

VISION UND EMOTION IN DER KUNST

MILÁN FÜST

Translated by: Nicolas Eber
E-mail: ebnic@sunrise.ch

ERSTER VORTRAG

Verehrte Zuhörerschaft!

Erwarten sie hier keine systematischen Ästhetik-Vorträge. Solche würden mehr Zeit erfordern. Gleichwohl können wir auf ein Mindestmaß an Ordnung nicht verzichten. Irgendwo muss man die Sache beginnen, und gemäß unserer Erfahrung am besten am Anfang.

Wir werden hier einige größere kunstästhetische Themen aufwerfen und umwälzen, in der Erwartung, aus ihnen vielleicht Einsichten zu gewinnen. Der Titel des ersten Vortrages könnte dabei etwa so lauten: Über die Künste im Allgemeinen und über die Aufgaben der Ästhetik. Fangen wir mit diesem Zweiterwähnten an – was könnte die Kunstabsthetik wollen? Und worin besteht sie? Wir können sogleich ganz einfach feststellen, dass die Ästhetik offenbar als ein Teil der Philosophie zu betrachten ist, da sie in ihren auf die Künste bezogenen Studien beispielsweise die Fragen untersucht, wie ist die Kunst. Wozu dient sie? Wie wirkt sie auf uns? Jede solche grundsätzliche Betrachtung, welche etwas Derartiges anvisiert, hat philosophischen Charakter.

Philosophie und Naivität

Hier ist es vielleicht angebracht, wenn ich sogleich erzähle, was ich neuerdings über die Natur der philosophischen Studien gedacht habe. Ich gewann je länger, je mehr den Eindruck, dass es im Grunde genommen die kindlichen Neigungen des Menschen sind, welche seine Philosophie hervorrufen. Anders gesagt, dass die Quelle der philosophischen Neigung des Menschen vermutlich in seiner ursprünglichen naiven, aber fundamentalen Neugierde zu suchen sei, welche für sein Kindesalter so charakteristisch ist. Damit wollte ich keinesfalls behaupten,

dass die Philosophie eine Wissenschaft unserer Kindlichkeit wäre. Ganz im Gegenteil: Keine andere Wissenschaft verlangt von uns mehr reifes Verständnis, Abwägung und Urteilsfähigkeit als eben die Philosophie. Wenn ich im Zusammenhang mit ihr von unserer ursprünglichen Naivität rede, dann möchte ich auf die Ursprünge der seelischen Reize dieser Wissenschaft hinweisen. Denn wie ist unsere diesbezügliche Erfahrung? Wie ist im Allgemeinen die Neugierde des Erwachsenen und wie diejenige des Kindes? Ist es nicht charakteristisch für das Kind, dass es seine Spielsachen aufmacht, um nachzuschauen, was in ihnen liegt? Was ist ihr Geheimnis? Woraus sind sie gemacht? Was bewegt die Augen im Kopf der Puppe? Sind nicht auch seine Fragen derart: Warum ist dies und das? Was ist sein Zweck? Wer hat es gemacht? Und wofür wurde es eigentlich gemacht? Wer hat die Welt erschaffen und weshalb? Und das Oberste Gericht? Und warum wird dort geurteilt? Seine Fragen sind wohl endlos. Und nachher? Später?

Später verstummen seine Fragen. Das Mannesalter hat sich damit abgefunden, seine Grundneugierde für unergiebig zu betrachten, hütet sich davor, und solche oder ähnliche Fragen wie etwa: „Was ist eigentlich die Wahrheit?“ oder „Was ist die Ungerechtigkeit?“, „Weshalb büßen wir dafür wie wir sind, obwohl wir uns nicht selbst erschaffen haben?“ tauchen in ihm nur noch selten auf. Solche Fragen fallen ihm meistens nur noch bei Begräbnissen und Hochzeiten, also in den kritischen oder interessanten Momenten des Lebens ein.

Der so genannte erwachsene Mensch pflegt zumeist solche Fragen zu stellen wie – in welcher Beziehung soll man zu seinen Vorgesetzten stehen? (was auch Goethe, Gracian und Knigge so häufig fragen) – wann ist es ratsam zu schweigen und wann laut für etwas zu kämpfen? – Oder als noch trivialeres Beispiel: Welche und wie viele Backsteine benötigt man für die Errichtung eines Hauses? – Ist dies zutreffend? Anscheinend ja – all unsere Erfahrungen deuten darauf hin. Das heißt, dass die Seele des so genannten erwachsenen Menschen am besten durch das zielgerichtete Interesse für konkrete Sachen charakterisierbar ist. Und wenn bereits das Wort konkret gefallen ist, sollten wir gleich auch sagen, was wir darunter verstehen sollten? Wir müssen es frühzeitig verkünden, dass wir in der Folge das als konkret bezeichnen wollen und werden, was in der Augennähe liegt, das heißt Teile der Wahrheit und somit nicht ihre Perspektive. Die großen Fragen sind immer auf der Suche nach der Perspektive und gerade dies ist beim erwachsenen Menschen nur noch selten – er hat seine großen Fragen längst aufgegeben aufgrund seiner Erfahrung, dass er auf sie sowieso keine im praktischen Sinne nützlichen Antworten erhalten kann. Er hört seinem Kind staunend und lächelnd zu, wenn es ihm etwa solche Fragen stellt: Wenn die Welt von Gott erschaffen wurde, warum nicht gleich auch die Häuser? – und denkt für sich, dass dies kindliche Fragen sind.

Die drei philosophischen Hauptfragen

Eine ganze Reihe von gleichen oder ähnlichen Fragen wird jedoch, beispielsweise, auch durch die Religionsphilosophie erhoben. Und nun einige Worte über den Ursprung dieser Fragen. Wie grenzenlos auch neuerdings der Gedanke und selbstbezweckt die Philosophie des Menschen geworden ist, erscheinen mir deren Ursprung und ursprüngliche Motive auf jeden Fall zweckdienlich, und folglich praktisch zu sein. Denn wie ich sie auch drehe und wende, kann ich darüber nichts anderes feststellen, als dass die Philosophie ursprünglich und vor allem auf folgende drei Fragen nach Antwort gesucht hat: Was ist die Ursache von etwas, also woher stammt es? – zweitens: Wie ist seine Sachlage? – und drittens: Wozu dient es, was ist sein Ziel? Dies hat ehemals die griechische Philosophie so definiert, indem sie für sich zum Grundsatz erklärte, dass bei der Untersuchung gleich welcher Dinge diese drei Fragen zu stellen sind – also nochmals: Wie ist diese Sache? Wie ist sie entstanden und wozu dient sie?

Und macht dies nicht ununterbrochen auch das Kind? Versuchen etwa nicht auch sein sich entfaltender und einfacher, weil noch auf seiner Naivität beruhender Intellekt und seine Neugierde sich aufgrund dieses Dreifachprinzips zu orientieren? Derart, dass man kaum in der Lage ist, ihm befriedigende Antworten zu geben.

Es macht also den Anschein, dass uns diese zwei Hauptaktivitäten des Geistes des menschlichen Wesens, sowohl seine Philosophie als auch seine Kunst, über die ständige Präsenz seiner kindlichen Naivität und somit über seine wichtigste Tugend, die schönste Eigenschaft seiner Seele, Zeugnis ablegen. Dass und weshalb auch seine Kunst aus seiner Naivität entspringt, darüber werden wir an passender Stelle noch selbstverständlich ausführlich reden müssen.

Vorerst bezeichnen wir aber unsere Ziele im Allgemeinen, das heißt weshalb und wie wollen wir über unseren Gegenstand reden. Dies bedeutet, dass wir zunächst über die Aufgaben der Ästhetik zu reden haben – und fangen auch wir dabei vielleicht mit den die Schönheit betreffenden Untersuchungen an, wie dies bei solchen Studien üblich ist.

Die Untersuchung des Schönheitsbegriffs

So viel können wir im Voraus wohl bereits jetzt festhalten, dass – so vielfältig die Künste auf uns auch einwirken mögen – das Gefühl der Schönheit, das heißt deren Freude vermögen sie in uns größtenteils in der Tat hervorzurufen. Trifft dies zu, dann beschäftigt sich die Ästhetik offensichtlich mit den Fragen des Gefallens und dessen Philosophie – und darüber hinaus, da das Gefallen Emotion ist, einerlei ob wir danach fragen, was für Emotion, oder was diese Emotion in uns

hervorzurufen pflegt – können wir in beiden Fällen nicht auf gewisse psychologische Untersuchungen verzichten. Demnach erscheint die Ästhetik teils als philosophisches und teils als psychologisches Studium. Und merken wir hier sogleich und noch rechtzeitig an, dass sie, da viel weniger eine Wissenschaft der Vernunft denn eine der Psychologie der Emotionen, nur demjenigen erfolgreiche Arbeit verspricht, der die Emotionen mag, weil ansonsten! – wäre es, als ob beispielsweise ein humorloser, trockener Mensch sich mit der Psychologie des Humors ernsthaft beschäftigen wollte, eine solche Seele, welche überhaupt keinen Sinn für Humor hätte... Also wiederholen wir: Zweierlei Gegenstände bieten sich hier zur Untersuchung an: Einerseits, was sind das für Erscheinungen, welche wir als schön empfinden? – und das werden wir auch tun: Gerade solchen Untersuchungen werden wir den größten Teil unserer Vorträge widmen – und andererseits: Welche Art Empfindung ist in uns diejenige der Schönheit? – dies werden wir hingegen nicht tun. Wir werden dies nicht eingehend untersuchen, und zwar hauptsächlich deswegen nicht, weil wir damit nie zu Rande kommen würden, so wie auch andere bis jetzt nicht. In Bezug auf die Schönheit sind wir im Besitze von zwei allgemein bekannten Definitionen, und beide definieren sowohl das Gefühl der Schönheit wie auch die schönen Dinge gleichzeitig und sogar miteinander: das Eine mit dem Anderen. Eine ist die wohlbekannte Bestimmung von Kant, wonach schön ist, was ohne Interesse gefällt – und darin, wie ersichtlich, bleibt er uns die Bestimmung des „Gefallen“-Begriffs schuldig, nämlich was für eine Empfindung ist das „Gefallen“, wann stellt sie sich ein und welche Dinge pflegen sie in uns hervorrufen? Aber diese Definition ruft auch schon deswegen große Verwirrung hervor, weil wir auch darüber nichts Bestimmtes wissen können, was wir in aller Welt als unser Interesse bezeichnen sollen. Wir können den Begriff des Interesses folgendermaßen bestimmen: Das Interesse des Menschen ist dort, wohin ihn seine Sehnsüchte lenken. Damit hapert es jedoch, da wir wissen, dass der Mensch durch seine Sehnsüchte sehr oft gerade ins Verderben geriet. Beispielsweise möchte ich sehr gerne Karten spielen und meine Mutter meint dazu: Das liegt nicht in deinem Interesse. Sie hält nämlich nicht die jeweilige Befriedigung meiner momentanen Sehnsüchte für mein Interesse, aber auch die Kirche und weltliche Sittenlehren nicht, den Hedonismus ausgenommen. Meine Mutter sagt mir beispielsweise: – „Du sollst jetzt kein Wasser trinken, du bist gelaufen und bist davon erhitzt.“ – Was im Interesse meines Organismus liegt, darauf macht er mich auch aufmerksam – pflegt man zu sagen. Dies ist jedoch so nicht ganz zutreffend und in der Natur ist die Durchführung dieses Prinzips nicht so konsequent. Wenn ich erhitzt bin, benötigt mein Organismus wegen der erhöhten Verdunstung zweifelsohne Wasser, des Weiteren auch Abkühlung, folglich liegen beide in seinem Interesse, daher ermahnt er mich auch – aber dass ich mich rasch abkühle, liegt nicht mehr in seinem Interesse, würde ihm sogar schaden – daran ermahnt er mich aber seltsamerweise nicht, wohl aber meine

Mutter. – Kurzum sind die Gesetze der Natur nicht minuziös, nicht das Ergebnis von großer Umsicht. Sie erscheinen eher als die Durchführung großer, allgemeiner Prinzipien, und scheinen die Welt nur wirr durcheinander zu lenken. Um hierzu nur ein Beispiel zu erwähnen, fällt Regen auch in die Meere, wo kein Mangel an Wasser herrscht und auch über die Städte, wo er weniger gebraucht wird als über den Äckern.

Die Kant'sche Interesselosigkeit

Zurückkehrend zu den vorangegangenen Gedanken, sollte man also auch diesbezüglich zwischen der dauernden und der augenblicklichen Nützlichkeit, also Genuss, unterscheiden, umso mehr, als dass beide oft im Gegensatz zueinander stehen. Hingegen erscheint es aus bestimmten Gründen eindeutig, dass wir unsere Genüsse auch als in unserem Interesse liegend betrachten können. Trotz unserer bereits diesbezüglichen Verwirrung müssen wir annehmen, dass die Kant'sche Definition den dauerhaften Nutzen aus unserem Gefallen auszuschließen beabsichtigt.

Lassen wir aber den Gedanken des dauernden Nutzens fallen und erleichtern unsere Aufgabe dadurch, dass wir das Wort „Interesse“ hier mit dem Begehrn gleichsetzen, und nehmen wir an, dass Kant hier das begehrungslose Gefallen als oberstes Kriterium der ästhetischen Schönheit definierte: Wir stehen vor einem schönen Apfel oder einer schönen Frau und wir sind davon bezaubert, ohne sie zu begehrn – also hochtrabend ausgedrückt: ohne irdischen Wünsche (wenn der Wunsch unser Gefallen nicht beeinflusst). Selbst wenn wir das Wort „Interesse“ derart deuten, müssen wir ihm widersprechen und zwar aus psychologischen Gründen. Es ist wahr, dass wir im Anblick des wunderschönen, echten Apfels nicht unbedingt und vor allem daran denken, wie gut es wäre hineinzubeißen, ihn zu essen, obschon unser Benehmen einem schönen Kind gegenüber manchmal diesen Verdacht erwecken könnte...

Lieben:

Dies Bedeutet auch den Wunsch nach Einverleiben,

... da wir in unserer heißen Hilflosigkeit, es uns nicht aneignen zu können, es so lange ans Herz drücken, bis es aufschreit; in welchen Fällen die zwei gegensätzlich scheinenden Manifestationen des wunscherfüllten Gefallens, dass ich sowohl das Kalbfleisch wie auch Karlchen liebe, in ihrer Tendenz sinngleich werden, da ich eigentlich beide verschlingen möchte – wie es auch wahrscheinlich ist, dass beide aus einem gemeinsamen Urquell entspringen. Denn was

machen ja sogar die Mütter? – Ich fresse dich auf. Ich zerdrücke deine Knochen! – rufen sie, und tun es auch beinahe, das heißt sie werden zu Peinigern in ihrer Unbefriedigtheit. Aber dies ist bloß eine Abweichung. Wir sprachen darüber, ob ein schöner Apfel bei uns unbedingt Appetit hervorruft. Nicht unbedingt – haben wir festgestellt. Noch weniger bei einem gemalten Apfel! Bei dem lockt uns wohl keinesfalls sein erwarteter Geschmack, sondern es ist seine malerische Form, die uns reizt. Die Schönheit eines Pfaus, eines Domes oder eines Teppichs kann auch weder Liebe noch Appetit hervorrufen, ebenso wie beispielsweise auch Ghirlandaio's warzenasiger, prächtiger Großvater keine solche Wünsche und Hoffnungen hervorzurufen vermag, während dem wir gerade seine charakteristische Warze am meisten bewundern. Wohlverstanden gilt das Gleiche für Brueghel's Missgestalten, Velasquez's krüppelhafte Zwerge usw. Wenn wir also in einem solchen, sozusagen praktischen Sinne: vom Standpunkt der leicht, mit einfacher Prüfung feststellbaren Wunscherfüllung das von Kant stammende Wort betrachten, dann müssen wir ihm Recht geben. Aber was haben wir davon? Was sich in jenem Geisteszustand verbirgt, wenn uns etwas gefällt, damit können wir kaum je fertig werden, höchstens können wir um diese Schwierigkeit herumtanzen. Ist es aber nicht besser, wenn wir es dann von mehreren Seiten betrachten und so auch mehr darüber erfahren können? Wir können beispielsweise fragen, ob sich in der Schönheit wirklich keinerlei Befriedigung verbirgt?

Dies ist nämlich auch zu untersuchen, wenn wir der Kant'schen Interesselosigkeit auf den Grund gehen wollen. Da: Wenn etwas Schönes gefällt, dieses Gefallen ja bereits auch die Freude des Eigennutzes ist und somit gleichzeitig unser Nutzen und Interesse. Wir können sogar behaupten, dass es dann ein vom Eigennutz unseres Organismus untrennbares Gefühl ist – da ja die Freuden des Eigennutzes jeweils derart sind, dass sie die Befriedigung von irgendwelchen unserer Wünsche verbergen. Nehmen wir dazu dieses Beispiel: Wenn man jemanden dazu verurteilen würde, während vierzig Jahren nichts anderes als die schönsten Berge oder grünen Blumenwiesen anschauen zu dürfen, dann ist es kaum vorstellbar, dass er sie noch immer für schön hielte. Wenn jemand hingegen aus einer verrauchten, schmutzigen Stadt, wo er sich lange aufzuhalten hatte, dort ankommt...

Die Befriedigung in der Schönheit

Hat sich der Betreffende nach den grünen Bergen gesehnt? Nicht einmal das ist sicher, dass sich in ihm ein solcher Wunsch ausgebildet hatte. Man kann jedoch von ihm getrost annehmen, dass sich sein gesamter Organismus nach den durch die Änderung verursachten Reizen gesehnt hat: Nach der verrauchten Stadt hat er andere Reize gebraucht und siehe, die grünen Berge und Wiesen haben seinen

Augen und übrigen Sinnen diese Änderung gebracht. Falls in dem Gefallen kein solches Element enthalten wäre, wenn die zwangsläufigen Wünsche nach veränderlichen Reizen in uns nicht auch diesbezüglich mitwirken würden, dann könnten wir das Meisterstück irgendeines Künstlers beliebig oft anschauen – sagen wir täglich zehnmal während zehn Jahren – und es müsste fortlaufend das gleiche Gefallen in uns hervorrufen. Wir wissen jedoch, dass dies nicht der Fall ist. Wenn mir eine Landschaft auch aus dem Grund gefällt, weil ich ein Bedürfnis nach Veränderung hatte, und ein Bild deshalb *nicht*, weil ich Bedarf nach Veränderung empfinde, da mich dessen Anblick ermüdet hat, es mir überdrüssig wurde (da mir auch das schönste Bild nicht mehr gefallen kann, wenn ich es ununterbrochen anschau) – wenn all dies zutrifft, dann spielt die Sehnsucht dabei eine Rolle, weil deren Befriedigung sich darin versteckt und folglich hier von Interesselosigkeit nicht die Rede sein kann. Wozu ist dann diese beinahe mathematischen Charakter aufweisende, weil so abstrakte Bestimmung noch gut? Das Schöne ist eine konkrete Sache und die Empfindung der Schönheit ein konkretes Gefühl. Daher können wir mit etwas, das Beide derart abstrakt definiert, kaum etwas anfangen. Folglich kann es vom Standpunkt unserer Untersuchungen getrost als unergiebig bezeichnet werden. Wozu eignet es sich trotzdem? Dazu, dass es auf einen absoluten Augenblick des ästhetischen Gefallens aufmerksam macht, auf einen derartigen Augenblick, welchen wir in der Wirklichkeit eigentlich nur höchst selten erleben können.

Was ist das Gefallen?

Was bedeutet nämlich, dass etwas „gefällt“? Und woraus besteht es? Ist beispielsweise meine Ergriffenheit Gefallen, wenn mich ein Leierkasten zu Tränen röhren kann? Des Weiteren: Verbirgt sich mein Interesse hinter meiner Ergriffenheit? Ich habe keine Ahnung. Was ist dann aber das Gefallen? – dies ist gerade das Wesentliche hier. Wir müssten sogleich auf die Gebiete der Psychologie hinüberwechseln, damit wir diesem psychischen Phänomen näherkommen können. Und wir werden auch dies nicht tun, und zwar gerade bei dieser Frage nicht, weil wir nach dem aktuellen Stand der Psychologie die Untersuchungen dieser Frage für unergiebig erachten. Sprechen wir also mutig aus, dass wir nicht wissen, welcher Vorgang sich abspielt, wenn einer Seele etwas gefällt. Wir wissen nur so viel aus Erfahrung, das heißt, können auf geschichtlichem Wege feststellen, was es ist, das ihr zu gefallen pflegt.

So sehr wir auch die Psychologie schätzen, werden wir gerade bei diesem Punkt nicht so sehr den Genießer untersuchen und auch nicht, weshalb dessen Seele etwas gefällt, sondern das Objekt, namentlich, welche Bedingungen darin es ermöglichen, welche Elemente unser Gefallen hervorzurufen pflegen. Auf-

grund dieser Erfahrungen werden wir dann versuchen, daraus gewisse Ge setzmäßigkeiten festzustellen.

Das Gefallen als biologisches Phänomen

Das Gefallen selber ist nämlich, wie sämtliche Phänomene oder Vorgänge der Seele, ebenfalls etwas sehr Kompliziertes. Weil wir beispielsweise etwas Derartiges schon jetzt feststellen können, werden wir es auch tun: Es scheint, dass dem menschlichen Organismus veränderliche Reize behagen und dass nach Feststellung der Biologie ihn wahrscheinlich nur solche am Leben zu erhalten vermögen. Die gleichmäßigen Reize rufen in ihm anfänglich Langeweile und danach Widerwille hervor und können ihn sogar umbringen. (Im Fernen Osten ist dies auch als Exekutionsart gebräuchlich – stellen wir uns vor: wie wirkt es, wenn jemandem zwei Tage lang ununterbrochen das Gesicht gestreichelt wird.) Derartiges werden wir auch auf dem Gebiete der Schönheit feststellen müssen: Dass die Seele auch darin das liebt, was abwechslungsreich ist. Anders gesagt: Es scheint, dass dort, wo die Geschwindigkeit groß ist, im Organismus auch verhindernde, verlangsamende, bremsende Kraft benötigt wird. Wir werden auch in dieser Hinsicht die Lehre aus der Physiologie nutzen: So wie die Funktion unseres Herzens und aller übrigen Organe etwas gleichermaßen beschleunigen und verlangsamten muss (vagus und accelerator) – ebenso wirkt nur das wohltuend auf uns auf den Gebieten der Schönheit, was in seiner Geschwindigkeit gehindert ist, was keinen ganz glatten Verlauf aufweist, was auch Widerspruch enthält. Beispielsweise: in den Formen die Kontroverse, in der Feinheit der Ausführung die Rohheit, oder inhaltlich: in den Eigenschaften der beschriebenen Personen der Kontrast. Und darüber hinaus: Es macht den Anschein, dass der menschliche Organismus das, was zu langsam ist, was keinen Schwung besitzt, nicht gerne annimmt, da er aufgrund ebenfalls physiologischer Erkenntnisse auch selbst die Heimat von schwungvollen Bewegungen ist... usw. Wir werden die genießende Seele nur so weit, d. h. nicht weiter, untersuchen und im Übrigen, wie schon gesagt, eher ihren Gegenstand selbst ins Auge fassen und aufgrund unserer Erfahrungen der Frage nachgehen: Was ist das, was dem menschlichen Wesen zu gefallen pflegt?

Die Stendhal'sche Definition

Vergessen wir aber auch die andere weltberühmte Schönheitsdefinition nicht, welche von Stendhal stammt. Die Schönheit ist das Versprechen des Glücks – sagt Stendhal. Wenn man die Kant'sche Definition im Allgemeinen als objektiv

zu bezeichnen pflegt, dann vielleicht gerade deshalb, weil er sich darin mit der Empfindung der Schönheit, d. h. deren Subjektivität, nicht beschäftigt, deren Wirkung auf uns keine Aufmerksamkeit schenkt. Er behauptet nämlich, dass die reine Schönheit unserem Eigennutz nichts anderes als bloß die interessenfreie reine Freude verspricht. Stendhal hingegen – dessen Definition im Gegensatz zur Kant'schen man als subjektiv zu bezeichnen pflegt – lässt, gerade umgekehrt, von ihr die glanzvollste Vollentfaltung unseres Eigennutzes, das Glück, versprechen (wie auch unser großer Denker Ernő Osvát schreibt, dass von den schönen Sachen das Herz durstig wird). Und damit können wir bereits etwas mehr anfangen, selbst wenn wir nicht wissen, was das Glück ist, und noch weniger, was die Verheibung des Glücks?...

Aber halten wir hier vielleicht für einen Augenblick an. Glück – über dieses himmlische Phänomen haben schon viele fantasiert und wenn ich mich recht erinnere, hat es Flaubert von äußeren Umständen abhängig gemacht: – Franzose zu sein, jung, reich, Künstler, verliebt, dies ist das Glück – so etwa sagte er. Demgegenüber sah ich auch schon einen solchen Menschen, den ein gutes Mittagsessen oder eine gute Zigarre glücklich gemacht hat und habe andererseits auch von solchen gehört, der sich im Besitz von Flauberts äußeren Bedingungen das Leben nahm. Was folgt daraus? Vorerst und vor allem: Dass es zumindest von oberflächlichem Denken zeugt, sich das Glück als Dauerzustand vorzustellen, weil alleine schon den Dauerzustand des Glücksgefühls vorzustellen langweilig ist, geschweige denn zu erleben. Folglich, wenn es langweilig ist, kann es kein Glück sein. (Und auch ansonsten: Bereits aus der Natur des Gefühls folgt, dass es nicht langdauernd sein kann.) Ferner zweitens: Bei der Frage des Gefallens haben wir bereits die psychologische Untersuchung damit abgelehnt, dass wir die durch die Schönheit hervorgerufene seelische Bewegung mit unseren bisherigen Methoden weder richtig zu erkennen noch zu charakterisieren in der Lage sind und dass wir folglich nicht die Seele des Genießenden untersuchen werden, sondern wodurch das Objekt dem Menschen Freude zu bereiten pflegt. Nun werden wir jetzt aber gerade das Gegenteil tun, denn: Wir anerkennen, dass die Bedürftigkeit häufig Unglückseligkeit verursacht, hingegen bezweifeln wir es stark, dass Reichtum glücklich machen würde, selbst wenn wir die übrigen großen Gaben laut Flaubert hinzufügen. Niemand kann in Kenntnis des Lebens so kühn sein, die These zu verkünden, dass die jungen französischen Künstler glücklich seien. Und weshalb kann man dies nicht verkünden? Weil, obschon wir zur Charakterisierung des Glücks noch weniger imstande sind wie des Gefallens, wir so viel darüber wissen, dass manche Menschen leichter zu beglücken sind als andere. Wäre es daher in diesem Fall nicht doch besser, trotz allem die seelischen Voraussetzungen des menschlichen Wesens zum Gegenstand der Untersuchung zu machen? Das heißt: Wer ist das zum Glück fähige Gemüt, weil wir ja wissen, dass ein gutes Temperament die größte Mitgift ist – und des Weiteren: Unter

welchen seelischen Bedingungen ist das menschliche Wesen empfänglicher für das Glück, wann ist es würdiger für jene Erlebnisse, nach denen es sich sehnte? Und darüber hinaus: Ob beispielsweise der Überraschung, der plötzlichen Freude darin eine größere Rolle zufällt, als der Erfüllung des dauernden Wunsches? Ist eher die Bedürftigkeit oder der Reichtum zum Glück befähigt? Aus psychologischer Hinsicht könnten wir auch noch die Frage aufwerfen, ob die Glückseligkeit nicht ein Zustand ist, in welchem das menschliche Wesen so selbstvergessen wird, dass es in den Urzustand der Zeitlosigkeit zurücktaucht, in welchem es endlich von seinen ewigen Befürchtungen befreit wird? (Angst als Hauptprinzip des menschlichen Lebens – schreibt über diese Befürchtung ein deutscher Psychologe.) In diesem Zustand wird man von all seiner zwangsmäßigen Aufmerksamkeit befreit. Dieser wundersame Seelenzustand charakterisiert größtenteils auch die Freuden, aber die vorgestellte Glückseligkeit noch viel mehr. Ich habe jetzt über vorgestellte Glückseligkeit gesprochen, und dies wird offensichtlich verständlich, wenn wir bedenken, dass die Glückseligkeit vielleicht nur so etwas ist, das ausschließlich in den Sehnsüchten und Träumen des Menschen existiert, dessen irgendwie geartetes Urbild in der Tiefe der Seele lebt und das eigentlich wirklich zu erleben ihm gar nicht vergönnt wird. Usw. All diese Fragen könnte man stellen, aber vielleicht brauchen wir sie gar nicht, weil, selbst wenn wir weder wissen was Glückseligkeit ist, noch wie sie im menschlichen Herzen zustande kommt, wir jene Feststellung, dass die Schönheit das Versprechen des Glücks ist, dennoch für bemerkenswert halten.

Denn sie weist auf außerordentlich interessante seelische Tatsachen hin und gerade darin, dass sie nicht das reine, von irdischen Sehnsüchten freie Ideal des Gefallens in seiner Definition sucht, sondern geradezu die sogleich daran anknüpfenden und mit Sehnsüchten schwangeren Gefühle zitiert... und nicht aussagt, dass die Schönheit glücklich macht, sondern bloß, dass sie die Glückseligkeit *verspricht*... Und Stendhal hält angesichts seiner außerordentlichen Lebenserfahrung bei diesem Versprechen auch inne. Und dies zu unserer großen Freude, da wir dadurch jene Unbefriedigtheit erwiesen sehen, welche auch wir so oft erfahren im Laufe unseres Lebens, dass nämlich alle Schönheiten unserer Fantasie, und somit auch jene der Künste, uns bloß den Anschein der Dinge projizieren und niemals die Dinge selbst... mit anderen Worten: Wir können uns weder die gemalten Äpfel aneignen noch die Romanheldin, in welche wir uns unsterblich verlieben... Stendhal weist uns folglich mit diesem Wort „Versprechen“ den Weg zum Verständnis dazu, worin ein melancholisches Element des Kunstgenusses zu suchen sei. Weswegen ein Leben, das unter lauter Fantasien verlief, melancholischen Charakter besitzt? Und welcher Art der Kater ist, welcher von dem langen und pausenlosen Spiel der Fantasie im menschlichen Herzen hervorgerufen wird – mit anderen Worten, worin unterscheidet sich der

Kater der eingebildeten Befriedigungen von den echten Genüssen? Dies sind die Fragen, die in uns infolge der Stendhal'schen Definition auftauchen.

Die melancholischen Elemente der Ursprünge der Kunst

Die riesige und monumentale Kunstmasse der Welt beinhaltet zweifelsohne auch gewisse melancholische Elemente – was nicht so viel bedeutet, dass die Künste auch in ihren *Themen* unbedingt melancholisch oder tragisch wären, obschon sowohl die Literatur- wie auch die Musikkunst dazu zu neigen scheinen. Des Weiteren will diese Feststellung noch weniger bedeuten, dass ihre Ausführung melancholisch sei, also, dass der Künstler selbst beim Erschaffen melancholisch wäre. Im Laufe der Zeit werden wir sogar genau das Gegenteil beweisen. Diese Feststellung bedeutet hier vor allem, dass Entstehung, Abstammung und Ursprung der Künste in uns auch solche melancholische Beweggründe haben. Beispielsweise ist auch diese Absicht derart: Ich beschreibe das, was nie mehr wiederkehrt... daher beschreibe oder male ich dich, Liebling, weil ich bewahren will, wie wunderschön du heute warst. Spürt man etwa nicht, welcher Seufzer sich in der Tiefe dieser Absicht verbirgt, geschweige denn in dem bezaubernden Vorgang, mittels welchem diese Absicht Ausdruck erlangt: War, war und war... in jener überwältigenden, nahezu hypnotisierenden Gleichmäßigkeit, mit welcher die Erzähler uns die Vergänglichkeit spüren lassen – dass das, was vergangen ist, nirgends mehr existiert – kurz und gut: Diese melancholischen Elemente der Ursprünge der Kunst vollbringen zweifelsohne ihre Wirkung auch in uns während des Kunstgenusses und dazu gesellt sich natürlich auch jene melancholisch wirkende Tatsache, dass wir beispielsweise die lieb gewordenen Figuren eines Romans in unserem Leben nie und nirgends treffen können. Vielleicht will ich aber jetzt nicht damit fortfahren, da ich hoffe, an passender Stelle noch darauf hinweisen zu können. Und nun fassen wir vielleicht zusammen, worüber wir bisher gesprochen haben. Wir sagten, dass die philosophischen Untersuchungen, bei Lichte gesehen, ebenso Ausflüsse der Naivität der Seele sind, wie auch jede Art Künste des Menschen. Danach haben wir die zwei wichtigen Definitionen der Schönheit flüchtig beurteilt.

Und wir waren beim Stendhal'schen und jenem Punkt, dass die Kunst anscheinend eigentlich die mit Melancholie belastete Freude des menschlichen Wesens ist und dass mich Stendhals Definition auf jenes Element der Kunst aufmerksam gemacht hat, dass die Kunst die Erfüllung nur verspricht, und da sie die Welt der Blendungen ist, damit nur verlockt. Wer folglich *nur* in der Kunst lebt, lediglich in der Fantasie, nur ein halbes Leben lebt.

Die Schönheit als moralisches Präzedens

Diese Definition macht uns jedoch auch auf noch wichtigere Dinge aufmerksam. Und auf Grund dessen könnten wir sogar kühn behaupten, dass wir eigentlich an gar nichts mehr Interesse hätten als gerade an der Schönheit. Vergessen wir nämlich nicht, wohin uns die Schönheit befördert, wozu sie uns verführt? Du bist schön – ich liebe dich! Spielt es sich etwa nicht so ab in unserer Seele? Und in diesem Fall hat Stendhal schon aus diesem Grund Recht, wenn er durch sie das Glück versprechen lässt, weil Lieben offenbar ein Grundelement des Glückes in uns ist. Und in diesem Fall gehen mit dieser Verführung auch moralische Konsequenzen einher. Wie auch immer nach meiner Meinung die Begriffe der Liebe und der Güte auseinanderzuhalten sind – der eine ist eine unserer Emotionen, der andere unsere Absicht oder Wille. Die Güte ist die definitive Absicht des moralischen Empfindens – die Liebe kann auch hassen oder morden, die Güte hingegen nie! Ich sage also, dass wie sehr auch immer die zwei auseinanderzuhalten sind, niemand es leugnen kann, dass die Liebe auch moralische Folgen in der Seele hat. Wenn uns etwas gefällt, dann sind wir dazu geneigt es zu lieben. Ich kann sogar behaupten, dass die Liebe bei den Menschen zumeist auf diesem Wege entsteht, also auf dem Wege der Schönheit. Wie ich es bereits gesagt habe, so: Du bist schön, ich liebe dich. Daraus folgt, dass ich zu etwas, das ich liebe, eher geneigt bin, auch gut zu sein. Spielt es sich etwa nicht so ab im menschlichen Herzen?

Die Intensität der Schönheit

Daraus folgt, dass uns die Schönheit auch in die Gefilde der Moral mitnimmt, woraus ersichtlich wird, welch große Macht sie ist! Bei guter Laune könnten wir sogar getrost behaupten, dass sie über uns die allergrößte Macht der Welt besitzt. Offensichtlich war auch dies die Absicht der Natur, da sie die Schönheit ja vornehmlich an die Oberflächen und somit für unsere Sinne leicht wahrnehmbar platzierte. Sie wirkt auch in der Tat, und dazu mit welcher Intensität! Oder ist es etwa nicht so, dass sich sämtliche anderen Werte der Dinge und auch des menschlichen Wesens im Vergleich dazu tief unter der Oberfläche und nur schwer entdeckbar verbergen? Denken wir dabei nur daran, wie schwer es ist von einer Person festzustellen, ob sie wirklich herzensgut sei. Wir sehen sofort selbst von einer Taschenuhr, ob sie schön sei, aber zur Feststellung ihrer Ganggenauigkeit benötigt man wesentlich mehr Zeit. Analog können wir uns auch über die Sittlichkeit und die übrigen Eigenschaften des Menschen nur schwieriger und über viel mittelbareren Wegen ins Bild setzen als über seine Schönheit. Es ist

beispielsweise beinahe selbstverständlich, dass wir sofort dazu bereit sind, ein schönes Kind zu lieben – wir strecken ihm all unsere Gutmütigkeit um seiner Schönheit willen vor.

Die Schönheit verspricht auch unserem Eigennutz Gutes

Die Schönheit hat außerdem auch noch eine andere Wirkung auf uns. Und hier fällt mir eine Bemerkung von Leonardo da Vinci ein, wonach irgendeine Maschinerie nur dann gut sein kann, wenn sie auch gute Proportionen und räumliche Schönheit besitzt.

Eine großartige Wahrheit verbirgt sich in der Tiefe dieser Feststellung, weil nach unseren Erfahrungen irgendein Organismus nur dann wirklich gut funktionieren kann, wenn er ganzheitlich ist – ein Organismus muss auch Ganzheitlichkeit haben und wenn er wirklich ganzheitlich ist, dann ist das auch an seiner Form ersichtlich. Kehren wir dies jetzt um: – Wenn etwas schön ist, dann folgern wir daraus, dass es auch gut ist, gut funktionieren und uns befriedigen wird. Wiederum das einfache Beispiel zitierend: Von einem schönen Apfel stellen wir uns doch vor, dass auch sein Fleisch gut ist, dass er auch wohlschmeckend ist. Folglich hat Stendhal auch darin recht – die Schönheit verspricht wirklich, dass sie uns beglücken wird und ihr Versprechen ist dazu noch zweifach: Einerseits, weil sie jene Hoffnung erweckt, dass wir ihren Gegenstand lieben werden, und andererseits, weil sie auch noch verspricht, dass sie unseren Eigennutz zufriedenstellen wird. Infolge dessen werden nicht nur wir selber besser, da uns unsere Liebe gutmütig stimmt, anders gesagt, weil sie auf uns ethisch wirkt, sondern auch im egozentrischen Sinne, da wir ja von ihr erhoffen, dass sie uns auch sonstige Freude oder Genuss bereiten wird. Und jetzt können wir erneut die Frage stellen: Wirkt die Schönheit wirklich interesselos? Außer dem bereits Gesagten könnte es ja auch noch sein, dass dies das theoretische Kriterium ihrer impulsiven oder anfänglichen Wirkung ist, dass jedoch danach und unmittelbar nach dem Impuls sich beliebig viele unserer Interessen an diese Interesselosigkeit anknüpfen.

Ich habe das Gefühl, dass diese Feststellung Leonardos uns zu noch einer und als ziemlich notwendig zu bezeichnenden Untersuchung berechtigt, nämlich dazu, dass wir seinen Satz noch einmal umdrehen. Stellen wir also gleich die Frage, ob wir uns nicht eine solche Maschine vorstellen können, welche in ihren Teilen in jeder Hinsicht gut proportioniert ist (oder wie man zu sagen pflegt: gewisse objektive Kriterien der Schönheit in sich trägt) und trotzdem, dass sie sich als gute Maschine ausgibt, für nichts zu gebrauchen ist, weil sie eine falsche Maschine ist. Unsere Antwort darauf wird sich in unseren weiteren Fragen

verbergen. Gibt es denn solche Äpfel, welche wunderschön aussehen, aber innerlich mangelhaft sind? Und gibt es nicht tausenderlei andere ähnliche Dinge? Wunderschön aussehende, aber kranke Kinder mit schwacher Konstitution? Daraus folgt also, dass schon aus dem Grund, weil nach unseren Erfahrungen jeder Organismus, welcher gut funktioniert, zugleich ökonomisch und gut proportioniert erbaut ist, auch der gut funktionierende Organismus die Merkmale ihrer Ökonomie in ihrer guten Proportionierung normalerweise tatsächlich auf sich trägt (und offensichtlich veranlasst uns gerade diese Erfahrung zu dem Optimismus, von dem, was schön ist, auch Gutes zu erhoffen). – Dies bewährheit sich trotzdem nicht immer, weil nicht jede gute Proportioniertheit Gewähr dafür ist, dass sie Gutes bzw. Brauchbares in sich birgt. Diese These könnte beispielhaft damit demonstriert werden, dass nach allen unseren Erfahrungen die Darstellung einer menschlichen Gestalt mit Flügeln, derart, dass sie auch gut proportioniert wirkt – eine Aufgabe ist, wozu die Vorstellung seit Jahrtausenden fähig war und dies sogar mit sechs Flügeln versucht hatte, wie dies die Denkmäler der babylonischen Kunst beweisen. Im gleichen Sinne hat sie auch Löwenkörper mit menschlichem Kopf, dazu noch mit weiblichen Brüsten und sogar mit Flügeln – wie bei den Ägyptern – sowie auch Kentauren mit Pferdeleib, Faune mit Ziegenfüßen, Riesen mit einem Auge auf der Stirn dargestellt – und all dies, wiederholen wir, kann dem Schein nach wohlproportioniert ausgeführt sein – aber fragen wir einen Physiologen, ob man sich so etwas strukturell vorstellen kann. Mit anderen Worten: Ob ein menschlicher Körper richtig proportioniert erbaut werden kann, in welchen nicht nur brauchbare Arme, sondern dazu auch noch brauchbare, d. h. mit den erforderlichen Muskeln und deren Verankerung versehene Flügel nebeneinander in die Körperkonstruktion eingefügt sind?

Und weshalb hat der Seehund keine Beine? Oder weshalb verfügen die Vögel neben ihren Flügeln nicht auch noch über Arme? Woher kommt es zum Beispiel, dass bei den Laufvögeln sogar die Flügel verkümmern? Offensichtlich davon, dass anscheinend alle Organe oder Körperteile von Lebewesen sich im Einklang mit deren Lebensumständen und dringendsten Bedürfnissen entwickelt und geformt haben, d. h. jeweils so, dass sie daraus optimal profitieren können und zugleich in der ökonomischsten Anordnung – dies ist aber gemäß allen unseren Erfahrungen einzig in organischen und richtig *proportionierten* Strukturen möglich. Demnach: Wahrscheinlich kann nur eine gut proportionierte Maschine eine gute Maschine sein – hingegen bietet der Anschein von Proportionalität nicht immer Gewähr für ihre Güte. (Davon abgesehen haben wir die Proportionalität jeweils als eine der Säulen der Schönheit empfunden, welche daher für uns offenbar die Schönheit selbst oder zumindest deren Tendenz zu bedeuten vermag.)

Die Schönheiten der Wirklichkeit und der Kunst

Ich sprach also von der Schönheit, beziehungsweise anfänglich und eigentlich darüber, durch was alles die Schönheit auf uns wirkt und wie sie sich in unserer Seele mit vielerlei verknüpft – und auch dies tat ich bloß vorläufig und nur flüchtig. Im Übrigen versprach ich, dass ich eher den Gegenstand der Schönheit als das Empfinden des Gefallens untersuchen werde. Ich muss jedoch auch diesbezüglich meine Untersuchungen begrenzen, da die Ästhetik eigentlich dazu berufen ist, die Gesetzmäßigkeiten von allerlei Schönheiten zu erforschen, das heißt nicht bloß diejenigen der Künste, umso mehr, als ja die Künste, was wir noch eingehend erörtern werden müssen, stark mit der Wirklichkeit in Zusammenhang stehen, zumindest in einem solchen, in welchem das Kind zu seiner Mutter zu sein pflegt: Und ich bitte Sie bereits jetzt sofort, diesen Vergleich nicht zu vergessen. Das künstlerische Produkt ist ein neues und neuartiges Geschöpf, von ganz andersartigen Gesetzen beherrscht, als seine Mutter, von der es stammt, und dies galt bereits damals, als es noch mit ihr über die Nabelschnur verbunden war. Aber selbst wenn es andersartig ist, dennoch entstammt es irgendwoher, und dies sollten wir nicht vergessen. Es ist zwar ein ganz andersartiges Geschöpf, aber hat offenbar dennoch irgendwelche Ähnlichkeit zu seiner Mutter, folglich auch zu ihrer Schönheit... – aber dies verlangt nach genauerer Formulierung. Deswegen, weil uns in der Kunst etwas ganz anderes gefällt als im Leben – welches Beispiel sollen wir hierzu bringen? Wenn jemand von einem sehr schönen Kind ein Porträt malt, so wird es vielleicht auch auf dem Porträt ein sehr schönes Kind, obwohl dabei das Gemälde als künstlerische Arbeit minderwertig sein mag. Oder: Ein Maler wird darauf aufmerksam gemacht, wie schön heute die Abenddämmerung sei – weshalb wird er sie nicht malen? Weil die Abenddämmerung zwar in der Tat sehr schön ist, sie eignet sich aber nicht als Thema, denn als Gemälde wäre sie hässlich, Kitsch – antwortet der Maler. Wie er ja bekanntlich die Welt gar nicht so beobachtet – er richtet sich nicht nach deren wirklichen Schönheiten, wählt seine Themen nicht danach, da er andersartige Schönheiten sucht: Er wählt beispielsweise vielleicht ein sehr hässliches Gesicht aus, und macht gerade davon ein großartiges Bild. Wenn die Schönheit der Wirklichkeit diejenige der Kunst bestimmen würde, dann wären beispielsweise die Landschaftsmaler der Schweiz die größten Meister. Sie sind es aber nicht – der Maler eines Misthaufens könnte sie übertreffen. Kurz und gut: Falls eine Person oder ein Gegenstand für uns auch einen widerwärtigen Anblick böte, sie könnte in ihrer künstlerischen Darstellung unvergessliche Freuden bereiten, dank der Kraft ihrer Darstellung oder sonstigen künstlerischen Qualitäten – so ergeht es uns beispielsweise mit Tolstoi's Polikuskaja oder mit Breughel's Krüppelgestalten.

Nebenbei bemerkt: Es hat sich im allgemeinen Bewusstsein seltsamerweise sowieso eine Art konventionelle Pragmatik etabliert darüber, welche Dinge der

Wirklichkeit unbedingt für schön zu halten sind – darunter: das Gold, das Silber, der Samt, die rosarote Morgendämmerung und das hellblaue Himmelszelt. Ein Maler wird hingegen stattdessen vielleicht gerade einen Misthaufen als sein Thema wählen, aus künstlerischen Gründen, da er immer und in allem die male rische Schönheit will und unbedingt danach sucht. Und in der Kunst der Literatur verhält es sich genau gleich: Eine wirkliche Geschichte kann sehr rührend sein, aber als Thema gleichwohl gänzlich ungeeignet, weil es als Kunstwerk minder wertig wird. Und dennoch, obschon dies so wahr ist, besteht offensichtlich auch zwischen diesen beiden irgendwelche Verwandtschaft: Die Schönheiten der Wirklichkeit und der Kunst haben doch einen Zusammenhang und sobald man dies feststellen kann – müssten wir, selbst wenn wir unsere Ziele auf die Untersuchung der Kunstästhetik beschränken würden, eigentlich alles in Augenschein nehmen, was dem Menschen gefallen kann: den Sonnenuntergang ebenso wie die Maschinen. Davon, dass dies keine künstlich erzwungene Untersuchung wäre, zeugen jene großen Zusammenhänge, welche in den gegenseitigen Wirkungen der Kunst und der Wirklichkeit jederzeit nachweisbar waren. Widmen wir nun auch dieser Frage einige Worte. Welche große Freude bereitet uns heutzutage das Wohlgefallen an den Schönheiten der Natur! Obwohl die alten Künste nirgendwo davon zeugen, dass Derartiges auch früher Freude bereitet hätte – es war die Kunst, welche auf die Schönheit der Landschaften hingewiesen und zur Freude an den natürlichen Schönheiten der Landschaften geführt hat. Selbst wenn diese beiden Freuden verschieden sind, sie entstammen voneinander und es muss zweifelsohne irgendeine Verwandtschaft zwischen ihnen bestehen. Des Weiteren: Was ist der Grund dafür, dass Maschinen, Fabriken, Gebäudestrukturen und sogar die Darstellungen geometrischer Formen derart große Rolle spielen konnten in der Kunst der zurückliegenden Jahrzehnte? Wenn nicht das, dass dies auch in der Wirklichkeit so ist? Sie haben eine große Rolle, aber es ist auch hier die Kunst gewesen, welche auf die in diesen Strukturen sich verborgenden Schönheiten hin gewiesen und dadurch auch beim Genuss der Schönheit der natürlichen Strukturen förderlich gewirkt hat. Über all dies, von den Freuden der räumlichen Verhältnisse müssten wir daher ebenfalls reden, über die geometrische Symmetrie und Asymmetrie. Wir müssten unter diesem Gesichtspunkt auch die Elemente der gewöhnlichen Harmonie in Augenschein nehmen und dazu die gewöhnliche menschliche Rede, also auch die Sprachen sowie die Formen des Ausdrucks, bevor wir uns der ästhetischen Analyse der Künste zuwenden würden. Leider sind wir jedoch zu all dem nicht in der Lage: Der Rahmen dieser wenigen Vorträge ermöglicht uns dies nicht. Ich muss mich daher anstrengen: Obwohl hier lediglich von den Künsten die Rede sein wird und dabei hauptsächlich von der Literatur, weil sie unsere am leichtesten zugängliche Kunst ist, werde ich bemüht sein, in diese Studien auch manches einzufügen, was ich über den Genuss der

Schönheit der Wirklichkeit zu sagen habe, bzw. auf das Zusammenspiel ihrer Unterschiede und Zusammenhänge hinzuweisen.

All dies handelt noch immer von der Schönheit, quasi als Einleitung, und wurde deswegen allem anderen vorangestellt, weil sie zu jeder Zeit als die fundamentale Frage der Ästhetik galt. Auch ich selber bin dieser Ansicht, jedoch in einem anderen Sinne: vom Standpunkt der Ausführung. Ich wiederhole daher, dass ich nicht untersuche, wie und woraus die Empfindung der Schönheit in der Seele entsteht, sondern wann das Werk schön ist. Vor allem aber: Weswegen muss es schön sein, damit es in uns die Freude an der Kunst erweckt? Sehen wir also. Fangen wir an und reden wir endlich von den Künsten selbst. Es ist höchste Zeit.

Dazu stellen wir erneut die drei Fragen: Woher stammt die Kunst, woraus besteht sie und was ist ihr Ziel? Woraus die Kunst besteht, wird Gegenstand dieser Vorträge sein. Diesem Hauptthema müsste man jedoch, quasi als dessen Vorbereitung, bereits jetzt einige Worte widmen.

Die Kriterien der Kunst

Was ist die Kunst? Bezuglich dieser Frage können wir uns offensichtlich dann orientieren, wenn wir das Kunstwerk selbst in Augenschein nehmen. Was ist darauf bezeichnend, wie ist es? Es ist natürlich, dass das Kunstwerk selbst uns auch zu seiner Untersuchung berechtigt, nämlich dazu, welche Bedingungen und Qualitäten, d. h. Begabungen, zu seiner Erschaffung erforderlich sind – bloß dass dies auch widrige Konsequenzen zu haben pflegt. – Das, was der Chirurg macht, ist wahre Kunst – so loben manche die inspirierten Chirurgen, aber nicht nur sie, sondern auch einige Kunstschrainer, Mathematiker und Fotografen. Was tun aber diejenigen, welche sich derart äußern? Sie gehen nicht von der Untersuchung der Leistung aus, sondern sie betrachten jene seelischen Bedingungen, welche zum Zustandekommen solcher Leistungen vermutlich erforderlich waren. Und da diese sie an die vermutliche Schöpfungsemotion des Künstlers erinnern... gelangen sie aus der Analogie zu der oben erwähnten falschen Schlussfolgerung. – Glauben Sie etwa, dass zum meisterhaften Schachspiel oder Mathematik keine Inspiration, Intuition und darüber hinaus auch noch Verspieltheit erforderlich ist? – fragen dieselben und folgern, dass demnach, da die betreffende Leistung ein Ergebnis von künstlerischen Emotionen ist, folgerichtig auch die Leistung als Kunstwerk zu betrachten sei, zu welcher Wissenschaft oder Handwerk gehörig es auch sein mag. Was sollte man nun darauf antworten?

Die Kriterien der Kunst in der Neuzeit

Natürlich war das „techne“ – dieses griechische Wort, eine viel allgemeinere Bedeutung als das heutige Wort „Kunst“ – aber auch noch das lateinische „ars“ als Sammelbegriff gebräuchlich und konnte sowohl Wissenschaft wie auch Künste, aber auch noch handwerkliche Fertigkeit bedeuten. Die heutige Ästhetik zieht jedoch strengere und ausschließlichere Grenzlinien zwischen den Künsten und den Wissenschaften. Wie wir auch die auf die Künste sich beziehenden neueren Definitionen der Ästhetik, dieser eigentlich nicht alten Disziplin, drehen und wenden, so viel können wir aus deren Vielfalt zweifelsohne festhalten, dass:

1. wir unter Kunst heute jederzeit die schöpferische Darstellung oder Verwirklichung zu verstehen haben. Diese Verwirklichung kann natürlich vielerlei sein: Die Kunst kann Bilder, Emotionen und sogar auch lebensnahe Proportionen verwirklichen (Architektur) – im Sinne der heutigen Definitionen ist jedoch das wichtigste Kriterium, sine-qua-non, ihres gegenständlichen Inhaltes die Verwirklichung. Dazu trägt natürlich auch die im Werk des Künstlers in Erscheinung tretende Subjektivität bei.
2. Ohne schöpferische Emotion ist die Kunst gar nicht vorstellbar. Und diese Emotion ist dann auch für uns erlebbar, und drückt sich aus rätselhaften Gründen sogar in bereits bekannten Gemütsabläufen aus (allenfalls in nie erfahrenen Emotionen, welche uns dennoch als bekannt erscheinen), als wichtigste Träger oder Ausdruck der tatsächlichen oder virtuellen Persönlichkeit des Künstlers. Diese Gemütsabläufe werden im Schwung und innerhalb dessen im Rhythmus des Werkes wahrnehmbar und empfindbar. – All dies müssen wir bereits jetzt vorwegnehmen, mit dem Hinweis, dass diese Dinge noch ausführlich zur Sprache kommen werden.

Nach all dem wird es uns leichter fallen, jene von ihren Irrtümern zu überzeugen, welche dazu geneigt sind, gewisse Betreiber der Wissenschaft und sogar auch noch gewisse hervorragende Handwerker oder Spieler zu den Künstlern zu zählen. Kann ein Zahnarzt Inspiration haben? Ja, weshalb denn nicht. Oder Intuition? Selbstverständlich. Braucht es Verspieltheit zum Schmiedehandwerk? Freilich und Rhythmus noch dazu. Beobachten sie bitte: Einmal schlägt er auf seinen Amboss und zweimal daneben. Und sogar die Barbiere lassen ihre Scheren rhythmisch klappern. Und rufen etwa die Lastheber oder Entlader nicht im Voraus: hau-ruck! Und danach, wie wenn sie den Verstand verloren hätten, plötzlich auf slowakisch, dasselbe, so: hau–rucki! Mit anderen Worten spielen sie, diese Lieben. Aber nehmen wir jetzt einen solchen, dessen Arbeit in jeder Hinsicht dem zu entsprechen scheint, was wir uns seit undenklichen Zeiten als Kriterium der künstlerischen Kreation vorstellen: den Schachmeister. Obwohl er ein Spiel betreibt, ist er gar nicht auch unbedingt ein spielerisches Gemüt – Cha-

rousek ist es gewesen, aber Lasker schon nicht. Nehmen wir also Charousek: Er ist Spieler gewesen, hat auch Inspiration gehabt, Intuition gleichwohl, und wie man sagt, auch schöpferische Energie – war er demzufolge Künstler? Er war keinesfalls Künstler, denn wenn er es gewesen wäre, dann würde sich von allerlei herausstellen, dass es infolge der künstlerischen Neigungen seines Betreibers auch Kunst ist, beispielsweise wie schon gesagt: von der Mathematik, der inneren Medizin, Chemie und Physik, aber von irgendwelchem anderen Beruf nicht weniger.

