

# PATTERNS OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN BUDAPEST AFTER 1989

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This paper will focus on various interrelated, intermingled but often divergent processes and phenomena condensed around the fall of communism in Budapest regarding the spatial structure and development of society and economy. It will demonstrate and analyze major tendencies, such as urban decay, gentrification, suburbanization, emergence of polycentric spatial patterns, effects of globalization, and economic proceedings that have fundamentally altered the position and picture of Budapest and its metropolitan area. It will point out local characteristics as well as the effects of general trends of socio-spatial development on Budapest and its surroundings.

**Keywords:** Budapest, transition, urban decay, urbanization, gentrification, suburbanization, sub-centers, globalization, regeneration, brownfield

## Introduction

The transition to market economy around 1989 was both a turning point in the history of Budapest and the start of a new era. However, continuity of social and economic processes and political and administrative practices were also prevalent. Some changes were totally new in the long history of the city. Budapest had always had a rather centralized municipal system with wide-ranging autonomy before World War II, both financially and politically; whereas Budapest theoretically had an autonomy in a centralized form during socialism it was under strict party control, thus without any real autonomy in any senses. Besides the turmoil caused by the transition to market economy from 1989, the new, two-tier system with the primacy of districts over the capital municipality and with a high level of administrative and political, but with little financial, autonomy posed new challenges to the city. On the other hand, continuity of long-term social, economic,

demographic and historic factors was fundamental as they exerted their determinative effects on the course of events only with few characteristic and distinct disruptive instances, such as deep crises, that altered their trajectories.

General socio-economic features of the post-communist cities of the East-Central European area have comprehensively been scrutinized (see e.g. Sailer-Fliege, 1999 or Sýkora – Bouzarovski, 2012). The following paper will describe, analyze and summarize the major, deeply nestled socio-economic processes that have determined the present condition of the Hungarian capital. The topic is too wide ranging to be extensively examined here; therefore the main characteristics and phenomena will be emphasized, starting from the historically oldest to the most novel.

### **Decay in the Inner Areas**

The decay of the inner areas of Budapest started after the 1950s with the nationalization of bourgeois apartments and the tenement sector, concentrated in the core areas, of the city between 1948 and 1952. The introduction of the ‘intensive’ housing policy measures – that is, increasing the *number* of the apartments without increasing the *floor space* – began in the 1950s, and the almost total negligence of the housing stock nationalized while the lack of effective urban regeneration in the forty years to come with concentrated efforts in constructing new housing in the outer areas cumulated in fast deterioration (Antal, 1995, Kocsis, 2009a). Before World War II, although somewhat affected by suburbanization from the 1910s, the middle class areas retained their character, with significant differences between neighborhoods: Józsefváros (8<sup>th</sup> district), the so-called Chicago area in Erzsébetváros (7<sup>th</sup> district) on the lower end, Lipótváros (5<sup>th</sup> district), and the Castle area (1<sup>st</sup> district) on the higher end (Kocsis, 2005 and 2009b, Kovács, 1998:65–6). During the socialist epoch, although the level of segregation significantly decreased and altered in patterns and nature, it was still observable and prevalent despite the official goal of the ideology and ‘social engineering’. Segregation became clearly apparent from the end of the 1960s with the introduction of the somewhat ‘quasi-market’, that is, less strict redistributive, policies with the New Economic Mechanism of 1968. As a consequence, Budapest was far more segregated than other major cities among the socialist countries.

The population started to decrease in the 1960s in the inner districts of Budapest (*Table 1*). The ‘very’ core, the 5<sup>th</sup> district, reached its peak in 1960 with about 66,000 inhabitants whereas in 2005, it had merely about 27,000. Although the drop in population density can also be interpreted as a sign of the strengthening of business, commercial and office activities, as well as rising per capita living space that may well be the case in this district, especially after 1990 (see gen-

**Table 1:** Population of the district in inner areas of Pest.

Year / District	1949	1960	1970	1980	1990	1995	2000	2005	2011
5 <sup>th</sup>	52,782	65,867	62,684	50,128	44,113	37,087	29,720	27,273	27,113
6 <sup>th</sup>	82,359	90,448	87,937	71,205	59,812	53,811	44,746	41,914	42,832
7 <sup>th</sup>	115,495	120,052	116,078	92,350	83,115	74,638	64,159	61,337	64,414
8 <sup>th</sup>	139,673	142,783	139,000	110,532	92,847	88,455	82,099	79,845	83,882
9 <sup>th</sup>	93,575	94,717	109,810	90,095	78,382	70,821	62,977	59,791	62,988
13 <sup>th</sup>	130,551	142,137	154,984	135,889	131,812	125,806	113,210	108,942	116,207

Source: KSH

trification below), the abrupt fall in population in the doubtless less prestigious 6th district, has been since the 1960s, a clear sign of urban blight. It had almost 143,000 inhabitants in 1960, and then shrank to 110,000 by 1980 and further to about 80,000 by 2005. The 6<sup>th</sup> district was the ‘least fortunate’ as it had lost more than half of its population by 2005. It had over 90,000 inhabitants in 1960 and 42,000 in 2005, and all the other inner districts (namely, the 7<sup>th</sup>, 9<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup>) also followed the same pattern.

The bulk of the decline took place between 1970 and the mid-1980s, which paralleled the construction of housing estates and later the spread of condominiums and other new forms of residence (Csizmady, 2008:33–50, Kocsis, 2012a) that virtually syphoned the better off from the inner areas and led to a rapid aging of the local societies. The processes, however, forced a deep transformation on the structure of the core as the population decline paralleled a heavy influx of low status population from the countryside, often of Roma background, drawn by the low-skilled jobs in the industrial and service sectors and by the collectivization of agricultural land, concluding with an intense replacement of the populace (Ladányi – Szelényi, 1998, Csanádi – Ladányi, 1992). Such changes did not uniformly affect the inner areas. Within the general urban decay, blight affected the outer areas of the 6<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> districts (especially the latter) and large areas on both sides of the Grand Boulevard (Nagykörút) in the 9<sup>th</sup> district (Csanádi *et al.*, 2010a: Maps M1.1 and M1.2). The problems were intensified by the actual workings of socialist housing policies, which, despite their theoretical goals, disfavored the worse off (Kocsis, 2004:70–2). Decay usually leads to an increase in crime-related activities, including heavy and visible presence of prostitution. This was especially prevalent around Mátyás and Rákóczi Squares in the 8<sup>th</sup> district and from the early 1990s was accompanied by drug-related activities.

The influx of the unskilled and low-skilled lower status population crested a new wave in the 1980s with the deindustrialization of small towns and villages whereas tertiary economic activities became predominant in Budapest, creating

a notable demand for labor. The almost total collapse of economic, especially industrial activities in large regions in the country, especially in the north-east, and the economic austerities and crises in the early 1990s, also generated a vast stream of migration to the capital. However, the breakdown of capital from the late 1980s caused such low-skilled workers to face more and more difficulties in finding permanent and better paid employment.

The privatization of the council housing stock, sporadically from the 1980s and speeding up around 1989 (even made compulsory by the 1993 Housing Law), also contributed to the deepening blight. During the process, the ratio of public tenement stock shrank from 50 per cent to six, with the sale of 350,000 units (Kovács – Tosics, 2014:47, Kocsis, 2004:77–80). The law gave the right to buy to sitting tenants in apartments of appropriate standard, excluding ones officially entitled to be protected as historic buildings or in areas with accepted redevelopment plans. The latter two restrictions did not have significant effects on urban poverty, but the former resulted in a municipal tenement stock made up almost exclusively of decaying substandard homes that the municipalities had no revenue to renew. As a consequence, those who could sustain the municipal tenement sector left and only the poor stayed behind, forcing the municipalities to further privatize the remaining stock.

The virtual lack of rehabilitation during the socialist epoch in the 1990s deepened problems. In 1989, the total cost of deferred maintenance in Budapest was estimated to be as much as HUF 200 billion, or USD 3.3 billion, about 10 per cent of the total annual GDP of the country at that time (Kocsis, 2004:74). The problem was most severe in the inner areas where the majority of the housing stock was built before World War I. There were sporadic instances of rehabilitation in the 1970s and 1980s, extending one or two blocks, or even only to individual buildings within blocks, in Erzsébetváros, with only one, significant although failed large-scale attempt in Józsefváros in the late 1970s with the construction of Józsefvárosi Housing Estate (Csanádi *et al.*, 2010a:74–6). In the major part of the area, no effective and systematic regeneration programs have been carried out as most renovations have been the result of isolated efforts of investors or condominiums; although the latter could use funds from the municipality of Budapest for that reason from 1997 on. Two examples stand out: Ferencváros and Józsefváros, 9<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> districts, respectively. Since the 1960s, Ferencváros struggled with attempts at regeneration but without political backing such efforts were fruitless before 1989. As a consequence, the existence of elaborate plans and regulations that allowed municipalities with accepted rehabilitation plans not to privatize their tenements stock (1993 Housing Law, see above), crucially eased the realization of already existing and widely accepted intents. Although claimed to be ‘social regeneration’, that is, an attempt to keep the most people in an area, related organizations facilitated the out-migration of the ‘less desired’,

lower strata. Mass-scale new developments with significant regeneration of existing buildings – parallel to the demolition of a great deal of them – characterize the processes in the district that have attracted momentous investments in the area where in the inner area, between the two boulevards, entertainment and catering dominate, while on the outer side of the Grand Boulevard, housing developments dominate. This has led to substantial social consequences from 1998 (see gentrification below). Józsefváros, undoubtedly the least prestigious inner district, chose a different path. The construction of the Józsefvárosi Housing Estate (1979–1980) was a long-planned effort to better the poor housing and social conditions, but the outcome proved a fiasco, as this housing estate soon became one of the most disreputable in the city. After 1990, the new municipality chose three different strategies for the district that started to bear fruit only after 2000. In the inner, most promising areas, it facilitated private initiatives with supportive regulations and regeneration of public spaces (the Mikszáth Square area). The area with the worst housing conditions but with the most promising potential, along Üllői út, was renamed Corvin Quarter. With the replacement of the population huge areas were demolished that had been some of the largest urban development projects in Europe. The infamous, prostitution and crime hit area around Mátyás Square was rebranded Magdolna Quarter and has become one of the largest examples of social regeneration in Europe with reconstruction and renovation of the existing housing stock and public areas, social, neighborhood and capacity building programs, and with the deliberate intent to keep the area affordable and livable for its existing populace (op. cit. 76–131). Although the more the signs of upgrading multiply, the more the social changes are becoming apparent.

A feature unique in Central Europe is that a significant size of the lower, or underclass, urban population is made up of Gypsy population, giving an ethnic attribute to the segregation (Csanádi – Ladányi, 1992, Kovács, 1998, Ladányi – Szelényi, 1998). The emergence of ghetto-like urban ethnic enclaves intensified segregation and blight, especially in the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> districts, and made the situation resemble those in some American and Western European cities. However, it has to be noted that ethnic minorities never made up more than half of the population in those districts.

The mass emergence of homelessness was associated to the transition to market economy, and was a result of economic crisis. During socialism, homelessness was regarded as a legal offence and the sudden appearance of the homeless and beggars was a shock to the general populace. Multiple reasons stood behind the sudden massive appearance of homelessness. Vagrancy, that had been against the law, became decriminalized, the living standards of the population fell, especially in the countryside, and the impoverished people flocked to the urban centers in hope of finding livelihood. The cheap workers' hostels that accommodated the weekly or monthly commuters from the countryside were shut down. Moreo-

ver, the shrinkage of capacities of the social and mental care systems, especially during the time of austerity, added to the problem as the less severe patients were sent away. Youth leaving from the state foster homes and a large ratio of divorcees also ended up on the streets without sufficient funds to rent or buy accommodation. The relative number of affected people in Budapest was high, estimated between 8,000–15,000, where 80 per cent arrived from the provinces. Most of these people are ‘hidden’ and the number of those who are virtually present on the streets – in subways, underpasses, sidewalks, shop windows, and in crowded areas – is estimated well under a thousand (Kocsis, 2004:81–2).

The disappearance of core function areas and ghettoization are well known and intensely studied in the United States and England, where they are less severely acute in Western Europe. In this regard, Budapest rather followed the Anglo-Saxon model and by the mid-1990s, the central areas had virtually lost most of their productive functions, which were essential for economic and social sustainability and maintenance. The upper and middle strata no longer regarded them as a desirable place to live and, with the collapse of the economy, most of the cultural functions disappeared, while a wide range of economic activities moved to other, especially outer, green-field areas; such as retail, commerce, entertaining, and catering. Offices and headquarters of small and bigger firms and companies also relocated. There was more than a decade in central Budapest without any notable department store or shopping street.

The situation looked so severe in the second half of the 1990s that renowned social scientists projected the ‘Americanization’ of Budapest’s inner areas where strict core areas would be dominated by commercial and business functions and the transitional zone would face further social deterioration as a consequence of middle class flight while upper strata would be driven away by soaring crime rates, growing ethnic segregation, and ghettoization (Ladányi – Szelényi, 1998).

### **Brownfield Areas**

As central areas are the forefront of observation, areas in the adjacent ring were given far less attention, notwithstanding the fact that more serious social and economic deterioration may have hit them.

The affected areas surround the core in a half-circle, especially along the main arterials and the River Danube. This is mostly in the northern, eastern and southern areas and consists of derelict, un- or underused industrial areas, workers’ colonies, originally attached to some factories, institutions requiring large lots, such as hospitals, cemeteries, etc., some agricultural lands, and wastelands. The total area classified as brownfield takes up approximately 68 square kilometers,

that is, 13 per cent of the total territory of Budapest – or about 30 per cent of the total urbanized areas (Kukely *et al.*, 2006:61). Characteristic industrial activities were heavy industries, breweries, slaughterhouses, chemical, medical, and electronic plants, brick factories, power stations, and food factories. In addition, warehouses, other storage facilities, logistical and necessary infrastructural zones also formed parts, with some particular areas. Historically, the bulk of this sector lay in the void between the densely built core of Budapest and the city limits towards the predominantly residential suburbs. Additional axes to this crescent were added along the main traffic arterials and the Danube, both towards the city and outwards, and some segregated plants were also present in Buda along the outer ring road.

With the focus on industrial developments concentrated in this sector, the socialist régime did not alter its fundamental characteristics, despite the annex of the related suburbs to Budapest in 1950. There were some unsuccessful efforts to lessen the weight of Budapest as the sole big industrial center of Hungary in the 1960s and 1970s (Kocsis, 2009b).

The main causes of the problems stem from the 1970s with the shrinkage of the industrial activities of the capital. The situation turned severe during the transition to market economy around 1989 when especially the heavy industries were severely affected, but did not fully disappear. The industrial activities in Budapest started growing again after 1994, employing about 115,000 people in 2006 (Kukely *et al.*, 2006:60), on both traditional and new greenfield sites too. The shift from the former to the latter created, and still creates tension both in the brownfield sector and in the suburbs, as the new, post-Foridist economic, industrial activities, integrated in a globalized economy, require large areas. Such sites are most easily and cheaply to be found in greenfield areas and not in the often polluted brownfields. The ratio of traditional industrial areas, nonetheless, are still of great significance and in such territories, 24 per cent of all employed worked in 2006 (*ibid.*).

The present state of the brownfield areas is far from homogeneous. Those in favorable positions, such as the segregated plants in central Buda and the areas along main axes, especially in the north of Pest, and recently in Buda, were quickly renovated and turned into shopping malls, residential, and office areas. The development is best perceived in Pest along Váci út with its dozens of office towers, which area used to be dominated by factories and warehouses. In Buda, developments in the stripe along Budafoki út in the 11<sup>th</sup> district in the south, in sites around the Gas Factory in the 3<sup>rd</sup> in the north, have recently gained significant momentum. Adjacent to them, and a bit more hidden, but still easily accessible, areas serve as fairly cheap sites for various economic activities, mostly related to IT and other related fields. Such areas were originally mixed in character with residential plots for working class families, small-scale factories, and other

industrial units, with a huge ratio of empty or underdeveloped patches. Thus, besides economic functions, such areas have also been prime targets for residential development, especially the 13<sup>th</sup> district. To a much lesser extent, similar tendencies may be observed in the 9<sup>th</sup> district, along Soroksári út. The causes of differences lie partly in the dissimilar socio-economic status of the surrounding communities. The aforesaid stripe in the 13<sup>th</sup> district is easily reachable from the prestigious north Buda while the southeastern areas of the city, both in the core and in the suburbs, are less reputable. In addition, the former has an advantageous traffic connection with the M3 subway line whereas the latter is less well integrated in the system. Worth mentioning is that public transport is still the main form of traffic for most in Budapest and thus accessibility, especially via subway, or major tram lines, is of primary significance for such developments.

Some large-scale sites, predominantly in Csepel and Kőbánya in the south and south-east of the city, have retained their industrial character, either in their 'original', redeveloped form, such as the pharmaceutical plants in Kőbánya (e.g. Richter Gedeon) or on the 'ruins' of previous sites, like the huge site of Csepel Iron and Steel Works on Csepel Island (which during its heyday employed 20,000 workers and now houses a myriad of small and medium enterprises that employ 10,000 people). Other huge sites in less favorable positions have faced a different fate, like the huge breweries in Kőbánya, which have become empty (as new technologies require less space), and they are still awaiting their new functions. These sites, with the size of tens of thousands of square meters, often have beautiful industrial buildings and cellars of significant architectural value (Budapest..., 2014:17).

Yards and other rail infrastructure, which belong to the Hungarian State Railway (MÁV), form a distinct part of the brownfield sector. They cover extensive territories that also act as long edges separating large neighborhoods and districts (op. cit., 27). Moreover, colonies built for workers of the MÁV are also set in such areas, apart from the rest of the city by the aforesaid edges, and are now often in a blighted social and physical state, causing grave social problems. Acting itself as a state within a state, the attitude of MÁV, rooted in its socialist past, is one of the main sources of the problem as it is the least susceptible to the value of the land and to its location and thus uses it prodigally, well beyond its needs and economic necessity. Potentially, two large yards, one in the 9<sup>th</sup> (Ferencvárosi) and 2<sup>nd</sup> between the 13<sup>th</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> districts on one side and 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> on the other (Rákosrendező), could be in the future of some large-scale development while some, many smaller and now defunct ones could house important functions and complexes, as it has already happened in some instances, such as the site of the National Theater and the surrounding area that used to be a freight terminal. Extensive track systems beyond existing railway stations in the core area also have huge potential, as the partial development of the tracks of Western Railway



Station (Nyugati pályaudvar) and related prospective wide-reaching plans have shown (op. cit., 17).

Most problematic are the derelict plants, abandoned warehouses, mines, and other dilapidated territories in the least favorable position, especially farther from the core in the east and the south of the city, where also isolated, blighted, residential communities are scattered often in a polluted environment. Fractured ownership structure, high costs, inevitable environmental remediation, and necessary infrastructural developments were the main causes of the lack of redevelopment efforts, but conflicts and tensions in the two-tier administrative system between the districts and the capital municipality, and between Budapest and the suburbs also played an important role. Severe economic problems, especially since 2006, further thwarted the renewal. Last but not least, lack of possible viable economic or social functions or feasible, realistic new ideas have all stymied their successful redevelopment and renewal. However, small steps have been taken but more fundamental, successful expansion requires new, innovative schemes and probably some substantial economic development.

Existing forms of usage often forestall the potential of future developments. Logistics heavily present in the area generates much freight traffic resulting in noise, dust and pollution (op. cit., 21).

The brownfield sector further has quite a lot of potentials because it contains vast agricultural and undeveloped land that would enable notable recreational, sports and residential development, if it were better connected to the abutting areas and the whole city and remediated from waste and pollution. Thus, it could ease the pressure on suburban areas, both in economic and residential terms.

### **Suburbanization and urban sprawl**

Suburbanization and urban sprawl were by far not new phenomena that emerged in the 1980s. The momentum of population growth gradually shifted from the core areas to the outer, then outlying areas of the city during the last decades of the 19th century. Large, predominantly working-class settlements sprang up around the city borders, especially east of the River Danube. From the early 1910s, the significant groups of the higher social strata started migrating primarily to the hilly areas of outer Buda, following the examples of the haute bourgeoisie and the élite some decades earlier. The latter phenomenon reflected the changes in lifestyle and priorities (Kocsis, 2005). Suburbanization, that is, the outward migration of the middle and higher strata to primarily residential areas, continued into the interwar period, resulting in the rapid development of the outer, previously uninhabited outer areas of the Buda districts. This created a large, rather homogeneous high prestige sector in the western part of the city. The migration

from the countryside to the outskirts, dominated by the working and lower strata continued and was especially intense during times of economic austerity (Kocsis, 2009b:45–59).

The overall majority of areas, then considered an agglomeration belt, was annexed to Budapest in 1950 and the new borderline was much more than a simple administrative issue as it strictly divided the capital from the surrounding areas, mostly deemed not to be developed in the forty years to come. Migrants arriving from the countryside, a pressure arising from the collectivization of land and industrialization could not find accommodation in sufficient number within the borders of Budapest and thus were forced to move to the villages neighboring Budapest. But, as housing construction sped up, especially from the 1960s, their majority moved to Budapest, chiefly to the new housing estates (Kocsis, 2012a). As a result, the social composition of the agglomeration belt was rather homogeneous and lower middle strata dominated. The overall characters were rural.

Impetus towards suburbanization and urban sprawl, although somewhat lessened but not diminished in the socialist period, due to the rigid nature of the administrative border, those willing to migrate to the less dense areas had to find suitable parcels or other means within the city limits. In this way both those who wanted to move from the dense central areas and those who migrated from the countryside to the capital and preferred the small-town like environment moved to the outer districts. These tendencies, although similar in origin to those in the West, took on twisted manifestations due to the constraints of socialist regulations and planning systems. As the state of the inner areas degraded from the 1950s, the housing estates, constructed first at the periphery of the core then gradually moving outward, became the prime target of the better off in the inner areas, until the prestige of the housing estates drastically fell in the early 1970s. Consequently, condominiums, small-scale estates, and semi-detached and detached houses, in the prestigious, especially Buda, areas came to be the prime targets of such social strata. For the less wealthy, large-scale family housing areas in the outer, underdeveloped, mostly Pest, districts, were feasible options from the 1970s (Kocsis, 2009a and 2012a). To satisfy the still existing further demand for greener and sparser living conditions and befitting the underdeveloped infrastructure and poor services, temporal and more distant means appeared in abundance. Secondary homes and weekend cottages of the well-to-do sprang up in huge numbers close to rivers and lakes, especially along the Danube and around Lake Balaton, whereas the less wealthy bought garden-plots, especially around Budapest, in the future agglomeration belt in large patches beyond, sometimes rather far from, the inhabited areas. This was not by far an utterly novel phenomenon, similar processes, although much less intense and affecting smaller areas, appeared in the then outer, now inner, agglomeration ring in the interwar period (Csanádi *et al.*, 2010a:274–5).

**Table 2:** Population of the Budapest Agglomeration.

Year / Region	1990	1995	2001	2005	2011
Budapest Proper	2,016,000	1,906,000	1,775,000	1,680,000	1,729,040
Agglomeration Belt	567,000	599,000	672,000	724,000	805,848
Total Agglomeration	2,583,000	2,505,000	2,447,000	2,404,000	2,534,888

Source: KSH

The situation changed rapidly during the second half of the 1980s, as people started moving to settlements abutting Budapest for permanent residence (*Table 2*). Reasons for the ‘discovery’ of the area are manifold, including the readjustment to market economy, privatization of previously nationalized agricultural land, the large-scale arrival of the foreign investments, the proliferation of inequalities, collapse of socialist housing and regional policies, decentralization of the municipalities, deterioration of the prestige of the housing estates, privatization of the council housing sector, further decay and rise of crime level in the inner areas, increased residential mobility, and last but not least, the significant changes in housing ideals, mostly resulting from the penetration of cultural patterns from the West. From the early 1900s, such processes were additionally accelerated by the transformation of the municipal system and the rapid catching-up and development of these suburban settlements in terms of amenities, infrastructure and services. In the process, first the temporal homes were enlarged and turned into permanent usage, then, traditional ‘peasant’ homes were modernized. Later, gradually new constructions appeared, first within the traditional residential, then from the second half of the 1990s, green-field, areas, sometimes rather far from any old villages and towns and suburbanization affected more and more distant settlements, especially along the main traffic arterials, with attractive, green and quiet environments. Besides the archetypical suburban genres, like detached and semi-detached houses and gated communities, denser forms also appeared, almost mimicking the smaller housing estates of the 1980s. Migrants included the better-off, moving especially to the inner western and northern part of the agglomeration belt, commuting back to the central areas, and the poorer strata, which fled from the increasing cost of living and property prices of the city proper and moved to the cheaper, outer, especially southern and eastern sectors, often with loosened connections to the city. Such patterns of social segregation in the agglomeration belt, in fact, reflected the existing structures within the city limits. The social sectors fundamentally grew beyond the boundaries, changing the previously homogeneous social characteristics of the settlements and also triggering rapid urbanization in the way of life. Large prosperous areas formed in the western and northern sectors of the agglomeration belt while the other sections have remained predominantly lower class, without large-scale deprived

areas. Within such large sectors of seemingly homogeneous character, however, significant levels of heterogeneity can be found on micro-levels, with pockets of poverty even within the richest settlements and pockets of wealth within generally poor areas – a phenomenon well known in Budapest (Csanádi – Ladányi, 1992, Kocsis, 2009b:22–25, Kocsis, 2012b).

The social character of a large part of the settlements, especially those of the emerging sub-centers (e.g. Budaörs, Törökbálint) and some ‘intellectual havens’ (e.g. Budakeszi, Nagykovácsi) drastically changed due to the influx of highly educated, more affluent and younger people, often creating tensions within the local community and politics (Kocsis, 2015, Kovács – Tosics, 2014, Szabó *et al.*, 2011, KSH, 2013:12–16, KSH, 2014:9).

In the beginning, many municipalities made strong attempts at controlling and limiting the influx while others warmly welcomed the migrants with new parcels and roads. A more complex attitude evolved from the early 2000s when the high costs of infrastructural developments, necessitated by migrants, and the social consequences were realized. The pace of influx slowed down parallel to increasing suburbanization within the official boundaries of the city, in the outer districts, and to the developments in the inner areas Csanádi *et al.* 2010a:229–99, Csanádi – Csizmady, 2002, Kocsis, 2012).

The stress in more ‘advantageous’ settlements shifted to economic development as a new phase of urban sprawl took shape: polycentric urban development, where the most advantageous and developed towns have become sub-centers in the transforming and evolving metropolitan area of Budapest. Economic activities began to flow to towns from the end of the 1990s. First those ones abutting Budapest with favorable geographic positions were affected, mainly along national highways (e.g. Budaörs, Fót, Gyál). Then other, more distant territories gradually joined along the main arterials and the M0 beltway, constructed during this period (e.g. Gödöllő, Törökbálint, Batorbágy, Szigetszentmiklós). Such economic functions include service, office, industrial, commercial, and logistic activities. The area in the southwestern agglomeration belt, around the highway triangle formed by M0–M1–M7 has become an important economic pole with characteristics that closely resemble those of edge cities in the United States and Western Europe. These sub-centers often offer employment in larger numbers than they could satisfy and thus have become targets for commuters. Patterns of commuting changed and the most educated still commute to the core areas as the most highly paid jobs are there whereas middle strata commute to these emerging sub-centers in increasing numbers, the lower strata either commute to the city or try and find employment in the vicinity (Kocsis, 2012b, Kovács – Tosics, 2014:41–45).

By the mid-2000s, urban sprawl reached areas beyond the agglomeration belt and gradually connected settlements in a single network along the main arterier-

ies in a 60–80 kilometer radius circle, forming a single, polycentric, metropolitan area housing three million people (almost one third of the country), utilizing on, and synthesizing the synergies of, integrated economic, innovative and social clusters dispersed, but also within the proximity, in the metropolitan region. Such developments are in line with the spatial developments of American and Western European urban development in the last thirty years, although the status of the network is less evolved with numerous factors hindering its development while large, island-like unaffected areas are situated within the area (Csanádi *et al.*, 2010a:231–5, Szabó *et al.*, 2011).

The rate of suburbanization decreased around 2008 (KSH, 2014:4) but it does not sign the end of suburbanization, as many projected (Kovács – Tosics, 2014:41). A more balanced relation between the suburbs and the core areas of the city comes rather into being as consequence of developments in the core and gentrification, where the migration to the suburbs, within or without the administrative borders of Budapest, tends towards equilibrium with the migration from the suburbs and from other areas to the inner areas (*Table 2*, KSH, 2013, Kocsis, 2012b).

### Gentrification

After the glorious days before World War II and a slow but steady deterioration and decline during socialism, the future of the inner areas seemed doomed in the middle of the 1990s, after the deep and long economic crisis resulting from the transition to market economy. Urban decay appeared inevitable, especially with the acceleration of suburbanization and that fact the inner areas became segregated and blighted (e.g. Kovács *et al.*, 2013:23). Quite unexpectedly, however, the population of the inner areas started stabilizing at the turn of the millennium, despite the ongoing suburbanization, and the population of Budapest proper commenced to increase after 2005, which included inner areas (*Tables 1 and 2*) while the characteristics of the streets and activities changed profoundly, turning quiet, aging and poor neighborhoods into vivid, colorful ones attracting well-to-do young people. There had been earlier centralized attempts at luring ‘posh’ people, high-end shops and sumptuous, elegant activities in the area but they failed because of the lack of demand. The situation has, however, altered to a significant degree since 2010 as new socio-economic phenomena have taken shape.

Only sporadic examples of rehabilitation were carried out before 1989 and the situation changed slowly afterwards with the sole large-scale rehabilitation project in the 9<sup>th</sup> district in an area which had been designated to regeneration well in the 1980s and thus had not been privatized. Later on, two major examples in the 8<sup>th</sup> district joined in, the Corvin and the Magdolna Quarters in the 2000s.

The last intended to maintain the original population of the neighborhood where the former two, explicitly or covertly, targeted a fundamental change in population by attracting younger, more affluent and better off strata through the demolition of a large ratio of the existing housing stock and through the displacement of the original, poor, population. In 2006, 70 per cent of the population in the rehabilitation area in the 9<sup>th</sup> district and 44 per cent in the 8<sup>th</sup> district had moved to the area in the previous five years (Kovács *et al.*, 2013:32). In other areas, in spite of the magnificent, but failed, attempts such as Madách Promenade (e.g. Kovács, 1998:76–7), similar processes started in an unorganized way from the early 2000s when investors first bought up empty sites, then existing buildings and a fast-paced demolition of the core areas began. In such cases, the ratio of displacement was rather low. The investors were mostly Spanish and Israeli companies that constructed expensive and relatively small flats in the area by the thousand before the crisis of 2008. In fact, more institutionalized ways of rehabilitation elsewhere had lacked both the legal and planning framework as well as the necessary financial resources in the 1990s (Kovács *et al.*, 2013:26).

In the beginning, consequently, centralized, municipal programs played only a secondary role in triggering inner city regeneration in Budapest. Changes on the demand side, that is, appearance of new social and economic functions and related strata were the key factors behind the present transformation. As a result of the sporadic investments and increasing demand, the prices later grew by 40 per cent between 2002 and 2008 in the inner areas of the 7<sup>th</sup> district and by about 120 per cent in the two above-mentioned quarters in the 8<sup>th</sup> district (Csanádi *et al.*, 2010b:120–1). Thus the specialized rehabilitation organizations and private investors used later the value gap to turn their investments profitable and because of the huge opportunities and the sheer size of possible revenues they could well convince local municipalities to support their activities in one way or another (Kovács *et al.*, 2013:25).

Gentrification is an influx of affluent newcomers and second-home owners to the poorer inner urban areas that drives up housing prices, introduces new services, regenerates the neighborhood, and transforms local communities (Hutchinson, 2010:305, Tomay, 2007:122). As a startling surprise for scholars at its appearance around 1990, it has been in the forefront of urban studies in the recent decades worldwide. The causes of this phenomenon have been theoretically and empirically studied with various, sometimes contradicting, outcomes (see e.g. Hutchinson, 2010: 306–8). Fundamentally, two major processes contribute: economic changes labeled under the umbrella of globalization and recent transformations in lifestyle and society.

Post-Fordist economies rely more and more on information and effective decision-making that enhance the role of central places, namely cities, where physical proximity, cardinal despite information technology, ensures the most advanta-

geous position in the network. Thus centers of decision-making, like company headquarters, gradually moved first to the most important cities from the late 1980s and then to other major ones about a decade later that arrived in East-Central Europe around 2000. The arrival of well-paid professionals (also known as young urban professionals, or yuppies) has brought about widespread development of accompanying service infrastructure, both hard such as traffic facilities, constructions, and soft such as restaurants, specialty shops and a web of auxiliary services. Such processes deeply altered the socio-economic picture of the core areas. Although observable, such processes are secondary in the present state of Budapest, due to the relative weakness of economy and lack of massive decision-making centers.

More important are the consequences of the social transformation resulting from complex, manifold, partially intertwined processes. After the epoch of modernism a significant portion of people turned from the 1970s to more conservative values, protecting something that seemed to be lost, like environment, monuments and past, and idyllic lifestyles, hence, they started to value the historical, urban environment, and rediscovered the romantic core areas. Artists also discovered the potential in the then cheap, well-serviced neighborhoods. In addition, some offspring of the middle class suburbanites started to get bored and isolated in the homogeneous outskirts and began to move back to the more stimulating, eventful, lively inner city. Families who found the suburban life too expensive, also joined them, especially after the crisis that started in 2006 in Hungary. Due to widening higher education, student number has multiplied, also adding to those preferring life in the center. The rising number of international students also fostered studentification. Delayed childbearing and family formation age, and new, non-traditional forms of cohabitation – the phenomenon of the so-called second demographic transition – and fragmentation of lifestyles and housing preferences have further increased the number of middle class people looking for accommodation and life there. Moreover, many young urban middle class families with children have opted for staying in central areas instead of moving to the suburbs – the so-called young urban professional parents, or ‘yupps’. To this roughly permanent demand more temporal forms, such as the new types of tourists, like backpackers, hen and staggers, seekers of cheap alcohol and thrills, have been added. Naturally, different strata settle in different places: families, for instance, prefer quieter, more homogeneous, secure neighborhoods a bit farther from the core. These phenomena have gradually transformed the core of Budapest since the early 2000s, and as demand for the inner city has grown, the investors have also discovered the area as it is capable of yielding more profit due to the lower prices than suburban areas. As a consequence, the regeneration processes have been ‘spontaneous’ in a major part of inner Budapest, resulting from social and business pressure, rather than from some systematical, coherent, planned effort.

The results, from one point of view, are tremendous: over 40 per cent of the buildings had been renewed in the inner city in 2005 (Kovács *et al.*, 2013:28) without any significant central initiative; whereas prestigious buildings even in prime locations are still wearing bullet holes from either World War II or the Revolution of 1956 and have not been renovated since their construction over one hundred years ago. The situation is obviously worse in poorer areas.

Statistics and extensive analyses demonstrated the effects of gentrification and studentification on neighborhoods in the inner 7<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> districts (Csanádi *et al.*, 2010a:82–131, Csanádi *et al.*, 2010b:122–4, Kovács *et al.*, 2013:32–34, Tomay, 2007), and also the differences compared to other gentrified Western cities. First, the local demand is weaker because of the traditional lack of capital and feeble middle strata. Second, urban decay still prevails in many neighborhoods parallel to the gentrified ones as many lower status people cannot sell their flats in their present state and thus are entrapped in their low-quality homes. Third, investors have produced housing for foreign (especially Spanish, British, and Irish) second-home buyers who buy their flats as investments, thus large blocks are virtually empty year around. Last, but not least, the power of foreign ‘fun-seekers’ is relatively large and thus the industry that serves them has deeper ramifications and imprint.

A somewhat novel and unexpected experience in Budapest is the mass-scale appearance of Western European and American partygoers and requires some further analysis. This is not by far a new phenomenon in East-Central Europe as Prague faced their invasion in the early 1990s and some other Baltic towns joined in in the 2000s. What is fundamentally different is the way in which it joined. In the aforesaid places the inner core was first physically renovated and then it was discovered. In case of Budapest, young local entrepreneurs, artists, students and others started to culturally regenerate and gentrify some cheap central neighborhoods, first in the 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup>, then in the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> districts, and occupied them in various, exceptional, unconventional forms (most notably, the ‘ruin’ bars and venues) from the late 1990s, often in illegal forms with strong civic backing and influential social networks (Lugosi *et al.*, 2010). With this elaborated web of venues and ‘know-how’ of hospitality and entrepreneurship, after the crisis of 2006–10 that had elementally affected the local purchasing power, was Budapest ‘discovered’ by the ‘hordes’ of foreign youths from 2011, which led to the commercialization, mass-scale restructuring and industrialization of the pub- and cultural scene. Somewhat ironically, the breakdown of the Hungarian national airline, Malév, in 2012, played a positive part in this process as it opened up the airport of Budapest to the cheap flight providers.

Gentrification poses different threats in Budapest than in other western cities. Segregation and social polarization present mostly similar dangers but because of the fundamental dissimilarities in ownership structure, that is, the low level



of tenants, related inhabitants are not hurt by the rent increase– on the contrary, those who can sell their property may well gain from the soaring prices. Those living in substandard housing are, on the other hand, badly affected: those in their own homes may find it hard to sell the property, others living in the still existing council housing sector, that is typically in very bad shape, pay low rents but may hope in vain for a betterment of their housing situation. In centrally renovated buildings, such residents may well be displaced to other, less prestigious neighborhoods, often in outer districts, thus transposing the situation elsewhere, especially if carried out in mass scale, as it happened with residents of the 8<sup>th</sup> district transferred to a housing estate in Csepel (21<sup>st</sup> district).

### Conclusions

Budapest was in a privileged position before 1990 as it was the biggest and most important city in the country. It was wealthier compared to other socialist cities and bigger than any other in a huge radius. Its potential seemed exceptional. Vienna had traditionally been on the horizon as a rival but it was a well-known one and Budapest had hoped to occupy the familiar situation with a small primacy of the former. These comfortable prospects made Budapest lazy and unprepared for the challenges of globalized Europe with its dozens of competing cities, conurbations, and huge metropolitan areas where it found itself unexpectedly in the 1990s. Problems and tasks it has been facing are not unique at all but are rooted in local historical, political and social characteristics that distinguish it from other East Central European major cities; so much so that the reason for a general East Central European urbanization model was seriously questioned among scholars. Although the ratio of common and special features may be debated, it is undeniable that Budapest and its unique urbanization require particular attention.

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# BUDAPEST'S LARGE PREFAB HOUSING ESTATES: URBAN VALUES OF YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW

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In Budapest, one third of the population lives in large prefabricated housing estates. Therefore, this Modern heritage of the Communist period is one of the key issues of sustainable urban development. The majority of scientific studies on mass housing focus on economic and social aspects, so this research intends to approach the subject from the built-up environment. Taking the people's needs and Budapest's specific situation in relation to the challenges of sustainability as a starting point, the paper attempts to use the back-casting method based on social, economic and environmental trends. Defining a theoretically desirable future for this dominant type of urban housing, the analysis works backwards to understand their principal historic turning points. What are the values of large prefabricated housing estates? What were they, and what could they be? How can this modern and open urban form be sustained? What elements of the existing built environment will disappear, and what can be adapted in the transition process? By introducing three different scales – city, neighborhood and building, along with their subcategories – it is possible to recognize the effects of changing socio-economic conditions upon the built context and indicate problem-oriented, locally-minded interventions.

**Keywords:** housing estates, urban renewal, Budapest, sustainable urban neighborhood, assessment indicators, urban history

One of the biggest transformations of urban social fabric in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) came about through the construction of large prefabricated housing estates. In Hungary, the mass housing policy utilizing prefabricated technology was initiated with the help of the first fifteen-year housing policy 1961–75 and the second five-year-plan development project 1961–65 (Körner 2006). In the politically and economically divided Europe of that time, professional reflection on modern housing and planning solutions remained absolutely international. France, the United Kingdom, Scandinavian countries and the Soviet Union were principal reference points for the Hungarian stakeholders. Following guidelines first from the International Congresses of Modern Architecture (CIAM), which operated between 1928–59 (for example, the La Sarraz Declaration from 1928, and the Athens Charter from 1933), then recommendations by Team 10, as the

vanguard of urban and architectural theory between 1953–81, cities were planned and divided into modern functional zones. New units of city organization were developed everywhere – called new towns and micro-districts in the United Kingdom, *villes nouvelles* and *grand ensembles* in France, *Großwohnsiedlung* in Germany, *микрорайон* (micro-districts) in the Soviet-Union, and *lakótelep* (large prefabricated housing estate) in Hungary. Nevertheless, it is evident that this common product of 20<sup>th</sup>-century urbanism was modified by local urban potential and socio-economic backgrounds. Budapest's new master plan drafted in 1960 (Kocsis 2008) defined territories for housing development such as Kelenföld or Zugló. Budapest's first Soviet housing factories began to produce in 1965, when planning and design were directed by new norms, panel-house technology and national economic requirements. As a result of this centrally-coordinated process, the first large prefabricated housing estate within the city was realized in Kelenföld, creating modern homes for human beings of the future. (Figure 1)



**Figure 1.** Kelenföld Housing Estate, Budapest, 1968. (From the photo collection of the Department of Urban Planning and Design, BME.)

**Methods: Past, Present and Tomorrow**

*Budapest tegnap, ma és holnap* (Budapest Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow) – this is the title of a popular 16-minute long science film released in 1970 (Kollányi 1970). With the help of expert Charles Polónyi, architect-professor of the Department of Urban Planning and Design at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics (Polónyi 2004) and one of the ten professionals in the international Team 10 group, it explains the large prefabricated housing estate developments around and within the historic city center. Rearranging the order of the simple words used in the title of this film, the paper starts from the present situation, gives a brief overview of the past, and then focuses on the tomorrow.

**Table 1.:** matrix of material values in three scales

City of Budapest	Neighborhood	Building
location	urban form	apartment
position within the city	road network	size
natural characteristics	land use	spatial division
proximity	built volume	wet area
infrastructure	facilities	technology
energy	culture and education,	comfort
water	health and leisure activities	panel structure
waste	commerce	materials
mobility	open space use	common spaces
public transport	territoriality	doorway
car	green area	staircase
accessibility	motorization	roof

Taking the people’s needs and Budapest’s specific situation in relation to the challenges of sustainability as a starting point, the paper attempts to use the back-casting method based on social, economic and environmental trends. In defining a theoretically desirable future for this dominant type of urban housing as a sustainable urban neighborhood, the analysis works backwards. The assessment indicators of the physical environment are categorized within three different scales. The city level addresses the location, infrastructure and mobility opportunities in Budapest in relation to a housing estate; the neighborhood level focuses on the master plan, primary facilities and use of open space within a micro-district; while at the building level there is the residential panel building with its flats, technology and common spaces. Nevertheless, it is certain that all these compo-

nents of the physical environment should be complemented with environmental, economic and social approaches to establish a complex system. Although in the Central and Eastern European literature, there are several good studies on large prefabricated housing estates focusing on economic and social aspects, also covering Budapest (Egedy 2000, Csizmady 2004, Tosics 2004, Molnár 2013); still, urban and architectural evaluation is lacking. (Table 1)

### Today

In Hungary, the proportion of “panel” dwellings in the national housing stock is 20 percent, but in Budapest this ratio is higher. Approximately one third of the population lives in large prefabricated housing estates. Nowadays, they are mainly associated with negative images having to do with socialist lifestyle, estrangement and “panel” circumstances, in accordance with the post-industrial society’s new political, economic, cultural and social ideas (Benkő 2014). Yet, the evaluation of the image, the perceived identity of the neighborhood by residents and the outside world, is often different. (Figure 2)

To describe today’s situation objectively, the best method is to take a look at the prices. Comparing the average price per square meter (m<sup>2</sup>) between used apartments constructed with panel technology and non-panel technology, the difference is huge. In 2014, the panel is only 181,000 HUF per m<sup>2</sup>, as opposed to the others at 290,000 HUF per m<sup>2</sup>. Among the panels, the most expensive units are on the Buda side, built at the end the panel period in the 80s (Pók utca – 226, 000, Gazdagrét – 211,000). The cheapest lie in the transitional belt or on the outskirts of the city on the Pest side, built during the mass production of the 70s (Havanna – 125,000 m<sup>2</sup>, Újhegy – 126,000, Pesterzsébet – 130, 000) (OTP 2014). This is despite the fact that the Havanna Housing Estate – one of the most stigmatized estates in Budapest (Csizmady 2004) – initiated an “integrated social urban rehabilitation program” co-financed by the European Union and Hungary in 2009. Roughly 40,000,000 Euros of public money were spent on the renewal of the physical and social environment. Nevertheless, it is very difficult to work against the stigmatization, because image is generally more important than reality. Obviously, the well-known slogan of the real estate developers, “location, location, location”, applies to the evaluation of large prefabricated housing estates, too. (Figure 3)



**Figure 2.** Typical soviet prefab building in Óbuda, Budapest, 2014.  
(Fabian Toth's photo.)



**Figure 3.** Location of large prefabricated housing estates in Budapest.  
(Author's figure based on Judit Rab's drawing.)

## Yesterday

The standardization, industrialization and prefabrication of apartment buildings, as well as the construction of large housing estates or new towns, were global phenomena that seemed an efficient solution to the post-war housing shortage. Not only Communist politicians, who promised apartments for every family to create a socially just society, but urban planners and construction designers were also enthusiastic about utilizing and developing in practice the international housing policy and architectural theory (Nagy 1968). What is more, it was actually prestigious to live in this modern environment, one which seemed to offer inhabitants superior physical housing conditions and a better quality of life. The home became a present of the State, and, as the Hungarian proverb states: “Don’t look a gift horse in the mouth.” Living in a panel apartment was simply the norm, and their values were not questioned (Muliolyré 2013). National and international publications that covered this progress confined themselves to objective and comparative figures like the number of developments (Werner 1975). The large prefabricated housing estate became a homogeneous product of Communist cities throughout Central and Eastern Europe. No attention was paid to country, city or neighborhood characteristics, while people were mere users of this new comfort.

Nonetheless, criticism appeared following the first realization. First, in 1969, two sociologists from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences published a book on the social problems created by new panel housing estates (Konrád & Szélényi 1969). Then, recognizing also some negative economic consequences of the mass housing policy, national politics changed the system. The last year for the State’s “present” of a free home for all was 1971 (Körner & Nagy 2006). Last but not least, planners and architects with no hope of any radical change – since panel technology and mass production were coordinated at the national level and the sector occupied a very strong political and economic position – discussed the urban and architectural problems recognized in housing estates. After quantity, the quality of living conditions became a question. During the preparation period of the second fifteen-year housing policy (1976–1990), new professional initiatives appeared. The first real discussion about panel aesthetics, the so-called Tulip discussion, occurred in 1975, when the façades of the building and their position in the landscape came into focus (Kissfazekas 1998). Simultaneously, architects were searching to find design solution to realize more flexible plans on neighborhood, building and apartment levels, too. In 1976, a new catalogue for panel buildings appeared with some small opportunities for innovation: corner sections to allow more complex urban compositions, as well as apartments for different households to accommodate multi-generational families, large families or single people. Technology followed new demands, only slowly. The famous “E” panel family with a 5.40 m panel structure was not realized until 1982 (Körner & Nagy 2006).



The first urban and architectural history overview of Budapest's large prefabricated housing estates was published in 1998, defining 26 mass housing units constructed during the Hungarian panel period between 1965 and 1991 (Preisich 1998). Without giving a complete list, there are some curiosities. The first was in Kelenföld, composed mainly of 10-storey "ribbon" buildings using Soviet panels with 3.20 m units. Óbuda Center, with the same technology, received the longest Hungarian slab, the 338-meter-long Faluház. Újpalota, using the Team 10 project theory, became the biggest with 15,400 units for approx. 60,000 inhabitants. Havana is well-known because of its criminological stigmatization. Gazdagrét was promoted by the first actual Hungarian soap opera, *Szomszédok* (Neighbors), at the end of 80s; while Káposztásmegyér, situated on the northern outskirts of the city, was constructed as the last huge product of panel housing factories. (Figure 4)

After the change of the political and economic regime, the position of the large prefabricated housing estate changed absolutely. First and most importantly, the national housing stock, including the panels, was privatized in the 90s. Every building became an independent condominium with many owners. The number of owners varied between 16 (in smaller 4-storey panel towers) and 886 (in the biggest 10-storey slab, the Faluház in Óbuda). Together, they were responsible for building maintenance, potential development of common spaces, technical installation, the façade, the roof, etc. However, residents bought not only their



**Figure 4.** Újpalota Housing Estate, Budapest, 1974.

Available at: Fortepan <http://www.fortepan.hu/> [Accessed 11 March 2015].

flat, but also all the problem inherent in ageing panel buildings. Second, ageing is also an important factor in terms of the residents. The young generation of the 60s, 70s and 80s, who received their first panel flat to raise two children and live as a typical communist middle-class family using the facilities provided by the state, are now middle-aged, if not elderly. The majority live in the same flat, in pairs or alone, their children having left the neighborhood; while new residents use the area without this natural attachment of childhood, just as a cheap transitional home in their lifetimes. In general, shrinkage has characterized the large prefabricated housing estates of Budapest since the mid-90s. Third, the lifestyle has changed completely. Economic and cultural globalization, new types of individualization, digital technologies, etc., provoke more and more social differentiation. In the heterogeneous world, everybody tends to reject the homogeneity represented by the physical appearance and the central heating of panel buildings. People who have the opportunity move away; those who cannot continue to reside there and feel segregated. In any case, the image of prefabricated housing estates has become quite negative. Finally, the only element which has not changed is the open space system. It belongs to the district municipality as a public territory in which the buildings float. This situation has resulted in problems represented by new phenomena related to socio-economic background – for example, maintenance cost, change of space use, accessibility, parking shortage, increased number of dogs, crimes and feelings of insecurity as well.

### **Tomorrow**

Now, 25 years after the transition period, the question is how the large prefabricated housing estates that we have inherited could become an integrated part of Budapest's future. In recent years, after the well-known and widely-used building evaluations, sustainable neighborhood assessment systems have begun to be created (for example, the CASBEE-UD from Japan, the BREEAM Communities from the UK, the DGNB-UD from Germany or the LEED-ND from the US), seeking scientific, objective and measurable fundamentals for new worldwide urban development (Szabó 2012). A recent study comparing the different mandatory and optional indicators of these internationally recognized assessment tools found that criteria focus upon three aspects: the location of the development, the ecology of the neighborhood and the technology of the buildings (Orova & Reith 2013). Nevertheless, the developers of new sustainable urban neighborhoods creating and using the assessment systems are not really interested in regeneration. It is sure that, in the case of existing large prefabricated housing estates, the location within the city and the panel technology are inherited; yet, given the economic, environmental and social challenges in Central and Eastern Europe, every com-

ponent of matrix of the material values has a potential for sustainability. It is the time to recognize this model, to discuss it and use it! (Table 2)

In post-Communist countries, the large prefabricated housing estates stand up well, and this type of modern housing remains dominant for a long time. Thus, their future depends on the geopolitical situation of the country and the city, on the local housing policy, on demographic changes, and on the property system established by the different privatization systems after the political and economic changes of 1990. It is impossible to generalize this urban challenge. The processes diverge sharply not only among Central and Eastern European countries (for instance, demolition is typical in the former East Germany, technical renovation is obligatory in Poland, restitution had a special physical impact in Latvia,

**Table 2.** Potentials of material values in three scales for sustainability

City of Budapest	Neighborhood	Building
location	urban form	apartment
re-use of urbanized land proximity intensification	Environmental sustainability sustainable transport high density	ownership transformation adaptability to social changes accessibility
Infrastructure – technology		
high density energy efficiency smart development renewable energy use water management waste management	high density energy efficiency smart development renewable energy use water management waste management	compactness energy efficient renovation smart development renewable energy use water management changing character
Mobility		
high density energy efficiency rapid transport development sustainable transport smart development	high density inter-modality permeability sustainable transport smart development community building facilities rich mix of uses adaptability to social change community buildings open space use environmental sustainability car-free zones greenery walkability	sustainable transport facilities accessibility smart development community building common spaces adaptability to social changes accessibility attractiveness changing character


etc.), but also among cities within the same country and housing estates within the same city (Temelová et al. 2011). The large housing estates in Berlin, thanks to urban growth, function well. Meanwhile, the majority of the housing stock in panel buildings has already been demolished in some estates situated on the outskirts of Magdeburg. In Hungary, large prefabricated housing estates demand different policies in prospering cities (such as Budapest, Székesfehérvár or Sopron) and in former industrial or new towns where shrinkage seems to be irreversible. In Budapest, as today's situation reflects perfectly, the location of the micro-district is and remains forever the most important issue: location within Europe, within the country, and the city, too. This location is fixed, but for sustainability, it is of utmost importance to re-use this urbanized land. Intensification, transformation, renewal and demolition could be tools. In the Central and Eastern European context, policymakers, developers and designers are responsible for confronting the complexity and disorder of existing urban areas in order to build complex sustainability.

Beside urban scale re-use, the other main indicator of sustainability in every assessment system is high density. The large housing estates were developed according to standards, to achieve the optimal density for the development of modern infrastructure: central heating, water systems, waste management, public transport, etc. It is evident that in the future, efficient management and smart development of existing infrastructure is one of the key challenges. The infrastructure, with its hierarchical organization, is the backbone for relationships along the city, neighborhood and building scale. The "green" elements of Budapest's public transport system provide rapid transit by metro, HÉV (suburban railroad) and train for several large prefabricated housing estates. For example, Kelenföld and Órmező are privileged by the new metro line, the M4 development in 2014; M3 serves Újpest, Angyalföld, and the József Attila housing estate directly; and the HÉV connects Békásmegyér, Pók utca, Óbuda and Csepel with the center. Still, there are isolated large prefabricated housing estates without any good transit opportunities, and their future depends on public transport development at the city level. Káposztásmegyér was built without the promised metro connection at the end of the 80s, the new metro line (M4), opened in 2014, has not yet reached Újpalota or Gazdagrét. Nevertheless, some housing estates perhaps can never be an integrated part of a sustainable public transport system (such as Havanna, Kispeszt, or the Centenárium Housing Estate). They remain far away from the main arteries of the city.

International literature uses the sustainable urban neighborhood (SUN) term as a new urban design model for the 21st century (Rudlin et al. 1999). Following the SUN characteristics, it is evident that the large prefabricated housing estates are perfect in some general respects for intense high density, environmental sustainability, permeability and walkability. Other components or qualities (such as location, transit opportunities and urban blocks) depend on the specific neighbor-

hood; however it is evident that the majority of weaknesses are community and function based. Location and good transit are city-level questions, but planning and design solutions made for a large prefabricated housing estate constitute two principal fields of the sustainable urban neighborhood: green mobility and environmental sustainability. It is important to recognize that large prefabricated housing estates are ideal sites to introduce new systems maintaining the original car-free and green open spaces of the micro-district (Fiala & Locsmáncsi 1981). Low-speed options (such as tram, hybrid or electronic bus, bicycle, walking or others solutions) combined with special intelligent technology (such as car-sharing and car-pooling) demand responsive transport solutions and can provide easily sustainable transport in areas that are dense enough at the neighborhood level. However, panel buildings and public open spaces have to be able to adapt to new functions related to sustainable transport on their ground floors and in former parking areas (bicycle storage, offices, CNG and electric vehicles chargers, etc.). Green transport has the potential to become a main value of prefab estates, playing an important role in the community building, in the management of open spaces and also in the transformation of “fundamental spaces”, the slabs and towers (Balla 2014). (Figure 5)

Large prefabricated housing estates were designed as a new urban unit liberated and independent from the surrounding environment. Nevertheless, the urban form of these neighborhoods varies by period and site. For example, due to adaptations in modern architectural theory, the buildings are stand-alone masses in a vast, continuous open space. There are no traditional urban contexts any more: no streets or blocks, no public or private areas, no building locations (corner building or neighboring buildings) in the traditional sense. The majority of mass housing in Budapest constructed in the 60s and 70s used this common international solution, though modified by local conditions. For example, in Kelenföld Housing Estate, they created a huge green center on the space of a former construction site. Újpalota is organized along a large main green axis, and Békásmegyér



**Figure 5.** Urban form from the 60s, 70s and 80s. József Attila, Tüzér utca and Káposztásmegyér Housing Estates. (Author's drawing after city maps; same scale, orientation to the north.)

approaches the bank of the Danube River, etc. Afterwards, in the projects of the 80s, postmodern architecture appeared, re-evaluating the importance of open space division both in terms of form and use. For instance, in Pók utca or Káposztásmegyér, they reinvented the courtyard system to make it feel like a semi private territory of the surrounding buildings.

According to the contemporary international discussion about sustainable urban form (Salat 2011), large prefabricated housing estates are extremely valuable in terms of environmental sustainability. On the one hand, the ratio of built area to active green surface is quite good thanks to standard regulations that set aside 14–20 m<sup>2</sup> of green space (playground, tree line, public green area, etc.) per resident (Preisich 1998). On the other hand, the quality of open spaces is also favorable, because, at the time of construction of the homogenous panel world in Budapest, interventions of the landscape architecture played an important role in humanizing the new neighborhoods. In the 70s, more the 70% of the Hungarian landscape architectural projects were in prefabricated housing estates, creating intense vegetation, organic space division and sometimes new topography (Bakay 2012). Besides having an environmental impact (off-setting climate change, developing biodiversity and water management at the neighborhood level, and so on), today and in the future, these open spaces can be an integrated part of the local socio-economic life as well. Green open space can adapt new functions as different types of urban agriculture. It influences the everyday feelings of users and makes the neighborhood more appealing by establishing a contact to nature. (Figure 6)

Another big issue regarding the sustainable future of large prefabricated housing estates is energy efficiency. The majority of the European and national programs focus on this objective socio-economic aspect, since utility costs have risen dramatically. Additionally, the renovation of simple panel surfaces is easy to implement, and the results are immediately measurable (Hrabovszky-Horváth & Szalay 2014).

After EU accession in 2004, beside the technical renovation (exterior insulation, change of windows and modernization of the heating system), the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions and the use of renewable energy also became important. Approximately one third of the panel housing stock has been renovated, but due to privatization and the public procurement method, the change is not on the neighborhood but on the building level. It is certain that – by utilizing existing infrastructure and the high density nature of mass housing, introducing complex technological solutions and educating people to be more energy conscious – large prefabricated housing estates have plenty of potential to create a more energy efficient urban neighborhood and a more sustainable city of Budapest.

Last but not least, it is important to recognize some merits of the prefab buildings. The new phenomenon of individualization, the changing family structure and new types of housing (for example, co-housing) can facilitate the use of small



**Figure 6.** Havana Housing Estate, Budapest, 2014.  
(Author's photo.)

and compact apartments (average two rooms, approx. 50 m<sup>2</sup>). In the 10-storey slabs and higher towers, lifts can provide accessibility for all. The ageing society of prefab neighborhoods provides an opportunity to reorganize the ownership system, develop the lack of common spaces and uses on the ground floor, create new apartments at the extreme parts of the building (for example, the top floor or at the corners), and invite new residents into the area (Csízy 2012). Realized already in Germany, the complex physical regeneration, complemented by media promotion of the new panel life, can attract the private sector, ensure a self-healing process and aid in image-building for the reevaluation of potentials. Nonetheless, the key to the future lies not in the immaterial values, but in the consciously discovered and well-coordinated development of material components. This is capable of spurring positive change in Budapest's large prefab housing estates.

### **Conclusion**

At the time of panel estate constructions, the Hungarian Communist system centrally coordinated everything: the planned economy, the housing policy and the construction industry. International urbanism and architecture combined elements to create a new living environment. Now, 50 years after the start of the first extensive mass housing program in Budapest, the European Cohesion Policy for

the period 2014–2020 is attempting to introduce a method of integrated sustainable urban development (EU 2013).

The various dimensions of urban life – environmental, economic, social and cultural – are interwoven, and success in urban development can only be achieved through an integrated approach. Measures concerning physical urban renewal must be combined with measures promoting education, economic development, social inclusion and environmental protection. In addition, the development of strong partnerships between local citizens, civil society, the local economy and the various levels of government is a pre-requisite. (European Commission, 2013, p. 2)

Yet, it is clear that integration should have a different meaning today than during the time of large centrally-planned prefabricated housing estates. The question is how it is possible to develop an appropriate sustainable future for one third of the Budapest population residing there, how to make participants cooperate to manage and compromise present needs, and how the immaterial (soft) and material (hard) values and deficiencies of this modern urban heritage can be recognized. To achieve the purpose of SUN (sustainable urban neighborhood), both types of integration, the vertical and the horizontal, are indispensable. As the tables of this study show, there are many aspects to be integrated. The keywords have not changed, but the contents of contemporary urban life are brand new. Within the vertical integration, the historic and spatial urban unit, the neighborhood, needs to remain central. Complex area-based renewal is very important, since behind the hard panel solutions, which tend to be similar, the soft human components are really quite different. Regeneration can be promoted by European, national or city programs, but it has to be coordinated by the city of Budapest; and without the residents of the building condominiums and responsible local professionals prepared to find compromise, it will never be successful. The film *Budapest tegnap, ma és holnap* (Budapest Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow) highlighted the importance of the transformation of urban and social fabric by new prefab housing estate developments around 1970; however, the current urban renewal process seems to be more complicated and problematic than new investments. In Europe and in Budapest, however, this is the real challenge for sustainable urban future.

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# LONG-TERM CHALLENGES OF ROMANIAN URBAN NETWORK: PLANNING FOR REGIONS WITH DIFFERENT BACKGROUND

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Romanian development policy and planning always had a major goal, namely turning Romania from a rural country into a prosperous urbanized one. Rurality is associated with backwardness, poverty and with a not really proudly accepted past. In the present paper I try to identify the main periods of Romanian planning, and I also use statistical demographic time series in order to describe the present state and the trends of urbanization in Romania. Planning, when it was applied, had a decisive effect on Romanian urbanization, while lack of planning or inappropriate planning is marked by stops in increase of urban share.

**Keywords:** Romania, town planning, systematization, development, five-year plans, housing, architecture

## Introduction

In this essay I summarize two of my presentations: the first was held during the 33<sup>rd</sup> György Ránki Hungarian Chair Conference entitled “Transformations of Urban Social Fabric in East Central Europe”, the second one was presented to the audience of the Romanian Studies Conference at Indiana University on the same day.

The methodology I adopted is mainly based on the following pillars:

- handbooks, plans and texts on urban and town planning in Romania,
- interviews with design professionals formerly working at the state planning institutions,
- statistical data analysis.

The texts I used were those accessible in the Central University Library Carol I in Bucharest. It seems necessary to add that it was really easy to read through these texts written during the one century history of Romanian planning: most of the texts disappeared during the several regime changes Romania had to face. I would like to also add that the librarians suggested me using new texts they have there, as they thought I choose the books by mistake. So the total list of texts accessible is quite short, and readers merely use them. I can tell that the texts I could read seem to offer a good insight in Romanian planning thought and its evolution, so I decided to put together the timeline and, based on that, I think that I could identify the major periods of planning thought in Romania. All texts are primary texts representing the corpus to be analyzed in order to describe the narratives of Romanian planning – I mention only one exception, the work of the late professor Nicolas Spulber (1971) on socialist management, one of the few books on the regime accessible in a public library before the Revolution.

The very few interviews I managed to organize (only 3 could be finalized) cannot serve as a scientific base for my text, but it really helped a lot in understanding where the authors really put the emphasis – at least during the period of systematization. All three architects I questioned used to work at the state planning institute, and they are active in design even today.

Regarding the statistical data I would like to highlight that data concerning the period before 1992 is not really reliable, so I used the primary texts I read as sources of data. After 1992 till 2014 the National Institute of Statistics (of Romania) offers a good range of quality data in time series suitable for analysis.

So the main parts of the present text are:

- identifying the main challenge for Romanian planning,
- periods of Romanian planning,
- spatial pattern and urban-rural shift (and shift back).

Why should one deal with such issues of previous periods, one may ask – and this question is relevant, indeed. But how can one understand the spatial structure of a country without any awareness of the thoughts that shaped its specificity? So my adventure seems to me even today a worthy one.

### **Town planning in Romania: network or system**

Romania in its present form was established in 1918, right after the World War I – it had to face only slight modifications, like the annexation of a part of Moldova by the USSR. None of its territories were developed in that time, even if the

main railway lines of today had been already built, and not too much development occurred in the last century in this respect (Biji, 1964).

The urban network was already present: today's main cities were several thousand inhabitant towns even in the past. The new towns later established by the communist party, like Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (today Onești), Victoria, Motru or Doctor Petru Groza (today Ștei) did not challenge historical regional poles, and they did not have any scope like that.

If one looks at texts on planning, it seems clear that every era had its objective and teleology regarding towns. Towns are very much associated with prosperity, culture, development, growth, quality jobs, healthy spaces, good housing, and utilities in the Romanian planning thought. If one looks at the very much underdeveloped (and not just lagging behind) rural areas of Romania, it is clear why planners and policy makers looked at the urban as the savior of Romania – and in 1912 only 16,4 per cent of the population lived in urban settlements.

In a very much rural and underdeveloped country how can one talk about planners? The first planner in Romania was Cincinat Sfințescu (Sfințescu, 1919), who worked for the city hall of Bucharest, activated in the land registry department. Sfințescu had the opportunity to work on the first plan of Bucharest titled *Plan General de Sistematizare al capitalei* (General systematization plan of the capital). Sfințescu had to choose between two major European trends: Howard's Garden city movement on the one hand, and on the other hand the Haussmannian order that reshaped Paris and some main cities like Budapest. In 1919 Sfințescu decided to suggest the garden city concept instead of the Haussmannian. His work seems really detailed: he dealt with the questions of transport, utilities, housing. He analyzed the population growth trend and assumed a one million inhabitant Bucharest in 1980. Sfințescu studied how to design the tramway network of Bucharest, and based on the unfortunate results of the Budapest underground, dismissed the idea of this kind of infrastructure in the case of Bucharest.

Sfințescu's dream could not become reality: the structure of Bucharest was rapidly changing, his plan was never put into practice, and in 1934 a new plan (Marcu, Bolomey, 1934) was formulated and approved by a new team of urban planners – it is worth remarking that in less than two decades after the early bird Sfințescu, there was plenty of planners and even the Urban Planning Institute of Romania were functioning (Davidescu, 1937). But the main motor of change was economic growth, and as its consequence: wealthy classes wanted to live like in Paris. So the Howard–Haussmann match was over and Haussmannian approach was present everywhere – even if the city hall never had enough sources to build the streets and boulevards projected by the team of the Urban Planning Institute of Romania.

The character of Bucharest had changed, and the quarters that could fit into Ottoman Empire towns, the so-called *mahalas* (Stahl, 1910) were ruined once and

forever – Henric Stahl even started a project in order to conserve the memory of the picturesque city they loved by means of photo archive. So what was done had nothing in common with Romanian tradition, and even if urban planners had an unquestionable goodwill, the outcome was a partly realized Haussmannian torso instead of the Howardian garden city.

