut cornu*; Mart. Cap. p. 76, 14–15 WILLIS) does not contain any argument, because it reveals nothing about its author's motivation.

¹⁷ Serv. GL IV p. 451, 27–28: „*Nominativus singularis has habet breves, a ut Musa, e ut sedile, o ut virgo, u ut cornu*...” Similarly “Metrorius” who adds the group of words with long -i suffix (e.g., *frugi*), which is not originally nominative and obviously indeclinable, precisely as the corrector of his Palatine codex (9th cent.) remarks too.

¹⁸ Of course, only the -a ending can provide a parallel if we deal with the long-short contrast.

¹⁹ It is peculiar that all grammarians equally regard the ending of the genitive as -ū, instead of -ūs. Cf. F. SOMMER, *Handbuch der lateinischen Laut- und Formenlehre*. Heidelberg 1914. p. 389. It has nothing to do with our problem, just for the understanding of grammatical terminology.

gelu. haec enim duobus modis tantum in declinatione variantur, quod quidem productione et correptione distinguimus. nam in nominativo accusativo vocativo correpta u proferuntur, in genetivo dativo ablativo producta."²⁰ Diomedes here defines a technical term. In this way the *bipertitum* term is applicable to words which have only two forms that, in the case of u-stem neuters, are distinguished by quantity.

A similar form of argumentation based on terminology can be seen in *De ultimis syllabis* (GL IV p. 224, 22–32), but from the other side: „*Nominativum singularem aptoti nominis neutri generis u littera terminatum in poemate aliquo non facilius invenies, ut si facias hoc cornu et hoc genu vel hoc gelu. nam haec nomina apud Vergilium septimo casu inveniuntur. verum tamen si nominativum casum conlocare volueris, ultimam hanc syllabam longam ponito, quoniam necesse est in ablativo eam produci... in ablativo tamen sine ambiguitate producitur.*"²¹ Here the applied term is *aptota*, which, in comparison with the meaning of Diomedes' term, is applicable to those words that have only one form in a paradigm, as if indeclinable. There is no quantitative opposition: since in the -u is long sine ambiguitate in the ablativo, it is long in the nominative also. The reference to poetical texts is more explicit in Priscian (GL II p. 362, 6–21), who also criticizes the opinions of older grammarians and quotes a Vergilian and an Ovidian line as documents: „*In u neutrorum, quae et indeclinabilia sunt in singulari numero, ut hoc genu huius genu, hoc cornu huius cornu, in quibus quamvis quibusdam artium scriptoribus videatur temporum esse differentia – dicunt enim, nominativum quidem et accusativum et vocativum corripi, reliquos vero produci –*, ego in usu pariter in omnibus produci invenio casibus haec nomina..." In Priscian's text the *indeclinabilia* are the same as *aptota*; the terminological equation is directly stated by Augustinus (GL V p. 497, 31–32; similarly in p. 501, 12–13) as well.²² There are numerous other grammarians, besides the above-mentioned Priscian, Phocas, Augustinus and the anonymous author of *De ultimis syllabis*, whose opinion, that the -u of the u-stem neuters in nominative and accusative is long, is described with the same terms: Charisius²³ (p. 31, 17–21. 40, 15–22. 82, 28–30 Barwick), the author of an *Explanatio*²⁴ (GL IV p. 541, 23–24) and Cleodnius (GL V p. 42, 7–9).²⁵

Examining the arguments of the opposing parties, we can summarize that while the opinion of that group which insists on short -u is supported by facts known from

²⁰ Sacerdos brings a similar argument to bear, but without terminological remarks.

²¹ The same term is used by Phocas (GL V p. 414, 11–13) for the u-stem neuters.

²² Priscian himself in his *Institutio* uses three terms: „*monoptota*" (GL II p. 187, 16), „*aptota*" (GL II p. 210, 14; also in Ps.-Prisc. *De accentibus*, GL III p. 523, 3–4) and „*indeclinabilia*" (GL II p. 362, 7; also in his *Institutio de nomine*, GL III p. 447, 14–15). The use of these terms as synonyms is inconsistent, if the subtle distinction of Cleodnius (GL V p. 45, 30–32) is right: „*inter monoptoton et aptoton hoc interest: monoptoton est quod per omnes casus idem significat, ut 'frugi'; aptoton est quod tantum unum casum, quem invenerit, servat et non flectitur, ut 'ab hac dicione'.*" But this kind of subtle distinction is irrelevant for our purposes.

²³ Along with the so-called *Excerpta Bobiensia* (GL I p. 551, 17–19; also in p. 547, 4).

²⁴ The uncertainty of this author – who may be a certain Sergius – is very conspicuous here, since a little later he argues for the position of Diomedes (see above). There is no acceptable reason; the inconsistency in the same work is more than curious.

²⁵ From the GL Supplement there are other texts too: the *Ars* of Ps.-Asper (p. 43, 7–13), the *Ars anonyma Berniensis* (see above) and the *Commentum Einsidlense* (p. 240, 4–5).

other declinations – short vowel quantity in final syllables and comparison of long and short endings as in the first declination –, the group of grammarians defending long -u, likewise populous, is not afraid to examine primary sources, i.e., the metrical texts themselves. So our second task is to analyze the poetical texts.

3. ANALYSIS OF METRICAL TEXTS

As the group of the -u stem neuters is very small, we can expect that there are few relevant passages from metrical texts relevant to our examination of the quantity of final -u in the nominative or accusative cases. There are only two grammarians, Priscian and the anonymous author of *De ultimis syllabis*, who, trying to demonstrate that this -u is long, use passages from poetical texts.²⁶ The first passages to be examined are those cited by Priscian.

His first example is from Ovid (*met.* IX 298–300):

*...dextroque a poplite laevum
pressa genu digitis inter se pectine iunctis
sustinuit partus...*

This reading can be found at Priscian and this is also the *consensus* of the 11th–12th century codices. But – as Suárez Martínez has noticed²⁷ – two codices of the same age write *genu et* instead of simple *genu*, and both of these variants are occur in the texts of recent editions. Such a textual problem can cause uncertainty: if we accept the former text, the -u is long; but if we prefer the latter, an *elisio* intervenes²⁸ and the quantity cannot be determined.

Uncertainty in the text can be found elsewhere too (*met.* IV 339–340):

*Tum quoque respiciens, fruticumque recondita silva
delituit flexuque genu submisit. At ille...*

The variants of the *paradosis* are *flexoque*, *flexumque*, and *flexaque*, the published variant is a conjecture by Lachmann. The passage can be relevant only if the correct text is *flexumque* or *flexuque*; but the existence of *flexoque*, in which case the *genu* must be a modal ablative, does not permit us to decide whether the passage is relevant.²⁹

²⁶ This grammarian cites two verses from Cicero (GL IV p. 224, 29 = Cic. Arat. fr. 28, 2 and p. 224, 31 = Arat. 27), from which the second is apparently incorrect, as we can compare its text with the manuscript tradition. Nevertheless, the overall negative opinion of Suárez Martínez (n. 4), p. 93 about the author's trustfulness in citation does not seem to be obviously well-founded, chiefly as he blames the anonymous grammarian for the inconsistency, whereas the works preserved under the name of Probus in GL IV were actually written by various authors.

²⁷ SUÁREZ MARTÍNEZ (n. 4), p. 93.

²⁸ Similarly, elision makes the length of final -u in this verse from an 8th century epigraphic poem (ILCV 1625, 1) unverifiable: *Flecte genu, en signum per quod vis victa tirani...*

²⁹ Cf. SUÁREZ MARTÍNEZ, (n. 4), p. 93. For the sake of completeness two other passages should be mentioned. The first is a piece from a lost work of Afranius. There are two variants of texts, as the

Priscian's other example is from Vergil (*Aen.* I 318–320):

*Namque umeris de more habilem suspenderat arcum
venatrix dederatque comam diffundere ventis,
nuda genu nodoque sinus collecta fluentes.*

Both Priscian (GL II p. 362, 20–21) and Servius (ad. loc.) interpret *genu* as *accusativus respectivus*. But Suárez Martínez rightly points out³⁰ that *genu* here could just as well be *ablativus limitationis*, and thus irrelevant for our purposes.

The question of whether a u-stem neuter is in fact an *accusativus respectivus* or an *ablativus limitationis* cannot be decided definitely. Poetically the former occurs as well.³¹

There are some more passages. Suárez Martínez has examined Ov. *fast.* III 869–870:

*Dicitur infirma cornu tenuisse sinistra
femina, cum de se nomina fecit aquae.*

His conclusion is that the u-stem neuters in these lines are not nominative or accusative.³² He formulates his judgement in the same manner in the case of *met.* XII 345–348:³³

*...tergoque Bienoris alti
insilit haud solito quemquam portare nisi ipsum;
opposuitque genu costis prensamque sinistra
caesariem retinens...*

Apart from the texts already examined, there is another passage from Ovid which must be an example of *cornu* as direct object (*met.* XI 324–325):³⁴

opinions of the publisher differ in the acceptance of verse. The first is Ribbeck's (fr. 420): *indignum vero testu <quod> dici solet*. The second is from DAVIAULT (fr. 421): *indignum vero dici solet testu [- - -]*.

Both variants are suspicious. The Ribbeck version cannot be used because there is an editorial conjecture after the nominative *testu*; the same is true for the Daviault version, as this word stands at the end of the incomplete line. Incompleteness is the problem in another epigraphic verse (CIL VIII 20249–50): *sancit tui sp̄ pl̄i I Vitisator genu † V O mpte tuis † S*.

³⁰ SUÁREZ MARTÍNEZ (n. 4), pp. 95–96.

³¹ The grammars refer to another passage from Ovid (*met.* IX 96–97): “...vultus Achelous agrestes / et lacerum cornu mediis caput abdidit undis.” Again we cannot decide the question, the text can be interpreted in either way.

³² SUÁREZ MARTÍNEZ (n. 4), p. 94. His argument (“nous sommes ... en présence d'un usage intransitif ou absolu [more rightly: middle-voice – L. L.] de *teneo*, dans le sens qu'il n'est pas nécessaire d'expliciter son objet direct, du fait qu'il coïncide avec le sujet: *se tenuisse*”) is not convincing, as this interpretation is far more complicated than the traditional one.

³³ SUÁREZ MARTÍNEZ (n. 4), p. 95. If we accept his reasoning, we may get a more difficult interpretation: instead of the simple “he (Theseus) pushed his knees to the ribs (of Bienor)”, the result can be “he pushed himself to the ribs with his knees” (medial sense) or “he was pushed to the ribs with his knees” (the so-called absolute sense). I find these explanations untenable: the author is apparently fighting to secure his opinion on the missing nominative or accusative u-stem neuters at any cost.

³⁴ Similarly, there are two more passages in which *cornu* is indisputably nominative or accusative. For the former (Cic. *Arat.* 28, 2): *iam Tauri laevum cornu dexterque simul pes*. For the latter (Phaedr. app. 22, 1): *pastor capellae cornu baculo fregerat*.

*Nec mora, curvavit cornu³⁵ nervoque sagittam
inpulit et meritam traiecit harundine linguam.*

As Klingenschmitt has demonstrated, all of these examples are problematic, because the u-stem neuters stand before the caesura.³⁶ As we know, not only syllables at the end of a verse can be *syllaba anceps*, but also those originally short syllables which fall before a caesura. This is called prosodical lengthening,³⁷ and is quite frequent in the poetical texts. If we assume that lengthening is present in our passages, the implication must be their exclusion from the set of possibly relevant examples. With the utmost caution we must accept the testimony only of those texts in which u-stem neuters do not stand before caesura. Fortunately, there are two passages that fulfil this criterion.

The first is from Vergil (*Aen.* XI 858–860):

*Dixit, et aurata volucrem Threissa sagittam
deprompsit pharetra cornuque infensa tetendit
et duxit longe...*

The labiovelar stop in the enclitic *-que* cannot be taken as a consonant cluster and so cannot cause *syllaba positione longa*. Similarly, the lengthening cannot be interpreted as a result of caesura *semiseptenaria* – in the Latin literature there are very few examples of caesura in a syllable with elision.

Suárez Martínez chose an interpretation of *cornuque* here as well, according to which it is not accusative. He claims that the direct object is the elliptic *sagittam*, while *cornu* is a local adverbial phrase.³⁸ This argumentation is a consequence of the author's *a priori* line of thought: the text relates how the Thracian woman draws forth an arrow from her quiver, then draws her bow and holds the bowstring taut. Even if the *sagittam* added in thought could be the direct object of *tetendit*, it would not be of *duxit*, as for archery, not the arrow but the bowstring pulled.³⁹ In this manner *cornuque* has to be a direct object, and consequently accusative.

The last, Pseudo-Ovidian passage is far less problematic (*nux* 105–106):

*At mihi nec grando, duris invisa colonis,
nec ventus fraudi solve geluve fuit.*

³⁵ Cf. *met.* V 383: *curvavit flexile cornum*.

³⁶ G. KLINGENSCHMITT, „Die lateinische Nominalflexion“. In: O. PANAGL–T. KRISCH (Hrsg.), *Latein und Indogermanisch. Akten des Kolloquiums der Indogermanischen Gesellschaft, Salzburg, 23.–26. September 1986*. Innsbruck 1992. pp. 121–122. In the hexameter the following caesurae are found, including dubious passages: *semiternaria* (Verg. *Aen.* I 320), *semiquinaria* (Ov. *met.* IX 97, IX 299, XII 347), *semiseptenaria* (Cic. *Arat.* 28, 2, Ov. *fast.* III 869, *met.* IV 339, XI 324). Even in Phaedrus *cornu* stands before the caesura of the iambic line. Cf. LEUMANN (n. 2), p. 441.

³⁷ See F. CRUSIUS–H. RUBENBAUER: *Römische Metrik. Eine Einführung*. München 1955². p. 28. More accurately, it is not lengthening in the common sense, but a short pause before the caesura, which can be annexed to the short end syllable of the previous word, and thus produces an effect of long syllable.

³⁸ SUÁREZ MARTÍNEZ (n. 4), p. 94.

³⁹ Moreover, *cornu tendere* and *arcum tendere* are common technical expressions for the bending of the bow. Cf. *Aen.* IX 606: *tendere cornu*; VII 164: *tendunt arcus*; VIII 707: *arcum intendebat*; IX 665: *intendunt ... arcus*; XII 815: *contenderet arcum*.

Just as the other elements of this list – *ventus* and *sol* – are subjects, *gelu* with enclitic *-ve* must also be a subject and so nominative as well. The problem of prosodical lengthening can be totally excluded, as the line is a pentameter and the caesura stands between *fraudi* and *solve*. This and the former example seem to be ground enough to reject the theory of the irrelevance of poetic texts.

4. CONCLUSION

From the data the following inferences can be drawn:

1. Although there is dissension among Roman grammarians, the arguments for long *-u* are better founded than those to the contrary. Passages for illustration are found only in Priscian and Probus. Moreover, the *diptota* category of the grammarians arguing the shortness of *-u* is very obscure: if they use examples, all of their words are *nomina casibus defectiva*, i.e., words which have only two cases.⁴⁰ Their employment of this category can only be explained by the need to fill the gap in the terminological line between *monoptota* and *triptota*.⁴¹

2. There are at least two relevant passages in Latin poetry that show long *-u* in the nominative and accusative cases, and in no place is short *-u* ever attested.⁴²

The *argumentatio a contrario* of Suárez Martínez was forced by the expectation of Indo-European short *-u* and the supposed lack of evidence from metre. But since Klingenschmitt has verified that from Celtic parallels the presence of long *-u* in PIE is verifiable as well,⁴³ and there are evidences for long *-u*, his theory cannot be defended. Apart from the dissension of both authors and grammarians, the *-u* of the singular nominative-accusative form of Latin *u*-stem neuters was unquestionably long.

H-3530 Miskolc

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⁴⁰ E.g., *fors*, *forte* (GL II p. 188, 4) and *vicem*, *vice* (GL Suppl. p. 244, 4–5). The *u*-stem neuters are, however, used in all cases.

⁴¹ This kind of automatic procedure is attested e.g., in Donatus (GL IV p. 377, 23–25): *sunt autem formae casuales sex, ex quibus sunt nomina alia monoptota, alia diptota, alia triptota, alia tetra-ptota, alia pentaptota, alia hexaptota*.

⁴² The question of *poetica licentia* remains open. Must we assume that poets had such freedom to use regularly long vowels instead of shorts in metrically neutral positions? It is not likely. And can we accept that various authors always lengthen prosodically the *-u* before the caesura? This is an unsolved problem. I would answer no. I cannot suppose that prosodical lengthening, otherwise rare, became almost universal in the case of *u*-stem neuters.

⁴³ KLINGENSCHMITT (n. 36), pp. 122–125.

WŁODZIMIERZ OLSZANIEC

TWO LATIN TRANSLATIONS OF A PASSAGE OF PLATO'S "LETTERS"*

Summary: In his Latin translation of Plato's *Letter VII* 326b-c Leonardo Bruni used the already existing translation of the passage made by Cicero. The paper shows how the Florentine humanist treated the version of his master: he reproduced it with slight modifications caused by his desire for originality.

Key words: Plato's *Letters*, translation, Cicero, Leonardo Bruni.

In this article I confront and compare two translations of a passage of Plato's *Letter VII* (Pl. *Ep. VII*, 326B-C). The author of the first one is Cicero and his translation of the Greek text is used for considerations about the need of moderation in eating and drinking in the book V of *Tusculanae Disputationes*. The second one is a work of Leonardo Bruni and it is a part of the complete Latin translation of Plato's *Letters*, made by the humanist from Arezzo in the 1426, considered by the scholars studying the topic one of his most successful versions (besides he translated from Plato the *Phaedo*, the *Apology*, the *Crito*, the *Gorgias*, and the initial part of the *Phaedrus*).

Here is Plato's text:

ἐλθόντα δέ με ὁ ταύτη λεγόμενος αὐ βίος εὐδαίμων, Ἰταλιωτικῶν τε καὶ Συρακουσίων τραπεζῶν πλήρης, οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἥρεσεν, δῖς τε τῆς ἡμέρας ἐμπιπλάμενον ζῆν καὶ μηδέποτε κοιμώμενον μόνον νύκτωρ, καὶ ὅσα τούτῳ ἐπιτηδεύματα συνέπεται τῷ βίῳ· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων τῶν ἐθῶν οὐτ' ἂν φρόνιμος οὐδεὶς ποτε γενέσθαι τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐκ νέου ἐπιτηδεύων δύναιτο—οὐχ οὕτως θαυμαστῇ φύσει κραθήσεται—σώφρων δὲ οὐδ' ἂν μελλήσαι ποτὲ γενέσθαι [...] (Pl. *Ep. VII*, 326b-c)¹

In the above cited fragment Plato describes his first stay in Sicily. By no means he could get used to the Sicilian customs: sumptuous banquets and luxurious way of life. "For not a single man of all who live beneath the heavens" – he says – "could ever become wise if this were his practices from his youth, since none will be found

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¹ I follow the edition by J. MOORE-BLUNT, Leipzig 1985, Teubner.

to possess a nature so admirably compounded; nor would he ever be likely to become temperate”².

Cicero translates the passage as follows:

*quo cum venissem, vita illa beata, quae ferebatur, plena Italicarum Syracusiarumque mensarum, nullo modo mihi placuit, bis in die saturum fieri nec umquam pernoctare solum ceteraque, quae comitantur huic vitae, in qua sapiens nemo efficitur umquam, moderatus vero multo minus. quae enim natura tam mirabiliter temperari potest? (Cic. Tusc. V, 100, 12)*³

Now here is Bruni’s translation:

*Eo cum pervenissem, rursus beata illa que circumferebatur vita Italicarum Sicularumque mensarum plena nequaquam placuit mihi, bisque in die saturum fieri et numquam per noctem iacere solum et quaecumque hanc vitam subsecuntur. Ex huiusmodi quippe moribus nemo omnium, qui sub celo sunt, si ab adolescentia illis innutriatur, quamvis natura optima sit, tamen ad rectam mentem evadere potest; temperatus certe numquam esse curabit [...]*⁴

I pass on to the comparison of the translations:

ἐλθόντα δέ με ὁ ταύτη λεγόμενος αὖ βίος εὐδαίμων...

C.: quo cum venissem vita illa beata,	B.: eo cum pervenissem rursus beata
quae ferebatur	illa que circumferebatur vita

Already here we see “the struggle within humanist breast between the authority of the ancients and the desire for originality”⁵. Use of Cicero’s version is evident and Bruni, unwilling to simply reproduce it, introduces changes of little importance, as *eo* instead of *quo*, *pervenissem* instead of *venissem* and *circumferebatur* instead of *ferebatur*. The only modification is rendering of αὖ as *rursus*, in which Bruni, with detriment to style, follows the practice of medieval translators.

...Ἰταλιωτικῶν τε καὶ Συρακουσίων τραπεζῶν πλήρη...

C.: Plena Italicarum Syracusiarumque mensarum	B.: Italicarum Sicularumque mensarum plena
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Bruni only changes slightly the order of words. Since we do not know the Greek manuscript that he utilized, we can not be sure if *Sicularum* instead of *Συρακουσίων* is an error in Greek transmission or in the Latin copy of Antonio di Mario.

² Translation by R. G. BURY, *Plato with an English translation*, vol. VII, London 1942, Loeb.

³ I follow the edition by M. POHLENZ, Leipzig 1918, Teubner.

⁴ The text is derived from Biblioteca Laurenziana’s codex Pluteus LXXVI, 57 – a copy made directly from Bruni’s autograph by Antonio di Mario, a scribe well known in the humanistic circles of Florence.

⁵ As J. Hankins said about *Phaedrus*’ passage, in which Bruni also used Cicero’s translation, J. HANKINS, *Plato in the Italian Renaissance*, third impression, Leiden–New York–Köln 1994 (Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition 17), p. 397.

...οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἤρεσεν...

C.: *nullo modo mihi placuit*

B.: *nequaquam placuit mihi*

Bruni only replaces Cicero's *nullo modo* with equivalent *nequaquam*.

...δῖς τε τῆς ἡμέρας ἐμπιπλάμενον ζῆν...

C.: *bis in die saturum fieri*

B.: *bisque in die saturum fieri*

Here the only Leonardo's innovation consists in rendering the conjunction τε. It can be already seen that he attaches more importance to literal translation. I will touch this point more widely in the subsequent part of my article.

...καὶ μηδέποτε κοιμώμενον μόνον νύκτωρ...

C.: *nec umquam pernoctare solum*

B.: *et numquam per noctem iacere
solum*

Bruni's innovations have little importance and they are motivated by his unwillingness to repeat literally Cicero's version.

...καὶ ὅσα τούτῳ ἐπιτηδεύματα συνέπεται τῷ βίῳ...

C.: *ceteraque, quae comitantur huic
vitae*

B.: *et quaecumque hanc vitam
subsecuntur*

Quaecumque ... subsecuntur renders more precisely Greek construction ὅσα... συνέπεται; *subsecuntur* is a synonym of *comitantur*. Bruni is still close to Cicero's version.

...ἐκ γὰρ τούτων τῶν ἐθνῶν οὐτ' ἂν φρόνιμος οὐδεὶς ποτε γενέσθαι τῶν
ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐκ νέου ἐπιτηδεύων δύναίτο...

C.: *in qua [sc.: vita] sapiens nemo
efficietur umquam*

B.: *Ex huiusmodi quippe moribus nemo
omnium, qui sub celo sunt, si ab ado-
lescentia illis innutriatur ... tamen
ad rectam mentem evadere potest.*

Cicero shortens clearly the passage. He condenses the contents of the sentence, preserving its sense. The only omission to have consequences for the sense is lack of rendering ἐκ νέου ἐπιτηδεύων. Bruni, firstly, is faithful to the original (*Ex huiusmodi ... innutriatur*). Next goes the stylistically inappropriate *tamen*. φρόνιμος ... ποτε γενέσθαι ... δύναίτο is translated freely, because *rectus* ("right", "just") has another meaning than φρόνιμος ("reasonable", "wise"). *Sapiens* used by Cicero is more accurate. Besides, Bruni omits ποτε, that his predecessor rendered as *umquam*.

...οὐχ οὕτως θαυμαστῇ φύσει κραθήσεται...

C.: *quae enim natura tam mirabiliter
temperari potest?*

B.: *quamvis natura optima sit*

Bruni misunderstands this passage. Cicero renders the sense of *κραθήσεται* and shifts the fragment further, after the translation of *σώφρων δὲ οὐδ' ἂν μελλήσαι ποτὲ γενέσθαι*.

...σώφρων δὲ οὐδ' ἂν μελλήσαι ποτὲ γενέσθαι...

C.: moderatus vero multo minus

B.: temperatus certe numquam esse
curabit

Cicero shortens considerably the text, leaving only the most important information about the lack of sense of measure. Such a condensation is a practice that he often uses in his translations of Greek prose, whenever he wants to point out the most important information, needed at the moment for illustration of a precise argument; sometimes for stylistic reasons.⁶ It is worth adding that also in other Plato's passages translated by Cicero there has been noted a tendency to abandon close renderings towards the end of passages.⁷

Bruni uses consciously another equivalent of *σώφρων* than Cicero.

What conclusions can be drawn from the comparison of these versions? I think that in commenting them we should refer to the theoretical mentions on the art of translation present in the writings of both authors. The Ciceronian way of translation is illustrated by a sentence from his treatise *De optimo genere oratorum*. He speaks about his translations of Aeschines and Demosthenes (not preserved to our times):

Converti enim ex Atticis duorum eloquentissimorum nobilissimas orationes inter seque contrarias, Aeschinis et Demosthenis; nec converti ut interpretes, sed ut orator, sentiis isdem et earum formis tamquam figuris, verbis ad nostram consuetudinem aptis. In quibus non verbum pro verbo necesse habui reddere, sed genus omne verborum vimque servavi. (Opt. gen. 14)

„I haven't translated [sc.: Aeschines' and Demosthenes' speeches] as a translator, but as an orator”, he says. *Orator* – means man of letters, master of word. This means not only the choice of words-equivalents, but the mastery of the composition as a whole, of the harmonious and accurate development of the period. Translators who don't observe this rule are called *interpretes indiserti*:

Nec tamen exprimi verbum e verbo necesse erit, ut interpretes indiserti solent, cum sit verbum quod idem declaret magis usitatum; equidem soleo etiam quod uno Graeci, si aliter non possum, idem pluribus verbis exponere. (Fin. 3, 15)

These considerations are very important for us also because of the context in which they are put. Namely, Cicero refers to the translation of Greek philosophical doctrines, so his views are not limited to the translations of speeches.

Elsewhere Cicero adds that one should refer to the models of the native stylistic traditions, if one wants to render not only the contents, but also the stylistic

⁶ Cicero's adaptations are not limited to shortenings. He often omits entire sentences, sometimes unites several clauses; sometimes he adds the text in order to point out and to unify the content. Instructive examples of such practices are presented in: J. DOMAŃSKI, Some Considerations on the Theory and Practice of Translating in the Latin Linguistic Area, *Przegląd Tomistyczny*, 1 (1984), pp. 140–142.

⁷ Por. D. M. JONES, Cicero as a translator, *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, VI (1959), pp. 24–26.

values of the original, and the complete stylistic effect (Jerome will mention it in his famous letter *Ad Pammachium de optimo genere interpretandi*⁸):

Quorum [sc.: Aeschinis et Demosthenis] ego orationes si, ut spero, ita expres-sero virtutibus utens illorum omnibus, id est sentiis et earum figuris et rerum or-dine, verba persequens eatenus, ut ea non abhorreant a more nostro—quae si e Grae-cis omnia conversa non erunt, tamen ut generis eiusdem sint, elaboravimus—, erit regula, ad quam eorum dirigantur orationes qui Attice volent dicere. (Opt. gen. 23)

In our passage Cicero is generally faithful to these rules and he translates as an *orator*, for the harmonious construction of clauses and their rhythmical structure is evi-dent, especially at the end: *in qua sapiens nemo efficietur umquam, moderatus vero multo minus. quae enim natura tam mirabiliter temperari potest?* From this and from the stylistic point, Bruni's translation is inferior to that of the ancient writer. The discussed passage, though very short, is a good illustration of Cicero's method *ad sententiam*.

Then, why is his translation of the end of the passage so far removed from the original? The reason, I think, is Cicero's attitude to his own activity of translator. He has always emphasized free character of this activity and his distance to it. He also used to stress that he translated passages of Greek writers when he needed them for his works (cf. *Fin.* 1,7) and that he drew from them freely, as Ennius from Homer or Afranius from Menander. Each translation had to serve as a material for construction of Cicero's own text; this concerns of course also other quotations from Plato used by Cicero.⁹

Scholars, who analysed these quotations, have stated that they were subject of adaptation which aimed at fitting them stylistically and syntactically into the compo-sition of Cicero's text to avoid an impression that the text is derived from another author.¹⁰ Cicero does not try to imitate peculiarities of Plato's syntax, he only renders the sense, fulfilling his own postulate exposed in *De optimo genere oratorum*.

This is the way in which, in my opinion, Cicero's distance from original can be explained. In the already mentioned letter Jerome quotes Cicero's translations from Greek as examples of free translations, with many omissions, addings and changes, caused by the translator's desire of adapting these versions to the peculiarities of Latin. (*Quanta in illis praetermiserit, quanta addiderit, quanta mutaverit, ut proprietates alterius linguae suis proprietatibus explicaret, non est huius temporis dicere.*)

The first humanists adopted Cicero's lessons on translating *ad sententiam*. One of them was Manuel Chrysoloras, Bruni's master, who was of opinion that a transla-tor using the rule *ad verbum* was only seemingly faithful, because the meaning is not

⁸ *Ep.* 57, 5.

⁹ Here is a representative: 1. *Tusc.* 1, 97–99 = *Ap.* 40c–42a 2. *Tusc.* 5, 34–35 = *Grg.* 470d 3. *Tusc.* 5, 36 = *Mx.* 247e–248a 4. *Cato* 6–9 = *R.* 328e–330a 5. *Off.* 3, 38 = *R.* 359d–360b 6. *Rep.* 1, 66–67 = *R.* 562c 7. *Div.* 1, 60–61 = *R.* 571c–572b 8. *Tusc.* 1, 53–54 = *Phdr.* 245c–246a 9. *Orat.* 41 = *Phdr.* 279 10. *Leg.* 2, 45 = *Lg.* 955e–956b 11. *Leg.* 2, 67–68 = *Lg.* 958d–e 12. *Tusc.* 5, 100 = *Ep.* 326b–c (= the passage analysed here).

¹⁰ For example J. DOMAŃSKI, op. cit., pp. 140–142. The most important studies of Cicero's trans-lations from Plato are: R. PONCELET, *Cicéron, traducteur de Platon*, Paris 1957 and A. TRAGLIA, *Cicero-ne traduttore di Platone e di Epicuro, Studi in onore di V. De Falco*, Napoli 1971.

contained in words, but in larger units – in clauses. Under the influence of these lessons Leonardo Bruni has developed his own method of translating *ad sententiam*, whose aim was to preserve the meaning of the original without losing any of its literary values. Therefore, the translator, apart from linguistic proficiency, had to possess the knowledge of the rhetorical technique and of the history and culture of the period in which the translated author lived; he had to possess also a sophisticated literary taste permitting him to catch and reproduce in his own language peculiarities of the individual style of every author. Such point of view is presented in Bruni's treatise *De interpretatione recta*, entirely dedicated to the problems of the theory of translation:

Ut enim ii, qui ad exemplum picture picturam aliam pingunt, figuram et statum et ingressum et totius corporis formam inde assumunt nec, quid ipsi facerent, sed, quid alter ille fecerit, meditantur: sic in traductionibus interpretes quidem optimus sese in primum scribendi auctorem tota mente et animo et voluntate convertet et quodammodo transformabit eiusque orationis figuram, statum, ingressum coloremque et liniamenta cuncta exprimere meditabitur. Ex quo mirabilis quidam resultat effectus.

*Nam cum singulis fere scriptoribus sua quedam ac propria sit dicendi figura, ut Ciceroni amplitudo et copia, Sallustio exilitas et brevitatis, Livio granditas quedam subaspera: bonus quidem interpres in singulis traducendis ita se conformabit, ut singulorum figuram assequatur.*¹¹

The passage that I am analysing in this paper, though very short, permits making some considerations. First of all, the attempt to reconcile faithfulness to the original with preservation of clarity of the Latin version is manifest. Bruni, therefore, translates some elements omitted by Cicero, though literal or wrong rendering of some Greek particles obscures the translation. In one case (*ad rectam mentem evadere...*) the abandonment of literal rendering, perhaps for stylistic reasons, changes the sense.

Now we can answer the question asked at the beginning of this paper. Leonardo Bruni has obviously used Cicero's translation. Wherever it was faithful, he reproduced it with slight modifications caused by the natural desire for originality, motivated by his aim of adopting the whole of Plato's *Letters* to Latin. Cicero's goal was different; the quotation derived from Plato had firstly to serve as a material for construction of his own text; it had to illustrate the argument presented by Cicero, so that it was treated freely and underwent quite considerable modifications at the end. Since Bruni was not going to incorporate fragments of translation into his own writings, he could not afford such a free approach; therefore, in the final part of the passage the two translators went their own ways.

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¹¹ *Opere letterarie e politiche di Leonardo Bruni*, a cura di Paolo VITI, Torino 1996, UTET, p. 160.

ZOLTÁN GLOVICZKI

ICARUS

Summary: Daedalus in the *Metamorphoses* may be interpreted as one of Ovid's typical artist figures, like Pygmalion or Arachne. A detailed comparative analysis of Ovid's two Daedalus-Icarus episodes, and similarly the structure of *Met.* VIII 183–259 go to show that here is *Icarus* in the limelight as an artist-allegory, serving to express the poet's view on poetry and his own role in it. His winged artist refuses the Horatian middle course and approaches to the winged soul of Plato's Phaedrus, representing at the same time the tragical impossibility of its attempt.

Key words: Ovid, Icarus, artist-allegory, Plato, Phaedrus.

Die Ovid-Literatur beschäftigen seit langem die paradigmatischen Episoden in den Metamorphosen, die von ästhetischer, poetischer Bedeutung sind oder die dichterische Existenz interpretieren. Die Geschichten von Arachne oder Pygmalion werden heute eindeutig für solche gehalten. Selbstverständlich gehört in diese Reihe auch die Gestalt eines Archetypus des *Künstlers*, des Daedalus. Die früheren Interpretationen und – größtenteils wegen des von der Gattung definierten Rahmens – Kommentatoren des Buches VIII der Metamorphosen haben sich jedoch statt der Textinterpretation mit einer gruppenweisen Darstellung der eventuellen Quellen und Parallelen des Mythologems begnügt.¹ Bezweckt ist traditionell nur der Beleg, daß sämtliche Elemente der Ovidschen Mythosvariante auch früher bekannt waren, ja daß sich auch dichterische Vorgänger finden lassen. Es scheint ein dankbares Thema zu sein, denn die Flucht des Daedalus und Icarus ist eine auch selbständig in zahllosen Formen bearbeitete Heroengeschichte. Das Thema scheint ungeachtet dessen dankbar zu sein, daß sich diese Darstellung üblicherweise auf die schriftlichen Quellen beschränkt, deren das Quellgebiet Ovids kartierende Systematisierung allerdings mit Knaaks Studie von 1902² – gemessen an den Möglichkeiten – abgeschlossen wurde. Wohl hat er mit der Eingrenzung der zwei wichtigsten möglichen dichterischen

¹ So am anspruchsvollsten Bömer (P. Ovidius Naso: *Metamorphosen*. Buch VIII–IX. Heidelberg 1977); die wichtigsten angelsächsischen Kommentatoren legen dem Detail auffällig wenig Bedeutung bei (Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. Books 6–10. Ed. with comm. W. S. ANDERSON. Oklahoma 1972; Ovid *Metamorphoses* book VIII. Ed. A. S. HOLLIS. Oxford 1970).

² Zur Sage von Daidalos und Ikaros. *Hermes* 37 (1902) 589–607.

schen Vorbilder (Aitia von Kallimachos und Kretes von Euripides, wobei die Kenntnis deren diesbezüglicher Teile kaum bruchstückhaft genannt werden kann³) vor allem darauf aufmerksam gemacht, daß der Einfluß dieser Werke selbst noch bei stabiler Hypothese vom griechischen dichterischen Vorgänger zumindest bestreitbar ist, doch kann dies – wenn man so will – auch die weitere Offenheit der Frage bedeuten. Andererseits: Wir kommen auch dann nicht weiter, wenn wir nur nach den Parallelen der Handlung suchen. Nach Ausschluß der die Fluchtgeschichte nicht kennenden, ohne die Gestalt des Icarus auskommenden und statt des Fluges von einer Meerfahrt sprechenden häufigeren Varianten bleiben auf der Suche nach Variationen mit fast sämtlichen wichtigeren Elementen des Ovidschen Sujets von den vielfach analysierten Bearbeitungen nur zwei übrig: die der Fabulae des Hyginus und der Epitome der sogenannte Apollodorische Bibliothek. Beide Texte sind nach den Metamorphosen entstanden. In Kenntnis all dessen bleibt die Erforschung der Quellen der Ovidschen Geschichte von Daedalus und Icarus und ihre Darstellung in zwei Fällen begründet: wenn es gelingt, den Text mit einer neueren Quellengruppe zu vergleichen, oder wenn wir die vorhandenen Quellen aufgrund eines wesentlich neuen Gesichtspunktes bewerten können.