All dies kann jedoch, wie wir schon festgestellt haben, aufgrund des heutigen Standpunktes der Ästhetik keinesfalls als Kunst betrachtet werden, da die Kunst die Welt der äußerlichen gegenständlichen Verwirklichung und dazu noch der schöpferischen Verwirklichung ist und beispielsweise die Mathematik dies par excellence nicht ist, sondern der Spekulation, Kombination. Sie ist selbst dann noch keine Kunst, wenn diese Kombinationen Talent, Intuition, Verspieltheit und schöpferische Kraft von ihrem Betreiber verlangen. Aber wahrscheinlich kann auch die Fotografie nicht Kunst sein, obwohl sie darstellt – da aus dieser Darstellung gerade die schöpferische Kraft am meisten fehlt. Obschon auch der Fotograf mit Proportionen arbeitet wie der Maler, seinen Gegenstand sogar einstellt, und darüber hinaus, Gott behüte, eventuell auch noch retuschiert und sogar auch noch Komposition mimt – und man schaut und schaut sie an und sagt dazu: Ganz schön ist diese Sache. – Aber dass sie auch eine Schöpfung wäre, das fällt einem schwerlich ein.

Die Architektur als besondere Kunst

Als Einleitung müssen wir hier noch eine Bemerkung machen über die Natur der Künste. Sie betrifft die Architektur. Unsere Aussage darüber ist, dass sie unsere am stärksten alleinstehende Kunst ist, welche die verhältnismäßig kleinste Gemeinsamkeit oder Ähnlichkeit zu den übrigen Künsten aufweist, alleine schon deswegen, weil sie nicht nur Kunst ist, sondern – da sie nicht auf dem Wege von Nachbildung zustande kommt – zugleich selbst Wirklichkeit ist, worunter unter anderen das zu verstehen ist, dass:

1. bei der Betrachtung der Schöpfungen der Architektur wir nicht empfinden, dass das, was wir sehen, nur die spielerische Nachbildung von etwas ist – während alle anderen Künste bei uns derartige Gefühle erwecken. Von einem gemalten Apfel wissen wir, dass er gemalter Apfel ist, also kein echter Apfel – demgegenüber muss das, was der Architekt verwirklicht, ein echtes brauchbares Haus sein. Den gemalten Apfel will ich für nichts verwenden, das Haus dagegen wohl. Daraus folgt also, dass das, was der Architekt zustande bringt,

2. vor allem und vorerst im praktischen Sinne nützlich zu sein hat und erst darüber hinaus, dass es schön ist, während die übrigen Künste mehrheitlich das am treffendsten auszeichnet, und sie gerade dafür bekannt sind, dass sie keinerlei praktischen Nutzen haben – und:
3. dass die übrigen Künste ihre Modelle größtenteils aus der Wirklichkeit, also der Außenwelt schöpfen. Es ist zwar wahr, dass es davon auch Ausnahmen gibt, und als solche gelten nicht bloß die lyrischen Werke sowie der Tanz und die Musik, sondern auch all jene Darstellungen, welche – sagen wir in einem Roman – jemandes Empfindungen veranschaulichen. Das Modell dieser letzt erwähnten Darstellungen ist also nicht mehr die Außenwelt, sondern des Menschen Innenwelt – demnach müssen wir die in der menschlichen Seele und sogar in deren Tiefe ablaufenden und in der Außenwelt ursprünglich nicht wahrnehmbaren Erscheinungen ebenfalls als Gegebenheiten der Wirklichkeit betrachten, umso mehr, weil sie als Modelle dienen. Die Architektur, zu der ich jetzt zurückkehren will, unterscheidet sich gerade darin sogar von diesen, dass sie von unseren Empfindungen lediglich und einzig unsere vom Raum erzeugten Form- und Proportionsempfindungen und deren Wünsche plastisch befriedigt – und aufgrund welcher Modelle? Darauf können wir nicht einmal hinweisen, nicht so, wie im Falle der Bildhauerei, welche Kunst ebenfalls vor allem raumwirkend ist, aber deren Modell trotzdem der menschliche oder allenfalls der tierische Körper ist. Von der Architektur müssen wir hingegen annehmen, dass ihr weder die Vogelnester noch die Tierhöhlen als Modelle gedient haben können – sondern, dass sie von den Höhlen der Menschen ausgehend schließlich ihre Modelle selber entwickelte. Was so viel bedeutet, dass die Architektur sich zu jeder Zeit selbst gestaltet hat, da der Anblick der Wirklichkeit ihr dazu im Vergleich zu den übrigen Künsten bloß wenige Impulse vermitteln konnte. Demnach ist die Architektur ebenfalls ein Fürsprecher gewisser, von uns als affektiv zu nennenden Sensibilitäten: die reine Projektion unserer Raumempfindlichkeit und, da die Reize unserer diesbezüglichen Empfindlichkeiten rein proportionaler und rhythmischer Natur sind und unter den diversen Wirkungselementen der Musikkunst gerade auch diese eine wirksame Rolle spielen – ist die Architektur vermutlich deswegen so sehr mit der Musik vergleichbar. Andererseits ist es trotzdem nicht vorstellbar, dass sie darin von keinerlei natürlichen Vorbildern geleitet wird, und daher annehmbar, dass sie sich aufgrund all der räumlichen Erfahrungen und Erinnerungen zu einer Kunstgattung entwickelt hat, welche das menschliche Wesen im allzeit gegenwärtigen Raum freiwillig oder auch unfreiwillig zu erwerben gezwungen ist.

Die Architektur ist also, wie man es auch aus diesen wenigen Bemerkungen beurteilen kann, in gewisser Hinsicht eine eigene Kunstgattung. Und darin, wo sie

anders ist als die übrigen Künste, gelten für sie auch andere Regeln. Wir also, welche uns jetzt vornehmlich mit Literaturästhetik beschäftigen wollen – werden in der Literatur zu zahlreichen solchen Regeln gelangen, von denen sich herausstellen wird, dass sie für andere Kunstgattungen ebenso gültig sind, d. h. dass sie jene uralte menschliche Erfahrung unterstützen werden, wonach in was immer der Schöpfungsgeist des Menschen sich offenbart: sei es Skulptur, Bild oder Gedicht – all diese nicht nur die gleiche Sehnsucht, sondern auch die gleiche Wesensart und seelische Qualität in ihm zustande gebracht haben – dass folglich in der „ars una“ Aussage eine fundamentale Wahrheit steckt: Die Kunst ist demnach eine Sache, unabhängig von ihrer Erscheinung oder Form... – Hingegen können unsere Feststellungen für die Architektur infolge ihrer hier charakterisierten besonderen Situation trotzdem nicht gleichermaßen gültig sein wie für die übrigen Kunstgattungen.

Die Ästhetik der Architektur ist innerhalb der allgemeinen Ästhetik eine solche besondere Disziplin, welche man nur in einem anderen Teil dieses Studiums, in den Kapiteln der angewandten Ästhetik und deren raumkompositorischem sowie stilkundlichem Teil als Thema behandeln könnte.

Worüber reden wir jetzt eigentlich? Wir haben die drei gräzistischen Fragen gestellt: Woher entstammt, wozu ist sie gut und was ist die Kunst? Und sagten, dass alle unsere Vorträge sich mit der letztgenannten Frage beschäftigen werden – also womit? Damit: Wie ist die Kunst? Wir dachten aber, dass wir trotzdem und bereits jetzt, selbst um diese Frage gewisse Grenzlinien ziehen müssen: Darum, was auf dieser Welt als Kunst zu betrachten ist? Und weswegen die Ästhetik sich mit der Architektur separat zu beschäftigen hat? Und damit können wir auch weiterschreiten. Nehmen wir also die zweite gräzistische Frage vorweg, da wir damit verhältnismäßig am schnellsten fertig werden können – also: worin besteht das Ziel der Kunst?

Die Grenzenlosigkeit der Anschauung und des Gedankens

Unter den drei gräzistischen Fragen ist diese die praktischste und wir gestehen, dass sie folglich für uns als Anhänger der Grenzenlosigkeit der Anschauung gerade infolge ihrer praktischen Nuance weniger sympathisch ist als die anderen. Wir können die Gelegenheit auch gleich wahrnehmen, um mitzuteilen, was wir darunter verstehen. Am besten wird es vielleicht, wenn wir mit unserer Schlussfolgerung anfangen und davon ausgehen, nämlich unserer Ansicht, dass wir Menschen schwerlich dazu fähig sind zu entscheiden, worin das eigentliche Ziel eines Phänomens mit uns oder in uns besteht. Dies schon deswegen nicht, weil sich von dem Denkenden bislang in allem und immer herausgestellt hat, dass das, was ihm bis dahin als Endziel erschien, nicht nur lediglich irgendeinen

Zwischenpunkt auf der Bahn der betreffenden Sache markiert, sondern dass gerade dies kaum dazu geeignet oder ausreichend ist, die Natur des betreffenden Phänomens zu erklären und zu bestätigen. Es ist wohl selbstverständlich, dass wir die Dinge vor allem vom Standpunkt ihrer Zweckmäßigkeit beurteilen, da dies die praktischen Prinzipien unseres Fortbestehens verlangen, aber sobald sich uns der verborgene Sinn unserer Existenz entfaltet und wir uns nach wahrer Erkenntnis sehnen, werden uns diese praktischen Anforderungen nutzlos. Kurz und gut: So lange wir dazu fähig sind, bei ihrer Zweckmäßigkeit zu verbleiben und die Dinge und Phänomene danach zu beurteilen, so lange erscheinen sie in unseren Augen rational und der einfachen Logik entsprechend – sobald jedoch diese Erklärung ihrer Zweckmäßigkeit nicht mehr zu befriedigen vermag, halten wir sie für irrational, da die Vielfältigkeit ihrer Elemente und deren widersprüchliche Tendenzen uns ihre Ziele zu unerkennbar machen.

Die Grenzenlosigkeit der Erkennbarkeit der Welt

Arbeiten wir etwa nur um unser Brot zu verdienen? Ist dies wahr? Wenn es wahr wäre, dann würde die Welt vielleicht zum Stillstand kommen, oder zumindest eine ganz andere Gestalt annehmen. Wir arbeiten offensichtlich auch, weil wir davon die Befriedigung unserer Eitelkeit erwarten, da wir nach dem Lob von Anderen dürsten (und was ist das Ziel dieser Eitelkeit? – auch darüber könnte man recht vielerlei feststellen) – des Weiteren bemühen wir uns auch deswegen so viel, weil ohne die Last der Arbeit bzw. Bewegung des Gemüts unser Leben leer und inhaltlos ist, nicht nur aus seelischen Gründen, sondern schon infolge der Konstruktion unseres Organismus.

(Was ist das Ziel des Organismus? Er will variable Reize – und was ist das Ziel der Seele? Sie will Ergebnisse sehen) – aber auch unsere moralischen Empfindungen wirken da nicht weniger intensiv mit, und auch tausenderlei andere, nicht aufzählbare seelische Gründe, deren Ziele wir uns nicht einmal vorstellen können – und wenn schon der Ursprung der Dinge, das heißt ihre Beweggründe so vielerlei und daher schon deswegen unermesslich sind, dann sind das wohl auch ihre vermutlichen Ziele. Auch ansonsten erscheint eine derartige Trennung der Gründe und Ziele als Willkür der Anschauung, da für das nicht praktische Denken diese Beiden aus der Kontinuität der Wirklichkeit schwerlich aussonderbare Dinge sind. Dies ist ähnlich, wie wenn wir den oberen Lauf der Donau als Grund von ihrem unteren Lauf betrachten würden, obwohl die Beiden miteinander nicht nur in kausalem Zusammenhang stehen, sondern zugleich eine Identität sind, und zwar eine solche, deren oben genannten unteren und oberen Teile zeitliche und räumliche und auch noch allerlei sonstige Distanzen und Spannungen aufweisen.

Vorausgenommene Folgerungen im Denken

Kurz und gut: Sämtliche Phänomene dieser Welt können grenzenlos untersucht werden, verehrte Zuhörerschaft, und wer sich in der Erkenntnis von Vornherein irgendwelche Art Zielpunkte auch immer vor Augen setzt – und dazu vielleicht aus seinen Erfahrungen auch noch bereits vorweg abgeklärte Schlussfolgerungen als deren Ergebnis ans Ende einer noch nicht existierenden Gedankenreihe schmuggelt, all dies aus dem Grund, damit er über den Treppenlauf seiner Logik schließlich dorthin gelangt, wohin er ohnehin wollte (wie beispielsweise der Behaviourist) – einem solchen Denker droht nicht nur die Gefahr, dass seine Gedanken auf einen falschen Weg gelangen könnten, da sie sich *vom Wege des reinen Verstandes auf denjenigen des praktischen Verstandes verirren könnten* – sondern, dass ihn gerade deswegen auch die Beschuldigung treffen könnte, dass er sein Denken freiwillig, einzig aus dem Grund des gedanklichen Nutzens oder seiner seelischen Bequemlichkeit beschränkt hätte. Der Grundsatz der Zweckmäßigkeit konnte nie der Leitstern der Anhänger der grenzenlosen Untersuchung sein, schon deswegen nicht, weil sobald sie die Phänomene selbst in ihren Eigenheiten als grenzenlos erkannt haben, sie sich auch darauf vorzubereiten haben, dass auch ihre Untersuchung ins Unendliche tendiert. Und gerade dies würde den Menschen der Gedanken keinesfalls entmutigen! – wer das Denken mag, wer leidenschaftlich dafür lebt, für den ist das Denken in gleichem Maße etwas Selbstbezwecktes, wie für Andere ihre was auch immer Art von Arbeit oder ihre Liebe. Und dies selbst dann, wenn sich nie irgendwelche brauchbaren Resultate ergeben würden. Einleuchtend ist jedoch, dass eine derartige Untersuchung die Herausbildung von so genannten Meinungen sehr erschwert, wenn nicht gar gänzlich verunmöglicht.

Meinung: Stillstand im Denken

Ich pflegte darüber zu sagen, dass: Wenn ich an einem Punkt einer unendlichen Gedankenreihe anhalte, und aus Zweckmässigkeitsgründen, moralischen oder sonstigen Gründen verkünde, dass dies meine Meinung ist – nur dann kann ich eine Meinung haben. Sobald ich einen Schritt weitergehe entlang der gleichen Gedankenreihe, löst sich meine frühere Stellungnahme zwangsläufig auf. Kurz und gut: Für den Denker bedeutet der Gedanke lediglich ein Stadium der Erkenntnis, welche jeweils ins Unendliche zeigt. Und – wiederholen wir, daran kann man ihn am besten kennenlernen, an seiner hoffnungslosen Liebe – also woran?

Daran, dass er das Denken um seiner selbst willen liebt, selbst dann noch, wenn, gleich wie die wahre Liebe der Gottheit, es ohne jeden greifbaren oder brauchbaren Erfolg ins Grenzenlose führt.

Wenn man einen afrikanischen Eingeborenen fragt, weshalb er die Kinder so sehr liebt und die Fruchtbarkeit seiner Frauen, dann wird er darauf vielleicht antworten: Damit es jemanden gibt, der für mich in meinem Alter jagt. Ein anderer hingegen vielleicht: Damit es jemanden gibt, der meine Erinnerung bewahrt. – Und so könnte man noch hunderterlei Ziele bezeichnen für ein und dasselbe Sache – obschon wir jeden solchen Zielbestimmungsversuch als Rationalisierung, als Manifestation unseres Rationalisierungshanges betrachten müssen, was soviel bedeutet, dass wir so wohl in unserem Schicksal wie auch in unseren Handlungen nach für unseren Verstand begreifbaren Gründen und Zielen suchen, damit sich deren Irrationalität auf uns ja nicht lähmend auszuwirken vermöge. Wir konstruieren also auch Endziele für uns gut im Voraus und immer deswegen, damit uns unsere Handlungen hinterher als Gründe dieser Endziele erscheinen mögen. Und dies ist jene Tendenz, welche – insbesondere dann, wenn die Seele aus Derartigem endgültige Formeln in sich verfestigt (und zu so etwas ist die Seele auch jederzeit geneigt) – die Anhänger des grenzenlosen Denkens um das Denken bzw. um die Unbefangenheit des Denkens in der Tat jederzeit und mit vollem Recht fürchten lassen kann.

Die Rolle unseres Vegetativsystems in der Herausbildung der Überzeugung

Es wird aber vielleicht nicht uninteressant, wenn wir die Frage der Meinungen und Überzeugungen für einen Augenblick besser in Augenschein nehmen. Was will eigentlich derjenige, welcher das Warum des Kindersegens, der Vermehrung in sich rationalisiert, mit seinem Verstand beweisen? Den Befehl der Vegetativa, welche ihn zur Vermehrung anspornt. Und jetzt nehmen wir ein anderes Beispiel. Die Mutter oder die Liebe von jemandem benimmt sich irgendwo stark daneben und wird deswegen in seiner Anwesenheit energisch getadelt. Daraufhin verteidigt der Betreffende verbal oder auch tätlich die Seinen, obwohl er dem Tadelnden Recht geben müsste. Und wenn man ihn fragt, weshalb er es tat, wird er vielleicht so antworten: – Ich werde auch künftig so handeln, weil in einer solchen Situation die Befangenheit Pflicht ist. Ich bin dazu verpflichtet, meine Angehörigen zu beschützen, wenn sie grob angegriffen werden, selbst wenn der Angreifer vielleicht etwas im Recht war. – Was hat also der Betreffende getan? Er hat mit seinem Verstand seine Emotionen rationalisiert, hat ihnen Recht gegeben. Und man kann sich fragen, ob er richtig gehandelt hat.

Ich glaube, ja. Aber nehmen wir ein anderes Beispiel, bei dem ich zufälligerweise auch Zeuge war. Ein Kind hat über das Horn des sagenhaften un-

garischen Fürsten Lehel gelesen und brach darüber in Weinen aus. Daraufhin gab ihm seine österreichischstämmige Mutter zu verstehen, dass der Fürst Lehel die österreichischen Provinzen durchgeraubt hatte und an ihm nichts beweinenswert sei, es war also nichts als rechtens, dass er zum Tode verurteilt wurde. Worauf das Kind so antwortete: Ich bin ein ungarischer Mensch und hasse den Kaiser Konrad, weil es mir weh tut, wenn ein Ungar hingerichtet wird. – Was tat auch dieses Kind?

Es hat durch seinen Verstand seine Emotionen akzeptieren lassen, sie rationalisiert, zu seiner Überzeugung gemacht. Und dies bedeutet so viel, dass bei der Heranbildung der Überzeugung demnach das Gefühl und die Emotion mitreden, und zu *solcher Zeit* das weitere Nachdenken für den Verstand verunmöglichen können. Das heißt, dass folglich das Denken auf seinem ins Unendliche führenden Weg an einer Stelle aus ethischen, gefühlsmäßigen, emotionellen oder sonstigen Gründen zum Anhalten gebracht wird.

Und daraus entstammt dann die vorweggenommene Konklusion, welche in den zwei beispielsweise zitierten Fällen so lautet: – Ich werde meine Angehörigen und mein Vaterland jederzeit beschützen, unabhängig davon ob der Angreifer Recht hat oder auch nicht. – Und dies bedeutet so viel – wiederholen wir –, dass er an diesem Punkt nicht weiter denkt, und bezüglich seiner Überzeugung seine Gefühle entschieden haben. Und wie oft erlebt es auch uns selber so? Es ist auch unvermeidlich, dass wir so sein sollen, weil sonst der Mensch kein Mensch ist. Das heißt, dass die Liebe des grenzenlosen Denkens zwar eine ehrwürdige Sache ist, dass man damit aber behutsam umgehen muss, weil sie sonst leicht in die Überzeugungslosigkeit führen kann.

Das Praktikum der Deduktion

Offensichtlich müssen auch die Anhänger der Deduktion unserer Meinung, wonach wir die Reinheit und Unbefangenheit des Denkens durch die vorweggenommene Konklusion für gefährdet halten, mit Widerspruch begegnen, da ja gerade sie es par excellence sind, welche für die in ihrer Inspiration auftauchenden Schlussergebnisse hinterher Begründungen suchen. Ist es denn nicht so, dass die Deduktion jederzeit zu großartigen Ergebnissen geführt hat, sowohl auf dem Gebiete der Religionsphilosophie wie auch der Wissenschaften? Sie können offenbar auch das beanstanden, dass ich gerade diese Denkweise, d. h. die Vorwegnahme der Endergebnisse, als tendenziell praktisch veranlagt bezeichnet habe, obschon es gerade die Induktion ist, welche, zwar aus anderem Blickpunkt, doch viel eher als praktisch genannt werden könnte. Was macht denn die Induktion? Macht sie etwa nicht das, dass sie ihre Ergebnisse Schritt für Schritt aufgrund von *Erfahrungen* gewinnt, das heißt also empirisch-praktisch, und

hinterher das zu untersuchende Phänomen daraus für sich quasi mit synthetischer Vorgehensweise zusammenfügt, formt? Ist demnach die Induktion beim Gewinn ihrer Ergebnisse, in ihren *Mitteln* etwa nicht praktisch? Sie ist es zweifelsohne, nur gerade in ihren Zielen ist sie es nicht, und wir reden gerade darüber. Demgegenüber kann die Deduktion gerade in ihren Zielen als praktisch bezeichnet werden, selbst dann, wenn sie hinterher vielleicht dem grenzenlosen Denken dienen würde mit ihren Studien und Ergebnissen. Die Deduktion ist jederzeit eine Methode der nachträglichen und zielbewussten Analyse der zwar ebenfalls aus unseren Erfahrungen, aber nicht auf Untersuchungs-, sondern auf Intuitionsweg erarbeiteten spekulativen Konklusion, welche zwar zweifelsohne und jedenfalls auch in ihren nachträglichen Beweisen auf praktische Empirie angewiesen ist, aber im Hinblick auf ihre Ziele eher als praktisch bezeichnet werden kann. Ihr zielbewusstes Praktikum verliert sie nur dann, und nur dann bewegt sie sich in Richtung der unendlichen Untersuchung, wenn sie ihre vorweggenommenen und nachträglich bewiesenen Ergebnisse bedingungslos aufzugeben bereit ist, für manche gleichfalls nicht auf Untersuchungs-, sondern ebenfalls auf Intuitionsweg erarbeitete speulative Konklusion. Wie sie es auch tut: Die Sonne dreht sich um die Erde, danach: die Erde dreht sich um die Sonne – im Atom gibt es Kreislauf – nicht Kreislauf, andersartige Bewegung usw. – so die Wissenschaft von Jahrhundert zu Jahrhundert beziehungsweise letztlich von Jahr zu Jahr. Es ist jedoch all dies davon zu trennen, was als Grundgedanke eines philosophischen Systems zu betrachten ist, insbesondere, wenn dieser Grundgedanke die in jeder Hinsicht allzeitige Untersuchung ermöglicht. Die deduktive Antizipation scheint demnach vom Blickpunkt unserer den Ergebnissen vorgestreckten Befangenheiten gegenüber umso weniger gefährlich, je allgemeiner, umfassender und hochrangiger sie ist – hingegen birgt sie umso mehr Gefahren in sich, je mehr sie sich auf Details bezieht.

(Wenn ich beispielsweise eine Gottheit voraussetze: Diese Antizipation ist weniger gefährlich für das Denken, als wenn ich vorweg annehme, dass beispielsweise der Wert der künstlerischen Arbeiten an ihrem Erfolg zu messen sei.) Und den philosophierenden Menschen kennzeichnet im Allgemeinen gerade dies am besten. Gerade ihm droht die Gefahr, dass er seinen im Voraus vorgestellten Detailergebnissen und seinen sich auf diese beziehenden, im Voraus festgelegten Zielen, d. h. um seiner Ideen willen, sich hinterher falsche gedankliche Gebäude errichtet, jeweils deswegen, um seine Ideen zu beweisen. Und was noch die Gefahr erhöht: Normalerweise hält er sich an sie.

Die Berechtigung der praktischen Ansicht

Nun gab es gleichwohl ganze philosophische Welten, welche sich rein praktische Ziele setzten. Auch dem nüchterneren Zweig der griechischen Philosophie ist eine solche Tendenz eigen, bereits von daher, weil sie gerade die Beurteilung der Ziele für so wichtig hielt. Und da kann sich natürlicherweise auch die Frage stellen, ob auch solche Untersuchungen eine Berechtigung haben. Man braucht es gar nicht zu sagen, dass sie dies haben und nicht bloß aus praktischen, sozusagen ethischen Gründen (auf welchem Gebiete das Prinzip der Zweckmäßigkeit das allerwichtigste ist) –, sowie und viel mehr deswegen, weil sie Gelegenheit bieten dafür, dass wir den Stoff, dessen Untersuchung wir anfingen, gut herumdrehen. Wenn ich beispielsweise erforsche, worin der praktische Zweck des Atmens besteht, dann kann ich auch sonst vielerlei über die Struktur des menschlichen Körpers erfahren – wenn auch das nicht, wozu der Mensch selbst gut ist? – Wir müssen folglich vorausschicken, dass wir nicht feststellen können, wozu die Kunst gut ist und worin ihr Ziel mit uns oder in uns besteht. Ihre Ziele sind grenzenlos. Wir entschließen uns dennoch gerne für diese praktische Untersuchung in der Erwartung, dass wir daraus vielleicht auch über das Wesentliche der Kunst mehr erfahren können.

Das Ziel der Kunst: Sie unterhält, erheitet, spiegelt

Also wieder, was ist ihr Ziel? Wir haben vielerlei Theorien darüber gehört. Wir haben beispielsweise gehört, dass die Kunst ihren Genießer vor allem unterhalten und belustigen will. Aber was ist das „Unterhalten“? Ein großartiges Wort, den Feststellungen der Psychologie vollkommen entsprechend, weil es genau ausdrückt, was sich in der Seele infolge der Unterhaltung abspielt. Es drückt aus und bedeutet also: Dass es die gezwungene menschliche Aufmerksamkeit, was wir gemeinhin als Sorge bezeichnen, demontiert und umschaltet, d. h. dass die beglückende und ungezwungene animalische Aufmerksamkeit lockerer ist, weil sie die Seele in Richtung ihrer natürlichen und durch nichts gehemmten Assoziationen treibt. Und wenn wir uns fragen, ob wir solche wertvollen, hochwertigen Arbeiten kennen, welche uns unterhalten und erheitet haben? Selbst die ernsthafteste Seele kann darauf nicht antworten, dass sie solche nicht kennt – ganz im Gegenteil! Unmittelbar an diese Begriffe knüpft sich der Begriff des Interessanten und diesbezüglich kann ich bereits jetzt so viel verraten, dass ich selbst beispielsweise ein solches umfangreicheres Werk: Roman oder Drama, welches nicht interessant (und vor allen Dingen das) ist und zwar in des Wortes allerkindlichstem Sinne, ich den derartigen Roman oder Drama verwerfe, nicht für gut halte. Ich

kann folglich als mein eigenes Gesetz verkünden, dass ich die Forderung, dass die Kunst uns sehr wohl unterhalten soll, für berechtigt halte.

Wir haben aber auch schon Derartiges vernommen, dass die Kunst etwas mit einer didaktischen Tendenz sei: Sie lehrt uns vor allem Selbsterkenntnis, sie will uns uns selbst zeigen – und wer hätte sich nicht schon selbst erkannt, wenn er – um nichts anderes zu erwähnen – Hamlet, König Lear oder Othello schon einige Male gelesen hatte? Dass die Kunst nicht bei einem solchen Ziel zu ertappen ist, können wir jedoch schon jetzt mit unserer vollen Überzeugung aussprechen, umso mehr, als auch das Folgende uns gerade dies beweisen wird. Sie hat mit uns keine solchen Ziele und doch – nehmen wir etwa dieses Volkslied:

*Mein gebänderter Hut
Wird vom Wind geblasen,
Danke dir, mein Täubchen,
Mich bisher geliebt zu haben.*

*Solang du mich geliebt hast,
Trugst du rote Stiefel,
Seitdem du mich nicht mehr liebst,
Hol' dich barfüßig der Teufel.*

Ich singe mir dies vor und muss anfangen zu lächeln. Nicht nur, weil mir seine Melodie gefällt und sein Rhythmus, sondern auch wegen seines Inhalts. Ich danke dir, dass du mich bisher geliebt hast – oh, wie fein und elegant ist dies – denke ich mir –, er bedankt sich für die Liebe, das ist schön von ihm. Aber im Gegensatz dazu: Was für eine schneidige und liebe Frechheit ist es, dass du bis dahin rote Stiefel hattest, solange du mich geliebt hast, nicht wahr? Aber ab jetzt soll es dir auch barfüßig gut sein. All dies, sage ich, gefällt mir darin sehr gut. Es ist hingegen fraglos, dass ich nicht bloß viel Freude daran empfinde. Ich habe auch manches konfrontative Vergnügen, was zu verstehen ist: also auch du? – denke ich mir und empfinde sogleich Sympathie gegenüber dieser Boshaftigkeit. Weil ich darin mich selbst erkenne. – Ach, du wünschest Schlechtes der, welche dich nicht mehr liebt? Darf man das? – und lächele in mich hinein, offenbar weil ich in ihm die verschmitzte Projektion eines Teils meines eigenen Wesens sehe, ich spiegele mich in ihm, ich werde vor mir selber in ihm wiederholt – etwas Derartiges pflegt also anscheinend dem menschlichen Wesen Freude zu bereiten, zumindest nach unserer Erfahrung. Irgendeinmal notierte ich mir den Satz, dass wir alle, die existieren, sein und uns spiegeln wollen – diese zwei zusammen machen anscheinend die Fülle des Lebens aus.

Kunst und Lebenskenntnis

Nehmen wir nun diesen armen, neuerdings oft erwähnten Narzissus und stellen wir ihn uns vor, wie er sich im Spiegel der Flussoberfläche betrachtet, zuerst in diesen Spiegel hineinlächelt und sich schließlich in sich selbst verliebt – ergeht es

nicht auch uns so? Dass auch wir, Gott weiß warum, die Wiederholung unserer selbst gerne anschauen? Und stimmt es etwa nicht, dass man dabei von einer guten und wohligen Wärme erfüllt wird? Die Kunst wiederholt mich für mich selbst und auch dies mag ich daran. Sie tut es keineswegs deshalb, weil sie Absichten mit mir hätte, aber sie tut es. (Davon natürlich ausgenommen die Künste mit didaktischer Tendenz, welche es deswegen tun, damit es getan ist.) Wiederholen wir also, dass die Kunst, auch wenn ihr Hauptziel nicht darin liegt, uns sowohl unterhält als auch uns selbst zeigt. Aber wir haben auch schon gehört, dass die Kunst in ihrer Lehrabsicht darüber sogar noch hinausgeht: Sie zeigt uns nicht nur uns selbst, sondern sie zeigt uns auch andere – macht uns eigentlich mit der Welt bekannt. Jemand, der über große Einfühlung, Fantasie sowie Ausdrucksfähigkeit verfügt, zeigt uns noch einmal (und besser als wir es sahen) auch das, was wir bereits kennen und auch das, was wir davon noch nicht kennen. Und wer kann behaupten, das sei nicht wahr?

Sind wir etwa schon Bergleute, Schiffsleute, Tischler gewesen, oder dass ich noch etwas Wichtigeres sage: Konnten wir Männer beispielsweise irgendwann Mütter sein? Und ein guter Roman oder Novelle klärt uns darüber auf, was es heißt, Mutter zu sein. Werden wir dadurch an Lebenskenntnissen bereichert? Zweifelsohne. Und in ethischer Hinsicht? Ebenfalls. Da wir derartig sind, dass beispielsweise nur solche oder ähnliche Leiden auf unser Mitgefühl wirken, welche auch wir kennen. Es ist bekannt, dass das Kind über die Zahnschmerzen der Mutter lacht, und solange darüber lacht, bis es nicht selber erfahren hat, was es ist. Hier muss man aber sogar noch weitergehen. Meine Mutter pflegte mir zu sagen: „Ein Kind kann nicht den Wirkungskreis seiner Handlungen kennen“ – und ahnte offenbar gar nicht, welch wichtige psychologische Feststellung sie mit ihrer pragmatischen Aussage machte. Das Kind kann sich nämlich in der Tat die Konsequenz seiner Handlung noch nicht gut vorstellen. Nehmen wir dazu ein Beispiel: Ein kleines Kind hat beim Esstisch unter seiner Großmutter den Stuhl weggezogen, als sie sich setzen wollte, worauf die kleine alte Frau auf den Boden fiel und sich sehr anschlug. Als man den Jungen ins Verhör nahm, weshalb er so böse war oder was über ihn kam, dass er sich dazu hinreißen ließ – antwortete er: – Ich glaubte nicht, dass auch die Großmutter hinfallen kann, und wollte mich davon überzeugen. – Und er weinte sehr, weil er kein böser Lausbub war...

Die Glaubhaftigkeit gegenüber der Fantasie

... Und ich selber, schon deshalb, weil ich ihn kannte, aber auch aus jeglichen anderen Gründen, glaubte ihm, dass er die Wahrheit sagte. Da die Seele, und insbesondere die kindliche Seele, auch jene seltsame Eigenschaft besitzt, dass sie – auch wenn das Kind sich etwas gut vorzustellen vermag, dennoch dazu sagt: Ich

glaube es nicht! Und das Kind verspürt dann eventuell einen unwiderstehlichen Drang, sich davon zu überzeugen, ob sich die Sache in der Wirklichkeit tatsächlich so verhält, ob diese Sache wirklich so sei, wie es sich vorgestellt hatte. Und gerade aus diesem Grund setzt es das Haus ein wenig in Brand. Diese Neugierde kann in einigen krankhaften Fällen sogar noch bis zum Mord gedeihen – zum ständig plagenden Zweifel, zum verzehrenden Durst.

Habe einst nicht auch ich selber so etwas getan? Meine Kindheit war von Mitgefühl geprägt, ich war ständig tränenerfüllt von Mitleid. Und was tat ich dennoch? Ich habe ein Hündchen einmal mit meiner ganzen Kraft gegen einen Stein geschleudert und dabei, ich kann mich wohl daran erinnern, so gerufen: Es tut ihm ja nicht weh! – Und als ich es dann bluten sah, lag ich den ganzen Tag im Schluchzen.

Das Kind kennt folglich tatsächlich die Tragweite seiner Handlungen nicht, teilweise schon deswegen nicht, weil in Ermangelung an Erfahrungen seine Vorstellung nicht dazu fähig ist, es realitätskonform zu lenken, und es vor vielerlei auch zurückweicht. Und dies Letztere kann sogar dem Erwachsenen widerfahren – da unsere Fantasie eine seltsame Natur besitzt, womit sich zu beschäftigen endlich fällig wäre. Unter anderen hat sie beispielsweise auch die Kuriosität, dass sie für einige Augenblicke aussetzt, so wie vermutlich auch bei den Pferden, wenn sie plötzlich zu vergessen scheinen, wie zu ziehen – und der Mensch gelegentlich unfähig ist, sich ganz einfache Sachen vorzustellen: Etwa wie man sich eine Jacke anzieht. Oder er ist gänzlich außer Stande, in der Dunkelheit seines Zimmers die Türe zu finden. Seine Fantasie kann aus tausenderlei Gründen sogar dauerhafter und sogar endgültig bei gewissen Dingen den Dienst versagen, nicht funktionieren wollen. Infolge gewisser Behinderungen, welche die neuartige Psychologie als Hemmungen bezeichnet, sind wir größtenteils nicht in der Lage, uns vorzustellen, wie unser Vater dereinst geworben hat.

Übertragen wir nun dies auf die Künste. Worüber sprachen wir eigentlich? Wir haben, nicht wahr, die drei gräßistischen Fragen gestellt, und nachdem wir zunächst generell eingegrenzt haben, was wir fortan für Kunst halten werden, warfen wir als Erste die Frage auf, worin das Ziel der Kunst liegt. Einige haben darauf bisher mit Unterhaltung geantwortet, andere, dass sie uns Selbsterkenntnis, Lebenskenntnis lehren will. Und wir sagten darüber, dass sie offensichtlich sowohl unterhält als auch lehrt, da sie uns in unserer Vorstellung mit tausenderlei Dingen bekannt macht, welche wir sonst nicht gekannt hätten. An diesem Punkt fuhren wir so fort, dass wir gewisse Sachen umso weniger kennenlernen können, als unsere Fantasie vor ihnen manchmal sogar noch zurückweicht. Oder kennen nicht auch Sie solche Herren, denen man – sagen wir – vergeblich versucht, die Sorgen und Probleme der Bergleute zu erklären, weil ihre Fantasie sich davon abwendet, nicht funktionieren will, zurückweicht. Diese wollen auf keinen Fall und nicht einmal in ihrer Vorstellung in die Grube hinuntersteigen und zumindest

so erleben, wie es sein könnte, wenn man monatelang keine Sonne am Himmel sehen kann. Von solchen Leuten sagt man, sie seien starrköpfig, obwohl vielleicht gar nicht er es ist, sondern nur seine Fantasie. Wir herrschen sie dann an und sagen schließlich: Warte nur, ich werde dich in irgendeine Grube hinunterschleppen. Aber wir können es natürlich nicht tun und stattdessen drücken wir ihm Zolas *Germinal* in die Hand.

Allerhand – sagt er dann nach dem Lesen des Buches, wenn er Anstand hat. Aber ich, der es ihm erklärt, woher vernahm ich vom Elend der Bergleute? Nicht etwa ebenfalls aus dem *Germinal*?

Folglich ist es wirklich so: Durch die Kunst wird unsere Lebenskenntnis nicht nur erweitert und vervollkommnet, wir lernen nicht nur solche Lebensbereiche, welche wir ansonsten nie hätten kennenlernen können, sondern wir entfalten uns dadurch auch in moralischer Hinsicht, alleine schon deswegen, weil sie unserer Vorstellung in ihrer Hilflosigkeit hilft.

Und trotzdem, obwohl all dies so wahr ist, müssen wir feststellen, dass die Kunst keinerlei solche Ziele mit uns hat. Und falls der Schriftsteller sich derartige Ziele setzt, kann er dies nur in zweiter Linie tun, weil er uns vor allem zu unterhalten hat. Und womit? Mit der Schönheit seines Werkes. Weil es ohne Schönheit keine Kunst gibt. Sie kann auch vielerlei anderes enthalten, aber ohne die Schönheit kann sie keinesfalls bestehen. Dies bedeutet zugleich, dass der Künstler sich allerlei vornehmen kann für sein Werk, nur eines nicht, dass sein Werk hässlich werden soll.

Die Kunst soll erfreuen

Bereits jetzt müssen wir betonen, dass dies unsere wichtigste These ist – dieser anzuhängen sind wir mit der gesamten Kraft von all unseren Gefühlen und Gedanken gezwungen, aufgrund der definitiven Erfahrungen, welche wir im Laufe unseres in den Künsten tätigen und sie untersuchenden Lebens erworben haben. Und dies wird auch das Hauptthema unserer Vorträge.

Wir sind also beim Angelpunkt unserer alle Künste betreffenden Auffassungen angelangt. Alles, was Sie hier hören werden, wird eigentlich dazu berufen sein, Ihnen dies zu beweisen.

Was wollen wir also mit all unserer Kraft beweisen? Dass die Kunst uns vor allem zu unterhalten hat, und wenn sie dies erfüllt, dann kann sie auch zahlreichen anderen Zielen entsprechen.

Und darauf, weshalb sich in uns diese große Bereitschaft verbirgt, dass wir an ihren Schönheiten Freude empfinden – darauf gibt es keine Antwort. Der Urmensch konnte in den Wildnissen seiner Welt beliebig viele lebendige Büffel

beobachten, aber keinesfalls dies! Wenn aber jemand sie auf die Wand seiner Höhle zeichnete, so war nur das für ihn das wirkliche Wunder.

– Und geht es uns nicht auch genau so? Denn wie oft geschieht es uns, dass keine Schönheit der Wirklichkeit so stark auf uns zu wirken vermag wie gerade diejenige der Künste?

Der Ursprung der Kunst: Nachahmung? Spiegelung?

Wir müssen aber auch noch die andere gräzistische Frage aufwerfen: Woher stammt die Kunst? Was hat sie im Menschen entstehen lassen?

Wir wissen es nicht. Ob der Mensch sich darin spiegeln mag? Oder ob er von seiner Nachahmungsveranlagung getrieben wird? Wir wissen darüber nur so viel, dass seit es den Menschen gibt, er immer gerne gesungen, fabuliert, gezeichnet hat und dass er immer bestrebt war, seine Gebrauchsobjekte, seine Umgebung zu verzieren – sogar dass er damit anfing, vor allem sich selber zu verzieren: Er bemalte seinen Körper, seine Zähne und brach sich sogar einzelne Zähne aus, wohl auch aus kultischen Gründen, aber dasselbe hat sich im Laufe der Zeit auch zur Norm der Schönheit entwickelt. Er zeichnete sogar auch Ornamente sowohl auf sein Gesicht als auch auf seinen Körper und auf seine Utensilien – mit einem Wort, dekorierte er auf künstlerische Weise nicht nur seine Höhle, seine Hütte, seine Utensilien, sondern auch sich selbst. Und was ihn dazu veranlasste, das wissen wir, wie bereits gesagt, nicht. Wir wissen darüber nur so viel, dass auch die Natur verziert und manchmal mit für uns unverständlichen und ungenießbaren Farben und Formen, wie z. B. die Farben auf dem Unterkörper des Mandrill-Pavians und die vom Schnabel des Truthahns herabhängenden Hautlappen. Ob der Mensch dabei und darüber hinaus auch von der Sehnsucht nach den wirksamen Mitteln der magischen Ideale geleitet wurde und für ihn erst dann zur Schönheit geworden ist, was sich als wirksam erwies? – Über all dies haben wir eher Ahnungen als Wissen. Weshalb ist es für gewisse Menschen oder Arten schöner, wenn sie ihre Zähne ausbrechen oder abfeilen? – warum bedeutet Derartiges eine höhere Harmonie des Angesichts für sie? – und warum ist für sie ein terrakotta- oder, sagen wir, sienarot-farbig bemalter Körper schöner als der ursprüngliche? – und weshalb setzen sie sich Marabufedern auf den Scheitel? – Wenn wir uns heutzutage immerfort fragen, ob es etwas Schöneres gibt als den nackten menschlichen Körper, und zwar in seiner originalen Beschaffenheit wie von der Natur erschaffen.

Die Verzierung unseres Körpers

Weshalb ist ein Ohr mit Ohrring schöner? Oder ein mit Schmuck vollgehängerter Hals?

Sagen wir, dass ein derartiger Schmuck allenfalls die natürliche Schönheit dieser Körperteile noch besser hervorhebt – aber der rotlackierte Fingernagel? – könnten wir noch weiter fragen, und diese Fragen sind offenbar gleichbedeutend damit, dass wir selber in dieser Hinsicht genau gleich weit sind wie die primitiven Völker: Wir verändern, bessern unsere natürlichen Gegebenheiten aus, damit wir sie verschönern. Nun aber dazu, woher, aus welchem Traum wir unsere Schönheitsideale entnehmen, kann ich wiederholen: Darüber wissen wir ziemlich wenig. Wie sehr rätselhaft ihre Ursprünge sind, aus welch unklaren Emotionen sie entsprangen, dazu liefern die einschlägigen Forschungen der Ethnologen gute Hinweise. Professor Holländer aus Berlin gibt beispielsweise einen ausgezeichneten Überblick darüber und zählt jene Völker auf, bei denen die unverhältnismäßige Überentwicklung der weiblichen Rundungen als höchstes Schönheitsideal gilt, und andere, bei denen der weibliche Körper nur dann Wertschätzung genießt, wenn seine Rundungen verkümmert sind – gar nicht zu reden von den Chinesen, bei denen bekanntermaßen die goldene Lilie, d. h. der auf gewisse Weise vollkommen verkrüppelte weibliche Fuß, den Eindruck der beseligendsten und vornehmsten Schönheit erweckt. Wir vermuten dahinter gewisse schwer erkennbare Sehnsüchte und Richtungen des Eigennutzes – aber nehmen wir vielleicht auch dazu uns selbst als Beispiel, da wir ja auch den kleinen Fuß mögen, und Gott weiß aus welchen Gründen. Obwohl man auf breiten, großen, starken Füßen offensichtlich besser gehen kann, aber nein, uns gefallen die Kleinen – vielleicht erweckt das weibliche Wesen auf kleinen Füßen eher einen ätherischen Eindruck in unserem Herzen... Und nun, warum benötigen wir, dass die Frau ätherischer sein soll, als wir uns selbst kennen? Gehen wir auch dieser Frage etwas nach. Aus tausenderlei Gründen, aber vor allen vielleicht deswegen: Weil von dem, was schön ist, wir nicht gerne denken, dass es auch nützlich ist, und diese These betonen wir am ehesten gegenüber dem Utilitarismus. Nehmen wir das folgende Beispiel: Eine weibliche Brust gefällt uns sehr – aber wir mögen nicht gerne daran denken, dass sie auch stillt. Jemand hat wunderschöne Perlenzähne – wir vergessen gerne, dass man damit auch zu kauen pflegt. Und es kann gut sein, dass auch jene Verzierungen dieser Tendenz angehören, mit welchen der Mensch seinen Körper verschönern wollte, und zwar zu allen Zeiten und unnatürlich. Womit würden wir es sonst erklären, dass er zu jeder Zeit mit der Arbeit der Natur unzufrieden war und sie für sich selbst korrigieren wollte?

Die Schönheit des Körpers lässt seine Brauchbarkeit vergessen

Denn es ist bei jemand, sogar bei einem Tier, schwer vorstellbar – und kommt auch nur verhältnismäßig selten vor, – dass irgendein zweckloser Auswuchs als Verzierung seines Körpers dienen soll – sondern lediglich so, dass es daraus auch Gebrauch macht oder einst gemacht hat und er sich erst danach, im Laufe der Zeit, zur Verzierung entwickelt oder degeneriert hat... Der Mund einer Frau kann schön sein, auch ihre Augen oder ihre Haare, aber nicht irgendeine unverständliche Warze auf ihrem Mund oder auf ihrer Brust, wie schön deren Farbe auch sein mag... (verwechseln wir dies nicht damit, dass ein kleiner Fehler ein Gesicht noch schöner machen kann, weil es dessen Schönheit besser hervorhebt – auch da ist nicht der Fehler schön, sondern seinetwegen das Gesicht) – ich wiederhole also: Wie sehr es auch wahr ist, dass als Zierde eines lebendigen Körpers zumeist nur so etwas vorstellbar ist, was zugleich brauchbarer Teil jenes lebendigen Körpers ist – ebenso wahr ist auch, dass seine Schönheit seine Brauchbarkeit vergessen lässt. Es wächst auch über diese Nützlichkeit hinaus und zeigt sich des Öfteren als Überschuss auf dem Körper. Es fällt uns beispielsweise gar nicht mehr ein, die riesigen und lästigen Schwanzfedern des Pfaus als nützliche Organe anzusehen, mit welchen er seinen Flug in der Luft lenkt. Obwohl er damit dereinst gelenkt hat, jetzt hingegen nur noch schwerlich, da sie über ihre Brauchbarkeit zugunsten ihrer Schönheit hinausgewachsen sind. Bei mehreren Rind- und Antilopenarten ist das Horn oder Geweih überhaupt keine Waffe mehr, sondern nur noch Zierde. Dem Löwen nützt seine Mähne, welche ihn dereinst gegen die Kälte schützte, überhaupt nicht mehr. Und nun zurückkehrend zum Ursprung der Verzierungen des Menschen: Wir können uns natürlich auch denken, dass auch die Bekleidung selbst und deren primitivste Formen die Proportionen, die natürliche Farbharmonie und die Vorstellung der Gewichtsverteilung des Körpers dermaßen verändert haben, dass schon rein deswegen Bedarf an diesen unnatürlich erscheinenden Korrekturen der natürlichen Schönheit besteht... Aber ich habe das Gefühl, es ist am besten, eher bei dem früher Gesagten zu verbleiben, da es auf einen tieferen Ursprung verweist – nämlich, dass die Schönheit die ursprüngliche Nützlichkeit der Körperteile vergessen lässt, und wir mögen dies und streben folglich nach solchen Verzierungen, welche uns dies noch mehr vergessen lassen.

Und natürlich entspringen aus dieser gleichen Quelle auch etliche unserer anderen geheimen Fantasien, welche jedoch gar nicht mehr in den Bereich der Ästhetik gehören: Wir mögen es nicht, wenn ein König im Ornat, sagen wir, Bier trinkt, oder wenn unser wunderschönes Ideal auf sich nach Flöhen sucht. Und unserer derartigen Unzufriedenheit leihen wir mit folgenden Worten Ausdruck: – Bestehen sogar bei ihr körperliche Bedürfnisse? – Und daher ergibt sich, dass wir es mögen, wenn ihre Füßchen klein und ätherisch schwebend sind – oder sich

nur zum Trippeln eignen, wie die Chinesen erträumen, weil dies unserer über sie gebildeten Fantasie und auch unseren Sehnsüchten besser entspricht...

Nach all dem bitte ich Sie nun, fällen Sie ein Urteil darüber, wohin wir in Kenntnis des Gehörten, d. h. den Befunden einer höher entwickelten Psychologie, mit jener unfruchtbaren, weil die seelischen Qualitäten des Menschen und deren Vielfalt missachtenden Definition gelangen, wonach schön ist, was ohne Interesse gefällt? Schön ist das, was unser höchstes Interesse, unsere Glückseligkeit, benötigt. Schön ist das, was wir aus tausenderlei unerfindlichen Gründen als schön empfinden.

Verborgene Fantasien

Und jetzt fahren wir fort mit der Erörterung der zweiten gräzistischen Frage: Woher entstammt die Kunst? Wir haben festgestellt, dass wir nicht einmal bestimmt wissen, was den Menschen dazu veranlasst hat, seinen eigenen Körper zu verzieren, selbst wenn wir versucht haben, dafür eine Erklärung zu geben. Noch viel weniger können wir jene komplizierte Frage beantworten, weshalb der Mensch seine Erlebnisse in seine Erinnerung zurückzurufen bestrebt ist. Dass auch dies einer der Beweggründe des Ursprungs der Kunst ist, ist dermaßen evident, dass es sozusagen keines Beweises bedarf; folglich, dass wir bestrebt sind, unsere eigenen oder anderer Leute Erlebnisse zu rekonstruieren und sagen wir so: derart auch zu verewigen. – Wir wissen, dass der Mensch ein fantasiereiches Wesen ist (und in welchem Maße er das ist, darüber wird an späterer Stelle noch viel die Rede sein müssen). Hier will ich hauptsächlich auf einen Punkt im Zusammenhang mit seiner Fantasie hinweisen: Nämlich, dass er dank seiner Fantasie bis zu einem gewissen Punkt dazu in der Lage ist, seine Sehnsüchte sich selbst zu erfüllen, oder dieses Wort im wissenschaftlichen, allgemeineren Sinne brauchend: dass er ein onanistisch veranlagtes Wesen ist. Und dies bedeutet nichts anderes, als dass seine Fantasie zugleich und gleichzeitig sein Segen und Fluch, Schatz und Elend ist, wie vermutlich alles, was er besitzt. Seine Fantasie verhilft ihm zu all dem, was er durchlebt, damit erschafft er sich ständig alles, was er sieht und hört... Aber sagen wir vielleicht so, dass meistens seine latente Fantasie am Werk ist. Ich höre Gebell und siehe, ich weiß, dass es von einem Hund stammt. Ich sehe einen sich bewegenden gelben Fleck und ich weiß, dass es eine Straßenbahn ist. Aber was bedeutet, dass ich es weiß? Ich habe bereits sowohl den Hund als auch die Straßenbahn erfahren und ihre Erinnerungsbilder leben in mir und tauchen irgendwie, sagen wir blitzartig, für das Bewusstsein unbemerkt auf, und dies nennt mein Bewusstsein so: ich weiß. Aber ich weiß sogar, ob es ein kleiner oder großer Hund ist, welcher bellt. Und wenn dabei meine latenten Fantasien, d. h. meine Erinnerungsbilder, nicht dienlich wären, dann wäre ich

kaum dazu in der Lage, das Gebell mit dem Hund und den gelben Fleck mit der Straßenbahn zu verbinden. Dass dies so sein kann, dafür gibt es mehrfache Beweise. Ein etwa vierzigjähriger Mann sagte mir einmal: – Erst jetzt ist es mir gelungen darauf zu kommen, weshalb es mich vor dem Mohnkuchen graut.

Plötzlich ist aus meinen Erinnerungen ein längst vergessenes, aber in mir dennoch wirksam gebliebenes Ereignis aufgetaucht. Ich mag etwa vierjährig gewesen sein, als böse Nachbarn unseren herzigen kleinen Hund mit vergiftetem Mohnkuchen umgebracht haben. – Darüber hinaus: Unfassbare, aber dennoch aufblitzende, irrtümliche Gefahrenfantasien beweisen dasselbe noch besser und etwas Derartiges habe ich sogar auch bei Tieren erfahren. Ich sah auf dem Film einer russischen Tierversuchsstation, wie ein Tiger und anschließend zwei Bären sich zu Tode erschreckt haben vor einem sich im Staub aufblasenden Frosch. Die Bären haben sich derart erschreckt, dass sie auf einen Baum kletterten, offenbar deswegen, weil in ihren Fantasien aus dem Staub eine Viper auftauchte. Aber des Weiteren: Einmal wurde ich auf dem Dorfe spätabends zu Hilfe gerufen zu einer ohnmächtigen Dame. Sie ging nach dem Nachtmahl spazieren. Ihre Freundin wollte sich einen Spaß leisten und schlich sich an sie heran und berührte von hinten ihren Arm. Wovon fiel diese Dame in Ohnmacht? Offenbar von ihren blitzartigen Gefahrenfantasien. Dies ist jedoch wieder eine Abweichung, kehren wir zu unseren ursprünglichen Themen zurück.

In unserer Fantasie korrigieren wir unser Leben

Aufgrund all dessen könnten wir daher sagen, dass der Mensch mit seiner Fantasie seine Welt für sich fortlaufend neu erschafft und dabei naturgemäß sein Leben auch ruiniert. Wie und weswegen? Darauf werden wir gleich kommen. Wiederholen wir: Ich höre ein angenehm klingendes Lachen und ich weiß, dass es von einer Frau stammt. Ich lese nicht Buchstaben – meine Fantasie vervollständigt die einzelnen Buchstabenzeichen zu Wörtern. Ich spüre ländliche Gerüche – vor meinen Augen steht ein Dorf. (Und welches Dorf meines Lebens? Und welches Bild davon? Auch dies ist eine hinlänglich interessante Frage, es wäre lohnend, sich damit auseinanderzusetzen.) All dies wäre bis dahin in Ordnung und bedeutet immer noch, dass ich meine Welt selber für mich selbst erschaffe. Aber die Sache hat auch noch eine Weiterung: Ein hungriger Mann erhält eine Einladung zu einem guten Nachtmahl und sofort gehen Geschmäcke in seinem Mund los und diese sind für ihn so angenehm, dass er eine Zeit lang bei ihnen verweilt und über das Nachtmahl zu fantasieren beginnt. Und dies ist bereits ein onanistisches Phänomen. Eine Weile erhöht es zwar die Sehnsucht und die Genussfähigkeit – aber danach... Der Mensch verzehrt fürwahr schon im Voraus den größten Teil seiner Erlebnisse, dies ist sein Los auf dieser Welt, weil er über

sie schon im Voraus fantasiert: Dies bedeutet hier im wissenschaftlichen Sinne des Begriffs die Onanie. Und diese menschliche Eigenschaft ist uns allen gemeinsam, es gibt kein menschliches Wesen, welches nicht im Voraus über seine Freuden fantasieren würde. Folglich: „es frisst sein Getreide als Gras“ – wie Shakespeare es irgendwo wunderschön ausgedrückt hatte. Was hat dies zur Folge?