During the period between the two World Wars Romania was set on the track of rapid modernization, so Bucharest was called the little Paris by admirers of the city, but World War II put an end to any positive expectation countrywide. In the late 1930s most of the texts I could access reflected the admiration of Nazi ideology (clear and proud antisemitism, racism), anti-Hungarian outbursts (very much understandable in the context of the harbingers of the Second Vienna Award when Hungary gained back 43,492 km<sup>2</sup> of its former territory from Romania) (Muresanu, 1934, Manolescu, 1938), and at the same time the five year plan of the USSR. I could not find any reference to the German *Raumordnung*, which is a bit grotesque because Romania was involved in World War II on the side of Germany, against the USSR.

After World War II the communists came to power and a soviet type economic development path was followed: heavy industry, urbanization, massive investments in infrastructure in order to show the victory of ideology even over the nature itself (Spulber, 1971). The five year plans were also introduced. This period lasted until the 1989 revolution that forced the fall of communism in Romania. Planning was crucial, as it was advertised in anti-communist texts written on Romania (for instance: Giurescu, 1994). What was the main objective of these plans? Infrastructure and industry were only the means: they aimed at urbanization of Romania. So the *telos* remained the same: a heavily rural country was supposed to catch up to the Occident, or using the words of that time, building a multilaterally developed country with omni-competence (Spulber, 1971), for the working classes and for agricultural workers.

One can imagine that Howardian utopia and Haussmannian business was put aside and an adaptation of Corbusierian architectural ideology was put into practice. But the task was so enormous: in 1948 only 23,4 per cent of the population lived in urban settlements, the rest lived in villages with no utilities at all, with lack of accessibility, in poverty, lack of basic public services, no work places. And the urban settlements had to change their character at the same time: their patterns were not fashionable for Stalinist urban planning, and their historical centers were named ‘feudal’ centers (Laurian, 1962, Curiuschi, 1967, Lazarescu, Ciobotaru, Cristea, 1977). They did tear down whole neighborhoods in several cases, but there was also an intention of conserving built heritage, even if they were aware that ideologically speaking the heritage cannot serve as a form for the new communist content (Lazarescu, Ciobotaru, Cristea, 1977): realized examples are Deva, Brăila, Tîrgu Mureş or Sighișoara or Suceava.

What could be seen from outside was a massive demolition of whole neighborhoods in Bucharest and also in other 36 cities in Romania (Giurescu, 1994), officially called systematization of the national territory (Cucu, 1977, Matei, 1977). All settlements, no matter urban or rural, had to find their place in the hierarchical and dynamic urban system. I would like to underline that planners looked at the layout of phenomena as a system, opposed to the network they wanted to abolish. The system was supposed to be scientifically and ideologically grounded. So those settlements that could not fit into the system were declared ready for *dezafectare* (decommissioning), while those with outdated or not enough efficient structure for *asanare* (sanitation) (Cardas et al., 1983, Lazarescu, Ciobotaru, Cristea, 1977).

The outcome became robust after implementing the Law on systematization (Law no. 58 from 1974): private ownership of low quality dwellings was replaced by state owned blocks of flats offering comfort, services and utilities to a large number of people. A similar trend was present also during the urbanization or systematization of rural communes, where some small scale apartments blocks investment was realized, education, health care, cultural and commercial infrastructure was introduced – mainly on the plots formerly used by private dwellings. This process was often accused as inhuman and destroying. In my understanding the systematization of the communist era really changed the character of Romanian cities and villages, but without these large scale investments one could not fight poverty and deprivation. Acting against Romania's rurality was present from the very beginning (Botis, 1941), and it was one of the motors of destroying the *mahalas* from the 1910s to the early 1930s – but the state in the communist era had much more power and sources to fulfill the urbanization project.

I am not willing to say that the first period of Romanian planning was similar or there are continuities: there were serious ideological incompatibilities between the quasi-haussmannian *interbelic* (interwar) period and the 1947–1989 one: Marxism and Leninism, scientific socialism was something completely different, but the aim remained the same – urbanization of Romania.

The spatial utopia they wanted to realize was a spatially balanced system, with small level of concentration: in this context also small towns with only a couple of thousands of inhabitants received state investment in heavy industry, the road and rail network was modernized, and those villages with sufficient development potential received funds too.

Nevertheless, the population had very bad feelings about systematization, and intellectuals had similar thoughts too, so right on the eve of the Revolution the *Frontul Salvării Naționale* (National Salvation Front) in its first decree repealed all the laws referring to systematization, and in this context the new age started with no planning or building regulation at all. The no plan era lasted until 2001

when the current planning law was adopted – they had to find a new name for systematization, so they call it now *amenajarea teritoriului* (which can be translated to English as territorial planning, it is originated from the French *aménagement du territoire*). I am going to enter into more detail about it in the next part of the paper, but I think I can conclude here by identifying the periods of Romanian planning as follows:

- 1) the rise of planning (Haussmannian and Howardian plans) from the 1910s to the early 1930s,
- 2) first no-planning and development period from the late 1930s to 1947,
- 3) communist systematization and urbanization from 1947 to 1989,
- 4) second no-planning and development period from 1989 to 2001,
- 5) new planning in the context of the European Union from 2001 to present.


### **Spatial Pattern of Population Change**

The main criticism against the systematization planning period was that it had negative impact on rural settlements both physically and socially speaking – even if there were serious works on the theory and practice on what we now may call public participation (Stahl, Sebestyén, 1972, Gusti, 1974). Perhaps it was true, but one might ask what happened after the Revolution with rural Romania? Since 1984–1985 more than half of the population lives in urban settlements: impressive success concerning the long lasting challenge: from 16,3 per cent to more than 50 per cent. The task was fulfilled by massive investment in housing, services and industry, as I have already mentioned (Lazarescu, Ciobotaru, Cristea, 1977, Monda, 1965, Sasarman, 1979). The present period started in 2001 has no other means than declaring villages as towns – the economic downturn and the political change could not let the Romanian state dispose of financial sources at least comparable to the pre-1989 times. The main source of investment in rural (and also urban) public infrastructure comes from the European Union's Funds, but it is very much questionable if it is spent in line with official planning and development policies, so it seems necessary looking at the trends using population change time series.

The first set of figures represent the situation of rural communes in the counties characterized by major cities, regional poles. I selected for this paper Cluj, Iași and Timiș in order to find out if the sort of rural Romania had turned better after abolishing the systematization. Unfortunately it is clear from the figure that the pattern in every area shows that growth and prosperity can be felt only in the very proximity of major cities: the average is only 16 km, even if one takes into account the capital city Bucharest. The area includes the cities



themselves and their rural *hinterland* with population growth. As there were no investments in the development of rural settlements, the answer seems easy to be formulated: rural Romania had to suffer once again after the Revolution: ageing population, lack of economic opportunities, amortization of public services, high fares of public transport equals rural depopulation – and I would like to highlight that it is valid not just for those villages selected previously for ‘decommissioning’, but there are no villages with serious population loss within 16 km reach from city centers, and a vast number of villages are facing the depopulation issue.




- Legend:
- rural municipality with serious population loss
  - ⊙ declared town with population growth
  - ▲ rural municipality with population growth
  - ⊠ declared town with population growth
  - radius of urban influence

Cluj area	Iași area	Timiș area
16 km radius urban zone	24 km radius	18 km radius
high GDP growth	low GDP growth	high GDP growth
320,000 inhabitant city	350,000 inhabitant city	330,000 inhabitant city
clear pattern	pattern influenced by state border on the East	not that contoured pattern

**Figure 1.** Rural population change in urban context

The trend is not as simple as at first might seem: in some cases even towns must face population change. In Figure nr. 2 I tried to show how certain towns changed in terms of population. In some cases, there is population increase in the proximity of cities: Brașov, Bucharest and Constanța are good examples for that. Urban population loss can be observed in the South (on the bank of the river Danube), in the North (on the border with Ukraine and Republic of Moldova), and in mountainous areas.

There is no population growth in some urban areas in towns, while it is observed in other cases? Yes, but it is easy to tell why: Bucharest and Constanța are the exceptions: in these urban areas former villages were declared as towns, so their growth is reflected in Figure nr. 2, while in most of the cases rural settlements held the status of rural communes, so they are indicated in Figure nr. 1 as villages with high population growth. Perhaps it is not easy to identify the boundary between urban and rural in Romania, that makes any comprehensive development policy quite hard to be fit to reality.



- Legend:
- serious population loss (more than 20%)
  - population loss (between 15% and 20%)
  - ▲ population growth (more than 20%)
  - urban area


**Figure 2.** Urban population change

Based in Figures nr. 1 and nr. 2 we can state that population growth is present overwhelmingly in urban areas, no matter what the ranking of the settlement is as defined by the law. In this respect I might also add that the issue of high population growth villages is the same as those towns around cities, so they are part of the urban development picture and no serious development policy can include them in rural development. The bad news is that in the programming period between 2014 and 2020 Romania gave priority to those rural settlements with high

growth potential, namely to those rural communes that were not declared towns but are placed in the proximity of over 100,000 inhabitant cities. For instance the commune of Florești with nearly 23,000 inhabitants could be ranked in the upper third or top 100 of towns, but legally speaking it is made of villages and it is a rural commune.

So there are new towns in Romania, some of them declared after 2001 implementing the new law on territorial development. One can find 54 new towns on the map, all declared after 2001, but the era before 1989 was well known for rapid and forced urbanization. Between 1948 and 1978 the number of towns increased by 84–2.4 a year, while between 2001 and 2014 the figure is 3.8 a year. If we look at Figure nr. 3 it is clear that new towns are located in areas without urban centers, mostly far from major cities. So in this context there are three different ways of urbanization in Romania:

- 1) new towns in areas characterized by lack of urban settlements,
- 2) former rural communes in the proximity of regional poles,
- 3) *de facto* towns in the proximity of regional poles pretending they are rural.



Legend:  new town  
 urban area

**Figure 3.** New towns (2001-2014)

I would like to add two more points to the analysis: firstly I would like to show that the size of the town does not affect its population change, or at least only in the case of those micro towns with only a couple of thousand inhabitants, secondly it seems now necessary to determine whether the urbanization in terms of increasing urban share is an ongoing trend.

If we take a look at Figure nr. 4 we can conclude that over 40 per cent population growth never occurs in the case of micro towns, and micro towns are more apt for population decrease than small towns or cities. As a result of this population change is firstly influenced by the proximity of major cities or regional poles, or by their absence. The good news is that Romania has a polycentric urban network as a result of the balanced spatial idea of the era when they understood the urban network as a system, while the main issue is that these areas of growth only cover 2.7 per cent of the national territory. That means that there is a polycentric polarization going on that cannot be solved by restricted planning and development tools and sources.





Figure 4. Population change and size (1992–2014)

I have already shown that the number of towns was growing between 2001 and 2014 in an unprecedented measure, foregoing even the first period of systematization between 1948 and 1978. In this context I calculated the figures for the next chart in order to find out if the overall aim of Romanian development and

planning, namely the urbanization project is an ongoing one, or it has reached its climax. For the time series after 1992 I included in the urban side all settlements which are considered as urban in 2014. Please bear in mind that the number of towns grew between 2001 and 2014 by 54. Surprisingly the trendline of urban share turns negative in 2002, the function has its inflection point there. So after a century of struggling with rurality, investing enormous efforts and sources into urbanization, it seems that the project is ended – and this fact must have serious consequences on the future of Romanian planning and development, no matter urban or rural.



**Figure 5.** Urban share (1912–2014)

One more result that can be obtained by analyzing the data presented in Figure nr. 5 is that the trendline follows exactly the periods I identified before. The first two periods are characterized by the rise of urban planning but with no means of realizing its goals. The era of systematization is marked with rapid urbanization: new towns and fast population growth in existing towns. After the revolution there are no sufficient tools in order to realize any policy – there was none between 1989 and 2001, while there is a highly questionable and ineffective one currently. The failure of the post-2001 urban policy is that Romania’s overarching objective of increasing urban share reached its inflection point right in 2001 when the new policy was adopted and entered into force.

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# SOCIAL COHESION AND TRUST IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN HUNGARY

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This paper summarizes the first results of the analysis of a questionnaire survey on the determinants of social cohesion and interethnic relations in Hungarian local communities. The survey was carried out in villages and small towns in four different regions of the country in 2012. Our results show that the socioeconomic status and geo-cultural background of the local community significantly shape social cohesion and interethnic trust. Migration rate, on the other hand, plays a surprisingly minor role in shaping trust and cohesion. The effect of fractionalization is moderate, and, interestingly, mainly positive if national minorities are present in the local community.

**Keywords:** social capital, Hungary, trust, community survey, ethnic heterogeneity, migration

## Introduction

This paper provides a summary of the first results of the analysis of a questionnaire survey on the determinants of social cohesion and interethnic relations in Hungarian local communities. The survey was carried out in villages and small towns in four different regions of the country in 2012.

We addressed in the first place the roles of the settlement status, geo-cultural background, ethnic fractionalization and migration rate in shaping social cohesion, interethnic trust and political preferences.

The points of departure of our analysis were Putnam's (1995, 2007) and Alesina and La Ferrara's (2002) seminal studies on local social capital and trust (see also Hooghe et al. 2009). Nonetheless, we concentrated on the slightly different concept of social cohesion (Chan et al. 2006, Letki 2008). Our special focus is on the effects of migration (c.f. Hickman et al. 2012), the socio-economic status

of the community residents, and ethnic fractionalization on social cohesion and interethnic trust (c.f. Letki 2008, Stolle et al. 2008, Lawrence 2011).

Our results point to social status and geo-cultural background as major factors behind social cohesion and interethnic trust. Migration rate plays a surprisingly minor role in shaping trust and cohesion. The effect of fractionalization depends on the ethnic composition of the community. A large share of low status roma residents seem to decrease perceptions of social cohesion, while the presence of indigeneous national minorities may enhance community cohesion. The former result may reflect measurement problems stemming from the still uncovered mechanisms of status dependent ethnic fluidity. The latter point to the long run benefits of interethnic contact – in line with the so-called contact hypothesis. This latter finding seems to be in contrast with earlier findings at the first sight. We argue, however, that it may reflect some measurement problems on the one hand, but important substantive mechanisms on the other.

### **Diversity and Cohesion**

The principle of embracing all kinds of diversity is considered by many of us as a key element of the cultural setup of the Euroatlantic civilization in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. At the same time, however, there is an ongoing discussion in the academic sphere and the political arena alike about the supposed negative externalities of diversity. In particular, ethnic heterogeneity is in the spotlight in many countries.

In Western Europe, the public discourse on interethnic relations is centered around the (lack of) sociocultural integration of the first and second generations of economic immigrants. In the US, on the other hand, immigration is considered as a primarily economic issue. When it comes to interethnic tensions, the long shadow of Southern slavery has still remained the major problem. In Hungary, and in some other countries in Central-Eastern Europe, the Roma are in the focus of public debates on the effects of ethnic diversity.

Note also, however, that the issue of immigration has also been part of the Hungarian national political agenda in recent years. The topic was always raised as primarily an economic problem (similarly to the situation in the US), but some politicians were eager to refer to the supposed interethnic tensions in Western Europe and quote Western politicians talking about the problems of multiculturalism.

The scholarly interest in diversity and social cohesion had preceded the recent waves of public debates on the issue. Some of the most influential research programs were launched early on in the nineties. In his seminal work, Putnam (1995) warned of the potential negative effects of increasing geographical mobility on local social capital in the US. Nevertheless, ethnic diversity was not at the focus



of his research. At the same time, some economists started to investigate the effects of ethnic diversity at the local and national level (e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara 2002). A consensus seemed to emerge about the negative effects of heterogeneity around this time. In his seminal paper, which was based on a large-scale survey on local communities, Putnam (2007) concluded that diversity could also erode intraethnic trust – along with the interethnic one.

All those results have seemed to be in sharp contrast with a long tradition in social psychological research, which have strongly influenced public discussions and policy in postwar Europe and America. Contact theory, as it is called, is traced back to Allport's (1954) conjectures about the effects of personal contacts between diverse people. It is assumed in this framework that personal experiences and stereotypes organize our understanding of the social world around us. A common observation is that differences attract more negative stereotypes than positive ones, introducing a negative bias in judging people whose gender, race, ethnicity, etc. differ from our own ones. Thus, interpersonal contacts between individuals of different ethnicity tend to improve interethnic relations, as there is an opportunity for the personal experience to overwrite biased stereotypes.

Contact theory has shaped public debates about school segregation from the 1950s, and has had a substantial influence on schooling policies all around the developed world. The decline of industrial capitalism in North America, and the emergence of inner city ghettos in North-Eastern metropolitan areas fostered the academic discussion about residential segregation from the late 1980s. Postindustrial transformation also raised concerns about the potential negative externalities of public housing policies in Western Europe. Namely, when the first waves of 'guest workers' and postcolonial immigrants arrived in large masses, new housing developments tended to concentrate immigrants in segregated neighborhoods. The fear came along with industrial decline that segregated neighborhoods would nurture alienated minority communities, a hostile majority public and recurring problems of cultural and economic integration.

Eventually, anti-segregationalist public discourse started to shape public housing policies in some European countries. Some efforts also were made at local and federal levels in the United States. Uncontrolled crime and studies on innercity ghettos may both have influenced the Clinton administration, when they initiated the demolishon of large metropolitan housing projects with particularly bad reputation.

In Hungary, segregation as a problem appeared in the academic discourse on public education few years after the fall of the communist regime. The major issue was the education a integration of Romani students. To a lesser degree, residential segregation also attracted some scholarly attention. As in some other countries in Central-Eastern Europe, segregated minority communities are concentrated in rural areas – instead of metropolitan neighborhoods. Some minor

policy measures were taken against school segregation in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. On the other hand, no governmental efforts have been made to cope with residential segregation.

As the principle of residential desegregation had gained ground in housing policies, evidence had been accumulating on the negative externalities of mixing people of different culture and ethnicity. This was not a clash between theory and evidence, however. Theories were developed early on in sociology, psychology and economics about the difficulties of interethnic relations in heterogeneous communities.

Limits of contact theory have been emphasized by psychologists themselves. Minimal group experiments provide evidence supporting identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979), according which human beings are extremely sensitive to in-group-outgroup frameworks. Economists also assume that ethnic preferences are not only initial dispositions but durable motivations which favor ingroup members over outgroup members. Blalock (1967) developed the conflict theory, which has become popular among sociologists. Conflict theory predicts that newcomers or other outgroup members in a community/society are often considered as persons who pose a threat to ingroup members' social and economic status. Often, all theories predicting enduring conflicts between various ethnic groups in local communities are grouped into the category of conflict theory.

Note that the theories of conflict and contact are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Conflict theories are about the effects of heterogeneity in itself. Contact theory, on the other hand, predicts the consequences of face-to-face peaceful interactions. The question still remains, however, that in real-world local communities, which types of mechanisms dominate the interethnic relations.

A large part of the evidence accumulated in the past 15 years indicates that conflict theories are better at explaining the accumulating evidence on the links between diversity and social cohesion (Van der Meer and Tolsma 2014).

However, some recent findings have challenged the above consensus about the negative impacts of heterogeneity. The most notable analysis can be found in the Sturgis et al. (2014) study which looks at London neighborhoods. By investigating very small administrative units along with larger ones in a large and very colorful city, they tried to separate the partial effects of district heterogeneity and everyday contacts. Their results show that heterogeneity could be harmful for social cohesion but real mixing is beneficial – at least when one appropriately controls for neighborhood status as well.

Unfortunately, Hungarian scholars of urban studies have mostly ignored this issue. At least, large-scale comprehensive studies are still missing. It could be a problem for policy planning since evidence in the Western world indicates that the effect of diversity on local communities could largely be context dependent (e.g. Koopmans and Schaeffer 2014). The sociocultural landscape in Hun-

gary differs in many ways from the ones in Western Europe and North America. Among the particularities one can find the large weight (and diversity) of national minority groups and the large number of ethnic Hungarian immigrants. The status of and challenges faced by the Roma communities are often compared to the ones of African-Americans and the muslim immigrants to Western Europe. However, the Roma differ in many ways from the above groups. They share the language and the Christian sociocultural traditions with the majority population. Moreover, the Roma are much harder to be seen as a distinct racial group like the African-Americans. In our view, their stigmatization is less to do with cultural differences and more about the stigma of poverty – unlike in the case of muslim immigrants and African-Americans.

Our aim is to launch the quantitative empirical study on diversity and cohesion in the Hungarian context. This survey could be considered as a pilot study but we still think that it provides some useful evidence.

### **Data and Methods**

*Sampling.* We conducted a computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) survey in December 2012. The fieldwork was carried out by a professional polling firm, H-Reports Ltd. We have a stratified quota sample of 2,800 respondents.

The sampling design does not address any kind of 'representativity' – a major issue in large scale social surveys. Instead, it aims at increasing variances along the crucial dimensions we focus on. This is because we concentrate on causal analyses instead of providing a descriptive review on the level of social capital in local communities in Hungary.

Large enough variance of the independent variables is a must in multivariate analysis. However, some types of differences might rather inhibit to get a clear picture of certain causal mechanisms, instead of helping it. Namely, local communities are to be defined in a strikingly different way in small towns, middle-size cities, and large metropolitan areas. The major difficulty here is how to fit available community level data to the highly varying and sometimes fairly 'fuzzy' boundaries of real-world communities – those which affect individuals' daily life and social well-being. Financial constrains forced us to restrict our analysis to the relatively simpler cases, namely, communities of small towns and not very small rural areas where the ego-networks comprised of the crucial family ties, neighbors, friends and colleagues are predominantly attached to a well-defined administrative unit. In those communities, one can relatively easily detect those demographic characteristics which may affect local residents' social well-being and attitudes outside their narrow ego-networks. Spatially structured census, electoral, etc. datasets provide such information on those community level attributes.

It is harder to capture the social world which matters for residents of large metropolitan areas. The major difficulty is with the search for appropriate spatial units which capture the boundaries of individual residents' social universes. Research on social capital should not, and, actually, does not restrain from the task of coping with this difficulty. In our project, however, we narrowed our focus on the easier cases due to the given constraints. That is, our survey is restricted to Hungarian towns of the size of 500–50,000 residents.

Our major concern is about the effects of immigration (and emigration) and inter-ethnic relations. However, the distribution of migration-rate among local communities is highly skewed in Hungary, with the large majority of towns experiencing only small-scale changes in their population in the past years. Therefore, we stratified the sample so as to over-represent the administrative units with high migration rate. The situation is similar to ethnic fractionalization, and we also artificially increased the variance in ethnic composition. To detect the differences between distressed and affluent communities, we increased the variance in status (as measured by employment rate and average educational level). Survey responses provide evidence on inter-ethnic relations though, we used data on the results of the recent parliamentary elections to increase variance in this dimension as well. Namely, we adopted the local electoral performance of the major far right party (named Jobbik) as a proxy for inter-ethnic tensions in the community. Jobbik has not been a one-issue party, but undoubtedly put the 'Roma-issue' at the very center of its electoral campaign in 2010.

Administrative units could be sufficiently good proxies for the social universes of a large share of local residents. Nonetheless, indicators based solely on those units cannot fully grasp the socio-cultural patterns and economic perspectives which significantly frame how individuals perceive the social reality and how they intend to cope with the perceived challenges. Hungary is a small country with appr. 10 million of inhabitants; and is often regarded as a culturally homogeneous society. In reality, regional economic differences are fairly large in international comparison in this country. Moreover there is a large body of historical, ethnographic and sociological literature on the significant regional differences in socio-cultural patterns along several dimensions of social life and individual attitudes and strategies. For instance, the social construction of the Roma minority shows very different patterns across various regions of the country. There is now a consensus that those differences cannot be fully understood simply by referring to current socio-economic and demographic conditions. To capture the impacts of the wider socio-cultural context we introduced regional strata as well. As in the case of the other contextual variables, we aimed at maximizing variance. Therefore, we concentrated on regions farther away from the average. We deliberately chose four counties (of the 19 ones, excluding the metropolitan area of Budapest) to capture differences in economic perspectives and cultural traditions. Two of them are among the most prosperous regions, while

the other two experienced economic decline in the post-communist transition. Note that large parts of the latter counties had been somewhat less prosperous compared to other regions during the past two centuries of capitalist development. The share of the Roma population is above the average in both of the distressed counties. However, ethnographic evidence and some statistical data indicate relevant differences between the two regions in the socio-cultural patterns of interethnic relations.

To sum up, our sampling units were villages and towns (up to the size of 50,000 inhabitants) in the four counties mentioned above. Then, we created 36 categories based on socio-economic status (high-middle-low), immigration rate (high-low), share of Roma residents (high-middle-low), and finally, recent electoral performance of the major far right party (high-low). Cutting points of the 'high' and 'low' levels are at the 20<sup>th</sup> and 80<sup>th</sup> percentiles of the distributions (of the settlements considered in the four counties). The cutting points were shifted towards the 30<sup>th</sup> and 70<sup>th</sup> percentiles in case there were not enough settlements in a category. Altogether we selected 119 villages and towns into the sample. Quota instructions restricted the number of respondents in a settlement, moreover their distribution according to age and labor market status.

*The questionnaire.* The average length of the interviews was about 10 minutes. Our 'objective' indicators of local social capital rely on questions about the respondents' participation in local religious, sport or other entertainment events. We asked about the participation as an organizer and audience/consumer separately. We also checked the frequency of church attendance. Several items addressed the residents' perceptions of the local social capital. A block of questions focuses on visible signals of disorderly neighborhoods (presence of abandoned dogs, graffiti, teenage gangs and street drinkers). A more 'subjective' measure of local social capital addresses the respondents' opinions on indicators of social cohesion in their home town. This block of items includes questions about the friendliness of the neighborhood, the local residents' helpfulness, norm enforcement, and perceived level of trust. Indicators of generalized trust and subjective well-being were also added to the questionnaire.

We also attached settlement level data, mainly the sampling indicators to the individual records. These include settlement size, rate of educated residents, employment rate, share of ethnic minorities and major denominations. In the case of minorities we distinguished those belonging to the Roma community, and those who identify themselves with one of the (indigenous) national minority groups in Hungary.

*Dependent variables.* We investigated four aspects of local social environment: local civic activities, perception of social cohesion, interethnic trust, and, finally, the recent (2010) electoral performance of the anti-Roma far right party (Jobbik). Several questions addressed the respondent's local civic activities. Based on those items, we constructed a factor score, which was then used in the multi-

variate model. We also constructed a factor score for indicating the respondent's perception of local social cohesion.

## Results

Only a small part of the individual level variance in local civic activity can be explained by community level characteristics (Table 1). As one might expect, citizens are more likely to participate in local events in small settlements than in larger ones. Catholic and Lutheran communities seem to be the most mobilizing ones. As far as the individual characteristics are concerned, educated, married people with a job are those who participate in such events relatively more often. Older residents are more active than the younger ones (note that we included a selective list of local activities).

Our models explain subjective perception of local social cohesion much better than individuals' activities (Table 2). Level of social cohesion decreases with the share of the Roma in the settlement, but increases in the percentage of other minority groups. This latter one is an intriguing result which points to the special role those indigenous minority groups play in Central-Europe. Interestingly enough, residents of settlements with a large Greek Catholic community report the highest level of local social cohesion.

One should note that the local migration rate does not play any role in social cohesion. More precisely, the indicator of migration is not connected to our two indicators of local social cohesion. This is in sharp contrast with our expectations, and future research is needed to explore this finding in more detail.

Our third set of models addresses interethnic trust (Table 3). Namely, trust in Roma people. As we expected, there is a strong geo-cultural effect detected in our models. The estimates do not show any significant effects of the migration rate and the share of the Roma population. However, one should be cautious about those results. In our telephone survey, much fewer respondents identified themselves as Roma than expected. It is likely that many (probably most) of those who expressed their connection to the Roma community in the last census, refused to do so in the phone survey. This is a serious measurement problem we have to address in future analysis of the data.

Finally we tried to explain the election results of the outspokenly anti-Roma Jobbik party in the last general elections. Here we adopted the communities as the primary observation units. The model's explanatory power is very high, but is mainly due to the regional effect. We could not detect very strong settlement-level explanatory indicators. Interestingly enough, there is no role for the share of the Roma in most of our models. Ethnically mixed communities (as far as the traditional "national" minorities are concerned), however, seem to be less prone to vote in large numbers for the far-right.

**Table 1** Determinants of active local citizenship. OLS linear regression estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
population	-0.000308** (0.000135)	-0.000316** (0.000136)	-0.000316** (0.000150)	-0.000368** (0.000144)	-0.000368** (0.000148)
cmigrate	-0.0688 (0.0704)	-0.0702 (0.0708)	-0.0702 (0.0615)	-0.0980 (0.0671)	-0.0980 (0.0622)
cedu	0.0345 (0.0674)	0.0481 (0.0677)	0.0481 (0.0663)	-0.0166 (0.0797)	-0.0166 (0.0722)
cactive	0.0810 (0.225)	0.0908 (0.223)	0.0908 (0.182)	-0.00125 (0.261)	-0.00125 (0.204)
croma	0.0328 (0.118)	0.0468 (0.118)	0.0468 (0.102)	0.0155 (0.114)	0.0155 (0.100)
cminority	0.0310 (0.0676)	0.0285 (0.0693)	0.0285 (0.0661)	0.0451 (0.0613)	0.0451 (0.0677)
ccatholic	0.113 (0.0751)	0.100 (0.0739)	0.100** (0.0464)	0.108 (0.0837)	0.108** (0.0499)
cgreek	-0.0344 (0.132)	-0.0511 (0.131)	-0.0511 (0.127)	0.0623 (0.145)	0.0623 (0.133)
creform	0.0656 (0.0988)	0.0549 (0.0969)	0.0549 (0.0642)	0.0969 (0.115)	0.0969 (0.0723)
cluther	0.351*** (0.100)	0.325*** (0.0996)	0.325*** (0.0987)	0.284** (0.116)	0.284*** (0.103)
bornhere		2.980** (1.223)	2.980** (1.229)	4.226*** (1.208)	4.226*** (1.243)
migrant2000		1.312 (1.741)	1.312 (1.752)	0.542 (1.802)	0.542 (1.760)
kor				0.0794* (0.0460)	0.0794* (0.0411)
male				-1.095 (1.304)	-1.095 (1.209)
working				6.089*** (1.420)	6.089*** (1.289)
nohighschool				-6.359*** (1.884)	-6.359*** (1.655)
degree				7.338*** (1.429)	7.338*** (1.374)
partner				6.770*** (1.122)	6.770*** (1.189)
baranya				-2.310 (2.784)	-2.310 (2.616)
baz				-3.017 (2.958)	-3.017 (2.672)
pest				0.396 (2.518)	0.396 (2.204)
Constant	26.21** (10.30)	24.45** (10.26)	24.45*** (7.058)	18.88 (13.38)	18.88** (9.256)
Observations	2,800	2,800	2,800	2,800	2,800
R-squared	0.011	0.013	0.013	0.066	0.066

Dependent variable: local activities factor score transformed to a 0–100 scale. Standard errors in parentheses. Cluster-robust standard errors are applied in (3) and (5) \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 2** Determinants of the perception of local social cohesion. OLS linear regression estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
population	-0.000453*** (0.000139)	-0.000431*** (0.000135)	-0.000431*** (8.27e-05)	-0.000408*** (0.000137)	-0.000408*** (8.28e-05)
cmigrate	0.0455 (0.0497)	0.0491 (0.0498)	0.0491 (0.0339)	0.0495 (0.0500)	0.0495 (0.0347)
cedu	0.0382 (0.0535)	0.0304 (0.0527)	0.0304 (0.0366)	0.0468 (0.0592)	0.0468 (0.0403)
cactive	0.493*** (0.142)	0.485*** (0.137)	0.485*** (0.101)	0.468*** (0.165)	0.468*** (0.114)
croma	-0.330*** (0.116)	-0.337*** (0.113)	-0.337*** (0.0561)	-0.336*** (0.115)	-0.336*** (0.0558)
cminority	0.0813* (0.0420)	0.0809* (0.0419)	0.0809** (0.0365)	0.0861** (0.0352)	0.0861** (0.0378)
ccatholic	0.0848** (0.0368)	0.0832** (0.0344)	0.0832*** (0.0256)	0.0517 (0.0370)	0.0517* (0.0278)
cgreek	0.406*** (0.0691)	0.414*** (0.0699)	0.414*** (0.0703)	0.333*** (0.0691)	0.333*** (0.0744)
creform	0.0591 (0.0510)	0.0596 (0.0486)	0.0596* (0.0355)	0.0173 (0.0550)	0.0173 (0.0403)
cluther	-0.00655 (0.0976)	-0.0167 (0.0953)	-0.0167 (0.0546)	-0.0355 (0.0835)	-0.0355 (0.0573)
bornhere		-1.076 (0.704)	-1.076 (0.679)	0.236 (0.732)	0.236 (0.694)
migrant2000		-0.125 (1.104)	-0.125 (0.967)	1.650 (1.098)	1.650* (0.981)
objcap		0.0574*** (0.0108)	0.0574*** (0.0105)	0.0625*** (0.0117)	0.0625*** (0.0106)
kor				0.166*** (0.0271)	0.166*** (0.0229)
male				-0.399 (0.724)	-0.399 (0.674)
working				0.0930 (0.709)	0.0930 (0.721)
nohighschool				1.816* (0.982)	1.816** (0.925)
degree				2.076*** (0.695)	2.076*** (0.770)
partner				-1.094 (0.761)	-1.094 (0.667)
baranya				-1.090 (2.208)	-1.090 (1.459)
baz				-0.480 (1.960)	-0.480 (1.490)
pest				-2.522 (1.721)	-2.522** (1.229)
Constant	43.90*** (6.270)	42.99*** (6.055)	42.99*** (3.905)	36.98*** (7.784)	36.98*** (5.165)
Observations	2,800	2,800	2,800	2,800	2,800
R-squared	0.110	0.120	0.120	0.150	0.150

Dependent variable: perception of local cohesion factor score transformed to a 0–100 scale. Standard errors in parentheses. Cluster-robust standard errors are applied in (3) and (5) \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



**Table 3** Determinants of the level of distrust in Roma people. OLS linear regression estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
population	4.19e-06 (3.90e-06)	3.61e-06 (3.89e-06)	3.61e-06 (2.38e-06)	3.85e-06 (3.21e-06)	3.85e-06 (2.38e-06)
cmigrate	-0.00117 (0.00121)	-0.00126 (0.00119)	-0.00126 (0.000962)	-0.000510 (0.00126)	-0.000510 (0.000982)
cedu	0.00143 (0.00116)	0.00163 (0.00117)	0.00163 (0.00104)	0.000468 (0.00134)	0.000468 (0.00114)
cactive	-0.00705** (0.00321)	-0.00687** (0.00317)	-0.00687** (0.00285)	-0.00419 (0.00347)	-0.00419 (0.00321)
croma	-0.00206 (0.00192)	-0.00184 (0.00188)	-0.00184 (0.00158)	-0.00243 (0.00149)	-0.00243 (0.00158)
cminority	-0.00123 (0.00338)	-0.00122 (0.00329)	-0.00122 (0.00115)	0.000639 (0.00230)	0.000639 (0.00120)
ccatholic	0.000139 (0.000768)	0.000160 (0.000773)	0.000160 (0.000726)	-0.000546 (0.000820)	-0.000546 (0.000790)
cgreek	0.00261 (0.00199)	0.00237 (0.00204)	0.00237 (0.00210)	-0.00111 (0.00209)	-0.00111 (0.00223)
creform	0.00144 (0.00113)	0.00141 (0.00113)	0.00141 (0.00100)	-0.00139 (0.00129)	-0.00139 (0.00114)
cluther	0.00346 (0.00221)	0.00371* (0.00215)	0.00371** (0.00155)	0.00361** (0.00177)	0.00361** (0.00163)
bornhere		0.0250 (0.0193)	0.0250 (0.0193)	-0.00950 (0.0191)	-0.00950 (0.0197)
migrant2000		-0.00116 (0.0265)	-0.00116 (0.0275)	-0.0312 (0.0260)	-0.0312 (0.0278)
objcap		-0.00141*** (0.000292)	-0.00141*** (0.000296)	-0.00128*** (0.000313)	-0.00128*** (0.000299)
kor				-0.00328*** (0.000662)	-0.00328*** (0.000653)
male				0.0185 (0.0209)	0.0185 (0.0191)
working				0.00500 (0.0199)	0.00500 (0.0205)
nohighschool				0.0189 (0.0250)	0.0189 (0.0262)
degree				-0.121*** (0.0229)	-0.121*** (0.0220)
partner				0.0322 (0.0204)	0.0322* (0.0190)
baranya				-0.0464 (0.0518)	-0.0464 (0.0418)
baz				0.169*** (0.0527)	0.169*** (0.0424)
pest				0.0565 (0.0385)	0.0565 (0.0347)
Constant	0.459*** (0.127)	0.484*** (0.124)	0.484*** (0.110)	0.592*** (0.146)	0.592*** (0.146)
Observations	2,647	2,647	2,647	2,647	2,647
R-squared	0.011	0.020	0.020	0.056	0.056

Standard errors in parentheses. Cluster-robust standard errors are applied in (3) and (5) \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 4** Election results (%) of Jobbik party in the last general election (2010)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
croma	0.00997 (0.100)	-0.0418 (0.114)	-0.309*** (0.0807)	-0.0934 (0.110)	-0.0589 (0.113)
objcap		-0.0965 (0.108)	0.0105 (0.0880)	-0.0359 (0.0937)	-0.0170 (0.0967)
subjcap		-0.107 (0.127)	-0.149 (0.0928)	-0.137 (0.1000)	-0.105 (0.103)
baranya_1			-0.428 (1.348)	3.737** (1.728)	4.161** (1.713)
baz			16.36*** (1.565)	21.64*** (1.950)	20.34*** (2.104)
pest			4.049*** (1.448)	7.430*** (1.862)	6.941*** (1.857)
population				-0.000223** (9.62e-05)	-0.000232** (9.70e-05)
cmigrate				-0.0398 (0.0491)	-0.0399 (0.0486)
cedu				-0.0490 (0.0603)	-0.0383 (0.0589)
cactive				0.509** (0.203)	0.512** (0.203)
cminority				-0.101* (0.0578)	-0.117** (0.0478)
ccatholic				-0.00267 (0.0521)	0.00511 (0.0524)
cgreek				-0.163 (0.113)	-0.167 (0.113)
creform				-0.0119 (0.0756)	0.00218 (0.0753)
cluther				0.224** (0.0933)	0.204** (0.0943)
cignotrust					7.614* (4.489)
Constant	19.55*** (0.893)	30.49*** (8.660)	23.68*** (6.745)	4.188 (10.26)	-1.306 (10.74)
Observations	119	119	119	119	119
R-squared	0.000	0.018	0.588	0.672	0.681

Population vote on the party list. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Conclusions

Our non-representative community survey of Hungarian localities should be considered as a pilot study on local social capital in Hungary. Nonetheless, there are some important lessons to be learned from our preliminary results. First of all, patterns of local cohesion and trust seem to differ from those found in Western Europe and North America. Maybe the most important characteristic is the presence of national minorities, and the roles they play in fostering local social capital in Hungary. National minorities can be considered as special types of indigeneous ethnic groups, and the local impact of their presence clearly shows the potential long-run benefits of diversity. This is a kind of mechanism which is harder to detect in the present-day Western societal contexts. Note, however, that some recent analyses could capture this kinds of positive effects of diversity in the Western World as well (e.g. Sturgis et al. 2014).

When it comes to the Roma minority, the effect of local ethnic heterogeneity on trust seems to be negative – in line with many findings across the developed world. However, one should think about the possibility that there might be some inherent measurement problems related to Romani identity in Hungary. The social construction of the Roma is strongly built on social status in many countries in Europe. There has been a heated discussion about the situation in Hungary – still not settled fully. But there is a widespread suspicion among Hungarian scholars that the 'whitening' of high status Roma people, and the 'Gypsification' of the underclass makes it impossible to look at the Roma community as a fairly stable social group whose integration into the wider society can be measured by comparing the situations of the Roma populations at different time points. Until this measurement problem is not settled, one should take any results about Roma-related diversity with a pinch of salt.

Future research should include better measurement of neighborhoods – in line with recent international trends. That is, we should be able to separate interacting heterogeneous communities from segregated ones (c.f. Strugis et al. 2014). Moreover, international comparative studies could tell more about regional and country level characteristics of the formation of local social capital in Hungary. Finally, careful research design can account for the abovementioned effects of ethnic fluidity on the perceived influence of Roma-related heterogeneity on local trust and cohesion.

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## RIGA AND TALLINN IN THE LATE TSARIST ERA: MULTIETHNICITY AND SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE

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This article offers a comparative perspective on the impact of the rapid development of the Baltic cities of Riga and Tallinn (Ger. Reval) from the 1860s to the eve of the First World War in 1914. In many ways typical East-Central European cities, Riga and Tallinn had been dominated by a Baltic German elite for centuries until the middle of the nineteenth century. In the six-decade period until the collapse of the tsarist regime the population of the two cities mushroomed and their ethnic composition changed drastically, especially as Latvians and Estonians increasingly chose the urban option. Adapting to this growing multiethnic diversity provided a challenge for both cities in the last decades of the Russian Empire. Various forms of modernization, including industrialization, expanded trade, and new access to various options in the free professions, afforded the opportunity for upward social mobility. In the contest for hegemony between the Russian and German languages Latvian and Estonian found a niche for themselves, also buoyed by their rapidly growing numbers. Even some local political change transpired in the last years of the Russian Empire.

**Keywords:** Riga, Tallinn, Latvians, Estonians, Baltic Germans, Russians, modernization, multiethnicity, social change, municipal government

Strategically located on the northeastern coast of the Baltic Sea, Riga and Tallinn (Ger. Reval, Russ. Revel'), the largest cities in the Russian Baltic Provinces in the late tsarist era, constituted two of the northernmost urban complexes in a band of East-Central European municipalities that experienced similar rapid modernization and population growth in the half-century before World War I. Riga, the capital of the central Baltic province of Livland (the *Kernprovinz* or 'core province', as the Baltic Germans typically called it), quintupled in size between 1867 and 1913, while the population of Tallinn, the capital of the more northerly province of Estland, quadrupled in the years 1871–1913. Growing to over half a million inhabitants on the eve of World War I, Riga had become a major regional metropolis and the fifth largest city in the entire Russian Empire after St. Petersburg, Moscow, Warsaw, and Odessa. According to the census of 1913 and including

its so-called patrimony (additional territory belonging to the city), the number of inhabitants in Riga already reached a figure of 517,264 (Krastiņš, 1978, 16–17). In contrast, with a population of 116,132 in 1913, Tallinn remained a medium-sized city, but one that nevertheless went through the same transforming socio-economic process as Riga, only on a smaller scale (Pullat, 1966, 42).

Riga's faster and more extensive expansion was no doubt encouraged by its especially favorable location in the middle of the Baltic Provinces and closer to Western Europe than Tallinn or St. Petersburg, for that matter. However, both Riga and Tallinn stand out as part of an intriguing 'transitional border' region between east and west in northern Europe (von Hirschhausen, 1999, 475). On the one hand, they were culturally and historically Western, as seen, for example, in their traditionally Protestant or Catholic religion and centuries of rule by Germans and Scandinavians. On the other hand, by the mid-nineteenth century they had politically belonged to the East as part of the expanding Russian Empire since the Great Northern War of the early eighteenth century. This article will offer a comparison of the impact of the strikingly rapid process of modernization in these two Baltic cities in the five decades before the First World War as well as how effectively they dealt with the ongoing challenge of an expanding and increasingly diverse multiethnic population. The size aspect, i.e., the fact that the population of Riga was five times larger than that of Tallinn by 1913, will also be taken into account.

Symbolically as well as in a practical sense, the key step in initiating the onset of economic modernization in Riga and Tallinn was the decision in the early years of Alexander II's reign to dismantle their medieval fortresses and to begin the process of opening up the traditionally isolated inner cities. Expert opinion was agreed that the aged fortresses no longer had any military value. In the case of Riga the process, lasting some six years, it began in late 1857 and proved to be the more radical one, including tearing down nearly all of the city walls, transforming the former moat into an attractive city canal, and constructing broad avenues lined with extensive parks and gardens to replace the existing narrow streets (Lenz, 1954, 9–10). The second essential undertaking in stimulating economic development was the construction of the first railroad lines connecting the two cities to the emerging all-Russian network. Riga's greater economic significance was recognized already in 1861 when it was joined to the important St. Petersburg–Warsaw line by a link to Daugavpils (Ger. Dünaburg, Russ. Dvinsk) in Vitebsk province. Tallinn followed nearly a decade later in 1870 as it became part of a new rail line across all of northern Estland that joined the equally strategic St. Petersburg–Moscow line (Henriksson, 1983, 66; Pullat, 1969, 16). These links began the crucial process of closely connecting the two Baltic cities with the internal Russian market, and over the next few decades the rail network continually expanded to include the smaller towns in all three Baltic Provinces (Kassebaum, 1918, 41).

Foreign trade through Riga, which had already been important before the era of modernization, now expanded even more, also greatly aided by increasing the depth of the water and improving conditions at the city's harbor on the Daugava (Ger. Düna, Russ. Dvina) River, about 10 miles inland from the Gulf of Riga. Between the mid-1860s and 1913 Riga's share of the Russian Empire's foreign trade nearly doubled to a substantial 17.2 percent of the total, placing it just behind St. Petersburg in importance in the empire as a whole. Tallinn, although lagging far behind Riga in total foreign trade, demonstrated substantial progress as an import center, especially in the latter part of the period, as imports increased by a factor of ten in the years 1900–1913 (Corrsin, 1978, 73, 77; Lux, 2004, 97; Pullat, 1969, 27). Nevertheless, the most important economic development in these years was industrialization, especially in the last two decades before World War I. By 1913, the number of factory workers in Riga had reached 76,300 while that in Tallinn was 16,300, which in view of the disparity in overall population actually suggests a similar level of industrial development. Interestingly, the two cities specialized in manufacturing some of the same products, e.g., railroad cars, machinery and metal works, and textiles (Corrsin, 1978, 73, 78; Pullat, 1969, 17–19). Riga's growth and industrial expansion was clearly aided by the size and wealth of its Baltic German community, who had the capital to invest in new industrial firms as well as the technical and administrative knowhow that could be applied at all levels of the production process. A key new element in providing Riga's inhabitants with access to advanced scientific and technical education was the Riga Polytechnic Institute, founded in 1862, the first such institution in the entire Russian Empire (Henriksson, 1983, 76, 90). It is noteworthy that the number of Germans in Tallinn in this period never rose above 13,000 and declined slightly in the 1880s and 1890s while their number in Riga reached a figure of nearly 79,000 in 1913 (Pullat, 1966, 42; Krastiņš, 1978, 22–23). Thus, the potential pool for a new industrial-era elite, both in managerial positions and on the factory floor, was readily at hand in Riga, but much less apparent in the case of Tallinn.

Parallel to and as a result of this transforming economic development in Riga and Tallinn came social modernization involving the massive shift from the importance of traditional social orders or categories such as nobility, clergy, or honorary citizens (estates; Ger. *Stände*, Russ. *sosloviia*) to a growing consciousness of belonging to modern social classes associated with urban life such as various levels of an emerging middle class or a rapidly expanding cohort of industrial workers. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century urban society in the Baltic Provinces remained static and largely unchanged despite the emancipation of the Estonian and Latvian serfs already in 1816–19. Freed without land, the Baltic peasants struggled economically, and their freedom of movement was heavily restricted until an important new passport law in 1863 finally permitted mobility on a large scale. It is characteristic that the leading Baltic German journalist Julius

Eckardt, among others, referred to the years before mid-century as 'livländisches Stillleben' (Livlandic still life) (Henriksson, 1983, 1, 185). However, by the 1860s immigrants from a variety of ethnic backgrounds began streaming into the Baltic urban centers, especially Riga and Tallinn. In view of their accumulated wealth and location at the top of traditional Baltic society, it is not surprising that the Germans were best able to take advantage of the expanded options in commerce and industry. Nevertheless, the economic expansion in the last fifty years before World War I was so extensive that it afforded a wide range of new opportunities for able persons of any nationality. For example, it is noteworthy that the Latvian population of Riga markedly increased its share of employment in the following areas in the years 1881–1913: officialdom and free professions (7 to 25 percent), trade (19 to 39 percent), and handicrafts (17 to 50 percent) (von Hirschhausen, 2006, 90).

In terms of absolute numbers as well as rates of growth the Latvians in Riga and the Estonians in Tallinn showed conspicuous advancement in ownership of real estate in the two cities by the end of the period under review, as indicated by data for 1912. In the case of Riga the Latvians had become the most numerous property owners (44.7 percent), far outdistancing the Germans (31.6 percent), the Russians (10.4 percent), and the Jews (7.2 percent). Note that even though Riga was outside the Pale of Settlement, a considerable Jewish population developed there in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In contrast, the Jewish population in Tallinn was minimal (0.9 percent in 1913). Even among the wealthiest real estate owners, those whose property was worth 5,000 rubles or more, the Latvians had come to outnumber the Germans (1,314 vs. 1,286) by 1912 (Pullat, 1966, 42; Krastiņš, 1978, 182–83). In Tallinn a similar process had taken place, as the number of Estonian real estate owners rose some six and a half times between 1871 and 1912, from 18.3 percent to 68.7 percent of the total. The absolute number of German and Russian property owners declined in Tallinn, probably because of a certain level of emigration among both groups and possible assimilation through intermarriage by the Russians with wealthy Estonians or Germans. Although the value of real estate in the two cities was probably not comparable in view of Riga's much larger population, it is striking that the proportion of wealthy property owners, i.e., with real estate worth 5,000 rubles or more, was much higher among the Latvians of Riga (52.7 percent) than among the Estonians of Tallinn (12.7 percent) (Pullat, 1966, 85–86, 138).

A demographic overview of the entire Russian Empire at the end of the tsarist era clearly indicates the distinctive position of the Baltic Provinces. In 1911–13 they had the lowest rate of natural increase among the fifty provinces of European Russia, and there is definite evidence that fertility began to decline earlier than elsewhere in the empire. Not surprisingly, given its location and the prevailing historical influences such as the key role of Western forms of Christianity, the Bal-



tic region appears to have followed a demographic pattern more similar to Western rather than to Eastern Europe (Rashin, 1956, 227–29; Wetherell and Plakans, 1997, 246–47, 256–57). Nevertheless, a sufficient potential pool of immigrants certainly existed in Estland, Livland, and Kurland, and despite some mid-century reforms, continued limited opportunities for land ownership no doubt encouraged increasing movement to the cities, especially by young peasant men. Thus, the overwhelmingly dominant source for in-migrants to Riga and Tallinn was the Baltic region itself (Kruus, 1920, 21). In Riga the ethnic Latvian population mushroomed nearly sevenfold from 1867 to 1913, from 43,980 to 187,135 or from 23.6 to 39.6 percent of the total population, while in Tallinn the Estonian increase was nearly as dramatic, growing five and a half times from 15,097 to 83,133 (51.8 to 71.6 percent of the total population) (Kraštinš, 1978, 22–23; Pullat, 1966, 42). For further detail on ethnic composition see Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1. Population of Riga by Nationality, 1867–1913 (percentages)

	Latvians	German	Russians	Jews	Others	Total
1867	23.6	42.9	25.1	5.1	3.3	100
1881	32.8	31.0	19.7	12.2	4.3	100
1897	41.6	25.5	16.9	6.5	9.5	100
1913	41.3	13.5	19.5	6.6	19.1	100

Source: von Hirschhausen, 1999, 482

Table 2. Population of Tallinn by Nationality, 1871–1913 (percentages)

	Estonians	Germans	Russians	Jews	Others & Unknown	Total
1871	51.8	34.4	11.3	-	-	100
1881	57.4	27.8	11.1	2.1	1.6	100
1897	68.7	17.5	10.2	1.1	2.5	100
1913	71.6	10.7	11.4	0.9	5.4	100

Source: Pullat, 1966, 42

The most striking aspect of the population growth in Riga and Tallinn from the 1860s to World War I was the retention and even enhancement of ethnic diversity, especially in the case of Riga. Although the Estonians constituted a clear majority of the population in Tallinn in 1913 and the Latvians held a strong plurality in Riga in the same year, in many ways the dominant demographic theme continued to be multiethnicity. In both cases the Baltic German traditional elites, despite a gradual erosion of their hegemonic position in urban society, managed to hold on

to a considerable portion of their previous socioeconomic, political, and cultural power in this period. The ethnic Russian population, as representatives of the rapidly growing and increasingly mobile state nation of the Romanov empire, displayed its demographic vigor and made its presence felt more and more in the Baltic Provinces, especially in the last two decades before 1914. Other ethnic groups also appeared on the scene more and more, especially in the case of Riga with the influx of Jews, Poles, and Lithuanians. As the phenomenon of a *Vielvölkerstadt* cemented itself in Riga and Tallinn, relations among the various nationalities, who were increasingly conscious of ethnic differences, became more of an important factor in Baltic urban society. In Riga in particular no single nationality was able to dominate city life, as seen, for example, in the command of languages according to the 1913 census, which indicated that about 40 percent of the population could speak Latvian, 20 percent German, 20 percent Russian, and the remaining 20 percent something else (especially Polish and Lithuanian) (Lenz, 1954, 71, 81).

In this situation ethnic identity continued to be mutable, as it had indeed been for centuries, but now the prevailing trends were changing. Before the middle of the nineteenth century the prestigious position of the Baltic German elites and of the German language clearly fostered assimilation in that direction by any socially rising Estonians and Latvians in both town and country. However, the prevalence of the institution of serfdom and its aftereffects limited their numbers before the 1860s. Despite the preeminence of German since medieval times the great social anomaly in the Baltic region was the absence of any German-speaking peasants or lower orders in the cities. Although occasional voices had called for a planned or purposeful Germanization of the Estonian and Latvian peasantry, the majority opinion among the Baltic German elite held that this was unnecessary. As late as the second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, the Baltic Germans remained convinced that Latvian and Estonian, as rustic and undeveloped tongues spoken by small-numbered, mainly peasant peoples, simply had no future. Assimilation to a large *Kultursprache* was viewed as inevitable (Lenz, 1956–57, 192; Berkholz, 1864, 571–73; v. d. Brüggen, 1871, 605–06; von Berent, 1907, 339–40, 342). In spite of growing recognition of Estonian and Latvian achievements during the last decades of the tsarist era (the typical adjectives describing the Baltic natives were *tüchtig* ('able') and *fleissig* ('hard-working'), the dominant Baltic German opinion was never able to move beyond a certain level of condescension in its attitudes.

In the 1860s and 1870s the position of German remained unchallenged in Tallinn and Riga and other Baltic cities, and the eager Latvian and Estonian immigrants who, for example, moved into positions as artisans or lower level officials had plenty of incentives to become Germanized as quickly as possible (Lenz, 1956–57, 194–95). Thus, it is characteristic that according to the 1881

census 10.3 percent of ethnic Latvians in Riga had adopted German as their usual language, and in Tallinn 7.3 percent of Estonians by nationality were using German as their primary means of communication (Corrsin, 1982, 24; Jordan, 1883–1885, I, 68–69). However, a serious blow to the position of German and a major turning point in its status came in the mid-1880s with the implementation of a policy of cultural and administrative Russification in the Baltic Provinces, as the tsarist regime sought to integrate its peripheral regions more fully. The introduction of Russian as the administrative language in the institutions of local government, the courts, and the police as well as the language of instruction at all levels of education to a large extent removed the motivation for rising Estonians and Latvians to assimilate to the German cultural world (Lenz, 1956–57, 196). Although the physical Russian presence gradually increased in Riga and Tallinn, the prestige that the Russian language could claim in the Baltic region was never able to approach that formerly held by German. In this situation the Latvians and Estonians assimilated less and less to either German or Russian and even began to absorb members of other nationalities through such phenomena as intermarriage (Henriksson, 1983, 91; Lenz, 1956–57, 198–99). In addition, numerous Latvians and Estonians who had adopted German as their usual language now returned to the use of their native language in everyday life. In 1913, for example, the proportion of ethnic Latvians in Riga who were using German as their primary means of communication had dropped markedly to 2.3 percent (Wohlfart, 2004, 40).

To what extent did socioeconomic modernization lead to political change in Riga and Tallinn in this period? The tsarist regime steadfastly held on to autocratic power at the all-Russian level until forced by the Revolution of 1905 to allow a limited level of participation through the institution of the State Duma. In 1870, however, during the era of Great Reforms in the reign of Alexander II, municipal government in the mainly Russian provinces of the empire and Siberia was at least modestly modernized on the Prussian model, and this reform was also implemented in the Baltic region in 1877. Before this change urban government in Riga and Tallinn had followed a highly traditional medieval pattern in which political power remained in the hands of a tiny elite of merchants, lawyers, and artisans who simply coopted the membership from among its peers (Henriksson, 1986, 178). The new municipal government, centered in a city council that varied according to the size of the total population, was mainly elected by property and enterprise owners divided into three *curiae* according to the level of taxes paid. In the first elections in 1878 in Riga the new electorate increased nearly four times, but still only constituted 3.4 percent of the total population (5,212) of the city. Most importantly, because of its wealth and economic power the traditional Baltic German elite totally dominated in all three *curiae* (Ozoliņa, 1976, 45–46). Nevertheless, the possibility of participating in the urban government elections for the first time helped to mobilize Latvian activists, and given the changing

ethnic composition of Riga, they clearly felt the time had come for a real sharing of power in running the city (Wohlfart, 2006, 332; Lenz, 1954, 31). However, in 1892 under Alexander III the tsarist regime chose to move in the opposite direction by enacting a so-called counter-reform in municipal government and raising the property value qualification needed to vote, thereby reducing the electorate to less than 1 percent of Riga's total population. In this situation voter participation fell to as low as 25 percent in 1897 (Hamm, 1980, 446). In the case of Tallinn the initial impact of the reduced size of the urban electorate was similar with the Baltic Germans retaining full control until the end of the nineteenth century (Pullat, 1969, 68–69).

Despite the highly negative impact of Russification from a non-Russian viewpoint in most areas the Baltic Germans recognized that the increasingly conservative nature of the municipal government reforms meant that the tsarist regime did not intend to sweep them out of power in the Baltic cities. Indeed, relations with St. Petersburg thawed in the last two decades before 1914, as the central government came to appreciate the stability Baltic German political leadership offered in turbulent times (von Pistohlkors, 1994, 402; Henriksson, 1983, 93). Nevertheless, the Baltic Germans were powerless to stop the continuing socioeconomic and cultural advancement of the native Baltic peoples. Largely because of their Lutheran background and the emphasis placed on reading the Bible, the Estonians and Latvians were the most literate nationalities in the Russian Empire by the end of the nineteenth century with 94.1 percent of the Estonians and 85.0 percent of the Latvians over the age of ten able to read (Kappeler, 2001, 407). From their Baltic German mentors they also learned about social mobilization and self-help in the form of non-governmental organizations. For the Latvians, for example, the Riga Latvian Association, founded in 1868, played a crucial role in organizing and consolidating the activities of the city's Latvian community (Wohlfart, 2004, 52–53).

By the last years of the nineteenth century the Latvians and Estonians had begun to take over the urban governments in the smaller cities of the Baltic Provinces, and the prospect of victory in the larger cities arose. Already in 1904, an Estonian–Russian alliance was able to win election in Tallinn and followed that up with victories in 1909 and 1913, all clearly made possible by an expanding Estonian bourgeoisie. In Riga, on the other hand, despite a growing and highly mobilized electorate the Latvians were unable to wrest power from a German–Russian alliance before the end of the tsarist regime. At least some Latvians continued to vote for German-led governance in Riga, especially under the enlightened leadership of George Armitstead, mayor in the years 1901–1912, who oversaw key advances in education, public hygiene, and welfare for the poor (Pullat, 1969, 69; Hamm, 1980, 448–50; Carlberg, 1913, 166). Thus, to a certain extent the Baltic Germans in Riga succeeded in legitimizing their rule by offering good government.

In conclusion, it may be noted that the rapid pace of social and economic modernization in Riga and Tallinn in the half-century before World War I proved to be highly comparable, but Riga's much larger size offered a broader range of opportunities for gaining wealth and upward social mobility. The contrast in size and power of attraction of the two cities also meant that Riga was ethnically more complex, thus rendering the large Latvian community's attempts to gain political power more difficult than those of the smaller Estonian one in Tallinn. The role played by the Baltic Germans, as the declining, but still powerful traditional elite, was similar in both cities, as was the attitude of the imperial government which increasingly intervened, seeking more and more control over the borderlands like the Baltic Provinces. In Riga and Tallinn in the late tsarist era the rising Estonians and Latvians found a crucial opportunity for economic advancement, upward social mobility, and a school for politics whose lessons could be applied under different circumstances. Despite the devastating upheaval and massive loss of life, World War I would provide an unexpected turning point by means of which Riga and Tallinn suddenly emerged as the capital cities of two new independent states.

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# TRANSFORMING REGIONAL POSITION OF CENTRAL- EASTERN EUROPE IN THE ECONOMIC SPACE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO HUNGARY

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In post socialist countries that now form the eastern member states of the European Union there was a general vision of the society from the early nineties to catch up to the developed West. The dream of reaching the level of western European economic development and living standards was the main driver for economic transition and EU integration. In spite of modest convergence, however, the difference between the West and the East has remained dominant until today, ten years after the EU accession, while the core–periphery duality is also an important economic-geographic dimension in the European single market. The changing relative position of these regions in economic terms and the interrelation between the East and West of the EU is in the focus of this paper. It addresses some specifics of regional economic development of this area and particularly of Hungary at both macro-regional and regional levels paying attention to the economic crisis which started in 2007. In most of the eastern bloc, economic transition and EU integration were associated with several challenges and followed by imbalanced regional development as a result of the dominant role of the foreign direct investments in regional development, which led to the territorial concentration and increase of regional inequalities among regions within these countries.

**Keywords:** European Union, economic development, regional development, Eastern Central Europe, Hungary, transition, economic geography

## Introduction

Around 1990, the countries of Eastern Central Europe, including Hungary, chose market economy instead of the centrally planned one, shifted their political orientation to the capitalist Western Europe instead of Moscow, and started integrating to Western Europe, instead of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the economic organizing scheme of the eastern bloc. There are no doubts that these political and economic reorientations had very strong support

from the vast majority of societies that time due to numerous reasons. One key reason was probably of the highest importance, that is, the assumed promise of the economically more successful capitalist world through which these societies might gain better quality of life, reach the welfare level of the western European countries. The dream of catching up to the West became the key motivation for introducing several economic reforms and a sort of fuel to attain the support of the society to accept and sometimes even welcome measures, such as privatization, market liberalization or giving up centrally-secured full employment, which in Hungary, for example, culminated in the loss of 1.5 million jobs in the early nineties. The dream of catching up became a common framework of understanding that induced these countries to follow the patterns of western economies and to quickly internalize the guidelines coming from the institutionalized European Union.

More than a decade has passed since most of the current post socialist member states – Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Lithuania – joined the European Union, followed some years later by Romania, Bulgaria, and recently Croatia. By today, these countries have a wide range of experiences and it is clearly observable that they have had to face several challenges during the transition and their development track is by far not the same as the western economies had experienced earlier. Attaining the level of the Western welfare does not seem evident now, in addition, there are also some other consequential effects of market liberalization and accession to the European integration from the point of regional development. The economic performance and the position in a single market economic space differ strongly among regions within the eastern block and even the regional differences within these countries have increased, sometimes to a radical extent during the last two decades. After twenty years of evolution of these regions, the economic crisis which started in 2008 has generated a new and much quicker dynamics with regionally selective impacts, influencing the position of the whole post-socialist eastern zone and also its regions. It seems that the economic crisis contributed to the rearrangement of the macro-geography of the economic development of the European Union, and influenced the regional inequalities within the countries, too. Nowadays it is important to pay attention to the current impacts, and even more, to the possible further consequences of recent geopolitical events, particularly the conflicts around the Islamic State in the Middle East and North Africa that are bringing about increasing waves of migration. In this rearrangement, the position of the post socialist eastern bloc, including that of Hungary, is also changing.

By addressing these issues, this paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of the changing position of the regions of this eastern EU bloc and particularly of Hungary in the territory of the European single market. It pays particular attention to the core-periphery geography of the EU and the regional concentra-



tion within the member states of that zone focusing on Hungary. The analysis is based on the databases of Eurostat and the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH), and uses secondary sources, particularly the latest cohesion report of the European Commission (2014), analyses of ESPON program (2005 and 2010) and the Central Bank of Hungary (2014).

### The Changing Position of the Eastern Part of the EU

The EU produces 21–23 per cent of the world gross domestic product, similarly to the United States' performance, though its population of half a billion is 60 per cent more than that of the USA. The contribution of the post-socialist member states to the total EU performance is 7.8 percent, a definite increase compared to 5.5 per cent at the accession year of 2004. However, it is still a limited progress compared to the 20 per cent share of these countries within the population of the EU. Hungary's contribution to the GDP of the European Union is 0.74 per cent with stagnation or a little fall as a result of negative demographic trends (See Table 1).

**Table 1.** The share of Hungary and the post socialist EU member states in GDP and population of the European Union (%) (Data source: Eurostat)


	2004 (%)	2014 (%)
Share of Hungary in the total population of the EU28	2.05	1.95
Share of Hungary in the total GDP (at market price) of the EU28	0.75	0.74
Share of Hungary in the total GDP (PPS**) of the EU28	1.27	1.31
Share of the post socialist member states* in the total population of the EU28	21.62	20.44
Share of the post socialist member states* in the total GDP (at market price) of the EU28	5.46	7.89
Share of the post socialist member states* in the total GDP (PPS**) of the EU28	10.88	13.41

\*Poland, Hungary, Czech Rep., Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia

\*\* PPS: purchasing power parity

It is a fact that there are significant growth potentials in the less developed eastern zone of the European Union due to its emerging markets where demand is growing, the cost of labor force is low, and the population has an increasing mobility. This zone, which is in a gateway location towards the rapidly growing

Asian markets has in the long term higher growth rates, and increasing innovation possibilities in production. The recognition of the good business opportunities this region offers for the Western European economies from the early nineties was a key motivation of the eastward extension of the European integration. In the last two decades the eastern bloc has been in a slow but obvious catching-up process in a number of areas such as transport accessibility, GDP growth, received foreign direct investment (FDI) and expansion of trade in goods and services within the group of new member states, the so-called EU-13 (joined in 2004 or later) and between EU-13 and EU-15, the group of older member states (See Figure 1). The process of catching-up, on the other hand, has recently been slowing down.