Für die vor allem die *griechischen literarischen* Vorgänger voraussetzende Fachliteratur blieb die *bildkünstlerische* Erscheinung des Mythologems und seine Kenntnis im *römischen Goldenen Zeitalter* in der Mehrheit der Fälle uninteressant. Erstere kann auch dann aussagekräftig für uns sein, wenn bei der visuellen Darstellung der Geschichte und der ikonographischen Identifizierung der Darstellung offensichtlich die Herstellung und Verwendung der Flügel eine Rolle spielt.⁴ Denn es ist eine Tatsache, daß die Gestalt des fliegenden Daedalus schon auf mehreren etruskischen Darstellungen aus dem 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr. vorkommt und das selbständige Bild des geflügelten Icarus in der griechischen Welt mehrfach seit dem 6. Jahrhundert erscheint – und ein Exemplar der lange beliebten römischen Bronzestatuen sogar bis nach Aquincum gelangte.⁵ Der die Flügel herstellende Daedalus und Icarus sind auf einem Vasenbild erstmals im 5. Jahrhundert aus Süditalien bekannt, auf italisch-römischen Gemmen seit dem 2.–1. Jahrhundert, die beiden fliegenden Gestalten auf einem Vasenbild erscheinen bei den italischen Griechen des 6. Jahrhunderts, kommen aber im 5. Jahrhundert auch bereits auf einer etruskischen Goldbulle vor. Es lassen sich selbst bildkünstlerische Parallelen für so charakteristisch ovidisch gehaltene Elemente nachweisen wie die als eine Art Kontrast des Fliegens fungierende fischfangende Figur oder das Auftreten des Perdix in der Geschichte.⁶ Die auch bei Ovid bestimmenden Elemente der Geschichte verbreiten sich dann ganz bis zu den Reliefs

³ Ersterer beschäftigte sich außer in einer bedeutungslosen Parallele, dem Fragment 23, mit der Geschichte aufgrund des Hinweises eines Homer-Scholions (zit.: *Callimachea*. Ed. O. SCHNEIDER. Leipzig 1873, 119), auf letzteren verweist ebenfalls eine einzige – diesmal an Aristophanes geschriebene – Scholion-Stelle mit einigen Worten hin (zit.: NAUCK. *TGF* 401).

⁴ Über die Ikonographie vgl. J. D. BEAZLEY: Icarus. *JHS* 47 (1927) 222–233 bzw. J. E. NYENHUIS mit seinem *LIMC* Artikel.

⁵ Über die letzteren ausführlicher: N. KOKOLAKIS: The iconography of Icarus. In: P. OLIVA–A. FROLIKOVA eds.: *Consilium Eirene* 16. II. Prague 1982, 25–30.

⁶ H. J. ROSE: Ikaros and Perdix on a fifth-century vase? *JHS* 48 (1928) 9–10 – die ikonographische Beziehung ist bestreitbar.

und Wandgemälden der römischen Kaiserzeit, höchstwahrscheinlich auf Wirkung unseres Dichters, die genauer zu bestimmen allerdings wieder ein zweifelhaftes Unterfangen wäre. Selbst noch im Falle der Wandgemälde – deren Thema in überraschend vielen Fällen, gemessen an der Menge erhaltener Denkmäler, der Flug von Daedalus und Icarus und der Sturz des Icarus ist – müssen wir die Parallelen mit Vorsicht behandeln. Während im Einklang mit früheren Forschern aufgrund der ikonographischen Beziehung die erhaltenen Darstellungen eindeutig mit Ovid in Beziehung zu bringen sind, hat die spätere differenziertere Analyse⁷ darauf hingewiesen, daß die thematischen und formalen Charakteristiken des gesamten pompejanischen Fundmaterials, vor allem seine Kompositionstechnik, eindeutig dem augustinischen und Horazischen Klassizismus näher stehen. Andererseits entstand jede der zehn heute bekannten Darstellungen zumindest Jahre nach den Metamorphosen, und auch wenn wir diesmal tatsächlich rechtens mit deren verlorengegangenen römischen oder hellenistischen Vorbildern rechnen können, läßt sich konkret höchstens die umgekehrte Wirkung untersuchen. Dies wiederum weist der gründlichste Interpret der Bilder, Ph. von Blanckenhagen, selbst in solchen Fällen wie der schon erwähnten – aus Ovid bekannten – Fischerfigur nachdrücklich zurück.⁸ Wir haben hier aber nicht die Absicht, mit der obigen Aufzählung die Bildquellen Ovids suchen zu wollen. Dagegen scheint es Tatsache zu sein, daß die von ihm bearbeitete Variante der Daedalus- und Icarus-Geschichte im ganzen Mediterraneum verbreitet und im frühkaiserzeitlichen Rom eine typischerweise in dieser Form bekannte Geschichte war. Auch wenn die *Fabulae* des Hyginus von daher uninteressant ist, gewinnt hier die Parallele der Bibliothek des Apollodoros sowie auch das Daedalus-Bild anderer Dichter des Goldenen Zeitalters Bedeutung. Horaz beruft sich gerade in seiner Ode an Vergil auf den gewagt fliegenden Daedalus (I.3.34), aber das Anfangsbild der Ode IV.2 und besonders auch die gesamte Ode II.20 belegen unsere Feststellung an sich schon. Der in Hesperia eintreffende Hauptheld in Vergils *Aeneis* (VI.14 ff.) erblickt als erstes die den Phoebeus-Tempel zierenden Reliefs des gleichfalls hierhin geflüchteten Daedalus, und dabei fehlt auch nicht die Erinnerung an die Tragödie des Icarus. Als also Ovid in der *Ars Amatoria* erstmals zu diesem Mythologem greift, liefert er außer den technischen Charakteristiken der Bearbeitung und der Einbettung der Geschichte in das gesamte Werk fast keine bemerkbare Neuheit, und damit ist auch die Art seiner konkreten Quelle uninteressant. Und wenn die Variante in den Metamorphosen gegenüber der früheren irgendeinen schwererwiegenden Unterschied aufweist, dann können wir diesen in Kenntnis der bisherigen Ausführungen kaum dem Einfluß irgendeiner „äußeren Quelle“ zuschreiben. Die einzige adäquate Parallele der Analyse der Beschreibung im Buch VIII ist also die Daedalus-Geschichte der *Ars*.

Ein Analyseversuch beruht selbstverständlich von vornherein auf der Hypothese einer – über die Quellenfrage hinausgehenden – selbständigen, eventuell literarischen Bedeutung des Textes. Einige diesbezügliche Studien und Hinweise aus den

⁷ K. SCHEFOLD: *La peinture Pompeienne* (Collection Latomus 108) Bruxelles 1972, vor allem 132 und 135 ff.; Ph. von BLANCKENHAGEN: Daedalus and Icarus on Pompeian Walls. *Mitteilungen des Deutschen Arch. Inst. Römische Abteilung* Bd. 75 (1968) 106–143 passim.

⁸ A. a. O. 134.

letzten Jahren – wenige Annäherungen aus spezieller Sicht ausgenommen⁹ – suchten diese Bedeutung in erster Linie in der Frage der Daedalischen Hybris und der Funktion der ganzen Geschichte als „Metamorphose“.¹⁰ Wessen „Metamorphose“ von welcher Art in der Geschichte wirklich dominiert, ist tatsächlich eine Streit- und zugleich unbeantwortbare Frage. Das gegenüber den aus dieser Sicht offensichtlicheren Geschichten vermutete Besondere, das wir eventuell mit seinem zentralen Platz im Werkganzen verknüpfen können, wird von der überzeugend gründlichen Analyse G. Tronchets¹¹ sowohl aus strukturellen wie inhaltlichen Gründen verworfen. Die Hybris des Daedalus, eventuell die von den Göttern zugewiesene *menschliche* Schuld und Sühne, ist ein ähnlich auf der Hand liegender Analysegesichtspunkt – besonders, wenn wir berücksichtigen, daß die augenfälligste Neuheit der Metamorphosen-Variante das Auftreten des Perdix ist, den Daedalus vorher aus Eifersucht – zudem „*ex sacra aece Minervae*“ – in den Tod stößt, wobei die Rettung des unglücklichen Jünglings auch ausgesprochenermaßen die Wut der auch in der Welt des Daedalus eine Hauptrolle spielenden Minerva spiegelt. Dazu kommt noch die Eroberung der Götterwelt durch das Fliegen, die schon im Falle Phaetons schlimme Konsequenzen hatte und deren Bedeutung die drei irdischen Beobachter unterstützen können, die zweifelsohne das „*esse deos*“ vom Vater und dem Sohn glauben. Die Betonung des Hybris-Motivs hinterläßt allerdings mehrere störende Fragen. Wenn die Tatsache des Fliegens als Hybris gilt, warum sprechen sie dann nicht vorrangig von der des Icarus? Wenn die Hybris in der Herstellung der Flügel besteht und diese tatsächlich das Zentralmotiv der Geschichte wäre, was begründet dann die ebenso zentrale Rolle der Gestalt und Tragödie des Icarus – wenn diese für den Vater auch noch so tragisch ist? Wenn der Fall des Perdix den Leitfaden darstellt, bleibt wieder nur die Frage, warum des Icarus Sühne die göttliche Rache ist. Für das In-den-Tod-Stoßen des als Kind erzogenen Schülers mit dem Tod des Sohnes zu büßen und dann allein lebend ans Ziel zu kommen – ist das wohl eine genügend überzeugende und künstlerische Komposition? Und schließlich: Wenn zwischen dem Schicksal des Perdix und Icarus' Tod ein Zusammenhang von Grund und Folge zu suchen ist, warum stehen dann beide Geschichten in umgekehrter Reihenfolge?

Auf einen Teil dieser Fragen hat Zsigmond Ritoóks – teils von der Theorie Frontisi-Ducroux' ausgehende – Analyse eine überzeugende Antwort gegeben.¹² Ritoók sieht in Daedalus, Icarus und Perdix drei Figuren von sorgsam genau austarierter

⁹ M. H. T. DAVISSON: The observers of Daedalus and Icarus in Ovid. *CW* 90 (1997) 263–278; R. FABER: Daedalus, Icarus and the fall of Perdix. Continuity and allusion in the Metamorphoses 8. 183–259. *Hermes* 126 (1998) 80–89.

¹⁰ So zuletzt, auch die bisherigen Gesichtspunkte zusammenfassend, M. HOFFMANS: Mith into Reality: The metamorphosis of Daedalus and Icarus (Ovid. Met. VIII. 183–235) *AC* 63 (1994) 137–160 und L. SPAHLINGER: *Ars latet arte sua. Die Poetologie der Metamorphosen Ovids*. Stuttgart und Leipzig 1996, 156–160.

¹¹ *La Métamorphose à l'Oeuvre. Recherche sur la poétique d'Ovide dans la Metamorphoses*. Louvain–Paris 1998 passim.

¹² Ritoóks Analyse: Amphion und Icarus. *AAH* 36 (1995) 87–99. Vgl. F. FRONTISI-DUCROUX: *Dedale. Mythologie de l'artisan en Grèce ancienne*. Paris 1975, 159 ff.

Wichtigkeit.¹³ Sie sind die drei Wege der künstlerischen Existenz und Berufung, von denen ausgesprochen und allegorisch der des Daedalus *in der Mitte* steht. Die Studie geht nicht nur mit der Bestimmung dieser sehr bedeutungsvollen Allegorie über die früheren Annäherungen hinaus, sondern auch damit, daß sie auf das poetische Dilemma von *prodesse–delactare/delectari* aufmerksam macht, das sich im Gegenüber Daedalus–Icarus verbirgt – eventuell konkret auf die Vergegenwärtigung der dichterischen Absicht von Horaz und Ovid.¹⁴ Auch weiter bleibt die Frage, ob in dieser Komposition auf drei Ebenen der Gegensatz Daedalus–Icarus/*prodesse–delectare* nicht von der Gestalt des Perdix gestört wird, der extrem auf der einen Seite steht. Ebenso muß hier schließlich auch noch das Problem aufgeworfen werden, ob es auf irgendeinen lesesozilogischen, kulturgeschichtlichen Umstand oder auf die Wirkung Ovids zurückzuführen ist, daß für die Leser späterer Zeiten, die die Episode fast ausschließlich durch Ovid kennenlernten, die Hauptperson der Geschichte über jeden Zweifel hinaus der ins eigene Verderben rennende *Icarus* wurde? Denn während in den antiken Bearbeitungen, so bei Vergil, Horaz und auch in der *Ars Amatoria*, der Flug des *Daedalus* der Hauptfaden der Handlung ist, schrumpft Daedalus für die Nachwelt bald zum Begleiter und Räsonneur des *Icarus* zusammen,¹⁵ und ihn in seiner ursprünglichen Bedeutung und Erscheinung fungieren zu lassen, wird bis zum 20. Jahrhundert zum hyperintellektuellen Hinweis.¹⁶ Eine nicht geringe Rolle können dabei in dieser auch als schulischer Lesestoff klassisch gewordenen Geschichte ihre bis ins Unendliche zu vereinfachenden und sich in *Icarus* verkörpernden moralischen Lehren oder andere literargeschichtliche Gesichtspunkte spielen. Aber um bei Ovid zu bleiben, verdient auch die Kleinigkeit Aufmerksamkeit, daß sich das im Lebenswerk unseres Dichters mehrfach genannte Mythologem in seinen frühen Dichtungen (Her. XVIII.49, *Ars* II) ebenfalls mit dem Namen des Daedalus verknüpft, wogegen sich in seinen späteren Werken mehrfach ein Hinweis auf die Tragödie des *Icarus* an sich findet (*Fasti* IV.283–284, *Tristia* III.4.22, I.1.90). Die Bedeutung dieser winzigen Veränderung zusammen mit den früher genannten Problemen kann durch eine detailliertere Analyse der Metamorphosen beleuchtet werden, der – entsprechend des einleitend Gesagten – der Vergleich mit der *Ars*-Variante zugrunde liegen kann.

In der Einleitung zum Buch II der *Ars* fungiert Daedalus als Parallele des unerreichbar fliegenden Amor, als eines der im Werk mehrfach erscheinenden mythologischen *exempla*. Die Metamorphosen-Variante hat natürlich keine ähnliche – aus dem Werkganzen hervorzuhebende – Funktion. Beim ersten Lesen stimmen beide Erzählungen in Thema wie Umfang fast überein. Ein großer Teil von den 77 Zeilen der

¹³ Der gleicherweise günstigen Beurteilung der drei Figuren, besonders der des Daedalus, würde die Nachstellung der Perdix-Geschichte dienen bzw. die Gruppierung oder Verschweigung sonstiger Informationen über Daedalus.

¹⁴ Außer der offensichtlichen Generationenähnlichkeit aufgrund des Spürbarmachens der „aurea mediocritas“ des Daedalus und des allein von Ovid betonten Spielerischen bei *Icarus*, der Wonne des Fliegens.

¹⁵ Wichtigere Zusammenfassungen des Nachlebens der Geschichte: N. RUDD: *Daedalus and Icarus*. In: *Ovid renewed*. Ed. by Ch. MARTINDALE. Cambridge 1988, 21–53.

¹⁶ So z. B. die Gestalt des Stephen Daedalus im *Ulysses* von J. Joyce.

ersten Variante besteht aus der Einführung des Daedalus, die die Vorgeschichte erzählt; in den Metamorphosen kommt diese selbständig vor, fehlt demgemäß dort. Den letzteren 52zeiligen Text ergänzt aber die Geschichte des Perdix, die sich nicht nur thematisch, sondern auch von der Komposition her organisch anschließt: Nach dem 20zeiligen Daedalus-Prolog der Ars folgen die 28 Zeilen der Vorbereitung des Fluges und dann statt dem 26zeiligen Flug hier nach fünf einführenden Zeilen in regelrechter Ordnung die Vorbereitung, der Flug und die Perdixgeschichte mit je 24 Zeilen. Auf die Beschreibung der Vorgeschichte – die ständig die Tragödie vorausprojiziert (Z. 196, 204–205, 210–212, 215) – „antwortet“ Perdix, der ausgehend von der Beobachtung der Folgen des Fluges dessen *frühere Vorgeschichte* schildert.

Die inneren Differenzen im Aufbau beider Texte spiegeln selbstverständlich auch die Gattungsunterschiede wider.¹⁷ Die folgend genannten weisen aber weit über diese hinaus: Icarus' Auftreten in Met. 195–200, das auch schon in Ritoóks Studie als grundlegendes Charakterisierungselement des spielerischen Icarus erscheint, der Vogelvergleich Z. 211–215, der – ähnlich dem vorigen – einen halbzeiligen Ars-Hinweis entfaltet, das Auftreten der drei Beobachter in Z. 217–220, die das Angeln der Ars ablösen, und schließlich die Struktur der Beschreibung des Fliegens: Statt der streng geschlossenen Beschreibung in Met. 233–235 unterbrechen in der Ars noch die zwei verschiedenen Exkurse von Z. 77–82 die Szene. Außer dem epischen Charakter und eventuell der anspruchsvolleren Gestaltung der Metamorphosen-Variante ergeben sich letztere Abweichungen aus dem in gewissem Maße *thematischen Unterschied* beider Texte.

Der Daedalus der Ars ist aufgrund seiner Vergleichsfunktion ein *erfolgreicher Erfinder*. Ovid erzählt die in jener Zeit – wie gesehen – sich unverzichtbar mit ihm verbindende Icarus-Tragödie, nimmt ihr aber auf fast groteske Weise jede Bedeutung in dem scharfen Kontrast der Z. 96–97: ... *ossa tegit tellus, aequora nomen habent. / non potuit Minos hominis conspescere pinnae* ... In den Metamorphosen ist Daedalus einerseits offensichtlich nicht erfolgreich – und so ändert sich der ganze Grundton der Geschichte –, andererseits beherrscht er auch als „Hauptdarsteller“ nicht eindeutig die Geschichte. Während nämlich die Interpreten den „Daedalus und Icarus“-Flug als unlöslichen Teil des Daedalus-Sagenkreises behandeln, darf man nicht vergessen, daß eines der grundlegenden Kompositionsmittel der Metamorphosen die in der Rahmenkonstruktion (also innerhalb der Geschichte irgendeines Akteurs) auf Assoziationsbasis auftauchende Erzählung eines neuen Akteurs – und der Metamorphose – ist. Wie den Fall des Minotaurus oder auch des Perdix die meisten Texttherausgeber und Übersetzungen als gesonderte Einheit behandeln, so wählen wir jetzt auch die Gestalt des *Icarus* gesondert aus. Denn der allbekannte Text der Metamorphosen erzählt, anders als die Ars, seine *Geschichte*, noch dazu seine *Tragödie*.

Die Ars charakterisiert nur zwei Pole: das Feuer des Jünglings und seine erschrockene, aber schon zu späte Reue. Wie dies im Buch II der Ars geschieht, ist es eine alltägliche Tragödie. Wie besonders der Fall des Daedalus und Icarus auch ist,

¹⁷ Über diese zusammenfassend: M. von ALBRECHT: „Epische“ und „elegische“ Erzählung. Ovids zwei Daedalusfassungen. In: ders.: *Römische Poesie. Texte und Interpretationen*. Heidelberg 1977, 63–79.

schon der sich in Z. 38–40 entschuldigende Artifex und die Erfindung (*labor* 48) lassen sich nicht an den Ausdrücken der Metamorphosen, dem *mirabile opus*, und deren Schöpfer messen. Und der Sturz des Icarus in der *Ars* reißt selbst diese nicht mit sich ins Verderben. Ganz zu schweigen davon, daß er auch selbst keinerlei erschütternden menschlichen Werte vertritt: *puer incautis nimium temerarius annis* (83), der von seiner Vernichtung entsetzt auf das Meer starrt, dessen Angst seinen Blick verdunkelt und der zum ersten und letzten Mal in der Geschichte mit seinen eigenen Worten spricht: *o pater o pater auferor* (91) und schließlich *clausurunt virides ora loquentis aquae* (92). Daedalus wiederum erreicht sein Ziel ...

Die Metamorphosen-Geschichte organisiert sich demgegenüber in allen ihren Elementen um die Tragödie des Icarus, der, sich im Raum und auch im geistigen Raum spektakulär erhebend, aufgrund eines gebührend tragischen Vergehens, aber dementsprechend als *tragischer Held* stürzt. Beginnend mit dem Plural *ibimus* in Z. 186 ist auch Icarus Akteur der Geschichte. Abgesehen von den räumlichen Schranken des sprachlichen Ausdrucks sehen wir „gleichzeitig“ den in der Werkstatt arbeitenden Daedalus und den *spielenden* Icarus (189–200) vor uns, als Daedalus bereits *libraviv* (201), da *instruit et natum*, danach stehen sie einander gegenüber, gemeinsam machen sie sich auf den Weg, auch als „Vögel“ kommen beide im Vergleich vor, und wir könnten sie sogar noch gemeinsam für Götter halten – bis sich dann jedoch Icarus höher erhebt und allein bleibt. Auch die weiter oben erwähnten textlichen Abweichungen verknüpfen sich mit dieser Variante. Von den vorbereitenden Elementen war schon die Rede (die Spannung wird auch durch die Entfaltung des Vogel-Vergleichs erhöht). Das „großartige Werk“ läßt immer aufs neue auch die eigene Schrecklichkeit aufleuchten. Der Vorgang des Fliegens verläuft ungeachtet dessen von der Flügelherstellung über die Probe bis zum Erheben über die Menschen und dann über die Landschaft – im Gegensatz zur *Ars* – bruchlos. Und Icarus erhebt sich von diesem Bogen aus weiter, statt *fortius* (*Ars* II.76) *altius*. Er kommt in die Nähe der Sonne, und von dort blickt er nicht mehr herab, er erschrickt nicht, wie schon bisher nicht, das Meer, der *aequor*, interessiert ihn nicht mehr, und auch sein Aufschrei schließt mit einem einzigen Nomen (*ora ... clamantia ... excipiuntur aqua* 229–230). Nur in den Metamorphosen werden wir dann Zeugen des Schicksals des gestürzten Icarus und der Tiefe des Sturzes (*sepulcro, sepulti, miseri nati tumulo ponentem ...*), der in der heutigen Formulierung auch den Wertverlust der *artes* mit sich bringt: Daedalus *devovit suas artes* (234), ebenso deren wirklichen Erfolg eliminierend (vgl. *Met.* VIII.260 ff.) wie früher durch die Betonung des letzteren die Tragik der Geschehnisse ...¹⁸

Wir könnten allerdings nicht von der *Großartigkeit* der Tat des Jünglings sprechen, wenn die Formulierungen der beiden Motivationen nicht grundsätzlich unterschiedlich wären. Denn der Icarus der Metamorphosen steigt nicht in der Weise eines *incautis annis temerarius*, sondern *caeli cupidine tractus* (224) in die Höhe. Diese *caeli cupido* erhebt ihn über seinen Vater – und in schöner Ausführlichkeit *über alles und jeden anderen*. Den Unterschied zwischen beiden läßt Ovid auch *innerhalb der*

¹⁸ Vom tragischen Heldentum des Icarus in bezug auf den in gleichem Maße banalen Perdix: R. FABER, a. a. O., 83 ff.

Metamorphosen spüren: mit der Buch II eröffnenden Phaeton-Geschichte, die man früher höchstens hinweisartig und trivial zum Zwecke identischer moralischer Lehre neben die von Icarus stellte.¹⁹ Beide Erzählungen stehen tatsächlich unverkennbar parallel zueinander, zugleich aber auch miteinander im Gegensatz: der Flug in der Welt der Götter und Halbgötter gegen den der Menschen. Statt der Gelegenheitswerkstatt des ins Labyrinth eingeschlossenen und aus Zwang schöpferischen Vaters Daedalus lernen wir in Z. II.1–30 den Palast des Phoebus kennen. Auch wenn Phoebus in der vorliegenden Geschichte weder mit dem von Augustus geschätzten Apollo noch mit dem nach Meinung vieler Augustus verkörpernden Iuppiter identisch ist, kann die Beschreibung des Gebäudes und des Innenraumes mit Recht an die öffentlichen Bauten des Princeps und auch deren Geschmackswelt erinnern. Vielleicht ist auch das nicht uninteressant: Es ist von der Sonne die Rede, die nicht nur anders ist als Daedalus und sein Kind, sondern, wie wir wohl wissen, auch die Hauptgefahr für sie bedeutet ... Jedenfalls befinden wir uns auf dem Gipfel der Macht und der Pracht, wo der eintreffende Phaeton vom ersten Dialog an in beschämender Banalität vor uns steht. Auch hier werden wir Zeugen des entscheidenden Beschlusses, der Angst des Vaters, seiner besorgten und den Weg zwischen den Sternbildern beschreibenden Ratschläge, des anfänglichen Aufstieges des Sohnes, des Verlustes seiner Herrschaft über den Flug und zuletzt seines Verderbens. Der Sohn wird ins Grab gelegt, der Vater trauert. Gegenüber der dünnen und manchmal andeutungsweisen Formulierung der Icarus-Geschichte genießen wir hier einen in barocker Pracht schwelgenden Text, der mit den Göttern würdigem mythologischem Apparat ausgestattet ist: Hier geht es um die *Macht* und das Spielen mit ihr, um echte Hybris, die – und daran läßt Ovid keinen Moment lang auch nur einen Zweifel – *hier* wirklich ein von Sich-Hinaussehen und jugendlicher Unüberlegtheit getriebener Jüngling beging (*nescius adfectas* 58, *magnanimus* 111, bzw. Phaetons Vorstellung in den letzten Zeilen von Buch I ...). Mit Recht können wir in ihm den neben dem erfolgreichen Daedalus törichteren Icarus der Ars erkennen, der untätig seinem eigenen Verderben zusieht. Ars II.87–88: *territus a summo despexit in aequora caelo / nox oculis pavido venit oborta metu*. Met. II.178, 181: *ut vero summo despexit ab aethere terras (...) suntque oculis tenebrae per tantum lumen obortae* ... Phaeton verursacht mit seiner Beschrenktheit eine weltweite Katastrophe (seine Beschrenktheit damit weiter vertiefend), die nur Ovids Ironie mit dem Trauervers auf den Sohn *magnis ausis tamen excidit* ... (332) und seiner Schlußbemerkung über den praktischen Nutzen der Helligkeit der Feuersbrunst steigern kann.

Dem Icarus der *Metamorphosen* liegt, wie wir sahen, dies alles fern. Seine Gestalt und Rolle ist eine andere. Er sehnt sich nicht nach der Nähe der Macht, sondern nach der Nähe des *Lichtes*. Wie erwähnt, haben Ritoók und auch Frontisi-Ducroux zur Erwägung gestellt, daß zusammen mit Daedalus und Perdix die drei möglichen Formen der Gestalt des Künstlers – eher des *artifex* – gezeigt werden: der „prodesse“ nüchterne Meister, der „delectare“ spielende (*lusor*) Dichter und der geschickte, aber

¹⁹ So zuletzt M. HOEFMANS: a. a. O., 145; speziell Daedalus und Phaeton vergleicht V. M. WISE: Flight myths in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. *Ramus* 6 (1977) 45–59; Aufzählung der textlichen Ähnlichkeiten: BÖMER a. a. O., zu Z. 204.

banale Handwerker des Alltags. Ovid aber stellt nicht nur dar, sondern bewertet auch. Vor allem: Der Wert ist die *Kunst*. Alle drei Gestalten läßt er, auch die möglichen Unwürdigkeiten geschickt gruppierend, positiv, zumindest aber *mitteleidenswert* werden. Denn das Künstlerbild ist ähnlich dem Falle der Arachne zugleich grundlegend *pessimistisch*. Drei verschiedene Begabungen: drei verschiedene Tragödien.

Für den Künstler ist allerdings die Möglichkeit des Ausdruckes und des Gehörtwerdens – Ovid-Kenner wissen das – nicht von seinem individuellen Schicksal abhängig. Daedalus schafft ein großes Werk, verflucht es aber. Perdix entkommt dem Tode, kann aber als banaler Vogel seine einst erfolgreiche Meisterschaft nicht ausüben. Icarus aber sehnt sich nach der Höhe und erreicht sie. Dessen Gewißheit ist der Tod. Er muß sterben, aber die Erreichung seines Ziels und der Tod sind *eins*. Auf ihre Weise fliegen alle drei Künstler. Darin sind sie mehr als die einfachen Menschen. Welche wertmessende Funktion bei diesem Unterschied der Höhe zukommt, das lassen die den Flug von Vater und Sohn bestaunenden Figuren sehr gut spürbar werden, für die die am Himmel fliegenden menschlichen Wesen *Götter* sind. Die Beobachter repräsentieren statt des zufälligen *piscator* der Ars das gesamte in der betreffenden Gegend existierende Alltagsleben (*piscator – arator – pastor*): die Sterblichen, zu deren Arbeitsverrichtung auch *os sublime dedit, caelumque videre iussit ille opifex*²⁰ *rerum* ... Und Icarus erhebt sich über dieses Niveau hinaus, im Werk in der Mitte beide Gefährten überflügelnd.

Cupidine caeli. „... Wenn jemand, durch den Anblick der Schönheit hier auf Erden an die wahre erinnert, dadurch Flügel erhält und beschwingt den Wunsch hat, emporzufliegen ... und nun sich den Vorwurf zuzieht, er sei nicht bei Sinnen ... wer das Schöne begehrt, wenn er von diesem Wahnsinn erfaßt, Liebender genannt wird.“ „Wer ohne den Wahnsinn der Musen an Pforten kommt der Poesie, überzeugt, er werde allein schon mit handwerklichen Fertigkeiten zum rechten Dichter werden, der bleibt selbst unvollkommen, und seine Dichtung, da das Werk nüchternen Besonnenheit, verschwindet vor der Poesie des Inspirierten.“ Platons Phaidros²¹ zitieren wir, um den Ausdruck zu interpretieren, ohne irgendwelche konkrete Verwandtschaft zwischen beiden Texten vorauszusetzen.²² Ebenso wenig stand auch den Dichternachfolgern des Ovid eine der obigen ähnelnde Analyse zur Verfügung, um in Icarus' Flug eine Formulierung ihres eigenen künstlerischen Bekenntnisses erkennen zu können. Während von Seneca bis B. Russel in der *lehrenden Literatur* von Jahrhunderten gegenüber der Verantwortungslosigkeit des Icarus der nüchterne Mittelweg das zu verfolgende Vorbild blieb, haben von Philippe Desportes bis zu Baudelaire Dutzende von Dichtern bis ins 20. Jahrhundert in ihm die Dichter-Allegorie *par excellence* gesehen.

Für Ovid war Icarus nicht bloß die Allegorie des Dichters, sondern seines *eigenen* dichterischen Lebenswerkes. Im Bild des Vater-Vorfahren Daedalus läßt er uns

²⁰ Eine interessante Kleinigkeit: Diesen undichterischen Ausdruck verwendet Ovid außer für den Demiurg nur für Daedalus! Die zitierte Stelle: *Met.* I.85.

²¹ 249.D, E; 245.A. Übers. und komm. von E. HEITSCH. Göttingen 1972.

²² Es scheint, als würde Ovid selbst in den *Fasti* eindeutiger ein Echo auf die Seelen-Theorie des Phaidros geben (I.297–300).

die Gestalt des Horaz nicht nur durch die auffällige Mittelwegsuche, sondern auch durch die Polemisierung mit Ode II.20 sehen. Der ältere Berufskollege sehnt sich dort nach der Rolle und Höhe des *Daedalus* der Metamorphosen, um sich so über die die weiten Grenzen des Reiches repräsentierenden Landschaften zu erheben wie dieser über die aufgezählten Punkte der griechischen Inselwelt. Er verurteilt Icarus für seinen Leichtsinn und distanziert sich mit Recht auch von dessen tragischer Rolle: *absint inani funere neniae / luctusque turpes et querimoniae* ... (21–22). Und der von Ovid in den Mittelpunkt gestellte, über seine Gefährten und zum Symbol erhobene Icarus verbindet sich auch nicht nur durch die unmißverständlichen Hinweise des Textes (*luser*) mit dem Dichter selbst. In seiner Autobiographie tauchen ebenfalls der schwerfällige, banale ältere Bruder (*fortia verbosi natus ad arma fori* Trist. IV.10.18²³), der in Perspektiven denkende, aber praktische Vater (*saepe pater dixit: quid inutile temptas*. Ebd. 21) und zwischen beiden der Dichter selbst auf den *suum* furtim *Musa* trahebat *opus*. Und an zwei anderen Stellen der Tristia (I.1.90, III.4.22) vergleicht er sich schon expressis verbis mit dem in die Höhe strebenden Icarus, wenn er auch noch so sehr seine einstige Tollkühnheit bereut.

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²³ Auch zur weiteren Bedeutung der Stelle im Zusammenhang mit Ovid: B. NÉMETH: Caelestia Sacra. Zur Frage des Ovidischen Selbstbewußtseins. *ACD* XIX (1983) 67–74.

GYÖRGY NÉMETH-ISABEL CANÓS I VILLENA

SKYLAX. A GEM CARVER IN POLITICS

Summary: The Tarragona Museum is in possession of a gem engraved with a satyr-citharode dressed as Hercules (Nr. 7543). The gem, according to the inscription, is the work of Scylax, an engraver at the court of Claudius and Nero. With the figure of the satyr-citharode, Scylax expressed his disapproval of Nero, the tyrant who proclaimed himself a great sportsman and artist.

Key words: Skylax, Nero, Claudius, intaglio, cameo, gemma, portraits of Nero.



Fig. 1

In the collection of the Museu Nacional Arqueològic de Tarragona is an amethyst intaglio, [17x14,5 mm], inv. 7543.¹ On the stone can be seen the engraved figure of a naked male with cithara, who is identified as Hercules by the lion skin thrown over his shoulder and dangling down to front and back. Behind his back an inscription of eight Greek letters can be made out. (Fig. 1) The stone was first displayed in public at the 1893 Barcelona World's Fair. The amethyst intaglio was first published by the doctor Augustí M. Gibert y Olivé in 1900.² His enthusiastic, if unfounded interpretation dated the gem to the Hellenistic period, and identified the master, on the basis of his signature, as Skylis of Crete. Gibert y Olivé's false reading (CKAVVKOC) and his identification of the figure

¹ RICHMONT, R. M.: *Les gemmes del Museu Nacional Arqueològic de Tarragona*. Tarragona, 1982. 39. Núm. 10. "Núm. Inventari General: 7543. Material: Ametista. Translúcida. 0,018x0,0021 m. Forma: Convexa 8 A. Superfície polida. Tema: Herakles Musagetes. Té una inscripció amb motius grecs: κκλννκoc. Estil: Classicista. S. I-II d.C. Procedència: Pedrera del Port de Tarragona. Observacions: Ingressada el 20 novembre de 1915."

² GIBERT Y OLIVÉ, A. M.: *Ciutats focenses del litoral cosetá*. Barcelona, 1900. 28–30: "Digne de figurar en las riquísimas collections dels més notables museus estrangers, com moltes altres de variats tamanys, formes y colors, és la pedra grabada, extreta de la mateixa capa y en los indrets del mateix portal que exhibirem en l'Exposició d'indumentaria retrospectiva de Barcelona (1893): vuydat sobre una ovalada pedra d'una sola tinta (ametista), de 27 mil·límetres d'alçaria per 17 d'amplaria, veuse en posa natural pulcant la lira un hermosísim Hercules musagetes d'execució la més delicada, ab la particularitat de portar á la dreta la firma del grabador CKAVVKOC. Concepció plástica d'exquisita elegancia y pulimentada ab lo més gran cuidado (Plini: Hist. Nat., llibre XXXVII.), que deu atribuirse, si no als millors temps del període macedonich, á la proximitat de la radiant expansió d'eixos artístichs treballs."

with Hercules was adopted by Rosa M. Ricomà in her 1982 catalogue of the Museu Nacional Arqueològic de Tarragona.³ The citharode cannot, however, be Heracles, since he obviously has goats' feet instead of human feet. Between the feet of the figure dressed in Heracles' lionskin cape, advancing with right foot forward, the stone has suffered damage; a small piece has broken away, presumably when the gem was removed from its original setting. The left foot is thus lost, but the original surface is preserved on the right, and there is no foot to be seen there, the space is enough only for a hoof. Which is to say that, despite the attributes characteristic of Hercules, the figure cannot be identified with the hero himself, but is rather a satyr dressed as Hercules. The motif is not unknown in Greek vase-painting; we meet with it first on a fragment of the Kleophrades Painter, who draws a satyr dressed in a Hercules costume, playing on the aulos.⁴ According to Boardman the subject of Heracles the musician was adopted by writers of satyr-drama, and in this way gave birth to the iconographic type of the musician-satyr in Heracles-costume. The motif then spread during the Hellenistic period, arriving finally at Rome, possibly through the mediation of the South Italian Greeks. The iconographic type appearing on the tarragona gem is thus not at all special; much more interesting is the fact that the correct reading of the master's signature CKVΛAKOC. Gibert és Ricomà apparently did not notice that the inscription – as is customary on gems – is in fact in mirror-writing, and simply read the letters upside-down.