Die aus Fantasien hervorgehenden Befriedigungen

Zum Teil, dass ich den größten oder zumindest einen Teil meiner Erlebnisse schon aufgebraucht habe, wenn ich dann beim Erlebnis ankomme, und die Sehnsucht in mir bereits ausgebrannt ist – wer hätte bei sich selbst nicht schon Derartiges erfahren? Unser Verlangen lässt uns reichlich im Voraus das Mögliche und eher noch das Unmögliche vorstellen – und hier gehört hinzugefügt, dass je mehr wir entbehren, desto mehr. Die Sehnsucht ist der beste Koch – pflegt man zu sagen, und wahrlich, gibt es noch etwas anderes in uns, das unsere Fantasie besser inspirieren würde als die Sehnsucht?

„Possession lessens the value of a thing“ – der Besitz vermindert den Wert der Dinge, sagt das Englische, ohne dass es vom Hinduismus, Augustinus oder Schopenhauer etwas hätte lernen müssen. Folglich: Das Kommende wird von der Sehnsucht ausgemalt – und der Mensch muss hinterher gezwungenermaßen feststellen, dass die Wirklichkeit nicht so ist, wie er sie sich im Voraus vorstellte, und dies wird hinterher als Enttäuschung bezeichnet (Enttäuschung des Egoismus oder der moralischen Erwartung). Natürlich kommt dies auf Beide an: Weder die Wirklichkeit ist so, wie meine Fantasie sie erwünscht hätte, und auch ich bin nicht mehr meiner Erlebnisse würdig, da ich sie in meiner Fantasie mehrheitlich schon aufgezehrt habe und folglich sie zu erleben nicht mehr hinlänglich empfindsam bin. Und an dieser Stelle müssen wir über die Beziehung zwischen der fantasierenden Seele und der sich anbietenden Wirklichkeit auch das noch festhalten, dass je mehr ich über meine kommenden Erlebnissefantasiert habe, umso weniger bin ich schließlich zum Genuss der Wirklichkeit befähigt, und zwar aus folgendem Grund nicht: – Denn wie ist meine Fantasie? Vor allem egoistisch und egozentrisch veranlagt. Demnach erwarte ich, dass die kommenden Dinge dann meiner Eigensucht vollkommen entsprechen, sie restlos befriedigen – und demgegenüber die Dinge schon deswegen nicht so sind, weil sie gar nicht so erschaffen sind und offenbar nicht mit dieser Bestimmung. Dazu pflegte ich zu sagen, dass das Kalb möglicherweise nicht mit der Bestimmung und nicht vor allem dazu erschaffen wurde, dass daraus Kalbfleisch und mein Geschmack vollkommen befriedigt wird, sondern in erster Linie vielleicht doch dafür, dass es selbst lebt. Demzufolge können die Dinge des Lebens den Menschen anscheinend

schon aus solchen Gründen nicht restlos befriedigen, selbst dann nicht, wenn er über sie nicht fantasiert hätte – irgendeine Unbefriedigung hinterlassen sie immer, welche Freude sie auch bereitet haben. Wäre es nicht so, müssten wir beispielsweise nicht so vielerlei essen – sagen wir so vielerlei Speisen versuchen, denn falls etwas vollkommene Befriedigung bereiten würde, dann könnten wir immer nur dasselbe essen. (Im uralten Mysterium des Brotes verbirgt sich auch möglicherweise etwas davon). – Und falls wir auch noch gut im Voraus über unsere kommenden Freuden fantasieren! – dann pflegt Derartiges meist so zu enden: „Das habe ich mir wohl nicht so vorgestellt.“ Damit wir bei diesem gewöhnlichen Beispiel verbleiben: Wir hätten gerne, wenn das Kalbfleisch aus lauter solchem bestünde, was wir mögen, obwohl es nicht ganz so ist, und es offenbar deswegen voll von Knorpeln und Sehnen ist, weil zwar nicht wir, aber das Kalb sehr wohl auch Sehnen benötigt.

Und auch die Welt braucht Regenwetter, wenn wir uns im Voraus Sonnenschein vorgestellt haben.

Aber auch unsere Angebetete hat dieses und jenes nötig, womit wir nicht gerechnet haben, beispielsweise Jodoform, weil sie Zahnschmerzen hat. Und sogar ihr Kleid riecht nach Jodoform und gerade dann, wenn wir ihr unsere Liebe gestehen wollen, wenn wir sie uns als vollkommen vorgestellt haben. Oder was nicht weniger jämmerlich ist, auch wir selber können Zahnweh bekommen in derartigen Momenten, wo wir am meisten darauf angewiesen wären, dass wir auch würdig dafür seien, worauf wir uns vorbereitet haben.

Aber warum erzählen wir all dies? Ausschließlich um darauf hinzuweisen, wie vielerlei Missgeschick den Menschen treffen kann in Dingen, welche er als Erfüllung seines individuellen Wohlergehens oder als Erfüllung seiner Sehnsüchte bezeichnet, und wie oft es auch unter diesen vorkommt, dass er gerade seiner Fantasien wegen leiden muss. Und es bedarf gar keiner Erwähnung, dass all dies in ihm zum Thema der Kunst, besser gesagt, zum Anreiz der Schöpfung werden kann. Also bereits auch die seinen Erlebnissen vorangehenden Fantasien, aber vielmehr noch sein Seelenzustand, wenn er mit ihnen unzufrieden ist, wenn er sie in seiner Vorstellung erneut durchlebt, und sie wenigstens so zu korrigieren, zu verschönern versucht.

Die Hoffnungslosigkeit der Erinnerungen ist fürchterlich – schrieb Ernő Osvát in seinen Aphorismen. Dies bedeutet nämlich so viel, dass man daran, was schon geschah, nie mehr etwas ändern kann. Dazu ist nicht einmal der Herrgott fähig, sagte Thomas von Aquin. Aber der Schriftsteller versucht es dennoch, zumindest auf dem Papier. Er beginnt darüber zu fantasieren, wie es gewesen wäre, wenn es möglich gewesen wäre – beobachten wir doch uns selbst, ist dies nicht so mit uns? Fantasieren wir nicht viel eher über jene unserer Erlebnisse, mit welchen wir unzufrieden sind, derentwegen wir dazu geneigt sind, uns unglücklich zu finden? Demgegenüber kommen unsere glücklicheren Erlebnisse, unsere so genannten

Befriedigungen, kaum noch in Erinnerung. Und dass dies so ist und daher der Kunst eher unser ursprüngliches Unglück, beispielsweise unsere Unbefriedigung, ihre Stimuli und ihren Stoff liefert – darin liegt das andere Element der melancholischen Eigenart der Künste verborgen.

Die Korrektur der unvollkommenen Erlebnisse

Der Künstler ist demnach bestrebt, in seinen Werken seine unvollkommenen Erlebnisse zu korrigieren – ist dies wirklich zutreffend? Wir müssen sagen, dass es so scheint, dass in der Tat auch dies in ihm wirkt, dass auch dies eines der Stimuli, Gründe beim Zustandekommen seiner Werke sein kann, aber ob ihm dies wirklich gelingt? Ob er wirklich bei seinen Erlebnissen verbleibt, ausharrt? – Genauer gesagt, beschreibt er derart korrigiert und verschönert schließlich trotzdem wirklich seine Erlebnisse? Wir beantworten diese Frage sogleich. Selbst wenn ihn so etwas anspornt – dies pflegt ihm nur recht selten zu gelingen. Und weswegen nur selten? Darüber wird in diesen Vorträgen größtenteils die Rede sein.

Die Aufopferung der Erlebnisse

Aber schicken wir so viel voraus: Beim echten Künstler, selbst wenn es sich so verhält in ihm und mit ihm, dass er seine Erlebnisse verschönern will – wird, sobald er an die Arbeit geht, über seinen Korrektur- oder Verschönerungswunsch schon nicht mehr die Erinnerung beherrschend bleiben, sondern die Kunst wird die Dominanz übernehmen. Er wird alsbald darauf verzichten – er korrigiert nicht seine Erinnerungen, sondern arbeitet so, dass er sie den Anforderungen seiner Kunst unterordnet, so dass sein Werk möglichst vollkommen sein soll, und das sind zwei verschiedene Dinge. Er macht alles der Kunst zuliebe und tut, was diese von ihm verlangt. Er hält vielleicht noch eine Zeit lang an seiner Absicht fest, neigt aber danach demütig seinen Kopf, und schreibt das, was ihm gelingt. Was gut wirkt, was schön ist – er schreibt also das und arbeitet so, wie es das Werk von ihm verlangt und nicht die Erinnerung – und diese zwei können gemäß unserer Erfahrung sozusagen niemals eine identische Anforderung repräsentieren. Und weswegen nicht? Schon daher nicht, weil die Proportionen und Elemente der Wirklichkeit ganz anders als diejenigen der Kunst sind, und er vor allem den imperativen Proportionen der Kunst zugetan ist, und ihr unterordnet er auch seine Vergangenheit.

Mit einem Wort: Er wird von der Traurigkeit seiner Vergangenheit getrieben, gehetzt, aber nur Gott weiß, wo er dann endet, in was für fremden Ländern und jubelnden Türmen!

Und erst dann jubelt er wirklich. Was so viel bedeutet, dass er vom Reiz der getreuen Darstellung des Vergangenen durchdrungen ist, getrieben wird und von der Fälschung beglückt. Und wahrscheinlich auch deshalb, weil er das, was er ganz selber herausfindet, noch mehr als schöpferische Arbeit empfindet.

Einer der größten Denker, Goethe, sagt, dass die schöpferische Emotion des Künstlers von den zwei Dingen: Drang nach Wahrheit und Lust am Trug charakterisiert ist. Und dies ist so viel, wie wenn wir sagen würden: Der Schriftsteller will eine Wahrheit zum Ausdruck bringen, welche ihm seine Freude an der Fälschung gestattet. Oder wir können es auch so sagen, dass er aus der Wirklichkeit nur so viel entnimmt, wie viel ihm die noch größere Anforderung der Schönheit ermöglicht...

Die Erlebnistreue der Dilettanten und Reporter

... Und gerade darin unterscheidet er sich sowohl vom Reporter als auch vom Dilettanten.

Der Dilettant schwelgt über seine eigenen Leiden oder Freuden – wenn er schreibt, fallen ihm die Tränen und das Werk geht an seiner Hand verloren, der Künstler hingegen, sobald der Strom in ihm zu fließen beginnt: Er will ausschließlich die Schönheit, er will mit seiner gesamten Kraft nur wirken. Dem opfert er sowohl seine Mutter wie auch seine Liebste, wenn der Stoff des Werkes es von ihm verlangt. Von dem Reporter braucht man gar nicht zu reden: Er ist nicht der Schönheit, sondern der größtmöglichen Treue verpflichtet. Aber reden wir noch vielleicht ein wenig mehr von der gleichen Sache: von der Sehnsucht und dem Reiz zur Korrektur der Erlebnisse, da dieses Thema nicht uninteressant ist.

L'Esprit d'escalier

Worauf sind wir also gekommen? Dass einer der wichtigsten Beweggründe der Kunst sowie einer der wichtigsten Gründe für ihre Entstehung wahrscheinlich der „esprit d'escalier“ ist – dass mir erst beim Weggehen auf der Treppe einfällt, was ich beispielsweise jemand hätte sagen müssen, und ich ihm leider nicht das gesagt habe. Ich möchte folglich meinen Fehler korrigieren, aber kann man das? Was soll ich tun? Soll ich zurücklaufen? Was vergangen ist, ist unwiederbringlich vorbei. (Facts are stubborn things – sagt der Engländer, also dass Tatsachen hartnäckige Dinge sind.) Ich schrieb einmal irgendwo, dass tragisch ist, was nicht wieder-

gutzumachen ist. Und wenn dies so wahr ist, dann versteckt sich in der Tiefe unseres gesamten Lebens unsere größte Tragik – nämlich, dass unser Leben schon infolge des kontinuierlichen Vorgangs der Vergänglichkeit eine tragische Note trägt. Keine einzige meiner Handlungen kann ich je wieder verändern, höchstens könnte ich ihre Wirkung mit irgendeiner neuen Handlung modifizieren. Und dies pflegt trotzdem nicht zu gelingen. Wer würde sich nicht an Tschechows Mann erinnern, welcher im Theater einen General anniest und ihn von da an mit seiner Entschuldigung zu verfolgen anfängt? – Was machen also die Menschen, wenn sie mit etwas Vergangenem unzufrieden sind? Offenbar kennt jeder jenen zwanghaft zu nennenden seelischen Vorgang, dass ich, wenn ich in etwas gefehlt habe, anfange es umzurühen, in mir zu modifizieren, unzählige Male in immer neuen Formen zu durchleben, als ob ich mit diesem Röhren es trotz allem irgendwie verändern könnte – also, wie wenn ich die unerbittliche Vergänglichkeit zum Erbarmen bewegen könnte. Und in der Seele verändert sich dadurch in der Tat etwas: Durch die ständige Wiederholung gewöhne ich mich an die Pein des Fehlers und dadurch erlange ich vielleicht Gleichgültigkeit ihr gegenüber. Es gibt aber solche, welche von den Mahrs ihrer Vergangenheit sich auch derart nicht befreien können, und offenbar sind es diese, welche von ihrer Natur her zu Konfessionen oder Beichte gezwungen werden. Was bedeutet nun etwas Derartiges? Sollen wir uns etwa auch damit etwas befassen? Ich habe das Gefühl, dass dies nötig ist, weil es zur eingehenderen Kenntnis der Beweggründe der Kunst gehört.

Jede Art von Beichten, Konfessionen ist Konfrontation, d. h. ich vergleiche meine Sicht oder mein Gewissen mit demjenigen eines Anderen – etwas Derartiges pflegt uns Menschen bekanntlich Beruhigung zu bringen. Und weshalb? – Vergessen wir nicht, unser Thema ist: Was pflegen die Menschen dann zu tun, wenn sie damit unzufrieden sind, was vergangen ist? Und wir sagten dazu, dass sie versuchen, es in sich immer wieder erneut durchzuleben, quasi in der Hoffnung, dass sie damit dennoch verändern können, was unveränderlich ist – und aufgrund unserer Erfahrungen ist gerade eine der wirksamsten Arten und Mittel dieses Durchlebens, wenn sie jemandem erzählen, was sie bedrückt. Und jetzt müsste man ein wenig untersuchen, welches Geheimnis darin verborgen liegt, weswegen uns die Konfrontation dennoch besser beruhigen kann? Der Hauptgrund dieses Phänomens ist wahrscheinlich im Folgenden zu suchen:

Die Beichte. Die Kraft der Tatsachen

Wir müssen dies mit jener aus der positivistischen Philosophie stammenden und unwiderlegbar erscheinenden Feststellung beginnen, dass die Tatsachen der Außenwelt auf uns anscheinend unvergleichlich größere Wirkung zu haben pflegen als jene, welche sich in unserer Seele oder Fantasie ereignen. Welche

Ausnahmen sich davon zeigen, beispielsweise wie sehr die Wunschträume, aber auch die Angstvorstellungen gegenüber jeder Empfindung und Wahrnehmung der Wirklichkeit Überhand nehmen können – dies könnte wiederum das Thema eines eigenen Kapitels sein. Das generelle Muster darin ist, dass die Tatsachen der Außenwelt in der Regel stärker wirken als die Fantasien und noch stärker die Handlungen. Alte Lehrer sind sich beispielsweise dessen bewusst, dass leider, aber sehr wohl auch die kleinste und am wenigsten schmerzliche körperliche Strafe infolge ihrer außerordentlich positiven Natur größtenteils wirksamer ist als jede Schelte. Mit einem Wort: Die Handlung und die Tatsachen übertreffen infolge ihrer positiven Macht in der Regel in ihrer Wirkung diejenigen der Fantasie. Ich bemühe mich darum, diese These jetzt mit einigen Worten annehmbar zu machen. Ich pflegte darüber zu sagen, dass ich inmitten meiner Träumereien alle beliebig fürchterlichen Taten, sogar auch Mord, begehen kann, und zwar mit derart heißem Erleben, dass ich sogar das Blut auf dem Boden zu sehen wähne – und danach gehe ich am Morgen zur Arbeit, und es fehlt mir nichts. Es hat in mir keine Spuren hinterlassen. Sollte ich hingegen in böser Absicht jemand bloß am Arm ankratzen, so könnte es sein, dass ich mein Leben lang von der schlechten Erinnerung nicht loskomme. Nun aber gilt dies auch umgekehrt: Irgendetwas plagt sehr in Gedanken – also mache ich es zur Tatsache der Außenwelt, d. h. ich verleihe ihm eine Stimme, nämlich meine eigene – aber ich unterbreite meine Sache auch noch der Kontrolle eines anderen Auges, Gewissens oder Urteils, und damit mache ich es auch vor mir selbst zur unbestreitbaren Tatsache – all dies offenbar in der Hoffnung, dass diese Tatsache mit ihrer intensiveren Kraft auf mich zurückwirken wird... – also erwarte ich zweifelsohne irgendwelchen Trost von dieser Konfrontation. Ich erwarte davon eine größere Wirkung, als von meinem Inneren, und in diesem Fall zu meinen Gunsten. Beispielsweise: Es wird sich vielleicht herausstellen, dass unter den tausenderlei verschiedenen Erscheinungen dieser großen Welt (sagen wir so: im Lichte der Sonne) dies eine viel unbedeutendere Sache ist im Vergleich dazu, wie sie in der Dunkelheit meiner Seele und in meiner Einsamkeit groß gewachsen ist. Da das, was in mir steckt, eigentlich auch formlos ist im Vergleich zu seinem späteren Stadium, wenn es auf dem Wege der ausgesprochenen Worte schon Form angenommen hat und auch vor mir selbst zur außenweltlichen, wahrnehmbaren Tatsache geworden ist.

Aber ich kann ja zu den Dingen meiner Fantasie auch keine Distanz haben, solche vermag ihnen nur der Zeitverlauf zu verleihen, oder ihre Projektion – und vielleicht werde ich darüber lachen, was mich einst geplagt hat. Wer hätte bei sich so etwas noch nicht erfahren? Da die Grübelei in vieler Hinsicht mit mikroskopischen Untersuchungen vergleichbar ist – und die Permanenz der mikroskopischen Nähe bei der Beurteilung einer Sache nie vorteilhaft ist –, möchte ich es also auch aus der Distanz sehen, da ich vielleicht gerade so mehr darüber erfahren kann. Und dies umso mehr, weil man sich beispielsweise über die Gestalt

einer größeren Sache auf mikroskopischem Wege gar nicht überzeugen kann. Mit einem Wort: Der Mensch kann etwas zur äußeren Tatsache umwandeln, was sich in seiner Seele unsicher, ungeordnet, formlos und unverständlich ballt, wobei gemäß deren ursprünglicher Natur und Gewohnheit allerlei kreuz und quer herumliegt und herumgeworfen wird: Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, Fantasie und Wirklichkeit, Perspektiven und mikroskopisch benennbare, allzu große Nähen. Er mag es, wenn daraus endlich etwas für die *außenweltliche Vernehmung wahrnehmbar* wird, d. h. bestimmtere Form annimmt. Denn lassen Sie mich wiederholen: Nichts von all dem, was der Mensch denkt und seelisch empfindet, gelangt zu ihm über seine Sinnesorgane. Mit anderen Worten, sind es nicht meine Sinnesorgane, welche meine Gefühle und Gedanken erfassen, und manchmal ist es für mich besser, wenn sie aus der Außenwelt in fester Gestalt zu mir gelangen. Und dafür genügt manchmal ein Augenblick: Ein Mensch fängt auf einer Treppe laut für sich zu reden an – ein anderer sagt: – Ich blicke einen Augenblick lang in den Spiegel, und damit werde ich schon für mich selbst besser zur Tatsache und werde auch davon besser überzeugt, dass ich lebe. – Der Dritte äußert sich so: – Ich spreche gerne aus, dass „ich dich liebe“, weil ich mich dann besser fühle. – Wieder andere sind dazu gezwungen, ständig zu reden, ihre Stimme zu hören und hören zu lassen – auch diese werden vornehmlich von der Angst vor ihrer inneren Unsicherheit getrieben (die deutsche Terminologie bezeichnet dies als Funktionssucht).

Mit einem Wort: Ich sehe die Angelegenheit meiner Seele gestaltet und aktiver vor mir – und so etwas pflegt zu beruhigen und mich sogar etwas zu verändern. Da das, was ich so von mir sehe, auf mich zurückwirkt. Folglich, sobald ich meine Not erzählt habe, ist sie nicht mehr die gleiche Not.

Und wenn ich sie dazu auch noch in mein Tagebuch niederschreibe, oder noch besser formuliere und meine Prozesse mit meinem Leben vor das Auge der großen Welt lasse!

Wie weit sind wir also gekommen? Wir haben jene Frage aufgeworfen, woher die Kunst im Menschen stammt. Und wir sagten darüber, dass der Mensch sich seine Erlebnisse im Voraus vorstellt und dies ihn auch inspiriert und er sie danach nachträglich korrigieren will. Beim Entstehen seiner Kunst wirkt offenbar auch dies mit, umso mehr, als wenn etwas aus dem unwahrnehmbaren Inhalt seiner Seele wahrnehmbare Gestalt annimmt und dadurch für ihn zur Außenwelt wird, dies auf ihn beruhigend zu wirken pflegt.

Die Kunst ist grenzenlose Korrektur

Und jetzt noch etwas darüber, also über die Korrekturen der unbefriedigend durchlebten Episoden unseres Lebens. Das Leben hängt oft von je einem Moment

ab, wir wissen – wenn ich nicht im geeigneten Augenblick meine Liebe gestehe, bin ich anderntags damit vielleicht schon verspätet. Eine Ohrfeige bedarf der Spontaneität – die hinterher verabreichten Ohrfeigen, die inaktuellen, nicht akuten, folglich künstlich heraufbeschworenen Ausbrüche der Emotionen geben ihren Handelnden gewöhnlich der Lächerlichkeit Preis. Das Papier ist aber, wie wir wissen, nicht so. Ich habe jemandem nicht richtig geantwortet – ich korrigiere es auf dem Papier. Und ist dies auch noch nicht gut genug?

Ich korrigiere es noch einmal, denn das Papier ist geduldig – zum Schreiben braucht man keine Geistesgegenwart, weil es selbst die Korrekturen der Korrekturen erträgt.

Denen, welche dazu veranlagt sind, sich überall und jederzeit zu verspäten, scheint die Kunst des Schreibens sehr gut zu entsprechen und eher den Entbehrenden als den Erfüllten und Satten, da die Sehnsucht wahrlich ein besserer Maler ist als die Sättigung.

„Die Kunst ist l'esprit d'escalier“ – sagte ebenfalls Ernő Osvát.

Die Kunst gehört den Geschädigten

Es scheint, als ob auch die Geschichte darauf hinweisen würde, dass Gott eher den Geschädigten den Dichterkranz verleiht: Wir wissen, dass die Barden und wandernden Spielleute, Sänger arme Menschen waren. Von Homer ist überliefert, dass er blind war, Milton ebenfalls, Byron an den Füßen verkrüppelt, Leopardi bucklig, Dostojewski epileptisch, Blake, Hölderlin und wahrscheinlich auch Gogol monomanisch und die Übrigen größtenteils arm – im Wohlstand lebende Herren finde ich kaum einige unter ihnen. Es scheint demnach, dass die Dichter überwiegend geschädigte Seelen waren: für den Genuss des wahren Lebens so oder anders unfähig. Sie sind par excellence jene, welche sich mit ihren Fantasien für all ihre Verluste entschädigen wollen. In dieser Hinsicht bin ich also vollkommen einig mit einem Schriftsteller dieser Generation, wenn er sagt: „Das Schicksal eines Menschen kann man bedauern, dasjenige eines Künstlers hingegen nie.“ Was so viel bedeutet, dass aus seinen Leiden tatsächlich Perlen entstehen, da die Leiden es sind, welche seine Fantasie am besten anregen. Am seltensten die Glückseligkeit und am öftesten das Leiden.

Die Welt, nicht wahr, ist geschäftig, will nicht auf unsere Klagen hören – wir sind also schlau: Wir bezaubern sie mit deren eigener Schönheit, damit sie bereit wird, uns ihr Ohr zu leihen.

So vielerlei aus der Melancholie stammende Elemente wohnen der Kunst inne. Und doch – und das ist das Seltsamste! – zur Schöpfung bedarf es vor allem der guten Laune, was – hoffe ich – auch Sie bald einsehen werden.

Und offenbar ist dieser melancholische Ursprung zwar nicht der einzige, aber einer der Gründe dessen, dass der Stoff der Poesie viel eher aus Tragik besteht und wir daher nur so wenige Werke über das Glück besitzen.

Aber auch ansonsten: – Weshalb lieben wir die Traurigkeit, die Rührung und unsere Tränen? – fragt der heilige Augustinus, was natürlich nicht so zu verstehen ist, dass man die Dichter foltern oder hungern lassen müsste, damit sie schöpfen. Die Dichter muss man unterstützen: Dies ist das Wort der Güte und ihre Forderung in uns. Aber was tut dann ihrer dichterischen Kraft wohl? Wenn Shakespeare keine so bittere Seele gewesen wäre – diese süßeste Seele der Welt! – dann wäre weder Hamlet noch König Lear, noch Othello, noch Macbeth je entstanden...

Der Künstler und die Entbehrung

Und abschließend noch so viel hierüber: Manchen Polemikern pflegte ich zu sagen: „Gebt ihnen genug Brot, in Ordnung, gebt unbedingt, denn sie sind darauf angewiesen, verdienen es auch, aber erwartet nicht, dass ihre künstlerische Produktion im Verhältnis zu mehr Brot zunehmen wird.“ Vielleicht wird sie bei diesem und jenem auch zunehmen, aber nicht zwangsläufig. Der Vorgang ist hier nämlich nicht derselbe, wie wenn die Kuh mit mehr Futter mehr Milch liefert.

Wiederholen wir also das zuletzt Gesagte.

Kurz und gut, ja, es scheint, dass die Kunst mehrheitlich Sache der Unglücklichen ist, von jenen Notleidenden, denen Mutter Natur zum Leiden auch noch eine flammende Fantasie bescherte, von den Empfindsamen, sich Zurückziehenden... sowie denen, welche sich zu den schönen Momenten ihres Lebens immer verspätet haben... deren Seele in der Gegenwart nicht präsent ist, entweder weil sie vom Gewicht des vorherigen Moments zurückgezogen werden und daher für ihre Gegenwart zu wenig Aufmerksamkeit übrig haben, oder sie haben zu wenig Geistesgegenwart, weil sie nicht wissen, was sie von ihren tausendfachen verschiedenen Eindrücken, vom Getümmel des Lebens für sich auswählen sollten – von den Irren, ja, es scheint wahrlich, von ihnen, welche jederzeit auf jene Zeitlosigkeit angewiesen sind, welche nicht das Leben, sondern allein die Kunst ihnen bieten kann, und die zeitlosen Nächte der Schreibtische, welche ihnen unübersehbare Möglichkeiten zu Korrekturen bieten, also dazu, dass sie mit ihrer Fantasie ihr Leben zu korrigieren, d. h. zu verschönern versuchen.

Siehe da, also – es könnte sein, dass auch dies einer der Beweggründe der Kunst in uns ist, weshalb wir das Fabulieren anfangen.

Kunst und Vergänglichkeit

Und jetzt müssen wir hier über noch einen wahrscheinlichen Beweggrund reden. So wie unser ganzes Leben auf dem allermächtigsten Prinzip des kontinuierlichen Entstehens und Vergehens beruht, ebenso können wir auch getrost feststellen, dass es in uns keine größere Kraft gibt als die, welche zum Kampf und Protest gegen die Vergänglichkeit anspornt. Wogegen kämpfe ich nämlich, wenn ich Hunger habe oder schlaftrig, krank, traurig oder müde bin? Ist es etwa nicht so, dass all dies die Drohung des Todes in mir ist? – Es bedarf gar nicht der Erwähnung, dass wenn ich nicht esse, nicht schlafe, mich nicht ausruhe, dann sterbe ich, und dass ich dagegen kämpfe, dass dies mein Leben ausmacht, da auch alle meine Freuden damit zusammenhängen. Es scheint also, dass eigentlich mein ganzes Leben auf diesem tödlichen Prinzip beruht – wer unsterblich ist, kann nicht hungrig sein, folglich sich auch nicht satt essen, kann auch nicht müde sein, also auch am Ausruhen keine Freude finden, da für ihn eine solche Bedrohung nicht existiert. Und dasselbe gilt auch in Sachen der Schönheit. Wie kann jemandem, der nie stirbt, der Mond gefallen? – oder den griechischen Göttern das Meer, wenn sie es zum hunderttausendsten Mal sehen oder es ewig sehen können? Weil es sich mit der Schönheit auch so verhält wie mit allen anderen Sachen, dass die Seele davon gesättigt werden kann, und dann ist für uns die gleiche Sache schon gar nicht mehr schön. Offenbar ist dies auch einer der Gründe, weshalb wir die Schönheit als etwas Ephemeris bezeichnen, wofür es noch zahlreiche weitere Gründe gibt, welche später an den passenden Stellen noch ausführlich erörtert werden. Was ich jetzt darüber sagen will, ist nur so viel, dass all das, was der Mensch schön und gut nennt, lediglich für vergängliche Wesen vorstellbar ist.

Und wir sterbliche Menschen – obwohl wir gerade dank unserer Vergänglichkeit an einem so großen Geschenk teilhaben, am Leiden und Guten, die sich daraus ergeben – beklagen, dass unser Leben vergeht und darin alles nicht wieder-gutmachbar, folglich auch das zur tragischen Vergangenheit wird, was darin schön und gut war. Was bedeutet aber, dass es zur Vergangenheit wird? Wo ist meine Vergangenheit? Wo ist mein gestriger Tag?

Vergangenheit und Zukunft: Lauter Irrationalitäten

... Nirgends auf der Welt, ausschließlich in meiner Erinnerung. Einige Zeichen davon blieben zwar auch in der Außenwelt erhalten, z. B. dass ich Dieses oder Jenes dahin oder dorthin legte – aber wo finde ich den gestrigen Tag?

Wie ersichtlich, wird er sofort auch zur Irrealität, sobald er zu meiner Vergangenheit wurde, umso mehr als die Erinnerung nichts anderes ist als rekonstruierende Fantasie, und diese meine Fantasie daran auch sofort ändert. Und wo

ist meine Zukunft? Wo finde ich sie unter der Sonne, wenn ich sie sehen möchte? Nirgends auf der Welt – höchstens ebenfalls in meiner Fantasie. Was habe ich demnach als Mensch, was ist mein Besitz? Jeder meiner Augenblicke wird sofort zur Vergangenheit, meine Zukunft ebenfalls, und ist es nicht so, dass ich diesen meinen Augenblick als meine Gegenwart bezeichne? Diese scharfe Grenze? Anscheinend ja, so viel ist meine Gegenwart, nicht mehr – vielleicht die philosophische Sekunde der Kenntnisnahme. Ich habe also gar nichts anderes als den Moment, wenn meine noch nicht existierende Zukunft an irgendeiner Grenze zu meiner nicht mehr existierenden Vergangenheit wird. Es mag sein, dass jene Recht haben, welche in den fundamentalen Prinzipien unseres Lebens eine mit dem Verstand nicht begreifbare Irrationalität vermuten.

Die Illusion der Beständigkeit

Und doch: Wir sind auch von der Illusion der Beständigkeit nicht frei. Wir errichten Häuser, erstellen Statuen, welche diesem Gesetz zwar ebenfalls untergeordnet sind, bloß dass es an ihnen weniger ersichtlich ist als beispielsweise an der Erscheinung, auf jenem Gesicht, welches soeben ihr wunderbares Lächeln auf mich zusandte und sogleich im Gedränge verschwand. Eine Statue erscheint im nächsten Augenblick unveränderter als ein Lichtblitz, als das Gewimmel der Stimmen und Lichter um mich herum, als der Zufall der Erscheinungen – die Erde, auf welcher ich gehe, erscheint auch jetzt gleich wie sie vorher war – ich lebe also in jener Illusion, dass vielleicht auch irgendwelche Beständigkeit existiert. Dazu trägt auch bei, dass beispielsweise dieser eine Tag selbst und auch die übrigen Tage, in welche die Natur meine Zeit einteilte, ebenfalls als dauerhafte Einheiten auf mich wirken und gleichermaßen diese Sinnestäuschung in mir steigern...

Erinnerung und Beständigkeit

... Darüber hinaus auch noch mein Gedächtnis, da darin weiter rumort, was mit mir geschah. Also sind in uns die Voraussetzungen dafür gegeben, dass sich die Sehnsucht der Verewigung entwickeln konnte als unser höchster Protest gegen die Vergänglichkeit. Sagen wir es noch einmal: – Ich will es nicht vergessen, will es aufzeichnen, wie schön du gewesen bist dann und dann – diesen Sonnenuntergang, dieses Lächeln, diesen Blumenstrauß, welcher bis morgen verwelkt – die verführerische Anmut des Klatschmohns oder das flammende Strahlen der Schwertlilien und tausenderlei traurige Schönheiten dieser Welt, welche deswegen so traurig sind, weil sie versinken – wer hätte nicht schon so etwas Ähn-

liches verspürt, es sei denn, dass er sich damit tröstete, dass er sich ohne Seufzer und vollkommen identifizieren kann mit dem, was ist, folglich auch mit der Vergänglichkeit.

Protest gegen die Vergänglichkeit

Der Mensch will nicht, dass es ins Nichts versinkt, er will das festhalten, was verging – es scheint, dass auch dies eine der höchsten Antriebskräfte der Kunst ist, d. h. jene Bewusstheit, dass alles vergehen muss, also nicht nur wir. Die äußerste Summe aller unserer Überlegungen könnte also so lauten, dass das schönste und edelste Ergebnis unseres Protestes gegen die Vergänglichkeit in uns gerade die Kunst ist.

Und offenbar stammt von daher auch die alte divinatorische Auffassung über sie, welche die Künstler mit den Göttern vergleicht, weil sie die vergänglichen Schönheiten in ihren Werken zur Unvergänglichkeit verzaubern können.

Hier wird vielleicht nicht uninteressant, wenn wir für einen Augenblick auf eine der die göttliche Macht bestimmenden logischen Ableitungen von Thomas von Aquin eingehen, worin er Folgendes über die Vergänglichkeit aussagt: „Sogar Gott kann nicht bewirken, dass das, was verging, niemals existent gewesen sein soll.“

Dieser Satz kann offenbar auch so verstanden werden, dass nicht einmal Gott die Vergangenheiten ändern kann, dass folglich das, was vorbei ist, sogar für ihn endgültig vergangen ist, und das, was verwelkt ist, für alle Ewigkeit verwelkt ist. Und offensichtlich hat auch der heilige Thomas selbst eine derartige Interpretation seiner These erwünscht und für richtig gehalten, wie dies aus der Anwendung der These andernorts hervorgeht. Und dennoch, ich spüre, dass wir auch zu noch einer Interpretation berechtigt sind, und zwar dazu, dass entgegen jeder derartigen und damit verwandten Auffassung, wonach das, was vergangen ist, durch sein Vergehen vom Standpunkt seiner eigenen Subjektivität auf jeden Fall durch den spürbaren Ablauf seiner Auswirkungen auch objektiv wohl als niemals existent gewesen betrachtet werden kann. Demgegenüber können wir die thomistische Definition derart erweitern, dass: Selbst Gott nicht bewirken kann, dass das, was vergangen ist, niemals existent gewesen sein soll, und wenn er dies nicht kann, dann existiert das Vergangene zumindest in einem gewissen Maß. Denn wenn er nicht bewirken kann, dass es nicht existent gewesen sein soll, bedeutet dies so viel, dass es für ihn nicht möglich ist, es *vollständig* aufzuheben, und wenn ihm dies nicht möglich ist, dann besteht es, für die Ewigkeit noch mehr als für uns, die wir Geschöpfe des Anscheins der Vergänglichkeit sind. Es ist also annehmbar, dass für die Ewigkeit die Vergangenheit gar nicht existiert (da sie auch keine Zeit hat – was der heilige Augustinus so ausdrückt: „Gott lebt in der Ewigkeit“ – und

wiederum er: – „Zeit gibt es nur dort, wo es Veränderung gibt, und da Gott unveränderlich ist, gibt es für ihn keine Zeit“). – Demnach kann Gott daran, was vergangen ist, auch schon deswegen nichts ändern, weil es für ihn konstante Gegenwart ist. In einer solchen Interpretation könnte also der thomistische Satz auch derart ergänzt werden: Gott kann nicht bewirken, dass die vergangene Sachen niemals existent gewesen sein sollen, da sie für seine Unvergänglichkeit auch jederzeit gegenwärtig sind. Natürlich ist unser ganzes Leben und die ganze irdische Existenz nicht derartig, denn so weit sie wahrnehmbar ist, zeigt sie in jeder Hinsicht die Vergänglichkeit als höchstes Prinzip. Welche fundamentale Macht dieses Prinzip des Unterganges, der Zerstörung hier ist, braucht man vielleicht gar nicht zu erklären, so sehr, dass wir geneigt sind, die Natur als Feind des Lebens zu betrachten. Ist es denn nicht etwa die ewige Klage der Mütter, wie beschwerlich es für sie ist, ein Kind auszutragen, groß zu füttern, zu erziehen und wie leicht demgegenüber dessen Untergang ist? Was nichts anderes bedeutet, als dass die Entstehung des Lebens auch als behindert angesehen werden kann, da sie wahrlich nur um den Preis von wie großen Hindernissen entstehen kann! – denn was für eine komplizierte Struktur macht sogar die Aufnahme und Wahrnehmung des evident erscheinenden Lichtes im Nervensystem erforderlich! – und auf was für eine ständige und mühselige Ernährung ist der Organismus der Lebewesen unter allen Umständen angewiesen, um erhalten zu bleiben! – denn ist es nicht so, dass wenn er die lebenserhaltende Luft bloß wenige Minuten lang entbehren muss, er schon vergeht, an sein Ende gelangt? – und all dem gegenüber: Welch ungehindertes und leichtes Handwerk sind der Tod und die Zerstörung? Einfacher ausgedrückt: Erschaffen ist schwer, zerstören ist leicht – entspricht das etwa nicht der hiesigen Erfahrung?

Ist es beispielsweise nicht die Beschwerde der Hausbauer, dass während sie ihr Haus errichten, es bereits schon zu verfallen beginnt? Und ist nicht etwa auch die Frage berechtigt, ob wohl auch eine solche Bombe existiert, welche mit einer einzigen Explosion ein Haus ebenso errichten kann, wie sie dazu fähig ist, es zu zerstören? Und ist nicht etwa seit Urzeiten unsere Erfahrung die ewige Quelle unserer Befürchtungen, dass alles, was existiert, für seine Existenz Opfer zu bringen hat – die Bäume ihre Äste, Blüten und so viele Früchte und die Tiere und Menschen ebenso ihren Nachwuchs und ihre körperliche und seelische Unverehrtheit? Ist es nicht vorstellbar, dass gerade aus dieser Befürchtung das System der die Gottheit versöhnenden freiwilligen Opfer entstand, sowie ebenso die vielerlei Machenschaften all der Sekten der Teufel-Anbeter? Mit einem Wort: Wir müssen auf jeden Fall bejahen, dass die Vergänglichkeit das Leitmotiv unseres Lebens auf dieser Erde zu sein scheint – wenn auch vielleicht nicht vollständig und nicht in allem. Da sich hier zweifelsohne auch irgendein Rätsel des entgegengesetzten Prinzips zeigt, zumindest in jener Wahrnehmung, welcher schon zahlreiche Denker Ausdruck verliehen haben und die von Nietzsche so

formuliert wurde: „die ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen“ – also, dass obwohl die Dinge für uns wahrlich und auf jeden Fall als vergänglich erscheinen, sie doch, und zwar nicht einmal in ihrer Ähnlichkeit, sondern sogar anscheinend in ihrer Identität zurückkehren. – Was nicht weniger bedeuten würde, als dass sogar auch dieses Prinzip der Vergänglichkeit immer wieder durchbrochen und durchdrungen wird von den Prinzipien jenes anderen Systems und vielleicht positiverer Wirklichkeit, von welcher es entstammte. (Was in der emphatischeren Formulierung von Augustinus so lautet: „Unsere Tage und unsere Zeit bewegen sich entlang der ewigen Gegenwart Gottes fort.“)

Mit einem Wort: Das menschliche Wesen ist entweder das Geschöpf der tatsächlichen Vergänglichkeit oder von deren Anschein, und ob wir es so oder anders betrachten, so viel ist zweifelsfrei, dass die Ansprüche seiner Seele größer sind als das, was ihm sein hinfälliger Körper bieten kann, dass sie nicht im Gleichschritt mit seinem Körper altert, sich mit ihrer ganzen Kraft gegen das Vergehen stemmt, und damit ihre Momente nicht in Vergessenheit geraten, sie zumindest zu ihrer Geschichte macht. Und offenbar wirkt dasselbe auch anspornend auf den Künstler – darüber hinaus können wir getrost auch noch feststellen, dass er all dies gar nicht benötigt um zu schaffen...

Die ursprüngliche Notwendigkeit der Mitteilung

... da es so sein könnte, dass unsererseits all dies nur trügerisches Rationalisieren ist. Weil darüber hinaus vermutlich auch wahr ist, dass wenn ihn auch all dies nicht anspornen würde, wir uns seine Fabeln ebenso gut vorstellen könnten wie seine Statuen oder seinen melancholischen Gesang... In meiner Jugend habe ich mir hierzu notiert: Siehe, warum singt eigentlich die Drossel? Unterhält sie damit vielleicht ihren Partner? Es kann sein, dass sie weiland tatsächlich aus diesem Grund damit anfing, aber dass sich danach der Gesang in ihr entartete, zum Selbstzweck wurde, und sie jetzt bereits auch schon in ihrer Einsamkeit singt – da ihr diese Fähigkeit schon gegeben ist. Und siehe, auch das gewöhnliche Volk, die Spatzen, tun das ihre – was für ein Stimmengewirr herrscht manchmal auf den Plätzen in den Baumkronen – obwohl es kaum vorstellbar ist, dass sie sich gegenseitig verstehen können bei diesem Lärm? Und was veranlasst die Frösche am Seeufer dazu, dass sie mit ihrer Stimme den weiten Raum füllen? Was spornt die Wesen dazu an, in diesem unendlichen Raum Zusammenhang zu suchen mit den übrigen Existierenden und mit ihren Farben, Glanz oder zumindest mit ihren Stimmen die weite Welt auszufüllen?

Wozu dient wohl dieses unendliche Stimmengewirr der Kommunikationen? Wenn wir Ärger haben, weshalb müssen wir es erzählen, und auch wenn wir über etwas erfreut sind? Warum bringt es Erleichterung, aber warum empfinden wir es

zugleich als unsere Genugtuung für unser verpasstes und entflohendes Leben? – Weil wir es so empfinden, und es wohl möglich ist, dass all dies wirklich dabei mitwirkt, aber auch das erscheint zweifelsfrei, dass in uns ein ursprüngliches Kommunikationsbedürfnis gegeben ist, dass dies zu unseren Lebensäußerungen gehört.

Die Freude der Funktion

Darüber habe ich unlängst noch etwas notiert und erzähle dies jetzt auch noch zum Abschluss: Dass jene dürftige Ranke, welche ihre mächtige Frucht, die Melone, mit lauter Zucker und duftenden Säften füllt, es zum Glück nicht weiß, dass sie all dies für andere macht – aber selbst wenn sie es wüsste, was könnte sie sonst tun? Wenn jede ihrer Zellen, ihr ganzes Wesen so erschaffen, eingerichtet sind, dies zu tun, dass sie ihre gesamte existierende Kraft in Richtung ihrer Frucht transportiert, nicht zurück für sich selbst, sondern dorthin. Da wenn sie rückwärts zu befördern hätte, sie darüber wahrscheinlich unglücklich wäre. So wie auch die Mütter unglücklich sind, wenn sie ihre Kinder nicht stillen können. So etwas nennt sich die Freude der Funktion.

Eitelkeit

Die Freude der Funktion macht also auch den Großteil der Emotionen der schöpfenden Künstler aus. Des Weiteren: Vergessen wir nicht, dass das menschliche Wesen auch eitel ist. Und ist dies wirklich seine minderwertige Eigenschaft oder muss man es in jeder Hinsicht dafür halten? – Müsste man nicht vorerst in Betracht ziehen, worauf jemand eitel ist? Man müsste ja vielleicht gar nicht sagen, dass so wie unserer Eigennutz auch dieser weitverzweigte Baum, unsere Eitelkeit, höher und tiefer liegende Zweige hat. Falls jemandes Eigennutz auch in der Freude Anderer Befriedigung findet, oder wenn jemand die höchste Erfüllung seiner Eitelkeit, seiner Ehrgeize – sagen wir – in der Reinheit seines Gewissens oder Schönheit seiner Kunst sucht, ist dieser Eigennutz und diese Eitelkeit freilich anders zu beurteilen als die gewohnten und minderwertigeren oder weniger entwickelten Manifestationen derselben Emotionen, an denen wir so reichlich teilhaben und unter welchen wir so viel leiden.

– Hier kann jedoch auch noch jene Frage auftauchen, ob eine menschliche Handlung, in welcher die Selbstsucht oder Eitelkeit gar keinen Platz haben, und sei ihre Absicht noch so altruistisch, überhaupt etwas Wert ist. – Hat sie dann Lebensfülle, Leuchtkraft? Und sind wir nicht eher beglückt, wenn, sagen wir, unserem Wohltäter aus irgendeinem Grund, gar wegen seiner Eitelkeit, seine Güte

auch Freude bereitet? Können wir etwas, das ausschließlich nur Opfer ist, von jemandem überhaupt annehmen? – ist dies nicht dermaßen verpflichtend, dass es in uns eher Widerspruch als Dankbarkeit auslöst? Ist demnach für uns des Menschen Behagen nicht auch darin besser als sein etwaiges lustloses Wohlwollen? Und schließlich: Der Mensch ist ein eitles Wesen, wahrlich, bereits in seiner Wiege und auch noch auf seinem Totenbett. Wenn wir aber bedenken, wozu ihn diese Neigung anspornt? Er möchte dadurch zumindest schöner und besser scheinen. Und kann man diesen Eifer als so unbedeutend bezeichnen?

Kurz und gut, scheint es, dass auch dies sowohl sein Segen wie auch Fluch ist, wie überhaupt alles, was ihm gegeben wurde. Denn ist es nicht wunderbar, wie gern diese gesamte große Menschheit, wahrhaftig und der Ranke der Melone gleich, dazu bereit ist, ihr gesamtes Wissen und Fähigkeiten, das Beste ihres Wesens, zu verströmen? Sie ist zu den allergrößten Anstrengungen fähig, sozusagen wirklich gratis, weil größtenteils nur dafür, dass sie dafür an Beifall, Lob oder sogar nur einen Kopfnicken, an diesen flüchtigen Belohnungen, teilhat. Dennoch, ist es nicht wundersam, dass dies so ist? So dass man sich fragt, ob nicht so etwas diese ganze große Welt und alle ihre Säulen errichtet? Und wenn dies so wahr ist, könnte dieser Gedanke nicht dennoch unseren alten Pessimismus, zu dem wir bei der Beurteilung des menschlichen Wesens manchmal so sehr geneigt sind, beeinflussen? Und schließlich: Wird nicht gerade der Künstler am ehesten durch seine Eitelkeit unter seinen Mitmenschen charakterisiert – und ist er nicht zugleich unter ihnen das hauptsächlichste Opfer seiner Eitelkeit? Da sich über ihn wirklich sagen lässt, dass er gratis singt, weil sobald er das, was er zustande brachte, in die Welt hinausschickt, was ist das dann noch für ihn? Nur noch Anderen bereitet es Freude. Wahrlich, wie gewisse Ranken, vergibt auch er umsonst seine mit Zucker und duftenden Säften volle Frucht... – Leo Tolstoi bezeichnete sie als giftige Frucht.

Tolstoi: Die Kunst ist eine giftige Frucht

Er sagt, dass die Kunst eine unmoralische Sache sei, weil sie vergeblich verführt, erregt und anlockt. Dass sie als Aufputschmittel wirkt: Sie erweckt dann Hunger und Liebessehnsucht, wenn danach kein Bedarf besteht, verleiht also den überflüssigen Sehnsüchten, der Unsittlichkeit und der Lüsternheit Nahrung.

Und tatsächlich hat er in alldem Recht. Sind wir aber nicht auch mit unserer Fantasie so? Hat nicht auch sie Segen und Fluch in uns? Ist sie nicht zugleich unser größter Schatz und unser Elend?

So auch die Kunst. Wie wir sie auch immer charakterisieren würden, dass sie vor allem ein Kind der Fantasie ist, das kann niemand leugnen. Es schwebt demnach auch über ihr der Segen und der Fluch der Fantasie.

Die Fantasie hat ihre Künste zustande gebracht – und ihre Künste spornen ihre Fantasie an, gewiss, so ist es wahr. Aber was soll der Mensch tun? Soll er seine Fantasie beenden? Wie könnte er sie aus sich vertilgen? Und wenn er dies tun könnte, was wäre dann ohne sie die gesamte Menschheit noch wert? Und wenn er schon Fantasie hat, zu was Schönerem und Größerem könnte er sie gebrauchen, als dass sie damit die Kunst zustande brächte?

Bis zu welchem Maße die Kunst ein Kind unserer Fantasie ist, darüber werden wir in den folgenden Vorträgen reden. Das heißt: Alle unsere weiteren Vorträge werden auf jene gräzistische Frage Antwort suchen, wie die Kunst ist. Und als Detaillierung dieses großen Themas wird der Titel unseres nächsten Vortrages so lauten: Der Zusammenhang des Werkes mit dem Erlebnis.

IMAGES OF THE FRIENDSHIP WITH BARTÓK: FROM BÉLA BALÁZS'S RECOLLECTIONS

YOSHIKO OKAMOTO

The University of Tokyo, Tokyo
Japan
E-mail: okamotosy@gmail.com

Béla Balázs, the librettist of Béla Bartók's *Bluebeard's Castle* and *Wooden Prince*, wrote many remarks about Bartók in his recollections throughout his life, and their manuscripts are preserved in Budapest, in the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and National Széchényi Library. Some parts of these texts, however, still remain unpublished. Even though his reminiscence tends to exaggerate their friendship, which in fact ended in their earliest period in Budapest, examination of the sources provides us with a new understanding of the relationship between the librettist and the composer. Therefore, this paper introduces the documents written by Balázs, gives a selective overview of their friendship, and examines how the image of Bartók changed in Balázs's mind over time.

Keywords: Béla Balázs, Béla Bartók, Hungarian literature, music, *Bluebeard's Castle*, *Wooden Prince*, stage works, recollection, exile

Introduction

As several previous studies have mentioned, a vast number of manuscripts and typewritten scripts by Hungarian playwright and film critic Béla Balázs still remain unpublished.¹ Hungarian resources are mainly preserved in Budapest in the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Manuscript Collection (MS 5009–5024)² and the Manuscript Collection of National Széchényi Library (Fond 134).³ The latter collection, which has not been researched minutely, includes the manuscripts of his recollections about Hungarian composer Béla Bartók.

Balázs and Bartók had a relationship not only as the composer and the librettist of the opera *Bluebeard's Castle* and the ballet *Wooden Prince*, but also as neighbors and friends in the 1910s in Budapest. However, since Balázs defected from Hungary to Vienna after the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic (1919), their relationship became one-sided, with Balázs seeking Bartók's friendship. Consequently, no more collaboration was realized in the end.

This short-term friendship has been viewed rather skeptically in Bartók's studies because of the fact that Bartók did not mention him at all in his career; for in-

stance, Demény stated that Balázs's role should not be overestimated; Bartók did not mention Balázs not because of political reasons, for Bartók was not afraid of dedicating his composition to another refugee, Béla Reinitz, in spite of the political situation in Hungary at that time.⁴ Mentioning that today "we can only conjecture", Leafstedt also points out that "this was one of those friendships that grew too burdensome emotionally for one of the parties, who then, without any sense of malice and without conscious effort, simply began to find the company of other people preferable".⁵

On the other hand, however, their friendship was a beautiful memory that was to be glorified and romanticized for Balázs. What is overlooked is that it is impossible to deal with their interactions equally before and after Balázs's exile, which decisively brought distance between them and urged Balázs to start writing recollections and autobiographies. Moreover, for Balázs in exile, it seems that publicly writing many recollections and articles about Bartók in Hungarian, whose name became well known in Western Europe, was an important political as well as personal act of going back to the root of his youth and Hungarian modernism, to which he had once devoted himself. Therefore, these articles need to be considered as autobiographical works by Balázs rather than "primary resources" about Bartók or other historical events.

Hence, this paper deals with the images of Bartók created by Balázs. Comparing portraits of Bartók in Balázs's diary with his reminiscence, the transition and changing images of a composer described by a writer will be examined. The materials are Balázs's diary from 1904 to 1922 and several recollections, including the aforementioned unpublished resources. Analyzing these texts, I attempt to discuss the signification of changing images and memories and their relation with cultural as well as political background. As a consequence, this paper tends to focus on Balázs's works and texts about Bartók rather than their stage works and their processes of creations, although as a matter of course, this stance does not deny the fact that re-examining these texts still provides us with several new facts about the relationship between the composer and the librettist.

The contents of the article are as follows: the first part gives an overview of their relation in the 1910s and collaboration. The second part shows the catalog of articles about Bartók written by Balázs. In the third part, several depictions from the diaries and the recollections (both in exile and after Bartók's death) are compared and analyzed.

1. The Relationship between Bartók and Balázs: Chronology and Collaboration

Balázs wrote several autobiographical novels, *Impossible People (Unmögliche Menschen)* (1930) and *Dreaming Youth (Álmódó ifjúság)* (1946), and these works are frequently cited in biographies.⁶ However, compared with his diaries it seems that these autobiographical works include more misconceptions and some exaggerations.⁷ This section attempts to briefly describe the relationship between Bartók and Balázs based on real-time resources such as letters and diaries as much as possible. *Table 1* shows their collaborative works, including unrealized plans. It indicates there were at least three collaborative works planned during their lives; one was just a suggestion and one was created after Bartók's death.

Although it is uncertain exactly when and where he got acquainted with Bartók, in 1906 he had already participated in collecting folksongs with Bartók in Szeged, Balázs's hometown. It is very plausible that Zoltán Kodály, Balázs's roommate of Eötvös Collegium, connected them. Balázs's entry on 1906 depicts Bartók who he had just encountered.⁸

After that, there are no traces that they met or discussed for about three years – probably because of Balázs's absence in Budapest in 1906–07, when he gained a scholarship and stayed in Vienna, Paris, and Berlin. After his return to Budapest, they lived in the same building “Teréz ringstreet 17” near Oktogon, which is the intersection in Pest side (see *Figure 1*).⁹ Bartók's residence was number 23 and Balázs's number 26 on the same 4th floor (European Style). The letters and their envelopes clearly show that they lived in that building at the least from January to September in 1910.¹⁰ Moreover, according to the fact that postmarks stamped in post office number 62 (near Oktogon) did not change it is relatively possible that they lived there, visiting each other, until Bartók's family moved to Rákospálos in May 1911.