**Figure 1.** Evolution of GDP per capita in PPS of the Visegrád four countries in relation to the average of the 28 current EU member states (EU28 = 100%) (Data source: Eurostat)

Now we must see that the economic disparities between the East and the West still represent the most obvious regional dimension in the European Union. If we consider *quality of life*, we can still discover an even wider gap between the West and the East than what the GDP (measured by purchasing power parity method) shows. As we can see in figures, for instance in the 6<sup>th</sup> cohesion report (European Commission, 2014: 93), life expectancy – which is a key indicator of health – is extremely different westward of the former iron curtain than eastward. The Eastern Central European countries made good progress in setting up the system of market economy, but the east-west dichotomy of the European Union remained, although with changing meaning since the post socialist economies are in a weak and sometimes dependent position. The integration to the single market created still-existing


difficulties. The post socialist countries had carried their negative heritage, such as lack of sufficient capital, the weaknesses of domestic companies to compete in the single market, the rapid loss of their domestic market, and the dependence on foreign capital, and multinational companies. Most of these countries are highly open economies – e.g. Hungary’s export is almost the same as its total GDP – with high exposure to global changes and a risk of vulnerability. In such dual organizational structure of the economy, most of the domestic small and medium enterprises taking part in the export oriented production are dependent on the large foreign companies as suppliers. However, not only companies, but also cities, regions, even states depend sometimes extremely on only one or a handful of companies. Such cases are in Hungary the dominant role in the local economies of IBM in Székesfehérvár, of NOKIA in Komárom, of Audi in Győr, of Mercedes production in Kecskemét. These multinational companies can quickly bring a sort of prosperity, but their relocation could finish in crisis as we saw it in some cases, e.g. Székesfehérvár. These regions are attractive more for economic activities with lower added value; while knowledge intensive industries are much less frequent there with the exception of some capital regions. Nowadays the competition among regions is more about the ability to link to and also to anchor higher levels of the so called value chains of economic activities, where the higher value added activities are concentrated, such as innovation or design. Those regions which are attractive locations only for manufacturing – which is a low level in the value chain – could never approach the development level of the core areas of global economy, like some of the western European regions.

Most of the rural regions of the post socialist bloc face severe difficulties in finding their function in the highly integrated EU arena. These regions are typically not able to compete in the highly competitive export markets, while as a consequence of market liberalization and globalization the domestic and local markets have shrunk due to the increased import. This is important because the eastern bloc is less urbanized. In 2014 only 62 per cent of the population of the eight Eastern-Central European member states were living in cities, while this figure is 79 per cent in the EU-15. (United Nations, 2014: 199)

### **The Impact of the Economic Crisis**

The global financial crisis that started in 2007 and spread in 2008 strongly affected the EU by changing its development path, just like for most of the developed world (see Figure 2). As current analyses of The Central Bank of Hungary revealed, the latest crisis is unlike any previous crises in the world since the Second World War. Although the imbalance in the generation and utilization of income and in the global distribution of savings and investment opportunities

preceding the current crisis were similar to the imbalances prevailing in the past – as was ultimately reflected in the widening of current account positions – the emergence of protracted current account imbalances of unprecedented magnitude was a novelty, which affected several economic agents and regions simultaneously. (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 2014: 10) The account imbalances are in strong connection with the debts of countries. The greatest external debt of the global regions was accumulated in the EU. It is alarming that even in 2014 the government debts to GDP ratio increased in the total European Union (EU-28) from 85.5 per cent to 86.8 per cent, although the government deficit could already decrease. The increase of governmental debt has also set serious limits to local and regional authorities, themselves often also indebted.



**Figure 2.** EU28, euro area and United States GDP growth rates (% change over the previous quarter) (Source: Eurostat, 2015: 1)

Therefore, the current situation in the European Union is dramatically different from what it was at the start of the previous financial period in 2007. As the sixth cohesion report pointed out (European Commission, 2014: XV–XVII), that time the EU was still enjoying a sustained period of economic growth. Income levels were rising as were employment rates and public investment; poverty and social exclusion were diminishing and regional disparities were generally shrinking (at least at the level of countries). The advent of the crisis changed all this. Since 2008, public debt has increased dramatically, income has declined for many people across the EU, employment rates have fallen in most countries and unemployment is higher than for over 20 years while poverty and social exclusion have become more widespread. The shock of the economic depression was territorially very selective. Not only countries, but even regions, different types

of cities and also main macro regions of the EU showed sensitivity or resistance to very different extents. The onset of the crisis led to major reductions in the EU in trade and foreign direct investment that are important sources of growth for the less developed member states. Exports of the EU-13 to other EU countries, however, have shown significant recovery and now account for a larger share of their GDP than before the crisis, while FDI has also picked up. In most parts of the EU, metropolitan regions have been shown to be more prone to booms and busts, while overall rural regions have proved more resilient. In the EU-15, second-tier metropolitan regions performed near the average, while in the EU-13, they outperformed other regions. Rural regions in the EU-15 had a smaller contraction of GDP than the other regions between 2008 and 2011 due to higher productivity growth. Also, in the EU-13, higher productivity growth meant that they closed the growth gap with the other regions. In transition and less developed regions, increases in unemployment have been larger, averaging 5 percentage points between 2008 and 2013 as against 3 percentage points in more developed regions. (European Commission, 2014: XXX)

Austerity policies, less public funding are influencing the possibilities of regional and urban development as well, and push local actors to do more to regenerate from crisis and foster economic growth at local level. This is why in the EU member states and also at the level of European Union policies focused on growth gained very high importance and other policies have necessarily lost their positions. The experience of the economic crisis and the still existing obvious challenges strongly influence regional, spatial and urban planning policies.

### **Recent Development of Regions in Eastern Central Europe**

Between 2000 and 2011, all the regions in the central and eastern member states recorded an increase in GDP per head (in PPS) relative to the EU average. The biggest increases were typically in the capital city regions. Indeed, in these regions in Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria, GDP per head in PPS terms increased markedly (to 186 per cent of the EU average in the first, 122 per cent in the second and 78 per cent in the third), in the first two countries by more than double the national average increase. In the less developed regions in Greece, Italy and Portugal (except the Azores), however, there was no increase in GDP per head relative to the EU average, in Greece due to the severe effect of the crisis, but in the other two, partly to their growth rates being relatively low before the crisis. (European Commission, 2014: 1)

The sixth cohesion report stated that the GDP per head grew faster in real terms in the less developed member states over the period from 2000 to 2013 and is forecast to continue to do so in 2014 and 2015. The rate of growth in the moder-

ately developed member states, however, fell below that in the highly developed member states in 2010 and continued to be lower in 2011–2013 but is forecast to be slightly higher as to 2015. (European Commission, 2014: 7) If we look at it with the approach from macro geographic dimensions we can state that while the least developed regions in the east could continue their convergence, most of the southern regions – many of them are moderately developed regions – suffered most from the recession.

The *cohesion policy of the European Union* – allocating 32 per cent of its total budget, the main community level financial support of investments, can be considered as an east–west stabilizing policy, where the net contributors are typically the countries of the more developed West and the main beneficiaries are in the less developed East. It is obvious if we examine the two main funding of cohesion policy: Between 2014 and 2020 all the 182 billion euro of the Cohesion Fund is channeled to the countries having GDP per capita figures less than 90 percent of the EU average, which are all the post socialist member states plus Greece and Portugal, while in case of the Structural Funds, 182 billion euro is allocated to the less developed regions – most of them also located in the eastern zone plus some of them in Portugal, Greece and Southern Italy, while only 54 billion is allocated to the more developed regions of the EU and about 35 billion to the so-called transition regions with 75–90 per cent figures. However, the last reform of the cohesion policy resulted in a more direct control on EU level, by stronger thematic guidance, stricter conditions for member states. It means stronger control over the less developed countries, where the EU funding gives the funds for the vast majority of all public developments. In 2010–2012, Cohesion Policy funding was equivalent to over 75 per cent of public investment in Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Lithuania and 57 percent in the cohesion countries. During the crisis, the total public investment of member states decreased by 20 per cent in the EU. The rapid reduction of public investment was a part of fiscal consolidation efforts and it brought increased reliance on cohesion policy.

### **Dependence of Peripheries?**

Based on the World-System Theory of Immanuel Wallerstein and Dependence Theory (Wallerstein, 2010), the core-periphery concept is expansively applied as an obvious tool to understanding the global world, particularly in literatures of sociology and geography. The basic principle of the ‘Core-Periphery’ theory is that as general prosperity grows worldwide, the majority of that growth is enjoyed by a ‘core’ region of wealthy countries despite being severely outnumbered in population by those in a ‘periphery’ that are ignored. In the approach of geography this duality is understood more in the meaning of physical space, where the

core is really in a center of a given territory. Though it is most frequently used in global context, looking at the spatial distribution of power, economic performance and wealth of regions within the EU we can recognize that this concept does make sense at a European Union scale. The spatial patterns as these characteristics show exhibit clear relation to the geographic center of the EU. According to most of the socio-economic facts the ‘good places’ are really in the geographical center of the EU. However, this core–periphery relation can be understood in the regional development of countries with strong relation to the monocentric versus polycentric character of socio-economic spatial structures or the spatial distribution of power.

Nearly half of the GDP of the EU is concentrated in a Western core territory called pentagon area, from London to Milan, from Paris to Hamburg, where only one third of the population and 14 per cent of the territory of the EU is located. (Salamin – Sütő, 2011: 50) The core–periphery division of the territory of the EU in development approach was introduced by the expert document of the Hungarian EU presidency entitled “The Territorial State and Perspectives of the European Union” (Salamin – Sütő, 2011: 50–63). As this document pointed out “in general terms the economic as well as the accessibility patterns in Europe are core–periphery centered with the highest peaks in the core of Europe” (Salamin – Sütő, 2011: 50). Although the eastern part of the EU is the most significant periphery, we should mention the other peripheries as well. Periphery can be the northernmost regions of the EU, mainly due to their extremely low population density and lack of bigger, stronger urban centers. In many terms of economic performance, however, the northern part of Europe is on equal footing with the core area and even outperforms it in some indicators. There are western peripheries such as Ireland and also Portugal in many dimensions, while the southern region is rapidly becoming periphery since they suffered at most the economic crisis. Basically, market forces work towards a concentration of economic activities, both at European and national levels. At the same time, there are evidently catching-up processes underway and areas are developing outside the traditional core area. Nonetheless, there are differences even between peripheries: the post-socialist eastern regions are in a quite different position than Europe’s western or the less populated northern peripheries. Tendencies suggest that the European core–periphery paradigm shows signs of dissolving. However, these changes are very slow. Centrally located economic concentrations still hold the most advantageous positions.

When addressing the core–periphery division of the EU beyond the issue of economic disparities we also have to mention the issue of *dependence of the eastern bloc* on the European Union as such (see cohesion policy before), and also on certain more developed western economies. As post socialist countries have not been able to accumulate any sufficient quantity of capital, their GDP

and especially their export highly depend on the foreign economic agents, while their domestic actors do not have a similar influence on other countries. Not only domestic companies, but also regions and cities of this area have to take part in a strong competition that they are not prepared enough for to compete with other players, particularly to gain better position in the more and more globally organized economic value chains, as mentioned before. Their economies are driven by foreign direct investments that are also the main factor of the development of regions. Obviously the flows of profit also have a similar pattern from the East to the West. Small and highly open economies of the eastern bloc are generally dependent on their main export targets, on the larger markets. In the case of Hungary, the economic performance is directly linked to the German economy, which is the prime foreign trade partner. The dependence of less developed eastern countries on the EU cohesion policy has been already mentioned above. According to the author, the most serious dependency of the east, however, will be seen in the issue of demography (see later in the paper).

### **Distance to the Core of the EU**

It is reasonable to address the question of what the core is, where the central region of the European Union lies. It is worth seeing whether any regions of the post-socialist countries can be considered as part of this central zone. Beyond the above mentioned pentagon model developed by ESPON program, the geographic center of the EU can be localized in different ways according to factors we are focusing on. Considering the *economic power* the territory of the center is obviously slightly closer to the west, due to the location of the biggest markets – the UK, France, Germany and the Benelux states. Italy and Spain also have bigger economies but they are still fighting the consequences of the crisis. Nevertheless, as a result of the recent depression the nearly crisis-resistant German economy could strengthen its position, while Poland could take steps towards the central position as its economy hardly suffered from the crisis. Therefore there is a chance that this form of economic core in the EU shifts a bit eastward as a result of the economic shock. According to the *innovation activity* of the regions the central territory is more extended towards north due to the strong knowledge orientation of the economies of the southern regions of the north of EU. Looking at the intensity of patent applications we see that the area from London to Milan, from Lyon to Stockholm is the innovation core of the EU, where almost all the regions which have more than 150 patent applications a year per million inhabitants are located. (European Commission, 2014: 33) The east is extremely underdeveloped in that regard. It is important to note that economic integration itself increases the potentials of the regions located in the central area of that territory.



The improvement of physical accessibility within the single market – supported by the transport policies of the EU – naturally contributes to strengthened center–periphery relations of the EU. Nevertheless, the less significant neighborhood policy provides possibilities to regions along the edge of the Union.

If we understand center–periphery relations in a different way, focusing on the *quality of life* instead of economic and innovation activity, we find a slightly different, but still definite center–periphery picture, where some regions of the eastern bloc can have more chance to be closer to the center of the EU. In this approach we identify center as the area that has better quality from a human point of view. As we shall see below with this approach the center is shifting eastward. A good example is if we take into account a really periphery-related issue, the risk of becoming poor or excluded. The higher *risk of poverty or social exclusion* is an important legacy of the economic crisis. In this term, the center – areas with relatively good values – is more extended towards the south-east, for example, the Czech Republic and the north-western part of Hungary are also part of this advantageous core, while the northern part of Germany is outside. (See European Commission, 2014: 75–76) However, looking at the increase of risk of poverty rate we see that the regions geographically far from the center have lost the most. There are now around nine million people at risk of poverty or exclusion in the EU, the increase being particularly pronounced in the geographically peripheral areas, mostly in Greece, Spain, Italy, Ireland, but also in the UK and Sweden and the Baltic states. A key issue is the variation within countries: risk of poverty tends to be much lower in cities than in the rest of the country in less developed member states, while surprisingly in cities in the more developed member states, the reverse is the case. In terms of *early school leavers* the best center zone of the EU consists of Sweden, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania and the south-east part of Germany while the regions westward from this zone (and also eastward) are in significantly worse positions. (See European Commission, 2014: 67)

In general however, the crisis hit the geographically peripheral areas more severely, particularly the Mediterranean zone, thus amplifying the core–periphery division of the EU.

### **Possible Consequences of Demographic Change**

The natural fertility rate is generally very low in Europe with the exception of France, the Nordic countries, the UK and Ireland. This trend threatens with serious economic outcomes mainly due to the predicted loss of workforce and the radical changes in the ratio between taxpayers and transfer recipients. Demographic trends indicate that the working-age population in the EU-27 started to fall in 2013, and will decrease by around 39 million (12 per cent) by 2050 com-


pared to 2008. Migrations can be part of the solution to labor market deficits both in qualitative and quantitative terms. Therefore, in the aging Europe facing severe demographic challenges the migration of labor force, which has a clear east-west pattern, is a key factor of development. The very high differences between wages offered in countries with different economic powers means a constant motivation to migrate to work – and later to live – in the western part of the EU (ESPON, 2011). In relation to geopolitical cases in the Middle East, the more developed member states are more likely to prefer eastern European migrants to extra EU migrants. The poorest East may lose the most skilled, educated and ambitious young groups of society, while migration in the opposite direction is less significant. In general economic terms, every wave of migration implies a shift in the knowledge base of both the arrival and the departure country. As migrants carry different skills with them there can be important processes of increasing or declining skills in the labor force (brain gain or brain drain).

### **Imbalanced Regional Development within the post-Socialist Countries: Regional Polarization is a Side Effect of Transition?**

Having reviewed some regional dimensions at EU level economic processes we now analyze some characteristics of subnational regional development within the countries of the eastern bloc of the European Union and particularly Hungary, identifying the challenge and the possible impact of the crisis. In most of the former socialist countries the period since the EU accession in 2004 commenced with a peculiar, and historically determined, inherited economic spatial structure that has undergone only modest rearrangement during the past ten years. Since the early nineties, the trend of increasing territorial inequalities in the Eastern Central European countries has been closely linked to the process of conversion into market economies and to economic integration to the EU. As mentioned above in this changing economic space, many rural regions in the eastern bloc have lost their perspective, only some bigger cities – mainly capitals – could become international players, while other cities are trying to find their role, but their capability to compete efficiently is questioned in the highly integrated economic arena of the single EU market, itself more and more geographically connected (see Figure 3).

After four decades of centrally planned economy in the socialist era, since 1990 the role of foreign direct investment had been growing increasingly dominant in territorial development as well – through a shift to market economy, market liberalization, and then EU integration – resulting in territorial concentration of the economy by focusing primarily on capital regions along with mainly the western regions. Indeed, in terms of urban size, commercial projects tended to increasingly give preference to sites in larger towns and cities. The faster devel-

opment of the western parts of these countries can be perceived resulting in an east-west division of the economic space also within the countries.



Note: Ratio of the per-capita GDP in the most advanced NUTS2 level region to the least advanced one in the given country, their unweighted average in the various groups of countries. Overseas regions and the states comprising a single region are not taken into account.

Club Med: Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain

V4: Hungary Poland, Czech Rep., Slovakia

**Figure 3.** Territorial concentration of GDP within the countries on the basis of their range, 2011 (Based on Eurostat data)

Behind the high regional inequalities, it is important to recognize the lack of sufficient infrastructure in rural areas in these countries. Internal peripheries are unique type of rural peripheries specific to Eastern Central Europe with serious problems. Their peripherality stems primarily from their poor accessibility, and is deepened by the paucity of real urban centers where essential central functions could be concentrated. These problems derive from the historical under-development of these territories and specific features of the settlement network or social characteristics often compound them. The main problems of these areas are their weak and vulnerable regional economies and their lack of appropriate job oppor-

tunities. In these circumstances, negative demographic processes, notably out-migration and aging of the population, are getting stronger and stronger. These trends create conditions for social exclusion, and even territorial exclusion from mainstream socio-economic processes and opportunities. While rural ghettos are mainly a result of social factors, ethnic segregation can render difficult situations even worse. This is the case, for example, in rural peripheries of Slovakia, Hungary and Romania where there are areas with high proportions of Roma population. This is a non-disappearing specificity of the post socialist Eastern Central Europe, while in the West the social segregation is mainly the challenge of urban areas, emerging particularly in connection with immigrants.

As the cohesion report points out, during the last decade the increase of disparities was particularly high in Bulgaria and in Romania (where the coefficient of variation increased by 22 percentage points and twelve percentage points, respectively), mainly because of the high growth rate in the capital city region. (European Commission, 2014: 5) While GDP per head in the other regions in the two countries still converged towards the EU average, it was at a much slower rate. Regional disparities, however, also widened in Greece and the UK over these eleven years (the coefficient of variation increasing by twelve and eight percentage points, respectively), but in both cases partly because GDP per head declined relative to the EU average in a number of less developed regions.

### **Increasing Regional Economic Disparities in Hungary**

In comparison to the average of the EU-28 countries and especially in the light of the small size of the country, the internal territorial inequalities are particularly large in Hungary. In longer term the decreasing role of agriculture resulted in the loss of economic weight of regions, which had more agricultural orientation, primarily in the Great Plain during the last decades. The transition crisis in the 1990s hit most the so-called “socialist industrial districts”, which is still causing problems in economic development, primarily in the former heavy industry regions of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Nógrád and Baranya counties. Komárom-Esztergom County, particularly its seat, Tatabánya, is perhaps the only heavy industrial district of the socialist era, which could recover and attain significant economic prosperity. The foreign direct investment, however, had a very concentrated regional preference focusing mainly on Budapest and the north-west of Hungary.


The overall consequence is that territorial inequalities have been growing steadily within Hungary since the mid-1990s, creating severe differences in the levels of development between the capital city and the rest of the country as well as between the eastern and the western part of the country, including a general lag in the development of territories without major cities or towns (see Figure 4). If we

look at the regional pattern of Hungary's modest convergence to the EU average since the accession, we find that it is in fact the very fast (but slowing) development of Budapest and a modest improvement of the position of Western Transdanubia and the Northern Great Plain, while the other four regions of the country have been showing stagnation or even deteriorating positions (see Table 2).

**Table 2.** The relative position of Hungarian regions among the 274 regions of the EU28, in terms of per-capita gross domestic product (2011) (Data source: Eurostat)

Region	2004		2011	
	GDP/capita PPS EU-28=100	position in ranking order	GDP/capita PPS EU-28=100	position in ranking order
Central-Hungary	101	124	110	79
Western Transdanubia	65	225	68	218
Central Transdanubia	60	233	59	241
Southern Transdanubia	45	251	45	259
Southern Great Plain	44	252	44	260
Northern Great Plain	41	256	43	263
Northern Hungary	41	257	40	265

The domestic territorial development policy (which was particularly dedicated to tackle less developed regions) and the EU funds, available to Hungary in increasing scale since the accession, have not induced much improvement in the way of reducing the inequalities in economic growth in the various regions; at least no significant results could be observed up to 2010. Although the criterion of regional convergence appeared in the strategies and programs prepared for applying to the utilization of funds, and regional operational programs defined on local levels were launched, the businesses and organizations of the more advanced regions were able to gain access to a greater extent to the funds allocated predominantly through such application schemes. The regional operational programs defined territorially – although they have accomplished significant results for instance in the development of settlements and, in general, in the quick absorption of funds – were not, for the most part, efficiently adjusted to the different conditions and resources of the different regions (which should have been one of their main advantages); accordingly, they remained standardized and typically failed to foster efficient development projects, which could generate significant economic growth in the regions concerned. This was accompanied by a relatively low proportion of the funds dedicated within the structural funds to economic development in the Hungarian operational programs. In the new 2014–2020 period of EU cohesion policy Hungary developed a more economy oriented strategy



**Figure 4.** Per-capita GDP and its ratio relative to the EU average in the NUTS3 level counties of Hungary in terms of purchasing power parity (PPS), 2013 (Based on KSH data, map prepared with the support of J Gutpintér)

and the aspects of territoriality are more integrated – as Péti pointed out in his work (Péti, 2014). Transportation – primarily: highway – development projects implemented for the most part with EU funding from accession have also failed to bring about the expected spectacular economic benefits in the rural regions. For example, the disadvantaged regions that have become accessible through the extended M3 and M6 highways in Baranya, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén and Hajdú-Bihar counties are not showing signs of growing economic dynamics, indeed, the Budapest-centered large infrastructure development projects may indeed have, in many cases, enhanced the agglomerational advantages of the region of Budapest over the rest of the country (see Figure 4).


### **Core–Periphery, the Dominant Pattern in the Spatial Structure of Hungary**

In the economic spatial structure of Hungary, the core-periphery dichotomy appears most pronouncedly among the EU countries. Forty percent of the GDP is generated, and two thirds of research and development (R+D) capacity is located

in Budapest, while only 18 percent of the total population lives there. Obviously this situation has a particular historical background: at the end of the World War I, Hungary lost two third of its territory including all the major regional urban centers that could theoretically have counterbalanced Budapest. Several strategies (governmental concepts of 1971, 2005 and 2014) attempted since at developing momentous urban centers in the countryside but they could never achieve real results. Since the EU accession this duality between the capital and the rest of the country has further risen. Budapest has been able to improve its international importance and become one of the most interesting, vibrant focal point of this part of Europe. Hungary's monocentric territorial structure, the overly Budapest-centered transport system, the lack of transversal links or even the deficiencies of the settlement network, impede the economic development in rural regions while this structure is not even beneficial for Budapest beyond a certain point. The excessive concentration of the economy – primarily in Budapest and a handful of other regions – may result in massive losses in efficiency, e.g. as a consequence of the scarcity of available commercial sites, transport, the increasingly concentrated environmental burdens, commuting and the costs of the treatment of economically depleted rural areas.

### **The Impact of Crisis on Regional Disparities**

As I have mentioned, on the general EU level the crisis suspended the reduction in regional disparities that had taken place until 2009. In Hungary the process of divergence of regions that had continued practically unbroken since the EU accession seemed to be grinding to a halt in the wake of the 2008–2009 economic crisis; indeed, a process of leveling among regions was also observed in certain years (see Figure 5). According to the territorial GDP and investment statistics released for the period up to 2012, the decrease in territorial inequalities has not so much been driven by dynamic convergence of the lagging regions as by a deceleration in the growth of the most advanced regions. This is because it was the most advanced counties that were hardest hit at that time by the economic crisis which affected each county to different extents, i.e. the regions with the highest proportions of foreign direct investment, whose output was most heavily exposed to the quickly responding external demand as well as to retail consumption and investment demand driven largely by currency loans. It was primarily the highly developed Western and Central Transdanubian regions that were hit hardest by the economic downturn in 2009. Nonetheless, the three most developed regions – Central Hungary, Western Transdanubia and Central Transdanubia – with 24 percent of Hungary's total population, still generated two-thirds of Hungary's GDP, and some 89 per cent of foreign direct investments that can be geographically



Note: The index measures the territorial distribution of GDP relative to the territorial distribution of the population. Its value range: 1–100 (1 = no territorial difference).

**Figure 5.** Developments in the territorial inequality of GDP at the county level, on the basis of the Hoover index (based on KSH data)

localized was operating in businesses having their registered offices in these regions. From 2010 the economic weight of Budapest within Hungary started to decrease, even if only to a slight degree. On the other hand, Pest county, comprising the agglomeration of the capital city, has been gradually falling back since 2008 not only in absolute terms, but also in the ranking order of the counties, despite the fact that up to 2007 it seemed to be on the way to becoming a dynamic region linked to Budapest. During the pre-crisis years the intensive residential construction boom in the Budapest agglomeration resulted in strong suburbanization that was partly a consequence of the growth in the provision of foreign currency loans; due to this, tensions are particularly strong in this region. We cannot judge yet whether this change in regional development dynamics is a real turning point or only a temporary leveling effect of the recession.

## Conclusions

In spite of the modest and decelerating convergence of Eastern Central Europe we see that the post socialist EU members have not been able to attain the economic development and welfare level of the West, and there is not an observable trend of doing that within reasonable time. Only the most developed regions,



typically the capitals could exceed the EU average measured at purchasing power parity. However in several dimensions the regions of these countries are depending on the western economies or on the European Union as such. In several socio-economic terms, such as health, the difference between the East and the West of the EU is still very sharp, while demographic trends with increasing westward migration patterns resulting in loss of labor force may threaten the future economic development of eastern EU countries. What is more, most of the eastern bloc countries have become regionally more fragmented in terms of economic prosperity, quality of life by today as a result of a regional divergence within countries. Economic transition and EU integration were followed by imbalanced regional development as a result of the dominant role of the foreign direct investments in regional development, which led to the concentration and increase of territorial inequalities within these countries. The economic crisis has exerted a territorially diverse influence that has modified regional development, e.g. by increasing the importance of difference between North and South. The crisis has seemed to slow down or even stop this spatial concentration in Hungary.

In spite of the higher growth potential of the eastern part of the EU there is a risk that without changes its periphery position will be conserved in longer term. However, the recent economic recession indeed launched changes.

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# TURBULENT HISTORY, TROUBLESOME HERITAGE: POLITICAL CHANGE, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF REVIVAL IN THE “OLD JEWISH QUARTER” OF BUDAPEST

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This article explores the history of Belső-Erzsébetváros, the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District of Budapest, an urban area regarded as a historic Jewish quarter in today’s discourse. The historical summary focuses on societal transformations caused by political changes and historical tragedies during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. One explicit goal is to show in which ways the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District of Budapest is unique among similar historic districts of other Central European cities: in Central European comparison, a large proportion of its population – just like the Jewish population of Budapest in general – survived the Holocaust. Therefore Jewish heritage has been experienced differently there than elsewhere in cities of the region.

After briefly introducing the historical evolution of the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District before World War II, the article portrays local society, and explores the social relations that characterized this area until the last years of the World War II. Patterns of ethnic and confessional intermixing will be interpreted as defining characteristics of the district in the interwar period. Then the author will show the way wartime events and political measures disrupted the social fabric of the neighborhood, and transformed the local population dramatically by the spring of 1945. At the same time, patterns of survival will be also emphasized. After discussing the impact of World War II and the Holocaust, the article will highlight the post-1945 shifts in local society, exploring the impact of migration as well as the connection between societal transformation and the area’s physical decay in the Communist period. Finally, the author will briefly touch upon the past 25 years, discussing the possibilities of revival in the area, pointing out the role of Jewish heritage in the recent rediscovery of the neighborhood.

**Keywords:** urban society, Jewish history, Holocaust, World War II, migration, heritage, urban renewal, Budapest, Hungary

## Introduction

The revitalization of centrally located historic districts is often linked to the revival of an area’s particular heritage. In certain Central European cities, the revival of former “Jewish quarters” have been a characteristic process of the past twenty years. The rediscovery of local Jewish heritage has become an important

motif in the regeneration of urban areas such as Josefov in Prague, Kazimierz in Cracow, the Scheunenviertel in Berlin, or the Leopoldstadt in Vienna (Gruber, 2002; Gruber, 2009; all the articles in Murzyn-Kupisz and Purchla eds., 2009; Murzyn, 2006; Kalmár and Stelzer, 2000; Szívós, 2012a) This article is going to focus on one of these urban quarters: namely the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District of Budapest, an area that is often regarded as the "Old Jewish Quarter" of the city these days.

The 20<sup>th</sup>-century evolution of this quarter – named Belső-Erzsébetváros (Inner Elisabethtown) in Hungarian - is in many ways similar to those of its Central European counterparts, and in some respects its early 21<sup>st</sup>-century revival can be compared to the varieties of revival that have been taking place in the Scheunenviertel, in Josefov, in Leopoldstadt, or in Kazimierz. At the same time, the dissimilarities between the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District of Budapest and the historic Jewish quarters of other Central European metropolises must be immediately apparent.

There are several reasons to treat Belső-Erzsébetváros as an untypical case. First of all, uniquely among historic "Jewish districts" of Central European cities, a substantial part of its Jewish population survived the Holocaust, and that surviving population remained an important component in the area's social makeup during the post-World-War-II decades and even beyond, in spite of the strong tendencies of Jewish out-migration from the area (Ladányi, 2013, 220–222.). For specific historical reasons, the overall number of Holocaust survivors and returnees in Budapest was in general the highest in the region compared to all other Central European cities (Stark, 1995, 53 and 64, compared to e. g. Murzyn, 2006, 118–120; Pařík, 2009, 199; or Kalmár and Stalzer, 2000, 14) The consequence of that has been the continuous presence of a relatively large Jewish population in the Hungarian capital city up to this very day (Kovács ed., 2002). Whether Jewish should be understood in terms of religion, origin, or identity may vary from period to period, but in any case, for the above reasons, the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District of Budapest as a place of memory and a place of identification functions differently today than similar districts do elsewhere in Central Europe – i. e. districts from which Jewish residents practically disappeared after World War II (Gruber, 2002, 7).

Secondly, as far as urban regeneration in the late 1990s and early 2000s is concerned, the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District of Budapest is a special case because of its prolonged stagnation and its belated – still questionable – gentrification. Compared to Josefov, Berlin Mitte, Leopoldstadt, or Kazimierz, urban renewal in the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District of Budapest has been halted by several factors since the political transition of 1990, and has remained incomplete up to this day (Csanádi, Csizmadya and Olt, 2012, 51–124).

My intention in this article is to highlight the specific historical factors that have shaped the characteristics of the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District of Budapest during the past century. In order to draw the historical context in which today's controversial

urban renewal is taking place, I will portray processes of social transformation that affected the area during the 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> century, relying on the already existing, extensive body of literature as well as on my own research.

### **The Evolution of the “Old Jewish Quarter” from the Beginnings to World War II**

The history of the district began in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The area evolved as one of the earliest suburbs of 18<sup>th</sup>-century Pest. At that time Buda and Pest were two separate towns, with privileges established by royal charters. The new suburb of Pest was named Terézváros (Theresatown) after the Habsburg Empress Maria Theresa, and was located outside the city walls. Its first inhabitants were not Jews but Christian artisans and tradespeople of modest means, who had little chance to acquire burgher's rights in the city of Pest (Keresztély, 2009, 166) and who therefore settled down in the cheaper and at that time wholly unregulated outskirts.

Soon, however, the area began to attract Jewish migrants as well. Up until the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Jews had been mostly banned from royal chartered towns in Hungary, similarly to other countries of the region. In 1781, Emperor Joseph II issued the so-called Decree of Tolerance, which allowed Jews in Hungary to settle down in chartered cities, although with limitations (Frojimovics et al., 1999, 69).

From that time on, the inner part of Terézváros developed into an area of concentrated Jewish settlement, and functioned as the first harbor for newcomers who wished to establish themselves in the city. Certain spots, such as the Orczy House complex with its multiple courtyards, played a particularly important role in providing new arrivals with a supportive environment and all the essential institutions of Jewish life. (Frojimovics et al., 1999, 67–74). From the 1830s on, due to the removal of legal barriers, the wealthiest Jews tended to choose their residence in the inner city of Pest, primarily in the quarter called Lipótváros (Leopoldtown), while the less affluent majority tended to remain in Terézváros (Keresztély, 2009, 166). The gradual departure of the Jewish elite notwithstanding, over 70% of Pest Jews lived in Terézváros in the 1840s, and that proportion remained almost the same as late as 1870 (Bácskai, 1995, 9 and Zeke, 1990, 170). The Inner Terézváros (today's Inner 7<sup>th</sup> and partly the Inner 6<sup>th</sup> District) remained the real hub of Jewish religious and community life. From the early 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards, the area has been home to synagogues, prayer houses as well as many other Jewish institutions, and continued to have a high percentage of Jewish residents until World War II.

In spite of its strongly Jewish character, however, the Inner Terézváros was never homogeneously Jewish: Christian churches and Gentile residents were just

as strongly part of the local milieu. The neighborhood was home to various ethnic groups and languages, including Hungarian, German, Yiddish, and Romanian – with transitional dialects such as “jüdisch deutsch” and bilingualism or the knowledge of more than two languages being fairly common until the end of the 19th century. (Fenyves, 2010, 180–184). As opposed to some other Central European Jewish districts, e. g. Josefov in Prague, the inner part of Terézváros never officially functioned as a ghetto – i.e. an area of compulsory residence for Jews – during its 18<sup>th</sup>-and early 19<sup>th</sup>-century history, although in the figurative sense it was sometimes called “the ghetto” in mémoires and literary narratives. Tamás Kóbor, a turn-of-the-century Jewish writer who grew up in the area in the 1860s and 1870s, published an autobiographical novel titled “Out of the Ghetto” in 1930, creating one of the seminal narrative sources on old Terézváros for posterity (Kóbor, 2007 [1930]).

The neighborhood certainly had the reputation of a Jewish quarter in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, but that popular image was in fact limited to only a few streets where Jews represented an absolute majority. In the national census of 1900, the 7<sup>th</sup> District was broken down into smaller units, represented on a map attached to the Budapest summary of that census. Within a certain area, 51 to 80% of the population was Jewish in 1900 in terms of religious denomination; that area was bordered roughly by today’s Károly Boulevard, Andrásy Avenue, Csányi Street and Dob Street (see the map titled „Az izraeliták eloszlása” [Distribution of Israelites] in Kőrösi and Thirring 1905, 56–57).

Apart from that narrow area, the presence of Jews was strongly counterbalanced by Christian denominations. On the district level, the proportion of denominationally Jewish residents within the 7<sup>th</sup> District was 35.8% in 1900 (compared to the Budapest figure of 23.6%). Their proportion in the 7<sup>th</sup> District fluctuated between 30 to nearly 40% between 1910 and 1935, declining slightly toward the end of the interwar period (Table 1, based on Thirring 1935, 43, and Budapest Székesfőváros Statisztikai Évkönyve 1941., KSH, Bp. 1941.)

**Table 1.** The proportion of Jewish versus Christian denominations in the whole 7<sup>th</sup> District, 1900–1941

	1900	1910	1920	1930	1941
Jewish	35.8	38.5	39.1	36.6	28.5
Christian denominations	64.2	62.5	60.9	63.7	71.5

After Budapest as a national capital had been officially created in 1873 by the unification of formerly independent towns Pest, Buda, and Óbuda, the position of Terézváros was finalized in the new system of city administration. It was split

into two administrative units, namely the 6<sup>th</sup> and the 7<sup>th</sup> Districts; the 7<sup>th</sup> District then adopted the name Erzsébetváros (Elizabethtown) in 1882, in honor of Empress Elizabeth, spouse of Emperor Franz Joseph I, and the use of the name “Terézváros” was from then on restricted to the 6<sup>th</sup> District only (see Figure 1). The name mostly used throughout this article for the area (Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District) thus dates back to the administrative reorganization of the early 1870s.

After 1873, Budapest was consciously developed into a grandiose European metropolis. As part of the large-scale urban construction projects carried out at that time, the major boulevards and avenues bordering on the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District acquired their architectural character between 1870 and 1896.



**Figure 1.** Map of Budapest in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, with Erzsébetváros, the 7<sup>th</sup> District (VII) east of the center

The Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District thus developed a certain dual character by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The outer main streets, such as Andrásy Avenue, Erzsébet Boulevard, and Kerepesi (today Rákóczi) Road were prestigious, fashionable, and upscale, with cafés, theatres, and, after 1900, more and more cinemas. (Koltai and Rácz, 2011, 91–100; Fabó 1997). Several editorial offices and publishing houses were located on the main streets as well. The inner side streets, on the other hand, were busy but more humble, with little stores, workshops, smaller factories, and printing presses, many of which had Jewish owners and employees. In addition to small trade, lowbrow entertainment facilities like *cafés chantants* (*Sängerei* in German, *zengeráj* in Hungarian), later cabarets and *orfeums* were lining the broader inner streets of the quarter, concentrated especially in the neighborhood's traditional thoroughfare Király Street and in Nagymező Street (Konrád, 2013; Perczel, 2014, 62–71; Molnár Gál, 2005). The same duality – namely the metropolitan bustle of the main avenues versus the more small-town-like atmosphere of the inner streets – continued to characterize the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District in the interwar period as well (Figure 2).

In fact, the Jewish population of the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> Districts contributed greatly to the emergence of modern popular culture in Hungary. From the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards, Jewish people in Budapest were in general playing an active role in sports, modern journalism, café life, and all forms of show business (Zeke, 1995). Jews were heavily overrepresented among the owners of coffeehouses, cabarets, private theatres and cinemas; so were they among journalists, actors, actresses and directors of the early twentieth century. They were significant not only as producers but also consumers of entertainment; the petite bourgeoisie of Teréz- and Erzsébetváros, as well as the Budapest Jewish middle classes in general, provided a fostering environment to modern forms of popular culture as its main – though not the only – audience (Zeke, 1995; Molnár Gál, 1995; Konrád, 2013; Gluck 2008 and 2013).

In sum, the district used to represent a uniquely complex urban subculture in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, characterized by a peculiar mixture of ethnic groups and religious denominations. The area, the inner streets in particular, had a characteristically lower middle class profile, with the predominance of small business, especially fashion trades (Szívós, 2012a, 179 and 192–193). The versatile cultural economy of the district in many ways grew out of the area's distinct social milieu, and, while its Jewish component remained strong until the late 1930s, that cultural industry also fostered a fruitful Jewish–Gentile exchange.

From the late 1930s on, however, that local milieu of the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District and its traditions of cross-cultural coexistence came to be increasingly threatened by the political climate of the day. Anti-Semitism was increasingly adopted as part of governmental policies in Hungary, and became more and more acceptable in parliamentary discourse.



Figure 2. Király Street in 1929

After 1933, Hungary followed an increasingly pro-German orientation in its foreign policy. In the peace treaty of Trianon, signed in 1920, Hungary had been reduced to one-third of its former territory. During the interwar years, Hungarian political circles constantly sought the possibilities of the peace treaty’s revision, and found a natural ally in Germany when Hitler came to power in 1933. The German orientation, however, meant increasingly explicit anti-Semitism in Hungary’s public life. Discriminative measures were adopted from 1938 on in the form of the so-called anti-Jewish laws, which were modelled largely on discriminative



legislation introduced in Nazi Germany a few years earlier. (For the full texts of the so-called anti-Jewish laws, namely Act XV of 1938, Act IV of 1939, Act XV of 1941, and Act XV of 1942, see *Ezer év törvényei* [Laws of one thousand years], <http://www.1000ev.hu/index.php?a=1&k=5>, 1918–1945.)

The anti-Jewish laws of 1938, 1939, and 1941 had serious consequences for the residents of the inner 7<sup>th</sup> District of Budapest, many of whom were Jewish either by religion, or by origin, or both. These laws strongly determined the atmosphere of the late 1930s, and affected the local population economically, depriving many people of their means of living, career options, and educational opportunities. While the first anti-Jewish law, passed in 1938, classified citizens as Jewish on the basis of their religious affiliation, the second anti-Jewish law, namely Act IV of 1939, already defined the category of Jewish on racial grounds; so the latter affected several people who were not Jewish by religion but by origin. The third anti-Jewish law, passed in 1941, forbade marriages between racially defined Jews and Gentiles, and – with some exceptions – declared sexual relationship between them a criminal offence.

In the light of all this, it may be surprising that in the 7<sup>th</sup> District Jews and Gentiles continued to live in a close and undeterred symbiosis throughout the entire interwar period and even during the first years of World War II. In a recent study (Szívós 2012a), questionnaires of the 1941 Hungarian national census recorded in the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District provided detailed information on local residents of the area, and shed light on the confessional intermixing in buildings and apartments of the district. (In the analysis of those sources, the term Jewish was used purely as a denominational category, as it appeared in census questionnaires; see Szívós, 2012a, 173.)

The narrower area examined in the above-quoted study was Klauzál Square (Klauzál tér), the only large square located in the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District. If we look at the sixteen Klauzál tér houses in 1941, it is apparent that the confessional make-up of the buildings varied to a great extent, the proportion of Jewish residents ranging from 12 to 70% per building (see Table 2, based on Budapest Főváros Levéltára [Budapest City Archives] BFL IV. 1419. j, No. 1-16 Klauzál tér). The proportions of various Christian denominations (Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, Greek Orthodox, etc.) varied from house to house as well. But one thing is obvious: each building had a mixed, Jewish–Gentile resident community, and not only in the sense that families of different confessional backgrounds were living next door to one another.

The intermixing of religions within the individual households was just as common. One finds that, with three exceptions, 23 to 63% of the buildings' apartments were shared by Jewish and Christian residents. (Szívós, 2012a, 176.)

Expressed in an average figure, 33% of *all* the apartments on Klauzál Square had Christian and Jewish inhabitants living together. There were four main types of denominationally mixed households: Jewish families sharing their apartments

**Table 2.** Residents of ten Klauzál Square buildings in 1941 by religious denomination\*

House number	All 1941 residents by building		Jewish residents		Roman Catholic residents		Protestant residents (Calvinists, Lutherans, Baptists, Unitarians)		Other denominations (Greek Catholic, Greek Orthodox, etc.)	
	Number of all 1941 residents	%	Number per building	Proportion per building	Number per building	Proportion per building	Number per building	Proportion per building	Number per building	Proportion per building
Klauzál Square 1.	47	100%	27	57%	17	36%	2	4%	1	2%
Klauzál Square 2.	91	100%	10	11%	46	50.5%	35	38%	0	0%
Klauzál Square 3.	82	100%	44	54%	30	37%	5	6%	0	0%
Klauzál Square 4.	73	100%	26	36%	25	34%	19	26%	3	4%
Klauzál Square 5.	136	100%	74	54%	42	31%	19	14%	1	1%
Klauzál Square 6.	97	100%	68	70%	23	24%	5	5%	1	1%
Klauzál Square 7.	56	100%	16	28.5%	30	54%	10	18%	0	0%
Klauzál Square 14.	83	100%	10	12%	59	71%	11	13%	3	4%
Klauzál Square 15.	166	100%	98	59%	45	27%	19	11%	4	2%
Klauzál Square 16.	157	100%	101	64%	44	28%	12	8%	0	0%

\* Without those rented spaces that functioned exclusively as stores and workshops. In this table, only those ten buildings are featured the resident populations of which could be systematically compared to the resident populations of the same buildings in 1945.

with Christian housemaids and au-pairs; Jewish tenants subletting some of their rooms to Christian subtenants, or *vice versa*; apartment-workshops in which craftsmen and -women employed and also provided accommodation for apprentices of another confession; mixed-marriage households and other family types in which some of the family members were confessionally Jewish, while the others belonged to Christian denominations. (Szívós, 2012, 176–181)

The fact that Jewish and Christian individuals were living together in such close symbiosis in private spaces is in fact rather surprising if we consider the political conditions of the discussed period, and imagine the atmosphere created by the anti-Jewish laws by 1941. The cultural and psychological roots of such forms of symbiosis may have had several different components, as was analyzed in detail in Szívós, 2012, 182–186. For constraints of space, let it suffice in the present context to emphasize the subcultural uniqueness of that situation, rather untypical for Hungary and for Budapest as a whole, but very characteristic of the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District, where forms of intermixing had long been the norm; where Jews and Gentiles had been accustomed to each other's presence in the world of work, in public spaces, and in social relations; and where therefore anti-Semitism apparently was much less of an issue than in other social milieus of Budapest at the time.

### **The Impact of World War II and the Holocaust: The Torn Fabric of Local Society**

Although the symbiotic relationship of ethnic groups and denominations largely prevailed during the time of the anti-Jewish laws, local patterns of coexistence were made increasingly difficult to maintain during the years of World War II.

The Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District's population was heavily affected by wartime events and the Holocaust. Until the time of systematic air raids against Budapest, the impact of the war was less direct, and was experienced primarily by those families from which adult men were conscripted for army service or, in the case of Jewish men, were called up for labor service (for the wartime system of labor service in Hungary, see Braham, 1995). The military occupation of Hungary by German troops in March 1944, however, represented a turning point, and brought about dramatic changes.

After the German occupation of Hungary, the situation deteriorated dramatically, particularly for Hungary's Jewish population. The ghettoization and organized deportation of Hungary's Jewish population began in the countryside in May 1944, and – with the exception of Budapest – had been completed by the beginning of July that year.

In Budapest, the ghettoization of the Jewish population in June 1944 followed an untypical pattern at first. Instead of declaring one particular area of

the city to be the Jewish ghetto, a mayoral decree ordered that all Jews in Budapest must move into so-called yellow-star houses (buildings designated specifically as obligatory Jewish places of residence). The majority of yellow-star buildings were located on the Pest side of the city, and their concentration was particularly high in the areas where the proportion of the Jewish population of Budapest had been traditionally concentrated, namely in the 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup>, and 7<sup>th</sup> Districts (Cole, 2003, 105–115). As it follows from that spatial logic, the Inner 7<sup>th</sup>, and also the Inner 6<sup>th</sup> Districts were densely spotted with those buildings of forced Jewish residence (see map at <http://www.csillagishazak.hu/>, last accessed May 16, 2015.)

Local traditions of coexistence, however, prevailed even in those times of extreme hardship: several Gentiles chose to stay in yellow-star houses in the 7<sup>th</sup> District (as a concession to the non-Jewish population, Gentiles were eventually allowed to stay in their old buildings if they wished, even if their buildings were declared yellow-star houses). Gentiles' persistence is indicated by the fact that 144 out of the 162 yellow-star houses in the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District were inhabited by mixed communities of Jews and non-Jews throughout the following five months (Braham, 1988, 218; Cole, 2003, 154).

The concentration of everyone legally classified as Jewish into yellow-star houses was obviously meant to be a prelude to the mass deportation of the Jewish population of Budapest. As a result of various pressures, however, Admiral Miklós Horthy halted the deportations in July 1944, and the Jewish population of Budapest thus avoided total extermination. The enthusiasm of survival, however, turned out to be premature. Safety was only temporary; further sufferings were awaiting Jewish residents after mid-October 1944.

On 15 October, 1944, except half a year after the German occupation, there was a coup d'état in Hungary, led by the extreme right wing Arrow Cross Party and its leader Ferenc Szálasi. The coup brought into power a radically anti-Semitic Nazi puppet regime, completely subservient to the German military command. Soon after the coup, two ghettos were organized in Budapest; the larger one was established in the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District, surrounded by walls, and crowds were deported, most of them on foot, as forced laborers to German or German-occupied areas (Szekeres, 1997, 91–92.)

Instead of the yellow-star houses scattered all over the city, the remaining Jewish population of Budapest was required to move into the two ghettos, except for those Jewish men between age 16 and 60, and women between age 16 and 40 who were called up for forced labor service. The ultimate intention is most likely to have been the extermination of the ghettos' population, just like it happened in several other countries. Conditions in the buildings of the "big ghetto" (i.e. the larger ghetto organized in the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District) were extremely crowded; by January 1945, over 70,000 people were forced to live in this relatively small

area (Braham, 1988, 220–221; Szekeres, 1997, 93; Varga 2014: 276.) and a large number of people died in the subsequent months of diseases, malnutrition, or were killed in the raids of Arrow Cross groups.

Non-Jewish residents of the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District were reluctant to leave their neighborhood even in the final phase of ghettoization, that is, at the time of setting up of the walled-in Pest ghetto in late November 1944 (Cole, 2003, 375, quoting Lévai, 1948, 375); but they were eventually forced to leave the area in early December, and many of them never returned to their original residence.

Budapest was liberated by the Soviet Red Army in February 1945. The Pest side, including the ghetto in the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District, had been liberated on January 18 already. Human losses were immense, but the number of victims was difficult to determine (Lévai, 2014 [1946], 276). In any case, the majority of the ghetto's population eventually survived the war. The casualties as well as the survivors of the ghetto included several people who had originally not been residents of the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District; a massive population movement in and out of the area thus began soon after the fighting had ended. Once the non-local captives of the ghetto moved out of the area and returned to their domiciles elsewhere in Budapest, many of the non-Jewish residents began to move back to their original apartments into the former ghetto, but – as it will be demonstrated below – the majority of the area's former Gentile residents turned out to be gone once and forever.

In the spring of 1945, a new preliminary census was organized in Budapest in order to assess the war damages and the losses in human lives. As far as the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District is concerned, the records of the census reflect an immense transformation of local society. Here again, the sources related to the already familiar spot, namely Klauzál Square, might be illuminative. Detailed information on all residents was available for 10 buildings (out of the altogether 16 buildings surrounding Klauzál Square), so the comparison of full resident communities of 1941 with those of 1945 involved 10 buildings on the spot (BFL IV. 1419. n. „Az 1945. évi népszéírás lakásívei és házigyűjtőívei [forms of the 1945 national census by apartments and lists of main tenants by buildings]”, Budapest, Klauzál tér, buildings No. 1-16.)

Compared to the population of 1941, only an average of 16.9% of the original residents could be found in those ten buildings of Klauzál Square in March 1945 (Table 3 and Chart 1). In that figure were included those people who were living in the same building but not in the same apartment as in 1941 (e.g. because their original apartments had been damaged). Within the average, however, there were big differences among the individual buildings. The rate of returnees – and/or residents continuously present from 1941 to March 1945 – seem to have been the highest in the case of those buildings which had been designated as yellow-star houses in June 1944. In such buildings, the rate of those 1941 Jewish residents

(Jewish again understood in the sense of religious denomination) who survived or returned and were found by the 1945 census at their old addresses could be as high as 34%.

The explanation is relatively simple: several Jewish residents living on Klauzál Square had the “privilege” of being able to stay in their old apartments all the way through 1944 and early 1945, in both phases of ghettoization: first, in June 1944, because their apartments happened to be in buildings designated as yellow-star houses, and then in late November, 1944, when their homes again happened to be located in the ghetto area that was demarcated as a zone of compulsory residence for Jews. True, from late November 1944 to mid-January 1945 those locals were forced to share their apartments with sometimes up to 14 new ghetto dwellers, but at least – if they survived the conditions at all – they had the meager consolation of being able to live through the whole infernal period of the ghetto in their own homes.

In terms of the rate of returnees, the big differences among religious denominations are quite striking. If we assess the proportion of returned residents by confession, we will find that, as a rule, the 1941 Jewish residents are present in much higher proportions in 1945 than their one-time Christian neighbors. If we count those ten buildings together for which individual questionnaires by apartment are available from 1945, we can see that on average – in rounded figures – 21% of the 1941 Jewish residents could be found in the same buildings in 1945 we can see that on average 22.6% of the 1941 Jewish residents could be found in the same buildings in 1945, while only 14.9% of the 1941 Roman Catholics, 4.4% of Protestants – Lutherans, Calvinists, and Baptists –, and 0% of Greek Catholics and Greek Orthodox returned by March 1945.

(Table 3 and Chart 1). It seems that the war and especially the ghettoization policies of 1944/1945 disrupted the continuity of the one-time Christian population much more than the continuity of Jewish families’ presence.

The rest of the apartments on Klauzál Square, the residents of which had not returned, were either damaged and empty on March 1945, or were occupied by newcomers. The large number of empty apartments left behind after the liberation of the ghetto attracted hundreds of people looking for places to live: at the time of the March 1945 census, about 75 per cent of the apartments on Klauzál tér had new residents who moved in some time after January 18, 1945.

There is reason to suppose that rate of returnees increased to some extent by the end of 1945 and even beyond, as some people returned belatedly from concentration camps, DP camps, or as former prisoners of war. POWs captured by Soviet troops in 1942–45 (including unarmed labor servicemen who were in many cases captured together with Hungarian soldiers), and also civilians who were gathered in the streets of Budapest and carried away to the Soviet Union after the siege of Budapest to do forced labor in the GULAGs would often come back only years later, sometimes as late as six or seven years after the war. Oral history interviewees

**Table 3.** Continuity of the resident populations of ten Klauzál Square buildings, 1941–1945  
(entire populations\*)


House number	Number of 1945 residents	Whole population (all denominations)		Jewish residents		Roman Catholic residents		Protestant residents (Calvinists, Lutherans, Baptists, Unitarians)		Other denominations (Greek Catholic, Greek Orthodox, etc.)		Did the house become a yellow-star building in June 1944?
		Percentage of all 1941 residents living in the building in 1945	Number of all 1941 residents living in the building in 1945	Percentage of 1941 Jewish residents living in the building in 1945	Number of 1941 Jewish residents living in the building in 1945	Percentage of 1941 Roman Catholic residents living in the building in 1945	Number of 1941 Roman Catholic residents living in the building in 1945	Percentage of 1941 Protestant residents living in the building in 1945	Number of 1941 Protestant residents living in the building in 1945	Percentage of 1941 residents of other religions living in the building in 1945	Number of 1941 residents of other religions living in the building in 1945	
Klauzál Square 1.	26	19%	9	33%	9	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	yes
Klauzál Square 2.	48	21%	19	10%	1	33%	15	9%	3	0%	0	no
Klauzál Square 3.	36	13%	11	25%	11	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	yes
Klauzál Square 4.	18	12%	9	35%	9	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	yes
Klauzál Square 5.	61	18%	24	16%	12	14%	6	18%	3	0%	0	yes
Klauzál Square 6.	99	28%	27	35%	24	13%	3	0%	0	0%	0	yes

Klauzál Square 7.	19	10	18%	3	19%	7	23%	0	0%	0	0%	no
Klauzál Square 14.	31	11	13%	0	0%	11	19%	0	0%	0	0%	no
Klauzál Square 15.	68	19	11%	15	15%	4	9%	0	0%	0	0%	yes
Klauzál Square 16.	86	31	20%	23	23%	8	18%	0	0%	0	0%	yes
			Average 17,3%		Average 21.1%		Average 12.9%		Average 2.7%		Average 0%	

\* Without those rented spaces that functioned exclusively as stores and workshops. Klauzál tér Nos. 8–13. are not featured in the comparison, because their census questionnaires by apartment have not been preserved from the 1945 census.



**Chart 1.** Percentages of 1941 residents living in ten Klauzál Square buildings at the time of the 1945 census, by denomination (rounded figures)



in the 7<sup>th</sup> District do mention acquaintances or, in some cases, family members who would fall into one of the above categories of returnees. (Interview with Mrs. V. M., Febr. 1. 2011; interview with M. V., Febr. 2012; interview with Mrs. M. Z., July 5, 2011. ) But even if we assume that those late returnees altered the proportions of residential continuity and discontinuity to some degree, we cannot determine their exact impact because we have no sources from the postwar years that would offer detailed and systematic data on individual apartments and their residents, comparable to the censuses of 1941 and 1945.

As this local analysis suggests, the changes caused by the war appear to have been truly dramatic in the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District of Budapest. When we sum up the damage and human losses, and interpret the number of people who disappeared from the residential buildings of the former ghetto, we cannot limit our explanations to the effects the Holocaust had on local Jewish residents. We must see that in this particular neighborhood non-Jewish residents were in many ways also negatively affected by the anti-Jewish policies, notably ghettoization and forced relocation, and the formerly strong ties between Jews and Christians suffered irreparable damages during the final phase of the war.

### **The Postwar Period**

Although the city was left in ruins by the two and a half months of the siege, life slowly went back to normal during 1945 and afterwards. But the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> Dis-

trict never shed memories of the ghetto, and in the postwar decades many people are said to have moved out of the area for that reason. Many Jewish survivors emigrated immediately after the war; young people who lost their relatives in the Holocaust; and those who could not forgive Hungary for what had been done to them and their families. Movements of expatriation were then stimulated by postwar political changes; the next wave started when people began to understand what the establishment of a Communist regime would really bring about for them. (On the postwar emigration of the middle and upper classes in general, see Romsics, 1999, 314–315; specifically on Jewish migration, see Erdei, 2004; Komoróczy, 2012. vol. 2, 974–975.)

Turbulent times certainly did not end with the war for the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District. While the years 1945–1948 brought about the partial recovery of local economy, the restoration of private business, the reorganization of religious institutions (those of the Jewish community included), and relative freedom in the field of political activity, the same years also represented a period of gradual sovietization (Romsics, 1999, 269–331). Local society was thoroughly affected by that process. The Communist regime, firmly established by 1949, almost fully eliminated private economy by nationalizing private businesses step by step, small business included (Romsics, 1999, 309; Komoróczy, 2012. Vol. 2, 925–926); it nationalized all larger residential buildings too and set out to suppress religious life, bringing the remaining confessional organizations under strict state control. In sum, the regime waged war against almost everything that used to give the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District a distinct character before.

The result was an exodus. Several people emigrated because their means of living and economic activities were threatened and in the end eliminated by Communist policies; or because they felt that the regime was making it impossible for them to adhere to their earlier lifestyles and freely practice their religion; or all these factors together (see e. g. Soskis, 1967, 42.) In the case of Jewish residents of the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District, the Palestine- and, from 1948, Israel-bound migration was organized actively by Zionist organizations – as long as the Communist regime at all allowed Zionist organizations to exist.

The emigration movement was temporarily halted when legal emigration was outlawed by Communist legislation in early 1949. But then six years later, after the outbreak of the 1956 revolution, crowds of people who missed their chance before January 1949 took the opportunity of the revolutionary upheaval to leave Hungary, many of them never to return – several residents of the 7<sup>th</sup> District included. Oral history interviews with one-time Inner-7th-District residents often reflect a clear sense of population loss following 1956, and interviewees narrate several stories of people – including well-known local figures such as shopkeepers and entrepreneurs – who left Hungary in 1956. (In-

terviews in Matern, 2009; interview with Mrs. Gy. V., May 2, 2014, and with G. F., May 2, 2014. ).

The successive movements of expatriation (of Jewish as well as non-Jewish Hungarians) between 1945 and 1956 had typical patterns: the main target areas were North America (both the US and Canada), Israel, and certain Central and Western European countries such as Austria, West Germany, France, and Britain. According to Viktor Karády, the patterns of Jewish migration differed by period: while until 1949 the main target was Palestine, and – after the foundation of the new state – Israel, the typical destinations of the Jewish emigrants of 1956 were North America and Western Europe (Karády, 2002, 140).

In addition to the emigrants, out-migration took place on the Budapest scale as well. A large proportion of the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District's population, especially the younger generations, moved out to other parts of the city during the decades of state socialism. (Ladányi, 2013, 220–221). So the societal changes that were triggered off by the war were continued by further demographic losses.

By about 1970, the early wartime families of the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District seem to have been largely replaced by others. As part of my research, I reconstructed the residential communities of certain buildings of the area, systematically comparing the stages of 1941, 1945, and 1970 wherever possible (census questionnaires from the 1970 census were available only for a certain number of buildings featured above in this article); and I found that in the examined buildings on average about 80% of the 1941 families *and* also their descendants were gone by 1970. The Jewish families from 1941, including those still present in 1945 after the liberation, were almost all gone by 1970 (see e.g. Szívós, 2012b, 212 and 214). What is significant is that many of those “vanished” residents were *not* killed in the Holocaust; in spite of casualties in almost every Jewish family, a large enough number of 1941 Jewish residents were still – or again – living in their buildings after the war in 1945, as it was demonstrated above by the Klauzál Square examples. Several residents who had been registered alive in the 1945 census disappeared from the local sources *afterwards*, which underlines the importance of emigration and the flight from the haunting memories of the ghetto.

On the level of population statistics, unfortunately, postwar Jewish population loss in the 7<sup>th</sup> District is difficult to assess by statistical methods, because from 1949 until 2001 (years of national censuses in Hungary) religious denomination was not recorded any more on population census questionnaires. Only less direct methods are available; for example, a comparison of the pre-1956 and post-1956 lists of taxpayers of especially the Orthodox Jewish community clearly reflect a dramatic decrease in the membership of that community. Oral history interviews, even if they do not make up for a statistical analysis, provide strong enough impressions, especially if conducted and recorded in large enough numbers.

During the decades of state socialism, as a result of the above-described tendencies combined, the “Old Jewish Quarter” of Budapest lost much of its character as a Jewish district in terms of residential composition. The wartime losses, the postwar waves of emigration, and the massive replacement of the population by non-Jewish residents all contributed to that.

Besides the population exodus and especially the large-scale departure of observant Jewish families before 1949 and in 1956, the Jewish character of the neighborhood was on the wane also because signs of observance could no longer appear in the public space as they could before 1945. The Communist regime heavily discouraged religious practice, especially in its publicly visible forms. The cultivation of Jewish identities was equally discouraged. So Jewish community life went almost underground during the decades of state socialism, relegated largely into the private sphere; only a handful of dedicated rabbis and a shrinking number of religious institutions were holding guard to the tradition – under strict political control, and under strong pressure to cooperate with the state (Jalsovsky, Tomsics and Toronyi, 2014, 333 and 338–341.)

Many people in fact permanently left their Jewish identities behind. Jewish identities were rediscovered only in the 1980 when the regime began to develop a more tolerant attitude. A real Jewish renaissance, with a revival of religious traditions and the establishment of new communities as well as institutions, could begin in Budapest mostly after the political transition in 1990; those developments affected the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District as well.

The revival of collective as well as individual Jewish identity in the 1990s may have contributed to the surprising discovery of a sociological survey, conducted in 1999, about the residential distribution of Jewish people in Budapest: namely that the Jewish population was still overrepresented in the “Old Jewish Quarter” at the beginning of the new millennium, although not as much as in Újlipótváros, a middle- and upper-middle-class neighborhood (today part of the 13<sup>th</sup> District) that has attracted high numbers of Jewish professionals and intellectuals since its formation in the interwar period (Ladányi, 2013, 221; Ladányi, 2002 in Kovács ed., 2002, 95–99). The total eclipse of the one-time “Jewish district” had been more or less public perception by then; so the sociologists were the most surprised when they came upon the above conclusion.

The 1999 survey, carried out by András Kovács, János Ladányi, Róbert Angelusz, Róbert Tardos, and Tamás Stark, adjusted its methodology to what the times dictated: in the lack of more objective criteria, various ways of self-identification were adopted as criteria of Jewishness (Kovács ed., 2002, 141–146). But in whichever way Jewishness was measured, the results of the survey shed light on a hidden and underexplored, but existing continuity of Jewish presence in the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### Urban Decay and Renewal in the Postwar Period

As far as the postwar physical development of the 7<sup>th</sup> district is concerned, societal transformation after the Communist takeover was accompanied by a long period of physical decay, which lasted until 1989 – and even beyond. Similarly to the fate of other downtown historic districts of Budapest, the intentional neglect of the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District had much to do with ideological reasons, and with the regime's clear preference for concentrating on the construction of new housing estates (Lampel and Lampel, 1998; Lichtenberger, Cséfalvay and Paal, 1995).

In the 1980s, there were some attempts to revitalize the neighborhood. Urban planners and political leaders of the era had realized by then that the decades of neglect led to dramatic consequences. The decay of the building stock seemed almost irreversible. The remaining middle class, especially younger and more mobile residents, were steadily deserting the inner districts, leaving an elderly population behind. The 7<sup>th</sup> District was among the rapidly aging areas which lost 27,700 people, that is, one quarter of its population, between 1960 and 1980. Out of that loss, 23,728 fell between 1970 és 1980 (Census publications of the Hungarian Central Statistical Bureau (KSH) digital database: <http://konyvtar.ksh.hu/neda>, census of 1960, 3.e. Budapest, II; census of 1970, vol. 3.; census of 1980, 1. Budapest, 1.1., last accessed July 10, 2014.)

This was an outstanding demographic decline even among the decaying inner districts of Budapest at the time; only the 8<sup>th</sup> District produced a comparable rate of population decrease in the same period. In both districts, the authorities themselves furthered social transformation by their housing policies. “In line with the policy of destabilizing established historic communities to reduce coherence, a large number of deprived social groups (mainly Roma) were settled by force in apartments across the [Inner 7<sup>th</sup>] district”, Krisztina Keresztély characterized the situation (Keresztély, 2009, 171).

The warning symptoms at some point led to the realization, on the level of state and party authorities as well, that a systematic renewal of central historic districts could not be postponed any longer.

There was a certain change in attitude as well, similarly to other countries of Europe at the time. All across Europe, the attitude toward historic neighborhoods was changing. While in the 1950s and 1960s urban reconstruction usually meant razing old housing stock to the ground and erecting new residential blocks, from the mid-1970s on milder and more considerate practices of urban renewal began to gain ground. (Lichtenberger, 1990, 29–34.) These changes had an impact on Hungary as well, in spite of the Iron Curtain still in place. While in the 1950s and 1960s the regime was openly hostile toward the historic architecture of the fin de siècle, the 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence of more respectful and considerate approaches. This was the first time when old neighborhoods began to be

regarded as heritage, with inherent values that needed to be preserved (Egedy and Kovács, 2005, 9–20; Szívós, 2010, 384–385).

The preparation for the comprehensive revitalization of inner-city Budapest districts began in the late 1970s, and the program itself was officially announced in 1986 (Lichtenberger, Cséfalvay and Paal, 1995, 33–35). Experimental local projects of urban regeneration began in Budapest at that time; one of the testing grounds became precisely the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District. A large block – numbered “Block No. 15” in the citywide revitalization plans – composed of old inner-courtyard residential buildings, adjacent to Klauzál Square, was renovated, with profound changes implemented inside the block. This successful experiment produced high-quality housing with carefully preserved historic details but modernized flats and new green spaces (Lampel and Lampel, 1998, 88–104; Szívós, 2010, 391–398/2014, 44–47 and 52–53.) The physical renewal triggered off a thorough replacement of the block’s former population (Hegedüs and Tosics, 1993, 85–90; Lichtenberger, Cséfalvay and Paal, 1995, 44–45).

Apart from a handful of similar projects, however, the block renewal project in the 7<sup>th</sup> district remained an isolated example in Communist Budapest. Even though the plans were ready for the large-scale revitalization of historic districts in Budapest, the whole grand program was conceived as a state-funded enterprise, financed entirely from the sources of the national budget. This was still Communist Hungary, with a centrally planned economy, where alternative solutions to state funding were still problematic and scarce (Lichtenberger, Cséfalvay and Paal, 1995, 39–40).