Gisela Richter in her magisterial monographic treatment of ancient glyptics lists three other works by the gem-engraver Skylax, who was active in the first century A.D., probably in Rome.⁵

No. 691. Head of Claudius. Hermitage. (Amethyst intaglio, mounted in an ancient gold ring. 17x14.5 mm) (Fig. 2)

No. 692. Herakles playing the cithara. Once in the collection of Baron Roger. Paris. (Sardonyx cameo. 34x23 mm) (Fig. 3)

No. 693. Satyr. Present location not known. (Onyx intaglio. 13x16 mm) (Fig. 4)

The three stones are linked by the fact that all share the signature of the master. He used the genitive of his name (CKVΛAKOC) on the portrait of Claudius and the Heracles citharode; on the gem with the dancing satyr the nominative (CKVΛAΞ). There is widespread agreement in the literature that Skylax was in fact active in the time of Claudius,⁶ and in fact cite the gem in question as an example of the way in

³ Cf. n. 1.

⁴ BOARDMAN, J.: Herakles. *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae*. IV. 1. Zürich-München, 1988. 816: "A satyr dressed as H. and playing the pipes on a fragment by the Kleophrades Painter (Acr. 730; ARV2 186, 42; Graef/Langlotz II pl. 58; Buschor, E., *Satyr Tänze* [1943] fig. 59) suggests that the motif of a musical H. was taken up in a satyr play ..." "This motif, which recalls the bf. 1454, appears also on gems (1456–1458), and the type on gems persists in Roman studios, to which some examples cited may belong, but it is clear that it was established in Hellenistic Greece."

⁵ RICHTER, G. M. A.: *Engraved Gems of the Romans. A Supplement to the History of Roman Art. The Engraved Gems of the Greeks, Etruscans, and Romans. Part II.* London, 1971. 134.

⁶ VOLLENWEIDER, M.-L.: *Die Steinschneidekunst und ihre Künstler in spätrepublikanischer und augusteischer Zeit.* Baden-Baden, 1966. 79: "Als ein Künstler, der ganz gewiß für Claudius gearbeitet hat, kann Skylax genannt werden." ZAZOFF, P.: *Die antiken Gemmen. Handbuch der Archäologie.* Mün-




Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Fig. 4

which gems, difficult to date for the most part, can at times be placed with considerable chronological accuracy.⁷ Vollenweider has written that the portrait must be dated to the reign of Claudius, since it shows the emperor wearing the aegis, that is to say, in the role of Jupiter, a type seen also on portraits of Augustus and Tiberius.⁸ Such a portrait is, however, unthinkable for Claudius both under his predecessors – since he was considered quite mad before his accession to the throne –, and under his successors, when Seneca and Nero were hard at work blackening his reputation. Vollenweider for his part goes even further, attributing the Claudius-apotheosis cameo in Paris to the master, along with the cornucopia cameo in Vienna.⁹ These cameos are unsigned; hence we will not take account of either, despite the fact that they exemplify the highest artistic quality of the Claudian period, nor will we discuss the unsigned portrait of a boy in Auerberg, attributed to Skylax by P. Zazoff. The dating of the Heracles citharode cameo to the reign of Nero is also quite uncertain. Marie-Louise Vollenweider and Peter Zazoff are however unanimous to this effect; Boardman lists the dating without commentary, but in invetted commas: “Vollenweider:

chen, 1983. 321: “Zeitlich gesichert ist der Steinschneider Skylax, sein prachtvoller Amethyst trägt das Porträt des Claudius (41–54 n.Chr.)” 79. N. 78.: „

⁷ GUIRAUD, H.: *Intailles et camées Romains*. Paris, 1996. 81: “Dans certaines cas, le chemin suivi par des intailles est repérable. On peut mettre à part les cas aussi exceptionnels qu’une améthyste signée Skylax figurant le portrait de l’empereur Claude retrouvé en Crimée ou une pierre signée Platon, graveur de Haut Empire.”

⁸ VOLLENWEIDER 1966, 79. N. 78: “Der Stein ist schon deshalb in die Zeit des Claudius zu datieren, als auf ihm der Kaiser selber mit der Ägis in der Art des Augustus und Tiberius wie Jupiter dargestellt ist.” VOLLENWEIDER besides this also attributes to Skylax two small busts made about AD 81 (*Catalogue raisonné des sceux, cylindres, intailles et camées. Vol. II. Les portraits, les masques de théâtre, les symboles politiques*. Musée d’Art et Histoire de Genève. Mainz am Rhein, 1979. No. 227–228; planches 67–68.), P. ZAZOFF 339. a portrait of a boy found in Auerberg, and dated to AD 20–50: “Eine durch ihren Fund auf dem Auerberg auf die Jahrzehnte 20–50 n.Chr. datierte amethystfarbene Glaspaste mit der Profilbüste eines lockigen Knaben geht in der Tat gut mit dem Claudius des Skylax zusammen ... anstelle der losen Haarbandenden sieht man einige Knoten der Herakleskeule hinter dem Nacken; vielleicht handelt es sich um einen claudischen Prinzen als Herkules.”

⁹ VOLLENWEIDER 1966. 79. N. 78: “Der Cameo mit dem Leier spielenden Herakles mag dagegen schon in der Zeit Neros gehören.” ZAZOFF 1983. 321. N. 99: “Der Kameo mit dem Herakles als Kitharode mag schon neronisch sein.”

«neronisch»”.¹⁰ Of the three gems, only the Claudius portrait in the Hermitage can today be studied. The whereabouts of the dancing satyr and the Heracles citharodes are unknown. The latter was in the possession of Senator Tiepolo, the Venetian collector, in 1724 (Figs. 5–6); in 1841 it belonged to the parisian collection of the baron Roger, but was not included in the catalogue at the time the collection was auctioned in 1904.¹¹ The stone was, it seems, already lost at that time. A. Furtwängler published a photograph of the gem in his article of 1888. The disappearance of the gem can thus be dated between 1888 and 1904. The iconography is especially interesting, since Heracles is rarely shown as a musician, and images of him as citharode are even rarer. According to Boardman the motif cannot be explained with appeal to a particular cult; what is more, the name “*mousikos*” was attributed to the type by modern researchers, nor do the myths provide a secure ground for the creation of the type, since Heracles’ musical education was only superficial.¹² Since the earliest images of Heracles Mousikos appear on Attic vases of the Peisistratid period, they must relate to some sort of innovation in the musical life of the time. The exact date of the motif’s appearance in Roman art is known exactly. The cult of Heracles Mousagetes, who, as “leader of the muses”, was in some sense a replacement for Apollo, was introduced to Rome by the victorious general M. Fulvius Nobilior from Ambracia in the year 189 BC (Plin. NH 35, 66).¹³ The general set up the statues of the muses plundered from Ambracia in the temple he built next to the Circus Flaminius. The temple was rebuilt under Augustus by L. Marcius Philippus, probably according to Augustus’ own intentions, as Suetonius alludes in his biography of the princeps (29, 8): “*Multaque a multis extructa sunt, sicut a Marcio Philippo aedes Hercules Musarum ...*” It must have been natural for a ruler who had committed himself to a renovation of the ancient traditional cults and the arts to take this temple and its cult, so congenial to his own program, and a monument to past glorious victories, into his care. To explain the origin of Skylax’s Hercules entirely on this basis, namely by appeal to the cult of Hercules Musarum, supported also by Augustus, would be to risk serious error. If we assume as a working hypothesis that Vollenweider and Zazoff were right in making of Skylax a “court artist” under Claudius, and if we accept that the Hercules gem was engraved already under Nero, we can easily understand how naturally the motif of Heracles mousikos, which was already two hundred years old, if never very popular, could have seemed to a court artist working under Nero. The portrayal of rulers as Heracles was an everyday phenomenon already in the Hel-

¹⁰ VOLLENWEIDER 1966, 79. N. 78.

¹¹ STOSCH, F.: *Gemmae antiquae caelatae, sculptorum nominibus insignitae*. Amsterdam 1724. Tab. LIX: “Hercules Musarum Scylaxis opus.” VOLLENWEIDER 1966, 79. N. 78.

¹² BOARDMAN *LIMC* IV. 1. 816: “The inspiration for this important though restricted (in time and place) series cannot be in cult (the epithet *mousikos* is applied by modern scholars not antiquity), nor can it be in myth since his education in music was incomplete. Given the special role that H. seems to play in the Athens of Peisistratos and his sons it is likely that musical H. reflects some innovation in the musical life of Athens under the tyrants ...”

¹³ BOARDMAN *LIMC* IV. 1, 811. On coins struck by Q. Pomponius Musa we find the inscription “Hercules Musarum” (*LIMC* IV. 1482). RITTER, S.: *Hercules in der römischen Kunst von den Anfängen bis Augustus*. Heidelberg 1995. 32–35.




Fig. 5




Fig. 6

lenistic period, as U. Huttner's recent monograph emphatically reminds us.¹⁴ Among Roman emperors and princes who donned the grab of Heracles – with the exception of the prince of the Claudian period identified by Zazoff – it is worthwhile to mention Caracalla's portrayal as the child-Heracles strangling the snakes,¹⁵ and the Esquiline Commodus in full Hercules costume. It is also worthwhile to mention that Commodus was the victim of what can only be described as a real Hercules mania.¹⁶

After the death of Claudius Seneca celebrated the young Nero as Apollo in his Apocolocyntosis, and in which poem Apollo himself compares the singing and appearance of the young prince to his own (Apocolocyntosis 4):

*Phoebus ait 'vincat mortalis tempora vitae
ille mihi similis vultu similisque decore
nec cantu nec voce minor.'*

„Apollo
spoke: «Let him conquer the span of mortal life:
the boy is like to me in face and like in form,
nor less in song or voice»”

¹⁴ HUTTNER, U.: *Die politische Rolle der Heraklesgestalt im griechischen Herrschertum*. Historia Einzelschriften 112. Stuttgart, 1997.

¹⁵ KLEINER, D. E. E.: *Roman Sculpture*. New Haven, London, 1992. 323.

¹⁶ KLEINER 277: “The *Scriptores Historiae Augustae* reports that Commodus was found of donning the attributes of Hercules in public and that he saw himself as a god on earth (*S. H. A.*, Comm., 14, 8). The imperial coinage of 191–92, a widely circulated means of expressing public policy, also depicts Commodus in the guise of Heracles.” HEKSTER, O.: *Commodus. An Emperor at the Crossroads*. Amsterdam, 2002.

It is clear that this divine attention is to be explained by Nero's very high-flown poetic ambitions, to his public performances where he sang and accompanied himself on the cithara. Naturally enough, all of this contributed to the expectations of a Golden Age which accompanied Nero's accession to power, and which Seneca did his best to promote. The Apollo simile was literally flogged to death by the sycophants of the court.¹⁷ It is true however that Nero, like Commodus had another rather less Apollonian character, of which he was inordinately proud: his image of himself as a sportsman. He actually took part in competitions and even managed to win, even if only at the cost of extraordinary cheating. This proves, however, that for Nero his physical performance was as important as his poetic and musical talent. If someone wished to entrust a court engraver trained under Claudius with the task of carving a cameo which would win Nero's liking, he could not have found a better subject than Heracles as citharode, who combined, as it were, all the virtues important to the Emperor.

It seems that in the Tarragona gem we have managed to identify a lost work of Skylax, in which the master reassessed his treatment of an earlier subject, Hercules the citharode. He turned the picture around: where his Heracles faced right, the satyr faces left. (Here it must be remarked that on p. 29 of Gibert's book the gem's photograph was accidentally printed in reverse, and so the figure faces right, as on the Paris cameo.) But the satyr-intaglio was clearly made as a seal: it is much smaller, at 17x14,6 mm, than the Paris Hercules cameo (34x23 mm), and its inscription was naturally carved in mirror-writing, so as to be clearly legible on the sealing.

Before turning to questions of interpretation, we must examine the problem of authenticity. The Tarragona gem could quite easily be a forgery. From Ricoma's book¹⁸ we know that the museum acquired the gem as a gift on November 20, 1915. A well-prepared forger could have made use of the publications of F. Stosch in 1724, S. Reinach in 1895, and of Furtwängler's book, published in 1900. Only the provenance of the Tarragona gem, which was displayed at the Barcelona World's Fair in 1893, is known exactly (the "gravel mine" near the town's harbour), as is the name of its first owner, a veterinarian from Reus, D. Joseph Dols y Bardina (Pedra grabada conegudíssima [Cose] que'ns llegà'l veterinari de Reus D. Joseph Dols y Bardina).¹⁹ Unfortunately the book of Gibert y Olivé does not specify clearly who inherited the gem from the popular veterinary doctor, Joseph Dols y Bardina, but it seems clear that Dr. Dols was no longer alive in 1900, when Gibert's book was published. If we suspect that Dr. Dols was deceived by a forger who sold him the gem in Reus or Tarragona, it will not hurt if we remind ourselves that the gem engraved with the image of Heracles as citharode, recognized as original but later lost, was published in 1888 by Furtwängler for the first time since 1724, in a volume of the *Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts* that to this day is not available for study in Catalonia. We can quite confidently dismiss the suggestion that a forger well-versed in the contem-

¹⁷ KLEINER 135. BERGMANN, M.: *Die Strahlen der Herrscher. Theomorphes Herrscherbild und politische Symbolik im Hellenismus und in der römischen Kaiserzeit*. Mainz 1998. 185–189.

¹⁸ RICOMÀ 39. FURTWÄNGLER, A.: *Die antiken Gemmen*. I–II. Berlin–Leipzig, 1900., REINACH, S.: *Pierres gravées des Collections Marlborough et d'Orléans, des recueils d'Eckhel, Gori, Gravelle, Mariette, Millin, Stosch, réunies et rééditées*. Paris, 1895.

¹⁹ GIBERT Y OLIVÉ 29.

porary German scholarly literature sold the gem, found supposedly at Tarragona, to a veterinarian from Reus in the five years between 1888 and 1893. If such a forger had existed, he certainly would have tried to increase the prestige value of his work by calling Dr. Dols' attention to Scylax's name. But in fact neither the doctor nor Gibert y Olivé, who first published the stone, nor Rosa Ricomà were able to read the inscription; which is to say that they were not aware that the intaglio was the work of Skylax.

The gem could also be an antique copy, a reformulation or perhaps a misunderstanding of the original. Against this possibility the objection might be raised that gems were not widely known in Antiquity, like public sculpture: hence it is unlikely that an ancient forger would have wished to produce a reformulation of Scylax's Hercules-gem, keeping the master's original signature.

Finally, it might be objected that, while the signature is original, the Tarragona gem is in fact the work of another master named Scylax. Apart from the fact that the existence of a second master of this name has never been suspected, it is singularly unlikely that a second Scylax would produce a work so similar to that of the first.

On the basis of the above considerations it seems likely, even if it cannot be proved beyond the shadow of a doubt, that the Tarragona intaglio is the work of the same man who engraved the Hercules. A comparison of the three signed works by Scylax shows that the letter-forms are indeed similar (e.g., use of lunar sigma); this does not, however, mean very much in itself. The objection might be raised that the Tarragona gem is an intaglio, whereas the Hercules gem is a cameo. It should be mentioned, first of all, in response that cameos were more expensive and thus were more likely to be made by order of the court than the cheaper intaglios; second, that the masters we know by name frequently worked in both genres, and that the cheaper intaglios in fact make up the larger part of the oeuvre of each.²⁰

Engraver	Intaglio	Cameo
Aulos	6	1
Dioskourides	8	2
Sostratos	3	2
Hyllos	10	1
Skylax	3	1

As well, it must be remarked that cases do occur where the same engraver gives his name once in the nominative, once in the genitive.

Engraver	Nominativus	Genitivus
Solon	Richter 696; 697	694; 696; 698

²⁰ RICHTER 131-135.

Taken together, these considerations seem to justify our assumption that the gem is the work of the same artist who made the Hercules citharode for Nero. The question remains, that if both are the works of Scylax, why did he decide to reformulate his old subject? Diana E. E. Kleiner has written that Nero-portraits – of which, thanks to the *damnatio memoriae*, very few remain – can be divided into five groups.²¹ The first type shows the princeps while still a child (AD 51), the second immediately follows his accession to the throne (AD 54), the third, so called Cagliari type shows the ruler after his break with his mother (AD 55). Types 4–5 show the features of the tyrant, surprisingly already in Nero's lifetime. If we see in the lost Paris gem a product of Seneca's positive Nero-propaganda, in which Nero is portrayed as the perfect embodiment at once of Apollonian and Herculean qualities, then the cameo ought to be dated to about AD 54/55. The Tarragona gem is, however, the product of Scylax's dissatisfaction: he no longer sees Hercules in the figure of the princeps, but only a satyr dressed as Hercules, a confidence-man figure dressed in the clothes of a hero, demanding recognition for feats he is not able to perform. This gem can thus be dated between 59 and 68.

Against this interpretation it might be mentioned that Scylax had already carved a satyr, and that there the satyr does not have the feet of a goat, but rather a human being (Richter No. 693). If, however, Scylax had really wished to emphasize that the Tarragona intaglio does not show the real Hercules, but only a satyr dressed as Hercules, he would of necessity have made use of this unmistakable mark of difference. The goat's feet betray the real meaning of the picture.

The final question which must be answered is how the gem came to Tarragona. Naturally it could have made the trip from Rome to Tarraco at any time after its making (if Scylax was at Nero's court at all at this time), since the Claudius intaglio was discovered in Kertch, in the Ukraine, which was even farther from Rome than Tarraco. A more probable solution can, however, be imagined. As is well known, the centre of resistance to Nero which grew up around Galba was located at Tarraco. If Scylax made the gem at his own initiative and wished to sell his gem with a satyr dressed as Heracles anywhere at all between 59 and 68, Tarraco was certainly the place. The emperor had turned out to be phony artist, a false Apollo and false Heracles: an impostor in the costume of a god. The disillusioned court engraver expressed his disillusionment in this way. If, however, he wished to make a living by his craft, he had to sell his gem, a dangerous act in Rome. But in Tarraco he would have found a buyer who, by purchasing such a seal and setting it in a ring, could express his loyalty to the rising Imperial star, Galba.

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²¹ KLEINER 136: "The willful destruction of Nero's portraits after his death means that there are few surviving images from which to construct a chronological and typological sequence ... The portraits of Nero have been divided into five portrait types, their creation corresponding to the years 51, 54, 55, 59 and 64."

EDINA GRADVOHL

“DOG-LIKE” WOMEN: THE ORIGIN OF THE RHYTHM METHOD

Summary: Hippocrates, Aristotle, and Soranus all mention that women are most likely to fall pregnant during menstruation or the days following it. They correctly realised the connection between the menstrual cycle and conception, but they committed a serious mistake concerning the time of conception and they did not rectify this error for seven centuries. The mistake probably comes from the observation of bitches being in heat as these ancient scholars linked the two phenomena – being on heat and menses – in the wrong way.

Key words: Soranus, Hippocrates, Aristotle, menses, contraception, gynaecology, bitches.

Very little is known about Soranus of Ephesus, this outstanding figure of ancient gynaecology, and that little is full of contradictions. The *Suda* mentions not one, but two Sorani, both happened to be gynaecologists, and both were from Ephesus.¹ All this goes back to an ancient method of biography where, if the biographer found contradictions in the sources, he doubled the personality portrayed instead of solving the problem. Thus, as Ann Ellis Hanson states, it is probable that the two Sorani are actually a single person. Soranus probably completed his studies in Alexandria and later lived in Rome under Trajan and Hadrian, that is between 98 and 138 A.D. He alludes to the latter fact in his works, when he compares the child-care customs of Greek and Roman women.² Caelius Aurelianus also agrees that Soranus lived in Rome.³ His renown is well illustrated by the fact that a little more than a hundred years later he is quoted by Galen a number of times. Though Soranus was of Greek descent, his name is of Latin origin (its meaning is: an inhabitant of Sora), the reason being that Quintus Marcius Barea Soranus, proconsul of Asia between 61, and 63, was a benefactor of Ephesus, and Soranus' parents, Menander and Phoebe named their son after this benefactor. This suggests that Soranus came from the Ephesian aristocracy and was not an emancipated slave. The *Suda* mentions at least twenty works

¹ *Suda* Σ 851 and 852. Cf. HANSON, Ann Ellis-GREEN, Monica H.: Soranus of Ephesus: *Methodicorum princeps*. In: *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt*. 37. 2. Berlin–New York, 1994, 981.

² Soranus: *Gynaikeia*. 2. 6.

³ HANSON, Ann Ellis-GREEN, Monica H. 983.

written by Soranus, but only three are preserved in whole or in part, among them the Gynecology (*Gynaikeia*).

Ancient physicians, Soranus and his predecessors, used various mixtures to avoid conception or pregnancy, to propagate menses or to initiate an abortion. Most of these mixtures were made up of medicinal plants and herbs, fruits, cereals, and materials containing ferrous sulphate, but internal organs of animals were also used on rare occasions. The medicaments made of such ingredients were applied orally or vaginally. The ingredients of oral medicaments were often mixed with wine or honey and water before consumption. Vaginal medicaments were applied in a pessary or were rolled in wool (or, in the case of liquids, wool was soaked in them), a tampon-like shape was formed and applied. We, however, shall not discuss these methods here. We shall also not consider such ancient methods of contraception as coitus interruptus, protraction of the breast-feeding period, anal coitus and marrying at a later age. Abortion of the pregnancy was also known of course, just as abandoning the born child, but the latter cannot be considered a medical method of contraception.

It is intriguing though, that Soranus and his predecessors described a method of contraception, nowadays called the rhythm method. This seems surprising, because the method of Knaus and Onigo was elaborated at a strikingly late date, in the 1930s. Ancient physicians also noticed that there were periods in the functioning of the female body when there was less chance of conception. The only problem in the ancient theory was, that in contrast with modern scientific knowledge, they placed ovulation at a different point in the cycle. We shall present this difference through texts of various authors:

A) "... ἐπὶν ἀποκαθαρθέωσιν αἱ γυναῖκες, μάλιστα ἐν γαστρὶ λαμβάνουσιν ἡμερωθεῖσα, καὶ ἡ γονὴ σφισι ῥώννυται, ἣν ὅτε χρὴ μιγέωσι, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ῥῆιδίως μίσγεται, καὶ ἦν ἐπικρατήσῃ, τῷδε ἡδέλφισται.

2 τότε γὰρ μάλιστα τὸ στόμα τῶν μητρέων κέχηνε, καὶ τετανὸν ἐστὶ, καὶ μετὰ τὰς καθάρσιαις καὶ αἱ φλέβες τὴν γονὴν σπῶσιν. ἐν δὲ τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ τό τε στόμα τῶν μητρέων μέμυκε, καὶ μᾶλλον αἱ φλέβες πλεῖται αἵματος ἐοῦσαι οὐχ ὁμοίως σπῶσι τὴν γονήν."

"When the menstruation stops women are most fit to fall pregnant if they desire it and their ovum is in good condition. If they mate in the best time it is mixed easily with the man's semen and if that of the man is stronger (the child) will resemble him.

2 The orifice of the uterus is most open and most tense at this time after menstruation and the veins suck the semen in. In the time preceding this the orifice of the uterus is closed and the veins are more filled with blood and they cannot suck the semen in a similar fashion."

Hippocrates: *De mulieribus* C 62, 19, 24.⁴

⁴ *Hippokratische Gynäkologie. Die gynäkologischen Texte des Autors C nach den pseudohippokratischen Schriften De muliebribus I, II und De sterilibus.* Hrsg. und übersetzt von H. GRENEMANN. Wiesbaden 1982, 114.

B) "Φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ σύλληψις γίνεται μετὰ τὴν τούτων ἀπαλλαγὴν ταῖς γυναιξίν· καὶ ὅσαις μὴ γίνεται ταῦτα, ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἄτεκνοι διατελοῦσιν ... ὕστερον δ' οὐ συλλαμβάνουσιν, ὅσαις εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν αἱ ὑστέραι συμμύουσιν."

"Now by nature conception takes place in women after this discharge is completed; and those that do not have the discharge, remain childless as a rule ... but conception does not occur later in those whose uterus closes up immediately after the purgation."⁵

Aristotle: *Historia animalium* VII, 582b

C) "Ὅσαι δὲ μὴ γιγνομένων τῶν καταμηνίων συλλαμβάνουσιν, ἢ μεταξὺ γιγνομένων ὕστερον δὲ μὴ, αἴτιον ὅτι ταῖς μὲν τοσαύτῃ γίνεται ἱκμὰς ὅση μετὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν ὑπολείπεται ταῖς γονίμοις, πλείων δ' οὐ γίνεται περιττώσις ὥστε καὶ θύραζε ἀπελθεῖν, ταῖς δὲ μετὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν συμμύει τῷ στόμα τῶν ὑστερῶν."

"There are instances of women who conceive without the occurrence of menstrual discharge; others conceive during its occurrence but not after it. The reasons are these. The former produce only just so much liquid as remains in fertile individuals after the evacuation is over, and there is no surplus residue to be discharged externally; in the latter the mouth of the uterus closes up after the evacuation is over."⁶

Aristotle: *De generatione animalium* 1, XIX, 727b

D) "Ἀριστος συνουσίας καιρὸς πρὸς σύλληψιν ὁ πανομένης τε [καὶ] παρακμαζούσης τῆς καθάρσεως, ὀρμῆς καὶ ὀρέξεως πρὸς συμπλοκὴν ὑπαρχούσης, καὶ τοῦ σώματος μὴτ' ἐνδεοῦς ἐντος μὴτ' ἄγαν πλήρους καὶ βαρέος ἐκ μέθης καὶ ἀπεψίας, καὶ ὁ μετὰ τὴν ἀποθεραπείαν τοῦ σώματος ἐμβρωματίου λημφθέντος ὀλίγου καὶ κατὰ πᾶν εὐαρέστου τοῦ καταστήματος ὑπάρχοντος· ὁ μόνος οὖν καιρὸς ἐπιτήδειος ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀπόληξιν τῆς καθάρσεως· κεκούφισται μὲν γὰρ ἡ μήτρα καὶ σύμμετρος παρέπεται θερμασία καὶ ὑγρασία."

"The best time for fruitful intercourse is when menstruation is ending and abating, when urge and appetite for coitus are present, when the body is neither in want nor too congested and heavy from drunkenness and indigestion, and after the body has been rubbed down and a little food been eaten and when a pleasant state exists in every respect. ... Consequently, the only suitable time is at the waning of menses, for the uterus has been lightened and warmth and moisture are imparted in right measure."

Soranus: *Gynaeciorum libri* 1. 12. 36⁷

Hippocrates of Kos wrote in the 5th century B.C., Aristotle of Stageira in the 4th century B.C. and Soranus of Ephesus in the 2nd century A.D. Ancient physicians were clearly of very similar views even though they lived and worked in very different times and territories. According to Hippocrates (A), conception happens immedi-

⁵ English translation from: ARISTOTLE: *History of Animals. Books VII–X*. Ed. and translated by D. M. Balme. Cambridge (Mass.) 1991. (Loeb Classical Library)

⁶ English translation from: ARISTOTLE: *Generation of Animals*. Translated by A. L. Peck. Cambridge (Mass.) 1942. (Loeb Classical Library)

⁷ English translation from: Soranus' *Gynecology*. Translated by O. TEMKIN. Baltimore 1956. 34–35.

ately after menstruation, supposing the woman desires intercourse. Aristotle supposed that conception is most probable after (B) or during (C) menstruation. Soranus (D) in concord with Aristotle's (C) view believes that the time best for conception is when menstruation is ending or abating, but he includes the condition known from Hippocrates (A): the woman must desire intercourse. Thus according to these concepts the period of time immediately following the end of menstruation, or menses itself is best for becoming pregnant.

These ideas of ancient medical writers differ fundamentally from the views of modern medicine. On the basis of modern scientific observation it can be stated, that "because of the permanent length of the luteal phase, ovulation usually happens 14 days prior to the first day of the next menses. Coitus should be avoided 2–3 days before and after this day. This method can only be used in the case of a regular cycle, and then also with a very high rate of error reaching 35%"⁸ Thus, based on modern medical knowledge, we may state that ancient physicians placed the time of conception in the worst possible period of the cycle. True, their goal was not contraception, but to help conception that could all but happen at the time they wanted conception to be. Anyhow, this pseudo-discovery could have been used in contraception as well: every day that was not during or immediately before or after menstruation could have been called safe as far as the risk of becoming pregnant is concerned. The result was however, that whoever wanted to avoid conception had intercourse almost certainly at the time of ovulation. So, one would think, the uselessness of the method was quickly realised, if not otherwise, then because of the complaints brought forward by discontent mothers. In spite of this not even the 700 years between Hippocrates and Soranus were sufficient for the renowned writers to rectify their error. What is even more intriguing is that "the correlation between the time of ovulation and menstruation was realised relatively late by the Japanese gynaecologist Ogino."⁹ The question arises: where does the wrong idea of Hippocrates (and physicians after him) have its origins and why could this risky error, probably revealed by women quite often, be repeated in medical works for centuries? The answer lies probably in a factor that surely remained unchanged or changed very little over the centuries: the often quite simple views of men (and physicians were indeed men) concerning women.

Ancient authors starting right from Homer compare women (and even goddesses) remarkably often to various animals. Epithets like "cow-eyed Hera", "owl-eyed Pallas Athena" are frequent. These epithets might have preserved something from an era when Greeks imagined their gods (and not only goddesses) in a not absolutely human form. The animal mentioned most often in comparisons, however, is the dog and it is improbable that this would be proof of some kind of theriomorphic prejudice in the case of mortal women. Helen for example applies the following to herself:

“Δᾶερ ἔμεϊο, κυνὸς κακομηχάνου, ὀκρυόεσσης,
ὥς μὲν ὄφελ’ ὦματι τῷ, ὅτε με πρῶτον τέκε μήτηρ,

⁸ PAPP, Zoltán: *Szülészeti – nőgyógyászati (Obstetrics – Gynaecology)*. Budapest 1998. 183.

⁹ PAPP, Zoltán 132.

οἷχεσθαι προφέρουσα κακὴ ἀνέμοιο θύελλαῖ
 δαερ, ἐπεὶ σε μάλιστα πόνος φρένας ἀμφιβέβηκεν
 εἵνεκδ' ἐμεῖο κυνὸς καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐνεκδ' αὐτῆς"

"O Brother of me that am a dog, a contriver of mischief and abhorred of all, I would that on the day when first my mother gave me birth an evil storm-wind had borne me away ... my brother, since above all others has trouble encompassed thy heart because of me, the dog and the folly of Alexander"¹⁰

Homer: *Iliad* 6, 344–346; 355–356.

Iris warns Hera thus, when she revolts against her husband:

“ἀλλὰ σύγ', αἰνотάτη, κύον ἀδεῆς, εἰ ἐτεόν γε
 τολμήσεις Διὸς ἄντα πελώριον ἔγχος ἀεῖραι.”

"But most dread art thou, thou bold and dog-like thing, if in good sooth thou wilt dare to raise thy mighty spear against Zeus."¹⁰

Homer: *Iliad* 8, 423–424.

Zeus also addresses similar words to his wife, Hera:

“οὐδὲ ἐν ἔνθ' ἀφίκηαι ἀλωμίνη, οὐ σεῦ ἔγωγε
 σκυζομένης ἀλέγω, ἐπεὶ οὐ σέο κύντερον ἄλλο.”

"Though thou shouldst fare even thither in thy wanderings, yet reck I not of thy wrath, seeing there is naught more dog-like than thou."¹⁰

Homer: *Iliad* 8, 482–483.

More examples could be brought forward, but it is apparent already, that the poet compared women to dogs primarily because of their quarrelsome nature and their disputes ("thy wrath"). The author of a 3rd-century B.C. Egyptian magic papyrus was driven by completely different motives:

“Πρὸς μήτρας ἀναδρομήν: »ἐξορκίζω σε, μήτραν κατὰ τοῦ κατασταθέντος ἐπὶ τῆς ἀβύσσου πρὶν γενέσθαι οὐρανόν ἢ γῆν ἢ θάλασσαν ἢ φῶς ἢ σκίτος, τὸν κτίσαντα ἀγγέλους, ὦν πρῶτος Ἀμιχαμχου καὶ χουχαω χηρωει ουειαχω οδου προσειογγη, καὶ ἐπὶ χερουβιν καθήμενον, βατάζοντα τὸν θρόνον τὸν ἴδιον· ἀποκατασταθῆναι ἐν τῇ ἔδρᾳ μηδὲ κλιθῆναι εἰς τὸ δεξιὸν πλευρᾶν μέρος μηδὲ εἰς τὸ ἀριστερὸν πλευρὸν μέρος μηδὲ ἀποδήξῃς εἰς τὴν καρδίαν ὡς κύων, ἀλλὰ ἐτάθητι καὶ μένοις ἐν χώροις ἰδίοις, μηδὲν μεμασῆναι Ἰνῆ, ἔστε ἐξορκίζω σε τὸν ἀρχὴ ποιήσαντα τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὸν γῆν καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ. ἀλληλουια, ἀμήν.« γράφε ἐν λεπίδι κακκίτερῖνῃ καὶ ἔνδυνε ἐν χρώμα ἐι Ζ'.”

"Against the rising of the womb: »I swear you, womb by him that stands firmly above the abyss, before the sky or the earth, or light or shadow would come to be, him, the creator of angels, the first of whom is Amichamchu and Chuchaô Chêrôei Ueiachô Odu Proseiongês and who sits on that cherub, which bears his throne to return to your place and turn not either towards the right ribs or towards the left ones and proceed not towards the heart as a dog, but stop and stay in your place. Attack nothing until I swear you by the one who created heaven and earth and everything

¹⁰ English translation slightly modified from: HOMER: *The Iliad*. Translated by A.T. Murray. Cambridge (Mass.)–London 1924. (Loeb Classical Library)

there is upon it in the beginning. Halleluia, amen.« Write this on a lead tablet and tie it (to your waist) with a seven-coloured (string).”

Preisendanz, K.: *Papyri Graecae Magicae*. Stuttgart 1974². VII 260–271.

This spell quotes another widely known superstition, namely, that the womb sometimes starts to wander around in the body causing a number of gynaecological diseases and it intends to serve as a cure for such an illness. It is more important for us to note that the woman and her uterus is similar to a dog because according to ancient views the uterus desires love as wildly as a bitch. So, the basis of this comparison is intense sexual appetite. As we have seen, Hippocrates, Aristotle, and Soranus agreed that conception is not possible without desire, but the desire of bitches (and according to Greek physicians that of women) is usually so strong that its lack is not very probable. According to Helen King, one of the best experts in ancient gynaecological writers, the comparison to a dog “recalls the Greco-Roman ideas of the insatiable sexual appetites of dogs – and women.”¹¹ Helen King called the attention to the fact how important this sexual aspect is in comparing women to dogs.¹² Another important correlation is that the word for ‘dog’ in Greek is *kuōn*, while the verb ‘to be pregnant’ is *kuēin*.¹³

If we continue to think along the lines of Helen King’s observation we, might suppose that the linking of the dog with women and sex might bring us nearer the solution of the problem discussed here. In the ancient world, as it is well known, people tried to explain a lot of things based on experience and observation. The animal best known to and most often mentioned by ancient authors, was the dog. Aristotle emphasises (*Historia animalium* 574a-b) that the bitch’s genital organs grow when she is in heat and that one cycle lasts 14 days. He does not recommend mating in the first seven days, during menstruation, but he thinks that the 14th and last day of the cycle is ideal for that purpose. If Aristotle compared the human woman’s menstrual cycle (which is not 14 days long) with that of the dog he might have reached the conclusion that was so often advocated by ancient physicians: the time of abating or ceasing of menstruation is best for conception. Even though in the case of human females the 14th day would have meant the middle of the cycle, that is ovulation, there is no sign of such a conclusion in ancient literature (or indeed anywhere before the 19th century). Thus, the basis of comparison was not the dog’s 7-day menstruation but its 14-day cycle. Dogs are in heat twice (sometimes only once) a year, whereas the cycle of human females is completely different. “The bitch will only mate and may become pregnant when she is in heat, as the ovum only becomes detached in these periods. The male is ready for mating all year round ... The changes in the genital organs of the bitch are apparent when she is in heat: the external genital organs swell and a bloody discharge comes from them. Mucus production is increased on the surface of the womb and the vagina, the orifice of the uterus more or less opens ... A number of external and internal factors influence the time a bitch is in

¹¹ KING, Helen: *Hippocrates’ Woman. Reading the Female Body in Ancient Greece*. London–New York 1998. 234.