It was this year when Bartók composed his first collaborative work with Balázs, one-act opera *Bluebeard's Castle* based on the cognominal drama. This symbolist opera unfortunately failed twice in opera competitions. However, Balázs's letter to Bartók in early 1912 implies that they already planned their next collaborative work, called “grotesque pantomime”, which probably would become ballet *Wooden Prince*.¹¹ The libretto was published in *Nyugat* in 1912, and in the next year they made a contract with the Royal Hungarian Opera.¹² Around the same period, another stage work project was also planned by Balázs, a fairy tale drama entitled *Ilona, a Smiling Fairy*.¹³ Balázs asked Endre Ady, one of the most influential poets at that time, to versify his fairy tale and Bartók to set music to it. Nevertheless, his fascinating plan turned out to be fruitless because Ady did not work out.¹⁴

Table 1. Collaborations between Bartók and Balázs, including plans that were never realized

	Title	Genre	Language	Date	Premiere
1	<i>Bluebeard's Castle</i> (<i>A kékszakállú herceg vára</i>)	One-act opera	Hungarian	First published in 1910 Composed in 1911, 1917	24 May, 1918 in Royal Hungarian Opera
2	<i>Wooden Prince</i> (<i>A fából faragott királyfi</i>)	Ballet	Hungarian	First published in 1912 Composed in 1914–1917	12 May, 1917 in Royal Hungarian Opera
3	<i>Ilona, a Smiling Fairy</i> (<i>Mosolygó Tündér Ilona</i>)	Fairytale Drama	Hungarian	ca. 1913	Not realized
4	<i>A Little Girl in the Big City</i> (<i>Ein kleines Mädchen in der grossen Stadt</i>)	Pantomime	German	ca. 1930	Not realized
(5)	<i>Imaginary Castle</i> (<i>Bálványos vár</i>)	Dance Legend	Hungarian	Composed in 1923 Created in 1948?	27 February, 1948 in Hungarian State Opera



Figure 1. The Location of the Residences of Bartók and Balázs (Teréz ringstreet, 17)
Budapest székesfőváros területének térképe 1:5000 (Budapest: Budapest Székesfőváros Mérnöki
Hivatala, Budapest Székesfőváros Tanácsa, 1908), 34.
Budapest History Museum, Kiscelli Museum

The outbreak of World War I forced young Hungarian intellectuals to return to their homeland. Balázs and Lukács held a philosophical circle called “Sunday Circle” with some of those philosophers, and according to Emma Litoók, Kodály and Bartók sometimes dropped in to join this circle. Although few real-time documents of the activities of this circle remain, documents of the lecture series “Lectures from Intellectual Circle” carried out by them mention that Kodály and Bartók also participated (or at least were going to participate) in this series as a lecturer.¹⁵ In 1917, *The Wooden Prince* was finally performed preceding *Bluebeard’s Castle* in the Royal Hungarian Opera House. This successful performance led the opera to the stage in the next year as well. Finally, Bartók came to be recognized as a talented composer, but these performances did not satisfy Balázs, for the media valued Bartók’s music but blamed his librettos.¹⁶

It is said that both Bartók and Balázs took part in the lower organization of the Commissariat of Public Education in Hungarian Soviet Republic to a greater or lesser extent,¹⁷ which was established after October Revolution and Communist Revolution and ended in demise a mere 133 days later. In December 1919, Balázs escaped from the White Terror by Horthy regime to Vienna. After that demise, with the exception of several letters, they did not seem to contact each other. Nevertheless, one letter shows that Balázs suggested that Bartók create one more stage

work with him, presumably a pantomime titled *A Small Girl in a Big City* written in German. Balázs wrote this plan and sent it from Berlin when Bartók had asked to resign his royalty of their stage works *Bluebeard's Castle* and *Wooden Prince* in Hungary.¹⁸ However, it did not stimulate Bartók to compose. Somfai, Zsuffa and Lenkei noted that this plan was never realized probably because of its scandalous plot.¹⁹ After the long exile in Vienna, Berlin, and Moscow, Balázs came back to Hungary and Ballet *Imaginary Castle* was created in 1948 with Bartók's *Dance Suite*, Balázs's libretto and Gyula Harangozó's choreography. Of course, it was not a bona fide collaboration, as it was produced after Bartók died in New York in 1945.

The interactions between Bartók and Balázs, therefore, lasted almost only in the 1910s and they produced only two works together. This relationship and collaboration were just small parts of their careers for both of them. Still, Balázs "linked Bartók to wider cultural circles",²⁰ as Hooker states, and no doubt that Bartók entered his name into this intercultural – and left-wing intellectual – group. The result of these influences was one of Bartók's most radical articles "On Hungarian Music" in *Aurora* (1911), presumably his participation in the New Hungarian Music Society²¹ and the participation in the lecture series of Sunday Circle, eventually in the Hungarian Soviet Republic.

The end of World War I and a number of exiles made this flexible community discrete, and Bartók and Balázs had no further interaction. There were two plausible reasons: one is that Balázs began to be dissatisfied with his treatment while Bartók became more and more famous as composer; the other is the distance because of Balázs's political emigration. In this situation, Balázs started to write recollections publicly, which consequently involved not only personal activity, but also had political nuances.

2. Sources and Recollections about Bartók Written by Balázs

Balázs indeed wrote various kinds of texts about Bartók. These writings include diaries, newspaper and magazine articles, and public letters. *Table 2* shows these recollections, critical essays, and other resources and works.

As aforementioned, Balázs kept his minute diary from 1904 to 1922, which is used as a primary resource for studies of Balázs. He wrote about personal events and his relationships as well as his creations of dramas or poetries. However, compared with Kodály, with whom Balázs had close relationship, fewer entries or personal depictions of Bartók are noted than entries related to business or complaints about their collaborative works.

Bartók first appears in the entry of September 5th 1906. As discussed later, this describes Bartók's appearance and his impression when Bartók and Kodály

stayed in Szeged, which is Balázs's hometown, and Balázs also accompanied them to collect folksongs. On September 7th in 1911, Balázs also mentioned that he spent that summer with Bartók and admired his talent and individuality. In other entries, Balázs tended to write about collaborations and their premiers. In July 1913, Balázs recollected *Bluebeard's Castle*'s premier as a drama, in which Bartók also participated in playing the piano in the intermission and Balázs persuaded Bartók to contract with Royal Opera House as for *Wooden Prince*. Between 1917 and 1918, he intensively wrote about their premiers in the opera house; especially about *Wooden Prince* in detail because according to him, he took part in the stage production.

After his demise, Balázs mentioned Bartók several times in 1921 and 1922. These entries are almost complaints that Bartók did not evaluate Balázs's achievement for him. They did not meet each other directly, and it seems that his situation as a refugee made it more and more difficult to assess the political condition in Hungary. Conversely, the opera house abandoned their credit of Balázs as a librettist in the production. It was in that period when Balázs started to write his recollections about Bartók, who became more and more known as a composer both in Hungary and Western Europe.

Balázs's earliest reminiscence seems to be lost. According to his diary, he contributed an article to a feature issue on Bartók in a music magazine *Musikbätter des Anbruch* in 1921, which was not published in the end.²² The next year, he published another article titled "Diary" in *Hungarian Newspaper in Vienna*. This newspaper is the Hungarian daily paper that appeared in 1919 in Vienna, and Balázs often contributed to it.

In Moscow, the form of "Diary" written in Vienna became that of "Letter". A Hungarian magazine *New Voice* was published in 1938, and Balázs contributed one article titled "Letters from a Distance to Bartók" (Levelek a távolból. Bartók Bélának küldöm) in 1938. Although it was not clear where it was published, he wrote another public letter in 1941 called "From a Distant Land, to a Distant Land: On the Occasion of Béla Bartók's Sixtieth Birthday (Messziről messzire: Bartók Béla hatvanadik születésnapjára)".

After Bartók's death in 1945, Balázs intensively recollected Bartók again in Hungary. Balázs was already in Budapest at that time, and he provided an article for commemoration for Bartók in the theater magazine *Light Beam* (*Fényszóró*) that he edited (*Figure 2*). The last recollection was published in 1948 in *Forum*, and its title was "Indivisible Man".

There are other types of writings as well. Balázs hardly wrote reviews or critical essays about Bartók's compositions. The only plausibly essay is "Béla Bartók's Folksiness", which appeared in 1946 in *Forum*. It might be also noteworthy that Balázs attained inspiration from Bartók in his literary works. The

Table 2. The list of publications and articles about Bartók written by Balázs
Manuscripts marked * were referred to for the first time

Genre	Title	Date of writing	First published	Media	Places of manuscripts and typewritten texts
Diary	–	1906–22	Balázs, Béla, 1982. <i>Napló, I. II.</i> Fábri Anna, ed. Budapest: Magvető Kiadó	–	Manuscripts (MTA)
Recollection?	Unknown	1921	Contributed to <i>Musik Anbruch</i> but not published in the end	Magazine	Unknown
	“Diary (Napló)”	1922	<i>Bécsi Magyar Újság</i> , 1922 May 21, 7–8	Daily paper	Unknown
	“Letter to Béla Bartók from an Old Friend (Egy régi barát levele Bartók Bélához)”	1945	<i>Fényszóró</i> , 11 (1945), 3	Magazine	Manuscripts (OSZK)* and typewritten texts (MTA)
	“On the One-year Anniversary of Béla Bartók’s Death (Bartók Béla halálának évfordulójára)”	1946?	Unknown	Unknown	Manuscripts (OSZK)* and typewritten texts (MTA)
	“Memories of Béla Bartók (Emlékezés Bartók Bélára)”	1948	The abbreviated version titled “Indivisible Man” was published in <i>Fórum</i> , December 1948	Magazine	Manuscripts (OSZK)* and typewritten texts (MTA)
	“Memories (Emlékezés)”	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Typewritten texts (OSZK and MTA)*

Table 2 (cont.)

Genre	Title	Date of writing	First published	Media	Places of manuscripts and typewritten texts
Public Letter	“Letters from Distant Land: to Béla Bartók (Levelek a távolból: Bartók Bélának küldöm)”	1938	<i>Új Hang</i> , 4 (1938), 97–100	Magazine	Manuscripts (MTA)
	“From a Distant Land, to a Distant Land: On the Occasion of Béla Bartók's Sixtieth Birthday (Messziről messzire: Bartók Béla hatvanadik születésnapjára)”	1941	Unknown Reprint: Balázs, Béla, 1968. <i>Válogatott cikkek és tanulmányok.</i> Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 47–65	Unknown	Manuscripts (MTA) and typewritten texts (OSZK)*
Critic	“Béla Bartók's Folksiness (Bartók Béla népiessége)”	1946	<i>Fórum</i> , October 1946	Magazine	Manuscripts (OSZK)* and typewritten texts (MTA)
Drama	<i>Deadly Youth (Halálos fiataloság)</i> (The protagonist's model seem to be Bartók and his wife Márta)	1912–17	Several parts appeared in <i>Nyugat</i> , 8 (1913). Complete version: <i>Halálos fiataloság</i> . Gyoma: Kner Izidor Kiadása, 1917	Magazine and later book	Unknown
Poetry	Béla Bartók (Bartók Béla)	1940	<i>Táboriúz mellett</i> . Moscow: Nemzetközi Könyv, 1940	Poetry anthology	Unknown
Abstract of a planned film	“Legend of Miraculous Stag: Filmexposé (Rege a csodaszarvasból: filmexposé)”	Unknown	Unknown (It seems not to be realized)	–	Typewritten texts (OSZK)*

OSZK: The Manuscript Collection of National Széchényi Library (Országos Széchényi Könyvtár)

MTA: Department of Manuscripts & Rare Books, Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Magyar Tudományos Akadémia)




Figure 2. The Front Cover of Bartók Issue of *Fényszóró*, vol. 1, no. 11, October 3rd, 1945
http://epa.oszk.hu/01900/01982/00011/pdf/fenyszoro_1945_11.pdf (Accessed: May 4th, 2013)

protagonists of a drama *Deadly Youth* published in 1917 probably derived from Bartók and his wife. Moreover, he wrote a poem titled *Bartók* as well as *Mozart* and *Michelangelo*, in which he admired Bartók's individuality and excellence in 1940. In this way, Bartók gave Balázs inspirations for creations and writing recollections.

3. The Changing Friendship between Librettist and Composer: The “Summoned” and Created Image of Bartók

This section discusses the transition that took place in the images of Bartók, citing and analyzing Balázs's texts. The materials are his diaries written in the period in which they could actually meet each other in Budapest, the “Diary” that appeared in *Hungarian Newspaper in Vienna* and the public letter in 1938 in Moscow, and finally the last recollection from “Memories of Béla Bartók”, which was the draft

of *Indivisible Man* preserved in the National Széchényi Library and the Library of Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Depiction in the Diaries

As mentioned in the previous section, Balázs's diary includes the depictions of Bartók. Although there is a blank between the years of 1906 and 1911, it gives a basic impression of Bartók when Balázs could meet him in Hungary. According to this, his strong characteristic was "Wunderkind".

Szeptember 5.

Itt volt Bartók Béla, egy hétag együtt jártunk népdalt gyűjteni. Naiv, esetlen. Egy 25 (vagy hány) éves *csodagyerek*. Csudálatos, csendes szívosság van benne. [...] Gyönyörűen játszik, szép dolgokat ír. Nem értek hozzá, de az emberből nem éreztem ki a *nagyot*. [...] Gyerek-naivitással, kiváncsiságból kutakodik.

Csillagászkodik, bogarász, etnografizál stb. Ez a mohósága nyilván abból magyarázandó, hogy a zenén kívül nem sok egyebet tanult idáig. [...] És a zenéjén kívül semmit se tudok belőle élvezni.

[1906], September 5th

Béla Bartók was here. We spent a week collecting folksongs together. He is naive and awkward. A twenty-five-or-odd-year-old *Wunderkind*. And yet there exists in him an incredibly quiet tenacity. [...] He plays splendidly and writes beautiful works. I don't know much about him, but from his personality I don't feel *greatness*. [...] He researches with childish naiveness and curiosity.

He skygazes, he is also entomologist and acts like an ethnographer etc. This eagerness can be clearly explained by the fact that except for music, he has not learned much more. [...] And outside of his music, I am able to enjoy nothing about him.²³

Firenze
[1911], szept. 7.

[...]

Annál jobban megszerettem Bartók Bélát. A legmeghatóbb ember. [...] Hihetetlen, varázsoló méltóság és előkelőség van benne. [...] És mennyi gyermekesség, mennyi báj van benne. [...] Valami csodálatos paradoxia van a megjelenésében. Alakja, arca, mozgása olyan, mint egy rokokó hercegé, és mégis valami titánikus méltóság van rajta. Egy rokokó titan! Egy 32 éves, véres komolytársú csodagyermek. [...]

Firenze
[1911], Sept. 7th

[...]

I am becoming all the more fond of Béla Bartók. He is the most moving and most marvelous man. [...] He has unbelievable, magical dignity and nobility. [...] And how much childishness, how much charm exists within him. [...] There is some wonderful paradox in his appearance. His figure, face, demeanor are those of a Rococo prince and yet he possesses some titanic dignity. A Rococo titan! A 32-year-old Wunderkind in deadly earnest. [...]²⁴

Particularly the depictions in the former such as “from his personality I don’t feel *greatness*” or “outside of his music, I am able to enjoy nothing about him” show that Balázs’s first impression of Bartók was that of an innocent and childish man depreciated, except for music. This is probably because of his comparison with Kodály, one of the intellectuals who had just graduated from the Pázmány Péter University and attained a doctoral degree. As for collecting folksongs, Bartók was still a beginner in this field. The latter recollection describes that Balázs came to like Bartók and the sense of depreciation had already disappeared. Nonetheless, his attention tended to focus rather on personal activities and Bartók’s hobbies than on music. Although Balázs publicly mentioned Bartók and Kodály and highly valued them,²⁵ his personal diary dealt with their personality and their relationships with Balázs, which makes it clear that he was less interested in their compositions.

Recollections in Exile: “Public” Diary and Letter

Other entries in his diary are almost complaints about the production of the stage works. As Demény stated, it is possible that Balázs referred to his diaries when recollecting Bartók. It was the sense of loneliness and frustration that urged Balázs to make these emotions public.

On May 21st in 1922, Balázs published an article titled “Diary” in Vienna, just after the premiers of *Bluebeard’s Castle* and *Wooden Prince* on May 14th in Frankfurt, Germany. The texts mainly include his memories about collecting folksongs near Tisza river in 1906, the creation of the two stage works, and the premier of *Wooden Prince*. Here Balázs emphasized his achievements and contributions to their works and attempted to confess private emotions in his diary.

És én voltam, én az emigráns forradalmár, akkor, aki hitet élesztettem benne. Én beszéltem neki a nagy magyar kultur-renaissanceről, a magyarság hivatásáról az európai kultúra fejlődésében, [...] Azt akartam, amit Bartók. Együtt akartuk egy fiatalsgban. Hittük, hogy

az egészen ujat csak az egészen régiből lehet kipalántázni, hogy csak az ősmatéria birja el a mi spiritualizálásunkat uly, hogy mégsem párlog el az ujjaink között.

I [Balázs] was, I was the emigrant revolutionist, who stirred his belief in him [Bartók]. It was I who talked to him about the Hungarian great cultural renaissance, the call of Hungary in the development of European culture, [...] I wanted the same as Bartók. We wanted it together in our youth. In our belief, complete novelty could be derived only from what was ancient, since only primeval material could be expected to stand our spiritualization without evaporating from under our fingers.²⁶

He explains that after the failure of *Bluebeard's Castle*, it was Balázs who persuaded Bartók not to leave the country and to compose another stage work. For Balázs, Bartók is still comrade of the Hungarian modernist movement. We cannot know whether these memories are true or not, but at least we can imagine how Balázs cherished his youth and activities in Hungary.

Moreover, it is noteworthy that he wrote about not only private events, but also very political affairs. This is the most significant difference from his private diary. When its chief editor was a socialist Oszkár Jászi from 1920 to 1923 and Balázs contributed, Jászi wanted *Hungarian Newspaper in Vienna* to function as the hub of activities of Hungarian exiles in Vienna.²⁷ Therefore, it is natural that an article tends to be opposed to Horthy's regime in Hungary: just a recollection of Bartók also includes a political tone that denounces the situation in Hungary. The object of criticism is not only the regime, but also Bartók himself. Here Balázs produces an image of Bartók, who was such an innocent artist that he still stayed in Budapest – this depiction reminds us of the tone in his diary in 1906 – enjoying his privileged position, being entertained by Horthy.

[...] És máma Bartók Béla Horthynál teázik. Ezt senki se vegye rossz néven tőle. Bartók nem politikus és nyilván nem is tudja, hogy ez mit jelent. [...]

Én most, hogy Bartók Béla a nemzetközi zenetudomány tárgya lett, bizvást elbucsúzhatom tőle. Mert én csak költő vagyok. Engem, mint írót, mégis csak az ember érdekel és az ő embersége.

[...] And today Béla Bartók has a cup of tea with Horthy. Forbid that anyone not take it badly. He is not a politician and he doesn't absolutely know what it means. [...]

Now, when Béla Bartók has become the object for studies of international musicological studies, I surely could bid a farewell to him. Because I am just a poet. Just a man, his personality interests me, as a poet.²⁸

Therefore, in this article, Balázs wrote both his personal feelings and his political stance and a paradox that his “Diary” was written in public symbolizes this mixture. Balázs did not veil his jaundice, jealousy, and sorrow as an old friend. In addition to a personal recollection, this is a farewell to Bartók, who has become a great composer in Europe. This article is a pronouncement of his political stance as a Hungarian exile as well as a farewell to an old friend.

About 16 years later, however, his attitude toward Bartók drastically changed again; Balázs’s public letter to Bartók titled “Letters from a Distant Land: Sent to Béla Bartók (Levelek a távolból: Bartók Bélának küldöm)” in 1938. It was published in *New Voice (Új hang)* in Moscow and the style also changed from diaries to letters. In this letter, he amiably recollected their relationship. This is perhaps partly because Balázs once again reactivated the relationship with Bartók by exchanging letters in Berlin and Moscow. Actually, they met each other in Bartók’s concert in Berlin. In this magazine censored by Soviet Republic, Balázs emphasized Hungarian modernism and above all things, admired the cultural policy in Moscow.

Drága Bélám,
 neked címezem mai elmondanivalóm, mert te jutottál eszembe
 legelőbb mikor a komi-nép zenei olimpiádjáról és annak lefolyásáról
 értesültem. [...] De hányszor gondolok ilyenkor vándorlásainkra,
 mikor – hej de régen volt! – együtt jártuk a szegedvidéki és tiszaháti
 tanyákat népdalgyűjteni. Szerelmes aggodalommal tallóztunk és
 keserűen láttuk, hogy vész feledésbe feltartóztathatatlanul a világ
 egyik legértékesebb melódiakincse: az igazi magyar népdal.

[...]
 a népművészet szeretete tenálad sohasem volt nacionalista jelszó.

Dear Béla,
 I am addressing to you now, because you were the first person to come to mind when I heard about the Komi folk music Olympiad and its proceedings. [...] How many times I remember wandering with you on such an occasion – oh it was long time ago – when we together walked to gather folksongs in the suburbs in Szeged, along the Tisza river. We gleaned with uneasiness of love, and bitterly saw the treasure of melodies to be condemned to vanish: real Hungarian folksongs.

[...]
 as for you, your fondness for folk arts was never a symbol of nationalism.²⁹

It is Bartók as ethnomusicologist that is emphasized in this article. Balázs wrote about “Folksong Olympiad” as well as Bartók. In the Soviet Republic, varied musicians gathered in Moscow and played folksongs or folk music from all

over the world. Moreover, he pointed out that they have an affinity with each other, since Bartók collected folksongs from various countries and regions. According to this article, Bartók was not a nationalist composer, but rather a cosmopolitan and international one.

Balázs wrote another letter to Bartók from Moscow: "From Distant Land, to Distant Land", seemingly the most famous recollection written by Balázs. Although it is not clear when and in which magazine or newspaper it was published, its long recollection was prepared for Bartók's 60th birthday in 1941. It was after his departure that Balázs wrote this letter. Although I do not examine its text here because it includes overlap with "Diary" and "Memories of Béla Bartók" analyzed in the following section, it seems that Balázs not only emphasized his achievement of creation of their stage works, but also strongly cherished his adolescence in Budapest and interactions with Bartók. He also mentioned his astonishment about Bartók's emigration and his new libretto for another stage production.

With all these texts, a temporal conclusion might be stated. Balázs's recollections written in exile when he was almost shut out from communications with people in Hungary tended to be an activity of cherishing his Budapest period. At the same time, he also took on a political attitude.

Imagined Memories of the Deceased Composer

The images of Bartók appeared again in Balázs's articles after the death of Bartók in New York. At that time, Balázs had already returned to Budapest and worked as a film director and pedagogue. On October 3rd in 1945, Balázs published a special issue on Bartók in the art magazine *Fényszóró*, which Balázs edited in 1945–1946 (*Figure 2*). In addition to Balázs, Kodály, Viktor Lányi, and László Márkus contributed to this issue.

Balázs continued writing about Bartók almost until he died. The most literary recollection among them may be "Indivisible Man (Oszthatatlan Ember)" that appeared in *Forum* in 1948. This article includes various fragments of his memories of Bartók, and he linked them together one after another. While the image of Bartók appears quite vividly in each episode like a scene of film, it seems to be no more "memories", but created fictions.

To analyze these images, I give an example in this section. Excerpts of "Indivisible Man" are cited as follows. This text is about the creation of the opera *Bluebeard's Castle*, the first collaborative work between Balázs and Bartók. Balázs recollects an impressive episode when Bartók composed the opera secretly and surprised Balázs by playing the opera's piano reduction version at home.

Egyszer berohan hozzá Márta. Lángvörös arccal, nedvesen csillogó szemekkel. minden ajtó tárva maradt mögötte. Két kezét nyújtva felém futott

“Jöjjön! Jöjjön!” – ujjongott. Megragadta kezemet, felerántott az íróasztal mellől, húzott kifelé, futva. Tárva maradt minden ajtó. És át a szomszéd Bartók-lakásba. – “Jöjjön! Jöjjön”

“Mi történt?” – kérdeztem csodálkozva.

“Majd meglátja!” – sugárzott rám boldogan és megindultan. – “Béla megtiltotta, hogy szóljak. Meglepetés!”

Édes szorongás markolta meg szívemet. Nem sejtettem, hogy mi lehet. De nagy boldog esemény. Délelőtt tizenegy óra volt, mikor beléptünk Bartók szobájába. Akkor becsukta mögöttünk az ajtót. Márta gondosan és ünnepélyesen csukta be. Ránk is zárta.

Béla a zongora előtt ült, a kótatartón kézirat. Csak egy szemernyi pillanatig villant rám szemüvege mögül tekintete, de olyan mosolygó gyöngédséggel, hogy odaadtam volna érte minden szerelmeket. Aztán hegyes profilját a kótának szegezte.

“Mi történt? – kérdeztem és torkomat már fojtogatta a megindultág holott valóban nem tudtam még.

“Hát történt... valami – felelte a kótába elmondhatatlan kokett szigorúsággal.

“Ide üljön! – nyomott Márta a diván sarkába és hallgasson. Most készült el. Egy félórával ezelőtt.”

“Mi?” – leheltem elfulladtan. Bartók belecsapott a zongorába. Eljátszotta nekem a “Kékszakállu herceg várát”, mely egy félórával azelőtt készült el.

[...]

One day Márta [Bartók's first wife] rushed to me with a red face like a fire and shining, moist eyes. Behind her all the doors were opened. Stretching out both hands, she ran toward me.

“Please, please come!” – she rejoiced. She took my hands, pulled me up from the desk and rushed to draw me out (all the doors were left open) and toward neighbouring Bartók's house. – “Please, please come!”

“What's happened?” – I asked her surprisingly.

“You will see soon.” – Her face shined happily with deep emotion. – “Béla forbade me to tell you. It's a surprise!”

Sweet uneasiness tugged at my heart. I couldn't guess what was happening. But it would be a great, happy event. It was 11 o'clock in the morning when we entered Bartók's room. Then she shut the door

behind us. Márta carefully and solemnly closed the door. She moved in front of us.

Béla was sitting down in front of the piano and there was a manuscript music sheet on it. For just a moment his glance blinked through his spectacles, but it was with smiling gentleness, as if I gave him all of my affection. Then he fixed his sharp profile to the sheets.

“What’s happened? – I asked. My deep emotion had choked my throat though I really still did not know what this was.

“Well, something... has happened. – He replied into the music sheets with unspeakable koketish strictness.

“Please have a seat here! – Márta pushed me to the corner of the sofa – and listen. It has just now been completed – just a half hour ago.”

“What?” I took a deep breath with difficulty. Bartók struck the piano. He played for me “Bluebeard’s Castle”, which had been completed just a half hour ago. [...] ³⁰

Nevertheless, this story seems to be apocryphal: according to the facts of this opera’s creation, their residences in 1911, and their letters or Balázs’s diary, such a situation might have been impossible for them.³¹ Namely, it is likely an imagined story by Balázs. Although it is not correct to conclude that these episodes are all fictions, Balázs seems to be quite eager to make these events dramatic.

On the one hand, Balázs created memories; on the other hand, the intertextuality from the composition itself is found in these recollections as well: in terms of content, this episode is not mere memory; it seems that it was written under the influence of the opera’s texts. The underlined part of the cited texts include an obstinate repetition of “Doors”, “open”, and “close”. In *Bluebeard’s Castle*, the protagonists Bluebeard and his wife Judith open seven doors in the castle to cast a light, which eventually exposes Bluebeard’s nature symbolically and ends with failure. The phrase “open the doors” is reminiscence of texts in the opera itself. This emphasis becomes clear when comparing a variety of this text. Indeed another recollection “Memory” (see Table 2) also records the same episode, but in this version there is no repetition of the phrase “open the doors”.³² Compared between two versions, he seemed to add this phrase in order to make this scene more vivid and evoke the plot of the opera. This “memory” does not only consist of historical events and fictions. It also includes an intertextuality with the libretto of the opera, entirely fictional composition.

Now we can pose one question: Is it a memory, just a fiction, or a literary work? Indeed Balázs also attempted to answer this question. As mentioned before, “Indivisible Man” was published in *Forum*, but when it appeared some parts of the texts were deleted from manuscripts and typewritten papers. Actually, the title “Indivisible Man” was originally derived from the deleted section’s title. Some

parts of the abbreviated section are cited in below. This time Balázs emphasized the monumentalized image of Bartók and the political interpretation of his emigration to the U.S.

Hát ezt nevezzük-e emlékezésnek? A lélek, melyető termékenyített meg, őt akarja ujra világra hozni. Csdálatos mithos hasonlata ez. [...] Irás ez még, vagy szellemidézés? A toll megállna kezemben. De feltámadás történik, megállíthatatlanul.
[...]

Bartók Béla ugyanis politikai emigráns volt. Ez a legtalajhoz-kötöttebb művész kitépte éltető gyökereit a Magyar földből és idegenbe bujdosott azért, hogy tiltakozzék Horthy Magyarországának sötét reakciója ellen. Nem csak egy írással, nem csak egy cselekedettel, hanem egészéletével és halálával tiltakozott.

Well, do we call it “memory” or not? The soul that he [Bartók] made fertile wants to draw him to the world again. This is miraculous mythical imagery. [...] Still, is it writing or necromancy? A pen would like to stop in my hand. But resurrection has started, unstoppably.

[...]

Bartók Béla was a political emigrant also. This artist, who was most unseparable to the land, tore his nurturing roots from Hungarian soil and emigrated abroad to protest the dark reaction of Horthy’s Hungary. He protested by not only writing, not only one action, but throughout his whole life and death.³³

In this section, two significances can be pointed out; the first is an attitude to reinterpret Bartók’s emigration politically. According to Balázs, Bartók opposed to Horthy regime and protested so that he had gone to the U.S. This image is absolutely adverse interpretation of an article in 1922. The second is that Balázs himself admitted that it is no more “memories” but his necromancy, namely it is a process of recalling Bartók and embodying him again by writing with his pen. In this article Bartók is not just his friend, but a canonized great composer. At the same time this canonization is so personal that Balázs could also emphasize the friendship with Balázs himself. In this way the double images of Bartók were produced in a series of recollections written by Balázs.

Conclusion

In this paper, the interactions and the depictions of friendship between Bartók and Balázs were analyzed. Their actual relationship lasted about 10 years or so, and it

created precious memories for Balázs not only while he was in exile, but also long after his return to Budapest. As described in section 2, Balázs's text varies from recollections to literary works. In the early 20th century, Balázs kept a diary, which includes his personal impression of Bartók. These texts of course remain very private documents, although some public documents show Bartók stating what inspired his literary works. The drastically changing political situation, however, forced Balázs to escape from his homeland and significantly changed their relationship. It is after the exile when Balázs began to write recollections about Bartók.

As discussed previously, for Balázs, writing about Bartók was an attempt to bring him back to Hungarian modernism and give Balázs himself affirmation of his activities in Hungary. At the same time, Balázs's situation as a refugee led him to consider his political stance; therefore, the images of Bartók are quite inconsistent. At any rate, this imagined friendship is actually one-sided, and by adapting not criticism but recollections and public letters, he emphasized his relationship with Bartók. This tendency continued after his return, but Bartók's death influenced Balázs so strongly that the image of Bartók became imagined and canonized. This canonization is a natural means for Balázs to connect with Bartók.

Although these recollections are not entirely credible, it is not necessary to consider all of them unworthy of examination, because to some extent Balázs related true facts, including their residences. Therefore, these texts continue to contribute to Bartók's study, especially two stage works produced with Balázs. Moreover, Balázs's texts still remain unpublished. Balázs's study gives a new aspect of his creation – an intertextuality between recollections as autobiography and his stage works. The relation between his political situation in each period and the content of his writing should be examined in more details in future studies.

We could consider these texts as one of the social phenomenon in broader contexts, too. The varied images of Bartók appeared not only in musical culture in the cold war, as Fosler-Lussier shed light,³⁴ but also in political and literary culture even during his life. Balázs's recollection shows how the images were used, sometimes distorted and created literally. While Bartók himself was remembered as "Indivisible Man" by Balázs, his images were always "divisible" ones.

Appendix

Excerpts from *Recollections of Béla Bartók* [Emlékezés Bartók Bélára]

Emlékezés az szellemidézés. De nem mi idézünk halottakat. Mert a ami valóban elmult, azt se memoria, de krónika, sem mágia eleveníteni nem tudja többé. Ám van feltámadás. Igen: támadás!

Ránk támad az emlékezés. Bizony nem mi emlékezünk. Emlékeztetnek magunkra konokul és hevesen, akik öntudatunk alsó kriptáiból ki támadnak, mikor a valóság materiális erői megérlelték az ő idejüket.

Eljött az ő idejük, de nem "magától". Nem az ő mindenütt lappangó hivásuk nélkül. Ők emelik a hantot, ők emlékeztetnek magukra, ők idéznek és feltámadnak.

Nem, nem méla andalodás az emlékezés. Ha döntő rohamra indulunk jövőnkért, akkor Csaba utján segítségünkre száguldó szellemi őseink támadnak a mi támadásunkkal. Feltámadnak.

Ime, eljött Bartók Béla ideje. Emlékezzünk reá? Tekintsetek ma körül a Dunavölgyében és próbáljatok nem emlékezni Bartók Bélára, mikor minden nap új diadala az ő nevét is hirdeti.

De nemcsak Bartók Béla immár ezmévé vált szellem támadt fel támadón, hanem alakká inkarnálódott szellemé is, mely itt járt közöttünk és szemekkel nézett ránk, hanggal szólított bennünket és mozdulattal intett felénk. A barát és költő evvel jár lelkében mint magzatával a terhes asszony, immár negyven esztendeje. Hát ezt nevezzük-e emlékezésnek? A lélek, melyet ő termékenyített meg, őt akarja ujra világra hozni. Csodálatos mithos hasonlata ez. Magában is lehet feladata és értelme egy életnek. Irás ez még, vagy szellemidézés? A toll megállna kezemben. De feltámadás történik, megállíthatatlanul.

1. Oszthatatlan ember.

Kezdjük a végén. Mert mártiroknak a halála az, mely visszafelé értelmezi életük minden dolgát. Ezt mindig tudjuk és el ne felejtsük, hogy Bartók Béla nem egyszerűen elhunyt, hanem mártirhalált halt. Még pediga [sic] mi mártirunk ő, mert a Magyar demokrácia harcos eszméjének halottja.

Bartók Béla ugyanis politikai emigráns volt. Ez a legtalajhozköttöttebb művész kitépte éltető gyökereit a magyar földből és idegenbe bujdosott azért, hogy tiltakozzék Horthy Magyarországának sötét reakciója ellen. Nem csak egy irással, nem csak egy cselekedettel, hanem egész életével és halálával tiltakozott.

Mert ez volt Bartók Béla lényeges jellemvonása: minden meggyőződéséből levonta a végső konzekvenciát, nemcsak gondolatban, nemcsak művészettel, hanem totálisan, egész életével, fizikai létével is. Soha ilyen egydarabból való, oszthatatlanul monolit embert!

Mert nincsen abban kétség, hogy Bartók Béla abba halt bele, hogy hazáját kellett elhagynia. Nem hiszünk misztikus erőkben. Tudjuk, hogy Bartókot sulyos betehség [sic] vitte sirba. De azt is tudjuk, hogy máskép emészti a kór azt, aki számkivetve és keserü lélekkel, művészettel talaja nélküл sinyődik és reménytelen magányban, mint azt, aki testileg-lelkileg otthon van.

De Bartók Béla minden végig csinált. Fenntartás és megalkuvás nélkül, manikus, aprólékos pedantériával. Nem volt napja, napjának órája, melyben nem

lett volna egészen Bartók Béla. Egész egyéniségenek vértezetében élt szüntelenül. A groteszk paradoxiákig.

Valami programmatikus és stilizált lehetett volna ebben a magatartásban, ha egy pillanatra is szándékoltak látszott volna. De a sorsszerű kényszer félelmek fátuma érzett rajta. Nem tudott máskép. Az elkerülhetetlen, feltarthatatlan szükségszerűség tették monumentálissá legkisebb mozdulatát, leghalkabb hangsulyát is. Gyakran merev volt ezért. Rideg. Valóban. De szikla. Nemcsak hajlithatatlan, hanem törhetetlen is.

Remembrance is necromancy. But we don't summon the dead, because any memories, chronicles, or magic can revive no more what has really passed away. Yet there is a resurrection [feltámadás]. Indeed: an attack! [támadás]

Memories attack us. Certainly we do not remember. They make us remember, severely and violently, who attack from the crypt of our consciousness when the material power of reality returns us to their time.

Their time has come, but it is not "by themselves". It is not without their ubiquitous hidden calling. They dig the grave, they reminded us of themselves, and they call and summon themselves.

Recollection is not a lulling dream. If we so hurry towards our future then our spiritual ancestors meet our attack, rushing to call our help in Csaba's way. They summon themselves.

Here Bartók's time has come. Shall we recollect him? Please take a glance around today in the Duna valley, and do not remember Béla Bartók when they give new glory to his name every day.

But it is not only Béla Bartók's soul revives on arising, which has already manifested as conceptual, but also his soul revives, which has incarnated to the body. His soul goes around between us, look at us with its eyes, call us with its voice, and with its movement it signals us. The friend and the poet have already interplayed in the soul in this way for 40 years, like a pregnant woman and her baby. Well, do we call it "memory" or not? The soul that he [Bartók] made fertile wants to draw him to the world again. This is miraculous mythical imagery. There might be a problem and meaning for a life in himself as well. Is it yet writing or necromancy? A pen would like to stop in my hand. But resurrection has started, unstoppably.

1. Indivisible Man³⁵

Let us start from the end. It is because it is a martyr's death that we interpret everything backwards in his life. We always know it, and we shall not forget that Béla Bartók did not merely die, but died a martyr's death. He is still our martyr, because he is a deceased fighting spirit of Hungarian democracy.

Bartók Béla was a political emigrant, also. This artist, who was most unseparable to the land, tore his nurturing roots from Hungarian soil and emigrated abroad to protest the dark reaction of Horthy's Hungary. He protested by not only writing, not only one action, but throughout his whole life and death.

It is because this was Béla Bartók's essential characteristic: he drew a final conclusion from every conviction not only in his thought, not only in his arts, but also with his whole life and physical existence. I have never seen such a man who consists of one piece, an indivisible monolith!

It is obvious that Béla Bartók died because he had to leave his country. We do not believe in mystical power. We know that serious disease brought Bartók to the grave. But we also know that a sickness undermines a person in other ways who exiled and languishes, with bitter feeling and without ground of arts in hopeless loneliness, than one is at home physically and spiritually.

But Béla Bartók always did everything thoroughly, without reservation or compromise, maniacally, in meticulous detail. There were no days, nor hours of the day, in which he would not be completely Béla Bartók. He stood complete in the armor of his personality unceasingly. Till the paradox of grotesque.

There could have been an element of conscious attitudinizing in this posture, if for even a moment it had appeared intentional. But the relentless and inescapable force of fate was to be sensed in it. He could not do in other ways. The inevitable and unstoppable necessity altered his slightest movement and the most silent stress to monumental ones. Thus, he was often rigid. Cold. Indeed. He was a rock. He was not only inflexible, but also unbreakable.

Notes

¹ Júlia Lenkei, 'Nívómbelivel együtt dolgozni...': Balázs Béla két szövegkönyve. *Critical Lapok*, 7–8 (2009), http://www.criticailapok.hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=37702&catid=15&Itemid=2 (Accessed: 29 January, 2013).

² The list of the collection is included in Dóra F. Csanak, *Balázs Béla hagyatéka az Akadémiai Könyvtár Kézirattárában (ms 5009–ms 5024)* (Budapest: Bibliotheca Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 1966).

³ I greatly appreciate the help provided by the librarians in the Manuscript Collection in Széchényi Library for suggesting these unpublished resources. Josef Zsuffa also mentioned in the bibliography that Balázs's unpublished librettos are stored in Széchényi Library, although he did not show exactly where they are. See Josef Zsuffa, *Béla Balázs: The Man and the Artist* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 515.

⁴ János Demény, Adatok Balázs Béla és Bartók Béla kapcsolatához. In *Magyar zenetörténeti tanulmányok: Kodály Zoltán emlékére*, edited by Ferenc Bónis (Budapest: Zeneműkiadó, 1977), 373.

⁵ Carl S. Leafstedt, *Inside Bluebeard's Castle* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 31.

⁶ Zsuffa took over the texts of *Dreaming Youth* in the beginning of the biography. Although it is not strictly a biography, Mary Gluck also cites *Impossible People* to explain Balázs's life. See

- Mary Gluck, *Georg Lukács and His Generation, 1900–1918* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).
- ⁷ This aspect will be discussed in Section 3 in this paper.
- ⁸ Béla Balázs, *Napló: 1903–1914*, by Anna Fábri, vol. 1 (Budapest: Magvető Kiadó, 1982), 339. This text will be discussed in Section 3.
- ⁹ The building in which Bartók and Balázs lived is located today in the place of Teréz ring-street 22. The photo of this building is inserted in Ferenc Bónis, *Béla Bartók: His Life in Pictures and Documents* (Budapest: Corvina, 1980), 91. This old address (Teréz ringstreet 17) is identified as an erroneous building (at that time Teréz ringstreet 13 and today 17), in Lynn Hooker, The Political and Cultural Climate in Hungary at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, in *The Cambridge Companion to Bartók*, edited by Amanda Bayley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 21. It is important to note that house numbers have been changed frequently. I am grateful to Prof. Shingo Akiyama at Hitotsubashi University, who kindly advised and provided me with the map of old Budapest.
- ¹⁰ It is known that Bartók and his mother lived in this residence from November 1st in 1907 to May 3rd in 1911. See Béla Bartók Jr., *Apám életének krónikája* (Budapest: Helikon Kiadó, 2006), 97, 121, and Bartók to János Busitia, 27 April, 1911, *Bartók Béla levelei*, edited by János Demény (Budapest: Zeneműkiadó, 1976), 178–9. Moreover, Balázs's letters show that he also lived in that building at least from January 4th to September 26th. See Balázs to György Lukács, a letter and its envelope, 4 January, 1910, Georg Lukács Archives of the Institute for Philosophical Research, 85/2, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and Balázs to Mihály Babits, 26 September, 1910, Manuscript Collection, National Széchényi Library. I greatly appreciate the help given by Mária Székely (Lukács Archives), who sent me these envelopes.
- ¹¹ Balázs mentioned that he was going to write librettos for Kodály and Bartók when he sent Bartók the revised texts of *Bluebeard's Castle*, saying “I don't forget your one-act grotesque pantomime. I'm sure it will be [produced]”. Béla Balázs to Béla Bartók, ca. beginning of 1912, Bartók Archives of Institute for Musicology of the Research Centre for the Humanities, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
- ¹² Béla Balázs, *Napló: 1903–1914 I*, 606.
- ¹³ Béla Balázs, *Napló: 1903–1914 I*, 610. See also Demény, Adatok Balázs Béla és Bartók Béla kapcsolatához, 364.
- ¹⁴ Demény, Adatok Balázs Béla és Bartók Béla kapcsolatához, 364.
- ¹⁵ Béla Balázs, *Dramaturgia. Előadások a Szellemi Tudományok Köréből 2* (Budapest: Benkő Gyula Cs. és Kir. Udvari Könyvkereskedése, 1918), 44–5.
- ¹⁶ Antal Molnár summarized several critics about the premier of *Bluebeard's Castle* in *Zenei Szemle* in August 1918. According to his article, some of them said, “the texts with no action entirely killed the potentiality of music”. Zita Burda and Dániel Kis Domokos, eds., *Bartók a színpadon* (Budapest: Osiris, 2006), 78.
- ¹⁷ Tibor Tallián, *Béla Bartók: the Man and his Work* (Budapest: Corvina, 1981), 116–20 and Zsuffa, *Béla Balázs*, 78–84. Lukács was the deputy of this comissariat.
- ¹⁸ Balázs to Bartók, November 1930, Bartók Archives of Institute for Musicology of the Research Centre for the Humanities, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. See also Zsuffa, *Béla Balázs*, 188.
- ¹⁹ László Somfai introduced this libretto in *Nichtvertonte Libretti im Nachlass und andere Bühnenpläne Bartóks*, in *Documenta Bartókiana*, Heft 2, edited by Denis Dille (Mainz: B. Schott's Söhne, 1965), 29–30. Lenkei and Zsuffa also stated that the libretto sent to Bartók is likely this pantomime. See Lenkei, ‘Nívómbelivel együtt dolgozni...’ Balázs Béla keít szövegkönyve, and Zsuffa, *Béla Balázs*, 188.

- ²⁰ Hooker, The Political and Cultural Climate in Hungary at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, 21.
- ²¹ The inclination to create “new Hungary” by introducing contemporary western European culture is parallel to that of Lukács, founding Thália Society in the field of dramas in 1904–08. As for New Hungarian Music Society and Hungarian modernist movement. See Judit Frigyesi, *Béla Bartók and Turn-of-the-Century Budapest* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998) and Lynn Hooker, Modernism on the Periphery: Béla Bartók and the New Hungarian Music Society of 1911–1912, *Musical Quarterly* 88, 2(2005), 274–319.
- ²² Béla Balázs, *Napló: 1914–1922 II* (Budapest: Magvető Kiadó, 1982), 461.
- ²³ Béla Balázs, *Napló: 1903–1914*, 339. The translation was largely taken over from Leafstedt, *Inside Bluebeard’s Castle*, 17–18.
- ²⁴ Balázs, *Napló: 1903–1914*, 510–13. The translation was largely taken over from Leafstedt, *Inside Bluebeard’s Castle*, 27 and László Vikárius, Commentary to Béla Bartók *Duke Bluebeard’s Castle*, in *Duke Bluebeard’s Castle, Opus 11: Facsimile of the Autograph Draft*, edited by László Vikárius (Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2006), 21.
- ²⁵ Béla Balázs, A zenei szépség evolúciójáról, *Színjáték*, 15(1910): 288–91.
- ²⁶ Béla Balázs, Napló, *Bécsi Magyar Újság*, 1922, May 21, 8. The translation was largely taken over from Leafstedt, *Inside Bluebeard’s Castle*, 23–5.
- ²⁷ Noriko Tsujikawa, Bōmeisha ni you Pari kōwa kaigi shuō no Chū-Tō Ō no kokusai taisei e no taian: Pēchi deno Yūgo gun senryō keizoku yōkyū undō wo megutte (1919–1921 nen) [An Alternative by Hungarian ‘Exiles’ to the International Order under the Paris Peace Conference in Central and Eastern Europe: The Significance of the Requests from Pécs for the Extension of Occupation under SHS (1919–1921)], *Tō Ōshi kenkyū* [The Journal of East European Studies] 35(2013), 75. Balázs’s wife Anna Hamvasy worked in its office as a typist.
- ²⁸ Béla Balázs, Napló, *Bécsi Magyar Újság*, 1922, May 21, 8.
- ²⁹ Béla Balázs, Levelek a távolból, *Új hang*, 4(1938), 97, 100.
- ³⁰ Béla Balázs, *Emlékezés Bartók Bélára*, Department of Manuscripts & Rare Books, Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, MS 5014/38. Translated by the author of this paper.
- ³¹ I supposed so for several reasons: first, there are no such entries in his diaries; second, it is not likely that Bartók finished composing the opera when they lived in the same building. The creation of *Bluebeard’s Castle* has already been examined in Leafstedt and Vikárius. Bartók started to compose the opera in February in 1911 and moved to Rákoskeresztúr on May 3rd. Moreover, Bartók wrote to Frederick Delius that he had not finished yet in July and to his wife Márta Ziegler in 1915 that he could not even play this opera on the piano. See Leafstedt, *Inside Bluebeard’s Castle*, 127–35 and Bartók to Márta Ziegler, 1915, *Bartók családi levelei*, edited by Béla Bartók Jr. (Budapest: Zeneműkiadó, 1981), 236.
- ³² Béla Balázs, *Emlékezés*, Department of Manuscripts & Rare Books, Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, MS 5014/39. It seems that this short text was prepared for the performance of *Bluebeard’s Castle*.
- ³³ Balázs, *Emlékezés Bartók Bélára*.
- ³⁴ Danielle Fosler-Lussier, *Music Divided: Bartók’s Legacy in Cold War Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).
- ³⁵ This part was partly published as an introduction of Béla Balázs, Indivisible Man, *Forum*, December 1948, 956–65. The translation was partly taken over from Tallián, *Béla Bartók*, 13.

THE VISIT OF THE MOST POPULAR AMERICAN OF THE DAY: THEODORE ROOSEVELT IN HUNGARY

ZOLTÁN PETERECZ

Eszterházy Károly College, Hungary
E-mail: zpeterecz@yahoo.com

It is a well-known fact that Theodore Roosevelt was and still is one of the most popular presidents of the United States. It is also somewhat known that he had a relatively brief, and relatively good relationship with Count Albert Apponyi, one of the most influential politicians of Hungary in the first three decades of the twentieth century. Perhaps a somewhat lesser known fact is that Roosevelt visited Hungary in 1910. As part of a European tour in the spring of that year, Theodore Roosevelt spent three days in Hungary. The courtesy visit was made into a huge and significant-looking event in Hungary behind which there were certain wishes, bitterness, and propaganda aims on the part of the Hungarian political leadership. Hungary hoped by the virtue of the ex-President's visit to prove the country's equal standing with Austria within the Dual Monarchy. Furthermore, the well-educated Roosevelt knew exactly what his hosts wanted to hear and, accordingly, although inadvertently, he kindled the flames of Hungarian independence, a concept with which he did not agree. The paper wishes to tell the story of Theodore Roosevelt's short stay in Hungary as well as the importance, and lack of consequences, of such a visit.

Keywords: Theodore Roosevelt, Hungary, Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Count Albert Apponyi, Hungarian–American relations

After Theodore Roosevelt¹ had left the presidency in 1909, he could not just stand or sit still. Driven by enormous amount of energy and childhood dreams, he set out on a months-long African hunting journey. After the conclusion of that trip, which resulted in various trophies and articles from the ex-president, Roosevelt turned his eyes on the European continent. He was coveted by basically every country in Europe and was hailed as the most popular and most influential person of the era. Though somewhat exaggerated as this statement may sound, there is some truth that Roosevelt was both popular and influential, which partly was thanks to the emergence of the United States as a burgeoning world power, which fact was made possible partially by Roosevelt himself.

It is little wonder then that Hungarians were very excited when it became known that the former president was going to pay a visit to the country. He was to

be the first former president to have visited the country,² and it served a much bigger purpose than a media event in the early twentieth century. It can be safely stated that Roosevelt's three-day visit in 1910, which was a stop on his European tour, put Hungary on the map of the political world after a long hiatus. Not since Kossuth's tour in the United States in 1851–52 had Hungary and Budapest been so often mentioned in the American press.

Theodore Roosevelt's visit was not important only in itself. Although Hungarians may have been accustomed to catching a glimpse of one or two kings and other high excellencies, such a prominent and popular person had never paid a visit earlier. The period, the pre-World War I years, meant the high point of Hungarian nationalism. The almost half century in the wake of The Compromise with Austria in 1867 had been spent by various Hungarian attempts to secure a larger independence within the Empire. This they wished to achieve by establishing the most evident appearance of a nation state. In this endeavor a prominent tool was the oppression of the various ethnic minorities, often their forced Hungarianization. Since the ratio of those minorities reached about 50% of the total population of Hungary, it is little surprise that the Hungarian political leadership from the late nineteenth century did everything in its power to arrest such a demographic tendency.

At the visit of Theodore Roosevelt this Hungarian effort was at its zenith. The leaders of the country welcomed every piece of possible positive propaganda in the belief that any such circumstance might mean a legitimate framework for Hungarian dominancy over other ethnicities in the Carpathian Basin. The minorities within Hungary craved for their own independent nation states at least with the same fervor, which in their eyes only seemed achievable by throwing off the Hungarian yoke. The Hungarians, therefore, thought that Roosevelt's visit came at the best possible moment, because the hosts interpreted the ex-presidential visit's stops as falling in the same category of importance, for example, Rome, Paris, London, and, perhaps most of all, Vienna. Although this was naturally a naïve and too optimistic understanding of the realities of the unofficial visit of a private person, it is still important to keep in mind that Hungary welcomed more than just an American who had held the highest office in his country earlier. The Hungarian leadership, and somewhat the population at large as well, anticipated a small-scale version of a modern-day Messiah in the person of Theodore Roosevelt. Through this prism must one observe the events concerning Roosevelt's visit to Europe and especially to Hungary, and investigate whether the three days here met with the high expectations, caused disappointment, or changed anything at all in the status quo, perhaps legitimized it to any degree.

It is important to note at the outset that at the momentous visit Hungary as a sovereign state did not exist and, on the other hand, the United States was still not an active participant as far as European political issues were concerned. Both of

these factors played a role in the fact that the relations between the two countries were in a budding form at best. Since within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy foreign affairs were a common ministry, one cannot speak of independent American–Hungarian relations. All forms of connections and information flow took place through the private sector. In this connection Count Albert Apponyi must be mentioned, who was probably the best known Hungarian statesman of the era, a respected political figure in the Western world. It is partially thanks to him that Roosevelt visited Hungary, while the other figure in this respect was Baron László Hengelmüller, ambassador of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to the United States.³ This again well underlines the fact that in diplomacy, or rather, in the lack of it, how important personal relations will become; how crucial it is whether next to the official and often rigid contacts that may exist between two states there are private channels.⁴

Theodore Roosevelt, the 26th president of the United States enjoyed a rare case of popularity, both at home and in foreign countries. In recent decades various rankings made by historians regularly put him in the first five among the presidents.⁵ Another sign of his popularity are his statue in front of the U.S. Capitol, and one of the four larger than life heads is his at Mount Rushmore. The secret for this popularity is manifold. Roosevelt is remembered as the first president who devoted his office to the progressive idea, started his trust busting policy, tried to improve low hygiene across the country, doubled the numbers of federally protected natural sites, or fought with some success governmental and municipality corruption. Furthermore, Roosevelt was also a learned historian and a prolific author mainly concerning the history of the United States in the nineteenth century. Aside from his books and articles, he often met with the people, and his being a great orator only increased his popularity. Another source of his popularity was his foreign policy. He firmly believed in a strong United States, which had a rightful place among the traditional European powers, but at the same time, he was an ardent nationalist and preached the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon peoples over other “backward” nations, especially in Latin America and Asia. Although these notions today are deemed politically unacceptable, a hundred years ago they were natural and coveted by large masses of Americans. Roosevelt believed in the triumph of war, and he personally took part in the Spanish-American War as a leader of the Rough Riders, a special military unit that he recruited. As president, Roosevelt was much more cautious in foreign policy, and can be described as an international realist. He always well chose where and to what extent to use American political influence or military power. His best-remembered political declaration is the Roosevelt Correlation to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904, in which he professed his belief that the United States ought to play the role of an international policeman in the Central American region, a concept that later was faithfully accepted and enlarged by his late successors.