The accumulating problems of state socialist economy, including the dramatic indebtedness of Hungary by that time, made the generous state support of inner-city revitalization projects clearly impossible. Post-Communist Budapest, with the 7<sup>th</sup> District included, inherited a hopelessly run-down historic housing stock which bore the marks of several decades of neglect, and which represented almost insurmountable problems for the new, democratically elected municipal governments after 1990.

### **The Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District after 1990**

After the collapse of Communism, profound changes took place in Budapest. Democracy was restored, municipal government was re-established, and capitalist market conditions reemerged after 1990. These changes brought about new chances for the renewal of the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District, but at the same time produced new problems and controversial solutions as well.

These phenomena were related to the patterns of real estate privatization adopted in post-Communist Budapest as well as to the specifics of the two-tiered municipi-

pal government structure in Budapest after 1990, which gave extensive autonomy and economic independence to the individual districts. (For an accurate summary of post-Communist municipal government structure and the resulting problems of urban renewal policies in the 7<sup>th</sup> District, see Keresztély, 2009, 172–176.)

The recent revival and rediscovery of the neighborhood has to do with both the problems and stagnation of its recent urban development and the area's turbulent past. Stagnation, surprisingly, can be a stimulant of both social transformation and the appearance of special forms of culture.

According to models and case studies of gentrification, that process may begin at deprived and neglected but centrally located zones where real estate prices are sufficiently low to attract investors (Smith, 1996; Butler, 1997; Introduction in Atkinson and Bridge, 2005) or, in the case of spontaneous gentrification, attract relatively young and enterprising pioneers – artists, bohemians, freelancers, certain types of professionals – who could not as a rule afford buying properties of their own in more expensive neighborhoods. The Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District is mostly an example of the latter type of spontaneous gentrification (Csanádi, Csizmady and Olt, 2012), since a large-scale, systematic, municipally coordinated revitalization of the quarter has not taken place in the last two and a half decades. Before 2010, isolated developments were mostly carried out by private investors, and generated much controversy from the point of view of heritage protection; since 2010, municipally subsidized renewal projects have also been limited to certain streets (i.e. Kazinczy Street in 2012–2013) or spots (e. g. Madách Square in 2014). But even if the revitalization of the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District has been spot-like rather than systematic, the renewal of certain public spaces did enhance the attractiveness of the area.

Recent publications summarize the changes by contrasting the sociological profile of the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District around 1990 with the current situation. By the end of the state socialist period, the quarter “had become one of the most deprived and disadvantaged inner-city neighborhoods of the capital, represented by a deeply deprived social structure” (Keresztély, 2009, 171). In the population census of 1990, the deprived character was reflected by “an extremely high share of elderly and unemployed residents, and a low share of college and university graduates.” Since the mid-1990s, however, the area has experienced a thoroughgoing social transformation. By the second half of the first millennial decade, “the number of people settling in the neighborhood has increased sharply. More than 40% of its present population moved in between 1990 and 2005 (Keresztély 2009, 142, quoting Csanádi et al., 2006, 80) This newly settled population is composed mostly of young people: singles or couples without children.” (Ibid.)

The influx of relatively young, educated and mobile new inhabitants can be explained partially by the real estate prices of the neighborhood which remained affordable until the mid-2010s; partially by the central location and the proximity of inner-city institutions of business, culture, and higher education; partially by

the expectations regarding the area's anticipated improvement and the expected rise in real estate prices; and partially by the district's cultural attractions and entertainment potential.

In the recent one and a half decades, the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District became very popular among younger Budapestians because of the large number of new bars and entertainment facilities opened in the area; the entertainment profile generates substantial tourist traffic as well. The most attractive venues of the 2000s became the so-called "ruin bars", unique to the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District. The first "ruin bars" represented a special solution of temporary utilization: they were opened in the inner courtyards of vacated buildings which were destined to be demolished, but which in some cases were placed under temporary heritage protection.

True, these attractions have proven to be somewhat double-edged from the point of view of residents. The noise and traffic of the "party quarter", as the Inner Seventh District has come to be called by many in recent years, is often disturbing for locals, and not just for old-timers. Younger residents, as soon as they arrive into a mature life cycle, may find the street buzz just another nuisance besides the other reasons that may motivate them to move on. The welcome signs of the neighborhood's social renewal conceal a negative tendency as well: "young people only intend to spend a few years in the area – the period when they are flexible and mobile – but they intend to leave as soon as they have children. The lack of green areas and parks, good schools and other services for families is a huge problem in the area" (Keresztély, 2009, 172).

Besides its entertainment potential, the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District has also developed an old-new cultural identity which is rooted in the area's historical Jewish past.

Many people can relate to this area on the basis of their identity, even if they do not live in the 7<sup>th</sup> district themselves. The number of those Budapest residents who are of Jewish origin or of partly Jewish origin is hard to determine in the early 2000s, but is possible to roughly estimate. According to Tamás Stark's calculations, the Jewish population of Hungary, understood in terms of origin, could be estimated around 118,000 for the year 2000 (Stark, 2002, 124). But Stark himself stated that the above figure would be much higher if it contained those born from "mixed" – i.e. Jewish-Gentile – marriages whose fathers were Jewish; and there is a further, significant contingent of people who are related to the above calculated Jewish population by family relations, i. e. marriages, partnerships, in-law relations, etc. (Ibid.) Knowing that the overwhelming majority of Hungary's surviving Jewish population has been concentrated in Budapest since World War II (Karády, 2002, 69–70), one can assume that the majority of that 118,000 to 200,000-strong population lives in the Hungarian capital city today.

The post-Communist decades, especially the 1990s brought about a revival of religious life in Budapest, the revival of various forms of Judaism included. A significant number of people rediscovered their Jewish ties, if not in an ex-



PLICITLY religious form, then in the form of a cultural identity (Kovács in Kovács ed. 2002, 36–39; Angelusz and Tardos in Kovács ed. 2002, 41–76.) The younger generations, born after 1970, are particularly open about their Jewish identities, and some of them, affiliated with Jewish cultural organizations like Marom Association or MAZSIKE (the latter short for Hungarian Jewish Cultural Association) work actively on building up a new Jewish subculture in Budapest. Several forms of urban cultural traditions have been revived, from Jewish theatre to cabaret and annual Jewish festivals (e.g. Jewish Summer Festival or Judafest). These events almost all take place in the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> and Inner 6<sup>th</sup> Districts, hosted by clubs, theatres and synagogues in the area (Gantner and Kovács, 2008) – or just in the street. Some, more frequently organized cultural festivals play upon the theme of local identities, joining forces of neighboring districts: one such event is Negyed6Negyed7 (Quarter6Quarter7) Festival, recently refashioned as Negyed 7Negyed 8 (Quarter7Quarter8).

Jewish memory is cultivated in other ways as well, and not only by people of Jewish origin. Besides the official commemorations at the Holocaust memorials located in the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District, there are civil demonstrations and acts of commemoration as well. The March of Life, organized annually, commemorates survival and the survivors of the Holocaust. In recent years it has grown into a mass march, attended also by several people who are not of Jewish origin. Participating in it has become a form of expressing solidarity; in the eyes of many, the March of Life is also a demonstration against racism and anti-Semitism, and against the toleration of these in public discourse in Hungary. In certain years, e.g. in 2011, the March of Life started in the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District.

### Summary

The Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District is an ideal case study for a modern urban historian examining urban transitions and the impact of political changes on urban society.

Firstly, the story of the district raises practically all the questions and problems of urban development related to the historic centers of Central European cities, from questions of 19<sup>th</sup>-century urban planning to cycles of urban decay and renewal in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries.

Secondly, the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> District of Budapest is an ideal case study because it mirrors the most dramatic developments of 20<sup>th</sup> century Hungarian history on the local scale. The neighborhood was strongly influenced by the political events of the 1930s and 1940s, and acquired central importance in the history of the Hungarian Holocaust. Reestablished as a walled-in Jewish ghetto of Budapest during World War II, the district's population was heavily affected by wartime measures. The partial survival of this population is a unique component in the history of the

Shoah. The Jewish community of Budapest was the only large surviving Jewish population in Central Europe, the presence of which in the city is still significant.

Although, as was shown in this article, several Jewish residents disappeared from the Inner 7<sup>th</sup> district after World War II, and the area has undergone profound societal transformation during the socialist period, the Jewish component is still noticeable in its sociological makeup. Although the current social re-stratification of the district has many different roots, the revival of Jewish heritage may be identified as one of its current attractions.

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# FROM CAFÉ TO STAGE TO MUSEUM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE GYPSY MUSIC INDUSTRY IN 20<sup>TH</sup>-CENTURY HUNGARY

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With a few exceptions, the scholarly literature on Hungary's Gypsy music remains frozen in an increasingly remote past, in what Budapest journalist Imre Déri in 1912 called "the old patriarchal relationship between the Gypsies and the gentlemen-merry-makers." Yet Gypsy musicians thrived in the twentieth century, through dramatic social and economic changes, adapting to new institutional frameworks and audience expectations. In the early days of the Hungarian Radio, culture brokers attempted to regularize sound production to fit the technical demands of this new medium, in the process asserting new controls over the musicians; their proposed changes led to a public conflict with the musicians, the "Gypsy war" of 1934. Under socialism the state initially strove to break the "feudalist-capitalist" framework of the previous system by closing restaurants, but then reopened them as sites for workers' entertainment and tourist revenue; additionally, Hungary's professional folk ensembles (created there and throughout the East bloc after the model of Igor Moiseyev's ensemble in the USSR) filled the ranks of their orchestras with Gypsy musicians almost exclusively until the 1980s. Using oral history interviews and journalistic and archival sources, this essay shows how these artists sought both economic stability and recognition as they negotiated changing conditions.

**Keywords:** Hungary, Gypsy music, economic history, Communism, Roma, music, magyar nóta

They pulled up chairs around the now devastated supper table and called for more champagne. This was the moment when Laji Pongrácz came into his own and he played with renewed fervor, wittily titillating his hearers by subtly juxtaposing the tunes of all those he knew to be involved in courtship or dispute. Laji never forgot anyone's special tune, nor who was or had been in love with which girl and who no longer spoke to who. ... the tunes he played chronicled the loves and hates of more than a quarter of a century. With a roguish look in his eye he would gaze pointedly at the man to whose past the music referred. Sometimes he would step close to someone, his violin barely audible, just breathing an old tune in their ears and sometimes, with a wild flourish he would

make everyone laugh as they recalled a forgotten scandal. ... Most of the company were pretty drunk... (Bánffy 2009, 227–229)

With a few exceptions, the literature on Hungary's Gypsy music (see note at end of article about use of this term) remains frozen in an increasingly remote past. The assumption that this genre is part of the past goes back at least to 1912, when Budapest journalist Imre Déri defined it as emerging from the (already declining) "old patriarchal relationship between the Gypsies and the gentlemen-merry-makers" (cited in Sárosi 2012, 104). That relationship, and the social functions of this genre more generally, is at the core of the scene from the first volume of Count Miklós Bánffy's *Transylvanian Trilogy* that appears as the epigraph. This passage happens around dawn at the "last ball of the Carnival season," after the ladies have retired and the men are all sitting together, taking "their last chance for some months of seeing each other all together" (Bánffy 2009, 227); it features a specific historical musician, Lajos Pongrácz (1844–1915), a Gypsy violinist from Kolozsvár/Cluj, who was known as the favorite Gypsy bandleader of Archduke Rudolf (see Sárosi 2012, 148–150). Despite its specificity, both narrative and historical, it could apply to much of Hungary's urban Gypsy music performance tradition at a time when, as Judit Frigyesi wrote, many believed that "the Hungarian soul... express[ed] itself in [G]ypsy music" (1998, 55).

The novel shares this emphasis on "pastness" with much scholarship on Hungarian Gypsy music—though instead of relying on a discourse of nostalgia, as Bánffy often does in his novel, scholars and critics tend to look at this music through a lens of "tradition," whether explicitly or implicitly. But this focus on the pastness in the literature on Gypsy music obscures the ways that it changed as "the modes of cultural reproduction change"—"as traditions become mass-produced, as cultural artifacts become commodified, as intimate performances become available to large audiences" (Appadurai, Korom, and Mills 1991, 21–22).

According to some tradition-based narratives, these changes constitute decline. And yet by many measures Gypsy music thrived in the twentieth century, until its post-socialist collapse. This brief essay offers a preliminary sketch of how Gypsy musicians adapted to new institutional frameworks and audience expectations in the twentieth century.

### **Recording, Radio, and Restaurants: Changing Contexts, Changing Aesthetics**

To refer once again to the epigraph, Bánffy's description not only elegantly captures the interaction between Transylvanian high society and Pongrácz's band; it could also apply to much of Hungary's urban Gypsy music tradition. Particularly significant is the way Bánffy illustrates those elements of these musicians' per-

formance that are beyond technical aspects or specific repertoire: how it produced “a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement, passion—even a sense of connectedness or community... what is essential to it, its in-person aspect, is really the creation and manipulation of affects” (Hardt 1999, 96). But the advent of recording and radio reshaped music audiences and models of music consumption in profound ways. It would be difficult to overstate the importance of these new technologies in transforming popular music from a kind of affective labor, a service profession that relied on the managing of emotions, in this case through music, to a commodity, whether packaged in consumable units—first cylinders, then discs—or as a stream, through broadcast.

That commodity was used not only to earn money but to spread “culture.” In the classical music realm, Mark Katz has documented the way in which the phonograph was used to propagate so-called “good music” throughout the United States, to provide cheap access to the “highest class” of musical material (2010, 83). The dominant recording format in the first half of the twentieth century was the 78RPM record, a 10- to 12-inch disc with a duration of 3 or 4 minutes per side. This limitation presented challenges to all who used it, but different solutions were favored in different genres. For classical works, that meant recording a work on multiple discs, since a recording could not be considered Beethoven’s Symphony no. 5 unless it included all the notes of Beethoven’s Symphony no. 5. For jazz or Hungarian Gypsy music, however, the musical texts are only a starting point, a tune and perhaps words, often appearing in different versions, and the number of verses, choruses, or solos could be—and were—altered to fit the format. In the words of one jazz critic, “for a musician with a lot to say it was like telling Dostoevsky to do *The Brothers Karamazov* as a short story” (cited in Katz 2010, 83). A brief reflection indicates that the listener’s experience of Hungarian Gypsy music on a three- to four-minute recording would be completely different from the type of free-wheeling medley of songs described in Bánffy’s text.

In part, it seems, because of the limitations of contemporary recording formats, the Hungarian Radio in its early period frequently relied on live broadcasts—including live broadcasts of Gypsy bands from the restaurants where they customarily played, despite whatever chaos (from singing and talking patrons to clanking dishes) that might ensue. Gypsy music was a cornerstone of interwar Hungarian radio programming, appearing almost every night; according to polling of radio subscribers in 1927, 1933, and 1941, it was the most popular genre (Legrády 2011, section 5.1; Tiszay and Falk 1944, 325–326). But it also seems that the terms granted by the radio to Gypsy musicians in general were less than ideal, and this new context highlighted once again the sharp divide between Gypsy musicians and classical musicians. In September 1929, a cover article in the trade publication *A Magyarország rádiója* [Hungary’s radio] discussing the contentious negotiations working to broadcast from the Opera House stated that



The Opera and the artists of the Opera may not put themselves in the position that the Gypsy bands have occupied working in the cafés, that in return for broadcasting Gypsy music from the café for free, the Radio hires them to appear from time to time for pay in the studio as well. (“Az Operaház és a radio harca” 1929, 19–20)

This comment—clearly secondary to the author’s topic—appears to indicate that the Gypsy musicians did not get paid for many, perhaps most, of these early broadcasts, except through the restaurants that hosted those broadcasts and their patrons. Meanwhile, the unpredictability of live broadcasts from restaurants surely violated the aesthetic ideals of many at the studio; a 1929 letter from the director of the Radio, Miklós Kozma, indicates that they “gradually want[ed] to stop broadcasting from cafés” (MOL K429).

As the listenership of the Radio grew, this arrangement became more problematic. In late February 1934, a dispute that came to be called the “Gypsy War” broke out when the Radio attempted to institute a so-called “Gypsy voivode” or “Gypsy censor,” a non-Roma lawyer named Endre Spur, who had become one of the Radio’s experts on Gypsy music, to approve programs ahead of time. The bands were to appear at the radio building an hour before their studio broadcast—time that the musicians earlier would have had free, or might have used for rehearsal—and play their entire program for this non-musician “monitor.” Many of the musicians objected, however, and when the radio did not back down immediately, the Gypsy musicians went on strike. Spokesmen for the radio appealed to the press, attacking both the technical skill and the artistic judgment of the Gypsy musicians: saying that the bands did not play enough of the good old Hungarian repertoire, relying too much on “fashionable” “modern” hits; that they repeated items too often; and that the overall quality of performance was uneven. A piece in *Rádió Élet* [Radio Life], the magazine put out by the Radio itself, averred that

even the undersigned primásés [that is, leaders of the strike] could not deny that the music brought in front of the microphone by Gypsy orchestras does not always hit the measure that the radio audience may expect, and that is worthy of representing our national interests for the radio’s public beyond the national borders. (“A rádió álláspontja,” 1934, 15, cited by Légrády 2011)

In another column in *Rádió Élet*, Endre Spur, the new monitor, presented his role in this process as “the audience’s representative”: “we will talk everything out in a friendly manner, out of which [process] there will arise increased enjoyment for the listeners, and ethical utility for [the musicians]” (“Beszélgetés a nótáról” 1934, 5). But for the musicians, having this non-Roma non-musician act

as the judge did not sit well; they were the experts, and some deference was due their expertise. The musicians' statement that appeared in the newspaper *Pesti napló* made that claim clear:

We have been playing for three hundred years, and now he [Endre Spur] comes and wants to teach us how to play. Let him stand in front of the microphone if he knows better than we do, who have spread the fame of Hungarian folk music all over the world. (cited in Sárosi 2012, 334)

Part of this conflict clearly reflects the power differential between classes and races. The Hungarian radio authorities viewed the Roma performers as “mere... tradition bearers” (Bohlman 1988, 71); as radio director Miklós Kozma put it, the matter at hand in the “Gypsy war” was “not actually about the Gypsies’ question [or the ‘Gypsy question’] but rather about developing Hungarian folk-style music, *for which the Gypsy is only a performance implement*, to a higher level” ([Kozma] 1934, 15; emphasis added). (A survey of *Rádió Élet*’s coverage of the so-called “Gypsy War” indicates that the radio still used the terms *népdal* [folk-song], *népzene* [folk music], *népies zene* [folk-like music], *magyar nóta* [Hungarian song], and *cigányzene* [Gypsy music] more or less interchangeably in the mid-1930s, despite the ongoing efforts of Bartók and Kodály.) There was also a crucial financial aspect to this dispute, as the Radio had been undercompensating the musicians for much of their time.

But these were far from the only issues here: the broadcast medium demanded a different sound than the café or restaurant. Even absent the time limitations posed by the 78 RPM recording format, the broadcast, in rendering the performers and audience invisible to each other, tended to prefer a more rehearsed, less improvisatory, “cleaner” sound. In Kozma’s words, “the radio want[ed] to ... exert its influence to [shape] how Gypsy music comes before the public via the microphone... The Gypsy, like every other orchestra, must be schooled and monitored for technical reasons [related to the] microphone.” ([Kozma] 1934, 15–16)

### **Gypsy Music Under State Socialism: Breaks and Continuities with the Past**

Whereas the interwar period was rife with nostalgia for the past, including the Gypsy musicians’ “old patriarchal relationship [with] gentlemen-merry-makers,” the state-socialist period worked to break with that past. As the government prepared in late 1949 to nationalize the Hungarian Radio, the music department of the Radio prepared a plan for reforming the “pseudo-romantic, rootless music of feudal-capitalism, namely the rubato-filled ‘magyar nóta’

singing and the headlong-accelerating fast *csárdás* of Gypsy music-making” (“*Javaslat a szórakoztatató muzsika kérdésében*”). This was not just a matter for the Radio but for society at large, as in the words of well-known *primás* Sándor Déki Lakatos:

... in the 1950s they closed the cafés, they threw the Gypsy musician out the window along with the billiard table... They closed the cafés, there wasn't music in the restaurants, and then the Roma moved into those big orchestras (interview with author, March 2012)

Déki Lakatos indicated some of the many ways in which Budapest's urban Gypsy music industry was transformed at this time. Other scholars' studies of Budapest's hospitality industry have confirmed how drastically it shrank during World War II, from 167 cafés in the capital in 1938 to 90 by 1947, among which 20 more closed in a “short time”—bringing the total down to less than half of what it had been before the war (Csapó 2004, 204). At the end of the forties, there were 1,200 hospitality establishments altogether, compared to 3,500 in 1938. Leading up to and in the period following the nationalization of the hospitality industry in January 1949, the numbers of establishments shrank everywhere; in one central Pest district, the Seventh, there was a reduction from 140 establishments before nationalization to forty afterward (Bodor 2004, 292–293). Their styles also transformed, as the richly decorated “silver-mirrored café” (in the words of the song) – a place for leisurely discussion and socializing, often accompanied by Gypsy music – gave way to the “*eszpresszó*”—usually a more modest establishment where workers could eat and get out. The drop in quantity and the shift in the quality of establishments yielded a crash in employment for Gypsy musicians, in a context where there had long been more musicians than positions to start with.

At the same time, “according to the principle of socialist distribution” all the social and economic benefits of citizenship were to be linked to citizens' contributions, in the words of Hungary's 1951 Labor Code, “according to the quantity and quality of their labor” (Pittaway 2012, 116). Many Hungarian Roma had long filled important roles in rural economies—as smiths, horse-dealers, basket-weavers, pot-menders, trench carvers, and agricultural day-laborers, as well as entertainers—but these roles were almost all outside of conventional wage labor, and many of them were in sectors that the Communists' planned industrialization would soon abolish. The national drive to transform all of Hungary's adult citizens into laborers implied an obligation on behalf of officialdom to apply this principle to the Roma minority as well as the non-Roma majority, and as the most linguistically and culturally integrated portion of the Roma population, the restaurant musicians might have been considered the easiest group to work with. Compelling those musicians to operate “on the books” seems like an obvious

goal in this time when the party was working furiously (if not always effectively) to optimize the productivity of the nation's workforce.

Therefore various corners of the newly nationalized music industry set about reshaping Gypsy music in their own image. The most public element of this reshaping was the state-sponsored folk ensembles: the Honvéd (Army) Ensemble, founded in 1949; the Radio Folk Ensemble, founded in 1950; the Hungarian State Folk Ensemble, founded in 1951; and the Rajkó Ensemble—the Gypsy Orchestra of the Communist Youth League—founded in 1952, among others. These “folk orchestras” in Hungary were part of a boom in folk music and dance ensembles throughout the East Bloc, following the Soviet model led by the State Academic Ensemble of Folk Dances of the Peoples of the USSR (still in operation and now known as the Moiseyev Dance Company), to perform the music and dance of the people for the people. In the words of Igor Moiseyev, the founding director of this company, these performances of “folk art, the art of the people,” were “a splendid means of educating the masses, for [they] can speak their own language, simple, colourful, and replete with wisdom” (quoted in Shay 2002, 74). Professional folk ensembles were the embodiment of Zhdanov's dictum: their use of folk music sources and costumes were “national in form,” but “socialist in content” (Frolova-Walker 1998, 331, quoting Stalin 1934), highlighting the optimism and accessibility the cultural authorities sought in folk art while leaving behind the “backwardness” of their peasant associations.

In some countries, notably Bulgaria, folk orchestras deliberately homogenized their representation of their country's music culture, either disguising Roma musicians as non-Roma (personal communication, Shaun Williams) or trying to keep traces of the substantial contribution of Roma to that culture off the stage entirely (Buchanan 2005, 265–266). In Hungary, the idea of representing Hungarian national “folk” music without Romani musicians—at least to a popular audience—was almost unthinkable; on the other hand, this fact had long been a point of tension (see Hooker 2013). So the fact that the majority of professional “folk musicians” in the state-socialist period ensembles were Roma was minimized. Officially, Hungary's state-run folk ensembles were all called “Folk Orchestras” for the bulk of the state socialist period. Although Lakatos' group for the Hungarian Radio was created as a “Gypsy orchestra,” by January 1951, *Magyar Rádió*, the Radio's house periodical, without fanfare, dropped that name in favor of the label “Radio Folk Orchestra” (“Egy nap a rádióban” 1951, 3).

More important than the name of such ensembles was the change in mission, and with it something of a change in repertoire. This “Folk Orchestra,” led by Lakatos, was created to lead in

[...] the battle against the ‘café’ style, in order to lead Gypsy music back to where it started: to *folk music* [...] Uncle Zsiga Rác [an older primás

and supervisor at the radio] says, “finally we have arrived where we can play what we want to play: we give the songs of the people, the music of the people, back to them on our instruments.” (“Bemutatjuk a Rádió Cigányzenekart” 1950, 8)

Another article from *Magyar Rádió* from 1952, announcing an award won by a recording in which the Radio Folk Orchestra appeared, celebrated the liberation of music once tainted by “the tattered genteel ranks of mindless revelry and café folksong-forgeries” and its (supposed) new-found reach, via radio and recording, to broader and deeper publics:

Folk [or people’s] music [népzene] has been purified ... it has reached the hearts that can delight in the message of crystal-clear art. They listen to it in the village, where listeners gathered for a rest around the culture house’s loudspeakers, the [radio] gear of the cooperatives, the folk radios of the small houses, and the ‘line’ [radio] box recognize their own songs—they listen to it in the city, where many now get to know the true folk music; they listen to it beyond the borders, where this music speaks of a friendly people... (B. J. 1952, 5)

To re-state in a less propagandistic mode: broadcast and stage performances, organized in the capital and spread far and wide via radio and recordings, could promote repertoire that was considered more appropriate—the “true folk music,” following the principles of Bartók and Kodály—in a socialist-approved format, with the performers on a stage and none of the messy interaction with the audience that recalled the old “feudalist-capitalist” context from which Gypsy music emerged.

Yet at the same time, the old style of Hungarian reveling to the accompaniment of Gypsy music did not go away; a sort of “feudal-capitalist” environment for playing magyar nóta persisted in weddings and other private parties, and to some degree in restaurants. In these settings musicians could play “what they wanted” (interview with Sándor Déki Lakatos, March 2012) and what their patrons wanted. Even apparatchiks might have some attachment to politically incorrect repertoire in private. In the industrial town of Ózd, several hospitality establishments featuring Gypsy music came into being as the iron and steel works developed at the beginning of the twentieth century; the managers and the workers of these factories patronized these musicians just as the aristocrats did in Bánffy’s novels, but unlike Bánffy’s milieu, the social outlets around the factories, and the musicians who served them, continued to thrive through the socialist period (Dobosy and Farkas 2004, 1). Even in the dark days of the early 1950s, people wanted Gypsy music at their weddings and parties. Several musicians I have interviewed who played public roles in state-sponsored ensembles also continued to be in demand in the private sphere.

Indeed, despite the challenge of negotiating with those in power, the Kádár era was good to Gypsy musicians at almost every level in Hungary, not just stars like Lakatos or members of major state-sponsored ensembles. In the capital of Budapest, Gypsy music sounded all around the *körút*, from the Petőfi Bridge all the way back to Krisztinaváros. One musician interviewed claimed that Gypsy bands played at “every gas station” (interview with Sándor Kecskés, 2012). Building on—and coopting—the musicians’ labor organizations from earlier in the century, the official Gypsy musicians’ union, the National Center for Entertainment Musicians—the Országos Szórakoztató Zenészek Központ (or OSZK)—assisted musicians with job placement and licensed musicians according to their skill level: only “category A” musicians could lead a band at top establishments or on a tour abroad (see Fátyol 1986, Kállai 2002b for more on this system). Gypsy musicians represented Hungary for tourists in the country and on stages and in restaurants abroad; in return, the musicians had the freedom to travel accessible to few and coveted by many at that time.

In recent years only a handful of restaurants feature Gypsy music regularly, those do so with fewer and fewer musicians. Where in 1912 musicians might assert that the standard ensemble size was fourteen (Sárosi 2012, 108) and Bálint Sárosi states that the “classic” size is six (personal communication, April 2012), to this author’s knowledge no restaurant is fielding a band that large any longer on a regular basis—now four is considered a good size. As a result, in Ernő Kállai’s words, playing this genre in restaurants “as a way of making a living is almost extinct” (2002b, 75).

Though the recent decline has been steep, it has been a great surprise. Pressure has come from two directions. Probably the most abrupt in its impact was the change of regime and related changes in economic regulations, which simultaneously ended requirements that restaurants of a certain class employ musicians and subsidies for the musicians; as a result, in the words of one musician, many restaurateurs “threw them out even if they were under contract” (Kállai 2002b, 94). In the estimation of several people with whom I have spoken, formally and informally, musicians and non-musicians, most Hungarians no longer could afford to patronize restaurants that could afford to hire musicians. The “businessmen” who could afford them were not there to “celebrate while weeping” in the traditional Hungarian way, but to work out their business deals, and live music only interfered.

The second was a change of taste long in the making. “Gypsy music,” in particular the magyar nóta, was considered sentimental music of the past—and not even the good, “authentic” part of the past, going back at least to the beginning of the twentieth century, when Béla Bartók in a 1904 letter dismissed the genre as inauthentic “slop” (*slendrián*) (1976, 83), and his colleague and friend Zoltán Kodály condemned it as the “products of domestic folksong factories” in the 1906 forward

to their joint publication *Twenty Hungarian Folksongs* (1974, 10), and they argued for both the Hungarian and international music publics to leave behind the “fake” composed folksongs played by Gypsy bands for the more “genuine” (and genuinely Hungarian) musical expression of the rural peasantry. Even in the late 1950s, a time when Hungary’s cultural apparatus frequently featured ensembles of Romani musicians from the restaurant tradition on radio and in stage performances, an official from the Hungarian Radio followed Bartók and Kodály in distinguishing strongly between what was genuine and the music played by “Gypsy bands,” emphasizing at a conference of the International Folk Music Council

that most of the repertoire of these gypsy bands is composed of popular music rather than real folk music. Generally the gypsy bands cannot play the traditional folk songs. In order not to distort the folk music, composers are asked to harmonise and sometimes to score it for gypsy orchestras. But in many cases this is not enough to give the folk music piece its special flavour. (Grabócz 1959, 82)

This critique of the “unreal” nature of Gypsy music goes back at least as far as Bartók and Kodály, whose writings stressed how inauthentic the repertoire of these bands – particularly magyar nóta – is in contrast to the repertoire of “traditional folk songs” that arose among the rural peasantry. Lessons about the genre’s inauthenticity are to be found not only in the school curriculum but also in the táncház (dance house) movement, a “form of recreation in which folk music and folk dance appear in their original forms and functions as the ‘native language’ – musical language and body language – of those taking part” (Halmos 2000, 29); this movement began in the early 1970s, and a number of its founders have risen to become respected scholars and influential cultural administrators in today’s Hungary (see Quigley 2014).

The rise of the táncház movement came with a decline not only of Gypsy music but of employment for the musicians. Sándor Timár, director of the (amateur) Béla Bartók Dance Ensemble for twenty-two years and one of the pioneering dance teachers and choreographers of the movement, considered finding appropriate musical accompanists for the kind of dance he wanted to cultivate to be a continual problem; the urban Gypsy musicians “played Hungarian folk music in the Gypsy manner” (cigányosan), that is in the style of the urban restaurant tradition, and it was only when his ensemble started working with (non-Roma revivalist musicians) Ferenc Sebő and Béla Halmos around 1970 that he felt he had found people who could play the Transylvanian rural style in the appropriate manner (Abkarovits 2002, 136–137). By the late 1970s, journalist László Siklós observed Sebő working to teach urban restaurant musicians the rougher village style, but it was a challenge (2006 [1977], 35–36); overall, few musicians from the urban Gypsy music tradition fully invested themselves in the folk revival.

(The *táncház* movement since its beginning has relied heavily on village musicians, most of them Roma, but they have generally retained their village residences, even as they travel frequently to Budapest and other cities, in Hungary and abroad, as bearers of Hungarian village traditions (Quigley 2013; Hooker 2006, 54–56, 64).) When Timár took over as the artistic director of the Hungarian State Folk Ensemble in 1981 (Overholser 2010, ch. 2), he changed the ensemble's approach to music as well as dance, and that meant using non-Roma revivalists more than urban Roma musicians from the restaurant tradition. This shift eventually echoed through most of the major state-supported ensembles.

### A Post-Socialist Museum for Gypsy Music

One question that several musicians have posed in interviews I have conducted is why the government does not respect and support urban Gypsy music as a tradition in itself, since it had such a great historical role in spreading Hungarian culture to the world. Some called it a *Hungaricum*—a term that has come into vogue in recent years to refer to “special items from Hungary, that characterise the Hungarians by their uniqueness and high quality” (Hungarian Tourism Ltd.)—for example *gulyás* soup, the *Hortobágy*, and *paprika*. Claiming that Gypsy music is itself a legitimate aspect of Hungarian heritage flies in the face of long-standing critiques of “so-called Gypsy music,” but as the genre has declined, more people have expressed regret about its impending extinction. From 1989 until 2012, almost no state resources went toward the promotion or preservation of Gypsy music, but that changed in 2012 with the formation of the Roma *Hungaricum* *Állami Művészgyűjtés*—the Roma *Hungaricum* State Artists' Ensemble—a group that operates alongside the Hungarian State Folk Ensemble and others, supported by the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice and operated by the Forum *Hungaricum* Public Ltd., working to “preserve” and “renew” the “Hungarian cultural treasure” of urban Hungarian Gypsy music. For a time the group rehearsed in the headquarters of the Balassi Institute (a Hungarian government-funded non-profit that institute promotes Hungarian culture worldwide), though it has recently relocated. Even so, the ensemble through its website (<http://romahungaricum.hu/en/>) continues to stress the inauthenticity of the genre, stating that is “not identical with gypsy folklore.”

While the fact that the state has stepped in to preserve this “*Hungaricum*” not only as a symbol but as a way to make a living has been positive, at least for the musicians employed by the Roma *Hungaricum* State Artists' Ensemble, it is not enough to rescue Hungary's participatory tradition of celebrating the manipulation of affects by playing and singing *magyar nóta* in restaurants and cafés. It is likely not even enough to rescue the *magyar nóta* repertoire itself, as that



repertoire apparently plays only a small part in the ensemble's life; of four concert programs posted on their website, it is featured in one, the "Evergreens," while the other three are light-classical, featuring mainly "Hungarian," "Hungarian-style," or "Gypsy-style" – notably including Liszt's Hungarian Rhapsodies, Brahms' Hungarian Dances, Sarasate's *Zigeunerweisen*, certain works of Bartók and Kodály, and Hungarian dance composers of the *verbunkos* period (in the early-to-mid nineteenth century) – or operetta excerpts arranged for Gypsy bands.

Western classical repertoire has served to legitimize Gypsy bands going back to early in the twentieth century, since this repertoire has historically been more prestigious than either popular or folk music, and even as folk music has carved out substantial institutional spaces in the Hungarian cultural landscape, Gypsy music and musicians have only infrequently gained access to those spaces. On the other hand, Gypsy bands playing arranged classical music are not fully accepted as classical musicians. More and more Hungarian Roma are becoming successful as classical musicians in recent years, but to do so, they must generally become classical musicians first and foremost, with "Gypsy music" becoming a colorful part of their background rather than a key component of their job.

This article began by critiquing as somewhat excessive the emphasis on "pastness" in scholarly discourse on Hungary's Gypsy music. So it may seem a bit disingenuous to end this story with a "decline of time" narrative, but the current state of the genre—and of many of the musicians who formerly performed it—make it difficult to avoid such an end. Even so, showing how that genre and its musicians evolved over the course of the twentieth century, through alterations in the technological and political frames in which they operate, offers a much more nuanced view of the meaning of that genre. Further research will continue to illustrate the complicated ways in which Roma musicians have participated in Hungarian musical life, and have changed and been changed by it.

About terminology: The word Roma, the adjectival form of which is "Romani," means "man" in the Indic language spoken by many Roma across Europe; the word "Gypsy" and its equivalents—"cigány" in Hungarian, "Zigeuner" in German, etc.—is based historically on the mistaken notion that these people are from Egypt. The word "Gypsy" is often used pejoratively, and for this reason, some have advocated for its abolition in academic and official discourse. There is an argument for talking about "Gypsy music," or "Romani music," in an inclusive way: any music that Roma musicians perform. Though I generally agree with this practice, I use it in a narrower sense here: the term "[Hungarian] Gypsy music" is used to refer to entertainment music performed in Hungary (or Hungarian spaces outside of the country), almost exclusively by Roma musicians, mainly at restaurants, cafés, and private events, both from a podium and circulating among tables, as well as in more concert-like settings or in theaters.

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## RURAL SOCIETIES WITH INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN NORTHEAST HUNGARY

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The sphere of analysis in this article includes settlements in the north of Hungary. They are located in the north of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County, in the area that attracted a labor force to the former Metallurgical Works of Ózd. The most considerable stratification of society of the rural and poor noble population that lived in the settlements neighboring Ózd, which was inhabited since the Middle Ages, happened when in the former industrial town the demand for the labor force of the gradually expanding works extended and changed the society of the neighboring villages. After 1945, the process continued, and it attracted the inhabitants of the settlements located within a 50 kilometer radius to take part in industrial employment. Metallurgy, which offered a secure, permanent living as well as mining, which was typical of the region, formed laborers and miners from the native peasants living close to migrating workers and sometimes created dynasties of workers through several generations. The employment of women came to the fore in time: apart from housekeeping, which was demanding, the girls and mothers could do heavy manual work, so they appeared on the labor market as earners as well.

**Keywords:** urban history, Hungary, Ózd, social stratification, socialism, demographic shift, urbanization

The analysis of the industrial, building, transport and trade sectors, and within these the categorization according to profession and position provides an opportunity to monitor, compare and draw conclusions from the changes that took place after the socialist era and the years following the change of regime. The formation of manufacturing industry and the working class in the industrial sector took place even in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, however, escape into mining had similar effects on impoverished masses of former peasants especially in the first waves of stratification. From the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century these phenomena became common nationwide, the world of rural societies changed, at the same time the stratum of industrial workers included new elements. Accordingly, the participants of labor market showed a complex image. Looking through their groups according to employment a significant stratification among the gen-


erations can be noticed within a short period of time. The intra- and intergenerational analyses represent the importance of industrial employment, the break-up of the traditional peasant world, the changes in lifestyle, the trauma caused by the cutback of heavy industry as well as the disappearance of traditional social groups (e.g. peasantry, industrial workers). In the early 21<sup>st</sup> century we can notice the gradual downtrend of labor market as well as the revaluation of the service sector despite the decreasing demand. The transition from Socialism into a market economy created insurmountable problems in several regions, mostly in the fields of economic restructuring, employment, unemployment and social composition. The picture is especially depressing in the northern region of Hungary, in the once flourishing settlements relying on mining and heavy industries, which had provided them with certain livelihood. The study focuses on villages surrounding the city of Ózd, where the survival and sustenance of the population was directly threatened by closure of factories, plants and mines in the area. The common features of these settlements often include social restructuring, negative migration due to manifold reasons such as demographic processes and the lack of employment opportunities, deep poverty and subsequent social ghettoisation, the gradual deterioration and disintegration of cultural and educational facilities, and last but not least, a hopeless vision for the future.

### **The Factory of Ózd**

The demographics and social composition of the district of Ózd was shaped by various historical factors. Industrialisation, which began in the mid-nineteenth century, followed by world wars, annexation, land reforms, forced industrialisation and reorganisation of agriculture, and finally the crisis and liquidation of heavy industries, were determinative for the lives of the people living in the region in the past hundred years. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, intensive immigration to the region caused a major population increase, which eventually gave way to a dramatic decrease due to the regression of the iron industry after the middle of the 1980s.

The “Gömöri Vasművelő Egyesület”, established in the May of 1845, as well as the factory being in the process of construction from the following year immediately became an influence on the life of Ózd, which was then a small village only inhabited by 350, in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In 1881 the Rimamurány-Salgótarján Ironworks Plc. was established through merging and it brought a dynamic development to the works of Ózd. The expansion of capacity brought about the upsurge of coal mining and mining communities. At the turn of the century there were more and more neighboring settlements with stratification: Sajóvárkony, Arló, (Borsod)Bóta, Csernely, the later connected Csokva and

Omány, Bükkmogyorósd and (Lénárd)Daróc. They rapidly became mining settlements while the number of their populations started to increase. (Sárközi, Z. 1980. 90.)



The factory viewed from above. Photo by Dobosy, László. Ózd, 1992

Statistics also refer to the way industry gained ground. One of the examples can be Arló, situated 3 kilometers outside of Ózd. The population of Arló in 1890 was only 1,458, in 1900 it was 1,679, in 1910 it was 1,954, in 1920 it was 2,095, in 1930 it was 2,625, and in 1941 it was as many as 3,147. The increase within half a century was 53.7 percent! (Population Census, 1932. 63.; 1947. 52.) The reversal of employment is indicated by the gradual decline in number and proportion of local farmers earning their living from agriculture despite the constant growth in the number of members and in 1930 only 31.2 percent (304 people) belonged to this category out of all the earners (973 people). It was a significant decrease of more than 10 percent comparing to the previous census (in 1920 it was 42.1 percent). (Population Census, 1925. 108.; 1934. 73.) After the cessation of mining Arló gave the biggest proportion of commuting workers of the Metallurgical Works of Ózd in the mid-1970s, so industrial work only changed in form, its importance regarding secure living had been determining until the change of regime. The lifestyle changed and the shifts of earlier 16, 12, and finally 8 hours governed the rhythm of the life of manufacturing, mining colonies and industrial workers.

Along with social changes an unique labor market evolved with workers mainly coming from villages whose inhabitants were engaged in agriculture. They

became later skilled workers, unskilled workers or semi-skilled workers in the factory, but majority of them came from peasant families with peasant parents. The local societies changed and the agricultural population restratified. Due to the changes it was not possible to prevent traditional peasant family models from disintegrating. By the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, 35 percent of industrial labor worked in the city of Ózd but at the end of the century the factory was providing work for the inhabitants of 28 settlements, which accounted for more than 44 percent of the labor force then. In 1955 industrial manpower employed in Ózd exceeded the 13,000 mark and while 7,000 workers were local residents, over 45 percent of the workforce commuted daily from the villages of the industrial area. (Kóródi, J. 1959. 245.) In 1975 there were commuters already from 55 villages to Ózd, and their number increased to 4,650. (Dömötör, Á. 1997. 615.) The important role of the factory is clear-cut: with 1,350 workers the above mentioned settlements, which were 7–8 kilometers away from Ózd, gave a third of the commuting workers. One of the settlements, Arló, belonged the region where commuting took place at the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, therefore it can be considered as one of the first settlements where stratification of society appeared. In 1975 there were 1,050 locals working in the factory, there was a strong differentiation among them: from simple cleaners to engineers, we could find local people in all positions. (Papp, E. 1976. 83–84.) There were workers from Arló not only in the Borsodnásasd Factory of Plates but also in other smaller factories.



End of the shift. Photo from a private collection. Borsodnásasd, 1960s

In the mid-1970s, 72 percent of the population in the region of Ózd worked in industry while the proportion of those working in agriculture fell to 13.3 percent. The number of commuting workers was high: according to one of the reports it reached 1,200 at the Borsodnádásd Factory of Plates and in the working coal mines it was 1,500 people. (Vodila, B. 1976. 79.) All the same, fluctuation was high and there were several sources to back it up: before 1970 we can talk about migration within the walls of the factory, but after that it was the leaving of workers from the factory that often caused problems. (Tóth, P. 1980. 432.)

During the 1970s shortage of steel in Hungary, the steel industry continued to use obsolete technologies and the product structure was never reorganised to satisfy the demands of international markets. By the 1990s, mining ceased altogether, heavy industry plants stopped operation, and the Ózd Metal Works was divided into parts, and even their successors are long gone by now. Besides Ózd itself, the agglomeration and nearby settlements were in the same position: their development ground to a halt, new opportunities were hard to find. Contrary to the national tendencies at the time, the job market entered an unfavourable phase. While the number of pensioners was above national average, the majority of the unemployed were young (under 35) with no education and technical skills. With the disappearance of the formerly prevalent metal and mining industries, the re-employment of people over 40 became very difficult. Although the number of registered unemployed dropped between 1995 and 2005, the figures were still very high in January 2005 (nearly 5,000 people), and the situation has not improved since then.

In the following I will analyse the local phenomena of social changes and take as examples two settlements lying in the valley of Hangony creek emphasizing the common features and the main differences. During the economic and political transformation following the change of regime the former socialist economic cooperative system fell apart. The export of Hungarian agriculture, which was in financial difficulties, was no longer able to provide the transport of raw materials and energy which were necessary for smelting and the manufacturing of materials in chemical industry. The low prices, the losing of markets, uneconomical production and finally the reconstruction of structure which failed to happen all aggravated the situation. In order to control losses support for export was ceased, the transformation of the structure of production and employment became important. By the 1990s, the metallurgical and mining industry ceased to exist, the heavy industrial factories stopped, the Metallurgical Works of Ózd fell apart. The outskirts of the city and its surroundings got into the same situation, too, their development has stopped, new chances arose only in a few places.

In the spring of 1991 iron industry of crude iron ceased in Ózd while procedures of privatization, bankruptcy and liquidation proceedings started across the country. (Vass, T. 2003. 100, 104.) Unemployment gradually increased and at the same



time demographic figures deteriorated: the mortality rate is high and increasingly less and less children are born, the number of emigrants grew, the population of the town and its area decreased, the standard of living declined. In a statistical respect 1993 was a trough when the number of registered unemployed approximated the number of former factory workers of Ózd exceeding 12 thousand.

### **Analyses of Settlements in the Hangony Valley I. Domaháza**

One of the most important centers of the eastern “Palóc” ethnic minority where tradition is kept is definitely Domaháza. The westernmost settlement of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County is situated near the Slovak border, 17 kilometers from Ózd. According to the documentary evidence, Domaháza had existed by the 13<sup>th</sup> century and lies in an ethnographic region called Barkóság with eastern Palóc groups. Its population reached 1,000 only after the First World War, then in 1960 the maximum number of population was 1,286, but since then it has been continuously decreasing, today only 950 people live there. Its surroundings are hilly, the ground here is sterile, the fields are of poor quality and hard to cultivate. Accordingly, its farming was self-sufficient, there was no real possibility to produce goods for markets. Despite the village’s bad conditions the population of the settlement was engaged in agriculture and animal keeping through centuries.

The former noble families, who lived as peasants, were mostly engaged in animal husbandry, industrial work had not been typical in the settlement before 1945. In the socialist system, with the abolishment of private property more and more people left their lands and became factory workers at the works of Ózd. The population of Domaháza grew gradually through the years and in 1920 it reached 1,000, and after the Second World War at the time of a census held on 1st January 1949 the number was 1,182. Domaháza can be considered enclosed. It is clear from the fact that unlike other settlements neighboring Ózd the proportion of those who earned their living from agriculture was still bigger.

The changes of the “Kádár-era” (1956–1988) made essential impacts on the structure of families and the employment distribution. In 1960 the number of local inhabitants reached the so-called “demographic peak” which was 1,286 people, the majority of which were women.

With the 367 families the proportion of dependents was 10 percent higher than that of the earners and it refers to the natural progeny and the make-up of people which was not senescent yet. It must be emphasized that there was a most considerable and dynamic change in the structure of employment by comparison with the time of the previous census: regarding the distribution of earners agriculture came in the second position (33.9 percent) with an enormous

decline while the proportion of industrial and construction workers, which increased simultaneously, came to the top (with a total of 51.5 percent!) (Population Census, 1961. 97.)

**Table 1.** Population by economic branch in Domaháza (1960–1980)

	1960		1970		1980	
	Person	percent	Person	percent	Person	percent
Agricultural, sylviculture	282	46.8	199	37.1	82	19.2
Industry, building industry	225	37.4	281	52.4	272	63.6
Transportation	16	2.6	11	2.1	16	3.7
Trade	9	1.6	21	3.9	22	5.1
Other	70	11.6	24	4.5	36	8.4
Total	602	100	536	100	428	100

(Population Census, 1961. 183, 196–197.; 1972. 550.; 1981. 735.)

After dealing with the problems of distance and the appearance of bus transport there was a remarkable growth in the number of industrial workers. In 1949 there were only 64, in 1960 already 224 and in 1975 there were 228 workers of Domaháza who worked in one of the departments of the Metallurgical Works of Ózd most of them commuting on a daily basis. According to the data from the year 1960 most of these commuters worked at transport factories. At the time of the transformation of structure concerning heavy industry, it was around the mid-1980s, there were 516 wage earners in the village a great proportion (77 percent – 395 people) of whom worked at the works. The period between 1990 and 2001, however, looks quite different: the number of unemployed (32 and 117 people) grew appreciably and it proved to be permanent. (Population Census, 1990; 2001)<sup>1</sup>

The factory itself and its close-down had its effect both on the local communities and families. Now there is no producers' cooperative, no factory. The future of the village has probably never been so insecure as today. Meanwhile, the local society has transformed: without work and secure living the youth move away, the number of elderly people is high, and at the same time there is a great number of Roma who are buying the cheap properties but are without qualifications, education and work.

## Analyses of Settlements in the Hangony Valley II. Hangony

This settlement is also one of the villages among Palóc settlements and its natural environment was not particularly favorable for the predominantly farming and stockbreeding Roman Catholic population. Protestantism could not appear here, it became a completely Catholic settlement. The village is a good example for the effect that distance from the factory had. In Hangony, which is situated just 9 kilometers from Ózd and therefore it is closer than Domaháza, the stratification of society took place with similar intensity to Szentsimon, which became part of Ózd in 1979, earlier than in Domaháza. The village that was located on the southern border of the former Gömör hundred (a county in the Middle Ages under the control of a castle) had a population of 1,639<sup>2</sup> people at the beginning of 2013.

The village had formerly been inhabited by nobles and villeins and consisted of two individual parts (Felsőhangony and Alsóhangony), which were administratively joined only in 1939. Industry soon attracted the local peasants who owned just a few lands: for instance in 1930 in Alsóhangony, which belonged to the district of Putnok in the county, 28 percent (386 people) of earners worked in industry and this proportion was similar among the businesspeople of Felsőhangony (382 people). (Population Census, 1934. 73.) 1,076 people lived in Domaháza in that year and only 5 percent of this number were engaged in industry, whereas in Szentsimon out of 950 people it was 30 percent. After the two parts of Hangony had united it became part of the district of Ózd and by 1949 the majority of workers were employed in industry here too. Industrial workers could only outnumber other workers in the second half of the “Kádár-era”: at the time of the census in 1980 the proportion of those working in agriculture was only 15 percent, consequently the process of stratification was over.

In the 1970s Hangony became one of the villages of traditional labor reserve of the metal industry, too, and it had many workers commuting daily by bus. The majority of them came from peasant families so the local society changed and the agricultural population restratified while the number of inhabitants was more than 1,900 in 1960 and 1,873 in 1970. The settlement then exceeded the so-called “demographic peak” (1,970 people), but the number of those really living there started to fall: in 1970 it was 1,892, in 1980 it was 1,803, and in 1990 1,753 people lived in Hangony. (Population Census, 1992. 309.)

In consequence of the changes the collective effects of both commuting and the factory as well as the town integrated the lifestyle of the people of Hangony. In 1980, ahead of Szentsimon, Hangony gave the second most commuters (514) to Ózd. Most of them were naturally blue-collar workers employed in industry. Comparing them to their parents or grandparents it is clear that there was a transition and a change in occupation, so most of the fathers of commuters from Hangony were attached to agriculture, forestry: there were shepherds, servants, day labor-

**Table 2.** Active earners by sex and economic branch in Hangony (1980)

Sex / Branch	Men						Women					
	Total	Agricultural	Industry	Transportation	Trade	Other	Total	Agricultural	Industry	Transportation	Trade	Other
Person	472	55	355	16	9	37	296	23	165	8	36	64
percent	100	11.7	75.2	3.4	1.9	7.8	100	7.8	55.7	2.7	12.2	21.6

(Population Census, 1981. 746–747.)

ers, peasants, woodmen among them. The prestige of qualification was revalued in time, since by the 1980s there were more and more skilled workers (248 people) among them, and even workers who held positions in directorates and managements (18 people). (Commuting, 1983. 634–635.) At that time, in the villages of Hangony Valley two major occupational groups lived together: the agricultural population working locally (or in agricultural cooperative farms) and the industrial workers (e.g. metalworkers, smelters), who commuted to the iron factory of Ózd.

The traditional family model also changed: the strict wedding (and religious) endogamy, which was typical of the eastern “Palóc” ethnic minority, was pushed into the background, and as a result, unmarried men and women could choose their partners from other settlements. The survey of Ákos Dömötör ethnographer in 1976 emphasized these processes in the neighborhood of Ózd, and while other settlements did not experience such changes the proportion of such “events” was 20 percent in Hangony. The choice of partners became exogamous: in one of the neighboring settlements, Kissikátor, nearly two-thirds of the commuting factory workers chose local partners, while in Hangony this proportion was only 46.4 percent. (Dömötör, Á. 1994. 380.)

At the same time with the disappearance of endogamy and the stratification of the local society the traditions of ethnic culture were gradually losing their importance, the traditional peasant world sank into oblivion. Achieving middle-class status was dilatory and as a result the functional system of family transformed, the former large families were replaced by smaller families of workers, the factory (place of work) became the center of communication and information stream, within the previously closed community the giving of tradition and the reception of culture heightened. Most of the women who had been previously engaged in housekeeping started to work together with men. Among the workplaces was the branch of Debrecen Clothes Factory in Ózd, or other smaller factories (for instance in Hangony) where most local women could find employment and consequently they could contribute to the upkeep of their families as well as the income of the household. Meanwhile, light industry became a branch of industry that could employ a considerable number of people. With the change of regime this – similarly to heavy industry – also ended: in the April of 1990 the press reported the gathering of workers, and finally the clothes factory of Ózd closed down.

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### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> [http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kotetek/06/05/data/tabhun/4/load02\\_1\\_2.html](http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kotetek/06/05/data/tabhun/4/load02_1_2.html);  
[http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kotetek/06/05/data/tabhun/4/load02\\_1\\_3.html](http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kotetek/06/05/data/tabhun/4/load02_1_3.html) (Last download: March 2012)
- <sup>2</sup> [http://www.ksh.hu/apps/hntr.telepules?p\\_lang=HU&p\\_id=25104](http://www.ksh.hu/apps/hntr.telepules?p_lang=HU&p_id=25104) (Last download: March 2014)

# SPECIAL URBANIZATION: THE EFFECTS OF INDUSTRY ON RURAL SETTLEMENTS IN HUNGARY: A CASE STUDY

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Until the middle of the nineteenth century Ózd was only a small settlement the residents of which were engaged primarily in farming. The center of the area was not Ózd, but rather the neighboring town of Sajóvárkony, which was also home to the registry office. The society and image of the village underwent major changes with the decision to establish an ironworks. As Ózd was slowly affected by urbanization, its population grew substantially. At the turn of the century, it was already seen as a small town. However, Ózd only became legally town in 1949. In this article, I present the evolution of the settlement from a small community with an economy founded essentially on agriculture to a medium-sized city with an economy based on industry.

**Keywords:** Ózd, Hungary, urbanization, urban history, industrialization, economic history

I would began my examination of the transformation of Ózd with an outline of the problems that arose with the urbanization of the settlement. The landowners and craftsmen living at that time in Gömör county in the north of Hungary were interested in smelting. In the early nineteenth century most of them merged to extend their influence and they formed smaller organizations. The main reasons were: merging was essential to make production more efficient and to increase the quantity, they needed to use their combined power to counteract any unfavorable outside impact, and it was easier for them to launch their products on export markets together. In 1845 the organizations planned to construct an ironworks. They chose Ózd, which was located in the northernmost of Borsod county, to



be the site for the works since it had brown coal deposits which were necessary for smelting. The iron ore was transported from the neighboring yards in Gömör county.

The production in the works started in 1847 and it generated significant changes in the region. In 1881 the works of Ózd merged with those of Borsodnádásd and Salgótarján creating the Rimamurány-Salgótarján Ironworks Plc. This brought about an even greater development, and as a result, the image and society of Ózd was very much like that of a town in the last decades of the nineteenth century. (Berend 1980) Earlier the inhabitants of Ózd were only engaged in farming on lands of poor quality, we could only find a few craftspeople there. They could, therefore, get employment at the ironworks only as hands. It was at least something better than the way they had lived as poor peasants since the payment they got at the works was secure and predictable. The management recruited clerks and skilled workers from abroad and the north of Hungary where there had previously been industrial plants and smelting. Formerly the population of Ózd had been exclusively Catholic and they had only spoken Hungarian there, but the migrant workers were Slovaks, Germans and Moravians who were Catholics, Lutherans and Calvinists. They had a great impact on the image of the society in Ózd. These migrants came from citified surroundings, so they influenced the mentality of the natives in this direction. (Dobosy 1992)

Table 1: The changes in the population of Ózd in the given periods

<i>Year</i>	<i>Population (capital)</i>
1850	346
1857	821
1869	1,216
1880	1,430
1890	2,304
1900	3,640
1910	5,981
1920	6,022
1930	7,322
1941	21,277


Source: Statistical data from censuses

According to the table it is obvious that the population of Ózd multiplied during a century. The fastest increase happened in the early period (in the middle of the nineteenth century) and at the turn of the century. The population grew signifi-

cantly as a result of the location of the works and the attracting effect of smelting. The number of inhabitants increased from a couple of hundred to several thousand, at turn of the century the population was ten times bigger than before. Urbanization can clearly be seen from the increase of population. It shows us that by the early 1900s there was a population in Ózd as big as that of a smaller town. The population here did not include the inhabitants of those smaller settlements which had been built by the management of the works, but administratively belonged to the neighboring Bolyok or Sajóvárkony villages whose dwellers also experienced observable changes thanks to the ironworks. These neighboring settlements and Ózd merged into a larger town in 1940, and that gives the visibly larger number of population in the statistics of the year 1941.

It is definitely worth taking a closer look at how the structure of employment changed at that time, as it can also be one of the characteristics of urbanization. The locals, the majority of which had previously been in poor financial situations, were more than willing to take a job at the ironworks. The local society was soon stratified from agricultural workers to industrial workers. The settlement of people was continuous, and it accelerated from the 1880s.

I have looked through the sources of the time and I conclude the three-quarter part of the population, at the turn of the century, earned their living from iron industry. The rest is as follows: 7–10% is made up of business people, craftspeople, administrative clerks who moved to Ózd because of the increased demand



Picture 1: The ironworks, surrounded by housing estates in the early twentieth century  
Source: Collection of the Museum of Ózd

created by the development of the works and the growth of the population. Agricultural workers had a similar proportion to the above. They were the natives who still had not chosen to be employed at the works. The proportion of the stratum of agricultural workers slowly decreased in this period. Through the analysis of the employment structure it is obvious that the settlement had the characteristics of a town rather than a village by the turn of the century. (Registers of Ózd 1895–1949, The census of the Countries of the Hungarian Crown in 1900)

The appearance of the ironworks caused a considerable change to the housing conditions which had previously been poor and rustic. The Rimamurány-Salgótarján Ironworks Plc attached great importance to improving the living conditions of its workers and employees after its foundation in 1881. Apart from the high wages and generous payments in kind the company built several housing estates for their workers. It was a way to localize people and to enhance loyalty towards the company. Another reason for the importance of building these houses was that formerly if one had been offered a better payment somewhere else they had not had any trouble moving away. These buildings were considered to be modern at that time and they surrounded the factory. The main consideration was to make it faster for the workers to get to their place of work. Besides, there was free use of the gardens.

At the beginning of the twentieth century the housing estates were provided with modern road network and public services. Peace was kept by the guardians of the housing estate. Those areas which were outside the boundaries of the housing estate – the „old Ózd” – were not so developed and remained rural. (Csontos–Vass 2001)

It is essential to analyze the level of the provision of public institutes in Ózd at that time as it can also mark the urbanization of a settlement. The Rimamurány-Salgótarján Ironworks Plc also laid special emphasis on improving the living standard and education of its workers. A hospital for factory workers was also established to improve medical attention. A swimming pool was also built near the factory in 1904, and it was available not only for clerks but also for workers. It was the first indoor swimming pool in Central Europe. Apart from swimming possibilities it also provided smaller rooms where one could enjoy the favorable effects of hot and cold steam. In 1896 the company set up an own elementary school in which there was a high level of education and the school itself employed teachers recognized nationwide. The eight-class education system was first established at this school in the country instead of the previous six-class system.

The company gave special attention to culture. The clerks could take part in cultural programs in the Tiszti Kaszinó (Casino for Officers) and the workers in the Olvasó Egylet (Society of Readers). The auditorium of the latter was the sixth biggest in the country. Many charities and other organizations as well as choirs operated and there was a wide variety of sporting possibilities. The buildings



Picture 2: The building of the indoor swimming pool and bath in Ózd  
Source: Collection of the Museum of Ózd

were of great architectural value. These are unambiguously the signs of urbanization since Ózd was adequately provided with public institutes already in the late nineteenth century. (Nagy 2012)

Table 2: The changes in the numbers of craftsmen and businesspeople (per person) between 1898 and 1908 in Ózd

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>1898</i>	<i>1908</i>
Shoemaker	5	11
Tailor	2	4
Watchmaker	2	3
Joiner	1	2
Tinner	1	3
Butcher	1	2
Slaughterer	3	3
Ale-draper	4	6
Trader	7	17
Barber	2	5
Baker	1	3
Brush-maker	1	1
Coffee seller	2	3
Confectioner	-	1
Architect	-	2
<b>Altogether</b>	32	66

Source: A.B.: Az ózdi hetivásár ügye. (The matter of weekly fair in Ózd) In: Ózdi Hírlap, 6 Dec. 1908. pp 2 –3.

The table above shows us that at the end of the nineteenth century Ózd already had a wide range of possibilities as regards business. In 1898 there were 32 craftsmen and businesspeople living in the settlement, this number doubled within 10 years. More than 222 self-employed craftsmen and 140 businesspeople lived in Ózd in 1940 after the merging of settlements. (Berend 1980: 263.) The appearance and expansion of trades was due to the demand created by the local residents, and this demand also reflects urbanization, in other words the urban mentality of the locals. Although the number of traders increased remarkably in this period, it was considered to be too low compared to those settlements that had similar number of residents.

The migrating skilled workers made a remarkable impact on the mentality of the local villagers. Their previous scale of values changed significantly. It was not agricultural work, but the factory that was in the center of their lives, they made their schedules according to the work at the factory. The people in Ózd, similarly to those in other towns, regularly went out to attend cultural programs and entertaining shows in their free time. The way they dressed also changed rapidly as

a result of the migrants and the work at the factory, and it was supported by the management as well. (Vass 1977: 168–175.)

Even the contents of newspapers reflected the town-like features of Ózd at the turn of the century. In the January of 1910 a local paper called “Ózdi Hírlap” described Ózd this way: *‘For only a few years our little village has been undergoing a drastic change. Certain things happen day by day and they further the formation of a small country town from a muddy settlement. Delightful palaces are being built (...), and the society is slowly beginning to be a town...’* (Alig néhány. Ózdi Hírlap, 9. jan. 1910. 9. p. 2) Not only the journalists had these thoughts but also the local intellectuals whose real aim was also the change from village to town already in this period. Göbl Márton local parish priest had also expressed his thoughts in the paper called “Ózd és Vidéke” in 1907, more than 40 years before Ózd was pronounced town. He suggested that by joining the neighboring settlements to Ózd *‘... it will found a large town. These settlements are so closely located to the developing industry of Ózd which provides them, that their joining involuntarily offers itself and it can lead to the formation of a town with a regular council.’* (Dr. Göbl Márton: Ózd jövője (*The future of Ózd*). In: Ózd és Vidéke, Dec. 5. 1907. pp 2–3). These words unequivocally refer to the fact that contemporary intellectuals all believed that both the aesthetic and social image of Ózd showed that the settlement would soon have to be given the status of a town.



Picture 3: View of the high street of Ózd  
Source: Collection of the Museum of Ózd

All in all, we can see that Ózd was more like an urbanised settlement than a village at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The number of population increased as well, the structure of employment of those living there did not reflect rural conditions. The image of Ózd was also town-like if we take a closer look at the view of the streets of that time and also at the architectural features of the buildings which have been built since then. The town was adequately provided with social and cultural institutes and it started to act as the center of the region from the last third of the nineteenth century. The contemporary sources supported this as well. By the beginning of the twentieth century the mentality considerably changed as a direct result of the migrating clerks and skilled workers, and the local residents looked and behaved like urban people rather than rural ones. The way people dressed also changed rapidly, local clothes were fast replaced by factory clothes. Nevertheless, thanks to the political circumstances the people of Ózd had to wait a long time before their settlement was given the status of a town. It only happened in the first years of socialism, in 1949, so Ózd had spent half a century on the waiting list to earn its well-deserved place among the towns of Hungary.

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**HUNGARIAN-CROATIAN WATER-PAINTING:  
THE RICHNESS OF NUANCE  
IN THE IMAGE OF HUNGARIANS IN THE CROATIAN  
PUBLIC IMAGINATION FROM THE 16<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY  
TO THE 19<sup>TH</sup>**

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This paper presents the image of Hungarians in the Croatian lands from the 16<sup>th</sup> century to the 19<sup>th</sup> on the basis of examples from literary (fictional) and journalistic (non-fiction) texts in Latin, Croatian and German. The image was very complex. It varied from an extremely positive perception – in the first centuries of the period under consideration – to clearly expressed negative perceptions and intolerance – that were most prominent during the revolutionary years 1848–1849, and most frequently, one can encounter a combination of positive and negative stereotypes existing in different ratios and with numerous transitional nuances.

**Keywords:** image of Hungarians, Croatia, literature, journalism, Habsburg, Revolution of 1848

It is an ancient and wide-spread phenomenon that specific characteristics or even characters are attributed to different societies, nations, or races. In the course of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, such understanding was included in a comparative-historical paradigm that prevailed in the humanities. Perceptions of foreign peoples and countries – perceptions of Others – are a research topic in which interests and research methodology of different social sciences and humanities overlap. In the 1960s, imagology emerges (from Latin *imago* – image, perception, idea; and Greek *lógos* – speech, word, concept, thought, reason) as a separate discipline of comparative literature whose primary task is to research literary perceptions of foreign countries and peoples (hetero-perceptions) and of one's own country and people (auto-perception). Perceptions of other nations are not objective and complex but are mainly highly subjective and simplified, marked by exaggeration

of some characteristics on the one hand and by downplaying or omitting other characteristics on the other.<sup>1</sup> Most often, they are based on certain stereotypes and ingrained views. Stereotypes are imagological constructs, petrified identification points of sorts, which come into being as a result of a (long-lasting) process of shaping ideologies and identities.<sup>2</sup>

When researching national perceptions, it is necessary to determine the inter-text of a given national perception as a trope, in other words determine its place and function within a text in which it appears, place it in a broader historical context and also take into consideration its pragmatic-functionalist perspective, *i.e.* research its reception in the target audience and similar.<sup>3</sup>

The stereotypical image of Hungarians in the Croatian public and in Croatian literature was shaped under the influence of a number of factors: personal contacts and family ties, political, ideological, social, military, economic, cultural, and religious factors in changing combinations and with varying intensity. It was first shaped and disseminated in fiction, in prose and poetic literature. Different strategies were used in the process of shaping stereotypes about Hungarians in the country of their neighbours across the Drava River: imagination (thinking an idea of Self/Own versus Other/Foreign), totalisation (thinking individual images of Oneself and Others as absolute wholes), these images are then naturalised, they are declared to be the actual essence of a nation and are generalised and are attributed to all members of a nation. Discrimination, or rather denigration or exclusion of Others, is closely connected to generalisation. The ultimate goal of the process of building modern identities is to establish domination of one's Own over Others.<sup>4</sup> Contrasting (juxtaposing auto-perceptions and hetero-perceptions), analogy (determining mutual similarities), inversion (conscious attribution of one's own, mainly negative characteristics to Others) and other procedures are used in the process of building one's own identity in relation to the identity of Other.