¹² KING, Helen 25.

¹³ KING, Helen 24.

heat: the personality of dogs is quite varied, too; it is generally 20–25 days long ... A normal bitch will not allow the male to approach her until the 7th–9th day of her being in heat, she bites him. From the ninth to the thirteenth day she exhibits her readiness to mate by her characteristic behaviour. In this period ova become mature and are detached. Bloody discharge abates and becomes lighter in colour, more watery. Bitches are usually most fit for mating in this period, between days 11 and 13."¹⁴ For the eyes of ancient observers the pregnancy of dogs was in some ways connected to their cycle of being in heat and they might have compared the menstruation of women to this. The frequent (and quite negative) dog motif in ancient literature might have thus served as a basis of a biological impossibility, which apparently could not be refuted even in seven centuries.

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¹⁴ SZINÁK, János–VERESS, István–SÁRKÁNY, Pál: *Nagy kutya lexikon (Great Canine Encyclopaedia)*. Budapest 2000. 186. I thank Helen King for her valuable comments.

ZSOLT VISY

AMICITIA ET INVIDIA.
DIOKLETIANUS BEZIEHUNGEN
ZU SEINEN MITREGENTEN*

Summary: The two Augusti and two Caesars of Diocletian's tetrarchy have been commilitones, originating from the Balkanic provinces. They were chosen by Diocletian on the basis of friendship that was corroborated by family connections. Although these connections were changed partly because of invidia, Diocletian achieved a remarkable success through his system which was tightly connected with the possible oracle of a celtic sibyl. She said that Diocletian would become emperor if he slayed the wild boar. As Diocletian killed Flavius Aper (= boar), the oracle came true. The only representation of the boar slaying that relates to Diocletian is an inscribed tegula with such a representation found in Intercisa.

Key words: amicitia, Diocletianus, aper/boar, graffiti, Intercisa.

Die Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit gliedert sich in zwei voneinander deutlich trennbare Epochen, die mit der treffenden Benennung von Th. Mommsen als Prinzipat und Dominat bezeichnet werden. Zwischen den beiden Epochen steht die Tetrarchie mit dem Schöpfer des neuen Systems, dem Initiator der meisten Reformen, Diokletian. Der von Augustus begründete Prinzipat litt seit vielen Jahrzehnten unter inneren und äußeren Qualen; das seinerzeit so vorsichtig, ausgeglichen und zukunftsbegeistert erdachte, sparsam wirkende System konnte nicht mehr aufrecht erhalten werden. Die drei Jahrhunderte seit Augustus brachten so viele Veränderungen in Gesellschaft, Ökonomie und Politik, dass es höchste Zeit war, das Reich vor dem Zusammenbruch zu retten.

Diese Rettung kam aus Illyricum. Dieses Gebiet war den sarmatischen und germanischen Angriffen am meisten ausgeliefert, und es war jenes Gebiet, wo eine ganze Provinz, Dacia, vollständig geräumt, verloren ging. Es war das Gebiet, wo die Soldateska die Verteidigung der Balkanprovinzen längst in eigene Hände genommen hatte und anhand unterschiedlicher Bestrebungen versuchte, auch die Zentralmacht an sich zu reißen.¹ Sie konnte ohne die Zentralmacht keine dauerhafte Machtausübung sichern, da gegenüber den westlichen und östlichen Reichshälften, wo reiche

* Als Vortrag gehalten am Kolloquium zu Ehren des 65-jährigen Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. mult. Géza Alföldy: *Aspekte der Freundschaft in der griechisch-römischen Antike*. Heidelberg, 11. Juni 2000.

¹ A. ALFÖLDY: *Studien zur Geschichte der Weltkrise des 3. Jahrhunderts nach Christi*. Darmstadt 1967; G. ALFÖLDY: *Die Krise des Römischen Reichs*. HABES.

und ausgedehnte Provinzen als Hinterland für eine selbstständige Staatenbildung vorhanden waren, für die Donauprovinzen kein solches Hinterland existierte. Wenn doch, dann war das Italien, manchmal zusammen mit Africa, wie von Rostovtzeff gezeigt wurde.

Die illyrischen Kaiser ergriffen zwar mit Claudius II. wieder erfolgreich die Macht. Unter Aurelian und seinen Nachfolgern erfolgte sowohl die Vereinigung des Reiches als auch die Sicherung der Donaugrenze – ohne Dacia –, aber der Teufelskreis der immer wieder gewählten und immer wieder abgesetzten Kaiser konnte nicht durchbrochen werden.² Die Situation wurde schon oft mit der der späten Republik verglichen, wobei aber auch die grundsätzlichen Unterschiede zu betonen sind. Der wesentlichste Unterschied ist, dass es sich unter Caesar und Augustus um die Art und Weise der Machtausübung, am Ende des 3. Jh. dagegen um die Aufrechterhaltung des Reiches handelte. Wenn man nach weiteren Parallelen sucht, stößt man auf einige Ähnlichkeiten, die merkwürdig sind.

Augustus hat ein neues System ausgebaut, er reorganisierte die Wirtschaft und das Heeressystem. Das wurde auch von Diokletian getan. Augustus machte die ersten Schritte in Richtung des Herrscherkultes, Diokletian gab diesem neuen Schwung. Nur in der Methode war es ähnlich, dass sowohl Augustus als auch Diokletian die führende Schicht in ihrer Macht stärkten. Diese Schicht war für Augustus die mit dem Ritterstand ausbalancierte senatorische Aristokratie, für Diokletian in erster Linie die Provinzialaristokratie, hauptsächlich die Ritter, und besonders die sich von diesen immer stärker absondernde militärische Führerschicht. Augustus wählte seinen besten Freund aus, zuerst als Heerführer, später als Nachfolger; Diokletian machte dasselbe. Er nahm den alten Kamerad und Freund Maximian an seine Seite, der zuerst als Caesar, bald danach als Augustus Mitherrscher geworden ist. Und wenn Augustus die zukünftige Herrschaft mit vielen Intrigen durch Adoptionen und verordnete Eheschließungen vorzubereiten vermochte, so tat dies auch Diokletian innerhalb der Tetrarchie. Man kann noch hinzufügen, dass Diokletian wie Augustus die alten Tugenden und die traditionelle Religion verstärken wollte, womit er bewusst oder nicht vielfach die Methoden und Zielsetzungen seines einstigen Vorgängers nachahmte. Die einzige Frage ist, ob diese Bestrebungen vom ihm selbst, dem ungeschulten, aber hoch aufsteigenden, talentierten Dalmatiner, oder von seinen Ratgebern stammten.

Der wesentliche Unterschied bei der Tatsache, seine Freunde gleich zu Mitregenten zu machen, konnte einerseits auf ähnliche Lösungen einiger Vorgänger zurückblicken, andererseits auf die harte Tatsache, dass keiner von seinen unmittelbaren Vorgängern die vielseitigen Probleme des Riesenstaates in Krisensituationen allein bewältigen konnte, und wenn dies versucht wurde, dann kam gleich eine Usurpation. Diokletian war klug genug, das zu bedenken, und die Lösung lag auf der Hand: Es mußten die besten Freunde herangezogen werden, die als Mitkaiser die einzelnen Reichsteile regieren sollten, damit einerseits überall Ruhe herrschte, andererseits durch die Zersplitterung der Armee, später auch der Provinzverwaltung die po-

² A. Mócsy: Pannonia und die Soldatenkaiser. *ANRW* II/6, Berlin–New York 1977, 557 ff.

tentiellen Gegner in ihren Bewegungen gehindert wurden.³ Er hatte Recht: Obwohl das erzwungene System der Tetrarchie mit der Abdankung Diokletians und Maximians zusammenbrach, lebte ihr Geist noch lange so weiter, dass sich in den nachfolgenden rund 50 Jahren kein bedeutendes Gegenkaisertum ausbilden konnte, und wenn es doch Bürgerkriege gab, dann waren die Teilnehmer Familienmitglieder oder Mitregenten innerhalb der Schanzen der höchsten Macht.

Dieser Umstand unterstreicht die Bedeutung der ersten Tetrarchie und ihres Schöpfers. Nicht weniger wichtig war seine Entscheidung über seine Helfer und Kollegen. Seine Wahl fiel einerseits auf Illyrier, andererseits auf hervorragende Generale, die mit Ausnahme von Constantius von ebenso niedriger Herkunft waren wie er selbst. Es wurde oft hervorgehoben, dass er jedenfalls zu Maximian in alter Kameradschaft und in guter Freundschaft stand, aber auch die beiden weiteren, Constantius und Galerius, mussten zu diesem Freundeskreis gehören, damit sie Mitkaiser und Familienmitglieder der beiden anderen werden konnten. Constantius und Galerius mussten ihre Frauen entlassen und die Töchter der beiden Augusti heiraten. Diokletian betrachtete Maximian als seinen Bruder: *Maximianus ab eo fuerat frater adscitus* (Pan. Lat. VI (7) 15.6). Auch Lactantius nannte Diokletian und Maximian als Brüder (Mort. Pers. 8.1): *frater eius Maximianus*. Constantius war kaum jünger als Maximian, aber er wurde trotzdem *filius*, und sein Sohn, Constantinus, wurde 307 als *iure adoptionis nepos* des Maximian erwähnt (Pan. Lat. VII (6) 3.3).

In der früheren Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit wurden nur Mark Aurel und Lucius Verus *Augusti fratres* genannt.⁴ Diokletian beherrschte sie alle, nicht nur als erster und älterer Augustus, sondern vielmehr mit seiner eindeutigen Autorität. Vielleicht konnte Galerius laut Lactantius⁵ als einziger Diokletian manchmal seinen Willen aufzwingen.

Die Statuen der Tetrarchen in Venedig stehen einander paarweise umarmend, mit ernsthaftem Gesicht und stechendem Blick. Sie waren nicht nur Amtskollegen, sondern auch Freunde. Die Tiefe dieser Freundschaft lässt sich besonders am Verhalten Diokletians erkennen, als er bereit und fähig war, mit Rat und Tat, hauptsächlich aber auf Grund der noch bestehenden Freundschaft, 308 in Carnuntum Maximian noch einmal abdanken zu lassen und eine schwierige Situation zu beruhigen.

Wir kennen aber eine weitere Darstellung, die zwei Tetrarchen nebeneinander zeigt. Das ist ein Dachziegel, der in einem spätrömischen Ziegelgrab von Intercisa gefunden wurde (Abb. 1). Die in den weichen Ton eingeritzte Darstellung besteht aus drei Einheiten. Oben befindet sich eine ganz regelmäßige Inschrift, darunter zwei menschliche Figuren, die zwei Kaiser verkörpern sollen, im unteren Feld die zweimal eingeritzte Szene einer Eberjagd. I. Bóna interpretierte das Ganze als eine Spottinschrift und ironische Darstellung.⁶ Er nahm an, dass Galerius, der lokale Caesar, un-

³ E. GIBBON: *Der Untergang Roms*. Vollmer Verlag o.J., 192 ff.; K. CHRIST: *Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit*. München 1992, 702 ff.; F. KOLB: *Diocletian und die erste Tetrarchie*. Berlin 1987, 12 ff.

⁴ F. KOLB, a.a.O. 47.

⁵ Mort. Pers. 9; 18.

⁶ E. B. VÁGÓ-I. BÓNA: *Der spätrömische Südostfriedhof*. Budapest 1976, 184 f., Taf. 30 und XX.



Abb. 1. Ziegelplatte mit Inschrift für Diokletian und Ritzzeichnungen aus Intercisa

erwähnt blieb und dass die beiden im Pallium dargestellten Augusti reine Karikaturen sind, und dass dieser Charakter von der unteren Szene noch weiter untermauert wird. Th. Pekáry dachte aber, die Idee einer Karikatur zurückweisend, mit Recht an die spontane persönliche Loyalitätsbekundung einer Person, die kein Geld hatte, eine Statue zu errichten.⁷ A. Mócsy wollte nicht Galerius Maximianus, sondern Maximianus Augustus weglassen, und über die Szene meinte er, dass die beiden älteren Augusti den Kampf zwischen den neuen Tetrarchen wie in einem Amphitheater beobachten.⁸ Demgemäß wurde die Tegula spätestens 305 angefertigt. Seine Ergänzung lautet wie folgt: *Dominis nostris Diocletiano (et Maximiano Augg.) et Maximiano (= Galerio) et Constantio nobilissimis Caes.*

Diese Interpretationen können aber nicht richtig sein. Es hat keinen Sinn, dass gerade der in Illyricum regierende Galerius in der Liste einer spöttischen Inschrift weggelassen werden konnte. Mócsy hat also recht, wenn er sagt, dass die Inschrift als eine ‚normale‘ Inschrift zu betrachten ist und einer der Kaiser nur versehentlich weggelassen wurde. Er hat aber nicht recht, dass dieser Kaiser nur der alte Maximian sein konnte, da in diesem Fall (Galerius) Maximianus vor Constantius stehen würde. Ich kenne keinen solchen Fall, wo in der Reihe der Tetrarchen Galerius vor Constantius genannt wurde. Die Ergänzung ist meines Erachtens die folgende: *Dominis nostris Diocletiano et Maximiano (Augg.) et Constantio (et Galerio) nobilissimis Caes.*

Ich kann keinen Spott-Charakter dieses Monuments erkennen, vielmehr waren Text und Motive dem ‚Künstler‘, der als Schreiber und Zeichner zweifelsohne geschickt und geübt war, gut bekannt. Als der Ziegel in Intercisa hergestellt wurde, diente dieser ‚Künstler‘ dort, wohl in der Garnison des Kastells. Die zwei Gestalten im mittleren Feld müssen die beiden Augusti sein, aber mit keinem ironischen Charakter und keinesfalls als Zuschauer in einem Amphitheater, wo stehende Augusti unvorstellbar sind. Der eingeritzte Bogen konnte Mócsy diese Idee eingeben, aber es ist viel wahrscheinlicher, dass auf dem Ziegel nur der in die untere Hälfte vieler Ziegel gewöhnlich eingezogene Bogen, und nicht etwa die *cavea* eines Amphitheaters zu sehen ist. Noch schwerer wiegt, dass keiner der Kaiser als Eber dargestellt wurde, so fehlt einer solchen Interpretation in diesem Fall jede Grundlage.

Die Darstellung der Eberjagd oder Ebertötung ist aber ein gut bekannter Bildtypus im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert, besonders am Ende des 3. Jahrhunderts. Sie kommt manchmal auf Terra-sigillata-Gefäßen vor, aber sehr oft auch auf Sarkophagen. Die Eberjagd stand im Zentrum mehrerer Mythen. Als beliebtes Bild der Jagdsarkophage erscheint die Szene oft so, dass der Reiter den Eber niederstößt. Der Sarkophag von Kopenhagen, der um 230/240 entstanden sein kann, zeigt diese Szene, rund herum mit anderen menschlichen Gestalten und Tieren.⁹ Der Venatorsarkophag in Rom entstand wohl fast gleichzeitig.¹⁰ Hier wurde der reitende Hippolytos dargestellt, als er den Eber mit der Lanze tötet. Das Motiv gehörte auch zum Mythos des Adonis, aber

⁷ Th. PEKÁRY: *Das römische Kaiserbildnis in Staat, Kult und Gesellschaft*. Berlin 1985, 103.

⁸ A. MÓCSY: *Pannonia Forschung 1973–1976*. *Acta Arch. Hung.* 29, 1977, 376.

⁹ G. KOCH: *Die mythologischen Sarkophage* VI. Meleager. Berlin 1975, 96, Taf. 89.

¹⁰ G. KOCH, a. a. O. 152, Taf. 80.



Abb. 2–3. Gürtelgarnitur mit Kerbschnittdekor aus Intercisa mit Eberjagddarstellung

am meisten sieht man diese Szene im Meleager-Mythos. Der Sarkophag der Villa Doria, wo der Eber noch halb in seiner Höhle steckt, wurde reichlich mit Figuren geschmückt, entspricht aber noch einer älteren Komposition, der aus der Tetrarchie-Zeit stammende Sarkophag von Rom aber der neueren Komposition, wo der Eber schon frei steht.¹¹ Diese Kompositionen stehen denjenigen des Ziegels aus Intercisa ganz nahe.

Ähnliche Darstellungen gibt es im ganzen römischen Reich. Einige seien hier erwähnt. Merkwürdig ist, dass eine mit Kerbschnittverzierung versehene Gürtelgarnitur, die aus Intercisa stammt und in Köln aufbewahrt ist, dasselbe Thema zeigt, und zwar zweimal auf den beiden, eckig-halbkreisförmigen Zierplatten¹² (Abb. 2–3). Die-

¹¹ G. KOCH, a. a. O. 162, Taf. 184–185.

¹² G. BEHRENS: Spättrömische Kerbschnittschnallen. In: *Schumacher-Festschrift*, Mainz 1930, 283 ff.; H. BULLINGER: Spätantike Gürtelbeschläge. In: *Diss. Arch. Gandenses* 12, 1969, 92, Nr. 163,




Abb. 4. Ziegelplatte mit Ritzzeichnungen aus Intercisa

se Garnitur stammt aus dem 4. Jh., wie auch das Saphirkameo, auf dem Constantius II. einen Eber tötet.¹³ Das Motiv war auch in den späteren Jahrhunderten beliebt. Eine Platte aus Ephesos¹⁴ oder ein Mosaik aus Antiocheia aus dem 5. Jh.¹⁵ reichen aus, das zu bestätigen. Das Motiv und der Mythos lebten in der germanischen Mythenwelt weiter,¹⁶ auch Siegfried wurde von einem Eber (Hagen) getötet.

Die Frage ist, wie man die Szene der Ebertötung auf der Ziegelzeichnung von Intercisa interpretieren kann. Die einfache Lösung ist, uns nach den mythologischen Darstellungen zu richten, aber es besteht auch eine andere Möglichkeit. Man kann sich nämlich kaum von dem Gedanken lösen, dass alle Darstellungen des Ziegels eine Einheit bilden, die die Tetrarchen betrifft. In der *Numerianus-vita* steht, dass nach der Prophezeiung einer keltischen Priesterin Diokletian Kaiser sein wird, falls er den Eber tötet. *Diocletiane ... nam eris imperator, cum Aprum occideris.*¹⁷ Man sollte einer solchen Weissagung im allgemeinen keine Bedeutung schenken, aber in

Taf. 52.1–1c; D. STUTZINGER (Hrsg.): *Spätantike und frühes Christentum*. Frankfurt am Main 1983, 633 ff., Kat.-Nr. 221.

¹³ A. RUMPF: *Stilphasen der spätantiken Kunst. Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Forschung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Abhandlung*, Heft 44, Köln und Opladen 1957, 16, Abb. 10.45.

¹⁴ D. STUTZINGER (Hrsg.), a. a. O. 498 ff., Kat.-Nr. 103.

¹⁵ H. BUSCHHAUSEN, in: *Byzantinische Mosaiken aus Jordanien*. Wien 1986, 24, Abb. 12.

¹⁶ H. BECK, in: *Reallexikon der Germanischen Altertumskunde*. Berlin–New York 1986, 328 ff.

¹⁷ *SHA* Carus, Carinus et Numerianus 14.3.

diesem Fall muss man es doch tun, weil Diokletian den *praefectum praetorio*, Aper, wirklich einhändig erlegte (diese Angabe der HA wird als echt angesehen). Wenn das so geschah, kann die ‚Weissagung‘ nachträglich hierfür konstruiert worden sein, und sicherlich kannten die Soldaten sie. Als der Soldat in der militärischen Ziegelei von Intercisa noch während der Tetrarchie diese Graffito zeichnete, liegt es nahe anzunehmen, dass er diese Tat, und zwar in der gewohnten Weise des Bildtyps Ebertötung, verewigen wollte. Der Jäger ist also Diokletian selbst, und der Eber ist Aper.

Es kann kein Zufall sein, dass die Ebertötung auch in den Mosaiken des Palastes in Piazza Armerina vorkommt.¹⁸ Dies ist um so interessanter, weil eine andere Parallele zwischen Intercisa und Piazza Armerina existiert. Unweit von Grab 1078 mit dem vorigen Ziegel kam in einem weiteren Ziegelgrab (167) eine andere Tegula zutage, auf der die Gestalt einer Frau mit einem Palmzweig und einer Startscheibe in den weichen Ton eingeritzt wurde (Abb. 4). Bóna hat schon darauf hingewiesen, dass die beiden Attribute auf den Mosaiken von Piazza Armerina¹⁹ in den Händen von zwei Frauen im Bikini und in leichtem Gewand vorkommen.²⁰ Er wollte keine nähere Verbindung vermuten, aber wir wissen wohl, wie weit sich die künstlerischen Motive ausbreiteten. Da diese Villa Maximian gehört haben dürfte, ist es auch nicht ausgeschlossen, dass diese Kenntnis unmittelbar nach Intercisa gelangte, weil es sich auch im Falle der anderen Tegula wohl um einen Soldaten handelt, der über die Tetrarchie und über die Kaiser etwas mehr wusste als andere.

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¹⁸ G. V. GENTILI: *La villa imperiale di Piazza Armerina*. Roma 1956, 28, Abb. 14.

¹⁹ G. V. GENTILI, a. a. O. 42 f., Abb. 28.

²⁰ I. BÓNA, a. a. O. 185.

GÁBOR KENDEFFY

AUGUSTINE ON DIVINE IDEAS AS EPISTEMOLOGICAL CRITERIA

Summary: To what extent, if at all, can we say that the bishop of Hippo thought that the eternal rules function as truth-criteria for empirical knowledge? In the first part of this paper the author tries to show that the position according to which Augustine's theory of illumination provides a theory of knowledge that accounts even for sense-perception is extreme and based in part on a flawed interpretation of the texts; hence it is impossible to regard Augustine's eternal rules as truth-criteria in the true sense of the term. On the other hand, the aim of the second section is to argue that certain pragmatic traits can indeed be found in Augustine's "epistemology". He rejects dogmatism on moral grounds and states that it is the duty of the Christian philosopher to extend his researches to the sphere of empirical knowledge. The eternal rules, it can be said, serve as points of reference for a form of probabilism.

Key words: Augustine, Bubacz, Confessions, criterion of truth, epistemology, scepticism, theory of knowledge.

In a number of passages Augustine unequivocally states that it is through the light of divine wisdom, with the help of eternal and immutable intellectual rules, that human reason performs its task of judging (*iudicat*) sense-impressions, recollections based on sense-perception, and concepts formed by the imagination.¹ These eternal rules are for him identical with the divine ideas (*species*): the forms (*rationes*) that served as patterns for God's creation of the world, and are the constituent elements of His wisdom, i.e., His actual substance.² Augustine's approach to the divine forms remains largely inside the conceptual framework of mathematics, to the point where he can risk the hypothesis that perhaps even Wisdom itself is nothing other than number.³ One question, however, still arises: to what extent, if at all, can we say that the sage of Thagaste thought that the eternal rules function as truth-criteria for empirical knowledge? Most scholars deny that Augustine attributed any great importance to

¹ See, e.g., *lib. arb.* 2.3,9ff.; *vera rel.* 29,53ff; *ep.* 147. 16,39. As far as intellectual concepts are concerned, Augustine does not allow for any possibility of error; hence he is not speaking of judgement in the strict sense, but rather the their separation from images connected to the body (*discernere, diudicare*). Spiritual substances like God and the soul are able to attain knowledge first and foremost by a process of gradual abstraction from everything that is *not-spirit*. (not-God?) (*trin.* VIII.2,3. *trin.* I.1,5. Cf. VERBEKE 1962; VAN BAVEL 1993

² *lib. arb.* 3. 5. 13.; *div. qu.* 46. 2.; *Gn.litt.* 1. 10. 20; 1.18. 36.; 5. 12. 28; 5. 13. 29.; *trin.* 4. 10. 11.)

³ *lib. arb.* 2. 11. 32.

empirical knowledge. The most radical critic of this consensus is Bruce Bubacz, who acknowledges in the bishop of Hippo first of all the epistemologist of genius whose theory of illumination provides a theory of knowledge that accounts even for sense-perception.⁴ In the first part of this paper I will try to show that this position is extreme and based in part on a flawed interpretation of the texts; hence it is impossible to regard Augustine's eternal rules as truth-criteria in the true sense of the term. In the second section I will argue that certain pragmatic traits can indeed be found in Augustine's "epistemology". He rejects dogmatism on moral grounds and states that it is the duty of the Christian philosopher to extend his researches to the sphere of empirical knowledge. The eternal rules, it can be said, serve as points of reference for a form of probabilism.

1

Bubacz cites the following text as proof that Augustine had a constructive epistemology (*De Trinitate* 9. 6. 10)⁵:

Unde etiam phantasias rerum corporalium per corporis sensus haustas et quodam modo infusas memoriae ex quibus etiam ea quae non visa sunt ficto phantasmate cogitantur, sive aliter quam sunt, sive fortuitu sicuti sunt, aliis omnino regulis supra mentem nostram incommutabiliter manentibus, vel approbare apud nosmetipsos vel improbare convincimur, cum recte aliquid approbamus aut improbamus. Nam et cum recolo Carthaginis moenia quae vidi et cum fingo Alexandriae quae non vidi, easdemque imaginarias formas quasdam quibusdam praeferens rationabiliter praefero, viget et claret desuper iudicium veritatis, ac sui iuris incorruptissimis regulis firmum est; et si corporalium imaginum quasi quodam nubilo subtextitur, non tamen involvitur atque confunditur.

In my opinion, the form of "acceptance" (*approbare*) or "rejection" (*improbare*) that our text proposes does not in fact involve a qualification of truth or falsity. This is clear from examples cited in the following paragraph (9. 6. 11), where Augustine mentions, first of all, a person who is said to have suffered excruciating tortures in order to bear witness to his faith; upon meeting him we discover, however, that certain other actions of his reveal that the real motivation for his heroism was not

⁴ BUBACZ 1980; 1981; 1982. O'DALY (100ff.), much more cautious, emphasizes the gap in Augustine between metaphysical and empirical knowledge, and quite correctly remarks that the sage of Thagaste never developed an epistemological account of the way we compare sense-data, memories, and ideas of the imagination with the divine ideas. At the same time he notes "*the Ideas are the guarantors of the correctness of our perceptions*" (100–101) and, appealing to *Soliloquia* 1. 15. 27, he attributes to the philosopher the notion that every true empirical statement is true to the extent that it partakes of the truth (102). Augustine, however, does not here connect the truth of any single statement, that is to say its coherence to reality, with the extent to which it partakes of the truth; rather he says that an object of perception, insofar as it really and truly exists, partakes of the truth. He does not in fact tell us just in what sense we can call the ideas a criterion.

⁵ See BUBACZ 1981, 93ff.

true faith. At such a juncture our judgement of the person in question is altered, but this does not change the form of unshakeable and constant truth (*forma inconcussae et stabilis veritatis*), or – which is essentially one and the same thing – the form of immutable justice (*incommutabilis iustitia*), a single bit: the latter, of course, in the new situation will prescribe a different behavioural norm. The “form of truth” does not have any part to play in our empirically-based change of mind – our recognition that the actions of the person in question are not in fact above criticism – but rather in the moral condemnation which replaces our earlier approbation. The second example cited is that of a beautifully curved bow that the author saw in Carthage. He emphasizes the difference between his obscure and confused recollection of the bow and that certain image, difficult to define, that he perceives in his mind (*quod mente conspicio*). The quality of the workmanship pleases on the basis of the latter (*secundum quod opus illud placet*), but he also says that he would be able to correct the recollection on this same basis if he should find something in it not to his liking (*unde si displiceret, corrigerem*). The judgement in this case is aesthetic, but the essence of the aesthetic for Augustine is to be found in the mathematical-geometric aspect of the divine forms.

After these preliminaries, it seems highly probable that the example of the walls of Carthage and Alexandria was never intended as proof that, while the image in my mind of the former, being the remembered image of a thing I once perceived directly, is true, the latter, being a synthetic image composed of many others compiled in the imagination, is false, and that this “preferential judgement” is guaranteed by the eternal rules. Augustine simply wanted to provide an example of each category, of remembered and imagined images respectively, and the preferential judgement is to be understood as applying *within each category respectively*. This is clear from his remark that we prefer *one or the other of these same imagined forms (easdemque imaginarias formas quasdam quibusdam praeferens)*.

Our text therefore leads us to interpret *iudicium veritatis* as regards the objects of the external world not as a touchstone *by which* we can judge truth (*genitivus obiectivus*), but rather a touchstone provided or denoted *by* truth (*genitivus subiectivus* and/or *explicativus*).

In *Confessiones* 6,10 we find that Augustine attributes first of all an ontological and aesthetic significance to the eternal forms. The passage forms part of Augustine’s meditations on the way in which the things of the perceptible world allude in some negative way to God and, in doing so, praise Him and teach us to love Him. Each thing, however perfect or imperfect, through its external appearance or beauty (*species*) betrays – or in Augustine’s words, declares (*loqui*) – that it is *not* God: in doing so it glorifies His absolute perfection. The soul, the speaking subjectivity, here inquires of the things of the empirical world which of them it loves when it loves God. The question is the striving, the *attention (intentio)* of the Augustinian “I”; the answer is the *species* of each of the phenomena (*Interrogatio mea intentio mea, et responsio eorum species eorum*). And so we arrive at the passage that, if we follow Bubacz’s interpretation, is supposed to raise the question of how it is that the same external world can appear differently to different observing subjectivities⁶:

⁶See BUBACZ 1980.

Nonne omnibus quibus integer sensus est apparet haec species? Cui non omnibus eadem loquitur? Animalia pusilla et magna vident eam, sed interrogare nequeunt, on enim praeposita est in eis nuntiantibus sensibus iudex ratio. Homines autem possunt interrogare, ut invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciant, sed amore subduntur eis et subditi iudicare non possunt. Nec respondent ista interrogantibus nisi iudicantibus, nec vocem acceptam foris intus cum veritate conferunt. Veritas enim dicit mihi, 'non est deus tuus terra et caelum neque omne corpus.' Hoc dicit eorum natura. Viden? Moles est, minor in parte quam in toto. Iam tu melior es, tibi dico, anima, quoniam tu vegetas molem corporis tui praebens ei vitam, quod nullum corpus praestat corpori. Deus autem tuus etiam tibi vitae vita est.

That the *species* of each created thing does not say the same thing to everyone (*lege*: to every created subjectivity) means only, according to my interpretation, that it does not in every case tell the truth as regards the question “where is God *not*”, “what is He *not*”; and hence, by implication, where and what He *can* be. The phenomena cannot address the animals in this way because they do not have a rational mind, and lovers of the temporal world are excluded as well because they are by their voluntary submission to the empirical world unable to assume a position of judgement. The ordered design of the world truly addresses only those who confront the external voice with the truth within.⁷ Thus it is the inner truth, in the true meaning of the word, that speaks. The nature of earth and sky informs the inner man about the ontological status of the body. In this passage, therefore, the criterium is first of all the divine Truth present in the rational mind, and only in a secondary sense the *iudex ratio*; its judgement is related to the structure of the created world and the ontological status of individual created things, and does not establish whether any of their concepts or images is true or false.

This aesthetic and ontological point of view predominates in the discussion that begins at ch. 2.3.9 of the *De libero arbitrio*, according to which the senses pronounce judgement on their objects, the inner sense judges the senses, and reason the inner sense. The tasks of rational consciousness as regards the external world are as follows: 1) it establishes the difference between the body perceived, the perception, and any perceptive capacity not actively employed in perception; 2) it performs the function of defining the difference between the object, the perception, the internal perception, and itself; finally 3) one finds the rather vague task of differentiating the objects of perception “according to their limits” (*ea quae sentiuntur suis finibus discernere*). This makes possible not only that we perceive the objects of perception, but know them (*scientia comprehendere*). But how are we to understand the differentiation of the objects of perception according to their limits? It is clear from the context

⁷ The word *species*, therefore, here means not simply “external features”, but “ordered appearance”, “beauty”. cf. *vera rel.* 29. 52–33.61. See p. 10ff. of this paper. cf. the translation of O'DONNEL 1992 : *beauty*; E. Tréhorel and P. G. Bouisson's translation: *beauté* (BA 14, *Nouvelle série* 159.) See also the textual parallel cited by O'DONNEL 1992 (III.169–170), in which *pulchritudo* and *evidentia* both serve as synonyms for *species*.

that Augustine is thinking of the conscious separation (almost a definition) of the levels of being that play a role in knowledge (percieved physical quality, sense-organ, inner sense, rational mind). Reason can perceive (*videre*) the lower strata of being with the help of a faculty of knowledge subordinate to it; that is to say, that such a faculty can inform (*renuntiare*) the rational mind about them, but only reason itself is able, with the means at its disposal, to separate (*definire*) the strata of being from each other and itself.⁸ The discussion continues with the question of how or on what basis the rational mind performs this work of judgement, and arrives at the eternal rules mentioned above, which Augustine here calls the “inner rules of truth” (*interiores regulae veritatis quas communiter cernimus*). With their help we can make judgements about bodies – for instance that X is not as perfectly white or as perfectly square as it ought to be (*minus candidum est quam debuit aut minus quadrum*) – or souls – e.g., that someone is not as suited to a task, or not as friendly or as strong as he should be (*minus aptus est quam debuit aut minus lenis aut minus vehemens*) (2.12.34): in this last sort of judgement the moral state of the judge has an important part to play (*sicut nostrorum morum ratio se tulerit*). Furthermore on this basis we can establish that the incorruptible is superior to the corrupted, the eternal to the temporal, the invulnerable to the vulnerable (2.10. 29).

From this we can draw the following conclusions:

1) Of the normative statements that we reach with the help of the rules, some can be explained from the mathematical nature of the rules themselves, as Augustine remarks not only in this work but in the *De vera religione* as well (see the discussion of the similarity of *numerus* and *sapientia* in *lib. arb.* 2. 11. 30–32). The statement “This is not as white as it should be” is surprisingly empirical, but in fact fits neatly into the sequence. Elsewhere Augustine argues that the soul strives in the course of any kind of perception – and therefore even in cases where mathematical laws apparently have no part to play (e.g., in touch, smell, and taste) – for symmetry (*convenientia*), equality (*aequalitas*) and similarity (*similitudo*).⁹

2) Other judgements are of a moral nature, and these are directly dependent on the moral state of the judge, which is partly a cause, partly a consequence of what we comprehend of the eternal, unchanging rules. These naturally have a moral content as well, since they are constituent elements of the Wisdom of God.

3) The rational mind judges the hierarchy of the soul’s various faculties of knowledge on the basis of the eternal rules and even gives each faculty its respective place in the ontological hierarchy of the cosmos, insofar as it acknowledges the ontological difference that lies, on the one hand, between perception and its object, and, on the other, the mind and the eternal rules. It therefore distinguishes levels or strata of being.¹⁰ This conclusion is substantiated by the fact that the proof of the existence of God in *De libero arbitrio* II begins with the axiom that existence, life,

⁸ See 2. 3. 9.

⁹ *mus.* 6. 13. 38; 6. 14. 44.

¹⁰ cf. *Ep. 147. (De videndo Deo)* 17. 41–18. 45.

and knowledge are three different things.¹¹ In surveying the faculties of knowledge the speculative mind follows the ladder of being upwards from bottom to top. This means that the knowledge expressed in the eternal rules in fact conveys the true metaphysical structure of the soul and the world.¹² That the differentiation of levels of being has a part to play in the evolution of experiential knowledge (science) has already been suggested by the paraphrased tenet that we not only perceive the objects of perception but make them the objects of our knowledge (*scientia comprehendere*). There is no restriction as to the point of view from which they can be known, so we cannot exclude the possibility that Augustine is discussing some sort of empirical knowledge or science. The possibility of such “scientific knowledge” is deduced by Augustine directly from the statement that the strata of being that play a role in knowledge are distinguishable one from the other (*ea quae sentiuntur suis finibus discernere*). He neglects to tell us what distance may separate the two.¹³

2

Even though a number of passages in Augustine – especially in the early works – deny all possibility of knowledge of the external world, categorically rejecting the idea that the criterion of truth has anything to do with empirical knowledge,¹⁴ in others – and moreover in important works of his mature period – we find that the mind is able, with the help of the eternal rules, to systematize perceptual data into a sort of empirical science.