Today, the judgment on Roosevelt has a dual nature. Although basically everybody recognizes his undoubtedly successfully presidential years, however, since World War II more and more historians have put emphasis on his qualities and views that are seen as incorrect today. First, however, it is worth taking a look at the opinions of some of Roosevelt's contemporaries. Mark Twain thought that "Our people have adored this showy charlatan as perhaps no impostor of his brood has been adored since the Golden Calf."⁶ H. G. Wells opined that Roosevelt

was the most vigorous brain in a conspicuously responsible position in all the world in 1906", whose "range of reading is amazing; he seems to be echoing with all the thought of the time, he has receptivity to the pitch of genius. And he does not merely receive, he digests and reconstructs; he thinks.⁷

Henry Adams wrote of the president that "his restless and combative energy was more than abnormal" he "showed the singular primitive quality that belongs to ultimate matter – the quality that mediaeval theology assigned to God – he was pure act".⁸

As a contrast, it serves well to observe some historians' view regarding Roosevelt. One of them summarized Roosevelt's character and political significance in the following manner:

A weird but decipherable combination of democrat, jingo, missionary and Anglo-Saxon, he had nothing but contempt for the argument that America should teach the world democracy by example alone.⁹

Perhaps Roosevelt's most eminent scholar, Edmund Morris, who devoted three bulky volumes to the whole life and career of Theodore Roosevelt, had this to say about the larger than life "Teddy":

He takes an almost mechanistic delight in the smooth workings of political power...With his clicking efficiency and inhuman energy, the President seems not unlike a piece of engineering himself.¹⁰

According to this biographer, Roosevelt's speeches were a typical amalgam of "aggression, vehemence, frankness, and authority, expressed in sentences a child could understand", while his attitude toward international affairs can be characterized as a "lifelong obsession with balance".¹¹ In 1906, in the First Moroccan crisis, for example, Roosevelt boldly asserted that as long as the balance of power was upheld by Britain in Europe, it was

well and good; should she however for some reason or other fail in doing so, the United States would be obliged to step in at least temporarily, in order to restore the balance of power in Europe, never mind

against which country or group of countries our efforts may have to be directed".¹²

After seven and a half years of presidency, Roosevelt decided against another term, although constitutionally he could have run, because he deemed the presidential tradition set up by George Washington binding on himself. Instead, he picked William Howard Taft as his successor, while he, now again as a "simple citizen", full of energy and crave for adventure, set out to realize some of his dreams. That is why he ventured on an almost year-long safari hunting trip in Africa in 1909, which served various aims: entertainment, science, and politics. The latter label got much stronger when it became certain that after the conclusion of his trip in Africa, Roosevelt was going on a shorter, but obviously much more significant trip all across Europe. His spring journey across the continent was a real media event: countless American and European newspapermen wrote basically about every move and utterances of the former president. The most prominent place was England, where Roosevelt, aside from his important university speeches, was to attend the funeral of Edward VII, who had passed away during the early phase of the tour. Norway was another important scene, where Roosevelt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his activities at bringing the Russo-Japanese peace under conclusion in 1905. Aside from these venues, Roosevelt met with Wilhelm II in Germany, the Italian king, Francis Joseph Austro-Hungarian emperor, and various other European prime ministers and dignitaries. Wherever he went, he was greeted with such reverence pomp as if he were a real king, partly because everybody was convinced that Roosevelt would be again the president of the United States. A small episode of this two-month European trip was Hungary and Budapest.¹³

In Hungary people and leaders alike looked forward to the approaching visit with excitement and high expectations. Quite a few kings and emperors had been guests in Hungary, but these were not always carefree and festive occasions. Despite the fact that since 1867 Hungary had been the number two nation within the Monarchy, and regardless the reality that it had extended its own dominance over different ethnic minorities inside the Carpathian Basin, Hungary could not be called an independent and sovereign state. It counted little that Hungary could boast of its own bicameral parliament when the three more important ministries with respect to independence, war, treasury, and foreign affairs were common, but mainly under the dominance of Vienna.¹⁴ As a result of this condition, the century-old dream of regaining total independence remained unfulfilled. Therefore, when Roosevelt had indicated that he would visit the country as a stop on his European tour, this bore significant propaganda value for Hungary and some loss of prestige for Vienna.

Roosevelt, somewhat in accordance with his ebullient and controversial personality, made headlines at his very first stop on his European tour. What he put to his friend Henry Cabot Lodge as “an elegant row”, was in fact a clash of religious free will and dogma, the prerogative of an American in the old world.¹⁵ At the visit to Rome the former president had been scheduled for an audience at the Pope after which he wanted to visit a Methodist church as well where he would have made a speech. Roosevelt, who himself belonged to the Dutch Reformed Church and was brought up in the aura of religious freedom in a country of multicolored faiths, thought that his plan was only natural. His idea, however, provoked vehement resentment on the part of the Vatican, which at every junction wished to consolidate its preeminence over other dominations. Roosevelt decided that he would at any rate explain to the American public why he insisted on either both visits or on neither, and pointed out that he was the friend of both Catholics and Protestants. He added that his being away from the United States made him once more realize that religious freedom was a fundamental right to any individual.¹⁶ Naturally, more was at stake here than meets the eye at first sight. For Roosevelt, the issue revolved around the question of the prestige of the United States, which question was always one of the most defining aspects for him. As he informed a close confidant, “No self-respecting American could allow his actions or his going and coming to be dictated to him by any Pope or King.”¹⁷ In the end, Roosevelt visited neither place; the Vatican was not willing to receive him, while the Methodist had issued a declaration in the meantime that was considered deprecative concerning the Vatican. In his own judgment, Roosevelt managed to have the best possible outcome of the controversy.¹⁸

The Hungarian journals at the conclusion of the former president’s Italian visit spread the major news: Theodore Roosevelt was coming soon. The first remarks proved already quite hyperbolic:

There is hardly a more popular name today in the world than that of Theodore Roosevelt. His assertive personality, commanding self-assuredness, and immaculate character did not only elevate him to the presidency of the United States, but ensured him a place in history as well.¹⁹

Since Roosevelt’s arrival was not due for another two weeks, it can be safely stated that the Hungarian media, and in all probability the nation at large, saw the event and especially Roosevelt’s person as of immense importance. In addition, the visit to Hungary came right in the wake of a few days in Vienna, and although the route was made in accordance with logistical prudence, the quick Vienna–Budapest axis offered a chance for all kinds of parallels between the two capitals and countries. Nevertheless, these two sites were only a warm-up to the really significant places on the agenda: Paris, Berlin, and in the end Cambridge and Oxford in

England, which meant the final stop of Roosevelt's European tour. But the above quoted lines from a Hungarian daily contained a lot of truth in the sense that Theodore Roosevelt was truly one of the most well-known and celebrated persons both in Europe and overseas. Wherever he went he was greeted with the highest respect, which was partly attributed to his country that had grown immensely in power during his presidential years; but the deference was also due on account of the visitor's humanistic, educated, progressive side as a popular former president. It is also worthwhile to mention that many political leaders in Europe were confident in predicting that Roosevelt would soon be president again, thus the extra will to entertain him and establish the best possible personal relationship.²⁰

In Vienna Roosevelt was met with even greater celebration than in Italy. Roosevelt remembered particularly two persons from his days in the Austrian capital: Francis Joseph, the Emperor, and Count Johann Wiltczek. The old sovereign made a positive impression on the American from a personal point of view. He recalled that he was "an interesting man", although not "a very able man, but he was a gentleman", and he also had good instincts.²¹ However, Roosevelt deemed Archduke Franz Ferdinand "a furious reactionary in every way, political and ecclesiastical both".²² The conversation between the former president and the still active Austrian emperor was mainly about politics and hunting, in which subjects both men had plenty of experience. Francis Joseph made a sharp observation when he labeled himself as "the last representative of the old system", while to him Roosevelt "embodied the new movement, the movement of the present and the future".²³ Next day's lunch at Count Wiltczek proved once again how advantageous the immense information that he had learned in his youth could be. Roosevelt's photographic memory stored the once seemingly unnecessary names and dates, and now, decades later, he was able to profit from them. When he laid eyes on a wall of a portrait of István Báthory, he could instantly place the man in the history of Central and Eastern Europe, to the utter amazement of his host.

During his stay at Vienna, Roosevelt visited a Hungarian hussar regiment stationed there. As a war veteran, who had always been fascinated by the glory attainable on the battlefield, he was naturally attracted to everything that was in connection with the military. His "rough riders" in the Spanish-American War in Cuba were in many ways similar to the Hungarian hussars, at least Roosevelt saw it that way. It was little surprise then that both the soldiers and their horses received his rapt attention, and he took pride in the fact that he was "received with the most genuine cordiality as a fellow soldier".²⁴ And it is even more understandable that the Hungarian newspapers reported this piece of news as a major event. One of them emphasized that the things that mostly "captured his attention in Vienna were two Hungarian features: the Hungarian part of the hunting exposition and the Hungarian hussars".²⁵ Another paper quoted Roosevelt as allegedly enthusiastically saying after the hussar meeting: "It was grand! I would be really

happy to lead such a regiment.”²⁶ Roosevelt’s close attraction to horses was interpreted in Hungary as a twin feature of the basic Hungarian trait concerning horses. And this set the tone for the media voices for the next few days: they tried to find some positive point that might move the swing in favor of Hungary as opposed to the Austrians and Germans.

Roosevelt, with his indispensable pince-nez, arrived in Hungary on April 17. In Pozsony he and his son, Kermit, were greeted by Count Albert Apponyi. The two men had known each other for a number of years. Apponyi was usually the leader of the Hungarian delegation to the Inter-Parliamentary Union.²⁷ The 12th Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, which took place in the United States, on which occasion Apponyi paid a visit to Roosevelt at the latter’s house in Oyster Bay.²⁸ The relationship that started there and lasted about ten years can be said to have been good. As one of the scholars of this era put it, it was “one of the most important links in the American-Hungarian relations before World War I”, which proved to be “one of the most shining and interesting chapters of American-Hungarian relations”.²⁹ Despite these claims, Roosevelt had a truly complex opinion about Apponyi.

One year after his visit to Hungary, Roosevelt wrote about Apponyi in a confidential private letter. By the nature of the writing, we can be assured that these are the most honest words that Roosevelt ever put on paper about the Hungarian statesman. As an opening, he clearly stated that Apponyi was “a really fine fellow”, who “represented a type of Liberal much more common in Continental Europe prior to 1848 than at present; but in some ways, purely Hungarian”. Moreover, the Hungarian Count impressed the former president as “not only an advanced Liberal in matters political but also in matters ecclesiastical”. Roosevelt was especially impressed by the fact that despite his devout Catholicism Apponyi made serious friendships with Protestants, and thought that Apponyi “was like an American Liberal of the best type”. At the same time, however, Roosevelt emphasized Apponyi’s doctrinaire composition:

He was in theory an almost irrational advocate of immediate international peace... and yet he represented the violent and extreme Hungarian party which was practically working for a separation from Austria that would probably bring war.

As he put it, Apponyi “was shocked and puzzled by finding that a large number of Hungarian Slavs regarded his attitude, and the attitude of the Magyars, toward them as itself an attitude of pure oppression”. In all likelihood Roosevelt understood well why their relation was so friendly:

One reason why he and the other Hungarian politicians whom I met got on well with me was probably the fact that I knew a good deal of Hungarian history and Hungarian constitutional claims.³⁰

The overture in Pozsony set the tone for Roosevelt's whole stay in Hungary. The enthusiastic crowd that he experienced here was only a taste of what was in store. As one person of his entourage recalled,

the Hungarians, eager for their independence, shouted themselves hoarse at sight of the representative of American independence. Wherever he went the masses in the cities crowded round him and the people in the country flocked to cheer him as he passed.³¹

The high expectations sometimes resulted in undue exaggerations. One Hungarian newspaperman thought he had heard Roosevelt whisper to the correspondent of the *New York Herald*, "At last I am among friends!"³² The former president's first speech in front of the Hungarian audience did not disappoint.



Teddy in Budapest

Source: Gruelle in the Cleveland Press.

He praised the Hungarian nation on account of its history. He also found a parallel between the two nations because of the love of horses. He easily stimulated the people with such lines as “There is certain intrepidity, freedom, and enthusiasm in the Hungarian character that I always found admirable.”³³ Every such sentence, which was translated to the audience one by one, was greeted by tumultuous applause, and this was the impression with which he started to Apponyi’s estate at Éberhard for lunch and a little rest. Along the way they passed many small villages and it struck Roosevelt as strange that in every village people spoke another language: Hungarian, German, or Slovakian.³⁴ This experience provided him with proof for the colorful ethnicity of Hungary and further convinced him that Hungary’s leaving the Monarchy would lead to war. The conversation between Roosevelt and Apponyi is a mystery in the sense that there is no record about it. The only thing that seems certain is that Apponyi signaled to Roosevelt that he would welcome the American’s help in having the *Outlook* (Roosevelt’s unofficial newspaper outlet) use Apponyi as its Hungarian correspondent.³⁵ After a short rest Roosevelt was on the road again and arrived in Budapest at late evening, the obviously most important scene of his Hungarian trip.

According to eyewitnesses, despite the rain and the late time of the arrival of Roosevelt, people lined up from the railway station all the way to the central square. After many handshakes Mayor István Bárczy welcomed the prominent guest. In his acceptance speech Roosevelt chose a tone similar to the one at Pozsony:

I am not only a friend but a true admirer of the Hungarian nation. In your welcome you said I was the friend of Hungarians; well, by this you also said the friend of freedom; since, as far as I know, the Hungarian nation has always belonged to the most freedom-loving peoples. I can only repeat that I am surprised at the distinguished and honorable welcome and I am honest when I say that I cannot find words to express my thanks and gratitude. Hurray for Hungary”³⁶

It is easy to imagine that the people present were delighted and “indescribable enthusiasm came over the crowd”.³⁷ After this celebration the illustrious guest went to his lodging at the Hotel Hungaria, where he held a quick press conference for the English-speaking reporters. Such media outlets had their correspondent follow Roosevelt’s trip in Hungary as the *Associated Press*, the *New York World*, the *New York Sun*, the *Chicago Tribune*, and the *London Daily Mail*.

The program of the second day was just as busy, but Roosevelt was famous for both his fervor and the accompanying energy: a program that would have been exhausting for someone else for him was average. He visited the Royal Palace, the office of the Prime Minister, then again the Palace after which came, as it turned

out, the high point of not only the day but that of the whole trip. This small episode cemented his reputation for a long time to come in Hungary, and in the interwar years his words uttered here were often recalled as proof of Hungary's proper place in the world.

Roosevelt paid a visit to the Parliament, where, thanks to the organization of Count Apponyi, he was the guest of honor at the meeting of the Hungarian members of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference. The impromptu speech that he performed here made the already very popular former president practically a superstar in the eyes of all Hungarians. Although only the newspapers printed what Roosevelt said, since there was no difference among these accounts there is no reason to doubt that the American did say the following words:

I do not only respect and hold sympathy for Hungary but I am also an admirer of her, because I know that throughout the history of Hungary there are several lessons that are worth while for us and every other nation to learn. From these we can learn the lesson of bravery and the lesson of iron resolve and perseverance. Gentlemen! The whole civilized world is indebted to Hungary for her work. When America was still in Europe's womb, Hungary was protecting the safety of the civilized world by preventing barbarism from spreading. The merit belongs to your ancestors since it was they who repelled those attacks which were coming from the barbaric world and were aiming at Western culture, since it was their bodies that stopped the advance of barbarism. Washington's nation in the large cities of the Western Hemisphere still looks with admiration at your great, brave, and noble kings, at the glorious soldiers fighting in Transylvania and on both sides of the Danube, and at those many triumphant victories that they fought. There is no more illustrious history than that of the Hungarian nation. I know this history and I would not deem myself an educated man if I did not know it.³⁸

It is natural that after these words, which were often interrupted by applause, "there was an ovation lasting for several minutes".³⁹

It is clear that when the speech appeared in the newspaper columns the echo was a huge collective joy on part of the Hungarian readers. It is easy to understand that a nation that had been vying and craving for independence again for centuries now thought that at last it had found an apparent benefactor, or at least a prominent politician from overseas, someone from the New World who knew and understood the stormy but glorious past of Hungarian history. One of the Hungarian newspapers put it right when it summarized why Roosevelt proved so sympathetic in Hungarian eyes:

This one man's testimony compensates us for the twisted and poisonous opinion of half the world, because there is more moral weight and human truth in it than in the superficiality of misled millions”⁴⁰

Although Roosevelt's words do sound as a statement for propaganda consumption, consciously prepared for a target audience, there is no reason to assume that he did not speak what he really thought and meant. From his early studies he was really knowledgeable about the history of Hungary, which knowledge now served him very well. Furthermore, these were not scripted words; the former president improvised, that is, he had not prepared a speech but reacted on the spur of the moment. Obviously his wide range of knowledge, oratorical skills, and many years in the limelight made it for him easier to formulate those sentences. Still, he was honest in uttering them and it is little wonder that they created enormously positive feedback.

There were various reasons why it was in the interest of the host country to have a positive Hungarian-picture by Roosevelt. One of them, the most apparent, was any support for the cause of Hungarian independence. As it was pointed out earlier, Roosevelt was of the opinion that the dual Monarchy was the practical path from a geopolitical point of view. When three years after his Hungarian trip the former president wrote a short preface to László Hengelmüller's, the former and first minister from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, book on Hungary, Roosevelt did not miss to express this thought again. Although he once more expounded the maxim that “establishment of Hungary as a bulwark against further Asiatic invasion of Europe”, he added,

All wise and far-seeing men earnestly hope for the continuation of the Dual Empire, the Empire Kingdom in which the same man is Emperor of Austria and Apostolic King of Hungary.⁴¹

Thus, Hungarians had to be content with the laudation of their past, but this was no small solace: the nation that was starving for proper foreign recognition sucked up Roosevelt's words. It is also of some importance to note here that Roosevelt, too, found the positive role for Hungarians in their fights against barbarians from the east; this was the link that connected them with the West. During the long struggle against the Turks Hungary slowly drifted to the brink of total collapse as a state while Western Europe escaped the worst. But one ought not to forget either that until that historic calamity commenced, Hungarians were not either very welcomed or esteemed in the western part of Europe. As soon as though it sacrificed itself for a “higher” standard of civilization, it was promptly exalted, it achieved respect, and became the “bastion of Christianity”. It is largely thanks to Pope Pius II in the middle of the fifteenth century that this notion widely spread and Hungary became the stereotype of a defense line both in Western European and Hungarian

eyes.⁴² As this respect and esteem started to fade, Hungarians were very grateful when a leading citizen of the United States repeated those praises.

The other aspect that bears some significance is the multitude of Hungarians who had emigrated to the United States. From the 1880s the number of immigrants from Eastern Europe grew steadily and Hungary was no exception. In Hungary it was a widespread belief that the president in power had a defining say concerning the situation of the huge wave coming to the shores of the United States. It is obvious that in the beginning of the twentieth century few Hungarians knew and understood the constitutional rules and practice of the overseas country, and in light of this it is little surprise that such ideas could be read as “We need his [Theodore Roosevelt’s] sympathy; we see some insurance in this with regard to the fate of our blood overseas.”⁴³ Since Roosevelt had good relations with the Republican division of the Hungarian colony in New York City, as with countless similar such groups, many people in Hungary came to the conclusion that he must be a friend of Hungary. This notion was only strengthened by the widely held belief that “Roosevelt, the quintessential Yankee, the prototypical American, possessed Hungarian characteristics in many ways”.⁴⁴ These traits were courage, impulsiveness, good heart, and, of course, his horse-riding nature. All these well represent how naïve pre-World War I Hungarians were in their perception of the world at large, how much they were longing for recognition, and how utterly they disregarded hard realities.

The rest of the program was as busy as colorful. After brunch at the Palace as the guest of Archduke Joseph, Roosevelt paid a visit to Ferenc Kossuth, leader of the Kossuth Party. The former president immensely enjoyed the tour at the Agricultural Museum after which he visited sculptor György Zala. During his conversation with the artist, the topic turned to Hungarian literature. When Mór Jókai’s name came up, Roosevelt said:

Where is Mikszáth? I have read in English translation one of his novels, *The Umbrella of St. Peter's*. I very much would like to meet with Mikszáth.⁴⁵

Indeed, a casual meeting was arranged for the evening, an occasion what a scholar termed “an essential building block in the history of Hungarian-American ties”.⁴⁶ Then came the Washington statue in the City Park, which was unveiled four years earlier, and Roosevelt was the first prominent American public figure to lay a wreath on it. Later he had late lunch with the local American colony at the American Consul General’s residence. When he had returned to his lodging, first he met a delegation of priest students, than he found time for American, British, and Hungarian journalists alike. Since a large mass of people continually cheered his name, he stepped out on the balcony and one more time addressed the people. Cal

O'Laughlin, one of the journalists that accompanied Roosevelt, recorded this event in the following, somewhat hyperbolic fashion:

With every expression there was a shout which rolled over the berg across the river and came back in a thundering echo. I have seen many demonstrations, but that one by the Danube has not been surpassed in my experience.⁴⁷

The evening offered a sumptuous dinner at the Park Club, where everybody who counted was present. The program of the day ended at the National Casino, while the next morning Roosevelt travelled to Bábolna to see the famous local animal farm.



“Here’s the Lion-Hunter”
– And the stone lions are fleeing for their lives!

Source: Kakas Márton (Budapest).

When it was time to say goodbye, Roosevelt's farewell followed the well-established pattern of the last two days: he praised his hosts and with that he only managed to increase the already immense sympathy that was his share.

I will always think of you with the utmost gratitude, and as long as I live, I will cherish these memories, and everywhere I go I will be the spokesman of the Hungarian nation, because I know that the best way to praise it is describe their true nature. I will work on it that the Hungarian people should receive everywhere the respect and esteem that are their due.⁴⁸

It is a well-known fact that Theodore Roosevelt had great oratorical gifts. His speeches were typically of great design and well formulated. This was no different during his stay in Hungary. Of course, that tells something about the lack of importance of Hungary that Roosevelt's speeches here were not pre-written and well-composed performances in sharp contrast to his speeches held in Berlin, Oslo, Paris, or those in England. While those were well thought out, carefully structured, and painstakingly edited orations, the Hungarian speeches were improvised, the given moment being their impetus. As he himself said to a journalist after his famous Parliament speech,

to tell the truth, I did not prepare for it. As I was going to the meeting of the conference, I did not know what I was going to say, but Count Apponyi's speech, the moment, and the environment all gave me some inspiration and, as a consequence, they created sublime feelings and soaring thoughts in me.⁴⁹

Obviously Roosevelt was very prepared, as a professional public figure and speaker ought to be, and Roosevelt was just that to the core. He knew very well what he was supposed to say in each country, what the given people may have wished to hear from him. Still, it is essential to note that not only were his speeches in Hungary that of an impromptu nature, but neither were those made in Rome or Vienna composed in advance. So, as a matter of importance, these countries or cities did not achieve the same rank as the great capitals of the West, either: Berlin, Paris, or London.

At any rate, irrespective of how elaborate they were, whether they were well-composed or really improvised in the heat of the moment, one thing is certain: they landed in the heart of the Hungarian audience and readership. This can be attributed both to Roosevelt's self-assured but easygoing and friendly style and his thorough knowledge of Hungarian history. His familiarity with the latter, such as the relationship between Hungarians and Austrians or Croats, came from his youth, but he did believe that "any ordinary scholar with a good second-hand

knowledge of history is acquainted with all this as a matter of course; but among politicians the one-eyed is apt to be king – so far as concerns foreign history”. This American politician understood that Hungarians appreciated so much the mentioning of their heroes of the past because he himself saw a parallel with the former American experience in this field.

Evidently they felt as regards the ignorance they encountered concerning their own national history when they went to Berlin, Paris, or London, much as an American felt forty or fifty years ago, when he found that Europe quite simply ignored the men and events that he had believed to be of capital importance.

As he further put it,

it was the feeling of injured dignity natural to the man who does not like to have his cherished heroes and their deeds treated as provincial, and who is not as yet sufficiently self-confident to realize that such treatment reflects, not on him or them, but on those who really show themselves provincial by failing to appreciate the fundamental importance of what has happened outside their own kin.

The proof that Roosevelt indeed had a good mental insight into the Hungarian soul may be found in his following lines:

To a Hungarian the fact that the Golden Bull was analogous to the Great Charter, and was issued about the same time that the latter was signed, seemed of such interest that he could not understand an Englishman never having heard of the said Golden Bull; and in consequence he was much pleased to find that an ex-President from across the ocean had heard about it, and knew for instance that it solemnly reserved to the nobles the right of revolution if the king misbehaved himself.⁵⁰

Therefore, Roosevelt not only proved himself a good historian who was able to cite certain facts at random notice, but he was a master psychologist at the same time.

If one studies the speeches that Roosevelt made in Western Europe, one can find nuances that make it clear that although the speeches in Hungary were spontaneous in fact, the main points of them were well within certain boundaries that had been laid down before. The three most significant stops on his European tour, Paris, Berlin, and Oxford, were written well in advance. For instance, in Paris, a few days after the warm words for the Hungarian audience, Roosevelt mentioned that “probably the best test of true love of liberty in any country [is] in the way in which minorities are treated in that country”.⁵¹ He elegantly avoided any such

topic while in Hungary. With another thought though, the one that he expressed at Oxford, the Hungarian political elite would have been in much agreement, and Roosevelt's following line would have been welcomed in Hungary:

In the long run there can be no justification for one race managing or controlling another unless the management and control are exercised in the interest and for the benefit of that other race.⁵²

Roosevelt knew the Hungarian past and present much more than to arouse such charged emotions. Moreover, as for the time being, he believed with his whole heart in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy being held together, therefore alone his geopolitical views would not have been a proper basis, on the one hand, to incite the minorities living in Hungary, who made up almost half of the total population, and to offend his Hungarian hosts on the other.

How should then Theodore Roosevelt's Hungarian trip be evaluated, especially with a view on American-Hungarian relations? It was by all means a significant event, because this was the first time that a former president had visited Hungary. Furthermore, this took place at the juncture when the United States had become a world power, even if its potential did not reach its limits and many in Hungary could not appreciate what this new and energetic country would be capable of in the future. It must be emphasized again that Hungary was not a sovereign, independent state, and that Roosevelt came to Hungary not in an official capacity but only for a friendly short stay, so his few days here did not bear significantly on diplomatic or political questions. That is a different question that in Hungary many people wanted to magnify the obvious importance of the former president's visit, thereby ensuring larger prestige to the Kingdom of Hungary. It can be stated that a country that remained part of the east but wanted to become somehow part of the west, a country that partly on account of the aforementioned fact had a certain amount of inferiority complex, a country that was full on insecurity – all these symptoms can be diagnosed in the overvaluation of Roosevelt's days in Hungary. It is undisputable that Budapest was Roosevelt's most eastern stop, in itself an achievement for Hungary, and it was on the same rank of importance as Italy, Austria, or Denmark. But it is also beyond doubt that Count Albert Apponyi and his relationship with the former president played a large role why Roosevelt picked Hungary as a place to visit; without such an influence there probably would have been no Hungarian stop on the European tour. In any event, by spending almost three days in Hungary, Roosevelt gave an enormous uplift to the Hungarian nation and politics alike, even if this could not be converted into hard political currency. Still, after 60 years of the Kossuth-tour in the United States, the American-Hungarian relations were started in many ways with Theodore Roosevelt, and his Hungarian visit in 1910 was an important stop of this evolution.

Notes

- ¹ Theodore Roosevelt (1858–1919) is still very popular both in the eye of the American public and among American historians. Some of the major works dealing with his life and presidency are George E. Mowry, *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America, 1900–1912*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1962); William H. Harbaugh, *Power and Responsibility: The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1961); Edmund Morris, *The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1979); David McCullough, *Mornings on Horseback: The Story of an Extraordinary Family, a Vanished Way of Life, and the Unique Child Who Became Theodore Roosevelt* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981); Lewis L. Gould, *The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1991); Edmund Morris, *Theodore Rex* (New York: Random House, 2001); Edmund Morris, *Colonel Roosevelt* (New York, 2010), and Lewis L. Gould, *Theodore Roosevelt* (Oxford University Press, 2012).
- ² The first president in office who paid an official visit to Hungary was George Bush in 1989.
- ³ Zsolt K. Virágos, Mikszáth and Roosevelt, in *Hungarian-American Ties. Essays and Studies in Intercultural Links and Contacts*, ed. by Zsolt K. Virágos (Debrecen: Debrecen University Press, 2013), 272.
- ⁴ In the English-language historiography, Roosevelt's visit is hardly mentioned. The three works that I know of are Imre Major Mark, *American Hungarian Relations 1918–1944* (Astor, FL: Danubian Press, Inc., 1974); Tibor Glant, *Through the Prism of the Habsburg Monarchy: Hungary in American Diplomacy and Public Opinion during the First World War*. War and Society in East Central Europe, vol. XXXVI (Highland Lakes, NJ: Atlantic Research and Publications Inc., 1998; distributed by Columbia University Press); and Morris, *Colonel Roosevelt*.
- ⁵ As an average result of the last four such surveys, Roosevelt has the distinguished 4th place. Nate Silver, “Contemplating Obama’s Place in History, Statistically”, *The New York Times*, January 23, 2013. <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/contemplating-obamas-place-in-history-statistically/> [Accessed April 12, 2013.]
- ⁶ Mark Twain to Walter Bliss, March 6, 1908, reprinted in *The New York Times*, May 31, 1912.
- ⁷ H. G. Wells, *Experiment and Autobiography* (New York: Macmillan, 1934), 649; and Wells, *The Future in America: A Search after Realities* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1906), 248.
- ⁸ Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams* (New York: The Heritage Press, 1942), 389.
- ⁹ Clinton Rossiter, “The American Mission”, *The American Scholar*, vol. 20, no. 1 (Winter 1950–51), 26.
- ¹⁰ Morris, *The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt*, xxi.
- ¹¹ Ibid., 520; Morris, *Theodore Rex*, 383.
- ¹² Quoted in Michael Lind, *The American Way of Strategy* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 93.
- ¹³ In more detail about Roosevelt's European trip, see Morris: *Colonel Roosevelt*, 40–79.
- ¹⁴ As Pál Pritz showed, however, in the domain of foreign policy, the Hungarian interests were better represented than typically thought earlier. Pál Pritz, “Két elvtárs – két mentalitás” [Two Comrades – Two Mentalities], In: Pritz, Pál, *Magyar diplomácia a két világháború között* [Hungarian Diplomacy between the Two World Wars] (Budapest, Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 1995), 9.
- ¹⁵ Henry F. Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1931), 513.
- ¹⁶ Theodore Roosevelt, “A Message to the American People”, *The Outlook*, April 3, 1910.
- ¹⁷ William Roscoe Thayer, *Theodore Roosevelt: An Intimate Biography* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1919), 323.

- ¹⁸ Joseph Bishop Bucklin, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time Shown in His Own Letters*, Vol. 2 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920), 200. To the Vatican affair, also see Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt*, 513–15.
- ¹⁹ *Budapesti Hírlap*, April 8, 1910, vol. 30, no. 81.
- ²⁰ Theodore Roosevelt did indeed try one more time to reach the presidency, but in 1912 he lost to the Democrat Woodrow Wilson.
- ²¹ Bucklin, *Theodore Roosevelt*, 216.
- ²² Morris, *Colonel Roosevelt*, 43.
- ²³ Bucklin, *Theodore Roosevelt*, 216.
- ²⁴ Bucklin, *Theodore Roosevelt*, 218.
- ²⁵ *Budapesti Hírlap*, April 19, 1910, vol. 30, no. 92.
- ²⁶ *Magyarország*, April 17, 1910, vol. 17, no. 91.
- ²⁷ About Apponyi's Inter-Parliamentary experiences see Albert Apponyi, *The Memoirs of Count Apponyi*, 1935, C2/3310 [Központi raktár] 229–231, 235
- ²⁸ In more detail about this meeting, see Tibor Glant, Roosevelt, Apponyi és a Habsburg Monarchia [Roosevelt, Apponyi, and the Habsburg Monarchy], *Századok*, vol. 131, no. 6 (1997): 1388–89. On Apponyi's tour in the United States and his own account of the meeting with Roosevelt, see Apponyi, *Memoirs*, 130–44.
- ²⁹ Glant, *Roosevelt*, 1399, 1400.
- ³⁰ The quotations in the paragraph come from a letter from Roosevelt to George Otto Trevelyan Bart, October 1, 1911, quoted in Bucklin, *Theodore Roosevelt*, 220, 221, and 222. Roosevelt's whole account of his visit to Hungary is in *Ibid.*, 220–6.
- ³¹ Thayer, *Theodore Roosevelt*, 324.
- ³² *Budapesti Hírlap*, April 19, 1910, vol. 30, no. 92.
- ³³ Ibid.
- ³⁴ Morris, *Colonel Roosevelt*, 44.
- ³⁵ Glant, *Roosevelt*, 1392. This request provided Apponyi only with somewhat unfulfilled publication possibilities.
- ³⁶ *Budapesti Hírlap*, April 19, 1910, vol. 30, no. 92.
- ³⁷ Ibid.
- ³⁸ *Budapesti Hírlap*, April 19, 1910, vol. 30, no. 92.
- ³⁹ Ibid.
- ⁴⁰ *Budapesti Hírlap*, April 19, 1910, vol. 30, no. 92. The created foreign "Hungarian picture" offers an interesting comparison with Hungary's political position today within the European Union, especially if one recalls Roosevelt's question to Count Apponyi at their meeting in Hungary: "Why are foreign countries angry with you, Hungarians?" Quoted in József Kerekesházy, *Apponyi* (Budapest: Singer & Wolfner, 1943), 193. This should be the topic of another study.
- ⁴¹ Theodore Roosevelt's Preface to Ladislas Baron Hengelmüller, *Hungary's Fight for National Existence, or The History of the Great Uprising Led by Francis Rakoczi II. 1703–1711* (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1913), xv–xvi.
- ⁴² József Marton, Magyarország képe és megítélése Enea Silvio Piccolomini életművében [The Picture and Judgment of Hungary in the Oeuvre of Enea Silvio Piccolomini], *Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények*, vol. 110, no. 5 (2006): 468–76.
- ⁴³ *Magyarország*, April 19, 1910, vol. 17, no. 93.
- ⁴⁴ *Pesti Hírlap*, April 19, 1910, vol. 32, no. 92.
- ⁴⁵ *Budapesti Hírlap*, April 19, 1910, vol. 30, no. 92. A short meeting took place the following day at the Hotel Hungaria.

- ⁴⁶ Virágos, Mikszáth and Roosevelt, 271. Mikszáth died five weeks later in the wake of pneumonia he had contracted the year before.
- ⁴⁷ Morris, *Colonel Roosevelt*, 45.
- ⁴⁸ *Budapesti Hírlap*, April 20, 1910, vol. 30, no. 93.
- ⁴⁹ *Pesti Hírlap*, April 19, 1910, vol. 32, no. 92.
- ⁵⁰ The quotations of the paragraph are from Bucklin, *Theodore Roosevelt*, 222 and 223.
- ⁵¹ Theodore Roosevelt, The Man in the Arena, Speech at the Sorbonne, Paris, France, April 23, 1910, <http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/trsorbonnespeech.html> [Accessed September 24, 2013.]
- ⁵² Theodore Roosevelt, *Biological Analogies in History*, delivered before the University of Oxford, June 7, 1910, (London: Henry Frowde, 1910), 41.

FORGOTTEN ERA, FORGOTTEN PEOPLE: THE NORTH KOREAN DIASPORA

BOGOOK KIM

Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
Republic of Korea
E-mail: kimbogook@hufs.ac.kr

Since the middle of the 1990s, more than 25,000 North Koreans have settled in South Korea, and researchers estimate that a further 20,000 North Korean refugees have migrated mainly to China, Southeast Asia, America, and Europe. Many of these refugees cite economic factors as the main motive for their escape, which more or less coincided with the North Korean famine, but before the 1990s there were two other periods that saw relatively large-scale emigration from North Korea, which occurred for other reasons. This paper identifies and compares the three periods, using archival sources from Korea, Hungary, and the former Soviet Union. It also uses the representative case of a North Korean medical student in Hungary to provide a unique perspective on a number of important historical events, including the August Incident in North Korea and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.

Keywords: Korean Diaspora, Hungarian Revolution, Korean War, Soviet Union, confidential documents of foreign affairs, National Archives of Hungary and Korea

Introduction

The history of the Korean Diaspora could be said to have begun with the fall of Gojoseon around the 108 B.C. or when many displaced people moved to Japan after Baekje fell in 660. Because of many national disturbances, such as the Japanese invasion of 1592 and political disruption at the end of the 19th century, many Koreans established themselves overseas, either voluntarily or by compulsion, after turning their backs on their own country. Today they constitute a Korean Diaspora around the world, in places like America, China, Japan, and Russia. One argument about the Korean Diaspora that has never been resolved relates to the North Korean Diaspora. There is a range of opinion on the subject,¹ starting from whether North Korean Diaspora can even be regarded as a diaspora² in the traditional sense. Terms like “North Korean defectors”, “North Korean immigrants”, “North Korean refugees”, and “North Korean migrants” are used widely to describe North Koreans who have left North Korea. This study defines the North

Korean Diaspora as those North Koreans who escaped from North Korea after the government was established or who settled down overseas after rejecting orders to return. The study recognizes the aforementioned diversity of opinion regarding the application of the term diaspora but uses it to avoid confusing future researchers by creating another term. The application of the term is diachronic and restricts its use to “Wollamin”, mainly the escapees who defected to South Korea before and after the establishment of the North Korean government in 1948 and during the Korean War; “defected veterans”, who escaped to South Korea after the war ended; “refugees” who escaped to foreign countries from North Korea; and “North Korean defectors” since the early 1990s. After the North Korean government was established, many immigrants established North Korean diasporic communities in South Korea or elsewhere, such as China, the Soviet Union (Russia), and Southeast Asia. When the present North Korean Diaspora is compared to that of the past, economic factors are more significant in explaining their formation than used to be the case.³

The data and studies on those who escaped North Korea after the establishment of the North Korean government and during the Korean War are growing continuously, especially on the diaspora that has arisen since the early 1990s; studies on the earlier diaspora, from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s, are fewer. Strictly speaking the diaspora comprised of mainly war orphans and students studying abroad, who were accepted by countries like the former Soviet Union, China, and many of the East European countries. After the North Korean government ordered them to return, some of them defied the order and remained in these countries or fled to other places as North Korean diasporas. The number of refugees who fled to Europe was not large, and most of those involved turned their backs on North Korea for ideological reasons. The main reason for the inadequacy of research on them could be insufficient data.

Much of the data that was previously difficult to access is now available to the public, following the removal of the so-called Iron Curtain across the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Many of the better studies were made possible by the availability of the new data. This diaspora is particularly worth studying because it explains the reasons behind the disruption of the diasporic process, which only resumed in the mid-1990s.

This study divides the diaspora into three main periods. In order to analyze the communities that were established in Europe from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s – the second period – the study examines the life of a North Korean student studying abroad. The study makes use of Hungarian diplomatic documents from the National Archives of Hungary (NAH) and Korean diplomatic documents from the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea (DAROK). This case study exemplifies a pattern of refusals to return by students studying abroad in Eastern Europe including those in the Soviet Union

that was so common that a case can be made for treating those who fled during this period as a separate diaspora. The study also examines how cases such as this one, occurring within the context of a changing Eastern Europe, affected the North Korean government. It also explores how North Korean students overseas viewed the world at the time and identifies common features among North Korean diasporas that have until now been regarded as separate and distinct.

The Three Periods of the North Korean Diaspora

As has been mentioned above, this study recognizes that the meaning of the term “North Korean Diaspora” is open to contestation, so the term is used with a restricted meaning, limiting its application to those who possessed North Korean citizenship once the North Korean government was established and who sought new homes outside North Korea. The diaspora is categorized into three periods. The first period covers the years from the establishment of the North Korean government in 1948 to the end of the Korean War in 1953. This period could be subdivided into before/after 1948 and the Korean War (1950–53),⁴ but since the periods are connected and most of the migrants moved to South Korea, it is treated as one period.⁵ The number involved could be anything from 500,000 to 4.5 million people, depending on classification, but South Korean scholars estimate the number to be between 550,000 and 650,000.⁶ Because those involved moved to South Korea, which had the same language and culture, it is reasonable to dispute the use of the term diaspora in its usual sense.⁷ However, whether or not South and North Korea recognize each other as independent countries, the ambivalent attitude that the Wollamin displayed meet the criteria for diaspora as defined by Mudimbe and Engel,⁸ who employ an expanded concept of the term. It certainly would not be a stretch to include the Wollamin in the North Korean Diaspora on the basis of Tölöyan’s definition of the term,⁹ which expands to include immigrants, expatriates, guest workers, exile communities, overseas communities, and ethnic communities.

After the Korean War ended, many North Koreans left their homes and moved abroad, but while the timing of their departure is connected to the end of the war, this study assigns them to a different period because most of them were sent abroad under government direction. The migrants from this period belong, for the most part, to one of two groups: war orphans sent abroad to be educated¹⁰ and young North Koreans sent overseas to other socialist countries to acquire skills to help restore postwar Korea. The number involved could be more than 30,000 people, but data sources are insufficient in number and disagree.¹¹ Moreover, what data we have comes from personal sources; legitimate, scholarly studies that put them into context in relation to North Korea are lacking. Of course, research

should include the accounts of those involved, as well as data from North Korea and the countries targeted for education and study, but this has not been possible because the data has not been accessed – except for a few countries like the Soviet Union, China, and Japan – and because the oral statements are not diverse or sufficient enough. Nevertheless, research is still being carried out, and it has become easier because of accessibility to data concerning those who stayed in the Soviet Union, China, and Japan, which provide relatively more people for research. Such studies as there are, however, deal with their subjects as returnees rather than as members of the North Korean Diaspora. Of course, it would be unreasonable to include all North Korean emigrants as members of the diaspora,¹² because many of them left North Korea temporarily and their return was prearranged, even if precise dates were not set. Those who rejected the order to return to North Korea or who chose not to return and settled in a foreign country could be seen as members of the diaspora, however, and this study deals with them. From what we know, most North Korean Diaspora groups from this period formed in the Soviet Bloc countries, but also Japan and China. It is presumed that the number decreased rapidly after North Korea's forced repatriation measures, which continued from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s. Some North Koreans disobeyed the government and still live abroad, as citizens of their host countries, as stateless individuals, or as South Korean citizens. From the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, there was nothing resembling the previous outflow of manpower from North Korea. Many students were sent abroad to study in Europe and the United States, particularly in the 1980s,¹³ but we can assume that their management was very strict, and it would be appropriate to regard them as participants in one country's special but ordinary activities, be it short-term study abroad or overseas deployment of manpower.

The third period of the diaspora covers the period from the mid-1990s to the present. Research on the period is accumulating steadily. The number of North Koreans who settled in South Korea increased significantly in 1992, and by 2013, the number had reached 26,124.¹⁴ It is estimated that there are between 12,000 and 20,000 escapees in China¹⁵ and that several thousand more have settled in the United States, Canada, and Europe.¹⁶ Most of them were pursuing a better economic life; this period of the diaspora began during North Korea's food shortages in the mid-1990s and accelerated after the United States enacted the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004¹⁷ and the West officially recognized the status of North Korean escapees. The number of those escaping has dropped recently because of new measures introduced by the North Korean government to prevent escape, but many experts believe it will not be able to contain its citizens' desire to escape for very long if internal sanctions are eased in any way.

The Diaspora in the Second Half of the 1950s

From the perspective of the North Korean Diaspora, circumstances in North Korea after the outbreak of the Korean War were little different to those in South Korea. After the war, however, the need to acquire the advanced skills that were unavailable, except abroad, made outward migration unavoidable. Other socialist countries agreed to accept up to 30,000 war orphans, sent by the North Korean government to study in China, the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries, and Mongolia. Most of them were sent to China, although it is said that not all of them were war orphans; some were the children of high-level North Korean officials.¹⁸ Most of these were summoned back to North Korea around 1959, mainly because the approximately 250,000 members of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, which had participated in the reconstruction of North Korea after the war, had completed their withdrawal in October 1958.¹⁹ Since the returnees had acquired skills and knowledge from countries more advanced than North Korea, they contributed greatly to the reconstruction of North Korea. Recent studies have focused on their role in the development of North Korean society (or North Korea).²⁰ Data on students in Eastern Europe has not been included, however, because of limited access, and those studies that have been carried out focus on the students' activities once they had returned rather than from the perspective of the diaspora. Information about students' lives in the Soviet Bloc is important because although they shared the same philosophy and ideology as North Korea, political conditions were very different, and those who had experience of both societies can provide a unique perspective. In addition, their perspective constitutes something more than just personal experience. Although they were not members of an organized movement, the students shared a common attitude of hostility toward the North Korean system and a preference for exile in the West.²¹ This was not something North Korean leaders would have welcomed and could be one of the reasons why the regime maintained relatively strict policies on study abroad and kept a close eye on those it sent to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, although the main reason for this attitude had more to do with North Korea's internal political background and the international environment. To understand this, we must examine the political situations in North Korea and Eastern Europe in the mid-1950s, as well as North Korea's conflicts with China and the Soviet Union over the August Incident of 1956, among other things. This incident led to acceleration in the withdrawal of the Chinese People's Army,²² which meant a serious lack of labor for postwar reconstruction, so the government came up with the policy of recalling many of those abroad. The incident, which is the only collective civilian attempt to ever challenge the supreme power in North Korea, greatly influenced the political landscape of North Korea and provided the impetus for placing the *Juche* idea, North Korea's ruling ideology, ahead of political ideology. Moreover, the middle

of 1956 was a period full of tension in Eastern Europe, where the Polish and Hungarian Revolutions were taking place in the wake of the 20th convention of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, when criticism of Stalin began, albeit behind closed doors.²³ Under these circumstances, an examination of the ideas and opinions of those North Koreans who chose to stay in Eastern Europe rather than return home offers much of value.

Dossier on Csö In-huan (Inhwan Choi)²⁴

Inhwan Choi was born on March 10, 1934, in Euiju, Pyonganbuk-do. After finishing high school²⁵ in Euiju in September 1953, he studied at a medical school in Budapest, Hungary, on a scholarship. When the Hungarian Revolution occurred in October 1956, he fought alongside the Hungarian people against the Soviet Union's armed crackdown.²⁶ After the Revolution was suppressed by force, he fled²⁷ to Yugoslavia, where he was able to stay for nine months with the help of the Ministry of Interior. He obtained the status of political refugee there²⁸ before moving to Switzerland.²⁹ He arrived in Zürich³⁰ on September 7, 1957, and while there, he asked for help from Won Yil Sohn,³¹ who was the minister in the South Korean Consulate, located in Bonn, the capital of West Germany. On Sohn's recommendation, Choi was able to continue his studies at a Zürich medical school and receive financial support from the American–Korean Foundation,³² following a request from Sohn to Ambassador Yu Chan Yang of South Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C. Choi received a South Korean passport issued by the Korean Consulate in Bonn around March 1958 and obtained Korean citizenship.³³ Toward the end of July 1959, he visited the Chinese Embassy in Bern, Switzerland, and tried to express his political views, arguing the need for a union or confederation between North Korea and China based on Marxism-Leninism. However, because of problems with the language, he could not converse smoothly, so he expressed his opinions in a letter, which he wrote at the suggestion of the staff at the Chinese Embassy.³⁴ When he did not receive any response from the Chinese Embassy, he visited the Hungarian Consulate³⁵ in Bern at the end of October. On October 27, he sent a long letter to the Consulate that included his feelings, political views, and his interpretation of the international political situation, based on his experience of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. In that letter, he requested help to study Chinese in China for one year so that he could work in the Hungarian Embassy in Beijing, which seems a bit absurd now.³⁶ Receiving no reply, he sent another letter³⁷ in early December to hurry things up.³⁸ Up to this point, he had wanted to go to China in order to realize his political ideals and did not show any intention of going to South Korea, from which he received financial and administrative support, or to North Korea, his homeland.³⁹ Suddenly, however, he

changed his attitude, and on January 21, 1960, he applied for a Hungarian entry visa, with a document written in his own hand,⁴⁰ to the Hungarian Consulate in Bern.⁴¹ On January 27, the Hungarian consul directly signed and forwarded Choi's official application⁴² to the Passport Division of the MFAH. The day before, the protocol department of the MFAH saw Taehwa Kim, an attaché of the North Korean Embassy in Budapest, notified him that Inhwan Choi had sent an application for a Hungarian entry visa, and told him that they would process this according to the requirements of the North Korean Embassy.⁴³ One month later, Kim requested that the MFAH allow Inhwan Choi to enter Hungary and for the Ministry of the Interior of Hungary (MIH) to follow him "illegally" (*illetgalisan*) from the time he arrived to the time he left Hungary.⁴⁴ The MFAH sent a confidential document to László Földes, the vice-minister of the MIH, informing him that Choi had specified the length of his visit to be 2–3 months on the application for an entry visa, and requested the MIH's cooperation so that it could follow him during his visit.⁴⁵ The MIH replied on April 14, agreeing with the request and asked for Choi's visit to be reduced to three weeks or one month if the North Korean Embassy would allow it.⁴⁶ Upon receiving this request through the MFAH,⁴⁷ the North Korean Embassy in Budapest replied that once Choi arrived in Budapest, they would collect his South Korean passport, issue another one (*más útlevelet*), and issue an exit visa immediately because he would be repatriated to Pyongyang.⁴⁸

Comparison of Diasporas

As mentioned earlier, studies on those who left North Korea for Europe between the mid-1950s and early 1960s have been inadequate because of the lack of data. As a witness to the events of that time, Inhwan Choi provides a valuable and interesting case. Rather than interpret his exile and return as the consequences of his own individual and unique circumstances, we can regard them as events that occurred in the middle of North Korea's internal crackdown that accompanied the frozen political atmosphere that arose after the August Incident, the uprisings of the Polish and Hungarian peoples against Stalinist rule, and the denigration of Stalin that began at the 20th convention of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It was during this period that not just Choi but many other North Korean students defected or disobeyed the order to return to North Korea, suggesting that the above perspective is warranted. The 20th Convention of Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held on February of 1956. It affected not only the events leading to the August Incident, but also to the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The August Incident caused many of North Korean diasporas. Even though events were not limited to one area or country, they can be looked at as a group phenomenon, al-

beit one without a systematic intelligence network, and it is possible to interpret the Inhwon Choi case on that basis. Thus, if we look at those who left North Korea right after the establishment of the North Korean government and because of the Korean War as the first set of defectors, then those like Choi can be regarded as the second set. A period of stability then followed as the regime was established and the government's strict policies prevented any further diaspora from occurring. The collapse of those policies in the early 1990s led to the emergence of a third set of defectors, which persists to this day.

Control of Students Overseas

A further reason to pay attention to the North Korean Diaspora of the mid-1950s to the early 1960s is that the North Korean government turned to strong management and control of overseas students in light of such dissident activity, reducing the numbers sent abroad significantly.⁴⁹ Such activity could be seen by the North Korean government as a major impediment to solidifying the system and as damaging to the country's reputation abroad. The government actively monitored and controlled the students because it regarded them as potential forces of opposition.⁵⁰ In the case of Inhwon Choi, Dongcheol Choi, the North Korean ambassador in Budapest, personally asked the Yugoslavian Embassy in Budapest about his escape to Yugoslavia and followed his activities in Yugoslavia.⁵¹ The fact that the North Korean government was aware of Inhwon Choi's statement⁵² criticizing North Korea on a Munich radio station also suggests that they kept an eye on his activities systematically.

The actions that the North Korean government later took regarding deserters in regions other than Hungary increased in severity. For example, in the case of the four North Korean students who refused to return from Bulgaria, the North Korean ambassador was deported for tracking them down, kidnapping them, and locking them up.⁵³ When Kim Il Sung visited Bulgaria in 1976 and 1986, he raised the issue of these four refugees with the Bulgarian government.⁵⁴ Even in the Soviet Union, there were diplomatic problems when North Korean special agents pursued students who had disappeared, with the result that the North Korean ambassador in Moscow was eventually deported.⁵⁵ It is possible that the North Korean government's diplomatically irrational decisions arose because it was attempting to "make examples" of the students for internal consumption, but it would also be difficult to deny that their actions show the political significance they attached to the students' actions.⁵⁶

The Propaganda War in Europe

In the mid-1950s and early 1960s, the students' actions meant that the propaganda war between the two Koreas expanded across Europe. Most of the students wanted to continue studying where they were, not even thinking of South Korea as a place to live, but some of them came to the South Korean embassy and asked for South Korea's support.⁵⁷ Among the diplomatic documents regarding these refugee students that were sent to Seoul from the South Korean Consulate in Bonn, there is something interesting. Chang Yoon-Kul, who was the first secretary at the South Korean Consulate in Bonn and worked as the acting minister, reported information regarding the purges that followed the August Incident, as follows:

This information is rather an old story already known to the people, but the reason why I am reporting this to Your Excellency is that this has been confirmed by the two students and also this might be useful in counteracting the recent Communists' unification propaganda campaign.⁵⁸

It is not difficult to imagine, as the diplomatic documents suggest, that they tried to get information from those students who chose exile,⁵⁹ and it shows that there were already discussions in progress regarding their political use or as a source of valuable information, focusing on the exile group in Europe. Unfortunately, North Korean data regarding this cannot be accessed, but the likelihood of North Korea responding in kind to South Korea's actions or even pre-empting them can be assumed. In the East Berlin (Spy) Incident,⁶⁰ for example, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) announced that Korean students studying abroad in West Germany had contacted North Korea and had been in touch with the North Korean Embassy in East Germany since September 1958.^{61,62}

Conclusion

Until now, studies of the lives and activities of North Koreans studying in Europe between the mid-1950s and the early 1960s have been inadequate because of insufficient data.

This paper tries to classify the occurrence of North Korean diaspora into three eras. The first era spans the time of establishment of the North Korean regime until the Korean War and the second era from the Korean War until the early 1960's when the war orphans and students studying abroad were ordered home to North Korea. The third era originated in the mid-1990s when the economic crisis happened in North Korea. While the first and third periods have been well documented, until now, studies on the lives and activities of North Koreans studying in

Europe between the mid-1950s and the early 1960s have been inadequate because of insufficient data.

This has mainly been attributed to the lack of access to documented evidence. Moreover, this period has been difficult to research because at the time North Korean refugees mainly fled to formerly Communist countries, such as the East European countries, and the former Soviet Union. The period between the Korean War and the early 1960s, when North Korea laid the foundation for stability of political power after the August incident of 1956, belongs to the second term. In this paper, I have cited several sources from the Korean, Hungarian and Soviet Union archives. Especially, this paper is a dossier on a North Korean refugee (Inhwon Choi who studied in Hungary as a medical student on scholarship) complied from confidential diplomatic documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary. Tracing the microcosm of this refugee's early years has provided glimpses into significant historical events, like the August Incident and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Moreover, the macrocosm surrounding this refugee has enabled to identify a point of contact between these two political events. A few documented memoirs and reminiscences of those historical events remain with the very man who experienced these events. Particularly, the refugee himself wrote a 10-page long memoir, and some official documents recorded by a third person exist, which are a rarity. These reveal how a particular refugee understood the state of the world around him, both as an individual and as someone thrown into the maelstrom of history. These documents are, therefore, valuable, transcending the perspective of one individual and setting them apart from the memoirs, autobiographies, and interviews that appear following his exile.

Besides the North Korean diaspora under consideration in this paper, the Hungarian sources additionally tell us some new facts, namely that North Korea anticipated the military dictatorship in South Korea right after the April Revolution and the so far unknown information of North Korean ex-ambassador in Moscow who was banished by ex-USSR for kidnapping.