The image of Hungarians in the Croatian lands from the 16<sup>th</sup> to the 19<sup>th</sup> century was hardly ever exclusively positive or negative, it was not black and white, but was most often a combination of positive and negative national perceptions in different ratios and in a wide range, with Hungarophilia and Hungarophobia being its opposite poles. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the process of shaping national stereotypes was, in addition to the already mentioned factors, also influenced by at the time contemporary achievements in natural and social sciences, and the humanities, but most of all by current ideology and practice of politics. One can distinguish two imagological aspects in the Croatian public's perception of the neighbour across the Drava River: the one is an image of a common state – the Hungarian-Croatian Kingdom, in other words of Hungary; the other is an image of Hungarians as a nation or individuals. More material on the first imagological aspect has been preserved from the early Modern Age.<sup>5</sup> In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, voluminous

material came into being that enables research of the perception of Hungarians as a nation. In the earlier periods, literature most effectively shaped, preserved and disseminated national stereotypes about Hungarians in the Croatian public, whereas from the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards, this function was to a large extent taken over by periodicals, brochures, leaflets, etc., even though the role of literature is not to be neglected in that period either.

This paper will demonstrate how stereotypical perceptions about Hungarians were shaped, what their function was, and what factors they depended on. The basis for this will be examples of Croatian literary texts written in Croatian and Latin, and non-fiction texts published in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Croatian press in Croatian and German.

In 1102, Croatia lost its independence having entered a state union with Hungary. From then on, it became an arena for different political pretensions and divisions, which resulted in the fragmentation of the Croatian ethnic territory. For this reason, it was almost impossible to standardise and unify the language of the people, Croatian, and Latin was therefore the official language of the Croatian Sabor (Diet) all through to 1847 as an aspect of defence against foreign influences and at the same time a demonstration of patriotism. Literary works too were more or less written in Latin.<sup>6</sup> In the context of imagology, this fact makes a slightly unusual situation: one speaks of Other in a foreign, but not one's own language. Positive and, very frequently, negative ideas and images of Other were expressed in the language that did not belong either to the one or the other people, or vice-versa it belonged to both. Thus, the Latin language as a supraregional language served as a language of mutual communication and a language of the intellectual elite but it also became an indispensable factor in shaping Croatian national identity.<sup>7</sup>

Using representative examples of Croatian literature in Latin, this paper will attempt to demonstrate in what way the image of Hungarians changed in dependence of the political circumstances of the time and the status of mutual relations between Croats and Hungarians. Three authors to be discussed represent three periods, the imagological procedures they use writing about Hungarians are diverse and their views on Hungarians vary from positive to slightly negative and to extremely negative and discriminating. The selected writers are Ludovik Crijević Tuberon (15<sup>th</sup>–16<sup>th</sup> century), Juraj Rattkay (17<sup>th</sup> century) and Tit(uš) Brezovački (late 18<sup>th</sup> century). They belong to different historical periods and differ from each other with respect to the genre they write in. In this regard, Tuberon and Rattkay are somewhat more similar: both write historiographical prose, the former in the genre of *commentarii*, and the latter in a specific kind of biography – banology, in the genres that were characteristic of the period in which they wrote.<sup>8</sup> Brezovački, on the other hand, wrote poetry – a political occasional *réveille*, also typical of the period in which it was written. One can assume that they, having selected a

customary genre and Latin (in particular in the case of Brezovački), imparted (or at least wanted to impart) to their works – in addition to universal intelligibility and broader spread – a certain dose of objectivity, in particular with respect to the attitudes about Hungarians and Other in general.

The humanist Ludovik Crijević Tuberon (1458–1527) from Dubrovnik was the first who, in his work *Commentarii de temporibus suis – Commentaries on My Time* (that may have been written between 1522 and 1527, and was first printed in 1603) described events from 1490 to 1522 (from King Matthias Corvinus' death to the election of Pope Adrian VI) with many episodes from recent and remote past.<sup>9</sup>

In his *Commentaries*, Tuberon has for the most part a positive opinion about Hungarians: they are courageous, adaptable, and sharp-witted (*solerti ingenio atque ad succumbendum tempori, maxime quum res urgent adversae, haud imparati*)<sup>10</sup>, dedicated to Christianity and consequently enemies of the Turks (*Turcis per se essent infensi et Christiano nomini deditissimi*)<sup>11</sup>, and these very characteristics make them positive. Nevertheless, they are not popular with their neighbouring nations, especially Czechs and Poles, who hate them as invaders of foreign lands (*Quapropter Hungari perinde ac alienae terrae invasores a finitimis odio habentur, praesertim a Boemis Polonisque*)<sup>12</sup>. Like other mortals, they too crave for money (*ut sunt Hungari veluti plerique mortals pecuniae avidi*)<sup>13</sup>, and as for Hungarian temperament, Tuberon claims that it has much wolfish in itself since they are a nation that has not yet discarded their innate savagery and smacks of Scythian barbarity. Thus, Bishop of Oradea, Ivan (John) Filipec, giving King Vladislaus pieces of advice on how to rule, says:

*Est igitur tibi noscendum Hungarorum ingenium, moresque eorum penitus animadvertendi, qui quidem multum lupi in se haud falso dicuntur habere, atque ita his imperandum, ut te amando simul et timendo venerentur, admirationeque dignum putent. I...I*

*Enimvero gens illa Scythicam adhuc redolens barbariem nondum ingenitam exiit feritatem. Atque iccirco omnia, prae viribus ac divitiis, caeterisque externis bonis, humana contemnit, nec prorsus quemquam venerandum putat, cuius maiestas nocere nequit. Quin etiam, non tam qui benigne cum Hungaris faciunt, quam qui non sinunt esse iniurios admirationi apud eos sunt. Illa enim inmanis feritas vi quidem frangi potest, comitate vero nunquam fere mitescit.*<sup>14</sup>

On the one hand, Tuberon attempts to objectively define the relationship between Croats and Hungarians through the state and legal relationship based on the law of inheritance, and emphasises that Dalmatians (in other words Croats) were not forced into the common state union with the force of arms (*neque enim vi ut armis coacti, sed cognationis iure in Hungaricam concessere ditionem*)<sup>15</sup>.

Generally speaking, the works from that period clearly display an awareness about “sharing the same destiny” in the struggle against Turks. On the other hand, however, a subjective component occasionally prevails in Tuberón’s writings and he writes that Hungarians and Croats quarrel over courage (*Hungari nimirum et Chrovati perpetuas de virtute controversias inter se habent*)<sup>16</sup>, adding, however, that the Turkish enemies appreciate the courage of Hungarians, Croats and Moldavians and hold them their equals (*Tametsi ferocissima nation solos fere Hungaros, Chrovatos et Moldavios sibi virtute pares ducat*)<sup>17</sup>. There are as many as 867 references to *Hungari* and *Hungaria* in Tuberón’s work (as opposed to 149 references to *Dalmatae* or, as expected, just a dozen references to *Croatae / Chrovati*).<sup>18</sup> In accordance with the usage in humanism, Tuberón uses ethnonyms taken over from Antiquity and thus more often uses the term *Dalmatae* meaning by this the Croatian population.

Tuberón’s “disinclination” towards Croats was noticed by another author whose examples will be presented here: Zagreb canon Juraj Rattkay (1612–1666) in his banology *Memoria regum et banorum Regnorum Dalmatiae, Croatiae et Sclavoniae* (*Memory of Kings and Bans of the Kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia*, printed in 1652).<sup>19</sup> He writes that “Tuberón seems to me suspicious whenever he writes about Croats, since he takes every opportunity presenting itself to rebuke the people impolitely and gratuitously (*Demum suspectum se mihi Tubero reddit cum de Croatis scribit, cum semper fere oblata occasione, sine causa hanc gentem inurbane perstringat*).<sup>20</sup>

Although it may at first sight appear that Rattkay writes against Hungarians and the union with them and that he praises “his” Croats, things are still not as simple as that. As shown by Sándor Bene in his introductory study accompanying the work *Memoria*,<sup>21</sup> Rattkay approved of the Pannonian-Illyrian state union, which is evident from the following examples: in his speech in honour of the election of Ivan Drašković to the office of Palatine, Rattkay refers to Drašković as the fifth in a succession who, following the honour of Croatia’s Ban (Vice-Roy), was elected Palatine and of whom our “entire Illyricum” is proud, since he is “ours most” (the other four being Nicholas Garai/Garay [Miklós Garai/Garay – Nikola Gorjanski], Imre/Emerik Perényi, Toma Nádasdy / Tamás Nádasdy and Emerik Zapolja / Imre Zápolya who are partly of Hungarian origin).<sup>22</sup> The speech also cites an epitaph from the gravestone of Drašković’s father which one certainly cannot interpret as Rattkay’s “misohungria”, *i.e.* as his negative attitude to Hungarians: “*O Drascovicios dent saecula postera multos / Gloria prisca Hunni Martis et artis erit.*”<sup>23</sup>

Some polemical notes in *Memoria* directed against Hungarians (the issue of the border between Slavonia and Hungary, or a conflict between Hungarian peers with Ivan Drašković), which are not based on Rattkay’s general opinion about Hungarians, but are his criticism of some individual cases, resulted in the percep-

tion of Rattkay in part of Croatia's older technical literature as a "counter-Hungarian agent" (as dubbed by Bene).<sup>24</sup> This position certainly needs to be revisited and redefined in the light of more recent interpretations.

A change in the political circumstances in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, characterised by a response of the Croatian and the Hungarian political elites to unconstitutional policy pursued by Joseph II, marked by centralist and Germanising tendencies, ruling by means of patents without convening the Hungarian and the Croatian Diet, and the beginnings of the Hungarian National Movement which looked across the Drava River as well and strove to make the southern neighbour accept the Hungarian language as official – which was in Croatia understood as a Hungarianisation tendency – resulted in the introduction of new negative elements in the image of Hungarians in the Croatian public. Since that time, resistance to such tendencies grew more prominent and found response in poetry too, in the genre of political occasional poems. One of the most well-known poems of the genre written in Latin is a poem by Tituš/Tit Brezovački (1757–1805) of July 1790 addressed to Ban Ivan Erdödy (1733–1806), who was in March 1790 appointed Ban of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia by Leopold II and who, in September of the same year, coined in the Croatian Diet the famous catchword: *Regnum regno non praescribit leges*. The poem is an attack on the Main County Head of Zagreb, Nikola Škrlec Lomnički (who appears in the poem under the recognisable nickname of *Scaliger*<sup>25</sup>), and his proposition that Croatia and Hungary should in the future be connected by an inextricable bond in defence against potential future onslaughts of the executive power. Somewhere along these lines, the Croatian Diet proposed and the Hungarian Diet adopted the conclusions LVIII and LXIX of 1791 that the Hungarian Vice-Regency Council should be accepted as a common government for Croatia and Hungary (until the time when Croatia would restore its control over the areas that were at the time under Turkish and Venetian rule) and that Croatia's contribution should be discussed at the Hungarian Diet, however, separately from Hungary's military contribution.<sup>26</sup> Brezovački also attacks the Bishop of Zagreb, Maksimilijan Vrhovec, and the Main County Head of Križevci, Aleksandar Szécsen, who, together with Škrlec, betray their own homeland and want to sell it to Hungarians (*His tamen, ah! miseras nos vendere Scaliger optat. / Impius, et patriae proditor usque suae;*).<sup>27</sup> The poem *Dalmatiae, Croatiae et Slavoniae trium sororum recursus ad novum proregem comitem Joannem Erdoedy*<sup>28</sup> is told by three sisters (personified Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia) who hope that the Ban will rescue them from "a godless company" – of Hungarians (*impia turba*) who are called (again following the inherited humanistic usage) Scythians who wish to obliterate the Croatian name and language (... *atque Croatorum nomen gentemque abolere. / Nullus abhinc Slavinus, Dalmata nullus erit, / Sed genus in Scythicum linguamque immutarier ipsam, / Hirsutos mores inque statuta placet*)<sup>29</sup>. Brezovački then compares Hungarians

with Austrian Germans (the former he dubs Huns, the latter Teutons, after the ancient Germanic tribe), and the comparison finishes in favour of Austrian Germans: *Credite, nulla datur toto truculentior orbe / Gens Hunno; Teuto suavior ipse fuit.*<sup>30</sup> After several verses, Brezovački continues his comparison with the reference to imposition of the Hungarian language which, he believes, is barbarian and for which nobody cares, except perhaps the inhabitants of the North Pole (*Barbara praeterea lingua est, quam respuit omnis / Ni extremi Lappon incola forte poli*).<sup>31</sup> In conclusion, he hyperbolically concludes that there is no alphabet in the world that could take down Hungarian words (*Ac merito, nam alphabetum non extat in orbe, / Hunnica quo possis scribere verba bene*)<sup>32</sup> and poses a rhetorical question: *Theuto fuit durus, quod vos peregrine iubebat / Verba loqui: quanto durior Hunnus erit?*<sup>33</sup>, and answers it in the following verse: *Ille tenet cultos mores et se excolit ultro, / Hic revocat barbibus saecula suis*.<sup>34</sup> Thus, in Brezovački's opinion, the Habsburgs wanted to carry out Germanisation but Hungarians in their Hungarianisation will be even worse. Equally so, the Austrian rule is rated cultured, whereas Hungarians are wild. This is emphasised with a trope stating that Hungarians invoke barbarian centuries with their beards (a symbol of savagery since the ancient times: even Cyclops is trying to become more civilised by cutting off his beard with a sickle in order to seduce beautiful Galatea). Brezovački ends his poem with a couplet, which through its lascivious, humorous, and slightly misogynic statement expresses the utmost contempt for Hungary, but at the same time its readiness not to shrink from anything in order to achieve its aspirations (*Hungara, da veniam, ardens quid sit femina, nosti / Illam dum caro vis spoliare viro*).<sup>35</sup>

The perception of Hungarians in this poem is very negative and is a reflection of the then topical bilateral political relations between the two peoples separated by the Drava River. Part of the Croatian public, and Brezovački was obviously one of them, did not support close links between Croatia and Hungary at the administrative level, *i.e.* a new political course charted by the Croatian Diet, and considered such policy to be a treachery of Croatian interests. The subsequent decades would demonstrate that the mentioned conclusions of the Diet had grave political consequences for Croatia, since its position was weakened in the forthcoming conflicts with Hungary riding the wave of an upsurge in national movements in both states.

As this example of a political *réveille* in Latin shows, the traditional, predominantly positive image of Hungarians in the Croatian public is increasingly gaining negative elements after 1790. This is particularly obvious since the 1820s as a consequence of the strengthening of the Hungarian National Movement and ever stronger pressures exerted on Croats to accept gradually the Hungarian language in public services. In their motto coined by Ljudevit Gaj, members of the Croatian National Revival<sup>36</sup> pointed to the important link with Croatia's neighbour across

the Drava River being common constitutionality (*Da Bog živi konstituciju ugarsku, Kraljevinu Hrvatsku i narodnost ilirsku!*).<sup>37</sup> To them, Hungarians served as a role model for modernising society and economy, promoting one's own language, developing national culture and building national cultural institutions, shaping social programmes, and in many other fields. Janko Drašković especially highlighted Hungarians as a role model in a number of areas.<sup>38</sup> In spite of all this, as early as the 1830s, Illyrians started to consciously introduce some negative elements in the perception of Hungarians in the Croatian public. This procedure was a consequence of deteriorating bilateral political relations, and it served to mobilise and homogenise the domestic public around the cultural and political programme of the Croatian National Revival. From then onwards, Hungarians were perceived as oppressors of Croats (and other Slavic peoples) in the national sense and as assimilators (starting with a brochure by the Slovak author Samuel Hojč *Sollen wir Magyaren werden?*, which, due to strict censorship was not printed in Slovakia, but in Karlovac in 1833). The Croatian public perceived them as enemies who wanted to destroy the Croatian people. A poem by Pavao Štoos *Kip domovine vu početku leta 1831*. [*The Picture of the Homeland at the Beginning of the Year 1831*] clearly reveals the fear of the death of one's own people: (*Ar već tjam Dunaj z slapmi v zrak điple, / Hoće da Savu z blatom zasiple; / Some vre z mustači gizdavo miže, / Lampe prot savskem ribicam zdiže, (...) Vre i svoj jezik zabit Horvati / Hote ter drugi narod postati.*).<sup>39</sup> The same is true of a speech by count Karl Sermage in the Croatian Diet on 15 November 1832. In a slightly paranoid way, he depicted the policy of the Magyar political elite towards Croatia in utmost negative terms: *I doista, ako ne ćemo da sami sebe zavaravamo, moramo priznati, da sva nakana Mađara ide zatim da sve naše pradjedovske običaje i zakonito stečena prava i privilegije, što smo ih nastojali kroz vjekove utvrditi i sačuvati, svojom nama dušmanskom premoći na saboru dokinu, kraljevstvo naše mnogo starije negoli Ugarska razvale i da mu ostave samo prazno ime, da stanovnici ove zemlje što jače osjete propast svojih prava, da osjete sramotu i svoju potištenost.*<sup>40</sup>

In the Croatian society of the time, the perception of Magyars as an Asiatic element in European culture was quite common.<sup>41</sup> The Asiatic element as one of the determinants of Hungarian identity can be found in the aforementioned poem by Tituš Brezovački from 1790. Ljudevit Gaj, Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski and other authors also made references to it,<sup>42</sup> and it was especially frequently exploited in the revolutionary years of 1848–1849. The negative elements in the image of Hungarians were noticeable in different public appearances by members of the Croatian National Revival, in brochures, newspaper articles and in Croatian literature of the Revival period, in particular in *budnice* (réveillés – popular songs aiming at awakening national feelings) and *davorije* (patriotic/battle songs), which at times could not be printed due to censorship but were disseminated



orally. Emphasis on the negative stereotypes about Hungarians in these poems can be explained by the fact that they had the strongest mobilising potential in the Croatian society of the time where an overwhelming majority of the population was illiterate. Several verses from an anonymous poem *Davorie dobrovoljacah spremajućih se na Magjare* [A Battle Song of Volunteers Preparing for a Fight against Magyars] printed as a leaflet, most probably from September 1848, serve as an example of the utmost negative perception of Magyars: *Dugo Magjari nami vladahu / Našu slobodu satàrt hotjahu: / Poraz vama o barbari, / Poraz vama o Magjari! / Hajd na vraga do Budima, / Smàrt Magjarima!*<sup>43</sup> Since the early 1830s, more precisely ever since a satirical poem *Palma* [Palm] by the Slovak author Juraj Rohony was printed in Zagreb in 1832, the image of Hungarians in the Croatian public was expanded by a further element of denying the genuineness of the Hungarian language and culture, which were called barbarian. This stereotype would later be used, especially during the time of major escalation in Croatian–Hungarian political relations. In other words, during the Illyrian Movement, the former allies of Croatia’s classes in their struggle against Viennese absolutism – Hungarians – were gradually turning into enemies. The way Hungarians were perceived in the Croatian public was, to a large extent, consciously changed by Croatian nationally conscious intellectuals in order to mobilise and homogenise the domestic public and contribute to it accepting the cultural (and political) programme of the Illyrian Movement.

Nevertheless, even at the time of gradual escalation in Croatian–Hungarian political relations in the 1830s and 1840s and, as a result, a deterioration in the perception of Hungarians in the major part of the Croatian public, there was still a sizeable group in Croatia that retained the traditional positive image of Hungarians, and perceived them as brothers in constitution, defenders of the same traditional social values, comrades-in-arms in the century-long armed struggle against Turk conquerors, and collaborators in their common resistance to germanising and absolutist-centralising tendencies of the ruling circles in Vienna. This group of people was called *Magyarones*, i.e. members and supporters of the Croatian–Hungarian Party (Horvatsko-vugerska stranka), which was established in 1841. They retained the extremely positive image of Hungarians until the revolution broke out in 1848, when they ceased to exist as an organised political group in Croatia due to the pressure of Croatian policy opposed to the Hungarian revolutionary government. This policy was pursued by members of the National Party headed by Ban Josip Jelačić.<sup>44</sup>

The strong aversion to Hungarians, even Hungarophobia, in most of the Croatian active and attentive public<sup>45</sup> culminated during the revolutionary years 1848–1849, when all negative elements in the perception of Hungarians became most severe. In Croatia, the Magyars were accused of having oppressed non-Magyar peoples and having tried to abolish Croatian autonomy, they were

rebuked for not choosing means to achieve their ends, for being perfidious and cunning. In line with the then contemporary accomplishments of social sciences, stereotypes about a clash of civilisations were applied to the relationship between Croats and Hungarians, and mutual differences were highlighted on the basis of a contrast between the West, represented by Croats, and the East, represented by Hungarians. As representatives of Western culture, Croats were considered culturally and biologically dominant *vis-à-vis* Hungarians, and their right to domination in Hungary was consequently challenged. Luckily, they did not apply extreme interpretations of differences in civilisation and did not use the stereotype of racial inferiority of eastern peoples in relation to western, obviously aware of the fact that the application of this stereotype to the differences in the relationship between Croats and Hungarians was indeed unacceptable. Differentiation by religion as a distinguishing element between Croats and some Hungarians was in the background. However, Magyars were connected with Turks and Mongols, and in this context, savagery, cruelty and similar characteristics were attributed to them. A myth about the Illyrian origin of Croats, which emphasised their indigenosity and belonging to the circle of Western civilisation, was juxtaposed to a myth about the Hunnic origin of Magyars who were called “a Turkish tribe”, “barbarians”, “Asiatics”, “Mongols’ fellow tribesmen” and “Oriental arrogance” and “Hunnic aristocratism” were attributed to them. The Croatian/Austrian-Hungarian War of 1848–1849 was accompanied by a propaganda war on both sides. Typical of it was its black-and-white perspective and belittling of the opponent. Thus, there were talks on the Croatian side that Hungarian leaders were blinded by the idea of Hungarian linguistic and national supremacy, the Hungarian army was dubbed “Magyar gangs” and there were attempts at discrediting it by alleging that its members had perpetrated war crimes (actual or fictional). Cowardice was attributed to them and it was said that they needed alcohol to boost their courage. Such accounts were not consistent though, since there were some positive elements in them too: “Arpadic courage” and concord. Denial of the genuineness and beauty of the Hungarian language and culture reached their peak at that time.<sup>46</sup> All the negative stereotypes about Hungarians are sublimated in the following quotations from the then newly established paper *Slavenski Jug* [*The Slavic South*] of liberal orientation. The first denies the genuineness and beauty of the Hungarian language and consequently the ability of Hungarians, using their language as a tool, to civilise their neighbouring peoples: *Vaš jezik bez snage i bez izvornosti, bez bogatstva i liepote, ima biti nosiocem izobraženosti europejske? Znete li da je jezik, kojim govorite kinezki zid, dieleći vas od svih narodoh, koji vas okružavaju, zid, kroz kojega zapadna civilizacia nikada nije mogla prodrieti, koi je obustavio trake izobraženosti europejske; pa jezikom ovim, koi niti imade duševne kakve potencie, niti ga itko izvan pustarah vaših razumie, hoćete vi da po zapadnom ukusu izobrazite tolike milione Slavjanah kojih narav nije majmunstvo*

(...) *ovaj narod hoćete Vi da civilizirate?*<sup>47</sup> The second citation stresses the Asiatic character of the Hungarian people and condemns attempts at Hungarisation directed against other peoples living in Hungary: *Kako su Magjari, suplemenici Mongolah, duh ovoga vriemena shvatili, vidieti je iz toga, da narodom u Ugarskoj živućim, ne samo da nisu ništa u obziru njihove narodnosti popustili, da pače su ih u tomu jošte više nego prie dušili, i utamničili sve, koji su počeli o svetih ovih pravih narodah govoriti. (...) Oni su dakle i dalje nakanili u duhu barbar-skih viemenah raditi i gospodariti nad narodi. Pogérdan je onaj jaram Magjarski za Slavene, i veoma škodljiv (...).*<sup>48</sup>

The bloody crushing of the Hungarian Revolution and, in particular, the execution of Hungarian military commanders of Pest and Arad on 6 October 1849 provoked shock, outrage and unanimous condemnation in Croatia,<sup>49</sup> and again some positive elements were introduced into the image of Hungarians – compassion with the defeated opponent.

The absolutist regime of the Habsburg Monarchy in the 1850s marked by centralisation, strengthening of bureaucracy, imposition of the German language, tightened police controls, absolute restriction of civic and political rights and freedoms, and the impossibility of the opposition to act publicly weighed heavily both on Croats, Hungarians, and other peoples as well. The pressure exerted by Vienna pushed into the background again disagreements between the two peoples separated by the Drava River. The Croatian public sympathised with Hungarians' "passive resistance", Hungarian dances were again performed in Zagreb, Hungarian folk costumes were popular, and there were voices calling for reconciliation with Hungarians for the sake of protection of common interests.<sup>50</sup> The path to reconciliation was not easy. In proportion to the ups and downs in the process of improving mutual relations, there was also a gradual process of introducing positive elements in the perception of Hungarians in the Croatian public.

The Croatian–Hungarian Settlement of 1868 was a new important milestone in Croatian–Hungarian relations. The major part of the Croatian political elite strongly condemned it while a minor part supported it. In line with their political views and attitude to the Settlement, the major part of the Croatian public, except the Unionists, perceived Hungarian political (and economic, social, cultural) influence as, more or less, hegemonic. From then until the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, the perception of Hungarians in Croatia was very complex with a broad range of elements – from a very negative image in the oppositionally minded press and public opinion in Croatia, to partly or predominantly positive in the Unionist and, from the early 1880s, in pro-regime circles – and was under the strong influence of the political parties' propaganda and press.<sup>51</sup>

The Hungarian–Croatian political and economic relations in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century had a substantial influence on the image of Hungarians in Croatian literature of the time as well, which was predominantly negative but complex.<sup>52</sup>

There were some cases where poor mutual relations of the time were projected to the remote past when Croats and Hungarians had struggled in concert against their common enemies and when the image of Hungarians in Croatian literature had been predominantly or exclusively positive. Some extreme examples of the procedure occurred at the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> into the 20<sup>th</sup> century when even the heroic defence of Szigetvár under the leadership of Nikola Šubić Zrinski [Zrínyi Miklós] was used, in literary interpretation, to express anti-Hungarian sentiments (Osman Beg Štafić in the epic poem *Vjerne sluge [Loyal Servants]* and Higin Dragošić in the play *Siget [Szigetvár]*).<sup>53</sup>

A gallery of predominantly negative Hungarian characters was opened by August Šenoa in his historical novels. Foreigners – Hungarians and Germans – and their local assistants were the source of all evil in his novels *Diogenes* (1878) and *Kletva [Curse]* (1880). In his novel *Seljačka buna [The Peasant Revolt]* (1877), the main negative character was a haughty and rapacious Hungarian nobleman Franjo Tahi who cruelly exploited his serfs and became a negative symbol of Hungarian domination over Croats in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, since there is no doubt that the account of his conduct towards serfs was supposed to associate readers with the status in the Croatian–Hungarian relations of the time.<sup>54</sup> In the novel *The Peasant Revolt*, the image of Hungarian soldiers was negative as well, and they were depicted in an even worse light in the novel *Kraljica Lepa [Queen Lepa]* (1902) by Eugen Kumičić. In that novel, the Hungarian kings Ladislaus and Coloman were depicted as incapable army leaders: Ladislaus was a coward and incapable, and Coloman managed to defeat the Croatian army led by Petar Svačić with the assistance of Croatian traitors. The Croatian king Zvonimir was represented as a servant of Hungarians and his own wife (a sister to the Hungarian King) since he was prepared to sacrifice Croatia's independence. This hides implicit criticism of the writer's contemporaries, Unionists, who were prepared to make concessions to Hungarians at the detriment of Croatian interests. Here, Eugen Kumičić's political views become prominent, Kumičić being a member of the Croatian Party of Rights. Queen Lepa was depicted as a femme fatale who did not shrink from anything striving to achieve her goals. In Kumičić's another novel *Olga i Lina [Olga and Lina]* (1881), the chief characters were Hungarian women – femmes fatales of questionable morals. Such Hungarian female characters appeared in the works by Ksaver Šandor Gjalski and Antun Gustav Matoš. In the novel *Melita* by Josip Eugen Tomić, Hungarian characters were depicted in a less negative light and more neutral, and the major female character – a Croatian Melita – was a prototype of a femme fatale guided by her pleasures.<sup>55</sup>

Hungarians were presented in a satirical tone in the writings of Ante Starčević, member of the Croatian Party of Rights, in the humorous-satirical paper *Zvekan [Simpleton]* (Starčević created a stereotypical image of a Hungarian named Pišta with his round, red cheeks, and a large moustache) as well as in the satirical feuil-

letons by Ante Kovačić *Iz Bombaja* [*Out of Bombay*] and *Iz egipatske tmine* [*Out of the Darkness of Egypt*], published in the paper *Sloboda* [*Freedom*] (1879-1884), and in the work *Peštanski stipendiste* [*Scholars of Pest*] (1878), where he criticised Croatian deputies in the joint Diet who had been bribed by the Hungarian Prime Minister Kálmán Tisza.

The image of Hungarians and their supporters in Croatia in the novels and stories by Ksaver Šandor Gjalski is much more complex and more differentiated – criticism and irony are combined with liking. In the novel *U noći* [*In the Night*] (1886), Gjalski described Hungarian harmful economic policy pursued towards Croatia and arrogant conduct of Hungarian soldiers in the middle of Zagreb. He criticised excessive Hungarophilia among members of the Croatian Magyarone nobility (similar to a story *Illustrissimus Battorych* from 1884). The stereotypical image of arrogant Hungarians who fanatically love their own people and despise all the others was given in the novel *Osvit* [*Daybreak*] (1892). The major character in the story *Žitomirski gospodin* [*A Gentleman from Žitomir*] (1891) was a femme fatale, a Hungarian woman Ilona. In this work, one can find a stereotype about the passionate and hot-blooded Hungarians that was common at the time of Romanticism in other European literatures as well, and it was created as an auto-stereotype by Hungarians themselves. In the story *Znanstveni heureka Mazalji Mikše* [*A Scholarly Eureka by Mazalji Mikša*] (1896), Gjalski ridiculed Hungarian megalomania and their striving to prove their priority in everything (an Old Croatian charter written in the Glagolitic script was interpreted as an Old Hungarian document and a proof that the Croatian Zagorje region had originally been inhabited by Hungarians). In his story *Izlet Grinczinger Pála na Magyar tenger* [*Pál Grinczinger's Excursion to Magyar tenger*] (1902), he ridiculed Hungarian claims on the Croatian Littoral.<sup>56</sup>

The stereotypical image of Hungarians as oppressors, arrogant masters, suppressors of Croatia's independence prevailed in Croatian poetry of the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, which condemned their domination. In this context, assistance was sought in a symbolic way from Ban Josip Jelačić, who became a symbol of the struggle for Croatia's rights against Hungarian onslaughts. Such atmosphere prevailed in the poems by Ognjeslav Utješenović Ostrožinski, Petar Preradović, Ivan Trnski and other authors. Poetic work by Silvije Strahimir Kranjčević represents an exception in this respect, since he disregarded everyday political turmoil and conflicts.<sup>57</sup> Antun Gustav Matoš was very critical of Hungarians in his journalist writing and poems on national themes due to many violations of Croatia's rights by the Hungarian side. The image of the neighbour across the Drava River was extremely sinister, and his symbolism was plain and recognisable. Matoš depicted economic misery of Croatia and blamed for it Hungarians and other foreigners (Germans and Jews), who were economically exploiting Croatia, with massive Croatian emigration being a consequence. In his pamphlet *Mađarska kultura* [*Hungarian Culture*] (1904), he painted an ex-

tremely negative image of Hungarian culture, even though he did not know it nor desired to know it.<sup>58</sup>

In the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, a negative perception of Hungarians prevailed in the entire Croatian literature. A more differentiated image of Hungarians was introduced to Croatian literature by Miroslav Krleža's works at the time of Croatian Literary Modernism at the beginning of the new century. Krleža, unlike Matoš, was very knowledgeable about Hungarian culture and held it in high esteem.

The image of Hungarians in the Croatian lands from the 16<sup>th</sup> to the 19<sup>th</sup> century was complex, made up of different positive and negative elements in different ratios. While it was mainly positive in the earlier centuries, allowing its characterisation even as Hungarophilia, in the mid part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Hungarophobia was present in most of Croatia's public, featuring most prominently during the revolutionary turmoil in the Habsburg Monarchy. Apart from strong personal and family ties between Croatian and Hungarian nobility (to a lesser extent in the middle class), Hungarophilia in Croatia was conditioned by common political, economic, and social interests. Many Croatian intellectuals, being unable to make a distinguished career in politics, church, literature, or science in their homeland, left the country crossing the Drava River and were active at the courts of Hungarian kings and noblemen. Through their positive attitude to Hungarians, they showed their allegiance and loyalty to their "employers" or Maecenas. Furthermore, Hungarians were allies in the struggle against Turks and in the resistance to the Habsburg centralism and absolutism, which also had an impact on their positive perception in Croatia. A predominantly negative image of Hungarians in the Croatian public in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, which was primarily a reflection of the political and economic relations of the time and dissatisfaction of the major part of the Croatian intellectual and political elite with frequent violations of Croatia's rights by the ruling circles in Hungary, was improved by some positive elements, but it would never again approximate the predominantly positive image of the earlier periods.

### Summary

This paper presents the perception of Hungarians in the Croatian lands from the 16<sup>th</sup> to the 19<sup>th</sup> century based on selected examples from literary (fictional) and journalistic (non-fiction) texts in the Latin, Croatian and German languages. The perception ranged between Hungarophilia – in the first centuries of the period under consideration – and Hungarophobia – most prominent in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century – and was most frequently a combination of positive and negative stereotypes existing in different ratios. Material from the earlier centuries represents an image of the

common state – the Hungarian–Croatian Kingdom, whereas material from the 19<sup>th</sup> century allows research in the perception of Hungarians as a people. In the earlier periods, literature most effectively shaped, preserved and disseminated national stereotypes in Croatia, whereas from the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century on, this function was to a large extent taken over by periodicals, brochures, leaflets, etc.

The highly positive image of Hungarians in Croatia in the earlier period was linked with, on the one hand, personal and family ties, and on the other with common political, economic and social interests of the two peoples. From the early 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards, negative perceptions were introduced into the image, and an outspoken aversion to Hungarians culminated in the revolutionary years 1848–1849, when all the negative elements in the perception of Hungarians culminated. Hungarians were at the time perceived as oppressors of Croats in the national sense, as assimilators, as Asiatic element in European culture. The Hungarian language, one of the more important elements in the process of building national identity, was perceived as barbarian and unintelligible. A good image of Hungarians in Croatia was restored following the crushing of the Hungarian Revolution, but never to the extent of the earlier periods.

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> For the emergence of imagology as a discipline, its methodology, subject matter of its research, and various directions of research see Davor Dukić, “Predgovor: O imagologiji” [Foreword: On Imagology] in *Kako vidimo strane zemlje. Uvod u imagologiju [How We See Foreign Countries. An Introduction to Imagology]*, ed. by Davor Dukić, Zrinka Blažević, Lahorka Plejić Poje, Ivana Brković (Zagreb, 2009, Srednja Europa), 5–22 and papers by other authors printed in this synthetic overview of the development of this discipline, in particular Hugo Dyserinek, “O problemu ‘images’ i ‘mirages’ i njihovu istraživanju u okviru komparativne književnosti” [On the Problem of ‘Images’ and ‘Mirages’ and their Research within the Framework of Comparative Literature], *ibid.*, 23–36 [originally published: “Zum Problem der ‘images’ und ‘mirages’ und ihrer Untersuchung im Rahmen der Vergleichenden Literaturwissenschaft”, *Arcadia*, 1, (1966), 107–120]; Manfred S. Fischer, “Komparatistička imagologija: za interdisciplinarno istraživanje nacionalno-imagotipskih sustava”, [Comparative Imagology: For Interdisciplinary Research of National-Imagotypical Systems], *ibid.*, 37–56 [first published: “Komparatistische Imagologie: Für eine interdisziplinäre Erforschung national-imagotyper Systeme”, *Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie*, 10 (1979), 30–44]; Joep Leerssen, “Retorika nacionalnog karaktera: programatski pregled”, *ibid.*, 99–124; [original title: “The rhetoric of national character: A programmatic survey”, *Poetics Today*, 21, No. 2, (2000) 267–292]; Joep Leerssen, “Imagologija: povijest i metoda”, *ibid.*, 169–185, [“Imagology: History and Method”, in *Imagology. The Cultural Construction and Literary Representation of National Characters. A Critical Survey*, ed. by Manfred Beller and Joep Leerssen (Amsterdam, 2007, Rodopi), 17–32], and Jean-Marc Moura, “Kulturna imagologija: pokušaj povijesne i kritičke sinteze” [Cultural Imagology: An Attempt at Historical and Critical Synthesis], *ibid.*, 151–168. [first published: “L’imagologie littéraire: essai de mise au point historique et critique”, *Revue de littérature comparée*, 66, No. 3 (1992), 271–287].

- <sup>2</sup> Dubravka Oraić Tolić, “Hrvatski kulturni stereotipi. Diseminacije nacije” [Croatian Cultural Stereotypes. Dissemination of Nation] in *Kulturni stereotipi. Koncepti identiteta u srednjoeuropskim književnostima* [Cultural Stereotypes. Identity Concepts in Central European Literatures], ed. by Dubravka Oraić Tolić and Ernő Kulcsár Szabó (Zagreb, 2006, FF press) 29–45, esp. 30.
- <sup>3</sup> Joep Leerssen, “Imagologija: povijest i metoda”, 179–180. This author differentiates between two types of statements about nations: factual-report type and stereotyping statements about nations. The latter are characterised by pointing out typical distinguishing characteristics of some nation and are object of imagological research. More on that see in Joep Leerssen, “Retorika nacionalnog karaktera: programatski pregled”, 99–124; Davor Dukić, “Predgovor: O imagologiji”, 17–18.
- <sup>4</sup> Dubravka Oraić Tolić uses examples to explain these strategies of shaping stereotypes and modern identities in her paper “Hrvatski kulturni stereotipi. Diseminacije nacije”, 31–34.
- <sup>5</sup> Davor Dukić, “Ugrofilstvo u hrvatskoj književnosti ranoga novovjekovlja” [Hungarophilia in Croatian Literature of the Early Modern Age], in: *Kulturni stereotipi* [Cultural Stereotypes], 93–109. For Hungarian topics in Croatian literature of the early Modern Age compare also Stipe Botica, “Ugarske teme u djelima hrvatskih književnih prosvjetitelja” [Hungarian Topics in the Works of Croatian Literary Enlighteners], *Croato Hungarica. Uz 900 godina hrvatsko-mađarskih povijesnih veza. A horvát-magyar történelmi kapcsolatok 900 éve alkalmából* (hereinafter: *Croato Hungarica*), ed. by Milka Jauk-Pinhak, Kiss Gy. Csaba, Nyomárkay István (Zagreb, 2002, Katedra za hungarologiju Filozofskoga fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu and Matica hrvatska) 315–323; Boris Nikšić, “Sudbina Ugarske u hrvatskoj književnosti šesnaestog stoljeća” [The Destiny of Hungary in Croatian Literature of the 16<sup>th</sup> Century], *Croato Hungarica*, 307–314.
- <sup>6</sup> For a brief overview of the role of Latin in the eventful period of Croatian history from 1790 to 1847 cf. Marko Trogrlić, “Uloga i značenje latinskoga jezika u političkomu životu Hrvatske od godine 1790. do 1847.” [The role and importance of the Latin Language in Croatia’s Political Life from 1790 to 1847] in: *Latinitet u Europi s posebnim osvrtom na hrvatski latinitet nekad i danas* [Works in the Latin Language in Europe with Special Reference to Croatian Works in Latin in Former Times and Today], collection of works, ed. Darko Deković (Rijeka, 2006) 21–30.
- <sup>7</sup> For the role of the Latin language in shaping Croatian national identity cf. Joanna Rapacka, “Uloga latinskog jezika u regionalnim sustavima i općenacionalnom sustavu hrvatske kulture” [The Role of the Latin Language in Regional Systems and the General National System of Croatian Culture] in *Hrvatska književna baština, knjiga II*. [Croatian Litarary Heritage. Book II] (Zagreb, 2003) 373–393.
- <sup>8</sup> *Commentarii* (commentaries, notes) as a genre inherited from Antiquity (Gaius Julius Ceasar and his *Commentarii de bello Gallico* and *Commentarii de bello civili*) are nominally less demanding than what is understood to be other historiographic genres in Antiquity – *historiae* and *annales*. This is truly merely nominal, at least as far as Tuberon is concerned, since his commentaries comprise 11 volumes, in other words over 300 pages of text. Commentaries were also written by Enea Silvio Piccolomini (better known as Pope Pius II) *Commentarii rerum memorabilium quae temporibus suis contigerunt*; Paolo Giovio *Turcicarum rerum commentarius* and Ferenc Forgách *Rerum Hungaricarum sui temporis commentarii*. Banology is a specific historiographic sub-genre focused on the institution of ban, which emerged in the 17<sup>th</sup> century (with Juraj Rattkay and Franjo Ladány as its representatives) and developed during the 18<sup>th</sup> century (with Pavao Ritter Vitezović, Franjo Zdelar, Baltazar Adam Krčelić, and Josip Mikoczi as its representatives).
- <sup>9</sup> Ludovik Crijević Tuberon, *Commentarii de temporibus suis* (the Latin text prepared by Vlado Rezar) and *Komentari o mojem vremenu* (translation and introductory study by Vlado Rezar) (Zagreb, 2001).



- <sup>10</sup> Cf. L.C. Tuberon, *Commentarii*, 70: “of bright mind and ready to adapt to the moment, especially when they are depressed by misery”.
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 165: “... and by themselves were in hostility with the Turks, and in addition to it dedicated Christians”.
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 11: “Therefore, the neighbouring peoples, especially Czechs and Poles, hate Hungarians as invaders of foreign lands”.
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 21: “Hungarians, like most mortals, crave for money”.
- <sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 33–34: “You have, thus, to get to know Hungarian nature, and observe well their temperament, for which it is rightly said that it has something wolfish in itself. One should have command over them so that they may respect you, loving you and fearing you at the same time, and holding you worthy of admiration. /.../ This people that still smack of Scythian barbarism has not yet discarded their innate savagery. Therefore, they despise all human qualities but force, wealth and other material goods and believe that nobody should be respected whose majesty cannot do any harm. Indeed, they do not so much admire those who treat them benevolently, as those who do not allow them to do them injustice. That wild savagery can be broken with force, but it will hardly ever soften with gentleness”.
- <sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 100: “since they did not come under Hungarian rule under armed coercion, but that happened by law of kinship”.
- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 100: “Croats and Hungarians are constantly quarelling over courage...”.
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 160: “That very cruel people consider just Hungarians, Croats, and Moldavians their equals in courage”.
- <sup>18</sup> The Latin text was put on the Internet within an electronic collection of texts by Croatian writers in Latin entitled *Croatiae auctores Latini (CroALa)* (<http://www.ffzg.unizg.hr/klafil/croala/>, last access on 3 June 2014).
- <sup>19</sup> Juraj Rattkay, *Memoria regum et banorum* (Vienna, 1652, reprint: Zagreb, 2000); *Spomen na kraljeve i banove*, transl. by Zrinka Blažević et al. (Zagreb, 2001).
- <sup>20</sup> J. Rattkay, *Memoria*, 53.
- <sup>21</sup> Sándor Bene, “Ideološke koncepcije o staleškoj državi zagrebačkog kanonika” [Ideological concepts of the Standesstaat by a Zagreb canon], introductory study in: *Spomen na kraljeve i banove*, 4–103.
- <sup>22</sup> J. Rattkay, *Memoria*, 235: (... *ita iam Illyrium nostrum post Nicolaum Garam, Emericum Perenium, Thomam Nadasdium, ac Emericum Zapolyam, te quinto banali dignitate in palatinalis fastigii apicem sublimato gloriatur*).
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 235: “Oh, may the next centuries give many Draškovićs, / Restoring the old glory of the Huns, Mars and arts.”
- <sup>24</sup> Cf. Bene, *ibid.*, 77.
- <sup>25</sup> Scaliger is the earlier form of the family name Škrlec originating from Italy.
- <sup>26</sup> Ferdo Šišić, *Pregled povijesti hrvatskoga naroda [A Survey of History of the Croatian People]* (Zagreb, 1962) 373–377.
- <sup>27</sup> Tituš Brezovački, *Dalmatiae, Croatiae et Slavoniae trium sororum recursus* vss 39–40; “Nevertheless, Scaliger, this godless man and traitor of his homeland, wants to sell poor us to them (Hungarians)”.
- <sup>28</sup> Cf. Darko Novaković, “Latinske pjesme Tita Brezovačkog” [Tit Brezovački’s Latin poems] in: *Dani hvarskog kazališta XXIII: Hrvatska književnost uoči preporoda [Days of Hvar’s Theatre XXIII: Croatian Literature on the Eve of the Croatian National Revival]*, ed. N. Batušić et al. (Split, 1997) 344–372; and Darko Novaković, “Novi rukopis prigodnice *Dalmatiae, Croatiae et Slavoniae trium sororum recursus* iz Hrvatskoga državnog arhiva u Zagrebu” [A new manuscript of the occasional poem *Dalmatiae, Croatiae et Slavoniae trium sororum recursus* from the

- Croatian State Archives in Zagreb], in: *Nikola Škrlec Lomnički 1729-1799, vol. 3*, ed. E. Pusić et al. (Zagreb, 2001), 127–141.
- <sup>29</sup> Tituš Brezovački, *Dalmatiae, Croatiae et Slavoniae trium sororum recursus* vss 13-16; “(The godless lot is about) to obliterate the Croatian name and people! There will be no more Slavonian or Dalmatian, but (this godless lot) wants to change both the people and the language into Scythian, and wild customs into laws”.
- <sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, vss 21-22: “Believe, there are no people in the world more fierce than the Huns; one prefers even the Teutons”.
- <sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, vss 29-30: “Moreover, (their) language is barbarian and everybody despises it except perhaps Lapps, inhabitants of the North Pole”.
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, vss 31-32: “Rightly so, since there is no alphabet in the world that could correctly write down Hungarian words”.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, vss 33-34: „Teuton was horrible when he ordered you to speak a foreign language; how much more horrible will Hungarian be?”.
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, vss 35-36: “That (sc. German) is cultured and is further becoming more civilised, and this (sc. Hungarian) is invoking barbarian centuries with his beard”.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, vss 93-94: “You know, pardon me, how hot a Hungarian is, when you want to seize her dear husband”.
- <sup>36</sup> There is an extensive body of literature on the Croatian National Revival. Here are references to some of the most important works: Jaroslav Šidak et al., *Hrvatski narodni preporod – ilirski pokret [Croatian National Revival – Illyrian Movement]* (Zagreb, <sup>2</sup>1990); *Hrvatski narodni preporod 1790-1848. Hrvatske zemlje u vrijeme ilirskog pokreta [Croatian National Revival 1790-1848. Croatian Lands at the Time of the Illyrian Movement]*, ed. Nikša Stančić (Zagreb, 1985); Nikša Stančić, *Gajeva ‘Još Hrvatska ni propala’ iz 1832-33. Ideologija Ljudevita Gaja u pripremnom razdoblju hrvatskog narodnog preporoda [Gaj’s Poem ‘Croatia Has not Fallen Yet’ from 1832-1833. Ljudevit Gaj’s Ideology in the Preparatory Period for the Croatian National Revival]* (Zagreb, 1989); *ibid.*, “Die kroatische Variante des mitteleuropäischen Modells der nationalen Ideologie”, *Österreichische Osthefte*, 37, Heft 2 (Vienna, 1995), 401–422; *ibid.*, „Ideja o ‘slavenskoj uzajamnosti’ Jána Kollára i njezina hrvatska recepcija“ [The Idea of ‘Slavic Mutuality’ by Ján Kollár and its Croatian reception], *Radovi – Zavod za hrvatsku povijest*, 30 (Zagreb, 1997), 65–76; Anna Pia Maissen, “Von den *filiis dormientibus* zu den *Forderungen des Volkes*” [From the *filiis dormientibus* to the *Demands by the People*], *Hrvatska 1848. i 1849. Zbornik radova [Croatia in 1848 and 1849. Collected Papers]*, editor-in-chief Mirko Valentić (Zagreb, 2001), 35–56.
- <sup>37</sup> “Long live the Constitution of Hungary, the Kingdom of Croatia and the ethnicity Illyrian!”
- <sup>38</sup> Janko Drašković, *Disertacija iliti razgovor darovan gospodi poklisarom zakonskim i budućem zakonotvorcem kraljevinah naših, za buduću dietu ungarsku odaslanem, držan po jednom starom domorodcu kraljevinah ovih [Dissertation, or Treatise, given to the honourable lawful deputies and future legislators of our Kingdoms, delegated to the future Hungarian Diet; by an old patriot of these Kingdoms]* (Karlovac, 1832; reprint Karlovac, 1991)
- <sup>39</sup> The poem was printed in *Hrvatski narodni preporod [Croatian National Revival]*, vol. I., ed. Jakša Ravlić (Zagreb, 1965), 245–250. “There, the Danube springs into the air with its waterfalls, it wants to cover the Sava with mud; the catfish struttingly moves its moustache, it takes a look at the small fish in the Sava, (...) Oh Croats, do you want to forget your own language, do you want to become another nation?”
- <sup>40</sup> “And indeed, if we do not want to delude ourselves, then we have to admit that Magyars, at the Diet and with their hostile superiority, aim at abolishing all of our ancestral customs, and legally acquired rights and privileges, which we strove to enforce and safeguard through the centuries, at destroying our kingdom that is much more ancient than Hungary, and at leaving just an empty

name of it, at leaving the inhabitants of this country with a stronger feeling of the ruin of their rights, a feeling of shame and their depression.” Quoted after Fredo Šišić, *Hrvatska povijest, Treći dio: Od godine 1790. do godine 1847. [Croatian History: Part Three: From the Year 1790 to the Year 1847]* (Zagreb, 1913), 172.

- <sup>41</sup> In Hungarian literature of the period of Romanticism, one can notice an awareness of a different nature of Magyars who trace their origin to Asia and do not speak an Indo-European language. There is also awareness of the isolated position of the Hungarian state and nation resembling an island in the sea of other nations. Csaba Gy. Kiss, “Dodaci uz nacionalnu zemljopisnu simboliku (primjeri iz mađarskog i hrvatskog romantičarskog pjesništva)” [Additions to National Geographic Symbolism (Examples from Hungarian and Croatian romantic poetry)], in *Hrvatsko-mađarski odnosi 1102.-1918. Zbornik radova, [Croatian-Hungarian Relations 1102–1918. Collected Papers]*, editor-in-chief Milan Kruhek (Zagreb, 2004), 236.
- <sup>42</sup> Dinko Šokčević [Soksevitš Dénes], *Hrvati u očima Mađara, Mađari u očima Hrvata. Kako se u pogledu preko Drave mijenjala slika drugoga [Croats in the Eyes of Hungarians, Hungarians in the Eyes of Croats. How the Image of the Other Changed in the Look across the Drava River]* (Zagreb, 2006), 55.
- <sup>43</sup> “Long did Magyars rule over us / Our liberty they wanted to destroy: / Defeat to you, oh barbarians, / Defeat to you, oh Hungarians! / Let’s fight the devil all the way to Buda, / Death to Magyars!” Ela Jurdana, “Leci i ideja javnosti u Hrvatskoj 1848. godine” [Leaflets and the Idea of the Public in Croatia in 1848], *Godina 1848. u Hrvatskoj. Katalog izložbe [The Year 1848 in Croatia. Exhibition Catalogue]*, ed. Jelena Borošak-Marijanović, 42–47, quotation p. 46.
- <sup>44</sup> For their political activities and perception of Hungarians, cf. Arijana Kolak Bošnjak, *Hrvatsko-vugerska stranka 1841.-1848. [The Croatian-Hungarian Party 1841–1848]*, doctoral dissertation (Zagreb, 2012).
- <sup>45</sup> This was a group of (mainly educated) people who had an active influence on shaping the public opinion through their own articles, either literary or non-fiction, as well as a broader circle of readers for whom these articles were intended. For different types of the public cf. Walter Lippmann, *Javno mnijenje [Public Opinion]* (Zagreb, 1995) and Vesna Lamza-Posavec, *Javno mnijenje: teorije i istraživanja [Public Opinion: Theories and Researches]* (Zagreb, 1995), 22–23.
- <sup>46</sup> For more on the image of Hungarians in the Croatian public in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century see: Dinko Šokčević, “Slika Mađara u Hrvata i Hrvata u Mađara 1848. godine” [The image of Hungarians in the Croatian People and the Image of Croats in the Hungarian People in 1848], *Hrvatska 1848. i 1849.*, 315–330; Vlasta Švooger, “Slika Mađara u hrvatskome liberalnom tisku sredinom 19. stoljeća” [The Image of Hungarians in the Croatian Liberal Press of the Mid-19<sup>th</sup> Century], *Croato-Hungarica*, 81–93; Arijana Kolak, “Između Europe i Azije: Hrvati i Mađari u propagandnom ratu 1848./49.” [Between Europe and Asia: Croats and Hungarians in the 1848/1849 Propaganda War], *Povijesni prilozi, [Historical Contributions]*, 27, No. 34 (Zagreb, 2008), 175–193.
- <sup>47</sup> “Should your language, being without force and genuineness, without richness and beauty, be an instrument of European education? Do you know that the language you speak is the Great Wall of China, which separates you from all the peoples that surround you, and through which Western civilisation could never penetrate and which stopped the ways of European education; Do you want with this language, which has no spiritual potential whatsoever, and which is utterly unintelligible to anyone outside your puszta, do you want to educate so many millions of Slavs whose nature is not apishness (...) with this language to Western taste? Do you want to civilise this people?” Editorial, *Slavenski Jug (SJ)*, issue No. 3 dated 11 August 1848.
- <sup>48</sup> “How Magyars, Mongols’ fellow tribesmen, understood the spirit of the time can be seen in the fact that they did not make any concessions to peoples living in Hungary with respect to their

- ethnicity, but rather oppressed them even more than before and incarcerated all who began to speak about the sacred rights of the peoples. (...) Thus, they further intend to work in the spirit of barbarian times and rule over peoples. This Hungarian yoke is for Slavs abusive and very harmful (...)” Anonymous article without title, *SJ*, No. 3 dated 11 August 1848.
- <sup>49</sup> Editorials in the paper *Südslawische Zeitung (SZ)*, No. 171 dated 15 October and No. 172 dated 16 October 1849; *SZ*, No. 162 dated 4 October 1849; *SJ*, No. 166 dated 16 October 1849; [Podvelebitski] “Zašto padoše tolike žertve u Pešti i Aradu?” [Why Did So Many Victims Fall in Pest and Arad?], *SJ*, No. 168 dated 18 October 1849; “Finis Hungariae!”, *SJ*, No. 177 dated 29 October 1849; “Sa Save pred Šimunje”, *SJ*, No. 179 dated 31 October 1849.
- <sup>50</sup> Dinko Šokčević, *Hrvati u očima Mađara, Mađari u očima Hrvata*, 264–265.
- <sup>51</sup> More on this in: Dinko Šokčević, *Hrvati u očima Mađara, Mađari u očima Hrvata*, 171–190; Jasna Turkalj, “Zvekan – humor, satira i karikatura kao sredstvo pravaške političke propagande” [Zvekan – Humor, Satire and Cartoon as a Means of Political Propaganda of the Party of Rights], *Povijesni prilozi*, 18 (Zagreb, 1999), 121–160; *ibid.*, “Pravaški humorističko-satirički listovi kao prenositelji političkih poruka 80-ih godina 19. stoljeća” [Humorous and Satirical Papers of the Party of Rights as a Medium for Transmitting Political Messages in the 1880s], *Časopis za suvremenu povijest [Journal of Contemporary History]*, 32, No. 3 (Zagreb, 2000), 463–472.
- <sup>52</sup> For more details on the image of Hungarians in Croatian literature of the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century see: Dinko Šokčević, *Hrvati u očima Mađara, Mađari u očima Hrvata*, 261–291.
- <sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 288.
- <sup>54</sup> Dinko Šokčević, *Hrvati u očima Mađara, Mađari u očima Hrvata*, 268–269, finds anti-Hungarian views in the plays by Franjo Marković *Karlo Drački*, *Benko Bot* and *Zvonimir* from the 1870s.
- <sup>55</sup> Dinko Šokčević, *Hrvati u očima Mađara, Mađari u očima Hrvata*, 270–272.
- <sup>56</sup> Dinko Šokčević, *Hrvati u očima Mađara, Mađari u očima Hrvata*, 272–276; István Lőkös, „Magyarságkép Ksaver Šandor-Gjalski műveiben“, *Croato Hungarica*, 415–436.
- <sup>57</sup> Dinko Šokčević, *Hrvati u očima Mađara, Mađari u očima Hrvata*, 277–279.
- <sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 279–286; István Lukács, “Antun Gustav Matoš magyar ‘vedutái’“, *Croato Hungarica*, 475–486.

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## ABOUT THE ASPECTS AND ROLES OF PHRASEMES IN KOSZTOLÁNYI'S *SKYLARK* (1924)

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In this essay I examine the ways in which language functions both as a means of preserving the past and as a marker of change by examining the significance of phrasemes in the novel *Pacsirta* (*Skylark*) by Hungarian author Dezső Kosztolányi. In part by examining the ways in which the English and German translators of the novel dealt with the complexities posed by the historically and culturally embedded nature of language, I explore the complex and at times contradictory functions of language in the novel. Kosztolányi's use of phrasemes in *Pacsirta*, I argue, exemplifies several of his theoretical ideas about language itself and the roles of language in the mediation of the past.

**Keywords:** Dezső Kosztolányi, Hungarian literature, phrasemes, proverbs, Humboldt, translation theory, linguistics

Dezső Kosztolányi's second novel, *Pacsirta* (*Skylark*, translated into English by Richard Aczel),<sup>1</sup> met with interest among linguists at a time when the reception of his oeuvre was weak in some ways.<sup>2</sup> Writing on Kosztolányi and the Hungarian language one linguist referred to *Pacsirta* as one of the most telling works of the author in this context (Deme, 1960). Another offered a deep analysis of linguistic forms in the novel, enumerating stylistic elements in its text (Horváth, 1959) and demonstrating the highly masterful linguistic elaborateness of the work. She even rebuked a former literary historian for having completely misinterpreted the novel by neglecting its essence, namely the structure of its text (Horváth, 1959, 332).

Some decades later, however, a literary historian wrote an article entitled *Kosztolányi on Language*. As Mihály Szegedy-Maszák claims, *Pacsirta* “interprets the world as a confused interaction of language games. *Pacsirta*'s own let-

ter, the dream [of her father – KB] as well as the card game in the casino or the menu card in the restaurant represent distinct language games.” (Szegegy-Maszák, 1998a, 264)<sup>3</sup> From that time on, *Pacsirta* proved to be a rich source for literary interpretations focused on language, even in the recent past. A monograph written by Katalin Szitár entitled *A prózanyelv Kosztolányinál* [“Kosztolányi’s Prose”] (Szitár, 2000) and a detailed study by Tibor Bónus entitled *A csúf másik* [“The Ugly Other”] (Bónus, 2006) can be mentioned as significant examples of works by authors who also used the methods of semiology, deconstruction, literary anthropology.

As was noted in the interpretations of the novel by linguists since very early on, the novel itself brings its own medium into the foreground. One must also note that in this context almost every study emphasizes the characters’ distinctive use of language in *Pacsirta*. Writing on the role of lexical items in the novel, Mária Horváth was the first to note that Latin proverbs and quotations, special terms of duel vocabulary, and those of pharmacology and of genealogy had been used by certain characters in the story (Horváth, 1959, 355). As László Deme observed, “the masterly choice of words” by Kosztolányi creates the impression that each character can be identified by his or her speech (Deme, 1960). These linguists referred to the same phenomenon which is later (already in connection with narratological characteristics of the novel) described by Erzsébet Juhász as the “alien word” (Juhász, 1995), by Mihály Szegegy-Maszák (after Wittgenstein) as “language games”, and by Tibor Bónus as “alien discourses” i.e. “dialogic multilingualism” (Bónus, 2006). Interestingly enough, each of these studies concentrated on the level of lexemes. The present analysis would like to accentuate another aspect by pointing out the remarkable presence of phrasemes, not only as part of the characters’ interactions but also throughout the whole novel. As I demonstrate by citing several examples, these “small forms”, which have already been mentioned in the secondary literature but were not given much importance in the existing analyses, play a special role as structural and historical phenomena in the text by creating deeper textual interrelations.

Another reason why the level of phrasemes is relevant to analyses of Kosztolányi’s prose is that the author himself was highly interested in this linguistic phenomenon (as he was in language itself).<sup>4</sup> In the early 1920s, before he had adopted the later linguistic purism which found expression in his pamphlet-like and manifesto-like articles,<sup>5</sup> he reviewed a book entitled *Szokásmondások* (“Proverbs and Sayings”) on the etymological genesis of old Hungarian sayings. In this work, the linguist and folklorist Manó Kertész “excavates” old measurements, professions, tools, etc. as elements of phrasemes. In the introduction to the book he refers to these materials as cultural monuments. In the review Kosztolányi makes the following assertion: “We, inheriting the language from our great-great grandfathers, speak it like children do. We remember many things, yet it is the



language that remembers everything latently. It absorbs the forgotten habits of the past and they covertly lurk forth in it" (Kosztolányi, 2002a, 36).<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, proverbs seem to preserve tradition even against the permanent change of meaning, which, in contrast, significantly affects language. As Kosztolányi wrote in an essay many years later, "Oh, my dear fellow, what an eventful life words do live. You can't find one of them that would mean exactly the same thing in 1933 as it meant in 1900" (Kosztolányi, 2002b, 206)<sup>7</sup>.

In the same year in which Manó Kertész's book was published, Kosztolányi started to write his novel, *Pacsirta*. The plot is set in 1899 and the novel depicts a world that at the time of its portrayal belonged already to the realm of imagination, namely the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. As many interpreters have noted, *Pacsirta* is wholly about the past, as is reflected even by the profession of the protagonist. It is worth noting that the work of the archivist described in the novel is quite akin to the task of the linguist portrayed by Kosztolányi in his review of *Szókásmondások*, as both of them burrow into the past in search of their materials. "It was here he came alive; here in the past." (24)<sup>8</sup> So, if it is true that "[p]hrasemes tend to absorb and accumulate cultural elements" and they bind so to cultural memory (Pirainen, 2007, 217), then one could claim that proverbs and certain idioms in the novel represent (not as *signified* but as *signifier*) the past itself, as *Pacsirta* depicts a world in which time has stopped. However, the sayings, i.e. proverbs, in the text do not, in the historical sense, really belong to the common past with the Austrian Empire. Rather, some of them, perhaps not accidentally, have German equivalents or sources. One can demonstrate this simply by referring to the four German translations of *Pacsirta*,<sup>9</sup> as well as by citing Manó Kertész's etymological derivations (Kertész, 1985). Nevertheless, one notes that in the English translation of the novel almost each of these culturally specific phrasemes was omitted or replaced. Let me enumerate some telling examples below.

When after a long time Bálint Környey, the commander in chief of the local fire brigade and a prominent figure of the town, "spotted Ákos, the dear old friend and companion of his youth" (50), he called out in surprise: "This is a turn-up for the books". When later, thanks to his promptings, Vajkay appeared at the weekly revelry again after years of not having attended, Környey rebuked his companion with the following words: "You've a lot to answer for" (129). The first case is based on a nonsense saying: "Fel kell írni a kéménybe fekete krétával", which means literally: "it should be written onto the chimney wall with black chalk". The same saying exists in German as well, so almost all of the German translations use this idiom.<sup>10</sup> Richard Aczel, in contrast, had to replace it at the same level with an English idiom: "This is a turn-up for the books" (50). In the second case the Hungarian idiom "Sok van a rovásodon" re-

minds one of an old habit, as does the German “er hat zuviel auf dem Kerbholz.”<sup>11</sup> (cf. Kertész, 1985, 163). The English version, however, retains its figurative meaning only: “You’ve a lot to answer for” (129).<sup>12</sup> Even if there are some idioms which have a German equivalent, most of the phrasemes are more culture-specific, so they remain, even literally, only more or less translatable. (Not surprising if one knows that Kosztolányi, as his essays confirm, mainly adopted Humboldt’s conception of linguistic and cultural relativism (Bengi, 2012, 198–217)). Accordingly, the most eminent example cannot be found in Richard Aczel’s English translation at all. The scene in which Ákos Vajkay eats a delicious meal in the local restaurant comes to a conclusion with an old Hungarian idiom that actually expresses how satisfied he is: “*Vérré vált benne mint barátban a lencse*” (Kosztolányi, 2013, 179). The German texts, which retain literal and figurative meanings,<sup>13</sup> still lack the folk etymology that the original was based on, for there is also an anecdote about the misheard Latin words: *vere valet* (Szemerkenyi, 2009, 115).

To conclude, *Pacsirta* contains more than thirty phrasemes, the abovementioned of which can be seen as indicators of language as a medium of cultural memory. In this context their historical meaning proved important. Norrick’s following explanation about the twofold relation to the tradition of proverbs is true of idioms as well: “On the one hand, proverbs in general are traditional by virtue of their being items of folklore. In this sense, as we have just seen, traditionality amounts to common use in a linguistic community or in one of its lectal groups over a period of time, say more than one generation. On the other hand, any given proverb may be considered traditional or not on the basis of its content, especially if it is cast in rustic imagery, i. e. if it describes a pre-Industrial Revolution scene, and/or contains archaisms.”<sup>14</sup> (Norrick, 1985, 40)

The past presented in the novel is hardly judged in a one-sided manner. Its values and tradition(s) are questioned by many ironic scenes and characters in the story, which seems to reflect the fact that the world of the Monarchy was exhausted and decaying by 1899. The approach of including items from the level of phrasemes is also able to mirror this aspect and it does so to such an extent that even the opposite of the previously noted quality of phrasemes can be registered: total inadequacy and meaninglessness.