The most unequivocal statement of this sort is to be found in *De Trinitate* 12.2.2:

Possunt autem et pecora et sentire per corporis sensus extrinsecus corporalia et ea memoriae fixa reminisci atque in eis appetere conducibilia, fugere incommoda, verum ea notare ac non solum naturaliter rapta, sed etiam de industria memoriae commendata retinere et in oblivionem iam iamque labentia recordando atque cogitando rursus imprimere, ut quemadmodum ex eo quod gerit memoria cogitatio formatur, sic et hoc ipsum quod in memoria est cogitatione firmetur: fictas etiam visiones hinc atque hinc recordata quaelibet sumendo et quasi assuendo componere, inspicere, quemadmodum in hoc rerum genere quae verisimilia sunt discernantur a veris, non spiritualibus, sed ipsis corporalibus, haec atque huiusmodi quamvis in sensibilibus atque in eis quae inde animus per sensum corporis traxit agantur atque versentur, non sunt tamen ra-

¹¹ Daniel SCHMAL (1997, 74) has proved that the Augustinian *cogito* fits into the threefold metaphysical structure of *being–life–knowledge*, and is in no way the foundation of this structure.

¹² cf. *Gn. ad litt.* 12. 6. 15–31. 59 (on the hierarchy of *visiones*).

¹³ I would like to allude shortly to the way that, in my opinion, BUBACZ (1980) appeals without the slightest justification to *mag.* 11. 38-ra in arguing for his position. In this passage Augustine speaks of inner and outer light, and of things of the body and the soul, but he says nothing about whether we seek the judgement of the inner light in connection with things of the body.

¹⁴ See, e.g., *c. acad.* 3. 9. 18ff; 3. 17. 37–38; *ep.* 118. 3. 19.

tionis expertia, nec hominibus pecoribusque communia. Sed sublimioris rationis est iudicare de istis corporalibus secundum rationes incorporales et sempiternas: quae nisi supra mentem humanam essent, incommutabiles profecto non essent, atque his nisis subiungeretur aliquid nostrum, non secundum eas possemus iudicare de corporalibus. Iudicamus autem de corporalibus ex ratione dimensionum et figurarum, quam incommutabiliter manere mens novit.

The passage permits the conclusion that a re-examination of the images of sense-perception is involved in our judgement of bodily things. The point of this re-examination is the separation of truth from probability. In this case we must therefore conclude that the eternal forms do, in fact, serve as a criterion of truth. I would, however, like to call attention to the way in which Augustine emphasizes that the distinction can be only imperfect “in matters such as these”, and that the truth in question is only a kind of bodily, not an intellectual truth (in the *De Trinitate* the word *spiritualis* does not allude to the level of *vivere*, but rather to that of *intelligere*). Hence, in the course of empirical knowing we take aim at a lesser order of truth.¹⁵ On this level of being the “true” means only the “probable”; the probable represents merely the potential for error.

Augustine therefore is recommending a form of probabilism (?). The method is one of confrontation of a perception with the *rule of proportion and shape*. We are to compare the physical world of perception with the real thing, its pattern, namely the mathematical and physical laws that govern the nature of bodies. We can grasp these laws in the eternal rules. This process will lead us to the form of understanding that the *De libero arbitrio* expressed as *scientia comprehendere*.¹⁶

This is the same *scientia* that Augustine discusses at *De trinitate* 15. 12. 21–22, where, after the “si fallor, sum” argument in defense of the knowledge of the knowing subject, he extends the concept of knowledge to sense-perception and even to our acceptance of verbal and written communications. Bubacz also cites the passage as proof of Augustine’s constructive epistemology.¹⁷ All the same, it is clear that here the philosopher is talking about knowledge only in a greatly reduced sense. Knowledge gained through the senses or other indirect sources – in contrast with the kind of knowledge that remains within the bounds of the knowing subject or tries to stretch those boundaries upwards – is not, for Augustine, indubitable. At another point of the *De trinitate* (12. 1. 3) and in a number of other writings as well, he draws a very strict line separating forms of knowledge that are completely beyond doubt, and those that are not;¹⁸ the section of the *De civitate Dei* in which he propounds the *si*

¹⁵ *c. Iul.* 4. 14. 65, also mentioned by BUBACZ (1981, 94), is a similar discussion of relative knowledge.

¹⁶ cf. *ep.* 147. 16. 38, where the *mens* is the subject of an extremely complicated activity stretching from the voluntary fixation, recollection and grouping of images of the memory and the imagination to the act of passing judgement on them with the help of the eternal rules of which we read in *trin.* 12.2.2.

¹⁷ See BUBACZ 1980.

¹⁸ cf. *ep.* 147. *praef.* 4., *Gn. litt.* 12. 1. 3 *retr.* 1. 14. 3. See O'DALY 1987, 95ff.; KENDEFFY 2001, 195.

fallor, sum argument (19.16) asserts only that we must *believe* in the *evidentia* of sense phenomena and the communication of apparently reliable witnesses.

Augustine, on occasion, when discussing just the possibility of how one can avoid errors in sense-perception, mentions the eternal rules as a starting-point for the act of judgement.

A passage of the *De vera religione* (29. 59–32.62) sets the form of judgement that aims to eliminate the possibility of error in sense-perception in the same aesthetic-ontological context that we have observed elsewhere. Just as in the *De libero arbitrio*, here too Augustine moves from the visible to the invisible along the hierarchy of knowledge-faculties, and, as at *Confessiones* 10. 6. 9, he proceeds toward the original pattern of the beauty (here: *pulchritudo*) of the created world. Physical beauty is perceived (*sentit*) by a lower faculty of the soul, the so-called *vital nature* (*natura vitalis*) or, by another name, *sensitive life* (*vita sentiens*) (29. 52). Using the means offered by sense, a higher faculty, *thinking life* (*vita ratiocinans*) passes judgement (*iudicat*) on bodies (29. 53). This latter does not, however, judge autonomously, but rather on the basis of the intelligible divine nature that it perceives, if imperfectly, with its higher “part”: the rational mind (*mens*). In judging physical beauty, the mind works on the basis of one important aspect of the divine nature, unity. This is why similarity, symmetry, and harmony appeal to us in physical bodies (30. 54–55).

Here Augustine, apparently without the slightest logical justification, fits the judgement of sense-perception (*sensus*) – which is to say the mental correction of erroneous sense-impressions – into the framework of his description of the aesthetic-ontological judgement of the phenomena of perception (*sensibilia*):

*Non solum autem rationalis vita de sensibilibus, sed ipsis quoque sensibus iudicat; cur in aqua remum infractum oporteat apparere cum rectus sit, et cur ita per oculos sentiri necesse sit. Nam ipse aspectus oculorum renuntiare id potest, iudicare autem nullo modo*¹⁹

¹⁹ 29. 53: The attentive reader will already have noticed that while in the *De libero arbitrio* Augustine said that the senses also pass judgement on sense-phenomena, even as the inner sense judges not only the perceived things themselves but also the senses that inform us about them, here he makes judgement the privilege of the rational faculty. There is in fact no essential difference between the positions taken in these two works. The kind of judgement that, according to the *De libero arbitrio*, the sense-organs pass on the objects of perception is of a purely elementary sort – the wholly unconscious re-action of the sense-organs to external impressions. The real subject of this judgement cannot, of course, be the sensory faculty itself, but rather the soul, which by its own striving towards the object (*intentio animi*) informs itself about the impressions that have reached the body (e.g. the sense-organ; see *quant. an.* 23. 45 ep. 137; 25. 48; *mus.* 6. 5. 10; *Gn. litt.* 8. 21. 42; 12. 16.33). This judgement expresses itself in terms of pleasure and pain (*lib. arb.* 2. 5. 12). The inner sense, following on this, judges and corrects the intensity of the perception (*ibid.*) The mind, according to *lib. arb.*, co-ordinates the activity of the different sensory faculties, and is at the same time the only faculty of the soul able to carry out the particular form of judgement directly dependent on the eternal rules. The apparent contradiction is resolved by the fact that, while *lib. arb.* concentrates on the interconnected nature of the different faculties of knowledge, *vera rel.* emphasizes the role of the subject of knowledge as a morally qualifiable rational being. In fact, of course, Augustine sees a close connection between the so-called “conscious” and “unconscious” forms of judgement, in so far as the former in some sense mirrors the latter. The activity of the essentially – if imperfectly – unitary soul is marked, in sense-perception as much as in the contemplation of the eternal rules, by a voluntary striving or directedness. cf. those passages of *De Trinitate* (11. 3. 6–4. 7), in which

At the end of this argument from the visible to the invisible Augustine raises the question of what conditions are necessary, for someone to be able to distinguish real, intelligible beauty from its physical imitations. He holds that "a man equipped with inner eyes and able to see invisibly" (*vir intrinsecus oculatus et invisibiliter videns*) will be "brave enough to judge even the delights of humanity" (*ut iudex audeat esse ipsius delectationis humanae*), which means that "he will judge not on the basis of pleasure, but will judge pleasure itself (*non secundum ipsam, sed ipsam iudicat*)."²⁰ But this is not simply a question of natural endowments or luck. A person who takes delight only in the beauty of created things bears full responsibility for his error. Beautiful things do not mislead him, since they do not possess a will aiming to deceive (*voluntas fallendi*):

*Ergo corporea species, quia nullam voluntatem habet, non mentitur. Si vero etiam non putetur esse quod non est, nec fallit. Sed ne ipsi quidem oculi fallunt. Non enim renuntiare animo possunt nisi affectionem suam. Quod si non solum ipsi, sed omnes corporis sensus ita nuntiant ut afficiuntur, quid ab eis amplius exigere debeamus ignoro, Tolle itaque vanitantes, et nulla erit vanitas. Si quis rerum in aqua frangi opinatur et cum inde aufertur integrari, non malum habet internuntium, sed malus est iudex. Nam ille pro sua natura non potuit alter in aqua sentire nec aliter debuit. Si enim aliud est aer aliud aqua, iustum est, ut aliter in aere aliter in aqua sentiat. Quare oculus recte, ad hoc enim factus est, ut tantum videat. Ille autem vult mentem convertere ad corpora, oculos ad Deum. Quaerit enim intelligere carnalia et videre spiritalia, quod fieri non potest.*²⁰

On the question of how exactly the eternal rules serve as a criterion for the recognition and correction of sense-errors, the passage claims that the sense organs themselves inform us of their own empirical impressions (*Non enim renuntiare animo possunt nisi affectionem suam*), and that this occurs by necessity (*Nam ille pro sua natura non potuit alter in aqua sentire nec aliter debuit*). The same physical processes or mutual interactions of cause and effect that determine the relations of external bodies characterize the relations of bodies and the sense-faculties as well. The laws which govern these interactions are revealed to the mind in the ideas, the eternal rules. So the mind is able, starting from these rules, to draw inferences about which processes led, in a given case, to a certain sense-impression. The argument is similar to the one we find at a point in the *De Trinitate* (11.2.3.) important in itself for our discussion, since here Augustine touches on an epistemological problem of considerable importance, the existence of the external world. The passage argues

Augustine points to the presence of the will (identified with *intentio* and *amor*) not only in the contemplation of the ideas, but in perception and recollection as well (cf. *civ.* 14. 6. 13–7. 14). For Augustine the soul, if not to the same extent as God himself (*trin.* IV.5; VI.6,8), is a unified whole (*conf.* 10. 7. 12; see KÖRNER 1956; HÖLSCHER 1986, 101ff.). Hence judgement, as an essential function of the soul, permeates all its levels. Judgement cannot in fact really be distinguished from *intentio*: it is nothing other than the epistemological aspect of the latter.

²⁰ 33. 61–62.

that, just as it is possible in the external world to trace impressions back to an original form, so the mind is able to infer that the forms present to the senses must possess some original form in the external world.²¹ Correction is possible, by the testimony of both texts, only in a relative sense, since we can draw inferences from sense-impressions to their causes only with the help of other sense-impressions and the powers of recollection and imagination founded on them. The process of knowing is therefore entirely open-ended; one can indeed say that the theory represents a form of probabilism, if not in the strictest sense.

The way in which, in the *De vera religione*, Augustine identifies the two forms of judgement as one and the same seems at first sight quite illogical: for him both faculties of judgement originate in the contemplation of the divine nature (30,54), even as it is clear that they are completely different; the one being aesthetic in nature, the other factual. How is it possible that both these faculties serve as a ladder connecting the different levels of being, each of which is both the subject of the one below and the object of the one above? Also surprising is the parallel drawn between aesthetic and factual error (*falli*) – for the latter is nothing other than incorrect judgement. The passage does, however, enable us to find the deeper parallel linking the two kinds of judgement and the two kinds of error.²² The parallel is in fact a moral one. If I err in an aesthetic judgement, I cannot say that the perceived phenomena have deceived me, for these are always incorruptible witnesses; I am in fact the victim of my own mistaken ethical presuppositions: I have made the witness, physical beauty, into my standard of judgement, forgetting that the real standard is the incorporeal beauty of the divine. Similarly, it is not the oar or the water that tricks me when I see the oar in the water and really think it is broken, nor in fact my eye, but my incorrect moral standpoint: I have again made the witness, the sense-faculty, my criterion of judgement when the true standard of judgement is the Wisdom of God which expresses itself in the eternal rules. The purely epistemological issue simply does not interest the philosopher. What interests him is the moral inference to be drawn from any given judgement, correct or incorrect. Even so, or thanks precisely to this, the passage makes it clear that the degree of precision of our empirical knowledge is not at all indifferent. In this important question, therefore, I find myself in complete agreement with Bubacz. I would, however, like to make two additions to his thesis. 1) What I have called “the degree of precision of our empirical knowledge” can, as I hope is clear enough from the preceding arguments, extend only to a high level of probability. Observation of the world of perception from as many points of view as possible and the comparison of sense-data with the eternal forms can serve only as grounds for some sort of probabilism which leads only to a lower order of knowledge. 2) Augustine, in stating the identity of aesthetic and factual judgements, not only brings (perhaps distorting) moral elements into his epistemol-

²¹ cf. *ep.* 147. 16.39.

²² BUBACZ (1981, 96), citing other passages, correctly calls attention to the difficulty that in Augustine the two approaches to the problem of empirical knowledge run parallel to one another. One concentrates on the problem, in modern epistemological terms, of illusion and reality (e.g., “si fallor, sum”), the other on the ontological issue, and places the hierarchy of levels of being in the centre of attention.

ogy, but in fact reconstructs the epistemology itself on a moral foundation. Which is to say that he expresses the moral demand that the human mind doubt its sense-impressions and look further, subjecting them to reexamination and judgement and consulting as many witnesses in as many ways as possible. Dogmatism is a sin. This thought is closely tied to the way in which Augustine establishes the association of the lower order of knowledge, *scientia* as opposed to *sapientia*, with *actio*, the useful employment of temporal things,²³ itself dependent on our attainment of certain virtues.²⁴ Hence *scientia* is intimately connected with the moral and social spheres.²⁵

The other important passage concerning sense-error is *De Genesi ad litteram* 12. 25. 52:

Illuditur autem anima similitudinibus rerum, non earum vitio, sed opinionis suae, cum approbat, quae similia sunt pro iis quibus similia sunt, ab intelligentia deficiens. Fallitur ergo in visione corporali, cum in ipsis corporibus fieri putat quod fit in corporibus sensibus; sicut navigantibus videntur in terra moveri quae stant, et intuentibus coelum stare sidera quae moventur et divaricatis radiis oculorum duas lucernae species apparere et in aqua remus infractus et multa huius modi, aut cum putat aliquid hoc esse quod similiter coloratum est vel similiter sonat vel olet vel sapit vel tangitur; hinc enim et medicamentum aliquod ceratum coctum in cacabo putatur legumen et sonitus transeuntis vehiculi putatur ex tonitruo, et si nullis aliis sensibus exploretur sed soli adiaceat olfactui, citrium putatur herba quae vocatur apiaria, et cibus aliquo dulciculo succo affectus putatur melle conditus, et ignotus annulus contrectatus in tenebris putatur aureus aut argenteus, aut cum repentinus inopinatisque corporalibus visis anima turbata vel in somnis videre se putat, vel aliquo huiusmodi spiritali viso affici: unde in omnibus corporalibus visis et aliorum sensuum contestatio et maxime ipsius mentis atque rationis adhibetur, ut quod in hoc rerum genere verum est inveniatur quantum ineniri potest. In visione autem spiritali, id est in corporum similitudinibus, quae spiritu videntur, fallitur anima, cum ea quae sic videt, ipsa corpora esse arbitratur; vel quod sibi suspicione falsa coniectura finxerit, hoc etiam in corporibus putat, quae non visa coniectat.

The passage in my opinion does *not* say that “the mind, that is to say the insight of reason” enables us to distinguish without fail, with the help of the eternal rules, cucumbers from aparias, or wax from vegetable stew.²⁶ Augustine elsewhere (*trin.* 4.16.21) denies the possibility that this kind of purely empirical knowledge can have anything to do with the contemplation of the ideas. In my interpretation Augustine here attributes the following function to the eternal rules: since they give insight,

²³ *trin.* 12. 14. 22.

²⁴ *trin.* 12. 14. 21.

²⁵ See *trin.* 12. 3. 3–14. 21.

²⁶ The latter example reminds one of the Hellenistic anecdote that illustrates the difference between approval and contingent acceptance based on probability in Stoic epistemology. See DL 7. 177; Athenaeus, 8. 354e.

according to the degree of preparation of the mind in question, into the mathematical and physical laws that govern the physical world, we can compare any given external object with them by investigating it through as many sense-faculties and as many points of view as possible.²⁷ The relative nature of the result is expressed in similar terms to the passage at *trin.* 12. 2. 2, which we have already discussed: “the discovery of the truth, insofar as this is possible at all in matters such as these”. The statement “this is a cucumber”, which, it would seem, ought to be confirmed with relative ease, can never in fact be true in the same way, as, say, the Pythagorean theorem. Here we are dealing with a form of truth better described as probability.

The Christian philosopher, therefore, recommends a kind of probabilism.²⁸ His sort of probabilism is, however, rather permissive, since the lesser order of knowledge with which it is concerned extends not only to the senses, but to knowledge based on indirect communications as well. Where no direct sense-impressions are available, we are forced, even obliged, to make do with verbal or written information, and to relate each datum one to the other in a hierarchy of probability just as we would the data of direct sense-perception, if only because Christian life is active and social by nature. Faith, based on revelation, sets further limits to probabilism, since according to Augustine the miraculous epiphanies of God and his Incarnation and the miracles of Christ and his disciples must be considered true and not merely plausible; we do not however, establish their truth by comparing our sense-impressions, recollections, and imaginative images with the natural laws grasped through the contemplation of the eternal forms.

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(CCSL: *Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina*; CSEL *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*;
 BA: *Bibliothèque Augustinienne*; PL: *Patrologia Latina*)

²⁷ The roots of this thought can be found also in the early *Contra academicos* (3. 11. 26), cited up to now only as a source for the opposite tendency.

²⁸ cf. KENDEFFY 2001 190ff.

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THE INITIAL STATE OF MAN IN AUGUSTINE'S *DE GENESI CONTRA MANICHAEOS*¹

Summary: An important passage of Augustine's *De genesi contra manichaeos* (Gen. man. 2.8.10), which seems to be the source of permanent misunderstandings, includes one thesis, two hypotheses, and three sub-hypotheses concerning the initial state of man or the soul. All possibilities derive from an exegetical puzzle raised by Gen. 2:7. The author of the paper analyses these possibilities mentioned by Augustine in order to ponder whether Augustine gave preference to one of them. Arguments are shown for the assumption that according to the early Augustine, in its initial state the soul did not use any kind of body.

Key words: St. Augustine, origin of the soul, first man, exegesis.

Augustine's early interpretation of Genesis 1:26, 2:7 and 3:21; that is, his concept of man and theory about the origin of the soul, raises difficulties. According to the famous and disputed theory of Robert J. O'Connell and his disciples, Augustine believed that the soul "is fallen and yet not fully fallen, that memory and illumination are identical, that souls are diversely fallen and differ in their way of return."² O'Connell grounds his conclusions upon detailed analyses of Augustine's early works, above all, *De genesi contra manichaeos*.³ The other thesis he insistently formulated in his writings is closely linked to the fallen-soul theory, namely, that Augustine believed in the pre-existence of souls. In the first commentary "the pre-existence of the soul must have been so obviously an *implicit* to the moderately cultivated reader of his time that Augustine does not feel the slightest need to 'unequivocally assert' it."⁴

¹ An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of North American Patristics Society in 2000.

² I borrowed this concise summary of O'Connell's position from R. PENASKOVIC, "The Fall of the Soul in Saint Augustine: A *Qaestio Disputata*," *Augustinian Studies* 17 (1986), 135.

³ R. J. O'CONNELL, *St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968, 156–183; idem "The *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* and the Origin of the Soul," *Revue des Etudes augustinienes* 39 (1993): 129–141.

⁴ O'CONNELL 1993, 139; cf. idem 1968, 183.

These conclusions have been criticised by many specialists in Augustine's theology.⁵ However, all of its opponents except Roland J. Teske pay no particular attention to *De genesi contra manichaeos*, the work which O'Connell regarded as the most relevant to the issue.⁶ I shall focus on this commentary.

The key passage of the work, which seems to me to be the source of permanent misunderstandings, includes one thesis, two hypotheses, and three sub-hypotheses concerning the initial state of man or the soul. All possibilities derive from an exegetical puzzle raised by Gen. 2:7.

Scripture says, 'And he breathed into him the breath of life, and man became a living soul.' If up to this point there was only the body, we should understand that the soul was at this point joined to the body. Perhaps the soul had already been made, but was still as if in the mouth of God, that is, in his truth and wisdom. But it did not depart from there as if separated by places, when it was breathed forth. For God is not contained by place, but is present everywhere. Or perhaps the soul was made when God breathed the breath of life into the mud he had formed so that the breathing forth signifies God's activity by which he made the soul in man by the spirit of his power. If the man who had been made was already body and soul, sensation was added to the soul⁷ by that breath, when man was made a living soul – not that this breath was turned into the living soul, but it acted upon the living soul. We should not yet think of the man who was made into a living soul as spiritual, but as still animal. For he was made spiritual when he was established in paradise, that is, in the happy life, and received the commandment of perfection so that he might then be made perfect by the word of God. Thus, after he sinned by withdrawing from God's commandment and was dismissed from paradise, he remained in such a state that he was animal.⁸

⁵ See the reviews by Robert P. RUSSELL in *Thought* 44 (1969), Mary T. CLARK in *International Philosophical Quarterly* 11 (1971) and Ernest FORTIN in *Theological Studies* 30 (1969). More detailed criticisms are formulated by G. O'DALY, "Did Augustine ever Believe in the Soul's Pre-existence?" *Augustinian Studies* 5 (1974): 227–235; G. MADEC, "Une lecture de Confessions VII IX, 13–XXI, 27: Notes critiques à propos d'une thèse de R. J. O'CONNELL." *Revue des Etudes augustiniennes* (1970): 79–137; R. J. TESKE, "St. Augustine's View of the Original Human Condition in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*." *Augustinian Studies* 22 (1991): 141–155; E. TESELLE, "Thesis on O'Connell: The Origin and 'proper Life' of the Soul in Augustine's Thought." *Augustinian Studies* 27 (1996): 7–19. Arguments for O'Connell's thesis are found in PENASKOVIC 1986 and J. T. BEANE "Augustine's Silence on the Fallenness of the Soul." *Augustiniana* 43 (1993): 77–84.

⁶ O'CONNELL, "Pre-Existence in the Early Augustine," *Revue des Etudes augustiniennes* 26 (1980): 178; idem 1993, 139; PENASKOVIC 1986, 142.

⁷ Or: 'sensation of the soul was added to him,' viz. to man. Morphologically, '*animae*' might be taken as a genitive, '*sensus*' as the possession of '*anima*' and '*ipsi*' as a dative referring to '*homo*.' I agree with Teske's version.

⁸ Translated by R. J. TESKE in *Saint Augustine on Genesis. The Father of the Church* 84. Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991, 104–105. *Gen. man.* 2.8.10, 129: *Quod autem scriptum est: 'et insufflavimus in eum spiritum vitae, et factus est homo in animam viventem,' si adhuc corpus solum erat, animam adiunctam corpori hoc loco intellegere debemus; sive quae iam facta erat, sed tamquam in ore dei erat, id est in eius veritate vel sapientia, unde tamen non recessit*

There are two expressions in this passage which may be unusual to the modern reader who is not familiar with the vocabulary of Scripture. *Homo animalis* and *homo spiritalis* represent Pauline terms, as in 1 Cor 2:13 ff.; Rom. 8:5; Gal 6:1. 'Animal man' lives according to the flesh and is ruled by bodily desires. Such a man is not capable of the Holy Spirit and is unable to understand and receive the gifts of the Spirit. Contrary to him, spiritual man can judge all things: this man is purified and has subjected himself to God's law.

This classification, of a moral character, serves as the basis for Augustine's moral interpretation:

*And so all of us who were born from him after sin first bear the animal man until we attain the spiritual Adam, that is our Lord Jesus Christ, who committed no sin.*⁹

This remark could mean that, being born from Adam, who sinned and lost the spiritual life, we are not capable at first of the Spirit, but then, having converted to Christ, we can attain a higher, spiritual state. Augustine, importantly, places this moral interpretation in its historical framework. He conceives of 1 Cor. 15:45, *but what is spiritual is not first; but what is animal, as has been written: the first Adam was made into a living soul; the last Adam into a lifegiving spirit*, as a reference to the fact that the first Adam, that is, the first man, was made into animal man. For this reason, it would be an oversimplification to assert that Adam was merely a symbolic figure for Augustine at the time when he composed *De genesi contra manichaeos*. It is obvious from chapter 2.8.10 that he thinks of an historical Adam, a 'real' Adam, who first was made an animal man but whom God established in paradise as spiritual man.

This historical perspective reveals another substantial feature of Augustine's understanding of the Pauline classification. Animal and spiritual man are distinguished not only morally, but also anthropologically. For he makes it clear in the commentary that in paradise spiritual man lived in a heavenly, transparent and fine body, which was identical in its nature to the angelic body of the resurrection.¹⁰ After

quasi locis separata, quando insufflata est – non enim deus loco continetur, sed ubique praesens est –, sive tunc anima facta est, quando in illud figmentum deus insufflavit spiritum vitae, ut illa insufflatio ipsam operationem dei significet, qua fecit animam in homine spiritu potentiae suae (cf. Sap. 11:20). Si autem homo ille, qui factus erat, iam corpus et anima erat, ipsi animae sensus est additus ista insufflatione, cum 'factus est homo in animam viventem,' non quia illa insufflatio conversa est in animam viventem, sed operata est animam viventem. Nondum tamen spiritalem hominem debemus intellegere qui factus est in animam viventem, sed adhuc animale. Tunc enim spiritalis effectus est, cum in paradiso, hoc est in beata vita, constitutus praeceptum etiam perfectionis accepit, ut verbo dei consummaretur. Itaque postquam peccavit recedens a praecepto dei et dimissus est de paradiso, in eo remansit ut animalis esset.

⁹ TESKE 1991, 105. *Gen. man.* 2.8.10, 129–130: *Et ideo animale hominem prius agimus omnes, qui de illo post peccatum nati sumus, donec assequamur spiritalem Adam, id est dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, qui peccatum non fecit* (1 Pet. 2:22).

¹⁰ *Gen. man.* 2.21.32, 155: *Neque enim in illis corporibus caelestibus sic latere posse cogitationes credendum est, quemadmodum in his corporibus latent; sed sicut nonnulli motus animorum apparent in vultu et maxime in oculis, sic in illa perspicuitate ac simplicitate caelestium corporum omnes omnino animi motus latere non arbitror. Itque illi merebuntur habitationem illam et commutationem in*

man transgressed and 'was dismissed from paradise he remained in such a state that he was animal.' Fallen man received a fragile, mortal, and perishable body called flesh.¹¹ Spiritual man lives in a spiritual body; animal man in an animal body.

The first animal man, thus, lived in an animal body; hence, he was similar to us. This is the point that Augustine takes for granted. At this point, however, two questions occur. First: How did this man become spiritual? What does it mean: to be established in paradise? Second: Why is this man still animal? What does it mean: to be made animal? For the present, I shall attempt to answer these latter questions.

It is worth repeating Augustine's thesis according to which *we should not yet think of the man who was made into a living soul as spiritual, but rather still animal.*

For Teske and O'Connell this thesis means that the first man "was created as animal," that is to say, the so-called animal condition must have been the "initial state" of man.¹² Augustine does not affirm, however, that the animal state necessarily was the initial state of man. His thesis is that after the breathing forth the first Adam was made, or was turned into (*factus est*) animal man. In fact the Latin '*factus est*' can be derived either from '*facere*' or '*fieri*.'

According to Augustine the first part of Gen. 2:7, *God formed man from the mud of the earth*, can be understood in two ways. Firstly, it can refer to the moulding of the body. Secondly, it can refer to the creation of man, who is a composite of body and soul.¹³ The body of this man, moreover, is described as a spiritual body ruled and vivified by the soul, so that *it would not be subject to corruption if, in obedience to God's commandment, the man had not willed to sin.*¹⁴

angelicam formam, qui etiam in hac vita ... hoc solum tegunt, quod hi qui audiunt ferre non possunt, sed nulla mentiuntur.

¹¹ Gen. man. 2.7.8, 128: *Dicimus enim tabidum et fragile et morti destinatum corpus humanum post peccatum esse coepisse.* Cf. ibid. 1.13.19; 2.21.31.

¹² TESKE 1991, 105. n. 46 and 47: Augustine "claims that Adam was created as animal."... "To say that man was created as 'animal' would imply that man was created in a state such as that he had after the Fall." O'CONNELL 1993, 140 states "For Augustine makes it plain that man was subsequently elevated from his initial 'animal' to the 'spiritual' state of happiness."

¹³ Gen. man. 2.7.9, 129: *Sic enim nonnullos nostros intellegere accepi, qui dicunt, posteaquam dictum est: finxit deus hominem de limo terrae, propterea non additum: 'ad imaginem et similitudinem suam', quoniam nunc de corporis formatione dicitur; tunc autem homo interior significabatur, quando dictum est: 'fecit deus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem dei.' Sed etiam si nunc quoque hominem ex corpore et anima factum intellegamus, ut non alicuius novi operis inchoatio, sed superius breviter insinuati diligentior retractatio isto sermone explicetur, si ergo, ut dixi, hominem hoc loco ex corpore et anima factum intellegamus, non absurde ipsa commixtio limi nomen accepit. Sicut enim aqua terram colligit et conglutinat et content, quando eius commixtione limus efficitur, sic anima corporis materiam vivificando in unitatem concordem conformat et non permittit labi et resolvi.*

¹⁴ Gen. man. 2.7.8, 127–128: *Quid autem mirum aut difficile deo, etiamsi de limo istius terrae hominem fecit, tale tamen corpus eius efficere, quod corruptioni non subiaceret, si homo praeceptum dei custodiens peccare noluisse? Si enim speciem caeli ipsius de nihilo vel de informi materia dicimus factam, quia omnipotentem artificem credimus, quid mirum si corpus, quod de limo qualicumque factum est, potuit ab omnipotenti artifice tale fieri, ut nulla molestia, nulla indigentia cruciaret hominem ante peccatum et nulla corruptione tabesceret?* These are characteristics of the spiritual body, as it is also clear from chapter 1.19.30, 97–98: *Erat enim prius casta coniunctio masculi et feminae, ... et spiritalis fetus intellegibilium et immortalium gaudiorum replens terram, id est vivificans corpus, et dominans eius, id est ita subiectum habens, ut nullam ex eo adversitatem, nullam molestiam pateretur.*

The commentary on the second part of Gen. 2:7, *God breathed into him the breath of life, and man became a living soul*, is the explanation of three sub-possibilities of these two possibilities.

1. First hypothesis: *If up to this point there was only the body,*
- 1.1. Sub-hypothesis: *we should understand that the soul was at this point joined to the body.*

This sub-hypothesis is divided into two:

- 1.1.1. First: *Perhaps the soul had been already made, but was still as if in the mouth of God, that is, in his truth and wisdom.*
- 1.1.2. Second: *Or perhaps the soul was made when God breathed the breath of life into the mud...*

2. Second hypothesis: *If the man who had been made was already body and soul.*

- 2.1. Third sub-hypothesis: *sensation was added to the soul by that breath, when man was made a living soul ...*

Let us consider the third sub-hypothesis (2.1), usually neglected by interpreters. What seems the most remarkable in Augustine's Latin is the chronological and logical distinction between two events. He uses verbs in *praeteritum perfectum* and *praesens perfectum*. The man who consisted of body and soul had already been made (*factus erat*) and after that, he was made (*factus est*) living soul, because sensation was added (*additus est*) to the soul. In this version, the breathing forth is not considered a creative act of God, because man, the composite of the soul and body, already existed. This man, for some reason, received sensation and turned into animal man. In the beginning he was made, according to the second hypothesis, a soul and spiritual body which was not yet subject to corruption and death. Consequently, the third sub-hypothesis, according to which this man turned into animal man, implies the theory of the Fall – but not the fallen-soul-theory! It is man and not the soul who received sensation, that is, man and not the soul was dismissed from a spiritual state of happiness. In the spiritual state, man did not yet use his sense-organs, if he had any at all: sensation was no more than mere potentiality. When God activated sensation, man turned from his spiritual state into a mortal and animal condition and he “was made into living soul.” This is exactly what happened to the spiritual man in paradise. He consisted of virile reason (*virilis ratio*), an animal part (*animalis pars*), and a heavenly body. There, he did not need bodily eyes to see God.¹⁵ After the Fall, however, *it is necessary that we be admonished about the truth through these eyes and these ears* because of our corruptible body.¹⁶ Just as man received sensation after sin in paradise, so the first man had received sensation and was made into animal man before the life in paradise.

The second sub-hypothesis (1.1.2) predicates that God joined the soul to the body. In this case, ‘connection’ is taken as ‘creation.’ God had moulded the earthly body and created the soul that he immediately joined to the body. This could mean two things. First, the body had already existed when God created the soul, that is to

¹⁵ Cf. *Gen. man.* 2.11.16 12.16.

¹⁶ TESKE 1991, 125. *Gen. man.* 2.20.30, 152–153.

say, the body in a sense predates the soul. Second, if this sequence of events is due to only the natural temporality of the narrative, then Augustine simply means that the body and the soul may have been simultaneously created. Since this man was made into a living soul (*factus est in animam vivam*) as still animal man, the second sub-hypothesis includes that in his initial state, man was created as soul and mortal, corruptible body. In this version, Augustine thus considers the term "*factus est*" a derivative of the verb "*facere*," "to make."

In the first sub-hypothesis (1.1), Augustine chronologically differentiates between the creation of the soul and its connection to the body. His Latin is as consequent as in the case of the third sub-hypothesis. The soul *had been already made* (*iam facta erat*) and after that, God joined it to the body *when the soul was breathed forth* (*quando insufflata est*). Augustine's main thesis reveals that as the result of the connection, the body and the soul were made into animal man. One can say about the soul that it happened to find itself in a mortal, corruptible body. At the same time, it is not evident from the passage whether the soul was sent by God or had fallen *sua sponte* into the body;¹⁷ in other words, this sub-hypothesis may allow the fallen soul theory, although Augustine does not make it obvious whether the soul was fallen or sent into the body. It is clear that according to this version, the soul did not use any kind of body at all before God joined it to the animal body. This is an essential difference between the first and the third sub-hypotheses. Unlike the third sub-hypothesis, the first does not imply that the soul was originally joined to a spiritual or celestial body which later turned into an animal or earthly body. The vehicle of the soul is the incorporeal matter of which Augustine speaks in chapter 1.11.17: *The firmament of heaven separated the corporeal matter of visible things from the incorporeal matter of invisible things.*¹⁸

Consequently, as far as the initial state of man or soul is concerned, Augustine offers three possibilities in *De genesi contra manichaeos*.

1. In the beginning the soul alone existed. It was joined to a mortal body and man thereby came into existence. (This is the first sub-hypothesis.)
2. In the beginning man was created as a composite of soul and immortal, incorruptible body. (This is the second hypothesis.)
3. In the beginning man was created as a composite of soul and mortal, corruptible body. (This is the second sub-hypothesis.)

Can we regard these possibilities as being equal in weight? Considering Augustine's emphatic statement in the contemporary *De moribus* (2.7.9) that the initial state of creatures is identical to their final state, that is: *all things return to that from which they fell away*, one must exclude the third possibility as *suppositum non concessum*. It would be nonsensical and non-Biblical (against, for example, 1 Cor. 15:53) to believe that after the resurrection man will live in a mortal and perishable body. In *De genesi contra manichaeos* Augustine unequivocally asserts that the resurrected body is not subjected to corruptibility and death.¹⁹

¹⁷ Cf. *Lib. arb.* 3.200.

¹⁸ TESKE 1991, 64.

¹⁹ *Gen. man.* 2.21.32.