It is regrettable that there was no possibility of reviewing the data of other countries in more detail and that it was not possible to make any significant contact with North Korean escapees in China and Japan, where the majority of those with North Korean citizenship lived, outside of Europe. I close this study in the hope that more research will be done in this field and that interest in it will be sustained.

Abbreviations Used in This Paper

DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
NAH	The National Archives of Hungary

DAROK	Diplomatic Archives of the Republic of Korea
KCIA	Korean Central Intelligence Agency
HAHSS	Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security
UNHCR	The United Nations Refugee Agency
AFPSU	Archive of Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union
MIH	Ministry of Interior of Hungary
MFAH	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary

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Ministry of Unification of Republic of Korea Home Page: http://www.unikorea.go.kr/index.do?menuCd=DOM_00000105006006000 [Accessed: February 3, 2014].

Notes

¹ Given that South and North Koreans share an identical ethnicity, regardless of their differences in ideology and government, it is arguable that the North Korean Diaspora should be treated as a subdivision of the larger Korean Diaspora. It is worth noting that Hartley describes ethnicity as a concept related to the past and explains it in terms of community, neighbors, and

cultural transformation. See John Hartely, *Communication, Culture and Media Studies: The Key Concepts* (London, New York: Routledge, 2002), 66. Brass defines ethnicity in terms of objective characteristics and subjective emotions. See Paul R. Brass, *Ethnic Groups and Ethnic Identity Formation*, in *Ethnicity*, edited by John Hutchinson and D. Anthony Smith (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 85. At the very least, it is clear that the term "North Korean Diaspora" does not go uncontested.

² Safran defines the term "diaspora" as applicable to any expatriate communities possessing several of the following features: 1. dispersal from the place of origin to two or more other places; 2. retention of a collective memory, fantasy, or myth about the homeland; 3. a feeling that they are not – and possibly cannot be – part of the host society; 4. a yearning for the homeland as the true, ideal home and for an eventual homecoming at the proper time; 5. a belief that they should, collectively, be committed to the motherland's security, prosperity, and restoration; 6. an ongoing relationship with the mother country such that their ethnocultural consciousness and sense of solidarity are strongly affected by that relationship. See William Safran, "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return", *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 1.1 (1991): 83–4.

³ For more details, see In-Jin Yoon, North Korean Diaspora: North Korean Defectors Abroad and in South Korea, *Development and Society* 30.1 (2001): 6.

⁴ Jeong-koo Kang mentions the Wollamins' anti-communist beliefs and the impact of the North Korean land reform of March 1946 in relation to their decision to defect. He is skeptical about regarding the period before the Korean War as one of genuine defection because the Wollamin who left were landowners and made up only 4% of the agricultural population. See Jeong-Koo Kang, Study on the Motive and the Class Consciousness of Wollamin (North Korean Defectors) after Liberation, in Korean Sociological Association, *The Korean War and the Changes in Korean Society* (Seoul: Pulpit Publishing, 1992), 98–9.

⁵ Some chose a country other than North or South Korea. For example, of 76 prisoners of war released after the truce, 50 settled in Brazil and 12 in Argentina, after passing through India with 12 Chinese prisoners. The other ten stayed in India or repatriated to North Korea. For more details, see DAROK, Class No. 729.5. Reg. No. 142–143, 145. Film No. G0001. Frame No. 0557–0866. 0933–1064.

⁶ Byeongok Cho notes that ordinary North Koreans with no contacts in the military or government struggle to live because the government devotes most of its budget to the military. Approximately 4.5 million North Koreans have moved to south of the 38th Parallel. See Department of State, "Northeast Asia", in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1948: Volume VI. The Far East and Australasia* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office 1974), 1310. Jeong-koo Kang estimates that approximately 840,000 Wollamins moved during the truce period of 1945–53 (Kang, "Study on the Motive", 95–98). Tai Hwan Kwon estimates the number of Wollamin who defected at approximately 1.4 million for the same period; approximately 740,000 defected from 1945 to 1949, and 650,000 defected during the Korean War. A further 300,000 people defected to North Korea during the war. See Tai Hwan Kwon, *Demography of Korea: Population Change and Its Components, 1925–1966* (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1977), 202–5.

⁷ The validity of including the Wollamins of this period in the diaspora can be debated. In addition, it might be appropriate to classify those North Koreans who defected and settled in South Korea as a "North Korean intra-diaspora." This study uses "North Korean diaspora" to avoid the use of too many terms.

⁸ "Members of diasporas define themselves in terms of at least a double identity, thus bracketing the unconditional fidelity associated with citizenship in a particular nation-state." Mudimbe,

- V. Y. and Sabine Engel, "Introduction," in "Diaspora and Immigration," ed. Mudimbe with Engel, special issue, *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 98.1/2 (1999): 4.
- ⁹ K. Tölölyan, "The Nation State and Its Others: In Lieu of a Preface", *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 1.1 (1991): 4–5. Tölölyan regards the term "diaspora" as a promiscuously capacious category (Tölölyan "The Nation State", 8).
- ¹⁰ This actually happened during the Korean War. According to Razuvaev, more than 2,000 North Korean war orphans were sent overseas at the request of other socialist countries; for example, in 1951, 200 orphans went to Poland and 200 went to Hungary; in 1952, 200 went to Czechoslovakia, 1,500 went to Romania, 200 went to Bulgaria, and 200 went to the Mongolian People's Republic. China suggested that North Korea send 23,000 war orphans there to be educated. In early 1951, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) executive committee planned to take 100 North Korean war orphans to the Soviet Union, but the plan foundered because of North Korea's refusal. The suggestion that the Soviet Union should take North Korean war orphans, even though North Korea had not requested it, appears in a report from February 1953. See Vladimir Nikolaevich Razuvaev, *Soviet Chief Military Advisor's Korean War Report* (ROK Ministry of National Defense, Institute for Military History Compilation, 2001), 13–16.
- ¹¹ This number of 30,000 orphans is only an estimate based on the first Far East Division in the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union (AFPSU) quoted in Sin, "Training and Reorganization of Higher Manpower in the Change of the North Korean Society (1945–1960)", *North Korea Studies Review* 8.2 (2005): 39–83. However, it seems that we cannot regard this as the only authentic source because with regard to the number of war orphans, these data are inconsistent with those reported by Razuvaev (2001), even though both originated from the former Soviet Union. With regard to data from Hungary, for example, Razuvaev said that 200 war orphans were sent between 1951 and 1952, but the AFPSU has no record of any being sent during that period (*ibid*). According to the testimony of Inhwan Choi, a North Korean student who settled temporarily in Switzerland after defecting from Hungary to Yugoslavia, approximately 700 people returned to North Korea, including those studying abroad, in January 1957 (NAH Roll No. 53706. Frame No. 2008 0000 0099). Hungarian administrative confidential documents are the most authentic sources in this regard because Hungary was one of the countries involved. They show that, on January 5, three groups arrived back in Pyongyang: 21 students; 375 students who were mainly war orphans, through Sopron in Hungary and Czechoslovakia; and approximately 400 students, mainly technical school students or university students (XIX-J-1-k. Box No. 8. 1/25/3/1957). According to AFPSU data, however, approximately 1,200 people returned to North Korea, all war orphans except for 110 students who were about to graduate in Hungary (AFPSU, quoted in Sin, "Training and Reorganization", 68).
- ¹² There is a theoretical justification for regarding North Korean war orphans who were sent overseas for an education within the category of diaspora. Marienstras points out that length of time abroad is an important aspect of diaspora. See R. Marienstras, "On the Notion of Diaspora", in *Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation-States*, edited by G. Chaliand (London: Pluto, 1989), 125. Tölölyan interprets the meaning of diaspora broadly and includes exile, loss, dislocation, helplessness, and pain in general as useful and proper signifiers in describing the features of dispersal. See K. Tölölyan, "Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment", *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 5.1 (1996): 9.
- ¹³ In the 1970s, only 156 North Korean students entered higher education institutions in the Soviet Union, whereas for the years 1980–1985, 915 students enrolled (Byelov, quoted in Sin, "Training and Reorganization", 60). For Hungary, refer to Footnote 53.
- ¹⁴ South Korean Ministry of Unification, http://www.unikorea.go.kr/index.do?menuCd=DOM_000000105006006000

- ¹⁵ Soo-am Kim, “The Change of Actual Circumstances of North Korean Defectors in China and the Direction for Carrying out the Policy”, *EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper 29* (Seoul: The East Asia Institute, 2012), 3.
- ¹⁶ Between October 2004 and March 2010, the United States granted refugee status to 94 North Koreans. See United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Humanitarian Assistance: Status of North Korean Refugee Resettlement and Asylum in the United States”, Report to Congressional Requesters, June 2010: 12. Canada granted refugee status to 217 North Koreans between 2003 and 2009, the United Kingdom granted refugee status to 350 North Koreans between 2006 and 2009, and Germany granted refugee status to 191 North Koreans between 2000 and 2009 (GAO, “Humanitarian Assistance”, 48–49).
- ¹⁷ President Obama signed the North Korea Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2012 on August 16, 2012 (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/16/statement-press-secretary-hr-1402-hr-3670-hr-4240-s-3510>). The original North Korea Human Rights was enacted in October 2004 when George W. Bush was in office and was extended for four more years in 2008. For more information, see Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinheart, *North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation*. Congressional Research Service, April 5, 2013: 20–21.
- ¹⁸ Eun-lee Joung, “History of Market and Changes of Economic Structure in North Korea”, *Journal of Asiatic Studies* 54.1 (2011): 228.
- ¹⁹ For more details on the withdrawal of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army, see Park, “Chinese People’s ‘Volunteers’ Aiding to and Retreat from North Korea during the Korean War and After”, *Korean Studies Quarterly* 29.4 (2006): 265–291.
- ²⁰ See Eun-lee Joung, “Re-illumination of North Korean System through Life of Korean Residents in Japan Returning to North Korea: Focusing on Testimony of North Korean Defectors in Japan”, *Journal of Asiatic Studies* 52.3 (2009): 189–282.
- ²¹ Resistance and hostility to the regime was displayed on a number of occasions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe around this time, including defections by North Korean students in 1956 (see Footnote 51); a protest against Kim Il Sung that took place in Moscow in 1957, reported by the musician Jung Chu, who refused to return to North Korea from Moscow (see Footnote 55); and the refusal to return by four students who declared themselves exiles for ideological reasons in Bulgaria in the early 1960s (see Footnote 52).
- ²² See Sang-Jun Han, “The Reason for Withdrawal of the Chinese People’s Volunteers and China–North Korea Relations”, *Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies* 19.2 (2012): 5–39.
- ²³ The uprising of workers that happened in East Germany in June 1953, right after Stalin’s death, could be seen as the start of the political upheavals in Eastern Europe in the 1950s, represented here by Poland and Hungary.
- ²⁴ The Inhwani Choi file is a part of the confidential diplomatic documents of the MFAH. It is now declassified and in possession of the NAH. It consists of 39 microfilms in total. This study replaces the document number with the microfilm number so that general researcher can access them easily. Among the diplomatic confidential documents of the MFAH that are in possession of the NAH, the data from 1949 to 1989 are kept on microfilm. Apart from a few exceptional cases, they are provided to general researchers on microfilm rather than in their original form, so this study provides the roll number and serial number of the microfilm. Bogook Kim has organized the entire list of the data relevant to this period and has published it in the form of a catalogue. For further explanation on the data of North and South Koreas at the NAH, see Balázs Szalontai, *Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era* (Stanford University Press, 2005), xv–xviii. For the catalogue, see Bogook Kim, *Catalogue of Confidential Diplomatic Documents of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary Related to South and North Koreas (1945–1993)* (Bread & Roses Publishing Co., 2012).

- ²⁵ DAROK Class No. 743.73GE/KN 1957–1959. Reg. No. 329. Film No. K0001. Frame No. 0185.
- ²⁶ Upon the request of South Korean embassy in Germany, the Hilfsaktion für Flüchtlingsstudenten in der Schweiz, Ungarn Kommission, Zürich, confirmed this. The fact that some North Korean overseas students participated in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution appears in the testimony of Herzum Péter, a participant in the revolution. See also Adrienne Molnár, Zsuzsanna Körösi, and Márkus Keller, eds., *A forradalom emlékezete: Személyes történelem* (Budapest: 56-os Intézet, 2006), 124–241.
- ²⁷ According to the UNHCR, the Hungarian Revolution created approximately 200,000 refugees. Around 180,000 crossed the Hungary–Austria border, and the rest escaped across the Hungary–Yugoslavia border. See Rupert Colville, *Refugees* 144.3 (2006): 2.
- ²⁸ DAROK Class No. 743.73GE/KN 1957–1959. Reg. No. 329. Film No. K0001. Frame No. 0188.
- ²⁹ Dongcheol Hong, the ambassador of North Korea to Hungary at the time, inquired of the Yugoslavian Embassy there as to the whereabouts of Choi in Yugoslavia, but they claimed not to know. He was later able to confirm that a Yugoslavian institution had helped Choi, however (NAH Roll No. 53706. Frame No. 2008 0000 0063).
- ³⁰ The statement that Inhwon Choi wrote in Hungarian says that he arrived in early October 1957, but according to the data from the Hilfsaktion für Flüchtlingsstudenten in der Schweiz, Ungarn Kommission, Zürich, he entered Switzerland on September 7, 1957 (DAROK Class No. 743.73GE/KN 1957–1959. Reg. No. 329. Film No. K0001. Frame No. 0184).
- ³¹ Since Switzerland only established diplomatic relations with South Korea on February 11, 1963, there was no Korean embassy in Switzerland. The closest Korean embassy was in Bonn. The consulate became an official embassy in August 1958, and Sohn was appointed ambassador.
- ³² Hearing that the financial support for Inhwon Choi from the Hilfsaktion für Flüchtlingsstudenten in der Schweiz, Ungarn Kommission, Zürich, was not sufficient, Sohn sent a letter to Yu Chan Yang. In the end, Choi received financial aid (a \$200 initial payment for clothing and \$100 per month for one year as an initial settlement support) from the American-Korean Foundation (DAROK Class No. 743.73GE/KN 1957–1959. Reg. No. 329. Film No. K0001. Frame No. 0192).
- ³³ When Choi applied for a Hungarian entry visa later, he identified himself as South Korean on the application (NAH Roll No. 53706. Frame No. 2008 0000 0065). In a telegram from the Korean diplomatic office in Bonn, dated February 28, 1958, there is an interview of Choi by Sohn (DAROK Class No. 743.73GE/KN 1957–1959. Reg. No. 329. Film No. K0001. Frame No. 0189–0190). It seems that a South Korean passport was issued to Choi after this interview. In the Korean data, the passport number is not written, but on the application for a Hungarian entry visa, there is a Korean passport number, 23092 (NAH Roll No. 53706. Frame No. 2008 0000 0066).
- ³⁴ NAH Roll No. 53706. Frame No. 2008 0000 0094.
- ³⁵ Diplomatic relations at ambassador level were established between Switzerland and Hungary in 1963. The Hungarian Consulate in Bern was in charge of the consular work at that time.
- ³⁶ NAH Roll No. 53706. Frame No. 2008 0000 0092–0100.
- ³⁷ NAH Roll No. 53706. Frame No. 2008 0000 0087–0088.
- ³⁸ The date of dispatch is unclear, but the letter arrived at the Hungarian Consulate in Bern on December 8, 1959 (NAH Roll No. 53706. Frame No. 2008 0000 0089).
- ³⁹ The North Korean ambassador heard that Choi had applied for a Hungarian entry visa from the MFAH and mentioned that Choi had no intention of returning to North Korea in a letter to his family (NAH Roll No. 53706. Frame No. 2008 0000 0063).

- ⁴⁰ NAH Roll No. 53706. Frame No. 2008 0000 0068 and 0070.
- ⁴¹ We can assume that there must have been some prior contact with the Hungarian Consulate to obtain the documents to apply for entry.
- ⁴² NAH Roll No. 53706. Frame No. 2008 0000 0067.
- ⁴³ NAH Roll No. 53706. Frame No. 2008 0000 0063.
- ⁴⁴ NAH Roll No. 53706. Frame No. 2008 0000 0073.
- ⁴⁵ NAH Roll No. 53706. Frame No. 2008 0000 0081–0082.
- ⁴⁶ NAH Roll No. 53706. Frame No. 2008 0000 0084.
- ⁴⁷ NAH Roll No. 53706. Frame No. 2008 0000 0108.
- ⁴⁸ NAH Roll No. 53706. Frame No. 2008 0000 0110.
- ⁴⁹ In the case of Hungary, North Korean student Güm-csol Kim, who was studying abroad at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest at the time, says only a few students were left in Hungary after the war orphans returned to North Korea. Sixty students arrived following a new exchange agreement between the countries in 1983. See Güm-csol Kim, *Egy modern Magyar-Koreai szótár koncepciója* (1983), S.1, S.n. In the case of the Soviet Union, at least 922 North Korean students enrolled in the Soviet Union's institutions of higher education between 1950 and 1956, after which there were only two more, up to 1966 (See Byelov, quoted in Sin, "Training and Reorganization", 60).
- ⁵⁰ In an interview, Chu Jeong said that there was a relatively well-organized anti–Kim Il Sung movement in Moscow around 1956, composed of 10-membered gathering of North Korean students (called 10 Jin Hoe in Korean). See Haeu Koo and Hogeun Song, *Genius Musician Chu Jeong Deserted by North Korea* (Seoul: Zeitgeist, 2012), 54–64.
- ⁵¹ NAH Roll No. 53706. Frame No. 2008 0000 0063.
- ⁵² NAH Roll No. 53706. Frame No. 2008 0000 0073.
- ⁵³ Gwon-jin Choi and So-young Kim, "Life Stories of North Korean Students: Lives as Students Studying Abroad and as Refugees in Bulgaria", in *The Interrelationship between Bulgaria and Korea after the Second World War (Survey of archives and relevant publications)* (2012), 99.
- ⁵⁴ Choi and Kim, "Life Stories", 100.
- ⁵⁵ According to Hungarian diplomatic documents written in Pyongyang on November 8, 1962, Sangu Lee, a North Korean student at the Moscow Conservatory, requested personal protection from the Soviet Union in 1959. The North Korean embassy asked the Soviet Union to hand him over. The case reached the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which decided to comply but, being either unable to wait for the decision or believing that the Soviet Union would not comply, the North Korean embassy kidnapped Lee and tried to smuggle him out of the country by tying him up and putting him in a sack. Upon hearing this news, Khrushchev immediately expelled the North Korean ambassador, Li Szün Phal. According to Third Secretary Fagyejev of the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang, Kim Il Sung mentioned this case only once, saying that the central government knew nothing about it and that the embassy had acted alone (NAH Roll No. 53694. Frame No. 2008 0000 2320).
- ⁵⁶ When students returned from Hungary to North Korea, there was a welcoming convention at Pyongyang Station, at which the students protested at having to return (AFPSU, quoted in Sin, "Training and Reorganization", 68). In addition, after their return, flyers of an inflammatory nature went around the university and dormitory (AFPSU, quoted in Sin, "Training and Reorganization", 69). It might be conjectured that the efforts made to bring unwilling students home were deliberately forceful to minimize any disruption they might cause among the young. In February 1957, the head of the Department of Propaganda and Demagogic of the Central Committee of the Labor Party and the advisor from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs visited educational institutions in Poland, East Germany, the Czech Republic, the Soviet Union, Romania, Bulgaria, and China. The purpose of their visits was to investigate student attitudes

- in the wake of Poland's uprising and the Hungarian Revolution (AFPSU, quoted in Sin, "Training and Reorganization", 69).
- ⁵⁷ According to a South Korean diplomatic document (DAROK Class No. 743.73GE/KN 1957–1959. Reg. No. 329. Film No. K0001. Frame No. 0188), this includes Inhwon Choi. There is a record of seven students in East Germany visiting the South Korean Embassy in Bonn at the end of 1957 and early 1958 (DAROK Class No. 743.73GE/KN 1957–1959. Reg. No. 329. Film No. K0001. Frame No. 0183, 0193). Two of them escaped to East Germany through West Berlin in 1958 (DAROK Class No.: 743.73GE/KN 1957–1959. Reg. No. 329. Film No. K0001. Frame No. 0193).
- ⁵⁸ Kyungmu-dae's response to this report cannot be known precisely, but when looking at the contents of the report that was written by Won Yil Sohn and sent to Kyungmu-dae 20 days after this report was written, it seems Kyungmu-dae was at least not negative about this suggestion and ordered Sohn to make a careful approach (DAROK Class No. 743.73GE/KN 1957–1959. Reg. No. 329. Film No. K0001. Frame No. 0201).
- ⁵⁹ "They told me that there are many students, about 400 in East Germany alone, but almost all of them are unhappy at studying under the communists' rules and are wondering whether it is true that they will be able to continue their studies in West Germany if they choose freedom. I have therefore obtained a list of freedom-loving students who, if we could secretly get in touch with them, might come to West Germany. I am enclosing the list, showing 10 individuals who are in Dresden, East Germany. Under the circumstances, I am examining ways to handle this confidentially, and I am considering how we might provide school expenses for so many persons if they come to us. I presume that AKF may be able to take the steps needed to meet the possible increase in assistance" (DAROK Class No. 743.73GE/KN 1957–1959. Reg. No. 329. Film No. K0001. Frame No. 0194).
- ⁶⁰ The East Berlin (Spy) Incident, East Berlin (Spy) Case, or East Berlin Affair involved 194 South Korean students and Korean residents living in Germany, France, England, America, and Austria who were suspected in 1967 by the KCIA of communist activity against South Korea as a consequence of visiting the North Korean embassy in East Berlin and North Korea. Diplomatic rows were caused with the host governments because of their compulsory repatriation to South Korea, which included kidnapping.
- ⁶¹ *Dong-A Ilbo*, July 8, 1967, 1.
- ⁶² Korean diplomatic document reports that two North Korean students who escaped could not find the South Korean embassy but then met "our students" by accident in Frankfurt and were led to the embassy (DAROK Class No.: 743.73GE/KN 1957–1959. Reg. No. 329. Film No. K0001. Frame No. 0193).

ALWAYS ON THE RUN: THE VICISSITUDES OF REALISM IN HUNGARIAN CRITICISM

SÁNDOR HITES

Institute for Literary Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Budapest, Hungary
E-mail: hites.sandor@btk.mta.hu

In this article I offer an overview of the ways in which the term realism has been understood and used in Hungarian literary criticism, from the introduction of the term into Hungarian discourses in the middle of the 19th century to the post-1989 period, when the term had to grapple with the legacy of its appropriation by the Socialist regime. I examine three specific junctures in the critical trajectory of Realism: the introduction of the term in the 1850s, the uses and abuses of the term by Marxist ideologues, and finally the aversion towards the term that emerged in the post-Socialist era. In addition to examining pivotal moments in the history of this critical concept in Hungarian literary discourse, my inquiry also offers a critical perspective from which to consider an enduring anxiety concerning the achievements, past and future, of Hungarian literary culture, an anxiety that finds expression in a symptomatic concern with the ways in which tendencies in Hungarian culture do or do not relate to cultural developments outside of Hungary.

Keywords: Realism, Naturalism, Marxism, Structuralism, Post-Structuralism, Hungarian literature, literary history

Realism has not fared well in Hungary, neither in literature nor in criticism. At times exaggerated, at other times snubbed or neglected, it has remained a sensitive and dubious issue. During its controversial career, realism has been both privileged and condemned from official critical positions, much as it has been fought both for and against from oppositional stances. Raised to the status of aesthetic ideology or despised as a decline in literary taste, realism has been seen as uncannily missing from Hungarian literary history or as something threateningly deluging Hungarian literature and depriving it of its allegedly genuine characteristics. It has been the burden of a better-to-be-forgotten past, a proof of the cultural decay of the present, or the promise of a brighter future.

In what follows I will not give a comprehensive survey of the term in Hungarian criticism, nor will I make more than passing remarks on the history of the Hungarian novel. Instead, I attempt to highlight three important and characteristic junctures in realism's critical trajectory. First, I will scrutinize how the term was

introduced during the 1850s into Hungarian critical vocabulary: attempting to track down the variety of meanings and fields in which the notion of “realism” figured at this early stage, I will delineate the diversity of literary (prose fiction, folkloristic poetry, literary history, national cultural development, reception of foreign cultures) and non-literary (philosophy, science, scholarship, economy, education, ethics) contexts that coexisted in its use. Then, taking a leap forward in chronology, I will try to uncover the intricacy of the Marxist uses and abuses of the concept of realism during the 1950–60s. And finally, with a glance at the post-Marxist trial of the term, I will touch on how and why realism has been recently dismissed from the critical vocabulary, and what prospects of revival seems to have appeared.

A Reluctant Devotion to the Real: the Polysemy of Realism in the 1850s

The way the notion of realism first appeared in Hungarian criticism somewhat foreshadowed the vicissitudes it was to go through. In literary contexts the term first showed up in the late 1850s, contemporaneously with major European literary cultures, where, despite previous scattered uses, realism as a systematical critical term came to be established when, after the self-imposed characterization of Gustave Courbet’s painting in 1855, it was extended to describe a literary style.¹ In Hungary, however, literary realism entered an intellectual landscape where the issues of “reality” and “realism” had already occupied a central place with various concepts of the “real” figuring in political, economic, cultural, philosophical, historiographic, and educational concerns. When the word acquired a literary significance, realism had to be accommodated to a wide and much-contested field of already established non-aesthetic meanings and usages. The ongoing debates over the nature of perceiving or representing reality and the role of the real (or material) in human life had decisive import on the way literary realism was conceived, received, practiced and theorized upon in decades to come.

After the fall of the 1848–49 revolution and the defeat in the war with Austria and Russia, Hungary’s political, economic, social and cultural life underwent a severe crisis. As a retribution for the “revolt”, the victorious Habsburg administration suspended political rights (military government gave way to civil administration only in 1853) and revoked the administrative independence the Hungarian Kingdom had formerly enjoyed within the Empire. In the state of nationwide depression and amid apocalyptic fears, limited public and informal discussions sought the perspectives of recovery. The debates over what kind of political attitude would be advisable, what kind of economic and cultural behavior should be adopted, and what kind of ethical stances would be agreeable, drew on the sometimes explicit, sometimes tacit dichotomy of *reality* and *illusion*. As many found

that the fading liberal and national political goals of the roaring 1830s and 1840s (in historiography labeled the Reform Era) had proved to be “illusory”, the intention to turn toward something “real” came to the fore in many intellectual and political endeavors. In his 1850 pamphlet *Forradalom után* [After the Revolution], the novelist and political journalist baron Zsigmond Kemény blamed the national predilection for “affected pathos” and “flowers of speech” in what he described as a general enmity to facing facts in a sober and rational way, and suggested that the collapse of the national cause was due to the adherence to illusions instead of rational plans.² In his claim Kemény drew on the observation made by count István Széchenyi in the early 1840s, namely that the favor of illusions and imagination was a genuine Hungarian characteristic and as such testified to the “oriental origin” of the Hungarians.³ (During the 1850s, this observation was increasingly referred to as a commonplace.) While relentlessly insisting that only “facts” should be taken into account when explaining political events, and pressing on a turn from fast-burning enthusiasm to prudence, from political daydreaming to calculation, Kemény added that the nation should “collect the remnants of its wealth, manage its estates, acquire, and labor” in “a relentless and sober way”, and as a result “we might not achieve what our sages prophesied, but could be happy after all”.⁴

Though his political judgments regarding the revolutionary years were generally disallowed, Kemény’s insistence on soberness, pragmatism, and accumulation was echoed in a wide range of discourses, voicing the imperative that the Hungarian public should make a shift from rhetoric to logic, from fancy to facts, from indulging in irrelevancies to practical occupations, from self-deception to knowledge, from falsehood to truth, all in all, from imagination to reality. Similar claims appeared in literary criticism, pressing authors to turn from lyric to epic poetry, from romance to novel, from literature proper to literary scholarship, that is, from subjective to objective genres. The critical suggestions that the exalted self-expressive outbursts of lyric poetry should be confined to a more “objectified” and “consolatory” lyrical voice equally relied on the anti-romantic eclipsing of the individual, on the post-revolutionary need for “soberness”, and on the increasing influence of positivism.⁵ In his long essay *Élet és irodalom* [Life and Literature], published in 1852–53, Kemény himself urged historian novelists to seek their sources in memoirs written in the age they aimed to depict instead of historiographic accounts in order to grasp the historical *Umwelt* of past events more immediately and more vividly, and to avoid “incongruent psychological motifs, fantastic figures and inherently untrue plots”.⁶ This claim, which Kemény supported both as a novelist and with publishing historical documents, introduced new criteria for verisimilitude and credibility in historical fiction.

In 1851 a heated debate developed in the Hungarian Academy’s periodical *Új Magyar Múzeum* [New Hungarian Museum] over the status of natural and social

disciplines. In the so called “Tudomány, magyar tudós”-debate [Science/Scholarship, Hungarian Scholar/ Scientist],⁷ the philosopher Gusztáv Szontágh argued that the propensity to illusions and the aversion to reality were the features of “young nations” like the Hungarian. His reasoning to leave the “age of idealism” behind and move on to the “age of realism” intertwined with his proposal for a new taxonomy of knowledge. Szontágh relied on an opposition between the “productive”, “state-sustaining” sciences of *realismus* (natural, military, and technical sciences, engineering, economics, etc.) and the “non-productive”, “sumptuous” field of *humanismus* (classical philology, historical scholarship, law, linguistics, etc.), and argued that financial, intellectual and institutional support should be given to the first.⁸ In the light of the fervently hoped national recovery, the contrast between the “ennobling” but otherwise “useless” humanities and the productive “realities” was reinforced by the dilemmas of educational reform, that is, whether to educate the post-revolutionary generations in “real” disciplines instead of the traditional emphasis on law and philology.⁹ Among others, Kemény again insisted on the need to popularize sciences of practical utility, and urged the Hungarian middle class (that is, small estate nobility) to turn to occupations more linked with everyday realities, both to further the development of civil (bourgeois) society and to avoid non-Hungarians taking key positions in what he predicted to be “an age of industry, commerce and money”.¹⁰ One of the novels Kemény wrote in the early 1850s, *Férj és nő* [Husband and Wife], used a marriage plot to play out the tensions between the new class of financiers and the old aristocratic order, to which he himself belonged, and related the contrast of self-delusion and self-knowledge in the disastrous fate of the main character to the clash between money and land, interest and tradition.

The urge for the realism of science and for the pragmatism of finance, however, gave rise to accompanying fears of “overstressing” material reality at the expense of the ideal aspects of life. While for many the “real” sciences appeared to be favorably supporting the nation’s recovery and development, parallel concerns emerged about how to preserve “humanistic” knowledge in the face of a “reality” where natural sciences outgrow historical scholarship and aesthetics, the search for material well-being overshadow moral principles, and mechanical laws threaten ideal standards. During the Science/Scholarship-debate, the literary historian Ferenc Toldy, opposing utilitarianism with Humboldtian notions of *Bildung*, insisted on the social value of humanities and on the utility of literature as the means that would elevate man from the “status of the animal”, and warned against the dire consequences of what he called “a realistic reaction” to the previous emphasis on the humanities.¹¹ Along with Toldy, other literati gave voice to similar fears and counterarguments. The leading poet of the age, János Arany repeatedly expressed in his correspondence, poetry, and criticism his disgust with “reality” both in life and literature. In *A lantos* [The Minstrel], written in the

autumn of 1849, the bard the poem stages is being chased by “a monstrous wraith, the *Real*”. A year later, refiguring the ancient *topos* of the storm-tossed vessel, he claimed in his poem *Reményem* [My Hope] to have been “exiled” from “the land of the bleak *real*”. In a letter written in 1860, looking back on this poem and the time that followed the collapse, he stresses that while seeking escape from the real, “I long for an ideal world not merely because that is the proper place for a poet, but because this daydreaming makes one forget the real, and alleviates its sufferings”.¹² In his 1861 poem *Vojtina ars poeticája* [Vojtina’s *ars poetica*], summarizing his aesthetic views, he emphasizes that in the “unfaithful faithfulness” characteristic of poetry “the magic of the song” depends not on the “real”, but on “its ethereal counterpart”. In his criticism, drawing on what had come to be the most prevalent critical dichotomy of the age, that of the “ideál” [ideal] and the “réál” [real], Arany maintained that “All true poetry is *ideal*. What is said to be *real* stands apart the boundaries of poetry”; therefore the “réál”, that is, the temporal, the contingent, the particular has to confide itself to formal features, for if “it intrudes from the surface to the substance” of the text then “it would cease to be poetry”.¹³ In his review on Friedrich Hebbel’s short epic *Mutter und Kind* (1859), Arany also argued that poetry “must remain what it is”, “a feast of the soul” and not a matter of the “everyday”. And while he admitted that Hebbel’s poem might give “a truthful picture of contemporary society”, he doubted whether the task of poetry is to thrust the reader into the very “harsh reality” that he tried to escape through reading poetry. While acknowledging that the novel could be the proper genre for real-life concerns, Arany insisted that a novel also could be remarkable “not because of, but despite” raising the issue of social suffering.¹⁴

In prose fiction, the young novelist Mór Jókai, who gained his immense and enduring popularity during the early 1850s, also confronted, in his own seemingly naïve but in fact devious way, the urge for more true-to-life stances. In his 1850 volume of short stories depicting the revolutionary days *Forradalmi és csataképek 1848 és 1849-ből* [Sketches of Battle from the Hungarian War of Freedom] the introduction of the piece *Az ércz leány* [A Girl of Ore] insisted on the peculiar need to “mythologize” the past:

Let us write mythology. Let us account the events of that year faithfully, truthfully, everything that happened, everything wonderful, superhuman, outstanding that we saw, experienced, and witnessed, and declare that it is merely a tale, otherwise no one would believe it.

The poet must have dreamt of all this.

So much grandeur, so much splendor, the reckless images of deeds exceeding human capabilities; where else could they have been born but in the phantasmagoric world of a visionary mind?

But would not the teardrop that runs the eye at the remembrance
of the names evoked tell that all this is not a dream but the dead glory
of a buried world?¹⁵

With his double-edged proposal of mythology writing, both ironic and melodramatic in kind, Jókai simultaneously accepted and eluded the reality criterion of historical representation. Being well aware of the possible objections to an idealized exaggeration of events and personalities in writing a historical “mythology”,¹⁶ Jókai here argues that in exceptional times reality can turn “mythical” and “myth” can become real. With this authorial credo, which he relentlessly followed throughout his long career, Jókai attempted to reconcile the opposition of truth and fancy in his own literary way. Through the portrayal of larger than life characters and romance-like plots Jókai not merely reversed the opposition of fact and fiction, but suggested that the two are, and better be, inherently inseparable. Here lies the irony of Jókai’s “mythology”. On the one hand, what he offered as a realistic picture of a “superhuman” past had to conceal itself as “mythological” to evade the criterion of true-to-life representation. On the other hand, by the melodrama of the “teardrop” revealing the secret common knowledge that it was not just a “dream”, he appealed to a community of remembrance with his readers, who, as he seemed to suppose, must have witnessed the same events in the same fanciful way, and thus would validate his “mythology” as a credible narration of pure reality.

As a matter of fact, Jókai had every right to assume that his readers would share his “mythological” realism. In the early 1850s the Hungarian public was immersed in a variety of spiritual practices, such as *table-dancing*, by which families sought contact with their relatives having disappeared on the battlefield with the help of the spectral world. Symptomatic of the coexistence of extreme degrees of reality-seeking and longing for consolation in illusions, the craze for table-dancing in the early 1850s showed a “suspension of disbelief” toward spiritual forces, similar to the eagerness with which the fiction-reading audience received Jókai’s exaggerations.¹⁷ The urge to encounter a spiritual or a “mythological” reality could be seen as part of the overall public longing for truth. (As an indication of the prolonged presence of this mentality even after the passing of straightforward spiritualism, Jókai’s practice of putting larger than life characters in romance-like plots continued to meet the public’s approval until the very end of his long career in the early 20th century.)

During the 1850s, the pro- and anti-reality discourses continued to run side by side. Toward the end of the decade, literary circles followed with growing impatience what they saw as the increasing influence of a not merely literary realism, but a general realism of life. The issue of *realismus* vs. *humanismus* in the taxonomy of disciplines, first discussed in 1851 during the Science/Scholarship-debate,

reappeared in 1857. In *Új Magyar Múzeum*, the editor Toldy stated that he decided to reopen the discussion because he regretfully recognized that “in the meantime the so called realism had occupied great fields of life”.¹⁸ Other literati were witnessing a growing imbalance between the real and the ideal as well. The topic was kept in focus in the newly founded *Budapesti Szemle* [Budapest Review], the leading periodical of the era, too.¹⁹ In volumes 7–8 (1858), the editor Antal Csengery started his series of essays on the world history of culture (beginning with India and China) with the exclamation: “Realism and idealism! antithetical tendencies none of which is solely able to make mankind happy.”²⁰ To enlighten “the true meanings of these two words”, Csengery defined *realismus* and *idealismus* as “labels of philosophical systems”, that is, parallel principles in the workings of world history from the earliest ages to the present, and he called for their reconciliation.

With others, however, the attempt to regain the lost balance between the real and the ideal motivated more fierce attacks. Around 1858–59 the humanistic aversion to the real or the material turned into a full-scale campaign against any kind of realism. The emergence of the notion of *literary realism*, as an application of this *general realism*, therefore signaled only a new stage in the ongoing collision between reality and ideality principles. Joining the debates over the meaning and conduciveness of “realism” of any kind, the question of literary realism was placed along these decade long intellectual anxieties. It explains, therefore, the apparent paradox why literary realism came to be snubbed by an overwhelming majority of critics, many of whom nevertheless had called for, without using the term realism, true-to-life representations in literature from the 1840s, or, on the other hand, supported the cultural program of pragmatism of the 1850s.

The campaign against literary realism culminated, finding a target in Balzac, in a lengthy summary of a prize-winning *Revue des deux Mondes* essay by the less-known French conservative critic Eugène Poitou, that appeared in the *Szemle* in 1858.²¹ Reviewing Balzac’s collected works, Poitou accused the by then deceased author of cynically and unrestrictedly representing the “hideous side of life” and of “breaking the ground for materialism and realism” in preferring the superficial “material surface” to the “substantially ideal”.²² The article, translated by the critic and historian Ferenc Salamon, served as a mouthpiece for the *Szemle*-circle’s overall opinion: with the authority drawn from the prestige of the *Revue*, it reinforced many of the remarks they had formerly made. The critic Pál Gyulai, a regular contributor to, and the future editor of the *Szemle*, had already argued in 1854 (in his review of Kemény’s novels, praising his psychological sensibility) that in Balzac “vice is always victorious”, with which he suggested that his novels gave no morally solid answer to the social and psychological questions they posed.²³ The opposition between the ideal and the real in Poitou’s argument suited perfectly the *Szemle*’s aesthetic views inasmuch as they also found disturb-

ing, not only in the realist novel but in art in general, what they saw as worldly, vulgar, and immoral in representations lacking poetic “idealization”.²⁴ With epistemology taking on a moral aspect, the question was not whether Balzac represented reality truthfully: their concern was that the way he depicted ordinary life, everyday people, and the forces that shape society displayed the immoral and the hideous in life “as the true picture of the real”.²⁵ Within the *Szemle*-circle’s idealist notion of “aesthetically true”, the representation of the “real” was supposed to point not to “mere life” but to its moral ideal: the closer art gets to “mere life”, the more inartistic it becomes. Therefore, the very impression that Balzac depicted life as realistically as a “daguerreotype” made his portraits only more “distorted”: without idealization human characters appear only from a deeply anti-poetical, ignoble physiognomic or anatomical perspective.²⁶ What the *Szemle*-critics, echoing Poitou, referred to as “idealization” was a conviction that in the ultimate instance art must reinforce and express the pre-determined (divine) ethical order of existence, and, as such, serve as consolation amid the inherently tragic conditions of human life.

With the notion of realism originating from outside literature, however, the question of realism as a literary mode was subsumed under the wider ideological issue of realism as a *world-view*. The rejection of Balzac, or what he was taken to stand for, linked the notion of literary realism to that of “materialism” which was associated not only with a nihilistic or skeptical philosophical stance but also with utilitarianism and greed. “Realism” as a style or a representational mode, therefore, merely expressed the underlying immorality of philosophical materialism and economic worldliness. In addition to vulgarity, Balzac was also found guilty of introducing “the spirit of commerce” into the literary field, which, being incompatible with the dignity of art, was felt to “degrade intellectual work to a commercial article”.²⁷ This is where the argument goes a full circle: utilitarian materialism as philosophical realism entails literary realism, which, in turn, implies the intrusion of capitalist values into a par excellence idealistic (that is, non-marketable) sphere, aesthetics. And if realism equals materialism, then the realist novel serves and promotes the immorality of business by the way it represents the world as well as by the way it turns *itself* into a commodity, a part of the commercialized world it represents. What the members of the *Szemle*-circle, along with Poitou, recoiled from was that at the intersection of economy and art human deeds would be deprived, if only apparently, of their inherent moral value which was ought to be expressed only through idealized (non-economic) and idealizing (moralistic) representations. That is, what was felt to be vulgar and materialist in realism equally applied to the style or subject of literary language and to the economic mode in which it was produced. Hence, the critique of Balzac was equally aimed at realist literature and the “realism of life” itself.

The argument of anti-realism was carried out on the largest scale by the aesthete and critic Ágost Greguss, who in his 1859 *A materialismus hatásairól* [On the Effects of Materialism], his inaugural lecture at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, gave a thorough philosophical overview of the issue. In his treatment, philosophical materialism (with its 18th century forerunners such as Holbach, La Mettrie, and Condillac) gave rise to realism in art, and it did so by permeating the principles and institutions of science/scholarship as well as the public and private morals and manners. Evoking the positions of the Science/Scholarship-debate, Greguss accused the materialism of natural sciences of “conquering” every, even non-material forms of knowledge, and saw in the intrusion of realism into education the “devilish” materialism in the guise of “pragmatism”. As off-springs of philosophical realism, Greguss enumerated all the horrors of realism in literature and in the arts: with the depiction of the dismal, the gloomy, and the immoral in social life, realism turns character-portrayal into “anatomical description” and reduces psychology to physiology, dealing with man only as a “specimen” (*példány*) and not as an individual. Thus, the realist predilection for the “ugly” and the “sensual” in art coincides with moral nihilism and selfishness in public life, and with mechanical thinking in science. In the delight of the “ordinary” and the estrangement from “the noble” and “the superior”, Greguss predicted the general decline of the arts if they become “mere copying”.²⁸ Towards the end of the argument the lament over writers getting immersed in the material, that is, the “murderer of poetry”, rises to Carlylean outbursts against the banalities of capitalism and the rule of money that threaten to destruct the basis of social order. In conclusion, Greguss hints that materialism will ultimately lead to the “suicide” of mankind.²⁹ In the later part of his career, Greguss, as the professor of aesthetics at the university in Budapest from 1870 to 1882, continued to condemn every form of realism.³⁰ As it is clear from the volume that his pupils compiled after his death in 1882 from notes taken at his lectures, anti-realism remained the culmination point of his system: his lectures ended on mocking Zola and the “craziness” of naturalism.³¹

In the late 1850s hostile responses to realism in the form of moral dismissal or neoclassical or romantic aesthetic arguments were certainly not unique to Hungarian criticism. Poitou’s article itself, originally published in 1856, reminds us that realism was received as transgressing the acceptable and the representable in France as well.³² Nevertheless, what made the fastidious rejection of literary realism peculiar in Hungary was that the stigma of “realism” was not confined to prose fiction, but permeated the controversies around folkloric poetry as well. The translator-summarizer of Poitou’s essay, Salamon applied the same argument when assessing the poetry of the national icon, the late Sándor Petőfi, who died on the battlefield in 1849. In a long essay that appeared in 1859, also in the *Szemle*, Salamon, echoing the arguments of the Poitou-article he had translated in the pre-

vious year, claimed that in his revolutionary-political poetry Petőfi had committed “the fallacy of realism” for he failed to “idealize” his impressions.³³ Here realism is defined as the means of arousing ignoble passions instead of lofty emotions and unsettling the mind instead of raising and delighting the soul – independently of genre, for Salamon claims to base his argument on a notion of realism borrowed from the fine arts. On the one hand, he highly acclaims what he sees as “lifeliness”, “verisimilitude”, and “honesty” in Petőfi’s amatory poetry, which, as he adds, “depicts the real in its reality”.³⁴ On the other, Salamon declines the realism of Petőfi’s political poetry, for it mistakes the role of the poet for that of the demagogue by “addressing the blood and the nerves”.³⁵ Distinguishing what he calls “the realism of the blood” from those parts of Petőfi’s poetry where “he brings the reality of life into his songs and epic poems”, Salamon stresses that the latter is *not* realism in the sense of the former, for it harmonizes “life” with the “greatest degree of ideality”.³⁶

The link Salamon made between Poitou’s anti-realist notion of prose fiction and Hungarian poetry was already anticipated in his choice of words. While describing the indecencies in Balzac’s style, Salamon’s translation used the Hungarian phrase *pórias* (rustic, coarse) which since the 1840s had been employed as a critical idiom to condemn excesses and distortions in folkloric poetry, first in Petőfi himself, then in his imitators.³⁷ In connection with this “unrefined” tradition of folkloric poetry, the term “real” acquired a further meaning: it came to figure as a counter-concept to the “ideal” in terms of historical periodization. In the 1847 essay *Egyéni és eszményi* [Individual and Ideal] by János Erdélyi, the leading Hungarian theoretician of folk poetry, the “individual” designated the true-to-life way of representation in art brought about by the national-romantic phase of cultural development, while the “ideal” referred to the bloodless style of the outdated universal-classical phase. Back then, Erdélyi argued for the “individual” in order to arrive at a genuinely national literature. He claimed that “life” exists only in individual forms, therefore the representation of the real in literature should include both the beautiful and the ugly. A decade later, however, in his 1859 essay *A legújabb magyar lira* [Recent Hungarian Lyric Poetry], the first part of which appeared in the same issue of the *Szemle* where Salamon’s essay on Petőfi ended, Erdélyi came to take an opposite view. He claimed that by the popularity of what he felt extravagant and excessively “material” in contemporary folkloric poetry (use of local dialects, blasphemous or extreme metaphors, exaggerated nationalism), the “individual” had reached an excessive measure and become a threat to aesthetical refinement. Erdélyi’s change of opinion apparently reflects the ongoing campaign against realism: in his 1859 survey, in accordance with the opposition that had become prevalent since his earlier work, he rephrased his dichotomy of ideal vs. individual as ideal vs. real. Redefining his terms according to the current realism-controversies, he also pressed, in a Hegelian fash-

ion, for a reconciliatory synthesis between a regained “ideal” and the adverse abundance of the “real”.³⁸

Similar efforts of balance-keeping characterized Gyulai’s view of the novel. In his double-front war on realism and romanticism, in which the refusal of Sue or Balzac was accompanied by that of Victor Hugo, Gyulai relentlessly criticized Jókai for “lacking the sense of reality” and for embedding his fiction “not in the idealization of the real but in its falsification and its senseless exaggeration”.³⁹ Jókai defended the conventions of his prose with a similar ambivalence. In his late autobiographical sketch in 1895 he maintained that in his own way he had been a realist all along: “I attempted to find the true figures of life (...) and that I depict extraordinary figures and unusual situations does not make neither the subject, nor the character impossible.”⁴⁰ In this self-portrayal Jókai echoed the epilogue he wrote to his 1858 novel *Az elátkozott család* [The Cursed Family]. Back then, Jókai defined his position amidst the diatribes against realism by declaring to have been part of the novelistic current under critical attack for “scrutinizing life too closely” and “eclipsing the world of ideals”. However, with a characteristic move, Jókai justified this practice by claiming that the “poet needs to study life because it is life that is poetic, not the world of ideals”.⁴¹ The hint that the task of literary realism, a term Jókai carefully evaded, is to represent life precisely because in a sense life is more pervasively poetic than the ideals, clearly follows and justifies the larger-than-life realism he first formulated in his proposal of historical and political “mythology writing”.

While the vulgar and the material in “realism” was equally attacked in French prose and Hungarian poetry, the question of realism also had affiliations with the *Szemle*-circle’s overall assessment of inter-national cultural exchanges. The condemnation of Balzac was part of a wider concern as to how conducive the appearance of foreign literary products would be to the national culture. Balzac’s *Eugénie Grandet* had already been translated in 1843, in a series of foreign novels (*Külföldi Regénytár*) by the prestigious Kisfaludy Society, the leading literary association of the era. The fact that it had been published among classic and prominent contemporary authors from Cervantes to Dickens signaled a high critical esteem and an intention to make Balzac popular in Hungary.⁴² As a representative of contemporary European fiction, Balzac was praised then, without using the term “realist”, as a faithful recorder of social facts and manners in both urban and provincial life, as someone who reveals the secrets of both high society and the underworld somewhat in the manner of Boz and Eugène Sue.⁴³ In contrast, Balzac’s Hungarian assessment came to be determined during the 1850s by the emerging critical opposition between the French and the British novel in general. The phrase “English novel” came to serve not only as a designation of cultural origin, but as a critical term that referred to a specific way of narration (psychologically motivated, coherent story-telling with a harmonious world-view) that ensured

aesthetic quality and was held up as a model to follow. By contrast, the phrase “French novel” came to point to a novelistic method (romantic adventurousness, unmotivated characters, incoherent story-telling, cheap entertainment) that the critics advised to avoid. The castigation of Balzac’s realism was, therefore, part of the general denunciation of French literature, including Sue, George Sand, and even the romanticism of Victor Hugo, as counter-examples to the moral realism of Dickens and Thackeray.⁴⁴

The argument that French and English literature provided two possible models to follow according to their respective modes of realism was most explicitly formulated in another *Szemle*-article entitled ‘The Foreign Novel’ by the critic and translator Károly Bérczy.⁴⁵ Enumerating the critical attacks against the “French novel”, which would reappear as the defects of “realism” in the Poitou-essay two issues later, Bérczy castigated Balzac, Sue, Dumas, and Sand, for they “depict society as it is” by “idolizing vice” and “naturalizing frivolity”, and, therefore, by “justifying the depravity of the world”. The “English novel”, he averred in turn, is superior both in its “artistic structure” and “moral tendency”: contrary to the “absurd characters and impossible events” in the French novel the down-to-earth characters of the English are portrayed “as we meet them in society, however, in an idealized form as necessitated by artistic form”.⁴⁶ As Bérczy added, while the English novel portrays domestic or public life in a “natural course of events”, it also “calms” the soul and makes the reader more susceptible to “the beautiful, the good, and the righteous”.⁴⁷ When Bérczy argued that the popularity of Sand and Sue in Hungary had an adverse effect on the public’s taste, he also referred to a supposed affiliation between the English and the Hungarian national characters – a commonplace at the time based on the ostensible similarities between the British and the Hungarian legal systems. However, Bérczy also doubted that the Hungarian public had the cultural abilities to appreciate the moral realism of the English novel. As he expounded, while *Hard Times* (which appeared in Hungarian translation, along with *Bleak House*, in 1855–56) and its attack on materialism was “effective” in England where the philosophy of business threatened to wipe out every poetic feature of life, it proved to be “ineffectual” in Hungary, because “in our midst, we, if in anything, differ from the English in that we do not idolize materialism, but on the contrary, like to live in the ideal world of illusions”. As such, *Hard Times* “could not arouse as much attention as an unresolved and thus discarded enigma”.⁴⁸ With some irony in connecting and distinguishing British and Hungarian mentalities, the hint that the Hungarian public, living in a not-yet industrial society, could not appreciate the antagonism *Hard Times* presents between utilitarian industrialism and the poetry of life also serves to mock the Hungarians’ reluctance to face reality. While rejecting both the British materialism of business and the Hungarian adherence to illusions, Bérczy highlights the difference between not only two social worlds, but also two senses of reality: the cri-

tique of a materialist view of reality in a British novel cannot be understood and appreciated if one is reluctant to face the very reality of materialism in the first place. (Bérczy, however, seems to have failed to acknowledge that the way Dickens portrays utilitarian education in *Hard Times* could have quite easily found a Hungarian context in the opposition introduced by the Science/Scholarship-debate between “realist” natural sciences and “fanciful” humanities.)

As far as wider critical positions were concerned, the morally determined stand against realism in prose fiction was accompanied by a general ambivalence about the genre of the novel itself. A central critical issue of the decade was whether the epic or the novel corresponded more with the requirements of the age. Many worried that with epic poetry losing ground, a genre that the critic Gyulai and the poet Arany equally prompted to identify with Hungarian national character, Hungarian literature would be distorted. The dilemmas of how to assimilate the currents of European culture without losing national identity had, therefore, implications for genre preferences. Anticipating the critical efforts of the post-revolutionary era to build a literature of *national* genres, Gyulai claimed in his 1850 *Társaséletünk* [Our Public Life] that literature as a social system had to accommodate itself to the overall cultural features that had organically developed within society.⁴⁹ From this perspective, the portrayal of “urban depravity” by Balzac or Sue appeared not only as the expression of the inferior popular taste of the French middle classes, and as such alien to the Hungarian national character, but turned the adaptation of French realism into a threat to the integrity of Hungarian literature itself.

In the apocalyptic political mood of the 1850s, fueled by the fear that the country would be assimilated into the Habsburg empire and the cultural or economic power would be taken over by non-Hungarian or cosmopolitan elements (ethnic minorities, Jews, Germans), literature was considered not only the means by which the nation could express, but by which it had to *Maintain* itself. The crucial role that was attributed to literature in the nation’s recovery explains why critics refused to base that role on what they felt as immoral, hideous, depraving and vulgar in literary realism. The passionate repulsion with which they responded to it therefore did not stem from a pure idealism aimed to distance art from reality. Quite on the contrary, it showed their deep concern for their mutual determination. The relationship between everyday life and literature had already been contested in the discussion of József Eötvös’s novel *A falu jegyzője* [The Village Notary] (1845).⁵⁰ While Eötvös described the political and social critique of his novel as the necessary subordination of “beauty” to the dissemination of “truth” as exemplary for the task of literature, his opponents raised the question of the legitimacy of political critique in literature, claiming that art’s close connection with the vulgarity of the everyday world would contaminate the ideal sphere of the aesthetic.⁵¹ As a continuation of this debate, the anti-realist current of criticism in the

1850s urged for a close but ethically determined and idealistically informed relationship between life and literature.

Anti-realism as a critical principle underpinned, therefore, the cultural policy that the *Szemle*-circle envisioned, and it had clear implications for post-revolutionary politics. Aesthetic, social and ethical judgments were in a large part determined by the ultimate political goal of the nation's recovery. The harsh demand for self-analysis and self-critique that was voiced shortly after the collapse of 1849, gradually turned into a milder effort to prevent the "excesses" that would threaten the national consensus on social and political issues. The counter-concept of realism, *idealization*, evoked the need for appeasement and reconciliation with political resonances: the anti-realism of aesthetic consolation was designed to support political consolidation. In the repeated disapprovals of literary realism, the intention to regain and retain the balance of the ideal and the real in the field of literature, served as an aesthetic form of the political consensus.