The most striking presence of proverbs and sayings in the novel can be identified in the scenes in which Szunyogh, the alcoholic Latin teacher of the local secondary school, uses many Latin sentences. The drunken man “could speak only Latin, above all through quotations from the classics.” (191) However, it is worth mentioning that the only classical quotation he utters throughout the novel is a paraphrase of a line from Vergil’s *Aeneis Post tot discrimina rerum* (Vergil: *Aeneid* I, 204–205) (197). (In the early manuscript of the novel a citation from Juvenal’s *Satires* could

also be found (Kosztolányi, 2013, 470).<sup>15</sup> In addition to the above examples, he quotes one line from *The Bible: Etiam si omnes, ego non* (Mat. 26:33) (191) and a maxim from Jean de Santeul (1630–1697) “*Castigat ridendo mores*” (192). He also uses *Si tacuisses philosophus mansisses*, which is actually a common Latin saying, though it can be regarded as a quotation, for as Norrick puts it: “A speaker who uses a proverb falls back on the traditional store of performed utterances. Seen this way, utterances of proverbs are acts of quoting.” (Norrick, 1985, 26). Yet as the teacher character really does not utter any word in Hungarian throughout the novel (cf. the scene in which he orders even his schnapps at the restaurant in this ancient language: *aquam vitae, aquam vitae* (191)), his speech is actually a “conglomeration” of Latin citations. The fact that the sentences are uttered in a foreign language affirms the feeling that the “other voices” entirely incorporate Szunyogh’s own speech. Thus the “ready-made utterance” instead of an “original utterance” (Norrick, 1985, 25) has a negative effect in this context. Moreover, the use of the quotations illustrates a knowledge less active than an “enormous erudition [...] submerged beneath a sea of wine and schnapps” (73). This is so true that the proverbs and sayings used by this character prove to be completely meaningless in this respect. Given that Szunyogh addresses the Panthers, his fellows, most of whom do not know Latin,<sup>16</sup> the conversation is something of a monologue as the recipients do not understand his quotations. On the other hand, the teacher’s wasted life and ambition (48) can ironically attest to the inefficiency of the sayings and proverbs; they simply lose one of their main roles, the didactic tone.<sup>17</sup> “[S]peakers use proverbs to direct and convince hearers [and] hearers interpret (even non-didactically intended) proverbs as prescriptive moral rules or as directive warnings.” (Norrick, 1985, 42)

On the contrary, the archivist Ákos Vajkay wants to believe in the existence of “eternal verities”. He needs proverbial wisdom as he expects every book to be a guide for life:<sup>18</sup> “he preferred stimulating, edifying books which elucidated some moral truth or the interconnections between otherwise meaningless or incomprehensible facts. Truths like ‘hard work is always rewarded’ or ‘evil never goes unpunished’; books that rock one in the lap of the comforting illusion that no one suffers undeservingly in this world, nor dies of stomach cancer without due cause.” (86–87) Still the destiny of his spinster daughter convinces him that “[t]here was no justice in the world, no justice anywhere. Everything was meaningless.” (125) He and his wife meet “the fledgling provincial poet” whose father’s story forced Vajkay again to draw a bitter conclusion: “How children suffer for their parents, and parents for their children.” (106) Consequently, eternal verities and moral rules are obviously rewritten by life as they seem to be ironically understood, as the truths Vajkay prefers are mostly worn-out clichés of penny-books. A parody of wisdom and didacticism can be detected in the “pseudophrases” (Eismann, 2007, 327) of the Panthers and Feri Füzes: “Those who were sick twice had had a better time than those who were sick only once” (194);

“what had worked once would work twice” (192); “just like everyone else, Lajos Kossuth has his good points and his bad points.” (69)

As Norrick notes “Jolles [...] objects [...] [the] prescriptive didactic tendency. [...] He insists strenuously that proverb content is directed toward past experience rather than to future behaviour.” (Norrick, 1985, 41) Kosztolányi, who preferred the indirect instead of the direct meaning in literary works, would have likely shared the opinion of the Dutch folklorist and linguist about proverbs (Norrick, 1985, 41). In an essay on literature entitled “Why do we write?” Kosztolányi argues in support of the opposite of what Ákos Vajkay requires from books: “Every work behind which there is not all of life remains meaningless. What to twaddle about if one understands life? The real poet does not understand life and writes only to understand it through the act of writing (and not, like a teacher, to make people understand it).” (Kosztolányi, 2002c, 397)<sup>19</sup> The refusal of the didactic tone can be confirmed by the fact that, in a kind of rejection of a still dominant literary tradition, *Pacsirta* possesses a circular narrative structure instead of having a developing and simply linear plot (See Szegedy-Maszák, 1998b, 87).

Jolles, who emphasizes the importance of past experience in proverbs, analysed their formal aspects in a book entitled *Einfache Formen: Legende, Sage, Mythe, Rätsel, Spruch, Kasus, Memorabile, Märchen, Witz*. The genres in the title, he argues, are “small genres” or “short forms” the smallest literary (pre)categories in language. (Jolles, 1968, 150–170) The artistic potential of phrasemes seems to reside not only in their figurativeness yet in their state as text and therefore their manifold nature of “intertextuality” (See Piirainen referring H. Burger 2007, 209). “One could go so far as to say that there is a ‘story’ behind every proverb, and it is usually a sizable task to deal with just one text in this diachronic and semantic fashion.” (Mieder, 2007, 401)<sup>20</sup>

In this section I would like to analyse phrasemes in the novel as text within text concentrating on the interaction between them. To assert that this relation is not a supposition made by the present study but it does intentionally exist in *Pacsirta* we have many reasons. Hardly insignificant in this context is that Kosztolányi in an homage announced Péter Pázmány (1570–1637) a kind of predecessor, more close to him than any other Hungarian prose writers. (Kosztolányi, 1976, 42, 48) Kosztolányi described how fascinated he had been when reading the whole oeuvre of the famous catholic preacher (Kosztolányi, 2002d, 340), a collection of sermons and disputations. He praised the language of such an author whose works are considered to be one of the main sources of the phraseological collections and scrutinies. Pázmány played an undoubtedly great role in the bequeathing of old (Hungarian) proverbs. (Tolnai, 1910, 22)<sup>21</sup> It is quite likely then that, as an heir to this tradition, Kosztolányi thought phrasemes were the essential elements of prose.

Furthermore, an author who has, like Kosztolányi, written so many times about the importance of structure and who has highly appreciated narrative compactness of literary works, could presumably be fascinated by proverbs and idioms as extraordinary dense stories. That is convincingly proven by some proverbs in the novel that seem to have deeper connections with different elements and levels of the narrative thus improving the complexity of the text. (See Eismann, 2007, 325)

A paraphrase of a Hungarian saying can serve as a telling example for a kind of symbiosis of small form and great narrative. After Pacsirta's parents arrived home from the railway station where they had said goodbye to their daughter who had left for a holiday, we can see them in her room quite regretfully. As the scene is set on Friday and the father wants to console his already crying wife he utters the following words: "Aki pénteken sír, az vasárnap nevet." (Kosztolányi, 2013, 81) The English translation of the phrase is literally the same: "Friday's tears are Sunday's laughter." (29) It is actually the reversed version of the original Hungarian saying: „Ha pénteken jókedved van, vasárnap sírsz”; „Pénteki öröm, vasárnapi üröm” (Szemerényi, 2009, 1140) (literally: 'If you laugh on Friday, you will cry on Sunday'). There is evidence that the change was deliberate and not a misprint, as each earlier version of the novel, including the existing manuscript, contains similarly the reverse of the original.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, the already mentioned study on proverbs by Vilmos Tolnai, that Kosztolányi read in the same year when he began to write *Pacsirta*, eventually contains this saying (Tolnai, 1910, 33). Still the change seems quite motivated if one pays attention to the context and is aware of the nature of Vajkay's character. His only effort is actually to suppress the tragedy of their life by deluding himself and his family about the opposite. This impression is confirmed by the short dialogue it is used in: "“Whatever will we do without her?” Ákos made no reply. He never spoke much, but felt and thought all the more.” then ““And we'll laugh too, Mother, just you see,” he said without a trace of conviction, and disappeared into the dining room.” (29)

Here we could see how a set phrase had been changed for the sake of the novel's meaning; the next examples then present how a properly chosen phraseme can deepen the impact made by the main elements of the story.

The central character, Pacsirta, in a letter tells her parents about how she is spending her holiday at her relatives' home in the plain of Tarkő. She describes her aged uncle and adds that he still likes playing jokes as he has said to her the same even then what he used to say during her childhood: "Never fear Skylark dear, Uncle Béla's here." (119) Although the English version by Richard Aczel splendidly grasped the manner of the sentence yet his translation misses a likely important element. The original idiom actually contains the word "eyesight" ["Ne félj, míg engem látasz"]: a sense through which Pacsirta's ugliness is only perceivable. The fact that her uncle's "sweet humour" is hardly innocent (even if unintentional)<sup>23</sup> can be confirmed by another idiom he uses when he gets to know

how Pacsirta's parents worry about her: "A bad penny....," he says (119). As this idiom refers to "someone or somebody undesirable"<sup>24</sup> it can easily be read as a *mise en abyme* of the novel's central theme in a condensed figurative form: the tragedy of the spinster as well as her parents. Neither a marriage nor a railway accident could "guarantee" the absence of their ugly and oppressive daughter.<sup>25</sup> As during her break-away at Tarkó, even in her absence almost every object reminds her parents of her perpetual presence.

Similarly, Pacsirta, after her arrival, is handing a photograph of her and the relatives over to her parents with the following words: "Guess who!" (212). Yet the Hungarian original version contains actually the first words of a rhyme "Itt vagyok ragyogok" (Kosztolányi, 2013, 519), whose second half remains implicit in the novel yet seems to be hardly irrelevant: "mint a fekete szurok". The whole saying translated literally into English is as follows: 'Here I glow – just like the black pitch'. This paradox (or nonsense) can be seen again as an idiomatic formulation of Pacsirta's fate.

These examples illustrate how the phrasemes can deepen the meaning and the structural complexity of the novel.

Interestingly, even the inverse of such a relation has been detected in the novel. One interpreter remarked that the beginning of the novel evokes the following well-known French proverb: *Partir, c'est mourir un peu* (Bónus, 2006, 41).<sup>26</sup> As in the opening lines of the third chapter can be read: "When people go away they vanish, turn to nothing, stop being. They live only in memories, haunting the imagination. We know they go on being somewhere else, but no longer see them, just as we no longer see those who have already passed away." (17) The text in this part does not lack further elements of such a figurative sequence: "They stared dumbly into space like the speechless *victims of some sudden loss*, their eyes still hankering after the spot where they had last seen her." [my accent. KB] (17) and after "They hung their heads and stared at the gravel on the track *as mournfully as at an expectedly and hastily filled grave.*" [my accent. KB] (18).

Indeed, there are further narrative sections in the novel that can recall certain idioms or proverbs for the reader. In the very beginning of the fifth chapter the following can be read: "Sárszeg is a tiny dot on the map. [...] Most people have either never heard of it, or mention it with disdain. But every Sunday morning, in the clear blue sky before the Church of St. Stephen, the good Lord hovers above the town, invisible and merciful, righteous and terrible, ever present and everywhere the same, be it in Sárszeg or in Budapest, in Paris or New York." (59) This part of the text could even be perceived as an elaborated negation of the idiom: *behind God's back*. A very similar, yet in the translation hardly perceptible, allusion of an idiom could be identified in the opening phrase of chapter 7: "And as for Thursday... Well, Thursday was simply Thursday. A Thursday

was no ordinary day. [...] For Thursday was the day of the shindig.” (127) There is a Hungarian idiom “Csütörtököt mond” [literally: ‘To say Thursday’], which actually means “to be ruined” or “to fail”. This supposition as a possible connotation may seem less exaggerated if one reads about the “shindig”: “[t]he women of Sárszeg looked forward to these Thursdays with trepidation. Their husbands would stumble home at dawn, or later still, and all day long they’d be surely, red-eyed and thoroughly sick.” (127) As well as on Thursdays a group called “the Panthers” would flock together: “[T]he Panthers’ Table had been formed some twenty years before, with the not unworthy aim of popularizing the consumption of alcohol and promoting gentlemanly friendship. The Panthers were expected to drink daily and diligently, whether they could hold their drink or not. [...] Many more had fallen by the wayside, collapsing from chronic alcohol poisoning and cirrhosis of the liver, which was how most men in Sárszeg met their end.” (49) Obviously, the intention of such Thursday evenings is not less than being spoiled. Nevertheless, the night of the shindig prepares the climax of the novel as well in the next chapter still during the same night signaled by the Ákos Vajkay’s outburst. It is then for the first time when he utters to his wife that they could not love their daughter, Pacsirta, because of her ugliness (167).

As I have shown, Kosztolányi’s novel presents antagonistic aspects of proverbs and idioms. Phrasemes used *in* Pacsirta’s world are able to illustrate the erosion of communication as well as the exhaustion of language, while proverbs and idioms used on a meta-level *for* describing the world of *Pacsirta* prove on the one hand the historical richness of language and on the other its artistic potential. Kosztolányi was well aware of the Janus-faced nature of language, which changes and preserves simultaneously. The focus on the level of phrasemes in *Pacsirta* could show how the greatness of this novel resides mainly in the manner in which it includes and unites different values (even literary historical paradigms), therefore permitting multiple simultaneous and divergent interpretations.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> First published in 1924. Dezső Kosztolányi: *Pacsirta*. Budapest: Athenaeum, 1924. In English: Dezső Kosztolányi: *Skylark*. Trans. Richard Aczel; Introd. by Péter Esterházy. London: Chatto & Windus, 1993.
- <sup>2</sup> One can even talk about a suppression by the ideology of the 1950s. As it has resulted in the highly controversial book on Kosztolányi’s oeuvre by Ágnes Heller. “The strongly moral approach goes together with an emphasis on biography, Kosztolányi’s works are examined as documents that illustrate the value system of the author. Her perspective must have changed radically since the 1950s, when she failed to see that Kosztolányi had anticipated the loss of credibility of great narratives.” Mihály Szegedy-Maszák, *Agnes Heller on Literature = Ethics and Heritage: Essays on the Philosophy of Agnes Heller*, Ed. János Boros, Mihály Vajda, Pécs, Brambauer, 2007, 163–174. Especially: 163–166.

- <sup>3</sup> [Translated by the author – KB] [“a regény különböző nyelvjátékok egymást zavaró kölcsönhatásaként értelmezi a világot. A címszereplő levele éppúgy önmagában zárt nyelvjáték, mint az álom, a kaszinói kártyajáték vagy a vendéglői étlap”.] In his recently published monograph on Kosztolányi a chapter analysing the language of the novel is titled: “Language Games”. Mihály Szegedy-Maszák, *Kosztolányi Dezső*. Pozsony: Kalligram, 2010, 237–242.
- <sup>4</sup> He has written numerous essays (filling more volumes of his oeuvre) on language (i.e. its phenomena). His notion on language was quite complex yet sometimes paradox since as an artist his writings lack theoretical regularity and methodology.
- <sup>5</sup> For a detailed periodisation of his concept see László Bengi’s recent paper. László Bengi, *Hagyomány és viszonylagosság. Kosztolányi nyelvölfogásáról*. In: László Bengi: *Elbeszél halál. Kosztolányi-tanulmányok*, Budapest: Ráció, 2012.
- <sup>6</sup> [Translated by the author – KB] [“Mi a nyelvünket, melyet úkapáinktól örököltünk, úgy beszéljük, mint a kisgyerekek. Sok mindenre nem emlékszünk. De a nyelv, rejtetten mindenre emlékszik. Az fölveszi magába a múlt elfelejtett szokásait, melyek tovább bujkálnak benne, homályosan.”]
- <sup>7</sup> [Translated by the author – KB] [“Jaj, barátom, micsoda pályát futnak meg a szavak. Nincs olyan, amely 1933-ban pontosan azt jelentené, amit 1900-ban jelentett.”]
- <sup>8</sup> See also Kosztolányi, *Szokásmondások*, 51–52. (The page numbers in the text refer to the following edition: Dezső Kosztolányi, *Skylark*, Trans. Richard Aczel, with an introduction by Péter Esterházy, Budapest, London, New York: CEU Press, 1993.)
- <sup>9</sup> The following German editions were published from 1928 to 2007: Desider Kosztolányi, *Lerche (Roman)*, Trans. Stefan J. Klein, Heidelberg: Merlin Verlag, 1928; Dezső Kosztolányi, *Lerche (Roman)*, Trans. Klaus Schmuck, Rev. by Georg Harmat, Afterw. by Paul Kárpáti, Leipzig: Reclam, 1970 (1976: 2nd edition); Dezső Kosztolányi, *Lerche (Roman)*, Trans. Heinrich Eisterer, Afterw. by Ilma Rakusa, Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2007; Dezső Kosztolányi, *Lerche (Roman)*, Trans. Christina Viragh, Afterw. by Péter Esterházy, Zürich: Manesse Verlag, 2007.
- <sup>10</sup> “Das müssen wir ja mit schwarzer Kreide in den Schornstein schreiben.” (Trans. by Stephan J. Klein; Kosztolányi, 1928, 59); “Das muß man ja mit schwarzer Kreide in den Schornstein schreiben!” (Trans. by Klaus Schmuck; Kosztolányi, 40); “Das wird man in den Kamin schreiben müssen, mit schwarzer Kreide.” (Trans. by Christina Viragh; Kosztolányi, 2007a, 66); The only example in Heinrich Eisterer’s translation keeps only the literary meaning by using another expression that, however, lacking the nonsense of the original’s: “Den Tag müssen wir uns rot im Kalender anstreichen.” (Trans. Heinrich Eisterer; Kosztolányi, 2007b, 50.)
- <sup>11</sup> The idiom is based on the use of notch. Although there are idioms in English with “notch” they only refer to high or low ‘quality’ (top notch; take it up a notch; etc.).
- <sup>12</sup> About literal and figurative meaning (mostly of proverbs) see: Norrick Neal R., *How proverbs mean: semantic studies in English proverbs*. Berlin, New York: Mouton, 1985.
- <sup>13</sup> “Das Essen wurde in ihm zu Blut, wie im Mönch das Linsengericht.” (SJK, 83); “Diesen Speisen würden ihn kräftigen, sich in Blut verwandeln wie in einem Mönch das Linsengericht.” (KSch, 55); “Es hatte ihm ausgezeichnet gemundet.” (E, 70); “Die Speisen in ihm wurden zu Blut wie im Klosterbruder die Linsen.” (ChV, 94).
- <sup>14</sup> However the referred literature here is mainly on proverbs as the experts point out, many characteristics of proverbs, sayings and idioms are common. That leads even to a kind of terminological fuzziness: “When considering the open boundaries of the subject area of phraseology, and its fuzziness concerning categories, it seems neither desirable nor possible to find an exhaustive classification or terminology.” See Burger, 2007, 15.
- <sup>15</sup> *Dat veniam corvis, vexat censura columbis* (Juvenal, *Satires* II, 63)



- <sup>16</sup> They do not understand, they can only recognize Latin words. “Those versed in Latin shouted back at him: *Vino veritas*, old boy, *vino veritas*.” *Skylark*, 192.
- <sup>17</sup> The dominant role of the Latin culture in education is indeed unquestionable – almost at that time: “In Europe this began in the Middle Ages when Latin proverbs were used for translation exercises and to teach children moral precepts. [...] In fact, the developmental stage of fourth graders might be the perfect time to confront students with the character-building values of proverbial laws of life.” (See Mieder, 2007, 406)
- <sup>18</sup> The genre “self-help books” described in the study of Mieder seems to require such type of reader like Vajkay. See Wolfgang Mieder: *Proverbs and cultural units or items of folklore In Phraseologie/Phraseology. Ein Internationales Handbuch der zeitgenössischen Forschung/An International Handbook of Contemporary Research*. Ed. Harald Burger, Dimitrij Dobrovolskij, Peter Kühn, Neal R. Norrick. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007, Vol. I., 405–406.
- <sup>19</sup> [Translated by the author – KB] [“Minden írás, mely mögött nincs az egész élet titka, értelmetlen. Mit fecseg az, aki érti az életet? Az igazi költő nem érti az életet, s azért ír, hogy az írással, mint tettel megértse. (Nem azért, hogy másokkal, mint valami tanítómester, megértesse.)”] See also Mihály Szegedy-Maszák, *Kosztolányi Dezső*, 236.
- <sup>20</sup> See also: „The interrelationship of proverbs with other verbal folklore genres has been of great interest to folklorists in general and paremiologists in particular for a long time. Classical Greek and Latin writers commented on the obvious interrelationship between fables and proverbs, theorizing, as it were, about which of the genres came first” *Ibid.*, 404.
- <sup>21</sup> This fact is also announced by Vilmos Tolnai whose work on proverbs, as a letter proves, has been surely read by Kosztolányi. (Dezső Kosztolányi, *Levelek – Naplók*. Ed. Pál Réz, Budapest: Osiris, 1998, 472–472)
- <sup>22</sup> The novel was published in the fiction column of a periodical in Budapest and of a newspaper in Kolozsvár in 1923. So it has actually three more or less distinct printed versions.
- <sup>23</sup> That seems to be hardly untouched by the influence of Sigmund Freud’s notions. As several essays and letters prove, Kosztolányi knew his works well.
- <sup>24</sup> *Webster’s Universal College Dictionary*, Gramercy Books: New York, 1997. It is actually the “kernel” of a longer version: *A bad penny always turns up*. Norrick called kernel “the minimal recognizable unit” of a proverb. See Norrick, *How proverbs mean*, p. 45.
- <sup>25</sup> Every sign during the waiting for their daughter at the railway station seems to prove them that Pacsirta never comes home: so the terrific visions of the father as well as the “mysterious and obscure” doubts of the mother about her vanishing. See *Skylark*, 187, 189.
- <sup>26</sup> Kosztolányi has indeed a short story titled *A bujdosó* [“The Hider”] from the year 1912, which can be really read as a kind of elaboration of this proverb. Dezső Kosztolányi, *A bujdosó* In Dezső Kosztolányi: *A léggömb elrepül*. Ed. Pál Réz, Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1981.

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# MARGIT SLACHTA, UNE RELIGIEUSE DU TRAVAIL SOCIAL DANS LA VIE PUBLIQUE

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En 1958, le service des affaires intérieures du Ministère de l'intérieur hongrois a déclassé les archives liées à Margit Slachta. L'opposante politique, qui vivait encore aux Etats-Unis, n'était plus considérée comme dangereuse pour le socialisme en construction. En quelques dizaines d'années, elle était même peu à peu tombée dans l'oubli en laissant seulement l'image un peu falsifiée d'une « religieuse bigote ». Mais qui était véritablement Margit Slachta ? Il ne fait aucun doute qu'elle ne fut pas une personnalité banale. Si cela avait été le cas, elle n'aurait pas eu autant d'ennemis.

**Mots-cléfs :** Margit Slachta, Edit Farkas, mission sociale, féminisme, nazisme/antnazisme, cardinal Mindszenty, émigration hongroise

## Son enfance et sa jeunesse

Margit Slachta est née le 18 septembre 1884 à Kassa (Košice), dans une famille de la noblesse d'origine polonaise<sup>1</sup>. Ses aïeux étaient de riches propriétaires terriens de la Haute Hongrie historique. Son père, Kálmán Slachta de Zadjel (*zadjeli Slachta Kálmán*), s'était marié en 1882 avec une demoiselle appartenant elle aussi à la classe des propriétaires terriens, Borbála Saárossy de Sáros. La vie du ménage fut prospère jusqu'à ce que le chef de famille, ayant dilapidé sa fortune, décidât d'émigrer en Amérique, en 1908, avec sa femme et trois de ses six enfants. Margit, qui était alors âgée de 24 ans, resta en Hongrie. Elle enseignait l'allemand et le français dans la ville de Győr et venait d'obtenir un poste de formateur à Budapest, dans l'institution de formation des maîtres de la rue Csalogány (*Csalogány utca*).

Déjà, au cours de ses études, elle avait eu l'occasion d'entendre Edit Farkas s'exprimer sur les patronages et sur la protection des ouvrières, ce qui l'avait profondément impressionnée. En 1897, une veuve de la haute société, la comtesse Pál Pálffy (*gróf Pálffy Pálné*), avait fondé la première organisation sociale pour la protection des ouvrières dans un cadre chrétien, en s'appuyant sur des dames de sa condition, privilégiées, en un mot oisives. Il était alors à la mode de « s'abaisser » jusqu'aux classes inférieures, mais, pour le travail sérieux, l'enthousiasme des dames désœuvrées était insuffisant. On avait donc assez rapidement décidé de s'adjoindre l'aide de jeunes intellectuelles bien formées, parmi lesquelles se trouvait la jeune enseignante Edit Farkas qui accéda en 1906 à la vice-présidence de l'association. Tandis que la comtesse Pálffy croyait qu'il suffisait d'associer aux dames aristocratiques de jeunes femmes actives et cultivées, Edit Farkas quant à elle, réorienta le recrutement de simples collaboratrices temporaires vers celui de jeunes filles acceptant de consacrer leur vie et leur temps à cette activité. C'est ainsi que naquit l'idée d'une nouvelle organisation destinée à la cause féminine, la Mission du service social. Dès 1908, Margit Slachta rompit à son tour avec l'enseignement et fut la première candidate à la nouvelle mission de patronage lancée par Edit Farkas.

### La sœur de mission

De la Mission sociale, Margit Slachta évolua bientôt vers la vie publique et la politique. Les membres de la mission se situaient au carrefour de la vie religieuse et de la vie dans le monde ; aujourd'hui, on dirait qu'elles faisaient partie d'un institut de vie communautaire et apostolique (en 1922, l'évêque leur confirma le statut de congrégation). Les sœurs ne faisaient pas de vœux publics, mais ce qu'on appelait alors des vœux privés. Pour Slachta, c'était le bon équilibre entre la proximité avec Dieu et l'immersion dans le siècle.

Vêtue d'un long pardessus et d'une large coiffe, comme c'était l'usage parmi les sœurs de la mission sociale, elle commença à donner ses premières conférences sur la condition de la femme et sur la nécessité d'union des femmes catholiques. En neuf ans, cette frêle et jolie jeune fille de 25 ans allait devenir la *passionaria* chrétienne de la cause féminine et du travail social. Moderne, dans le sens que l'on donnerait même aujourd'hui à ce terme, elle défendait ses idées avec une grande ardeur. Ottokár Prohászka, évêque de Székesfehérvár, la soutenait en raison même de ses méthodes inhabituelles : « j'aime cette jeune femme délicate et tendre et en même temps géniale, dont l'âme est d'une grande finesse ; elle est si radicale qu'elle peut sans difficulté adopter le mode de vie des classes les plus basses, elle est peu exigeante, capable par exemple de dormir par terre, s'il le faut, etc. ... » Sans perdre haleine, elle enchaînait les conférences, récoltait

des fonds, mettait en place des antennes de la Mission sociale en province. Elle ouvrit des écoles sociales, écrivit d'innombrables articles dans la presse sur la représentation des intérêts de la femme, sur le suffrage des femmes. Elle collabora au journal *A Keresztény Nő* (« La femme chrétienne »), puis à la nouvelle version relancée en mars 1918, *Magyar Nő* (« La femme hongroise »), au sous-titre révélateur : *A keresztény feminizmus lapja* (« Journal du féminisme chrétien »). Le féminisme défendu par Slachta était à la fois favorable à la femme et centré sur la famille. Tout en mettant l'accent sur les obligations fondamentales de la femme en tant que génitrice, elle s'écartait des vues purement conservatrices assignant aux femmes le rôle de mère de famille à l'exclusion de tout autre fonction. Elle revendiquait des droits : le droit à l'éducation, le droit de vote, le droit à l'éligibilité. Elle était à la fois habile et volontaire, passionnée, inspirée et stimulante. C'est sans doute sa formidable aspiration au bien commun qui la motiva dans sa décision de jouer un rôle social d'importance. En 1918, elle s'inscrivit au *Keresztényszociális Néppárt* (« Parti populaire chrétien social »). Le 28 octobre de la même année, elle prenait la tête de la « section chrétienne féminine » du parti (*Keresztény Női Tábor*), avec l'intention de mettre en place tant l'organisation générale que les antennes locales d'un mouvement féminin chrétien, national, légitimiste et social.

### La première femme au parlement hongrois

Les premières élections législatives en Hongrie, après la première guerre mondiale, furent tenues en 1920. Conformément aux attentes internationales, le suffrage fut général, égalitaire et secret – avec, toutefois, quelques restrictions concernant les femmes (par exemple, celle-ci étaient tenues, pour voter, de savoir lire et écrire dans une des langues du pays<sup>3</sup>). Slachta n'était membre du parti que depuis un an et demi, mais elle obtint à l'assemblée du *Keresztény Nemzeti Egyesülés Pártja* (« Parti national chrétien unifié ») la majorité absolue pour être désignée comme candidate officielle à des élections partielles. Edit Farkas l'autorisa à participer aux élections, que Slachta gagna d'une confortable avance avec un total de 5471 bulletins exprimés en sa faveur, tandis que son opposant, l'ancien Ministre des affaires sociales, András Csilléry, obtenait 3642 votes et que les deux autres candidats en présence ne dépassaient pas le millier<sup>4</sup>. *Margit Slachta devenait ainsi la première femme élue au parlement de Hongrie, elle était en quelque sorte la première « mère de la nation »*. Du reste, son apparition sur la scène politique fut accueillie avec des sentiments mitigés. Certains célébrèrent la victoire de l'émancipation, d'autres s'agitèrent au nom du principe que l'arène politique n'était pas un lieu convenable pour les femmes.

D'ailleurs, ceux-là se trompaient qui croyaient que la voix de la jeune femme serait nécessairement embarrassée, aurait du mal à porter au sein de l'assemblée. Lors de son premier mandat, qui commença le 25 mars 1920 et se termina le 16 février 1922, elle prit la parole 28 fois, s'exprimant sur non moins de 67 problèmes majeurs. Elle donna son premier discours le 23 avril 1920. Le correspondant du journal social démocrate *Népszava* racontait que « tout en avançant les vérités qu'elle avait apprises des femmes socialistes, elle fut constamment interrompue par les politiciens mâles qui plaisantaient, imbus de leur supériorité<sup>5</sup>. » Elle aborda tour à tour la question et la situation féminine, la situation sociale, le suffrage universel, proposant par exemple qu'aux femmes (et aux jeunes hommes âgés de moins de vingt ans) fût interdit l'accès aux détaillants d'eaux de vie, car la vue des hommes pris d'ivresse n'était pas favorable à l'édification de l'âme féminine<sup>6</sup>. Elle proposa la modification des lois relatives au travail féminin, l'embauche de « contrôleur » de sexe féminin dans l'industrie, la garantie institutionnelle de la protection de la maternité, l'octroi de deux semaines de congés payés aux ouvriers de l'industrie, la limitation de la mise en nourrice, alors en plein développement au détriment de l'allaitement maternel, enfin, la révision du droit pénal des mœurs. Les membres du parlement se rendirent compte assez vite qu'il ne s'agissait pas de ricaner de leur consœur avec sarcasme ou supériorité. Ses discours, ses propositions, ses positions démontraient qu'elle était une femme cultivée et profondément sensible à la chose sociale.

Et pourtant, l'historiographie la traite avec une grande injustice. Non sans quelque approximation soigneusement entretenue, le nom de Slachta est en effet associé avec la loi XXVI de 1920 sur la défense de la propriété, de la morale et des personnes, demeurée célèbre sous le nom de « loi du bâton ». Or elle n'était pas présente lors des discussions et du vote de cette loi. Elle était en vacances. L'origine de la confusion tient au fait qu'une autre loi en discussion à la même époque prévoyait elle aussi la peine du bâton, la loi XV de 1920 dont l'objet était de renforcer la punition du profit illicite. Lors des discussions sur la loi XV, Slachta s'était rangée derrière les partisans du bâton et avait même proposé son extension aux femmes. Entre autres, elle affirmait être elle-même arrivée à « cette étrange constatation que c'étaient les femmes et non les hommes qui étaient responsables du profit illicite ». Selon elle, la conquête de l'égalité pour les femmes devait passer par les avantages, mais aussi par les inconvénients. D'autre part, la punition du profit illicite par la peine du bâton n'était pas spécialement critiquée, y compris dans la presse de gauche, où l'on commença seulement à la stigmatiser en première page quand il apparut qu'elle pourrait être appliquée contre les associations de gauche. (Le parlement commençait justement à discuter, pour la protection des intérêts supérieurs de l'État et de la société, d'une proposition de loi prévoyant l'interdiction du parti communiste – concrétisée l'année suivante par la loi III de 1921). Avec le temps, des articles tendancieux firent peu à peu

l'amalgame entre les restrictions imposées à la gauche, la peine du bâton et Margit Slachta. Plus tard, l'intéressée allait d'ailleurs elle-même réviser son jugement sur la question. Mais l'historiographie allait tout de même conserver cette étrange obsession pour son prétendu goût de la peine du bâton.

Le mandat parlementaire de Slachta prit fin le 16 février 1922. Edit Farkas ne l'autorisa pas à se présenter aux nouvelles élections. Les deux femmes s'étaient éloignées l'une de l'autre, car leurs conceptions respectives de l'avenir du pays étaient profondément différentes, quoique toutes deux monarchistes : Edit Farkas était partisan de la libre élection du roi et entretenait des relations amicales avec la famille du régent Horthy. Slachta, quant à elle, était légitimiste et le demeura jusqu'à sa mort, c'est-à-dire qu'elle souhaitait que le trône fût réservé à un membre de la Maison Habsbourg, Charles IV, puis, après la mort de ce dernier, à son fils Othon, selon les règles strictes de dévolution inscrites dans la *Pragmatica sanctio* de 1723<sup>7</sup>.

D'autre part, la conférence des évêques hongrois avait rejeté plusieurs fois les constitutions de la Mission sociale, exigeant surtout la cessation de toute activité politique par leurs membres. Edit Farkas modifia l'inspiration bénédictine initiale de sa règle pour y infuser un certain esprit jésuite, non sans conserver une part de méticulosité médiévale dans l'organisation quotidienne de la communauté, formant un mélange inédit. Du reste, les obligations de la vie communautaire (la prière, le jeûne, la discipline dans la maisonnée, etc...) n'étaient pas faites pour Slachta, qui refusait d'être une religieuse aux mains liées par une multitude de règles. Elle souhaitait simplement faire le vœux de s'immerger dans le monde, qu'elle considérait comme le lieu le plus adapté pour un travail social efficace et institutionnalisé.

Entre les deux femmes, le conflit larvé sur la nature de l'engagement politique s'aggrava jusqu'à ce que Margit Slachta finît par quitter la Mission, le 5 mai 1923, accompagnée de quelques autres religieuses. Les parcours de ces deux femmes de grande valeur en dépit de leurs grandes divergences, n'allaient plus jamais se rejoindre. Quelques jours plus tard, le 12 mai, Slachta fonda la Société des sœurs du service social, qu'elle allait diriger pendant quarante ans, jusqu'en 1963. Avec ses compagnes, elle abandonna le voile bleu et adopta un voile gris, c'est pourquoi on les a appelées les « sœurs grises ». Après avoir franchi les premières difficultés liées à l'établissement de la Société, Slachta reprit ses activités politiques, en 1927.

Revenons donc au parti politique, la Section chrétienne féminine. Depuis sa fondation en 1918, on avait l'habitude d'organiser au cours de l'assemblée annuelle du parti une « parade » qui consistait en séances de formation et discussions informelles. Slachta donnait généralement un discours sur les activités réalisées au cours de l'année, ainsi que sur les orientations de fond du parti. Après l'éclatement de la deuxième guerre mondiale, elle entreprit de renforcer l'esprit



chrétien de résistance morale : lors de la Parade de 1939, elle évoqua notamment la question juive en affirmant que « toute injustice agit comme un boomerang et revient vers celui qui la commet<sup>8</sup>. » À cette occasion, le parti adopta notamment une motion qui fut présentée au Président du conseil : à savoir que les prêtres ou religieux des ordres féminins et masculins d'origine juive soient exemptés de l'application des lois juives (antisémites). Le 6 janvier 1942, elle s'exprima publiquement contre le nazisme. L'ambassadeur d'Allemagne protesta auprès du Ministère hongrois des affaires étrangères, tandis que la presse libérale et radicale hongroise donnait au contraire un écho favorable<sup>9</sup>. À partir de 1942, le parti organisa à travers le pays des « séminaires de vision du monde » afin d'apporter le contrepoids des valeurs chrétiennes à la propagande hitlérienne<sup>10</sup>.

### Margit Slachta, la juste

Quand l'antisémitisme se répandit dans l'opinion hongroise, Slachta le repoussa, pour sa part, de la plus ferme manière. À mesure que s'approchait l'hitlérisme, ses positions théoriques prirent une forme plus active. Elle écrivit et diffusa d'innombrables tracts et pétitions, intervint auprès des pouvoirs publics. Elle publia plusieurs séries d'articles, en particulier dans le journal *A Lélek Szava* (« La parole de l'âme »), qui fut l'un des premiers organes de presse supprimés après l'invasion allemande<sup>11</sup>. Accompagnée de onze religieuses de la Société, elle présenta devant le Prince primat, Mgr Jusztinián Serédi, une protestation contre les lois juives : « l'enseignement de notre Eglise nous interdit de nous associer avec les conceptions sur lesquelles se fonde la législation hongroise pour persécuter les juifs, moins encore avec celles qui, ignorant la sainteté du sacrement du baptême, considèrent à certains égard des chrétiens comme des juifs, et bien moins encore nous pouvons accepter que ces lois soient assez imparfaites pour qualifier de juifs des personnes qui ont dédié leur vie entière au service des âmes au sein de l'Eglise<sup>12</sup>. »

En 1939, les catholiques convertis avaient fondé une institution de défense, l'Association hongroise de la Sainte Croix, dont Margit Slachta était vice-présidente. Au printemps 1942, les premières nouvelles de la déportation des juifs de Slovaquie parvinrent à l'association. « Je suis rentrée à la maison avec l'âme dévastée – écrivait-elle – ce qui me tourmente, c'est que j'ai le sentiment d'être moi aussi coupable, si je ne fais pas tout pour empêcher ce désastre<sup>13</sup>. »

Les protestations de Slachta ne furent entendues ni par l'Etat hongrois, ni par l'Eglise. Après l'annonce, le 8 février 1943, que la Slovaquie allait bientôt commencer la liquidation de tous les juifs, Slachta cessa toute tergiversation. Elle se rendit à Rome où elle parvint à obtenir une audience papale le 11 mars 1943, obtenant que Pie XII somme les sept évêques slovaques de protester auprès du prési-

dent de la République et du gouvernement de Slovaquie et fassent en sorte qu'une lettre pastorale de protestation fût lue dans toutes les églises de Slovaquie<sup>14</sup>.

Sa foi chrétienne et son humanisme stimulaient son engagement dans une activité qui lui faisait risquer sa vie. Les sœurs de la Société restaient volontairement à ses côtés. L'enseignement spirituel des religieuses contenait la disposition au don de soi-même et le vœu d'obéissance, mais sans préjudice du l'examen de conscience. C'est-à-dire que chacune pouvait choisir librement : devait-elle risquer sa propre vie pour sauver celle des autres ? Outre les sœurs de la Société, Slachta œuvrait avec tous ceux qui étaient prêts à s'engager. Par exemple, la militante sociale démocrate Sára Karig imprimait des certificats de baptême et falsifiait des tampons qu'elle remettait à Slachta<sup>15</sup>. Les sœurs grises sauvèrent ainsi un millier de juifs. Certaines d'entre elles y perdirent leur propre vie : Sára Salkaházi fut exécutée et jetée dans le Danube le 27 décembre 1944 par les Croix fléchées, avec une catéchiste, Vilma Bernovits, et quatre enfants réfugiés.

### Après la deuxième guerre mondiale

Début 1945, Slachta fut accueillie, non sans débat houleux, par les dirigeants du Parti démocrate chrétien populaire. Mais son nom était associé au parti chrétien d'avant-guerre qui avait perdu tout crédit. De plus, sa propre position politique était jugée éloignée de celle du Parti populaire. Les différences d'opinion finirent par provoquer la scission : le comte József Pálffy, président du parti, expulsa non seulement les « dissidents » modernistes (qui allaient former le Parti démocrate populaire), mais aussi l'aile conservatrice, plus proche du clergé, qui tint une assemblée générale en se donnant Slachta pour vice-présidente. La Commission nationale générale (*Országos Nemzeti Bizottság*) autorisa le Parti démocrate populaire, qui affichait des positions progressiste jugées en phase avec les exigences de la politique internationale du moment, mais il n'autorisa pas l'aile conservatrice à faire campagne en tant que parti aux élections législatives de 1945.

Quant à Slachta, elle se présenta comme candidate individuelle et entra finalement au parlement sur la liste du Parti démocrate bourgeois (*Polgári Demokrata Párt*). Son engagement était considéré avec suspicion par de nombreux catholiques : puisque la persécution des juifs n'était plus d'actualité, pourquoi devait-elle s'allier avec le parti bourgeois qui continuait à représenter ? D'autre part, beaucoup de ses confrères au parlement – pas seulement les marxistes, mais aussi nombre de croyants chrétiens – la considéraient comme représentante d'un cléricalisme dépassé. Ses discours furent accueillis avec des exclamations sarcastiques, parfois vulgaires. La vieille question de la peine du bâton suscita des accusations récurrentes. On s'efforçait ainsi d'anéantir, du moins de contester le grand capital moral que Slachta avait acquis en sauvant des vies pendant la guerre.

Elle défendait des valeurs conservatrices. Au parlement, elle s'opposa à la proposition de loi sur le régime républicain, favorisant – d'accord avec le cardinal primat József Mindszenty – l'organisation d'un référendum sur la question qu'elle proposait de soumettre après la conclusion de la paix (on espérait encore que le pays recouvrerait alors sa souveraineté). Slachta était attachée aux anciennes structures et aux autorités héritées du passé. Le royaume promettait la même stabilité, les mêmes structures solides que l'Eglise ; de plus, il entretenait des liens étroits avec le catholicisme. Mais la réalité était incontournable : l'Union soviétique avait étendu son influence sur la moitié de l'Europe. Au terme de cette deuxième guerre mondiale, il y avait quelque chose de véritablement incongru dans l'idée d'un royaume en Europe centrale. Mais Slachta refusait de croire qu'un changement de régime pût mettre la Hongrie dans une meilleure position lors des négociations de paix.

En 1947, elle participa de nouveau aux élections générales et fut élue dans le cadre de la Section chrétienne féminine qu'elle venait de réactiver. Pendant la campagne, elle mit l'accent sur l'organisation des femmes sur une base chrétienne, nationale et sociale, sur l'amélioration de la situation économique et politique des femmes et sur la diffusion de l'intelligence féminine dans la vie publique : toutes les idées qu'elle n'avait cessé de défendre. La protection des enfants, des femmes, de la famille étaient des thèmes sympathiques, mais, après un événement comme la deuxième guerre mondiale, c'était insuffisant. La coalition au pouvoir, menée par le Parti des petits propriétaires (*Kisgazda párt*), avait déjà passé un grand nombre de lois sociales, il était impossible de gagner les votes des femmes en s'appuyant seulement sur la nature spécifique des femmes et la vision du monde chrétienne. La campagne du parti de Slachta éveilla peu d'écho, ni dans la coalition, ni dans les partis de l'opposition. (Aujourd'hui encore, il serait peu judicieux de fonder en Hongrie un parti politique sur des questions de genre.) En 1947, la Section féminine chrétienne exerça peu d'influence, mais, avec 1,4% des suffrages, elle parvint tout de même à envoyer quatre représentants au parlement.

Les interventions de Slachta, en 1947, furent principalement consacrées à la question de l'État de Saint Étienne, en tant que symbiose intacte du christianisme et de la monarchie, et au maintien de la « constitution historique » de la Hongrie. Nous connaissons les nombreux efforts du gouvernement en vue de réduire progressivement l'indépendance de l'Église catholique. Le 5 février 1947, lors du débat parlementaire sur l'introduction du caractère facultatif de l'enseignement religieux à l'école, conformément à la mise en application de la liberté de conscience, Slachta prononça un long discours en faveur de son caractère obligatoire. (Un député indépendant, qui venait de quitter le jour même le Parti des petits propriétaires, György Parragi, allait dire à ce propos : « s'il y a un homme dans cette assemblée, c'est bien elle ! »).

Le glissement de la vie politique hongroise vers la gauche finit par rendre impossible la poursuite de son activité politique dans le pays. Son discours du 28 octobre 1947 fut considéré comme préjudiciable à la politique extérieure du pays (elle y avait condamné l'Union soviétique et la Yougoslavie). Le 30 octobre, sur proposition du comité de l'immunité parlementaire, elle fut exclue de l'assemblée pour une durée de soixante jours. Lors de son dernier discours – constamment interrompu – en date du 16 juin 1948, elle s'opposa avec véhémence à la proposition de loi sur la nationalisation des écoles religieuses. Après le vote de la loi, les représentants des partis gouvernementaux entonnèrent l'hymne national, mais Margit Slachta resta assise. Le comité de l'immunité décida de prononcer une nouvelle fois son exclusion, mais pour une durée de deux fois six mois<sup>16</sup>.

Connue depuis toujours pour sa droiture, Margit Slachta finit par être rejetée pour son intransigeance. Slachta ne pouvait défendre le christianisme que dans son intégralité, elle était inapte à formuler le moindre compromis sur les principes. Ses luttes imprégnées d'équité, marquées par sa vision du monde chrétienne étaient irrémédiablement condamnées à l'échec dans cette époque féroce. Était-elle, elle-même, après 1945 la même personne qu'elle avait été en 1920 ? Encore jeune femme au temps de sa première expérience parlementaire, elle était déjà une dame d'âge mûr lors de la seconde. Mais il n'y a pas deux Margit Slachta, seulement deux périodes historiques profondément différentes. Si elle avait pu représenter en 1920 une pensée catholique moderne, trois décennies plus tard, elle n'était déjà plus en mesure de remarquer les changements survenus même au sein du camp catholique. Elle restait fidèle à ses anciennes opinions.

L'été 1948 venait d'être marquée par l'exclusion de Slachta des travaux parlementaires. La deuxième partie de l'année le fut par la lutte contre le « mindszentysme » qui se termina, comme on le sait, par l'enfermement du prince primat le 26 décembre, à l'encontre de toute autre solution plus diplomatique. De son lieu de détention, le cardinal fut autorisé à envoyer deux courtes lettres à Margit Slachta, dans lesquelles il demandait quelques menus services. Slachta considéra ces lettres avec suspicion, croyant – sans doute à juste titre – qu'il s'agissait d'une provocation. Craignant une prochaine arrestation, elle se cacha dans un couvent dominicain à partir de janvier 1949. À l'origine, elle avait prévu de faire campagne pour les élections de 1949, en réalité, c'est à peine si elle vota elle-même le 15 mai. Finalement, le 23 juin 1949, à l'aube, elle traversa la frontière en direction de l'Autriche avec sa sœur cadette, d'où elle émigra aux États-Unis le 16 septembre sous le pseudonyme d'Etelka Tóth.

### Dans l'émigration

De son exil, elle continua à correspondre avec des connaissances en Hongrie sous le pseudonyme de Margit Nemes ; sous celui de Borbála Nemes, elle collabora à *Radio Free Europe*. En 1951, elle revint à Vienne avec l'espoir, qui s'avéra vain, de revoir son pays natal, mais elle reprit finalement le chemin des Etats-Unis le 5 mai 1953, cette fois-ci définitivement et sous son vrai nom.

Au cours des premières années d'émigration, elle s'efforça de rester active. À l'une de ses sœurs, elle écrivait en 1954 : « Tu ne peux imaginer combien je suis débordée. Sans cesse, je dois m'occuper de ma survie et de celle de mes sœurs, sans cesse résoudre des problèmes, écrire des lettres... Je suis vidée, ma tête refuse de se souvenir. Rappelle-toi tout de même que j'ai 70 ans. Je ne me suis pas assise sur un divan pour me couper les ongles depuis dix ans<sup>17</sup>... » En 1956, elle était déjà affaiblie, mais elle fit de son mieux pour venir en aide aux réfugiés.

Avec le temps, elle s'était retirée de la politique, mais elle continuait à entretenir une correspondance avec quelques « anciens combattants ». Béla Varga, ancien président du parlement, lui écrivit par exemple en 1959 : « Je sais que dans ce monde étranger où je suis loin de ma patrie, il y a près de moi la meilleure amie de toute ma vie<sup>18</sup>. » Deux ans plus tard, il la mettait encore en garde contre toute idée de retour en Hongrie : « Pour tout l'or du monde, n'essayez pas<sup>19</sup>... »

Même au sein de sa propre sororité, elle eut à subir des conflits douloureux qui reflètent étrangement son sort personnel en 1923. Les sœurs de Los Angeles et du Canada finirent par rompre avec elle. Ses dernières années furent celles du dépouillement total. Son corps fatigué finit par venir à bout de ses capacités. Elle passa le 6 janvier 1974 à l'âge de 90 ans, à Buffalo, dans une maison de la Société des sœurs du service social.

Le personnage de Margit Slachta représente des valeurs et une attitude exemplaires, indépendante de toute position politique, dominant toutes les époques, tous les pouvoirs et toutes les visions du monde. Elle fut une personne extrêmement complexe et compliquée. Et pourtant simple, par ailleurs, car elle s'est constamment soumise au commandement d'amour du Christ. Elle se sentait à la fois revêtue d'une responsabilité envers les autres et envers la nation.

Onze ans après sa mort, en 1985, elle reçut à titre posthume la distinction des Justes de l'Etat d'Israël et l'on planta un arbre à sa mémoire dans le parc de Yad Vashem. Le 15 mars 1995, Margit Slachta reçut du gouvernement hongrois la médaille du souvenir (*emlékérem*), conjointement avec la Société des sœurs du service social, puis, le 7 mai 1995, la médaille du courage de la République de Hongrie (*Magyar Köztársaság Bátorság érdemjel*). Mais ce n'est pas pour obtenir des décorations qu'elle a tant lutté et souffert : la Société des sœurs du service social n'est pas morte, elle accueille encore de jeunes sœurs, la relève est arrivée pour le XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Palkó Magda, « Slachta Margit », *Politikuspályák* [Parcours politiques], Budapest, 1984, p. 146.
- <sup>2</sup> Prohászka Ottokár, *Naplójegyzetek 3.* [Journal], Szeged–Székesfehérvár, 1997, p. 130. Note du 11 janvier 1920.
- <sup>3</sup> *Magyarországi Rendeletek Tára* [Répertoire des décrets hongrois], 1919, p. 879.
- <sup>4</sup> *Budapesti Hírlap*, 28 mars 1920, p. 5.
- <sup>5</sup> *Népszava*, 24 avril 1920, p. 1.
- <sup>6</sup> *Magyar Nő*, année IV. (début IX.), n°2, 26 mars 1921.
- <sup>7</sup> NdT : Le parti de la libre élection considérait la déclaration de Charles IV à Eckartsau, le 13 novembre 1918, comme une abdication, il fallait donc, selon lui procéder à l'élection d'un nouveau roi, conformément aux anciennes traditions hongroises et surtout aux luttes pour l'indépendance nationale ayant culminé en 1848-49.
- <sup>8</sup> *Pesti Hírlap*, 8 janvier 1939, p. 19.
- <sup>9</sup> *Pesti Hírlap*, 8 janvier 1942, p. 7 ; *Magyar Nemzet*, 8 janvier 1942, p. 8 ; *Nemzeti Újság*, 3 janvier 1942, p. 3.
- <sup>10</sup> *Sorakozzál a Front védelmére* [Engagez-vous avec le Front], [Budapest] 1943, 4 pages.
- <sup>11</sup> NdT : l'invasion de la Hongrie par l'armée allemande eut lieu le 19 mars 1944.
- <sup>12</sup> Archives primatiales (Esztergom) 4843/1941. 8 juillet 1941.
- <sup>13</sup> Lettre à l'archevêque de Kalocsa, Mgr Gyula Zichy, 27 avril 1942. Archives de la Société des sœurs du travail social (*Szociális Testvérek Társasága Történeti Irattára*). Plus loin : « SzTTTI »
- <sup>14</sup> Mona Ilona, *Slachta Margit*, Budapest, 1997, p. 153.
- <sup>15</sup> Interview de Sára Karig dans le documentaire intitulé *Credo* (réalisation : Ágnes Tölgyesi), 20 mai 1995.
- <sup>16</sup> SzTTTI, lettre de Margit Slachta à Alice Slachta (résidant alors à Shanghai), Budapest, sans date.
- <sup>17</sup> SzTTTI, Lettre de Margit Slachta à Irén Slachta. Kneipp Spring, 29 mars 1954.
- <sup>18</sup> SzTTTI, Lettre de Béla Varga à Margit Slachta. 11 décembre 1959.
- <sup>19</sup> SzTTTI, Lettre de Béla Varga à Margit Slachta. 9 mars 1961.

# LÁSZLÓ RAVASZ ET LES CONCEPTION DU PROTESTANTISME HONGROIS AU TOURNANT DU XX<sup>E</sup> SIÈCLE

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Le rôle historique du facteur religieux est actuellement un problème majeur dans la réflexion historiographique en Hongrie. Le positivisme et le romantisme, dont la Réforme avait été la matrice dans tous les pays européens, ont procuré une stimulation mentale décisive aux historiens hongrois du milieu du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, en particulier Mihály Horváth et László Szalay, dans leur effort en vue de l'émancipation religieuse et dans leur lutte contre la dynastie Habsbourg, lutte dont le cœur était justement la principauté calviniste de Transylvanie. La lutte des ordres transylvains au XVI<sup>e</sup> et XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle fut ainsi considérée comme les prémisses de la lutte pour l'indépendance, principal moteur de la société hongroise au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle avec le développement du libéralisme. Ces idées s'imposèrent dans le savoir historique dont, jusqu'alors, les plus prestigieux épisodes étaient la conquête du Bassin des Carpates, l'âge d'or du royaume médiéval et la défense contre les Turcs (le « bastion de l'Europe »). D'ailleurs, l'image que la Réforme se faisait d'elle-même, c'est-à-dire le progressisme libéral, convenait tout aussi bien en tant que contre-image aux catholiques conservateurs (ultramontains), qui, depuis les Lumières jusqu'aux progrès de la pensée scientifique moderne en passant par la Révolution, tenaient la Réforme pour responsable de tous les phénomènes préjudiciables au catholicisme<sup>1</sup>. En s'efforçant de s'approprier les outils symboliques de la pensée nationale hongroise, le protestantisme, en voie de sécularisation, mettait en place une stratégie qui allait finalement s'avérer dommageable à la formation d'un discours national unitaire.

**Mots-clefs :** László Ravasz, protestantisme libéral, conservatisme protestant, sécularisation, professionnalisation

Le paradigme du protestantisme libéral, qui se développa dès le début des années 1840, allait non seulement être la principale vision du monde au sein de l'Eglise protestante, mais aussi dominer la Hongrie dans son ensemble pendant trois quarts de siècle. Libéral et *national*, plutôt que libéral et *démocratique*, le protestantisme hongrois se sentait plus proche du libéralisme conservateur de type Macaulay que du radicalisme. Face aux tendances de plus en plus radicales du protestantisme propres à cette époque, s'imposait en particulier l'influence modératrice de l'idéal moral issu de la philosophie kantienne (la « morale religieuse »), de même que la pensée hégélienne sur le développement historique. L'époque avait un théologien en la personne de Mór Ballagi, devenu théologien réformé

après avoir été, dans sa jeunesse, un spécialiste prometteur du Talmud. Selon Ballagi : « la religion, à proprement parler, [était] un développement de la culture générale d'une époque, si bien que chaque époque [avait] en quelque sorte son propre credo. Les conceptions sont éternelles – poursuivait-il –, mais l'intelligence humaine, qui les saisit, reste tributaire des lois du raisonnement par degré et du perfectionnement<sup>2</sup>. »

La période du Dualisme fut d'abord caractérisée par la montée de l'indifférentisme religieux, tant parmi les masses que dans les élites libérales, mais la situation allait se retourner au début du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle avec l'apparition du catholicisme politique en réaction au vote des grandes lois religieuses en 1894. Dans les années vingt, le langage politique allait même s'imprégner d'une nouvelle rhétorique désignée par la locution « cursus chrétien » ; non seulement l'influence politique des Églises allait se renforcer considérablement, mais, d'une manière plus spécifique, les manifestations publiques de la pratique religieuse allaient devenir plus spectaculaires et plus intenses par rapport à la période précédente. Indéniablement, l'impact de la guerre fut aussi un facteur déterminant dans cette évolution. Comme le disait László Ravasz : « c'est la leçon des siècles. Si le christianisme est trop faible pour empêcher la guerre, il se met alors à son service<sup>3</sup>. » Du reste, le sentiment religieux ne fut pas seulement alimenté par la guerre, mais aussi et même plus encore par l'effet durable des conséquences dévastatrices de cette dernière.

Les désillusions issues des expériences révolutionnaires successives et de l'explosion provoquée par le traité de Trianon eurent pour conséquence un état de panique semblable à celui qui succède à une catastrophe naturelle, ainsi que l'exprimait Ravasz, en guise de consolation et d'encouragements : « l'ébranlement propre aux états d'insatisfaction permanente ou d'aversion malade est toujours lié à un état caché de l'âme [...], comme il est possible d'en faire l'expérience, dans le monde physique, après les grands tremblements de terre<sup>4</sup>. » La « renaissance religieuse » caractéristique de l'entre-deux-guerres eut ainsi pour motivation fondamentale une angoisse existentielle, comme le soulignait le philosophe hongrois, Béla Hamvas, en s'appuyant sur les catégories philosophiques heideggériennes : « l'homme d'esprit ne peut se réjouir entièrement de cette religiosité qui s'est répandue dans l'humanité depuis la dernière guerre. [...] Les hommes sont terrorisés. Rien dans leurs conditions de vie actuelles ne vient atténuer leur terreur. Au contraire, les difficultés de la survie, les troubles sociaux, l'étranglement économique et l'incertitude morale ne font que la renforcer. Cette situation nous fait prendre conscience, comme on dit, créature-nature, [...] de notre état d' "être-jeté" (*Geworfenheit*) dans la vie ; le sentiment dominant, c'est le souci, le souci pour la vie, pour la survie, pour la patrie, pour la famille, le souci intense, dur, écrasant et usant. Et la religiosité qui remplit les



églises, la religiosité cause de toutes ces prières, provient le plus souvent de cet état des choses<sup>5</sup>. »

Un élément crucial dans le contexte d'intensification religieuse caractéristique de l'entre-deux-guerres est le renforcement démographique et politique du catholicisme. Avant 1918, la proportion des catholiques en Hongrie dépassait à peine 50%, mais les recensements réalisés dans les années vingt montrent une proportion qui s'élève presque aux deux tiers (63%). En outre, le catholicisme se rendit beaucoup plus visible à travers les rassemblements de masse, la diffusion des associations catholiques et l'apparition d'une presse très active et d'humeur batailleuse. Son poids intellectuel et politique fut aussi marqué par des personnalités qui comptèrent parmi les plus belles intelligences de l'époque, en particulier Ottokár Prohászka, dont la formation intellectuelle, la connaissance de la langue philosophique moderne, l'excellente capacité au débat, et *last but not least* la mise à l'index avant 1918, étaient d'efficaces moyens pour attirer des fidèles issus des mouvements progressistes, voir même radicaux. La personnalité contradictoire de Lajos Bíró (qui allait par la suite embrasser un carrière littéraire et cinématographique internationale) apparaît dans une déclaration qu'il publia en 1917 dans la revue radicale *Huszadik Század*. Bíró y décrit l'influence déterminante de l'évêque de Székesfehérvár (Prohászka), aujourd'hui connu pour son antisémitisme virulent, en tant que symbole du changement de génération par rapport au *statu quo ante* libéral-conservateur. « [...] cette génération juive à laquelle j'appartiens est totalement étrangère à la génération juive précédente. Nous ne les comprenons pas et ils ne nous comprennent pas. Ces hommes de soixante ou soixante-dix ans, armés de toute la culture de leur temps – strictement rationalistes, anticléricaux acariâtres, ennemis de la soutane – inspirée non pas d'écrivains allemands, mais plutôt de Taine ou de Macaulay, nous reprochent avec véhémence de ne pas rester fidèles à István Tisza et de choisir au contraire le suffrage universel. Ma génération est étrangère au rationalisme têtue, elle est aussi étrangère à l'anticléricalisme bruyant, elle ne voit plus, tout simplement, ce protestantisme pour lequel il lui arriva de s'enthousiasmer, elle aime Ottokár Prohászka, elle voit dans le catholicisme un grand mouvement démocratique<sup>6</sup>. »

Bíró remarquait à juste titre que dans le cadre d'une période transitoire, le catholicisme était à même de jouer le rôle d'une force innovante. Ainsi, dans la démocratie moderne de masse, il devait permettre d'entrevoir la possibilité d'une politique de la « majorité ». Bíró jugeait que ses représentants – comme le jésuite Béla Bangha – avaient été, en dépit de leurs convictions légitimistes, les premiers à véritablement sentir l'effondrement de l'ordre monarchique-dynastique et le déclin irréversible de l'alliance entre le trône et l'autel, ce qui leur permettait d'invoquer le « droit de la majorité » afin de fabriquer une nouvelle alliance entre le catholicisme politique et le nationalisme. Non sans succès. L'effondre-

ment de la Hongrie historique puis les conflits entre révolutionnaires et contre-révolutionnaires venaient de faire émerger une « culture de la défaite ». Dans ce contexte, en opposition au progressisme, la nation « abandonnée » et le christianisme « foulé au pied » par le libéralisme firent sourdre un topos de victime éternel qui bénéficiait d'une grande force de mobilisation. Les principaux ouvrages antilibéraux fondés sur l'idéologie conservatrice, après 1920, furent pour une bonne part issus de la plume de personnalités catholiques, comme Bangha, avec *Magyarország újjászületése és a kereszténység* (« la Renaissance de la Hongrie et le christianisme »), ou l'ouvrage de Szekfü, *Három nemzedéke* (« les trois générations »). D'ailleurs, les représentants gouvernementaux du néonationalisme, les protagonistes de la politique culturelle étaient eux-mêmes en majorité des catholiques, comme Kunó Klebelsberg ou le professeur d'école piariste devenu secrétaire d'État aux cultes, Gyula Kornis.

**« ...l'institution nécessaire à la race hongroise » (i.e. nécessaire à la nation hongroise<sup>7</sup>) Le protestantisme hongrois à la croisée des chemins**

Le renforcement du catholicisme et le succès de sa synthèse nouvelle avec le nationalisme provenaient partiellement de l'affaiblissement du protestantisme. Plus exactement : de l'échec rencontré par l'optimisme anthropologique communément désigné sous le nom de protestantisme libéral, largement répandu, quoique pas unanimement, depuis le XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle à travers toute l'Europe selon les mêmes schémas de pensée réunissant, d'une part, la validité et l'universalité du progrès, d'autre part la téléologie du développement national. En vain et malgré sa personnalité charismatique, l'homme politique déterminant de l'époque, István Tisza (1861–1918), a-t-il cru jusqu'au bout à ce modèle, en vain il fonda, en 1911, la revue *Magyar Figyelő*, en défense d'un programme conservateur aux racines libérales. De plus en plus, en effet, il apparaissait que ce paradigme devenait problématique. D'autre part, il était clair – bien qu'on évitât d'en parler – que le protestantisme libéral pêchait par manque de théologie. Ce n'est pas un hasard si la classification confessionnelle du protestantisme, pour la plupart des contemporains, reposait sur des critères de tradition et non de mentalité religieuse. Il en était pour qui l'ordre naturel des choses avait fait long feu. L'écrivain Zsigmond Móricz (1879–1942), qui s'était inscrit à deux reprises en faculté de théologie réformée avant de renoncer par deux fois, exprima ainsi l'avis que le protestantisme hongrois était tout simplement « l'institution nécessaire à la race (nation) hongroise et la matière même de sa religion [...] une couche fine et pas encore cristallisée<sup>8</sup>. » Móricz formula aussi l'axiome suivant : « le protestantisme hongrois : le calvinisme. Les luthériens appartiennent à un autre monde. » Pour d'autres, en revanche, les relations entre la modernité et le christianisme n'autorisaient

pas cette vision limitée et instrumentalisée. C'est pourquoi le célèbre esthète et critique, membre du *Vasárnapi kör* (« cercle du dimanche<sup>9</sup> ») – et futur pasteur de l'Église réformée – Lajos Fülep (1885–1970), soulignait que « chaque jour sont publiés en Europe des quantités de livres sur le christianisme, mais, parmi nous, pas un seul [...]. Comme si le christianisme ne méritait pas l'attention d'un penseur ou d'un savant hongrois. [...] Dans l'irrationalité de l'histoire en général, l'élément le plus irrationnel est la religion, qui non seulement dans son intelligibilité, mais dans tout son être, dans toute son histoire, est dominée par le principe *credo quia absurdum*. Une question se pose : avons-nous véritablement dépassé le christianisme, ou bien sommes-nous encore dedans – puisque nous ignorons à peu près tout de ce qu'il est<sup>10</sup>. »

Le problème soulevé par Fülep était le signe de sa solitude intellectuelle. Les écrivains progressistes répondirent vigoureusement dans la revue littéraire dominante à l'époque, *Nyugat*, lors de ce qu'on a appelé le « débat du protestantisme ». Les participants, tous écrivains et poètes de renom, tous nés protestants, étaient Dezső Szabó, Endre Ady ainsi que le surnommé Zsigmond Móricz. En lieu et place d'éventuelles orientations théologiques, ils continuaient à voir dans le protestantisme l'incarnation du génie politique hongrois. Ainsi suggéraient-ils de substituer aux inspirations libérales desséchées et dépassées une nouvelle alliance, progressiste, avec la social-démocratie, une alliance qui « forgerait une organisation pour la vie hongroise fondée sur des éléments majoritairement magyars et dont les racines étaient dans le développement organique du passé national<sup>11</sup>. »

Tout cela, en vain. Cette alliance ne vit pas le jour, non seulement à cause de l'échec de la révolution, mais aussi parce que le calcul sur lequel elle se fondait ne tenait pas compte du fait que le protestantisme était, tout de même, à l'origine un mouvement de nature religieuse, dont les intentions émancipatrices pouvaient susciter le doute et la suspicion parmi les adeptes des idées radicales du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle. Quelques années après le débat, à l'occasion du quatrième centenaire de la Réforme, le rédacteur en chef de *Nyugat*, Ignotus, rendit son verdict : le progrès scientifique a dépassé toutes les visions du monde religieuses, et ces dernières appartiennent désormais au camp réactionnaire : « la science est désormais incompatible avec la religion, avec toutes les religions, car elle n'admet aucune hypothèse préconçue, autrement dit, elle choisit librement, et rejette ou développe encore et encore de nouvelles hypothèses. Ce que fut ou a pu être le protestantisme, c'est aujourd'hui la science, mais là où il se distingue de la science – aussi peu que ce soit, mais c'est inévitable – là, il entre en conflit avec lui-même. [...] Il arrive un point, une ligne, une frontière où le protestantisme est dans l'obligation de se détourner de la liberté de conscience, exactement comme le catholicisme<sup>12</sup>. »

Face à la position quelque peu manichéenne du problème protestant, certains étaient partisans de la continuation dans la voie traditionnelle de l'émancipation de type libéral-démocrate, comme par exemple Dezső Baltazár, l'évêque réformé de la région *Tiszántúl* (la Transtibiscie, c'est-à-dire les territoires situés « au-delà de la Tisza »). Mais, après 1920, ce point de vue ne pouvait plus être le discours dominant du protestantisme, en raison de l'atmosphère fortement anti-libérale ; d'autre part, considérant avant tout sa communauté comme une entité politique, Baltazár montrait des variations d'opinion qui dévoilaient des convictions manquant de solidité sur le plan théologique et moral, reposant moins sur des ambitions intellectuelles que sur des questions de tactique politique. Dans le sens inverse, certains pasteurs, notamment de la circonscription *Dunamellék* (« rives du Danube »), organisaient des missions intérieures œuvrant pour un « renouveau de la foi », une pratique pieuse plus intense et une religiosité intérieure. Malgré leur succès, leur attitude apolitique et – encore plus importante pour les esprits conservateurs – leur méfiance à l'égard des institutions de même que l'exclusivisme de leurs particularités linguistiques pouvaient avoir tendance à éloigner les classes moyennes sociologiquement protestantes. Ces dernières, en revanche, n'étaient pas insensibles à la rhétorique du « cursus » catholique-national : ainsi les conférences du Père jésuite, Béla Bangha, sur le renouveau chrétien de la Hongrie attiraient une audience qui, selon certains observateurs, comprenait plus de protestants que de catholiques<sup>13</sup>. Le Cercle de Pécel, fondé en été 1920 par un meneur de la mission intérieure, le pasteur Gyula Forgács, faisait ainsi un diagnostic amère sur les dissensions, la confusion et l'anxiété qui pesait sur la société : « les récents événements, pleins de fureur, mettent notre Église face à un choix crucial ; dans un proche avenir, nous verrons si elle est capable de se renouveler dans le respect à la fois de son passé et de ses idéaux, ou si elle est condamnée à un affaiblissement indigne et même en plus d'un endroit à la dissolution pure et simple<sup>14</sup>. »

### **Les réformés dans la circonscription de *Dunamellék***

Depuis la Contre-réforme, les régions démographiquement protestantes se trouvaient traditionnellement dans la partie orientale du pays, mais, depuis l'époque contemporaine, l'agglomération de Budapest s'était imposée comme le centre du protestantisme hongrois. Tandis qu'au début du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, à peine six cent réformés vivaient à Pest-Buda (représentant 1% de la population totale des deux villes jumelles), en 1920, ils étaient presque cent mille<sup>15</sup>. Il est vrai qu'ils ne représentaient pas plus de 10% de la population de la capitale, c'est-à-dire bien moins que leur proportion au niveau national. Quoi qu'il en soit, en cent ans, c'était bien la religion réformée qui parmi toutes les confessions admises avait eu le taux de croissance démographique le plus élevé à Budapest. Du reste, cette ten-

dance était contradictoire avec le processus lent, mais indéniable, qui caractérisait alors la démographie religieuse des provinces hongroises : les communautés réformées de la circonscription de *Dunamellék*, à l'instar des autres provinces du pays, étaient gagnées par la progression générale du catholicisme. À Budapest, qui connaissait alors un essor considérable, se concentrait une intelligentsia réformée n'ayant pas la tradition « urbanus » et que frustrait le renforcement visible du catholicisme, notamment le poids grandissant de ce dernier dans la vie publique. Et ils avaient des raisons. Malgré leur plus forte croissance démographique et malgré l'exode rural, si l'on examine la mobilité interconfessionnelle au sein de la capitale, c'est-à-dire le paramètre de la conversion, le solde des réformés n'était positif qu'à l'égard des juifs – en vertu du processus général d'assimilation en cours –, avec toutes les autres confession, en revanche, le solde des réformés était négatif, c'est-à-dire non seulement avec le catholicisme, mais aussi avec les autres confessions protestantes, de moindre importance<sup>16</sup>. Il manqua en fait au camp de la réforme, au cours des deux premières décennies du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle, un « chef » doué des aptitudes nécessaires à la construction de nouveaux lieux de cultes, à la conception d'un programme intellectuel et moral capable de donner une réponse aux attentes intellectuelles de l'époque et d'intégrer des tendances contradictoires et des groupes divers, en un mot, à la conduite d'une *Kulturkampf* sur deux fronts, à la fois contre le catholicisme et contre la propagation de la sécularisation.