The question is then whether Augustine chose between the two other possibilities. Did he hold the view that the soul as a member of the spiritual creatures did not initially use a body at all? Or, did he believe that man had been created as soul and immortal, spiritual body? In other words: What is man? The rational soul alone, or a composite of soul and body? This is the dilemma which frequently emerges in the early writings. In *De moribus* 1.4.6–5.7 Augustine asks: What is it that we call man? The composite of soul and body, the body alone, or the soul alone?²⁰ He excludes, naturally, the possibility that man might be identical to the body, and, finally, defines man as a rational soul which uses a mortal and earthly body.²¹ This is a definition for the fallen Adam and his descendants. Following this pattern, we might say that man in paradise was rational soul which used an immortal and heavenly body; however, in this way every difference between angels and humans would disappear, for according to the early Augustine, man in paradise lived an angelic life. It is a more urgent question as to whether Augustine's interpretation in *De genesi contra Manichaeos* implies that in the beginning, before the life in paradise, rational souls did not use any kind of body.

The commentary does not provide firm ground for an unequivocal answer. A sharp distinction between the incorporeal matter of the invisible things, like the soul, and the corporeal matter of the visible things, like the body, is made in chapter 1.11.17, but the distinction is ontological in its nature and does not cogently imply the theory of the initial incorporeality of the soul (incorporeality in the sense of not using a body), especially because the two kinds of matter had been simultaneously created. Possibly, the spiritual creature, however incorporeal it was, had been inseparably joined to the corporeal matter through the firmament, 'the most beautiful body.' This would mean that the spiritual creature originally did make use of an ethereal body, since for Augustine the firmament consists of some kind of fine ethereal body.²²

Nevertheless, R. J. O'Connell has pointed out an important characteristic of Augustine's terminology in the commentary, which may suggest that Augustine gave preference to the hypothesis of the total incorporeality of the soul. Concerning Gen. 2:5–6, Augustine observes that

*the addition, 'before they were upon the earth,' (cf. Gen. 2:5) means: before the soul sinned. For soiled by earthly desires, it is correctly said to have come to be upon the earth or to be upon the earth. [...] After sin man began to labor on the earth and to have need of those clouds. But before sin God had made the green of the field and food, and we said that this expression signified the invisible creature. God watered it by an interior spring, speaking in its intellect, so that it did not receive words from the outside, as rain from the aforementioned clouds. Rather it was satisfied from its own spring, that is, by the truth flowing from its interior.*²³

²⁰ Cf. *Moribus* 1.4.6 5.7.

²¹ *Moribus* 1.27.52: *Homo igitur, ut homini apparet, anima rationalis est mortali atque terreno utens corpore.*

²² *Gen. litt. imp.* 3, 464; 8, 479; 12, 486.

²³ TESKE 1991, 97–99. *Gen. man.* 2.3.5–4.5, 123–124: *Deinde quod addidit: 'antequam esset super terram,' intellegitur: antequam anima peccaret. Terrenis enim cupiditatibus sordidata tamquam su-*

Importantly, when Augustine uses the term 'man' (*homo*) he thinks of man living in a fallen state.²⁴ It is the 'soul' that initially enjoys and contemplates God while being 'watered' by Truth, the inner fountain. This is the spiritual mode of existence which in the hypothesis of initial incorporeality is also described as the state of the soul which exists '*in the mouth of God, that is in his Truth and Wisdom.*' The claim that after the sin of the soul 'man' appeared upon the earth is also analogous to the hypothesis that after the soul had been joined to an earthly body, animal man came into existence. The following terminology indicates that 'man' is a term applied to a being consisting of soul and body, whereas the 'soul' stands for the incorporeal, in every sense incorporeal, and 'interior man' made in the image of God. This terminological argument seems to be the only indication of the fact that Augustine preferred the theory of initial incorporeality.

Finally, what are the implications of this theory? If in its initial state the spiritual creature, like the soul, and the body were not linked at all, then the soul and its substrate, incorporeal matter, existed before the body and corporeal matter.²⁵ This composite could have been pre-existent in two ways. On the one hand, since all of time is made along with the corporeal creature subsisting in corporeal matter,²⁶ pre-existence cannot mean a temporal priority, but merely the relationship between timelessness and temporality. On the other hand, since the visible world of the corporeal creatures represents the world of spatiality where the soul arrived from the non-spatial, non-extended divine Wisdom, pre-existence can also mean the relation of non-spatiality and spatiality.

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per terram nata vel super terram esse recte dicitur. [...] Post peccatum autem homo laborare coepit in terra et necessarias habere illas nubes; ante peccatum vero cum 'viride agri et pabulum' fecisset deus, quo nomine invisibilem creaturam significari diximus, irrigabat eam fonte interiore loquens in intellectu eius, ut non extrinsecus verba exciperet tamquam de supradictis nubibus pluviam, sed fonte suo, hoc est de intimis suis manante veritate satiaretur.

²⁴ O'CONNELL 1968, 158: "Noteworthy here is the fact that the original sin is regularly imputed not to 'man' but to 'soul.' Augustine seems bent on distinguishing the ideal state 'before the soul sinned' (*antequam anima peccaret*) and post-lapsary state where the term 'man' (*homo*) appears for first time to become an entirely appropriate designation. Only after the Fall, he observes, was there 'man laboring upon the earth' (*homo laborans in terra*, 2.5)." Cf. TESKE 1991, 97–98.

²⁵ This 'pre-existence' does not involve pre-existence of the individual souls which Augustine would explore in *Lib. arb.* 3.200 and 214 as a possibility. In *Gen. man.* 2.8.10 he is concerned with the origin of the first man. Even if for Augustine the first man was a 'fallen soul,' it does not mean that he believed our individual souls to be pre-existent and fallen souls as well. The theory of pre-existence can be combined with others, like traducianism and creationism. Cf. J. M. RIST, *Augustine*. Cambridge: University Press, 1996, 317–320.

²⁶ *Gen. man.* 2.3.4, 121: *Fecit enim deus omne tempus simul cum omnibus temporalibus creaturis; quae visibiles caeli et terrae nomine significantur.*

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HOW TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A SUPREME BEING?¹

Summary: This essay undertakes the task of unravelling the history of the concept of the “Supreme Being” from the beginnings of Greek philosophy to the emergence of Christianity, with a special attention to a system of argumentation meant to demonstrate the existence – and eternity – of such a being. Referred to here as the “gradation argument”, it is related to the ontological proof, and thus our inquiry belongs to the discussion about the prehistory of the latter. The key authors in the development of the argument discussed are Xenophanes, Plato, Aristotle, and Cleanthes, but I devote a short excursus to the presence of the concept of the Supreme Deity in pseudo-Pythagorean and Middle Platonist authors, and to the epistemological aspect of the concept that connects it with the *via eminentiae*. Besides the historical inquiry, I examine the validity of the proof and propose a mathematical model that helps us to see its merits and limits.

Key words: Theology, theism, proofs for the existence of God, ontological proof, Xenophanes, Plato, Aristotle, pseudo-Aristotle, Cleanthes, Zeno, [Onatas], Albinus, Maximus of Tyre, Cicero.

8th July 1794 was meant to be one of the most distinguished dates in human history. On this day, initiated by Robespierre, the religious and cultic reforms of the Republic were solemnly introduced. The feast of the Supreme Being inaugurated the series of the new cultic days, that of the *décadis*. To address the question of why the ceremony organised by David in Tuileries Gardens turned into a fiasco, and why the glorious statue of Virtue emerged with a smoky face, is not among the goals of this paper. I am rather interested in the possible arguments behind the rational religion proclaimed on that day.

The feast had been instituted by the Convent a month earlier. The decree did not, however, order the feasts alone. In an unusual way, it ratified two postulates of religious philosophy: the existence of the Supreme Being, and the immortality of the soul.² Unfortunately, the honourable legislators did not observe Plato’s advice in the

¹ The preparation of this paper has been made possible with the financial support of the Hungarian National Research Fund (OTKA D 34591) and the Bolyai János Research Fund of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. I am grateful to Péter Lautner for reading a draft version of this article and for his conducive remarks. István Bodnár has also helped me in many ways in earlier stages of my research.

² See M. BOULOISEAU, J. DAUTRY, G. LEFÈVRE, and A. SOBOUL, eds., *Ouvres Maximilien Robespierre* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1969), vol. X, 462–465.

Laws concerning the law against *asebeia*³, and, unlike him, they did not attach any reasoning to the article. Nonetheless, from the speech of Robespierre preceding the vote, we can obtain a few ideas about the possible reasons.⁴ Even this thrilling oration makes recourse, for the most part, to arguments *ad hominem* (i.e., that only the enemies of the New Order and people of loose morality deny the existence of the Supreme Being), and where it comes closest to a philosophical argument, it is by the reference to the *consensus sapientium*⁵ and a version of the ontological argument: the postulate argued for is too beautiful not to be true (or, to formulate it more properly, it is not according to nature that something unreal would be more beautiful and useful than something real).⁶ In its totality, however, the speech – not counting the allusions to actual politics – is based on classical references. The author identifies himself chiefly with the Stoics, especially with their polemics against the Epicureans.⁷ This is confirmed by the fact that according to the decree proposed by Robespierre, one among the *décadis* should be dedicated to Stoicism. Moreover, each of the rest of the feasts is devoted to a personified virtue, which again reminds us of the religious philosophy of the Stoa, where cultic gods besides the one cosmic god are reduced to his personified aspects and activities.⁸ Thus, I do not propose here to trace all the direct sources of Robespierre or the ones mediated by Rousseau, but aim only at presenting the Antique background behind the idea of the Supreme Being, and especially the arguments for it.

I. THE CONCEPT

I 1. *The Aristotelian definition*

The definition of God as the “Supreme Being” can be traced back to Aristotle. His exact wording in *Metaphysics* *A* is the following: “God is the supreme/best eternal being” (ζῶν ἀίδιον ἀριστον).⁹ Although this is articulated in the context of describing god in terms of the νόησις νοήσεως, its origin is to be sought elsewhere. As a concept of god, it can be distinguished from the concept of a cosmic god (*Dieu cosmique*), which defines him as the cause (or specifically mover) of the world. This latter concept is bound up with the cosmological/teleological proofs, while the idea of the Supreme Being is coupled with another system of argumentation, one that is related to the ontological proof and will be referred to here as the “gradation argu-

³ Plato, *Laws* X. 885ce.

⁴ “Sur les rapports des idées religieuses et morales avec les principes républicains, et sur les fêtes nationales” in Maximilien Robespierre, *Textes choisis*, intr. and notes by Jean POPEREN (Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1958) vol. 3, 155–180.

⁵ Robespierre, *Textes choisis*, 169.

⁶ Robespierre, *Textes choisis*, 167.

⁷ Robespierre, *Textes choisis*, 170.

⁸ Diogenes Laertius VI 147; Cicero, *ND* I 15. 40 (Chrysippus); II 23. 61–62; 26. 66; III 25. 64.

⁹ *Met A* 7. 1072b28–29.

ment".¹⁰ It has in common with the ontological argument the notion of the supreme. We shall also see that in this discourse the other term of the Aristotelian definition, the 'eternal' (i.e., eternally existing), turns out to be the consequence of the attribute 'supreme'. Thus our inquiry belongs to the ongoing discussion of the prehistory of the ontological argument.¹¹

I 2. Xenophanes

The pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *On Xenophanes* attributes to Xenophanes both the concept under investigation and the related argument. Elsewhere I have argued that this treatise forms a single work with two other discourses, *On Melissus* and *On Gorgias*, and can be dated to the period between the third and first century BC.¹²

¹⁰ In the case of the passage from Cicero's *ND* discussed below (p. 214–215), P. Boyancé uses the expression "l'argument dit de l'échelles des êtres"; see Pierre BOYANCÉ, "Les preuves stoïciennes de l'existence des dieux d'après Cicéron," *Hermes* 90 (1962): 60.

¹¹ On the history of the question of the ontological argument before Anselm, see Jacques BRUNSCHWIG, "Did Diogenes of Babylon Invent the Ontological Argument," in *Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy* (Cambridge: UP, 1994), 171 n. 2.

¹² "Unus et omnia: Kozmológiai-teológiai tárgyú értekezések a hellenisztikus kori peripatetikus irodalomban" [Unus et Omnia: Cosmo-theological Treatises in the Peripatetic Literature of the Hellenistic Period] Ph.D. Diss. Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 1999. I have argued extensively against Mansfeld that the author would be a neopyrrhonist: Jaap MANSFELD, "De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia: Pyrrhonizing Aristotelianism," *Rheinisches Museum* 131 (1988): 239–276, cf. *id.*, "Historical and Philosophical Aspects of Gorgias' 'On What is not'," in *Gorgia e la Sofistica: Atti del convegno internazionale (Lentini-Catania 12–15 dic. 1983)*, ed. L. MONTNERI, F. ROMANO. *Sicilorum Gymnasium*, no. 38 (Catania: Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia Università di Catania, 1985), 243–271; *id.*, "Theophrastus and the Xenophanes Doxography," *Mnemosyne* 40 (1987): 286–312 and *id.*, "Compatible Alternatives: Middle Platonist Theology and the Xenophanes Reception," in *Knowledge of God in the Greco-Roman World*, ed. R. VAN DEN BROEK, T. BAARDA and J. MANSFELD. *Études Préliminaires aux Religions Orientales dans l'Empire Romain*, no. 112 (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 239–276. The choice of subject, the method and the vocabulary of the author can be well explained on Aristotelian grounds. The author seems to practise Aristotelian dialectics. He may be influenced by the Megarians (Mario UNTERSTEINER, "Senofane e Melisso nel De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia. Una polemica Megaraica?," *Antiquitas* 8 (1950): 22–28) or the sceptical Academy (H. DIELS, "Aristotelis qui fertur de M.X.G. libellus: Praefatio" *Abhandlungen der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin, 1900): 10–12) in finding his main interest in this field of Aristotelian learning, as Lyco was also known as a rhetor rather than a philosopher (cf. Cicero, *Fin* V 5.13; *DL* V 65–66, though according to V 68 Lyco was a student of the dialectician Panthoides, who became a target of Chrysippus' criticism: *ibid.* VII 193). Nonetheless, the typical vocabulary of the Sceptics is totally absent from the treatises, which is especially conspicuous in the case of *On Gorgias*, where the author has ἀγνοστον for Sextus' ἀκατάληπτον, which becomes standard in sceptical and anti-sceptical discourse from Arcesilaus onwards. At one point the author calls a theory mentioned but finally rejected by Aristotle (*GC* A 10. 327b30sq) "probable" (εἰκός *M* 977a4–10, for another use of probability see 975a6–7). Although he does not use the Carneadean term (πίθανον) here either, one may again assume an influence on his attitude from the sceptical Academy. The author is strikingly ignorant of some Aristotelian esoteric passages, and especially metaphysics seems to be alien to him (e.g., he in *X* 978a16–20, contrary to *Phys* Θ 10. 267b19–24, cannot conceive that the divine is without magnitude, although has exegetical and critical reasons for excluding this solution). He seems to be interested only in such physical theories as that of empty space (*M* 976b14–19) and mixture (*M* 977a4–11), that were extensively discussed under Strato (fr. 54–67). With this description of the attitude of the *MXG* in mind, one may recall Strabo's words on post-Theophrastean Aristotelians, who, with little knowledge of the esoteric writings, restricted philosophy to dialectics (θέσεις ληκυθίζειν),

Nonetheless the treatise *On Xenophanes* seems to be the most original, while the other two – conceivably with a lost treatise *On Zenon* – are probably closely based on discourses with identical titles mentioned in the Hellenistic catalogues of the writings of Aristotle. Correspondingly, the accounts of the Presocratics in the other two tracts seem to be fairly reliable,¹³ while the summary of Xenophanes' theology in *X* is openly in conflict with Aristotle's words in *Metaphysics A*.¹⁴ Here I am concerned only with the question of how far the version of the gradation argument presented in *On Xenophanes* can be traced back to Xenophanes or Aristotle, and what is the position of this treatise in the history of the problem under investigation.

The train of thought has been to some extent muddled in the account of *De Xenophane*, but it can be unravelled in the following way. The Xenophanes of the reconstruction identifies the Existent with God and thus in lines 977a14–23 argues not for the existence but only for the eternity of his god. While proving it, he denies generally that anything existing can change for the better or the worse. Although in this context he does not operate with the concept of the Best Being – unlike Plato or Aristotle, who do so in a related argument, as we shall see –, in the following section (ll. 23–36) he bases his proof of the uniqueness of god on the concept of the supreme being.

Here I have to add a brief terminological excursus. In Greek the ἀμείνων-ἄριστος (cf. ἀρετή: virtue, excellency), the βελτίων-βέλτιστος, and the κρείττων-κράτιστος (cf. κράτος: power, supremacy) form-pairs can all be considered as comparative and superlative forms of ἀγαθός (good). Of these Aristotle applies the first in

and even in the revival of the early first century BC "called most things probable" (τὰ πολλὰ εἰκότα λέγειν): *Geographica* XIII 1,54,26–30. Contrary to Barnes and encouraged by the MXG, I take these words at face value: cf. Jonathan BARNES, "Roman Aristotle," in *Plato and Aristotle in Rome*, ed. Jonathan BARNES and Miriam GRIFFIN (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 2 n.1. On *X* see also n. 14 on p. 206.

¹³ For a general assessment of the reliability of *X* as a source on Xenophanes see Jürgen WIESNER, *Ps.-Aristoteles, M.X.G. Der historischen Wert des Xenophanesreferats: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Eleatismus*, (Amsterdam, 1974); and P. STEINMETZ, "Xenophanesstudien," *Rheinisches Museum* 109 (1966): 13–73. For the assumption that *G* is based on a hypomnematic work of Aristotle with the same title, see, e.g., Hans Joachim NEWIGER, *Untersuchungen zu Gorgias Schrift über das Nichtseiende*, (Berlin–New York: de Gruyter, 1973), 2. n. 6. There has been little discussion about *M*, since it squares reasonably well with what we know about Melissus from fragments of his own words, although an indirect source is likely here, too.

¹⁴ *Met A* 5. 986b18sq. Nonetheless, there is no negative theology presented in *X*, contrary to Mansfeld. The "neither finite nor infinite, neither moving nor unmoved" postulate is based on a misunderstanding of Theophrastus' proposition (see Xenophanes A 31) that Xenophanes "did not assert either that it was finite or infinite, moving or unmoved". The Greek usage of οὐ φημι is ambiguous enough to warrant such a misunderstanding. In the background one should not look for contemporary theories on negative theology, but dialectics. Mansfeld has rightly drawn attention to the dialectical exercise in Plato's *Parmenides*. Further, Carneades indeed advances a strikingly similar argument about god (though the conclusion he intimates is that there can be no god: Sextus Empiricus *M IX* 148–51; 178; 180sq, cf. Cicero, *ND III* 30.34). The reasoning of the lemma attributed to Xenophanes in *X* is a dialectical reconstruction based on Eleatic arguments: not infinite following Parmenides, not finite following Melissus, not moving following both. The argument furnishing the "unmoved" attribute is produced by substituting the relevant terms in the "infinite" argument, as there is a similar connection between the "finite" and "moving" arguments.

the definition, while the text examined now uses the other two. This difference, however, is irrelevant to the structure of the argument, and the corresponding variants, both in Greek and in English are interchangeable.

What is it, then, that we can attribute reasonably to Xenophanes from the reconstruction of his thought as we read it in pseudo-Aristotle? At least the concept of the Supreme Being, since fr. B 23,1 states that there is

One God, the greatest among gods and men.

However, Mark Edwards has questioned the authenticity of the fragment,¹⁵ which has been preserved through Christian mediation, and has suspected a Jewish-Christian forger in the background. I have nothing to say about the metrical problems of the second line of B 23,¹⁶ the henotheist idea – conceiving an outstanding, or unique god as opposed to the single God of monotheism – expressed in B 23,1 fits too well with the standard theological position of Greek thinkers, and is not appropriate to a Jewish or Christian forger. Moreover, the message of the fragment is well in accordance with frs. B 24–6, which are transmitted through non-Christian authors, Sextus Empiricus and Simplicius. Although these belong rather to the discourse on the cosmological concept of God, they describe at the same time what the supremacy and uniqueness of the “One God” consists of. From our perspective it does not count that in B23 Xenophanes’ metaphorical language operates with the relation “greatest” (μέγιστος), unlike the account of pseudo-Aristotle, who uses our standard variations of best/supreme. More remarkable is the fact that the pseudo-Aristotelian Xenophanes argues for the monotheistic position (which would suit a Jewish/Christian forger better). Nonetheless, one may note that the god of B 24–6 does not seem to exhibit solely quantitative differences compared to other gods and men, and thus the reconstruction of pseudo-Aristotle may be justified in its ideas, even if not in its words.

Thus we have detected the idea of the Supreme Being in Xenophanes. What is then the case with the argument pertaining to it? Here the preserved fragments and other testimonies hardly support the reconstruction of pseudo-Aristotle. In order to say more than this, we have to start with the proof of the eternity of God. That the Supreme God is eternal for Xenophanes is testified by fr. B 26,1:

He stays eternally in the same place moving nothing.

This is confirmed by a testimony from Aristotle in the context of polytheism: those who teach the birth of gods fall into the same ungodliness as those who speak about their death.¹⁷ A late text, the pseudo-Plutarchian *Stromata* adds an argument to

¹⁵ M. J. EDWARDS, “Xenophanes Christianus?,” *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 32 (1991): 219–228.

¹⁶ Nonetheless I should like to remark that the word *δέμας*, which Edwards considers suspicious, is used by Critias B25,33 about the heavens, the dwelling place of gods, which, in one understanding of Aristotle’s testimonium on Xenophanes in *Met A*, is exactly the supreme god of Xenophanes. Besides, Critias B17–19 contains an allusion to Xenophanes B 24.

¹⁷ Xenophanes A 12 = *Rhet B* 23. 1399b5. (cf. A 13 [*ibid.* 26. 1400b5; Plutarch, *de Is. et Os.* 70. 379B; *de superstitione* 13. 171E; [*Apophth. Lac.*], 26. 228E: gods must not be mourned for).

this claim.¹⁸ The proof is adduced, however, not in the context of theology but in that of ontology: what-is is eternal. In attributing this postulate and its demonstration to Xenophanes, pseudo-Plutarch follows a tradition already present in Plato¹⁹ that appears to project back later Eleatic (Parmenidian) doctrine on Xenophanes. Moreover the characteristic feature of the argument in the *MXG*, which operates with the impossibility of something being generated from something inferior/superior or equal – and thus differentiates the pseudo-Aristotelian Xenophanes from Parmenides and Melissus – is missing from pseudo-Plutarch. Whether this distinctive form of the argument can be traced back in some sense to Xenophanes, I cannot decide. At any rate, it is ancient enough, since Plato uses it in the theological inquiries of *Republic II* in the context of polytheism,²⁰ which would be at least perfectly suitable to Xenophanes, as shown by the above mentioned Aristotelian testimony.

Concerning the demonstration of the second postulate, that God is one, we have no source independent of pseudo-Aristotle. The premise of the argument – that gods cannot be superior or inferior to each other – can be found in pseudo-Plutarch as well as in the Euripidean lines apparently paraphrasing Xenophanes, including his B 11:

For my part, I do not believe that the gods indulge in unholy unions; and as for putting bonds on hands, I have never thought that worthy of belief, nor will I now be so persuaded, nor again that one god is naturally lord and master of another. For the deity, if he be really such, has no wants; these are miserable tales of the poets.²¹

The claim of the “divine democracy” is completed – in pseudo-Plutarch as well as in Euripides – with the assertion that gods need nothing (*δεῖται ... οὐδενός/μηδενός*), i.e., that they are perfect²² as in the above mentioned theological section of Plato’s *Republic II*.²³ Both ideas can thus be reasonably attributed to Xenophanes. The demonstration itself, however, seems to be a later reconstruction, and we shall be able to detect its source: the *de philosophia* by Aristotle.

13. Plato

I will not undertake here the task of systematizing Plato’s complex theological ideas, as several authors have discussed since Antiquity “who is God according to Plato.”²⁴ I note only that both the idea of the Supreme God and the demonstration of

¹⁸ Xenophanes A 32 = [Plutarch], *Stromata* 4.

¹⁹ Xenophanes A 29.

²⁰ 380C–381D.

²¹ *Hercules* 1341–6, translation by E. P. COLERIDGE, source: www.perseus.tufts.edu.

²² For a discussion of the source-value of Pseudo-Plutarch and Euripides see József MARTICSKÓ: Három új Xenophanész-fragmentum: Rekonstrukciók a 32. testimónium szövegéhez [Xenophanes: Three New Fragments] *Magyar Filozófiai Szemle* 36 (1992): 43–57, with an English summary on p. 57.

²³ *ὁ θεός γε καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντα ἄριστα ἔχει* 381b4.

²⁴ Here I mention only a few well-known modern contributions: R. HACKFORTH, “Plato’s Theism,” *Classical Quarterly* 30 (1936): 4–9; G. E. MUELLER, “Plato and the Gods,” *Philosophical Review* 45 (1936): 457–472; A. E. TAYLOR, “The ‘Polytheism’ of Plato: An Apology,” *Mind* 47 (1938): 180–199;

the eternity of god based on his supremacy are known to Plato, as is obvious from *Laws*²⁵ and the above mentioned passages of the *Republic*. (It appears that Robespierre was a Platonist at least in the sense that he considered the theory about the Supreme Being a part of politics, indeed of legislation.) The difference between the two works of Plato is that in *Republic* II we are in the context of polytheism, while in the *Laws* he speaks in the framework of henotheism. One could suggest that the all-embracing excellency of the gods does not exclude a hierarchy between them, but I would hesitate to strive to create such a consonance between the two discourses of Plato. Nor do I wish to decide here what the relation is between the Greatest God and the Best Soul of the *Laws* and whether the Supreme Soul is the Supreme God and the Supreme Being.²⁶ I shall be content to have found the basic ideas of the discourse about the Supreme Being in Plato.

14. Aristotle

The elements of the concept and the demonstration build up a compact argument in Aristotle's admittedly early work, the *de philosophia*: in the hierarchy of beings there is a supreme element, which is God,²⁷ and he, being supreme, cannot change.²⁸ This second stage of the argument is based on the above mentioned passage from Plato's *Republic*, as noted also by Simplicius, who has preserved the fragment concerned. With Xenophanes,²⁹ Aristotle assumes that the Best Being is indeed perfect (*ἐνδεές ... οὐδενός*). In another fragment of *de philosophia* the concept of the Supreme Being is enriched with an epistemological aspect: the hierarchy of perfection is at the same time the way to know God, or, more precisely, to form a concept about him.³⁰

Francis McDONALD CORNFORD, "The 'Polytheism' of Plato: An Apologia," *Mind* 47 (1938): 321–330; Friedrich SOLMSEN, *Plato's Theology*, Cornell studies in classical philology, no. 27 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1942); André-Jean, FESTUGIÈRE, O.P., *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, Collection d'études anciennes: série grecque, no. 77 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1990), vol. II, 92–152; W. J. VERDENIUS, "Platons Gottesbegriff," in *La notion du divin*. Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique, no. 1 (Vandoevres-Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1954), 241–293; G. RIDBERG, "Plato's Belief in God," in *Platonica Selecta* (Stockholm, 1956), 109–126; C. J. DE VOGEL, "What was God for Plato," in *Philosophia*. Philosophical Texts and Studies I: Studies in Greek Philosophy (Assen: van Gorcum, 1970), vol. I, 210–242; Richard D. MOHR, "Plato's Theology Reconsidered: What the Demiurge does," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 2 (1985): 131–144.

²⁵ VII. 821a (*μέγιστον θεόν*); X. 897c; 898c (*ἀρίστη ψυχή*).

²⁶ At least some middle Platonists (Plutarch, *De E*; Maximus of Tyre, *Who is God according to Plato*) seem to read Plato in such a way that they identify these three.

²⁷ This definition of god is echoed both in Theophrastus *Met* 1,4b,12–15 (god must be grasped by his power and supremacy) and in the *MXG X* 977a27–28 (to be god is to be superior and never inferior).

²⁸ fr. 16: Simplicius, in *de caelo* 288,28–9,15. Aristotle uses all the equivalent terms: *βέλτιον*, *ἀριστον*, *κρείττονος*.

²⁹ See p. 208 above.

³⁰ Sextus, *M* IX, 45: that the passage refers to Aristotle, and most probably to *de philosophia* has been shown by Bernd EFFE, *Studien zur Kosmologie und Theologie der Aristotelischen Schrift 'Über die Philosophie'*, Zetemata: Monographien zur Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, no. 50 (München: C.H. Beck, 1970), 76–78.

Now we can understand what has happened in the pseudo-Aristotelian *de Xenophane*. Starting from an exoteric writing of Aristotle, the author projects back onto Xenophanes an argument, the elements and premises of which can indeed be detected in Xenophanes. There is only one novelty in *de Xenophane* compared to Aristotle: while – assuming that *Metaphysics* Λ and *Physics* Θ are unitary treatises³¹ – Aristotle could be rather termed as a henotheist³² rather than a monotheist, by pseudo-Aristotle Xenophanes is portrayed as an extreme monotheist. At any rate, in the passages referred to from *de philosophia* and in certain chapters of the above mentioned esoteric writings, Aristotle speaks about a single god. That the idea of monotheism was not unknown by Aristotle's time is shown by the Socratic Antisthenes³³ and probably by Euclides of Megara.³⁴

INTERLUDE: A MATHEMATICAL MODEL

With Aristotle's *de philosophia*, we have reached the complete form of the argument. Before turning to later developments, let us look at the validity of the proof. For that purpose we shall need a few notions from relation-theory.

I shall represent the relation signified in our text by different terms ($\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\iota\text{-}\nu\omega\nu/\beta\epsilon\lambda\tau\acute{\iota}\omega\nu/\kappa\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\tau\omega\nu$) with the sign " $<$ ". I gather that our authors expect implicitly that the relation be

- (i) asymmetrical: $(a < b \rightarrow \sim (b < a))$
- (ii) transitive: $a < b \ \& \ b < c \rightarrow a < c$

That our relation has a maximal element " m " ($\forall x \sim (m < x)$) is guaranteed by the sufficient but not necessary condition that the set on which the relation is defined is finite.³⁵ This hypothesis is explicit by Cleanthes, as we shall see, but I think that Aristotle also shares this conviction. That the maximal element is singular is endorsed by the (iii) requirement of trichotomy ($a < b \vee b < a \vee a = b$), the assumption of which

³¹ On this problem, see W. C. K. GUTHRIE, "The Development of Aristotle's Theology," *Classical Quarterly* 27; 28 (1933–1934): 162–172; 90–98; reprint in German in *Metaphysik und Theologie des Aristoteles*, ed. Fritz Peter HAGER, 75–113. Wege der Forschung, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969; Philip MERLAN, "Aristotle's Unmoved Movers," *Traditio* 4 (1946): 1–30; Anton-Hermann CHROUST, "Aristotle's Religious Convictions," *Divus Thomas* 69 (1966): 91–97; OEHLER, Klaus. *Der Unbewegte Beweger des Aristoteles*. Phil. Aloh., no. 52. Frankfurt-am-Main: V. Klostermann, 1964; DEVEREUX, Daniel T. "The Relationship between Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* and Aristotle's *Metaphysics Lambda*." In *Theophrastean Studies*, ed. W. W. FORTENBAUGH and R. W. SHARPLES, 167–188. Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, no. 3. New Brunswick–London: Transaction Publishers, 1988; KRÄMER, Hans-Joachim. "Az arisztotelészi metafizika történeti helye." [The Historical Place of Aristotelian Metaphysics]. *Filozófiai Szemle* 35 (Budapest, 1991): 892–935.

³² This is at least the interpretation of Arius Didymus (fr. 9): according to Aristotle, the greatest ($\mu\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\nu$) among the nine gods of the spheres is a blissful rational being ($\zeta\omega\omicron\nu \text{ λογικόν καὶ μακάριον}$).

³³ Cicero, *ND* I 13. 32.

³⁴ Fr. 1.

³⁵ That the condition is not necessary is shown by the example of the non-positive real numbers with the relation "grater", or of a river system with the relation "closer to the source". In the latter case all sources are maximal elements.

we can reasonably attribute to our authors, although this is again not a necessary condition.³⁶

The result of the demonstration, however, is not that there is a single supreme being, but a single supreme excellency, i.e., an equivalency class of beings with the same grade of excellency. A way out could be the assumption that there are no two beings that are equally excellent/good. A different type of solution is to understand with *de Xenophane* "supreme" as "most powerful" and suppose that as such he is omnipotent, and cannot be restricted by an equal power. In this version of the argument, as we shall soon see when we turn to the Stoics, one step is missing.

III. THE STOICS³⁷

The Stoics expressed the content of the concept/preconception of God in similar terms to those of Aristotle: god is "a living being unsurpassed in excellence,"³⁸ and the attribute of eternity was presumably implied.³⁹

As for the argument, Cleanthes seems to have adopted it as he found it in Aristotle's *de philosophia*.⁴⁰ What he added is what was implicit in Aristotle: that the Best Being is not a Man. Here he makes use of the assumption that the Supreme Being is perfect. We have noted this conviction in Aristotle⁴¹ and traced it back to Xenophanes,⁴² but as I have just hinted, this assumption does not formally follow from the rest of the argument, since the Best Being can still be imperfect: that is to say, one might be able to conceive the possibility of a still better being. The existence of the Perfect Being could be then ensured only by an ontological type of argument.

Surprisingly enough, we also find the elements of such a proof in the Stoa. It was Diogenes of Babylon who has been – probably unduly – charged with inventing the ontological argument,⁴³ but the components of the argumentative scheme had already been advanced by Zeno. His argument runs as follows:

³⁶ See the example of a river-system with the relation "closer to the mouth".

³⁷ Unfortunately I was unable to consult M. DRAGONA-MONACHOU, *The Stoic Arguments for the Existence and the Providence of the Gods* (Athens, 1976).

³⁸ Cicero, *ND* II 17.45: "Sed cum talem esse deum certa notione animi praesentiamus, *primum ut sit animans, deinde ut in omni natura nihil eo sit praestantius*, ad hanc praesensionem notionemque nostram nihil video quod potius accomodem quam ut primum hunc ipsum mundum, quo nihil excellentius fieri potest, animantem esse et deum iudicem"; cf. Malcolm SCHOFIELD, "Preconception, Argument and God," in *Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology*, ed. M. SCHOFIELD, M. BURNYEAT and J. BARNES (Oxford, 1980), 301.

³⁹ See Sextus Empiricus *M IX* 118 and esp. 143 (cf. 141; 145; 147; 151; 157; 160; 161; 166; 170; 172 and BRUNSCHWIG, "Diogenes," 183–184).

⁴⁰ Sextus Empiricus *M IX* 88–91 (Cleanthes, fr. 529 Arnim.). His preferred terms are *κρείττων/-κράτιστον*, *ἀρίστη/ἀριστον*, and the verbal forms «*προέχει τε καὶ κρατιστεύει*». The argument is briefly summarised by BOYANCÉ, 52 n. 2, who remarks that parallel *ideas* can be pointed out in Chrysippus (Cicero, *ND* II 6.16–7.18, in the context of a cosmological proof though).

⁴¹ See p. 209 above.

⁴² See p. 208 above.

⁴³ For his version of Zeno's argument and the possible traces of idea of an ontological type of proof in it see BRUNSCHWIG, "Diogenes", 170–189.

The rational is superior to the non-rational. But nothing is superior to the world. Therefore the world is rational. And similarly with “intelligent” and “participating in animation”. For the intelligent is superior to the non-intelligent and the animate to the non-animate. But nothing is superior to the world. Therefore the world is intelligent and animate.⁴⁴

If we add “existent” to the list of replaceable predicates in this argument,⁴⁵ we obtain an ontological argument, keeping it in mind that the *cosmos* and God are identical for the Stoics and that the *cosmos* is conceived here as the supreme being.⁴⁶

Although the substitution of the predicate with “existent” would be a rather bold step, the fact that it was not alien to Zeno is shown by another fragment of him:

One might reasonably honour the gods. <One might not reasonably honour those who do not exist.> Therefore gods exist.⁴⁷

Here *vice versa*, in order to gain an ontological argument, one has to replace “can reasonably be honoured” with “perfect” (or Anselm’s “better cannot be thought of” – a phrase in fact used by Chrysippus in the context of the cosmic god).⁴⁸ As Sextus reports, this argument has provided a catalyst for a subtle discussion already in this embryonic form.⁴⁹

Returning to the gradation argument, it is expounded in its full-grown form but less formally by the Stoic speaker of Cicero’s *De natura deorum*, Balbus.⁵⁰ Here the demonstration as presented by Cleanthes is completed with the Zenonian argument that the Supreme Being is necessarily intelligent,⁵¹ and the ontological hypothesis, i.e. that the Perfect Being exists, is made explicit.⁵² The line of the argument is at the same time the way to know God.⁵³ Balbus also appends two additions to the train of thought attributed to Cicero: first, a proof that man is not the perfect being, since he

⁴⁴ Sextus Empiricus *M* IX 104 (Zeno, fr. 111. Arnim). Translation from A. A. LONG and D. N. SEDLEY, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 54F. vol. 1, 325. The argument has been repeated generally by Stoics, among them Chrysippus and Posidonius: *DL* VII 142–143. Parallel ideas appear frequently in Cicero’s *ND* II (e.g., 14. 38; 17. 46–48).