One sees, then, at the turn of the 1850s a merger of similar arguments from prose fiction and poetry to painting and sculpture, cultural and educational policy, all in favor of some kind of balance between realism and idealism, acclaiming the "truthfulness" of representation only when accompanied by consolation and harmony in "idealized realism". On the one hand, these arguments endorsed the reality-claims of the natural sciences and historical scholarship, if based on "positive facts", but, on the other, they cautioned against materialism if pervading every field of knowledge and feeling. In these balance-keeping efforts realistic and anti-realistic claims frequently intertwined: the reluctance to face the non-pleasant of the real in art went hand in hand with a heightened epistemological awareness in historical scholarship. In the same issue where Poitou's anti-realist article appeared, the historian Móric Lukács started to publish his long essay, drawing on Niebuhr and Macaulay, on the question of credibility in Roman history. Picking up, probably unwittingly, the thread of Jókai's claim of factual fiction taking the guise of mythological history writing, Lukács pressed for demythologizing the sources, hence argued for realism in historiography, without using the term. On the other hand, he ultimately doubted whether truth could be completely distinguished from myth, which, he added, conveys the very beauty of Roman history.⁵²

The efforts to promote one meaning of realism and condemn the other (like in Salomon's distinction between the "realism of blood" and the harmonious "likeness" in the case of Petőfi) required careful compromises between the aesthetic question of beauty, the social question of order, the moral question of virtue, and the epistemological question of truth. With all the aversion of the Hungarian critics to what they found all too real and material in life and art, and with all their sympathies for Dickens's moral realism, the "two and two are four" reality of Mr. Gradgrind from *Hard Times* still had a great share in their concerns. This interiorized contradiction between the devotion to and the recoil from the real has

been aptly labeled as the attitude of *fact-revising*.⁵³ This attitude implied that “given” facts must be revised according to consciously chosen values: in the course of the profound, scrupulous, but *not unreserved* efforts to take stock of the real, the Existential has to be compared to an ideal form of the Possible. With ideality taken as a standard (and as the essence of being human), the pure existence of a fact does not immediately entail consent or affirmation even if it refers to unalterable conditions. This rejection of ontological or epistemological *Realpolitik* underpinned the political practice of “passive resistance” (the widespread, but not general, refusal to cooperate with the Habsburg administration) as well as the outbursts against materialism. In the mutual determination of politics, literary criticism, cultural and social theory, the question of what is entailed in valid knowing implied the ultimate question of righteousness. With the politicization and moralization of values, the worship of mere facts was felt to be equal to the amorality of political survival. The insistence on the difference between what exists and what can be approved of provided a framework, both metaphysical and positivistic in its kind, which enabled this simultaneous longing for the real and the ideal, knowledge and imagination. And when it came to determining aesthetic principles, the attitude of fact-revising led to the joint rejection of “phantasms” and the reproduction of “mere reality”.⁵⁴ This explains why romanticism, which the *Szemle*-circle deemed deceptive, untrue, outdated and fueling national illusions (of which, one might add, aesthetic idealization is but a form), came to be refused along with realism.

In summary, what we see in Hungary in the 1850s is a wide and dense semantic field in which the variants and derivatives of terms like “real”, “realist”, “realism” figured as homonyms for many supplementary and contradictory senses. A “realist” could equally mean someone who worked in the field of natural sciences, a poet who exceedingly drew on the formal “materiality” of language, a novelist who depicted everyday reality “unreservedly”, or any person who lacked ideal ethical standards, had a “materialist” or utilitarian worldview, or was cynically immersed in seeking only earthly pleasures or financial gain. The use of “realism” as an umbrella term with multifarious extensions ranging from politics to morality, aesthetics to science, education to economy, served as an ambiguous focal point for the intellectual endeavors of the era and provided a site for coming to terms with the cultural and political challenges of post-revolutionary recovery. Hence, the treatment of literary realism was inseparable from political aspirations (revolution, recovery, progress, resistance), the revision of knowledge (“productive” vs. “unproductive” disciplines), ethics (how to praise virtue, how to condemn vice), aesthetics (idealization vs. mimesis), psychology (soul vs. anatomy), and the questions of national character (what are we like; what ought we to be).

During the 1850s and 1860s, Hungarian society was transforming at a relatively quick pace, but politically remained in suspension. The strategy of “passive

resistance” was a deliberate, and in a way successful, reluctance to surrender to political and social realities. Nevertheless, this strategy pointed towards the 1867 Compromise with the Habsburgs and the birth of the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary, and was itself an ultimate attempt to reconcile illusion and reality, desire and coercion. The anxiety of having lost too much of the ideal, however, was lurking in the ideological ground of the new state, which, until its disintegration in 1918, continued to rest on suppressed desires for another reality on all political sides. These tensions are particularly clear in the conspicuous presence of Quixotean figures in the post-1849 and especially in the post-1867 Hungarian novel. The prevalence of anachronic protagonists who tend to misinterpret, misjudge, misconceive, convert or substitute the real in favor of their delightful historical, social, or emotional illusions, also highlight the emerging controversies between heroic and commercial values, tradition and modernity. The trajectory of the literary eccentric, the character who is alien in his own political, social, or cultural environment, and marginalizes and excludes himself from the accepted forms of behavior and knowledge, leads from Kemény’s 1855–57 novel *Özvegy és leánya* [Widow and Daughter] and Gyulai’s 1857 short novel, *Egy régi udvarház utolsó gazdája* [The Last Lord of the Old Manor-House] through László Arany’s 1872 epic *A délibábok hőse* [The Hero of the Mirages] and János Asbóth’s 1876 novel *Álmok álmódója* [A Dreamer of Dreams], to Sándor Bródy’s *Don Quijote kisasszony* (1886) [Ms. Don Quixote] and Kálmán Mikszáth’s *Beszterce ostroma* (1894) [The Siege of Beszterce], *A gavallérok* (1897) [The Gentlemen] and *Új Zrínyiász* (1898) [A New Zriniad]. The persistence of this tradition in late 19th century Hungarian literature reflects upon a society that was entrapped in an ambiguous division between reality and illusion, for instance, between economic modernization and a state driven ideological historicization of social practices and values.

Syntomatically, the political and economic disenchantment that followed 1867 (and the *Gründerzeit* of fully fledged capitalism with its periodical crises from the 1870s onward) was accompanied by the institutionalization of the idealist aesthetic ideologies of the 1850s. The opposition of the “ideal” and the “real” continued to permeate critical vocabulary. The most influential critic of the age, Pál Gyulai, whose aesthetic views developed along the anti-realist currents of the 1850s and came to dominate academic literary criticism until the end of the century, took pains to maintain the ambivalence of art being simultaneously “true” and “idealized”. Facing a literary scene in which realism was not merely a threat anymore, but the disturbing reality of the emerging naturalism,⁵⁵ Gyulai still insisted in his 1885 lecture *A költészet lényegéről* [On the Essence of Poetry] that “poetry, at any rate, is the faithful though idealized portrayal of life, and even the most eccentric realist could not do without a certain degree of idealization”.⁵⁶ Gyulai, whose short novel, *Udvarház* contrasted the reluctance to accept the

post-revolutionary social and political realities with the chasing of ghost-like illusions, continued to demand from the artist to be “the lofty and compassionate explainer and consoler of life”.⁵⁷

Showing No Mercy: Hungarian Marxism and its Realism

From the mid-1940s onwards, communist ideology started to pervade every field of culture and scholarship, excluding, banning, and condemning all former “bourgeois” approaches. In literary criticism, the Marxists, many of whom, including György Lukács himself, returned from their Moscow exile in 1945, attempted to radically rewrite, from a position of force, Hungarian literary history.⁵⁸ Their ambition was to reconstruct a revolutionary teleology in which previous developments led to what they called the present “democratization” of literature. As early as 1946, Lukács suggested in his essay *Demokrácia és kultúra* [Democracy and Culture] that “the whole of the past must be re-evaluated” in order to “forge a new national tradition”.⁵⁹ In this process, the concept of realism was to play a crucial though controversial role. In 1948, when the Marxists were taking over the *Magyар Irodalomtörténeti Társaság* [Hungarian Society for Literary History], a key step in the Stalinization of the institutions of Hungarian criticism, Lukács made an inaugural speech as the new head of the Society. He insisted once again on the need for “a thorough and fundamental revision of Hungarian literary history” along the “reflection theory” of Marxist aesthetics and “a new concept of realism”. And, as Lukács added, in uncovering the true yet hidden pattern of ideological evolution, that is, the “triumph of realism” as envisaged by Engels, Marxist critics “should show no mercy”.⁶⁰ Despite the ups and downs of Lukács’s position in the party hierarchy and the modifications he made (or was pressed to make) to his concept of realism with regard to *socialist realism*, his initiative remained the guiding principle for both historical scholarship and the criticism of contemporary literary production.⁶¹

The enormous ideological importance that was thus attached to the notion of realism in cultural policy required intricate interpretative maneuvers to arrive at an appropriate picture of literary development. Because Lukács had only limited familiarity with (and limited interest in) the Hungarian literary tradition, these adjustments had to be carried out mainly by others. To meet the task in a systematic way, the *Society*, still headed by Lukács, held a three-day congress in November 1955 under the title *The Questions of Realism in Hungarian Literature*. The event was attended by representatives of the other socialist countries, including the Soviet Academy. In his presidential address Lukács declared that the “ideological battle” that started in 1945 for the acknowledgement of realism being more than

just an outdated style “has been won.”⁶² Accordingly, the Congress aimed to outline the literary progress that allegedly led from rudimentary forms of realism in early Hungarian literature to the socialist realism of the present. The challenge they had to face was that the era most crucial to Lukács’s vision of realism, the mid-nineteenth century, generated only a weak tradition of realist fiction. Therefore, while critics at the Congress relentlessly insisted that “the main stream of Hungarian literature had turned into the struggle to achieve critical realism”,⁶³ and that the struggle between realism and anti-realism had been the literary equivalent of the political struggle between “progressive” and “retrograde” social elements,⁶⁴ at the same time they had to account for the “national peculiarity” of the particular absence of a genuine Hungarian realism. The impression of Hungarian literature having failed to achieve the stage of (critical) realism at its proper time led to an ideological anxiety that the national cultural heritage might not suit the pattern prescribed by Marxist literary theory.⁶⁵ In order to compensate for the ensuing feeling of cultural inferiority, national literary history had to be awkwardly adjusted to the preordained scheme of historical development.

Approaching literary history from a Marxist perspective on social and political development, the speakers attributed the backwardness or irregularity in literary evolution to the slow and fragmented nature of ideological progress. The survival of “reactionary romanticism” was assigned to what they saw as distortions in Hungarian social and political history. As to realism, most of them agreed that the “realist mainstream” did not develop in a linear fashion: the 1840s brought about “promising realistic tendencies” (labeled “revolutionary realism”), but due to the lack of a social force to lead a new revolution after the failure of 1848–49, the triumph of Hungarian critical realism was interrupted, delayed, and forced to make certain “detours” between the 1850s and the 1870s. Towards the fin de siècle the “suppressed critical realist tendencies were liberated”, although the “microscopic self-analysis” of some radical intellectuals and decadent aristocrats produced neither great nor progressive art, merely “politically impotent” forms of naturalism. Sporadic efforts to arrive at a comprehensive and critical social survey produced merely torsos (like Zsigmond Justh’s novel series, which remained unfinished due to the author’s early death) or failed to go beyond the scope of journalistic genres and short forms of prose fiction.

To avoid the embarrassment of finding realism proper a missing link in Hungarian literary evolution, its notion had to be simultaneously narrowed and over-stretched. On the one hand, realism was identified with almost exclusively political meanings. It came to embrace not poetical devices or stylistic tendencies, but “progressive” political ideas (plebeian sentiments, anti-Habsburg commitment, and a zeal for national independence) entertained by certain authors and critics.⁶⁶ The more an author seemed to be devoted to these causes, the more he was taken to be a realist representative of the “true feelings” of his age.⁶⁷ Shifting realism

from “formal features” to an umbrella term for political values also helped to solve another distressful problem: if realism was *per definitionem* the highest level of aesthetic and ideological production, how were those national classics to be understood who hardly worked along realist principles, or, like Arany and Jókai, openly rejected them? The dilemma of how to retain the canonical status of the national classics if they do not fit into the ideologically favored way of writing was dissolved by simply equating realism and “great art”, regardless of genre, poetics, or style. As several speakers insisted, realism was to be taken as a “term of appraisal” and not of “classification”. Therefore, inasmuch as realism does not refer to a literary movement but to the highest aesthetic quality, every valuable work could be deemed realist. On the other hand, while reducing the meaning of realism to political progressivity and great art, its generic scope was extended way beyond prose fiction.⁶⁸ To fill up the theoretically prescribed framework, lyrical and epic poetry had to be included, so much so that due to his revolutionary and plebeian commitments the poet Sándor Petőfi was considered the greatest realist author of his era, and his romantic fairy tale *János vitéz* (1844) [John the Valiant] written in heroic stanza was declared to signal the onset of Hungarian critical realism.⁶⁹

These adjustments to the notion of realism led to considerable inconsistencies, even paradoxes. The harshest debate erupted over the question of how to account for the neglect or the explicit refusal of realism by the most prominent literati of the 1850–60s. The keynote speaker on 19th-century realism, János Barta, criticized these decades for replacing the pre-1849 commitment to social transformation with idealist moralism. As he expounded, the literature of the era staged “idealistically” determined “types”, and not social but moral conflicts, and the collision of ethical forces lacked the basic requirement of “critical realism”, namely social determination.⁷⁰ The secretary of the Society, István Király, who had been a key figure in the Stalinization of cultural policy, angrily justified in his response the anti-realist current of the 1850s, and insisted that in the post-revolutionary era the “road of progress” and “true realism” resided, for the time being, precisely in what he called an “idealized realism”, which “reached back” to romanticism in order to maintain the temporarily defeated political ideals and to keep up the national spirit.⁷¹ The paradoxical nature of these ideological maneuvers became most manifest in the treatment of Kemény. Even from a Marxist perspective, the poetics of his novels showed that he came closest to contemporary European realism. Kemény was also among the very few who dismissed the tendencies of idealization, relying on notions of biological determination and physiognomy in detailing psychological motivation. However, because his political views were unacceptable (he deemed both the revolutionary sentiments and the idea of an independent Hungary illusory or leading to catastrophic effects regarding precisely the national cause), Kemény, as Király argued, only *appeared* to be a realist, but since he opposed the course of progress, which carried the “true values of realism”

in the “mask of anti-realism”, he was in fact an anti-realist in the disguise of a realist.⁷² As the other hard-boiled party critic Pál Pándi added, in this case “anti-realism” turned out to be, on a more profound level, “true revolutionary realism”.⁷³ In the end, Kemény was condemned for confining his analysis to ethical or psychological aspects and deliberately avoiding social critique, just as Lukács criticized Flaubert. Kemény’s analytical rigor was taken as the very sign of his contemptible skepticism.⁷⁴ (Kemény’s treatment followed Lukács in another crucial respect: Lukács had already warned in 1948 that the revision of literary history must not lead to the discovery that “reactionary writers” were in fact “progressive”.⁷⁵)

In this awkward manipulation of terminology, the desperate efforts to keep the politically agreeable but non-realist national classics in high esteem in the realist canon run parallel to the banishment of politically unacceptable authors with disturbingly realist features to the margins of literary history. With “anti-realism” appearing in the guise of realism, and “true realism” refusing realist poetical devices, the debate reached ideological clarity at the expense of an ultimate conceptual confusion.

While the ideological debate on the relation between socialist realism (which I cannot discuss here) and the heritage of critical realism lingered on in the 1960s,⁷⁶ the Congress managed to ensure the position of realism as the official aesthetic ideology, determining its treatment in decades to come. The six-volume *Academic History of Hungarian Literature* (published between 1964 and 1966) dealt with the question in a more moderate fashion. Most of the key chapters on 19th century realism were written by the head of the Academy’s Institute for Literary Studies, István Sótér. It underlined the crucial importance of the question but also signaled the intention to arrive at a conciliatory view. In Sótér’s perspective, the 19th century Hungarian novels appeared to be stuck between romanticism and realism, merging their features but never getting properly rid of the former. In the opening sentence of his main chapter on ‘Romanticism and Realism’, Sótér declared that “reality is in constant development and transformation”, and he went on arguing that reality is not always clearly conceivable, therefore, realism cannot be a relevant approach at every historical period, and even when it is, reality might be agreeably represented by diverse poetical devices depending on the author’s stature.⁷⁷ Neither element of this argument would have been thinkable at the 1955 Congress. Sótér implicitly suggested that the Congress, where he chaired the session on 19th century realism but made only a few remarks, failed to produce a viable theoretical and historical framework of realism in Hungarian literature. While maintaining the key ideological aspects, Sótér’s venture put more emphasis on poetic features, like the realistic potential of the much-blamed anecdotal tradition. He established a framework where the absence of realism proper was substituted for by “provisional and transitional forms”, such as the novel in verse, and found the true achievements of 19th century Hungarian realism outside the realm of

prose fiction, in the epic poetry of János Arany. In this light, he managed to ease some of the awkwardness of the historical scheme designed at the Congress, in which a surviving romanticism was immediately followed by a full-fledged critical realism in the early 20th century. In his treatment of realism in the Academic Literary History Sőtér, who had to compensate throughout his career for the non-Marxist works he wrote before Stalinization, attempted to arrive at a compromise between national values and communist teleology, and to ease the contradictions between Marxist theory and the national critical heritage.

The Dismissal of Realism after Marxism

In the following decades the ideological tensions around realism, which were partly created by personal rivalries among critics, deeply compromised the whole issue, and discouraged scholars outside party circles to engage in it. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a short-lived current of Hungarian structuralism was publicly castigated precisely for being a formalistic antithesis to Lukács's theory of realism.

The only significant non-Marxist approach to the theory of realism came from Mihály Szegedy-Maszák's 1989 monograph on Kemény.⁷⁸ Its narratological perspective gave an implicit critique of the prevalent Marxist critical tradition. Disapproving both Lukács's theory of mimesis ("the correct and profound mirroring of reality") and René Wellek's definition of realism ("the objective representation of contemporary social reality"), Szegedy-Maszák insisted that "reality" is an ever-changing "system of institutionalized values" and reminded the readers that literary realism simultaneously constructs and describes its "reality".⁷⁹ Enumerating the traditional attributes of historical realism (the denial of the fantastic, clear referentiality and transparency, the neglect of inner life, omniscient narrator, and the lack of narratorial intrusion), he demonstrated their limited applicability, and showed that realism eventually failed to correspond to its ideal of language as a neutral medium of representation. Besides highlighting what he found as characteristically realist elements in prose fiction (the peculiar temporal-spatial structure of frequentative narration and the constant efforts of the narrator to maintain a dialogue with the reader through language games that are intended to create the impression of verisimilitude), he came to define realism as "a way of reading".⁸⁰ As far as Kemény's novels were concerned, the monograph focused on the way free indirect speech (and inner monologue) came to organize narrative strategies, stressing that in the psychological representations the felt inadequacies of omniscient narration resulted in the proliferation of competing meanings. Highlighting the pervasive ambiguity of Kemény's characters, the study suggested that the undecidability of moral dilemmas weakens textual transparency as well.⁸¹

The most remarkable achievement of Szegedy-Maszák's study was that it showed how Hungarian realism at its best was able to address its own controversies. After 1989, however, as a response to its Marxist overemphasis, the whole notion of literary realism tended to disappear from Hungarian critical vocabulary. If it appeared, it merely figured as a scapegoat for the distortions in critical life and was turned into a counter-concept to romantic, modernist and postmodernist aesthetic inventions. In historical surveys the term "realism" came to be substituted by "modernity", or as in the flourishing romanticism studies, was considered a temporary degradation of a romantic semiosis seen to be continuous to modernism. When mentioned at all, it was only to reinforce the uncontrollable nature of language over hopeless efforts to capture reality in representation. (To give but one example, the new current of historical novels, an emblematic genre of the 1990s, enjoyed critical welcome or refusal according to the extent at which it seemed to follow "historiographic metafiction" in leaving behind the reality-claims of 19th century historical fiction and its devotion to facts and comprehensive narratives.)

It is worth noting that realism underwent a similar loss of prestige in Western criticism, too, but there realism came to be seen as an example of philosophical and ideological naivety, or was condemned for being a means of oppressive bourgeois ideologies. Here realism was dismissed for having compromised itself with oppressive Marxist ideologies: with its dismissal Hungarian literary criticism celebrated its own liberation from politically distorted interpretations and canon-formations.

As the new critical orthodoxy was based on the denial of referentiality, the previous Marxist urge to find at least sporadic traces of realism proper in Hungarian literary history got reversed. Novels once celebrated as realist were systematically liberated from the now compromising label. Gyulai's 1857 short novel *Udvarház* is a spectacular case in this respect. In its own time, it was considered too much of a realist novel and was dismissed for giving "mere reality" without holding up something ideal.⁸² In Marxist literary history it was considered a promising though ultimately failed attempt to achieve genuine critical realism.⁸³ In a recent comprehensive Hungarian literary history, it was praised for showing remarkable "late-romantic" features of deconstructive disfiguration that were previously "mistaken" as "realist elements".⁸⁴ The same novel had thus been treated favorably or unfavorably according to whether it was "still", "already", "not-yet", or "not-at-all" realist. Along similar lines, the former condemnation turned into appraisal in the case of Jókai. His larger than life characters and romance-like plots, previously seen to be lacking realistic coherence and credibility, now appeared to testify to a very postmodern denial of narrative integrity and causality. His portrayal of personality as being dispersed in masks, roles and misrepresentations were celebrated as the generic refusals of realism.⁸⁵ The tradition of anecdotalism

in Jókai and Mikszáth, formerly disapproved as an obstacle in the way of achieving true realism, also came to be celebrated as resulting in heterogeneous and fragmentary narrative structures denying the possibility of coherent realistic plots.⁸⁶

While Lukács's legacy was severely criticized around 1990, the anti-Lukács sentiment soon turned into neglect. Recently, however, a new generation of critics rediscovered, if only critically, the Marxist heritage, and attempted to redefine the tradition of realism. It has been shown how by the metaphors of seeing "visual" realism becomes "disfigured" in Mikszáth's "skeptical modernism";⁸⁷ the role of self-restrictions in the formation of Lukács's realist canon has been studied as an instance of the *ascetic* ethical element in communist self-fashioning;⁸⁸ studies on the institutional history of the Stalinization of literary criticism in the 1950s have investigated the role realism came to play in that process.⁸⁹ Along with the discourse analysis of Hungarian Marxism and the refiguration of 19th century realist fiction, Zsolt Bagi's analysis of Péter Nádas's *Emlékiratok könyve* [Book of Memoirs] (1986) made a singular though remarkable attempt to redefine the theory of realism. Through a critical revision of Lukács, and part of a broader venture into the phenomenology of literary language, Bagi comes to recognize Nádas's prose as a genuine and intricate example of "circumscriptive realism". Distinguishing it from *description*, Bagi makes the claim that *circumscription* marks the ultimate self-consciousness of writing in a complexity that narration and description cannot achieve. Radically revising the inherited critical terms, Bagi finds as "realism" writing that creates its own "structure" and resists the temptation to acquire meaning from the integration into a story or an image. In Nádas's case, it is his page-long sentences that thwart the rule of "narrative" that would tend to turn writing into a novel or a memoir: the "reality" of the text's "world", therefore, overwrites the "ideality" of its "structure".⁹⁰ The irony of this critical experiment is that *Emlékiratok könyve* has always been praised as the key work of the anti-realist current of the 1980s – a gesture with which its admirers celebrated their own aversion to the official realist canon still prevalent when the novel appeared. Probably due to this tradition and the overall neglect to the theory of realism, Bagi's book received a high critical acclaim but failed to reintroduce realism as a critical term even in this profoundly revised sense.

Summary

For conclusion, some common patterns might be detected in the three junctures I have outlined in the treatment of realism in Hungarian critical history.

In the light of an idealist aesthetics preserving classicist values, literary realism was considered during the 1850s as a literary trend originating from the West with vulgar and immoral distortions of art (and life). While it was recognized as some-

thing, thankfully, alien to Hungarian culture, it was still felt to be disturbingly intruding into the national literary production and the manners and morals of the age. Its possible domestic spread (through the cultural import of the French novel) was felt to contaminate the national character and the national system of genres, both supposedly calling for epic poetry. To relieve the ideological anxiety realism caused, the aesthetics of idealization tried to prevent realism's intrusion into poetry, prose fiction, art, education, cultural policy, politics, and ethics. With the institutionalization of anti-realist views, an idealist notion of art became the official aesthetic ideology.

In the late 1940s, Marxist theories of realism were imported by communist émigrés returning from the East, and literary realism became the highest level of aesthetic and ideological production. According to the new critical orthodoxy, its proper form was disturbingly missing from the Hungarian literary heritage. To relieve the ideological anxiety due to the lack of realism, Marxist literary criticism tried to discover its traces, however hidden, and imposed it on poetry, prose fiction, art, education, cultural policy, politics, and ethics. With the institutionalization of pro-realism, a realist notion of art became the official aesthetic ideology.

In the light of poststructuralist theories imported from the West, literary realism came to be regarded as epistemologically naïve and poetically inferior during the 1990s. In the new critical orthodoxy, realism was recognized as alien to literature proper, but felt to have disturbingly permeated the Hungarian critical heritage. To relieve the ideological burden of realism, critics attempted to wipe out every trace of it. When post-structuralist views became institutionalized, antirealism turned into a consensual aesthetic ideology.

What one might witness in all of these formulations of realism is a profound and enduring anxiety with regard to the future prospects and past achievements of Hungarian literary culture. In one way or the other, the preoccupation with realism, or the suppression of it, seems to have always been linked to the question of how Hungarian literature and criticism relate to foreign cultural developments. With the rather obvious political connotations of this, the notion of realism in Hungarian critical history might be an emblem of the constant struggle to relocate Hungarian culture within these relations, either following or resisting influences coming from the West or the East. I see this dynamic to be latently preserved even today, when with the third juncture I discussed the issue of realism seems to have come to a standstill. With the dawn of post-structuralist obsessions, one might expect the screw to make a new turn.

Notes

- ¹ On Courbet's gesture, the French magazine *Réalisme* (1856–57) and the 1855 article 'Du Réalisme' by the poet Fernand Desnoyers, see: Peter Brooks, *Realist Vision*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2005, 16, 71; Pam Morris, *Realism*, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, 63–4. (The early French manifestos of realism have been republished in *Documents of Modern Literary Realism*, ed. George J. Becker, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963, 80–111, 117–19.) In the British context, the first mention of Thackeray as the "chief of the realist school" dates back to a *Fraser's Magazine* article in 1851: see Morris, *Realism*, 85.
- ² Zsigmond Kemény, 'Forradalom után' = Kemény, *Változatok a történelemre*, Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1982, 281.
- ³ István Széchenyi, *A' Kelet Népe*, Pozsony: Wigand, 1841.
- ⁴ Kemény, 'Forradalom után', 183.
- ⁵ On the concordances in this respect between Hungarian criticism and Julian Schmidt's late 1850s views on post-1848 German literary history, see Mihály Szajbály, 'Az 1849 utáni líraellenesség érvei és forrásai' = *Forradalom után – kiegész előtt*, ed. Béla G. Németh, Budapest: Gondolat, 1988, 58–78.
- ⁶ Zsigmond Kemény, 'Élet és irodalom' = Kemény, *Élet és irodalom*, Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1971, 138.
- ⁷ The Hungarian term "tudós" equally refers to "scholar" and "scientist".
- ⁸ Gusztáv Szontagh, 'Tudomány, magyar tudós' = *Új Magyar Múzeum*, 1, 7, 377–90.
- ⁹ Due to the pervasive Latinisms in Hungarian, by the mid-1800s the Late Latin words *realis*, *realitas* were equally prevalent as the Hungarian "való", "valóság". They have continued to coexist up to the present day.
- ¹⁰ Kemény, 'Élet és irodalom', 186.
- ¹¹ Ferenc Toldy, 'Ismét: Tudomány, magyar tudós. Értekező levél Szontágh Gusztávhöz,' *Új Magyar Muzeum* 1851, 9, 469–86; Ferenc Toldy, 'Még egyszer magyarhonai humanismus és realismus' = *Új Magyar Muzeum*, 1857, 10, 433–41.
- ¹² János Arany to Pál Szemere, April 14 1860. = *Arany János Összes Művei*, XVIII. kötet, Levelezés 3. (1857–1861), ed. János H. Korompay, Budapest: Universitas, 2004, 391.
- ¹³ János Arany, 'Törökös gondolatok' = János Arany, *Tanulmányok és kritikák*, ed. Pál S. Varga, Debrecen: Kossuth, 1998, 351.
- ¹⁴ Arany, 'Anya és gyermeké' = Arany, *Tanulmányok és kritikák*, 382, 384.
- ¹⁵ Jókai, 'Az érczleány' = *Csataképek a magyar szabadságharczból* [1850]. Centenárium kiadás. 25. kötet, Budapest: Franklin, 1925, 31. [My translation.] A selection from this volume appeared in English as early as 1854 (*Hungarian Sketches in Peace and War. From the Hungarian of Moritz Jókai*, ed. Emeric Szabad, Edinburgh, London and Dublin: Constable and Co., Hamilton, Adams and Co., and M'Glashlan) in a series of *Constable's Miscellany of Foreign Literature*, but this piece was omitted.
- ¹⁶ The claim that in order to achieve the realism of knowledge history writing should dismiss any kind of mythology making would explicitly turn up next year during the already discussed Science/Scholarship-debate and would be repeatedly returned to throughout the decade. The Science/Scholarship-debate included a subtopic on Hungarian prehistory, a crucial ideological issue of the age whether the Hungarians were part of the Finno-Ugric phylum or the descendants of the Huns. This brought forth the antagonism between methodological impartiality and national bias, historical truth and national interest. Later I will touch on the 1858 essay by Mór Lukács on ancient Roman history, which programmatically attempted to face the contemporary dismissal of mythology from the sources of historical scholarship. (See note 49)

- ¹⁷ On 19th century Hungarian spiritualism and its connections with literature and art: Eszter Tarjányi, *A szellem örvényében. A magyarországi mesmerizmus, szellemidézés, teozófia története és művészeti kapcsolatai*, Budapest: Universitas, 2002. On similar “suspensions of disbelief” of the age in British contexts: Catherine Gallagher, ‘The novel and other discourses of suspended disbelief’ = Catherine Gallagher – Stephen Greenblatt, *Practicing New Historicism*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2000, 163–210.
- ¹⁸ Toldy, ‘Magyarhoni humanismus és realismus’, 172.
- ¹⁹ A review modeled after its British counterparts, the *Szemle* (1857–1944) published essays ranging from historiography, linguistics, political economy, and jurisprudence to geology, geography, and aesthetics. Its editorial board and most of its contributors rallied from what later came to be labeled as the “Deák-party”, a loosely connected group of intellectuals and politicians gathering around Ferenc Deák, the former minister of the 1848 government and the informal head of the Hungarian political opposition during the 1850–60s. Eventually, Deák led the political negotiations that concluded in the 1867 Austrian–Hungarian Compromise.
- ²⁰ Antal Csengery, ‘Képek az emberi művelődés történetéből’, *Budapesti Szemle*, 1858 (7–8) 3.
- ²¹ Ferenc Salamon, ‘Balzac összes munkái’, *Budapesti Szemle*, 1858 (6) 408–22. For the French original, see: Eugène Poitou, ‘Études Morales et Littéraires. — M. de Balzac, ses Œuvres et son Influence sur la littérature contemporaine’ = *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 2e période, tome 6, 1856, 713–67. The article can be downloaded from: http://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/M._de_Balzac,_ses_%C5%93uvres_et_son_influence_sur_la_litt%C3%A9rature_contemporaine
- ²² Salamon, ‘Balzac összes munkái’, 415, 422.
- ²³ Pál Gyulai, ‘Kemény Zsigmond regényei és beszélyei’ [1854] = *Gyulai Pál Válogatott Művei*, Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1989, 98.
- ²⁴ The article aroused a long and harsh debate with the conservative periodical *Hölgyfutár*, but without anyone siding with realism. Instead, the debate staged a clash between opposing literary circles: the *Hölgyfutár*, which completely agreed with the *Szemle* on snubbing non-idealistic literature, criticized the *Szemle*’s increasingly dominant role and its harsh critical tone, of which the essay on Balzac they found an example. At a later stage, however, the debate also revealed the limitations of Salamon’s command of French and even of his familiarity with Balzac’s works.
- ²⁵ Salamon, ‘Balzac összes munkái’, 411–13.
- ²⁶ Salamon, ‘Balzac összes munkái’, 414, 417.
- ²⁷ Salamon, ‘Balzac összes munkái’, 421–2.
- ²⁸ Ágost Greguss, ‘A materialismus hatásairól’ [1859] = Greguss, *Tanulmányai*, volume 1, Pest: Ráth, 1872, 20.
- ²⁹ Supporting his condemnation of realism, Greguss’s essay *A rútról* [On the Ugly], which also appeared in the *Szemle* in 1858, two issues later than Poitou’s article, stated that because in aesthetics the ugly is never autonomous, but always the negation of beauty, it is allowed to enter art only in an idealized form: when it appears in its own sake, the ugly opposes the very notion of art. Greguss, ‘A rútról’ = *Tanulmányai*, vol. 1, 276–310. As an indication of how widespread the ideas that Greguss summarized were in art criticism from the late 1850s, note the similar, though less harsh opinion on realism with regard to sculpture in Zsigmond Ormós’s *Adatok a művészeti történetéhez* [Data to the History of Art] in 1859. Here Ormós asked for a unity of the real and the ideal, urging for a “lifelikeness” elevated by classic beauty. As he claimed, realism proper cannot be mere verisimilitude, for the “crudeness” of merely true-to-life representation would amount to a “coarse realism” [“vastag realizmus”] as the imprint of the “materialism” of their age.
- ³⁰ As for painting, in his 1865 essay *A torzképről* [On Caricature] Greguss mentions Courbet mockingly as the instance of the *hideously real* (“rút realtà”) in art: “The realist who seeks not

- beauty but everything that exists and the way it exists, soon gets to the point where he does not differentiate between the beautiful and the hideous, and the results of this disposition are paintings like Courbet's 'Bathing Women' where we even see what bathing is needed for." [My translation.] Greguss, 'A torzképről' = *Tanulmányai*, vol. 1, 333.
- ³¹ Ágost Greguss, *Rendszeres széptan*, ed. Béla Liszkai, Budapest: Eggenberger, 1888, 262.
- ³² In 1857, at the trial of *Madame Bovary*, Flaubert's "realism", a characterization he relentlessly refused, was treated by the judge as "the negation of the beautiful and the good". Quoted in Brooks, *Realist Vision*, 8, 12, 71. (For the French anti-realist arguments of the 1850s, very similar to those of Greguss and his Hungarian contemporaries, see *Documents of Modern Literary Realism*, 80–111, 117–19.) In Britain the term realism appeared also in connection with Balzac "as head of the realist school in France" in the *Westminster Review* in 1853, but in a much more favorable way, recommending his works to the British readers. On the British reception of French and German realism in general, see: Morris, *Realism*, 88–91.
- ³³ Ferenc Salamon, 'Petőfi újabb költeményei', *Budapesti Szemle*, 1859 (16–17) 297.
- ³⁴ Salamon, 'Petőfi újabb költeményei', 295.
- ³⁵ Salamon, 'Petőfi újabb költeményei', 297.
- ³⁶ Salamon, 'Petőfi újabb költeményei', 297.
- ³⁷ Salamon's critique of Petőfi presumably was intended to reach his imitators in the first place, who came to dominate the Hungarian lyrical scene during the 1850s.
- ³⁸ János Erdélyi, 'A legújabb magyar líra. 1859' [1859] = *Erdélyi János válogatott művei*, ed. Ilona T. Erdélyi, Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1986, 540–79.
- ³⁹ Pál Gyulai, 'Jókai legújabb művei' = Gyulai, *Bírálatok 1861–1903*, Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1911, 82.
- ⁴⁰ 'Jókai önéletírása (10 évvel később)' = *A Jókai-jubileum és a nemzeti díszkiadás története*, Budapest: Rétvai, 1898, 142, 146.
- ⁴¹ Jókai, *Az elátkozott család* [1858], Budapest: Akadémiai, 1963, 272.
- ⁴² This particular novel received a more favorable judgment by Poitou, too, who took it as an exception in Balzac's immoralist tendencies.
- ⁴³ In the editorial preface to the translation, the novelist and journalist Ignác Nagy presented Balzac according to his own commitment to the genre of *Lebensbilder*: see Balzac, *Grandet Eugenia*, trans. István Jakab, Pest: Hartleben, 1843, 11–14.
- ⁴⁴ As a matter of fact, at the time in Hungary both Sue and Sand outstripped Balzac in popularity. New Hungarian translations from Balzac only sporadically appeared throughout the second half of the 19th century, while a great deal was translated from Sue even after the 1850s. Along with the preference of Thackeray and Dickens, Gyulai also felt closer to the Hungarian soul the realism of Turgenev. In 1862 in his review on Turgenev's *A Nest of Gentlefolk* (1859), Gyulai stressed that Turgenev "is a strong realist but never descends to photography". (See Pál Gyulai, 'A nemes fészek', *Szépirodalmi Figyelő*, 1862 (2) 20, 315–16.) In general, the Hungarian critics of the age felt affiliated not with the French claim to present the harshest realities, but the self-censorship of the Victorian novel. (On the avoidance or suppression of realism in the French sense in Dickens, see Brooks, *Realist vision*, 40–4. On the moral realism of the Victorian novel along these tendencies, see George Levine, *Realism, Ethics, and Secularism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.)
- ⁴⁵ Károly Bérczy, 'A külföldi regényirodalom', *Budapesti Szemle*, 1858 (4) 124–34.
- ⁴⁶ Bérczy, 'A külföldi regényirodalom', 124–6.
- ⁴⁷ Bérczy, 'A külföldi regényirodalom', 125–6. As Bérczy added, in Thackeray's works (*Vanity Fair* appeared in Hungarian translation as early as 1853) "posterity will find the true image of the present English society". (131)
- ⁴⁸ Bérczy, 'A külföldi regényirodalom', 126.

- ⁴⁹ Pál Gyulai, *Bírálatok, cikkek, tanulmányok*, eds. Gyula Bisztray – Aladár Komlós, Budapest: Akadémiai, 1961, 432–49.
- ⁵⁰ In 20th century literary historiography, *The Village Notary* was widely held to be the first “Balzacian effort” in Hungarian literature to give an all-embracing picture of social reality. Eötvös’s novel, however, shows a peculiar double-faced character as far as its realism is concerned. On the one hand, it intends to give a comprehensive survey of the social tensions and corruption in the feudal county administration, in accordance with the author’s political views which favored the introduction of a centralized government in the place of the administrative independence of the counties. On the other, it is hardly realist in the sense that it presents a deeply ironic narrator whose constant efforts to thrust himself in the forefront result in a both melodramatic and playfully metafictional narration.
- ⁵¹ On the debate over the genre of *Tendenzroman*, see Péter Dávidházi, ‘Mimetic orientation in 19th century Hungarian criticism’, *Neohelicon*, 1988 (15) 2, 180–3.
- ⁵² Móric Lukács, ‘Róma régi történeteinek hitelessége és eredete,’ *Budapesti Szemle*, 1858 (5) 220–74, (6) 289–340.
- ⁵³ On this attitude permeating the political and social thinking of the age, and the aesthetic principles and scientific methodology they entertained, see Péter Dávidházi, ‘A bevégzett tények felülvizsgálása. A kritikatörténet korszakformáló elve 1849–1867’ = *Forradalom után – kiegész előtt*, 1988, 79–98.
- ⁵⁴ Dávidházi, ‘A bevégzett tények felülvizsgálása’, 81–3.
- ⁵⁵ In Hungary, the appearance of Zola in translation during the 1880s was followed by a parliamentary denunciation similar to the one in Britain.
- ⁵⁶ Pál Gyulai, ‘A költészet lényegéről’ = Gyulai, *Emlékkbeszédek*, vol. 2, Budapest: Franklin, 1914, 227.
- ⁵⁷ Gyulai, ‘A költészet lényegéről’, 228.
- ⁵⁸ On Lukács’s homecoming, see John Neubauer, ‘Exile: Home of the Twentieth Century’ = *The Exile and Return of Writers from East-Central Europe. A Compendium*, eds. J. Neubauer and B. Zs. Török, Berlin–New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009, 35–6.
- ⁵⁹ György Lukács, ‘Demokrácia és kultúra’ = Lukács, *Magyar irodalom, magyar kultúra*, Budapest: Gondolat, 1970, 317.
- ⁶⁰ György Lukács, ‘A magyar irodalomtörténet revízija’ = *Magyar irodalom, magyar kultúra*, 497, 510, 513.
- ⁶¹ Although social realism was in the center of critical and ideological debates, here I restrict my analysis on the Marxist treatment of the 19th century realist heritage. On social realism in Hungary, see the chapter ‘1948: The Culture of Revolutionary Terror’ in *History of Literary Cultures in East-Central Europe. Junctures and Disjunctures in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Vol. 1, eds. J. Neubauer and M. Cornis-Pope, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2004, 107–12.
- ⁶² ‘Lukács György elnöki megnyitója’ = *A realizmus kérdései a magyar irodalomban*, ed. Tibor Klaniczay, Budapest: Akadémiai, 1956, 4.
- ⁶³ János Barta, ‘A kritikai realizmus kérdései a XIX. század magyar irodalmában’ = *A realizmus kérdései*, 157.
- ⁶⁴ Béla G. Németh, ‘Hozzászólások’ = *A realizmus kérdései*, 310.
- ⁶⁵ Lukács himself was well aware that his theory of the 19th century development of realism (high realism from Walter Scott to Balzac, and its decline from Flaubert to Zola) was hardly applicable to Hungarian literature.
- ⁶⁶ It is worth noticing that by the 1950s the communist notion of “progress” had been reconciled with nationalist ideologies.
- ⁶⁷ Nagy Miklós, ‘Korreferátumok’ = *A realizmus kérdései*, 223.

- ⁶⁸ Lukács also shared the conviction that the revolutionary mainstream detected in lyrical poetry (Petőfi, Ady, Attila József) had been accompanied by a weaker tradition of prose fiction, and that the novel designed to represent “the totality of society” was of second rank in Hungarian literary history. See his ‘A magyar irodalomtörténet revízija’ = *Magyar irodalom, magyar kultúra*, 507.
- ⁶⁹ István Király, ‘Korreferátumok’ = *A realizmus kérdései*, 209. (Nevertheless, the idea of Petőfi’s “lyrical realism” tacitly drew on the “bourgeois” literary historian János Horváth’s 1922 monograph.)
- ⁷⁰ Barta, ‘A kritikai realizmus kérdései’ = *A realizmus kérdései*, 173.
- ⁷¹ Király, ‘Korreferátumok’ = *A realizmus kérdései*, 203–6.
- ⁷² Király, ‘Korreferátumok’ = *A realizmus kérdései*, 205–6.
- ⁷³ Pál Pándi, ‘Korreferátumok’ = *A realizmus kérdései*, 218–9.
- ⁷⁴ In a similar fashion, the “monarchist illusions” of the novelist and political philosopher József Eötvös were held responsible for the “defects” of his post-1849 realism, see Pándi, ‘Korreferátumok’, 215.
- ⁷⁵ Lukács, ‘A magyar irodalomtörténet revízija’ = *Magyar irodalom, magyar kultúra*, 510.
- ⁷⁶ See for example Tibor Klaniczay, ‘Realizmus vagy szocialista realizmus’ [1965] = Klaniczay, *Hagyományok ébresztése*, Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1976, 476–84.
- ⁷⁷ *A magyar irodalom története IV. A magyar irodalom története 1849-től 1905-ig*, ed. István Sötér, Budapest: Akadémiai, 1965, 281.
- ⁷⁸ For an excerpt in English from the theoretical introduction, see: Mihály Szegedy-Maszák, ‘Notes toward a Historical Definition of Realism’ = *Neohelicon*, 1988 (15) 2, 31–54.
- ⁷⁹ Mihály Szegedy-Maszák, *Kemény Zsigmond* [1989], Pozsony: Kalligram, 2007, 28.
- ⁸⁰ Szegedy-Maszák, *Kemény Zsigmond*, 29.
- ⁸¹ On Kemény’s novels along similar lines: Thomas Cooper, ‘Mimesis of consciousness in the fiction of Zsigmond Kemény’, *Hungarian Studies*, 2003 (17) 1.
- ⁸² Greguss, in a private letter written on December 14, 1857, described Gyulai’s novel as a timely and effective piece of journalism, lacking aesthetic quality. The reader, Greguss averred, “sees a publicist who embitters and agitates, but not the artist putting reconciliation into our hearts”; what this novel gives is “mere reality instead of poetic justice, and reality turns into untruthfulness precisely because it is only the real without the consolation of the ideal”. *Gyulai Pál levelezése 1843-tól 1867-ig*, ed. Sándor Somogyi, Budapest: Akadémiai, 1961, 339.
- ⁸³ Barta, ‘A kritikai realizmus kérdései’ = *A realizmus kérdései*, 170–1.
- ⁸⁴ György Eisemann, ‘Népiesség és klasszicitás’ = *A magyar irodalom történetei II. 1800-tól 1919-ig*, eds. M. Szegedy-Maszák – A. Veres, Budapest: Gondolat, 2007, 415.
- ⁸⁵ See István Margócsy, ‘Kalandorok és szirének – Jókai Mór jellemábrázolásáról’ = Margócsy, ‘A férfikor nyarában’. *Tanulmányok a XIX. és XX. századi magyar irodalomról*, Pozsony: Kalligram, 2013, 297–330.
- ⁸⁶ A similar exoneration from the stigma of “realism” has been carried out in the case of Petőfi. See István Margócsy, *Petőfi Sándor*, Budapest: Korona, 1999.
- ⁸⁷ Levente Szabó T., Mikszáth, a kételkedő modern. *Történelmi és társadalmi reprezentációk Mikszáth Kálmán prózapoétikájában*, Budapest: L’Harmattan, 2007.
- ⁸⁸ Dávid Szolláth, *A kommunista aszketizmus esztétikája*, Budapest: Balassi, 2011.
- ⁸⁹ Tamás Scheibner, *A magyar irodalomtudomány szovjetizálása. A szocialista realista kritika és intézményei, 1945–1953*, Budapest: Ráció, 2014.
- ⁹⁰ Zsolt Bagi, *A körülírás. Nádas Péter: Emlékíratok könyve*, Pécs: Jelenkor, 2005, 28–9.

DISCOURSE FORMATIONS IN READINGS OF THE *SZINDBÁD* NARRATIVES

ISTVÁN DOBOS

University of Debrecen
Debrecen, Hungary
E-mail: idobos@puma.unideb.hu

This paper delineates critical approaches to the reading of the *Szindbád* narratives by Hungarian author Gyula Krúdy, which basically have tended to assume a balance of the sensual and the spiritual, as well as literal and figurative meanings. I propose an interpretative model focusing on the question as to how an imaginary event exists in the consciousness of a literary character, and how that character's perception can be related in the narrative. There is not much on this short-fiction poetical issue in the secondary literature, much as there is very little on notions of overlaps between reality and fiction or the transformative text-events of becoming a creation.

Keywords: double readability, rhetorical analysis, parody, self-interpretation

Discussion of the theoretical aspects of the issue mentioned in the title of this study is possible primarily in the course of a rhetorical analysis. At this early stage, it might be necessary to highlight among the major conclusions that are deducible from the experience of reading the one that purports a revision of the fundamental interpretative model of morphological structures, which basically assumes the balance of sensual and spiritual, as well as literal and figurative meanings. Although the conventionally accepted metaphors of reading Krúdy's texts are under the "protection" of a perfect unity of images, words, and sounds, the language-oriented formative devices in the *Szindbád* stories hardly present their simultaneous perception as a process void of barriers.

Metonymy: Puppet or Personality?

As regards the issue of the identity of characters, the basic narrative features of the *Szindbád* stories, regarding the metonymical relationship between the narrator and the figures created in the text, are transitions, unmarked viewpoints and switches between parts. In relation to the double readability of metonymy, a reference must be made to the reversibility of the cause and effect relationship between

the inner and the outside worlds, which is concurrent with the round and round of the mutual substitutions between the characters. The interchangeability of the personal traits of the characters is one of the signs of the multiplicity of the worlds imagined, i.e., of the fictional stories within fiction itself, which is a distinguishing mark of the *Szindbád* stories. In fact, *Szindbád* can choose to have one of three occupations after his death: he could become a tin soldier, a back-comb, or a wooden bead in a rosary.

The short story *Utazás éjjel* [A Journey at Night] (1911) presents an elopement by *Szindbád* as if it took place in a puppet show, among the props in the scenery of a model railroad. Seen through the train window, the night landscape seems motionless. Observed from the passing railroad car, the lengthmen, who stand still and stiff, look lifeless: “*Egy tanyaház pirosló ablakával úgy fut a tájon keresztül, mint egy bábszínházbeli kép; egy kis állomáson, egy percig megállottak, az emeleti ablakban két leány ült, varrtak, a harmadik fehér alsóruhában állott a szoba közepén, a függőlámpa alatt, és éppen egy lila szoknyát próbált felvenni.*” [With its red window, a farmstead was running through the landscape, like an image from the puppet theater; at a small station they stopped for a minute, there were two girls sitting in the window, sewing, while a third one was standing under the lamp in the middle of the room in her white underwear, trying to put on a purple skirt.] (312).¹ *Mimi*, the eloped girl, has been sitting silently, without as much as a stir, also like a lifeless puppet on her seat, from the beginning of their journey. Getting bored of this game, *Szindbád* changes his mind and informs the girl that he will take her back to her parents by transferring to the train coming from the opposite direction at the next stop. *Mimi* does not respond to this either. This narrative can be interpreted also as a chain of events taking place in the imagination of the person observing the model railroad. At the beginning of the narrative, the listing of a sequence of title variations evokes the announcement of a part or section in a puppet show performed at a fair: “*Curly vagy egy színész története*” [Curly, or the Story of an Actor], or “*Esmond Henrik, Anna királynő öfelsége ezredesének története*” [The Story of Henry Esmond, General of Her Majesty], and, finally, the one considered to be the most expressive of them all, “*A gonosz varázslo, vagy az ártatlanság diadalma*” [The Wicked Magician, or the Triumph of Innocence] (212). On the other hand, the story *Utazás éjjel* can also be read as a parody of elopement.

The so-called *performed narrative* is very close to a dramatic play; in fact, it is a narrative production of a play. It is not only the characters in *Utazás éjjel* (1911) who resemble lifeless puppets, who seem to be the props for the parody of elopement, but also, for example, the grotesque female figures in *Szindbád és a csók* [*Szindbád* and the Kiss] (1911), as well as even *Szindbád* himself, from a certain aspect. One of these two women practices the “mérköldjáró csók” [verbatim: mile-long kiss] with *Szindbád* on even days, while the other one does so on odd

days: “*Julcsa harminckilenc, Jella harmincnyolc és fél esztendős volt*” [Julcsa was thirty-nine, while Jella was thirty-eight and a half years old] (65). Not only their age but also their names and looks are similar: both of them “*kövérek, puhák és csókszomjasak voltak*” [were fat, plump, and thirsty for kisses] (65), and “*tűnő nyaruk mulandósága miatt forrasztották hosszadalmasan ajukat Szindbád ajkára*” [they would stick their lips to Szindbád’s lips for a long time because of the transience of the fleeting summer of their life] (65). These two female figures are distinguished by numbers, which are connected to them randomly and arbitrarily. The numbers stand for persons, or, rather, the persons are substituted by numbers, as if these characters were props, with identification labels attached to them.

The third woman flies in through the window of our protagonist on Saturdays, like a birdbrained swallow. *Szindbád* falls asleep next to this innocent creature, who keeps observing his face and motionless body with a frightened and cautious look. *Szindbád* gets disenchanted quickly, and his apathy can also be deduced out of his appearance: “*Szindbád hamar kihült, hamar felejtett, és közömbös, hideg tekintete jeges nyugalommal fordult el sokszor látott női szemek sugárzása elől.*” [*Szindbád* could quickly cool off, he could quickly forget, and his cold and indifferent look would turn away from the radiation of oft-seen female eyes with icy reserve.] (64).

The double readability of metonymic formations based on sheer connectedness makes it possible for the parody on the identity of personality to appear. That is to say, the even and the odd numbers, which are used metonymically to identify as well as to differentiate between the characters, are associated with their bearers quite randomly. The marker is an external marker of the marked entity. The incompatibility of the constituent parts in the marking process is revealed here exactly by the logic that is supposed to be used for restraining the arbitrariness of the language that establishes timeless connections. The critique of metaphors applied for the figural presentation of people is executed through metonymical structures, but this operation is not tantamount to reversing the hierarchy of the two linguistic operations. There is no concord between the statement of the lesson related to the difference between the women and its implemented performance either. Metonymy thus excludes the possibility of a psychological approach to the characters, as the analogy between the number and the corresponding character is purely based on an accidental relationship. The metonymy used for naming the characters has a subversive power, yet it does not erase the rhetorical pattern of reversing and substituting from the literary language. The impersonal number used for metonymy here seems to be the *metaphor of the absence of personality* that would distinguish the character.

What is there behind the external features? Is it possible to state anything more specific about the nature of *Szindbád*’s self? The reiterative occurrence of the

variations of the sentence “*Nem vigasztalta a százhét nő, aki viszontszerette*” [He was not consoled by the one hundred and seven women who reciprocated his love] in the *Szindbád* stories reminds us of the Catalog Aria of Leporello in Mozart’s opera. Don Giovanni keeps an exact account of women seduced by him, whereas it is far from certain that *Szindbád*’s amorous conquests really did take place.² According to the preliminary interpretation in the introduction to this story (see *Tájékoztatás* [Information] (1915)), the one hundred and seven women, in fact, lulled *Szindbád* into a numb reminiscence in his imagination [“*képzelődésében kábult emlékezésbe ringatta*”] (14). How does an imaginary event exist in the consciousness of a literary character, and how can that be related in the narrative? There is not too much about this short-fiction poetical issue discussed in the relevant critical literature, just like about the notions of coverage between reality and fiction or the transformative text-events of becoming a creation. Imagination and reminiscence, as well as the fictional and the real are inseparable from one another when following the self-interpretation of the piece.

Repetition: Irony and Recollection

Due to the double readability of repetitive formations, an interplay between pathos and irony expresses the complexity of the behavior of the reminiscing *Szindbád*. The iterative structures present the emotional recollections of the past as a piece of parody. In one single, short passage in *A hídon. Negyedik út* [On the Bridge. The Fourth Journey] (1911), there are four different versions of the description of the narrative situation of retrospection: “*Eszébe jutott fiatal korából egy város, – völgyben és piros háztetőkkel, ahol a barna híd ódon ívei alatt színes kavicsok felett vágat egy tiszta kis folyó, és Szindbád a hid kőpárkánya mellől álmodozva nézte a messzségen alvó kék erdőket.*” [He remembered a town from his youth; in a valley and with red roofs where, underneath the old arches of the brown bridge, a clean rivulet was rushing over colored pebbles, and *Szindbád* was dreamily watching the blue forests asleep in the distance from the stone ledge of the bridge.] (52)

The basic sentence that expresses a desire to go back into the past is full of pathos, but the repetitive appearances of its versions drive the recollection through irony towards self-mockery: “*a kék erdőket látni a messzeségen és a híd lusta ívei alatt serényen utazgató folyót*” [the blue forests can be seen in the distance and the river running past diligently under the lazy arches of the bridge], then “*egy folyó szeli kereszttü a várost, és a hídról álmódó erdőket látni*” [a river runs through the town and, from the bridge you can see dreaming forests] (52). In the various repetitive versions, the sequence is continued with the iteration of one of the components of the original sentence, which is sleep and dreaming. Uttering

what speaks for itself also approximates the description of the sleeping town to parody. It seems to *Szindbád* that time has stopped perhaps: twenty-five years ago, he saw the same windows with their closed shutters.