Après la guerre, une personne se présenta qui semblait finalement capable de répondre à ces défis. Il s'agit de László Ravasz (1882–1975). Ce dernier, choisi en 1921 comme évêque de la circonscription de *Dunamellék*, la plus importante de l'Église réformée de Hongrie, allait également recevoir la charge de diriger le *Convent* des Églises réformées de Hongrie en 1936.

Originaire de Transylvanie, qui faisait alors partie du royaume de Hongrie, il avait achevé ses études à Kolozsvár (Cluj), où il avait également obtenu, à l'âge de 25 ans, une chaire universitaire. La carrière soigneusement construite de Ravasz fut au début étroitement liée, dans le cadre du protestantisme transylvain, à la tendance très libérale dont les principaux patrons étaient l'évêque György Bartók et le professeur de théologie Károly Nagy. En 1910, il entra dans la franc-maçonnerie. Le fond de sa vision du monde était défini par la philosophie morale néokantienne de Károly Böhm. L'orientation allemande de sa jeunesse – au cours de laquelle il avait, étudiant boursier à Berlin, suivi les cours du philologue classique, Willamowitz-Moellendorf, de l'historien de l'art, Wöfflin, du théologien et historien de l'Église, Adolphe von Harnack et du philosophe et sociologue, Georg Simmel – résultat, d'une part, en une bonne connaissance des philosophies de la vie, d'autre part, en une thèse universitaire sur l'esthétique de Schopenhauer. Néanmoins, après sa nomination comme professeur de théologie, son

intérêt se tourna de plus en plus vers les disciplines théologiques. Il entreprit plusieurs études approfondies sur Calvin qui allaient plus tard lui procurer la sympathie des cercles favorables à une renaissance du calvinisme historique. Bientôt, il devint un orateur recherché, ses oraisons funèbres en particulier touchaient les intelligences réformées insensiblement éloignées du temple, mais aussi commença-t-on régulièrement à rapporter, dans la presse transylvaine, qu'un certain « Saint László bouche d'or » avait pris la parole, lors de quelque banquet du parti d'István Tisza. Sa réputation intellectuelle continuait à se propager, au point qu'il prit en janvier 1914 la tête de la *Protestáns Szemle* (« Revue protestante »). Jusqu'alors, la revue avait observé une ligne composite, mêlée de libéralisme et de mission intérieure. Mais, dès le premier numéro réalisé sous l'autorité de son nouveau directeur, elle adopta une attitude critique et polémique, marquée de conservatisme, mieux armée pour viser un lectorat plus étendu. Dès lors, ses relations avec les francs-maçons commencèrent à s'estomper pour finalement se rompre en 1917. Tempérant ses réserves de départ, Ravasz montra une plus grande compréhension à l'égard des mouvements de jeunesse chrétiens inspirés des missions intérieures, qu'il entreprit même de soutenir avec détermination. À la fin des années 1910, non seulement ses disciples les plus talentueux (Sándor Makkai, Imre Révész, Sándor Tavaszy, etc.) avaient fondé une « école Ravasz », mais ce dernier venait de lancer, en 1915, un bulletin pastoral intitulé *Út* (« chemin »), largement consacré à la mission intérieure et à l'organisation concrètes des communautés religieuses, dont la renommée allait rapidement s'imposer au niveau national. Comme il l'a lui-même écrit dans ses mémoires, « personne n'ignorait que lorsque les places auraient été libérées, mon influence croissante me permettrait de prendre les choses en main. » À Noël 1918, Kolozsvár (Cluj) et la Transylvanie tombèrent entre les mains des Roumains et dans ces circonstances difficiles pour les Hongrois et les Églises hongroises, Ravasz consacra d'abord tout son temps à maintenir le lien avec la mère-patrie. Il continuait à jouir d'une position prédominante, mais les circonstances étaient telles qu'il avait l'impression d'avancer dans un champ de ruines. « Notre Église se fissure jusque dans ses structures intimes. La cessation des aides publiques nous conduit droit à la faillite. » Ce constat alarmant est extraite d'une correspondance avec l'un de ses élèves, Sándor Tavaszy, qui allait plus tard devenir un professeur de théologie, réputé pour avoir introduit en Hongrie la pensée de Karl Barth. La lettre contenait aussi des encouragements : « mais conserve tout ton calme – écrivait Ravasz – et rend grâce d'avoir encore un toit et de quoi te nourrir. Je t'en conjure, ne désespère pas plus que les 40 000 personnes qui, justement, diffèrent de toi parce qu'ils ont perdu tout ce qu'elles possédaient. »

Ravasz avait formulé son programme dès les premières années de sa carrière : « nous devons accéder à un christianisme qui ne s'oppose pas au mode de pensée civilisé, mais qui procure au cœur la paix et la consolation et à la volonté un

élan joyeux. Nous devons faire du christianisme une singularité qui un jour ou l'autre puisse devenir un trésor historique<sup>17</sup>. » Au dilemme dont il avait *déjà* pris conscience en 1907, Ravasz donnait *encore* une réponse qui relevait de l'idéalisme subjectif : « La religion sera de nouveau une expérience de vie, dans la Réforme, qui ne sera ni une thèse, ni une technique, mais au contraire l'expérience directe de la grâce divine<sup>18</sup>... » En adoptant le subjectivisme néo-kantien, il s'écartait, dans une certaine mesure, du christianisme primitif, de la Bible et des diverses confessions qui fondaient le christianisme sur l'idée d'autorité. En 1917, Ravasz écrivit dans la *Protestáns Szemle* qu'il dirigeait depuis trois ans, un article intitulé *Hitbizonyosság és reformáció* (« certitude et réforme ») dans lequel il évoquait de nouveau la Réforme, mais en adoptant un point de départ tout à fait différent ; il y manquait en particulier l'individualisme de la philosophie du moi sur laquelle il avait précédemment établi le bien-fondé de la religion. Au début de l'article en question, Ravasz se distanciant des évocations ordinaires de la Réforme : « lors d'un discours prononcé en hommage à la Réforme, on a coutume de choisir entre deux options, soit l'on se vante en dépréciant le catholicisme – c'est le plus efficace et le plus fréquent –, soit on se déprécie en vantant le catholicisme. » L'optimisme ironique de Ravasz indique, de manière sous-jacente, que ce dernier, derrière l'abandon d'une apologie dont la rhétorique semblait inutilement provocante et usée, cherchait une identité *sui iuris* dans l'importance de la Réforme. C'est ainsi qu'il pointait en particulier son caractère religieux : « la Réforme a rendu sa pulsion vitale à la religion, c'est ce qui explique son succès universel. Il ne s'agit pas d'une nouvelle philosophie, d'une nouvelle thèse, d'un nouveau rituel ou de nouveaux concepts politiques et économiques, mais bel et bien du fait que la religion, en tant que force à la fois dynamique et enracinée, dans un geste décisif est parvenue à se sauver elle-même, alors qu'elle était pour ainsi dire en danger de mort. » La Réforme, en particulier dans sa forme calviniste, a rompue avec tout anthropocentrisme : « Calvin est parvenu au sommet de toutes l'histoire des religions avec l'idée que Dieu n'est pas fait pour nous, mais que c'est nous, les hommes, qui sommes faits pour Dieu. Et c'est ainsi qu'il a rompu avec tout pragmatisme. Le rôle de la religion n'est pas de nous singulariser ou de nous rendre plus heureux, mais de faire en sorte que la gloire de Dieu soit plus entière. » Pour le protestantisme libéral et rationnel, cette formulation était l'un des aspects les plus problématiques de la tradition calviniste. Ravasz faisait en effet référence à la souveraineté intacte de Dieu et à l'enseignement de la prédestination, tout en cherchant encore à réaliser une synthèse avec les Lumières – sous la forme qu'il avait naguère adoptée de la tradition kantienne assimilée à l'idéalisme subjectif. D'ailleurs, la prédestination n'était pas seulement envisagée du point de vue individuel, mais aussi du point de vue collectif : « la vie nationale de tout peuple, sa langue, son territoire, le développement de son système juridique, sa constitution, son individualité historique et ses caractères spirituels ne sont pas des éléments

ajustés les uns aux autres par hasard, mais sont une manifestation de l'ordre divin. » Dans un texte de 1909, Ravasz affirmait trouver un écho de cet ordre divin dans la politique libérale conservatrice d'István Tisza. « Il s'agit d'une nécessité d'ordre historique : la seule politique possible pour la Hongrie est libérale, car son esprit est protestant ; nationale, car elle est hongroise ; celle d'une grande puissance, car on prend ici au sérieux le système dualiste [austro-hongrois] ». Par ailleurs, il s'opposait avec véhémence au catholicisme : « c'est le calvinisme qui a fait notre culture nationale. Nous avons une culture propre, ancestrale, païenne, mais le catholicisme l'a piétinée. Ce qu'il a mis à la place est incolore et nous est étranger<sup>19</sup>. » Sur sa rupture avec la franc-maçonnerie, en 1917, Ravasz allait écrire dans ses mémoires : « la situation s'était développée de telle sorte qu'il me fallait choisir entre des extrêmes opposés. En vain, on approuve les réformes sociales, si la rigidité des exigences idéologiques pousse dans le camp adverse. Or on était contraint d'attaquer tout ce qui venait du passé, quand bien même cela fût fondé sur des lois morales éternelles, et de ne jamais défendre ce qui pouvait être conservé du passé, surtout si ce dernier avait pour nom les Dix commandements ou le Sermon sur la montagne... Dans cette lutte, j'ai finalement considéré qu'il était préférable de prendre la défense des facteurs essentiels comme la religion, l'Église, la morale, la nation, l'histoire, la tradition. Il fallait prendre leur défense afin qu'ils protègent à leur tour l'héritage de la Réforme, afin de se sentir en union avec eux en Christ et d'éloigner la mauvaise levure romaine ; aller autant que possible sur le chemin du progrès sans renoncer aux racines et ne s'associer en rien à la destruction diabolique du monde fondée sur l'athéisme. Pour nous qui regardons aujourd'hui en arrière, alors que tout nous apparaît sous une autre lumière, il nous semble clair qu'il aurait fallu mettre en place une politique sociale radicale fondée sur une forte inspiration évangélique. Nous autres qui avons pris la défense de l'intégrité historique de la Hongrie, qui avons proclamé la souveraineté de l'esprit, qui avons assumé le message de justice, nous nous sommes rangés derrière la sagesse de la morale absolue, dans un monde qui s'effritait et s'effondrait, il nous était impossible d'agir autrement que de la manière dont nous l'avons fait : nous avons fait de notre mieux pour sauvegarder le bien<sup>20</sup>. »

Ce texte exprime l'expérience sincère d'une menace générale sur la religion, la nation et l'histoire. L'intensité de cette expérience est paradoxalement authentifiée dans ces mêmes *Mémoires* (1960) où Ravasz reconnaît que les idées stigmatisées quelques décennies plus tôt étaient dans plus d'un cas un leurre. La primordialité des racines religieuses du protestantisme et l'exigence d'une réaction ferme aux menaces et aux attaques contre la religion étaient les deux fondements de la prédication de Ravasz, parvenu entre les deux guerres au sommet de son influence intellectuelle et politique. C'est le sentiment de menace qui trouvait une solution diligente avec la doctrine de la prédestination. Car l'un des facteurs essentiels de la prédestination est la relativisation du libre arbitre, dont une conséquence, au



niveau historique, est la dévaluation des visions du monde fondées sur le progrès. C'est ainsi qu'une nouvelle spiritualité émergea qui avait elle-même des implications concrètes en terme de vision du monde. D'après Ravasz, « avant la guerre, l'esprit du protestantisme était une miscellanées d'éléments épars qu'il était aussi difficile de distinguer que d'éliminer, que nous inhalions tout comme on inhale l'oxygène dans l'air. Après la guerre, il est devenu un facteur important, distinct, une rayure, ou une encoche dans la vie spirituelle hongroise<sup>21</sup>. » L'idée d'une menace séculariste sur la vie religieuse fut aussi exprimée par l'un des élèves de Ravasz, l'historien Imre Révész. Dans la revue principale du conservatisme entre les deux guerres, *Magyar Szemle*, ce dernier publia une étude en 1928 en réponse à la question suivante : « sur quel front et dans quelle direction le protestantisme veut-il se positionner au sein de la vie de la nation hongroise ? » À cela, il répondait de la manière suivante. Le protestantisme « ne remplira pas [...] sa fonction historique [...] en s'alliant à droite à gauche, mais seulement s'il s'appuie sur ses propres forces, avance le long de son propre chemin et sert la nation toujours selon son propre esprit, en construisant ses propres arguments. » Pour Révész, ce devait être possible si « la conviction s'impos[ait], au sein de la vie intérieure du protestantisme, que le protestantisme est une religion et qu'il est chrétien<sup>22</sup>. » Imre Révész – tout comme l'avait aussi remarqué Ravasz – soulignait que ce retour au programme religieux d'origine n'était pas à proprement parler une restauration : « il ne s'agit pas de s'interroger sur le degré d'alliance entre le trône et l'autel, ni non plus de définir la distinction entre la conservation et la révolution, car ce serait oublier que l'irréligion propre à l'ancien régime est plus souvent la source de la révolution que d'un progressisme courageux et assumé<sup>23</sup>. »

Cette affirmation est importante, car le travail théologique de Ravasz et de ses élèves, leur activité en tant que responsables ecclésiastiques, prédicateurs et écrivains a défini dans une large mesure l'essor religieux caractéristique de l'entre-deux-guerres. D'autant plus que les lacunes de la recherche liées aux tabous de l'avant 1990 renforcent la thèse de la sécularisation, toujours aussi dominante au sein des sciences sociales et dont l'excès de généralité rivalise avec l'opiniâtreté de ses défenseurs. En soutenant que le corolaire inévitable de la modernisation est la marginalisation graduelle de la religion, la thèse de la sécularisation tend à considérer tout phénomène contradictoire comme une anomalie régressive de la modernité. Bien que ce modèle ait été attaqué maintes fois au cours des deux dernières décennies, l'absence d'une méta-narration alternative a considérablement ralenti l'exfiltration des réflexions conduites à son sujet hors des frontières de l'histoire religieuse en tant que discipline<sup>24</sup>. Pourtant, l'idée consacrée dans l'historiographie sociale et des idées sur le XX<sup>e</sup> siècle qui tend à considérer la religion comme une force marginale ou rétrograde exigerait une réévaluation. Or l'examen des causes du renouveau religieux effectif au tournant du siècle et particulièrement après la première guerre mondiale – dans un premier temps au

sein de l'Église catholique – nous conduit à faire l'hypothèse d'une forme de réaction contre le discrédit du libéralisme et contre l'échec de la révolution associée avec le cursus chrétien du système contre-révolutionnaire.

Mais ce n'est pas une explication suffisante. Pour László Ravasz, l'État n'était pas une valeur en soi. C'est pourquoi, en dépit du rôle indéniablement philanthropique de l'État (à mettre en perspective avec l'échec des protestations contre la persécution des juifs en 1944), dans l'analyse de la société à venir tout comme dans la pratique de l'histoire des idées il conviendrait d'accorder un plus grand rôle aux caractéristiques proprement hongroises du phénomène européen de la « deuxième confessionnalisation<sup>25</sup> », c'est-à-dire à l'étude des ressemblances et divergences à cet égard entre les pays d'Europe centrale et ceux d'Europe occidentale. La société hongroise, entre les deux guerres, n'a pas adopté le modèle hollandais de la « pilarisation », à savoir la cohabitation « contractuelle » de cultures religieuses délimitées dans des unités politiques et sociales, mais plutôt, comme je l'ai souligné plus haut, celui du pluralisme ponctué de conflits spectaculaires. D'autre part, cette situation, qui exerça une telle influence sur les positions théologiques de László Ravasz, reflétait, en quelque sorte, une nouvelle manière d'envisager les relations entre le catholicisme et le protestantisme. L'image de la réforme proposée par Ravasz précédait le revirement dans l'histoire de l'église qui allait s'imposer vers le milieu du siècle, selon lequel les siècles de préparation au sein de l'Église n'avaient pas seulement conduit à la naissance du protestantisme, mais aussi à la « rénovation tridentine » du catholicisme. « La réforme de Cluny au sein de l'Église médiévale – écrivait-il – doit être nommée réforme, tout comme du point de vue catholique, la plus grande et la plus significative des réformes a été accomplie lors du concile de Trente<sup>26</sup>. »

La signification de la Réforme s'intégrait donc selon lui dans une vision religieuse fondée sur le pluralisme historique des temps modernes : « il y a deux forces historiques : deux types de vision et pratique du christianisme qui se trouvent face à face. Il ne s'agit pas seulement d'une opposition théorique ou théologique, mais aussi d'un développement relevant de l'histoire culturelle, et, à ce titre, pour l'esprit humain un facteur essentiel<sup>27</sup>. » D'autre part, cette dualité « a rendu un tel service à la culture de l'Europe occidentale et donc à la dignité de l'esprit humain en général, que la remise en cause ou la tentative d'anéantir ses conséquences mettrait en danger le bien le plus précieux de la culture européenne et, encore une fois, l'intégrité de la dignité humaine<sup>28</sup>. » Dans une autre conférence, Ravasz se posait en contradiction avec la tradition issue des Lumières sur la signification des conflits issus de la rupture et des divisions intervenues à la suite de la Réforme : « Depuis la création du monde, les questions spirituelles se transforment en questions politiques ou économiques... Mais on ne pourrait imaginer plus grande trahison, plus grand pécher contre le Saint-Esprit que celui qui consiste à ignorer une vérité spirituelle que l'on considère soi-même comme

l'affaire la plus sainte de Dieu, parce que la confession ou la proclamation de cette dernière aurait des conséquences fâcheuses en raison de la déchéance de la nature humaine. Ce type de raisonnement priverait les sociétés humaines du pouvoir de faire leur propre histoire<sup>29</sup>. » Au contraire, l'acceptation du pluralisme religieux met en évidence « les fondements communs du christianisme qui, même s'ils sont invisibles, sont plus grands, plus éloquents, plus essentiels et plus décisifs que les fissures ou divisions de la superstructure » et n'expriment pas seulement l'expérience de la crise, mais aussi témoignent « des temps apocalyptiques actuels », surtout contre le bolchevisme mais aussi contre le néo-paganisme nazi qui, de toute évidence, « menacent dans sa totalité » le christianisme<sup>30</sup>.

Une génération entière et tout un milieu se reconnaissaient dans les conceptions conservatrices de László Ravasz. D'ailleurs, la reconnaissance sociale ne fut pas en reste : il fut ainsi admis comme membre de la Chambre haute et membre de l'Académie, il reçut moult décorations et des revenus supérieurs à ceux d'un ministre, il vécut dans une belle villa d'un quartier bien fréquenté de la ville. Mais, pour tout cela, il travailla dur. En un quart de siècle, il accomplit son programme avec une assurance inébranlable et nul n'a représenté aussi bien que lui cette période propice au rééquilibrage du conservatisme au point de vue matériel et spirituel. Toutefois, en 1932, à l'occasion du jubilé de sa première décennie au siège épiscopal, il attira l'attention sur le fait que les circonstances favorables offertes par la restauration n'étaient que temporaires : « dans un avenir déjà visible – disait-il –, nous allons devoir nous transformer en communauté huguenote, [...] le calvinisme hongrois a vécu pendant un demi-siècle comme une plante vivace, mais il est condamné à retourner bientôt à la vie enfouie de tubercule. La vie simple, cachée dans la boue... » En avril 1945, au sortir des horreurs du siège de Budapest, il affirmait que « Dieu avait fait le choix de cette génération pour qu'elle vive une période critique, comme encore jamais la Hongrie n'en avait vécue. [...] Parmi les fils de la nation s'est formé un camp qui a pris pour proie la culture accumulée en un millénaire. Le monde n'avait encore jamais vu de politique aussi mauvaise et aussi privée d'éducation et de spiritualité. » Il était, en revanche, convaincu que « l'héritage de l'Église était intact » et pouvait, « sous la couche de boue criminelle de ce monde en pleine destruction », allumer les premières « chandelles sacrificielles » qui permettraient « d'ouvrir un nouveau chapitre dans l'histoire de l'humanité ». Ce chapitre, ce n'est pas lui qui allait écrire. En 1948, le « meilleur disciple hongrois » de Staline, Mátyás Rákosi (1892–1971) éloigna Ravasz de la direction du protestantisme hongrois, que ce dernier n'allait jamais recouvrer, à l'exception du court intermezzo de la révolution de 1956. Vieillissant, plongé dans l'exil intérieur où le forçait le pouvoir communiste, il allait reconnaître que ce monde, dans lequel il avait intégré son propre monde, avait « cessé de vivre. Ses fondements étaient dans le sentiment national, mais l'intégrité spirituelle hongroise [avait] perdu toute signification. »

C'est en 1962 qu'il écrivait ces lignes à sa famille et au cercle étroit de ses amis fidèles. Il a un peu plus tard témoigné de ses luttes dans ses mémoires publiées à titre posthume : « mes succès, mes déceptions attestent que l'Église doit rester spirituelle, doit rester indépendante, qu'elle ne doit en aucun cas se lier à un régime politique ; sa vocation réside uniquement dans le service. »

En guise de synthèse : les discours critiques et apologétiques sur le protestantisme au début du siècle établissaient une dichotomie semblable à celle qui caractérisait la rupture entre le libéralisme et le progressisme politique à la même époque. Et l'on peut sans doute établir une corrélation entre les deux débats. À partir de la moitié des années 1910 et pendant toute la période de l'entre-deux-guerres, les conceptions existentielles sur la prédestination telle que les défendait László Ravasz tendaient à considérer le dilemme comme dépassé ou plutôt – en dépit des contradictions de nature dogmatique – plaçaient le protestantisme dans le voisinage du catholicisme, tant le plan de l'approche de la société que de la stratégie à mettre en place. Reste à savoir dans quelle mesure ce rapprochement des interprétations historiques protestante et catholique n'était pas le signe d'un déclin du monde religieux et de l'effacement des explications de l'histoire fondées sur des considérations religieuses, c'est-à-dire que désormais, la dialectique des interprétations historiques ne s'appuierait plus sur la concurrence entre les visions historico-théologiques respectivement catholique et protestante, mais entre les utopies universalistes, d'une part, et les interprétations religieuses, d'autre part, rejetées ensemble dans le camp conservateur, ce qui – si c'était le cas – refléterait inévitablement un certain déclin du corpus doctrinal.

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Kósa László, « Protestáns történelemértelmezés Csehországban és Magyarországon » [La compréhension de l'histoire par les protestants, dans les pays tchèques et en Hongrie], in Hofer Tamás (dir.) *Magyarok Nyugat és Kelet között. A nemzettudat változó jelképei* [Les Hongrois entre l'Orient et l'Occident. Les reflets changeant de la conscience nationale], Budapest, Bállassi, 1996, pp. 136-137.
- <sup>2</sup> Ballagi Mór, *Adalékok a föllállítandó protestáns istenészeti fakultás alaprajzához* [Eléments sur la fondation d'une faculté de théologie protestante], P.E-I.L., 1848, p. 21, n° 647.
- <sup>3</sup> Ravasz László, *A háború hatása a magyar vallásos életre* [L'impact de la guerre sur la vie religieuse en Hongrie], 1924, pp. 20-21.
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 21.
- <sup>5</sup> Hamvas Béla, « Az örökkévalóság » [L'éternité], *Katolikus Szemle*, octobre 1937, pp. 611-612.
- <sup>6</sup> Bíró László, « La question juive en Hongrie. Une question clef pour le vingtième siècle », *Huszedik Század*, 1917, pp. 54-55.
- <sup>7</sup> NdT : Le terme de « race » était communément employé, à l'époque, dans le sens plus général de « nation », sans connotation nécessairement ethnique.

- <sup>8</sup> Móricz Zsigmond, « A magyar protestantizmus problémája » [Le problème du protestantisme hongrois], *Nyugat*, 1913, II, pp. 209-217.
- <sup>9</sup> NdT : Le « cercle du dimanche » réunissait des philosophes et des critiques d'art ou littéraires comme Georg Lukács ou Károly Mannheim, en rupture avec les valeurs bourgeoises de leur époque.
- <sup>10</sup> Fülep Lajos, « Magyar könyv a kereszténységről » [Un livre hongrois sur le christianisme], *Huszdik Század*, janvier-février 1919, XX, pp. 47-48.
- <sup>11</sup> Szabó Dezső, « A magyar protestantizmus problémája » [Le problème du protestantisme hongrois], *Nyugat*, 1913, II, (n° 14.), pp. 118-121.
- <sup>12</sup> (l-s) notes, *Nyugat*, 1917, II, (n° 22), p. 840.
- <sup>13</sup> « Üdv az olvasónak » [salut au lecteur] (brochure anonyme en faveur de Ravasz László), 1921, 2, archives Ráday, A/1.c. Correspondance et coupures de presse liées à l'élection épiscopale de 1921. (Plus loin : RL A/1.c)
- <sup>14</sup> Programme de Pécel, In: *Reformáció*, 1920, n1° 1, pp. 5-7.
- <sup>15</sup> Nagy Áron, « Budapest vallásföldrajza » ([Géographie religieuse de Budapest], In Kósa László (dir.), *Reformátusok Budapesten I-II*, Budapest, Argumentum, 2006, I, p. 84.
- <sup>16</sup> Kozma István, « Reformátusok a budapesti statisztikákban » [Les réformés dans les statistiques urbaines de Budapest], In Kósa László (dir.), *Reformátusok Budapesten I-II*, Budapest, Argumentum, 2006, I, p. 112. Kozma s'appuie sur les données des années trente et quarante, mais il est probable que les tendances en question soient apparues dès avant les années vingt.
- <sup>17</sup> Ravasz László, *Bevezetés a gyakorlati teológiába* [Introduction à la théologie pratique], Kolozsvár, s.d, [1917], p. 37.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibidem, p. 11.
- <sup>19</sup> Ibidem, p. 56.
- <sup>20</sup> Ravasz L., *Emlékezések...* [Mémoires...], pp. 122-123.
- <sup>21</sup> Ravasz László, *A protestantizmus lényege és sorsa* [Le protestantisme : son essence et son destin], 1934.
- <sup>22</sup> Révész Imre, *A magyar protestantizmus útjai* [Le protestantisme hongrois face à ses choix], *Magyar Szemle*, novembre 1928, pp. 237-238.
- <sup>23</sup> Ravasz László, « Harangszó » [Les cloches], In *A protestantizmus Magyarországon* [Le protestantisme en Hongrie], Budapest, Bethlen Gábor Szövetség, 1928, p. 377.
- <sup>24</sup> Jeffrey Cox, « Master narratives of long-term religious change », in Hugh McLeod - Werner Ustorf (eds.), *The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 201-217.
- <sup>25</sup> Olaf Blaschke, *Das 19. Jahrhundert: ein Zweites Konfessionelles Zeitalter? Gesichte und Gesellschaft*, 26, 2000, pp. 38-75.
- <sup>26</sup> Ravasz László, 31 octobre (1935).
- <sup>27</sup> Ravasz László, *A protestantizmus lényege és sorsa* [Le protestantisme : son essence et son destin] (1934).
- <sup>28</sup> 31 octobre..., p. 504.
- <sup>29</sup> Ravasz László, *A reformáció mérlege* [La Réforme dans la balance] (1936).
- <sup>30</sup> « Egység vagy barátság. Válasz Bangha Béla cikkére » [Union ou amitié. Réponse à l'article de Béla Bangha], *Protestáns Szemle*, 1937/4, pp. 161-166.

## LES AUTEURS FRANÇAIS DE LA REVUE *CHRÉTIENNE SOCIALE (JUN 1931–DÉCEMBRE 1938)*

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La revue *Korunk Szava*, publiée entre 1931 et 1938, était politiquement légitimiste et d'orientation sociale. Ayant des positions religieuses assez progressistes, ses rédacteurs se sentaient proches du milieu français dit des convertis, dont l'objectif était de réaliser une nouvelle alliance avec la tradition. *Korunk Szava* ouvrit ses pages en particulier à des auteurs comme Jacques Maritain, François Mauriac, Paul Claudel ou Charles Péguy. Confrontés plus tôt que les Français aux périls du nazisme, les Hongrois développèrent leurs propres conceptions de la nation, tout en offrant une tribune à leurs confrères français sur la question.

The journal *Korunk Szava* was published from 1931 to 1938. With a legitimist political viewpoint and rather social orientation, it also represented a progressive approach to religion and thus had close relations with the so-called French *convertis*, known for aiming to create a new alliance with tradition. *Korunk Szava* published texts written by authors like Jacques Maritain, François Mauriac, Paul Claudel and Charles Péguy. Facing the Nazi peril earlier than their French counterparts, Hungarians developed a particular vision of the nation, while they also shared their ideas on the subject with their French colleagues.

**Mots-clefs** : légitimisme social hongrois, convertis français, nationalisme, Habsbourg-principium, couronne de Saint Étienne

Depuis 1887, l'Église de Hongrie publiait la revue *Katolikus Szemle* (la « Gazette catholique »). Les jésuites lancèrent en 1921 leur propre mensuel, *Magyar Kultúra*, qui fut jusqu'à sa disparition pendant la seconde guerre mondiale le fer de lance du corporatisme traditionnel contre les idées démocratiques.

Mgr Prohászka (1858–1927), quant à lui, avait créé en son temps une revue d'inspiration plus moderne, *Sion* (il s'y affichait, notamment, favorable à la liquidation du vaste patrimoine immobilier de l'Église hongroise). À la mort de l'archevêque chrétien-social, ceux qui voulaient perpétuer son souvenir et ses idées fondèrent le « Cercle Prohászka » qui fut notamment à l'origine d'une nouvelle publication, *Korunk Szava* (« La voix de notre époque »), lancée en 1931 par le comte György Széchenyi (1889–août 1938), assisté par Jenő Kátona (1905–1978) en tant que rédacteur en chef. Il avait été question d'inscrire

en bandeau sur la première page « Revue du nouveau catholicisme » (en réalité : du « jeune » catholicisme : *ifjú katolicizmus folyóirata*). Mais le cardinal Serédi, primat de Hongrie, pour lequel il n'existait qu'un seul catholicisme, ne donna pas son accord<sup>1</sup>. *Korunk Szava* fut publié jusqu'en décembre 1938, année de l'*Anschluss*, quand il fut supprimé sur décret gouvernemental, quelques mois après la mort de son fondateur. En octobre 1939, Jenő Katona allait fonder une nouvelle revue baptisée *Jelenkor* (en français : « Temps présent »).

*Korunk Szava* fut placé dès sa création sous le signe de l'influence française, on y trouvait régulièrement des articles consacrés à Charles Péguy, Paul Claudel, Jacques Maritain. Les Hongrois leur empruntaient la voie étroite du « progressisme conservateur », dont une certaine branche du légitimisme hongrois promettait de faire la synthèse. György Széchényi, en particulier, fut en Hongrie l'un des plus virulents critiques de la politique de Gyula Gömbös (président du Conseil de 1932 à 1936), combinaison de contrôle politique sur la société et d'accommodement diplomatique avec l'Allemagne<sup>2</sup>.

Pour une meilleure compréhension de ce qui suit, il est utile de préciser que le mouvement légitimiste hongrois avait pour objectif de placer sur le trône Othon, le fils de Charles IV, déposé en 1920.. En l'absence de forces résolument républicaines en Hongrie, les adversaires du légitimisme étaient soit, par pragmatisme, des partisans du *statu quo* (la régence de l'amiral Horthy), soit les héritiers des indépendantistes anti-Habsbourg (les *Kouroutz*<sup>3</sup>), satisfaits de la régence ou éventuellement favorables à une libre élection d'un nouveau roi, de préférence hors de la dynastie Habsbourg.

Dans cet exposé, je vais d'abord présenter la position de la revue *Korunk Szava* sur la nation, telle qu'elle apparaît explicitement ou implicitement dans les articles consacrés aux questions politiques, puis la contribution spécifique de la pensée française ou des penseurs français, directement en tant qu'auteurs, à cette problématique. Enfin, je terminerai en évoquant l'évolution de la revue, sous sa nouvelle forme, après 1938 et après 1940.

### a) *La position de Korunk Szava sur la nation*

En novembre 1937, *Korunk Szava* annonçait la nomination du nouveau rédacteur en chef d'un journal important (György Ottlik, au *Pester Lloyd*, quotidien gouvernemental publié en langue allemande), en affirmant s'intéresser à cet événement parce que « la revue et ses lecteurs s'intéressent à tout ce qui touche la nation et le pays<sup>4</sup>. » Ce n'était pas une hyperbole. *Korunk Szava*, revue d'opinion, exprimait régulièrement des conceptions sur la nation, à la fois dans sa nature intime et dans sa mission extérieure. La synthèse de cet ensemble de prises de positions était donnée par l'idée de Sainte-Couronne (de Saint Étienne) – du moins

l'interprétation que la revue en faisait à la frontière du légitimisme politique et du catholicisme social.

Dans l'éditorial du 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1938 intitulé « Le légitimisme social contre le national socialisme antichrétien », György Széchényi exprimait l'idée que seul le légitimisme social pouvait sauver, non seulement l'humanité du chaos où les extrêmes étaient en train de la conduire, mais aussi la nation hongroise, en tant que fondement parcellaire mais nécessaire de l'humanité. D'ailleurs, non seulement le légitimisme social était, selon lui, la cible commune de tous les extrêmes, mais la Hongrie elle-même, placée entre l'Orient et l'Occident, « entre la barbarie orientale et l'irrégion occidentale », était « de nouveau le point le plus exposé dans cette lutte qui envahissait l'Europe ». Or il n'existait nul remède « en l'absence d'une approche nationale ». György Széchényi détaillait son programme en trois points : (1) la pensée de Saint Étienne, c'est-à-dire le cheminement vers un royaume ouvert sur le social et l'universel ; (2) le respect de l'être humain et le libre développement de ses qualités, considérés comme fondements de la société et de l'Etat ; (3) le développement des formes hongroises de l'existence en tant qu'incarnation de ces principes généraux, d'où l'exigence d'une politique générale (*országos politika*) d'ores et déjà déclinée en certaines applications spécifiques, notamment urbaine (suivait une critique acerbe d'un mouvement politique intitulé « Parti chrétien des provinces », gagné par l'extrémisme fasciste).

On parle donc de « formes hongroises de l'existence ». Or des siècles de lutte venaient d'opposer les Hongrois à la dynastie Habsbourg. Comment les directeurs de *Korunk Szava* prétendaient-ils réconcilier ce paradoxe ? La réponse est double : d'une part, l'avènement de circonstances nouvelles, d'autre part, ce qu'on peut appeler un acte de confiance. Ainsi Jenő Katona écrivait-il en novembre 1936, dans un article sobrement intitulé « Le roi Ottó<sup>5</sup> » : « Le roi voit bien que la seule solution possible est la synthèse entre l'Etat hongrois de Saint Étienne et le Habsbourg-*principium* – bien plus que la politique germanophile des pseudo-Kouroutz. Ce Habsbourg-*principium* nous a causé bien de l'amertume dans le passé, mais, à l'avenir, il apportera des fruits. » (1) Circonstances nouvelles : les héritiers auto-proclamés de l'indépendantisme séculaire ont justement sombré dans une alliance étrangère, avec l'Allemagne. (2) Acte de confiance : on fait le pari que l'héritier Habsbourg et toute sa descendance avec lui ont sincèrement adopté les « formes hongroises de l'existence » – sur simple déclaration en ce sens du roi Ottó.

D'ailleurs, cet esprit de circonstances qu'aurait, en quelque sorte, professé le légitimisme hongrois, tel qu'il apparaît incidemment dans cet article du rédacteur en chef de *Korunk Szava*, n'était pas habituellement revendiqué par la revue. Au contraire, dans une nécrologie<sup>6</sup> du principal chef politique du légitimisme catholique et social – Miklós Griger – publiée le 1<sup>er</sup> mars 1938, c'est-à-dire quelques jours avant l'*Anschluss*, le même Jenő Katona posait deux affir-



mations sans équivoque. D'une part, « le christianisme social n'est pas un rival tardif de la social-démocratie, c'est la foi et la force frémissant spontanément de l'Évangile » ; d'autre part : « la cause du peuple et celle du roi, comme si souvent dans l'histoire, sont inséparables ». Ici, point de détours par les fourvoiements de l'indépendantisme hongrois, mais l'affirmation d'une relation claire et franche entre monarchie hongroise, légitimisme et cause sociale. Dans un article publié au numéro suivant (le 15 mars), deux jours après l'*Anschluss*, intitulé « devant la tombe de Miklós Griger »<sup>7</sup>, György Széchényi revenait sur ces pensées en leur procurant encore de la force : « Pour Miklós Griger – disait-il – tant les idées de la Sainte Couronne que les institutions monarchiques étaient indissociables du terrain social. Et s'il n'avait pas trouvé son idéal dans la Sainte Couronne, [Griger] n'aurait sans doute été ni légitimiste, ni l'apôtre de la monarchie sociale. » En revanche, dans l'article de Katona (du 1<sup>er</sup> mars) figurait un élément important : le fait que Miklós Griger s'était élevé contre l'hitlérisme en vertu du principe hongrois de la fraternité avec les autres nationalités. Qu'il avait fait sienne la politique noble et courageuse qui place le catholicisme « au-dessus des nations »<sup>8</sup>.

Ayant semble-t-il résolu un dilemme typiquement hongrois (entre le légitimisme et l'indépendantisme), *Korunk Szava* se trouvait dès lors confronté à un paradoxe beaucoup plus ordinaire, celui du catholicisme envisagé à la fois comme national et universel. Ce terrain était bien sûr celui où l'on pouvait rencontrer les intellectuels français.

### **b) Contribution des auteurs français sur la question nationale**

Pendant toute la durée de l'existence de la revue, les auteurs français apparurent à *Korunk Szava* tantôt comme thèmes de réflexions ou d'analyses, tantôt comme auteurs d'articles ou d'essais traduits de la littérature ou de la presse française, tantôt, enfin, comme auteurs d'articles commandés directement par les Hongrois. Le spectre littéraire était large : Baudelaire, Henri Brémond, Anatole France, Proust, Céline, Paul Valéry, etc... Au-delà de l'attraction vers l'esprit, la langue et les lettres françaises, la revue s'intéressait en particulier à la vague de conversion de la première moitié du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle et à ce que l'on appelle communément le renouveau catholique, ouvrant ses pages à Léon Bloy, Charles du Bos, Huysmans ou Péguy, ainsi qu'aux contemporains comme Bernanos, Maritain, François Mauriac, Daniel-Rops. C'est à ceux-là que nous allons nous intéresser en particulier, en ce qu'ils abordèrent, dans les pages *Korunk Szava*, de manière spécifique ou incidente la question nationale.

La grande référence doctrinale francophone était Jacques Maritain. En février 1937, ce dernier vint donner une conférence à Budapest sur le thème de Saint Thomas d'Aquin. L'auteur d'un compte-rendu de l'événement publié dans *Ko-*

*runk Szava* ne tarit pas d'éloges sur « le porteur le plus digne de l'intelligence latine » qui devait être à l'ère moderne ce qu'avait été le docteur angélique lui-même à sa propre époque, cette « époque brillante où le ciel et la terre étaient unis ». « Lors de cette soirée – termine l'auteur du compte-rendu – la France catholique, la vraie Europe, la culture humaine éternelle et la vérité divine ont scintillé dans la salle de conférence de l'avenue Üllői<sup>9</sup>. » Peu après, deux articles de fond publiés en octobre 1937 et février 1938, dont un de la plume de Maritain lui-même, détaillaient la pensée du maître sur la question de la nation, en distinguant l'ordre culturel et l'ordre de la communauté. La chrétienté – selon Maritain – appartient à l'ordre culturel, mais « les peuples ayant reçu l'enseignement de l'Église peuvent se fixer dans l'ordre de la communauté. Il n'y a qu'une seule Église, mais il peut exister plusieurs entités étatiques chrétiennes [...]. » Néanmoins, à mesure que l'État chrétien s'est dissous, la religion, devenue superficielle, a pu se changer en levier pour les classes dirigeantes. « La réponse à ce déisme bourgeois fut l'athéisme communiste. » « Le temps est venu pour la Chrétienté de tirer les conséquences du fait que la Renaissance et la Réforme ont rompu avec le Christ<sup>10</sup>. » Il faut, en l'occurrence, se garder de trois erreurs – lit-on dans l'article signé par Maritain (février 1938) – (1) livrer le monde d'ici-bas à Satan ; (2) vouloir réaliser la cité de Dieu sur terre (calvinisme, gallicanisme et josphisme, communisme) ; (3) anéantir toute connexion entre les deux cités (humanisme anthropocentrique, libéralisme)<sup>11</sup>. Le chemin proposé semble donc celui d'une collection de nations autonomes au sein d'une grande aire culturelle latine. Une certaine vision de l'Europe, en quelque sorte, avec laquelle sympathisaient volontiers les Hongrois bien au-delà du légitimisme, en dépit des origines ethnolinguistiques magyares (non latines, ni même indo-européennes). Deux ans plus tôt, *Korunk Szava* avait donné la parole à un autre défenseur de l'Europe latine, beaucoup moins progressiste que Maritain, le RP Gillet O.P., supérieur général de l'ordre des Dominicains. À son égard également, la revue n'avait pas été avare de compliments : « Et quel Français ! Cet homme passionné ne donne pas dans la phraséologie. Et tout avec un petit sourire. C'est un homme extraordinaire : pour sa vie exemplaire de religieux, certes, mais aussi parce qu'il est français ! » Le RP Gillet était justement venu à Budapest pour donner une conférence sur l'Europe latine (chrétienne, humaniste, universelle) face à la barbarie<sup>12</sup>. Du reste, *Korunk Szava* n'était pas sectaire et publia aussi une analyse de Julien Benda sur les conceptions spinoziennes de la paix (« la paix n'est pas l'absence de guerre, mais une vertu qui naît de la vigueur de l'âme »). Il est vrai que Benda s'appuyait sur Spinoza pour fustiger les pacifistes et surtout pour critiquer l'erreur consistant à négliger le facteur moral pour ne compter que sur les interdépendances économiques<sup>13</sup> (une bonne partie de la réflexion politique en Hongrie était alors tendue vers la révision des frontières fixées par le traité de paix de 1920 afin de reconstituer tout ou partie du royaume de Saint Étienne,

contre les simples projets de raccommodage par la coopération économique dans le bassin danubien).

### c) 1938 et 1940 : nouvelles problématiques ?

À propos de frontières et de danger pour la paix, le matin du 13 mars 1938, la Hongrie se réveilla avec une borne, sur la rivière Leitha, qui ne la séparait plus de l'Autriche, mais du III<sup>e</sup> Reich. Dans le premier numéro du mois d'avril, *Korunk Szava* consacra plusieurs pages à décrire la nouvelle situation au regard des principes que la revue continuait à vouloir préserver. Dans son éditorial, György Széchenyi défendait l'idée de garantir, en toutes circonstances y compris dans les présentes, aux Allemands de Hongrie (environ 5% de la population) la possibilité de s'épanouir dans leur langue et leur culture. Plutôt que tout tenter pour assimiler cette minorité allemande (en danger de nazification), il importait au contraire de lui offrir la possibilité de former un fragment particulier, loyal et fidèle, du *Hungarus*, une sorte de *Deutsch-Ungar*. Ainsi le voulaient – disait-il – la simple justice, la pensée chrétienne et la raison d'État hongroise historique<sup>14</sup>. Dans le même numéro, un article de fond soulignait que le roi Étienne (*István*) n'avait pas été un grand fondateur du seul point de vue de la Hongrie, mais aussi à l'échelle de l'Europe chrétienne, comme en témoignaient ses mémorables « admonestations » qui restaient un modèle pour tout gouvernement. La pensée de Saint Étienne sur les nationalités était celle qui pourrait promouvoir l'autodétermination des pays danubiens contre toutes les menaces des puissances voisines et cela sans imposer une langue commune, mais en réinsufflant dans la région un certain esprit, une forme d'âme. C'est pourquoi la pensée de Saint Étienne était « un facteur capital de la paix européenne ». Le Congrès eucharistique de Budapest (en mai 1938) allait justement attirer sur la Hongrie l'attention de l'opinion catholique internationale. L'auteur terminait en citant Paul Claudel qui venait d'affirmer que la guérison de l'Europe danubienne se trouvait sur la route de Saint Étienne<sup>15</sup>.

Les Congrès eucharistiques rassemblent traditionnellement les plus hautes personnalités de l'Église catholique du monde entier. Chef de la délégation française, le cardinal Verdier accorda un entretien qui parut dans le numéro du 15 juin de *Korunk Szava*. En même temps qu'il se réjouissait de remarquer dans la revue hongroise les noms de Maritain, Mauriac, Daniel-Rops, le cardinal affirmait croire en la paix, grâce à la coopération des pays d'Europe centrale. Sur le plan social, il félicitait *Korunk Szava* d'œuvrer dans l'esprit des encycliques *Rerum Novarum* et *Quadragesimo Anno*, tout en soulignant que « chaque pays [devait pouvoir] résoudre les problèmes selon son propre esprit, selon ses propres lois et selon ses propres intérêts. La question sociale serait

bien mieux traitée – précisait-il – si chaque peuple était en mesure d'exécuter les réformes nécessaires selon sa propre volonté que si l'on imposait quelque solution de l'extérieur<sup>16</sup>. »

Tout en continuant à condamner les extrémismes, notamment par la voix de Jean Guiraud (rédacteur en chef de *La Croix*)<sup>17</sup>, *Korunk Szava* réaffirma en décembre 1938 ses faveurs pour une « troisième voie », définie par György Széchenyi comme étant du centre et chrétienne, opposée à toutes les dictatures, opposée au libéralisme et où, « au-dessus des partis, c'est la morale qui dirige les opinions<sup>18</sup>. » Dans ce projet, il pouvait bénéficier du soutien de Daniel-Rops qui venait de troquer son habit de « jeune intellectuel non-conformiste » pour celui d'écrivain catholique. « Crise de la gauche, crise de la droite – écrivait ce dernier. Le catholicisme est la seule force capable de sauver la France<sup>19</sup>. » (Et la Hongrie, pensait *Korunk Szava*).

En novembre 1938, le premier arbitrage de Vienne rendit à la Hongrie une partie des territoires perdus en 1920, accomplissant, en quelque sorte, une partie du programme national. À la revue *Korunk Szava*, ce fut l'occasion d'une sobre réjouissance dont la poésie sévère tranchait avec les cris de joie rencontrés dans la presse hongroise en général. Accueillant favorablement la fin du « plus gros mensonge de l'histoire », à savoir la ci-devant Tchécoslovaquie, Jenő Katona s'adressait à la population magyare enfin réunie à la Hongrie : « C'est sur vous que le Dieu de justice répand sa miséricorde et ses bienfaits, celui qui permet aux nations de naître et de périr et qui dirige les peuples non vers des solutions bienveillantes, mais selon des lois d'airain<sup>20</sup>. »

En l'absence de György Széchenyi, décédé en 1938, et à la suite de l'interdiction de *Korunk Szava*, le même Jenő Katona lança une nouvelle revue en 1939 intitulée *Jelenkor* (Temps présent). Son lancement coïncidait avec la déclaration de guerre entre la France et l'Allemagne. Conservant son attitude foncièrement antinazie, la nouvelle revue embrassa naturellement l'esprit de guerre français. Notons par exemple un éloge de *Plein Pouvoir*, de Giraudoux, soulignant que « l'esprit [devait] prendre la défense des nations, petites et grandes, contre le danger intérieur et extérieur<sup>21</sup>. » La défaite de mai 1940, qualifiée de « tragédie française », de « terrible fatalité », suscita la stupéfaction en même temps qu'une introspection précoce, à la manière de Marc Bloch. « Cela dépasse l'entendement – lisait-on. C'est pourquoi tout commentaire sur la question n'est que bavardage lamentable, s'il s'attache seulement à l'analyse de la vie politique ou à l'économie<sup>22</sup>. »

Alors, que restait-il ? L'esprit, invoqué par Giraudoux, sans doute. En avril 1941, *Jelenkor* allait donner la parole à Henri Massis pour sa critique de l'intellectualisme qui, dans ses excès, avait égaré l'esprit français (article intitulé *Les idées restent* : critique aimable, mais au fond plutôt acerbe de Proust, Gide et Valéry)<sup>23</sup>. Dans ce même numéro figuraient une longue analyse philosophique de

Jacques Maritain et le billet habituel de François Mauriac. Pour les Hongrois de *Jelenkor*, en 1941, la France de Pétain restait le phare latin, mais couvert d'un épais brouillard d'incertitude.

L'analyse de la revue *Korunk Szava* et de son successeur *Jelenkor* dans ces années difficiles donne une image saisissante de certains traits spécifiquement hongrois dans leurs relations avec l'esprit français. Le patriotisme stéfaniens était un puissant outil de synthèse entre l'attachement inconditionnel à la nation et la conception universelle du christianisme, amplifiée par la sensibilité sociale. En revanche, la confusion fréquemment entretenue par les auteurs entre la pensée de Saint Étienne et le *principium* Habsbourgeois pose le problème de la compatibilité entre l'attachement légitimiste à la dynastie autrichienne et l'orientation française, historiquement opposée à l'Autriche et dont la tradition tant républicaine que monarchiste repose sur l'idée que toute nation doit être dirigée par un souverain (monarque ou représentants du peuple) en vue d'accomplir une mission précisément nationale, au sein d'un grand concert de nations jouissant chacune d'une égale estime et légitimité. D'autre part, les circonstances extrêmes, réduites au nom de l'urgence humaniste, masquent parfois des antagonismes profonds.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Entretien avec le Pr. Jenő Gergely (†), mai 2005

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Nécrologie du 1<sup>er</sup> novembre 1936

<sup>3</sup> Le terme Kouroutz (*Kuruc* en hongrois) désigne les indépendantistes hongrois, en particulier les troupes de François II Rákóczi, qui conduisit la dernière insurrection anti-Habsbourg au début du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle.

<sup>4</sup> Novembre 1937. *Ottlik György és a Pester Lloyd*.

<sup>5</sup> Katona Jenő, « Ottó Király » *Korunk Szava*, 1<sup>er</sup> novembre 1936

<sup>6</sup> Katona Jenő, Nécrologie de Miklós Griger, *Korunk Szava*, 1<sup>er</sup> mars 1938

<sup>7</sup> Széchenyi György gróf, « Griger Miklós sírjával », *Korunk Szava*, 15 mars 1938

<sup>8</sup> Katona Jenő, art. cit.

<sup>9</sup> Compte-rendu sur la conférence de Jacques Maritain au Musée des arts décoratifs, *Korunk Szava*, 15 février 1937

<sup>10</sup> « Jacques Maritain gondolataiból » *Korunk Szava*, 1<sup>er</sup> octobre 1937

<sup>11</sup> Jacques Maritain, « La cité de Dieu », *Korunk Szava*, 11 février 1938

<sup>12</sup> « P. Gillet O.P. az európai gondolat szószólója », *Korunk Szava*, 1<sup>er</sup> mars 1936

<sup>13</sup> Julien Benda, « Az igazi békeprobléma », *Korunk Szava*, 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1938

<sup>14</sup> Gy. Sz., « Idő sodrában », *Korunk Szava*, 1<sup>er</sup> avril 1938

<sup>15</sup> Dsida Elemér dr., « A szentistváni gondolat európai jelentősége », *Korunk Szava*, 1<sup>er</sup> avril 1938

<sup>16</sup> Entretien avec le cardinal Verdier, *Korunk Szava*, 15 juin 1938

<sup>17</sup> Jean Guiraud, « La race comme idole des états totalitaires » *Korunk Szava*, 1<sup>er</sup> juillet 1938

- <sup>18</sup> Széchenyi György, « a keresztény demokrácia », 15 décembre 1938
- <sup>19</sup> Daniel-Rops, « Lettre sur le catholicisme français », *Korunk Szava*, 1-15 juillet 1938
- <sup>20</sup> Katona Jenő, « Köszöntünk Magyar Felvidék », *Korunk Szava*, 15 novembre 1938
- <sup>21</sup> Compte-rendu de Jean Giraudoux *Pleins pouvoirs*, *Jelenkor*, 1<sup>er</sup> décembre 1939
- <sup>22</sup> « A francia tragedia », *Jelenkor*, 1<sup>er</sup> août 1940
- <sup>23</sup> Compte-rendu d'Henri Massis « Les idées restent », *Jelenkor*, 15 avril 1941

# OTTOKÁR PROHÁSZKA ET LE CHRISTIANISME SOCIAL

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Depuis *Rerum Novarum* de Léon XIII (1891) et jusqu'à nos jours, avec les encycliques *Centesimus Annus* de Jean-Paul II (1991) et *Caritas in Veritate* de Benoît XVI (2009), l'enseignement social de l'Eglise catholique est essentiellement une prise de position, au nom du message du Christ, contre le monde livré au matérialisme et à l'athéisme. L'accent y est constamment mis sur la dimension spirituelle de l'homme, sur la vocation de la personne à la transcendance, sur les droits fondamentaux et la poursuite du bien commun, sur la justice et la charité. Aux tournants du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle, deux grands apôtres de l'Eglise sociale en Hongrie, le prêtre Sándor Giesswein et l'évêque Ottokár Prohászka, furent dans leurs œuvres écrites et dans leur action les pionniers engagés de ce « christianisme social ».

**Mots-clefs :** Ottokár Prohászka, encyclique *Rerum Novarum*, modernisme catholique, marxisme, social-démocratie

*Keresztényszocializmus Magyarországon 1903–1923* [Le christianisme social en Hongrie, 1903–1923]. Sous ce titre, l'historien Jenő Gergely a publié une monographie à l'époque communiste<sup>1</sup>. Celle-ci reste une source incontournable, bien que discutable en plusieurs points, perfectible, certes, comme le professeur Gergely lui-même l'a montré en publiant une nouvelle version de ses travaux après le changement de régime<sup>2</sup>. Bien entendu, tout dépend de la vision du monde selon laquelle on étudie les faits, selon laquelle on analyse les événements et, finalement, selon laquelle on observe le progrès social et les moyens envisagés pour mettre en œuvre les réformes nécessaires.

Dans l'introduction de son livre publié en 1977, Jenő Gergely décrivait ainsi les antécédents du christianisme social en Hongrie : « Au cours de la dernière

décennie du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle et des deux premières décennies du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle, le mouvement social prit de l'ampleur sous la double impulsion de l'apparition de forces progressistes et des revendications en faveur d'une transformation démocratique. Comme alternative à la tradition séculaire du libéralisme hongrois apparurent, au tournant du siècle, des radicaux bourgeois qui notamment fondèrent la Société des sciences sociales (*Társadalomtudományi Társaság*) et lancèrent la revue *Huszadik Század*. [...] Au sein des différents mouvements sociaux ayant surgi au tournant du siècle en Europe occidentale prévalait nettement l'hégémonie du socialisme. Néanmoins, en 1891, l'encyclique *Rerum Novarum* proposa un autre type de programme social, dans le cadre du *ralliement*. Répondant aux exigences de la société bourgeoise, le Pape réunissait les thèses sociales du christianisme en opposition au socialisme marxiste, et exhortait les ouvriers à s'organiser sur la base du christianisme social. [...] Au cours des années 1890, nous commençons ainsi à rencontrer le terme de « christianisme social » en Hongrie, dont la propagation est largement due à la presse catholique indépendante et aux écrits de Ottokár Prohászka<sup>3</sup>. » Le professeur Gergely retraçait ensuite la manière dans laquelle le mouvement catholique social hongrois (Prohászka, Giesswein, les associations de travailleurs, les associations de jeunes gens, les cercles catholiques, les coopératives) s'était développé sur le modèle des mouvements sociaux allemands et autrichiens (surtout de l'évêque Ketteler et du Centrum). D'autre part, l'influence des idées modernistes françaises et du réformisme religieux à la française fut aussi déterminante, surtout sur Prohászka<sup>4</sup>.

### Prohászka, apôtre social

Ottokár Prohászka (1858–1927) est non seulement le principal protagoniste de la renaissance catholique du tournant du siècle, mais aussi, sans conteste, la plus grande figure du catholicisme hongrois au XX<sup>e</sup> siècle. C'est ce qu'a déclaré Jenő Gergely en 1994 dans son livre intitulé *Prohászka Ottokár, « l'homme revêtu de soleil »* (« Ottokár Prohászka, "A napbaöltözött ember" »)<sup>5</sup>. Même ses adversaires, lorsqu'ils sont impartiaux, reconnaissent que Prohászka a précédé ses contemporains dans la modernité de son catholicisme, dans ses efforts de réforme, dans la propagation du message social de Léon XIII, dans sa sensibilité même aux questions sociales et dans son témoignage inlassable en faveur du progressisme social. Les principaux chefs du mouvement chrétien social à proprement parler, Sándor Giesswein et d'autres, comme par exemple les jésuites actifs entre les deux guerres, Jenő Kerkai et László Varga, tous se sont inscrits dans la lignée de Prohászka.



Au cours des sept années d'étude qu'il a passées à Rome, avant d'être installé à Esztergom, Prohászka eut le loisir d'observer le mouvement des idées en Occident. Au début des années 1890, Léon XIII annonça le message social de l'Église : c'est Prohászka qui publia en hongrois une version annotée de l'encyclique *Rerum Novarum*, c'est lui également qui traduisit les discours et la correspondance du pape. Au cours des quelque trente-cinq années suivantes, il allait répandre et aussi s'efforcer de mettre en pratique ces mêmes idées sociales développées par les papes de *Rerum Novarum* à *Centesimus Annus*. Dès 1894, il s'exprima clairement sur l'action chrétienne sociale : « Ne soyons pas aveugles ! Le socialisme n'est pas une simple tentation ; c'est une secte qui *nourrit son étonnant succès sur d'innombrables et profondes frustrations*. Il ne s'agit pas simplement d'agitateurs qui prennent plaisir à bousculer la tranquillité publique, mais d'un système. Un système dont l'ambition est d'améliorer l'état du monde. Et pourquoi est-il si populaire ? Parce que sur la terre et dans le ciel retentissent les cris de détresse. La situation est grave. Il est à craindre que si le christianisme ne parvient pas à répondre à cette détresse, les utopies les plus délirantes et les hommes déçus, aux poings sanglants, plongeront la société dans une confusion sans nom. Déjà, le chaos s'annonce, car il est bien tard<sup>6</sup>. » En 1897, peu après les fêtes du *Millénium* [millénaire de la conquête du bassin danubien par les tribus hongroises], Prohászka publia une étude dans la revue *Magyar Sion* portant le titre suivant : *Az egyház demokráciája* (« La démocratie de l'Église »), dans laquelle il présentait le rôle du prêtre comme celui d'un guide vers le progrès. Jenő Gergely s'est largement exprimé sur cette étude<sup>7</sup>. « Il est impossible de décrire avec plus de clairvoyance les relations entre l'Église et le peuple de notre temps, et l'engagement de Prohászka envers le progrès et la démocratie. Ces lignes n'ont rien perdu de leur actualité, même si, au niveau de l'Église universelle, le concile Vatican II a dorénavant donné une nouvelle direction. On peut surtout mesurer aujourd'hui l'ampleur de la surprise que ces lignes provoquèrent au sein de l'Église catholique hongroise, qui était encore murée derrière des droits et ses privilèges féodaux post-joséphin<sup>8</sup>. »

### Socialisme et marxisme

Le jeune professeur de théologie fraîchement installé à Esztergom était un profond connaisseur du socialisme et du marxisme. Il y a plus de cent ans (en 1897), il publia dans *Magyar Sion* une étude intitulée *Marx Károly nemzetgazdasági alapelvei*<sup>9</sup> (« Les fondements de l'économie nationale selon Karl Marx ») qui est un document rempli d'honnêteté et d'objectivité. Prohászka y met en évidence ce qui dans l'enseignement de Marx est positif ou du moins relève de la vérité partielle. Un an plus tard, il publia un état des lieux complet intitulé *A szociális*

*theória hadi állása*<sup>10</sup> (« Le point de vue martial des théories sociales »). Après avoir synthétisé les principes du matérialisme historique, il était en mesure d'en faire l'analyse suivante :

« Personne ne réfutera que les conceptions socialistes contiennent beaucoup de vérité, permettez moi de mettre en évidence certaines perles particulièrement lumineuses. [...]

1. Il est vrai, tout d'abord, que le travail dépend de l'outil de travail et que le développement de l'outil de travail dépend lui-même du progrès technique...
2. En deuxième lieu, il est également vrai que le capital donne le pouvoir à la machine tout en monopolisant le profit de la production, et c'est ainsi que le travail est mis au service du capital...
3. En troisième lieu, il est aussi vrai que les idées d'une époque ont pour origine la nécessité sociale, en ce sens, elles n'ont aucun fondement hors des nécessités sociales...
4. Enfin, en quatrième lieu, le matérialisme historique a raison d'affirmer que le travail et les modes de production connaissent une évolution divisée en périodes et que certaines de ces périodes sont caractérisées par la souffrance, l'appauvrissement et l'accroissement des inégalités. Ce n'est pas par la force de la pensée que l'on est en mesure d'effacer ces périodes de l'histoire. Or nous vivons l'une d'entre elles, actuellement, avec le capitalisme... »

Un peu plus loin, Prohászka souligne les *erreurs* et les *fautes* du marxisme.