⁴⁵ Many modern logicians would hesitate to make this step and would be embarrassed to call “existent” a predicate (a good summary of the debate can be read in Christopher STEAD, *Philosophy in Christian Antiquity*, (Cambridge: University Press, 1995), 121–126). The ancients had fewer scruples, and my main task is to unravel *their* way of arguing.

⁴⁶ Similarly in Plato, *Timaeus* 32c–33b, and in [Ocellus], *de universi natura* I 7; 11; [Aristotle] *de mundo* 397a5–17; Philo of Alexandria, *De aeternitate mundi* I.1 etc. The idea of the perfection of the world and the argument for its eternity based on this fact may well have been also present in Aristotle’s *de philosophia*: EFFE, 9–13.

⁴⁷ Sextus Empiricus *M* IX 133 (Zeno, fr. 152. Arnim.), translation from LONG-SEDLEY 54D. vol. 1, 324. The insertion is based on the parody of the argument that follows in Sextus.

⁴⁸ Cicero, *ND* II 7. 18, in a passage related to the gradation argument, as noted above n. 40 on p. 211.

⁴⁹ *M* IX 134–136.

⁵⁰ Cicero *ND* II 12.33–13.36, analysed by BOYANCÉ, 60–62; for the possible sources of anonymous arguments in *ND* II see *ibid.* 69–71.

⁵¹ 13.36; cf. 14. 48.

⁵² 13.35; cf. 14.38.

⁵³ Generally for the Stoics, the way of the formation of our concept/preconception about god and the proofs of his existence were deeply interrelated: BOYANCÉ 49; SCHOFIELD 289–307.

is not self-aimed;⁵⁴ second, that the universe is indeed perfect (and thus intelligent), since it contains everything.⁵⁵ This serves as a substitute for the ontological argument.

With “Balbus” the argument also reaches its supreme form in Antiquity and does not change further – only its epistemological aspect is elaborated in Middle Platonism, as we shall see.

IV. NEO-PYTHAGOREANISM AND MIDDLE PLATONISM

IV 1. Onatas

Before turning to Middle Platonists, however, we should add a brief note on Onatas, or pseudo-Onatas, who – in the spirit of the philosophical renaissance of his age⁵⁶ – recapitulates the Aristotelian-Xenophanean tradition, but without supplying the argument he only summarises the definition of God and the theses of Xenophanes: god is supreme, and rules but is not ruled, and is perfect.⁵⁷ He puts forward the creed of henotheism and seems to openly oppose the argument in *de Xenophane* that the supremacy of the Sovereign God involves his singularity. On the contrary, says Onatas, supremacy is manifested in the existence of lower gods. His argument may also be directed against the pseudo-Aristotelian *de mundo* as well, since many of the images about God the Ruler are common to both texts (although they may well come from Aristotle’s *de philosophia*). Thus the author behind Onatas starts from writings that he knows to be by Aristotle and corrects Aristotle by reconstructing his supposedly Pythagorean source which, as “Onatas” thinks, Aristotle distorted. This is the standard process of the pseudo-Pythagorean literature with the texts of Plato and Aristotle. We may possibly detect Onatas’ basis of reconstruction: he relies on Xenophanes, who was also believed to have been associated with Pythagoras.⁵⁸

We do not have to assume that Onatas is arguing against Jewish or Christian authors, as a strict monotheism is proposed by the pseudo-Aristotelian *de mundo*, *de*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 14. 37.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 14. 38–39.

⁵⁶ About the philosophical milieu of the period between the first century BC and the second century AD see, e.g., Olof GIGON, “Die Erneuerung der Philosophie in der Zeit Ciceros,” in *Recherches sur la tradition platonicienne: Sept exposés*. Entretiens sur l’Antiquité classique, no. 3 (Vandoeuvres-Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1955; reprint, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliches Buchgesellschaft, 1971), 25–61. For the debate on the dating of these pseudo-Pythagorean writings, see Walter BURKERT, “Hellenistische Pseudopythagorica,” *Philologus* 105 (1961): 16–43; 226–246; and *id.*, “Zur geistesgeschichtlichen Einordnung einiger Pseudopythagorica,” in *Pseudoepigrapha*. Entretiens sur l’antiquité classique, no. 18 (Vandoeuvres-Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1972), vol. 1, *Pseudopythagorica-Lettres de Platon-Littérature pseudépigraphique juive: Huit exposés suivis de discussions par Ronald Syme, Walter Burkert et al.* ed. by Kurt VON FRITZ, 23–56.

⁵⁷ The expressions he uses referring to superiority/supremacy are as follows: μέγιστος καὶ καθυπέρτερος, κράτιστον, ὑπεροχῆς, the verbal forms ἄρχειν, κράτειν.

⁵⁸ Fr. B 7 (Diogenes Laertius VIII 36). According to Diogenes IX 18, he in fact argued with him.

Xenophane and Antisthenes.⁵⁹ Since the latter is quoted by Cicero's doxographic source on the history of theology, his view must have been known in Onatas' time.

IV 2. Alcinous, Maximus and the via eminentiae

For Middle-Platonism the gradation argument is hardly relevant, because it is not easily compatible with the growing emphasis on divine transcendence. Thus, among the ways to the knowledge of God, the *via negativa* takes by far the first place, followed by the *via analogiae*, while only the last place can be reserved for the *via eminentiae* based on the hierarchy of beings and corresponding to the gradation argument.⁶⁰ Both the handbook-writer Alcinous and the popular philosopher Maximus emphasise the extraordinary status of the last step on this *gradus*: here quantitative change turns into qualitative, corresponding to the Platonic theory of Forms, since the Form/Idea is not on the same ontological level as the things participating in it. If we were to continue to apply the mathematical model, than the hierarchy of beauty/excellency by Platonic authors would correspond to an ordered set consisting of the natural numbers and the first infinite cardinality, ω , which would be the maximal element representing God. ω is grater than any final cardinality, but cannot be reached by addition from them. This model, however, openly contradicts the Stoic Cleanthes, who *expressis verbis* excludes infinite progress in grading superiority. No wonder, since, as we have seen, he needs this assumption to make the argument work – in which, however, the Platonists seem to have no interest.

CONCLUSION

I am not aware of any direct trace of the gradation argument in Philo,⁶¹ and it certainly did not impress early Christian authors. The early apologists and Church Fathers – with, possibly, the single exception of St. Augustine – were wary of advancing arguments for the existence of God, and if they did come up with arguments for apologetic reasons, they usually applied the cosmological proof, inspired by Romans 1,20.⁶² On the one hand, as we have seen, the gradation argument loses its relevance with Middle Platonism and the milieu which puts the emphasis on the transcendence of God. On the other hand it may be too technical for a Christian theologian, who has a different audience and purposes in mind. Alongside Augustine, it is Boethius who displays the most interest in philosophy among early Christian writers. He indeed pro-

⁵⁹ See p. 212 above.

⁶⁰ Alcinous/Albinus, *Didascalicus* X 6; cf. Maximus of Tyre, *Or* 11, 5.

⁶¹ See the summary of Philo's arguments by Samuel SANDMEL, "Philo Judaeus: An Introduction to the Man, his Writings and his Significance," in *ANRW* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984), vol. II.21, *Hellenistisches Judentum in römischer Zeit: Philon und Josphus*, 23.

⁶² Christopher STEAD, *Philosophy in Christian Antiquity*, (Cambridge: U.P., 1995), 115–119.

vides us with a version of the gradation argument, with ethical overtones.⁶³ In the West, Anselm of Canterbury is probably the next author who is interested in philosophical techniques to this extent. His story, however, transcends the framework of this paper, the competence of the author, and probably also the philosophical horizons of Robespierre. Finally the question of whether it was the convincing power of the gradation or the ontological argument that persuaded the Convent to vote unanimously for the existence of the Supreme Being is beyond the scope of the history of Ancient philosophy.

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BENGT LÖFSTEDT

DREI NEUE PATRISTICA

Summary: In this paper I discuss (1) the language of Lactantius; (2) the textual criticism and language of Rufinus; (3) the textual criticism and language of Verecundus Iuncensis.

Key words: Latin language; Lactantius; Rufinus; Verecundus Iuncensis.

I. NOTIZEN ZUM LATEIN DES LACTANTIUS

Es gibt keine schwedische Dissertation über die Latinität des Lactantius, und zwar wohl deshalb, weil sie im großen und ganzen klassisch ist. Chr. Mohrmann, *Etudes sur le latin des chrétiens*, Bd. 3 (Rom 1965) 47 ff. hat allerdings einige Seiten den „Christianismen“ seiner Sprache gewidmet, und H. Gläser, *Musée Belge* 4 und 5 (1900–1901) hat drei Aufsätze über seine Syntax veröffentlicht.¹ Einige sprachliche Bemerkungen lassen sich hinzufügen.

Syntax

tanti für *tot*. J. B. Hofmann–A. Szantyr, *Lateinische Syntax* (München 1965) 206 besprechen die Verwendung von *tanti* statt *tot*. Unter Autoren mit diesem Sprachgebrauch wird Lactantius nicht erwähnt, vgl. aber 1,3,21 (CSEL 19 S. 11,5 f.) *in uno corpore tantarum rerum gubernationem mens una possidet* (P. Monat, *Sources Chrétiennes* 326 S. 55 übersetzt: „tant de choses“). Aber *tot* kommt häufiger vor; z. B. 1,3,19 (S. 10,16) *tot ... quot*; 1,8,1 (S. 29,1) *tot ac tantis testibus*.

iste für *hic*. Die vulgärlateinische Verwendung von *iste* für *hic* kommt bei unserem Autor mehrfach vor, z. B. 7,9,15 (S. 613,22) *vita ista terrena*. Lactantius wird von Hofmann–Szantyr 184, wo dieser Sprachgebrauch behandelt wird, nicht erwähnt.

¹ Für Hofmann–Szantyr's *Syntax* (s. unten), den *Thesaurus linguae Latinae* und sogar für K. E. Georges, *Ausführliches lateinisch-deutsches Handwörterbuch* hat man Lactantius sorgfältig exzerpiert.

hic aliquis. 4,27,20 (S. 388,12 f.) *Ego vero non dubito, quin ad veritatem Trismegistus hac aliqua ratione pervenerit*. Diese pronominale Verbindung wird im *ThLL* 6:3,2738,49 ff. nicht verzeichnet.

quis ... unus. 7,22,10 (S. 654,13 f.) *quis unquam unus ab inferis resurrexit?* Vgl. frz. *aucun* < *aliquem unum*.

de für *cum*. 1,5,1 (S. 13,3 ff.) *Sed omittamus sane testimonia prophetarum, ne minus idonea probatio videatur de his, quibus omnino non creditur*. Es scheint, wir haben hier die vulgäre Verwendung von *de* statt *cum*.

quam für *magis ... quam*. Unter den vielen von Hofmann–Szantyr 593 f. zitierten Autoren mit diesem Sprachgebrauch figuriert nicht Lactantius; vgl. aber 6,18,14 (S. 549,7 f.) *illum tamen suspiciunt, qui nocere quam qui prodesse possit*.

quam potuit mit dem Positiv. 3,17,1 (S. 228,8) *Dixi de philosophia ipsa quam potui breviter*. Unser Autor nicht bei Hofmann–Szantyr 170.

Wortschatz

femina als Adjektiv. 1,16,4 (S. 61,19 f.) *deas feminas et esse credunt et colunt*. Andere Belege für diese Verwendung von *femina* im *ThLL* 6:1,462,1 ff., u.a. einer aus Lactantius, aber nicht dieser.

fons et origo. 1,11,52 (S. 46,5). Zu diesem Ausdruck vgl. *ALMA* 50 (1991), 113. Vgl. *caput et origo* 5,14,11 (S. 446,2) und *caput fontemque* 5,17,2 (S. 452,13 f.).

homo 'mas'. 2,12,1 f. (S. 155,7 ff.) *Cum ergo marem primum ad similitudinem suam finxisset, tum etiam feminam configuravit ad ipsius hominis effigiem ... In ipsius autem hominis fictione ...*

ingratus 'nolens'. 2,10,25 (S. 151,20 ff.) *non poterit defendere Aristoteles, quominus habuerit et mundus ipse principium. Quod si Aristoteli Plato et Epicurus extorquent, et Platoni et Aristoteli, qui semper fore mundum putaverunt, licet sint eloquentes, ingratum tamen idem Epicurus eripiet, quia sequitur, ut habeat et finem*. Dieser Sprachgebrauch im *ThLL* 7:1,1564,28 ff. nur zweimal (aus Hieronymus und Ps. Rufinus) belegt.

maleficus 'magus'. 2,16,4 (S. 168,1) *magi et ii quos vere maleficos vulgus appellat*. Lactantius scheint hier zwei Kategorien zu unterscheiden und *maleficus* in dieser Bedeutung als vulgär aufzufassen. Vgl. *ThLL* 8,177,26 ff., wo u.a. die folgenden Belege angeführt werden: Hier. in *Dan.* 2,2 *consuetudo ... et sermo communis magos pro maleficis accipit*; Cod. Theod. 9,16,4 *Chaldaei et magi et ceteri, quos maleficos ... vulgus appellat*. Auch der Codex Theodosianus bezeichnet also *maleficus* als vulgär, und es lebt im Romanischen weiter: W. Meyer-Lübke, *Romanisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg 1935) Nr. 5263.

titio. 4,14,14 (S. 328,3 f.) *Titionem ... vulgus appellat extractum foco torrem semiuustum et extinctum*. *titio* wird ins Romanische weitergeführt (*Rom. etym. Wb.* Nr. 8758: frz. *tison* etc.), aber nicht *torris*.

II. NOTIZEN ZU RUFINUS

Rufinus, der ein Zeitgenosse von Hieronymus war und mit ihm in eine große Polemik geriet, ist ja in erster Linie als Übersetzer bekannt. Seine wenigen selbstständigen Schriften wurden von M. Simonetti gesammelt und herausgegeben (CC 20, 1961). Eine Durchsicht dieses Bandes gibt zu einigen Bemerkungen Anlass.

Zur Textkritik

S. 44,14 *ex his quae interpretatus sum libellis*. Die Hs. N und ältere Editionen haben *quos* statt *quae*, und m. E. ist *quae* unhaltbar: nach dem *ThLL* 7:2,1262,54 und 58 kommt neutr. *libellum* in der ganzen Latinität nur einmal vor, und zwar bei Johannes Maxentius in den Akten der Konzilien;² ferner wurde das Wort vom Griechischen als *λίβελλος* und *λίβελλον* entlehnt. Das ist eine zu schmale Basis, um dem Rufinus den Genuswechsel zuzuschreiben.

S. 141,40 druckt Simonetti mit den älteren Hss. *expectat* für erwartetes *spectat*: *Quantum ... expectat ad illam deitatis immortalem substantiam*; ebenso S. 169,10 f. Die Vermischung von *spectare* und *expectare* ist in vulgären Texten ganz häufig und erklärt sich ja einerseits durch die Entwicklung des prothetischen Vokals vor anlautendem *s* + Kons., andererseits durch das Verschwinden von *k* in der Gruppe *eks*-. Es fällt schwer zu glauben, dass ein gebildeter Mann wie Rufinus die beiden Verba nicht auseinanderzuhalten vermochte.

S. 170,10 ff. (es geht um die Verwendung der Präposition *in* nach *credere*) ... *ut dicatur: in sancta ecclesia, sed sanctam ecclesiam credendam esse ... Et remissionem peccatorum credendum esse, non in remissionem peccatorum*. Statt *credendum* ist *credendam* zu schreiben.

S. 207,12 ff. ... *ascendentem etiam super cubile patris et polluentem torum paternum, id est etiam praecepta et monita naturalis legis, quae in nobis est (quod nunc paternus torus dicitur), praeuaricantem*. Ich sehe nicht ein, worauf sich *quod* bezieht, und schlage *qui* (nach *torus*) vor.

S. 115,7 f. interpungiert Simonetti: *illi (sc. Iudaei) te libellis editis notas infligere Christianis; illi nec martyribus parcere faciunt*. Nach *Christianis* ist ein Komma statt des Strichpunkts zu setzen, denn *faciunt* regiert auch *infigere*.

Zur Sprache

S. 86,12 f. *quantum ad personam meam pertinet, quem solum ... lacerare se putat*. Hier wird *quem* verwendet, weil *personam meam* für *me* steht; ähnliche Belege für Synesis bei *persona* verzeichnen J. B. Hofmann–A. Szantyr, *Lateinische Syntax* (München 1965) 440.³

² *Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum* 4:2 (ed. E. SCHWARTZ, p. 5,43) = Maxentii *Opuscula, Libellus fidei* 8,13 (CC 85 A 13,169) *in libello, quod de fide sua Theodosio dedit imperatori*.

³ Zum dort behandelten mask. *gentes* vgl. noch Vulg. *Psalm*. 117,10 *Omnes gentes circuierunt me, et in nomine Domini quia ultus sum in eos*; dazu Cassiod. *in Psalm*. (CC 98) S. 1051,149 ff. *Nam*

S. 107,34 *resecaui* für *resecui*. Weitere Belege für (-)*secaui* in K. E. Georges' *Handwörterbuch* und bei F. G. Banta, *Abweichende spät- und vulgärlateinische Perfektbildungen* (Diss. Bern 1952), 119; s. auch P. Stotz, *Handbuch zur lateinischen Sprache des Mittelalters* (Bd. 4) S. 194, Anm. 9.

S. 109,31 *iste ipse qui* ... Im *ThLL* 7:2,512,44 ff. werden Verbindungen wie *iste hic*, *iste talis*, aber nicht *iste ipse* verzeichnet.

S. 134,6 f. *ob praedicandum Dei verbum ad singulas quasque proficisci nationes*. Nach Hofmann–Szantyr a.a.O. 238 erhält sich die Konstruktion von *ob* mit dem Gerundivum „bis ins Spätlatein bei archaisierenden Schriftstellern“. Unseren Autor wird man indessen kaum als archaisierend bezeichnen können.

S. 135 *fons et origo*. Vgl. oben I.

Rufinus weiß gar nicht, wann *tanto* – *quanto*, wann *tantum* – *quantum* zu verwenden ist: S. 138,36 f. haben wir den Abl. mens. mit Positiv: *tanto nobis occulta uidentur, quanto et adspectui corporeo inuisibilia*; ebenso S. 153,10 f. *Quanto enim magna sunt quae credenda sunt, tanto idoneis et indubitatis testibus indigent*. Umgekehrt begegnet der acc. mens. S. 147,13 f. *Quantum putas natura solis illo inferior est?* Vgl. Hofmann–Szantyr a.a.O. 136 f.

III. ZU VERECUNDUS IUNCENSIS

Verecundus war Bischof in Iunca (Afrika) in der ersten Hälfte des 6. Jhs. Die letzte Ausgabe seiner Werke verdanken wir R. Demeulenaere, *CC* 93 (Turnhout 1976), und sie liegt der folgenden Untersuchung zugrunde. Ich werde mich auf seinen Kommentar zu den biblischen Liedern (*Cantica ecclesiastica*) beschränken (S. 1–203). Dieser Text wurde früher von J. B. Pitra, *Spicilegium Solesmense*, Bd. 4 (1858) herausgegeben. Eine gute textkritische Untersuchung ist die Dissertation Erik Kullendorffs, *Textkritische Beiträge zu Verecundus Iuncensis* (Lund 1943).⁴ Demeulenaere folgt gewöhnlich Kullendorffs Vorschlägen;⁵ Kullendorff ist seinerseits sehr kritisch gegen Pitra. – Der Kommentar ist nur in einer Leidener Handschrift aus dem 9. Jh. überliefert.

Zur letzten Edition

Wenn es gilt, Ergänzungen von Wörtern, die in der Hs. fehlen, zu notieren, ist D. inkonsequent: S. 303,4, z. B., wird das Addendum durch die Zeichen < > im Text und eine Bemerkung im Apparat gekennzeichnet; 199,21 und 26 fehlen < >.

quod dixit 'gentes' et subiungit genus masculinum 'ultus sum eos', siue ad intellectum pertinet, quia in gentibus populi significantur, siue schema est exallage.

⁴ Leider hat KULLENDORFF keine *Indices verborum* und *rerum grammaticarum* beigelegt, und man läuft leicht Gefahr, wichtige Beiträge zu Verecundus' Sprache zu übersehen (z. B. S. 88 und 91 zu *nisi* für *quam*, 99 *defendere* für *ulcisci*, 124 *spiritualiter* [Orthographie], 126 Synesis, 134 *intemporaliter* 'auf ewig', 145 *adeo* für *ideo*).

⁵ Das Latein in der Praefatio ist schlecht, vgl. z. B. S. XII,14 f. *in ipsis Commentariis legi potest* (für *possunt*) *quinque preces*; XXV,8 f. *qua de causa omisa fuerunt* (für *fuerint*), *non liquido apparet*; XXIX,6 von unten *ualor, si quam* (für *quem*) *habet editio nostra*, aber das Wort ist überhaupt unklassisch und erst mittellateinisch zu belegen.

S. 34,7 ff. druckt D.: *Verba itaque nostis, quibus Deum debemus inpensius conlaudare. Si coeperimus turpiloquiis uitare, in abominationibus nostris Dominum prouocamus*; eine zweite Hand der Hs. hat *nostis* in *nostra* korrigiert, und Pitra hat diese Lesart akzeptiert. M. E. ist *nostra* allein möglich und ist der Text folgendermassen zu interpungieren: *Verba itaque nostra, quibus Deum debemus inpensius conlaudare, si coeperimus ...*

43,13 f. *Audienti postremo audiat*: ... Pitra hat *audiat* vorgeschlagen, was den Dativ erklären würde (dativus agentis).

93,40 f. ... *secundum promissum Abrahae factum, quod eius semen non sis in suis generationibus relicturus*. Ich schlage *sit* statt *sis* vor.

106,49 ff. *His (scil. ceruis) sanctus uir se conparari praeoptat, ut cornibus suis, uidelicet duobus testamentis, spiritales angues de domo sui cordis expellat, cum ea in se per caritatis flammam fecerit sufflammari*. Ich vermute *eos* (scil. *angues*) statt *ea*.

129,21 *Hoc et etiam Ezechiel propheta testatur*. Et ist wohl als Dittographie zu streichen.

An den folgenden Stellen dürften Druckfehler vorliegen: 121,34 *teneus*: lies *tenuis*; 165,8 *expelsus*: lies *expulsus*; 183,27 *interauit*: lies *iterauit*; 187,32 *temporali potentiae*⁶ et *carnali superbia*: lies *potentia*; 189,64 *diuisiones*⁶: lies *diuisores*; 193,46 *commitunt*: lies *committunt*. 141,35 steht *abdito* als Adverb statt *abdite*; obgleich auch Pitra *abdito* druckt, vermute ich, dass es ein Druckfehler ist, denn die Form scheint sonst unbelegt zu sein.

Mehrfach ist die Interpunktion zu verbessern: 50,20 f. *quia superius de poenis et afflictionibus loquebatur, dicendo ... De his dicit ...* Man muss ein Komma statt des Punktes vor *de his* setzen.

60,21 f. *Et hoc est quod dixit*. 'Viuo ego ...' Kolon statt Punkt.

124,29 ff. *Postquam uero dispersionem sui populi Dominus recollegit atque ad Iherusalem, Ecclesiae uidelicet, fidem oberrantes collegit, tunc ...* Das Komma ist nach, nicht vor *fidem* zu setzen.

132,32 f. *omnem animam uiuam occidit, morte uidelicet spiritali, percussit omnes ibidem commorantes*. Das Komma nach *spiritali* ist zu streichen.

164,42 ff. *Si tamen temptatus conrueris uictus, sed ilico recurreris ad paenitentiam renouandus, fluctus quidem super te transierunt. Magnitudine supereminentes maiori, non tamen abstulerint ...* Der Punkt nach *transierunt* ist zu streichen, denn *supereminentes* gehört zu *fluctus*; ferner würde ich *abstulerunt* schreiben.

Einigemal lässt sich der Quellenapparat ergänzen: 97,19 *cor unum et anima una*: Act. 4,32.–138,2 *iustitiae sol*: Mal. 4,2.

Zur Sprache

90,36 *conuiuiis, potu* (aus *poto* korrigiert) *et cibo ... dediti*. Zum Dat. Sing. der 4. Dekl. auf -u im Mlat. s. P. Stotz, *Handbuch zur lateinischen Sprache des Mittel-*

⁶ So schon Pitra.

alters. Bd. 4 (München 1998) S. 99 f. mit Anmerkungen. – 169,29 f. *profunditas ultimae abyssus*⁷ *circumdedit me*. *Abyssus* scheint hier nach der 4. Dekl. flektiert zu sein. Ich kenne keine Parallele dazu. – 8,9 und 132,24 in *Apocalypsin*. Zur erstarrten Form *Apocalypsin* s. Stotz a.a.O. 89, Anm. 592. – 135,28 *commiscunt*. Zur Flexion von (-)miscere nach der 3. Dekl. s. Stotz a.a.O. S. 177, Anm. 55; dazu noch *Acta Classica* 27 (1984), 143; *Maia* 45 (1993), 51, Anm. 3.

12,11 *ad sequendum Patri*. Zur Konstruktion von *sequi* mit dem Dat. s. Hofmann–Szantyr a.a.O. S. 89; auch meine Edition des Ambrosianischen Donatkommentars (CC 133 C) IX; *Eranos* 89 (1991), 103; *Maia* 50 (1998), 524. – 117,16 f. *oboedientia diuinis mandatis*. Andere Belege für Dative, die von Verbalabstracta abhängig sind, im *ALMA* 40 (1977), 169.172; *Arctos* 15 (1981), 72; in der Einleitung zum Ambrosianischen Donatkommentar IX. – 144,46 *magis maior*. Zur doppelten Steigerung s. Hofmann–Szantyr a.a.O. 166 f. – 190,85 f. *si quis ... tenes, hoc agis ut ...* Zur Verbindung eines Pronomens mit der 2. Pers. s. Hofmann–Szantyr a.a.O. 412. – Die Gleichwertigkeit von *alius* und *alter* beleuchten Stellen wie 71,13 *de alia in alteram fugierunt ciuitatem*; 189,41 ff. *Quis enim discernet, cur uni datum est hoc donum uel cur alteri aliud; et quod unus habet, alius non accipit*. Vgl. Hofmann–Szantyr a.a.O. 207 f. – 34,26 f. *quisquis Deum uerum minus diligit et plus caducum aliquid delectatur*; 108,41 *Dominum delectari*; 157,5 *quisquis paenitentiam delectaris*. Zum deponentialen *delector* s. *Acta Classica* 12 (1969), 99; *Kratylos* 20 (1975), 122; *Glotta* 54 (1976), 132. – In der *Glotta* 54, 135 bespreche ich die Verbindung von aktivischen *uerba significandi* mit zwei Accusativen. Unser Autor bietet viele derartige Belege, z. B. 4,24 *caro equus figuraliter praenotatus*; 15,19 f. *manus Domini prophetas ... cognosce*; 15,7 *caelum spiritales posuit sanctos*; 23 *caelum angelos ponit*; 17,9 f. *uellus humanam carnem ... praeuidebat*; 25,9 *diuisas gentes scismatum distributiones ostendit*; 24 f. *gentes ... doctrinas haereticas cognoscamus*; 30,13 *petram ... significat Dominum*; 34,9 *deos recentes haeresum doctrinas ostendit*; 17 f. *deos nouos ... consuetudines prauas ... agnosce*; 40,47 f. *non gentem posuit christianos*; 42,54 f. *terram et nascentia terrae carnem et carnalia opera manifestet*; 47,9 *lac spiritalis doctrinae sermo est cognoscendus*; 133,15 ... *quae (scil. insula) significatur gens Iudaea*; zu *aduertere* mit doppeltem Akk. s. Kullendorff a.a.O. 138.

165,26 *adhuc adiciet intueri*; ähnlich 28. Diese Umschreibung mit *adicere* ist biblisch, s. F. Kaulen, *Sprachliches Handbuch zur Vulgata* (Freiburg 1904), 235.

39,37 f. *in aliis similitudinibus conficticiis*. Das Wort *conficticius* ist weder im *ThLL* noch von A. Blaise, *Dictionnaire latin-français des auteurs chrétiens* (Turnhout 1954) belegt. Im *Mittellateinischen Wörterbuch* Bd. 2 (München 1999) wird ein Beleg zitiert.

120,9 *quod obsignatum est resigillet, quod clausum est patefiat*. Das Wort *resigillare* muss hier ‘das Siegel brechen’ bedeuten.

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⁷ So schon Pitra.

ISTVÁN BORZSÁK

DIE ANTIHELDEN IN DER FRÜHCHRISTLICHEN HYMNENDICHTUNG

Summary: In the description of persecutors of Christianity, as given by early Christian hymns, the typical features of ancient tyrants return: they are cruel, brutish, invent always new means of tormenting, finally however they are humiliated.

Key words: early Christian hymns, tyrant typ.

Der Titel meines Konferenzbeitrages wird meine verehrten Hörer verwundert haben: wer sollen denn ‚Antihelden‘ der frühchristlichen Hymnendichtung gewesen sein? Denkt man etwa an den homerischen Apollonhymnus oder an Pindars ersten olympischen Hymnus, so kommt einem Typhon (oder Typhōs) bzw. Tantalos in den Sinn, der das große Glück nicht zu verdauen vermochte und übersatt unsäglich Qual – ἄταν ὑπέροπλον – auf sich zog. In der frühchristlichen (und auch in der späteren) Hymnendichtung gibt es keine Pythonschlangen, höchstens harmlose Löwen (z. B. Prud., Hymn. IV. 47 *lambunt indomiti virum* – d.h. Danielelem – *leones*) o.Ä., es gibt aber immer verblendete Feinde der gerechten Sache, die wegen ihrer Gottlosigkeit beschämt werden und unentrinnbar ein schmähhches Ende nehmen.

Lasst uns *in mediis rebus*, oder gar früher beginnen! Im J. 168 v. Chr. musste Antiochos IV. (Epiphanes oder von seinen Gegnern Epimanes genannt) auf das Ultimatum des römischen Gesandten hin das bereits eroberte Ägypten räumen. Nach dieser Demütigung verbot er als eifriger Verehrer der griechischen Kultur den Jahvekult in Jerusalem und erbaute einen Altar des Zeus Olympios, worauf die Erhebung der Makkabäer ausbrach. Die Ereignisse dieses Volksaufstandes aufzuzählen wäre hier unangebracht. Wir verweisen nur auf das Zustandekommen der Daniel’schen Prophezeiungen *ex eventu*, die das Siegesbewusstsein und die Hoffnungen der vom ‚rasenden‘ Tyrannen noch unlängst Erniedrigten verkünden sollten.¹ Dafür dürfen die Makkabäerbücher der Septuaginta als ein Dokument sondergleichen erachtet werden, in welchem ein Opfer des blutdürstigen (αἰμοβόρος), mordlustigen (φονώδης), unreinen (παμμιαρωτάτος), ja viehischen (θηριωδέστατος) Tyrannen καλοκάγαθα

¹ Vgl. dazu O. EISSFELDT, *Einl. in das AT*. Tübingen ²1956, 642 ff.; E. BIKERMAN, *Der Gott der Makkabäer*. 1937; F. HAMPL, *Gnomon* 15 (1939) 619 ff.; H. E. STIER, *Roms Aufstieg*. 1957, 16 ff.

καθωπλισμένος (II 11,22) zu sterben gewillt ist. Der blutgierige Wüterich (II 7,31 πάσης κακίας εὐρετής) soll getrost noch peinlichere Folterungsmethoden erdenken: ἐπινόει, τύραννε, βασάνους (II 10,16), die standhaften sieben Söhne² der standhaften Mutter opfern ihr Leben τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις (II 7,37) – wie einst Sokrates getan hat.

Die Bewertung des „energischen, aber maßlosen“ Antiochos (H. Volkmann, Kl. Pauly I 389) ist nicht unsere Aufgabe. Statt dessen weisen wir auf zwei Stellen des II. Makkabäerbuches hin. 5,21 liest man vom Ausplünderer des Tempels in Jerusalem, wie er – im Bewusstsein gut verrichteter Dinge – rasch nach Antiocheia fort will, οἰόμενος ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερηφανίας τὴν μὲν γῆν πλωτὴν καὶ τὸ πέλαγος πορευτὸν θέσθαι διὰ τὸν μετεωρισμὸν τῆς καρδίας. Dabei wird ein jeder von uns unvermeidlich an Xerxes' ὕβρις denken, der – „um zu prahlen“ (Herod. VII 24 μεγαλοφροσύνης εἵνεκεν) – die Landzunge des Athosgebirges durchstechen ließ („er wollte seine Macht zeigen und sich ein Denkmal damit errichten“) bzw. an den Brückenbau am Hellespontos (Herod. VII 13 ff.; X.' Befehl, das ihm Trotz bietende Meer durch Geißelhiebe usw. zu züchtigen: 35; vgl. Lucr. III 1029 f.; Iust. II 10,24; wie abgedroschen das rhetorisch ausbeutbare Thema wurde, zeigt u.a. Luk., Rhet. praec. 20).

Auf so ein ungehörtes Attentat gegen die göttliche Fügung muss eine Strafe folgen, die als warnendes Beispiel für alle Zeiten dienen soll: der ruchlose Sünder wird von einer unheilbaren Krankheit befallen (II Makk. 9,5 f.) und stirbt eines schmachvollen Todes, aber noch vor dem wohlverdienten, schrecklichen Ende bekehrt sich der Elende zum wahren Gott (12) und erklärt die bis dahin negativ privilegierten Juden für Gleichberechtigten mit den Athenern (9,15), πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις καὶ Ἰουδαῖον ἔσεσθαι καὶ πάντα τόπον οἱ κητὸν ἐπελεύσεσθαι καταγγέλλοντα τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κράτος (9,17; vgl. Mt. 28,19 und Mk. 16,15).³

Noch etwas Bemerkenswertes: Als Antiochos trotz seiner Krankheit vom Stolz – einstweilen – nicht absteht (9,7 οὐδαμῶς τῆς ἀγερωχίας ἔληγεν, „Feuer und Flamme speiend auf die Juden“), aber infolge eines Unfalls nicht mehr auf die Beine kommen kann, ὁ δ' ἄρτι δοκῶν τοῖς τῆς θαλάσσης κύμασιν ἐπιτάσσειν ... καὶ ὁ μικρῷ πρότερον τῶν οὐρανίων ἄστρων ἕπτεσθαι δοκῶν (9,8 ff.) bekennt sich erst im Bewusstsein seiner Hinfälligkeit für einen Sterblichen, der sich dem Herrn unterwerfen soll. Man braucht nicht zu sagen, dass wir hier mit der Lehre zu tun haben, die man zu allen Zeiten aus Alexanders d. Gr. Beispiel ziehen konnte.

Und nun zu einem anderen „energischen, aber maßlosen“ Herrscher der hellenistischen Zeit, an dem unbedingt etwas Großes ist (W. Otto, RE Suppl. II „Herodes“ 158), obwohl ihm die Geschichte den Beinamen ‚der Große‘ nicht von sich aus zuerkennen sollte, und dessen Familiengeschichte („wie in so vielen hellenistischen Reichen“: *ibid.* 127)⁴ mit Blut geschrieben ist: zu Herodes, dessen Name im Russi-

² Im *Lex. des Mittelalters* (VI 155) liest man gerade vom „Kult der Makkabäer-Brüder“, der die christliche Märtyrerliteratur „in entscheidender Weise“ beeinflusst habe.

³ Zur ‚Bekehrung‘ des Antiochos vgl. Ios., Ant. XI 8,5 p. 338. (Alexanders d. Gr. Dankbarkeit den Juden gegenüber): er soll ihnen gestattet haben, χρήσασθαι τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις usw.; desgleichen – u.a. – Esthers B. 16,19 (8,11).

⁴ Dazu vgl. man O. SEELS Anmerkungen zu Pompeius Trogus' Weltgeschichte (Zürich München 1972) 535 (zu Iust. XXX 3,2 von den Hauptakteuren gegen Rom zwischen Zama und Pydna): „Eine Fülle von kraftvollen Persönlichkeiten, ... ein Klima von Verfall, Intrige, Unsicherheit und Gewalttat;

schen (Ἰπποδ) bis auf heute gleichbedeutend mit 'Ungeheuer', 'Unmensch', 'Scheusal' ist.