The return of what is not identical with itself offers the semblance of interrelatedness. A basic pastime of *Szindbád* is to be looking dreamily as if brooding for long time periods. The closing of the story means returning to the starting point. The iteration of the basic sentence creates a circular structure, which places the narrated story on a revolving stage, as it were: *Szindbád* “*a régi hidra ment, ahonnan sokáig elgondolkozva nézte az alkonyatban álmodozó messzi erdőségeket. A folyó fürgén futott a hid álmos ívei alatt*” [went to the old bridge from where he was looking at the distant dreamy forests in the dusk for a long time, thinking all the while] (56). The repetitive versions grow out of the sample original sentence, but these cannot be regarded as unified and joining elements that would organize themselves around one single focal point in the entirety of the text. The double readability of the formation of repetition ensures the appearance of parody in nostalgic short stories in search of their subject matters.

One of the basic features of Krúdy's way of writing is the application of synesthesia as related to recollections. Its iterative occurrence also offers the possibility of assuming a parody of the formation. It is striking how the imagined perceptions of various sensory fields, such as flavors, aromas, images, and touches are connected with one another in Krúdy's comparisons and similes. It is typical that, in the individual *Szindbád* stories, it is always different sensory organs that come to the fore in the text. For example, in the story called *Az első virág* [The First Flower] (1911), it is the sense of hearing, the laughter of actress *H. Galamb Irma*, and the joint impression created by these two that are in focus. The repetition of the versions of joint perception places the phenomenon itself into the center of attention ironically, during the course of which an impression perceived through one of our sensory organs evokes the memory or the sensation belonging to another. The single distinguishing feature of this character is that she produces strange sounds: “— *Ah, maga az?... – kiáltott fel csengő hangon, amely úgy csillámolt Szindbád előtt, mint a folyóvíz a holdsütésben.*” [Ah, is that you?... she exclaimed in a ringing voice, which sparkled in front of *Szindbád*, like running water in moonlight] (310). Not very far from this in the text, the reader can hear *H. Galamb Irma* again, whose name proves to be a warning sign: “Most már turbékolt a hangja...” [Her voice was now cooing...] (310). This actress knows one of *Szindbád*'s tutors, who is specialized in conquering female hearts: “*Tiszteletem... És csókolatom – tette hozzá halk kacagással, amely úgy hangzott Szindbád fülébe, mint a gyors tavaszi eső csengése a nyugodt tó tükrén.*” [“Tell him I'm sending my greetings... and my kisses,” she added with a soft chuckle, which sounded to *Szindbád*'s ears like the ringing of fast spring rain on the surface of a placid lake.] (310). The awkward young man, however, does not hear that the

actress has accepted his advances: “—*Az este hűvös – mondta finomkodó hangon, mint a francia szalondarabokban szokás –, Szindbád úr, megengedem, hogy elki-sérjen... Szindbád – bár már tizenhat esztendős elmúlott – néha ostobaságokat mondott: – Nevelő uraim a Hársfában ülnek, és bizonyára várnak.*” [“The evening is cool,” she said in a genteel voice typically used in French drawing-room pieces, “Mr. *Szindbád*, I’ll let you escort me... *Szindbád*, although he was past the age of sixteen, sometimes said stupid things, “My tutors are sitting in the restaurant *Hárfa*, and they are probably waiting for me to arrive.] (310) *Szindbád* is wet behind the ears, as it were: he is hard of hearing, and the experienced *H. Galamb Irma* has to take cognizance of this using a more and more inornate voice: “—*Furcsa ember! – mormogta csendesen.*” [“Strange man,” she muttered softly.] (310) The actress makes yet another effort, in a different tone: “—*Remélem, hogy holnap délután eljön hozzámn uzsonnázni? – mondta csendesen és komolyan. – Kettvényi urat is elhazzam? – kérdezte Szindbád. Az alacsony nőcske csendesen meghintázta gömbölyű mellét, mint egy madár, aztán közömbösen mormogta: – Ha ugyan eljön az öreg bácsi?*” [“I hope you’ll come and have tea and an afternoon snack with me tomorrow?” she said quietly and seriously. “Shall I take Mr. *Kettvényi* along, too?” asked *Szindbád*. The small cutie silently swayed her round breasts, like a bird, and murmured indifferently, “If the old geezer wants to come at all?] (311) If the reader associates meanings to go with the voices and calls for the help provided by the system of signs used by pigeons, based on the meaning of the name of this female character, this narrative will read like a parody of bird language. The short story, on the one hand, suggests that the reception of courting voices requires a delicate sense of hearing while, on the other hand, it does not refute the assumption either that education can have a benign influence on sensory perception because, as time passes, *Szindbád* will become better than his masters. The double readability of simultaneous perception allows for both interpretation possibilities. What is realized here is the poetics of tautology, insofar as the short story can be considered as the extension of a self-evident correlation, which goes: in order to hear a voice, hearing is necessary.

Tautology: The Narrative in Search of its Subject Matter

The poetics of tautology manifests itself in expressing the obvious and repeating its variations in the *Szindbád* stories. In narratives searching for their subject matter, the author presents the activity of narrating on a stage, so expressing and relating, as forms of action, play an equal part with that of the story. No value appears to be permanent or solid in the worldview of the narrator. Compulsive retrospection creates a safe haven through the language-related activity against the loss or depletion of personal memories. The poetics of tautology reveals itself against the

alluring nothingness in a *narrative in search of its subject matter*. I do not wish to contend, however, that the *Szindbád*-stories are about nothing, as I think that they are rather about the play of fancy that annihilates nothingness.

In the opening short story called *Ifjú évek* [Young Years], the story unfolds from the description of a painting. The interruptions of the presenter relate to the ways of expression, to the narrative activity that purports to appear expedient: “*Ki volt, mi volt a herceg, mielőtt kopottas, aranyozott rámák között elfoglalta volna helyét a régi kolostorban? – ez szorosan nem tartozik e történethez. Elég az hozzá, hogy ott volt, a bolthajtás alatt a falon.*” [Who or what had been the prince before he took his place within the gilded frames in the old monastery? This does not belong closely to this story. Let it suffice that he was there, under an arch, hanging from the wall.] (15) It seems as if the presenter/narrator was proceeding in a strictly straight fashion, yet there is an immediate gap between what is uttered and what is contemplated. Soon after it is announced that diversions will be avoided, we get a detailed description of the figure of St. Anna, visible underneath the decaying plaster of the archway section: “*egy kis zsámolyon üldögélt, az arcát megérintette a régiségek, csak két fakó szeme tekintgetett kérdőleg a diákokra, akik a folyosó kockakövein csizmában kopottak*” [she was seated on a small footstool, her face was touched by antiquity, and only her two pale eyes looked at the students who would clatter on the cobblestones of the hallway in their boots] (15). And then the lean narrative, announced before, turns into a presentation losing itself in so many details. The travesty of laconic expressivity grows into full proportion in the reference to the image of St. George: “*György sárkányát öldökölte*”. [George was slaughtering his dragon.] (15) This piece of information is obviously unnecessary. An image of St. George cannot be of anything else, due to its own essence. The narrator thus is verbose, since he explains one issue or notion with the issue or notion itself. Nevertheless, it is exactly this amount of excess that distinguishes Krúdy’s art as a writer. There is much more, and also something different, present here than simply the dissolution of the cause and effect principle or the structure based on temporal connections, or even the lack of pragmatism, as it is unanimously claimed by the Krúdy critics and experts.

The way *Szindbád*-stories are written takes us very close to the genre of parody. Still, it is not the constant transition between reality and absurdity that brings forth the effect of ambiguity but rather the interplay between narration and presentation/performance. The possibility of reading *Szindbád* stories as parodies comes from the tension between the actual utterance and the interpretation of the way markers are used.

The personification of the voice coming from the past pushes almost automatically the presentation of *Szindbád második útja* [*Szindbád’s Second Journey*] (1911) to the boundaries of parody at the beginning of the 20th century. The name *Szindbád* is not necessarily supposed to serve the purpose of identifying the char-

acter but rather to expand the limits of the self, in order to multiply the personality. It is more of an empty marker than a proper name, which is why it can comprise the most diverse human characteristic features. It is then the exaggeration, the excessive piling up of the personal traits, i.e., tautology, that turns the characterization of *Szindbád* into parody. The conscientiously elaborated and diversely highlighted psychological portrait becomes distorted after a certain point. Verbosity driven by irony turns against its own objective: it does not create unity and continuity in the personality of the character bearing the name. However, tautology is not merely a waste of verbal expression. On the contrary, the description teeming with attributes, comparisons, and other figures of speech directs the attention not to the complexity of the personality but to the richness of language. Here, the wasteful abundance of expressions is the source of enjoyment, not the psychologically nuanced quality of the profile.

Látott halált, látott születést, esküvőt, házasságtörést és gyilkosságot az erdőben. Egyszer sírt is, pénz miatt véres könnyet sírt, és titokban segített a szegényeken. Imádkozott elhagyott kis templomokban, és orvgyilkosságot forgatott a fejében ellensége ellen. Majd becsületes, nyílt és bátor volt, mint egy középkori lovag. Majd okos volt, mint a kígyó, és mámoros álmokat próbált fejtégetni a másnapokon. Voltak barátai: gőgös nagyurak és bujdosó pénzhamisítók. Egyszer nőrabló volt, máskor otthoniülő családapa.

[He has seen death, he has seen birth, adultery, and murder in the forest. Once he even cried; he cried bloody tears because of money, and he helped the poor in secret. He prayed in small desolate church buildings, and he contemplated assassinating his enemy. Then he was honest, open, and brave, like a mediaeval knight. Then again he was clever as a snake, and he tried to interpret inebriated dreams on the days after. He had friends: haughty lords and fugitive counterfeiters. Sometimes he was an abductor, at other times a couch potato of a family man.] (37)

The directionless piling up of elements, working as a parody of enhancement, makes the formation of tautology visible at the climax of the listing: “*Verekedett verekedőkkel*” [He fought with fighters] (37).

Szindbád sets out to find the memories of young age. On the path to his memories, he wishes to emulate his young self in order to re-live his youth. Thus, the reader becomes a part of a mirror-play. It is as if *Szindbád* were the *alter ego* of the unnamed narrator, while the old *Szindbád* imitates his young self, and the young *Szindbád* comes on stage from the perspective of the reminiscer. The destination of the second journey is a small town in the Plains region, where the young *Szindbád* went to see a young girl once at night. The marking of the place and the time is tautological: “*Nyár volt akkor és harmatos volt az éjszaka.*” [It was sum-

mertime then, and the night was dewy.] (38) Uttering what speaks for itself can also be explained through the fact that, to *Szindbád*'s mind “*már semmisem jutott eszébe a régi gondolatok közül*” [nothing/none of the old thoughts came back] (38). So, the short story creates its own world out of nothing: the lack of subject matter and the awkward search for it provide the reason for the story-teller to put the narrating activity itself on stage as well. The description of the figure of the girl unfolds from several clichés: “*Irmának hívták, és barna volt, nagyhajú, és az ajka fölött gyöngé kis árnyék lebegett, mint a fehérbőrű, barna nőknél. Szindbád ezt azóta gyakran tapasztalta.*” [Her name was *Irma*, and she was a brunette with big hair, and above her lips there was a feeble little shadow, like with other white-skinned and brown-haired women. *Szindbád* has experienced this often since.] (39)

Another discursive formation belonging to the notion of tautology, known as the rhetorical question, would also seem in Krúdy's writings to be the manifestation of maintaining narration in search of its subject matter: it is a question only as far as form goes, as it does not require an actual answer: “— *Bacsó kertész az este meghalt. Most virrasztanak mellette –felelte Irma. Vajon azóta még mindig Bacsó kertész mellett virrasztanak a kis kerti házban?*” [“Gardener *Bacsó* died last night. A wake is being held now at his place,” said *Irma*. Is it possible that there is still that wake being held at Gardener *Bacsó*'s bedside in the small garden cottage?] (40) The repeated occurrence of a word embedded into a context that brings forth a contrary meaning is supposed to provide glimpses of reverse extremities of life in Krúdy. The opposition of hot and cold expresses the well-known inseparableness of life and death: *Szindbád* can feel the kiss laid on the lips of the girl in love and the proximity of the cold dead body laid out next door.

Hot and cold, a sample of *the figure of speech called antonym* also allows for double readability. It is striking how worn out and cliché-like the opposition under scrutiny is, yet it is exactly due to this commonplace quality that its repeated occurrence functions as a piece of parody. The precondition for this transition, however, is for the reader to be able to find the symbolic sense about the closeness of life's extremities. Having properly perceived the travesty of this figure of speech, the reader is not really surprised at the conclusion of the story: after a few months, *Irma*, who has fallen in fatal love with *Szindbád*, of whom she thinks fondly and with gratitude, is taken to the cemetery to be buried. The routine explanation for the suicide of the forsaken girl is presented through a parallel, which formation also requires a double reading strategy: *Irma* poisons herself *after a couple of months*, whereas *Szindbád*, upon learning about her death, does not feel well *for a couple of days*. It is through the choice of reading the unbalanced quality of the parallel as an expression of antinomy that the reader can recognize the ironic tone describing the hasty mourning of her voluntary death on the part of *Szindbád*.

Nonetheless, the question of the relationship between parody and self-interpretation is still to be more thoroughly explored in Krúdy-criticism, which is why it is also difficult to answer the question whether the mysteriousness of the personality of *Szindbád* is open towards genuine depths of meaning or simply deceptive and false appearance.

Notes

- ¹ You will find the title of the short story in my text, followed by the date of publication and the page number where the quote is taken from, in the original Hungarian collection Gyula Krúdy, *Szindbád*, coll., ed., epilogue by Sándor Kozocs, Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1985³.
- ² Kierkegaard discusses the list of the seduced women in great detail. Cf. Søren Kierkegaard, *Vagy-vagy* [Either-or], Budapest: Osiris, 1994, 86–102; especially: 94–9. In Mozart's opera, the own power of sensuality takes care of seducing. Don Giovanni lacks reflection, consciousness, and shrewdness. He does not plot, he is driven by momentary desire, and he “enjoys the satisfaction of lust” (*ibid.*, 97). Kierkegaard even dares to assume that Don Giovanni “does not have time to make a plan beforehand, and he does not have time afterwards either for letting his act become conscious in his mind” (*Ibid.*). His sensuality is musical, and what Kierkegaard means by this is that “it will fade away forever, just like music, which is gone as soon as it is not played, and it is reborn only when it is played again” (*Ibid.*, 100). Perfidious speech and retorting do not befit it. As opposed to Don Giovanni, *Szindbád* seduces his women by using the power of words, he probes the gullibility of women, and feels best when he can foresee the impact of his words.

FROM CABERNET SAUVIGNON TO EGRI CSILLAG: CHANGING PATTERNS IN HUNGARIAN WINE NAMING

ERZSÉBET TÓTH-CZIFRA

Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary
E-mail: toth.czifrae@gmail.com

This paper aims to demonstrate the changing practice of Hungarian wine branding and wine naming. I show how the branding and naming strategies react to the recent changes in the field of wine selling and consumption in Hungary. These changes increased the importance of the front label in wine selling and, as a result, the number of creative wine names increased significantly. I adopt a combined approach of corpus and cognitive linguistics and make the following hypothesis: due to the complex function of brand and product names – i.e. to identify the product, and to catch consumers' attention and therefore help in imprinting – branding and naming strategies are governed by the *minimax principle* (Berkle 1978). By providing a cognitive corpus linguistic analysis of a collection of wine names, I aim to identify newly emergent naming schemata. In doing so, I demonstrate that the increasing richness of the novel brand and product names is a result of a set of conceptual mechanisms underlying their *semantic make up* (Hernandez-Pérez 2013). These are: metonymy, metaphor, conceptual integration and phonological analogy.

Keywords: viticulture, marketing, cognitive linguistics, branding, naming strategies, Hungarian wine

Introduction – On the Increasing Importance of the Front Label

In the first 15 years following the 1989 change of regimes in Hungary, significant changes occurred in the structure of wine production as the cc. 40 wine-producing cooperatives ceded their places to an increasing number of small, mostly family owned wineries (Farkas 2007). Similar to the international trends (see Walker 2006, Lehrer 2009: 239 and 2013: 12), the hypermarkets and large wine shops caused changes in wine selling and, as a result, in wine naming. These recent developments, accompanied by the development of wine tourism and festivals, brought a wider selection and an increasingly competitive environment.¹ The surface of the bottle, which originally had the primary function of identifying the product by providing information on the characteristics of the wine, became an important place for advertisement (in fact, for a large portion of Hungarian wines

the only one). One of the most important tools of designing an eye-catching label that attracts consumers' attention is to increase the suggestiveness and semantic richness of the product names.²

One could argue that today's marketing objectives demand double functionality from a wine name. Primarily, it should be congruent with the target product. That is, both brand name and product name have to provide a unique reference in order to identify and position the product within its category. Secondly, the name has to gain a selling power that is capable of catching the attention of the consumers and can prompt inferences based on the rich semantic fabric encoded in the product name. The question is, how these two different functions can be fulfilled by a given name. To answer, we have to take an excursion to the meaningfulness of these names.

Concerning the international presence of creative wine names, Adrienne Lehrer addresses the question as to whether these names are meaningful. According to her, “(...) ‘technically’ they do not have meaning, but they take on the associations connected to the word or words selected (Lehrer 1992)” (Lehrer 2013: 9–10). Contrary to this approach, I consider wine names as being systematically motivated by a certain set of cognitive principles, whose creativity cannot originate from purely fictitious sources since they have to achieve relevance to their target product and fulfill the aforementioned identifying function. Accordingly, it can be observed how the two afore mentioned functions mutually constrain each other: the eye-catching properties have to be congruent with the identification and positioning of the product, and the other way round. In order to understand how these two emerge in a successful product name we have to take *minimax principle* into consideration (Berkle 1978) which is mainly used in the investigation of compounds (see Benczes 2010). According to this principle, the economy of compounds reflects a minimum of surface complexity combined with a maximum of semantic information expressible. The application of this principle within the semantic field of wine names concerns 1) the amount of the information that provides a unique reference for the given wine and helps categorize and position the product on the market and 2) the maximization of the possible evocative content, i.e. positive connotations and aspects of meaning that increase the selling power of the name.

Hypotheses

Based on the above, I hypothesize that 1. Hungarian wine names today are meaningful symbolic units which have a double function; 2. A higher degree of cognitive economy is needed in order to fulfill both of these functions. This economy, reflected in the *minimax principle*, shapes the semantic configuration of wine

names; 3. As a result, the semantic richness of these names is carried out by meaning extensions of different kinds which convey a wealth of meaning that goes beyond the literal interpretation of the chosen name. Therefore wine names are figurative in nature. Before analyzing each of them in relation to the Hungarian wine names, I introduce the corpora on which the research was based.

Table 1. Distributions of the corpora of brand and product names

Source	Period	Number of product names	Number of brand names
Bortársaság	2014	421	80
Annual selection	2006 and 2008	200	78
In total	2014, 2006, 2008	621	114

The Examined Corpora

In order to be representative of today's wine naming practices, the basis of the corpus was obtained by listing all the items from Hungary's biggest wine distributor company, the *Bortársaság*'s web page (Hungarian Wine Society, www.bortarsasag.hu), which provides a good cross-section overview of the Hungarian brand and product names available on the market.³ This means 421 product names from 80 brands. In order to account for the patterns in their changes over a short period, this collection was complemented by another corpus containing 200 product names and 78 brand names respectively⁴ from the years 2006 and 2008.⁵ In total, a corpus of 621 product names and 114 brand names⁶ provides the basis of the present investigation. In the followings, I will analyze this collection by looking into the pragmatic and semantic mechanisms underlying their semantic configuration and touch upon the differences in the naming strategies characteristic of the two periods.

Branding

Regarding the branding strategies, the picture is rather homogenous. The metonymy PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT is by far the most productive mechanism underlying Hungarian wine brands (87% of the corpus instantiated this metonymy). Since even the most creative and novel wine names retain this traditional way of branding, the question arises, what the origins of the strength of this conceptual link are, and why this pattern is so dominant.

First of all, family names, as proper nouns, function as “rigid designators of a unique reference” (Barcelona 2003: 12). The (family) name of the wine producer is not only more salient than any other element of the WINERY frame such as the terroire, the wine yard or the grape varietal the wine is made of, but is also capable of identifying the product in a straightforward way. Therefore, the uniquely identifying function of brand names is fulfilled. Another reason for the family name being preferred over other nouns (e.g. region, winery) is the fact of the highly fragmented ownership of the wine regions. While in other countries a region is suitable to identify the product (e.g. Chianti, Bordeaux), in Hungary these links are too general and therefore do not provide *differentia specifica*. Now let us see in which ways this naming schema is capable of giving rise to positive connotations. The following analysis is based on the theoretical framework of Cognitive Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).

One important implication of the PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT metonymy is that its source domain also implies a sense of guarantee in the consumer inasmuch as the winemaker gives his good name (and sometimes even his face or portrait) to the product, communicating personal responsibility. In some cases this metonymy is further elaborated by the product name (see e.g. *Gere Attila Cuvée 2007*; *Thummerer Vili papa Cuvée 2006* ['Thummerer Uncle Vili Cuvée']). These advantageous attributes are also strengthened by the fact that the producer for product metonymy as branding schema is usually preferred in the domain of luxury goods (e.g. *Ray Ban*, *Gucci*). This, as a priming effect, might also contribute to the development of positive connotations. Notice, however, that the wealth of knowledge that becomes activated within the winery frame this way heavily depends on whether and to what extent buyers are “wineologically skilled” (Lehrer 2009) or familiar with the Hungarian wine-producing context. Knowledge of winemaker generations or recognition of the producer as the founder of the company (which is often the case in Hungary) has a potential to enrich the semantics of the brand by activating a whole metonymic chain ranging from the founder through the wine producer accounting for the target product itself. Although all this information is not necessarily available for consumers, the family business nature of the winery is clearly indicated by the source, even for those who are less familiar with the Hungarian wine-producing context. Wine brands therefore reflect sensitively the type of business enterprise and therefore convey the sense of added values, like family tradition and craftsmanship. This accurate reflection of production and ownership in wine names is even more apparent if we consider that in those cases where – as a deviation from the conventional Hungarian wine branding schema – names make use of conceptual mechanisms other than that of the producer for product metonymy (e.g. *IKON*, *Folly Arboretum*, *Pannonhalmi Apátság*), the owner of the winery is not a family but an institution or corporation.

One potential reason for the homogenous and rather traditional branding practice in the case of Hungarian wine names in particular and wines in general is the partial distribution among the functions of brand names and product names. From their general functions identified in the previous section, brand names serve as the primary identifying cues, therefore product names have more room to be playful and more descriptive in this space already marked by the brand name.

The Traditional Pattern of Wine Naming

Taking one step closer to the content of the bottle, in the following, I will focus on the subordinate category of branding, namely, the actual product names. As for Hungarian wine names, the ones that instantiate the traditional pattern also stay within the WINERY frame and take one of its subdomain, most frequently the grape varietal⁷ the wine is made of (*Cabernet Sauvignon*, *Furmint*, etc.), the place of production (*Kopár*) or simply the color of the wine (*Red*, *White*), or, in addition, the actual technique used (e.g *barrique*, *late harvest*) to provide access to the target, the wine. These names, on the one hand, further specify the characteristics of the wine and are rather descriptive and straightforwardly informative. As an example, the wine name in (1) is a prototypical instantiation of this metonymic pattern. The brand designates a family name, *Merlot* is the grape varietal, while *Barrique* refers to the technique applied in the winemaking process.

- (1) Günzer Merlot Barrique 2008

The cognitive mechanism that gives rise to this naming schema is again a metonymy, where THE GRAPE VARIETAL THE WINE IS MADE OF STANDS FOR THE PRODUCT. The conceptual content metonymies like this activate is strongly consistent with the target product and therefore achieve strong relevance with it. By foregrounding one (or two) of the salient characteristics of the wines, conventional metonymic names complete the task of categorizing and therefore make products identifiable among wines in general and within the brand in particular. Furthermore, one important advantage of making use of the grape varietal the wine is made of is making the type of wine internationally recognizable.⁸ At the same time, however this naming schema assumes that consumers are familiar with grape varietals.

Looking at the corpora, it seems that in spite of its decreasing proportion, this naming pattern is still the most frequent one. As the data shows, 91 % of the examples in the 2006/2008 corpus fall into this pattern, while in the 2014 corpus this proportion had decreased to 79%. This decrease is particularly significant, especially if we consider that there is only a 5-year period between the two corpora.

Creative Wine Naming

This group consists of the wine names which deviate from the above depicted traditional pattern. Common characteristics of them are: 1. a set of cognitive operations, metonymy is only one of them, underlying their semantic configuration. These are: metaphor, metonymy, conceptual integration, complemented by analogy and rhyming. 2. In order to maximize the evocative effect of the name in target in many cases more than one of them are at work. 3. Some of these names work at multiple levels inasmuch as their effect is largely influenced by consumers' approach to and knowledge of context (i.e. interpreting from the perspective of a wider cultural context or from the context of professional winespeak with all its lexical and discursive knowledge).

Metonymy-based Creative Wine Names

Metonymy-based creative names are the closest relatives of the traditional pattern, since in many cases only a slight modification distinguishes them from the names representing the traditional naming pattern. For instance, in *Légli Lugás* there is an unconventional instantiation of the traditional PLACE OF PRODUCTION FOR THE PRODUCT (MADE THERE) pattern. Instead of making use of the relevant vineyard of wine producing area, a common noun, designating an informal wine-related place, is chosen for source domain. As *lugás* (trellis) is seen as a cozy place for wine consumption as well, wealth of its positive connotations are also mapped onto the name. In addition, the sound symbolic effect⁹ of the name also contributes to the relaxed atmosphere evoked by the source. Thus, the congruence of the semantic and phonetic pole of the name therefore increases the semantic efficiency of the resulting product name.

In one form of metonymy-based creative names the WINEMAKER (or, the WINEMAKER FAMILY) subdomain of the WINERY ICM activated by the brand is further elaborated in the product name and therefore strengthen all its positive effects (i.e. the personal guarantee, the familiarity, etc. see above).

- (2) a. Gere Attila Cuvée 2007
- b. Thummerer Vili papa Cuvée 2006
 ('Thummerer Uncle Vili Cuvée')

Comparing (2) a. and b. it can be seen that their different connotations are carried out by the lexical choice. In the case of (2) a. Gere is the brand name and Attila Cuvée is the product name. Together (Gere Attila Cuvée) explicits the name of the founder and head of the winery¹⁰ (and of the family as well) and therefore refer to the high-end status of the actual wine (cf. LEADER OF THE WINERY FOR THE

LEADING PRODUCT). The name in handwriting (see *Fig. 1*) helps in interpreting the product as an *ars-poetica* even for those not familiar with the Hungarian winemakers in general. The example in (2) b. bears totally different connotations with evoking a familiar atmosphere by explicating the family member status of the winemaker.



Figure 1. Handwriting stands for the personal guarantee on the bottle of Gere Attila Cuvée

Another type of productive metonymical source domains is that of the effects and reactions triggered by the consumption of a particular wine. *Látomás* ('vision') and *Boldogságos* ('happy') are good examples instantiating this CAUSE FOR EFFECT mapping, since both are positive effects and are made to stand for the wine that causes them, thus presenting the target product as something desirable. The name *Aligvárom* ('I can't wait') reflects straightforwardly the desirability of the given wine as the FEELINGS TOWARDS THE PRODUCT STAND FOR THE PRODUCT. Furthermore, the unusual way of nominalization (a whole phrase is nominalized) also adds to the salience of the name. The persuasive power of these metonymies originates from the hyperbolic way in which the products' positive effects are conceptualized. Also, these names clearly illustrate how the purpose of the communicative exchange (i.e. selling wine) governs the selection of the elements from the effect frame (e.g. although 'hangover', as an effect, is highly relevant for wines, due to its negative connotations its selection for being mapped into a name is straightforwardly ruled out).

In the third type of metonymy-based creative wine names we find PART FOR WHOLE mappings in that one of the subdomains of the product ICM stands for the product itself. A careful selection of the most relevant, desirable or prolific characteristics, like in Friss ('fresh') or Illatos Friss ('fragrant fresh') increases the efficiency of the resulting name. The lexical choice of the selected attribute can also contribute to the intended meaning and deepen the conceptual link between the name and its referent. Consider Szekszárdi Ó Vörös ('old red from Szekszárd') where an old word meaning *old* is chosen to refer to a wine whose quality increases with age.

Making Use of Knowledge on the Self and on the Other in Metonymy-based Wine Names

Hungarian wine names of this type have a preference for describing the product with terms generally used in the context of folk and fairy tales. *Mesés* ('fairy', 'fabulous', 'starry'), *Madárláttá* (lit. 'seen by the birds', expression for something travelled around), *Százrejtekű* ('hundredfold'), *Hetedhét vörös* ('once upon a red')¹¹ do not only refer to highly culture-specific concepts which are difficult to translate, but as such, also add positive connotations from the FOLK TALE frame. Additionally, through these expressions the product is placed into a specific scenario or a narrative typical of tales and deeply entrenched into the Hungarian culture.

Interestingly, though in lower numbers, the same conceptual mechanism (i.e. metonymically foregrounding a positive attribute of the product instantiating the SALIENT PROPERTY FOR THE PRODUCT metonymy) is present with source concepts, which implies the sense of *otherness* instead of culturally deeply entrenched concepts. Product names like *Fortissimo* and *Andante* activate the highly sophisticated atmosphere of arts, since these are used for the characterization of classical music. Moreover, this naming pattern is congruent with the brand name concerned (*Gróf Degenfeld*, 'Earl of Degenfeld') which also suggests nobility and exclusiveness. It depends on consumers' attitude towards classical music in particular or Italian language in general whether connotations like elegance, exclusiveness and nobility will be inferred or, as an opposite effect, they interpret the name as a sign of snobbism or expensive price.

In this section I demonstrated how metonymy results in meaning extensions in the field of Hungarian wine names. All the sources produce different communicative effects which has several advantages in designing an effective and eye-catching product name. Staying within either the WINERY or the WINE frames results in straightforward consistency with the product through mapping felicitous descriptive information into the product names. Their promotional aspect is carried out

via carefully chosen source concepts, often hyperbolic in nature, as well as via lexical choice which further elaborates the conceptual basis of them. One important consequence of deviation from the traditional naming schema is that it enables the products to address wider audience. Choosing a more general, culturally entrenched adjective as a source concept for this purpose – instead the grape varietal the wine is made of – activates a wider and within Hungarian culture generally shared context rather than that of wine knowledge. As a result, these creative names become accessible also for those who have no idea what type of wine a *Pinot Noir* is. At the same time, however, this makes them inaccessible for the international audience. Considering the fact that the wines in question are meant to be sold in Hungary, it can be stated that their names reflect and show high degree of consistency with their target audience.

Metaphor-based Creative Wine Names

Involving across-domain mappings, the greater conceptual distance between the two independent domains (source domain and target domain) makes metaphor a flexible tool for naming. In this naming pattern the descriptive content of names is no more readily accessible and therefore more emphasis falls on the process of interpretation. One aspect of the conformity to the *minimax principle* is that metaphorical wine names are interpretable on multiple levels, according to what extent the potential consumer is familiar with the professional context of wine drinking or wine speak. Therefore these names can be interpreted inside the already existing wine discourse metaphors, as elaborations of them, or outside, but not independently from the characteristics of the wine. As a result of this type of cognitive operation a large number of resemblance metaphors (Kövecses 2013) were found in the corpus. According to the matrix of wine metaphors developed in Hernandez-Pérez (2013), we can distinguish them on the basis of whether wine is compared to inanimate objects or living entities. This latter group proved to be preferred over the former, as, according to the data, Hungarian wine brands largely exploit the general-level metaphor NON-LIVING ENTITIES ARE LIVING ENTITIES which yields two specific-level metaphors: WINES ARE ANIMALS and WINES ARE PEOPLE.

The name *Tinta* ('ink') illustrates how an inanimate object is capable of extending the meaning of the target (INANIMATE OBJECTS ARE WINES) and identifying its type at the same time. Both the color and the liquid form of the source (and also the circumstance that ink is stored in a dark bottle) are mapped onto the target, therefore, one can conceptualize the given bottle of wine *as if* a bottle of ink. In the hyperbolic effect of the color mapping, namely, that the wine does not, actually, reach such an intense tonality that ink does, we can observe the operation of what

is called *strengthening* (Hernandez-Pérez 2011: 44). Strengthening proved to be widespread in the practice of Hungarian wine naming (see also *Elixír*, *Indigó*, *Essenzia*, etc.). In addition, the name *Tinta* also makes use of the Hungarian slang expression *betintázik* (lit. ‘inking in’) which refers to getting drunk or tipsy but tends to have a more permissive and funny evaluation. This way the name achieves congruency with the context of wine consumption through a sense of wittiness.

One important attribute of conceptual metaphors which enables metaphorical wine names to fulfil the communicative need for being persuasive is that each conceptual metaphor imposes its own particular perspective through the metaphorical linguistic expressions chosen (Lakoff 1996). Accordingly, metaphorical product names not only describe but also evaluate the product. Wine names making use of the INANIMATE OBJECTS ARE LIVING ENTITIES general-level metaphor may be particularly persuasive because of two reasons. First, living entities have greater cognitive salience than non-living entities (Radden and Kövecses 1999). Second, and in connection with the former, these source domains imply a shift in the GREAT CHAIN OF BEING metaphor and position them as a higher form of existence in this culturally embedded hierarchy of entities. Furthermore, personification is a powerful branding tool in general (see Kövecses 2010).

As instantiations of the INANIMATE OBJECTS ARE PEOPLE, more specifically, wines are people metaphor, source domains, like *Barbár* (‘barbarian’) and *Nomád* (‘nomad’) are interpretable as further elaborations of the already existing metaphors from the wine discourse. The (stereo)typical traits of a barbarian person are strength, wildness and roughness. All these adjectives are conventionally used construals in wine speak regarding either the body or the astringency (see Lehrer 2009) of a red wine.¹² This example also shows how the gender aspect of the wines are people metaphor is entrenched in the already existing ways of conceptualizing and talking about wines, i.e. in wine speak red wines tend to be treated as masculine, while white wines are rather conceptualized as feminine beings.¹³ Notice, however, that in Hungarian culture (and, presumably, in many others) barbarian carries mainly negative connotations. Though wildness and roughness in the wine speak are considered as positive characteristics often describing a high-positioned red wine, outside of this context, i.e. in the generally shared Hungarian (or even wider) cultural context barbarians are rather synonyms of unculturedness and uneducatedness. Accordingly, in the case of a wine called *Barbár* the degree of familiarity with the wine discourse facilitates the effectiveness of the wine name, i.e. whether its positive connotations originating from the wine discourse are foregrounded in the interpretation, or the more generally accessible negative ones.

Similarly to the international wine naming practice (see Walker 2006), animals are frequently used sources also among Hungarian wine names. Basically three

naming schemata can be observed in the corpora which make use of the WINES ARE ANIMALS metaphor. With regard to the first, *Oroszlán* ('lion') is a good example, which simply maps the characteristics of the animal onto the wine. As it was touched upon above in the introduction, the selection of the relevant attributes of the stereotypical (or: collectively shared) mental representation of a lion is governed by the contextual factor called topic of the discourse (i.e. the target product) (see Fig. 2). Apart from attention raising and providing an easy-to-memorize cue to the consumer this naming strategy also involves the positioning of the product within the brand hierarchy.¹⁴




Figure 2. The metaphoric mappings of a wine conceptualized as a lion

Applying this pattern to another instance of the animal product names we find that in the case of *Farkas Furmint* or *Medve Furmint* the traits one can associate from these animals are not congruent with the attributes of the wine in question. Taking a closer look at the motivation underlying this second naming schema, it turns out that these names rather have a metonymic basis, since the animals are taken from the name of the wine yard (*Farkas dűlő*, *Medve dűlő*) where the wine was produced and therefore represent the given geographic area and refer to historical fauna rather than to the wine. Since this element of the WINERY frame is not a widely shared one, the accessibility of this semantic motivation is strongly limited (that is, only for those who have detailed knowledge on local (historical) myths and beliefs). Thus, a name which achieves consistency with the environment where wine is produced instead of the wine itself, and therefore provides no descriptive cues to help in the identification of the product, can be considered as a misleading one with reduced efficiency.

The optimal solution is a third naming schema involving animals where the above described patterns are merged and the multiple contextual cues activated result in and achieve a higher degree of relevance. In the corpora examples can be found for this third pattern as well. For instance, the name *Ördög* ('devil') both re-

fers to the origin of the wine (*Ördögárok dűlő*, which is a wine yard with high-quality terrain) and at the same time makes use of some advantageous characteristics of the shared mental representation of ‘ördög’ which are relevant for and mapped onto the target product. Since this example has the capability of expanding the metaphorical naming schema, before I touch upon the semantic configuration of the naming of this type, a brief summary is provided on what the analysis revealed on metaphoric wine names.

As can be seen, metaphor-based wine names reflect a higher degree of deviation from the traditional Hungarian naming schema, since making inferences between two independent and conceptually distant domains (such as that of ANIMALS, PEOPLE or OBJECTS like INK and WINE) requires greater cognitive effort and therefore more emphasis falls on the process of interpretation. This makes metaphor a flexible tool for naming where the descriptive content of names is no more readily accessible but inferred. As a result, metaphorical wine names are interpretable on multiple levels due to consumers’ access to contextual factors of different sorts. Here persuasiveness was achieved either through the (pragmatic) strategy of strengthening, or by procuring a shift in the GREAT CHAIN OF BEINGS metaphor which has the advantage of positioning the target product into a higher order of existence. Both of these strategies manifest in the careful selection of the source material.

Conceptual Integration in Creative Wine Names

Making use of both the origin of the wine and some of the characteristics of *ördög* (‘devil’) implies that in order to fully exploit the semantic richness of the name hearers have to simultaneously activate two different frames: WINERY frame (i.e. the quality of the grape grown in *Ördögárok dűlő*) and another one from our culturally shared mental representation of ÖRDÖG. The interpretation of this semantic complexity can be accounted for neither with the purely metaphoric, nor with the purely metonymic reading.¹⁵ In the following, therefore, I will analyze the wine name *Ördög* as a double scope conceptual integration¹⁶ where the two input spaces are the winery frame and the ördög (devil) frame, while the blended space is the wine itself. This interpretation is illustrated by *Figure 3* where the metonymic mappings are indicated with dashed lines, while the metaphoric ones are indicated with bold lines. In this interpretation the culture-specific conceptualization of the devil (*ördög*) deserves a mention.

In the Hungarian concept the supernatural power and skillfulness of devil is foregrounded and – apart from its real “devilness” – results in positive connotations. This is reflected in idiomatic expressions like *ördögien jó* (‘devilishly good’) or az *ördög hegedűse* (‘violinist of the Devil’, whose referent is conven-




Figure 3. Possible interpretation of the wine *Vylyan Ördög*

tionally the famous 19th century violin virtuoso Niccoló Paganini). Another relevant aspect of this within-culture shared mental representation of 'ördög' is its red color.¹⁷ Furthermore, here the same preference for the FOLK TALES frame is present, previously witnessed in a group of metonymic names (e.g. *Mesés*, *Százrejtekű*, *Hetedhét vörös*).

The semantic complexity of conceptual integration-based names leads us to the cognitive operation exploiting the *minimax principle* to the full. It depends on the knowledge of the context whether these are interpreted as pure metonymies, pure metaphors or both.

One of the most obvious differences in the 2013 corpus in comparison to the 2006–08 one is the increasing number of names based on multiple conceptual operations i.e. names that have the potential for instantiating conceptual integration.¹⁸ In the 2014 corpus I found 16 of them while in the 2006/2008 corpus only one. Names making use of conceptual integration are good candidates for product names because they are capable of making extensive use of the *minimax principle* in that the complex network of conceptual mappings at work in a conceptual integration is able to achieve a maximum semantic effect and information with a minimum of effort. According to Benczes (2010) this maximum effect might also involve humor.

A general characteristic of these examples is that they rely on highly culture-specific concepts and linguistic units and therefore some of them are impossible to translate. In the following example it is demonstrated how making use of an elementary piece of cultural knowledge can trigger an efficient product name with a high degree of relevance. *Egri Csillag* ('Star from Eger') is created through a reduction of a proper name, Géza Gárdonyi's novel, *Egri Csillagok* (Stars from

Eger). This title is deeply entrenched in Hungarian common cultural knowledge, practically known by every Hungarian, since it is one of the earliest piece of the Hungarian literary canon taught in elementary schools. As such, it is a salient source referring to a product of the same origin (see Fig. 4). The reduction (and also the possible remotivation) of the proper name involves the metaphoric mapping THE WINE IS A STAR OF EGER, and therefore places the product into an honorable historical narrative and a cultural context. Furthermore, the star accounts for the high value of the wine as well.




Figure 4. Possible interpretation of the wine *Egri Csillag*

As it can be seen in Figure 4 here the umbrella term ENTITIES EMBLEMATIC FOR EGER provides the generic space of the conceptual integration. This represents conventional cultural knowledge attached to the town. Two especially relevant and therefore salient pieces of it serve as input spaces, namely, WINEREGION OF EGER and CASTLE OF EGER. The complex network of metaphoric (bold lines) and metonymic (dashed lines) mappings result in the rich semantic configuration of the blended space i.e. the wine name *Egri Csillag*.

Apart from making use of within-culture deeply entrenched concepts, in another portion of conceptual integration-based names the opposite tendency is also present, that is, preference for source concepts which implies the sense of *otherness*. Here, either an English term is used (e.g. *Magic Rain*), and therefore can be interpreted cross-culturally, or the name interacts with foreign languages and cul-

tures reflecting some analogy or linguistic hybridity. Phonological analogy-based conceptual integrations usually involve puns in the product names such as: *Porta Géza* which rhymes to *portugieser*, *Mammaróza Rozé* which rhymes with *rosé*, and *Bogyólé* (lit. ‘berry juice’) which evokes *Beaujolais*.

This latter represents a higher degree of semantic complexity. *Bogyólé* (‘berry juice’) is a metaphor-based name which is congruent with wine speak in that comparing the aroma and bouquet of (good) wines to berries of different kinds is a usual aspect of wine descriptions (cf. the recontextualization of the sensory experience of wine drinking). The source concept *berry juice* therefore highlights a salient and positive characteristic of the wine, namely, its intensive and pleasant aroma and bouquet. Thanks to the phonological similarity, when coming across *Bogyólé* the hearer (consumer) can also access *Beaujolais*, which considerably contributes to the semantic enrichment of the name and also helps to unravel the meaning of it. Additionally, *Beaujolais* refers not only to a special early harvest type of wine and the special wine producing technique, but also to the town famous for its production (cf. the paragon use of the place name), therefore, the name makes use of the double metonymy PLACE FOR THE TYPE OF WINE TYPICALLY PRODUCED THERE AND GENERAL TYPE OF WINE FOR THE SPECIFIC WINE. *Bogyólé* thus can be interpreted as a “Hungarianized version” of *Beaujolais* (at least linguistically). These two source concepts achieve a high degree of congruency with each other since one general characteristic of the *Beaujolais* types of wines is their rich berry-like overtones in their aroma. Therefore, phonological analogy to an already existing compound in this case is able to bring forth conceptual similarities between the source name and the novel coinage, thereby enhancing the humorous effect of the novel expression.

In this section the latest and most creative Hungarian wine naming practice was described. The resulting product names motivated by multiple cognitive operations i.e. their (complex) semantic configuration is both metaphor- and metonymy-based, and as such, were analyzed as conceptual integrations. These names are capable of exploiting the *minimax principle* in that the complex network of conceptual mappings at work in a conceptual integration is able to achieve a maximum semantic effect and information with a minimum surface complexity. As it has been demonstrated, this maximum effect might also involve humor.

Concluding Remarks

The aim of this paper was to investigate how the recent changes in wine market and consumption affected Hungarian wine branding and naming. The corpus-based cognitive analysis of Hungarian wine names in the years 2006 and 2008, and 2014, respectively, has revealed a tendency of shift from the traditional

naming schema towards unconventional, creative names. As a result, new naming schemas with different pragmatic and semantic mechanisms underlying their semantic configuration have emerged. The semantic richness of these novel brand and product naming patterns is a result of a set of conceptual mechanisms underlying them systematically. These are: metonymy, metaphor, and conceptual integration complemented by phonological analogy.

In the naming strategies embodied in naming schemas the multiple functions an effective name has to fulfil are present at different levels and degrees. That is, in branding and traditional naming strategies the straightforward (and conventional) categorization and identification is more dominant than the attention-seeking or descriptive character. In some of them making use of proper names (like family names, names of wine producers or place names) guarantees a unique reference to the target product. Due to their conventionality, their interpretation requires familiarity and knowledge on wines and wine discourse. In the case of recently emerged creative wine names on the contrary, due to their unconventional nature, multiple context-sensitivity and higher degree of semantic complexity, the (figurative) inference-making process itself is foregrounded, which makes the resulting creative names more flexible for interpretation. The rich and often humorous and witty imagery encoded in them with the use of conceptual operations of different sorts makes them attractive and attention-grabbing. These qualities enable wine names to fulfil their complex functions.

A general characteristic of these strategies is that in them often highly culture-specific concepts are made use of and as such, it reflects both the origin and the target audience of the products.

Furthermore, the cognitive analysis of Hungarian wine names suggests that semantic complexity goes together with increasing flexibility regarding their interpretation. The fact that these resulting creative names are open for multiple interpretations from different perspectives presumably enables product names to be accessible for a wide and heterogeneous audience. This hypothesis is only one of the many emerged during the analysis. As a possible continuation of the research, a detailed consumer preference survey could shed light on the in-practice functioning of the naming schemas identified in this paper and provide an in-depth insight on the validity of these hypotheses.

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Notes

¹ For more information on Hungarian wine producing, see Farkas (2007).

² Certainly, the textual part of the label is not the only effective cognitive tool for a successful branding. A wide range of visual elements and perhaps even some degree of tactile experience can and do interact with the names. Although these interactions might form a basis for a multimodal cognitive research, these other modalities are out of the scope of this paper.

³ This corpus was designed in June 2014.

- ⁴ The source of this collection is the annual selection: *A száz legjobb magyar bor* [Top 100 Hungarian Wines]. (László and Issekutz 2006; Issekutz 2008.)
- ⁵ In the year 2007 this collection was not published.
- ⁶ Due to overlapping, the brand names in the two corpora are not added up. This is not the case regarding the product names where at least the year differentiates the otherwise similar names.
- ⁷ Interesting that some of these are already figurative in nature, see e.g. *királyleányka* ('princessin') or *ezerjő* ('thousands of good'). Since these are well entrenched symbolic units, their figurative nature is not active during the course of interpretation. As highly conventionalized symbolic units, despite their internal complexity, these units "constitute for the speaker ‐prepackaged‐ assemblies because he has no need to reflect on how to put it together" (Langacker 1987: 57).
- ⁸ As the provisions of the (Hungarian) Act XVIII of 2004 on grape and wine producing state, the Hungarian producers have to indicate the grape varietal according to international naming standards.
- ⁹ On how sound symbolic effect can and does influence consumers' choice see Yorkston and Menon (2004).
- ¹⁰ Since this alignment is congruent with the Hungarian naming practice (i.e. family name first and then the given name), this wine name further elaborates the signature-like character of the wine.
- ¹¹ For the creative and sensitive translations I wish to thank Judit Pethő-Szirmai.
- ¹² Interestingly and surprisingly enough, no research has been carried out on Hungarian wine discourse yet. Therefore, in the following I have to rely on 1. the English language wine speak, 2. wine descriptions available on the homepage of *Bortársaság*, 3. my own introspection regarding Hungarian wine discourse.
- ¹³ Although as Lehrer (2013:3) points out this practice is fading in western culture because of its sexist overtones.
- ¹⁴ Not surprisingly the data shows that the naming of the high-end products usually receives more attention and creative effort.
- ¹⁵ Nevertheless, the interpretation of these names either as a pure metaphor or as a pure metonymy is also possible depending on the knowledge accessible for the consumers. E.g. when a potential consumer is not familiar with the fact that the target product is made from grape grown in the *Ördögárok* vineyard, the metaphorical interpretation (wine is a devil) might come into play. This example illustrates the fuzzy boundaries between instances of conceptual metaphor and conceptual integration.
- ¹⁶ Here I adopt the Fauconnier-Turner (2002) view of conceptual integration. Conceptual integration occurs "when mental spaces do not simply map onto each other but partially blend their conceptual content" (Kövecses 2006). Conceptual integration (or a conceptual blend) consists of input spaces (the one with one input space is called a single scope blend while the one with two input spaces is a double scope blend), a blended space and (not necessarily) a generic space, a frame within which the whole conceptual operation is interpretable.
- ¹⁷ An interesting aspect of the Hungarian system of color terms is that as the equivalent of the English 'red' in Hungarian two different terms are used simultaneously, *piros* and *vörös*, which differ in their connotations and frequency. Both for *ördög* and for *bor* *vörös* is used. (On the semantic network and distribution of these two color terms see Benczes and Tóth-Czifra 2014).

A NEW ENGLISH-LANGUAGE JOURNAL: *THE HUNGARIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW*

BÉLA TOMKA

University of Szeged, Hungary
E-mail: tomka@hist.u-szeged.hu

Apart from university departments, research institutes and learned societies, the most important institutional preconditions of the emergence and continuance of an academic discipline include specialised scholarly journals. The professional orientation and academic quality of the latter determine to a great extent the development of the given discipline. That is why all such endeavours are worth attention. The academic yield can be even more considerable, and thereby the interest is especially justified, if the journal's language is English – as in the case of the recently launched *Hungarian Historical Review* (HHR). Obviously, this short review cannot aim to describe in detail this periodical, and, in particular, the contents of the issues already published or forthcoming. Rather, four major points related to the publication will be addressed. First, some basic facts about the journal will be reviewed, focusing on the institution and people behind it. Secondly, the antecedents of the journal will be investigated, as, given the fairly painful experience with English-language historical periodicals in Hungary, this new initiative can be properly understood and assessed in the context of the forerunners. Thirdly, the goals and the functions of the journal will be dealt with, including the inherent pitfalls of the publication. And, finally, based on the first two double issues, we will briefly reflect on some of the most important problems the editors have to face during their everyday work.

As to the basic facts about the journal, the HHR was launched by the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) in late 2012, and is published quarterly. Two double issues were published first, one on urban history and another on migration history. They were followed by four single issues: on the Reformation, on the Angevin Dynasty in medieval Central Europe, on ethnicity and borders, and, finally, on the 17th century history of the principality of Transylvania. Later issues included the history of the family and a theme called “fabricating history”. The journal also has a book review section which is a quite neglected genre in Hungarian historiography. The Editor-in-Chief is Pál Fodor, Director of the Institute of History (HAS) and a well-known expert on Ottoman history. The editors, Gabriella Erdélyi, Sándor Horváth, Judit Klement, Veronika Novák and

Tamás Pálosfalvi belong to the younger generation of historians. An international advisory board and an editorial board also support the editors. The journal is available online as well under: <http://www.hunghist.org>. Two short remarks seem to be substantiated here. It has been a long-held view among Hungarian historians that the Institute of History has not properly fulfilled the task entrusted to it. Despite the fact that it has a critical mass of scholars who do not have the teaching load with which university professors have to cope, and thus, are well suited to carry out larger projects, such as editing handbooks, or, as a matter of fact, publishing an English-language journal, the results have been fairly modest in this respect for the last couple of decades. Launching this journal can be regarded as a promising sign of the Institute's new leadership's dedication to take on these responsibilities. Additionally, another positive development is that the journal's editorial board is laudably diverse as far as the institutional affiliations of their members are concerned – in contrast with earlier practices in the Institute and the major forums of Hungarian historical scholarship in general.

Talking about the forerunners of the journal is important in the case of the HHR, since, in my view, the earlier efforts still haunt any new attempts to establish an English-language historical periodical in Hungary. As suggested earlier, the history of the English-language historical journals in Hungary is a battered one. The *Acta Historica* of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences was published from 1951 to 1989 partly in English (with some articles in other languages, such as German, Russian and French). The 35 volumes that were published altogether seem to be an impressive achievement. However, the journal had some particularities which prevented it from becoming a well-established and reputed periodical. It was basically a replica of articles that came out in other academic journals in Hungarian. Moreover, the hierarchy of the HAS largely determined who could publish in the *Acta Historica*, that is, no independent editorial policy existed. It was circulated irregularly, with huge delays, and after a long agony, it ceased to exist in 1989.

The two other, more recent forerunners, the *Danubian Historical Studies* and the *History and Society in Central Europe* were of much higher quality, but, at the same time, they were very short-lived, released between 1987 and 1988, and between 1991 and 1994, respectively. In fact, only a couple of issues came out in both cases. These failures largely contributed to the fact that no historians, group of historians, or publishers have had the courage to launch a new initiative for the last two decades. Consequently, the editors of the new journal cannot rely on high-quality and long-sustained antecedents, they have to start with the publication from scratch.

Why is this new journal needed? For many, the answer might seem obvious: making the results of Hungarian historiography available for a wider, international public. This was what several of the agencies or institutions providing financial sup-

port for the HHR probably have in mind, and this rationale appears in the leaflet of the journal as well. Even though this is a fully legitimate goal, the realization of the aim will obviously not be enough for producing a journal that is worth being followed regularly. We can even go further: if the realization of this goal were to dominate the editorial work, it might be harmful for the internationalization of Hungarian historical research altogether. To put it bluntly: colleagues who are not able to publish their papers in international journals might try to place their pieces here by using their positions in the hierarchy of the HAS, as happened in the case of the *Acta Historica* several decades ago. Thus, the HHR would become a surrogate for real internationalization. This danger was already expressed by László Kontler, member of the advisory board, on the occasion of launching the journal.

How to avoid this? The most important means is opening up to authors beyond the Hungarian borders by initiating debates on topics that have broader, regional or even global relevance and might attract authors from beyond Hungary as well. This is a clear balancing act: instead of simply reflecting the present state of Hungarian scholarship, the editors have to transcend national discourses, introduce novel themes, set agendas and thus standards. It is promising that the two issues published so far have clearly represented that direction, and I know from personal communication with the editors that they want to attract even more authors from the international community of scholars.

Besides finding authors and reviewers as well as promoting the journal successfully, and building an effective editorial board, there are two important issues which necessitate further editorial policy planning. First, the editors opted for publishing exclusively thematic issues. This policy has several advantages such as sourcing out a great deal of the editorial work for conference organizers. However, it also makes the journal less lively and prevents the editors from responding to current scholarly debates and creating a regular forum for critical-minded historians. So, I would argue for a combination of thematic issues and regular issues. Second, the editors seem to opt for a subscription based journal. I think that a limited open access journal might be a more viable solution. This model does not repel the libraries which can only be realistically regarded as subscribers for that particular journal; at the same time a wider public could read the journal, which, in the long run, will yield more institutional subscribers as well.

The latter remarks should be considered as humble suggestions, and they do not dwarf the enormous and excellent work the editors have done so far. Rather, I wish merely to suggest that good journals are always under construction. They are constructed by the editors, and first of all, by authors – that is, all of us. The future fate of the HHR largely depends on the willingness of inventive historians specializing on East Central European topics to contribute to the journal. There are clear signs that the editors will attract this species.