1. C'est toutefois une erreur de croire que toutes les idées puissent provenir du mode de production et des besoins matériels de l'existence. En commettant cette erreur, Marx s'est montré excessivement unilatéral ; jamais il n'a considéré autre chose que les conditions matérielles directes de l'existence, elle-même considérée uniquement dans sa matérialité, source d'explication tant des idées que de la morale, avant même la religion et la fonction normative du droit.
2. Le matérialisme historique commet aussi l'erreur de négliger les idées, il réfute notamment à ces dernières toute influence sur le choix entre les alternatives possibles du développement social. Cela est naturel, du reste : si l'on considère que les idées sont contingentes, elles ne peuvent produire cela même dont elles dépendent. Or si les idées ont une source indépendante et une valeur éternelle, ne peuvent-elles pas venir en aide aux gens censés, dans leurs efforts, améliorer la situation sociale ? »

Prohászka ajoutait avec perspicacité que *le marxisme lui-même ambitionnait d'agir sur la société par les idées* : « ... d'où provient la condamnation du régime capitaliste ? N'est-ce pas de l'anathème fulminant des idées qui depuis longtemps résonnent dans le monde pour protéger l'humanité, afin que jamais l'on ne se résigne<sup>11</sup> ? »

Prohászka ne niait pas l'existence d'un certain déterminisme économique, ni le fait qu'aux principes fondamentaux de la société capitaliste les idées n'apportaient que des nuances douces ou amères ; qu'il était en outre impossible de sauter certaines phases du processus de développement. Sur ce dernier point, il était même plus matérialiste encore que Marx<sup>12</sup>. D'ailleurs, Prohászka n'était pas moins audacieux dans son jugement sur la *propriété privée*. Il aura fallu plus d'un demi-siècle avant que son avis fût confirmé dans l'encyclique *Mater et Magistra* où Jean XXIII réclame la socialisation et la restriction de la propriété privée. Du reste, Prohászka ne niait pas les droits des propriétaires, mais il s'élevait contre l'accaparement violent et contre l'accroissement du capital au détriment du bien commun. Il voyait juste sur les nouvelles tendances de son temps : une évolution durable vers un monde plus social, progressivement, disait-il, « la production passera dans les mains de la collectivité. » « Mais nous ignorons encore – soulignait-il – quelle forme exacte prendra le droit de propriété ; le futur nous le dira<sup>13</sup>. »

### Social-démocratie et christianisme social

En 1909, dans un petit cahier publié à Esztergom (réédité ensuite dans l'almanach du *Néppárt* – Parti catholique populaire), intitulé *Kinek higgyen a munkás?* (« Qui les ouvriers doivent-ils croire ? »), Prohászka affirmait sur un ton déclamatoire que « la terre avait tremblé » : « À quoi bon la liberté politique, si l'on n'a pas de quoi manger ? À quoi bon la fraternité, si, du ragoût, l'un des frères mange toute la viande en laissant seulement quelques os qu'il jette à l'autre frère ? À quoi bon l'égalité devant la loi, si l'un dépense en cure-dents et en dentelles plus que l'autre pour se loger, se nourrir et entretenir sa famille ? Les temps sont durs, la pauvreté s'accroît comme un champignon. Les difficultés de la vie quotidienne pèsent sur l'ouvrier comme un gros nuage sombre, au cours d'une soirée d'été, qui enfle et peu à peu obscurcit entièrement le ciel. Le grand mal de notre époque, c'est l'accroissement de la pauvreté ; et ce problème nous concerne tous. » L'égoïsme « sans frein, comme une tempête maritime, amasse des tas gigantesques d'argent, d'actions et autres valeurs financières, faisant accroître les revenus réalisés sur le travail afin qu'un Rothschild puisse décider du sort des travailleurs ; pour finir, des millions et des millions d'hommes travaillent et le profit de leurs efforts ne leur revient nullement, il est accaparé par d'autres<sup>14</sup>. » Sur la situation

spécifiquement hongroise, le jeune Prohászka soulignait que la *révolte contre l'injustice* était à l'origine du mouvement des masses ouvrières ; qu'il existait véritablement une question sociale en Hongrie ; que la situation était extrêmement grave ou même sans espoir pour les paysans, les artisans, les petits propriétaires ; que la social-démocratie était en train de s'appropriier les masses indigentes. « Et justement, que veut la social-démocratie ? En un mot : elle veut un nouveau monde. Elle a raison. Il faudrait manquer de sérieux pour ne pas vouloir changer le monde. [...] Eh bien, en avant ! C'est ce que nous disons, nous aussi ! Nous voulons un nouveau monde. Nous voulons soigner le mal. Et la seule question qui demeure, c'est : comment ? Nos moyens ne sont pas les mêmes. La sociale - démocratie veut un monde qui n'a jamais existé nul part, mais elle se frappera la poitrine jusqu'à ce qu'elle parvienne à la créer. Et le petit peuple rêve<sup>15</sup>... »

Plus loin, Prohászka proposait à son lecteur de *lever le voile recouvrant le libéralisme* : « le libéralisme ne connaît rien d'autre que la liberté. La liberté complète, la concurrence sans frein, c'est son slogan ; et qu'est-ce que cela signifie ? Simplement la raison du plus fort. Et le plus fort, c'est celui qui a de l'argent. C'est-à-dire celui qui entasse de l'argent et du capital, celui-là est libre ; il peut mâcher et remâcher son bien, tout lui est dû ; tandis que le peuple au travail est à la dérive, tandis qu'il erre sans assistance et sans organisation, qu'il cherche du travail et vend son âme ; le grand capital, lui, se lance dans une course au profit effrénée<sup>16</sup>... »

### ***Où est le remède ? Il n'y en a qu'un – selon Prohászka – c'est le christianisme social***

L'évêque nous explique ce que signifie l'expression « socialisme », lorsqu'on lui ajoute le terme « chrétien ». « Le socialisme est nécessaire, autrement dit, la coopération, car, individuellement, l'homme n'est pas en mesure de résister à la concurrence économique ; mais aussi parce que Dieu a créé l'homme en société afin qu'il ne soit pas un grain de poussière, mais un édifice solide ; pas une feuille légère poussée par le vent, mais un chêne solidement enraciné. L'humanité est un grand corps ; la société humaine une vaste organisation qui, notamment sur le plan économique, doit être organisée en une structure cohérente. C'est ce que nous entendons par le terme de coopérative. [...] Et que signifie le terme « chrétien » ? Il désigne les vérités du christianisme : la religion, la morale ; autrement dit la charité, la tempérance, la justice, la patience et la tolérance, qui sont les seuls fondements certains du christianisme et sans lesquels il est impossible de fonder un lien social, une quelconque cohésion ou compréhension mutuelle »<sup>17</sup>. Prohászka préconisait donc la création de coopératives, ainsi que la garantie, pour les ouvriers, qu'ils seront protégés et édifiés et qu'ils auront accès à la culture.

« En avant les réformes chrétiennes sociales ! » C'est ainsi qu'il terminait son manifeste.

Son message, de toute évidence, était révolutionnaire : le haut-clergé, encore marqué par l'époque féodale, le considérait tout simplement comme un prêtre « rouge » ; c'est ainsi qu'il fut dénoncé à Rome. Notons toutefois que sa mise à l'index, en 1911, fut justifiée par la modernité (non pas le modernisme) de ses vues philosophiques et théologiques<sup>18</sup>. « Le cher lecteur pensera peut-être que l'auteur de ces lignes est un socialiste – écrivait-il – mais s'il pense ainsi, il se trompe. Avec ces réflexions, j'ai simplement souhaité lutter contre l'idée idiote qui prétend que toutes les conceptions actuelles sur la propriété privée sont des dogmes incompatibles avec toute pensée sur l'évolution sociale<sup>19</sup>. »

Parmi les réfractaires à « l'évolution sociale » en cette fin de siècle se trouvaient des grands seigneurs ecclésiastiques aussi bien que laïcs. En 1894, Prohászka tenta déjà d'éveiller le clergé qu'il jugeait indifférent à la question sociale, avec son livre *A papság földadata a szociális kérdések körül*<sup>20</sup> (« Le rôle du clergé dans la résolution des questions sociales »). « La société officielle hongroise est tout entière attelée au char du libéralisme. Qui sont les chevaux de trait et les porteurs, inutile de le préciser... » « Le peuple des travailleurs abandonné à lui-même attend un prophète, qui puisse lui dire : “j'ai pitié de cette foule”. »

« Mais le clergé a-t-il véritablement agi, ce clergé qui cheminait au milieu de la population pauvre et souffrante comme un char à travers les crevasses de la société, convaincu de pouvoir les combler de lui-même tout en maîtrisant les éléments destructeurs ? – Je répondrai sans hésitation que nul part, le clergé a suffisamment agi contre les malheurs et l'irréligion qui n'ont cessé de renforcer le socialisme. En certains endroits, il s'est ébranlé avec un grand retard. Ailleurs, il n'a pas même encore bougé. Ne soyons pas heurtés par ce mot ! Ne soyons pas choqués du fait que j'ai dit : « le clergé » ; il serait impossible de mentionner toutes les exceptions à la règle. Néanmoins, les exceptions n'annulent pas la règle. J'admets volontiers le fait qu'il y ait eu des exceptions, et ceux qui sont concernés savent bien, plus exactement ils ressentent bien qu'ils sont des orphelins, qu'ils sont abandonnés à leur sort comme des pierres de rivière parmi leurs confrères<sup>21</sup>. »

Prohászka discute longuement, en s'appuyant sur des auteurs étrangers comme Lange, par exemple, de la situation de la classe ouvrière et des progrès de la sociale-démocratie, puis il énumère les actions à entreprendre d'urgence. Il importe, selon lui, que le clergé prenne plus d'intérêt aux maux sociaux, aux souffrances des artisans, des ouvriers de l'industrie et du peuple de la terre. « Ne nous livrons pas... entièrement au système dominant, au risque de couler avec lui, le jour venu. Ne nous mêlons pas au système économique libéral, ne prenons pas sa défense<sup>22</sup> ! » Précisons ici que le concile Vatican II a adopté la même position, en affirmant que *l'Église ne doit en aucune circonstance se lier à un quelconque système socio-politique*. « L'Église, dans sa charge et sa légitimité, n'a rien de

commun avec la société politique, et ne se lie à aucun système politique, elle est à la fois le signe et la protection de la transcendance de la personne humaine<sup>23</sup>. »

### **La révolution : les « signes du temps » (appel à la réforme de l'Église)**

En un mot, Prohászka prenait l'Évangile au sérieux : « l'Évangile s'adresse aux pauvres. » Il savait bien qu'en définitive, il ne s'agissait pas d'un problème de *système*, mais d'une question éminemment humaine. Seuls des hommes convertis, rompus à la charité, à la justice peuvent construire le monde nouveau. C'est là qu'est la signification de l'Église évangélique depuis toujours, aujourd'hui encore. Vingt ans avant Lénine, Prohászka voyait déjà venir le cauchemar rouge.

En 1919, après l'intermède de la révolution de Károlyi, le poing sanglant de la dictature rouge s'abattit sur la Hongrie. Dans le *Journal* de Prohászka et dans certaines de ses déclarations publiques (comme ses lettres pastorales ou les lettres qu'il rédigea au nom de la conférence des évêques, après l'échec de la Commune<sup>24</sup>) témoignent de son dégoût face aux atrocités commises, non sans qu'il *continuât à observer les signes de son temps* : il continuait en particulier à s'interroger sur les réformes nécessaires de l'Église. Dans son journal, en date du 7 juillet 1919, il écrit : « je suis convaincu de l'impérative nécessité d'une rénovation de la situation et des visions du monde en vigueur. Tout ce que les forces de l'histoire nous avaient donné nous a été arraché ; désormais, l'essence intérieure et même l'esprit se sont refroidis dans les nouvelles formes. Ce genre de malversations était naguère frappé d'excommunication. Il faudrait aujourd'hui opposer une volonté aussi implacable, sans hésitation sur le sens à donner à la volonté divine. Dieu sait que le monde n'est pas prêt, que le pêcher et la vertu y sont encore à l'œuvre ! Et en ce qui concerne l'Église ? Eh bien, ce qui dans le christianisme est venu du ciel et continue à être dans le monde en tant que force divine, c'étaient bien l'esprit et l'âme et le bien, qui se sont incarnés dans l'histoire au moyen des rapports noués par les hommes entre eux. Les formes prises par ces forces ont considérablement varié au cours de l'histoire, ainsi en Orient, ainsi en Occident, ainsi de l'ère classique, du Moyen Âge, des temps modernes<sup>25</sup>... » Plus loin, il énumère des principes de modernisation qui ne sont pas, de nouveau, sans rappeler ceux du concile de Vatican II : un clergé cultivé et collégial, le fait que les prêtres ne forment pas une classe à part, séparée des laïcs : « que ce ne soit pas l'autorité de commandement, le pouvoir qui dirigent, mais le principe interne d'amour » ; la sensibilité religieuse – la liturgie en langue vernaculaire. Toutes ces exigences ont été exprimées dans son ouvrage, *Le catholicisme moderne*, publié en 1907 et mis à l'index en 1911<sup>26</sup>.

Dans une lettre pastorale intitulée *Après l'échec du communisme*, en date du 17 août 1919<sup>27</sup>, après avoir décrit les méfaits commis par les rouges, il attirait l'attention des fidèles sur les points suivants :

1. « En premier lieu, assurons nos frères ouvriers qu'en luttant contre le bolchevisme et ses destructions, il n'est pas question une minute d'en rendre responsable la classe ouvrière. [...] Au contraire, je suis convaincu que si nous cherchons véritablement les nouvelles sources de la rénovation de la vie religieuse et de la société hongroise, et si nous observons d'un œil clairvoyant *les facteurs véritablement déterminants pour l'avenir de la Hongrie* : alors c'est en premier lieu dans les couches travailleuses, parmi les ouvriers industriels et le peuple des campagnes que nous pouvons espérer les trouver... »
2. d'autre part, nous avons pour devoir d'*atténuer les souffrances* et ainsi d'arracher toute racine à la haine et à la lutte fratricide. [...] L'exemple des coquins et des brigands, nous ne devons pas le suivre... »
3. Notre troisième obligation est celle d'organiser la défense des intérêts sur une base hongroise, nationale et chrétienne. [...] *Penchons nous sur le peuple et aidons le* dans ses efforts, propageons la nécessité de défendre ses intérêts... »
4. Dans cet ordre d'idée, la quatrième obligation est de prendre la *défense de nos écoles* et de garantir le *fond de morale religieuse dans l'éducation et l'instruction*... »

Prohászka n'a pas seulement proclamé des principes sociaux, mais il a aussi mis ces derniers *en pratique*. Sous son autorité s'est développée la Société de mission sociale d'Edit Farkas. En 1915, les sœurs récoltèrent des dons pour la construction de maisons d'orphelins de guerre et s'efforcèrent d'atténuer par tous les moyens possibles les misères causées par la guerre. En 1916, lors de l'assemblée générale de la Fédération paysanne, Prohászka soumit son plan de réforme de la propriété agricole<sup>28</sup>. Son initiative s'inspirait partiellement de la *Bodenreform* allemande. L'idée de bail perpétuel fut accueillie avec enthousiasme par les paysans pauvres, mais les grands propriétaires haussèrent les épaules avec indifférence. Mgr Prohászka mit en place sur ses propres propriétés épiscopales *sis* les communes de Tés et Ősi la réforme agraire qu'il préconisait. Au lendemain de la dictature de 1919, il espérait connaître la renaissance de son pays en vertu d'une meilleure cohésion nationale. C'est pourquoi il s'engagea en 1920 comme député, afin de promouvoir au parlement les réformes économiques et sociales. Mais il fut bien vite frustré par cette expérience directe de la politique, constatant avec amertume que le soi-disant « cursus chrétien » n'était qu'un programme vaguement lié au christianisme et ses représentants en rien de véritables chrétiens<sup>29</sup>.

Au cours des années vingt, il s'orienta vers la méditation – son journal et son livre inachevé, *Élet kenyere* (« le pain de la vie ») témoignent de son intérêt croissant pour la mystique, la dévotion au mystère de l'eucharistie, mais cela ne l'empêcha pas de continuer à revendiquer la réforme sociale. Ainsi, en 1926, peu de temps avant sa mort, il prononça le discours suivant :

« Quelle est donc la cause de l'apostasie de masse dans le peuple ouvrier, et quelle est la source de ce phénomène qui lui est corrélé, le succès de la social-démocratie, qui attire vers elle des millions de personnes ? La force de la social-démocratie n'est pas dans la philosophie de Marx ni dans la phraséologie matérialiste qui s'oppose à Dieu, au Christ et à l'Église. [...] La force de la social-démocratie, elle vient du prolétaire privé de capital, de terre, de maison, d'un moindre chez-soi et de tout espoir, que le déracinement a privé de toute vie décente en le livrant aux masses sans âme. [...] N'ayons pas peur des accusations de radicalisme ! À ces accusations, nous pouvons répondre que nous ne voulons rien d'autre que ce que le pape Léon XIII a voulu. Avec lui, nous proclamons que le prolétariat a droit à une vie digne, à une maison, qu'il doit bénéficier des moyens d'entretenir sa famille, d'une juste part du fruit de son travail. [...] Nous affirmons la sainteté de la propriété privée, mais pas de toutes les propriétés privées ; nous condamnons l'usure à laquelle se livre la ploutocratie et l'accroissement des droits de cette dernière aux détriments du bien commun. Dans le régime capitaliste, la propriété privée s'est à ce point concentrée au niveau mondial entre les mains de quelques-uns qu'elle est sur le point d'étouffer la vie. [...] Je n'ignore pas que le capitalisme est une étape indispensable de l'évolution des sociétés et qu'il est impossible de sauter une étape dans le processus d'évolution des modes de production ou de décréter, sans autre forme de procès, l'avènement d'une autre ; mais la situation présente a montré combien le capitalisme, en concentrant la fortune, encourage finalement l'avènement d'une nouvelle alliance entre le travail et le capital<sup>30</sup>... »

C'est précisément ce qu'a proclamé Jean Paul II dans *Centesimus Annus*. Prohászka, en effet, était un « prophète » lorsqu'il appelait de ses vœux, dans ce même discours prononcé peu avant sa mort, une Hongrie et même une Europe dont le développement serait fondée sur les racines chrétiennes. « Nous devons surtout arriver à la conviction que la culture de l'Europe occidentale est fondée sur des racines chrétiennes indestructibles. Nous devons affirmer notre conviction que le christianisme, dont la mission jusqu'aux temps modernes fut de créer la civilisation et la culture, a aujourd'hui encore la mission d'insuffler dans le monde la force divine et d'en faire sentir la puissance à travers les nations. [...] Notre monde a besoin de Catholiques munis d'une vaste culture et dont les yeux reflètent la lumière infinie et éternelle !<sup>31</sup>... »



Notes

- 1 Gergely Jenő, *Keresztényszocializmus Magyarországon* [Le christianisme social en Hongrie], Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1977. Voir aussi Szolnoky Erzsébet, *Szociális igazságosság és keresztény szeretet*. Giesswein Sándor a magyar keresztényszociális és kereszténydemokrata gondolkodás megalapozója. [La justice sociale et la charité chrétienne. Sándor Giesswein, fondateur de la pensée chrétienne sociale et démocrate chrétienne], Éghajlat Kiadó, Budapest, 2003.
- 2 Gergely Jenő, *A katolikus egyház története Magyarországon 1919-1945* [Histoire de l'Eglise catholique, 1919-1945], Budapest, 1997
- 3 *A keresztényszocializmus...* [Le christianisme social...], 1977, pp. 9-16.
- 4 Voir Szabó Ferenc SJ, *Prohászka Ottokár időszerűsége* [Prohászka Ottokár en phase avec son temps], Kairosz, Budapest, 2006, (61) ; Idem, *Prohászka Ottokár élete és műve (1858-1927)* [La vie et l'œuvre de Prohászka Ottokár], Szent István Társulat, Budapest, 2007, chap. V. (121)
- 5 Gergely Jenő, *Prohászka Ottokár, „A napbaöltözött ember”* [« Prohászka Ottokár, l'homme revêtu de soleil »], Budapest, Gondolat, 1994, 247 pages
- 6 Összes munka [œuvre complète de Prohászka : plus loin « ÖM »], 11, pp.65–66.
- 7 Gergely, *Prohászka Ottokár...* pp. 50-54.
- 8 Ibidem, p. 52.
- 9 ÖM 11, p. 128kk.
- 10 ÖM 11, pp. 107-127.
- 11 ÖM 11, pp. 117–120.
- 12 Cf 11, p. 122.
- 13 ÖM 11, p. 120.
- 14 Ibidem, pp. 22, 29.
- 15 Ibidem, pp. 22, 33.
- 16 Ibidem, pp. 22, 38.
- 17 Ibidem, pp. 22, 41.
- 18 Sur la question de la mise à l'index, Szabó Ferenc: *Prohászka Ottokár élete és műve*, VI. fej. 175kk.
- 19 ÖM, 11, p. 125.
- 20 Ibidem, p. 40kk.
- 21 Ibidem, p. 41.
- 22 Ibidem, p. 48.
- 23 *Gaudium et Spes*, p. 76 (« La communauté politique et l'Eglise »).
- 24 Voir Gergely Jenő, *A püspöki kar tanácskozásai* [Les synodes de la conférence épiscopale], Gondolat, Budapest, 1984, pp. 74 et 324 ; voir aussi ÖM 9, pp. 265-273.
- 25 ÖM, 23, pp. 309–310.
- 26 Voir Szabó... *Prohászka Ottokár élete és műve* [La vie et l'œuvre de Ottokár Prohászka], p. 122.
- 27 ÖM 9, p. 26.
- 28 ÖM 22, p. 164.
- 29 ÖM 21, p. 276.
- 30 ÖM 13, pp. 285–286.
- 31 Ibidem, pp. 187, 189.

**LA SENSIBILITÉ SOCIALE ET NATIONALE  
DE SÁNDOR GIESSWEIN.  
LES DILEMMES POLITIQUES D’UN PRÊTRE  
CATHOLIQUE<sup>1</sup>**

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*Aliud est facta narrare, aliud docere facienda;  
historia facta narrat fideliter atque utiliter.  
(S. Augustinus: De doctrina Christiana, II. 28.)*

Qui était Sándor Giesswein ? Son nom figure à côté de ceux d’Ottokár Prohászka (1858–1927) et Béla Bangha SJ (1880–1940), lorsqu’il s’agit de nommer les principales figures de la renaissance catholique en Hongrie au début du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle. Ajoutons aussitôt : ce sont trois noms pour trois routes bien différentes, qui ont par la suite été appréciées comme telles. Ce qui les rapproche, c’est qu’ils ont tout trois cherché des solutions aux problèmes sociaux-politiques apparus dans les années 1900.<sup>2</sup>

**Mots-clefs :** Sándor Giesswein, Ottokár Prohászka, Béla Bangha, Pannonhalma, progressisme chrétien, partis politiques chrétiens, république des conseils

J’ai fait la connaissance de Giesswein lorsque j’étais lycéen. En tant qu’élève au lycée bénédictin de Győr, dans les années 1970, j’eus maintes fois l’occasion d’entendre son nom – car il avait été chanoine à Győr – prononcé par l’un de mes deux professeurs également religieux dans l’ordre de saint Benoît. Le premier d’entre eux, Gyula Jánosi OSB (1910–1978), professeur de latin et d’histoire, avait alors l’intention de publier un livre sur la vie de Giesswein, auquel il travailla jusqu’à sa mort sans parvenir au bout de son projet. Son manuscrit portait le titre suivant : *Aux seuils des temps nouveaux. La vie et l’époque de Sándor Giesswein.*<sup>3</sup> Il fut aidé dans son projet par le second professeur, László Cziráki OSB (1915–1981), dont les disciplines étaient le hongrois et le français.

En novembre 2011, je me suis rendu avec un certain émoi à la bibliothèque de l'abbaye de Pannonhalma, pour y lire enfin le manuscrit en question, resté inédit<sup>4</sup>. Sa lecture est édifiante : au beau milieu de l'historiographie marxiste propre aux années 1970, l'ouvrage s'efforce de montrer que bien avant l'avènement du « socialisme », un prêtre catholique s'est courageusement élevé en faveur des « petites gens ». Du reste, un extrait du manuscrit fut publié en 1977, dans l'album annuel du lycée bénédictin « Czuczor Gergely » de Győr imprimé à l'occasion du 350<sup>e</sup> anniversaire de l'institution. Certes, le raisonnement déployé par Gyula Jánosi reflète tout de même la pression de l'historiographie marxiste, montrant ce que pouvait être à l'époque cette petite marge de manœuvre dont bénéficiaient alors les auteurs dans le domaine de l'histoire de l'Église. On relèvera en particulier la fréquente autocritique et certains détails dans la terminologie qui ont pris aujourd'hui un sens qu'ils n'avaient pas au moment où le texte a été écrit : « l'époque à laquelle Giesswein vivait était riche en tensions spirituelles et sociales. La vie de l'Église ne faisait pas exception. Non pas tant au sein de l'Église hongroise elle-même, où régnaient encore les vieilles formes baroques de plus en plus vides, complètement dépassées, mais plutôt en Occident où le catholicisme bourgeois (*sic*), renouvelé dans l'esprit de Léon XIII, s'efforçait d'harmoniser les anciennes et les nouvelles valeurs, de s'adapter au monde bourgeois. Finalement, en Hongrie aussi, à la fin du siècle, quelque chose allait se passer. Le catholicisme hongrois finit par s'éveiller à la conscience, non sans rencontrer sur son chemin le lourd héritage de l'époque baroque. Giesswein fut un représentant de ce progressisme dans ses multiples aspects, au nom du catholicisme hongrois, mais aussi du catholicisme universel. Du reste, il n'a jamais cessé, même après sa mort, de s'opposer aux milieux catholiques hongrois. Aujourd'hui, l'intérêt pour sa personne se manifeste tant parmi les catholiques que parmi les marxistes. [...] Au début de sa carrière, Ákos Mihályfi<sup>5</sup> voyait en lui un apologiste contemporain. En 1903, on le considérait comme le leader du réveil catholique. En 1921, lors du quarantième anniversaire de sa carrière d'écrivain, la gauche le fêta avec enthousiasme, notamment pour son œuvre en tant que rédacteur en chef de la revue *Auróra*<sup>6</sup>. Giesswein s'éloignait de plus en plus du catholicisme officiel, attaché aux formes baroques vidées de leur sens et de plus en plus chauvin. Il s'est dressé courageusement contre la terreur blanche, contre l'antisémitisme. [...] En 1923, officiant lors de ses obsèques, Ákos Mihályfi constata qu'il enterrait un véritable grand homme, car seulement aux enterrements des grands hommes on a coutume de voir autant de visages de petites gens émus – ils étaient des dizaines de milliers. Toute sa vie et même après sa mort, il eut des adversaires. Aujourd'hui, l'intérêt pour sa personne se manifeste parmi les catholiques et parmi les marxistes. Dans son étude publiée à la revue *Világosság*<sup>7</sup>, Jenő Gergely a observé que si Prohászka était beaucoup mieux renseigné que Giesswein sur le marxisme, sur le plan du progressisme social proprement dit, Giesswein avait des positions bien

plus proches d'Ervin Szabó ou Zsigmond Kunfi<sup>8</sup>, voire partageaient entièrement les conceptions de ces derniers. Aujourd'hui, nous, les catholiques, nous voyons en lui le représentant du renouveau catholique du type le plus progressiste sur le plan social, et aussi, dans ses vues prophétiques et dans son attitude personnelle, l'un des pionniers les plus brillants des idées de Vatican II. »<sup>9</sup>

Dans ce texte, il apparaît que Jenő Gergely s'occupait déjà, dans les années 70, de la vie et de l'œuvre de Giesswein. Si le professeur Gergely est toujours resté fidèle à ses conceptions historiques, il lui est aussi arrivé, au besoin, de réviser ses thèses plus personnelles. Mais il a surtout accompli un travail colossal de recherche dans le domaine du christianisme social. En 2007, nous avons organisé ensemble, dans le cadre de l'Académie jésuite « Faludi Ferenc », un colloque consacré aux questions sociales entre les deux guerres. Sa tâche était de nous donner une synthèse de l'histoire du christianisme social à la lumière des « recherches les plus récentes ». De prime abord, il affirma être surpris par la question, prétextant avoir déjà tout écrit sur le sujet. Néanmoins, peu à peu, il se mit à s'exprimer avec un enthousiasme croissant. Les actes de ce colloque ont été publiés en 2008 par mes soins, aux éditions Gondolat avec le soutien de l'Académie « Faludi Ferenc » et de la fondation István Barankovics<sup>10</sup>. C'est sans doute ainsi que j'ai acquis la réputation de m'intéresser au thème qui nous occupe aujourd'hui, en particulier à Giesswein. Outre celui du professeur Gergely, il convient aussi d'évoquer le nom d'Erzsébet Szolnoky, décédée en avril 2011, auteur de l'unique biographie de Sándor Giesswein publiée à ce jour<sup>11</sup>. Je me suis largement appuyé sur ses résultats ainsi que sur le travail de László T. László<sup>12</sup>.

Après une brève présentation biographique de Giesswein, je tenterai de mettre en évidence des faits, des événements qui ont jusqu'à présent échappé à la recherche ou n'ont pas été, selon moi, considérés à leur juste mesure. Je ferai référence, bien sûr, aux textes les plus importants de Giesswein, en particulier – sans prétention à l'exhaustivité – aux discours qu'il a prononcés à la Chambre<sup>13</sup>. J'ai inscrit, en sous-titre de ce travail, « dilemme politique ». Il s'agit d'un angle d'attaque important, comme en témoigne lui-même le contexte de la carrière de Giesswein, qui débuta en politique sous la monarchie austro-hongroise, connut une guerre puis une ou deux révolutions et enfin termina sa carrière dans un royaume sans roi<sup>14</sup>.

Giesswein est né le 4 février 1856 à Tata, dans une famille d'origine alsacienne dont les ancêtres avaient émigré en Hongrie au temps de Marie-Thérèse. Il a suivi sa scolarité à Tata puis à Győr en obtenant son baccalauréat au lycée des bénédictins de cette ville. C'est là qu'il fut aussi ordonné prêtre en 1878. Par la suite, il continua à étudier à Budapest, à la faculté de théologie de l'Université Pázmány où il obtint, en 1880, le grade de docteur en théologie. En 1914, il fut admis en tant que membre à l'Académie des sciences hongroise. Son champ de compétence, en tant que chercheur, embrassait l'archéologie biblique, l'étude compa-

rée des religions, la linguistique générale, la philosophie sociale et la sociologie, etc... Il maîtrisait huit langues, ce qui ne l'empêcha pas d'être en Hongrie le vulgarisateur enthousiaste de l'espéranto. En 1903, il fut nommé vice-président de la Société ecclésiastique Szent István, cadre dans lequel il allait fonder une Académie éponyme. C'est en 1898 qu'il se lança dans la politique en fondant à Győr la première association hongroise de travailleurs chrétiens. En 1905, il fut élu dans la circonscription de Mosonmagyaróvár en tant que candidat du Parti catholique populaire (conservateur), tout en mettant l'accent sur un programme social. Dès lors, il allait être élu à toutes les échéances électorales, non sans changer parfois d'étiquette politique, mais en restant toujours fidèle au même programme. Il est mort le 15 novembre 1923 à Budapest<sup>15</sup>.

D'emblée, il m'a paru intéressant de comprendre ce qui avait provoqué chez Giesswein l'apparition de la sensibilité sociale. Ceux qui se sont occupés de sa vie et de son œuvre n'ont pas véritablement abordé la question. Ou plutôt, ils se sont contentés d'évoquer l'influence de l'encyclique *Rerum Novarum* de Léon XIII, connu pour avoir éveillé en Hongrie l'intérêt de l'Eglise pour le monde ouvrier<sup>16</sup>. Il me semble que l'intérêt de Giesswein remonte beaucoup plus loin en arrière, comme on peut d'ailleurs le constater en consultant un ouvrage adapté d'un livre étranger, publié en 1876 par l'école de littérature religieuse hongroise du grand séminaire de Budapest et intitulé *La question ouvrière et le socialisme*<sup>17</sup>. Entre 1874 et 1877, Giesswein poursuivait des études de théologie à Budapest et résidait au séminaire, qui se situe encore aujourd'hui dans les mêmes bâtiments que l'école de littérature religieuse hongroise. Je ne fus pas surpris en constatant que le nom de Giesswein figurait parmi ceux des contributeurs. Certes, il est difficile d'établir avec précision son rôle dans la traduction (comme il connaissait très bien l'allemand, il est possible qu'il y ait pris une part très active). Quoiqu'il en soit, sa participation est avérée. D'ailleurs, quel livre est-ce, au juste ? Il s'agit d'un ouvrage de 300 pages dont l'auteur est Karl Wilhelm Reischl, professeur à l'université de Munich. On y envisage d'abord la question ouvrière sous l'angle religieux, puis on fait l'analyse du socialisme d'un point de vue théorique de même que dans ses solutions les plus concrètes. L'auteur évoque, par exemple, la grève, mais aussi la question féminine (cause en faveur de laquelle Giesswein allait aussi s'engager). Reischl s'intéresse spécifiquement à la situation des femmes « célibataires ou veuves qui n'ont d'autre moyen de subsistance que leurs deux bras<sup>18</sup>. » Sur cette question, au cours des discussions échangées à la Chambre en 1919 dans le cadre de la proposition de loi interdisant le travail nocturne des femmes dans l'industrie, Giesswein soulignait comment le choix d'accorder plus d'autonomie économique aux femmes, en leur permettant de s'élever au-dessus de leurs occupations anciennes, au sein du cercle purement familial, ne leur avait pas pour autant procuré un nouveau territoire spécifique. Elles étaient simplement devenues des « chefs de famille »<sup>19</sup>. Revenons au livre de Reischl. Ce dernier donne

aussi des informations sur Mgr Ketteler, évêque de Mainz, pour qui « la question sociale ne [pouvait] être résolue que par le christianisme<sup>20</sup>. » Il me semble évident que cet ouvrage a mis Giesswein sur la voie du christianisme social. En 1913, ce dernier allait publier *Keresztény szociális törekvések a társadalmi és gazdasági életben* (« Le projet chrétien social dans la vie sociale et économique »).<sup>21</sup> Selon moi, il s'agit précisément d'une adaptation du livre de Reischl. D'ailleurs, Giesswein y présente dans le détail la vie et la pensée de Ketteler<sup>22</sup>. Il évoque également les théoriciens du mouvement chrétien social français, comme Le Play<sup>23</sup>. D'après Erzsébet Szolnok, Giesswein reprochait à Le Play son idéalisme ; celui qui connaissait réellement l'existence des ouvriers européens, quant à lui, « ne tenait pas la forme du gouvernement comme déterminante de la paix sociale, mais seulement le niveau moral et l'observation des dix commandements. [...] Le fondement de l'État est nécessairement [...] l'éthique familiale<sup>24</sup>. »

Que signifie l'expression « christianisme social » ? La question est légitime, y apporter une réponse satisfaisante n'est pas une chose aisée. Du reste, cela exige une analyse de type historique. D'une part, il faut s'intéresser à l'évolution des relations entre l'Église et le prolétariat. Au cours du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, ces relations ont connu des difficultés, car l'Église a d'abord considéré l'industrialisation et ses conséquences comme un processus de sécularisation et d'appauvrissement du prolétariat. D'après l'Église, cet appauvrissement avait pour cause la disparition du système patriarcal. Conformément à ce diagnostic, le remède préconisé devait avoir pour seuls fondements la rechristianisation et la charité. C'est ainsi que la création de syndicats chrétiens (par exemples : l'Association des travailleurs catholiques ou les Syndicats professionnels chrétiens) était envisagé avec suspicion, ceux-là étant assimilés à « l'athéisme militant social-démocrate et à ses visées subversives<sup>25</sup>. »

Dans la terminologie hongroise, le concept de christianisme social à proprement parler remonte au début des années 1890, entre autre dans les textes d'Ottokár Prohászka<sup>26</sup>. Sur la base des analyses de Sándor Giesswein, on peut en résumer ainsi le contenu : il s'agit d'une orientation de la politique sociale dont le but, fondé sur l'éthique chrétienne, est de s'opposer aux injustices sociales liées à l'autoritarisme individualiste en préconisant des réformes sociales en vue d'un développement social sain. Dans une formule particulièrement frappante, Giesswein affirme que si la social-démocratie dit : ce qui est à toi est à moi, le fondement du christianisme social, au contraire, est : ce qui est à moi est à toi<sup>27</sup>. En 1921, dans un article de la revue *Nyugat*, Miksa Fenyő<sup>28</sup> a résumé ainsi le christianisme social de Giesswein : « chez [lui], le terme de christianisme social a valeur d'obligation apostolique : toutes les questions que posent actuellement l'évolution et la division de la société appartiennent au christianisme. L'individualisme sans frein est-il un danger perpétuel pour les masses ? L'organisation sociale des masses appartient au christianisme, qui est le rempart moral contre

la toute puissance de l'individu. Y a-t-il lutte des classes ? Si c'est le cas, le devoir du christianisme est de prendre position du côté des opprimés en confiant à ces derniers les armes du combat éthique. Ce n'est pas seulement une obligation ; cela ne peut être autrement. Il n'existe pas de pensée sociale qui ne nous soit parvenue à travers les conceptions chrétiennes<sup>29</sup>. »

Le mouvement chrétien social hongrois a commencé à se structurer au cours des premières années du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle, soit une quinzaine d'années après ceux d'Europe occidentale. En 1903, Giesswein donna l'impulsion aux premières associations chrétiennes sociales puis, en 1905, il prit la présidence d'une Fédération nationale des Associations chrétiennes sociales (*Keresztény Szociális Egyesületek Országos Szövetsége*). Jenő Gergely a attiré notre attention sur un fait important : c'est en 1905 que les membres des associations généralistes commencèrent à s'organiser en profession et qu'ainsi apparurent les « sections professionnelles » sur lesquels s'est plus tard développé de manière autonome le syndicalisme chrétien<sup>30</sup>.

Dans son numéro du 29 novembre 1905, le journal chrétien social *Igaz Szó* [« la parole de vérité »] rendit public un programme qui puisait largement dans la pensée de Giesswein. Parmi les 23 points avancés, on remarquera en particulier la déclaration de guerre contre la social-démocratie athée, accusée de priver les travailleurs de leur religion. Parmi les revendications politiques figurent le droit de vote universel, secret, direct et organisé à l'échelle de la commune, ainsi que « la garantie et la réglementation par la loi de la liberté de réunion<sup>31</sup>. »

La Fédération nationale des associations chrétiennes sociales fut transformée en parti politique en 1910, prenant le nom de Parti national chrétien socialiste (*Országos Keresztény Szocialista Párt*). Giesswein en fut dès le début le directeur exécutif, puis le président à partir de 1913. En 1910, il avait quitté le Parti catholique populaire (*Katolikus Néppárt*), qu'il considérait trop peu enthousiaste, notamment sur la revendication du suffrage universel. Cela n'empêcha pas les deux partis de fusionner en février 1918 en formant le Parti populaire chrétien social (*Keresztény Szociális Néppárt*), dont le président fut le comte Aladár Zichy, personnalité peu en vue sur le plan politique (cette formation politique allait bientôt être dissoute par la République des conseils). Il me semble important de mentionner ces questions institutionnelles, car elles mettent en évidence un trait déjà souligné chez Giesswein : pour lui, l'association à un parti politique n'était pas un but, mais un moyen. Miklós Nagy a exprimé cela d'une manière particulièrement bien choisie dans un album d'hommage paru en 1925 : « il est difficile à classer. Les politiciens hongrois se rangent habituellement en deux catégories bien distinctes : les premiers répondent à l'esprit de parti, les seconds sont imprégnés de droit public. Chez Giesswein, l'une comme l'autre de ces deux tendances étaient totalement absente. Pour ainsi dire, rien ne lui était plus étranger que les mesquineries de la politique politicienne<sup>32</sup>. »

Ses conceptions politiques se manifestent dans les discours qu'il allait prononcer à la Chambre au cours des années suivantes. Voyons quelques extraits marquants, jusqu'en 1918. En 1907, par exemple : « Si l'on se trouve en face d'une transformation politique, il est essentiel de consolider d'abord les fondements sociaux, mais, en face d'une évolution politique, il faut d'abord poser les bases du développement social.<sup>33</sup> » Pour Giesswein, l'idéal vers lequel devait tendre tout projet social est une société nationale forte et équilibrée, dont la colonne vertébrale est la classe moyenne et le principe fondamental le respect du travail. « Notre principale préoccupation doit être, pour ainsi dire, de procurer à l'État une classe moyenne saine, sereine et intellectuellement formée, pas au dépens de la classe inférieure, mais, au contraire, de sorte que des plus inférieures couches du prolétariat puisse émerger ladite classe moyenne<sup>34</sup>. » Parmi les membres de la classe moyenne, il évoquait notamment les petits industriels et artisans auquel l'État se devait d'apporter un soutien attentif. « Du point de vue de la nation hongroise – soulignait-il – ce serait selon moi un grand danger que les soi-disant petites gens, la grande masse, la colonne vertébrale de la nation, c'est-à-dire les petits industriels et artisans dont le rôle est d'être ensemble la source de l'indépendance nationale, ce serait un grand danger que ces petites gens viennent à disparaître ou à se prolétarianiser<sup>35</sup>. » Sur le droit de grève, il s'exprimait ainsi : « la grève est une question de pouvoir » contre laquelle doit être mise en place une organisation juste du travail à l'échelle nationale. Il importait selon lui d'éviter « autant que possible la nécessité de lutter », car « la justice ne viendrait pas du coup de poing, mais devait être décidée en vertu de principe éternel<sup>36</sup>. » Du reste, Giesswein ne faisait pas un secret sur le fait que « ses syndicats [chrétiens], peu structurés, étaient comme les troupes auxiliaires des véritables syndicats très structurés<sup>37</sup>. » Voici ce qu'il disait pourtant sur le rôle de la religion : « et puisque la religion est le facteur social le plus puissant, il est impensable qu'elle puisse être absente de l'éducation aux questions sociales<sup>38</sup>. » Giesswein rêvait d'un État dans lequel la conséquence du suffrage universel ne serait pas de précipiter la nation tout entière au niveau spirituel et moral des classes les plus nombreuses, mais, au contraire, d'élever les classes inférieures à un meilleur niveau intellectuel et moral. Il soulignait ainsi le fait que la démocratie ne peut perdurer que sur un fondement moral. Ailleurs, il disait : « là où le Parlement est élu sur une base la plus démocratique possible, [...] on a su mettre en application les exigences sociales du monde moderne. [...] le suffrage universel – écrit-il – est selon moi une garanti que la sensibilité sociale soit placée dans le contexte le plus étendu possible. Parce que j'admets que l'on conçoive de très bons programmes sociaux, mais il est encore plus impératif, pour leur mise en œuvre, de bénéficier du soutien de l'ensemble de la population<sup>39</sup>. » Sur la liberté, il s'exprimait ainsi : « toute liberté est bonne, à condition qu'elle réponde à certaines règles, en se gardant d'en faire des lois rigides<sup>40</sup>. » Sur la composition du parlement : « tout parlement



a nécessairement une aile conservatrice et une aile progressiste, c'est seulement ainsi que le développement peut être harmonieux<sup>41</sup>. » La solidité de l'union nationale n'était selon lui en aucune manière fondée sur la race, mais plutôt sur la culture, ainsi le facteur capital n'était-il pas la langue, mais le degré d'unification de la pensée au sein de la nation<sup>42</sup>. On pourrait continuer à citer, mais il me semble que ce florilège suffit à donner une idée assez complète de la pensée de Giesswein.

En 1917, Giesswein s'écarta de ses habitudes lorsqu'il préconisa l'alliance, non pas avec les démocrates libéraux, mais avec les sociaux-démocrates. La raison de ce retournement n'était autre que la lutte commune en faveur du suffrage universel et secret et pour une meilleure protection des travailleurs. D'autre part, cette même année, une plateforme d'un rapprochement possible avec les Radicaux était la condamnation de la guerre et la question de la paix<sup>43</sup>. L'ancien Premier ministre lui-même, István Tisza, avait ces paroles sévères au parlement : « [...] dans cette maison même, trouve-t-on des politiciens dont le regard est assez large et clairvoyant pour se rendre compte que l'avenir est bien là et qu'il est impossible à barrer ; qu'il dépend de la force résidant dans le peuple. Cette force crée elle-même son chemin et si la compréhension vient à manquer à son égard, elle risque de se frayer un chemin qui ne nous paraîtra pas souhaitable, un chemin qui, peut-être, passera par la violence<sup>44</sup>. » Ces paroles furent malheureusement prophétiques, puisqu'un an plus tard allaient se déchaîner les violences révolutionnaires et antirévolutionnaires.

Sur son engagement dans le Bloc pour le suffrage universel (*Választójogi Blokk*) en 1917, Giesswein eut l'occasion de s'expliquer auprès du Cardinal primat, Mgr János Csernoch : « j'ai parlé avec un responsable du Centrum à Berlin, qui dirigeait alors les affaires étrangères [il s'agit de Erzberger]. Il m'a dit : nous coopérons désormais avec le Parti social-démocrate et nous avons trouvé la bonne formule, qui pourra nous conduire jusqu'à la fin de la guerre. Il m'a encouragé à œuvrer en ce sens en Hongrie, au moyen de la coopération avec les groupes de gauche. C'est ainsi que j'ai finalement pris la décision d'entrer en contact avec les radicaux, les sociaux-démocrates et d'autres mouvements orientés à gauche<sup>45</sup>. »

Après l'échec de la République des conseils, Giesswein constata un tel dévoiement des idées chrétiennes sociales authentiques parmi les « nouveaux chrétiens » récemment convertis en masse qu'il renonça à joindre le Parti de l'union nationale chrétienne (*Keresztény Nemzeti Egyesülés Párt*). Il décida de fonder un nouveau parti et fut attaqué pour cela. On lui reprocha d'avoir ruiné l'union du camp chrétien. C'était notamment l'avis de Prohászka. D'ailleurs, on ne pardonnait pas à Giesswein d'avoir collaboré en pleine révolution avec les partis de gauche. Dans le *Lexicon catholique* dirigé par Béla Bangha, on peut lire : « à la fin de sa vie, il fit excès d'optimisme et, mû par sa bonne foi, il se rapprocha de certains cercles radicaux, ce que beaucoup lui reprochèrent<sup>46</sup>. »

En 1921, il justifiait ainsi son action politique : « La question sociale ne relève pas seulement de l'économie, elle doit aussi susciter la recherche d'une meilleure justice, elle est donc une question morale. C'est la plateforme sur laquelle se rencontrent le socialisme et le christianisme, et c'est sur cette plateforme que doivent s'entendre la sociale-démocratie et le christianisme, grâce à l'institution sociale la plus répandue dans le monde, la plus universelle et véritablement l'institution morale et religieuse la plus internationale, à savoir le catholicisme. Selon moi, seule une entente entre ces deux grands systèmes internationaux est en mesure de remettre en place le monde dérangé dans lequel nous nous trouvons. Le premier, c'est l'Église, qui reste une puissance considérable sur le plan moral. Le second, c'est la social-démocratie, dont l'organisation économique donnerait les moyens de consolider l'alliance des peuples. Nous constatons tous en effet que le monde capitaliste, militariste et diplomatique ne tient compte ni des idées du Pape Benoît XV, ni de celles du président Wilson. C'est ainsi qu'ont été signés les traités de paix à Versailles et à Saint-Germain et surtout ceux de Neuilly et de Trianon. L'idée de droit des peuples a été développée par le Pape, de même que par l'organisation permanente de la paix à la Haye ou les conférences sociale-démocrates de Stockholm et de Zimmerwald. Il leur suffirait de s'entendre pour que la paix entre les peuples soit<sup>47</sup>. »

L'isolement dans lequel tomba Giesswein au sein de l'Église se mesure à la perte de sa position de président de l'Académie de Saint Étienne. Depuis 1903, il était vice-président de la Société de Saint-Étienne. En 1915, il avait proposé la fondation de l'Académie du même nom, dont il avait obtenu la présidence l'année suivante. L'Académie était divisée en quatre sections qui organisaient des soirées de lecture données par des sommités de diverses disciplines. En 1921, trente membres de l'Académie déposèrent une motion de censure contre Giesswein. « [Ses] éminentes qualités – disaient-ils – ont largement contribué à la fondation et au rayonnement de l'Académie. De même, au cours des quelques dernières dizaines d'années, il a considérablement concouru aux activités des mouvements du catholicisme hongrois dans les domaines scientifiques, sociaux, religieux et politiques, à travers son action inépuisable, tant sur le plan personnelle que littéraire, tant sur le plan intérieur qu'à l'étranger. Pourtant, au cours des dernières années, au sein de la vie publique (en dehors du ressort de l'Académie), il a émis de nombreuses fois des avis qui, tant du point de vue catholique que du sentiment et de l'intérêt national, s'écartent des convictions de la majorité des membres de l'Académie<sup>48</sup>. » Par conséquent, ils demandaient à Giesswein de se démettre de son titre de président. Ce que l'intéressé refusa de faire. Dès lors, on considéra que la chaise du président était vide, non sans déclarer que « l'on garderait avec estime et gratitude le souvenir des discours riches en idées et de l'infatigable activité déployée par l'ancien président dans l'intérêt de notre Académie<sup>49</sup>. » Son successeur, Albert Apponyi,<sup>50</sup> fut intronisé le 19 juin 1921 en présence du régent

Miklós Horthy en personne. Après 1920, Giesswein s'exprima peu à la Chambre. En 1923, il prit la tête d'un parti libéral-démocrate, le Parti de la réforme (*Reformpárt*), il signifiait ainsi sa rupture définitive avec la politique chrétienne conservatrice. La même année, il passa.

En guise de synthèse, on peut affirmer que le mérite de Giesswein est d'avoir posé les bases des idées du christianisme social en Hongrie. Jusqu'en 1918, il fut le seul représentant à la Chambre considérant comme relevant de son mandat de s'occuper du sort des « petites gens » (les sociaux-démocrates n'étaient pas présents au parlement !). Après 1919, il resta attaché à la conception d'"alliance" (d'après l'exemple allemand), selon laquelle il n'existait pas de solution à la question ouvrière sans la social-démocratie, cela en dépit de la participation du parti social-démocrate à la République des conseils. Il ne peut pas être tenu responsable du fait qu'après 1920, le « cursus chrétien » en cours de consolidation n'adopta pas une politique accordant plus d'attention à la question ouvrière et à la représentation des intérêts des ouvriers.

Après la deuxième guerre mondiale, István Barankovics (1906–1974)<sup>51</sup> fut celui qui allait relancer les principes chrétiens-sociaux – démocrates chrétiens dans le jeu politique hongrois. Dans son discours de campagne pour le Parti démocrate populaire (*Demokrata Néppárt*), en 1947, il prononça les paroles suivantes : « ce n'est pas un hasard si le Parti populaire a levé son drapeau dans la ville de Győr. C'est ici que sont nées la pensée politique du christianisme social moderne et la démocratie chrétienne, au tournant du siècle par la grâce d'un prêtre extraordinaire, le premier apôtre hongrois d'une mise en pratique de l'évangile sociale, le héraut en Europe centrale de la démocratie chrétienne moderne, défenseur du pacifisme, fondateur du premier syndicat chrétien hongrois, le précurseur et le héros tragique de la politique démocratique et chrétienne : Sándor Giesswein. Cette source véritable de toute politique chrétienne moderne, démocratique et sociale en Hongrie, dans laquelle nous voulons nous immerger, a jailli pour la première fois à Győr. Il n'est donc que justice que nous lancions notre premier appel dans cette ville, là où le premier prédicateur s'est élevé. Et en cela nous rendons hommage à celui qui a précocement représenté l'esprit de la démocratie chrétienne et du socialisme évangélique, œuvre pour laquelle il n'a été que trop tardivement reconnu<sup>52</sup>. »

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J'ai commencé avec, en guise de *motto*, une pensée de Saint Augustin : « aussi est-ce autre chose de raconter les choses qui sont déjà faites, et d'enseigner celles que l'on doit faire. L'histoire raconte fidèlement et utilement les choses faites et passées<sup>53</sup>. » En complément de cette pensée augustinienne, dont le thème est l'interprétation de l'histoire, et en guise de conclusion, je citerai Giesswein, sur le

même sujet : « en ce qui concerne l'écriture de l'histoire, je ne reconnais qu'une seule règle, celle d'être avant tout objectif, mais de manière à ne jamais cesser d'être subjectif. Et ne croyez pas qu'il y ait là un paradoxe, même si cela y ressemble de prime abord, ou lorsque l'on ne poursuit pas profondément la réflexion. Il faut être objectif dans l'écriture de l'histoire, car il faut éviter de corrompre les faits ou de donner à ces derniers un éclairage trompeur ; il n'est pas permis d'insérer parmi les événements des éléments imaginaires, il s'agit de relater l'histoire et non de la construire librement. Au demeurant, il importe aussi que l'écriture de l'histoire soit subjective. Retirons à l'artiste la subjectivité et il cesse d'être un artiste [...]. Que l'objectivité ne s'impose pas au détriment de la subjectivité. »<sup>54</sup>

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Première publication en hongrois : *Iustum Aequum Salutare*, XI, 2013/3, pp. 253–264
- <sup>2</sup> Ottokár Prohászka, évêque de Székesfehérvár, suscite régulièrement des discussions tant parmi les historiens que dans la vie publique. Son historiographie est riche. Voir, dans ce volume, la contribution de Ferenc Szabó SJ. Chaque année, le diocèse de Székesfehérvár organise une commémoration à l'occasion de l'anniversaire de sa mort. Les allocutions prononcées sont publiées. Le volume pour 2012 donne une longue bibliographie. Voir : Gergely Mózessy (dir.), *Prohászka-tanulmányok, 2009-2012*. A Székesfehérvári Egyházmegye Prohászka konferenciáinak előadásai. [Etudes sur Prohászka, 2009–2012. Textes des conférences du diocèse de Székesfehérvár sur Prohászka], Székesfehérvár, Editions des archives de l'évêché de Székesfehérvár et de Székeskáptalan, 2012. En outre : Szilágyi Csaba, « „Pro libertate”, Prohászka Ottokár beszéde a magyar ifjúsághoz II. Rákóczi Ferenc újratemetésekor, 1906. október 29-én » [« Pro libertate », Le discours de Prohászka à la jeunesse à l'occasion de la réinhumation de François II Rákóczi, 29 octobre 1906], in *Prohászka-tanulmányok... op. cit.*, pp. 242–249 ; sur Béla Bangha, voir un article récent : Molnár Antal – Szabó Ferenc SJ, « Bangha Béla SJ emlékezete » [En souvenir de Bangha Béla SJ], *Távlatok*, 2010/3–4, Budapest, 2010. En outre : Szilágyi Csaba, « *Bangha Béla, a sajtóapostol* » [Bangha Béla, l'apôtre de la presse], in Molnár Antal – Szilágyi Csaba (dir.), *Múlt és jövő. A magyar jezsuiták száz éve (1909–2009) és ami abból következik* [Le passé et l'avenir. Le centenaire des jésuites hongrois (1909–2009), et leur œuvre], [Jubileumi konferencia, Budapest, 16-17 octobre 2009], Budapest, METEM Könyvek-73, 2010, pp. 51–65.
- <sup>3</sup> Un livre de Giesswein porte un titre similaire : *Új idők küszöbén. Társadalombölcseleti elmélkedés* [Au seuil des temps nouveaux. Réflexions philosophiques sur la société], Budapest, 1918.
- <sup>4</sup> J'exprime ici mes remerciements à Monsieur l'archiabbé de Pannonhalma, Asztrik Várszegi, qui m'a permis de consulter le manuscrit. J'étends ma gratitude, pour leur aide généreuse, aux responsables de la bibliothèques et des archives de l'abbaye : Madame Ilona Ásványi, directrice adjointe, Madame Éva Józsefné Hegedűs, bibliothécaire, et Monsieur Tamás Dénesi, directeur des archives. Le manuscrit existe en plusieurs exemplaires. Aux archives : un exemplaire dans les papiers légués par Gyula Jánosi. À la bibliothèque : un exemplaire réparti dans trois boîtes déposées par Gyula Jánosi. Deux versions tapuscrites sont également disponibles. Les fiches indiquent les références suivantes. Pour le manuscrit : BK 873/IV. 3. Pour les tapuscrits : BK 873/V. 3.

- <sup>5</sup> Ákos Mihályfi OCist (1862–1937), professeur universitaire de théologie.
- <sup>6</sup> La revue *Auróra*, fondée en 1919, était un hebdomadaire de vulgarisation sur des sujets ayant trait à la société et à la science (littérature, arts, politique et politique sociale, vie religieuse, éducation, question féminine, santé, économie, industrie, commerce, vie internationale). La « revue de la démocratie hongroise » fut dirigée par Sándor Giesswein jusqu'en 1923. Ensuite, par Dezső Szabó. Voir: [http://www.kosztolanyioldal.hu/sites/default/files/55\\_biblio-kd-3.pdf](http://www.kosztolanyioldal.hu/sites/default/files/55_biblio-kd-3.pdf) (dernière consultation : 18 août 2012).
- <sup>7</sup> Gergely Jenő, « Giesswein Sándor és a szocialista kapitalizmus » [Sándor Giesswein et le capitalisme socialiste], *Világosság*, 15, n°10, 1974, pp. 624–633.
- <sup>8</sup> Ervin Szabó (Ármin Schönfeld) (1877–1918) : sociologue, bibliothécaire. Membre depuis 1900 du Parti social-démocrate (MSZDP), il s'en écarta à partir de 1905 et se rapprocha progressivement de l'anarcho-syndicalisme.  
Voir : *Akadémiai kislexikon 2*, Beck Mihály et Peschka Vilmos (dir.), Budapest, 1990, p. 642 ; Zsigmond Kunfi (1879–1929) : politicien social-démocrate, membre du comité du MSZDP, représentant le plus éminent de la tendance dite centriste. Voir : *Akadémiai kislexikon 1 ... op. cit.*, p. 1038.
- <sup>9</sup> *A Győri Czuczor Gergely Bencés Gimnázium Jubileumi Évkönyve* [Album jubilaire du lycée...], sous la direction du directeur, Bánhegyi Miksa, Győr, 1977, pp. 77., 78.
- <sup>10</sup> Szilágyi Csaba (dir.), *Szociális kérdések és mozgalmak Magyarországon, 1919–1945* [La question sociale et les mouvements sociaux en Hongrie, 1919-1945], Budapest, Faludi Ferenc Akadémia sorozata, Agora VI, 2008 ; Gergely Jenő, *A keresztényszocializmus a legújabb kutatások tükrében*. in: *Szociális kérdések... i. m.* 79–97.
- <sup>11</sup> Szolnoky Erzsébet, *Szociális igazságosság és keresztény szeretet. Giesswein Sándor a magyar keresztényszociális és kereszténydemokrata gondolkodás megalapozója* [La justice sociale et la charité chrétienne. Giesswein Sándor en tant que fondateur de la pensée chrétienne sociale et démocrate chrétienne en Hongrie], Budapest, 2003.
- <sup>12</sup> László T. László, *Egyház és állam Magyarországon 1919–1945* [L'Eglise et l'Etat en Hongrie de 1919 à 1945], Budapest, 2005. Parmi les plus importantes ressources : *Giesswein-émlékkönyv*. Kiadja az országos Emlékmű-bizottság [Homage à Giesswein. Edition du Comité national d'hommage], Budapest, 1925 ; Gergely Jenő, « Giesswein Sándor a törvényhozásban (1905–1923) » [Giesswein Sándor et l'activité législative (1903-1925)], in Szabó B. István (dir.), *Kenyeres Zoltán-émlékkönyv. Értés – megértés* [Homage à Kenyeres Zoltán. Les deux sens de la compréhension.] Budapest, 2004, pp. 92–107 ; Idem, « Giesswein Sándor, a politikus » [Giesswein Sándor le politicien] in *Demokrácia – Kereszténység – Humanizmus. Giesswein Sándor a modern kereszténység előfutára* [Démocratie – christianisme – humanisme. Giesswein Sándor comme précurseur du christianisme moderne], Budapest, 1994, pp. 29–41 (*Kereszténység és közélet sorozat*) [Série Christianisme et vie publique] ; Kern Tamás, *Giesswein Sándor társadalompolitikai tevékenysége* [L'action politique et sociale de Giesswein Sándor], *Köz-politika*, janvier 2002, pp. 35–50 ; Sarnyai Csaba Máté, « A szociális kérdés és a világi hívek szerepe az egyházban Prohászka Ottokár és Giesswein Sándor értelmezésében » [La question sociale et le rôle des laïcs dans l'Eglise selon Prohászka Ottokár és Giesswein Sándor] in *Szociális kérdések és mozgalmak Magyarországon ...* [La question sociale et les mouvements sociaux...] op. cit., pp. 163–178.
- <sup>13</sup> Les références du présent travail sont toutes imprimées, mais les discours à la Chambre sont aussi disponibles sur le site de la bibliothèque du Parlement <http://mpgy.ogyk.hu/>.
- <sup>14</sup> Il s'agit de la révolution d'octobre, dite des « chrysanthèmes » (1918), et de la République des conseils (1919), suivies par la régence de l'amiral Horthy.
- <sup>15</sup> Pour une biographie en détail de Giesswein, voir l'ouvrage de Szolnoky. Une version de Péter Kozák, plus brève, mais informative, est disponible sur le *Tudósportál* (conçu conjointement

par le Centre de recherche sur la société et l'Institut de soutien logistique aux centres de recherche de l'Académie des sciences hongroise. Responsables : Margit Balogh et Márton Tolnai). <http://www.tudosportal.hu/egy.php?id=4709>. Notons que la rubrique « mémoire » donne de nombreuses indications sur le « culte de Giesswein » jusqu'à ce jour.

- <sup>16</sup> On a fêté en 2011 le 120<sup>e</sup> anniversaire de la publication de l'encyclique *Rerum novarum*. À cette occasion, la chaire de droit et d'administration publique de l'Université catholique Pázmány Péter a publié un volume d'études : Tóth Tihamér (dir.), *120 éves a Rerum novarum*. Tanulmánykötet [Le 120<sup>e</sup> anniversaire de *Rerum novarum*], Budapest, A Pázmány Péter Katolikus Egyetem jog- és Államtudományi Karának Könyvei. Tanulmányok 11., 2012. Ce volume s'intéresse en particulier aux aspects juridiques de l'encyclique et à son impact sur la société jusqu'à ce jour. Notamment : Szilágyi Csaba, « A magyar szociálpolitika és a pauperizmus a *Rerum novarum* és a *Quadragesimo anno* korában » [La question sociale et le paupérisme en Hongrie au temps de *Rerum novarum* et de *Quadragesimo anno*, pp. 125–137].
- <sup>17</sup> *Munkáskérdés és socialismus*, Írta Dr. Reischl Károly Vilmos a müncheni egyetem volt r. tanára. Tudományos szakmunkák nyomán átdolgozta a Budapesti Központi Növendékpapság Magyar Egyházirodalmi Iskolája, Budapest, 1876 [La question ouvrière et le socialisme, par le Dr. Károly Vilmos Reischl, ancien professeur de l'université de Munich. Adaptation d'un ouvrage scientifique par l'École de littérature religieuse hongroise du grand séminaire de Budapest].
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 338..
- <sup>19</sup> Nagy Miklós, « Giesswein Sándor mint politikus » [Sándor Giesswein comme politicien], in *Giesswein-emlékkönyv ...* [Hommage à Giesswein...], op. cit., p. 227 (discours prononcé le 27 juin 1911).
- <sup>20</sup> Reischl, *Munkáskérdés...* [La question ouvrière], op. cit., p. 316. Sur Ketteler, voir Kern Tamás, *Giesswein...* op. cit., p. 40.
- <sup>21</sup> Giesswein Sándor, *Keresztény szociális törekvések a társadalmi és gazdasági életben* [Le projet chrétien social dans la vie sociale et économique], Budapest, 1913. Cet ouvrage est accessible en ligne : [http://www.fszek.hu/mtda/Giesswein-Keresztenyszocialis\\_torekvesek.pdf](http://www.fszek.hu/mtda/Giesswein-Keresztenyszocialis_torekvesek.pdf) (dernière consultation: 18 août 2012) Szolnoky Erzsébet a écrit que cet ouvrage est le mâtore de Giesswein. (Szolnoky, *Szociális...* op. cit., p. 74).
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 40–57.
- <sup>23</sup> Giesswein Sándor, *Keresztény ...* op. cit., pp. 57–76.
- <sup>24</sup> Szolnoky Erzsébet, *Szociális ...* op. cit., pp. 77–78.
- <sup>25</sup> *Egyháztörténeti lexikon 2.* [Lexikon d'histoire de l'Eglise], Budapest, 2009, pp. 923–924.
- <sup>26</sup> László T. László, *Egyház ...* op. cit., p. 52
- <sup>27</sup> Giesswein Sándor, *Keresztény...* op. cit., p. 1.
- <sup>28</sup> Miksa Fenyő (1877–1972) : critique, rédacteur, juriste, un des fondateurs de *Nyugat*. Voir : <http://www.pim.hu/object.02526c2b-fd6b-452a-9499-3f7711e273e9.ivy>
- <sup>29</sup> Fenyő Miksa, « Giesswein Sándor », *Nyugat*, 1921/8. (16 avril) <http://epa.oszk.hu/00000/00022/nyugat.htm> (dernière consultation: 18 août 2012)
- <sup>30</sup> Gergely Jenő, *A keresztényszocializmus ...* [Le christianisme social], op. cit., p. 80.
- <sup>31</sup> László T. László, *Egyház...* [l'Eglise...], op. cit., pp. 54–59.
- <sup>32</sup> Nagy Miklós, *Giesswein...* op. cit., p. 221.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 223 (discours du 16 mai 1907).
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 223–224 (discours du 5 juillet 1906).
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 224 (discours du 1<sup>er</sup> décembre 1906)
- <sup>36</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 224.
- <sup>37</sup> *Ibidem*.
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 227 (discours du 2 mai 1914).

- <sup>39</sup> Gergely Jenő, *Giesswein S., a politikus ...* [Giesswein S. politicien], op. cit., p. 31 (discours du 19 mai 1906).
- <sup>40</sup> Nagy Miklós, *Giesswein...*, op. cit., p. 230 (discours du 15 décembre 1913).
- <sup>41</sup> Ibidem, p. 230 (discours du 27 janvier 1912).
- <sup>42</sup> Ibidem, p. 230 (discours du 18 décembre 1911).
- <sup>43</sup> Giesswein est devenu en 1915 membre du Comité exécutif de l'organisation pour la paix perpétuelle dont le siège était à Bern. Voir : <http://lexikon.katolikus.hu/G/Giesswein.html> (dernière consultation le 19 août 2012).
- <sup>44</sup> László T. László, *Egyház ...* op. cit., p. 91.
- <sup>45</sup> Gergely Jenő, *Giesswein S., a politikus...* op. cit., p. 35.
- <sup>46</sup> László T. László, *Egyház...* op. cit., p. 146 (adn. 71).
- <sup>47</sup> Mihályfi Ákos, « Giesswein Sándor emlékezete » [en souvenir de Sándor Giesswein], in *Giesswein-emlékkönyv ...*, op. cit., pp. 36–37.
- <sup>48</sup> Mészáros István, *A Szent István Társulat százötven éve 1848-1998* [Le cent cinquantième de la Société de Saint Etienne 1848-1998], Budapest, pp. 148–149.
- <sup>49</sup> Ibidem.
- <sup>50</sup> Apponyi Albert (1846–1933) : président du parlement entre 1901 et 1903. Ministre de l'éducation et des cultes entre 1906 et 1910 puis en 1917 et 1918. Voir : *Akadémiai kislexikon* 1... op. cit., p. 110.
- <sup>51</sup> István Barankovics (1906–1974) : journaliste, homme politique chrétien démocrate, président du Parti démocrate populaire de 1945 jusqu'à la dissolution du parti en 1949. Voir : *Akadémiai kislexikon* 1... op. cit. p. 183.
- <sup>52</sup> Szakolczai György – Szabó Róbert, *Két kísérlet a proletárdiktatúra elhárítására*. Barankovics és a DNP 1945–1948, Bibó és a DNP 1956 [Deux tentatives contre la dictature du prolétariat, Barankovics en 1945-1948 et Bibó en 1956], Budapest, 2011, p. 313. (voir le programme : pp. 291–313.)
- <sup>53</sup> Pour ce motto, je suis redevable à Csóka J. Lajos OSB : *Szent Benedek fiainak világtörténete, különös tekintettel Magyarországra*, I–II., [Histoire mondiale des fils de Saint Benoît. Accent sur la Hongrie], Budapest, 1970, I., köt., 10–11.
- <sup>54</sup> *A szabad tanítás Pécsen 1907-ben tartott magyar országos kongresszusának naplója* [Compte-rendu du congrès sur l'enseignement libre organisé à Pécs en 1907], Vörösváry Ferenc (dir.), Budapest, 1908, p. 173.