Die Legende vom bethlehemitischen Kindermord (Mt. 2,13 ff.), der der König von Judaea zu Augustus' Zeiten seinen üblen Ruf verdankt, hängt ohne Zweifel mit dem rücksichtslosen Einschreiten des Herrschers gegen die Verbreiter gewisser messianistischer Weissagungen zusammen, die auf die Prophezeiung des baldigen Sturzes des Herodes hinausliefen (*ibid.* 138). „Allgemein bekannt war die Tötung der eigenen Kinder durch Herodes; wer so handelte, dem durfte man die Ermordung fremder Kinder erst recht zutrauen.“ In Erinnerung an den wahnsinnigen Mordbefehl, den der König kurz vor seinem Tode gegen die angesehensten Juden gegeben haben sollte, konnte man leicht Glauben schenken einem ebenso wahnsinnigen Mordbefehl gegen die Kinder in und bei Bethlehem, wozu „die Erinnerung an die Geschichten von der Bedrohung und Errettung berühmter Männer in ihrer Kindheit, d. h. allgemeine Sagenmotive beigetragen haben werden“ (*ibid.* 139).

In Kenntnis dieses Tatbestandes lesen wir den Epiphanienhymnus (XII) des Prudentius: *Quicumque Christum quaeritis, oculos in altum tollite!* So folgten die morgenländischen Weisen – *periti interpretes* – dem Königsmacht verkündenden Stern:⁵ *Exim sequuntur perciti / flexis in altum vultibus, / qua stella sulcum traxerat / claramque signabat viam. / Sed verticem pueri supra / signum pependit imminens, / pronaque submissum face / caput sacratum prodidit ... / Audit tyrannus (= Herodes) anxius / adesse regum principem, / qui nomen Israel regat / teneatque David regiam. / Exclamat amens nuntio: / „Successor instat, pellimur; / satelles, i, ferrum rape, / perfunde cunas sanguine! / Mas omnis occidat ...“* Darauf führen die Henker (*carnifex furens*) den tyrannischen Befehl aus, aber *quo proficit tantum nefas? / Unus tot inter funera / impune Christus tollitur, /* – wie einst Moses, Präfiguration Christi, „der törichten Verordnung des bösen Pharaos entgangen war“, dank seiner sorgfältigen Hebamme, d. h. der Pharaonentochter (Ex. 2,6), die *pie contumax in tyrannum* (d. h. den Pharao) war – wobei man unwillkürlich an Horazens *splendide mendax (in parentem periurum: C. III 11,35)* denken wird.

Wie man sieht, können viele historische (biblische) Namen bzw. Figuren zum gotteslästerlichen *Tyrannen* gestempelt werden, wie z. B. Senacherib (vgl. 2 Reg. 18,28 und 19,37), Nabuchodonosor (Dan. 4,21 ff.), Holofernes usw.⁶ Die von mir als Antihelden apostrophierten Personen nicht nur der frühchristlichen Hymnendichtung tragen *deren* Züge, benehmen sich wie es sich für einen *typischen* Tyrannen geziemt, der alle Menschenrechte wie Vernunfts- oder Moralgebote mit den Füßen tritt, und der als *θηριωδέστατος τύραννος* nicht verdient, als *homo sapiens* erachtet zu werden.

Deshalb werden die Verfolger Christi und seiner Bekenner – entsprechend dem Usus des Verfolgung leidenden Judentums – konsequent nicht als Menschen, son-

bedeutende Leidenschaften, jähe Wechselfälle, Heldentum und Verrätereie, Schwelgereie und ringsum drohender Mord: eine Zeit lodernder Intensität und insgesamt eine Gestimmtheit, die jedes denkbare *fin de siècle* überbietet.“

⁵ Vgl. I. BORZSÁK, *Innoxia flamma. Listy Filologické* (Prag) 156 (1983) 33 ff. = *Eine Handvoll*. Budapest 1999, 107 ff.

⁶ Vgl. I. BORZSÁK, *Persertum und griech.-röm. Antike. Zur Ausgestaltung des klassischen Tyrannenbildes. Gymnasium* 94 (1987) 289 ff. = *Eine Handvoll* 712 ff.

dern als tierische Tyrannen bezeichnet. Hier kommt uns der Sprachgebrauch im klassischen Rom in den Sinn, wonach die politischen Gegner nicht selten als *belua* beschimpft werden, so z. B. Verres (von Cicero, Verr. II 5, 42 *immanis belua*), Antonius (Phil. VIII 4,13; vgl. u.a. Liv. IV 49,14 *haec belua*), oder gar Domitian (freilich nach seiner Ermordung: Plin., Paneg. 48,3 *immanissima belua*; vgl. 90,5 *ille optimi cuiusque spoliator et carnifex*) usw. Der Tyrann wird auch in Ciceros philosophischen Schriften nicht feiner behandelt, so z. B. De re publ. II 26,48 *tyrannus, quo neque taetrius, neque foedius, nec dis hominibusque invisius animal ullum cogitari potest* (desgleichen De off. III 8,36). Tacitus verweist in diesem Zusammenhang (Ann. VI 6,1 f.) auf den *praestantissimus sapientiae*, d.h. Platon, der die Tyrannen noch im Jenseits furchtbare Qualen erleiden lässt (Gorg. 524 e; Pol. 579 d). So wird die erschreckend naturalistische Darstellung des qualvollen Endes eines Antiochos oder Herodes und später dasjenige eines jeden Christenverleugners oder Häretikers – von Judas (Acta ap. 1,18) bis Arius (z. B. bei Ambrosius PL 16, col. 556)⁷ – zu erklären sein, im Gegensatz zur Verklärung von Gottes Heiligen.

In Zusammenhang mit dem Märtyrertod der Makkabäersöhne haben wir den verzweifelden Ruf ihrer Mutter an den Tyrannen erwähnt: „Ersinne nur (ἐπινόει) weitere, bisher unbekannte Folterwerkzeuge“ (oder -methoden; vgl. Herod. I 48 vom Erraten eines Orakelspruches). Das gehört auch zum Inventar des Tyrannenkomplexes, wie es sich z. B. am literarischen Bild des Xerxes und seiner unrühmlichen Nachfolger beobachten lässt. In einem Zweig der Überlieferung⁸ liest man über ihn als willenlosen Sklaven seines Harems, der nur auf ‚Erfindung‘ eines neuen Genusses sinnt (s. z. B. Cic., Tusc. V 7,20 *Xerxes praemium proposuit, qui invenisset novam voluptatem*). Xerxes’ (d.h. *des Tyrannen kat’ exochên*) ‚Erfindungen‘ sollten in der Tyrannentypologie späterer Jahrhunderte mannigfaltige Folgen nach sich ziehen. Wie die Wohltäter der Menschheit, die das Leben „durch neue Künste“ (Verg., Aen. VI 663 *inventas per artis*) veredelt haben, im Bewusstsein der Nachwelt in verklärtem Licht erscheinen, so werden die jeweiligen „Tyrannen“ als *scelerum inventores* schonungslos verdammt.⁹ So soll Vergils Mezentius u.a. ein greuelvolles *tormenti genus* (Aen. VIII 487) erfunden haben – wie manches dann die *Siculi tyranni* (Hor., Epist. I 2,58) erfanden. Zu den von Plutarch (Arttox. 16 ff.) registrierten persischen Hinrichtungs- und Foltermethoden oder zur Zerstampfung des renitenten Philosophen Anaxarchos durch Nikostratos von Salamis¹⁰ (Plut., Mor. 449 EF; Diog. Laert. IX 58 f.) mag hier die Passio Hippolyti des Prudentius zugezählt werden: Der zur *una fides* bekehrte Presbyter muss durch den *insanus rector* (anderswo: *furens quaestor*), der in Rom mit seinen Todesurteilen ohne Ende (*caedibus assiduus*) selbst den wütenden Kaiser Tiberius übertroffen hat (V. 54 ff. werden die exquisitesten Hinrichtungsarten,

⁷ S. I. BORZSÁK, *Eine Handvoll*, 566 f.

⁸ Vgl. I. BORZSÁK, *Acta Ant. Hung.* 19 (1970) 49 f.

⁹ Kl. THRAEDE geht in seinem reichhaltigen R4C-Art. „Erfinder“ auf die ‚Erfindungen‘ der Tyrannen nicht ein: vgl. immerhin Sp. 4242 (böse Engel als Lehrer verderblicher Techniken) und 1273 (Engel, Dämonen, Teufel als Erfinder der Häresien).

¹⁰ Vgl. A. ALFÖLDI, Der Philosoph als Zeuge der Wahrheit und sein Gegenspieler, der Tyrann. *Scientiis artibusque. Collect. Acad. Cath. Hung.* (Rom) 1955–1957, 14 ff.; orientalische Herrscher als Modell: s. H. BERVE, *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen*, I. (München 1967) 196.

u.a. Neros ‚Erfindung‘, das Todesschiff, aufgezählt), eines „ungewöhnlichen“ Todes sterben (83 ff. *insolitum leti genus; et nova poena / inventa, exemplo quo trepidant alii*): „Ergo sit Hippolytus, ... *intereatque feris dilaceratus equis*“ (87 ff.), und die schreckliche *dilaceratio* sowie das Zusammenlesen der zerstreuten Körperteile wird mit peinlicher Detaillierung erzählt.

Desgleichen wird u.a. die schauerhafte Tortur des Märtyrers Vincentius detailliert beschrieben (100 ff.); Passion der Makkabäersöhne auch im *Romani martyris suppl.* 746 ff.: *illud nobile ac memorabile / certamen, una matre quod septem editi / gessere pueri, sed tamen factis viri* – mit dem Regenwunder des Kroisos, danach mit weiteren Greueln.

Im *Hymnus in laudem Vincentii martyris* wird der wütende Christenverfolger als „misslungener Folterer“ dargestellt (132 ff.): *nil illa vis exercita / tot noxiorum mortibus / agone in isto proficit, / ars et dolorum vincitur*. In demselben Hymnus findet man eine „neue Art von Bestrafung“ (253 ff.): *poenam novam, ... / nulli tyranno cognitam ... / Haec ille versutus vafra / meditatus arte struxerat: / sed Belzebulis callida / commenta Christus destruit*, – d.h. die teuflischen Konstruktionen wurden durch Christus destruiert, entkräftet. Aber der Feind Christi vermag sich in seinem Misserfolg nicht dareinzufinden (383 ff.): „*Evasit exultans*“ – *ait* – / „*rebellis, et palmam tulit?*“ / *Sed restat illud ultimum: / inferre poenam mortuo, / feris cadaver tradere, / canibusque carpendum dare ...*“ *Sic frendit, et corpus sacrum ... / exponit inter carices* (Riedgras); / *sed nulla dirarum fames / aut bestiarum aut alitum / audet tropaeum gloriae / foedare tactu squalido* – ja sogar wiederholt sich – dank einem Raben (*corvus Heliae datus*) – das Wunder des Propheten (und des legendären römischen Helden). Noch immer nicht genug: der halsstarrige Tyrann (*tyrannus pertinax*) lässt den Leichnam (*corpus intactum*), Hände und Füße zusammengebunden, mit einem Stein noch schwerer gemacht ins Meer werfen; trotz alldem wird der Körper des Märtyrers unversehrt ans Ufer verschlagen, und nach dem baldigen Sieg des rechten Glaubens werden seine Knochen gebührendermaßen verehrt. *Sic corpus: ast ipsum Dei / sedes receptum continet / cum Maccabaeis fratribus / sectoque Isaiae proximum* (521 ff.).

Tyrannus wird – u.a. – auch der Herrscher von Babylon genannt, der den Propheten Daniel vor die Löwen warf (Prud., Hymn. IV 43 ff.; vgl. 76 *tristificus tyr.*). *Tyrannus kat'exochén* war auch Herodes zu allen Zeiten. U.a. wird der *persecutor* Maximianus als Herodes apostrophiert, wenn er (Eul. 86) *sanguine pascitur innocuo*. J. Szövérfy, der beste Kenner der mittelalterlichen Hymnendichtung, erwähnt Herodes¹¹ nur im Zusammenhang mit dem witzigen Dictum des Augustus, wonach er im Hofe des Judenkönigs lieber ein Schwein als dessen eigenes Kind gewesen wäre – in Hinsicht auf die religiöse Vorschrift, die das Essen des Schweinefleisches den Gläubigen verbietet. Die zu einer Schablone verblichene Tyrannengestalt wird man auch unter den nicht-namentlichen Benennungen verstehen: *carnifex* (*taeter, pastus sanguine*), *persecutor*, *tortor*, *satelles*, *hostis truculentus*, *praefectus*, *praetor*, *minis-*

¹¹ J. SZÖVÉRFY, Klassische Anspielungen usw. in mittelalterl. Hymnen. *Archiv für Kulturgesch.* 41 (1962) 170 f.; *Latin hymns*. Turnhout 1989, 49.

ter insani ducis, contemptor aeterni dei usw.¹² Im *Hymnus in honorem Fructuosi episcopi* wird eine Episode aus den Christenverfolgungen des Mussius Aemilianus (im J. 257: vgl. Euseb., Hist. VII 11) erzählt: *Iudex Aemilianus ... / atrox, turbidus, insolens, profanus / aras daemonicas coli iubebat*. Als der Bischof und seine beiden Diakonen den Scheiterhaufen besteigen (98 f.: *Felices animae, quibus per ignem / celsa scandere contigit Tonantis!*), fallen ihnen die Fesseln ab (106 f. *non ausa est cohibere poena palmas / in morem crucis ad Patrem levandas: / solvit brachia, quae deum precentur*) – wie einst mit jenen biblischen Dreien geschah, *quos olim Babyloniaceum per ignem / cantantes stupuit tremens tyrannus* (d.h. Nabuchodonosor, 110 ff.; vgl. Dan. 3,23 ff.). Selbstverständlich wird auch Galerius (Maximianus, Mitkaiser Diocletians) mit ähnlichen, wenig schmeichelnden Beiwörtern bedacht (Prud., *Romani mart. suppl.* 32): *immitis, atrox, asper, implacabilis*; desgleichen beweist sich sein Praefectus vor und während der Folterung des Künders Christi derselben Epitheta würdig, als Romanus auszusprechen wagt (455): *Hoc omne, quicquid lancinamur, non dolet!* (Dazu vgl. *man vocem illam immortalem ac paene divinam: Paete, non dolet*, Plin., *Epist.* III 15,6.)

*

Illuc, unde abii, redeo: Fanden wir in den Makkabäerbüchern lehrreiche Requisite aus früheren Zeiten, ‚tyrannische‘ Gesten und deren Ertragen oder Nicht-Ertragen, ‚tyrannisches‘ Wüten einerseits und Heldenhaftigkeit seitens der Verfolgten, so können wir nun behaupten, dass diese typischen Situationen auch später oft in Erscheinung treten, sich quasi wiederholen. So entpuppten sich die Antihelden der frühchristlichen Hymnendichtung als typische Vertreter des Bösen, immer neue Reinkarnationen eines Xerxes (Antiochos, Herodes ...). J. Szövérfy (a.a.O.) hat in den mittelalterlichen Hymnen zahlreiche Anspielungen auf antike Vorbilder registriert und eine unendliche Kette solcher Züge in den Hymnen aufgezeigt – seit der Dichtung des Hilarius von Poitiers bis zum Ausklang der spätmittelalterlichen Hymnendichtung. Unser Ziel war von vornherein nicht so hoch gesteckt, und hoffentlich hat es der ausgediente Artillerist nicht so weit verfehlt.

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¹² Um einen gewalttätigen Herrscher, einen unbequem gewordenen Staatsmann und überhaupt jeden politischen Feind zum Tyrannen zu stempeln, stand unter der Einwirkung des persisch-orientalischen Herrscherbildes ein ganzes Arsenal reich entwickelter Tyrannentypologie zur Verfügung (H. BERVE, a.a.O. I 383). So ist diese Typologie in die christliche Märtyrerakten usw. eingegangen: „Kaiser, Statthalter, Richter werden ohne Unterschied Tyrannen genannt und von den Märtyrern sehr unhöflich behandelt.“ (E. WALSER, *Die Gestalt des tragischen und des komischen Tyrannen im Mittelalter und Renaissance*. Basel 1932, 198 f.)

CRITICA

Sub corona vendere. Quellenkritische Studien zu Kriegsgefangenschaft und Sklaverei in Rom bis zum Ende des Hannibalkrieges. Von Karl-Wilhelm Welwei, unter Berücksichtigung des Nachlasses von Gottfried Prachner. Forschungen zur antiken Sklaverei. Band XXXIV. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2000, 181 S.

Im Vorwort nennt Verfasser als seine Zielsetzung bei der Behandlung der Anfänge der römischen Sklaverei die quellenkritische Stellungnahme gegenüber den frühromischen Quellen. – Die Sklaverei war in Rom eine frühe Erscheinung; Quellen der Sklaverei waren Menschenraub, Piraterie und Kriegsgefangenschaft, auch die Verschuldung. Es gab verschiedene Formen, so den Sklavenverkauf bzw. den Sklavenhandel. Eine Stütze des oben Gesagten findet man in den Zwölftafelgesetzen und in den Vorschriften und Klauseln der Römisch-Karthagischen Verträge. Die Mitteilungen der Annalistik und des Livius sind nämlich unglaublich, anachronistisch. Sie projizieren sie auf die Verhältnisse ihrer Zeiten zurück, ihre Zahlenangaben sind übertrieben. Aber auch die Daten aus der Zeit der späten Republik geben keine sichere Stütze für die Angaben zur frühen und mittleren Republik. Darum sucht W. in den methodischen, prinzipiellen Erörterungen in der Einleitung seiner Arbeit „Klarheit über die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Aussagen zu frühromischen Verhältnissen zu erhalten“ (S. 9).

Bezeichnend für die Problematik ist schon der Titel der Arbeit *sub corona vendere*: „der ältere Cato kannte offenbar nicht mehr die ursprüngliche Bedeutung der Wendung ...“ (S. 13). Die heutige Forschung kam auch nicht zu einer konkreten Feststellung. Nach W. war das „ursprünglich wohl ein technischer Ausdruck für den Verkauf von den Gefangenen im Felde bzw. im Kampfgebiet“ (ebd.). – Weitere Anhaltspunkte sind aus den Überresten von Gesetzen, Gebräuchen, Opferriten usw. zu erwarten. Im Vordergrund dominieren also Fragen, Probleme, Hinweise, Möglichkeiten, Zweifel, Widerlegungen, Aufgabestellungen usw.

Die literarischen Quellen zur frühromischen Sklaverei (II.1) tragen deutlich spätrömisches Kolorit, sie aktualisieren, rechtfertigen Roms Taten und widersprechen einander oft. Auch die erhaltenen Fragmente des Zwölftafelgesetzes lassen nur spärliche Bezüge der Rechtslage der Sklaven erkennen.

„Berichte“ über Versklavungen von Kriegsgefangenen vor dem Fall Veis (II.2) enthalten gängige Topoi, bieten „dramatische Ausschmückung fiktiven Geschehens“ (S. 25). Die Zahlen der Gefangenen bei Livius sind weiter „suspekt“. Jedenfalls gibt W. zu: „Prinzipiell besteht freilich kaum ein Zweifel, dass in der frühen Republik zumindest ein Teil der Gefangenen ... in die Sklaverei verkauft wurden“ (S. 26, vgl. 30).

Im Kapitel III „Kriegsgefangenschaft als Quelle der Sklaverei während der italischen Expansion Roms“ behandelt W. zuerst (I) den Fall Veis. Der Sieg der Römer über Veii ergab einen großen Zuwachs an Landbesitz, vier neue Tribus wurden organisiert und ein Teil der Bewohner der Stadt wurde verkauft. Die Darstellungen und Zahlenangaben bei Livius sind umstritten. „Allerdings könnte der Verkauf der gefangen genommenen Veienter der erste authentische Fall einer derartigen Praxis gewesen sein ...“

(S. 33). Ausweitung von Territorium und Sklavenhaltung stehen in Wechselwirkung. Natürlich versäumt W. nicht zu betonen, dass dies freilich nicht bedeutet, als ob ein erklärtes Ziel der Römer „Kriege zur Gewinnung von Sklaven zu führen“ gewesen wäre. (S. 35).

Danach (2) befasst sich W. intensiv mit den Themen „Versklavungen von Kriegsgefangenen und Ausweitung der Sklavenwirtschaft von der Eroberung Veis bis zum Ende des zweiten Samnitenkrieges“ (S. 35–42). Im Zusammenhang der *VICESIMA MANUMISSIONUM* enthält Anm. 22 eine unangenehme Kritik an Prachners Manuskript (vgl. auch S. 41 mit Anm. 43–44). Die vielseitige Analyse der Erzählung von Livius ist überzeugend, aber auch diesmal gibt es überwiegend negative Konklusionen (S. 36–38). Es verwundert, dass W. bereit ist, den Sklavenbesitz der Römer möglichst herabzusetzen, zugleich aber geneigt zu sein scheint, in eroberten Kleinstädten, wie z.B. Satricum, mehrere Tausend von Sklaven anzunehmen. Aber den Bericht über den zweiten Samnitenkrieg beurteilt er mit berechtigten strengen kritischen Bemerkungen (S. 40–42).

Die Darstellung „Nachrichten über Versklavungen im dritten Samnitenkrieg“ (3) ist eigentlich eine vernichtende Analyse der Erzählung des Livius. Auch wenn die Ziffern nicht übertrieben zu sein scheinen, muss man Vorsicht üben: Es gibt nämlich überall Übertreibungen, Ausschmückungen, auch Dubletten. Charakteristische Konklusion ist z.B. „als Fazit bleibt somit festzuhalten, daß auch die Überlieferung über Gefangenenzahlen im Jahr 194 v. Chr. keine Basis für Schätzungen bietet“ (S. 46). Übrigens erwähnt auch Livius im allgemeinen nicht, dass die Kriegsgefangenen in die Sklaverei verkauft wurden.

Danach ist im Punkt 4 „Sklaverei und Römische Wirtschaft in der Zeit der Samnitenkriege“ die Konklusion beinahe überraschend, dass im Verlauf dieser Kämpfe weit mehr Menschen in die Sklaverei verkauft wurden als je zuvor. Dennoch scheint es so zu sein. Für die unfreie Arbeitskraft bestand wachsender Bedarf in dem sich vermehrenden großen Grundbesitz führender römischer Familien (S. 50). W. erwähnt auch die bekannte Tatsache, dass die Ländereien der römischen Oberschicht – infolge der schrittweisen Eroberungen – aus „Streubesitz“ bestanden (S. 51). Diese Tatsache hatte vielleicht die spätere Idealisierung der bescheidenen Lebensführung der Großen der alten Zeiten motiviert, meint Rezensent.

W. argumentiert begründend gegen die Auffassung der damaligen Konzentration des Grundbesitzes, rechnet mit dem Weiterleben der römischen Bauernschaft und mit dem Vorhandensein der freien Arbeitskraft (S. 53). – Ja, auch der alte Cato hat das später für wichtig gehalten, *Agr.* 3,1. – Vielseitig erörtert W. auch die Schwierigkeiten der ‚Vermarktung‘ von versklavten Kriegsgefangenen, vor allem mit der unterentwickelten römischen Münzprägung. Im Blickfeld steht zum Vergleich die diesbezügliche Tätigkeit der Griechen und Karthager auf Sizilien. Die Wirkung des geprägten Geldes aus den Griechenstädten der Magna Graecia, das Aufblühen des Sklavenhandels, der wachsende Bedarf in den laufend sich erweiternden Territorien hatten die Bedeutung der Sklavenarbeit immer mehr verstärkt und die Zahl der beschäftigten „Unfreien“ gesteigert (S. 54–62). Die Reproduktion dieser Menschen schätzt W. aber m.E. zu hoch ein.

Nach dem zuletzt geschilderten Aufschwung der Sklaverei folgert W. (5) auf „Rückgang der Versklavungen von Gefangenen und verstärkte natürliche Reproduktion der Sklavenschaft zwischen 290 und 264 v.Chr.“ – letztere Behauptung ist wohl hypothetisch und wird von keiner Quelle unterstützt. Dass die Sklavenschaft sich nicht verringert hat, muss man unbedingt anderweitig erklären; das postulierte Vertrauen seitens manches Herrn ist nicht zwingend (S. 64). Nur darf man beim Fernhandel nicht den Menschenraub der früher nicht einmal erwähnten Piraten vergessen. Und nebenbei: Wenn die Quellen von Mengen der Kriegsgefangenen reden, aber deren Versklavung nicht erwähnen, ist das kein Beweis und verleitet leicht zu „*argumentum e silentio*“...

Kapitel IV (S. 65–87) behandelt die „Versklavungen von Kriegsgefangenen und Ausweitung der Sklavenhaltung in Rom von 264–219. v. Chr.“ Punkt 1 ist den Ereignissen des ersten Punischen Krieges gewidmet. Die Untersuchung hat eigentlich zwei Seiten wie aus dem ersten Satz zu sehen ist: „Zahlreiche Kriegsgefangene und ‚Civilpersonen‘ erobelter Städte sind von den Römern im ersten Punischen Krieg versklavt worden“ (S. 65). Die Feststellung der einzelnen Tatsachen ist, aber vielfach problematisch: Die Zahlen der Gefangenen sind oft nicht angegeben, wenn ja, sind sie nicht zuverlässig. Im Zusammenhang mit dieser Problematik bei den eroberten Städten ist es fraglich, ob es möglich ist zwischen bisher freien Bürgern und gefangen genommenen Sklaven zu differenzieren. – Große Mengen fielen in Seeschlachten in Gefangenschaft, aber im Einzelnen sind nur „grobe Schätzungen“ möglich (S. 68): viele Schiffe versanken, die Besatzungsstärken der karthagischen Kriegsschiffe sind nicht bekannt, die überlieferten Zahlen sind abgerundet, usw. Die Beweisführung stützt sich so auf Hypothesen, was auch Beschränkungen wie „vielleicht, wahrscheinlich, möglicherweise, vermutlich“ usw. zeigen. Man muss mit mehreren Unbe-

kannten rechnen (S. 69). Also ist Vorsicht geboten. W. veranschlagt behutsam jedenfalls die Zahl der in Kriegsgefangenschaft geratenen Besatzungsmitglieder der karthagischen Flotte bei Eknomos auf über 20 000 Mann (S. 72).

Eine Menge der Lastschiffe, die versklavte Kriegsgefangene, Stadtbewohner von weither, z.B. aus Afrika nach Italien transportierten, erlitten unterwegs Schiffbruch. So sind die Menschen in den Wellen ums Leben gekommen. Diesbezügliche Angaben der Quellen sind widersprüchlich, man muss mit mehreren unbekannten Tatsachen und Unsicherheitsfaktoren rechnen. Somit ist es hoffnungslos, auch nur eine annähernde Gesamtzahl der im ersten Punischen Krieg in die Sklaverei verkauften Gefangenen zu ermitteln. Soviel darf aber ein Althistoriker bemerken, dass ungeachtet allerlei Zweifel eine unleugbare Tatsache bleibt: Infolge der Kriegseignisse gelangten doch Sklaven in genügender Menge nach Sizilien und Italien, um Bedeutendes beim Aufschwung und der Verstärkung der Landwirtschaft stufenweise beitragen zu können. Diese These wurde in den Punkten 2–4 nolens-volens unterstützt: In den Kämpfen gegen Falisker, Sarden, Kelten und Liguren, auch in den illyrischen Kriegen werden zahlreiche Gefangengenommene versklavt. Die Gefangenenzahlen sind ja auch in diesen Fällen unmöglich zu „verifizieren“...

In Kap. V befasst sich W. neben Kriegsgefangenen auch mit der „Bedeutung der Sklaverei für Kriegsführung und Wirtschaft Roms von 218–201 v.Chr.“ (S. 88–131). Die Ereignisse auf dem Italienischen Kriegsschauplatz (1) bedeuteten für Roms Sklavenhaltung und Sklavenwirtschaft bis zum Abzug der Karthager eine Krisenzeit. Ungewöhnlicherweise fielen in den ersten Jahren viel mehr Römer in die Kriegsgefangenschaft der Karthager als je zuvor. Nach der Katastrophe bei Cannae griff der römische Senat zu einem äußersten Mittel: er kaufte Sklaven und stellte aus ihnen zwei Legionen auf. In kurzer Zeit trat aber eine merkwürdige Wende ein: Die römischen Legionen konnten nacheinander in kleineren, dann in größeren Gefechten Siege erringen. Auf Grund dieser Erfolge wurden immer mehr Gegner gefangengenommen. Die Mitteilungen von Taten und Zahlen behandelt W. auch weiter immer kritisch, mit Zweifel und Vorbehalt. Obwohl damit der wirkliche Tatbestand aber nicht geklärt wird, ist die Darstellung doch manchmal lehrreich. Den Problemen, die mit der Kapitulation von Capua (J. 211) im Zusammenhang stehen, widmet W. gebührende Untersuchung (S. 96–99). W. rechnet auch damit, dass die erbeuteten Sklaven weiterhin als Arbeitskräfte in der campanischen Landwirtschaft eingesetzt wurden. Die Einnahme von Tarent bedeutete für Rom einen großen Erfolg; demzufolge gerieten mehrere Tausende von Gefangenen in die Sklaverei (S. 101). Nebenbei sei gesagt: deshalb ist nicht verwunderlich, dass kaiserzeitliche Historiker derzeitige Benennungen für frühere benutzen, so z.B. *'fiscus'* für *'aerarium'*. Es ist wohl möglich, dass die Siegesberichte überhöht waren, doch musste der – immer weniger – siegreiche Hannibal Italien schließlich verlassen!

Im weiteren liest man über Kriegsgefangene aus Sardinien (2), ausführlich von der Iberischen Halbinsel (3), auf Sizilien (4), dann im ersten Makedonischen Krieg (5), zuletzt in Nordafrika (6)...

Nach seinen Darlegungen entwirft W. (VI) eine „Zusammenfassung und Analyse der Ereignisse“ (132–158). Letztere sind, wie gesehen, allzu spärlich. Ein Bild der damaligen Wirtschaftsverhältnisse wurde auch im großen Rahmen nicht fassbar vorgestellt. Die Analyse dient zur theoretischen Unterstützung seiner befolgten Methode, deren ständiges Ziel darin besteht, die Brauchbarkeit der Quellenüberlieferung womöglich zu relativieren, den Wert ihrer Angaben herabzusetzen. Eine charakteristische Formulierung ist z.B.: „Hierin lässt sich zwar die Summe der überlieferten Zahlen noch irgendwie einordnen, doch entspräche dann auf jeden Fall die Gesamtzahl nicht der faktischen Zunahme der Sklaven im römischen Bürgergebiet“ (S. 149).

Wichtige Fragen wurden nur andeutungsweise mit wenigen Worten „behandelt“. Der Leser vermag auch nicht zu erahnen, was W. unter den Begriffen wie *clientes*, *clientela* versteht. Was er über die Zusammenhänge der *gentes* und der *familia* meint (S. 139), ist vom Standpunkt der Sprachwissenschaft und der römischen Rechtsgeschichte nicht haltbar. Es gibt bei ihm Deklarationen ohne alle Beweise. Das Wort *peculium* wurde nicht erwähnt, Zustandekommen, Bedeutung ipso facto nicht. – Passim liest man über natürliche Reproduktion der Sklavenschaft. Man darf aber nicht aus den Augen verlieren, dass nur das zu reproduzieren möglich ist, was schon früher vorhanden war. – Großer Fleiß ist der Arbeit zu bescheinigen; die konsequent durchgeführten Zielsetzungen führten zu negativen Folgerungen. Untersucht man die Einzelheiten, wissen wir eigentlich nicht mehr als das, was im allgemeinen auch vorher bekannt war: die annalistische Tradition ist unzuverlässig. – Die Punkte 1–8 (S. 153–158) geben einen Ausblick auf späteren Zeiten. Die Thesen wecken Erwartung und hegen Hoffnung auf eine realere und greifbarere Darstellung ...

Das Buch schließen folgende Anhänge: Listen überlieferter Zahlen für Kriegsgefangene im dritten Samnitenkrieg und in den beiden ersten Punischen Kriegen, Literatur- und Abkürzungsverzeichnis, Register der Quellen, Namen und Begriffe (150–181).

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Pierre Sanchez: *L'Amphictionie des Pyles et de Delphes. Recherches sur son rôle historique, des origines au II^e siècle de notre ère*. Historia Einzelschriften 148. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2001, 574 pp. [The Amphictyony of Pyla and Delphi. A study of its historical role from the beginnings to the second century A.D.]

A comprehensive monograph on the structure and history of the Amphictyony of Delphi was last published in 1877.¹ This in itself justifies the undertaking of this work by Pierre Sanchez. Huge quantities of epigraphic and archaeological material have been brought to light since 1877. One of the major advantages of Sanchez's work is the critical analysis of this material, which indicates overtly that for now he cannot give a definite answer to questions of dating and interpretation. Another value of the book is that it presents the history of the Amphictyony and the changes in its structure from the beginnings to the 2nd century A.D.

The book is made up of eleven chapters and two appendices. In the first chapter reports by ancient authors are examined in a chronological order, and the conclusion reached is that reports relating to the early period acquired their final form in the 4th century B.C. Upon examining Speusippus's letter to Philip and Strabo's report (C 420. 9. 3. 7) the author warns that caution is needed when interpreting these sources (30).

In the second chapter the formation of the Amphictyony is discussed. Here the author concludes that the roots of the Amphictyony go back to the 8–7th centuries B.C. and that its centre was originally the sanctuary at Anthela. Its competence extended to organising *panēgyreis* (festive gatherings) and processions and to the defence of the sanctuary and perhaps in peacetime to ensuring free passage through the pass of Thermopylae. In the third chapter events are reviewed from the founding of the Delphi council to the first holy war. The foundation of the Pythian Games is also touched upon. The topic of the fourth chapter is the history of the 6–5th centuries B.C., while chapters 5, 6, and 7 are concerned with the fourth century, which is most important in the history of the sanctuary. In chapter 7 the author examines whether the role of the Amphictyony as a Panhellenic tribunal can be proven in the case of Macedon and Athens or Thebes and Thessaly. In the eighth chapter he discusses the changes under the Aetolian hegemony (e.g., the accession of new members), while in the ninth one he reviews the history of the 2nd–1st centuries B.C. from the liberation of the sanctuary. Chapter 10 is about the role of the Amphictyony in the Augustan era with special emphasis on the three important reforms under Augustus, Nero and Hadrian.

Chapter 11 sums up the changes in the structure and function of the Amphictyony.

The most important conclusion of the author is that he states that in contrast with a few late antique sources and the positions of modern scholarship, the Amphictyony never functioned either as an inter-state court in the course of its history, or as some kind of a centre defining the policies of Greece: "le Conseil amphictionique a-t-il disposé, au cours de son histoire, de compétences politiques et judiciaires importantes qui auraient fait de lui un tribunal d'arbitrage entre États ou un organisme susceptible d'influencer la vie politique grecque internationale? La réponse est non, sans aucune hésitation" (493). Thus its council cannot be regarded as some kind of a council above states of the Greeks. Though there is some kind of a development in this direction from the 3rd century B.C. onwards, but even then it did not act in defence of Greece but of Greek interests. In most of its functioning the council of the Amphictyony was concerned with the affairs of the sanctuary and lawsuits of private individuals. It only exceeded this framework once, when it passed its famous resolution on the international acceptance of Athenian tetradrachms (FD III 2. 139). It seems that some merchants, or may be even poleis were unwilling to accept

¹ BÜRGE, H.: *Die pylaeisch-delphische Amphiktyonie*. München 1877.

and exchange these in the value of four drachms. The council of the Amphictyony sanctioned slaves with whipping and freemen with a fine of 200 drachms for such a case in the territory of all Greek states. The date of the resolution is disputed, it is usually placed between 165 B.C. and the first years of the first century B.C. Sanchez is right in emphasising that the resolution was passed at a special session as usually there were no sessions in the month of *Daidaphorios* (419). In the late second century B.C. there was no power in Greece that could force poleis to implement this economic resolution, so it is probable that the Amphictyony passed its resolution with the agreement or even at the instigation of Rome. The first appendix deals with the terminology of the magistrates *hieromnêmones*, *pylagorai* and *agoratroi* and with the assembly (*ecclêsia*) of the Amphictyony and the conclusion reached based on G. Roux's opinion is that the term *agoratroi* did not replace *pylagoras*, but in Delphi *agoratroi* had always been used, the Athenian-Ionic literary form of which is *pylagoras* (498). In the second appendix the author concludes that the council of the Amphictyony decided autonomously in religious and administrative questions. These decisions were only sent for approval by the individual member-states when more serious problems arose: changing the composition of the council or starting a war on behalf of the Amphictyony (515).

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